The Russia-Ukraine War of 2022: Faces of Modern Conflict 1032377984, 9781032377988

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The Russia-​Ukraine War of 2022

This volume examines the war in Ukraine from a range of historical, military and feminist perspectives, exploring aspects such as the attitude of neighboring states, political leadership, local government, social mechanisms and the cultural and media policies of both Russia and Ukraine. The contributors explain how Ukraine shaped its identity following its separation from the USSR and how Russia built its military power and implemented its invasion plans. Considering the impact of the war not only in Ukraine, but also the Baltic states, chapters discuss the leadership role of President Zelensky, patriotic attitudes, the victimization of women and the impact on Poland as it helps and gives aid to huge numbers of refugees. Providing much needed context on the Russia-​Ukraine war, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, political science, gender studies, international and national security, and public politics. Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka is Professor of political science at Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Director of the Institute of International Relations and Public Policy, specializing in political leadership, social communication, political marketing and women’s political activity in Poland. She is a member of international political science organizations (International Political Science Association, Central European Political Science Association) and vice-​chairman of the Polish Political Science Association (PTNP). Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Policies, and Secretary in the Editorial Office of the Journal of Political Science of the Jan Kochanowski University. Her research interests focus on political communication in social media and information management in social media /​social media analytics.

Post-​Soviet Politics Series Editor –​Neil Robinson

The last decade has seen rapid and fundamental change in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Although there has been considerable academic comment on these changes over the years, detailed empirical and theoretical research on the transformation of the post-​Soviet space is only just beginning to appear as new paradigms are developed to explain change. Post-​Soviet Politics is a series focusing on the politics of change in the states of the former USSR. The series publishes original work that blends theoretical development with empirical research on post-​Soviet politics. The series includes work that progresses comparative analysis of post-​Soviet politics, as well as case study research on political change in individual post-​Soviet states. The series features original research monographs, thematically strong edited collections and specialized texts. Uniquely, this series brings together the complete spectrum of work on post-​Soviet politics, providing a voice for academics world wide. For more information about this series, please visit: https://​www.routle​dge. com/​Post-​Sov​iet-​Polit​ics/​book-​ser​ies/​ASH​SER1​198 Crises in the Post-​Soviet Space From the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the conflict in Ukraine Edited by Tina Olteanu, Felix Jaitner and Tobias Spöri Militant Right-​Wing Extremism in Putin’s Russia Legacies, Forms and Threats Jan Holzer, Martin Larys and Miroslav Mareš Russia and EU in the New World Disorder Revisiting Sovereignty and Balance of Power in the study of Russian Foreign Policy Aziz Elmuradov The Russia-​Ukraine War of 2022 Faces of Modern Conflict Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad

The Russia-​Ukraine War of 2022 Faces of Modern Conflict Edited by Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The authors of ‘Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower’ gratefully acknowledge the support of the PRA under the Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at Jagiellonian University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: 1 Kasińska-​Metryka, Agnieszka, 1971–​edi | 1 Pałka-​Suchojad, Karolina, edi Title: The Russia-​Ukraine war of 2022: faces of modern conflict /​ edited by Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka, professor, Jan Kochanowski University, Poland, and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad, PhD, Jan Kochanowski University, Poland Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2023. | Series: Post-​Soviet politics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022048720 (print) | LCCN 202204 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032377988 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032378008 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003341994 ​ ​ (ebook) ​ Subjects: MESH: 0 Ukraine–​F​ oreign relations–​ ​ ​ 21st​ cent Classification: LCC DK508.852 .R87​ 2023 (print)​ | ​ ​ LCC DK508.852 (ebook) | DDC 947.7086– ​ ​ dc23/ ​ eng/ ​ 20221018 LC record available ​ ​ ​ at https:// ​ lccn.loc.gov/2022048720 LC ebook record ​ ​ ​available ​ at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022048721 ISBN: 978-1-032​ 37798-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-37800-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34199-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994 Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Introduction

vii viii ix 1

AG N I E S Z K A KA SIŃ SK A -​M ETRY K A A N D K A ROLINA PAŁ KA- ​S UCHOJAD

1 Russia –​Ukraine: Difficult Neighbourly Relations

6

MARYANA P RO KO P

2 Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower

22

AN NA JAC H , E LŻBI ETA K UŻELEWSK A A N D AGNIE S ZKA LE GUCKA

3 The Baltic States in the Face of Russian Aggression in Ukraine

40

AL E K S AN D RA K U C ZYŃ SK A -​Z O N I K A N D K A M ILA S IE RZ PUT OWS KA

4 A Celebrity, a Hero, a Statesman … All Images of the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky

59

MARZ E NA C I C H O SZ A N D JOA N NA KO ZI ER SKA

5 New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians in Polish Society

79

AG N I E S Z K A KA SIŃ SK A -​M ETRY K A A N D K A ROLINA PAŁ KA- ​S UCHOJAD

6 The Conflict in Ukraine from the Feminist Perspective

94

AG ATA WŁOD KOWSK A

7 Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine RE NATA P OD GÓ R ZAŃ SK A , SA BI NA G R A BOWS KA, MAŁG ORZ ATA PO D O LA K A N D A N NA PIĘTA -​S ZAWARA

113

vi Contents

8 Local Governments in Poland in the Face of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis

133

MAŁG ORZ ATA MA D EJ, MA ŁG O R ZATA MYŚ LIWIE C AND K AROL I NA TY BU C H OWSK A -​H A RTLIŃ SK A

Conclusions

150

AG N I E SZ K A K A SIŃ SK A -​M ETRY K A A N D K AROL I NA PA ŁK A -​S U C H O JA D

Index

153

Figures

Charts 5.1 Changes in sympathy and dislike towards Ukrainians over the years 1993–​2022 8.1 Revenue of the Polish state budget in 2022

83 146

Map 8.1 The number of refugee students from Ukraine by voivodeship (as of May 2, 2022)

144

Tables

1 .1 Ukraine’s foreign policy doctrine and relations with Russia 4.1 Types of politicians’ images and their characteristics 6.1 Global Gender Gap Index 2021 score 7.1 Directions of migration and the number of refugees 8.1 Increase in population in cities of the Union of Polish Metropolises 8.2 Number of PESEL numbers issued to Ukrainian refugees in selected cities 8.3 The number of refugee students from Ukraine by type of school (as of May 2, 2022) 8.4 Share of local government units in Poland in the revenues of the Polish state budget

11 65 103 116 137 141 143 146

Contributors

Marzena Cichosz, PhD with habilitation, is Political Scientist, Researcher and Lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland. She conducts research in the field of political market analysis and political and social marketing as well as on the transformation of political systems in Central and Eastern European countries. Sabina Grabowska, PhD with habilitation, is a lawyer and Political Scientist at the University of Rzeszów, Poland. She is member of the Polish Society of Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law Journals Network (CLJN), editor-in-chief of the journal Przegląd Prawa Konstytucji and thematic editor of the quarterly Polityka i Społeczeństwo and The Polish Political Science Yearbook. She analyses contemporary constitutional and political systems, as well as forms of direct democracy and electoral systems in European countries. Anna Jach, PhD with habilitation, is a historian. She is Assistant Professor at the Department of Eurasian Studies at the Institute of Russia and Eastern Europe, Faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. She specializes in the history of the 20th and 21st centuries, with particular emphasis on the history of the USSR and Russia, Polish– Russian relations, systemic transformation and the functioning of the nongovernmental non-commercial sector and civil society in Russia. Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka is Professor of political science and Director of the Institute of International Relations and Public Policy, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland, specializing in political leadership, social communication, political marketing and women political activity in Poland. She is a member of international political science organizations (International Political Science Association and Central European Political Science Association) and vice-chairman of Polish Political Science Association (PTNP).

x  List of contributors Joanna Kozierska, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political and Administrative Systems, Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland. In her research work she focuses mainly on the political systems of Central and Eastern Europe, with particular emphasis on the theory and practice of creation and functioning of coalition cabinets. Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, PhD, is Head of the Department of the Baltics at the Institute of Central Europe, Poland. She is also Research Assistant at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. She holds PhDs from the Faculty of Political Science at the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (2015) and the Faculty of Sociology and History at the University of Rzeszów (2013). She is Political Scientist and Archaeologist. She is a laureate of the “Mobility Plus” program. Over the period 2016−2017 she conducted research at Vilnius University, Lithuania, regarding Russian minorities in the Baltic states. Her recent research focuses on politics and security in EastCentral Europe and the post-Soviet space, the Baltic states, Russian diaspora and Soviet heritage. Elżbieta Kużelewska, PhD with habilitation, is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bialystok, Poland, where since October 2019 she holds a position of Vice-Dean for Science. She is Chair of the Centre for Direct Democracy Studies (CDDS) at the Faculty of Law, University of Białystok. Her research fields include constitutional law, direct democracy, European integration and contemporary political systems. She is Co-Editorin-Chief of European Integration and Democracy Series, published by Intersentia. Agnieszka Legucka, PhD with habilitation, is a senior research fellow of the ‘Russia in Eastern Europe Program’ at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Poland. She is an associate professor of security studies at the Faculty of Business and International Relations in the Academy of Finance and Business Vistula, Warsaw. She is also a deputy editor-in-chief of the journal Sprawy Międzynarodowe. Her areas of expertise include Russian foreign and internal policy, security issues and conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, EU–Russia and NATO–Russia relations, Russian disinformation, and hybrid threats. Małgorzata Madej, PhD, is Political Scientist and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political and Social Activity Research at the Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland. The main areas of her scientific interest are citizen participation in elections and decision-making processes, especially at the local level. Her research also includes the issues of metropolitan policies and the activities of local and sublocal self-government in Polish cities. She is also a deputy editor-in-chief of the Polish Political Science Review.

List of contributors  xi Małgorzata Myśliwiec, PhD with habilitation, is Political Scientist, Researcher and Lecturer at the University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland. Her main areas of research interest include the political systems of the European Union and the Maghreb countries (especially the political systems of Spain and Morocco), the processes of decentralization and regionalization in Europe, the theory of nations and nationalism, and study of regional and ethno-regional parties in Europe and public administration in European countries. She is author and co-author of several books and articles on this issue. Karolina Pałka-Suchojad, PhD, is Political Scientist and Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Policies, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. She is also Secretary in the editorial office of the Journal of Political Science of the Jan Kochanowski University. Her research interests focus on political communication in social media and information management in social media, and social media analytics. She is a member of the Polish Society of Political Sciences. Anna Pięta-Szwara, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Rzeszów, Poland. She is member of the scientific board of the journal Current and Future Perspectives on Teaching and Learning, published by ‘1 Decembrie 1918’ University (Alba Iulia, Romania). Member of the Scientific Council of the Information Society Laboratory of the University of Rzeszów. Her research interests include political thought, political theory, methodology of science and public policies. Renata Podgórzańska, PhD with habilitation, is Political Scientist and works at the Institute of Political and Security Sciences, University of Szczecin, Poland. She analyses contemporary international relations, with particular emphasis on Poland’s foreign policy, Poland’s security policy, international conflicts and the process of stabilizing and strengthening security in the Balkans. The subjects of her interest are also migration processes in the modern world, the migration crisis in Europe and the securitization of the migration problem in Poland. Małgorzata Podolak, PhD with habilitation, Faculty of Political Science, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland. She is member of the editorial team of the American Journal of English and Cultural Studies and the Journal of Asian Research. From 2020, she is the scientific editor of the series Constitutional Systems of the World’s States, published by the Sejm Publishing House; secretary of the journal Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio M – Balcaniensis et Carpathiensis. Her research interests include ecological policy, political systems, political system of the Republic of Poland, forms of direct democracy. She has participated in numerous domestic and foreign scientific conferences in Latvia, Romania, Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russian Federation.

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xii  List of contributors Maryana Prokop, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Policies, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. Her scientific interests focus on research on the political systems of Eastern European countries, hybrid regimes and international relations in the postSoviet area. Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Department of Security Policy, Faculty of Political Sciences and Administration, Kazimierz Wielki University (UKW), Poland; member of Editorial Board JFTC NATO magazine – Transformation Through Training; thematic editor of Świat Idei i Polityka; and has specialization in international relations. Her research interests include international relations, the Republic of Estonia, transatlantic security, NATO and soft power. Karolina Tybuchowska-Hartlińska, PhD, is an employee of the Institute of Political Sciences, University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland. She focuses her research on issues related to local government, and in particular, issues related to local elections, political participation, and social and political innovation. She participated in the research on the political preferences of Poles in 2010−2018 in the project ‘Political Preferences: Attitudes – Identifications – Behaviors’. Agata Włodkowska, PhD with habilitation, is Political Scientist and Director of the International Relations educational program at the Vistula Academy of Finance and Business, Vistula University, Warsaw, Poland. She conducts research in the field of international relations in the post-Soviet area and Polish foreign policy and on the theory of international relations as well as gender issues in international relations. She is also a coordinator of the Women in the Polish Political Science project.

Introduction Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad

War is a phenomenon that reorganizes the existence of states, affects the world economy, destabilizes stock exchanges, but most of all violates the security of individuals. The Russian aggression against Ukraine, which formally began on February 24, was the product of a chain of earlier events that the international community had taken note of, but it probably did not foresee such a tragic ending. There can be academic disputes about the extent to which the European Union has been responsible for the escalation of Russian claims against Ukraine (since the occupation of Crimea), but it seems more rational to analyze the event of military aggression, which the Russian authorities assumed to be ‘immediate’ and that has continued for several months now. Analyzing the events taking place ‘here and now’ is a difficult and risky phenomenon. Possible event scenarios can never be fully predicted, even if modern diagnostic tools are used. On the other hand, however, we are convinced that only ‘accompanying’ war events allows us to capture their nuanced specificity, which loses its clarity with the passage of time. There are no publications on the publishing market that directly refer to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, which is obvious due to the date of the beginning of the conflict. However, there are several items that analyze the identity of Ukraine as a state, its dependence on Russia and the conditions for shaping its identity. These include: Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, Yale University Press, 2015 and Anders Åslund, Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015. Interest in Ukraine was undoubtedly sparked by the events of 2014, that is by the seizure of Crimea by Russia. In this context, it is worth recalling the book: Richard Matheny, US Foreign Policy and Ukraine: Russian Aggression, Rebellion, and War, Paperback, Booklocker. com, 2021. The third group of existing publications are books on interstate relations, clearly emphasizing Russia’s superpower influence, i.e., Agnieszka Pikulicka-​Wilczewska, Richard Sakwa, Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, E-​International Relations, 2016; Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina, Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Other Europes, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 and Sergei Medvedev, Return of the Russian Leviathan, Polity Press, 2019. Also worth noting is the DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-1

2  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad book by Andrey Makarychev, Vocabularies of International Relations After the Crisis in Ukraine, Taylor & Francis, 2016, which can be a slogan introduction to understanding the events currently taking place. This monograph has been written almost from the first days of the war. The entire team of authors was united by the conviction that the dramaturgy of the phenomenon of war should be grasped and examined, and that it should be presented to readers from a specific –​conditioned by geography and history –​Polish perspective. Direct neighborhood with a country affected by a war conflict generates a lot of systemic changes –​from legislative and economic to humanitarian. It was Poland where the largest number of refugees from Ukraine was brought, it was here that the incredible mobilization of the society took place, which, anticipating formal solutions, organized help on its own and developed good practices of a universal nature. On the other hand, there were also some negative phenomena that cannot be kept silent in the name of political correctness –​reactivation of prejudices or media disinformation. The book is also distinctive by the selection of the authors’ team entirely made up of women. Eighteen researchers –​alone or in teams –​analyzed various areas affected by the war or its effects. Thus, the stereotype that functions in some circles that war is a ‘man’s thing’ and therefore the experts in this field are primarily men has been broken. Paradoxically, this belief is more common in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., in conflict areas, than in Western European democracies. The idea for the book appeared during the First Congress of Polish Women Political Scientists in 2022, representing all the largest universities in Poland. The researchers who make up the team of authors represent various sub-​ disciplines of social sciences, but all of them are experts in the field of international security, international relations, political science, and media studies. The result was a work with a broader cultural and historical perspective. It can be a starting element in comparative analyses for other publishing items, e.g., cultural studies. The content of the monograph entitled The Russia-​Ukraine War of 2022. Faces of Modern Conflict has been divided into eight chapters. Of course, this number does not exhaust all the presentations of the war conflagration, but it highlights its key factors, such as the difficult neighborhood of Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s military and superpower efforts, the situation of the Baltic states, and the phenomenon of the leadership of V. Zelensky. The authors indicate the feminist perspective of the war and describe the aid mechanisms applied in Poland to refugees. The monograph opens with a Chapter by Maryana Prokop (‘Russia –​ Ukraine: Difficult Neighbourly Relations’). The author analyzes the relations between the former Soviet republics. She identifies the factors of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation which have been constructing Russian imperialism for decades. In turn, the Ukrainian perspective of the country’s development, after 2004, clearly took the European course, striving to free itself from the Russian sphere of influence. M. Prokop bases her analysis on

Introduction  3 the main vectors, which include foreign policy, security policy and ideological influences on their shape. The author used numerous sources (including Ukrainian and Russian literature), which allows for an in-​depth exploration of Russia-​Ukraine relations. The second Chapter (‘Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower’) by Anna Jach, Elżbieta Kużelewska and Agnieszka Legucka is a logical consequence of the previous one. The authors focus their attention on the causes and description of the militarization of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (RF) based on the national security strategy and the Russian military doctrine. They describe military instruments in the RF’s foreign policy and the militarization of socio-​political life. They pay special attention to the concept of Putinism, in which they pinpoint the ideological and political conditions of Russian imperialism. In their analysis, the researchers ask questions about whether Russia has achieved its superpower goals with military instruments. What military aspects has it used in domestic and foreign policy? The chapter in its form identifies the main factors of the military power of the Russian Federation. In the third Chapter (‘The Baltic States in the Face of Russian Aggression in Ukraine’) Aleksandra Kuczyńska-​ Zonik and Kamila Sierzputowska analyze the security sphere of the Baltic states. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine resulted in a rapid evolution of the security concept of the Baltic states. The authors construct their analysis on the basis of a geopolitical security triangle: the Baltic states –​Russia –​Ukraine. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia optimize their security by combining elements of state security strategies with international security factors (e.g., within the NATO structure). From the point of view of the security of the Baltic states, it is crucial to identify the instruments enabling the quick adaptation of the Balts to the turbulent conditions of international security. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine has transformed not only in the area of security, but also in terms of power, and especially political leadership. The last aspect is referred to in Chapter 4 (‘A Celebrity, a Hero, a Statesman … All Images of the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky’). Marzena Cichosz and Joanna Kozierska undertook an analysis of the process of transforming the image of the president of Ukraine. They distinguish three turning points that illustrate this transformation. The authors build the image model of V. Zelensky on the basis of the triad of images: celebrity –​hero –​statesman. The leadership of V. Zelenskiy amazed the world and allowed us to look at Ukraine and Ukrainians from a completely different perspective, in a way that often contradicts the well-​established stereotypes about this nation. These issues are discussed in Chapter 5 (‘New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians in Polish Society’). Agnieszka Kasińska Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad analyze the issue of stereotypes of Ukrainians in Poland and confront two of its dimensions. The first one, corresponding to historical stereotypes, grounded in the history of both nations (World War II, Volyn), which were characterized by a negative sentiment. The second one, which started to

4  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad become clearer since the ‘Orange Revolution,’ makes it possible to look at the Ukrainian nation through the prism of European values. The authors argue that some stereotypes were in a latent phase to come to life when the appropriate background emerged. Some of them concern the role of women both in society and in the war narrative. In the sixth Chapter (‘The Conflict in Ukraine from the Feminist Perspective’), Agata Włodkowska looks at the war in Ukraine from the perspective of women. Analyses of conflicts are most often conducted within the realistic paradigm, less often the constructivist and post-​colonial paradigm. In such circumstances, the feminist perspective is a kind of novum. The chapter tries to answer questions about the gendered sources of the conflict, the place and role of women and their bodies in the Russian-​Ukrainian war. Despite the stereotypes that in the past affected Polish-​Ukrainian relations many times, during the war Poles showed extraordinary solidarity towards the inhabitants of the attacked country. Two levels of the support shown can be distinguished, the first of which covers grass-​roots initiatives of Poles, while the second is the nature of systemic solutions adopted by the Polish state. The analysis of these system solutions at the national level is the subject of Chapter 7 (‘Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine’), and at the local level of Chapter 8 (‘Local Governments in Poland in the Face of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis’). The authors of Chapter 7, Renata Podgórzańska, Sabina Grabowska, Małgorzata Podolak and Anna Pięta-​Szwara, point to the need for legal and administrative solutions ensuring the state’s fluidity in accepting refugees, but also those that will ensure quick integration with the host society. The unprecedented influx of war refugees has changed the patterns and nature of migration. In turn, in Chapter 8, Małgorzata Madej, Małgorzata Myśliwiec and Karolina Tybuchowska-​Hartlińska diagnose the potential of Polish local governments in responding to the needs of the arriving refugees. The procedures for admitting and registering refugees, providing them with accommodation, and including Ukrainian students in the Polish education system, are just a few of the aspects discussed in this chapter. In conclusion, the publication is an attempt to explain selected aspects of the war in Ukraine, with particular emphasis on the circumstances that gave rise to the conflict and the support mechanisms mitigating its effects among war refugees. The monograph will be useful for first and second cycle students of social sciences and for doctoral students. The monograph can be a kind of research aid in which interested students and researchers will find useful information on recent political history or inspiration for further research on the issues discussed in it. Although the work was written by Polish researchers, the nature of the considerations is universal and the presented good practices may also be applied in the event of conflicts in other parts of the world.

Introduction  5

References Åslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Makarychev, A. (2016). Vocabularies of International Relations After the Crisis in Ukraine. Florence: Taylor & Francis. Matheny, R. (2021). Us Foreign Policy and Ukraine: Russian Aggression, Rebellion, and War Paperback. Booklocker.com. Medvedev, S. (2019). Return of the Russian Leviathan. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Pikulicka-​Wilczewska, A., & Sakwa, R. (Eds.) (2016). Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives. Bristol: E-​International Relations. White, S., & Feklyunina, V. (2014). Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Other Europes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilson, A. (2015). The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

1 Russia –​ Ukraine Difficult Neighbourly Relations Maryana Prokop

Introduction After gaining independence in 1991, the Ukrainian state faced the challenge of deciding on its own future state policy, both in its internal and external dimensions. The need to implement these postulates, resulting from Ukraine’s geopolitical location, contributed to the formation of Ukraine’s foreign policy and national security concepts. Self-​determination of its own fate imposes on the state the obligation of effective implementation of national security policy. The security issue for Ukraine has become extremely important in recent months, given the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, which led to full-​scale military action. The preceding events of 2013/​14, the annexation of Crimea, and the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine are undoubted confirmation of the tense relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Józef Kukułka (1982, p. 43), writing about the relationship between foreign policy and security, pointed out that there is a kind of consensus in foreign policy theory with the recognition of security as the most important existential goal of foreign policy, which realises the natural need of the state. Maryana Prokop (2014, pp. 37–​38), analysing the security concept of Ukraine, states that the evolution of the concept of national security policy largely reflects the evolution of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Thus, as the direction of foreign policy has changed, so has the dimension of security policy (Закон України, 1993; Закон України, 2010). Taking into account Ukrainian-​Russian relations,1 the issue of guaranteeing state security is undoubtedly the dominant trend in Ukrainian foreign policy. It is also worth adding that an important factor implicating the shape of bilateral relations between the states is, on the one hand, the specificity of Ukrainian foreign policy, or rather its volatility, and on the other, Russia’s imperial approach to the territory of the former USSR and its desire to maintain the status quo in the region. Trying to describe Ukrainian-​Russian relations, we can draw from many ways of framing bilateral relations through the notion of war, military threat, hybrid war, armed conflict, attempts at shaping foreign policy through the pressure politics of energy policy, and in earlier stages even through the category of strategic partnership. In this case, DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-2

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  7 we can see a certain gradation of tools used by Russia in order to achieve its goals; when previous softer instruments failed, others of a more expansive nature were used. The aim of this paper is to analyse Ukrainian-​Russian relations as an example of a difficult neighbourhood in the context of the background for Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. The aim of the paper is not to chronologically recount the events characterising bilateral relations between the states. Instead, the author’s task was to highlight the difficult aspects in interstate relations that were a matter of dispute and aroused the greatest tension.

The specifics of Ukrainian foreign policy When analysing Ukrainian-​Russian relations, it is important to present the specifics of Ukrainian foreign policy, as this largely implies the shape of the Ukrainian state’s relations with other actors. Furthermore, Ukraine’s opening up to Euro-​Atlantic cooperation conflicted with the Russian perception of Ukraine’s future and was perceived by Russia as a change in the status quo in the region. It should be noted that the following factors influence the formation of Ukraine’s national security policy: political instability and conflicts in neighbouring countries; territorial claims to Ukraine, resulting from the unfinished process of border demarcation; historical circumstances; lack of acceptance of Ukraine’s internal and external policies, consisting of interference in state policy or attempts to create it by means of economic pressure (Ліпкан 2002, pp 19–​23). The case of the border with Belarus and the related disputes over its ratification by the Belarusian side may serve as an example of the misunderstanding over the demarcation of the border. It should be noted that already in the Treaty on Friendship, Good-​Neighbourliness and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus of 17 July 1995, the Belarusian and Ukrainian sides recognised the inviolability of the existing state borders between them and declared that they do not have any claims to the state territory of the other party and will not make them in the future (Договір, 1995). Two years later, an Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus on the state border was signed (Договір, 1997), which was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 18 July 1997, while the Belarusian side did so only on 2 April 2010. The failure of the Belarusian side to ratify the agreement on the state border made it impossible to demarcate the Belarusian-​Ukrainian border. The unregulated agreement on the status of the border promotes illegal emigration and smuggling of goods (Szeptycki, 2007, pp 60–​75; Prokop & Brin, 2019, pp. 120–​122). Analysing the concepts of foreign and security policy of Ukraine, taking into account the factor of the international environment, Yeropolk Tymkiv (2007, pp. 182–​185) distinguishes three concepts which at different stages of the functioning of the state were implemented: neutrality (non-​bloc status); the concept of multi-​vector policy and the directional concept, which can

8  M. Prokop be implemented in two dimensions: Euro-​Atlantic, through integration with European and Euro-​Atlantic institutions, and Eurasian, through cooperation with Russia. The first of these was referred to as the ‘Dmytro Pavlyuchko doctrine’, which was the first post-​independence attempt by Ukraine to declare both neutral (non-​bloc) and non-​nuclear status; according to this doctrine, Ukraine was not to pursue any of the international lines of integration (Prokop, 2014, p. 31). Ukraine’s war doctrine (Постанoва, 1993) declared the state’s relinquishment of its possession of the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal and its adoption of non-​nuclear status. After the collapse of the USSR, the state inherited around 1,800 strategic nuclear warheads and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, making it the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world after the US and Russia. Ukraine, declaring its agreement to get rid of nuclear weapons and accepting permanent non-​nuclear state status, received security guarantees from the US, Russia, and the UK in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. On 14 January 1994, a tripartite declaration was signed by the presidents of the USA, Russia, and Ukraine, concerning the destruction of all nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the state. The memorandum stipulated that the powers would respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine’s existing borders and would not use the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. In addition, assistance was also guaranteed, should Ukraine become the victim of an attack or act of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used (Меморандум, 1994; Махно 2013, pp. 199–​203). It is worth mentioning that Russia offered Ukraine the opportunity to join the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the so-​called Tashkent Treaty, which was rejected by Ukraine precisely by arguing its neutral status. Despite the postulates of an out-​ of-​ block state, the North Atlantic Alliance was an important priority in Ukraine’s security policy. However, given Russia’s attitude and the situation in which Ukraine found itself after gaining independence in 1991, the Ukrainian state did not undertake any declarations on shaping security with Western states and institutions. On the other hand, Ukraine also rejected the possibility of building a security system within the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the first years after independence, Ukraine balanced on the NATO-​Central Europe-​Russia axis in the context of seeking foreign policy priorities (Tymanowski, 2009, pp. 301–​302; Prokop, 2014, pp. 30–​35). Thus, in the existing conditions in the international arena and the situation of Ukraine with a short period of independence, a given foreign and security policy direction might have seemed like the right option. From the perspective of 2022 and Russian aggression against Ukraine, we can argue whether it was right to get rid of nuclear weapons and trust declarations including Russia’s guarantee of Ukraine’s security. The adoption of the National Security Concept of Ukraine in 1997 (Постанова, 1997) marked the official end of the state’s neutrality policy, as the provisions on non-​blockade status were replaced by provisions on

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  9 the implementation of a security policy through participation in global and regional security systems. According to Stanislav Bieleń (1998, p. 72), the concept of neutrality proved to be too idealistic and impossible to implement in the long run. The clashing interests of Russia and European states became the basis for the formation of Ukraine’s multi-​vector policy. Ukraine embarked on a policy of balancing between the structures of the East and the West; from the Ukrainian perspective, this is the search for the right path and strategic partners, referred to by researchers as the concept of multi-​vectorality. In Ukrainian practice, this has meant conducting a foreign policy based on the simultaneous implementation of the eastern vector by forming a strategic partnership with Russia and the western vector, which involves establishing cooperation with Euro-​Atlantic structures. The genesis of this multi-​vector policy can be traced back to the presidency of Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk (1991–​ 1994). This period was characterised by a search for foreign policy directions, although given the implementation of the concept of neutrality, multi-​vectorality did not have a clear dimension, and its heyday came only during the first presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994–​1999). During this period, the lack of a clear and defined foreign policy direction was apparent; at this stage Ukraine focused on cooperation with Russia, but the authorities sought to maintain relations with Western structures (Shmelova, 2008, pp. 33–​48; Prokop, 2011, p. 269). It is worth noting that during Kuchma’s second presidency (1999–​ 2004), the policy of multilateralism began to change towards the choice of a pro-​Russian foreign policy dimension. A completely different foreign policy dimension could be observed after the ‘Orange Revolution’, when the third round of elections resulted in the victory of the pro-​European candidate Viktor Yushchenko (2005–​2010). Despite his assurances and guarantees that Ukraine had made a pro-​European foreign policy orientation, this was not realised in practice as the pro-​Russian dimension and cooperation continued to be an important pillar of the policy (Olszański, 2003, pp. 125–​127). In 2010, the presidential election was won by Viktor Yanukovych, the same pro-​Russian candidate whose victory in the second round of the presidential election triggered the so-​called ‘Orange Revolution’ as a manifesto against the rigged election results. During his presidency (2010–​2014), we can speak of the implementation of one of the directional concepts, directed towards cooperation with Russia. The Eurasian (directional) concept was generally based on integration with Russia (Prokop, 2020, pp. 102–​103; Tymkiv, 2007, pp. 188–​189). That was in essence due to the perception of Russia as the main heir of the Soviet Union and its desire to preserve the status quo in the region by counterbalancing the influence of European structures. The realisation of the given concept for Russia took place through the functioning of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, seen as a tool for strengthening its military-​political dominance over the Tashkent Pact States, as well as Russia’s efforts to transform it into a defence alliance, along the lines of the one already existing between it and Belarus (Tymkiv, 2007, pp. 188–​189; Tymkiv, 2009, p. 114).

10  M. Prokop Despite favourable conditions for the consolidation of the concept in the foreign policy of Ukraine led by the pro-​Russian President V. Yanukovych, this dimension was not introduced. Along with the change in the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy comes a shift in Russian policy towards Ukraine, from declaring the need to implement a strategic partnership between the states, to annexing Crimea and waging a hybrid war in the east of the country, all the way to overt military aggression in February 2022. Yanukovych’s resignation from signing an association agreement with the EU in 2013 in favour of tightening cooperation with the Russian Federation became the premise for mass protests by Ukrainian citizens on Independence Square in Kiev, referred to in the public space as the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ or ‘Euromaidan’. Ukraine moved away from a directional doctrine aimed at cooperation with Russia. The events led to the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime and new presidential elections, in which, as a precedent, Petro Poroshenko won the victory already in the first round (Tymkiv, 2007, pp. 188–​ 189; Tomala & Prokop, 2021, pp. 45–​50). The latest doctrine distinguished within the framework of the directional concept is integration with European and Euro-​Atlantic institutions. The Western dimension in Ukrainian foreign policy began to crystallise after the events of the ‘Orange Revolution’. However, the political crisis of the ‘orange option’ led to a split in the coalition and the victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections of the ‘Party of Regions’ led by V. Yanukovych, who was appointed Prime Minister (Prokop, 2020, pp. 129–​135). Despite the assurances of the then president, V. Yushchenko, during this period Ukraine did not manage to change direction from a multi-​ vector policy to a pro-​ European one. Considering also the economic factor, in the context of Ukraine’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas, this forced the country to maintain its strategic partnership with Russia. The so-​called ‘gas crises’ in 2006 and 2009 were a consequence of the tensions between the two states. The implementation of the pro-​European doctrine became possible after the ‘Revolution of Dignity’, although it also became a premise for Russia to change the instruments used against Ukraine in order to persuade it to tighten its cooperation. The orientation of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards cooperation with Euro-​Atlantic structures is seen by Russia as a threat to its stability and a loss of influence in the region. In addition to economic instruments, the Russian approach has begun to use military instruments. Initially, the annexation of Crimea took place, followed by the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine through Russian support and supply of weapons to separatist groups behind the creation of the DNR (Donetsk People’s Republic) and LNR (Lugansk People’s Republic) (Hajdak & Stępniewski, 2015, pp. 136–​142; Darczewska, 2014, pp. 17–​28; Головко, et al., 2015, pp. 5–​18). The events of late 2013 and early 2014 turned into the biggest political crisis in the history of independent Ukraine (leaving aside the Russian aggression of 2022). The annexation of Crimea by Russia was important for spreading the assumptions of the ‘Russky Mir’ concept due to the strategic importance of the Black Sea Fleet

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  11 base stationed in Sevastopol, which allowed the Russian Federation to play a key role in the Black Sea Basin. The concept of the ‘Russian Mir [World]’ was heavily influenced by the geopolitical theory of Aleksandr Dugin, who preached the need for Russia to pursue an isolationist policy towards the West and to create an alliance of post-​Soviet states to ensure its security and strong position in Eurasia. Dugin emphasised Russia’s civilisation identity and was an opponent of seeking to identify with the West and adopt its models, as had been the case during the time of Tsar Peter I (Delong, 2020, pp. 53–​62; Bäcker, 2007, pp. 195–​197). Table 1.1 presents how the doctrine applied by Ukraine has affected the shape of its relations with Russia. For obvious reasons, the directional doctrine applied by V. Yanukovych, which envisaged closer cooperation with Russia, was the most favourable in this situation. A point of inflammation in Ukrainian-​Russian relations is the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. According to the 2001 census, Russian is the second most widely spoken language in Ukraine after Ukrainian, spoken by more than 14 million Ukrainians,2 who live mainly in the eastern and central regions of the country. The 1996 Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that the state language in Ukraine is Ukrainian. The state ensures comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life. It guarantees the free development, use and protection of the Russian language and other languages of national minorities in Ukraine (Конституція України, 1996). In 2012, during Yanukovych’s regime, a law was introduced that allowed for bilingualism in individual regions. After his government was overthrown, the law was repealed by the Ukrainian Parliament, although the decision

Table 1.1 Ukraine’s foreign policy doctrine and relations with Russia Doctrine

Years

Presidency

Relations with Russia

1 Neutrality

1993–​1997

L. Kravchuk L. Kuchma

2 Multilateralism

1998–​2004, 2005–​2010

L. Kuchma W. Yushchenko

3 Directional –​Russia

2010–​2013

W. Yanukovych

4 Directional –​ European structures

2014–​2022

P. Poroshenko W. Zelenskyy

Formation of relations with Russia Russian interference in 2004 presidential election results, gas crisis Deepening of relations with Russia Annexation of Crimea, war on Donbass, military aggression 2022

Source: Own elaboration.

12  M. Prokop of the Verkhovna Rada only gained legal force in 2018, based on a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Рішення Конституційного Суду України, 2018). In 2019, a law on guaranteeing the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language was introduced. The provisions of the bill impose an obligation to use the Ukrainian language in public space (in offices, universities, schools, transport, catering establishments, cultural sphere and mass information resources) but does not impose an obligation in private contacts and religious worship. Thus, the aim of the language law was to limit the Russian language in public space and to ensure the development of the Ukrainian language, for which the Commission on the Status of the State Language was established (Закон Україн, 2019). From the perspective of Russian politics, measures to strengthen the status of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian state were perceived negatively. Russia reserved the right to respect the views and rights of the Russian-​speaking population living in Ukraine. There were messages that the Ukrainian side was restricting the rights of this population, which also became an argument for launching military aggression in February 2022, since, according to the Russian side, Ukraine had been attacking the Russian-​ speaking population living in Donbas for eight years. The National Security Strategy (Указ Президента України, 2007), which replaced the National Security Concepts (Постанова, 1997), should be considered the main document regulating the national security of the Ukrainian state (Указ Президента України, 2012). On 14 September 2020, V. Zelensky approved a new draft of the Ukrainian National Security Strategy (Указ Президента України, 2020), which followed a law published in May 2015 during Petro Poroshenko’s presidency (Указ Президента України, 2015). According to the Strategy, Russia is the greatest threat to Ukraine’s security. It enumerates Russian actions from the use of military force, through subversion, to information warfare and the threat to the cybersecurity of the state. The document stresses that a constant threat in the military sphere is the development of military structures of the Russian Federation on NATO’s ‘eastern flank’ and near the border with Ukraine. According to the Strategy, Ukraine’s efforts to become a member of NATO are important. According to the document, Ukraine’s national security guarantees include close cooperation with the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and France, as well as maintaining a strategic partnership with Poland and Lithuania. The strategy included modernising the armed forces by withdrawing equipment based on Soviet technology and continuing the reform of the state security sector. On 15 September 2021 the Information Security Strategy (Указ Президента України, 2021) was approved, which is a document complementary to the main National Security Strategy of Ukraine. Its aim was to create conditions for ensuring the information security of Ukraine aimed at protecting the vital interests of citizens, society and the state in countering internal and external threats, ensuring the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining social and

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  13 political stability, protecting the state, and ensuring the rights and freedoms of every citizen. In the literature, Ukrainian researchers seem to hold opinions that the implementation by Ukraine of first the policy of neutrality, then multi-​vectorality, and the subsequent stages of the directional concepts, is conditioned by the internal political situation of the state and the geopolitical situation. Furthermore, the shape of the pre-​war foreign policy was also implied by the social question. Ukrainian society was highly differentiated in economic, social and cultural terms. The categories of division (stratification of the state) include the so-​ called western Ukraine –​pro-​European, supporting integration into the EU and NATO –​and eastern Ukraine –​pro-​Russian, advocating closer cooperation with the Russian Federation. The indecisiveness of the Ukrainians, the problem with self-​determination, the lack of consistency in thinking about their own state, politics, economy and above all, the role of citizens in the state, resulted in the Ukrainian society being called ambivalent (Riabchuk, 2004, pp. 20–​73; Портнов, 2008, pp. 22–​24). In the social sciences, the term ambivalence should be understood as the parallel adherence to mutually exclusive values; as Jevhen Holovaha (1992, pp. 24–​39) claims, it is a characteristic feature of any transitional period –​a period of contact between two political cultures and two models of social behaviour (political, economic, linguistic). The differentiation of the eastern and western parts of Ukraine is not solely the result of the events of recent months. The division that characterised society until the outbreak of war3 is at least 30 years old. Therefore, the blame for the situation of creating divisions and splits in Ukraine should be attributed to the authorities and elites of the country, who have failed to create a coherent policy uniting the eastern and western parts of Ukraine. Political candidates (whether in presidential or parliamentary elections) focused on the preferences of a particular region when formulating their election campaigns (e.g. the development of cooperation with Russia was targeted at the electorate living in the eastern regions, while integration with European structures was targeted at citizens from the western part of the country). For many years, emphasis was placed on the things that divide Ukrainians. Post-​communist hibernation, state nihilism, political apathy and differences in voter preferences have not gone unnoticed. All this has contributed to deepening this division in the state, giving way to separatists. Separatist sentiment stems from the Ukrainian government’s ineffective language policy and has been reinforced by Russian activity in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The ongoing hybrid war with Russia since 2014 has required Ukraine to make significant changes in its security policy, take decisive steps towards military reform and work towards integration into NATO. The events surrounding the annexation of Crimea and the creation of the separatist republics LNR and DNR became the ultimate confirmation of the need for Ukraine’s security and that the conflict would not find a diplomatic solution, as evidenced by the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022.

14  M. Prokop

Ukraine in Russian foreign policy Beginning in the 1990s, a clear desire to maintain a leading position in the former Soviet space was evident in Russian foreign policy, which was often argued in terms of the need to protect vital Russian interests. The post-​Soviet space is important for Russia due to, among other things, the presence of a Russian diaspora of around 25 million people, as well as the existence of many interests of an economic nature (including the issue of transit of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea area). Deepening integration processes in the post-​ Soviet area and postulating the protection of the Russian-​speaking population remain among Russia’s most important objectives, which has been used as an argument for Russia’s involvement in conflicts in other former Soviet republics (including Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). This position has been maintained to the present day. For years, Russia’s foreign policy documents have endlessly mentioned the Commonwealth of Independent States (as a replacement for the USSR) as a priority field of action in regional policy. In doing so, Russia declares its desire to increase the scope of integration and various types of cooperation within the Community. This is a policy with a high degree of continuity, as since its inception Russia’s aspiration has been to create a structure of ‘strategic partnership’ within the CIS. Of great importance is the joint regulation of conflicts in the member states and the development of military cooperation. Ukraine, together with Russia and Belarus, was a founding member of the CIS; however, in May 2018, given the ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine and Russian support for the separatist movement, a decision was made to suspend membership (Bryc, 2004, pp. 21; Włodkowska 2008, pp. 60–​78; Mironowicz, 2012, pp. 92–​100). According to Vikroriya Harasymenko (2016, pp. 125–​133) Russian perception of international relations is based on the paradigm of realism. Russia, pursuing her own interests, seeks to increase her power, using a wide range of means and methods. In order to realise goals in the international arena, the state conducts foreign policy in a selfish way, that is typical for human behaviour. The Ukrainian authorities’ pro-​European orientation after 2004 does not align with the Russian Federation’s strategy to influence post-​Soviet space. Modern Russia considers the area of the former USSR (apart from the Baltic republics) to be its sphere of influence, so expanding the EU or NATO eastwards is considered a violation of the integrity of the zone. This policy has been compared to the 1823 doctrine promulgated by US president James Monroe, which held that the American continent was the exclusive sphere of influence of the USA, and could not be subject to further colonisation or political expansion by European states. Changes in Russian foreign policy occurred in relation to Central and Eastern European states aspiring to join NATO. Moscow’s ‘categorical nyet’ has appeared, clearly indicating that Russia does not allow any changes in the emerging European security system without its consent (Diec, 2015, pp. 40–​51).

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  15 The year 1996 brought changes in the external policy of the Federation as for the first time the necessity of diversifying interstate relations and pursuing a multi-​directional policy emerged, opening up to both the West and the East. The year 1999 saw a continuation of these developments, which indicated a deterioration in Russia’s image on the international stage. First, in March, as a result of enlargement, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, once members of the socialist bloc, became full members of NATO. Secondly, in defiance of the Russian Federation’s objections to violating the territorial integrity of the new Yugoslavia, NATO countries carried out a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and used military force against Yugoslavia. Thirdly, Russia was criticised for the actions taken by Vladimir Putin in Chechnya, starting the so-​called Chechen war. After the enlargement of the EU by ten countries, Ukraine bordered the EU, finding itself, as it were, on the edge between two rival blocs, namely Russia and Western Europe. The key issue here is undoubtedly Ukraine’s location on the edge of Europe, and access to gas and oil from the Caspian basin and its possible transport through Ukrainian territory to Europe, bypassing Russia, is of no little significance. Therefore, one of Russia’s main objectives is not to allow any rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU. On the other hand, Ukraine is dependent on Russian energy resources: oil and natural gas. It should also be remembered that in September 2003, a common economic space was created by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, aimed at strengthening cooperation between the countries and removing barriers in trade between them (Bieleń, 1998a, pp. 63–​ 84; Bieleń, 1998b, pp. 7–​30; Olszański, 2001, pp. 5–​10; Kapuśniak, 2007, pp. 105–​130; Szapowałowa, 2006, pp. 25–​30). When analysing bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia from the perspective of Russia’s foreign policy, it is worth mentioning that relations have always been accompanied by tension, which has led to cooling and stagnation. In Russian rhetoric, the expression ‘Russia is the elder “brother” to Ukraine’ has often appeared (in communications, the term brother not sister was used). One of the perennial problems in bilateral relations between the states was separatist movements in regions inhabited by Russian-​speaking people in Ukraine. This applied to Crimea, Donbass and the Black Sea areas. The status of Crimea with the city of Sevastopol, where the Soviet naval base was located, was also a sensitive issue. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty, the Republican Movement of Crimea was formed, which put forward demands for Crimean autonomy. In a referendum held in January 1991, 93 per cent of the population voted for the creation of the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR, i.e. for leaving Ukraine (Закон 1991). In 1994, after his victory in the presidential elections, L. Kuchma, who came from the post-​Soviet nomenclature, convinced the representatives of the Movement to vote for the abolition of the office of the President of Crimea, and in time, changes were made in the perception of Crimea’s independence and the rules of the Ukrainian state were

16  M. Prokop imposed there. Ukraine felt Russian pressure through energy instruments to reshape its foreign policy (Mironowicz, 2012, p. 28). The 1990s were a favourable period for Ukraine to form its own statehood, given the weakening of Russia after the collapse of the USSR. However, the then Ukrainian president, L. Kuchma, pursued a largely pro-​Russian foreign policy and continued the country’s subordination to Russian influence. Kuchma devoted the beginning of his presidency to normalising relations with Russia. During Kuchma’s first meeting with the then President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, in October 1994, it was agreed that a document regulating relations between the states should be drawn up, although the treaty between Ukraine and Russia was not signed until 1997 (Szeptycki, 2007, pp. 60–​80; Diec, 2015, pp. 114–​ 120; Mironowicz, 2012, pp. 91–​140). Difficult aspects to regulate were the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the conditions of stationing the Russian navy in Sevastopol. Another issue was the Ukrainian debt for Russian energy resources. The division of the USSR’s assets and liabilities outside the borders (division of debts and real estate) was also under discussion, with Russia considering itself the sole heir and demanding access to the real estate as well as committing itself to repay the debts. Ukraine first agreed to this arrangement, then, after realising that the assets far outweighed the debts, demanded a renegotiation of the agreement. On 28 May 1997, an agreement was signed regulating the status of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory. The Russian military, on the basis of the agreement, should have respected the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and functioned on the principles of the regulation of Ukrainian legislation. On 31 May 1997, the presidents of the states L. Kuchma and B. Yeltsin signed the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the parties undertaking to preserve and respect the mutual integrity and inviolability of borders and not to use force or the threat of its use, including economic pressure (Договір, 1998; Mironowicz, 2012, pp. 64–​65). Ukraine is undoubtedly part of the Russian scenario of maintaining the status quo in the region. Russia has extensive plans for Ukraine, which is linked to its negative stance towards Ukrainian attempts to integrate with Western Europe. Ukraine seems to be standing on the edge of two competing blocs, the clashing interests between East and West, which has been the reason for its multitrack policy. However, as Ukraine moved further away, Russia changed its rhetoric and policy instruments. In the beginning, messages about the need to build a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Russia were used, with the use of ‘energy blackmail’, which led to energy crises in 2006 and 2009. This was facilitated by Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy resources (oil and natural gas). The Russian gas trading monopoly Gazprom sought to take control of the Ukrainian transmission systems. Offers to buy the Ukrainian equivalent, Ukrhazprom, were categorically rejected by the Ukrainian side. The signing of an agreement on the price for natural gas and the value for its transportation between Ukraine and Russia did not provide a

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  17 guarantee that Russia would fulfil all of its obligations under the agreement. Russia was the largest trading partner for Ukraine as about a third of foreign exchange went to Russia (Махно 2013, pp. 200–​203; Mironowicz, 2012, pp. 240–​250). The change in the governing elite in Ukraine as a result of the ‘Orange Revolution’ led to a change in the Russian approach to Ukraine; Kuchma’s successor did not continue his policy of close relations with Russia, which was perceived negatively by the Russian state. It was not until the following presidential election and the victory of a pro-​Russian candidate that Russia restored its influence in Ukraine. It was not foreseen that Ukrainian society would not support the actions of President Yanukovych, so a ‘Revolution of Dignity’ broke out after his resignation over signing the association agreement. For Russia, this was a kind of defeat, which is why more powerful instruments of exerting influence were used (Szeptycki, 2007, pp. 60–​70; Wasiuta & Wasiuta, 2017, pp. 100–​120; Tymkiv, 2007, pp. 183–​189). At the end of February 2014, on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, local self-​defence units and unmarked units of Russian ‘SpecNaz’ soldiers took control of critical infrastructure. The local authorities proclaimed Crimea’s independence, and in March, following a referendum, it was annexed by Russia. The peaceful annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation4 triggered demonstrations by the Russian-​speaking population living in the eastern part of Ukraine, who also demanded that the territories they inhabited be annexed to Russia. As early as April, the demonstrations consisted of the occupation of government administration buildings and the replacement of Ukrainian flags with Russian ones. The largest demonstrations took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. There, the separatists announced the creation of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LRL) and announced their intention to join the Russian Federation. Russia’s support for the separatists, by sending troops and securing the rebels with weapons, became a reason to destabilise eastern Ukraine. In order to regain control over the occupied territory, the Ukrainian side therefore started fighting the separatists. The situation turned into an armed conflict that lasted until Russia openly launched a conventional war (Bryjka, 2016, pp. 201–​205; Головко et al., 2015, pp. 10–​18; Tomala & Prokop, 2021, pp. 45–​50; Hajdak & Stępniewski, 2015, pp. 136–​ 140; Darczewska, 2014, pp. 10–​30). Ultimately, Russia undertook military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 in order to achieve its strategic goal of complete subjugation of Ukraine. Conditions were put forward that Russia would cease military action if Ukraine recognised the Russian annexation of Crimea, recognised the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and amended its constitution to ensure neutrality status. In addition, Ukraine was required to demilitarise, i.e. give up having an army altogether. The Ukrainian side rejected all the Russian demands and undertook the difficult task of defending its own state, as the existence of a Ukrainian state was at stake.

18  M. Prokop

Conclusions Ukrainian-​ Russian relations have always been characterised by tensions and difficulties, despite the fact that the countries are neighbours and are linked by history, tradition and culture. To a large extent, the tensions and disagreements are related to the differing approaches to conducting foreign policy and shaping the future of the state. From Ukraine’s perspective, it is important to be able to decide for itself about its own state and to adopt a Euro-​Atlantic dimension in its foreign policy. We can see that, after long years of drifting between the eastern and western vectors of external policy, Ukraine has chosen the right direction. The signing of the Budapest Memorandum and the Treaty between Ukraine and Russia, which resulted in guarantees of Ukraine’s trigonal inviolability, has not prevented Russia from supporting separatist movements fighting in eastern Ukraine since 2014 and from waging a full-​scale war against Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s main objective is to maintain its imperial status in the region, which entails preventing the expansion of European structures to the East. As the threat grows and Ukraine becomes more involved in the pro-​European dimension of its policy, Russia is completely changing its policy towards the Ukrainian state, from encouragement and blackmail to military aggression. In view of these factors, it is difficult to speak of the development of friendly and good neighbourly relations between the states. The main reason for this is the different perception of the future shape of Eastern Europe by the two states. The purpose of this article has been to analyse Ukrainian-​Russian relations as an example of difficult neighbourly relations in the context of the background to the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. Contemporary bilateral relations between the states were largely based on unresolved issues from the Soviet past. Russia, recognising itself as the sole heir to the legacy of the USSR, chose to dictate the conditions for the Ukrainian side. At the same time, everything was done to prevent Ukraine from becoming independent and free from Russian influence. Over the years, Russia has demonstrated that its aim is not to create friendly relations with Ukraine, but to subjugate the country completely, and it is ready to make every effort to achieve this aim, a perfect example of which is Russia’s current military aggression against Ukraine.

Notes 1 The author deliberately uses the term Ukrainian-​Russian relations, rather than Russian-​Ukrainian, as part of this work to present relations between the states in the context of the specifics of Ukraine’s foreign policy and Russia’s attempts to influence it. 2 Taking into account the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, this number may be lower, given that some Ukrainians declare having converted to the Ukrainian language.

Russia – Ukraine: Difficult Relations  19 3 In the current situation, it is difficult to say whether this differentiation persists. 4 It is worth noting that the takeover of Crimea took place without any shots being fired, with a completely passive attitude on the part of the Ukrainian authorities and the international community.

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2 Russia Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower Anna Jach, Elżbieta Kużelewska and Agnieszka Legucka

Introduction Russia sees itself as a superpower. The characteristics of this country usually begin with the size of its territory, which covers over 17 million km2 of the Eurasian continent. This largest state area in the world is the basis of Russia’s superpower position, but it raises dilemmas regarding the country’s internal development and the directions of foreign policy. The attitude of the inhabitants of Russia to this space is essentially a composition of two emotions: pride and fear (Moϊsi 2012, pp. 29–​30; O’Loughlin, Talbot 2005, pp. 23–​50). For centuries, the immensity of the Russian state has been a reason for national pride and a sense of superiority over others. Thanks to it, the Russians identified themselves as a great and unique nation, which gave rise to a sense of mission and strength. The Russian perception of territory was associated with a particular understanding of a strong state authority that could control space and mythologize the army that should defend this space (Grabowski 2011, p. 160). At the same time, the geographic location and unstable neighbourhood gave rise to the syndrome of ‘besieged fortress’ and a constant sense of danger in Russian society, which is used by the political authorities to consolidate citizens around the leader. A superpower is a specific type of state in international relations (Włodkowska 2004, pp. 163–​176). It is characterized by greater possibilities of influencing than others in the international arena. It can decide about war and peace on a global scale, has world interests and determines the global balance of power (Sullivan 2001, 89). Superpowerhood is ‘redefined in the context of the features of each historical epoch, as well as the potential and activity of other countries’ (Bogadał-​Brzezińska 2009, pp. 80–​94). At different times, other matters were important for the strength of the state: geographical distance, military, technology, demography and culture. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, superpower was identified with power, understood as the ability to exert military and political influence on the environment, in which also territorial (geopolitical) aspects were emphasized. Superpower is assessed by comparing the power of the key players, their DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-3

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  23 aspirations and the potential (strength) of influence. Although in the era of economic and technological development the military criterion is losing importance, Russia is guided by the principle of protecting its sphere of influence, using military instruments to do so. The Russian authorities aspire not only to be recognized as a superpower by others, but also to implement it in action. According to Henry Bull, the real power of a state is not yet a superpower condition, but must be recognized internationally, and vice versa (Bull 1977, p. 56). Formal superpower encompasses states which have been recognized as superpowers by the international community by being granted special status within the framework of international organizations. Russia inherited this status from the USSR as a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The de facto superpowerhood means the real power of the state, which Russia has big problems with, if it wants to be able to compare itself with other countries in the international arena. Superpower is related to such concepts as power and influence, which are key elements in the discussion on the status and hierarchy of the state in international relations. Russian geopolitical thought is dominated by a realistic perception of international relations, in which competition, conflict and the maximization of power are emphasized. Russia is a military type of superpower, because among the components of the power it emphasizes the issues of nuclear potential, armed forces, military and technological potential, geographic and defence location, demographic and raw material potential, and only in the further economic plan. In other words, the elements of hard power are emphasized over soft power (Nye 2004, pp. 30–​46). Russia has global aspirations, and its military-​strategic potential predisposes it to play a one-​ dimensional, military, power. Its superpower status manifests itself in action, in order to achieve specific goals, including, in particular: • • •

increasing the strength of the state and the international position of the state (the possibility of influencing other participants of international relations); maintaining their sphere of influence (mainly within the near abroad); increasing international prestige.

Russia, as a power that follows the principle of ‘you are afraid of us, therefore we are’, tries to strengthen its international position by means of military instruments. However, verifying the military capabilities of a superpower can be a difficult experience for it at times, as shown by the interventions of the USSR or the USA in Afghanistan. Therefore, the research questions of this chapter are: Has Russia achieved its superpower goals with military instruments? What military aspects has it been using in domestic and foreign policy? This chapter consists of four sections. The first section explains the militarization of Russia’s foreign policy, including the main provisions of national security strategy and the war doctrine. The second section discusses the

24  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka powerfulness expressed by military instruments in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The third analyses the militarization of Russia’s socio-​ political life with particular reference to the system known as Putinism. This part explores the repression of so-​called internal enemies, discusses the repression of the so-​called enemies of the state and indicates the tightening of criminal laws and consequences. Finally, the fourth section draws conclusions, namely that Russia seeks to change the existing international order, so it is a revisionist type of power.

Militarization of Russia’s foreign policy Concretization of the military aspects of the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation was included in the first military doctrines of 2 November 1993, 21 April 2000 and 5 February 2010. Already in the military doctrine of 2000, the focus was on external threats, primarily on the dangerous expansion of military blocs with NATO in mind and the deployment of troops in the vicinity of the Russian Federation (Указ Президента РФ от 21 апреля 2000 г. N 706). The key document, however, was the 2010 military doctrine, which gave the Russian authorities the opportunity to defend Russian citizens who remained outside the country and found themselves in a threatening situation. It sanctioned Russia’s post-​factum military actions related to the violation of territorial integrity against Georgia in August 2008. Another doctrine and its amendment in 2014 resulted in the introduction of new concepts in the field of Russia’s security and taking into account new external and internal threats (Russian Military 2020). In the doctrine, a hybrid war has been ‘sanctioned’, which means that the strategies of Russia’s neighbours must take into account the scenario of possible subliminal aggression (Fisher 2022). The doctrine is treated as an extended interpretation of the obligation to ensure security not only for Russia and allied states (including the self-​proclaimed Abkhazia and South Ossetia), but also for Russian citizens who are in a threatening situation outside their borders. The defence doctrine of 30 December 2014 contains provisions on the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, and in the event of aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons where the very existence of the state is at stake. In July 2021, Putin approved Russia’s national security strategy, which replaced the 2015 document. It is the main document setting the directions for the development of Russia’s state security system. In the new strategy, much stronger emphasis has been placed on ensuring Russia greater independence from the outside world. The way in which the goals of Russian foreign policy are presented has also changed. It is primarily intended to pursue the interests of Russia, while any plans to develop political cooperation with the USA or cooperation in the Arctic have been abandoned. Instead, there were declarations of strategic partnership with China and India. Moreover, the sources of the most important threats have been identified primarily by

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  25 Western countries (including the USA), which are to seek to change the state order in Russia. The strategy clearly emphasizes that the danger posed by Western countries has a military dimension. This is also related to the thesis about the growing importance of power as an ‘instrument of achieving geopolitical goals’ (Rotkiewicz & Żochowski 2021). In November 2021, during a meeting of the enlarged cabinet of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Putin set out the most important goals of Russian diplomacy. Among them was the announcement of a tightening of security policy –​including relations with NATO –​and of Russia’s further involvement in ‘resolving regional conflicts’ (Dyner 2021). In turn, in February 2022, a new military doctrine of the Union State of Belarus and Russia was published. The new doctrine contains many references to the Belarusian military doctrine of 2016 and the Russian military doctrine of 2014. The document clearly shows that the Union State is focused on confronting Western countries, not cooperating with them. The provisions of the doctrine indicate that Belarus and Russia regard NATO’s actions as the most important challenges for their security, especially the expansion of the Alliance’s infrastructure in the countries of the eastern flank and the United States (Dyner 2022). The doctrine makes reference to hybrid threats and Western countries as the source of these threats. There is a clear militarization of Russia’s foreign policy and the pursuit of an aggressive imperial policy expertly combined with the story of a ‘good empire’, waging only defence wars and pursuing peaceful expansion. This is supposed to justify Russia’s aspirations for exclusive influence in the post-​Soviet area. The idea of the ‘Russian world’ is applied for their own use (Wawrzonek et al. 2016, pp. 50–​64).

The superpower status expressed by military instruments in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation In Russia’s strategic culture, war and the building of an imperial identity play an extremely important role. This is accompanied by extreme politicization of the topic of the past (Domańska & Rogoża 2021, p. 13). The streets are named after war heroes, historical policy has been militarized, and the uniform is present in public spaces. For example, in the mass consciousness of Russians, there are no moments of cooperation between Nazi Germany and the USSR, and they limit World War II to the years 1941–​1945, that is, to the Great Patriotic War. According to Znakyuz Huseynowicz, this is because this war, in order to become a national myth, had to become something unknown in social consciousness from personal experience, but an event of great importance passed down through generations, to finally become a ‘symbol/​icon’ (Хусейнович 2011). Lev Gudkov is of a similar opinion, arguing that the war and its victims in the eyes of Russian society sanctioned not only the existence of a strong army, supporting the social institutions of the USSR and the post-​ Soviet system of power, but also the functioning of the ‘vertical’ structure of

26  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka society, mobilized around the hierarchical social order (Гудков 2005, p. 34). This system does not recognize individual autonomy and private property, but group interests, the ‘whole’. These calculations ignored the debate about the cost of war, but only stressed the importance of victory. Russia would like to occupy a central position in the international system, with the aim of increasing the state’s strength and its international position. It uses military instruments for this (Gajewski & Rentz-​Tylińska 2011, pp. 108–​ 128). This applies to its military potential, especially its nuclear power, as a deterrent to its rivals, as well as its activity in armed conflicts. Russia has developed its nuclear resources in which it invests the largest funds. The Russian Strategic Destination Forces also have the highest percentage (81 per cent) of modern weapons. However, although the number of Russian nuclear warheads (6,257) compared to US (5,600) speaks in favour of Russia, the comparison is difficult, because the use of this type of weapon guarantees mutual destruction –​that is, the possibility of destroying the enemy with mass destruction resources, and thus the practical application of one’s superpower (Gajewski & Rentz-​Tylińska, 2011, p. 108–​128). That is why the ‘testing’ of the limits of Russia’s influence against other international actors takes place in armed conflicts. With the second army in the world at its disposal, the Russian Federation uses its armed forces in various types of wars. To the greatest extent, this concerns its closest neighbourhood, that is the countries of the former USSR, towards which it pursues its most important superpower goal –​to protect its own sphere of influence. Protection of the Russian sphere of influence The Russian Federation influenced the course of each of the low-​intensity conflicts in the area of the former USSR in the early 1990s: in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-​ Karabakh). Russia in the 1990s –​that is, in the first phase of the conflict when military operations were taking place –​provided weapons and soldiers (sometimes mercenaries), offered military advisory assistance and carried out parallel diplomatic activities. In the second phase, after the end of hostilities, Russia acted as the main mediator and guarantor of the ceasefire agreements. At that time, it offered help in the form of peacekeeping forces (in fact, these were primarily Russian troops). In the third phase, when the conflict was frozen (Kolstø 2006, pp. 723–​740) or by definition ‘protracted conflicts’, Russia used diplomatic means and its military presence to guarantee the status quo and to influence the foreign policy and security of countries affected by conflicts, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova (Legucka 2017, pp. 79–​97). For this purpose, it used separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, who stiffened their negotiating position at appropriate times. For Russia has usually rejected peace solutions that were not favourable to it. The constant monitoring of the situation by the Russian Federation made it impossible to finally resolve the post-​Soviet conflicts.

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  27 The decisive motivator of Russian foreign policy is to maintain its sphere of influence and the status of a superpower –​and even an empire. The policy of the centre over the periphery was influenced by many factors, but the idea remained the same as with the colonial powers (Snyder 2022). The control over individual regions of the great territory was aimed at economic exploitation and building the image of a superpower in the world. Russia enforced postcolonial dependence with military means. This was confirmed in the war with Georgia in August 2008. Russia violated the most important principle of international law –​the prohibition of the use of force and the threat of using force in international relations, and respect for the territorial integrity of states. After firing by Georgian forces on the capital of South Ossetia, the Russian army entered Georgia, seizing strategic points and tearing the rebel republics away from their motherland. On 26 August, Russia officially recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, proving that it is able to ‘unfreeze’ armed conflicts in the event of unfavourable developments (Legucka 2017, pp. 79–​97). Subsequently, Russia annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014, ripping part of Ukrainian territory (Grant, 2015, pp. 68–​95). In eastern Ukraine, on 7 April 2014, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) was proclaimed, and on 27 April, the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). The Russian authorities wanted to implement the so-​called Novorossiya, assuming the unification of several regions of southern and eastern Ukraine into a single structure. Russia wanted to select local representatives who could stand for the local community in peace talks between the Ukrainian authorities and Western partners, as part of the so-​called Normandy Four (Germany, France, Ukraine, Russia). Therefore, Russia insisted on recognizing the DPR and the LPR as parties to the dispute and sought to include their leaders among the signatories of the so-​called the Minsk agreements. Russia wanted to apply the ‘conflict freezing’ model to part of Donbas in order to be able to influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy through separatists. This, however, did not bring the desired results from the point of view of Russia’s superpower interests, so on 24 February 2022, Vladimir Putin announced the implementation of the so-​called ‘special military operation’ to ‘demilitarize and de-​Nazify’ Ukraine (Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 2022). He referred to the request of the DNR and LNR –​previously recognized by Russia as independent states –​and to the decision of the Federation Council (the upper house of the parliament) which gave him the right to use the Russian armed forces outside the country. This means that in the face of the failure of Ukraine’s attempt to force the implementation of the Minsk agreements that were unfavourable to it, Russia decided, through an armed attack, to prevent Ukraine from further rapprochement and possible accession to NATO and the European Union. Russia has carried out a full-​scale military aggression against the sovereign Ukrainian state. At the same time, as a power with a much greater military potential than Ukraine, in the first months of the war it made a number of operational and tactical mistakes that undermined its capabilities and prestige

28  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka as the world’s second army. The lightning-​fast war plan failed due to poor intelligence reconnaissance, lack of command coordination, poor logistics and planning. As a consequence, Russia had to withdraw from seizing the capital and concentrate on the offensive in the south and east of Ukraine. Russia’s unpreparedness for complex airborne operations resulted in a minor role of aviation during the first stage of the Russian invasion and significant losses among airplanes and helicopters (Zabrodskyi et al. 2022). This means that recognition of its superpower by the international community will depend on success on the battlefield in Ukraine, on defeat or victory in that country. Building the position of a global power From 2015 –​that is, from military involvement in Syria –​Russia has moved beyond its traditional ‘geographical’ zone of the post-​Soviet power and begun to influence, inter alia, Middle Eastern relations. On 30 September 2015, the Russian air force, at the request of Bashar al-​Assad, entered the war against the Islamic State. In fact, it was about saving Assad. Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war had changed the balance of power in the region. First, thanks to the support of the Russian air force, Assad stopped the progress of the rebels, mainly concentrated in the Free Syrian Army. Then he could go on a counteroffensive. This was favoured by an agreement between Russia, Iran and Turkey under the so-​called the Astana triangle (Bechev et al. 2021). Russia joined various types of proxy wars (Bryjka 2019, pp. 181–​201). Proxy-​ type activities were also carried out with the help of paramilitary groups, such as the Wagner group. Russia also began to conduct them on the African continent, for example in South Africa, Sudan and Libya. In Syria, the Wagner group fought with the promise of a 25 per cent profit from the exploitation of gas and oil fields, which they were to recover from the hands of the so-​called Islamic State and opponents of President Bashar al-​Assad (Cherep 2021). In Libya, in June 2020, the Wagnerists took over the control of the country’s largest Sharara oil field. Later, they carried out work on fortifying the roads leading from this area to the port in Sirte, which was to ensure the continuity of gas exports through the areas controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, whom they supported. The mercenaries from the Russian private military company became a tool of Russia’s military and political expansion in Africa, thus undermining the position of European postcolonial states, in particular France. Not all operations were successful. In August 2019, the Russians were unable to cooperate with the Mozambique army against jihadists, and the drones they used were useless in dense forest, and in October at least seven Wagnerists were killed in ambushes (some were decapitated) (Czerep 2020).

Militarization of Russia’s socio-​political life The desire to restore Russia to its rightful place in the international arena as an equal partner, accompanied by the rebuilding of the sense of superpower,

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  29 resulted in a change in the vector of the state’s functioning both in the field of foreign policy and in the internal sphere. The syndrome of the so-​called besieged fortress has become one of the main elements of the ‘re-​education’ of citizens for the Russian Federation in such a way that those subject to power could identify themselves fully with the state’s policy. It was then that the construction of a new model of the system of power in the Russian Federation was initiated –​Putinism –​which is considered to be the social, political and economic system of Russia shaped during the political leadership of Vladimir Putin. Putinism The term Putinism was first used in an article by Andrei Piontkovsky, published on 11 January 2000 on the website of the Yabloko party. He characterized Putinism as the highest and final stage of bandit capitalism in Russia, a stage in which, as one half-​forgotten classic said, the bourgeoisie throws the flag of democratic freedoms and human rights overboard; as well as a war in which there is a ‘consolidation’ of the nation on the basis of hatred towards some ethnic group, an attack on freedom of speech and information, brainwashing, isolation from the outside world and further economic degradation. (Пионтковский 2000) Putinism is characterized by centralization of power, strong presidential power, weakening the political influence of regional elites and big business, establishing direct or indirect state control over the country’s main television channels, censorship, increasing use of ‘administrative resources’ in elections at the regional and federal level, de facto elimination system of separation of powers, establishing control over the judicial system, non-​public style of political behaviour, monopolization of political power in the hands of the president, putting the interests of the state ahead of the interests of the individual, limiting the rights of citizens, repressions against civil society, creating the image of a ‘besieged fortress’, equating opposition activities with hostility and driving it out of the political field. To this should be added the cult of the leader –​Putin, the embodiment of state succession after the greatest geopolitical catastrophe which was the collapse of the Soviet Union, bureaucratic authoritarianism, the presence of a ruling party strongly connected with the bureaucratic apparatus, state corporatism, strong state control over property, aggressive foreign policy, focus on restoring order and conservative values, imperial ideology, anti-​Western moods (Урнов & Касамара 2005; Herpen Van 2013; Вишневский 2017, Alabaykonst 2017; Aron 2008; Migranyan 2004). The new level of administration was established by Vladimir Putin immediately after his election in May 2000 and has become a symbol of the militarization of the political elite in Russia, concretized by the mass recruitment

30  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka of people from the so-​called power departments. Moreover, in the context of a closed institutional game and the government’s willingness to neutralize the entire mass of rules of the political game, the law also becomes the basis for building control over the recruitment of political and administrative elites. One of the key aspects of Putinism is the so-​called militarization of the Russian elite. A few months after Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, something called the ‘militocratic paradigm’ (Violier 2016) emerged. Putin’s rise to power entailed the appointment of more and more people from the military structures to managerial positions. The entire political regime of modern Russia has been affected by the massive penetration of military men. Putinism, that is the authoritarian regime of Russia, reached its maturity after 2012 (an extensive system of public law and bureaucratic institutions, formally based on depersonalized ties) (Domańska 2019). Initially (since 2000), it changed from state to social-​state (until 2008), and then returned to the original, with the difference that now it was based on a new background, the so-​called siloviki. From then on, they had in their hands the instruments thanks to which the state’s control over the socio-​political life of citizens began to expand steadily. Strengthening the political position of the president The strong position of the president in the Russian political system results from two important factors. First of all, these are constitutional and legal solutions which provide the president with a number of competences both for himself and for other organs of power, making the office of the head of state almost hegemonic. Secondly, these are non-​legal factors, the so-​called ‘personality’, assigned to individual presidents of Russia, who exercised power basically on the same legal regulations and within very similar powers. The present systemic position of the President of Russia is determined by two main legal acts –​the Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in a nationwide referendum on 12 December 1993, as amended, approved during the All-​Russian vote on 1 July 2020, and the federal law ‘On the elections of the President of the Russian Federation’. The Russian Federation is an example of a country in which the president’s constitutional position is extremely strong. The president is placed high in the hierarchy of state power, which is referred to in the literature as ‘super-​presidential democracy’ (Cox 2013, pp. 179–​207). The president has executive powers and extensive prerogatives in domestic and foreign policy. In July 2020, the amended constitution entered into force. The constitution contains ideological statements such as belief in God as the historical heritage of the nation and the protection of traditional family values as a government task, thus strengthening the conservative foundations of values that have over the years been presented as distinguishing Russia from other countries (Laine 2021, pp. 49–​79). The key changes to the ‘reset’ of the president’s term of office, i.e. the re-​counting of Putin’s term of office as head of state, further strengthen both the office of the president and Putin himself. These solutions allow Putin to remain president until 2030 and to run

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  31 for office again (in fact, even until 2036). It should be remembered that the proposal for an unlimited number of terms of office of the head of state was taken into account in the previous amendment to the constitution (in 2008). At that time, Putin did not agree to it. The current change in his position is probably dictated by the lack of a trusted man in the role of a ‘one-​term president’ and an attempt to prevent ‘dual power’ (Kużelewska 2021, pp. 83–​95). Moreover, strengthening the president’s position in the constitutional order is directly related to strengthening his position in the military aspect. Repressions against the so-​called internal enemies Regular control over the socio-​political life of citizens resulted from the definition of the forces, structures and centres of possible threat to Putin’s people. Therefore, the tactic of finding potential enemies and systematic elimination of them was initiated. As the current model of government is becoming exhausted, decisive steps have been taken to ‘restore order’ in Russian society. As a consequence, the Russian society stimulated to action, engaging in non-​ violent activities (civil or political disobedience), encountered an increase in repression on the part of the rulers, primarily in the field of legal regulations. The course towards the non-​governmental and non-​commercial sector has clearly tightened. There was a calming down of the ferment and preventive actions by putting pressure on the opposition circles, initiating splits in their ranks and preventing possible consolidation actions. Protest actions were prevented and media sympathizing with the opposition were blocked, including through numerous attacks by hackers on their websites (Rogoża 2012). The third sector, which had so far remained beyond the control of the state, has become the subject of interest of state structures in the form of successively implemented policies. After the period of dynamic development (1985–​1998/​ 2000), along with the tactics of support, neutrality or ignorance of NGOs by the RF authorities, the stage of ‘nationalization’ of the non-​governmental sector followed. In the period 1999–​2021, strategies were adopted aimed directly at maintaining the dominant position of the state sector and keeping the Putinist camp in power: I. 1999–​2004: neutralization of the organization for the protection of the rule of law as ‘the main troublemakers in the society’, establishment of a state monopoly on the implementation of activities in the field of human rights protection; termination of the activity of ‘phantoms’; improvement of management discipline and the requirement for organizations to comply with elementary legal requirements); II. 2004–​2006 discrediting of the non-​governmental non-​commercial sector by GONGO structures; preventing the financing of the non-​governmental non-​profit sector by foreign and Russian institutions whose activities have been interpreted by officials as contrary to the national interests of Russia; thwarting spying by NGOs on behalf of third countries;

32  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka preventing terrorist organizations from influencing the political process in Russia through social organizations); III. 2006 the necessity to stop financing Russian human rights activists from abroad or at least curtail such financing with heavy accusations of moral influence (raising stereotypical accusations of espionage, subversive, terrorist and other destructive activities) and through special administrative supervision (the procedure for obtaining a permit for obtaining foreign grants should be introduced, granting foreign NGOs a special legal status), as well as high operating costs and additional legal restrictions; the necessity to involve unregistered non-​governmental organizations in the sphere of legal regulations; an initiative should be taken to create social structures, seeds for the development of civil society; attempts to ‘neutralize’ such activities should be continued; IV. 2007–​2008 professionalization of the services of the non-​governmental non-​commercial sector; extending the registration procedure so that the control over the new formation was more thorough; tightening the criteria of requirements in order to appoint and register non-​governmental organizations to such an extent that most of them are unable to do so (Jach 2019, pp. 446–​448); V. 2009–​ 2014 –​top-​ down constitution of own socially oriented non-​ profit non-​governmental sector SO NKO (социально ориентированныe некоммерческиe организации –​ СО НКО); VI. From 2014 –​the liquidation of all social structures that are against the state’s policy, referring to Western standards and the system of values, criticizing the conflict with Ukraine, including the oldest organizations upholding the rule of law, established in the USSR era and continuing their activities in the Russian Federation, including International Historical, Educational, Charity and Defence of Human Rights Association ‘Memorial’ (Международное историко-​просветительское, правозащитное и благотворительное общество «Мемориал») (1989–​2022), Russian branch of Amnesty International (Международная амнистия) (1974–​2022). The policy of shaping a submissive and subordinate non-​commercial sector with a socially defined area of operation was accompanied by two main processes. First, there was increased pressure on organizations that posed a potential threat to the sphere of political influence –​structures specializing in civic control. Second, the Russian third sector was systematically cut off from foreign sources of financing. A restrictive policy towards organizations considered hostile was to discredit them, first of all in the eyes of citizens, but also in the international arena. Repressions against the so-​called ‘Enemies of the state’ The strategy of ‘ordering’ the sphere of social activity did not end only at the stage of ‘neutralizing the main troublemakers in society’ in the form of

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  33 non-​governmental organizations. An important step on the way to consolidate the old/​new Putinism was to be the legal regulation of the status of the so-​called ‘Enemy of the state’, which category is called ‘agent of foreign influence’ (выполняющие функции иностранного агента –​ инагент). This status was introduced into Russian legislation in 2012 and has been constantly updated since then (Федеральный закон от 20.07.2012 № 121-​ФЗ). Currently, it includes several categories of entities –​both legal and physical, which prevent their normal functioning in the Russian state. The practice of searching for people considered ‘hostile’, ‘undesirable’ or even ‘harmful’ to the state is one of the elements of the model of government built from the very beginning (2000), known as ‘Putinism’. The presence of the above-​mentioned features allows us to agree with the opinions of Western researchers that now we are dealing with the return of a police state (totalitarian), directly drawing from the source of Stalinism (Beichman 2007). The warfare on the territory of the Ukrainian state with the commencement of the ‘special military operation’ on 24 February 2022 (Обращение Президента Российской Федерации от 24 февраля 2022 года) may be a confirmation. According to the list prepared and constantly verified by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, entities covered by the ‘stigma’ of ‘foreign influence’ can be divided into several types. From March 2021, the following groups are distinguished: 1. individual informal groups (незарегистрированные общественные объединения, выполняющие функции иностранного агента) (Реестр незарегистрированных общественных объединений); 2. domestic and foreign social organizations /​non-​ governmental organizations (некоммерческие организации, выполняющие функции иностранного агента) (Федеральный закон от 20.07.2012 N 121-​ФЗ); 3. domestic and foreign mass media (средства массовой информации, выполняющие функции иностранного агента) (Федеральный закон от 02.12.2019 N 426-​ФЗ); 4. individuals/​ natural persons (физические лица, выполняющие функции иностранного агента) (Федеральный закон от 30.12.2020 N 525-​ФЗ). As of 9 May 2022, in individual registers we can find information about the number of entities –​‘agents of foreign influence’: non-​profit organizations –​76 (Сведения реестра НКО); media –​44 (Реестр иностранных средств массовой информации); natural persons associated with the media –​114, with the decision of the Ministry of Justice of 29 April and 6 May 2022, 6 persons were removed from the register (Реестр иностранных средств массовой информации); natural persons –​5 (Список физических лиц) and unregistered social associations –​7 (Реестр незарегистрированных общественных объединений). The list of legal and natural persons considered hostile to the current ruling party is constantly being ‘improved’. As you can read on the State Duma

34  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka website: ‘to protect the interests and security of the Russian Federation, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rights and freedoms of its citizens’, the draft amendment to the act of 2012 was prepared by deputies, members of the Commission for Investigating Foreign Interventions in Russia’s Internal Affairs, and senators of the Russian Federation. Its content included provisions which extended the definition field, which would allow for further stigmatization of any person in the area of influence of ‘agents of foreign influence’ or their relatives. ‘The main purpose of introducing our legislation on foreign agents is still not to counteract or repress these structures, but primarily to informational campaigns aimed at ensuring the transparency of their activities’ –​explained the initiator of the project and chairman of the Commission, Vasily Piskariew (Внесен законопроект 2022). In turn, Andrei Lugovoy, co-​author of the bill, first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Security and Combating Corruption, stressed that this document was necessary in connection with ‘great and growing attention to this institution [‘foreign agents’] of countries hostile to Russia that want to influence our citizens and state policy’ (Каминев 2022). The analysis of the provisions of the draft allows for the formulation of a conclusion about freedom of interpretation, which is to be accompanied by provisions extending the catalogue of entities and their forms of activity. The free interpretation of the list of ‘hostile entities’, resulting in the systematic expansion of the ministerial list, will consequently lead to a ban on the activities of persons considered to be ‘agents of foreign influence’, which in turn will result in an increase in political refugees from Russia. Militarization (tightening) of penal regulations The militarization of foreign and domestic policy brought two tangible results –​a ‘special operation’ was launched in Ukraine, and legal regulations and sanctions were tightened against citizens who criticized Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. New strict legislation has been adopted in connection with the so-​called ‘Special military operation’ in Ukraine. On 4 March 2022, the penal code of 1996 was amended (Уголовный кодекс 2022; Федеральный закон от 04/​ 03/​2022 N 32-​ФЗ). Severe penalties were imposed for ‘deliberately disseminating false information about the activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’. Preparing and spreading fake news is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment; five to ten years, if fake news is spread over the internet or by a group of people. The highest penalty of 15 years is for ‘disseminators of information that consequences are socially dangerous’, and in fact this applies to calling the war in Ukraine a war. Article Art. 280.3 provides for the penalty of public action aimed at ‘discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to protect the Federation and its citizens, and to maintain peace and security’. A person who has already been charged with administrative liability similarly in the last

Russia: Military Aspects of the Functioning of a Superpower  35 year is liable to a fine of between 100,000 and 300,000 rubles or up to three years’ imprisonment. If these actions have ‘serious consequences’, the fine ranges from 300,000 to a million rubles or up to five years’ imprisonment. In turn, according to the new Art. 284.2 of the penal code, calling for sanctions against Russia risks up to a 500,000 ruble fine or up to three years’ imprisonment. In addition to the penal code, the code of administrative offences was also amended. The relevant penal provisions apply only after the cancellation of the administrative liability provided for in the new articles. On 22 March 2022, the Duma adopted provisions extending Art. 207.3 and 280.3 of the penal code to certain entities which are prohibited from ‘knowingly spreading false information’ and discrediting them. From now on, the same penalties as in the case of the Armed Forces are to apply to state bodies of the Russian Federation operating outside the country. This is mainly the activity of embassies, the Ministry for Emergency Situations, Rossguard and other bodies that ‘protect the interests’ of Russia outside its territory. The amendment was signed by Vladimir Putin on 26 March and entered into force on 5 April 2022 (Приняты поправки 2022). The tightening of the penal legislation goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the official message on the actions taken by Russia in Ukraine. We are dealing with the monopoly of the state media to cover the war in Ukraine and the open introduction of censorship and an information blockade. The main rule in the programmes is the formulation of statements based on the theses in line with the Kremlin’s line and the inadmissibility of criticizing President Putin (Chawryło, 2022). Moreover, there is a clear demonization of the image of the West, NATO and Ukraine (Domańska & Chawryło, 2022). Propaganda is dominant, the aim of which is to maintain a high level of support for the authorities and war, and to spread responsibility for war crimes among the public.

Conclusions Russia is striving to change the existing international order and is therefore a type of revisionist power. Taking as a starting point the return of Russia to the group of actors deciding the fate of smaller states, which was clearly exposed in defence doctrines and state strategies, the strategy is one of not only regaining, but also consolidating the power of central control over the state, and protection of the ‘centres’ deciding about state power and domination of areas where national interests are located (Mickiewicz 2018, pp. 39–​ 56). The project of ‘rebuilding the power of the Russian state’ (Wojciuk 2010) fully corresponded with the assumptions of the policy towards foreign countries, especially the so-​called near abroad. Russia’s direct or indirect participation in all armed conflicts was to confirm the Russian superpower, and in particular its influence on other participants in international relations. Russia managed to block the accession of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia to NATO and the European Union.

36  A. Jach, E. Kużelewska and A. Legucka The militarization of social and political life will generate fateful consequences, both for the society itself and for the state. They will cover all spheres of socio-​political and economic life of the Russian Federation and will prove difficult to overcome. The international community in the twenty-​ first century is richer by a century of experience, and although it seems to have forgotten the lessons of twentieth-​century totalitarianism, under the threat of Russia’s Third World War, it will quickly make up for the shortcomings. Let it not take the shameful path of the interwar ‘appeasement’.

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3 The Baltic States in the Face of Russian Aggression in Ukraine Aleksandra Kuczyńska-​Zonik and Kamila Sierzputowska

Introduction The Russian attack on Ukraine destabilized the global security system and redefined the scale and nature of the threats. The aggressive international actions carried out by Russia once again threatened the stability of individual states in the post-​Soviet area, strongly weakening the sense of security. For the small Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia –​former Soviet republics –​the aggressive attack raised additional concerns. The historical context of difficult relations with Russia, its close neighborhood, and numerous clusters of Russian-​speaking people living in the Baltic countries, as well as Russian disinformation activities in their area, increased the feeling of instability. Russia’s military actions in Ukraine are among the elements of Russian pressure on the European security system. Putin’s main intention is to revise the international order established after the end of the Cold War and to destabilize the region. The means to satisfy the superpower ambitions of the Russian leader is the restoration of hegemony in the post-​Soviet sphere and a change in the security architecture, which at the same time generates threats to the entire Euro-​Atlantic area (Banasik, 2019). The article aims to show the evolution of the perception of the security of the Baltic states in connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The regional security triangle –​the Baltic states–​Russia–​Ukraine –​ has been analyzed in order to examine how the Baltic states combine elements of a security strategy with elements of international security in order to optimize their security situation. The main research problem is to answer the question: How did the war in Ukraine influence the perception of security in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and what actions were taken at the national and regional level? The problem is complex as it consists of several closely related elements that need to be investigated. Therefore, several more detailed research questions should be asked, and most of all: How do individual states and societies define their security? How has the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation influenced the interpretations of threats? What strategic activities in the area of security, within the framework of national defense mechanisms, illustrate the main instruments enabling the adaptation of the Baltic states to international conditions? DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-4

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  41 The immediate reaction of the authorities of the Baltic republics to the aggression was a joint sharp condemnation of Russia’s military actions on the day of the invasion –​February 24. In the following days of the conflict, these countries in solidarity joined the economic sanctions against the aggressor. In response to the war, they reacted and carried out activities that expressed commitment and support towards Ukraine in various aspects: political, economic (military, medical, humanitarian aid) and social (charity concerts, aid for refugees, street demonstrations, fundraising). As a result, Russian aggression against Ukraine became the most serious challenge in the history of the Baltic states after they regained independence in 1991. Hence, apart from symbolic declarations of a sense of bond and solidarity, the authorities of the countries, having enormous social support, joined in joint efforts to help Ukraine and its citizens as well as global efforts to deepen Russia’s political and economic isolation.

Framework of analysis Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are included in the group of ‘highly stable’ countries. According to the Fragile State Index report, Lithuania was ranked 155th, which made it the least stable and vulnerable among the three Baltic states. Estonia (152) and Latvia (146) were placed lower (Fragile States Index, 2021)1. Recently, the security risk in the Baltic Sea region has increased. The border between Russia and NATO countries was considered to be the most likely flashpoint, which made the Baltic states a site of potential international conflict. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia jointly share concerns about Russia’s revisionist policy. For Russia, the destabilization in the Baltic states is beneficial; therefore, Russia continues to maintain the tense situation in the region. Russia wants to punish the Baltic states for their independence and for abandoning the existing rules of the game under Russia’s sovereignty (Laurelle, 2015). The instruments used by Russia included accusations of discrimination and violation of human rights (Kuczyńska-​Zonik, 2016), economic pressures and embargoes (Kilvits, Purju & Pädam, 2006; Oja, 2015; Sineviciene & Krusinskas, 2018), impact through non-​profit organizations, religious organizations (Lamoreaux & Mabe, 2019), historical narratives based on the glorification of the Soviet Army (Onken, 2007; Nikitina, 2014), media influence and propaganda. Russia also used national minorities, in particular in Latvia and Estonia, to destabilize them politically and to weaken their position on the international stage. Russia also increased defense spending, reformed its own armed forces and demonstrated its own military capabilities at the border in the Kaliningrad Oblast (Veebel, 2018; Veebel & Ploom, 2019). This situation has been observed in particular since 2008 (the Russian-​ Georgian conflict), but the annexation of Crimea (2014) and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022) were of particular importance for security in the region. The result of the above events was the intensified actions of states in the field of defense and multidimensional cooperation in the region. Currently, this

42  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska cooperation is visible mainly at the level of European institutions and NATO, as well as in tripartite and informal multilateral formats. The natural reaction of the state to the threat is to increase its security through alliances with other countries that share its values (Lamoreaux, 2014). At the same time, the Baltic states saw the need for greater activity in the region in order to prevent potential threats in Eastern Europe. To indicate how the Ukrainian-​ Russian war has influenced security concerns in the Baltic states, Barry Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is adapted. The regional security complex theory, as elaborated by Buzan (2003), forms the theoretical basis for this thesis where Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are interdependent from the security of the other actors. According to Buzan, regional complexity refers to the situation in which security issues of states are interconnected to each other in a way that is not possible to separate them reasonably. Moreover, within changing international environment we observe re-​conceptualization of the security concept takes place by including new issues related to threats and risks to state stability as a consequence of new-​generation (hybrid) warfare. While military concerns have still been serious, other types of threats have been emerging directed to sectors such as economy, politics, environment and society, that do not operate in isolation from each other. They all include offensive capacities, organizational stability of state, the authorities, economic and financial resources, language and media, as well as culture and national identity. Each of them can be vulnerable to internal or external threats. States may address problems differently and their approaches how to solve them may diverse as well. In our study, we focus on the Baltic states’ security perception interrelated to Russia’s invasion to Ukraine. Thus, we analyze the regional security triangle –​the Baltic states–​Russia–​Ukraine –​to explore how the Baltic states mix elements of a national security strategy with elements of an international security to optimize their security situations. The authors use mainly the method of a critical analysis of media content and systemic analysis to indicate the security strategies and selected narratives which stood behind the authorities’ decisions. The RSCT will be adapted as an adequate instrument to introduce an analysis of security discourse in the Baltic states on national dimension. In particular, our aim is to reveal: 1) how individual states and societies define their security; 2) how they interpret threats; and 3) what multidimensional strategies they apply.

Political consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine The tense situation in the region, caused by the deployment of additional Russian forces in the vicinity of the border with Ukraine and Belarus, and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, influenced the feeling of danger in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The reaction of the leaders of these countries was immediate. At an extraordinary session of the Lithuanian Seimas, convened on February 24, parliamentarians adopted a

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  43 resolution condemning Russian aggression. The politicians called on NATO and the EU to grant Ukraine EU candidate status and to include it in the Action Plan for NATO membership. They expressed their readiness to provide Ukraine with military, economic, political, humanitarian and legal aid. Fearing the threat of a Russian invasion immediately after the aggression on Ukraine, the Lithuanian authorities announced a state of emergency, which meant, inter alia, strengthening the protection of the state border, and control of vehicles, people and luggage in the border area, as well as the use of the Lithuanian Armed Forces for special security measures. On March 10, the state’s regime was tightened. This referred to the prohibitions related to, inter alia, organizing demonstrations, media publications, taking pictures of infrastructure or broadcasting TV programs. The Latvian Saeima also stated that ‘Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a flagrant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a violation of Russia’s international obligations.’ Riga City Council decided to provide financial aid to Ukraine in the amount of EUR 500,000. Lithuania and Latvia have also suspended the issuing of visas for Russian citizens. Another gesture of solidarity was the meeting in the Lublin Triangle format, in which the presidents of Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda and the Polish president Andrzej Duda met in Kiev with the Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky. A day before the Russian invasion, the leaders of the states, in a joint declaration, had denounced their condemnation of Russia’s actions, which grossly violated the basic principles of international laws. A meeting of the heads of diplomacy of the Baltic states in Kiev was scheduled for Friday, February 25, which was to be another act of support for Ukraine. However, due to the outbreak of the war, on the night of Wednesday (23rd) to Thursday (24th) the ministers of foreign affairs were evacuated from the territory of the country by land. The date of the Russian invasion coincided with the celebration of the Estonian national holiday. In the celebration of the 104th anniversary of Estonia’s independence, as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine, parade participants pinned two-​color ribbons in the national colors of the country. Like Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia also condemned the aggression and expressed support for wide-​ranging sanctions against Russia, including regions newly recognized by Russia. Prime Minister Kaja Kallas announced that she would help by all possible means. Due to the bias and disinformation regarding the situation in Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia immediately suspended broadcasting Russian TV channels. All three Baltic countries also decided to close their airspace to Russian planes. Along with the development of the situation on the war front, issues related to security in the region took a priority place in the public debate of the Baltic states. Solidarity with Ukraine and unconditional commitment were actions that also served to increase the security of the region. Russia’s action plans, announced many times, provided an additional incentive to maximize efforts to support the attacked country. From March 7, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, called on the states of the North Atlantic Alliance to close the airspace over Ukraine. Despite repeated calls from the president, the

44  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska United States firmly ruled out such a possibility, fearing that it would lead to a direct conflict between the American and Russian armies. The Baltic states clearly supported the appeals of the Ukrainian leader, also calling on NATO countries to introduce a no-​fly zone. The Riigikogu was the first parliament in the world to uphold the appeal of President Zelensky. In the same week, the Lithuanian parliament and the Latvian Saeima called upon the UN to immediately take the necessary measures to enforce the no-​fly zone over Ukraine. The issue of protection of the civilian population as part of the ban on flights over Ukraine and support for the tightening of sanctions united the Balts in solidarity with Ukraine. As is the introduction of laws prohibiting the use of hostile symbols. The Seym of first Estonia, then Latvia, and later of Lithuania banned the use of the symbols ‘Z’ and ‘V,’ used by Russia during its aggression against Ukraine, and the use of the St. George’s ribbon in yellow and black, symbolizing Russia’s victory. The display of these signs, among others, in the Baltic states is punishable by a fine. On March 18, a total of ten Russian diplomats were expelled from the Baltic region. Latvia and Estonia each sent away three diplomats for being security threats and using propaganda activities to justify Russian military actions, while Lithuania classified four Russian embassy employees as undesirable on its territory. In addition, at the beginning of April, in response to the brutal crimes committed by Russian soldiers in the Kiev region (including Bucha, Irpiń and Borodyanka), the Lithuanian authorities decided to close the Russian consulate in Klaipėda and to lower the Russian diplomatic representation. The organized consultations and visits attended by representatives of the Baltic states participated in the demonstration of support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as support for European and NATO aspirations: on March 24 in Brussels (presidents of Poland and the Baltic states on the margin of the extraordinary NATO summit); April 12 in Rzeszów (presidents of Poland and the Baltic states –​as part of the extraordinary B3 +​Poland summit); April 13 in Kiev (presidents of Poland and the Baltic states –​on the first visit of heads of state to the Ukrainian capital since the beginning of the Russian aggression); April 15 in Kiev (the ministers of foreign affairs of the Baltic states); April 22 in Kiev (ministers of culture of the Lublin Triangle –​Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine –​the issue of television infrastructure and disinformation); on April 22 in Riga (prime ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). The leaders and representatives of states emphasized the need for the international community to carry out tasks, which include financial and military aid, showing support, also in the efforts for Ukraine to join NATO and the EU, as well as trying war criminals. On April 21, the Estonian and Latvian parliaments unanimously adopted a resolution in which they recognized the actions of the Russian armed forces against the civilian population in Ukraine as a crime of genocide. Russia’s aggression has brought about fundamental changes in the economic relations of the Baltic states with Russia and the puppet authorities of Belarus, which was the backbone of military operations on Ukrainian

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  45 soil. Due to the significant role of revenues from transit, as well as the expected losses as the economic consequences of the blockade of exports to Russia (Russia has so far been the main export destination for Lithuania and Estonia), the turn in economic relations with Russia has proved to be quite a challenge. Despite the annexation of the Crimea, the Russian military operations launched in the Donbas in 2014, and the crisis on the Belarusian border, aided by decisions from Moscow, the Baltic states were quite restrained in implementing decisions that severely affected their economy. There were still domestic economic actors in the region, even state-​owned corporations, which took advantage of emerging opportunities to circumvent sanctions for as long as possible. The fairly cautious approach of the Balts to energy independence should also be noted, which was actually postponed over the entire decade. It was undoubtedly influenced by the low level of regional cooperation and the significant abandonment of transformation. Meanwhile, what could have atomized the Baltic region after the Russian-​Georgian conflict or the events in Ukraine in 2014, in the face of Russian aggression in 2022 led to a fundamental reconfiguration of inter-​Baltic relations. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have become the strongest votes in NATO, due to their assertive policy towards Russia and Belarus; this time, despite the rift between economic opportunities and geopolitical rhetoric, they firmly reacted to Russian actions. Despite a significant drop in incomes related to making radical decisions, the Baltic states indicated a clear intention to cut themselves off from a country which, due to its criminal activity in Ukraine, did not meet the conditions of a partner entity. Hence, the ministers responsible for transport in the Baltic states and Poland asked the European Union to ban road transport to Russia and Belarus. They also called for a ban on the entry of ships belonging to aggressor countries into ports throughout the European Union. This was another blow to the Russian economy. The pioneering decisions of the Baltic states and Poland were also maintained at the EU level. And so, from April 8, as part of the fifth package of EU sanctions against Russia, the possibility of the entry of trucks from Russian and Belarusian carriers to the EU, also in transit transport, was suspended. The situation in Ukraine has put energy security in particular among the Baltic states’ main underlying issues as well. The growing scale of brutalization of actions in the territory of Ukraine provoked a harsh reaction from the Baltic states. The Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian authorities unanimously decided to withdraw from Russian natural gas from April 1, 2022. The needs of the Baltic market began to be met by gas reserves accumulated in an underground storage facility in Lithuania (liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda). Another proposal was to supply Lithuania with gas through a gas interconnector with Latvia, and from May 1 through a similar system with Poland. Finland, which is one of the most energy-​dependent EU countries on Russia (100% of natural gas consumed in Finland, and 90% of oil from Russia) has also announced its intention to immediately diversify its supplies. Cooperation with Estonia is to serve the purpose of building independence. It assumes

46  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska the use of liquefied gas supplies by sea. As announced by Finland’s economic minister, Mika Lintilä, in order to quickly disconnect from the Russian gas pipeline, Finland and Estonia decided to lease an LNG gas carrier, i.e. a liquefaction and regasification unit (FSRU), the so-​called floating LNG terminal. Ultimately, it is to be connected to the natural gas network, and located on the southern coast of Finland, and ready for delivery in the winter of 2022/​ 23, when gas shortages may appear in Europe. Until it is put into service, the gas carrier will be accepted on the northern coast of Estonia at the port of Paldiski. Due to the limited ability to meet the gas demand of all Baltic states through the LNG terminal in Klaipėda, Latvia is also looking for its own solutions to diversify natural gas supplies. The idea of building a new LNG terminal is supported by investors from the USA and the Middle East, who want to get involved in its construction as a supplement to the Lithuanian terminal. The Latvian terminal would be connected to the Estonian Paldiski junction. Lithuanian president Gitanas Nausėda encouraged other EU Member States to boycott Russian gas. Meanwhile, as announced by the EU representative for foreign affairs and security policy Josep Borrell, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia is to contain only ‘some’ form of an oil embargo. The EU countries are still divided over the embargo or the increase in tariffs on Russian oil. Among the EU countries, only the Baltic states, Poland and France are in favor of a complete abandonment of Russian energy sources. The Balts introduced their decisions in a flash.

Military support of the Baltic states for Ukraine Russian aggression against Ukraine, contrary to Putin’s assumptions, led to the consolidation and a relatively coherent reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance countries and the EU. Despite the Kremlin’s disinformation activity revived in recent years and intensified work on creating and strengthening divisions in the transatlantic community, Western military aid, along with sanctions, was a key tool for influencing the course of the war. On the other hand, in the Baltic region, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the feeling of being threatened by a possible intention to demonstrate power by Putin against Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which could become an area of a potential conflict, has increased significantly. The armed conflict in the Ukrainian territory has clearly changed the Balts’ perception of the threat –​ as in addition to hybrid activities, cyberattacks and activation of pro-​Russian circles, conventional war was also starting to be considered. Therefore, in the context of the events of 2022, the Baltic states updated their national policies and initiated deepened cooperation focused on solving common problems. External pressure forced states to implement an even more active defense policy. Therefore, it is noticeable that intensified activities have been undertaken in the region, within the framework of regional (Lublin Triangle, EU) and international organizations (NATO, UN), as well as bilateral and

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  47 multilateral formulas. Hence, it seems natural to look for allies among the closest neighbors who share their opinions and beliefs, and to tighten contacts. One of the most important allies of the Baltic states is Poland, which provides them with support for projects against Russia’s influence in the region. There is now a noticeable concentration of efforts on the following issues: military, energy and information. It remains to be hoped that these countries will continue their current direction of cooperation in a trilateral (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) or even a quadrilateral (Poland) format. On the other hand, future political, defense, economic and especially energy cooperation will not be limited to participation in regional organizations or diplomatic initiatives, only as part of meetings and discussions, but only real activities aimed at actual solving common problems. Therefore, the success enabling the Baltic states to undertake effective cooperation is the change in the security paradigm, assuming, conditioned by extraordinary circumstances, the superiority of regional interests over national interests, especially in this matter. The scale of the threat to these three small Baltic states after February 2022 is the largest in years. The unequivocal condemnation of Russia’s policy, the weakening of the region’s sense of security, which was intensified after the Russian attack on Ukraine, and the commitment to support Ukraine in solidarity, had a strong influence on the unified position of the Baltic states. It is not without significance that the foundation of their stability is NATO, which is the basis of security and defense cooperation in the Euro-​Atlantic region and a key pillar of collective defense. All three countries, aware of the strong dependence in military matters on NATO, are aware of its importance and importance. Hence, shortly after Russia’s aggression, there was a consistent demonstration of reliability in the context of the coherent implementation of the Alliance’s objectives in the region. In the face of the events that took place, these countries emphasized the need to strengthen and dynamize the military cooperation of the pact to stop Russia’s aggression. Key decisions aimed at strengthening NATO’s eastern flank were made during the Warsaw summit in 2016. After that, at the beginning of 2017, multinational battalion battlegroups capable of interoperable operations in cooperation with national forces were deployed in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. In the face of the Kremlin’s aggressive policy in 2022, the leaders of the Baltic states unanimously asked for an increase in the number of troops stationed in the region. Lithuanian Minister of Defense, Arvydas Anusauskas, called for an increase in the NATO combat groups in the Baltic states, i.e., battalions (approximately 1,000 soldiers), to the level of brigades. This would significantly strengthen the number of Alliance soldiers stationed in the region, as the brigade consists of several battalions. Following the invasion of 2022, the battalions stationed in the Baltic states have already been partially enlarged. However, the final decision to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense attitude, and in particular to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank in the longer term, was made at the North Atlantic Alliance summit in June 2022 in Madrid. The decisions of the Madrid summit significantly strengthened the level of security of the

48  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska states of this Baltic region. The number of NATO troops has been increased (a total of brigade-​sized groups, i.e., from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel, are to be stationed in each of the Baltic states), it was decided to improve communication and coordinate actions in the event of a threat, including close military cooperation between the Baltic states. In addition, it was decided to intensify the training plan, to streamline the decision-​making process and expand the infrastructure. A historic event was the decision to enlarge NATO to include Sweden and Finland, which, thanks to Turkey’s final consent, which has been blocking the accession process for a long time, will strengthen NATO’s potential in the Baltic Sea region. Undoubtedly, the main beneficiaries of these countries’ accession to the organization will be the Baltic states, which will be measurably affected by the strengthening of security in this area. Meanwhile, at a meeting in Riga at the end of April, the prime ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia reaffirmed their strong support for Ukraine’s independence and its future in the EU, called for the rapid delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine, and announced an increase in defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the group of countries most strongly involved in the supply of arms, military equipment and training support for Ukraine. These countries were involved in helping Ukraine even before the outbreak of the war. The Estonian authorities have unsuccessfully called on EU countries, especially Germany, to become more actively involved in defending it against the attack. A month before the invasion, the Estonian government appealed to the German chancellor to hand over the post-​Soviet howitzers, previously belonging to the GDR, which went to Estonia in 2009. However, the German authorities blocked the possibility of handing them over, expressing their support only in April, three months after the appeal by Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas. The Baltic states also provided military, medical and technical assistance to Ukraine. FGM-​148 Javelin anti-​tank missile systems, ammunition, hand grenades, mines, 2A18 (D-​30) howitzers, Stinger missile sets, military equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets) provide significant support in the fight against aggression on the war front. The enormous commitment to the area covered by the war of these three small Baltic republics makes these countries, and especially Estonia, the leaders of aid to Ukraine today. According to the Institute of World Economy in Kiel, in terms of national GDP, Estonia gave the most support, and Lithuania is in third place, right after Poland. The governments of the Baltic states have launched a humanitarian aid coordination mechanism. Aid is targeted at people staying in the territory of Ukraine, as well as refugees who are already in the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as those who are reaching them. Humanitarian organizations, social activists, artists and ordinary citizens have launched numerous collections of material gifts as well as cash for Ukraine. In addition to charity concerts, efforts have been concentrated in the first place to prepare for the admission of war pupils, i.e. to create accommodation and conditions

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  49 for the admission of Ukrainian students to schools. The Baltic states were preparing for various scenarios of conflict development, including accepting refugees. According to the plans, Lithuania would be ready to accept 30,000 to 40,000 people, Latvia 10,000, and Estonia 2,000. The plans concerned the preparation of accommodation centers for refugees, the method of their registration, health verification and other forms of assistance (providing basic necessities, vaccination against COVID-​19). In Latvia, additional training for rescue services and firefighters is planned in the near future. Lithuanian business also reacted to Russia’s aggression. The Lithuanian companies Norfa and Maxima informed about the withdrawal from sale of goods produced in Russia and Belarus and the suspension of further orders from these countries. The Latvian hotel industry has expressed its readiness to accept refugees from Ukraine. The Estonian Postimees Grupp unilaterally terminated the contract for the sale of advertising on Russian TV channels broadcast to the audience in Estonia.

The war in Ukraine and social integration Russian-​speaking minorities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which account for around 6, 32 and 27 percent of the population respectively in these countries, are often perceived as presenting integration and social security problems (Janson, 2003; Kalmus, 2003; Smith, 2003; Zepa, 2008; Kuczyńska-​ Zonik, 2017). This is the case most in Latvia and Estonia (in Latvian Latgalia, Russian-​speaking inhabitants constitute 40 percent of the population, and in the Estonian Eastern Virumaa region 80 percent). A number of public opinion polls carried out after 2014 indicated significant support of minority representatives for the annexation of Crimea by Russia (Ozolina, 2016). For this reason, they were repeatedly accused of supporting the regime of Vladimir Putin and considered a potential threat to social cohesion (Laruelle, 2015). Similarly, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian speakers faced accusations that they accepted and supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Latvia, after the annexation of Crimea, 35 percent of Russian-​speaking respondents supported Russia (2016 SKDS research) –​currently 21 percent are in favor of Russian action (research by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Latvia in 2022). The same research confirmed that 15 and 22 percent of respondents showed solidarity with Ukraine, respectively. A similar situation took place in Estonia. On the other hand, the Lithuanian society agreed as to the assessment of Russia’s aggression –​ 91 percent of the inhabitants were against the military invasion of Ukraine, which resulted from the lower percentage of the Russian-​speaking minority and the high degree of integration with Lithuanian society (Kasatkina, 2003). Especially in social media, Russian speakers were accused of supporting the regime of Vladimir Putin. Russian students were also attacked. This narrative was repeated by members of the ruling parties in Latvia, who expressed the opinion that the Russian-​speaking inhabitants of the country

50  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska should be assimilated, and those dissatisfied with the government’s policy should be expelled. There was also information in the media about plans to deprive Russian citizens of the right to stay in Estonia. They were denied by interior minister Kristian Jaani, explaining that only those who breached the conditions of the permit could receive revocation or non-​renewal of their residence permit. Estonian minister of justice Maris Lauri confirmed that nothing will change for Russian-​speaking holders of the so-​called gray passport (in Estonia about 70,000 people have it; these are people with undefined citizenship, who after the collapse of the USSR did not receive Estonian citizenship and do not have any other). Most of them have lived here for over thirty years, and they consider Estonia their homeland. The acts against local Russians and Belarusians have been vehemently condemned by the prime ministers and members of the governments of the Baltic states. The first to object was the mayor of Vilnius, Remigijus Šimašius, who called on the Lithuanian population not to criticize the Russian-​speaking inhabitants. He emphasized that he wanted Russian-​speaking children not to be bullied in schools and playgrounds. Lithuanian prime minister Ingrida Šimonytė said that Lithuanians of Belarusian and Russian nationality were patriots in this country. The Latvian prime minister, Krišjānis Kariņš, stated that in the face of the situation, the society had to integrate, because the attack was being carried out by the brutal Kremlin regime, and not by the Russian people. Kariņš also called on politicians to refrain from any speeches or statements that could be seen as incitement to hatred. Former Latvian president Valdis Zatlers called for social solidarity –​both between ethnic Latvians and Russian-​speaking minorities, and Latvian Ukrainians and Russians. He pointed out that the war in Ukraine could be used as a pretext for the escalation of tensions between conflicting ethnic groups by agents of the Russian secret services stationed in Latvia. Deputies of the City Council in Rēzekne called on residents not to transfer responsibility to Russian speakers and not to contribute to incitement to hatred. The local government also expressed its readiness to support the Ukrainian nation. Despite accusations of supporting the Kremlin, many Russian speakers have joined the protests condemning the aggression and are in solidarity with the fighting Ukrainians. Like many ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, they participated in anti-​war protests and provided aid to refugees. More than 100 Latvian Russians and Belarusians signed an open letter from the Society for Literature Without Borders condemning Russia’s military aggression and expressing support for Latvia’s actions. Employees of the Russian Theater named after Mikhail Chekhov in Riga supported the refugees who came to Latvia by providing them with housing, medicines and food. Similarly, Eugene, the Metropolitan of Tallinn and the whole of Estonia, called for the clergy and parishioners of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to stop fighting and help Ukraine. The Russian-​speaking communities in the Baltic states are not homogeneous, and tensions between ethnic groups have been increasing since the

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  51 beginning of the Russian aggression. Many of their members show solidarity with Ukraine, but some endorse Putin’s policy. The attitude of Russian-​ speaking people towards refugees from Ukraine is also different. For example, according to a survey conducted at the end of February (Turu-​uuringute AS), 91 percent of ethnic Estonians support accepting refugees from Ukraine, but at the same time this opinion is shared by only 48 percent of respondents of other nationalities in the country. In Latvia, an opinion poll (SKDS) revealed a different attitude towards helping refugees among ethnic Latvians and Russian-​speaking people. While only 5 percent of respondents who use Latvian on a daily basis believed that the help so far was too great, 30 percent of Russian-​speaking people shared a similar opinion. They were afraid that Ukrainians would receive more support from the state than residents and that refugees might take their jobs away. Those interviewed also believed that the government discriminated against Russian-​speaking residents –​while Ukrainians were temporarily exempted from the obligation to speak the state language in some professions, Russian-​speaking residents are still required to be fluent in the language. Residents also pointed out that Ukrainians can benefit from free healthcare, which means that the queues for specialists are longer. Some Russian-​speaking residents in the Baltic states also complained about too severe economic sanctions imposed on Russia, especially those who receive pensions from Russia through or Estonian institutions. In Latvia, it is about 20,000 people, and in Estonia –​just over 4,000 people. These are mainly people with Latvian and Estonian citizenship who worked in the USSR until 1991. Due to the depreciation of the Russian ruble, the pensions paid in euros in Latvia and Estonia were much lower. Education in Russian was also a particularly problematic issue –​Russian speakers were afraid that the current situation would limit education in this language. Concurrently, in Latvia, at the initiative of conservative groups, shortly after the invasion, work began on a reform of the education system, limiting classes in Russian. In the opinion of some experts, the initiative took advantage of the concerns of part of the society about the too large share of the Russian language in public life, and was dictated by the October 2022 parliamentary elections in Latvia. There were also isolated cases of anti-​Ukrainian attitudes in the Baltic states. In the building of the music school in Daugavpils, Latvia (inhabited in large numbers by the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities), a group of protesters tried to take off the Ukrainian flag and opposed the admission of refugees. The police had to intervene. City officials explained that they had not placed the flag on the council building to avoid provocation. The police also investigated the destruction of cars with Ukrainian registration numbers or blue and yellow flags displayed in solidarity with Ukraine. Skepticism and aversion towards Ukrainian war refugees are also visible in Russian-​speaking Facebook groups and in comments on news portals. There are narratives that refugees are prejudiced against Russian-​speaking residents in the Baltic states, that they do not have the necessary competences on the local labor market (e.g., Ukrainian health certificates do not meet EU

52  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska requirements, and diplomas confirming professional competences have been illegally purchased), and that classes for Ukrainian children will be created at the expense of students belonging to national minorities. The special attitude of Russian-​speaking people towards refugees from Ukraine is the result of long-​term political and social processes in the Baltic states, as well as partial negligence on the part of the state (Murasovs, 2017). Firstly, the attitude of solidarity with Ukrainians among ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians may result from the experiences of refugees during World Wars I and II and deportations during the Soviet period. Thanks to collective memory, they understand and share the burden of experiences of war refugees to a greater extent (Kattago, 2010). On the other hand, the lack of similar experiences in Russian-​speaking people (who themselves came to the Baltic republics during the Soviet period as labor migrants or are their descendants) may affect their lower level of empathy and distancing of themselves from refugees (Cheskin, 2012; Birka, 2016). Second, anti-​Western and anti-​government narratives spread over the years in Russian media available in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia may be a source of resentment. Despite the closure of many pro-​Kremlin TV channels, propaganda about Russian aggression and refugees is spread over the internet. Thirdly, the reason may be an ineffective integration policy of the state, especially in Latvia, where the Latvian language is central (Aasland & Fløtten, 2001). The Russian language, which is also spoken by some Ukrainians who have come to the Baltic states, is still treated as a threat to state security and social cohesion.

Russian-​speaking media in the Baltic states In the Russian-​speaking media sphere in the Baltic states, one can distinguish media belonging to Russian media groups that broadcast Russian content directly in these countries, and media whose content is modeled on the content of Russian media. Both types are financed from and depend on Russian sources, which affects their quality and the way political and social events are presented (Kuczyńska-​Zonik, 2016). Pervyj Baltijskij Kanal –​PBK (three versions of the channel for the three Baltic states respectively) and other channels are broadcast by the Latvian company Baltijas Mediju Alianse (its turnover in 2019 was EUR 13.5 million). It also publishes the Russian-​language press MK-​Latvija and MK-​Estonija and maintains websites in Russian. Until now, the popularity of these media in the Baltic states resulted from their attractiveness and the appropriate selection of topics and ways of presenting them, which ensured entertainment and a pleasant way of spending free time. These media imposed on the recipients a pro-​Kremlin narrative, the aim of which was to maintain significant ethnic divisions in society and the lack of trust between the society and institutions in the state. The governments of the Baltic states, the USA and NATO were blamed for the current negative political, social and economic situation of states and the status of national minorities. As a result, they created a sense of injustice and built tensions among the

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  53 Russian-​speaking people based on Soviet resentments. It influenced the degree of political, social and cultural stability of states. After 2014, the Russian media have become an effective channel of Russia’s information influence in the Baltic states, based on propaganda, manipulation and disinformation. Despite the fact that Russian TV channels in Lithuania and Latvia have been repeatedly suspended due to providing false information or promoting hatred between nations (such restrictions have not been applied by Estonia), their popularity has not decreased (Maliukevičius, 2015). However, the preference for this type of media channels by the recipients did not mean unreflective approval of Putin’s policy, as Russian-​speaking people more and more often remain skeptical about the information provided. They focus primarily on local issues and social issues (education, state social policy, labor market). Moreover, the level of interest in politics and international affairs, as well as the degree of political activation of Russian-​speaking recipients is low. However, the Baltic states have taken actions in the media sphere to increase the awareness of information threats and resistance to manipulation among Russian-​speaking citizens in these countries. After the riots related to the relocation of the monument, the so-​called Bronze Soldier in Tallinn in 2007, and especially after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014, the Estonian public broadcaster started broadcasting in Russian. In 2015, ETV +​television was established for this purpose. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ETV +​had less than 2 percent of the daily viewership, while the three most popular Russian channels (PBK, RTR Planeta and NTV Mir) accounted for 11 percent. On the other hand, in Latvia, PBK was the third most watched TV channel, with a 7 percent share of audience time, and in Lithuania it was outside the top ten (2 percent of total viewing time). Apart from Estonia, none of the public service broadcasters broadcast their entire channel in Russian. Due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, many pro-​Kremlin TV channels have been banned from broadcasting in the Baltic states, which aroused the dissatisfaction of some politicians, in particular national minorities receiving Russian-​language programs. Lithuania and Latvia have banned the retransmission of Russian TV stations, including Rossiya and Rossiya-​ 24. Similarly, Estonia, which has so far not imposed major restrictions on the domestic media market, has suspended the broadcasting of pro-​Kremlin media: RTR Planet, NTV Mir, NTV Mir Baltiya, Russia 24, Belarus 24 and TV Center International. In addition, Estonian media operators Telia and Elisa have announced that they will terminate cooperation agreements with local media broadcasting in Russian based on content from Russia, i.e. PBK Estonia, REN TV Estonia and NTV Mir Estonia. The pro-​Kremlin propaganda is still disseminated on internet portals and in social media. Among internet portals, this mainly concerns Baltija.eu (registered in Estonia in 2008, provides information to the Russian diaspora and the Russian-​speaking inhabitants of Estonia) and Baltnews (a Russian-​language news agency specializing in informing about the socio-​political situation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Until 2018, both editorial offices were located in the Baltic

54  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska states, and currently they are located in Moscow. Their range of influence is relatively low, which does not mean that they can be ignored. As for social media, these are mainly Facebook groups in which their administrators and members actively share content in line with the Kremlin’s rhetoric (sometimes the administrators remain hidden and do not publish any posts). While users of these groups have so far focused on discrediting the national governments of the Baltic states and improving the image of Russia among the diaspora, they are now spreading false information about the war in Ukraine and the reactions of Baltic states’ governments in solidarity with Ukraine. The most frequently repeated false narratives have been: 1. Russia has launched a special operation in Ukraine. Its purpose is to protect residents who are intimidated by the Kiev regime, which is responsible for the bloody crimes against the civilian population in Donbas. 2. Russophobia has taken over the societies of the Baltic states. The Russian diaspora has become the target of acts of aggression by representatives of other nationalities. Russians in Lithuania are attacked and their property destroyed. In Latvia, vandals desecrated monuments to Soviet soldiers –​ liberators from the Nazi occupation. 3. The Baltic states cause panic among NATO states. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are looking for excuses to conflict with Russia in order to show that they are loyal to the USA. 4. The political elites in the Baltic states are weak and are subject to pressure from nationalists. 5. The governments of the Baltic states are taking revenge on the Russians, and, under the guise of the events in Ukraine, are trying to completely remove Russianness (education, language and culture) from public life. Such actions result from the desire for revenge and retaliation against the Russians.

Conclusion The reaction of the authorities of the Baltic states, unlike after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, indicates a united position towards Russia. Certainly, Baltic solidarity increases the weakened sense of security after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as direct threats targeted at Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The real threat from Russia (or at least its announcement) is also strengthened by the historical analogies of these countries (belonging to the USSR treated in terms of the occupation of countries) and the comparable geopolitical location (post-​Soviet territories bordering the Russian Federation), which have a direct impact on the state of anxiety. The Baltic states, aware of their military dependence on NATO, realized that the Alliance remained the key foundation of the region’s stability, which largely influenced speaking with one voice on Ukraine. Solid support for initiatives against the Russian Federation –​condemning Russia’s military

The Baltic States and Russian Aggression  55 actions and joining economic sanctions against the aggressor, as well as political and social initiatives expressing commitment and support towards Ukraine (before and after the outbreak of the war) –​has clearly united the Baltic states. Aid for the fighting country and the Ukrainian society (military, medical, humanitarian) as well as care for energy, raw materials and information security in the Baltic region have strongly integrated the efforts of the political elites, allowing them to join forces in overcoming Russian influence and pressure. The rapid increase in fears about the future of the Baltic states and the awareness of the scale of the threat, nota bene reinforced by Russian blackmail, led to actions aimed at strengthening their own security. The unique geopolitical situation and the accompanying aggressive statements from the Kremlin have paradoxically created the conditions for undertaking activities that boost cooperation between them. The authorities in the Baltic states, drawing conclusions from the Russian sabotage activities carried out to date in various areas, unanimously took decisive steps to make the energy sector independent by stopping the import of energy and natural gas from Russia, as well as diversifying the directions of supplies and searching for new economic partners. As a result of the economic sanctions imposed by the EU, the economic relations of the states have also been reoriented. The involvement in joint actions for Ukraine and the anti-​Russian policy of the entire region were conducive to rebuilding mutual trust in the Baltic states. The awareness of the growing threat, exacerbated by the crisis situation, made it possible to rebuild the partnership of the Balts, allowing them to join forces in overcoming the influence and pressure of the Russian Federation. All these actions are determined on the basis of fear for security understood in many dimensions (politically, militarily, economically, and socially). Hence, the optimal way to increase the stability of the region is precisely the cooperation and coordination of its entities, due to the importance of interdependence as a key determinant of collective security. Regional complexity must therefore be the starting point for strategic cooperation of entities carrying out tasks for the territorial integrity of the region. It is for this reason that the mechanisms filling regional and global security stability are gaining importance in the post-​ Westphalian international environment (Buzan, 2003). Therefore, the security of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia depends on the security of other international actors. The unanimity and coordination of the actions of the Baltic states towards war-​torn Ukraine may be conducive to increasing the region’s stability, strengthening the common regional identity and motivating to harmonious cooperation for the benefit of a collective security environment. Meanwhile, the societies of the Baltic states in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not homogeneous, and the dividing line runs along ethnic lines (Steen, 2000). From the very first days of the war between Russia and Ukraine, most of the inhabitants, ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, as well as Russian-​speaking people, condemned the attack by Russia and expressed their solidarity with Ukraine. Many of them were involved in helping refugees. At the same time, some Russian-​speaking people claimed that the sanctions

56  A. Kuczyńska-Zonik and K. Sierzputowska imposed on Russia were too severe, and that the help given to Ukrainians fleeing the war was too much. The reasons for this situation are complex and result from both historical conditions and the failure of the state’s integration policy to date. Especially the latter factor means that immigrants –​even from neighboring countries –​are often perceived as a threat. Therefore, empathy towards refugees is not a strong enough motivation to engage in help. It should also be kept in mind that the government’s refugee program may lead to strong opposition to being accepted by part of the population. Russian-​speaking people in particular may feel insecure and worry about their socio-​economic situation. They are also less trusting towards the government and perceive state policy as discriminatory (Cheskin, 2013). The overwhelming majority of decision-​makers support help and solidarity with the war refugees from Ukraine. Nevertheless, some politicians popular among Russian-​ speaking voters of political parties (such as the Social Democratic Party ‘Harmony’) do not have an unequivocal attitude to the war between Russia and Ukraine, thus fitting into the pro-​Kremlin narrative. They prefer to distance themselves from helping refugees, and their attitude stems from fear of social unrest. For years, the Baltic states have also been trying to create an open, mature, independent information environment accessible to Russian-​speaking people. Activities to improve information security in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia consist in making their own media offer more attractive, improving the quality of the media, promoting civic attitudes and cooperation between the state and private media sector and non-​governmental organizations. As a result, the awareness of information threats as well as resistance to manipulation increases among citizens. As a result, now Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia show greater inter-​ethnic solidarity than in 2014 in expressing both criticism of the Putin regime and support for Ukraine. Importantly, there is a large group of Russian-​speaking people who do not support either side, which is the result of the information war and the deep identity crisis of Russians. Both in Latvia and Estonia, differences between the representatives of individual ethnic groups are still visible in the judgment of the events in Ukraine.

Note 1 The report assessed the ability to control one’s borders and territory as well as the political, demographic and economic situation of the state. The monitoring covered 179 countries.

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4 A Celebrity, a Hero, a Statesman … All Images of the President of Ukraine, V. Zelensky Marzena Cichosz and Joanna Kozierska

Introduction Volodymyr Zelensky appeared on the political scene in Ukraine only in 2019, shortly before the presidential election and –​with, among other things, capital gained thanks to an acting and cabaret career, including recognition –​he won these elections. In the second round of the presidential election, with a significant advantage (73.22 to 24.45 percent) he defeated an experienced politician, Petro Poroshenko –​the president seeking re-​election. Another success of V. Zelensky was that his newly formed group called Servant of the People (which was a reference to a popular TV series in which the politician played the main role) obtained 254 seats (out of 450 in total) in the parliamentary elections in the same year. Just this short presentation of V. Zelensky’s political path allows him to be included in the category of politician-​celebrities, that is, leaders who successfully capitalize in politics their resources of recognition and popularity gained thanks to the media. At the same time, however, they enter the political arena without preparation and experience, often without a political base, and taking advantage of the populist mood of the electorate. In the literature on the subject, the celebrity of politics is characterized critically (e.g., West & Orman, 2003, pp. 14, 111–​119); in its context such a kind of politics is often referred to as ‘spoiled’ connected with amateurism, populism, etc. These categories were also used to describe the presidency of V. Zelensky until February 24, 2022, i.e., the beginning of the aggression of Russian troops against Ukraine. From that event on, the public image of V. Zelensky has undergone a fundamental change, and the politician began to be perceived and described as a hero fighting for his country and successfully seeking support for his country. The aim of this chapter is therefore to analyze the process of transforming the image of the president of Ukraine, starting from the presidential election in 2019, through the period of his presidency in 2019 to February 2022, to the escalation of the Russian-​Ukrainian war in February–​April 2022. Comparison proposed by V. Zelensky’s creation in these three periods will allow, on the one hand, the process of the politician’s image ‘transformation’ to be traced, understood as an attempt to radically change the content of the DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-5

60  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska image offer, but also –​in accordance with the assumed thesis –​will allow for deepening research on particular types of images of politicians, in particular a political celebrity, a hero and a statesman. Focusing attention on changes in the image offer of politicians under the influence of situational factors is also connected with the necessity of in-​depth research in this area. Previous studies either concern one type of image (Schmalenberger, 2016; Schneiker, 2019; Simons, 2019), or devoted to the analysis of well-​thought-​out strategies of leading a politician /​politicians to change their image offer (Wood, Corbett & Flinders, 2016). On the other hand, there are few analyses of the aspects of politicians’ communication in situations of serious crises and threats to citizens’ lives (e.g., Griffin-​Padgett & Allison, 2010). The deepening of this type of study is possible thanks to the exceptional situation on the international scene after February 24, 2022. Thanks to modern technology, the development of social media, but also –​ above all –​thanks to the strategies and tactics of the president of Ukraine, one has the opportunity to observe and analyze processes that are usually hidden from the public.

The image of the political leader, its types and functions The image of the political leader is one of the areas of political marketing that researchers eagerly explore. The development of studies on these issues is related, inter alia, to noted processes of personalization of the political offer (Dalton, McAllister & Wattenberg, 2000; Mughan, 2000; Bittner, 2021; Garzia, Ferreira da Silva, & De Angelis, 2020), i.e., the fact of focusing attention on relations in the political market on an individual –​a politician –​not his parent formation or the details of his political programs. The very concept of image is usually defined as a cognitive representation of the subject of politics –​the political leader, created in the minds of recipients mainly through political communication (Hacker, Zakahi, Giles & McQuitty, 2000; Bast, 2021, p. 3). While there is a relatively high agreement as to the method of defining the concept, significantly different concepts appear in the case of the components of the image of politicians. By greatly simplifying the ongoing discussion on this subject, it can be assumed that two main positions have crystallized. The first is represented by those researchers who combine the image of a politician with the perception of his personal qualities (personality, character, appearance, behavior, e.g., Johnston, 1989, p. 380). The second, in turn, is the position of supporters of a more comprehensive approach to the components of a politician, including also taking into account, for example, issues that the politician touches on and with which he is associated (among others Newman, 1994; Kaid, 1991; Hacker et al., 2000, p. 235). Due to the aims of this chapter, we are inclined to the latter position. We assume that the image of a politician is a complex construct and, as noted by Ştefan Stănciugelu and Irina Stănciugelu, belongs to the sphere of ‘social imaginary’ (2013, p. 217). Its content is influenced by both politicians and their environment by

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  61 proposing a specific construct, but also mass media and target recipients (citizens) who filter the content sent to them by their system of beliefs, attitudes, needs and expectations and confront them with internalized stereotypes and myths (Albouy, 1994, pp. 85–​86; Stănciugelu & Stănciugelu, 2013, p. 270 ff.). The effectiveness of broadcasters in creating the desired image is based, inter alia, on the proper recognition of the recipients’ expectations, as well as the aforementioned stereotypes, myths and cognitive devices, in order to send a simplified, condensed (in accordance with positioning requirements) message, to move the recipient’s emotions, evoke specific associations and, as a result, to permanently subscribe in her/​his consciousness. This observation leads us to search for the aforementioned patterns, i.e., types of images. In the scientific literature, one can find both items containing proposals for several types of images, such as S. Albouy, who (referring to Schwartzenberg’s concept) distinguished, among others, images of a politician as ‘father,’ ‘the charming leader (brother),’ an ‘ordinary man’ and a hero (Albouy, 1994, p. 93). There have also been studies devoted to the analysis of only selected types of images of politicians, e.g., statesmen (Overeem & Bakker, 2019), celebrities (Ribke, 2015; Weiskel, 2005; Wood et al., 2016), hero (Çaymaz, 2019). Many of these works relate to creating the image of a politician with the use of social media and include analyses of verbal, visual and audiovisual materials. Typologies of images largely depend on the criteria taken into account by researchers. When browsing the literature, it can be noticed that the main factors taken into account in this case are the personality traits of politicians and the style of communicating with the target audience (Bast, 2021; Street, 2019). The personality of a politician, and especially the fact that she/​he possesses charisma, is one of the premises allowing, for example, a political hero to be distinguished from an ‘ordinary man’ (Albouy, 1994, p. 73; compare K. Frisk, 2019, p. 90). With regard to the style of communication, the distance between the leader and the recipient is emphasized, i.e., whether the politician presents herself/​himself as ‘one of us,’ a person close to the recipients, having, for example, the same qualities and hobbies and spending time in a similar way, or ‘someone better,’ surpassing ‘ordinary’ citizens due to their unique qualities (education, skills, charisma, personality, place in the social structure), a leader (emphasizing distance). The types of ‘everyman’ and ‘people’s tribune’ are associated with reducing the distance (the authors’ term means a reference to the political populist style, see Knight, 1998, p. 223, Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 387, Finlayson, 2022, p. 64)). On the other hand, the following types are associated with increasing the distance to the recipient: a celebrity, a statesman, and a hero. Reducing the distance in the case of ‘everyman’ (referring to the proposal: ‘ideal candidate,’ cf. Grabe & Bucy, 2009) can be suggested, inter alia, by emphasizing empathy, showing politics among children, family, religious symbols, selected social groups, interaction with other people, using popular and symbolic gestures (e.g., thumbs up) (Bast, 2021, p. 4; Muñoz & Towner, 2017, p. 297). In turn, achieving the

62  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska effect of increasing the distance in the case of ‘statesman’ is possible, inter alia, by presenting the figure of a politician in more formal situations, using state symbols, in the company of other politicians (Schmalenberger, 2016; Bast, 2021, p. 4). A lot of space in the literature is devoted to the analysis of celebrities’ images. With regard to celebrities, first of all, it is necessary to emphasize the difference in defining ‘celebrity politicians’ and ‘political celebrities,’ for in the context of our considerations both types are important. Celebrity politicians are celebrities who, thanks to the popularity gained in other spheres of activity, successfully capitalize on their recognition and sympathy in the political sphere (t’Hart & Tindall, 2009; Marsh, ’t Hart & Tindall, 2010, p. 324). Their political successes are facilitated by the fact that they appear on the political scene as a ‘new’ image offer, present themselves as ‘political outsiders,’ not ‘tainted’ with the awkward compromises, linguistic obfuscation and endemic opportunism that, they claim, professional politics imposes upon its practitioners (Marsh et al., 2010, p. 324). Political celebrities, in turn, are defined as politicians who build their personal image resource on the basis of methods and techniques used by celebrities, with an emphasis on the use of mass and social media (‘t Hart and Tindall 2009, p. 259; Marsh et al., 2010, p. 324). Feature of the celebrity’s communication style are, among other things, blurring the difference between the spheres of private and public life (Marshall, 1997, p. 247), and an emphasis on political performance and the form rather than the content of politics (Street, 2019, p. 4). The audience’s reaction to the celebrity offer is also important: recognition and not only acceptance, but even adoration of fans (Street, 2019, pp. 9–​11). The process of creating the image of politicians is influenced by systemic and situational conditions: a politician may choose or circumstances will choose for her/​him a specific role that she/​he will play on the political scene (Simons, 2019, p. 310). Therefore, the next criteria taken into account when determining the types of images are the conditions in which the politician has to act (crisis vs. ‘normal times’) (Albouy, 1994, p.85; Simons, 2019, p. 310). This criterion is especially emphasized in the characteristics of the image of the political hero (Kitchen & Mathers, 2019). A hero is a politician in the times of crisis that arise when the life and property of citizens are in danger. The hero is someone whose special circumstances prompt her/​him to sacrifice herself/​himself for the good of others (see more in Franco, Blau & Zimbardo, 2011, pp. 102–​103). The authors emphasize that, although politicians in their appeal often refer to several different types of image, the guiding axis indicating the dominant type is usually clearly outlined. Another important remark due to the goals of this work is the observation that a politician in the course of her/​his political career may change the preferred type of image, adapt her/​his creation to the changing conditions of rivalry on the political scene and her/​his role in the political system (Albouy, 1994, p. 94). With regard to the function of a politician’s image, in the literature on the subject, some evidence can be found that they may be related to the

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  63 representation, not only of the leader herself/​himself, but also of her/​his parent formation, her/​his electorate (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Smith, 2001, p. 995; Coakley, Garry, Matthews & O’Leary, 2019, p. 11) and community-​specific values (Bast, 2021, p. 3). In a situation where a politician takes up positions important in the political system (e.g., of a president, prime minister), her/​his image in international relations influences the state’s brand (brand country, brand nation). As evidenced by, among others, D. Ingenhoff and S. Klein, researching the relationship between the image of a leader and the national brand, not all components of the image of a leader are equally significant in this case. Integrity is especially important (e.g., integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, lack of scandal), while the competences and charisma of the leader are less influential (Ingenhoff & Klein, 2018, p. 4525). The strength of the leader’s influence on the image of her/​his country also depends on the type of political regime; a greater influence can be seen in the case of presidential regimes (Ingenhoff & Klein, 2018, p. 4526). An important function of the image is also the mobilization (demobilization) of supporters (opponents), including electoral mobilization. The image of the leader may be one of the important reasons for voting for a specific political party (Newman, 1999, Smith, 2001; Garzia, 2013; Lobo, 2006, pp. 283–​284; Aaldering, 2018). The image may also play a role that legitimizes politics and the scope of power exercised by her/​him (in the context of the analysis of the phenomenon of political celebrity: Bang, 2009, pp. 5–​8). In an interesting study on the perception of the hero, K. Frisk refers to M. Weber’s argument concerning the relationship between the ideal type of ‘charismatic authority’ that tied together heroism and the legitimization of power. Weber argued that, contrary to the rational and traditional types of legitimate domination, ‘the power of charisma rests upon the belief in revelation and heroes […] upon heroism of an ascetic, military, judicial, magical or whichever kind’ (Frisk, 2019, p. 90). And finally –​as the functioning of a celebrity in politics sells –​the function of the image of politicians may be to provide entertainment to viewers (Weiskel, 2005; Keller & Kleinen-​von Königslöw, 2018). Not all the functions of the image presented are in practice emphasized by specific politicians and their image offer. If they are, not all of them are noticed by major audiences, public opinion, and the mass media. Especially the role of the latter is special in the context of considerations about the types of images. The manner of presenting the figure of a given politician in the media, metaphors, and labels that journalists use to characterize a politician are important indications as to the type of image that a politician ultimately creates in the minds of the target audience (Street, 2019, p. 9–​11).

Methodological assumptions The purpose of the analyses is to follow the process of changing the image of President V. Zelensky, starting from his appearance on the Ukrainian political scene in 2019 until the end of April 2022, and to indicate its characteristic

64  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska features. Assuming that the content (and, in effect, the type) of the image created by a politician is influenced by, inter alia, its role on the political scene, but also the situation in the environment, we have distinguished three periods in which, as we assume, the images created by the politician may be profiled differently: • • •

period I –​election campaign and presidential elections in 2019; period II –​the president’s term of office from June 2019 to February 23, 2022; period III –​from February 24 to April 30, 2022, i.e., the period after the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

The main research question concerns the types of political images created by President V. Zelensky, while the detailed questions are: To which audiences did V. Zelensky address his political appeal in subsequent periods of his activity on the political scene? What relations did he maintain with the recipients –​did he increase the distance towards the recipients, or did he reduce this distance? What tools (including social media) did V. Zelensky use to communicate with selected target groups (citizens, other political actors)? What political goals did he pursue, and thus –​what functions of his image did he refer to? We also put forward the following hypothesis: in all of the periods distinguished, V. Zelensky creates a different type of image, ranging from a political celebrity, through a ‘father,’ to a hero, and a statesman. He also adjusts tools, including preferred social media, to the created image. The spectrum of types of images to which we will be looking for references is presented in Table 4.1. We mainly took into account the proposals of S. Albouy (1994), S. Stănciugelu and I. Stănciugelu (2013), and J. Street (2019). However, slightly differently from the above-​mentioned authors, we selected criteria that will help in the identification of individual types. We propose taking into account the way of defining the recipient of messages (Questions: How does the sender define the recipient of his messages? Does the sender present himself as someone ‘outside and above’ the group of recipients, or is he a member of the community to which the appeal is addressed?) and the way he formulates his political goals (Questions: What benefits does the sender promise the recipients? What goals and how does he want to achieve them?, see Table 4.1). The nature of these relations, especially the distance between the sender and the recipient (Questions: What is the distance between the sender and the recipient?) The comparison of the creations proposed by V. Zelensky in these three periods will allow, on the one hand, the phenomenon of changes in the politician’s image offer to be characterized, but also –​in line with the assumed thesis –​will allow for in-​depth research on particular types of images of politicians, in particular political celebrities and heroines/​heroes. The research will be qualitative; the content of messages (verbal, audiovisual and audio) sent by President V. Zelensky in social media, mainly on Twitter,

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  65 Table 4.1 Types of politicians’ images and their characteristics Image type

Recipient

Relations with the recipient

Father

‘you’: ‘my people’

increasing the distance; paternalism

Brother/​local tribune Hero

Ordinary man Statesman Celebrity

The way of formulating political goals

concern for the welfare of ‘his’ people, over whom the politician cares for ‘we’: the society, distance reduction, development; jointly the people emphasizing formulating goals common features with the society with the recipient ‘you’: my brothers increasing the saving the community in arms distance /​people in times of crisis self-​sacrifice /​ sacrifice ‘we’: ‘normal shortening the implementing policies people’ distance in ‘normal times’ ‘you’: my nation increasing the representation of the distance interests of the nation and the state ‘you’: ‘my audience,’ increasing the entertaining people my fans distance

Source: Own study based on S. Albouy (2014, p. 93), Stănciugelu & I. Stănciugelu, 2013, pp. 280–​ 282; J. Street, 2019.

Facebook and Instagram, will be analyzed. The choice of content posted on social media as the main source material is justified. On the one hand, social media make it easier for a politician to create the desired image, because he himself is the main sender of messages addressed to recipients and can control their final shape, without the influence of journalists and their editors (Goodnow, 2013; Page & Duffy, 2018; Bast, 2021, p. 1), although of course this does not mean that the politician has complete freedom in this respect. The limitations of his creative activities are related to, inter alia, platform format and algorithm operation (Finlayson, 2022, p. 63). Secondly, research shows that the style of communicating with recipients (and thus the type of image created) also depends on the nature of the social medium. X. Farkas and M. Bene, who conducted research on visual materials, noticed that the use of Facebook promotes the individualization of the message (understood as focusing on the work of a politician), while Instagram promotes privatization (information about the private life of a politician) of the message (Farkas & Bene, 2021, p. 137). On the other hand, T. Small (2016) states that, in the case of Twitter, the strategies of message personalization rely on individualization, while privatization is somewhat marginal. Thirdly, the focus on social media also has a situational justification. As of the end of February 2022 and Russia’s aggression, social media is the most

66  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska accessible and sometimes the only available source of information on current events in Ukraine.

The image of V. Zelensky during the presidential election campaign in 2019 In November 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ordered presidential elections for March 31, 2019. These elections were to be a test for the path that Ukraine took after 2014 and the removal from power of the pro-​Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. At the same time, they were to be an examination of support for the incumbent president P. Poroshenko. The Central Election Commission of Ukraine registered as many as 44 candidates, of whom Poroshenko and former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were to play the most important role. However, with the passage of time, the balance of power in the election arena had changed significantly. The first round of the elections was unexpectedly won by Volodymyr Zelensky –​an actor and cabaret artist, obtaining 30.24 percent of the vote; second place was taken by Petro Poroshenko (15.95 percent), and in third place was Yulia Tymoshenko (13.4 percent). In the second round, there was a political knockout: Zelensky won 73.22 percent of the vote, Poroshenko only 24.45 percent. The result of these elections came as a surprise to world public opinion. So who was the ‘comedian’ V. Zelensky, what image did he create in politics and to whom did he address his offer? Recipients and relations with them Zelensky is an actor, comedian, and producer of television programs by profession, and a lawyer by training. Over the years, he built his popularity performing in the Kvartal 95 cabaret, took part in television talent shows, winning, among others, the very popular in Ukraine Dancing with the Stars. In 2015, he began to play a role in the series Servant of the People broadcast on TV channel 1 +​1. His character, Vasily Petrovych Holoborodko, is a history teacher who becomes president of Ukraine under quite unexpected circumstances. Before the start of the election campaign, according to the research of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2019), 50 percent of Ukrainians watched the series Servant of the People, and 85 percent watched the performances of the Kvartal 95 cabaret. This meant that V. Zelensky entered the political scene as a widely recognizable person, more –​as a famous star surrounded by a halo. This recognition and the sympathy of the audience allowed him to appeal to a wide group of voters –​viewers. The candidate’s election image offer combined both the features of V. Zelensky –​an artist and producer, as well as a fictional character in which the candidate played the role in the aforementioned television series Servant of the People. As a candidate, V. Zelensky communicated with voters through social media, mainly Instagram, where he was followed by 4.2 million internet users. V. Zelensky did

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  67 not create a new profile on Instagram, but used his existing account to join the content promoting him as an artist and private content (e.g., candidate with friends, at the gym, with family) with political messages. He interacted with voters sporadically on social media, but by representing citizens, for example, he asked them about the needs, expectations, and urgent tasks for the head of state. An example is the video material posted on Facebook, in which he asked for help in creating his political program (I will write my program together with you, January 8, 2019, FB). After the first round of elections, he asked his supporters for questions that he should ask his competitor, the incumbent President Poroshenko, on their behalf, during the debate. Throughout the election campaign, he avoided contact with journalists, gave only a few interviews and did not organize direct meetings with voters. Among his election postulates (issues) he included the slogans of renewing the political class and introducing uncompromised and honest professionals to politics. Responding to the accusations (the comedian wants to become the president) of critics of his candidacy, he published a video on social media in which he considered the attack on himself an attack on 40 million ‘ordinary citizens’ who are hit by ‘political elites’ (#Iclown, July 2, 2019, I). The image of the celebrity V. Zelensky, who aspired to the role of the ‘representative of the nation,’ was complemented by the image of the fictional ‘V. Holoborodko’ –​an ‘ordinary person,’ with the same worries, problems and experiencing the same frustrations. Someone who, being outside the political class, becomes president and becomes a true ‘servant of the people,’ listens to the voice of society and meets its expectations. It can be assumed that the use of the Holoborodko image helped V. Zelensky, despite being physically inaccessible, to achieve the effect of emotional closeness to the electorate. It also allowed the image of a candidate to be built in opposition to its main competitor –​the incumbent president, P. Poroshenko. Objectives V. Zelensky, striving for electoral support, used the means and tools available to him (including easier access to mass media), turning his presidency efforts into a promotional campaign of ‘new quality in politics,’ building tension and effectively fueling the curiosity of voters –​viewers. V. Zelensky announced his participation in the elections, as befits a media star: on December 31, 2018, on the TV channel 1 +​1, during the time traditionally set aside for the speech of the incumbent president. Throughout the election campaign, V. Zelensky was engaged in artistic activities, including performing with Kvartal 95. Support for Zelensky’s campaign was provided by the TV station 1 +​1 of the oligarch I. Kolomoysky. According to the report of the National Council of Television and Radio of Ukraine, during the election campaign, this station spent over 200 hours on programs produced by Zelensky (National Council of Television and Radio of Ukraine, 2019). The candidate, in turn, did not interact with his political competitors. And if he did, it was on the terms dictated by Zelensky

68  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska and in a format adapted to the needs of the mass media. For example, after the first round of elections, Zelensky and Poroshenko agreed to a joint debate, but no convenient date was agreed. Zelensky did not appear at the debate organized by the incumbent president. Poroshenko was forced to conduct a 45-​minute ‘debate’ with an empty chair. Zelensky, however, issued an invitation to another debate, which quickly went viral, and the accompanying video resembled a preview of a feature film. Zelensky had outlined the terms of the debate (including alcohol and drug testing) and had given his opponent 24 hours to respond. Poroshenko undertook the narrative, but also the form of his opponent’s message, giving his consent in a video posted on Facebook. It is the skillful image creation, the reference to the myth of ‘a man from outside politics’ who will ‘impose order on the political scene and in the state’ with a recognizable celebrity, and the use of media events created for the purposes of the campaign, that ensured V. Zelensky the highest election victory in the recent history of Ukraine. And –​unprecedentedly –​in almost all its regions (24/​25 –​only the Lviv region supported Poroshenko), voters backed the candidate’s promises. According to the research conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, he owed his victory to a radical renewal of power –​55 percent of respondents thought so –​but also to reluctance to keep Petro Poroshenko as president (39 percent), and the fact that Zelensky was a ‘new face,’ not involved in corruption or in any other activity that discredits him (34 percent). On the evening of the election, the candidate entered the headquarters of the election staff to the sounds of music from the series Servant of the People. And after the elections, Volodymyr Zelensky became a value in itself, not his political program, not slogans, not political support (the Servant of the People party, which in December 2017 adopted the name identical to the title of the series), nor his closest associates, whom he presented only a few days before the elections. The image of Zelensky in the period June 2019 to February 23, 2022 After the presidential elections, V. Zelensky looked to secure support for his future policy in the Ukrainian parliament. Due to the fact that his formation, Servant of the People, was not represented in the legislature, he dissolved the parliament and ordered early elections. The early parliamentary elections held in July 2019 turned out to be a great success for Zelensky and his party. It won 254 seats in the 450-​person Supreme Council of Ukraine. It was the first time in Ukraine’s recent history that a party had won such an overwhelming majority in elections, allowing it to form a one-​party majority government. And what is more important from the perspective of the election promises, the Ukrainian parliamentary elite had been renewed. More than 80 percent of members of parliament became such members for the first time. Among this group, the largest part were representatives of the Servant of the People, who owed their electoral success to the public support for V. Zelensky. A year later, the local elections showed a different face of the level of social support for

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  69 the Servant of the People party and the president himself. And although the party in these elections obtained the best result among all political forces, it was only 17.59 percent. Taking over the function of the president of Ukraine presented new tasks for V. Zelensky, but also the possibility of fulfilling the election promises, including the implementation of the assumed mission of ‘servant of the people.’ Recipients and relations with them After the presidential and parliamentary elections, the process of changing Zelensky’s image began. As researchers have rightly pointed out, ‘Their (celebrities’) challenge before, but even more so after, reaching elected office is to change the expectations and norms with which they are publicly judged’ (Marsh et al., 2010, p. 325). They now need to ‘perform authority’ (Hajer, 2009), not simply project their old public persona. The actor, comedian, and celebrity had to start being a politician, and not only play the role of a politician in the fictional world of the series. His inaugural speech can also be read in the context of the previous activity. Saying ‘This is why I really do not want my pictures in your offices, for the president is not an icon, an idol or a portrait’ (Volodymyr Zelensky, 2019), Zelensky not only declared ‘closeness to the common man,’ but also somehow said goodbye to the role of an artistic celebrity. One of the first noticeable changes was that in the politician’s outfit, the informal outfit being permanently replaced by a suit. The number of social media outlets used increased; the politician set up, for example, an account on Twitter, which was to help him communicate with the environment, including new recipients of his messages –​foreign partners. Communication was based not only on the visual form, as before, but also on the verbal one. The content posted on V. Zelensky’s internet profiles has changed, private content having been replaced with content showing the new politician during activities related to the exercise of the state function. Although, by the way, it is worth adding that V. Zelensky gradually resigned from private content –​for instance, the last photos on Instagram showing him on vacation with friends were posted in July 2019, i.e., two months after taking the presidency. Relations with recipients have also changed. The distance related to the performance of the function was reinforced with paternalistic messages of the ‘me’ type. An example is a post encouraging vaccination against Covid-​19, with a photo of V. Zelensky with a naked torso, reassuring citizens: ‘do not be afraid of vaccination […] I am setting an example’ (March 2, 2021, I). In the period from June 2019 to February 2022, Zelensky tried to build an image of an effective politician, solving the most important problems and being dynamic. As expected by the electorate, he tried to resolve the conflict with the Russian Federation that had been ongoing since 2014, talking about the need to regain territorial awareness and end the war in Donbas as soon as possible. Moreover, he demanded that the parliament adopt laws on lifting parliamentary immunity and punishing officials for illegal enrichment, and

70  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska introduce new electoral law. He also requested the resignation of the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, the prosecutor general and the public administration. These demands refer to the failure with election slogans. While communicating about the implementation of election promises, V. Zelensky emphasized his own agency. For example: ‘Two years ago I announced the Big Construction program […] and it is important to me that every region should feel it’ (October 26, 2021, I). By formulating this type of message, the president presented himself as a typical ‘father,’ acting for the good of ‘his’ citizens, responding to their needs with care. But at the same time, it is worth noting that one could still see in the politician’s offer elements appropriate to the style of a political celebrity, such as the first press conference of the newly elected president. The ‘Marathon’ press conference’ took place on October 10, 2019, at the Kyiv Food Market and lasted 14 hours. Surrounded by food and drink stands, over 300 journalists asked 500 questions. Zelensky, a politician without a sustainable political, administrative and financial background, based his democratic legitimacy on his image and it resulted from the sympathy of citizens rather than, as in the past, from support by the oligarchs. Over time, however, public admiration for the president began to melt, which was perfectly visible in the polls, which until February 2022 showed lower and lower support for Zelensky. According to the research of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, in October 2021, the president’s actions were supported only by 24.7 percent of Ukrainians (Kyiv, 2021). This was due, among others things, to the unresolved conflict in Donbas, the change in the position of prime minister (in March 2020 Denys Shmygal replaced Oleksij Honcharuk), the Covid-​19 pandemic (and the government’s actions in this matter), the so-​called Pandora Papers (October 2021), which showed that Zelensky and his associates owned shares in foreign companies (including in Cyprus, Belize, and the British Virgin Islands), and dismissal of the chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, Dmytro Razumkov (October 2021).

The image of Zelensky during the war On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine, as President V. Zelensky reported to the world on Twitter and other social media. His message posted on Instagram on February 24, 2022, reached the level of 11 million views, which shows the informative power of social media. From the beginning of the aggression, the president of Ukraine has actively used them, posting three to eight posts a day on his social media profiles (Twitter, Instagram, Facebook). From the first days of the war, he was also able to focus public opinion on his person and the war in Ukraine, and the largest world mass media hailed him as a hero ready to defend his nation and state. This was especially emphasized when the president’s life was in danger.

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  71 In connection with reports that one of Russia’s goals was to kill the president and the subsequent offer from the United States –​to evacuate Zelensky and his family from Ukraine and ensure his safety –​Zelensky stated: ‘I need ammo, not a ride’ (Associated Press, February 26, 2022). Zelensky became an inspiration not only for the citizens of Ukraine, but also for the masses of citizens of other countries. The number of followers of his profiles on social media at the end of April 2022 was: Facebook –​2.9 million, Twitter –​6 million, Instagram –​almost 17 million. What is the phenomenon of V. Zelensky, what elements of his communicative style make him focus on himself and able to pursue political goals? Recipients and relations with them Taking into account the requirement of finding a specific balance when creating the image of a politician indicated by S. Albouy between ‘being like others’ (everyman; reducing the distance towards the recipient) and ‘being better’ (distance towards the recipient) (1994, p. 94), Zelensky clearly emphasizes the first pillar, i.e. bringing people closer to recipients, above all –​the citizens of their own country. One of the first signs that the president would share their war fate with citizens was a change in appearance. On the first day of the war, Zelenskiy replaced the suit with a military outfit, which he also consistently wears during official meetings with heads of state and speeches before foreign parliaments. His messages, regardless of the medium used, were mostly written in the first person plural. The ‘we’ used, depending on the context, meant: ‘we –​the Ukrainian authorities,’ or ‘we Ukrainians.’ He addressed world public opinion in a similar way –​then the use of the pronoun ‘we’ designated ‘the world of the West, people who love peace and freedom.’ The few messages written in the first person singular concerned mainly the performance of the president’s function and were used when the message was informative (reports on talks with foreign partners), personal thanks and wishes, or an assurance that the president remained in the country (which was especially important in the first days of the conflict and disinformation activities on the part of Russia). In his messages, Zelensky was spontaneous, he was sometimes emotional, he referred to felt emotions, shared experiences, he felt the concern and pain of citizens, stressed that he was an ordinary citizen, a husband, a father (I’m ... the father of two children, March 11, 2022, FB). Addressing foreign audiences, he recalled historical experiences significant for individual nations in order to characterize the situation in Ukraine by analogy. Zelensky simplifies his message, introducing a clear positioning from the beginning of the war and building a dichotomy between ‘we the defenders of the homeland –​a people who love peace and value Western freedoms,’ and ‘him’ (V. Putin, president of the Russian Federation) and ‘them’ –​the army, aggressors posing a threat to the civilized world: the most barbaric and inhuman army in the world (April 19, 2022, FB), the monsters (April 11, FB) tyranny, concentrated evil (April 4, FB).

72  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska Objectives Zelensky in his entries, as was mentioned, presented himself primarily as a representative of the Ukrainian state and nation. Verbal messages conveying such content were additionally supported by visual symbols: the national colors of Ukraine, yellow and blue (FB, Instagram, Twitter), scenery in photos and videos presented by the politician (the president’s office, places affected by war, popular streets and squares of Kiev; Twitter, Instagram). Focusing on the presentation of the state’s interests, he clearly indicated the current goals related to the war (military and financial aid from NATO and EU countries, sanctions against the Russian Federation), but also the long-​ term strategic goals of Ukraine (reconstruction of the state after the war, joining the structures of the European Union and NATO). While being capable of serving as the state representative, he met with diplomats, heads of states supporting Ukraine, appeared in the forum of parliaments of other countries, and gave interviews to foreign media. As a representative of the nation, he emphasized the unity of Ukrainians, their heroism and uniqueness (we have strong, kind and die-​hard people, April 4, 2022, FB). Zelensky in his messages did not pretend to be a hero as an individual. He designed the image of a hero for the entire Ukrainian nation: ‘You have all become heroes. All Ukrainian men and women who withstood and do not give up’ (April 15, 2022, FB). This image of a collective hero contains several important features: the inequality of forces, meaning for the heroes to fight against the overwhelming forces of the enemy (‘We are aware that the occupiers outnumber us. That they have more equipment’), the fatalism of the situation, the fact that the choice was made somewhat outside the hero (‘the fate of our land and our people is being decided’), and the awareness of the purpose and rate of the war (‘we know what we are fighting for. And we do everything to win’ April 6, FB). The stakes for which the heroes are fighting is not only the sovereign Ukraine within its pre-​2014 borders, but also –​importantly –​the security of Europe and the whole world, which is threatened by the aggressor with nuclear weapons. Interestingly, there are also humorous accents in this collective portrait of the heroes. The Ukrainians defending their country are not only soldiers fighting in the trenches, but also civilians who can cunningly win against the stronger side –​for example, by stealing tanks with a tractor. Another important goal of V. Zelensky’s messages was mobilization to fight the aggressor. The president pursued this goal by showing his commitment (and thus an example), engaging citizens in the fight and helping the combatants, and summarizing the effects of the war to date –​the losses of the aggressor, but also the losses that Ukraine suffered. Importantly, Zelensky does not dazzle with materials showing the effects of the war on the Ukrainian side; they accounted for approximately 7–​10 percent of the entire content, and whenever such materials were posted, it was accompanied by a morale-​raising commentary, a promise of fight and compensation for the harm done to Ukraine. Zelensky also mobilized the leaders of states and world organizations, mainly

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  73 using ingratiating techniques against those who supported Ukraine in the fight against the invaders and world public opinion, also pointing to ways of supporting Ukraine (e.g., popularizing the #StandUpForUkraine campaign, or a film promoting the imposition of sanctions on Russian gas): ‘by buying Russian oil and gas, you finance the murder of Ukrainians. Be more determined than ever. Stop feeding the Russian military machine’ (April 8, 2022, FB).

Conclusion According to our hypothesis, the image created in the particular stages of V. Zelensky’s political activity was slightly different, but also –​contrary to our intuition –​it was not so much ‘transformed’ as ‘evolved.’ Each of the subsequent types of the image of V. Zelensky refers to the others, and is adapted to the circumstances and emerging challenges, which allows the politician to maintain integrity and credibility in the eyes of the public. V. Zelensky began his political career as a celebrity, capitalizing on his popularity among the audience of his film and cabaret work. During the election campaign in 2019, he allowed the content of his political image to be largely defined by the TV personality, the fictional protagonist of the series Servant of the People. It was an image of a man from outside the political class, created in opposition to the image of political competitors. The period after assuming the office of president in 2019 until February 24, 2022, is an attempt to gradually change the image of a political celebrity into that of the ‘father of the nation,’ but the attempt was unsuccessful. V. Zelensky disappointed with the lack of political experience, both his own and his supporters’, he gave evidence that he had committed the same mistakes as his predecessors in the presidential chair. After two years in office, the charm of Zelensky’s image, based mainly on the contrast to the rest of the Ukrainian political scene, had ceased to work. With the outbreak of the war, the situation changed, and V. Zelensky, thanks to his steadfast attitude and clearly formulated goals, was hailed as a ‘hero’ by the world media. Importantly, as the president himself says, he was well aware of the responsibility that had fallen on him with the escalation of the conflict: ‘You understand that they’re watching … You’re a symbol. You need to act the way the head of state must act’ (Shuster, 2022). As already mentioned, V. Zelensky himself, in the context of heroism, communicates not about himself, but about the Ukrainian nation, presenting himself as its representative (‘I’m Ukrainian’). At the same time, an important motive in the president’s messages is the emphasis on the representation of the interests of the state, which allows for the categorization of the created image as a statesman. Other goals pursued by the president include mobilization (both internal and global public opinion along with its leaders), maintaining morale, informing about the course of the war, and sharing successes. The evolution of the types of images we have observed and the changes on the political scene and in the environment were accompanied by a change

74  M. Cichosz and J. Kozierska in the main addressees of V. Zelensky’s messages. While during the 2019 election campaign and the first stage of his presidency, he addressed mainly the citizens of his country, less often politicians from the international environment, from November 2021, and with particular intensity from February 24, 2022, Zelensky constantly communicates with both internal and global public opinion (mainly on Twitter). As expected, he adjusts his message to the nature of the social media used. However, what is worth emphasizing is that, above all, he adapts the form of the content, not the actual content. For example, the tendency noticed by analysts to personalize the message through individualization in the case of messages on Facebook and privatization in relation to content on Instagram does not occur in the case of Zelensky. Since the outbreak of the war, the content on both FB and Instagram has been characterized primarily by individualization, while there is no content that indicates privatization. There is no ‘private’ image of Zelensky; he is a politician fully subordinated to the goals of the state and the nation, which is a clear reference to the style of the presidency of the role he played in the television series Servant of the People.1 Another example of breaking certain patterns is the issue of Twitter style. It was said about Twitter (summing up D. Trump’s activity) that it was defined by three key features: simplicity, impulsiveness and unkindness (Ott, 2017, p. 60). The activity of V. Zelensky, however, could be characterized in a different way: simplicity, focusing on goals /​articulation of interests /​rationality, ingratiation (with regard to partners). In conclusion, it is worth considering one more issue –​did the Zelensky celebrity come out of his celebrity role? The answer is complex. As J. Street noticed, a celebrity even in politics acts like a star and even more: he does not play the role of a star, he just is that star (Street, 2019, p. 3). President V. Zelensky has made his celebrity experience one of his strengths during the war. His biography, unusual career, and skills in communicating through the media (including social media) helped him focus the attention of world public opinion on Ukraine and –​as a result –​engage it in helping the country at war. He also efficiently uses celebrity activism (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009), and has engaged world-​famous artists, businessmen and presenters as advocates of his interests. The conflict in Ukraine, largely thanks to V. Zelensky, is not perceived as ‘another war in the region’, but has become a matter of world security. The image of V. Zelensky is also created in opposition to the authoritarian leaders of the neighboring republics of Belarus, A. Lukashenka, and –​especially –​the Russian Federation –​V. Putin. While V. Putin cares about the staffage showing his dominant position in the system (a position equal to the former tsars), Zelensky is natural, he is an ‘ordinary person’ who finds himself in ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ that is, someone with whom each recipient can identify.

Note 1 Interesting research carried out in Latvia indicates that the ‘ideal politician’ is to have the following characteristics: ‘a politician is a servant of the nation, a patriot

Celebrity, Hero, Statesman … V. Zelensky  75 and a statesman who is evaluated by the voters and elected multiple times, able to take responsibility for unpopular decisions while thinking about the future of the state. An ideal politician is honest and fulfils the promises they have given’ (M. Zakrizevska, 2018, p. 8).

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5 New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians in Polish Society Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad

Introduction Stereotypes are a unique component of social discourse. It is on their basis that evaluations are built, judgments formulated, and actions initiated. Conflict situations simplify the map of perception of the environment, i.e., stereotypes, even dormant ones, are easily ‘awakened’ and verify the attitudes of the opposing parties. Mass media can significantly contribute to strengthening stereotypes as well as attempting to limit their impact. Since Walter Lippmann’s (1922, pp. 4–​ 7) proposal no definition has emerged that would more accurately describe the nature of stereotypes. As Lippmann stated, stereotypes are images of the outside world that each individual creates in their head. These images take various forms –​diagrams, templates, scripts –​and suggest what information should be learned and remembered, and what can be marginalized or even omitted. From the perspective of states and societies, images that relate to other cultural groups or entire nations are particularly important. They influence international relations, but at the same time build a sense of intra-​group identity. Poland is an excellent example of a country that has experienced aggression in the past from its closest neighbors (Germany, the USSR), which has shaped stereotypes and prejudices for many years. At this point, it should be remembered that while stereotypes can be both negative and positive (‘as mean as a Scot,’ ‘as hardworking as a German’), prejudices are always pejorative. Prejudice is defined as negative emotions, attitudes not resulting from rational premises. They can be created on the basis of false or incomplete information, but most of all they are closely related to the stereotypes on which they arise. Both stereotypes and prejudices create the natural bedrock of conflicts. They build social images of ‘enemies’ with whom one should fight in order to defend one’s own values. In addition, stereotypes play a significant role in shaping acculturation orientations, especially among members of the host society (see: López-​ Rodríguez & Zagefka, 2015).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-6

80  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad The Russian-​Ukrainian war and the active help of Poles to refugees from Ukraine created a new reality, but this state does not mean the elimination of existing tensions at the same time. In the case of Russia, negative emotions, determined by historical events –​the attack on Poland on September 17, 1939, the circumstances of the Polish plane crash with the most important politicians near Smolensk in 2010 and finally the brutal attack on neighboring Ukraine on February 24, 2022 –​strengthened. However, the role of stereotypes in Polish-​Ukrainian relations is much more complex. On the wave of grassroots aid for refugees from Ukraine, Poland found itself at the center of attention of world public opinion and was called ‘the largest NGO in the world.’ Scientific reliability requires, however, the picture from the beginning of the war to be completed with an analysis of the stereotypes which in the past determined neighborly relations between states, and which may also influence them in the future. The research field of the work covers, through its historical references, the area of Poland and Ukraine in the period from World War II to the present day. The formulated research problem concerns to what extent the stereotypes rooted in the past influenced Polish-​Ukrainian relations after the aggression by Russia and how they appeared on social media. One of the premises for defining the research field was the assumption that conflicts and crisis situations would show a strong tendency to dynamically perceive other cultures and nations. As Durante observes (Durante et al. 2017, p. 669), the building and strengthening of stereotypes are strongly influenced by the level of peace /​conflict in a given country. Countries with a low level of conflict are united because national identity is often associated with ethnic homogeneity. In such societies, different subgroups of citizens are perceived positively. On the other hand, if an open external conflict breaks out, citizens can build their perception of others on the axis of us, and they will move from ambivalent stereotypes towards the negative ones. Three research hypotheses were adopted: H 1. The negative stereotype of a Ukrainian, formed after World War II, remained in a latent phase, mainly due to the ‘active’ stereotypes directed against the Russians. H 2. The social uprising aimed at helping refugees from Ukraine is not one-​ dimensional, as both traditional and social media voice opposition to the scale and duration of assistance. This may mean that, in the event of a protracted conflict and an influx of more refugees, the mood of a part of Polish society will be radicalized, and stereotypes directed against Ukrainians will be included in the public debate. H 3. Depending on the media technology, stereotypes will be suitably extinguished or reinforced. An intuitive assumption is that television in Poland (public) will try to extinguish certain historical stereotypes about Ukrainians, while social media (Twitter analyzed here) will strengthen these stereotypes. The result, because it will be the form of

New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians  81 social media itself, will also be dictated by the fact that they are the target of Russian disinformation. In connection with the above claims, it is important to answer the following questions: • • •

What stereotypes of the Ukrainian were shaped in Polish culture? What was the impact of these stereotypes in the period leading up to the outbreak of the war on February 24, 2021? How does the content on social media broadcast by Poles affect the current relations between Poland and Ukraine?

The research methods used are primarily the analysis of social media content and the comparative method. The former was used to identify trends in the formation of a new stereotype, while comparative studies made it possible to trace the changes in the ‘vitality of the Ukrainian stereotype’ over time. Ibroscheva and Ramaprasad (Ingenhoff, Segev & Chariatte, 2020, p. 96) note that stereotypes should not be treated as a resultant of the social and cognitive but analyzed from a broader socio-​cultural perspective. The variables that mediate the formation of stereotypes are, inter alia, culture, ethnocentrism, closeness and media. The research conducted by Hřebíčková and Graf highlights the role of cultural and geographical proximity in shaping the image of states and generating stereotypes based on them. They emphasize that the countries that are in the vicinity evaluate the image of the country in a similar way, while those that share the cultural and geographic distance, in their perception of others, will be based on the stereotypes of other countries. A continuum of criticism is also important; if the country is close, the society has a more critical attitude towards it (see: Hřebíčková & Graf, 2018). This geographic and cultural proximity of Poland and Ukraine is particularly important today and largely defines the mutual relations that have changed since February 24. The literature on how to define stereotypes and define their social role comes mainly from sociology. The study Stereotypes as Explanations by McGarty Craig, Vincent Y. Yzerbyta and Russell Spears (Craig, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002) or the book by Claude Steele How Stereotypes Affect Us and What We Can Do (Steele, 2010) set on the verge of sociology and psychology, can be cited as particularly comprehensive. From the perspective of an analysis that takes into account the influence of the media on the viability of stereotypes, the work of Media Stereotypes: From Ageism to Xenophobia (Billings & Parrott, 2020) is also important, as is the study Stereotypes and the Construction of the Social World by Perry R. Hinton (Hinton, 2019). Although the extensive literature on stereotypes seems to exhaust their theory, there is no study analyzing stereotypes in relation to Ukraine and its neighbors. Even the most recent books on the history of Ukraine, e.g., Ukraine. What Everyone Needs to Know by Serha Yekelchyk (Yekelchyk, 2020), or its relations with Russia,

82  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad e.g., P. D’Anieri’s Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War (D’Anieri, 2019), do not address the subject of the influence of stereotypes on interstate relations. In turn, Polish publications from before 2022 are primarily historical studies. The events in Volyn and Eastern Galicia during and immediately after World War II, which separated the Polish and Ukrainian nations, and which were covered by the ‘spiral of silence’ for decades, are particularly explored in this respect. Historical analyses created after many years enabled a dialogue between Poles and Ukrainians, but neither side can say that a single, durable and satisfactory narrative has emerged.

Stereotype of a Ukrainian in Poland –​historical background Thanks to stereotypes, the world becomes more concrete and understandable, and abstract, complex concepts are simplified. The complicated social reality is reduced to unambiguous, indisputable and understandable facts. Information reduction, which is an indispensable element of the stereotyping process, allows the individual to have an economy of thinking, cognition and perception (Jurek, 2019, p. 43). The complex reality is thus reduced to simplified categories. In the case of national stereotypes present in Polish society, one can basically talk about two categories, i.e., those resulting from an inferiority complex (towards the West) and those based on the belief that they are superior (towards the East). Research conducted by CBOS in 2021 shows the sympathy of Poles with the Czechs (63%), Italians (62%), Slovaks (61%) and Americans (60%). declared sympathy (26% indifference, 26% reluctance). It can therefore be concluded that, before the outbreak of the war in 2022, more respondents were indifferent or reluctant towards Ukrainians than liked them. It is also significant that Ukrainians found themselves in this ranking between Germans (sympathy at the level of 43%) and Jews (sympathy of 38%). Only the Chinese, Russians, Romanians, Roma and Arabs, who close the list, are placed below (CBOS, 2021). On the basis of Chart 5.1, the sympathy of Polish society towards Ukrainians has tended to increase since 2008. Referring only to the nations of the former Soviet states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine), one can ask why it was the Ukrainians who were the least liked in the year before the war broke out? The answer is complex and firmly anchored in history. Firstly, Ukrainians are still ‘Ruski’ (in Polish this word has a negative connotation, especially for the older part of society, remembering the times of the superpower USSR). Identity differences between Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and residents of other, former Soviet republics, become hardly noticeable in a situation where ‘ruskość’ (again, negative connotation) dominates. This, in turn, does not trigger any positive connotations, even on a colloquial level. Poles who compulsorily studied the Russian language in schools (1950–​1990) do not hold much esteem for the cultural achievements or the civilization development of the inhabitants of the areas occupied for

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Chart 5.1  Changes in sympathy and dislike towards Ukrainians over the years 1993–​2022. Source: authors’ own elaboration based on data from ‘Relationship to other nations,’ No. 21/​2022, pp. 3–​4.

decades by the ‘enemy,’ that is, the USSR. Thus, the perception of Ukrainian identity is subject to simplification, which is strengthened by the relatively short nationality tradition of the Ukrainian state. In 1991, when Ukraine regained independence, Poles expressed their support, but this concerned mainly the collapse of the Soviet empire. With regard to the new neighbor, Ukraine, sympathetic restraint dominated in the media. As Prokop writes: ‘The prospect of separating the Ukrainian state from the USSR did not arouse the enthusiasm of Polish journalists’ (Prokop, 2013, p. 49). Unlike other former republics, the ‘Polish problem with Ukraine’ was based on the vivid memory of 1945, when the Republic of Ukraine significantly enlarged its territory at the expense of Poland (former Eastern Galicia and Western Volyn), but also other countries (Romania, Czechoslovakia). One can formulate a conviction that the Polish stereotype of a Ukrainian is built on historical foundations to a much greater extent than the stereotype of a Pole in the eyes of Ukrainians. By grading the events of the past that weighed down on mutual relations, two of them turn out to be the most important –​Volyn and the Vistula Action. In 1943, Ukrainian nationalists murdered the people living in Volyn, and the largest group of those murdered (about 50,000–​60,000) were Poles. Research on this crime, described by Poles as ‘the Volyn slaughter’ and genocide, was allowed only in the 1980s, and the first studies were published in the 1990s.

84  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad During the so-​called Vistula Action or ‘Operation Vistula’, in 1947, there were forced evictions of entire villages and civilian settlements from south-​eastern Poland. Ukrainians, Boykos, Lemkos and mixed families were displaced, mainly to the Western Territories. Until today, historians’ opinions on the nature of the activities at that time (they involved about 140,000 people) are divided, and some support the thesis that the real motive was not the need to destroy Ukrainian nationalists (UPA, i.e., the Ukrainian Uprising Army), but ethnic cleansing. These two examples from the past show that, in Poland’s relations with Ukraine, the success of one nation meant the failure of the other. In international relations this is referred to as a ‘zero-​sum game’ (I will win as much as my opponent loses) and it means a situation that is naturally conflicting. Since 2000, a breakthrough in the perception of Ukrainians in Poland has been noticeable. Prokop (2013, p. 57) notices political stereotypes such as: ‘Kuchmism,’ ‘Sovietism’ and ‘crime,’ which have been replaced by others referring to new reality, bringing with them new political and social values: ‘orange Ukraine,’ ‘orange opposition.’ In turn, economic stereotypes such as ‘Ukraine –​Russia number 2’ and ‘threat to the EU’ have been changed into ‘European state,’ ‘EU partner.’ As Prokop notes, the image of the Ukrainian as ‘intolerant,’ ‘neglected,’ ‘Banderite’ has changed into ‘patriot,’ ‘tolerant,’ ‘hospitable.’ Such a reorientation did not mean a complete departure from the negative image, but it was a clear change from the stereotypes of the 1990s. According to a research report presented by the Institute of Public Affairs in 2001, entitled ‘Poland –​Ukraine, mutual image’ (Konieczna, 2001, p. 19), the image of Ukraine and Ukrainians can be described as negative. 50 percent of the surveyed respondents had negative associations with their eastern neighbor; in the youngest group, 56 percent had negative associations, and in the older group, 59 percent. In the case of the elderly, historical aspects had a decisive impact on the negative perception of Ukraine, while in the case of the youngest segment of the surveyed population, negative perceptions arose as a result of direct contacts and the general image of Ukraine as a poor, corrupt, and backward state. Only 12 percent of respondents identified Ukraine with positive values, while 38 percent had a neutral attitude. The image of Ukrainians at the beginning of the twenty-​first century was based on quite specific relations –​mainly bazaar trade and employment in the shadow economy, as a result of which Ukrainians were considered to be a low-​skilled workforce. Ukrainians in Poland are perceived as belonging to the Eastern European nations (on a par with Belarusians and Russians). The stereotype of a Ukrainian in 2001 was not very clear, the main attributes attributed to Ukrainians being alcohol abuse, hospitality and religiousness. Even then, Ukraine’s role in Europe was seen as important. Moreover, public opinion polls indicated that Poland should cooperate with Ukraine on the economic and political levels and provide it with support in the international arena (Konieczna, 2001, pp. 7–​8).

New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians  85 A significant breakthrough in the perception of eastern neighbors by Poles can be said to have occurred only in 2004, when after the rigged presidential elections in Ukraine, there was a wave of protests called the Orange Revolution. According to Konieczna-​ Sałamatin, the ‘Orange Revolution’ meant that the stereotype of a Ukrainian changed; it turned out that this is a nation committed to freedom and democracy (Jurek, 2019, p. 35). Having had the experience of NSZZ ‘Solidarność,’ the largest trade union and its struggle for democracy, the Poles looked favorably on the protesting Ukrainians. It turned out then that, despite the difficult history, both nations fight for democracy and the values that create it with the same determination. The stereotype of the Ukrainian –​ruthless, backward, ‘wild,’ –​which had been built since the war, weakened and even went into a dormant phase. The Polish public opinion polls conducted at that time indicated that over half of the respondents were keenly interested in the events in Ukraine and discussed them. Further warming of mutual relations, and thus the dismantling of stereotypes, took place after 2014, i.e., after the Russian annexation of Crimea. And although the history of Crimea, incorporated into Ukraine in 1953, is complex, Poles strongly criticized its occupation by the Russians. The negative stereotype of a Ukrainian was also weakened through direct contacts, and they became particularly intense when young people from Ukraine began to visit Polish universities on a large scale, which was possible thanks to cooperation between partner cities in Poland and Ukraine. Another identified stereotype functioning in Polish society, which began to take shape several years ago, was a Ukrainian –​a labor immigrant, a person for whom Poland is associated with a workplace, and Poles as potential employers. This perspective of perceiving the eastern neighbor was accompanied by stereotyping of Ukrainians as poor, those who come to Poland to ‘earn a living’ (Koval, Vaičiūnas & Reichardt, 2021, p. 16). Taking into account the historical evolution of the process of stereotyping Ukrainians and Ukraine in Poland, two phases can be distinguished: establi­ shing and reorganizing. The stereotypes typical of the first phase fell in the years of Ukrainian independence (after the collapse of the USSR). Generali­ zing this stereotype was negative. In turn, the stereotypes corresponding to the second phase covered the period after the Orange Revolution. There was a clear change in the assessment of the Ukrainian nation and state; the stereotype then began to change from negative to neutral, and in the longer term it acquired positive elements (Prokop, 2013, p. 56) In addition to the negative features mentioned in the research so far, noticed by Poles in Ukrainians (i.e., impulsiveness, carelessness, helplessness, service), positive attributes also began to appear –​cheerfulness, diligence, courage (immigrants from Ukraine in Poland). This evolution of the stereotype of a Ukrainian took place at the level of public opinion, but was also visible in the media. The aforementioned ‘Orange Revolution’ was eagerly described in the mass media, due to its spectacular character (also in the marketing dimension). A detailed picture of the stereotype of a Ukrainian in Poland was

86  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad provided by analyses of the press during the Euromaidan period, in which the image of Ukrainians themselves is not homogeneous. Some of the society represented themselves and fought for their own future, others were clearly pro-​European in their views, while others strongly identified with the OUN camp, wanting to build modern Ukraine on the myth of Stepan Bandera. As in the case of media coverage of Ukrainians and Ukraine during the Maidan revolution in 2014 and the subsequent Ukrainian-​Russian conflict, partiality towards the ongoing events was dominant. According to media experts, it manifested itself in an uncritical pro-​Ukrainian message (Baran, 2016, p. 103). As a result, the negative stereotype not only took on neutral features, but even shifted towards the positive. However, the reorganization of ‘images in the minds’ about Ukrainians did not mean a permanent change in attitudes. The Maidan explosion and solidarity with the Ukrainian nation were lined primarily with fear of Russia. It is therefore true to say that in Polish society there is a permanent dissonance between support for an independent Ukraine and the image of a Ukrainian. There is a continuity in Polish culture between Cossack and Bandera.1 A bloody Ukrainian nationalist played the same role as a steppe cruel from the Dnieper. He was a bearer of features that allowed Poles to feel their civilizational advantages (Kalukin, 2014). The aforementioned figure of Stepan Bandera has become one of the historical symbols on which the stereotype of a Ukrainian nationalist is based. Forty-​ two monuments of Bandera, located mainly in Western Ukraine, strengthen the propaganda message about anti-​Polish Ukrainians. As the President of the Union of Ukrainians in Poland notes: ‘The stereotype that has been persisted since the Second Republic of Poland that Ukrainians are anti-​Polish, and the worst are those from the West, because they promote Flag, cannot stand the clash with the facts’ (‘Stereotypes about Ukrainians,’ 2022). The aforementioned facts are –​according to the research of Ukrainian society –​a common aversion to Russia and divided opinions about S. Bandera. However, this complex image of Ukrainian sympathies does not reach the common message on which the stereotypes are based. Generalization of negative features is often not confirmed in research results, but it does not affect the verification of stereotypes. An example is the belief of a large part of Poles that Ukrainians are poorly educated. Even before the outbreak of the war, large studies were carried out (OTTO Work Force Polska in 2018), which showed that as much as 95 percent of Ukrainians working in Poland have higher or secondary education. According to the researchers, the unfair belief that the level of education is low may result from the fact that Ukrainians who come to Poland usually work below their competences. Only 12 percent of Ukrainians in Poland work in accordance with their education, 51 percent of the surveyed citizens of Ukraine work in Poland in positions in production plants, and 40 percent perform other physical work (‘Stereotypes about Ukrainians,’ 2022). In addition to the generalization of negative features, the stereotype of the Ukrainian is also intended to activate fears. The most resonant one has

New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians  87 to do with ‘taking jobs.’ This argument is universal, i.e., it was present in the critical narrative towards Ukrainians both before and after the outbreak of the war. An analysis based on rational rather than affective premises shows that especially in the years 2002–​2013, when about 1.2 million workers left Poland for work, there were shortages in the labor market, which were filled, among others, by Ukrainians. In the following years, their presence had a positive impact on the nominal GDP of Poland, and the fact that they usually performed work below their competences confirms that these classes were not attractive for native workers.

Polish political actors and media about Ukrainians Stereotypes in social life are not only images, but can lead to an escalation of prejudices, the spread of hate speech, and, consequently, to the development of conflicts. The two-​part report entitled ‘Ukrainian minority and migrants from Ukraine in Poland. Discourse analysis’2 contains insightful analyses of the phenomenon of reluctance towards Ukrainians, whose manifestations were noticed by the former Ombudsman, Adam Bodnar. The problem is systemic, as legislative solutions do not keep up with negative practices, and state bodies do not always react to such negative phenomena as, for example, the inclusion of anti-​Ukrainian narrative in an election campaign. Arguments about the ‘threat from foreigners’ appear among political actors, including most media.3 The author of the report, Marek Troszczyński, investigated that it is difficult to find on the Polish internet such a large percentage of negative assessments relating to other national minorities, as to Ukrainians. This is mainly due to the fact that, for the first time in the post-​war period, Poles have to deal directly with such a numerically significant minority that makes the society no longer homogeneous. Konieczna (2003, p. 17), who examined the attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians, also stated that attitudes towards Ukrainians are poorly differentiated regionally. The northern and western territories do not differ in this respect from the central regions of Poland. On the other hand, there is a region bordering Ukraine in the south-​eastern region, which is more reluctant to do so to Ukrainians. It seems that in the present reality it is the politicians who have the most tools to eliminate prejudices and weaken stereotypes. In practice, using these stereotypes for short-​term political goals turns out to be an important strategy for gaining the electorate. After February 24, 2022, when the situation of Polish neighbors changed so drastically and the society reacted with humanitarian aid, a significant number of political actors remained critical or distanced. Particularly significant was the initiative of MEP Beata Kempa, who, together with MP Michał Wójcik and Minister of Education and Science Przemysław Czarek, organized a competition on genocide in Volhyn for students right after the outbreak of the war. Its regulations stated that ‘the aim was to create the foundations for contemporary Polish-​Ukrainian relations based on the truth that is historical’ (Wysocki, 2022).

88  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad Another example is the Twitter post by Robert Winnicki, a politician of the Confederation, i.e., the right-​wing national party, who stated that ‘Poles accept refugees, give weapons, bear the costs and … Ukrainians invite the Germans’ (Winnicki: Polacy, 2022). The speeches of another member of the Confederation and one of the politicians most often mentioned in the media –​ Janusz Korwin-​Mikki –​were also scandalous. He not only undermined the drama of the war (writing about ‘set-​ups’), but also questioned the official information of the Ukrainian authorities. As a result, Russian sources eagerly recalled the MP’s statements, enhancing their disinformation. The quoted statements of politicians are only a partial and minority picture, because the majority from the beginning of the war declared an absolute need for support and help. President Andrzej Duda, who is in constant contact with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, was particularly active in this regard. However, even in the case of the head of state, an ambiguous statement was made. During the celebration of the National Constitution Day, A. Duda referred to the past and future of neighborly relations with Ukraine, saying: ‘I hope that Ukraine will be a brother country for the Republic of Poland for decades, and perhaps even centuries; [the state] between which and us –​ Poland –​as, I hope President Volodymir Zelenskiy said prophetically, will not have a border that there will be no such border; that we will live together on this earth, rebuilding ourselves and building our common happiness, our common strength’ (Kostrzewa, 2022).

Active stereotypes The conducted research is qualitative, two-​stage. In the first phase of the analysis, public television broadcasts about the war in Ukraine were presented, while the second phase included the analysis of the content of messages in Polish social media, especially on Twitter. The choice of these analysis planes, as well as the Messenger that is Twitter, is justified. In principle, television will seek to extinguish certain stereotypes and images of Ukrainians, while social media, as the main area of influence of Russian propaganda, will strengthen these stereotypes. The choice of social media is also dictated by the constant tendency that in crisis situations (social, political) they are the leading source of information (e.g., Dogruel, 2014; Kim, 2020; Otto & Meyer, 2012; Park, 2017; Bruns, 2014; Zhang, 2013). Moreover, according to Settle (Barbera, 2020, n.p.), social media increase the antagonistic attitude towards foreign groups, which often causes stereotyping and reinforcement of negative assessments of foreign groups. In addition, social media have the potential to polarize public opinion (Sunstein, 2001; Barbera, 2014; Beaufort, 2018; Narayanan et al., 2018; Walker, 2018; Pałka-​Suchojad, 2019). Since the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the influx of refugees to Poland, there has been a noticeable increase in anti-​Ukrainian rhetoric in Polish social media. The narrative on social media, especially on Twitter, is highly polarized. According to the data of the Institute for Internet

New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians  89 and Social Media Research, anti-​Ukrainian slogans referring to, inter alia, ‘Banderites’ (in a negative context –​they are not people; dogs; murderers; infanticides); UPA (in the sense of the murderer of Poles); Ukrainian refugees (in a negative context –​the labor market; unemployment) or vulgarisms about the citizens of #UKR (Rosyjska dezinformacja, 2022). Russian troll factories, whose disinformation and propaganda campaigns aimed at Polish cyberspace and were intensified from the first days of the war, are largely responsible for spreading negative stereotypes about Ukrainians in Poland. According to Darczewska (2014, p. 25), the stereotype of a Ukrainian-​ Banderite is a permanent element of propaganda narratives directed at European countries, but especially with strong historical connotations in Poland. The ‘Orange Revolution’ (according to the Russian narrative: ‘Orange Plague’), supporting Russian separatists in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, were the events that generated an increase in propaganda stereotypes in the information space. The analysis of television broadcasts4 since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine confirms the hypothesis that in its materials television will seek to extinguish the historical antagonisms between Poland and Ukraine. The results of the survey showed that public television did not reproduce negative stereotypes, but emphasized the positive features of Ukrainians very rarely. In the analyzed period, there were only eight information units that referred directly to Poland’s eastern neighbors. The dominant narrative about Ukraine focused on the terms: free, independent, sovereign country; European state; and in relation to the Ukrainians: the heroic Ukrainians and brothers and sisters from Ukraine. As in the aforementioned pro-​Ukrainian press releases regarding the Maidan events and the Ukrainian-​Russian conflict from 2014, similarly in the television broadcasts analyzed for the purposes of this chapter, a clear pro-​Ukrainian orientation of the media is also discernible. The second phase of the study included an analysis of Polish Twitter to ensure a high coefficient of representativeness of the problem under study, and aggregated tweets for the keywords ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Ukrainians’ in the period from February 24, 2022 to April 30, 2022. As a result, 184,365 tweets were collected. Social media analysis made it possible to identify the tendency to express negative opinions about Ukrainians; in the first month of the war it was 77 percent negative in relation to 6 percent positive and 17 percent neutral to the slogan: Ukrainians. The values were similar in the second month of the war and were respectively: 78 percent negative, 7 percent positive and 15 percent neutral. In Polish Twitter, a particularly strong narrative was adopted by the right-​ wing circles, whose references to Ukraine invariably reproduce stereotypes based on the historical past between the Polish and Ukrainian ethnicities (Mierzyńska, 2022). The analysis of tweets allowed the following terms to be identified: UPAina, banderland, UPolin –​i.e., the alliance of Ukraine and Poland, a term with a negative sentiment. Another recognized stereotype (corresponding to the original economic one), which intensified after February 24, 2022, is the image of Ukrainians

90  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad who, when coming to Poland, have better living conditions, access to healthcare and other services than Poles. This narrative is one of the dominant threads on Polish Twitter. The image of Ukrainians emerging from Polish Twitter is clearly negative, and the sources of this can be found in two reasons. The first is conditioned by the ease of manifesting negative opinions in social media, so-​called disinhibition (Pyżalski, 2012, p. 42), while the second results from the activation of far-​right groups (anti-​vaccinationists), which reproduce Kremlin propaganda and disinformation directed at Polish social media.

Conclusions Summing up, it should be noted that in periods of political destabilization, such as the war in Ukraine, the role of stereotypes is greatly strengthened. Both at the level of politicians’ statements and in horizontal social narratives, the components of stereotypes are sharpened. The multitude of information in the media space means that recipients use filters in their processing, i.e., they focus on this message, which strengthens their current judgments. The universal mobilization of Polish society and dedication in helping refugees from Ukraine (mainly women and children) must not obscure the fact that the war has not eliminated existing prejudices. Some politicians, some media and representatives of the Catholic Church have all contributed to perpetuating and spreading harmful generalizations about Ukrainians. These arguments, raised by Polish citizens, were expressed especially willingly on the internet, probably due to the anonymity provided by this medium. The three hypotheses formulated in the introduction were fully positively verified by indicating the answers to partial questions. First of all, the stereotype of a Ukrainian, although present in Polish historical memory, was not activated for years due to the strength of anti-​Russian and anti-​German stereotypes, which were most common in the period after World War II. Secondly, the growing radicalization of public sentiment has been confirmed, and it has turned out to be directly proportionate to the duration of the conflict in Ukraine. The analysis of the media content proved that the longer Poles provided aid to war refugees, the more critical voices, especially in the ‘new media.’ Thirdly, stereotypes have indeed proved to be useful as tools of political manipulation, i.e., political or quasi-​political broadcasters effectively extinguish or strengthen those elements of stereotypes that arouse social aversion. Stereotypes are a historically fixed element in shaping public opinion. The strength of their impact changes depending on the degree of diversification of information sources on the basis of which society builds its judgments about reality. The war in Ukraine released Poles’ great solidarity and willingness to help, but on the other hand it ‘reminded’ them of the stereotype of the Ukrainian in many negative aspects –​historical (‘banderism’), economic (‘taking over the labor market’), educational (‘less educated’) or, finally, moral (‘lack of gratitude,’ ‘Ukrainian women involved in prostitution’). After

New and Old Stereotypes of Ukrainians  91 February 24, 2021, social media, and especially Twitter, which we examined, were dominated by negative content towards Ukrainians. The anonymity of the internet is probably one of the reasons why it is easier to cast negative judgments than in the traditional media, although an open question that requires separate research is to what extent the anti-​Ukrainian content is created by the broadcasters themselves, and to what extent it is commissioned disinformation.

Notes 1 Stepan Bandera was the leader of one of the factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Its armed arm, the UPA, was responsible for the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in Volyn and Eastern Galicia, carried out from the spring of 1943. In Poland –​for obvious reasons –​the character of Bandera is hostile and hated. 2 For the purposes of the study, in the period from December 2016 to November 2017, Dr. Troszyński analyzed over 1.2 million statements taken from Polish social media: Facebook, Twitter, comments under articles in portals, online forums. 3 The speech of the MP Kukiz’15, Tomasz Rzymkowski, of the events around the procession in Pikulice or the speech of the Lublin voivode at the time, and now the minister of science, Przemysław Czarnek, after the ceremonies in Sahryń in July 2018. 4 The analysis covered all issues of the TVP1 evening news services (public television) from February 24, 2022, to April 30, 2022.

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6 The Conflict in Ukraine from the Feminist Perspective Agata Włodkowska

Women’s war has its own colours, its own smells, its own lighting, and its own range of feelings. Its own words. There are no heroes and incredible feats, there are simply people who are busy doing inhumanly human things. Svitlana Alexievich (Alexievich, 2017, p.xvi)

The Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, is a continuation of its paternalistic and neo-​imperialist policy towards this country. For the breakthrough moment, the so-​called external shock affecting Ukraine’s foreign policy, but also nation-​ building processes, should be considered the ‘revolution of dignity’ (2013–​2014) and the first aggression by the Russian Federation (RF) against Ukraine in March 2014. Its consequence was the occupation of Crimea and destabilization of the eastern part of the state. Most of the analyses of Russian-​Ukrainian relations, the strategic culture of both countries, and the two Russian aggressions against Ukraine focus on the so-​called high politics, the activity of state actors and the rivalry of superpowers. Most of these works are part of the analysis carried out within the realistic paradigm, slightly less often the constructivist and postcolonial approach. The earlier publications of the author of this text on the post-​ Soviet area, including the policy of the Russian Federation, also focused on this approach to the subject. This time, the goal was to analyze the Russo-​ Ukrainian conflict, taking into account the feminist perspective, i.e., other than the one that dominates the media and the existing analytical and scientific publications.

Many faces of feminism There is no single feminist approach in the science of international relations and security studies. However, common points can be found in all variants of the feminist view of international relations. Most feminist researchers define masculinity and femininity in relation to socially and culturally constructed categories, and not to biological characteristics (Tickner, 1988, pp. 430–​431). DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-7

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  95 These differences relate, inter alia, to the dichotomy of features and concepts considered typically male and female: objectivity–​ subjectivity, reason–​ emotions, or public–​private (see: Keller, 1985). The features considered male are assessed by society (both women and men) as higher than the female ones. Most of the works in the field of international relations and the laws governing them are male, and therefore one-​sided. This is the result of being based on theories and research approaches dominated by men, but also on problems described from the point of view of men, i.e., those who ignore the perspective of women and men who do not fit into stereotypically understood masculinity. For many years, the majority of researchers and practitioners of international relations have been men, which influences the focus of this discipline on ‘high politics’ and on issues such as power, competition, conflict, relations between states. For decades, the issue of ‘low politics’ relating to social, cultural and environmental issues has been on the margins of research. It is closer to women’s perspectives and those theoretical approaches that are closer to them (liberalism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, ecologism, feminism). According to researchers of the feminist trend, it is not true that gender and international relations are two separate spheres, as the classical theorists of international relations claim. The feminist approach recognizes gender as an important factor influencing the explanation of the phenomena and mechanisms of the contemporary world, and thus undermines a number of basic concepts of international relations. Objectivizing male judgments and experiences as well as treating them as typical of the human individual obscures the picture and is wrong with regard to different experiences of both sexes. The above-​mentioned culturally constructed male and female characteristics are also important, as they determine (often limiting) the place and roles of both sexes not only in families, societies and countries, but also in international relations. Given the above, it is difficult to agree with one of the key representatives of Hans Morgethau’s realistic theory, who claims that ‘politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature’ (Morghentau, 1978, p. 4). As mentioned, human nature consists of male and female elements. Women and men experience the same phenomena differently, and moreover, the same phenomenon may have a different impact on each of them. The war discussed in this article often affects men and women differently. It is enough to mention rapes, which women and girls are much more exposed to. When making a certain generalization of the feminist approach in the science of international relations, it is worth quoting the feminist reconstruction of Hans Morgethau’s assumptions made by J. Ann Tickner, which is the basis of the feminist approach in the science of international relations and the feminist epistemology of international relations. According to it: 1. ‘feminist perspective believes that objectivity, as it is culturally defined, is associated with masculinity. […] Human nature is both masculine and

96  A. Włodkowska

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

feminine: it contains elements of social reproduction and development as well as political domination’; ‘feminist perspective believes that national interest is multidimensional and contextually contingent. Therefore it cannot be defined solely in terms of power’; ‘power cannot be infused with meaning is universally valid. Power as domination and control privileges masculinity and ignores the possibility of collective empowerment […] often associated with feminity’; ‘feminist perspective rejects the possibility of separating moral command from political action’; feminist perspective seeks to find common moral elements in human aspirations which could become the basis for de-​escalating international conflict and building international community’; ‘feminist perspective denies the validity of the autonomy of the political. Since autonomy is associated with masculinity in Western culture, disciplinary efforts to construct a world view which does not rest on pluralistic conception of human nature, are partial and masculine. Building boundaries around a narrowly defined political realm defines political in a way that excludes the concerns and contributions of women’ (Tickner, 1988, pp. 437–​438).

Tickner’s conclusions will also be used in this article. They will contribute to a broader view of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict.

Making feminist sense of war In international relations and in works devoted to them, women are invisible and unnoticed, which does not mean that they are not there. The traditional, narrow and masculine perception also dominates in research on armed conflicts. This also applies to the one-​sided explanation of their causes, course and consequences (Sjoberg, 2013). Noticing and including gender in the phenomenon of war allows for a new perspective and a better understanding of the phenomenon of armed conflicts, their causes, mechanisms and consequences. This in turn can contribute to more effective conflict prevention, as well as stabilization and peace building after their end. The postulate of giving a feminist sense to international relations, including wars and armed conflicts, has been pursued by feminist researchers for three decades. One of the first was Cynthia Enloe, who in her 1989 book, Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (see: Enloe, 2014; Enloe, 2010) asked where the women were (Where are the Women?). If, like Enloe, we give up the international personal /​private dichotomy, we will find women in every dimension of international life. We will also see how world politics influences the daily activities of women and men and how their actions result from gender identities (Enloe, 2014). Military and warfare are

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  97 viewed as male activities. This is due to the role culturally attributed to men of fighting warriors and defenders of those who are only seemingly passive (not fighting) and need protection. The latter are most often women, children and non-​fighting men. The archetypal image of war and the accompanying narrative reproduce the image of a passive, innocent and beautiful woman (Beautiful Souls) and active, righteous and fighting men (Just Warriors) (Elshtain, 1983). In this narrative, the need to protect women motivates men to wage wars. It should be noted that, despite the passage of time, the need to protect women remains one of the most important elements of the war narrative. In the media coverage of the war on terrorism, Private Jessica Lynch was forced to play the role of Beautiful Soul, and soldiers of American special units were forced to play the role of Just Warriors. The story of Lynch’s release turned out to be untrue. The reproduction of such an image simplifies it, directing thinking about war and the activity or passivity of both sexes in advance. Such perception of women also makes their experiences and their perspective in global politics easier to ignore, because it is allegedly not translated into interstate relations. This is not true. Even the intentional use of rape as a war strategy contradicts this assumption. As mentioned, feminist scholars perceive international relations and war through the prism of gender, and moreover, they believe that they are subordinated to the logic of gender. This means that the identity of states is made up of gender-​related characteristics and that relations between states are based on a gender hierarchy (Sjoberg, 2013). We can find them in the competition of states whose aim is to prove to other states their own relative and absolute strength (‘masculinity’). Some of the interstate rivalry is even presented as the personal rivalry of leaders. According to J. Ann Tickner, this is how the 1991 Gulf War was portrayed. It was ‘described in appropriate locker-​room or football language’ (Tickner, 1992, p. 9). According to some authors, the quick and decisive reaction of George W. Bush to the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 was a reaction to the cruelty of the attackers, but also a desire to create a hyper-​masculine image of the USA and its president (Peterson, 2010, p. 22). This may be due in part to Bush’s having avoided serving in Vietnam, as well as his desire to finish the work of his father, who failed to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was perceived by some Americans, as was the defeat in Vietnam, as a feminization of US identity and power. The desire to strengthen a macho image, present among many leaders, including Vladimir Putin, is often associated with the fear of being feminized by an opponent or in the eyes of society. It should be noted that the concept of feminization is not neutral, but rather has negative connotations. ‘Feminize something or someone is to directly subordinate that person, political entity, or idea, because values perceived as feminine are lower on the social hierarchy than values perceived as neutral or masculine’ (Sjoberg, 2006, p. 34). Feminizing the opponent may be associated with taking certain actions to humiliate him, e.g.,

98  A. Włodkowska through rape or verbally by comparing him to a woman. An interesting and gender-​based perspective can be applied to the US-​EU relationship. The latter is often described by features culturally associated with women –​compared to the United States, it is more passive, dependent on them and focusing on soft power in its international activity (see: Anderson, 2010, pp. 30–​41). In a book devoted to the international activity of both actors, Robert Kagan directly writes that the USA is from Mars, and the Europeans (EU) from Venus (see: Kagan, 2003). The former is more prone to violence, sanctions and pressure, while Europe is more prone to cooperation, negotiation and peaceful dispute resolution. When talking about the feminization of identity and US power, it is worth focusing on the gender component of state identities. A category that provides some clues is the concept of state honor, which feminist scholars believe cannot be understood without reference to its male and female components (see: Jowkar, 1986, pp. 45–​65). While male honor relates more to chivalry, pride, or being a protector (sometimes aggressive), purity and innocence dominate in female concepts of honor. The state will be associated with the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, as well as the protection of its inhabitants (see: Steel, 2008, p. 94–​ 114). An attack by an aggressor is often described as a rape committed on the territory of a given country, and the capture of territory as its penetration. The term rape was used to characterize, for instance, the attack on Belgium carried out on August 4, 1914, by Germany, the attacks on Poland in September 1939 carried out by the Third Reich (September 1) and the USSR (September 17) (see: Mikołajczyk, 2010). and the attack on Kuwait by Iraqi forces in August 1990. The gender identity of the state can also be found in the narrative of the 1914 attack on Belgium. Germany was equated with a hyper-​male aggressor, while the United Kingdom was equated with a chivalrous defender (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 3). With regard to Poland, the hyper-​male aggressors were the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. In 1945, the USSR also found itself in the role of a defender and liberator of Polish lands from the Nazi occupation. Proponents of the feminist approach do not negate the traditional causes of armed conflicts, they only supplement domestic sources of war and point to the importance of the gender hierarchy and the militarization of societies. In addition to the traditional causes of war, they indicate that there is a relationship between gender equality, women’s leadership, and women’s participation in decision-​making, and the number and severity of wars (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 5). According to Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-​ Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett: 1) The higher the level of violence against women, the greater the likelihood that a country will not abide by international standards and behave less peacefully in international relations; 2) The higher the level of violence against women, the worse the state’s relations with neighboring countries;

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  99 3) The greater the gender gap in a country, the more likely it is that it will be involved in interstate and intra-​state conflicts and will use violence in the conflict first; 4) Higher levels of female representation in parliament and parity in education may have a pacifying effect on state behavior, reducing the likelihood of interstate war (Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-​Spanvill, McDermott & Emmett, 2008/​2009, pp. 7–​45). Among the causes of wars and armed conflicts, feminist researchers also point to the gender hierarchy, which overlaps with the anarchic structure of international relations (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 3). It organizes global international political relations in an invisible way typical of the gender. According to Laura Sjoberg, gender becomes a key element of the international structure in which, for example, exploitation and control between states are modeled on masculinity and femininity, so they are gendered (Sjoberg, 2017, p. 325). Also in the gender hierarchy between countries, features related to (hegemonic) masculinity are valued more highly than those related to (subordinate) femininity (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 3). Given the above, when acting in the international arena of states, their leaders, as well as other actors of international relations, compete and constantly prove their masculinity (strength) and deny their femininity (weakness). This, in turn, makes the international system conflicting. Also, militarization understood as ‘processes by which characteristically military practices are extended into the civilian arena –​as when businesses become dependent on military contracts, clothing fashions celebrate military styles, or toys and games embody military activities’ (Peterson & Rynyan, 1999, p. 258) is seen as an important source of wars and armed conflicts. One of the features of militarization (and not a by-​product) is violence (It’s in our hands, 2004, p. 34), also domestic, which in turn, as has already been mentioned, is treated by feminist scholars as one of the sources of war.

Feminist sense of the Russo-​Ukrainian war The above-​ mentioned assumptions of the feminist approach to international relations as well as wars and armed conflicts will be transferred to the Russo-​Ukrainian conflict. The author recognizes that the analyzed conflict reflects gender norms. Furthermore, the author agrees with Laura Sjoberg’s statement that ‘states are gendered, the level of gender inequality in a state is a predictor of the level of aggressiveness that state will show in interstate relations, or states have gendered relations’ (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 3). In the section on domestic sources of war, data on the gender gap in Russia and Ukraine will be analyzed and their impact on the relations between the two countries. The gender context will also be used to analyze the identities of Russia and Ukraine and to what extent their relations are based on the gender hierarchy.

100  A. Włodkowska Machismo and gender hierarchy In many countries of South and Central America, machismo means the cult of a strong, imperious and aggressive man. Until recently, the image of Vladimir Putin was based on the cult of machismo. The president rode horses, helped mark a white bear and put a wild tigress to sleep. Putin’s professional career, which is associated with service in the Soviet KGB Committee for State Security, and since 1998 with being chairman of the FSB (Federal Security Service), strengthens his personal qualities and those attributed to men. According to Marek Menkiszak from the Center for Eastern Studies, the Russian president is a man who believes in strength and who despises the weak. He believes that it is better for others to be afraid than for them to love and have some warm feelings. According to the analyst, if someone attacks or does some unpleasant things, it should be doubled (Trójka Polskie Radio, 2022). According to Rebecca Friedman, a certain pattern of aggressive, male and autocratic Russian leaders dates back to the beginning of the tsarist era, i.e., the beginning of the seventeenth century (Friedman, 2022). Despite the passage of years and more and more advanced age, Putin is still trying to be macho. Putin’s Russia also has the features of a macho president. In its actions, like him, the country is relentless, ruthless and aggressive. Repeatedly, including on the eve of aggression against Ukraine, in his speeches he emphasized the hierarchy and domination over colleagues, citizens and other countries, both Western and Ukraine itself. Most often, he sits behind a desk or a long heavy table in an upholstered chair or armchair. He is dressed in a suit, he often threatens, shouts, talks at length and with conviction about his arguments. He even tries to impose the latter on the recipients. His speech leading up to the invasion of Ukraine was particularly bitter and angry. Also in earlier years, Putin used ruthless and even hooligan language. In September 1999, after the attacks in Volgograd, he threatened terrorists that ‘We will go after them wherever they are. If, pardon me, we find them in the toilet, we will waste them in the outhouse’ (Myers, 2015, ch. 10).1 Putin thus adheres to a hyper-​realistic, and therefore, according to feminists, hyper-​masculine view of international relations, in which force is an end in itself, and also a means of achieving goals. In Putin’s statements, as well as in the policy of the Russian Federation, we can also find recognition of the key role of great powers, which, when it is in their interest, can use force, and treat weaker states as objects of rivalry rather than subjects of international relations. Recently, we could observe this during negotiations with the West, the aim of which was to return to a kind of concert of powers, in which Russia would strengthen its position. Russia’s negotiating position included, inter alia, acceptance by the USA, Germany and France of the neutral status of Ukraine and inhibition of NATO enlargement, as well as agreement by NATO not to deploy additional troops and weapons systems on the territory of countries that did not belong to NATO before May 1997 (Central and Eastern European countries). The exception could be if NATO and Russia were to reach an agreement on such a deployment.

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  101 Machismo and gender hierarchy can also be found in President Putin’s feminization of the West, which is present in many of his statements. This is especially true of the European Union. In Putin’s perception, the introduction of EU activity in the non-​military sphere, including commitment to fight discrimination on the basis of gender or sexual orientation, is a sign of the EU’s weakness and the moral decline of its elite. It is also seen as a threat to traditional European and Russian values. Attention is often given to the fact that the commencement of aggression was motivated by Russia by its national interest, but also by the recognition by Russian decision-​makers that the West was weak due to a pandemic, and forthcoming elections, i.e., parliamentary in Germany and Hungary, and presidential in France, as well as the clear focus of the Biden administration on internal affairs and on rivalry with China. After the bloody attack on the school in Beslan in 2004, Putin expressed another of his principles in his speech: ‘We demonstrated weakness, and the weak are beaten’ (Myers, 2015, ch. 14). A different image accompanies President Zelensky. He also presents the traditional pattern of masculinity, but not based on power and aggression, but rather on heroism and defense of his country (Breuer & Lehnen, 2022). Observing his professional and political career, one gets the impression that he has a lot of distance to himself. He was a comedian, he played in romantic comedies, in 2006 he won the Ukrainian edition of Dancing with the Stars, voiced Paddington and danced in high heels and latex in a parody of the music video ‘Love’ by Kazaky. Zelensky, unlike Putin, is most often in a T-​ shirt, on the streets of Kiev, among ordinary people or in administration buildings close to members of his government. His speeches are short and simple, often referring to personal experiences and memories. Apart from rhetorical procedures,2 Zelensky focuses on emotions in terms of both the choice of words and expression. Unlike Putin, he tries to connect, addressing not only Ukrainians but also Russians, Jews and other nations. He asks for help from the stronger states, stirs their consciences, is not ashamed of tears, and reaches for features identified with women. On the one hand, it is natural in the face of the invader’s bestiality, and on the other hand, he is helped by his acting experience, a team of associates working in entertainment and his wife Olena. At this point, it is worth noting that there is no wife or partner with Putin, no daughters. With the exception of MFA spokeswoman Marija Zacharowa, there are only men in uniforms and suits. Despite a number of differences between the styles of Zelensky and Putin, between the two leaders there is ‘a battle between two competing masculinities: the mighty, bare-​ chested Putin, whose hyper-​masculine strength is being challenged, and the kind, gentle, but still strong protector, Zelensky’ (Friedman, 2022; Friedman, 2020, pp. 859–​898). We can also find elements of macho behavior in the international activity of Russia, including its aggression against Ukraine. The gender hierarchy in this case clearly overlaps with realistic anarchy. A strong state, Russia, is invading a weaker state, using its political, economic and military advantage,

102  A. Włodkowska wanting to dominate and subordinate it, and keep it within the reach of its influence and control. Vladimir Putin has feminized Ukraine many times. In his perception, Ukraine, like a woman of a possessive lover, belongs only to him. If Russia fails to keep it under its control, it will destroy it (Bishara, 2022). The disappointment with Kiev, which, despite Russian efforts and the 300-​year union of the two countries, decided to flirt and get closer to the West, is treated in the Russian narrative as Ukraine’s shameful infidelity (Bishara, 2022). Domestic sources of war There is a link between high levels of violence against women and a greater likelihood of breaches of international law and more aggressive behavior towards other countries, including neighboring countries. As mentioned, Putin is a macho man, which translates into Russia’s policy, which is dominated by the need to dominate and subjugate the weaker. The Russians also worship an aggressive man. According to the report of the Russian Consortium of Women’s NGOs, in 2011–​2019 over 12,000 women died in Russia as a result of domestic violence, 81 percent of whom (i.e., approximately 9,800) were killed by their partners (Russia’s Domestic, 2021). Not only has Russia failed to ratify the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), but in 2017 the Russian Duma passed a law decriminalizing one-​off instances of domestic violence. The law was passed with zero opposition from women. Under the Act, if the first incident of violence did not lead to serious bodily harm (blindness, hearing loss, fractures, threat to health and life), it is not treated as a crime, but only as an offense. The new law has increased domestic violence against women in Russia. Ukraine signed the Istanbul Convention in 2011, but despite pressure from the EU, it has still not been ratified.3 Every year, according to the UN, at least 600 Ukrainian women die from gender-​based violence. For comparison, about 170 women died each year as a result of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (Radio Free Europe, 2019). The problem of violence against women is most acute in the eastern part of the country, where the war has been going on since 2014. Women living in eastern Ukraine are most vulnerable to violence by soldiers and partners (Fornusek, 2021). The situation of Ukrainian women deteriorated after February 24, 2022. They are at risk of violence, including sexual violence, displacement and becoming refugees. As a result of the war, women who worked professionally often lose this opportunity, and along with it their independence. Observing Russia’s actions, as a target it chooses schools and hospitals, and therefore the most feminized workplaces. The attack on the Mariupol hospital and the theater in which, as the inscription said, there were children, was shocking. The Russians are also bombing schools and training establishments such as those in Ochtyrka and Uragan. The ongoing fighting is preventing the cultivation of fields and destroying the natural environment, limiting access to food and clean water. Grain shortages

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  103 related to interruptions in supplies from Russia and Ukraine will be felt by the most vulnerable, primarily women, disabled people and children, who are already exposed to hunger and poverty. Easy access to weapons, ubiquitous militarization, and frequent difficulties in accessing medical care also negatively affect the situation of women, as well as children, the elderly and the disabled. The conclusions from the conducted research indicate that the level of gender-​based violence is higher during and after armed conflicts. If Western institutions, especially the EU, which has arguments in the form of membership and support in reconstruction, will not enforce the Ukrainian government’s actions for equality, the situation of women in this country now and after the war will be bad (Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-​Spanvill, McDermott & Emmett, 2008/​2009, pp. 7–​45). The return of soldiers to their homes, often with post-​ traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), may increase the level of domestic violence. Violent behavior may be reinforced due to the forced emancipation of women who, in the absence of men, took over decision-​making roles, and who may not be willing to give them up. While the gender gap indicators for both countries regarding economic opportunities, education and health are relatively high, the influence of women on political decisions, and therefore also those relating to the international activity of countries, remains very low. The spectrum of indicators to which we will look for references is presented in Table 6.1. It is worth noting that while the level of economic integration of Russian women is high (they relatively rarely hold managerial positions), the disparities in incomes are still significant. Women’s income is 60 percent less than men’s income (‘Global Gender’, 2021). It is similar in Ukraine. In 2021, only 21 percent of the seats in parliament were occupied by women (in Russia even less –​16 percent) (Proportion of seats, 2022). The above-​mentioned indicators, according to the results of research by Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli and others, in the case of Russia and Ukraine may translate into a limited possibility of a pacifying influence on the behavior of states. Table 6.1 Global Gender Gap Index 2021 score* Ukraine Global Gender Gap Index Economic participation and opportunity Educational attainment Health and survival Political empowerment

Rank out of 156 countries

Russia

Rank out of 156 countries

0.714 0.732

74 44

0.708 0.767

81 25

1.000 0.978 0.147

27 41 103

1.000 0.980 0.085

1 1 133

*  The first place in the ranking is taken by Iceland GGGI 0.892, and the last (56th) is Afghanistan 0.444. Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2021, Insight Report, March 2021.

104  A. Włodkowska According to supporters of the feminist approach, the militarization of society also remains one of the important sources of armed conflicts. In both Russia and Ukraine, the level of militarization remains high. While in the case of Ukraine this is a consequence of the Russian aggression in 2014, the annexation of Crimea and the persistent instability in the eastern part of the country, in the case of Russia it is a process triggered by its decision-​makers. In 2021, a patriotic education program for the youngest was launched. Its goal is to promote patriotism, national service and readiness to defend the state. This purpose is also served by the Youth Army (Yunarmy) established five years earlier, recruiting even 8-​year-​old children. They are also popular in Russia, stylized as military romps and Victory Day parades, in which parents with children in prams styled as tanks and young children dressed as soldiers participate. According to Maria Domańska, ‘ostentatious displays of military and patriotic symbols in state propaganda lead to public trivialisation of the war issues and unreflective participation in ideologised rituals’ (Domańska & Rogoża, 2021, p. 41). The narrative about the enemies of Russia and the Nazi-​controlled Ukraine, as well as the constant reference to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, have been present in the Russian state media for many years. This contributes to the militarization of Russian society, including its youngest members. War narrative Among the main elements of the Ukrainian war narrative we can find, among other things, threads of an invincible nation that opposes the barbaric message, a unified Ukrainian society and a strong leader, crimes against humanity, damage assessment, holding accountable and rebuilding the country’s infrastructure (Maksak, 2022). There are also references to fascism and its incarnation in the form of the Russian Federation. When making a certain generalization with regard to the Russian narrative, it is worth paying attention to its main elements. First, Russian actions are described as a ‘special military operation’ (the words ‘war’ and ‘intervention’ are not used). Secondly, Russia’s goal is to protect the Russian-​speaking population in the Donbas against persecution and ‘genocide’ by the fascist regime of Ukraine (Chawryło , 2022). Thirdly, NATO and the USA are responsible for the situation in Ukraine, and fourthly, the Russians in this narrative are compared to contemporary Jews, and the Russophobia present in the West to the Holocaust (Chawryło, 2022). The narrative of the Western media coincides with the Ukrainian one in many respects. In both cases, we find many traditional elements of the war narrative. One of them is the wartime hero narrative, which encapsulates the perfect version of masculinity, courage, bravery and protection. At the same time, on the Ukrainian side we are seeing a marked increase in the activity of female soldiers and the use of rape by the Russian army as a military strategy. This makes the narrative of Beautiful Souls and Just Warriors, while still present, much more difficult. Ukrainian women are visible and active. This fact was influenced by the militarization related to, inter alia,

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  105 Russia’s aggression in 20144 (Weichert & Filtenborg, 2021). Still ‘in 2008, only 1,800 women served in the Ukrainian military, a number that rose to 23,000 in 2017, 24,487 in 2018, 27,074 in 2019, and 29,760 women in 2020’ (Weichert & Filtenborg, 2021). According to Deputy Minister for Veterans’ Affairs of Ukraine, Oleksiy Illiashenko, ‘there are more than 400,000 combatants since the beginning of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in 2014. More than 19,000 of them are women. Women defenders took and are taking part in hostilities as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, law enforcement agencies, as well as volunteer battalions’ (Ministry for Veterans’ Affairs of Ukraine, 2021). Many of them are also fighting on the disinformation front. One should be aware of the fact that the development of technology, and with it new types of weapons (drones, robots or other gender-​neutral equipment –​ i.e., traditional weapons such as airplanes, tanks and rifles are often unsuitable for women, their height or weight) (Sjoberg, 2013, ch. 8), as well as the propaganda war and the war in cyberspace increase the opportunities for the participation of women and Ukrainian women in general, in the armed forces and in the fight against the enemy. Ukrainian female soldiers prove their masculinity, just as they photograph themselves, for example, with a gun, and at the same time try to preserve the elements of the female world. Every day the Ukrainian and world media circulate photos of ordinary women with weapons slung over their shoulders, taking care of children, taking them to kindergartens or schools and preparing Molotov cocktails. We will also find those that, while writing about the war, provide their articles with photos focusing on the beauty of female soldiers. One of the goals is to attract readers, but also to keep media and society focused on the ongoing conflict longer. Russian women could and did serve as volunteers in the Russian and Soviet armies. After the collapse of the USSR in November 1992, under the decree of President Yeltsin, they were allowed to enroll in contract service. In May 2020, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that around 41,000 people were serving in the Russian armed forces. About 4.26 percent of all active duty soldiers in the Russian armed forces are women, according to official data (in the United States, women constitute 16.5 percent of the armed forces (Chesnut, 2022)). According to Russian law, women cannot fight at the front. One cannot see Russian female soldiers –​the only information related to this issue was the mention in May 2022 of the death of the first Russian female soldier, Valentina Galatova. The woman was killed in April during the fighting near Kharkiv. It is also worth focusing on a male thread other than the dominant one in the media and war propaganda. Despite the announcement of universal compulsory calling up into the army5 in Ukraine, many men do not want to fight and are trying to leave the country with their families. Trans women who are identified in documents as men are also detained at the border and prevented from leaving (Moaveni & Nagarajan, 2022). The wartime hero narrative completely ignores the issue of male suffering. With regard to the present conflict, there is no image of a Russian other than a criminal, rapist or bandit. We

106  A. Włodkowska know that many of the Russian soldiers are still teenagers, sons of desperate mothers who, as during the war in Chechnya, look for them with the help of the Committee of Mother Soldiers, want to know what they are doing or what they are forced to do. It is worth noting that the image of Ukrainian and Russian mothers is also different. The former are mainly victims of the war, refugees, raped women or soldiers, while the latter are dominated by the image of bad mothers, women who ignore crimes, support Russia and their sons. There are many women among the decision-​makers and leaders reacting to Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine. It is enough to mention the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the Minister of Defense of Germany, Christine Lambrecht, or the Prime Ministers of Lithuania, Ingrida Simonyte, Estonia, Kaja Kallas, Finland, Sanna Marin, and Sweden, Magdalena Andersson. Despite the enormous support of Western countries, including the EU, which, as mentioned above, has an identity closer to women, and Finland and Sweden, which conduct a ‘feminist foreign policy,’ it is rarely mentioned that gender will be a framework for them, or even one of the elements of solving Ukraine’s problems. The gender issue also seems to be missing in the discussion of non-​military responses. Western unity and the relatively quick sanctions imposed on Russia will initially hit primarily the wealthiest and the middle class. As time passes and the Russian economy shrinks, however, those who are already the most marginalized, including women, will suffer the most. Women’s participation in the labor market is likely to decline, as will feminist activism, while patriarchy (Moaveni & Nagarajan, 2022) and violence will increase. All of this, as previously mentioned, affects the quantity and severity of wars. Gendered strategies and tactics of waging war When looking at armed conflicts, one cannot ignore the sexual dimension of their conduct, including the intentional choice of strategy and tactics. Among them, war rape deserves special attention, as it is primarily women and girls at risk. Until recently, war rape was ignored due to its apparent invisibility and recognition as a by-​product of the war, not as an intentional act, which it really is. Rape is also associated with shame, trauma, and the possibility of becoming pregnant. It is therefore burdened with double victimization –​possible health problems of a physical (illness, pregnancy) and mental (depression) nature, rejection in the family or in the local community. War rape and other forms of sexual violence aimed at feminization, i.e., subjugation and humiliation, are a risk, albeit to a lesser extent, also for men and boys. The rape of Ukrainian women and girls during the Russian invasion of Ukraine ‘is a tool, a tactic, a plan, a strategy as well as a practice’ (MacKinnon, 1994, p. 10). According to the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) definition, rape has been denounced as a war crime. According to the provisions of the statute, rape means a situation in which

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  107 the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. (‘Rome Statute,’ 1998) There are several ideas about the causes of rape. Most of them can be related to those carried out by Russian soldiers in Ukraine. First, during wars and armed conflicts, gender roles are polarized, relationships based on patriarchy are strengthened, and power is abused, including the enhancement of sexual violence. The conservative nature of Russian society, in which the roles of men and women are clearly defined, and which do not penalize violence against women, makes the use of force all the more ‘natural’ beyond the borders against hostile women and indirectly hostile men. This is also due to the greater possibility of committing a sexual act with impunity (Wood, 2010, p. 131). During the war, social norms are suspended in a peculiar way, and the control of one’s own family or society disappears. At the same time, a soldier staying in a hostile country in which general conscription has been declared has ‘easy access’ to women who remain at home without their partners. Secondly, the purpose of sexual violence, including mass rape, often collective and public, is to intimidate civilians or force their migration (Wood, 2010, p. 133). Sometimes rape becomes part of the genocide. Forcing men to watch rapes is also supposed to serve as their symbolic castration, and thus the aforementioned feminization and humiliation, due to the inability to protect women, partners, mothers, daughters and sisters. Thirdly, one factor that increases the likelihood of sexual violence is the forced recruitment of soldiers currently taking place in the Russian army. Many of them have been deceived as to the causes and purposes of their actions. By forcibly recruiting very young recruits, often from low society, and criminals, which is also the case in Russia, an army is being created that is characterized by low cohesion and low morale. According to researchers, group rape is a way to socialize reluctant soldiers and consolidate the group (Nordås, 2022). In the case of sexual violence and rapes by Russian soldiers on women and girls in Ukraine, we are probably dealing with intentional, i.e., planned, use of this type of tactic. This can be proved by the history of rape as a weapon of war during the ‘liberation’ of Central Europe and Germany by the Red Army, during Russian operations in Chechnya, during the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and in Donbas (Nordås, 2022). According to Lori Handrahan, whose approach we can also apply to explaining the mechanism of war rape in Ukraine, sexual violence against

108  A. Włodkowska women can be applied to the symbolic expansion of the territory of the state, the woman as the mother of the nation by the conqueror man. This conqueror at the time of conquest, which is rape, dominates the one whose role was to protect them (Handrahan, 2004, p. 437). According to this approach, the war is fought by the bodies of women who are extensions of enemy territory. In this context, forced impregnation is therefore a violation of the chastity not only of women, but also an attack on a group, a specific message about the opponent’s inability to protect what is valuable. Defective mechanisms of selection of fighters, low wages and low group cohesion (low morale, lack of full knowledge of the actions taken, national and ethnic diversity) contribute to a higher level of violence during the war. For the record, it’s worth mentioning that ‘sexual violence is less likely when military groups • • • • • • •

have a high ratio of female combatants; have a normative image that is incompatible with the practice of sexual violence; are dependent on civilians for resources or recruits; believe it will strategically benefit them by reducing civilians’ desire for revenge; are concerned with their combatants’ health; are dependent on international allies; want to avoid humanitarian and other international criticism’ (Gerecke, 2010, p. 141).

None of the above factors is present in the Russian army.

What after the war? The feminist approach helps to capture what is invisible in wars and armed conflicts. It allows us to better understand the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in which women play many roles, and at least the stereotypical one –​Beautiful Souls. Ukrainian women are active and are often forced into activities that they would not otherwise wish to do. The question that needs to be asked is precisely about women, their place and role after the end of the conflict. Now the value of their direct and active involvement in the life of the state and its defense is recognized. Research shows that when women are involved in peace negotiations, agreements are more durable. This does not mean that women are more peaceful than men, it only shows that they can bring new elements to negotiations and pay attention to what is of little importance to men. If both sides of the conflict want to reach a lasting agreement, they should remember to involve women in the negotiations. What was noticeable during the broadcast of the Russo-​Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul was the room filled

Conflict in Ukraine – Feminist Perspective  109 almost exclusively with men, even though reports of rape and mass refugees of women were already known. The European Union and its President of the European Commission, as well as women in power in European countries, can play a huge role in this matter. Also, help in the reconstruction of Ukraine or support for its membership in the EU should be subject to conditions related to women’s rights. On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325, ‘Women, Peace and Security.’ The document called for a gender perspective in all peace-​keeping operations and for the inclusion of women in peace agreements and post-​conflict decision-​making. Importantly, it also drew attention to the need to recognize the ‘special needs’ of women and girls in post-​conflict societies, when they are again exposed to sexual violence. According to a poll conducted by the Peace Research Institute Oslo in March and April 2022, 43 percent of Ukrainian and Ukrainian women surveyed supported the participation of women in the Ukrainian delegation for peace talks (Nordås, Olsson, Østby & Tryggestad, 2022). Their participation is supported by 47 percent of the surveyed Ukrainian women and 40 percent of Ukrainians. 13 percent were against it. How will it be this time? History shows that there is always time for women’s rights and freedoms, for taking into account their perspective, there are always more important matters. Will the call for women’s rights, consideration of their problems and their ideas for peace and a new Ukraine be perceived as ‘something tactless, selfish, inappropriate’? (Penn, 2003, pp. 251, 257).

Notes 1 The bombings on residential buildings in Bujnaksk, Moscow and Wołgodonsk in September 1999, for which Chechen fighters were accused, according to former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko (poisoned probably by Putin in 2006 with radioactive polonium) were a provocation carried out by the FSB, which in 1998 was headed by Putin. The attacks made it possible to intimidate Russian society and provided an excuse to start an intervention in Chechnya and paved the way for Putin to the highest office in the state. 2 During his speech to the House of Commons on the 13th day of the invasion, the president compared the Ukrainians’ struggle against Russia to that of the British against Hitler. He also referred to the words of Winston Churchill. Before the American Congress, he compared the bombing of Ukraine to Pearl Harbor and September 11; he also referred to words from Martin Luther King’s speech ‘I have a dream’. 3 It is worth noting that in 2017 the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Law On Preventing and Combating Domestic Violence, which, inter alia, extended the definition of domestic violence to include mental, sexual and economic violence. 4 According to the data of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, since 2014, more than 30,000 Ukrainian women became war veterans (Prus, 2022). 5 Ukrainian men of fighting age are prohibited from leaving the country with their families.

110  A. Włodkowska

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7 Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine Renata Podgórzańska, Sabina Grabowska, Małgorzata Podolak and Anna Pięta-​Szawara

Introduction One of the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been the massive escapes of civilians from the areas affected by military operations. For the sake of safety, health and life, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian residents (both in the western and in the eastern part) have decided to leave their current places of residence and look for shelter in the immediate and further vicinity of Ukraine. The scale of the influx of refugees from Ukraine is a huge challenge for government and local government administration, social organizations, local communities and individual citizens who undertake the provision of the required support and humanitarian aid. These challenges are related both to the need to organize material and financial support for refugees, as well as to develop a mechanism for their integration with Polish society. The dynamics of the phenomenon of the influx of refugees show the need for systemic and, importantly, long-​term operation of relevant services and institutions, implemented both individually as a consequence of the state’s migration policy, as well as being a consequence of Poland’s membership in international organizations and joining projects initiated and coordinated by various types of international collaboration formats. In particular, attention should be paid to the activities carried out within the national legal order, resulting from the applicable regulations and in line with the assumptions of the state’s migration policy. At the same time, it should be noted that the applicable rules in this regard turned out to be insufficient and required urgent modification and consideration of the scale and dynamics of the influx of refugees to Poland. Regardless of the fact that in the migration practice to date, Ukrainian citizens constituted the essential part of migrants coming to Poland, the war in Ukraine changed the patterns and nature of migration. Importantly, the circumstances of the influx, the scale and dynamics of the phenomenon, structural features, all these factors make the current situation unprecedented, requiring complex, comprehensive and coordinated actions. The aim of the chapter is the exegesis of Poland’s policy towards refugees from Ukraine, explaining the premises of Poland’s activity in this area, and indicating legal solutions to increase the effectiveness of Polish support for refugees. It is necessary to efficiently manage the influx of refugees, to develop DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-8

114  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara effective support tools, and what is important, not to weaken the possibilities and abilities of the state’s activity in the field of social policy and social security. It should be noted that effective measures in the area of support for refugees must be socially acceptable measures. In this socially sensitive area, they cannot cause anti-​refugee attitudes, which boil down to negating systemic support for refugees in the long run.

The scale and dynamics of the influx of refugees from Ukraine in the context of hostilities For many years now, the citizens of Ukraine have been the most numerous group of foreigners in Poland, and one of the most important factors determining this is the geographical proximity. The scale of the influx of refugees to Poland (over 3 million) is determined by the geographical proximity as well as a number of other circumstances, such as the presence of large groups of migrants from Ukraine in Poland, who assist refugees from Ukraine in organizing their departure from Ukraine to Poland (or other countries), the activity of Ukrainians settled in Poland, and the readiness of Poles to provide support in such dramatic circumstances. It should be mentioned that so far Ukrainian migrants are mainly people belonging to two groups: workers (including seasonal workers) and students. Since 2014, a group of Ukrainian citizens applying for international protection has also resided in Poland (Office for Foreigners, 2022). With the Russian invasion, the nature of Ukrainian migration to Poland changed. As an introduction, it should be noted that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has caused enormous migratory movements in Ukraine, both internal and external. By May 10, 2022, the number of people who left Ukraine had exceeded 6 million (UNHCR, 2022). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the beginning of the invasion estimated that in two months Ukraine will have 7.5 million internally displaced persons, 12 million will need medical care, and the number of people fleeing the war will amount to 4 million. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that we are dealing with the largest migration crisis since World War II (Reuters, 2022). When analyzing the scale and dynamics of the phenomenon of Ukrainian population migration to the territory of the European Union countries (including Poland), it should be remembered that Ukraine has had an association agreement with the EU since 2017 and people with biometric passports have the right to a 90-​day visa-​free stay in the Schengen area states (Schengen Visa ETIAS, 2022; Schengen News, 2022). After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Commission called on the Member States to permit the entry and temporary residence of people who do not have biometric passports for humanitarian reasons. In March 2022, the Council of the European Union agreed to introduce, for the first time in its history, the Temporary Protection Directive (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/​ 382), which makes

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  115 it easier for refugees to cross borders and regulates the rules of stay in the Member States. Temporary protection is an emergency mechanism that gives you the right to stay in an EU Member State for an initial period of one year, which may be extended to a maximum of three years. Beneficiaries enjoy rights across the EU, such as residence rights, access to the labor market and housing, medical assistance and access to education for children. As for the countries neighboring with Ukraine, the largest group of refugees came to Poland, mainly through border crossings in Podkarpacie and the Lublin region. The figures show the scale of the influx of refugees to Poland. At the beginning of May 2022, the Border Guard announced that the daily number of people crossing the Polish border was about 20,000 (Puzyr, 2022). Using the data of the Border Guard as the most reliable in the context of the influx of refugees to Poland, it can be roughly calculated that, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nearly 3.5 million refugees have arrived in Poland, mainly women and children (Derewienko, 2022). The next country in terms of the number of people fleeing Ukraine is Romania 901,696 (as of May 12, 2022). In addition, over 739,000 refugees went to the aggressor’s country –​Russia, to Hungary 572,000, to Moldova a little over 457,000, to Slovakia over 400,000, to Belarus 26,000 (Kobyliński, Kowalko, Zbroja, Koziestański & Rabiega, 2022). It should be noted that before the war, 70 percent of Ukrainians coming to Poland were men, today, as was noted, mainly women and children. Currently, as many as 94 percent of all refugees from Ukraine arriving in Poland are women with children, and as many as 51 percent of all refugees from Ukraine coming to us are children. Another 43 percent of the refugees are women aged 19–​65. The next 3 percent are retirees. Working age males are only 3 percent (Potocka & Berenda, 2022). Poland has always been an attractive place for Ukrainian labor migrants (Gajewski, Szydlik & Buchwald, 2018, pp. 169–​186). After Poland joined the EU, they were covered (similarly to the citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Russian Federation with special procedural facilitations (Wawryniuk, 2017)). With them in mind, regularization campaigns, the so-​ called abolitions, enabled under certain conditions the stay of persons residing in Poland illegally to be regulated (Szczepanik, 2015, p. 21). Demographers estimate that half of the refugees from Ukraine that crossed the border with Poland went further to the West, while the other half stayed with us. After February 24, over 62,900 Ukrainian citizens started working in Poland, 75 percent of them women. They most often found employment in large cities: in Warsaw, Poznań, Łódź and Wrocław (Potocka & Berenda, 2022). Ukrainians also submitted about 300,000 applications for 500 plus (a benefit of 500 zloty for each child) for approximately 445,000 children. The Ukraine Aid Act also gives Ukrainian citizens free access to the Polish labor market –​they do not need any permits or declarations to legally work in Poland (Filarybiznesu.pl, 2022). The directions of migration and the number of refugees to which we refer are presented in Table 7.1.

116  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara Table 7.1 Directions of migration and the number of refugees (data on May 10, 2022) Direction of migration

Number of refugees

Poland Romania Russia Hungary Moldova Slovakia Czech Republic Germany Bulgaria Austria Italy Belgium Croatia Cyprus Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Netherlands Spain Iceland Lithuania Luxemburg Latvia Portugal Serbia Slovenia Sweden Switzerland Great Britain Australia Brazil Canada Egypt Israel Japan Turkey

3,143,550 901,696 772,121 557,820 458,242 406,833 315,785 239,000 185,055 150,000 113,239 30,807 15,000 3,000 30,000 25,347 15,000 70,000 16,700 325 (people) 30,000 748 (people) 51,100 No data 28,159 33,106 Over 1,000 18,415 5,200 24,837 12,000 5,000 1,100 6,017 (by land) and 22,317 (by air) 16,000–​20,000 15,200 29 people 85,000

Source: Operation Data Portal, 2022, Ukraine Refugee Situation. https://​data2.unhcr.org/​en/​sit​ uati​ons/​ukra​ine [accessed on May 3, 2022].

It should be noted that the figures provided are estimates. Movements of refugees from one country to another are often not officially recorded. Ukrainian refugees have been able to travel to many countries without a visa and can stay there without a special permit. Often, Poland is treated only as a transit and not a destination country. This is because travelers can move around the Schengen area countries both without visas and without customs clearance.

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  117 Consequently, we can only use approximate data. However, they allow the dynamics of the phenomenon to be characterized and indicate potential threats.

Legal aspects of admitting and assisting refugees from Ukraine The massive influx of refugees from Ukraine and the necessity to provide them with support required an inventory of the legal infrastructure and the design of solutions enabling refugees to receive systemic assistance. The key task was to adopt provisions that would constitute the legal basis for the legal residence of Ukrainian citizens who, as a result of hostilities, were forced to leave their country of origin and entered the territory of Poland (Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2022b). On March 7, 2022, the Government draft law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that country was submitted to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. The project concerns the definition of specific rules for legalizing on the territory of the Republic of Poland the stay of Ukrainian citizens who entered the territory of Poland directly from the territory of Ukraine in connection with hostilities conducted on the territory of that nation and the determination of forms of support for Ukrainian citizens, including specific rules for entrusting them with work and the rules for the undertaking and carrying out of economic activity by them. On March 12, 2022, the Act was adopted, signed by the President of the Republic of Poland and published in the Journal of Laws (Journal of Laws, 2022b). Thus, it entered into force, and its provisions are applicable retroactively from February 24, 2022 (Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022). Additionally, it should be noted that foreigners who are not covered by the aforementioned Act, and belong to the category of displaced persons listed in the EU Council Implementing Decision stating the existence of a mass influx of people displaced from Ukraine (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/​382), may benefit from temporary protection in accordance with the Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland (Office for Foreigners, 2022). The law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that nation defines, inter alia, special rules for legalizing the stay of Ukrainian citizens (and their spouses who do not have Ukrainian citizenship) who came to Poland from the territory of Ukraine in connection with hostilities carried out on the territory of that country, and Ukrainian citizens who have a Pole’s Card, who came with their immediate family because of these hostilities on the territory of Poland (Article 2). The provisions of the Act do not apply to Ukrainian citizens who have a permanent residence permit, a long-​term EU resident permit, a temporary residence permit, refugee status, subsidiary protection, a permit for tolerated stay, and who have submitted applications for international protection in Poland (or on behalf of whom such applications were submitted) or declared their intention to submit applications for international protection.

118  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara Art. 1 sec. 3 of the Act specifies: 1) specific rules for entrusting work to citizens of Ukraine legally residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland; 2) assistance provided by voivodes, local government units and other entities to citizens of Ukraine; 3) establishing an Assistance Fund to finance or co-​finance the implementation of tasks to help Ukrainian citizens; 4) certain rights of Ukrainian citizens whose stay in the territory of the Republic of Poland is considered legal; 5) special rules for extending the periods of legal stay of Ukrainian citizens and the documents issued by Polish authorities regarding the rights to enter and stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland; 6) certain rights of Polish citizens and Ukrainian citizens who are students, academic teachers or research workers entering from the territory of Ukraine; 7) specific regulations concerning the education, upbringing and care of children and students who are citizens of Ukraine, including support for local government units in the implementation of additional educational tasks in this regard; 8) special rules for the organization and operation of universities in relation to the provision of study places for Ukrainian citizens, referred to in sec. 1; 9) special rules for undertaking and carrying out economic activity by citizens of Ukraine legally residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland. In accordance with the intention of the legislator, citizens of Ukraine who have left their homeland as a result of Russian aggression may legally stay in Poland for 18 months from February 24, 2022. This applies to people who came to Poland from Ukraine and declared their intention to stay in our country. The law also regulates the path of further legalization of the stay of Ukrainian citizens who fled from the war. Persons may submit such applications not earlier than 9 months from the date of entry, and not later than within 18 months from February 24, 2022. After meeting all the conditions, the temporary residence permit will be granted once for a period of three years, counting from the date of the decision. From March 16, 2022, citizens of Ukraine may also submit applications for a PESEL number at any commune office (a special procedure for obtaining a number is provided) and with the assignment of the number, they will be able to obtain a trusted profile (Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej, 2022). This solution allows for the implementation of a number of public services for these people, which is crucial from the point of view of satisfying their basic social needs. Persons who stayed in the territory of Poland before February 4, 2022, on the basis of a national visa or on the basis of a temporary residence permit,

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  119 will automatically be able to stay in the territory of Poland until December 31, 2022. If voluntary return falls in the period from February 24, 2022, it is extended by operation of law for a period of 18 months. The provisions of the Act also regulate access to the Polish labor market for Ukrainian citizens (Gąsiorowska, 2022) and the possibility of running a business, on the same terms as Polish citizens, provided that they obtain a PESEL number. Persons covered by the Act in question may be employed by Polish employers (Art. 22 sec. 1). The Act –​this should be emphasized –​enables easier employment of these people in specific positions or for performing certain professions, such as: • • •

teacher’s assistant (Art. 57 of the Special Act), a doctor, dentist, nurse or midwife (Art. 63 sec. 1 and Art. 64 sec. 1), employee of universities and other research units (Articles 46–​48).

In addition, the assistance to Ukrainian citizens is provided for by voivodes and local governments. It can be, inter alia, for accommodation or the provision of full board meals, payment of benefits, food parcels (Art. 12). The citizens of Ukraine also gained access to social assistance, child benefit, family benefits, good start benefits, family care capital or subsidies for lowering the parent’s fee for a child’s stay in a nursery, children’s club or day carer (Art. 26, Art. 28). Access to the public health care system has also been guaranteed to Ukrainian citizens on the same terms as Polish citizens (Art. 37). The National Health Fund will pay for each medical service for a Ukrainian citizen in the public health service. The financing of these benefits will be guaranteed from the state budget. It should be noted that Poland was one of the first countries in Europe to provide comprehensive assistance to Ukrainian citizens. The law was adopted very quickly, pursuant to which the citizens of Ukraine are provided with safety and basic living conditions and livelihoods.

The practice of managing the refugee crisis in Poland The events that occurred in Poland as a result of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine fulfilled the definition of a crisis situation referred to in Art. 3 point 1 of the Act of April 26, 2007, on crisis management (Journal of Laws, 2022a). According to this, a crisis situation should be understood as ‘a situation having a negative impact on the level of safety of people, property to a large extent or the environment, causing significant limitations in the operation of the competent public administration bodies due to the inadequacy of the strength and resources available.’ In order to properly respond to it, it became necessary to launch crisis management, understood as ‘the activity of public administration bodies as an element of national security management, which consists in preventing crisis situations, preparing to take control over them through planned actions, and responding in the event of

120  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara crisis situations, removing their effects and restoring resources and critical infrastructure’ (Journal of Laws, 2022a). The Council of Ministers headed by its President is responsible for the implementation of tasks adequate to the development of the situation, including the control of the crisis situation and appropriate response to it on a national scale. In the light of the above, the government administration should be the main entity coordinating the influx of Ukrainian citizens to Poland. Meanwhile, in practice, especially in the first weeks of the crisis, the task of accepting hundreds of thousands of refugees was faced primarily by the bodies of local government units, local communities and the sector of local government organizations. A huge social energy was activated, thanks to which the activities related to taking refugees at the border, providing them with food, transport and organizing temporary places for them were taken over by individual citizens. Mass fundraisers and material collections started immediately. Despite the government’s assurances about anti-​crisis measures, intersectoral cooperation to help Ukrainian citizens did not function at that time. A crisis team has not been established, neither formal –​at the Government Center for Security –​nor informal. The government also decided not to introduce a state of emergency in the country, which in view of the scale of the crisis might have seemed justified. The activities carried out in this period were typically bottom-​up and short-​term, and focused on the social provision of basic living needs to newcomers. In the following weeks, the government focused on the preparation of legal and budgetary solutions, also taking into account the use of financial aid declared by the European Commission (Szymańska, 2022, p. 2; Kolanko, 2022) and participation in international efforts to help refugees and organizing military aid for Ukraine. As a result, building a multi-​level national crisis management system was very slow. It took place especially between the central and local authorities, mainly due to the growing problems related to financing the stay of refugees in Poland, which forced the government to establish a dialogue with local politicians who were unable to cope with the emerging challenges on their own. In addition to providing food and shelter to refugees, it has become necessary to plan issues related to education, health, housing, security, employment opportunities and social protection. To this end, on April 28, 2022, an ad hoc team for refugees from Ukraine was appointed at the Joint Committee of the Government and Local Government, with the task of shaping a long-​term migration policy (PAP Local Government Service, 2022). However, representatives of the NGO sector still remained outside the orbit of the central authorities’ interest, while the voivodes responsible for crisis management in the field, as well as their collective administration, were still unable to take over the burden of humanitarian activities carried out by local governments and the public (Report: New Solidarity Initiative, 2022, p. 13). Representatives of domestic business and non-​governmental organizations gradually joined the talks with the authorities over the strategy of medium and long-​term crisis management, while the supporting and coordinating role was taken over by universities (Report: New Solidarity Initiative, 2022).

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  121 It was in these circles, in consultation with local government officials, that it was decided to create new municipal public policies (educational, social, employment, etc.) that would allow for social and humanitarian activities in a stable and perspective manner, as well as integrating Ukrainians with the local community. Thus, a completely new quality has emerged in relation to classical crisis management, which is the exclusive domain of the central government. The preparation of recommendations and necessary legal changes in connection with the admission by Poland of over 3 million refugees from Ukraine was undertaken by the Local Government Round Table, which took place in Wrocław on May 8–​9, 2022. It was attended by representatives of local government units, non-​governmental organizations, business and science. The invitation was also received by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, President Andrzej Duda and Minister for Refugees Paweł Szefernaker, who, however, did not participate in the event personally, sending only their representatives to Wrocław. This testified to the continuing distance of the central government from building full understanding with local government and social activists. Importantly, the event was also attended by representatives of the Ukrainian community and the mayor of Kiev, Witalij Kliczko (Wiązowska, 2022; Ambroziak, 2022). The next entity to join the crisis management network was international humanitarian organizations, including US government agencies, as well as global companies. The help was joined, among others, by representatives of UNHCR, Boston Consulting Group (Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 2022a), and UNICEF. The scale and nature of the challenges related to providing assistance to refugees from Ukraine requires the construction of a multi-​level system in which each of the entities, depending on their competences and assigned tasks, realizes the primary goal of creating an effective crisis management system.

State and non-​state entities in activities to support refugees from Ukraine The President of the Council of Ministers together with the Minister of Interior and Administration, the Government Crisis Management Team and the Government Security Center and their local crisis management bodies are responsible for the coordination of humanitarian activities for Ukraine by operation of law. In the area of individual voivodships, this function belongs to voivodes who, together with Voivodship Crisis Management Teams and Voivodship Crisis Management Centers, ensure cooperation of government and local government administration bodies in the field. At a lower level, i.e., in poviats and communes, there are poviat and commune teams and crisis management centers, respectively. Appropriate coordinators were responsible for humanitarian activities for asylum seekers. Important activities undertaken by the above-​mentioned state administration bodies include the creation of refugee reception points, where asylum seekers can obtain information on their stay in Poland and temporary

122  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara accommodation, as well as first aid related to providing hot meals, basic medical care, as well as the possibility of a short break. Eight points were established at the Polish-​Ukrainian border (Dorohusk, Dołhobyczów, Zosin, Hrebenne, Korczowa, Medyka, Budomierz, Krościenko), while the remaining ones were created in individual provinces. Another form of government assistance was the creation of information points and helplines of voivodeship offices for refugees. In addition, on February 27, 2022, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the website pomagamukrainie.gov.pl, supporting the coordination of humanitarian aid proposed by the non-​governmental sector in Poland. There is also a list of verified fundraisers and other activities carried out by NGOs for refugees. Further actions by the state to support refugees were included by the government in the aforementioned law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that state. Pursuant to the adopted solutions, in addition to the detailed powers for asylum seekers, the Assistance Fund for Ukraine was established, supported by PLN 8 billion from the state budget and other contributions, including contributions from donors, from which funds may be allocated to the implementation of tasks related to helping Ukrainian citizens, affected by the armed conflict (Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 2022b). Moreover, it is worth noting that on April 2, 2022, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki appointed Deputy Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs Paweł Szefernakera to the position of the Government Plenipotentiary for War Refugees from Ukraine in order to efficiently coordinate the adopted solutions. In the organization of humanitarian aid for the Ukrainian refugees, apart from the Polish Government and local government unit, a number of entities belonging to the so-​called third sector began to work. They took action immediately after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, both in the center of the humanitarian crisis (on the Polish-​Ukrainian border and in the border zone) and throughout the country. In the first days of the Russian invasion, their activity was spontaneous and uncoordinated, while just a few days later the first social crisis bars began to appear, aimed at associating refugee needs and –​ above all –​improving communication between NGOs, Crisis Management Centers, public administration bodies and local governments. The Crisis Staff, just a few hours after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, was also created by Polish Jewish organizations: the Jewish Religious Community in Warsaw, rabbis of the Warsaw Community, and Jewish organizations: European Jewish Congress, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), Jewish Community Center (JCC Warszawa)), American Jewish Committee (AJC), Association of the Jewish Historical Institute, Lauder-​ Morasha School, Hillel Warsaw, Puszke Foundation, Makabi Warsaw, JCC Krakow, Socio-​Cultural Society of Jews in Poland (Social Communication Office of the Jewish Community in Warsaw, 2022). Among the non-​ governmental organizations working for migrants, one should mention, for example, the Polish Humanitarian Organization

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  123 (hereafter: PAH), Caritas Polska, the Polish Red Cross (hereafter: PCK), the Ocalenie Foundation, the SOS Children’s Villages Foundation, the International Aid Center Foundation (hereafter: FCPM), the Society Friends of Ukraine, UNICEF Poland, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and many others. They took actions that can be classified into several groups: 1) providing safe shelter for asylum seekers (Ukrainian House in Warsaw, run by the ‘Nasz Choice’ Foundation, the Refugees Welcom program under the Ocaleniem Foundation, Chlebem i Solą organization, sosua.pl portal, created by numerous NGOs, including the Polish Humanitarian Organization, Polish Migration Forum, or the Shipyard Foundation), 2) caring about the well-​being of people who host the refugees (created by HumanDoc Foundation The Guide for people who host the Ukrainian refugees), 3) help for people with disabilities and dysfunctions (Mudita Association, SMA Foundation, Akademia Młodych Deafuchych Foundation, Polish Physiotherapy Association), 4) support for LGBT +​people (Stonewall Group, Lambda Warsaw, Continuous Help Group, Queer Tour, Wrzenie Foundation), 5) organization of psychological support (Polish Migration Forum, Nagle Sami Foundation, RAZEM Social Education), 6) providing legal assistance (Ukrainian House, Ocalenie Foundation, Halina Nieć Legal Aid Center, Polish Migration Forum Foundation), 7) volunteering coordination (Polish Humanitarian Action, the Ocalenie Foundation, the Ukrainian House in Warsaw), 8) Polish language learning and educational counseling (Center for Immigrants and Immigrants Support, Ocalenie Foundation, Polish Hospitality Foundation ‘Bread and Salt’), 9) transport of refugees from the areas of military operations (SOS Children’s Villages Association), 10) aid for animals (‘ADA’ animal clinic in Przemyśl, Benek Foundation), 11) support in the field of blood donation ([email protected]), 12) collection of material gifts (Polish Red Cross), 13) money collections (Polish Humanitarian Action, Caritas Polska, UNICEF, Ukraine Foundation) (Dudkiewicz, 2022). Help was also provided by trade unions operating in Poland, such as NSZZ Solidarność, OPZZ, ZNP, Labor Conference, Employee Initiative, which also conducted financial and material collections, organized transport and provided accommodation for refugees. Interesting activities were undertaken by an organization associating education workers –​the Polish Teachers’ Union, which carries out a number of activities for the organization of education as part of the Polish education system for children from Ukraine and the preparation of the necessary legal solutions for the efficient organization of refugee education (Ołdak, 2022, p. 23).

124  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara At the lowest level of social commitment, help was also provided by local action groups, organizing their activities via social media. Their activity was usually of a voluntary nature.

Political aspects of accepting refugees in Poland. National and European context The conflict in Ukraine, which resulted in a massive influx of refugees on Polish territory, became the subject of political discourse. Due to the complex nature of the challenges related to the influx of refugees, the debate emphasized various issues related to the reception of refugees, the scale and nature of the support, the prospects of refugee stay in Poland, and finally the degree of Polish involvement in helping Ukraine. The obligations that arise for Poland as a neighboring country were highlighted, and the solidarity and obligations of Poland as a member of the international community were emphasized. At the same time, it should be noted that the debate focused not only on the national context of support for refugees from Ukraine, but also emphasized the broader European dimension of the problem, emphasizing the obligations of the international community to engage in aid for Ukraine. It was argued that the violation of the integrity of the territory of Ukraine, the inviolability of its borders and the right to self-​determination is a threat to European security and as such requires a response from the international community. The characteristic feature of the political discourse on the issue of the influx of war refugees to Poland was, on the one hand, the agreement on the legitimacy of accepting and providing support to refugees, and on the other hand, a kind of internalization of the Russian-​Ukrainian conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was assessed in terms of a violation of international law, as an example of an expansionary Russian policy that violates the rules of international coexistence, undermining international order and peace (Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2022a). There was a widespread narrative about the unauthorized actions of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine, characterized by the desire to deprive Ukraine of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Regardless of the political affiliation, opinions were formulated about the need for solidarity with the Ukrainian society and the development of effective mechanisms of support for the mass of refugees flowing into Poland. At the same time, however, while the mere fact of providing support to refugees was not the subject of political discussions, the scope and nature of the support was a source of criticism, as were the actions taken by the government towards the conflict in Ukraine on the international arena. Considering the multidimensional nature of the migration phenomenon, the influx of war refugees to Poland was an impulse for wider discussions on government initiatives in the context of the war in Ukraine. The challenges related to accepting refugees were of various origins and nature, and the key

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  125 was to verify the costs and benefits of including refugees into the Polish social and economic system. Criticism of the scope and nature of assistance to refugees varied depending on the environment formulating the comments. While the parties included in the government coalition (Law and Justice, Solidarity Poland, the Republican Party), as well as the overwhelming majority of opposition formations, indicated the need for support, differing only in assessing whether the government proposals are sufficient from the point of view of the effectiveness of meeting the needs of refugees, some contested the aid dimension and the proposed instruments. The latter included the Confederation of Freedom and Independence, whose leader during one of the parliamentary speeches indicated that it is necessary to ‘oppose the policy of philanthropy at the expense of the Polish citizen’ and ‘create demand for war migration’ (Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2022c, p. 212). Negative resonance was also caused by his statement at the press conference that the influx of refugees could result in a radical change in the population structure of the Republic of Poland, and this ‘may result in long-​term consequences’ (Niezalezna.pl, 2022). Basically, the group criticized the refugee support instruments, considering them too costly and connected with rights to which only Polish citizens, and not migrants, have rights. Their position boiled down to the statement ‘yes to help refugees, not for privileges’ (Do Rzeczy, 2022). Moreover, due to the European dimension of the conflict in Ukraine, the opposition parties referred to Polish-​EU relations and unresolved disputes in their political discourse. We are talking about the reform of the judiciary in Poland and the Polish-​EU dispute in this matter, the culmination of which are financial penalties imposed on Poland for failure to comply with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the need to liquidate the Disciplinary Chamber. The issue of support for refugees from Ukraine contributed to the contestation of the government’s European policy and discussions on the nature of the reform of the judiciary in Poland, the main author of which is the grouping of Zbigniew Ziobro, Solidarna Polska. As regards Poland’s involvement in the war in Ukraine called by Russia, the lack of consistency on the part of the government was pointed out. While the efforts of Polish diplomacy were emphasized, for example in the context of sanctions, increasing the scope of military aid to Ukraine, and explaining war crimes, the scope and speed of the sanctions introduced and their nature (in particular regarding gas supplies) were criticized. It should be added that due to the lack of consensus on the assumptions of the implemented foreign policy, in the face of the war in Ukraine, some categories were strongly exposed. These included the already mentioned Polish-​EU relations, or due to the Hungarian position in the context of Russian aggression, the prospects of Polish-​Hungarian cooperation (Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 2022a). Incidentally, it should be noted that the duality of the debate has its origins in the political conflict that has lasted for years between the main political forces in Poland –​Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, exemplified by,

126  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara inter alia, dispute over the imponderability of foreign policy and the manner of its implementation. The issue of the government’s policy towards refugees, which was highlighted in the political debate in Poland, contributed to a broader discussion on the activities of the government in the internal and international dimension. The divergent positions of political parties towards the implemented foreign policy, including European policy, resulted in linking in the political debate the issue of support for refugees with the actions of the government based on the Law and Justice towards the European Union.

Social aspects of accepting refugees in Poland The powerful wave of refugees coming to Poland from war-​torn Ukraine that appeared in Poland in the last days of February started one of the largest refugee crises in Europe since the Second World War. In its first weeks, Poles showed an extremely open social attitude towards newcomers from beyond the eastern border. Thanks to social sensitivity, just after the borders were opened for refugees, humanitarian support from local governments, non-​ governmental organizations, companies and individual citizens began to flow to the needy in a wide stream. Within a month (up to and including March 24), it was possible to receive and organize the most urgent aid for 2,237,000 people from Ukraine (Border Guards. 2022). Moreover, Poles immediately organized the logistics of humanitarian aid coming to our country from all over the world (Górny & Kaczmarczyk, 2022). According to the results of the research carried out as part of the project ‘Poland –​Germany 2022 Barometer,’ carried out jointly by the Polish Institute of Public Affairs and the German Institute of Polish Affairs, published on March 4, 2022, as many as 77 percent of Poles surveyed expressed their approval for accepting refugees from Ukraine, while only one in ten opposed such actions. It is worth emphasizing that in view of the clear political polarization existing in Poland, votes of support for social aid activities were expressed by voters of all political forces. Moreover, as many as 48 percent of Poles positively assessed the government’s policy during the ongoing crisis (Kucharczyk & Łada-​Konefał, 2022, pp. 24, 33–​35). In turn, in a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (hereinafter: CBOS) on February 28–​March 10, as many as two-​thirds of respondents, i.e., 68 percent, declared that they personally help refugees (financially or in kind) (Feliksiak & Roguska, 2022, pp. 1–​2). In comparison, in a study conducted on March 3–​ 7, 2022, by the French Jean Jaures Foundation in cooperation with the Yalta European Strategy Institute, the inhabitants of Poland, France, Germany and Italy were surveyed. It turned out then that as many as 92 percent of Poles surveyed believed that refugees from Ukraine should be helped, while 90 percent of Germans, 89 percent of Italians and 80 percent of French were of the same opinion (Szpyrka, 2022). According to CBOS, among Poles the people who mainly help are interested in current political events, mostly well-​educated and with a good financial

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  127 situation, aged between 35 and 44, inhabitants of the eastern macroregion (especially Lublin and Podkarpacie provinces), more often women than men (Feliksiak & Roguska, 2022, pp. 1–​2). It is worth noting that as many as 94 percent of Poles were convinced that our country should accept refugees –​ never before has this position been so unequivocally positive, as evidenced by research on the policy towards asylum seekers conducted by CBOS since 2015. The vast majority of respondents also declared their support for various activities of the international community aimed at helping Ukraine. As many as 91 percent supported diplomatic pressure on Russia to stop hostilities, while 93 percent supported helping Ukraine with financial aid, and 90 percent supported the supply of weapons (Feliksiak & Roguska, 2022, p. 6). The third study, concerning the reaction of Poles to the mass influx of refugees, was conducted by IPSOS, for the OKO.press portal, on March 8–​10, 2022. The respondents were asked whether they expected conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians, after over 2 million refugees had found shelter in our country. As many as 56 percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative (Chrzczonowicz, 2022). Soon after, the results found their way into reality. As time passed and the first social emotions based on compassion and interpersonal solidarity subsided, the first symptoms of a change in a friendly and committed attitude towards migrants began to appear in Polish society. This was indicated by anti-​refugee narratives disseminated in the public space, radicalizing Polish public opinion in terms of attitudes towards the incoming Ukrainian citizens. It is worth noting, however, that they were not a symptom of a new phenomenon, or a particularly exceptional phenomenon in a crisis situation, because a similar situation took place in the European space also during previous migration crises, including in 2015. Fatigue with prolonged necessity was not without significance for the radicalization of moods. aid and its financial costs as well as the difficult Polish-​Ukrainian past. The key role here, however, was played by the broad Russian operation in cyberspace, aimed at social destabilization of Poland, not only as a border NATO state, but also the country most involved in helping Ukraine. Examples of disinformation activities that took place in Poland after Russia’s attack on Ukraine include: 1) spreading propaganda information about cases of racism on the Polish-​Ukrainian border; 2) introducing information into public circulation about the possibility of lack of fuel and cash in banks; 3) short-​ term disruptions in the supply of telephone services and the internet, which have become the cause of spreading fake news in social media about possible cyberattacks on the Polish IT services sector (Borkowski, 2022); 4) emphasizing the risk of changing the demographic structure of Poland, in which Poles will become being second-​class citizens in the face of Ukrainian domination; 5) pointing to the potential threat of an increase in crime and the transfer of numerous infectious diseases to Poland; 6) paying attention to the possible appropriation by Ukrainians of social assistance intended for Polish citizens, as well as other public services, including healthcare (Oleksy, 2022). In addition, there were also cyberattacks on banks and public service sector

128  R. Podgórzańska, S. Grabowska, M. Podolak and A. Pięta-Szawara institutions, which –​although quickly and effectively repulsed, not causing any particular disturbances in the functioning of the state –​were also used to weaken social cohesion and build a negative image of the migrant. We will be able to observe the further development of the aid process towards refugees and the attitudes of Poles towards them in the coming months.

Conclusions and recommendations The challenges and threats related to military operations on the territory of Ukraine should be analyzed both in the international dimension, bearing in mind their short and long-​term consequences from the perspective of international relations, as well as their implications for political, economic and social practice in Poland. From the perspective of Polish reality, a key phenomenon is the influx of refugees from Ukraine and the need to provide them with systemic support and protection. Due to the necessity of a multifaceted approach to the issue of the influx of migrants to Poland, both in relation to war refugees and earlier waves of economic migrants, actions against this group must be multifaceted, systemic and, most importantly, long-​ term. Regardless of the fact that for a large part of refugees, Poland is only a transit country, a significant part of them remains in Poland and requires the design of systemic support covering the social, economic and cultural spheres. It should be emphasized that Poland was one of the first countries in Europe to undertake a number of activities to support Ukrainian citizens by organizing both help for those who took refuge in our country and for those who stayed in Ukraine. It should be emphasized that this support largely relied on grassroots social initiatives, the involvement of individual citizens, social groups and non-​governmental organizations. Their activity was a key element of the system of assistance for refugees organized by local authorities and government administration. Apart from the ongoing discussion in Poland on the effectiveness of aid activities, it should be emphasized that support for refugees should be considered in a long-​term perspective. Spontaneously organized assistance in the first weeks of the Russian invasion was necessary and resulted from the willingness to react quickly to the development of events. Along with the protracted war in Ukraine, it requires a systemic approach and the development of solutions that will enable, on the one hand, the provision of necessary assistance to refugees, and, on the other hand, will not entail the necessity of bearing costs by Polish society. Close cooperation of all state and non-​state entities responsible for managing the refugee crisis is necessary, and this is what we are dealing with in Poland. It should be borne in mind that the influx of refugees to Poland is not only a temporary help in satisfying their basic needs. It is also a necessity to include refugees in the health care system, the educational system, and enabling them to enter the labor market, as well as social and cultural integration. The slogans of solidarity and readiness to help formed the basis of social activity in the initial period of the Russian invasion, but after three months they are no longer

Poland’s Policy for Refugees from Ukraine  129 sufficient. Bearing in mind the solutions in force within Poland’s immigration policy, it is necessary to redefine its basic assumptions. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has revealed areas that require reorganization and the development of new solutions. First of all, it requires indicating the benefits that may result from accepting refugees for the state and the economy, their acclimatization and integration with Polish society. For years, attention has been paid in Poland to the need to change the model of immigration to Poland from short-​term and rotational to long-​term. It is postulated to accept immigrants due to the demographic situation and the needs of the labor market (Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers, 2021, pp. 3–​9). The current situation is an opportunity to reevaluate the way of thinking about immigrants in Poland as a burden for the state and society in favor of perceiving them in terms of good and the benefit that may be associated with their absorption.

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8 Local Governments in Poland in the Face of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis Małgorzata Madej, Małgorzata Myśliwiec and Karolina Tybuchowska-​Hartlińska

Introduction The consequences of the war in Ukraine are not only direct, but also indirectly affect the authorities and societies of other European countries, especially neighboring ones. Sudden immigration of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Poland met with a huge spontaneous response from individual persons and non-​ governmental organizations, but in many areas more formalized measures were necessary to make the aid official, properly organized and coordinated. These actions, taken from the very beginning by local governments, required quick response, openness and flexibility, and at the same time considerable material resources. The official registration of newcomers and the inclusion of their children in the educational system are examples of challenges that fall within the competence of local governments. In the Polish three-​level system of self-​government authorities, the broadest powers are assigned to communes, but often they are not tied to adequate resources. At the same time, Polish local governments are constantly dealing with the effects of the recentralization policy pursued by the right-​wing Polish government, especially in terms of financing. Some municipalities have previously developed policies towards migrants and procedures for cooperation with non-​governmental organizations supporting migrants, still in the period of intense economic migration from Ukraine and other Central European states, but these tools, although useful, are not sufficient in a dynamically developing and unpredictable situation. The aim of the chapter is to find out how local governments dealt with new challenges and whether they encountered systemic and /​or material barriers in implementing measures. The chapter begins with an analysis of the evolution of the legal and systemic conditions of local governments in Poland, which allows the assessment of their potential to respond to the needs of refugees. Then, the chapter describes the challenges for local governments that arose as a result of the situation at the beginning of the war and the measures taken in the field of accepting, registering refugees, supporting their accommodation and including refugee children and youth in the Polish school system. The

DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-9

134  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska issue of the necessary participation of central authorities in the process of accepting refugees and the related financial challenges were also discussed.

Methodology and research assumptions The presented material is an attempt to capture the conditions in which local government units had to work at the time of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The aim of the chapter is to show how local governments coped with new challenges and whether they encountered systemic and /​or material barriers in implementing the measures. The main hypothesis is the assumption that local government units in Poland play a significant role in the face of the Ukrainian migration crisis. The main research questions are: How did Polish local governments cope with the significant influx of Ukrainian people? What actions have been taken by the Polish self-​government in connection with such a large influx of Ukrainian people? What are the long-​term plans and possibilities of the local government in connection with the influx of Ukrainian people? Due to the high dynamics and novelty of the issue, all data contained in the article were obtained and compiled by the authors using the desk research method, from press materials and publications of municipal offices. The authors also referred to statistical data published by the Central Statistical Office and other institutions and used the analysis of legal acts.

Local government in Poland. Legal framework and responsibilities The basis for the functioning of any democratic state is an efficiently operating local government. Today, we are dealing with clear changes taking place within societies, changes in the scale of threats, increasing participation of residents and the emergence of new challenges in the field of civilization progress. Polish local government has been operating since 1990, and over the past 30 years it has undergone many changes and evolutions to respond to the changing needs of citizens and the modern world. The superior legal Act defining the framework for the functioning of local self-​government is the Constitution of April 2, 1997 (Constitution, 1997), and under it the functioning of self-​government was strengthened. It devotes an entire chapter to the issue of local self-​government (Chapter VII). Local self-​ government is part of the executive power in the state. Pursuant to Article 164 para. 1 of the Constitution, the commune is the most basic unit of local self-​ government. Art. 1 sec. 1 of the Act on commune self-​government adds that the commune performs public tasks on its own behalf and on its own responsibility. However, the existence of other local government units, i.e., at the regional level and other local level units, has not been regulated. It also does not close the way to their creation, but leaves this regulation to be established by ordinary legislation. The remaining issues raised in the Constitution concern ensuring the participation of local government units in public revenues,

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  135 adequate to the tasks performed (Article 167) and the possibility of determining the amount of local taxes and fees (Article 168). It also considers the issue of appointing representative bodies and the procedure for their dismissal (Art. 169), as well as the possibility for residents to make decisions by way of a referendum (Art. 170). The only way of state control over self-​government concerns the legality of its actions. This supervision is exercised by the prime minister and voivodes, and in financial matters control is provided by regional accounting chambers (Article 171). Local governments may also be active abroad by ‘joining international associations of local and regional communities’ and establish cooperation with units from other states (Article 172). Subsequent systemic changes that shaped the present local government took place in 1998, when a three-​level administrative division of the state (communes, counties, voivodeships) and local government at all three levels were introduced. The newly established self-​ government structures were organized according to the dichotomous division into local and regional self-​government. The local level is represented at the level of communes and districts, and the regional level in voivodeships. The main mission and task of the regional self-​government in Poland is to conduct the regional policy through the implementation of the voivodeship strategy. The strategy of the voivodeship takes into account, first of all, aspects related to the cultivation of Polishness and the development of national awareness, stimulating economic activity, increasing the level of competitiveness and innovation of the voivodeship economy as well as shaping and maintaining the spatial order (Swianiewicz, 2003, 2011). There is a dualism of power in the region. Apart from local government bodies responsible for conducting regional policy, administrative functions are performed by the voivode (representative of the Council of Ministers in the field), who is empowered to control the legality of the activities of local government authorities at all levels. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, no local government unit in Poland was sufficiently prepared to accept such a large number of new residents. And above all, to create favorable conditions for them to live, work and study. In the case of local government, its basic dimensions of functioning in three areas are emphasized: legal and political, economic and social, and educational and cultural (Matusz-​Protasiewicz, 2013). So far, at the local government level, we have dealt with a moderate influx of inhabitants, and there has also been no excessive problem during the war on the African continent, where Western Europe took on most of the migrants on its shoulders. The district family assistance centers responsible for the implementation of programs for the integration of foreigners under international protection and district labor offices registering declarations of will for short-​term employment mainly dealt with migration issues at the local government level. Some of the local governments, noticing the needs and problems of the modern world, undertook activities related to the migration policy themselves: for example, in Warsaw there is the Industry Social

136  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska Dialogue Commission for Foreigners at the Social Communication Center of the Warsaw City Hall and the Multicultural Center. There is a unit in the City Hall responsible for coordinating activities related to foreigners. And in voivodeship offices there are departments for foreigners. On the other hand, on the initiative of the cities associated with the Union of Polish Metropolises, in 2017, the Migration and Integration Team was established, whose task is to develop and implement local action plans in the field of immigrant integration, the aim of which is to build basic standards in the areas of education, employment, security, culture, social welfare and health (Pawlak, 2018). In the context of the functioning and activities of local government, it is worth paying attention to the aspect of international cooperation. This applies both to cooperation at the level of individual cities or communes, but also districts and voivodships, e.g. twin cities, but also to establishing unions and joining associations. In the acts regulating the activities of the self-​government of communes and districts there are general terms regarding international cooperation, in the Act on voivodeship self-​government we can find specific regulations concerning the setting of priorities for foreign cooperation by each voivodeship and its main assumptions and directions. International and cross-​border cooperation is an important element of local government activity, because local governments are the most important creator of cross-​ border cooperation, as they cooperate in terms of their own tasks in order to increase the effectiveness of their activities (Modzelewski & Żukowski, 2007). The effectiveness of this activity can be checked and assessed in the situation of the war in Ukraine. For a lot of help, support and funds were transferred precisely thanks to earlier cooperation and established contacts, targeted help to specific cities and districts. In this case, we are also dealing with a negative effect, as many local governments had their partners for cities and oblasts in Russia, and this cooperation was severed. When referring to cross-border cooperation, it is worth mentioning those communities that, separated by a border, coexisted and functioned in everyday life, and this activity was also interrupted (e.g., with the Kaliningrad District) (Modzelewski, 2017, 2021).

The crisis in Ukraine as a challenge for Polish local governments. Inflow of refugees (statistical data and estimations) The influx of migrants from Ukraine to Poland occurred immediately after the start of the Russian invasion. According to the estimates of the Representation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in the period from February 24 to April 18, 2022 more than 2 million out of a total of 3.2 million Ukrainian refugees (UNHCR, 2022) arrived in Poland, while the Polish Red Cross estimates indicated a higher number –​2.4 million people who crossed the Polish border due to the outbreak of war (Polski Czerwony Krzyż, 2022). It should also be emphasized that as early as April 2022, high return rates began to be recorded, and according to the EWL Foundation and the Study of Eastern Europe, 56 percent of the surveyed adult refugees from Ukraine

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  137 planned to return to the country immediately after the war (Raport Specjalny EWL, 2022, p. 7). Estimating the exact number of refugees is additionally hampered by their planned and spontaneous decisions to leave Poland for further migration to the west of Europe –​in order to reunite with a family residing in another country or simply because of the opportunities created by authorities and non-​governmental organizations from other EU states. Relatively accurate statements based on data from the geolocation of mobile devices as well as official data of the Border Guard and the PESEL register were published by the Union of Polish Metropolises in the report of April 25, 2022 (Wojdat & Cywiński, 2022) for twelve metropolitan areas associated in this organization. The report indicated that in the period from February 24 to April 1, 2022, the population of Poland increased by 8.3 percent; however, this was not a proportional increase and it concerned mostly the largest cities, where it reached even more than a quarter of the population, and in the extreme case Rzeszów –​more than one-​third (Table 8.1). Women were definitely dominant among the incoming refugees. This phenomenon was confirmed in a detailed study of a group of 400 adult refugees residing in Warsaw and Kraków (Raport Specjalny EWL, 2022, p. 4). Of the respondents to this survey, 93 percent were women. From the point of view of education, it is important that almost two-​thirds came to Poland with at least one child. Another parameter that will affect educational needs is the knowledge of the Polish language: only 4 percent of the respondents declared very good knowledge of Polish (compared to 27 percent in the corresponding study of migrants from 2021), and the complete or almost complete lack of knowledge of the language of the host country was indicated by 45 percent (compared to 6 percent). The results also indicate significant challenges in the area of the labor market: as many as 63 percent of refugees want to take up gainful employment in Poland, and most of them in Ukraine performed jobs Table 8.1 Increase in population in cities of the Union of Polish Metropolises City

Number of new inhabitants

Increase (%)

Białystok Bydgoszcz Gdańsk Katowice Kraków Lublin Łódź Poznań Rzeszów Szczecin Warszawa Wrocław

36,592 43,446 157,787 96,462 177,565 68,396 85,675 84,612 104,784 59,574 266,895 187,281

11 11 25 25 19 17 11 14 35 13 13 23

Source: authors’ own study based on Wojdat & Cywiński, 2022, pp. 18–​41.

138  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska requiring education (the most frequently indicated categories are specialists and education workers). However, employment in similar professions in Poland may turn out to be difficult for people who do not know the Polish language. The demand potential on the labor market is probably one of the reasons why the majority of the survey respondents (69 percent) declared that they want to live in a Polish city of over 200,000 residents. Data from the Union of Polish Metropolises confirm the concentration of newcomers in the largest cities. The increase in the population of provincial cities by more than 10 or even 20 percent translates into the need for municipal services and the costs of providing such services. Taking into account the percentage of children and adolescents among the newcomers, a particular burden will be placed on the education system (both schools and kindergartens). The number of refugees, their status, place of residence and work, plans and undertaken ventures change dynamically and it is difficult to both unequivocally estimate the size of this group and to predict its fluctuations. However, it is justified to say that the number of refugees currently staying in Poland requires the creation of an organized and coordinated system of assistance in order to ensure their access to services for which local government in Poland is responsible.

Welcoming the refugees and cooperation with NGOs The spontaneous influx of migrants in Poland immediately after the outbreak of the war met with an immediate reaction from the civil society (Ołdak, 2022). It concerned activities of individual people or groups, often direct friends, as well as initiatives of non-​governmental organizations. This activity related mainly to the reception of newcomers, providing them with the minimum conditions of functioning at the places of arrival (at border crossings, at railway stations) and the supply of elementary food, hygiene products and clothes. Transport was also an important issue (within Poland and abroad). Already in the first weeks, local governments were involved in these activities through the direct participation of officials, coordinating the work of volunteers, creating information and support points for refugees, and providing local government resources. The analysis below covers the activities of the local government of Warsaw, which received the largest absolute number of refugees, and four other cities with the highest population growth due to the influx of refugees. All surveyed cities launched special subpages with information for refugees on their websites, at least partially translated into Ukrainian and Russian (Gdańsk –​oficjalny portal miasta, 2022; Katowice dla Ukrainy, 2022; Rzeszów dla Ukrainy –​serwisy informacyjny Urzędu Miasta Rzeszowa, 2022; Warszawa –​oficjalny portal miasta, 2022; Wrocław i wrocławianie wspierają Ukrainę, 2022). Supporting the work of non-​ governmental organizations, the City of Warsaw implemented a project to attract volunteers and coordinate their

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  139 work, also offering them insurance and anti-​pandemic personal protective equipment. Some of the recruited volunteers were sent to work in information points created by the cities –​mainly at railway stations, but also in individual districts. A 24-​hour helpline for refugees was also launched. Free travel is available to them on public transport, including rail. The city also offers help to jobseekers, although the condition for launching a program of vocational and language training for refugees is obtaining funding from the state Labor Fund –​job placement is not within the competence of municipalities. Also in Katowice, the local government has created application forms on its website for volunteers and other people offering help to refugees, as well as the possibility of reporting needs by Ukrainians themselves. It is a useful tool for the coordination of aid activities and a relief for non-​governmental organizations. An information point, a helpline for refugees and, above all, a very extensive website on the city’s homepage, collecting tips in many areas, both in terms of assistance offered by the city, non-​governmental organizations and private institutions, were created. Moreover, in order to meet the needs of refugees with disabilities, the city established cooperation with the Polish Association of the Deaf. Free city transport was introduced for all citizens of Ukraine, and for war refugees journeys on the Silesian Railways as well. The Municipal Office in Katowice offers refugees assistance in looking for a job provided by the Employment Office, which is not subject to the local government. In Wrocław, one of the key reception places was the Main Railway Station. In this area, the city council made the spaces of the city gallery and library available to those in need and volunteers. Together with the voivode of Lower Silesia, the city also helped to create places for rest and accommodation in tents. Among the available resources there were also vehicles of the Municipal Transport Company used to transport refugees within the voivodeship. In the city itself, public transport is free of charge for people who came to Poland from Ukraine after the outbreak of the war. An important support was the creation of information points in Wrocław, available physically, by phone, email and communicators. Information is provided not only in Polish, but also in Ukrainian and Russian. The Wrocław City Hall has also published a short glossary of the Polish language for Ukrainian children in paper and electronic versions. Gdańsk, like Wrocław, is a local government that had already implemented a special immigrant support policy before 2022 (Matusz, 2020). Separating various streams of refugees –​newcomers and people who had already lived in Gdańsk –​the City Council created both information and reception points. The city’s website also provides guidance for potential donors and volunteers to ensure the inflow of assistance in the form that is actually needed by refugees and to avoid unnecessary effort by assistants. In order to more fully coordinate assistance activities in the long term, and not only on an ad hoc basis, Gdańsk introduced a system for registering people in need of support in the form of the ‘Gdańsk Card Helps Ukraine,’ enabling regular in-​kind assistance

140  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska at designated Local Material Assistance Points. City cultural institutions also became involved in helping refugees by organizing adaptation activities and workshops, as well as childcare, which is to facilitate their functioning in a new environment, and at the same time give their parents time to rest, arrange formalities and look for a job. As in other cities, public transport is free for refugees. The Rzeszów City Council, which, due to its geographical proximity to the border, has a special role in helping refugees, was the only one of the surveyed local governments to not only promote collections, but also set up its own account for funds from donors for refugees. In addition to providing information for refugees and people providing assistance, the City Hall also coordinates free specialist assistance, primarily by organizing free legal assistance points for refugees in cooperation with the bar association. On its information website, the local government of Rzeszów also publishes information about free medical assistance –​dental, diabetes and veterinary.

Registration of refugees The registration of refugees arriving in Poland is crucial. It is important for the newcomers themselves, as it determines the possibility of applying for due social benefits, educating children in local institutions and obtaining medical assistance. Also for the Polish administration –​central and local –​it is a condition for the coordination and ordering of aid, as well as for anticipating future needs. Refugee registration can also reduce the risks to immigrants by directing them straight to a formal assistance system. For this purpose, the system of personal PESEL registration numbers has been used in Poland, which was also issued to foreigners before the war. Obtaining this number is not obligatory either for refugees or for other migrants residing in Poland, but the huge crowd of arrivals responded to the encouragement to register. A special Act on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that country (Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583) facilitates the submission of applications for granting a PESEL (including bilingual Polish-​Ukrainian and Polish-​Russian applications for assigning a number and the possibility of verifying identity the applicant on the basis of an expired document issued in the country of origin). Receiving applications, generating and issuing individual numbers were tasks that also burdened local governments (Widera-​Cichoń, 2022). This was associated with a great challenge to ensure fast and efficient service to a large number of customers, a large part of whom do not speak Polish, while maintaining the current service of Polish citizens and people previously residing in Poland. According to the Polish Ministry of Digitization, during the month from mid-​ March to mid-​ April 2022, refugees submitted 869,000 applications for this number. Almost half of these applications concerned children and

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  141 Table 8.2 Number of PESEL numbers issued to Ukrainian refugees in selected cities Warszawa Gdańsk Katowice Rzeszów Wrocław Poland

40,477 4,469 6,216 4,651 11,773 623,420

Source: Wojdat & Cywiński, 2022, p. 53.

adolescents under 18 years of age, and less than 4 percent were for adult men (Cyfryzacja KPRM, 2022). According to the quoted report of the Union of Polish Metropolises, 623,420 Ukrainians were issued with PESEL numbers in Poland after the outbreak of the war, including 40,477 in Warsaw itself (Table 8.2). City Councils in Warsaw, Katowice, Rzeszów and Wrocław have opened additional stands or even service points. As a result, in the case of Warsaw, refugees were served in 18 places in various parts of the city, and in 12 places in Wrocław. Many local governments extended the opening hours of offices or decided to open them additionally on Saturday, and some also temporarily hired additional people. Everywhere, services are provided in Ukrainian and Russian –​either through the resources of the offices themselves, or through cooperation with volunteers of non-​governmental organizations.

Ensuring accommodation The described refugee crisis made it necessary to quickly organize an appropriate number of accommodation places for Ukrainian citizens coming to Poland. Some of them found the possibility of staying with their families or friends who were already staying in Poland. However, the number of such cases is difficult to study. According to the report of the Polish Office for Foreigners of December 2021, the number of Ukrainian citizens with valid residence permits in Poland exceeded 300,000 (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, 2021). However, in the same document it was noted that the above data did not include persons staying in Poland temporarily under visa-​free travel or on the basis of visas. According to ZUS data, as of February 1, 2022, the number of insured persons who specified Ukrainian citizenship in their application for retirement and disability pension insurance was 641,276 (ZUS Statistical Portal, 2022). However, according to the data of the Central Statistical Office of June 4, 2020, the population of foreigners of Ukrainian citizenship recorded in Polish administrative registers, as of December 31, 2019, amounted to 1,351,418 people (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2020). People who, after crossing the Polish border, could not count on help from relatives or friends found themselves in a much more difficult situation.

142  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska For many of them, the long hours of waiting for the completion of border procedures was extremely exhausting, and therefore Polish reception points needed to provide places for a short sleep, refreshment and rest. Both the local governments of border communes and the cities to which Ukrainian citizens traveled by public transport (mainly trains) have performed well with this task. They were, however, a temporary stop. Many Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war found shelter in private homes and apartments of Poles, as well as in private hotels, boarding houses and lodgings. Russia’s sudden invasion of Poland’s neighboring country sparked a spontaneous social reaction, consisting in a willingness to help refugees. Hiring additional people to support individual households or small businesses, however, was a serious challenge for their modest budgets. In order to support citizens and entrepreneurs who showed such a noble attitude, the legislator, on the basis of the regulation specified in Art. 13 of the Act of March 12, 2022, on helping Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that country (Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583), decided to provide them with financial support. Each individual or other entity providing assistance in the field of accommodation and meals, upon submission of a relevant application, could receive a special cash benefit in the amount of PLN 40 per day for each person admitted, but not longer than for a period of 120 days from the date of the arrival of a Ukrainian citizen to territory of the Republic of Poland. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the period of payment of the benefit may be extended in particularly justified cases. The adoption of such a regulation was particularly important in the context of the uncertainty related to the situation in Ukraine. It is impossible to predict how long the Russian invasion will last and in what perspective it will be possible for the citizens of this country to return to their places of permanent residence. The Polish legislator also referred to the possibility of taking measures to accommodate Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war by both governmental and local government authorities. It should be emphasized, however, that the Act creates such a possibility, but its granting depends on the availability of funds for their implementation. Therefore, it does not impose a legal obligation on public administration authorities in this respect. Pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Act, each voivode may provide assistance to Ukrainian citizens, consisting in accommodation (Article 12.1, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). The Act provides that such assistance should cover a period of not less than two months from the date of the first entry of Ukrainian citizens into the territory of the Republic of Poland (Article 12.17, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). Assistance may also be provided by a local government unit, a union of local government units or a metropolitan association, on its own initiative and within the scope of resources (Article 12.4, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). The scope of assistance is specified in a resolution by the decision-​making body of a local government unit, an association of local government units or a metropolitan

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  143 association. On the other hand, the forms and procedures for providing assistance are determined by the competent executive authority of a given unit or association (Article 12.5, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). Moreover, taking into account the dynamics of the development of the situation in Ukraine, as well as the potential need to accommodate an even larger group of refugees in Poland, a regulation on collective accommodation was adopted. For this purpose, it is even permissible to accommodate people who need help in construction facilities that meet the basic sanitary and safety requirements, but are not collective residence buildings (Article 12a.5, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583).

Inclusion of refugee children in the schooling system According to the above-​cited research conducted in April 2022 by Marcin Wojdat and Paweł Cywiński (2022) published by the Union of Polish Metro­ polises, 21 percent of Ukrainians in Poland are children up to the age of 14. Almost all of them have to deal with the trauma of war, which means, among other things, a sudden interruption of the education process. Admittedly, the online distant learning experience during the Covid-​19 pandemic has made it easier for many Ukrainian schools to resume teaching remotely. However, this form does not allow for the daily experience of peer contacts, which facilitate the process of adaptation to new conditions. That is why some Ukrainian parents decided to include their children in the Polish education system. According to the data of the Ministry of Education and Science of May 2, 2022, 195,900 students who were refugees from Ukraine were studying in the Polish education system (Table 8.3). The largest number of Ukrainian

Table 8.3 The number of refugee students from Ukraine by type of school (as of May 2, 2022) Type of educational institution

Number of Ukrainian refugee students

Kindergartens and day care points Primary schools Industry schools of the 1st degree General secondary schools Art schools General Secondary Ballet Schools Music Schools of the 1st degree Post-​secondary schools Special vocational training schools Technical colleges

38,700 140,784 550 12,384 30 13 34 334 15 3,039

TOTAL

195,900

Source: authors’ own study based on Uczniowie –​uchodźcy z Ukrainy (https://​dane.gov.pl/​pl/​data​set/​2711,uczni​ków-​uchod​zcy-​z-​ukra​iny; accessed on May 5, 2022).

144  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska students entered primary schools (140,784 pupils and students). A large group of children –​38,700 –​was also included in pre-​ school education (Uczniowie –​uchodźcy z Ukrainy, 2022). The largest number of refugee students from Ukraine was received by school institutions in the Mazovian voivodeship. This situation is not surprising, due to the capital nature of the region. It is noteworthy, however, that a large group of Ukrainian refugees chose to stay and send their children to Polish schools in well-​developed provinces of Western Poland. This is evidenced by the large number of students from Ukraine in the Silesia, Lower Silesia and Greater Poland voivodeships. This situation can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, these were regions whose dynamic economic development attracted workers from Ukraine even before the Russian invasion. These voivodeships were chosen by refugees as their place of stay. Secondly, these are regions located relatively far from the eastern border of Poland, and therefore also from activities related to the Russian aggression. Data on the number of refugee students from Ukraine, including voivodeships, are presented in Map 8.1.

14 565 4 565

9 882

3 425

7 868 36 233 6 512

19 653 12 480 7 761

20 269 4 699

21 885

3 174

17 856

5 073

Map 8.1 The number of refugee students from Ukraine by voivodeship (as of May 2, 2022). Source: authors’ own study based on Uczniowie –​uchodźcy z Ukrainy (https://​dane. gov.pl/​pl/​data​set/​2711,uczni​ków-​uchod​zcy-​z-​ukra​iny; accessed on May 5, 2022).

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  145 The Ukrainian students, as well as the Polish education system, faced several serious challenges. One of these is the lack of Polish language skills among Ukrainian students. It is not a serious problem at the stage of pre-​school or even early school education. At this stage, it can be equalized fairly quickly. A much more serious problem is the lack of knowledge of the Polish language among older youth who want to take state exams such as vocational exams or matriculation exams. In this context, the language barrier that prevents Polish teachers from contacting students is also a big problem. Moreover, the problem is the differences between the Polish and Ukrainian education systems. In Poland, primary education lasts eight years, and children start it at the age of 7. In Ukraine, primary school is attended for nine years, and education begins at the age of 6. The systems differ from each other in terms of the program content they implement. These differences are even more visible in the case of secondary education.

Involvement of government administration Poland is a highly centralized unitary state. This means that a large number of matters of social and political importance fall within the competence of government administration bodies. This applies, inter alia, to such matters as the protection of the state border, control of border traffic and foreigners, and the coordination of activities related to the state’s migration policy (Article 29.1 and 2, Dziennik Ustaw 1997, No. 141, item 943). Therefore, for the effective coordination of bottom-​up aid activities, already in the first days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the main burden of responsibility for decisions concerning the improvement of border traffic and the admission of a large group of refugees fell on the central government. Local government units actively participated in these activities, organizing ad hoc assistance for Ukrainians crossing the Polish border. The extraordinary situation and the need to allocate special funds for crisis measures also required special action on the part of the Polish parliament. On March 12, 2022, the law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with an armed conflict in the territory of that country was adopted (Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). This created a legal framework both for regulating the legal situation of refugees from Ukraine and for further actions of government and self-​government administration bodies in Poland. Local government in Poland is well prepared to fulfill this type of task. Its structure largely does not result from the historical tradition of individual units, but from the decision to create entities capable of effectively providing public services (Myśliwiec, 2019). The problem, however, which makes it difficult for them to effectively perform their tasks and use their legal competences is the structure of the distribution of budget revenues between public administration units in Poland (Chart 8.1). It provides that local government units may only use a small part of PIT and CIT taxes. The level of participation of local government units in Poland in the income of the Polish state budget is presented in Table 8.4. However, they do not participate in the most profitable budget

146  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska

Other 11% CIT 11%

VAT 48% PIT 14%

Excise 16%

VAT

Excise

PIT

CIT

Other

Chart 8.1 Revenue of the Polish state budget in 2022. Source: authors’ own study based on: Budget Act for 2022 of December 17, 2021, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 270. Table 8.4 Share of local government units in Poland in the revenues of the Polish state budget Local government unit

PIT

CIT

Excise

VAT

Municipality District Voivodeship

39.34% 10.25% 1.60%

6.71% 1.40% 14.75%

0% 0% 0%

0% 0% 0%

Source: authors’ own study based on the Act of November 13, 2003, on the income of local government units, Dziennik Ustaw 2003, No. 203, item 1966.

taxes, i.e., VAT and excise duty, which fully contribute to the budget of the government administration. At present, a special Assistance Fund, established at Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, is to ensure the possibility of performing tasks related to helping Ukrainian citizens. Local government units may use its resources on the basis of action plans prepared by their executive bodies (Articles 14 and 15, Dziennik Ustaw 2022, item 583). This is a solution that may prove sufficient in a situation where the Russian invasion of Ukraine ends relatively quickly. If, on the other hand, it turns into a long-​term conflict, and a larger number of Ukrainians decide to stay in Poland for longer, the financial situation of local government units may become seriously complicated.

Local Governments and the Refugee Crisis  147

Conclusions /​forecasts and recommendations for future The war in Ukraine has turned out to be a great test for Polish local govern­ ments. So far, Poland has mainly dealt with the influx of foreigners for work purposes, who filled the gap in the labor market. Poland was also largely unaffected by the problem of migrants coming to Europe in connection with the war in Syria; if refugees came to Poland, it was not their destination. The immensity of tasks and problems for which Polish communes were not prepared was carried out in an effective manner. The local governments and the residents reacted immediately to the attack, without waiting for institutional solutions from the state. The basic needs of people fleeing the war were perfectly met, with housing, food and psychological support. In the next more formal stages, access to health care, education and legal employment. Although the activities were implemented in a decentralized manner, many repetitive patterns can be observed: organization of admission points and information activities, coordination of volunteer and donor activities, including those providing refugees with shelter and accommodation, very quick admission of Ukrainian children to schools, extension of time and increase in the numbers of service places in offices. The exchange of experiences and the use of solutions implemented by other local governments allowed the municipal authorities to quickly respond to the crisis situation. Actions taken –​both in the context of emergency aid, cooperation with volunteers and the provision of communal services –​were clearly focused on the migrants themselves. The needs of refugees were identified, and then actions aimed at meeting those needs were implemented. In this context, the financial issue is also important, because at first local governments mobilized their financial reserves from budgets that had been reduced in this way since 2019, then the state came with help, supported by subsidies from the European Union. The policy pursued by local governments has been associated with significant costs. While Polish local governments are doing very well at the organizational level, the financial barrier may turn out to be a key obstacle both in the context of short-​term support and long-​term integration of those refugees who decide to stay in Poland permanently. Without significant EU assistance, local governments will not be able to bear such a burden, and in this situation, long-​term assistance will be of key importance. It should be emphasized that over time, the tasks of local governments towards refugees will evolve. In the longer term, aid /​charity actions will be less important, and it will be necessary to develop and implement plans aimed at enabling refugees to fully participate in all areas of social life, so that they simply become members of local communities and contribute to the local reality. In the current situation, particular attention should be paid to eliminating a number of potential threats resulting from the admission of a large number of migrants from Ukraine and to provide them with favorable living and working conditions. The most important issue now will be to find a balance between the labor market, education and housing –​as the main tasks of local governments.

148  M. Madej, M. Myśliwiec and K. Tybuchowska-Hartlińska

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Conclusions Agnieszka Kasińska-​Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad

The aim of the work was achieved by the authors who shared their knowledge and research results on the conditions and the course of the existing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Thanks to the consolidation of female researchers representing different disciplines of the social sciences, it was possible to present the complex picture of war as well its influence on militarily involved countries, neighboring countries and the international community. The monograph does not exhaust the subject because the analyzed phenomena took place hic et nunc. It is, however, a contribution to further discussions and analyzes. The background of the events in Ukraine should be sought in mutual Ukrainian-​Russian relations, which were characterized by tensions, despite their cultural and historical proximity. Maryana Prokop concluded her analysis with identification of contradictions in the Ukrainian understanding of foreign policy, shaping the future of the Ukrainian state, and above all, the Russian understanding of the notion of Ukrainian statehood. International legal guarantees (e.g., the Budapest Memorandum) did not prevent Russia from stoking its separatist sentiments in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea. Among other factors, these factors made the Russian Federation a successor of the legacy of the Soviet Union and, in its image, it sought to establish a relationship of domination with neighboring countries. The international order, as it turned out, was not unwavering, the existence of superpowers revisionists such as the Russian Federation raised a number of questions about security and stability. As proved by Anna Jach, Elżbieta Kużelewska and Agnieszka Legucka, Russia’s imperialism manifested itself in two main vectors of its policy. The first was addressed to the near abroad (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan), the second to that geographically reaching further (involvement in the former or ongoing conflicts: e.g., Afghanistan, Syria). The build of both was a reconstruction project aimed at restoring the power of the state (like the USSR), and its multi-​dimensional tool understood in a peculiar way has been Putinism. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine had sparked strong integration and solidarity tendencies focused on the issue of regional security, which was aptly exemplified by the casus of the Baltic states. Kamila Sierzputowska DOI: 10.4324/9781003341994-10

Conclusions  151 and Aleksandra Kuczyńska-​Zonik investigated how the Baltic states that had realized their dependence on NATO structures took one common stand concerning the Russian aggression. The Balts, as a result of the Kremlin’s aggressive rhetoric and sanctions imposed by the EU, have taken decisive steps to make their cooperation more dynamic within the framework of the region in the area of security (including information), energy and economy. While in the case of the Baltic states it was possible at the level of political elites to speak of the homogeneity of the positions towards Russian aggression, their societies were heterogeneous in this respect. This dichotomy was conditioned by a large Russian-​speaking diaspora living in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Western solidarity in response to Russian aggression would probably not have taken such a character and scale had it not been for the strong and charismatic leadership of V. Zelensky. Marzena Cichosz and Joanna Kozierska outlined the evolution of the model leadership of the president of Ukraine. They proved that the original image of the celebrity was used as capital-​creating function, preceding the appearance of the ‘father of the nation.’ The situation changed completely on February 24, 2022, when the president of Ukraine, thanks to his steadfast attitude, was hailed as a ‘hero’ by the world media. Therefore, the ‘private’ image of V. Zelensky ceased to exist. It was replaced by an image of a politician completely subordinated to the goals and interests of the state and nation. The authors suggested that the process of image transformation of V. Zelensky had not been a transformation but an evolution. Conflicts and wars not only bring about a number of changes in the constellation of structures widely understood as international security, but also result in differentiation of psychological and social mechanisms. Stereotypes are a special example of how the appearance of a destabilizing factor in the environment affects the perception of other nations. The analysis carried out by Agnieszka Kasińska Metryka and Karolina Pałka-​Suchojad diagnosed the current stereotype of Ukrainians, present in Polish public space. Concluding the analysis carried out, they clarified the conclusion as to the dichotomy of intensity and emotional character of the stereotypes about Ukrainians in the narrative about the war. Polish mainstream media tried not to duplicate negative prejudices and images of Ukrainians, while in social media (Twitter was analyzed) the situation was quite different. Social media replicated and strengthened negative sentiments in messages about Ukrainians. The view of a conflict-​ridden society required going beyond certain frames, patterns, in order to perceive the complexity of phenomena. Such a perspective was adopted by Agata Włodkowska who undertook the analysis of the war in Ukraine from the perspective of a feminist. The analysis identified the roles that Ukrainian women played in the conditions of war. As the author stated, these were not only the stereotypical Beautiful Souls, but also female soldiers taking up arms, and in extreme cases women being victims of sexual violence of the aggressor. A rhetorical question appeared as essential for the reflection about the future of women in post-​conflict conditions, noticing and ensuring that their special needs would be met.

152  A. Kasińska-Metryka and K. Pałka-Suchojad A military conflict disrupts the sense of security in both macro and micro dimensions, especially in relation to the civilian population. Renata Podgórzańska, Sabina Grabowska, Małgorzata Podolak, Anna Pięta-​Szawara pinpointed the influx of war refugees and earlier economic refugees as one of the challenges facing host countries. They recommended finding a balance between the necessity for help within systemic solutions, but without the risk of incurring cost by society. The refugee crisis had exposed these aspects of Polish immigration policy that required rapid correction; including its revision from short-​term into a long-​term perspective. Poland, as a ‘front-​line state,’ had to quickly develop mechanisms of relief efforts which, despite the national and local character, would be universal. The analysis of Polish system solutions in helping refugees made it possible to identify ‘good practices’ in responding to refugee crises, e.g., within EU Member States. Małgorzata Madej, Małgorzata Myśliwiec and Karolina Tybuchowska-​ Hartlińska concluded that, despite the decentralized nature of the implementation of support solutions at the local government level, some patterns of duplication were discernible. Efficient information policy on individual levels of local government, allowed Polish communes to respond quickly to crisis situations, identifying and satisfying basic needs of refugees. ‘The language of strength, power and unity’ –​that is, the message most understandable by V. Putin –​was at the same time, a hint for states applying unrelenting pressure on Russia concerning the direction of further actions. Consistency and solidarity could discourage other potential dictators, and prevent the scenario of gradual weakening of Ukraine through low-​intensity conflict.

Index

Aasland, A. 53 Abkhazia 24, 26–​7 Afghanistan 23 Africa 28 agent of foreign influence 33–​4 aggressive statements 54 Alexievich, S. 94 Andersson, M. 106 anti-​Ukrainian narrative 87 appeasement 36 Arctic 24 armed attack 27 Armenia 26 Astana triangle 28 Authoritarianism 29 authoritarian regime 30 Azerbaijan 26 Baltic Sea 41, 48 Baltic States 3, 41–​5, 55–​6, 150 Baltic states–​Russia–​Ukraine 40, 42 Banasik, M. 40 Bandera, S. 86, 91 Banderism 90 Banderite 84, 89 Bashar al-​Assad 28 Beautiful Souls 97, 104, 108, 151 Belarus 44–​5, 49, 53, 74 besieged fortress 22, 29 Bieleń, S. 9 Birka, I. 52 Boykos 84 Bull, H. 23 Bush, G. W. 97 Buzan, B. 42, 55 Caprioli, M. 103 Catholic Church 90 Censorship 29, 35

Central Election Commission of Ukraine 66 Cheskin, A. 52, 56 China 24 Churchill, W. 109 civil society 29, 32 Constitution of the Republic of Poland 134–​5 constructivist approach 94–​5 COVID-​19 143 Crimea 6, 10–​11, 13, 15, 17–​18, 27, 41, 45–​6, 49, 53–​4, 85, 89, 150 crisis management 119–​21 crisis situation 120 Cult of the leader 29 Daugavpils 51 directional concept 7, 9–​10 disinformation 44, 46 diversification 45–​6 Dmytro Pavlyuchko doctrine 8 DNR 10, 13 Domańska, M. 104 domestic violence 99, 102–​3, 109 Donbas 27, 45, 54, 69–​70, 89 Donetsk People’s Republic 27 DPR 27 dual power 31 Duda, A. 43, 88, 121 Dugin, A. 11 ecologism 95 Enloe C. 96 Estonia 3, 40–​56 European Union (EU) 27, 35, 43–​6, 48, 51, 55, 72 Euromaidan 86; see also Maidan Europe 72 European security 124

154 Index fake news 34 false information 52 Federation Council 27 feminization 97, 98, 101, 106, 107 feminize 97 feminism 94, 95 feminist approach 95, 99, 104, 108; feminist foreign policy 106; feminist perspective 4, 94, 96; feminist sense 96 feminity 94, 99 Finland 45–​6, 48 Fløtten, T. 53 foreign agents 34 foreign influence 33–​4 foreign policy 6–​7, 9–​11, 13–​16, 18, 22–​7, 29–​30, 34 France 27–​8 Friedman, R. 100 Gazprom 16 Gdańsk 137–​9, 141 gender 95–​6, 98–​9, 101, 106, 109; equality 98; gender inequality; hierarchy 97, 99–​101; inequality 99; gender gap 99, 103; norms 99 genocide 104, 107 Georgia 24, 26–​7, 35 Germany 25, 27, 48 global companies 121 GONGO structures 31 Grabowska, S. 113 Great Patriotic War 25 Gudkov, L. 25 Haftar, K. 28 hard power 23 Hitler, A. 109 Holoborodko, V. P. 66–​7 Hudson, V. M. 103 Huseynowicz, Znakyuz 25 Hussein, S. 97 hybrid war 6, 10, 13 India 24 integration 49, 52, 56 international community 124, 127 International Historical, Educational, Charity and Defence of Human Rights Association ‘Memorial’ 32 International humanitarian organizations 121; protection 114, 117 inernational law 124 invasion 113–​15, 122, 124, 128

Janson, A. 49 Just Warriors 97, 104 Kagan, R. 98 Kaliningrad Oblast, the 41 Kallas, K. 43, 48, 106 Kalmus, V. 49 Kasatkina, N. 49 Katowice 137–​9, 141 Kattago, S. 52 Kiev 43–​4, 54 Kilvits, K. 41 King, M. L. 109 Klaipėda 44–​6 Kliczko, W. 121 Kolomoysky, I. 67 Kraków 137 Kravchuk L. 9, 11 Kremlin: dissinformation 46, 90; policy 47; pro-​narrative 52, 56; pro-​media 53; propaganda 90; pro-​propaganda 53; pro-​TV 52–​3; regime 50, 55; rhetoric 54 Krusinskas, R. 41 Kuchma, L. 9, 11, 15–​17 Kuchmism 84 Kuczyńska-​Zonik, A. 41, 49, 52 Kukułka, J. 6 Kvartal 95; cabaret 66–​7 labor market 137–​8 Lambrecht Ch. 106 Lamoreaux, J. W. 41–​2 Laruelle, M. 49 Latvia 3, 40–​56, 151 Lemkos 84 Leyen, U. von der 106 liberalism 95 Libya 28 Lithuania 3, 40–​50, 52–​4, 151 Litvinenko, A. 109 LNR 10, 13 local communities 121 local government 119, 121–​2, 126, 133–​6, 138–​42, 145–​7 local government administration 113, 120–​1; units 118, 120, 122 long-​term EU resident permit 117 LPR 27 Lublin Triangle, the 43–​4, 46 Lugovoy, Andrei 34 Luhansk People’s Republic 27 Lukashenka, A. 74 Lynch, J. 97

Index  155 Mabe, M. 41 machismo 100, 101; macho 97, 100–​2 Maidan 89 Maliukevičius, N. 53 Marin, S. 106 masculine perception 96 masculinity 94–​7, 99, 101, 105 Menkiszak, M. 100 migration crisis 114 militarization 23–​5, 28–​30, 34, 36, 99, 103–​4 Minsk agreements 27 Moldova 26 monopolization 29 Morawiecki, M. 121–​2 Morgenthau, H. 95 multi–​vector policy 7–​10, 13 Murasovs, V. 52 National Council of Television and Radio of Ukraine 67 Nationalization 31 national minorities 41, 52–​3; residents 50–​1, 54; Russian language programs 53; Russian speaking people 49–​3, 56 national visa 118 NATO 3, 8, 12–​15, 24–​5, 27, 35, 41–​7, 52, 54, 72, 151; eastern flank 47; troops 48 Nausėda, G. 43, 46 neutrality 7–​9, 11, 13, 17 Nikitina, Y. 41 non-​governmental non-​commercial sector 31, 32; non-​governmental non-​profit sector 31; non-​ governmental organizations (NGO) 31–​3, 133, 138–​9, 141 Normandy Four 27 Novorossiya 27 NSZZ ‘Solidarność’ 85 offensive 28 Oja, K. 41 one-​term president 31 1+​1 (TV channel) 66–​7 Onken, E. C. 41 Orange Revolution 4, 9–​10, 85, 89 Ozolina, Ž. 49 Pädam, S. 41 Pandora Papers 70 penal code 34–​5 permanent residence permit 117

permit for tolerated stay 117 Pięta-​Szawara, A. 113 Piontkovsky, A. 29 Piskariew, V. 34 Podgórzańska, R. 113 Podolak, M. 113 police state 33 Polish-​Ukrainian relations 80, 84, 87 political polaryzation 126 Poroshenko, P. 10–​12, 59, 66–​8 postcolonial approach 94–​5 postmodernism 95 Post-​Soviet 25–​6, 28 Prokop, M. 6 propaganda 35 proxy wars 28 Purju, A. 41 Putin, V. 15, 24–​5, 27, 29–​31, 35, 40, 46, 49, 51, 53, 71, 74, 97, 100–​2, 109, 152 putinism 3, 24, 29–​30, 33 Putinist camp 31 rape 95, 97–​8, 106–​9 Razumkov, D. 70 realistic: anarchy 101; paradigm 4, 94 refugees 4, 80, 88–​90, 113–​17, 120–​9, 133–​4, 136–​40, 143–​5, 147, 151 refugee status 117 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) 42 Revolution of Dignity 10, 17 Rēzekne 50 Riga 43–​4, 48, 50 Ruski 82 Russia 22–​35, 70–​1; Russian Federation 2–​3, 24–​6, 29, 32, 34–​6, 40, 54–​5, 64, 69, 71–​2, 74 Russia: aggresion 1, 44, 47; brutal crimes 44; crime of genocide 44; invasion 40–​4, 54–​6 Russian Strategic Destination Forces 26 Russian: annexation of Crimea 85; armed forces 27; branch of Amnesty International 32; media 52; third sector 32; TV 43, 49, 53; world 25 Russian imperialism 2 Russia’s military operations 34 Russskiy Mir 10–​11 Rzeszów 137–​8, 140–​1 sanctions 41, 43–​6, 51, 55 school system 133, 143–​5 security policy 6–​9, 13

156 Index Security Service of Ukraine 70 Servant of the People: party 59, 68–​9; TV series 66, 68, 73–​4 sexual violence 102, 106–​9 Shoigu, S. 105 Siloviki 30 Simonyte, I. 106 Sineviciene, L. 41 Sjoberg, L. 99 Smith, D. J. 49 SO NKO 32 social crisis bars 122 social organizations 32–​3, 113 soft power 23 solidarity 41, 43–​4, 46–​7, 54–​6 South Africa 28 South Osetia 24, 27 Soviet Union 29 Soviet: Army 41; period 52; post-​area 40; post-​howitzers 48; post-​sphere 40; republics 40; resentments 53; soldiers 54; territories 54 sovietism 84 special military operation 27, 33, 34 spiral of silence 82 stalinism 33 State Duma 33–​5 Steen, A. 55 stereotype 3, 79–​81, 87, 151 strategy: multidimensional strategy 41–​3, 46, 55; security strategy 40; strategic cooperation 55 subsidiary protection 117 Sudan 28 superpower 2, 22–​3, 25–​8, 35 super-​presidential democracy 30 Supreme Council of Ukraine 70 Sweden 48

totalitarianism 36 Transnistria 26 Trump, D. 74 trusted profile 118 Tsar, P. 11 Turkey 48 Tymoshenko, Y. 66

Tallinn 50, 53 temporary protection 115, 117 temporary residence permit 118 Third sector 31–​2 Third World War 36 threats: 40, 42–​4, 49–​54; perception 46 Tickner, J. A. 95–​7 totalitarian 33

Yabloko party 29 Yanukovych, V. 9–​11 Yanukovych, Y. 66 Yeltsin, B. 105 Yushchenko, V. 9–​11

Ukraine: aggression 40–​56; attack 40–​56; support 41–​4, 46–​51, 54–​6 Ukrainian nationalists 83–​4, 86 Ukrainian-​Russian relations 6–​7, 11, 18, 150 Ukrainian sterotype 81–​5, 90 Ukrainian Uprising Army (UPA) 84, 89 UN Security Council (UNSC) 23 Union of Polish Metropolises 136–​8, 141, 143 USA 24, 25 USSR 6, 8, 14–​16, 18, 23, 25–​6, 32, 50–​1, 54, 79, 82–​3, 85 Veebel, V. 41, 43 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 66 violence against women 98, 102, 107 Virumaa 49 Vistula Action 83 volunteering work 138–​9 Volyn 3, 82, 83 Wagner group 28 wagnerists 28 war crimes 125; narrative 97, 104 Warsaw 135, 137–​8, 141 West 35 World War II 3, 25 Wrocław 137–​9, 141

Zelensky, V. 2–​3, 11–​12, 43–​4, 59, 63–​4, 66–​74, 101, 151