The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare: Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood (Contributions to International Relations) [1st ed. 2021] 3030739546, 9783030739546

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Contents
Contributors
Introduction: The Russian Federation and New Challenges of Modern Warfare
References
Concept of Information Warfare and Foreign Policy Tools of the Russian Federation
Global Knowledge Warfare, Strategic Imagination, Uncertainty, and Fear
1 Introduction
2 Strategic Imagination as an Assessment Method in Global Knowledge Warfare
3 The Role of Strategic Narratives in Global Knowledge Warfare
4 Global Knowledge Warfare and Its Clusters
5 Cultures of Uncertainty, Fear, and Irrational Response
6 Knowledge Warriors and Their Weapons
7 COVID-19 Pandemic and Global Knowledge Warfare
8 Key Methods of Knowledge Warfare
9 Conclusion
References
Synthetic Media and Information Warfare: Assessing Potential Threats
1 Introduction
2 Information Warfare Russia Style: Reflexive Control and Epistemic Anarchy
3 Deepfakes and the New Frontier of Digital Forgery
4 Extended Reality and Synthetic Surroundings
5 Virtual Influencers: Synthetic Humans Promoting Synthetic Things?
6 Conclusion
References
Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe: Goals, Means and Measures
1 Introduction
2 What Does Russia Want in Europe?
3 Strategic Communication and Russian Foreign Policy
4 Three Case Studies of Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe
4.1 Narrative 1: The West is Irresponsible and Aggressive
4.2 Narrative 2: Historical Break
4.3 Narrative 3: Discord Among NATO Countries
4.4 Narrative 4: Discord Within NATO and/or EU Countries
4.5 Narrative 5: The US Is Dictating Solutions to European Countries
4.6 Narrative 6: Brexit Is Part of a Transnational People’s Uprising Against Elites
4.7 Narrative 7: The UK Is in Political Turmoil
4.8 Narrative 8: The UK is Losing Power and Position in International Affairs
4.9 General Conclusions from the Narrative Analysis
5 Conclusions
References
Mass Media Instrumentalization in Foreign Policy of States: Russian Strategic Toolset
1 Introduction
2 Typological Scheme: Soft Power Paradigm
2.1 Roots
2.2 Conception and Mechanisms
2.3 Means of Implementation
2.4 Goals
2.5 Narrative Structure
3 Typological Scheme: Information Warfare Paradigm
3.1 Roots
3.2 Conception and Mechanisms
3.3 Means of Implementation
3.4 Goals
3.5 Narrative Structure
4 Discussion
References
The Russian Doctrine—A Way for the Political Elite to Maximise the Efficiency of Information Warfare
1 Introduction
2 The Russian Theory (Philosophy) for Waging War
2.1 Russia is Always Right
3 War is Forever
4 The State Fights a War
5 Centralisation, Coordination, and Synchronisation are Essential
6 Russian New War-Waging System, Led by the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC)
7 The C4I as an Enabler
8 In Addition to the Military
9 Conclusion
References
Propaganda Gone Viral: A Theory of Chinese and Russian “COVID Diplomacy” in the Age of Social Media
1 Introduction
2 Diplomacy and Information Operations in the Age of COVID
3 The Seeds of Distrust
4 Science Versus Populism
5 Cognition and Heuristics
6 A Theory of Revisionist States’ Propaganda
7 To Deflect, Suspect and Reject
8 Sowing Doubt
9 Chinese Preemptive COVID Public Diplomacy
10 A Strategic Narrative of Abandonment
11 Overreach in COVID Diplomacy
12 More Targeted, but Less Precise: Moscow’s Ambitions
13 Revisionist States and the Culture of Nihilism
14 Conclusions
References
Influence Operations, Hybrid Warfare and Technological Awareness
The Russian Influence Strategy in Its Contested Neighbourhood
1 Introduction
2 Information Warfare: Definition and Scope
3 The Russian Information Strategy
4 The Nationalist Discourse and the Pro-Russia Narrative
5 Conclusions
References
The Hybrid Arsenal of Russia’s War Against the Democratic World
1 Introduction
2 Crimea 2014: A Rude Awakening
3 Fake News and the Fate of States
4 MH17: The Deluge of Disinformation
5 Sowing the Seeds of Discord
6 Fighting Back
References
Information aggression—A Battlefield of Smartphones
1 Introduction
2 Why the Smartphone Matters
3 Information as Aggression?
4 There is a Troll in My Pocket
5 Banning as the Easy Way Out?
6 Freedom or Security?
7 So, Is There Nothing We Can Do?
8 Concluding Remarks
References
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the International Humanitarian Law. Case Study: Russia
1 Introduction
2 Core Principles of IHL and Lethal UAVs
2.1 Military Necessity
2.2 Distinction
2.3 Proportionality
2.4 Preventing Unnecessary Suffering
3 History of UAVs in Russia and Current Developments
3.1 Class I
3.2 Class II
3.3 Class III
4 Case Studies About Russian Practice
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Hybrid Situational Awareness Against Cyber-Attacks
1 Introduction
2 The Operational Environment
3 Hybrid Situational Awareness
4 Cyber-Attacks on Critical Infrastructures Attributed to Russia
5 Conclusion
References
European Union Strategy and Capabilities to Counter Hostile Influence Operations
1 Introduction
2 Setting the Scene
3 The EU as an Aspiring Actor in the Information Security Domain
4 European Endowment for Democracy
5 European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services and EUvsDisinfo
5.1 ERGA
5.2 EUvsDisinfo
6 Conclusion
References
Strategic Environment and Interpretation of History in Kremlin’s Influence Operations
Russia’s Strategic Blame Narratives: Comparative Analysis of Domestic and International Media Coverage About 5G
1 Introduction
2 Understanding Strategic Narratives and the Construction of Blame
2.1 System Narratives, Identity Narratives and Policy Narratives
2.2 Blame Narratives
3 Background and Data
3.1 Chinese and Huawei’s 5G Technology as a Security Threat
3.2 Russian State-Funded Media Outlets
4 Analysis: Discourses of Blame in Russia’s Strategic Narratives About 5G
5 US Is Blamed for Spreading 5G-Related Misinformation
5.1 Anglophone Media Coverage
5.2 Russophone Media Coverage
6 The United States Is Accused of Hypocrisy
6.1 Anglophone Media Coverage
6.2 Russophone Media Coverage
7 The United States Is Being Accused of Pressuring Its Allies to Stop Them Collaborating with Chinese 5G Technology Companies
7.1 Anglophone Media Coverage
7.2 Russophone Media Coverage
8 Allies Blame US for Pressuring Them to Cut Ties with Chinese 5G Technology
8.1 Anglophone Media Coverage
8.2 Russophone Media Coverage
9 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Russian Influence Campaigns Against NATO in the Baltic Region: Spread of Chaos and Divide et Impera
1 Introduction
2 What Are Influence Campaigns?
3 Russia’s Influence Campaigns
4 The Baltic Rim: Russia’s Barrier Against NATO
5 Russian Influence Operations in the Baltic Region
5.1 Ukraine
5.2 Estonia
5.3 Lithuania
5.4 Latvia
5.5 Sweden
5.6 Finland
6 Conclusion
References
Russia in the Western Balkans: Interests and Tools of Influence
1 Introduction
2 The Western Balkans in the Russian Geopolitics
3 The Power of the Church and the Protection of the Slavs
4 The Weapon of Misinformation and Subversion
5 The Geopolitics of Energy
6 Conclusions
References
Russia’s Strategy for Influence Operations Through Public Diplomacy: The Romanian Case
1 Introduction
2 Russia’s Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of Influence Operations on Foreign Public Opinion
3 The Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest as Instrument of Russian Influence Operations on Romanian Society
4 Conclusion
References
Battles for History. ‘Combats Pour l’histoire’ as the Elements of Russian Information Warfare. Ukrainian Case
1 Introduction
2 Historiography
3 History as a Weapon. Ukrainian Case
3.1 The Heritage of Ancient Rus is Russian
3.2 Ukrainian People Are Judeophobes
3.3 Ukraine Is Not a State
3.4 Divided Country
3.5 Common History and Historical Brotherhood
3.6 Holodomor Denial and an Apology for Stalin’s Modernization
3.7 The Great Victory and Collaboration, Brothers and Enemies
3.8 The Artificiality of Ukraine/Ukrainians
4 Putin’s New History Policy
5 How to Answer This New-Old Challenge?
6 Conclusions
References
Interpretation of Historical Facts in Documentary Movies About the Occupation of Lithuania in 1940 by Soviet Troops
1 Introduction
2 Safety as an Essential Need of Society: The Art of Survival
3 Exploiting the Needs of Society: The Art of Persuasion
4 Soft Power Versus Hard Power
5 The Search for Historical Truth: Key Concepts, Institutions and Interpretation
6 Occupation Without Mercy: A Case Study
7 Conclusion
References
Between History and Propaganda: Estonia and Latvia in Russian Historical Narratives
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical Framework
3 Official Kremlin
4 Academic Historiography
5 Politicized Historical Projects
6 Russian Media
7 Summary
References

Citation preview

Contributions to International Relations

Holger Mölder · Vladimir Sazonov · Archil Chochia · Tanel Kerikmäe Editors

The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16658

Holger Mölder · Vladimir Sazonov · Archil Chochia · Tanel Kerikmäe Editors

The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood

Editors Holger Mölder Tallinn University of Technology Tallinn, Estonia

Vladimir Sazonov Estonian Military Academy Tartu, Estonia

Archil Chochia Tallinn University of Technology Tallinn, Estonia

Tanel Kerikmäe Tallinn University of Technology Tallinn, Estonia

Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-73954-6 ISBN 978-3-030-73955-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Fourteen years ago, Estonia was the target of what some call the first strategic cyberattack in history. Over a 3-week period, my country—one of Europe’s most wired nations—was paralysed by a series of DDoS attacks against its government, emergency services, media agencies and financial institutions. These attacks were accompanied by disinformation operations. In 2007, I was Estonian Ambassador to Russia and witnessed first-hand not only propaganda campaigns against my country but also against me personally. 2007 marked a watershed moment in the use of state-sanctioned cyberattacks to advance foreign policy goals: for the first time in the history of mankind, cyberworld was used by one nation against another. It also introduced a model for conflict in cyberspace fought by proxy to retain a degree of plausible deniability. Conflicts between states are taking new forms, and cyberspace is likely to play a leading role in this newly volatile environment. Behind this backdrop lies the concern that a catastrophic cyber exchange between nation states could occur. In recent years, this threat has often been described as a major threat in national security threat assessments. New hybrid methods of warfare have emerged. The use of social media and online platforms has also taken information operations to a completely new level. The exposure of citizens to disinformation is a major challenge to all democratic countries. It can polarise debates, create or deepen tensions in society, undermine electoral systems and thus have a wider impact on European and international security. It also impairs freedom of opinion and expression—one of the fundamental human rights. Therefore, cyberspace is becoming an increasingly exploited resource that few feel compelled to take responsibility for, leading to a steady decay of the stability and security of the entire environment itself. Despite states’ traditional dominance over all questions related to international peace and security, its role within the overall cyberspace ecosystem is limited. After all, the Internet is governed by a complex ecosystem of stakeholders, each with its own set of standards, norms, rules and processes. Governments alone cannot decide on all aspects of cyberspace—a space in which civil society writes much of the key

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code, the private sector owns nearly all the digital and physical assets and digital platforms are rising. Cyberworld came to stay with all its benefits and challenges. Nobody questions anymore that cyberattacks and fake news are a new normality. Even more, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates very clearly how vulnerable we all are not only to cyberattacks but also to disinformation campaigns. This does not mean that we should do nothing. On the contrary—we have to be vocal and we have to take all necessary means to stop those who hack our democracy and challenge our values, both offline and online. The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare: Influence Operations in Europe and its Neighbourhood not only raises many timely and topical questions but also elaborates and provides lots of food for thought. Marina Kaljurand Member of the European Parliament and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia (2015-2016)

Acknowledgments

This volume is supported by the research project “Strategic Narrative as a Model for Reshaping the Security Dilemma” of the Estonian Military Academy.

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Contents

Introduction: The Russian Federation and New Challenges of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov, Archil Chochia, and Tanel Kerikmäe

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Concept of Information Warfare and Foreign Policy Tools of the Russian Federation Global Knowledge Warfare, Strategic Imagination, Uncertainty, and Fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Holger Mölder and Eric Shiraev

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Synthetic Media and Information Warfare: Assessing Potential Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ignas Kalpokas and Julija Kalpokiene

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Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe: Goals, Means and Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jakub M. Godzimirski

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Mass Media Instrumentalization in Foreign Policy of States: Russian Strategic Toolset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tomáš Mareš

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The Russian Doctrine—A Way for the Political Elite to Maximise the Efficiency of Information Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Daivis Petraitis Propaganda Gone Viral: A Theory of Chinese and Russian “COVID Diplomacy” in the Age of Social Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Noel Foster

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Influence Operations, Hybrid Warfare and Technological Awareness The Russian Influence Strategy in Its Contested Neighbourhood . . . . . . . 149 Marco Marsili The Hybrid Arsenal of Russia’s War Against the Democratic World . . . . 173 Evhen Tsybulenko and Aleksi Kajander Information aggression—A Battlefield of Smartphones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Katrin Nyman Metcalf Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the International Humanitarian Law. Case Study: Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Marek Kohv and Archil Chochia Hybrid Situational Awareness Against Cyber-Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 David Antunes and Manuel Esteve European Union Strategy and Capabilities to Counter Hostile Influence Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Ramon Loik and Victor Madeira Strategic Environment and Interpretation of History in Kremlin’s Influence Operations Russia’s Strategic Blame Narratives: Comparative Analysis of Domestic and International Media Coverage About 5G . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Andreas Ventsel, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Sten Hansson Russian Influence Campaigns Against NATO in the Baltic Region: Spread of Chaos and Divide et Impera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Pnina Shuker and Lev Topor Russia in the Western Balkans: Interests and Tools of Influence . . . . . . . . 315 Marco Cruz Russia’s Strategy for Influence Operations Through Public Diplomacy: The Romanian Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Constantin Hlihor and Ecaterina Hlihor Battles for History. ‘Combats Pour l’histoire’ as the Elements of Russian Information Warfare. Ukrainian Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Yevhen Mahda and Tetiana Vodotyka Interpretation of Historical Facts in Documentary Movies About the Occupation of Lithuania in 1940 by Soviet Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 Gediminas Buciunas Between History and Propaganda: Estonia and Latvia in Russian Historical Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 Vladimir Sazonov, Sergii Pakhomenko, and Igor Kopytin

Contributors

David Antunes Portuguese Army, Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain Gediminas Buciunas Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania; Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Archil Chochia TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Marco Cruz Centro de Investigaço e Desenvolvimento, Instituto Universitário Militar, Lisboa, Portugal Manuel Esteve Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain Noel Foster Princeton University, Princeton, USA Jakub M. Godzimirski Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway Sten Hansson University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia; Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia; University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Constantin Hlihor “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania Ecaterina Hlihor “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania Aleksi Kajander Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Ignas Kalpokas Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Julija Kalpokiene Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Tanel Kerikmäe TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia; National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, Kharkiv, Ukraine Marek Kohv Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Igor Kopytin Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia xi

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Ramon Loik International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), Tallinn, Estonia Victor Madeira Cambridge Security Initiative (CSi), Cambridge, UK Mari-Liis Madisson University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia; Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia; Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK Yevhen Mahda Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine Tomáš Mareš Charles University in Prague, Prague, Czechia Marco Marsili Centro de investigação do Instituto de Estudos Políticos, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal; Centro de Investigação e Desenvolvimento, Instituto Universitário Militar, Lisbon, Portugal; Centro de Estudos Internacionais, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal Katrin Nyman Metcalf Department of Law, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Holger Mölder Department of Law, School of Business and Management, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Sergii Pakhomenko Mariupol State University, Mariupol, Ukraine Daivis Petraitis Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, Vilnius, Lithuania Vladimir Sazonov University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia; Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia; Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Tallinn, Estonia Eric Shiraev George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA Pnina Shuker Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel; Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel Lev Topor Centre for Cyber Law and Policy (CCLP), University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Evhen Tsybulenko Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia Andreas Ventsel University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Tetiana Vodotyka Institute of History of Ukraine, NASU, Kyiv, Ukraine

Introduction: The Russian Federation and New Challenges of Modern Warfare Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov, Archil Chochia, and Tanel Kerikmäe

There is no question about the importance of information manipulation in the contemporary security environment. This entails new trends in international security studies, where a comprehensive discussion about the role of such manipulations and their impact on strategic communication takes place in academic circles, think tanks and among practitioners as well as in society at large. Ever since the legend of Prometheus, unsurprisingly technology in its broadest sense has not only been a factor of economic development but also deeply influenced political and societal transformations as well (Kerikmäe et al., 2019). Cybersecurity, cyber warfare, information warfare, psychological operations, influence operations, strategic communication, fake news and disinformation … all these more or less recent terms entered everyday discourse in H. Mölder (B) Department of Law, School of Business and Management, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] V. Sazonov University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Tallinn, Estonia V. Sazonov e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] A. Chochia · T. Kerikmäe TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] T. Kerikmäe e-mail: [email protected] T. Kerikmäe National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, Kharkiv, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_1

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the first half of the twenty-first century (see, e.g., Cosentino, 2020; Lemieux, 2015; Rid, 2020). Conventional conflicts are no longer the main threats in the modern security environment. Instead, we are faced with various hybrid threats that necessitate an extended approach to security (Heap et al., 2019). In the changing security environment, military attacks play a minor and often just supporting role in modern warfare. The more imminent problem modern societies face is the increasing impact of insecurity throughout different levels of society. This may require a new type of thinking, in which traditional threat assessments prepared for a large-scale conventional war, similar to World War I and World War II, may belong to history. Research in the field of novel and non-traditional security threats is relatively new and thus challenging, including among other things, discussion on the consequences of information warfare and influence operations. Knowledge is becoming the main objective in contemporary threat assessments. Several regional initiatives prove that there is an international race in the cyberworld. The EU Commission proposes to launch a network of Security Operation Centres across the EU, powered by artificial intelligence (AI), which will constitute a real ‘cybersecurity shield’ for the EU, able to detect signs of a cyberattack early enough and to enable proactive action, before damage occurs (EU Cybersecurity Strategy, 2020). The United States adopted a National Cyber Security Strategy in 2018, with the promise to being “engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. These states have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose a long-term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and partners,” (Department of Defense, 2018, 3). However, if to Google search various indexes about the countries that have the strongest cybersecurity, it gives somewhat surprising top chart: leading EU member states France, Sweden, Spain, Lithuania and Estonia are coming only after United States, Russia, Canada, UK, Israel, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and China.1 Even if there are a plethora of criteria in assessing the countries’ capacity, the result of the search, being objective or not, shows certain perceptions. There are also other developments that may well influence the area of technological advancements such as the EU Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act and UNESCO recommendations on Artificial Intelligence. However, Realpolitik seems to prevail in international relations more than ever, and the attempts to find a compromise between global stakeholders may fail easily even before considered. The advanced distribution of communication networks in recent decades has created a favourable environment for Global Knowledge Warfare (GKW) which includes image-building, conspiracy theories, a culture of fear and the construction of (in)security dilemmas as tools of a new kind of permanent conflict (Shiraev & Mölder, 2020). Global Knowledge Warfare quite often reflects the ongoing status of conflicts between international actors. Global issues like the COVID-19 pandemic,

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That is, Global Cybersecurity Index, Analytics Insight, CyberDB, Comparitech; please see cipher.com blog Which Country is #1 in Cybersecurity? https://cipher.com/blog/which-countryis-1-in-cybersecurity/.

Introduction: The Russian Federation and New Challenges …

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migration crises or climate change, through which cultural and performative representations articulate the political strategies of status-seeking international actors, have become a part of large-scale information warfare which spreads all around the world. Moreover, contemporary conflict does not only involve actual fighting on military fronts but also takes place in human minds and relies on virtual weapons like strong emotions (e.g., fear, anger and honour) manufactured and reproduced by myths and beliefs. Sometimes, it takes place as an integrated part of ongoing asymmetric conflicts (e.g., Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen). At other times, however, it can be skilfully used by populist and extremist politicians and political spin-doctors in order to disseminate alternative knowledge which could captivate a public audience and produce fear, uncertainty and new security dilemmas difficult to resolve for contending actors. The distinction between war and nonviolent conflict has become less evident. International actors have begun to practice new, hybrid forms of hostilities—both open and covert—involving the media and social networks (see, e.g., Pomerantsev, 2015, 2019; Nissen, 2015). The goal of such technologically advanced warfare is to affect the minds, emotions and actions of individual citizens. These attacks are likely to focus on deliberate disinformation (‘fake news’), exaggeration and the misinterpretation of facts—all to achieve a range of political or diplomatic objectives. Cyberattacks can be one-time or sustained to affect the media and social networks, to create a ‘new reality’ or multiple realities, with the ultimate plan of affecting public opinion and, ultimately, the decisions of hundreds of millions of people. In many constituencies, it sometimes only takes a few thousand votes to sway elections. Future warfare may appear as a war of narratives, supported by a limited number of military-related special operations, which could strengthen images of fear and hatred and produces irrational responses from actors involved in the conflict. Multiple agents may conduct influence operations in different social and political environments by using various forms of strategic communication, the Internet and social media being among the most influential. The Russian Federation is believed to have taken on the role of an advanced player in Global Knowledge Warfare. Evidence can be found in various conflictprone areas around the world like the Middle East, the Balkans, or the post-Soviet space, where Russia has intervened. Russia’s position as a great power has changed to some extent after the end of the Cold War. Russia does not lead the world subsystem like the Soviet Union in the second half of the twenty-first century but has still kept its strategic ambitions to interfere with global international relations (Sakwa, 2017). In recent years, the Russian Federation has effectively been using new tools of communication for achieving its strategic goals (see, e.g., Fridman, 2018; Rácz, 2015; Yablokov, 2018). As a prominent status-seeker and rising power, Russia’s strategy under the Putin administration has been focused rather on destabilizing others than on promoting its own competitiveness. In this challenge, the Kremlin has often met with support from extremist political movements in the West which also follow similar agendas and support nationalist and protectionist policies. The status conflict between Russia and the West (see, e.g., Lebow, 2010; Wohlworth, 2009; Neumann, 2008; Larson & Shevchenko, 2010) best characterizes contemporary information

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warfare between contrasting strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2017). Russia’s influence operations often seek to widen the political gap between Europe (EU) and the United States and attempt to create an internal gap between major powers in NATO, which would help to weaken Western solidarity. Tensions in the relationship between the European Union and Russia have increased since 2013/2014 after the conflict in Ukraine flourished. Eventually, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov during the meeting with the EU’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell in Moscow on February 5, 2021, called the European Union an ‘unreliable partner’ (Herzenshorn & Bariggazi, 2021). Since President Putin’s speech in Munich in 2007, the Russian Federation openly started to promote a status conflict with the West by undermining Western liberal democratic values, whose strategic objective is often supported by extremist Western movements with similar political ambitions. Russia’s strategic narratives are often tailored according to their potential target groups, including various anti-establishment groups, Eurosceptics, anti-American, anti-immigration and antiglobalization movements from both sides of the political spectrum, which are dissatisfied with austerity policies of Western powers, and are brought to target groups through public and covert methods that are carefully tailored to the specific problems of dissatisfied communities (Mölder & Sazonov, 2020). Russia’s influence operations outside the post-Soviet space produce and disseminate strategic narratives that amplify or shape perceptions of the world and political preferences in accordance with the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals and strategic ambitions. The strategic narratives communicated by Russia describe the liberal world order as weak and irresponsible, unable to offer any effective solution for security governance. In justifying its positions in restored and mythologized opposition between the East and the West, Moscow often adopts narratives that accuse the West of promoting aggressive strategies against Russia. At the same time, the Putin administration has declared the restoration of the image of Russia as a great power as its primary national goal. In doing so, the narratives conveyed often remain declarative, without setting specific steps, timetables or assessing their effectiveness in achieving the objectives. As a security contender, Russia is rather interested in an unstable world than peace and stability, because remarkably being first of all a military power, it remains a modest economic power, which has not much to achieve from a status quo. Prominent Prussian military officer and thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote about war as “a continuation of policy by other means”. By Clausewitz, states use wars as political instruments in achieving their policy goals to protect their strategic interests and to reduce or eliminate domestic and international threats they may face. Extensively quoted General Valery Gerasimov (2013), Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, emphasized the importance of information warfare, which opens a wide array of asymmetric opportunities for destroying the potential of the adversary powers. Among the Kremlin’s key foreign policy goals today are “to create a favourable external environment” and to “bolster the standing of Russian mass media and communication tools in the global information space and convey Russia’s perspective on international process to a wider international community” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). A new

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military doctrine from the end of December 2014 states that information superiority is essential for achieving success in modern warfare (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014). The foreword to the volume is written by Marina Kaljurand, who is a member of the European Parliament from Estonia, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and during the turmoil of the ‘Bronze Monument’ conflict in 2007, which fixed the meaning of cybersecurity into the European consciousness, she was Estonia’s ambassador to the Russian Federation. This volume collates the unique experience and interdisciplinary knowledge that various scholars and practitioners have formed in conducting their research on Kremlin-orchestrated influence operations in various political, strategic and cultural environments. The first part of the book focuses on political challenges related to the Kremlin’s positioning in the Global Knowledge Warfare. This new type of contestation refers to the new global security environment of the twenty-first century, where ideological warfare and psychological warfare are dominating. Holger Mölder and Eric Shiraev examine these new information-based security challenges in the contemporary security environment and active involvement of China and Russia in the processes described above. Concerning modern information warfare, synthetic media (e.g., deep fakes, extended reality applications and virtual influencers) could be a challenging area, produced by employing techniques such as deep learning. In their chapter, Ignas Kalpokas and Julija Kalpokiene discuss the nature of synthetic media and its connections with changes in the information ecosystem, in which Russia has an obvious impact. The following chapters study the interconnection between foreign policy strategies of the Russian Federation and their strategic toolsets like information and influence operation, which often focus on the Western world and visibly promote the status conflict between Russia and the West including the Western political institutions (e.g., NATO and the European Union). Jakub Godzimirski focuses on strategic communication in Russian foreign policy towards Europe and studies how the Kremlin’s strategic ambitions are linguistically and rhetorically expressed in narratives covering European affairs from Russia’s point of view. In his chapter, Tomaš Mareš examines the Russian strategies of foreign mass media instrumentalization on the information-psychological level. Daivis Petraitis tells how political elites in Russia have transferred new challenges of hybrid warfare into a two-edged sword to be used against the opponents by hitting weak sides of their societies. Finally, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and extensive spread of coronavirus opened a door for new challenges in Global Knowledge Warfare, including disinformation campaigns, production of fake news and influence operations, the Russian Federation has been actively involved in. Noel Foster theorizes and analyses China and Russia’s COVID diplomacy and COVID vaccine politics in the EU, tracing its processes and mechanisms, arguing for epistemological nihilism as the objective of revisionist states’ information operations. The second part of the book examines military, legal and technological challenges the Russian Federation is developing in its information and influence operations. Marco Marsili investigates the hybrid warfare strategy carried out by Russia in its ‘sphere of influence’ over the last three decades—Ukraine (Crimea and Donbass),

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Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Moldova (Transnistria)—and assesses the effectiveness of its hybrid strategy. Very often liberal democratic principles, the world system more or less successfully attempted to follow in building up international systems in the twentieth–twenty-first century, became extremely vulnerable during the crisis. Russia has been a frequent contender of democratic systems and has been active in building alternative systems based on power politics. The next, Evhen Tsybulenko and Aleksi Kajander, take into account Russia’s misuse of democratic institutions and principles, as well as the effectiveness of available countermeasures. Information—primarily digital—is an increasingly important commodity in the modern world. Consequently, the virtual information space is the primary location for threats, aggression and even potentially foreign occupation. There is widespread agreement that Russia under the Putin regime has lifted propaganda to new levels, and the extensive use of smartphones in human society offers multiple opportunities for information attacks, which is the focus of Katrin Nyman-Metcalf’s chapter. Russia is maturing her technologies and tactics for advancing in technological warfare. Marek Kohv and Archil Chochia argue this may produce an upward trend in the violations of core principles of the Law of Armed Conflict as long as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have been used for targeted killings. Considering some recent case studies of cyberattacks attributed to Russia, hybrid situational awareness (HSA) is becoming an essential part of cyber operations in achieving information superiority. David Antunes and Manuel Esteve analyse how HSA capability can improve the handling of cyber incidents, particularly its threat hunting functions during multidomain attacks on critical infrastructures. In their chapter, Ramon Loik and Victor Madeira analyse some key areas of EU’s initiatives and actions in diminishing threats coming from adverse influence operations, such as regional communication programme OPEN Neighbourhood, European Endowment for Democracy (EED), EaP Civil Society Forum and EUvsDisinfo platform, among others. The third part of the book keeps focus on regional, historical and cultural challenges. Lately, strategic narratives are increasingly studied as a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics. Andreas Ventsel, Mari-Liis Madisson and Sten Hansson reveal how 5G-related threats are framed, and the main actors (the USA, China, NATO and EU) are depicted by comparing narratives in the Kremlin-sponsored Russophone and Anglophone media outlets. Geopolitics has remarkably entered into world politics, and Russia has activated its influence operations against different parts of Europe. The Western institutions (e.g., the European Union and NATO) play a crucial role in the status conflict between Russia and the West, while Russia intends to diminish the effectiveness of international institutions and cooperative security. Pnina Shuker and Lev Topor examine how Russia utilizes soft cyber power, fake news, bots and trolls to spread chaos and pressure on vulnerabilities not only in NATO new member states, but also in these countries which face an ongoing discussion in their potential future NATO membership. Marco Cruz studies the Kremlin’s influence operations in the Western Balkans. Due to the Russian interference in the area, particularly in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia, the fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria to become EU members has been blocked. Constantin Hlihor

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and Ecaterina Hlihor discuss Russian global media platforms, NGOs and other public institutions, which actively perform information operations through public diplomacy and provide empirical proofs on how Russia has used the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest for image-building purposes. Yevhen Magda and Tetyana Vodotyka argue that Russia’s information warfare against Ukraine has deep roots in its imperial past, while disinformation campaigns use narratives like artificiality of Ukrainian nation, anti-Semitism and collaboration with the Nazi regime for discrediting Ukraine and attempt to revise the history of WWII, which have become the key elements of Putin’s New History Policy. Gediminas Buˇciunas presents a genesis of cultural policy and significant changes over it in the minds of top officials of the Russian Federation over the last decade including the approach into painful historical events. Finally, Vladimir Sazonov, Sergei Pakhomenko and Igor Kopytin examine the modern Russian narratives about the history of Latvia and Estonia combined with cases from academics, popular science and propaganda. The chapter demonstrates the dynamics of politicization and ideologization of historical controversies, the transformation of historians into ‘mnemonic warriors’, and the use of history as a tool of informational and cognitive influence operations by Kremlin and pro-Kremlin oriented forces. Philosopher Karl Popper (1945) has said “We must plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only freedom can make security secure”. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has generated new revolutionary options to increase global instability and insecurity, which makes the security issues closely dependent on the development of legitimate democracy and Rule of Law. The impact of influence operations conducted by the Russian Federation and various aspects of Kremlin-orchestrated information warfare have an urgent relevance to be discussed in academic circles of the field of international security studies including the concept and practical outcomes of hybrid (or non-linear) warfare; information warfare; influence operations and its strategic, legal and cultural aspects for a changing security environment; cyber operations introducing new technological tools (smartphones, UAV and 5G) for advanced manifestations of information warfare; a comparison between Russian and Chinese strategies and tactics as the most prominent statusseekers in the current international order; the peculiarities of Russian influence operations in various vulnerable security environments (e.g., the Baltic states, Ukraine and the Balkans) against the Western institutions (particularly NATO and the European Union), among others. The volume encourages interdisciplinary and intertheoretical/methodological approaches for examining the phenomenon of Global Knowledge Warfare and discusses the role of the Russian Federation in shaping a new security environment.

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References Cosentino, G. (2020). Social media and the post-truth world order. Palgrave Pivot. Department of Defense. (2018). Summary Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from C:/Users/hmold/OneDrive/t%C3%B6%C3%B6d/infos%C3%B5jakogumik/ 1%20February/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF. EU Cybersecurity Strategy. (2020). Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/digitalsingle-market/en/news/eus-cybersecurity-strategy-digital-decade. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016). Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://www.mid.ru/ en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. Fridman, O. (2018). Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and politicization. Oxford University Press. Gerasimov, V. (2013). The value of science in foresight [Cennoct nayki v Ppedvidenii in Boenno-Ppomyxlenny kyppep], No. 8(476), 27 February. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. Heap, B., Krauel, S., & Althuis, J. (Eds.). (2019). Hybrid threats: A strategic communications perspective. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Herzenshorn, D. M., & Bariggazi, J. (2021, February 5). Borrell stands by as Lavrov calls EU ‘unreliable partner’. Politico. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://www.politico.eu/article/ borrell-stands-by-as-lavrov-calls-eu-unreliable-partner/. Kerikmäe, T., Ramiro Troitiño, D., & Shumilo, O. (2019). An idol or an ideal? A case study of estonian e-governance: Public perceptions, myths and misbeliefs. Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 7(1). Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. primacy. International Security, 34(4), 63–95. Lebow, R. N. (2010). The past and future of war. International Relations, 24(3), 243–270. Lemieux, F. (2015). Current and emerging trends in cyber operations. In Palgrave Macmillan’s studies in cybercrime and cybersecurity. Palgrave Macmillan. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. (2014). [Boenna doktpina Poccicko Fedepacii, 2014]. Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok. html. Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2017). Forging the world: Strategic narratives and international relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mölder, H., & Sazonov, V. (2020). Kremlin information campaign in the Baltic states during the COVID-19 pandemic escalation of spring 2020. Modern Management Review, XXV (4), 83–97. Neumann, I. (2008). Russia as a great power 1815–2007. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 128–151. Nissen, Th. E. (2015). The weaponization of social media. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College. Pomerantsev, P. (2015). Authoritarianism goes global (II): The Kremlin’s information war. Journal of Democracy, 26(4), 40–50. Pomerantsev, P. (2019). This is not propaganda: Adventures in the war against reality. Public Affairs. Popper, K. (1945). The open society and its enemies. Routledge and Kegan, Paul Ltd. Rácz, A. (2015). Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine: Breaking the enemy’s ability to resist. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

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Rid, Th. (2020). Active measures: The secret history of disinformation and political warfare. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Sakwa, R. (2017). Russia against the Rest: The post-cold war crisis of world order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shiraev, E. & Mölder, H. (2020, 31 August). Global Knowledge Warfare: Using Strategic Imagination to Harness Uncertainty and Fear. The Cipher Brief. Retrieved October 1, 2020 from https://www.thecipherbrief.com/global-knowledge-warfare-using-strategic-imagin ation-to-harness-uncertainty-and-fear. Wohlworth, W. C. (2009). Unipolarity, status competition, and great power. World Politics, 61(1), 28–57. Yablokov, I. (2018). Fortress Russia: Conspiracy theories in the Post-Soviet world. Polity.

Concept of Information Warfare and Foreign Policy Tools of the Russian Federation

Global Knowledge Warfare, Strategic Imagination, Uncertainty, and Fear Holger Mölder and Eric Shiraev

1 Introduction It has been attributed to the Ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu that, “… a hundred wins out of a hundred battles is not the best. Forcing another army to surrender without a battle is the best” (The Art of War by Sun Tzu). This would be a perfect goal for introducing Global Knowledge Warfare—if you affect the minds of the people in an adversarial country, the country should become a weakened opponent (Shiraev & Mölder, 2020). The year 2020 will remain in world history to remind us—among many other things—about global threats from biological agents. Ignoring physical borders and defying national policies, the coronavirus threatened the stability of the global international system. Yet along with the unfolding biothreats, an informational chaos emerged. Social bots and trolls, if instructed to do so, can generate thousands of retweets and simple postings. On the other hand, retweeting or reposting provocative opinions and false reports can be very inexpensive. In either case, created by them, false narratives can become weaponized knowledge. Researchers today have gathered empirical facts about Internet trolls and social bots as well as their psychological motivations. However, trolls—as global knowledge warriors—are not necessarily acting out their psychological insecurities. Many global knowledge warriors are indeed highly trained professionals hired by intelligence agencies. In many cases, they are just ideologically motivated and politically inspired ordinary human beings who are fighting for their truth on the virtual battlefield. H. Mölder (B) Department of Law, School of Business and Management, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] E. Shiraev George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_2

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Further, the trust in the existing international alliances and institutions is under attack too. The goal of the attacks is to portray these institutions as either useless (like NATO) or discriminatory and intrusive (like EU), and to persuade the audience that today’s liberal democratic governments are decadent, inefficient, hostile to people, racist, discriminatory, and corrupt. Overall, as we argue, more detailed empirical and critical knowledge about cyber trolls and bots—acting on behalf of adversarial regimes and posing a threat to liberal democracy and the existing international order—should help in developing cyber immunity and other defences against such threats. Experts were hardly able to manage sudden changes, such as to predict the end of the Cold War or the origin of the Arab Spring (Martin, 2015, 199). The strategic imagination method the authors propose in this chapter would help to operationalize the decision-making process at the strategic-political level and allows analysts, based on the study of existing patterns of knowledge warfare, to identify the warriors’ common tactics and methods as well as to predict the methods of deliberate attacks in the future.

2 Strategic Imagination as an Assessment Method in Global Knowledge Warfare Future warfare cannot be necessarily imagined as a traditional destroying clash between military forces, but it may appear as a war of narratives, supported by a limited number of military-related special operations, which could strengthen images of fear and hatred among potential adversaries (Achcar, 2010; Mölder, 2016; Rickli & Kaspersen, 2016). In this case, the battleground would be knowledge. George Orwell, in his dystopian novel “1984”, describes a perpetual war, which was fought somewhere far away, and where the only information citizens received was information about victorious battles on unseen military fronts. Attention! Your attention, please! A newsflash has this moment arrived from the Malabar front. Our forces in South India have won a glorious victory. I am authorised to say that the action we are now reporting may well bring the war within measurable distance of its end (Orwell, 1949, 25).

The preceding segment may easily fit into any suitable description of information campaigns related to a contemporary conflict, where fictional newsflashes are coming to be an irreversible part of political battles, as we see on the basis of the latest US presidential elections, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and, most forcefully, during the migration crisis in Europe. Moreover, the same patterns characterize the future of international society, in which self-constructed often adversarial worlds are permanently challenging one another and making the international system extremely destabilized and vulnerable (see also Krastev, 2014). Many of these competing worlds have relied on more or less totalitarian or authoritarian ideologies. Aron (1958, 73) said that fear of war is often a tyrant’s opportunity for preserving totalitarian (as well

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as authoritarian) regimes. The post-truth world has taught us that the human society is far from being naturally open to liberal democracy. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are able to effectively play with the weaknesses of liberal democracies and gain popular support under the slogans of law and order. For centuries, states used strategies to prepare for a conventional conflict involving regular armies that clash in pitched battles usually along recognizable frontlines. Weapons of mass destruction required different types of imagination and different strategies to operate in conditions of mass destruction. Still, the key elements of the traditional understanding of warfare remain based on conflicts between identifiable international actors (i.e., states, alliances, and coalitions). In order to become responsive to future crises, we have to foresee the future development, and the ability to produce effective strategic imagination becomes more and more apparent these days. This method has been successfully implemented in business studies, where strategic imagination means “challenging deep-rooted assumptions and rejecting the tendency to assess new innovations and opportunities by our current systems and standards” (Schmierer, 2019). If we are interested in correct strategic forecasts, this method should be introduced in the international relations studies as well. For international security studies, strategic imagination is the method of creative and critical assessment of possible scenarios involving threats to security. This method allows security experts from different fields to think about the future, consider “what if” situations, and creatively assess the probability of different threats, even those that appear as improbable to some. Educated forecasting—based on historical facts, today’s developments, and strategic imagination—is an important component of building successful security strategies and supportive public policies. Stan Glaser (1994, 31) wrote on strategic imagination: “strategic advantage can be obtained by changing the rules or deliberately creating turbulence”. The components of the method include strategic fit (the actor’s competence between its abilities and the needs of the market), structure (the degree of concentration and maturity), competitive advantages (the extent to which the resources that denied the competition can be mustered, e.g., access to novel technology), and strategic focus (i.e., on cost advantages, a differentiated product or exploit a market niche). All this can be translated into the language of security studies. Therefore, from the perspective of strategic imagination, all strategic textbooks should be regarded as history books—“they will always be out of date and their main benefit is to outline the fading conventional wisdom and perhaps indicate how this can be fractured” (Glaser, 1994, 34). Complacency often leads to the state of preparing to “fight the last war”, which is basically using the lessons learned from the last conflict in the hopes of winning the future one. Failure of imagination leads to serious security failures and was mentioned in government reports in the United States as one of the important reasons for the intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. On the other hand, the success of strategic imagination should lead to more comprehensive and effective security measures and policies. Hereinafter the authors describe some principles of strategic imagination referring to modern warfare in the realm of knowledge.

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3 The Role of Strategic Narratives in Global Knowledge Warfare The vast spread of transnational communication networks in recent years has created a favourable platform for starting and advancing cyberwarfare—deliberate targeting of computers and networks of sovereign states and organizations. It requires the use of cyberweapons—tools and methods that can disrupt and weaken government institutions and private enterprises related to the adversary power. As a part of multifaceted cyberwarfare, GKW is the purposeful use and the management of knowledge in pursuit of a competitive advantage over foreign opponents. Knowledge is information that has a purpose or use and requires awareness or a form of understanding of the subject. Knowledge warfare is about what people know, how they interpret this knowledge, and how they use it in their actions. To answer these emergent actions, not only do we need to rely on what we know about information warfare in the past, but to also take a step further and outline the ways in which this warfare can emerge tomorrow (see also Baumard, 1996; Jones & Kovacich, 2016). We should think strategically. Strategic narratives are existential tools in the GKW, built on effectively visualized images they can easily attract large audiences and impact the decision-making process of political elites, where the strategic objective is “to create fear, not in the few unfortunate dead victims who might number from one to three thousand, but in the millions, who survive physically unharmed but emotionally profoundly distressed,” (Ganser, 2005, 30). The constant fear that one day they might attack is not less destructive than the nuclear attack, which can be compared with the effects of a neutron bomb—it destroys the people but has less influence on their physical environment. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Rosselle (2013) state that strategic narratives can affect: (1) the international system, expressing how a political actor (state, international organization, interest group, etc.) shapes perceptions of the organization of international relations; (2) politics, such as the desire of political actors to influence international arms control negotiations or to interfere in disputes between the parties in the armed conflicts management; (3) identity, how political actors wish to project their identity in international relations. If political actors succeed in aligning the narratives of the system, politics, and identity with the strategic goals they set themselves, the greater their chance to increase their influence in international relations (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Rosselle 2018, (3). The method of strategic imagination can become a progressive tool in security studies to protect against potential strategic advantages of well-shaped strategic narratives attacking vulnerabilities of democratic societies. The important strategic narrative strongly disseminated by rising powers such as Russia and China, which oppose the Western-led international system, is to enhance a network of alternative institutions to Western ones and create mistrust against the Western liberal democracies relying on the recognition of personal freedoms and human rights. The idea of a Greater Eurasian Partnership promoted by

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Russia sets a goal of a complex, multi-level system of multilateral cooperation with the participation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries (IGIGlobal, 2020). For this goal, Russia is developing a partnership with China while they both might have similar strategic interests—to offer challenges to the Western-led system. GKW will offer an excellent network to advance and enlarge the impact of illiberal strategic narratives by introducing the cultures of uncertainty, fear, and irrational response.

4 Global Knowledge Warfare and Its Clusters Global Knowledge Warfare is an efficient ingredient of psychological warfare, which in order to destroy ‘the enemy’ does not physically attack the target group, but the minds of the target group, the psyche (Ganser, 2005, 28). In such environments, beliefs based on popular narratives have advantages over the facts, which explain why the world system has been often noted as the post-truth world. Misleading new stories could strengthen images of fear and hatred and may become an alarmingly influencing phenomenon in the so-called post-truth environment and reminds the Hobbesian concept of “war of all against all” awakened. GKW has two closely interconnected clusters: ideological warfare and psychological warfare. Ideological warfare is generally about what general strategy is better for humankind. It is a clash of fundamental ideas or principles referring to economy, government, politics, lifestyle, or life in general. For example, social conflict ideologies, like Marxism, focus on capitalism and inequality. Neo-Marxists often focus on race and colonialism. Political ideologies, like conservatism and liberalism, also make judgement calls about the structure and functioning of economic, social, and political forces. Nationalism calls attention to nation-centred models of development—American, French, Russian, and Chinese, among others, strongly emphasizing the idea of their exceptionalism. Civilizational ideologies are rooted in deepseated cultural principles, such as Western, Eurasian, Muslim, Hindu, and Confucian, among others. These are, of course, just the most prominent ideological clashes the modern world is experiencing. Psychological warfare is the deliberate manipulation of information to influence emotions, judgement, and subsequent behaviour of individuals or groups to fulfil particular political goals. These actions, of course, are not rooted in some pseudo-scientific concepts such as “sixth sense”, “mental telepathy”, “subconscious influences”, and similar bogus ideas from sci-fi movies or comedies. Today’s psychological warfare is likely to be based on science. Bradshaw and Howard (2019) explain modern computational propaganda—the use of algorithms, automation, and big data to shape public opinion. Their study conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute argues that a handful of sophisticated state actors, including Russia, China, Iran, India, and Venezuela, have specifically been using computational propaganda for their foreign

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influence operations and they found evidence in 70 countries, where at least one political party or governmental agency is using social media for political manipulations in order to influence domestic or international public opinion. In the early 2000s, a debate emerged—in books and essays of well-known political leaders and scholars (i.e., Lee Kuan Yew, Park Chung Hee, Mahathir Mohammed, Shinzo Abe, and Narendra Modi) from South and East Asia—about the advantages of “Asian values” vis-a-vis Western values (Sen, 1997; Welzel, 2011). Many Russian ideologists today (i.e., Alexandre Dugin) promote the idea of the “Eurasian civilization” of Russians, which influential circles of Russian political elites, some of them close to President Putin, have vowed to protect by all means. An existential part of Asian values has been always connected with the preference of social harmony, collectivism and communitarianism, loyalty and respect to authority, and socio-economic prosperity over the Western liberal values like individual liberties and human rights. For the Kremlin’s long-time strategist Vladislav Surkov, the highest strategic goal of Putin’s administration is to make Russia a world leader, and for that, the country must first and foremost offer prosperity to its citizens (Mäkinen, 2011). Surkov’s concept—modernization without Westernization—has strongly influenced Russia’s policies and had a considerable impact on the development of Russia’s strategic narratives. Surkov’s perceptions of Russia’s sovereign democracy can be understood as a unique way for Russia to achieve its goals, with no one dictating from outside Russia and to the Russians how this path should proceed. One of the important topics of his concept is to strengthen the competitiveness of the Russian economy. Russia’s raw materials-based economy should be transformed into an innovative and intellectual economy (Surkov, 2008). Surkov left the Putin administration in February 2020, but similar strategic thought still dominates in the strategic narratives and political discourses produced and disseminated by the administration of the Russian Federation. President Putin has called Russia a unique civilization that must be protected by developing genetics, artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and other newest products of high technology (The Moscow Times 2020). As seen above, the values developed by Putin’s administration tend to be closer to core Asian values than to Western liberal democratic ones, which may conclude why Russia opposes Western liberalism and sells itself as the guardian of traditional conservative values, a core element for many new right populist movements in the West. In December 2015, President Xi Jinping set out his vision for the future of China’s Internet: “We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber-development,” (Economy, 2018). Since 2012, after Xi became president, stronger restrictions to control the Internet in China have been carried out. The government has invested in technological upgrades to monitor and censor content and new laws have passed (Economy, 2018). In 2014, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel had a phone conversation with Putin on the crisis in Ukraine, she stated that the President of the Russian Federation was out of touch with reality (Kalb, 2014). GKW sets a new normality to move outside a reality and build your own world to sell in the strategic market. Experts discussed the “worlds” according to Merkel, Putin, Trump, or Xi in terms of ideological and

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economic models of their governments suitable or not for the world of the future. By weaponizing ideologies, intelligence agencies can actively promote their countries’ national interests. But information alone is useless; it becomes knowledge: there should be a perceiving audience and the methods to persuade it.

5 Cultures of Uncertainty, Fear, and Irrational Response The Global Knowledge Warfare is a lot about the status of interfering actors. While turning to the ongoing status conflict between China versus the West or Russia versus the West, there appears a lot of mistrust against liberal democratic values closely linked to the Western political culture, especially after the 1990s and the end of the Cold War. As a status seeker and rising power, Russia’s strategy has been focused rather on destabilizing others than on promoting its own competitiveness. In its challenge, Russia has often met support from extreme political movements in the West, which also follow similar agendas and support nationalist and protectionist policies.1 Russia holds a direct disruptive approach to influence international social media audiences by disseminating negative images about their potential adversaries. The ongoing status conflicts between Russia, China, and the West (Larson & Shevcenko, 2010; Lebow, 2010; Neumann, 2008; Wohlforth, 2009) best characterize the contemporary information warfare between contrasting narratives. Since President Putin’s speech in Munich of 2007, Russia openly started to promote a status conflict with the West, undermined liberal democratic values, and effectively began to destabilize the Western liberal democratic society by often supporting extremist movements with similar goals of destroying Western solidarity. Kimberly Martin (2015, 195) argues that the more aggressive policy emerged because Putin felt disrespected by the West. The strategic narrative communicated by Russia describes the liberal world order as weak and irresponsible, unable to offer an effective solution for international security governance. In justifying its positions in then restored and mythologized opposition between East and West, Moscow often adopts narratives that accuse the West of promoting aggressive strategies against Russia. At the same time, Russia has declared the restoration of the image of Russia as a great power (which is similar to Trump’s famous slogan with the promise to make Russia great again) as its national goal. In order to implement their status-related concerns in the globalized world, Russia and China challenged Western-born liberal democratic world order that strongly emerged in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Global Knowledge Warfare offers to its warriors several soft solutions for increasing their influence in international affairs. 1

If to compare Russian-produced narratives to those spread by extreme populist movements in the West, multiple similarities can be found. For example, claims of a “secret world government” led by George Soros, a Hungarian-American business magnate and the founder of the Open Society Foundation are core narratives that have long been promoted not only by Russian conspiracy theorists and their counterparts in Europe, but also by the QAnon supporters in the United States.

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First, in the ideological arena, global knowledge warriors pursue the goal of undermining the individual’s beliefs in liberal democratic values and principles governing domestic and foreign policy. Among these principles are political, economic, and individual liberties, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability of public officials, among others. The strategic narrative communicated by Iran, China, or Russia, for example, is that that liberal democracy has failed, and the principles of liberty on which democratic governments were built are fundamentally flawed. The second goal of the knowledge warriors is to persuade today’s liberal democratic governments that are decadent, inefficient, hostile to people, racist, discriminatory, and corrupt. Further, the third goal is to undermine Western international alliances and institutions to be portrayed as either useless (like NATO) or discriminatory and intrusive (like EU). The focus of China and Russia, as well as other governments challenging Western democracies, has been to destroy the post-Cold War US hegemony in the international system and to build an alternative multipolar system, where anti-Western cooperation initiatives (i.e., BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Greater Eurasian Partnership) become competitive and eventually dominate what they call Western neo-liberalism. Psychologists show that fear drives heightened attention to uncertainty (Carleton, 2016, 5). During the COVID-19 pandemic, online allusions to research papers that have never been peer-reviewed, out-of-context quotations, bogus numbers, or bizarre predictions on websites, blogs, and social networks, all tended to add to uncertainty among many. Uncertainty tends to exaggerate human fears. Pollsters report that fears contribute to dominate public opinion and give birth to new worries and uncertainties of millions of people. Anxiety grows. Public officials react under the pressure of public anxieties and demands “to do something”. Tactical mistakes in policy can lead to strategic blunders and global miscalculations—all leading to negative societal and political consequences that weaken the country on the global scale. Global knowledge warriors do not use physical force. Their ultimate goal is to influence the minds and, ultimately, the behaviour of targeted groups. In the domain of psychological warfare, global information warriors pursue at least three following scenarios. They involve the process of creating three types of public sentiments: a culture of uncertainty, a culture of fear, and a culture of irrational responses. Fear and uncertainty in people’s minds can thrive in today’s informational environment and may characterize the strategic goal of return to history, which became popular among many new right movements, but eventually developed also by the new left, both strategically supported by Russia and China. At times, the situation looked like a global informational anarchy—a modern kind of “war of all against all”, to refer to the words of seventeenth century’s English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651). Fear and uncertainty most effectively support the logic of Hobbesian culture (Mölder, 2011, 260). A culture of uncertainty is a prevailing state of ambiguity, confusion, and doubt. It leads to helplessness and irritation in large groups of people. Helplessness is tied to the breach of trust between the government and the governed: here people start to realize that nobody is helping them. Being uncertain, people tend to turn to random media narratives, often false ones, or to the convenient echo chambers of

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social networks. In this culture, populist leaders thrive and win elections. Maintaining uncertainty democratic states is the goal of their adversarial international actors. A culture of fear. Helplessness further contributes to alarm, anxiety, and fears. If fear becomes part of society’s daily life, this gives birth to a culture of fear. A frightened individual becomes even more vulnerable to manipulation. Brzezinski (2007) once argued that the culture of fear “obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue”. Adversarial international actors today manipulate information to cultivate a culture of fear in other countries to pursue specific purposes. A culture of irrational responses. Long-lasting uncertainty and fear cause irrational demands. Officials—being under pressure of fear and uncertainty—make policy mistakes, which further lead to irrational reactions of the people. Ridiculous ideas often find support among emotionally charged audiences. All these three interconnected cultures inevitably affect politics. Efforts, resources, and money to address fears and uncertainties are often wasted on futile responses.

6 Knowledge Warriors and Their Weapons Knowledge warfare requires educated and trained professionals and writers. On the other hand, retweeting or reposting provocative opinions and false reports is very inexpensive. Social bots and trolls, when instructed to do so, can generate thousands of retweets and postings. In both cases, fake news or retweeted stories create false narratives that become knowledge to serve specific political goals. In fact, disinformation has been a favoured tool in the foreign policy of international actors for centuries. The German Reich intentionally fabricated facts about Polish hostilities to excuse the invasion of Poland in 1939. The Soviet Union—in order to maintain the good international image of the Communist Party and its leadership—deliberately lied about the existence of a secret agreement between Stalin and Hitler signed before World War II. The 2003 Iraqi invasion was influenced to a great extent by misinformation from multiple sources about the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In 2020, Russian President Putin stated that the Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 was done on a “contractual” basis (Putin, 2020). Nowadays, governments are rapidly advancing their strategies in GKW. Moscow and Beijing are constantly trying to advance new tools of communication for achieving such strategic goals. Technological resources for the advancement of information warfare became unprecedented and are being used in a global, strategic fight for individual minds. Governments do not have to spend tens of billions of dollars on propagandistic projects like they do to build fighter jets or aircraft carriers. They can achieve their goals with a reasonable price tag. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army introduced a special unit called the Strategic Support Force not only for many new kinds of warfare, including the

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information domain, but also for space warfare, cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare missions. The United Front Work Department, a unit in China’s Communist Party, among other functions, deliberately targets ethnic Chinese overseas to generate support for China’s domestic and foreign policy objectives (Costello & McReynolds, 2018). Online battles with a clear pro-Chinese bias intensified in Southeast Asia after the coronavirus crisis broke out. The term, Milk Tea Alliance2 emerged to describe an online loose democratic movement in Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to counter China’s propaganda campaign related to the virus (Banka, 2020). Iran has been involved in social media manipulations for years using reposting and retweeting methods to promote government agendas. Some analysts believe that Iran has been a frontrunner in social media manipulations and started its activities even earlier than Russia did. Iran-linked influence operations turn more often to the knowledge created by activist groups in the United States or the West Bank of Palestine, rather than producing their own original materials (Barojan, 2019). In Russia, the Russian military intelligence (GRU) and many other units act as components of “information operations force”, as they call this Moscow. For example, in 2012 the Internet Research Agency was founded in St. Petersburg to become a successful trolling company that conducted influential social media campaigns on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram and was successful in the United States, where their posts reached the computers of tens of millions of social media users (Howard et al., 2018). Such units include trolling companies to launch disinformation and organize campaigns on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other networks. Russian commentators have actively disseminated conspiracy theories related to secret plots behind the creation of the European Union (the fictional Kalergi plan3 ), vaccination causing autism and other chronic illnesses, Marxist plots to penetrate America, and many others (Mölder, 2021). There is a difference in strategic narratives promoted and spread by China and Russia. China has successfully entered into a technological race and aggregates a considerable economic power. Russia still represents an old-style military power that is economically not competitive with the West. Russia’s strategy in their status conflict with the West focuses more on information warfare, which in many ways stems from the situation where Russia is economically less competitive than China (Washington Post, 2020). Russia has been among the pioneers of global information warfare, which is effectively using new tools of communication for achieving its strategic goals. As a status seeker and rising power, Russia’s strategy has been focused rather on destabilizing the others than on promoting its own competitiveness. In its challenge, Russia has often met support from extreme political movements in the West, which also 2

China is the country where tea tends to be consumed without milk, so the term Milk Tea Alliance symbolizes their resistance to the Chinese influence. 3 The Kalergi Plan is a conspiracy theory that claims there is a plot to wipe out white Europeans, which refers to misinterpretation of the works of Austrian politician and author Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, especially his Practical Idealism (1925).

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follow similar agendas and support nationalist and protectionist policies. Russia holds a direct disruptive approach to influence international social media audiences by disseminating negative images about their potential adversaries. Compared to Russia, which is still strongly influenced by traditional strategical geopolitical thinking, China is more concerned on winning trade wars and achieving technological advantages over the West (Washington Post, 2020). Regarding China, it would be important to keep in mind that Chinese strategic thinking could be different than a traditional Western thought on which all great IR theories have been built. In ensuring the control over communications infrastructure, China is focusing on the regions that might feel “peripheral” for Western powers. There are regions like not only Africa but also Latin America where China has been successful to establish itself as a global superpower. In Africa, China is introducing multiple low-quality development projects, which also can be used for strategic goals. The Belt and Road Initiative is another big international enterprise, which reflects the increasing strategic ambitions of China (Rolland, 2017; Tekdal, 2018). China intends to be globally competitive to the West, and therefore to use the openness of Western societies on its behalf, but simultaneously to set restrictions to communication networks nationally. In the global context, China is focusing rather on the cyber domain than the fake news industry. Since 2012, stronger restrictions to control the Internet in China have been carried out, and the Chinese government has invested in technological upgrades to monitor and censor the content of Internet sites. In December 2015, President Xi Jinping set out his vision for the future of China’s Internet, which emphasized that China should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber-development (Economy, 2018). Concerning the information warfare, China is traditionally promoting favourable strategic narratives supported by diplomatic, military, and economic efforts. However, tactically China more often prefers traditional diplomatic tools and silent diplomatic efforts to getting popular support in social media channels (i.e., Servaes, 2012). At the same time, China is actively developing its worldwide cyber espionage capabilities and is remarkably advancing in establishing information dominance through its military concepts. However, recent developments around Hong Kong indicate that China is willing to turn to more extensive tools of information warfare including cyber intrusion, disinformation, and social media manipulation, especially in Chinese information space (Wallis, 2019). Among key Russia’s foreign policy goals today are “to create a favourable external environment” and to “bolster the standing of Russian mass media and communication tools in the global information space and convey Russia’s perspective on international process to a wider international community” (The Foreign Policy Concept, 2016). To achieve its strategic goals in the Global Knowledge Warfare, Russia effectively turns to trolls, bots, fake accounts, and cybercrime. Interference in elections by supporting and opposing candidates, posting fake news, fabricated articles, making strategic comments, and launching character attacks against political figures are the methods most frequently used in the GKW (Washington Post, 2020).

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7 COVID-19 Pandemic and Global Knowledge Warfare All three cultures—culture of uncertainty, culture of fear, and culture of irrational response—affected the global response during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, in which governments instead of developing comprehensive international cooperation to manage the consequences of the virus, often plunged into costly partisan debates. Ignoring physical borders and defying national policies, the coronavirus threatened the stability of the global international system. Yet along with the unfolding biothreats, an informational chaos emerged: official government updates about the pandemic followed by an avalanche of manufactured news, rumours, panicky forecasts, and conspiracy theories. During the 2020 pandemic, sources in China and Russia turned to conspiracy theories about Washington’s role in biological warfare research and a massive coverup in the United States that followed. Similar narratives about deliberate government foul play have been spread in the past in relation to HIV and Ebola outbreaks. Such false narratives—like those spread by Russian media channels Russia Today and Sputnik— also serve the role of reinforcing an enemy image and consolidating domestic public opinion (Broad, 2020). Pandemics remind us also about the threats of biological weapons: viruses can be weaponized in GKW and used for promoting the three cultures described above. The COVID-19 outbreak perfectly manifests a new type of crisis, the new globalized world will stand against, and the ongoing GIW perfectly fits with such an increasingly unstable environment. The spread of infectious disease with dangerous consequences is just one visible side of the current crisis, but in the long run the information war that accompanied the crisis may produce much more disastrous consequences. Therefore, we may take the COVID-19 outbreak as a warning; there may be new types of similar challenges ahead. Revisionist powers like Russia and China may emerge stronger from the crisis and challenge the current power lines. Global pandemics can be easily used for achieving advantages in the Global Knowledge Warfare. The panics accompanied by the worldwide outbreak of COVID19 describe the vulnerability of the international world system, which revisionist powers can use for introducing challenges to securitizing, weakening, and destabilizing it. The reports from the Belgian Internal Security Service 2010–2016 indicate that biological weapons and vaccines are of great interest to Chinese intelligence services (Rettman, 2020). This is not only for defence purposes, as China is highly vulnerable to epidemics due to its overcrowding, but also for offensive purposes, as shown by China’s investigation of Ebola as an attack vector. One of the obvious issues is the handling of the pandemics by Western democracies, especially the European Union and the United States. In February, US Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Philip Reeker told to France-Press, “Russia’s intent is to sow discord and undermine U.S. institutions and alliances from within, including through covert and coercive malign influence campaigns” (Agence France Press 2020). Russian-produced and conspiracy-driven narratives, which are spread in media outlets and online forums, attempt to convince us the coronavirus

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is weaponized by the West for political purposes. Western experts have noted that China has intensified its control as well over the information about the coronavirus. The access of Western journalists to direct sources has been limited or even blocked.

8 Key Methods of Knowledge Warfare In 2016, Vladimir Putin said to a news agency Interfax: “We live in the information age and the aphorism ‘one who possesses information possesses the world’ of course reflects the present-day reality,” (Interfax 2016). This one may easily refer to becoming the motto of the Global Knowledge Warfare. The world is becoming more spiritual, where emotions frequently establish themselves more successfully than rational calculations, much more unpredictable and difficult to control by great powers as it has been experienced during the Cold War. Dissemination of fear, confusion, and doubt is becoming a key tactical feature in conducting global information warfare. Modern information warfare is producing and spreading these cultures by relying on the power of insecurity, which is easy to sell in the global security market. The recent European migration crisis would manifest an excellent example of the power of fear that can be upgraded to a major security threat with the skilful manipulation of information. The images of rapist culture, terrorism, and threats to social welfare strongly related to the recent migration wave and spread by status-seeking strategic narratives have changed the European security environment insecure and vulnerable, the local extremist forces and adversary powers (i.e., Russia and China) are purposefully using for their benefits. Similar narratives concerning the migration wave from Latin America—why there is an imminent need to build a wall—have been successfully introduced in the United States. The following methods will be actively used to affect domestic and foreign policy in democratic countries. Targeting democratic elections. The first and rather expected method is electoral interference by means of supporting a candidate or creating a culture of confusion. Russia has already and effectively turned to trolls, bots, fake accounts, and cybercrime to support and oppose certain candidates, to fabricate news, to make strategic political comments, or launch character attacks against political figures. Russia has been suspected of interfering in the elections in key Western states, including the United States in 2016 and France in 2017 as the most prominent ones. Also, Russia was involved in the crisis in Catalonia to spread critical messages about the government in Madrid handling the crisis (Milosevich-Juaristi, 2017). The ultimate goal of the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom was certainly pleased knowledge warriors in Moscow: any weakening of the European Union is seen as a blessing. These days, any political movement or political party in the European Union that supports a weakened European community will find support in the Kremlin. China is likely to focus on widening the political divisions in America by promoting extreme narratives for both sides of the ideological spectrum (Diamond & Schell, 2018).

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Targeting public opinion. Knowledge about a particularly divisive political and social issue can be manipulated too. At least two outcomes are most desirable for GKW warriors. One is to deepen the divisions in a targeted country. The other is to advance own foreign policy goals. Russia constantly appeals to the Russian-speaking populations in the post-Soviet space, keeping in mind that not just ethnic Russians but many other people in those regions understand the Russian language, which makes them targets of knowledge warfare. For example, Kremlin strategists promote and are very likely to advance the belief that the West is unreliable, and the governments of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania have no choice but either to coordinate their policies with Russia or to be ready for catastrophic consequences after the West abandons them (Krol, 2017). Russia effectively uses the advantages of market-oriented journalism eager to publish hot topics without verifying them, which incites and fuels rumours, misperceptions, and confusion and makes efforts to destabilizing the Baltic countries by boosting images like “the war between Russia and the Baltic states is inevitable in the future” or “the West will not help the Baltics” (Mölder, 2018). Moreover, using strategic imagination, it is logical to see that Russia is likely to portray itself as a defender of traditional conservative values, and China, in a similar fashion, will continue painting itself as a defender of common sense and global stability. In these contexts, both countries are now appearing as “rescuing” the world from the shackles of the liberal ideology. Russia’s influence operations are often tailored to potentially target various anti-establishment groups, Eurosceptics, anti-American sentiments, anti-immigration and anti-globalization movements, and many others on the extreme right or left side of the political spectrum. Attacking the reputation of public figures. Character assassination is a form of knowledge warfare that specifically targets the reputation of public figures. False allegations, exaggerations, bogus translations, scorning, and slander are among the most frequently used means of character attacks (Icks & Shiraev, 2014). There were “traditional” targets, like Hungarian-born American billionaire, investor, and philanthropist George Soros, who has been blamed for being responsible for organizing political unrest in Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, and other countries, which Russia considers being within its sphere of influence (Madisson & Ventsel, 2020). There have been new attacks, such as Bill Gates who was accused by Russian public figures— and these claims have been amplified by thousands of social network users—about sinister microchips being prepared for installation into human bodies by global scientists-conspirators to control their behaviour. This could have been regarded as a delusion, if this belief weren’t so widespread in Russia (Furlong, 2020). Again, we do not claim that a foreign government has initiated and spread these bizarre rumours. Our examples are to suggest, using the method of strategic imagination, how easy such attacks can be organized against key-decision makers and how quickly such attacks can become effective. Creating chaos. By contributing to a culture of uncertainty, foreign adversarial powers target the disappointed, the discouraged, and the angry. One bizarre example that can be repeated in future campaigns is the so-called buckwheat crisis of 2010, which started in Russia, but rapidly spread over the post-Soviet space including the Baltic countries (Baltic News Network, 2010). The knowledge of a considerable

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part of the population can deliberately be manipulated by sharing a joint information space. When in Russia people began to panicky buy and hoard buckwheat for about a week earlier, the news about rising prices and possible buckwheat shortages have also spread across Estonia via Russian-language channels. The “buckwheat crisis” is a great prototype of a possible disinformation campaign, by which a social crisis can easily emerge from nothing. Confusing knowledge with bogus references to “scientists” or “authoritative sources” can be spread via social networks to boost the trustworthiness of fake knowledge. Building historical myths. Foreign adversarial powers are capable of creating false narratives in the form of historical myths. Among such myths are the powerful narratives that portray China as historical victims of injustice, for which the West and Japan were exclusively responsible. Chinese narratives often refer to the “century of humiliation” from 1839 to 1949 when the Western powers and Japan actively interfered in Chinese affairs. Russia has also moved in the same direction by making constitutional amendments to protect a certain view of history and essentially justify Soviet dealings with Hitler before World War II (Hapaeva, 2020). Other Russian historical myths scorn many Western courtiers as essentially pro-Nazi and pro-fascist before and even during World War II. We anticipate a new wave of historic revisions coming from various countries aiming at the West and especially its colonial past and imperialism. History is not what foreign knowledge warriors are interested in. The goal is to enforce the culture of uncertainty and self-doubt and to undermine the moral foundations of liberal democracy. Promoting own leaders’ image. Unlike democratic states, authoritarian regimes have significant government resources to promote the positive image of their leaders—all for domestic and international consumption. The images of Putin and Xi as strongmen, the “giants” standing for security and order, effectively compete with the images of Western leaders in the past and present (i.e., Bush, Obama, Macron, Merkel, Tusk, von der Leyen, and others) who have been described as weak, failing and inconsistent, unable to manage multiple challenges we are facing in a new world. We anticipate a constant stream of images and commentaries about the assertiveness and benevolence of Chinese and Russian leaders in sharp contrast with “weak” and “wavering” Western politicians (Rachman, 2016). Insulting Western liberal values. Russian strategic narratives harshly criticize Western liberalism as decadent and impractical. The harshest attacks are launched against feminism, LGBT rights, multiculturalism, and other policies of tolerance and inclusiveness. Russian-language postings in social media do not shy away from using racist and homophobic words such as—Jewrope or Gayrope—facilitating hatred against many social, ethnic, and cultural groups (Schmid, 2018). Although we believe that many of such postings are not generated by professional knowledge warriors, they essentially share the official position of the Kremlin regarding these issues. The European migration crisis or violent riots in the United States in 2020/2021 are examples of how the culture of fear can be reinforced through the skilful manipulation of information. Portraying immigrants as rapists and racial minorities as vandals, foreign governments not only will try to consolidate public opinion at home (a big chunk of which shares racist and anti-immigrant views) but will also widen the

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political and ideological divisions in Europe and the United States by appealing to far-right groups in the West. Scorning key government policies. Information campaigns initiated by adversarial powers and promoted by their official media channels as well as in social media provide various and sometimes bizarre conspiracy theories. It does not matter because some of them attract attention and create the knowledge about fading capabilities of Western democracies in handling COVID-19. Popular narratives spread in the background of the pandemic were about Russia and China saving the world by taking effective measures. On the contrary, the West, with all its advanced medicine, was incapable of stopping the virus. Stories disseminated in social media praising China, Russia, and Cuba—and their leaders—for their international help to countries, such as Italy, during the early weeks of the pandemic (EU vs. Disinfo, 2020). No matter which party or a coalition is in charge of the government, it will be attacked by knowledge warriors. Exaggerating difficulties. Social and economic problems of the West have been favourite targets in GKW. Inequality, racism, unemployment, crime, or instability— all these topics will be picked up and tirelessly discussed. The goal is, as always, two-fold: to create and promote a negative cultural climate of fear and uncertainty in the West and to consolidate some portion of public opinion at home. The Kremlin will try to promote voices and provide a forum for all alternative forces critical of Western liberal democracy, whose political goals may be found to be similar to the strategic goals advocated by Russia and so deliberately use them for the purposes of knowledge warfare.

9 Conclusion It would be naïve not to anticipate that countries such as Russia, China, or Iran would not use current international and domestic events to boost their strategic interests to achieve their particular strategic domestic and international goals. In the Global Knowledge Warfare, Russia and China intend to convince the public in the West that they can offer a viable alternative to the West. The United States and China are competing over global economic primacy, at least potentially challenged by the European Union as well, but economically unsuccessful Russia is focusing on security challenges including advancing new types of warfare. Therefore, GKW is justified for powers intending to move out from the status quo and challenging the existing international order. The modern GKW is producing and spreading the cultures of uncertainty, fear, and irrational decisions to win the battle over people’s minds. Winning the war over knowledge in the minds of millions of people, challenging the West’s desire to defend its fundamental values or freedom and democracy, can lead to a new illiberal multipolar international order, where there is less cooperation and transparency, more mistrust, more restrictions—the Hobbesian warning to the world.

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Synthetic Media and Information Warfare: Assessing Potential Threats Ignas Kalpokas and Julija Kalpokiene

1 Introduction This chapter aims to shed light on the potential use of synthetic media (such as deepfakes, virtual and augmented reality, and virtual influencers) for manipulative purposes, with particular emphasis on Russia’s understanding of information warfare. Synthetic media are understood as digital audio-visual content that has been wholly, or at least mostly, artificially generated, often (and, in case of deepfakes, exclusively) through the use of automated content generation techniques based on Artificial Intelligence (such as deep learning). As a relatively new phenomenon (deepfakes only entered the public discourse in 2018 while virtual influencers, despite being around since 2016, only became mainstream during 2019–2020), synthetic media remain underexplored. While there already are discussions regarding potential nefarious use of these new media, particularly regarding deepfakes, the precise contours, and vectors of such use, as well as the likely effects of their employment, remain unclear. Therefore, Russia’s understanding of information warfare provides a benchmark against which the potential negative uses of synthetic media are evaluated. Hence, synthetic media are not analysed as Russia’s information warfare tools per se, but, instead, the discussion of Russia’s strategy in the first part of this chapter is used as a framework to establish the contours of synthetic media’s potential use in general. Moreover, as contemporary societies are increasingly dependent on the online environment and digital communication and content delivery technologies, it is of crucial importance to better understand the relationship between innovations in content generation and the ever-expanding perimeter of manipulation and information warfare.

I. Kalpokas (B) · J. Kalpokiene Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_3

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The chapter opens with a discussion of information warfare, and the specifically Russian approach to it. It is demonstrated that this understanding of information warfare treats it as a constant and all-encompassing phenomenon, whereby the entire society is seen as a target, at times of both war and peace (in fact, it can be said that there is no such thing as ‘information peace’). The aim of such conflict is to undermine the adversary’s decision-making processes and societal coexistence so that decisions are either made to the attacker’s (i.e., Russia’s) benefit or rendered impossible at all. It is particularly the latter condition, which can be called epistemic anarchy, i.e., the undermining of trust and a shared reality that can be exacerbated through synthetic media. As it is confusion and not persuasion that the attacker intends to achieve, even content that is not fully believable on its own can have a significant effect. For that reason, the chapter then moves towards an analysis of different types of synthetic media to demonstrate how they can contribute to epistemic anarchy. In particular, it is demonstrated that synthetic media can further hinder the ability to distinguish between what is true and what is fake (particularly, in case of deepfakes), provide unprecedented immersion in manufactured content (virtual and extended reality) and assist in reaching new audiences in ostensibly non-political ways (virtual influencers).

2 Information Warfare Russia Style: Reflexive Control and Epistemic Anarchy In order to adequately discuss information warfare (hereafter, IW), one must begin with a definitional problem. The issue is that the term itself is notoriously imprecise. It is highly ambiguous and has no uniform usage in Western military thinking and public discourse (Tashevet al., 2019, 132). By contrast, there is a broad consensus among researchers analysing Russian strategic military thinking that the Russian military doctrine ‘attributes an unparalleled role to information struggle’ (Adamsky, 2018, 40) as a means to ‘neutralize state opponents’ (Thornton & Miron, 2020, 16). Overall, IW is concerned with shaping the strategic environment in a way that is preferable to Russia by way of simultaneously affecting public and elite perceptions in terms of both the strategic calculus of the leadership (civilian and military) and the behaviour of the general population, so that the citizens start thinking in Russiafriendly categories (Tashev et al., 2019, 133–134, 139). The aim is to make the adversary choose the outcomes strategically beneficial not to themselves but to Russia, i.e., achieving so-called the ‘reflexive control’ (Adamsky, 2018, 41; Pynnöniemi, 2019, 215). That only illustrates a fundamental difference in the understanding and use of information between Russia and the West; since for the former, information is not seen as a public good, but as a strategic asset, as well as due to lack of scrutiny in the decision-making process, Russia ‘faces fewer legal and cultural barriers to influence at the operational and strategic levels’, thereby enabling effective weaponization of information (Tashev et al., 2019, 132).

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Moreover, while Western states prefer to retain the war/peace dichotomy, the Russian understanding of IW implies that it is ‘a continuous and comprehensive process’ (Pynnöniemi, 2019, 216), a form of confrontation that ‘is waged during peacetime and wartime, simultaneously, in all domains—domestic, the adversary’s, and international’ (Adamsky, 2018, 42). No less crucially, as already stressed above, IW also erases another distinction, fundamental to conventional thinking about conflict: that between the military and the leadership on the one side, and the general civilian population on the other—instead, the entire society is the target (Pynnöniemi, 2019, 216; see also Di Pietro et al., 2021). The goal is, therefore, achievement of psychological, ideological, and informational dominance, undermining of the core structures of the targeted society, and erosion of the basic attributes of knowledge and trust (Tashev et al., 2019, 136). There is an entire well-oiled machinery dedicated to the amplification of IW content. Bokša (2019) provides a useful account, whereby messages and themes are first seen to originate in Russia’s state-run media and then transmitted by various ‘friendly voices’ (local analysts, experts, activists, politicians, and other actors who are ostensibly independent but actually aligned to Russia) whose comments are spread via dedicated disinformation websites and then shared in social media groups, from which they are picked up either by ordinary citizens who are already believers of Russian propaganda or by trolls and bots. However, such campaigns would be limited in their effect should the target society be robust in its capacity to recognize and tackle disinformation. Hence, the Russian strategy also involves bullying critical voices on social media and online fora as well as smear campaigns against journalists investigating Russia’s role in spreading disinformation (Aro, 2016, 123). The preceding has the dual effect of silencing and confusing people. The more active citizens who oppose the trolls are silenced through abuse and attempts at reputation damage; similarly, for those who are less committed but, nevertheless, sceptical of the promoted message, the atmosphere becomes simply too toxic to express their views, thereby stifling any discussion and leaving the troll voice hegemonic. Confusion and disorientation are then spread among the rest of the population through a barrage of claims and counterclaims (inducing what will be later referred to as epistemic anarchy) or by establishing a fake perception of consensus through the troll discourse remaining relatively unopposed (Aro, 2016, 124). It must be stressed that, in terms of Russia’s IW strategy, ‘an attack is successful when it leads to the “self-disorganization” and “self-disorientation” of the adversary’ (Pynnöniemi, 2019, 218) by way of spreading disillusionment, distrust, and widespread scepticism (Adamsky, 2018, 41). Bokša (2019) also stresses pervasive distrust, fuelled by alternative media and social media groups, as instrumental to the disinformation effort; crucially, he also highlights the contagious nature of such distrust as it then spreads through family and friend networks. In this way, fake information, rumours, manipulative interpretations of events, deceptively genuine public voices, and other types of falsehoods (Pynnöniemi, 2019, 219) are used to ultimately ‘hack’ the society. Likewise, according to Robinson et al. (2019, 2), IW ‘works by amplifying, obfuscating, and, at times, persuading’. Note that here, again, persuasion is far from being the main focus. What the Russians have noticed to their strategic

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advantage is that oftentimes, one does not need to convince people—it is sufficient to simply confuse them. Thereby the bar for success is lowered significantly and a wide range of techniques that are not necessarily fully persuasive when considered in isolation suddenly become useful, nevertheless. In this case, it becomes immaterial whether a reasonable person would find, e.g., a deepfake or a virtual reality experience persuasive—what matters is how these types of content contribute to the general atmosphere of disorientation and disconcertment. Likewise, even content that is explicitly non-convincing, such as satire, both traditional and modern (e.g., memes or self-disclosing deepfakes) can contribute to the overall IW effort by furthering a cynical attitude which accompanies epistemic anarchy. The IW content that is the most difficult to tackle is what Aro (2016, 126) calls ‘subtle disinformation’: content that is not outrageously disinformation, but instead works in a piecemeal fashion, providing a constant drip of falsehoods and halftruths embedded within the seemingly generic discourse and coming from sources that are not overtly political. This type of IW is a matter of persistence: not an information blitzkrieg but, instead a continuous stealth effort, either in preparation for intensification (which can sometimes be misperceived as a blitzkrieg) or for the purpose of sowing distrust and inducing an epistemic crisis within the target society, thereby undermining the very foundations of social interaction. In either case, this is a long-term effort, for the maintenance of which a broad variety of means and techniques, spanning across both news and entertainment media and straddling different delivery formats, is necessary. Hence, an important role is reserved for new content generation and dissemination technology (Pynnöniemi, 2019, 220). A crucial area in the evolution of IW is the growth of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. It transpires that among the top applications of AI mooted by the Russian military elite are various options for ‘employment in the realm of “information”; specifically, information targeted at the grand-strategic level’ (Thornton & Miron, 2020, 16). Of particular relevance here is the progress made in the domain of deep learning in order to synthesize video, audio, and still images from scratch or to convincingly modify existing ones (Polyakova, 2018). Russian strategists therefore see AI as a generator of ‘virtual truth’ and ‘artificial data’ to confuse the adversary and severely hamper their decision-making (or even render the latter impossible) if the data available will no longer be reliable (Thornton & Miron, 2020, 17). Ultimately, ‘faith would be undermined in everything from government announcements to GPS readings’, leading to the collapse of state functions ‘under the weight of an inability to discern truth’ (Thornton & Miron, 2020, 17). Should that succeed, epistemic anarchy would reign, and the adversary would be truly incapacitated. The effect of fake content will likely be maximized through ‘precision propaganda’, with manipulative content reaching the intended audience with a high degree of accuracy through the use of AI to ‘supercharge’ the targeting ecosystem, composed of ‘data collection, advertising platforms, and search engine optimization’ (Polyakova 2018; see also Ghosh & Scott, 2018). In this situation, automated synthetic content creation, once laid over the entire (fully legitimate) advertising and marketing infrastructure, will likely have the capacity to corrode Western political systems from inside (Ghosh & Scott, 2018). Even though neither of these techniques

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and types of content would be able to produce epistemic anarchy taken on their own, it is as a combined effect within a persistent stealth strategy that they can be seen to come to fruition. Moreover, identifying, debunking, and attributing fake content ‘will require far more resources than the cost of production, and it will be difficult if not impossible to do so in real time’ (Polyakova, 2018), so the damage will be done before any countermeasures are adopted. Finally, and still squarely within the domain of technology-driven innovations, advances in synthetic media have already meant that ‘reality has become less straightforward than ever’, but, instead, ‘intangible and personalized’ due to the manufacturing and spread of ‘synthetic likenesses, persons, and entire worlds’ that can be tailored to appeal to specific target audiences (Kalpokas, 2021, 8)—a perfect match for an IW strategy that aims to induce epistemic anarchy. Ultimately, then, the goal of a hostile information campaign, carried out by a state like Russia, is likely to be not necessarily full control of the narrative or public opinion in the target state but, instead, epistemic anarchy. While, for example, Benkler et al. (2018) already use the term ‘epistemic crisis’ to refer to the general state of confusion caused by transformations in the media environment and their abuse by hostile actors, including Russia, they see it as an objective condition that is opportunistically capitalized on by threat agents. Epistemic anarchy, meanwhile, is a strategic goal, which is intentionally aimed for by the attacker. In essence, epistemic anarchy is achieved when a society can no longer agree on the basic tenets of reality and coexistence and/or is so disoriented by a barrage of competing claims that nothing ultimately seems believable and, therefore, worth fighting (figuratively or literally) for. Defining characteristics of epistemic anarchy within the target society are the spread of confusion over what is happening or what adequate knowledge is; erosion of trust, both among societal groups and in experts, political leaders, etc.; fraying of the fabric of society due to polarization; growing feeling of insecurity following the loss of social and political markers. The results of this condition are, likely, passive cynicism or active polarization, in either case leading to the paralysis of decisionmaking processes. As a strategic goal, epistemic anarchy is also convenient for the attacker because it lowers the bar for success: instead of taking over the cognitive processes of the target population (or a significant part thereof), one merely needs to dismantle them. Likewise, contrary to alarmist assertions about synthetic media being some kind of superweapons (see, e.g., Schick, 2020), a more modest (and realistic) claim should be made: it suffices if they work as part of a broader operation, convincing only some people or, at least, making them less likely to trust any information.

3 Deepfakes and the New Frontier of Digital Forgery One of the most succinct and informative definitions of the deepfake technology is provided by (Young, 2019, 8), who frames it as ‘a technology that uses Artificial Intelligence to produce or edit contents of a video on an image to show something

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that never happened’. In other words, it offers the capacity to create entirely new or edit existing visual material in a way that makes it increasingly difficult to separate between fakery and reality. The latter is of particular concern in the context of the increasing prevalence (and influence) of fake news and deliberate political manipulation, because this technology purports to add a new weapon to the arsenal of those aiming to disrupt the normal functioning of the public sphere (Hall, 2018, 52). Moreover, as the speed and ubiquity of today’s digital platforms allow instant dissemination of content to large audiences, such fakery will spread, and likely go viral, almost instantly and certainly prior to any response strategy being developed by those who are targeted (Chesney & Citron, 2019). Moreover, if such fakery is timed well (e.g., appearing just on the eve of an election), there will likely be no time for the victim to provide a convincing explanation; and if the margin between the contenders is slim, even a small number of those falling for a deepfake might suffice (Charlet & Citron, 2019). Technically, deepfakes pertain to deep learning, one of the most widely used approaches to artificial intelligence, in which artificial neural networks are trained to plough through big sets of data (in this case, photos and videos) to discover rules and replicate patterns (Chesney & Citron, 2019, 148). The specific technique typically used for deepfake production is known as a ‘generative adversarial network’, or GAN. A GAN is composed of a pair of algorithms that are pitted against each other: one of them, the generator, is tasked with creating output on the basis of preexisting training data, while the other, the discriminator, is tasked with identifying the fake content, thereby competing until the discriminator can no longer detect the generator’s fakery; as both are training against each other all the time, the GAN is set to produce output of ever higher quality—in this case, increasingly realistic audio-visual content (Chesney & Citron, 2019, 148; Giles et al., 2019, 8; Young 2019, 10). At their most menacing, deepfakes can be used to show politicians saying or doing things they never did, thereby jeopardizing their reputations or insulting groups domestically and/or abroad with the aim of inciting violence (Greengard, 2019, 164). While we have already witnessed during the 2016 US presidential election campaign that a well-timed foreign intervention into a nation’s public sphere can create, at the very least, the possibility of swaying election results, deepfakes can up the ante, for example, if a deepfake video emerged of one of the contenders allegedly accepting a bribe or making disparaging remarks towards a key constituency. Likewise, under conditions of simmering economic, ethnic, or religious tensions, a fake representation of the head of state or some other leading politician apparently insulting the sensibilities of the already dissatisfied groups could push them over the edge towards violence or other acts of active resistance, thereby destabilizing the already fragile situation completely (see, e.g., Greengard, 2020, 17; Woolley, 2020, 14). Deepfakes should also be seen as a full-spectrum phenomenon, as the technology is capable of combining fake images (for both ‘proof’ of made-up events and profile pictures of automated accounts), video (for allegedly incriminating material), and automatically generated text; in this way, the potential is opened up for automated astroturfing

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(faking grassroots opinion and activism) by ‘generating an entire fake public to influence political decisions’ (Giles et al., 2019, 11; see also Martineu, 2019). Therefore, if left unchecked, deepfakes appear to have the potential to further disrupt the fabric of reality (Woolley, 2020, 107), if not leading to opinion manipulation, then at least contributing to epistemic anarchy, as already discussed in the section on Russia’s IW strategy. While most deepfakes today are pornographic in nature, a more worrisome outcome would involve threat actors embracing both data analysis and precisiontargeted marketing techniques to generate political fakes tailored to specific target audiences that would find it highly difficult to resist the made-up content, even in cases where quality is still rough (Paul & Posard, 2020). After all, as Giles et al. (2019, 11) observe, ‘[t]echniques for achieving virality in malicious influence campaigns are precisely the same as those used to market a product’. Moreover, the reaction that humans have to visual material is typically more immediate and visceral than that to any other content (see, e.g., Charlet & Citron, 2019), and once that gets coupled with the pre-existing motivation to believe that comes from targeting, deepfakes may become even more difficult for the public to resist. Consequently, as marketing analysts already envision a future of deep personalization, whereby everyone is getting content tailored to their personal data, an analogous tailoring of the information environment appears to be more than merely a possibility (see also Constine, 2020). Moreover, there clearly is potential for the spread of deepfake risk through technologically enabled democratization of fake content. As Young (2019, 12) points out, unlike traditional editing software that requires skill and tedious labour, deepfakes generate content automatically, meaning that ‘[a]nyone can now create hyper-realistic deepfakes’ (Van de Weghe, 2019). It is also worth noting that the necessary software is often freely available online, and so is training data; hence, while initially deepfakes were mostly discussed in the context of high-profile individuals or deepfake revenge porn, it must be kept in mind that ‘there are sufficiently large amounts of audio, video, picture, and text materials online, provided voluntarily or otherwise, to put most humans with any online presence at some risk’ (Giles et al., 2019, 17). And while it might seem at first glance that such trends would primarily point towards private risk (distortion of private reputations by faking incriminating or pornographic material) while information warfare pertains to public risk, the two are not necessarily disconnected. With the decreasing burden (financial, hardware, and data) of deepfake creation, activists and factcheckers who work to counter hostile operations will be the prime targets, thereby silencing them or making their voice less convincing. A very similar chord is struck by Simonite (2019) who asserts that, at least for now, the major threat is, likely, ‘amplifying local harassment’ of activists and journalists—again, a threat identified as part of the Russian toolkit. Notably, not every activist or journalist has to become an actual target—a few well-known cases may be enough to have a chilling effect on everybody else, reducing the willingness to actively resist disinformation and clearing the path towards epistemic anarchy. Ultimately, once deepfakes become widespread, everything must be treated with suspicion (Joseph, 2019), leading to the emergence of a paranoid public sphere,

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where citizens become equally cynical towards any claims, right of wrong, and thereby losing trust in any information provided and an impetus to cooperate on matters of common concern (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020, 2). No less alarming is the potential for deepfakes being used to shed doubts on the actual misdeeds as lying politicians (and other actors) who will likely be able to deflect proof by dismissing it as deepfake (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020, 9; Woolley, 2020, 14). Given the already prevalent habit of some politicians to use accusations of ‘fake news’ against anyone expressing unfavourable views, this is more than just a theoretical possibility. The preceding will also make factchecking more difficult because counterproof against disinformation can itself be dismissed as fake, producing confusion as to what (or which) the actual (deep)fake is, thereby further contributing to epistemic anarchy. A natural reaction to such uncertainty will likely be voters opting for remaining ‘within their partisan bubbles, believing only those politicians and media figures who share their political orientation’ as evidence further shrinks in value, at least when it comes to public debate (Galston, 2020). Once again, although the quoted authors use diverse terminology, the preceding are manifestations of epistemic anarchy par excellence. In response to the deepfake threat, technology is often touted as a solution, alleging that detection and recognition techniques will be developed that identify and flag deepfake content with a high level of effectiveness (see, e.g., Riparbelli, 2019). However, it must also be kept in mind that deepfake detection is not only reactive (hence, the fake content will already have struck the chord with the audience) but is also typically more time-consuming than the generation of fake content itself; as a result, deepfakes will probably remain underproved (and reach large numbers of people) before their artificial nature can be demonstrated convincingly, if at all (Galston, 2020). Moreover, the way recognition is likely to work poses problems as well: as Thomas (2020) observes, ‘[w]hilst the good guys need huge numbers of deepfake videos to train on, the forgers might only need to place one video in the right place at the right time to achieve their goal’. For that reason, while deepfake detection algorithms might work towards reducing the threat posed by deepfakes, it is unlikely that they would significantly dint the potential of deepfake-based manipulation, let alone remove the threat altogether.

4 Extended Reality and Synthetic Surroundings As the mediatization of everyday life progresses as a result of both technological innovation and market pressures, further development of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies (usually referred to collectively as extended reality, or XR) appears to be a natural next step. At their most basic, ‘VR refers to an interactive computer-generated 3D environment completely immersing a user inside it, while AR […] combines virtual objects with the real world’ (Leung et al., 2020, 1). In essence, AR puts virtual objects directly on top of the real world in real time (see Scholz & Duffy, 2018; Steffen et al., 2019), while VR replaces the physical world with a manufactured digital alternative altogether, providing ‘an environment

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where users can retrieve information in multi-sensory modalities, including visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic’ (Tussyadiah et al., 2018, 141). In this way, AR has the benefit of not disconnecting its users from reality, but rather merging the physical and the digital in an interactive way (Rauschnabel et al., 2019, 44). Hence, there is a distinct sense of realism in AR that VR cannot provide: instead of being transposed into a completely different and unfamiliar environment (as happens in VR), here users can see and experience the referent object in their own familiar environment, thereby better understanding what it would mean to own something, communicate with somebody (e.g., an avatar), or to experience something (McLean & Wilson, 2019, 220). In both cases, the user has an opportunity to have a richer experience than the physical world could afford. Immersion is a key quality of any VR experience, and the underlying technologies have already ‘improved in their ability to immerse participants, which leads to an increased sense of being present in another environment’ at the expense of the physical environment (Steffen et al., 2019, 689–690). Other VR researchers focus on the closely related concept of presence, which can be defined as ‘a psychological state in which the virtuality (artificiality) of an experience is unnoticed’ (Tussyadiah et al., 2018, 141–142). Likewise, immersion is the subjective experience of ‘being “in” a real or virtual experience’ and, as such, ‘involves physical and mental participation’ (Hudson et al., 2019, 461). Hence, immersion/presence takes place as a result of an interplay between sensory and cognitive processes as both the technology involved and the physical environment in which the user is objectively located disappear from perception (Tussyadiah et al., 2018, 142). Crucially, then, ‘VR is able to fool the predicted coding mechanisms used by the brain generating the feeling of presence in a virtual body and in the digital space around it’ (Riva et al., 2019, 89). The mental element here is crucial as it delineates a capacity to induce synthetic experiences in the minds of the users, including for manipulative purposes. Simultaneously, mental presence is fortified with visceral presence as VR operates by modifying the perception not only of the body’s outside, but also of what is happening inside the body, including the release of hormones, muscle tension, heart rate, etc. (Riva et al., 2019, 90). In essence, unless there is a glitch in the technology, the reaction is complete as if the virtual was real, despite the nature of the content. Under such circumstances, epistemic anarchy could result in the inability to distinguish memories of VR experiences from memories of real-world experiences, particularly at a more latent level. The synthetic experiences within which the user becomes immersed take place within virtual worlds, which could be game environments, educational or entertainment experiences, social spaces, etc. As VR technology is becoming increasingly available, even low-budget creators are enabled to build ambitious projects, ‘providing a level of immersion and experience that has never been seen before’ (Hall & Takahashi, 2017), making it almost impossible for the users not to believe their synthetic perceptions and experiences. In this context, it is vital to note that virtual presence has been demonstrated to induce attitude change, whereby the experience of something leads to a more favourable attitude towards it (Tussyadiah et al,. 2018, 151)—provided that the object is presented in a positive way. Likewise, and with particular relevance to potential manipulative use, it is reasonable to assume that

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should something or somebody be portrayed negatively in XR, aversion would be equally strong and lasting. Users appear to be able to both learn and recall more about things experienced in VR than they do about similar things experienced through other media (Tussyadiah et al., 2018, 141). Likewise, as Griffin and Muldoon (2020, 2) show, ‘[i]n comparison with other media platforms, users of VR report greater senses of attachment, understanding, and general interest in the experiences they view’, and AR-induced experience seems not to lag far behind (McLean & Wilson, 2019, 220). Moreover, as XR (and VR in particular) imposes a high perceptual and cognitive load, user perception seems to be fully focused on the experience, leaving significantly fewer cognitive resources available to critically evaluating that experience; likewise, attention to any distractions is limited, meaning that the user remains solely engaged with whatever is deliberately provided to them (Leung et al., 2020, 3). In this way, the experience provider gains complete possession of the user. Crucially, the psychological impact of VR is likely to be, according to one of the pioneers of the technology, ‘of a different magnitude’ in comparison with any other media, progressively ‘cutting us off from the real world’ (Bailenson, 2018, 67). Hence, because VR simply feels real, and does so in a profound and personally meaningful way, ‘the potential dangers for misinformation and emotional manipulation are exponentially greater’ (Bailenson, 2018, 67). There are already fears that VR experiences may be used for radicalization and recruitment by extremist or terrorist organizations, because immersive experiences provide more convincing material, regardless of whether it is real or fake (Marr, 2019). It would be surprising if hostile technology-oriented actors, such as Russia, did not follow suit. In this way, the technology becomes a double-edged sword: for example, there are already proven ways to use VR for empathy training through immersive material by enabling users to experience someone else’s hardship (Hall & Takahashi, 2017; Collange & Guegan, 2020). Simultaneously, though, such capacity opens up ways for social engineering and manipulation through selective case choice and deliberate framing of a referent object (the real victim of the manipulative effort) as the object of frustration thereby evoked. Crucially, toying with virtual experiences allows the provider ‘to maximize experimental control of a complex social situation’ by manipulating a single variable each time and doing so with total control; moreover, by controlling how the virtual characters behave, ‘it is possible to create infinitely many combinations of social variables and test them against each other’ (Pan & Hamilton, 2018, 396), allowing for highly efficient optimization of social control through deliberately induced emotions. Notably, induction of contrary emotions and the capacity to diversify experiences could be important steps towards epistemic anarchy. Another issue to keep in mind is the amount of user data that is being exposed through the use of XR, including biometric data, such as ‘facial expressions, speech data, and even retina patterns that can be used to uniquely identify us’ (Marr, 2019); recording body movements and data, and monitoring the user’s environment can be equally informative of the personality of the user (Braun, 2019). It is crucial to note that most of such data are typically collected by default as they are necessary for an interactive experience: how the user is moving and where, the direction in which they are looking, how they are reacting and communicating, both verbally

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and non-verbally, enable seamless and live adjustment of the virtual environment or augmented overlay. The problem is, of course, that such data can be also used for unprecedented personalization of deception and manipulation as more data allow more precise targeting (Braun, 2019; Marr, 2019). It is also impossible to discard the possibility of malicious impersonation: just as it is the case with deepfakes, personal reputations can be severely hit, this time by having an individual’s avatar engage in unacceptable behaviour in XR, either as a new generation of ransomware or for the purpose of intimidation and/or (political) manipulation (Braun, 2019), thereby reducing willingness to resist IW. Finally, there is also a matter of content that might not be explicitly disinformational but have a detrimental or distortive effect on the user’s (self-)perception anyway. Mukherjee (2018) provides a crucial piece of the puzzle in his analysis of computer games from a postcolonial perspective. For him, a key aspect of subaltern experience in gaming is that players from former colonies almost never have the opportunity to play as themselves, but only as their own colonizers (and, therefore, against their own caricatured or otherwise distorted selves). Hence, the postcolonial subject is framed as voiceless and continuously at the receiving end of the (former) master’s civilizing mission. One can only speculate that similar content trends will carry on into XR experiences, but their effects are only going to be stronger due to the added immersive qualities of XR. Similarly, the perpetrator of IW could use XR experiences to promote the image of their own superiority and grandeur at the expense of the victim. In this way, the user’s self-perception (and the perception of their referent group) can be negatively affected (and that of the manipulator enhanced) even through content nominally focused on entertainment and escapism. Given that Russia, for example, already has a track record of using cultural produce, such as films or music, to maintain its cultural and ideological grip on some parts of post-soviet populations, such experiences would be a logical extension.

5 Virtual Influencers: Synthetic Humans Promoting Synthetic Things? Virtual influencers (VIs) form a distinct class of online personalities that, despite being synthetic in nature, are increasingly populating not just photo-based social media, such as Instagram, but also video-first platforms, like YouTube (Cruz, 2019). Broadly speaking, it is possible to categorize VIs into two major strands: (1) those created and owned by a single brand and (2) general-purpose VIs who act (or, rather, are puppeteer by their creators) in the same way as their human counterparts do— creating a personal brand and then striking deals with commercial partners on the go (Sokolov, 2019). To some extent, such VIs even manage to transcend the boundaries between the physical and the virtual by, e.g., co-starring in ad campaigns with reallife celebrities or releasing music in collaboration with actual bands (Sokolov, 2019; Bradley, 2020). General-purpose VIs are also increasingly indistinguishable from

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human influencers in terms of their standing within the media and entertainment industry: they are progressively treated in the same way human talent is, leading to actual or speculated involvement in TV shows and film performances (Spangler, 2020). Hence, these synthetic entities effectively become multimedia packages that can bring in diverse revenue streams to their creators (Yates, 2020). Moreover, it transpires that at least some of the general-purpose VIs tend to cast a wide net in terms of their engagement and go beyond simple brand endorsements into supporting social and political movements and campaigns (Delibasic, 2018), from Black Lives Matter to Trump. While the latter can be, to a degree at least, be written down to VI owners pitching their creation to a particular demographic which would find the politician, movement, or cause appealing, it is equally impossible to discard the opposite: that these are endorsements aimed at promoting a movement or a cause among the existing follower base, thereby opening up the potential for IW applications. VIs are definitely intentionally designed to appeal. Contrary to humans, who already have characteristics of their own, VIs ‘are a painstakingly crafted vision of what their creators have assumed audiences will be interested in engaging with’ (Torossian, 2020). That vision is not based on guesswork either—it is, usually, premised upon audience data analysis and detailed market research so that the chance of a positive match with audience tastes and expectations is maximized (Bradley, 2020). Hence, one must agree with Bergendorff’s (2019) argument that, courtesy to the combination of social prediction and the total malleability of a VI, such digital entities ‘will inherently be hard for the target market […] to dislike’—after all, ‘they should theoretically trend by default, and always be mysteriously ahead of trends’. Then, since there is no physical person to lean upon, significant attention is dedicated to storytelling techniques that are not random either, but painstakingly crafted to support and enhance the backstory developed for the VI in question (Luthera, 2020). To some extent, following the unfolding story of a virtual influencer might be the modern equivalent of reading a novel centred around a strong main character; keeping in mind that many novels of the past had initially not been conceived as single volumes but, instead, printed serially across multiple newspaper issues, it might well be that the difference here is solely that of the medium. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that many of such stories have had not only artistic but also propagandist intentions, and VIs may not be much different. One of the main issues regarding VIs is their apparent lack of authenticity. Allegedly, human influencers are simply more believable and, therefore, effective— after all, there is an actual person behind the profile (see, e.g., Cruz, 2019; Forsey, 2019). Nevertheless, a counterargument can be made that many human influencers (and celebrities more broadly) are barely more human anyway—their profiles are strategically crafted representations that may have little to do with the actual person (Gräve, 2019). And humans already have a track record of looking up to idols that are real in name only: just like a few decades ago reality television stars had become the epitome of popular success, only to be replaced by influencers once social media became the medium of choice; VIs may be the next logical step, reflecting the growing digitization and virtualization of everyday life (Sokolov, 2019). Likewise, the cultural clout achieved by the more popular VIs implies that the relationship established with

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followers is less dependent on the nature of the influencer than might be otherwise assumed (Robinson, 2020, 3). The steady growth of the VI phenomenon is in itself a testament to followers being undisturbed by their virtual nature (Vogue Business, 2020). Moreover, early research indicates that the engagement rate of VIs might be three times that of human ones (Leighton, 2019). Hence, while it is undisputedly correct that any VI is ‘nothing more than a coded puppet at the hands of the people and brands who control it’ (Haile, 2020), the actual value of such a synthetic entity is in the eyes of the beholder. And it seems like, for much of the VI follower base, the digital and the physical seem to be increasingly indistinguishable, at least in terms of importance and potential effects on the perception of the broader world phenomena. After all, it is also crucial to remember that in order to contribute to epistemic anarchy, not full conviction but mere disorientation of the audience suffices. From the perspective of those employing VIs, there is certainly much to like. Among the main benefits are full control of the message (it is not going to get diluted through the influencer’s own voice) and predictability (a VI is not going to do anything crazy that would also make its sponsors and partners toxic)—qualities that real human persons can rarely offer (Bradley, 2020; Robinson, 2020). While it is easy to imagine why such qualities would strongly appeal to brands, the same effectively applies to political campaigners and even international organizations: for example, the World Health Organization has enlisted VI help in spreading information about the Covid-19 pandemic (see, e.g., Williams, 2020). Those aiming to engage in IW will likely find the same attributes attractive. However, for them there is a further benefit in employing VIs: as the current oversaturation of the online environment with information seems to drive some people to avoid news (both real and fake) or any other outwardly informational content (see, e.g., Park, 2019), VIs, due to their entertainment focus, can reach audiences that regular disinformation and propaganda efforts cannot. And to some extent, even the novelty factor might be a sufficient draw—people may simply lack critical distance towards VIs by seeing them merely as a curious novelty rather than a potential tool for manipulation; moreover, this novelty factor might also help to cut through the noise that characterizes the social media environment by standing out as something fresh and intriguing. Hence, VIs can simply be used as directional signs, pointing attention to disinformation already placed elsewhere or to real or staged events that are of benefit to the hostile actor. User response to VIs appears to indicate a significant level of trust in their taste and opinion, forgetting that they, by definition, can have neither (Cook, 2020). But then there is also manipulative use that goes beyond the actual virtual characteristics of a VI: as the technological rendering capacity progresses, such creations become ever less visually distinguishable from real humans, acquiring the capacity to deceive followers as to their own nature (Powers, 2019). After all, it transpires that close to half (42%) social media users belonging to the Gen-Z and millennial categories have followed at least one VI without realizing for some time that they were not human (Cook, 2020). For that reason, it is clearly conceivable that VIs may be created not just by commercial but also by political actors in order to shape political views, either overtly or, much more likely, covertly. In the latter case, influence operations would most likely take place by peppering fake news and politically arousing themes onto

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generic entertainment-driven content, so that the manipulative VI would blend in just enough not to cause alarm while also standing out just sufficiently to appeal to the target audience for which it had been created in the first place. Overall, it transpires that VIs do have a potential for manipulation and disinformation, particularly should one imagine a scenario in which a VI, made attractive beyond the target audience’s capacity to resist, is controlled by a hostile foreign government, such as Russia, or a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group (Bradley, 2020). However, currently available manipulative uses of VIs pale in comparison with likely developments in the near future. Ultimately, as the technology progresses, automated content creation from audience trace data as well as increasing use of XR to bring VIs to life in 3D will make these synthetic entities more and more convincing. In fact, VIs are already beginning to straddle the virtual/physical divide, either as AR representations or as holograms, for example, in branded or brand-related settings (see, e.g., Webster, 2020). Meanwhile, automation of creation will mean real-time precision targeting of content to individuals and groups thereof in a way that would be impossible to any human influencer, and thereby enabling manipulation campaigns that will be seamless and personally tailored to audience members in real time, and thus extremely difficult to notice and resist.

6 Conclusion Overall, it is reasonable to maintain that synthetic media can make a significant contribution to IW, and it is therefore likely that threat actors aiming to manipulate societies would employ them. Certainly, it is clear that no one form of synthetic media would be effective in isolation, but their potential is best revealed as part of a stealth strategy that aims at disrupting societies in a subterranean, but persistent, way. That is particularly the case should we assume that the goal of IW is not full persuasion, but epistemic anarchy, as is the case in Russian strategic thinking on information. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Russell (2020, 107–108) argues for a new right to ‘mental security’, which would require governments to take more active defensive actions against attacks aiming for epistemic anarchy. In terms of potential uses of different types of synthetic media, deepfakes must be seen as making the separation between genuine and fake content increasingly difficult through the creation of misleading and manipulative content and simultaneously making it more complicated to trust any proof one is presented with. This can lead to disrupting the fabric of reality and manufacturing an entirely alternative world with its own synthetic public opinion or simply making any proof infinitely deniable, in both cases contributing to epistemic anarchy. As far as XR is concerned, immersion and cancelling out of real-world conditions are key; such immersion is known to make synthetic content more appealing while also erasing critical distance through the illusion of presence. In this way, the lasting psychological impact can be created, which, when combined with greater ability to control the experienced environment

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than with any other technology currently available, can indoctrinate or sow disorientation and confusion effectively. Finally, VIs can help promote IW narratives in a way that is difficult to recognize and can lure in audiences that would otherwise ignore (dis)informational content. They can also help cut through the noise of the current online environment; moreover, because VIs can be manufactured specifically to be very difficult for a precise target audience to resist, can act as Trojan Horses, and give privileged access to the attention of a particular group. Overall, then, while neither of these tools would likely be sufficient in isolation, each of them can make a distinct contribution to an IW strategy aimed at epistemic anarchy.

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Mukherjee, S. (2018). Playing subaltern: Video games and postcolonialism. Games and Culture, 13(5), 504–520. Pan, X., & Hamilton, A. F. C. (2018). Why and how to use virtual reality to study human social interaction: The challenges of exploring a new research landscape. British Journal of Psychology, 109, 395–417. Park, C. S. (2019). Does too much news on social media discourage news seeking? Mediating role of news efficacy between perceived news overload and news avoidance on social media. Social Media + Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119872956. Paul, C., & Posard, M. N. (2020). Artificial intelligence and the manufacturing of reality. The RAND Blog. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/01/artificial-intellige nce-and-the-manufacturing-of-reality.html. Polyakova, A. (2018, November 15). Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved November 14, 2020, from https://www.brookings. edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. Powers, K. (2019, June 20). Virtual influencers are becoming more real: Here’s why brands should be cautious. American Marketing Association. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.ama.org/marketing-news/virtual-influencers-are-becoming-more-realheres-why-brands-should-be-cautious/. Pynnöniemi, K. (2019). Information-psychological warfare in russian security strategy. In R. E. Kanet (Ed.), Routledge handbook of Russian security (pp. 214–226). London and New York: Routledge. Rauschnabel, P. A., Felix, R., & Hinsch, C. (2019). Augmented reality marketing: How Mobile AR-apps can improve brands through inspiration. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 49, 43–53. Riparbelli, V. (2019). Our vision for the future of synthetic media. Medium. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://medium.com/@vriparbelli/our-vision-for-the-future-of-synthetic-media8791059e8f3a#:~:text=Synthetic%20media%20will%20significantly%20accelerate,digital% 20realm%20begins%20and%20ends. Riva, G., Wiederhold, B. K., & Mantovani, F. (2019). Neuroscience of virtual reality: From virtual exposure to embodied medicine. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 22(1), 82– 98. Robinson, B. (2020). Towards an ontology and ethics of virtual influencers. Australasian Journal of Information Systems, 24, 1–8. Robinson, L., et al. (2019) The growing need to focus on modern political warfare. RAND Research Brief. Retrieved November 13, 2020, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071. html. Russell, S. (2020). Human compatible: AI and the problem of control. London: Penguin Books. Schick, N. (2020). Deepfakes and the infocalypse: What you urgently need to know. London: Monoray. Scholz, J., & Duffy, K. (2018). We are at home: How augmented reality reshapes mobile marketing and consumer-brand relationships. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 44, 11–23. Simonite, T. (2019, September 4). Forget politics: For now, deepfakes are for bullies. Wired. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://www.wired.com/story/forget-politics-deepfakes-bul lies/. Sokolov, M. (2019, December 5). Virtual influencer trends: An overview of the industry. The Drum. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2019/12/05/virtual-inf luencer-trends-overview-the-industry. Spangler, T. (2020, May 6). Miquela, the uncanny CGI influencer, signs with CAA. Variety. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/miquela-virtual-inf luencer-signs-caa-1234599368/. Steffen, J. H., et al. (2019). Framework of affordances for virtual reality and augmented reality. Journal of Management Information Systems, 36(3), 683–729.

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Tashev, B., Purcell, M., & McLaughlin, B. (2019). Russia’s information warfare: Exploring the cognitive dimension. MCU Journal, 10(2), 129–147. Thomas, Z. (2020, April 19). Coronavirus: Will Covid-19 speed up the use of robots to replace human workers? BBC. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/techno logy-52340651. Thornton, R., & Miron, M. (2020). Towards the ‘Third Revolution in Military Affairs’: The Russian military’s use of AI-enabled cyber warfare. The RUSI Journal, 165(3), 12–21. Torossian, R. (2020, March 25). The risks—And benefits—Of working with virtual influencers. Agility PR Solutions. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.agilitypr.com/pr-news/ public-relations/the-risks-and-benefits-of-working-with-virtual-influencers/. Tussyadiah, I. P., et al. (2018). able. Tourism Management, 66, 140–154. Vaccari, C., & Chadwick, A. (2020). Deepfakes and disinformation: Exploring the impact of synthetic political video on deception, uncertainty, and trust in news. Social Media + Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120903408. Van de Weghe, T. (2019, May 30). Six lessons from my deepfakes research at stanford. Medium. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://medium.com/jsk-class-of-2019/six-lessons-frommy-deepfake-research-at-stanford-1666594a8e50. Vogue Business (2020, June 16). Brands eye China’s virtual idols. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.voguebusiness.com/technology/china-virtual-influencers. Webster, A. (2020, August 31). IKEA turned a virtual influencer into a physical installation. The Verge. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/31/21408626/ ikea-tokyo-imma-virtual-influencer. Williams, R. (2020, April 6). WHO enlists virtual influencer for COVID-19 prevention campaign. Mobile Marketer. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from https://www.mobilemarketer.com/news/ who-enlists-virtual-influencer-for-covid-19-prevention-campaign/575493/. Woolley, S. (2020). The reality game: How the next wave of technology will break the truth and what we can do about it. London: Endeavour. Yates, K. (2020, May 29). The lucrative rise of the virtual influencer. Vice. Retrieved November 12, 2020, from https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/xg8xdd/liam-nikuro-imma-lil-miquela-virtualinfluencers. Young, N. (2019). Deepfake technology: Complete guide to deepfakes, politics and social media. Independently published by Amazon.

Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe: Goals, Means and Measures Jakub M. Godzimirski

1 Introduction The idea of Russia’s ‘information war’ against the West gained prominence after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. This broad concept encompasses a wide range of measures and approaches. This article explores the role of strategic communication and mass media in the broader Russian strategy towards Europe. Over recent years Russian strategic communication1 directed against the West has attracted the critical attention of policymakers and the diplomatic and academic community. Various counter-propaganda units, such as EUvsDisinfo or the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, were established in the West. Establishment of these centres was to raise public awareness about information threats coming from Russia that had become an important security challenge to be dealt with (NATO STRATCOM, 2017; Lupion, 2018; Mahnken et al., 2018; Zakem et al., 2018; Tolz & Teper, 2018; Orttung & Nelson, 2019; Mazarr et al., 2019; Dobrowolski et al., 2020). 1

When referring to ‘Russian strategic communication’ from now on, this should be understood as ‘Russian strategic communication as part of its foreign policy’. When referring to ‘Russia’ the text refers to actions undertaken and supported by the representatives of the current regime and actors who formally or informally represent this regime. The term ‘strategic communication’ is used instead of the related concept of ‘public diplomacy’ because the latter traditionally implies communication efforts that are directed at foreign publics as opposed to foreign elites. In the modern Internet saturated society this distinction appears artificial and therefore the wider, but arguably less specific concept of ‘strategic communication’ is used.

This chapter is based on findings from the project Russian strategic communication and political ambitions in Europe (RUSSTRAT ) funded by the grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and conducted jointly by the author and the NUPI Research Fellow Malin Østevik whose main contribution to the project was the detailed examination of the three case studies. J. M. Godzimirski (B) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_4

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In Western military circles, observations of the conflict in Ukraine also brought renewed interest in doctrines like ‘hybrid warfare’ and information security (Galeotti, 2016a, b; Splidsboel Hansen & Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 2016; Renz, 2016; Kramer & Speranza, 2017) viewed as important elements in Russian fullspectrum approach to conflict (Jonsson, 2019). In Russia itself, with the collapse of the Soviet Union relatively fresh in memory as well as the fear of ‘colour revolutions’ that could undermine the stability of the current regime, there is growing interest in strategic communication—seen as an important element of the soft and hard power policy toolbox of both Russia and its Western counterparts (Bartosh, 2014a, b, c, 2015, 2016a, b, c, 2017; Galeotti, 2016a; Mukhin, 2016, Pynnöniemi & Kari, 2016; Fedorov, 2017; Fridman, 2017; Panarin, 2017; Novosti, 2017; Mölder & Sazonov, 2018; Lupion, 2018; Tolz & Teper, 2018; Orttung & Nelson, 2019). The Russian official approaches to information security are therefore thoroughly discussed in the official Russian doctrine on this issue published in 2016 (President of the Russian Federation, 2016). There have been thorough conceptual discussions of the role of communication measures in international politics and conflict (Norris, 2000; Miskimmon et al., 2013; Esser & Pfetsch, 2013; Miskimmon et al., 2017) and in the Soviet/Russian context (Shultz & Godson, 1986; Giles, 2016; Darczewska & Zochowski, 2017). This chapter aims therefore to provide a concrete, empirical analysis of the use of strategic communication and mass media in Russian foreign policy strategy towards Europe. Strategic communication is treated as one of many tools in Russia’s foreign-policy toolbox, and this chapter inquires into the role it plays within the broader political context of Russian foreign-policy ambitions towards Europe. The aim is to (1) establish a baseline by identifying Russia’s main long-, mid-, and short-term foreign and security policy objectives and interests today; (2) map key media institutions and personalities used for to this end and (3) explore how the work of these media institutions has been used in connection with three important events in Europe—the Brexit vote, the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw and the decision of the Norwegian authorities to allow rotational deployment of US troops on Norwegian soil. In the first section, the Russian and Western expert communities’ understanding of Russia’s long-term and short-term objectives in foreign and security policy towards Europe is examined to present the broader political context in which Russian strategic communication takes place and information instruments are employed. In the second section, the focus is on Russian expert-level and official understandings and debate of the role of strategic communication and related concepts in contemporary international affairs. The major Russian actors involved in implementing Russian strategic communication, with a particular emphasis on mass media channels operating in the open, are mapped in this section with main emphasis on the role of two organizations playing a major part in conveying the Russian vision to international audience—the RT and Sputnik, and on Rossiyskaya gazeta as the main official channel used to communicate Russian official views to both domestic and international audiences. The third section presents empirical examination of three case studies analyzing Russian coverage of the Brexit vote in the UK, the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July

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2016, as well as Norway’s decision to allow temporary deployment of US Marines in Norway taken in October 2016 (NRK, 2016) and implemented in January 2017 (Cadamarteri, 2017). Here, the attention is paid to how the interests and aspirations of Russian foreign policy strategy on European affairs identified in the first section have been ‘translated’ into Russian actions in the sphere of strategic communication examined in detail in the second part.

2 What Does Russia Want in Europe? A state’s strategic communication is inherently political. When discussing the use of strategic communication in Russian foreign policy, it is therefore crucial to put it in the political context it operates in and try to understand the achievement of which strategic goals the strategic communication is to support. Naturally, there is a never-ending debate on Russian approaches to foreign and security policy. At one end of the spectrum are those who claim that Russian policy lacks any strategic cut and is purely reactive because it is realized by a whole host of actors who compete for power and influence and often have various and contradictory interests they want to realize (Godzimirski, 2000; Ledeneva, 2006; Saivetz, 2006; Wallander, 2007); at the opposite end of the spectrum there are those who argue that Russian policymakers have a clear-cut long-term vision, rigorously implemented by applying a carefully considered grand strategy (Rice 1991; Tsygankov, 2009, 2011; Saltzman, 2012; Monaghan, 2013; Person, 2019; Kofman, 2019; Marsh, 2019; NSI et al., 2019; Marangé, 2019). Finally, it is also important to be aware of a strong connection between foreign and domestic policy (for more on that see Putnam, 1988; Schultz, 2013), also in Russia, and especially in a situation when the survival of the domestic regime is the main goal and foreign policy may serve as a tool facilitating its realization, as was for instance the case with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that boosted support for the regime and made Russians rally behind it (Rogov, 2016; Treisman, 2016; Fortescue, 2017). As a general point, it could be argued that Russian foreign policy is complex and multifaceted, and that the three approaches describe its various aspects. Russia’s foreign and security policy involves various actors and various ad hoc reactive and opportunistic decisions, but also carefully designed policies aimed at helping Russia to achieve its strategic goals as defined by the ruling elite (Rice, 1991; Luttwak, 1983; LeDonne, 2003; McFaul, 2003; Tsygankov, 2011; Saltzman, 2012; Monaghan, 2013; Starr et al., 2014; Hill & Gaddy, 2015; Treisman, 2016). It is therefore important to understand how those who take key policy-related decisions understand the role of strategic communication when they set the goals they want to achieve and consider means they have at their disposal. In this context, strategic communication should be therefore treated as a tool that is to be used to facilitate realization of the strategic goals set by the key policymakers in the given geographical and historical situation—in this case in Russia’s relations with Europe.

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The official doctrinal texts issued in the post-2014 period are an expedient place to start our examination of how the interests and objectives in foreign and security policy are defined by the official Russia. Three of these doctrinal documents—the Military Doctrine (2014), the National Security Concept (2015) and the Foreign Policy Concept (2016)—outline the main goals of Russian policy and form the current official basis for Russian interactions with the outside world. The National Security Concept, issued on 31 December 2015 (President of the Russian Federation 2015), is the central document, as it deals directly with questions pertaining to the security of the country that is officially presented as the top priority by the current elite. Our brief outline of the current set of Russian strategic objectives is therefore based on detailed analysis of this document, which defines the following strategic interests of Russia: • strengthening the country’s defence, ensuring the constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, and national and territorial integrity and inviolability of the Russian Federation. • strengthening national accord, political and social stability, developing democratic institutions, and refining the mechanisms for cooperation between the state and civil society. • raising living standards, improving the population’s health and ensuring stable demographic development. • preserving and developing culture and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values. • making the national economy more competitive. • consolidating the status of the Russian Federation as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually advantageous partnerships in a polycentric world. Further, the extensive Russian and Western literature analyzing and presenting synthetic conclusions on how to ‘read’ Russian strategic interests complements and expands our understanding of Russian foreign and security policy. There are some mainstays of Russian foreign policy. In his seminal study of the long-term objectives based on in-depth analysis of Tsarist and Communist foreign and security policy, Black (1962) identified the following long-term goals sought by Russia: stabilization of frontiers, ensuring conditions favourable to economic growth, unification of Russian territories and participation in alliance systems and international institutions. Later, Light (2015) identified several recurring themes in Russian foreign and security policy in the post-Soviet period. These included the following: maintaining good relations with the CIS; opposition to NATO enlargement and ballistic missile defence deployment near Russia’s borders; staunch defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law in general as measures to counter forced regime change in Russia and elsewhere; the creation of a multipolar international system—and finally, Russia’s desire to regain great-power status. Most of these still rank high on the Russian foreign and security policy agenda. However, the impact of the post-2014 tensions in relations with the West on the reformulation of understanding of Russia’s short- and mid-term goals must also be

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considered. A RAND study on Russian views of the international order (Radin & Reach, 2017) identifies the following five points as strategic objectives in the current situation: • • • • •

defence of the country and the current regime influence in the near abroad a vision of Russia as a great power non-interference in domestic affairs political and economic cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers.

Also, Liik (2017) presented an interesting examination of Russia’s objectives. She argued that what Russia wants to achieve in territorial terms is not the restoration of the Soviet Union or even the gathering of Russian territories but the establishment of a sphere of control in its neighbourhood where it could manage, arbitrate and veto the relations of these countries with the West. Her main conclusion is that Russia’s primary goal is to establish a new international order, with new rules of the international game, rooted not in the liberal-institutional but in the realist and realpolitik paradigm. According to this reading, the country is no longer content with being a rule-taker but wants a more active role as a rule-maker and implementer. Russia wants to be a great power among great powers and to be allowed to shape the international realm with the same prerogatives as other recognized great powers. Also, other scholars have noted this craving for status and recognition as a great power as a key driver of Russian foreign and security policy in the short-, mid and long-term perspectives (Clunan, 2009; Neumann & Pouliot, 2011; Tsygankov, 2012; NSI et al., 2019). Logically, it could be assumed that Russia’s use of strategic communication towards Europe should also be informed by the ambitions identified above. It is why it is important to examine more specific ways in which Russia uses communicative tools in its pursuit of recognition and the establishment of a new non-liberal international order, in the current period of tension following the intervention in Ukraine.

3 Strategic Communication and Russian Foreign Policy This section maps various understandings of the role of strategic communication in Russian foreign policy. Strategic communication is a part of political communication which in turn could be approached either from a communication or from a political perspective, paying more attention either to its communicative or its political aspects (Negrine & Stanyer, 2007; Archetti, 2010; Esser & Pfetsch, 2013). This chapter examines political aspects of strategic communication which is understood as dissemination of various strategic narratives to support achievement of some political goals by informing, persuading, convincing or influencing the various groups targeted by these strategic communication measures. Strategic narratives are understood as a way of conveying a certain vision of the world, as a story that is told

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in the communicative space to promote the interests of the sender of the message and thus facilitate achievement of some political objectives (Miskimmon et al., 2013, 2017; Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017). Strategic narratives can be therefore viewed as one of the means/instruments/tools from the strategic communication toolbox. Various available communication channels, such as TV, newspapers, internet and social media, are used to shape and make these strategic narratives known, because only if they reach the targeted audience, they serve their purpose—namely to influence and to have impact on political outcomes. Such a use of communication can be viewed as an element from the arsenal of the soft power, a concept that rests on the recognition that ‘the ability to shape the preferences of others’ (Nye, 2004) is also a form of power. It is, however, important to underline that the Russian understanding of soft power differs greatly from the Western one and has much more ‘offensive’ and state-centric character symbolized by the establishment in 2007 of Russkiy mir foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo in 2008 that are to be used to project Russia’s soft power abroad (Tsygankov, 2006; Sherr, 2013; Herpen, 2016; Krickovic & Bratersky, 2016). The Russian use of strategic communication should be therefore understood in this Russian context as a means that is to facilitate the achievement of various tactical, operational and strategic goals, and forms thus a part of the country’s strategic toolbox. The use of strategic communication has gained greater attention not only for political but also for technological reasons as both individuals and groups, including decision-makers and the public, are today much more exposed to communicated content via various communication channels that can be used for information, persuasion, influence, attraction or deception purposes. This chapter focuses on the content of Russian overt communication measures to examine the mass-mediated strategic communication and the use of the government-owned news media outlets RT, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Sputnik News. But to understand the place strategic communication plays in Russian designs we must examine how these issues are approached in Russian official and expert debates. Russian debate on the use of strategic communication in narrow sense and information security in the broader context is characterized by the dual, defensive and offensive, approach. On the one hand, many Russian experts see Russia as the main victim of Western strategic communication aimed at weakening or even destroying Russia as an important player in the international game (Bartosh, 2014a, 2015, 2017; Panarin, 2017). On the other hand, many experts and decision-makers have a good understanding of how to use the strategic communication offensively as exemplified by the Russian aggressive use of strategic communication after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine and in the following years (Darczewska, 2014; Giles, 2015; Herpen, 2016; Lawson & Barrons, 2016; Babbage, 2019; Robinson et al., 2019; Fridman, 2020; Radin et al., 2020). In May 2017, Russian experts gathered at the Moscow State Linguistic University (MSLU) for a conference on the use of information measures as an element of soft power (Ivanov, 2017). In their opinion strategic communication should be used to provide motivation for action—but, unlike coercive methods, the point is to get the interested parties to re-format the opponents’ awareness so that, in the future, they

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will act in full accordance with the interest of the influencer. By using information strategically, the intent is to improve the chances of attaining foreign policy goals by changing the understandings and approaches of potential opponents of actors implementing communication measures. General Leonid Ivashov argued that ‘information operations’ are used to undermine the independence of countries and change the way of thinking in societies that could oppose the West (Ivanov, 2017). Sergey Nebrenchin, a 1983 graduate of the Faculty of Special Propaganda of the Military Institute of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, explained that strategic communication is more efficient than hard power, and that states should play a more active role in ‘information operations’—both offensively and defensively. He accused Western ‘mainstream media’ of influencing the information policies of other countries by spreading a strictly coordinated and even censored message that is imposed on states and societies to create an integral and universally valid system of public opinion on a global scale. The use of strategic communication is therefore undermining the sovereignty of independent states, which become especially vulnerable to external information pressures in periods with declining living standards, widening economic gaps, and in situations with deep conflicts among the local ruling elites (Ivanov, 2017). These defensive and offensive aspects of strategic communication are seemingly well understood not only by Russian experts but also by Russian policymakers who in 2016 ‘produced’ the country’s Doctrine for Information Security (President of the Russian Federation, 2016). This official document provides many insights into Russian thinking about the role of information—and thus strategic communication—in the strategic context. The document approaches information in the broadest possible manner, defines threats to information security as ‘a combination of actions and factors creating a risk of damaging the national interests in the information sphere’, and lists several national interests in the information sphere. In the context of strategic communication aimed at both the domestic and foreign audience especially two issues seem to be crucial: 1.

2.

providing the Russian and international community with reliable information on the State policy of the Russian Federation and its official position on socially significant events in Russia and in the world and applying information technologies to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation in the sphere of culture. facilitating the development of an international information security system aimed at countering threats of the use of information technologies to compromise the strategic stability, at strengthening equal strategic partnership in the sphere of information security, as well as protecting the information sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

What seems to worry Russian officials the most are the questions of transboundary information circulation that is used for geopolitical goals, goals of a military-political nature contravening international law or for terrorist, extremist, criminal and other unlawful ends detrimental for international security and strategic stability. Also, the fact that several countries are building up their information technology capacities to influence the information infrastructure in pursuing military purposes, that

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intelligence services are using information and psychological tools to destabilize the internal political and social situation in various regions across the world, thus undermining sovereignty and violating the territorial integrity of other states, are viewed as serious challenges. This document states also that Russia needs to counter a trend among foreign media to publish an increasing number of materials containing biased assessments of State policy of the Russian Federation. In addition, the document claims that Russian mass media face blatant discrimination abroad and the population in Russia is put under growing information pressure aiming at eroding Russian traditional and spiritual values. The Russian policymaking community treats strategic communication as an important element of broadly understood security. In the current edition of the National Security Strategy (President of the Russian Federation, 2015), informationrelated questions are mentioned no less than 36 times. The document states that Russia is being put under ‘informational pressure’ and recognizes that ‘an entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena’. As a consequence, Russia must deal with the increasing level of confrontation in the global information arena that is caused by the aspirations of some countries to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives. To counter these threats the state is to develop an improved system for identifying and analyzing threats in the information sphere, to protect society from the influence of destructive information from extremist and terrorist organizations, foreign special services, and propaganda structures. While the National Security Concept focused on defensive aspects of information security, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved in November 2016, is very frank about the offensive utility of information measures for Russian foreign policy. It states, for instance, that the State’s foreign policy activities shall be aimed at … bolster[ing] the standing of Russian mass media and communication tools in the global information space and convey[ing] Russia’s perspectives on international process to a wider international community (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2016).

Many Russian experts and officials use the collapse of the Soviet Union to illustrate their points on the importance of strategic communication and the role of information related measures—such as glasnost’—in this process. However, it should be borne in mind that their views on defensive aspects of ‘information operations’ as a way of preventing turmoil in Russia are mirrored in Russian expert and official thinking about the offensive use of strategic communication to promote Russia’s strategic interests abroad and thus facilitate the achievement of Russia’s strategic goals, as described above. Examination of the role of strategic communication—often conceptualized as propaganda and disinformation—in Soviet/Russian policy towards the West has a long history (Byrnes, 1962; see Barghoorn, 1962; Shultz & Godson, 1986; Bittman,

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1987; Van Oudenaren, 1986; Pipes, 1973; Thomas, 1998; Thomas, 2014). Nonetheless, when the Ukraine crises unfolded in 2014, the West was not mentally or politically prepared to cope with Russia’s massive information campaigns that combined traditional methods of Soviet-style propaganda with the use of new information channels (Pomerantsev et al., 2014; Czuperski & Atlantic Council of the United States, 2015; Geers & NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015; Malashenko, 2016; Herpen, 2016; Polyakova, 2017; Bergmann & Kenney, 2017). Some scholars hold that it should be recognized as a key dimension in an ongoing Russian ‘hybrid war’ on the European theatre (Baev, 2016). Which strategic communication tools can be found in the current Russian toolbox, and who are the main Russian actors in this strategic information game? Two organizations are pivotal as regards overt activities aimed at the foreign public and one that is to provide the official interpretation of the events to Russian domestic audience. The first is the media group Rossiya Segodnya, established by government decree in 2013 as part of a major restructuring of the foreign-oriented news media. Rossiya Segodnya owns the international news agency Sputnik News, which as of November 2020 provides news in 31 languages,2 as well as the Russian-language news agency RIA Novosti.3 This media group is owned by the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation. It is headed by the Russian journalist and Kremlin mouthpiece Dmitry Kiselyov—who has appointed Margarita Simonyan as editor-inchief. Simonyan is also the editor-in-chief of the television news network and online news provider RT,4 previously known as Russia Today which is the second organization examined. RT has no formal links with the media group Rossiya Segodnya but is owned by the other pivotal organization: the autonomous non-profit organization TV-Novosti, which is financed by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. TV-Novosti is a rather obscure organization that, in addition to RT, sponsors Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) and the smaller-scale social media-based content provider In the Now! (Herpen, 2016). The third explored channel is Rossiyskaya Gazeta—the official newspaper used to convey the official Russian understanding of events to domestic public. What is examined here is the coverage of the three events in these three Russian media outlets and the idea is to explore whether the messages conveyed to foreign and domestic audience are the same or different. The Russian government has been accused of directly or indirectly sponsoring various more covert information efforts, such as ‘troll factories’ that are to support Russian official efforts in the field of information (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015; Aro, 2016) or the production and circulation of false information (see for instance: Strand, 2017) but these activities are beyond the scope of this chapter. How do the activities of these organizations tie in with Russian foreign policy strategy on European affairs? Above all, Sputnik and RT serve as platforms for the distribution of strategic narratives supporting Russia’s official positions on world affairs (Yablokov, 2015; Miazhevich, 2018; Hutchings, 2019). Although RT has won 2

For an overview see Sputnik website https://sputniknews.com/ under link All editions. RIA Novosti website https://ria.ru/. 4 RT website: https://www.rt.com/. 3

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some prizes for some of its programmes, the reliability of information provided by RT and Sputnik’s is not always very high as the narratives they present are biased against the mainstream in target countries. Their activity fits ‘firehose of falsehood’ propaganda model characterized by high numbers of channels and messages and a willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions (Paul & Matthews, 2016). In line with the ‘principles’ of ‘firehose of falsehood’ propaganda model, there are also examples where these organizations provide content that is more difficult to pin unequivocally to the Russian government and use more malign and subversive tactics. Such tactics may involve conflating fact and fiction, presenting untruths as facts, exploiting Western journalistic values of presenting a plurality of views, infiltrating politics, influencing policies and political decisions, inculcating an alternative, proRussian view of the international order, and more. A good example of how these media operate was the coverage of one of the case studies examined in this chapter—the decision on deployment of the US troops in Norway. RT presented strongly distorted information on the location of the area of deployment of the US troops in Norway. On 10 October 2016, it indicated that the base was located at Værnes which was according to RT located 970 km from the Russian border (RT, 2016a). The next article published on 19 October 2016 reported that it was only 100 km from Russian borders (RT, 2016b). In fact, Værnes is located some 1500 km from the Norwegian–Russian border. Shekhovtsov (2018) observes also that RT routinely uses radical right-wing European politicians, like Marine Le Pen or Nigel Farage as political commentators. This may legitimize RT points and appeal to some fringe groups in the Western societies that are used by official Russia to promote interests that are consistent with the interests of the current regime but not necessarily with the interests of the Western institutions and countries in question (Makarychev & Braghiroli, 2016). When using strategic communication, Russian policymakers will often tailor their efforts so as to be most effective in the given political, geographical, social and historical context (Dajani et al., 2019). For instance, in Central and Eastern Europe they seek to sway policies away from European integration and toward Russia by exploiting such strategic vulnerabilities as weak governance, underdeveloped civil society space, and underfunded independent media, and by cultivating relationships with rising autocratic leaders and nationalist-populist parties. Western Europe has different strategic vulnerabilities, so approaches must be more subtle: aimed at building political alliances with ideologically friendly political groups and individuals and establishing pro-Russian organizations in civil society to legitimate and diffuse Moscow’s views (Polyakova et al., 2016). Russian strategic communication as presented above seems to serve several strategic goals set by the current regime. The most important of these goals is Russia’s interest in undermining the cohesion of the West and popular trust in Western institutions and elites that support European and trans-Atlantic integration and cooperation. The narratives aim also at making the Western ideas less attractive to Russians who could be inspired by Western values which could in turn cause some trouble to the stability or even survival of the current Russian regime. By undermining the Western cohesion and attractiveness Russia may be able to better promote its own interests in

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an international environment characterized by a higher level of compartmentalization, lack of Western unity and where known rules of the game are put under pressure. In the predominantly realist Russian understanding of international relations where a zero-sum game is believed to be played, a collective and united West represents the greatest challenge in both power and value terms. Undermining its cohesion, attractiveness and unity may be therefore viewed as the best way of advancing Russia’s strategic interests, including the interest in being recognized as a legitimate great power, which is the key Russian strategic concern. Russia also seems to aim at weakening the trust between the ruling elites and population in the West and is interested in ‘helping’ political forces that represent more pro-Russian and anti-NATO and anti-EU views to be put in charge of national policies (Gude, 2017; Gressel, 2017; Rogers & Tyushka, 2017; Shekhovtsov, 2018).

4 Three Case Studies of Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe To find out how Russia’s use of strategic communication may serve Russia’s strategic interests, three case studies are examined: the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, the Warsaw NATO Summit on 8 July 2016 and the announcement on 24 October 2016 that US troops are to be stationed rotationally in Norway. These three events were chosen for various reasons. First, they are highly representative as they deal with three strategic aspects of Russian policy towards Europe. The Brexit case was chosen because it could have dire consequences for the EU that is the key strategic counterpart of Russia in Europe. The positive decision on Brexit was expected to give a boost to anti-EU forces in Europe and the fear was that it could cause an anti-EU domino effect leading to the collapse of the EU integration project in its current form, which would lead to relative strengthening of Russia’s position in Europe and to further bilateralization of Russia’s relations with leading European powers. In addition, the UK decision on withdrawal from the EU could be viewed as dealing a lethal blow to the Western liberal democratic order, opening a way for alternative approaches to international order. Second, the Warsaw NATO summit was expected to make some important decisions with some repercussions for Russia’s strategic position in Europe, but it could also reveal some strategic cleavages within NATO, which in turn could have negative consequences for NATO’s internal cohesion leading to weakening of NATO. Since NATO is viewed in the official narrative as the main source of strategic concern any weakening of NATO would be in line with Russian strategic objectives. Third, the case on deployment of the US troops in Norway was chosen to give this study a more local character and examine how Russia’s relations with its neighbours are dealt with in the information space. This case was chosen also because it was highly representative of Russian approach to what is in the official Russian parlance

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Table 1 Number of news items retrieved, by source and event Event 1: NATO summit in Warsaw Event 2: Decision to station US troops in Norway Event 3: Brexit referendum

RT

Sputnik

29

205

RG 26

6

10

4

96

177

148

referred to as the issue of NATO approaching Russia’s borders, which is a recurrent theme in the Russian official strategic narrative. The examination includes strategic narratives presented on these three events in the internet news coverage of RT and Sputnik News, as well as the online version of Rossiyskaya Gazeta (RG). RT and Sputnik News were chosen because their stated target audiences are foreign publics, and as such form an obvious part of the broader Russian foreign policy. Rossiskaya Gazeta was included due to its close government affiliation and its role in conveying the official narratives to domestic public which is important if one wants to understand foreign—domestic policy nexus very much present in the Russian policymaking. Also interesting was finding out whether these three events were presented to foreign and domestic audience in the same or in different manner. Table 3 shows our interpretation of how these narratives on the political situation in Europe fit in with our findings on Russia’s political ambitions in Europe. The more x-signs in a cell the more relevant in our opinion is the given narrative for achievement of objectives listed above. The aim was to examine two weeks of coverage from the respective news organizations—one week before the event and one after. Since coverage of the stationing of US troops in Norway was limited, decision was made to include all news items from 17 October 2016 to May 2017. For Sputnik News and Rossiyskaya Gazeta the websites’ advanced search functions were used, specifying the time period and using the search phrases ‘Brexit’ and ‘NATO’ + ‘Warsaw’.5 As RT has only a very rudimentary search function on its website, so several procedures were tried and the one that yielded the most results was used: a Google Search with combination of the search command ‘site: rt.com/news’ with ‘Brexit’,’ NATO’ ‘Warsaw’, and ‘Vaernes’ (Table 1). In all news organizations’ coverage of Brexit, as well as Sputnik’s coverage of the NATO summit, a random sample for in-depth qualitative analysis was drawn. The articles were randomly numbered, and every third article was included in the sample. For instance, in Sputnik’s coverage of Brexit, all articles were given a random number from 1 to 177. The articles 1, 4, 7, 10, 13 and so on were sampled and analyzed. The sampling was motivated by time management concerns, as qualitative narrative analysis is time consuming. Analysis included examination of how the three events were framed in this coverage and what strategic narratives emerged. Narratives serve as devices for constructing ‘shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics’ 5

With Rossiyskaya Gazeta Russian translations of these phrases were used.

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through communication (Miskimmon et al., 2013). Miskimmon et al. (2013) further suggest that strategic narratives are the communication devices through which softpower influence can occur. In the case of Russia, these strategic narratives serve several purposes—as a tool for public deliberation on the role of Russia and others in the world, as a tool for projection of state power, and as a means to exert persuasive force in international relations (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017). Miskimmon et al. (2013, 5) define narratives in terms of structure and content. The structure of a narrative ‘entails an initial situation or order, a problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that re-establishes order’. In order to use this part of the definition as an analytical tool, it was operationalized as linguistic representations of causality. The content of narratives is made up of ‘actors; events, plot, and time; and setting and space’ (ibid.). In uncovering the narratives offered in RT, Sputnik News and Rossiyskaya Gazeta’s selected news coverage, both structure and content were therefore examined (Table 2).

4.1 Narrative 1: The West is Irresponsible and Aggressive It is clear from the coverage of the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 and the decision to station US troops in Norway, that the West—in the shape of NATO as such, or the USA and Norway—is portrayed as aggressive. An illustration can be found in the framing of a concluding paragraph used in many Sputnik News reports on the Warsaw Summit ‘Moscow has repeatedly […] warned NATO that the military build-up on Russia’s borders is provocative and threatens the existing strategic balance of power’ (Sputnik, 2016c). Moreover, this portrayal of the West accords to Russia the role of the responsible, knowledgeable and appeasing party—classic great-power traits. Other times more colourful language is used, as when Sputnik News journalists are reported to have asked the NATO Secretary General why ‘the NATO alliance seems hell-bent on viewing Russia as a threat worse than Daesh terrorism’ or to ‘presenting Russia as a threat, instead of focusing on European security, and preventing attacks like Paris and Brussels?’ (Sputnik, 2016d). This emphasizes the irresponsibleness of the ‘aggressive behaviour’ and presents NATO policies towards Russia in direct relation to their supposedly inept handling of European security.

4.2 Narrative 2: Historical Break The historical break narrative suggests that decisions taken at the NATO summit in Warsaw or the deployment of US troops in Norway are actions that mark a decisive break with the status quo. The word ‘unprecedented’ is often used. This narrative rhetorically equips the Western countries considerable agency and capacity but used in a negative manner. This plays into and elaborates on the above narrative of irresponsible Western countries. In the coverage of the deployment of US troops in

The West is irresponsible and aggressive

Historical break

NATO and EU are not united

Domestic political discord within NATO countries

The USA is dictating European countries

Brexit is a part of a transnational people’s uprising against elites

The UK is in political turmoil

The UK is losing its power and position in international affairs

Brexit is a danger to the global economy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Narrative

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Sputnik News

x

x

x

x

RG

RT

RG

RT

Sputnik News

Event 2: Decision to station US troops in Norway announced

Event 1: NATO Summit in Warsaw 8 July 2016

Table 2 Narratives in the three news organizations’ coverage of the events studied

x

x

x

x

RT

x

x

x

Sputnik News

Event 3: Brexit referendum

x

x

x

x

RG

64 J. M. Godzimirski

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Norway, the historical break narrative is the most prominent one—as expressed in this RT headline: ‘US Marines land in Norway, signalling departure from postWW2 commitment to Russia’ (RT 16 January 2017). The Warsaw Summit is often described by an historical metaphor and analogy: NATO, through its aggressive tone and deployments in Central and Eastern Europe, is ‘bringing us back to the Cold War’.

4.3 Narrative 3: Discord Among NATO Countries Another prevalent theme, pertaining primarily to coverage of the Warsaw summit, concerns disagreement among the political leaderships of NATO countries over decisions relating to Russia. The German and Belgian Foreign Ministers Walter Steinmeier and Didier Reynders warn against creating tensions with Russia, the Greeks want to cooperate with Russia in Syria and are said to ‘violate’ ‘the image of anti-Russian unity’ (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2016). NATO members positively inclined towards Russia are said to be held hostage by the leadership of the Baltic countries and Poland. The US role here is singled out as a separate narrative, detailed below. This discord narrative contributes to the portrayal of NATO as a politically unstable alliance that is not united and more likely to create chaos than security and stability.

4.4 Narrative 4: Discord Within NATO and/or EU Countries In addition to disagreements among NATO members, disagreements between the elite and the public, or various factions of domestic elites within the countries themselves, are emphasized. For instance, anti-NATO civil society events opposed to the NATO summit are covered in detail. This discord is usually portrayed in general terms: Germany is the only country to be singled out. It is noted that the German Left party opposes the government’s policy towards Russia and NATO more generally and has proposed to the Bundestag to establish a new security system in Europe that can incorporate Russia (Sputnik, 2016g). A domestic discord narrative is evident in the coverage of US force deployment in Norway, as politicians’ and experts’ voices opposing the governments’ decision are frequently cited. The discord narrative is interesting because it shows doubt as to the democratic basis of the decisions of Western leaders and whether they are acting in the interests of their own people. This results in a portrayal of Western elites and leaders as illegitimate and questions their governing capacity.

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4.5 Narrative 5: The US Is Dictating Solutions to European Countries This narrative uses the toughest and most animated language—especially in Sputnik News coverage. For instance, in allowing force deployment on its soil, Norway is ‘outsourcing its security’ to the United States (Sputnik, 2016e). The general theme is that of the USA dictating the policies of European countries, implicitly indicating that they have little or no agency. NATO is referred to as Washington’s ‘instrument of power projection in Europe’ (Sputnik, 2016f), or as an ‘orchestra’ with the USA as the ‘conductor’ (Sputnik, 2016b). Some European leaders, such as Angela Merkel, are at least portrayed as attempting to be ‘constructive’—i.e. questioning the tough stance on Russia—but to no avail, with the result that Merkel is said to have ended up putting US interests before those of Germany.

4.6 Narrative 6: Brexit Is Part of a Transnational People’s Uprising Against Elites The underlying causes of Brexit are portrayed as being a people’s protest against national and EU elites. In one and the same article, this people’s protest is framed in terms of the periphery against the centre, as an economic class issue, and finally in nationalist civilizational terms (Sputnik, 2016a). ‘Brexit fever’ is said to be spreading across Europe, and several right-wing parties (like the PVV of the Netherlands, National Front in France, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and Italy’s Northern League) are said to want similar referendums in their own countries. As such, the underlying cause of Brexit is framed as a transnational popular revolt. This impression is underlined by drawing parallels with the presidential campaign of then-candidate Donald Trump. This narrative further contributes to the portrayal of European elite actors as illegitimate and not acting in the interest of their people (narratives 4 and 5 above).

4.7 Narrative 7: The UK Is in Political Turmoil The UK is portrayed as a country in a chaotic and split condition. The most serious issue is the threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty following Brexit, with Scottish political leaders proposing a new independence referendum. Mention is also made of the street protests against the results of the Brexit referendum; likewise, certain (non-violent) clashes between the Remain and Leave sides. This narrative makes the political leaders appear less capable and legitimate.

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4.8 Narrative 8: The UK is Losing Power and Position in International Affairs Partly in consequence of the internal split of the country, the UK is portrayed as losing its position in international affairs, and other European cities are vying to become the new financial hub of Europe. Moreover, it is reported that international soft power ratings show the UK falling from first place.

4.9 General Conclusions from the Narrative Analysis Overall, it seems that the RT, Sputnik and RG coverage ties in with the political ambitions as mapped out in Table 3. It is also clear that that the message conveyed to both foreign and domestic public is highly consistent and not very different. The narratives help to paint a picture of Russia as an authoritative, cautious great power, whereas Western Europe is portrayed as both irresponsibly aggressive and passive, controlled by the USA. Although inconsistent, both portrayals convey the image of Western European countries, individually or jointly, as illegitimate. The source of frictions in Europe lies in the actions of the West—not in actions undertaken by Russia. Also noteworthy is how coverages of the Warsaw summit and of the stationing of troops use the same language, whereas Brexit coverage employs different terms. This may be in part because that issue is seen less as a question of European security, and more as an internal British issue with some consequences for Europe’s strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. Also, given the people vs. elites character of the Brexit debate, perhaps this event plays better into the rejection of the liberal-institutional paradigm and the wish for a new world order (Liik, 2017). Table 3 links the findings of the examination of Russian narratives with our readings of Russia’s pre- and post-2014 strategic interests presented in the previous section. This shows how the narratives identified in the coverage of these three events by RT, Sputnik and Rossiyskaya Gazeta may support Russia’s advancing both the old, pre-2014 and new, post-2014, strategic objectives. The number of ‘x’ in the table reflects how the relevance of the narratives in advancement of Russia’s long-, mid-, and short-term interests is perceived by the author with the higher number of ‘x’ implying higher relevance. Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2017) argue that Russia’s main objective with the use of strategic narrative is ‘to reinforce Russia’s global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top-ranking great powers’ (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017,111). The fact that Russia employs not only material policy instruments—like its military power in Ukraine and in Syria—but also strategic communication to achieve this objective reconfirms that Russia’s search for recognition as a great power is still a major strategic concern. This also demonstrates the continuity in Russian approaches to the international system and Russia’s own insecure, fluctuating and sometimes volatile

Historical break

NATO and EU are not united

Domestic political discord within NATO countries

The USA is dictating European countries

2

3

4

5

x

xxx

xxx

xx

The West is xx irresponsible and aggressive

x

xxx

xxx

x

x

x

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xx

xx

xx

xxx

x

xxx

xxx

xx

xxx

Opposition to NATO eastward expansion

Light (2015) Priority for relations with the CIS as a buffer zone

Participation in alliance systems and international institutions

Black (1962)

Stabilization Assurance Unification of frontiers of of Russian favourable territories conditions for economic growth

1

Narratives/Interests

Table 3 Strategic objectives and supporting strategic narratives

x

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

No to Western deployment of ballistic missile defence

x

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Support for a multipolar international system

(continued)

xx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Russia recognized as a great power

68 J. M. Godzimirski

Brexit is a part of a transnational people’s uprising against elites

The UK is in political turmoil

The UK is losing its power and position in international affairs

6

7

8

Narratives/Interests

Table 3 (continued)

xxx

x

xx

xxx

xxx

xx

xxx

xxx

xx

Opposition to NATO eastward expansion

Light (2015) Priority for relations with the CIS as a buffer zone

Participation in alliance systems and international institutions

Black (1962)

Stabilization Assurance Unification of frontiers of of Russian favourable territories conditions for economic growth

xx

xx

Defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity

No to Western deployment of ballistic missile defence

xxx

xxx

xxx

Support for a multipolar international system

(continued)

xxx

xxx

xx

Russia recognized as a great power

Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe … 69

Brexit is a danger to the global economy

The West is irresponsible and aggressive

Historical break

NATO and EU are not united

2

3

xxx

xxx

xxx

Defence of the nation and the regime

xxx

xx

xx

Influence in the near abroad

Radin and Reach (2017)

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

No to Western deployment of ballistic missile defence xxx

Support for a multipolar international system

Russia recognized as a great power

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(continued)

Vision of Russia as Political and economic a great power cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers

Defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity

Non-interference in domestic affairs

Opposition to NATO eastward expansion

Light (2015) Priority for relations with the CIS as a buffer zone

Participation in alliance systems and international institutions

Black (1962)

Stabilization Assurance Unification of frontiers of of Russian favourable territories conditions for economic growth

1

Narratives/Interests

9

Narratives/Interests

Table 3 (continued)

70 J. M. Godzimirski

Domestic political discord within NATO countries

The USA is dictating European countries

Brexit is a part of a transnational people’s uprising against elites

The UK is in political turmoil

The UK is losing its power and position in international affairs

Brexit is a danger to the global economy

4

5

6

7

8

9

Narratives/Interests

Table 3 (continued)

xx

xx

xx

xx

x

xxx

xx

xx

xx

xxx

Influence in the near abroad

Radin and Reach (2017)

Defence of the nation and the regime

xx

xx

xx

xx

x

xxx

Non-interference in domestic affairs

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xx

xxx

xx

xxx

xxx

xxx

x

xxx

Vision of Russia as Political and economic a great power cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers

Russian Strategic Communication Towards Europe … 71

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identity (Clunan, 2009; Neumann & Pouliot, 2011; Tsygankov„ 2012; Neumann, 2016). This negative account of the West presented in these narratives and conveyed to the domestic public through Rossiyskaya gazeta’s coverage of these three events is to help the regime make the West much less attractive to the Russian public and thus help the regime to secure its stability and survival—illustrating in that way the strong connection between Russian foreign and domestic policy as signalled earlier.

5 Conclusions The examination of Russian strategic interests in the first part of the chapter reveals a relatively high level of continuity combined with certain level of adaptation to changing conditions. Russian policymakers view relations with the West as important but troubled and communication measures have been used to undermine the internal cohesion of the West, to saw discord between various Western actors, to present the West as a declining actor and as a less attractive alternative to its domestic audience and finally restore Russia as a great power with legitimate great-power interests. The examination of Russian approaches to strategic communication specifically and the use of various types of soft power generally that was presented in the second part suggests that Russian experts and policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the role of covert and overt communicative measures in advancement of national interests and in national strategy, both in offensive and in defensive contexts. The examination of Russian communicative approaches to the three events examined in this chapter revealed some continuity between the historical, pre-existing Russian strategic narratives and the ones produced and conveyed after the 2014 crisis. Furthermore, the strategic narratives present in Russian strategic communication were instrumental in facilitating and supporting realization of Russian strategy towards Europe and the West. The main conclusion is that there is a relatively high level of consistency between the traditional Russian narratives on Europe and the West (Neumann, 2017) and the narratives used in portraying the three events and what could be termed Russian strategic narratives produced and conveyed after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine—a watershed event in Russia’s relations with the West. It is difficult to ascertain whether this continuity and consistency are caused by deliberate coordination of information policy at the central level and in redactions of Russian media outlets, or by the deep-seated Russian clichés on the West. It is plausible to claim that some level of deliberate coordination may be the case as RT and Sputnik News share some editorial leadership. It could, however, also be caused by the predominance of some perceptions and anti-Western clichés among producers of the content in the three communication examined channels or by their ‘independent’ actions aimed at pleasing their strategic political principals. There is also a clear connection between the understanding of the strategic interests and the use of strategic communication aimed at weakening of the internal cohesion of the West which thereby make Russia relatively more powerful—a key long-term strategic objective not only of the current Putin regime but also historically. This

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shows a relatively high level of continuity of Russian political class’ concern with the country’s status in the international community which has made Russia’s striving to be recognized as a great power one of the most persistent motives and drivers of its policy (Neumann & Pouliot, 2011; Neumann, 2016). The deep social and political changes observed in the West over the past years have provided some opportunities to Russian decision-makers. The rise of the populist right in Europe and election of Donald Trump as the president of the USA could be viewed in Russia as coinciding with what the country’s rulers define as its strategic interests. They have contributed to even a greater polarization in Western societies and have posed a challenge to the West’s internal cohesion and as such could facilitate achievement of one of the Russian long-term strategic goals—the strengthening of Russia’s position vis a vis the weakened West. This explains why many of the strategic narratives conveyed by Russian strategic communication channels examined in this chapter have been actively trying to undermine internal cohesion of the West by presenting it as being in decline, weak and split. These changes may in the mid- and long-term perspective contribute to changing the strategic balance in relations between Russia and the West, but it seems that the ‘ideological’ and normative alternative Russia has to offer today to Western societies is even less appealing to the mainstream public in the West than the communist ideology promoted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This does not mean that Russian efforts in the sphere of political and strategic communication and their negative impacts should be ignored—they should indeed be approached with due caution, in a systematic, balanced and rational manner, but without overacting that can do more harm than good to our understanding of this challenging political phenomenon.

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Mass Media Instrumentalization in Foreign Policy of States: Russian Strategic Toolset Tomáš Mareš

1 Introduction This chapter concentrates on the instrumentalization of mass media1 in the foreign policy of states on the information-psychological level. This field of research revolves around the power of information and deals with different approaches in which states can employ mass media assets to influence public opinion abroad. This research area has seen a resurgence in recent years incited by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that broke out in 2013. The significant role which mass media have played throughout this conflict has reignited interest in exploring the possibilities of utilizing this tool in compliance with foreign policy objectives and focused attention on the Russian Federation (RF) (Dougherty, 2014; Kofman et al. 2017; Sazonov et al. 2016). The contemporary debate surrounding the role of mass media in Russian foreign policy has split into two separate strands. The first group of authors includes Russian mass media among soft power assets (Laruelle, 2015a; Kiseleva, 2015; Feklyunina, 2016; Rotaru, 2017; Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019). In contrast, there are articles claiming that Russia engages media assets abroad in a much more proactive manner and incorporates them with capabilities related to information warfare (Giles, 2016b; Pomer˙ antsev & Weiss, 2014; Darczewska & Zochowski, 2015; Meister, 2016; Doroszczyk, 2018). As a result, two more or less dissonant paradigms have emerged on the nature of media power in terms of Russian foreign policy. Despite increased interest in both the nature of Russian soft power and information warfare, a study that might strive to overcome the strict division between these paradigms is still missing. Thus, 1

This chapter uses a generally accepted definition of the term ‘mass media’: a set of various media technologies allowing mass communication or, in other words, to transfer information content to the wider general public.

T. Mareš (B) Charles University in Prague, Prague, Czechia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_5

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discussion in this field of research still revolves around the question of whether Russia utilizes mass media abroad as a soft power tool or as an instrument of information warfare instead. However, these are oversimplified explanations that cannot fully capture Russia’s intricate performance. Such discontinuity encourages further research into overcoming the strict division offered by the soft power and information warfare paradigms, which can be valuable especially with regard to strategic thinking. In an attempt to address this lacuna, the author uses a synchronic perspective to construct two individual typological schemes representing unique designs for the strategic instrumentalization of mass media in Russian foreign policy. Each of them reflects on one of the two aforementioned paradigms regarding the nature of mass media power that have profiled within academic literature. To introduce a systematic procedure, the author sets up five categories that create a framework for analysis: (a) roots (providing the strategy with an ideational framework); (b) conception and mechanisms (creating the rationale for mass media employment within the given ideational framework); (c) means of implementation (the particular techniques of media employment in practice within the given conception); (d) goals (representing the expected outcomes) and (e) narrative structure (demonstrating how the roots, conception, and goals echo in the information streaming). These categories are derived from the general definition of ‘strategy’ that is understood as a plan (conception and mechanisms) delineating the manner (means of implementation) in which one uses the best means (instruments/resources) to achieve the desired ends (goals) (Freedman, 2015; Mattern, 2005; Mintzberg et al., 2002; Roselle et al., 2014). This perspective offers a unique multi-layered insight into the formation of Russian strategic thinking in the field of foreign mass media instrumentalization on an information-psychological level. More precisely, the procedure allows to (a) identify the crucial components which constitute a strategic design on different layers of strategy formulation; and (b) assess the manner in which the specific amalgam of these constituents drives the applicability of the examined strategic designs in foreign policy. Moreover, using the five structuring elements makes the two examined strategic modalities easily comparable and helps the reader to understand their function and importance within the overall Russian strategic toolset. In the end, this chapter provides a reconsidered view of the range of applicability of mass media assets in contemporary Russian strategic thinking. It describes the strategic modalities based on soft power and information warfare paradigms as two components of one strategic toolset, with both having a vital impact on strategic diversity, leading to remarkable versatility in terms of applicability. The chapter is arranged into two parts. The first part analyses the key characteristic features affiliated with the soft power strategy of foreign mass media instrumentalization with respect to the specific modes of applicability in the framework of the predetermined categories and outlines the role of this typological scheme in the current Russian strategic toolset. The second part focuses attention on information warfare in the same manner. A comprehensive overview which considers the overall character of the current strategic toolset and the range of applicability of mass media

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assets in the contemporary geopolitical setting is presented in the discussion section that concludes this chapter.

2 Typological Scheme: Soft Power Paradigm To begin with, it is essential to realize that this typological scheme cannot be understood as a pure application of soft power theory. Russian political leaders have primarily interpreted the concept of soft power in a very instrumental and pragmatic manner. Despite that, it is indisputable that Russia has discovered the meaning of soft power, has grasped the basic principles, and has incorporated them into its own strategic culture concerning foreign mass media instrumentalization, thus creating a unique modification tailor-made to achieve a precise cluster of foreign policy goals.

2.1 Roots The Russian Federation (RF) formed an innovative perspective on Russian identity and its role in the changing international environment (Suslov, 2017a). First, a group of scientists originally concentrated around Peter Shchedrovitsky developed a construct labelled the ‘Russian World’ which provided a brand-new framework for the Russian nation, surpassing the traditional boundaries of territorially delineated states2 (Tishkov, 2008). The Russian World comprises (a) ethnic Russians living in the territory of the RF; (b) residents of the RF who are not ethnically Russians (categories A and B constitute a civic nation of the RF); (c) ethnic Russians living outside of the territorial boundaries of the RF; (d) non-Russians living outside the RF who associate themselves with its cultural-historical heritage (Zevelev, 2001). Such reasoning constitutes an image of a transborder network in the centre of which lies the RF, symbolizing the motherland that is connected to multiple social communities scattered around the world (Shchedrovitsky, 2000). Second, the Russian World construct has been saturated with neo-conservative thoughts based on socio-cultural traditions rooted in Eastern Orthodox Christianity (Melville, 2017). According to the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian World represents a common civilisational space founded on the following pillars: Eastern Christianity, Russian culture and common historical memory (Stoeckl, 2014). More precisely, the unifying features are culture, habits, Orthodox religion, shared history, stance towards freedom and justice, along with the Russian language, with only one of these attributes being sufficient reason to include anybody in the construct. This allows the forming of a network of extensively accessible communities abroad that induce foreign populations to express their ideational proximity to the current Russian 2

Efim Ostrovsky, Valery Tishkov, Tatiana Poloskova or Natalia Narochnitskaya can be included among the foremost theoreticians of this construct.

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state and its policies (Tiido, 2015). Third, some Russian thinkers have proposed the creation of a transnational civilization comprising European and Asian states which are supposed to adopt Russian socio-cultural neo-conservatism on their way to geopolitical, geoeconomic and ideological integration (Dugin, 2009; Skladanowski, 2019). This attitude, entitled neo-Eurasianism or Greater Eurasia, proposes a vision around which the RF has built its international-cooperation initiatives in the last 20 years, integrating former members of the Soviet Union in the first place (Barbashin & Graef, 2019; Krickovic & Bratersky, 2016). These three elements have constituted a newfashioned, socio-cultural and value-based ideology that has deeply entrenched itself in the Russian attitude towards foreign policymaking in the last decades. First and foremost, these elements reflect state efforts to actively promote compatriot policy programmes focused on Russian diasporas (Laruelle, 2015b). In the same manner, this ideological framework has heavily pervaded Russian mass media messaging content focused on various foreign media markets, most notably (but not solely) in Europe and Central Asia where historical, cultural, or religious ties and commonidentity feelings may still persist, although with varying levels of intensity (Laruelle, 2015a; Klyueva, 2017).

2.2 Conception and Mechanisms Such foreign policy conception—combining the Russian World, neo-conservative thinking and Eurasianism—has often been characterized as Russian Soft Power (Laruelle, 2015a; Suslov, 2017a; Tiido, 2015). To clarify what soft power means for the purposes of this chapter, it largely rests on three resources: culture (in places where it is attractive to others); values (if considered to provide sufficient moral authority) and foreign policies (if they are seen as legitimate). To put it in a complex manner: when a country’s culture includes universal values, and its policies promote interests that others share, this increases the probability of obtaining the desired outcomes (Nye, 2004). As maintained by the broader definition distinguishing the state-led from the civil-society-led category, soft power can be intentionally employed by state institutions in compliance with foreign policy goals. Thus, a country may achieve the outcomes it wants not solely because others admire its values, but also by deliberately setting an agenda (Burlinova, 2015; Watson, 2012). Many countries, including Russia, have recognized the significance of using soft power resources to engage in the competitive politics of legitimacy. In so doing, they try to enhance the compatibility of their policies with other nations’ values/interests or set a transnationally acceptable agenda to gain support in the international arena (Wilson, 2015). The effort to win favour for a country must rely on the moral, political or intellectual consent of the addressed populations (Jang, 2019). In the realm of international politics, soft power brings interests together, encourages new or closer cooperation with other states or sub-state political entities, and thus enhances the legitimacy for particular actions (Lenczowski, 2009). As claimed by Russian Foreign Policy Concepts

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(MFA, 2013, 2016), this should be done by developing effective means of information influence on public opinion as well as through strengthening the positions of the Russian language and culture abroad. As a result, soft power conception represents a consolidating dimension of the Russian strategic toolset in the field of foreign mass media instrumentalization that is embedded in the convergence of interests. In terms of state-led soft power conception, cultural diplomacy functions as a key mechanism providing a meaningful framework for mass media instrumentalization in favour of Russian foreign policy. Cultural diplomacy is defined by a given course of action including mass media information streaming which utilizes the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation, promote national interests or contribute to the understanding of a nation’s institutions and policies (Arndt, 2011; ICD, 2020). This mechanism can be submitted to political interests by processes of government management that employ various methods of external cultural representation or calculated nation-branding. From this perspective, cultural diplomacy turns into a specific communication strategy (Zamorano, 2016). In that regard, the Russian World construct has created this kind of agenda, based on an idiosyncratic state-promoted ideology, rooted in the image of national, cultural, and historical uniqueness. This new ideological background has enabled Russia to comment on an extraordinarily wide range of issues (ranging from daily life patterns to almost every aspect of state policies) all over the world in a manner favourable to current Russian foreign policy interests (Zeleneva & Ageeva, 2017). Russia has invested significant financial resources into developing various soft power institutions, the purpose of which is to exert multi-national/transnational communication and carry out information campaigns promoting a new culture/value-based ideology among foreign audiences (Wilson, 2015). Moreover, Russia has achieved remarkable success in establishing state-owned media outlets (e.g. Russia Today, Russia Beyond the Headlines, Voice of Russia, Sputnik International, etc.) which possess multi-language mutations, as well as in the expansion of these assets into foreign media markets, especially within the range of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Eastern European states, and in the Balkans where they have been able to attract significant public attention (Dimitrova et al.,2017; Hofmeisterová et al. 2018). From this perspective, Russia combines a tailor-made ideologized agenda with the effects of the expansion of large media corporations into foreign media markets. Both these elements have been deeply incorporated into the pillars of Russia’s soft power strategy.

2.3 Means of Implementation Since the cultural diplomacy that Russia utilizes today is rooted in soft power theory, in the realm of foreign mass media instrumentalization it employs persuasion through attraction, inducement and co-option to shape the actions of the target audience abroad. In the theory of soft power, all these elements of persuasion are congruent.

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They complement each other and together they pave the way to stimulating, widely acceptable, and internationally transferable agendas. Therefore soft power, in its essence, is a systemic strategy that can be formed in a universalist manner (Gallarotti, 2011). According to Nye (2004), soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. In behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power using resources that produce a sense of temptation, duty or justness in contributing to common purposes. If a country’s branding is attractive, others more willingly follow (Nye, 2004). However, a successful policy of attraction depends on the stimulating use of words or symbols which can have many meanings. To be attractive means to frame content to make others want the outcomes that you want (Waller, 2009). Countries that are likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations are those that help to frame issues, whose interests are closer to general norms, and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by a generalized set of values (Rothman, 2011). Thus, commodities with wider acceptability can be used to persuade the public, opinion-makers, or leaders in allied, neutral, as well as in adversary countries (Kearn, 2011). Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that even values that deviate from those promoted by Western liberal democracies, like those embedded in Russian neo-conservatism, can be attractive to a wide range of groups regardless of territorial delimitation. For such groups nationalism, patriotism, anti-globalization, independence from supranational bodies, the idea of national sovereignty and stability, firm leadership, or centralized governance can be attractive (Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019). From this point of view, the wide-ranging agenda associated with the Russian World, neo-conservatism and Eurasianism channelled through mass media (among other assets) all represent that sort of generalized values which stimulate a multi-varied attractiveness which has the potential to bind foreign audiences to Russian policies. Moreover, current Russian persuasion allows different levels of self-identification. It means that people can agree with the presented agenda to its full extent, but can equally well identify with only a limited amount of it, or accept precisely chosen pieces that reflect their personal preferences (Rutland & Kazantsev, 2016). This kind of persuasion has the potential to address considerably different communities in various regions of the world and bind them with Russia, which symbolizes a state that proactively deals with these inclusive agendas in its foreign policies (Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019). Policies reviving Russian World reasoning intertwined with neo-conservative values promote a community approach based on an inducement that is sufficiently friendly to various civic as well as political associations/movements/parties in many states across Europe and Asia (Horvath, 2016). In mass media content, the Russian World is presented as a global phenomenon. It invites Russian-speaking compatriots of all nationalities to join, along with those who perceive themselves as Russians, who are spiritually connected with Russia, and those who care about its fate (Saari, 2014). Russia’s information messaging invites the target audience to become part of an international community that better reflects the roots of their identity and persuades them to support policies that make an effort

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to preserve it (Batanova, 2009). The emphasis on non-violent co-option provides Russian policies with additional legitimacy with the potential to multiply the effects of justification and rightfulness (Just, 2016).

2.4 Goals The purposes of this Russian strategy related to foreign mass media instrumentalization have been soft in nature. The ultimate goal is to enhance political influence abroad, maximize power in the environment of peaceful coexistence and mitigate the negative effects of certain policies on its international reputation (Yablokov, 2015). This goal can be divided into three larger sub-categories: (a) positive imagemaking; (b) legitimacy enhancement and (c) support-searching. This specific set of goals is designed to help Russia keep up in the geopolitical competition with other great powers like the USA, China and India who have been spreading their own socio-cultural paradigms (Isar, 2017; Krenn, 2017; Liu, 2019). With regard to positive image-making, mass media function as an instrument that, in the long run, patiently explains government initiatives in a positive manner. Besides that, they can rapidly react to crisis development by distributing Russian interpretations of individual events in real time (Kiseleva, 2015). The key objective in this category is to improve Russia’s image, mitigate its negative reputation as an aggressive or undemocratic state, blunt international criticism for human rights violations, political-military interventionism, coercion, and for supporting regimes that the West considers corrupt or non-democratic (Simons, 2011). This goal has been viewed as especially important for Moscow’s relations with the EU who has become Russia’s major critic in areas such as human rights, the lack of progress in legal and administrative reforms, in corruption matters, or its stance towards militarized conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine (Makarychev & Sergunin, 2013). President Putin (2012) addressed this set of goals in quite a similar manner after his presidential inauguration in 2012 when he argued that ‘soft power is about promoting one’s interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one’s country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage. Russia’s image abroad is not formed by us, and as a result it is often distorted and does not reflect the real situation in our country or Russia’s contribution to global civilization, science and culture. Russia also instrumentalizes the media to bolster its legitimacy and credibility in the international environment, which should provide it with firmness in the justification of particular foreign policies (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015). In this manner, the core objective of mass media is to persuade the international public along with the political elites of other states that Russia respects, abides by, or even actively promotes global peace, transnational cooperation, mutually beneficial integration, the nature of civilizational diversity, and that it acts to the benefit of the broader international community by promoting the Russian World (Averre & Davies, 2017). Russia strives to increase its importance and relevance by creating an image of itself as

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a systemic, non-revisionist player caring about international peace, order and human security, as well as the preservation of cultural traditions (Fawn, 2017). Likewise, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (MFA 2016) calls for the rule of law in international relations, strengthening international security, and supporting international cooperation in the sphere of economy, environment, humanitarian cooperation, and human rights. The objective of Russian media in terms of support-searching is to (a) attract a foreign audience to its socio-cultural value-based agendas; (b) excite feelings of selfidentification with this ideologized framework; (c) encourage the target audience to engage in the promotion and preservation of this common legacy and (d) co-opt the foreign audience into cultural/political programmes organized by Russian institutions abroad (Hudson, 2013). The intention behind this is to bind the target audiences with Russian discourse emphasizing a civilizational mission and thus increase support for divergent foreign policies that are framed in overtones of commonality (Hudson, 2013). In other words, Russian mass media turn out to be an instrument increasing foreign influence through the convergence of other states, as well as particular segments within a foreign population, with Russian policies. According to Igor Zevelev (2008), this is because Moscow has always regarded the rights and interests of Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities not as a goal in itself, but as a means to achieve a leadership role in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

2.5 Narrative Structure Let us now look at how the mass media narratives are structured in a close association with Russian soft power strategic design. To present some sort of comprehensible classification, it is possible to divide Russian soft power content into four major categories: (a) multilateralism and cooperation; (b) culture and values; (c) human rights and (d) historical explication. These narratives are frequently addressed by Russian top-ranking political or opinion leaders. They are subsequently retranslated into multiple adaptations and, with adjustments or commentaries, are then delivered by the Russian mass media network to foreign audiences. On the international level, Russian narratives advocate multipolarity. Multipolarity is viewed as the central feature of any stable world order ensuring peace, security and stability. An image of global governance executed by multiple centres of power across the world is provided, and Russia is depicted as one of the systemic mainstays (Laruelle, 2015a, b). These narratives reject that one or more dominant states should be able to impose rules on the rest of the world, preferring geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic pluralism. (Hinck et al. 2018). In this manner, international cooperation—especially when taking into account economic affairs— is presented as a possible or even desirable option (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015). Concurrently, a multipolar framework is used to address the following issues: political solutions to conflicts; the role of the United Nations in the international system; the rule of law in international relations; interventions into national sovereignty;

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collaboration on ecological security and climate change; nuclear power issues; and economic interdependence (Klyueva, 2017). On the backdrop of these issues, Russian messages come from the premise that all participants in international relations should respect each other’s interests. In conformity, Russian narratives claim that countries with different socio-economic and political systems can coexist peacefully and should abide by the existing rules (Stronski & Sokolsky, 2020). On the other hand, they justify efforts to make international norms more appropriate to national interests. Russia promotes its cultural/value model, claims the right to preserve equality among countries, and stipulates respect for state, national, or communal concerns (Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017; Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015). Narratives praising Russia’s cultural achievements and societal success have been re-released time and time again (Rawnsley, 2015). The Russian World is depicted as a naturally existing, multi-national, inter-religious, Russia-centric civilization reinforcing collective identity based on the ideals of freedom, faith, spirituality, kindness and conscience (Feklyunina, 2016). It provides the image of a wider community unified by neo-conservative values that serve to maintain human dignity. In this context, liberal democracies are portrayed as a post-Christian, morally corrupt and decadent world rejecting the roots that once constituted the foundation of Western civilization (Chapman & Gerber, 2019; Gerber & Zavisca, 2016). The neoconservative framework calls for a moral and ethical renaissance by turning away from a ‘depraved’ westernized lifestyle delivering consumerism accompanied by loose morality and ethics, ‘perverted’ sexual behaviour, as well as ‘non-traditional’ patterns of family life. In light of this, Russia is portrayed as protector and promoter of traditional values in times of ‘moral darkness’ (Lukin, 2014; Shahnazarian, 2017). Beyond that, Russia is considered to be the only direct follower of the rich Byzantine heritage, giving it cultural and religious primacy. Therefore, Russia is portrayed as a natural leader in the world of Orthodox Christianity that represents a strong bond of brotherhood which unites Russia with other Eastern/Southern Slavic nations or with religious diasporas scattered across different regions of the world (Damm & Cooley, 2017; Sherr & Kullamaa, 2019). In close association with the previous categories, Russian narratives commonly articulate the country’s responsibility to protect the civilian population abroad (Suslov, 2017b; Ziegler, 2016). Messages dealing with international humanitarian cooperation and human rights justify Russian foreign military engagement or turn attention to the status of Russian nationals, compatriots, diasporas, or the Russophone public in the countries of their residence (Averre & Davies, 2017). Absolutely dominant themes are language equality related to education and employment, the right to express cultural traditions, and protests against expressions of Russo˙ phobia (Darczewska & Zochowski, 2015) The Russian vision asserts a communitarian approach to human security (instead of an individualistic understanding of human rights typical for a westernized attitude) according to which a human is depicted as a part of his/her social context, community, tradition or religious faith (Tsygankov, 2016). In this sense, Russia is portrayed as protector of the Russian World, a patron contributing to human security in different world regions, especially in those which traditionally belong to the Soviet/Russian sphere of influence

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(Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Balkans) (Laruelle, 2015b; Stoeckl, 2014). Some narratives contain a warning against attempts at intervention or the exercise of aggression towards Russia or any entity claiming allegiance to the Russian World (Curanovi´c, 2017). Although it is obvious that historical connotations also pervade through all the previously mentioned categories to some extent, this area is so wide that it can constitute a separate narrative cluster on its own. Here, Russia’s distinctiveness and uniqueness are directly linked to the country’s role in world history (Richter, 2019). The most frequently mentioned narratives are those related to modern European development, especially military conflicts and occupations with a particular emphasis on the struggle against Nazism/Fascism (Roberts, 2017). In the heart of this narrative cluster lies the memory of the Russian victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War’, the liberation of Europe, and its contribution to long-lasting peace (Doma´nska, 2019; McDaniel, 2018). Some of these narratives revive the idea of the common historical origin of Russia and individual Eastern European nations. From this point of view, this common past links these nations with joint traditions, mentality, or culture, and is part of a common identity. At this point, the Russian historical narrative directly intersects with Russian World reasoning (Roberts, 2017). Last but not least, Russian messages regularly cast an eye on the alleged depreciation of cultural monuments and historical Russian heritage sites abroad (such as burials of Russian soldiers or monuments commemorating the war merits of the Russian/Soviet army). Those sites are considered to be places of national importance commemorating Russia’s historical significance to European development (B¯erzi¸na et al., 2016). All these overlapping narrative clusters fit perfectly into the described soft power conception. Each of them represents a set of broader, generalized and easily transferable agendas stemming from the Russian World construct. They are all complementary and contribute to restoring common identity and Russian influence consolidation by stressing the role of the Russian nation or state in international affairs. In this context, Russian soft power narratives are based on exceedingly ideologized messages emerging from the signature socio-cultural or value-based design. As a result, Russian soft power is characterized by highly unified content that is in a very similar manner employed and disseminated in various world regions. Countryspecific messaging is quite rare, appearing only in association with particular incidents, especially those regarding historical interpretations, the alleged depreciation of historical sites, or violations of the human rights of Russians abroad (B¯erzi¸na et al., 2016; Eglitis & Ardava, 2012; Fried, 2019). However, even such cases are planted deeply into the generalized ideological context which is dominant in the related messaging. Finally, the vast majority of these narratives are formulated to promote international cooperation (among states or non-state communities) or convergence on the background of the Russian World context, and thus they consolidate Russian power abroad in one way or another.

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3 Typological Scheme: Information Warfare Paradigm While the soft power conception represents a generalized systemic approach designed to consolidate power in conditions of peaceful coexistence, the recent development in strategic thinking concerning the instrumentalization of foreign mass media also shows that Russia has developed a highly flexible offensive modality that can be tailored to specific operational environments. In contrast, the second typological scheme is rather tailored to deciding political-military conflicts in Russia’s favour, and instead of promoting cooperation or convergence it strives to weaken the system of political power generation in target countries.

3.1 Roots After the 2008 war in Georgia, Russian military circles fully entered the debate about mass media instrumentalization in foreign policy. Based on this debate, the Russian Military Doctrine issued in 2014 integrated information measures with essential components of contemporary warfighting alongside military force, special forces missions and economic measures (MFA, 2014). Russian military experts were inspired by the original concept of hybrid warfare, mixing together military and nonmilitary assets (Hoffman, 2009; Thomas, 2016). According to the NATO definition (NATO, 2018), hybrid warfare is an amalgam of covert and overt civilian, paramilitary, as well as purely military actions integrated into a compact approach including mass media, cyber-attacks, economic pressure and the deployment of special units or conventional armed forces. Combining military and non-military tools implemented in a variety of ways leads to a blurring of the lines between different types of war and even between war and peace. As Frank Hoffman (2009) notes, our greatest challenge in the future will not come from a state that selects one approach but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies and blend them in innovative ways to suit their own strategic culture, geography, and aims. Russia adopted this strategic thinking and developed a progressive approach that should help win contemporary interstate conflicts in which military confrontation is often marginalized to a minimum, and non-military means become the primary weapons for attacking the enemy—new-generation warfare (Ermus & Salum, 2016; Rot˘arescu, 2015). The importance of military resources in new-generation warfare reasoning has been considerably reduced and their employment has been shifted rather to the later phases of conflict escalation (Chivvis, 2017; Vladimirov, 2013). This type of warfare is sometimes called contactless war (Slipchenko, 2004). The clearest explanation underlining the substantial role assigned to non-military means in the latest Russian hybrid approach, or new-generation warfare, respectively, was made by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov who stated that war and peace have become notions whose borders have been diminishing more and more as non-military ways of waging war replace the traditional

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ones. Gerasimov adds that the impact of non-military instruments can be the same as that of the large-scale deployment of troops and forces, and that a massive influence on people’s consciousness facilitated the inflammation of nationalism in Ukraine and upheavals in the Arab world (Gerasimov, 2013).

3.2 Conception and Mechanisms An information warfare conception provides a framework driving the instrumentalization of foreign mass media that fits the changing Russian attitude to waging conflicts described above. In information warfare, actions are primarily undertaken in the information space, and whoever controls this space will get the victory (NATO Stratcom, 2015). This conception comprises a wide range of offensive activities utilizing information as a tool, a target, or a domain of operations, and ranges from psychological to technical measures (Giles, 2016a). Despite the fact that information warfare and information operations have become a widespread phenomenon, there are principal differences in connotations attributed to these notions in individual strategic cultures. In Western strategic thinking (especially in the USA), the information-technical level—which sees information warfare capabilities as useful primarily to disrupt a target states’ physical infrastructure (with special attention to the command and control communication channels)—dominates (Molander et al., 1996; Brunetti-Lihach, 2018). While not diminishing the usefulness of information tools for the aforementioned purpose, Russia, on the other hand, gives a lot more relevance to the psychological pressure which information tools can produce (Blank, 2013). In this sense, Russian information warfare conception reinvigorates the effort to influence the thoughts and actions of the target foreign audience by means of socio-psychological manipulation (Mattsson, 2015). Information warfare is thus understood in a purely offensive and utilitarian manner. It gives Russia an offensive capacity in geopolitical conditions in which public tolerance of military intervention is rapidly decreasing. A weaponized media can be understood as a key mechanism of the Russian information warfare conception on the information-psychological level. In this context, mass media are considered to be an essential weapon through which a decisive offense capitalizing on the psychological effects of massively dispersed informational narratives can be launched in peaceful conditions as well as during wartime (Hansen, 2017; Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014). Accordingly, Boothby (2014) claims that a weapon is an offensive capability that is applied, or that is designed to be applied, against an enemy and that the destructive, damaging or detrimental effect of a weapon need not result from physical impact as the offensive capability need not be kinetic—and in the last decade, Russia has been increasingly willing to give primacy to non-kinetic operations (Mattsson, 2015). The traditional (Western) assumption has been that psychological effects are mere force multipliers to firearms in combat situations. At present, Russia sees kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfighting as interchangeable stand-alone complexes, as traditional types of war are becoming

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less acceptable in the eyes of the international community as well as the general public (Galeotti, 2016). As a result, in Russian strategic thinking, the mass media have become a weapon that can have a similar impact on deciding the outcome of a conflict to missiles, bombs, torpedoes and so on (Slipchenko & Gareev, 2005; Thomas, 2019). With this in mind, Russia has incorporated mass media assets deeply into its strategic-military planning and has reached a high level of synchronization in political, information and (if necessary) military actions which help to carry out precisely targeted information campaigns able to produce a significant advantage in all types of conflict situations (Badrak & Kozlov, 2016; Lucas & Nimmo, 2015). Moreover, the effects of such an offensive instrumentalization have been boosted with development in the field of mass media technologies, especially in the sphere of the internet and online social networking which has accelerated communication speeds, quickened the news cycle, allowed concealment, and multiplied the effect of malign messaging (Weitz, 2019). It is obvious that Russia sees mass media not only as an instrument of cultural diplomacy, but also as a weapon system designed to generate operational, tactical, and strategic effects in pursuit of its foreign political interests.

3.3 Means of Implementation A weaponized media employs traditional methods. Russia, in this regard, relies heavily on massive information dispersed in systematic campaigns. It also employs reviewed, rebuilt, and transformed special information operations (Lucas & Pomerantsev, 2016; Snegovaya, 2015). Indeed, Russian media assets are now able to excessively utilize a full spectrum of possible social discrepancies to arouse internal turmoil among religiously, culturally, nationally or politically diverse segments with various value systems which exist within the populations of the target states (Fedchenko, 2016). In that respect, the RF proactively uses information content to spread hate speech, destroy trust, sap morale, degrade the information space, erode public discourse, increase partisanship and incite violence (Lanoszka, 2016). Although this approach is offensive, it does not destroy the enemy from the outside but rather instigates intrastate processes leading to self-destruction through selfdisorganization and self-disorientation (Lucas & Pomerantsev, 2016). Such means of implementation demand extremely focused information narratives with the strong potential to encourage internal disputes between different segments within society, undermine trust as well as the devotion of the people to the central government, precipitate upheavals or even armed insurgencies and decompose the social-political order from below (Bruusgaard, 2014). Russian weaponized media are designed to attack the enemy directly and to harm complex intrastate decision-making processes in a bottom-up direction by exerting pressure on already existing resentments, stereotypes, and vulnerabilities (Meister, 2018). This approach strives to exploit existing opinion/social incongruity to ignite enough strong splintering to inflame internal conflict escalation. This practice is not to provide universally applicable content like

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in case of soft power, but rather to create many theatre-based narratives in order to give rise to the clashing preferences of different segments within a population in individual target states (Fedchenko, 2016). Moreover, Russia has developed a sophisticated framework for foreign mass media instrumentalization rooted in new-generation warfare reasoning which rather resembles a ‘battle’ plan. This new-generation Russian warfare strategy consists of three stages: (a) destabilizing the country by inspiring intense domestic conflict; (b) causing state collapse by ruining the economy and destroying the infrastructure and (c) replacing local political leadership with its proxies (Thiele, 2015). This suggests that mass media-based information campaigns are launched in the very first stages of any political/military conflict to stir up the fragmentation of the target society. Mass media are employed to incapacitate the target state as much as possible before it is even able to realize that hostile activity has already started. Thus, mass media gives the attacking state an advantage similar to an ambush that can decide the outcome of political conflicts from their very beginnings (Giles, 2016a). When the media activity starts to intensify it could be already too late for an unprepared targeted state to counter the effects of increasing pressure produced by the amassing offensive information messaging (Kopõtin & Sazonov, 2017; Strovsky, 2015). Thus, the new-generation warfare strategy is largely determined by success in the offensive instrumentalization of mass media over the course of the initial, low-intensity stages of the conflict (Carpenter, 2017; Rácz, 2016). If the opinion of the target audience has been successfully manipulated, and division of the target society has been achieved, then the chances of the affected state to engage in effective counter-measures are significantly lowered (Chivvis, 2017; Rácz, 2016). This is the main reason why the Russian military leadership claims that depressing the opponent psychologically can pave the way to achieving national interests without military engagement. The core idea of this changing strategic reasoning is the following: while traditional combat remains a possibility, it will no longer be the primary means of achieving victory on the battlefield in the twenty-firstcentury. In contemporary Russian strategic thinking, information warfare with a substantial position of mass media takes over the reins. Vast mass-media activity can permeate through all the following phases of conflict escalation in which it creates a breeding ground for further Russian involvement in internal processes or can actively support allied groups within the target state population. To demonstrate this with a specific case, some studies suggest that it was primarily the mass media which generated the fragmentation of Ukrainian society in 2014 and subsequently stirred up discontent by provoking fear-motivated protests sweeping the way to the overthrow of regional political representations in Donetsk and Luhansk, the dispersion of illegal or stolen weapons, and the occupation of key institutions and critical infrastructure facilities (Rukomeda, 2018). This situation then provided the Russian leadership with justifications for speaking about the failed state in Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis, and for advocating their intervention into Crimea along with material, financial, or personnel support provided to the newly established groups assuming political power in the eastern Ukrainian regions (Carpenter, 2017; Golts & Reisinger, 2014). In this sense, the new information warfare that is waged on the information-psychological level also offers an asymmetrical advantage allowing

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either to overcome a superiority in troops and weapons, or to avoid the legal restrictions on their utilization (Šlabovitš, 2017). Throughout the Ukrainian campaign, Russia combined various tools in manifold methods. It had already launched its media messaging in autumn 2013—a few months before military action broke out— and this messaging continued with increasing intensity as the conflict began to escalate. Similarly, the Russian media achieved enormous flexibility in narrative framing which was tailor-made for individual escalation phases and which precisely hit the discrepancies between the western (pro-European) and eastern (pro-Russian) regions of the country (Kofman & Rácz, 2018; Rojansky, 2015).

3.4 Goals Contemporary Russian strategy sets much more tangible goals for information campaigns (than soft power) which are targeted at particular audiences in a considerably narrowed-down manner and with unprecedented precision. The goals attached to the current foreign Russian mass media campaigns are tailor-made to specific conflict situations and to different geopolitical arenas representing distinctive operational environments. Thus, the contemporary information campaigns’ essential purpose is to paralyze the affected state’s capacity to mobilize the power necessary for countering Russian interests as much as possible in specific operational conditions (Fedchenko, 2016; Perry, 2015). It is achieved by limiting the sources of internal sovereignty, and the extent of this limitation can significantly vary in accordance to the specific needs and intentions in individual geopolitical theatres: (a) to inflict confusion to mitigate public reaction to specific Russian policies; (b) to arouse opinion fragmentation limiting the manoeuvring space of the target country to introduce counter-measures; (c) to disintegrate the target audience in an effort to paralyze the state’s ability to raise internal support for the central government and even (e) to initiate turmoil or motivate subversion (Meister, 2016; Pasitselska, 2017). The described multi-layered set of goals is based on one common principle: stimulating animosity within the target audience to reach a sufficient level of social division for achieving the stated objective. This stimulation of animosity can range from confusion—representing the mildest and the least resource-demanding status—up to the instigation of an insurgency—requiring thorough preparation in the phase of narrative framing as well as the involvement of a full range of media assets from official ones to those having concealed ties to the Russian state or political elites. Furthermore, all of these goals are directed at depriving the leadership of the target country, or the groups opposing Russian interests, of a certain amount of actual sovereignty without physically seizing the territory of the target state (Gerasimov, 2016; Samadashvili, 2015). If successful, it is much more difficult for the central government to gain enough support to make a prospective engagement in effective counter-measures which might tackle the hostile narratives with sufficient legitimacy and public acceptability (Thomas, 2019).

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3.5 Narrative Structure The narrative structure associated with this typological scheme is closely linked to the specific means of implementation as well as to a certain variability in the setting of goals. The aim is not to provide a sole, unified narrative, but rather to create many narratives in order to give rise to a clash of preferences in different segments within a population in individual target states. Different audiences are affected by different messages, as different societies can be fragmented by different issues (Fedchenko, 2016). Aside from Ukraine, Russia has also been able to launch unrivalled information campaigns across Europe, which has become particularly evident in Great Britain, Germany, the Baltic states and in the Balkans (Lucas & Pomerantsev, 2016; Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2017; Hofmeisterová et al. 2018; Ellehuus, 2020; Mankoff, 2020). These information campaigns are noticeably milder than the one in Ukraine but are exceptional in the precision with which they use country-customized narratives to hit the crucial dividing issues within the target states’ societies that differ from country to country. These characteristic features are particularly evident when looking at the latest Russian information campaigns in the area of the Western Balkans. The cases of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Northern Macedonia can be brought to the stage to demonstrate country-specific narratives which revive inter-ethnic animosity. What defines the main trajectory of the Russian information strategy in Serbia is the fostering of nationalistic sentiments and the re-awakening of inter-ethnic rivalry, in which Russia positions itself as the guardian of Serbian interests vis-à-vis Kosovo and a guardian of Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries (Stefanov & Vladimirov, 2018). In this context, Russian narratives assert that Kosovo is not a sovereign country but an integral part of Serbia. The Russian media spread messages promoting the perception that Kosovo is an unstable, unsafe place to live. This information depicts strong Islamic sentiment as the cause preventing North Kosovo from further integration into Kosovo’s political system, and claims that the country is on the verge of an inter-ethnic clash (StopFake, 2019). Kosovo is also portrayed as an antiSerbian project created by the West. Russian information messaging feeds nationalist sentiments in Serb-dominated North Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska by spreading alarming news pointing to nationalistic Islamic/Albanian emancipation (Bashota, 2019). Other narratives target the mutual relationship between Christians and Muslims by claiming that support for Kosovo’s independence was part of the ‘Greater Albania scam’. (Kuczy´nski, 2019). There have also been calls for the unification of ethnic Serbs from Serbia, Montenegro, North Kosovo and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska into a single political entity that should have close ties to Russia (Stefanov & Vladimirov, 2018). In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the information spread by Russian media assets undermines the prospects of political and institutional cooperation between the country’s multi-ethnic population. Russian narratives capitalize on political power divided between the country’s two administrative entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) and between its three communities (Serbs,

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Bosnian Muslims, and Croats) (Himes & Stronski, 2019). Some messages call for the creation of a separate Croat entity within BiH or promote the idea that they should be granted political autonomy within the Federation (Salvo & De Leon, 2018). Information of a nationalistic nature has also appeared, asserting that the collapse of BiH means a chance for Serbs and Croats in their efforts to gain emancipation (Cvjeti´canin et al. 2019). Other narratives have alleged that Croats are being deprived of their rights by Bosniaks supported by American officials (Salvo & De Leon, 2018). Apart from that, Russian media messaging has been boosting nationalism and fuelling the idea of the separation of Republika Srpska. Such pieces of information are perceived by the other two communities as a threat to the political stability of BiH. These messages are frequently channelled with a specific focus on the dispute with Kosovo; if Kosovo is not Serbia, Republika Srpska is not Bosnia (Metodieva, 2019). In reference to the case of North Macedonia, Russian media messaging instrumentalizes political rivalries between the Slav and Albanian communities (Bechev, 2019). Russian narratives have recently attempted to arouse disputes around the agreement between Macedonia and Greece about the process of changing the country’s name from the Republic of Macedonia to North Macedonia. This act has constituted a necessary condition for Macedonia in opening the way to NATO membership and accession talks with the EU (Teodorescu, 2020). This issue was so sensitive because ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia were overwhelmingly in favour of the deal, seeing EU membership as a means for tackling poverty and discrimination. On the other hand, this issue was unpopular with those ethnic Slavs who bitterly resent the change of the country’s name ‘at the behest of Greece’. The country’s information landscape was saturated by Russian media with sensitive narratives saying that the change of the state name would lead to the weakening of its national identity. Thus, some messages called for a boycott of the agreement efforts, employed hate speech against Albanians and contained radical patriotic appeals to stand against this act (Squires, 2018). The use of hate speech incorporated a strong dichotomy between patriots (Slavs) and traitors (Albanians and name-change supporters). This Russian messaging also contained an increased usage of hate symbols (such as Pepe the Frog) that has been focused on awaking the North Macedonian far right (Metodieva, 2019). Some narratives assert that Albania, backed by the EU, NATO, and Kosovo, was seeking territorial claims against its neighbours Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia (Kuczy´nski, 2019). Moreover, Russia tries to intensify the internal disintegration of individual countries to thwart the ambitions of local states to associate with NATO/EU institutions. Russian information campaigns in this region highlight local resentments towards Brussels or Washington and support Euro-Atlantic scepticism as well as suspicion and doubts concerning the role of NATO/EU in the region (Bechev, 2019). These narratives blame the West as responsible for: (a) corrosive corruption; (b) democratic deficiencies and the lack of the formation of rule-of-law-based political systems; (c) the inability to empower civil societies based on unique local socio-cultural characteristics and (d) supporting separatism. (Secrieru, 2019) Russian media in the region

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frequently emphasize an alleged Western preference for defending Muslim communities at the expense of Orthodox Christians in order to divide the societies along religious lines (Himes & Stronski, 2019). To sum up, Russia’s mass media messaging carried out in the framework of information warfare conception fuels the fragmentation of political discourse in target countries. Thus, mass media content that is used in the framework of information warfare is characterized by the dominant position of tailor-made, country-specific narratives with a strong accent on controversial issues with fragmenting potential. Tensions between different communities are stoked and the confidence of nationalist/patriotic movements is supported. By exploiting the issue of social conflicts, these narratives directly challenge the stability of target states and strike at intricate relations between countries and among multiple ethnicities. This has been done wherever needed in an effort to weaken disadvantageous political tendencies or perceived negative developmental trends with the potential to undermine Russia’s political, economic and even security interests.

4 Discussion It is apparent that Russia has used both soft power as well as information warfare paradigms to develop sophisticated strategic designs representing idiosyncratic approaches to foreign mass media instrumentalization on an informationpsychological level. These strategic designs stem from specific ideational frameworks and employ unique conceptions that drive the mechanisms of mass media utilization in practice. Each of these strategic modalities is designed to achieve varying sets of goals in different geopolitical conditions. The first typological scheme concerning mass media instrumentalization in foreign policy is rooted in Russian World reasoning. This strategy has been built on a conception of soft power characterized by a consolidating logic in a systemic universalist manner. The main mechanism is cultural diplomacy operating on selfidentification with converging transferable agendas which offer alternative possibilities of social association. In terms of practical implementation, Russian cultural diplomacy is based on persuasion through attraction, inducement and co-option. The primary goal of this strategic approach is to maximize foreign political influence in an environment of peaceful coexistence and mitigate international critique to maximize the legitimacy of its actions. Typical markers affiliated with the narrative structure are as follows: high level of ideology allowing the development of generalized, broadly transferable, and widely acceptable agendas with only very limited and indistinct country-specific connotations. The second typological scheme within the current strategic toolset concerning the instrumentalization of mass media in foreign policy is rooted in the new-generation warfare rationale. This strategy has been built on an information warfare conception characterized by an offensive theatre-based approach. The main mechanism is a weaponized media designed to hit the crucial and weakest spots in the structure of

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the target state’s population. In terms of practical implementation, weaponized media employ special information operations and massive information messaging to inflict bottom-up disintegration along severe dividing lines already existing within segments of the target state society. The primary goal of this strategic approach is to limit the sources of internal sovereignty within target countries and thus to paralyze the affected state’s capacity to mobilize the power necessary to counter Russian interests. Typical markers affiliated with the narrative structure are the dominant position of offensive information content based on precise country-specific connotations with a high level of fragmentation potential. Moreover, these strategic modalities are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, by combining them Russia has created a manageable strategic toolset representing a smart approach of mixing together soft power (representing the consolidating component of the strategic toolset) on the one hand and agile information warfare (representing the offensive component of the strategic toolset) on the other. These two strategic modalities provide Russia with a full range of actions that are fitting for peaceful conditions as well as for various stages of conflict escalation. Thus, they help Russia to pursue national interests in any kind of geopolitical conditions or environment. This amalgam contributes to encouraging new cooperation with potential allies as well as political support abroad, but it also provides an instrument for resolving conflict situations of different intensities regardless of the level of militarisation. The structure of the current strategic toolset based on these two typological schemes is characterized by three particular attributes which have a direct impact on its applicability. The first attribute is complementarity, as both components (typological schemes) of the strategy can be activated simultaneously in one or more foreign media markets to enhance the effectiveness of media campaigning. The second one is flexibility, as this multi-modal approach allows one to scale goals in accordance with the desired objectives or even change goals in time by switching among strategies. The third feature is adaptability, as this strategic toolset enables applicability in different geopolitical conditions that differ from region to region. Together, these three attributes enable Russia to choose the most effective approach to mass media instrumentalization according to its goals and operational environment and to conduct highly opportunistic campaigns in compliance with foreign political interests in different world regions or particular foreign media markets. The comprehensive outline of the Russian strategic toolset introduced above is summarized in Table 1.

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Table. 1 The structure of the Russian strategic toolset concerning the instrumentalization of foreign mass media and the consequences for applicability Strategic toolset Typological scheme 1

Typological scheme 2

Roots

Russian world • Ideological framework

New-generation warfare • Militaristic framework

Conception Mechanisms

Soft power • Consolidating (non-aggressive) • Systemic approach Cultural diplomacy • Self-identification • Transferable agenda • Offering alternative

Information warfare • Offensive • Theatre-based approach Weaponized media • Attacking critical and the weakest spots in the structure of the target state population

Means of implementation • Persuasion through attraction, inducement, and co-option • Logic of social convergence

• Bottom-up disintegration along severe dividing lines • Logic of social division

Goals

• Influence maximization in state • Limiting the sources of internal of peaceful coexistence sovereignty within target • Mitigating the negative effects countries of particular policies on an • Paralyzing the affected state’s international reputation capacity to mobilize the power necessary for countering Russian interests

Narrative structure

• Generalized narrative framing • Dominant role of cultural/value-based ideology

• Theatre/country-specific narrative framing • Dominant emphasis on unique social incongruities

Consolidating component

Offensive component

Consequences for applicability: • Complementarity—both components can be activated simultaneously • Flexibility—allows scaling in the determination of goals • Adaptability—enables applicability in different geopolitical conditions

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The Russian Doctrine—A Way for the Political Elite to Maximise the Efficiency of Information Warfare Daivis Petraitis

1 Introduction In 2013, the Chief of Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, published an article that made Western experts talk about “The Gerasimov Doctrine”1 that describes the Russian method for waging modern wars. They missed the fact that the article presented only an analysis and conclusions made by Russia that were based on the recent wars in the Arab world and elsewhere. Earlier, General Gerasimov had made a presentation at a conference at the Russian Academy of Military Science (Akademi voennyx nayk Poccicko Fedepacii) about the role of the General Staff in preparing the country for modern warfare (Gerasimov, 2013). This presentation, not the article, should be perceived as the first indicator of how Russia is likely to respond. According to Gerasimov (2013), the word war was replaced with “preparations for defence-related matters”, but the presentation itself presented a new system for war-waging. Both the article and the presentation stated that the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and the General Staff must continue developing a comprehensive understanding (theory) and a potential modus operandi for a new non-linear warfare. As a result of this involvement, these new ideas and suggestions became known as the “Russian hybrid warfare doctrine”. It is worth mentioning that this new doctrine was compiled in the example of the greatest Prussian General Staff traditions, covering all new warfare areas (including information warfare) and listing the actions that a country is supposed to perform. Conservative Russian academics developed and published a doctrinal paper on the global role and position of Russia, a book called “The Russian Doctrine”, already in 2005 (Kobiakov et al., 2005). The second edition of “The Russian Doctrine”, 1

Mark Galeotti was among the firsts to use that term (Galeotti 2018).

D. Petraitis (B) Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_6

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published in 2016, had a quote on the cover, which describes the book as a “national ideology for Putin’s administration” (Russkaya doktrina, 2016). Written by a group of academics, it was supposed to become the doctrine believed in by ordinary Russian people, followed by politicians, and used by servicemen and civilians involved in planning and waging wars. The Russian hybrid war philosophy is based on four positions that largely correspond with the Russian current and past mentalities that are presented in “The Russian Doctrine”. The philosophy is also based on the values and approaches developed by the Prussian General Staff centuries ago and continuously modernised by Russian military strategists. The first position concerns all Russians being confident in their activities. There are dozens and dozens of examples: Russia was never violating the INF (IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces) Treaty (MID.ru, 2019); President Putin and Sergey Shoygu, the Minister of Defence constantly claimed that NATO was the only aggressive party. In short, the statement is that Russia is always right. The political right-wing and conservative groups advocated for this by promoting Russia ‘s great past, claiming that the country “is always right in its decisions and actions and is on a historical mission” and is representing a pillar of human civilisation in the Russian Doctrine (Kobiakov et al., 2005). Even though the Russian Doctrine is not officially called a national ideology, it has become to serve as a guideline for the Russian leaders that they have followed “in words and deeds” since the early 2000s. Putin and his supporters have already adopted the Russia is always right mentality as their main ideological slogan for the political system and the state. Russian interpretation on situational awareness serves as a base for the second position. It is best described by Army General Y. Baluyevsky2 who said, “A war never ends, it just becomes torpid,” (Baluyevsky, 2017). This position requires everyone (civilians and servicemen) to consider any time as wartime and think and act accordingly. It also establishes a norm of constant preparedness and a certain modus operandi. The explanation is simple: since Russia is always right, its enemies are constantly trying to destroy it. Classical military theorists like Sun Tzu (2021) and Carl von Clausewitz3 justify constant war with all possible efforts and means/assets. I suspect that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrine “Three-warfare”, adopted in 2003, has also played its part in this doctrine (Petraitis, 2020). Furthermore, this position is supported by historical examples from the Russian people’s resistance to the MongolTatar yoke, the Napoleonic Wars, other wars in Tsarist Russia, and even the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (World War II), which all refer to the era when the mentality of “war is fought by all people, the entire state, and the motherland” was distinctly emphasised. Consequently, the third position states that war is always fought by the entire state. An entrenched position like that motivates citizens to

2

The former First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, from 2004 to 2008. 3 Famous term from Carl von Clausewitz “The fog of war” (Nebel des Krieges) refers to uncertainty in situational awareness.

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devote themselves to victory, be ready to make sacrifices and face hardships, and fight at any cost. The fourth position is related to the second and, even more, to the third one. According to this position, all activities done by people and the country must be efficient. It corresponds with the traditions and philosophy of the aforementioned Prussian General Staff that values a professional approach and claims that any planned or implemented activities give the best results if “all actions of all participants are synchronised, coordinated, and centralised (put under the unity of command)” (Millotat, 1992). Even the best ideas and theories, unless implemented, remain but a fantasy. At the aforementioned conference, Army General Gerasimov presented not only an analysis on recent conflicts but also the fundamental ideas about a modern system that incorporates any means necessary to fight a war. This system is essentially based on the third and fourth positions. The MoD applied them in creating a system that would involve all “soft” and “hard” authorities in hybrid war. The tippy top of the system is the establishment of a comprehensive body in the MoD—the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC) (Hacionalny centp yppavleni obopono PF). The NDMS supervises, manages, and synchronises all activities (including information warfare) within the hybrid war.

2 The Russian Theory (Philosophy) for Waging War 2.1 Russia is Always Right When a person tries to observe recent global events and analyse their consequences, he might see how important it is to have confidence in what you do. This is especially important for information warfare where an endless amount of controversial messages could either confirm or destroy even the most thought-through efforts and prevailing beliefs. Confidence is crucial in all (defensive and offensive) cases. Russian tactics in modern information warfare prove that their actions and efforts are used not to demonstrate objectivity, but to find and distribute (broadcast) the “right arguments” and “right facts” to prove that Russia is always right.4 The Russian political leaders found that the aforementioned Russian Doctrine best supports the Russian self-esteem, so they adapted it. What makes this academic doctrine elaborated almost 15 years ago so attractive for Russian political elites? First, as it was already mentioned, the Russian Doctrine is a solid, theoretical, and philosophical document of over 500 pages compiled by more than 50 respected conservative philosophers, economists, political scientists, and other experts. It covers all national areas and gives clear and simple answers to “what”, “why”, and “how”. The Russian Doctrine offers an attractive viewpoint for Russia and the 4

See Main Statements of “The Russian Doctrine”. Accessible at https://www.rusdoctrina.ru/pag e95509.html.

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Russian people, stating that the country and its citizens are and must forever remain special. Nationalist ideas were modernised and presented in a manner that made Russians seem almost like savers of mankind and the contemporary world. This suits perfectly with the ideas shared by the ruling regime and a large percentage of citizens. The doctrine interprets Russian history in a way that satisfies almost every ordinary Russian. It also explains why the country failed to fulfil the dreams of people who were counting on a new Western type of democracy under the rule of Boris Yeltsin. The doctrine argues that, in the nineties, Russia lacked a national ideology that could have guaranteed future prosperity for the country. It also claims that adventurists and criminals used the Western liberal ideology to make themselves rich and become oligarchs (“the new Russians”) who only cared about their own wealth and moved abroad, robbing the Russian people of their basic rights and a future that they deserve. Finally, the Russian Doctrine gives quite a clear answer to what ought to be done to have a satisfying future, suggesting that Russia must make “a big break-through” and return “to the traditions of a historic Russia” (Kobiakov et al., 2005). Putin and his people recognised the value of this ideology because it is widely adaptable. Firstly, it agrees with the people who miss the glory of the Tsarist times and those who believe that Russia is a Holy State, a Third Rome, and the place where “social truth” (cocialna ppavda) triumphs. By stating that the Soviet Union was a continuation of the Great Russia project and echoing the statement made by Putin about the collapse of the USSR being “a geopolitical catastrophe”, the doctrine pleases the people who remain loyal to the USSR. It satisfies the people who distrust the elected individuals. And finally, the doctrine suggests that “Russia should be associated with three national values, the Motherland (Oteqectvo), the Honour (Qect), and the Faith (Bepa)” (Kobiakov et al., 2005). Without publicly referring to the doctrine, the Russian leaders are following all its principles and, as a result, brainwashing the ordinary Russian people and turning them into proud nationalists. Secondly, in addition to granting a special status to Russia, the doctrine claims that “Russia is a special, good, and unified nation, considering contemporary times and values” (Kobiakov et al., 2005). It gives the “right answers” to all questions regarding the dilemma on how to proceed. It also explains the type of education that would best suit the new Russian state and the kind of new elites that Russia needs. It clarifies the role of the church and political parties, and, finally, the role of a Ruler (gocydap) whose main duty is “to defend the historical Russian land and expand the empire by adding new lands in order to maintain national security” (Kobiakov et al., 2005). Finally, it recommends ways for building the entire state. In conclusion, the doctrine provides clear and detailed explanations and recommendations that both the people in charge and the people being ruled are willing to accept as the best instruction for fulfilling expectations. I believe that the Russian Doctrine, which has become an unofficial doctrinal document for Putin’s elite, was used to create a “missing ideology” and make quite a few Russians believe in the great future of the state and Putin as a “strongman” leader of the country. Almost every statement and action of the current Russian leadership is laid down and justified by the doctrine. As a result,

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the ideas of the Russian Doctrine are spread to foreigners and compatriots using the methods of information warfare.

3 War is Forever Nobody knows the origin of this statement. Some refer to historians who claim that war is as old as the history of mankind. Others point to Bolsheviks who persisted that a global and never-ending proletarian fight against the rich and exploitation is a new reality. This mentality suits the Russian military management and helps to influence the everyday lives of the Russian people. Following this discussion, we should proceed with a short excursus into the history of the Russian military management. They are among the last remaining followers of the German (Prussian) military traditions and culture. It was a military culture developed by the Prussian General Staff and applied to the Prussian state-building by integrating military management into the process. The military culture of the Prussian General Staff kept persisting that professionalism, efficiency, and devotion bring results (Millotat, 1992). It was abandoned with the Treaty of Versailles for being “an efficient instrument of militarism”, then partially revoked during the Nazi reign, and finally abolished in the Western culture after World War II. The Russian emperor Paul I (1796–1801) introduced the Prussian military culture in Russia and, ever since, these principles have remained as the one and only for Russia. After the Tsarist regime collapsed in 1917, the Bolsheviks preserved these principles and used them not only in the Red Army, but also in the organisation of the Communist Party and Soviet repressive organisations such as the NKVD (a forerunner of the KGB). The Prussian principles for planning and preparing for war prevailed during the Soviet times and the General Staff considered war as a permanent environment and condition in all its plans. Even though war may have different forms, its essence—to defeat and to win— always remains. In his article, Gerasimov presented a diagram with different forms (stages) of conflict, starting from preparations, continuing with combat operations, and ending with re-establishing peace. According to Baluyevsky (2017), all countries are simultaneously involved in a number of different conflicts which can be assembled under a single general war, “War never ends, it only becomes torpid”. Moreover, Baluyevsky was not the first to make this statement. Boris Shaposhnikov, a Russian General and later Chief of the Staff of the Red Army, made the same statement in his book “The Brain of the Army” (Mozg Apmii), published in the 1920s. He analysed and promoted the idea that wars consist of two parts: a hidden part (a hidden war), conducted during peacetime, and an open part (a real war), and stated that all planning and operations must be conducted as if in the conditions of war (Shaposhnikov, 1927).

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The idea of a never-ending war seems to allow and justify the use of all means and methods. This is also applicable to information warfare. The concept of a neverending war allowed General Gerasimov to support and promote this idea and propositions, “The rules of war have essentially changed. The role of non-combating measures and means for achieving political and strategic objectives has increased” (Gerasimov, 2013). According to him, information warfare belongs in the noncombat category and means and should, therefore, be supervised by the military because they can competently apply all the above-mentioned knowledge to military planning and execution.

4 The State Fights a War If we perceive any kind of engagement with a potential opponent as war, we realise that even the strongest military can never have enough resources and capabilities. For Russia, and especially the Soviet Union, involving the entire state in a war was a rule that required no justifications. All former General Staffs from different periods of Soviet history had so-called directorates for organisation-mobilisation that were responsible for bringing everything necessary for war under the military command and control. The idea to leave only military assets under the control of the General Staff and exclude other institutions was also explored in the Soviet Union, but after a short period of time, they decided it was not reasonable and abolished it (CIA, 1982). The initial idea remains valid even today. This designates that, at first, other Russian “hard” institutions (like the National Guard, the FSB5 Border Guard, the Ministry of Emergencies, etc.) are transferred under the General Staff6 through the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC). This also applies to the Russian Secret Services. Secondly, the “supporting institutions” such as the national Russian Railways or the Ministry of Economics are included in the national defence and mobilisation plans. This also concerns the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, and others that represent “soft” institutions but can, nevertheless, contribute to the plan and presumably participate with their knowledge and capabilities. All these are represented in the NDMC. As a result, if any issues arise in a single part, the entire state is at war. The supporters of this idea always claim that the system has solidly worked in the past and brought victory in the Great Patriotic War.

5 The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation—Fedepalna clyba bezopacnocti Poccicko Fedepacii (FCB). 6 The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation—Genepalny xtab Boopynnyx cil Poccicko Fedepacii.

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5 Centralisation, Coordination, and Synchronisation are Essential The idea of having everything coordinated, synchronised, and centralised, at least in a sense of Command and Control (C2), was developed as part of the Prussian military culture and aimed at achieving maximum efficiency. The synchronisation and coordination of activities and efforts serves as a force multiplier and a demonstration of effect. This approach is present and detectable in the activities of different Russian national institutions. In the study on the Russian military exercise Zapad2017 (Petraitis, 2019), I presented the facts and evidence for centralisation and synchronisation used in conducting the exercise, which can be used in every form of hybrid war, including information warfare. Moreover, the main General Staff principles for achieving success in such a warfare emphasise the following: – Precise selection of targets (objects, groups, etc.) and deciding on the tasks and types of other (asymmetric) actions. – Concentrating all efforts on the main features of the opposing forces and all their interactions and dependencies (communication, etc.). – Disorientating the opponent (in his estimation of a real situation or your actions). – Avoiding the loss of own initiative in other (asymmetric) operations or turning the situation into a real war. – Restricting the freedom of operations of the opposing forces. – Increasing the efficiency of own actions. – Demoralising the forces and population of opponents. – Disorganising the C2 of opponents on national, military, and weaponry levels. – Interfering with all types of logistics and communication lines, systems, and channels of the opponent. – Unlimited exploitation of all available situational elements (geographical, social, etc.) (Selivanov, 2020). A real-life example of the “who is guilty and who is innocent in setting off World War II” case demonstrates how Russia applied these principles concurrently with centralisation, coordination, and synchronisation in an information warfare battle. When more and more Europeans and Russians started to ask that, it started to jeopardise the Russia is always right mentality. In response, the Russian leaders began to “prove” that Russia was nowhere near an initiator of the war. The Russian Military-Historical Society (Poccickoe ictopiqeckoe obwectvo) chaired by Sergey Naryshkin, a recent Chief of Russian Foreign Intelligence Services and chairman of the State Duma, organised a conference in Moscow that was named “In Celebration of the 80th Anniversary of World War II: from Versailles to Gliwice”. The main speaker at the conference was Mr. Sergey Ivanov, better known as a long-time deputy to Putin in security structures, a former Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, a Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, a member of the Russian Security Council, and a Special Representative of the President on the issues of environment and transport (Rossiiskoe

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istoricheskie obshestvo, 2019). Evidently, the Society and Ivanov are also fighting “this battle” by personally advocating for the Russia is always right principle. After the European Parliament adopted a resolution for the importance of remembering the past for the future of Europe and listed all the causes for World War II (EU Parliament, 2019), Russia began to maximise, coordinate, and synchronise response activities by using centralised C2. The National Defence Management Centre was, of course, closely following the case and led the operations of different state institutions. On the next day, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and responded to the resolution. Their spokeswoman Mrs. Maria Zakharova said, “This resolution is nothing short of a bunch of revisionist claims” (Zakharova, 2019). The Russian Central Archive and the MoD also joined in. To prove that Russia bears no guilt for any sins of the war, both institutions suddenly “found”, declassified, and released some secret documents that proved the atrocities of the Nazis and the generosity of the liberating Red Army (Russian MFA, 2020). There was nothing new or unknown in these documents, which raised the question: why were they classified in the first place, waiting for this particular incident for decades? We can only conclude that there may be other secret documents in the Central Archive and archives of other institutions that are waiting for appropriate circumstances and instructions for someone “to find” and declassify them. Subsequently, a number of messages, debates, accusations, document findings and disclosures, movies, TV discussions, etc. in different languages started to appear, targeted at different audiences in different countries and all blaming the resolution. Each one kept criticising the European Parliament and confirming that Russia is always right. Let us look at some examples. An unknown Internet site EUvsDi, probably financed by Russia, posted a statement, saying, “The recent European Parliament resolution that equates the Nazi Germany with the Soviet Union is an example of a blatant lie about World War II. The resolution basically states that the Soviet Union is responsible, alongside Nazi Germany, for starting World War II, apparently forgetting that they invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941” (EUvsDiSinfo, 2019). Even the President tried to prove that Russia is always right. Suddenly, Putin became very interested in this subject. At a meeting with the leaders of the Union of Independent States (UIS), he gave a lecture and commented on the documents released from the archives. In his research, he came across a pre-war Polish diplomat Józef Lipski and accused him of being an “anti-Semitic pig” and a “snitch “. He promised to support his lecture with an article, and delivered: in his publication, he found another responsible party for World War II—Poland (Putin, 2020). Putin’s article encouraged others. Other documents were released, “proving” that Poland was sneaky and, according to Russia, gained from the Munich Agreement by demanding a part of Czechoslovakia. To support that “fact”, an NGO called “Suvorovec of Moscow”, again “accidentally” and following the instructions by MoD, got hold of these documents and published an article on how Poland gained from the Munich Agreement with the Nazi Germany (Saulkin, 2020). Immediately after Putin’s lecture, another participant, a news agency, found a very interesting subject of research: a biography of a Polish diplomat Józef Lipski, where he was

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portrayed in the darkest colours (Kislov, 2019). To keep the “battle going” and make their efforts more efficient, the MoD kept releasing other documents on WWII and “suddenly” decided to organise firework shows devoted to the 75th anniversary of the Soviet troops invading the capitals of Poland, the Baltic States, and other European countries. An Estonian researcher Toomas Alatalu (2019) noted, “The Kremlin propaganda machine is very flexible. For example, nobody remembers a fireworks display in Moscow in celebration of the 70th anniversary of liberating Tallinn from the fascists”. To win the case, some remaining Russian war veterans (Bovdunov & Komarova, 2020), academics (Ekshtut, 2019), experts, historians, and journalists (Senshin, 2019) got involved; they presented and commented on the released documents, creating informational diagrams and projects (Sputnik Estonia, 2019), and expressing their disappointment and anger. The Russian mass media, including RT, other national TV channels, journals and newspapers, news agencies, the Russian “Sputnik” in Estonia (Itchenko, 2018), Belarus (Andriusik, 2018), Abkhazia (Ivashenko, 2018), Kyrgyzstan (Stefanov, 2019), and Ossetia (Itchenko, 2018), and Russian supporters abroad (Goncharenko, 2020) all devoted their time and energy to prove that “Russia is good, others are bad”. It was very sudden and rapidly accumulated to smash all obstacles. This particular case demonstrates very well how different institutions were concentrating, synchronising, and coordinating their activities to get the highest results and effect by operating in different places and applying different forms and means.

6 Russian New War-Waging System, Led by the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC) The Russian Doctrine promotes a new and efficient national governing system—a network empire that consists of a system of interrelated layers. With centralisation in place, the system is transformed in its final stage into a network-centric empire. According to the doctrine, Russia should establish a so-called centre for all network-centric warfare (Centp cetevogo yppavleni boevymi dectvimi) that would provide comprehensive C2 (Kobiakov et al., 2005). However, there are supposedly already a variety of threats that the military has to consider. In addition to the standard safeguarding and protection of territories or the political system, the military should, according to the doctrine, also defend Russian spiritual and cultural values, lifestyle, and history. More specifically, war targets (threats) include religion (promoting non-traditional religions is a national threat), ideology (destroying Russian national ideologies is a national threat), finance (destructing the national system and replacing it with an international one is a national threat), demography (reducing the health and life expectancy of Russian people is a national threat), etc. When it comes to potential battlefields, the Russian Doctrine divided them into physical (territories, economy, and demography), mental (political, informational,

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and psychological), and spiritual (culture, history, etc.) categories, which suggests that the military is responsible for all national areas in Russia. And finally, concerning future wars, the doctrine characterised them as global, total, or network-centric fights with the involvement of non-armed forces (Kobiakov et al., 2005). After a decade from when the Russian Doctrine was published, General Gerasimov presented a plan to implement these recommendations, suggesting that the centre should be established and called the National Defence Management Centre. At the conference held at the Military Science Academy in 2013, he presented a scheme of a potential national wartime C2 with military management in the centre. In addition to military institutions, he also involved civilian institutions like the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Transport, etc. alongside a structure—the NDMC—that, at the time, did not exist (Gerasimov, 2014). The original figure from the presentation slideshow that included the NDMC box in pale print is printed below. Bear in mind that the presentation was given and later published in a military publication at the beginning of 2014, long before the centre was established (Gerasimov, 2014). The NDMC was established on 1 December 2014, and it celebrated its fifth anniversary last year. In celebration, the Russian military TV network “Zvezda” created a series of documentaries that claimed that the centre was able to control over 50 national institutions and hundreds of other participants involved in defence activities 24/7/365 (TV Zvezda, 2019). The documentaries followed a single day in the Centre, but it was enough to show how synchronised and coordinated the institutions and activities are.

7 The C4I as an Enabler It is not enough to only establish the structure. To guarantee a fast and efficient synchronisation and coordination, they need a technical aspect of Command and Control (C2) or a system of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4I). Technologies multiply efforts as they help institutions fight any hybrid war faster and more efficiently because they have become a basis for new management algorithms and equipment. The Russian state and military managed to replace the missing foreign high-tech components for communications and computing with those produced in Russia. Russia, like the rest of the world, attained the necessary solutions and progress through digitalisation. It helped to increase the speed, volume, and security of communication. Here, the fourth C—computers (with a focus on technology) and computing (with a focus on calculations)—enabled the development of a new type of Automated Command Systems (ACSs). They are applied and tested on different levels, but the strategic level is the most important for a comprehensive coordination and synchronisation. The NDMC has a system called Program Apparatus Complex

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or PAC7 that is able to handle problems on a strategic (national) level. It helps the people who make strategic decisions to instantly respond to different situations and scenarios. It also employs a variety of other system functions and is, therefore, able to supervise, govern, and manage the institutions and forces that are in the C4I loop in real time. In addition to distributing data and information and handling situation awareness, PAC is also known for being able to make potential decisions and compile draft proposals for directives and orders. And finally, the system can manipulate and control ACSs and similar systems that are governed by not only the MoD and its Forces, but other institutions as well (TV Zvezda, 2019). According to available sources, the Russian General Staff has composed a set of draft proposals for potential decisions based on previous historical cases or theoretic calculations. The documentaries about the NDMC listed nearly 180 different sets of situational response plans and decisions for various activities such as civilian emergencies, natural disasters, pandemic outspreads, social disorders, information attacks, and psychological operations. Now, the centre only needs permission to activate them and use them as planned (TV Zvezda, 2019).

8 In Addition to the Military The Russian leaders plan to expand military C4I8 and make it a foundation for statewide C4I. This involves other (non-military) institutions and areas. Currently, the Russian federal communication agency Rostelekom (Poctelekom) is responsible for digitalising civilian communication networks and, as a result, increasing the technical capabilities of civil communications and creating a possibility for the military to listen in. We are witnessing the creation of an enormous integrated national communication network that may finally turn into a single joint military-civilian system C4I that covers the entire country. According to the Russian Doctrine, the military part of the Network Empire is very important, but remains, nevertheless, just a single part. The civilian parts must exist concurrently and, if possible, be similar to the military one. All parts of the empire must be interoperable. Today, the Russian “hard” institutions are already completely interoperable. Interoperability also includes a management style, or modus operandi. Currently, this is not the case in other institutions. As a solution and in addition to the new systems for technical integration, the military tries to transpose its management style to civilians. The NDMC military leaders go around different Russian regions to explain their experiences with military management and educate local and regional authorities (TV Zvezda, 2019). In April 2019, a new regional managing centre was established in Tula for the Moscow region, which was the first centre in Russia. At the opening ceremony, the Tula governor admitted that the centre was an MoD 7

This is a generic name; the proper name of the system is unknown. Available sources do not provide sufficient information. 8 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Information System.

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pilot project for civilians. The centre itself manifests a civilian version of a regional military centre that is a part of a system led by the NDMC. At the end of January 2020, President Putin visited the centre and reviewed how computerised management can help municipal authorities to almost instantly solve (or at least account) any problems reported by citizens. Putin left satisfied and encouraged other regions to follow their lead. Similar technologically advanced, digitalised, and interconnected systems with specially designed software will also be applied in other federal regions. This was already mentioned that confidence is a key success feature in any operation. The doctrine, in addition to explaining the operations of a new network-centric empire, emphasised the need for new type of operators/managers. They all have to be interoperable, or in other words, share the same mentality, training, etc. The recent political regime, including that of Putin’s who has a military background, employs many former servicemen. They understand each other well for they all have a similar (military) background. Evidently, the political elite is willing and prepared to spread this military culture, putting a special emphasis on a high level of professionalism and devotion, and focus on efficiency and results for all Russian civilians. If, in addition to a common mentality of Russia is always right, they possess the same modus operandi, then fighting a hybrid war will become especially efficient. This objective will be achieved in two ways. First, more and more former servicemen have been hired in civilian areas as managers. A Russian researcher Dr. Olga Kryshtanovskaya analysed and described this phenomenon and, at the beginning of the 2000s, introduced a new term (militocracy) to the Russian political glossary (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2013). A common mentality helps the system to operate faster and more efficiently, but, even in Russia, there are not enough former servicemen. To “fix” the situation, the Russian political leaders decided to, instead, “breed” new type of managers and politicians. Over the last few years, the Russian leaders have initiated different projects for training new administrators and even politicians. One of those is called “Leaders of Russia”. It is designed to prepare loyal people who think alike for national governance positions. A large proportion of the training methodology (especially in leadership training) was adopted from the military. The most successful graduates are assigned to the presidential administration; some already work as governors or high-level administrators. Putin himself initiated a subproject of the Leaders of Russia, which instead of administrators trains future politicians. They follow similar training programs, and the brightest participants are invited or encouraged to join different political activities or parties. As a result, all administrators, politicians, and servicemen will have the same modus operandi in addition to believing that Russia is always right. This would definitely bring (information) war-waging to a new level.

9 Conclusion Reality has been changed. After winning the Cold War, the West has enjoyed liberal democratic societies and naively expected that others will follow them. Some thought

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of the Westernisation as an on-going democratisation, and others interpreted it as a new type of attack against them. Russia happens to be among the second group. Already at the beginning of the 2000s, the Russian conservative academics created an ideology for Russia, the Russian Doctrine, that suggested that, instead of integrating with Western democracies, Russia should aim for restoring a dominating position. Ever since Putin came to power, these ideas are considered to be a new political doctrine. The Russian Doctrine forms a basis for developing theories on fighting hybrid wars and introducing Russia is always right and other narratives. Since these expectations were not met, nationalist groups were motivated to return to the political elites. They formed a prevailing majority with representatives of military organisations and, little by little, the entire political elite started to believe that the West is trying to destroy Russia. Former servicemen were already well established in different institutions when they came across some new information: a war would help to establish their objective faster and more firmly. We can already see that a majority of the Russian political elite follows a mentality that celebrates war or at least confrontation. They are influenced by a military culture brought to them from organisations involved in defence, national security, and intelligence, and think and behave differently from leaders coming from the Western culture. For the followers of Russian military culture, every past and future global event can be interpreted as a new war, and they are developing a response—a comprehensive and multifaceted warfare. Regardless of the type of conflict (economic, information, legal or psychological) Russia is involved in, their response is always the same—concentrated, coordinated, and synchronised. The Russian Doctrine lays down new rules for warfare and procedures for standing operations and recommends unified actions and confidence. Russia interprets even the smallest act or incident against them or their interests as a declaration of war and gives a militaristic response by also assigning leadership roles for the military. In its military culture, the Russian military applies the principles of the Prussian German General Staff, which includes detailed planning, synchronisation, and coordination, and emphasises devotion to results. The military developed a theory on hybrid (non-linear) wars and created a system to make them efficient and successful. In Russia, information warfare is considered becoming warfare that applies the rules of military operations and requires military leadership. The National Defence Management Centre helps to supervise the involvement of relevant institutions and coordinates all efforts in the Russian society. In hybrid wars, the narratives and messages created and supported by synchronisation and coordination of all activities make Russian information warfare efficient at least within the country.

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Propaganda Gone Viral: A Theory of Chinese and Russian “COVID Diplomacy” in the Age of Social Media Noel Foster

There is a global battle of narratives going on […] we have also seen attempts to discredit the EU as such [and] a geo-political component including a struggle for influence through spinning and the ‘politics of generosity’. There is also a battle of narratives within Europe [emphases in the original]. Josep Borrell, “The coronavirus pandemic and the new world it is creating,” March 24, 2020. In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing was true.

Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pg. 382.

1 Introduction The outbreak of COVID-19 took Beijing and Moscow by surprise and posed a dilemma to both powers. Beijing suffered for having undermined its own, previously well-regarded epidemiological early warning system and punished whistleblowers, and the Kremlin’s initial response was one of denial, obfuscation and inefficiency. Like Russia, the People’s Republic of China faced the prospect of a devastating pandemic internally, but it also risked the loss in the world’s eyes of some of the performance legitimacy it had gained over the course of its seemingly inexorable rapid economic rise. Yet within weeks, both Beijing and Moscow adapted rapidly to the global pandemic and placed that outbreak at the centre of an ambitious campaign of “COVID diplomacy.” What does the COVID-19 crisis reveal about Chinese and Russian information operations? After reviewing the differences and similarities between Beijing and N. Foster (B) Princeton University, Princeton, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_7

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Moscow’s response to the crisis, I argue that the response says less about the crisis itself but serves as a stress test that reveals both states’ adaptability and fundamental objectives: feeding polarization and sowing epistemological nihilism in target audiences. From the evidence I then outline a theory of Chinese and Russian information operation, drawing on paired case studies Chinese and Russian COVID diplomacy. The variation here provides several conclusions of import well beyond the subject of COVID diplomacy.

2 Diplomacy and Information Operations in the Age of COVID COVID diplomacy, the use of traditional diplomatic tools such as medical assistance, exchanges of subject matter experts and public diplomacy, is inextricably linked to the messaging goals of these powers. Rather than emerging sui generis, COVID diplomacy is an adaptation to a contingent crisis that serves to reveal the underlying objectives and mechanisms of revisionist states’ global information operations. Regime type matters in this account, because status quo powers and revisionist powers by definition behave differently in international politics. While status quo powers by definition seek to previous the existing international order, revisionist states attempt to disrupt it in their favour. To that end, they are willing to take certain risks that other powers, irrespective of regime type, would avoid. Intervening in the domestic politics of their adversaries is one such choice, one facilitated by technological advances and falling entry barriers. At the heart of revisionist states’ information operations are strategic narratives, I argue. A strategic narrative is a representation of an event or a series of related events collated in a way as to manipulate the audience in the target state to respond in the manner that the sender wants it to respond. Revisionist states use strategic narratives that incorporate controversial and divisive topics to activate and exacerbate preexisting societal cleavages, and in turn push an overarching narrative that bolsters the sender state’s position. A culture of fear (Mölder, 2011, 2020) provides the framework for such policies on the level of the international system, but great powers’ use of information operations works through cognitive processes on the individual and societal level. This renders a review of the literature in behavioural economics and social psychology, as well as COVID diplomacy.

3 The Seeds of Distrust Online misinformation can complicate the most settled of matters, from climate change and vaccines to who won the 2020 U.S. presidential election (a Monmouth University Poll found that 77% of Trump supporters surveyed in mid-November

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2020 believed that president-elect Joe Biden had only won because of fraud, and 88% stated that they required more information on the vote count to know who had truly won the election). A sizeable segment of audiences is conditioned to believe distrust information from authorities, whether the State or academe, and to suspect ulterior motives behind public policy pronouncements. It is no accident if rising distrust in authority is correlated with growing populism, as disenchanted segments of the electorate defect from their pre-existing political allegiances and support upstart, anti-establishment parties. Part of this distrust stems from growing suspicion of and resentment towards educated classes and technocrats on the part of those who consider themselves the victims of economic and societal shifts favouring elites and the upwardly mobile educated classes. Since 2008, crisis-driven economic insecurity has proven a substantial driver of populism and political distrust in EU member states, with correlations between increases in unemployment and both votes for populist parties and decline in trust in national and European political institutions (Algan et al., 2017). But educational attainment accounts for one growing societal cleavage in EU member states, one which overlaps with some class cleavages and resilience towards economic shocks. The relationship between trust and education is complex, but an enduring finding appears to be the relationship between educational attainment and trust in others. For instance, in all OECD countries, individuals with tertiary education were by far the most likely of groups to report trusting others. Similarly, in almost every country, those with post-secondary but non-tertiary education reported that they were more likely to trust others (OECD, 2015). Those with low educational attainment are already less likely to report trust in others, therefore, and the same stands to reason for informational sources on a complex crisis with severe economic consequences like COVID-19.

4 Science Versus Populism However, with growing political polarization and Coronavirus scepticism may derive in part from socio-economic status and educational attainment but stems from political leaders’ cues as well. McKee et al. (2020) find connections between populist leaders’ rhetoric and poor practices. Falkenbach and Greer (2020) attribute mishandling to populists’ lack of experience and expertise with complex public health questions. In the context of healthcare debates in the United States, Nyhan (2010) shows the persistence and strong effects of initial misinformation, its resistance to correction and the partisan framing of reforms shapes subsequent debates. Misinformation in the health domain need not be prevalent to exert an oversized effect. Guess et al. (2020b) estimate that 84% of Americans visit a vaccine-related webpage each year, but that vaccine-sceptical content only accounts for 7.5% of vaccine-related pageviews and 18.5% of individuals annually.

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Hart et al. (2020) find evidence to suggest that the politicization in initial COVID19 coverage may have contributed to polarization in Americans’ COVID-19 attitudes. Such polarization has consequences. Drawing on location data from a large sample of smartphones in the U.S., Allcott et al. (2020) show that areas with more Republicans engaged in less social distancing, even controlling for other factors including public policies, population density, and local COVID cases and deaths. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats surveyed reported significant differences in social distancing, beliefs about personal risks stemming from Coronavirus, and beliefs about COVID-19’s future severity. This is not an American or a Western phenomenon; factors such as democratic backsliding, populist anti-scientism and religio-political polarization have been linked to poor responses to the pandemic outside of advanced industrial democracies as far afield as Indonesia (e.g., Mietzner, 2020). In addition to pre-existing polarization of responses to the virus, the differences in the crisis’s severity between northern and southern Europe might well accentuate intra-EU divides and widen structural polarization (Gräbner et al., 2020). Moreover, belief polarization is not solely a question of misinformation, disinformation or mal-information. Nor is it a matter of expertise. As Lee et al. (forthcoming) find, it can persist even among government officials who are better informed on a wide range of contentious subjects. Put differently, factual accuracy does not necessarily translate into factual agreement, even among political elites. And while misinformation on more technical and complex questions of public policy, such as Chinese currency manipulation, can be changed by error correction, preferences remain stable (Flynn et al., 2020). Individuals may consider information that questions their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes to be threatening and unwelcome, a threat to their general self-integrity and identity (Steele, 1988). Identity threat may account for the persistence of misperceptions among individuals who are tacitly aware of correct information but reluctant to acknowledge it (Nyhan & Reifler, 2019). In sum, individuals tend to be cognitive misers, who when limited in their ability to process information take cognitive shortcuts whenever they can (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Fiske & Taylor 1984), which points to the centrality of cognition and heuristics in understanding revisionist states’ propaganda.

5 Cognition and Heuristics The fundamental role of cognitive biases and heuristics in audiences’ consumption and interpretation of messaging have proven one of the most resilient findings in the literature. Redlawsk (2002) found that effective biases and motivated reasoning were pervasive. Counterintuitively, motivated reasoners actually increased their support of a hypothetical candidate they had previously rated positively even after being exposed to negative information about that candidate. Individuals also set higher evidentiary standards when they contradict their beliefs and evaluate arguments that

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are incongruent with their beliefs as weaker and congruent arguments as stronger (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Acknowledging the role of cognitive limitations, Nyhan (2020) points to the role of elite cues and of incentive structures in how individuals form and hold beliefs. Individuals face strong directional motivations to align beliefs with group identities such as partisanship, and weak incentives to gain more accurate beliefs. Elites have incentives to craft or amplify misperceptions for their own electoral or policy gains. Yet it would be an error to focus primarily on elites and on the supply side of COVID diplomacy-related propaganda. In a competitive informational environment, with multiple other narratives, such messaging would not have enjoyed much success if it did not appeal to a significant share of target audiences. In other words, it would seem that there is strong demand for this supply of disinformation. Small initial effects of initial misinformation or disinformation can accumulate as they lead receivers to select informational content that reinforces their initial prior beliefs. For example, in a study focused on information exposure in South Korea, Singapore and the United States, respondents exposed to information on COVID-19 reported informational insufficiency and sought out more. Conversely, those who believed that they knew enough about COVID-19 as a result of misinformation exposure were more likely to avoid information and heuristically process (rather than systematically process) relevant information (Kim et al., 2020). Prior beliefs are conclusive even in a rational Bayesian framework, that is to say that recipients are fully rational and update their beliefs in accordance with new information as they receive it. Even if two individuals receive the same piece of new information, harbouring different prior beliefs about the underlying subject can lead to belief polarization that is Bayesian rational (e.g., Andreoni & Mylovanov, 2012; Benoît & Dubra, 2016; Jern et al., 2014). Moreover, the same piece of equivocal information can lead a Bayesian rational population with heterogeneous prior beliefs to polarize (Benoît & Dubra, 2016). As I will later argue, the direct approach of persuasion in revisionist states’ messaging seldom works, as many target audiences hold strong prior beliefs against sender states. A strong body of evidence in social psychology (e.g., Brock and Balloun, 1967; Hart et al., 2009; Ringold, 2002; Sagarin et al., 2002), behavioural economics (e.g., Bénabou, 2015; Rabin & Schrag, 1999), and political communication (e.g., Berinsky, 2017; Flynn et al., 2017) suggests that audiences reject persuasion by those sources they distrust or harbour negative feelings towards. One of the latest and most compelling findings paradoxically may appear banal but is pivotal to understanding revisionist states’ information operations. Guess et al. (2020a) delve into the effects of consuming misinformation and conclude that consumption only leads to an increased likelihood in believing false claims. Those who consumed news from untrustworthy websites were also more likely to hold more negative views of the media and more polarized feelings towards political parties. These findings support the central insight from the evidence presented in the survey of COVID diplomacy messaging, which is that the singular goal of revisionist states’ information operations in COVID diplomacy is not persuasion, but rather polarization and epistemological nihilism.

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6 A Theory of Revisionist States’ Propaganda As Peter Pomerantsev memorably titled his 2014 work on state messaging in Putin’s Russia, “nothing is true, and everything is possible.” There is little new to the arguments that totalitarian propaganda aimed to engender cynicism and disbelief in its subjects, or that the ideal subject of such propaganda is not a true believer but rather someone who no longer believes in any objective truth. Consider Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, describing the totalitarian powers that shaped the mid-twentieth century: Mass propaganda discovered that its audience was ready at all times to believe the worst, no matter how absurd, and did not particularly object to being deceived because it held every statement to be a lie anyhow.

Here extreme cynicism serves to facilitate state propaganda. Similarly, Arendt argues that totalitarians did not seek a die-hard believer, but rather a malleable cynic: The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.

Neither China nor Russia are totalitarian states, of course, and their goals are decidedly different from those of the totalitarian regimes Arendt analysed. Moreover, the propaganda of which Arendt was directed at a domestic, captive audience. In an era of social media and the Internet, the hermetic barriers between domestic and international propaganda have disappeared. Indeed, much of Russia’s foreign-oriented state messaging derives from content produced originally for domestic audiences, through the Rossiya Segodnya concern. Faced with foreign audiences in a competitive informational environment, these states can only hope to subvert, rather than to dominate, that informational environment. If they cannot control messaging or outperform other messages in a competitive environment, they seek to discredit opposing messages by undermining them directly and by weakening audiences’ confidence in their ability to ascertain the truth. I argue, therefore, that the central feature of these revisionist states’ messaging is their cultivation within their target audiences of epistemological nihilism. With regard to definitions, I define epistemological nihilism as the form of philosophical scepticism that holds that knowledge either does not exist or that, if it does, it remains unreachable. This is distinct from epistemological fallibilism, for which all knowledge is uncertain and subject to continuous revision and falsification through incoming data, with the concession that a priori knowledge—such as mathematical axioms—are true. It also is a step far beyond social constructivism, where the values accorded “brute facts” are socially constructed and contingent, for it calls into question individuals’ ability to discern many brute facts. 2 + 2 = 4, but in this case, it is the unknown qualities and quantities, such as the R0 rate of Coronavirus cases in a locality, the efficacy of different vaccines, or the prospect of herd immunity, that provide the fodder for these revisionist states’ information operations.

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The authoritarian powers as senders cultivate such epistemological nihilism because it leads receivers, the target audience, at a minimum to doubt the information they receive from local sources, and potentially to doubt that the truth itself can be known. From that basis audiences will be more likely to distrust their own institutions and lend equal weight to the senders’ propositions, which might appear even more plausible or credible by comparison. By manufacturing doubt, senders can demobilize audiences in adversarial target states that would otherwise support their governments against the sender—or mobilize them against the senders’ adversaries in their host countries. Democracy depends on an informed and educated populace (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 2000), and the foundational myth of EU member states lies in the superiority of the democratic deliberative process on two forms of legitimacy, performance legitimacy, here a question of information, and participational legitimacy. The former can be found in rational choice theory, but one need not ascribe to rational choice to support it. The latter, in contrast, is a normative position. First, and again on strictly positive rather than normative grounds, decisions are more likely to be well-founded where no information asymmetries exist, and where all relevant information can be shared. Second, and more importantly, legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed and their participation in those decisions that affect them. Deliberative democracy confers legitimacy through the reflective assent of all those subject to the outcome in genuine deliberation (however irreconcilable this may be with real-world deliberations in democracies, e.g., Dryzek, 2001). Deliberative democracy is not required in this conception, rather the participation and consent of the governed. The message in COVID diplomacy and its messaging seeks to turn this on its head on both grounds. Sharing much with the wave of populism present in the public discourse, this messaging questions the extent of public participation in governance, as well as that of the public’s representatives in the key decision-making over public health amidst the pandemic. Such doubts are facilitated by the complexity of policymaking where a small number of technocrats alone possess the knowledge to make policy recommendations. Indeed, the defining feature of populists outside the EU has been their readiness to further discount the expertise of technocrats whose recommendations do not coincide with their preferences. Lascow (2020) finds similarities in populist leaders’ willingness to minimize the import of the virus, to embrace miraculous solutions, to instrumentalize medical claims to their ends, and to draw a line between the “people” and the “other,” embracing “medical populism.” In addition to attacking the participative legitimacy of target states, the messaging behind COVID diplomacy attacks the informational advantage and performance legitimacy of open societies. This messaging places much emphasis on the role of suspect elites in decision-making (Sweeney, 2020), dedicating considerable emphasis to EU elites’ self-interest and financial motives (Shevardnadze, 2014). It reminds citizens that deliberation in any democracy is invariably limited to a few, with citizens far from equal in their say. It also highlights as many examples as possible of failures, incompetence and untrustworthiness in EU member states (Lewis, 2020), leading

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audiences to assume that these examples are representative of their governments or interests (Cunningham, 2020). Second, Chinese and Russian information campaigns are effective to the extent that they play to audiences’ heuristics and biases, as reviewed previously, as well as their hermeneutics of suspicion. Target audiences are conditioned to ask cui bono and to indulge their suspicions that greed, malfeasance or some form of malice lies behind perceived public policy failures, rather than mere human error, and that nothing is as it seems or is stated to be. Target audiences might also believe in the representativeness and accuracy of the figures they receive, therefore generalizing from a few outliers to the whole, and concluding that their governments are indeed incompetent if not corrupt. In low-trust informational environments such heuristics are a common tool for low-information and rationally ignorant individuals. These effects are particularly exacerbated given the confluence of contradictory and changing information about a complex, and a poorly understood public health crisis. In other words, the efficacy of disinformation is inevitable, because heuristics are hard-wired into human reasoning. Faced with highly complex issues that pose threats to them, individuals search for heuristics that can allow them to cut through uncertainty and ambiguity and form rapid judgments.

7 To Deflect, Suspect and Reject The strategy at hand is to deflect, suspect and reject. Beijing and Moscow provide alternative stories that deflect the focus from their handling of the COVID-19 pandemic—such as the 2019 Military World Games in Wuhan or the presence of American-funded laboratories in former Soviet republics such as Georgia and Ukraine. These same stories, together with accounts of malfeasance or incompetence by elites in EU member states, lead audiences to suspect their own elites’ accounts based on a variety of pre-existing biases and then to reject them. In their messaging, Beijing and Moscow need not assert accusations, let alone falsehoods, as facts. They need only present allegations as opinions worthy of consideration, on the same plane as factual reporting, often drawing on local sources or commentators in target states. By presenting so many dramatically opposing narratives Chinese and Russian state messaging overwhelms audiences and sows doubt as to the veracity of any account. Diversion is another technique frequently encountered in the disinformation supporting COVID diplomacy. The spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, at first hinted without stating as much that the possible source of the COVID outbreak in Wuhan may have come from American servicemembers participating in 2019 Military World Games in Wuhan, an international military athletic olympiad, before doubling down on such allegations that “it might be U.S. Army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan” (Myers, 2020). Only once China’s ambassador to Washington was summoned did that ambassador disavow the claims

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and that campaign abate (Zhou, 2020). Of note, the remarks were on Twitter, which remains inaccessible in China, highlighting their international audience. This suggests two lessons: that Beijing can back down when faced with counterpressures, but also that diversion is the primary objective all along. In spite of its wellrespected epidemiological early warning service, large public health infrastructure and medical community, Beijing’s goal was not to contradict accounts emanating from Wuhan but to change the subject, reframe the debate and undercut belief in the dominant accounts. Revisionist powers need not produce conspiratorial or fake content, merely sow the seeds of doubt by mentioned claims that users can find online with the growth of conspiratorial content (Clark & MacKinnon, 2017). A recent development in both Chinese and Russian state messaging has been the emergence of newfound aggressiveness on the part of spokespersons and diplomats. This phenomenon began well before COVID-19 s emergence, with Xi Jinping’s injunction to the Chinese press to “tell China stories well” and his consolidation of Chinese state media for greater efficiencies (Xinhua, 2016). China’s “Wolf Warrior diplomats,” starting with its MFA press secretary Zhao Lijian, have gained considerable notoriety (Taylor, 2019), especially as they break with decades of practice in China following Deng Xiaoping’s counsel to “hide your brightness and bide your time.” Emboldened by a newfound sense of superiority, these envoys have abandoned diplomatic niceties entirely and gone on the offensive in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic, threatening host countries with economic boycotts if they launched investigations into the source of COVID-19, as in the case of Australia, or criticizing European countries’ handling of the Coronavirus outbreak, as when China’s embassy in Paris accused the French of abandoning retirees to die in retirement homes (Hille, 2020) and outraged French parliamentarians (Irish, 2020). Zhao Lijian is hardly provocative, however, in comparison to long-time Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who has built a reputation as a hardliner providing content for domestic consumption more than foreign audiences, on subjects from Syria to the MH-17 shootdown (Kanygin, 2019). Indeed, Zakharova’s combative tone and content frequently contradicts that of Foreign Minister Lavrov, and to directly convey the Kremlin’s sentiments (Donath, 2018). In Zakharova’s account, it is the West that is guilty of “nihilism” (TASS, 2020). Since the Coronavirus outbreak observers have noted an alignment of Chinese practices have aligned with Russia’s, as both Beijing and Moscow seek “to weaken the United States, blunt the appeal of democratic institutions, and sow divisions across the West” (Brandt & Taussig, 2020). China’s realignment along Moscow’s lines follows a hardening in policy but also the perceived failure of previous approaches to public diplomacy, combined with COVID-19 s threat to Beijing’s international image. This assertiveness reflects the Zeitgeist where revisionist powers sense they have little to lose, but also speak to the thesis here that they have abandoned attempts at persuasion. However, it would be incorrect to characterize the relationship between Beijing and Moscow as one of frictionless coordination and careful planning, let alone a harmonious alliance. The public show of solidarity between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping and joint call to refrain from “politicizing” the pandemic (Chen & Yeng,

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2020) came at a moment of weakness for both leaders, as Xi had contained the pandemic domestically but faced the economic and international image costs of the outbreak, while after months of denial COVID-19 hit home in Russia. Russia’s initially lethargic response came under criticism from the Chinese press. COVID diplomacy varies distinctly according to the sender, Beijing or Moscow, and the receiver, the target audience. While both states share the goal of engendering epistemological nihilism, their longer-term objectives diverge. “Russia sees European democracy, prosperity, and particularly the European security order as inherently aimed at weakening Russia” Brandt and Taussig argue (2019). “Putin has, therefore, taken steps to expedite its decline. China, on the other hand, prefers a stable Europe that can serve as a trading partner, albeit a fractured one willing to operate on Chinese terms. Despite differing capabilities and tolerance for risk, Russia and China share underlying objectives in Europe: undermine democratic norms, weaken European institutions and cohesion, and capitalize on fissures in the transatlantic relationship.” The partnership between China and Russia instead was a marriage of convenience. This did not prevent the apparent coordination of Coronavirus information campaigns between Beijing, Moscow and Tehran, in a “triad of disinformation” that employed a variety of state-controlled media and social media to disseminate conspiracy theories (Watts, 2020). This prompted Washington to accuse all three states of sowing disinformation on COVID-19 (Cox, 2020), as well as the emergence of a separate informational echochamber rife with such claims (Donati, 2020), but in a charged environment the efficacy of “naming and shaming” those parties behind online disinformation is doubtful.

8 Sowing Doubt What is clear is that as soon as the Chinese Foreign Ministry press secretary Zhao Lijian pointed to conspiracy theories that the United States might lie behind the spread of Coronavirus, Russia’s RT amplified these theories, along with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp’s claims that Coronavirus might be “a product of a biological attack by America which initially spread to China and then to Iran and the rest of the world.” However, RT did not vouch for the veracity of the claims or take an editorial position. Instead, it highlighted that “the problem with all of those theories, blaming both animals and humans, is that no direct causal proof has been established” RT (2020) reported Chinese accusations and speculation verbatim). In other words, RT merely gave a platform through which to disseminate these accusations to a wider audience, lending them credence to the extent to which they were judged to be newsworthy, while sowing doubt as to the veracity of all theories. In other words, Moscow sought to undermine belief in any mainstream account. Mysterious and unaccountable American laboratories in Russia’s near abroad made for another popular theme in Sino-Russian COVID-19 messaging. “Naturally, we cannot ignore the fact that the Americans are developing an infrastructure with

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hazardous biological potential in the direct proximity to the Russian borders,” Maria Zakharova said, referring specifically to the Richard Lugar Centre for Public Health Research in Tbilisi, adding that Moscow “cannot rule out that the Americans use such reference laboratories in third countries to develop and modify various pathogenic agents, including in military purposes.” A day later, Chinese MFA spokesman Geng Shuang echoed those comments, complaining that “the United States has created many laboratories in the territory of the former Soviet Union, which evokes serious public worries in the neighbouring countries concerned” (Brennan, 2020). The content varied according to the audience, with the stentorian, pro-Kremlin Komsomol’skaya Pravda hinting that the laboratories in the former Soviet republics might be encircling Russia to disseminate viruses (Steshin, 2020). But here as elsewhere, the goal is not to suggest that laboratories spread Coronavirus, but rather to spread doubt in the minds of readers as to the true origins and nature of the pandemic, as well as the trustworthiness of Western powers. Ultimately this objective, the common contention in messaging from both Chinese and Russian government sources that much of lies behind the COVID-19 pandemic either will never be fully known or is fundamentally unknowable, may prove more damaging to Coronavirus responses. Undermining faith in audiences’ ability to reason and discern truth from falsehood serves to anesthetize them and facilitate the spread of disinformation in subsequent information campaigns.

9 Chinese Preemptive COVID Public Diplomacy COVID-19 s rapid spread from Wuhan caught Beijing by surprise and constituted a crisis on the informational, as well as the epidemiological front. The PRC’s initial stonewalling of epidemiologists and the international press, to include refusing to share virus samples or allow for an independent investigation, as well as its repression of whistleblowers, arguably backfired. Its adversaries, including an unlikely coalition of anti-Chinese populists in the West and anti-Beijing activists in the Chinese diaspora (Qin etal., 2020), were free to fill the informational vacuum with disinformation of their own. This viral spread of disinformation also highlighted the power of nonstate actors in the informational sphere—as well the Western origins of much of the disinformation on COVID-19 online, irrespective of its orientation. Given the Coronavirus’s origins, Beijing quickly recognized the potential risks of anti-Chinese sentiment stemming from the pandemic and has sought to pre-empt such sentiment. But the PRC also recognizes the opportunities inherent in EU member states’ conflicting responses and the heavy toll suffered by core EU member states such as Belgium and Italy. Beijing has relied on the contrast between its displays of relative competence and generosity and EU citizens’ perceptions of their own authorities’ weakness. China’s COVID diplomacy is more, therefore, than an attempt to pre-empt anti-China sentiment, but also serves its longer-term ideological goal of convincing target audiences that its model is superior, or at least comparable in its outcomes. Thus, through its donations of medical equipment and emphasis on

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its superior handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, Beijing could build performance legitimacy with Western audiences, “portraying itself as an essential power which has the capacity to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) and ancillary medical equipment (as a public good) relative to the US-led West” (Verma, 2020, 205). China’s goals, therefore, are ideological and reflect an ideological challenge that has not existed since the end of the Cold War. Beijing seeks to showcase the relative superiority of its own model as an alternative to Western liberal democracies. While the PRC’s messaging focusing on its successes lacks the same appeal within EU member states that it might enjoy in the developing world, Beijing’s COVID diplomacy recreates a favourable comparison between China and target audiences’ states. Whereas Chinese messaging in developing countries focuses on the real economic gains the PRC has enjoyed in the past forty years, Chinese messaging in EU member states juxtaposes mismanagement in EU member states with Beijing’s allegedly superior performance in combating COVID-19, in addition to examples of medical assistance. This favourable comparison bolsters respect for Beijing as a co-equal worthy of respectful disagreement, rather than rejection, and affords the PRC more latitude in its diplomacy with otherwise sceptical audiences.

10 A Strategic Narrative of Abandonment A core strategic narrative of both Chinese and Russian propaganda has been EU member state or prospective member state abandonment by Brussels and Washington. The underlying message of Chinese and Russian COVID diplomacy messaging, according to disinformation experts, was that the EU was a moribund institution that had abandoned Italy and that only China and Russia had stepped in to assist Italians (EuvsDisinfo, 2020, Issue 191). But this was not only limited to EU member states, but also to states in accession negotiations with the EU that might drift into its orbit. In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, whom Russian state-sponsored media quoted as citing an EU export ban on medical equipment and supplies to state that European solidarity exists only “on paper,” and that “only China can help us” (RT, 2020). Touting a “centennial and strong-as-steel friendship” between China and Serbia, Vucic asked his “brother and friend” Xi Jinping to “send us anything you can” (Kynge & Lockett, 2020). This was a windfall for Xi, as it allowed him to recalibrate his foreign policy and burnish the PRC’s image through COVID diplomacy. By sending medical supplies to the EU Beijing was able to secure Brussels’ public statements of thanks, including from European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, shifting the narrative from one of incompetence or a coverup targeting whistleblowers in Wuhan to a position as a responsible and generous global power. Through the intermediaries of pro-Chinese think tanks in Brussels (Peel et al., 2020), it was also able to disseminate its message in policy circles and in highbrow publications, appealing to opinion-makers and more influential segments of EU public opinion.

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Similarly, Moscow exploited discontent by political actors in EU member states in an attempt to drive a wedge between member states and Brussels (ARD, 2020). Quoting former Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who told RT staff that “what Russia has done is not comparable to what other countries have done, including China because China also sent something but not comparable with the support provided by Russia,” RT (2020) went on to state that the “EU clearly underestimated the virus, blaming the outbreak in Italy on its national healthcare system flaws.” Moscow’s Coronavirus disinformation targeted other weak links and pre-existing targets, notably the Baltic states, with the goal of sapping confidence in their institutions and driving a wedge between them and their allies. The message to the Baltic states, however, was predictable and nearly repetitive. As Vladimir Sazonov (2020) noted, pro-Kremlin forces quickly adopted Coronavirus as another tool of their messaging. For stance, pro-Moscow outlet Rubaltic.ru stated that the pandemic had become such a disaster for the Latvian economy that it showed that Baltic state’s development model was untenable. “The only possibility for Latvia to survive the new realities is to return to strategic cooperation with Russia” (RT, 2020). This narrative is familiar to observers of politics in the Baltics because it repurposes a timeworn refrain: economic disaster is near, European integration has failed and the sole recourse is to turn towards Moscow. In this sense it is but a Coronavirus mutation of a longstanding editorial stance, one framed more subtly by more skilful advocates as an argument that the Baltic states’ European integration and transition to a market economy has left behind many members of society, including its Russian-speaking minorities, and has reached diminishing returns much akin to Latin American countries facing a middle-income trap (Aleksandrova, 2017).1 The subtext holds that Baltic countries must chart a new course, at a minimum equidistant between West and East, and thus closer to Moscow. The Baltic states are not alone as targets for Moscow’s COVID disinformation, with Ukraine another perennial target facing the latest twist in Moscow’s highly adaptive information operations (Rawnsley, 2020). Anti-EU messaging drove Members of the European Parliament from the Baltic states and Eastern Europe to spearhead a joint appeal to leaders of European institutions and member states, complaining of Moscow’s “sending humanitarian aid of dubious quality” that “only serves its own propaganda purposes” (see open letter from Kubilius et al., 2020).

11 Overreach in COVID Diplomacy Beijing and Moscow found that their ambitions ran aground, however, in their execution. China’s aid was predicated on public displays of gratitude and recognition from recipient countries that could be utilized for gains in mainland China for domestic 1

For a window onto the scholarly debate, see Staehr, Karsten (2015), Economic Growth and Convergence in the Baltic States: Caught in a Middle-Income Trap? Intereconomics, 50(5), pp. 274–280.

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audiences, as well as for audiences in recipient EU member states and in developing countries where Beijing sees greater returns for its model. But by demanding displays of appreciation, the PRC alienated core target audiences. The trade-offs between rapidity and accuracy became apparent in Beijing’s search for pro-PRC content, which also relied on less credible content sourced from within China. Italy was a prize for Beijing, and so the Chinese government disproportionately invested in public diplomacy and medical outreach to the country. But in its haste to show results, particularly to domestic audiences on state television, Beijing tipped its hand by sharing dubiously doctored videos of Italians allegedly thanking China for its generosity (Johnson & Yang, 2020). Similarly, Chinese diplomats may have pressured their German counterparts to not only offer thanks for their medical assistance, but to go a step further by praising the PRC’s handling of the pandemic (AFP, 2020). Russia’s COVID diplomacy in Italy proved even more acrimonious, given its dubious efficacy and intentions. Following a call between Giuseppe Conti and Vladimir Putin, Italy agreed to accept medical aid delivered through the Russian military. But the Russian military convoy of troops who landed in Mario de Bernardi Airbase in Practica di Mare, southwest of Rome, triumphantly drove northwards towards the hard-hit northern Italian city of Bergamo, delivered equipment that was “80% useless, only a pretext” according to one Italian official (Iacoboni, 2020). An understudied and empirically challenging, but pivotal tool in China’s COVID diplomacy has been its use of influence operations to cover its information operations. When the European Union’s East Stratcom Task Force prepared a report on Chinese state-sponsored disinformation, Beijing promptly intervened to have significant sections redacted (Müller, 2020), hinting to unspecified consequences—but leading Brussels to fear China’s retaliation by withholding medical supplies. The report’s initial version described a “global disinformation campaign” using “both overt and covert tactics” and run by Beijing with the intent of deflecting blame for China’s Coronavirus pandemic (Lau, 2020). The report coincided with EU-PRC trade negotiations ranging from the German automotive industry to French agriculture. Its redaction also echoed that of a critical report on Russia in 2019, which had been edited to excise all mentions of Russia’s support for some European political parties (Apuzzo, 2020).

12 More Targeted, but Less Precise: Moscow’s Ambitions The Kremlin’s ambitions are less lofty than Beijing’s. Moscow seeks more modest gains of improving its image with certain core target audiences in a limited number of EU member states where it seeks gains, notably Austria, Italy and Germany. Late Putinism holds some ideological appeal to marginalized groups, notably on the far right, but it boasts no alternative model to the West. Instead, within Russia Moscow emphasizes EU member states’ repeated waves of COVID-19, juxtaposed with putative Russian domestic successes and displays of generosity, so as to weaken domestic criticism of the Kremlin’s erratic handling of the Coronavirus pandemic.

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In foreign messaging, Moscow can only seek to undermine Westerners’ faith in their own press, institutions and state to create the conditions under which Westerners can relativize Russia’s failings and become more receptive to Russian state messaging. The “firehose of falsehood” model in Paul and Matthews (2016) might seem apt here. The Kremlin has multiplied disingenuous claims related to COVID-19. Moreover, and as Meister (2016) analysis of Germany’s “Lisa case” suggests, Moscow has again shown its readiness to distort and fabricate events from non-events. However, an important distinction remains that the Kremlin usually avoids wholesale fabrications of non-events, instead choosing to weave together elements of real events in order to provide more compelling narratives. Again, the goal is not necessarily to persuade, but rather to sow doubt and from that cynicism. Three related factors inherent to the COVID-19 pandemic facilitated the messaging in COVID diplomacy. The first two factors were the initial lack of information on the emergent virus and the arcane nature of the response, inevitably led to the third, a lack of understanding by the public amplified by the inevitable errors and inconsistencies on the part of all states and institutions. The polemic over Sweden’s public health policy, for instance, in stark contrast to other EU member states, serves as one extreme example, but most member states faced difficulties responding effectively to the crisis. Public authorities in member states could differ in their responses. The lack of clarity, unanimity and instantaneity on the part of authorities led public opinion to perceive confusion and failure on the part of elites. Assuming that Zaller’s (1992) model is correct and that individuals’ opinions depend largely on the interplay between those messages they have received, accepted and sampled from, then this ambiguity in elite messages combined with the lack of individuals’ prior knowledge but strong prioritization of the crisis. explains the wide variation in opinions. In the absence of strong elite cues and pre-existing knowledge, public opinion was ripe for disruption. This then created a choice opinion for messaging that sowed distrust in authorities’ competence, contrasting those perceptions of incompetence with an orderly response and magnanimity on the part of the sender state. The rapidity with which authorities and opinion-makers began to speak in the arcane language of epidemiologists, in some cases poorly, only heightened confusion. A March 2020 study in France indicated that there was little difference between the proportion of French and American respondents who suspected that the Coronavirus was of manufactured origin. The demographics most prone to conspiratorial ideation appear to those already accustomed to conspiracy theories and distrustful of authorities. 26% of French respondents in a March 2020 poll believed that the Coronavirus was not of natural origin but rather had been conceived in a laboratory— 17% intentionally, 9% accidentally. But 40% some of respondents who supported the far-right Rassemblement National believed that the virus had been fabricated intentionally in a laboratory (Reichstadt & Fourquet, 2020).

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13 Revisionist States and the Culture of Nihilism As Kremlin propagandist and RT English editor-in-chief told one European newspaper, “the Western world as we knew and appreciated it, with its Western values, no longer exists. There are no values: there is no Western world. What is left are authoritarian regimes under the cover of national flags” (Alandete, 2018). With this as its core messaging, the Kremlin seeks to spread a nihilistic creed according to which Russia’s might not be a model worthy of emulation, as it purported to be in the first half of the Cold War—but that it outperforms the West in many respects and that the West is worse still, and doubly untrustworthy for its hypocrisy. Weakening individuals’ belief in their ability to process and understand events is a hallmark of this messaging that is facilitated by the inherent complexity of the subject matter: the more educated the respondent, the more reason she would have to doubt her own expertise if she does not possess a life sciences or health background. The polarization of Coronavirus may also have served to further doubts, though in this case the direction of causality is far more uncertain. It remains equally plausible that those who came to distrust public health authorities or the scientific mainstream in favour of their politicized sources on the subject of COVID-19 and public health measures, such as face coverings and social distancing, did so because of their leadership cues or because of a pre-existing lack of faith in these very authorities. At the same time as Russian state media was urging compliance with vaccinations and public health measures in Russia in general, RT America gave high profile coverage to anti-vaccination activists. Analysing Russian trolls and bots from July 2014 through September 2017, Broniatowski et al. (2018) found that while bots that spread malware and unsolicited content disseminated anti-vaccine messages, Russian trolls promoted discord, and that their messages were more political and divisive. Russian accounts masquerading as legitimate users created a false equivalency in the guise of a “debate,” eroding public consensus on vaccination. Russian state media has long sought to instil scepticism towards Western and in particular American public health authorities, such as the U.S. Centres for Disease Control. Through RT in particular, the Kremlin has given a platform to conspiracy theorists such as Wayne Madsen, who regularly appears in the guise of “an investigative journalist.” Already in 2009, RT allowed Madsen to claim that H1N1, an unusually virulent flu, had been “bioengineered.” When Ebola struck in 2014, it gave a platform to former plant pathologist Cyril Broderick, who claimed that the Ebola outbreak was an American conspiracy to use West Africans as guinea pigs. As Peter Pomerantsev noted, “it’s all about seeding lack of trust in government institutions” (Broad, 2020). The distribution of the first COVID vaccines saw COVID vaccine diplomacy, providing perhaps the strongest and most troubling validation of this theory of revisionist states’ strategic narratives that foster epistemological nihilism. Vaccines quickly became intertwined with national pride and states’ international public diplomacy. In May 2020, Xi Jinping had promised that China’s vaccine would “be made a global public good,” particularly for developing contrast—on the same day that

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President Donald Trump had threatened to freeze U.S. support for the World Health Organization, a juxtaposition noted in Chinese state media (Pan, 2020). Only days after clinical trials of the Sinovac CoronaVac vaccine in Brazil revealed a far lower efficacy rate than previous trials in Indonesia and Turkey, combined with criticism of the trials’ handling (Ma, 2021), Chinese state media counterattacked—not by directly defending the vaccines or providing contrary evidence, but by attacking Pfizer vaccines and the credibility of Western media (Global Times, 2021). Pointing to alleged cases of sudden deaths and adverse reactions in Norway and France, Xu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Chinese state newspaper Global Times claimed a double-standard whereby “major media in the US and the West […] is out to destroy the reputation of the Chinese vaccine, hoping that the world will wait for Pfizer and other American and Western companies to produce surplus vaccines and finally get vaccinated” (Hu, 2021).

14 Conclusions Writing well too far before the end of the Coronavirus pandemic, what is evident is that the pandemic has revealed not only the agility of Beijing and Moscow in adapting to the unforeseen, but also the core objectives of their messaging. COVID diplomacy tells us little about COVID-19 but much about the overarching policy objectives of Beijing and Moscow. Their means in large part dictate their ambitions, with the Kremlin adopting a more conservative approach of seeking public opinion gains where feasible in a handful of states, and Beijing seeking to defend and bolster its model. In this review of Chinese and Russian messaging as part of their COVID diplomacy, it should be apparent that both of these revisionist powers were caught off guard by the pandemic, that their improvisation was error-prone, and by through their initial assertiveness they overplayed their hand and undercut their messaging. However, it should also be apparent that the longer-term goal that both states share is that of going beyond merely asserting their case, to attack the foundations of any case. If citizens in EU member states do not believe that the facts in relevant public matters are discernible, and that their own authorities are not trustworthy on such matters, then they are more open to messaging from revisionist states and less able to coalesce and public responses to collective action problems. This is the purpose of their fostering epistemological nihilism. Decreased trust in institutions and authority long predates the contingent policies of these two revisionist states, and their actions in pushing towards distrust in what is knowable alone would be ineffectual were Beijing and Moscow not riding strong undercurrents in that direction. COVID diplomacy alone cannot bring EU citizens to believe that their states have failed them or that authorities do not warrant their trust: citizens’ lived experiences predispose them to believe so. Nor are revisionist powers the only actors seeking to push audiences to believe that they cannot ascertain brute facts. For decades, the public discourse over public policy questions embedded in science from climate change to the economic and social consequences of migration

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have come under attack from “merchants of doubt” who prey on uncertainty and complexity. Countermeasures in the form of media literacy and critical thinking are in its infancy. The seismic effect of Twitter’s decision to permanently suspend Donald J. Trump (see rationale articulated by Twitter, Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump, January 8, 2021), one followed shortly thereafter by Facebook, points not only to the power of social media giants but the regulatory vacuum left by legislators. The threat from epistemological nihilism constitutes a grave threat to democracies, for it undermines the very core principles of deliberation and the legitimacy of those outcomes derived from that civic deliberative process. A direct risk of this epistemological nihilism is that it extends to a distrust of authorities and science that would lead to low compliance with vaccines and prophylactic measures for Coronavirus, much as the world has already witnessed in the form of resistance to social distancing and masks. In the midst of an unprecedented global vaccination campaign, the side effects of COVID diplomacy and its messaging remain and vaccination against disinformation has yet to come. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Shuk Ying Chan, Zenobia Chan, Johann Anders Trovik, Tracy Llanera, Ian Walling and two anonymous reviewers for their generous comments.

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Rawnsley, A. (2020, April 12). How Russian Trolls Weaponize Virus Lies to Undercut Ukraine. The Daily Beast, April 12, 2020. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from https://www.thedailybeast.com/ how-russian-trolls-weaponize-coronavirus-lies-to-undercut-ukraine. Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of reasoning on political decision making. Journal of Politics, 64(4), 1021–1044. Reichstadt, R., & Fourquet, J. (2020). L’Épidémie dans L’Épidémie : Thèses Complotistes et COVID-19. Ifop pour Fondation Jean-Jaurès et L’Observatoire du conspirationnisme. N° 117275. March 28, 2020. Ringold, D. J. (2002) Boomerang effects in response to public health interventions: some unintended consequences in the alcoholic beverage market. Journal of Consumer Policy 25, 27–63. https:// doi.org/10.1023/A:1014588126336. RT. (2020, March 24). EU left Italy ‘practically alone’ to fight coronavirus, so Rome looked for help elsewhere, including Russia—ex-FM Frattini to RT. RT. Retrieved March 28, 2020, from https://www.rt.com/news/483897-italy-eu-coronavirus-solidarity-russia/. RT (2020, March 16). “European solidarity doesn’t exist, only China can help us: Serbia goes full emergency over coronavirus.” RT. Retrieved March 28, 2020, from https://www.rt.com/news/483 239-serbia-eu-china-coronavirus/. RT. (2020, March 13). Where was your patient zero? Chinese official speculates AMERICANS may have infected Wuhan at army games and calls to ‘come clean’. RT. March 13, 2020, Retrieved March 28, 2020, from https://www.rt.com/news/482990-china-coronavirus-us-come-clean/. Sagarin, B. J., Cialdini, R. B., Rice, W. E., Serna, S. B. (2002). Dispelling the illusion of invulnerability: The motivations and mechanisms of resistance to persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3) (September), 526–41. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.526. Sazonov, V. (2020, April 14). Dezinformatsiya i koronavirusnyye feyki protiv stran Baltii kak propagandistskiy priyem prokremlevskikh sil [Disinformation and Coronavirus Fakes against the Baltic Countries As a Propaganda Tool of Pro-Kremlin Forces], Sprotyv. April 14, 2020. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://sprotyv.info/analitica/dezinformaciya-i-koronavirusnyefejki-protiv-stran-baltii-kak-propagandistskij-priem-prokremlevskih-sil. Shevardnadze, S. (2014. July 25). Corrupt EU politicians think they have a right to rob their countries—Drago Kos, corruption fighter. RT. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://www.rt.com/ shows/sophieco/175340-corrupt-eu-economy-money/. Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the Self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). New York: Academic Press. Steshin, D. (2020, April 29). SShA okruzhayut Rossiyu sekretnymi biolaboratoriyami, chtoby zabrosit’ nam novyy virus? [Did the US encircle Russia with secret biological laboratories, in order to drop a new virus on us?]. Komsomol’skaya Pravda, April 29, 2020. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://www.kp.ru/daily/27126/4208473/. Sweeney, C. (2020, April 27). The UK’s Covid-19 response is being led by a secretive, incompetent cabal. No wonder our policies have been such a shambles. RT. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from https://www.rt.com/op-ed/487021-uk-covid19-policy-sage/. Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–69. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006. 00214. TASS. (2020, October 8). Western countries showed nihilism by refusing to listen to former OPCW chief—diplomat. TASS. Retrieved January 17, 2020. Taylor, A. (2019, July 15). A Chinese diplomat had a fight about race in D.C. with Susan Rice on Twitter. Then he deleted the tweets. The Washington Post. July 15, 2019. Retrieved October 29, 2020, from Twitter Blog. (2021, January 8). Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump. Retrieved January 9, 2021, from https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124.

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Influence Operations, Hybrid Warfare and Technological Awareness

The Russian Influence Strategy in Its Contested Neighbourhood Marco Marsili

1 Introduction The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (also known as the Helsinki Accords), that concluded the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—re-established in 1995 as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—reaffirmed the fundamental principle of renouncing the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Marsili, 2020, 44). Through this agreement, the Soviet Union (USSR) gained the implicit recognition of the “sphere of influence” that was determined in Eastern Europe after the end of World War II. This political and geographical area encompasses Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2016a). These countries, plus Belarus, participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy (EEAS, 2016b), and at the same time they are partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 2020a), and members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Helsinki Accords did not affect the U.S. recognition of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that were forcedly incorporated into the Soviet Union following the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. The annexation was never accepted by the United States—see the Welles Declaration of 23 July 1940—since the three states regained de facto independence in 1990–1. Before gaining de jure independence in the aftermath of World War I the Baltic nations were part of the Russian Empire, and now they are members of M. Marsili (B) Centro de investigação do Instituto de Estudos Políticos, Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] Centro de Investigação e Desenvolvimento, Instituto Universitário Militar, Lisbon, Portugal Centro de Estudos Internacionais, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_8

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the European Union (EU) and NATO. Too late for Moscow to impede the NATO-EU enlargement towards North-East, but maybe not too late to avoid further “territorial losses” in the Caucasus and in Central and Eastern Europe (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 13; Iasiello, 2017, 55, 59). After the attempts to assimilate by force the Baltic states, Russia is pursuing a policy of attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, through the annexation of Crimea, the support for destabilizing proxies in Eastern Ukraine (Donbass) and the inclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into its security field (Kivirähk et al., 2009; Darczewska, 2015, 36; Wetoszka, 2016, 63; Müür et al., 2016, 33; Mölder, 2016, 109; Kofman et al., 2017, 1; Pompeo, 2020). Although NATO has claimed that never promised Russia it would not expand after the Cold War (NATO, 2018), Moscow feels encircled and threatened by the Allies (Darczewska, 2015, 10, 12, 17; Sliwa, 2017, 16; Tashev et al., 2019, 141) and strives to regain control over the sphere of interest defined by the Helsinki Accords that the Atlantic Alliance and the EU have gradually challenged (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 12, 36; Kanet, 2011; Kofman et al., 2017, 45–46; Sliwa, 2017, 21–22; Värk, 2017, 47–48; Beehner et al., 2018, 35). Among the scholars is a broad consensus that Moscow is trying to re-establish its zone of privileged influence in the Black Sea region, disturbing and incapacitating the nations’ sovereign decisions—i.e., Ukraine and Georgia—and their processes of Euro-Atlantic integration (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 9–10; Darczewska, 2014, 18, 26, 33–36; Winnerstig, 2014, 11, 142; Mölder, 2016, 100; Sazonov et al., 2016, 8–9; Müür et al., 2016, 30–31; Renz & Smith, 2016, 16–18; Kofman et al., 2017, 1, 45–46; Anastasov, 2018; Cre¸tu & Ardeleanu, 2019, 335–336; Popa, 2019, 347–348; Tashev et al., 2019, 130). In the aftermath of the Soviet Union breakup, unconventional conflicts erupted in the newly formed independent republics: Armenia–Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh), Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova (Transnistria or Transdniestria) and Ukraine (Crimea and Donbass, i.e., Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics). Somehow, these conflicts are the legacy of the Cold War (Marsili, 2020, 45). The Russian Federation (RF) intervened in these conflicts to protect the Russian ethnics population of these breakaway territories, without prejudice to the obligations, set forth in the Helsinki Accords, to respect principle of the inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The war against Georgia took place in August 2008 to support the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the aftermath of the contested recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states by Moscow, the NATO severed a first time the cooperation with the RF; the collaboration was resumed later, but was suspended again in 2014, following the Russian annexation of Crimea (NATO, 2020b). Although Moscow does not consider that such interventions constitute an unlawful invasion of a sovereign country—but rather views it as a domestic affair—the Russian government had to justify some way its interference and to present it to the public opinion as “fair and just” and not as acts of aggression (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 13, 16; Darczewska, 2015, 34; Snegovaya, 2015, 7; Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016, 43, 52; Blank, 2017, 82; Boyte, 2017, 95; Iasiello, 2017, 52, 58; Sazonov, 2017, 75; Värk,

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2017, 48). This conundrum was solved through the resort to hybrid warfare, of which information operations are an essential component.

2 Information Warfare: Definition and Scope There is no common definition of the term “hybrid warfare” and therefore it is correspondingly ambiguous (Renz & Smith, 2016, 12; Wetoszka, 2016, 64; Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, 3; Tashev et al., 2019, 132). While it is a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes overt and covert use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian, conventional and unconventional, including information and influence operations (Hoffman, 2007, 7; Heickerö, 2010, 20; Brangetto & Veenendaal, 2016, 117–118; Wetoszka, 2016; Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, 3; Theohary, 2018, 4). These “hot topics” became very popular in the geopolitical context that emerged after the end of the Cold War, when hybrid conflicts replaced the traditional ones (Marsili, 2019, 172). In a semantic sleight of hand, hybrid warfare was originally confined to an activity committed by non-state actors (NSAs) at the express detriment of the nation-state (Hoffman, 2007). In other words, hybrid warfare was linked almost exclusively with NSAs. Afterwards the concept of hybrid warfare developed in a way that is now commonly accepted to describe the interplay between conventional and unconventional means used also by governments and regular armies1 (Hoffman, 2007, 29, 58; Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017, 3; Marsili, 2019, 178). The low barriers of entry the information environment have enabled both state and non-state actors, individuals and private groups, terrorists, and criminals, to access it and to turn it into a battlefield (Eriksson, 1999, 60, 61; Thomas, 1996a, 86, 90; Cilluffo & Gergely, 1997; Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 116; Hollis, 2007, 1049; Schreier, 2015, 23; Department of Defense, 2016, 2). As the resources required for IW are likely to be much lower than for conventional military capabilities, IW is considered a ‘power equalizer’ (Eriksson, 1999, 60). Accordingly, both nation states and NSAs resort to IW to achieve strategic objectives (Theohary, 2018, 9). Covert operations2 and support to proxies, such as independentists and secessionists, are facilitated by the nature of hybrid and information warfare, although the inclusion of IW in the broader concept of hybrid warfare is disputed but is widely accepted by most of the scholars (Iasiello, 2017, 60–61). As Vertuli & Loudon, (2018, xi) stresses, is worthy of attention that he U.S. Army doctrinal definition of IO has changed three times over the last decade: from a focus on five core capabilities to information engagement (2007), to inform and influence 1

A regular army is the official army of a state or country (the official armed forces). A covert operation is a military operation intended to conceal the identity of (or allow plausible denial by) the sponsor and intended to create a political effect which can have implications in the military, intelligence or law enforcement arenas — affecting either the internal population of a country or individuals outside it.

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activities (2011), to its current incarnation focusing on information-related capabilities (2016). This shows to what extent information warfare is a nebulous concept, but widely cited as a keystone in any present and future campaigns (Chekinov & Bogdanov, 2013).3 In the near future militaries are unlikely to adopt purely nonphysical strategies of conflict, while it is more likely that attacks will surely continue to combine physical and cyber capabilities (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 118). Physical destruction will remain a compelling proximate goal and cyber-attacks are likely to be used in support of lethal operations on the battlefield and against the adversary’s homeland (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 118). This hypothesis is supported by the reasoning that Western societies would seem more inclined to accept non-lethal IO than the traditional use of military force (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 120). IW blurs the peace-war boundary (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 121), transcends the traditional domains of warfare and finds itself at the intersection of the information, physical and cognitive/social domains. Boundaries between “conventional” and “unconventional” warfare are fading, and even the physical/kinetic and virtual dimensions of conflict are blurring. The virtual realm encompasses electronic warfare (EW); electromagnetic spectrum operation (EMSO); cyberspace operations (CO); information warfare (IW); psychological (warfare) operations (PSYOP), now better known as military information support operations (MISO); information operations (InfoOps or IO), also known as influence operations; Strategic Communications (STRATCOM); Military Deception (MILDEC); computer network operations (CNO); operations security (OPSEC). Most of these concepts intertwine and overlap; moreover, they rely heavily on the U.S. and NATO military doctrine (Hollis, 2007; Porche et al., 2013; Brangetto & Veenendaal, 2016; Vertuli & Loudon, 2018; Tashev et al., 2019).4 Information warfare is sometimes referred to as persuasion or IO or even PSYOP. (Theohary, 2018, 1). Therefore, we uphold the holistic approach that integrates PSYOP, CO, and EW as constituents of IW as a whole, considering in turn the latter a component of hybrid warfare (Bakshi, 2018, 178–179; 184). We can agree with practitioners like Jones (1999, 12) when he says that IW, that is the sum of many things, including those mentioned above, has been largely superseded by the ‘more technically acceptable term Information Operations’. Information warfare is well defined, in its components, purpose and scope, in the Annual Report that the Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, presented to the President and the Congress in 1994 (227–8). Thomas (1996a, 85, 88) considers IW a “psychological weapon” that serves “to manipulate perceptions, emotions, interests, and choices” and in doing so intimidates and pressures other governments. Other scholars (Theohary, 2018, 1–2; Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 115; Tashev et al., 2019, 133–134) define IW a strategy to use information to pursue a competitive advantage and to 3

For a broad survey of information warfare literature, see, inter alia, Merrick et al. (2016). See, e.g., Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 on Joint Operations, JP 3-12 on Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-13 on Information Operations, JP 3-13.1 on Electronic Warfare, JP 3-13.2 on Military Information Support Operations, JP 3-13.3 on Operations Security, JP 3-13.4 on Military Deception, JP 3-58 on MILDEC, JP 3-61 on Public Affairs and JP 5-0 on Joint Planning.

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achieve foreign policy goals; a form of political warfare that targets governments, political leaderships, military, private sector, general population, news and media in order to influence public opinion or to compel decision-makers. IW has become a key issue in conflict and competition, not only military (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 115); it includes actions taken to achieve information superiority over adversaries (Cilluffo & Gergely, 1997, 84–85; Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 121, 133). The scope of IW goes beyond the military and touches on the political, diplomatic and economic spheres of information (Cordey, 2019, 9); the targets include enemy population beliefs, enemy leadership beliefs, and the economic and political information systems upon which society relies to function (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 119). Certainly, IW cannot be reduced only to attacks against computer networks— Schreier (2015, 19–30) spells out the difference between IW or IO and cyberwarfare. Dorothy E. Denning, a pioneer in computer security, in her 1999 classic book defines IW as “operations that target or exploit information media in order to win some objective over an adversary”. However, this definition is so broad that it includes a set of techniques and technologies that ranges from of electronic warfare to propaganda. A report prepared by Theohary (2020) for the U.S. Congress, in which she recaps an array military activities that fall under the broad definition of IO, underlines that currently there is no official definition of IW, thus preferring the wording “information operations” that links strategic objectives with a wide range of tactics, techniques and procedures (Theohary, 2018, 2).5 A forenote to a 2003 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, published by the U.S. Department of the Army, focuses on the information environment (including IW and EW) and points up that the understanding of IO is “simultaneously frustrating and intriguing” and a “daunting task”. Nevertheless, we will continue to use these terms, despite their shortcomings. In the opinion of the current author the term “warfare” is not synonym of “armed conflict” defined by the Hague and Geneva Conventions and therefore it does not fit to operations in virtual domains (Marsili, 2019). Information and influence operations (IIO) are located in a “grey zone”6 between peace and war which includes ambiguous contexts such as hybrid conflicts (Schreier, 2015, 19, 23; Gorkowski, 2018, 26; Cordey, 2019, 10, 19) and below the threshold of war (Theohary, 2018, 2; 2000). Bishop and Goldman (2003, 115, 123–125) find that, although IW employs a broad array of non-lethal tools, a cyberattack can have deadly consequences. Zhaohong (2016, 49) perceives information as an operational warfare to provide non-kinetic capabilities for achieving strategic outcomes. Renz and Smith (2016, 22) exclude that the use of information in itself represents an act of war. The question is whether an IW campaign could be considered an armed attack or use of force under international law that could trigger a military response or whether it falls below the threshold of damage and destruction resulting from a kinetic attack (Hollis, 2007; Theohary, 2018, 16). 5

For a wide review of the literature on influence operations and techniques (propaganda, PSYOP, IW, etc.), see Cordey (2019). 6 For a definition of grey zone warfare, see Theohary (2018, 4).

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In a seminal paper Thomas (1996a, 86–7) defines information attack “an assault on the territory of a sovereign state” affecting, inter alia, international relations, political institutions and social structures. He (disproportionately) concludes that information technologies have the same potential of nuclear or conventional weapons during the Cold War (Thomas, 1996a, 90). Likewise, Bishop and Goldman (2003, 113, 132) equal information deterrence to nuclear deterrence. Hollis (2007) wonders whether IO constitutes a use of force or an armed attack, lacking the physical characteristics of traditional weaponry, or if should be considered a crime under domestic law. He gathers that the law of war includes no specific provisions, thus leaving much room for interpretation (Hollis, 2007, 1035). Therefore, is strongly questioned how IIO capabilities should be considered. Eriksson (1999, 57) finds that the huge potential of IW places it among weapon of mass destruction. Some scholars (Thomas, 1996b, 26; Hildreth, 2001, 11; Khan, 2013, 146–7; Giles, 2016a, 34), which quote V.I. Tsymbal (1995), a prominent Russian analyst, remind us that some Russian officials perceived IW as a strategic threat to such an extent that they benchmarked its functional outcome against weapons of mass destruction. Other researchers (Heickerö, 2010, 15, 52; Tashev et al., 2019, 134) compare them even to nuclear weapons. Whatever it is, the Russian doctrine considers IW a conflict between two or more states in the information space (Theohary, 2018, 9) and accordingly the RF employs IIO as a weapon. The Russians have taken the information threat so seriously that in 1998 they boosted an UN-sponsored treaty to ban IW7 —what makes us smile, considering the current Russian military doctrine, and the large use that Moscow made, in recent years, of this resource. I rather prefer to label non-lethal actions, like IO are, as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), according to the definition provided by the U.S. Department of the Army (1995). While a clear concept has not yet crystallized, IW can be considered “a form of comprehensive warfare, a strategy, not merely a set of techniques” (Johnson, 1997, 49–50)—a seminal report by Jensen (1997) provides an historical overview of IW and emphasizes strategic issues. Whatever it is, in present-day conflicts IO are considered an essential element of an overall winning military strategy (Schreier, 2015, 19; Zhaohong, 2016, 51). As any other weapon, IO can be split in offensive and defensive activities: the former includes MILDEC (measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion and falsification of evidence) and PSYOP (measures to influence attitudes and behaviour of allies and enemies)—the latter comprise: counter-deception and counterpropaganda or counter-psychological operations (Hutchinson, 2006, 219). PSYOP also cover perception management (PM), public information (PI), and public diplomacy (PD). IO methods such as PSYOP present alternative ways to accomplish larger strategic goals without resorting to force at all by convincing the adversary (or those who support it) to change their policies or positions (Hollis, 2007, 1032). The concept of “influence operations” is broader than that of “information operations” and incorporates EW, OPSEC, CO, PSYOPS, and MILDEC, thus including 7

UN General Assembly, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, A/RES/53/70, 4 December 1998.

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also non-military and coercive activities such as propaganda (Cordey, 2019, 4, 10). Influence operations whose purpose is to persuade foreign audiences (Larson et al., 2009). Mixing information operations and warfare, the RAND Corporation turns out a concept of influence operations that incorporates “the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent”. The term “influence operations” in the context of IW is used to describe “efforts to influence a target audience, whether an individual leader, members of decision-making group, military organizations and personnel, specific population subgroups, or mass publics” (Larson et al., 2009: 2). Influence operations are therefore an umbrella term covering all operations in the information domain, including soft power activities (Cohen & Bar’el, 2017).8 While is not the purpose of this work to give a definition of these terms— which do not have any commonly accepted or legally binding—for the scope of this essay we adopt the following comprehensive definition of IO set forth in the monograph by Porche et al. (2013, xx), to which we refer for a discussion: “efforts to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences through actions, utterances, signals, or messages”. A similar definition is provided by some scholars (see, e.g., Hollis 2007, 1023; Brangetto & Veenendaal, 2016, 114). Information operations are generally understood as intended to influence decisions, perceptions, and behaviour of political leaders, the population or particular target groups with the objective of achieving security policy objectives (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2017; Cohen & Bar’el, 2017; Pamment et al., 2018; Cordey, 2019). The Russian strategy, which deeply incorporates IOs within IW (Blank, 2017: 93), proved to be crucial to win every war in which Moscow has participated in the second millennium (Blank, 2017: 85), particularly in Ukraine and Crimea (Jaitner, 2015, 87; Bakshi, 2018, 181). In this context, Renz and Smith (2016, 12) point out that there are no wars in history that were won by non-military means, or by the use of information, alone (Renz & Smith, 2016 12). Kuehl (2002, 36) explains clearly the difference between IO and IW: the former are “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems”; the latter consists of “information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries”. Giles (2016a, 18–19, 24, b, 9), to which we refer for a discussion on the cognitive and technical aspects of the Russian IO, finds that information-psychological warfare affects the personnel of the armed forces and the population of the adversary. Zhaohong (2016, 5) sceptically argues that information operations are probably overrated, to the point that they are supposed to exercise a “disproportionate influence” over population and to undermine the legitimacy and morality of the military. Anyway, regardless of their pivotal role, effectiveness of IO is not questioned. All these activities, although currently carried out with the use of modern technology, are not new: they are widely described as a simply a modern, digital-age version of well-established Soviet tactics and strategies (Thomas, 1996b, 31–32; Darczewska, 2014, 34, 2015, 7, 33; Snegovaya, 2015, 7; Arold, 2016, 26; Giles, 8

For a meaningful list of information operations, see Schreier (2015), 19–23.

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2016a, 33–36, b: 4; Renz & Smith, 2016, 6; Blank, 2017, 83, 89; Ajir & Vailliant, 2018, 75; Beehner et al., 2018, 35–36). Darczewska (2014, 34) pictures them effectively as “an old product in new packaging”. Indeed, “Disinformation” is the English transliteration of the Russian word dezinformatsiya, a KGB black propaganda department (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, 23–24). This term can be defined as “the deliberate creation and sharing of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain” (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee [DCMS], 2018, 2, 2019, 10, 12). On the opposite, misinformation is “the inadvertent sharing of false information” (DCMS, 2018, 2, 2019, 10, 12). The same distinction can be found in a fresh report on IO drafted for the U.S. Congress (Theohary, 2020). Libicki (2007, 50) thinks that the expected outcome of misinformation is believing what is not true, while disinformation is aimed to lead the audience to being unable to believe what is true.9 In the changed nature of conflict, the manipulation of information became an essential function and a high priority goal for political and military leaders (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 116; Hutchinson, 2006, 213). The control of information is therefore deemed critical to military success and PSYOP are regarded to have a fundamental role to influence the decision-making of possible adversaries (Wilson, 2006). PSYOP gained a central importance for insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, starting from international tension and going through all pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases (Lord & Barnett, 1988, xix). In the IW context, denial and deception support the construction of an “artificial reality” that may prove useful to gain advantage over the adversary: this combination became a mantra (Godson & Wirtz, 2002). Propaganda is included in the bouquet of techniques used in psychological warfare and is widely used to influence public opinion and to support the government’s hardline (Marsili, 2015). According to the definition of Jowett and O’Donnell (2012, 7): “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. Through the intentional dissemination of false claims, fictitious or based on facts, propaganda aims to support or justify political actions or ideologies by creating a false image in the mind of the audience (Marsili, 2015). Although it is information, propaganda is not impartial—neither should tell the truth—but it often presents facts selectively, thus possibly lying by omission, to produce an emotional rather than rational response to the information presented (Marsili, 2015). Propaganda also has much in common with public information campaigns by governments or political groups, which are intended to encourage or discourage certain forms of behaviour, including a nationalist discourse, but also covert interests (Marsili, 2015).

9

For a definition of disinformation and misinformation, see Theohary (2018, 4), Arold (2016, 25–26).

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3 The Russian Information Strategy Lord & Barnett (1988, 17) thinks that psychological-political operations should target everybody: not only adversaries, but also neutral, allied, and semi-allied countries. Accordingly, Moscow’s information strategy is aimed to present the behaviour of the RF as “fair and just”, to demonize the adversaries and to frighten its neighbours, from the Baltic to the Black Sea (Blank, 2017, 87). To accomplish its geopolitical objectives, Russia relies on social media tools to disseminate a blend of propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation (Darczewska, 2014, 2015; Snegovaya, 2015; Arold, 2016, 25–26; Müür et al., 2016, 30–31; Iasiello, 2017, 51, 61; Theohary, 2018, 9; Vertuli & Loudon, 2018). Thomas (1996a, 84, 87) finds that information warfare—informatsionnaya voyna—emerged in the Russian military strategy after the end of the Cold War and considers the RF to be the forefront of this array of techniques. On a Russian standpoint IW is a strategy of resolving a conflict through information and psychological influence on a nation’s decision-making system and on its population that includes a variety of military activity/operations (Thomas, 1996, 26–27; Giles, 2016a, 18–19, 24; Renz & Smith, 2016, 11–18; Beehner et al., 2018; Tashev et al., 2019, 139). The Russian doctrine has adopted a concept of offensive IW that includes physical attacks and the use of CNO, EW, PSYOP, STRATCOM, and MILDEC (Thomas, 1996b, 33; Cilluffo & Gergely, 1997, 85; Heickerö, 2010, 9; Darczewska, 2015; Vertuli & Loudon, 2018).10 Although the Russian tradition of propaganda and (dis)information comes from afar (Iasiello, 2017, 51), the Moscow authorities started framing doctrine organically since 2000 and now information superiority in considered instrumental for a successful military strategy (Iasiello, 2017, 61; Sazonov et al., 2017a, b, 7). The Information Security Doctrine approved by the President of the Russian Federation in September 2000, jointly with the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ Information Space Activities Concept, underlines the role of the information war and the global importance of information space in all spheres of the vital activity of the society. The Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space, adopted in the end of 2011 by the Russian Ministry of Defence, presents the updated vision of aims, priorities, and methods of activities of the Russian armed forces in information space. The Russian Military Doctrine, approved in December 2014, lists the key features of modern conflict that include information operations, “protest potential” of local populations, and the use of special forces (Darczewska, 2015, 27; Charles, 2016). Lastly, the Russian National Security Strategy 2020 further emphasizes the significance of the “global information struggle” against nationalists and separatists (Jaitner, 2015, 88). In this way, IW concepts were integrated into the Russian national security and foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, the Russian IW approach is to be considered a “developing process”, rather than “a static situation” (Giles, 2016b, 2). 10

For a discussion on the IIO Russian strategy, concepts and doctrine, see Arold (2016).

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The Russian strategy employs (dis)information to affect adversary’s decisionmaking process and to guide the opponent into making pre-determined decisions favourable to Moscow (Thomas, 2004, 253; Heickerö, 2010, 21; Giles, 2016a, 18– 19; Beehner et al., 2018, 35; Tashev et al., 2019, 139). Therefore, IIO are means (or weapons, if you want to consider them as such) to impose limited sovereignty upon allies and neighbours (Darczewska, 2015, 7, 35). Tabansky (2017, 3) and Giles (2016a, 18–19, 24) believe that Russian IO are planned to manipulate public opinion, political debate, and decision-making in its neighbouring countries, while it is questioned whether IO should be considered an instrument of hard or soft power, according to the original definition if the term by Joseph Nye (Tabansky, 2017, 5). A deep study conducted in 2009 by Kivirähk investigates the Russian influence operations on six former USSR counties (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) through the analysis of soft power means, including IO. The research concludes that the RF uses the promotion of culture and language and the use of media as tools for achieving foreign policy objectives and as means of persuasion to threaten neighbouring countries. Likewise, Winnerstig (2014, 143) assumes that soft power seems to be a preferred option for Russian policymakers to have weak and domestically unstable neighbouring states. A report published by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) concludes that the Russian soft power strategy towards the Baltic states consists only of non-military means of influence as tools of destabilization whose effects can be “devastating” (Winnerstig, 2014, 4, 10, 12, 143). On this point the scientific community offers different interpretations. Brangetto and Veenendaal (2016, 114) infer that Russia considers IW as an instrument of hard power, while Darczewska (2015, 29) and Bakshi (2018, 181) think that Moscow views IW as a soft power tool. We disagree with both these assumptions and we explain why. Hard power is based on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions, while “soft power is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants” (Wilson, 2008, 114) using various means, including IIO. Armitage and Nye made clear that hard power combined with soft power combined gives birth to “smart power” (2007, 7), hence using a mix of resources that fits better with the concept of hybrid warfare (Blank, 2017, 86–87). Hudson (2015), who investigated the extent of Russian soft power in contemporary Ukraine, offers a different interpretation: she gathers that, while Moscow is convinced to use soft power, the Kremlin strategy is seen by the audience as “hard”. Probably this ambiguity is due to the fact that Russia’s understanding of IW does not distinguish between war and peace activities (Heickerö, 2010; Darczewska, 2015, 31; Giles, 2016a, 4, 10–11; Gorkowski, 2018, 23; Cordey, 2019, 9; Tashev et al., 2019, 133, 141). Soft power therefore seems to be not a form of warfare per se, but “something that is done for purposes that might be useful both in peacetime and in a future traditional conflict” (Winnerstig, 2014, 143). The Russian leaders are not only questioning the post-Cold War order in Europe, but they are also employing hybrid instruments to blur the boundaries between war and peace (Meister, 2016; Renz & Smith, 2016, 12; Värk, 2017, 46; Tashev et al., 2019, 134). The vast majority of the analysts (Darczewska, 2014, 2015; Winnerstig, 2014, 11; Vilson, 2016; Blank, 2017, 88, 91; Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017,

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28; Sazonov et al., 2017a, b: 8; Sliwa, 2017, 21–22; Anastasov, 2018; Ajir & Vailliant, 2018; Beehner et al., 2018, 35, 39; Rugge, 2018) argue that, in the context of the strategic confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic bloc and its Eastern partners, the RF makes an extensive use of (dis)information techniques as a strategy to undermine the trust in Western institutions and to disrupt the process of integration into the latter of the nations once included into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence: the Baltic states, Georgia, and Ukraine. Beehner et al. (2018, 32) assumes that the Russian IW is aimed, inter alia, to prevent countries in its desired sphere of “privileged interest” from Western alliances like NATO by keeping these areas in perpetual conflict, regardless of the national state of cooperation or hostility between the opposing sides (Giles, 2016a, 10). Indeed, IW can be used as a means of coercion to persuade an adversary to reverse or stop (deterrence) an action (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 133–134). While deterrence is aimed at dissuading an adversary from undertaking a damaging action, coercion is used to persuade an adversary to stop or reverse an action. Coercion does not require the use of force; it may be executed entirely through diplomacy and persuasion (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 134). Some researchers (Fridman, 2018) believe that hybrid warfare is the Kremlin’s main strategy in the twenty-first century, while some others contest this interpretation (Renz & Smith, 2016: 14; Fabian, 2019) but they all agree the RF employs widely a mix of techniques, methods, technologies, and tactics that we can cluster under the umbrella concept of “hybrid warfare” (Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016; Renz & Smith, 2016, 1).11 Lanoszka (2016) thinks that the Russian hybrid warfare strategy has made other former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic countries, fear that Moscow would use subversion rather than conventional military means against them. Thus, we can infer that the RF is not only threatening but is also blackmailing its neighbours. Information warfare is considered a critical component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy (Snegovaya, 2015, 21; Beehner, et al., 2018; Tashev et al., 2019, 138) intended to achieve combat superiority (Thomas, 1996b, 27; Heickerö, 2010, 25) and to accomplish results that are usually gained with the use of military means (Giles, 2016a, 16; Blank, 2017, 83). Russia sees superiority in this broad application of IW as a key enabler for victory in current and future conflict (Giles, 2016a, 6). This does not mean that Moscow gave up traditional means: the RF has simply embodied information capabilities into conventional ones (Beehner et al., 2018; Thompson, 2018, 5) and resorts to armed force when non-military measures fail (Darczewska, 2015, 30; Renz & Smith, 2016, 18; Kofman et al., 2017; Tashev et al., 2019, 140). Indeed, the Russian concept of IW does not fit the conventional notion of war but is instead a mix of traditional, old and modern methods, open and covert means, military and non-military, conventional and unconventional, lethal and non-lethal (Darczewska, 2015, 14–16, 38; Giles, 2016a, 6; Sliwa, 2017, 21). The conflicts in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine served as test beds for Russian forces to fully integrate new capabilities into traditional military operations (White, 2018, 155). 11

For a discussion on hybrid warfare Russian strategy, concepts and doctrine, see Renz and Smith (2016).

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The attack on Estonia in 2007, that the government of Tallinn has equated to a conventional attack or an act of war (Hollis, 2007, 1025–1026; 1028), can be considered an “exercise” of the effectiveness of IW. The lack of specific provisions on cyberwarfare, as well as the difficulty in identifying the perpetrators with certainty, makes this option profitable for the perpetrators, with the Kremlin that easily denied any participation in the attacks against Estonia (Heickerö, 2010, 42, 50; Schreier, 2015, 79, 110). In Summer 2008 hundreds of government and corporate websites in another Baltic state, Lithuania were hacked by Russian nationalists nostalgic for the Soviet era (Schreier, 2015, 111). Kyrgyzstan suffered a similar cyberattack in January 2009, in which the Russian authorities denied any involvement (Schreier, 2015, 113). Until then, just non-kinetic actions. Schreier (2015, 23–24) infers that IO are a good strategic viaticum, but at operational-tactical level they are not enough to achieve conflict resolution. Accordingly, Russia made a quantum leap one year later, when Georgia was the first country to experiment the combination of IO and PSYOP with traditional kinetic attacks (Heickerö, 2010, 43, 46; Schreier, 2015, 112; Blank, 2017, 88–89; Iasiello, 2017, 52; Gorkowski, 2018, 22). IO against Georgia were part of a “coordinated and synchronized kinetic and non-kinetic campaign” which appeared to be orchestrated with military and political operations (Murphy, 2010, 95). After the war in Georgia, Moscow was forced to rethink how to conduct IO and adjusted its strategy 6 years later against Ukraine (Müür et al., 2016, 33; Iasiello, 2017, 51, 54, 59) when the Russian Federation conducted (dis)information operations to influence the audience and to destabilize entire communities and districts (Boyte, 2017, 93). The RF made extensive use of IIO to regain dominance in the Black Sea region (Darczewska, 2014; Giles, 2016b; Anastasov, 2018). Moscow reshaped its strategic influence in Crimea and Georgia by creating a hybrid approach to conventional warfare that makes a large use of strategic IO (Hatch, 2019, 69; Iasiello, 2017, 55). Russia has been using an advanced form of hybrid warfare in Ukraine since early 2014 that relies heavily on an element of IW (Snegovaya, 2015, 7). In Ukraine, the Russian hybrid warfare was characterized by a mix of IO and PSYOP carried out jointly and integrated with military operations (Müür et al., 2016: 28–29; Renz & Smith, 2016, 22–23; Sazonov, 2017, 75; Sazonov & Müür, 2017, 11; Beehner et al., 2018: 42). In Crimea the RF combined a variety of means and tactics—military and irregular forces, IO and CO (Scheipers, 2016, 47)—but IO and PSYOP played a key role and were more important than the use of conventional means (Renz & Smith, 2016, 11). IO were used to blanket covert operations (Giles, 2016a, 6; Kofman et al., 2017). From case to case the Russian Federation used military force openly or unofficially, like the military support offered to separatists (Kivirähk et al., 2009; Kofman et al., 2017, 55 et seq.; Sazonov, 2017, 75) but the open intervention in Eastern Ukraine in August 2014 transformed the nature of the conflict from hybrid war into a conventional, but limited, interstate conflict (Rácz, 2015, 14, 67, 73–4; Kofman et al., 2017, 2).

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A report released in May 2019 by CNA, a non-profit research and analysis organization located in Arlington, VA, argues that Russia turned its attention to unconventional warfare by supplementing its conventional forces with proxies and mercenaries and conducting influence operations in Ukraine via proxies from the Donbass region (Graja, 2019, 11), even if these strategy and techniques have resulted employed less successfully in Eastern Ukraine (Tabansky, 2017, 26). The report concludes that, in doing so, Moscow is moving away from conventional battlefield operations.12 Distinguishing kinetic operations from IO or IW, like in Georgia and Ukraine, is virtually impossible: in the Russian strategy they are fully integrated in military operations (Giles, 2016a, 68, b, 4, 15; Blank, 2017, 81–82). In Ukraine the RF combined lawfare with kinetic and non-kinetic means to achieve its objectives, manipulating international law and using it as a weapon (Värk, 2017, 46). Information warfare is deemed to be convenient for Russia, as it remains below the threshold of conventional war and therefore it does not trigger a military response (Thomas, 1996b, 29; Giles, 2016a, 5; Gorkowski, 2018, 23). Although Moscow won the battle on the field, the information war in Georgia was not successful (Heickerö, 2010, 50; Giles, 2016b, 4; Müür et al., 2016, 33; Iasiello, 2017, 52, 54, 59). As the result of the new strategy tested in Estonia and Georgia, the RF increased the use of social media to support military offenses in hybrid warfare (Boyte, 2017, 93). After the intervention in Crimea the Kremlin undertook measures to destabilize the compact Russian-speaking Eastern Ukrainian regions using, inter alia, IO, PSYOP, and CO (Sazonov et al., 2016, 10; Sazonov & Mölder, 2017, 30). Crimea has been assessed to be the only “completely successful case” of hybrid war conducted by the RF, even if unexpected (Renz & Smith, 2016, 2), being Eastern Ukraine a “partially successful case” (Rácz, 2015, 73). Kofman et al. (2017, 26) believes that the Russian information campaign in Crimea was not planned in advance, had several shortcomings and eventually was “of little influence”. Anyhow, the Russian global influence campaign through Internet and social media has been assessed to be the most successful in history (Hatch, 2019, 69). IO in Georgia and Ukraine marked a turning point in the use of IW within Russian traditional military activities (Giles, 2016a, 35). Has been reported (Iasiello, 2017, 61; Bakshi, 2018, 181) that, following the success of its IIO, the Russian military is expected to make a greater use of coordinated EW and PSYOP in the future, even if some scholars (Rácz, 2015, 90) believe that Russia can make a limited resort to hybrid warfare. Is therefore questioned whether the successful operation in Crimea can be repeated elsewhere in the former Soviet republics (Kofman et al., 2017, 74–76); Russia’s operations in the peninsula benefited from a series of highly favourable circumstances that makes it difficult to replicate: political, historical, geographical (the proximity of Crimea to Russia), linguistic and military advantages.

12

The collective volume The Crisis in Ukraine and Information Operations of the Russian Federation, edited in 2016 by Sazonov et al. provides a wide-ranging discussion on the attempts of the RF to control the neighbouring territories and analyses the information warfare and hybrid war in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

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4 The Nationalist Discourse and the Pro-Russia Narrative The Russian speech blew over nationalism in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine (Popa, 2019, 347–348) where Moscow maintains military bases and troops in the occupied territories (NATO, 2018) to keep up the pressure on those countries (Blank, 2017, 87; 88). Indeed, the fear of a new intervention of the Russian soldiers in defence of Abkhazia proved successful in forcing the government of Tbilisi to step back from collaboration with NATO (Blank, 2017, 90; Popa, 2019, 360) and is perceived as a threat by the Baltic states (Winnerstig, 2014, 11). In Moldova and Armenia, the RF may be unlikely engaged in a hybrid war due to the lack of direct border, and hence the small Russian bases far away from mainland are not suitable for supporting the military like in Ukraine and Georgia (Rácz, 2015, 90). Nevertheless, the Russian support of separatism in Transnistria indicates the desire of the Kremlin to play an important role in events in Moldova (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 13). Eventually, the Kremlin took advantage of the conflict that re-flamed in Fall 2020 in NagornoKarabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan to deploy a peacekeeping force of about 2,000 servicemen in the region and thereby increasing its influence in the region. The use of media to impact society, national ethnic, or religious groups is a distinctive characteristic of IW (Wetoszka, 2016, 55). Hybrid warfare aims non only to traditional political and material objectives, but also as symbolic ones (Bishop & Goldman, 2003, 115). Information operations are not limited to the military context but form part of a broader strategy to exert power over adversaries by putting in place coercive economic means or exploiting ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, and social tensions in society (Pamment et al., 2018). The Russian information strategy aims to lead to a climate of confusion among the masses of the target state and perpetuates distrust in the government and political system, in an attempt to subvert local authorities (Blank, 2017). If we reverse the reasoning of Bishop and Goldman (2003, 120) we can infer that information can facilitate inflammatory nationalist rhetoric and ethnic clashes. An early report prepared in 1996 by RAND for the Office of the Secretary of Defence warns that the Russian IW effort increased that year as a strong “nationalist regime” came to power in Moscow and moved to consolidate influence in the near abroad (Molander et al., 1996, 5). In the post-Soviet linguistic tradition, the term “nation”, as well as its derivative concept “national identity”, has strong ethnic connotations (Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016, 43). The conflicts between breakaway territories in former Soviet Union republics are rooted in the incorporation of Russianspeaking nationalities, which enjoyed a certain autonomy within the USSR, in ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different states (Marsili, 2016, 162, 163). To fill the vacuum caused by the breakup of the USSR, the Russian government committed itself to build a new national identity that puts together the many ethnic, religious, and national communities that once were incorporated into the Soviet state (Darczewska, 2014, 33; Sakwa, 2006, 412–6). The Moscow authorities developed therefore a narrative that relies on belonging to the “glorious” Soviet era and therefore to Russia as a nation-state, thus creating

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a common historical narrative (Breslauer & Dale, 1997, 315–17; Winnerstig, 2014, 143; Darczewska, 2015, 34–35; Sazonov et al., 2016, 11; Mölder, 2016, 105; Kofman et al., 2017, 80–81; Sazonov et al., 2017a, b, 55; Beehner et al., 2018, 31). The RF uses national identity as a propaganda tool (Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016). Indeed, the Information Security Doctrine (2000) discusses also how to strengthen national identity and preserve the cultural heritage to develop shared moral values, patriotism for the sake of the motherland (Heickerö, 2010, 18; Darczewska, 2015, 20, 24). Information operations orchestrated by Moscow, whether they are in the service of a conventional military attack or not, target extra-territorial Russian-speaking population (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 41 et seq.; Iasiello, 2017, 54; Beehner et al., 2018, 32) but they are successful only where there is a strong pro-Russia sentiment Renz and Smith (2016, 6). Russian state and non-state actors have exploited history, culture, language, and nationalism (Giles, 2016b, 2) that seems to be the motivation that in Summer 2008 drove Russian patriotic hackers to perpetrate cyber-attacks against hundreds of government and corporate websites in Lithuania (Schreier, 2015, 111), Georgia and later in Ukraine (Cordey, 2019, 22). In the Baltic region the Kremlin fully supported a strategy aimed not only to promote the Russian-speaking minorities in the area but also to undermine the local institutions (Winnerstig, 2014, 11, 142). The ethno-nationalist discourse supported by IO was experimented in Estonia in 2007 (Heickerö, 2010, 5; Hollis, 2007, 1024) with the goal to influence the “not friendly” government of Tallinn (Blank, 2017, 85– 86). The complaint that the Russian population Estonia is discriminated (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 51, 141 et seq.) serves as excuse for a “fair and just” intervention to protect the Russian compatriots living in these countries but was not successful to warm the situation to the point of triggering military intervention like in Ukraine (Blank, 2017, 86). The FOI report concludes that in the Baltic region the Russian influence strategy that relies on cultural and linguistic the ties with the motherland was a flop (Winnerstig, 2014, 12, 143). The failure is due to integration and cultural policies that the three Baltic states have directed at their own minorities, especially in Estonia but also in Latvia and Lithuania. The massive presence of ethnic Russian minorities in the target country, such as Ukraine, who are not completely satisfied with their treatment by the central government, is a precondition for a successful hybrid offensive (Rácz, 2015, 89; Kivirähk et al., 2009, 275; Kofman et al., 2017, 20). In the context of the RussoUkrainian confrontation IO were used to disorganize governance, organize antigovernment protests, delude adversaries, influence public opinion, and reduce an opponent’s will to resist (Jaitner, 2015, 89). According to some observers (Hudson, 2015, 334; Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018) the reasons of the tensions between Kiev and Moscow reside in logic of competitive influence-seeking that the latter considers as the opportunity for a re-integration. Other analysts (Darczewska, 2014, 33; Wetoszka, 2016, 63; Herb & Kaplan, 2017) argue that the annexation of Crimea follows the political ambitions of the Kremlin

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but also comes from a multifaceted Russian nationalism.13 Ukraine has always been an essential part of narratives related to Russian nation-building, at the extent that the exit of Kiev from the geopolitical sphere of influence of the Moscow was perceived by Russia as its major geopolitical defeat, a catastrophe (Müür et al., 2016, 30–31; Kofman et al., 2017, 1). In Ukraine, the Kremlin build a cultural narrative, targeting pro-Russian, that goes far beyond a simple ethno-national narrative, including native language and religious discourse (Hudson, 2015) and selects not just Russian citizens but the entire Russianspeaking population of the planet (Darczewska, 2015, 13; Jaitner, 2015, 92; Vilson, 2016, 120–121; Kofman et al., 2017, 81). The concept of Russian identity is multiethnic and international (Riistan, 2016, 220) and the so-called “compatriots’ policy” supports all Russian-speaking people outside the motherland, thus emphasizing on language rather than ethnicity (Winnerstig, 2014, 142). Ethnic or separatism and language-related elements have been present both in Crimea and in the Donbass (Rácz, 2015, 78, 80; Riistan, 2016, 222). The same name Novorossiya (New Russia), an historical region of the Russian Empire which now identifies a confederation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, reveals the nationalism that underlies the conflict in Easter Ukraine (Marsili, 2016, 163, 170; Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016, 45–46; Kofman et al., 2017, 51–54). In an attempt to legitimize the Russian intervention in the Donbas, propagandists sought to characterize the participation in the conflict in terms of language, culture, history, as a support to protect the just claims of the ethnic Russian separatists (Pakhomenko & Tryma, 2016, 52; Kofman et al., 2017: 49; Sazonov, 2017, 75; Popa, 2019, 349; Tashev et al., 2019, 130). Russia’s actions in its near abroad include the protection of Russian-speaking minorities through information and soft power means (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 13; Winnerstig, 2014, 11–12). Indeed, Moscow’s military intervention in Georgia was justified as a defence of Russian citizens in South Ossetia (Kivirähk et al., 2009, 13). The Kremlin pushed on information to make believe that the intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine was necessary to protect ethnic Russians and Russian native speakers (Renz & Smith, 2016, 6; Iasiello, 2017, 56; Kofman et al., 2017, 21; Värk, 2017, 46). The Russian language was used to keep cultural and emotional links with the fatherland and contributed to the successful of the operation (Darczewska, 2014, 34; Kofman et al., 2017, 16, 49–50). From this perspective, Eriksson (1999, 58) finds that IW tools are “weapons of cultural disruption”. During the secession of Crimea, local ethno-nationalists used the periphrasis “Russia’s Kosovo” to underline the parallel with the independence of Pristina from Belgrade and the reasons underpinning (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2017). To legitimize their claims to Crimea, the authorities of Moscow presented the annexation with a national irredentist terminology, using ethno-lingual or ethno-cultural terms (Teper, 2016). The Ukranian experience proved to be so successful in mobilizing pro-Russian

13

For a discussion on the direct impact of nationalism on the likelihood of disputes, see Ciorciari and Chen Weiss (2016).

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sentiment that it becomes a landmark for future influence operations (Kalpokas, 2017, 53). Information operations have blown nationalism, and created the political (and pseudo-legal) conditions for Russia’s intervention beyond its borders, to the extent that Italy’s interior minister and deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party, backed the annexation of Crimea, due to the fact that there are “some historically Russian zones with Russian culture and traditions which legitimately belong to the Russian Federation” (Weymouth, 2018)—the Kremlin portrayed Crimea as being historically belonged to Russia (Kofman et al., 2017, 28, 52; Sazonov et al., 2017a, b, 57–58; Beehner et al., 2018, 40). Kalpokas (2017, 53) has summarized effectively the Ukraine conflict characterizing it not only as a kinetic action, but also as a “battle of narratives”. Much of the work produced in the area of IW is concerned with descriptive narrative (Martinus, 2001, 12), no matter whether it is truthful, and IO are intended to reinforce these narratives (Zhaohong, 2016, 49). As its IW strategy has proven successful, the RF is making an extensive use aggressive narrative to support the legitimacy of its Arctic sovereignty claims (Darczewska, 2015, 35; Carr, 2019) and is likely that the Kremlin will continue to make extensive use of this strategy in the conduct of its foreign policy.

5 Conclusions Information superiority is considered essential to achieving victory on the physical battlefield in modern war. Information operations, for which it is difficult to attribute responsibility and which are not specifically regulated by international law, fall below the threshold of armed conflict and are convenient to be used to destabilize a government or to try to legitimize a (unlawful) action. The Kremlin has developed information capabilities, clustered under the umbrella concept of “hybrid warfare”, that make a fundamental contribution to accomplish foreign policy goals. Disinformation, propaganda, and cyber capabilities have been employed in Russian influence campaigns to support a new nationalist ideology. The Russian strategy makes a large use of media outlets to inspire nationalist Russian sentiment and identify loyalists and supporters. Through flag propaganda operations, the Russian Federation has caused political instability and poisoned bordering countries with the purpose to regain regional dominance and counteract the enlargement of Western powers. It is expected that Moscow will continue to use this strategy that, so far, was successful to weaken neighbouring nations and increase its regional influence. To be effective the hybrid strategy of Moscow, which makes extensive use of information and psychological operations, requires a combination of favourable circumstances: the presence of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking population on foreign soil and the border with Russia, that is necessary for military intervention. Without

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both requirements Moscow’s strategy is ineffective and represents neither a deterrent nor a real threat. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, for supporting this work through grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

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The Hybrid Arsenal of Russia’s War Against the Democratic World Evhen Tsybulenko and Aleksi Kajander

1 Introduction To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting —Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The second decade of the twenty-first century brought the battle for the minds of the citizens of democratic countries around the world to the centre stage. Two events, the Russian aggression which led to the occupation of Crimea and the eastern parts of Donbass (International Criminal Court, 2017) (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2018) (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2017) and the 2016 United States election, stand out as especially pivotal in changing the perception of warfare from the traditional trenches and gunfire of the previous century to the battle now being waged for the control of the minds of individual voters through cyberspace. The rapid occupation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia and the lack of response from NATO, the EU or anyone else for that matter shocked the world and served as a long-overdue wake-up call to a ‘new’ form of warfare. Two years later, the malicious meddling into the U.S. Presidential election by Russia through social media and other platforms completed the rude awakening, not with a ‘shot heard around the world’ but rather ‘tweets heard around the world’, with the concepts of ‘fake news’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ becoming hot topics all around the globe. The popularity of social media as a news source, as, for example, over 60% of Americans get their news from social media (Jang & Kim, 2018), has given the unprecedented ability to remotely influence the thoughts and actions of foreign voters. Russia has certainly capitalized on this possibility, with its widespread distribution E. Tsybulenko (B) · A. Kajander Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_9

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of disinformation, fake news, and other forgeries to further its own geopolitical goals, as well as cause division and distrust within the populations of ‘target’ states. Consequently, this paper aims to examine the arsenal of means and methods that Russia has used to wager its war against the democratic world through its hybrid warfare. The first part of the paper is divided into sections that highlight the means employed by Russia to further its own objectives and agenda in a variety of cases, such as those related to the downing of MH17, the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, and the Black Lives Matters movement of 2020. The second part of this paper is dedicated to the available means of combatting the methods described in the first part.

2 Crimea 2014: A Rude Awakening Divide et Impera —Ancient Maxims

The successful swift occupation of Crimea in 2014 was a major shock to the world, especially in light of the previous failures of past Russian military interventions (Renz, 2016), albeit considering the weak international response to the 2008 RussoGeorgian war, Russian re-aggression was perhaps inevitable. Consequently, many in the West immediately deduced that the Russian success must be due to a ‘new way of war’ that they have managed to implement successfully (Galeotti, 2016). However, upon further reflection, there has been a great deal of disagreement about whether Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’ is in fact new at all, but rather an amalgamation of existing indirect and unconventional tactics which are familiar tools to the militaries of a multitude of states (Galeotti, 2016). Therefore, it is best to take a step-back and examine briefly exactly what enabled Russia to successfully invade Crimea while the rest of the world stood still (PartanenDufour, 2016). Firstly, the strategic importance of Crimea to Russia should be considered, before the occupation, it was the home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet under a renewable lease (Galeotti, 2016). Therefore, from the Russian perspective, the threat of loss of access, real or perceived, to the Sevastopol naval base would be a concern of the highest order. This fear materialized in February 2014 when the Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych fell after a period of unrest due to the ‘Euromaidan’ protests (Freedman, 2014), seemingly sparking the belief that Ukraine would revoke Russia’s lease and even join NATO (Galeotti, 2016). Following Yanukovych’s flight from the country to Russia on the 21st of February, the chaos provided an opportunity for Russia to take matters into its own hands and ensure its long-term position in the Black sea (Galeotti, 2016). Within the next few days, Russian agents orchestrated pro-Moscow and antiKiev protests while Russian forces were quietly mobilized including the airborne

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45th Independent Special Purpose Regiment and the 3rd Brigade of Spetsnaz special forces. On the 27th of February, unidentified armed men took over strategic locations across Crimea and a new provisional government was proclaimed (Galeotti, 2016). The identity of the armed ‘little green men’ or ‘polite people’ as they are known in Russia, remained a mystery with firm denials from Russia regarding their involvement and insistence that the men were ‘self-defence’ groups or local volunteers (RT International, 2019). With no evidence to disprove Russia’s somewhat obvious lies, confronting Russia over their arguably evident involvement proved impossible for the Western powers (Allison, 2017). The illegal annexation to Russia was completed on the 18thof March following an abominable illegal ‘referendum’ on the 16th of March which ‘resulted’ in an over 90% vote for joining Russia (Paul, 2015). At this point, Russia had accomplished what might have seemed inconceivable years earlier, a swift and near bloodless (several people were killed including Crimean Tatars and a warrant officer of the Ukrainian regular army) victory (Renz, 2016). Bloodshed would follow in the subsequent war in Donbass, however, as of the moment of writing, Crimea remains occupied by Russia. Russia’s victory in annexing Crimea was seemingly ‘confirmed’ by the Western response, which focused more on limiting further aggression rather than restoring the situation to what it was before Russian aggression (Freedman, 2014). While the abovementioned events were occurring, in the background a ceaseless campaign of information and psychological warfare was taking place which enabled the occupation to happen with little resistance. The types of narratives used to support the Russian actions can be demonstrated by the six distinct ‘frames’ used by Russia Today (RT) during the events. Firstly, initially a ‘Danger frame’ was used to play up highlight the risks for the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, as well as labelling the Euromaidan protests as violent, thereby setting the stage and justification for subsequent actions (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). This ‘Danger Frame’ further stressed the need of Russia to protect the Russianspeaking population, as Ukraine had fallen into the hands of ‘fascists’ and ‘neo-Nazis’ that were planning to commit violence against ethnic Russians (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). As a concrete example, in an interview by RT, the Russian Foreign Minister states that the public in Ukraine is urged to ‘shoot Russians in the head and kill them all’. This ‘Danger Frame’ was complemented by the ‘Blame Frame’ whereby it was insinuated that the EU and U.S. conspired with far-right political forces to overthrow the legitimate government of Yanukovych (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). Upon the coup by ‘little green men’, the Russian media including RT, switched to a ‘Denial Frame’ which firmly denied the involvement of Russian soldiers in Crimea. Besides labelling the men as ‘volunteers’ or ‘self-defence’ groups (after all the Ukrainian fascists were after their heads), Russian President Putin himself denied the notion that the unidentified gunmen were Russian and continued to perpetuate the lie that they were ‘Crimean self-defence forces’. Subsequently, in April 2014 he admitted that the troops in Crimea were Russian, however, by that point Crimea had been illegally annexed and arguably the revelation made quite meaningless on a practical level, as the damage was done (RT International, 2014). This denial was arguably crucial in avoiding immediate responses from NATO or the EU, for there

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was no contrary evidence to prove the troops were definitively Russian or any formal declaration of war. This same tactic of denial has continued to be employed by Russia regarding regular Russian troops that are present in the occupied parts of Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the use of purposefully misleading terminology when referring to the local collaborators, and even regular Russian troops and de facto state-affiliated Russian ‘private’ military contractors, using terms such as ‘rebels’ and ‘separatists’, implied that the people of Crimea where in fact being ‘liberated’ (Tsybulenko & Francis, 2018). This terminology made its way out of the Russian media and into a wider sphere of influence including foreign mass media and even diplomatic circles (Tsybulenko & Francis, 2018). Even the adoption of the terms from the narratives being pushed by the Russian media may have the insidious effect of influencing the perception of the conflict, for after ‘rebel’ and ‘separatists’ are repeated enough times, the public may begin to associate the conflict in Crimea with a fight for freedom, which could not be further from the truth. From the ‘Denial Frame’ the narrative changed to a ‘Peaceful Frame’, in an attempt to convince the world that the ‘referendum’ was peaceful and more importantly, legitimate (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). Moreover, the media attempted to downplay the violence that was occurring in the region to convey an image of a calm and peaceful Crimea, even if this was clearly not true (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). The ‘Peaceful Frame’ was followed by the ‘Acceptance Frame’ which portrayed a narrative that Crimea ‘chose’ to be a part of the Russian Federation as that is what the vast majority of its population wanted (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). Moreover, the reunification supposedly ended the division of Russian people and righted ‘historical injustices’ (Tsybulenko & Kelichavyi, 2018). This narrative was strengthened by framing the West’s disapproval as undemocratic and hypocritical (RT International, 2014). A contrary ‘Intimidation Frame’ was used throughout the events to discourage foreign intervention by presenting Russia as a militarily strong and capable state, thereby attempting to convince any would be intervener that they would be unsuccessful and suffer a defeat (Partanen-Dufour, 2016). Moreover, the severe limits to the freedom of speech and the general suppression of dissent in Crimea have been used by Russia to establish a new status quo, whereby an annexed Crimea is the norm and any suggestion otherwise dissent (Tsybulenko & Platonova, 2019). From the occupation of Crimea in 2014, it is possible to derive the key means and methods used by Russia, which include – Information and psychological warfare through the use of media narratives, both before and after physical actions. – Encouraging political discord before the physical invasion. – Incitement of riots by Russian agents to create further division and chaos as further preparation for a physical invasion to minimize organized resistance. – Use of disguised troops posing as ‘local self-defence units’ and volunteers and refusing to identify the true nature and origin of the troops in public. Upon closer inspection, analysts have suggested that the methods employed in Crimea are far from new, as arguments have been made for hybrid warfare stretching

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back to the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC as well as the Jewish Revolt in 66 AD (Erol & Oguz, 2015). Regardless of the controversy regarding the exact definition of hybrid warfare and what it includes, this paper will focus mainly on the ‘non-linear warfare’ aspects of Russia’s strategy. Non-linear warfare can be described as a type of warfare that uses subversion and division of the enemy’s social and political structure, thereby allowing the aggressor to impose their will on the target (Schnaufer, 2017). The concept is essentially the same as the old military maxim of ‘Divide and Conquer’ dating back to Antiquity (Tzu, 2000) through non-conventional means, where the ultimate battlefields are the minds of the target country’s population (Erol & Oguz, 2015). As can be noted from the 2014 Crimean example, a country that is suffering from internal unrest and division is unlikely to be able to a resist foreign invasion with a united front, thereby reducing their chance of successfully repelling the advances of their invader. The use of (dis)information warfare was widespread by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as exemplified by Operation INFEKTION which instilled the false belief that the United States deliberately created AIDS/HIV (Sukhankin, 2020) to foster anti-Americanism. However, the advance of technology has made it considerably easier and quicker to spread such disinformation intended to create distrust and division within the target population. For it is no longer necessary to resort to using an obscure newspaper such as in the case of Operation INFEKTION (Sukhankin, 2020), but rather disinformation can now be proclaimed on social media or websites which will be visible for the whole world to see at once. The illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014 arguably was the long-overdue awakening for the world about the very real effects of Russia’s non-linear warfare, where the final result of Twitter bots and fake news is the forceful invasion of a region of a sovereign state (Helmus et al., 2018), and therefore the battle for the minds of people across the world waged by Russia could no longer be ignored.

3 Fake News and the Fate of States A vote is like a rifle: its usefulness depends upon the character of the user —Theodore Roosevelt

A democratic state entrusts its future to the hands of its voting population, thereby meaning that ultimately the population determines whether the state is lead towards ruin or prosperity. In this equation, it is often presumed that each voter will have done their due diligence on either the candidate they vote for or the matter being voted on. However, in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, election meddling by Russia through a disinformation campaign utilizing social media and other sources to spread ‘fake news’ became a widespread concern in that it was unduly influencing the voting decisions of U.S. citizens.

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The term ‘fake news’ is somewhat problematic to define, as it is a broad term that encompasses more accepted forms of ‘fake news’ such as purposeful parody (Brummette et al., 2018) as well as malicious disinformation attempting to pass itself as the truth. This paper will focus on the latter type of malicious disinformation that charades as truthful, used to unduly influence the minds of individuals rather than the humorous or satirical parodies of actual news. However, it would be unfair to simplify the spectrum of information as ‘real’ versus ’disinformation’, for while it is an age-old question of whether an ‘objective truth’ exists, any form of reporting is susceptible to inaccuracies, unconscious or conscious biases, and intentional or unintentional misrepresentation. Furthermore, it would be simplistic to point at wellestablished mainstream news outlets as being the beacon of truth immune from spreading disinformation that can be relied on without critical thinking or evaluation. The unfortunate truth is that history has demonstrated that any media outlet on occasion may produce ‘fake news’, as was demonstrated by the questionable journalistic practices of CNN in 2017 which resulted in the resignations of three journalists (BBC News, 2017). While the story itself was redacted three days later, the damage was arguably done to the public perception of events, as it had already become ‘yesterday’s news’. Incidents such as this does not obviously necessarily categorize a news outlet as ‘fake news’, but rather serves as a reminder that all claims, regardless of origin, should be subjected to scrutiny rather than immediately accepted merely due to their seemingly credible origins. Nevertheless, as a result, a discussion regarding what information ‘should’ be available for individuals in a democratic state has emerged, which is a topic that is fraught with danger. For arguably freedom of speech goes together with the democratic concept of voting, as the right to vote would have little worth if the voter’s access to information and different opinion was limited. Consequently, considerable caution should be exercised when discussing ‘fake news’ and disinformation in general, for the cure should not be worse than the disease, in the sense that if the provision of information is ‘limited’ to a few ‘trusted’ sources (O’Neill, 2016; Paul, 2016) the effect would be censorship reminiscent of the worst dictatorships. In fact, the whole discussion about how the average voter should be prevented from accessing certain information has a distinctly undemocratic notion to it, for arguably, if a voter can be trusted to choose the course of the whole state, so too should they be trusted to be able to sift through all available information and discern what is truthful and what is not. Furthermore, a systematic disinformation campaign such as waged by Russia is difficult to combat even with established journalistic principles such as the so-called ‘BBC standards’ of journalism (Goble, 2019a, b). For if equal prominence is given to both ‘real’ news and ‘fake’ news in an attempt to ‘find the truth in the middle’, the resulting story is not actually neutral and thereby truthful, but rather it allows disinformation to impact public opinion (Goble, 2019a, b). This has been the case with the coverage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where the disinformation from Russian media sources has been given undue value, thereby allowing Russia to influence international public opinion regarding the events (Goble, 2019a, b). In other words, when both sides of a story are given equal weight, the outcome favours the side that provides

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the bigger lie, hence incentivizing the provision of disinformation favourable to their own side rather than even attempting to communicate truthfully. Thus, as a corollary, a truthful recollection of events is essentially punished, meaning that in the face of systematic large-scale disinformation campaigns, current journalistic standards are not necessarily adequate. In addition, the other measures which are employed to fight ‘fake news’ may themselves be draconian, as exemplified by Youtube’s policy during the Covid-19 outbreak, banning any material that ‘explicitly disputes the efficacy of guidance about social distancing and self-isolation that has been issued by the WHO and/or local health authorities’ (BBC News, 2020a b). While at first glance appearing to be a prudent policy to fight disinformation on the spread of the Coronavirus, the prevention of discussion regarding the guidance given by local health authorities is extremely troubling, as it effectively shuts down free speech on what may very well be incorrect advice. For example, criticism of the official guidance of the Russian government regarding Coronavirus, which is wrought with questionable suggestions (Meduza, 2020), would be censored by Youtube, and thereby any existing faults would remain unexplored, at least on the platform of Youtube. If similar policies are to be adopted by other major social media platforms or other similar discussion forums, the effects on freedom of speech would arguably be significant and undemocratic. The lamentable reality of freedom of speech, which is essential for a true democracy, is that inevitably misinformation will enter the discussions. Censorship is not the answer, for once institutions or other entities are tasked with deciding what the ‘truth’ is, the discussion will no longer be balanced and serve its purpose from a democratic point of view. The fact that censorship justified by fighting ‘fake news’ is being re-introduced and is now encroaching on the freedom of speech in democratic states, is a testament to the insidious efficacy of a deliberate ‘fake news’ campaign by a hostile state. For seemingly without realizing it themselves, democratic states are dismantling their own democracy, and the democratic principles their states were meant to uphold. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the effect of Internet ‘fake news’ may be somewhat overstated, as research indicates that the audience for fake news is relatively small and consists of the Internet’s heaviest users, while the majority of the Internet audience sticks to the established mainstream ‘real news’ (Nelson & Taneja, 2018). However, the balance may be shifting as, for example, in the United States trust towards the established ‘mass media’ is declining, which could potentially bring larger audience to ‘fake’ news websites (Nelson & Taneja, 2018). Nevertheless, there is a caveat in this conclusion, as it presumes that the ‘established’ mainstream media is in fact not the source of the ‘fake news’ themselves. Consequently, if the ‘established’ mass media, that still retains trust among the public, is purposefully communicating ‘fake news’ themselves, arguably the situation could be reversed where the majority consumes the ‘fake news’ and the ‘heaviest’ Internet users find the ‘real news’. In light of the previous discussion regarding the Russian mass and state media narratives relating to the invasion of Ukraine, it is not unreasonable to consider that the most effective target for ‘fake news’ is the population of one’s own country rather

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than foreign audiences, provided the government has sufficient control of the media to be able to push their desired narratives. Therefore, provided the mainstream media is not compromised by conveying fake narratives, the reach of ‘fake news’ through the Internet pushed by malicious foreign actors may be less significant than what has been perceived. On the other hand, the danger of promoting ‘fake news’ through ‘trusted’ established media outlets is highlighted, whereby the bigger threat would be the lack of a truly independent established domestic media outlets. Furthermore, there appears to be a widespread contradicting perception that fake news causes confusion about the basic facts of current events, a belief shared by 88% of Americans. This is inconsistent with the self-reported confidence in being able to identify fake news, where 39% of respondents to Pew Research were ‘very confident’ in being able to identify fake news, with a further 45% being somewhat confident (Jang & Kim, 2018). The related concept of the ‘third-person hypothesis’ has been discussed for a long time, whereby individuals consider others to be more affected by the media than they themselves (Jang & Kim, 2018). Moreover, individuals tend to consider that third persons will be more affected by socially undesirable messages, such as libellous news stories, which has garnered support for the regulation of ‘socially undesirable media content’ (Jang & Kim, 2018). Therein lies the danger for any democracy, for once ‘socially undesirable content’ is regulated, the descent into full-blown censorship where only the dominant ‘party line’ is the only ‘desirable content’ is a step closer. After all, arguably it is impossible to point to a comprehensive set of universally agreeable ‘socially desirable values’ in all matters as the discussion is inevitably a question of personal and cultural preferences and thereby what is ‘socially desirable’ is a fickle matter of opinion. Hence, once the power is granted to an entity to block out ‘socially undesirable’ content, the danger of that power being misused by the powers that be is introduced. Adding to the third-person effect, strongly partisan individuals believe that the members of the ‘other party’ are more vulnerable to the effects of fake news, whereas they themselves believe that they are not easily influenced by fake news (Jang & Kim, 2018). Therefore, as both sides agree that ‘fake news’ is unduly affecting their local politics, this may result in significant support from both sides to censorship methods aimed at combatting the ‘fake news’ that they perceive is affecting their ideological opponents. Moreover, the perception of ‘opposing’ partisans being more susceptible to ‘fake news’ has the side-effect of potentially increasing the division between the opposing parties as both perceive that their opposing counterparts are falling victim to harmful misinformation and thereby are acting against the best interest of the state. Consequently, the resulting distrust between opposing partisans will play directly into the hand of the state conducting the disinformation campaign as any resulting unrest provides an opportunity for more direct action, as could be seen in Crimea in 2014, thereby completing the tried and tested ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. Additionally, when an environment where partisans mistakenly believe that they are not influenced by fake news develops, and as a result information shared among them is perceived as true (Jang & Kim, 2018) they are tremendously susceptible for influence from disinformation. This effect may be amplified by the increased possibility to form homophilous networks where there are few contrarian views

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(Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017), thereby further reinforcing any existing confirmation bias that may exist within the members of the group. As a result, in the light of the above theoretical framework, any ‘fake news’ or disinformation that will feed into the existing bias of that particular partisan group is likely to be accepted if it manages to slip through one member’s better judgement, who then shares the information within the group which may not adequately scrutinize its accuracy. Thereby, arguably it may have a significant effect on the beliefs of that group. This is particularly dangerous as it may specifically affect the most vocal partisans of each side, thereby having a disproportionate effect on public discourse, even if the majority of the population is not as affected by ‘fake news’. Therefore, with a Russian information warfare campaign that was described by the 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Philip Breedlove as ‘the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare’ (Pomerantsev, 2014), there is arguably a legitimate concern over the effect it will have in the minds of the voters and thereby its effect on the future of entire states. Therefore, the Russian ‘information blitzkrieg’ is effectively weaponizing the democracy of democratic states in an effort to weaken them from within. Furthermore, elections have become increasingly displays of ‘political warfare’ in the sense that the country holding the election is effectively fighting a defensive battle against malicious outside forces. Consequently, elections are increasingly becoming times of vulnerability rather than displays of strength and freedom that they once were in democratic countries. The arrests of Russian state-affiliated private military company Wagner mercenaries in Belarus before the local elections (InformNapalm, 2020) is a grim reminder of the new reality facing democracies (albeit Belarus is certainly not a poster child of democracy). The replacement of local Belarussian journalists by pro-Kremlin Russian journalists (The Moscow Times, 2020) as well as the threat of sending Russian police into Belarus (BBC News, 2020a b), highlight the immense pressure Russia is willing to exert if it is able during an election on a state. Thereby almost any country can become a target both physically and digitally during an election, especially if there are protests involved such as in Belarus. This is a depressing reflection of how the international law principle of non-interference codified in the UN Charter Article 2.7 is flagrantly disrespected by Russia in its hybrid warfare campaign. Consequently, it is now more evident than ever that the price of democratic freedom is eternal vigilance, especially during elections.

4 MH17: The Deluge of Disinformation Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping after it, so that when men come to be undeceived, it is too late; the jest is over, and the tale hath had its effect —Jonathan Swift

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On July 17th of 2014, 298 innocent civilians lost their lives in the downing of flight MH17 en-route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. As a tragedy of horrendous proportion, to the extent that it was considered a national crisis in the Netherlands, the incident shook the international community which called for justice. However, unfortunately, the subsequent events became a case study in the information warfare that forms a part of Russia’s hybrid warfare against the West. The shooting down of MH17 was not a murder mystery for the ages, as collaborators of the Russian aggressors celebrated the successful destruction of a Ukrainian AN-26 transport airplane on social media as well as discussing the event on the telephone (Hatch, 2014). Only, it was not a Ukrainian AN-26, it was in fact a civilian Boeing 777-200ER of Malaysia Airlines, and as a result, the Dutch led Joint Investigation Team (JIT) would later conclude, MH17 was shot down in a case of mistaken identity (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019). Social media posts celebrating the shooting were quickly removed from social media to conceal who was responsible for the downing (Hatch, 2014). To make matters worse, as the JIT concluded later on, the fatal missile had been fired from a Russian-made 9M38 BUK surface-to-air missile system (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019), which originated from the Russian 53rd Air Defence Brigade and almost certainly had a Russian army crew (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service 2018). Even if the crew of the BUK was not Russia, it is evident that Russia failed to comply with its obligation to ‘ensure respect’ to the Geneva Conventions under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, as under the ICRC’s current interpretation it includes an obligation to prevent foreseeable violations such as in this case the most obvious possible misuse of an anti-aircraft missile battery (Kajander et al., 2020). The responsible missile system was subsequently hastily removed from the area, with one missile missing (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service n.d.). Shrapnel specific to the missiles of the BUK was recovered from the bodies of the flight crew and the wreckage, sealing a seemingly airtight case regarding what happened to MH17 (Pelley, 2020). However, Russia responded with one of its signature tactics, the ‘data deluge’ method whereby target audiences in Russia, Ukraine, and the West are disorientated by a huge amount of diverse disinformation over various channels to obfuscate the truth. In practice this took the form of a multitude of both Russia’s own mass media and other pro-Russian channels elsewhere disseminating multiple and varied conspiracy theories about the incident. To highlight just how varied the conspiracy theories involved in this deluge of disinformation were, below are examples of the conspiracy theories conveyed during this time (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019): – Ukraine’s president Petro Poroshenko himself ordered the shooting of MH17. – Ukrainian armed forces and/or various members of the ‘fascist’ government of Ukraine shot down MH17, either by a Ukrainian Su-25 or a Ukrainian BUK – Ukraine attempted to shoot down Putin’s plane – NATO was responsible, in an effort to justify a ‘peacekeeping’ mission to Ukraine. – The CIA or the American government was responsible for the downing.

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– The Netherlands orchestrated the downing, possibly to sabotage the 2018 FIFA World Cup. – An Israeli missile shot down MH17. – A paranormal cause such as a ‘hole in time’ caused the downing, similar to the disappearance of MH370 in March 2014. – An unidentified flying object was responsible. – The shooting was organized by groups attempting to get the New World Order to start a third world war. – The victims of MH17 had died already beforehand, implying the plane was loaded with already dead faux victims. – Claiming that ultimately the fault lies with Ukraine for not closing the airspace over Donbass As demonstrated above, the conspiracy theories differ wildly in their contents, from the paranormal to political enemies, however, in each theory Russia is either entirely innocent or even the true victim as the incident is a scheme to justify aggression against Russia. Particularly concerning is that many of the conspiracy theories are admonished by accompanying evidence, either in the form of named witnesses supporting the theory, including even a former Ukrainian member of parliament, or named culprits (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019). Furthermore, in Russia the conspiracy theories originated from a variety of sources, such as newspapers, tv-channels to even the Russian federal information agency, adding to the effect of the deluge as the theories were not limited to obscure website on the Internet, but rather they originated from a multitude of mediums. Consequently, when considering that there has been a systematic effort to bring anti-Western conspiratorial thinking to the core of Russia’s political discourse, which seemingly led to the Russian population being quite susceptible to believing conspiracy theories (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019), it becomes alarmingly clear how effective the ‘data deluge’ is, at least in Russia. As a testament to the efficiency of the ‘data deluge’, research conducted in Russia in 2014 indicated that 82% of Russians blamed Ukrainian forces for the downing of MH17 while only 3% believed that the ‘rebels in Eastern Ukraine’ were responsible (Luhn, 2014). Over time, however, the belief in the conspiracy theories appears to have gone down as based on a 2020 survey, while 60% still agree with the official Moscow line that Ukrainians are to blame, 25% avoided answering which would suggest that doubt is seeping in (Hurenkamp et al., 2020). Therefore, it would appear that while initially effective, the effect of the ‘data deluge’ cannot be maintained over long periods of time, as after the deluge is no longer in effect, the belief in the conspiracy theories or Moscow’s official explanations declines over time. However, in the West where the Russian government does not have the same ‘homefield’ advantage in media coverage, the ‘data deluge’ had to be supported by other means. These include using ‘lobbyists’ to spread disinformation and attempt to discredit the official JIT investigation (NewsParticipation, 2020). As an example, Honorary the Consul General of the Russian Federation in Maastricht, who is a known

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pro-Russian influence in the Netherlands with close business ties to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, furthered the Russian narratives regarding MH17 (NewsParticipation, 2020). More disturbingly the Dutch political party Forum for Democracy (FVD) spread Russia’s narrative in the Netherlands as evidenced by the statements of the party leader Thierry Baudet, who has on multiple occasions disputed the Dutch government’s criticism of Russia over the MH17 downing (Schaart, 2020). Similarly, the non-profit organization ‘The Global Rights of Peaceful People’ was used in an attempt to discredit the JIT investigation as well as spread disinformation (NewsParticipation, 2020). The capacity of Russia to influence the public’s opinions overseas through democratic parties with sympathetic candidates in the West is a cause for concern, knowing how Russia exploited the political instability in Ukraine in 2014 to be able to occupy Crimea and thereby accomplish its own objectives. If Russia’s influence in the political sphere increases in the West, the possibility for Russia to manufacture chaos will similarly increase, which it can potentially exploit for its own purposes. On the Malaysian side, the Malaysian Transport Minister Anthony Locke stated in 2018, therefore long after the JIT had concluded that MH17 was shot down by a BUK, that Russia cannot be accused without convincing evidence (Tsybulenko, 2020). Similarly, the ex-Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad also claimed that a faction with such a high level of military discipline as Russia could not be responsible for the incident (Tsybulenko, 2020). Though such opinions are generally the exception rather than the rule, they serve to demonstrate the disturbing influence Russia has even outside of its borders to influence key democratic figures in order to reinforce its conspiracy theories. Consequently, it is evident that Russia’s hybrid warfare can reach even the highest levels of democratically elected officials. The continuous efforts from Russia to meddle with numerous elections are a cause for additional concern in this context, as a successfully influenced election could mean even further infiltration of democratic governments around the world by Russia. On the International level, Russia used its veto in the UN Security Council to prevent a draft resolution which demanded the creation of an International Tribunal to guarantee justice for MH17 (Tsybulenko, 2020). No other member of the UN Security council voted against the proposal, though three abstained (Tsybulenko, 2020). The UN Security Council vote in itself is a demonstration of absurdity, essentially the suspect of the crime is given the power to prevent an investigation into their own crimes. However, it nevertheless demonstrates how Russia is able to use even respected international institutions to cover up their crimes and prevent their conspiracy theories from being discredited conclusively.

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5 Sowing the Seeds of Discord Someday when the time comes to deliver the final ultimatum, our surrender will be voluntary, because by that time we will have been weakened from within spiritually, morally and economically —Ronald Reagan

A country suffering from internal division and strife is unable to focus on its foreign enemies, thereby making them an easy target for their foreign enemies. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the hybrid warfare strategy of Russia includes encouraging the escalation of internal conflicts within its target states. As a concrete example, black Americans have been the single most targeted group in America by Russian disinformation according to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report in 2019 (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2019). Russia attempted to create divisions already during the 2016 elections, however, the efforts have continued and further intensified during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests and riots (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2019). The disinformation campaign related to Black Lives Matter represents an evolution in the modus operandi of the Russian disinformation campaigns, in the sense that it has been conducted using ‘troll factories’ located outside of Russia’s borders (Ward, 2020). During the 2016 elections in the United States, the St. Petersburg based ‘Internet Research Agency’ was responsible for much of the meddling effort. Consequently, the tracing of the trolling effort back into Russia was not complicated. However, with the ‘troll factories’ discovered by CNN in Ghana, the connection back to Russia is noticeably more difficult to establish conclusively (Ward, 2020). Firstly, in Ghana the compound was rented by a small non-profit organization called Eliminating Barriers for the Liberation of Africa (EBLA) and employed sixteen local citizens (Ward, 2020). A worker who was willing to speak to CNN, claimed that she had no idea she was working as a Russian troll (Ward, 2020). The founder of the non-profit organization, who posed as South African, claimed that he had funded the non-profit organization himself and viewed himself as a person fighting for black people (Ward, 2020). Consequently, on the surface, there is little to connect Russia directly to the disinformation efforts spread by EBLA, as there are no Russian citizens involved and the activity itself was taking place far away from Russia’s borders. Moreover, the EBLA could easily be construed as a genuinely interested party in fighting for the rights of black Americans, thereby giving plausible deniability to the claim that they would be working in the interest of Russia rather than their own. However, upon deeper inspection the links to Russia become more evident, such as that the founder is not South African, but a Ghanaian citizen living in Russia with alleged links to the Russian Internet Research Agency and a Russian oligarch, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is close enough to Vladimir Putin to be called his ‘chef’ (Ward, 2020). Moreover, a local Ghanaian investigation by their Cyber Security Unit claimed that EBLA was engaging in ‘organized radicalism with links to a foreign

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body’ and that the organization itself was receiving its funding from an anonymous source from a European country (Ward, 2020). The compound was abandoned after being raided by local security forces (Ward, 2020), with the trolling effort likely continuing in another facility located potentially anywhere in the world. This development is significant as it highlights the evolution and increased sophistication behind the Russian disinformation campaign, in the sense that it is becoming increasingly difficult to track and trace back to Russia. Considering the success Russia has had with avoiding responsibility for an event they were clearly responsible for, the downing of MH17, by comparison the prospect of Russia ever acknowledging that they were behind the trolling campaigns outsourced around the world seems even more arduous owing to the less conclusive nature of the evidence. Moreover, the disinformation campaign spread by the troll factories such as the Ghanaian EBLA, arguably laid the groundwork or at least contributed to the widespread BLM protests and the following internal unrest in the United States. Consequently, it would seem likely that Russia will continue to pursue such campaigns and continuously develop their methods to make it increasingly difficult to associate such campaigns with Russia, as they are seemingly capable of eventually causing or exacerbating widespread civil unrest in their target countries, as demonstrated by the 2020 BLM protests in the U.S. The contents of the disinformation spread by the Russian disinformation campaign aiming to use existing racial tensions to cause havoc within the United States are equally insidious. On a broad scale, on the one side the social media posts focus on the themes of police brutality against blacks as well as white Americans supposedly being racist against black Americans (Svedkauskas et al., 2020). As a particular example, a tweet read ‘Just experienced blatant #racism in Downton (sic) Huntsville, Alabama… Three of my black male friends were turned away because they were “out of dress code”’ (Ward, 2020). This type of anecdotal ‘evidence’ is effective as it plays well into the framework of the confirmation bias of individuals and the potentially false belief that they are not susceptible to ‘fake news’, provided the individual believes that black Americans are subject to racial discrimination, especially in that area. If that is true, the tweet may be shared in highly homophilous groups where it is accepted and treated as the truth. Further adding to the insidious efficiency of such anecdotal tweets is the difficulty in disproving them quickly. The anecdote does not provide a specific time or place, besides ‘Downton (sic)’ Huntsville Alabama, which is a city of 200,000 people with arguably numerous possible locations where the supposed incident could have happened. Consequently, it is not viable to begin investigating if the incident happened or not, with the available information. Secondly, the anecdote is emotionally evocative as it relates to unjust racial discrimination, thereby anyone questioning the validity of the incident is at risk of being called ‘racist’ themselves, as they are seemingly unsupportive of the struggle of blacks against racism in the United States. Moreover, almost any anecdote is defendable with the simple retort of ‘You were not there’ or some variations of the same argument, which while not an effective argument in a court of law or academia, is effective especially in connection to emotionally charged situations. For, the anecdote’s opposer, provided the anecdote

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is not implausible by its nature, will appear unsympathetic and they may be perceived as ‘tormenting’ or ‘re-victimizing’ the person who is the ‘victim’ in the anecdote they share. As a result, especially if the anecdote is plausible and plays into the existing biases of the reader, it is likely to be accepted unless there is immediately contradicting evidence readily available, however, from the disinformation point of view, the key is obviously to create plausible yet generic ‘anecdotes’. Thus, Jonathan Swift’s statement of the falsehood flying while the truth hobbles far behind is especially true of spreading faux experiences and anecdotes on social media, as individual anecdotes can be incredibly laborious to discredit. Therefore, in essence, they may practically only be discredited after the ‘troll factory’ that produced the tweet has been identified and the account conclusively linked to it. This latter process is likely to take considerable time, during which the anecdote has already had its ‘jest’ and influenced the opinions of the audience it reached, if they were susceptible to believe it in the first place. However, the Russian disinformation campaign also focuses on the perceived ‘opposing forces’ of, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement, such as those organizations which support law enforcement and oppose the BLM calls for defunding the police (Aceves, 2019). As an example of this already in 2016, the Internet Research agency used a Facebook advertisement titled ‘Back the Badge’ supporting law enforcement in the face of BLM, which cost around 1800 dollars (Aceves, 2019). Whilst stoking both sides of the fire, the Russian campaign has been successful in literally facing off opposing groups in real life, as evidenced by the ‘Stop Islamization of Texas’ and the ‘Save Islamic Knowledge’ events being scheduled in the same place and time in 2016 (O’Sullivan, 2018). In both cases, fake Facebook groups were created in support of each side, with the ‘Heart of Texas’ for the former event and the ‘United Muslims of America’ for the latter. The Texas example is a concerning testament to the capacity of Russian disinformation to organize protests with the protestors themselves being completely oblivious to the fact that they are being ‘useful idiots’ for a foreign state. Furthermore, in the Texas case the truth was only discovered afterwards, by which time the event had already been held, confirming Jonathan Swift’s statement about the truth always lagging behind. The situation regarding Russian agitation of civil and political unrest is equally concerning from the point of view of a democratic state, as the right to protest is essential to the proper functioning of democracy. Consequently, as with the case of using censorship to ‘fight’ fake news the ‘moderation’ of acceptable protest causes by government institutions would go against the principles of a free democracy. Therefore, it would be unwise to use the ‘manufactured’ protest events as a justification for tighter controls on who is allowed to protest in a democracy, as that would unwittingly give more successes and ammunition to Russia’s war on democracies.

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6 Fighting Back The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance —John Philpot Curran

The first step in fighting Russia’s hybrid warfare against the Democratic world is arguably to both recognize and take seriously the fact that such a war exists. For though mainly fought through ‘bloodless’ means such as disinformation and corruption outside of Ukraine, Russia’s hybrid war nevertheless has casualties as demonstrated by the assassinations of former Chechen freedom fighters, Kadyrov and Putin critics in Europe (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2020) and the Novichok poisoning of Sergei Skripal as well as the Polonium poisoning of Litvinenko (Corera, 2020). Therefore, it would be a misconception to consider that Russia’s campaign of hybrid warfare against the West is ‘peaceful’, and therefore to be dismissive of its importance. As with any problem, it must first be acknowledged before it can be solved or be faced with increasingly escalating actions by Russia such as the coup d’état attempt in Montenegro (Walker, 2020) or the offering of payments to the Taliban for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan (Savage et al., 2020). Though seemingly an obvious step, for example, in the EU, the issue is not taken nearly as seriously as it should be. As a concrete example is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Germany and Russia, which will add to the 40% of gas that Russia already supplies to the EU as well as increasing the EU’s dependence on Russia for its energy (BBC News, 2019). The decision to have such a pipeline rightfully raised criticism from the United States and the Ukraine, as it represents both a willingness to continue to financially support the regime in Russia as well as become increasingly energy dependent on Russia. If the continued and systematic Russian hybrid warfare effort towards the EU would truly be recognized, it would logically be inconceivable to increase the dependence on what is essential, the enemy. Consequently, it can be stated that the problem of Russia’s sustained hybrid warfare efforts against the EU are not properly recognized and treated with the appropriate severity (Goble, 2019a, b). Besides continuing to fund and prop up the undemocratic regime in Russia, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline will additionally make it easier for Russia to justify an increased presence in the Baltic Sea as well as further isolate Ukraine in terms of energy (Goble, 2019a, b). Therefore, as long as the targets of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign continue to give funds to their enemy and refuse to recognize the situation, it is likely that the Russian hybrid warfare efforts will not only become bolder but additionally more sophisticated due to growing funding. Naturally, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not the only instrument of influence that Russia is using to influence European states that ought to be re-assessed in the light of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign against them. Besides the so-called ‘energy lever’, Russia maintains contacts at a high level as can be seen through Vladimir Putin’s ability to personally promote his policies to top European leaders, such as when Putin alleged that Russian journalists were persecuted in Ukraine, which the

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German Chancellor Merkel agreed to raise with the president of Ukraine (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Similarly, Russia uses business and economic ties to pressure and blackmail various European states as exemplified through the Russia ‘counter’sanctions on food imports from the EU (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Consequently, it is time for the EU as a whole to begin re-evaluating its relationship with Russia on every level, for it is not a prudent strategy to keep financially supporting one’s enemies. After this crucial first step has been taken, the effort towards countering Russia’s hybrid warfare will become significantly simpler. Furthermore, the means and methods employed by Russia in its hybrid warfare campaign are out on display in Ukraine, which is the current focus for Russia (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Consequently, when the situation in Ukraine is given appropriate attention and study, it will increasingly be possible to not only counter Russia’s hybrid warfare efforts, but also to begin predicting and attempting to prevent them in the future. While the Russian hybrid campaign against European states as a whole is arguably not treated seriously enough, there are nonetheless several exemplary successes with various methods that have been able to counter attempted Russian influences. In the fight against Russian disinformation on social media as well as mass media, France, for example, has launched the Decodex project which aims to use a large database for fact-checking and thereby identify inaccurate or manipulative information (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Similarly, in Italy, the newspaper La Stampa published its own investigation on the use of Twitter accounts in Italy during the 2016 referendum, which prompted an Italian court proceeding into the suspected Russian influence (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Furthermore, numerous non-governmental organizations consisting of volunteers have been established all around Europe and the world to counter Russian disinformation by means of fact-checking, arguably the most famous of these being the Ukrainian Stopfake (Stopfake n.d.). Stopfake was created in March 2014 as a response to the Russian aggression and the blatant disregard of journalistic practice by the Russian media (Haigh et al., 2017). Stopfake is not alone in this regard as the Ukrainian InformNapalm, which describes itself as an international volunteer community aimed at debunking the lies and revealing the secrets of Russia’s hybrid war, was also created as a direct response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine (InformNapalm n.d.). However, the events had a similar impact in the Baltics where an ‘online army’ of ‘elves’ joined the fight against Russian disinformation (Deutsche Welle, 2017), as well as the Estonian Propastop which functions as a blog aimed at countering disinformation similar to StopFake (PropaStop, 2017). Consequently, the Russian aggression in 2014 has had a profound effect on numerous citizens of democratic states targeted by Russia’s hybrid warfare which inspired them to dedicate time and effort on a voluntary basis to counter Russia’s information warfare advances. These types of volunteer grassroot initiatives play an important part in the fight against Russian disinformation as they are private in nature and therefore not restricted by state-level political reluctance to antagonize Russia.

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The expulsion of diplomats, which is a legal countermeasure usually perceived as a symbolic gesture to signal disapproval or a decline in relations between states, has arguably additionally been used successfully as a practical measure to reduce Russian interference in the internal affairs of a country. The prime example of the expulsion of diplomats reducing Russian influence on a practical level is the case of the two Russian diplomats who were accused of attempting to bribe Greek government and church officials (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Arguably, similar expulsion measures could be extended to produce similar results by not only expelling diplomats, but also ‘businessmen’ and other similar Russian agents who engage in subversive behaviour or otherwise threaten the national security in various countries around the world. As a further example, Finland had a rude awakening on Russian individuals and companies buying land in strategic locations from a military point of view (Malin, 2016), which resulted in the passing of a law that requires non-EU/ETA land buyers to obtain a license for the purchasing of land in Finland (Finlex, 2019). Consequently, the denying of suspicious business transactions as well as expelling Russian agents are both viable means in reducing Russian influence on a society. Taylor Caldwell wrote that a state can survive its fools but not treason from within which moves within its gates freely and whispers among halls of government (Caldwell, 2017). Therefore, uncovering traitors from within each state is a priority in the fight against undue Russian influence. On this front, the efforts of the Hungarian prosecutor’s office stand out, when they uncovered that Bela Kovacs, a Member of the European Parliament was in fact working for Russian intelligence (Tsybulenko & Teperik, 2019). Which both proves the insidious nature of Russian infiltration as well as that no level of governance is exempt from that threat. Similarly, the Polish Internal Security Agency has uncovered numerous individuals engaged in espionage for Russia, such as Marek W. (name withheld) who worked for the Ministry of Energy (Zaryn, 2019). Similarly, and on a much higher profile, Mateusz Piskorski, leader of the proRussian political party Change, was arrested on suspicion of espionage and cooperation with Russia (Zaryn, 2019). These types of internal investigations into potential Russian influence and their agents are key in countering the hybrid offensive by Russia, as they will prevent the democratic system of the state from becoming a mockery of the true will of the people, as otherwise it may become more of a representation of Russia’s will. Consequently, as John Curran stated, the price of freedom is eternal vigilance, for the Russian hybrid warfare campaign is but the latest threat against democratic states which must forever remain vigilant against undue influences seeking to corrupt them from within. For it should never be forgotten that freedom is in fact, not free.

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Information aggression—A Battlefield of Smartphones Katrin Nyman Metcalf

1 Introduction Information—primarily digital—is an increasingly important commodity in the modern world of cyberspace. This is no longer a new phenomenon. Although the history of Internet goes back to (at least) 1969, the World Wide Web—which meant access to different contents in an easy way and is what many of us think of when talking about Internet—began in 1991 and became more accessible from 1993, when browser systems were made freely available.1 Warfare has historically often included a battle of information in addition to the physical fighting—all sides trying to justify their cause and muster support in different ways. The status of information in presentday society, however, lifts information warfare from a supporting role to a leading position. The number of electronic services with fluid lines between public and private, between professional and amateur, coupled furthermore with the absence of physical borders and a 24-hour news cycle provide ample opportunities for virtual ‘attacks’. An even more significant development as far as the general access to cyberspace is concerned came with the spread of the smartphone some 20 years later. Depending on what criteria to use as milestones, there could be many different dates and years stated for when use of Internet and cyberspace became common or popular, but the current article does not need exactitude on this matter. Suffice to say that Internet has been around in the lives of ‘ordinary people’ for more than 25 years. The exact history of the smartphone (or any phone with Internet access capabilities) can equally 1

For further information, please see ‘20 years ago today, the World Wide Web opened to the public’. https://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/06/20-years-ago-today-the-world-wide-web-openedto-the-public/ (13/07/2020).

K. N. Metcalf (B) Department of Law, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_10

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be described in different ways, with some such phones in existence in the 1990s but the common use of them starting in the late 00s/early 2010s.2 When smartphones started conquering the world, it meant that Internet really did become something for everyone—even people with limited economic means, low education and so on. This device democratised information and made everyone (almost) a participant in the brave new world of information. Furthermore, people started creating more information by carrying with them a device that could monitor and record in different ways. The smartphone has become an indispensable part of daily life for many people (Franklin, 2019, 6). With a mass of information literally at everyone’s fingertips, there is a powerful temptation to explore any potential benefit of such a situation for ill or for good reasons. Completely new ways to invade privacy arise when people track and share their movements and activities most of the time. The ancient tool of propaganda takes on a new importance when it is possible to reach people constantly and in their most private sphere. This book contains chapters that look at many different aspects of information warfare perpetrated by the Russian Federation. There is a widespread agreement that Russia under Putin has lifted propaganda to new levels—or perhaps back to Soviet levels but with the ubiquity of modern means of communication in addition. The Russian leadership has been explicit for more than a decade about how they see any norm-setting actions undertaken in the area of the former Soviet Union or its sphere of influence that it has not been consulted on and which it objects to, as hostile acts against Russia (Jonsson, 2011, 448). Although certain principles have developed and some rules on cyber warfare have been drafted (even if often non-binding, like the Tallinn Manual), there is as of yet no unanimity on how to use the terminology of war in the cyberworld, specifically in the informational context. Academics as well as military and civilian professionals discuss the nature of cyberattacks: what these are, when does something amount to an attack, how does international law apply and what measures to prevent them are allowed? (see Ziolkowski, 2014). Cyberspace is used for managing non-cyber tools (vehicles, electricity grids, etc.), providing opportunities to attack ‘the real world’ via cyberattacks. Attacks may target the information space as such (communications, data) or instead the role of Internet as a transmission network, using the cyberattack as a conduit to ‘real-world’ aggression. In this chapter, we look at the former aspect: aggression via information, attacks on the minds of people and on their privacy—specifically through the portal of the most widespread devices, the mobile phone. We do not go into a detailed discussion on terminology but permit ourselves a popular usage of the term ‘aggression’ as denoting a hostile act, without any ambitions of contributing to the discussion on levels and types of behaviour in the context of humanitarian law. In this chapter, we will discuss the reasons a specific technology such as the smartphone has importance for the question of cybersecurity. The question of what information aggression means is elaborated upon, specifically mentioning the phenomenon of trolling and looking particularly at the situation in the Russian 2

For further information, please see ‘History of mobile phones’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/His tory_of_mobile_phones (13/07/2020).

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context. Finally, we propose some ways to deal with risks—although it may be mentioned already here that there are more questions than answers related to the topic under discussion.

2 Why the Smartphone Matters The ubiquity of smartphones has brought Internet to new groups of people and even to new countries—in the sense that countries where only a small number of elites have access to computers and where Internet in its earlier decades remained marginal as far as influence on the population as a whole was concerned are now part of the internet age. Susskind points out that more people have access to Internet than have access to justice (Susskind, 2019). As access to Internet keeps spreading, access to justice unfortunately does not spread with the same speed. Attacks on the information sphere can take many forms. The potential aggression may be found in new ways to use propaganda as well as by using mobile devices as the avenues through which to perpetrate other attacks. The significance of the mobile devices like smartphones lies both in the fact that people consume information constantly, in all kinds of situations, but also that the devices permit new products and services that create information, which can be used as portals for information aggression of many different kinds. We know about fitness tracking devices or applications (apps) having been used to pinpoint supposedly secret locations of military units and computer games being designed to steal personal data. By combining data, like what apps people have on their phones, research has shown that personal characteristics can be accurately traced (NATO StratCom COE, 2019a, 10). Such information can be used to design the best way to target an individual. Gaming and other activities in which people create a persona give other clues about who they are, which can be exploited in direct or indirect ways (Barker, 2016, 63). For example, the United States Army has used the online game streaming site Twitch to entice recruits, by allegedly creating links to fake giveaway gaming products that took users to Army recruitment pages, although the use was paused for review in July 2020 due to ethical and legal questions having been raised (Hern, 2020). Aggression via information can be conducted in the way that people are made to support specific views and hold opinions against someone, possibly thus laying the groundwork for potential physical action. Since the advent and spread of smartphones, messages from a wide variety of sources reach people in what used to be the private sphere. Often the message is supported by twisted or false information, ‘fake news’, or supported by propaganda, which can be false or true albeit subjective information. Spreading certain information may be the aim or a means to another end. Burri refers to something called ‘accusation in a mirror’ in the context of Russian media in Eastern Ukraine. This is a method of incitement that includes media (social or regular) giving warning of imminent attacks, telling people to prepare themselves and through this encouraging them to commit violent acts, which will be shaped as justified self-defence (Burri, 2015, 180). This type of incitement was highlighted

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by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic case.3 Incitement may be seen as an ultimate aim of propaganda but in some contexts, propaganda is limited to the desire to change people’s views as a goal in itself. The smartphone has meant that views can be influenced by a constant barrage of information, targeted directly at the individual. Despite the term ‘propaganda’ having been analysed in legal contexts for a long time, it remains value-laden and hard to define in a strict sense.4 In 1934, Lasswell defined propaganda as the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations, in the form of spoken or written words, pictures, films or any other form (Laswell, 1934/1995, 13). Oxford Dictionary proposes: ‘information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view’5 —thus even correct information, depending on the context and way in which it is used. Now, via the smartphone, such messages can come very directly to the individuals, at any time and place. Using social media to spread a message adds a useful dimension for those wishing to spread misinformation. This dimension can be found in the name itself—‘social’ media, media that is spread by people’s own social circle, that is, something more than just abstract news. It may be a news story, but it is something your social group has found to be relevant, so you are likely to notice it more than just any story. You may also trust it more, as it was something suggested by people you know. This is one of the explanations of the attractiveness of trolling—creating social media profiles that look like real people but that are creations specifically for the purpose of spreading certain messages, often propaganda and fake news. The messages will come to an end user from ‘ordinary people’: yes, you may not personally know the person who first posted something, but it is probably a friend of a friend and thus someone whose opinion is interesting, especially as they appear to share your general outlook on the world by being in the same public groups or following the same sites. We will discuss some specific examples below. Smartphones have meant that people can access social media more or less constantly. The smartphone (or Internet as such) and the many ways it offers to communicate extensively have led some commentators to talk about the end of the ‘Gutenberg parenthesis’,6 in which the non-personalised, mass-produced media dominated over gossip in a closed circle. The village may now be global, but we see how polarisation 3

Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY 7 May 1997. International human rights conventions do not contain a definition of propaganda although some provisions deal with aspects of it. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) deals with propaganda for war in the same Article as the ban on incitement. However, the first paragraph of the Article that deals with propaganda only mentions propaganda for war. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 51, considers propaganda in a limited context by including a ban on an Occupying Power to compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces and makes it illegal to exercise pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment. 5 Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/ (20/07/2020). 6 The term is used widely to denote a return to ways and means of communicating that were common before the printing press was invented. The exact way in which the term is used varies depending on context. Mostly its first use is attributed to Lars Ove Sauerberg (2009) and the research 4

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means that instead of people having access to a multitude of different views—which would be easily accessible if we wanted them—it is more common to stick even more firmly in your tailor-made information bubble. When authoritative, properly checked information from a limited number of controlled sources is no longer the norm, it becomes easier to plant propagandistic content. This is especially useful to exacerbate prejudices that people already have, which is why it is often employed in a step-by-step manner by those who excel in this kind of misinformation—like the Russian government.

3 Information as Aggression? If information can be seen as a way to conduct aggression, we are faced with the dilemma of how to be able to take reasonable measures to counter such conduct while it has been established by courts around the world that freedom of expression extends to all kinds of information, including content that is useless, negative, annoying and even hostile (to a certain level).7 There is no ‘quality control’ allowed of the content of communications from the side of authorities, but prohibitions of certain content should be the exception if a country respects freedom of expression, and based on clear and proportional reasons, set out in law. Countries like Russia, which do not respect freedom of expression in their own country, are quite ready to abuse it elsewhere where it does exist. A strong protection of freedom of expression makes such abuse easier. It is hardly surprising that there is a temptation even in democracies to ban communications that try to subvert democracy, as we see with recent ‘fake news’ legislation for example. However, such temptations should be resisted. Sacrificing freedom of expression in what should be a fight for freedom and democracy would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed. However difficult it may seem, if to stay on the moral high ground, one cannot do the same as those one opposes. If the attacks on, or via, information amount to actual aggression, the situation may be different. As mentioned, the ways to apply terminology of humanitarian law (‘the laws of war’) to cyberspace, in general, or information, in particular, are contentious. Principles may crystallise with time, unless new technologies provide new dilemmas that we cannot imagine yet, but in the meantime, it may be more practical to look as an analogy to the more mundane world of communication—specifically broadcasting—regulation. In the absence of specific rules, legal systems traditionally seek inspiration from analogous areas. Thus, related to broadcasting we will find the kind of prohibitions on incitement to hatred and violence as well as principles for distinguishing between facts and opinions, stating that value judgements should be project ‘The Gutenberg parenthesis—print, book and cognition’ at the University of Southern Denmark, https://www.sdu.dk/en/om_sdu/institutter_centre/ikv/forskning/forskningsprojekter/gut enberg_projekt (20/07/2020). 7 On the inclusion of unnecessary and nuisance speech in protected expressions, Handyside v. UK (European Court of Human Rights), Application 5493/72, decided 1976.

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presented as such and only in such case is there no need to present evidence in favour of them that are lacking for the Internet—or smartphone—world.8 Shocking speech is protected if it does not pass the threshold to incitement to violence.9 For political or other societal debate, whatever its form, there should be especially strong protection against any interference or prohibitions (Dommering, 2008, 51). In claiming that it is a useful approach to look at existing communications regulation, we are not trying to say that the interpretation and application of such rules on information aggression is easy in practice. Nevertheless, in these contexts, there is a framework for dealing with the issues which is more practical and approachable than attempting global-level determinations on the meaning of aggression or definition of propaganda. As definitions of propaganda tend to stress that it refers ‘especially’ to biased or misleading information10 we can see that the phenomenon is defined by the effects it strives for more than its form. Social media provides new ways to reach an effect. The paramount role that various kinds of communication have in modern lives means that possibilities to influence are widespread and the interest in finding ways to use them is consequently greater. Historically, the role of information as a tool in disputes and conflicts was more ambiguous. For example, in the First World War, it was only during the war and in an ad hoc manner that politicians became aware of the importance of information and the need to influence public opinion (Haste, 1977/1995, 105). At the same time, the desire to stop nationalistic propaganda was part of the ultimatum to Serbia that to a large extent was behind the start of the hostilities leading to the First World War (Richter, 2015, 489). Regarding the Second World War, the Soviet judge at Nuremberg, Nikitchenko, stated that dissemination of ‘provocative lies and the systematic deception of public opinion’ was as necessary for the Germans as arms and military plans (Burri, 2015, 266). The Vietnam War is often mentioned as the first war in which creating and spreading a narrative of success was seen as an essential goal (Altheide & Johnson, 1980/1995, 300). Today, the battle via spreading information is a key component of any conflict. In addition, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sphere offers ample opportunities for achieving various kinds of effects via communication— the above-mentioned use of propaganda to provoke anticipatory self-defence, or a direct effect on the non-cyber world by manipulating all the things we do by smartphone. The Russian aggression on Ukraine provides examples of activities ranging from limiting or blocking information to cyberattacks on infrastructure in Ukraine.11 Meanwhile, Russian media plays a central role as a traditional propaganda machine to justify aggression, weaken opponents and influence international opinion.

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Lingens v. Austria (European Court on Human Rights), Application no. 9815/82, decided 1986. Gündüz v. Turkey (European Court on Human Rights), Application 35071/97, decided 2004. 10 Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/ (20/07/2020). 11 News reports have been reported on cyberattacks against Ukrainian media but also against electricity systems, allegedly with the same malware. See P. Paganini ‘Hackers cause power outage with malware in Ukraine. Is it an Information warfare act?’ https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/43321/ hacking/ukraine-attack-caused-power-outage.html. 9

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Multiple communication channels are used to achieve the general result of harming the adversary—often in a clandestine and ‘plausibly deniable’ manner. Another angle of using information as aggression is to attack the privacy of people, in order for them to be tricked, coerced, blackmailed or, otherwise manipulated into revealing things that are useful for a hostile state. There can be proper, ‘old fashioned’ blackmail because of embarrassing pictures or videos that are stolen from private accounts, but this will be a marginal feature (even if important enough for those it affects) compared with the kind of everyday manipulation that the cyberworld makes possible and that those targeted may not even know about or understand.

4 There is a Troll in My Pocket As we have underlined, propaganda is nothing new. What is new, is that it can reach you at any time, in any place and be spread by your friends and family. When this author was growing up in Scandinavia in the 1960s and 70s, trolls used to be strange— good or bad—creatures lurking in the forest, encountered in fairy tales! The trolls of the twenty-first century are rather more sinister as well as closer to home. The attraction of trolling is easy to see, as this is a way to overcome a lot of the natural protection against propaganda, which is to be found in the way we react to different sources of information in different ways. For classical propaganda to be effective, it was necessary to somehow convince people of the reliability of the source, by trying to mask it as something it was not or by first undertaking efforts to create credibility for a specific source. This is especially difficult in a situation where the relations between countries are not good and people may have a fair amount of scepticism against messages from a certain source. To mention another personal reference, when this author no longer believed in fairy tales of trolls, she also did not believe in the Soviet media stories sent to Baltic exiles to convince us that the Baltic States had never been forcibly occupied by the Soviet Union. However, the modern troll will look like a friend (or perhaps a friend of a friend) on Facebook or a cool person to follow on Instagram, against whom there is no reticence or suspicion, which makes it more likely that even discerning persons are less vary. For our reaction to a message, it is very important who the transmitter is or who we think it is. Sometimes just by knowing the source of information is enough for it to lose the effect of propaganda or incitement. Being aware of the source may also mean that the audience will assume that expressions are opinions, contributions to a debate and not facts. This is why it is so interesting to troll: to make material originating from one source (a state, Russia in our examples) look like it comes from a friend or a trusted organisation like an NGO or a Facebook group. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in its report on trolling on the Russian social network VK found that only 14% of messages regarding NATO in the Baltic States and Poland were from genuine people—the rest came from a selection of trolls, fictitious bloggers and other forms of fake news. However, the same study found that about 80% of those who shared stories from a fictitious Finnish

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blogger were real people. This is a good illustration of why it is so difficult to unmask the fake news: imagine when the reshared story is shared again by the friends and friends-of-friends of those who read it from the ‘Finnish blogger’ (NATO StratCom COE, 2019b: 2). It is not surprising that someone who reads it will be convinced that it comes from a real person, as there will indeed be several levels of real, known people to point to. Even if the VK network may be less credible, as it undertakes less efforts to counter fake accounts than, for example, Facebook, the study can still be assumed to show a trend of something that per definition will be difficult to determine with certainty. The VK network is important among Russian speakers not just in Russia but in many parts of the former Soviet area, which makes it a very interesting propaganda tool for the Russian government if the aim is to sow disaccord among ethnically and linguistically mixed populations in, for example, the Baltic States or Ukraine. Russian trolling networks are sophisticated and take a long-term view (LangeIonatamishvili & Svetoka, 2015). Examples of this can be seen starkly in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea. In addition to propagandistic messaging in traditional media before and during the occupation, activities to shape the message in social media also began even before the conflicts on the ground broke out. A trolling network was created, and significant online presence ensured (Lange-Ionatamishvili & Svetoka, 2015, 110) to make sure the Russian version of the story would be the dominant one (Wirtz, 2015, 36; Lange-Ionatamishvili & Svetoka, 2015, 106). Specifically, authors state that the term Novorossiya (meaning New Russia and clearly indicating the Russian nature of the areas) was launched well before any announcement about such a new name for the occupied territories (Levin Jaitner, 2015, 92). It may appear like quite a small detail in the broader context of things, but such small steps in the view of this author can cement a propaganda message.

5 Banning as the Easy Way Out? There is no shortage of examples of authorities in different countries turning to prohibitions as the apparently easy way to deal with undesirable content. Specific rules for social media and/or for smartphones are rare, but examples abound in the information sphere. Recent examples concerning Russian media content can be found from all three Baltic States. These measures were subject of criticism by the international organisation Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in a statement on 10 July 2020. From a freedom of expression viewpoints, considerations are not linked to the form of media (Internet or traditional) but aim at worrying trends to impose excessive restrictions. The object of the criticism was a decision on 6 July 2020 by the Latvian media regulator, the National Electronic Mass Media Council of Latvia (NEPLP) to ban the broadcasting of seven Russia Today (RT) channels, giving as grounds that the decision was an implementation of the sanctions that the EU had imposed several years earlier

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on Dmitrii Kiselev, who allegedly controls RT.12 Lithuania announced on 8 July that its regulator would ban the broadcasting of five RT channels. In its statement, Reporters Without Borders furthermore mentions a situation in Estonia in December 2019, where it was alleged that abusive threatening of prosecution of employees of the news agency Sputnik, which belongs to the news agency Rossiya Segodnya, also controlled by Mr Kiselev, led to closure of Sputnik. Reporters Without Borders states that while it is legitimate to defend and promote independent and reliable news reporting ‘regardless of the aggressiveness of Russian propaganda in Europe, EU sanctions are not a legitimate or appropriate tool for combating it’. They claim that the decisions were taken on ‘a flimsy legal basis’ and that instead countries can require media to guarantee editorial independence and impose legitimate sanctions, subject to judicial control, for non-compliance. Specifically, RSF (2020) claims that if the same requirements are imposed on media outlets regardless of their country of origin, this avoids retaliatory measures and information wars. RSF in its critical statement on the measures of Baltic media regulators mentions that Latvia is ranked 22 out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2020 World Press Freedom Index, while Lithuania is on place 28 and Estonia on place 14. They do not mention in their statement that Russia is at place 149 of 180. The media content in question was of the traditional, broadcasting kind, but the reason for this is partly to be found in the difficulty to find tools for dealing with purely online content rather than any claim that broadcasting content is more important than online content. The difference is only that there is an established system to deal with the former. This can have strange consequences like how fairly unknown, small TV or radio stations may be given a sanction for a programme that most likely very few people have noticed while the same content may be accessed online thousands of times, without any sanction. Actions against traditional media are, however, not only desperate attempts to at least do something, even if less effective. The lines between different outlets of media content are getting more and more blurred, with TV stations having online content that may have a much larger audience than the traditional broadcast content and that lives on the reputation and resources of the broadcaster to attract audience. This kind of connection is especially important in the context of ‘fake news’. People will decide what to believe and what not based on where the information comes from (or is perceived to come from). The media landscape in many countries has become polarised in recent years, at the same time as the number of media outlets has grown. There are few countries in the world where just one or a few broadcasters exists and provide everyone with the same news. Mostly, people can select the outlet and make such a selection based on their preference, influenced by the reputation of the media channel but also increasingly on whether the channel will support the views of the person. The brand of a content provider is important, so, for example, the version of history (for example, regarding whether the Baltic States were occupied 12

Latvia has earlier come under criticism from the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media for closing a Russian news website https://www.osce.org/fom/230866. As often is the case with online media, the site moved to another jurisdiction and continued operating.

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by or voluntarily joined the Soviet Union) or current events that is promoted by RT will reach many more people than those tuning into the broadcasts. Given the importance of apps for smartphones, it is not surprising that direct action against these is also taken for political reasons. A recent example is found in the prohibition in India of popular apps from China, which according to many commentators was due to the tension between the two countries linked to a border dispute among other things, rather than to any content problem of the apps (The Economic Times, 2020). Prohibition appears as an easy way out for authorities. Unfortunately, there is little reason to think that such bans are unique. Instead, governments will most likely continue to apply restrictions on apps in different contexts to signal displeasure for one or other reason—in many cases, a reason that is not directly linked to what it is that is banned. Such bans on apps may be more problematic than broadcasting content limitations or prohibitions, as there is a settled legal and institutional framework for the latter. Legislation and licences give the mandate to the relevant organisations to take decisions regarding broadcasting content. In countries with freedom of expression and a free media, such decisions should only limit or prohibit content in cases where it clearly violates law and there is no public interest that supports the spreading of the content. Possible sanctions for unsuitable or illegal content should be proportional and applied in a gradual manner, starting with warnings and only in exceptional cases leading to closure of broadcasters (or the equivalent for other media).13 The control can only ever be made after the content has been aired, as prior control is censorship, which is prohibited in rule of law societies with freedom of expression. However, even if freedom of expression has strong protection, most countries criminalise incitement to hatred and violence and there may be additional provisions on hate speech dealt with by media regulatory authorities (Burri, 2015, 172).14 Thus, some tools do exist against harmful content of the kind that tries to invigilate the population on the instigation of a foreign power, even if their proportional as well as effective application is anything but easy in practice. One tool for combating negative occurrences using mobile telephones, not just smartphones, is the compulsory registration of SIM cards. This is used in a number of countries and is seen to facilitate law enforcement as non-registered phones are clearly attractive to criminals, terrorists and others who want to remain untraceable in an era where it is very easy to track movements via SIM-card tracking. Such prohibition on communicating while staying anonymous prevents this for legitimate purposes as well, so a clear weighing of the possible reasons for and against such rules must be made, keeping in mind the proportionality of the measure. Provided there is legislation on data protection in place so that people are not tracked excessively, it is not necessarily against human rights principles to prevent anonymous SIM cards, 13

Cases (from the European Court on Human Rights) include Jersild v. Denmark, Application No. 15890/89, decided in 1994; Purcell et. al. v. Ireland, Application No. 15404/89, decided in 1991 and Brind v. UK, Application 18714/91, decided in 1994. 14 Burri makes the distinction that hate speech is prohibited but not criminalised under international criminal law.

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but there is nevertheless a risk that the weighing of reasons is not done seriously enough but the facilitation for law enforcement is automatically seen as a sufficient reason.

6 Freedom or Security? When putting freedom of expression in a broader context, we see that it is not just a question of restricting bans on content—having no censorship—but it also includes the right of people to be able to express themselves and receive the expressions of others (Ramsay, 2012, 33). The right cannot be interpreted as a right for everyone to use any means of expressing themselves that they chose. We can see in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights how the legitimate rules on licensing of broadcasters are explicitly mentioned as a limitation which is not seen as a restriction of the fundamental right. Such limitations traditionally were motivated by the scarcity of the frequency spectrum, which with new technologies may become gradually less important (even if until now, this is not the case as there are also many new users of the spectrum due to new technologies), but which may be replaced by other technical or natural limitations. There may also be practical reasons—regardless of technology— to not interpret freedom of expression so that everyone can always express themselves in any way they like: for example, it is quite legitimate to remove a person who starts shouting during a concert. Sometimes law indeed allows for common sense! The question of right to access to means of communication becomes more complicated in the context of whether it is legitimate to ban or limit a specific way to communicate, a specific technology or application of technology. The wider the ban, the more we can assume that it is not legitimate. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for countries to shut down Internet in crisis situations, which is disproportional and can be counterproductive as Internet is such an important means of communication, information and conducting private and public business, that its limitation may prolong the crisis. Another approach, which is somewhat more targeted but still far wider than a restriction on communication should be is to prohibit content platforms. The most famous example is probably the bans on Facebook and Google in China but ad hoc such decisions have also been taken, like against YouTube in Turkey. The mentioned Indian ban on Chinese apps resembles this, even if its justification was less focused on content as such and more on a general apprehension—in that respect similar to the Chinese approach to Facebook and Google. Authors have called censorship a form of negative propaganda, which means that a false impression of reality is created through preventing access to information (Haste, 1977, 114).15 Russia practices a less strict form of censorship of social media than China, but as discussed in other parts of this book, this does not mean a free information space. 15

She mentions how even weather reports were banned as they could be useful for the enemy and chess problems (unless sent by perfectly reliable British nationals) as they could be hidden code, ibid. p. 116.

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With apps on mobile phones being important for many things, in order for any restriction to be legitimate, it should pass a very strict test on whether it is in proportion to what the negative consequences of the app could be. New ways to communicate mean that freedom of expression can be exercised in new ways too. There is already precedent on that liking Facebook pages is protected as an exercise of freedom of expression.16

7 So, Is There Nothing We Can Do? It is quite easy when going through the different obstacles to effective rulemaking and enforcement for our very personal use of cyberspace to conclude that there is nothing to do about fake news, information aggression and invasions of privacy. Indeed, if looking for easy solutions, it is best to accept that it is highly unlikely that they can be found. It is not probable that one type of action or one tool could deal with the various risks and threats that exist. This does not mean that there are no measures available to take, but it must be accepted that the actions will be piecemeal and inconclusive. A common mistake when looking for solutions to cyberproblems is to exaggerate the extent to which the cyberaspect means that ‘old’ solutions are not suitable, often instead looking for technical solutions. There are instances where technology can indeed help and presumably there will be more such situations as technology advances, as now there is considerable understanding of the importance of security aspects of, for example, apps. More and more forms of security are built in through protection against hacking, and the need to approve privacy settings or create strong passwords (Franklin, 2019). This does not work against all threats and not all actions and tools that can be used are new, but existing rules and precedents can be relevant. In any event, we should look at the matter as a patchwork (with shifting patterns), containing elements of law and technology. The technical features of devices will presumably continue to improve, while at the same time rigorous protection of freedom of expression can be enforced by verifying that any legal limits for certain apps or certain information channels are checked for their proportionality, necessity in a democratic society and proper legal basis. Despite the strong protection of freedom of expression that, for example, the European Court of Human Rights has stressed in numerous decisions, the jurisprudence also shows that it is possible to find justification for measures to protect democracy, even if these entail restrictions of democratic rights in the process. The most famous cases concern banning of political parties that do not advocate democracy,17 but similar reasoning can be applied also for other freedoms (Dommering, 2008, 52). There are situations where banning can be the best remedy and such bans may be legitimate. 16

Bland v. Roberts, No. 12-1671 (US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 4th Cir. 2013). Joined cases Refah I v. Turkey (Applications 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98) and Refah II (in the Grand Chamber), decided 2003. 17

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At other times, it is not a ban but proactive work in favour of something that is needed. People are likely to use only certain information channels and with the multitude of available information sources, it is increasingly easy to find channels with a message we like and that we thus are more likely to believe in (Mills 1956/1995, 89). However, this should not deflect from the importance of plurality (and not just a multitude) of information channels as this at least provides the possibility to refer to more than one source, which makes it more difficult for anyone to provide only one truth. In practice, this may mean that the era of public service broadcasting (including online and on demand) may not be over, but information coming from a known source may be sought after. Such information providers will become or remain popular only if they are objective and do not fall into the propaganda trap themselves. It is difficult to convince the debate that countering propaganda with information is not just a battle between different versions of propaganda, which is how suggestions first made in 2014 of launching a European, EU-funded, Russian-language TV channel with objective news reports was greeted by many.18 For Internet use, there are agreements (end-user licence agreements), with various rules about what is permitted or not and sometimes with dispute resolution mechanisms (Barker, 2016, 65). This may appear like a very weak tool against governmentsponsored aggression, but in this context the hybrid and ‘hidden’ nature of information aggression can be used against the aggressor in the sense that if the aggressor pretends to be an ordinary person rather than a state agent, the victims of aggression can pretend to believe this as well and use normal, commercial terms of agreements to take action against undesirable content. The blurring of roles between the public and private sector that the cyberreality has given rise to—with private companies in many cases being more powerful than many states—means that surprising steps may be possible against information aggression. For example, Russian actions against Ukraine were facilitated by the fact that information service providers and infrastructure were owned by Russian interests. Even until recently, when the Russian aggression against Ukraine was hardly new, many Ukrainians including public officials used Russian e-mail services (Giles, 2015, 24). Such things may provide new ways to attack but also ways to protect against attacks. The important role of companies, like Internet platforms, means that states are increasingly looking for ways to exercise power and enforce rules, despite the fluid jurisdictional lines and difficulties to assign responsibility to the correct party that characterise the cyberenvironment. Germany passed a law in 2017 on strict rules for content removal by the major Internet platforms19 and in 2020 has begun reforms to further strengthen user rights and transparency, including simplifying user notifications and objections to content removals (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2020). In France, the Constitutional Court declared major parts of a proposed law regarding online hate speech as unconstitutional in a decision from 18

See, for example, ‘EU mulls response to Russia’s information war’. https://euobserver.com/for eign/127135. 19 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG). In force 1 October 2017.

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18 June 2020,20 which means the law will not enter into force in the near future. Both countries have encountered examples of Russian information aggression. Looking at examples of what such activities can look like illustrates how difficult it can be to combat it even if legislation like the existing or proposed acts do exist. The perhaps most famous case is the German so-called ‘Lisa case’ from 2016. This is the story of how a 13-year-old Russian-German girl went missing in early 2016 and was reported by First Russian TV to have been raped by migrants. The story could quite easily be proven to be false, but that did not prevent it from being intensively reported in Russian domestic and foreign media plus being spread and commented on extensively in social media. Through social media, real-world demonstrations were arranged, inciting anti-immigrant sentiment and provoking violence (Meister, 2016). The way such lies and incitement are spread is so multi-facetted that a law alone will not be efficient. This, however, should not mean that legitimate and law-based tools for at least being able to proportion responsibility in the cyberworld are regarded as totally useless. In trying to deal with information aggression, it is very clear that the good cannot be sacrificed on the altar of perfection as far as remedies are concerned.

8 Concluding Remarks The idea of ill-intentioned persons, including potentially violent and vindictive political leaders, having a direct channel—the smartphone—through which to influence vulnerable people 24 h a day, 7 days a week in their homes, workplaces or during private activities is frightening. And it is reality. The hope of finding an easy solution to mitigate possible negative effects of such a situation is unfortunately not very great. Fortunately, history contains many examples of freedom fighters who did not give up because they did not have effective weapons, but instead found ways of fighting better with whatever they had. The fight against online disinformation and brainwashing is quite different than a physical guerrilla fight, but it has in common that very feature: of keeping up the struggle even if it may appear if not hopeless, then at least a very uphill task. Reporters Without Borders in its criticism of Baltic measures against Russian media advocates for transparent sanctions, based on law and applied regardless of national origin of the media outlet as a way to avoid information wars. Theoretically this is a very sound advice. In practice, against concerted attacks backed up by considerable resources and cleverly targeted to people in ways that are the most likely to influence their personal sphere, it may sound naïve. The effect will not be an absence of war but rather a war with one aggressor and the other side a victim. In the cybersecurity context, the question of the right to ‘hack back’ as a measure of self-defence is contested and complicated (as it is so hard to determine when an attack occurs, in the terminology of humanitarian law and as the question of anticipatory 20

Décision n° 2020-801 DC du 18 juin 2020: Loi visant à lutter contre les contenus haineux sur internet https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2020/2020801DC.htm (24/07/2020).

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self-defence is a complex debating point of modern warfare, not just in cyber). In any event that countries that respect freedom of expression and the rule of law—like the Baltic States—would emulate Russian troll factories to fight back in the information warfare is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, after thus criticising as naïve the view that the ‘good guys’ should avoid anything that may give the ‘bad guys’ reason to aggravate information warfare, it is necessary to point out that such a view may be legitimate as the alternative could indeed be worse. To fight propaganda with propaganda is rarely effective, but leads to an escalation, where both sides have to provide more and more propaganda, in an increasingly explicit tone, and people will be constantly more likely to believe only what comes from ‘their’ side. Anyone looking for easy solutions will be disappointed. The changing communication landscape present multiple security challenges and no clear ways to counteract risks. Information is the new battlefield. This reality means that we should not try to squeeze the new reality into old concepts and terminology that does not fit well with a situation where everyone can become an attacker as well as a victim. The ancient tool of propaganda takes on a new importance and a new look in this environment. Aggression uses information, it is not just information to get people to commit limited ‘bad acts’ like with traditional propaganda (deserting, etc.) but to subvert society—the information is the attack. The information we produce by our constant use of devices opens for new forms of attacks on our privacy (in addition to new ways to conduct attacks in the physical world). Nevertheless, even if the picture may look bleak, we should hesitate to introduce new tools to restrict freedom of expression. Otherwise, the restrictions introduced to prevent negative occurrences may stop the positive side of the information society as well. Instead, what is possible is to continue doing whatever is possible to ensure plurality of media, prevent forced shutdown of media outlets or domination of cyberspace and social media by pro-Kremlin trolls. Transparency should be underlined as it is crucial at different levels: transparency in how rules are made, in how regulators work, in the ownership of communications channels, in contractual terms and so on. After the euphoria of the early cyberage, when many thought we were entering a brave new world without laws and restrictions, the debate has moved increasingly to the question of how to combat the worse effects of our interconnected world. However, let us not forget that information or ways to communicate are rarely so harmful that it would be better for democracy to ban them. Any limitations have to be subject to a strict test of necessity and proportionality. The freedom to communicate and have access to information that the smartphone has provided to such a large proportion of the World’s inhabitants is to be welcomed—even if we are likely to encounter Trolls lurking in the shadows.

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References Altheide, D. L., & Johnson, J. M. (1980/1995). Bureaucratic propaganda: The case of battle efficiency reports. In R. Jackall (Ed.) (1995), Propaganda (pp. 299–328). New York: New York University Press; Reprinted from reprinted from Altheide, D. L., & Johnson, J. M. Bureaucratic propaganda. Boston. Barker, K. (2016). Virtual spaces and virtual layers—governing the ungovernable? Information and Communications Technology Law, 25(1), 62–70. Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. (2020). Weiterentwicklung des Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes. Retrieved July 24, 2020, from https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Art ikel/DE/2020/040120_NetzDG.html. Burri, N. (2015). Bravery or Bravado? The protection of news providers in armed conflict. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Dommering, E. J. (2008), Article 10 of the convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms: Freedom of expression. In O. Castendyk, E. J. Dommering, & A. Scheuer (Eds.), European media law (pp. 35–81). Alphen a d R: Kluwer. Franklin, M. I. (2019). Human rights futures for the internet. In M. Kettemann, B. Wagner, & K. Vieth (Eds.), Research handbook on human rights and digital technology: Global politics, law and international relations. Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, Massachusetts, USA: Edward Elgar. Giles, K. (2015). Russia and its neighbours: Old attitudes, new capabilities. In K. Geers (Ed.), Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression against Ukraine (pp. 19–28). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Haste, C. (1977/1995). The machinery of propaganda. In R. Jackall (Ed.) (1995), Propaganda (pp. 105–136). New York: New York University Press; Reprinted from Haste, C. (1977) Keep the home fires burning. London: Allen Lane. Hern, A. (2020). US army retreats from Twitch as recruitment drive backfires. The Guardian. Retrieved July 24, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/23/us-military-tac tically-withdraws-from-game-streaming-site-twitch. Jonsson, A. (2011). Russia and Europe. In G. Gill, & J. Young (Eds.), Routledge handbook of Russian politics and society (pp. 444–453). London: Routledge. Lange-Ionatamishvili, E., & Svetoka, S. (2015). Strategic communications and social media in the Russia Ukraine conflict. In K. Geers (Ed.), Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression against Ukraine (pp. 103–111). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Laswell, H. D. (1934/1995). Propaganda. In R. Jackall (Ed.) (1995), Propaganda (pp. 13–25). New York: New York University Press; Reprinted from E. R. A. Seligman (Ed.) (1934), Encyclopaedia of the social sciences. New York: Macmillan. Levin Jaitner, M. (2015). Russian information warfare: Lessons from Ukraine. In K. Geers (Ed.), Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression against Ukraine (pp. 87–94). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Meister, S. (2016). The “Lisa case”: Germany as a target of Russian disinformation. NATO Review. Retrieved July 24, 2020, from https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/07/25/thelisa-case-germany-as-a-target-of-russian-disinformation/index.html. Mills, C. W. (1956/1995). The mass society. In R. Jackall (Ed.) (1995), Propaganda (pp. 74–101). New York: New York University Press; Reprinted from Mills, C. W. (1956). The power elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence - StratCom COE. (2019a). Responding to cognitive security challenges. Riga. NATO StratCom COE. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence - StratCom COE. (2019b). Robotrolling Issue 1. Ramsay, M. (2012). The status of Hearers’ rights in freedom of expression. Legal Theory, 18, 31–68. Reporters Without Borders. (2020). Baltic countries: Misusing EU sanctions to ban Russian TV channels is not a legitimate tool for promoting reliable information. Retrieved July

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20, 2020, from https://rsf.org/en/news/baltic-countries-misusing-eu-sanctions-ban-russian-tvchannels-not-legitimate-tool-promoting. Richter, A. (2015). The relationship between freedom of expression and the ban on propaganda for war. In W. Benedek, F. Benoît-Rohmer, W. C. Kettemann, B. Kneihs & M. Nowak (Eds.), European yearbook on human rights (pp. 489–505). Antwerp: Intersentia. Susskind, R. (2019). Online courts and the future of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Economic Times. (2020). India bans 59 Chinese apps including TikTok, WeChat, Helo. Retrieved July 29, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/software/india-bans59-chinese-apps-including-tiktok-helo-wechat/articleshow/76694814.cms. Wirtz, J. J. (2015). Cyber war and strategic culture: The Russian integration of cyber power into grand strategy. In K. Geers (Ed.), Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression against Ukraine (pp. 29–37). Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Ziolkowski, K. (Ed.). (2014). Peacetime regime for state activities in cyberspace. Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the International Humanitarian Law. Case Study: Russia Marek Kohv and Archil Chochia

1 Introduction International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict, regulates how the states should use force during armed conflicts, with core legal principles of it being: military necessity, distinction, proportionality and preventing unnecessary suffering (International Committee of the Red Cross). Rapid developments in the field of military technology, specifically unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), often referred simply as drones, are raising several questions, including questions related to the potential violation of the above-mentioned core principles of IHL (Kajander et al., 2020). The states’ sovereignty, even though rather critical issue in the realm of UAV usage, is of no interest of the research, since the focus of the paper is on jus in bello and not on jus ad bellum aspects. The main scope of this paper is the usage of military drones, their legal status and potential conflict with IHL core principles. Since the subject is rather extensively covered in the political and legal academic discussions, the paper will focus on the specific area of military UAV’s targeted killings, from the perspective of IHL core principles. For targeted killings authors use United Nations Special Rapporteurs (2010) definition: A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. At the same time, the paper will focus on Russia, as there is a lack of academic research studying relationship between Russian foreign policy, Russia’s application M. Kohv Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] A. Chochia (B) TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_11

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of emerging military technologies, specifically UAVs, and potential violations of core IHL principles. The most of available research papers have analysed Russia’s foreign policy in the context of hybrid warfare or cyberwarfare. Therefore, the authors believe that the idea of focusing a discussion on Russia’s use of UAVs as part of a targeted killing campaign provides a novel perspective in the field. Russia could not match NATOs conventional forces, and Russian leaders know this as well. Hence, there is a need to develop unconventional capabilities that will have advantage over conventional means. Hybrid warfare provides opportunities for that and is lately mostly mentioned in context with Russian activities abroad. Hybrid warfare is a complex of activities with military and non-military means to achieve political goals (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen, 2016). The chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, states his doctrine ‘the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness’ (Gerasimov, 2013; Kasapoglu, 2015). Since the term ‘hybrid warfare’ did not prevail in the Western political terminology before 2014, scholars operated with other terminology, such as lawfare. Original definition by Dunlap (2009) describes it as ‘a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective’. Dunlap (2017) later specifies the term by ‘using law as a form of asymmetrical warfare’. It is important to analyse both concepts together, as they complement each other. Russia’s tendency to bypass and deny international rules and law (see, e.g. Hoffmann & Chochia, 2018) might indicate the preferred warfare method for the future use in the context of using UAVs. Hence, while using advanced technology it exploits legal system. It is even more hazardous, as implying UAVs in disputable ways additionally question international law. Senn and Troy (2017) argue that targeted killings have moved from undercover activity to the core of policymaking. On the other hand, Russia has rather sizable history of denying its actions that violated international law. Just to name few of such cases, attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Alexei Navalny or illegal annexation of Crimea.1 Haas and Fischer (2017) are supporting this claim by stating that future conventional and hybrid scenarios may see targeted killings to limit or escalate control together with deniability of air operations. To conclude the argument, the conditions for perfect storm are set. Further, General Gerasimov has stated ‘hybrid warfare requires high-tech weapons and a scientific substantiation’ (Gerasimov, 2013). As noted by the scholars in the field, Russia currently is, and is expected to continue, focusing on development and use of unmanned combat systems.2 Country’s experience in recent military engagement in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria has also contributed to this process, as Russian Ministry of Defence saw clear need for expanding its unmanned combat capabilities (Bendett, 2020). Important development in this direction is a creation of special institutions tasked with 1

On annexation of Crimea and Russian actions in Ukraine, please see Tsybulenko and Platonova (2019), Sayapin and Tsybulenko (2018), Tsybulenko and Kelichavyi (2018). 2 Please see, e.g. Center for Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence https://www.cna.org/CAAI/Ben dett_S.

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advancing such technologies, ERA Military Innovation Technopark3 and Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the Defence Industry.4 Such development is in line with general trend worldwide and therefore Russia is only expected to follow the path. As Samuel Bendett (2020) indicates: ‘the next decade will see Russia seeking to absorb the lessons learned from these conflicts, acquire new technology to fight the next war, and to potentially market their solutions to willing customers and allies’. Since Russia is still aiming to possess the strike drones and there is no relevant practice examples known to public, the paper will investigate the Russian usage of traditional air force weapons and, to some extent, the activities undergoing with small-sized UAVs. One could compare the use of strike drones as similar to the usage of traditional manned air force weaponry, as both these capabilities should consider applicable international regulations and customs. Future practices of UAVs usage can be derived from the past and current Russian activities in conflict zones and more widely from their activities abroad. First, the authors will examine the IHL from the perspective of UAVs, focusing on core legal principles of IHL: military necessity, distinction, proportionality and preventing unnecessary suffering. In the following chapters, the authors will provide a short overview of UAV history in Russia and current developments as well as Russia’s experience in recent military engagement in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Finally, providing concluding remarks based on the observations. The authors will use the doctrinal research methodology by analysing the core principles of the IHL, inductive research approach with empirical observation and logical reasoning is implemented, empirical observation of recorded practices from case studies related to research object, compared with analysis from core principles, while logical reasoning authorizes authors to make predictions about on Russia’s use of emerging military technologies.

2 Core Principles of IHL and Lethal UAVs IHL is derived from the public international law. There are many treaties that have contributed to IHL, such as the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions and the various agreements between countries (Liivoja & McCormack, 2016). The scope of the IHL is rather broad and covers variety of topics from conflict characteristics to role of international courts. International law is not specifically prohibiting the autonomy in weapon systems, the question in this case is how much of the decisions can be left to the machine until we can still be sure that the decisions are lawful (Liivoja & McCormack, 2016). The lawfulness of the weapon system itself under IHL is concluded from weapons law and lawful use of drones (Sehrawat, 2017).

3

Please see ERA Military Innovation Technopark’s website https://www.era-tehnopolis.ru. Please see Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the Defense Industry’s website https://fpi.gov.ru.

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UAVs, although unmanned, have a different level of human control to the extent where it is fully autonomous. US Department of Defence (2012) has drawn division on weapon systems as follows. Autonomous weapon systems will have after activation the capability to select and engage targets independently without human transaction. Human-supervised autonomous weapon systems are similar to autonomous weapon system, but with the possibility for human to intervene or halt its activity. Semi-autonomous weapons target specific targets appointed by human activity after that is autonomous. The International Human Rights Clinic’s report gives different, yet fundamentally same division. Human-in-the-Loop weapons select targets and strike with human control. Human-on-the-Loop weapons select targets and strike with the human oversight and possibility to intervene. Human-out-of-the-Loop weapons select targets and strike without any human input or interaction. It is important to mark that there are no fully autonomous weapon systems now. Availability is related to the development of artificial intelligence. Closest to the fully autonomous weapon now is Israeli HARPY, suicide drone with autonomous action once it detects a target. The legal issue arises with the autonomic drones. For full or semi-autonomy, the system has to have certain amount of data for decision-making. For semi-autonomic systems, the problem of sufficient amount of data emerges. Is it possible to foresee every aspect of combat and feed this information to the computer? Simultaneously, the interpretation of complex legal and ethical norms has to be conducted also. More problems arise with fully automatic systems. Roff and Singer (2016) argue that there is no control over the AI’s learning process once the data has put in. Initial control over data disappears as neural network starts to work, and it is impossible to predict what capabilities it develops. If the system’s capabilities cannot be verified, it is impossible to guarantee its compliance with law, more specifically with IHL core principles (Wagner, 2016). A weapon or weapons system has to respect two aspects to be accepted as legitimate on a battlefield: prevention of unnecessary suffering and capability to effectively distinguish targets. The UAVs themselves are not unlawful, nor are the weapons they carry or the way they engage in and conduct strikes (Gross, 2016). The critical questions lie elsewhere, do the use of these specific weapons correlate with IHL’s core principles? (Alston, 2010). In order to answer this question, it is necessary to have a short overview of the core legal principles of IHL and how are these justified while using military drones.

2.1 Military Necessity As Brooks (2014) explains, there should be a clear military necessity, a need for the action, not ‘just war’ reasoning. When the decision of using lethal force is made, why the necessity of using targeting killing by drone instead of some other means? The necessity should always rise from the fact that there are no other options more suitable at the given moment. The attack has to be calculated and its purpose has

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to be targeting the enemy, at the same time maximizing avoiding collateral damage. Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977) Article 57—Precautions in attack describes desired conditions. Usage of the drones could in some cases be justified and if during such engagements the international (and often domestic) laws are followed, there is no specific argument for one to perceive that as reprehensible. Rand Corporation has published an analytical framework where it has suggested that the decision to use, or not to use, drones for targeted killing should pass so-called ‘gated’ thought process (Davis et al., 2016). If followed as described, it should reduce the risk of violating the relevant international treaties. It can be deduced from Fig. 1 that there is an understanding and awareness of targeted killing’s borderline characteristics and states are willing to take some countermeasures to minimize the misuse of UAV strikes. Such kind of step-by-step regulations definitely will help to reduce potential violations. Military necessity allows usage of the force only if necessary, for fighting a given enemy. In this regard, the examples from the United States of America (USA) are interesting. Also due to the fact that USA is one of the leading states in the field UAV technologies and most research has also been done in the US institutions (Rodríguez et al., 2019). As Cortright et al. (2015) explain, USA has rather unique position in the world because of undoubtedly being one of the world’s superpowers, as well as being engaged in the so-called global war on terror. However, we should be closely

Fig. 1 Decisions through ‘gate’ process (Rand Corporation 2016)

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observing how Russia will use similar argumentation provided by the USA. The statement in 2012 from the United States Attorney General Eric Holder: Because the United States is in an armed conflict, we are authorized to take actions against enemy belligerents under international law. The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense (Cortright et al., 2015).

From the perspective of national defence, the US has the understandable urgency to execute countermeasures for the terrorist attacks it has experienced on its soil. Preventing the terrorism is plausible argument in this case. And therefore, if the targeted killings prevent greater harm, it can be argued as necessary. The most controversial aspect of drone strike is security paradox—the tactical benefits are hard to challenge by anyone, but the strategic outcomes might not be as prolific as it is claimed to be (Cortright et al., 2015). On the contrary, since the updated results and statistics will remain classified for the time being, there is a growing suspicion that the results on the global level may prove that drone strikes and targeting killings, to some extent, contribute to popularity of terrorism in some regions (Carvin, 2012). Critical questions arise concerning the period between terrorist attacks and counter-strikes, targeted killing oppose to possible capture, sense of revenge, etc. (Cortright et al., 2015).

2.2 Distinction Distinction, as one of the core elements of IHL, is a requirement to differentiate civilian and military targets, including people, when engaging in combat. Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977) Article 48 requires parties of the conflict at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Military operations, whether planned in advance or during the conflict, include process of planning which combat systems, which weapons to use and setting the rules for using those. When decision is made to use UAVs, Dyndal et al. (2017) argue that to certain extent, the war moves from the battlefield into the office, the territory of some sort, without negative aspects of a battlefield, such as sound, light, visibility, speed, etc. Decision-making on the individual combatant level in the armed conflicts, on the other hand, is made under pressure, under significant time constraints and often with lack of information. Human’s ability to process information without emotions, fast, with substantial gaps in the picture and interfering factors from battlefield are by no means comparable to cold analytical computerized decisions. Since machines have no emotions, the possibility of war crimes could be reduced (Dyndal et al., 2017). However, at the same time, when talking about UAV attacks, being it fully or semi-autonomous drones, it is crucial to consider technical aspects of decision-making process, such as reliable technology, sufficient data, distance, etc., in order to be able to evaluate possibility to clearly distinguish lawful and unlawful targets (Waseem, 2017).

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Distinction principle applies not only to the need to separate combatants and civilians, or other protected objects, but also addresses the necessity of an actor who participates actively in combat to identify himself as a combatant (Waseem, 2017). Matthew Crosston (2014) suggests, with an example of CIA drone operator who during the drone strike is located in safety back in US, that he also can be lawfully targeted as combatant because of his direct participation in the fight. Therefore, possibly bringing battles into the societies, which are not otherwise located in given conflict zone. Another issue to consider is that the drone strikes nowadays often happen in the environment were combatants and civilians are mixed and therefore very difficult to distinguish, especially due to technical aspects of the drone strikes (Crosston, 2014). According to the experts, there is little knowledge about full impact of US drone attacks, while publicly available official statistics often differ from those provided by the human rights groups’ statistics (Bergen & Rothenberg, 2015). Furthermore, if a target is inside a building, strikes are usually stronger by munition, carrying a risk of hitting innocent civilians. Even the precision-guided-munitions, although precise, damage the surroundings. This can be seen as violation of distinction as a core principle, as well as principle of proportionality as explained below.

2.3 Proportionality Principle of proportionality is fundamental aspect of IHL, as it dictates that harms to civilians during the fight must be proportional to the advantage of attack (International Committee of the Red Cross). Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977) Article 51 prohibits indiscriminate attacks where result, injury or loss of life would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. In this regard, the question remains whether the UAVs are able to make proportional attacks in order to minimize casualties among civilian population, or high rate of collateral damage will remain. The supporters who were using UAV combat systems believe this will result in reduction of losses among civilian population. Using ammunition that is more precise and taking all the measures to eliminate the target without innocent bystanders should at least in theory indeed reduce harm to civilians (Bakerjian, 2019). At the same time, it is important to underline that proportionality is rather difficult to measure in reality. While still, the case study from Pakistan shows that average 10–20% of the strikes bring collateral damage resulting in the death of civilians (Cortright et al., 2015).

2.4 Preventing Unnecessary Suffering The main idea of this principle is to minimize suffering during the armed conflict and therefore choose weapons and military tactics accordingly (Sehrawat, 2017). If

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accuracy of the attacks is guaranteed, consequently the suffering should be minimal (Gross, 2016). On the other hand, one could easily image the devastating results of mortar or artillery shells landing in the middle of crowded village with the sole purpose to hit only one person. The principle of unnecessary suffering could also be viewed from the perspective of preventing excessive firefights because one side eliminates the enemy’s air defence systems. Israeli attack on Syrian nuclear sites is one of the examples, although possible cyberweapon was used (Mahnaimi et al., 2007). Some of the experts already predict possible usage of drones as part of cyberattacks also, when drones are fitted with Wi-Fi Pineapple (Muncaster, 2019). If we look from the perspective of an attacker, such attacks keep the operator in safe distance, which saves from the moral pressure of taking the life of another human, less possibilities for post-traumatic stress disorder, etc. One could say that drone strikes are the most human way of combat. It has minimal connections between fighting sides. However, from the perspective of the targeted people’s local communities, who has to deal with the consequences of drones loitering or striking, it has rather significant effect (Muncaster, 2019). Such events could potentially harm these people mentally and physically, as they have influence on people’s everyday life, denying them a possibility to move within their community for conducting everyday necessary actions, to travel normally to certain areas, avoiding certain ceremonial events like funerals, other gatherings, etc. (International Bar Associations).

3 History of UAVs in Russia and Current Developments Ambition to possess and then improve military UAV arsenal is not unique to only Russia, but rather has been such for main powers in the world (Sloggett, 2014). During the Cold War period, Soviet Union covered technology projects with utmost secrecy, so it is rather difficult to find adequate information on drones from that era. For that period, it is sufficient to say that in broader scale Soviet Union copied the US developments, mostly building drones for aerial reconnaissance. Collapse of the Soviet Union obviously had a significant impact on the research and development in the Russian military sector. The 1990s period is considered the lowest of such decline for Russia, which was also demonstrated in First Chechen War, by no means technological, where Russians used heavy bombing by traditional weaponry and Chechen fighters used guerrilla tactics (Felgenhauer, 2017). Surveillance drones serve their value best in the situation where one conflicting side is on the unfamiliar terrain and the other takes the advantages of their local knowledge. While the unmanned vehicles, in general, give the option to spare humans from being directly on the battlefield and economize human workhours, it has not been the case for Soviet Union or Russia. Heavy corruption and financial problems contributed their portion. One could deduce that kind of set of issues has something to do with the lack technological inventions. Probably the transition of before-mentioned problems from Soviet Union to Russia, and some of other challenges as well, but the lessons were not learned even during the Second Chechen War (Felgenhauer, 2017).

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War in Georgia in 2008 had some lessons to Russian armed forces in the field of UAVs. While Russian paratroopers (VDV) were assembling in Abkhazia to invade Georgia, Georgian UAVs, Israeli made Hermes 450 (Felgenhauer, 2017) and monitored their preparations. Russians were not able to shoot it down since it was flying at the height of 5 km, while Russian 30-mm gun on the personnel carrier could reach only 2 km. On another occasion, Russian troops lacking UAVs had to send TU-22 bomber deep into Georgian territory for reconnaissance, where it was shot down by Georgian air defence (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). The former and latter incident rang a serious wake-up bell to the Russians about the necessity of unmanned aerial vehicle. The announcement concerning a need to modernize Russian military came after Georgian war in 2008, on October 14, when Defence Minister declared the key components of the reform to the defence ministry collegium: enhancing the combat capabilities and combat readiness and forming mobile, smaller and modernized forces (Mcdermott, 2011). The war in Georgian showed Russian military many short fallings they had, including communications and reconnaissance. A major testing of the ‘new look’ forces took place in the autumn of 2009, during different military exercises. During Ladoga-2009, in September, one remarkable incident occurred, as Russian-made UAV Grusha was field-tested, and Russian Ground Forces commander General Vladimir Boldyrev observed how it failed to strike an identified target. General gave an order to have such domestic assets immediately upgraded (Mcdermott, 2011). In 2010, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told in his opening speech for discussion re-equipping the Russian Armed Forces: ‘The strategic and tactical command capabilities of the armed forces are of primary importance, as is the reliability and flawless performance of communications systems and the extensive use of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems.’, and he also highlighted the need to modernize and equip forces with high-end technologies (Putin, 2010). In 2012, then-President Putin said in the meeting with Russian defence industry: ‘We need a range of all types [of drones], including automated strike aircraft, reconnaissance and other types’ (Putin, 2012). The understanding of the importance of technological weapons and specifically UAVs was realized and after orders given at different levels, the development started with high priorities resulting in visible outcomes. In 2019, Russia had more than 2100 UAVs in service throughout its armed forces, while from 2019 onwards Russian military will receive more than 300 UAVs annually, according to the defence procurement plan (Edmonds & Bendett, 2019). State Armament Program for 2027 points out the need to implement operational experience from Ukraine and Syria, expected also to focus on the UAVs (Connolly & Boulègue, 2018). Important development in this direction is a creation of special institutions tasked with advancing such technologies, ERA Military Innovation Technopark5 and Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the Defence Industry.6 From recent military engagements as Russian Ministry of Defence saw clear need for expanding its unmanned combat 5

Please see ERA Military Innovation Technopark’s website https://www.era-tehnopolis.ru. Please see Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the Defense Industry’s website https://fpi.gov.ru.

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capabilities, while such development is in line with general trend worldwide and therefore Russia is only expected to follow the path (Bendett, 2020). Regardless of a rather late start in the field of high-end technological UAVs, Russia seems to have caught up. In Eastern Ukraine, Russian troops already used UAVs rather extensively not only for reconnaissance, but also for helping artillery to target and conduct action assessment (Felgenhauer, 2017; Tsybulenko & Francis, 2018). Today, Russia has formed UAV units in army, navy and air force (Gettinger, 2019). The fleet of Russian UAVs in service is rather inclined towards smaller-to-medium size UAVs, in comparison with other leading countries when it comes to UAV industry. The lack of striking drones has been yet unsolved, since the Orion (Opion) and Okhotnik (Oxotnik) are still under development, although the former is already being tested in combat (Karnozov, 2019) and latter one being in the final stages before entering the service (Kretsul et al., 2019). This paper brings out only the representative samples from each class and gives a short description on each. Some more examples will be brought up from striking UAVs, since it serves the explanatory purpose of this paper. The classifications used here are NATO standards, where division into three classes of Unmanned Aircraft Systems is in place. Class I is for the micro, mini and small (600 kg) (Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2019). The division has more characteristics, but it is not necessary to elaborate those in order to get an overview of current situation and the direction of ongoing developments.

3.1 Class I Orlan-10 (Oplan-10) is the most used Class I UAV in the fleet with more than 1000 in active service in Army, Airborne units and Navy (Gettinger, 2019). It is developed by Russian company Special Technology Center LLC (OOO Cpecialny Texnologiqecki Centp) in St. Petersburg.7 Technical parameters include flight altitude 5 km, maximum speed 150 km/h and maximum take-off weight 16.5 kg. Its missions can be aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, jamming, detection of radio signals and target tracking. Although relatively ‘young’, being in the fleet since 2013, Orlan-10 is one of the most ‘experienced’ models of Russian drones having combat experience in East Ukraine and Syria (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technology; InformNapalm 2016a). During the Vostok-18 military exercises, Orlan10 was reported to have provided live video feed for battle assessment and offering targeting for Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). During Kavkaz 2020 exercises, Orlan-10 was paired with Strelets tactical system. Strelets tactical system is 7

More on Orlan-10 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) please see from https://www.airforce-techno logy.com/projects/orlan-10-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav/.

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a command, control, communications and reconnaissance system for the commanders, which can through the system obtain information about own troops and enemy locations or movements.8 Therefore, showing important development in the process of UAVs becoming integral part of Russian military.

3.2 Class II Most experienced drone in Russian fleet is Israel origin. Searcher Mk II or as it is called in Russia—Forpost (‘Foppoct’) is in service of Army, Navy and Air Force since 2013 and is now produced under licence in Russia at the Ural Civil Aviation Plant in Yekaterinburg (Janes, 2020). Flying distance more than 250 km, weight of the drone 450 kg and flight time up to 17 h (Ramm & Stepovoi, 2018). Although the main purpose of Forpost drone is surveillance, there is ambition (and order) to convert it to perform attack missions as well (Felgenhauer, 2017).

3.3 Class III None of this class drones are yet in service; however, the closest to that is the Orion (Opion), developed by Kronshtadt Group. The Orion has flight capability of 24 h at altitudes of up to 7500 m. It is comparable to the USA made Predator. In 2019 Kronshtadt declared readiness to create an armed version able to carry bombs weighing 25 and 50 kg (Karnozov, 2019). Russian state media outlet TASS announced at the end of 2019, that Orion has passed combat tests and is now ready to be sent to units. Next project drone is the Altair (Altaip). The project started in 2011 as a response to US Globalhawk, which has always been a surveillance drone, but Altair was designated as strike drone, though later changed to reconnaissance-strike drone and is now surveillance drone.9 It is argued that during the process it became evident that drone does not have a capacity to carry munitions (Gettinger, 2019; Mizokami, 2019). Latest media reports from Russia suggest that the management of programme is handed over to the Ural Civil Aviation Plant, the company responsible for the production of Orlan-10 (Janes, 2020). Finally, rather promising the Okhotnik (Oxotnik) is developed by famous Sukhoi Design Bureau. The Okhotnik conducted first test flight in January 2019. It is the

8

For more on Vostok-18 and Kavkaz 2020 military exercises, please see https://russianmilitary analysis.wordpress.com/vostok-2018/ and https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/kavkaz2020/. 9 More on Altair/Altius-M/Altius-O/Altius-U please see from https://www.globalsecurity.org/mil itary/world/russia/altair.htm.

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first heavy Russian drone with the total weight of 20 tonnes, flying speed is impressive 1000 km/h and operational radius of 4000 km.10 Russian Academy of Military Science professor Vadim Kozyulin claims that the drone is fully robotized system, which is using AI technology and is testing platform for sixth-generations fighter technologies. Having AI technology on the board means the UAV can react on the changing situations dynamically and continue with pre-programmed mission. It can be equipped with most developed munition like OFZAB-500 high-fragmentation high-explosive incendiary bomb and the ODAB-500PMV fuel–air-explosive bomb (Roblin, 2020).

4 Case Studies About Russian Practice Russia has used drones in Ukraine conflict, where at least one Class II Forpost drone have been shot down by Ukrainian forces (see, e.g. Peleschuk; InformNapalm 2016b). There have been several reports about using drones in Syria (McDermott, 2019; Lavrov; Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technology). Although there are some rumours about Russian drones having dropped some loads of explosive, it is not accurately confirmed. Russian Class III UAVs are not serviceable yet by the best knowledge of the authors of this paper. Since we cannot study the usage of unmanned aerial strike vehicles, we had to investigate the practices of using manned aircrafts in the combat zones. During the war in Georgia in 2008, it is generally agreed that Russian Armed Forces encountered serious problems. Lack of proper intelligence, usage of old Soviet maps, etc. all contributed to the Russian Air Force failure. Since the targeting was ‘off the map’, Russian aircrafts often bombed the sites with no value or usage (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). Some of the off bombing could be explained by pure intelligence negligence, when some military sites remained untouched though their existence had been extensively covered in the local media. However, there were also several reports where schools, hospitals and apartment buildings were bombed. Cohen and Hamilton (2011) argue that such atrocity cannot be deliberate and has to be related either to wrong targeting or just plain pilot’s mistakes. Has that been the isolated incident, it could be possible to agree; however, in the next cases, we will see how that kind of action is forming patterns again and again. Amnesty International (2008) has also investigated some incidents, where local villages without presence of any military targets were bombed. Georgia’s then-deputy Defence Minister Batu Kutelia claimed that 50 percent of Russian air strikes in Georgia were off the target as ‘the Russian army is an heir to the Soviet army and accuracy of strikes was never a priority for it’ (Antidze & Stubbs, 2015). When it comes to Syria, Russian Armed Forces have been in Syria since 2015, when President Bashar Al-Assad-led government officially requested the help of 10

More on Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B please see from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ russia/su-70.htm.

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Russian Federation to deal with the civil war that started in 2011. Most of Russian military involvement is conducted by Air Forces airstrikes. Antonio Giustozzi (2019) argues that Russian Air Force in Syria surprised observers how accurate their strikes were, even comparing to few other Western air forces, who possess similar capabilities. It is believed that Russian Air Forces have achieved the level where mistakes derived from old maps or questionable intelligence can be avoided. However, at the same time, James Kearney (2019) reports that, during the period of 5 years, Russian airstrikes killed between 1392 and 15,407 civilians. There are many incidents related to civilian killings in Syria, but some have been described in the Amnesty International report released in May 2020. The bombings of schools and hospitals seems to be again the usual practice. Just to point out the example of the extent of those violations, we take Russian air attacks between 5 May 2019 and 25 February 2020 on medical facilities and schools—seven by Russian government forces and four by Syrian or Russian government forces (Amnesty International, 2020). It should be taken into account that some Russian attacks may have not been confirmed or misattributed to Syrian forces. A real-life witness, a doctor, who survived Russian attack from 29 January 2020 to the hospital in Ariha, described how the strike demolished also at least two residential buildings killing 11 civilians and injuring more than 30 (Amnesty International 2020). United Nations Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock (2020) stated on Syria on 17 February 2020: ‘/…/ The violence in northwest Syria is indiscriminate. Health facilities, schools, residential areas, mosques and markets have been hit. /…/’. Human Rights Watch (2019) report argues that Russia, as a permanent member of UN Security Council, is using its place to protect itself and the ally Damascus. The report details that Russians have used Uragan systems with cluster munition at least 10 times during 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This is rather important information, taking into account observations from exercise Vostok-18, conducted prior to these events, where Orlan-10 were paired with MLRS systems. Thus, it illustrates the role of drones in Russian warfare in modern conflict.

5 Concluding Remarks The possible usage of military UAVs for targeted killings is an open debate. As it was analysed in this chapter, the laws and treaties leave the room for interpretations in both ways. What one should keep in mind though is that international treaties (and any kind of laws) will never cover all the aspects of newest technology, simply due to the fact how fast technologies develop. One should always interpret humanitarian laws with the sense of a human. If they are written to take into account the weaker part and protect the human rights, there should be universal understanding that the stronger (states) should not have the upper hand in outcomes of legal disputes. As long as there are grey zones for interpretations with semi-autonomic weapon systems, there should not be attempts to legalize full autonomic weapon systems. As ironic

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it may sound, emotional personal experience-based decisions of humans are still irreplaceable. From the ethical aspect of semi- or fully automated weapon system usage, it is important to remember that the complexity of starting an armed conflict has always been connected with the thorough planning and preparation of resources. As argued by Bergen and Rothenberg (2015), what in the past meant armoured vehicles, supply routes and stocks, housing, training of soldiers, etc. nowadays can be done from the convenient office, not even involving many individuals for executions. Furthermore, only the will to start a war campaign was not enough, the support of the population was also needed, which continues to remain the truth of today. The problem is in the relative simplicity to forward drones to execute strikes and not to inform the public each time doing so. Those orders fall usually under some long-lasting policies and do not require consistent coordination. Moreover, the military actions are often covered with secrecy for security and strategic reasons to protect the ongoing operations, information, etc. Important aspect of using lethal drones is liability. Denial by Russian authorities for misconduct is normalcy as it is observed from recent attempts of murder in sovereign countries, namely, United Kingdom. More widely, the question of liability remains. In the process of launching fully autonomous weaponry, where to point. In case of violating international laws, is it the responsibility of programmer of software, or developer who observes the learning process of machine, or is it commander’s liability who gives the order for mission. Although Russia has joined all international conventions regulating jus in bello and at least in the declarations seem to have established rules of engagement, it was demonstrated by the authors that following those agreed rules are often taken as optional by Russian government. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that development in military technology, and Russia’s development strategy in the field, will not better the situation how IHL is treated, but rather worsen it. The case studies from previous armed conflicts where Russia was involved and its actions during those military actions, as described by the authors, provide sufficient argument to conclude that the war’s consequences do not represent enough of an argument, or concern for Russia, until it serves the main purpose the country has established for given military operation. With the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries, for illegal annexation of Crimea, and the recent COVID-19-related economic consequences still starting to make an impact, it is fair to assume that some of the developments in Russian military will take longer than planned. Changing the tactics and training for armed forces when Class III UAVs should enter the service take another period. The training for Class I and II UAVs is not comparable to Class III one, and it also needs different logistical and infrastructure support, as explained by Atherton (2018). Samuel Bendett (2020) claims that the fielding of new UAVs will give to Russia the capability to strike targets almost everywhere across the globe without extensive logistic and supportive resources, therefore making it easier for them to do so. As explained above, UAV characteristics make their usage in combat a potential threat, to some extent, violating core principles of IHL. When waiting for the

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strike drones entering the battlegrounds, one could only imagine the practice periods and mistakes. The Russian understanding about respecting international norms and civilian protection is anyhow somewhat differing from Western understanding. If given problem is added to the policies Russia implements during its military operations, as demonstrated by the case studies provided by the authors, it is arguably sufficient to conclude that we shall expect further violations of IHL key principles by Russia when using UAVs in military combats.

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Hybrid Situational Awareness Against Cyber-Attacks David Antunes and Manuel Esteve

1 Introduction Our world, a place where so many different species are living, trying to thrive and prosper but also surviving and fighting for resources at the expense of others. Global commons are ‘areas – and their potential economic resources – that lie beyond national jurisdiction: the atmosphere, the high seas, Antarctica and outer space’ (Global Commons Alliance, 2020). Cyberspace is also recognized by several authors as a man-made, global common. They are interconnected and their prosperity and access are an economic and military necessity (ACT, 2011), whose governance needs to be regulated through international treaties. This is the case, for example, with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Concerning the cyberspace, however, there is still a long way to go in terms of drawing up an international code of conduct, therefore giving the floor to ambiguous behaviours, frequently associated with actors like Russia, North Korea and China, to name a few. Advanced societies are increasing dependency on cyberspace despite currently unsolved challenges, such as attribution and asymmetry, related to its nature, that endorse the attackers. Vital functions of a society depend on productive critical infrastructures which must be protected, independently of their presence in the physical and/or information environment. To increase performance but also safety and security, it is necessary to know better what is going on in an environment, that is, to have a suitable ‘situational awareness’ (SA), achieved through intelligence gathering. The present chapter goes further from SA on classical domains to a merge of SA on different environments and seeks to analyse the utility of a so-called ‘Hybrid D. Antunes (B) Portuguese Army, Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain e-mail: [email protected] M. Esteve Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_12

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Situational Awareness’ (HSA) capable of improving cyber-incident handling against cyber-attacks, on critical infrastructures. For that purpose, we will outline the operational environment and the need to operationalize classical and man-made domains for power projection. Then, we will characterize HSA and focus on the integration of different kind of Intel disciplines (Intel gathering) along with deception techniques, moving from classical domains towards cyberspace. We will not go into a detailed discussion of a Cyber Situational Awareness System as CyCOP,1 but still, introduce the concept DECEPTINT, as a cyber-deception adaptive tool to be integrated with it. Subsequently, considering threat groups linked to Russia, we will present, through recent case studies of cyberattacks to critical infrastructures, possible applicability of HSA in benefit of threat hunting.

2 The Operational Environment Some intellectuals have thought about the importance of cyberspace as a heritage of humanity, and more precisely in the relationship that a country must maintain with it and concerning its military use. Alfred Mahan, for example, influenced the Navy from 1890 with a literary work that appealed to the possession of the Sea, thus ensuring any victory and strategic successes, since the oceans were the stage of trade and offered countless possibilities to nations. In this sense, it was essential to have a Navy capable of destroying the adversary and controlling the Sea. Giulio Douhet, for his part, defended at the beginning of the last century that ‘Air’ would be something to be crossed to reach the heart of the enemy territory, so he supported the aviation industry to achieve a strong Air Force to ensure access to air domain (Vacca, 2011). Looking at the greatest power on a world scale, Barry Posen says that the command of these global assets is ‘the military key that facilitates the global power of the USA (…) that allows exploring in-depth other forms of power, such as economic (…) and contribute to a more useful military potential to achieve a hegemonic foreign policy’ (Posen, 2003). In this line of reasoning, it is important to operationalize these domains, something that the human race has been doing throughout history. This process started with the ‘terrestrial’ domain and, along with the appearance of the first ships, the ‘maritime’ domain was born. At the beginning of the last century, the ‘air domain emerged and only more recently, the ‘space’ domain. Nowadays, ‘cyberspace’ is also considered an operational domain, despite some debate on the matter, with opposing views. Libicki questions the designation. It was not necessary, in Libicki’s opinion, to raise the electromagnetic spectrum as a domain to support Electronic Warfare (Libicki, 2012). On the other hand, since 2011, the US joint doctrine recognized cyberspace early as a ‘global domain within the informational 1

CYCOP—Cyber Common Operational Picture—provides an immersive virtual reality and a realtime risk analysis tool. It was developed by the Spanish Joint Cyberspace Command and Universitat Politecnica de Valencia.

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environment’ (JCS, 2017), and after common consensus between Nations, further on NATO, at Warsaw summit in 2016. Nations use instruments or ‘elements’ of national power, known as the acronym DIMEFIL (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic, Financial and Law Enforcement), to attain national objectives. Efficiency is achieved by understanding thoroughly the environment on which power is projected. An operational environment is defined as ‘a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander’ (JCS, 2017). Therefore, those elements must be studied in detail for a more accurate decision-making process. This field of study is known as ‘Situational awareness’ (SA) and defined by Endsley as ‘the perception of environmental elements with respect to time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their future status’ (Endsley, 1995). Alongside physical environments, the information environment appears ‘interdepend and integral to others’ and can be defined as ‘the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information’ (JCS, 2014a, b). Within the Operational Environment, the fusion of situational awareness achieved on physical environments with SA on the Information one leads to what we can define as ‘a hybrid situational awareness’ (HSA). HSA is necessary to define one’s status and possibilities but also highlight limitations. In the picture depicted below, we can see an integrated representation of the ‘physical areas and factors’ of traditional domains and the Information environment, with cyberspace, where different kind of actors (friendly, neutral and adversary) may interact to attain their objectives, based on sociocultural factors and time (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 Holistic view of the operational environment (JCS, 2014a, b)

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This representation seeks to simplify the complexity of the ‘operational environment’ and highlights the application of tools for systems’ analysis, such as PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Informational). An accurate understanding of the ‘operational environment’ is crucial either on competitive markets or during the conduct of military operations and can be achieved through a holistic and analytical process commonly divided into four major steps: defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary and other relevant actors and determining and describing adversary and other relevant actors courses of action, particularly the adversary’s most likely and the most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment (JCS, 2014a, b).

3 Hybrid Situational Awareness SA on the physical dimension is nowadays relatively well defined and studied. It is not so through the Information and Cognitive dimensions or some of the layers of cyberspace. Knowledge from physical, virtual or cognitive sources emerges from a myriad of different sensors collecting data and the application of intelligence gathering disciplines. In the figure depicted below, we can observe that the sources contributing to understanding are ‘cognitive’, ‘physical’ and ‘virtual’ and information correlation from those sources must happen for enhanced analysis and judgement, leading to improved understanding (Fig. 2). Commonly defined classical intelligence gathering disciplines are as follows:

Fig. 2 Overview of the way path to understanding (Mallick, 2018)

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– Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information from people. – Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the collection of signals such as phone conversations or electronics data (COMINT and ELINT). – Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is the information collected by sensors regarding different characteristics of a target. – Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) refers to the information collected from photographs and imagery. – Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to the information available in the public domain. Keeping in mind old principles, those disciplines are enhanced with new techniques and technological improvements, as adversaries evolve as well, using newer techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP). Nevertheless, HUMINT is still considered an old school discipline because it operates on the human terrain, by human collectors. In a certain way, that is a strength not to be ignored as it relies on a vast experience of highly qualified operators and intelligence organizations worldwide. Steinhart introduced the ‘cyber HUMINT’ concept, combining HUMINT traditional methodologies with intuitive innovation at the heart of ‘social engineering’ (Steinhart, 2014). Social engineering, popularized by the hacker KevinMitnick,2 is the art of exploiting human psychology to bypass technological control systems and consists of many techniques such as phishing, vishing, impersonation, persuasion, bribery, tailgating, shoulder surfing, exploiting human curiosity or greed, dumpster diving, etc. It can also be seen from the ‘defender’ side, for counterintelligence purposes. Consequently, we can focus on its improvement beyond human intelligence by dint of artificial intelligence and machine learning, more specifically. Possible techniques are, for example, the creation of spear-phishing bots, speech recognition, voice impersonation, deepfake, avatars and personality analysis. John Seymour developed an automated end-to-end spear phishing on Twitter called SNAP_R. Deepfake algorithms can create fake images and videos that humans cannot distinguish them from authentic ones (Seymour, 2016). DeepFaceLab and DeepFake-tf are examples of such tools. Personality computing studies how machines could automatically recognize or synthesize human personality and is nowadays expanding to predict human behaviour and personality traits through, for instance, the ‘associations between social media and other digital records, with established personality measures’ (Bleidorn, 2018), for instance. The application of such techniques by itself looks promising for the recognition of a certain type of attackers, eventually some individuals like script kiddies, but arguably less efficient to welltrained cybercriminals or nation state-sponsored attackers, using a very different cyber-person on cyberspace.

2

Kevin Mitnick (born in 1963) is an American computer security consultant, author and hacker. In the mid-90 s, he was ‘The World’s Most Wanted Hacker’ by the FBI, specialized in social engineering. He was convicted on multiple counts of wire fraud, possession of unauthorized access devices and other cybercrimes and spent 5 years in jail (TheFamousPeople, 2021).

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However, well combined, as impressive they seem to be used by attackers, they can also create powerful effects to mislead them. Nothing new, because since ancient times, men used deception to manipulate perceptions and thus gain an advantage over their adversaries or enemies. Military deception is ‘actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision-makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission’ (JCS, 2012). Humans have always dreamed to be able to predict future events accurately. Within the fog of war, military commanders seek victory, planning and conducting operations based on many factors, such as available forces, knowledge of the operational environment and its adversaries, where experience and judgement play essential roles. That is why deception had been closely related to warfare, manipulating perceptions and suggesting a very different outcome to one’s vision. History taught us countless events of ruses used to obtain an advantage. Nevertheless, contrasting with its successful application in traditional domains, deception seems to be still incipient in cyberspace. Based on game theory, historical evidence, social science and decision analysis theory, the CIA developed ‘Deception Maxims’ that are useful to frame better some concepts because they are considered general principles relatively unalterable and possibly suitable to different environments (Table 1). Deception will be based on one or more of those maxims. US Army, on its side, reveals four mains functions for military deception, depicted in the first column of the table below. For each function, in the second column, we added possible related ‘effects’ on cyberspace (Table 2). The identification of effects is an excellent tool for planners to achieve goals, synchronize operations, distribute tasks to specific subunits or sensors, etc. We are looking beyond monitoring, detection and passive defence to actively respond to adversaries. The application of effects is possible using specific techniques or tactics. US Army identifies, for instance, the following ones: Diversion, Feint, Demonstration, Ruse and Display. Heckman et al., on their side, developed a framework for supporting ‘Active Cyber Defence’, as an interesting approach translating the use of denial and deception from the physical world to the cyberworld and pointing to specific techniques (Heckman, 2015). Tactics, Techniques and procedures (TTP) gives the behaviour of any actor, adversary or not. In the following table, a methods matrix is depicted with techniques and tactics, useful to characterize unwanted behaviours (TTP), or to be used for the application of effects in our favour, during cyberspace operations (Table 3). The implementation of cyber-deception as an adaptive tool, called DECEPTINT, capable of fuelling the intelligence cycle, is under development at the Distributed Real-Time Systems Group of Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV), Spain. Using the most recent techniques of Artificial Intelligence capable of anticipating trends and thus adapting an adequate response in a real and friendly system, it seeks

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Table 1 Adapted from US Army (US Army, 2019) Magruder’s Principle

It is generally easier to induce the deception target to maintain a pre-existing belief than to deceive the deception target to change that belief

Limitations to human information processing: • the law of small numbers • the susceptibility to conditioning

• the tendency to generalize from a small sample set • the repeated presentation of stimuli to elicit a specific response from the target

Multiple forms of surprise

More forms of surprise more likely will overwhelm the target

Jones’ dilemma

The target receives information through multiple means and methods, from many angles. The greater the number of conduits that are deceptively manipulated, the greater the chance the target will believe the deception

Care in the design of the planned placement of The harder the target has to work to acquire deceptive material Intel, the more likely the target will believe it as credible Leverage the truth

A deception that conforms to proven or predictable patterns of behaviour is more likely to succeed

Minimize falsehood

Use only the amount of false information needed to produce the desired perceptions. Any falsehoods should be supported by elements of truth

Husbanding of deception assets

Withhold the employment of deception capabilities until the stakes and the benefits are high

Sequencing rule

Planners must sequence deception activities and maintain them for as long as possible to maximize the deception story

Importance of feedback

Planners must develop indicators that will determine the success or failure of the deception

Beware of possible unwanted reactions

Believing that a threat is real, an enemy can act unpredictably, resulting in unfavourable action

for unwanted events, proactively. DECEPTINT prototype will integrate with CyCOP, the UPV Cyber Situational Awareness System (Fig. 3). DECEPTINT architecture is based on three main modules: – Monitoring of adversaries TTP in cyberspace. – Deception tactics and techniques. – Projection of effects in the real system (e.g. deceive, deter, degrade and disrupt). In recent works, Hingant developed an enhanced intelligence system (Hingant, 2018) that provides the necessary decision-making support for an efficient critical

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Table 2 Adapted from US Army (US Army, 2019) Functions of military deception

Possible effects on cyberspace

Causing delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion or misunderstanding

Delay, uncertainty

Causing the enemy to misallocate personnel, fiscal and materiel resources

Manoeuvre, diversion

Causing the enemy to reveal strengths, weaknesses, dispositions and intentions

Exposition, Intelligence, predictive

Causing the enemy to waste combat power and resources with inappropriate or delayed actions

Degrade, resource depletion

Table 3 Adapted from Heckman et al. (Heckman, 2015) and Bennett and Waltz (Bennett, 2007) Deception objects Methods deception: revealing

Denial: concealing

Facts

Reveal facts: Paltering, Negative spin, Feints/Demo, Double Play, Double Bluff • Publish true network information • Allow disclosure of real files • Reveal technical deception capabilities • Reveal misleading compromise details • Selectively remediate intrusion

Dissimulation: Masking (pseudonyms, steganography), Repackaging (Crypto, footprinting), Dazzling (software obfuscation), Red Flagging (disposable email addresses) • Deny access to system resource • Hide software using stealth methods • Reroute network traffic • Silently intercept network traffic

Fictions

Simulation: Mimicking (fake accounts, clickjacking, DNS Cache poisoning), Inventing (Phishing), Decoying (honeypots), Double Play (evercookies) • Misrepresent intent of software • Modify network traffic • Expose fictional systems • Allow disclosure of fictional information

Conceal fiction: OPSEC, Positive Spin • Hide simulated information on honeypots • Keep deceptive security operations a secret • Allow partial enumeration of fictional files

infrastructure protection by combining the real-time situation of the physical and cyber-domains in a single visualization space, known as HYBINT, already part of CyCOP.

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Fig. 3 Actual print screen retrieved from CyCOP

4 Cyber-Attacks on Critical Infrastructures Attributed to Russia European Union defines a ‘critical infrastructure’ as ‘an asset, system or part thereof located in the Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions’ (EU, 2008). It is consequently vital for the functioning of modern societies at a national level but also inside the same organization where interdependencies are growing. Critical infrastructures are excellent targets, in certain geopolitical scenarios, for those seeking from multidomains to disturb countries, such as organized crime, cybercriminals, hacktivists or nation-sponsored attackers and hackers such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) groups. Fireeye company states ‘like other attackers, APT groups try to steal data, disrupt operations or destroy infrastructure. Unlike most cybercriminals, APT attackers pursue their objectives over months or years. They adapt to cyber defences and frequently retarget the same victim’ (FireEye, 2020). APT groups are frequently associated with China, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Vietnam. Russia is known to be particularly active. According to Panda Security, critical infrastructures have been hit by at least one cyber-attack in the previous 2 years, and vulnerability warnings are increasing (PandaSecurity, 2019). In the following table, using open-source reports, we have listed threat groups suspected to be linked with Russia (Table 4). The list is impressive by the number of associated groups and the suspected links with the Russian government. We know that State-sponsored actors score very high in risk management due to the severity of the consequences of an attack. We will

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Table 4 Threat Adapted from Mitre (MITRE Corporation, 2020) Name

Associated groups

Description

APT 28

SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127

Attributed to Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. This group has been active since at least 2004

APT 29

YTTRIUM, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, Attributed to the Russian government CozyDuke and has operated since at least 2008. This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015

Dragonfly 2.0

IRON LIBERTY, DYMALLOY, Berserk Bear

A suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016

Sandworm Team

ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING, BlackEnergy (Group), Quedagh, VOODOO BEAR

Attributed to Russian GRU Unit 74455 by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. Sandworm Team’s most notable attacks include the 2015 and 2016 targeting of Ukrainian electrical companies and 2017 s NotPetya attacks. Sandworm Team has been active since at least 2009

TEMP.Veles

XENOTIME

Has targeted critical infrastructure and been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems

Turla

Waterbug, WhiteBear, VENOMOUS BEAR, Snake, Krypton

Has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. The heightened activity was seen in mid-2015. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spear-phishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. Turla’s espionage platform is mainly used against Windows machines but has also been seen used against macOS and Linux machines

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focus our attention, for illustration purposes, on Temp.Veles, also known as Xenotime or ATK 9. Dragos characterize the Russia-based group as ‘the most dangerous threat activity publicly known. It is the only activity group intentionally compromising and disrupting industrial safety instrumented systems, which can lead to scenarios involving loss of life and environmental damage’ (Dragos, 2019). In 2017, a petrochemical facility suffered an attack through a malware called TRITON, controlling Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers, sold by Schneider Electric. The malware made a lateral movement in terms of the industrial sector, moving from oil and gas to electric utilities. Since 2019, a persistent pattern of activity attempting to gather information and enumerate network resources associated with U.S. and Asia–Pacific electric utilities was identified (Seals, 2019). In terms of Incident Handling, a company should certainly put a lot of attention on the first stages, independently of the framework being used: Preparation and Identification (or Detection and Analysis). It is certainly wise to hunt for malicious activities as early as possible, along the cyber kill chain. HSA with cyber-deception techniques is here applicable. In the table below, we will match some TTP used in TRITON with appropriate Intel techniques at early stages of the attack life cycle, more precisely at ‘Establish foothold’ and ‘Internal reconnaissance’ (Table 5). In this particular case, the expansion of malware can be traced geographically and in terms of sector of activity, and therefore intelligence gathering techniques in the physical domain apply. Additionally, with an HSA mindset, critical infrastructures, pre-emptively, can prepare their infrastructure for upcoming attacks, eventually monitoring continuously and using deception techniques to create uncertainty, diversion and consequently degrade the adversary and intend its exposition. Unfortunately, an attack can already be ongoing on posterior phases, and internal reconnaissance or lateral movement takes place, for instance. Threat hunters can benefit from HSA, based on the identification of attackers’ TTP through OSINT and Table 5 TRITON attack methodology versus DECEPTINT techniques

Adversary methodology

Deceptint methods and techniques

Credential harvesting

Dissimulation: Masking (pseudonyms)

Backdoor

Reveal facts: Allow disclosure

C and C domain name generator

Dissimulation: Silently intercept network traffic

Modified legitimate Outlook Simulation: web access Mimicking. Fake outlook web access Output file containing credentials harvested

Conceal fiction: Positive spin, allow partial enumeration of fictional credentials

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DECEPTINT, verifying if footprints or identified behaviours are discovered inside their organization.

5 Conclusion Along with History, Men sought to operationalize traditional domains such as Terrestrial, Sea and Air to project power and achieve its objectives. Cyberspace, a man-made global common within the informational environment, is not different and consists of specific challenges. We are nowadays more dependent on it to prosper but other actors, with different or colliding aspirations, can pose threats through cyber-attacks. A holistic and accurate understanding of today’s Operational Environment is important for the decision-making process and can be achieved through the fusion of situational awareness on physical and information environments, defined as ‘hybrid situational awareness’. We took a look at classic intelligence gathering disciplines enhanced by new concepts like ‘cyber HUMINT’ with machine learning but also techniques to perceive better and mislead adversaries, such as spear-phishing bots, deepfakes and personality analysis. Deception, in various forms, had been practised since antiquity to obtain an advantage but is still underused in cyberspace. Nevertheless, old principles apply to relatively recent cyberspace, where effects can be created based on deception, using specific tactics or techniques. DECEPTINT, for instance, is a prototype of implementation of cyber-deception, as an adaptive tool to proactively anticipate trends and respond, and integrates with the Cyber Situational Awareness System, CyCOP. Critical infrastructures are essentials for the maintenance of vital societal functions so they must be protected from attackers coming from multiple domains. Statesponsored actors are the most dangerous and several groups are commonly associated with Russia. For instance, Xenotime utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems, poses a serious threat to several sectors of activities around the world that could be exposed through threat hunting. Based on those case studies, we are convinced that cyber-deception and the fusion of enhanced intelligence collection techniques in the cyber-domain merged with the physical domain create a Hybrid Situational Awareness that can improve incident handling capability along the life cycle of an attack on critical infrastructures.

References ACT. (2011). Assured access to the global commons—Findings and recommendations. NATO. Bennett, W. (2007). Counterdeception principles and applications for national security. Artech House.

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Dragos. (2019). xenotime. Récupéré sur dragos: https://www.dragos.com/threat/xenotime/ Accessed February 1, 2021. Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors Journal, 37(1), 32–64. EU. (2008). Council Directive 2008/114/EC. European Union. FireEye. (2020, December). apt-groups.html#russia. Récupéré sur. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://www.fireeye.com: https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html#russia. Global Commons Alliance. (2020, December). global-commons. Récupéré sur globalcommonsalliance.org. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://globalcommonsalliance.org/global-com mons/. Heckman, S. T. (2015). Cyber denial, deception and counter deception. In Advances in Information Security (64). Springer. Hingant. (2018). A hybrid intelligence system for critical infrastructures protection. (p. 13). Wiley. JCS. (2012). Military deception. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS. (2014a). JP 2–01.3 Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS. (2014b). JP 3–13 information operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS. (2017). JP 3–0 joint operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Libicki, M. (2012). Cyberspace is not a warfighting domain. Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 8(2), 325–340. Mallick, P. (2018). Enhanced situational awareness for modern warfare. MITRE Corporation. (2020). groups. Récupéré sur MITRE ATTandCK. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://attack.mitre.org/groups/. PandaSecurity. (2019). xenotime-apt-critical-infrastructure. Récupéré sur www.pandasecurity.com. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://www.pandasecurity.com/en/mediacenter/news/xen otime-apt-critical-infrastructure/. Posen, B. R. (2003). Command of the commons: The military foundation of U.S. Hegemony. International Security, 28(1), 8–9. Seals, T. (2019). trisis-physical-destruction-electric-companies. Récupéré sur Threatpost. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://threatpost.com/trisis-physical-destruction-electric-companies/145 712/. Seymour, T. (2016). Weaponizing data science for social engineering: Automated E2E spear phishing on Twitter. BlackHat. Steinhart, A. (2014). The future is behind us? The human factor in cyber intelligence: Interplay between Cyber-HUMINT, Hackers and Social Engineering. Journal of Diplomacy, Diplomatic Institute. TheFamousPeople. (2021, 01). https://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/. Récupéré sur https:// www.thefamouspeople.com/. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://www.thefamouspeople. com/profiles/kevin-mitnick-37791.php. US Army. (2019). FM 3–13.4 army support to military deception. Government Printing Office. Vacca, W. A. (2011). Military culture and cyber security. Survival - Global Politics and Strategy, 164. Bleidorn, W., & Hopwood, C. J. (2018). Using machine learning to advance personality assessment and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review.

European Union Strategy and Capabilities to Counter Hostile Influence Operations Ramon Loik and Victor Madeira

1 Introduction States, especially authoritarian ones such as Russia and China, have long used targeted information operations to secure political goals and advance strategic interests. Foreign interference itself is nothing new, but the ‘toolbox’ of information manipulation has grown rapidly in the past 15 years, especially as different digital and social media platforms spread. With the ambition of restoring Russia’s global standing, the Russian State under Vladimir Putin’s regime has developed a highly instrumentalist and interest-centric interpretation of ‘soft power’ (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, 359). Hostile influence operations, including electoral interference, are one of Moscow’s key instruments to increase its influence in the ‘near abroad’1 and further beyond (see Vilmer, 2019, 1–2). As a recent report put it, anyone 1

Most commonly, a term in the Kremlin’s geopolitically motivated language referring to the 14 successor (or so-called ‘post-Soviet’) states, other than Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ramon Loik is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS). E-mail: [email protected]. Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the position of the ICDS. The corresponding author declares that there is no conflict of interest. Dr. Victor Madeira is a Contributing Author to The Cambridge Security Initiative (CSi). Email: [email protected]. Disclaimer: Views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect CSi’s position. The author declares that there is no conflict of interest. R. Loik (B) International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] V. Madeira Cambridge Security Initiative (CSi), Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_13

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‘in the Baltic states, Ukraine, or Georgia has been used to Russian disinformation campaigns since the early 1990s’ (CEPA, 2020). The ‘wake-up’ call for the European Union (EU) was only gradual. It came with the Russian Federation’s illegal annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014, military interventions in eastern Ukraine later that year and in Syria in September 2015, as well as interference in the 2016 US presidential campaign and election. In addition, the suspected role of Russian interference before the Brexit referendum (see, among others, Kirkpatrick, 2017; Ellehuus, 2020), in the ‘Lisa Case’ in Germany (see, among others, Meister, 2016) and the ‘Macron Leaks’ in France (see, among others, Vilmer, 2019), also alarmed Europe. For governments under attack from disinformation, it quickly became clear that hostile information operations pose a real threat to proper democratic processes. By 2021, the EU has also clearly recognised that disinformation seriously endangers public safety, and democratic values and freedoms, as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012). The European Council’s (EC) 19 and 20 March 2015 meeting conclusions stressed the common need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns against Europe. The EC invited the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in cooperation with member states and EU institutions, to prepare an action plan on strategic communication and the ‘establishment of a communication team as a first step in this regard’ (European Council, 2015, 5). By June 2015, the EU launched an Action Plan on Strategic Communication, establishing also a start-up East StratCom Team2 within the European External Action Service (EEAS), with a coordinating and monitoring role regarding strategic communications in furthering EU policy objectives in the Eastern neighbourhood and beyond. By doing so, the EU took a step closer towards its ambition of becoming a more coherent actor in the information security domain. Six years later, it is now an appropriate time to evaluate progress of EU strategy and capabilities in promoting significant values and normative power across wider Europe. To do so, this chapter examines some key areas of EU initiatives. First, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), which looks to empower civil society and grassroots movements along EU borders and beyond. Second, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), as a model for improving inter-governmental cooperation between EU member states as national regulators. And third, the EUvsDisinfo counter-disinformation platform. Together, these case studies help us to understand the complexity of EU strategy and how it is building capabilities to safeguard the information environment as common, security-driven policy domain.

2

Officially the East StratCom Task Force (ESCTF).

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2 Setting the Scene Informational security challenges—including disinformation—know no physical or digital borders, and can lead to serious service disruptions, flawed decisions and destructive behaviour. From a wider perspective, the recent EU Security Union Strategy (European Commission, 2020b) emphasised that the Covid-19 pandemic has reaffirmed how threats and uncertainties create wider safety and security vulnerabilities. This only increases the potential for more complex (i.e. subtler) ‘hybrid’ challenges by state and non-state actors, with dependencies and vulnerabilities open to exploitation. Hostile actors could do so through a combination of cyberattacks, damage to critical infrastructure (see also Council Directive, 2008)3 and disinformation campaigns to polarise target societies by radicalising their political narratives (see also Pamment, 2020d). As L. Güllner, head of EEAS strategic communications, has argued, ‘pro-Kremlin disinformation actors have spread conspiracy theories and orchestrated disinformation campaigns, sowing confusion and targeting the EU, its member states, and its neighbours by alleging a lack of solidarity and an internal crisis’ (Güllner, 2020, 1). The latest Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) annual report (EFIS, 2021) shows how one of the main tasks of Russian ‘special services’4 is to conduct influence operations abroad in the Kremlin’s strategic interests. The Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU or GU) all carry out covert influence operations though with different, but often overlapping, emphases. For the Kremlin, political-psychological warfare aims to influence foreign (mainly Western) audiences to modify their views and behaviours in Russia’s political interest. Targets include political, business and religious leaders, military personnel and civilian audiences. Targeting can be quite specific, such as of ethnic, religious, other minority and various opposition groups. Online, for example, the GRU concentrates on popular social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Reddit and VKontakte. In 2020, the GRU used English-language online portals under its control—such as inforos.ru, infobrics.org and oneworld.press—to disseminate false information (‘fake news’) about the Covid-19 pandemic. The aim: undermining Western efforts to tackle the spread of the virus while vastly exaggerating the limited successes of Russia’s own inadequate measures to protect its population. The GRU also uses online platforms to plant disinformation more widely overseas, including for Russians living abroad, in the hope that messages will spread as widely as possible and that the original source remains hidden (see EFIS, 2021, 59–63). 3

According to Council Directive 2008/114/EC, critical infrastructure is any that is vital for societal functions such as safety, health, security, economic or social well-being, and whose disruption or destruction has a significant impact. By addressing the direct link between protecting critical infrastructure and democratic resilience, the EU Security Union Strategy widens critical infrastructure protection to good governance in functioning democracies. 4 Spetssluzhby are security and intelligence agencies, as Western democracies would understand them, but in the Russian context this implies a far wider role overseeing assassination, politicalpsychological warfare and other ‘special’ duties.

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The Russian Federation remains one of the two main states that threaten Western (liberal) democracies also in cyberspace. Beyond traditional espionage, Russian special services actively use the cyberdomain in hostile influence operations to create and/or escalate socio-political divisions in targeted countries and international organisations (EFIS, 2021, 65). One example: in 2019, suspected Russian hackers stole US–UK trade negotiation documents from a former UK Trade Secretary’s e-mail account and leaked them on social media. One of the negotiation topics was the UK National Health Service (Stubbs & Faulconbridge, 2020), its possible privatisation being intensely debated during the 2019 General Election campaign. Another example: on the day of the 2016 Montenegrin parliamentary election, media and government websites suffered distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Such attacks again happened in 2017 after Montenegro declared its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—NATO (see EFIS, 2021, 67–68). These are examples of offensive, or so-called ‘probe and push’, tactics that are key to Russian information warfare doctrine (see, among others, Giles, 2016).

3 The EU as an Aspiring Actor in the Information Security Domain The EU is a polycentric political system characterised by a drive to cooperate and gradually integrate, with complexity of interdependence growing as the division of powers between EU member states and institutions develops. According to its Global Strategy (2016), the EU is also aiming and mandated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—TFEU (2012) to safeguard member states and their citizens better, with the ambition of achieving a high level of security within its area of free movement and sufficient stability in its neighbourhood. Hence, the EU has gradually prioritised security cooperation when implementing its strategy of providing regional stability in a changing and interconnected security environment. This points to the EU’s aspiration to develop as a coherent, legitimate collective security actor. The political challenge is similar to C. Hill’s (1993) well-known concern about the ‘capability–expectations’ gap in realising the EU’s economic and diplomatic potential internationally. In terms of credibility in security affairs, the emphasis is on the EU’s effectiveness in offering added value to its member states when tackling cross-border security challenges, such as the spread of disinformation as a threat to public safety and democratic values. The main way to achieve credible security influence is to understand the EU’s wider region as a whole. It is an interconnected and interdependent space of security challenges, which should create enough common security awareness, a convergence of interests and combined capabilities for coordinated activities between member states. This, despite them all having different geographical, historical, socioeconomic and other attributes, as well as shifting political preferences. The securitisation of the cyberdomain over the past decade reflects the convergence of information

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security needs. And it also stresses the importance of EU-level mechanisms that widen the understanding of what the ‘security issue’ is, which should additionally be coordinated at Union level. The security of fast-changing information and communications technology networks is vital for the proper functioning of infrastructure in an information era, something already recognised by the Digital Agenda for Europe (2010) and the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union (2013). These addressed policy issues related to anti-cybercrime measures to guarantee a safer Internet and better privacy protection in the digital space. The high-tech European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol already plays an important EU-level analytical and coordinating role in the fight against cybercrime (Europol, 2021). Beyond the EC3, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European Information Sharing and Alerting System (EISAS) liaise with a network of national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). The focal points in the EU’s fight against cybercrime, CERTs are responsible for safer Internet traffic and have been under operational development since 2012 (see also EU Internal Security Strategy, 2010). These national- and EU-level security initiatives should work closely with relevant privatesector companies to reach technological goals and innovate compatible security tools. In addition to increasing common cybersecurity measures, the EC’s 19 and 20 March 2015 meeting conclusions emphasised the need to resist Russia’s disinformation campaigns. The EC also mandated the High Representative with EEAS to maintain a coordinating role in relation to EU strategic communication in furthering EU policy objectives in the Eastern neighbourhood and beyond. The three overall objectives of the EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication fell into two main categories. The first was proactive, aimed at increasing the EU’s influence as a normative power. This involved promoting commitment to liberal democracy, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, protection of minority rights and fundamental freedoms of expression, and of independent media in target countries. The second category of Action Plan objectives sets out to achieve ‘increased public awareness of disinformation activities by external actors, and improved EU capacity to anticipate and respond to such activities’ (Action Plan on Strategic Communication, 2015, 1). The EEAS Strategic Communications 2 Task Forces and Information Analysis Division (see EEAS, 2021) is currently contributing to the EU’s counterdisinformation objectives mainly by monitoring, detecting, analysing and exposing hostile influence and interference operations. The EEAS also cooperates internationally, for example, with NATO, the Group of Seven (G7) and relevant civil society associations. The EUvsDisinfo (2021) platform and several social media channels regularly publish findings on mis- and disinformation campaigns, and also share them with EU institutions and member states, including via the Rapid Alert System (RAS) on Disinformation (European Commission, 2018).5 5

The RAS is one of the key elements of the EU Action Plan Against Disinformation (JOIN/2018/36 final) of 5 December 2018. The tool to enable exchange of information about ‘fake news’ campaigns was set up in March 2019.

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Table 1 Key coordinated actions by the EU to tackle online disinformation (2015–2020) March 2015

EC’s 19–20 March 2015 meeting conclusions, including on challenge of ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns against European countries

March 2015

Launch: EEAS ESCTF

June 2015

Action Plan on Strategic Communication

April 2016

EU Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats

April 2018

Communication: Tackling Online Disinformation—a European Approach

September 2018

EU Package of Measures on Free and Fair European Elections

September 2018

Code of Practice Against Disinformation

November 2018

Launch: Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA)

December 2018

Joint Communication on Action Plan Against Disinformation

January 2019

Inaugural meeting: European Cooperation Network on Elections

January–May 2019

Reporting by online platforms

March 2019

European Media Literacy Week

March 2019

Set up: RAS

May 2019

European Commission’s contribution to the informal EU27 leaders’ meeting in Sibiu

June 2020

Joint Communication on Tackling Covid-19 Disinformation

December 2020

Communication: Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade—An Action Plan to Support Recovery and Transformation

Source Collated by the authors based on original European Commission (2021) data

Yet as Pamment (2020b, 5) critically argues, the EU has taken some counterdisinformation action against adversaries but has struggled with how to do so effectively. Current EU disinformation policy lacks clear terminology, firm legal foundations, a strong evidence base and a reliable political mandate. This means that several EU counter-disinformation instruments have not developed systematically. Quite limited successes so far, such as the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Action Plan Against Disinformation, the East StratCom Task Force (ESCTF) and the RAS have come by with difficulty. The timeline of key coordinated actions by the EU to tackle online disinformation between 2015 and 2020 is presented in Table 1.

4 European Endowment for Democracy The European Endowment for Democracy (EED or ‘Endowment’) is an independent grant-awarding organisation that supports citizens striving for democracy in the European Neighbourhood—the Eastern Partnership (EaP), Middle East, North Africa, the western Balkans and Turkey. Eastern Neighbourhood countries eligible for support are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (see

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EED, 2021a). The Endowment is arguably one of Europe’s more effective tools in promoting EU values across neighbouring regions, with the added benefit of helping also to counter hostile influence on the continent itself. The Endowment does so by supporting grassroots and individual engagement. This gets around most bureaucratic barriers, particularly in grantees’ countries, that so often constrain and intimidate civil society, including through state repression and ‘ideology’. But there are also growing concerns that the Endowment may be overlooking internal vulnerabilities because of its own ideological ‘blind spots’ since its creation. The Arab Spring events of 2011—especially in Tunisia—prompted the EU and member states to set up the Endowment in 2013 as a way of promoting democracy in the European Neighbourhood and beyond (see EED, 2017, 8). The Endowment (see EED, 2017, 2) claims a ‘distinctive niche’: its ‘ability to operate in difficult, often dangerous, environments [and] often off-limits to other donors’, partly because of limited mandates and grant-awarding cycles. The Endowment funds (see EED, 2018, 10) human rights and political activists, democracy movements and civil society organisations, young leaders, and independent media and journalists. In other words, they are all registered or unregistered pro-democracy activists who may not get funded otherwise. Support and funding are to advance democratic values, observance of principles of non-violence and respect for human rights. The Endowment’s willingness to take risks and ‘rapid response’ operational model (EED, 2017, 2) have proved effective in supporting pro-democracy voices by providing ‘flexible, gap-filling, un-bureaucratic, and demand-driven support’ (EED, 2018, 52). Since its establishment in 2013, the EED has received over 6,000 requests for support, of which nearly 1,350 initiatives have been funded, worth nearly 80 million euros. The EED has also organised about 130 events presenting the work of pro-democracy activists from more than 20 countries (see EED, 2019, 3; EED, 2021b, 13–16). Twenty-three European countries so far and the European Commission have provided most of the funding, Canada contributing also through a special Ukraine grant (EED, 2019, 56). Ukraine, the Baltic States and the Balkans have been the key planks of Endowment efforts to advance EU values in EaP countries, while also countering malign Russian influence there. The number of EED-funded media initiatives by type of support between 2013 and 2019 is presented in Chart 1. In March 2014, the Kyiv-based Mohyla School of Journalism launched the online platform StopFake.org. A network of experts, journalists and translators manages and supports the website in 12 languages as of April 2021, fact-checking and refuting disinformation on Ukraine in international media channels (Legrand, 2016, 16). The EED has importantly contributed to countering Russia’s disinformation in EaP countries by supporting independent Russian-language media there. The EED foreshadowed this topic to the EU’s agenda with its study ‘Bringing Plurality and Balance to the Russian Language Media Space’, in which recommendations were presented in May 2015 during the first EaP media conference in Riga (EED, 2018, 45). But not until 2017 were the Russian Language News Exchange, the Riga-based Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME) and the Creative Content Support Fund (Content Fund) properly underway (Garcia, 2018). And only at the end of that same year did

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Core Funding

71

Start-Up (Actors)

42

Start-Up (Activities)

32

Bridge Funding

29

Un(der) Supported Thematic Activities

28

Rapid Response

27

Political Risk

24 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Chart 1 Number of EED-funded media initiatives by type of support (2013–2019). Source Collated and composed by the authors based on original data in Crozier (2019, 5)

the Endowment’s Board of Governors agree to start western Balkans operations in 2018. To the Endowment’s credit, internal and external monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) reviews have from the start been central to the organisation’s work and driven it. In 2015, independent assessors noted (see EED, 2016, 49) that the Endowment quickly became a relevant actor that ‘fills gaps, complements the work of other EU donors, and is responsive to the needs of (potential) grantees’. In 2016, an external review into the first three years of operations highlighted ‘significant results already’ through ‘fast and flexible’ grant awards. Good examples are authoritarian environments such as Azerbaijan and Egypt, where few other grant-making bodies operated; and Ukraine, where the Endowment quickly established a reputation for supporting rapid social changes happening, including as a result of and to counter Russian disinformation (EED, 2017, 3). Despite an overall positive assessment, the 2016 review (EED, 2017, 21) also identified areas for improvement—especially grantee concerns about long-term sustainability and a need to foster gender equality in democracy. In 2018, the Endowment (see EED, 2019, 5) undertook three monitoring missions to assess performance from different perspectives, including regional and thematic. And in 2019, the EED (2020, 47) launched its in-house MEL function, though interestingly and for the first time, no ‘lessons learnt’—not even anonymised case studies—appeared in the annual report published in late March 2020. Though possibly a coincidence, the timing of this sudden change is interesting to note. Shortly after, in mid-June 2020, Thierry Mariani, a far-right French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) joined the Endowment’s Board of Governors, causing alarm in civil society and political circles. His evident pro-Kremlin positions over the years have meant that Mariani supported the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, and actually visited it afterwards and has pushed for sanctions on Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, given his longstanding business and personal ties to prominent Russian politicians and businessmen (see Euromaidan,

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2020). The growing concerns before his resignation from the Board in September 2020 were that Mariani could access the Endowment’s plans and work, including identities of grantees in particularly hostile environments. Any of this could potentially put activists there at particular risk of reprisals. Understandably, such sensitivities may explain why not much detail is publicly available, even in annual EED reports (2016–2020) that would allow a better assessment of effectiveness.

5 European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services and EUvsDisinfo 5.1 ERGA Seven years after its establishment, the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA or ‘Group’) is one of Europe’s most effective tools in preserving EU values and countering hostile influence across the continent itself. The Group does so by bringing together top regulators and subject-matter experts whose greatest collective asset is their independence. But there have been concerns in recent years that the Group’s effectiveness is under threat from (national) attempts to dilute this same independence, which professional and industry associations say helps ensure the EU’s continued global leadership in countering online harms. The ERGA was established in 2014 (Commission Decision, 2014) as an advisory body to the European Commission to ‘advise and assist it’, to ‘cooperate and exchange information’ and ‘to give opinions when requested by the Commission’, with ‘procedural autonomy’6 (European Audiovisual, 2019, 24; see also Kukliš, 2019; ERGA, 2021a)—in other words, independence. The Group brings together top-level representatives of independent, national audiovisual regulators to advise the European Commission on implementing the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive—AVMSD (2018). The Directive guides European coordination of national laws on audiovisual media—both traditional TV broadcasts and online streaming services—which ‘like other goods and services’ also come under EU single-market rules. Key areas of coordination include stopping hate speech, widening access and protection of minors, while looking to ensure key coordination goals like preserving cultural diversity, safeguarding media diversity, and fighting racial and religious hatred (see AVMSD, 2020). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) praises the Group as one of only a handful of regulators (or countries) worldwide following governance ‘best practice’ (see OECD, 2014; 2021).7 As part of its ongoing work advising the European Commission (ERGA, 2021b), the Group has undertaken 6

North Macedonia, Norway and Serbia are also ERGA members. The seven ‘best practice’ principles are: role clarity; preventing undue influence and maintaining trust; decision-making and governing body structure for independent regulators; accountability and transparency; engagement; funding and performance evaluation.

7

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three major projects related to defending EU values and countering hostile influence: (i) participation in the European Cooperation Network on Elections (2018), (ii) assessing European media plurality (ERGA, 2019) and (iii) assessing the implementation of the voluntary European Code of Practice on Disinformation online (ERGA, 2020). This last project, especially linked to the first one and carried out by a special task force in two phases (see Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, 2020), has further strengthened the Group’s reputation for being able to advise the European Commission (2020a) on complex topics with clear geopolitical implications. Some MEPs (see GUE/NGL, 2016) have in recent years voiced concerns about national efforts to erode the Group’s independence and its role through proposed amendments to AVMSD, the most recent revision coming into force since November 2018 (AVMSD, 2020). While some of these concerns seem to have been addressed in the near term, others will remain—especially as the online media landscape continues to shift in coming years due to geopolitical, economic and other crises (not all of them foreseeable). What is reassuring is that journalist and related professional groups continue to call for more Group involvement in monitoring and tackling growing threats to media and speech freedoms in the EU (European Federation of Journalists, 2020). National regulators work closely together but recent surveys show that most such authorities would like to increase cooperation, highlighting just how valuable the Group is. Some regulators believe that it should become more active in cross-border issues and possibly represent regulators in global discussions on new services. Moreover, while the EU decides on regulatory frameworks, national regulators or courts in practice enforce them (Kukliš, 2019). A crucial cross-border issue, for example, is the growing global debate on whether, how (much) and when to regulate and/or tax online content platforms such as Facebook or Twitter as vehicles for the spread of disinformation. No European national regulator can tackle this alone, so the Group should lead on talks with other G7 national regulators, for example, on countering disinformation. Since the EU further integrates and harmonises rules and implementation, future effectiveness assessments should consider how much value the strengthened EU networks of national regulators could add to smoother and more integrated enforcement. In a borderless digital world, an EU regulator, similar to the US Federal Trade Commission, may be in order. One already exists for the banking and financial sector, for example, and the Group would be well placed to advise the European Commission further on this vital issue (de Streel, 2019, 7). Also, the European Data Protection Board’s new General Data Protection Regulation strategy includes the issuing of new guidance and developing a Coordinated Enforcement Framework to close enforcement gaps (CMS, 2021). Improved cooperation among national regulators, and between them and the Group, has since at least 2015 been recognised as essential in fighting disinformation and hostile influence effectively (see Action Plan on Strategic Communication, 2015).

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5.2 EUvsDisinfo European counter-disinformation has been fragmented and not nearly as effective as intended, mainly due to a slow understanding of the problem, diverging national interests and a lack of common political will. By 2020, the tiny 16-strong EUvsDisinfo team was the ESCTF’s ‘flagship’ counter-disinformation project, although the team’s 3-year non-renewable funding was due to end last year (Pamment, 2020b, 8). In 2018, the ESCTF received an additional 1.1 million euros to counter Russian disinformation, this increasing to 3 million euros in 2019 (EEAS, 2018). Compared with this, Russian state media outlets for 2020 had a combined budget of around 1.3 billion euros (EUvsDisinfo, 2019). For many politicians, officials and citizens, it is difficult to understand, at a visceral level, the language of contemporary conflict—physical or psychological, real or implied—that authoritarians really ‘speak’. Currently, the ESCTF and its EUvsDisinfo team tackle sources of disinformation beyond EU borders mainly (EUvsDisinfo, 2021c). This leaves a key vulnerability on the domestic (internal) front that Russia and other actors, state and non-state, continue to exploit. The European Commission approved the creation of ESCTF in June 2015 to monitor and implement the EU’s agenda regarding the Eastern Neighbourhood, and wider efforts aimed at ‘strengthening the overall media environment’ (including ‘support for media freedom and strengthening independent media’), all while improving ‘Union capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities by the Russian Federation’ (European Commission, 2018, 4). EUvsDisinfo’s key objective is ‘to increase public awareness and understanding’ of Russian disinformation operations, and help European and neighbouring citizens ‘develop resistance to digital information and media manipulation’ (EUvsDisinfo, 2021a). By April 2021, the EUvsDisinfo database consisted of nearly 11,600 pro-Kremlin disinformation cases (EUvsDisinfo, 2021b), enabling the monitoring of key trends and narratives in Russia’s information operations. The EUvsDisinfo platform uses two criteria to determine whether evidence of disinformation goes into the database. First, whether the ‘message is verifiably false or misleading, according to the publicly available factual evidence’. And second, if ‘the message originates in a Kremlinfunded media outlet or other’ source with ‘clear links to the Russian Federation’ (EUvsDisinfo, 2021c). Since the Covid-19 outbreak, EUvsDisinfo has collected nearly 800 examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation related to the pandemic. In April and May 2020 alone, for example, the EUvsDisinfo database logged more than 100 new cases of pro-Russian disinformation on Covid-19 and the EU’s responses to it. Publications carrying such disinformation messages received over 230,000 likes, comments and shares on social media platforms (see EEAS Strategic Communications 2 Task Forces and Information Analysis, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic has also exposed some serious weaknesses in the supranational vision, not least a damaging but entirely predictable reassertion of national interest when struggling countries most needed solidarity during the first lockdown in early 2020. Though the EU disputes this, it is failing to limit substantially Russian disinformation, which is going more ‘local’

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to avoid detection and countermeasures. In other words, Russia is working harder to find European voices to spread and amplify disinformation, making it harder to track. What is more, Russia remains ‘undeterred’ because the EU sees disinformation as a ‘tech governance challenge’ rather than the geopolitical threat that it is (Nardelli, 2020). By ‘going local’ to attack others, Russia has created and can exploit a key vulnerability in the work of the ESCTF and EUvsDisinfo more narrowly. Neither can counter disinformation from European websites or media, even any highlighting Russia’s disruptive support for European far-right and far-left parties (see Apuzzo, 2019). Calls continue for the EU to plug urgently such gaps in ESCTF and EUvsDisinfo capabilities, especially this domestic element. It should expand to cover hostile influence operations by ‘state, non-state (e.g. terror and extremist political groups), and private sector and political actors’ (Pamment, 2020a, 6). But the greatest obstacle to effective counter-disinformation across the EU is diverging national interests, leading to a lack of trust among members and therefore poor information-sharing. The leading European expert on counter-disinformation and resilience, James Pamment (2020b, 5), recently described the EU’s current disinformation policy as: characterized by a lack of terminological clarity, unclear and untested legal foundations, a weak evidence base, an unreliable political mandate, and a variety of instruments that have developed in an organic rather than a systematic manner […] many member states do not recognize the problem, do not publicly attribute particular malign activities to the offending adversaries, or are under political pressure to limit support to EU-level activities to counter disinformation.

Political will is what will ultimately make the difference in countering disinformation and hostile influence. As Pamment (2020c, 7) explains, true deterrence is only possible cumulatively, by ‘raising costs, denying benefits and denying capabilities’ in geopolitical terms. And the Task Force(s) and EUvsDisinfo can learn much about effective deterrence from other fields such as criminology (Innes, 2020).8 The EUvsDisinfo platform and campaign are good examples of public education work that the EU can expand if it decides to tackle more than just pro-Kremlin disinformation and influence. But the EU will need ‘to develop the EUvsDisinfo database into a more useful resource that goes beyond simply logging individual examples of disinformation’ (Pamment, 2020d, 15). Most importantly, the ‘task forces that perform monitoring and analysis need to be protected from day-to-day political considerations’ (Pamment, 2020d, 14). If the EU chooses to do at least some of what is outlined here, it will be much closer to having four kinds of effective countermeasures against disinformation and hostile influence (see also Pamment, 2020d, 16–17): ‘democracy-building’ (e.g. EED), ‘norm-defining’ (e.g. Code of Practice on Disinformation), ‘resilience-building’ (e.g. EUvsDisinfo) and ‘adversary-influencing’ (e.g. ESCTF). These should complement each other along a spectrum of defensive and offensive countermeasures. And unlike what has happened so far, all need guaranteed funding for longer periods and for doing more than just the bare minimum of work. Commit, say, to trebling staff levels 8

For example, the 3Ds: Disrupt, Displace, Deter.

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for at least 5 years. Any less is to keep sending hostile states the message that all they have to do is wait until the EU, or national governments at that, either lose interest or events force their attention elsewhere.

6 Conclusion The EU’s approach to building capacity to counter hostile influence operations has been cautious and fragmented, but steadily developing. It has moved towards more coherent and cooperative policies between member states, who are the main security actors responding to public safety challenges within their jurisdiction. So, when it comes to promoting values and countering hostile influence, the question is into what kinds of ‘power’ for the EU do the examples of the EED, ERGA and EUvsDisinfo translate. Certainly, a measure of ‘soft power’, though the EU does not always think through the broader geopolitical implications of some of its internal and external policies. Often this means a real EU struggle to be understood beyond the Brussels ‘bubble’, costing the Union much-needed popular support and, so, some of this hard-earned soft power. Two relevant examples are the weak response to Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and subsequent political powerlessness to impose meaningful sanctions against the NordStream 2 natural gas pipeline. Since 2015, the EU has clearly recognised that the spread of disinformation poses extensive risks to public safety, and threatens democratic political processes and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is the EU’s primary legal basis for safeguarding freedom of expression and protecting fundamental rights in the information domain, done through strategies and initiatives to build capabilities to counter hostile influence operations. After several hostile information campaigns against some of its member states, the EU set out and implemented measures to counter disinformation from 2015 onwards. Institutionally, the responsibility for strategic communications and countering disinformation falls on the EEAS, which allocates far fewer resources than needed to be operationally successful against adversaries such as Russia or China. The EU’s approach to building counter-disinformation capacity falls broadly into situational awareness efforts (‘detect and deter’) and defensive operational measures (‘react and respond’). This is the normal approach for a liberal-democratic international organisation like the EU. This contrasts with many examples of offensive (‘probe and push’) tactics that dominate Russian doctrinal thinking on information warfare to achieve its strategic goals in the ‘near abroad’ and beyond. This seems further to undermine claims that the EU is a true normative power. What is more, anti-EU sentiment, with its internal and external drivers and many actors, is here to stay despite temporary setbacks in some European and other elections. How persuasive the EU is depends on it being able to spread its values: here the EED and ERGA are characteristic instruments. But countering disinformation and hostile influence have not been nearly as successful, despite EUvsDisinfo’s good work identifying and exposing hostile information operations.

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When it comes to ‘hard power’ use, a credible European deterrent is still a long way off: defence, security and intelligence resources are nowhere near the cutting-edge global capabilities of the Anglophone ‘Five Eyes’ (FVEY) alliance—or rather ‘Six Eyes’ (SXEY), with Japan as a likely new member.9 Europe has more successfully deployed its ‘soft power’; here, the EED, ERGA and the EUvsDisinfo all contribute in their own way to somewhat effective strategic communication efforts to spread European values. But this is still not enough if not backed up by ‘hard power’ instruments such as effectively targeted economic sanctions to counter the ‘sharp power’ deployed at will by authoritarian adversaries such as Russia and China. Hence, the EU cannot be naïve and should allocate far greater resources to counter the original sources of disinformation that can cost many lives, as the offensive information campaign against European Covid-19 vaccination efforts has shown. Strategically, the EU should more effectively use its significant economic and trade power as the main dimensions of Europe’s ‘hard power’. This could put pressure on social media platforms to detect and deter disinformation by removing inappropriate content and sanctioning malign actors. And such pressure could also help to uncover more easily the original sources of hostile influence, and to apply effective, targeted economic or trade restrictions on guilty actors where possible.

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Strategic Environment and Interpretation of History in Kremlin’s Influence Operations

Russia’s Strategic Blame Narratives: Comparative Analysis of Domestic and International Media Coverage About 5G Andreas Ventsel, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Sten Hansson

1 Introduction The present article analyses discourse about 5G technology in channels targeted both at the Russophone domestic audience (NTV, Perviy Kanal, ITAR-TASS) and at the Anglophone foreign audience (Sputnik, RT), domains where this topic has emerged forcefully over the last couple of years. Since 5G technology is seen as central to the next developmental stage of digital technology, it is understandable why 5G has turned into an important theme of dispute in several state policies. This article explores the functions of 5G-themed stories in Russian strategic communication. One central feature of the analysed Russian media coverage is the discursive construction of blame, i.e. the use of language to portray some actor as deserving blame for having intentionally caused a negative outcome, or for violating a norm. We combine insights and tools from discourse-analytic studies of blame (Hansson, 2018a, b) and studies of strategic narratives in international relations (Miskimmon et al., 2017). Some goals of strategic narratives, among others, are to achieve a shift in the status of parties to undermine the opposing party’s reputation, to create alliances, etc. (Madisson & Ventsel, 2020). Our framework helps to identify the specific ways in which certain articulations of blame in relation to the adoption of 5G technology A. Ventsel (B) · M.-L. Madisson · S. Hansson University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] M.-L. Madisson · S. Hansson Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia M.-L. Madisson Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK S. Hansson University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_14

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are used by Russian state-funded news portals to achieve these strategic purposes. Analysing blaming devices in the context of strategic narratives enables us to explicate the discursive mechanisms used to construct strategic narratives and to explain how these devices perform wider communication purposes. These two perspectives thus complement each other: blaming devices specify the discursive articulation of strategic narratives, while the strategic narrative enables us to contextualise blaming devices in more general strategic aims. Contemporary conflicts are, to a large extent, shaped in and through media. Strategic communication implemented by the state aims, first and foremost, to ‘win the hearts’ of media audiences and to legitimise its agenda through means of soft power. Moreover, previous research demonstrates that the Russian government supports the projection of strategic narratives which include negative information about Western societies and/or their politics, using state-sponsored media outlets (Ramsay & Robertshaw, 2019; Watanabe, 2018, 139; Yablokov, 2015). Analysing Russophone and Anglophone media coverage of 5G technology should thus explicate the aims and differences in Russian strategic communication on this theme to domestic and foreign audiences. The media discourse under analysis here is characterised by the fact that Russia is not included among the principal parties. Instead, the main actors represented are the United States and China who ‘struggle over the terms of global order’ (Ikenberry, 2015, 2). Both these powers are represented as tending to constrain rather than encourage more cooperative solutions to key global challenges (Ikenberry et al., 2015). With the protectionist foreign policy of Donald Trump and with China’s emergent economic and military power, trade conflicts become ‘politically instrumentalised’ (Perthes, 2020, 6). Our aim is to analyse the discursive devices of these blame games through which Russia puts forward its political goals, creates strategic alliances and undermines Euro-Atlantic relations in the context of US–China conflict. To clarify, here we will not investigate the direct effect of strategic narratives on the audience; instead, we will focus first and foremost on textual strategies identifiable through qualitative research of media representations. Effective analysis would require designing experiments and using quantitative methods. Similarly, we will not be taking a stance on the adequacy of the future scenarios articulated in connection to 5G technology, nor will we speculate on the probability of the realisation of security risks. The chapter begins with the unpacking of the concept of strategic narrative and with the mapping of the main strategic narratives of the Russian Federation. Then we will present the context for the 5G-related conflict and a sample of our research. We will analyse Russia’s media coverage of the topic as targeted both at the domestic and foreign audiences, focusing primarily on the articulations of blame in 5G subnarratives and on how the theme of 5G technology is integrated into Russia’s main narratives.

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2 Understanding Strategic Narratives and the Construction of Blame Strategic narratives can be defined as the ‘means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors’ (Miskimmon et al., 2017, 6). Speaking in a general sense, audiences attribute meaning to events through strategic narratives, or in other words, through interpretive structures (Nissen, 2015, 22). Characteristic of strategic narratives is their intentionality, that is, they always entail the conscious purpose of the actor shaping the narrative to frame the conflicts in question in a certain manner, and through this process to influence the decisionmaking processes of the target audience towards a beneficial direction to this actor (O’Loughlin et al., 2017, 50). Strategic narratives help to create a context (which organises various information fragments) and guide the meaning-making of the media audience. This is the reason why those shaping the narratives must take into account the views and expectations the target audience holds at any given period and be aware of the sensitive themes at play in the formation of the addressee’s identity. Knowing the target audience and the specific context of communication enables one to activate the meaning-making mechanisms stored in the audience’s memory and through them shape and direct the interpretive paths of the addressee.

2.1 System Narratives, Identity Narratives and Policy Narratives Miskimmon and others have proposed a three-tier model for analysing strategic narratives; they distinguish between system, identity and policy narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2017, 8). System narratives articulate how the global political field is structured and who the main actors are in international politics. In the context of Russia’s strategic communication, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2017) point out three main interconnected system narratives. Firstly, there is a narrative focusing on a polycentric world order and thus opposing the unipolar world order based on US hegemony; this narrative highlights the United States’ disproportionate dominance in shaping global politics. Secondly comes a narrative propagating equality and mutual respect between superpowers and also the increase of Russia’s prestige in international politics; in the background of this narrative is the unbalanced international political situation which is caused by the above-mentioned US dominance. Thirdly, we have a narrative that highlights how Russia is being disregarded and how NATO and the European Union shape global progress single-handedly, especially compared to the Cold War period when Russia had a large role to play in shaping European politics (see also Prozorov, 2007). Oliver Tüür (2020) points out that these narratives rest, to a large extent, on

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the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2016). It is important to keep in mind here that the above-mentioned narratives of a unipolar world order dominated by the US and of Russia being distanced from European politics are shaped from the Russian perspective and present the latter’s vision of the logic of international relations. Depicting international politics in this manner often simply enables Kremlin to use multilateralism as a cover for rebuffing US positions (Krastev, 2007, 99). These types of system narratives revaluating the international world order are often justified by the corrupt nature of Western institutions and by their weakness in decision-making; as a counterpoise, the increase of power and capability of non-Western states is proposed. ‘In this sense, Russian media defines what actors matter most in international politics while envisioning a new global order whereby Eurasia and the Global South will become the major players’ (Hinck et al., 2018). Identity narratives define the values, characteristics and aims of different political actors (Miskimmon et al., 2017, 8); these are intimately connected to the cultural opposition between the own and the alien. Russia often describes itself as a fortress under siege which has to defend its values against threats coming from every direction (but especially from the West) (Ventsel et al., 2021). This metaphor of the fortress elevates Russia above the decaying West (Makarychev, 2014, 32; Lipman, 2015, 121; Yablokov, 2018; Tamm, 2020). This narrative is made paradoxical by the presentation of the West, and especially of European and Anglo-American culture, as simultaneously threatening and powerful and just about to collapse due to the contradictions and weaknesses in its core values (Missiroli et al., 2016, 10; Makukhin et al., 2018). Popovych et al. (2018) have studied the Russian mediascape and pointed out the symptoms articulated responsible for the downfall and disintegration of the EU: protests taking place in several member states, terrorist attacks and the fear derived from them, socio-cultural clashes accompanying the refugee crisis, the souring of relations in the context of Brexit and the ‘boomerang effect’ of sanctions imposed against Russia due to them occupying Crimea in 2014. The Russian identity narrative oppositional to the Western world is underpinned by the idea of the ‘Russian World’ (Pyccki mip) articulated in messages aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences. This idea is closely connected to the metaphor of the fortress under siege and it has attained its contemporary political charge from the events of 2014 in Ukraine (Tamm, 2020). The idea has several meanings, but its most immediate referent is the original Russian civilization with influence ranging far beyond the current borders of the Russian Federation (first and foremost, territories populated by Slavic peoples), but with Russia and the Kremlin as a cultural and political centre (Van Herpen, 2015). Central to the idea of the ‘Russian World’ is contact with diasporas, conservative and nationalistic positions, the increasing role played by the Orthodox Church (Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019) and the revival of the Soviet legacy. Through these aspects it is possible for Russia to justify interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring states since the latter are also understood as belonging to the greater ‘Russian World’ (Makarychev, 2014, 30–31; Laruelle, 2015; Brown, 2017, 177–178).

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Thirdly and finally, policy narratives have as their aim to envision specific political moves and to justify them (Miskimmon et al., 2017, 8). Here, the following questions become important: in which strategies, narratives and symbols remain the same and which are adjusted, erased or newly introduced by the political elite when communicating with the public in order to justify the contemporary situation (Leichtova, 2016). Since this level of strategic narrative is highly dependent on the concrete political situation and on particular aims, the success of this type of narrative is largely determined by the connection between the pragmatic and the symbolic aspects—or in other words, how the previous system and identity narratives come to be connected with new political circumstances and actors. As mentioned above, on the level of system narrative, one of Russia’s fundamental aims is to sow discord in the Western world and between the member states of NATO. On the level of identity narrative, a crucial role in causing rifts between member states is played by the representation of the US as weak (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014), but at the same time also as being in pursuit of self-interest, as aggressive and as an unjust partner. In order to succeed, Russia attempts to create tensions that might subvert the security environment of the allies and create the impression that allied relations are about to disintegrate. At the same time, the Russophone media depicts the expansion of NATO and the EU as aggressive conquest that directly threatens the security of Russian Federation (Makhasvhili, 2017). The policy narratives used in service of the primary aims of system narratives are connected to specific events, such as the Ukrainian crisis (Van Herpen, 2015, 20; Nimmo, 2016); the collaboration between the EU, NATO and the Balkans (Doncheva, 2020); the corona crisis (Ventsel, 2020); etc. It must be specified here that these three levels can be distinguished only conditionally for heuristic purposes; in actual strategic communication they appear as interrelated. Any policy narrative rests on a more general understanding of the international system as such, but the former can also shape and change the conception of the latter. The same can be said of the strategic narratives directed to foreign and domestic audiences. The theory of strategic narrative acknowledges that state-led identity projection is targeted at domestic audiences as well as foreign ones (Szostek, 2016). These cannot diverge completely in their aims; they must complement each other. Differences can rather be found in the construction or emphasis of the narrative and in linguistic tropes. Thus, several researchers have pointed out that the aims of Russian strategic narratives are, on the one hand, to mobilise and sustain domestic political support for the state’s governmental policies, and, on the other hand, to present the state’s official positions and policies to foreign audiences (Zakem et al., 2018). Hinck et al. (2018) have argued that these narratives help construct Russian identity in building domestic cohesion while fending off criticisms by Western nations. At the same time, the Russian Federation is able to make use of criticism of Western liberal values and policy decisions in order to strengthen the identity of the Russophone audience, to construct an external enemy and to decrease the influence of internal opposition to Kremlin’s political elite (Götz & Merlen, 2019, 7).

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2.2 Blame Narratives All of these narratives may involve the discursive construction of blame, i.e. the use of various linguistic articulations to portray some actor as deserving blame or being blamed for having intentionally caused a negative outcome, or for violating a norm. By blaming someone, a blame-maker may wish to change the behaviour of a blame-taker (e.g. to stop them causing harm or violating a norm) and invite others— onlookers, various audiences of blame-making—to take the side of the blame-maker. Hence, blaming may affect the formation of public policy agendas as well as the institutional structures and communicative behaviour in government (Weaver, 1986; Stone, 1989; Hood, 2011). Blaming may be seen as an instrument of social regulation/control as well as part of a discursive struggle—a ‘blame game’—over the meaning of (potentially negative) events and (potentially blameworthy) actors in relation to some course of action (Hansson, 2015, 2018b, 2019). In international politics, publicly mediated blaming (e.g. accusations covered in news) may affect the public perception of the quality of relations between countries. From a linguistic point of view, blaming usually involves presenting arguments (claiming, suggesting, offering evidence) that someone caused a negative outcome or transgressed a norm, did it intentionally, and had the obligation and capacity to prevent it (Hansson, 2018a). Some argumentative moves used in blame generating may be regarded normatively as fallacious, for instance, argumentum ad hominem (pointing out a negative characteristic of the opponent), tu quoque (appeal to opponent’s hypocrisy) and blaming the victim (Hansson, 2015). Blame-makers may use of legitimation strategies (van Leeuwen, 2008), that is, provide explanations and justifications for the calls to blame someone by using references to authority (e.g. status, rules, commendation by experts), value systems and the goals of institutionalised social action. Blame-makers may try to construct the impression that a blame-taker deserves blame by omitting references to any positive characteristics of the blame-taker or adding linguistic cues that (over)emphasise the negativity of an outcome (Hansson, 2018b). Blame-makers may also use narrativeframing devices to portray the target of accusations as a prototypical Villain who deserves to be punished. This chapter analyses the various uses of blame discourse in the Russophone and Anglophone media of the Kremlin. This enables us to investigate the ways in which strategic narratives are discursively constructed in concrete media stories. The above-mentioned layers of strategic narrative—policy, identity and system narrative—enable us to contextualise various blaming devices in the larger frame of strategic communication and to show the ways in which blaming devices, e.g. making moral judgments, slander, etc., complement each other on different levels of strategic narratives and thus fulfil the aims of Russian information and influence campaigns.

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3 Background and Data 3.1 Chinese and Huawei’s 5G Technology as a Security Threat 5G technology began to be developed at the end of the first decade of this century. The process gained impetus when Samsung and Huawei took on this technology. By now it has become clear that the further development of 5G technologies will determine, to a large extent, the operational logic of future digital solutions. To put it briefly, 5G marks a great leap in the development of wireless mobile technology and creates a fertile ground for improving and developing the Internet of Things (de Looper, 2019). The main factors understood to be sources for positive change both in the digital private sphere (e.g. personal smart devices, online retail business, etc.) and in public applications of communication technologies (from education and (tele)medicine to digital developments in the defence industry) involve the speed of data transmission (this new technology can be up to 100 times faster than 4G), its relatively low price and energy efficiency. At the same time, the development of this innovative technology is accompanied by all kinds of gloomy future scenarios. For instance, it is feared that by interconnecting billions of electronic devices 5G will bring about an exponential growth in both the targets and means for espionage, to say nothing of the potential collection of telemetric big data (Reichert, 2018). According to these gloomy predictions, these developments are liable to lead to the creation of a potential ‘surveillance network’ encompassing a large part of the planet (Woods, 2018). The global reach of 5G technology and the potential increase in the vulnerability of both private and public structures have resulted in it being thematised in the context of national security risks. The USA and the Western world have considered China and its leading role in developing 5G technology as the greatest security risk. More precisely, the biggest threat is understood to be posed by connections between the Chinese government, intelligence services and Huawei; this connection is seen as creating potential pathways for espionage (China reportedly threatens tiny Faroe Islands over Huawei, 2019). Government subsidy and direct financing have boosted Chinese companies’ competitive position on the global market, both in terms of technological advance and affordable prices (Kaska et al., 2019, 9). Huawei and other Chinese telecommunication companies have been playing a decisive and active role in developing 5G standards, acquiring a significant amount of 5G core patents (Sharma, 2018; Kaska et al., 2019, 7). Unlike their primary competitors Nokia and Ericsson, Huawei is the only telecommunication company able to produce all the elements required for the 5G network, and at a lower cost than its competitors. The Chinese government has made no secret of striving for the leading position in global economy and politics (e.g. China leads a ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ crossing Asian, European and African continents, see also the XIII Chinese Five-Year Plan

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(2016–2020) that focuses on technological innovation). In order to achieve this position China has consistently been involved in industrial espionage and has advanced collaboration between Chinese industry and academic circles (Raud, 2016). China has been involved in 90% of all economic espionage cases handled by the US Department of Justice between 2011 and 2018. European national intelligence and cybersecurity agencies also have frequently raised concerns about Chinese cyberespionage in their public assessments (Kaska et al., 2019, 11; Estonian Information System Authority Annual Cyber Security Assessment, 2017; Intelligence Risk Assessment, 2018). Therefore, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Czech Republic have imposed restrictions on the use of Huawei 5G solutions over national security concerns; much of Europe is pondering whether to follow suit. According to Kaska et al. (2019, 16), ‘national practice towards restricting or accepting Chinese technology varies from binding legislative or administrative means by the state to restrict specific manufacturers (such as in the case of the United States and the Czech Republic), issuing non-binding guidance (Estonia), or voicing abstention from introducing restrictions’. The Russian position on 5G is yet to develop on the juridical level (Gorian, 2020). In 2019, Vladimir Putin laid down regulations (Russian Federal Law, 2019a, b) which created a juridical framework for administering the Internet centrally across Russia but applying these regulations fully will be extremely complicated (Epifanova, 2020). Still, experts are of the opinion that this framework will result in stricter control mechanisms over society and additional complications for both domestic and foreign enterprises. It is presumed that these regulations will also accelerate the fragmentation of the global Internet and increase Russian dependence on Chinese technology (Epifanova, 2020). Although the development of 5G technologies was already talked about in several countries in 2013, it is only in the last couple of years that it has become a theme in public debates, i.e. when relations between the US and China turned increasingly tense (Medeiros, 2019). Debates over Huawei and Chinese 5G technology gained impetus in 2018 when the United States adopted a law prohibiting the purchase and use of telecommunications and surveillance products by specific Chinese companies. In March 2019, Huawei contested this decision as ‘unconstitutional’, restrictive of fair competition, and harmful to US consumers. In February 2020, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed Huawei’s claim, responding ‘that Congress was within its rights, and thereby acted constitutionally, to enforce a ban against telecommunications equipment made by Huawei and fellow Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE through section 889 of the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA)’ (Campell, 2020). Increasing problematisation in public discourse and souring relations between China and US are the reasons why we chose the ensuing period to collect data for the following case study.

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3.2 Russian State-Funded Media Outlets RT (formerly Russia Today) is a Russian international broadcasting network comprising of TV and radio programmes and news websites in multiple languages. Launched in 2005 with the direct support of the Russian government, it is regarded by scholars as the Russian state’s propaganda tool that is used to influence international audiences (Pomerantsev, 2016; Krag & Åsberg, 2017; Flaherty & Roselle, 2018; Miazhevich, 2018; Dajani et al., 2019). RT’s content promotes anti-American/antiWestern sentiments and undermines confidence in Western democracy (Yablokov, 2015; Orttung & Nelson, 2019). Sputnik is the second major media outlet backed by the Russian government for the spreading of pro-Russian narratives abroad (Lanoszka, 2019; Wagnsson & Barzanje, 2019). Sputnik was launched in 2014 based on the government-financed radio station Voice of Russia and is owned by the news agency Rossiya Segodnya (not to be confused with RT1 ). Sputnik publishes stories in over 30 languages and provides news and opinion pieces on global politics and economics. It is known for skewing or disrupting information to serve Russian interests (Ramsay & Robertshaw, 2019, 12) and is considered to be more explicitly propagandistic in comparison to RT (Boffey & Rankin, 2017). Sputnik often functions as a springboard for antiWestern conspiracy theories (Ramsay & Robertshaw, 2019; Kalmar, 2018) tailored to be spread on social media by readers (Watanabe, 2018, 24). According to the poll of Levada-Center (2019) conducted in the summer of 2018, television remains the main source of information for Russians, with the exception of the youngest respondents (aged 18–24) who receive news from television and the Internet with virtually the same frequency. From the Russophone channels we chose Perviy Kanal, NTV and ITAR-TASS since the former two are among the most viewed channels in the Russian population (Mediascope, 2017) and the latter is the official news agency of Russia. NTV and Perviy Kanal—like most other Russian news channels—are clearly, during the second period of Putin’s reign, under the control of Kremlin power structures (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014; van Herpen, 2015). This enables us to presume that the narratives distributed through these channels have been endorsed by the Kremlin. Accordingly, in our analysis, we treat the stories produced and disseminated by RT, Sputnik, Perviy Kanal, NTV and ITAR-TASS as vehicles for Russia’s strategic narratives. Our dataset includes 30 articles about 5G published on the RT.com websites, 60 articles about 5G published on the sputniknews.com website, 20 articles about 5G published on the ITAR-TASS website https://tass.ru, 15 articles about 5G published on the Perviy Kanal website https://www.1tv.ru and 30 articles about 5G published on the NTV website https://www.nt.ru between 1 January and 30 July 2020. We focused on stories that contained at least one of the following keywords (in English

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Rossiya Segodnya (current name of the news agency owned and operated by the Russian government) means Russia Today in Russian. International broadcasting network RT was known as Russia Today prior to 2009.

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and Russian): 5G technology, Huawei, technological espionage, Chinese telecommunications companies and ZTE. Although some of the news stories analysed also communicate the positions of persons directly involved in Kremlin’s power hierarchy, our primary purpose was not to analyse the voice and position of the Russian government but to investigate the state-sponsored media narrative that shapes the audience’s preferences and expectations. The present article will consider the 5G theme as part (in terms of sub-narratives) of strategic narratives spread by Russia, and as such focuses first and foremost on discursive blaming devices. More precisely, we will study: (1) the ways in which blaming devices are used to depict and represent parties in news stories; (2) how motives are attributed to these parties on a discursive level and (3) how the stories on 5G overlap with previous Russian strategic narratives. Upon close reading, we focused primarily on articles using blaming devices and identified the opposing parties of conflict. It is important to note that all media channels, but especially the Russophone ones, published texts covering the innovations and positive advances of 5G technology. In these types of stories, no blaming could be identified. We will consider these as creating a positive context for 5G technology. As explained above, this was a period when the topic received heightened international media attention due to significant efforts by the United States to prevent Chinese 5G technology from being used in sensitive telecommunication equipment while Huawei was fighting several legal battles against the US government. Therefore, these texts provide rich and timely material for a qualitative analysis of the uses of various articulations of blame in Russia’s strategic narratives.

4 Analysis: Discourses of Blame in Russia’s Strategic Narratives About 5G Below we will present the four primary blame narratives used in 5G media coverage distributed in the Kremlin-endorsed media: 1. US is blamed for spreading 5G-related misinformation; 2. the United States is accused of hypocrisy; 3. the United States is being accused of pressuring its allies to stop them collaborating with Chinese 5G technology companies and 4. allies blame US for pressuring them to cut ties with Chinese 5G technology. In media coverage, these narratives were often intertwined and complemented each other. In our discussion, we will show how these narratives supported the more general strategic narratives directed against the United States and its allies.

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5 US Is Blamed for Spreading 5G-Related Misinformation 5.1 Anglophone Media Coverage The 5G-themed stories by RT and Sputnik often lay blame on the US and its allies for spreading misinformation, false accusations, slander, etc., against Huawei and China. For instance, the lack of persuasive evidence supporting the intelligence risks associated with Huawei’s 5G technology is constantly pointed out, as well as baseless fearmongering. An article entitled ‘US charges Huawei with RACKETEERING & attempting to steal American trade secrets’, published on 13 February in RT, writes: The charges against the Chinese telecommunications behemoth come amid the ongoing pressure and intimidation campaign by Washington aimed at discouraging its allies from using Huawei’s technology in developing ultra-fast 5G mobile networks. While the Trump administration insists that the company poses a “security risk” due to its supposed affiliation with Beijing, many of Washington’s allies – including the UK, India, Portugal and the EU – have defied the US fearmongering, providing Huawei access to their markets. The Chinese company itself has denied all the allegations, accusing the US of unfair competition. (RT, 2020a)

This citation portrays the US as blameworthy in several senses. The first layer of blame can be identified in the opening sentence which points out that, in connection to the 5G theme, the US employs an aggressive tactic towards its allies that exploits so-called base emotions, a tactic that has as its elements ‘pressurizing’, ‘intimidation’ and ‘discouraging’. It is highlighted that the US accuses Huawei of posing a significant security risk and that the US attempts to sow fear among their allies so that the latter would stop collaborating on 5G with the Chinese technology behemoth. Both in this text and elsewhere Washington’s scare-mongering campaign is addressed (see Sputnik, 2020a, b; Burunov, 2020). Also, the beginning of the next sentence highlights US’s imperious style of communication; the verb ‘insist’ signifies ‘to demand something forcefully, not accepting refusal’. The second aspect of US’s blameworthiness regards the arbitrary nature of the accusations made by Washington. The RT article stresses the conditionality of the Huawei-related security risk. Upon its first occurrence it is presented in quotation marks, thus connecting security risks to a concrete quote or marking its dubiousness. Where relations between Huawei and Beijing are referred to, it is specified that we are dealing with a ‘supposed affiliation’. Near the end of the cited text the term ‘allegations’ is used to describe US statements about Huawei’s security risks, thus indicating their speculative nature. It is noteworthy that accusations made by Huawei towards the US are not similarly marked. Presenting Chinese accusations towards the US, RT uses the phrase ‘unfair competition’; it is not marked as alleged unfair competition. It is also significant that the US is seen to employ an aggressive style of communication, conducting a campaign that exaggerates with threats, but at the same time it is claimed that such tactics of persuasion have not been successful among the United States’ allies. The verb ‘defy’, attributed to the allied reaction, points unambiguously

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towards disagreement and disobedience. This kind of explanation makes it possible to depict the US as both immoral, since it employs undue means of force and practices baseless fearmongering, and as being condemned among its allies. These kinds of claims connect to the larger strategic system narrative of the Russian Federation which tells of the excessive dominance of the US over its allies and over global politics, and of a multipolar world order as the alternative to US dominance. In addition to suggesting that Washington has arranged a direct smear campaign targeting Huawei, RT and Sputnik often accuse the US and its allies of spreading rumours and conspiracy theories. Russian media channels highlight the extreme dangerousness of rumours and conspiracy theories, claiming that besides damaging Huawei’s reputation they sow insecurity and anxiety among a population already traumatised by the corona crisis (see Cureton, 2020; Korso, 2020; RT, 2020b). Conspiracy theories relating 5G with the coronavirus are also understood to have a directly crippling effect on the state-level decision-making process regarding 5G infrastructure (Madisson & Ventsel, 2021).

5.2 Russophone Media Coverage Similarly, to RT and Sputnik, Russophone media also accused the US of spreading slander against Chinese 5G technology. These accusations took on different forms in specific news stories. In several stories, the US was said to blame Chinese and Huawei’s 5G technology for enabling secret surveillance practices (ITAR-TASS, 2020a; NTV, 2020a). Additionally, Russophone media published stories that accused the US of spreading 5G-related conspiracy theories. The main targets here were the rumours erupting in spring 2020 of how 5G technology contributes to the spread of coronavirus (ITAR-TASS, 2020b; NTV, 2020b; Siraziev, 2020). Although these articles did not explicitly state that the US is behind the conspiracy theories associating Chinese 5G technology with the coronavirus, the Russophone media repeatedly highlighted the Trump administration’s insistence on COVID-19 being a ‘China virus’ of non-biological origin. This type of semantic transfer based on analogy describes one object (5G technology that can be used both for spying and spreading the virus) via a metaphorical substitution with another (a virus originating from China and 5G technology developed in China). The addressee of the message is often tasked with creating his or her own image of the relations between the elements referring to the referent object (the above-mentioned semantic transfers enable the reader to connect China to using 5G technology for spreading coronavirus). In this kind of semantic transfer relations are often defined by a mere reference to analogy (Ventsel & Madisson, 2019, 146; Selg & Ventsel, 2020, 298). The accusations against China made by the US which associated Chinese 5G technology and the intentional spreading of coronavirus were decisively criticised in Russophone media via editorial, expert and political commentary (both by Russian and non-Russian politicians). The United States’ accusations were seen to be the most damaging in that they baselessly slandered and sowed fear and confusion among society (Siraziev, 2020).

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The second device enabling such semantic transfer that highlighted the baseless nature of the United States’ accusations against China was the mixed use of direct quoting and indirect paraphrasing. An ITAR-TASS news story from 17 April (2020c) begins in the following manner: US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo believes that a lot of states will review their plans to co-operate with Chinese companies in constructing 5G networks, since Beijing allegedly did not present exhaustive data on the spread of coronavirus.

ITAR-TASS’s paraphrasing uses conditionals: ‘allegedly’, ‘Pompeo believes’, etc., although at the end of the article Pompeo’s direct quote is also used. There he uses the indicative mood when speaking about the confusion surrounding the prevention of coronavirus in China: ‘I am fully confident that now the Chinese Communist Party has not shown transparency and openness…’ (ibid.). This kind of device puts in doubt the US official position on China as the spreader of coronavirus, also casting a shadow of doubt on the US’s previous accusations against Chinese 5G technology. In sum, both Russophone and Anglophone media took a critical stance on the statements of US and Western media and of US governmental representatives, i.e. on those statements presenting US criticism against China as a security issue. Accusations were articulated through the statements of both the journalists and the quoted politicians and experts. One of the main reasons for the US to propagate slander against China is seen to be in the Kremlin-endorsed media, US fear of ceding its leading position in the IT domain. As an important distinction between Russophone media and RT and Sputnik, we can point out that the former explicitly associated 5G technology with various conspiracy theories less than the latter. The Russophone media published a couple of short news stories and one longer piece which gave an overview of various 5G conspiracy theories distributed in media; these theories were rather seen as curiosities (Siraziev, 2020). In RT and Sputnik, on the other hand, the Western media was given the role of a unified antagonistic group dispersing conspiracy theories. This group was accused of Sinophobic propaganda and of cultivating positions hostile to Huawei (on accusations against Western media on the grounds of Russophobia, see also Ventsel, 2020; van Herpen, 2015).

6 The United States Is Accused of Hypocrisy 6.1 Anglophone Media Coverage In stories about 5G, RT and Sputnik depict the US government as deserving blame for hypocrisy: for spying on other countries while accusing other countries (especially China) of spying. For example, in an article entitled ‘China says US is an “EMPIRE OF HACKERS”, mocks cyber-accusations in wake of Crypto AG Scandal’, RT writes of a statement by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Geng Shuang in response to revelations that the CIA used Swiss cryptography firm Crypto AG to monitor communication in more than a hundred countries.

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Facts have proven time and again that as the largest state actor of espionage in the cyber space, the US is worthy of the name of ‘Empire of Hackers’. Geng said the US has “no credibility” in accusing other countries of hacking and spying, but it “keeps playing the victim of cyberattack[s], like a thief crying ‘stop thief’!” “It’s hypocrisy on the issue of cyber security [that] could not be clearer,” he added. (RT, 2020c)

In the first sentence, RT attributes to the US the derogatory label ‘Empire of Hackers’. The second sentence cites a Chinese official claiming that the US lacks any moral standing to blame China or any other country for spying. The phrase ‘like a thief crying “stop thief”’ is a Chinese proverb referring to a ploy criminal use to divert the attention of investigators. In this context, it casts the US as a prototypical Villain who is trying to present itself as a Victim to escape blame and punishment. The third sentence is a direct quote from a Chinese official explicitly emphasising the idea that the US is guilty of hypocrisy. In sum, RT uses references to a Swiss report and quotations by a Chinese official to delegitimise any criticism the US may express towards spying by China or any other country, including Russia.

6.2 Russophone Media Coverage Blaming the US of hypocrisy appeared in Russophone media in mainly two ways. On the one hand, it was stressed that the US was attempting to conceal its actual economic interests by accusing China of spying via 5G technology. This was the dominant blaming narrative during the beginning and the middle of the period under analysis. On the other hand, it was pointed out that, although the US accuses China of manipulating with 5G technology, the US itself actually wishes to control the movement of big data. The risk of manipulation of big data made possible by 5G technology emerged as a novel theme since the United Kingdom backed out of its initial promise to allow Chinese 5G technology companies access to its market. On 15 July NTV published a longer piece on 5G technology in the context of international relations entitled ‘Digital colonialism: the fight over 5G control has reached a decisive phase’ (NTV, 2020a). The title implies that controlling 5G technology is the main factor in the confrontation between the US and China. The article cites Vadim Kozolin, a political scientist from the PIR-Centre of policy studies, who explains the context of the United States’ opposition to China in the following manner: The repartition of the world. The two contemporary leaders are undoubtedly the US and China. The Internet of Things, the military Internet of Things and 5G networks that connect the whole infrastructure into a unified network – this is the main cornerstone on which the strategy of network-based wars will be built. Most importantly – these are the same big data that the US is using for its own interests. China does not want to surrender them and uses this [big data – authors’ addition] for its own advantage.

The first two sentences situate the 5G discourse into a global context and divide the world into two antagonistic camps. This also gives the framework for understanding what is taking place—a state of war. Previously, the Russophone media had touched upon the security risks brought about by 5G technology mainly through statements

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of US representatives, and in these cases, it was, as a rule, clearly marked that these statements had the indirect aim of the US scaring allies and of covertly advancing US economic interests. This article, however, clearly states that 5G is accompanied by a very real security risk: ‘control over big data’ and a ‘military Internet of Things’ that can be used for military purposes in ‘network-based wars’. At the same time, acknowledging 5G as a potential security risk does not cancel out the blame narrative directed towards the US. The last two sentences of the quote make it seem as if the US is behaving hypocritically: the US does not wish so much to protect itself against potential espionage by China (this has been the main American argument) as to employ big data to advance its own interests. In addition, the Russophone media published stories stressing that it was not appropriate for Washington to accuse China of espionage since the CIA had previously conducted secret operations among its allies. One story about the Swiss company Crypto wrote that both German and US military intelligence had used the diplomatic communication devices produced by Crypto for the interception of communications. The end of the article pointed to US hypocrisy and previous cases of American espionage were referred to as reasons for ‘the US being now jealous of Russian “Kaspersky Lab” products or for Washington conducting a trade war with Chinese 5G systems’ (NTV, 2020c). Here, we can also detect the mechanism of semantic transfer operating on the basis of analogy: referring to previous US actions delegitimises accusations made by the US that associate China with 5G espionage and puts in doubt the transparency of US motives. Blame narratives depicting the US as a hypocritical international partner that appeared in Kremlin-backed Russophone and Anglophone media coverage of 5G technology were similar: referring to previous espionage by the US, the latter’s accusations against Chinese 5G technology and the accompanying security risks were delegitimised. At the end of the period under analysis, however, a significant thematic shift took place in the Russophone media: it was pointed out that 5G technology might still pose a military threat, but this was done while being accusatory of the US, i.e. the Americans themselves wanted to control big data.

7 The United States Is Being Accused of Pressuring Its Allies to Stop Them Collaborating with Chinese 5G Technology Companies 7.1 Anglophone Media Coverage The third theme of blame narratives emerging in RT and Sputnik is the United States’ complaints against its allies, especially against the UK. These complaints regarding potential collaboration with Huawei are depicted as power-hungry statements based on US economic interests. The US image, in this context, emerges as a resolute bully restricting its allies’ opportunities for collaboration. The stories from RT and Sputnik point out that the UK and other smaller partners have fallen victim to US exhortations

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and reprimands since they decided on trade deals with Huawei independently and thus demonstrated disobedience to Washington’s diktat. US accusations against its allies are articulated, for instance, in Sputnik’s article ‘Final Bout? White House Chief of Staff to Pressure UK to Reconsider Use of Huawei in 5G – Report’ in which it is written: Britain has come under intense pressure from the United States since Prime Minister Boris Johnson informed Donald Trump of the decision to allow Huawei to develop the UK’s 5G network. The Financial Times reported that President Trump was “apoplectic” during a phone conversation with Johnson and according to some media reports the 45th president even hung up on his counterpart. In a veiled threat, Vice President Mike Pence said London’s decision will affect the prospects of a post-Brexit trade deal between the two sides. (Sputnik, 2020a)

This example clearly brings forth the negative characteristics attributed to the ‘bully’ US: aggression/short-temperedness and tendency to manipulate. Using the term ‘apoplectic’ and mentioning him possibly hanging up the call points to President Trump’s affective state and resoluteness. The ‘veiled threat’ noted in connection with Pence implies that the US is ready to employ threats and insidious means of pressure in order to get its way with allies. The phrase ‘pressure to reconsider’ in the article’s title also implies that the US does not only condemn the UK’s decisions regarding Huawei, but in addition attempts to move these decisions onto a beneficial path for itself. This quote represents the UK as an independently deciding state that has to confront Washington’s aggressive tactics, since decisions beneficial for the Chinese technology giant do not follow US prescriptions.

7.2 Russophone Media Coverage Two main aspects of US blame-making against its allies as depicted in Russophone media can be identified: (1) the main purpose of US pressure was understood to promote US technology and to prevent the completion of trade deals between its allies and Chinese 5G technology giants; (2) US threats of terminating collaboration with its allies, should the latter make deals with Chinese ICT companies. The abovementioned connections between Huawei and Chinese intelligence—which would expose American communications with its allies—were presented as the main US argument against Chinese 5G technology (ITAR-TASS, 2020e). The public letter signed by 20 US senators to the UK parliament and government merited extended coverage in ITAR-TASS. In this letter, the senators stress the need to continue collaboration with British colleagues in the domains of intelligence and technology, and that ‘the integrity of telecommunications infrastructure cannot be risked simply for convenience’ (ITAR-TASS, 2020d). In addition, the article presented a US warning to UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The warning stated that the UK’s partnership with Huawei compromises collaboration between US and UK security structures (ibid.). The article attempted to highlight the dominant position of the US in allied relations with terms such as ‘recommends’, ‘warns’, etc.

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It also pointed out potential US countermeasures (‘puts US and UK collaboration in great danger’) if the UK should continue to collaborate with China on 5G technology. The Russophone media painted the following picture of the US: a state handing out ultimatums to its NATO partners in order to maintain its leading position in the world. For instance, the title of a story covering US and Spanish relations highlights the power vertical between the US and its allies: ‘US threatens to discontinue sharing intelligence data with Spain because of its collaboration with Huawei’ (ITAR-TASS, 2020f). Similar reproaches mixed with threats can also be found set against the institution of the European Union (ITAR-TASS, 2020g). Although these examples do not constitute explicit accusations made by the US (since the allies have not yet collaborated with China), we are dealing here with US threats against its allies, threats aimed at preventing future collaboration between its allies and China. Thus, the US is presented as pressuring its allies and accused of behaviour unbecoming in the political practices of allied relations. Accusations that the US baselessly pressures its allies were commonly presented in the context of the global confrontation between the US and China. The crux of the Russophone media’s position is summarised in a longer article published in midJuly, entitled ‘Digital colonialism: the fight over 5G control has reached a decisive phase’. The introduction of the article depicts the US as a clearly aggressive and inconsiderate leader towards its allies (‘pressures everyone’): The United States pressures everyone doing business with Chinese companies, claiming that their devices are used for espionage. Experts say that the real reason lies in the potential shift of global power balance caused by advances in the domain of 5G technologies. (NTV, 2020a; see also ITAR-TASS, 2020a).

The second sentence of the quote contrasts US ‘claims’ with the experts’ assessment that should put US positions in doubt. However, it is not specified who those experts are. The counterargument questioning espionage via Chinese 5G technology does not stem from the domain of information technology but rather from political discourse (‘global power balance’). In sum, the blame narratives of both Russophone and Anglophone Kremlinbacked media coverage stressed the shift of power balance in global politics, depicting the US as blaming its allies for potential collaboration with Chinese 5G technology companies. This kind of US pressure politics was depicted negatively, but the core of US accusations against its allies—5G as risk for allied security—remained unpacked by experts.

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8 Allies Blame US for Pressuring Them to Cut Ties with Chinese 5G Technology 8.1 Anglophone Media Coverage RT and Sputnik often articulate blame in stories about 5G by depicting the United States as a recipient of accusations from its allies for pressuring them to cut ties with Huawei as a potential 5G network provider. By framing the US as a blame-taker, RT and Sputnik can delegitimise the policies of the US without seeming to act as blame-makers themselves. They adopt the stance of neutral bystander, ostensibly providing mere descriptions of what the allies are saying and doing. Moreover, by framing the US as a blame-taker and its allies as blame-makers, RT and Sputnik support the construction of a narrative in which the US and its allies are divided and un-cooperative. In an article entitled ‘Chinese FM after Pompeo & Esper speeches: Replace “China” with “US”, and maybe lies become facts?’, RT writes: Washington has repeatedly claimed that Huawei poses an existential security threat to its allies. However, these allegations have been largely dismissed by Europe. The UK has already decided to allow Huawei limited participation in its 5G network, and countries such as Germany, Portugal and Italy have been vocal critics of US pressure to cut all ties with the Chinese firm. (RT, 2020d)

In the first two sentences, RT contrasts the standpoint of ‘Washington’ with that of ‘Europe’, thereby constructing the impression that the claims made by the US administration are opposed by all European governments. In the third sentence, the UK is depicted as acting against the advice of the US, while Germany, Portugal and Italy are depicted as blame-makers (‘vocal critics’) who accuse the US of exerting ‘pressure’ on them. While blame-making usually involves the presentation of arguments (evidence and warrants) to support the proposition that someone should be blamed (Hansson, 2018a), the construction of blame in this example is void of any evidence or justification. It is not clear for what reasons the listed allies oppose the US administration’s standpoint on Huawei and there are no references to any concrete accusations made by them. RT and Sputnik also make use of various spokespersons from the Western allied countries whose quotations could be used to construct the US as a blame-taker (RT, 2020e).

8.2 Russophone Media Coverage The circle of allies accusing the US is similar in Russophone media to the one presented in RT and Sputnik, i.e. the UK and, to a lesser extent, some EU states. After Brexit—undoubtedly a positive development from the perspective of Russian geopolitical interests—the media attempted to highlight the deepening rift between

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London and Washington. The article ‘A silly situation: post-Brexit UK in the grip of US and China’ speaks, at the beginning, of mutual deals between the US and UK, but then adds that if ‘the United Kingdom will not change its position regarding Iranian nuclear deal or regarding collaboration with China on creating a 5G network’, the US will implement sanctions (NTV, 2020d). The allied blame narrative against the US regarding Washington’s pressure politics is presented in this article in the two following quotes by UK politicians (ibid.). Firstly, a statement by Jonathan Freyer (member of the Liberal Democrats): Do not think that the Americans do something just for the sake of it. It is their wish to weaken Europe and we [the UK – authors’ addition] shall help them do it. But this looks like a raider takeover – the UK is being taken over.

In the first two sentences, the British politicians refers again to US covert plans: the actual interest of the US is to weaken the EU and maintain its leading position. Post-Brexit UK, however, ends up here as a sidekick to the US. In the third sentence, however, it is pointed out that collaborating with the US would mean a loss of independence for the UK (‘raider takeover’). In Russian ‘raider takeover’ (pedepcki zaxvat) has the clear connotation of illegal activity. The term is commonly used to refer to company takeovers by the mafia or other criminal organisations (Feodorov, 2010).2 The previous statement is followed by an assessment of the United States of America from Ken Levingston, ex-mayor of London (2000–2008): The UK will be pinned between America and China, and it must choose whether it [the UK – authors’ addition] will lose credibility in the global security alliance because it is spied after by the Chinese, or whether it will be placed under American control.

This statement also accuses the US of pressure politics. The first half of the quote brings forth the circumstances of choice faced by the UK. The UK’s difficult position is highlighted by the phrases ‘pinned between’ and ‘lose credibility’, depicting the UK as a passive actor in global politics. Also, choosing the US for its traditional ally is depicted here as a Pyrrhic victory entailing the loss of independence. It is important to note here that both quotes highlight the rift between the US and its allies on a global scale: Freyer’s statement pins the UK between the US and the EU in the context of their depicted confrontation; Livingston’s statement points to the UK’s awkward position in the confrontation between the US and China. Several media stories used different textual strategies in depicting tensions between the US and its allies. These texts did not use literal accusations by allies against the US; they rather referred to cases in which allies did not meet US expectations. Nevertheless, this strategy also supports the blame narrative being constructed against the US, i.e. a textual construction depicting independent allied policy and the allies’ resistance to US pressure which implies allied dissatisfaction with US pressuring behaviour. At the same time, this kind of media coverage functioned as being subversive of US authority: ITAR-TASS’s article from January 2020 entitled ‘5G 2

For further information, see also https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rederstvo_(biznes).

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in the Old World. Why US allies are choosing Huawei’ highlights several reasons for Europe choosing Chinese technology despite US pressure politics (ITAR-TASS, 2020a). The nature of the fourth main blame narrative that we have concentrated on—allies blaming the US for pressuring them to cut ties with Chinese 5G technology—overlapped in Russophone and Anglophone media. Both stressed allied dissatisfaction with undue US pressure put upon the former because of their collaboration with China. However, one difference between the two media spheres is that Russophone media published more stories depicting caving into US pressure as an allied loss of sovereignty. Those cases presented as allied resistance to the US function as subversions of US authority.

9 Discussion and Conclusions In the Kremlin-backed Russophone and Anglophone media, a multi-layered blame discourse emerged in coverage of 5G technology. This discourse depicted the US as a distributor of false information on 5G technology, as baselessly slandering China, and as forcefully pressuring its allies. The latter were depicted as also accusing the US of such pressure politics. Both the Russophone and Anglophone coverage were characterised by the following: even though US accusations against China originated mainly from US politicians, the stories and their mood were framed by comments (by both experts and journalists) highlighting the baseless nature of these accusations. The main differences between Russophone and Anglophone media are the following. Firstly, Russophone media more forcefully emphasised US pressure on its allies. This pressure was presented as subverting the sovereignty of allied political decision-making processes. Secondly, at the end of the period under analysis Russophone media presented explicitly, for the first time, Russia’s position in the global confrontation between the US and China. Russia’s position is that it supports a technological alliance with China that Russia ‘trusts more than the USA’ (NTV, 2020a). However, sympathy towards China was already identifiable in several articles published at the beginning of the period under analysis. These stories created a positive context for Chinese 5G technology and for Huawei. The following points countered US accusations against China and its espionage: China’s success in employing 5G technology to combat the coronavirus (ITAR-TASS, 2020h); the Chinese social surveillance programme being described as ‘smart social governance’ (ITAR-TASS, 2020i) and arguments made by Chinese representatives for the merits of employing and applying 5G technology (ITAR-TASS, 2020j). As explained in the framework section, strategic narratives can be interpreted on three levels: policy, identity and system. At the level of strategic policy narrative, the analysed blame narratives worked against the core—national security risks accompanying the employment of Chinese 5G technology—of US accusations against China. Blaming devices used in both Russophone and Anglophone media outlets concerned

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two aspects. Firstly, it was stressed that the US government had presented no watertight evidence to the public for the security risks accompanying the use of Chinese 5G technology. Thus, US accusations against China must, in fact, be slander. The other aspect focused on depicting the confrontation between the US and China in terms of a trade war policy narrative: by smearing China the US is, in fact, covering up its actual concern of coming off second best in the economic and technological progress race with China. US pressure on its allies was depicted in a similar manner: although the US is attempting to persuade its allies to abandon using Chinese technology—mainly on the grounds of security risks—the actual reasons for doing so lie in being defeated by China in a trade war. At the level of identity narratives, these articulations of blame frame the roles and relations between international actors in the following three ways: (1) (2)

(3)

The US is depicted as an ill-willed and aggressive blame-maker, and an undemocratic spying hypocrite. The Western countries—the US and its allies—are portrayed as being at odds or in conflict with each other, as supposedly evidenced by mutual attributions of blame. China is framed not only as a ‘victim’ of baseless blame attacks by the US, but also as a technologically advanced superpower that can put the US to shame.

These three strands of blame work together in the identity narrative as damaging the antagonist’s reputation. The purpose of damaging the antagonist’s reputation is to subvert the international position of the US and NATO. Pointing out the deceitfulness of US politics painted it clearly in negative colours and gave it a morally condemnatory judgement. First and foremost, US authority as a blame-maker was called into question here: both Russophone and Anglophone media outlets referred to previous espionage scandals involving US state institutions; this enabled them to depict the US as a hypocritical state. One important facet of the accusations made against the US was depicting the disintegration of ideological unity, through which it was stressed that the Western world no longer rests upon a unity of values but primarily on US dominance in allied relations. While undermining the antagonist’s identity narratives, this kind of blaming device also has a mirroring effect. Evoking a negative image of the antagonist enables us to infer the speaker’s positive self-image (e.g. Ventsel, 2020; Madisson & Ventsel, 2020; Ventsel et al., 2019). Morally condemning the US and NATO constructs a clean image of the maker of such statements (Russia and China): we do not behave as the US does with its allies. Emphasising the dominant role of the United States in allied relations, thereby subverting the sovereignty of allied political decision-making processes in the eyes of the Russian domestic audience, an image of Russia as a sovereign state is thus presented. To explain this difference, we should take into consideration the heterogeneity of the Anglophone audience and the possibility of the audience being familiar with other depictions of relations between the United States and its allies, i.e. not only such as mediated by the Kremlin-controlled Russian-language media. It is also likely that those consuming English-language media would be aware of the background information about the problems with China, 5G technology, espionage, etc.

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At the more general level of system narratives, references to blame structure the global political playing field in the following three ways: (1) (2)

(3)

The stories convey the idea of the erosion of US (Western) global hegemony, paralleled by the rise of China (Asia). Relatedly, the stories allude to the erosion of Western democracy as the dominant (or exemplary) political system (including the erosion of civil rights and rational debate as political values). The media creates an alliance between Russia and China. The creation of such an alliance is marked by four characteristics. Firstly, neither Russophone nor Anglophone stories contain criticism of China; this is present solely in the form of US and allied positions. At the same time, a critical stance is cultivated against US positions through the opinions of experts and journalists. Secondly, the positions of the Kremlin-backed media and those of the representatives of the Chinese government and Huawei overlapped. Media coverage often claimed that Huawei’s 5G technology does not constitute a security risk and that it is solely a question of economic policy between the US and China. Thirdly, media coverage of 5G technology contributed to creating a positive image of China, since China was depicted (especially in the Russophone media) as a victim of unjust persecution and as a state developing cost-effective and innovative technology. Fourthly, at the end of the period under analysis, the Russophone media explicitly stated Russia’s position in the confrontation between the US and China.

The present chapter focused on Russia’s strategic narratives, but in order to fully understand the strategic meaning-making concerning 5G technology it would be beneficial to look at the bigger picture and investigate: (1) how the US frames Chinese 5G technology as a security risk and (2) how the topic is addressed in Chinese national public diplomacy. This would help to cast a comparative light on the issue and explain if and how these strategic narratives condition each other, and how they thus shape together the contemporary state of international politics. Acknowledgements This work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grants PRG314 ‘Semiotic fitting as a mechanism of biocultural diversity: instability and sustainability in novel environments’ (Estonian Research Council), SHVFI19127 ‘Strategic Narrative as a Model for Security Dilemma’ and ‘this work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grants PRG314 ‘Semiotic fitting as a mechanism of biocultural diversity: instability and sustainability in novel environments’ (Estonian Research Council) and SHVFI19127 ‘Strategic Narrative as a Model for Security Dilemma’.

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Russian Influence Campaigns Against NATO in the Baltic Region: Spread of Chaos and Divide et Impera Pnina Shuker and Lev Topor

1 Introduction The Russian Federal Council, in a document titled ‘The Concept of the Cyber Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’ has emphasized the growing importance of cyberwarfare, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), and utilization of cyber-related actions to strengthen its already significant hard and soft power projections (Federation Council, n.d.). Russian military officials do not use the term ‘cyberwarfare’. Instead, they conceptualize cyberwarfare within the broader framework of information warfare (IW), a holistic concept that includes computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and information operations (Connell & Vogler, 2016). This chapter examines contemporary Russian influence campaigns as they have been executed and still going on in the greater Baltic region against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and against other Western influences in Eastern Europe. Methodologically, we use a comparative qualitative analysis. Five case studies from the greater Baltic region are qualitatively examined and analysed—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden alongside a sixth case study which is not from the Baltic region—Ukraine. We use the Ukrainian case as a reference point to which we compare all other cases. As further elaborated, comparing the cases sheds light on Russian foreign actions and aspirations. The Baltic region and Eastern Europe were always of significance to Russia but also to other powers like the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), as well as to other countries P. Shuker (B) Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel e-mail: [email protected] Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel L. Topor Centre for Cyber Law and Policy (CCLP), University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_15

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in the region. The great powers seek strategic influence and military advantages in the Baltic region but, the countries which count as the Baltic region themselves seek international and domestic security, stability and economic growth—slightly more humble desires. Regardless, both the West, specifically NATO, and Russia, seek greater advantages each in the region in order to counter one another in the global struggle for hegemony. Russia has already strengthened itself and its near borders in Georgia and Ukraine. The next point of conflict will probably be in the greater Baltic region (Hooker, 2015). It is not probable that Russia would ignore NATO’s expansions towards its borders with Europe. In this case, Russia seeks to keep the status quo of isolating Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from other NATO members in Europe. Sweden and Finland are not NATO members but only partners of the alliance and, as we discovered, are subject to influence as well. Thus, Russia projects its powers to each individual country and not NATO or the EU as a whole. In order to balance against NATO, the practice of spreading domestic political chaos through clandestine IW or Influence Campaigns (IC) has been found to be very successful and fruitful for Russia, as seen in the examples of the 2016 US presidential elections or the Brexit issue in the UK (Chance, 2018; Jensen, 2018). Rather than resisting the West as a whole, Russia simply utilizes the technique of Divide et Impera by executing influence campaigns. Russia has already begun executing influence campaigns in most of the region (Flanagan et al., 2019; Thornton & Karagiannis, 2016).

2 What Are Influence Campaigns? An influence campaign is the coordinated, combined, and synchronized application of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic abilities, together with other national capabilities, whether in times of peace, periods of crisis, hostile situations, or following hostilities. Influence campaigns seek to influence the behaviours and decisions of foreign target populations and persuade them to adopt positions that serve the interests of the campaign’s initiators (Larson et al., 2009). The Swedish Military Intelligence Service (MUST) has provided a helpful definition of ‘influence operations’ as ‘coordinated and deniable activities that are initiated by a state actor and which are aimed at influencing decisions, perceptions and behaviour of political leaders, the population or particular target groups [such as experts and the media] with the objective of achieving the state actor’s security policy objectives, mainly through the dissemination of misleading or incorrect information, often complemented with other actions tailored for the purpose that is being pursued’ (Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2017). In the doctrine of states and non-state organizations, an influence strategy is seen as part of a multi-channel systematic approach, sometimes known as information warfare or cognitive warfare. This strategy aims to manipulate actors to behave in

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a desired way, sometimes against their own interests, through actions which distort their picture of reality and the use of various kinds of leverage (Adamsky, 2015). In recent years, there has been a marked rise in attempts by foreign actors (both governmental and non-governmental) to intervene in the election campaigns of rival countries using digital tools. This involves cyberattacks on the computer systems supporting the electoral process (databases, software, and communications systems) in order to disrupt their operation or to distort or steal data. Additionally, extensive efforts are made to influence the public discourse in the target country and thus affect voting. Another type of influence campaign is a synthesis of the first two and uses cyber tools to penetrate the public consciousness. Possibilities are wide, ranging from attempts to undermine public faith in the democratic process, to interfering in support for specific parties or candidates. Another goal of these efforts is to dissuade people from voting altogether, based on identity or socio-economic status and social rifts (Tenove et al., 2018, 2). Although there is an evidence that some democratic liberal governments, such as the US, UK or even Israel, are using these methods in order to influence events in the international arena, the central players behind these efforts are usually authoritarian regimes like Russia, China, and Iran. Just before the latest US mid-term elections, the Trump administration announced that China, Iran, and Russia together were trying to undermine the democratic process with an online propaganda campaign— including the spread of disinformation on social media—with the aim of deepening the ideological rifts in the United States and stirring up internal arguments about issues on the local agenda (Grace, 2018; Pandey, 2018; Bin Abdul Rahman, 2019). However, contrary to the known Russian efforts, which exhibit a relatively high level of sophistication, Iranian and Chinese attempts to influence events are poorly executed and fairly easy to track.

3 Russia’s Influence Campaigns Russia is the international player that tries to influence European politics and decision-making most, more than China and other countries even though the Chinese influence in Europe, following its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has increased in recent years (Sielker & Kaufmann, 2020). These influence activities support three main Russian strategic objectives: regime security, predominance in Russia’s near abroad, and world-power status for Russia. The long-term objective of Russian influence activities is to weaken NATO, the EU and the West in general. In the shorter term, it is to lift the sanctions imposed after the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014 (Karlsen, 2019). In traditional Soviet military thinking, the systematic effort to influence outside developments covertly is the so-called ‘active measures.’ The main difference between public diplomacy and active measures is that the latter serves to hamper the target country’s ability to generate public support in pursuing its policies. Active measures are made covertly, based on the principle of plausible deniability, where the

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desired result is to influence decision-making in a direction favourable or at least not harmful to the Kremlin. Active measures rely on disinformation, among other tactics, which is the deliberate dissemination of carefully constructed and false messages into the communication system of a target group in order to deceive decision-making elites or public opinion (Romerstein, 2001). Different channels can be exploited, including forgeries, manipulative political actions, agents of influence, front organizations and rumours. A disinformation operation is most likely to succeed when it enters a target group’s independent media climate, as the originator of the planted story can then refer to ‘credible’ sources in its own official communication. This makes the border between active measures and public diplomacy very vague and blurry. Thus, at times it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the two. Some of these assets are controlled by Russian intelligence or other state organs, while others share values or sympathize with the cause and Moscow utilizes the entire governmental sphere for the campaigns (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, 15). The Russian National Security Strategy published in December 2015 identifies the US and NATO as Russia’s main threat. Conceptually, these influence activities are part of Russian thinking about strategic deterrence, where anything from social media to nuclear capabilities can be used, in peacetime or war, to shape and stabilize the environment according to Russia’s liking (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, 22–23). Russia has a long tradition of exploiting influence campaigns and has developed a whole ‘eco-system’ of disinformation (US Department of State, 2020). In this context, Russian methods include spreading false news on social networks by means of fake profiles; acquiring genuine profiles as a vehicle for political messages in support of pro-Russian candidates in elections worldwide, or to publish false or even incriminating information about Moscow’s enemies, using Kremlin-owned media to manipulate news reports (Polyakova, 2019; Schwirtz & Frenkel, 2019). During recent years, Russia has conducted influence campaigns for manipulating elections, including in Spain, Nigeria, Indonesia and South Africa, among others, as well as in the elections to the European Parliament (Shuker, 2019). While traditional IW was aimed to create a new narrative favourable to its practitioner’s interests, it was quite difficult to achieve as opposing narratives were promoted by the other side. The contemporary Russian IW is not seeking to control or promote particular narratives. It seeks to knock down all existing narratives all together, by making them all seem false. Thus, people would struggle to recognize and spot real or fake news. This type of IW technique creates chaos. In a case like this, people would not be able to fully trust the media, the authorities and other types of information platforms. All information and ICT would essentially be questionable (Shuker, 2019). In recent years, governments, academia and NGOs have initiated work to identify and respond to Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaign, as evidenced by the European Council’s establishment of the East StratCom Task Force in March 2015 (Panichi, 2015). A number of troubling events have challenged observers to rethink their understanding of Russia’s foreign policy strategy towards European Union member-states—the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) campaign against

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German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, over the known ‘Lisa’ Case in January 2016 or the abduction of an Estonian security officer by Russian special forces on 5 September 2014 and Russian financial support for Marine Le Pen’s Front National (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). Reviewing the application of these principles by using several case studies of Russian influence campaigns against NATO in the Baltic region clarifies the importance of IW in Russian strategic thinking.

4 The Baltic Rim: Russia’s Barrier Against NATO Otto Hoetzsch (1931), a former member of the German Reichstag, wrote about the Baltic states, Germany and Russia, in the late 1931 issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine. It should be mentioned however that the European map of power and sovereignty has changed before and significantly after the Great War (World War I). Yet, Hoetzsch’s concepts do align with ours regarding Russian interests in the region. After mentioning the 1908 Baltic Agreement between Russia, Germany, Denmark and Sweden he suggested that the Baltic region is of great importance to Russia as it allows Russia to maintain an active coastline in the Western region of the country, regardless of the land and maritime bottlenecks near the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland. Additionally, Russia had the opportunity to reach Northern and Western Europe in an easy and efficient way. After the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were later on occupied by Nazi Germany and then occupied back again by the Soviet Union. In 1945, Russia enjoyed another littoral in the exclave of Kaliningrad, moving forward with the old wish of Peter the Great (Peter I) from the early Eighteenth century to acquire control of the Baltic Sea at the expanse of the Swedish Empire. In between the World Wars Germany posed the greatest threat to Russian influence and power in the Baltic region (North, 2015, 117–144, 145–182). After the Second World War Russia’s problem was NATO. It posed a threat to the Soviet Union and then to Russia since it allowed for a smooth transition area over which Western countries might advance into the Western border of Russia. It also blocks Russian military and economic interests in the Region as the Baltic Sea is not frozen and is very fertile, compared to other Russian coastlines. It is also much closer to St. Petersburg and Moscow compared to Northern or Eastern waters. Further, the Baltic region was, and still is, of great importance because it provides an access point to the West and to Kaliningrad (Sukhankin, 2018). As Russia recovered from the 1991 Soviet collapse and its decline in power and influence over international affairs, it now aspires to gain more influence and control in the Baltic region as a lever against the West and as a secure opposition against NATO (Kasekamp, 2020). The 2004 Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, in which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined NATO and became members, enlarged the problem for Russia as one of its largest—Moscow had to act (Kundu, 2003; Lane, 1997). Now, Russia is targeting Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—NATO member-states—as part of a hybrid warfare campaign. This is one of the results of the more aggressive stance Russia has

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recently come to adopt on the international stage (Thornton & Karagiannis, 2016). In terms of the specific issue of threatening states of the greater Baltic region, the rationale raised for its actions is that Russia is concerned about its ‘strategic depth’. The fact that NATO is now on its doorstep in the Baltics and a mere few hundred kilometres from St. Petersburg is deeply uncomfortable for the Kremlin. As one Russian source puts it, ‘The US uses the organization [NATO] to continually push against [Russia’s] strategic depth’. Thus, from a Russian perspective, if Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be induced into a state of domestic turmoil, then they will be unable to act as effective NATO allies and thus can once more act as buffer states between core NATO members and Russian territory (Berzins, 2014, 1). Moscow’s goal, it seems, is not to militarily occupy these states—it is to destabilize them. The same logic has been apparent in eastern Ukraine, Georgia as well as in Finland and Sweden. The consensus in that case is that Vladimir Putin has no desire to have Russian troops occupying the region. He merely wants to create instability to resist NATO. As with Ukraine: ‘He wants the separatist Donbas to remain inside Ukraine, but as an open sore which Russia can prod when needed to control the country’ (Economist, 2015). Russia and Lithuania swapped spies at the border of Kaliningrad in November 2019. Lithuania handed the Russians two convicted Russian spies and got two Lithuanians and a Norwegian border guard in return. Interestingly, Lithuania had to change its domestic Laws for the deal—Another example of Russian pressure giving impact on a foreign government. The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West might have ended, but tension is still present in the air (Troianovski, 2019). In 2019 Russia also sought after even more influence as it pushed on more military and psychological pressure. It has established a new military helicopter launchpad in Gogland, an Island in the Gulf of Finland. Gogland, positioned between a NATO country and a NATO partner country might not give much military might but it acts as an influence agent on the Baltic states and on NATO since it allows Russia to closely and quickly monitor ongoing events such as NATO military drills. Russia seeks to intimidate the small Baltic states, as if to let them know that the Russians are near, watching, and their Western protectors are far away. Moreover, since 2014 Russia holds nuclear capable missiles in Kaliningrad. On a visit to Finland, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a calculated threat to his hosts; ‘NATO would probably love to wage war with Russia to the last Finnish soldier. Do you need that?’ (Marson & Grove, 2019)—As if to warn that a conflict between NATO and Russia could wipe out Finland.

5 Russian Influence Operations in the Baltic Region The Baltic countries, due to their geopolitical location, are of Moscow’s interest and the residents of these countries are subject to Russian influence and policies. Russia began to do this ever since the collapse of the USSR, and the degree of Putin’s

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information aggression was gradually increasing, creating a negative image of the Baltics in the Russian and pro-Russian media (Winnerstig, 2014). Many countries which are part of or have interests in the Baltic region, including Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, condemned Russia alongside more than 20 other nations (Bloomberg, 2014). The whole of Eastern and Central Europe stood up against the Russian aggression as each state feared it could be Russia’s next target (Ford, 2014). The condemnation did not come out of the blue. Many states, specifically some Baltic states, if not all of them, have real concerns from Russian influence and intervention within their domestic political systems (Blank, 2016). As argued by former President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili in 2019, Russia’s next aggressive act near its Western backyard could probably be a non-ex-Soviet state such as Sweden or Finland (Saakashvili, 2019). Regardless of Saakashvili’s predictions, whether Russia will intervene in a European state or in an ex-Soviet one, Moscow definitely seeks more influence over the Baltics. Mainly, Moscow seeks to generate an instability which will weaken NATO (Raitasalo, 2019; Thornton & Karagiannis, 2016). If there will ever be an aggressive land-grab operation by Russia in the Baltics, it is feared that Russia could use its military power and geographical position to create ‘No-Go’ zones in order to keep NATO reinforcement from reaching the annexed territory in time. For instance, using its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities (Dalsjo et al., 2019). In the following section we will examine how Russian influence campaigns are executed in the Baltic region. In order to achieve this, we examine several significant case studies which were chosen on the basis of relevance and availability of material. We chose to focus on Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, which are all NATO members, as well as on Sweden and Finland, which are not full NATO members but partners of limited liability. The first case study of this part is the case of Ukraine. In that matter, Ukraine serves as a methodological anchor and a reference point since it is not a Baltic state, but similar patterns of IW are found within its case. Even though Ukraine is not part of the Baltic region it is of similar proximity to Russia. That is, it is also in Russia’s backyard.

5.1 Ukraine For Vladimir Putin the February 2010 inauguration of Victor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine was undoubtedly a moment of personal satisfaction. Five years earlier, Putin had twice congratulated Yanukovych for his ‘victory’ in the November 2004 presidential election, only to see the result overturned as fraudulent by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Like Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s peaceful, popular uprising vividly demonstrated the political power of Western political ideas in the post-Soviet region. This vision found its expression in both countries’ desire to join NATO and the EU—Western institutions whose respective enlargements in

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2004 had brought the community based on common markets, democratic values and transatlantic security guarantees to Russia’s doorstep (Green, 2012, 1). Russia’s IW has been relentless and shrill in its castigation of Ukraine and Ukrainians; it exceeds anything the Soviet Union undertook during the last three decades of the USSR. Ukraine is the most misrepresented country in the Russian media, representing half of the 5,000 entries in the EU Disinformation database. Ukraine is often described as a ‘laboratory for Russia’s information warfare tactics’ (Jankowicz, 2019). Seven years into the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin’s use of information warfare against Ukraine has not decreased; Ukraine still stands out as the most misrepresented country in pro-Kremlin media (EU Disinformation Review, 2018). Ukraine is the most targeted country in Europe when it concerns influence and disinformation campaigns. During 2018 alone 461 cases were reported from a total of 1,000 disinformation cases reported (EU Disinformation Review, 2019). In 2018, a third (60) of the 212 fake news reports in the Russian news outlet ‘The Insider’ were about Ukraine and the Crimea. In fact, Russia penetrated Facebook and Twitter many years before it became an issue for the United States and Europe. Russian imposters would act as Ukrainian officials, posting inaccurate, fictitious, and inflammatory information and participating in discussions seeking to spread confusion and discord (Priest et al., 2018). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2015 and of Georgia in 2009 may not be isolated incidents, but rather symptomatic of a grander ambition in Moscow to restore a Russian sphere of influence in the area of the former Soviet Union, and that these plans could come to threaten regional stability and NATO members directly (Korenig, 2015). Interestingly, there is a specific target in mind when it comes to Russian IW campaigns conducted against the populations of Ukraine and the Baltic States— ‘Compatriots Living Abroad’—Russians living abroad as minority communities in ex-Soviet states bordering Russia (StratCome, 2014, 8). They play an important role in Moscow’s employment of influence campaigns. The calls for action presented in this ‘New Russian Doctrine’ were backed up by no little substance. A huge investment was made in creating the infrastructure for this ‘wide-ranging and diverse information policy’. ‘Moscow’, it has been noted, ‘does not count money when it comes to propaganda tools’. New television and radio stations and Internet sites were established that were specifically designed to ‘convince’ people immediately beyond its borders—whether compatriot Russians or indigenous populations—that ‘joining’ Russia was a positive choice. In its counter-rhetoric, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO in 2014, Alexander Grushko demanded the Ukrainian army stop its military actions and accused NATO of ‘unprecedented activity close to the Russian borders’. Putin argued that the crisis in Ukraine ‘was provoked and staged by some of our Western partners’, was being used to resuscitate NATO. Moscow also issued warnings against further NATO expansion. In January 2015, Putin hardened his rhetoric by claiming that ‘the Ukrainian army is essentially a ‘NATO legion’ which doesn’t pursue the national interests of Ukraine but persists to restrict Russia’ (Forsberg & Herd, 2015).

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5.2 Estonia According to Barthel, although Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Estonia today, the relationship between the two countries alternates between overtures and tensions. Russia’s historical claim on Estonia being part of the Russian territory of influence is based on Estonia having belonged to the Russian and Soviet Empire for centuries. This claim encounters massive resistance from most parts of the Estonian society. Contradicting interpretations of the common history in the twentieth century, systematic instrumentalization of the Russian minority in Estonia and fake news attacks pose fundamental challenges to the relationship between the two neighbours (Barthel, 2018, 31). In Estonia and Latvia, the Soviet Union engaged had set populations from elsewhere in the Soviet Union—mainly from Russia. The result was that, when Estonia and Latvia regained independence at the end of the Cold War, these two countries had substantial minorities of people whose families were not from Estonia or Latvia and who primarily used Russian as their native language (Kasekamp, 2010, 11–20). Compatriots make up about 25% of the population in Estonia, and a comprehensive Swedish study concluded that Russian minorities are used in a comprehensive strategy as tools of destabilization (Winnerstig, 2014, 43). The Russophone audience of Estonia constantly receives messages and narratives from Russia’s propaganda channels (e.g., about the ‘immorality’ of the West, about ‘misdeeds’ and ‘aggression’ of NATO), stoking up the fear of migrants and refugees and other harmful narratives for architecture of European security, values and identity of EU. Russia is constantly blaming Estonia, its government, and people in fascism, xenophobia and Russophobia. Russia has also tried to use its energy leverage to influence the policies of the Estonian government towards its ethnic Russian population. In 1993, Russia cut off gas shipments when the Estonian Parliament adopted a new law on citizenship. This was considered to be a form of punishment and pressure to change these laws. Although cut-offs have occurred, Estonian citizenship policies have remained unchanged (Larson, 2006). Over the last 15 years Russia has developed three negative narratives about Estonia; that it is a fascist country, it has a significant Russian population, and that this population needs protection [from Russia] (Barthel, 2018, 31). The second narrative had a particular meaning for the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. In January 2007, the Estonian Parliament passed legislation that required the removal of a Soviet War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn. In April, the statue on the monument was removed and transferred to a safe place. The removal of the statue caused riots by Russians in Tallinn (CBC, 2007). Members of the Russian government, including the foreign minister, called it blasphemy and some, including Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, called for economic sanctions. Several months later Estonian internet sites at banks and the government were attacked from Russia via a denial-of-service attack. Estonian experts charged that some of the attacks originated from hackers working inside the Kremlin (Ciziunas, 2008).

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There are a few examples of Russia’s interference in context of Parliament elections 2019 in Estonia. At the beginning of 2019 a set of posters appeared publicly on both sides of a tram stop in the centre of Tallinn with paying attention on ethnic segregation between Estonians and Russophone people in Estonia. Three of these posters had following text ‘Only Estonians here’, the others had other message: ‘Only Russians here’. These posters caused anger in society, among Russophone minority and caused ethnic before of parliamentary elections in March 2019. This was political advertisement of Estonian party ‘Eesti 200’, which strongly used by Russian TV channels and media outlets, such as by Sputnik, who showed that in Estonia there is a discrimination of Russians (Makarychev & Sazonov, 2019).

5.3 Lithuania Lithuania, as a front-line state which constitutes NATO’s eastern defences against Russia, has long been a target of Moscow’s disinformation campaigns. Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare its renewed independence in March 1990. Russian media outlets sometimes refer to this fact, arguing that Lithuania, as well as the other Baltic States ‘destroyed the Soviet Union’. Other than the Kremlin’s ‘softer’ influence campaigns, another challenge for Lithuania in the field of information security is Russian cyberattacks aiming to destroy Lithuania’ information channels (Skarzauskiene et al., 2010). In one example, a website of the Lithuanian Armed Forces was hacked and information from the site was used to mislead that Lithuanian intentions were to annex Kaliningrad. It quickly spreads in local media and then was cited on Russian media outlets. Russia also attempted to change the Tatar leadership in Lithuania to a kind which will favour Russian goals, specifically regarding the annexation of Crimea. The attempt to control the Russian language information space is perceived as a serious threat in Lithuania, considering the fact that the majority of Russian-speaking Lithuanians rely exclusively on Russian controlled media (Karlsen, 2019). Recently, Russia also directs coronavirus-related disinformation campaigns towards the Baltic region and Eastern European audiences in an attempt to incite anti-NATO sentiments among them. In a recent example Russia attempted to influence over COVID-19 related issues such as vaccinations. It has spread downgrading information about Western vaccines while highlighting only the quality of Russian made vaccines. The Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence recorded nearly 1,500 cases of disinformation related to COVID-19 between February and June 2020. Social media outlets such as Facebook and YouTube were the popular means of dissemination. The aims of these campaigns were to make Lithuanians view Russian policies positively, distrust their own government’s response to the pandemic, and question the support they were receiving from their Western partners (Weitz & Pieciukaitis, 2020). In another example, from January 2020, a false story was posted on the Lithuanian news site Kaunas Day, claiming that an American soldier stationed in Lithuania had

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COVID-19 and was the source of the pandemic in Lithuania (Tucker, 2020). The tactics range from the usual sort of anti-Western commentary on pro-Russian sites to hacking a legitimate news site to post a false story (Topor, 2020).

5.4 Latvia Latvia is another ex-Soviet country that is targeted by Moscow and of all Baltic countries it has the largest Russian population in its boundaries—over 36%—a very significant political and electoral force. From the beginning of the 90s, Latvia and Russia have been trying to negotiate an agreement regarding the status of their current border. In March 2007, Latvia and Russia signed a treaty that delimited it. Both parties had originally agreed to the text of a border treaty in 1996. But signing the agreement was delayed, due to disagreements over additional wording as well as Russian accusations of Latvian mistreatment of its ethnic Russian minority (Ciziunas, 2008; Duszy´nski, 2020). As in Lithuania, Russia has used several different levers to influence the policies of Latvia. The first was the use of the border treaty to keep Latvia from joining NATO and the EU. This failed, as Latvia still joined the EU in November 2004 and NATO in March 2004. Russia also tried to cut off oil and gas to force Latvia to sell ownership shares in its energy sector. This has not worked and has only brought Latvia closer to the West (Bugajski, 2004, 123). Social and economic problems that are unrelated to the presence of Russian speakers in the Baltic states can also offer an opportunity for Russian influence attempts in the region. For example, researchers founded that Russian or pro-Russia actors tended to exploit reports of government malfeasance among the non-Russianspeaking population. Although such campaigns do not necessarily directly echo Russia’s own interests, they do meet with Russia’s general political objectives (Helmus et al., 2018). And, in a recent case similar to that of Lithuania, Russian media has circulated a report which suggested that a Canadian-led NATO force was the source of the COVID-19 outbreak in a military base outside the city of Riga. This rumour is very harmful for NATO as it questions NATO’s presence in Latvia (Brewster, 2020).

5.5 Sweden The increased Russian military activity in the Baltic region in the last decade had forced Sweden into a hasty program of rearmament, including the purchase of Patriot missiles from the United States. After the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden showed an increased interest in joining NATO. Some 1,400 Swedish troops participated in a large cold weather training with 16,000 NATO soldiers in Norway in March 2014. That month, an official Swedish announcement was made by then Deputy Prime Minister Jan Björklund regarding an increase in its defence

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budget (Ford, 2014). Sweden’s potential transformation into full NATO member bears significant implications for Russia’s position in the Baltic region (Deni, 2019). A successful Russian IC on Sweden, which could undermine its desires to join NATO, would allow Russia to keep using its Divide et Impera strategy. Thus, weakening NATO and Western grip in general in the Baltic region. Therefore, The Russian influence operations against Sweden are aimed to make Swedish citizens and even policymakers doubt pro-Western policies and especially the expected utility of Sweden’s collaboration with NATO, as well as to spread divisions in the Swedish society. Joining NATO can undoubtedly increase Sweden’s security, protect itself from terror and Eastern threats. However, it would also require Sweden to bear some duties. Therefore, some of Russia’s influence operations towards Sweden are aimed specifically at this point—Sweden’s duties within NATO. In that context, Moscow spreads that if Sweden were to join NATO, the latter would stockpile nuclear weapons on Swedish soil in secret places due to its proximity with Russia (Deni, 2019). In addition, Moscow also spreads in the Sweden media that NATO could attack Russia from Sweden without Swedish governmental approval. A more vulgar and emotional example is the false rumour that NATO soldiers could rape Swedish women without fear of prosecution as they are immune from it (MacFarquhar, 2016). In January 2017 the Swedish Institute of International Affairs has accused Russia of spreading fake news, false documents and other types of disinformation as part of a coordinated propaganda campaign in an attempt to influence public opinion and decision-making in Sweden (Helmus et al., 2018). Anders Thornberg, former head of Sweden’s security service, the SÄPO, argued in January 2018 that Russia attempts to influence Sweden and spread chaos in the Swedish political arena rather than to promote a particular ideology, political candidate or party (Corera, 2018). As in other cases, Russia promotes its propaganda in the Swedish context through news channels such as RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik News (Brattberg & Maurer, 2018). Another example to the Russian influence efforts regarding Sweden is the Russian news agency TASS which reported in July 2017 that ‘Poll shows most Swedes oppose NATO membership’, regarding the upcoming elections (TASS, 2017). In order to balance this claim, Allan Widman, the defence spokesman for the Liberal Party stated that ‘For the first time ever, you have four parties in one bloc that are all in favour of NATO’ (Duxbury, 2018). Indeed, more credible polls for Swedish support for NATO memberships showed an increase in support. In 2007 nineteen percent supported NATO membership, forty-four percent were against and thirty-seven were undecided. In 2015, after the Ukrainian case, the support jumped to thirty-eight percent while only thirty-one opposed. In 2018, forty-three percent supported the issue, thirty-seven opposed and only twenty percent were undecided. Thus, the TASS publication was misleading intentionally. In an even more worrisome example since January 2017, a Swedish Facebook group, Mediekollen, presented itself as a false information debunker—a fake news checker. It turned out that the fake news checker was fake. Mediekollen created a false narrative using various pieces of evidence or opinion to support or knock down a statement or story which was initially not fake. It was suspected to be another fake

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tool of Russian IC. Hanna Larsson, an executive in Swedish television, challenged the administrators of the group and asked to reveal who they were, who supported them, and who their clients were. She received generic answers with no convincing explanations (Jackson, 2017). Interestingly, Moscow does not have to address the issue of NATO directly in order to spread chaos in the Swedish political arena. For instance, since the 2014 Syrian refugee crisis, Sweden has welcomed hundreds of thousands of immigrants. As of October 2014, the number of immigrants who came to Sweden and asked for asylum reached to 10,000 per week. Actually, Sweden has taken in far more refugees per capita than any country in Europe, an act which drew much criticism from certain parties in Sweden (Traub, 2016). Ever since, immigration has been one of the most contested and politically deployed issues in Sweden. The Swedish FarRight quickly grew from being a fringe party to be the third largest party in Sweden (Brattberg & Maurer, 2018). In 2017, a viral article blamed asylum seekers for ‘seven bombings in twelve days in Sweden’, and another article blamed immigrants for ‘severely bruising an elderly woman’. However, the bombings never took place and the elderly women fell at her home (Cederberg, 2018). As found in a report by Sweden’s Defence Research Agency, trolls and bots are forty percent more likely to support anti-immigration on social media than real human users (Bershidsky, 2018). Generally, before the Swedish September 2018 elections, the Swedish government discovered that the usage of Twitter bots and trolls inclines dramatically (CBC, 2018). Even though Sweden acts against the Russian influence operations, it still encounters some problems. Mainly, the question of how to sort real users from trolls. Ahead of the September 2018 Swedish elections, hundreds of local election workers have been trained to spot and resist foreign influence. Swedish media groups as well as political parties, lawyers and election officials have all briefed and trained their employees and supporters how to deal with fake news. However, a key problem, a backlash, is that during the struggle against Russian bots and trolls, real users are at risk, since they might lose their voice and influence on social media if they are mistaken for foreign trolls. Fringe parties and fringe voices are highly at risk (Birnbaum, 2018). Recently, the tensions between Russia and Sweden reached to its peak since the cold war. After NATO held its annual exercise in the Baltics in June, Russia executed a major naval exercise in the Baltic sea. As a response, in late August, the Swedish military deployed four naval warships and an unspecified number of ground forces and warplanes in Gotland, a scenic island in the Baltic sea which carries a strategic importance, often referred to as Sweden’s ‘fixed aircraft carrier’ (Erdbrink & Kramer, 2020). Against this background, in September Sweden also reached an agreement for military cooperation with Finland and Norway. As an act of projecting power, Russia sent two warships which entered Sweden’ territorial waters without permission (Reuters, 2000). Given the great importance that Russia attaches to Sweden as a key player in the Baltic region, and given the latter’s rapprochement with NATO recently, it is likely that the tension between the two is far from over, Both kinetically and cognitively.

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5.6 Finland Finland, not a full member state, has cooperated with NATO significantly after the annexation of Crimea led Finnish politicians to believe that Russia poses a major threat (Zimmermanová et al., 2020). A poll of Finnish opinions from late 2016 showed that half of Finns considered Russia a threat, a significant rise since a similar poll from 2010 where 28% held that opinion (New Europe, 2016). Thus, Russia is also attempting to influence Finland out of joining NATO (Standish, 2017). Although Russia uses similar influence methods in the European information sphere, Bjola and Papadakis (2020) claim that there is a more customized and localized content regarding Finland. One such case is the ‘child custody’ narrative. According to Russian media, Finnish social services systematically engage in unrightful seizing of Russian children across Europe, placing them in social care or giving them up for adoption to same-sex couples in Western countries. The Russian children’s rights ombudsman even accused Finland of perpetrating ‘juvenile terror’. These stories were mainly circulated on Russian outlets including Russia Today, Sputnik, and Pravda. Within Finland, they were circulated in part by Johan Blackman, pro-Kremlin Finnish activist, who positioned himself as a ‘human rights activist’ advocating for the Russian minority group in Finland. This was made with the intention to provoke a strong public reaction, tarnish the international reputation of the Finnish government and deter Finnish government from taking a critical position against Russian policies in Ukraine (Bjola & Papadakis, 2020). Similarly, In April 2015, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoli Antonov accused the Finnish government and Defence Minister Carl Haglund of having promoted an ‘antiRussian rhetoric’, for the duration of their mandate, and urged the next government that it should adopt a more friendly position towards the Kremlin; Sergey Markov, the Co-chairman of the National Strategic Council of Russia, criticized Finland for its ‘monstruous Russophobia’ and suggested that the Finnish elite is suffering from ‘hatred of Russia’. He also claimed that it is due to the ‘bad influence’ of Sweden and the Baltic states that Finland has turned into ‘one of the most Russophobic’ countries (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2014). Russia also tries to push disinformation regarding Finland and the European migration crisis. In 2015 and 2016, Russia suddenly enabled migrants to access the Russo–Finnish border to seek asylum in Finland. A total of 1,713 asylum seekers arrived in Finland from Russia during the winter months. The issue became a political bone of contention in bilateral relations and was ‘resolved’ by signing a temporary agreement that restricts border crossings (Pynnöniemi & Saari, 2017). The timing of this incident coincided with a period in which public discussions intensified about the possibility of Finland to join NATO. A report on this topic commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and published in April 2016, warned, for instance, that Russia would likely take ‘strong, even harsh’ political and economic actions to thwart any move by Finland or Sweden to join NATO (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

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The relatively small number of asylum seekers may indicate that Russia’s aim was not to destabilize Finland but perhaps to test the reaction and operational readiness of the Finnish authorities. Furthermore, the aim was to signal that good working relations between authorities cannot be taken for granted and that the consequences of losing Russia’s trust could be significant for Finland. A straightforward example of this message was a comment by a Russian official to his Finnish counterpart during the negotiations that Russia has 11 million foreigners living in its territory (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). In another example, the most known case in the Nordic region of a systematic and concerted attempt to intimidate journalists with an online troll harassment campaign is that of Jessikka Aro (2016), following her reveal of the Russian troll farm in St. Petersburg which confirmed that Russian ‘trolls’ are systematically manipulating the public debate in Finland across a range of different online forums (Aro, 2015a, b). Aro’s investigation found out that bots and trolls can actually garner the support of real people in Finland as the avalanche of fake comments gradually succeeds in mobilizing segments of the target population. After Aro and her colleagues published their findings, Aro was systematically targeted and discredited in the public domain in Finland, as well as in the Russian media. The extreme responses to her revelations about the Russian ‘troll farm’ included physical and online harassment, systematic slander which turned over time into a veritable hate campaign (Aro & Mäkeläinen, 2015). In June 2015, Finnish researcher Saara Jantunen published a book titled ‘Infosota’ (The info war), exposing the techniques and practices of Russian disinformation in and around Ukraine. Jantunen was also savaged by online trolls as a result, but the term ‘info war’ became a common currency in Finland, and a significant debate arose on how to counter it (Nimmo, 2017). As it seems, Russia is willing to push into Finnish public debates in order to deny any anti-Russian concerns as well as any pro-NATO actions, let alone (Zimmermanová et al., 2020).

6 Conclusion This chapter examined Russia’s influence operations against NATO in the greater Baltic region. As it appears, the influence campaigns are aimed to destabilized Western grip in the region. While NATO poses a traditional military threat, Russia resists that threat not solely with traditional military means but with a sophisticated utilization of information warfare and cyber influence campaigns. Russian operations are not only useful as stand-alone operations, but they contribute to the general Russian projection of power in the Baltic region. As Russia perceives the Baltic region as its own backyard, it fears a NATO Baltic could allow the West to push Russia even further East and lose its current grip and influence in the region. Russia resists the West with soft and smart power. It uses traditional and new media platforms as well as social media cyber operations to question the credibility and accountability of the North Atlantic Treaty. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,

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Sweden, Finland were all subject to significant influence campaigns, as described and discussed throughout the article. We also discovered that, compared to the Ukrainian case, the methods of influence are very similar—Russia implements similar tactics which were found useful in its Ukrainian laboratory of influence campaigns. Of course, other countries are subject to influence as well, mainly Germany, France and Britain—cases which should be dealt with in a different article. This kind of IW also lowers the risk of military escalation between Russia and the West as in the current state of affairs, cyber operations, espionage and disinformation have no biding laws or rules and deterrence against cyber operations is blunt (Nye, 2017). Moscow spreads negative debates whether NATO’s presence in the region or about illegal migration, enhancing social rifts and creating chaos which slows down political decision-making. Russian RT, Sputnik or TASS news groups, as well as many other groups, bots and trolls, spread false, or misleading information which is consumed by many in the Baltic region.

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Russia in the Western Balkans: Interests and Tools of Influence Marco Cruz

1 Introduction Russia is one of the states where we can clearly note the relation between the internal affairs and its foreign policy. Several academic works, such as the ones by Kaczmarski (2014, 385), Bratersky (2016, 516) and Anderson et al. (2016, 146), intend to demonstrate that the Kremlin’s relationship with other regions and players of the international scene is intended to uphold and legitimize a significant portion of Moscow’s internal policies, thus contributing to reinforce Russian nationalism. To the Russian leadership, lack of internal control hinders Russia’s international stance (Mankoff, 2009, 2). As a result of this interdependence, in terms of security, Russia has been looking for an expansion of its borders far beyond the post-1991 limits, establishing what it classifies as a “buffer zone” related to its home security, claiming that it does so in order to protect the large Russian communities who live in those regions (Anderson et al., 2016, 12–13). This area is comprised of all the states in its near abroad, located west of the Federation, represented by the former Soviet satellite states, including Western Balkans, as well as the old Republics and now independent states, such as Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (Metodieva, 2019). The EU and NATO enlargement to the East and Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power in 2000 have profoundly changed the relation between Moscow and the West. To Russia’s geopolicy, the enlargement “erases” the “buffer zone” between the two blocks, representing not only a loss of influence, but also posing significant security challenges (Berzins, 2014; Szpala, 2014; Bratersky, 2016, 516; Pushkin, 2015, 15). In order to defend its interests in those territories, Putin’s Russia has been primarily using instruments of soft power, although it does not exclude the use of its hard M. Cruz (B) Centro de Investigaço e Desenvolvimento, Instituto Universitário Militar, Lisboa, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_16

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power in combination with the former. Crimea’s annexation is the best example of this combination. Putin’s first public reference to soft power was made in 2012, in an article entitled “Russia and the Changing World” (Putin, 2012), where he describes the tools and methods to be used by Moscow in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, without recurring to instruments of war, as much as possible. As well as highlighting the exploration of the information dominion as a way of expanding its influence, the Russian President emphasized the use of extremists, separatists and nationalists and the manipulation of the population in order to affect other countries’ foreign policy. With no regard to legitimacy and morality, used more often to divide rather to unite, Russian soft power acts in several areas (cultural, economic and political) and uses several techniques, spreading misinformation, through media controlled by the Russian government, and using the Russian communities which are settled in those countries. Russia’s strategy to influence also contemplates the use of energy (gas and oil) and the Orthodox Church, whose rapprochement to the Russian State and President Vladimir Putin has allowed religious issues to become relevant again through its connection to Russian foreign policy. On an international level, according to Lamoreaux (2019, 1), Russia’s intervention seeks to reach three main goals: that Russia is recognized as a great power, openly demonstrated by Vladimir Putin in 2007, in the Munich Conference, the desire to protect Russian identity and that of the Slavic community and to curtail Western power, particularly the American power. According to that author, it is based on these objectives that Russia looks at the Western Balkans, seeking to divert the West from this region, so that Russian interests go unquestioned, and its imperial image is preserved (Lo, 2002, 48). This anti-Western feeling, which was reinforced during the Soviet Union breakdown, has characterized the Russian strategic thinking, being quite visible amongst Russian politics and philosophers, as Aleksandr Dugin (Fellows, 2018). Another Russian interest is the energy issue. The Western Balkans region is a central point for the control of the energy supply routes to the European countries, thus keeping Moscow’s regional control over the energy sector. In spite of the geographic distance and minor trade relations when compared with the EU, Russia has been able to exercise, quite effectively, some of its continuous influence in the region. The use of a wide array of instruments related to soft power has been decisive, and its use has been facilitated by historic and cultural ties with the Slavic communities and the Orthodoxy, by means of misinformation campaigns and propaganda and by using energy as a political weapon in order to influence local governments decision-making, in particular those of Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth designated only as Bosnia) and Kosovo. That influence has not been achieved by Moscow in Ukraine, given that by the end of 2019, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had severed ties with its Russian counterpart. Based on these dimensions of Russia’s operation, this article is therefore divided in two essential parts, apart from the introduction and final comments. The first part consists of a brief geopolitical framework of the Western Balkans, looking to identify

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the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Russia in that region. The second part analyses the main instruments of power used by Russia in order to pursue its interests. Although presented in an isolated form, it’s important to clarify that Russia’s different courses of action are pursued in an integrated and comprehensive manner. Integrated, inasmuch as we can observe a continuum between the uses of the different instruments, an example of it being the concurrence of the narratives of the Orthodox Church and the propaganda and misinformation campaign. Comprehensive, bearing in mind that these instruments complement and reinforce each other, including the engagement of public and private entities that operate under the political and strategic guidance of President Putin himself and coordinated by the Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov.

2 The Western Balkans in the Russian Geopolitics For centuries, the Western Balkans has been a region of disputes between the major powers, and therefore, a spot of conflict between the foreign policies of several external players, with different interests and strategic goals (Chrzová, 2019, 9). Geographically speaking, the Western Balkans region is a large crossing point, which connects the Mediterranean to Central Europe (Tonchev, 2017, 3). To Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, 2012) the region is a foothold to the control of Eurasia, being in his opinion the geopolitical “Achilles’ heel” of the XXI century, due to its instability and the ability to spread a crisis into other regions. During the Cold War, the Western Balkans made up for a buffer zone in the bipolar geopolitical structure. The region’s significance increased because the Balkan Peninsula (Fig. 1) made the demarcation between NATO’s south flank and the Soviet block—which included, however, the Eastern Balkans states, namely, Romania and Bulgaria, as full and active members of the Warsaw Pact. By joining the EU and the Atlantic Alliance, these two states emphasized the division as a territorial discontinuity. The Albanian Ports of the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea (as well as the Yugoslavian Ports in the Adriatic) served as a counterweight to NATO’s total control of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Territorially, the USA were the dominant power in the region and considered the Balkans, especially North Macedonia, a security zone—idea promptly supported by the European powers, namely, Germany, France and the UK (Smirnova, 1999). For the Russians, this American and European stance poses a threat to its interests, exacerbated right after the Cold War by the American and NATO’s intervention in the region, especially in the states that were formed from the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, namely, in those which are historically connected to Moscow (Smirnova & Yaskova, 1999, 264). In the sectors of energy security and geo-economics, the Western Balkans are also a platform for the passage of important oil and gas pipelines that supply the European market (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013, 66; Clark & Foxall, 2014, 6). The demand by some of the EU of alternative supply sources to the Russian market, whose economy relies deeply on these energy resources,

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Fig. 1 Balkan Peninsula. Source Stronski and Himes (2019)

increases the geopolitical disputes which occur in the region. About this, Fisher (2002, 76) underlines that “instability in the Balkans would impact seriously on the requirement for a safe passage for Caspian oil and gas to the West”. Cultural diversity in the majority of the Eastern Balkans, and between the states themselves, has been noted as one of the most relevant premises for instability in the region, given the inter-ethnic divides (Dyrstad, 2012; Mujanovic, 2018). In Albania and Serbia, there is a relative ethnic homogeneity, with the former having, respectively, 97.8% Albanians and in the latter case 83.3% Serbians of population. That trend is also observed in Kosovo, since 89% of the population is Albanian, 6% Serbian and 2% Bosnian. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic map is rather more complex, with 11% Bosnians (Bosniaks), 30.78% Serbians, 15.43% Croatians and 2.73% representing other cultures and ethnicities. In North Macedonia, 64% of citizens are ethnic Macedonians, 26% Albanians, 2% Serbians, 1% Bosnians. Finally, in Montenegro 44% are Montenegrins, 30% Serbians, 13% Serbians, 13% Bosnians and 5% Albanians. In terms of religion, the Western Balkans population is divided between Muslims (Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bosnia,), Catholic Christians (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Orthodox Christians (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro) (Hysa, 2020, 20). To this diversity,

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one must add the divisions between states, made evident in the former Yugoslavian wars and that, quite often, are still felt in an acute manner. There is an historical relationship between the Kremlin and Western Balkans states that goes back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moscow’s significant influence has been motivated by the standing ties to the Slavic population and the Christian Orthodox of the region, particularly the Serbs (of Serbia and Bosnia), Montenegrins and Macedonians (Chrzová, 2019, 11). When it comes to geostrategy, Russian priorities had as goal to guarantee the security of the Mediterranean Sea, through the Black Sea, by seeking to hamper the Ottoman Empire’s influence in the Dardanelles and the Bosporus straits (Clark & Foxall, 2014, 5; Bobic, 2015, 102–103). The need to have free access to warm waters is still very present in Russian strategy, by seeking to maintain a dominant position in the Black Sea, guaranteeing the security of the passage of the Bosporus into the Mediterranean (Smirnova & Yaskova, 1999, 268), and access to the Mediterranean through the Adriatic, via Montenegro (Bobic, 2015, 102–103; Clark & Foxall, 2014, 6). To achieve that, after the Soviet incursions in Albania, Russia approached the Montenegrin government in 2013 in order to use the ports of Bar and Kotor by some of its Naval Fleet (Secrieru, 2019). Russian influence in the region decreased during the Soviet era, notably when the communist regimes of Yugoslavia (1948) and Albania (1961) moved away from Moscow. With Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power, the Western Balkans re-entered Russia’s geopolitical radar, largely due to the Russian Eurasianism (Laruelle & Gabowitsch, 2012), the Western Balkans representing one of the chess pieces to reach that very goal, but also for security issues that/affect the entire European continent (Clark & Foxall, 2014, 6; Lamoreaux, 2019, 2). Therefore, security is particularly important in Russia’s relation with the EU. By reason of the geographic vicinity, the Western Balkans represent a priority for the European (in)security. This particular aspect is also considered in the Russian strategy, keeping in mind that its influence in the Western Balkans is a way for Moscow to interfere in issues related to European security and assume the role of a main player, alongside other powers, as previously referred, namely Germany, France and the UK. Besides the geographic and security issues, Russia’s interests in the region are notably of a political and economic nature. The political connection that Moscow maintains with a significant part of the Western Balkans states (nowadays, those who have not yet joined the EU, NATO or both) and that is mostly rooted in the Slavic culture and religion favours the Russian strategy, whose main goal is to remove Western influence from the Western Balkans, and especially avoid an en masse adherence to NATO and the EU. This political proximity has also favoured the Western Balkans politicians, who in most cases, are eager to promote Russia’s image as a powerful alternative to what Moscow continues to see (with some reason), the West by means of strengthening the bonds with the Kremlin and to President Putin, who remains a popular politician in the region (Samorukov, 2017; Mankoff, 2009). Besides the states and Western organizations, Russia also has to face other powers’ interference, namely China, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. All of them are states

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that quite often use a good portion of the elements that make up the Russian strategy, through the enhancement of cultural, historical and religious ties and the use of economic instruments or others related with subversion and propaganda.

3 The Power of the Church and the Protection of the Slavs Religion and culture constitute one of the axes of the Kremlin’s policy to achieve its foreign policy. Besides using the Russian communities settled in their host countries, which are fundamental to conduct instability campaigns, the link between the Russian state and the Orthodox Church and the Slavic governments favours Moscow’s interests. The relation between the Orthodox Church and the Russian state was reinvigorated by Vladimir Putin’s arrival to power. Besides closed links between soviet foreign policy, throughout KGB, and the Orthodox Church, as was underlined by Marcel Herpen (2016), during the Soviet era there was a clear separation between the Church and the State, resulting from the ideological role of communism in the identification of the Russian national consciousness, both internally and externally. The communist regime took away all the privileges, including tax exemption that the Church had until the 1917 Revolution (Kelly, 2018, 273). The Soviet implosion and the communist collapse took the Russian state to seek, once more, the role of the Orthodox Church, which nowadays has a great prominence in the Russian political system, where there’s an alignment between the religious diplomacy and Russian foreign policy. This rapprochement between the Church and the State is quite visible in the rebuilding of a large part of the Orthodox Church patrimony, which was directly supported by Vladimir Putin (Coyer, 2015; Chrzová et al. 2019, 5). This proximity is so notorious that there are even laws that forbid the practice of other religions, like the Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example (Kelly, 2018, 293). In the Western Balkans, orthodoxy is expressed in quite an intense manner, particularly in Serbia, where 88% of the population is Christian Orthodox. In Montenegro, the numbers are slightly inferior (72%), with 65% in North Macedonia and 31% in Bosnia. This importance is even greater, since a large part of these countries’ population claims to be religious, having its identity very much defined by its connection to religion, that is, to the Orthodox Church (Secrieru, 2019). In this sense, Moscow uses the religious element in order to deepen the cultural and spiritual ties of the region to Russia, by establishing the liaison between the Church, the Russian oligarchs and local politicians (Zeneli, 2018). Over the years, Russia has developed a feeling of protection towards the Christian Orthodox population, in order to maintain and enhance its influence in those territories, by using the Church in its propaganda, especially to politicize and exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions that exist in the region between Catholics and Orthodox (Croatians and Serbs), Orthodox and Muslims (Serbs and Albanians, Serbs and Bosniaks).

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With the manifest intention of strengthening the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the region, Moscow has been financing the building of churches in North Macedonia, in Kosovo, in Serbia and in Bosnia. Recently, Gazprom (a multinational energy corporation, mostly owned by the Russian Government) has made a donation of 5M US Dollars to the Orthodox Church in Serbia, this being an unmistakable sign of the increasing Russian presence in the Western Balkans, through its connection to religious and cultural matters (Metodieva, 2019, 5). The historical and political relations between the Serb Patriarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church are also recognized. In 2016, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro called for a referendum regarding the adherence of the country to NATO, having dubbed it as a civic and pastoral duty. The strengthening of the Church’s weight in this region has allowed to attract local agents (politicians) to the Russian cause (Secrieru, 2019). The Russian Orthodox Church has been working closely with the Russian Foreign Office in order to strengthen the Orthodox unity at an international level, through establishing so-called non-governmental organizations, such as the Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations, whose role is to promote the participation of the Orthodox community in the enlargement and extension of the connection between the Slavic nations and the Western Christians, in the spiritual and cultural fields, apart from scientific and economic matters (Clark & Foxall, 2014, 13). In a more comprehensive manner, the bond between the Slavs (ethnic Russians) strengthens the Russian influence in the region, being notorious the Kremlin’s interference with governments of states led by Slavs. The case of the little, but unstable and powerful Serbian Republic of Bosnia (Republica Srpska) is an example of this bond through the Slavs, with Russia’s support of the president of the local government, Milorad Dodik. Before the 2016 referendum, which aimed to make this sub-region independent, President Vladimir Putin received Dodik in Moscow. The Russian support was made public by the Russian ambassador in Bosnia, Petar Ivancov (Cropsey & Truitte, 2017; Bechev, 2019; Latal, 2019, 33). The matter of the Slavic identity is also relevant when it comes to Serbia, as reflected in Russia’s support towards the dispute between Belgrade and Kosovo (Ageeva, 2019; Kaletovic, 2018). Besides, Russia’s weight has been fundamental in increasing Serbia’s political weight internationally, especially towards the USA, that recognizes and supports Kosovo’s independence. Slavic identity has equally been used in the several connections that Russia maintains with Serb nationalist groups, in order to exacerbate ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Kosovo and North Macedonia (Chrzová, 2019, 11), a matter we shall look into more deeply in point 3. The existence of this (divine) feeling of control of areas with Slavic ethnic communities gives legitimacy to the Kremlin, in coordination with the Orthodox Church, to protect all Slavs, not only those who live in Russia, but out of geopolitical (and spiritual) reasons, the ones who live outside Russia as well (Lamoreaux, 2019, 2; Chrzová et al., 2019, 5). Religion has also been used in conflicts outside the Western Balkans, especially in Syria and Ukraine. Fighters from Western Balkans countries which are pro-Russian, namely from Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro, recruited by Russian military companies considered illegal, like the Wagner Group, and with ties to the Russian Secret

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Services, joined local forces that fight for and defend Moscow’s interests in those two conflicts (Zivanovic, 2018; Secrieru, 2019; Kuczynski, 2019, 12; Ageeva, 2019). Religion has also been used to mobilize manpower from Croatia into Ukraine to join the so-called Azov Battalion, a group of paramilitary militias that operates at the order of the Ukrainian Home Minister, justified by the fight between Christian Orthodox (Serbs) and Catholics (Croatians) (Colborne, 2019). Actually, Moscow has supplemented all of the above with more discrete but no less effective initiatives. Besides region, the cultural relationship between Russia and the Western Balkans’ Slavic communities is strengthened through several fora and institutions that promote the Slavic culture, like the Forum of Slavic Cultures International Foundation. Created in 2004, the Forum’s founding members were Bulgaria, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro. Also, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, whose activity is very connected to the objectives of Russian foreign policy, intends to contribute to the preservation of the ethnic culture and identity of the Russian diaspora. This foundation was established in 2007, by decree of President Putin, with the purpose of promoting the Russian language as national heritage and supporting its teaching abroad. Apart from that, the Foundation aims to provide support to Russian communities, safeguard its rights in their host countries, and preserve its cultural and ethnic identity while preserving their bonds with Russia. In the Western Balkans, there are two such centres in Serbia, one in Bosnia (Republic Srpska) and another one in Montenegro. Likewise, the Gorchakov Foundation was created on February 2nd 2010 by decree of the Russian President at the time, Dmitry Medvedev. Officially, the Foundation’s mission is to promote the development of the Russian diplomacy abroad, under the supervision of the Russian Foreign Minister. However, practice shows these objectives are different, since its activities were connected to Russian political propaganda all over Europe, including, naturally, the Western Balkans. The Gorchakov Foundation’s main representatives are, generally, prominent figures from the Russian political and economic sectors, with a strong attachment to the muscular diplomacy conducted from Moscow (Ageeva, 2019). Last but not least, the cultural bonds with Russia are also promoted through young students that attend Russian universities, in particular in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, given their popularity and appeal in the Balkans region, in the domain of the social sciences and humanities (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, 354). Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans made of the religious aspects, and broadly speaking, the culture, one of its main axis, in that it favours Russian image in the region and support the Kremlin’s narrative, keen in portraying itself as the main alternative to the Western powers. As a result of the political connections between Moscow, the Orthodox Church and most of the Forums and institutions that promote Slavic culture, created in most cases by the Russian President himself, Moscow has attained the necessary political support which allows to monopolize local governments’ decisions. Religious and cultural aspects have been integrated in the Russian strategy in order to achieve its misinformation and propaganda, existing, therefore, an articulation between these instruments.

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4 The Weapon of Misinformation and Subversion In 2014, Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014) conducted a rather in-depth analysis of the way Russia uses information as a weapon (weaponization of information), hand in hand with culture and money, in order to achieve part of its hybrid warfare. For both of these authors, the Kremlin exploits Western democracies’ freedom of information to spread misinformation in the society, having as main goal to create havoc through conspiracy theories and dissemination of fake news. Another of the ideas presented by the authors concerns the support offered by the Kremlin to groups that explore internal divisions in those countries, acting subversively, resorting to misinformation as well as armed actions that intend to foment instability. Russia’s intervention in the fields of misinformation and subversion is achieved mainly through the media, exploring the capabilities of radio and TV stations and the internet in reaching a significant portion of the population, in particular the one culturally connected to Moscow. In the Western Balkans, a significant role is played by the Russia Today (RT) TV network and the Sputnik website, which influence the local vision of the West. This narrative is quite visible in most of the broadcast contents, like the one that was published by one of the Sputnik chroniclers, Andrew Korybko (2016): In a display of massive arrogance, the West has grandiosely attacked the pride that many Serbians and Macedonians feel for their countries, possibly heralding a long-awaited turning point where the people finally realize their subservient status under “Euro-Atlanticism” and begin actively pressuring their governments to reject it in full.

RT also promotes to its audience anti-West subjects/topics and stories, using, when necessary, interviews with the Russian President himself or with his Foreign Minister, Lavrov. The network, which is directly financed by the Russian government, broadcasts abroad in English, Arabic and Spanish, apart from Russian. Even more globally, Sputnik, also controlled by the Kremlin, broadcasts news in about 30 languages (Helmus, 2018, 1). The Russian bet in different countries of the Western Balkans is based on the cultural and religious ties, whereby Serbia is one of the Kremlin’s preferred targets. Having begun its activity on January 1st, 2015 and with approximately 30 workers, Russia Today (RT/Sputnik Srbija), broadcasts in Serbian, with news reports which tell the Russian version of events involving Russia and the West. As such, news stories about conspiracy thesis that portray interference attempts in the Western Balkans’ countries are common (Ageeva, 2019). Besides the intervention of this TV network, two of the major Serbian newspapers, Politika and Geopolitka have Russian supplements: Ruska Reˇc and Rusija i Srbija (Klepo, 2017; Naunov, 2019, 51; Presi´c, 2020). The modus operandi of Sputnik radio network and news website (which has replaced the Radio Voice of Russia) in Serbia is similar in every single way to the one of the RT/Sputnik Srbija, although with a wider impact, reaching out to Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo and North Macedonia. Besides these two platforms, Sputnik also has social networks (such as Facebook and Twitter) followers.

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According to a report recently made public by the news observatory Raskrinkavanje, Sputnik is the main centre of Russian misinformation for all of the Western Balkans regions. Since it began operating in Serbia, in 2015, local population support to Russia has significantly increased, from 47.8% in 2015 to 60% in 2017. According to a report from the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, Sputnik’s target audiences are several, including far-left and far-right parties, environmentalists, civil rights activists and minorities (Kaletovic, 2018; Sampson, 2018). In Bosnia, the analysis of hundreds of articles published by Sputnik over a period of 3 months showed an editorial trend favouring the image of the ruler of the Republic of Serbia, Milorad Dodik and his party, was noted. Raskrinkavanje has analysed Dodik’s campaign, concluding that a significant support was endorsed by Sputnik, having the main opposition candidate repeatedly presented as a “puppet” of the West who would have accommodated foreign powers interests if elected. Amongst the conspiracy theories disseminated at the time, the one that stands out is the one which identified a Western attempt to start a revolution in the country, as happened in Russia’s regions of interest, in order to install pro-West governments (Cvjeti´canin et al., 2019, 57; Presi´c, 2020). Kremlin’s connection to Dodik allows Russia to indirectly control the Republic of Serbia media, by using these channels to accomplish its objectives of misinformation and propaganda (Latal, 2019, 36). In Kosovo, the scenario is similar in every way to the one in Bosnia and Serbia, with RT and Sputnik as the main source of fake news and Russian propaganda, in order to reach the Serb communities of the territory, who live mostly in northern Kosovo. One of Russia’s main goals is to exacerbate the tension between the Serb (Orthodox) and the Albanian (Muslim) communities, conveying the image of a country profoundly unstable and in permanent conflict, being therefore an unsafe place to live, which affects the perception of the resident Serb communities (Bashota, 2019, 80). The positive image of Russia and its President stands in stark contrast to the extremely negative image of Albania, the Kosovar leaders and NATO portrayed as the villains of instability in Kosovo (Presi´c, 2020). Equally part of this campaign is the use of social media. Russian interest in these platforms has increased significantly, using it in a more sophisticated way (Helmus, 2018, 1). For the Russian leaders, the Internet and social media represent a new and much more effective way to conduct its propaganda and disinformation campaigns, having as main inspiration the effects produced by the so-called colour revolutions (the Rose Revolution in Georgia, in 2003, and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, in 2004) (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, 17). The use of social media to mobilize protesters that took part in demonstrations in the streets of the capital Belgrade against the Covid-19 pandemic related restrictions imposed by the government has been ascribed by the Serbian authorities to Russia, despite the lack of clear evidence of that interference. Apart from social media, manipulation campaign of the protesters by Russia is also achieved, according to Samorukov (2020) through pro-Russian radical groups, which promote such demonstrations. This interference has been interpreted as a change in the relationship between Serbia and Russia, given that in some spheres of Belgrade, including

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political, there currently are intentions to portray Russia as a hostile power, contrary to what’s been usual in the country. This matter assumes even greater relevance after an operation by the police authorities and the treasury department of Serbia, in late July 2020, which targeted bank transfers of groups and NGOs. There are suspicions of “money laundering”, regarding terrorism related funding, and hundreds of entities, including journalists are currently under investigation. On the list, there are several media, like the BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), from the Centre for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS), Crime and Corruption Reporting Network KRIK, the Novi Sad Journalism School. It is important to underline that these media conduct investigative journalism and are financially backed by private entities and by the EU (Stojanovic, 2020). Russia carries out its subversive actions by also resorting to extremist groups and pro-Russian, far-right political parties, such as the Dveri and the Obraz in Serbia, which in need, can be deployed in destabilization and subversion actions, inside the state (Kuczynski, 2019: 12). In 2012, one of the radical nationalist political parties was banned by the Serbian Constitutional Court. The use of those groups and political parties is also a current practice of the Kremlin in North Macedonia, via the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO), and in Montenegro, through the Montenegro’s Democratic Front. In those two countries, as it did early in the nineties, Russia continues to train paramilitary groups in order to create instability and therefore constrain their respective political alignments (Kuczynski, 2019, 12; Clark & Foxall, 2014, 10). In August 2018, Serbian authorities closed a training camp in Zlatibor, which was organized by Russia and Serbian far-right groups and included war veterans of both countries whose mission was to train children and adults in handling firearms so they could defend their country (Kaletovic, 2018). In Montenegro, the attempted coup-d’état, on October 15th, 2016, has been ascribed to Serbian militants, with training and experience gained from Russians. Besides having supported the international outrage and condemnation towards the invasion of Crimea by Russia, Montenegro showed at the time a political will to join NATO (which actually occurred on July 7th, 2017) (Bechev, 2018; Belford et al., 2017; Galeotti, 2018). One of the most notorious groups known in the Western Balkans, the Night Wolves (Nochnye Volki), considered to be Russian ultra-nationalist, has been in touch with the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin himself was seen publicly with the biker gang, which develops its activity in Bosnia, but maintains a large part of its structure in Serbia, in Russian owned facilities (Bjeloš, 2019, 17). In political and social terms, in North Macedonia, Moscow has been able to influence several pro-Russian organizations and political parties, like the Edinstvena Makedonija (“United Macedonia”) and the Hristijansko Bratstvo (“Christian Brotherhood”), who actively work to separate the country from the Euro Atlantic alliances. These organizations were at the helm of the movement against the change of the country’s name, which was voted in 2018 (Chrzová et al., 2019, 4). In Montenegro, alliances between Russia and paramilitary groups of Slavic origins? have also been

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reported, like the Balkanska kozaˇcka vojska “Balkan Cossack Army” and the gang “Russia’s Night Wolves” (Pancevski, 2016; Galeotti, 2018, 13). At last, in Kosovo, Russia has established connections with far-right groups that operate specially in the north of the country, region that apart from having a limited authority of the government at Pristina, shelters the most evident and violent interethnic tensions. Of the groups involved, the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka) stands out as supportive of most of the anti-Western narrative and embodiment of the far-right ideology. This extremist ideology is equally supported by Russian intellectuals and by the supply of equipment (drones and communications equipment) to the Serbian groups in Kosovo (Bashota, 2019, 80). Moscow’s ties to various actors (states, NGOs, paramilitary groups and private entities) from the Western Balkans countries are also a privileged source for the Kremlin to enforce its intelligence gathering strategy. In Serbia the Rusko Srpski humanitarni centar (The Russian-Serbian “humanitarian” centre), located in the vicinity of the city Niš (in the south of the country) is suspected of being used for intelligence gathering by Russia. With the same purpose, connections of the Police Forces of the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia have been reported, through cooperative actions with Russia, extended also to the sphere of counterterrorism (Metodieva, 2019, 4). The use of misinformation and propaganda instruments is one of the legacies of the Soviet Regime to the Russian Federation, which makes use of them quite effectively in many regions, the Western Balkans included. The campaigns conducted in the region do not involve many costs to the Kremlin, once that a large part of the local information and communication infrastructure is used, stemming from the political, cultural and religious connections. The Russian manipulation is also materialized by its informal connection with radical groups, of both ends of the political spectrum, which as a whole, aim to create subversion manoeuvres and increase instability, through the exploitation of ethnic issues and resistance to the importation of Western values.

5 The Geopolitics of Energy Apart from the dimensions previously analysed, Russia’s ties to the local communities are also underpinned by the heavy dependency on the Russian energy supply (oil and natural gas) to most of the countries in the Western Balkans. However, Moscow is also very dependent of this region, due to the passage of its supply infrastructure, but especially because it is known that the EU is seeking alternatives to the Russian supply, which will undoubtedly pass through the Balkans (Tonchev, 2017, 2). With this in mind, we can conclude that the energy issue is the main factor for the Russian presence in the Western Balkans, and we have lately noticed an increase in the Russian investment in the region (Ageeva, 2019). During his last official visit to Serbia, in January 2019, the Russian President promised to invest a sum of around 1,4 billion US Dollars in Russian gas to the country. Gazprom, the main Russian

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state energy company, holds the monopoly of natural gas in Serbia, Bosnia and North Macedonia, having signed long-term supply agreements with these countries (Metodieva, 2019, 4). Besides Gazprom, since 2010, Gazpromneft and Lukoil have bought the main companies in the Western Balkans, assuming a leading role in their oil and gas internal market. The control that the Kremlin exercises over these companies makes them an important instrument for the Russian influence and a source of promotion of the Russian interests. For that reason, there is a close connection between the Russian foreign policy and its energy strategy, which has as main goal to secure the control of the energetic resources and infrastructures (Ageeva, 2019). This dominant position of Russia in the energy sector is crucial to maintain its influence in the Western Balkans. In Serbia, Gazpromneft controls Naftna Idustrija Srbije (NIS), considered to be the largest energy company in the whole of the Western Balkans, with gas stations (95) in Romania, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tyurdenev, 2019). When it comes to energy, it is important to stress that Serbia is totally dependent on Russia (Kaletovic, 2018). In spite of the EU resistance, the agreement between the two countries has allowed that NIS, run by Russians, held the monopoly of energy in Serbia (Rotaru, 2017, 9; Kuczynski, 2019, 9). According to Samorukov (2020), this exclusivity regime has been, however, quite disadvantageous for Serbia, since it pays the highest price in the region, as a result of the lack of transparency of the contracts and their draconian clauses. In Bosnia, the Russian oil company, Zarubezhneft, has reached an important strategic position in the fuel supply to the Republika Srpska. In 2007, after the privatization, the Russian company bought the oil refinery Rafinerija Nafte Brod and the Modriˇca motor oil. In 2011, the government of Milorad Dodik established a joint venture Zarubezhneft—NIS—, which allowed to create the Jadran-Naftagas, granting it the exploration of oil and gas in the territory for the next 28 years (with exclusivity) (Clark & Foxall, 2014, 8). In North Macedonia, Russian companies not only control the supply, but also the main infrastructure that supplies the country and the region, the TransBalkan Pipeline (Naunov, 2019, 51). The monopoly of the gas supply held by Gazprom, the company that owns the pipeline, allows for the highest prices in all of Europe to be charged to North Macedonia. The presence of Russian companies is also marked by subsidiaries with offices in other countries. One of the examples with a greater impact is the electricity company TKG, which is a result of a joint venture with an intermediary company in Cyprus and has set up the TE-TO Combined Cycle Heat and Power Plant, located near the capital, Skopje, and controls the electric supply to most of the territory. In the metal sector, the Russian Solway, trading in lead, zinc and copper, in North Macedonia, is officially registered in Switzerland (Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2018). The recent visit (November 2019) of the Russian Vice-Minister for Industry and Commerce, Aleksei Gruzdev, to Skopje, to be present in the economic forum, has signalled the relationship between the two countries, particularly in the field of the energy sector, via the construction of infrastructures and supplying gas to the entire region. In statements made during the forum, North Macedonia’s Prime Minister,

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Zoran Zaev, apart from stressing that the strengthening of the economic cooperation does not jeopardize his position towards adherence to the EU and NATO, has also highlighted the importance that Russian companies have for the national economy (Marusic, 2019). In 2016, the Russian gas company Stroytransgaz advertised the conclusion of one more segment of the gas pipeline, between Klechovtse—Block Valve, which had been launched a year before. In a ceremony with the presence of North Macedonia official entities, it was underlined the significance of the construction of the pipeline to the deepening of the relations between the two countries through the energy sector (Stroytransgaz, 2016). Besides the energy sector, the Russian presence in the Western Balkans is achieved by other economic instruments. So, Russian investments in financial institutions can be identified, as well as in the mining sector, transport and communications, being not only commercially driven, but also geopolitically. The close relation between the companies that control these sectors and the Kremlin easily transforms the commercial influence into political influence and vice-versa (Pushkin, 2015, 28). Economically, the country in the Western Balkans that gets the largest Russian investment in Montenegro. More than 30% of the Montenegrin national companies are in Russian hands. Most of these investments are concentrated in sectors related to the State, tourism, leisure and health care (Stronski & Himes, 2019). Most of the tourists that visit the country are from Russia, so one of the instruments used by Moscow to prevent Montenegro from joining the countries that condemned the invasion of Crimea was the threat of ceasing the liberalization of visas between the two countries, an instrument considered essential to keep the flow of Russian travellers into Montenegro (Clark & Foxall, 2014, 10). Russia’s participation in the economic dimension has, thereby, two main characteristics: the first is that this interference is made, largely using Russian investors, heavily connected to the central power, and that have invested in strategic sectors in the Western Balkans’ countries; the second is that investment, in most cases, doesn’t have a profit as an objective, but simply the indirect control by Russia of those very same sectors, thus increasing the dependence of the several capitals on Moscow. In Bosnia, in spite of the (substantial) losses of Zarubezneft, no inclination towards leaving the activity in the country was shown (Secrieru, 2019). Throughout the years, Moscow has sought to present itself as economically attractive to the Western Balkans countries, as a source of investment. The energy sector has distinguished itself from the rest, with Russia using this issue as one of the more important political weapons in the relations with the Western Balkans countries, with the USA and with the EU. Internally, energy has recurrently been used to increase pressure on the Western Balkans countries during the integration processes in the Western organizations (NATO and the EU). We have to bear in mind that, in the winter of 2009, Russia broke off the gas supply to Ukraine, as a result of political conflicts between them, and that the Western Balkans are entirely dependent on the infrastructure that runs through that state. Energy has also been used by Russia in the relationship of the EU with the region, since Brussels understands that, apart

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from the historical and cultural connections, the Balkans are deeply dependent on the Russian power through energy.

6 Conclusions There is a wide and shared perception that Russia uses energy in the Western Balkans to promote political and diplomatic bonds. This economic influence of the Kremlin stems, on a significant scale, from the cultural and religious ties. For this reason, the proximity that the Russian Orthodox Church maintains in the region and the call to the cultural aspects which are used in the Russian narrative are one of the more relevant instruments used by the Kremlin in order to achieve its economic purposes. Besides energy issues, Russia’s presence in the Western Balkans aims to stop NATO and the EU expansion to the states of the region, having as main motivation, the defence of geopolitical and geostrategic issues, stressing the search for a Eurasian role held by Russia and the access to the Mediterranean, through the East. In spite of this importance, the Western Balkans are a “second line” region to Moscow, existing therefore, a rationale from the Kremlin towards the actions and the instruments used, recurring mostly to external players, which in spite of Russian support, do not call for its direct engagement. Russian presence will continue to give priority to the misinformation and propaganda campaigns, exploring the secessions and ethnic and religious tensions, naturally favouring and defending the Slavs and the Christian Orthodox. Likewise, Moscow will support the leaders and movements that internally seek to divert the countries in the region from joining Western organizations. Lastly, Russian businessmen will continue to be supported by the Kremlin in taking over important sectors of the society, namely, media and energy companies. Although there is an interference of other international players, the ability of the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance to offset Russia’s power in the Western Balkans, remains to be seen, and above all, the will in achieving the enlargement policies, given the internal divisions, in the EU, and NATO’s redirection to Asia–Pacific. If the enlargement is not achieved to most of the Western Balkans countries, the region will remain the southern frontier between Russia and the West.

References Ageeva, A. (2019). The Kremlin and its “soft power” strategy in the Balkans. Il grido del popolo. Retrieved July 15, 2020, from https://ilgridodelpopolo.com/869-2/. Anderson, R. R., Ellis, P. J., Paz, A. M., Reed, K. A., Renegar, L., & Vaughan, J. T. (2016). Strategic landpower and a resurgent Russia: An operational approach to deterrence. Strategic Studies Institute. Army War College (U.S.) and Press. Retrieved Febuary 23, 2020, from https:// publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2393.pdf.

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Russia’s Strategy for Influence Operations Through Public Diplomacy: The Romanian Case Constantin Hlihor and Ecaterina Hlihor

1 Introduction In the era of contemporary history states, organizations, and individuals have always tried to influence others to achieve what they want. Multiple means and methods have been used, some legitimate, some not. In the post-Cold War era, Russia has reemerged as a regional power player capable of exerting influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood Russia gradually expanded its military presence in Central Asia, annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, provoked and supported an ethnic Russian insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, and intervened militarily in support of the ruling regime in Syria. These events have dramatically aggravated the relations between Russia and West. The danger of great powers war could quickly return. Therefore, for both Moscow and West the top priority must be to contain and avoid the conflict and crisis by both sides. To achieve that goal, both Russia and West must carefully study the lessons of the Cold War era. During that Cold War, the two sides, despite their bitter rivalry, were eventually able to develop a variety of mechanisms for reducing tensions and containing risks. During the Cold War era the United States sensed a need for non-military ways to combat the Soviet Union expansion. According to Cold War historian W. Scott Lucas “The Cold War was a battle for hearts and minds” (Lucas, 1999, 11). By the other hand the Soviet Union used so-called active measures as a form of malevolent influence in western world. Soviet era active measures were a primary way in which the Soviet Union competed to maintain international influence and further its strategic interests. It developed a multi-faceted approach that cantered on tarnishing another nation’s image in hopes of bettering its own (Cull et al., 2017, 17–26).

C. Hlihor (B) · E. Hlihor “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_17

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A new cold war between Russia and the West could be possible but not in a classical way. In this confrontation, Russia keeps its military threats, including nuclear weapons, primarily on the table, complemented by constant forms of non-military pressure. Military power always has been and remains present as part of a larger and more comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy but a future clash of Russia with the West will be without direct classic military actions (Hlihor, 2016, 36–48). Putin and most of Russian leaders appear to have convinced that Russia is surrounded by enemies poised to attack but he sees these developments in Europe as a zero-sum game and has characterized U.S. missile defence in Europe as “…no less, and probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion” (Keith & Foster, 2017, 4). A new kind of warfare is going on between Russia and Western powers. It is a hybrid war. According to the most analysts, hybrid war is not a new phenomenon because intense work has been done on the hybrid warfare theory since the beginning of the Cold war, with great emphasis on its asymmetrical character (Deep, 2015; Hoffman, 2007; O˘guz, 2017), but it has been updated for the Twenty-First Century (Wijk, 2012; Pomerantsev, 2014). During the Cold War “Moscow frequently made use of subversive ‘active measures’ to gain influence and shape the political landscape in Europe” (Chivvis, 2017, 7). Professor Igor Nikolayevich Panarin states that “From our point of view, the ideology of hybrid war began to be developed in the British Empire, which, using its tools, became the largest Empire in the world, and then, through the organization of the two World Wars, it was able to destroy all other empires (Russian, German, etc.)” (Panarin, 2019). In the academic community, hybrid war is an essentially contested concept, therefore, it has been defined in various terms and meanings. Numerous works have traced the history of the concept of hybrid war, both in Western and Russian language literature, given many of its definitions. Most western of the definitions revolve around threats, instruments and actors, tactics and strategies, dynamism, complexity, ambiguity, simultaneity, etc. Military historian Peter R. Mansoor, coined the term “hybrid warfare” to describe a conflict that involves a combination of conventional military forces with irregulars (Mansoor, 2012, 2) while Frank Hoffman established the use of the term to refer to post-Cold War conflicts. Hoffman describes hybrid warfare as the employment of a full spectrum of tools, tactics and coercions (Hoffman, 2007, 8) In the Russian geopolitical and security studies, the history and comparative analysis of the concept of hybrid war are discussed in the works of R.V. Arzumanyan, Yu. Yu. Pershin and I. N. Panarin. Professor Panarin, for example, describes hybrid war as “a set of methods of military power, political-diplomatic, financial-economic, information-psychological and information-technical pressure, as well as technologies of colour revolutions, terrorism and extremism, activities of special services, embodiment of special forces, special operations forces and public diplomacy structures, carried out according to a single plan by the government bodies of the state, military-political blocs or multinational corporations” (Panarin, 2019). It can be observed that both Russian and western military and political analysts are using the term “hybrid war” as a toolkit for assessment of the new Cold War. Western analysts link the hybrid warfare to Russian doctrine and Russian theories about the nature of

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conflict (Clark, 2020) while Russian strategists use the concept of “hybrid war” to describe alleged Western efforts to destabilize their adversaries such as Russia itself (Panarin, 2019). At present, this means that both Russia and the West are locked into a political and normative struggle being fought in familiar and unfamiliar battlefields, from the virtual realms of cyberspace to the minds of people from eastern European and former soviet societies and this reality cannot be denied. In Russian hybrid warfare political and military leaders often exercises both soft and hard power. Using soft power, they can synchronize multiple instruments of power simultaneously and intentionally exploit creativity, ambiguity, non-linearity and the cognitive elements of warfare (Wetoszka, 2016, 64). The main target is to gain public opinion support for Russian interests. Therefore, influence operations have a huge importance because public opinion has become a factor of increasing importance and weight in foreign policies of many states (Mor, 2006, 161). So, Russia is also engaged in a battle over the “hearts and minds” of foreign public opinion. Therefore, since the mid-2000s, Russia has attempted to develop a soft power concept and an implementation mechanism of its own. Upon his 2012 re-election, Putin called on Russian foreign policymakers to start thinking about how to utilize non-traditional foreign policy instruments, including the soft power (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, 350). The idea of soft power was formally introduced into Russian foreign policy doctrine in 2013 and top Russian leaders (including President Vladimir Putin) have declared that soft power instruments are the most important ones in Moscow’s foreign policy arsenal (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, 347; Lukin, 2014, 49). Therefore, Russian attempts to regain its influence within public opinion of the Central and Southeastern countries of Europe have risen in the last decades. Russia has several reasons for using its influence operations on the former communist countries (Helmus et al., 2018, 3). First, Contemporary Russian intellectuals and political leaders have been discovering the nostalgia of a great nation from the very collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse was described by President Vladimir Putin as a major geopolitical disaster of the century, and in his Presidential Annual Address Putin explained why he considers this to be a disaster of such an importance: […] for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama […], because […] the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia […] (Maliukeviˇcius, 2013, 62). For that reason, Russian political and cultural elites take into account and perceive the post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence and consider the countries of this area in terms of their previous status of former Union Republics of the USSR or Kremlin’s satellites. Therefore, Kremlin officials see policies in their near neighbourhood as an extension of Russian domestic ordering principles, as wedged between domestic politics and foreign policy (Adomeit, 2011, 7). Second, effectively influencing the political outcomes of these countries helps establish a cushion against what it considers malign Western influence. Therefore, the Kremlin has adopted several different strategies pursuing its aims of gaining and increasing its influence in this region. The Russian Federation is using a combination of soft, smart and hard power tools and instruments to destabilize democratic or democratizing governments across central and southeastern Europe (Bowyer, 2019, 2). Therefore, Russia can select from

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a very large toolbox when engaging in influence operations. The different tools are all ultimately used in attempts to influence personal views and/or public opinion. One of these tools can be public diplomacy carried on by government and non-governmental organizations, groups and individuals. Major M. T. N. Bolduc set out that “Public diplomacy, a component of hybrid strategies, becomes an attractive option for countries like Russia against the supremacy of Western states traditional instruments of national power to restore influence in their region and gain international recognition” (Bolduc, 2018, 2). This study does not pretend to reach a final conclusion regarding Russian influence activities in Romania for many reasons. The research does not aim to establish the entire range of influence operations carried out by Russia, instead, due to several reasons, it will focus only on one of them. First, we will analyse only overt influence operations of Moscow with focus on public diplomacy. For this we will only use open sources and academic researches. Second, the influence activities that we will analyse are here defined as activities aimed at influencing someone to agree with your opinions or do what you want. By other words how and in what ways Russia wants to change anti-Russian-Romanian public opinion into a favourable one.

2 Russia’s Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of Influence Operations on Foreign Public Opinion After the end of the Cold War, Russia retained a huge military potential from the Soviet Union but largely lost its cultural and ideological attractiveness. To rebuild its external attractiveness in former Soviet space and Eastern European area Russia began to develop its foreign policy according to soft and smart power principles and tools. According to recent studies “Compared to other external actors, Russia stands out in terms of the wide set of instruments it uses in engaging with the EaP countries and in the existing interdependencies with those countries. The Kremlin has demonstrated both its versatility in deploying multiple and overlapping tools of influence, and extensive skills in tailoring its toolbox to the conditions in individual countries” (Laurynas Jonavicius et al., 2019). Now it is engaged in the process of reappearing in the public diplomacy arena. Public diplomacy is something that has been in existence for a long time in world politics practice (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, 287; Hlihor, 2017, 34–41), but how do Russian political leaders and cultural elite perceive it? Thus, public diplomacy is the fundamental basis of the more general and somewhat diffuse concept of soft power. Among its tools some researchers even list trading and economic assistance to other countries. Furthermore, some see manifestations of soft power in the engineering and implementation of “velvet” (“colour” and other) revolutions. This is because public diplomacy is not just an intervention in the minds, hearts and souls of people, but also an effective way of influencing the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. According to Podberezkin (2017, 41) “Public diplomacy, therefore, includes an endless list of potential means of influence and participants—from officials to figures of science,

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culture, education, media representatives, etc.—which in fact become the basis for conducting not only a policy of “soft power”, but in general a power strategy aimed at strengthening military confrontation, and in this sense, part of state foreign policy”. It should be noted that public diplomacy is an effective tool of “soft power”, which is an unofficial but legal activity of non-governmental organizations, individual citizens, commercial structures aimed at the implementation of the national and public interests of the state in the international arena (Glebov, 2019, 6). In the last decades, in Russia there is a great deal of discussion concerning soft power and public diplomacy. The concepts that Russian analysts use to describe and analyse public diplomacy as a phenomenon and as a theory matter greatly for Russian public diplomacy practices. According to Joanna Szostek from University of Glasgow (2020, 27–29): “Conceptual choices also matter because there can be assumptions implicit in the language used to describe phenomena”. It is also important to look at how the conceptualization of the terms “public diplomacy” and “influence operations” has been translated and adopted into Russian contemporary hybrid warfare actions such as in the Balkans and other regions. In the Soviet era the systematic effort to influence outside developments covertly is so-called active measures. According to Kragh and Åsberg (2017, 6) “The main difference between public diplomacy and active measures is that the latter serves to hamper the target country’s ability to generate public support in pursuing its policies. Active measures are conducted secretly, based on the principle of plausible deniability, where the desired result is to influence decision-making in a direction favourable or at least not harmful to the Kremlin. Active measures rely on disinformation, which is the deliberate dissemination of carefully constructed and false messages into the communication system of a target group in order to deceive decision-making elites or public opinion”. For a better understanding of confrontation between Russia and the West it is necessary to discuss what elements are common and what distinguishes military information operations from public diplomacy—conceptually and in practical terms. Both terms “public diplomacy” and “military influence operations” entered in circulation during the Cold War (Hlihor, 2017) although some similar activities carried out in the conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century could have been called by these terms. According to military analyst Susan L. Gough (2003, 2): key informational components of strategic influence include public affairs, political warfare, political advocacy, public diplomacy and psychological operations. While each of the components contains a persuasive element to some degree, by themselves they do not constitute strategic influence,

However, she wants to underline it clear that “Public diplomacy by itself is not strategic influence”. Both are used to achieve a Strategic Communication effect to support the interests outlined and agreed by political leaders but influence operations are about mass inform/manipulation tasks while public diplomacy is about targeted engagement, inform, influence tasks. Carnes Lord (2006, 7–8) argues that is better to use the term public diplomacy: in a relatively robust sense that covers information across a broad spectrum (from nearterm policy related to long-term generic), cultural affairs, and what I will call political

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action. Public diplomacy so understood is primarily a function of today’s State Department and international broadcasting organizations. It is one part of a more general complex of disciplines that I prefer to call psychological-political warfare.

Between PSYOPS and public diplomacy or even public affairs is not a sharp difference (Lord, 2006, 34). The key criteria that can draw an effective distinction between public diplomacy and influence operations are legitimacy. It becomes a yardstick for distinguishing between the actors of the acceptable influence such as branding, cultural and public diplomacy, and those that make use of manipulation or intend to deceive through public diplomacy instruments as is the case with Russian practitioners. This predisposition was also underlined by the Swedish specialists in public diplomacy. Kragh and Åsberg (2017, 4) found that “the boundary between Russia’s public diplomacy and active measures has become blurred”. In February 2017, answering the question of one of the parliamentarians about the need to recreate the counterpropaganda department in the army, the Russian Defence Minister, Sergey Shoigu replied that have already been created “information operations troops”, which are much more effective and stronger than the department that operated in the Soviet army (Petrov, 2017). Sergei Shoigu have underlined that “propaganda must be smart, effective and competent” (Petrov, 2017) but did not said what instruments and ways should be used in these kinds of influence operations. In such conditions public diplomacy becomes an important tool for military specialists, helping Russia illegitimate convey its alternative narratives and capture an important abroad target population for manipulation in its own purposes. Russian Federation has many institutions that are regulating its public diplomacy efforts. Some of those are the Pushkin State Russian Language Institute (the Pushkin Institute), founded in 1966, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation (the Russian World), established via a decree by Vladimir Putin in June 2007. Both institutions are subsidized by the State and controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Science. In 2017, the Pushkin Institute had 28 centres around the world and 446 affiliate organizations, with around 1.1 million students and The Russkiy Mir Foundation currently has 50 Russian Centres (Milosevich-Juaristi, 2020). Another similar institutional example is Rossotrudnichestvo, founded by President Medvedev in 2008 that acts as a coordinating institution for Russian foreign humanitarian activity as well as promoting Russian culture and language through educational cooperation. Russia Today and RIA Novosti can be presented as international news agencies examples for the institutionalization process. The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation has the main aim to promote the development of public diplomacy, as well as to facilitate the creation of a favourable for Russia, social, political and business environment abroad (Simons, 2014: 446–447). According to Kiseleva (2015), Russian efforts in the field of public diplomacy are tightly connected with the necessity of Russia to establish itself as a state capable of using soft power. However, when Russia cannot gain status through recognition of its soft power in the hegemonic West, it resorts to asserting “great power” on its own terms, in opposition to hegemon and its soft power “standards”. Russian soft power

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in this framework is put in geopolitical terms, meant as a counterforce to the West and its detrimental soft power (Kiseleva, 2015, 325). Russian leaders often stated that Moscow is keen on employing soft power in the West in a way that would facilitate understanding and a sense of affinity between the two sides. Various official documents and presidential speeches stress the need to project an “objective” and “truthful” image of Russia in Western societies. According to Kiseleva (2015, 322) “Russian policymakers are concerned that Russia’s image in the West is unjustifiably distorted due to, among other things, deep-seated stereotypes that perpetuate a “negative perception inertia”. But in fact, Russia, with an authoritarian regime based on non-democratic value systems, uses soft coercion, sharp power, mimetic power and public diplomacy also with “the intent to mislead and confuse democratic nations and their leadership, hence the influence emanating from these approaches is inevitably negative in the normative sense and is termed here as malicious” (Shekhovtsov, 2020, 75). These are only apart from the Russian public diplomacy limits. Therefore, Russian specialists and political leaders make a huge effort to pass current challenges facing Russian public diplomacy and consequently attempt to project a more positive image of Russia abroad. In this context, for Russia, influence operations abroad have a huge weight. Moscow makes many efforts to extend an efficient system of influence beyond Russia’s borders to Western political, media, business, and cultural elites. Thus, stories and images, promoted by political actors have become weapons in the war for hearts and minds. Public diplomacy has adopted the mantra of whose story wins and political actors have become increasingly involved in constructing narratives and analysing those of opponents.

3 The Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest as Instrument of Russian Influence Operations on Romanian Society In the last years Romania has become a target for Russian influence operations (Tudoroiu, 2008, 401–405). The issue of Russian influence in Romania has always been a sensitive subject for Romanians and has a marginal importance to Russian public opinion for many reasons. In contemporary history the relations between Russia and Romania have been highly asymmetrical, connecting a great regional power and its medium-sized neighbour. There was a huge imbalance in political influence, military strength, economic weight and regional status. Romanian society has a strong legacy regarding anti-Russian sentiment. Bucharest before and during the communist regime, particularly under Ceausescu, promoted a version of Romanian history that was largely antagonistic in outlook towards Russia. This is because Romanian’s generally see Russia as their “other” and as an enemy, due to Bessarabia annexation (1812) and historical experiences during the Independence War (1877) and particular in the Second World War era, when the imposition of

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communism was facilitated by the Soviet occupation after 1945 (Anton & Chiper, 2005; Hlihor & Scurtu, 2000). After the Cold War’s end, the Kremlin’s actions first aimed at Romania’s inclusion in a Soviet and then Russian sphere of influence while the new government in Bucharest tried to promote a new foreign policy oriented towards western democracies. Romania’s admission to NATO and the EU constrained Moscow’s ambitions but did not stop them and civil society reacted to these actions of Russian leaders. Russia is seen by Romanians as a long-term foe of their independence–and with some justification, for Russian troops are still stationed in the Transnistria region of Bessarabia, a province that had been part of Romania from 1918 until 1940 (Gallagher, 1999, 411).

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014), Russia became a direct neighbour of Romania. The proximity of Russia’s military arsenal to Romania’s exclusive Black Sea economic area and offshore oil and gas fields have worried society because Romania aspires to security, stability and predictability of its own borders and environment. On the other hand, for Romanians, Russia, unlike the West, has a great handicap: it is not an economic power, it does not offer a new model, although it comes with the same capitalism, but in a much more “primitive” and violent form. Russia has a pretty bad image and does not have a “myth” behind it, a mirage that attracts (Avram, 2015). According to public opinion, this perception of Russia is also confirmed by sociological research carried out periodically in Romania. According to the most recent opinion poll conducted at the request of a research institute, “over 60% of Romanians believe that Russia was and remains the main threat to Romania’s security” (Dungaciu, 2019). This trend of mistrust obviously has its roots in the complicated history of relations between the two states. The short periods of collaboration during conflagrations in which the two states were allies or those of cooperation on a fair and honest basis in various fields could not lead to the erasure from the collective memory of the image of Russian/Soviet invasions in Romania. With all its procession of sufferings, the image of the territorial ruptures made by Russia/the Soviet Union in the territories inhabited by Romanians has not been erased. Moreover, this image is enhanced by the aggressive behaviour that the Russian Federation has adopted in the last two decades in what they call the near neighbourhood, in particular, and in international politics, in general. The Kremlin leaders are aware that Russia has a negative representation in Romanian public opinion and has an obvious interest in changing it. Romania, a very close ally of the United States, is geographically located in the Pontic-Baltic region, which the Russians consider to be of strategic interest to Moscow. In order to regain its influence in this space, Russia understands that it cannot ignore Romania’s position. According to Russian experts, Moscow must find the most appropriate solutions to rebuild its image in these societies. Hard thing to realize because “shortly after Ceausescu’s Communist regime was overthrown in December 1989, Romania turned its eyes to the West, towards the North Atlantic Alliance”. That’s why Russian experts, despite the fact that they know that “significant and deep-rooted anti-Russian forces exist in Romanian society and in its political and intellectual elite” and “Russophobia is a constant for the mood of the population and the Romanian authorities”

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they believe that political elites should try to engage Romanian elites into developing interstate bilateral relations and to prevent Romania from becoming an “Outpost” or “aircraft carrier” of NATO in the Eastern Balkans and the Black Sea region (Yermakov & Kurtov, 2013). Because it wants to gain a capacity for political influence in Romania (Damian, 2013), Russia will use all the means at its disposal in the arsenal of soft power, from instruments that have become somehow neoclassical, such as public diplomacy, to those of information warfare and hybrid warfare. According to Peter Gross (2020) “Russia’s information war against NATO and EU member Romania is delivered with both the accuracy of a twenty-first century guided munition and hurled in scattershot ways in the hope that it creates confusion, distrust, fear, and ethnic strife, and fabricates anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-democracy sentiments”. For Russian leaders, public diplomacy is also an instrument of soft power to its complex use in conjunction with other means of influence on former soviet space, eastern and Balkans societies. There has been created an increasing number of institutions, which communicate and form relationships with an increasing number of people in Romanian society. Among those institutions that promote Russian interests and carry out influence operations in societies that have become targets for the Kremlin are the Russian Centres for Science and Culture. They function as institutional structures under the coordination of Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation) which was established in 2008 but is the successor to the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) of the USSR and has close ties to personalities in the Russian political and secret service world (Demash, 2020). In different regions of the world, where Moscow has strategic, political or other interests, are operating 73 Russian Centres for Science and Culture. In 62 countries, such institutions of public diplomacy (Yakovleva, 2020) are engaged in activities of promoting the image of Russia and also in operations of influence in those countries. In Bucharest, such a public diplomacy institution was established in the summer of 2015, based on an agreement signed by former Foreign Minister, Titus Corl˘at, ean, in 2013, in Moscow. The real purpose of the activities carried out by the Russian Centre in Bucharest is characteristic to influence operations, as it can be seen from the analyses made by Russian experts in the field of public diplomacy. According to Bartosh (2018) the public diplomacy strategy in these countries, also in Romania obviously, must aim at combating NATO’s public diplomacy activities that try to justify the expansion of the Alliance, their military preparations, and the deployment of a missile defence system near Russia’s borders. In order to increase the range of action and make it easier to reach to the target audience, the Russian Centre in Romania is using a series of cultural or non-governmental organizations, even individuals, who organizes musical activities for young people such as DJs. An edifying example is ARTVIVA, a non-governmental organization founded in September 2012. It is a constant cultural partner of the Russian Embassy and the Russian Centre for Culture and Science in organizing cultural activities that can attract a large number

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of young people in Romania or contribute to their convergence with Russian target audiences in other countries (Mondiru, 2020). The wide range of activities that the Russian Centre carries out in the capital, but also in the major university centres in the country, as well as the careful choice of the target audience shows us that it is perfectly framed in the “Russian public diplomacy strategy to counter hybrid war and colour revolution” (Bartosh, 2018). According to this strategy, such public diplomacy institutions must have • the ability to respond quickly and decisively to conflicts, the non-linear nature of which allows achieving significant results with relatively small disturbing influences; • the ability to quickly concentrate critical efforts and resources in the most threatened place; • and, finally, the availability of a high-quality human resource capable of ensuring the development and implementation of a strategy for countering hybrid warfare, including through public diplomacy (Bartosh, 2018).

In order to meet the first two requirements of the strategy and achieve maximum efficiency in influence operations, a good knowledge of the target audience is required. Anna Velikaya (2016), a member of the Rossotrudnichestvo Advisory Board for Public and Humanitarian Programs, emphasized that for the increased efficiency of public diplomacy activities abroad, influencers must not only be very familiar with the technical means of communication, but also have to “know the portrait of people who are potential recipients of information, to conduct sociological research aimed at identifying the requests of a foreign audience, since, it seems, only states that understand the interests of the expert community and the civil society of key players, offering formats of interaction corresponding to them and their own national interests, are able to emerge victorious from the “battle for hearts and minds” unfolding today” (Velikaya, 2016). Pavel Shevtsov, deputy director of Rossotrudnichestvo, believes that the Russian Centres must focus on attracting people who are also vectors of influence. The academic environment is a very suitable one and the influencers are making efforts accordingly. According to Pavel Shevtsov, more than 15,000 students from 182 countries around the world were recruited, primarily from the CIS and South-East Asia countries and from Europe (RIA Novosti, 2020). In Romania, the Russian Centre has opened branches or structures for learning Russian language in various university centres. In Romania is operating the Russian Cultural Centre in The Bucharest University of Economic Studies with a library that holds over 1500 books and where various activities are organized, especially those for learning Russian. The target audience is formed by those who have graduated from university and work in places where Russian language is a condition or an advantage. At the University of Craiova, the Russian Centre for Science and Culture even tried to set up a public diplomacy structure. Fake news appeared in the Romanian public space, launched by the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who had announced the creation of a public diplomacy entity. In a press release, the University of Craiova denied the Russian fake news and stated that “we express our amazement regarding the implication of the name of the University of Craiova in this statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry, especially since such inter-institutional agreements

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can only be signed by the rector of the University, after their approval in the Board of Directors and in the University Senate” (Mih˘aescu, 2018). Also, in Craiova, in October 2017, the County Library “Alexandru and Aristia Aman” organized a round table entitled “Dilemmas of Europe. The Future of Romania and Russia Relations”, with the participation of the historian Alexey Gromyko, Director of the Institute for Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and one of the most active Russian influencers in Europe. During the same period, the “Titulescu European Foundation”, together with the “Mihai Eminescu” International Academy, CFPSS—Center for Foreign Policy and Security Studies and the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Romania organized on Thursday, October 12, 2017, the Conference entitled “Dilemmas of Europe. The Future of Romania and Russia Relations”. The conference was held in English by Mr. Alexey Gromyko—Director of the Institute for Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The moderator of the conference was former prime minister Adrian N˘astase (Vodi¸ta, 2017). In five years of existence, the Russian Centre in Bucharest has organized a wide range of activities, from seminars and conferences dedicated to historical events of interest to Romanian history, to activities of promoting film, music and other artistic creations in Romania. In this manner could have been actively transmitted messages to promote topics that present the Russian Federation in a positive note in Romania, including by drawing up older associations and connections of historical nature between the two countries. In addition, synergies between Russia and Romania are identified and promoted in areas such as past spatial collaboration, belonging to the Orthodox family, historical “alliance” between the two states, etc. In Romania, as well as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the influence operations carried out by the Kremlin and with the help of the Russian Centre for science and culture in Bucharest have a dynamic character and are exploiting any opportunity no matter how small or insignificant it might appear. They speculate and use the socio-political context, arouse existing emotions or beliefs in various societal groups, to bring them closer to the narratives supported by the Kremlin. The most frequently used tools are those that use the film and the image promoted with the help of art or photography exhibitions but also the historical narrative. In Romanian society the participation in World War II in the Eastern Campaign for the Liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, kidnapped by the Soviets in June 1940, and then in the Western Campaign to remove the Vienna Dictate, as well as the occupation of the country and then the establishment of the communist regime are sensitive issues and have their share of contributing to the formation of a negative perception of Moscow. The Russian Centre for Science and Culture has focused its activities on these historical events in order to reverse the image of the Soviet Union/Russia in the minds of public opinion. Thus, even in the year of its opening in Bucharest, on May 13, 2015, the Russian Centre organized a round table dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory in World War II. There were invited historians that were investigating the events related to Romania’s participation in World War II and its consequences. In the first part of the year 2020 was launched the book entitled “No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten”. The former director of the Centre, Natalia Muzhennikova, stated that this work appeared:

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because the history textbooks in Romania deal very briefly with the broad and complex issues of World War II. In these textbooks, you will always find one, two or maximum three pages about the events of World War II, pointing out only two or three events that took place on the territory of the Russian Federation or the USSR. And this fact does not suit us, because the most affected country by the events of World War II was the USSR (Arsene 2020).

Other influencing tools used are Russian film galas and art and photography exhibitions. A real army of directors—related to the Mosfilm concern—led by Nikita Mihalkov and Feodor Bondarciuk are working to produce historical films. Many of their films are spectacular tools for crushing awkward historical realities, applying to indigo Lenin’s famous thesis: “of all the arts the most important for us is the cinema” (Cr˘asescu 2019). The photo and documents exhibitions from the Russian archives aim at presenting some events and personalities that resonate in the Romanian public opinion and that could shed a favourable light on Russia. Knowing the prestige of the Royal House in Romania, especially the popularity of King Carol I, King Ferdinand and Queen Maria, The Russian Centre for Science and Culture in collaboration with the Bras, ov County Museum of History organized in June–August 2019, at the Council House in Bras, ov, the exhibition “Russian-Romanian historical consonances: the visit of Emperor Nicholas II to Constant, a (JUNE 1/14, 1914) and Tsarist Russia in Bras, ov”. These are opportunities and occasions to launch influential operations with the purpose of positivizing the image of some extremely negative characters in the Romanian collective mind. Such an action took place on the occasion of the opening of a photography exhibition dedicated to World War II in Bucharest. On this occasion, Natalia Muzhennikova, former director of the Russian Centre in Romania, stated that she is sorry that Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin is “criticized here, forgetting to whom Romania owes Transylvania” (Nicolae, 2018). This message was not transmitted by chance, it was correlated with the essence of a video of only one minute and nine seconds length which was broadcasted on the website of the Russian Embassy in Bucharest that highlighted, among other things, how the Red Army and Stalin freed us from the German occupation, when in fact it replaced the German occupier (Mihu, 2018). The number of participants in classic activities organized by the Russian Centre is extremely small and even on online communication platforms the number is not large compared to other organizations of this type. Despite all the efforts made by Russian leaders to change the image of their country in Romanian public opinion through the tools that public diplomacy offers, the results are more than modest. According to an opinion poll conducted in the spring of 2019, “64.4% of Romanians believe that Russia was and remains the main threat to Romania’s security” (MN, 2019). Finding out that they do not have the expected efficiency, its representatives are trying to find other methods. One of them aims at attracting young people from the academic environment to create NGO’s that can become vectors of influence. In 2016, Vostok Group was founded in Cluj, an NGO led by AlexandruVlad Cris, an, Ph.D. student at the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the “Babes, Bolyai” University. A year later, in October 2017, Cris, an was one of the leaders of the delegation that represented Romania at the World Festival of Youth and Students (WFYS, 2017) in Sochi. The involvement of the Russian Centre for Science and

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Culture is presented in an article published in the magazine “Russian Kaleidoscope”, which can be found on the website of Rossotrudichestvo—Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation. According to the publication, “Approximately 35 future participants, representatives of various national youth and student organizations as well as students from the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures gathered at the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest. During this meeting, Mihai Lucacs, a student at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures and collaborator of the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest, invited all participants to set up a National Preparatory Committee (NPC) to participate in the festival, according to the requirements of the organizers from the Russian Federation” (Felseghi, 2018). As a result of the meeting from the festival in Sochi was founded an NGO called Future Team, which sent 300 “foreign observers” to the presidential elections in March 2018, to demonstrate to the international community the correctness and validity of the result: the re-election of Vladimir Putin for the fifth presidential term (Felseghi, 2018). The representatives of the Russian Centre tried to capture a segment of the “rebel” public of Romanian society that usually reacts negatively to any action taken by the authorities. The message of the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest (RCSC), which asked those Romanians who challenged the government’s measures to leave their homes in the midst of a pandemic is edifying. At the end of March, when the Romanian authorities, in accordance with the provisions of Military Ordinance no. 3, imposed new measures regarding the isolation of the population at home, as well as the traffic restrictions, RCSC was inviting Romanians to come to its headquarters on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m., to take a brochure entitled “To find your immortality as a hero in the fire of battle” (T˘al˘au, 2020). The message “Even in the period of the coronavirus we work for you” incorporated in the content of the brochure tried to show that, unlike the Romanian authorities that impose measures of restrictions for health protection, the RCSC is on the side of Romanians! Both the invitation and the associated message are relevant for at least two reasons. First of all, the content was significantly multiplied in the public space by both sites obviously positioned in the pro-Russian area and by the ones included in the internal mainstream which, although, being anti-Russian, increased the notoriety of the message. Secondly, in the context of the worsening of the health crisis caused by the SARS COV 19 virus, a current of opinion was initiated and permanently maintained, the central theme of which was to challenge the antipandemic measures taken by the authorities, and the invitation is part of this current. Later, between July 20–23, in the context of the “Power of Memory” Film Festival, dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great War for the Defence of the Fatherland, it included in the program the launch of the brochure “Finding Your Immortality hero in the fire of the fight” although it had been offered to the public free of charge since March, which confirms a characteristic of influential actions, namely the use of recurring themes.

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4 Conclusion After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained a huge military potential from the former regime but largely lost its cultural and ideological appeal. Therefore, in order to rebuild its external attractiveness, Russia began to develop its foreign policy according to soft power principles with a large public diplomacy web. But Russian policymakers misinterpreted the role of public diplomacy in international arena, including Romania. They failed to appreciate the idea of partnerships with clear advantages for both sides in the near and long term. Instead, Moscow perceives public diplomacy as a tool/instrument to influence, or even manipulate, public opinion in target countries. On the other hand, Russia has not abandoned its centuries-old hegemonic mentality and rhetoric. Therefore, most of the Romanians have perceived Russia as a state with a neo/imperial behaviour towards neighbouring states. Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest by its activities is not able to offer them an attractive vision of integration without building patterns of strong dependence linked to Moscow. Its proposals of close cultural and artistic cooperation are received with caution and untrust by Romanian public opinion because the official Russian political discourse towards Romania is unfriendly. It is impossible for Moscow to create with public diplomacy instruments an appealing external image in Romanian society if the Russian Centre for Science and Culture promotes the same vision, same cultural products and same historical discourse like in the soviet era. With such a vision and rhetoric on public diplomacy, it is difficult to trust Russian leaders when they speak of multilateral cooperation. Therefore, Romanian public opinion on the Russian Centre for Science and Culture is highly mixed and varied according to the geopolitical considerations at one given time, ranging from predominantly indifference, sometimes to slight interest, at times deep frustration and even deep disagreement. Romanians most often do not infringe on Russia’s sensibilities but the general Russian leaders opinion on Romanian society is profonde negative and often exerts military pressure on Romania. The slight esteem derived from common grounds reached between the two sides at various times, a common Christian Orthodox faith and some common cultural values. Deep frustrations and even profound inconsideration remained in despite of the public diplomacy activities carried out by the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest. All of these emphasize the fact that when public diplomacy is used only to gain influence, by manipulating public opinion through outdated strategies and methods, the actions and activities carried out by various institutions and organizations of public diplomacy, such as the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest, not only that they do not achieve their goal, but may even lead to the opposite effect. In other words, the use of public diplomacy to build a better/positive image of Russia in Romania can prove itself useless if there are intense negative images in society regarding the strategic objectives promoted and pursued by Russia in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the activities carried out by the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Bucharest are useless, but that they must be rethought and carried out in such a way as to become useful and beneficial for both parties.

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Battles for History. ‘Combats Pour l’histoire’ as the Elements of Russian Information Warfare. Ukrainian Case Yevhen Mahda and Tetiana Vodotyka

1 Introduction Wars and warriors of modern days have small differences from the ones of the past decades and centuries. Some fight for ideas and values, but in the end, all is about power, money and influence. All this is correct about Russian hybrid aggression. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept of ‘hybrid aggression’ becomes popular in military literature (see i.e. Hoffman, 2009; Mattis & Hoffman, 2005; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015). There were some discussions about if hybrid warfare is something old or something new (Wilkie, 2009, 13; Murray & Mansoor, 2012). The idea of combining military and non-military instruments for gaining victory in the war is of course, not new. However, the methods change throughout the times and spaces. Nowadays we may say that hybrid aggression is always ‘the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects’ (Cullen & ReichbornKjennerud, 2017, 8) or as we define it ‘a set of prepared and promptly implemented actions of the military, diplomatic, economy-based, and informational that are aimed for the achievement of strategic objectives. Its key goals are the subordination of one nation’s interests to another in terms of the formal preservation of the political system of the sacrificial country’ (Mahda, 2018, 21). Ukraine and some other European states face Russian hybrid aggression. At the modern hybrid battlefield, the values clash, the power of law tries to prove to be better Y. Mahda (B) Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] T. Vodotyka Institute of History of Ukraine, NASU, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_18

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than the law of power, the truth and the post-truth fight for the right to speak out. In some countries, countering hybrid aggression is also a fight for democracy—and this is correct for Ukraine. Hybrid aggression is carried out not so much to seize territory but for the sake of establishing control over the sentiments and opinions of the nation’s residents who are the victim of aggression. Informational operations are significant and even vital part of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare even claimed to be the war of ideas and narratives (Marovic, 2019). In this context, it is impossible to overestimate the role of history in any nation’s development and survival. It is therefore not surprising that the Ukrainian national history became a target in a hybrid war. It is hard to define the accurate time when the attacks on Ukrainian history started. Historians faced severe restrictions—some topics were taboo, personalities, even periods of national history. The bounds between Russian and Ukrainian histories had to be visible and robust, rigid predetermination of establishing the Soviet power was undiscussable. National scientific schools were destroyed—by repressions first of all (Ûrkova, 2017, 314–316). In Soviet times the aim was to suppress the idea of Ukrainian independence. Historians, archaeologists and theorists of literature lost their jobs and careers for claiming Ukrainian culture had its roots, fate and future (see Kas yanov, 1995 for detailed information). Dozens of poets, who wrote in Ukrainian, but not in the regime’s proper style, were arrested and spent years in jail or in Siberia. Some of them, for example, Vasyl Stus, died in prison (See more about Stus in one of Ukrainian 2020 bestsellers Kipiani 2019). Since 1991 independent sovereign Ukraine became a reality, so the aim has changed. To undermine the right of the Ukrainian nation to have its state, be the sovereign international actor and even one of the region’s leaders—these goals are the priorities for Russian propaganda. We will talk about the use by the Russian Federation of historical memory and contradictory or difficult or even tragic pages of European history and national histories of the EU countries and Ukraine for political purposes. Moreover, this is direct aggression and attempts to reassess many cornerstone historical events and processes in a favourable direction. This article aims to show how history became the instrument of Russian hybrid aggression in the twenty-first century in general and since 2013 in particular to describe the narratives Russian propaganda uses and set up the problem of countering such challenges.

2 Historiography It should be noted that using historical memory as a tool of hybrid aggression is not the first time in the field of view of researchers. However, historians and political scientists have been more likely to write and research in memory studies, talk about memory conflicts and conflicts of commemoration strategies. National Institute of Strategic Studies published several analytical

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notes in 2006, 2010 and 2015 with the primary aim to draw the attention of authorities to the problems of state memory policy (Rozumnyi, 2015, 340). Poland was the most popular antagonist in these studies (Zhurzhenko, 2013). Of course, common Polish–Ukrainian history is not simple, and the memory policies of both states need reflections. However, this perspective made it hard to see what is happening on the other border. In 2013 was published the collective survey devoted to the representation of Ukraine in Russian historical discourse (Kas yanov et al., 2013). We also have to mention the texts by Oleksiy Rozumnyi (2015, 2017) and Volodymyr Golovˇcenko (2017). These Ukrainian scientists were among the first ones who highlighted the role of history as an element of information warfare and hybrid aggression. In our non-fiction book, devoted to the patterns of international perception of Ukraine globally, we have also mentioned the role of history in shaping the international image of Ukraine (Vodotyka & Mahda, 2016). Historical memory as one of the instruments of information warfare in the context of the war in Donbas, the role of identity factor in this conflict and Russian aggression, in general, became one of the most significant topics of recent research of Sergii Pakhomenko. He and his co-authors consider methods of information propaganda, ‘such as creating new holidays, new heroes and new approaches to schooling, are considered in detail’. Furthermore, attempts to use the events and heroes of the Second World War are similarly analysed, while tangible narratives, such as Soviet symbols and ‘The Great Patriotic War’ (Pakhomenko et al., 2018). Holger Mölder (2016) writes about the war of the narratives—and this is a very productive approach as far as narrative can include and unite very different episodes (information attacks, publishing books, public speeches, films). For example, anti-Western narrative influence and incorporate the Russian MH 17 information strategies (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019). Keir Giles (2016) examines the use of history and historical memory in the broad context of information warfare. He stresses that ‘planting and disseminating a lie is exceptionally easy’ but countering disinformation, proving the truth is much more challenging. To prove this statement, he used the case of Katyn massacres in 1940. The conclusion from this case is obvious—modern Russian information warfare is changing all the time, but it grounds on dozens of years of Soviet practice. One of the methods is censoring school textbooks on history. Another one is direct repressions against historians, like in the Yurii Dmitriev case. Yurii Dmitriev, a Russian historian and head of the Memorial human rights centre that opened the site of the mass shootings in the Sandarmokh tract, was sentenced to 3.5 years for the photos of his 11-year-old daughter which had a sexual meaning (as the court recognized but a historian and his daughter never did). Maria Mälksoo (2015a, 317) studies policies of history in Russia over the past few years. Her texts affirm the deep Soviet roots of modern Russian politics of memory: ‘The controversial politics of memory during the Putin era, in particular, has been denounced as aimed at constructing a new national mythology of the positive legacies of the communist period in Russian history’.

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The study by Janis Kr¯ek¸ is (2015), devoted to the use of collective memory as a resource in Russian information warfare against Latvia, should be mentioned. His research was ‘to identify the usage of manipulations of collective memory in the Russian-language newspaper “Vesti Segodnya”, which is the only Russian-language daily newspaper in Latvia’ (Kr¯ek¸ is, 2015, 93). It is indicative that such research appeared in Latvia as far as Baltic states are also the target of Russian information aggression and painful episodes of history are not a rare thing to use in this context. The author analysed 22 articles, published in 2014, in which historical facts were used to describe the situation in Ukraine. In conclusion, he claims that ‘there is a lack of theoretical foundations of information warfare concept’ to conclude that ‘collective memory has been incorporated into news stories deliberately to achieve political goals’ (Kr¯ek¸ is, 2015, 112). Even though the article was published in 2015, we have to stress that theoretical background of the problem is still weak. So, we hope that our article would help to strengthen it. This historiographical review is incomplete, but it gives an idea of the level of development of the problem not only by Ukrainian but also by foreign experts. An indisputable advantage is that the problem is generally in the research focus, as well as the fact that the problem of using historical memory as a tool of aggression is considered in the broader context of information aggression.

3 History as a Weapon. Ukrainian Case Georges Mink states that plots and images from the past, present in the public consciousness, can be described as ‘stocks of memory’. This kind of resource can be reactivated (i.e. woven into the current political context) and used to mobilize society or particular groups. This is the general principle of the historicization strategies used by political players. Mobilization measures that appeal to the conflict past oppose the trend of reconciliation applied by national and international institutions, together with informal groups and NGOs (Rozumnyi, 2015, 341). History as an ideological weapon and a tool for massive brainwashing has proven to be very effective. The prerequisite for this is the Soviet model of world image and historical memory in the post-Soviet republics. This conclusion was made by Ukrainian analysts in 2006 and 2015, for example (Rozumnyi, 2015, 343). Olga Malinova (2015, 175–176) analyses the way it works in the Russian Federation. She claims that the victory in the Great patriotic war became ‘the myth of the founding’ (mif ocnovani) for modern Russia. The other important point is that community of historians is the recipient of the narratives, created by the authorities. In Ukraine, situation differs. The state does not have such influence on establishing the narratives, even though there works Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (since 2014). The functions of this institution lay preferably in the field of public history than pure science. G. Kas yanov, a Ukrainian historian, shows the ways of Ukrainian memory policy evolution and analyses, how the last Soviet generation of historians suddenly started

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writing the history of Ukraine in 1991. Their approaches did not change much since the late 1980s, despite the Ukrainian state and nation had changed dramatically (Kas yanov, 2018, 188–190). After gaining independence in 1991, the history of Ukraine had to be written again. Almost 30 years later, after the Revolution of Dignity, this problem is no less relevant and essential. It is no coincidence that today’s Russian–Ukrainian relations are made of historical discussions on the leading edge of confrontation. It would seem that history is known to play a secondary role in contemporary ideological debates, information wars and political conflicts. However, history, especially the episodes that intersect the trajectory of past Russian and Ukrainian people, becomes the subject of fierce controversy (Mahda, 2018, 162). The memory communicated in the Russian information war is fundamentally different from European societies’ historical memory/memories. In Europe, historical memory is linear; it aims to distinguish between past and present, modern society looks to the future (and the past) from the present reality. Russian communication does not distinguish between past, present and future. The past repeats continuously; there is no non-return. As a result, the cyclical memory and ‘Gothic’, middle-aged understanding of the world establishes. The edge of 2010 became the turning point in this aspect. In May 2009 under then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ‘commission to combat falsifications of Russian history’ was established. The main task of it was to develop the appropriate content of school textbooks on history. For 2 years, their content could be judged at least from the following assessments of critical events in the common history of Ukraine and Russia: – the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918 was a ‘manifestation of separatism’, ‘did not correspond to the interests’ of the Ukrainian people and ‘did not have’ national support. – the Holodomor of 1933 ‘was not a genocide’ of the Ukrainian people, because of the following reasons (used separately or in the complex): (1) famine also affected some areas of Russia and Kazakhstan; (2) in the USSR not only Ukrainian peasants but also representatives of ethnic minorities went on hunger strike; (3) famine occurred due to drought; (4) the famine occurred as a result of mistakes made by the lower authorities during collectivization; (5) famine was God’s punishment for Ukrainians for participating in atheistic government campaigns. – Ukrainian nationalists ‘were in the service of the German occupiers’; many of them ‘served in the German paramilitary organization of the SS’. – soldiers of Ukrainian insurgent army ‘shot in the back’ of soldiers of the Red Army, they were ‘criminals’. – independent Ukraine is an ‘unnatural state formation doomed to imminent death’ and so on (Golovˇcenko, 2017). The list of the messages, used by Russian propaganda and based on historical facts, may be longer.

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Russia’s information war aims to create the preconditions for revising the borders that emerged in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, depriving the postSoviet states of their sovereignty, weakening or even dismantling the European Union and establishing Russian dominance in Europe. Regarding Ukraine, the purpose of this war is to delegitimize the Ukrainian state and government, to convince large groups of Ukrainian citizens of the artificiality, ‘unnaturalness’ of the Ukrainian people and nation, to impose the idea of the secondary nature of Ukrainian culture and its inability to form ‘correct’ models of social behaviour. The ultimate goal of Russian communication about Ukrainian society is to deprive/displace/replace the meaning of Ukraine’s existence as a political community and deprive Ukrainian identity of its political dimension, its ethnicization and reduction to a set of ‘Slavic’ folklore markers. According to the Kremlin, this will make it possible to ‘reunite the divided people’, including the territory and population of Ukraine, or at least most of them, in Russia (Ruban, 2014). It seems necessary to name the historical messages of the broadcasts from Russia to Ukraine during the years 2000–2014. Of course, they may change according to the agenda, but the main ones are as follows. It should be mentioned that the aim is just to list the messages and show the way they fit the main Russian narratives, not to analyse or deconstruct them.

3.1 The Heritage of Ancient Rus is Russian The situation with Kyivan Rus’s legacy, in particular Prince Volodymyr, is very significant in the context of the struggle for Ukraine’s historical heritage. Prince Volodymyr (or Volodymyr the Great) reigned in Kyivan Rus in 980–1015 and he is one of the key persons of Early Medieval Ukrainian history. He was the prince, who Christianized the Rus, united it and was canonized. Since the seventeenth century, his cult became popular and his day (15 July) become the big religious holiday (Ters kij, 2012, 135). Prince Volodymyr is venerated as a saint in Russia as well. And in both countries, he is also a hero of state level—he built and strengthened Rus’. The starting point of Moscow’s self-consciousness was the idea of the continuity of church and dynastic unity from Kyiv to Moscow. St. Volodymyr was revered as the Moscow rulers’ ancestors who were positioned as the only legitimate heirs of the Kyivan princes. The principle of religious unity for all Russia, formulated since Ivan Kalita’s time, has become a point-to-point policy issue for Moscow. That is why the struggle for the ‘gathering of Russian lands’—the historical heritage of Volodymyr [Vladimir in Russian] the Baptist—was, not at the least, an ideological struggle for the appropriation of the history of these lands. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Prince Volodymyr’s epithet has found its final form as ‘holy and equal to the apostles of the autocratic Russian land’. From the middle of the fifteenth century, St. Volodymyr acquired the Moscow principality featuring a state-church cult with Moscow also possessing the heritage of St. Andrew the Apostle. The idea of Moscow possessing the heritages of both St. Andrew and St.

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Volodymyr later finds confirmation in receiving the relics of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus’. Part of the relics from the year 1640, originally found in the ruins of the Church of the Tithes by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, were flown from Kyiv to Moscow and a few years later, the relics of St. Andrew were taken from Thessalonica to Moscow. Volodymyr is valued as a historical figure whose identification in the Russian Empire increased significantly in the late eighteenth century. The revival of interest in the person and work of Volodymyr was among the impetus of joining Crimea to Russia. It is from the Black Sea coast of Kyiv where early Christianity first began. From the Russian point of view, it is here, in Chersonesos—the city of Russian princes—where Russia finds its faith and its history again. However, the first large-scale celebrations in honour of St. Volodymyr took place only in 1888 in honour of the 900th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia. The day of his memory on July 15 turned into one of the most important Russian religious holidays for the Russian Orthodox Church Synod specially decreed it (Buslayev, 2010, 22–23). In the twenty-first century, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia once again elevated him to the status of the primary patron saint in Russian history (Lozovyi, 2015). One of the signs—the building of a huge monument to St. Volodymyr in Moscow in 2015 (Wyatt, 2015). The idea is to show Volodymyr as a Russian prince, underline the common past of Ukraine and Russia in medieval times. One example of how this topic is used in modern politics is Putin’s statement that Kyivan Rus was the core of the Russian Empire and since then Russians and Ukrainians have had a common history and culture and mentality, similar languages. Hence, the conclusion—Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Such statements are an ideological justification for the right not only to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine but to pursue a policy of its full incorporation into the Russian state (Lozovyi, 2015). Significantly, the Kremlin’s ‘privatization’ of Volodymyr the Baptist began in preparation before the start of the aggression against Ukraine. On July 31, 2013, after large-scale celebrations in Kyiv and Sevastopol for the 1,025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’, the President of Russia had established a particular working group for the preparation of events dedicated to the millennium of Prince Volodymyr’s repose (Kopat’ko, 2015). In Russia, the reactions were somewhat nervous towards the decree by Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko had declared the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of Volodymyr the Great’s death (Poroshenko has signed a decree on the commemoration of Prince Volodymyr the founder of the state of Rus-Ukraine, 2015). These facts indirectly confirm that Russia was preparing for the ‘subjugation of Ukraine’ before the Euromaidan events. Less known but also exciting story is about Jurii Dolgorukii, the prince, who founded Moscow in 1147, dozens of years after Kyiv became the capital of Ancient Rus. According to the written chronicles, he was buried in the Church of the Saviour in Brest in Kyiv. In 1947 according to the personal order of Joseph Stalin and ‘iron’ occasion—the celebration of the 800th anniversary of the founding of Moscow in 1147—famous Soviet anthropologists and archaeologists started excavations to find the grave of Dolgorukii and in case of success to reconstruct his face. The prince’s

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burial was not found, which had not prevented installing a stone cenotaph monument in the form of an ancient Russian sarcophagus on the probable location. At the end of the Soviet era, there were also excavations conducted by the Architectural and Archaeological Expedition of the Institute of Archaeology of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences. The authors of the 1989–1990 excavations tried to identify one of the burials in the Church of the Saviour at Berestove with Yuri Dolgoruky. However, not all fellow archaeologists agreed with this view. More precisely, not everyone agreed. Therefore, in scientific circles, the question ‘Is Yuri Dolgoruky buried in the Church of the Saviour?’ is irritating. The closest to the truth will be the answer—not yet. This paradoxical answer has its logic—the Church of the Saviour’s necropolis at Berestove is not fully explored, still interferes with a piece of the defensive wall. Furthermore, none of the burials that have been investigated belongs to Yuri Dolgoruky (Ìvakìn, 2014, 136). Nevertheless, the opposite theory is popular in public discourse. From time to time Russian nationalists demand the remains of Prince Yuri back to Moscow (see i.e. Kiyevskiy khram s mogiloy osnovatelya Moskvy mozhet otoyti Konstantinopolyu, 2019).

3.2 Ukrainian People Are Judeophobes In the first half of the twentieth century, the Ukrainians received an undeserved image as militant anti-Semites—a problem that arose in the absence of being without a nation. The catalyst for such positioning was the murder in 1926 of Symon Petliura by Shalom-Shmuel Schwartzbard. During the trial, Schwartzbard claimed that he took revenge for the pogroms against the Jews carried out by the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. ‘There have always been forces that are interested in creating and fuelling anti-Semitic stereotypes about Ukrainians, and after the Second World War, it was finally confirmed in the minds of the Western community. On the one hand, there have been facts about collaborations between Ukrainians with German invaders in the destruction of the Jewish population during the Second World War. On the other hand, some were interested in inflating the topic and strengthening the stereotype that still causes great damage to the country’s international image’ (Pagìrâ, 2012).

3.3 Ukraine Is Not a State This is one of the key messages of the Russian narrative. As we have already mentioned, Russian propaganda uses historical arguments to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and prove that Ukraine in the twenty-first century is nothing more than a failed state.

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To make it easier for a soldier to kill his enemies, he must dehumanize them. So, it was regarding the ‘dehumanization’ and ‘delegitimization’ claims held over Ukraine. In the eyes of the civilized world, the image of Ukraine was purposefully shaped with overriding negative features. The Russian media was determined to declare Ukraine ‘a bankrupt country’. Most of the foreign editions did not have their own news bureau in Ukraine (except for The Financial Times and the BBC monitoring services), and for a long time, their vision of the country’s situation was often formed on the basis of analysis by the Russian media that deliberately discredited Ukraine (Denisûk, 2014). The priority of the Russian foreign policy strategy concerning our country is for the return of Ukraine within the zone of exclusive Russian influence and Russia’s legitimization into Ukraine’s state of affairs in the minds of the civilized world.

3.4 Divided Country Ukraine’s regional diversity is used to divide and contrast the inhabitants of one area with the inhabitants of another area in various contexts, for example, historical memory, language attitudes or even values. Russian media and politicians had interpreted Ukraine as a divided nation oriented towards the West or East, using the thesis of the deep-seated conflict between the two community regions through the memories that are the bearers of different identities. These identities supposedly were formed as a result of different historical experiences and different perceptions. But we must recall that the history of our country’s formation as a whole makes it possible to draw analogies with some European countries such as Germany or France. In today’s world, regional differences show strengths and not weaknesses. It must be confessed: the approval of the division of Ukraine’s ‘nationalist West’ and ‘pro-Russian East’ has become a popular way to describe the situation in Ukraine not only in the Russian but also in the Western media. Even though it is not correct, it is a facile and straightforward way to explain many of our young nation’s problems. The Russian–Ukrainian war only strengthened the popular idea of Ukraine as a split country, with a clear reflection of this split on the front lines in Donbas (Râbˇcuk, 2004, 2–12).

3.5 Common History and Historical Brotherhood The essence of this idea is a postulate of the ‘common destiny’ of Eastern Slavic peoples, the fate of which was not interrupted until 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union in this context is considered a historical mistake, or, according to Vladimir Putin, ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’ (Putin, 2005). Despite all the contradictions of the Soviet period, all his negatives are offset by the joint victory over Nazism in 1945. However, on this issue, the Russian President has a dissenting private opinion, which has already been mentioned.

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A retrospective of this idea confirms the postulate that all the achievements of Ukrainians in the past could only have taken place with the participation of Russia. However, when isolated from Russia, the Ukrainian people then suffered the most painful historical periods of foreign domination. Ukraine’s joining the Russian nation could not be done by seizure or occupation, but only when exclusively exempted from foreign domination or reunification.

3.6 Holodomor Denial and an Apology for Stalin’s Modernization It is reasonable to raise the questions about the initiators, inspirers, and performers of how the Ukrainian perspective of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was perceived as a genocide against the Ukrainian people. In Ukraine, it was perceived because of the culprit party leadership of the Soviet regime in Moscow and Kharkiv (then the capital of the Ukrainian SSR). According to Russian historians, ‘blackens’ the era that began in Russia for rehabilitation and glorification—an example that is widely used in Russian scholarship is Stalin’s portrayal as an effective manager, even a hero (i.e. Barsenkov & Vdovin, 2010). Russia has consistently ignored the obvious connection ‘of grain procurements’ and ‘the collapse of Ukrainization’ and the coincidence of the areas with the most incredible hunger that included ethnic Ukrainians, and the terrorist actions by the authorities to deprive them of any food. A simultaneous famine occurred in the early 1930s in Kazakhstan which also involved politics (an attempt to ‘besiege’ nomads as a way to keep them in line through another and local version of collectivization). Russian historians deny Holodomor as a genocide and claim that hunger was the problem for all Soviet peasantry (Kondrašin, 2004). Discussions on the problems of Holodomor were one of the most severe in the dialogue of Ukrainian and Russian historians until the interruption of institutional communication in 2014 (Ukraina i Rossiya: istoriya i obraz istorii. Session 4. 2008).

3.7 The Great Victory and Collaboration, Brothers and Enemies T. Zhurzhenko illustrates the differences between Russian and Ukrainian ways of remembrance of the Second World War. If in Russia there is a basic consensus on the role of World War II in national history, in Ukraine the memory of the war is characterized by ‘pluralism of narratives and forms’, clearly expressed regionally (Zhurzhenko et al., 2018). The USSR’s participation in the anti-Hitler coalition and the victory over Nazism is perceived in official Russian circles as a complete historical indulgence for the

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Stalinist regime and of that era. As Nazism was the greatest evil of the twentieth century and condemned by humankind, then all its winners were equally ‘without sin’. Based on the same logic, any social movement, and the armed forces of the Eastern European countries that do not recognize the power of the Soviet Union (for example, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—UPA), are automatically considered collaborators. It is indicatively that even streets’ renaming after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army heroes was news-worthy in state Russian Information agency (V Kiyeve pereimenovali dve ulitsy v chest’ natsistskikh kollaborantov, 2019). Of course, even the UPA artist Nil Khasevych was called judeophobe and Nazis. However, the possibility is not considered a rejection of both Stalin and Hitler. This ignores the fact of the cooperation between the USSR and Nazi Germany in the 1930s and the joint participation of these two totalitarian regimes before the outbreak of the Second World War (the attack on Poland in September 1939, the Soviet–Finnish war of 1939–1940, and the Soviet occupation of Baltic States, Northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia in 1940). The concept of the Great Victory has also been experienced in recent years—from the evolution of the interpretation in the framework of the ‘common destiny’ or ‘total victory’ to the negation of the role of other nations except for Russia in the victory on the Eastern Front of World War II. Ukrainians are the ‘traitorous people’ since they are now referred to generally in the context of the ‘collaborative’ OUN and UPA (Primaˇcenko, 2014). We have already mentioned that in December 2010, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would have won the Great Patriotic War, and without the help of Ukraine (Putin: Rossiya pobedila by v voyne i bez Ukrainy, 2010; Doma´nska, 2019). This statement can be considered the starting point of the fine-tuning of the Kremlin’s historical policy methods. Even before the Euromaidan Revolution, Ukrainians were displayed to the public and media through the Russian historical rhetoric in the ethnic friend category of ‘fraternal peoples’ but also in a negative political one as ‘nationalist-fascist traitors’. However, this did not prevent the Russian leadership at the highest political levels to broadcast them as ‘fraternal people’. The scenario of consistent “integration’ of a holistic Ukraine (while requiring the tactical politically correctness of addressing the Ukrainians as a nation) was leading towards a new ‘Eurasian space’ From around 2012, this was supplemented with a similar scenario of the dismemberment or annexation of Ukraine under the pretext of restoring the ‘Russian-ness/Russians’ parts of the population. Hence, the development of the concept of ‘New Russia’ the emergence of which included creating a group of ‘people’s republics’ designed to play grey zones with different shades of this colouring but with the same international legal uncertainty. Vladimir Putin publicly declared the historical origins of an entity declared as ‘New Russia’ on April 17, 2014. During a live television broadcast with the Russian viewers, President Vladimir Putin said: ‘There is only one region from the centre of Novorossiysk, the so-called Novorossiya. Let us remind that this is the New Russia. Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa—were not part of Ukraine in tsarist times. These are all areas that were transferred to Ukraine by the Soviet

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government. Why did they do that—only God knows,’ (Pyat’ gromkikh zayavleniy Putina ob istorii Ukrainy, 2014). Six months later, he returned to this thesis, stressing that the capital of ‘New Russia’ was the city of Novorossiysk. ‘It was one of the regions from the centre of Novorossiysk, which was called Novorossiya. It is the Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa regions. These lands in the 1920s with the creation of the Soviet Union were transferred from Russia to Ukraine’ Putin said at a Valdai Conference in late October 2014 (Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba Valday, 2014). Simultaneous policy scenarios with the relevant historical background seem quite natural since such an algorithm allows an appropriate combination for a different course of action. What we have observed in the performance of the Russian leadership in 2014 is the midst of hybrid aggression. Diverse and sometimes conflicting clichés have been used on a revolving basis, and the ‘shots’ were called on the public consciousness in Ukraine and on Ukrainians.

3.8 The Artificiality of Ukraine/Ukrainians The idea is not new. This apogee of the popularity of such a world view belonged to the First World War. The Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire was perceived as ‘the Austrian intrigue’ to split the unity of the Russian people without taking into account the social and cultural factors of the development of society. The context of the First World War is easy to understand—Austro-Hungarian was the enemy. Claiming that the Ukrainian nation is the enemy’s creature was the way to avoid solving the bigger problem of all national movements in the Russian Empire. However, the idea is still alive, despite dozens of years passed (Proyekt ‘Ukraina’. Chast’ 1. 2012). Millions of people (and some Ukrainians) are ready to believe that ˆ Ukraine is a fake state, and the Ukrainian language is a fake language (Sedrin, 2015). The high degree of personalization of the Russian power system suggests that it aligns with the application of the ‘national leader’ which invariably in the second decade is Vladimir Putin. That, and it must be emphasized, pays much attention to demonstrating his own vision of Ukrainian history. The psychological underpinnings of the Russian President’s statements were observed by the well-known American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, who stressed that: Mr. Putin’s motivation is historical nostalgia, which has no connection with reality. The accomplished fact is that neither the Kazakhs nor Ukrainians or Belarusians do not want to again become a part of the empire, even disguised. As a consequence—any efforts to create a new Russian empire will generate resistance, which will harm the ability of Russia to become a modern, successful, democratic and European state even later (Bezp’âtˇcuk, 2012).

It is worth noting that many of the current ideological constructions that the Kremlin uses in trying to explain the Russian–Ukrainian relations have been formulated by the Russian elite from as early as the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries, in

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many ways thanks to the ‘useful khokhol’ [Russian derogatory name for Ukrainians] in the imperial service. In the Ukrainian elite environment, there were always those who were ready to serve the empire. At the same time, since the nineteenth century, Russia had already imposed on the world its interpretation of Ukrainian history and the image of Ukrainians that were passed down and based on Russian expansionist interests. That empire was formed long ago, and very much still forms the external representation of Ukraine and its past.

4 Putin’s New History Policy In 2019–2020, Russian leadership decided to use history to reach political goals more intensively. We consider it possible to talk about the established principles and implementation of the Kremlin’s New Historical Policy to achieve Russia’s geopolitical goals of undermining the EU from within and destroying the prospects for its development (i.e. Mahda, 2020; Kolesnikov, 2020; Eggert, 2019). In the last year and a half, political observers have observed tectonic changes in this area. The Russian leadership finds and uses new historical themes for manipulation and methods of using contradictory and painful events/epochs to achieve foreign policy goals. In this case, they remain unchanged—discrediting Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states in the eyes of Jewish circles in the United States and Western Europe, creating new dividing lines in the European Union, weakening the European community by escalating historical disputes, escalating internal tensions through proliferation and strengthening domestic anti-Semitism, for example, as well as delegitimizing the historical longevity of Ukrainian statehood. Russia’s motives also include the desire to compensate in this way for the image losses that Russia suffered after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of hybrid aggression in the Donbas. What is fundamentally new in it? The first thing to note is the orientation—this time under attack not only Ukraine but also other countries and topics—Poland, World War II, the Holocaust, and the Nazis’ collaboration. At the same time, we repeat, the whole European Union and the consensus on specific aspects of commemorative policies are under attack. What does prove this thesis? Some theses in the materials of the discussion of Russian historians about historical memory go first (Istoricheskaya pamyat’—yeshche odno prostranstvo, gde reshayutsya politicheskiye zadachi, 2019). For example, it refers to proposing that World War II began not in 1939 with an attack on Poland, but in 1931 with aggression in Manchuria, emphasizing that Poland is now a common enemy of Russia and the European bureaucracy. During the last decade of 2019, Vladimir Putin publicly criticized Poland’s policy in the pre-war period, effectively accusing its leadership of allied relations with the Third Reich and anti-Semitism as part of public policy. Also, at this time, Vladimir Putin is beginning the hybridization of the Holocaust. On December 24, at an expanded board of the Ministry of Defence, Putin called the ‘ambassador’ and

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‘anti-Semitic pig’ of the Polish ambassador to Germany, Józef Lipski according to the President, in 1938 praised the persecution of Jews (Vladimir Putin regulyarno obvinyayet Pol’shu v razvyazyvanii Vtoroy mirovoy, 2020). Putin was answered by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who stressed that Russia had systematically lied about Poland and its history (Gvozd ž-Pallokat, 2020; Ševˇcenko, 2019). An impressive headquarters headed by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has also been set up in Warsaw. Why is Poland the object of Putin’s ‘historic’ blow? The first reason is that in this country, historical memory is an essential element of domestic policy, and any external speculation will somehow resonate because, in 2020, Poland will hold presidential elections. Andrzej Duda’s positions look convincing, but this is no reason for Russia to abandon speculations aimed at official Warsaw. Second, during the rule of Law and Justice, Poland gradually became a powerful centre of influence in Central Europe and the enfant terrible of the European Union on several issues. Two more facts can be recalled—the final Brexit planned for January 2020 and Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Moscow announced for May 2020 to realize the Kremlin’s plan’s scope. At the end of January 2020, during the Holocaust Remembrance Forum in Jerusalem, which was primarily organized with Vladimir Putin’s participation, the Russian President expressed a fundamental thesis. He stressed that the Holocaust was carried out not only by the Nazis but also by their accomplices in the occupied territories. In the next paragraph of Putin’s speech, there was a phrase about 1.4 million Jews exterminated in Ukraine and the almost complete extermination of Jews in Latvia during World War II. It can be called an example of the Kremlin’s post-truth when a real historical fact and a false historical interpretation are skilfully mixed in one presentation (Forum ‘Sokhranyayem pamyat’ o Kholokoste, boremsya s antisemitizmom’, 2020). Putin and the Russian propaganda machine are incredibly adept at using some factors. First, the enormous sacrifices of the Holocaust require constant reflection, and it has taken place in many post-socialist countries in recent years, adding public interest to the problem. Second, the scale of the tragedy allows the Kremlin to manipulate skilfully and, if not whiten the Nazis, hybridize the Holocaust, shifting the blame for the extermination of Jews onto the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Third, Russia seeks to emphasize its role in defeating Nazism and is trying to inflate it. Thus, let us list emphasize Russia’s new historical policy’s cornerstones, emphasizing that this topic needs further fundamental research. • The desire to review the history of World War II in the context of the 75th victory over Nazism. • Intentions to use anti-Semitism and facts of collaboration as a factor of discrediting Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States. • The key goal is to increase the contradictions between different parts of Europe. • We may consider criminal prosecution of some historians as a part of this new policy.

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5 How to Answer This New-Old Challenge? Memory studies in the European and Ukrainian socio-humanitarian space have long been nothing new. Relevant bibliographic lists will reach thousands of pages. At the same time, the development of the issue by Ukrainian specialists lags far behind the work of colleagues from Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Germany. Equally fundamentally different is the degree of development and implementation of historical policy and commemorative practices as part of it at the state level. Regardless of this, each of the developed models, despite its functionality, is now faced with an unusual challenge. Even though hybrid aggression in the historical plane was carried out systematically and persistently, in Ukraine, these destructive processes were not in focus; there was no systematic counteraction. At the state level, not enough work has been done to bring to society the real history of our state and neighbouring countries, including Russia. This was facilitated by the fact that many Ukrainians, especially the older generation, perceived the state’s history as it was distorted in the Soviet Union. Russia shamelessly privatized the most attractive episodes of Ukrainian history and sought to discredit Ukrainian historical characters. It would be wiser to assess Russia’s policy towards Ukraine about the historical past issue based on the maxim formulated by George Orwell: ‘Who controls the present, controls the past. Who controls the past, controls the future.’ The precise role of Ukraine’s history is significant to Russia’s imperial past. According to the well-known political scientist Lilia Shevtsova, ‘Ukraine, upon leaving for the West takes with it the legitimacy of the Russian nation, and we remain only as of the Muscovy who were inhabited by unknown people. Then Russia will have to start counting its stories not beginning with the thousand years of the history of Christianity and the Baptism of Rus,’ and St. Andrew from the twelfth century— but that is another story. Therefore, Ukraine is of paramount importance for Russia. First, Ukraine is there for the protection of Russia’s history and nation. Second, Ukraine is needed to support the Kremlin’s legitimacy. The third is to prevent the Maidan from happening in Russia. Fourth is a big challenge for Europe and the Western world. You [Ukraine] shook the sleeping, paralyzed Europe and said: ‘Hey, you asleep there? And we are fighting for your values’ (Shevtsova, 2014). Frankly, Russian leaders understand this argument much better than European ones. Now, maybe, it is time to start talking about mnemonical security. Maria Mälksoo (2015b: 221) writes that ‘genuinely agonistic mnemonic pluralism would enable different interpretations of the past to be questioned, in place of pre-defining national or regional positions on legitimate remembrance in ontological security terms’. She also claims that memory is unsecurable. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian case shows that attacks on memory and attacks on the national history may lead to the state’s critical unguardedness, they undermine the historical legitimacy. The Ukrainian case shows that national history requires the attention of the state, of the historians themselves and the society as well.

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6 Conclusions As we see, history policy is one of the key elements of Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine. The problem of use history as a political instrument has been already the object of scientific research. But undoubtfully, it needs more attention as far as the threat is growing. Some key messages have been used in different ways since the 1990s—Ukrainians are an artificial nation, Russians and Ukrainians have no differences and are the one nation, Ukraine does not have the right to exist, Ukrainians are judeophobes and collaborated with the Nazis regime, moreover, they are in charge for some episodes of Holocaust, Holodomor 1932–1933 is not a tragedy for Ukraine. These statements are not really something new or unfamiliar, rather nowadays we have grounds to consider them a part of information and hybrid aggression. The goal is to undermine the legitimacy and historical roots of Ukraine as a sovereign state. Another goal is to legitimate the objections to Ukrainian inner policy, aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Russia continues using history narratives to achieve political goals. But the target is not only Ukraine. Some observers including the authors claim that we witness the period of new Russian historic policy. Since the end of 2019, the targets of these attacks have changed. Now it is not only Ukraine but also Poland, Baltic states and the whole EU. The aims have changed as well. The wish to review World War II’s history and underline the role of the USSR (meaning Russia) means the desire to support Russia’s plans to stay among world leaders. Another visible goal is to increase the contradictions between different parts of the European Union, to use painful past to achieve todays’ tasks. The Ukrainian case shows that it is never too late to pay attention to your history and memory policy. The past and the way you remember and commemorate the past might be attacked and undermined. And if we care about energy security, information and cybersecurity, we have to start protecting our historical approaches and memory. Memory security may become one of the most important branches of security studies in general. How to counter this challenge? Past is impossible to forget, it impacts our lives, visions, strategies. Of course, it is also impossible to avoid its presence in international politics. Painful problems of European history should be discussed by historians, historical traumas should be re-thought and re-lived.

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Interpretation of Historical Facts in Documentary Movies About the Occupation of Lithuania in 1940 by Soviet Troops Gediminas Buciunas

1 Introduction …of all the arts the most important for us is the cinema (V.I. Lenin).

The quote above is taken from communication between Vladimir Lenin, leader of Soviet Russia (and leader of the Soviet Union starting in 1922) and Anatoliy Lunacharsky, People’s Commissar for Education, the leading Soviet ideologist (after Lenin himself) in 1922. Films were a powerful ideological tool that formed the outlook of Soviet people on the world for generations. Such films have continued to play a role in geopolitical games amongst big powers in different parts of the world. The motives behind using the cinematic arts vary from glorifying a country’s achievements and the actions of its statesmen despite severe consequences for entire nations to justifying tough actions taken to cope with a threat. Examples of this are the “war on terror” movies which emerged after 9/11 events in the USA, or the film series designed to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The aim of this article is to explore how the visual arts, namely documentary films, are used as an element of soft power in Russia’s internal and foreign policy. The proper selection of significant historical events in the country’s history and their interpretation and presentation through the documentary film genre play an important role in influencing people’s minds. At the same time, such films reflect a country’s position on a historical event and project a country’s steps in international affairs.

G. Buciunas (B) Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_19

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2 Safety as an Essential Need of Society: The Art of Survival In his volume, “On the Origin of the Species,” Charles Darwin said, “the species that survives is the one that is able to adapt to or adjust best to the changing environment in which it finds itself” (Darwin 1861). This theoretical concept may be applied to the genesis of a state as a political organization of society and its vitality and ability to survive. Encyclopaedia Britannica states that “the state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; … and finally by its sovereignty” (Britannica). This definition of a state highlights the importance of safety. The feeling of safety (emotional and physical) is a very important indicator to measure satisfaction with living standards in a particular country. When we feel safe, we can focus on work or study and ensure stability in building connections between individuals and among social groups. This facilitates social capital, which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (What is social capital?). One of the preconditions for enabling such networks is the creation of an environment conducive to the feeling of safety and shared values. The question naturally arises: what can be done to achieve such an environment? Every state concerned with this question employs various tools and methods to ensure a sense of security for its society; at the same time, the state may also try to foster a sense of shared values. The achievements of the digital revolution provide a myriad of possibilities to transmit messages on values, to influence the acceptance of these values amongst society and to ensure that these values become the shared values of an entire nation. One of the most effective ways to transmit shared values, in effect to capture the minds and souls of thousands, hundreds of thousands, even millions of people, is art: music, films and literature can all have a powerful impact. Rulers throughout history have taken decisive actions to achieve their own objectives, which vary from protecting the country from invaders, providing safety for the population and creating conditions for doing business to exporting the state’s shared values. For example, from the October seizure of power in 1917, the Bolsheviks tried to export the Red Revolution ideas throughout Europe. The Bolsheviks sponsored an entire institution tasked with that objective—the Comintern (Communist International Archives Project). It was a turbulent period for many nations and entire empires. In the sixteenth century, the philosopher and statesman of Florence Niccolo Machiavelli, one of the founding fathers of realism, in his best-known treatise The Prince, wrote: people tend to be self-centred, work for their personal benefits and don’t think about the society. There is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power …. Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I will not consider laws but speak of arms (Prince CW 47) (Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy).

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Thus, Machiavelli justified all means for achieving a goal, including corruption, deception, and military power. We can find a lot of examples in history of how countries were able to survive due to one simple reason: they were driven by selfishly motivated human beings who had the flexibility to swiftly adapt to the rapidly changing social, political, moral and spiritual environment. For example, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Soviet Union’s dictator Joseph Stalin. A leader’s life experience, character and worldview obviously have an impact on decision-making policies, visions for a country’s future development, and the kind of tools used to achieve objectives both domestically and abroad. For example, the Bolshevik leaders Vladimir Lenin (notablebiographies.com), Leon Trotsky (Jewish Virtual Library), Joseph Stalin (biography.com) and Felix Dzerzhinsky (newworldencyclopedia.com) spent many years in jail or exile, experiencing harsh environments and fighting for survival. They also lived through the vibrant times at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century: the first Russian revolution, the First World War, the October Revolution, and the Russian Civil War in 1918–1920. The valuable knowledge they obtained through these life experiences helped them to survive in the dangerous and risky situations in 1917–1922 and taught them how swiftly adapt to changing situations. They managed to keep the main instruments of power firmly in their hands in the newly established country with a vast territory, mobilizing millions of people to follow their ideas and accept their values despite the fact that the methods used to achieve the objective very often were violent. This enabled the Bolshevik party headed by Lenin, and later by Stalin, to set up their new ideology in the minds and hearts of millions of people. These leaders also actively participated in modelling and shaping the future trends of foreign policy in Soviet Russia (later the Soviet Union), especially with its neighbouring countries. In some ways, it could be said that they embodied the characteristics of effective leaders; however, their ruthless and violent methods exclude them from the category of good leaders. The following is a short list of the states that had or have a significant influence on international relations by spreading their values, lifestyle and ideology through different forms of art: the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, France, the Russian Empire, Spain, the Soviet Union, China, India, the Russian Federation, and the USA. Although some of these countries fully disappeared from the world map, others have survived and even regained their positions in international affairs and now play an important role in their region and on the world stage. The Russian Federation assumed the Soviet Union’s rights and obligations and presents itself in the international arena as the successor state of the USSR. The new amendment to Article 671 to the Constitution of the Russian Federation states: 1. The Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR on its territory, as well as the legal successor of the USSR in relation to membership in the international organizations, their bodies, participation in the international treaties … (Hovy tekct Konctitycii c poppavkami 2020; non-official translation).

Many countries have a long and complicated history of international relations. The same historical event that may be looked upon favourably by one country can leave

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very deep wounds in the memory of another country. Tied up with that are the specific narratives that emerge from these historical events. The following sections of this paper will analyse how films are used to present an interpretation of the historical events that occurred in 1917–1918 in Europe. It was a turbulent period for many nations and even entire empires. The world witnessed the collapse of the AustroHungarian, the Ottoman, and the Russian Empires and the creation of new nations on the map of old Europe: Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia and other countries. For many Bolsheviks, the Russian Revolution was only part of the worldwide struggle between two systems and ideologies: capitalism and socialism. The leaders of Soviet Russia (V. Lenin and L. Trotsky) used hard power, mainly in the form of military intervention, to influence the behaviour of the newly established countries’ political bodies and governments, harshly forcing them to choose the ideology promoted by Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks also used soft power to transmit their values to the world. Joseph Nye of Harvard University introduced the concept of soft power in the late 1980s. Nye (1990) states in his book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”: power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want. There are several ways one can achieve this: you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them (Nye, 1990).

The film industry is one such soft power instrument used to influence the attitudes and mindsets of an entire nation or even nations on historical events, even to the point of justifying aggressive actions.

3 Exploiting the Needs of Society: The Art of Persuasion Lenin employed an effective strategy to gain the sympathy and support of the population of the conquered nations: Polish, Lithuanians, Latvians, Finns, Estonians, Ukrainians and other nationalities populating the territory within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire. On November 2, 1917, according to the Julian calendar (on November 15, 1917, according to the Gregorian calendar), the Bolshevik government of Russia proclaimed, “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” (signed by Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin). The document set forth four main principles: Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; the right of the peoples of Russia of a free self-determination, including secession and formation of a separate state; abolition of all national and religious privileges and restrictions; and free development of national minorities and ethnographical groups populating the territory of Russia (marxists.org)

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According to F. Przetacznik (1990, 49) “The right to self-determination of peoples and nations consists of two aspects, one internal and the other external”. Alexandre Kiss defined the external aspect of self-determination as “the right to choose freely from foreign interference the political status which people want to adopt” (Przetacznik 1990, 54). The Bolsheviks used “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” as a means of soft power to get support from national minorities in their struggle against the anti-revolutionary White Russian movement, who did not support the right of a nation to self-determination. For example, some Latvian riflemen participated in the Russian Civil War on the Bolsheviks’ side. However, “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” cannot be presented exceptionally as the idealistic thinking of Lenin about a nation’s right to self-determination and its right to create a separate state. The author of this article thinks that the declaration was a coldblooded decision based on an assessment of the current situation of affairs in the world: the dreams of the leaders of national minorities in the former Russian Empire to create or to restore their own states (for example, the Polish and Lithuanian nations seeking to restore their statehoods, and Latvians and Estonians to create their own states); the still ongoing First World War and the weariness of the countries involved in the war; and the wishes of different socio-economic classes to finally have peace in Europe and the right of equality for everyone. Also, Russia had lost most of its western areas to the advancing German Empire troops during the First World War and it was the perfect opportunity to complicate the matters behind the front lines in the Western part of the former Russian Empire territories for German Empire troops. “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” stimulated many nationalities populating the territory in the boundaries of the former Russian Empire to move towards independent statehood. For example, Finland declared itself an independent nation, ending its autonomy within Russia as the Grand Principality of Finland on November 15, 1917, according to the Gregorian calendar (2 November 1917 according to the Julian calendar which Soviet Russia nullified pursuant to a Sovnarkom decree signed by V. Lenin in 1918; in further dates, the author is going to use the Gregorian calendar). Estonia declared its independence by issuing the Manifesto to the Peoples of Estonia (the Founding Act of the Republic of Estonia) on February 24, 1918. Latvia proclaimed its independence on November 18, 1918, Lithuania on February 16, 1918, and Belarus on March 25, 1918. The declaration was one of the first and most effective soft power tools used by the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power on November 7, 1917. The proclamation of the four principles by the Bolsheviks could be translated into chess language as the gambit. It was just a short show for the masses, imparting the idea to the world that the Bolsheviks want only happiness, peace and nothing more. It helped the Bolsheviks to mobilize material and human resources, and the next step of the Red Russian government headed by V. Lenin was the attempt to export the idea of the Red Revolution with the usage of hard power, mainly military might, in the other European countries. Attempts to set up a Red Soviet-style government in some countries failed totally, for example in Hungary. However, it had success in many territories of the former Russian Empire: Russian Turkestan (now territories of independent Central

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Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan), Sakhartvelo (Georgia), Azerbaijan, Armenia, part of Belarus, part of Ukraine and part of Bessarabia (now Moldova). Later in 1919–1920, the Red Army attacked the Baltic countries, Belarus, Ukraine, Finland and Poland. It was not a successful military campaign, especially the battles near Warsaw that resulted in a decisive Polish victory in August 1920 during the Polish–Soviet War. Also, Vilnius, the historical capital of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, fell under the control of the Polish forces. The Lithuanian government demanded Vilnius land be returned, but Poland refused. It caused tension between Lithuania and Poland during the interwar period. This situation was skilfully exploited by the Bolsheviks (the Soviet Union).

4 Soft Power Versus Hard Power The use of military hard power is not a popular tool nowadays. There are many explanations for this. In the author’s opinion, one of the reasons why military interventions have become less and less popular in the last 50 years is the willingness of a nation to fight battles outside the country’s territory. Are soldiers and military commanders psychologically ready to sacrifice their lives for the greater good? The Winter War in Finland in 1939 and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1979–1989 did not go very well for the Soviet Union. Russian people would fight to the death to protect The Motherland and their families, but if it is a cause they do not believe in, that level of determination may not be there. On the other hand, glorifying military victories in the field of battle, great military commanders, and successful intelligence operations is a powerful instrument to mobilize a country’s population inside the country or to distract their attention from painful domestic issues. This can be accomplished through the cinematic arts, which can be powerful tools in a country’s soft power arsenal. An inspiring film can affect millions of souls and minds, especially those who are young and impressionable. Political and business leaders must take decisive action to maintain the population’s trust if they want to stay in their positions of power. So, like a chef de cuisine, a country’s ruling politicians look for recipes to prepare a feast for the population’s eyes and minds. What ingredients does it take to prepare an appealing meal? How should the final product be delivered? Who is the target audience? Is the film intended only for the country’s own population or will it reach the neighbouring countries or even other continents? Could the ingredients be the country’s history, the achievements of their citizens in the fields of science or the arts, or the country’s victorious military battles in the past? What would be the right blend of these elements to produce the desired effect? The message to be communicated in such films is ultimately influenced by the vision of the head of state. The head of state determines the foreign policy of the country. For example, Article 86 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that “The President of the Russian Federation: (1) governs the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” (consultant.ru 2020). The president’s vision for the country’s

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development serves as the foundation for a strategy on the how country that is going to achieve or maintain its aims. The right combination of hard and soft power is needed to achieve a goal. The vision, including the tools and methods to achieve it, can be found in detail in the country’s strategic documents, which help us to understand the country’s strategy and tactics in shaping international relations and mobilizing its population. The Strategy of the State Cultural Policy for the period up to 2030 (a 44-page document) approved on February 29, 2016, by order No 326-p of the Government of the Russian Federation states that: The most dangerous threats to the future of the Russian Federation, with the potential of causing a humanitarian crisis, include: …deformation of historical memory, negative assessment of significant periods of Russian history. …Threats to national security in the field of culture. …attempts to falsify Russian and world history, illegal attacks on cultural objects. Attempts to falsify Russian history and subject it to revision, including revising the outcomes of the Second World War, do not stop. Under these conditions, the most important condition for the success of the soft power of Russian humanitarian influence abroad is the implementation of an effective cultural policy. …The priority directions of the Strategy are strengthening and expanding the influence of Russian culture in foreign countries. (Ob ytvepdenii Ctpategii 2016: 27. Translated by the author of this article).

We can find the same ideas on the important role of historical policy mentioned above in the new amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which were proposed in January 2020 and approved on July 1, 2020, by 3/4 of voter’s endorsement.1 With Putin signing an executive order on July 3, 2020, to officially insert the amendments into the Constitution of the Russian Federation, they took effect on July 4, 2020. This testifies to the degree of importance of historical policy for state power. The working group on the preparation of the new amendments to the Constitution came up with the idea of consolidating the fight against “falsifications of history” to advance the preservation of the historical memory of Russia. President Putin also agreed with the proposal to include statements regarding historical truth and the inadmissibility of falsifying history in the amendments to Article 671 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: 3. The Russian Federation honours the memory of the defenders of the Motherland and ensures the protection of historical truth. Diminishing the significance of the heroic acts of the people in defending the Motherland is not allowed. (consultant.ru 2020).

5 The Search for Historical Truth: Key Concepts, Institutions and Interpretation What stands behind the term “historical truth”? Each country has its own approach to events in its history in relation to other countries. For example, the occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1939–1940 triggers hot debates amongst politicians 1

For further information, see https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-voters-endorse-consti tutional-amendments/1897131.

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and historians from the Russian Federation and the Baltic countries. Each side has its own arguments and differing explanations of the same event. So, who is right? Various issues may complicate the interpretation of historical events. This is the case between France and Algeria on the war in 1954–1962, Turkey and Armenia on events in 1915, the Soviet Union and the Baltic countries on events in 1939–1940, and the Soviet Union and Finland on the Winter War in 1939. Each side presents their own interpretation of the facts and looks for a suitable tool to present their point of view. Nowadays one of the most suitable tools of soft power weaponry is the cinematic arts. Any form of art, including film, is a form of communication and the creators should obey certain rules, for example, codes of conduct. The biggest movie industry, Hollywood, followed the Motion Picture Production Code. It was the set of moral guidelines for self-censorship on the content of motion pictures released by major studios from 1934 to 1968 in the USA. The Soviet Union had very strict censorship on art. The main purpose of such strictures was to promote the ideology of one party and to prevent the dissemination of any other views that were contrary to the Communist Party’s position on historical events. The content of a movie might be subject to regulations aiming to prevent the dissemination of hatred towards other nations or minorities and race superiority. Such measures should be prescribed by the film industry’s codes of conduct but not be imposed heavily from the top officials of the state and state institutions. However, such suppression of anything but the accepted “historical truth” occurs in totalitarian regimes. The author of this paper proposes a theory found in criminal law to explain this phenomenon in the field of interpretation of historical events—“an excess of the principal offender”. Some officials may go beyond the limits set up by law in the fulfilment of their duties and in implementing their rights due to various reasons varying from fear of being punished for the poor performance of their duties to the desire to worm oneself into favour with higher authorities. These thoughts could be the subject of further multidisciplinary research. There are several fundamental concepts that have arisen from key historical events; these are fully supported and promoted by authorities in the Russian Federation, especially in the last decade. Firstly, the concept of “The Immortal Regiment” (in Russian “Beccmeptny polk”) has a long history. The first time this concept was announced and implemented was in 1965 in Novosibirsk. The main objective is: immortalizing” the memory of home front workers, armed forces service personnel, partisans, personnel of resistance organizations, and personnel of law enforcement and emergency services. It involves people carrying on the memory of war veterans, with participants carrying pictures of relatives and/or family friends who served in the country’s labour sector, paramilitary units, and the Soviet Armed Forces and law enforcement organizations during the Second World War, (academ.info).

The Soviet-era concept was resurrected in Russia and around the world in 2011. Now it is a massive civil event staged in major cities in Russia and around the world every 9 May during the Victory Day celebrations. Other concepts supported by the Russian Federation top officials are “Russian World” and “Exceptionalism of Russia in the

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world history”. Some of the above-mentioned concepts are based on the studies of the Russian scholar, strategist and political activist Aleksandr Dugin. The revival of the Russian Historical Society in 2012 shows the importance of historical policy for the Russian Federation. The main goal of the Russian Historical Society is to popularize Russian history in the Russian Federation and abroad, preserve the historical heritage and traditions of the peoples of Russia, and support historical education programs. The permanent Chairman is Sergei Naryshkin, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation since 2016 and the head of the Board of Trustees of the Lenfilm film studio. The non-profit organization “History of the Motherland” was created by a decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated on April 6, 2016, No. 163. The Chairman of the Board of the Fund is also Sergei Naryshkin. He states that: the main goals and tasks of the fund’s activities correspond to the priorities of the activity of the Russian Historical Society. First of all, educational work, fostering patriotism and respect for Russia, its history, the struggle to preserve the truth of interpretations of historical events on the basis of the most objective and transparent presentation of historical facts (historyru ssia.org).

Thus, the above-mentioned concepts, the revival of the Russian Historical Society and its role in shaping directions for historical education programs, the creation of the “History of the Motherland” fund and the support given to various other projects related to Russian history indicate the importance of interpreting historical events in compliance with the Russian Federation internal and foreign policy. Each country, especially countries with a rich history of statehood, has a vast collection of archives that may be made available for research to specialists from other countries. Western Europe’s promotion of dialogue and reconciliation between neighbours used to be the dominant approach to engagement with traumas of the past. Unfortunately, countries that border Russia, and thus have a long history of relations with Russia, have a lot of unanswered questions. The revitalization activity of the Russian Historical Society and the work of the “History of the Motherland” fund should serve to promote dialogue and reconciliation inside and outside the country, especially with neighbouring countries. However, the rise of the so-called “memory wars” have made it increasingly difficult for European countries and the Russian Federation to have a proper conversation about the past, in particular on historical events which happened during the pre-war period, during WW2 and afterwards (for example, the Russian and Polish attitudes on historical events in 1938–1939, and the Warsaw uprising in 1944). The battle in the memory fields is getting more aggressive and fiercer. This is evident in the opposing attitudes of the Baltic countries and the Russian Federation regarding The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret supplementary protocols signed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 and the following occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union troops. The author of the novel Da Vinci Code, Dan Brown (2003), said: “History is always written by the winners. …the loser is obliterated, and the winner writes …” (Brown, 2003). After the occupation, the majority of the historical archives of the Baltic States were moved to the Soviet Union, and other sources of information which contradicted the winner’s (the Soviet Union) ideology were

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almost completely destroyed. The highly effective propaganda machine was used to change the memories of the youth. All research on historical events came under the strict control of various repressive institutions of the Soviet Union. Dissertations, academic articles, handbooks, etc. had to comply with the Soviet Union’s official position on interpretation of the historical events. The research materials on painful topics were contaminated by pseudo-historic works. Researchers on the history of the Baltic countries faced considerable challenges finding reliable information on historical events after the return to independence in the 1990s. People who are not living a rich cultural life form their cultural canon at a young age, and it changes little later on. This is what gives rise to the classic view of culture held by many politicians: true culture is what they learned in school or encountered in childhood, and that which they experience later on in life seems dubious to them. Professor of Education at Michigan State University Judith Taack Lanier states: The fundamental job of teaching is no longer to distribute facts but to help children learn how to use them by developing their abilities to think critically, solve problems, make informed judgments … (edutopia.org).

In the context of interpreting historical events, the role of a teacher of history is vitally important in developing students’ creativity and critical thinking, as well as the ability to consider other viewpoints. Teachers of history, and professional and amateur historians, can raise new questions, giving them different interpretations. At the same time, they create new images that influence historical memory and understanding of the past. Educational literature plays a special role in the formation of the historical consciousness of young people. For this reason, a state takes an active part in shaping programs of history at educational institutions through the ministry of education. Professor of the European University Alexei I. Miller points to the return of totalitarian practices in the Russian Federation, including the order and subsequent publication of school history textbooks edited by the conservative A. V. Filippov and A. A. Danilov (Isaev, 2015; Miller, 2009). Some European countries banned the usage of Nazi and Soviet Symbols. For example, the Latvian Parliament introduced new amendments to the law on banning the use of uniforms and signs of identification, as well as elements of armed forces and law enforcement institutions (repressive institutions) of the USSR, its republics and Nazi Germany (lrt.lt). Lithuania banned Soviet and Nazi symbols in 2008 and set up administrative responsibility for this (Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, infolex.lt). The Russian Federation introduced criminal responsibility for the variability of interpretations of history by Federal Law on May 5, 2014, No. 128-FZ on amendments to Article 3541 “Rehabilitation of Nazism” to Chapter 34 “Crimes against peace and security of humanity” of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (consultant.ru 2020). The author of this paper would like to draw particular attention to the wording in part 1 of Article 3541 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: “the dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War” is forbidden behaviour. This provides grounds for starting a

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criminal investigation and public prosecution against a teacher over his/her interpretation of historical events which occurred during WW2, such as the occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union in 1940. The crisis of the ideas of globalism, nostalgia for the “strong hand” amongst some parts of the Russian population and other factors affected the internal and foreign policy of the Russian Federation, including the interpretation of historical events, which in turn inevitably manifested itself in works of art and in historical science. The same event or person is interpreted in completely opposite ways in the different countries of the world. For example, Ivan Mazepa, hetman of Cossack-controlled Ukraine who turned against the Russian military force and joined the Swedes during the Second Northern War, is a hero to some and a traitor to others. The historical movies trend has been and will continue to be one of the most attractive genres of the visual arts for the general population and, at the same time, a space for intervention from the state institutions for the dissemination of their interpretation of historical events. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, interpretation is: 1. the act or the result of interpreting: explanation, 2. a particular adaptation or version of a work, method, or style, 3. a teaching technique that combines factual with stimulating explanatory information (Merriam-Webster.com).

The process of interpretation is associated with the development of scientific research, which replaced the mystical reading of the surrounding reality. From the prehistory of mankind to the present century, we all interpret the phenomena of nature and the signs of the reality around us. At the professional level, interpretation of historical events in ancient times was done by a narrow circle of persons. Now we can distinguish at least two levels of interpretation—amateur and professional. Both are closely interrelated and interconnected. The activity of amateur interpretation stimulates the professional one, which, in turn, shows the direction for the development of amateur interpretation. Consequently, a state which desires to keep the interpretation of historical events in the desired direction has to create the proper conditions for professional and amateur interpretation, which includes sufficient financial support and access to archives. At the same time, a state shapes the direction for filmmakers on how events should be interpreted to completely meet a state’s historical policy. Most of the movies in the Russian Federation deal exclusively with the events of WW2. In the year of the 75th anniversary of the Victory against the Nazis, history becomes the centre of political discussions. Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation made in 2020, the “Strategy on the Development of Culture until 2030”, the creation of the “History of the Motherland” fund, and public statements of President Putin and other top officials on the historical events in question are all part of the arsenal of soft power weaponry used to carry out the country’s internal and foreign policy. For example, on December 20, 2019, at an informal summit, the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter referred to as CIS) in Saint Petersburg, led by V. Putin, proposed to create a commission of historians from the CIS countries in order to form a single historical discourse.

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Today’s Russian Federation uses history also for political mobilization purposes— as a strategy to increase the degree of support from ordinary people for the authorities, especially the institution of the President of the Russian Federation. The victory of 1945 is not just a central axis of Soviet history. It also gives positive reference point on the national identity of the society of the Russian Federation. There is a saying in Russian: “winners are not judged”. In other words, “the ends justify the means, so long as you actually achieve the ends”. Contemporary history politics is not limited to academic debate, curriculum reforms, or education programs. Work in the field of mass communications is an equally important tool. The Film Foundation in Russia annually selects applications and distributes funds to support films. This policy stems from an understanding of the importance of constructing images of the past in popular culture. Another important tool to maintain an interpretation of the historical events in accordance with a state policy is to control the financing of the movie industry. Nowadays people watch movies not only on TV but also on the Internet. It is an excellent place to present the state’s internal and foreign policy on historical events.

6 Occupation Without Mercy: A Case Study The author of this paper has faced a hard task regarding the choice of film genres for this study. Which is the most suitable for this purpose and fully reflects the topic and the objective of this research? There are movies created during the Soviet times characterized by total censorship in all segments of the visual arts, for example, the seven-part TV melodrama Long road in the dunes, created by the Riga Film Studio (Latvia) in 1982, which promotes the positive role of pro-Soviet activists. However, the author chose to analyse films created after 2000, which marks the new era in Russian foreign policy: revitalizing the old Soviet soft power strategy of using film to promote certain narratives. For example, the Post-Soviet blockbuster crime film Brother 2 On the way home, created in 2000,2 contained short scenes of the interpretation of history, such as the short scene (extracts to watch the episodes mentioned below are: 01:00:24–26, 01:33:40–42) where the Ukrainians were labelled “Banderovci” (the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera who fought for the independence of Ukraine) or when the question of the peninsula of Crimea was addressed (extracts to watch the episodes mentioned above start from 01:03:48 to 51, 01:33:51 to 53). The author chose to analyse documentary films due to a simple reason: documentaries present a more comprehensive range of methods used for the interpretation of historical facts than historical movies due to the essence of documentary films. Another criterion for selecting a documentary for case-study is the key historical event and its importance for the whole region. For example, the documentary film Estonia—Crossroads of History was not chosen as it mostly deals with the history of Estonia. The topic of this study is the Baltic States and the documentary film 2

The website address for viewing the film is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9TRaGNnjEU.

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Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics was chosen as a case study due to its coverage of all three Baltic States, and it has proved to be the right object of research to present the usage of visual art as a soft power instrument in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The rest of the article is going to focus on the interpretation of historical events through analysis of the documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided the spheres of mutual interest in Eastern Europe between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and in the aftermath, the three small independent Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were occupied by the Soviet Union. In Soviet times it was kept in secret for almost 50 years after the signing of the pact. The first President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, did not immediately admit that this historical skeleton was in the “closed” file No. 34 of the VI sector of the General Department of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After the initial disclosure of the truth, there was a negative attitude towards the Pact and its supplementary protocols. On December 24, 1989, the Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union (the highest body of state authority of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991) stated that: in both their preparatory method and contents, the August 23rd, 1939 Protocol and other secret protocols that were signed with Germany in 1939–1941 were deviations from the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy. From the standpoint of law, territorial division into Soviet and German spheres of interest and other actions were in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of several third countries. The Congress notes that during this period “the relations of the USSR with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were regulated by a system of treaties. Pursuant to the 1920 Peace Treaties and 1926–1933 Non-Aggression Treaties, the signatories were obliged to honour each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability under any circumstances …. 7. The Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR condemns the fact of signing the secret protocol on August 23rd 1939 as well as other secret agreements made with Germany. The Congress declares the secret protocols legally unjustified and invalid from the moment of signing. (historydoc.net 1989)

On July 1, 2009, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in the Europe Parliamentary Assembly came out in favour of the European Parliament’s initiative to declare the 23 August, the day of the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, a European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, which met with resistance from the Russian Federation. For example, President Dmitry Medvedev, on the eve of an important historic date, September 1, the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II, in an interview on the Russian program News of the Week said that: Governments in the Baltic States and even Ukraine are now essentially pronouncing former Nazi accomplices to be their national heroes who fought for the liberation of their nations. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly just recently grouped together Germany and the Soviet Union, pronouncing them to be equally responsible for World War Two. Now this, quite frankly, is a flat-out lie (kremlin.ru).

This example demonstrates the collision of polar positions: the desire to integrate the history of the Soviet Union into the common European history and strong resistance

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to this on the part of Russia, which ultimately triggers the process of isolation in historical politics. On August 31, 2009, then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin wrote in his article “Pages of History—Reason for Mutual Complaints or Ground for Reconciliation and Partnership?” published in the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza: There is no doubt that one can have all the reasons to condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in August of 1939. But a year before, in Munich, France and England signed a well-known treaty with Hitler and thus destroyed all the hope for a united front to fight fascism (Lipien 2009).

In 2019 and 2020, statements made by Russian Federation top officials marked a significant change in the tone of Russian historical propaganda. The turnaround took place when the state, represented by its top officials, formulated key theses on how to interpret the history of WW2 and the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and secret supplementary protocols as a victory of Soviet Union diplomacy and J. Stalin personally. On August 22, 2019, Rossiyskaya Gazeta No. 187 (7945) published an article entitled “There was no other way out”, written by Sergey Naryshkin, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and head of the Russian Historical Society. The key thesis is as follows: “Further events confirmed that the rejection of Ribbentrop’s proposals could put the Soviet Union in much worse military-political conditions” (rg.ru 2019). Vladimir Medinsky, head of the Russian military–historical society, former minister of the Russian Federation, and author of the book War: 1939–1945, titled his chapter about the nonaggression pact “The USSR’s Diplomatic Triumph”. He argues that Joseph Stalin had no other choice but to conclude a treaty with Adolf Hitler and said that the Pact “deserves a monument” (2019). The same position—denying the fact of the occupation of the Baltic States—can be found in other statements made by Sergey Naryshkin and Vladimir Medinsky on May 8, 2020. A draft legislation to revoke the resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union Soviet 1989 on the condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was submitted in the Russian Federation State Duma on May 27, 2020. The State Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously backed the bill on June 9, 2020, and submitted it for further consideration (rferl.org 2020). The entry of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union in 1940 can’t be considered an occupation, according to Nikita Buranov, chief specialist of the Russian Military Historical Society, on the website “Pobeda” in June 2020. He states that “the Baltic countries were part of the Russian Empire. In fact, they were torn away from Russia without treaties, international commissions and everything else. Independence was declared with the support of Western states” (pobedarf.ru 2020). Criticism of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Stalin is a criticism of the Victory of the Soviet Union in WW2. Clarification of the circumstances of the outbreak of WW2 in today’s Russian historical discourse is equated with a “revision of the results” of this war. According to Ivan Kurilla (2020), a historian at the European University in Saint Petersburg, “V. Putin is wielding an instrument of politics that engages the public’s

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emotions.” He calls the Russian Historical Society “a political society headed by politicians who want to manage academic work on history.” The author of this paper chose the documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics (in Russian Hevyyqennye ypoki. Ppibaltika) for further analysis of the tools and methods used to interpret historical events based also on the criteria of the significance and the consequences for international relations at that period. This film is about the historical events in the Baltic countries in 1939–1945. The documentary is in the Russian language, with a duration of 44 min and 52 s. The film was created in 2007 and uploaded to YouTube, which is a popular online platform for uploading, viewing and commenting.3 The main sources of information about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 and the occupation of the Baltic countries are archival documents in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Russian State Archives of Social and Political History, and the State Archives of the Russian Federation, including documents on the activities of organs of internal security, such as the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and other countries. A big part of the archives of state institutions of occupied countries was moved to the Soviet Union. Also, another source of information is the memoirs of the top state officials of both the Soviet Union and the formerly occupied Baltic countries. Many of the Soviet Union state institutions were involved in the events in 1939–1940, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Each of them presented information on the process of fulfilling the assigned tasks based on their internal rules. Unfortunately, various factors have had an effect on the contents of the documents describing these historical events, including the fact that different state institutions had different approaches to documenting things and the tendency for certain institutions to try to present things better on paper than they were in reality. There are other important factors which have to be taken into account in our analysis of historical documentaries: (1) the consultants who worked on the film; (2) the accessibility to archival documents of the former Soviet Union institutions for the researchers from foreign countries; (3) the sources of financing (state, private). The consultants are chosen for the filming of a documentary play a significant role in shaping the “right” direction for interpretation of the historical event. This might be called a hidden form of censorship. The documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics was directed by veteran propaganda filmmaker Vadim Gassanov. The consultants for the film were Alexander Zdanovich, Victor Bylinin and Janis Dzintars. The author collected information about these consultants from open sources. Alexander Aleksandrovich Zdanovich was a Soviet and Russian intelligence officer (for example, in 1996–1999, he headed the Public Relations Center of the FSB of the Russian Federation). He has held the position of Deputy General Director of All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (hereinafter referred to as “VGTRK”) for Security since 2002 (from 2012 to 2014—advisor to the General Director of VGTRK). He is a doctor of Historical Sciences, professor, retired lieutenant general, and member of the scientific council of the Russian military–historical 3

The website address for viewing the film is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZUknNx_ESo.

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society. Victor Konstantinovich Bylinin, the member of the Presidium of the Society for the Study of the History of Russian Special Services, is a doctor of Philology. Janis Dzintars, a Soviet historian, lived in Russia. Likewise, a documentary gains credibility by the calibre of people selected to be interviewed in the film. People such as academic Viktor Kalnbergs lend credence to the claims of the documentary, especially since he has the abbreviation PAMH after his name. This abbreviation is well known in the Russian language and means “Russian Academy of Medicine Sciences”. The honorific title is used to denote a full member of an academy that has a strong influence on scientific life; the title also inspires respect from ordinary people. It increases the degree of trust in the provided information. Other people interviewed in the documentary include academic Viktor Kalnbergs, a Latvian who is internationally famous for the transplantation of fingers, and Egon Bahr, former Secretary of State in the West German Chancellery. The film opens with a young Latvian girl reading some excerpts from the book History of Latvia. The twentieth century on the negative assessment of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact and the occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviets and the film ends with images of the same young Latvian girl at the memorial at the site of the Salaspils concentration camp in Latvia. Such images aim to grab and hold the audience’s attention. After several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (24 January 2006 Vladimir Penart v. Estonia; 17 May 2010 Vassili Kononov v. Latvia; 20 October 2015 Vytautas Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania) related to the occupation of the Baltic States, Russia has no more legal arguments to counter the fact of occupation. Instead of just denying the existence of the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the filmmakers propose a logical vindication for it and exploit emotions to negate the occupation. For example, Egon Bahr’s quotation is used to question the “false interpretation” of the events in question (the extract to watch the below-mentioned statement in the documentary film starts from 15 min 00 s): “but would another state in this situation have acted differently, could the Soviet Union have acted differently?” This is an excellent example of how the words of a famous statesman during the interview might be masterly used for the justification of illegal actions and interpretation of the historical facts according to the country’s internal and external policy and the vision of top officials on history. Mikhail Krysin was also selected for an interview on the interpretation of the events in question. According to information from open sources, Professor Krysin is a Russian military historian, political scientist, and specialist in the Baltic region. He misuses a term related to the history of the Baltic States during an interview on nationalism in the Baltic States in the interwar period: he states that “Lithuanians dreamed about Great Lithuania” (the extract to watch the above-mentioned statement of the documentary film starts from 08:14). However, Lithuanian top officials and ordinary people did not plan to restore the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the boundaries of the fifteenth or sixteenth century and did not make any attempts to do so. The term “Great Lithuania” is rarely used in Lithuanian historiology. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, the term “Grand Duchy of Lithuania” means “the state incorporating Lithuania proper, Belarus, and western Ukraine” (Britannica).

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The documentary presents the idea that a decision on the fate of many European countries was made on September 30, 1938, in Munich (Germany) by Adolf Hitler (the extract to watch it in the documentary film starts from 01:58). The film conveys a negative view of Great Britain and France’s interwar foreign policy in 1938–1939 through the tone of the narrator. Indeed, the narration of a documentary film plays a significant role in how the viewer perceives the events portrayed; vocal elements such as volume, pace, pitch, pauses, articulation, tone, timbre, emphasis and intonation all serve to influence the viewer. These elements were used to great effect in the film in this study. One such moment can be felt in the segment depicting how just 2 days after Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 3, 1939, France declared war against Nazi Germany based on the defensive treaty between France and Poland. The narrator emphasizes these words “declared war, but that was enough” (in Russian “obvili vony, no tem i ogpaniqilic”) (the extract to watch the abovementioned statement starts from 16:58). This changes the meaning of the sentence as well as the feeling behind it. Another example of how the narrator skilfully uses intonation and emphasis is a segment of the documentary related to the election in Latvia in July 1940. The segment begins with the narrator saying that it was the first election after six years. Later, the same words are repeated by the interviewee, Ilga Kreituse, who is the head of the department of political science at Rigas Stradins University. She also stated that the election in July 1940 in Latvia was illegal as Latvia was occupied by Soviet troops at the time. The filmmakers amplified the volume to stress Dr. Kreituse’s words (the extract to watch below-mentioned statement starts from 28:28) “no election for six years”. It is also worth noting that a short pause was made before the abovementioned phrase. This gives the impression that the filmmakers used certain parts of quotes and omitted others to paint the desired picture. The choice of words can convey political meaning, as seen by the use of the phrase “shards of the former Russian Empire” (the extract to watch the above-mentioned statement starts from 11:36) used to describe the Baltic states. Such phrases demonstrate the imperial syndrome in the historical politics of Russia. Another way of influencing the interpretation of key historical events is the omission of significant facts from archival documents. At one point in the documentary, the narrator states that Stalin returned Vilnius to the Lithuanians. However, the narrator omits the fact that the Soviet Union occupied part of Poland and had been preparing the ground for implementation of their plans to occupy the Baltic States. Stalin pressured Lithuania to sign a treaty on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, which included returning the Vilnius region with the capital city of Vilnius. The treaty was signed on October 10, 1939. The fact that even ordinary people understood this insidious plan of the Soviet Union is evident by the saying “Vilnius belongs to us, but we belong to the Russians” (in Lithuanian “Vilnius m¯us˛u, o mes—rus˛u”). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania in 1939–1940, diplomat Mr. Juozas Urbsys, described in detail in his memoir how the treaty was signed under pressure from top leaders of the Soviet Union. Urbsys was jailed in the Soviet Union and spent long years in prison. This also proved the fact that the Soviet Union (Soviet Russia) had an imperial mindset and was looking for

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opportunities to expand its territory to the boundaries of the former Russian Empire. The relationships between Lithuanians and Poles regarding Vilnius land during the interwar period were strained. This fact is skilfully used in the movie. The narrator reads excerpts from the diary of a Polish refugee, a former official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland Zygmunt Skarbek-Kruszewski, about Vilnius “(text in Russian). … za tot god nax Bilno pepexl iz pyk Polxi v pyki Poccii, ot Poccii k Litve. Bilnc clovno kyptizanka pepexodila iz pyk v pyki, menlc po elani cvoix vpemenix obladatele. On dae im menl dl ydobctva lbovnikov. Cegodn on nazyvaetc qyt mgqe Bilnc.” (translation in English: “...this year our Wilno passed from the hands of Poland to the hands of Russia, from Russia to Lithuania. Vilnius, like a courtesan passed from hand to hand, has changed at the request of its temporary owners. He even changed his name for the convenience of his lovers. Today he is called a little softer “Vilnius”).

In reality, Skarbek-Kruszewski wrote in his diary: my friend, since Marushka and I returned to Wilno, I have the impression of witnessing history in the making. During this year our Wilno has changed hands from Polish to Russian, from Russian to Lithuanian and from Lithuanian back to Russian. Wilno, like a courtesan, changed hands, was remodelled according to her temporary possessors. She even changed her name, as is customary for lovers. Today she is called, more softly, ‘Vilnius’ (BBC, 2005).

The city’s name in Lithuanian is “Vilnius”, and in Polish “Wilno”. The terms in Russian “vlblennye” and “lbovnik” have different meanings, but they might be translated in English as “lover”. According to the Cambridge dictionary, the term “lover” means “a partner in a romantic or physical relationship.” There are clear signs of manipulations with the different meanings of the terms “lover” and “in love/amorous”. The narrator also said that “the cream of society” and “the governmental elite” left the country, giving the impression that anyone had the right to leave the Baltic countries freely in 1940. But it was not true. For example, the President of Latvia, Karlis Ulmanis, requested permission to leave Latvia to immigrate to Switzerland, but he was arrested and sent to the Russian Federation Stavropol region where he was imprisoned in 1941 and died in 1942. The Estonian President was arrested and he, too, was imprisoned. The narrator justifies the forcible deportation of thousands of people on June 14, 1941, in the Baltic countries with the argument that this was actually mass arrests of suspected persons for cooperation with Nazi Germany that occurred in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The film’s treatment of the circumstances of the signing of the mutual assistance treaty between the Soviet Union and Estonia is another example of how the interpretation of history can be manipulated. The Soviets forced Estonia to sign the treaty on mutual assistance in 1939. The pretext for it was the incident with the Polish submarine on September 14–18, 1939, in Tallinn. The Soviet Union made false claims that Estonia breached its neutrality and started the blockage of Estonia from the Baltic Sea on September 20–24, 1939, and at the same time concentrated military troops at the border with Estonia. However, we can clearly witness the falsification of the historical facts in the documentary as the narrator states that Estonia started to concentrate

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military troops at the border with the Soviet Union in September, 1939. Footage as even shown as evidence of the concentration of Estonian troops (the extract to watch it starts from 20:45). However, the footage looks very suspicious, namely in regard to the time period, the participants, and the environment where the event supposedly occurred. Are those Estonian military troops or Soviet troops? The images of troop movement in a mountainous environment provoke serious doubts about the exact place represented in the film. The film finally ends with the Bronze Soldier in Estonia and a brief account of the lives lost by the Red Army in the Baltic States. The statue of the Bronze Soldier amongst some segments of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was a symbol of the triumph of the Red Army against Nazi Germany. The decision of the Estonian authorities to relocate the statue of the Bronze Soldier to a less prominent place in Tallinn sparked protests and riots in April 2007. The controversy surrounding the Bronze Soldier and the ensuing riots are directly related to the concepts of “The immortal regiment” and “Russian World”. The documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics was financed by the government of the Russian Federation. The main narrative of this documentary is the justification of the occupation of the Baltic States by the Red Army in 1940. According to information openly accessible on Youtube, the film has 37,108 views (data updated in December 2017). It was also aired on the Russian-language TV news channel Russia-24 (in Russian Pocci-24). The owner of this channel is the government of the Russian Federation and it is broadcast worldwide through satellite, terrestrial, cable, and streaming media (its sister channels are RTR-Planeta, Russia Today, Russia 1, and Russia 2). The fact that this documentary was so widely disseminated through various channels ensures that the desired narrative is spread to vast audiences around the world.

7 Conclusion In Soviet times, history was a political tool for turning people into patriots and the same is happening now in the Russian Federation. In the ideology of historical politics, evaluative signs are reversed: what was previously shameful or hidden and received a negative assessment is now evaluated positively. The Russian Federation uses historical politics as an instrument for justifying the occupation of its neighbouring countries in 1940, politically mobilizing the population, and maintaining the positive ratings of the President and the population’s trust in authority. The case study of the documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics presents a model of how visual arts can become an instrument of soft power. The essence of this model is the selection of “necessary” details and the suppression of “inconvenient” historical facts, which can give an authentic yet twisted accounting of past reality. The interpretation of historical facts is aided by the use of various tools (What?) and methods (How?):

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• Selection of an effective narrator who makes skilled use of vocal elements, such as volume, pace, pitch, pauses, articulation, tone, timbre, emphasis and intonation. • Selection of the most suitable, prominent persons for the interviews and the careful use of the desired quotes from these interviews. • Manipulations with terminology and the content of archival documents. The documentary film Unlearned Lessons: The Baltics was financed by the government of the Russian Federation and was widely disseminated to audiences around the world. Despite all the changes in society in the last 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation does not have the political desire to come to a consensus on the past. The finding of this analysis through case study reveals that the processes of the rehabilitation of Stalin and the promotion of neo-Stalinism are on demand in the Russian Federation.

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Between History and Propaganda: Estonia and Latvia in Russian Historical Narratives Vladimir Sazonov, Sergii Pakhomenko, and Igor Kopytin

1 Introduction Russia has its own historical policy (Miller, 2011), which the Kremlin uses for achieving its goals (Be¸kere et al., 2014). Various methods of using and (re-)interpreting or manipulating historical facts and narratives are not a new phenomenon in the modern world, but in the twenty-first century, they have gained significance as a tool for influencing target audiences (Vázquez Liñán, 2010; Morozov, 2009, 1–5; Sinisalu, 2008; Levchenko, 2018; Sazonov & Gontšarenko, 2020; Sazonov, 2020). Russia uses history as an influential political weapon and this must be acknowledged, because, as Prus asserts: …manipulation of history is becoming a growing challenge for the West, since it helps to sustain Moscow’s confrontational course in foreign policy, and to fuel anti-Western attitudes within Russian society. The West faces a difficult task of counteracting it in such a way that would not further alienate Russians. This demands a deep understanding of how Moscow’s historical policy is used today to capitalise on the Great Patriotic War’ (Prus, 2015, 1).

Published with the support of research project 253 (O-014) ‘Strategic Narrative as a Model for Reshaping the Security Dilemma (8.03.2019–31.01.2023)’, Estonian Military Academy. V. Sazonov (B) University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] V. Sazonov · I. Kopytin Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia V. Sazonov Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Tallinn, Estonia S. Pakhomenko Mariupol State University, Mariupol, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 H. Mölder et al. (eds.), The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_20

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One of the techniques of the informational influence (Mölder & Sazonov, 2020) of the Russian Federation is the active use of historical memory, which serves as a kind of ideological and propaganda frame for foreign policy (Piirimäe, 2020; Sazonov, 2020), and sometimes even a justification for military–political intervention (as in the case of Ukraine) (Sazonov et al., 2016; Snegovaya, 2015; Mölder & Sazonov, 2018, 2019). The reanimated myths of Soviet propaganda have become the usual rhetoric in public policy and diplomacy of the Russian Federation, as well as the content of a part of modern historiography (Sazonov, 2020). Estonia and Latvia are the most vulnerable to Russian influence operations due to a number of historical and geopolitical factors: the 50-year-long Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries (1940–1941 and 1944–1991) which caused collective trauma in the form of mass deportations and repressions; the length of the common border (Piirimäe, 2020, 102–103); and the presence of a sizeable Russophone population, a large proportion of which is influenced by Russian Federation propaganda which is often anti-state in nature (Andriukaitis, 2020; Król, 2017; Winnerstig, 2014). One particularly important factor in the relationship between the Baltic States1 and the Russian Federation is historical memory which has remained a permanently conflict-prone sphere for the last 30 years, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Two mutually exclusive historical narratives provide either memory wars or a zero-sum game. Since the 1990s the Baltic countries have introduced the concept of two totalitarianisms and two occupations—the Soviet and Nazi occupations. In turn, the geopolitical ambitions of Russia and the hypertrophied cult of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ have led to outright revisionism and justification of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.2 According to this Russian narrative, the occupation of Estonia and Latvia3 in 1940 is justified, and the re-occupation in 1944 is interpreted as ‘liberation’ (see e.g. Chekinov, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation). This interpretation of history, coupled with the accusation that the Baltic states were glorifying fascism, has an impact on the local Russophone community in the Baltic states, forming a powerful narrative of counter-memory with the cult of ‘Victory Day 9th of May’ and the Soviet ‘liberation’ of Latvia and Estonia (Litvinov, 2015; Ibragimova, 2016, 61–63). The Soviet period is often depicted by Russian historians and political scientists as having several positive aspects (or mostly positive), even sometimes by those historians and political scientists whose works are more or less objective and refrain from abusing history or manipulating facts. For example, the Russian sociologist R. Simonyan asserts that:

1

In our article, we have focused only on Latvia and Estonia and have not included Lithuanian material for analysis. 2 See Russian scientific sources and Russian interpretation of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact— Smirnov (2009, 185–203), Ionov and Kharitonova (2013, 110–127), Simindey (2015a). See also opinion of Vladimir Putin (Interfax, 2015; Dubrovskaya, 2014; Putin, 2020d). 3 Lithuania as well, too.

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… joining the Soviet Union was useful for Estonia: in the USSR, higher education was free, and representatives of the Union republics had privileges to enrol in leading Russian universities out of competition. In the post-war years, Estonia was able to train specialists in Leningrad and Moscow higher education institutions (Simonyan, 2016, 36).

Our hypothesis is as follows: due to its historical, geopolitical and ethnic specificity, historical memory as a part of identity is one of the most important components of the security of Estonia and Latvia. Proceeding from this, modern Russian historical and propaganda narratives are aimed at disavowing the Estonian and Latvian national concepts of historical memory and using history to discredit the modern political elites of Latvia and Estonia. These actions serve on the one hand, as part of the informational influence on Estonia and Latvia, and on the other, as constituent elements of the strategy of historical revisionism. Our article is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to the conceptualization and operationalization of the research: defining the concept of the politics of memory; describing approaches, methods, terms and definitions that are adequate for research; and briefly characterizing the empirical base. In the second part of the current chapter, we will consider Russian historical narratives concerning two of the Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, with a focus on their main actors, plots and channels of dissemination. In this study, the authors focused on official Kremlin sources (the opinions of Putin and other Russian authorities), academic historiography, and various other studies (articles, volumes and monographs) published by Russian historians. In addition, we analysed politicized historical projects and, last but not least, we also examined proKremlin media articles published in 2009–2020 in various media outlets (Rubaltic.ru, Sputnik, Kremlin.ru, Inosmi.ru and others) which touch upon topics related to Estonian and Latvian history, especially narratives about the Second World War, the occupation of Estonia and Latvia, and the Soviet period.

2 Theoretical Framework The core concepts that form the theoretical and empirical framework of our research are politics of memory/historical politics and narrative. Clarifying the relationship between these concepts will help to form a certain theoretical model for studying the cases of Latvia and Estonia. We propose a broad interpretation of the politics of memory, which includes all practices related to the formation of collective/historical memory from the formalization of a historical narrative to memorial laws. Various studies interpret the politics of memory in differing ways. It may be construed as the actions of the power elites and their opponents to construct the meaning of the past and its wider dissemination or to impose them on other members of society. Another view is the communicative dialogical approach, which focuses on how these ideas are produced, influenced, attracted and conflicted with other narratives that are present in society at large (Verovšek, 2016).

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In the case of the two Baltic states in our study, the official historical narrative is supported by ethnic Latvians and Estonians as it is confirmed in their collective memory of repressions and deportations. On the contrary, among the Russophone population, these memories are not common. This provides, on the one hand, a ‘shared memory mode’ (according to Bernhard & Kubik, 2014, 7–36), and on the other hand, the prospect of the mnemonic influence of the Russian Federation on the Russophone community (particularly in Estonia and Latvia). The politics of memory is indeed a powerful tool in the political arena. A. Confino asserts that memory, if used politically, becomes ‘a prisoner of political reductionism and functionalism’ and approaches ideology (Confino, 1997, 1395). The Estonian political scientist Maria Mälksoo strongly insists on the need to turn to the agonistic politics of memory in order to form a mutually respectful dialogue, which should not necessarily lead to agreement and reconciliation about the past, but still to understanding the opponent and not antagonistic confrontation (Mälksoo, 2015, 221–237). However, according to A. Myller, the agonistic approach to the politics of memory has been postulated, but it has not been analysed as a real or widespread phenomenon (Myller, 2018, 174). Maria Mälksoo (2015), while strenuously promoting the agonistic vision of history, recognizes that successful approval of the history of the origin of the state is unlikely to happen without the exercise of power over what to remember and how. She also acknowledges that the rapid adoption of the agonistic mnemopolitics model in Eastern Europe remains rather contrived against the backdrop of a significant power imbalance between Russia and its former Soviet republics, and state-approved mnemopolitics defining state identity in a zero-sum environment (Mälksoo, 2015). Researchers must acknowledge any external factors that complicate mnemonic pluralism within the country and cause, on the contrary, the securitization of the narrative and even the ‘war of memory’. A vivid example here is precisely the mnemonic confrontation between the Baltic countries and the Russian Federation. According to Malinova (2018a, b), by promoting or supporting certain interpretations of the collective past, representatives of the ruling elite (of Russia) pursue political goals that are not necessarily associated with the formation of a certain concept of the past: they seek to legitimize their own power, strengthen community solidarity, justify decisions made, mobilize electoral support, show the insolvency of their opponents, etc. For this reason, the terms historical politics and politics of memory are not always appropriate to describe the political use of the past. The latter concept is broader than the previous one; it describes any practice of referring to the past in a political context, regardless of whether it adds up to a coherent strategy. And its addressees, obviously, can be the whole range of various segments of the domestic and foreign audience (Malinova, 2018a, b). However, both in the case of historical politics as a unified conceptual strategy and in the case of the tactical use of history in political practice, the focus is on the historical narrative. Narrative, which offers a coherent picture of the chain of historical events, is the main format for representing the past both in historiography and in political discourse (Malinova, 2018a, b, 37). According to the Polish historian Topolski (1999, 202), the linking of individual episodes (narrative wholes), forming a

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horizontal projection of the narrative, occurs at three levels: (1) information mediated by the historian’s imagination; (2) rhetoric, i.e. the means of convincing the audience of the plausibility of the semantic scheme; and (3) ‘politics’ or ‘theoretical and ideological foundations’, including the values and ideological attitudes of the authors of the narrative. Unlike professional historiography, ‘politics of memory’ works with simplified narratives that reduce complex and contradictory historical processes to emotionally coloured schemes that are easy to perceive. The narrative promotes the concept of ‘us’ and ‘our foes’, endowing space and time with cultural and historical meaning, thereby securitizing the internal space of the community (Apryshchenko, 2018, 23–50). The securitization of memory, which is the understanding of historical memory as an element of national security, also relies on narratives. Moreover, Strukov and Apryshchenko (2018, 1–21) argue that securitization itself emerges as a system of narratives used by government officials, representatives of the state, cultural entrepreneurs, and so on. Conflicts arising from conflicting narratives set the stage for further securitization steps. In his analysis of the narratives of the politics of memory, Gill (2013) pays special attention to the metanarrative. Metanarrative is a means of transforming ideological principles into the practice of the everyday reality of citizens; it is a symbolic construction of society and an explanation of its past (why it became what it is) and its future (where it wants to be). Since the metanarrative focuses on the temporal connections between past, present and future, it is constituted by myths. By this term, ‘socially constructed stories about society and its origins, which provide members of the community with meaning to explain important aspects of the life of the community and its development’ (Gill, 2013, 4). Myth is socially constructed and is a means of defining and explaining social reality for those who believe in it. In other words, what matters is not what the empirical foundations of the myth are, but that it is accepted by members of the community. Gill identifies six myths that have served as the main elements of the Soviet metanarrative: they are associated with the October Revolution (1917), the building of socialism, the nature of leadership, internal and external opposition to the party’s course, and victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Gill, 2011, 4–5). In modern Russian politics of memory, the supporting structure is undoubtedly the myth of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945). Moreover, it has essentially turned into an independent metanarrative: an explanation of the past—the country as the victor over fascism; the present—the ‘besieged fortress’; and the future. This metanarrative also draws special attention to Estonia and Latvia as its main antagonists. Ilya Yablokov has thoroughly studied the narrative of Russia as a fortress, detailing the historical evolution of conspiratorial thinking in Russia from the Imperial period of the nineteenth century through the whole Soviet period up to the modern-day under Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Yablokov (2015, 2018) sets the origin of Russian anti-Western conspiracy theories in the period after the Crimean War (1853–1856), which was recognized as a major defeat of Russian policy by the ruling elites. This period was very productive in building a strong image of the West as an adversary (see also Mölder & Sazonov, 2019, 99).

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Russia had found itself in a war against major powers in Europe who were allied with the Ottoman Empire, i.e. France, Great Britain and Sardinia (which soon became part of the Italian kingdom). The patriotically minded elite of the Russian Empire came to the conclusion that Great Britain and its allies had betrayed Russia by supporting the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s sworn enemy, thereby turning the war against the Russian Empire and hindering it from gaining new territories. Consequently, the Western countries obtained the image of an ultimate and insidious power-seeking way to undermine Russian history, culture and its progress towards its glorious future (Yablokov, 2015, 301–315). The narrative of Western conspiracies against the Russian state did not die with the end of the Russian Empire (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019, 99), and in the Soviet Union, conspiratorial thinking was a widely practised political tool for keeping society in a constructed information space (The Moscow Times, 2014). During the Soviet era, the belief that Western countries were dreaming of the annihilation and humiliation of the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly disseminated in the society. As a result, many Russian people still believe in a Western plot against the Soviet Union and that the West deliberately destroyed the USSR. Russian society has always suffered from messianic expectations, a mindset which could also encourage conspiratorial thinking to thrive. In the nineteenth century, Russia had taken upon itself the role of protector of the Eastern Orthodox Church, which entailed the duty to defend Christian minorities living in the Holy Land (Palestine), Lebanon and Syria under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. In the ongoing status conflict with the West, Russia also tends to position itself as protector of traditional and conservative values against the assault of Western liberalism and so-called ‘gay propaganda’ (Mölder & Sazonov, 2019, 99). Malinova (2018a, b) proposed an approach to working with narratives that include, firstly, a comparison of narratives developed by different mnemonic actors, and secondly, a conditional scheme containing the main structural elements of a narrative. She has analysed the jubilee narrative of the 1917 revolution in Russia, according to the following criteria: (1) the main idea serving as the core of the narrative and, as a rule, associated with the mission/political program/identity of the corresponding mnemonic actor; (2) the storyline: in most of the narratives under consideration, it focuses on the history of tragedy and trauma experienced by Russia in the twentieth century, while at the same time, the moment of injury and its causes are seen in different ways; (3) the elements-events between which perspective connections are built (what is ‘forgotten’ is no less important than what is ‘remembered’); (4) the main characters: protagonists/heroes/doers and antagonists/enemies/pests; the connection between the actors of historical narratives and contemporary mnemonic antagonistic actors is often implied; (5) the lessons to be learned from historical experience (Malinova, 2018a, b, 37–56). We consider it permissible to use this approach as a whole when analysing Russian narratives of the history of Estonia and Latvia. Namely, let us single out the main mnemonic actors that form and develop the narrative and see their positioning in relation to its constituent elements.

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3 Official Kremlin Since the authorities in the Russian Federation have long elevated the controversial issues of history to the rank of strategically important, fundamental and sometimes even determining the foreign policy of the state, it is no wonder that the president himself is concerned with ‘the Baltic Question’. The collective memory of the tragedy of defeat in the Cold War, the collapse of the socialist camp and the collapse of the USSR are hardly conducive to the Kremlin’s ambitions. Vladimir Putin needed to create a more glorified, non-conflict image of the past, which, in addition to the communicative function, would play a significant role in ensuring the security of the state, delineating the concept of ‘us’ and ‘our enemies’, fostering a cultural-historical sense of space and time, and securitizing the internal space (Apryshchenko, 2016). ‘The Baltic Question’, as interpreted by the Kremlin, offers exactly that. The memory mode, in which the president as the ‘chief historian’ is a mnemonic actor and the main subject of securitization, has formed a single reference object with a single semantic construction shared by the majority of the population: the historical myth about the Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War (Pakhomenko & Gridina, 2020, 98). It should be noted that there is no pronounced boundary between myth and history, and the use of the definition ‘myth’ is largely evaluative (Makovskaya, 2014, 80). Viktor Shnirelman (2000) offers several criteria for distinguishing between historical myth and history. Firstly, the goals are different: whereas the historian seeks to find the truth, the mythmaker manipulates historical data to achieve completely different aims related to modern politics. Secondly, a historical work is open to discourse and allows for adjustments and changes in accordance with new historical information, but a myth builds a rigid structure that is intolerant of criticism and requires blind faith. Thirdly, the mythmaker, as a rule, completely ignores the methods accepted in science, relying instead on approaches that are generally characteristic of pseudoscience. According to Malinova (2016), the ‘Great Victory’ became the main pillar of the memory policy aimed at the formation of Russian identity, as it is indeed the only event in Russian history that meets all the criteria of ‘political suitability’: it is actualized in the mass consciousness by numerous ‘speech acts’ and by creating a branched infrastructure of memory (places of memory); it has a wide range of symbolic meanings for defining ‘us’ (positive) and ‘our enemy’ (negative); and under the conditions of the state monopoly on the politics of memory, it is not the subject of opposite assessments. In addition, the memory of the Second World War plays the role of a defensive/offensive weapon aimed at the past against the traumatic events of Soviet totalitarianism and occupation in the national histories of Eastern European countries, including Latvia and Estonia (Pakhomenko & Gridina, 2020, 98). The refusal of Estonia and Latvia to buy into the Russian narrative of the history of the Second World War transfers them into the category of ‘enemies’; this shift in relations was first enshrined in the new edition of the National Security Strategy of the Russian

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Federation (2015) (see Ukaz, 2015) and now in the ‘updated’ Constitution (Novyj tekst Konstitucii s popravkami, 2020). The most striking and illustrative example of the president’s historical narrative concerning the Baltic states is Putin’s programmatic article ‘75 Years of the Great Victory: Shared Responsibility to History and the Future’ (Putin, 2020b). In his article, the Russian leader asserts that the Soviet Union was forced to sign the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact due to the inaction of its Western allies and neighbours. The annexation of the Baltic states, according to Putin, was a ‘military-strategic, defensive task’. Moreover, Vladimir Putin stressed that this act of aggression ‘was in accordance with the norms of international and state law of the time’ (Putin, 2020b). Prior to the publication of his article, Putin had radically changed his position at least twice on the assessment of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. In 2009, Putin called this pact immoral (Putin, 2009), but 5 years later he saw nothing wrong with it, explaining that the signing of the pact was motivated by the unwillingness of the USSR to fight (Kremlin.ru, 2015). This idea of the USSR’s reluctance to have a war and that it had no choice but to sign the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was also promoted by Putin in western media— in June 2020 the president of the Russian Federation published a famous article in National Interest entitled ‘The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II’ (Putin, 2020a), where he discussed issues related to World War II, including the Baltic States and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact: I will only say that, in September 1939, the Soviet leadership had an opportunity to move the western borders of the USSR even farther west, all the way to Warsaw, but decided against it. The Germans suggested formalizing the new status quo. On September 28, 1939 Joachim von Ribbentrop and V. Molotov signed in Moscow the Boundary and Friendship Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the secret protocol on changing the state border, according to which the border was recognized at the demarcation line where the two armies de-facto stood (Putin, 2020c).

Putin does not mention the occupation of the Baltic states at all, instead, he used the phrase ‘protocol on changing the state border, according to which the border was recognized at the demarcation line where the two armies de-facto stood’ (Putin, 2020c). Then Putin described the occupation and annexation of the Baltic states as an ‘incorporation’ and accentuated that it was done legally with the support of the local authorities and no international law was broken: In autumn 1939, the Soviet Union, pursuing its strategic military and defensive goals, started the process of the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Their accession to the USSR was implemented on a contractual basis, with the consent of the elected authorities. This was in line with international and state law of that time (Putin, 2020c).

The so-called ‘incorporation’ into the USSR was a de facto occupation of Estonia and Latvia (and Lithuania as well) and, in legal terms, was not at all in line with any international or national law, as was confirmed later by extensive research (Mälksoo, 2003; Riismandel, 2004).

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The Russian president’s assertions were echoed by his close associates, particularly Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who spoke out against ‘attempts to rewrite the history’ of the Second World War, unequivocally hinting at the Baltic countries and Ukraine. In addition, Shoigu made sure that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation prosecuted foreign officials who made decisions about the demolition of monuments to ‘Soviet soldier-liberators’ (Rubaltic.ru, 2019, 2020a; Lindemann, 2020). The Investigative Committee not only approved the minister’s proposal, but also created a whole unit to investigate ‘crimes of falsification of history’. A vivid example of such a ‘falsification of history’ is a case connected with the appeal of former soldiers of the Latvian legions, who are outraged by the attention brought to them by Russian journalists. Almost a hundred names of former legionnaires became public knowledge due to a publication by Vladimir Simindey. This resulted in the persecution of the Latvians on the list by Russian TV journalists (Rubaltic.ru, 2020b). The interpretation of the history of the Baltic countries by the official Kremlin is not the primary plot of the historical narrative but is woven into the broader plots of the Second World War and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The aim is to fix at the public level the indisputability of the Great Victory as the main merit of the USSR and disavow such an interpretation of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that considers it a trigger for the outbreak of World War II. The Kremlin considers the major tragedy in this narrative to be the ‘rewriting of history’ and the blaming of the USSR for the outbreak of World War II, which leads to the main lesson—to prevent the ‘rewriting of history’ and, by securitizing the narrative, to establish the only correct view of these events (Sazonov, 2020, 21–23).

4 Academic Historiography It was during the ‘Victory Anniversaries’ that Russian leaders released recommended schemes to historians for studying issues related to the Second World War. Certain freedom persisted only until 2010, after which the ‘tightening of the screws’ began, which resulted in the emergence of pro-Kremlin publications by L. Vorobieva and V. Simindey, who strung tendentiously adjusted facts and documents on a threadbound within the walls of the Kremlin. They clearly followed the directive of the ex-Minister of Culture V. Medinsky, who wrote that ‘the criterion of the truthfulness and reliability of a historical source lies in its compliance with the national interests of Russia’ (Euvsdisinfo, 2020). A researcher from Voronezh, M. Kirchanov, calls his work on the Baltics ‘a difficult book because it talks about what is difficult to write about calmly and objectively at the present time’ (Kirchanov, 2007, 4). The author himself positioned his book as a collection of articles concerning the ‘difficult questions’ of the history of the Baltic states (first of all, Latvia); however, it is clear from the content that the author actually avoided the most controversial questions. The plots concerning the Latvian Legion were left out by the Voronezh historian; after examining the international

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situation on the eve and in the first year of the war, the author goes directly to the present. Dwelling on details regarding the problem of the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Kirchanov chose the safest, but at the same time indicative approach to the study of this issue—a purely historiographic one (Kirchanov, 2007, 92–103). Summarizing the stated positions of researchers (overwhelmingly Western), Kirchanov noted that: the loss of independence distorted national identities, becoming one of the most severe traumas in the entire history of the Baltic peoples. However, not only identities have changed. The inclusion of Latvia and Lithuania in the USSR pulled them out of the general context of European history but did not mean their exclusion from European politics (Kirchanov, 2007, 102).

Almost simultaneously with Kirchanov’s book, a detailed monograph by E. Zubkova was published, which had received Russian state support and grants from a number of Western academic organizations. Like Kirchanov, Zubkova calls the year 1940 a turning point for the Baltic states—just as 1917 was for Russia. Nevertheless, she decisively dissociated herself from Soviet historical and ideological myths about ‘voluntary entry’, ‘popular revolutions’ etc. (Zubkova, 2008, 44). Zubkova radically disagrees with the use of the term ‘occupation’ in relation to the introduction of Soviet troops into the Baltic states in 1940. In her opinion, this term ‘does not correspond at all to the long-term plans of the Soviet Union regarding the Baltic states, or to the real development of events in this region’ (Zubkova, 2008, 100). She gives her arguments in favour of the concept of ‘sovietisation’ as opposed to ‘occupation’: the arrival of the Soviets ‘seriously and for a long time’, the loss of sovereignty by the Baltic states, and the establishment of a Soviet-style Communist regime. She concludes that all this contradicts the semantic content of the concept of ‘occupation’, which in any case is temporary (Zubkova, 2008, 100–101). The ‘65th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people’ in 2010 became an important milestone in the academic view on the ‘difficult issues’ of the history of Latvia and the Baltic states as a whole. The monograph of Vorobieva (2011), which was published under the stamp of the Institute for Strategic Studies, is indicative in this regard, which already says a lot about the author’s ideological bias and the goals of ‘academic approbation’ of historiographic clichés imposed from above. Already in the foreword, Vorobieva makes an unambiguous statement claiming to be the ultimate truth: ‘If it were not for the June events of 1940, as a result of which the pro-fascist regimes were overthrown and the Baltic Soviet republics became part of the USSR, the peoples of the Baltic would be among the countries defeated in the Second World War with all the ensuing consequences and losses’ (Vorobieva, 2011, 11). The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (1939), according to Vorobieva (2011, 16), is not a conspiracy of aggressors, but ‘an ideologized construction of the Anglophiles, who worked hard to replenish the existing arsenal of historical and political myths with new falsifications’. And in general, ‘the Baltic countries have moved into the vanguard of forces falsifying the history of World War II and deliberately reducing the great significance of the victory of the Soviet people over Hitler’s Nazism exclusively to the shadow sides’ (Vorobieva, 2011, 18). This has become the official interpretation

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of the history of the Baltics in general and Latvia in particular, due to the new ‘anniversary’ dogmas that the Russian political elite dictated to historians in 2010. In a similar vein, Vorobieva also covered the activities of the Latvian Legion, basing her conclusions on the judgments of Soviet propagandists and tendentious collections of documents, where the sources were selected on a one-sided basis. The characteristic clichés of the Soviet era in relation to Latvians who served in the legion—‘bourgeois nationalists’, ‘accomplices of the Nazis and their selfish interests’ etc.—have been resurrected. Vorobieva sums up her arguments with the statement that the myth of the Soviet occupation of Latvia is ‘a claim to the right of Nazi accomplices and a handful of Anglophiles to determine the fate of the Latvian SSR liberated from the Nazis immediately after 1945’ (Vorobieva, 2011, 361). Nevertheless, the radical and simplified approach to the history of Latvia during the Second World War, such as Vorobieva proposed, did not immediately resonate with leading Russian specialists in the field of Baltic studies. A St. Petersburg’s historian Y. Kantor, who followed the principle of strict documentation of the constructions presented, wrote that the attitude of the inhabitants of the Baltics to the Soviet regime at the beginning of the war was largely determined by the large-scale repressive actions of the Stalinist regime in 1940–1941 (Kantor, 2011, 92) but not by nostalgia for the times of the ‘fascist’ dictatorship of Karlis Ulmanis, as L. Vorobieva imagined. A Russian historian K. Khudolei was not so radical in his conclusions; following Zubkova, he emphasized that the sovietization of the Baltic states did not in any way correspond to the state interests of the Soviet Union in the field of defence but pursued the goals of the so-called ‘export of communism’. It is the sovietization of the Baltic states that Khudolei considers a deep trauma of the Baltic peoples—these wounds are still fresh and are manifested, for example, in the interpretation of historical events (Khudolei, 2013, 108). Finally, in the multivolume work ‘The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 , which was published under the editorship of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu, the Latvian Legion is mentioned only in passing, although the activities of other national SS4 formations are described in great detail. The authors equated Latvian legionnaires with the soldiers of the Ukrainian Division ‘Galicia’ ‘whose glorification … is an open mockery of the memory of millions of lives ruined by the Nazis’ (Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna 1941–1945, 2015, 864). The history of Estonia (especially the period of the occupation of Estonia by the USSR and WWII) has likewise been an object for pro-Kremlin interpretation already for decades and several channels have been used for that (Sazonov, 2020).5 Estonian historian Jaak Valge (2019) acknowledges that the ‘professionalism of Russian 4

The Latvian and Estonian SS Legions were national armed formations within the Waffen SS (1943–1945). Although some of the legionnaires collaborated in the early years of the war with the Nazis and took part in the Holocaust, the vast majority did not, and the organization was not deemed as criminal during the trial in Nuremberg. However, they wore SS uniforms, and from a Russian perspective, they were definitely Nazi collaborators. 5 When analysing Russian sources, we should take into consideration the current situation of Russian and pro-Russian sources which are represented in the Estonian informational space and most probably the target audience of these Russian sources are the Russophone people of Estonia (Annual

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historians who are dealing as propagandists should not be underestimated. They are strong in their knowledge’. Valge admits that the spectrum of Russian historians is wide: there are historians who are pro-Kremlin, based on ideology, and who therefore receive better financial support, but there are also other historians whose views are not based on ideology (Rus.delfi, 2018; Valge, 2019). Nevertheless, the fact remains that those who are clearly pro-Kremlin are dogged in propagating their beliefs. Russian historians Zagoskin et al. (2013, 106–109). have stated that: ‘The need to resist the falsifications of history in historical science is now recognised as a national problem’. One of the strongest proponents of this ideology was Russian Army General and military historian Mahmut Gareev (1923–2019), who was well-known in Russia as a historian and scientist in Military studies and who was considered to be the leading military historian in Russia. Gareev held a Doctoral degree of Science in History and Military Sciences and was the president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. The general wrote many books and articles and served as editor-in-chief of several collective volumes, several of which were published in Russian and English (see e.g. Gareev, 1988, 1998). Also notable is the fact that Gareev was the committee head of the scientific-editorial council of the journal Informacionnye voiny6 (Information Wars). In the context of mentioning the ‘Bronze night’ in Estonia, Gareev claimed: The leadership of our country should first of all raise the question, including for the politicians of other states: ‘Is it good or bad that we defeated fascism in the Second World War?’ In addition, a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War should be created, which would provide a guide for textbook authors and researchers. It is also necessary to step up veteran and other associations of citizens so that they take the correct and principled position on these issues (Velikovskiy, 2008).

Gareev dealt with historical questions and issues of the Great Patriotic War, actively participated in discussions in Russia on historical issues and focused on the ‘falsification of the history of war’ (Sazonov, 2020: 22). According to his views, the Western historical society is trying to dispute the victory of the USSR over fascism and this is part of a large Western propaganda campaign against Russia (Gareev, 2014, 38). For example, in his article ‘The Great Victory and modern interests of international security’,7 Gareev described the Western conspiracy against Russian and Soviet history with great emotion: If G. K. Zhukov, D. Eisenhower, B. Montgomery, Ch. de Gaulle and other war veterans from different countries of Europe, Asia and the Americas would see the Assistant Secretary of State distributing sandwiches to people in Kiev on Maidan square, while the High Representative for EU Foreign Affairs is showing kindness to the Nazis, they would turn over in their graves with disgust and shame for those who support the fascists today under the pretext of imposing ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ (Gareev, 2014, 38).

Review of Estonian Internal Security Service 2019/2020, 13, 14). The Russophone community in Estonia is however not homogeneous (see e.g., Makarychev & Sazonov, 2019, 450−469). 6 https://www.iwars.su/redkol. 7 Note: this article was published in autumn 2014, in the same year when Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine.

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General Gareev accentuates the crucial and decisive role of the USSR in achieving victory over fascism in Europe.8 In his words, ‘abroad, the history of the war is falsified mainly due to the decisive role of the USSR in achieving victory over fascism and our country today should take the right place in the world, but certain forces in the West do not want to allow this’ (Gareev, 2014, 31). But the Russian Federation could use narratives of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in hybrid threats and war—for example, this was done in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began in early 2014 (Kopõtin & Sazonov, 2016: 73–75) and during the events of the ‘Bronze Night’9 in April 2007 in Tallinn (Liik, 2007, 71–76; Sinisalu, 2008, 154–162). Several Russian historians and opinion leaders have accused the Baltic countries, particularly Estonia, of falsifying history and have applied political pressure on the historians. For example, Russian historian and political scientist Aleksey Podberezkin (2009), a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, writes that in the Baltic countries, there are nondemocratic systems and ‘the goal of local authorities is simple enough: it is necessary to keep the current undemocratic systems of Latvia and Estonia, which consider Russian people to be second-class citizens by many indicators (political, social, humanitarian, etc.), as they are’. Podberezkin (2009, 75) states that: Our goal, one might say, is the noble task of protecting historians in countries such as Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia and several others. Protect them from the total 8

No doubt, the USSR played a big role in that victory, but he is ignoring other important issues and key factors of the Second World War: First: the USSR, along with its ally, Nazi Germany, invaded Poland in 1939. Second: Soviet military forces invaded Finland in 1939. Third: The Soviets occupied the Baltic countries in 1940 according to secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (through a deal with Nazi Germany). Fourth: the weight of the war from 1 September 1939 until 22 June 1941 was on the shoulders of Western and Eastern Europe, mainly Poland, England, and France, but also Belgium, etc. Fifth: Western allies began military actions against Fascism in Europe in 1939; they opened several fronts (e.g. in Italy in 1943, then later in June 1944 in France etc., and were participating in the annihilation of Nazism in Germany in 1945 etc.). 9 Bronze Night or April Unrest. This refers to riots of pro-Russian minded groups of Russianspeaking people in Tallinn surrounding the 2007 relocation of the Bronze Soldier ‘Alyosha’ (located in the centre of Tallinn), which is the Soviet memorial of the Second World War. In Estonia among Estonians, it was a symbol of the Soviet occupation (Annual Review of the Estonian Internal Security Service, 2007, 9–20). A brief description of Russia’s involvement in the Bronze Night events can be found in the Annual Review of Estonian Internal Security Service of 2007, p. 9: ‘… the special services and power structures of Russia were behind the instigation of an over-emotional reflection of the Russian media in connection with the disturbance over the ‘Bronze Soldier’ (one of the reasons why the events escalated into mass riots) and opposed several high-ranking Russian public officials, who agreed under various considerations with the civilised relocation of the monument. As for the April riots, we can say that despite preceding visits of several Russian intelligence officers into Estonia, the role of Russian special services (both the FSB and the SVR) during April 26–27 was to observe the course of events. The Security Police did not ascertain the directing of the violent events from the side of Russian special services. Secret meetings between Russian diplomats and local extremists (including the meeting in Tallinn Botanical Garden that was covered by the press) could not have initiated the hysterical outbreak. However, the SVR’s good position in the circle of Russian journalists, whose participation in instigating hostility was outstanding, should be taken into account.’

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political pressure and dictatorship under which they are held. Our task is to free the historical discussion in those countries where scientists are not given freedom.

Accusing Estonian historians of not being objective or scientific is a frequent tactic used by some Russian historians (Litvinov, 2015, 59). Russian historians try to deny the occupation of the Baltic States that took place in 1940 and then in 1944, instead insisting that this was when the ‘Baltic States joined the Soviet Union’, which is a lie and not based on historical facts.10 For example, Roman Chekinov, Senior Researcher of the Research Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, argues: The Baltic strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops was carried out from September 14 to November 24, 1944, in order to defeat the group of German troops in the Baltic States and complete the liberation of the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from German troops. The operation lasted 71 days, the front was 1000 km wide and 400 km deep. (Chekinov, MOD of RF).

Chekinov writes about the liberation of the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the German army without mention that these territories were re-occupied by the Red Army in 1944 (Chekinov, MOD of Russian Federation). In accusing the Baltic States of falsification of history, pro-Kremlin forces involve not only Russian scholars but also students who are studying history. For example, a student of history at the University of Tyumen, I. Ibragimova (2016, 61) writes: If we analyse, in detail, cases of the falsification of historical events of the Great Patriotic War, then we should start with he who was the aggressor or initiator of this war. For the older generation, the answer to this question is obvious; but even here, some historians disagree. The framework for falsification includes discussions related to the events of 1939–1940 in the Baltic States, as a result of which the Baltic republics were joined to the Soviet Union. The authors of Baltic history textbooks unanimously view the events of 1940 as a fact of ‘occupation’.

She accuses the Baltic countries of the falsification of historical events of the Second World War.

5 Politicized Historical Projects One of Russia’s flagships of the fight against ‘the falsification of the history of the Second World War by Latvian nationalists’ is the Historical Memory Foundation, which began work in the fall of 2008 and which is supervised by A. Dyukov (Director

10

This is not a true statement. The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States in 1940 by using political pressure and supporting military forces. In 1944, the Soviet army invaded and re-occupied the Baltic States by military force again (Second World War).

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of the Foundation) and V. Simindey—both of them are certified historians, although they do not have scientific degrees.11 The Foundation has issued a number of detailed monographs that set out the proKremlin interpretation of events. One of the foundation’s first books was Dyukov’s work on deportations and repressions of the civilian population of Estonia in 1940– 1953 (Dyukov, 2007). In this book, the author concludes that the Soviet Union was forced into using such measures in response to the cooperation of Estonians with the Germans and the ‘nationalist underground’. During the expulsion, the deportees, according to Dyukov, did not starve, and life in the Gulag was quite bearable. He justifies the high mortality rate of prisoners by the ‘privations of the war years’.12 This work of Dyukov using clichés and ideologemes of Soviet propaganda. It is noteworthy, however, that Dyukov used a large array of documents from the FSB archive to which access by ordinary historians is difficult to obtain. It should also be noted that the editor of the published Estonian version of the book was a former KGB officer, Vladimir Ilyashevich, and the opponent at the presentation of the book in Tallinn was Vladimir Pool, who was also a former KGB officer (Chshegedin, 2009). The next publication was Dyukov’s book ‘Mercy to the Fallen: Soviet Repressions against Nazi accomplices in the Baltic States’. In it, the author claims that the Soviet Union took care of the repatriated soldiers of the Baltic SS legions, who were allegedly not repressed, but immediately sent home (Dyukov, 2009b, 79–82). The foundation also publishes collections of documents about the Baltic states during the Second World War years. They contain a specially compiled sample of documents, which forms the reader’s ‘correct’ opinion about the sovietization of the Baltic countries, repression and cooperation of the Baltic peoples with Nazi Germany. The selection of documents in Dyukov’s collections is in itself tendentious, and the author’s preface is a vivid example of the Kremlin version of historical events. Dyukov denies the carrying out of Stalinist repressions in the Baltic states, and he blames the Western powers for the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, which allegedly did not want to recognize the neutrality of the Baltic states, pushing Stalin to annex the region (Dyukov, 2013, 7–20). The collections published by the Historical Memory Foundation cover a wide range of topics from years 1939 to 1953. One collection is devoted to contacts between the Lithuanian and German special services, which is called ‘secret cooperation’ in the collection. This is what became, according to the compiler, a security risk for the Soviet Union and the reason for the annexation of Lithuania (Dyukov, 2013, 224–225).13 The collection ‘Destroy as many as possible …’, about Latvian collaborationist formations in Belarus, ‘shows how Latvian soldiers in the German 11 O Fonde. Fond «Istoricheskaya pamyat’». https://historyfoundation.ru/about/. Accessed 19 October 2020. 12 Dyukov (2009a, 132–136). Dyukov, A. Iynskaya deportaciya 1941 goda https://scepsis.net/lib rary/id_1897.html (26.10.2020). 13 This is a tendentious statement regarding all the Baltic states—they could not provide an independent foreign policy and therefore they were a military bridgehead for the West in the war planning against the USSR in 1939 (Meltyukhov 2014).

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service carried out massacres in the territory of Belarus’ (Dyukov, 2009c, 19–20). The message of the compilers of the collection, Dyukov and Simindey, is clear—the socalled ‘punishers’ were not Soviet security officers from the NKVD on the territory of the Baltic countries, but the Baltic peoples themselves,14 allegedly systematically destroying the civilian population in Belarus. In the volume ‘On the Eve of the Holocaust: Front of Lithuanian Activists and Soviet Repressions in Lithuania 1940–1941’, the compiler and editor of the volume are trying to prove that the repressions of the Soviet authorities in Lithuania were supposedly a symmetrical response to the violent actions of ‘pro-German’ Lithuanian partisans (Dyukov, 2012, 7–25). Simindey took an active part in compiling the collections, and several years later, with the support of the same Historical Memory Foundation, published his collection of articles, in which he set out to ‘expose the nationalist historiography’ of the Baltic countries. Repression was a regularly used instrument of ‘pacification’ of the territories and states annexed by the Soviets. Latvia was no exception, but Simindey finds a ‘weighty’ justification for the actions of the Soviet punitive machine: in his opinion, Stalin wanted to ‘suppress the nationalist underground associated with the Abwehr’ (Simindey, 2015b, 85). In a similar way, the activities of the Latvian Legion, which Simindey considers as a collaborationist formation, are described without any hints of the participation of supporters of the national liberation movement and victims of Stalinist repressions (Simindey, 2015b, 153–181). On the occasion of the ‘80th anniversary of the annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union’, the Foundation launched a large-scale side project—‘Declassified. Baltic States 1939–1941’. On the official page of the project, the authors talk about two polar views on the events of 80 years ago. Some are inclined to consider them a ‘socialist revolution’, while others see it as ‘Soviet occupation’. However, the creators of the Internet project emphasize that both approaches were outlined at a time when the archives were mostly closed to researchers and the documentary background of these definitions had not yet been formed. The project ‘Declassified. The Baltic States 1939–1941’ just had to fill this gap. The curators of the project themselves adhere to only one definition, which is neutral in their opinion—incorporation. It is worth noting that the government of Latvia did not give access to its archives to the Foundation’s employees, and therefore the Latvian theme on the project website is represented exclusively by documents from Russian archival collections (Inkorporaciya Pribaltiki v sostav SSSR, 2019), and all due to the fact that in Latvia the Foundation’s activities were recognized as destructive, and Dyukov and Simindey have been persona non grata in this Baltic state since 2012. In response to such actions of Riga, Simindey accused the Latvians of deliberately concealing archival documents that did not meet the ‘nationalist vision’ of the events of 1939–1940 (Kommentarij direktora fonda, 2020).

14

For example, the so-called case of Nikonov, a Soviet partisan who killed civilians on the territory of Latvia—https://www.dw.com/ru/ byvxi-paptizan-kononov-ppoigpal-v-ctpacbypgedelo-ppotiv-latvii/a-5580909.

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However, the position of the Latvian side did not in any way affect the activity of the Historical Memory Foundation in the field of promoting pro-Kremlin interpretations of the history of World War II in the Baltic States. In the spring of 2020, through the mediation of the Foundation, a round table was held where Simindey presented to the public a list of almost a hundred former Latvian legionnaires. Moreover, it was implied that they should be held accountable for possible war crimes, despite the fact that no evidence of the involvement of those or other persons in the crimes was presented. Simindey claims that the majority in the legion were volunteers, although even the studies of Russian historians show that everything was exactly the opposite—that is why the legionaries were not convicted in accordance with the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Sputnik, 2020a, b). The Russian Association for Baltic Studies (RAPI, in Russian Poccicka accociaci ppibaltickix iccledovani), which began its work in 2015, is directly connected with the Dyukov and Simindey Foundation (Ob associacii, 2015). Despite the fact that the Historical Memory Foundation does not appear among the partners of the association on the official website, and Dyukov and Simindey themselves are not members of the association, nevertheless, the Foundation’s publications are published under the RAPI stamp, and Simindey’s books are actively advertised on the association’s Internet portal. The main plot in the historical narrative of these actors is the period of Baltic history 1939–1953. The main themes are the idea of the ‘voluntariness’ of entry (‘incorporation’) into the USSR, collaborationism and crimes of the Baltic SS Legions, as well as the deportation of the civilian population and the activities of the forest brothers.

6 Russian Media However, it is not at all academic historiography and not the ‘historical and educational’ activities of various foundations and associations that form the mass consciousness, but rather the media. Its influence is directly related to the number of the reading public and the general level of education of the population. Russian media present Russians with a kind of hypertrophied exposure of the entire array of propaganda that appeared thanks to the activities of the three previous actors (top officials of the state, academic historiography, and various politicized historical projects). Another question is whether the propaganda information campaign has been successful in this or that segment of the modern history of Russia. For one illustrative example, let us take one of the key subjects of our research— the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In this context, the data of opinion polls are very indicative. In 2010, the Levada Centre conducted a study which revealed that 46% of Russians had not heard anything about the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and only 5% were able to continue a further conversation on this topic. Of these five percent, 41% were unaware of the existence of secret protocols. The results of the study showed

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that a third of the respondents were sure that the tensions between Russia and the Baltic countries have nothing to do with the events of 1939–1940 (Interfax, 2010). Seven years later, the Levada Centre repeated its survey and, according to the survey, about a third of those who were surveyed had not heard about the secret protocols. Almost half of Russians approved the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and only 17% condemned such a decision. More than 40% of respondents simply did not know the details of this historical document (Regnum, 2017). The division of society and the lack of elementary historical knowledge is an excellent field for manipulating public consciousness. The Internet portal Sputnik, which is focused primarily on the Russophone community in the Baltic countries, plays a special role in the mission of relaying Kremlin propaganda. In particular, in connection with the next anniversary of the ‘Great Victory’, Sputnik correspondents were concerned about the situation with monuments to Soviet soldiers in the Baltic countries. Despite the fact that their condition, for the most part, turned out to be satisfactory, local pro-Russian political activists expressed the opinion that the Latvian authorities are simply waiting for the monuments to decay by themselves (Sputnik, 2020c). On the 80th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, an article was published by a Russian living in Estonia, Vladimir Vital, who asserts that the Soviets were coerced into signing the pact because they had no other choice (Vital , 2019). It is clear that the government-controlled media have opted for the tried-andtrue tactic of ‘offense is the best defence’ because blaming others is much easier than dealing with difficult historical issues. Another wave of indignation in the network was caused by the position of the Baltic countries, which demanded an explanation from the Russian side for the salutes in honour of the ‘liberation of the Baltic states’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, 2019). The answer from the pro-Kremlin oriented authors was not long in coming—they accused the Latvians of wanting to perpetuate the myth of the Soviet occupation and not wanting to celebrate the victory over fascism since they themselves were involved in the atrocities of the Nazi regime (Nosovich, 2019). Also, in 2020, a propaganda campaign was staged by the diplomatic missions of Russia in Estonia and Latvia, which regularly published Facebook posts justifying the occupation of the Baltic countries and condemning the actions of the Estonian and Latvian SS legions. The publications were mainly devoted to the ‘voluntary entry’ of the Baltic states into the USSR and showed the allegedly national character of the 1940 coups. The Russian media’s opposition to the Baltic concepts of occupation was taken over by V. Simindey. As a rule, it is his position that appears in most publications related to the Soviet occupation, legionnaires and Forest Brothers. He considers the accusations of Stalin’s repressions unfair, explaining this by the fact that cynical Latvians simply want to receive material compensation from the Russian Federation (Regeda, 2015). Simindey claims that the Latvian society welcomed Soviet troops in 1939, referring to the demands of the workers of the Moscow suburb of Riga, who called for ‘the arrival of the Russians and the change of the state system’ (Aleksandrova, 2017). The inconsistency of this statement is due to the fact that the

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Moscow suburb was inhabited mainly by Russians and remains so to this day. The Historical Memory Foundation took on the mission of documenting the ‘voluntary entry of Latvia into the USSR’ and the crimes of legionnaires as ‘Nazi accomplices’. This position provoked a response from the government of Latvia, which was now portrayed as striving to rehabilitate and heroize former Nazis. Russkiy Mir is another foundation involved in investigating processes of the falsification of history. Russkyi Mir organizes conferences and forums dedicated to this topic (Baltnews, 2018). For example, on 4–5 March 2018 the Russkiy Mir foundation organized ‘Together with Russia’ at the Moscow International forum. Its main goal was to discuss the most acute concerns of citizens of the Russian Federation permanently residing abroad, as well as representatives of Russophone diasporas (including those in Estonia), to develop proposals for their active involvement in the socio-political life of Russia and to coordinate their participation in the election of the President of the Russian Federation, the Foundation website reports. In an article on Baltnews.ee, Russia’s role in the fight against Nazism, Russia’s actions against the falsification of history and the importance of the ‘Immortal Regiment’ are discussed: Russia has always supported its compatriots, helping to strengthen their ties with their historical homeland. This is a fundamental issue of public policy. Today, it’s also appropriate to ask what our compatriots in their countries of permanent residence can do to support Russia: to advocate for the ideas of the Russian world, to fight for the preservation of historical memory, to support the advancement of the truth about Russia and the role of the peoples of our country in the fight against Nazism in all its manifestations, to counteract the falsification of history, to participate in the actions of the ‘Immortal Regiment’ etc. (Baltnews, 2018).

On several Russian TV channels and in newspapers, books and documentary films, the idea that fascism is flourishing in the Baltic states and that there are many Nazi sympathizers trying to restore Nazism is propagated (Baltnews, 2017). These proKremlin channels and persons accuse Estonia of changing historical narratives related to the Second World War and the Soviet Union and its victory over the Third Reich: Neo-Nazi marches, the war for monuments, the ban on broadcasting of Russian television and radio stations, the strengthening of the presence of NATO, and the advice to mine the border with Russia in general—all this happens in the immediate vicinity of our country. All this happens in the Baltic countries (Baranov & Afonina, 2016).

Russian media channels aimed at Russophone people in Estonia constantly publish articles accusing the Estonian population of collaborating with the Nazis to kill Jewish people.15 These kinds of opinions try to demonstrate that the Estonian civil population massively participated in the genocide of the Jewish people during the Second World War and that Estonia now holds these Nazi criminals up as local heroes (Tatarchuk, 2019). 15

There is no doubt that the Holocaust was a large-scale and terrible mass crime that took place throughout the whole territory controlled by the Third Reich. It was organised by Nazis everywhere, including in the territories of the occupied Baltic States. However, Russia’s accusation that all or most Estonians were involved in the mass killing of Jewish people in Estonia is false.

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The Forest Brothers16 have also been a target of propaganda. The Forest Brotherhood, prevalent in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, was an underground resistance against the Soviet occupation and Soviet authorities. They are portrayed by the Russian media as Nazis or Nazi sympathizers and are often represented as murderers, cowards, marauders, fascists, and collaborators with the Nazi regime (Tikhomirov, 2017). The Kremlin and pro-Soviet groups have been propagating this particular idea since the early twentieth century (Evans, 2007). It is notable to mention here the opinion of pro-Kremlin Russian political analyst M. Demurin who calls the Forest Brothers ‘bandits who operated in the Baltic region after the Second World War’. Demurin believes that it is necessary to systematize the Forest Brothers’ terrorist crimes (Baltnews, 2017).

7 Summary The main historical narratives and events from the histozy of Estonia and Latvia that are presented in the pro-Kremlin ideological agenda and discourse are closely tied with the Second World War, fascism, and the Soviet period. The Kremlin has used several tools, messages and narratives to influence target audiences in Russia, Estonia and also in Latvia (especially the Russophone audience) with its own interpretation of the history of Estonia, Latvia, the Soviet Union and the Second World War. The channels of influence which promote pro-Kremlin discourse are not only serious historical studies (articles, monographs, volumes), popular-scientific works, conferences and seminars but also TV, social media platforms, popular books, articles, documentaries and historical journals, etc. And, of course, there is even more material available to the narrow audience who have a strong interest in contemporary history. The main topics of the narratives are the Second World War and the Molotov– Ribbentrop pact (1939), the occupation of Estonia and Latvia by the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944, and also the post-war Soviet period that followed. The main actors who form the Russian vision of the history of Latvia and Estonia is undoubtedly the state officials—the president and his entourage. Major subjects such as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (1939), the annexation of Latvia and Estonia in 1940, and the activities of the Latvian Legion and Estonians in the Second World War from 1941 to 1944 are presented in a way characteristic of Soviet propaganda and historical science. The Soviet–German pact on non-aggression and the delimitation of spheres of influence is portrayed by pro-Kremlin discourse as having been forced into existence by the inaction of Western allies and the unwillingness of the USSR to enter into the war. Moreover, according to the official Kremlin narrative, Latvians 16

The Forest Brothers (metsavennad in Estonian) were active in 1940–1941 and 1955–1956. They were partisans and fighters who used guerrilla warfare against the Soviet occupation during and after the Second World War. The Soviet Army occupied Estonia in 1940–1941, and then after the German occupation (1941–1944) the Soviet Union occupied Estonia again in 1944.

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and Estonians should see the USSR (and its legal successor Russia) as the force that saved the Baltic States from being in the same position as states that were defeated in the war and collaborated with the Nazis. This position of the Russian political elite pursues the goal of disavowing the concept of the ‘occupation’ and painting the Baltic peoples as collaborators. Since about 2010 and the anniversaries of the Great Victory, academic science in Russia has developed several clichés that have migrated from the official narrative to scientific research, politicizing historical projects designed to support the only true theses of the state leader. This propaganda is then spread by the Kremlin-controlled media outlets and TV channels who actively saturate the media space with this approved content in an intelligible and simplified form for the layman.

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