The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics 1138905852, 9781138905856

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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SCANDINAVIAN POLITICS

The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics is a comprehensive overview of Scandinavian politics provided by leading experts in the field and covering the polity, the politics and the policy of Scandinavia. Coherently structured with a multi-​level thematic approach, it explains and details Scandinavian politics today through a series of cutting-​edge chapters. It will be a key reference point both for advanced-​level students developing knowledge about the subject, as well as researchers producing new material in the area and beyond. It brings geographical scope and depth, with comparative chapters contributed by experts across the region. Methodologically and theoretically pluralistic, the handbook is in itself a reflection of the field of political science in Scandinavia and the diversity of the issues covered in the volume. The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics will be an essential reference for scholars, students, researchers and practitioners interested and working in the fields of Scandinavian politics, European politics, comparative politics and international relations. Peter Nedergaard is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Anders Wivel is Professor with special responsibilities at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

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‘All things Scandinavian are in fashion. But this fantastic volume urges us to see the Nordic countries as increasingly integrated in Europe and the world, even as each nation retains some of its distinctiveness. No other book in the market offers such a sophisticated, balanced, and rich analysis of Nordic politics and societies.’ – Francesco Duina, Bates College, USA ‘This book brilliantly captures both the traditional and changing features of Scandinavian polities, politics and policies. The authors, by combining Scandinavian past and present, catch the essence of Scandinavian domestic and external affairs and shed light on how states can flourish in turbulent times.’ – Baldur Thorhallsson, University of Iceland, Iceland ‘The terms “Scandinavia” and “the Nordic model” tend to be used with increasing flexibility. This calls for a critical discussion of the Nordic examples in all their complexity and this impressively comprehensive handbook explores both the achievements and the challenges of the Nordic countries. It is essential for anyone interested in the Nordic societies, within or outside the region itself. – Johan Strang, University of Helsinki, Finland

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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SCANDINAVIAN POLITICS

Edited by Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel

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First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Nedergaard, Peter, 1957– editor. | Wivel, Anders, editor. Title: The Routledge handbook of Scandinavian politics / edited by Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016058390 | ISBN 9781138905856 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315695716 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Scandinavia–Politics and government–1945– Classification: LCC JN7042.R68 2017 | DDC 320.948–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016058390 ISBN: 978-​1-​138-​90585-​6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​315-​69571-​6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Out of House Publishing

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CONTENTS

Lists of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Preface

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1 Introduction: Scandinavian politics between myth and reality Anders Wivel and Peter Nedergaard PART I

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Polity

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2 The modern Scandinavian welfare state Stein Kuhnle and Matti Alestalo

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3 The egalitarian paradise? Olof Bäckman and Kenneth Nelson

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4 Still the corporatist darlings? Peter Munk Christiansen

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5 The green ‘heavyweights’: the climate policies of the Nordic countries Jens Hoff

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PART II

Politics

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6 Goldilocks’ Frankenstein monster: the rise, political entrenchment and transformation of the Scandinavian welfare states Carsten Jensen and Kees van Kersbergen v

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7 Nordic administrative traditions Per Lægreid

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8 Cabinets and ministerial turnover in the Scandinavian countries Martin Ejnar Hansen

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9 The parliaments of the Scandinavian countries Thomas Persson

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10 Nordic voters and party systems Kasper M. Hansen and Karina Kosiara-​Pedersen

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11 Public opinion and politics in Scandinavia Eva H. Önnudóttir and Ólafur Th. Hardarson

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12 Continuity and convergence: populism in Scandinavia Ann-​Cathrine Jungar

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13 Social capital in the Scandinavian countries Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen and Peter Thisted Dinesen

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14 The role of the media in Scandinavian politics Sigurd Allern

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PART III

Policy

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15 Fiscal policy in the Scandinavian countries U. Michael Bergman, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Øystein Thøgersen

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16 The fisheries policy in the Nordic countries: from open access to rights-​based management fisheries Peder Andersen and Vibe Busk Larsen

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17 Making and re-​making the Nordic model of education Tine S. Prøitz and Petter Aasen

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18 Immigration policies of the Scandinavian countries Grete Brochmann

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19 Scandinavian models of diplomacy Martin Marcussen

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20 Scandinavian defence and alliance policies: different together Carmen Gebhard

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21 Scandinavia and the European Union: pragmatic functionalism reconsidered Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel

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22 The United Nations and the Nordic four: cautious sceptics, committed believers, cost–​benefit calculators Peter Viggo Jakobsen

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23 Scandinavian development policies Thorsten Borring Olesen

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24 Conclusions: Scandinavian polities, politics and policies reconsidered Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel

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Index

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FIGURES

3.1 The Gini coefficient and the EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate in the Nordic countries and other European countries, approx. 1990–​2010 3.2 The EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate among the elderly, immigrants, young adults and lone parents in the Nordic countries and other European countries, 2003 and 2012 3.3 Net replacement rates in major cash benefit schemes in the Nordic countries and other European countries, 1990–​2015 5.1a Nordic CO2e emissions 5.1b Nordic GDP per capita 5.2 Projections of GHG emissions reductions in the Nordic countries in MtCO2e 10.1 Rokkan’s triangle 10.2 Support for Social Democrats in the five Nordic countries 10.3 Support for popular right in the five Nordic countries 10.4 Nordic parties’ voter self-​placement on left–​r ight 10.5 Electoral volatility 10.6 Time of vote choice 10.7 Electoral turnout in the Nordic countries 10.8 Party membership in the Nordic countries 11.1 Income inequality in ESS countries in 2012 11.2 Trust in country’s parliament in the Nordic countries, 2002–​14 11.3 Trust in the police in the Nordic countries, 2002–​14 11.4 Dissatisfaction with how democracy works in the Nordic countries, 1997–2013 11.5 The proportion (of total population) of foreign-​born population in the Nordic countries, 2002–​13 11.6 Allow few/​many immigrants from poorer, non-​European countries to live in country viii

26 28 31 50 50 60 115 116 117 119 119 120 121 121 131 131 132 132 137 138

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Figures

11.7 Immigrants good for country’s economy? 11.8 Immigrants good for country’s culture? 12.1 Election results for the Scandinavian populist parties in parliamentary elections 12.2 Policy changes over time 13.1 Social trust in the Nordic countries and the largest European countries 13.2 Work in organizations and associations in the Nordic countries and largest European countries 13.3 Social trust in the Nordic countries at NUTS 2 (Denmark and Norway) and NUTS 3 (Sweden and Finland) regional levels 15.1 Medium-​term measures of fiscal stance 16.1 If nobody has the property rights to the fish or everybody has the right to go fishing, a ‘race for fish’ will occur 16.2 Trends in fisheries development. Sweden, Denmark and Finland: 1997–​2013 16.3 Trends in fisheries development. Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands: 1997–​2013. Greenland: 2008–​13 17.1 Proportion of NEETs among native-​born individuals in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 17.2 Mean performance PISA 2012 Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 17.3 Percentage of students enrolled in primary and secondary public and government dependent private institutions in 2003 and 2012 18.1 Foreign-​born population shares 1990–​2013 19.1 The Scandinavian countries are increasingly visible in the global arena 19.2 The organization of the Danish foreign service 21.1 Nordic countries inside and outside central EU policy areas 22.1 Willingness to meet international/​UN demands for aid and peace operations 22.2 Nordic uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping operations 2000–​15 23.1 Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish ODA/​GNI ratio 1960–​2013

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139 140 149 153 163 164 165 190 203 207 208 218 219 220 232 246 249 273 283 287 296

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TABLES

1.1 Scandinavian polity, politics and policy 2.1 The share of votes for social democratic parties in parliamentary elections in the Nordic countries, 1980–​2015 2.2 Social spending as a percentage of GDP in the Nordic countries, 1980–​2014 2.3 GDP per capita and social spending among the top OECD countries in 2014 4.1 Adaptation of Scandinavian corporatism 5.1 Commitments under the UNFCCC 5.2 National emission reduction targets 5.3 Summary of selected policies in the Nordic countries 8.1 Majority status of Scandinavian governments, 1945–​2015 8.2 Cabinet termination, 1945–​2015 11.1 Left–​r ight position of voters in the Nordic countries, means and standard deviations 11.2 Left–​r ight ideology and party choice 11.3 Left–​r ight placement and party choice in the Nordic countries 11.4 Trust in parliament and party vote in the Nordic countries 11.5 Trust for parliament and party voted in the Nordic countries 11.6 Allow many immigrants from poorer, non-​European countries and party vote 11.7 Allow many immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe and party choice 11.8 Correlation of how many immigrants to allow with whether they create jobs, pay taxes and crime problems 12.1 Placement on different policy issues: Nordic populist parties 2011 14.1 Number of paid-​for newspapers in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 2003 and 2013 x

6 20 21 21 44 57 58 59 100 100 126 128 129 133 135 141 142 144 154 176

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Tables

14.2 TV broadcasting company audience shares 2000–​14 15.1 Selected fiscal indicators 15.2 Cyclically adjusted budget balance and output gap 16.1 OECD typology of rights-​based fisheries management (RBM) systems 16.2 Fisheries statistics, 2013 19.1 Reputation ranking 19.2 Scandinavian solidarity 19.3 Scandinavian commitment to development, 2009–​15 19.4 The Nordic countries as global soft power actors 19.5 The Scandinavian foreign services, cost comparison 2014 20.1 Summing up the institutional affiliations of the five countries 20.2 Functions performed in Scandinavian defence policies 21.1 EU applications of Nordic countries and results 21.2 Nordic affiliation with EU-​integration: EFTA, EEA, Schengen and EU membership 22.1 The five features of the Nordic UN model 22.2 Nordic promises and goal achievement with UN aid norms 22.3 EU and UN shares of Nordic development aid 2009 22.4 The evolution of Nordic–​UN relationship

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182 191 191 205 206 245 246 247 247 251 255 256 271 272 282 285 288 290

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CONTRIBUTORS

Petter Aasen is Professor and Rector at the University College of Southeast Norway, Norway. Matti Alestalo is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of  Tampere, Finland. Sigurd Allern is Professor at the Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo, Norway. Peder Andersen is Professor at the Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen is PhD fellow at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Olof Bäckman is Associate Professor at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Sweden. U. Michael Bergman is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Grete Brochmann is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Norway. Peter Munk Christiansen is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. Peter Thisted Dinesen is Professor with special responsibilities at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Carmen Gebhard is Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. xii

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Contributors

Caroline Howard Grøn is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Kasper M.  Hansen is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Martin Ejnar Hansen is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Politics, History and the Brunel Law School, Brunel University London, United Kingdom. Ólafur Th. Hardarson is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland, Iceland. Jens Hoff is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Peter Viggo Jakobsen is part-​time Professor at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark, and Associate Professor at the Department of Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark. Carsten Jensen is Professor at the Department of Political Science,  Aarhus University, Denmark. Svend E.  Hougaard Jensen is Professor at the Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Ann-​Cathrine Jungar is Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, Sweden. Kees van Kersbergen is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. Karina Kosiara-​Pedersen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Stein Kuhnle is Professor at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway. Per Lægreid is Professor at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway. Vibe Busk Larsen is Student Assistant at the Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Martin Marcussen is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Peter Nedergaard is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

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Contributors

Kenneth Nelson is Professor at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, Sweden. Thorsten Borring Olesen is Professor at the School of Culture and Society –​History,  Aarhus University, Denmark. Eva H.  Önnudóttir is Post Doc at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland, Iceland. Thomas Persson is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. Tine S. Prøitz is Associate Professor at the Department of Education and School Development, University College of Southeast Norway, Norway. Øystein Thøgersen is Professor at the Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway. Anders Wivel is Professor with special responsibilities at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

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PREFACE

Scandinavia is in vogue. Scandinavian culture, food, art and architecture have experienced a major revival in recent years. This is as much a revival of the international attention given to Scandinavia as it is a revival of content. Indeed, part of the attention given to Scandinavia has taken the form of a rediscovery of architectural and artistic classics accompanied by a reinterpretation of these classics by modern artists and craftsmen in the context of globalization. Scandinavian politics and societal models have experienced a parallel development. Leading US and European politicians and public intellectuals have pointed to Scandinavia as a ‘best case’ for combining the dynamics of globalization with the security of the welfare state, and Scandinavian societies are frequently viewed as successful laboratories for the good life with high scores on the happiness indexes. The ambition of this book is to engage critically with Scandinavian politics. We present the state of the art on Scandinavian politics, but in doing so we also deconstruct the idealized picture of the happy, egalitarian dream societies of Northern Europe. As the contributions to this volume show, Scandinavian societies share many of the challenges of Europeanization and globalization experienced by European societies in general. Moreover, there is rarely one unified Scandinavian point of departure for tackling these challenges. Rather than one Nordic model, there are several Scandinavian approaches, and even though they share some characteristics, they are typically better described as a cluster than a model. We would like to thank a number of people, who helped us at various stages during the writing and editing of the book. Our editor at Routledge, Andrew Taylor, conceived the idea of a handbook on Scandinavian politics and encouraged us to take on the project. Andrew and his staff offered timely assistance and a constructive dialogue on the content and form of the book from the initial stage of putting together a book prospect until the final stages of creating a coherent manuscript. Philip Larsen provided excellent and highly flexible research assistance throughout the editing process and helped us keep track of authors and their drafts. Maja Friis Henriksen was a valuable assistant in the final stages of proof reading and helped us to prepare the index of the book. Jon Jay Neufeld edited the language and style with his usual attention to detail. The Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen supported the project economically by contributing financially to research assistance and, in particular,

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Preface

language editing. Last, but not least, we would like to thank the contributors to the volume, who shared our enthusiasm for a critical engagement with Scandinavian politics. We trust that the readers of the book will feel this enthusiasm and find the book useful, no matter whether they are engaged in research and education, or whether they are acting as civil servants or policy-​makers inside or outside Scandinavia. Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel Copenhagen

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1 INTRODUCTION Scandinavian politics between myth and reality Anders Wivel and Peter Nedergaard

The rebirth (or rebranding?) of Scandinavia Scandinavia has become a symbol of advanced postmodern societies. Building on their particular versions of the welfare state and acknowledged for their United Nations activism and respective contributions to Third World development and détente, the Nordic countries self-​ consciously positioned themselves as a ‘Third Way’ between communism and capitalism during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing ‘American World Order’ together with increasing globalization and market competition resulted in a collective ‘identity crisis’ in the Nordic welfare states and threatened their positions as model societies. Consequently, the Scandinavian societies have reinvented themselves in two, sometimes contrasting, ways. On the one hand, the Nordics have actively adapted to the rapidly globalizing and Europeanizing economic and political structures in which they are embedded. This process has entailed the normalization of some of the allegedly particular Nordic characteristics of their societies, such as welfare and labour market policies, in order to increase their economic competitiveness and financial resilience and maintain political stability through the rethinking of the flexibility and security elements (often called ‘flexicurity’). This process has introduced new challenges, such as increased migration and a widening gap between cosmopolitan urban elites and more traditionalist rural constituencies, which affect policies as well as public opinion. On the other hand, in the face of waning Scandinavian distinctiveness, the political and cultural elites of the Scandinavian countries have actively and deliberately worked to reinvent ‘Nordicity’. This reinvention includes the showcasing of aspects of Scandinavian societies, such as gender equality and equal access to education and health services, as well as promoting the distinctly modernist and functionalist Scandinavian design and architecture as well as food and drink linked to the Nordic terroir. In addition to rebranding Nordicity, Nordic policy-​makers have attempted to reinvigorate Nordic cooperation by commissioning a number of high-​ profile reports exploring its relevance and potential in a Europeanized and globalized context (Stoltenberg 2009; Strang 2012; Wetterberg 2010). At least when it comes to the (re-​)branding of Scandinavia and Norden, this has proven a success. Thus, whereas a prominent observer of Scandinavian politics argued in a 2007 article on ‘branding Nordicity’ in the premier journal on Scandinavian international relations that the decline of Nordic exceptionalism and the melding of European and Scandinavian practices had 1

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undermined the Nordic brand (Browning 2007), this no longer seems to hold true. In contrast, the rebranding of Nordicity has provided part of the foundation for –​and been further strengthened by –​a resurging interest in Nordic politics, economics and culture and a comeback for these societies as ‘Nordic lights’ showing others the way in a time of conflict and crisis. Examples of this successful rebranding abound. In 2013, for instance, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, DC hosted a festival featuring 700 Scandinavian artists celebrating so-​called ‘Nordic cool’: ‘Using a smart mindset on power, the Nordics show that both soft and hard power capacities, part of one power toolbox, are the critical components that comprise a nation’s global brand … Together they are a formidable little giant to be reckoned with both economically, culturally and militarily’, as reported by András Simonyi and Erik Brattberg from The Johns Hopkins University (Simonyi and Brattberg 2013). Nordic (re-​)banding is also evident in both theoretical and practical political discourse. One of America’s most influential political thinkers and public intellectuals, Francis Fukuyama, argues in his magisterial account of the development of the political institutions of the world that the central challenge is ‘getting to Denmark’, a country that Fukuyama sees as characterized by stable, accountable and democratic institutions (Fukuyama 2014). In May 2016, US President Barack Obama hosted a state dinner for heads of state and government from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Roberts and Heil 2016). At the dinner, Obama toasted the ‘enormous, positive influence’ of the Nordics on the United States and underlined how, in the eyes of the US administration, these countries ‘punch above their weight. In their values, in their contributions, not just to making their own countries function well, but to make the whole world a better place makes them one of our most valuable partners everywhere in the world’ (Obama 2016). The celebratory approach to Scandinavia is by no means limited to the United States. The Reputation Institute, an international research and advisory firm, has carried out interviews with 26,000 persons from the G8 countries, consistently ranking the Nordic countries in the top ten in the 2010–​15 period. Other indexes, such as the Country Brand Index and the Good Country Index, also place the Scandinavians in the top tier.1 In the context of the Sustainable Solutions Development Network (SSDN) commissioned by the UN Secretary General, a group of independent experts has written the World Happiness Report, where all of the Nordic countries placed in the top ten of the 2016 edition, Denmark taking first place, followed by Iceland (3), Norway (4), Finland (5) and Sweden (10) (Helliwell et al. 2016). In the Institute for Economics and Peace 2015 Global Peace Index measuring a wide range of factors threatening the lives and well-​being of citizens at home and abroad, Iceland and Denmark are ranked 1 and 2, with Finland (6), Sweden (13) and Norway (17) also faring well (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016). To be sure, this strong brand is by no means a recent phenomenon. As early as 1936, Marquis W. Childs’ classic Sweden: The Middle Way provided a bestselling and still influential account of how societal reforms regulating capitalism allowed the budding welfare state to ensure that the domestic economy would ‘serve the greatest good of the greatest number’ (Childs 1936: xii). More recently, the Scandinavian states were celebrated as examples of ‘consensual democracies’ (Elder et al. 1982),2 successful ‘corporatist’ small states (Katzenstein 1985) and international ‘norm-​entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen 2002), adding to the Scandinavian brand as a region that was at the same time different from and better than the rest of Europe and the world; an assessment largely shared by Scandinavian elites and electorates (Wæver 1992).

The aim of the book The main objective of this book is to provide a critical assessment and comprehensive overview of Scandinavian politics provided by leading experts in the fields of Scandinavian comparative 2

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Introduction

politics, foreign policy and public administration. We seek to explain and understand contemporary Scandinavian politics by critically discussing the state of the art in the field and identifying the main characteristics of contemporary Scandinavian politics together with the most important trends. An important secondary aim of this volume is to provide a nuanced account of our understanding of Scandinavian politics today and over time by unpacking the similarities and differences between the Scandinavian countries and tracing how these similarities and differences developed over time. As documented by the contributions to this volume, there are important similarities and variations among the Scandinavian countries no matter whether we focus on the organization of their polities, the political landscape and how societal actors navigate it in individual countries or the concrete policies. On the one hand, the Scandinavian countries share a number of characteristics. They are welfare states with comparatively generous welfare provisions and high taxes and free and equal access to education and health for all citizens. In all five countries, the political and societal elites responded to the economic crisis of the 1930s with a fundamental bargain combating poverty and unemployment with extensive social programmes, public works projects and subsidies, thereby laying the foundation for the Scandinavian welfare state.3 All of the Scandinavian countries have strong civil societies and contribute actively to the maintenance and development of international society in areas such as conflict resolution and climate politics. The Scandinavian countries are affluent and well-​organized, characterized by effective bureaucracies and very low levels of corruption. In issue areas such as peacekeeping and labour market policies, it has even become commonplace to speak of a Nordic ‘model’, both in the prescriptive and descriptive senses of the word. On the other hand, there are notable differences among the Scandinavian countries. Even when we speak of a Nordic model, in some issue areas there are important developments over time and notable differences between the Scandinavian countries. Typically, three of them –​ Denmark, Sweden and Norway –​tend to share more characteristics with each other than with Finland or Iceland, reflecting the long-​shared political, diplomatic and administrative histories of these countries. In external relations, however, the foreign policy activism of Denmark is much more closely coupled to the United States than to that of Norway or Sweden, which remain wedded to a more traditionally Scandinavian, UN-​based activism. Finland allows a much greater role for the EU, while Iceland is notably less activist than the other countries (Wivel 2014). The dividing line between NATO founding members Denmark, Norway and Iceland versus non-​aligned Sweden and Finland continues to structure the opportunities for and demands on national Nordic defence policies, even though the increasing use of ad hoc coalitions in military affairs and the rise of Nordic defence cooperation in recent years have softened the effects of this divide (Forsberg 2013). In EU politics, there is a divide between insiders Denmark, Sweden and Finland on the one side and outsiders Norway and Iceland on the other, although these boundaries tend to be blurry in policy areas such as justice and home affairs and security policy, with the outsiders sometimes playing a more active role than the insiders (Grøn et al. 2015; Miles 2005). Moreover, some issue areas that previously served as part of a solid foundation for developing the Scandinavian brand have in recent years been overtaken by European developments. Thus, for example, beginning in the late nineteenth century, tri-​annual Nordic Lawyers’ Meetings underpinned the creation of a Nordic legal culture, but in the 1990s this development was undermined by developments in the EU, which crowded out Nordic legal cooperation and shifted the focus of legal innovation and cooperation in the Nordic region away from Scandinavia and towards Brussels (Letto-​Vanamo and Tamm 2016). More generally, the Europeanization of classic Scandinavian high-​profile issue areas such as conflict resolution, international development, human rights and environmental 3

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protection has led to the apparent ‘eclipse’ of Norden in international affairs, although this may also be interpreted as the successful ‘Nordification’ of the international profile of the EU (Laatikainen 2003). In this context, the recent increase in the ambition and activism of the Nordic Council of Ministers, focusing on the ‘increasing usefulness’ of Nordic cooperation, may be interpreted as a pragmatic reinvention of Nordic cooperation tacitly accepting that, on most aspects of Scandinavian politics, these countries do not constitute a community or an alliance but are more accurately described as a cluster of states sharing a number of affinities moulded by centuries of political interaction and interdependence, but only rarely developed into a coherent political platform.4 This book does not aim to assess whether the globalized and Europeanized Scandinavian societies of today are normatively better or worse than the societies of the Scandinavian golden age of the 1950s and 1960s, when Nordic cooperation flourished and the Scandinavians carved out a role as the proponents of a Social-​Democratic ‘Third Way’ between communist East and capitalist West. Nor do we aim to advise whether or not Scandinavian societies should serve as models for others or whether the way they lead is right or wrong. Rather, we critically explore how the actors and institutions in Scandinavian countries have responded to internal and external challenges and opportunities together with the extent to which this has led to policy revisions. We evaluate if anything is actually special about Nordic policy choices, as is sometimes alleged, and to what extent and how it makes sense to speak of Nordic models.

What is Scandinavia? What is Scandinavian politics? Historically, Scandinavia only included Denmark, Sweden and Norway.  The term was used from the late eighteenth century, referring to the shared language and culture of the three countries, which came to form the basis of a Scandinavist movement in the nineteenth century and Nordic cooperation in the twentieth century.5 We have chosen a broader definition, however, which is more in line with the common use of the term today. In our definition, Scandinavia includes all of the Nordic countries and their dependencies: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Åland Islands and Greenland. Throughout the volume, ‘Scandinavia’ and ‘Nordic countries’ will be used interchangeably. The Scandinavian countries share a lengthy political history. In 1397, Danish Queen Margaret I united Denmark–​Norway and Sweden in the Kalmar Union, incorporating Finland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the Orkney Islands and the Shetland Islands. Although an independent Swedish king was crowned in 1523 and the Union was demolished in 1524, a personal union between Denmark and Norway under the Danish Crown remained until 1814. As a consequence of the Danish alliance with Napoleon, the Treaty of Kiel forced Denmark to cede Norway to Sweden, but the old Norwegian provinces of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands remained under the Danish Crown.This also marked a transition of power in the region from Denmark, the leading Scandinavian power from the mid-​fourteenth century, to Sweden, which had overtaken Denmark’s position and expanded significantly since the early seventeenth century. Only a few years before the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1809, however, Sweden lost Finland to Russia. Norway gained independence by a referendum in 1905, whereas Finland seized the opportunity to unilaterally declare its independence following the Russian revolution in 1917. Iceland remained in a personal union under the Danish Crown until 1944 despite having achieved its independence in 1918. Greenland and the Faroe Islands remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark and Rigsfællesskabet (the Community of the Realm). However, the Faroe Islands achieved home-​rule in 1948 and obtained expanded autonomy by a supplement to home-​rule in 2005, and Greenland achieved home-​rule in 1979 and self-​determination in 4

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Introduction

2009. The Swedish-​speaking Åland Islands remain part of Finland but have enjoyed extensive autonomy since 1920. Since the 1840s, Scandinavian interstate relations were supplemented by a growing movement of cultural pan-​Scandinavism inspired by similar movements in Italy and Germany. In contrast to the movements on the European continent, however, the Nordic Scandinavists placed less emphasis on the potential of a common state and concentrated on the shared history, culture and language creating what they saw to be a Scandinavian brotherhood. Thus, it became part of the Protestant, Grundtvigian conception of enlightenment and universal brotherhood influencing Scandinavia (and Denmark in particular) at the time (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004). The parallel cultural romanticism of the post-​Napoleonic Scandinavian movement with the works of Danish poet Adam Oehlenschläger played an important role (Mai 2016:  112; Parker 2002:  358). The movement never fully recovered from the Swedish refusal to join Denmark in an alliance against Prussia in the 1864 war, when Denmark lost the three duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria, reducing Danish territory by a third. By that time, however, the idea of the Nordic was already an integral part of the thinking of the new intellectual and political elite, and ‘the idea of a common Nordic culture became part of the construction of the national identities of the Nordic countries’ (Mai 2016: 112).This idea also served as the starting point for subsequent Scandinavian political developments. Most importantly, the development of Scandinavism as a second-​order nationalism developed in tandem with the nationalism of the individual Nordic countries, the parliamentary democracies (Schouenborg 2013: 74–​77) and a strong tradition for peaceful conflict resolution among the Nordic states (Archer and Joenniemi 2003).6 The success of Scandinavian second-​ order nationalism transformed what was initially an elitist ideational project of Danish and Swedish university students to a movement with broad public appeal and a more inclusive Nordic profile. Thus, the Nordic Association of Civil Associations (Foreningen Norden), established in 1919, developed from a forum for the political and intellectual elites in Sweden, Norway and Denmark promoting peaceful coexistence and cooperation to an organization with a much broader agenda and membership base and the inclusion of Finland, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands. The close ties between and across Scandinavian societies –​sometimes summed up in the notion of ‘cobweb integration’, denoting the criss-​cross nature of formal and informal personal and organizational contacts (Andrén 1967; Götz et al. 2016; Nedergaard 2009) –​served as the basis for the development of a political culture with strong links between state and society and between state and nation (Götz and Hackmann 2003; Hansen and Wæver 2003). Since 1952, cobweb integration has been institutionally embedded in the Nordic Council, building ‘its reputation by concentrating on peripheral issues that are politically burnt out and have ceased to be controversial in any member country’ (Ørvik 1974: 66), although this micro-​integration, often bottom-​up or a combination of bottom-​up and top-​down initiatives and the efforts of public, private and third-​sector actors, has provided an institutional hub for continued Nordic cooperation (Götz et al. 2016).  At the same time, the success of micro-​integration has been accompanied by high-​profile, ‘top-​down’ failed attempts at macro-​integration, such as the attempts to agree on a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1947–​8 or to create a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) in 1968–​70, earning the Scandinavians a characteristic as ‘reluctant Nordics’, sceptical towards integration with one another as well as with Europe or the rest of the world despite the lip service paid in both respects (Arter 2008: 297–​313; Ørvik 1974; Strang 2016a: 3–​9). Despite the marked differences between the Scandinavian countries and the reluctance to relinquish sovereignty and trade national autonomy for international influence, it is possible to identify the characteristics of a Scandinavian political space. Indeed, the tendency to view the 5

6

A. Wivel and P. Nedergaard Table 1.1  Scandinavian polity, politics and policy Polity

Politics

Policy

Welfare state Egalitarian Consensual Sustainability

Parliamentary democracy Rule of law Corporatist Trust-​based

Pragmatic and incrementalist Liberal Activist Peaceful conflict resolution

world in the context of the domestic bargains and fundamental values of the welfare state may be interpreted as a special brand of welfare nationalism characteristic of all of the Scandinavian states (e.g. Arter 2008; Kuisma 2007). On the basis of recent discussions of Scandinavian politics (Arter 2008; Schouenborg 2013; Strang 2016b) and using the concepts of polity (understood as the community constituting the context for political action), politics (understood as the procedures for and power struggles over policy-​making) and policy (understood as the content of politics) as a prism, we can construct a first-​cut understanding of Scandinavian politics as depicted in Table 1.1. Scandinavian politics takes place within the community of the welfare state, with policy-​ makers and electorates viewing core values such as egalitarianism and sustainability as key to understanding which policies are necessary to maintain and develop the community. Consensual values provide the basis for how decisions should be made, different societal segments sharing responsibility for each other and society as a whole with a high degree of solidarity. Politics are played out in the context of parliamentarian democracy, with effective bureaucracies ensuring the rule of law in a policy-​making process that remains trust-​based despite changes and challenges. The government and opposition typically agree on major reforms and little policy change follows a change of government as the mutual intention of seeking common solutions to shared problems underlies the political power struggle.  This ‘soft’ nature of the political power struggle is strengthened by the formalized inclusion of a wide range of societal actors in the decision-​making process. In this setting of institutions and procedural norms, policy content tends to be egalitarian and liberal. Political compromises ensure the allocation of economic means for the activities of very different communities to thrive within the welfare state, and policy change tends to be pragmatic and incremental. The values of the welfare state and the soft nature of its political struggle underpin policies that are at the same time activist (in order to sustain and develop community at home and abroad) and focus on peaceful conflict resolution at home and abroad in the form of policy content, the process for identifying what the content of policy should be, and as an underlying value for doing politics at all. In that sense, Scandinavian politics have come full circle, as policy content becomes almost indistinguishable from process and community. While this provides an ideal-​type depiction of Scandinavian politics that never truly existed and might expand characteristics that are now becoming less important, it does provide us with a baseline for understanding Scandinavian politics and a starting point for organizing this volume.

The structure of the book: polity, politics, policy Methodologically and theoretically pluralistic, this handbook is in itself a reflection of the field of political science in Scandinavia and the diversity of the issues covered in the volume. However, coherence is ensured by organizing the volume into three parts –​on polity, politics 6

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Introduction

and policy –​and by maintaining the focus on the contemporary state of Scandinavian politics in the light of its recent history. Each chapter answers two fundamental questions: What characterizes Scandinavian politics on the specific subject of the chapter? And what are the main developments and trends in Scandinavian politics within the specific issue of the chapter? Each chapter thus aims to embed the analysis of contemporary Scandinavian politics in the relevant historical context in order to ensure that current developments are linked to past experience and avoid ‘snapshot’ analyses. Part I focuses on polity. It begins by analysing the modern Scandinavian welfare state, the primary institutional setting of the politics and policies of any Scandinavian country (Chapter 2). This is followed by critical discussion of the Scandinavian countries as ‘egalitarian paradises’ (Chapter 3) and ‘corporatist darlings’ (Chapter 4), two of the central corollaries of the welfare state, before proceeding to one of the more recent developments of the welfare state: the role as ‘green heavyweights’ (Chapter 5). Part II focuses on politics. As in the previous section, the initial focus is on the general issues of the welfare state, this time with a focus on its political entrenchment and transformation (Chapter  6) before moving on to a focus on the Nordic administrative traditions (Chapter 7), cabinets and ministerial turnover (Chapter 8) and parliaments (Chapter 9).This is followed by analyses of Nordic voters and party systems (Chapter 10) and public opinion (Chapter 11) and discussions of populism (Chapter 12) and social capital (Chapter 13) before we conclude the overall analysis of politics with an analysis of the changing media landscape in Chapter 14. Part III focuses on the substantial policies of the Scandinavian countries. As in the parts on policy and politics, we begin with the most fundamental discussion related to the Scandinavian welfare state. In the context of policies, the focus this time is on fiscal policy in Scandinavia and how it has been reformed over the past decades in order to secure an economically sustainable welfare state for the future (Chapter 15). This is followed up by analyses of fisheries policy (Chapter 16), education policy (Chapter 17) and migration policy (Chapter 18), providing examples of the development and change of policies in a primary sector (fishery), a traditional cornerstone policy of the Scandinavian welfare state (education) and a relatively recent policy issue of increased importance (immigration). Finally, we focus on the external policies, a traditional sphere for Scandinavian activism. Chapter 19 provides a general analysis of Scandinavian diplomacy followed by analyses of defence and alliance policies (Chapter  20), EU policies (Chapter  21), UN policy (Chapter  22) and development policies (Chapter  23); the two former policy areas (defence and the EU) are typically seen as problematic and divisive in the Scandinavian context, whereas the two latter policy areas (UN and development) are more often viewed as spheres for showcasing Scandinavian values and influencing the world outside the Nordic region. Finally, the book is concluded in Chapter 24.

Notes 1 See also Martin Marcussen, Chapter 19, this volume. 2 Although it should be noted that Elder and his co-​authors found that political turbulence in the 1970s reconfigured the patterns of consensus and conflict in Scandinavia to some extent. 3 The agreements were made in Denmark and Sweden in 1933, in Iceland in 1934, in Norway in 1935 and in Finland in 1937. For discussion of the historical effect on Scandinavian politics at home and abroad, see Schouenborg (2013: 108–​115). 4 See the report on the modernization agenda of the Secretary General and in particular pp. 75–​90 on its increasing usefulness (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014). 5 In an era where few Scandinavians spoke English, Scandinavian cooperation was facilitated by linguistic affinities. Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Icelandic and Faroese are all North Germanic languages, and Danes, Norwegians and Swedes are able to understand each other and would often hold meetings in Nordic languages rather than English up until the late twentieth century. Even though Finnish is a

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A. Wivel and P. Nedergaard Uralian language sharing more affinities with Hungarian and, in particular, Estonian, Finns would usually understand Swedish. 6 Thus, Karl Deutsch and his collaborators found that relations among the Scandinavian countries corresponded closely to what they termed a ‘security community’: a group of countries with compatible value systems and a shared sense of community among members resulting in extensive transactions and the construction of common institutions and responsive and predictable behaviour towards each other, with each member acknowledging the needs of the others and confident they will not be attacked militarily by any member of the security community (Deutsch et al. 1957).

References Andrén, N. (1967) Nordic Integration. Cooperation and Conflict 2(1): 1–​25. Archer, C. and Joenniemi, P. (eds) (2003) The Nordic Peace. Aldershot: Ashgate. Arter, D. (2008) Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Breitenbauch, H. and Wivel, A. (2004) Understanding National IR Disciplines outside the United States:  Political Culture and the Construction of International Relations in Denmark. Journal of International Relations and Development 7(4): 414–​443. Browning, C. S. (2007) Branding Nordicity:  Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27‒51. Childs, M. W. (1936) Sweden: The Middle Way. New Haven: Yale University Press. Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S. A., Kann, R. A. and Lee Jr., M. L. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area:  International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton:  Princeton University Press. Elder, N., Thomas, A. H. and Arter, D. (1982) The Consensual Democracies? The Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States. Oxford: Wiley-​Blackwell. Forsberg, T. (2013) The Rise of Nordic Defence Cooperation: A Return to Regionalism? International Affairs 89(5): 1161–​1181. Fukuyama, F. (2014) Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. New York: Macmillan. Götz, N. and Hackmann, J. (2003) Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region:  Towards a Hybrid Theory. In: Götz, N. and Hackmann, J. (eds), Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region. Aldershot: Ashgate. Götz, N., Haggrén, H. and Hilson, M. (2016) Nordic Cooperation in the Voluntary Sector. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (2015) The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the Other European Community? London: Routledge. Hansen, L. and Wæver, O. (eds) (2003) European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States. London: Routledge. Helliwell, J., Layard, R. and Sachs, J. (2016) World Happiness Report 2016, Update (Vol. I). New York: The Sustainable Solutions Development Network. Available at: http://​worldhappiness.report/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​sites/​2/​2016/​03/​HR-​V1_​web.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs. Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 37(1): 11–​23. Institute for Economics and Peace (2016) Global Peace Index 2016. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace. Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kuisma, M. (2007) Social Democratic Internationalism and the Welfare State after the ‘Golden Age’. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 9–​26. Laatikainen, K. V. (2003) Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict 38(4): 409–​441. Letto-​Vanamo, P. and Tamm, D. (2016) Cooperation in the Field of Law. In:  Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Mai, A.-​M. (2016) Dreams and Realities:  The Nordic Council Literature Prize as a Symbol of the Construction of Nordic Cultural Cooperation. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge.

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Introduction Miles, L. (2005) The North. In: Mouritzen, H. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Geopolitics of Euro-​Atlantic Integration. London: Routledge. Nedergaard, P. (2009) Policy Learning Processes in International Committees:  The Case of the Civil Servant Committees of the Nordic Council of Ministers. Public Management Review 11(1): 23–​37. Nordic Council of Ministers (2014) Nyt Norden:  Afrapportering på generalsekretærens moderniseringsopdrag. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Obama, B. (2016) Full Transcript of President Obama’s Toast at the Nordic State Dinner. Washington Post, 13 May 2016. Available at:  www.washingtonpost.com/​news/​reliable-​source/​wp/​2016/​05/​13/​full-​ transcript-​of-​president-​obamas-​toast-​at-​the-​nordic-​state-​dinner/​ [Accessed 14 August 2016]. Ørvik, N. (1974) Nordic Cooperation and High Politics. International Organization 28(1): 61–​88. Parker, N. (2002) Differentiating, Collaborating, Outdoing:  Nordic Identity and Marginality in the Contemporary World. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 9(3): 355–​381. Roberts, R. and Heil, E. (2016) Nordic State Dinner: A Warm Welcome for Leaders from Cold Climes. Washington Post, 13 May 2016. Available at:  www.washingtonpost.com/​lifestyle/​style/​a-​warm-​ welcome-​for-​leaders-​from-​cold-​climes/​2016/​05/​13/​52aaeb8e-​195f-​11e6-​924d-​838753295f9a_ ​ story.html [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Schouenborg, L. (2013) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–​ 2010. London: Routledge. Simonyi, A. and Brattberg, E. (2013) ‘Nordic Cool Power in Washington’: What the Nordics Teach about Nation Branding. The World Post, 23 February 2013. Available at:  www.huffingtonpost.com/​andras-​ simonyi/​nordic-​cool-​power-​in-​wasi_​b_​2748954.html [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Stoltenberg, T. (2009) Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy:  Proposals Presented to the Extraordinary Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Strang, J. (2012) Nordic Communities –​A Vision for the Future. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Strang, J. (2016a) Introduction: The Nordic Model of Transnational Cooperation. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Strang, J. (ed.) (2016b) Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Wæver, O. (1992) Nordic Nostalgia:  Northern Europe after the Cold War. International Affairs 68(1): 77–​102. Wetterberg, G. (2010) The United Nordic Federation. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Wivel, A. (2014) Birds of a Feather Flying Apart? Explaining Nordic Dissonance in the (Post)Unipolar World. In: Dahl, A.-​S. and Järvenpää, P. (eds), Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-​Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-​Unipolar World. London: Routledge.

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PART I

Polity

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13

2 THE MODERN SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATE Stein Kuhnle and Matti Alestalo

Introduction: varieties of welfare states The origins of the Western welfare state date back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century and are closely associated with the major social, economic and political transformations of the time (Castles et al. 2010). Great societal transformations involving industrialization, the rise of capitalism, urbanization and population growth paved the way for a new role of the state regarding its responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Traditional forms of welfare provision offered by families, guilds, voluntary organizations and charities, churches and local communities came to be seen by many people in authoritative positions as insufficient welfare providers. The last two decades of the nineteenth century mark the ‘take-​off of the modern welfare state’ (Flora and Alber 1981), and inaugurated the emergence and growth of social-​insurance-​like policies. The great societal transformations were conducive to new thinking about the social role of the state: Should the state assume a more active social role? And if so, then how? On entering the twentieth century, social policy and welfare emerged to become a crucial issue on the political agenda, first and foremost in Western countries, as to whether democratic or authoritarian, and significant variations among Western nations could already be observed from the beginning. The foundations for a divide between a social insurance model premised on an application of relatively pure insurance principles (continental Europe) and a social citizenship model premised on universal tax-​based provision (Scandinavia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand), although not necessarily intentionally, was established in this early period (Kuhnle and Sander 2010). Over the last 100 or so years, welfare states have developed along different paths, and ideas and institutions have spread globally, across different systems of governance, different political-​economic systems, different cultures with varying traditions of relations and mutual expectations between citizens and state. Welfare states vary in scope and format, in political orientations and in distributional outcomes (Arts and Gelissen 2010). Although every welfare state is unique, many scholars have tried to identify patterns, particularly since the early 1990s, that make it meaningful to group countries into different ‘worlds’, ‘regimes’, ‘types’ or ‘models’ of welfare states. Consequently, with such conceptualizations, social scientists try to explain why different kinds of welfare states have developed and to explain the implications of different kinds of welfare state constructions for distributional outcomes, political cleavage structures and for their social, economic and political effects. Esping-​Andersen (1990) built upon 13

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earlier attempts (Titmuss 1974; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958) concerning the classification of welfare states when he published Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. His seminal book has had a defining influence on the field of comparative welfare state research since its publication. Esping-​Andersen distinguished between the ‘liberal’ welfare regime (e.g. the United States), the ‘corporatist-​statist’ or ‘conservative’ regime (e.g. Germany) and the ‘social democratic’ welfare regime (e.g. Sweden). There has been an abundance of research on the advanced welfare states over the last 40 years, and there would appear to be near unanimity among researchers that the Scandinavian or Nordic countries –​Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden –​form a special welfare state model. Although the conception of a model, the Nordic welfare model being one, is a construction, a simplification of reality, it is analytically useful to distinguish between ‘types’ or ‘models’ of welfare and relating to various welfare states as proximate empirical examples. Since the 1980s, based on the results of a number of comparative studies, the concept of a ‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian’ model or ‘welfare regime type’ has successfully entered our vocabulary, whether that of international organizations, scholars or the mass media covering the Nordic countries. The concept generally, but not always, has positive connotations depending on the context, time period and the ideology of the beholder. To put it crudely, neo-​liberals and old Western Marxists seem to share sceptical views, while social democrats and moderate conservatives and liberals more gladly than most bring out strongly positive views. In fact, many Nordic social democrats will claim it to be their model, albeit in an excessively simplistic historical perspective. The concept is broad, vague and ambiguous, but it is a helpful reference for the observers of varieties of market-​oriented welfare democracies (see Leibfried and Mau 2008). But we can also observe that European welfare states seem to be on a track of mutual learning, particularly in areas of family and labour market policies (Borrås and Jacobsson 2004), implying that European welfare state models are becoming increasingly intermixed and less distinct (Cox 2004; see also Abrahamson 2002). In the following, we shall use the concepts ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘Nordic welfare states’ or ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘Nordic welfare model’ interchangeably. All of these concepts are used in the literature. In geographical terms, the ‘Scandinavian’ reference would include only the mountainous peninsula of Norway and Sweden, while ‘Nordic’ pinpoints the common history and cultural background also including the Danish flatlands as well as Finland and Iceland. In addition, since Nordic regional, political and institutionalized cooperation have developed since the 1950s, including the creation of a passport union, a free Nordic labour market and a ‘social union’, we think that the concepts ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘Nordic’ can be used interchangeably (see also Hilson 2008). This is not, however, to deny the historical intra-​Nordic variations in the welfare state construction. From the late nineteenth century until the Second World War, Denmark, Norway and Sweden made great steps towards introducing the major social security and welfare schemes. Finland was clearly a latecomer. As in many new states in Central and Eastern Europe, the Finnish political discourse was dominated by the land question rather than the labour question until the early 1950s. Finland was the last advanced European country to introduce the general sickness insurance in 1964. The major pension scheme for private sector employees had come into force some years earlier (Flora and Alber 1981). During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a catch-​up period in which Finland reached the high level of social expenditure prevailing in the other Nordic countries (Alestalo and Uusitalo 1992). Due to sudden economic and financial crises, the welfare state in Finland has been vulnerable to visible shortcuts and reorganizations since the 2008 global financial crisis. 14

15

The modern Scandinavian welfare state

Major elements of the Scandinavian type of welfare state1 The origin of such a concept and the specific Nordic experience can be traced back to the period between the two world wars in the twentieth century, to the 1930s, when an outside perspective on Scandinavia led American journalist Marquis Childs to coin the term ‘middle way’ when describing the Swedish political development with –​among other things –​a major agreement between the trade unions and employers’ associations (Childs 1936). This ‘middle way’ was one between a high degree of unregulated capitalism on the one side and authoritarian/​totalitarian systems and ideologies on the other (Nazism in Germany; communism under Stalin in the Soviet Union).The decade before the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe is marked by the social democratic parties ascending to political power in the Nordic countries, most particularly in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In the same decade, major agreements between the trade unions and employers’ associations were made (except in Denmark, where such an agreement had already been made in 1899, the first country in the world to do so), to define the rules for collective bargaining agreements, and the embryonic development towards the post-​war regular contact and cooperation channels between the organizations in the labour market and governments was initiated. In this respect, Finland was a latecomer. It was only after the ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union (1939–​40) that the first major agreement between the federation of trade unions and the employers’ associations was made. This Nordic political development was, and has become, a kind of neo-​corporatist system of governance complementing the system of governance manifested through the general election of representatives from various political parties to parliaments, and governments being formed on the basis of parliamentary majorities of general or case-​by-​case support (in the latter instance only if minority governments can be formed). The notion of a distinctly Nordic type of welfare state has (had) normative connotations, usually of a positive nature, as an example of a model to follow towards a ‘good society’, understood as a generally high level of well-​being with little poverty and egalitarian income distributions, but sometimes also of a negative nature, as something to be avoided, given the presumably undesirable economic effects of excessive emphasis on public responsibility and equality. In terms of ‘welfare states’ or ‘welfare models’, the five countries, with the exception of Iceland to some degree, also share a number of other characteristics. If we accept the notion of a Nordic or Scandinavian welfare model, the analytical findings of a very comprehensive literature can be summarized in three master concepts: The Nordic welfare state is about stateness, universalism and equality. Another important element that goes beyond the pure characteristics of the welfare system as such must be included in order to understand the evolution of ‘the politics of welfare’; that is, how formal and informal systems of governance have impacted the welfare state and continuous reform efforts and decisions.

Stateness First, the Nordic welfare model is based on the extensive prevalence of the state and the public sector in welfare arrangements.The stateness of the Scandinavian countries has lengthy historical roots and the state–​people relationship can be considered close and positive. The implication is not that the state sends ‘rain and sunshine from above’ (Marx 1852 [1979]: 187–​188), but rather that the twentieth-​century state has not been perceived to be a coercive apparatus of oppression in the hands of the ruling classes. Instead, it has generally developed as a peaceful battleground of different classes assuming an important function ‘as an agency through which society can be reformed’ (Korpi 1978: 48). Stateness implies the weaker influence of intermediary structures 15

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(e.g. church, voluntary organizations) but includes ‘relatively strong elements of social citizenship and relatively uniform and integrated institutions’. The class compromise (of the 1930s) was an important element in the construction of the Scandinavian-​type welfare state (Flora 1986: xvii–​xx). The role of the state is seen in extensive public services, public employment and tax-​based cash benefit schemes. It should be remembered, however, that social services are generally organized at the local level by numerous small municipalities that make the interaction between the decision-​makers and the people rather intimate and intensive. ‘The difference between public and private, so crucial in many debates in the Anglo-​American countries, was of minor importance in the Scandinavian countries’ (Allardt 1986: 111). Until recently, for example, it has been considered legitimate for the state to collect and publish the tax records of individual citizens in Norway, Sweden and Finland. It is hardly coincidental that Sweden and Finland have the oldest census statistics in the world.

Universalism In the Nordic countries, the principle of universal social rights is extended to the entire population. Services and cash benefits are targeted less towards the have-​nots than elsewhere, as they are universal in character and also cover the middle-​and high-​income classes. In short: ‘All benefit: all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay’ (Esping-​Andersen 1990: 27–​28).The universalistic character of the Nordic welfare state has been traced to both idealistic and pragmatic ideas promoted and partly implemented in the making of the early social legislation in the years before and after the turn of the twentieth century. Social security programmes were initiated at the time of the political and economic modernization of the Scandinavian countries, and the notion of universalism was at least a latent element of the nation-​building project. And, second, the similar life chances of poor farmers and poor workers contributed to the recognition of similar risks and social rights: Every citizen is potentially exposed to certain risks. Third, especially since the Second World War, there has been a strong tendency to avoid the exclusion of those with limited means in Scandinavia. And finally, there has been a very pragmatic tendency to minimize the administrative costs by favouring universal schemes instead of extensive bureaucratic means-​testing (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005; Kuhnle and Hort 2004: 9–​12). As of the early 1970s, all of the Nordic countries had established universal coverage of old age pensions systems, sickness insurance, medical care, occupational injury insurance, child allowances and maternal/​paternal leave schemes. The unemployment insurance was (and is) in principle universal and compulsory in Norway only, while trade union members alone were covered in the other countries, but all unemployed persons are entitled to cash benefits within some programme. The same overall institutional pattern has persisted until this day, but continuous reform activity has generally, although with variations among the Nordic countries, led to various modifications in pension programmes (with a strengthening of the insurance principle) and unemployment insurance, and to increased co-​payment in the health sector. Current developments indicate a further shift towards a more mixed welfare system, where the role of private pension and health insurance will increase, but more as supplement to public welfare and without jeopardizing the basic idea of universalism.

Equality The historical legacy of the Nordic countries is that of relatively limited class, income and gender differences, although the full implementation of gender equality policies, with concomitant norms and popular expectations, came relatively late, in the post-​Second World War 16

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The modern Scandinavian welfare state

period. The Scandinavian route towards the modern class structure was paved with the strong position of the peasantry, the weakening position of the landed gentry, and with the peaceful and rather easy access of the working class to the parliamentary system and to labour market negotiations. This legacy is manifest in limited income differences and in the almost non-​ existence of poverty (Fritzell and Lundberg 2005: 164–​185; Ringen and Uusitalo 1992: 69–​ 91).The combination of progressive income tax systems and universal and relatively generous, social security and welfare systems has implied redistribution, limited poverty (in relative and absolute terms) and egalitarian income distributions. According to recent OECD statistics, all five Nordic countries are among the 8–​10 nations of the world with the most equal distribution of disposable household income, with Denmark, Norway and Sweden among the top five. Moreover, Scandinavia is famous for her –​comparatively speaking –​limited gender differences. Not least given the high female employment rates and how local government (i.e. the municipalities) shares much of the responsibility for childcare and the provision of care for the elderly and infirm, the gender differences play a lesser role in the Nordic countries than in other parts of the advanced world (see Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1999). Keeping in mind the relatively high levels of welfare benefits, the extensive public services, and the relatively strong position of women in the labour market, it has been (somewhat ironically) pointed out that Scandinavian men are ‘emancipated from the tyranny of the labour market and Scandinavian women are emancipated from the tyranny of the family’ (Alestalo and Flora 1994: 54–​55).

Actual forms of governance The Nordic model is normally identified by reference to characteristics of welfare state institutions (stateness and universalism) and welfare policy outcomes (equality). But it seems appropriate to add a fourth component, namely forms of governance, referring to how political decisions are made. In this respect, the 1930s represented a political watershed decade in all of the Nordic countries with national class compromises between industrial and agricultural/​primary sector interests, and between labour and capital through the major trade union federations and employers’ associations. These compromises also came to be reflected at the parliamentary and governmental levels, with political compromises reached across parties representing various class or economic interests. From the late 1920s onwards, Denmark was in the lead, acting as a policy role model not least for Swedish social reformers (Nyström 1989). Nevertheless, the title of Marquis Childs’ Sweden: The Middle Way (1936) captures the path-​breaking shift in Nordic politics in the 1930s. The politics of the 1930s came to be formative for the kind of Nordic (welfare) model existing today, although these achievements at the time remained precarious and, from a broader European perspective, peripheral. A broad concept of the Nordic model must include aspects of the actual forms of governance in the Nordic countries, the evolution of a specific pattern for conflict resolution and policy legitimacy as the basis for political decision-​making and authoritative decisions. This pattern has developed over a long period of time and is characterized by the active involvement of and participation in various, often institutionalized, civil society organizations in political processes before formal decisions are made by parliaments and governments, most particularly pronounced through triangular relationships between government, trade unions, employers’ associations or similar organizations in, for instance, the agricultural sector. This system of governance may be labelled ‘consensual governance’. The Nordic countries are small and with a unitary state, which make decision-​making easier than in big and/​or federal states. The development of Finland towards consensual democracy has been more dramatic than in the other 17

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cases:  it is a long distance in politics and time from the Civil War of 1918 to the strongest example of consensus-​building in peacetime Nordic politics, as represented by the ‘Rainbow Coalition’ government –​comprising the parties of the communists, social democrats, liberals and conservatives –​of the early 1990s, which was established to set the Finnish economy and welfare state right after the dramatic economic downturn partly triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and an abrupt loss of substantial foreign trade. ‘Consensual democracies’ is a term that generally fits the developments since the mid-​1930s and which grew stronger after 1945; developments that are also reflected in numerous book titles (Elder et al. 1988; Rustow 1955). Consensus-​making has become an important element in Nordic politics partly for the simple reason that coalition governments are the rule (especially in Denmark and Finland) and due to the prevalence of minority coalition governments (particularly in Denmark, Norway and Sweden). Denmark is the world champion when it comes to the scope of minority governments. The Nordic tradition for what can be called negative parliamentarism –​that the government does not have to be positively or constructively based on a majority in the parliament nor to be installed by a parliamentary majority –​has logically appealed to the art of making political compromises: sustainable political decisions can hardly be made without parties consulting each other in advance, creating mutual trust and without government parties consulting opposition parties at some time or another. The consensual style of Nordic politics and the experience of long-​term multiparty parliamentary and/​or governmental responsibilities is one of the reasons it makes more sense to use the geographical adjectives ‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian’ rather than –​as do many of our social science colleagues –​using the narrower, political-​ideological adjective ‘social democratic’ when naming the ‘model’. A partial exception to this picture is Sweden, where the Social Democrats enjoyed a more dominant position throughout the twentieth century and where the debates on principles of social reforms at times appear to have been more polarized (Lindbom and Rothstein 2004).

Nordic cooperation It is also worth noting the development of Nordic cooperation in the field of social policy –​and the consolidation of a Nordic identity –​as factors being conducive to the development of the Nordic (welfare) model. The development of formal inter-​Scandinavian cooperation between parliamentarians already started in 1907. In this field of policy, the first of many regular joint Scandinavian top political-​administrative meetings took place in Copenhagen in 1919. Finland and Iceland joined these meetings in the 1920s and, according to an overview provided by Klaus Petersen (2006), there were 14 such meetings over the years of Nordic social policy-​makers before the Nordic Convention on Social Security was implemented in 1955, after the establishment of the Nordic Council in 1952, and which Finland was ‘allowed’ (by the Soviet Union) to join in 1955.These developments have sustained Nordic cooperation to this day across many public policy areas. Common, comparative and comparable Nordic social statistics were established in 1946. Not least the fact that the Nordic countries pioneered transnational regional cooperation after the Second World War has been conducive to the maturing of the ‘Nordic model’ concept. This cooperation developed despite different foreign policy orientations –​differences primarily owing to the war experience and geopolitical realities during the Cold War –​ranging from NATO membership in the western Nordics (Denmark, Iceland, Norway) over Swedish neutrality to a friendship pact between Finland and the Soviet Union in the eastern part of the Far North. It says something about the historical strength of Nordic identity and 18

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The modern Scandinavian welfare state

the strength of relation-​building developed both at the government and non-​government levels over a long period of time prior to the Second World War that Nordic political cooperation could be strongly institutionalized in the early developing years of divisive Cold War mentality and international relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the countries still relate differently to both NATO and the EU (only Denmark, Finland and Sweden are EU member states; Denmark, Iceland and Norway are the only Nordic members of NATO; and Finland is alone in having introduced the euro), but a common Nordic identity prevails and is given outlet both in common Nordic and other international fora. Nordic unity on issues concerning human rights, welfare and politics is often expressed through the UN and other international organizations. In terms of the development of the welfare state in the Nordic countries, the period since the early 1930s can be characterized as one of domestic consensus-​building and common Nordic identity-​building. These two elements are crucial pillars in the Nordic model.

Social and political stability One final reflection should be noted, namely that the particular Nordic combination of stateness, universalism, equality, forms of governance and cross-​national cooperation, taken as a whole, distinguishes the Nordic welfare states from other Western welfare states. This combination of political organization, policies, institutions, principles and social and economic outcomes, has –​compared to other Western countries and types of welfare state –​not inhibited long-​term economic development and growth (as measured by growth of GDP and GDP per capita) and has been conducive to high levels of trust in government institutions, including trust in an efficient and effective public administration together with high levels of social and political stability. Comprehensive, egalitarian and relatively generous welfare states can go hand in hand with efficient and productive market economies.

Middle-​class societies The figures for economic growth in the Nordic countries are impressive. Over the course of the last five decades, these countries have joined the richest countries in the world. Norway, Sweden and Denmark belong to the top-​ten countries in the OECD area measured in terms of GDP per capita. The economic development in Finland has not been as rapid and has suffered through a greater number of crises. Especially during the last decade, there has been no economic growth. However, its GDP per capita still exceeds the average of the OECD countries (see Table 2.3). The rapid economic growth, fast changes in the division of labour, the dramatic increase in the number of highly educated people and increased services offered by the welfare state have transformed the class structure of the Nordic societies in a fundamental way. The period in which the welfare state was constructed was dominated by rather unitary social classes: impoverished farmers, impoverished workers and less-​than-​affluent urbanites. In recent decades, the Nordic countries have developed to resemble the other advanced European countries, where upper and lower white-​collar employees dominate the class structure. Poor farmers have disappeared, and there has been a clear decline in the share of the economically active population doing manual labour (see Alestalo et al. 2009; Leiulfsrud et al. 2005). In the defence of his reasoning on welfare state regimes, Esping-​Andersen has stated that his typology heavily rests on the historical roots of the different welfare regimes. The notion of a unique ‘social democratic’ welfare state regime rests on the high popular support for social 19

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S. Kuhnle and M. Alestalo Table 2.1 The share of votes for social democratic parties in parliamentary elections in the Nordic countries, 1980–​2015, averages by decade (%) Decade

1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

Country Denmark

Finland

Norway

Sweden

30.9 36.0 26.8 25.6

25.4 24.4 23.0 17.8

37.4 36.0 28.5 33.1

44.5 39.8 37.5 30.9

Sources: Election Resources in the Internet. www.electionresources.org (accessed 6 July 2015); Norwegian elections in 1981: Nohlen and Stöver 2010.

democratic parties in Scandinavia in the interwar period, although there also are strong liberal roots in the Nordic welfare state (Esping-​Andersen 1999: 78–​82). Most notably, the structural changes in the class structures have reduced the electoral support of social democrats as well as that of the more leftist parties. Since the 1980s, the social democratic parties have clearly lost momentum. The most serious decline has taken place in Sweden, where the social democrats dominated the elections in the 1980s. Three decades later their share has fallen below one third of the electorate. Norwegian social democrats have remained in a more stable position. The decline of social democrats has been extensive in Denmark and Finland (see Table 2.1). This is not to deny the important role of social democrats in the construction of the Nordic model. Over time, many of the other parties have come to embrace the welfare state. As Erik Allardt (1984: 182) somewhat cynically stated back in the 1980s: ‘All major parties in the Nordic countries today support the social democratic pre-​war conception of the welfare state.’ More recently –​despite numerous conflicts regarding the welfare state in the Nordic countries –​we have seen how the welfare state has changed from a political programme and an ideological foundation of reforms into a collectively agreed-​upon societal institution and thereafter into an institution of its own.

Current reform trends The Nordic countries are traditionally open economies and therefore not foreign to economic globalization. Some would say that this is one of the reasons why ‘strong’ welfare states have developed in this region of Europe (Katzenstein 1985). The globalization and internationalization of the economy has increased since the end of the Cold War and generally left national economies more vulnerable to developments in the international economy, as demonstrated by the recent global financial crisis. The Nordic countries have also become more exposed than previously to international economic development, but the existence of well-​developed welfare states, with the characteristics referred to, may in fact be a comparative advantage if a crisis looms. The welfare state can serve as a buffer towards the risk of sudden increases in poverty and income and social inequality together with the political tensions likely to otherwise follow from such social upheaval. Table 2.2 provides a good illustration of the buffer function of the welfare state. The figures describing the real growth of social spending illustrate almost constant growth (Alestalo et  al. 2009). On the basis of the GDP proportions of the social expenditure, the picture 20

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The modern Scandinavian welfare state Table 2.2  Social spending as a percentage of GDP in the Nordic countries, 1980–​2014 Year

Denmark

Finland

Norway

Sweden

OECD total

1980 1990 2000 2010 2014

24.4 25.0 26.0 29.9 30.1

18.0 23.8 23.3 28.7 31.0

16.3 21.9 20.8 22.4 22.0

26.0 28.5 28.2 27.9 28.1

15.4 17.5 18.6 21.7 21.6

Source: Social expenditure: http://​stats.oecd.org/​viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=SOCK_​AGG&lang=en (accessed 3 July 2015); GDP: https//​data.oecd.org/​gross-​domestic-​product-​gdp.htm (accessed 7 July 2015).

Table 2.3  GDP per capita and social spending among the top OECD countries in 2014 Country

GDP per capita (US dollars)

Social spending as % the GDP

Social spending per capita (USD), index OECD average = 100)

Luxembourg Norway Switzerland United States Ireland Netherlands Austria Sweden Denmark Finland OECD total

93,261 64,837 57,744 54,640 47,796 47,635 46,151 45,113 44,835 39,765 38,898

23.5 22.0 19.4 19.2 21.0 24.7 28.4 28.1 30.1 31.0 21.6

260 169 133 129 119 140 156 151 161 147 100

Source: Table 2.2 and https//​data.oecd.org (accessed 11 July 2015).

becomes more complicated (see Alestalo et al. 2009). The development in Finland offers a case in point. During its long economic recession in the 2000s and 2010s, Finland achieved a Nordic record in the GDP proportion of social spending. As figures in Table  2.3 point out, however, its real expenditure was below that of the other Nordics. In 2014, Norway had the lowest GDP proportion but in absolute terms its social expenditure was the highest. Therefore, the analysis of the development of social expenditure claims both of these indicators. Other challenges facing the Nordics and other welfare states include the changing composition of the population given the ageing population and low fertility rates. But demographic changes seem to be less challenging in the Nordics than in many other European and East Asian nations. Migration patterns are a bigger ‘unknown’, and large-​scale immigration can, if it occurs, pose a great challenge for the welfare state as such, for not to mention integration and social cohesion, but it is a question of what kind of immigration (labour immigrants, skilled or non-​ skilled, asylum-​seekers, immigration for permanent residency or for short-​term labour? From where? And so forth) when assessing the impact or significance for the organization, financing and provision of welfare state services. 21

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Immigration policy has become an increasingly sensitive political issue. Social inclusion and integration policies have been successful in many countries, but many problems remain and have dramatically impacted the political system.The rise of populist parties in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s was largely in response to taxation. Finland and Sweden later also saw the rise of their own populist movements. Throughout Scandinavia, the open criticism of immigration policies has achieved increased emphasis in the voices of the populist parties. The universalistic welfare schemes –​with similar welfare benefits and services for the native-​born and immigrants alike –​have been questioned (Hort 2014: 154). High flows of immigrants, especially since the autumn of 2015, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, do not make the political decision-​ making easier in this respect and have already had a negative effect on the long-​standing Nordic (and European) open-​borders policy. Trends towards the increased privatization of welfare (pensions, health, social care) as a supplement (or alternative) to public welfare provision can imply a development towards mixed welfare and a social division of welfare in the future, which may most likely have implications for both ‘the politics of welfare’ and the format of state welfare state institutions (less universal? less generous?). Conversely, increasing inequality is unpopular among the majority of voters and government, and parties may be forced to devise policies to modify inequalities. The ‘Europeanization’ of social policy represents another challenge –​for better or worse, also for political decision-​making, since it may mean less national autonomy in the field of social policy. General reform tendencies in Europe over the last two decades are evident in the fields of pensions, health policy and labour market reforms, with greater emphasis on individual responsibility for future pensions; more co-​payment in medical or health care; more targeting of welfare provision; and greater emphasis on the so-​called ‘work line’ –​activation policy with efforts to get unemployed and partially disabled persons back into the labour market. On the other hand,‘family policies’ making it possible to reconcile work and family (paid parental leave, childcare, eldercare) have expanded in most European countries –​and beyond Europe. The welfare state in the Nordic countries and elsewhere has not been substantially deconstructed but rather reconstructed with a variety of combinations of cuts to benefit (‘less of the same’) and stricter eligibility criteria for receiving benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits, increased retirement age).

Future of the Nordic model The Nordic welfare model is not static. It is continuously reforming, adapting to changing demographic, economic and political challenges, but still retaining the fundamental characteristics as outlined above. Nordic welfare states have had their ups and downs over the last half century, but they have appeared to be fairly robust and viable over the long term. The Nordics deconstructed neither their welfare states nor their public sectors nor their tax base in the heyday of neo-​liberalism and the ‘Washington consensus’. A politically strong, normative commitment to the welfare state exists together with a high degree of consensus regarding its desirability among the main actors. Comparatively speaking, there is high trust in government institutions among ordinary citizens, which reinforces the legitimacy of the welfare state construction.

Note 1 Parts of the text in this section build on Alestalo et al. (2009).

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References Abrahamson, P. (2002) The Welfare Modelling Business. Social Policy & Administration 33(4): 394–​415. Alestalo, M. and Flora, P. (1994) Scandinavia: Welfare States in the Periphery –​Peripheral Welfare States. In: Alestalo, M., Allardt, E., Rychard, A. and Wesolowski, W. (eds), The Transformation of Europe: Social Conditions and Consequences. Warsaw: IFiS Publishers. Alestalo, M. and Uusitalo, H. (1992) Social Expenditure: A Decompositional Approach. In: Kolberg, J. E. (ed.), The Study of Welfare State Regimes. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Alestalo, M., Hort, S. E. O. and Kuhnle, S. (2009) The Nordic Model: Conditions, Origins, Outcomes and Lessons. Hertie School of Governance, working paper no. 41. Berlin: Hertie School of Governance. Allardt, E. (1984) Representative Government in a Bureaucratic Age. Daedalus 113(1): 169–​197. Allardt, E. (1986) The Civic Conception of the Welfare State. In: Rose, R. and Shiratori, R. (eds), The Welfare State East and West. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arts,W. A. and Gelissen, J. (2010) Models of the Welfare State. In: Castles, F., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Borrås, S. and Jacobsson, K. (2004) The Open Method of Co-​ordination and New Governance in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy 11(2): 185–​202. Castles, F., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (2010) Introduction. In: Castles, F., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Childs, M. (1936) Sweden: The Middle Way. New Haven: Yale University Press. Cox, R. (2004) The Path-​Dependency of an Idea:  Why Scandinavian Welfare States Remain Distinct. Social Policy and Administration 38(2): 204–​219. Elder, N., Thomas, A. H. and Arter, D. (1988) The Consensual Democracies: The Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States. London: Blackwell. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. New York: Oxford University Press. Flora, P. (ed.) (1986) Growth to Limits:  The Western European Welfare States Since World War II. Vols 1–​4. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Flora, P. and Alber, J. (1981) Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe. In: Flora, P. and Heidenheimer, A. J. (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Fritzell, J. and Lundberg, O. (2005) Fighting Inequalities in Health and Income: One Important Road to Welfare and Social Development. In:  Kangas, O. and Palme, J. (eds), Social Policy and Economic Development in the Nordic Countries. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hilson, M. (2008) The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945. London: Reaktion Books. Hort, S. E. O. (2014) Social Policy, Welfare State, and Civil Society in Sweden, Vol. II. The Lost World of Social Democracy 1988–​2014. Lund: Arkiv Academic Press. Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets:  Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press. Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (2005) The Nordic Welfare Model and the Idea of Universalism. In: Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (eds), Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience. London: Routledge. Korpi, W. (1978) The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism:  Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Kuhnle, S. and Hort, S. E.O. (2004) The Developmental Welfare State in Scandinavia: Lessons for the Developing World. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Kuhnle, S. and Sander, A. (2010) The Emergence of the Western Welfare State. In: Castles, F., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leibfried, S. and Mau, S. (2008) Introduction. In: Kiebfried, S. and May, S. (eds), Welfare States: Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Leiulfsrud, H., Bison, I. and Jensberg, H. (2005) Social Class in Europe. European Social Survey 2002/​3. Available at: www.europeansocialsurvey.org/​docs/​methodology/​ESS1_​social_​class.pdf [Accessed 14 July 2016]. Lewis, J. (1992) Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes. Journal of European Social Policy 2(3): 159–​173.

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S. Kuhnle and M. Alestalo Lindbom, A. and Rothstein, B. (2004) The Mysterious Survival of the Swedish Welfare State. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2–​5 September. Mimeo. Marx, K. (1852 [1979]) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In: Marx, K. and Engels, F., Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works,Vol. II. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Nohlen, D. and Stöver, P. (eds) (2010) Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Nyström, P. (1989) Välfärdsstatens styrningsmekanismer. In:  Nyström, P. (ed.), Historia och biografi. Lund: Arkiv Academic Press. Petersen, K. (2006) Constructing Nordic Welfare:  Nordic Social Political Cooperation 1919–​ 1955. In: Christiansen, N. F., Petersen, K., Edling, N. and Haave, P. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. Ringen, S. and Uusitalo, H. (1992) Income Distribution and Redistribution in the Nordic Welfare States. In: Kolberg, J. E. (ed.), The Study of Welfare Regimes. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Rustow, D. (1955) The Politics of Compromise. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sainsbury, D. (1999) Gender and Welfare State Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Titmuss, R. M. (1974) Social Policy. London: Allen & Unwin. Wilensky, H. and Lebeaux, C. N. (1958) Industrial Society and Social Welfare. New  York:  Russel Sage Foundation.

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3 THE EGALITARIAN PARADISE? Olof Bäckman and Kenneth Nelson

Introduction The egalitarian structure of the Nordic countries is internationally renowned and often considered a salient feature of the so-​called Nordic welfare model (Kautto et al. 1999). Although the basic characteristics of the Nordic welfare states are subject to ongoing discussion, international comparisons generally address the unique shape of the Nordic income distributions and how the Nordics have organized the welfare state (Bäckman 2009; Brandolini and Smeeding 2007; Esping-​Andersen 1990; Fritzell and Ritakallio 2010; Kildal and Kuhnle 2005; Korpi and Palme 1998). The particular mix of low income inequality and effective redistribution programmes has historically been a prominent element in the Nordic welfare states and often considered a salient feature of the social-​democratic regime as described by Esping-​Andersen (1990) in his famous three-​fold categorization of welfare capitalism. For much of the post-​war period, the Nordics have been at the top of the equality league, actually forming a family of their own in terms of (the lack of) income inequality and poverty (Fritzell et al. 2012). Similar to many other countries, however, the Nordics have experienced major challenges in recent decades, caused partly by increased fiscal constraints, the return of mass unemployment and demographic developments, such as ageing populations and immigration. In this period, income differences have widened in the Nordic countries and social policies have been scaled back.Whether or not the Nordic welfare states still offer their citizens an egalitarian paradise has not been sufficiently documented. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the egalitarian structure of the Nordic countries and investigate how income distributions have changed along with the re-​organization of the welfare state since the early 1990s. In this time, the Nordics, Finland and Sweden in particular, entered a deep financial crisis that appears to have marked an end to Nordic exceptionalism, both in terms of income inequalities (OECD 2008) and generous welfare benefits (Ferrarini et al. 2013). We have structured the chapter as follows. First we describe the overall developments in the Nordic income distributions, focusing on inequality and poverty trends. We then use more recent empirical data and analyse income differences across particular risk groups. The development of the Nordic income distributions is then situated against the backdrop of changes introduced to major cash benefit programmes. The chapter concludes with the discussion of our findings. 25

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Income distribution trends Many affluent countries have become more unequal over the past two decades, including the Nordic countries. Although the Nordics remain characterized by comparatively compressed income distributions, it is striking to note that inequality has increased more in the Nordic countries than anywhere else since the 2000s (OECD 2011). This section takes a closer look at this increased income inequality, going beyond country averages and exploring both the similarities and differences between these countries. Since we are interested in long-​term income distribution trends, we use data from the Cross-​National Data Center in Luxembourg (LIS), which provides harmonized income survey data approximately for every fifth year since the early 1980s for many countries. We use LIS data to cover the period 1990–​2010 in the following. We are thus able to follow the development of income inequality in the Nordics from the fiscal crisis in the early 1990s until the first years of the great recession in 2008. Unfortunately, the Swedish data in LIS are only available through the 2005 wave. We have therefore imputed 2010 inequality data for Sweden based on income data from two waves (2005 and 2010) of the EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-​SILC). Iceland is not included in LIS and is therefore excluded in this analysis of long-​term income distribution trends. Figure 3.1a–​b shows the Gini coefficient and the EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate in the Nordic countries.1 We also show income inequality as an average for a larger group of European countries.2 The egalitarian structure of the Nordic income distributions is clearly apparent in Figure 3.1a, which describes the developments in the Gini coefficient for the period 1990–​2010. Similar to previous observations, the dispersion of disposable income has widened in the Nordics. The most dramatic development occurred in Finland, where income inequality increased by about 25 per cent, from a Gini coefficient of 0.2 in 1990 to just above 0.25 in 2010. In Denmark and Sweden, the Gini coefficient declined during the financial crisis in the early 1990s, and here income inequality first increased in the second half of the 1990s. Despite increased inequality, however, plenty of leeway remains before the Nordic income distributions match those of (a) Gini coefficient EU

(b) EU at-risk-of-poverty rate 18

0.30

17 16

0.28

15 14

0.26

13 0.24

Denmark Finland Norway Sweden European average* Sweden (EU-SILC)

12 11

0.22

10 9

0.20 ~1990 ~1995 ~2000 ~2005 ~2010

8 ~1990

~1995

~2000

~2005

~2010

Figure 3.1  The Gini coefficient and the EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate in the Nordic countries and other European countries, approx. 1990–​2010 Note: * excludes the Nordic countries. Source: LIS and EU-​SILC (own estimates).

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The egalitarian paradise?

many other European countries.The income inequality in our larger group of European countries evidently exceeds that of the Nordic countries. From this perspective, we may very well conclude that the Nordics continue to perform like an egalitarian paradise. Averages conceal individual differences, however, and it is possible to find European countries that are at least as egalitarian as the Nordic countries. Belgium and the Netherlands are two examples of countries where income inequality is close to the Nordics. Increases in Gini coefficients over the last two decades are often explained by the rapid growth of top incomes and capital gains (Atkinson and Piketty 2007). By excluding the incomes at the very top of the distribution, we have reduced these effects somewhat, although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that much of the increased income inequality is due to capital gains and developments in high-​end incomes. In order to reach a more complete understanding of the egalitarian structure of the Nordic countries, it is therefore necessary to focus more explicitly on the changes in the lower part of the income distribution and analyse the developments in the EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate. Relative poverty measurements are less sensitive to changes in top incomes than the Gini coefficient and overall measurements of income inequality. Similar to the Gini coefficient, the results in Figure 3.1b show how relative income poverty has increased in the Nordic countries, at least since the mid-​1990s. Despite differences between the individual countries, the Nordics are also more egalitarian than many other European countries in this regard. They are evidently getting closer to the European average, however, where the relative income poverty in many countries has been rather stable since the mid-​1990s. The reduction in relative income poverty in Denmark, Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s has mostly resulted from substantial declines in median incomes following the financial crisis (Fritzell et al. 2012). This rather paradoxical result highlights the importance of complementary approaches when analysing poverty developments in periods of deep economic crisis (Kangas and Ritakallio 1998). Alongside reductions in relative income poverty in both Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s, consumption-​based poverty estimates did in fact increase (Kautto 2000; Palme et al. 2002). It is interesting to note that increases to the Gini coefficient in Norway are not mirrored in poverty statistics, which is most likely due to developments in capital gains and top incomes. Aaberge and Atkinson (2010), for example, reveal a dramatic increase in top income shares following the major Norwegian tax reform in 1992.

Old and new poverty The Nordic welfare states were largely developed over a period when full employment was a realizable element of macroeconomic policy and most citizens qualified for earnings-​related compensation in major social insurance schemes. This was largely still the case in 1990, when Esping-​Andersen’s seminal book was first published. However, the 1990s crisis that was soon to come altered these conditions substantially. The Nordic labour markets have thus changed considerably since the heyday of welfare state development in the decades immediately following the Second World War. The smooth transition into work for new entrants into the labour market, which was an implicit, built-​in assumption in the Nordic welfare model, now seems to be an historical artefact. As in many other countries, low-​skilled peripheral occupations in the Nordic labour markets are now characterized by increased job insecurity and restricted access to social security, similar to what Standing (2011) described as the ‘precariat’.While the Nordics have traditionally been successful in combating the ‘old’ risks emanating from temporary interruption or retirement from paid work, concerns are sometimes raised in connection with ‘new’ social risks that have emerged alongside post-​industrialization (Taylor-​Gooby 2004). While 27

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Timonen (2004) argues that the Nordic welfare model is well equipped to address new social risks, Fritzell et al. (2012) show that, in reality, poverty risks for immigrants and young adults are either on par with or higher than those of many other European countries. This section goes beyond an analysis of the overall trends and focuses more closely on the poverty risks in different groups characterized by old and new risks. Figure 3.2a–​d shows the EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate among elderly people, immigrants, young adults and ‘lone parents’ in the Nordic countries and as an average of our larger group of European countries. The analysis is based on EU-​SILC income data and restricted to the years 2003 and 2012. Here, we are also able to include Iceland. We will start by discussing the relative income poverty among the elderly, as shown in Figure 3.2a. Old age is conventionally regarded as an old risk that has been highly prevalent throughout the entire post-​war period. In 2003, poverty among the elderly was clearly lower in the Nordics than in many other European countries. By 2012, the egalitarian structure in these countries had become less pronounced. In both Finland and Sweden, relative income poverty in old age now exceeds the European average, which dropped substantially over the ten-​year period analysed here. Moreover, Sweden is the only Nordic country with an increase in old-​age poverty over this period. It is worth noting that among the non-​Nordic countries, only Belgium and the UK have higher old-​age poverty rates than Sweden (not shown). Contrary to the 28

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The egalitarian paradise?

developments in Sweden, relative income poverty among the elderly declined substantially in Denmark, Iceland and Norway, whereas old-​age poverty rates in Finland almost show a standstill. The old-​age poverty rates in Iceland are particularly low. Ageing populations pose considerable financial pressure on the Nordic economies. Another topical challenge is the growing influx of refugee immigration. Figure 3.2b illustrates the poverty rates among immigrants. Here, we have restricted the analysis to people of working age (27–​54 years).3 It should be noted that poverty estimates are too crude for an overall analysis of how successful countries are at integrating immigrants into society. For example, country of origin, residential time and the reason for immigration are all factors that seriously influence poverty risks. Both the number and composition of new people moving into the country are also closely related to immigration policy, which nowadays differs significantly between the Nordic countries as well as across Europe as a whole. Among the Nordics, Denmark and Finland are often considered to have more restrictive immigration policies than Norway and Sweden; at least with respect to asylum seekers.4 Until the autumn of 2015, Swedish immigration policies were among the most liberal in Europe.5 Except for Sweden, all of the Nordics for which we have data have relative income poverty rates among immigrants that are lower than our European average.6 It should be noted, however, that several of the non-​Nordic countries have immigrant poverty rates that are lower than in Denmark, Finland and Norway. Included in this category are Germany, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. The financial situation of young adults is evidently problematic in many of the Nordic countries, particularly in Denmark and Norway, where relative income poverty among young adults (20–​24 years) increased between 2003 and 2012. In comparison, relative income poverty among young adults has been fairly stable in Finland and Sweden. Relative income poverty is more widespread among young adults in the Nordic countries than in many other European countries, although Finland and Iceland are on par or even below our European benchmark. Here again, some words of caution are motivated when poverty estimates are interpreted cross-​ nationally. The Nordics are renowned for how their youth leave the parental home at early ages (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011). The Nordic youth thus tend to form their own households at an earlier age than in many other European countries, where children tend to continue living in the parental household and share their income for much longer periods. Another issue concerns the treatment of students and apprentices in poverty analyses. Although we analyse people aged 20–​24, there may still be many students and apprentices in this age group. A low income among those who are pursuing an education or receiving training may obviously be problematic, although schooling in this age group is voluntary and can be regarded as an investment in future income.When those in education are excluded from the analysis, relative income poverty among young adults in the Nordic countries is reduced substantially and much closer to our European average (not shown). Lone parents have comparatively low poverty risks in the Nordic countries. In our analyses, the overall pattern suggests that Nordic poverty rates are well below those of many other European countries. Despite this positive testimonial regarding the Nordic welfare states, the overall trend is more disappointing. Except for Denmark, relative income poverty among lone parents has increased in recent years. In both Norway and Sweden, the increase in relative income poverty has been quite substantial. In 2013, the poverty rate among lone parents in Sweden actually exceeded the European average. It should be noted, however, that poverty estimates among lone parents in Sweden are very sensitive to the income threshold used in poverty measurement. At lower poverty thresholds, the Swedish lone-​parent poverty rate is below the European average (not shown). 29

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Developments in social protection The analysis of income distributions above revealed how the Nordic countries remain highly egalitarian, also by European standards. However, this special trademark of the Nordic welfare model has become less distinctive along with substantial increases in both income inequality and relative income poverty. Although parts of this widening of the Nordic income distribution are due to developments in top incomes, there are also significant changes in the lower tail of the distribution. For low-​end income groups, changes to welfare state provisions are crucial determinants of material well-​being. In order to provide a more comprehensive account of the current state of the Nordic welfare model, we will here situate the analysis of income distributions against the changes introduced to social policy. The Nordic countries are renowned for their comprehensive welfare states, which provide almost universal access to high quality benefits and services. As already mentioned, however, beginning in the early 1990s, the Nordics have moved away from the signifying features of the social democratic regime described by Esping-​Andersen (1990). Nearly all of the areas of the Nordic welfare states have been subject to re-​organization, albeit with substantial cross-​national differences. The changes introduced to cash benefits are perhaps most relevant in this regard. Figure 3.3a–​e shows the net replacement rates in major cash benefit schemes in the Nordic countries and as averages of our larger group of European countries for the period 1990–​2015. The data emanate from the Social Policy Indicators Database (SPIN) and show the net benefit as the percentage of the net wage for stylized households.7 The development of cash benefits in the Nordic countries over the period 1990–​2015 is generally characterized by stability and decline, at least when programmes are evaluated in terms of their generosity. A few success stories are observed, particularly in the area of paid parental leave, where benefits in Denmark and Norway have substantially improved. Here, the Nordics evidently perform better than many other European countries. Despite a nearly constant erosion of social assistance since 1990, the Nordic countries also score higher than our European average when it comes to minimum income benefits. In the other programmes, however, the distinctiveness of the generous Nordic welfare model is less clear. In unemployment insurance, the Nordics even underperform in relation to the European average, whereas in the remaining programmes the Nordic countries are scattered around our European benchmark in a seemingly random fashion. The Swedish development is noteworthy and provides numerous examples of substantial cutbacks to income replacement. Income replacements in unemployment insurance, old-​age pensions and social assistance net replacement are down by one-​third. Cutbacks to paid parental leave are also substantive, but here Sweden is still comparatively generous, surpassed only by Norway. It is not possible to provide a detailed explanation here of the developments in individual countries. It is worth noting, however, that Sweden already cut formal levels of income replacement in social insurance during the financial crisis of the early 1990s, after which time income ceilings for benefit purposes lagged behind wage increases. In unemployment insurance, this hollowing out of income replacement continued well into the 2000s, not least as part of the policy packages for increasing the work incentives adopted by the centre-​r ight government between 2006 and 2014 (Ferrarini et al. 2012). The sharp decline in old-​age pension net replacement rates in the mid-​1990s coincides with the introduction of a new Swedish pension system with notionally defined contributions as a principal component (Lundberg 2003). The downward trend in social assistance is mainly due to a combination of price indexing and changes introduced to reference budgets (Kuivalainen and Nelson 2012). It is notoriously difficult to link policy changes to developments in income distributions. Nonetheless, it is evident 30

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that the overall increase in income inequality and relative income poverty in Sweden coincided with major cutbacks in cash benefits. One example is, of course, the increase in relative income poverty among elderly people and the simultaneous trend of deteriorated old-​age pensions in Sweden. Cutbacks to income replacement in the other Nordic countries have been less severe than in Sweden, mostly in the range of 5–​15 per cent of pre-​1990 crisis levels. We only find a few instances of clear improvements in income replacement. The development of paid parental 31

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leave in Denmark and Norway are two examples, another one being the Norwegian old-​age pension scheme. Norway appears to have the most generous contemporary welfare model, ranking highest not only among the Nordic countries but also in a European context in terms of income replacement in unemployment and sickness insurance, as well as in paid parental leave. In old-​age pensions, income replacement in Norway is also fairly generous and on par with the newly reformed pension scheme in Finland. The gradual increase in Norwegian old-​ age pensions seems to be mirrored in income statistics in so far as the old-​age poverty rate in Norway declined substantially between 2003 and 2012. Compared to social insurance and paid parental leave, it should be noted that Norwegian social assistance benefits are fairly low. This result should be interpreted cautiously, however, as Norwegian social assistance is calculated on the basis of national guidelines rates, which may differ from the actual local rates. Nonetheless, our data quite clearly support previous observations that the Norwegian welfare state nowadays is quite special, not least since revenues from the oil and gas sector eased the financial pressures for major institutional change (Kuhnle 2007). For Iceland, we only have preliminary data for 2005 and 2010, and we totally lack data on income replacement in paid parental leave. Regarding developments in cash benefits, Iceland has historically been lagging behind the other Nordics but has been catching up in recent years (Olafsdottir and Olafsson 2014). Our data support this observation. Income replacement in unemployment insurance, old-​age pensions and social assistance in Iceland was substantially strengthened between 2005 and 2010. Unemployment insurance net replacement rates in Iceland are now on par with those of Denmark and Sweden. In terms of the generosity of old-​age pensions and social assistance, Iceland holds the top position in the Nordic welfare league.While these observations should be interpreted cautiously due to the preliminary nature of Icelandic data in SPIN, we would like to recapitulate that Iceland outperformed the other Nordics quite substantially in terms of relative income poverty among elderly and young adults. Since young people generally have more difficulty qualifying for earnings-​related social insurance benefits, it is reasonable to assume that social assistance is particularly important in this age group.8

Conclusions: egalitarian paradise lost? The Nordic countries are often described as small, open economies that are vulnerable to external pressure caused by globalization, technological change and international business cycles. From this perspective, the increase in income inequality and relative income poverty in the Nordics comes as no surprise. Industries have been closing down in all of the Nordic countries coupled with an increased outsourcing of unskilled jobs and an increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour; all factors expected to exacerbate inequality (Atkinson 2015). Meanwhile, unemployment remains stubbornly high, particularly in Finland and Sweden. The Nordic countries are not unique in this context. In Europe, we find several countries with small, open economies that should also be heavily exposed to major structural shifts. Many of these economies have not witnessed a corresponding increase in income inequality, something that brings interest to the link between the egalitarian structure of the Nordic income distributions and social policy developments; or simply the changing nature of the Nordic welfare model. In this chapter, we have analysed the Nordic income distributions against the backdrop of changes introduced to major redistribution programmes. Much of the empirical analysis concerned changes in the lower part of the income distributions, where the role of social policies becomes particularly important. In the Nordics, poverty among people in the prime of life has less to do with inadequate wages and more with a lack of earnings, either due to unemployment 32

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or underemployment (Halleröd et  al. 2015). For these impoverished persons, redistribution programmes will obviously add substantially to disposable income. The Nordic welfare model is re-​organizing: major cash benefits are being scaled back and income inequalities are on the rise. Moving beyond such broad characterizations of the Nordic welfare states, however, it is actually possible to find examples of both good and poor outcomes. At aggregate level, the Nordics continue to perform better than many other European countries. From a European perspective, the Nordic countries still have lower levels of overall income inequality, regardless of whether focusing on Gini coefficients or on EU at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rates. However, cracks in the facade appear when the focus shifts to changes over time or when poverty rates are disaggregated by risk groups. Here, the egalitarian structure of the Nordic welfare model becomes less distinct. We observe this tendency most clearly in the development of relative income poverty, where substantial increases in the Nordics are narrowing the distance to other European welfare states. While it is tempting to lump all of the Nordic countries into a single category, it is important to emphasize the substantial intra-​Nordic variation, both in terms of inequality outcomes and the generosity of social policy. Finland and Sweden in particular were hit hard by the deep financial crisis in the 1990s, with severe economic consequences for groups who already had a weak position in the labour market, such as immigrants, youths and ‘lone parents’ (Palme et  al. 2002). In the 2000s, it is more difficult to identify particularly bad performers among the Nordics, although relative income poverty continued to increase, primarily in Finland and Sweden. For the latter part of the period 1990–​2010, we were able to analyse poverty trends by population risk groups (elderly, immigrants, young adults, lone parents). Almost no Nordic country succeeds at protecting all of these risk groups from poverty. With the exception of Iceland, it is possible to find at least one risk group where the poverty rate is on par or even exceeds that of many other European countries. In terms of poverty trends, the developments among young adults and lone parents are particularly worrying, where several Nordic countries display substantial increases in economic hardships. Here, the Nordics seem to perform worse than elsewhere in Europe. However, there is little to indicate that the Nordic countries are particularly bad performers in meeting the challenges of immigration. In Sweden, a country with a particularly massive influx of refugees, the at-​r isk-​of-​poverty rate exceeds that of many other European countries, but only marginally.The more restrictive immigration policies in Denmark –​and to some extent also in Finland –​may have reduced this particular poverty problem slightly. However, developments in Norway indicate that a greater influx of immigrants does not necessarily translate into higher poverty rates. In Norway, the risk of poverty among immigrants actually declined slightly from 2003 to 2012 despite having more liberal immigration policies than both Denmark and Finland. Parallel to the increases in income inequality and relative income poverty, the Nordic welfare states provide several examples of major institutional change, often in the downward direction. The development of cash benefits in Sweden is striking in this regard, where income replacement in major redistribution programmes has deteriorated substantially. In an international perspective, it is difficult to find retrenchment patterns in income replacement resembling those of Sweden. Even if we leave Sweden aside, however, the Nordic exceptionalism with regard to benefit generosity is clearly overstated. Here, the contemporary Nordic countries stand out only in the areas of paid parental leave and social assistance. For other major social benefit programmes, the status of the Nordic welfare model is less superior to those of many other European countries. Ironically, Sweden is the country that acted as the archetypical Nordic welfare state for several years but now seems furthest away from Esping-​Andersen’s (1990) social 33

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democratic regime type, whereas Iceland, which was not even included in Esping-​Andersen’s categorization, is closest to these configurations. The development of the Nordic income distributions and the social policy cuts obviously raise questions about the persistence of the egalitarian structures of the Nordic countries. Clearly, the Nordic welfare states are changing in directions that appear to be drifting away from an ‘egalitarian paradise’. Several of the distinguishing features of the Nordic welfare model remain, however, and it would therefore be inaccurate to frame developments in terms of an ‘egalitarian paradise lost’. It seems more appropriate to conclude that, in terms of egalitarian structures, the Nordics remain different, although the unique characteristics of the Nordic welfare model have become less apparent.

Notes 1 The Gini coefficient is an often-​used measure of income inequality with values ranging from 0–​1.Values close to 0 indicate that all individuals have almost exactly the same income, whereas values close to 1 show that income concentrates among a few individuals. The EU at-​risk-​of-​poverty rate is a relative poverty measure, as the income threshold is set to 60 per cent of the national median household disposable income. In all of the analyses of income distributions, we have adjusted disposable income for economies of scale within households. Here, disposable income is divided by a weight where the first adult receives a value of 1, each additional person aged 14 and over receives a value of 0.5, and each child younger than age 14 receives a value of 0.3. Following the recommended LIS procedures, we have excluded the top 1 per cent and the bottom 1 per cent incomes. 2 Here, we have included all of the so-​called old EU member states for which LIS provides data, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The Nordic countries are of course excluded from this European reference. 3 Here, immigration is defined in terms of birth country. We do not distinguish between immigration into Europe and immigration between countries within Europe. In order to exclude, as far as possible, students and people in early retirement, we have defined the working age group as those aged 27–​54 years. 4 Both Iceland and Norway are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and thereby bound by the same free movement of labour as the EU member states. 5 The Swedish government made temporary adjustments to its immigration policy in 2015 following the major refugee crisis in Europe. 6 In EU-​SILC, data on immigrants are missing for Iceland. 7 Details about measurement and data are available online (www.sofi.su.se/​spin) and in Ferrarini et al. (2013). 8 In all of the Nordic countries, eligibility for earnings-​related social insurance benefits are based on contributions paid into the scheme in one way or the other, either by the insured individuals themselves or by their employers.

References Aaberge, R. and Atkinson, A. B. (2010) Top Incomes in Norway. In: Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty,T. (eds), Top Incomes: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Atkinson, A. B. (2015) Inequality: What Can Be Done? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (2007) Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between Continental European and English-​Speaking Countries.Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bäckman, O. (2009) Institutions, Structures and Poverty: A Comparative Study of 16 Countries, 1980–​ 2000. European Sociological Review 25(2): 251–​264. Brandolini, A. and Smeeding,T. M. (2007) Inequality: International Evidence. In: Durlauf, S. N. and Blume, L. E. (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buchmann, M. C. and Kriesi, I. (2011) Transition to Adulthood in Europe. Annual Review of Sociology 37: 481–​503. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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The egalitarian paradise? Ferrarini, T. et  al. (2012) Sveriges socialförsäkringar i jämförande perspektiv. En institutionell analys av sjuk-​, arbetsskade-​och arbetslöshetsförsäkringarna i 18 OECD länder 1930 till 2010. Underlagsrapport nr. 10 till den parlamentariska socialförsäkringsutredningen, S 2010:04. Stockholm: Social Ministry. Ferrarini,T. et al. (2013) Social Citizenship Rights and Social Insurance Replacement Rate Validity: Pitfalls and Possibilities. Journal of European Public Policy 20(9): 1251–​1266. Fritzell, J. and Ritakallio,V.-​M. (2010) Societal Shifts and Changed Patterns of Poverty. International Journal of Social Welfare 19: S25–​S41. Fritzell, J., Bäckman, O. and Ritakallio, V.-​M. (2012) Income Inequality and Poverty:  Are the Nordic Countries Still a Family of Their Own? In:  Kvist, J., Fritzell, K., Hvinden, B.  and Kanga, O.  (eds), Changing Social Equality: The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century. Bristol: Policy Press. Halleröd, B., Ekbrand, H. and Bengtsson, M. (2015) In-​Work Poverty and Labour MarketTrajectories: Poverty Risks among the Working Population in 22 European Countries. Journal of European Social Policy 25(2): 473–​488. Kangas, O. and Ritakallio, V.-​ M. (1998) Different Methods –​Different Results:  Approaches to Multidimensional Poverty. In: Andress, H.-​J. (ed.), Empirical Poverty Research in a Comparative Perspective. Aldershot: Ashgate. Kautto, M. (2000) Two of a Kind? Economic Crises, Policy Responses and Well-​Being during the 1990s in Sweden and Finland. Report to the Swedish Welfare Commission (Kommitté Välfärdsbokslut), SOU 200:83. Stockholm: Fritzes. Kautto, M., Heikkila, M., Hvinden, B., Marklund, S. and Ploug, N. (eds) (1999) Nordic Social Policy: Changing Welfare States. London: Routledge. Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (2005) Normative Functions of the Welfare State:  The Nordic Experience. London: Routledge. Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality:  Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in Western Countries. American Sociological Review 63(5): 661–​687. Kuhnle, S. (2007) The Scandinavian Welfare State in the 1990s:  Challenged but Viable. West European Politics 23(2): 209–​228. Kuivalainen, S. and Nelson, K. (2012) Eroding Minimum Income Protection in the Nordic Countries? Reassessing the Nordic Model of Social Assistance. In: Kvist, J., Fritzell, J., Hvinden, B. and Kangas, O. (eds), Changing Social Equality: The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century. Bristol: Policy Press. Lundberg, U. (2003) Juvelen i kronan: Socialdemokraterna och den allmänna pensionen. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg. Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database available at www.lisdatcenter.org. [Multiple countries; microdata accessed between 10 September and 20 November 2015]. OECD (2008) Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD. OECD (2011) Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Paris: OECD. Olafsdottir, K. and Olafsson, S. (2014) Economy, Politics and Welfare in Iceland: Booms, Busts and Challenges. Oslo: Fafo. Palme, J., Bergmark, Å., Bäckman, O., Estrada, F., Fritzell, J., Lundberg, O., Sjöberg, O.  and Szebehely, M.  (2002) Welfare Trends in Sweden:  Balancing the Books for the 1990s. Journal of European Social Policy 12(4): 329–​346. Standing, G. (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Taylor-​Gooby, P. (2004) New Risks and Social Change. In:  Taylor-​Gooby, P. (ed.), New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Timonen, V. (2004) New Risks:  Are they Still for the Nordic Welfare States? In:  Taylor-​Gooby, P. (ed.), New Risks, New Welfare:  The Transformation of the European Welfare State. Oxford:  Oxford University Press.

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4 STILL THE CORPORATIST DARLINGS? 1 Peter Munk Christiansen

Introduction When one of the world’s most influential interest group scholars, Mancur Olson, happened to stumble across the Nordic countries, he discovered that they did not fit into his general thesis that economic prosperity is inversely related to the political power of interest groups (Olson 1982). Examining Sweden more closely, he later asked: How bright are the Northern Lights? (Olson 1990), and continued: ‘Thus I believe there really are Northern Lights. They are beautiful … But they are not bright or stable enough to save a society, if it rushes far ahead without taking along any further sources of light, from stumbling into catastrophe’ (Olson 1990: 69). This chapter considers the role of interest groups in the Nordic countries, especially their political role, but also the broader role of civil society and interest groups. To the extent that a specific Nordic model for the political role of interest groups exists, it looks like this: A strong civil society with a robust capacity for solving collective problems; strong and well-​organized business groups; a strong labour movement with high unionization rates; and public policy-​ making and implementation in close cooperation with interest groups. Even if parts of the corporatist structures have weakened in recent decades, a logic of privileging remains according to which some groups have a unique status in policy formation and implementation, and there are still traits of institutionalized involvement in the policy process. These traits are discussed with an eye to how they differ from otherwise comparable countries in the Western hemisphere, and the chapter assesses some of the most important implications of the Nordic model. Corporatism is defined here as ‘the institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/​or implementation of public policies’ (Christiansen et al. 2010: 26).This implies that interest groups engage in political exchanges with civil servants and politicians. Information and support are exchanged in return for access to and influence on political and administrative decisions (Öberg et al. 2011). The following sections discuss the advent of Scandinavian corporatism, its heyday and its –​to some extent disputed –​decline. Finally, present-​day Scandinavian modern corporatism and its relevance are discussed. 36

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The origins of Scandinavian corporatism Scandinavian corporatism is not the product of any grand design or even a social democratic design, but it correlates with (1) a tradition for the consensual handling of societal challenges paired with trial and error, (2) strong civil societies in general and strong unions in particular, and it has benefited from (3) imports from abroad. As regards consensual policy-​making, Arend Lijphart (1999) has pointed out the covariance of a number of societal traits that divide Western societies into two major groups: majoritarian democracies, characterized by winner-​takes-​all elections, two-​party systems and pluralist interest group systems; and consensual democracies with proportional voting, multiparty systems and often corporatist systems of interest intermediation. In Lijphart’s words, consensual democracy accepts majority rule only as a minimum requirement:  instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-​making majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these majorities. Its rules and institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the policies that the government should pursue. (Lijphart 1999: 2) The Nordic countries certainly belong to the consensual systems, as do a number of other, predominantly continental, European countries. Finland aside, they belong to an even smaller group of countries in which the transformation to bourgeois democracy and industrial societies was, if not peaceful, then almost non-​violent. There seems to be a sort of political-​cultural willingness to support political institutions in favour of consensual policy-​making. A second important factor in Scandinavian corporatism is the existence of strong civil societies with the capacity to act collectively on behalf of their members. Danish peasant groups were already very strong in the late nineteenth century. Without state interference, they managed to re-​organize agricultural production in response to increased international competition, only later becoming corporatist partners. During the twentieth century, there were numerous examples of arrangements between private interests and government within the agricultural sector (Christiansen et  al. 2012). Urban industrial groups developed close relationships with civil servants and the political parties before the First World War. On the labour market, a so-​ called ‘Main Agreement’ –​a sort of labour market constitution –​was established as early as 1899, conditioned by a united labour movement under the umbrella of the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions and the centralized Confederation of Danish Employers. Hence, the first elements of Danish corporatism were already established before the First World War. The Norwegian path is quite similar. The first instances of integrating interest groups into the public decision-​making machine date back to the same time as in Denmark (i.e. the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) with the establishment of public committees with interest group representation (Nordby 1994). Sweden also had very strong interest groups early on. The Swedish unions had more members than Denmark, Norway and Finland combined in 1907 (Edling 2006: 108), and Swedish industry, including agriculture, was also quick to organize strongly. Swedish corporatism has roots back to the early 1900s (Lewin 1994). However, Rothstein (1992a, 1992b) argues that the formative moment of Swedish corporatism was in the early 1930s and that it came into being under a Liberal government. Writing on industrial relations, Svensson (2015) dates the breakthrough of Swedish labour market corporatism to the late 1930s in a historic compromise between labour and capital. 37

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Social democrats had strong footholds in the unions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In Norway, communists pulled the Social Democratic Party into membership of the communist Comintern in 1919, leaving it again in 1923 (Esping-​Andersen 1985:  73ff.). These relations cooled down over the course of the twentieth century; they weakened significantly in Denmark, somewhat less so in Norway and Sweden (Allern et al. 2007). Finland deviates somewhat due to its more turbulent history. Castles (1967:  69)  calls Finland a ‘hybrid between the unstable democracies of Western Europe and the compromise of Scandinavia’. It had relatively strong unions and industrial organizations in the early twentieth century, but stable and committing relations between state actors and interest groups were not established until the Second World War because of the 1918 civil war and the strong positions of the communists in the unions during the 1920s and 1930s (Arter 1987; Rainio-​Niemi 2008: 16ff.). The Great Depression did not bring about the social compromises found in the other countries (Kettunen 2001), and the birth of Finnish corporatism generally dates to the late 1950s with social and labour market compromises (Bergholm 2009). High union membership in Finland was not realized until after 1960 (Arter 1987: 200–​201). In all of the Nordic countries, strong interest groups have generally been a prerequisite for the integration of interest groups into the public decision-​making machine. Third, in some cases, institutional imports and national adaptation happened to fit well into the Nordic interest group tradition. With the exception of Norway, a prominent example is the Ghent system. Named after the Belgian city where it was first implemented, this system denotes a model for unemployment insurance whereby unemployment benefits are administered by private organizations that are affiliated with unions, even if the benefits are partly financed by the state (Scruggs 2002). Ghent institutions are renowned for affecting unionization rates: ‘The Ghent system, it is often argued, provides unions with a valuable selective incentive to get workers to join unions’ (Scruggs and Lange 2002: 131). The Danish experience with this system dates back to 1907. Finland joined the club in 1917, Sweden in 1934 and Iceland as late as 1955. The introduction of the Ghent system did not presuppose a strong social democratic party or very strong unions. In the Danish case, the system was introduced by a Liberal–​Conservative coalition. It matched a liberal principle of self-​help and was seen as a means to deal with the so-​called ‘labour question’; that is, the potential societal threat from unemployed urban workers (Nørgaard 1997; Pontusson and Rasmussen 2015). Once established, however, it was used as a selective inducement for unionization. The selective incentive rests to some extent on the illusion that one must be a union member in order to have unemployment insurance. While this is not formally the case, unions have tried to circumvent this in different ways; in any case, the Ghent system appears to have had this positive effect on unionization. Denmark, Iceland, Finland and Sweden are the only countries in the world that still stick to the Ghent system (Belgium uses a hybrid system) (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006; Lind 2009). High unionization rates have resulted from different factors, but a major explanation in the Nordic countries is their adherence to the Ghent system. In 2013, union membership was at 83 per cent in Iceland, 69 per cent in Finland, 68 per cent in Sweden, 67 per cent in Denmark and 54 per cent in Norway, the first four countries being world leaders in terms of union membership. Norway would probably have ranked higher had the country stuck to the Ghent model, which was implemented in 1906 but abolished in 1938 –​actually under a Labour government. The large EU countries and North America are far from these rates: Italy 37 per cent, Germany 18 per cent, the United States 11 per cent and France 8 per cent (www.stats.oecd.org). The introduction of a Ghent-​type unemployment scheme typically occurs after an increase in union membership (Pontusson and Rasmussen 2015), but it is the subsequent positive effect on union membership that has rendered it an important weapon for the Nordic unions in 38

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their fight for high membership. While the Ghent systems and union membership have come under pressure in recent years (see below), the Nordic unions remain world leaders in terms of membership. In conclusion, Nordic corporatism is not the result of a grand design but rather an institutional manifestation of the correlates of consensus-​oriented political cultures and strong civil societies that are able to act collectively on behalf of their members. The Ghent corporatist system from the early twentieth century was soon imported into Denmark, Sweden and Norway, while Finnish corporatism came later.

Corporatism’s finest hour(s) While corporatism is not the result of any grand design, it certainly proved important for peaceful or –​at least conflict-​reducing –​ways of pursuing public policy formation and implementation. Corporatism also proved viable outside of the labour market and industrial and agricultural policies. The corporatist institution that Scandinavian decision-​makers had created in the first half of the twentieth century consolidated, developed and reached its pinnacle during the three decades following the Second World War (Öberg et al. 2011). Two indications of this claim will be discussed: the development of the committee system and the diffusion of corporatist traits into other sectors than the labour market and various business sectors. It is worth mentioning that corporatism only played a minor role in some policy sectors (e.g. economic policy; see Blom-​Hansen and Laursen 1999). A number of Western countries have committees, councils, commissions etc. occupied with drafting political decisions, advising ministers and parliaments, and implementing public policies and whose members are nominated or appointed by interest groups. What differentiates the Scandinavian committee system from other systems is that interest groups play a very prominent role in these committees and, in particular, that unions have a comparatively high level of representation. Pallesen (2006) shows how committees are extensively found in non-​corporatist Washington –​but far fewer of the American commissions have interest group representatives as members. Christiansen et al. (2015) show how Switzerland and Denmark both have many committees but that unions are much more frequently represented in Danish than in Swiss committees. In the Scandinavian context, committees and commissions with representation from interest groups are normally seen as if not a defining then at least an important part of the Scandinavian model (Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003; Christiansen et al. 2010; Hermansson et al. 1997; Nordby 1994). These committees are collective bodies through which interest group preferences enter political and administrative decisions in exchange for expertise and political support (or the reduction of protest). Temporary commissions are established to scrutinize a political problem and come up with possible solutions. In areas where the dominant line of conflict is parallel to the left–​r ight political conflict, such as labour market policies (cf. Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003: 158ff.), and a commission with representatives from labour and capital that comes up with unanimous suggestions, they will –​if sufficiently feasible –​most likely be endorsed and enacted by a broad majority in parliament. In other cases, the destiny of commission proposals is more difficult to predict; nevertheless, they represent a solid input to policy proposals from the participating committee members and the groups they represent. Permanent boards and councils have administrative and/​or advisory tasks. Typical administrative tasks include granting subsidies or making decisions on complaints or exemptions, while advisory tasks may involve all kinds of advice to ministers, ministries and parliament. Interest groups are supposed to contribute to the commissions in two ways:  They play a 39

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rational/​technical role by improving public policies through their specialized knowledge on their sector and a political role by delivering legitimacy and endorsement to public policies (Christiansen 2014). The committee system was founded in the first half of the twentieth century and grew impressively in the three decades following the Second World War. Finland had 141 boards and committees in 1940, 237 in 1950 and 489 in 1975. Of these bodies, 59 per cent had interest groups as members in 1975 (Arter 1987:  153). At its highest (early 1980s), Norway had altogether 1,115 committees, 490 of which had interest group members (Rommetvedt 2011: 25). Denmark and Sweden also had a considerable number of these committees around 1980 (Christiansen et al. 2010). Johansen and Kristensen (1982:  196)  found that ‘there are reasons to believe that public committees have long since become one of the most important, if not the single most important, mode of interest intermediation’. Setting up committees for the preparation or implementation of public policies became an integrated part of Scandinavian politics. Scandinavian corporatism is not confined to labour market and industrial policies. The definition of corporatism as the institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/​or implementation of public policies does not rule out any policy sector as a home for corporatist structures.The only prerequisite is the existence of groups that are able to speak on the behalf of their members or their cause. This can be illustrated by examining two examples of corporatism outside of the traditional corporatist home market: One is corporatism related to public sector production and the other is the establishment of corporatist structures in environmental policies. The Nordic countries have large public consumption sectors and very high unionization rates among public sector employees. Particularly after the Second World War, public sector unions came to play a prominent role in policy-​making and implementation alongside the expansion of the public service sectors. Teachers’ unions thus played a role in the formation and implementation of education policy (Rothstein 1992a: 292ff.). Christiansen and Nørgaard (2003: 56ff.) reveal that the sharpest increase in the number of public committees between 1945 and 1975 was in education. Public sector unions became integrated in the decision-​making machinery in relation to public services in the same way that unions and business groups were integrated into labour market and industrial policies. Furthermore, many public sector unions played a role through the shop steward system in individual schools, hospitals and childcare institutions (Christiansen 1998: 276). The interest group structure of environmental policy is characterized by strong business groups and strong institutional groups representing the interests of public stakeholders, such as municipalities, which play an important role in the implementation of environmental policy in all of the Nordic countries, and –​finally –​a variety of environmental groups. The Nordics all have old and relatively strong wilderness conservation groups (Hermansson and Joas 1996; Jansen and Osland 1996; Rothstein 1992a), but most environmental groups are as recent as modern environmental policy itself. Environmental policies were enacted in the Nordic countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Policy formation involved the industrial and institutional groups, while environmental groups played a very modest role, if any. Industrial and institutional groups have kept their strong influence on environmental policies, and they have established strong and institutionalized relations to the environmental authorities. With rising political and popular environmental awareness and with an increasing number of environmental groups, some environmental interest groups became integrated in the political decision-​ making machinery, such as via membership in policy-​ preparing or policy-​ implementing public committees (Christiansen 1999; Rommetvedt et  al. 2001), while most of them are 40

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probably less integrated in the environmental decision-​making machinery (Rommetvedt and Opedal 1995). In the three decades following the Second World War, Scandinavian corporatism institutionalized. Interest groups were integrated into the political and administrative decision-​making machinery and into a broad portfolio of public policies. The establishment of committees was an important –​but not the only –​institutional manifestation of corporatism.

Eurosclerosis or ‘Northern light’? The decline of corporatism? Corporatist structures were rather robust during the 1970s. In many policy sectors, privileged interest groups were more or less automatically included in policy formulation and implementation, albeit with considerable variation between sectors. However, different challenges piled up for the politics of good times: The Nordic economies were changing. Energy crises and industrial restructuring replaced the post-​war decades of growth, welfare state expansion and prosperity. High unemployment went hand in hand with inflation and large budget deficits. Class voting, stable party systems and majority governments were replaced by volatile voters, new political parties and weak minority governments (Damgaard 1992). To what extent could corporatism –​with its logic of compromise and linear policy-​making –​survive these new conditions? Is corporatism only for the good times? Scholars disagree on this point to some extent. Some point out the continued relevance of corporatism in one or more of the Nordic countries (e.g. Compston 1998:  Lindvall and Rothstein 2006; Siaroff 1999; Woldendorp 2011), while others point to rather substantial changes in the institutional skeleton of corporatism (e.g. Blom-​ Hansen 2000, 2001; Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999; Christiansen et al. 2010; Öberg et al. 2011; Rommetvedt 2005; Rommetvedt et al. 2013). Empirically, as suggested by the different stances in the literature, the development might appear uneven; however, there are also some clear and relatively uniform changes in the political role of Scandinavian interest groups. The institutionalized integration of interest groups in policy formulation through policy-​ preparing committees and commissions has become much less frequent, even rare (Christiansen et  al. 2010; Öberg et  al. 2011). While committee work has been used somewhat differently among the Nordic countries, they share in common how numerous policy proposals with broad political and interest group support have come out of these commissions. Such policy processes and outcomes come at two costs: First, they are time-​consuming; setting up commissions takes time and finishing the work takes years. Second, corporatist committees come up with proposals that are within the acceptance range of the groups involved –​this is what consensus is about. In other words, corporatist policy-​making takes place within the limits of the interests of dominant groups. The costs of corporatist policy-​making through commission work might therefore explain why this part of the Scandinavian corporatist tradition has vanished: Governments must constantly reproduce their electoral support due to declining class voting. Year-​long commission work fits poorly with contemporary political agendas and their fast and mediatized policy processes. Possibly even more important for the declining use of policy-​preparing committees is that many policy decisions today imply the reform of existing policies, often under severe budgetary constraints. Such reform policies usually have negative consequences for the groups that strongly resist reforms. Consequently, governments have become more hesitant to automatically include interest groups in policy-​making through the commission and committee system because commissions will give groups in a losing situation a good platform for combatting 41

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proposed reforms. Furthermore, at least in the Danish case, there is a tendency for the remaining commissions to increasingly become part of a political game wherein their role is to prepare the population for future unpleasant decisions rather than to scrutinize problems and negotiate their solution (Christiansen and Nørgaard 2009). There are examples of major reforms carried out with interest groups at arm’s length in many different policy areas (e.g. Blom-​Hansen et al. 2012). The labour market is a good sector to look for changing dynamics, however, because it is one of the most prominent corporatist policy sectors with very strong interest groups. In addition, the left–​r ight policy dimension is more pronounced here than in any other corporatist sector. Hard economic times and difficult adjustments to be made by the industries in high-​cost countries such as the Nordics have left an increasing segment of the labour force with little or no employment in combination with other economic illnesses (cf. Svensson 2015). During the 1980s and 1990s, unemployment –​particularly long-​term unemployment –​increasingly came to be seen not only as a result of demand mismanagement but also of excessively generous and protective unemployment schemes with insufficient incentives for the unemployed to find employment. Stronger incentives to look for work, lower unemployment benefits and shorter eligibility periods in different guises were included in labour market reform in all of the Nordic countries. Such benefits are the lifeblood of the labour unions, which fought hard for labour market benefits that they are not prepared to surrender without a fight. Numerous labour market reforms have been stopped at the negotiation table because of resistance from one of the involved interest groups, and numerous reformers have been forced to change their strategies during corporatist negotiations. This is why reformers tend to keep organized interests at arm’s length. The Danish case is probably the most extreme. From the early 1990s through 2015, a formerly generous unemployment scheme and related schemes have been the object of several reforms, most in the direction of retrenchment (Klitgaard and Nørgaard 2014). Employer and union representatives have been involved in some of the reforms, but the traditional social partners have been kept at arm’s length and even excluded from the formation of major political reform in some cases. The political logic has been that long and open policy deliberations will mobilize anti-​reform forces and probably limit reform success significantly (Christiansen and Klitgaard 2010). Controlling the information flow renders it easier to carry out controversial reforms. Sweden and Norway have also implemented major reforms, although not with the same strength and direction as in Denmark. Sweden already had an active labour market policy when the economic crisis hit. Reforms implemented in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000 are therefore softer than the Danish reforms but still had the same direction (Svensson 2015), although some favoured the unemployed (Klitgaard et al. 2015). Nor has the punctual decoupling of the top labour market organizations been as clear in Denmark. But Swedish interest groups are also held more at arm’s length from policy formation than was formerly the case (Öberg 2015). Due to its oil wealth, Norway has had less need for retrenchment reforms in the labour market, and the reform of sickness benefits, for example, has been met with strong resistance from organized interests (Hagelund and Pedersen 2015). If labour market policy has been ‘decorporatized’, it has not deprived strong interest groups of influence on the outcomes of reforms in all cases. If policy entrepreneurs want to pursue path-​breaking reforms against the interests of strong interest groups, they must look in the tool box of reform strategies: control of information, coalition building, compensation etc. (see Blom-​Hansen et al. 2012). In many cases, this will mean that interest groups are kept at slightly greater distance than was the case in the heyday of corporatism; not because the basic logic related to conflictual reforms has changed, but rather because the political agenda has moved much more in that direction. Governments, ministers 42

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and civil servants are increasingly selective when they consider how to include which groups in discussions on upcoming legislation. If corporatism is understood as an institutional exchange arrangement in which political and administrative decision-​makers trade influence on decisions for information and political support (Öberg et al. 2011), the conclusion is that decision-​makers have come to see interest groups as less valuable in all phases of political decision-​making than they used to because they are less capable of delivering what decision-​makers want. In a few instances, interest groups have taken the initiative to establish distance by opting out of corporatist policy-​making. The most famous example is the Swedish employers’ organization, SAF, which withdrew its representatives from a number of agency boards and so forth in the early 1990s because it believed the costs exceeded the benefits (Rothstein and Bergström 1999). It later resumed some of its positions. A Norwegian centre-​r ight government in the early 1980s had some success with downsizing the corporatist committee structure (Rommetvedt 2011: 24). While increasing the distance in the policy-​making process appears to be a more or less general phenomenon in the Nordic countries, this development is less clear for administrative corporatism, understood as the integration of interest groups in the administration of public funds, agencies etc. Comparing contemporary Norway to 1980, there is a sharp decline in the number of committees with administrative responsibilities where interest groups are members. In Sweden, the number of agency boards (Swedish agencies are administratively independent of the ministries) with interest groups as members has changed little since 1980, while in Denmark there is a moderate increase in the number of administrative committees with interest group members (Christiansen et al. 2010). In sum, the Nordic countries have developed in the same direction when it comes to changes in the relationships between state and interest groups in policy preparation while the development is less uniform when it comes to the role of interest groups in policy implementation.

Are unions still taken seriously? As mentioned above, the Nordic countries hold the world record in union membership, Norway being a partial exception. Unions have nevertheless lost some of their power, particularly in labour market policies, due to retrenchment and reduced workers’ rights via labour market policies. Unions have also been squeezed in other ways: Wage and working conditions negotiations have been decentralized, traditional blue-​collar unions are losing members, the Ghent system has come under attack with the establishment of alternatives to union-​related unemployment funds, and unions have lost a number of their other institutional strongholds. The falling Nordic union membership figures –​particularly among blue-​collar unions –​are too high to be explained by changing industrial structures alone. Sweden experienced a very dramatic drop in reaction to dramatically increasing membership payments to the unemployment scheme in 2007 and 2008 (Kjellberg 2011). In the Danish case, the success of new and cheaper unions established outside of the traditional labour movement provides part of the explanation. Centre-​r ight governments in Finland, Sweden and Denmark have attempted to loosen the relations between the unions and unemployment funds. While union membership is not a formal prerequisite for unemployment insurance, membership in the specific unemployment funds used to be restricted. Consequently, loosening the union–​unemployment fund relationship will reduce the selective inducement to become a trade union member (Klitgaard and Nørgaard 2014; Klitgaard et al. 2015). 43

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Despite all of these –​from the union perspective –​evils, the unions still have the highest membership rates in the world, they still play a significant political role, and they still enjoy good access to political arenas (Binderkrantz et al. 2015). It is no accident that Katzenstein (1985) coined the term social corporatism to cover the Scandinavian variant of corporatism with comparatively strong unions.

Conclusions: modern Scandinavian corporatism While Scandinavian corporatism might not be what it used to be, the rumours of its death are grossly exaggerated. Table 4.1 crystallizes some of the most important changes. Scandinavian corporatism is less encompassing today than in the 1970s. Policy preparation typically takes place with less institutionalized involvement of interest groups, rarely in committees –​but only rarely completely without the involvement of interest groups. As for policy implementation, the differences between the Nordic countries have increased. Denmark continues to use committees with interest group representatives to implement policies more than does Sweden –​and much more than Norway.When corporatism was strongest, corporatist groups supplied political support, technical information and the enforcement of public policies. While these resources remain valuable, they now carry less weight because more reforms contradict interest group preferences. Their resources are therefore better described as technical and political information and enforcement to varying degrees. The state has increased its autonomy vis-​à-​vis interest groups by moving policy preparation from commissions to the ministries –​mainly to be able to carry out reforms more independently of interest groups than earlier. Corporatism was born with business groups and unions as the most important interest groups. In the Scandinavian version, unions played a comparatively more important role than in most other countries. Unions and business groups remain important corporatist partners but have been supplemented with a broader set of interest groups, many of which are citizen groups. Interest groups continue to play an important role in the formation and implementation of policies and they still enjoy privileged access to the administration, although the countries vary significantly on this point. Even if corporatism is not what it used to be, the Nordic countries remain consensual. Despite all of the changes in the party structures, despite the decline of Table 4.1  Adaptation of Scandinavian corporatism Classic Scandinavian corporatism

Modern Scandinavian corporatism

Nature of interest mediation Type of resources supplied by groups

Encompassing Technical information, political support, enforcement of policies

Policy-​making

Commissions, privileging logic

Policy implementation Degree of state autonomy Type of interests represented

Committees, privileging logic Low Clear overweight of economic groups

Partial Technical and political information, enforcement to varying degrees Ministerial preparation, less privileging logic Different models High Better representation of citizen groups, but business groups, unions and institutional groups still play an important role

Source: Adapted from Binderkrantz et al. (2015).

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class voting and increased voter volatility, despite minority governments, the mediatization of the political process and other challenges to political processes, most legislation by far is (still) carried out with supermajorities in the Nordic parliaments and in many cases even enacted unanimously. Despite increased societal complexity and cross-​cutting interest structures, the dominant norm remains that affected interests should be heard when they are believed to be affected by proposed policies. In a 2008 survey of the Danish parliament, almost 90 per cent of the MPs fully or partly agreed that ‘all affected institutions and interest groups should be heard before proposals are promoted in parliament’ (Parliamentary Survey 2008). Scholars talk of interest group expansion, meaning a sharp increase in the number of interest groups (cf. Jordan et al. 2012 for the UK and US cases). A corresponding development is not found in the Nordic countries. The interest group system mirrors the society of which they are a part. Consequently, the interest group systems in the Nordic countries have also changed (e.g. Opedal et al. 2012). In Denmark, there were more groups in 2010 than in 1975; there are fewer economic interest groups, more citizens’ groups, but the number of groups has not exploded (Fisker 2015). Corporatism presupposes strong interest groups, and corporatism produces strong interest groups. The political exchange involved in corporatist policy-​making and implementation presupposes that interest groups can actually speak and act on behalf of their members –​otherwise civil servants and politicians cannot be sure that they can benefit from the exchange relation. Corporatism produced strong interest groups and strong interest groups will prevail for many years to come. Most Nordic business firms are organized in a business organization, most employees are union members, all municipalities are members of the national local government organization etc. Strong organizations reduce the incentive to establish new interest groups, partly because of the economies of scale involved in the collective pursuit of interests. Strong interest groups reproduce their own raison d’être, and the Nordic countries will be well endowed in terms of strong and encompassing interest groups for many years to come.

Note 1 I thank PerOla Öberg, Hilmar Rommetvedt, Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz and the editors for comments to earlier drafts.

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P. M. Christiansen Böckerman, P. and Uusitalo, R. (2006) Union Membership and the Erosion of the Ghent System: Lessons from Finland. British Journal of Industrial Relations 44(2): 283–​303. Castles, F. (1967) Pressure Groups and Political Culture (Routledge Revivals):  A  Comparative Study. Oxford: Routledge. Christiansen, P. M. (1998) A Prescription Rejected:  Market Solutions to Problems of Public Sector Governance. Governance 11(3): 273–​295. Christiansen, P. M. (1999) Miljøpolitik og interesseorganisationer: mellem anarki og integration. In: Blom-​ Hansen, J. and Daugbjerg, C. (eds), Magtens organisering: Stat og interesseorganisationer i Danmark. Aarhus: Systime. Christiansen, P. M. (2014) Forvaltningen: Adgang for de privilegerede? In: Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M. and Pedersen, H. H. (eds), Organisationer i politik. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels. Christiansen, P. M. and Klitgaard, M. B. (2010) Veil of Vagueness:  Success and Failure in Institutional Reforms. Journal of Public Policy 30(2): 183–​200. Christiansen, P. M. and Nørgaard, A. S. (2003) Faste forhold –​flygtige forbindelser. Stat og interesseorganisationer i Danmark i det 20. århundrede. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Christiansen, P. M. and Nørgaard, A. S. (2009) Kommissioner i dansk politik efter 1980. In: Christensen, J. G., Mouritzen, P. E. and Nørgaard, A. S. (eds), De store kommissioner.Vise mænd, smagsdommere eller nyttige idioter. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark. Christiansen, P. M. and Rommetvedt, H. (1999) From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives, and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies 22(3): 195–​220. Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S., Rommetvedt, H., Svensson, T., Thesen, G. and Öberg, P.-​O. (2010) Varieties of Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in Scandinavian Policy Making. Voluntas 21(1): 22–​40. Christiansen, P. M., Mach, A. and Varone, F. (2015) Convergence of Social and Liberal Neo-​Corporatism? Comparing Denmark and Switzerland over Time. Aarhus: Lausanne and Geneva. Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S. and Sidenius, N. C. (2012) Dänemark: Verbände und Korporatismus auf Dänish. In: Reutter, W. (ed.), Verbände und Interessengruppen in den Ländern der Europäischen Union. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Compston, H. (1998) The End of National Policy Concertation? Western Europe since the Single European Act. Journal of European Public Policy 5(3): 507–​526. Damgaard, E. (1992) Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries. In: Damgaard, E. (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Edling, N. (2006) Limited Universalism:  Unemployment Insurance in Northern Europe 1900–​2000. In: Edling, N., Haave, P., Christiansen, N. F. and Petersen, K. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1985) Politics Against Market: The Social Democratic Road to Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fisker, H. (2015) Studies on the Development of Interest Group Populations in Corporative Systems.Aarhus: Politica. Hagelund, A. and Pedersen, A. W. (2015) To Reform or not to Reform? Explaining the Coexistence of Successful Pension Reform and Sick Pay Inertia in Norway. In:  Engelstad, F. and Hagelund, A. (eds), Work,Welfare, and Institutional Change in Scandinavia: Conflict, Compromise, Cooperation.Warsaw: De Gruyter Open. Hermansson, A-​S. and Joas, M. (1996) Finland. In: Christiansen, P. M. (ed.), Governing the Environment: Politics, Policy, and Organization in the Nordic Countries. Nord 1996(5). Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Hermansson, J., Svensson, T. and Öberg, P. (1997) Vad blev det av den svenske korporativismen? Politica 29(4): 365–​384. Jansen, A.-​I. and Osland, O. (1996) Norway. In: Christiansen, P. M. (ed.), Governing the Environment: Politics, Policy, and Organization in the Nordic Countries. Nord 1996(5). Copenhagen:  Nordic Council of Ministers. Johansen, L. N. and Kristensen, O. P. (1982) Corporatist Traits in Denmark 1946–​76. In: Lehmbruch, G. and Schmitter, P. (eds), Consequences of Corporatist Policy-​Making. London: Sage. Jordan, G., Baumgartner, F. R., McCarthy, J. D., Bevan, S. and Greenan, J. (2012) Tracking Interest Group Populations in the US and the UK. In: Halpin, D. and Jordan, G. (eds), The Scale of Interest Organization in Democratic Politics: Data and Research Methods. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kettunen, P. (2001) The Nordic Welfare State in Finland. Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3): 225–​247.

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Still the corporatist darlings? Kjellberg, A. (2011) The Decline in Swedish Union Density since 2007. Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 1(1): 68–​93. Klitgaard, M. B. and Nørgaard, A. S. (2014) Structural Stress or Deliberate Decision? How Governments Have Disempowered Unions in Denmark. European Journal of Political Research 53(2): 404–​421. Klitgaard, M. B., Schumacher, G. and Soentken, M. (2015) The Partisan Politics of Institutional Welfare State Reform. Journal of European Public Policy 22(7): 948–​966. Lewin, L. (1994) The Rise and Decline of Corporatism: The Case of Sweden. European Journal of Political Research 26(1): 59–​79. Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-​Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lind, J. (2009) The End of the Ghent System as Trade Union Recruitment Machinery? Industrial Relations Journal 40(6): 510–​523. Lindvall, J. and Rothstein, B. (2006) The Fall of the Strong State. Scandinavian Political Studies 29(1): 47–​63. Nordby, T. (1994) Korporatisme på norsk 1920–​1990. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Nørgaard, A. S. (1997) The Politics of Institutional Control:  Corporatism in Danish Occupational Safety and Health Regulation & Unemployment Insurance, 1870–​1995. Aarhus: Forlaget Politica. Öberg, P. (2015) Interest Organizations in the Policy Process:  Interest Advocacy and Policy Advice. In: Pierre, J. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Öberg, P., Svensson, T., Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S., Rommetvedt, H. and Thesen, G. (2011) Disrupted Exchange and Declining Corporatism:  Government Authority and Interest Group Capability in Scandinavia. Government and Opposition 46(3): 365–​391. Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. Olson, M. (1990) How Bright Are the Northern Lights? Some Questions about Sweden. Lund:  Institute of Economic Research. Opedal, S., Rommetvedt, H. and Vrangbæk, K. (2012) Organised Interests, Authority Structures and Political Influence:  Danish and Norwegian Patient Groups Compared. Scandinavian Political Studies 35(1): 1–​21. Pallesen, T. (2006) Scandinavian Corporatism in a Trans-​Atlantic Comparative Perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies 29(2): 131–​145. Parliamentary Survey (2008) Aarhus: Department of Political Science. Aarhus University. [Data available from Peter Munk Christiansen upon request: [email protected]]. Pontusson, J. and Rasmussen, M. B. (2015) The Political Origins of Union Administered Unemployment Schemes. Geneva and Aarhus: Unpublished paper. Rainio-​Niemi, J. (2008) Small State Cultures of Consensus State Traditions and Consensus-​Seeking in the Neo-​ Corporatist and Neutrality Policies in Post-​1945 Austria and Finland. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. Rommetvedt, H. (2005) Norway:  Resources Count, but Votes Decide? From Neo-​ Corporatist Representation to Neo-​Pluralist Parliamentarism. West European Politics 28(4): 740–​763. Rommetvedt,H.(2011) Politikkens allmengjøring og den nypluralistiske parlamentarismen.Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Rommetvedt, H. and Opedal, S. (1995) Miljølobbyisme og næringskorporatisme? Norske miljø-​og næringsorganisasjoners politiske påvirkning. Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift 76(3): 279–​302. Rommetvedt, H., Farsund, A. and Melberg, K. (2001) Corporatism and Lobbyism in Norwegian Environmental Policy-​Making. In: Nagel, S. (ed.), Handbook of GlobalTechnology Policy. New York: Marcel Dekker. Rommetvedt, H., Thesen, G., Christiansen, P. M. and Nørgaard, A. S. (2013) Coping with Corporatism in Decline and the Revival of Parliament: Interest Group Lobbyism in Denmark and Norway, 1980–​2005. Comparative Political Studies 46(4): 457–​485. Rothstein, B. (1992a) Den korporativa staten. Stockholm: Nordstedts. Rothstein, B. (1992b) Explaining Swedish Corporatism:  The Formative Moment. Scandinavian Political Studies 15(3): 173–​191. Rothstein, B. and Bergström, J. (1999) Korporativismens fall och den svenske models krise. Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Scruggs, L. (2002) The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970–​1996. Political Research Quarterly 55(2): 275–​297. Scruggs, L. and Lange, P. (2002) Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density. The Journal of Politics 64(1): 126–​153.

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P. M. Christiansen Siaroff, A. (1999) Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement. European Journal of Political Research 36(2): 175–​205. Svensson, T. (2015) The Swedish Model of Industrial Relations. In: Pierre, J. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Woldendorp, J. (2011) Corporatism in Small North-​West European Countries 1970–​2006: Business as Usual, Decline, or a New Phenomenon? Amsterdam: Working Paper Series, Department of Political Science,VU University Amsterdam.

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5 THE GREEN ‘HEAVYWEIGHTS’ The climate policies of the Nordic countries Jens Hoff

Introduction There seems to be an almost global consensus about the fact that the Nordic countries1 are frontrunners in environment and climate policies (Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000; Lundqvist 2004; Nordic Council of Ministers 2015; Tobin 2015). Depending on who is asked or what literature one reads, this fact is underpinned by reference to a number of different factors or events, all highlighting this leadership position:  The Nordic countries were among the first in the world to establish ministries of the environment (between 1972 and 1987). The establishment of these ministries can be seen as a response to a growing popular concern with environmental problems, and in some cases strong social movements concerned with the environment and the energy supply. This first-​mover position led Nordic governments, in this phase dominated by social democratic parties concerned with questions of equity and global solidarity, to assume a global leadership role concerning environmental questions and issues related to sustainability. It is therefore no coincidence that the first global conference on the environment was held in Stockholm in 1972.2 The torch lighting was carried out by the Norwegian Minister of the Environment (later Prime Minister) Gro Harlem Brundtland, who was the driving force behind the influential UN Report ‘Our Common Future’, published in 1987. At the next important global event concerning environment and sustainability, the Rio World Summit on Environment and Development in 1992, Danish Minister of the Environment Svend Auken played an active role in bringing both the UNFCCC treaty as well as the Agenda 21 agreement to the decision phase, and Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven has recently assumed a very active role in organizing a group of prime ministers to actively engage in the Sustainability Development Goals 2030 agreed upon by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The Rio Summit and the ensuing Kyoto Protocol (agreed to at COP3 in 1997) catapulted the question of climate change to the top of the global political agenda (Hoff 2016), and the formulation and implementation of policies concerning climate change mitigation has further cemented the frontrunner position of the Nordic countries. Facts often mentioned to illustrate this point include: First, that the Nordic countries have ‘cracked the nut’ of simultaneous economic growth and reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Figures show that in the period from 1990 to 2011, the GDP in the Nordic countries increased by 49

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Figure 5.1a  Nordic CO2e emissions Source: UNFCCC and the World Bank.

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Figure 5.1b  Nordic GDP per capita (USD) Source: UNFCCC and the World Bank.

55 per cent, while GHG emissions were reduced by 9 per cent (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014: 9; see Figure 5.1a–b). Second, the Nordic countries have been able to implement the world’s highest taxation on carbon tax, Sweden topping the list with a tax of €139/​tonne of CO2, which has had a significant impact on fossil fuel consumption and energy efficiency (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014). Third, the Nordic countries have some of the most ambitious goals in the world concerning GHG reductions, ranging from 15–​40 per cent as national targets for 2020 (30–​40 per cent for Denmark, Norway and Sweden with baseline 1990), and goals of being 100 per cent fossil-​free in 2050 (50–​80 per cent for Iceland and Finland). Fourth and finally –​and maybe most significantly –​the Nordic countries are renowned for their efforts to stimulate and implement renewable energy in their energy mix. The share of renewable energy in the electricity mix was more than 63 per cent in 2010, while the share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption was 30 per cent in 2010 (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014: 22–​24). While these figures conceal considerable variations between the Nordic countries, especially due to their varying geographical conditions, 50

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they nonetheless demonstrate a strong determination to use and develop renewable energy, thereby reducing GHG emissions. Even though the examples above are somewhat sketchy and anecdotal, we take them to indicate that the Nordic countries can indeed be considered ‘green heavyweights’; countries that are frontrunners when it comes to environment and climate policies. What this chapter does is therefore not to further underpin this claim but rather to try to find the root causes of this long-​time leadership. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the puzzle of the apparent Nordic consensus or unity concerning climate policies in particular. Such consensus is rather surprising given that both Norway and Denmark produce and export oil and natural gas, whereas the other Nordic countries have neither oil nor gas. The Nordics also have very different preconditions when it comes to renewable energy: Norway and Sweden are blessed with plentiful hydropower resources, Iceland with geothermal energy, while Denmark and Finland are less fortunate in this respect. One might think that these very different geographical/​geological preconditions would result in different climate and energy policies if each country were to pursue its own interests; nevertheless, this would not appear to be the case. So what are the factors contributing to the similarity of the climate policies of the Nordic countries? This is the second question dealt with in this chapter.

How did the Nordic countries become frontrunners in environment and climate policy? Looking at environment and climate politics and policies in the Nordic countries since the 1960s, two particular factors appear to have been of importance for establishing the Nordic countries as global frontrunners. The first is the strong popular support for environmental or ‘green’ policies, while the other is the almost complete hegemony of so-​called ‘ecological modernization’ (later ‘green growth’) as the dominant discourse legitimizing ambitious environment and climate policies by combining them with strategies for economic growth partly based on exports of ‘green’ (or ‘clean’) technologies embodying a significant element of R&D.

Strong popular support for environmental policies It has been argued that the Nordic countries have a cultural bias towards nature conservation and biospheric values (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015; concerning values, see Stern 2000). While this claim is difficult to substantiate scientifically, there are also other –​more contemporary and politically determined –​reasons for why strong public support exists for green policies, including policies concerning renewable energy in the Nordic countries. Denmark offers a case in point in this regard. Like the other Nordic countries, Denmark was taken by surprise when the first oil crisis hit in 1972. At the time, Denmark was heavily dependent on imported oil. The initial reaction was to change the energy supply from oil to coal and to start investigating the prospects for introducing nuclear power. However, especially the attempt at introducing nuclear power, supported strongly by several parties in the Danish parliament, met resistance in the general population. In 1974, the Organization for Information about Nuclear Power (Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft, OOA) was formed, and it became one of the strongest and broadest popular movements in Denmark in the post-​war period. Its success seems to have hinged on the fact that it was not only a protest movement –​it was also a constructive movement developing alternatives to nuclear power. As part of the movement, engineers, students and craftsmen thus began working on how renewable energy (RE) could be scaled up from small RE experiments (e.g. wind turbines, straw-​fired district heating systems, solar power). This work resulted in the establishment 51

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of the Organization for Renewable Energy (Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi, OVE) in 1978. Together, OOA, OVE and other green forces developed a three-​pronged strategy meant to ensure that nuclear power would never become part of the Danish energy mix and that coal would gradually be phased out. The elements in the strategy were: (1) support for RE, (2) promotion of energy conservation, and (3) use of natural gas until demand could be met solely by RE (Ege 2009: 37). Industry and the energy companies were originally very sceptical towards this strategy, but their position changed gradually as it proved possible to scale up RE facilities, especially wind turbines, and Danish natural gas production started in the North Sea. Indeed, the biggest Danish energy company, DONG, is now one of the major proponents of (offshore) wind turbines (Sveistrup 2016). Underlying this shift in the attitudes among industry and energy companies was also the fact that the popular movement headed by OOA and OVE was powerful enough to lead the Danish parliament to abandon plans for establishing nuclear power facilities in Denmark in 1984. While the combined efforts of OOA and OVE might offer a particularly vivid example of what Connolly et al. (2012: 95ff.) call the ‘“new” environmental movements of the 1970s’, the Nordic countries as such exhibit the full range of environmental movements, ranging from conservation groups and green parties to 1990s-​type radical activists and local coalitions/​local Agenda 21 groups (LA21; see below), all bearing witness to the strong popular support for the green agenda. As in the United States and the United Kingdom, the conservationist groups are the oldest and most well-​established among the green movements (Connolly et al. 2012: 102–​103). All together, they have around 375,000 members and some 500 local divisions. The Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature (Naturskyddsföreningen) was established in 1909.3 Its Danish counterpart (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening) was established in 1911,4 the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (Naturvernsforbundet) in 19145 and the Finnish somewhat later.6 They are all an integrated part of the political system as they are typically heard by public authorities in relation to law-​making concerning the (protection of) nature and the environment. In Denmark, the Society has hearing rights in relation to the laws on the protection of nature and the environment. More generally, the societies also take independent initiatives and raise questions concerning environmental protection and broader issues concerning climate and sustainability.  The societies also have funds coming from members and donations, parts of which are used for buying land considered worthy of conservation.The local divisions of the societies are typically a standard partner in the LA21 work (see note 13). The strong public support for green policies is also reflected in the political arena. Even though parties with ‘green’ in their name have fared very differently in the different Nordic countries, the fate of the parties is also a reflection of the extent to which the green agenda has been integrated in the agendas of other parties. Typically, the green agenda is also part of the platform of the various left-​wing and centrist parties, and the extent to which green issues are salient on the platform of these parties, together with the electoral successes or failures of these parties, has (had) repercussions for the electoral fate of the green parties. In Finland, the Green Party (Gröna Forbundet)7 was created in 1987 and became the first green party in the Nordic countries to form part of a government eight years later. The party was part of government coalitions until 2002, after which it left the government in protest over decisions establishing nuclear power as part of the Finnish energy mix. This pattern repeated itself after the 2011 election, where it was part of the government coalition until 2014, when it left the coalition due to the other governing parties deciding to construct a new nuclear power plant at Pyhäjoki. It received 7.3 per cent of the vote in the 2015 election, resulting in ten MPs. 52

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In Sweden, the Green Party (Miljöpartiet De Grønne, usually just Miljöpartiet)8 was established in 1981, the first green party in the Nordic countries. It was established in response to the  Swedish referendum on nuclear power in 1980, which made nuclear power a part of Swedish energy policy. The party was first represented in the Riksdag in 1988, when it received 5.5 per cent of the vote. It failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold in the 1991 national election and was therefore absent from the Swedish parliament from 1991 to 1994. In 1994, it returned to the Riksdag and has been represented ever since. In 2014, it formed a coalition government with the bigger Social Democratic Party, the Löfven government then including six Green ministers. Its best national election result was in 2010, when it received 7.3 per cent of the vote, and it received 15.4 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. The Norwegian Green Party (Miljöpartiet De Grønne)9 was formed in 1988 and has participated in all of the national and local elections since. It first won representation in the Norwegian parliament in 2013, however, where it won 2.8 per cent of the vote, amounting to a single MP according to Norwegian election rules. It enjoyed something of a breakthrough in the 2015 local elections, however, winning 4.2 per cent of the total vote and 285 representatives in various local councils. The Green Party in Denmark (Miljøpartiet De Grønne)10 was formed in 1983 and ran in national elections in 1987, 1988 and 1990. It never won representation in the Folketing but did so in some local councils. As hinted at above, the Green Party’s weak position in Denmark, especially compared to its sister parties in the other Nordic countries, is probably a result of other parties promoting the green agenda on their respective platforms, thereby ‘crowding out’ the Green Party. The green agenda has a prominent position in the party programmes and the election platforms of the two left-​wing parties, the Red–​Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) and the Socialist People’s Party, but it has also been a salient part of the platforms of centrist parties such as the Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre) and Conservatives (Konservativt Folkeparti). The left-​wing parties have been quite successful in recent elections; especially the Red–​Green Alliance, which obtained 7.8 per cent of the popular vote in the 2015 national election, resulting in 14 MPs. As concerns Denmark, it may also be argued that the newly established party, Alternativet (the Alternative), is a green party on par with those in the other Nordic countries, as issues around sustainability and the climate constitute much of its party programme.11 The party ran in parliamentary elections for the first time in 2015, obtaining 4.8 per cent of the vote (nine MPs). If one then adds the election results of the Red–​Green Alliance, the Socialist People’s Party12 and the Social Liberal Party to this number, it adds up to 21.4 per cent of the total vote. As the Social Democratic Party also buys into the green agenda, one could add its share of the vote (26.3 per cent) to this number, totalling 47.7 per cent of the vote, making the case for strong popular support for an ambitious green agenda. The same argument could be made concerning the other Nordic countries, where green issues also figure prominently in the left-​wing party programmes; the Left Party in Sweden (Vänsterpartiet), the Socialist Left Party in Norway (Sosialistisk Venstrepartiet) and the Left Alliance in Finland (Vänsterförbundet). Green issues also play an important role in the platforms of the social democratic parties in these countries, bolstering the case for broad popular support of an ambitious green agenda. Further supporting the reputation of the Nordic countries as pioneers regarding environment policy is the collaboration of the Nordic green parties particularly in relation to the EU. Since 2004, the Nordic green parties have been organized in the European Green Party. Such collaboration is also found among the Nordic red–​g reen parties, which are organized 53

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in the Nordic Green Left Alliance, consisting of seven left-​wing parties (the left-​wing parties mentioned above except for the Red–​Green Alliance in Denmark, which is an anti-​EU party, but including red–​g reen parties from Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland). These parties are organized in the European United Left–​Nordic Green Left Alliance in the European Parliament. The Nordic countries also have their share of more radical, non-​parliamentarian action groups and movements concerned with environmental issues, sustainability, climate change and animal rights. Some of these groups, including animal rights activists and spontaneous movements created in relation to events such as the 2009 COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, only exist for a period and are difficult to pin down. Others, such as Greenpeace, have a more sustained existence. However, Greenpeace and the more mainstream WWF seem to have thrived best in the 1980s and 1990s and have since lost members. Greenpeace was down to 65,000 Swedish members in 2005, and the Nordic Greenpeace sections merged in the late 1990s in order to make the organization more efficient. While popular support for the green agenda is manifested by the existence and actions of the movements and parties mentioned above, such support can also be traced to the level of local governments and communities. It has already been mentioned that the conservationist organizations and most of the (red–​)green parties have a local presence.This presence has made it easy to engage these organizations as well as other local green activists in the more systematic action on sustainable develop laid out by LA21. The Agenda 21 Convention was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.13 The Convention recognized that because local government is the level of government closest to the general population, its functions and ability to mobilize support are seen as essential to any move towards a sustainable future. In fact, at the time of the Summit it was estimated that over two-​thirds of the actions needed to realize Agenda 21 could not be delivered without the commitment and collaboration of local governments (Connolly et al. 2012: 364ff.). Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK are often mentioned as being among the pioneering nations in developing and implementing LA21 ideas (Connolly et al. 2012: 367), whereas otherwise environmentally active nations such as Norway, Denmark and Germany became engaged in LA21 relatively lately. This late engagement is possibly explained by the fact that they were already involved in a range of environmental initiatives and therefore saw no reason to relaunch them as LA21 initiatives. Nonetheless, LA21 seems to have become a much more permanent feature of local government practices in the Nordic countries than in many other (European) countries. This is likely due to the fact that the Nordic local authorities are seen as stronger and have a higher degree of autonomy in many policy areas than do their counterparts in other countries (Rose and Denters 2005), which has made them relatively more effective in producing sustainable development alternatives. Thus, whereas the rhetoric and practice of LA21 seem to have run their course (Feichtinger and Pregering 2005; Kern et al. 2007), and in some places not moved beyond what Stoker and Young (1993) call ‘superficial tokenism’,14 partly due to its non-​statutory status and lack of financial and political support, it has obtained permanent, statutory status in some Nordic countries. This is the case in Denmark, for example, where LA21 has been regulated in the Law on Planning since 2000 (Law on Planning 2015:  ­chapter  6a, 33a and 33b). The chapter establishes that the regional and municipal councils have a duty to work out strategies for LA21 before the first half of each four-​year election cycle. Such strategies must contain an account of how the municipality intends to contribute to sustainable development in the twenty-​first century. The law is administered by the Ministry of the Environment and coordination is carried out together with Local Government Denmark (see Hoff and Kjer 2016). 54

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The implementation of LA21 in Denmark is manifest in many different ways, but areas that are typical for the municipal effort are green accounts, green procurement, ecological kitchens in municipal institutions, waste plans and the conservation of nature. Research has documented (Hoff and Kjer 2016) how LA21 is organized very differently in different municipalities. Some municipalities have ‘just’ established a LA21 board, aided heavily by local administration, while others have created more independent units that are responsible for the LA21 work. Some of the bigger municipalities, including Copenhagen, have decentralized LA21 and merged it with the local environmental offices (Miljøpunkter) (Agger 2010). Research has also shown that the actual content and length of the plans differ considerably (see Hoff and Kjer 2016). A final demonstration of the strong popular support for green policies in the Nordic countries is the work done by local governments concerning climate policies. While some of this work is concerned within or coordinated with the LA21 work, the question of climate change and climate change mitigation and adaptation has usually been conceived as a new agenda in politics from around 2000 onwards. In contrast to LA21, which is now statutory at least in Denmark, there are no laws compelling local governments in the Nordic countries to take action on climate change.15 Nonetheless, in Denmark, for example, 72 per cent of all municipalities have climate-​related action plans. Most of these plans cover the municipal activities and the municipalities as geographical units. Most of the plans also have concrete goals for GHG reductions. Calculated as annual reductions, these goals vary between 0.9 and 5.9 per cent in the period until 2020 (mean 2.5 per cent, median 2 per cent) (Hoff and Strobel 2013). The median value of 2 per cent is hardly surprising, as two-​thirds of all Danish municipalities have entered a voluntary agreement with the Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature, promising to reduce GHG by 2 per cent annually. Signing the agreement allows a municipality to call itself a ‘Climate Municipality’ (Klimakommune). Studying the concrete content of the climate plans, the list of initiatives is long, but measures such as energy conservation, RE, sustainable transport and sustainable lifestyles figure prominently (Hoff and Kjer 2016).

A conducive hegemonic discourse: ‘ecological modernization/​green growth’ It has been convincingly argued, first by Hajer (1995) but also Mol et  al. (2009), that especially in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, the discourse of ‘ecological modernization’ (EM) has dominated the political thought about environmental policies. Historically, Hajer (1995: 73ff.) sees this discourse as rising to prominence with the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, which set the scene for the work on the environment and sustainability carried out by the UN and its member states for a long period. Like the Brandt and Palme reports before it, this report was ingrained with West European social democratic ideas, stressing the need for multilateral collaboration and global solidarity in the solution of global problems related to poverty, health, the environment etc. Concretely, the discourse has the following characteristics: (1) environmental problems are seen as caused by structural conditions in our societies but can be solved by existing political, economic and social institutions; (2) environmental protection is a plus-​sum game; (3) environmental problems are collective action problems, meaning that they are governance problems; and (4) economic growth and the solution of environmental problems are not opposing aims. As some of the main social-​democratic figures in post-​war Europe were central in the formulation of EM, it is hardly surprising that EM is congruent with social-​democratic ideas about the environment and the instruments to be used in environment and climate policies. What does require further explanation, however, is how EM has become almost completely 55

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hegemonic in the Nordic countries, thereby marginalizing more radical as well as more neo-​ liberal discourses on the environment. A good point of departure for such explanation is the relation between sustainability and EM. Thus, the Brundtland Report launched its now-​famous definition of sustainability, saying that: ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WECD 1987: 41), and the report posits that a careful, politically steered process would make it possible to achieve economic growth that does not deplete the world’s resources and would contribute to greater global equity. While this claim has been heavily contested (see e.g. Langhelle 2009) in parts of the environmental movement in the form of discourses such as radical ecology (Dryzek 2005) and more recently in the form of the ‘planetary boundary’ discussion (see e.g. Rockström et al. 2009; Running 2012), it is also clear that it is exactly the promise of a simultaneous ‘greening’ of society and economic growth that has given EM its broad appeal. In order to make this happen –​that is, to achieve economic growth and a greener society simultaneously –​the more effective and sustainable use of resources is necessary. An early realization of this imperative led the Nordic countries to developing ‘greener’ and ‘cleaner’ technologies to the point where they are world leaders in some areas (e.g. wind turbines, hydraulic pumps, ball bearings, diesel engines). Realizing that this developmental path can be a win-​win situation for both businesses, employees and (presumably) the environment, breaking for example the correlation between economic growth and GHG emissions (see introduction) has contributed to very widespread support of the new millennium’s version of EM; the ‘green growth’ discourse (Blaxekjær 2014). An additional element in explaining the hegemony of the EM/​g reen growth discourse in the Nordic countries might be the ‘fit’ between EM and consensual democracies. The multiparty systems of Scandinavia, with their frequent coalition governments, therefore seem to offer a particularly conducive environment for EM/​green growth discourses, as they appeal to major groups in society (see Bøndergaard and Nielsen 2009: 139ff.).

Why are the climate policies of the Nordic countries so uniform? In this section, we will deal first with the uniformity of climate policies in the Nordic countries, looking at GHG emission-​reduction targets and policy instruments. Second, we will try to demonstrate that this uniformity is created by a number of institutions working to integrate and streamline these policies. The Nordics have all set national targets for reducing GHG emissions, and these targets have been followed by action plans and initiatives. The action plans are monitored, so there is an ongoing policy loop to maintain the focus on the reduction targets. Concerning the targets, the Nordic countries are all parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Further, as EU member states, Denmark, Finland and Sweden also have international emissions reduction commitments. The national emissions targets that have been reached by international agreement are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. For the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–​12), the joint EU obligation is shown for the Nordic countries that are EU members (the burden-​sharing commitment in parentheses). Norway and Iceland submitted individual mitigation targets for the first commitment period, as they are not EU members. For the second commitment period, which has yet to be implemented and probably never will, the EU did not settle on any internal burden sharing. The table therefore merely illustrates the shared EU obligation of 20 per cent reductions for the Nordic EU members. The EU Climate and Energy package agreed upon in 2007 established the famous ‘20-​20-​20 by 56

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The green ‘heavyweights’ Table 5.1  Commitments under the UNFCCC Country

Kyoto CP I 2008–​12

Kyoto CP II 2008–​12

Sectors and sources

Denmark Faroe Islands Finland Greenland Iceland Norway Sweden Ålandc

–​8(21) /​ 8(0) –​8 +1o +1 8(+4) 8(0)

–​20 /​ –​20 –​20 –​20a –​30b –​20 –​20

EU ETS /​ EU ETS

EU ETS EU ETS

Notes a Iceland is expected to fulfil its second commitment period Kyoto obligation, 2013–​20, jointly with the EU. b Minimum two-​thirds to be done nationally. Possibility of increasing target to 40 per cent pending international agreement. c Åland’s obligations are included in the Finnish obligations. Source: UNFCCC (2013) and International Energy Agency (2013).

2020’ goals: 20 per cent GHG reduction (baseline 1990), 20 per cent RE, 20 per cent increase in energy efficiency and 10 per cent transport fuels from biofuel sources. The package also included the Effort Sharing Decision, which codified into binding national legislation sharing the EU overall target of a 10 per cent reduction in the non-​ETS sectors by 2020 compared to 2005. The EU 2030 climate and energy framework has presented more ambitious goals: a 40 per cent reduction of GHG by 2030, 27 per cent RE and a 27 per cent increase in energy efficiency by 2030. Table 5.2 shows the national targets for the Nordic EU member states in the non-​ETS sectors. For Finland, this obligation corresponds to the national effort sharing for 2020, while for Sweden the national target is considerably more ambitious than the EU obligation. The Danish and Norwegian targets are total national emissions reductions and not just the non-​ETS sectors. Despite not being EU members, Norway and Iceland both participate in the EU ETS and will realize part of their obligations through this measure. As seen in the tables, while there is some variation between the Nordic countries in the original commitments under the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, there is much more uniformity when it comes to the current national targets for 2020 and 2050. This is especially true for the three Scandinavian countries with similar targets: Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The policy instruments used to mitigate climate change in the Nordic countries are also very similar, although some national variations exist. Table 5.3 gives an overview of these policy instruments; also for instruments only used in a few or even just one country. As noted by the Nordic Council of Ministers (2014: 29), information and awareness-​raising campaigns have also been one of the policy instruments in all of the Nordic countries but are not mentioned in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 gives an overview of specific policies implemented in the main emitting sectors. As seen in the table, the combination of taxes and incentives for renewable energy is and has been the main instrument in reducing GHG emissions in the Nordic countries. The taxes have different levels and varying coverage and exceptions but cover roughly the same areas.The taxes 57

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J. Hoff Table 5.2  National emission reduction targets Country

EU effort-​sharing

National targets for 2020

National targets for 2050

Use of offsets in the 2050 target

Denmark Faroe Islands Finland Greenland Iceland Norway Sweden Ålandh

20%

100% fossil-​freeb

20%

40%a 20%c 16%d

80% (domestic)

No No No

17% 16%

15% 30%e 40%g 16%

50–​75% 100% (net)f 100% (net) 80% (domestic)

Possibly Possibly Possibly No

Notes a Both ETS and non-​ETS sectors. b Corresponds to approximately 85 per cent emission reductions according to the International Energy Agency, 2013, referencing the Danish Climate Change Policy Commission’s calculations. c Baseline 2005. Domestic emissions including shipping and aviation. No offsets. d The target covers non-​ETS sectors. e Reduction of GHG emissions including offsets. f Including possibility for raising ambitions to realizing the 100 per cent target already by 2030 pending international agreement. g The target covers non-​ETS sectors. One-​third can be offset. h Åland’s obligations are included in the Finnish obligations. Source: UNFCCC (2013) and International Energy Agency (2013).

are slightly higher than the EU average and have been implemented earlier than in most other European countries. While policies are in place and appear to be working in the construction and industry sectors, the emissions from (road) transport and from agriculture constitute particularly wicked problems for the Nordic countries (as elsewhere). Energy use in road transport has increased 23 per cent since 1990, and while policies have been applied to increase the rate at which low-​emitting cars are introduced, emissions continue to increase. Norway has been the most successful of the Nordic countries in terms of increasing its share of zero-​emissions cars, giving them a leading market share globally. This has been achieved by introducing incentives including exemptions from registration fees, public parking fees, road tolls and road usage taxes, free ferry transport and permission to use lanes reserved for public transport (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014: 61). Concerning agriculture and the entire food value chain, very limited reduction policies have been introduced in the Nordic countries despite rather high GHG emissions.16 This ‘omission’ probably has to do with the fact that a certain level of agricultural production is seen as necessary to serve domestic (and export-​) markets and that agriculture in the Nordic countries operates under fluctuating and often difficult economic conditions. Looking ahead, the GHG-​emission projections for the Nordic countries are presented in Figure 5.2. Figure  5.2 shows that if no further policies are applied, GHG emissions are projected to follow the upper line, more or less preserving the status quo. This baseline projection includes countries with expected GHG emissions increases, as well as others –​mainly Sweden and Denmark –​with expected emissions reductions. The second line shows the projected emission reduction, including existing initiatives and policies, and the third line presents the targets from the Nordic countries as currently decided (2014). This means that it includes the 2020 targets 58

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The green ‘heavyweights’ Table 5.3  Summary of selected policies in the Nordic countries Sector

Policy area

Specify policy

Country

Energy

Support for renewable electricity (RE) production

Certificates for RE

A joint cross-​border system between Norway and Sweden Denmark, Finland

Transport

Reduction commitments for energy companies CO2 tax for petroleum production Car tax

Incentives for low emission vehicles

Introduction of cleaner fuels

Buildings

Low-​energy housing

District heating

Reduce oil for heating Industry

Increase energy efficiency

Subsidies for RE by a feed in tariff and tendering of offshore wind Annual reduction targets

Denmark

Tax of 410 NOK/​tCO2

Norway

CO2-​differentiated purchase tax CO2-​differentiated annual tax Fuel tax Rebate at purchase

Norway, Denmark, Finland All except Iceland All Sweden

No purchase tax and no annual tax Mandatory for fuel stations to offer biofuels Mandated biocontent in fuels. Reduced energy tax for biofuels (which also has no CO2 tax) Public support for charging facilities Building codes for new buildings Buildings codes for renovation of existing buildings System design and CO2 taxation Government support to district heating systems Mandatory phase out of oil burners Support schemes

Denmark, Norway Sweden, Norway Finland and Denmark Sweden, Norway

Norway, Denmark All Sweden, Norway, Finland Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway Norway Norway, Denmark Norway, Denmark, Sweden

Source: Nordic Council of Ministers (2014) and International Energy Agency (2013).

as well as the agreed vision for 2050. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, there is a widening gap between the targets and the projected reduction path. Filling this gap will require further policies and new initiatives. Summing up, combined with energy savings, taxes and incentives for renewable energy have historically been the main policy instruments in the climate policies of the Nordic countries. As demonstrated, they have been used in different ways and with great skill in different sectors, and it would appear likely that they will also be the main policy instruments used in the near 59

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J. Hoff 350 300

Mton CO2e

250 200

Baseline Target

150

Current policies Historic

100 50

30

25

20

20

20

15

20

10

20

05

20

00

20

95

20

19

19

90

0

Figure 5.2  Projections of GHG emissions reductions in the Nordic countries in MtCO2e Source: Own calculations based on national GHG emission projections.

future. However, it remains to be seen whether these instruments are sufficient to instigate the transition necessary to transform the Nordic countries to fossil-​free or almost fossil-​free societies by 2050.Thus, several authors claim that the responses to climate change thus far have been dominated excessively by short-​sighted CO2 reductions and market-​based approaches unlikely to produce the deep structural changes needed in order to enter a transitional pathway towards decarbonization (see e.g. Hildingsson and Khan 2015; Levin et al. 2012). Concerning uniformity, we can therefore conclude that both when it comes to GHG emission-​reduction targets and policy instruments, the Nordic countries display striking similarities. Concerning reduction targets, this is especially true when considering the national emission-​reduction targets for 2020 and 2050 (Table  5.2), and especially when comparing Sweden, Denmark and Norway.  The policy instruments also exhibit many similarities and even cooperation, which have surely resulted from mutual inspiration. So why are these GHG emissions-​reduction targets and the policy instruments used to achieve them so similar? The answer provided here is that this uniformity has resulted from a number of institutions constituting a framework for collaboration between the Nordic countries in this area. The first of these institutions is the Nordic Council of Ministers, which is the official body for Nordic intergovernmental cooperation. The Nordic prime ministers have the overall responsibility for Nordic cooperation, but in practice this responsibility is delegated to the Ministers for Nordic Co-​operation and to the Nordic Committee for Co-​operation, which coordinates the day-​to-​day work of official Nordic cooperation.17 The council was founded in 1971 and, despite its name, consists of several individual councils of ministers; among these, a Nordic Council of Ministers for the Environment and a Nordic Council for Fisheries and Aquaculture, Agriculture, Food and Forestry. The Nordic ministers for specific policy areas thus meet in 60

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their respective councils of ministers a couple of times annually. Corresponding to each council of ministers is also a Committee of Senior Officials, which typically consists of nine members; one for each of the Nordic countries, including the autonomous territories. Thus, a Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for Environmental Affairs as well as a Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for Energy Policy exists. The different Nordic Councils of Ministers and the Senior Officials Committees mainly work as platforms for exchanging experiences and ideas; they have no legal authority. The councils and committees nevertheless seem to work quite well. In the area of the environment and climate, for example, the Council has produced a string of interesting reports and analyses.18 Even though it is difficult to assess exactly how influential these reports and analyses are in the different national contexts, we claim that these reports and the ongoing coordination work in the Nordic Councils and Committees contribute to the uniformity of Nordic climate policies.19 The second of these institutions is the European Union. In order to achieve greater say in the EU, the Nordic EU member states (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) coordinate policy proposals and positions before major EU summits. These proposals and positions are also often discussed and coordinated with the Nordic non-​member states (Norway and Iceland). This is also the case with climate and energy policy, which are matters of ‘shared jurisdiction’ between the EU and the national governments.20 We also made note of the ongoing coordination between the green parties and the green left in the European parliament, so there is little doubt about the fact the EU works to unify and streamline the environment and climate policies of the Nordic countries –​both at the executive and parliamentary levels. The third of these institutions are the municipalities in the Nordic countries. They have a broad range of responsibilities and they are remarkably similar in the Nordic countries; internationally speaking, they are very autonomous. They have the right to tax both individuals and property and they are responsible for the bulk of public expenses (Rose and Denters 2005). Concerning climate policies, municipalities are under no legal obligation to reduce GHG emissions in any of the Nordic countries. In all of the countries, however, many of the municipalities have established their own reduction targets (see above for Denmark) together with action plans to meet their targets. These plans can involve a multitude of areas, as the municipalities are responsible for areas such as land-​use planning, (some) public transport, local roads, bicycle infrastructure, waste treatment, power utilities and district heating (including biogas production or incineration), energy codes for new buildings, and electricity production and distribution.21 Looking at the municipal GHG emissions-​reduction targets as well as their climate change action plans, many similarities become apparent among the Nordic countries. This can be argued to reflect the similarities between the countries at the national level. While there might be some truth to this, we find it more likely to result from the strength and relative autonomy of the municipalities, their many interactions with their citizens –​also in the climate and energy areas (Hoff and Gausset 2016) –​and the ongoing coordination between the municipalities in the Nordic countries.22 The fourth type of institutions producing uniformity in the climate and energy policies are different market-​based arrangements. The most well-​known of these arrangements is probably the common Scandinavian market for electricity. Transmission cables connecting the Scandinavian countries (as well as Germany and the Netherlands) have created a flexible infrastructure that makes it possible to balance production and consumption and maintain a market for electricity. Such flexibility is extremely useful for countries depending on RE as much as the Scandinavian countries, as RE depends on climatic conditions that cannot be regulated as neatly as the production of electricity from fossil sources. In periods where surplus hydropower is produced in 61

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Norway and Sweden, this can be exported to Denmark (and further along to the continent), while in periods with surplus wind power in Denmark, this can be exported to Norway and Sweden. A flexible infrastructure is therefore a precondition for operating with high levels of RE in a country’s energy mix. Establishing an infrastructure and a market for electricity is therefore a cornerstone in the further development of RE in the Nordics and establishes path dependency towards RE technologies. In this sense, the electricity market and infrastructure contributes to the Nordic uniformity in terms of climate policies and policy instruments. Another example of market-​based arrangements producing unity in climate policies are the RE certificates, which are basically incentives given to energy suppliers to support RE electricity production. This is a joint, cross-​border system between Norway and Sweden, which also works to produce uniform climate policies at least between these two countries.

Conclusions This chapter began by stating that the Nordic countries are indeed frontrunners when it comes to action on the environment and climate change. Instead of seeking to further underpin this fact, it has attempted to find the root causes of this long-​term leadership. The chapter has also sought to explain the uniformity characterizing Nordic climate policies, which is rather surprising given the very different geographical/​geological profiles of the Nordic countries. The answer to the first question was found in the combination of the strong popular support for green policies found among grassroots as well as in both national and local political arenas, and a strong hegemonic ecological modernization discourse enabling broad compromises on ambitious climate policies by combining them with strategies for economic growth based on green technologies. The answer to the second question initially sought to demonstrate the uniformity of climate policies in the Nordic countries by studying their GHG emissions-​reduction targets and their policy instruments. Their national emissions targets were found to be very similar with respect to the targets for 2020 and 2050. The policy instruments used to mitigate climate change were also found to be roughly similar, centring on different combinations of taxes and incentives to stimulate renewable energy and improve energy efficiency. These also seem to be the main policy instruments for use in the near future. In trying to answer the question of how this uniformity has been produced, it was argued that this is the result of a number of institutions constituting a framework for collaboration between the Nordic countries in the climate and energy policy areas: the Nordic Council of Ministers, the EU, the municipalities in the Nordic countries and different market-​based arrangements. In the Nordic Council, the ministers for specific policy areas meet a couple of times annually to exchange ideas and experiences. This is also the case for senior officials in the specific policy areas, and it was argued that the exchange of ideas and experiences in these fora contribute to uniformity around the climate policies of the Nordic countries. The EU is also seen as contributing to uniformity, as the Nordic countries often coordinate policies to achieve a stronger voice in both the Council of Ministers as well as in the European Parliament. The municipalities were seen to contribute to the uniformity of climate policies by extending –​in some cases even sharpening –​national climate policies through their own climate change action plans. These plans usually follow the logic of the national plans concerning RE and energy savings and are often coordinated nationally and internationally through different types of municipal networks (Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Different types of market-​based arrangements were also seen to contribute to the uniformity of climate policies in the Nordic countries. An example of this is the common Scandinavian market for electricity and the supporting infrastructure 62

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of transmission cables. This flexible infrastructure is seen as a precondition for ambitious goals concerning the further roll-​out of RE in the Nordic countries as well as an infrastructure that establishes a path-​dependency towards the use of common policy instruments in this area.

Notes 1 The Nordic countries are Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, but the Nordic region also includes the autonomous territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands.This is a vast geographical territory with approximately 25 million inhabitants. This chapter will only deal with the five countries and leaves out the peculiarities associated with environment and climate policies in the autonomous territories. 2 The UN Conference on Human Environment. 3 See www.naturskyddsföreningen.se. 4 See www.dn.dk. 5 See www.naturvernforbundet.no. The Norwegian Society is a member of the international organization Friends of the Earth. The Nordic societies for the Conservation of Nature are generally well-​ connected with their international counterparts. The Nordic societies also collaborate on matters of relevance at the EU level. 6 See www.sll.fi. 7 See www.vihreat.fi. 8 See www.mp.se. 9 See www.mdg.no. 10 See www.mdg.dk. 11 See www.alternativet.dk. 12 The Socialist People’s Party in Denmark and the Left Alliance in Finland were originally strong proponents of nuclear power. Their stance towards this issue shifted in the late 1980s/​beginning of 1990s, where they adopted a more genuinely green platform. 13 Agenda 21 has been argued to be the most significant outcome of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and as representing the most thorough and ambitious attempt at the international level to specify the actions necessary if (economic) development is to be reconciled with global environmental concerns (Connolly et al. 2012: 271). Agenda 21 consists of four sections: a section on social and economic dimensions highlighting the interconnectedness of environmental problems with poverty, health, trade, debt, consumption and population; a second section on the conservation and management of resources for development; a third section on the need to strengthen the role of major social groups, like women, indigenous populations, local authorities etc. in the process; and a fourth section on the means of implementation discussing the role of governments and NGOs. As there was originally no mention of local governments in Agenda 21, local authorities from around the world met a week before the Summit and endorsed the Curitiba Commitment: a declaration calling for local authorities to develop local action plans for sustainable development centred on principles of community education and democratic participation. This became known as Local Agenda 21 (LA21). 14 Stoker and Young have developed a typology of stages through which local authorities are seen to pass in their responses to sustainable development. ‘Superficial tokenism’ is the stage where local authorities begin to appreciate the significance of environmental issues but only tackle specific issues without taking into account the wider, overall effect of their policies. 15 While this is true in a legal sense, there are numerous laws and regulations that indirectly place pressure on municipalities to act on climate change. Apart from the international treaties and EU regulations that are also binding for municipalities, it concerns various different laws that give municipalities a role in the production and distribution of energy, as well as legislation enabling municipalities to affect local efforts concerning the climate and sustainability. 16 In Denmark, the former centre-​left government tabled a number of policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions from agriculture. Altogether, 18 measures were discussed, ranging from reforestation and taking organic soils out of production over taxing manure not being used for biogas production to putting lids on manure containers. None of these proposals were passed as laws, however, and the current (2016) government shows no sign of ever returning to any of these proposals. In Sweden, the former government proposed a support scheme for reducing methane emissions in biogas production, which is planned to take effect from 2014 (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014: 35).

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J. Hoff 17 See www.norden.org/​en/​nordic-​council-​of-​ministers/​thenordic-​council-​of-​ministers. 18 For some of these reports, see for example ‘Nordic Action on Climate Change’ or ‘Nordic Climate Policy’, both found at http://​urn.kb.se. 19 In order to further substantiate this claim, further research is needed on the inner workings of the councils and committees, their exact agendas etc. 20 Also in this area, further research is required in order to be more precise about the exact coordination going on between the Nordic countries in the climate and energy areas. 21 Power production, electricity production and district heating is often carried out by companies owned in partnerships between a number of municipalities, private–​public partnerships or private companies with significant public control. 22 The exact amount of ongoing coordination between the Nordic municipalities in the climate and energy areas is not known and subject to further research. What is known is that a good number of Nordic municipalities are members of ICLEI, an international umbrella organization for local governments in the environment and climate areas. See the ICLEI homepage: www.iclei.org.

References Agger, A. (2010) Involving Citizens in Sustainable Development: Evidence of New Forms of Participation in the Danish Agenda 21 Schemes. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability 15(6): 541–​552. Blaxekjær, L. (2014) Global Climate Governance Practices. PhD Thesis. Department of Political Science. University of Copenhagen. Bøndergaard, M. R. and Nielsen, E. B. (2009) Kursskift i dansk klimapolitik 2001–​09. Fra antimiljødiskurs til økologisk modernisering. Master’s Thesis. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P. (2010) Governing Climate Change. London: Routledge. Connolly, J., Smith, G., Benson, D. and Saunders, C. (2012) Politics and the Environment: From Theory to Practice. London: Routledge. Dryzek, J. S. (2005) The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ege, C. (2009) Er Danmark foregangsland? In:  Sohn, I. (ed.), Dansk klimapolitik –​globalt udsyn. Rødovre: Forlaget Sohn. Feichtinger, J. and Pregering, M. (2005) Imagined Citizens and Participation:  Local Agenda 21 in Two Communities in Sweden and Austria. Local Environment 10(3): 229–​242. Hajer, M. (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse:  Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hildingsson, R. and Khan, J. (2015) Towards a Decarbonized Green State? The Politics of Low-​Carbon Governance in Sweden. In: Bäckstrand, K. and Kronsell,A. (eds), Rethinking the Green State: Environmental Governance towards Climate and Sustainability Transitions. London: Routledge Earthscan. Hoff, J. (2016) Think Globally, Act Locally: Climate Change Mitigation and Citizen Participation. In: Hoff, J. and Gausset, Q. (eds), Community Governance and Citizen-​Driven Initiatives in Climate Change Mitigation. London: Routledge Earthscan. Hoff, J. and Gausset, Q. (eds) (2016) Community Governance and Citizen-​Driven Initiatives in Climate Change Mitigation. London: Routledge Earthscan. Hoff, J. and Kjer, M. (2016) Klimaets kommunale tilstand. Klimapolitik i danske kommuner. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. Hoff, J. and Strobel, B. W. (2013) A Municipal ‘Climate Revolution’? The Shaping of Municipal Climate Change Policies. Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies 12(1): 4–​16. International Energy Agency (2013) World Energy Outlook 2013. Available at: www.worldenergyoutlook. org/​weo2013/​ [Accessed 10 March 2017]. Kern, K., Koll, C. and Schophaus, M. (2007) The Diffusion of Local Agenda 21 in Germany: Comparing the German Federal States. Environmental Politics 16(4): 604–​624. Lafferty, W. M. and Meadowcraft, J. (2000) Patterns of Governmental Engagement. In: Lafferty, W. M. and Meadowcraft, J. (eds), Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langhelle, O. (2009) Why Ecological Modernization and Sustainable Development Should Not Be Conflated. In:  Mol, A. P.  J., Sonnenfeld, D. A. and Spaargaren, G. (eds), The Ecological Modernization Reader: Environmental Reform in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.

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The green ‘heavyweights’ Law on Planning (2015) Bekendtgørelse af lov om planlægning. LBK nr. 1529. Available at: www.retsinformation.dk/​pdfPrint.aspx?id=176182 [Accessed 5 December 2016]. Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S. and Auld, G. (2012) Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems:  Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Climate Change. Policy Sciences 45(2): 123–​152. Lundqvist, L. J. (2004) Sweden and Ecological Governance:  Straddling the Fence. Manchester:  Manchester University Press. Mol,A. P. J., Sonnenfeld, D.A. and Spaargaren, G. (eds) (2009) The Ecological Modernisation Reader: Environmental Reform in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Nordic Council of Ministers (2014) Nordic Climate Policy:  A  Case Study on Efficient Policy Measure. TemaNord 2014:522. Copenhagen:  Nordic Council of Ministers. http://​dx.doi.org/​10.6027/​ TN2014-​522. Nordic Council of Ministers (2015) Nordic Action on Climate Change. Copenhagen:  Nordic Council of Ministers. Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F. S., Lambin, E. F., Lenton, T. M., Scheffer, M., Folke, C., Schellnhuber, H. J., Nykvist, B., de Wit, C. A., Hughes, T., van der Leeuw, S., Rodhe, H., Sörlin, S., Snyder, P. K., Costanza, R., Svedin, U., Falkenmark, M., Karlberg, L., Corell, R.W., Fabry,V. J., Hansen, J., Walker, B., Liverman, D., Richardson, K., Crutzen, P. and Foley, J. A. (2009) Feature: A Safe Operating Space for Humanity. Nature 461: 472–​475. Rose, L. and Denters, B. (eds) (2005) Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Running, S.W. (2012) A Measureable Planetary Boundary for the Biosphere. Science 337(6101): 1458–​1459. Stern, P. C. (2000) New Environmental Theories:  Towards a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior. Journal of Social Issues 56(3): 407–​424. Stoker, G. and Young, S. (1993) Cities in the 1990s: Local Choice for a Balanced Strategy. Harlow: Longman. Sveistrup, H. (2016) The Path to Sustainability? How Danish Enterprises View the Danish Short and Long Term National Climate Policies and whether the Policies Contribute to a Theoretical Goal of a Sustainable Society. Master’s Thesis, Climate Master Programme, University of Copenhagen. Tobin, P. (2015) The Politics of Climate Change: Can a Deal be Done? Political Insight 6(1): 32–​35. UNFCCC (2013) National Inventory Submissions 2013. Available at:  http://​unfccc.int/​national_​reports/​ annex_​i_​ghg_​inventories/​national_​inventories_​submissions/​items/​7383.php [Accessed 10 March 2017]. WECD (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. United Nations. Available at: www.un-​documents.net/​our-​common-​future.pdf [Accessed 11 July 2016].

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PART II

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6 GOLDILOCKS’ FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER The rise, political entrenchment and transformation of the Scandinavian welfare states Carsten Jensen and Kees van Kersbergen

Introduction The contemporary Scandinavian welfare states are among the most generous and redistributive in the world. The universal protection that individuals enjoy in these countries if hit by joblessness or sickness is by comparative standards unparalleled.To many Scandinavians, however, their welfare states are more than simply protection against risk; they are a defining characteristic of Scandinavia itself and the people living there. The Scandinavian welfare states embody a set of values with which many wish to be associated: equality, compassion and fairness.To be opposed to the welfare state of the particular type found in Scandinavia is typically perceived as being an expression of a lack of such positive qualities: elitist, selfish and unfair. This chapter explores the social and political dynamics that brought about this state of affairs and how it affects modern-​day politics. While the welfare states are currently both big and deeply intertwined in the daily lives of millions of Scandinavians, this was not always the case. Indeed, 100 years ago, the Scandinavian welfare states were the mirror image of today; they were small and stigmatizing for those unfortunate enough to require protection. A set of historically unique circumstances combined to create the Goldilocks conditions; that is, the conditions ‘just right’ for this special type of welfare state to emerge, with its citizenship-​wide protection against many risks, the prominent position of the labour market partners in combination with encompassing active labour market policies, and large childcare and eldercare sectors. The Goldilocks conditions included: a labour movement that was just powerful enough to direct events but not quite potent enough to be able to ignore other political parties; a state apparatus that was just big and strong enough to implement welfare policies but not so vast and strong that it crowded out other social actors, such as unions and employer associations; and, finally, a post-​Second World War economy that had almost no unemployment for two decades in a row, which occurred at just the right moment in time when a cultural revolution in Scandinavia allowed women to enter the labour market in earnest. In sum, the Scandinavian welfare states are not the children of a single, brilliant designer, instead –​like Frankenstein’s monster –​patched together from whatever happened to be available at the time. 69

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The Goldilocks conditions gave rise to the Scandinavian welfare state, but these states themselves then took on a life of their own and remained full of life and viable, even though the ‘just right’ circumstances that initially caused them are long gone. As real monsters do, however, the Scandinavian welfare states not only do what they are supposed to –​create equality, social coherence and support for redistribution –​but also a number of things they are not supposed to. In fact, the Scandinavian welfare states have in some ways been digging their own respective graves for some time now due to their own immense success. In technical terms, we say that the Scandinavian welfare states not only produce positive or self-​reinforcing feedback (i.e. buttressing support for maintaining the status quo), but also negative or self-​undermining feedback (i.e. increasing support for change); two opposing forces that are coming ever more directly into conflict with each other. The chapter begins by summarizing the rise of the Scandinavian welfare states up until the mid-​1970s, focusing on what made this small region politically and institutionally unique compared to virtually every other country on the planet. The subsequent two sections examine the positive and negative feedback mechanisms created by the Scandinavian welfare states. As we explain, researchers have had a tendency to focus on the former type of feedback mechanisms, but the latter, in our opinion, are equally important. A key contribution of the chapter is to present an analytical framework integrating the two. The final section contains a discussion of the future of the Scandinavian welfare states.

Goldilocks conditions and the rise of the Scandinavian welfare states One key political feature of the Scandinavian welfare states that is frequently highlighted is that they are based on cross-​class coalitions (for a description of the similarities and differences characterizing the Nordic welfare states, see Chapter 2 in this volume).The original cross-​class coalition was between the labour movement, small farmers and rural labourers, a coalition that was later replaced with one between the labour movement and the middle class. The cross-​class coalition argument was first formulated by Esping-​Andersen in his landmark study Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (1985), but has since then featured in prominent work by, among others, Baldwin (1990), Huber and Stephens (2001), Iversen and Soskice (2006) and Korpi (2006). The argument rests on two basic premises. First, that during the twentieth century, and especially from the 1930s to the 1970s, the labour movement was a powerful force in Scandinavia, able to influence policy-​making in significant ways. Second, that despite this position of strength, the labour movement has rarely been so strong that it could disregard all other actors. To get its preferred policies passed in parliament and accepted by the organizations that were supposed to implement them, compromises have often been necessary. That the labour movement has had to make compromises helps explain why several welfare programmes, including basic state pensions and health care, ended up covering almost all of the population. In the early twentieth century, the labour movement’s first priority was to secure protection for workers for the doubly good reason that they were normally highly exposed and at the same time were the members of the labour movement. Since the labour movement fought for the interests of its own members –​as opposed to society as a whole –​its preferred policies were typically almost anti-​universalist: strictly to the benefit of an exclusive group of workers. With the exception of brief spells in Sweden, however, the labour movement’s parliamentary representation, the social democratic parties, have never held a majority of seats (see also Chapter 8 in this volume). Securing the parliamentary backing of other parties and representing the interests of other social groups therefore became essential to get anything done. 70

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Needless to say, these coalition partners were normally unwilling to accept all of the benefits from a new or more generous welfare programme going to the social democratic voters, meaning that coverage was spread out across the population to a far wider extent than the early labour movement pioneers ever advocated. The ‘strong-​but-​not-​too-​strong’ position of the labour movement is the first Goldilocks condition. The second is the role of the state apparatus, which again turned out to be ‘strong-​ but-​not-​too-​strong’ (for a discussion of the role of the state, see Evans et al. 1985). In many Catholic countries, the church remained a dominant, often the dominant, administrative agent well into the twentieth century, especially at the local level. In Scandinavia, however, administrative powers had been centralized since the Reformation, although the Protestant church continued to play an important role at the local level (Lindert 1998;Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Moreover, the Scandinavian bureaucrats were generally incorrupt, at least from the last half of the nineteenth century, and loyal to the elected government (Jensen 2013; Rothstein and Teorell 2015). Yet while powers were centralized formally, the ability and willingness to intervene in society was often limited. Politicians –​particularly those representing either the unions or employers –​have been happy to leave the regulation of the labour market and sometimes also of welfare programmes in the hands of the labour market partners (e.g. Katzenstein 1985; Korpi 2006; Martin and Swank 2012; Nørgaard 1997; Swenson 2002). The result has been a strange mix of state interventionism in some areas and laissez-​faire in others, where the unions and employer associations have instead been both the real decision-​makers and administrators of policy. The major example is unemployment insurance: with the exception of Norway, which had introduced compulsory insurance in 1938, all of the other countries developed and retained voluntary systems (Edling 2005). The upside of such corporatist arrangements has been an improved ability to steer the economy during economic cycles. When the economy is growing rapidly, rising wages frequently lead to rising prices and, eventually, to a downturn as companies find it harder to compete on the international market. A trademark of Scandinavian corporatism has been the willingness of unions to smooth-​out economic cycles to the mutual benefit of all (Katzenstein 1985; Wallerstein 1990; see also Chapter 4 in this volume). As argued by Garrett (1998), without such moderation it is unlikely that the massive expansion of the Scandinavian welfare states over the course of the twentieth century would have been possible. For their part, the employers have accepted the responsibility for creating decent unemployment benefits and opportunities for the re-​training of the jobless (Martin and Swank 2012); policies that are needed in order to secure the cooperation of the unions on, for example, economic policy issues. The third and final Goldilocks condition relates to the timing of two unrelated events. The first is the extremely low unemployment figures over a period of more than 20 years beginning in the 1950s and stretching (well into) the 1970s. The other event is a cultural revolution that enabled many women to seek paid employment in the labour market. All of the Western European countries experienced the same economic boom marked by very low unemployment in this period, but Scandinavia arguably advanced furthest in breaking down traditional gender roles. The massive inflow of women into the labour market only took place here at this time. In many continental European countries, the male breadwinner model survived for several decades more and remains alive and kicking in countries such as Italy, Spain and even the Netherlands (when considering full-​time equivalents). In Scandinavia, the surge of females into the labour market had radical ramifications for the welfare state, as it meant that whole new sectors had to be established to look after children and elderly family members, as working women could no longer provide full-​time care. Although other countries have followed, even today extensive 71

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child-​and eldercare is one of the defining characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare state (Esping-​Andersen 1999; Huber and Stephens 2000; Jensen 2008). The timing of the two events –​the exceptional labour demand during the post-​war boom and the increased supply of female labour stemming from the cultural revolution –​was perfect in more than one sense (see Bonoli 2005). Scandinavian women started to enter the labour market well before the economic crisis of the 1970s.This meant that as money got tighter from the 1970s onwards, a large and hugely popular care sector had already emerged. With many women working here and even more families depending on the services they provided, cuts to –​let alone the elimination of –​the care sector were politically out of the question. Such institutionally entrenched and politically salient vested interests existed nowhere else, rendering the Scandinavian path even trickier to pursue. We have thus far accounted for three unique conditions that have influenced the emergence and institutional and political entrenchment of the Scandinavian welfare states up until roughly the 1970s. Three characteristics stand out. The first feature involves the universalist coverage of the population by key welfare programmes, notably health care and pensions. The exception here is unemployment protection:  only Norway has a truly universalist scheme. The second trait concerns the prominent role of the labour market partners, which goes hand in hand with active labour market policies emphasizing relatively generous unemployment benefits and the re-​training of the jobless. The third and final attribute is the large sector that provides care for children and the elderly, which –​critically –​facilitates the labour market participation of women. We underscore again that there has never been a masterplan behind these developments. They occurred because of coinciding historical events that are unlikely to be repeated. Yet while the rise of the Scandinavian welfare states might seem to lack structure, the subsequent strengthening of their political entrenchment certainly did not.

‘It’s alive! It’s alive!’ Positive feedback effects and Scandinavian welfare state politics With the historical institutionalist approach of the early 1990s, it has become an established truism that welfare states can reproduce themselves even after the causes of their genesis have disappeared. Skocpol (1992), for instance, revealed how such positive feedback shaped the early development of the American welfare state, while Pierson (1994) studied positive feedback in the context of the more recent era of small-​government conservatives in Britain and the United States. In the most general formulation, positive feedback is defined as a process of increasing returns whereby ‘the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path’ (Pierson 2000:  252). In other words, as welfare states develop their distinct characteristics over time, it becomes increasingly unlikely that they subsequently will radically transform. The idea that the welfare state, almost as an autonomous organism, can sustain itself is a well-​versed argument when it comes to the Scandinavian welfare states. As early as 1980, Kristensen (1980, see also 1984) observed that a professional-​bureaucratic complex had surfaced consisting of vast numbers of public sector employees, most of whom were working in welfare services, that fought single-​mindedly to expand budgets. Because expansion typically would benefit a fairly concentrated group of public professionals (e.g. doctors, teachers, nurses), while the costs would be spread out across all taxpayers, such calls for expansion would be hard to deny; particularly because professionals often also function as experts with considerable power over public opinion. Big service sectors therefore beget even bigger service sectors. Since the Scandinavian welfare states are characterized by their large welfare service sectors –​that is, the 72

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professional-​bureaucratic complex (or ‘stateness’; see Chapter 2 in this volume) is uniquely big –​this is one noteworthy form of a positive feedback mechanism that is at play in one form or another, assuming Kristensen’s argument is correct. While Kristensen focused on the role of public sector employees, others have studied the importance of the voters. Korpi and Palme (1998) present an account of how the Scandinavian middle classes unexpectedly developed a taste for redistributive welfare programmes. Key to the argument is the adoption of universalist schemes, which by design serve to include the middle class among the recipients of benefits. Because middle-​class voters now also received a share of the social goodies, they gradually started supporting these welfare programmes; in fact, they demanded that they be expanded. Compared to most other classes in society, the middle class carries considerable electoral weight; win the middle class and you win the majority of voters that is needed to form the government. That is why the middle-​class’ demand for more welfare was heeded, according to Korpi and Palme, and why the Scandinavian welfare states continued to grow without the middle class rebelling against the high taxes, as was the case in other countries. The deal was appealing to the middle class because the well-​to-​do are paying even more and because the middle class receives first-​class welfare in return. This was fortunate for the poorest, as they too benefited from the generosity of the welfare programmes. In countries where the middle class does not have access to many welfare programmes because they are means-​tested, there is no electorally important group demanding expansion. Welfare for the poor therefore becomes poor welfare. Moreover, as shown by Larsen (2008, 2013) and Larsen and Dejgaard (2013), poor-​only programmes reveal a cultural divide between the poor and the middle class, with the poor being framed as outsiders –​lazy, ungrateful and untrustworthy –​with obvious negative consequences for the willingness of the middle class to even consider expanding welfare programmes. A vicious circle appears where the poor are perceived as outsiders and denied support, which in turn increases social inequalities and makes the distance between the middle class and the poor wider and even more tangible. Although never perfectly harmonious, perceptions of the poor are much more benign in Scandinavia and the support correspondingly high, a topic to which we return below. Kristensen (1980) and Korpi and Palme (1998) emphasize the material self-​interest –​enlightened or not –​of public sector employees and the middle class, respectively, as the driving mechanism behind the persistently large Scandinavian welfare states. In contrast, in Just Institutions Matter, Rothstein (1998) paints a much more flattering portrait of the Scandinavian people. In his view, the high levels of public support for the welfare state are explained by the fact that it is organized so as to meet some intuitive moral principles that most people across the world would agree are crucial. The first moral principle is that of general fairness, or substantive justice, which basically means that ‘the state should treat all citizens with equal concern and respect’ (1998: 157).This is arguably what universalist policies are designed to do, whereas means-​tested, insurance-​based welfare programmes are intended to separate people according to various criteria and not treat everybody the same way. The second moral principle is procedural justice, which concerns whether or not the state can implement its policies in a fair manner. Here, Rothstein’s argument is that universalist policies by design do not contain any assessment of the worthiness of potential recipients. All citizens are by default qualified for benefits, so there is no need for public bureaucrats to scrutinize the situation of claimants. Means-​tested welfare programmes turn this upside-​down. An entire public apparatus is put in place to assess if the living conditions of claimants fulfil the requirements stipulated in the law. This can feel intrusive for the individual claimant and create myths among the general public because the evaluation process is often complex and unclear. Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) report a Swedish study that shows how interpersonal 73

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trust is lower among people on means-​tested programmes and that the more means-​tested programmes people are in touch with, the lower the interpersonal trust. So even in a country with relatively few means-​tested programmes, the mechanism theorized by Rothstein (1998) appears to be at play. The third principle is the just distribution of burdens. In Rothstein’s words, ‘citizens who wish to contribute to the common good are only willing to do so if they do not believe others will take undue advantage of their solidarity’ (1998: 163). In countries where means-​testing dominates, the framing of the poor as untrustworthy and lazy means that many middle-​class citizens come to the conclusion that their hard-​earned taxes are probably wasted on some undeserving person. The link between payment and benefits is much clearer in universalist systems, making it more likely that the middle class will find the distribution of burdens fair. It is certainly self-​evident that Scandinavians are generally happier to pay their taxes than the average American (see e.g. Kleven 2014). In sum, there are several good –​and quite plausibly complementary –​reasons why the Scandinavian welfare states should exhibit positive feedback. However, positive feedback does not necessarily mean that things remain as they always have been or that the only development will be more of the same. Another line of research instigated by Hacker (2004) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) has explored how changes on the margins can gradually lead to large effects down the road. In the American context, such ‘gradual but transformative change’ has been argued to erode the value of welfare benefits as new vulnerable groups are left unprotected. In the Scandinavian context, the political and policy dynamics are likely to be different, as argued by Jensen (2014), not least because the acceptance of state responsibility for handling the poor and the marginalized is so relatively widespread that simply ignoring the predicaments of these groups is not an option. Instead, the political approach has been to introduce market elements in a process of marketization via layering whereby the core public services are maintained but with market-​inspired add-​ons such as more free choice for parents, patients and pensioners:  the three Power-​Ps. Marketization via layering typically offers benefits to the middle class, which receives a wide range of options, either because they can move from one school/​hospital/​pension fund to another or because they can pay for additional welfare. Such out-​of-​pocket spending is usually heavily subsidized by the state but still requires a surplus that people with low incomes do not have. Because of the subsidies, however, public spending often ends up higher than otherwise would have been the case. However, the redistributive effect is (slightly) less than under a fully public system, simply because the additional money is going to the better-​off. For ideologically-​ motivated centre-​r ight Scandinavian governments, such publicly subsidized marketization has been one of the few yet important avenues open to secure more market-​like arrangements.Yet the paradoxical result has been that Scandinavian centre-​r ight governments over the past three decades have generally ended up spending just as much on welfare as leftist governments –​and sometimes even more (Jensen 2010).

The monster turns on its master That centre-​r ight governments sometimes end up being more social democratic than the Social Democrats is perhaps the most potent example of the strong positive feedback mechanisms at play in Scandinavia. However, the Scandinavian welfare states produce both positive and negative feedback. Negative feedback occurs when an institution becomes self-​undermining; that is, it starts producing outcomes that gradually erode its own prospects for survival (Jacobs and Weaver 2015). One particularly interesting form of negative feedback is when a policy or 74

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institution is so successful that it begins to undermine the basis for its own existence. Such excessive success can come about due to changes at both the individual and macro levels. One oft-​praised feature of the Scandinavian welfare states is that they empower citizens: High quality childcare and education provide children with increased competencies, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, allowing them to seek better employment than they otherwise would have been able and to participate more actively in society. A large public service sector offers jobs to women, enabling them to earn their own income and thus leaving them less dependent on their respective husbands. Public care for children and the elderly liberates women and enables them to join the workforce and pursue a career. A generous social safety net means that men and women alike do not have to live in (excessive) fear of the financial consequences of sickness, unemployment or old age. Taken together, all of these benefits mean that the ordinary citizens living in Scandinavia escape the constraints of the traditional power structures of the market and the family to a greater extent than anywhere else (Bonoli 2005; Esping-​Andersen 1999, 2009; Huber and Stephens 2000; Korpi et al. 2013). Emancipation from traditional structures is likely to have knock-​on effects on the values of citizens. Inglehart (e.g. 1977)  has advanced the view that material security causes people to place greater emphasis on self-​expression. Self-​expression values imply that individuals put a high premium on the right and ability to do what they themselves want with their lives. Sticking to the hierarchy and eating what is put in front of you is distinctly unappealing for those valuing self-​expression. It is telling that self-​expression values are extremely prominent in Scandinavia, even more so than in many other affluent countries. A plausible reason for this is that the most extended and universalist welfare states empower citizens most, both via the provision of social protection and through investment in human capital formation from preschool to university.Yet self-​expression may not only entail a preference for not being subject to market or family control; it may equally likely entail an interest in not having to accept gratefully everything the welfare state offers. In fact, it may even cultivate an anti-​hierarchical –​and hence a more anti-​welfare state –​attitude, paradoxically because the efforts of the welfare state have contributed to their improved ability to cope on the market by themselves. In its popular form, the famous Wagner’s Law stipulates that the wealthier a country gets, the more welfare the population expects. Although Wagner’s Law may in a broad sense be correct –​ viewed from the perspective of the first 70–​80 years of the welfare state’s history since circa 1900, it clearly no longer works as first expected. Since the 1970s, the gross domestic product (GDP) of practically all Western countries has doubled in real terms, but the welfare states have remained roughly of the same size in terms of the share of GDP going to them. Based on the notion of self-​expression values, however, it may be possible to formulate a Wagner’s Law 2.0 that better captures what is going on in contemporary Scandinavia. Wagner’s Law 2.0 is simple and states: The more materially secure a country’s citizens get, the more individualized welfare and ‘choice’ they expect. While the threats from social risks such as unemployment and sickness were undoubtedly a major concern for many people during the build-​up of the welfare state, the majority of current-​day Scandinavians are not directly exposed to any substantial risks.That is precisely the unprecedented achievement of the Scandinavian welfare states, which suggests that other demands are becoming more important, including the freedom of choice and the right to maintain a certain lifestyle when dependent on the welfare state. By their very construction, the universalist welfare programmes that characterize the public service sectors in Scandinavia are not well-​suited to discriminate between citizens. This is a primary quality of the programmes because it means that people can develop a strong sense of trust in them, as explained by Rothstein (1998). Conversely, it also means that individualized preferences (‘my child shall have this form of schooling’, ‘my old mother this form of care’) 75

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are difficult to handle without breaking with the logic of the system. The one-​size-​fits-​all, universalist scheme comes into conflict with the preferences that itself helped bring about. It is little wonder, then, that the demand for all sorts of additional insurances and plans have surged. Although hard evidence is lacking, there is reason to believe that the relative success of marketization via layering strategies largely comes down to a changing set of values in the population. Whereas private health insurance might have appeared anti-​social 30 years ago, it now aligns perfectly with the growing belief that individuals have the right to organize their lives as they want and that the role of the welfare state is to facilitate such lifestyle choices. The Scandinavian welfare states may also have been excessively successful in another way. It follows from the work of Korpi and Palme (1998) and Rothstein (1998) that the key to the continued existence of the Scandinavian welfare states as we know them is the political support of the middle class. Bringing the middle class on board increased the total redistributive budget size substantially. It is certainly true that as the universalist welfare programmes were implemented in Scandinavia, the share of GDP going to the welfare state expanded dramatically. As also mentioned, however, the share of GDP going to the welfare state has been almost flat for the past 30 years with the exception of the spikes in spending related to economic downturns. There seems to be a natural saturation point at which the middle class either cannot or will not support the welfare state occupying a greater share of the economy than already is the case. To understand this development, we must move beyond the one-​dimensional picture of public opinion that much of the welfare state literature relies on where the only preference that counts is ‘more versus less welfare’. While still a simplistic analytical model, a lot of explanatory leverage is gained when realizing that the Scandinavian middle class simultaneously values both a generous welfare state and a sound economy. This has been repeatedly documented in the many National Election Surveys produced in recent decades in Scandinavia. For the middle class, a poor economy is at least as detrimental for their living conditions as cuts to welfare programmes, as the main source of income and material comfort comes from the labour market. Unfortunately, no time series data exists for the willingness to trade more welfare for lower disposable income (i.e. lower taxes and/​or lower salaries), so we can only speculate. Still, one possible reason for the slowdown in the growth of the welfare state in terms of the share of the economy may be that the middle class to an increasingly lesser extent prefers welfare over a lower disposable income. Danish middle-​class voters in the early 1980s, and Swedish middle-​ class voters in the early 1990s, certainly flocked to the centre-​right in response to the major downturns the countries were experiencing at the time, opening the window for a brief spell of unapologetic austerity. Assuming that the logic of Korpi and Palme’s and Rothstein’s arguments is correct, it would seem as though the positive feedback of the middle class demanding more and more welfare contains a built-​in switch that turns the positive feedback mechanism into a negative feedback process for the straightforward reason that the middle class cherishes both a lot of welfare and a sound economy with a solid labour market income for itself. As Jensen (2014) points out, this does not necessarily mean that the middle class actually has to forego anything, at least not in the grander scheme of things; rather, it means that welfare programmes aimed at the poor and marginalized (social assistance, unemployment insurance, disability pensions) will be cut in order to continuously expand the welfare programmes that benefit the middle class most directly (health care, education, childcare, eldercare). Since the 1990s, it is above all else the former type of welfare programmes that have been cut, while public spending on the latter has remained stable or increased. Crucially, this does not mean that the total spending on the welfare state will decline substantially, only that it will be allocated to other areas and groups. For American and British 76

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conservatives, the Scandinavian welfare states will remain oversized and freakish to behold, but the policy changes make perfect sense to Scandinavian middle-​class voters.

Conclusions: is there a place for monsters? The Scandinavian welfare states constitute a distinct type according to most welfare state typologies and we have deliberately focused on the features that make the Scandinavian welfare states stand out from the rest. These unique features include the unique conditions surrounding their origins up until around 1980; the powerful positive feedbacks that were set in motion and have helped sustain them; and more speculatively, the negative feedbacks that might be undermining them as you read these words. In an increasingly globalized world with immense migration flows, however, it is worth asking if the Scandinavian welfare states will be able to stick to their own distinctive path or if they will have to converge towards some sort of international minimum. Is there a place for monsters? Immigration obviously puts the universalist welfare state under pressure. Apart from the politics of the cultural issue that until the refugee crisis played out very differently in, for instance, Sweden and Denmark, the question for all countries is whether it is politically and financially possible to sustain an encompassing and inclusive welfare state that guarantees the same social rights to all residents. Universalism has (tacitly) assumed maximum labour market participation in return for the extension of social rights. Although labour participation rates among non-​ Western immigrants have been increasing (at least until the 2008 recession), a huge gap remains between migrant and native employment rates. This has opened up a Pandora’s box of political debate around issues of reciprocity and deservingness. One of the key economic features of the Scandinavian welfare states that has allowed them to remain competitive on the world market has been heavy investments in education for large segments of the public from preschool to university. This allows Scandinavian companies to engage in high-​value-​added industry and service production that creates enough turnover to pay both high wages and high taxes. With the involvement of the labour market partners, the unemployment system, as mentioned above, has been turned into a re-​training machine. This also facilitates a comparably smooth operation of the private market. Whether or not there will be a place for the Scandinavian welfare states in the future depends on the ability to protect these qualities.

References Baldwin, P. (1990) The Politics of Social Solidarity:  Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–​1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bonoli, G. (2005) The Politics of the New Social Policies: Providing Coverage against New Social Risks in Mature Welfare States. Policy & Politics 33(3): 431–​449. Edling, N. (2005) Limited Universalism:  Unemployment Insurance in Northern Europe, 1900–​2000. In: Christiansen, N. F., Petersen, K., Edling, N. and Haave, P. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1985) Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esping-​ Andersen, G. (2009) Incomplete Revolution:  Adapting Welfare States to Women’s New Roles. Cambridge: Polity. Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol,T. (eds) (1985) Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garrett, G. (1998) Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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C. Jensen and K. van Kersbergen Hacker, J. S. (2004) Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States. American Political Science Review 98(2): 243–​260. Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2000) Partisan Governance,Women’s Employment, and the Social Democratic Service State. American Sociological Review 65(3): 323–​342. Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2001) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Inglehart, R. (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton Legacy Library. Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006) Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions:  Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others. American Political Science Review 100(2): 165–​181. Jacobs, A. M. and Weaver, R. K. (2015) When Policies Undo Themselves: Self-​Undermining Feedback as a Source of Policy Change. Governance 28(4): 441–​457. Jensen, C. (2008) Worlds of Welfare Services and Transfers. Journal of European Social Policy 18(2): 151–​162. Jensen, C. (2010) Issue Compensation and Right-​Wing Government Social Spending. European Journal of Political Research 49(2): 282–​299. Jensen, C. (2014) The Right and the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jensen, M. F. (2013) Korruption og embedsetik:  Danske embedsmænds korruption i perioden 1800–​ 1866. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark. Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kleven, H. J. (2014) How Can Scandinavians Tax so Much? Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(4): 77–​98. Korpi, W. (2006) Power Resources and Employer-​Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists. World Politics 58(2): 167–​206. Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality:  Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries. American Sociological Review 63(5): 661–​687. Korpi, W., Ferrarini, T. and Englund, S. (2013) Women’s Opportunities under Different Family Policy Constellations:  Gender, Class, and Inequality Tradeoffs in Western Countries Re-​examined. Social Politics 20(1): 1–​40. Kristensen, O. P. (1980) The Logic of Political-​Bureaucratic Decision-​Making as a Cause of Governmental Growth: Or Why Expansion of Public Programs Is a ‘Private Good’ and Their Restriction Is a ‘Public Good’. European Journal of Political Research 8(2): 249–​264. Kristensen, O. P. (1984) On the Futility of the ‘Demand Approach’ to Public-​Sector Growth. European Journal of Political Research 12(3): 309–​324. Kumlin, S. and Rothstein, B. (2005) Making and Breaking Social Capital: The Impact of Welfare-​State Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 38(4): 339–​365. Larsen, C. A. (2008) The Political Logic of Labour Market Reforms and Popular Images of Target Groups. Journal of European Social Policy 18(1): 50–​63. Larsen, C. A. (2013) The Rise and Fall of Social Cohesion: The Construction and De-​construction of Social Trust in the US, UK, Sweden and Denmark. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Larsen, C. A. and Dejgaard, T. E. (2013) The Institutional Logic of Images of the Poor and Welfare Recipients:  A  Comparative Study of British, Swedish and Danish Newspapers. Journal of European Social Policy 23(3): 287–​299. Lindert, P. H. (1998) Poor Relief before the Welfare State:  Britain versus the Continent, 1780–​1880. European Review of Economic History 2(2): 101–​140. Martin, C. J. and Swank, D. (2012) The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nørgaard, A. S. (1997) The Politics of Institutional Control: Corporatism in Danish Occupational Safty and Health Regulation & Unemployment Insurance, 1970–​1995. Aarhus: Politica. Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pierson, P. (2000) Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review 94(2): 251–​267. Rothstein, B. (1998) Just Institutions Matter:  The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2015). Getting to Sweden, Part II: Breaking with Corruption in the Nineteenth Century. Scandinavian Political Studies 38(3): 238–​254.

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Goldilocks’ Frankenstein monster Skocpol, T. (1992) Protecting Mothers and Soldiers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Streeck,W. and Thelen, K. (eds) (2005) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Swenson, P. (2002) Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Kersbergen, K. and Manow, P. (eds) (2009) Religion, Class  Coalitions, and Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, M. (1990) Centralized Bargaining and Wage Restraint. American Journal of Political Science 34(4): 982–​1004.

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7 NORDIC ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS Per Lægreid

Introduction Administrative tradition is a slippery concept, often seen as being synonymous with terms such as historical legacy, administrative culture, cultural-​institutional context and state tradition (Yesilkagit 2010). Metaphors such as ‘many houses’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) or ‘family of nations’ (Painter and Peters 2010) have been used. Adding to the broad concept of administrative traditions, we also have the narrower concepts of the management ideas and organizational culture (Peters et al. 2016). In other words, there are several, partly overlapping and partly competing classifications of administrative traditions, and the categorization is rather incomplete and imprecise. A common definition of administrative culture includes both ideas and structure (Painter and Peters 2010; Yesilkagit 2010). This chapter sticks to this understanding of administrative tradition as both ideas and beliefs concerning the nature of government in a specific national context together with institutions and structures of government that are constructed in the past and have come to be taken for granted. Administrative traditions relate to relationships within the administration itself as well as to the relationship to political institutions and society at large. The recognition of the importance of administrative traditions can be linked to the ‘institutional turn’ in political science and public administration. Historical institutionalism and concepts such as path-​dependencies (Pierson 2004), logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) and layering (Streeck and Thelen 2005) are important to understand change and stability as well as administrative reform processes (Bezes and Lodge 2007). A  core argument is that public management is deeply rooted in national institutionalized values and that historical legacy matters (Lynn 2006). Domestic administrative traditions might have a filtering function on international reform trends (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). The national administrative tradition might both enable and constrain administrative reforms depending on how compatible the reforms are with the existing administrative tradition.When facing such a compatibility test (Brunsson and Olsen 1993), the reforms might transform or adapt to fit the existing administrative culture. The administrative culture is not unaffected by the reforms, however, and might also change over time. 80

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One of the main arguments is that administrative traditions employ particular administrative values that stand for a distinct model of ‘good government’. The Nordic countries are often portrayed as model states in terms of government reform and as efficient and successful in terms of the economy, welfare, security and democracy. Fukuyama’s (2004) metaphor ‘Getting to Denmark’ underlines how good government is a combination of a strong state, the well-​functioning rule of law and an accountable democracy that is characteristic of the Nordic countries. There has been increased attention regarding the importance of governance capacity, a good performing administrative apparatus and the quality of government to understand why some countries are more successful than others in providing good living conditions and welfare for their citizens (Holmberg and Rothstein 2014).The ‘institutional turn’ in political science has led to increased interest in governance capacity and administrative traditions. A central question in this chapter is whether there is such a specific Nordic administrative tradition related to administrative reforms. The Nordic countries have long been characterized as reluctant reformers (Olsen 1996) or as modernizers and maintainers more than marketizers when it comes to public management reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). But is this still the case? And to what degree has the traditional Nordic model of public administration been supplemented with New Public Management (NPM) reform initiatives and post-​NPM reform trends (Christensen 2004; Christensen and Lægreid 2007)? Are the Nordic countries moving towards a neo-​Weberian state model, as claimed by Bouckaert and Peters (2004)? Alternatively, are they moving away from the Weberian bureaucracy that has characterized the Nordic administrative arrangements and towards a ‘management bureaucracy’ or a managerial NPM-​inspired state (Clarke and Newman 1997; Hall 2012)? Or do we see a post-​NPM movement with whole-​of-​government features (Christensen and Lægreid 2007)? Or is the development instead characterized by increased complexity and hybridity in a layering process of different reform trends (Christensen and Lægreid 2010)? In the Nordic context, one might ask whether there is a single administrative tradition or if it would be more accurate to speak of a mixture of multiple administrative traditions. The argument here is that the administrative system constitutes a mixed order of multiple and partly competing demands, producing lasting tensions and dilemmas to which there are no optimal answers (Olsen 2010). Rather than facing a single best principle or consistent administrative tradition, we might see compound and composite systems with partly competing values, cultures and traditions. First, I will provide a brief outline of different administrative traditions in Europe, which might help to see the differences and similarities of a Nordic administrative model. Second, I will describe the Nordic administrative model in greater detail, both regarding common features and variations across countries.Third, I will address the links between administrative traditions and reforms, both generally and by using findings from a survey sent to top civil servants in central governments across Europe. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

Different European administrative traditions Different administrative traditions and national political-​institutional legacies might be important for understanding reform processes, trends and outcomes. Several scholars have attempted to classify and categorize the various administrative traditions found in Europe. Different families, groups and hybrids have been identified. Painter and Peters (2010) argue that there is a specific Scandinavian administrative tradition or ‘family’ of countries that have a common administrative inheritance that is different from the Anglo-​Saxon, Napoleonic and Germanic traditions. The Napoleonic state tradition is a strong centralized state with state–​society conflicts; the 81

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Germanic tradition is more organic, with cooperative state–​society relations; the Anglo-Saxon tradition has pluralistic state–​society relations; while the Scandinavian tradition is a mix between the Germanic and Anglo-​Saxon traditions (Lounghlin and Peters 1997). Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014) distinguish between a Continental Napoleonic Model, a Continental Federal Model, an Anglo-​Saxon Model, a Scandinavian Model and an East European Model. The classification criteria are both administrative culture (rule of law in continental Europe versus Public Interest Culture in the UK and Ireland) as well as administrative structure (unitary or federal, centralized or decentralized). According to Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014), the administrative tradition in the Nordic countries is characterized by a rule-​of-​law culture, transparency and accessibility of administration for citizenship. In comparative public administration, most scholars point to a specific Scandinavian model based on a common set of basic values and socio-​economic aspects shared by the five countries. This model overlaps with the continental European federal countries regarding the administrative profile, as they both are rooted in the Roman legal tradition. A main difference, however, is that the Scandinavian model has a more open recruiting and career system and a more accessible, open and transparent administrative system. The Scandinavian countries also have a more decentralized administrative structure, strong local governments and a high degree of autonomy of local authorities and agencies (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). Historically, the model of semi-​autonomous central agencies with major implementation tasks has been associated with the Scandinavian model. Painter and Peters (2010) claim that the Nordic countries have a strong welfare-​state orientation and a professional, non-​politicized civil service with high status and a consensual policy-​making style.They also claim, however, that the Nordic countries differ along a number of structural dimensions; for example, Norway is supposed to be more unitary while Denmark and Sweden have stronger local governments. Sweden has been characterized as a frontrunner in political decentralization (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014).

Administrative traditions in the Nordic countries Common features Denmark, Norway and Sweden are constitutional monarchies, whereas Iceland and Finland are republics with a president as head of state. They are unitary states with small populations, Iceland being particularly small. They are multiparty, parliamentary democracies, and their governments are normally coalition governments. Except for Finland, minority governments are common. The Nordic countries are all representative democracies that combine political and administrative decentralization. The doctrine of local self-​government is strong, and the local governments are responsible for the provision of a broad array of public services, meaning that local governments are also responsible for a major part of the financial and human resources in the public sector. They all have three-​level systems with local, regional and central government. Finland, Denmark and Sweden are members of the European Union, while Norway and Iceland are integrated into the economic union of the EU through the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) –​but not in the political union of EU. The Nordic countries have well-​developed administrative systems, which are characterized by merit-​based bureaucratic professionalism in contrast to a patrimonial-​Napoleonic culture. Rechtsstaat values are strong. They enjoy a consensus-​oriented democratic tradition and distinctive cooperative features in their administrative practice. The Nordic countries are also renowned for being large, universal welfare states with extensive public sectors. They have enjoyed well-​established cooperation between the state, civil society and the private sector 82

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through a long-​standing system of integrated stakeholder participation in government. The decision-​making style has not –​in modern times at least –​been confrontational but consensual, pragmatic and collaborative, allowing participation and representation from stakeholders (Pollitt et al. 2007).Trade unions in general and public sector trade unions in particular have been rather strong. The Nordics differ from other countries on cultural values, both at the societal level and within the political-​administrative system (Verhoest 2011). They score low on degree of masculinity, on power distance and individualism and high on equity/​equality. There is a high level of trust in government as well as mutual trust relations between politicians and administration (Christensen et al. 2002). There are long traditions of semi-​autonomous central agencies (Balle Hansen et al. 2012). The core bodies in central governments are ministries and semi-​independent central agencies that have been around for a long time. These central agencies are more numerous and also normally bigger than the ministries. The overall capacity of central agencies is much greater than that of the ministries. The autonomy of the central bureaucracy in the Nordic countries is greater than in the rest of Europe (Lægreid and Rykkja 2016). The Nordic countries share a political culture underlining the central role of the state in managing society. There is a strong statist view of governance and the state–​welfare orientation is strong (Painter and Peters 2010). The actions of civil servants are open to scrutiny, and transparency and the open access to government documents are high. The World Bank (2015) places the Nordic countries at the top of the list regarding government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption. Government effectiveness is the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation, implementation and services, combined with the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Rule of law refers to the extent to which actors have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. Control of corruption relates to the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. The 2014 Index shows how the average government effectiveness of the five Nordic countries receives a score of 96 out of 100, while the average for high-​income OECD countries is 88. For rule of law and control of corruption, the Nordic index is 98 compared to 88 and 85 in high-​income OECD countries (www.govindicators.org). In Europe and Central Asia, these indexes are 70 for government effectiveness, 68 for rule of law and 64 regarding control of corruption. The differences between the Nordic countries are small, indicating that there might be a Nordic model along these indicators. The high level of trust in government and low level of corruption in the Nordic countries is also documented in the OECD Government at a Glance report (OECD 2015). Overall, the administrative capacity is high in the Nordic countries. This goes for delivering capacity covering effectiveness, outcomes and legitimacy, regulatory capacity related to impartiality, autonomy, quality, coordination capacity related to self-​monitoring, coordination quality and analytical capacity (Hertie School of Governance 2015). Furthermore, the ‘Sustainable Governance Indicators’ by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2015) rank Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the top group regarding executive capacity as well as executive accountability. The variations among the Nordic state administrative systems can only be understood on the background of the extensive homogeneity (Jacobsson et al. 2004).

Western Nordic and Eastern Nordic models? From this common perspective, a distinction can be drawn between Eastern Nordic and Western Nordic administrative models. Except for Sweden, all of the Nordic countries apply the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible for the portfolio of 83

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subordinate agencies and bodies. This is not the case for Sweden, where the central agencies are responsible to the cabinet as a collegium and not to their parent ministry. This is one of the main differences between the dualistic ‘Eastern Nordic’ model and the monistic ‘Western Nordic’ model. Drawing the map in this manner is slightly misleading, however, as the Finnish system is closer to Denmark, Norway and Iceland than to Sweden. The dualistic Eastern Nordic model finds its clearest expression in the organizational structure of the Swedish central government administration (Jacobsson et  al. 2004; Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). Here, there is a clear formal distinction between the government and its ministries on the one hand and the central agencies on the other. They are semi-​autonomous not only because they are organizationally separated from the ministries but also because the power of the ministries to instruct the agencies is constrained, first, by the rule that decisions should be taken by collective vote in the cabinet and, second, that agencies cannot be instructed by ministries in individual cases. At various times, debate has arisen about this dualism (Jacobsson 1984; Jacobsson and Sundstrøm 2009; Premfors 1998), but a system consisting of relatively large central agencies with significant autonomy and relatively small ministries is still normally said to characterize Swedish central administration. In contrast, the Western Nordic administrative model represented by Norway, Denmark and Iceland is characterized by ministerial rule and usually referred to as monism (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). Finland has been placed in the Eastern Nordic model together with Sweden, but recent reforms have resulted in more monistic features. Ministries are formally responsible for their subordinate agencies (directorates), meaning that the formal autonomy of these agencies is more restricted than in Sweden. According to the ‘ministerial rule’, the Finnish parliament, the Eduskunta, can hold a minister accountable for all of the decisions made by subordinate administrative bodies.The autonomy of the directorates may vary, but the ministers are always accountable for the actions of the directorates. This model generally tends to result in strong line ministries. The difference between the Eastern and Western Nordic administrative models can be considered large (Petersson 1994) but might also be seen as rather small in practice when considering the more informal contacts and relationships (Jacobsson 1984; Lindblond 1997; Pierre 1995). The Swedish public administration is an extraordinarily autonomous bureaucracy in a formal, constitutional sense. But different informal measures have evolved to enhance the political control over the central agencies. Over time the Swedish administrative model has also transformed to include a more dynamic and complex relationship between ministries and agencies in the policy-​making process due to internationalization, managerialization and mediatization (Jacobsson and Sundstrøm 2009). Dahlstrøm and Pierre (2011) claim that the increased number of political appointees in government offices, a development intended to meet the stronger need for coordination from the centre, has resulted in increased politicization. In general, the boundaries between government departments and agencies have gradually become easier to cross. In practice, the core executive can steer its relationship with the agencies, even with the limited leeway constrained by the constitution (Jacobsson et al. 2015).

Administrative traditions and reforms The Nordic countries have been characterized as ‘modernizers’ rather than ‘marketizers’. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) distinguish between the core NPM group, ‘the marketetizers’, in Europe represented by the UK on the one hand and continental European ‘modernizers’ like Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany (below the federal level) on the other.This 84

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group also includes the Nordics. Compared to the Nordic countries, the Southern ones were latecomers to reform (Ongaro 2009). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) have also proposed the concept of ‘the Neo-​Weberian State’ (NWS) in their discussion of public management reform trends in the OECD world. The NWS is a concept reassuring the values of bureaucracy but also recognizing the continued focus on performance-​based management and emphasis on efficient service delivery to citizens. The NWS signals a friendlier, more efficient state, and the concept was originally intended as a Northern European alternative to the more Anglo-​centred perspective of marketization and managerialism associated with NPM. The NWS displays a more positive attitude towards the state and a less positive attitude towards the private sector, and it underlines the role of representative democracy and administrative law (Christensen and Lægreid 2012). Compared to traditional bureaucracy, it is more focused on citizens’ needs, performance and the professionalization of public service. Citizen participation was claimed to be more characteristic of the Northern European countries than of France, Italy and Belgium, which are more management-​ oriented modernizers. The Scandinavian countries are not only modernizers following user-​ responsiveness strategies and managerial strategies; they have also adopted competition and marketization strategies to some extent, while scoring low on privatization (Foss Hansen 2011). On the one end of the spectrum are the slow-​moving systems with reluctant reformers, such as federal Germany, while we have fast-​paced reformers such as the UK on the other end. Between them are the Nordic countries, which require time to gather the necessary political consensus for reforms that tend to be less radical but have a good chance of long-​term survival and successful implementation (Christensen and Lægreid 2012). Public management reforms have struggled to break through in Southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, which have legalistic and formalistic traditions and a politicized administration (Kickert 2011; Ongaro 2009). The Nordic model is a mixed order of various different governance doctrines and administrative values resulting in composite and compounded administrative apparatuses (Olsen 2010). It is, first, based on majority rule and the parliamentary principle of governance with political loyalty as a main norm. The administrative apparatus is supposed to be a neutral tool for contemporary government and it is to be responsive to signals from the political leadership. Second, it is supposed to be based on Rechtsstaat values such as impartiality, neutrality, fairness, predictability, due processes and rule of law. Third, it is supposed to be a professional apparatus, building its decisions on expertise and professional codes of ethics enhancing evidence-​based policy-​making. Fourth, it is supposed to be responsive to users and stakeholders in the private sector and civil society, allowing them representation and participation in policy-​making processes as well as implementation. Finally, it is supposed to be efficient, allowing for competition, marketization and the contracting out of different tasks. Rather than a sign of illness, these partly competing values represent a systemic feature that is constituting the Nordic administrative model. There is no ‘one best way’ or final solution for how to balance such tensions; they are permanent, and how to balance them varies over time. Olsen (1988) has distinguished between four models of governance: The sovereign rationality bounded state model, the institutional state model, the corporative pluralist state model and the supermarket state model. The intervening and active state model has been constrained by the institutional state focusing on impartiality and Rechtsstaat values, but also on the negotiating corporatist model being strong until the end of the 1980s, and to the more management-​ oriented state model from the 1990s onward. The main picture is that these different state models are not alternatives that are replacing each other but rather that they are supplementing one another; models that add up to a rather 85

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hybrid and complex arrangement. Instead of a single dominating administrative tradition, we therefore see a mixed order.This order tends to vary; it is not stable across different countries or over time. Empirical studies of the strength of different public sector values in Nordic countries demonstrate how traditional values such as accountability to society, transparency and openness, trust, Rechtsstaat values and professional standards remain strong in spite of NPM reforms enhancing marketization and efficiency (Jørgensen and Andersen 2011). A general public sector ethos seems to be strong and robust in the Nordic administrative systems.

Administrative traditions and reforms seen from the top A large-​scale survey of about 7,000 top public sector administrative executives in central government ministries and agencies in 19 European countries provides insight into the specific administrative traditions and reforms of the Nordic countries.1 The Nordic respondents include 1,907 top civil servants in ministries and central agencies from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland.The survey was conducted in the period 2011–​14, and the overall response rate for the Nordic countries was 35 per cent. The survey addressed the attitudes of top civil servants regarding the organizational characteristics, management and work practice of the organization, motivation, public sector reform processes, trends, content as well as perceived effects. Compared to the Germanic and Anglo-​Saxon countries, the Nordics have a high proportion of women among top civil servants, which reflects the low level of masculine culture in the central government apparatus. Different managerial tools are common in the Nordic countries and managerial role perceptions focusing on efficiency are rather strong (Jeannot and Bezes 2016; Steen and Weske 2016). There is a general contrast between the Nordic and Mediterranean countries in this respect. Performance management plays a significantly stronger role in the Nordic countries, and the implementation and use of such tools is substantially higher in the Nordics than in continental and Southern European countries (Hammerschmid and Loffler 2016). Overall measures aimed at improving the internal management of the administrative apparatus are more common than privatization and marketization (Wockelberg and Oberg 2016). As an example, management by objectives and results has become widespread in the Nordic countries. The Nordic model of performance management is characterized by bottom-​ up negotiation processes regarding goals and targets and the performance information is loosely coupled to sanctions, which are primarily soft and dialogue-​based (Johnsen and Vakkuri 2006; Kristensen 2011; Lægreid et  al. 2006). Variations are also found. Norway and Denmark are characterized by increasingly detailed performance targets and indicators, more frequent performance reporting and steering meetings than in Sweden, reflecting the monistic, Western Nordic system in contrast to the more dualistic Eastern Nordic model (Kristensen 2011).When the international performance management system comes to the Scandinavian countries it is translated to fit to the national administrative context (Kristensen 2011; Lægreid et al. 2006). In general, the management-​oriented NPM reform measures are more common in the Nordic countries than marketization measures, which is an overall trend in Europe. Reform trends such as privatization, contracting out and agencification are less important, often supplemented by reforms based on e-​government, transparency, citizens’ engagement and coordination. The Norwegian executives tend to see post-​NPM reforms as more important than average. In the Scandinavian countries, however, linking these reform trends directly to NPM or post-​NPM is no easy feat. For example, there were lengthy traditions for agencification

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before NPM came along, and the Scandinavian countries were also frontrunners in terms of transparency long before post-​NPM reforms were trending. It has often been claimed that Denmark has developed towards a neo-​Weberian state in the Digital Era (Greve and Ejersro 2016); that Finland is an active reformer looking for centralization and horizontal coordination (Virtanen 2016); that managerialism, incrementalism and collaboration are typical reform trends in Norway (Lægreid and Rykkja 2016); and that managerialism, transparency and performance are characteristic of Sweden (Wockelberg and Oberg 2016). Taken together, these reform trends can be seen as constrained and enabled by national administrative traditions but also that the administrative traditions might change due to contemporary administrative reforms. Regarding administrative management capacity, Nordic countries such as Sweden and Norway seem to be able to combine a public administration that values professionalism and a public service ethos with substantial effort to introduce managerial tools (Hammerschmid et al. 2014). Together with the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway are scoring high on strategic capacity, coordination, human resources, leadership and performance measurement capacity. Traditional bureaucratic features such as specialization by purpose or tasks and hierarchy are still very much alive and kicking in the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, hierarchical coordination and governance is less common in the Nordic countries than in many other European countries (Lægreid et al. 2016;Wegrich and Stimac 2014).The internal administrative hierarchy is rather weak in the Nordic countries compared to the rest of Europe.The use of collegial network arrangements, such as ad hoc cross-​cutting horizontal working groups, is more common in the form of supplementary coordination arrangements. Overall, the vertical coordinating quality within the same policy area is rather good in the Nordics. The horizontal coordination across policy areas is weaker –​but also better than in the European countries (Lægreid et al. 2016). Overall, the executives are of the opinion that collaboration and cooperation is an important reform trend, and they report that policy coherence and coordination have improved in recent years. Overall, the perceived degree of management and managerial autonomy is high and the perceived degree of politicization is low among the top administrative executives in the Nordic countries. Especially the respect among politicians for technical expertise and professional advice from bureaucrats is high. Overall, the combination of high autonomy and weak politicization is a common feature in the Nordics compared to many other European countries. On average, the Nordics have a more positive view of reforms than is found in many other European countries, viewing them as more consistent, comprehensive and substantial (Curry et al. 2015). They are also seen as more bottom-​up, less contested by trade unions and more open to public involvement and more about improving service delivery quality than cutting costs. Compared to the other European countries, Norway was a significant outlier and barely affected by the 2008 financial crisis; the reforms there were more about improving service quality than cutback management.There are also important differences within the Nordic countries in this respect, Iceland being heavily affected by the financial crisis and subsequently having to cut costs and downsize the public administration. As regards the success of reforms, the Nordic executives had high perceptions of improvement and low perceptions of deteriorations (Curry 2014). The Nordic countries rate the performance of public administration as higher than the rest of the COCOPS countries (Huxley et  al. 2016). They are examples of countries with high managerial autonomy, low perceived politicization and perceptions of rather successful reforms.

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Conclusions This chapter has attempted to answer the question as to whether or not a unique Nordic administrative culture exists and, if so, to describe its main characteristics. This is no easy question to answer, partly because the concept itself is rather ambiguous. We have tried to link the question of administrative culture to ideas and beliefs on the one hand and structural and polity features on the other. Important in this respect is addressing the relationship between culture and structure in order to grasp the administrative traditions. The culture evolves within structural constraints and the structural feature is enabling and constraining which ideas and beliefs come to dominate. Structural arrangements are more than neutral logistic management tools. Due to bounded rationality, they tend to favour some ideas, problems and solutions while ignoring or counteracting others.We face organizations with people and people with organizations, and the administrative culture is therefore a product of the relations between individual beliefs and organizational constraints. The Nordic countries are rather eager reformers.We face a picture of a mixed model of traditional bureaucratic features, New Public Management as well as post-​NPM components and neo-​Weberian trends. There is no single dominating reform trajectory, but rather an ongoing layering process resulting in a more hybrid and mixed system and a complex administrative culture. Managerial means and measures having obtained a strong footing in the Nordic countries does not necessarily mean that traditional public administration has faded away or that whole-​ of-​government reform trends are not present. We actually see a wide scope of different reform features that is not anchored in a single overall reform trajectory. Administrative culture is an important factor when trying to understand continuity, change and reforms in the political administrative system.We have revealed, first, that the Nordic administrative tradition has some specific features but also that this pattern must be qualified. First, there is no consistent Nordic model; the Nordic administrative tradition is multi-​functional, a mixed model that includes partly conflicting values and cultures producing tensions and trade-​offs. Second, the Nordic administrative model might have changed over time.The Nordic countries are not unaffected by the increased integration into Europe and the NPM reform movement that has been around internationally for the past 30 years.While managerialism has a stronger footing in the Nordic countries overall, we cannot see a strong convergence. Thus, the trade-​offs between different goals and values might be slightly different now than was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. Third, there might be differences between the Nordic countries. The traditional difference between the Eastern and Western Nordic models might still be relevant in some respects. Fourth, we have mainly addressed the central government and there might be interesting differences in the administrative culture between central and local government. Finally, there might also be interesting differences between policy areas.

Note 1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS), Socio-​economic Sciences and Humanities).

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8 CABINETS AND MINISTERIAL TURNOVER IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Martin Ejnar Hansen

Introduction When the votes are counted, pundits have spoken and it becomes clear how many seats the parties have won, the negotiations about forming a government begin. The head of state, or in the case of Sweden the speaker of the parliament, takes advice from the party leaders. On this basis, they decide who should be asked to form a government. All of the Scandinavian countries enjoy negative parliamentarism (see Bergman 1995), where no investiture vote is necessary, and the government is only obliged to resign when there is a majority against it. The scholarship on cabinet formation is extensive, far too broad to cover in this chapter. When discussing the making and breaking of governments (see Laver and Shepsle 1996), however, it is possible in this chapter to limit the theoretical discussion of government formation to a very simple proposition. For all of the Scandinavian countries, cabinets come in two forms: majority or minority. Both can consist of either a single party or more than one party in a coalition. The formation of a government entails the termination or turnover of a previously existing government. Defining the type of cabinet is an easy matter, but more debate has been forthcoming about how to define cabinet termination and cabinet change (for an overview, see Lijphart 1999). The general consensus is that a government is terminated or changed when (1) there is an election, (2) the prime minister (PM) changes, (3) the partisan composition of the cabinet changes, or (4) the head of state accepts the government’s voluntary or involuntary resignation (Browne et al. 1984, 1986).This definition is broad enough to cover all of the aspects and sufficiently detailed to allow for categorization. As Michael Laver (2003: 23) aptly writes, ‘no graduate student will be taken out and shot for using this definition’. There are limitations to this definition; a situation in which the prime minister stays the same but all of the other cabinet posts change will be counted as the same government despite a radically different cabinet composition. Conversely, a government that wins an election and continues unchanged is viewed as a different government than the one before the election, as the election has changed the negotiating environment. This definition allows us to examine in greater detail why cabinets terminate: Majority governments are more stable, while more fractionalized party systems have more government terminations.Where there is greater support for 92

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extreme opposition parties, there are more terminations; and lastly, governments will be more unstable as the number of attempts needed for forming the government increases (Laver 2003). Changes within the cabinet, ministerial turnover or more popularly termed ‘reshuffling’ are a matter for the PM and, if in a coalition, the party leaders of the governing parties.While reshuffling a cabinet is not without risk for a PM (Hansen et al. 2013: 229), the international literature suggests a wide range of reasons for why they do so on occasion: a policy failure or scandal that can be pinned on one particular minister, part of an attempt at increasing the popularity of the government among the electorate (Dewan and Dowding 2005), attempt to stop or placate intra-​party rivalry or a need for new talent and competence to aid the survival of the government (Huber and Martinez-​Gallardo 2008; Kam and Indriđason 2005). A study of ministerial turnover in Norway, Sweden and Denmark found that the saliency of the ministerial portfolios matters for turnover but that this effect is moderated by government popularity (Hansen et al. 2013). It should be noted here that the PM in the Scandinavian parliamentary democracies has the formal power to hire and fire cabinet ministers, the only limitation being the ability to maintain the confidence of the parliament. Under coalition governments, the hiring and firing of ministers might be decentralized informally to the participating party leaders, although the formal power is vested with the PM. In the next sections of the chapter, each of the five Scandinavian countries will be discussed in relation to cabinet formation, cabinet type, cabinet stability and ministerial turnover. The similarities and differences between the countries will be drawn out in the concluding section.

Sweden Swedish governments are formed under an unusual form of negative parliamentarism. Since 1975, the monarch (head of state) has played no role in the government formation procedure; this role is taken on by the speaker of the parliament, who presents a candidate for PM that the Riksdag must approve. Before forming a new government, an absolute majority must be shown to back the candidate; that is, fewer than half of the MPs can vote against the candidate. This element was introduced in 1975 together with the speaker’s role in the government formation process (Bergman 2000: 202). The speaker’s role is actually rather limited and the equivalent to that of the head of state in the other Nordic countries; the parties bargain internally, and once it becomes clear that a candidate is able to form a government with an absolute majority behind it, the speaker names that person their candidate. Historically, Sweden has seen a large proportion of single-​party minority governments, all but one led by the Social Democrats. Since 2005, however, coalition governments have been the norm. The governments formed by centre-​r ight parties since 1979 have exclusively been coalition governments. The last single-​party centre-​r ight government was the short-​lived liberal government, led by Ola Ullsten, which was in office for little more than a year (1978–​9). After the 2014 election, the Social Democrats formed a minority coalition government, the first Social Democratic coalition since Tage Erlander’s coalition with the Centre Party in the 1950s. The 2014 government under Stefan Löfven is also the first government in which the Greens have taken part. This government came about after an election that failed to produce a majority for either the incumbent centre-​r ight government or the Social Democratic opposition, the right-​wing Swedish Democrats left holding the balance of power. This resulted in the ‘December Agreement’ of December 2014, where six of the eight parties in the Riksdag agreed that the leader of the largest bloc should become PM and that minority governments would get their budgets through in order to keep the Swedish Democrats from obtaining parliamentary influence. In October 2015, however, the Christian Democrats decided to abandon the 93

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agreement, and they were swiftly followed by the three other centre-​r ight parties. At the time of writing, the breakdown of the agreement has had no influence on the position of the Swedish Democrats in the Riksdag; for all intents and purposes, their seats are not used by the opposition to place the government in a minority nor are they sought out by the government to find support for its policies. Swedish governments are generally stable. This is undoubtedly due to the fixed, four-​year interval between elections.1 While early elections can be called, this rarely occurs, as the PM cannot call an early election within three months of the last election and it cannot occur after the government has resigned and serves as a caretaker government (Bergman 2000: 204). The speaker can also call early elections if four successive PM candidates are rejected, although the results of these new elections only stand for the duration of the period; that is, they do not affect the date of the next fixed election (Bergman 2003: 603). This significantly reduces what can be achieved by holding an early election, which is undoubtedly why this tool is used so rarely to become PM; while it is possible de jure to call early elections in Sweden, it is de facto not the case. Before the constitutional reform of 1970, the risk of government turnover was higher due to the need for a majority in both chambers of the bicameral legislature. This element disappeared after the shift to a unicameral legislature (Bergman 2000: 201). The PM’s office has also proved very stable. Tage Erlander formed ten governments, serving from 1946 to 1969, before Olof Palme took over. Like Danish politics, Swedish politics in the 1970s were quite challenging for the duration and stability of governments. Four governments were formed and terminated over a six-​year period (1976–​82). Only four new PMs have been appointed outside of elections, twice due to the death of the incumbent (Per Albin Hansson in 1946 and Olof Palme in 1986), once due to the retirement of the party leader (Ingvar Carlsson in 1996) and once when the coalition led by Torbjörn Fälldin broke down in 1978 and was replaced without an election by the Liberal and single-​party government led by Ola Ullsten. Ministerial turnover outside of elections and outside of the entire government resigning is relatively small in the Swedish cases. Hansen et al. (2013) report 63 cases from 1967 to 2008, which is nearly 40 per cent lower than the corresponding numbers for Norway and Denmark. This might be due to the fixed electoral periods and the use of junior ministers, which are excluded from the 63 cases. As elsewhere, however, there are examples of ministers serving for very short periods, resigning or being fired due to a scandal or poor health. Most notably, Conservative Maria Borelius resigned eight days after being appointed Minister of Trade in 2006 due to a scandal about her not reporting the labour she was using for childcare, and therefore not paying the correct social fees. Social Democrat Börje Andersson resigned as Minister of Defence in 1982 after two months, and Social Democrat Sture Henriksson committed suicide one month after being appointed Minister of Communication in 1957. Long-​serving ministers are also found in Sweden, Tage Erlander being the best example with 23 years as PM and two years of previous cabinet experience. Gunnar Sträng also deserves mention after serving for more than 21 years as Minister of Finance (1955–​76), which is generally viewed as the most important post in Swedish politics after the PM.

Denmark Danish governments are formed after the party leaders take turns telling the queen who they feel should form the government and what type of government it should be. The queen then appoints the person with the most seats behind them as a Royal Examiner to investigate the possibilities for forming a government under the instructions given by the party leaders. This 94

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process can take anywhere from a day to several weeks, and multiple rounds are occasionally required. Once it becomes clear that there is no outright majority against one person and that person has the most support among the parties, they will be asked to form the government and become PM. Since 1945, Denmark has primarily had minority governments, with majority governments (all coalitions) only present from 1957–​60, 1968–​71 and, depending on how the situation of some party defectors are judged, 1993–​4. There were no single-​party governments from the resignation of the Social Democratic government in 1982 until 2015, when the Liberals formed a single-​party government with only 34 of the 179 seats in the Folketing. This is actually a much more comfortable situation than the last time the Liberals attempted to govern alone, when they formed a government with a mere 22 seats for a little more than 12 months in 1973–​5. Danish governments are generally less stable than elsewhere in Scandinavia. This is first and foremost due to the PM having the right to call early elections, a right that has been used extensively. Erik Damgaard (2000: 253–​258) demonstrates how Danish PMs usually dissolve parliament before the four-​year electoral period is over. Government turnover without an election has only happened twice: the Social Democrats left office in September 1982 after a long and arduous fight to right the economy, and the Conservative-​led coalition that took over and actually managed to stay in power until 1993, themselves then turned power back to the Social Democrats without elections due to a scandal over how the Ministry of Justice had handled a case involving Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. Government change where a coalition partner left the government and it continued without the partner has been equally limited: the Centre Democrats left the Social Democrat-​led coalition in 1996 and more recently the Socialist People’s Party left another Social Democrat-​led government in 2014, but neither cases resulted in a new election. It is also worth noting that new elections are not called when a PM resigns between elections or passes away. The latter occurred twice in the 1950s, Hans Hedtoft and H. C. Hansen both died in office, whereas Viggo Kampmann (1962), Jens-​Otto Krag (1972) and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2009) all resigned without an election and were replaced by a member of their own party. While the Danish governments are less stable than their Scandinavian counterparts, the internal turnover of ministers is quite similar to the Norwegian rate, while Sweden is much lower (Hansen et al. 2013: 238–​239). This is both with respect to general turnover (i.e. where the government changes) as well as within-​period turnover. Danish PMs generally tend to reshuffle cabinets for the usual reasons; new blood and new ideas. Yet there are also numerous examples of long-​serving ministers who have successfully changed ministerial posts but remained in government for longer periods; Liberal Bertel Haarder has headed an array of different ministries (including the Ministry of Education, Ministry for Cultural Affairs, Ministry for European Affairs, Ministry for Interior and Health, Ministry for Integration, Ministry for Science, Technology and Progress, and the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs) from 1982–​93, 2001–​11 and again since the 2015 election. These examples are rare, usually occurring are the removal of ministers for various reasons. Health reasons play a less important role than in the past, but scandals and internal party issues have become more common reasons for the firing of ministers. One infamous example befell Centre Democrat Bente Juncker, who served two weeks in 1994 before being fired for having made derogatory statements about mentally disabled people living near her vacation house. An example of internal party issues triggering ministerial turnover occurred when the Socialist People’s Party elected a new party leader in October 2012, after which the new party leader fired two of their ministers to make room for herself and another colleague. While the changes in Danish governments are the PM’s prerogative, the 95

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norm is that each coalition partner is responsible for their ministers and the respective party leaders can hire and fire rather freely.

Finland The prerogative of selecting who should form the government used to lie with the Finnish president on advisement from the party leaders. It used to be extremely important for the fragmented Finnish party system that the president could select the candidate for prime minister and provide the instructions according to which the government was to be formed. Since 2000, however, the parliament has elected the PM, who is then officially appointed by the president. Government formation via coalition building can generally take some time to be complete in Finland, not least due to less clear party alliances. This has also had an impact on the type of governments in Finland over time. The Finnish presidency has also undergone changes, meaning that it is now a less powerful office than was the case throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century. This is primarily due to a move made by President Urho Kekkonen (1956–​82), who moved the Finnish presidency towards a very activist role and expanded his authority to domestic politics (Nousiainen 2001:  101). The Finnish presidency was always important for foreign policy. Finland’s geographical position next to the Soviet Union meant that Finnish foreign policy had to balance Soviet wishes against those of a democratic nation. This approach was termed ‘Finlandization’, a policy that many viewed as subservient to the Soviet Union (Karvonen 2014: 34–​35) and meant that President Kekkonen used his powers to secure governments that were not questioning this element of policy. When Mauno Koivisto became president in 1982, a gradual normalization towards the Soviet Union began coinciding with reforms within the Soviet Union itself. President Koivisto also turned out to be a less activist president than his predecessor, and the presidency returned to its more traditional, pre-​ Kekkonen style (Nousiainen 2001: 101). For many years Finland saw primarily oversized coalitions, one explanation for which was that a number of laws required a two-​thirds majority to pass, including taxation (Nousiainen 2000: 269), meaning that the governments not enjoying such a majority were limited in what policies they could pass. While this requirement was abolished in 1991, Finland has still had oversized coalitions. In earlier times, oversized coalitions were often replaced by single-​party or caretaker governments (Karvonen 2014: 78–​79). An explanation traditionally given greater weight has been the wish to avoid bloc coalitions, but this might have diminished somewhat in recent years. In relation to the other countries examined in this chapter, Finland is the country with the least stable governments. As Nousiainen (2000: 273) remarks, however, there would appear to have been a shift in terms of stability from the early 1980s onwards towards much more stable cabinets. Karvonen (2014:  103)  goes as far as to argue that the transition from President Urho Kekkonen to Mauno Koivisto in 1982 can be seen as an important event for the durability of Finnish cabinets, which increased notably after 1982 than had been the case before and under Kekkonen. Since 1945, Finland has seen 38 cabinets, seven of which have been caretaker cabinets formed when the president decided that government formation was problematic and new elections would not yield a better outcome. These caretaker cabinets have been both partisan and non-​partisan, although Finland has not required such a cabinet since 1975.The election periods are for four years and have been so since 1956. Finland has had a few early elections, the last one being held in 1975, but since 1991, it has become very difficult to call an early election in the country (Karvonen 2014: 101). That leaves us with the question of the relatively high number 96

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of cabinets in Finland. The answer is that the Finnish cabinets often change slightly. Thus, even though the changes might be rather small, they still count as a government termination according to the definitions discussed earlier in this chapter. Take the electoral period 1975–​9, for instance, which saw five governments: a caretaker government followed by a Centre Party-​led coalition with four other parties, a Centre-​led coalition with two of the previous governing parties having left the previous coalition, a Social Democrat-​led coalition consisting of the same parties as the first Centre-​led coalition, and finally another Social Democrat-​led coalition with one of the parties of the previous government leaving the new one. This complexity does result in a large number of cabinets, although it must also be pointed out that stability has increased in recent years. Although the record for the shortest cabinet is recent, when Anneli Jäätteenmäki from the Centre Party only survived 68 days as PM in 2003 after it was discovered that she had lied about how she obtained confidential documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had used them in her election campaign. Nevertheless, the coalition that was formed after the 2003 election continued under a different PM. The large government turnover, especially in the earlier periods covered in this chapter, also means that there is less scope from ministerial turnover outside of an entire party leaving the government. Despite the frequent turnover, many ministers have had lengthy tenure when combining their service. Johannes Virolainen served nearly 17 years (1951–​79) and Paavo Matti Väyrynen served over 16 years (1975–​2011). Death and poor health are obvious explanations for some short tenures: Henrik Kullberg from the Swedish People’s Party served for 17 days in Sakari Tuomioja’s caretaker government before his passing; Paavo Rantanen, who was appointed as a non-​partisan Foreign Minister in 1995 after his predecessor Heikki Haavisto had to resign due to poor health, only served for two months until the 1995 election, when Esko Aho’s government was replaced by an oversized coalition without Aho’s Centre Party.

Norway The Norwegian Constitution places the responsibility for appointing cabinet ministers with the king. In practice, the king asks each party leader for advice. Once it becomes clear that there is a preferred leader, the king will ask them to form the government. This process is usually very short, rarely taking more than a single round (Narud and Strøm 2000: 172). Norwegian governments require no vote of investiture and the government is assumed to have the confidence of the parliament until proven otherwise. The government can even suffer defeats in parliament and is only obligated to dissolve itself if a lost motion has been designated as a motion of no confidence (although see Rasch 1987). Coalition governments in Norway remained the prerogative of the centre-​r ight parties for quite some time. Except for Per Borten’s government in the 1960s, they rarely survived an election. Up until the 2005 election, the Social Democrats had never taken part in a coalition government and Jens Stoltenberg was the first Social Democratic PM to lead such a government. Only one non-​social democrat, single-​party government has seen the light of day in Norway, a single-​party Conservative government from 1981 to 1983, which was replaced by a coalition government led by the same Conservative PM, Kaare Willoch. Coalition governments in Norway have been equally split thus far between majority and minority ones, whereas single-​ party governments have seen a slight overweight of minority governments. Hanne Marthe Narud and Kaare Strøm (2000: 159) reported that coalition governments had become less likely, which was undoubtedly true at the time, but from 2001 onwards Norway has seen nothing but coalition governments.

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The Norwegian PM cannot call an early election, meaning that if the government experiences a vote of no-​confidence a new government will have to be formed without an election being called. This was the case when the Conservative-​led Willoch government was unable to secure a majority for its budget in 1986 (Narud and Strøm 2000: 186). The lack of early elections means that many Norwegian governments last the entire four-​year term. There have also been examples of governments being formed and lasting only a short period of time, however, not least the first centre-​right coalition led by Conservative John Lyng in 1963, which only lasted 24  days and was defeated on its government declaration. Incidentally, John Lyng only formed a government after the Labour Party was forced to resign mid-​term. A similar situation occurred in 1972, when Social Democrat PM Trygve Bratteli chose to resign and Christian Democrat Lars Korvald was given the opportunity to form another coalition, which lasted a few days short of one year. After the 1989 election, Conservative Jan P. Syse formed a coalition government but had to resign a little more than a year later and allow the previous PM, the Social Democrat Gro Harlem Brundtland, to form her third government. The ministerial turnover outside of elections and the collective resignation of the entire government is at the same level as in Denmark. Governments serving for a short period of time, like that of John Lyng, produce ministers with correspondingly short seniority, although as the government resigned as one it does not count as ministerial turnover as such; neither does the person with the shortest ministerial tenure, Astrid Heiberg, who only served for three weeks in 1986 before Kaare Willoch’s government fell. Ministerial turnover can occur for several reasons; an interest in new blood is one, but poor health and scandals can also play a role. The latter happened when Terje Rød-​Larsen left government less than three weeks after being appointed after questions were raised about his private financial dealings in relation to a government-​ funded project with which he had previously been involved. Similarly, Minister for Children and Equality Manuela Ramin-​Osmundsen was forced to resign in 1998 a mere four months after taking office due to accusations of her appointing a close personal friend as the ombudsman for children instead of renewing the tenure of the incumbent. Centre Party leader Åslaug Hauga resigned in June 2008 for health reasons after prolonged criticism in the media concerning how her home violated the building code. While these examples are in the minority, ministerial turnover in Norway primarily appears to be related to party politics. Many ministers serve for considerable periods of time, although the frequent change between centre-​r ight coalitions and Social Democratic single-​party governments in the 1970s and 1980s naturally meant that periods of brief tenure were commonplace, but ministers usually stepped down when the entire government stepped down. To the contrary, the longest-​serving ministers in Norway mostly prove to be those who end up as PM; of the five longest-​serving ministers since 1945, Halvard Lange is the only one who never became PM, serving instead as Foreign Minister for almost 20 years (1946–​65), interrupted only by John Lyng’s short-​lived government in 1963.

Iceland After receiving advice from the party leaders, the Icelandic president decides who will be given opportunity to form a government. This normally falls to the leader of the largest party who can command support to become PM. There is no vote of investiture to pass for a new government, and a loss on a parliamentary vote is not equated with a loss of confidence in the government. This negative parliamentarism is usually seen as conducive to the formation of minority governments (Bergman 1995); however, something very different can be observed in Iceland. Alongside Finland, Icelandic governments are outliers in the Scandinavian context in terms of the frequency of majority coalition, and the coalition formation process would appear to be 98

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much more competitive than in the other Scandinavian countries, not least due to the clientelistic roots of Icelandic politics (Indriđason 2005: 439). The roots of Icelandic clientelism can be traced back to two main issues. First, the formation of Icelandic parties, which despite its legislative home rule from 1874 did not receive executive home rule until 1904.2 Second, the lack of an effective and strong bureaucracy meant that the parties were not held in check, each therefore able to develop strong clientelist relations to specific groups (see also Kristinsson 2001; Kristjansson and Indriđason 2011). Iceland has had neither a minority government nor a single-​party government since the 1979 Social Democratic government led by Benedikt Gröndal, which only lasted three months. Indeed, Iceland has only seen four single-​party governments since 1945, none of which have survived much longer than six months. All of the coalitions have involved at least one of the three major parties –​the Social Democrats, the Conservatives and the Progressive Party –​with the latter two forming the more obvious coalition. Coalitions including all three major parties used to be normal, but was last seen in the government led by Thorsteinn Palsson from 1987 to 1988. The Icelandic PM has the right to call early elections, and this has been used in about half of the Icelandic cabinets for various reasons, for instance it was used in 1974 by then PM Olafur Johannesson to avoid a vote of no confidence. Despite the opportunity to call early elections, the cabinet has been reshuffled on numerous occasions without elections. In one instance, this was due to the poor health of PM Olafur Thors, who left office for Bjarni Benediktsson in 1963, but the coalition remained the same. This was also the case when Bjarni Benediktsson passed away in 1970 while PM and was succeeded by Johann Hafstein with the same coalitional makeup. Yet the cabinet can also be reshuffled between elections for policy reasons. In 2009, widespread protests broke out in Iceland in relation to the financial crisis, which hit the country hard. Then PM Geir Haarde called an early election and announced he was stepping down after the election due to cancer. Long before the elections could be held, however, Haarde was forced to resign and turned the PM’s office over to Social Democrat Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, the first female Icelandic PM, who also formed the government after the 2009 general elections.3 Icelandic cabinets generally appear to have been relatively sheltered from reshuffling between elections resulting from scandals. Nevertheless, a few such situations have occurred. Notably, Albert Guðmundsson, the first Icelandic professional football player, was forced to resign as Minister of Industry in 1987 due to a tax scandal, and Björgvin G.  Sigurðsson resigned as Minister for Business Affairs in 2009 after taking responsibility for how the financial crisis impacted Iceland. More recently, Hanna Birna Kristjánsdóttir had to step down in 2014 after around 18 months as Minister of the Interior due to her attempt to interfere with a police investigation of a leak stemming from her office. While these are just a few examples, they resulted in a minimal reshuffling of cabinets. The earlier Icelandic cabinets were very small; when they functioned for a very short time, reshuffling rarely took place. With the somewhat more stable governments since the mid-​1990s, there has been an increase in reshuffling, not least due to the usual interest in getting new blood into the government.

Conclusions: comparing the Scandinavian countries Depending on what the goal is, a comparative study including all five of the countries covered in this chapter might provide some issues. All five countries form their respective governments under negative parliamentarism with the involvement of a head of state (or someone similar) to select who forms the government. However, the outcome in terms of government type varies considerably. Finland is an outlier due to its frequent oversized majority coalition governments. Similarly, Iceland can be viewed as an outlier due to its frequent majority coalitions. Denmark has had very 99

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few majority governments and is accustomed to minority coalitions, although the general election in 2015 returned a single-​party minority government with the least parliamentary support of any government since 1973. Sweden has also had many single-​party minority governments, mostly formed by the Social Democrats. Indeed, the 2014 election was the first time that the Social Democrats had formed a coalition government. Very knowledgeable researchers almost spelled the end of coalition governments in Norway around 2000, albeit their demise might have been predicted a tad too early, as all of the cabinets in Norway since 2001 have been of the coalition type. Table 8.1 presents an overview of the cabinet types found in the Scandinavian countries. Table  8.2 presents an overview of the broad reasons for cabinet termination in the five Scandinavian countries. It is possible to identify two broad types of termination and hence turnover: electoral and non-​electoral. Electoral termination requires either a regular or an early election. Non-​electoral termination is either due to the resignation or death of the PM, a change in the partisan composition of the cabinet or a parliamentary defeat not resulting in an early election. Danish governments are usually terminated by a call for early elections, which sometimes stem from defeats in parliament. While it is de jure possible in Sweden to call early elections it is de facto not the case, in Norway it is not possible under any circumstances to call early elections. Finnish governments are just as often terminated due to changes in the cabinet composition as for other constitutional reasons. In Iceland, cabinets stand an equal chance of being terminated either early or by a regular election. Furthermore, there have only been a few government terminations due to changes in the cabinet composition in Iceland.

Table 8.1  Majority status of Scandinavian governments, 1945–​2015 Majority

Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Iceland

Minority

Single-​party

Coalition

Single-​party

Coalition

0 4 2 0 0

 4  6  6 30 29

11  9 15  3  4

17  6  3  5  0

Source: From Narud and Strøm (2000), Bergman (2000), Damgaard (2000), Nousiainen (2000), Karvonen (2014), Indriđason (2005) and updated by the author.

Table 8.2  Cabinet termination, 1945–​2015

Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Iceland

Regular election

Other constitutional reason

Death of PM

Early election

Change in cabinet composition

Defeat in parliament

 6 17 20 15 12

4 6 2 8 2

2 0 2 0 1

21  0  1  4 12

3 1 1 8 3

10 4 0 3 1

Source: From Narud and Strøm (2000), Bergman (2000), Damgaard (2000), Nousiainen (2000), Karvonen (2014), Indriđason (2005) and updated by the author.

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It is more difficult to present a comparative view of the ministerial turnover in the five Scandinavian countries. The lack of research on Finland and Iceland means that the findings that can be presented are based on Sweden, Denmark and Norway (see Hansen et al. 2013), which finds only limited support for the Huber and Martinez-​Gallardo (2008) hypothesis that coalition governments experience fewer turnovers than single-​party governments. Regardless of whether the studies of ministerial turnover were to be expanded to Finland and Iceland, it does not include focus on the intricacies of why turnovers occur; that is, the extent to which a minister has resigned or actually been fired. Some examples of situations that lead to turnover have been put forward in this chapter, but this is mostly in relation to scandals. More difficult is the type of turnover that appears to have no particular background but where a thorough examination of the party situation and the parliamentary spoils given or not given to previous ministers might yield further information than what we currently know. Scandinavian cabinets are all governed by negative parliamentarism. There are differences in terms of early termination, but also in the usage of oversized coalitions and stable coalition patterns that render the five countries discussed in this chapter alike in some aspects and different in others. The traditional comparisons of the Scandinavian systems tend to focus on Sweden, Norway and Denmark, with Finland and Iceland often not included. From the discussions presented here, this might not be surprising. The most notable difference being the very strong presence of majority coalition governments in the two countries where minority governments are more prevalent in the three countries traditionally compared. In this respect, many questions remain unanswered when it comes to cabinet and ministerial turnover in the Scandinavian countries. One of these is whether majority coalitions are more stable when it comes to ministerial turnover. Or is the stability instead circumvented by frequent changes in coalition partnerships? Questions related to the reason for ministerial turnover that cannot be strictly attributed to scandal. Hansen et al. (2013) presented one view on this topic, where the connection between portfolio saliency and government popularity was explored, but they did not examine in detail the particular reasons for changeover. For comparisons, the differences between the Finnish and Icelandic systems versus the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish systems must be considered. The considerable differences between the relative instability in Finland before the early 1980s should be taken into consideration in a cross-​temporal comparison as it might not be entirely correct to view the case as similar across time.This also suggests that while a most-​similar systems design is obvious for the comparison of the Scandinavian countries, there are minor differences that should be heeded when comparing cabinet and ministerial turnover.

Notes 1 This changed from three-​year to four-​year intervals in 1994. 2 From 1917 to 1944, Iceland was the Kingdom of Iceland under an act of union with the Kingdom of Denmark and declared its independence from Denmark in 1944. 3 Geir Haarde was later indicted for negligence in relation to the financial crisis on Iceland and convicted on one count but would face no penalty.

References Bergman, T. (1995) Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation. PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Umeå University. Bergman, T. (2000) Sweden:  When Minority Cabinets Are the Rule and Majority Governments the Exception. In: Müller,W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds), Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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M. E. Hansen Bergman, T. (2003) Sweden: From Separation of Power to Parliamentary Supremacy –​and Back Again? In:  Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Browne, E. C., Frendreis, J. P. and Gleiber, D. W. (1984) An ‘Events’ Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability. Comparative Political Studies 17(2): 167–​197. Browne, E. C., Frendreis, J. P. and Gleiber, D.W. (1986) The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 30(3): 628–​650. Damgaard, E. (2000) Denmark: The Life and the Death of Government Coalitions. In: Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds), Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dewan, T. and Dowding, K. (2005) The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity. American Journal of Political Science 49(1): 46–​56. Hansen, M. E., Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S. B. and Bäck, H. (2013) Portfolio Saliency and Ministerial Turnover: Dynamics in Scandinavian Postwar Cabinets. Scandinavian Political Studies 36(3): 227–​248. Huber, J. D. and Martinez-​Gallardo, C. (2008) Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review 102(2): 169–​180. Indriðason, I. (2005) A Theory of Coalitions and Clientelism: Coalition Politics in Iceland, 1945–​2000. European Journal of Political Research 44(3): 439–​464. Kam, C. and Indriðason, I. (2005) The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminister Parliamentary Systems. Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(3): 327–​364. Karvonen, L. (2014) Parties, Governments and Voters in Finland. Colchester: ECPR Press. Kristinsson, G. H. (2001) Clientelism in a Cold Climate: The Case of Iceland. In: Piattoni, S. (ed.), Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kristjansson, S. and Indriðason, I. H. (2011) Iceland: Dramatic Shifts. In: Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (eds), The Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Laver, M. (2003) Government Termination. Annual Review of Political Science 6: 23–​40. Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. (1996) Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-​Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Narud, H. M. and Strøm, K. (2000) Norway: A Fragile Coalitional Order. In: Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds), Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nousiainen, J. (2000) Finland:  The Consolidation of Parliamentary Governance. In:  Müller, W. C. and Strøm, K. (eds), Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nousiainen, J. (2001) From Semi-​Presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland. Scandinavian Political Studies 24(2): 95–​109. Rasch, B. E. (1987) Manipulation and Strategic Voting in the Norwegian Parliament. Public Choice 52(1): 57–​73.

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9 THE PARLIAMENTS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Thomas Persson

Introduction The literature on national legislatures has long been telling a story of the ‘decline of parliaments’ and ‘deparliamentarization’, suggesting that the parliamentary influence in the democratic process has waned (Goetz and Meyer-​Sahling 2008; Norton 1992; Wheare 1967: ch.  9). In contrast, executive institutions have been strengthened and chief executives empowered. Some scholars refer to this as an ongoing ‘presidentialization’ of parliamentary democracies (Poguntke and Webb 2005), while others simply refer to it as the ‘empowerment of executives’ (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). The students of legislative politics have nevertheless claimed that ‘there is no basis for asserting a decline of parliaments in Scandinavia’ (Damgaard 1994:  100; see also Damgaard 1992; Sjölin 1993). The legislatures of this region are no mere ‘rubber stamps’ or ‘transport companies’. On the contrary, Scandinavian parliaments have ‘obtained increased importance and influence’ and it is more appropriate to speak of the ‘decline of governments and resurgence of parliaments in Scandinavia’ (Damgaard 1994: 100). More recent research also claims that the Nordic countries remain exceptions to the general trend regarding parliamentary decline. Students of parliamentary democracy have identified a ‘Madisonian turn’ in Nordic Europe, suggesting that parliaments are more constrained than ever before. As regards parliamentary activity, however, the authors conclude that ‘the evidence does not support a picture of decaying parliaments’ (Bergman and Strøm 2011: 367). Instead, new patterns of parliamentary practices have emerged in order to secure the ability of parliaments to control national governments. Despite this evidence, national parliaments in Scandinavia have increasingly been challenged by the internationalization of politics and in particular the ongoing process of European integration. Research has established that this development has resulted in the successive strengthening of national and supranational executives (e.g. Goetz and Meyer-​Sahling 2008; Maurer and Wessels 2001).The question is therefore whether Scandinavian legislatures have been losing their role as the centre of power in parliamentary democracy. This chapter briefly describes the historical origin of Scandinavian legislatures and their institutional characteristics. It analyses the defining features of the Scandinavian parliaments, pointing out the similarities and differences between them. Moreover, the chapter assesses the extent to which Scandinavian parliaments 103

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are still to be considered ‘strong’ and ‘influential’ or if they have become victims of the same ‘decline’ as other national parliaments. The chapter is structured as follows: The first section discusses the historical origins of the Nordic parliaments in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, as well as the dependencies Åland, Faroe Islands and Greenland. An analysis of the institutional characteristics of the parliaments is then provided, including a section on the committee system. Assessment is then made of the contemporary challenges to the parliaments in Scandinavia and parliamentary adjustments to European integration. The final section offers some general observations on the current trends and challenges for parliamentary strength in Scandinavia.

The history of Scandinavian parliaments The Scandinavian countries adopted parliamentary systems of government and were democratized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (von Beyme 2000), since which time each country has developed its own distinctive parliamentary model. Denmark, Norway and Sweden –​all parliamentary monarchies –​have relied extensively on minority governments (see also Chapter 8 on cabinets and ministerial turnover in this volume), while Finland and Iceland –​both semi-​presidential systems –​have relied more on majority coalition cabinets (Rasch 2004, 2011). Hence, the Scandinavian parliaments have a strong legacy (von Beyme 2000). In fact, Iceland’s Althingi is the oldest working parliament in the world, having operated as a consultative assembly from the year 930 until 1799, when it was discontinued for 45 years. The Althingi was later re-​established in Reykjavik in 1844. Parliamentary government was introduced in 1874, when Iceland was granted a constitution under Danish sovereignty. The country became a sovereign state in 1918, still under the rule of the Danish monarch, with government authority resting with the Icelandic parliament. After a referendum in 1944, Iceland finally became a semi-​presidential republic (Kristjánsson and Indriđason 2011). Until 1991, membership of the Althingi was divided between a lower house (Nethri Deild) and upper house (Efri Deild) with co-​equal legislative power. The budget, however, was considered in the united Althingi, but this was changed to a fully unicameral system in 1991 (Arter 2009). The Althingi currently has 63 members elected to four-​year terms according to the principle of proportional representation. Iceland has a multiparty system and a tradition of majority coalition governments. The Swedish Riksdag also has ancient origins in the Viking Things, its modern form having existed since 1866. Then, the Riksdag of the Estates (Ståndsriksdagen) was replaced by a political assembly with two chambers where the members were appointed in national elections (von Sydow 1989). With the 1809 constitution, Sweden established a separation-​of-​powers system whereby executive power was vested in the monarch and legislative power divided between king and parliament.The principles of parliamentarism were established in 1917, when the king in actual practice became synonymous with the cabinet, responsible before the parliament. The country was fully democratized in 1921 when women gained voting rights (males already in 1907). Since 1971, the Riksdag has been a unicameral legislature with 349 members, elected proportionally and serving fixed four-​year terms. Sweden has a multiparty system and a tradition of minority governments (Hermansson and Persson 2010; von Sydow 1989, 1991, 1997). Like other Nordic parliaments, the Norwegian Storting has ancient origins but was established in its modern form in 1814 when the Norwegian constitution was adopted. Although the Storting has always been unicameral, it would divide itself into two ‘internal divisions’ until 2009 –​the Lagting and the Odelsting –​in legislative matters.Through the dissolution of the two chambers in 2009, the Norwegian legislature was turned into a unicameral parliament with 169 104

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members, elected proportionally and serving four-​year terms (Rasch 2011). Parliamentarism was established in 1884, and although the constitution still grants important executive powers to the king they are in practice exercised by the cabinet which is responsible before parliament. The country gained universal male suffrage in 1898, with women included in 1913. Norway has a multiparty system and a tradition of minority governments (Narud and Strøm 2011; Rommetvedt 2003). From the twelfth century until 1809, Finland was part of Sweden and under the influence of the Riksdag of the Estates. In 1809, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy after Sweden ceded it to the Russian Empire, while the political institutions practically remained intact. The new assembly, the Diet of Finland (Valtiopäivät/​Lantdagen), followed the forms of the Swedish Riksdag and was the legislative body of the new autonomous region. It was first assembled in 1863, however, when new laws were adopted, and then met regularly until 1906, when it passed an act forming a new unicameral parliament on the basis of universal suffrage, the Eduskunta (Riksdag). Hence, the unicameral parliament was established when Finland was still part of the Russian Empire and the first years of the new parliament were politically unstable. It was first when Finland declared its independence in 1917 that the parliament gained true political power. In 1918, however, the Finnish Civil War ensued, which led to a fierce struggle over the country’s future form of government. After the 1919 parliamentary election, Finland became a semi-​presidential republic with a parliamentary system (Arter 2009). Today, the unicameral parliament has 200 members, including one seat for Åland. A new constitution entered into force in 2000, which restricted the presidential powers and rendered the Finnish political system more of a standard version of parliamentary democracy. Finland has a multiparty system and a tradition of majority coalition governments (Raunio 2011; Raunio and Wiberg 2008). The Danish Folketing is the unicameral national parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark, which was established in the Constitution of 1849. Like the Swedish Constitution, the main idea here was to limit the monarch’s power through a separation-​of-​powers system. Parliamentarism was introduced in 1901, when the king accepted the principle that a government cannot have a majority against it in parliament. Until 1953, the Folketing was the lower house of a bicameral parliament, the Rigsdag; the upper house was the Landsting (Damgaard 2011). The Folketing consists of 179 representatives; 175 from Denmark and two each from Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Parliamentary elections are held at least every four years and members are elected by proportional representation. Elections in the Faroe Islands and Greenland follow the Danish system of elections. Denmark has a multiparty system and a tradition of minority governments (Damgaard 1992). In addition to the legislatures of the five sovereign Nordic states, there are also three parliaments in the dependencies of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland. A brief presentation of each parliament is given below; however, none of these dependencies will be covered any further in this chapter since the focus is on the parliaments of the five sovereign states of Scandinavia.1 The Faroese Løgting (Lagting) is the unicameral parliament of the Faroe Islands, a self-​ governing administrative division of Denmark. Since 1948, the Løgting has legislative power as regards the areas that have been taken over as a separate jurisdiction in accordance with the Home Rule Act. The Faroe Islands compromise a single nationwide constituency and MPs are elected by proportional representation for a four-​year period. The number of MPs is currently fixed at 33. The Greenlandic Inatsisartut is the unicameral parliament of the government of Greenland, a self-​governing administrative division of Denmark since 1979. The Inatsisartut has legislative power over the areas that have been taken over as a separate jurisdiction in accordance with the 1979 Greenland Home Rule Act and the 2009 Greenland Self-​Government Act. Members of 105

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the Inatsisartut are directly elected in multi-​seat constituencies by proportional representation to serve four-​year terms. The number of MPs is currently fixed at 31. The Lagting, or Lagtinget, is the parliament of Åland, a self-​governing administrative division and Swedish-​speaking territory of Finland. In June 1921, Finland was granted sovereignty over Åland but placed under an obligation to guarantee Åland its Swedish culture, language and system of self-​government. In accordance with the Åland Autonomy Act, the parliament represents the population of Åland in matters relating to Åland’s autonomy. Members of the Lagting are directly elected by proportional representation to four-​year terms. The Lagting has 30 seats.

Institutional characteristics Many similarities apply when looking at the parliaments of the five sovereign Scandinavian states. All of the Nordic countries were fully democratized during the first quarter of the twentieth century, as universal suffrage for parliamentary elections was introduced in this period. The Nordic countries also adopted a parliamentary system of government, meaning that governments became dependent on support from a majority in parliament rather than support from the crown. This occurred in Denmark in 1901, and in Finland and Sweden in 1917. The other two countries had such systems prior to their independence. Norway’s first parliamentary cabinet was formed in 1884, and Iceland’s first cabinet was formed in 1904. This move to parliamentarism can be seen as a democratization of executive power, as control over the cabinet shifted from an unelected monarch to an elected parliament (Rasch 2004, 2011). Additionally, all of the Nordics gradually adopted proportional representation (PR) electoral systems that promoted the development of multiparty systems based on the cleavage structures of the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The Nordic parliaments thus have a high correlation between election results and the distribution of seats in parliament, albeit with different minimum requirements regarding the percentage of votes (e.g. 2 per cent in Denmark, 4 per cent in Sweden). The proportion of women in Scandinavian parliaments is high by international standards (Esaiasson and Heidar 2000; Wängnerud 2009). The high degree of proportional representation has also led to different solutions to dealing with the fact that no single party normally wins a majority in elections. Finland, for instance, is characterized by a multiparty system without a dominant party, which has resulted in majority coalition governments. Moreover, the Finnish PM is comparatively weak, as his powers are shared with the president, although the adoption of a new constitution in 2000 reduced the role of the president and thereby strengthened the PM’s role (Raunio 2011; Raunio and Wiberg 2008). Denmark, Norway and Sweden, on the other hand, are characterized far more by minority governments and strong social democratic parties enjoyed dominant status for long periods, which they eventually lost. In the Scandinavian countries, minority governments have been able to govern without the support of a parliamentary majority due to strong traditions of bloc politics. This usually means that although a government is not holding a majority of the seats in parliament, it can rely on a supporting bloc majority of either centre-​left or centre-​r ight parties, thus depriving the opposition of its veto power. With regard to Denmark, for instance, Green-​ Pedersen and Thomsen (2005: 154) note that ‘bloc politics represents the majoritarian aspect of Danish parliamentarism and … is the key to understanding how minority government in Denmark can both govern effectively and secure broad cooperation’. The Scandinavian experience with minority governments has accordingly promoted broad cooperation among parties (Christiansen and Damgaard 2008). 106

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In light of this, the Nordics are generally characterized as ‘consensual democracies’ in which governments are engaged in deliberation with parties in the opposition (Elder et  al. 1982; Sannerstedt 1996:  54). A  distinctive model of political decision-​making has evolved with particular emphasis on ‘compromise and pragmatic solutions’ (Arter 2004, 2006; Petersson 1994:  33). This characterization was perhaps most fully developed by Arend Lijphart in his seminal work on Patterns of Democracy, where he recognizes the Nordic countries as consensus model democracies, in sharp contrast with the Westminster model of majoritarian democracy (Lijphart 1999: 250). Lijphart’s dichotomy is too stark, however, and the Nordic countries should be seen more as a mixture of the consensus and majoritarian models (see Persson and Wiberg 2011). In other words, the Nordic countries represent a blend of broad power-​sharing between government and opposition and of concentrating power in the hands of the majority. This suggests that parliaments are an important arena for deliberation and debate on policy and legislation and for political negotiations between the government and opposition parties. As stated above, all of the Nordic parliaments are now unicameral. Until recently (2009), however, the Norwegian Storting did partly function in a bicameral manner. After national elections, Norwegian legislators divided themselves into two sections –​the Odelsting and the Lagting –​to handle non-​financial legislation (Rasch 2011). Iceland’s Althingi had a similar quasi-​bicameral system until 1991. Denmark and Sweden abolished their upper houses in 1953 and 1971, respectively, and Finland already in 1906 (Arter 1991, 2009; von Sydow 1989, 1991). The sizes of the respective Scandinavian parliaments reflect the population of each country. Sweden is the exception, as the number of seats in the Riksdag is larger than one would otherwise expect from the population of the country. This is a legacy from the bicameral era. The single chamber legislature almost has as many seats as the previous first and second chambers combined (von Sydow 1991). Nordic parliaments can influence the formulation of policy and legislation as well as exercising scrutiny and control of the government in many ways. All of the legislatures of this region have been characterized as ‘working parliaments’ in contrast to the less influential ‘debating parliaments’ that are common in Europe (Arter 2009: 198ff.). Of particular significance for the character and strength of an assembly are its decision-​making rules and internal divisions, especially the features of its committee system. Strong committees have been identified as a necessary condition for effective parliamentary influence (Strøm 1998). Working parliaments have a specialized system of standing committees that broadly correspond to government ministries. Committees are important arenas for negotiations, bargaining and compromise between parties in government and opposition (see, for example, Mattson 2015). All of the Scandinavian countries have specialist and permanent standing committees that broadly reflect the structure of government ministries with which they have close links (e.g. they call in the minister for hearings, they receive special treatment in the form of notes and documents from the ministry). Committee members become influential by developing policy expertise and use their specialized knowledge to negotiate and amend policy proposals from the government. The influence is related to the existence of specialized committees with the proportional distribution of committee chairs, implying that the opposition can obtain leadership positions in parliament (which is not the practice in all Scandinavian countries). Moreover, the committees are often populated by MPs with expertise within the jurisdiction of the committee, and restrictions apply to the number of committee assignments per legislator so that MPs can develop this expertise. In the Norwegian Storting, for instance, MPs are allowed to serve on only one of the standing committees. In contrast, there are not enough committee seats 107

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to provide all 349 parliamentarians in Sweden with full membership of a committee (Arter 2009: 203). Moreover, the committees in the Scandinavian countries have rules of enactment and deliberation that grant priority to committee recommendations and their proposed amendments. This enables participation in the final stages of parliamentary decision-​making (Rasch 2011). Hence, the committees in the Scandinavian countries are organized to facilitate the dispersal of policy-​making influence so that opposition groups also have a say in policy-​making. The committees possibly also possess agenda control and the ability to propose adjustments to government bills. However, the classifications of Scandinavian committee systems according to these factors are in fact ambiguous. Powell (2000: 34), for instance, claims that the committees in the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish legislatures facilitate opposition influence to a larger degree than do Finnish committees (Iceland is excluded from this data set). This is hardly surprising considering the fact that Finnish governments are usually broad coalitions, leaving few parties outside of government. Hence, one might expect less pressure for opposition parties to have influence on policy-​making. Mattson and Strøm (1996), on the other hand, distinguish between the drafting authority (e.g. authority to initiate and rewrite bills) and agenda control (e.g. control of timetables and the right to summon witnesses) of standing committees. In their assessment, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish committees do not come out consistently ahead of their Finnish and Icelandic counterparts. For instance, while Finnish standing committees are among the strongest with respect to drafting authority, Danish committees are among the weakest in Western Europe when it comes to the authority to initiate legislation and rewrite governmental bills. Since Denmark has a strong tradition of minority governments, we would also expect stronger committee influence. Similarly, as Döring and Strøm point out, only Iceland and Sweden empower their committees with the right to initiate legislation, whereas Danish committees are not even entitled to split or consolidate bills, which is the case in Finland and Norway (Döring 1995; Strøm 1998). As parliaments have become less directly involved in legislation, their oversight role has become more important. Parliaments can compensate to a certain degree for their alleged decline in legislative influence by placing greater emphasis on oversight and control. Different instruments of parliamentary control may apply, such as parliamentary questions, interpellations and ultimately no-​confidence votes. In an assessment of parliamentary control mechanisms, Nielsen (2011) concludes that there are many similarities between the Nordic countries, although there are also important differences in how parliamentary control is exercised. Denmark stands out from the other countries in terms of a great number of oral questions and Sweden with written interpellations, whereas submitting a no-​confidence motion seems to be a less dramatic act in Finland and to some extent Norway (see also Bergman and Strøm 2011: 367ff.). When it comes to decision rules, all of the Scandinavian parliaments operate on the basis of simple majority rules for the enactment of ordinary legislation. Accordingly, there is an absence of minority veto provisions to support the opposition, although Finland was a notable exception in economic policy-​making until 1992 (Arter 2009: 201; Mattila 1997). Only constitutional amendments are subject to minority provisions in all of the countries. This suggests that there are few constraints in terms of checks and balances on Scandinavian governments. For instance, there are no constitutional courts that provide strong judicial review like the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany. Judicial review in the Nordics is generally considered weak (Lijphart 1999:  226), arguably with the Norwegian Supreme Court as the most notable exception. In Finland, judicial review was explicitly prohibited until the 2000 constitutional reform (Wind and Føllesdal 2009). In Sweden, the Council on Legislation 108

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(Lagrådet) scrutinizes draft bills that the government intends to submit to parliament but recommendations from the council are only advisory and not binding. In recent years, however, there has been pressure towards stronger judicial review in Scandinavia through the process of European integration. Another important feature of the Nordic countries is the parliamentary ombudsman, a ‘whistle-​blower’ function adopted in Sweden in 1809 and later developed in the other Scandinavian countries. It has subsequently also been adopted in many other parliamentary systems around the world. The ombudsman is responsible for ensuring that public authorities comply with the laws and other statutes governing their actions. As a parliamentary control function, however, the ombudsman only has advisory functions and provides weak checks and balances (Strøm 2003: 73). On a more general note, Fish and Kroenig (2009) provide a Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) that measures the national legislature’s aggregate strength. It contains 32 measures of each legislature’s influence over the executive, its autonomy, specific powers, capacity etc. The Scandinavian parliaments (Iceland is not included in this data set) all come out fairly high on the score (Denmark 0.78, Finland 0.72, Norway 0.72 and Sweden 0.72 on a scale from 0–​1). Compared to other European legislatures, however, the Scandinavian countries are by no means exceptional.

Challenges from Europeanization The claim that European integration is a main driving force behind the strengthening of executives and a simultaneous weakening of parliaments is based on the insight that national executives represent the most powerful member state institutions in European affairs (Hoffmann 1982; Milward 1992). The simple logic behind this reasoning is that policy-​making powers previously held by national legislatures have been transferred upwards to the supranational level. This strengthens the executive branch and increases its autonomy from national legislatures; it is the executive branch that negotiates and bargains in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. While claims of increasing ‘de-​parliamentarization’ have been corroborated in many studies over the years, more recent Europeanization research ‘has forced us to reconsider these strong claims about de-​parliamentarisation’ (Raunio 2009: 327). As noted by Raunio (2009: 327),‘parliaments have fought back and have in many ways become better at controlling governments –​ they have reformed their rules of procedure and committee systems to facilitate oversight of the government, with MPs also making more active use of various control mechanisms’ (see also Damgaard and Jensen 2005). Hence, national parliaments are no longer only considered the ‘losers’ or ‘victims’ of European integration; they are now seen to have enhanced their position in many ways within the multi-​level system of European governance. The most important institutions for parliaments to exercise oversight and control in European Affairs are the European Affairs Committees (EACs). All of the Scandinavian countries have created EACs, the powers of which vary, that are responsible for coordinating the parliamentary scrutiny of European affairs and for monitoring the activities of government representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Council (Arter 2009: 202ff.; Raunio and Hix 2000; see further below). Governments are obliged to consult the EAC prior to Council meetings on what opinion the country should pursue with regard to various EU policies. In terms of their scrutiny powers, the OPAL project (the Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon) measures the institutional strength and level of activity of national parliaments in EU affairs. According to the scores distinguishing between the three sets of indicators, namely ‘access to 109

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information’, ‘scrutiny infrastructure’ and ‘enforcement’, Finland, Sweden and Denmark are ranked among the highest. Iceland and Norway are not included, as they are not EU member states (Auel et al. 2015). Specialized standing committees can also become involved in EU affairs. This has been developed furthest in Finland, where the committees process all bills and are therefore actively involved in scrutinizing European legislation. In Denmark and Sweden, the specialized committees are also routinely involved in processing EU issues. As non-​members of the EU, Iceland and Norway are part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which forces them to follow developments in the EU closely since they are affected by EU legislation; however, their parliamentary oversight in EU affairs is generally considered weak (Bergman et al. 2003: 175ff.). The subsidiarity control mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has further strengthened the role of national parliaments (Cooper 2015). By comparing how subsidiarity oversight operates in the three Nordic member states, however, notable differences become apparent. Sweden is among the most prolific parliaments in the EU when it comes to issuing ‘reasoned opinions’ in matters where it believes that an EU legislative proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity. The Finnish parliament is among the least prolific, while the Danish is in the intermediate group. The Nordic parliaments are generally considered well-​equipped to handle pressure from Europeanization, as they have had strong EU oversight systems from the outset. Ultimately, then, subsidiarity oversight provides the parliaments with a new tool, although the impact of this tool remains unknown (Larue 2011). Accordingly, parliaments have sought to compensate for their alleged decline in legislative activity by developing their oversight and control mechanisms. Hence, Nordic scholars report that overall parliamentary activities, such as deliberation on legislative proposals and parliamentary questions, have increased (Bergman and Strøm 2011: 367).

Conclusions The Nordic countries comprise one of the most stable regions in the world of parliamentary democracy. The combination of parliamentary systems of government and proportional electoral systems has promoted the development of multiparty systems in each country. Since no single party can normally gain a majority in parliament, collaboration is needed. Herein lies a big difference between, on the one hand, the majority coalitions of Finland and Iceland, and the minority governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden on the other. Notwithstanding these differences, however, Scandinavian countries share in common that their parliaments are considered strong in international comparison. The parliaments and their committees have received an important role in negotiating legislative proposals between the government and opposition parties. This has particularly been the case in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, all of which have been governed for long periods by minority governments. In Finland and Iceland, committees seem to have a somewhat weaker role. The general strengthening of executives comes at the expense of the parliaments.This development has been promoted both by a general internationalization of politics and in particular the European integration process. Stronger elements of bloc politics in Denmark, Norway and Sweden have further facilitated this development. Hence, the Nordic countries appear to be undergoing significant changes. One such change is that decisive negotiations and political settlements increasingly take place within governments rather than in parliamentary committees –​thereby reducing opposition influence in the decision-​making process. It thus becomes increasingly important for political parties to be part of the government (or at least to be part of the group of parties negotiating 110

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government proposals on specific issues) in order to gain influence; at the same time, the parliament’s role as an important political arena is threatened. Another important development is that coalition patterns appear to vary depending on whether policy issues are EU-​related or domestic. Coalitions for the negotiation and implementation of EU legislation are both broader and longer lasting than coalitions in domestic policy. This suggests that, on EU-​related issues, consensual decision-​making across bloc boundaries is the standard decision-​making model and that governments seek broad and lasting settlements on EU policy. Moreover, parliaments have sought –​and in part found –​new ways to control governments, particularly regarding EU affairs. The Nordic parliaments have developed oversight mechanisms, including powerful EU-​affairs committees, and the Lisbon Treaty introduced new mechanisms of subsidiarity oversight for reviewing EU legislative proposals. These mechanisms provide parliaments with an ‘emergency brake’ against the excessive appropriation of power by the executive. However, it should be kept in mind that these oversight mechanisms exist since parliaments have lost much of the legislative power they previously possessed. While there are signs that parliaments are ‘fighting back’ and gaining influence over executives, Christensen et al. (2002: 37) point out that parliaments might in fact have gotten ‘more control over less’. This may hold for Scandinavia as for most other European parliamentary states. Hence, Scandinavian parliaments are still at the centre of the parliamentary political system, but to a lesser extent at the centre of power.

Note 1 For further information, see www.logting.fo (the Faroe Islands), www.inatsisartut.gl (Greenland) and www.lagtinget.ax (Åland).

References Arter, D. (1991) One Ting too Many: The Shift to Unicameralism in Denmark. In: Longley, L. D. and Olson, D. M. (eds), Two into One: The Politics and Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change. Boulder: Westview Press. Arter, D. (2004) Parliamentary Democracy in Scandinavia. Parliamentary Affairs 57(3): 581–​600. Arter, D. (2006) Democracy in Scandinavia:  Consensual, Majoritarian or Mixed? Manchester:  Manchester University Press. Arter, D. (2009) Scandinavian Politics Today. 2nd edn. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Auel, K., Rozenberg, O. and Tacea, A. (2015) To Scrutinise or Not to Scrutinise? Explaining Variation in EU-​Related Activities in National Parliaments. West European Politics 38(2): 282–​304. Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (eds) (2011) The Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Scandinavia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Bergman,T., Müller,W. C. and Strøm, K. (2003) Democratic Delegation and Acountability: Cross-​national Patterns. In: Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Christensen, T., Lægreid, P. and Roness, P. G. (2002) Increasing Parliamentary Control of the Executive? New Instruments and Emerging Effects. The Journal of Legislative Studies 8(1): 37–​62. Christiansen, F. J. and Damgaard, E. (2008) Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia. The Journal of Legislative Studies 14(1–​2): 46–​76. Cooper, I. (2015) A Yellow Card for the Striker: National Parliaments and the Defeat of EU Legislation on the Right to Strike. Journal of European Public Policy 22(10): 1406–​1425. Damgaard, E. (1992) Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Damgaard, E. (1994) The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia:  Continuity and Change of Scandinavian Parliaments. In: Copeland, G. W. and Patterson, S. C. (eds), Parliaments in the Modern World: Changing Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

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Parliaments of the Scandinavian countries Powell, B. G. (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy:  Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rasch, B. E. (2004) Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries. In: Heidar, K. (ed.), Nordic Politics. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Rasch, B. E. (2011) Why Minority Governments? Executive–​Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries. In: Persson, T. and Wiberg, M. (eds), Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press Sweden. Raunio,T. (2009) National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research. The Journal of Legislative Studies 15(4): 317–​334. Raunio, T. (2011) Finland: Moving in the Opposite Direction. In: Bergman, T. and Strøm, K. (eds), The Madisonian Turn: Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Scandinavia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Raunio,T. and Hix, S. (2000) Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government. West European Politics 23(4): 142–​168. Raunio,T. and Wiberg, M. (2008) The Eduskunta and the Parliamentarisation of Finnish Politics: Formally Stronger, Politically Still Weak? West European Politics 31(3): 581–​599. Rommetvedt, H. (2003) The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament: Studies in Norwegian Parliamentary Government. London: Frank Cass. Sannerstedt, A. (1996) Negotiations in the Riksdag. In: Stenelo, L.-​G. and Jerneck, M. (eds), The Bargaining Democracy. Lund: Lund University Press. Sjölin, M. (1993) Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Power. Lund: Lund University Press. Strøm, K. (1998) Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies. In: Longley, L. D. and Davidson, R. H. (eds), The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees. London: Frank Cass. Strøm, K. (2003) Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation. In: Strøm, K., Müller, W. C. and Bergman, T. (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Von Beyme, K. (2000) Parliamentary Democracy: Democratization, Destabilization, Reconsolidation, 1789–​1999. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Von Sydow, B. (1989) Vägen till enkammarriksdagen. Stockholm: Tidens förlag. Von Sydow, B. (1991) Sweden’s Road to a Unicameral Parliament. In: Longley, L. D. and Olson, D. M. (eds), Two into One:  The Politics and Processes of National Legislative Cameral Change. Boulder: Westview Press. Von Sydow, B. (1997) Parlamentarismen i Sverige. Utveckling och utformning till 1945. Stockholm: Gidlunds förlag. Wängnerud, L. (2009) Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 51–​69. Wheare, K. (1967) Legislatures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wind, M. and Føllesdal, A. (2009) Nordic Reluctance towards Judicial Review under Siege. Nordic Journal of Human Rights 27(2): 131–​141.

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10 NORDIC VOTERS AND PARTY SYSTEMS Kasper M. Hansen and Karina Kosiara-​Pedersen

Introduction Whether considering the size of the welfare state, economic development or the political system, a myth exists that the five Nordic countries are exceptional and very similar on most dimensions. Nevertheless, the high trust among Nordic voters in their political institutions and politicians possibly offers an example of where Nordic voters are genuinely similar and exceptional when compared to the rest of the world (Bengtsson et al. 2014). We have recently witnessed ‘normalization’ in this area in terms of declining levels of political trust (Andersen 2016). Hence, the exceptionalism of the Nordic democracies, described by Tingsten (1966) as ‘the happy democracies’, is now also largely a myth. The Nordic political systems differ. While Denmark, Norway and Sweden are all constitutional parliamentary monarchies, Iceland and Finland are republics. The electoral threshold for election to parliament varies (2 per cent in Denmark, 4 per cent in Norway, 4 per cent in Sweden and 5 per cent in Iceland); Finland has no official threshold, but the de facto threshold can be as high as 12 per cent in small constituencies (Bengtsson et al. 2014: 19). In Finland, voters can only cast personal votes (full preferential voting), whereas Denmark generally has open lists where personal votes have an impact, as voters can choose to vote either for a party or a specific candidate. Sweden and Iceland have semi-​open lists where the personal vote rarely has an impact on the order of the elected candidates. Norwegian voters can only vote for a party, in practice very little preferential voting is possible, and it has never influenced the outcome of an election (Bengtsson et al. 2014). These are just some of the many differences between the political institutional settings in the Nordic countries that drive the political practice on Nordic politics in different directions (for a recent detailed account, see Bengtsson et al. 2014). The first step towards understanding the Nordic political systems is to specify the development of the party system in the five countries that is the focus of attention on the basis of Rokkan’s classic cleavage theory in the first section. The next step is to turn to the voters and describe some characteristic similarities and differences regarding Nordic electoral behaviour, analysing left–​r ight attitudes, electoral volatility, late deciders, turnout and party membership in Nordic politics. 114

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The Nordic political cleavage model: Rokkans’ triangle Lipset and Rokkan (1967) refer to a theory of societal cleavages when describing how the Nordic party systems evolved into the parties we have today (Bengtsson et al. 2014: ch. 3). Lipset and Rokkan described three dominant societal groups in the early twentieth century: workers, business owners and farmers. The conflicts between these three groups over resources and power developed into the three cleavages in society that formed the basis of the Nordic party system. These cleavages were often described as centre–​periphery, urban–​rural and worker–​ owner. At the worker/​urban end of these cleavages, strong unions and labour/​social democratic parties emerged. The urban–​rural cleavage resulted in a high level of organization in rural areas, including both the cooperative movement and agrarian parties. The third corner of the triangle is occupied by the conservative parties and trade organizations that attend to commercial interests (see Figure 10.1). Much work has been put into understanding and developing the cleavage model (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Deegan-​Krause 2007). Bartolini and Mair (1990: 215) define three elements that must be present before a cleavage can materialize: empirical, normative and organizational elements. The empirical element stipulates a social–​structural divide between different socio-​ demographic groups defined by variables such as education, employment and income resulting in different classes. The normative element concerns a need for some common values and beliefs within these groups, which create a sense of group identity. Finally, the organizational element stipulates that some institutional structure needs to be created to foster the cleavage, such as trade association and unions. When it comes to the Nordic countries, all of these elements are present and were especially strong when the party system emerged in the early twentieth century. Figure  10.2 summarizes the support for the social democratic project in the five Nordic countries. As can be seen, the Social Democrats were the dominant party in the 1950s in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, since which time their support has waned significantly. The electoral strength of the Finnish Social Democrats has been at lower levels but declined less

WORKERS VS. OWNERS Labour concern Organization: Trade Unions Party: Labour

PE

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RIP HE

.R VS

RY V

S.

CE

N BA

UR

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Business concern Organization: Trade Associations Party: Conservatives

Farmer concern Organization: Farmer’s League Party: Liberals/Agrarian

Figure 10.1  Rokkan’s triangle Source: Rokkan (1966: 93).

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K. M. Hansen and K. Kosiara-Pedersen 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Finland

Norway

Denmark

Sweden

Iceland

Figure 10.2  Support for Social Democrats in the five Nordic countries

(partly due to the original strength of the Finnish communists, which came at the cost of the Social Democrats). Iceland stands out in terms of markedly lower support for the Social Democrats until the turn of the century, after which time the support for the party approached that found in the other Nordic countries. In the most recent Icelandic elections, however, they are back at the bottom. Whereas Labour/​the Social Democrats have been the main left-​of-​centre parties, the dominant right-​of-​centre parties vary between the Nordic countries. In Denmark, the agrarian party has today transformed itself into the main bourgeois party, and the Conservatives received only 3.4 per cent of the votes in the latest election (2015). Finland has both strong agrarian (21.1 per cent in 2015) and conservative parties (18.2 per cent in 2015). Iceland also has both strong agrarian (24.4 per cent in 2013)  and conservative parties (26.7 per cent in 2013). In Norway and Sweden, the conservative parties (the Conservatives and Moderates, respectively) are the main bourgeois parties, the agrarian parties being far weaker. Here, the conservative parties received 26.8 per cent (Norway in 2015) and 23.3 per cent (Sweden in 2014) in the most recent elections. Especially in Denmark, the three parties (Conservatives, Liberals and Social Democrats) establishing the corners of Rokkan’s triangle have lost their previous total dominance. In 2015, they received less than half of the vote (49.1 per cent). While this declining support for the old parties is most prevalent in Denmark, a similar dynamic is observed across the Nordic countries, where their support in the most recent elections reached 64 per cent in Norway (2013), 60.4 per cent in Sweden (2014), 39.6 per cent in Finland (2015) and 64 per cent in Iceland (2013). Examining these changes more closely, Rokkan’s cleavage model has been supplemented with groupings around the urban areas and small landowners (i.e. the (social-​)liberals), and the rise of new left-​wing parties. On that basis, the Nordic party system has been classified as a five-​party model (Bengtsson et al. 2014; Berglund and Lindström 1978; Damgaard 1974; Elklit 1986; Knutsen 2006; Sundberg 1999) with a dominant Social Democratic Party, smaller 116

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left-​of-​centre parties and a more fragmented right-​of-​centre with more parties with less variation in size. These parties (Social Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals, Social-​Liberals and a group of various left-​wing parties) ruled the Nordic countries until the late 1960s, and the five-​ party model inspired the thesis of the stable, so-​called frozen party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This thesis is no longer valid and has not been for at least the last 50 years. Norway, for example, has had a strong Christian Democratic Party; these parties have been less successful in Finland, Sweden and Denmark but have nevertheless gained parliamentary representation and participated in government coalitions in different periods. Most remarkably, a new party family has entered the scene, here and elsewhere in Europe. In 1966, the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue) gained a seat in the Nordic parliaments as the first right-​wing populist party. In 1973, another right-​wing populist party, Fremskridtspartiet (Denmark), was elected to parliament. Since then, the populist right has gained substantial support in all of the Nordic parliaments except Iceland. Figure 10.3 illustrates the support for the five Nordic right-​wing populist parties since 1960. The electoral support for these parties has steadily increased over many years in Norway and Denmark.The populist right briefly gained representation in Sweden in the 1990s but seems again to be on the rise in the 2010s. The rise of the populist right in the Nordic countries can be seen as challenging the explanatory power of the cleavage model, since the three elements of a cleavage –​empirical, normative and organizational elements –​are difficult to identify when studying the populist right. Conversely, we do find several common traits in the electoral success of these parties, which can be linked to the three elements of the cleavage model. Populist right voters are on average less educated than those voting for other parties (empirical element). This has been among the factors that have led Stubager (2008, 2010) to argue that education is a new political cleavage. The Nordic populist parties are sceptical towards the EU and immigration, have strong faith in the cultural values of their respective countries (and the region, for that matter), and they are keen on protecting the Nordic welfare states; they are national conservatives with an anti-​ establishment line of thinking (normative element). In particular, their ability to focus on an 25 20 15 10 5 0 1960

1970

1980 Finland

1990 Norway

2000 Denmark

2010 Sweden

Figure 10.3  Support for popular right in the five Nordic countries (1960–​2016, percentage) Note: Denmark: Fremskridtspartiet (Progressive Party) and Dansk Folkeparti (Danish Peoples’ Party), Norway: Fremskrittspartiet (Progressive Party), Finland: Suomen maaseudun puolue (Finnish Rural Party) and Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party/​True Finns), Sweden: Ny Demokrati (New Democracy) and Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats). No popular right has been established in Iceland.

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immigration-​sceptical agenda seems to drive the success of the populist right-​wing parties. While the Nordic populist parties are similar in their place on the authoritarian side of the political spectrum, they diverge on the traditional left–​right economic dimension, where the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet stands out as right-​of-​centre with more libertarian ideas contrary to the other populist parties (Jungar and Jupskås 2014). In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party now occupies a position very close to the social democrats on the left-​r ight economic dimension despite the fact that Fremskridtspartiet (FP), the party from which the Danish People’s Party (DPP) emerged (a number of MPs left FP to form DPP in 1995), espoused libertarian economic views very similar to those of its sister party in Norway. Finally, the weakest trait of a ‘cleavage’ is likely the organizational element. Populist right-​ wing parties have organizational structures characterized by a high degree of centralization and strong, charismatic party leaders. In sum, in light of the increasing immigration to the Nordic countries and the subsequent political challenges, this agenda seems to have strong potential for years to come.

The Nordic voters The left–​right dimension plays a strong role in Nordic politics with respect to cooperation within parliament, electoral alliances supporting particular candidates for prime minister and, of course, voting behaviour. The traditional left–​r ight continuum goes from the left, focusing on a strong state that must provide equal opportunities for everyone through a large welfare state and ensuring everyone is taken care of. Conversely, the right focuses on individual responsibility for oneself and espouses a small state, lower taxes and less regulation. This general continuum is also simply classified as ideology, left being (socialist) red and right being (economically liberal and conservative) blue; which is the opposite of the colours used for the respective groupings in the United States. This cue to navigating among parties is very important to voters –​it is a strong compass for how they place themselves and the various parties. Nordic voters are largely able to place themselves and the various parties on the left–​r ight dimension (Bengtsson et al. 2014). The question of self-​placement on the left–​r ight dimension is also a core element in the Nordic Election Studies that run after each election. Figure 10.4 shows the self-​placement of each of the parties’ voters in all five Nordic countries from the election studies (2007), building on each of the studies in each of the countries. Figure  10.4 shows the party space of the Nordic parties. Denmark is the most polarized country with the greatest distance between the left-​most and right-​most parties. The conservative voters place themselves farthest to the right in all countries and the Social Democrats place themselves in the left centre in all countries. It is also interesting how the blue-​leaning parties are clearly placed together in Sweden and Norway but less so in the other countries. Nevertheless, the left–​r ight dimension clearly differentiates from left to right. As in other established democracies, contemporary Nordic voters are typically growing less true to their respective parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton and Weldon 2007).Voters identify with a particular party to a lesser degree than was formerly the case and they change party much more frequently. Figure 10.5 shows the development in the electoral volatility as measured using Pedersen’s index; that is, the sum, across parties, of the absolute differences between the support for the parties from one election to the next divided by two (Pedersen 1979). Here we see an increase in volatility across the Nordic countries; voters are simply changing party more frequently than was previously the case, as we also see in other established democracies (Bengtsson et al. 2014: 112; Gallagher et al. 2006: 294). The large increases in Iceland can partly be attributed to the significant impact of the financial crisis in the country. 118

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.51

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.42

AgPopRCon

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.54

AgLib ChrD Con

46 525354

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eta

.45

Con

Figure 10.4  Nordic parties’ voter self-​placement on left–​r ight (2007) Note: The party families (for more, see Bengtsson et al. 2014: 202–​203). Far Left: The Red–​Green Alliance and Red Party. Left Socialists: Socialist Peoples’ Party, Left-​Wing Alliance, Left–​Greens, Socialist Left Party and Left-​Party. Social Democrats: Social Democrats, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Alliance and Labour Party. Green: Green League, Iceland Movement and The Greens. Liberal: The New Alliance (now Liberal Alliance), Social Liberals, Swedish People’s Party, Liberal Party and Liberal People’s Party. Agrarian: Liberal Party (as mentioned in the chapter, it is still more questionable to group this party among the agrarian parties), Finnish Centre, Progressive Party and Centre Party. Christian Democrats: Christian People’s Parties, Christian Democrats and Christian League. Conservative: Conservatives, National Coalition, Independence Party and Conservative Party. Popular right: Progressive Party, Danish Peoples’ Party, Finns’ Party/​True Finns, Progressive Party, New Democracy and Sweden Democrats. Source: Bengtsson et al. (2014: 35).

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1950

1955

1960

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Norway

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1985

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Denmark

Figure 10.5  Electoral volatility (Pedersen’s index) Source: Updated from Bengtsson et al. (2014: 112).

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2000

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2005

2010

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K. M. Hansen and K. Kosiara-Pedersen 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1960

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1970 Finland

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1985

1990 Denmark

1995

2000 Sweden

2005

2010

2015

Iceland

Figure 10.6  Time of vote choice (percentage) Source: Updated from Bengtsson et al. (2014: 109).

However, the dominance of the left–​r ight dimension also has implications when voters shift. Floating voters are much more likely to float between parties close to each other on this continuum and within each larger bloc of parties; that is, the red-​or blue-​leaning parties. Hence, the high volatility is more of an intra-​bloc phenomenon than an inter-​bloc phenomenon. Another way of looking at the increased instability is to analyse when voters decide what to vote. Figure 10.6 shows a continued increase in the number of late deciders in all of the Nordic countries. Once again, this development mirrors the development across most developed democracies (Norris 1999: 178). Until recently, Denmark has been lagging behind the other Nordic countries, but almost half of the voters in all countries now make their decision during the campaign itself; that is, the last month before an election.The relationship between volatility and the number of late deciders is strong but does vary, which suggests that the national institutional setting plays a strong role. For example, many late deciders might be linked to strong preferential voting, as in Finland and partly Denmark; hence, there are more candidate-​focused campaigns in these countries (Bengtsson et al. 2014). Nordic voters display a high level of electoral turnout, even if a declining trend can also be observed here. However, there is also variation among the countries. Figure 10.7 shows that Sweden, Denmark and Iceland have very high turnout levels in an international comparison even if they are declining, whereas the Norwegian turnout is lower, recently within the 75–​ 80 per cent range. Finnish turnout has declined more markedly and has been lower than the other Nordic countries in the last 40 years. Part of the reason for this might be due to the very candidate-​focused system in Finland compared to the other Nordic countries, but it also goes hand in hand with weaker satisfaction with democracy in Finland than in the other Nordic countries (Bengtsson et al. 2014). The Nordics rank at the top when compared to the rest of Europe, surpassed only by Belgium and Luxembourg (with compulsory voting) and Malta. 120

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Nordic voters and party systems 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Finland

Norway

Denmark

Sweden

Iceland

Figure 10.7  Electoral turnout in the Nordic countries 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1960

1965

1970 Finland

1975

1980 Norway

1985

1990 Denmark

1995

2000 Sweden

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2010

2015

Iceland

Figure 10.8  Party membership in the Nordic countries

Party membership figures also add to the stories of decline and difference among the Nordic countries. Nordic membership figures have historically been higher than in other countries. As Figure 10.8 illustrates, however, the share of party members among the electorate has dropped in all of the Nordics except for Iceland. Currently, 4–​9 per cent of the voters have enrolled as party members in the Nordic countries, with the exception of Iceland, where the figure is 121

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27 per cent. These levels are similar to those found elsewhere in established democracies (van Biezen et al. 2012). Not all voters are equally inclined to be party members. Compared to the electorate at large, party members are more often male, older and have a higher education (Allern et al. 2016; Heidar 2015; Kosiara-​Pedersen 2015). The main reason for the larger and increasing number of party members in Iceland is the introduction of party primaries. These primaries have a major impact on which candidates may run and the order in which they appear on the ballot. The Icelandic parties differ in terms of how they conduct their primaries. Due to the limited effect of preferential voting in the general election, however, party procedures are very important for election outcomes (Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015).

Conclusions Over the last few decades, the Nordic countries have become less similar than previously concluded with respect to economic and social indicators, the political system and voting behaviour. Rokkan’s cleavage model is useful for understanding the development of the Nordic party system, as it helps explain the formation of a party system based on social democratic, agrarian/​ liberal and conservative parties. Rokkan’s cleavage model has been challenged by the establishment of new, strong parties, however, where populist right-​wing parties in particular have gained strong support in the Nordic countries, with the exception of Iceland. The populist right finds its strongest support among the least educated, national conservative working-​class segment of the electorate, which suggests the development of a new political cleavage along an educational divide in the Nordic societies. The left–​r ight dimension –​that is, the ideological continuum of economic redistribution –​ continues to act as a strong compass for Nordic voters when navigating the Nordic party space. This applies even with an increasing number of parties in parliament. The electoral volatility and number of late deciders have increased, and turnout, party identification and party membership figures have decreased. These tendencies suggest that the electoral behaviour of Nordic voters, like voters elsewhere, has become more unstable than previously. However, most of the volatility takes place among closely related parties and, hence, within either of the red or blue blocs/​party families. The Nordic party systems and voters share many similarities. But there are also marked differences, and the current trends found here resemble the trends found elsewhere in established democracies.

Acknowledgements Thanks to our Nordic colleagues, Rune Karlsen, Olafur Harðarson, Åsa von Schoultz, Hanna Wass, Henrik Oscarsson and Per Hedberg who have provided data (from national election studies) for updating the figures from Bengtsson et al. (2014).

References Allern, E. H., Heidar, K. and Karlsen, R. (2016) After the Mass Party: Continuity and Change in Political Parties and Representation in Norway. Lanham: Lexington Books. Andersen, J. (2016) Manglende tillid til politikere –​økonomisk usikkerhed, politisk uenighed eller generel afmagt. In: Hansen, K. M. and Stubager, R. Oprør fra udkanten –​Folketingsvalget 2015. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing.

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Nordic voters and party systems Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990) Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885–​1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K. M., Harðarson, Ó., Narud, H. M. and Oscarsson, H. (2014) The Nordic Voter: Myths of Exceptionalism. Colchester: ECPR-​Press. Berglund, S. and Lindström, U. (1978) The Scandinavian Party Systems:  A  Comparative Study. Lund: Studentlitteratur. Dalton, R. and Wattenberg, M. P. (eds) (2000) Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford Political Studies. Dalton, R. J. and Weldon, S. (2007) Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization. Party Politics 13(2): 179–​196. Damgaard, E. (1974) Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a Century. Scandinavian Political Studies 9(A9): 103–​125. Deegan-​Krause, K. (2007) New Dimensions of Political Cleavage. In: Dalton, R. J. and Klingemann, H. D. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elklit, J. (1986) Det klassiske danske partisystem bliver til. In:  Elklit, J. and Tonsgaard, O. (eds), Valg og vælgeradfærd: studier i dansk politik. Århus: Politica. Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2006) Representative Government in Modern Europe. Boston: McGraw-​Hill. Heidar, K. (2015) Party Membership in Norway:  Declining but Still Viable? In:  Van Haute, E. and Gauja, A. (eds), Party Members and Activists. London: Routledge. Indriðason, I. H. and Kristinsson, G. H. (2015) Primary Consequences: The Effects of Candidate Selection through Party Primaries in Iceland. Party Politics 21(4): 565–​576. Jungar, A. and Jupskås, A. (2014) Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family? Scandinavian Political Studies 37(3): 215–​238. Knutsen, O. (2006) Class Voting in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study. Lanham: Lexington Books. Kosiara-​ Pedersen, K. (2015) Party Membership in Denmark:  Fluctuating Membership Figures and Organizational Stability. In:  Van Haute, E. and Gauja, A. (eds), Party Members and Activists. London: Routledge. Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-​National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press. Norris, P. (ed.) (1999) Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pedersen, M. N. (1979) The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility. European Journal of Political Research 7(1): 1–​26. Rokkan, S. (1966) Norway. In:  Dahl, R. (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Stubager, R. (2008) Education Effects on Authoritarian–​Libertarian Values: A Question of Socialization. British Journal of Sociology 59(2): 327–​350. Stubager, R. (2010) The Development of the Education Cleavage:  Denmark as a Critical Case. West European Politics 33(3): 505–​533. Sundberg, J. (1999) The Enduring Scandinavian Party System. Scandinavian Political Studies 22(2): 221–​241. Tingsten, H. (1966) Från idéer till idyll: den lyckliga demokratien. Stockholm: Norstedt. Van Biezen, I., Mair, P. and Poguntke,T. (2012) Going, Going, … Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research 51(1): 24–​56.

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11 PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICS IN SCANDINAVIA1 Eva H. Önnudóttir and Ólafur Th. Hardarson

Introduction Half a century ago, Herbert Tingsten described the Nordic countries as ‘the happy democracies’ (Tingsten 1966). For decades, their democratic systems were generally viewed as stable, characterized by social consensus, compromise politics, corporatism, political trust, active participation and egalitarianism. At the same time, the Nordic countries developed some of the most ambitious welfare states in the world (Bengtsson et al. 2014). A combination of democracy, market solutions and high state expenditure came to characterize all five Nordic countries. In Sweden, Norway and Denmark, the Social Democratic parties were on the forefront in moulding this societal mix; while the Social Democrats were much weaker in Finland and Iceland, similar kinds of developments also took place there. In general, this broad picture remains the case today. While there have been fluctuations in the size of the welfare systems, political trust and the extent of corporatism, general consensus on the basic model of society has remained. Naturally, there have been political disagreements: the parties on the right generally support lower taxation and less state expenditure than the parties on the left; however, all parties support relatively extensive welfare systems and market economy. The disagreements are on the exact societal mix. Election studies in all five countries confirm the strong public support for this general societal model while also confirming strong ideological disagreement on individual policies. Very few voters want to return to the societies of the early twentieth century, where the welfare state was largely non-​existent; very few voters favour state socialism without market solutions (see e.g. Aardal and Bergh 2015; Hardarson 1994; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013; Stubager et al. 2013). In multinational studies on public opinion and values, the Nordic countries usually cluster together, sometimes along with a number of other countries, including the Netherlands (Inglehart 1997).This means neither that there are no differences between the Nordics nor that no other countries are rather similar to them; it simply means that the five Nordic countries share much in common when we consider public opinion regarding the general type of society preferred. This chapter investigates three aspects of public opinion in the Nordic countries using survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the European Social Survey (ESS). In the case of Iceland (which did not participate in all of the ESS rounds), this is 124

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supplemented with data from the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES). First, we will examine how the left–​r ight division in politics affects voting behaviour in individual countries. Despite considerable consensus on the general societal mix, different ideologies are important to voters. The left–​right voter positions are still the most important factor explaining voting choice; political parties offer different ideological solutions that the voters respond to in a rational manner. Second, we will consider the political support in all five countries. Political support, measured as political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works, has generally been high in the Nordic countries compared to the rest of the world. Comparing political trust as an indicator of support for the political system to satisfaction with how democracy works as an indicator of its performance, we examine whether the trust and satisfaction levels are similar in the Nordic countries or whether there is a divide. Third, we will investigate public opinion on immigration between 2002 and 2014. This is of special interest, as we have witnessed the emergence and rise of populist right-​wing parties in this period in all five countries except Iceland, parties that have been highly critical of immigration and sceptical of foreigners. This development is sometimes seen as a radical break with the Nordic traditions of tolerance –​ meaning that anti-​immigration views and xenophobia are on the rise in these countries. Our analysis reveals this not to be the case. The rise of new parties does not necessarily mean that the views they represent are becoming more popular among the general public. Quite to the contrary, their emergence is possibly a sign of weakness; that a minority feels threatened by a societal development that is going against values that they find important and they therefore feel it necessary to organize in order to defend these values. The rise of new parties would then indicate that some of the views and values in society have not found (sufficient) expression in the existing party system –​not necessarily that they are becoming more popular among the general public.

Ideological cleavage: left–​right ideology The saliency of the left–​r ight dimension as an ideological cleavage has been widely debated within the literature on electoral behaviour and representation. The left–​right cleavage has been argued to be less relevant than previously (e.g. Powell 2009), partly due to post-​industrialization, that valence politics explain vote choice (e.g. Clarke et al. 2004), de-​alignment (Dalton 2008), de-​polarization and the increasing complexity of the issue space (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). However, various findings indicate that the left–​right cleavages are still important in modern democracies (e.g. Hellwig 2008, 2014; Schmitt and Freiré 2012; van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010). Schmitt and Freiré (2012) show that polarization on the left–​right dimension is increasing in Central and Eastern Europe (the former Eastern Bloc countries, which are new democracies) and in the Nordic countries, declining in Western Europe, and that it varies in the South. The left–​r ight dimension is meaningful as a beacon for whom to vote for but differs depending on voters’ socio-​economic status (Hellwig 2008). Voters who are employed in trade-​related industries (agriculture, fisheries, crafts; i.e. manual workers) are more likely to base their vote on left–​r ight ideology than voters in the service industry.  Van der Eijk and Schmitt (2010) show that the policy content of party election manifestos reflects how voters perceive left–​right, even if the content varies over time and between different countries. In the former Eastern Bloc countries, it reflects positions on strong democracy, open and modern society, domestic and European cooperation, national independence, justice and wealth (van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010: 14). In Western Europe, the left–​r ight dimension primarily reflects positions on welfare, Marxism, democracy and globalization (van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010: 13). Even if left–​r ight ideology is less salient today than previously, it is still 125

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a prominent cleavage in politics. The political discourse is rooted in the left–​r ight spectrum and there is a clear and meaningful difference in the political orientation of the public to the left and right (e.g. Thorisdottir et al. 2007). The Nordic countries are no exception when it comes to the importance of the left–​ right dimension. The left–​r ight dimension has a clear effect on the vote in all five Nordic countries. In all of them, the political parties are lined up from left to right, and the political debate is heavily contested on typical left–​right issues, including welfare-​related issues and the role of the state in the economy. While there is variation between the countries as to whether the parties declare before an election with which party/​parties they would be willing to form a coalition, coalition formation generally takes place along the left–​r ight cleavage, where left and centre-​left parties form coalitions together as do right and centre-​r ight parties (Bengtsson et al. 2014). Table 11.1 illustrates the mean positions of the Nordic populations on the left–​r ight dimension together with the means for other European countries for the sake of comparison. For Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, we use the ESS, which covers every other year since 2002. For Iceland, we use the ESS data in 2004 and 2012 (Iceland was not part of ESS in the other years), as well as the ICENES data for 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2013. As seen here, the mean Table 11.1  Left–​r ight position of voters in the Nordic countries, means and standard deviations Year

Data

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Left right means and (st.dev.) Denmark

Finland

Iceland

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Western Europe

Central and Eastern Europe

Southern Europe

5.5 (1.99) -​ -​ 5.5 (1.97) 5.4 (2.14) -​ -​ 5.3 (2.16) -​ -​ 5.2 (2.15) 5.3 (2.14) -​ -​ 5.5 (2.33)

5.6 (2.02) -​ -​ 5.8 (2.02) 5.7 (2.02) -​ -​ 5.7 (2.01) -​ -​ 5.7 (2.00) 5.7 (2.04) -​ -​ 5.6 (2.00)

-​ -​ 5.4 (2.22) 5.1 (2.12) -​ -​ 5.5 (2.13) -​ -​ 5.2 (2.10) -​ -​ 5.3 (2.05) 5.5 (2.03) -​ -​

5.3 (2.01) -​ -​ 5.0 (2.08) 5.2 (2.04) -​ -​ 5.3 (2.06) -​ -​ 5.5 (2.11) 5.6 (2.11) -​ -​ 5.3 (2.10)

4.9 (2.39) -​ -​ 5.2 (2.23) 5.2 (2.28) -​ -​ 5.1 (2.23) -​ -​ 5.5 (2.29) 5.3 (2.22) -​ -​ 5.0 (2.40)

5.0 (1.99) -​ -​ 4.9 (1.95) 4.9 (1.97) -​ -​ 4.9 (1.94) -​ -​ 4.9 (1.93) 5.0 (2.03) -​ -​ 4.9 (2.01)

5.1 (2.33) -​ -​ 5.4 (2.44) 5.2 (2.35) -​ -​ 5.4 (2.39) -​ -​ 5.3 (2.28) 5.3 (2.33) -​ -​ 5.1 (2.27)

5.1 (2.24) -​ -​ 5.0 (2.30) 4.8 (2.26) -​ -​ 4.9 (2.25) -​ -​ 4.9 (2.18) 4.8 (2.48) -​ -​ 4.6 (2.37)

Note: Data for country comparison is weighted by design weight (dweight). Data for comparison between areas (W-​CE-​S Europe) is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght).

126

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Public opinion and politics in Scandinavia

position of the Nordic populations on the left–​r ight dimensions has not changed substantially since 2002 (2003 in the case of Iceland), even if fluctuations have occurred over time. The Finnish population displays the most stable left–​r ight means and the least changes from year to year (5.6 in 2002, 5.6 in 2014). The other Nordic populations display some minor fluctuations on the left–​r ight scale, but there are no apparent changes over the years. Comparing the standard deviations, left–​r ight variation increases to some extent in Denmark and Norway while decreasing slightly in Iceland. Comparing the Nordic countries to other countries in Europe, we see that the variance (st.dev.) in left–​r ight voter self-​placement is similar to Western Europe but less when compared to the nations of Southern and Central-​Eastern Europe. This supports Schmitt and Freíré’s conclusion that left-​polarization is increasing there and varies in the South while it is more stable in Western Europe. Table 11.2 illustrates the relevance of left–​r ight self-​placement for the vote and comparison over time. Again, we use data from both ESS and ICENES. For each year, we compute Eta, with vote choice as the dependent variables and left–​right self-​placement as the independent variable.2 Left–​right self-​placement would appear to have the strongest association with party choice in Finland and thereafter in Norway, and the weakest association with party choice in Iceland. Furthermore, it seems as though left–​r ight self-​placement is on the decline as a predictor of the vote in Iceland together with Sweden, while we see a tendency for it to have become a stronger predictor in Norway. When examining the same association for each party within the Nordic countries (Table 11.3), however, we find remarkably small changes. For Denmark, it is most notable that left–​r ight self-​placement increases in importance for the voters of the Red-​Green Alliance, which first won parliamentary representation in 1994. In Iceland, left–​right self-​placement decreases in importance for the right-​wing Independent Party and the Liberal Party, which was voted out of parliament in 2009. For the Icelandic Centre Party, the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Alliance, the left–​right self-​ placement of voters predicts the vote to an increasing degree from 2003 to 2013. In Norway, left–​right self-​placement becomes more relevant for the voters of the Socialist Left while hardly changing for the other parties.

Political trust Political support is commonly measured as political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works. It is considered to be crucial for the political system to function effectively (e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001) and for the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Diamond 1999). Explanations for how political support is mobilized have been, for example, the cognitive mobilization of citizens (Dalton 2008), perceptions and/​or level of corruption (Kubbe 2013; Stokemer and Sundstrøm 2013), and the institutional effectiveness of the political system (Norris 2011). In a recent study, Van Ham and Thomassen (2014) find no clear universal decline since the early 1970s in political support and dramatic country variation. The variation they find implies that the movers of political support are not universal; rather, they depend on different factors within different political contexts. In the comparative data available since the mid-​twentieth century, political trust has generally been higher in the Nordic countries than elsewhere (e.g. Holmberg 1999; Klingemann 1999). However, Holmberg (1999) found that political trust at the end of the twentieth century was waning in Sweden, had decreased slightly in Iceland, was relatively stable in Finland, while fluctuating in Denmark and Norway. He suggested that trust might have been exceptionally high to begin with in the Nordic countries and that for some of the Nordic countries it was simply approaching the levels found in other countries at the turn of the last century. 127

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Table 11.2  Left–​r ight ideology and party choice Data

Country and year

Election

Eta; L–​R placement and party vote (dependent)

Eta change

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Denmark 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2007 2009 2011 2011

0.42 0.43 0.38 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.40

0.01 –​0.05 0.08 –​0.03 0.04 –​0.06

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Finland 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

1999 2003 2003 2007 2007 2011 2011

0.68 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.68

–​0.01 -​0.02 0.04 –​0.06 0.00 0.04

ICENES ICENES ESS ICENES ICENES ESS ICENES

Iceland 1999 2003 2004 2007 2009 2012 2013

1999 2003 2003 2007 2009 2009 2013

0.35 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.10 0.21 0.20

–​0.03 0.04 –​0.08 –​0.18 0.11 –​0.01

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Norway 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2005 2009 2009 2013

0.60 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.72

0.03 0.03 0.01 –​0.01 0.01 0.06

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Sweden 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2002 2002 2006 2006 2010 2010 2014

0.59 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.35

–​0.10 –​0.04 –​0.04 –​0.06 –​0.03 0.02

Note: ESS data is weighted by design weight (dweight).

129

Table 11.3  Left–​r ight placement and party choice in the Nordic countries Country and party

Year

Change from first time point to last (+ = to left)

Denmark

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Danish Social Democratic Party Danish Social-​Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) Conservative Party Socialist People’s Party Danish People’s Party Christian People’s Party Denmark’s Liberal Party (Venstre) Red–​Green Alliance New Alliance/​Liberal Alliance

4.9

4.6

4.5

4.3

4.2

4.4

4.5

–​0.4

4.8

4.9

4.5

4.9

4.8

5.0

5.2

0.4

6.9 3.7 6.7 5.4 6.7

6.7 3.5 6.2 5.5 6.5

6.9 3.2 6.3

7.0 3.4 6.4

6.8 3.1 6.6

7.3 3.6 6.8

7.0 3.3 6.7

6.7

6.7

6.7

7.1

7.1

0.1 –​0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4

1.5

1.9

1.7

1.7 5.9

1.6 6.2

1.9 7.4

2.7 6.8

1.1 0.8

Finland

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

The National Coalition Party The Swedish People’s Party (SPP) The Centre Party True Finns/​the Finns Party Christian Democrats The Green League Finnish Social Democratic Party The Left Alliance

7.5 7.0

7.6 7.0

7.5 6.9

7.6 7.0

7.5 6.5

7.6 7.2

7.5 6.9

0.0 –​0.2

6.5 6.0 6.2 4.9 4.4

6.6 7.0 6.2 4.7 4.6

6.7 4.6 6.1 5.0 4.5

6.7 5.4 5.7 4.8 4.5

6.5 5.8 6.4 4.5 4.5

6.4 5.5 6.4 4.8 4.6

6.3 5.8 5.9 4.7 4.5

–​0.2 –​0.2 –​0.2 –​0.2 0.1

2.6

3.0

2.7

2.7

3.1

2.8

2.8

0.2

Iceland

1999

2003

2004

2007

2009

2012

2013

Social Democratic Alliance Progressive Party Independence Party The Left Green Movement Liberal Party Civic Movement Bright Future Pirate Party

3.8 5.2 7.4 3.1 5.6

4.0 5.6 7.3 2.9 5.5

4.0 5.1 7.0 2.9 5.0

4.6 5.4 7.3 3.3 5.5

4.5 5.6 7.4 3.4 4.9 4.9

4.7 5.8 7.3 4.1 5.0 5.2

4.4 5.8 6.6 3.3

Norway

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (A) Liberal Party (V) Christian Democratic Party (Krf)

3.6 4.3 5.2 5.7

3.2 3.8 4.9 5.8

3.1 4.3 5.3 5.8

3.1 4.3 5.4 6.0

3.2 4.5 6.0 6.0

3.1 4.6 5.3 6.0

2.4 3.9 5.2 5.6

4.8 4.7

0.7 0.5 –​0.7 0.1 –​0.6 0.3 n/​a n/​a

–​1.2 –​0.4 0.0 –​0.1 (continued)

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E. H. Önnudóttir and Ó. Th. Hardarson Table 11.3 (Continued) Country and party

Year

Change from first time point to last (+ = to left)

Norway

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Centre Party (Sp) Conservative Party (H) Progress Party (FrP) Coast Party (KYST)

4.7 7.1 6.6 4.7

4.4 6.9 6.4

4.6 7.3 6.8

4.7 7.2 7.0

4.7 7.3 7.2

5.0 7.4 7.5

4.6 7.0 7.0

Sweden

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Centre Party Liberals Christian Democrats Green Party Conservative Social Democrats Left Sweden Democrats

6.1 6.4 6.8 3.8 7.6 3.6 2.2

6.2 6.5 6.6 3.9 7.5 4.2 2.6

6.1 6.2 7.0 3.8 7.2 3.7 2.3

6.0 6.3 6.3 3.7 7.1 3.7 2.3

6.4 6.7 6.8 3.8 7.2 3.8 2.3 5.5

6.2 6.0 6.4 4.2 7.3 3.8 2.2 5.5

6.2 6.6 6.8 3.9 7.2 3.4 1.9 6.2

–​0.1 –​0.1 0.4 n/​a

0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 –​0.3 –​0.3 –​0.3 0.7

Note: ESS data for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden is weighted by design weight (dweight). ICENES data for Iceland is unweighted.

Income inequality has been found to explain the differences in voter dissatisfaction with how democracy works and political trust. Anderson and Singer (2008) find that these differences between those who are to the left and those who are to the right are greater in countries with higher income inequality. They also describe how income inequality makes a difference for the political support (measured in terms of satisfaction with how democracy works and political trust) of those who are to the left, while the relation between income inequality and political support is negligible among those to the right of centre. When income inequality is high, left-​ leaning voters express lower levels of support than do left-​leaning voters in countries with low income inequality. Income inequality is relatively low in the Nordic countries compared to elsewhere.We therefore expect both political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works to be similar between them and high in comparison with other European countries. Figure 11.1 shows income inequality (gini_​net) for 28 countries from the ESS data in 2012 (with available information about income inequality), with the Nordic countries grouped together at the lower end. The ESS questionnaire includes seven questions regarding trust in political institutions: the parliament, political parties, politicians, the legal system, the police, the European Parliament and the UN. All of these trust variables reveal a similar pattern. For that reason, we focus here on trust in the parliament and trust in the police. As seen in Figures 11.2 and 11.3, trust in the parliament and trust in the police have generally been higher in the Nordic countries compared to the ESS mean. The exception is trust in parliament in Iceland 2012, where it is just marginally above the other ESS countries. Trust in the police is higher in all of the Nordic countries compared to the mean in other ESS countries and relatively stable from 2002 to 2014 (Figure 11.3). Examining dissatisfaction with how democracy works, using data from the CSES, we see that 130

131

High income inequality 40 Income inequality (Gini_net)

35 30 25 20 15 10 5

Iceland Sweden Czech Republic Norway Slovenia Belgium Slovakia Netherlands Denmark Finland Ukraine Hungary Ireland Germany Switzerland Poland Cyprus France Estonia Italy Portugal Lithuania Spain United Kingdom Bulgaria Albania Israel Russian Federation

Low income inequality

Figure 11.1  Income inequality in ESS countries in 2012 Note: For those countries with available information about income inequality. Source: Solt’s SWID dataset, version 5, from: https://​dataverse.harvard.edu/​dataset.xhtml? persistentId=hdl:1902.1/​11992.

10. Complete trust Trust in country's parliament

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0. No trust

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Year ESS mean Iceland

Denmark Norway

Finland Sweden

Figure 11.2  Trust in country’s parliament in the Nordic countries, 2002–​14 Note: Data for the ESS mean is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght) and data for each of the Nordic countries by design weight (dweight). Source: European Social Service (ESS).

132

E. H. Önnudóttir and Ó. Th. Hardarson 10. Complete trust 9 8 Trust in the police

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0. No trust 2002

2004

2006 ESS mean Iceland

2008 Year Denmark Norway

2010

2012

2014

Finland Sweden

Figure 11.3  Trust in the police in the Nordic countries, 2002–​14 Note: Data for the ESS mean is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght) and data for each of the Nordic countries by design weight (dweight). Source: European Social Survey (ESS).

Dissatisfaction with how democracy works

4. Dissatisfied

3

2

1. Satisfied

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year Denmark

Finland

Iceland

Norway

Sweden

Figure 11.4  Dissatisfaction with how democracy works in the Nordic countries, 1997–2013 Source: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).

with the exception of Iceland in 2012, dissatisfaction is generally stable. With dissatisfaction in how democracy works on a scale from 1–​4 (satisfied–​dissatisfied), dissatisfaction increased from the 2007 to 2009 elections in Iceland, only to fall again in the 2013 election. The global credit crunch in 2008 led to the collapse of the Icelandic financial system, protests and an early election in 2009 and the increase in dissatisfaction with how democracy works. The reduced trust in the parliament clearly reflects those events. 132

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Public opinion and politics in Scandinavia

Political trust is considered to reflect the support for the political system and not necessarily be a decisive factor in elections. Those who vote for government parties generally express higher levels of political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works (e.g. Anderson and Singer 2008; Holmberg 1999). The levels of voter trust and satisfaction can be seen as a consequence of ‘their’ party being in government. Little is actually known, however, about whether trust in parliament plays a role in elections and who gets elected. In Table 11.4, we analyse the Table 11.4 Trust in parliament and party vote in the Nordic countries Data

Country and year

Election

Eta; trust in parliament and party vote (dependent)

Eta change

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Denmark 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2007 2009 2011 2011

0.09 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.11

0.01 0.01 0.03 –0​ .04 0.01 0.00

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Finland 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

1999 2003 2003 2007 2007 2011 2011

0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11

0.00 –0​ .02 0.01 –0​ .03 0.00 0.01

ESS ESS

Iceland 2004 2012

2003 2009

0.20 0.12

–0​ .08

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Norway 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2005 2009 2009 2013

0.21 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.16

–0​ .06 0.06 0.05 0.01 –0​ .01 –0​ .11

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Sweden 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2002 2002 2006 2006 2010 2010 2014

0.09 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.27 0.23 0.20

0.00 0.10 –0​ .07 0.14 –0​ .04 –0​ .02

Note: ESS data is weighted by design weight (dweight).

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E. H. Önnudóttir and Ó. Th. Hardarson

relevance of trust in the parliament for the vote choice as the dependent variable. Examining the Eta, trust in parliament has a weak association with vote choice in Finland and Denmark. In Iceland, trust in parliament is associated to some extent (Eta = 0.20) in 2004 with reported vote choice in the 2003 election but to a much lesser extent in 2012.This possibly reflects the almost universal (‘everyone’ trusts less) drop in trust in Iceland after the global credit crunch. Norway and Sweden display a different trend: trust in parliament has come to be associated with vote choice in both countries in recent years.The difference is that this has been the case in Norway more or less over the entire period since 2002, whereas it takes off in Sweden in 2006. When comparing voter trust in parliament over the years and what party they voted for (Table  11.5), small changes become apparent for the level of trust for each group of party voters over the years. Those voting for left-​wing parties generally express lower political trust than those voting for other parties, especially when compared to right-​wing parties. In all of the Nordic countries, left-​socialists (and the far-​left Red–​Green Alliance in Denmark) express the lowest levels of trust in parliament, while those voting for right-​wing, conservative parties display the highest levels of trust. This is in line with the Anderson and Singer (2008) findings that left-​wing voters generally have less trust than do right-​wing voters –​but they also establish that the levels of political trust among left-​wing voters depend on the extent of income inequality. This can also be explained by the ‘rigidity of the right’, meaning that right-​wing conservatives have a greater need to defend the status quo, are more likely to justify the existing political system (e.g. Jost et al. 2003, 2004; Þórisdóttir and Önnudóttir 2015) and are therefore more prone to believe in and trust the system. The tendency for those voting for government parties to express greater political support does not explain the differences between the groups of party voters’ political trust.Van Ham and Thomassen (2014) point out that the fluctuations in political support among those voting for government parties are not problematic, because they change from one government incumbent to the next. A  cursory glance at the slight fluctuations in party voter trust in Table 11.4 indicate no apparent trend along these lines. For example, the Danes voting for the Liberal Party (Venstre) express higher levels of political trust after the party was voted out of office in 2011 and the Social Democrats took over. Conversely, Danes voting for the Social Democrats express slightly higher levels of trust in parliament after the 2011 election.

Immigration Bengtsson et  al. (2014) find that issues related to immigration explain party choice in the Nordic countries, albeit to a varying degree. In their findings, immigration issues seem to be most relevant for party choice in Denmark and least in Iceland. Figure  11.5 shows that the percentage of foreign-​born population has increased in all five Nordic countries from 2002 to 2013. Sweden has had the highest proportion of foreign-​born population throughout this period, and thereafter Iceland and Norway followed by Denmark. Finland has had the lowest proportion of foreign-​born. Given the general trend of an increase in foreign-​born population in the Nordic countries, the current refugee crisis in Europe together with the growth of parties that campaign against or on limiting immigration in recent elections in all of the Nordics with the exception of Iceland begs an answer to the question whether attitudes towards immigrants among the Nordic publics have changed in the last decade or so. Anti-​ immigration parties are often referred to as ‘right-​ wing populist parties’, ‘radical right-​wing parties’ or ‘extreme right-​wing parties’. However, it is of importance that not all anti-​immigration parties are on the right end of the ideological spectrum. For example, the Finns Party in Finland, which campaigns on restricting immigration, is generally considered 134

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newgenrtpdf

Table 11.5 Trust for parliament and party voted in the Nordic countries Party family

Country and party

Year

Change from first time point to last (+ = more trust)

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

4.8 4.9

4.6 4.9

4.4 4.6

4.3 4.9

4.2 4.7

4.4 5.0

4.5 5.2

–​0.4 0.3

6.9 3.6 6.7 5.6 6.7 1.6

6.9 3.5 6.3 5.4 6.7 1.9

6.9 3.1 6.5

7.1 3.2 6.5

6.9 3.1 6.6

7.4 3.3 6.9

7.0 3.3 6.7

6.7 1.7

6.8 1.6 5.9

6.7 1.6 6.1

7.1 2.0 7.3

7.1 2.7 6.8

0.1 –​0.3 0.0 –​0.1 0.4 1.1 0.9

Conservative Left socialist Populist Christian democratic Agrarian/​liberal Far-​left Liberal

Denmark Danish Social Democratic Party Danish Social-​Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) Conservative Party Socialist People’s Party Danish People’s Party Christian People’s Party Denmark’s Liberal Party (Venstre) Red–​Green Alliance New Alliance/​Liberal Alliance

Conservative Liberal Agrarian Populist Christian democratic Green Social democratic Left socialist

Finland The National Coalition Party The Swedish People’s Party (SPP) The Centre Party True Finns/​the Finns Party Christian Democrats The Green League Finnish Social Democratic Party The Left Alliance

7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 6.2 4.9 4.4 2.6

7.6 7.0 6.6 7.0 6.2 4.7 4.6 3.0

7.5 6.9 6.7 4.6 6.1 5.0 4.5 2.7

7.6 7.0 6.7 5.4 5.7 4.8 4.5 2.7

7.5 6.6 6.5 5.8 6.5 4.5 4.6 3.1

7.5 7.1 6.4 5.5 6.4 4.8 4.6 2.9

7.5 6.9 6.3 5.8 5.9 4.7 4.5 2.8

0.0 –​0.2 –​0.2 –​0.2 –​0.2 –​0.2 0.1 0.2

Social democratic Agrarian/​centre-​r ight Conservative Left socialist Liberal -​

Iceland Social Democratic Alliance Progressive Party Independence Party The Left Green Movement Liberal Party Civic Movement

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​ -​

4.0 5.2 7.0 2.8 5.3 -​

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​ -​

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​ -​

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​ -​

4.7 5.8 7.3 4.1 5.0 5.1

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​ -​

0.7 0.6 0.3 1.3 –​0.3 n/​a

Social democratic Liberal

(continued)

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Table 11.5 (Continued) Party family

Country and party

Left socialist Social democratic Liberal Christian democratic Agrarian Conservative Populist Agrarian

Norway Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (A) Liberal Party (V) Christian Democratic Party (Krf) Centre Party (Sp) Conservative Party (H) Progress Party (FrP) Coast Party (KYST)

Agrarian Liberal Christian democratic Green Conservative Social democratic Left socialist Populist

Sweden Centre Party Liberals Christian Democrats Green Party Conservative Social Democrats Left Sweden Democrats

Note: ESS data is weighted by design weight (dweight).

Year

Change from first time point to last (+ = more trust)

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

3.5 4.3 5.0 5.7 4.6 7.1 6.7 4.6

3.1 3.9 4.8 5.7 4.4 7.0 6.4

3.1 4.3 5.3 5.9 4.6 7.2 6.8

3.1 4.2 5.4 5.9 4.6 7.1 7.0

3.0 4.5 6.1 6.0 4.8 7.4 7.2

3.1 4.5 5.4 6.0 5.1 7.4 7.5

2.4 3.9 5.2 5.6 4.6 7.0 7.0

–​1.1 –​0.4 0.1 –​0.1 0.0 –​0.1 0.4 n/​a

6.1 6.4 6.8 3.8 7.6 3.6 2.2

6.1 6.6 6.7 3.9 7.4 4.2 2.6

6.1 6.3 7.0 3.8 7.2 3.7 2.2

6.0 6.3 6.3 3.7 7.1 3.8 2.3

6.5 6.7 6.8 3.8 7.2 3.7 2.3 5.5

6.2 6.0 6.3 4.3 7.3 3.8 2.2 5.7

6.2 6.6 6.8 3.9 7.2 3.4 1.9 6.2

0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 –​0.3 –​0.2 –​0.3 0.7

137

Foreign-born populuation, % of total population

Public opinion and politics in Scandinavia 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Year Denmark

Finland

Iceland

Norway

Sweden

Figure 11.5  The proportion (of total population) of foreign-​born population in the Nordic countries, 2002–​13 Source: OECD: https://​data.oecd.org/​migration/​foreign-​born-​population.htm.

to be a centrist party. Furthermore, not all anti-​immigration parties are radical right-​wing parties or have outsider status. The two anti-​immigration parties in Norway (Progress Party) and Denmark (the Danish Peoples’ Party) can be considered part of the mainstream in their respective countries; in both cases, the non-​socialist bloc has relied on their support for a majority in the parliament. In the literature, there are four main schools of thought explaining the popular attitudes and feelings about immigration, many of which focus on the rise of anti-​immigration parties. First is economic performance, both actual (e.g. Kehrberg 2007) and perceived (e.g. Mudde 2004). Under deteriorating economic conditions, it is easier for anti-​immigration parties to mobilize votes. Second is distrust of government and the political elite. Norris (2005) finds evidence that radical right-​wing parties mobilize on distrust and dissatisfaction with the political system. Norris warns against reading too much into this, however, partly due to the fact that parties she terms ‘radical right-​wing’ have gained support in high-​trust countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and to a lesser extent (or not at all) in low-​trust countries such as Italy and Spain. Furthermore, van der Brug (2003) shows that radical right-​wing parties both mobilize on and fuel voter discontent. In that sense, discontent is both a cause and effect –​it feeds the support for anti-​immigration parties while at the same time representing a consequence of the support for those parties. The third common explanation for public opinion about immigration is political tolerance, commonly defined as moral and non-​material values (e.g. concerning freedom of speech, civil liberties and general trust) (e.g. Kehrberg 2007). High levels of political tolerance, such as accepting the civil rights of out-​g roups, including immigrants, should lower the perceived threat of immigrants –​and they are thus viewed more positively. Fourth is the size of the population of immigrants. Large-​scale immigration appears to be an important factor behind the growth of anti-​immigration parties (e.g. Mudde 2007). When comparing attitudes about 137

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immigrants and the share of immigrants on the macro level, however, individual-​level attitudes about immigration, refugees, multiculturalism and economic equality seem to feed into peoples’ support for extreme right-​wing parties –​not the share of immigrants in society (Norris 2005). It can thus be argued that even if large-​scale immigration has been found to be an important factor contributing to their growth, anti-​immigration parties will not necessarily emerge in all of the countries that have experienced large-​scale immigration. Furthermore, increased immigration does not necessarily mean that anti-​immigration attitudes will increase; rather, it might also mean that if an anti-​immigration party emerges and manages to place the immigration issue on the political agenda, they will mobilize the support of the voters who are already immigration-​sceptical. There are six questions in the ESS data that have been part of the core questionnaire since its start. Three of them have to do with whether many or few immigrants should be allowed to live in the country, asking about immigrants of the same race/​ethnic group, immigrants of different race/​ethnic groups and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. The other three ask about whether immigration is good for the country’s economy, the country’s culture and whether immigrants make the country a better place in which to live. The responses to all six reveal similar trends over the years, and we therefore focus on three of them here: whether many or few immigrants should be allowed from poorer countries outside Europe, whether immigrants are good for the country’s economy and whether they are good for the country’s culture. Figure  11.6 illustrates how the attitudes among the general public in the Nordics on whether few/​many immigrants should be allowed into the respective countries has changed little. Sweden, Norway and the two time-​points available for Iceland (2004 and 2012) show

Immigrants; allow many from poorer, non-European countries

Many

3

2

None 2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Year ESS mean Iceland

Denmark Norway

Finland Sweden

Figure 11.6  Allow few/​many immigrants from poorer, non-​European countries to live in country Note: Data for the ESS mean is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght) and data for each of the Nordic countries by design weight (dweight). Source: European Social Survey (ESS).

138

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Immigration; good for country’s economy?

10. Good 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0. Bad 2002

2004

2006

2008 Year

ESS mean Iceland

Denmark Norway

2010

2012

2014

Finland Sweden

Figure 11.7  Immigrants good for country’s economy? Note: Data for the ESS mean is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght) and data for each of the Nordic countries by design weight (dweight). Source: European Social Service (ESS).

that those three countries all express more favourable views about allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe compared to the ESS mean. The Danes and Finns express somewhat less positive attitudes about how many immigrants to allow and are on par with the other ESS countries. When asked about whether immigrants are good or bad for the national economy, the respondents from all five Nordic countries express similar levels of agreement when comparing the means –​and are generally slightly above the other ESS countries (Figure 11.7). The general public opinion about whether immigrants are good or bad for the economy has not changed over the years. Examining replies to the question about whether immigrants are good or bad for the national culture, we find some differences between the countries. All five Nordic countries express more positive views about immigrants being good for their countries’ cultures compared to the other ESS countries (Figure 11.8).3 Of the five Nordics, Denmark and Norway are the most negative on this score for the entire period, joined by the Finns in 2014, who had displayed the most positive attitudes on this question in 2002–​12. Given the success of the parties that are working to limit immigration in four of the Nordic countries –​the Danish Peoples’ Party, the True Finns/​the Finns Party, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Sweden Democrats –​it might be expected that popular attitudes on how many immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe are to be allowed should explain the vote to a greater extent today than used to be the case. Examining the relation between voter attitudes on this issue and party choice in Table  11.6, the results are mixed. Since 2002, the relationship has been strongest in Norway, and it increases almost gradually over the years. The importance of the issue increases to some extent in Sweden from 2008 and in Finland in 2014. In Denmark, it is relatively stable and has a weak association with the vote. In Iceland, it was more important for the reported vote in 2004 than in 2012. Comparing party voters’ attitudes 139

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E. H. Önnudóttir and Ó. Th. Hardarson 10. Better Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.Worse

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Year ESS mean Iceland

Denmark Norway

Finland Sweden

Figure 11.8  Immigrants good for country’s culture? Note: Data for the ESS mean is weighted by post-​stratification weight (pspwght) and data for each of the Nordic countries by design weight (dweight). Source: European Social Service (ESS).

about how many immigrants to allow (Table 11.7) uncovers relatively small changes over the years, and, as expected, the voters of the four above-​mentioned parties that want to limit immigration express the least favourable views about allowing large numbers of immigrants into their country. Tolerance towards immigrants in the Nordic countries could be related to a perceived or real challenge to the Nordic welfare state model. Immigrants generally depend on the welfare system more than do natives (e.g. Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Nannestad 2004), and natives have been shown to be reluctant to extend the Nordic welfare state model when immigrants are the beneficiaries of social welfare (e.g. Bay and Pedersen 2006; Nannestad 2007). It has also been argued that the barriers for immigrants to become full members of the Nordic national labour markets are higher than for natives, which partly explains why they become locked in as welfare-​state beneficiaries (e.g. Forsander 2004). In the ESS 2002 and 2014, respondents were asked to respond to three questions on an 11-​ point scale about whether immigrants take jobs away in the country or create new jobs (0 = take jobs away, 10 = create new jobs), whether immigrants take out more in taxes and services or put in more (0 = take out more, 10 = put in more) and whether they make the country’s crime problems worse or better (0 = worse, 10 = better). Examining Pearson R correlations between the question as to whether many immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe should be allowed into the country and these three questions, there is a positive correlation in the four Nordic countries that are part of the ESS data in 2002 and 2014 (Table 11.8). In Denmark and Finland, the question about whether immigrants exacerbate problems with crime has the strongest association with how many immigrants to allow in 2002, but in 2014 it has traded places with whether immigrants create jobs or not. In Norway and Sweden (both countries with a higher share of foreign-​born population than Denmark and Finland), the question 140

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Public opinion and politics in Scandinavia Table 11.6  Allow many immigrants from poorer, non-​European countries and party vote Data

Country and year

Election

Eta; allow many immigrants from poorer, non-​ European countries and party vote (dependent)

Eta change

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Denmark 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2007 2009 2011 2011

0.13 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.10

–​0.05 0.06 –​0.01 –​0.02 0.03 –​0.03

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Finland 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

1999 2003 2003 2007 2007 2011 2011

0.03 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.17

0.11 –​0.01 –​0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05

ESS ESS

Iceland 2004 2012

2003 2009

0.17 0.05

–​0.12

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Norway 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2001 2001 2005 2005 2009 2009 2013

0.26 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.32

–​0.04 0.00 0.05 –​0.04 0.04 0.05

ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS

Sweden 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

2002 2002 2006 2006 2010 2010 2014

0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.12

0.02 –​0.03 –​0.01 0.10 0.06 –​0.07

Note: ESS data is weighted by design weight (dweight).

about whether immigrants pay more in taxes and services than they take out (or vice versa) has the strongest association with how many immigrants to allow into the country in 2014. The most notable change between the years is found in Sweden: in 2014, the number of immigrants to allow is more strongly associated with whether immigrants create jobs or not and their contribution to the welfare system through taxes than was the case in 2002. 141

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Table 11.7  Allow many immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe and party choice Party family

Country and party

Conservative Left socialist Populist Christian democratic Agrarian/​liberal Far-​left Liberal

Denmark Danish Social Democratic Party Danish Social-​Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) Conservative Party Socialist People’s Party Danish People’s Party Christian People’s Party Denmark’s Liberal Party (Venstre) Red–​Green Alliance New Alliance/​Liberal Alliance

Conservative Liberal Agrarian Populist Christian democratic Green Social democratic Left socialist

Finland The National Coalition Party The Swedish People’s Party (SPP) The Centre Party True Finns/​the Finns Party Christian Democrats The Green League Finnish Social Democratic Party The Left Alliance

Social democratic Liberal

Year

Change from first time point to last (+ = more)

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2.5 2.9

2.4 2.8

2.5 3.0

2.6 2.9

2.6 3.0

2.6 2.8

2.5 2.8

0.0 0.0

2.4 2.9 2.0 2.6 2.3 3.2

2.1 2.7 1.8 2.4 2.3 3.4

2.2 3.0 1.9

2.3 2.9 2.0

2.3 2.9 1.9

2.5 2.9 1.9

2.4 2.9 1.9

2.3 3.0

2.3 3.4 2.5

2.3 3.3 2.9

2.2 3.2 2.4

2.2 2.9 2.7

0.0 0.0 –​0.1 –​0.2 -​0.1 -​0.4 0.2

2.4 2.7 2.2 1.7 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.4

2.2 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.5

2.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.2 2.5

2.3 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.5

2.1 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.3

2.3 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.5

2.3 2.6 2.1 1.9 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.6

–​0.1 –​0.1 –​0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2

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newgenrtpdf

Social democratic Agrarian/​centre-​r ight Conservative Left socialist Liberal -​

Iceland Social Democratic Alliance Progressive Party Independence Party The Left Green Movement Liberal Party Civic Movement

Left socialist Social democratic Liberal Christian democratic Agrarian Conservative Populist Agrarian

Norway Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (A) Liberal Party (V) Christian Democratic Party (Krf) Centre Party (Sp) Conservative Party (H) Progress Party (FrP) Coast Party (KYST)

Agrarian Liberal Christian democratic Green Conservative Social democratic Left socialist Populist

Sweden Centre Party Liberals Christian Democrats Green Party Conservative Social Democrats Left Sweden Democrats

Note: ESS data is weighted by design weight (dweight).

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​

2.7 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.3

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​

3.1 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.9

-​ -​ -​ -​ -​

0.4 0.1 -​0.2 0.2 –​0.3 n/​a

3.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.7

3.0 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.3

3.1 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.3

3.2 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.3

3.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3

3.3 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.3

3.3 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 –​0.1 0.1 n/​a

3.0 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.5

3.0 3.2 2.8 3.5 2.9 3.1 3.3

3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.5

3.2 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.4

3.2 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.6 2.5

3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.6 2.4

3.3 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.5 2.6

0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1

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E. H. Önnudóttir and Ó. Th. Hardarson Table 11.8  Correlation of how many immigrants to allow with whether they create jobs, pay taxes and crime problems Pearson R correlations between allow many immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe and …

… immigrants create new jobs (or take away)

… immigrants pay more in taxes and services (or take out more)

… immigrants make country’s crime problems better (or worse)

Year:

2002

2014

2002

2014

2002

2014

Denmark Finland Norway Sweden

0.23 0.32 0.26 0.30

0.33 0.33 0.21 0.35

0.29 0.24 0.29 0.35

0.31 0.24 0.31 0.43

0.34 0.34 0.32 0.29

0.28 0.29 0.26 0.28

Note: Data is weighted by design weight (dweight). All correlations are significant with p 2.0. The indices are averages created by the authors. The scales run from 0–​10: The higher the number, the more economic right-​wing, authoritarian, nationalist, EU-​sceptical and anti-​establishment the political parties are considered to be. All of the statements used in the survey are included in the Appendix. Source: Nordic Populism Expert Survey (Jungar and Jupskås 2011).

favour strong market regulation by the state, while FrP is far more positive to deregulation (the range of distribution is 5.5 on a scale from 0–​10). Differences prevail but are smaller on both privatization and whether increased taxation should be preferred to cutting public services. The Danish People’s Party is an outlier on the privatization issue. The differences between the Nordic populist parties are greater on the policy issues related to the economic dimension compared to the other indexes (see Table 12.1), which is to be expected, as the economic issues are less salient than other policies for these political parties. The authoritarian index includes four issues: liberal or illiberal policies on abortion and homosexuality, harder punishment as opposed to preventive measures to curb crime, the choice between the promotion of civil liberties to fighting crime and maintaining law and order, and gender equality. The four parties agree that civil liberties should be compromised in order to fight crime and that stiffer sentences are necessary for crime. The distances are greatest on social policies, as the Norwegian FrP and Danish DF are less authoritarian than the Sweden Democrats and the True Finns on issues such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia. On the question of gender equality, there is considerable variance in the expert estimates of whether the populist parties support or oppose measures aimed at increasing gender equality in different societal spheres, indicating that the parties do not have clearly defined policies on this issue. 154

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The nationalism index taps policies on immigration, national identity, nationalism and welfare chauvinism. The differences are smallest on the issue of immigration, as all parties agree that repatriation should be preferred to the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (0.7). FrP deviates slightly from the other three parties; that is, the three other parties are close to one another on the importance of supporting and protecting national identity, national values and traditions, including welfare chauvinism; that is, discrimination between citizens and non-​ citizens with respect to the provision of general social welfare, housing and jobs. All of the Nordic populist parties are in favour of prioritizing citizens over non-​citizens. Except for the Norwegian Progress Party, the Nordic populist parties are also strongly EU-​sceptical. The True Finns, Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party are all highly critical concerning the consequences of EU membership and oppose both the deepening and widening (transfer of competencies to and the enlargement) of the EU. Populism is measured in terms of the extent to which the four parties take an anti-​ establishment position. The True Finns and Sweden Democrats are perceived to hold the strongest anti-​establishment positions, whereas the Danish People’s Party and FrP hold less radical positions. The PS identifies itself as a populist party in its party manifesto of 2011, and the party’s historical legacy is in agrarian populism, giving a voice to the ‘common man’ and ‘virtuous people’ of the countryside. The anti-​establishment character of the SD is different, as it instead targets the political leadership not listening to or considering what ‘ordinary’ people think of ‘mass-​immigration’ and multiculturalism. The isolation of the SD contributes to the party’s anti-​establishment rhetoric, as it describes itself as maltreated by the media, political and cultural elites. The reason why the DF is not viewed as being anti-​establishment is likely due to the fact that it has actively supported the government, and FrP –​despite lacking government experience until 2013 –​has been in charge of municipalities (in Oslo, among others).

From the margins to the mainstream With the exception of the SD, the Scandinavian populist parties have moved from marginalized positions as untrustworthy for parliamentary cooperation into credible political parties with government potential. FrP and PS are currently members of centre-​r ight governments, whereas DF has actively supported government coalitions in Denmark.The SD are isolated by the mainstream political parties by a strategy of non-​cooperation. The Norwegian Progress Party became a party of government party in 2013 when it was invited to assume governmental responsibility 40 years after its formation in a centre-​r ight cabinet. The government formation was complicated: The Conservatives and the Progress Party formed a minority government coalition with a joint governmental programme, and a specific agreement was concluded with the two support parties –​the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. For more than a decade, FrP had prepared for office by broadening its policy appeal, centralizing the organization and acting more responsibly and less confrontationally in the parliament (Jupskås 2016a, 2016b). Despite being a long-​standing parliamentary party, it was first in 2009 that the party was considered fully legitimate for government by the conservative party: Höyre. The Progress Party actively supported the centre-​right government in the periods 1997–​8 and 2001–​5, the party voting in favour of several budgets in exchange for policy and parliamentary offices (Jupskås 2016b). The ‘government credibility’ of the True Finns was not questioned after the parliamentary breakthrough in 2011, but the PS position on the EU constituted a threshold for government participation. Timo Soini also feared that participating in government would have meant taking responsibility for the economic support packages to the EU member states in economic crisis, which was the main 155

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target of the PS electoral campaign. With the influx of new but parliamentary inexperienced MPs and the objective of stabilizing a constantly growing party organization, the party leadership refrained from parliamentary influence, focusing instead on increasing the support for the party. In 2013, the PS modified its position by no longer demanding the Finnish exit from the euro zone in 2013 in order to pave the way for office. After the 2015 parliamentary elections, the PS joined a centre-​r ight government with the Centre and Conservative parties. Opting to participate in a government coalition has its price. The incumbency effect has been strong for both FrP and PS. First, joining a government coalition entails compromises on party policies. FrP’s demands regarding restrictive immigration policies were not met, nor was the party successful in terms of furthering its demands regarding the use of the oil fund for welfare provisions, particularly programmes for the elderly (Jupskås 2016b). FrP’s support has initially been reduced by roughly 20 per cent since the 2013 election results to some 12 per cent. Moreover, party membership figures dropped in 2014, as one-​in-​seven party members left (Aftenposten, 29 April 2015). The European refugee situation has given FrP’s popular support a boost, however, as the party has mobilized on restrictive immigration policies. The average support during the first half has been around 16 per cent.4 In government, the TF has accepted the EU economic support to Greece and heavy economic cutbacks, which has had a negative impact on the support for the party: After receiving 17.7 per cent in the 2015 parliamentary elections, the party was polling at around 9 per cent in 2016 opinion polls (Taloustutkimus 2016). Combined with the identity shift from an anti-​ establishment oppositional voice to a party of responsibility, these compromises have consumed the support of the two populist parties in government. While the Danish People’s Party emerged from the 2015 national elections as the largest party in the non-​socialist bloc, it abstained from full participation in government. Instead, the Liberal Party formed a single-​party minority government. Party leader Kristian Thulesen Dahl stated that he ‘understand(s) those who believe that we should have joined the government, because they believe that is how to influence policy. But you can’t automatically say that the influence is greater in government than in opposition’ (Taloustutkimus 2016).The experience of being a support party between 2001 and 2011, when the party was able to influence policy-​making without upsetting the electoral support, is likely to be the reason for preferring opposition to government. As a support party, DF was successful in increasing its electoral support and had a major impact on the transformation of the Danish immigration and integration policies (Meret 2011). Until 1998, DF was largely ignored by the liberal party, Venstre, as it was not prepared to negotiate with the party on immigration issues. The situation changed after the 2001 elections, however, when Venstre, together with support from DF, could mobilize a parliamentary majority (Christiansen 2016). The first agreement between the two parties was over the 2002 state budget, and more structured cooperation was established thereafter (Christiansen and Pedersen 2012). The EU policies were removed from the agreement due to the DF’s stark EU criticism, and Venstre made agreements with other political parties on EU-​related policies. These legislative settlements provided DF with policy influence and the party was legitimized as a pro-​ system actor: ‘[Pia Kjaersgaard’s] long-​term purpose of close co-​operation with government was not only to gain policy influence, but also to get the party recognized as a normal party’ (Christiansen 2016). The centre-​right political parties were not alone in modifying their attitudes to the DF; in 1999, Social Democratic PM Poul Nyrup Rasmussen proclaimed in no uncertain terms that the DF would never become salongsfähig. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats announced in 2006 that it was prepared to cooperate with DF on issues of common concern. As a matter of fact, the DF 156

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became a role model for other PRR parties and consulted the Dutch PVV on how best to make use of a blackmailing position as a support party of the Dutch government between 2010 and 2012. The parliamentary breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats in 2010 was followed by a unified response: An informal cordon sanitaire, or anti-​pact rule, is applied to the Sweden Democrats, which is conceived of as a pariah (Geys et al. 2006;Van Spanje and Van Der Brug 2007). All of the parliamentary parties representing the government and the opposition have declared that they are not prepared to negotiate with the SD in order to obtain a parliamentary majority. As a rule, the governmental capability of PRR parties has been questioned due to extreme (in a relative sense) policies on the value-​based libertarian–​authoritarian policy dimension tapping nationalism, anti-​immigration and minority rights (Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 2002, Kitschelt 1997; Marks et al. 2006), which is the case with the Sweden Democrats. The democratic credibility of the SD is also in question due to the historical legacy of the SD in racist and neo-​Nazi milieus (Jungar 2015a, 2016a).The SD leadership aspires to overcome this ‘pariah’ status and to make the SD a legitimate party with governmental credibility: ‘Our aim is to grow electorally and assume a position as a political party with real blackmailing power in order to force the other parliamentary political parties to take us into consideration for government formation’ (Åkesson 2015). Aspiring to be recognized as a legitimate party, the SD has to overcome its historical legacy of extreme nationalism and racism (and contacts with more extreme subcultures). The party leadership has secured greater control of the party, for instance, centralization has taken place with regard to candidate nomination. The party leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmy Åkesson, launched a ‘zero vision’ in the autumn of 2012 against those whose actions and speech violate the party statutes and/​or are not in line with the party ideology and party norms. The zero vision is a vital element of the strategy to become a ‘normal’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘trustworthy’ party. More than 100 party members have thus far been expelled for extreme statements and inappropriate behaviour. The explicit aim of the SD to achieve an absolute ‘blackmailing position’ controlling the balance of power between the two main blocs was realized after the 2014 parliamentary elections. Since neither of the two blocs –​the centre-​r ight or the centre-​left –​controls a parliamentary majority, and they are not prepared to form a bloc-​ crossing coalition, the SD holds a strategic position in terms of being able to tip the majority to the government or the opposition. The parliamentary situation is turbulent, and a debate as to whether to terminate the isolation of the SD has been initiated within some of the centre-​ right political parties. Nonetheless, the central party leaderships are keen on maintaining it even though a parliamentary majority could be achieved with the support of the SD.

Conclusions Populism has been a long-​standing political current in the Scandinavian political systems and goes against common perceptions of populism as short-​lived, personalized and weakly institutionalized political forces. The presence of populism for more than five decades is due to successful mobilization of different policy niches, such as anti-​tax, immigration, anti-​EU policies, within the political systems combined with institutionalized and nationwide party organizations. The Scandinavian populist political parties have transformed from being marginalized positions, perceived as unreliable political parties, into parliamentary political parties with governmental credibility; with the exception of the Sweden Democrats, which is still treated as a pariah and surrounded by a cordon sanitaire. Regardless of the parliamentary position, the Scandinavian populist parties have succeeded in placing and maintaining their core policies on the political agenda. They have influenced the policy-​making directly as support parties to or members in government and indirectly in terms of the adaptations made by the mainstream parties. 157

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Appendix Policy position variables from the Nordic Populism Expert Survey (Jungar and Jupskås 2011). Variable

Statement

Economic policy: Taxes vs. spending Economic policy: Deregulation Privatization

0 = Promotes raising taxes to increase public services; 10 = Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes 0 = Favours high levels of state regulation and control over the market; 10 = Favours deregulation of markets at every opportunity 0 = Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry; 10 = Opposes all state ownership of business and industry 0 = Favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia; 10 = Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia 0 = Favours preventive work rather than tough sentences in order to curb crime; 10 = Favours tough sentences rather than preventive work in order to curb crime 0 = Promotes protection of civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to fight crime and promote law and order; 10 = Supports tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even when this means curtailing civil liberties 0 = Supports measures to increase gender equality in different societal spheres; 10 = Opposes measures to increase gender equality in different societal spheres 0 = Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society; 10 = Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin 0 = Does not encourage increased respect for national values; 10 = Encourages increased respect for national values 0 = Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national consciousness, history and culture; 10 = Strongly promotes a national rather than a cosmopolitan consciousness, history and culture 0 = Opposes discrimination between those with and those without citizenship with respect to general social services, jobs and social housing; 10 = Favours discrimination between those with and those without citizenship with respect to general social services, jobs and social housing 0 = Favours membership of the EU; 10 = Opposes membership of the EU 0 = Favours the extension of the EU to include new member states; 10 = Opposes the extension of the EU to include new member states 0 = Favours a more powerful and centralized EU; 10 = Opposes a more powerful and centralized EU 0 = Favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy; 10 = Favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy 0 = Party does not take an anti-​establishment position; 10 = Party takes an anti-​establishment position

Social/​moral policy

Criminal justice

Civil liberties

Gender equality

Immigration

National identity Nationalism

Welfare restrictions

EU: Membership EU: Enlargement EU: Strengthening EU: Authority Anti-​establishment

158

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Continuity and convergence

Notes 1 Iceland is not included in the analysis. 2 The 1947 peace treaty forbade all fascist organizations, and the Finnish Rural Party was perceived as a fascist organization due to its patriotic appeals combined with anti-​communism. In fact, Veikko Vennamo was one of the few Finnish politicians to criticize the Finnish subordination to the Soviet Union, i.e. the Finlandization. 3 The response rate for the four Nordic countries varies between 33 and 50 per cent. In contrast to previous expert surveys, we have used more specific criteria in order to select the most qualified respondents. First, experts were asked only to classify parties from their own country (i.e. a Swedish respondent would rate the Swedish parties, a Norwegian respondent the Norwegian parties and so forth). We did not ask researchers who have not previously written about their own country. Second, in order to avoid having answers from political scientist without the prerequisites to know exact policy positions of political parties, we selected only researchers working on parties and/​or doing electoral studies. 4 Data available from www.aardal.info /​ www.uio.no/​valgforskning (Accessed 2 October 2016).

References Aftenposten. (2015) Regjerings-Frp får refs av sine egne før landsmøtet. Available at: http://www.aftenposten. no/norge/politikk/Regjerings-Frp-far-refs-av-sine-egne-for-landsmotet-41275b.html [Accessed 10 April 2017]. Åkesson, J. (2015) Tid för ansvar. Open letter to the party members from the party leader Jimmy Åkesson. Arter, D. (2010) The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns. Government and Opposition 45(4): 484–​504. Bakker, R., Vries, C. D., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., Steenbergen, M. and Vachudova, M. A. (2012) Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–​2010. Party Politics 21: 143–​152. Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006) Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge. Bergmann, E. (2015) Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive Party Turned Populist? Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration 11(1): 33–​54. Bjørklund, T. and Bergh, J. (2005) Innvandrerne i lokalpolitikken. En suksesshistorie? In:  Saglie, J. and Bjørklund, T. (eds), Lokalvalg og lokalt folkestyre. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Canovan, M. (1999) Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Studies 47(1): 2–​16. Christiansen, F. J. (2016) The Danish People’s Party Combining Cooperation and Radical Positions. In: Akkerman, T., de Lange, S. and Rooduijn, M. (eds), Radical Right Wing Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? New York: Routledge. Christiansen, F. J. and Pedersen, R. B. (2012) The Impact of the European Union on Coalition Formation in a Minority System: The Case of Denmark. Scandinavian Political Studies 35(3): 179–​197. Converse, P. E. and Dupeux, G. (1962) Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States. Public Opinion Quarterly 26(1): 1–​23. Dansk Folkeparti (2002) Principprogram. Available at: www.danskfolkeparti.dk/​Dansk_​Folkepartis_​principprogram [Accessed 2 October 2016]. De Lange, S. L. (2007) A New Winning Formula? The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right. Party Politics 13(4): 411–​435. Erlingsson, G. Ó., Vernby, K. and Öhrvall, R. (2014) The Single-​Issue Party Thesis and the Sweden Democrats. Acta Politica 49(2): 196–​216. Flanagan, S. C. and Lee, A. R. (2003) The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian–​Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Comparative Political Studies 36(3): 235–​270. Fremskrittspartiet. (2009). Fremmskrittspartiets prinsipper 2009–​2013 [The Progress Party’s principles 2009–​2013]. Fryklund, B. and Peterson,T. (1981) Populism och missnöjespartier i Norden: studier av småborgerlig klassaktivitet. Lund: Lund University. Geys, B., Heyndels, B. and Vermeir, J. (2006). Explaining the Formation of Minimal Coalitions:  Anti-​ System Parties and Anti-​Pact Rules. European Journal of Political Research 45(6): 957–​984. Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J. (2002) Does Left/​Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration? Comparative Political Studies 35(8): 965–​989.

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A.-C. Jungar Jungar, A.-​C. (2015a) Business as Usual: Ideology and Populist Appeals of the Sweden Democrats. In: Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H.-​P. (eds), Populism in The Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press. Jungar, A.-​C. (2015b) Agrarian Populism in Finland. In: Strijker, D.,Voerman, G. and Terlin, I. (eds), Rural Protest Groups and Populist Parties. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers. Jungar, A.-​C. (2016a) The Sweden Democrats:  Adjusting the Organisation to Electoral Growth and Parliamentary Breakthrough. In:  Heinisch, R. and Mazzoleni, O. (eds), Understanding Populist Party Organization: A Comparative Analysis. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Jungar, A.-​C. (2016b) The True Finns: From the Mainstream to the Margin? In: Akkerman, T., De Lange, S. L. and Rooduijn, M. Radical Right Wing Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? London: Routledge. Jungar, A.-​C. and Jupskås, A. R. (2011) Centre–​Authoritarian Populists in the Nordic Countries: A New Party Family? Paper presented at the Triennial Congress of the Nordic Political Science Association (NoPSA) in Vasa, Finland, 9–​12 August 2011. Jungar, A.-​C. and Jupskås, A. R. (2014) Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family? Scandinavian Political Studies 37(3): 215–​238. Jupskås, A. (2009) Høyrepopulisme på norsk. Historien om Anders Langes Parti og Fremskrittspartiet. In: Simonsen, T. E, Kjøstvedt, A. G. and Randin, K. (eds), Høyrepopulisme i Vest-​Europa. Oslo: Unipub. Jupskås, A. R. (2016a) Between a Business Firm and a Mass Party: The Organization of the Norwegian Progress Party. In: Heinisch, R. and Mazzoleni, O. (eds), Understanding Populist Party Organization: A Comparative Analysis. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Jupskås, A. (2016b) Taming of the Shrew: How the Progress Party (Almost) Became a Party of the Mainstream. In: Akkerman, T., De Lange, S. L. and Rooduijn, M. (eds), Radical Right Wing Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? London and New York: Routledge. Kitschelt, H. (1997) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Kitschelt, H. (2007) Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. West European Politics 30(5): 1176–​1206. Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S.  and Timotheos, F.  (2006) Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared. European Journal of Political Research 45(6): 921–​956. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M. and Edwards, E. (2006) Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality. Comparative Political Studies 39(2): 155–​175. Meret, S. (2011) Party Life Course Effects and Mainstream Left Reactions to Radical Right Wing Populism in Denmark. Paper presented at the Triennial Congress of the Nordic Political Science Association (NoPSA) in Vasa, Finland, 9–​12 August 2011. Mimeo. Mudde, C. (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39(4): 542–​563. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pekonen, K., Hynynen, P. and Kalliala, M. (1999) The New Radical Right Taking Shape in Finland. In: Pekonen, K. (ed.), The New Radical Right Taking Shape in Finland. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association. Perussuomalaiset (2011) Suomalaiselle sopivin Perussuomalaiset r.p:n eduskuntavaaliohjelma. Available at: www. fsd.uta.fi/​pohtiva/​ohjelmalistat/​PS/​398 [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Rydgren, J. (2002) Radical Right Populism in Sweden: Still a Failure, But for How Long? Scandinavian Political Studies 25(1): 27–​56. Sverigedemokraterna (2011) Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2011. Available at: https://​sd.se/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2013/​08/​principprogrammet2014_​webb.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Sverigedemokraterna (2013) Sverigedemokraterna 25 år Jubileumsskrift 2013.Stockholm: Sverigedemokraterna. Taloustutkimus (2016) Puolueiden kannatusarvot 2016. Available at: www.taloustutkimus.fi/​tuotteet_​ja_​ palvelut/​puolueiden_​kannatusarviot/​puolueiden-​kannatusarviot-​2016/​ [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Van Spanje, J. and van der Brug,W. (2007) The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-​Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions. West European Politics 30(5): 1022–​1040. Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieβ, T., Nicolas, M., Regel, S. and Werner, A. (2013) The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/​ CMP/​ MARPOR): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Available at: https://​manifestoproject.wzb.eu/​ [Accessed 21 August 2016]. Widfeldt, A. (2008) Party Change as a Necessity: The Case of the Sweden Democrats. Representation 44(3): 265–​276.

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13 SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen and Peter Thisted Dinesen

Introduction The Nordic countries are admired worldwide for their social harmony. They are possibly the prime example of Lijphart’s ‘kinder, gentler’ consensus democracies, displaying high economic and gender equality, extremely low corruption, generous foreign aid and notable democratic satisfaction (Lijphart 1999). One of the most striking components of this ‘societal gentleness’ is how citizens relate to and act towards one another; or what we might call the ‘social capital’ possessed by these societies. More specifically, they are ‘cohesive’ societies wherein most citizens adopt cooperative attitudes towards others, refrain from crime and anti-​social activities, such as littering or other inconsiderate behaviours, uphold norms in the public sphere and organize in voluntary associations to cultivate their common interests. This chapter conceptualizes social capital as the strength of bonds between people who do not know each other.1 This definition sees social capital as collective in nature, but also as a societal aggregate of individuals’ relations, behaviour and attitudes. Two prominent components of social capital are citizens’ engagement in associations or voluntary work (sometimes called the ‘structural’ component), and their beliefs and expectations about the cooperation and trustworthiness of others (often referred to as the ‘attitudinal’ component) (Putnam 1993; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Scholars typically study individuals to examine engagement in associations and/​or social trust (i.e. trust in unknown others), and we will therefore primarily rely on this type of research. By aggregating these individual attributes for a given community, we can then also study social capital as a communal phenomenon. While great disagreement remains regarding the causes of social capital, its effects are somewhat less disputed. Trust and community connectedness are widely regarded as facilitating collective action by reducing the monitoring costs of informal social control and increasing cooperative tendencies and altruistic preferences (Putnam 1993). Consequently, social capital has been found to lower crime (Buonnano et al. 2009; Kennedy et al. 1998; Lederman et al. 2002), lead to better health outcomes (Islam et al. 2006), further economic growth (Helliwell and Putnam 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Tabellini 2010) and reduce corruption (Bjørnskov 2011). The political effects of social capital are perhaps most controversial: Some authors have found that it increases the responsiveness of democracy (Boix and Posner 1998; Nannicini et al. 2013; Putnam 1993), while others have found that social capital stabilizes authoritarian rule 161

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under certain circumstances (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Jamal 2008) or has even led to the breakdown of democracy (Berman 1997; Satyanath et al. forthcoming). The social capital concept has also entered the political discourse in the Nordic countries (and elsewhere). In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the question of social cohesion –​a close relative of social capital –​has given rise to legislation and public debate.2 Nordic politicians even justify policies based on arguments about how to best maintain and build up high levels of social trust. As discussed below, however, scholars of trust and civic life continue to debate exactly how social capital can be strengthened and what are its roots in the Nordic context and elsewhere.

Social capital in the Nordic countries Stocks of social capital In the following, we first review existing research on patterns of social capital in the Nordic countries, in general as well as in the specific countries. Then, to provide an up-​to-​date overview, we present figures mapping out two of the most frequently used indicators of social capital –​social trust and involvement in voluntary associations –​for recent data for the Nordic countries and larger European countries in order to be able to say something about the Nordic levels of social capital. As indicated in the introduction, the Nordic countries are generally considered high scorers on various measures of social capital. Illustrative of this, Delhey and Newton (2005), in their examination of cross-​country differences in social trust, describe how the Nordics display among the highest levels of trust in the world in the early to mid-​1990s, attributing this ‘exceptionalism’ to high scores on a range of characteristics known to be conducive to trust (see below). Other cross-​country studies produce a similar pattern, which also seems to have persisted into the twenty-​first century (Adam 2008; Bjørnskov 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Figure 13.1 illustrates the levels of social trust in the Nordic countries against the largest European countries based on 2012 figures from the European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). To measure trust, we have used the frequently employed question ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’, scaled from 0–​10, 10 reflecting higher trust.3 The figure confirms previous results:The five Nordic countries display higher levels of social trust than the seven other countries. Denmark leads, with Norway and Finland in the middle, and Sweden and Iceland at the bottom among the Nordics. The data also allow us to break down the Finnish figures separately for the Åland Islands (as the only Nordic dependency) for the years 2010, 2012 and 2014 (to increase the sample size). In this period, Åland displayed an average trust score of about 6.5, thus conforming with the levels in Finland and the other Nordic countries. Among the non-​Nordic countries, Great Britain scores highest and Poland ranks lowest on trust. There is also an important variation between the Nordics: The difference between Denmark (6.98) and Sweden (6.00) is actually greater than that between Sweden and Spain (5.13).4 These figures nuance the picture of Nordic exceptionalism in social trust. While the Nordics all have high levels of trust comparatively speaking, there seem to be relatively marked differences within the Nordic bloc. In that sense, the Nordic countries seem to be high scorers on a continuum from high to low trust in Europe rather than a homogenous cluster of very high-​trust societies that are qualitatively different from the other European countries. Turning to participation in civic life, the Nordics again rank relatively high in international comparisons. They are less distinctive than for social trust, however, and there is some variation across specific indicators (Adam 2008; Gesthuizen et al. 2009; Morales and Geurts 2007; Schofer 162

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Figure 13.1  Social trust in the Nordic countries and the largest European countries Source: European Social Survey 2012, design weight applied.

and Fourcade-​Gourinchas 2001; Sivesind and Selle 2010). Here, rather than Nordic exceptionalism, the pattern appears to be one of the Northern European countries more generally, together with the United States and Canada, standing out as being the most civic. Figure 13.2, which maps the share of the population indicating having worked ‘to improve things’ in a non-​ political organization or association within the last 12 months based on the 2012 European Social Survey, tells a similar story. Using this indicator, Iceland is in the lead with around 40 per cent working in organizations and associations, followed by Finland, Sweden and Norway. Denmark lags markedly behind the other four Nordic countries with only around 25 per cent indicating having done this. In fact, based on this indicator, association involvement is more pronounced in Germany (around 32 per cent indicate having done so within the last year) than in Denmark. Finally, it is worth noting that the Åland Islands show a very high rate of organizational work (around 57 per cent of the population from 2010 to 2014), thus outcompeting the other Nordics considerably as the most civic on this indicator.5 One should perhaps avoid reading too much into the observed variation in organization work, however, as this indicator is merely one of several frequently used indicators of engagement in civil society (others include volunteering or sociability). Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to measure engagement in civil society because its organization and form often varies considerably between countries. A key to understanding Nordic civil society is the close relationship between the state and civil society (Alapuro 2005; Klausen and Selle 1996; Rothstein 2001; Selle 1999; Torpe 2011). Association life –​especially in youth, sports and humanitarian organizations –​is highly subsidized by tax revenue. This has likely made organization life in the Nordic countries more vibrant. Critics would claim that this might undermine their independence. In order to play the role envisaged by many of the proponents of social capital, associations must be able to set limits against certain types of state action by mobilizing the population. As Klausen and Selle 163

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Figure 13.2  Work in organizations and associations in the Nordic countries and largest European countries Source: European Social Survey 2012, design weight applied.

write, however, ‘[t]‌he Scandinavian third sector is not working in opposition to the state; it is and has always worked together with and supplemented the state’ (1996: 118). In the Danish context,Torpe (2011) reaches the conclusion that Danish civil society remains independent and that associations are able to act critically towards the state and politicians who have fought for or protected their grants (see Henriksen (1996) for a dissenting view). Trägärdh (2013), based on the Swedish case, pinpoints another particularity concerning Nordic civil society. Unlike the hierarchical civil society institutions such as churches, foundations, charities or even ethnic or clan-​based organizations found in the United States or developing countries, Nordic civil society has usually taken the form of membership-​based voluntary associations marked by democratic decision-​making procedures and strong local branches (see Selle 1999 for a similar argument concerning Norwegian civil society). Hence, the Nordic countries largely share a qualitatively different, distinctive organization of civil society that is intimately connected with the state and internally democratic with local representation. In summary, the Nordic countries are generally high achievers in social capital as measured by social trust and civic engagement, although this is most pronounced for trust. While differences do exist between the Nordics, the overall picture is one of relatively high levels of homogeneity among the countries –​especially when viewed through the lens of worldwide or intra-​European comparison.

Social capital: intra-​country variations While there may be limited variation in social capital between the Nordic countries, there may still be marked geographical variation within each country. Indeed, regional variation is observed 164

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in other countries –​famously in Italy (Putnam 1993), but also in the United States (Fairbrother and Martin 2013). Focusing on municipalities or very local contexts (neighbourhoods), previous studies have shown that social trust is not entirely equally distributed within Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012, 2015; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2013; Wollebæk et al. 2012). Less research has been devoted to more aggregate regional patterns within the countries, which was the focus of Putnam’s (1993) path-​breaking study on social capital and government performance in Italy. Figure  13.3 explores intra-​country variation in greater detail by mapping regional levels of social trust in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.6 Note that the geographical levels of aggregation vary between the countries, with the regions in Sweden and Finland being more disaggregated than in Norway and Denmark. While some variation exists within each country, the overall picture is one of geographic homogeneity, especially compared to the regional differences previously found in other countries. This is especially pronounced in Denmark and Norway, where the difference between the most and least trusting regions is only 0.4 and 0.3 points, respectively, on a 0–​10 scale. However, the greater variation in Sweden and Finland also reflects, ceteris paribus, the nature of the more disaggregated regional units used here.7 Focusing on organization and association involvement (based on the measure presented above; analysis not shown), there is less internal homogeneity within each of the Nordic countries, some regions having an average level of involvement around double that of other regions in the same country. While this may in part reflect specific measurement, at the same time it arguably also indicates higher intra-​country variation in the organizational form of social capital. The overall picture of intra-​country variation in social capital in the Nordic countries thus varies for social trust and association involvement. For the former, we observe variation in very local contexts, but considerably more homogeneity across aggregate regional contexts. For the latter, we see greater regional variation.

Trust 5,649,351 – 5,746,322 5,940,265 – 6,037,235 6,231,178 – 6,328,148 6,522,091 – 6,619,061 6,813,005 – 6,909,975 7,006,947 – 7,103,917

Figure 13.3  Social trust in the Nordic countries at NUTS 2 (Denmark and Norway) and NUTS 3 (Sweden and Finland) regional levels Source: European Social Survey 2010–​2014, design weight applied.

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Social capital over time Having noticed that the high levels of social capital are relatively uniform among and within the Nordics, one might ask whether these countries have also been homogeneous in social capital over time. Have the levels of social capital been stable for long periods of time or changed more recently? The international literature again provides an interesting backdrop; specifically, in terms of Robert Putnam’s analyses showing a marked decrease in social capital on various accounts in the United States in the last decades of the twentieth century (Putnam 1995, 2000; Robinson and Jackson 2001). Our ability to track social capital over time in the Nordic countries (and more generally) is limited by the availability of specific indicators. This is most pronounced for social trust, which is predicated on large-​scale surveys. We are therefore effectively limited to focusing on the period after the introduction of questions on trust in public opinion surveys. Mapping the development in levels of social trust in Denmark, Sweden and Norway since around 1980, Sønderskov and Dinesen (2014) show that trust has increased markedly in all three countries. Bäck and Kestilä (2009) find a similar trend in Finland from 1981 to 2003, although the trust measures used are not strictly comparable over time. Again, some variation exists between the countries within this overall pattern. The increase in trust is most marked in Denmark, where the share of people indicating trust in others has increased from 47 per cent in 1979 to 79 per cent in 2009. This is an unparalleled increase in trust of 32  percentage points, or 68 per cent, and, remarkably, an increase that took place from levels of trust that were already comparatively high. The increases in the other Nordic countries have been less pronounced.8 Nevertheless, the increase in trust in the Nordic countries stands in contrast to the trend observed in many other countries, where trust has either stagnated or been in decline (especially in the United States; see Sønderskov and Dinesen 2014). Turning to association involvement, we can track the development in participation by means of survey data as well as historical records of various indicators of the vibrancy of civil society. The second half of the nineteenth century is often referred to as the ‘age of associations’ in the Nordic countries by historians due to the increase in and importance of civil society and voluntary organizations in this period (Balle-​Petersen 1976; Klausen and Selle 1996). Political liberalization ended the repression of civic life in Sweden, Norway and Denmark with the consolidation of liberal constitutions around 1850 and in Russian-​ruled Finland after the accession of Alexander II in 1855 (Nordstrom 2000). While this period also saw the formation of strong philanthropic movements in the Nordics rooted in the middle and upper classes, as in the rest of Western Europe and North America (Jensen 2012; Rothstein 2001), the most important and distinctive development was of popular mass movements:  the peasant movement, the labour movement, the sports movement, the religious movement and the temperance movement (Klausen and Selle 1996).The organizations formed around each of these mass movements were democratic and membership-​based, with local branches having considerable influence, founding the uniquely Nordic type of association life described in the previous section (Rothstein 2001; Selle 1999). The peasant movement (central in Sweden and Norway but strongest in Denmark) spawned liberal political parties, cultural associations and the formation of cooperatively owned ‘folk high schools’, which brought learning and liberal political ideology to the peasantry (Klausen and Selle 1996: 105–​106). Starting in the 1880s in Denmark, the movement even gave rise to economic cooperatives composed of peasants, who banded together to buy capital equipment for agrarian activity and the processing of agricultural goods. Agricultural cooperatives quickly spread to Norway, Sweden and Finland (Fernández 2014). 166

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Like the peasant movement, the labour movement reflected a distinct social group. It organized around trade unions and, increasingly, the national social democratic parties. The labour movement also organized its own cooperatives, cultural associations and social welfare organizations. Unlike the peasant and labour movements, the sports, religious and temperance movements spanned class divisions to some degree. The latter two were strongest in Norway and Sweden, where they had great influence and established wide-​ranging welfare institutions (Rokkan 1970).The organizations surrounding these five mass movements remained important in Sweden, Norway and Denmark until at least the 1960s. Association life in Finland took a distinctly different trajectory from that of the other Scandinavian countries. After 600 years of Swedish rule (until 1809) and widespread autonomy under the first 90 years of Russian rule, the ‘Russification’ in 1899 curtailed Finnish self-​rule, displaced the Finnish language from government and instituted Russian censorship (Harju 2006). This led to large-​scale mobilization against Russification, including a petition gathering 523,000 signatures, roughly one in three adult Finns, and the Great Strike in 1905. However, civil society also became radicalized and polarized: the labour movement withdrew from civic organizations, and workers were expelled from the sports movement. After proclaiming independence from Russia in 1917, the Reds (social democrats, trade unionists and communists) and the Whites (peasants, conservatives and industrialists) clashed violently in the Finnish Civil War (1918), in which more than 1 per cent of Finland’s population died in less than five months before the Whites emerged victorious. The civil war deepened political polarization, and post-​civil war association life was divided along party lines to a degree previously unseen in Scandinavia (Harju 2006). Repression also continued: From 1930 onward, a great number of rightist military organizations were founded, while over 3,000 leftist organizations were closed, including the largest trade unions (Harju 2006). Conversely, after the Second World War, almost 3,000 associations classified as rightist were closed. Not until much later in the twentieth century did Finnish civil society again settle into the consensual form it took in the other Nordic countries. From the 1960s onwards, organizations based on the peasant, labour, religious and temperance movements lost ground against new types of organizations, whereas the sports movement continued to grow. Based on studies of public registries of the total number of voluntary organizations in the Norwegian province of Hordaland, Selle and Øymyr (1992) found that from 1941 to 1988, the number of associations relative to population increased by about one-​third. At the same time, religious and temperance organizations fell from more than 50 per cent of associations in 1941 to only 16 per cent in 1988, while cultural, musical and sports clubs increased their share. Moving to the present day, Wollebæk and Segaard (2011) find that this trend has continued until today in Norway. Similarly for Denmark, Torpe (2011) found that association involvement increased from 1981 to 2008, with the largest increases in association membership and activity being concerned with education and culture as well as in sports clubs. Since the 1960s, membership in ‘ideational’ associations concerned with the environment, animals, human rights and development has also risen. Unlike the traditional, Nordic membership-​based organizations, however, the members of these organizations are generally passive, their organization activity being limited to paying dues, and they are run by professional secretariats rather than local, elected branches (Tranvik and Selle 2007). Summarizing the existing evidence on the development of social capital over time, we conclude that while historical data appear to indicate that the Nordics started with relatively high levels of social capital, the reservoir of social capital seems to have grown even deeper over the years –​especially with regard to social trust. This is all the more striking given the broader international patterns described above, which generally point to either stagnation or an erosion of social capital. 167

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Why are the Nordics exceptional? The Nordic exceptionalism in social capital described above naturally raises questions regarding the causes of this phenomenon. Given the ostensible importance of social capital for democratic government and the functioning of society more generally, this is obviously also a question of great importance from the view of policy-​makers. Mirroring disagreement in the wider literature on social capital and political culture, scholars disagree over whether high Nordic social capital should be attributed to recent social and political factors such as institutional quality, the universal welfare state or post-​materialist values, or whether it instead reflects deep cultural or structural factors such as Protestantism, ethnic homogeneity, early state-​building or the relative weakness of feudalism in Nordic societies. Many scholars have pointed to historical evidence suggesting that the Nordic societies were marked by relative social harmony and cooperation already in the nineteenth century. In a comparative perspective, present-​day trust predicts the success of agricultural cooperatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries around the world (Fernández 2014), which is taken to indicate the persistence of trust and cooperative tendencies more generally. Putting forward what might be the most extreme account of how very long-​run historical factors possibly shaped Danish culture and social capital, Svendsen and Svendsen (2010) highlight early Viking state-​building and trade networks, and the trust and trustworthiness it involved, as the cause of high present-​day social capital. Other evidence of ‘historical’ explanations of Nordic exceptionalism comes from Nordic immigrants in the United States, who were perceived and portrayed as almost naïvely trusting upon their arrival in the nineteenth century (Trägårdh 2009). Moreover, although their ancestors generally emigrated over a century ago, US citizens with Nordic roots remain the most trusting and civically minded of all Americans, thus mirroring the relative contemporary placement of citizens in their ancestral countries in international comparisons (Rice and Feldman 1997; Uslaner 2008). While this body of research has some merit, it may also be subject to confirmation bias. High levels of early trust may also have been present in other societies. Should this be the case, then observing high levels of cooperation and a vibrant civil society historically in Nordic societies is a less convincing argument for high Nordic social capital today. It is also less attentive to discordant evidence such as Finland’s civil war. Lastly, on a theoretical level, the mechanisms allowing earlier levels of social capital to be transmitted to the present are underspecified. In contrast to arguments about the deep roots of Nordic social capital exceptionalism, other scholars have focused on more recent causes of high social capital. More specifically, Sønderskov and Dinesen’s (2014) demonstration of the dramatic increase in trust in Denmark from 1979 to 2009 testifies to more recent drivers of social capital. They argue, and show empirically, that the increase in social trust can in part be attributed to increases in institutional trust. This ties in with the institutional account of social trust advanced by Rothstein and Stolle (2003).The argument is that high-​quality institutions –​especially those related to institutional fairness (e.g. low levels of corruption) –​can engender trust by punishing untrustworthy behaviour and espousing values of honesty. In a related, but somewhat different, vein, others have argued that the universalistic design of the Nordic welfare state (as opposed to more selective welfare programmes relying more on means testing), as well as the relatively high levels of economic equality that flows from it, are the causes of high levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2003; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Relatedly, Larsen (2007, 2013) has explained the increased levels of social capital (from already high beginnings) in the Nordics, vis-​à-​vis the drop in the United States and the United Kingdom, with the relative absence of a distinct 168

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underclass, which stems from low levels of inequality and the absence of mass media portrayals of character flaws of ‘the bottom’ of society. Empirically, the remarkable similarity of Finnish levels of social capital to those of the other Nordic societies (despite its history of Russian rule, civil war and non-​Scandinavian language) provides support for the assertion that universal welfare states and low corruption increase trust.9 Finally, another institutional aspect of Nordic societies that has been highlighted as an explanation for the high levels of social capital is the predominance of ‘horizontal’ teaching practices in the educational system. Such teaching practices, focused on group work as opposed to teacher lectures, gained a foothold in the Nordic countries, especially after the  student riots in 1968. Across and within countries –​even within the same schools –​ differences in such teaching practices predict differences in children’s trust and cooperativeness (Algan et al. 2013). Like the cultural and historical explanations, the institutional accounts of trust are plausible. Given their focus on more contemporary factors, however, these arguments rarely address the second-​order question of why low levels of corruption, universalist welfare states and low economic inequality arose in the first place and why they first did so in the Nordics (at least for the latter two). However, prior research provides some suggestions in this regard. One of the dominant interpretations holds that consensual democracies with proportional representation electoral systems were more likely to form the kind of ‘red–​g reen’ government coalitions between workers and small-​scale farmers that then pushed through universalist welfare states (Esping-​Andersen 1990; Manow 2009). Less empirical research has focused on how historical and more contemporary factors, as identified in the literature so far, have interacted. One potential example is whether high initial levels of social capital, trust in particular, in the Nordic countries helped shape institutional choices concerning the adoption of proportional representation in the early twentieth century or crucial first steps towards the welfare state in the early or mid-​twentieth century. The historical literature on association life in Sweden has gone some way towards examining the latter question, showing that the early welfare state largely took over the work being done by bourgeois non-​profit and voluntary charitable organizations (Lundström 1996). The charitable organizations supported this ‘nationalization’ of their work, sometimes themselves acting as instigators, and ‘[m]‌any of the leading persons in the charitable organizations quickly got leading positions in the governmental agencies that were established to handle the “social question”’ (Rothstein 2001: 215). This suggests that one type of social capital contributed very concretely to building the Swedish welfare state in the post-​war years. More generally, high pre-​existing levels of social capital, especially trust, possibly also helped protect against the problems of moral hazard inherent in welfare states without strict means-​testing or contributed to spurring strong labour movements capable of solving collective action problems. Thus, historically high social capital may have shaped the design of social policy and patterns of inequality in and of itself (Algan and Cahuc 2009), which in turn feeds back positively to future social capital.

Conclusion and perspectives for future research Are the Nordic countries exceptional in terms of social capital? The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that if not exceptional, they are at least high-​rankers on the two dimensions of social capital surveyed here:  social trust and association involvement. Especially for social trust, they stand out compared to other countries, while this is less pronounced for association involvement. Moreover, while they are alike when compared to other countries, considerable 169

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variation also exists between the Nordics in social capital. These countries also vary internally, although much more in terms of association involvement than trust. Finally, the nature of association life has been, and to some extent remains, distinct in the Nordic countries, as it is characterized by highly organized popular social movements with democratic internal workings. Are the high levels of social capital long-​standing features of the Nordic societies? On the one hand, there are indications that, comparatively speaking, they have historically had high levels of social capital. That said, there is also evidence of a more recent increase in social capital over the last 30 years. Hence, from already high beginnings, Nordic social capital appears to have increased further in recent years.The question of the development of social capital over time ties in with the larger discussion of the roots of social capital and political culture more generally. At present, there is evidence suggesting both deep historical and more contemporary roots of the high levels of Nordic social capital, but none are definite, and future work integrating the two perspectives would be of great value. Where should research on social capital in the Nordic countries look to next? In line with the broader political science literature and ongoing research on data from the Nordics, we suggest three avenues for further research. First, given the exceptional quality of the public registries found in these countries, studies utilizing these registries would further the literature on social capital not only in the Nordic region, but more generally. Examples in recent work include precise local geographical data (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015) and genetically informed data (Cesarini et  al. 2014). Second, implementing more field experiments would represent another advance in the literature, because they allow for much stronger causal inference and the evaluation of potential public or private interventions meant to increase social capital (see Bhatti et al. 2015 for an application in terms of turnout in Denmark). Third, and perhaps most pertinent in relation to the question of the causes of the high levels of Nordic social capital, more research utilizing historical data and natural experiments to differentiate between ‘deep’ and more contemporary causes would be very valuable. For instance, changes to borders have been used to estimate the effects of nineteenth-​century legal institutions (Buggle 2015) and pre-​1864 Danish rule (Andersen 2015) on late nineteenth-​century association life in Germany, as well as the effects of historically strong Habsburg bureaucracy (Becker et al. 2016), and of political instability (Jancec 2012) on local trust in contemporary Eastern Europe. Because of the lengthy Nordic traditions related to political stability and literacy, many historical sources of data are available yet remain underexploited. Thus, we believe research on Nordic social capital will continue to produce insights for years to come and that the Nordic countries are well-​placed to continue to play an outsized role in new research on social capital with relevance for the rest of the world.

Notes 1 We do not review research on social capital in the Bourdieudian sense. In this vein of research, a primary concern is the effect of social networks and contacts with respect to social mobility (see Bourdieu 1986; Portes 1998). 2 In Norway from 2000 to 2011, ‘social capital’ was used in 11 different reports by panels appointed by the Norwegian government (Norges offentlige utredninger, NOUs) and eight statements from the government to the Norwegian Parliament (stortingsmeldinger), see Wollebæk and Seegaard (2011). 3 This more fine-​grained, continuous measure of trust provides a more nuanced and valid measure than the dichotomous variable used in much previous work (Lundmark et  al. forthcoming; Zmerli and Newton 2008). It also accounts for the less pronounced differences in trust observed between countries (Adam 2008). The single-​item trust measure is often combined with two other items, tapping helpfulness and fairness, respectively, to form a trust scale. Employing this measure, we obtain an essentially identical pattern to that reported in Figure 13.1.

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Social capital in Scandinavia 4 The relatively small differences between the Scandinavian countries have not been subject to much research. The largest difference is between Denmark and Sweden, which Torpe and Lolle (2010) examine and find to be accounted for primarily by differences in institutional trust and subjective well-​being. 5 This is in line with other findings showing that Åland islanders work 30 per cent more volunteer hours per capita than Sweden and Finland (Kinnunen and Rundberg 2013). 6 The measure of social trust is the same as in Figure 13.1, but we also include data from 2010 and 2014 to increase the number of respondents in each region. Iceland is omitted for clarity of presentation. However, it consists only of the two regions (Reykjavik and the rest of Iceland), which are very similar (trust scores of 6.1 and 5.9, respectively). 7 The lower level of aggregation allows for a greater level of detail, and it also implies that the average for each region is based on fewer individuals, which induces larger random variation. 8 Over a much shorter period of time (1996–​2002), Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) show that trust has been relatively stable at high levels in Sweden. 9 The Finnish welfare state developed slightly later than the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian welfare states in partial emulation of them (Kettunen 2001).

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14 THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN SCANDINAVIAN POLITICS Sigurd Allern

Introduction Neither ‘the media’ nor ‘the news media’1 in the Scandinavian countries are part of the system of rules regulating the political process. As in most countries, media organizations are not a direct part of the political system, the electoral system, the party system or the judicial system. Without formally being a part of the polity, however, media organizations nevertheless play an institutionalized role as the channels and arenas for communication in the public sphere. Constitutional rights protect the freedom of expression and press freedom. In policy processes, election campaigns and day-​to-​day politics, news media organizations are important as channels, arenas and actors. News outlets influence the political agenda and the framing of politics and they are able to structure the actions of governments and other political actors (Allern and Blach-​Ørsten 2011; Cook 1998; Hjarvard 2007). For some decades, political communication scholars in Scandinavia have characterized the direct and indirect influences of the media on the work and priorities of political institutions as a ‘mediatization of politics’. It is vital to note the differentiation and potential conflict between political logic, influenced by polity, policy and politics, and media logic, influenced by news selection criteria and media dramaturgy (Asp and Bjerling 2014; Asp and Esaiasson 1996; Esser and Strömbäck 2014; Hjarvard 2008; Jenssen and Aalberg 2007). The traditional characterization of journalism as a ‘fourth estate’ (or fourth branch of government) still functions both as identification, professional ideology and historical myth.2 According to these normative ideas, journalism is to provide the electorate with information about public affairs, organize the scrutiny of the wielders of power, and organize public debates. Independent news media are regarded as a symbol of free speech and a prerequisite for democracy. These ideals and aims are also used by authorities in the Nordic region as an argument for economic support of the press and for the financing of broadcasting as a public service (Flensburg 2015; Krumsvik 2011; NOU 2010; Syvertsen et al. 2014). If –​and eventually how well –​modern media organizations do live up to such lofty ideals of political communication is another question. In a review of recent research, this chapter discusses the current political role of the Scandinavian news media. Does it still make sense to speak of Scandinavian media as typical of a northern European media model?

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The ‘democratic corporatist’ heritage In their seminal comparative study of Western media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004: 11) distinguish among three models:  the Liberal (North Atlantic) Model, characterized by the relative dominance of market mechanisms and commercial media; the Polarized Pluralist (Mediterranean) Model, characterized by the integration of the media into party politics, a limited development of commercial media and a strong and interventionist state role; and the Democratic Corporatist (or Northern European) Model, characterized by the historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and political groups and by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state. The three models do not include all types of media; empirically, they are based on legacy news media, like newspapers and broadcasting channels; that is, the most relevant media types concerning political communication. The analysis focuses on the degree of journalistic professionalization of the news media, relations between journalism and political institutions and the role of the state in shaping media systems. The models are ideal types, and there are important differences concerning how well a specific country’s media system fits into these patterns. A key dimension is the degree of political parallelism: the extent to which a media system is rooted in and reflects political or other social cleavages in society. Parallelism may exist on the level of news media content and ideological orientation as well as levels such as ownership and organization and the partisanship of media audiences. The Northern European countries, regarded as typical of the democratic corporatist model, are characterized by three historical ‘coexistences’ that do not appear simultaneously in other systems. First, the development of mass-​circulation commercial media has coexisted with a high degree of political parallelism, especially concerning the historical relations between the press and the political parties. The second point is the historical ‘coexistence’ of political parallelism and journalistic professionalism. A Scandinavian example is the institutional development of ethical rules and self-​regulation in journalism before and after the Second World War, a period in which most newspapers were still affiliated with political parties.The third ‘coexistence’ is the respect for press freedom and journalistic autonomy combined with active state involvement in the media sector through the ownership of public service channels, subsidies to the press and law-​making. However, it is easy to see that some of these factors and ‘coexistences’ have become of less importance in the twenty-​first century than immediately after the Second World War.There has been a shift toward the commercial structures and practices of neutral professionalism which are typical of the liberal model (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 277). One consequence is described as a commercialization of the role of journalism. In this sense, there is a clear tendency of convergence towards the Liberal system. Hallin and Mancini’s analysis was made more than a decade ago, however, before the dramatic changes related to the digital revolution and the expanding financial problems of the news media concerning advertising income. Does the democratic corporatist heritage of the Scandinavian news media continue to play a role?

A media system in transition During the last three decades, in Scandinavia as in other parts of the Western world, there have been important structural changes in the political and economic foundations of the news media. Party-​affiliated newspapers and broadcasting as a state-​owned monopoly have become history. Since the 1980s, there have been extensive commercial investments in a deregulated media

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sector, resulting in a concentration of ownership and increased profit demands. New types of personalized advertising channels like Google and Facebook as well as expanding online classifieds challenge and threaten the business models of legacy media. The new digital media landscape is more fragmented and unstable than the media landscape was a few decades back. The circulation of the Scandinavian paid printed press has weakened significantly in the last two decades,3 as in other European countries. However, this is a development with interesting nuances. The most dramatic decreases concern the printed versions of the national, popular tabloids, while local newspapers and some niche papers4 have largely retained their market position. Scandinavia is still a region with a rich flora of paid-​for newspapers including both dailies and non-​dailies, and the local press is particularly strong in Norway, Finland and Sweden (see Table 14.1). In recent years we have even observed an expansion of printed local non-​dailies in Norway and Sweden. National dailies are much more predominant in geographically smaller countries like Denmark and Iceland. The ‘newspaper death’ has been surprisingly limited thus far. In addition to this comes free printed (and online) newspapers, some of them dailies with a high circulation, such as the Swedish Metro and Danish Metroexpress. In 2014, the readers (aged 9–​79) of the newspapers’ printed and online versions were as high as 67 per cent in Sweden and 75 per cent in Norway. In Denmark,5 44 per cent of the population (aged 16–​89) in 2014 read a daily printed newspaper in 2014, and 42 per cent visited online news media. Finnish printed newspapers had a reach (age 12+) as high as 73 per cent in 2012, while 71 per cent read online versions.6 In the last decade, the Internet and the emergence of social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Flickr and the microblog Twitter have given political parties and other political actors –​even legacy media organizations –​several new media channels and platforms for communication and debates. Politicians actively use Twitter as a way to broadcast short news comments directly to a public of ‘followers’, and these texts may also be used as source ‘citations’ in news stories. Some Scandinavian politicians have established their own blogs, a few even with some success. However, this use of social media has yet to challenge the dominant role of the legacy media as agenda setters and political interpreters. The dominant news producers in the digital area are still the media houses with roots in newspaper production or public service broadcasting (Ohlsson 2015), which also goes for political commentary.  As Mark Blach-​Ørsten (2014: 96) sums up the development in Denmark:‘Though

Table 14.1  Number of paid-​for newspapers in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 2003 and 2013

2003 (total) -​of which dailies -​of which non-​dailies 2013 (total) -​of which dailies -​of which non-​dailies

Denmark

Finland

Iceland

Norway

Sweden

34 33  1 34 33 1

204 –53 148 183  46 137

14 –2 12 11  1 10

222  74 148 229  72 157

152  81  71 164  74  90

Note: The paid-​for newspapers are divided into two groups: (1) dailies (published 4–​7 days/​week) and (2) non-​dailies (published 1–​3 days/​week). Source: Nordicom –​Media Statistics (latest update 24 October 2014).

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a growing number of Danes access and share news via social networking sites like Facebook, stand-​alone online media remain marginal. Legacy media continue to dominate news provision both online and offline.’

The changing political role of the press From a historical perspective, the press–​party parallelism in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland was strong. When the modern parties were established in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, existing newspapers became affiliated with one party or another –​and the parties that lacked newspapers established their own (Esmark and Ørsten 2008; Grímsson 1976; Hadenius and Weibull 1991; Hardarsson 2008; Høyer 1995; Tommila and Salokangas 2000). In Denmark, the ‘four paper’ system of the early twentieth century, when the four leading parties all had their own newspapers in all of the major cities, is seen as the prime example of this (Søllinge 1999). Newspaper owners viewed party affiliation as a chance to increase circulation among party supporters, and parties regarded the newspapers as important for influencing voters. Three much-​used criteria to define a party paper include whether it is owned or controlled by a party, whether the editorial content favours the party and whether the paper is mostly read by party members and sympathizers (Seymour-​Ure 1968; Weibull 2013). The press–​party parallel could therefore be of varying kinds and strength. On the ownership and organizational level, from the birth of the party press, there were important differences concerning the type of press–​party parallelism. Families and private shareholders with political engagement most typically owned the liberal and conservative presses. The socialist and communist newspapers were either owned by party organizations or –​as in the case of the labour press –​by trade unions with close relations to the labour parties. Parties and organizations linked to the agricultural sector in Sweden, Finland and Norway were also active as newspaper founders. The different parties established news bureaus serving their own press with news and editorials. In many cases, chief editors in different kinds of party papers combined the roles of publisher and politician (Bastiansen 2009; Grímsson 1976). In a study of the Norwegian party press, Bastiansen (2009: 15–​16) sums up a common feature of party papers, regardless of what the ownership structure was, which was the political loyalty newspapers show towards a party, its initiatives and its leaders. Political parallelism could therefore survive even without ownership or formal party control on the organizational level. The dissolution of the Scandinavian party press did not happen from one decade to another; it was a long, gradual historical process influenced by internal and external forces (Allern and Blach-​Ørsten 2011; Bastiansen 2009; Esmark and Ørsten 2008; Høyer 1995; Moring 2008; Weibull 2013). Among the internal factors were the growth of the newspaper industry and the economic need to maximize audiences (Høst 2009) as well as the increasing professionalization of journalism resulting from the establishment of journalism schools (Esmark and Ørsten 2008; Ottosen 1996). A contributing factor since the 1970s has been the development of professional journalism within the state-​owned public service broadcasting channels (Djerf-​Pierre and Weibull 2001, 2008). This growing journalistic professionalism stood in striking contrast to the more controlled political communication of the party press and contributed to the demand among newspaper journalists for a more independent role (Bastiansen 2009: 117). The timetable of the gradual demise of the party press in Denmark is disputed, but the 1970s are seen as the definitive end (Esmark and Ørsten 2008; Hjarvard 2007; Søllinge 1999). In Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, important elements of party–​press parallelism lasted 177

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somewhat longer, but the party press became history throughout Scandinavia in the 1980s and 1990s. However, ownership influence with roots in press–​party parallelism lasted longer. The relatively strong labour press in Norway, A-​pressen,7 declared to be party-​independent in 1991, was owned until the end of 2015 by a corporation of which the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (the LO) and some other trade unions constituted the largest owner.8 The chain of newspapers controlled by the liberal–​conservative Centre Party in Sweden was sold to the family-​controlled media group Stampen in Gothenburg as late as 2005. Leading Swedish newspaper families are still ‘known by their political, non-​socialist affiliation, leaving all the dominant press groups in Sweden in either liberal or conservative hands’ (Ohlsson 2015: 60). In addition to this, foundations with direct and indirect roots to liberal and conservative parties own a considerable portion of the provincial Swedish press. While the party press has become history, the ideological orientation of newspapers (printed and online) is still of political importance on both the ownership and content levels. In most cases, such ideological guidelines are based on the paper’s political background and history, often formulated in statutes and policy documents. Labels such as ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, ‘Christian’, ‘social democratic’ or ‘socialist’ are used to express political signature and ideological haunt.The extent of the actual differentiation is another matter. Oslo is the only major Scandinavian city where it is still possible to find dailies representing a really wide political spectrum.9 The last social democratic daily in Denmark, with the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions as the largest owner, was closed in 2001. Neither Finland nor Iceland had any labour press of lasting importance, and the labour press in Sweden went bankrupt in 1991.10 However, Sweden has a small newspaper chain, ETC, which recently launched a new daily, both printed and online, Dagens ETC. While it is party-​independent, its political profile is defined as ‘a red paper for green politics’.11 However, the political profile of most paid, printed Scandinavian newspapers –​ and their online news sites –​is liberal or conservative, while commercial-​free papers mostly present news without political views or analysis (Hjarvard 2007). On the organizational level, an important effect of the inherited ideological guidelines is that they still influence the selection and appointment of chief editors and political editors. In Norway, a declaration of the ‘Rights and duties of the editor’, a joint document agreed upon by the Association of Norwegian Editors and the Norwegian Media Business Association, clearly states, ‘An editor is expected to share the fundamental views and aims of his/​her publication’. It is ‘within this framework [that] the editor is entitled to a free and independent leadership of the editorial department and editorial work’, even if the opinions ‘in single matters are not shared by the publisher or the board’.12 The basic principles of this declaration were even adopted in 2008 by Stortinget, the Norwegian parliament, as an act on editorial freedom.13 James Curran (1990: 120) has given a good summary of the rival perspectives between editorial independence and owner control: The much-​wanted ‘relative autonomy’ of journalists is best understood as ‘licensed autonomy’: journalists are allowed to be independent only as long as their independence is exercised in a form that conforms to the requirements of their employing organizations. The official ideological and political leanings of Scandinavian newspapers and media houses are, however, seldom changed, even when new owners have the power and legal right to do so. Commercial investors and publicly listed companies regard it as risky business to declare a change of political profile for newspapers and other media outlets they acquire. Schibsted’s careful policy concerning the editorials of the popular tabloid Aftonbladet offers a typical example.14 178

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Both readers and journalists would regard a declared change as disrespecting the paper’s traditions and would interpret it as an attack on the principle of editorial independence. Much more important for corporate owners are budget control and the power to hire (and fire) chief editors. Chief editors are often more engaged today in business administration and digital strategies than in political journalism. Political editors and commentators in most cases take care of the opinion pages. However, the ownership structure of the media houses indicates that you will find very few, if any, chief editors or political editors in large Scandinavian media houses opposing a market-​liberal worldview. On the content level, the analyses of news, news framing and editorial commentaries show that it is necessary to distinguish between party–​press parallelism and a more general political parallelism. A study of mediated political scandals in the Nordic region confirms that a scandal-​r idden government minister or party leader quickly will recognize, regardless of party and background, that he or she is prey to be hunted down by journalists in all types of media (Allern and Pollack 2012). However, while modern Scandinavian newspapers –​and their online editions –​have neither party affiliation nor demonstrate any party loyalty, they still have a political profile; they frame and comment on news and function as both mediators and political actors. The contemporary news media, as Østbye and Aalberg (2008) observe, initiate political issues, come up with possible solutions and muster support for their conclusions. In this respect, the news media can be characterized as a political institution (Allern 2007; Allern and Blach-​Ørsten 2011; Hjarvard 2007). Before the Swedish national election in 2010, the leading liberal daily, Dagens Nyheter, even launched its own five-​point programme on ten different policy areas, including advocacy of Swedish membership in NATO, abolishing progressive taxes and dropping the Swedish krona for the euro (Allern and Blach-​Ørsten 2011). In different areas, political partisanship continues to play a role in journalism. The polarization of the political system in Denmark, Sweden and Norway has led to differentiation between two political blocs competing for government power. This division has also influenced the editorial positions of the press concerning expressions of sympathy with the two government alternatives (Allern 2007; Allern and Blach-​Ørsten 2011; Bjerke 2001; Hjarvard 2007).15 An interesting tendency and feature after the decline of the party press is the new prominence given to political commentators in Scandinavia, also on the news pages. Often they have insider knowledge about political parties and institutions (Bengtsson 2015). ‘The political commentators have become the outstanding oracles of our time’, write Nord et al. (2012: 87). As a genre political commentary has similarities with both news and views pieces. The commentators express views but at the same time focus on current news. A distinctive feature ‘is their freedom to comment and express opinions about what is going on in society, without a declared political party affiliation or an ideologically consistent long-​term perspective’ (Nord and Stúr 2009: 88). When journalists commentate on and interpret events, writes Paul Statham (2007: 463), they have ‘a greater potential for influencing the way the public understands and forms opinions on such issues’. The pundits of today’s press are in many ways more visible in the news than they were in the time of the party papers. Sometimes their interpretations and opinions are treated as front-​page news, and they regularly play roles as expert sources and commentators in broadcasting programmes (Allern 2010). On the audience level, it is without doubt a fact that party–​press parallelism is history. The interesting question is whether political parallelism of a new type exists. Since few towns and regions in Scandinavia today have competing news outlets representing different ideological leanings, most readers have little opportunity to choose from among any ideological alternatives. Swedish surveys from after the millennium indicate that even if voters with a strong party identification still tend to subscribe to a paper with an ideological platform near their own, the 179

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importance of such audience priorities today is weak (Weibull 2006). That may, however, also be influenced by the strong domination of liberal newspapers in Sweden. Danish surveys from 1997 and 2006 show in both years a systematic correlation between readers’ political views and the different national newspapers’ overall editorial policy (Hjarvard 2007: 36–​37).

The role of the state in Scandinavian media policy As mentioned above, an important element in the democratic corporatist model is an active but legally limited role of the state. In article 100, the ‘freedom of expression article’ of the Norwegian Constitution, this is expressed explicitly: ‘It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions that facilitate open and enlightened public discourse.’16 In a recent study about the media welfare state in the digital age, Syvertsen et al. (2014: 17) point to four pillars: vital communication services that underscore their character as public goods; institutionalized freedom from editorial interference; a cultural policy that aims to secure diversity and quality; and consensual solutions and cooperation between the state, media and communication industries and the public.

Public service broadcasting In the Scandinavian countries the public service broadcasting corporations have been the most important form of state media involvement since before the Second World War. While they have not been monopolies since the 1980s, ‘no other commercial or publicly funded medium or constitution plays a similar role’ (Syvertsen et al. 2014: 73). In its first decades, public service was based on radio broadcasting. Television started in the 1950s and 1960s. The news service before the mid-​1960s was limited, mostly based on national news agency bulletins. The public service broadcasters were primarily public educators, not journalistic institutions (Djerf-​Pierre and Weibull 2008; Østbye and Aalberg 2008). Political journalism was mostly non-​existent. As Esaiasson and Håkansson (2013: 195) sum up, ‘In the early days of Swedish Radio history political matters other than merely ceremonial events like state visits and the official opening of the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) were simply not reported on’.The guidelines and rules for broadcasting political debates and other election programmes were strictly controlled by the political parties in this period (Allern 2011; Esaiasson and Håkansson 2002, 2013). The turning point was the process of journalistic professionalization that gained momentum in earnest in the mid-​1960s and gradually gave the public service channels a new, more independent role concerning both news and political journalism. Concerning the funding of the Nordic broadcasting corporations, there are both similarities and differences.17 In Denmark, the publicly owned DR is funded through a media licence fee, while DR’s main competitor since 1988, publicly owned TV 2, is primarily financed by advertising, which is supplemented by the licence fee. A licence fee funds all parts of the Swedish public broadcasting system, SVT, SR and UR.18 The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) is a state-​owned limited company financed by licence fees. The Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RÚV) is funded through a media tax combined with advertising income. The Finnish public broadcaster Yle is a state-​owned limited company. It was earlier funded by a licence fee paid by owners of radios and televisions; in 2013, however, the funding system was changed to a broadcasting tax. Licence fee systems and broadcasting taxes are both built on the recognition of broadcasting as a public good in line with national defence, scientific research, public roads and street lighting in towns. In economic theory, television and radio broadcasting are classical examples of a public 180

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good, which is nonexcludable and nonrivalistic in consumption. Public broadcasting television reaches everyone, and once a programme is produced, no marginal cost is incurred by letting an additional family watch it (Krugman and Wells 2014: 479–​485). Because of this public good character, public funding and advertising income have been the main alternatives to cover the costs of producing and broadcasting programmes.19 The strength of the licence fee system is that it reduces market pressures (especially from advertisers who favour light entertainment, not news and current affairs), and at the same time represents a type of self-​funding, independent of day-​to-​day politics and government pressures (Moe and Mjøs 2013). Losing their monopoly in the 1980s and 1990s represented a dramatic change, and the digital revolution since the mid-​1990s was another strategic challenge. However, concerning the building of a new digital infrastructure, they came to play a key role. As Syvertsen et al. (2014:  77)  sum up, ‘Digitalization has made it possible for public service broadcasters to set up new channels, and their assigned role as digital locomotives has allowed them to enter new platforms, including the Internet and mobile telephony’. The Scandinavian public service broadcasters generally seem to have consolidated their position vis-​à-​vis the commercial sector in the last decade (see Table 14.2). Denmark can be seen as a special case in this regard, as both of the leading channels belong to the public service system. Furthermore, the leading public service channels in Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland had a larger audience share than the biggest private channel in each country. Most of the numerous private channels are basically entertainment and sports channels, whereas the public service channels are the most important producers of news and current affairs programmes.

Press subsidies State involvement in the Scandinavian media system also includes other elements. In a discussion about state subsidies to the press, Swedish media economist Karl Erik Gustafsson (1980: 104) explained: ‘In the service of democracy and its citizens the state has responsibility to create and maintain an information and press system that will accommodate many and diverse voices.’ Press subsidies in different forms were introduced in the Scandinavian countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the aim being to prevent further newspaper mortality. Several of the second-​largest newspapers in towns and districts had closed down during the 1950s and 1960s. The economically most important –​and politically least controversial and discussed subsidy form –​were general branch subsidies like exemption from (or reduction of) VAT on newspaper sales and postal subsidies. The press support concept was, however, first and foremost used about the more selective support introduced in the 1970s in Sweden, Norway and Finland and given to newspapers with a ‘number 2’ market status. A Finnish study sums up that in 1971, at the start of this period, indirect and direct subsidies represented 20 per cent of the newspaper industry’s total revenues. ‘The lion’s share of the state aid was made up of general support (18% of overall revenue), compared to which the selective support was minimal (2% of overall revenue)’ (Nieminen et al. 2014). This direct support was mostly given to newspapers with limited advertising revenue in relation to their readership. This countered the effects of the advertising market on the media structure to some extent and was therefore of vital importance for some newspapers (Allern 1996; Gustafsson 1978; Høst 1996). The main argument for direct support to the latter category of newspapers was to uphold political diversity and geographical diversity in the newspaper branch. The main argument against the press subsidies, mostly from conservative parties and some of the large media companies, was that state involvement could undermine press freedom; an argument that is 181

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rarely heard today. This might be because over more than four decades of press subsidies in Scandinavia, no significant example of government pressure or political misuse of the system has been observed. Structural changes on the media market have led to new discussions and decisions about the role of newspaper subsidies over the last decade. Until recently, Norway and Sweden have maintained direct support to newspapers. In both countries, however, changes related to new online outlets are being considered and reform proposals related to the expansion of digital media to make subsidies ‘platform-​neutral’ are now part of an ongoing discussion.20 Consensus remains,

Table 14.2 TV broadcasting company audience shares 2000–​14 (percentages) 2004

2014

Denmark (Age 3+)

TV2 (public service) DR (public service) MTG (private)21 SBS Discovery22 (private) Other Total Daily viewing time (min.)

38 (3 channels) 34 (2 channels) 10 (3 channels) 7 (2 channels) 11 100 162

35 (6 channels) 34 (6 channels) 11 (5 channels) 10 (14 channels) 11 101 173

Finland (Age 10+)

YLE (public service) MTV Media23 (private) Nelonen Media (private) SBS Discovery (private) Other Total Daily viewing time (min.)

45 (5 channels) 38 (2 channels) 12 (1 channel) 5 100 167

44 (4 channels) 28 (11 channels) 15 (8 channels) 5 (3) 8 100 184

Iceland24 (Age 12–​80)

RÚV-​TV (public service) 365 ehf. (private) Other Total Daly viewing time (min.)

42 (1) 41 (3) 17 100 167

59 (2 channels) 33 (6 channels) 7 99 184

Norway (Age 12+)

NRK (public service) TV2 (private) SBS Discovery (private) MTG (private) Other Total Daily viewing time (min.)

44 (2 channels) 30 (2 channels) 10 (1 channel) 6 (1 channel) 10 100 166

38 (3 channels) 28 (5 channels) 17 (6 channels) 7 (3 channels) 10 100 174

Sweden (Age 3+)

SVT (public service) TV425 (private) MTG/​Viasat (private) SBS Discovery (private) Other Total Daily viewing time (min.)

41 (5 channels) 26 (3 channels) 13 (11 channels) 9 (1 channel) 11 100 151

35 (5 channels) 29 (5 channels) 17 (20 channels) 12 (13 channels) 7 100 153

Source: Nordicom, Media Statistics. The number of channels refers to the channels included in the audience share. Channels not included are mainly channels with small audience share.

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however, about the necessity of direct and indirect media subsidies. In Iceland, a reduced VAT rate is still the only (and indirect) form of newspaper subsidy (Hauksson 2012). The most dramatic changes can be seen in Finland and Denmark. In Finland, the last remnants of direct press subsidies were abolished in 2012. The only remaining indirect subsidy is a reduced VAT rate. Nieminen et al. (2014: 188) interpret this demise of the Finnish model as a symptom of more general societal and cultural trends: ‘instead of social welfare, economic competiveness and efficiency have been adopted as the main goals for national policy’. In Denmark, subsidies to newspapers have generally been less direct than in Norway, Sweden and Finland; tax exemptions and reduced postal rates have been the main sources of support since the 1970s (Esmark and Ørsten 2008). In sharp contrast to the development in Finland, however, Denmark introduced a new law on media support in 2014.The law implies state subsidies to the production of journalism, both in printed and online media. In the new support system, the size of the journalistic workforce –​not circulation figures –​is an important measure for receiving public funding. In practice, this can be interpreted as a check against the further development of a liberal media model (Flensburg 2015: 98), accentuating the public value of newspapers and journalism and reflecting continued support for the democratic corporatist model (Hjarvard and Kammer 2015).

Conclusions Is it possible, then, to speak about a Scandinavian or Nordic media model? As Syversten et al. (2014: 126–​127) point out, this requires both internal similarity and divergence in relation to other regions. As shown earlier in this chapter, Scandinavian countries are not uniform, neither concerning press structure and press subsidies nor the financial models of public broadcasting. When it comes to media policy, contemporary Finland and Iceland are more distant from the ‘democratic corporatist’ heritage than Sweden, Norway and Denmark. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries still have some important media features in common: the relative strength of the press, the patterns of news media use among broad sections of the population, the coexistence of commercialism and political parallelism, the relatively strong public service institutions and a long-​lasting press freedom tradition combined with direct or indirect state subsidies to secure news media diversity. Concerning the second condition, it can be argued that many of the specific ingredients of the Scandinavian media can be found elsewhere. This is true, especially in various other Northern European countries, such as Germany and the Low Countries. On that background, it seems more to the point to group Scandinavia as a part of a Northern European region with democratic-​corporatist traditions than as a separate entity. The uniqueness in relation to other parts of Europe and the rest of the world comprise more the combination of elements in the media and communication structure. Seen from Beijing or Bombay, Sydney, Rome or Dallas, the similarities among the empirical realities of Scandinavian and other North European media may still seem much more important than the differences mentioned.

Notes 1 ‘The media’ is an umbrella concept covering very different types of institutions, organizations, products and formats, including journalism, advertising, entertainment and other types of publishing. It is first and foremost the news media, the custodians and patrons of journalism as a societal institution, which play a role in politics and political processes. News media is defined here as media organizations producing news, reports and features, comments and debates about current affairs.The most important outlets are printed newspapers and news-​oriented magazines, television and radio channels with news services, and online news sites (most belonging to multimedia organizations).

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S. Allern 2 ‘The gallery in which the reporters sit has become a fourth estate of the realm’, historian Thomas Babington Macaulay (1828: 208) wrote to characterize the importance of the press lobby in the parliament of the United Kingdom. A decade later, Thomas Carlyle (1841) interpreted this insight about the role of the press: ‘Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all … Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-​ making, in all acts of authority.’ 3 Source: Nordicom, Media Statistics (paid-​for newspapers: circulation 2003–​13). 4 Some of the niche papers are specialized on economic and financial news, others have a more political and cultural profile. 5 Source: Kulturstyrelsen: Mediernes utvikling i Danmark. Summary 2015, Figure 1. 6 Source: Nordicom, Media Statistics (newspaper readership: daily reach of paper version, online version and total). 7 In 2015 named Amedia. 8 The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions declared in the autumn of 2015 that they now want to sell their shares. In Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, the social democratic press was weaker. A-​pressen in Sweden went bankrupt in 1992.The last Danish paper belonging to A-​pressen (controlled by the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions), Aktuelt, was closed down in 2001. 9 Aftenposten (liberal–​conservative), VG (independent liberal), Dagbladet (liberal), Dagens Næringsliv (neoliberal), Finansavisen (neoliberal), Dagsavisen (social democratic), Vårt Land (Christian), Klassekampen (left socialist), Nationen (district/​agricultural). 10 In Sweden, only two small local newspapers are owned by labour movement organizations, but a few social democratic papers owned by liberal media houses still exist. 11 The ETC-​papers are owned by the publisher Johan Ehrenberg. 12 www.nored.no/​Redaktoeransvar/​Redaktoerplakaten/​Redaktoerplakaten-​paa-​engelsk (downloaded 4 November 2015). 13 The act came into force in 2009. 14 Schibsted is a publicly listed Norwegian media corporation, owning Scandinavian newspapers besides owning online classifieds all over the world. Since 2009, the company controls 91 per cent of the shares in the popular tabloid Aftonbladet in Stockholm, bought from the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (the LO). However, according to an agreement with the minority owner, the LO, the editorial page still has an ‘independent social democratic’ platform. 15 Finland, with its person-​based electoral system and broad coalition government traditions, is a different case. 16 This part of §100 is a constitutional amendment from 2004. Source:  www.stortinget.no/​en/​ Grunnlovsjubileet/​In-​English/​The-​Constitution-​Complete-​text/.​ 17 Source: Nordicom 2012. 18 SVT (Swedish Television), SR (Swedish Radio) and UR (Educational Radio). 19 Pay TV and the commercial streaming of films and other digital goods can be described as artificially scarce goods, which are excludable but nonrivalistic in consumption (Krugman and Wells 2014: 479). 20 In Sweden, a government-​appointed investigator is scheduled to deliver a proposal to a revised media support system in 2016. In Norway, a government-​appointed committee is scheduled to deliver a proposal concerning revised media support policy in 2017. 21 MTG’s domestic channels. 22 Discovery communications acquired SBS Nordic from the ProSiebenSat.1 Group by the end of 2012, and formed SBS Discovery Media. 23 Included Cmore. 24 The Icelandic audience statistics for 2004 were based on a diary service in 2004; the numbers from 2014 are based on electronic measurement (ppm). 25 Cmore included.

References Allern, S. (1996) Kildenes makt.Ytringsfrihetens politiske økonomi. Oslo: Pax Forlag. Allern, S. (2007) From Party Press to Independent Observers? An Analysis of Election Campaign Coverage Prior to the General Elections of 1981 and 2005 in Two Norwegian Newspapers. Nordicom Review Jubilee Issue: 63–​79.

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The media in Scandinavian politics Allern, S. (2010) From Party Agitators to Independent Pundits:  The Changed Historical Roles of Newspaper and Television Journalists in Norwegian Election Campaigns. In: Hjarvard, S. (ed.), Northern Lights: Film and Media Studies Yearbook,Vol. 8. Bristol: Intellect Press. Allern, S. (2011) Fjernsynsvalgkampen. Program, deltakere og maktkamp, 1961–​2009. Oslo: Pax Forlag. Allern, S. and Blach-​Ørsten, M. (2011) The News Media as a Political Institution:  A  Scandinavian Perspective. Journalism Studies 12(1): 92–​105. Allern, S. and Pollack, E. (eds) (2012) The Marketplace of Scandals. In:  Allern, S. and Pollack, E. (eds), Scandalous! The Mediated Construction of Political Scandals in Four Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Asp, K. and Bjerling, J. (2014) Mediekratin –​mediernas makt och svenska val. Stockholm: Ekerlids Förlag. Asp, K. and Esaiasson, P. (1996) The Modernization of Swedish Campaigns:  Individualization, Professionalization, and Medialization. In:  Swanson, D. L. and Mancini, P. (eds), Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. Westport: Praeger. Bastiansen, H. (2009) Lojaliteten som brast. Partipressen i Norge fra senit til fall. 1945–​2000. Oslo:  Norsk Pressehistorisk Forening. Bengtsson, M. (2015) Approaches to Political Commentary in Scandinavia: A Call for Textual, Evaluating Scholarship. Nordicom Review 36(1): 5–​18. Bjerke, P. (2001) Fortsatt partipresse? Norske aviseres holdning til regjeringsskiftet i 2000. Volda:  Høgskolen i Volda. Blach-​Ørsten, M. (2014) The Emergence of an Increasingly Competitive News Regime in Denmark. In Kuhn, R. and Nielsen, R. K. (eds), Political Journalism in Transition: Western Europe in a Comparative Perspective. London: I.B. Tauris. Carlyle, T. (1841) On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History. London: James Fraser. Cook,T. E. (1998) Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Curran, J. (1990) Culturalist Perspectives of News Organizations:  A  Reappraisal and a Case Study. In: Ferguson, M. (ed.), Public Communication. London: Sage. Djerf-​Pierre, M. and Weibull, L. (2001) Spegla, granska, tolka. Aktualitetsjournalistik i svensk radio och TV under 1900-​talet. Stockholm: Prisma. Djerf-​Pierre, M. and Weibull, L. (2008) From Public Educator to Interpreting Ombudsman:  Regimes of Political Journalism in Swedish Public Service Broadcasting 1925–​ 2005. In:  Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg, T. (eds), Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Esaiasson, P. and Håkansson, N. (2002) Besked ikväll! Valprogrammen i svensk radio og TV. Stockholm: Prisma. Esaiasson, P. and Håkansson, N. (2013) Enter the Professionals: Shifting Logics of Election Broadcasts in Sweden. In: Djerf-​Pierre, M. and Ekström, M. (eds), Swedish Broadcasting: Communicative Ethos, Genres and Institutional Change. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Esmark, A. and Ørsten, M. (2008) Media and Politics in Denmark. In:  Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg, T. (eds), Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Esser, F. and Strömbäck, J. (eds) (2014) Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Flensburg, S. (2015) Dansk mediestøtte 1960–​2014: Fra økonomisk kompensation til publicistisk motivation. Mediekultur 31(58): 85–​103. Grímsson, Ó. R. (1976) The Icelandic Power Structure 1800–​2000. Scandinavian Political Studies 11: 9–​32. Gustafsson, K. E. (1980) The Press Subsidies of Sweden:  A  Decade of Experiment. In:  Smith, A. (ed.), Newspapers and Democracy: International Essays on a Changing Medium. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gustafsson, K. H. (1978) The Circulation Spiral and the Principle of Household Coverage. The Scandinavian Economic History Review 26(1): 1–​14. Hadenius, S. and Weibull, L. (1991) Partipressens död? Stockholm: SIM. Hallin, D. C. and Mancini, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems:  Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hardarsson, O. T. (2008) Media and Politics in Iceland. In: Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg, T. (eds), Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Hauksson, H. (2012) News Economics: How Property Rights and the Price Mechanism Influence Media Content. BS Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Iceland School of Social Sciences. Mimeo. Hjarvard, S. (2007) Den politiske presse. En analyse af danske avisers politiske orientering. Journalistica 5: 27–​53.

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S. Allern Hjarvard, S. (2008) The Mediatisation of Society: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Social and Cultural Change. Nordicom Review 29(2): 105–​134. Hjarvard, S. and Kammer, A. (2015) Online News: Between Private Enterprise and Public Subsidy. Media, Culture and Society 37(1): 115–​123. Høst, S. (1996) Aviskonkurransen. Nye og gamle teorier belyst gjennom A-​pressens utvikling. Fredrikstad: The Norwegian Institute of Journalism. Høst, S. (2009) Mye mer enn Akersgata. Norsk pressestruktur 1945–​2010. Oslo:  Norsk Pressehistorisk Forening. Høyer, S. (1995) Pressen mellom teknologi og samfunn. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Jenssen, A. T. and Aalberg, T. (eds) (2007) Den medialiserte politikken. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Krugman, P. and Wells, R. (2014) Economics. 3rd edn, international edition. New York: Macmillan. Krumsvik, A. H. (2011) Medienes privilegier –​en innføring i mediepolitikk. Kristiansand: IJ-​forlaget. Macaulay,T. B. (1828) Hallam. In: Grieve, A. J (ed.) (1890) Thomas Babbington Mccauley: Critical and Historical Essays.Vol. 1. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Moe, H. and Mjøs, O. K. (2013) The Arm’s Length Principle in Nordic Public Broadcasting Regulation. In: Carlsson, U. (ed.), Public Service Media from a Nordic Horizon: Politics, Markets, Programming and Users. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Moring, T. (2008) Media and Politics in Finland. In:  Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg, T. (eds), Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Nieminen, H., Nordenstreng, K. and Harjuniemi, T. (2014) Finland: The Rise and Fall of a Democratic Subsidy Scheme. In:  Murschetz, P. C. (ed.), State Aid for Newspapers:  Theories, Cases, Actions. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-​Verlag. Nord, L. and Stúr, E. (2009) Tyckandets tid. Journalistik, kommentar, valrörelse. Stockholm: SIM(O). Nord, L., Enli, G. and Stúr, E. (2012) Pundits and Political Scandals: A Study of Political Commentators in Norway and Sweden. In: Allern, S. and Pollack, E. (eds), Scandalous! The Mediated Construction of Political Scandals in Four Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Nordicom (2012) Public Service Media in the Nordic Countries, compiled by E. Harrie. Gothenburg: Nordicom. NOU (2010) Lett å komme til orde, vanskelig å bli hørt –​en moderne mediestøtte. Medieutvalgets utredning 2010: 14. Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning. Ohlsson, J. (2015) The Nordic Media Market 2015. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Østbye, H. and Aalberg,T. (2008) Media and Politics in Norway. In: Strömbäck, J., Ørsten, M. and Aalberg,T. (eds), Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the Nordic Countries. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Ottosen, R. (1996) Fra fjærpenn til internet. Journalister i organisasjon og samfunn. Oslo: Aschehoug. Seymour-​Ure, C. (1968) The Press, Politics and the Public: An Essay on the Role of the National Press in the British Political System. London: Methuen. Søllinge, J. (1999) Historien om den politiske journalistik. In: Carlsen, E. M., Pedersen, O. K. and Kjær, P. (eds), Magt og fortælling. Aarhus: Ajour. Statham, P. (2007) Journalists as Commentators on European Politics: Educators, Partisans or Ideologues? European Journal of Communication 22(4): 461–​477. Syvertsen, T., Enli, G., Mjøs, O. J. and Moe, H. (2014) The Media Welfare State. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Tommila, P. and Salokangas, R. (2000) Tidningar för alla. Den finlandske pressens historia. Gothenburg: Nordicom. Weibull, L. (2006) Finns det fortfarande en partipress? In:  Holmberg, S. and Weibull, L. (eds), Du stora nye värld. Trettiofyra kapitel om politik, medier och samhälle. Göteborg:  SOM-​institutet vid Göteborgs universitet. Weibull, L. (2013) Är partipressen död eller levande? Reflextioner från ett presshistoriskt seminarium. Nordicom-​Information 35(1–​2): 37–​48.

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PART III

Policy

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15 FISCAL POLICY IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES U. Michael Bergman, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Øystein Thøgersen

Introduction Fiscal management and structural reforms in the Nordic countries have attracted substantial international attention. In February 2013, for example, The Economist devoted a leader and a special feature entitled ‘The Nordic Countries:  The Next Supermodel’, which argued that politicians from both right and left could learn from these countries. Thanks to a consistent reform agenda, the fiscal positions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden were favourable at the onset of the global financial crisis compared to many other European countries.This allowed for more fiscal activism during the economic downturn without alarming financial markets or creating political upheaval. Hence, unlike many European countries, Scandinavia was not forced to adopt severe austerity measures. Against that background, this chapter zooms in on the lessons from Scandinavia in relation to design and operational aspects of fiscal policy.We have chosen not to adopt the wider Nordic perspective, which would also have included Iceland and Finland. As shown in the study by Gylfason (2015), Iceland deviates in many respects from the other Nordic countries. Finland, however, has a number of similarities with the three countries covered in this study but also a number of differences, such as its persistent vulnerability towards major fluctuations in its trade with Russia and other East European countries.1 Some descriptive statistics are presented below that illustrate the main fiscal trends. We then focus on recent developments in relation to fiscal frameworks, including budgetary rules and the role of fiscal expert panels. This takes us to some long-​term challenges for fiscal policy before ending with some policy perspectives.

Recent fiscal trends For Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the OECD average for comparison, Figure 15.1 illustrates the trajectories of the size of government and fiscal balances since 1980. Specifically, the selected variables include the total tax revenue, the government budget balance and the government gross financial liabilities. The Scandinavian countries clearly stand out, with significantly higher tax revenues (relative to GDP) than in the typical OECD country, thus confirming the widespread perception 189

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Total tax revenue

(a)

55 45 35 25 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

General government surplus

(b)

General government gross financial liabilies

(c)

20 10 0 –10

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

120 95 70 45 20

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Denmark

Norway

Sweden

OECD

Figure 15.1  Medium-​term measures of fiscal stance (as a percentage of GDP) Source: OECD Revenue Statistics –​Comparative tables dataset for total tax revenue graph; OECD Economic Outlook No. 97 Database (Edition 2015/​1) for all other graphs.

that Scandinavia is a region with ‘big government’. Despite signs of some convergence after the financial crisis between the OECD average and Sweden and Norway (but not Denmark), the gap remains considerable. As for fiscal stance, all three Scandinavian countries experienced a financial crisis at some point during the 1980s and 1990s.These crises led to pronounced fiscal imbalances, occasionally stronger than in the archetypal OECD country. However, these crises immediately triggered fiscal consolidation and reform programmes, characterized by prompt efforts to improve the fiscal stance following periods of economic and financial turbulence. Evidently, these programmes largely explain the strong position of public finances currently prevailing in Scandinavia. For the OECD as a whole, Figure 15.1 clearly indicates that the EU deficit criterion –​that the government deficit should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP (shown as the dashed line in the graph) –​has been violated every consecutive year since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008.The same holds true for the EU debt criterion; namely, that the public debt-​to-​GDP ratio should not exceed 60 per cent (the dashed line in the graph). However, such continued rule infringement has not taken place in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In order to elaborate on current fiscal outcomes,Table 15.1 shows the public deficit and debt positions during the run-​up to the financial crash (2006–​8) and the period following the crisis (2009–​14). For comparison, figures are also shown for the Eurozone. 190

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2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

General government surplus Denmark 5.0 5.0 Sweden 2.2 3.3 Norway 18.0 17.1 Euro area –​1.5 –​0.6

3.2 2.0 18.7 –​2.1

–​2.8 –​0.7 10.3 -​6.2

–​2.7 0.0 11.0 –​6.1

–​2.1 –​0.1 13.4 –​4.1

–​3.7 –​0.9 13.8 –​3.6

–​1.1 –​1.4 11.3 –​2.9

1.2 –​1.9 9.1 –​2.4

General government gross debt Denmark 31.5 27.3 Sweden 43.1 38.2 Norway 54.0 49.8 Euro area 67.6 65.2

(Maastricht criterion) 33.4 40.4 42.9 36.8 40.3 36.9 47.4 42.2 41.8 69.0 78.7 84.3

46.4 36.2 27.4 86.8

45.6 36.5 28.6 91.4

45.0 38.7 28.8 93.5

45.2 43.8 26.5 94.6

Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 97 Database (Edition 2015/​1).

Table 15.2  Cyclically adjusted budget balance and output gap

Denmark Sweden Euro area

Cyclically adjusted budget surplus (CAB)

Output gap

2007

2010

2011

2012

2007

2010

2011

2012

 2.7  1.4 –​2.1

–​0.7  0.8 –​5.1

–​0.5  0.0 –​3.6

–​1.5  0.1 –​2.5

3.7 3.3 2.6

–​3.3 –1.4 –​2.0

–​2.5 –​0.2 –​1.1

–​3.4 –​1.7 –​2.3

Source: European Commission, AMECO database (5 November 2015 revision).

The strength of the public finances in Scandinavia immediately prior to the 2008 financial crisis is striking, especially in Norway. With such initial conditions, the Scandinavian countries clearly had the capacity to use fiscal policy more actively to combat the economic downturn. Conversely, the Eurozone entered the economic crisis in 2008 in poor fiscal shape. Even in the years prior to the crisis with economic upturns, the Eurozone was running large general deficits. This demonstrates the massive divide between Northern and Southern Europe in terms of fiscal stance. This divide may be further illuminated by studying the changes in output gaps and the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) (see Table 15.2). The Scandinavian countries and the Eurozone had relatively large (positive) output gaps in 2007. For the CAB, however, recent estimates provided by the European Commission (2015) indicate that, unlike Denmark and Sweden, both of which had relatively large CAB surpluses in 2007, the Eurozone as a whole had CAB deficits. An important question is how the output gap and the CAB were affected by the financial crisis in 2008. As Table 15.2 clearly shows, the financial crisis led to dramatic falls in the output gap everywhere. In Denmark, for example, the output gap fell from 3.7 per cent in 2007 to -​3.4 per cent in 2012. Denmark and Sweden both responded by reducing the CAB surplus, thus indicating that fiscal policy was used for stabilization purposes.2 Quite the opposite type of fiscal response occurred in the EA, where the CAB improved by 2.6 percentage points from 2010 to 2012. The point is that while most countries used expansionary fiscal policy at the time of the financial crisis, the Scandinavian countries continued 191

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doing so throughout the European recession.The fiscal situation in the EA in general and in the southern periphery in particular simply did not allow for such crisis management. There is also a noteworthy difference between the Danish and Swedish experiences. In fact, budget deficits in Denmark following the crisis were fairly large until 2012, when they peaked at 3.7 per cent of GDP. However, Sweden maintained a roughly balanced budget from 2009 until 2012. In part, this indicates the strength of the cyclical sensitivity of public finances in Denmark but also the remarkable robustness of public finances to major shocks in Sweden.

Fiscal frameworks While considered a role model based on their ability to keep a firm grip on public finances after the major financial crisis, the Scandinavian countries have not always been strong fiscal performers. As a common feature, they have all been exposed to a number of financial and fiscal crises that have spurred them to develop more robust fiscal frameworks. The following sections explain in further detail how the fiscal frameworks have taken shape in Denmark, Norway and Sweden over the last few decades.

The Danish fiscal framework The fiscal framework in Denmark has been revised several times since the early 1980s. Against the background of a projected government deficit of nearly 10 per cent of GDP in 1982, a major macroeconomic policy change was announced in October 1982 and gradually implemented between 1983 and 1986. A key ingredient here was fiscal consolidation, which had two significant effects: first, the actual and cyclically adjusted budget deficit improved by, respectively, 12.5 per cent and 9.5 per cent of GDP from 1983 to 1986. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, there was an upsurge in output combined with a substantial reduction in unemployment in the period 1983–​6. This episode has attracted a considerable amount of international attention and is viewed by many scholars as prima facie evidence of an ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’.3 After the crisis in the early 1980s and the accompanying fiscal consolidation, several attempts have been made to formulate fiscal policy in accord with an overall fiscal framework (Budina et al. 2012). In 1994, an expenditure rule was introduced, which stipulated that real public consumption should not increase by more than 0.5 per cent per year. Since 2009, the expenditure rule has been stated such that public consumption as a share of cyclically adjusted GDP is reduced to 26.5 per cent by 2015. A revenue rule, often referred to as a ‘tax freeze’, was operated by a centre-​r ight government during 2001–​11. The rule implied that direct and indirect taxes could not be raised unless a tax rate was increased for environmental reasons or in order to fulfil Denmark’s EU obligations. A first step towards formulating a budget balance rule was already taken in 1992, when it was agreed to set a target of structural balance in ‘the medium term’. Budget balance rules were also part of the plan entitled ‘DK 2010’, originally formulated in January 2001 by a centre-​left government and later adopted in the same year by a centre-​r ight government. A later plan, ‘DK 2015’, launched in 2007, stipulated a target of at least a balanced budget during 2011–​15. The so-​called ‘convergence programme’ was launched in 2011, the rule here being reformulated with the goal of achieving a balanced budget in structural terms by 2020. The overall objective of the medium-​to-​long-​term strategies was to prepare for meeting the pressure on public finances caused by population ageing rather than delaying the fiscal response. Thereby, dramatic policy changes would be avoided at the time when the (expected) increases 192

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in the demographic dependency burden would unfold. The basic premise of the plan was that if the medium-​term targets were fulfilled by 2010, then a fiscal policy in which the same supply of welfare arrangements is available to future generations as to current generations would be consistent with fiscal sustainability (Andersen et al. 2008). In the sense that the fiscal policy adjustment could be characterized as ‘front-​loaded’, the adjustment would be implemented in the period until 2010. Even though Denmark does not participate in the Eurozone, the macroeconomic policy is restricted by the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Fiscal Compact (FC). Specifically, fiscal policy is meant to satisfy the (general) deficit criterion of 3 per cent of GDP in the SGP and, in line with the EU’s FC, a limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP has been imposed on the structural deficit. The latter constraint has been formalized in terms of the so-​ called Budget Law, as introduced in Denmark by January 2014. The Budget Law also imposes expenditure ceilings on the state, municipalities and regions. A further novelty implied by the Budget Law is the launching of a fiscal policy council, or fiscal ‘watchdog’. The rationale usually offered for a fiscal policy council is as a mechanism to increase the credibility of and commitment to a set of sustainable fiscal policies as well as to provide a politically impartial monitoring process.4 A primary function of any fiscal policy council is to forecast the future fiscal position, to monitor current performance, and to analyse the likely outcomes for sustainability, the main targets of fiscal policy and financial stability. In Denmark, the role of fiscal watchdog has been assigned to the chairmanship of the Danish Economic Councils (DEC). More precisely, it falls under the DEC’s duty to evaluate the fulfilment of various fiscal policy objectives, including long-​term sustainability and whether fiscal policy complies with the Budget Law and other medium-​term budgetary restrictions, such as assessing the expenditure ceilings.

The Norwegian fiscal framework The current fiscal framework in Norway largely reflects the management of the massive government petroleum wealth. It builds on two closely related institutions: the government petroleum fund, officially referred to as the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), and the Fiscal Rule (FR). While Norwegian fiscal policy has been exposed to large and volatile petroleum revenues since the 1970s, the GPFG and the FR were introduced much later. The legislation of the GPFG passed the parliament in 1990 and the first small deposit in the Fund took place in 1996. The FR was introduced as late as 2001, at the same time as the introduction of a formalized inflation targeting framework for monetary policy. As highlighted by Steigum and Thøgersen (2015), the creation of the GPFG and the FR could be regarded as results of hard-​earned policy lessons from the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the announced ambitions to fine-​tune the business cycle by means of fiscal policy, the dramatic drop in the price of oil in 1986 in combination with flaws in the ongoing credit market deregulation process led to a painful boom–​bust cycle that culminated in a banking crisis in 1991. The prolonged recession and the sharp weakening of the fiscal budget caused by much lower public revenues from the petroleum sector made it clear that Norway, at the time, had overspent its petroleum wealth. Mechanisms to ensure a smooth and sustainable spending of petroleum revenues were called for. This insight triggered the gradual adoption of a modern rule-​based policy mix where, when it comes to fiscal policy, the GPFG and FR have taken, and still take, centre stage. The combination of luck in terms of high oil prices, high oil and gas production and fiscal discipline implied that the contributions to the GPFG quickly grew significantly.Today, towards 193

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the end of 2015, the fund amounts to more than 200 per cent of mainland GDP. The GPFG thus represents a massive government endowment fund, giving future governments financial flexibility. Although it is not a formalized pension fund, one of its major objectives is to secure the welfare state and smooth tax burdens over time and across generations. The future development of the fund is subject to uncertainty about future returns, oil prices and the inflow of revenues from oil and gas production and, of course, the political decisions related to the spending of the fund. The latter issue depends on the working of the FR. The FR was introduced in response to the political debate caused by sharply increasing petroleum revenues and the corresponding spikes in the value of the petroleum fund. The rule combined a long-​term objective of how to gradually phase-​in increasing petroleum revenues with a short-​term objective to stabilize the business cycle. However, the rule implied that fiscal policy was geared much more towards long-​term objectives. This must be understood in light of the simultaneous adoption of a flexible inflation targeting framework for monetary policy, implying that monetary policy should now be ‘the first line of defence’ for the stabilization of the business cycle. According to the rule, the annual spending of the fund in a normal year should be given by the calculated long-​term rate of return of the fund, assumed to be 4 per cent annually. A proper understanding of the FR hinges on the fact that spending is measured by the so-​ called ‘structural non-​oil deficit’. This implies that increased spending caused by a larger fund is directly linked to a gradually increased gap between public expenditures and public revenues that are not related to the petroleum sector. ‘Structural’ refers to the fact that these components of the non-​oil budget are adjusted for business cycle effects. In, say, a recession, the temporarily lower tax base is adjusted upwards to its trend value and the temporary higher unemployment benefits are adjusted downwards to their trend. In this way, the automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy can work freely. The FR also allows for additional flexibility in the sense that (1) the effects of unexpected, large fluctuations in the value of the GPFG should be smoothed over some years, and, (2) when necessary, a fiscal stimulus could assist monetary policy for stabilization purposes. It follows, then, that the Norwegian FR targets the budget balance rather than the expenditure or revenue level. As discussed in detail by a recent government expert commission (NOU 2015:  9), the pure simplicity of the FR may have contributed significantly to its legitimacy and political support, which have led this rule to be the dominating reference point for all discussions of Norwegian fiscal policy. Governments across a broad political spectrum have all based their fiscal budgets on the FR but, typically, left-​wing governments have given priority to higher public spending, while right-​leaning governments have preferred to reduce taxes.The bottom line is that the FR has worked well. The rule has contributed to a smooth spending path of the petroleum wealth and to a pooling of risks related to fluctuating petroleum revenues. In 2016, the government spending of petroleum revenues, which in effect is spending of parts of the return on the GPFG, is calculated to amount to approximately 12 per cent of all public expenditures. There is no independent fiscal council in Norway, but the Ministry of Finance and academic economists have close ties. This is illustrated by, for example, an appointed expert panel of academic economists from several Norwegian institutions as well as members from Sweden and Denmark. This panel meets several times annually with ministry staff to discuss issues related to the ministry’s economic analyses and use of economic models. Finally, there are strong traditions for the government to appoint independent expert committees to provide comprehensive reports on topical themes in the Norwegian policy debate. 194

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The Swedish fiscal framework It is important to analyse the Swedish fiscal framework in light of the banking and currency crisis that occurred in the early 1990s (Bergman 2011; Claeys 2008; Hansson-​Brusewitz and Lindh 2005). Sweden underwent a financial crisis that started as a banking crisis but evolved into a currency crisis as the EMS crisis was transmitted to the Swedish krona market. In November 1992, the Riksbank was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. Since then, the Swedish krona has been floating, and the Riksbank has operated an inflation targeting regime since 1999. It also became necessary to implement budget consolidation in order to prevent the situation from evolving into a sovereign debt crisis. One important component of the consolidation programme was that the government also reformed the fiscal framework. The new framework constituted a major change in how fiscal policy was conducted as well as its overall objective. The new goal of fiscal policy was to maintain fiscal stability, consisting of four main pillars, introduced sequentially: The first pillar is a balanced budget requirement on local governments, introduced in 2000. Should this rule be breached, the local governments must correct the deficit within three years. In general, local governments are required to practice ‘sound economic management’, equivalent to a 2 per cent surplus. The second pillar of the fiscal framework is an expenditure ceiling for government outlays, introduced in 1997 and made statutory in 2009. This ceiling is decided by the parliament for at least three years ahead and refers to all central government expenditures except interest payments on government debt.The expenditure ceiling includes a safety margin to be used if there are large unexpected changes in government revenue. The third pillar involves a top-​down budget process that allocates the total budget to individual expenditures. This budget process requires that the sum of all budget proposals lie within the total expenditure ceiling. The fourth pillar is a surplus target.The surplus target was approved by the parliament in 1996 and has been fully implemented since 2000. Since 2010, it is a statutory requirement for the government to propose a surplus target for general government net lending. Under the current Budget Act, the government proposes a surplus target for general government net lending and then the parliament decides. The target was initially set at 2 per cent. In 2007, however, when Eurostat decided that saving in the premium pension system could no longer be included in financial saving, the surplus target was technically adjusted from 2 per cent to 1 per cent of GDP. Since 2014, the surplus target is evaluated using two indicators: a ten-​year backward-​looking average of net lending and structural net lending.5 The national fiscal framework described above is complemented with the supranational fiscal rules adopted at the EU level. These include the SGP rules on deficits and government debt as well as the Fiscal Compact (as ratified in March 2012), but Sweden has decided not to make any changes to national legislation. There are two independent fiscal institutions in Sweden evaluating fiscal policy.  The National Institute of Economic Research (NIER), founded in 1937, is a government agency operating under the Ministry of Finance providing research and independent economic analysis on all areas of fiscal policy, including forecasts of both the Swedish and the international economy. The Fiscal Policy Council (FPC), established in 2007, provides independent evaluations of the government’s fiscal policy, including distributional analysis. The fiscal framework is monitored both according to the rules laid out in the SGP (submission of convergence reports) and by national bodies including the NIER, the FPC, the National 195

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Financial Management Authority and the National Audit Office. Each of these has specific responsibilities but they are allowed to focus on all aspects of fiscal policy and the long-​term sustainability of public finances.

Long-​term fiscal challenges The task of achieving medium-​to-​long-​term fiscal sustainability is critically influenced by foreseeable demographic changes. Therefore, in addition to developing fiscal frameworks, reforms in areas directly affected by ageing, migration etc. may be crucial for sustaining the welfare state. This section briefly outlines how these challenges have been dealt with in the Scandinavian countries in recent years.

Denmark: demographic challenges and the poverty trap The pressure on public finances stemming from demographic changes and tendencies to early retirement has been handled through the so-​called welfare reform of 2006 and the retirement reform of 2011. Consequently, the statutory retirement ages for early retirement and old-​age pensions have been raised, and the indexation of retirement ages to changes in longevity has been introduced. The first element of the reforms increases the age for early retirement from 60 to 62 over the period 2014–​17. In effect, the early retirement age will be 64 in the year 2023, and the old-​age pension age will increase from 65 to 67 years over the period 2019–​22 (Andersen 2015). These are discrete changes in the sense that they will be implemented regardless of what happens to demographic background variables. The second element involves a rule-​based indexation of the early retirement age and pension age to the development in life expectancy at age 60. The objective is to limit the expected pension period to 14.5 years (17.5 years including early retirement) in the long run. Changes in the pension ages are announced 15 years in advance. For the pension age, this implies that the first change will be implemented in 2030; for the early retirement age, the change will take place in 2027. In addition to the public, pay-​as-​you-​go scheme with defined benefits (first pillar), the Danish pension system offers a funded scheme based on defined contributions to which the social partners agree (second pillar). While the latter schemes are broadly perceived as having been highly successful,6 the occupational pension system faces a key challenge that is related to whether the incentives to contribute to the schemes are sufficiently strong. This clearly poses a challenge to the Danish pension system as a whole due to the interplay between public and private pensions. More specifically, as a consequence of the means-​testing of public pensions, a poverty trap is likely to emerge. In more precise terms, since public pensions and other welfare provisions are reduced when private pensions are paid out, means-​testing effectively implies a tax on private savings. When considering the incentives to save (and retire), the implicit taxes arising via means-​testing must therefore be considered in addition to the explicit taxes. Since means-​testing targets public pensions for the least well-​off elderly, the effective tax rates become high for low private pensions, and thus typically low-​income groups. In Denmark, this is a serious challenge. For elderly with limited private pensions, the effective tax rate can be close to 75 per cent, whereas it is about 53 per cent for elderly with high values of pensions (Pension Commission 2015). In short, the challenge is really to preserve a saving-​friendly climate, keep the pension expenditures under control and not least keep the public pension benefit sufficiently high to avoid 196

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poverty among the elderly. Attempts at striking the right balance between these targets have thus far proven difficult in Denmark. The fact that the incentive structure within the pension system is inconsistent with the underlying objectives of the system therefore poses a major challenge to the Danish welfare state.

Norway: the long-​term dangers of a petroleum economy Despite the unique government financial position, fiscal policy in the intermediate and long run also faces significant challenges in Norway. In order to understand this, we must consider the predicted future government expenditures in light of the bleak prospects for both the magnitude of future revenues from the petroleum sector and the future returns on the government pension fund (GPFG). At the outset, the petroleum dependency of the Norwegian economy has become substantial. For many years, favourable oil prices and high production volumes boosted activity levels in the petroleum sector. In turn, the demand impulses from the petroleum industry on the mainland economy increased to more than 10 per cent of mainland GDP, and the spending of petroleum revenues, as measured by the non-​oil structural deficit, increased to more than 6 per cent of mainland GDP. Having become a mature petroleum economy, the number of new fields for development in the North Sea is declining. Oil prices have recently dropped to very low levels and forward-​ prices indicate that they will remain at lower levels for years to come. Naturally, this has accelerated the decline in petroleum sector activity levels, and forecasts indicate a gradual decline over several decades. Unemployment is currently increasing, and the national budget for 2016 recognizes that a sectoral re-​allocation of labour and capital must take place in the years to come. Even though monetary policy has responded forcefully and contributed to a beneficial depreciation of the Norwegian krone, a long-​lasting sectoral adjustment process is likely to reduce the growth of both potential GDP and the structural tax base. The growth of the GPFG is also expected to slow down. Obviously, the drop in oil prices and gradually lower petroleum production will reduce the inflow into the fund. Moreover, the outlook for global financial markets indicates that it will be difficult to obtain a 4 per cent real return in the years to come. As discussed in NOU (2015), this is mainly due to the fact that the real rate of return on bonds, with a 35 per cent portfolio share, will be zero or below as a consequence of the low global real interest rate level in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  Projections in NOU (2015) therefore assume that the real return on the GPFG will be 2–​3 per cent in the next 15 years before eventually returning to 4 per cent. As in most European economies, the future financing of the welfare state is heavily exposed to population ageing. Assuming constant tax rates and maintained service levels and compensation rates, expenditures on social security and health care will start rising sharply in 10–​15 years. This is consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that EU Commission calculations show that Norway has a deficit in its long-​term ‘generational account’ despite its considerable government wealth (EU Commission 2012).The calculations even show that this deficit is larger in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden. While such long-​run calculations are highly uncertain, they nevertheless illustrate the generosity of the Norwegian social security schemes. A  valid conjecture may well be that the highly visible financial wealth in the GPFG has counteracted the political feasibility of the social security reforms that have been undertaken step by step elsewhere; this is the case with disability pensions and sick-​leave benefits. The projected sharp increase in public expenditures shows that the petroleum wealth should not be an excuse for postponing reforms designed to improve the demographic robustness of 197

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the various parts of the welfare state. So far, Norway has successfully implemented one important reform in this direction, namely the old-​age pension reform for (mainly) the private sector in 2009. This reform combined a flexible retirement age with much improved incentives for large groups in the population to remain in the labour force until the normal retirement age of 67. In addition, the reform introduced longevity adjustment along similar lines as already implemented in Sweden. The reform seems to be working well thus far. According to an empirical study by Hernæs et al. (2015), the reform has tended to increase the retirement age substantially.

Sweden: the challenge of migration Like in Denmark and Norway, the Swedish welfare system faces demographic challenges. Among other things, this has led to a new pension system, characterized by a move towards a funded system with privately managed individual accounts.7 The new system seems to provide a base for solvent public finances. First, there is concern that the credibility of the Swedish fiscal framework, as outlined above, may be threatened. The background is a non-​parliamentary review of the surplus target, as initiated by the newly elected centre-​left government in March 2015. Specifically, Konjunkturinstitutet was commissioned to analyse the consequences of changing the surplus target from 1 per cent surplus to a balanced budget over the business cycle. Their report (Konjunkturinstitutet 2015) argues that the current framework has contributed significantly to strong public finances and a build-​up of credibility in the ability of reaching the surplus target. Yet there are indicators suggesting that the projected path of public finances is not consistent with the surplus target. For example, a recent report from the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2015) argues that the government plan for fiscal policy over the next three years is not in line with the surplus target. The decision to review the surplus target with the aim of introducing a balanced budget target may affect the credibility of fiscal policy. Indeed, adjusting such a target in a situation where it is not met could give the impression that the government only wants to adjust the target because it has problems meeting it. This puts the credibility of Swedish fiscal policy and its fiscal framework at risk. The pressure on government expenditures is closely related to the challenge raised by immigration. In 2015, the total number of asylum applications amounted to 160,000 persons. This is a sharp increase compared to 2014, where the number of applications was 81,301. This is undoubtedly a problematic situation, as the inflow of new asylum seekers puts pressure on public finances at the central, regional and municipal levels. The long-​term challenge is to integrate the newcomers into Swedish society and to increase the employment figures for foreign-​born citizens. Just a few facts to illustrate that this may not be easy:  (1)  the share of employment for the foreign-​born population is about 10  percentage points lower than for native-​born; (2)  unemployment for foreign-​born persons is about 10 percentage points higher than for native-​born (the unemployment rate for the former was 5.1 per cent in 2014, 15.1 per cent for the latter). A similar pattern carries over to long-​term unemployment, which is lowest for native-​born, somewhat higher for EU-​born and much higher for non-​EU-​born. There is a concern that the education level of immigrants may not match the demand for labour in Swedish society. This challenge is not limited to Sweden, as this pattern is fairly general throughout the EU. Labour market reforms must be implemented that can substantially increase the employment rates for foreign-​born persons in order to alleviate the pressure on public finances in the future. 198

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Conclusions The Scandinavian countries have recently been heralded as an exemplary role model due to their ability to maintain a firm grip on public finances. However, the Scandinavian countries have not always been strong fiscal performers. They have experienced their own crises, which have encouraged them to undertake major fiscal consolidations and reforms. This illustrates that restrictive fiscal policies during business cycle upturns provide room for manoeuvre during economic downturns without stressing sovereign debt markets or undermining fiscal rules (Bergman et al. 2015). The major fiscal consolidations in Denmark in the early 1980s were followed by a strong economic turnaround. These reforms were part of a broader package, including a credible conversion to a fixed exchange rate regime.Tighter fiscal rules were also later implemented in support of an active reform agenda. The Danish pension system reform also offers an example of how rising pensions and health-​care costs can be dealt with in a proactive manner.The statutory ages of early retirement and old-​age pensions have been raised, and indexation of retirement ages to changes in longevity has been introduced. These reforms possess a number of attractive characteristics from which other European countries with severe macroeconomic, fiscal and distributional problems could learn when designing their own reforms. For Norway, the creation of fiscal frameworks could be regarded as the result of hard-​earned policy lessons from the 1970s and 1980s.These decades were characterized by highly discretionary policy regimes both with regard to fiscal and monetary policy, with disappointing outcomes. A devaluation-​biased fixed exchange rate regime did not manage to anchor inflation expectations, the result being a pro-​cyclical interest rate setting in combination with high and volatile inflation. This increased the challenges for fiscal policy to stabilize the economy at a time when a rapidly growing petroleum sector provided positive wealth effects together with highly volatile impulses on the mainland Norwegian economy. The government pension fund and a well-​functioning fiscal rule have managed to separate the harvesting of large and volatile government oil and gas revenues from a smooth, long-​term spending strategy. Compared to other petroleum economies, this is an achievement that is well illustrated by the consequences of the persistent drop in the price of oil since late 2014. The bird-​in-​hand feature of the fiscal rule implies that the first-​round effect of lower oil prices on the government spending of petroleum wealth is zero due to the fact that all spending is related to the fund. Consequently, Norway is well positioned to enter decades in which the mature petroleum sector will gradually be phased down. Fiscal consolidation in Sweden has been gradual, and it has been implemented amidst a period of slow growth. But the Swedish consolidation was also introduced as part of a broader set of reforms, fiscal rules and fiscal reforms that put public finances on a sustainable path. Moreover, the Swedish exchange rate had depreciated sharply prior to the introduction of the reforms, which led to a very strong international export competitive position. Doubts about the long-​term sustainability of reforms are often related to a general distrust in the political process about the consequent distributional effects. In Scandinavia, public confidence is enhanced by the transparency of policy and the political process. Issues of income and wealth distributional effects across different segments of society are explicitly addressed and debated. This transparency and confidence in government, as evident in Scandinavia (Calmfors 2014), may not be present in many other European countries. This makes the implementation of fiscal reforms, viewed by the public as credible and sustainable, quite difficult.Without strong political support and confidence in the sustainability of the adjustment policies, adverse output and the unemployment effects of fiscal consolidations could be high. 199

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Notes 1 See, for example, Honkapohja (2015) for an overview of the challenges faced by the Finnish economy. 2 Data for the Norwegian economy is not available in the AMESCO database. However, the pattern is similar to observations elsewhere: an output gap exceeding 3 per cent in 2007 fell to approximately -​1 per cent in 2009 before returning to positive territory in 2011. Consequently, a fiscal stimulus package was introduced in 2009, leading to temporary increases in the spending of petroleum revenues in 2009 and 2010. 3 See, for example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Bergman and Hutchison (1999). 4 See, for example, Calmfors and Wren-​Lewis (2011) and Hallett and Jensen (2015). 5 The current government has initiated an evaluation of the surplus target.This involves whether the surplus target should remain as a pillar in the Swedish fiscal framework and whether there are arguments supporting an adjustment of the 1 per cent target to, for example, a balanced budget. The government commission appointed will deliver its final report in October 2016. 6 See, for example, Ministry of Finance (2015) and Bergman et al. (2015). 7 Palmer (2002), Sunden (2006) and Barr (2013) study the new pension system as well as the reform process in Sweden.

References Andersen, T. M. (2015) Robustness of the Danish Pension System. CESifo DICE Report 13: 25–​30. Andersen, T. M., Jensen, S. H. and Pedersen, L. H. (2008) The Welfare State and Strategies toward Fiscal Sustainability in Denmark. In:  Neck, R. and Sturm, J. (eds), Sustainability of Public Debt. London: MIT Press. Barr, N. (2013) The Pension System in Sweden. Report to the Expert Group on Public Economics (2013:7). Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Finance. Bergman, U. M. (2011) Best in Class: Public Finances in Sweden during the Financial Crisis. Panoeconomicus 58: 431–​453. Bergman, U. M. and Hutchison, M. M. (1999) Economic Expansions and Fiscal Contractions: International Evidence and the 1982 Danish Stabilization. In:  Andersen, T., Jensen, S. H. and Risager, O. (eds), Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Danish Economy. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Bergman, U. M., Hutchison, M. M. and Jensen, S. H. (2015) Shaping the Fiscal Policy Framework: Lessons from Fiscal Consolidations in Denmark and Sweden. In: Andersen, T. M., Bergman, U. M. and Jensen, S. H. (eds), Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Budina, N., Schaechter, A., Weber, A., Budina, N. T. and Kina, T. (2012) Fiscal Rules at a Glance: Country Details from a New Dataset. IMF Working Paper (WP/​12/​273). Fiscal Affairs Department. Calmfors, L. (2014) How Well is the Nordic Model Doing? Recent Performance and Future Challenges. In: Valkonen, T. and Vihriälä, V. (eds), The Nordic Model: Challenged but Capable of Reform. Copenhagen: Nordisk Council of Ministers. Calmfors, L. and Wren-​Lewis, S. (2011) What Should Fiscal Councils Do? Economic Policy 26: 649–​695. Claeys, P. (2008) Rules, and Their Effects on Fiscal Policy in Sweden. Swedish Economic Policy Review 15: 7–​47. EU Commission (2012) Fiscal Sustainability Report 2012. European Economy 8/​2012. Brussels: European Union. EU Commission (2015) AMECO database. 5 November 2015 revision. Available at: http://​ec.europa.eu/​ economy_​finance/​db_​indicators/​ameco/​archive_​en.htm [Accessed 10 March 2017]. Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M. (1990) Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5: 75–​111. Gylfason, T. (2015) Iceland: How Could This Happen? In: Andersen, T. M., Bergman, U. M. and Jensen, S. H. (eds), Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Hallett, A. Hughes and Jensen, S. H. (2015) The Fiscal Framework in a Currency Union: Lessons from Comparison between the Euro Area and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. The World Economy 39(6): 803–​823.

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Fiscal policy in Scandinavia Hansson-​Brusewitz, U. and Lindh,Y. (2005) Expenditure Ceilings and Fiscal Policy –​Swedish Experiences. Paper presented at Public Expenditure, proceedings of the 7th Banca d’Italia workshop on Public Finance, Perugia. Mimeo. Hernæs, E., Markussen, S., Piggott, J. and Røed, K. (2015) Pension Reform and Labor Supply: Flexibility vs. Prescription. IZA Discussion Paper no. 8812. Bonn: IZA. Honkapohja, S. (2015) Challenges to the Nordic Model:  The Case of Finland. In:  Andersen, T. M., Bergman, U. M. and Jensen, S. H. (eds), Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Konjunkturinstitutet (2015) Konsekvenser av att införa ett balansmål för finansiellt sparande i offentlig sektor. Specialstudier nr. 45. Stockholm: Konjunkturinstitutet. Ministry of Finance (2015) Convergence Programme Denmark 2015. Copenhagen:  Ministry of Finance [Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior]. NOU (2015) Finanspolitikk i en oljeøkonomi [Fiscal Policy in an Oil Economy]. NOU 2015: 9. Report from a Norwegian government expert commission, extended summary available in English. Oslo: Norges offentlige utredninger. Palmer, E. (2002) Swedish Pension Reform: How Did It Evolve, and What Does It Mean for the Future? In: Feldstein, M. and Siebert, H. (eds), Social Security Pension Reform in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pension Commission (2015) Det danske pensionssystem –​international anerkendt, men ikke problemfrit [The Danish Pension System –​Internationally Praised But Not Without Problems]. Published by the Danish Ministry of Taxation. Available at:  www.skm.dk/​media/​1242539/​det-​danske-​pensionssystem_​ samlettilweb.pdf [Accessed 12 May 2016]. Steigum, E. and Thøgersen, Ø. (2015) A Crisis Not Wasted: Institutional and Structural Reforms Behind Norway’s Strong Macroeconomic Performance. In: Andersen, T. M., Bergman, U. M. and Jensen, S. H. (eds), Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sunden, A. (2006) The Swedish Experience with Pension Reform. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22: 133–​148. Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2015) Fiscal Policy Council Report 2015. Stockholm: Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.

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16 THE FISHERIES POLICY IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES From open access to rights-​based management fisheries Peder Andersen and Vibe Busk Larsen

Introduction The use of the living marine resources plays an important economic and social role in the Nordic countries –​but in some countries significantly more so than others. The importance of marine resources primarily relates to the fish resources, although recreational use is of increasing importance. At the same time, the governance of fish resources has developed dramatically over the last 40  years, going from an almost open-​access regime to well defined property-​ rights regimes. Since 1983, the European Fishery Policy (CFP) has played an important role in the formulation of EU countries’ national fishery policies and been important for agreements between EU and non-​EU countries. It has also played an important role for understanding the conflicts about fishing rights and market access. This chapter provides a brief introduction to basic fisheries economics and management as a background for understanding the major principles in the EU fisheries policy and Nordic member states’ fisheries management systems, Nordic non-​EU countries fisheries policies, and country-​specific management initiatives. In the description of the policies, focus will be on the present systems and recent changes since 1983, the year the EU established a formal fisheries policy. The focus will be on the role of Rights-​Based Management (RBM), as the property rights issue is key to understanding the (mis)management of the living resources in the oceans.

Analysis The analyses will be framed by a short introduction to fisheries economics and management, followed by a brief presentation of the most important elements in EU fisheries policies and the options available to EU member states to implement country-​specific initiatives. The description of the regulations in the other Scandinavian countries focuses on the similarities and differences compared to the EU fisheries policy.

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Fisheries economics and management Historically, an important feature when studying renewable resources such as fish stocks has been the lack of property right to the stock. The result has been the so-​called ‘race for fish’ and the ‘tragedy of the commons’ phenomena: If nobody has the property right to the fish or everybody has the right to go fishing, a ‘race for fish’ will occur.The result is overfishing and in many cases also biologically overfished stocks, meaning small stocks and low long-​term catches. The tragedy is the fact that the economic surplus of the fishery, resource rent, will be low or completely disappear (the dissipation of rent; see Figure 16.1). Figure 16.1 is a simple presentation of classical fishery economics, where open access can be compared to optimal fishery (maximum long-​term resource rent of a fishery). Figure 16.1 shows the long-​term relationship between fishing effort (e.g. number of fishing days by the whole fleet) and total revenue (catch × price of fish). The biological dynamic behind the model is the fact than you can capture the growth of the stock and maintain it at a certain level. If you catch more, the stock will go down and vice versa. If the stock is very low, the growth is small due to a small spawning stock biomass. If the stock is very large, the growth is also small but this is due to lack of food relative to the large spawning stock biomass. The shape of the curve is species-​specific and determined by environmental conditions. The importance of this part is that fisheries policy will determine the long-​term harvest in the specific fishery. The economic part of the story relates to fishing cost. In Figure 16.1, the cost structure is simple. We assume that the cost per fishing day is constant. The cost curve is therefore a straight line. More realistic assumptions would not change the fundamentals in the model. Under open-​access fishing activities, fishing effort E will increase as long as fishing involves a

TR,TC TC RR

TR EMEY EMSY

EOA

Effort

Figure 16.1  If nobody has the property rights to the fish or everybody has the right to go fishing, a ‘race for fish’ will occur Note:  The economic result is overfishing and the economic surplus of the fishery (resource rent) will be low or completely disappear. The x-​axis represents the fishing effort, which could be the amount of days at sea; meanwhile, the y-​axis represents both the total revenue (TR) and total costs (TC). The open-​access equilibrium is where the TR and TC curves intersect, which results in the effect, EOA, here the resource rent equals zero. EMSY represents the effort at the maximum sustainable yield. The optimal fishing effort is where TC is moved up until it tangent TR. Here, the fishing effort is EMEY, which equals the maximum economic yield. At this level of effort, the resource rent is maximized and equals RR.

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net profit. Under open access, fishing activities will therefore be equal to EOA. If fishing effort and costs could be reduced, society would gain resource rent (pure economic surplus from the fish resource). In Figure 16.1, maximum resource rent would occur if fishing effort was reduced to Eoptimal. This is where the difference between total revenue and total cost is the largest possible. The lessons to be learned from the simple model is that fishery regulation is needed to create resource rent, that fishing activities, measured in terms of fishing days, will be smaller in the optimally regulated fishery than in open-​access fishery, and that long-​term catches might be smaller (as shown in Figure 16.1) under open-​access fishery than optimal fishery. This implies that the number of fishermen will fall under optimal regulation but that employment in the processing industry may be higher and the net employment impact depends on the specific fishery. If fishing is relatively cheap (low cost and/​or high efficiency), biologically overexploited stocks are likely and catches will consequently be low, employment in the fishing sector small, and there will be no resource rent for society to use for private or public consumption. There are many ways to control fishing effort but it is important for rent creation that the regulations are cost-​effective. The most common methods, such as closed areas, days in harbour, total allowable catches (TAC), mesh size, fleet and horse power restrictions and so forth, reduce the pressure on the stock as the fishing effort will be less efficient –​but they also drive up the cost of fishing a certain amount of fish. The resource rent will therefore be dissipated. In complicated fisheries (multispecies fisheries, different fishing areas, different fishing methods, various types of fleets) the right financial incentives must be combined with other regulations to balance different goals and avoid conflict. It is important to note that the exclusive use of biologically oriented regulations does not grant sufficient consideration to fishermen’s behaviour, therefore leading to waste of resource rent due to high fishing cost. In order to create resource rent and avoid biological and economic overfishing, the correct financial incentives must be in place. Taxes on catch or revenue are one option, another is individual transferable quotas (ITQ). They work in the same manner, as they reduce the incentives to expand fishing effort. In the tax case, the revenue goes to the state (owner of the resource). If ITOs are used, the value of the quota may go to the state if the quotas are sold by the state. If the state allocates the quota to existing fishermen (grandfathering methods), the owners of the quotas gain the resource rent. An ITQ system is the most market-​based system and has proven to be an efficient system for creating resource rent. The ITQ systems are able to create resource rent because they provide the correct financial incentives to solve the tragedy of the commons problem by moving the regulatory framework from open access to a Rights-​Based Management (RBM) system. The core in the RBM system is property right. In the ITQ system, the property right is the right to fish a given amount of fish, to buy more fish or to sell part of or the whole quota. There are many versions of an RBM system (see Table 16.1). The efficiency of the various RBM systems depends on the time horizon of the right, the trading flexibility and how easy it is to substitute between different fishing inputs. If the time horizon is short, the incentives for long-​term planning are not in place. If trading is not allowed or very restricted, the quotas will not end up with the most efficient vessels, the result being loss of resource rent. Finally, if fishing rights are not related to catch quotas but only to the right to fish (a licence) or the right to some input, like fishing days, to use specific vessels size or the like, fishing effort can increase by substitution. An example would be to buy more technical equipment and catch more per fishing day. As it is impossible to restrict or control all of the input, effort regulation will not be an economically efficient RBM system. 204

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Key features

Territorial Use Rights (TUFs)

Allocation of a certain area of the ocean to a single user, usually a group, who then undertakes fishing by allocating rights to users within the group.

Community-​based catch quotas (CQ)

Catch quotas are attributed to a ‘fishing community’ with decisions on allocation of rights within the community taken on a cooperative basis.

Vessel Catch Limits (VC)

Restrict the amount of catch that each vessel can land for a given period of time (week, month or year) or per trip.

Individual Non-​Transferable Quotas (IQ)

Provide a right to catch a given quantity of fish from a particular stock, or, more usually, a percentage of the TAC.

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ)

Provide a right to catch a given quantity of fish from a particular stock, or, more usually, a percentage of a TAC, which is then transferable (sale, leasing, loan).

Limited Non-​Transferable Licences (LL)

These licences can be attached to a vessel, to the owner, or to both and have to be limited in number and applied to a specific stock or fishery to be considered as market-​like.

Limited Transferable Licences (LTL)

By making limited licences transferable, fishermen are provided with an increased incentive to adjust capacity and effort over the short to long term in response to natural and economic conditions.

Individual Non-​Transferable Effort Quotas (IE)

Rights are attached to the quantity of effort unit that a fisherman can employ for a given period of time.

Individual Non-​Transferable Effort Quotas (ITE)

Transferability makes short-​and long-​term adjustment easier and allows for a better use of fishing capacities.

Source: Eliasen et al. (2009).

EU fisheries policy: the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) The EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was established in 1983. Since then, it has been revised every decade. Before 1983, the fisheries policy was limited and part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) produced in 1957 together with the Treaty of Rome. The CFP divides the responsibility between the EU and its member states on three different pillars. The first is total allowable catch (TAC), which refers to annual quotas giving the right to catch a certain amount of each species.This yearly quota is primarily based on biological arguments and scientific advice. However, the biological recommendations given by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) are evaluated in advisory bodies that include social scientists. The TACs are set at a level that should ensure the sustainable exploitation of resources in environmental, economic and social terms.The TACs should also ensure a stable and predictable framework for all of the operators who depend on fisheries and reduce the limits with variation. Finally, the policy should secure that international commitments are met, such as re-​establishing stocks. Overall, the principles are linked to the precautionary principle. The TAC is distributed between member states based on their historical catches in accordance with the relative stability principle. The member states are free to manage these quotas by using various measures as long as they meet the TAC and the general rules for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (EU Regulation No. 1380/​2013). 205

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The second pillar is structural policies. These policies specify restrictions concerning member state fishing fleet capacity. Again, the member states can decide which measures to use to adjust fleet size and there is a general set of rules for subsidy rates. These subsidies will be released if the member states co-​finance them. Third, there are technical measures such as closed areas, minimum mesh size, by-​catch rules and discard bans (landing obligation). Here, the member states can supplement with other measures as long as they do not violate the measures agreed to at the supranational level (Frost and Andersen 2006; OECD 2013). Of the Nordic countries, Sweden, Denmark and Finland are EU member states. The most important feature in the Common Fisheries Policy is that the relative stability principle de facto constitutes on the country level an RBM system as a country-​specific fixed share of the TAC, which is each year forwarded to each country.This system works like an individual, non-​transferable quota system in which the ‘individual’ is the country. The present version of the quota system does not allow for transferability between countries, allowing instead for the bilateral trading of quotas in the beginning of the year as well as during the year. How the individual countries allocate quotas between segments of the fleet and between vessels, and the degree of flexibility of quota trading among vessels, relies on national regulation.

Nordic fisheries in numbers The economic importance of the fishery sector varies considerably between the Nordic countries (see Table 16.2 for some fisheries statistics). The indicators shown for 2013 are ‘number of vessels’, ‘number of fishermen’, ‘landing values’, ‘fisheries’ share of Gross Value Added’ (GVA) and ‘export of fish and seafood’. A sector’s share of GVA is a good indicator of its macroeconomic importance, while the number of vessels and fishermen are better indicators of its local and regional importance. Table 16.2  Fisheries statistics, 2013a Number of vessels

Number of fishermen

Value of landings (millions €)

EU members Sweden Denmark Finland

1,335 2,369 2,723

1,641 1,519 847

76 461 31

Non-​EU members Norway Iceland Greenland The Faroe Islands

5,133 1,685 525 34

9,398 4,400 3,640c 1,501

1,762 933 137 70

Fisheries’ share of national Gross Value Added 0.03% 0.4%b 0.06%  1%  5% 11%c 10%

Export of fish and seafood (millions €) 3,431 3,495 46 9,552 1,896 341 886

Notes a The year can vary between 2011 and 2015. b This is an estimate. The share for agriculture, forestry and fisheries combined is 1.4 per cent. c The agricultural and forestry sectors are included, but they have only a marginal importance for Greenland. Sources: Eurostat, OECD, Norwegian Fisheries Directorate, Statistics Sweden, Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway, Statistics Iceland, Statistics Greenland, Statistics Faroe Islands, NUMO

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Generally speaking, fisheries play a minor macroeconomic role in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The share of national GVA is significantly below 1 per cent and the numbers of fishermen in all three countries are small in absolute numbers as well as in terms of the proportion of the labour force.The picture is slightly different for Norway, as the fishery’s share of GVA is 1 per cent and Norway has more than 5,000 fishermen. Fishery plays a much more important role for the Icelandic economy and is of significant importance for Greenland and the Faroe Islands.The share of national GVA in these countries is 5 per cent, 11 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. Norway has by far the biggest fleet and number of full-​time employed fishermen. In terms of the share of the labour force, however, fisheries are most important in Greenland, followed by the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Regarding the export of fish and seafood, Norway is number one, but the export of fish and seafood represents more than 95 per cent of the total exports of the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

Trends in the Nordic fisheries Based upon the trends in the fisheries of the Nordic countries, distinction can be drawn between the Nordic EU countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) and the Nordic non-​EU countries (Norway, Iceland, Greenland, Faroe Islands). Figures 16.2 and 16.3 provide some indication of the common trends in recent years. Sweden

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Figure 16.2  Trends in fisheries development. Sweden, Denmark and Finland: 1997–​2013 Sources: Eurostat, OECD.

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Figure 16.3  Trends in fisheries development. Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands: 1997–​2013. Greenland: 2008–​13 Note: * There was no data available for the number of fishermen in Iceland in 1997. The oldest number available was from 2007. Sources: Eurostat, OECD, Norwegian Fisheries Directorate, Statistics Iceland, Statistics Greenland, Statistics Faroe Islands, NUMO.

For Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the reduced numbers of vessels and fishermen are parallel and reveal significant reductions. At the same time, the landing values have been stable –​and actually improved for Finland. The EU fisheries policy has worked and the goal of less overcapacity and TAC restrictions together with fishing technology improvements have stabilized landing values. For Norway and Iceland, the trends also show reduced fishing fleets but increased landing values. Like the EU countries, Norway and Iceland use Total Allowable Catches (TAC), and parts of the regulatory framework in these two countries have been more flexible than the EU countries’ quota management system.The data for Greenland and the Faroes are less certain, but their fleet capacities have likely also been reduced. The overall picture indicates that the fisheries policy in the Nordic countries has focused on stock protection by way of fleet reductions, although stock recovery is not the overall trend. There are several reasons why this is the case. First, stock recovery takes time and only follows if catches are below stock growth for some period. Second, the fishing technologies are developing rapidly, and the development in fishing capacity is linked to fleet size, crew size and technology. Finally, it is politically difficult to reduce fishing capacity due to regional interests. 208

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Fisheries policy in the Nordic countries: country by country As EU member states, the fisheries policies in Sweden, Denmark and Finland are framed by the Common Fishery Policy as discussed above in the section on EU fisheries policy. Fisheries management is based on the TAC and accompanied by a quota system. Measures such as effort regulation, technical conservation measures, management/​recovery plans and stock enhancement operations are also used. The main differences between policies in the three countries relate to the choice of type of Rights-​Based Management system. In Sweden, a combination of individual quotas (IQ) and ITQs is implemented, including territorial use rights and limitations on transferability (OECD 2013). Sweden has also established a large number of Marine Protected Areas along its coast (Popescu 2010). The Danish fisheries management system resembles that of Sweden but with fewer restrictions on quota transferability. In fact, initiatives were taken as early as in 1991 to implement an almost full-​scale ITQ system, but the first group of vessels first received the ITQ system in 2003 due to a lack of political support.The Danish pelagic herring fishery was transferred to the new regulatory framework on an experimental basis to overcome the classical problems and to meet the need to modernize the pelagic fishing fleet. In 2007, the system was made permanent and extended to cover other pelagic species, such as mackerel, sand eel, blue whiting and horse mackerel. At the time, most of the remainder of the Danish fleet also implemented the ITQ system. Only a segment of small-​scale vessels continues under an effort control system and a share of the TAC for this segment. However, the EU regulations regarding capacity control have continued together with some technical measures and closed areas (Semrau and Gras 2013). Norway was one of the first countries to introduce a licence scheme in 1973 and was also in front regarding the implementation of a discard ban policy (1987). Today, most of the commercial fisheries are regulated by TACs and ITQs. The Norwegian structural quota system allows the sector to consolidate quotas on fewer vessels. Norway has an agreement with the EU and bilateral agreements with Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Greenland. Iceland implemented national fishing zones beyond the classical 12  nm as early as 1972 (50 nm), extended the zones to 200 nm three years later, and was the frontrunner for the general 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zones in the North East Atlantic waters in 1977 (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). This marked the beginning of a new era for a more economically rational fishery policy, as the implementation of a country-​based private property right system offers a means to avoid the open-​access ‘race for fish’ policy. The first step was the implementation of access licences, restrictions on fishing effort, investment controls and buy-​ back initiatives. Fisheries economic theory clearly concludes that such measures will not solve the problems. After some years, Iceland became one of the first countries in the world to move towards an ITQ-​based system. In 1984, the ITQ system was introduced for the demersal fleet and further developed in the following years. In 2004, all commercial fishing vessels were covered by such a system, meaning that Iceland has more than 30 years of experience with forming an RBM-​based fishing sector. Consequently, contemporary Icelandic fishery is very efficient, based on a uniform and complete ITQ system covering all commercial fishing vessels for all Icelandic fisheries (Eliasen et al. 2009). The government of Greenland decides the TAC for the fish stocks in the Greenlandic economic zone (EEZ) primarily based on biological recommendations. The TAC is allocated in the form of quotas to individual vessels for the major part of the fleet.The right to fish is regulated through licences. Greenland has an agreement with the EU consisting of two pillars: one on the fishery rights to Greenland’s EEZ and the other a partnership agreement beneficial to non-​fishery sectors. The agreement provides Greenland with annual compensation 209

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for quota rights to EU fishing vessels together with tariff-​free access to EU markets. Greenland also has bilateral fishery agreements with the Faroe Islands, Norway and Russia. These agreements secure Greenland’s right to fish in those countries’ waters and vice versa (Statistics Greenland 2015). The Faroe Islands’ fishery management system is two-​fold:  There is one system for the demersal fleet, which is based on Individual transferable Effort Quotas (IEQs), and an ITQ system for the pelagic fisheries, shrimp vessels and factory vessels fishing in the Barents Sea. The IEQ system was established in 1987 as a maximum number of fishing days and applied to the ‘home fleet’, which was further divided into different fleet segments. Each segment has its own set of restrictions on the number of fishing days, length of boat, type of fishing gear and horsepower. Vessels cannot move between segments. As only some of the inputs are restricted, the fishing capacity can expand through technical developments, resulting in overcapacity. This occurred in the home fleet, and political initiatives are currently being taken to render the system more efficient. As for other countries, the ITQ system is based on TAC allocations. The system is related to the pelagic fleet. Each vessel requires an affixed licence combined with restrictions regarding how much, where and when it can fish. As in other ITQ systems, however, capacity can be adjusted to fishing options via the purchase and sale of quotas. Clearly, the ITQ system has proven more efficient and the actual debate of a more general change towards an ITQ system is linked to the economic efficiency argument (Dunga 2016). The Faroe Islands have bilateral agreements with Iceland, Norway, Greenland, Russia and the EU that are similar to Greenland (Knudsen 2015).

Conclusions and newer trends There are some very similar trends in all of the fisheries in the Nordic countries. Technical improvements tend to increase fishing capacity and the pressure on the fish stocks, which demands capacity reduction in order to avoid overexploitation. While the trends regarding policy reactions in the various countries have been alike, the time of reaction has been very different. In Iceland and Norway, the recognition of the importance to balance fleet capacity and stock abundance to secure an economically viable fishing sector became clear as early as the 1970s. Furthermore, the fishery policy in the two countries moved towards RBM systems, resulting in management systems based on ITQs and resource rent gains. Moreover, Greenland has been aware of the importance of creating resource rent, as fishery is the single greatest economic activity in Greenland.This is a difficult balance, as the part of the fleet and the processing industry in Greenland are very closely connected to local employment. The major part of the fishery in the Faroe Islands has long been managed not to create rent, but the current initiatives for a new policy might change the situation. Formulated back in 1983, the EU fisheries policy (CFP) has always focused on the balance between fleet capacity and stock abundance, but the measures implemented by the countries supported by EU initiatives to secure the balance have been unbalanced. Subsidies have extended capacity and buy-​back schemes have not solved the problem. Effort restrictions, such as number of fishing days, limits on horsepower etc., have at the same time hurt fishermen’s finances and resulted in a waste of resource rent. There has been increased awareness of the problem in recent years, and the use of ITQs has improved the situation. The trends are clear for all countries, as the number of vessels and fishermen have been reduced and the value of landings has remained stable or increased. This is a clear indication of the value of a more Rights-​Based Management system with a high degree of transferability of fishing rights. This is obviously not without social cost, as financially unviable vessels will leave 210

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the fleet and a concentration of fishing-​related industries might result. Political goals regarding a certain distribution of fishing activities across regions demand restrictions on transferability at the cost of economic efficiency and loss of resource rent. As stated very precisely in Eliasen et al. (2009: 39): The Nordic experience shows that the introduction of RBM systems is highly sensitive, despite ‘obvious advantages’ in terms of economic efficiency etc. This relates not only to the perception of the impacts of such management systems on fishing communities and sector employment, but also to the principles applied for the allocation of fishing rights and the distribution of the associated wealth.The lesson learned from the Nordic experience is that the introduction of RBM should be adaptive and with an open discussion among all the stakeholders about the features of the system in relation to policy objectives in fisheries and in society at large. In recent years, the idea of co-​management as part of the management system has developed. Co-​management is about stakeholder participation in fishery management and, through this involvement, to obtain a better outcome. By including the practical knowledge provided by stakeholders, more data can be collected together with higher levels of compliance. As a result of the idea of co-​management, the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were established in 2002 as part of the CFP reform.Their main role is to advise the EU Commission by commenting on the Commission’s proposals and to formulate their own proposals.The Nordic countries have traditions for democratic stakeholder involvement in the fishery management process (e.g. Eliasen et al. 2009). The attitudes towards co-​management are positive, there is a clear trend towards more co-​management-​oriented systems, but the net results of co-​management arrangements are very difficult to estimate. The latest initiative in the EU fisheries policy is linked to the protection of fish stocks and waste of caught fish (see Regulation (EU) (2013, article 15)). Throughout the period 2015–​19, the EU will implement a full-​scale landing obligation (discard ban) for all catches of quota-​ regulated species in all EU waters and for all EU vessels. For a number of years, a landing obligation has been part of the management systems in Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands as a means to protect stocks and reduce the waste of caught fish. The Nordic experience supports the view that incentives to fish selectively combined with markets for landed discardable fish and a proper enforcement system improve the exploitation of the marine resources.

References Dunga, M. Ó. (2016) Resource Rent and Capital Dynamics in the Faroese Fisheries. Master’s Thesis. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. Mimeo. Eliasen, S. Q., Sverdrup-​Jensen, S., Holm, P. and Johnsen, J. P. (2009) Nordic Experience of Fisheries Management: Seen in Relation to the Reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. TemaNord 2009:579. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. EU Regulation No. 1380/​2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy. Available at:  http://​eur-​lex.europa.eu/​legal-​content/​EN/​TXT/​ ?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1380 [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Frost, H. and Andersen, P. (2006) The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union and Fisheries Economics. Marine Policy 30: 737–​746. Knudsen, D. (2015) Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne. Beretning 2015. Tórshavn:  Rigsombuddet. Available at: www.stm.dk/​multimedia/​Beretning_​2015_​til_​hjemmesiden.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2016]. OECD (2013) OECD Review of Fisheries: Policies and Summary Statistics 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing.

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P. Andersen and V. B. Larsen Popescu, I. (2010) Fisheries in Sweden. Note, Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy. Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies. Brussels: European Parliament. Available at: www.europarl.europa. eu/​RegData/​etudes/​note/​join/​2010/​438579/​IPOL-​PECH_​NT(2010)438579_​EN.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Semrau, J. and Gras, J. J.  O. (2013) Fisheries in Denmark. Note, Directorate –​General for Internal Policies Policy  Department B:  Structural and Cohesion Policies. Brussels:  European Parliament. Available at:  www.europarl.europa.eu/​RegData/​etudes/​etudes/​join/​2013/​513972/​IPOL-​PECH_​ ET(2013)513972_​EN.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2016]. Statistics Greenland (2015). Statistical Yearbook 2015. Nuuk: Naatsorsueqqissaartarfik. Available at: www. stat.gl/​publ/​en/​SA/​201503/​pdf/​2015%20statistical%20yearbook.pdf [Accessed 2 October 2016].

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17 MAKING AND RE-​M AKING THE NORDIC MODEL OF EDUCATION Tine S. Prøitz and Petter Aasen

Introduction Seen from a socio-​economic perspective, the Nordic societies are built on social democratic ideology (Berman 2006). This involves a political economy based on ideas of a publicly regulated market economy, universal social solidarity, equality, trust and collaboration, which consequently appears to foster both economic growth and social safety for the citizens of these countries (Klemsdal 2009). Theoretically and analytically, the Nordic social model is based on two central features:  First, the establishment of extensive agreements for collaboration and coordination between trade unions, employers’ organizations and the government, which uphold the support of a welfare state based on high levels of progressive taxation; and second, a generous and service-​intensive welfare state covering a broad spectrum of social services for all citizens. This principle of universalistic policies includes health-​care programmes, child allowances, eldercare and public education. The policies do not target specific vulnerable groups, catering instead to all segments of the population. This results in societies renowned for the lowest wage differentials in the world, the most generous welfare states, highly educated citizens, high employment rates, high levels of social and gender equality, as well as being among the most productive and profitable countries in the world (Barth and Moene 2009; Rothstein and Steinmo 2013). A central element of these societies is a publicly provided comprehensive school system. This chapter presents an overview of the education policies in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, with particular attention paid to the main features of the Nordic education model. For several years, education researchers have investigated distinctive features of the Nordic education model.This research considers the Nordic education model in relation to a broad range of education issues (Antikainen 2006; Blossing et al. 2014; Fladmoe 2012; Telhaug et al. 2006; Tjeldvoll 1998). Discussions of the traits of the Nordic education model have been framed by historic, cultural, national and –​more currently –​international education policy developments (Antikainen 2006;Telhaug et al. 2006).The notion of ‘Nordicness’ in education has been studied from the outlook of primary and secondary education (Hudson 2011; Raae 2012), adult education (Tuijnman 2003), lifelong learning (Rubenson 2006) and higher education (Haapakorpi 213

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and Saarinen 2014a, 2014b; Krejsler et  al. 2014; Orr and Hovdhaugen 2014). Studies have focused on thematic issues, such as school leadership (Moos et al. 2004), equity in education (Aasen 2003, 2007), teachers’ work (Carlgren and Klette 2008; Carlgren et al. 2006), curriculum and globalization (Wermke et al. 2015), evaluation, classroom assessment and grading (Hansen 2009; Lysne 2006) and testing and accountability (Ydesen et al. 2013). Several contributions have explored how the Nordic and Scandinavian education model, as well as the individual Nordic countries, are influenced, challenged and even threatened by the international policy development (Antikainen 2006; Blossing et al. 2014; Hatch 2013; Hopmann 2008, 2015; Hudson 2011; Telhaug et al. 2006). Other researchers have discussed the complex interchange and multidirectional relationships between Nordic education and transnational organizations in education policy development, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) (Forsberg and Pettersson 2014; Prøitz 2015). Researchers have also questioned whether or not a Nordic education model actually exists and discussed the realities of the notion of shared attributes in education across the Scandinavian countries (Antikainen 2010; Lundahl 2015; Raae 2012). This chapter is organized in five sections, starting with this introduction and followed by a presentation of the development of the Nordic education model, as seen in the light of developments in the Scandinavian countries during the first four decades of the post-​Second World War period. The third section describes and assesses more recent education reforms in the Scandinavian countries together with some statistics on Scandinavian education. The fourth section discusses central features of the re-​making of the education model in light of recent Scandinavian policy initiatives. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the descriptions and presents our review of the model.

The making of the model The origin of the Nordic model of education emerged in the first decades after the Second World War (Telhaug et al. 2006). Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden found unity in a Nordic community that was formalized in 1952 with the establishment of the Nordic Council. Telhaug et al. (2006) describe this Nordic community as founded on the efforts of these countries to define their relationships with the Western world in the aftermath of the war, under pressure from both East and West, thereby having to emphasize their independence in relation to both camps. At the time, the general characteristics of the Nordics were their exceptional homogeneity in ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural terms. The elements of cultural consensus concerning the preservation of national identities accompanied by high minimum wages, small wage differentials and universal social benefits are also described as central traits of the Nordic countries at the time. An important basis for the development of a more general Nordic social model in the post-​ war era are the ideologies of social democracy or ‘the Social Democratic Order’ (Sejersted 2005). Social democratic ideas are not unique to Nordic countries. However, while there have been elements of social democratic ideologies in many other welfare states, the social democratic principles in the Nordic countries are embedded in the social structure of the respective societies. Through labour protection laws, anti-​trust laws, progressive taxation, redistributive policies, universal healthcare and universal education, social democracy aims at developing a society based on a consensus of the common good. One of the fundamental ambitions here is to combine a positive attitude towards free trade, free labour markets and economic competition with the realization that a well running market economy requires extensive public regulation to function properly. The idea is that markets do not have the capacity to serve the common good 214

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if left unregulated (Rothstein 1998;Telhaug et al. 2006).The Nordic social model in general and the Swedish welfare state in particular, with their comprehensiveness and universalism, helped manufacture cross-​class solidarity and consensus while at the same time marginalizing the market as the principal agent of distribution and the chief determinant of the people’s life chances (Esping-​Andersen 1985). Thus, the Nordic countries offer examples of the social democratic welfare state model contrasting against the conservative welfare state that is common throughout Central and Western Europe and the liberal state characterized by the prevailing model in the Anglo-​American countries (Esping-​Andersen 1990). Progressiveness in terms of the search for and implementation of new solutions is an essential element in Nordic political culture (Antikainen 2006). Socially progressive policies imply that new policies or reforms intentionally, explicitly and continuously push the societies forward. The ambition has not been some idealized equilibrium. The Nordic countries can be distinguished from other democracies and welfare states by the fact that the state itself has been an explicit agent of social change (Rothstein and Steinmo 2013). More specifically, the Nordic model of education has been defined as ‘an attempt to construct a national education system on the foundation of specific local values and practices, but at the same time subject to international conditions and influences and even as an internationally influential example’ (Antikainen 2006: 229; Tjeldvoll 1998). Norwegian social economist Kjell Eide described the Nordic education model in the post-​ war era in terms of the following features (Eide 1990): • Compulsory education is comprehensive, with no organizational differentiation until age 16. Upper secondary education is also largely comprehensive. • Education of equal quality is available to all, which implies a financial redistribution policy securing equal resource standards throughout the country. • Parents tend to regard the local school as equivalent to any other, and there is no quality hierarchy between schools. • The pedagogy is relatively pupil-​centred; the teaching profession enjoys high status and pay and strong organizations compared to other countries. • Recruitment to the profession is very good, especially for teaching at the lower levels. The period from 1945 until about 1970 can be referred to as the ‘golden era of social democratic order’, during which time a number of special characteristics were attributed to the education model. First, reforms were introduced based on national policies initiated by a strong and innovative state in collaboration with the labour movement, business organizations and industry. The main objective was to employ education policy as a tool for the realization of broader social goals, such as equal opportunity and creating a strong community for all. School development was largely determined by state-​managed conditions, which were often referred to as input management. Generous public funding, regulations to secure equal opportunity and comprehensive schooling and detailed national curricula constituted strong political steering mechanisms. The Nordic countries were long considered by others, as well as themselves, as providing sustainable, high-​quality education. The comprehensive systems, pupil-​centred pedagogical ideal and substantial public investment in education were highly popular and served as models for other nations. The Nordic countries generally followed the same course, but at different tempos, Sweden being the main source of inspiration. However, the early success of the model was not regarded as fulfilling a defined ambition; on the contrary, new reforms were constantly introduced to improve schools as a tool for both individual and social progress. Eide (1990) presented his 215

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characterizations of the Nordic education model in the post-​war period in 1990. A decade later, the OECD presented the first results of the ‘Programme for International Student Assessment’ (PISA), followed by policy recommendations to individual nations. The PISA results shook the national self-​image of the Scandinavian countries and have since been described as the ‘Scandinavian PISA Shock’. Numerous policy initiatives and reforms have been introduced in the Nordic countries since the 1990s based on national ambitions and research-​based knowledge regarding school performance. The effect of these reforms has been a stronger focus on student outcome, accountability and varied approaches to enhanced competition to improve quality and student performance. The PISA Shock accelerated this reform agenda. The internationally comparative focus on school performance indicators changed the status of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from international role models to countries looking for advice on education policy (Pettersson et al. 2016).

The contemporary Nordic education model Within the current education landscape, Fladmoe (2012) underlines the prevailing connection between education and welfare state as one of the most crucial traits of the Nordic model. In this context, primary and lower secondary school is compulsory in terms of being mandatory, although it is regulated by law to a varying degree in the Scandinavian countries.Young people who have completed their primary and lower secondary education or the equivalent have a right to three years of upper secondary education and training (Olofsson and Wadensjö 2012). The vast majority of those who graduate from compulsory school proceed immediately to upper secondary education. While the compulsory school structure is similar in the Nordic countries, differences are all the greater when it comes to upper secondary school education. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, academic and vocational programmes are gathered in a single educational organization. In Denmark, preparatory academic studies and pre-​vocational training are separate forms of schooling. There are no tuition fees for any form of public education, and the participation rate in public schooling is very high. In all of the Nordic countries, over 90 per cent of a cohort will begin upper secondary education. Historically, the number of private providers has been limited, although the proportion of government-​subsidized private providers is growing.Very few students are home-​schooled.

Motives and mechanisms in comprehensive public education The bipartisan consensus concerning the obligation of the state to provide equal schooling for all children explains why schools primarily emerged as public institutions. Public compulsory and comprehensive schooling was established with two main objectives. First, it was established with an economic objective based on the assumption of a clear relation between the general level of education in society and national economic growth. The knowledge-​ based economy has strengthened this objective. Second was a social objective based on the idea that a comprehensive school system is key to eradicating a class-​based, segregated society (Richardson 2004; Telhaug and Mediås 2003). The social objective is based on a recruitment argument; a comprehensive system, as opposed to a parallel system, postpones the choice of education and career or profession, thereby giving all children the opportunity to develop in accordance with their abilities and goals as opposed to their material, social or cultural background. However, the social motive is also based on a community argument. The structure of the comprehensive school system, with its unstreamed classes, lays the foundations for a social community wherein the strong support the weak. The ambition is 216

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to create the foundation for a community characterized by solidarity, community spirit and cooperation rather than individual competition and a race-​to-​the-​top mentality. Especially in the founding years of the Nordic education model, social virtues, such as equal opportunity, equal results, cooperation and solidarity, were considered the main goals of compulsory schooling (Telhaug et al. 2006). Newer values and mechanisms, such as competition, choice, streaming, hierarchy and managerial accountability, have been introduced to the Nordic education model in response to global competition. Accordingly, it has been argued that central elements of the Nordic model, such as socially inclusive policies, comprehensiveness in education, democratic values and a focus on community, have been delimited by policy developments in the last decade in the Scandinavian countries (Blossing et al. 2014). The outcomes of the PISA and OECD recommendations have recently played an important role in the development of education policy. In Denmark, for example, in response to what was seen as poor results, the government invited the OECD to make a report/​analysis (OECD 2004).The OECD pointed out that Danish school culture lacks an orientation towards individual competencies and has a high tolerance for disruptive behaviour. In April 2006, the Danish government launched a strategy to gear Denmark for the future. An amendment to the Education Act the same year resulted in reform of the primary and lower secondary school system that, among other things, introduced national tests (Ottesen et al. 2013). In Norway, a prominent trend is the strengthening of the responsibilities for student learning at the local authority level. Central elements in this change include the introduction of a more results-​oriented education system, systems for assessment and evaluation in combination with a stronger accountability script (Aasen et al. 2012; Hatch 2013; Mausethagen 2013). The Norwegian education reform of 2006 reinforced deregulation and pushed policy-​making authority downwards in the education system, characterizing municipalities and counties as ‘school owners’ (Møller and Skedsmo 2013; Skedsmo and Møller 2016). Similar reform was introduced in Sweden ten years earlier. Today, the initial ideas regarding decentralization and governing exclusively by goals and monitoring results have been disrupted by policy initiatives to strengthen the control of the central state in the Scandinavian countries.This is performed by governing through the monitoring of results and outcomes, providing more supervision, provision of support systems and supplemental documents and guidelines for working with local curriculum, specifications of learning outcomes and assessment and a school inspection system (Aasen et al. 2012, 2015; Mølstad 2015; Prøitz 2015). Sweden has developed policies that have driven the growth in numbers and variation in types of education providers, including non-​profit organizations and private for-​profit companies working alongside municipality-​run schools. The central state has changed the focus of governing to a more evaluation-​based discourse of governance with a stronger focus on assessment, monitoring and inspection on both the individual and system levels. The curriculum and assessment are more integrated. Government development plans for education are introduced and international comparative tests are included in the national system of assessment and quality assurance (Lundahl 2005; Pettersson 2008). More recently introduced policies have been described as the reclamation of a more homogeneous, teacher-​proof school system where school content, in particular subject knowledge, has once again been more nationally uniform (Forsberg and Román 2014). Education policy in Denmark, Norway and Sweden has developed somewhat parallel to European trends, notably the increased attention placed on measurable outcomes and evidence. Compulsory comprehensive schooling is still regarded as an important value and trait of the Nordic education model (Blossing et al. 2014; Fladmoe 2012). However, recent developments 217

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point towards a more diversified school system with parallel tracks and increased competition within the public compulsory school system and between public and private providers.

Equity, enrolment and completion In the early years of the social democratic project, the universal principle of a comprehensive education system for all was considered fundamental to abolishing a class-​divided society and redistributing wealth (Aasen 2003). The idea of redistribution emphasized equity in education in terms of equality of opportunity and equality of results. While the former addresses the responsibility of the state to provide equal opportunity to participate, the latter is concerned with whether children from different social groups actually take advantage of this opportunity and are successful in so doing. Several types of data and information can be used to scrutinize the equity of an education system, where student completion and dropout rates are central indicators. These figures vary across the Nordic countries. Around 62 per cent of those born in 1982 in Iceland completed upper secondary education by age 24. In Norway, 68 per cent of those who started upper secondary education in 2003 had completed this programme five years later at age 20–​21 (Lamb et al. 2010). Another way of estimating the access, inclusion and equity of the education system is in terms of the proportion of young people in employment, education and training (NEET) (see Figure 17.1).

9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Denmark

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Figure 17.1  Proportion of NEETs among native-​born individuals (age 20–​24) in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (1995–​2006/​2007) Source: Bäckman et al. (2015).

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OECD average

Finland

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Iceland Reading

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Science

Figure 17.2  Mean performance PISA 2012 Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden Source: Data from OECD (2014: 5).

Figure  17.1 shows how the proportion of NEETs has developed in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the period under review (Bäckman et al. 2015). Finland has a stable decline and the lowest level of NEETs in 2007. Denmark has a stable rate at 6 per cent, while Norway and Sweden have a U-​shaped trend increasing towards the end of the period. Sweden has the highest NEET rate at the beginning and end of the period studied. Another indicator of equity is student performance data. Scrutinizing the results from PISA 2012, there are some variations between the Nordic countries (OECD 2014). Most noticeable are the Finnish results, with mean performance among the top performing countries (see Figure 17.2). The Finnish students are performing particularly well in science. However, the Finnish results show a clear fall in the results from previous years. In PISA 2012, the Norwegian and Danish students are performing in line with the OECD average, while the Icelandic and Swedish students have lower scores. In particular, the Swedish results show a clear fall in mathematics, reading and science. Even more interesting for questions concerning the equity of education systems are the trends in the PISA results. Kjærnsli and Olsen (2012) have studied the variation in student performance in the Nordic countries in PISA over time as a measure of how ‘equalizing’ the educational systems are. The study shows that Norway has had a stable development in reading and science, while the dispersal has gone considerably down in Denmark. In Sweden, the dispersion is high and far greater than what is considered preferable in the Nordic countries (Kjærnsli and Olsen 2012). Finnish students are generally still outperforming the students in the other Nordic countries, but the Finnish results in all three fields display a clear drop in the results from previous years.

Public and private provision Government-​dependent private providers of basic education have recently been encouraged in Scandinavia in order to promote competition and, thus, the quality of education. By comparing the numbers of students enrolled in all types of primary and secondary institutions with the number of students enrolled in public institutions and the number of students enrolled in public-​dependent private institutions1 in 2003 and 2012, an image of the development over the last ten years can be presented. Privately financed schools do not play any substantial role in 219

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97

95 91

88 86

96 95

91

95

87

60 40 20

12 14

0 Denmark Public 2003

5 9 Finland Public 2012

3

9

Iceland Gov dependent private 2003

4 5 Norway

5

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Sweden

Gov dependent private 2012

Figure 17.3  Percentage of students enrolled in primary and secondary public and government dependent private institutions in 2003 and 2012 Source: OECD Stats 2015.

education in the Nordic countries. The majority of all private institutions in the Nordic countries depend on government financing. Figure 17.3 illustrates a shift in student enrolment over the ten-​year period. Overall, there were more students enrolled in government-​subsidized private schools in 2012 than in 2003 in the Scandinavian countries. More were enrolled in Finland, Iceland and Sweden than in Denmark and Norway, where numbers were more stable. In Scandinavia, Denmark in particular, there is a long tradition of supporting private schools with alternative pedagogical and/​or religious and philosophical views compared to public schools. The argument for subsidizing these schools is to keep private schools available to all students independent of socio-​economic background and upbringing in line with the Nordic ideals regarding equality and inclusion. While Sweden and Denmark have similar numbers of students in private schools in 2012, the 2003 numbers indicate very different developments in the two countries. The growth of government-​dependent private ‘free schools’ or charter schools in Sweden seems to be part of a larger shift in education over the last two decades to enhance performance outcome through competition. In Denmark, the support and enrolment of students in private institutions is part of a more general and historical feature of the Danish school system. In Finland, Iceland and Norway, more than 90 per cent of the students in primary and secondary schools attend public institutions. In Sweden and Denmark, only 13–​14 per cent are enrolled in government-​dependent private primary and secondary schools. This observation is in stark contrast to countries with longer traditions of private schooling, such as the UK, where OECD statistics indicate that 36 per cent of students in primary and secondary education are enrolled in private institutions. This observation shows how publicly funded and provided schooling can still be regarded as one of the main traits of the Nordic model, although there are obvious differences between the Nordic countries.

Governing by national curriculum Another long-​standing tradition and common feature of the Nordic education model is the role of centrally defined national curricula (Carlgren and Klette 2008; Hopmann 2015; Telhaug et al. 2006). This differs from the Anglo-​Saxon traditions as found in the United States, where curriculum is rooted in the local government and autonomy of schooling (Lundgren 2015). 220

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In the Nordic countries, national curricula are legal documents and have two functions: first, as a platform and tool for the national governing of education and schooling and, second, as a common platform and tool for the pedagogical work of teaching and learning in schools (Aasen et al. 2015). As such, the government-​based national curriculum aims to govern and influence what is taught in classrooms in the country, providing a common point of departure for cultural, historical and societally embedded teaching and learning of the same knowledge, experiences and values to all students. How this is manifest in the different Nordic countries varies between the countries and over time in the individual country (Carlgren et al. 2006). Recent developments in curriculum governing in Nordic countries seem to be more strongly connected to the formal rule system, making curricula a part of the prescriptive legal framework.This widens the functionality of curricula from being a document for facilitating the preparation of teaching to being more clearly connected to political and legal issues (Aasen et al. 2015; Mølstad and Hansen 2013).

Teacher education Throughout the Nordic region, teaching in compulsory and upper secondary school is a government-​regulated profession (Carlgren et al. 2006). Nevertheless, teacher education varies considerably in the organization of the studies in terms of length, specialization and location. Structurally, they differ in subjects, academic orientation and regulation (Rasmussen and Dorf 2010). While there are differences, there are also similarities. There are national curricula for teachers’ education certifying for the teaching profession. Most of the institutions providing higher education for teachers are public institutions. There is a general trend towards research-​based programmes in education (i.e. to become a teacher) aimed at educating research-​ informed practitioners who are able to reflect critically on various trends and developments in education. This includes a strong focus on evidence and knowledge about efficacy. Another prevailing trend is the preparation for a teacher role within an education landscape with clearer responsibilities and an accountability rationale (Helgøy and Homme 2006, 2007; Rasmussen and Dorf 2010). Compared to the other Nordic countries, teacher education in Finland is exceptional on a number of different points. In Finland, educational science has a stronger position in both scope and relevance in the teacher education programmes, the proportion of practice-​based education is smaller, but the quality is regarded to be higher due to educated mentors and specialized practice schools. Whereas teacher training in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, especially to be a primary school teacher, has traditionally been organized in separate teacher-​ training colleges, in Finland there have been research-​based education programmes in the universities for years (Rasmussen and Dorf 2010). The development of Finnish teacher education stands out in terms of being more research-​based and academically oriented than in the other Nordics, where the development of teacher education is largely steered by policy actors and policy processes (Afdal 2012, 2013). Despite these differences, however, a state-​regulated teacher education programme in all of the Nordic countries is viewed as an important element in the formation and operationalization of the comprehensive education system that constitutes the Nordic education model.

Features and assessment of the re-​making process Structurally speaking, the idea of a comprehensive education system for all requires that it is regarded as the best alternative for all. This requires being able to meet the varying needs of all 221

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students in a satisfactory manner. At present, there would still appear to be broad popular support for the fundamental principles and policies underpinning the Nordic education model. To a varied extent, however, recent developments in the Scandinavian education policy appear to dispute the principle of universalism, public regulation and the equality-​of-​ results logic embedded in the social democratic welfare state and the Nordic education model. Deregulation and marketization, differentiation, outcome competition and privatization are challenging the public comprehensive education system. The definition of the common good as defined by the national curriculum and rooted in the Nordic education model is challenged by socio-​demographic changes resulting from cultural globalization and higher levels of immigration, creating heterogeneous ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural circumstances. In the Scandinavian countries, individual performance testing in general and international comparative tests in particular continuously challenge the notion of a sustainable system for all provided by the public. International comparative tests are driving education reform. In Sweden, the quest for change has introduced deregulation, free school choice and a school market model open to private for-​profit providers to enhance quality through competition. The result of privatization is disputed. Some studies confirm that competition promotes quality (Böhlmark and Lindal 2012). Others point out the failures of the school market model (Kornhall 2013;Wiborg 2010). Deregulation and school choice were introduced in Sweden in the early 1990s. In 2006, PISA results paved the way for a new wave of reforms, adding expanded testing to the earlier reforms and introducing the school market model. In PISA 2012, Sweden was the country whose performance had declined the most in all subject areas (Skolverket 2013). Today, we can observe how declining PISA results in Sweden are blamed for the increased number of private independent schools and how PISA may provide arguments for those opposing privatization and competition. The nature of the standardized individual tests may be seen as a challenge to the central values of the Nordic model due to its emphasis on individuality at the expense of the values of community and solidarity (Blossing et al. 2014). Comparing results may challenge the traditional Nordic values of equity and inclusion regardless of performance, as comparison enables open identification and separation between good and bad performers at the individual level and rankings at the institutional level. It also opens up for streaming, differentiation and even segregation between individuals from an early age, elements that are foreign to the principle of universalism and the traditions of the Nordic education model. In a world with a strong accountability script, one-​dimensional approaches to evaluation and assessment may lead to narrow-​sighted perspectives about what is to be appreciated as valuable learning. They may also overshadow aspects of education that are not as easily measured in terms of comparative and quantitative data, including several traits of the Nordic education model. On the other hand, recent developments in the field of assessment advocate a strong, multi-​dimensional focus on holistic and formative approaches (Prøitz 2015). They focus on self-​evaluation and feedback and embrace the value of all types of evaluation and assessment together with the importance of avoiding the distortion created by tools due to their role in accountability as well as the monitoring of broader learning outcomes, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data.These approaches can support and enhance the structures and values that are characteristic of the Nordic model. Through the identification and initiation of the support of weaker students in public comprehensive education at an early stage, the values of inclusion and participation may be cherished. A broader assessment regime may also contribute by providing information that can help teachers, parents and schools to reduce drop-​out rates. Such a regime might also support the ideal of a comprehensive education system by bringing 222

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in valuable information for the further development of a system based on the ambitious idea of being able to meet the needs of all of its students in a more heterogeneous society. Since the early 1990s, the Nordic model of education has been influenced by a new political order that can be characterized as dialectic in as much as it unites the faith in a relatively strong state with a neo-​liberal philosophy characterized by a market-​based, choice-​driven consumerist policy (Aasen 2003). The vision of a good state that ensures social and individual justice goes hand in hand with renewed confidence in local autonomy, market-​based solutions and individual choice. A new alliance between neo-​liberal and neo-​conservative positions, more clearly than hitherto, promotes the philosophy of the sovereignty of the individual with responsibility for his or her own destiny (Eriksen et al. 2003). With the state being described as overgrown and ineffective, its support to individuals in society is formulated more in terms of individual rights and less as collective obligations. Under right-​wing and left-​wing-​oriented governments alike, the social motive of education has attracted less attention in recent education policies in Scandinavia. Moreover, education policy rhetoric has expressed unprecedented worry and displeasure with the lack of proficiency in major school subjects. There have been demands for greater effectiveness concerning the obligations of schools in imparting knowledge and raising standards. More weight is placed on the accountability of schools for the achievements of individual pupils. The national authorities contribute to framework conditions, support and guidance. At the same time, they mobilize greater local creativity and commitment by allowing increased freedom for schools. Efficiency is upheld through clear national objectives for education, a national framework curriculum with defined levels of measurable basic competence required within each subject, and through national tests and supervision. The key concepts in contemporary school ideology in Scandinavia, like elsewhere in the Western world, are quality and standards, competencies and skills, diversity and variation, decentralization and deregulation, flexibility and individuality, local and personal autonomy, freedom of choice, competition, user or customer control and national supervision (Aasen 2003, 2007; Adamson et al. 2016; Blossing et al. 2014). The international comparative measurements and the recognition of the ‘academic crisis’ from the year 2000 onwards have accelerated the ideological turn in Scandinavian education policy. The rationale of educational attainment has changed the emphasis from concentrating on common culture and social inclusion to a focus on individual academic standards; education is increasingly regarded as a private rather than a public good. Accordingly, schooling is expected to provide children opportunities to develop the individual abilities and interests they possess ‘naturally’ and use them for their own benefit. This is assumed to be beneficial to the ability of the nation to compete on the global market.The social motive of schooling, as outlined in the Social Democratic Order, has acquired lower priority, giving way to notions of individual freedom of choice and differentiated, adapted and customized education. This ideological turn in education policy is undoubtedly influenced by international political trends and supranational trendsetting political agencies. However, the ideological change must also be understood in light of internal alterations. The Scandinavian countries are situated in a new, complex and contradictory cultural situation. The legacy of the social democratic educational model is based on a vision of a homogeneous society and a rather simplistic definition of the common good. Within the framework of a global economy, cultural emancipation, secularization, growing relativism and multicultural pluralism, this is becoming increasingly complex. The consequence of the free flow of information and immigration is that the special distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ collapses. The rapid advance of technological innovation continually redefines the nature of social relations and alters the conventions of material 223

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production in a manner that renders many aspects of everyday life ephemeral –​if not completely unpredictable. The aspiration is no longer to reconcile but to understand the divisions existing between ethnic cultures, social classes, linguistic communities and gender-​based identities. Accordingly, the distinctions found within and between such groupings are not only to be tolerated but in fact cherished. Put differently, after the Second World War, social democracy asserted human equity, reasoning that everyone is equal. Since the 1990s, cultural liberalism and pluralism emerged, claiming human equity in terms of everyone being different.This represents an ideological turn in policy. Heterogeneity challenges the self-​evident notion of common goals and the common good in the Scandinavian countries. This is a challenge for education policy and for schools. In a multicultural pluralist society, common goals and the common good are not self-​evident. A  great challenge for the renewal of social democratic policy is to redefine and reconstruct the common ground for political initiatives in general and to redefine and defend comprehensive education as a public common good in particular. The ideology of community and solidarity is currently being contested by an emerging anti-​emigrant sentiment in the Scandinavian countries. If adapted and differentiated, approaches directed towards vulnerable individuals and minority groups will increasingly replace the universalistic principle of the social democratic welfare state and the inclusive comprehensive model of education; we can fear the emergence of a parallel education system that will tend to stigmatize and marginalize individuals and social groups. In the long run, this can potentially undermine the support for the virtues of social solidarity and egalitarianism and the high level of social trust in Scandinavia.

Conclusions To meet new challenges and as influenced by international trends, the Nordic education model has continually been renewed since being designed and implemented in Scandinavia after the Second World War. Anchored in a pragmatic vision of social development education, reforms have been introduced regularly. Compared with other Western nations, however, Scandinavia has largely continued the policies of a public, unified educational system founded on social inclusion and solidarity. In contrast to the development in many other nations, the recent education reforms in Scandinavia can be viewed as a defence and renewal of social democratic progressive education to meet the new challenges of late modernity.This defence takes place within a contradictory, dialectical framework containing fundamental elements from traditional social democratic policy as well as powerful conservative and neoliberal elements. Based on an international comparative perspective, the education policy in Scandinavia has thus far maintained a social democratic meta-​perspective. The recognition of a good state and the level of social trust remain high and stable as being the best basis for new political initiatives. Scandinavian countries recognize that the market is here to stay and constitutes an invaluable tool for producing growth and wealth. The market is a good servant, but it can also be a terrible master. The renewal of the Nordic education model is therefore based on a social structure that takes into account the premise that the market does not have the capacity to serve the common good if left unregulated. To promote communal identity and social solidarity, the market must be tamed and state-​regulated. Viewed from an inside perspective, the more traditional social democratic education policy has clearly been contested since the early 1990s. Hence, in the endorsement of equity, less importance is attached to the equality of results in education policy rhetoric. Equity is usually understood as equivalence of status. The frequent use of the term ‘equivalent’ education rather than ‘equal’ education illustrates this ideological shift in education policy; from a sociological 224

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perspective with strong emphasis on equal life chances for all citizens and equality of results between social groups to the appraisal of greater individual autonomy and diversity. This form of equity will emerge from individual merits in education and does not imply communality and that the content of education programmes be identical for all students at the same level. All students are stressed as being of equal worth, but none of them are alike.The equality argument in the actual recruitment and choice of educational pursuits between members of social and cultural groups is no longer as prominent as previously. Accordingly, recent reform initiatives have attached considerable importance to education, meeting the training and development requirements of the individual through diversity and differentiated, adaptive and customized education. Despite economic turmoil and globalization and regardless of recent reforms, there is evidence demonstrating that the fundamental principles and policies of the social democratic welfare state are sustained in all of the Nordic countries. Within the broad spectra of political parties, the basic principles of the social democratic welfare state remain supported. The persistent belief in public investment in human capital and free primary, secondary and higher education as a universal right continue to be a cornerstone in the social structure of the Nordic countries, even though there are considerable variations in the choice of organization and steering mechanisms between the countries. What seems to be an overall and common feature in the re-​making of the Nordic education model is the prevailing role and position of education within the effort to renew a sustainable social democratic welfare state.

Note 1 ‘The classification between public and private institution is made according to whether a public agency or a private entity has the ultimate control over the institution. For private institutions, the distinction between government-​dependent and independent refers only to the degree of a private institution’s dependence on funding from government sources: a government-​dependent private institution receives 50% or more of its core funding from government agencies or one whose teaching personnel are paid by government agency. An independent private institution is one that receives less than 50% of its core funding from government agencies and whose teaching personnel are not paid by a government agency’. (http://​stats.oecd.org/​viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=RENRL&lang= en#retrieved 19.11.15)

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T. S. Prøitz and P. Aasen Skedsmo, G. and Møller, J. (2016) Governing by New Performance Expectations in Norwegian Schools. In: Gunter, H., Hall, D., Serpiere, R. and Grimaldi, E. (eds), New Public Management and the Reform of Education: European Lessons for Policy and Practice. London: Routledge. Skolverket (2013) PISA 2012, 15-​åringars kunskaper i matematik, läsförståelse och naturvetenskap. Stockholm: Skolverket. Telhaug, A. O. and Mediås, O. A. (2003) Grunnskolen som nasjonsbygger: fra statspietisme til nyliberalisme. Oslo: Abstrakt. Telhaug, A. O., Mediås, A. O. and Aasen, P. (2006) The Nordic Model in Education: Education as Part of the Political System in the Last 50 Years. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 50(3): 245–​283. Tjeldvoll, A. (1998) Education and the Scandinavian Welfare State in the Year 2000: Equality, Policy, and Reform. London: Routledge. Tuijnman, A. C. (2003) A ‘Nordic Model’ of Adult Education: What Might Be Its Defining Parameters? International Journal of Educational Research 39(3): 283–​291. Wermke, W., Pettersson, D. and Forsberg, E. (2015) Approaching the Space Issue in Nordic Curriculum Theory:  National Reflections of Globalisation in Social Studies/​Citizenship Textbook Pictures in Sweden, England and Germany. Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy 1(1): 57–​69. Wiborg, S. (2010) Swedish Free Schools: Do They Work? LLAKES Research Paper 18, Centre for Learning and Life Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies. Available at: www.llakes.org/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​2010/​09/​Wiborg-​online.pdf [Accessed 17 August 2016]. Ydesen, C., Ludvigsen, K. and Lundahl, C. (2013) Creating an Educational Testing Profession in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 1910–​1960. European Educational Research Journal 12(1): 120–​138.

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18 IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Grete Brochmann

Introduction Immigration to the Nordic countries is hardly a new phenomenon. Immigrants –​both those travelling great distances but first and foremost migrants from closer surroundings –​have entered the region (and moved within the region) for centuries. Nevertheless, what we today associate with the term ‘immigrants’ –​those coming from countries outside of the OECD –​is basically a post-​1960 phenomenon. These so-​called ‘new immigrants’ have started coming at different points in time to the Nordic area and they have varied greatly in numbers. Treating the five Nordic countries together in relation to immigration since the 1960s is a somewhat untidy project, as there are cross-​cutting similarities and differences between the five states, both in terms of institutional and political context and as to the kind of immigrants who are actually coming, concomitantly and over time. Comparative immigration research usually focuses on the three larger immigration countries in the region:  Sweden, Denmark and Norway. These three national cases receive the most of the attention in this chapter, but Finland and Iceland will also be described and analysed in relation to the others, primarily in terms of their deviation from their Nordic neighbours. The basic reason for giving analytical and substantial priority to the ‘Big Three’ is the fact that they clearly have much more experience as ‘immigration countries’. Moreover, the magnitude of the inflow has been altogether more substantial (although with internal variations), and the three states also shared a basic approach to the phenomenon for quite some time. At the time of writing, Europe –​and not least the Nordic region –​is exposed to the largest influx of immigrants ever from war-​torn Syria and a number of other sources. The situation is remarkable, even dramatic, having the potential to change many of the policy features described in this chapter. The most notable changes took place in Sweden during the late autumn of 2015: Border control was introduced together with a number of new restrictive measures in attempt at curbing the extraordinary inflow. This was a full-​scale paradigmatic shift, bringing Sweden in line with the more restrictive EU member states in the wake of the refugee crisis.

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Contextual similarities and differences: the welfare state and integration ideologies1 When the ‘new immigrants’ started coming –​first in Sweden,2 somewhat later in Denmark and Norway –​all three countries had recently established comprehensive public welfare systems. These welfare states, which strongly impacted how each country could handle immigration, resembled each other to the extent that they often figured as a single unit: the Nordic model. In terms of population, they were all small and culturally relatively homogeneous societies in the northern periphery of Europe, which after the war were (internally to a slightly different degree) strongly influenced by social democratic parties. And they regularly topped international rankings on generalized trust.3 The new immigration basically followed the same pattern from the late 1960s and until the last decade, at which time the differences became more pronounced. The first groups were labour migrants from countries such as Turkey,Yugoslavia, Morocco and Pakistan, undertaking manual work in industry and the service sector. This labour immigration lasted only until the early-​to-​mid-​1970s, at which time new, strict regulations were introduced: the moratorium on immigration,4 which lasted until labour migration again became an issue at the end of the century, particularly after 2004, when the EU enlarged to include a number of Central European countries. The moratorium on recruitment in the 1970s represented a milestone in the immigration policy in all three countries, introducing policy mechanisms with wide-​reaching consequences for the direction, size and composition of immigration in the decades to follow.Their goal was to curtail unwanted, unskilled immigration while allowing the admission of skilled workers in demand, especially important in Norway, which had become a brand new oil-​producing nation and an expanding economy in the early 1970s.5 One legacy of the moratorium on recruitment is a series of unforeseen consequences. As was the case in most receiving European countries, immigration did not stop –​it only changed character. There has never been more immigration to the Scandinavian countries than after the moratorium. When the legal channel was closed for low-​skilled labour, foreigners arrived via other entry channels, as refugees/​asylum seekers or as the family members of already-​settled migrants.6 The number of immigrants from non-​OECD countries increased significantly due to international conventions and the general humanitarian platform of the Scandinavian social democracies. The categories of immigrants have thus fluctuated in similar ways over time, and the political tools applied were quite similar. The majority of those entering the region from the south have generally had a lower employment rate than the majority population, making them a natural target for active labour market policies. Ideologically, the three countries were strongly influenced by the new radical human rights thinking of the 1960s and 1970s as to the premises for immigrant inclusion, which has been labelled integration or multiculturalism.This approach, which was applied with varying emphases among the Big Three, assumed a dual character; the state stood for both active governance in order to hinder the social and economic marginalization of the newcomers, and for actively promoting cultural diversity. Yet there have also been significant differences between the three countries, accentuated over time, with important consequences for the realm of immigration. Sweden was long the leading immigrant state in the region in terms of seniority, scope and policy-​making. As an early mover regarding the active recruitment of foreign labour and in terms of human rights, Swedish authorities became first-​movers in terms of formulating integration ideology and policy, which impacted the other two states strongly. This was particularly so in the early phase, and particularly in relation to Norway. This became less significant after the 1980s, as both Denmark and Norway chose different paths in a number of policy fields. 230

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Pertaining to public discourse, there are also marked differences between the three that are reinforced over time. The tenor of the debate has turned much tougher in Denmark over the last decade or two, with the stronger representation of immigration-​critical voices. Danish policy has also turned more restrictive since the turn of the century, both in terms of immigration-​ regulation and social policy. Norway has followed the developments in Denmark to a certain extent, whereas Sweden has maintained much of its more liberal, immigration-​friendly approach up until today. The role of the populist parties on the right is relevant in this context. Denmark has had a vociferous immigration opposition since the 1970s in the form of the Progress Party, Fremskridspartiet (which begat the Danish Peoples’ Party, Dansk Folkeparti). The Norwegian equivalent, Progress Party –​FrP –​ first gained momentum in the 1987 general elections after it started capitalizing on the immigration issue. Sweden has followed a different course, with strong norms dictating how immigration should be discussed publicly, and it was first with the 2014 parliamentary election that the populist right gained substantial representation in the parliament, Riksdagen. Finally, as to the external political conditions, the three states have chosen different forms of affiliation to the European Union (EU). Sweden has had complete membership since 1995 (except the Monetary Union –​EMU); Denmark has been a member state since 1973 but has opted out of the common immigration policy (Justice, Freedom and Security) as well as the EMU and defence policy; whereas Norway has remained outside of the EU proper but has joined both the Schengen and Dublin Agreements, accepting their wide-​ranging consequences for immigration policy. The EEA7 (European Economic Area) affiliation has also made Norway part of the Internal Market, resulting in substantial labour immigration from the EU region. What characterizes Denmark, Sweden and Norway today in relation to immigration is that they are three countries with similar economies, a number of common cultural traits, comparable welfare and labour market models, high societal trust, yet at the same time increasingly different approaches to immigration and integration, particularly as to ideology and how policies are legitimized. Finland and Iceland have not been included in this historical exposé, as these countries generally do not fit into the overall pattern sketched above. Finland was a net emigration country much longer than its neighbours (until the 1980s) and has received far fewer labour migrants and refugees.8 Many of the immigrants have come via marriage to a Finnish reference person as opposed to a consequence of active immigration or refugee policy. Even though the number of immigrants has multiplied since the 1980s, their share of the total population remains (2014) only 5.2 per cent (Djuve 2014). Many immigrants are Finnish return migrants –​a substantial number from Russia and Sweden. Russia, Estonia and Sweden currently constitute the biggest source countries for Finland. Even though most immigrants still come as family migrants, the immigration flow has become more diversified, now also including refugees (particularly from Somalia)9 and students. Whereas immigrants from Estonia have a higher employment rate than the majority population, refugee groups from Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq experience serious problems in the labour market. While Finland was late to join as an immigration country, the policy approach in relation to integration has largely followed the same path as the Big Three: active labour market policy combined with equal treatment in terms of welfare entitlement. Even though Finland was a latecomer even as concerns the establishment of a fully-​fledged welfare state, its features now resemble those of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Finland, being a full member of the EU (including the EMU), has also felt the impact of the free labour market since 2004, yet not to the same extent as its Scandinavian neighbours. Politically, the strong agrarian foundation of the economy has implied more coalition building than in the rest of the 231

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region.The influence of social democracy has therefore been more in the form of compromises with particularly agrarian forces (Kangas and Saloniemi 2014). Since 2011, when it received 20 per cent of the votes in the parliamentary election, the EU-​and immigrant-​critical ‘True Finns’ party has had a substantial impact on Finnish politics. As in Denmark, Finland got its immigration-​critical party even before immigration had turned into a major societal feature. The refugee crisis in 2015 has placed Finland on the map as a refugee-​receiving country, particularly among persons from Iraq. Iceland, being a small island (one of the smallest national populations in Europe), deviates from the Big Three in different ways. Its immigration population is closer to that of Denmark (8.1 per cent in 2014). Since Iceland was a net emigration country until 1995, the increased immigration rate has thus been remarkable. Being part of the EEA agreement since 1994, the country has received a substantial number of EU migrants, particularly since 2004. Labour migrants from third countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, have also come to Iceland, particularly before 2004, when new regulations made third-​country immigration more restrictive. Relatively few refugees have found their way to Iceland.10 Consequently, immigration has almost exclusively been via labour channels, and the employment gap between the majority and immigrant population has been relatively small (Grødem 2014). As to the welfare system, Iceland cannot readily be included in the Nordic Model proper. As with Finland, Iceland was late to establish central welfare institutions, and the Icelandic public sector remains much smaller than those of its Nordic neighbors; relatively less money is spent on families, disabled and the elderly. The welfare state, service-​intensive as it is, is to a larger extent designed for working people (Brochmann and Hagelund 2005). Social democracy has also been less influential in politics than in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and immigration has not been a very contentious issue thus far. Having previously had a policy of receiving 50 quota refugees per year, Iceland is now facing pressure from groups in the population to accept higher numbers of Syrian refugees. 232

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Structural preconditions for policy-​making: the supremacy of the welfare model If we now consider the major immigration countries in Scandinavia –​Sweden, Denmark and Norway –​which factors are the major drivers for policy-​making in the realm of immigration? I find it fruitful to combine three analytical features in order to approach this question: institutions, norms and actors. Of all of the institutional elements relevant for understanding immigration policy-​making in Scandinavia, the welfare model (including labour relations) deserves the label ‘master institution’. The model largely explains both the basic formation of the original approach of the 1970s and the continuous maintenance and adjustments in the decades to follow. Gösta Esping-​Andersen and Walter Korpi have characterized the Nordic Model as comprehensive as to the kinds of social needs it tries to satisfy; as institutionalized via the social rights that give all citizens the right to a decent standard of living; and as solidaristic and universal in the sense that the welfare policy serves the entire population, not just particularly exposed groups (Esping-​Andersen and Korpi 1987).11 This welfare model is structurally linked to the highly centralized organization of working life. Combined with welfare security, the regulation of the labour market via collective agreements, tripartite cooperation and an active labour market policy have contributed to productive economies with good flexibility and high human capital.12 Work life and welfare have represented mutual buffer functions, with a high employment rate as an economic buttress: Employment both finances welfare and reduces public spending. State control and planning constitute major ingredients in the system, which is basically tax-​based (Kangas and Palme 2005). Equal treatment is a key element, and the only criterion for accessing basic income security is legal residency. This master institution was in place in all three countries at roughly the same time in history as the countries started being exposed to the ‘new immigrants’. However, immigration was not taken into consideration when the institution was premeditated. Immigration was not yet a politicized issue, and the governments were unable to foresee the extent to which immigration was going to escalate in the years to come. The Nordic Model turned out to be generous yet bounded: it presupposed territorial delimitation, the benefits being intended for its resident members; that is, its citizens. The character of ‘bounded universalism’ (Benhabib 2002) basically had two implications for policy-​making related to immigration, materialized in the moratorium of the early 1970s: First, controlling the inflow was seen as a prerequisite for the sustenance of the system, as such. As the scope of social rights was extensive and therefore also expensive, inflow control was a chief concern. Ideally, only labour for which there was demand was to be allowed into the country. Second, the Nordic model, with its finely balanced welfare/​labour nexus, necessitated the equal treatment of newcomers. This element was in particular argued by the labour unions, which were afraid of low wage competition and the undermining of the hard-​won labour standards. Good welfare states could not accept substantial numbers of residents not being productively absorbed into the labour market, disturbing the regulated world of work and burdening social budgets. This reflects a Marshallian13 recognition that a society cannot function properly if a large segment of its population is marginalized and socially excluded. Integration policy –​beyond labour market inclusion –​added to this logic: To have newcomers become full members of their new home countries, active effort had to be made by the states in order to facilitate well-​ functioning citizenship for new residents. This dualism –​the restrictive access policy combined with the inclusive and equality oriented approach to the labour market and welfare –​was to mark the three countries for decades 233

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to come. It was only disturbed by the EU free labour market, which meant free access for all EU citizens to seek employment, particularly after the membership extension in 2004. Thus, in terms of institutional prerequisites, the EU externalities (intentionally induced by all three states) drastically changed the preconditions for governance in the area of immigration afterwards.The free mobility regime of the EU is also what brought Finland and Iceland more truly into the club of European ‘immigration countries’.

Normative underpinnings: human rights and integration ideology If governance was straightforward according to national economic interests in the realm of immigration, very few migrants would have entered Scandinavia between the moratorium on immigration of the 1970s and the liberalization of labour immigration policies in the early 2000s. The reason why Sweden, Denmark and Norway received more immigrants after the 1970s than ever before in history, belongs in the normative sphere. Sweden was the Scandinavian pioneer in the normative and ideological realm in relation to immigration governance. Having received immigrants soon after the Second World War, Sweden was in the lead in terms of experience with cultural diversity and labour market inclusion. The country also managed to position itself as a ‘humanitarian superpower’ in the post-​ war era.14 As early as the 1960s, the first documents materialized in Sweden as concerns new approaches to immigration and ‘integration’. The main principle was to be a responsible access policy (i.e. the number allowed in should be balanced against the capacity to include them), as well as equal treatment within the context of the welfare state. In 1974, the iconic catchphrase for this integration policy was introduced: jämlikhet, valfrihet och samverkan (equality, freedom of choice and cooperation). This was indicative of a dual approach; the newcomers should be able to achieve the same socio-​economic standard as natives, at the same time being free to choose their cultural affiliation. Language instruction in Swedish was to be offered, yet nobody should be pressured into Swedishness in a cultural sense. Minorities were even to receive state funding to maintain their connection to their original culture (Borevi 2010). Equality and cooperation were well known concepts from the general Swedish policy repertoire, but freedom of choice appeared as an anomaly in the heavily conformity-​oriented Sweden. Assimilation –​homogenization and streamlining culturally and economically had been seen as a necessary and natural part of the nation-​building and modernization processes that characterized Sweden (as well as Denmark and Norway) in the post-​war era. Gunnar and Alva Myrdal had given social engineering a central place in Swedish welfare generation, and a significant part of this endeavour addressed people’s values and attitudes (Hirdman 2000; Sejersted 2011). When the new immigrants arrived and cultural streamlining was explicitly exempted from their introduction to life in Sweden, however, it had ambiguous effects for inclusion and cooperation. It is interesting to note that Sweden, the country where social engineering had been elaborated furthest in Scandinavia, also became the pioneer in multicultural liberality. Sweden actually made this diversity approach part of its continuous nation-​building process after the 1970s: Traditional Swedish values were toned down in favour of values related to human rights and democracy. This early multicultural thinking held sway in Norway for a long time, whereas it was modified from an early stage in Denmark. Norway followed Swedish immigration policy-​ making closely; catchwords were copied and many public documents were strongly influenced, ideologically and practically. Even reforms and adjustments were often copied. In contrast, Denmark adhered ideologically to a more national approach from the very outset. Danish language and culture should have a privileged position in the integration process, and the Danes 234

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were early to make demands of newcomers. In Denmark, the equality approach meant an ‘absence of special treatment’, yet even Denmark introduced many of the Swedish novelties, such as voting rights in local elections, mother tongue education and financial support for cultural organizations.15 As to Finland and Iceland, it is interesting to see whether their latecomer status as immigration countries has made the ideological underpinning any different. Finland, with its ‘integration law’ of 1999, seems to have adopted the Swedish multicultural ideology 25 years after the initiation, without apparently incorporating criticism and the adjustments made along the road in (to a varying degree) the three fellow Nordic countries. According to the Finnish documents (both in 1999 and in the revised Integration Law in 2010), integration should be a mutual undertaking. Both the majority and minorities should adjust their lifestyles. Besides, newcomers in Finland have the same rights and duties as the rest of the population, yet they are entitled to support in order to maintain their original language and culture (Djuve 2014). On the other hand, Pasi Saukkonen (2013) emphasizes that, in practice, the spirit of mutuality is not reflected in the integration measures, which are claimed to be of a more assimilatory nature.16 Iceland did not have any particular policy towards immigrants prior to 2007, and it still lacks an integration policy similar to its Nordic neighbours.The ideological turmoil afflicting the Big Three after the 1990s does not seem to have reached Iceland. Newcomers are (generally) well integrated into the labour market, and immigration is not a politicized topic. Language instruction in Icelandic is made available together with courses about Icelandic society and culture (Grødem 2014).

Conflicting aims: recognition and redistribution The interplay between norms and institutions largely explains the original approach to the new immigration in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The new post-​war human rights regime combined with the early years of the welfare state moulded a new political opportunity structure into which immigration was to be fitted.Various kinds of actors entered the field –​within the authorities, among the political parties and among external activists and researchers, many of whom were influenced by the radical Zeitgeist relating to cultural pluralism and tolerance. In Sweden, the positive pioneer role partly resulted from the fact that the largest groups of the immigrants were the Finns –​who offered attractive labour for the industry and thus served the economy well. This group succeeded in claims-​making socially and culturally, hereby paving the way for the following, and culturally less familiar, immigrant groups (Borevi 2010). The pluralist or multicultural ideology had a strong impact, probably because it reconciled the ruling ideology with systemic necessities. At the same time, the Scandinavian approach revealed a tacit unease between different measures of justice and welfare. American philosopher Nancy Fraser (1995) has formulated this in terms of the tension between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. The ambitious social policies of the three Scandinavian countries have traditionally aimed at using the tax system, services as well as various kinds of social engineering in order to level out class differences in society. This redistribution was supposed to be achieved in a colour-​blind manner: equal treatment regardless of cultural or social background. The recognition policy, however, appreciates that injustice has a cultural and symbolic dimension. The values and identities of some groups render them invisible and subjugated when they are not specifically recognized beyond equal treatment. The integration policies of Scandinavia were ideally to do both:  On the one hand, to secure newcomers access to equal rights and opportunitiees for social mobility, and on the other hand create room for the conservation and cultivation of their original cultural or religious luggage. These two agendas have increasingly 235

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(although to varying degrees) been conflicting in the three countries since the initiation of the integration policy. Cultural and religious affiliations have more frequently been seen as obstacles to equal rights in practice; that is, equality in terms of social and livelihood performance as well as social mobility over time. Women’s rights are most commonly addressed as an issue within this schism.

Immigration policy in practice: recent developments in Sweden, Denmark and Norway The immigration policy introduced during the 1970s presupposed that immigration could be governed according to labour demand and welfare capacity. Rather quickly, the states were confronted with a different reality. This was partly caused by a number of refugee-​producing international conflicts combined with easier and cheaper international transport, yet humanitarian migrants also came as a result of the new immigration policies. When the labour migration options were curtailed, people found other openings. The right to family life and right to protection from persecution became new, essential criteria for legal residency. Some of the basis for the new policy-​making was thus altered: The new patterns of immigration could not be handled with the tools instituted by the fresh regulation. Both the asylum policy and family-​ immigration policy should not be managed according to national interests but rather according to humanitarian norms and conventions. Nevertheless, these categories of migrants were going to dominate the public immigration discourse in the decades to follow, particularly when the numbers began escalating in earnest in the late 1980s. Sweden has been the great asylum receiver in the region –​attracting and allowing a significantly higher number of refugees over the years than Norway and particularly Denmark. This pattern has continued into the 2000s, and even after the change of tide with the EU extension in 2004, Sweden has still had a proportionally much larger refugee influx than its neighbours.17 This in turn implies that Sweden has also become the great receiver in relation to family, or secondary, immigration. As already mentioned, the immigration policies in all three countries have the same basic structure when it comes to the interplay between access and welfare state integration: A restrictive front and an inclusive, equal-​r ights-​oriented inside. Until the turn of the century, the concrete integration policy was also roughly similar, although with national specificities. The nerve center of contention has been the question of legitimacy in relation to asylum seekers:  Who could claim the need for protection with reference to the UN Refugee Convention? And who should be able to remain even if those criteria were not fulfilled? And ultimately –​what was really possible in terms of getting control through governance in this complicated and complex field of policy-​making? The legitimacy question as a device for governance became more pressing in the course of the 1990s as concerns regarding the sustainability of the welfare state came to the fore in all three countries. It became increasingly apparent that the immigrants from the global South had significant employment problems in the advanced Scandinavian labour markets, thus posing a perpetuating challenge to the welfare model. Paradoxically, the heat of this debate turned stronger in Denmark and Norway, although Sweden was the country hit hardest by the economic crisis of the early 1990s and with the strongest influx. During the same decade, family immigration also became a target for policy-​making. The states were realizing the self-​perpetuating mechanisms of the inflows: Accepted immigrants generated secondary immigration –​often of a larger scale than the original, as family reunification meant residence permits to spouses and children. Some minority groups also practised arranged marriages with persons from the (parents’) sending country, which in practice became an important secondary immigration channel. The 1990s 236

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nevertheless turned out to be the decade during which all three countries tried harder to limit the inflows while at the same time realizing more clearly that the space of manoeuvring was greatly constrained. The three countries also gradually realized elements of regime competition among themselves; when one of the countries introduced restrictions, the others experienced increased inflow. At the turn of the century, Denmark, with its new liberal coalition government (Fogh Rasmussen from 2001), started a significant and comprehensive reform of the Danish immigration regime. The new government pulled several strings at the same time: Family immigration policy was the main target, yet the refugee policy also turned more restrictive. As to family reunification, the new ruling required that both spouses had to be more than 24 years old and would be required to have a stronger connection (as a couple) to Denmark than to any other country (Mouritsen and Bech 2013). Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the new reform was possibly the new dualization of the basic income support. Accessing the full social security allowance now required seven years of residence. This last reform (which was rolled back when the Social Democratic coalition government led by Thorning Schmidt took over in 2011, only to be re-​ introduced by the Løkke Rasmussen government in 2015) actually defied one of the pillars of the Nordic Model –​the universality principle (Jønsson and Petersen 2012). Denmark was a first mover in this endeavour, and the numbers declined significantly immediately thereafter. Neither Sweden nor Norway followed suit in these major retrenchments, although Norway introduced a few reforms to family immigration policy a few years later that were designed differently yet with the same effect. Both Sweden and Norway introduced an economic self-​sufficiency requirement for family reunification. All three countries stepped up their efforts in the return policy directed at the individuals whose application for asylum had been rejected. These tougher policies for humanitarian immigrants came at the same time as a paradigmatic shift in relation to labour immigrants. Even before the EU’s eastward extension, all of the countries (including Finland and Iceland) had recognized their need for access to foreign labour –​skilled labour in particular. During a short timespan –​roughly from the late 1990s until the financial crisis in 2008 –​public debate on immigration changed character from being focused on the welfare burden of the humanitarians to a positive tenor related to ‘necessary extra labour in order to preserve the level of welfare’. This was a trend throughout Western Europe, and receiving countries were competing for the ‘Indian IT engineers’. At the same time, worries related to the ‘unwanted’ immigrants lingered under the surface. A dual policy resulted from this schism: a continued, restrictive policy (most markedly in Denmark; least so in Sweden) combined with open access for EU labour.18 The inflow of EU workers was particularly high in Norway due to the strong oil economy. As concerns the integration policies proper, the differences have been fewer between the Big Three in recent decades. This is likely explained by the common basic features of the welfare/​labour model in the three countries; when people have managed to get in legally, the systemic imperative is to have them included in the best way possible. Consequently, any well-​functioning policy instrument invented in one place would most likely be copied elsewhere.19 A common denominator for integration policies in Sweden, Denmark and Norway since the 1990s is a much stronger emphasis on the work-​line approach. To have people included through work has become the mantra, economically and socially, and most of the efforts in policy innovation have been in this field. A continued difference between the three is nevertheless how the authorities implement the work-​line. Following the usual Scandinavian schism, Sweden believes in motivation, whereas Denmark has used sanctions more than the others. Norway follows a middle way, oscillating between the Danish and Swedish lines. 237

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Conclusions All five Nordics –​although in different ways and to different degrees –​are currently facing major challenges in relation to international migration. The challenges are more profound in the Big Three due to scale and composition (with Sweden as the most striking case), yet both Finland and Iceland have had increases in the immigration rate lately, which may become a greater concern in the close future. This chapter has mapped out and discussed major trends in immigration policy-​making in Scandinavia since the 1970s. Today, immigration has turned into a central driver for economic, social and political change in the region –​particularly in the three major immigration countries. The systemic qualities of the Nordic Model largely premised the national approaches to immigration from the outset.The scale of immigration is now one of the major factors prompting policy reforms in the model in order to make it more robust on both labour standards and welfare sustainability. The scope for action is not wide. Systemic premises and international agreements limit the manoeuvring space to a large extent. All five countries are trying to balance economic interests and humanitarian responsibilities in their immigration policies. As we have seen, this has nevertheless resulted in five possibly surprisingly different approaches to the immigration/​integration nexus.

Notes 1 This background pertaining to Sweden, Denmark and Norway largely builds on Brochmann and Hagelund (2012). 2 Sweden had not been occupied by the Nazi regime during the Second World War and was therefore in the economic lead in the region. The expansive Swedish labour marked employed foreign labour from an early stage after the war, first and foremost Finns but also some from further abroad. 3 See e.g. World Value Survey. Please see Chapter 13 in this volume for a discussion of social capital and trust in the Scandinavian countries. 4 The moratoriums on immigration were established in Sweden in 1972, Denmark in 1973 and Norway in 1975. These policies largely followed trends in other European receiving states. 5 In fact, the Norwegian business cycle was the opposite of what was going on in the rest of Western Europe at the time. The main reason for curtailing the immigration of low-​skilled labour in the early 1970s elsewhere was the so-​called ‘energy crisis’, the substantial increase in oil prices. 6 Sweden has consistently received more immigrants than the two other countries. In 2013, the percentage of foreign-​born persons was 8.2 per cent in Denmark, 11 per cent in Norway and 15 per cent in Sweden (Djuve and Grødem 2014). 7 European Economic Area: Agreement with the EU together with Norway and Lichtenstein, implying full affiliation to the Internal Market, yet no political influence. 8 More than 500,000 Finns migrated to Sweden after the Second World War, especially during the 1960s and 1970s (Djuve 2014). 9 Although Marjukka Weide (2015) explains that some of the bigger Swedish cities easily outnumber the whole of Finland in annual quota refugee accommodation. 10 During the period 2000–​9, only 627 asylum seekers entered Iceland, 38 per cent of whom were returned to another EU country with reference to the Dublin Agreement (Grødem 2014). 11 The universalism of the model can be qualified: Some entitlements do not include all residents, and the three countries have established qualification periods for certain benefits to varying degrees.Yet the Nordic Model is clearly more universal than other welfare models in most areas. 12 See also Chapter 4 in this volume on corporatism in the Scandinavian countries. 13 Marshall (1965). 14 See Borevi (2010) and Wickström (2013) for a more comprehensive description of the ideological basis for Swedish immigration policy. 15 See Brochmann and Hagelund (2012) for a comparison of the three countries in this policy field. 16 See also Weide (2015). 17 This description was taken to the extreme during the 2015 refugee crisis.

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Immigration policies 18 Sweden was alone in introducing demand-​side liberalization towards labour immigrants from third countries in 2008. 19 See Breidahl (2012) for discussion of ‘policy learning’ in Scandinavia.

References Benhabib, S. (2002) Transformations of Citizenship: The Case of Contemporary Europe. Government and Opposition 37(4): 439–​465. Borevi, K. (2010) Sverige: Mångkulturalismens flaggskepp i Norden. In: Brochmann, G. and Hagelund, A. (eds), Velferdens grenser. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Brochmann, G. and Hagelund, A. (2005) Innvandringens velferdspolitiske konsekvenser: nordisk kunnskapsstatus. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Brochmann, G. and Hagelund, A. (2012) Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State, 1945–​2010. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Djuve, A. B. (2014) Integrering i Finland. In: Djuve, A. B. and Grødem, A. S. (eds), Innvandring og arbeidsmarkedsintegrering i Norden. Oslo: Fafo. Djuve, A. B. and Grødem, A. S. (eds) (2014) Innvandring og arbeidsmarkedsintegrering i Norden. Fafo-​rapport 2014:27: NordMod. Oslo: Fafo. Esping-​ Andersen, G. and Korpi, W. (1987) From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States:  The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy. In: Erikson, R., Hansen, E. J., Ringen, S. and Uusitalo, H.  (eds), The Scandinavian Model:  Welfare States and Welfare Research. Armonk and London:  M.E. Sharpe. Fraser, N. (1995) From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-​Socialst’ Age. New Left Review 212: 68–​93. Grødem, A. S. (2014) Innvandring og sysselsetting:  Island. In:  Djuve, A. B. and Grødem, A. S. (eds), Innvandring og arbeidsmarkedsintegrering i Norden. Oslo: Fafo. Hirdman,Y. (2000) Att lägga livet til rätta. Stockholm: Carlssons. Jønsson, H. V. and Petersen, K. (2012) Denmark:  A  National Welfare State Meets the World. In: Brochmann, G. and Hagelund, A. (eds), Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–​ 2010. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kangas, O. and Palme, J. (2005) Social Policy and Economic Development in the Nordic Countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kangas, O. and Saloniemi, A. (2014) Historical Making, Present and Future Challenges for the Nordic Welfare State Model in Finland. Fafo-​report 2013:40: Nordmod 2030. Oslo: Fafo. Marshall, T. H. (1965) Class, Citizenship and Social Development. New York: Anchor. Mouritsen, P. and Bech, E. C. (2013) Restricting the Right to Family Migration in Denmark:  When Human Rights Collide with a Welfare State under Pressure. In: Jurado, E. and Brochmann, G. (eds), Europe’s Immigration Challenge: Reconciling Work,Welfare and Mobility. London: I. B. Tauris. Saukkonen, P. (2013) Multiculturalism and Nationalism: The Politics of Diversity in Finland. In: Kivisto, P. and Wahlbeck, Ö (eds), Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States. London:  Palgrave Macmillan. Sejersted, F. (2011) The Age of Social Democracy:  Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Weide, M. (2015) Curriculum to Classroom: Civics in Finnish Integration Courses. Paper presented at ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, University of Warsaw. Mimeo. Wickström, M. (2013) Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration. In: Kivisto, P. and Wahlbeck, Ö. (eds), Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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19 SCANDINAVIAN MODELS OF DIPLOMACY Martin Marcussen

Introduction: what is a model of diplomacy? The ‘model of diplomacy’ concept is not particularly prevalent in the literature on foreign policy and diplomacy. Better known concepts include ‘Models of Democracy’ (Held 1996), ‘Models of Capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) and ‘Models of Welfare States’ (Esping-​Andersen 1990), which all underline the point that there are many ways in which a country can organize itself politically and economically and that it is impossible a priori to predict which of the models performs best. The same applies to models of diplomacy. To the outside world, the Scandinavian countries –​in this chapter Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland –​display considerable similarities as regards their foreign policies and diplomatic practices. They are all very small, very open and very successful economies that are regarded with considerable admiration from far and wide. The Economist illustrates this fascination with the Scandinavian countries by declaring on its front page: ‘The Next Supermodel: Why the World Should Look at the Nordic Countries’ (The Economist 2013). It is not unusual that many outside Norden unknowingly consider these countries as a single coherent political and economic entity with one people. Instinctively, Scandinavian diplomats go to great lengths to uphold the impression that there is one big family of Scandinavian brothers and sisters. The first thing a Scandinavian diplomat does when arriving at a new posting is to establish contact with all of their likeminded colleagues, always including the Scandinavian colleagues. Scandinavian diplomats typically share the same approach to diplomatic practice. They are informal in their ways of interaction, and their conversation is usually based on institutionalized and generalized trust. It is taken for granted that the Scandinavian colleagues will bend over backwards to help each other; they exchange all kinds of information, invite one another to meetings and conferences, and they assist one another if one of them is confronted by an extraordinary challenge, such as a consular crisis, an important delegation visit from home or even personal problems.1 The signal from the Scandinavian home services is also unmistakable: Scandinavian diplomats are expected to strive to find further ways in which they can enhance inter-​Scandinavian cooperation in practice. The slogan seems to be that small countries are vulnerable on their 240

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own, but together they can accomplish miracles. The Scandinavian countries have increasingly engaged in co-​location in order to gain benefits from working closely together. The common Scandinavian embassy building in Berlin offers a case in point. Elsewhere, the embassy buildings and ambassadors’ residences are physically located close to each other, as in Brasilia, where the Scandinavian ambassadors and their staff can walk through holes in the hedges separating one embassy from another. In the following, I will try to demonstrate that even though there are many and marked similarities between the Scandinavian foreign services, talking about ‘models of diplomacy’ remains relevant. More concretely, I will emphasize three dimensions that, taken together, constitute a ‘model of diplomacy’: First, I will consider the foreign policy profile of the Scandinavian countries and more particularly the diplomatic role that this profile entails. It becomes clear that on this rhetorical and statutory level of analysis there are no very deep cleavages between the Scandinavian models of diplomacy. All of the Scandinavian decision-​makers apparently wish and hope for –​even expect –​that their country and its diplomats take an ‘active’ role in the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day with a view to enhancing the international impact and influence of the Scandinavian countries on these areas. Second, in a discussion about Scandinavian models of diplomacy it becomes relevant to include discussion about the foreign policy effectiveness of the Scandinavian diplomacies. It is one thing that the Scandinavian countries declare themselves active and influential; another thing may be the actual results obtained through their foreign policies. Such a discussion is obviously extremely difficult, if for no other reason than because there are a number of different criteria that can be applied to measure the actual foreign policy performance. In addition, the perception of foreign policy performance may vary a lot if you ask the Scandinavians themselves or external foreign policy observers (Browning 2007). The conclusion of this section, however, is that while it may be extremely difficult to produce a very precise evaluation of foreign policy effectiveness, evidence nevertheless exists that emphasizes how there are many similarities between the Scandinavian countries. All of the Scandinavian diplomacies are effective. Their reputations are extremely good, their visibility high, and the same goes for their external recognition and attraction. On an array of different benchmarks, the Scandinavian countries are placed at or very near the top positions among the largest, most resource-​rich countries in the world. One very concrete example of foreign policy effectiveness relates to how the Scandinavian countries, despite their very limited size, manage to influence EU decision-​ making (Panke 2015). A third dimension I wish to investigate in an analysis of the Scandinavian models of diplomacy concerns the question of how the Scandinavian countries have organized their foreign services. Despite the fact that the Scandinavian countries are very similar with regard to foreign policy profile and foreign policy performance, we will find that the Scandinavian countries have organized their foreign services very differently. It is this organizational dimension that leads me to conclude that it makes sense to speak about different models of diplomacy in Scandinavia. The last section will argue that the Scandinavian foreign services have demonstrated their willingness to adapt to a rising number of external challenges in a very dynamic and flexible manner; however, it remains uncertain whether they are resilient organizations.

Foreign policy profile: international activism The Scandinavian countries all define themselves as activists in the international arena. In government platforms, party programmes, foreign policy strategies and memorandums, one word is stated with great frequency: activism (Marcussen 2016). The Scandinavian countries 241

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are typically argued to indeed be small countries in an unruly world, but also that they can and indeed have a particular obligation to make a difference in the world by way of their foreign policies. The Scandinavian countries share a clear understanding that it is not possible to isolate themselves from the world. While they are pragmatists and recognize their vulnerability and their smallness, they demonstrate considerable self-​confidence in their ability and duty to influence the world in ways that are more in line with their own ideals (Ingebritsen 2002; see also Chapter 22 in this volume about this constant balance between idealism and interests/​pragmatism in Scandinavian foreign policy). From the outside, then, there are marked similarities between the Scandinavian countries’ foreign policy profiles: The basic objectives of their foreign policies are being defined in the same ways in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland; the basic assumptions underlying their foreign policies are quite similar; the strategies applied to realize their foreign policy objectives are also similar; and, finally, the expectations in the Scandinavian countries regarding the role that a modern foreign service ought to play in the implementation of foreign policies are similar. In all of the Scandinavian countries, left-​and right-​leaning, minority and majority governments alike all start with the notion that the basic objectives of their foreign policies are to promote the security and welfare of their populations and to promote universal values to the rest of the world. In Scandinavia, security, welfare and values are defined as each other’s preconditions. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the strategic point of departure for the foreign policies of the Scandinavian countries has been a broad and inclusive security concept, encompassing most of the challenges emanating from international society, including the climate challenge, migration, cross-​border crime and economic stagnation, not to mention all of the classical security challenges, such as terror, border conflicts and escalating military build-​up. The other strategic point of departure for their foreign policies has been the notion of export-​driven growth. The high welfare levels of the Scandinavian countries cannot be seen in isolation from the international economy.The European markets have been particularly important in this regard. The European continent is still by far the most important export destination for Nordic goods and services. Finally, the third strategic point of departure for Scandinavian foreign policy is the idea that the security and welfare of small states are highly dependent on a well-​functioning global system of governance in all sorts of areas. Global governance institutions will almost always by biased towards small states and therefore constitute a kind of guarantee for influence. But effective and predictable international systems of governance also allow small, strategic-​thinking, well-​coordinated countries like the Nordics to gain access to international agenda-​setting and decision-​making to an extent that sometimes means that they appear to be punching above their weight. Active foreign policy, which is the concrete manifestation of these strategic principles, consists first of promoting international cooperation among the Scandinavian countries, in Europe and in the rest of the world. The Scandinavian countries belong to the group of sovereign states in the world that are members of most intergovernmental organizations. Second, activism manifests itself in the fact that all of the Scandinavian countries have a very high profile with regard to demonstrating solidarity towards under-​developed countries, weak and failed states, as well countries requiring humanitarian assistance. The Scandinavian countries all aspire to maintain or elevate their official development assistance to the UN objective of 0.7 per cent of GNI (see also Chapter 23 in this volume). Third, activism manifests itself by way of export promotion on a global scale. Export-​ promoting agencies play an increasing role in the Scandinavian diplomatic models, and their efforts to help private enterprises conquer new markets and consolidate themselves in existing 242

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markets are being seen as an attempt to improve the institutional competitiveness of the Scandinavian economic models. Economic diplomacy has become an instrument for the competition state in all of the Scandinavian countries (Marcussen 2016). Finally, a fourth element of Scandinavian activism in the world has to do with their efforts to maintain a good and constructive relationship with the United States. This is not to say that US foreign policy will always find Scandinavian support. Far from it.The War on Terror in particular has been heavily criticized in a country such as Sweden. Rather, the United States, disregarding whether the Scandinavians are members of NATO or not, is being seen as a core military and economic ally (Wivel 2013a). To actually implement an active foreign policy, the Scandinavian foreign services strive to fulfil more or less the same criteria for small state diplomacy. First, the Scandinavian countries wish to be present in the right locations of the globe. In contrast to much larger foreign services, small states must constantly evaluate whether they have placed their diplomatic representations in the most optimal countries. The diplomatic representation system of the small Scandinavian countries is therefore quite flexible and dynamic. Whenever the global economic and security-​ related infrastructure changes, new diplomatic representations are being opened and others are closed. The home services are also dynamic organizations. On a regular basis, comprehensive organizational reforms are carried out through the introduction of a combination of thematic, geographical and centre-​based organizational principles. A second requirement of the Scandinavian diplomacies is that the foreign service is both willing and able to coordinate and integrate all of the foreign policies of the countries. The foreign services can be seen as meta-​coordinators that are expected to bring all of the relevant foreign policy actors together in a single common effort to influence the world, in routine as well as in crisis situations. In practice, this means that the foreign services aspire to promote synergies between development policies, security policies, trade policies and consular work. It also means that the Scandinavian foreign services reach out to a very broad spectrum of private actors who contribute more or less autonomously to the realization of the basic foreign policy objectives. Finally, a modern foreign service is expected to have found ways to overcome the extreme management challenges that by necessity characterize an organization that is physically stretched to cover the entire world, where numerous languages are being spoken and a number of different national and disciplinary cultures live side by side. To overcome such management challenges, the Scandinavian foreign services apply a distinctly Scandinavian management philosophy based on a mix of trust, digitalization and performance management.The Scandinavian foreign services are modern organizations; they are no longer the archetypical Weberian organizations. Since the objectives, strategies, activism and organizational ideals are converging among the Scandinavian countries, it makes good sense to conclude that instead of many there is a single dominant Scandinavian foreign policy profile (Schouenborg 2013). It is also clear, however, that this foreign policy profile allows for variation as regards foreign policy activities. The emphasis of the Scandinavian foreign policy profile can vary from case to case (Wivel 2013b). In Sweden, the present government has formulated so-​called feministic foreign policy with emphasis on universal values (Utrikesdepartementet 2015). In Finland and Norway, foreign policy-​makers emphasize their willingness to engage in peace negotiations and conflict-​mediation around the globe. In Denmark, the focus has been on military engagement together with the United States within the framework of either the UN or NATO. In all cases, however, these foreign policies do not deviate from the common Scandinavian foreign policy profile as described above. 243

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Foreign policy effectiveness: world-​class performance The previous section concluded that the self-​confidence of the political decision-​makers in the Scandinavian countries is high. There would appear to be a firm and widespread belief that the small Scandinavian states can make a difference in the world. The question to be investigated in this section is whether this holds true. Clearly there need not be a direct correlation between the stated visions, desires and self-​perceptions, on the one hand, and concrete foreign policy results on the other. Thus, the second dimension of the Scandinavian diplomatic model concerns foreign policy effectiveness. It is particularly difficult to actually measure foreign policy performance. In evaluation research, one would typically compare the publicly stated objectives of a policy with the instruments that are being applied and the concrete, observed results on the ground.This technique is utilized most often in the evaluation of a country’s development aid (Andersen et al. 2012), and it is employed in economic diplomacy.Thus, there are a number of studies investigating whether it makes a difference for the amount of export to a given country that a trade-​promoting agency is placed in the country or that a trade-​promoting delegation has visited the country in question (Munch and Schaur 2015; Nielsen 2012). In the present context, the purpose is not to investigate the constituent parts of the Scandinavian foreign policies in order to conclude whether the policy activities have produced satisfactory results. Overall, what we are discussing here concerns the issue of status; that is, the question of how the world perceives the Scandinavian countries (Paul et al. 2014). I am interested in relative performance, not absolute performance. Are some of the Scandinavian countries doing well in global rankings while others are faring badly, or are they placed in a distinct Scandinavian cluster? This is question number one. Question number two concerns the issue about how well the Scandinavian countries perform in relation to non-​Scandinavian countries. Are they close to the top, in the middle or at the bottom of the ranking? Obviously, a first measure of status is whether a country’s reputation is good or bad; or alternatively, whether they have no reputation whatsoever. In the world of finance, for instance, interest will typically be directed towards business conditions, the stability of the political system, the soundness of the economy, the level of education of the labour force and the scope and quality of its infrastructure. The World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’, the World Economic Forum ‘Global Competitiveness Index’ as well as international credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, are all in agreement: The Scandinavian countries, with their triple-​AAA ratings, belong among the best performing countries in the world. Among political and economic decision-​makers, the Scandinavian countries all enjoy remarkably good reputations that place them in a category unto themselves (Marcussen 2013a). But how about ordinary citizens around the world? What do they know about the Scandinavian countries? And do they even sympathize with the Scandinavian countries? The answer is an overwhelming ‘Yes’ (Table 19.1). Year after year, all of the Scandinavian countries are placed among the ten countries with the best reputations on the globe. It is noteworthy how particularly small, European countries seem to have exceptionally good international reputations. Other rankings obtain different results. For instance, the Country Brand Index produces the following ranking: 1. Japan, 2. Switzerland, 3. Germany, 4. Sweden, 5. Canada, 6. Norway, 7. USA, 8.  Australia, 9.  Denmark, 10. Austria, 11. New Zealand, 12. Great Britain, 13. Finland (FutureBrand 2014). The Scandinavian countries are still among the countries with the best brands in the world, this time together with some very large countries, such as the United States and Japan. 244

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Scandinavian models of diplomacy Table 19.1  Reputation ranking

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Sweden Canada Australia Switzerland Norway Finland Denmark Austria Netherlands Belgium

Canada Sweden Australia Switzerland New Zealand Norway Denmark Finland Austria Netherlands

Canada Australia Sweden Switzerland Norway New Zealand Finland Denmark Austria Netherlands

Canada Sweden Switzerland Australia Norway Denmark New Zealand Finland Netherlands Austria

Switzerland Canada Sweden Finland Australia Norway Denmark New Zealand Netherlands Germany

Canada Norway Sweden Switzerland Australia Finland New Zealand Denmark Netherlands Belgium

Note: The ranking is based on interviews with 26,000 persons from the G8 countries (Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the United States, Russia, Japan) equally distributed as regards region, age, sex and age.The results of this reputation ranking resemble the happiness ranking (UN World Happiness Report), the peace, security and stability ranking (Institute for Economics & Peace’s Global Peace Index) and the transparency and good governance ranking (Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index). Source: Reputation Institute (https://www.reputationinstitute.com/CMSPages/GetAzureFile.aspx?path= ~%5Cmedia%5Cmedia%5Cdocuments%5Ccountry-reptrak-webinar-2015-forweb_1.pdf&hash=07cf40 4f41364b36d38c8282897ec0e64c91ea20694cc77a075691f452e82d41).

Attempts have also been made to measure which countries actually deserve a good reputation. This is exactly the purpose of the so-​called ‘Good Country Index’ (Anholt 2014). Among those categorized as ‘good countries’ are: 1. Ireland, 2. Finland, 3. Switzerland, 4. Netherlands, 5. New Zealand, 6. Sweden, 7. Great Britain, 8. Norway, 9. Denmark, 10. Belgium. It is difficult to say anything concrete about the extent to which the diplomatic practice of the Scandinavian countries can be credited the good reputation of these countries. However, it seems quite safe to conclude that, everything else equal, an extremely high and consistently good reputation would facilitate the diplomatic practice, possibly making it more effective. The fact that the Scandinavian countries seem to have succeeded as regards their global visibility can be seen in Figure 19.1. The Spanish think tank, Real Instituto Elcano, has constructed a so-​called Global Presence Index, which assumes presence on the global arena to be a precondition for global influence. This assumption seems to be intuitively easy to accept: If you are unknown and basically do nothing, then you have no influence.The index includes the so-​called soft power resources, even though it is primarily economic and military dominance that elevates a country towards the top of the index. We would therefore correctly expect the Scandinavian countries to be placed far below the military and economic great powers. For the Scandinavian countries, however, it is still an interesting index. As it turns out, the Scandinavian countries have been particularly ‘activist’ in their foreign policies since the end of the Cold War. Through trade, all of the Scandinavian countries have expanded their economic presence in the world. The contributions made by the Scandinavian states to peace-​creating missions around the world have not gone unnoticed (however, see Chapter 22 in this volume discussing the changing nature of Scandinavian peace missions). In addition, targeted investments by, for instance, Norway’s Pensionfund, the successful attempts of mediating conflicts and the considerable amount of resources applied to development aid have all contributed to elevating the positions of the Scandinavian countries in the Global Presence Index. Other think tanks have also attempted to measure foreign policy effectiveness, including the American Center for Global Development, which has evaluated the development policies of 245

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1990

1995

2000

2005

Norway

2010

Sweden

2011

2012

Denmark

2013

2014

Finland

Figure 19.1  The Scandinavian countries are increasingly visible in the global arena Source: The figure is constructed on the basis of various ‘global presence annual reports’, retrieved from: www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/​en/​about.

Table 19.2  Scandinavian solidarity Sweden

Denmark

Norway

Finland

1980 2011 2015 1980 2011 2015 1980 2011 2015 1980 2011 2015 Official development 0.78 aid (ODA) as a percentage of GNI ODA in billions US 0.96 dollars

1.02

1.40

0.74

0.85

0.85

0.87

1.00

1.05

0.22

0.53

0.56

5.60

7.1

0.48

2.93

2.26

0.49

4.93

4.30

0.11

1.41

1.03

Source: Data for 1980 and 2011 is retrieved from http://​stats.oecd.org/​Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1#, data for 2015 is retrieved from www.oecd.org/​dac/​denmark.htm; www.oecd.org/​dac/​norway.htm; www.oecd.org/​dac/​finland.htm; ​www.oecd.org/​dac/​sweden.htm (running prices).

the OECD countries. The Commitment to Development Index (CDI) has ranked 27 of the richest countries according to their dedication to policies that benefit low-​income countries (Table 19.2). It is interesting to note how in order to obtain a high rank on the index, it is not sufficient merely to spend a lot of money on development aid; it must be well-​spent. For instance, if the development policies are being integrated with other foreign policies, then it is more likely that these policies do not balance each other out in practice. The policy areas that are being included in the index are development policy, trade, foreign direct investment, migration policies, environment policies, security policies and technology transfer policies. In short, the index measures one of the key characteristics of Scandinavian development policies, its horizontal integration (Table 19.3) (see also Chapters 22 and 23 in this volume). Yet another measure of status in global politics concerns the concept of ‘soft power’. By way of attractiveness and the better argument, soft power is about making others change their 246

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Scandinavian models of diplomacy Table 19.3  Scandinavian commitment to development, 2009–​15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

Sweden Denmark Netherlands Norway New Zealand Ireland Spain Australia Austria Finland

Sweden Denmark Netherlands Norway New Zealand Ireland Finland Portugal Canada Spain

Denmark Norway Sweden Luxembourg Australia Netherlands Finland New Zealand Great Britain Portugal

Denmark Sweden Norway Luxembourg Netherlands Finland Ireland Great Britain New Zealand Belgium

Denmark Sweden Finland Great Britain Norway Portugal Netherlands New Zealand France Austria

Denmark Sweden Norway Finland Netherlands Great Britain France New Zealand Portugal Australia

Source: www.cgdev.org/​initiative/​commitment-​development-​index, Center for Global Development. Table 19.4 The Nordic countries as global soft power actors

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

2010

2011

2012

2014

2015

France Great Britain USA Germany Switzerland Sweden Denmark Australia Finland Netherlands Spain Canada Singapore Norway Japan Italy China Israel

USA Great Britain France Germany Australia Sweden Japan Switzerland Canada Netherlands Norway Denmark Spain Korea Finland Italy New Zealand Austria

Great Britain USA Germany France Sweden Japan Denmark Switzerland Australia Canada Korea Norway Finland Italy Netherlands Spain Brasilia Austria

USA Germany Great Britain Japan France Australia Switzerland Sweden Denmark Canada Spain Italy Netherlands New Zealand Korea Norway Finland Belgium

Great Britain Germany USA France Canada Australia Switzerland Japan Sweden Netherlands Denmark Italy Austria Spain Finland New Zealand Belgium Norway

Source: McClory (2010: 5, 2011: 15), Monocle (2012, 2014), Portland Communications (2015: 25).

course of action (Nye 1990). Diplomatic practice is but one of a series of instruments that can be applied to obtain soft power in international relations. The average level of education in a country counts, as does its cultural thrust, its innovation system, and not least its political set-​up for its ability to take leadership as a good example and promote the good argument. One might initially assume that it is extremely difficult for small countries to stick out as regards soft power. After all, they are very small and, compared to much larger states, they are unable to invest much in developing relations. One would expect the soft-​power index to be an index for the really big players in international politics. But this is not at all the case.Year after year, the Scandinavians are placed among the biggest countries in the world on the so-​called soft-​power index (Table 19.4). 247

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Admittedly, it is notoriously difficult to say anything definitive about the international status of the Scandinavian countries. As seen in this section, however, there are indications that the Scandinavian countries are doing something right in their foreign relations. In all sorts of rankings that have something to do with status, the Scandinavian countries are placed in a cluster close to or at the top. The picture I have painted of the Scandinavian models of diplomacy is that they are extraordinarily similar. Scandinavian decision-​makers subscribe to more or less the same visions for their activist role in international politics, and the international status, reputation and recognition of the Scandinavian countries is surprisingly high. Nonetheless, the argument in this chapter is that there are multiple paths to successful foreign politics. The are several diplomatic models in Scandinavia, each of which have particular qualities that render them successful. There are a variety of different Scandinavian diplomacies.

Different organizational structures One approach to comparing foreign services is to calculate their operating costs. In order to be able to compare, such calculations require that we examine in depth the functions, structures and processes of the respective foreign services. If there are marked organizational differences between the Scandinavian foreign services, this must obviously be taken into account when comparing. We will, of course, also be able to conclude that one of the Scandinavian foreign services is the most expensive per capita and another the cheapest. The benchmark in the following is the Danish foreign service. This is basically because the Danish foreign service and all of its operating costs are to be found in a single paragraph (§6) on the annual Finance Act. All of the functions normally included in an analysis of foreign policy (e.g. cooperation in international organizations, development policy, consular affairs, export promotion, coordination of EU matters) are listed in that same paragraph. The Danish foreign service is a so-​called unitary organization, which in this context simply means that all of the mentioned functions are being executed under the responsibility of a single leadership team in the same organization. It is also possible to identify the revenue generated by the foreign service by producing services related to consular matters and trade promotion. In the following, I deduct that revenue from the total costs of the foreign service in order to compare the net operating costs of the Scandinavian foreign services. Since I compare the operating costs of the foreign services, I am not including programme costs, such as the very substantive official development aid. What then is not comprised in the operating costs of the foreign services? It could have been relevant to include all of the international activities undertaken by the sector ministries. Over the years, and particularly as a result of the European integration process, all of the sector ministries have established their own operational capacity to deal directly with international actors. This concerns the many day-​to-​day negotiations in the working groups of the EU Council of Ministers as well as cooperation within numerous other intergovernmental and international non-​governmental organizations. The same goes for the municipal and regional public authorities. Since 2007, when a major organizational reform was implemented, the local authorities have attained a size and capacity that enable them to undertake important international functions by themselves. In short, therefore, there is a considerable and increasing amount of resources spent on international relations throughout the public sector (Marcussen 2013b). Not all of the activities in the Danish benchmark case are included in the calculation of the operating costs. As we will see, some of the other Scandinavian foreign services have delegated some of the basic functions to

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other ministries, meaning that these delegated operating costs must be included to make cross-​ country comparison meaningful. One might also argue that the public administration is not alone in playing important roles in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies. Foreign policy activities are also being undertaken by a long series of private or semi-​private actors (Marcussen and Ronit 2014). It is therefore important to emphasize that when I  compare the operating costs of the Scandinavian foreign services, this does not imply that I conclude that foreign policy in all its variations is being conducted exclusively by the foreign service. The time has long passed since it could be claimed that the foreign services have any monopoly in the area of foreign policy. To summarize, the purpose of the comparison is to arrive at a deeper understanding of the organizational structures of the Scandinavian foreign services, thereby emphasizing how different these diplomatic structures really are. The purpose is not to try to establish a price for the total foreign activities undertaken in a country. This is not possible in practice. The year of comparison is 2014 for the simple reason that this is a year in which all of the annual reports have been made publicly available. As mentioned, the Danish foreign service is the most straightforward to price since all of its functions are being undertaken in one single organization and listed in a single paragraph on the annual Finance Act. In Figure 19.2, the organization diagram has been reproduced and some of the foreign policy functions have been pointed out. This concerns export and investment promotion, EU coordination and development policy. These are the three specific areas of activity that are placed differently in the organizational structures of the foreign services of Sweden, Finland and Norway. Compared to the Danish foreign service, the structure of the Swedish foreign service seems to be the most complicated to study. One obvious difference concerns the fact that, in 1997,

Foreign minister + secretariat Political director

Permanent Secretary Board

Controller

Protocol

Secretariat for the Board and Communication

Evaluation office

Centre for global politics and security

Centre for the Export Council

Centre for Europe and North America

Centre for Consular Affairs and Communication

Export and investment

Centre for global development and cooperation

Centre for Legal Services

EU coordination

Figure 19.2  The organization of the Danish foreign service

249

Centre for Administrative Services

Development cooperation

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a major organizational reform covering the entire central administration was implemented, resulting in a centralization of most of the administrative functions and services in one central unit. This meant that administrative functions and services related to archives, information and communications technology, human resources and budget management were transferred from the Swedish foreign service to a common secretariat in the prime minister’s office with the PM’s permanent secretary as director (Bergquist 2013). Another marked difference relates to the coordination of EU matters. This too is undertaken by the PM’s office. A third difference concerns the administration of development aid and all of the operating costs associated with Sweden’s very extensive development activities. These matters are all undertaken in a separate and autonomous organization, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which publishes its own annual report. Finally, the organization of the Swedish foreign service is different from the Danish with regard to the operating costs associated with export promotion. Here again, an autonomous organization, Business Sweden, has been established with its own budget and annual report (Murray 2011). The organization of the Norwegian foreign service also differs in some regards from the Danish foreign service. Like the Danish, the Norwegian foreign service takes charge of EU coordination. Norway is not an EU member state, but the European Economic Area (EEA) provides for the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital within the internal market, between its 28 member states, as well as the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), including Norway (Thorhallson 2015). The administration of the Norwegian development aid has been placed in its own agency, NORAD, which refers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but has its own budget and annual report. Another difference concerns Innovasjon Norge, which is the counterpart of the Danish Export Council and almost entirely financed by public funds but independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is interesting to note that Innovasjon Norge has its own global representation structure with posted and locally employed personnel in a long series of countries. In countries with a Norwegian embassy or another type of diplomatic mission, the Innovasjon Norge personnel are typically placed in the same buildings. In countries where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have a diplomatic mission, Innovasjon Norge has established its own mission. The Finnish foreign service also has a distinct organizational structure. As in Denmark, development aid is placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. EU coordination is placed under the PM’s office, however, just like in Sweden, and the Export Council (Finpro) is placed as an agency that refers to the Ministry of Economy and Employment (Haukkala 2013). Having these important organizational differences in mind, it is now possible to make a price estimate based on publicly available sources, such as Finance Acts, Annual Reports and the websites of the relevant authorities (Table 19.5). How should these results be interpreted? First, it is possible to compare the costs per capita directly. The operating costs of the Norwegian foreign service turn out to be more than double those of the Danish foreign service. This is quite revealing in itself. What can explain such substantial differences in costs? Is the Norwegian foreign service just too cost-​expensive compared to the Danish foreign service? Is the Norwegian foreign service producing twice as much active foreign policy compared to the Danish foreign service? To answer questions such as these would require more detailed policy studies. A second possible interpretation of the results from the comparison is more cautious.Taking into consideration the sizeable organizational differences between the Scandinavian foreign services, the costs of foreign policy-​making are associated with uncertainty. The result would 250

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Scandinavian models of diplomacy Table 19.5 The Scandinavian foreign services, cost comparison 2014

Operating costs (billion DKK) Employed personnel, FTE Embassies Cost per capita

Sweden

Norway

Finland

Denmark

4.38 3.792 91 DKK 449

3.96 3.566 85 DKK 767

2.11 2.842 71 DKK 385

1.96 2.584 71 DKK 346

Note: The number of employed personnel is indicated as full-​time equivalent (FTE). The number of embassies does not include permanent representations, consulate generals and trade offices. For Sweden, the applied method of calculation is fully specified in Murray (2012). In the Finnish case, it has not been possible to locate reliable data that would make it possible to calculate the operational costs associated with EU coordination. These costs are therefore not included, which makes the overall estimate of the costs of the Finnish foreign service a bit conservative. Sources: websites and annual reports from the respective ministries of foreign affairs and from SIDA, Business Sweden, Finpro, Innovasjon Norge, NORAD and Finance Acts for 2014.

therefore only allow us to rank the four Scandinavian foreign services in terms of their operating costs per capita. They would probably not allow us to say anything about how much more expensive one foreign service is than another. Applying this more cautious approach, the only conclusion we can make is that the Norwegian foreign service seems to be the most expensive while the Danish foreign service is the least expensive.

Conclusions: resilient foreign services? Over the last 15 years or so, government platforms and foreign policy memorandums from all of the Scandinavian governments have explicitly expressed a desire to be ‘active’ in the international arena (Marcussen 2013a, 2016); active in their approaches to peace and security, in their development strategies, in their roles in important international organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU, and active with regard to Scandinavian cooperation. The analysis seems to be that the international arena is becoming increasingly complex and unpredictable. Never before have there been so many international challenges to be dealt with simultaneously and with such a short reaction time. At the same time, globalization allows for a whole series of possibilities that can be exploited by small, smart and flexible countries such as those in Scandinavia. The official argument therefore seems to be that there is no alternative to an active foreign policy. It is the values, the security and the welfare of the Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish and Danish populations that are at stake in the new world order. Scandinavian foreign policies seem to have been successful in terms of branding. Most of the countries in the world are small in terms of resources. And most of these small countries are relatively unknown. Some have no reputation whatsoever. This is not the case with the Scandinavian countries, which have reputations; in fact, they have some of the best reputations in the world. This chapter demonstrates that although there are many important similarities between the Scandinavian diplomatic models, there are also differences. These differences primarily relate to how the individual Scandinavian countries have chosen to organize their foreign services and how much money they spend on diplomacy. They organize their foreign policy activism in very different ways, which confirms the fact that there are many paths to high performance in diplomacy. 251

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The obvious question to ask then becomes whether the Scandinavian diplomatic models are robust and can continue to deliver results in a constantly changing world. Over the last two decades, the ‘fashion’ in organizations has centred on ‘lean’ organizations. At first glance, this makes good sense: since small states by definition have few resources at their disposal, they should pay particular attention to how these resources can be spent in the best possible way. At second glance, however, it becomes clear that the focus on lean organizations means more than merely spending money wisely. Rather, ‘lean’ has come to mean spending less money on the foreign service. The Scandinavian foreign services have therefore all undergone considerable reforms that have typically resulted in slimmer foreign services. The resulting organizational setup has been targeted towards coping with existing and known challenges emanating from the external world. The new foreign services have not been organized in ways that make them adaptable, flexible and porous. Seen from the perspective of more recent research on organizations in complex environments, this tendency towards slimming and streamlining organizations is worrisome.What if the external environment is unpredictable, volatile and fast-​moving? How does a lean organization cope with that (Kayes 2015)? The answer is almost predetermined. To cope with the unknown requires an extended ability to observe, analyse, decide and learn, something which again is quite expensive in terms of operational resources. Organizational resilience is difficult to square with the decade-​long focus on cost-​saving. Basically, resilience in a complex world will always require a certain element of organizational slack and surplus capacity. In the Scandinavian countries as in many other countries, however, the foreign services are generally regarded as being in an identity crisis in search of a purpose (Cooper et al. 2013; Marcussen 2016). In the process, appropriations are being cut gradually and consistently.Whether it is the Danish foreign service with its trimmed structures or the Norwegian foreign service with its surplus capacity that will ultimately manage to reinvigorate diplomacy in the twenty-​first century remains to be seen.

Note 1 The data on everyday diplomatic practice is based on fieldwork conducted in the period 2013–​15, including visits to and observation of Nordic diplomatic representations in 12 countries.

References Andersen, O. W., Broegaard, E. and Kovsted, J. (2012) Hjælper vi? En introduktion til evaluering af udviklingsbistand. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. Anholt, S. (2014) Place Branding som begreb og metode. Økonomi & Politik 87(4): 4–​14. Bergquist, M. (2013) En svensk diplomatimodel? Økonomi & Politik 86(2): 45–​54. Browning, C. S. (2007) Branding Nordicity:  Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27–​51. Cooper, A. F., Heine, J. and Thakur, R. (2013) Introduction: The Challenges of 21st-​Century Diplomacy. In: Cooper, A. F., Heine, J. and Thakur, R. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Economist (2013) The Next Supermodel Politicians from both Right and Left Could Learn from the Nordic Countries. Front page and leader, The Economist, 2 February 2013. Leader available at: www.economist.com/​news/​leaders/​21571136-​politicians-​both-​r ight-​and-​left-​could-​learn-​nordic- ​ countries-​next-​supermodel [Accessed 21 September 2016]. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. FutureBrand (2014) Country Brand Index 2014–​15. Available at: www.futurebrand.com/​uploads/​CBI-​14_​ 15-​LR.pdf [Accessed 21 September 2016]. Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Scandinavian models of diplomacy Haukkala, H. (2013) Finske diplomatimodeller: Er der en ny model på vej? Økonomi & Politik 86(2): 34–​44. Held, D. (1996) Models of Democracy. Oxford: Polity. Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 37(1): 11–​23. Kayes, D. C. (2015) Organizational Resilience:  How Learning Sustains Organizations in Crisis, Disaster, and Breakdown. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marcussen, M. (2013a) Nordiske diplomatimodeller. Økonomi & Politik 86(2): 3–​18. Marcussen, M. (2013b) Det klassiske diplomati fragmenteres og hybriddiplomatiet opstår. Samfundsøkonomen 2013(2): 5–​11. Marcussen, M. (2016) Diplomati: Et portræt af den danske udenrigstjeneste. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels. Marcussen, M. and Ronit, R. (eds) (2014) Dansk diplomati: Klassiske træk og nye tendenser. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels. McClory, J. (2010) The New Persuaders:  An International Ranking of Soft Power. London:  Institute for Government. McClory, J. (2011) The New Persuaders II:  A  2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power. London:  Institute for Government. Munch, J. R. and Schaur, G. (2015) The Effect of Trade Promotion on Firm-​Level Performance. Mimeo. Monocle (2012) Monocle 2012 Soft Power Survey. Monocle 6(59). Monocle (2014) Monocle 2014 Soft Power Survey. Monocle 7(69). Murray, R. (2011) UD i en ny sits –​organisation, ledning och styrning i en globaliserad värld. Rapport til ekspertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi 2011:1. Stockholm: Finansdepartmentet. Nielsen, S. L. (2012) The Danish Foreign Service:  Does Export Promotion Lead to Higher Exports? Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 2012(150): 42–​71. Nye, J. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Panke, D. (2015) Small States in EU-​Decision-​Making: How Can They Be Effective? In: Baldersheim, H. and Keating, M. (eds), Small States in the Modern World:  Vulnerabilities and Opportunities. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Paul, T. V., Larson, D. W. and Wohlforth, W. C. (eds) (2014) Status in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portland Communications (2015) The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power. London: Portland. Schouenborg, L. (2013) Nordisk diplomati:  i det skandinaviske international samfundstjeneste? Samfundsøkonomen 2012(2): 18–​23. Thorhallson, B. (2015) The Outsiders: Norway and Iceland. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Utrikesdepartementet (2015) Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2015–​2018 med fokusområden för år 2016. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, Utrikesdepartementet. Wivel, A. (2013a) Birds of a Feather Flying Apart? Explaining Nordic Dissonance in the (Post)Unipolar World. In Dahl, A.-​S. and Järvenpää, P. (eds), Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic–​Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-​Unipolar World. London: Routledge. Wivel, A. (2013b) Nordisk smart diplomati: et eksempel til efterfølgelse? Økonomi & Politik 86(2): 55–​66.

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20 SCANDINAVIAN DEFENCE AND ALLIANCE POLICIES Different together Carmen Gebhard Introduction As is the case in many aspects of social and economic policy, Scandinavian countries are often perceived to be ‘different’ in terms of how they handle security and defence matters.The general perception is that they traditionally have a distinctive way of responding to strategic challenges, of pursuing their national interests and accommodating them with comprehensive regional and international goals, of engaging with alliances, and involving their societies in deliberations over policy priorities and core values, including security and defence matters. This international reputation of the European North most likely has roots in history: Over many decades, the Scandinavian countries have remained outside major international confrontations and global as well as European power politics (see Archer et al. 2003 on the ‘Nordic Peace’).They have thus turned into what some recognized as a textbook case of a ‘security community’; a group of states that have attained stable peace with one another (Adler and Barnett 1998). In geostrategic terms, Scandinavia is therefore still commonly seen as ‘the quiet corner of Europe’ (Archer 2008: 1). To this day, not least as exemplified by the very existence of this volume, the Scandinavian countries are often addressed en bloc and even referred to as some kind of virtual regional club in which political bargaining, preference formation and societal engagement follow an alternative and somehow more desirable or even morally superior logic. Indeed, taken together, they have an impressive track record of international engagement, for example, and one that is hugely disproportionate to their actual size: They have been amongst the most keenly engaged contributors to UN peacekeeping operations (until recently, with the exception of Iceland), and their joint expenditure on development cooperation and humanitarian aid amounts to approximately 11 per cent of global development assistance (OECD 2014; see also Chapter 23 in this volume).

Scandinavian similarities and differences The Scandinavian countries had diverging strategic ties during the Cold War and pursued different alliance strategies after 1989. This becomes most apparent in each of their institutional and political choices with respect to NATO and the EU Common Security and Defence 254

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Scandinavian defence and alliance policies Table 20.1  Summing up the institutional affiliations of the five countries NATO

EC/​EU

NORDEFCO

Denmark

Founding member, 1949

Founding member, 2009

Finland

PfP only, since 1994

Member since 1973, opt-​outs from military aspects of CSDP Member since 1995

Iceland

Founding member, 1949

Norway

Founding member, 1949

Sweden

PfP only, since 1994

European Free Trade Association only, since 1970 European Free Trade Association only, since 1960 Member since 1995

Founding member and initiator, 2009 Founding member, 2009 Founding member and initiator, 2009 Founding member and initiator, 2009

Policy (CSDP) as the main security governance structures in the Euro-​Atlantic sphere. While Denmark, Iceland and Norway were founding members of NATO, Sweden and Finland have resisted joining the alliance to this day. They have both been active members of the alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) since its inception in 1994 and have continuously intensified their collaboration with the alliance ever since.1 They also continue to call on their strategic traditions as ‘non-​aligned’ countries, however, albeit to varying degrees depending on the political leadership at any given time (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001). Denmark, Sweden and Finland are full EU member states, while Norway and Iceland have firmly remained on the margins of the European integration process.2 Among the Scandinavian EU members, there are differences in how membership came about and in how their memberships evolved, including in the areas of security and defence. Sweden and Finland contribute proactively to the CSDP, but some (in particular, Jakobsen 2009) are more positive about their actual impact on the direction of the policy than others (e.g. Wivel 2005). In any case, their strategic goals in view of European security and defence as well as their engagement in other areas appear to differ quite considerably (Gebhard 2013). Denmark has in turn an opt-​out from the military aspects of the CSDP, including the European Defence Agency (EDA), along with opt-​outs in monetary matters and in justice and home affairs. The Danish defence opt-​out also excludes the country from the so-​called ‘solidarity clause’ in article 222 of the Treaty of Lisbon (Nissen 2015), which foresees mutual assistance among EU member states –​‘by all the means in [each] their power’ –​should one of them fall victim to armed aggression.While many observers highlighted how close this would come to NATO’s ‘Article V’ and the mutual obligation of collective defence, interestingly, both non-​NATO members Sweden and Finland ratified the treaty without pretexts.This shows how difficult it can be to speak of ‘the Nordics’ as a uniform group of states in matters of security and defence; they are not. There are significant and persistent differences between the Scandinavian countries, not only in terms of their strategic choices as outlined above but also in view of their strategic cultures (Neumann and Heikka 2005), their respective security identities (Novack 2003; Rieker 2004), their strategic outlooks (Saxi 2011), and, as will be shown, their specific involvement in cooperative defence projects. Recent developments have rekindled perceptions of the Nordics as some sort of community of fate, which, in defence matters, under the surface of great power competition, had been confined to informal cooperation until fairly recently (see Petersson 2006).3 The Nordic Defence 255

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Table 20.2  Functions performed in Scandinavian defence policies

Denmark

Finland

Iceland

Norway

Sweden

NATO

EC/​EU

NORDEFCO

Mutual defence guarantee; Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Force transformation; Cooperation in defence research and development; Pooling and sharing; Training of personnel; Procurement standards and interoperability; Consultation and diplomacy Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Force transformation; Cooperation in defence research and development; Pooling and sharing; Training and exercising; Procurement standards and interoperability; Consultation and diplomacy Mutual defence guarantee; Framework for (financial and civilian) contributions to multinational operations; Pooling and sharing; Air surveillance support; Consultation and diplomacy Mutual defence guarantee; Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Force transformation; Cooperation in defence research and development; Pooling and sharing;Training of personnel; Procurement standards and interoperability; Consultation and diplomacy Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Force transformation; Cooperation in defence research and development; Pooling and sharing; Training of personnel; Procurement standards and interoperability; Consultation and diplomacy

Consultation and diplomacy; Framework for civilian contributions to multinational operations

Consultation and diplomacy; Procurement and capability development; Training and exercises; Coordination of contributions to multinational operations; Pooling and sharing

Consultation and diplomacy; Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Capability development and interoperability; Training and exercising; Involvement in Nordic Battle Group; Mutual defence guarantee Consultation and diplomacy

Consultation and diplomacy; Procurement and capability development; Training and exercises; Coordination of contributions to multinational operations; Pooling and sharing

Consultation and diplomacy; Framework for contribution to multinational operations (as partner); Involvement in Nordic Battle Group

Consultation and diplomacy; Procurement and capability development; Training and exercises; Coordination of contributions to multinational operations; Pooling and sharing

Consultation and diplomacy; Framework for contributions to multinational operations; Capability development and interoperability; Training and exercising; Involvement in Nordic Battle Group; Mutual defence guarantee

Consultation and diplomacy; Procurement and capability development; Training and exercises; Coordination of contributions to multinational operations; Pooling and sharing

Consultation and diplomacy; Procurement and capability development; Training and exercises; Pooling and sharing

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Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was created in 2009, a comprehensive institutional framework resulting from intra-​Nordic discussions about the practical pressures for more extensive defence cooperation in the light of a changing global security environment, steadily increasing numbers of multinational operations and, not least, ‘techflation’ –​the increasing cost of defence technology and force posture (Adelman and Augustine 1990: 90). The main rationale here is economic: like many other countries in Europe, all of the Scandinavian countries have made cuts to their defence budgets (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2016).4 Originally based on Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish initiatives, NORDEFCO now brings together all of the Nordic countries, and its chairmanship rotates annually. As shown below, the manner in which each Nordic country has assumed a somewhat distinctive role within NORDEFCO illustrates the persistent differences between them. Another recent development is seemingly shifting perceptions of the geostrategic importance of the region, marking a move away from the idea of ‘the quiet corner’ of Europe. US President Obama’s move to launch a ‘US–​Nordic Security Dialogue’ in September 2013 (White House 2013) has increased the global visibility of Nordic security and defence considerably. As shown below, the Nordics have since taken various steps to accommodate the newly emerging strategic interest in the region. In terms of preferences, strategies and levels of commitment, however, differences remain between them. The chapter proceeds with accounts of each country’s defence and alliance policy; each section examines the historical context before turning to their contemporary political conduct, defence posture and strategic outlook.

Sweden Contemporary Swedish defence and alliance strategy has to be discussed against the background of its history of neutrality, which originated in the early nineteenth century and became one of the main principles in Swedish foreign policy (see Hadenius 2003). Officially, Sweden made every effort to avoid getting involved in great power politics during both World Wars. However, there is evidence that Sweden had not been strictly ‘neutral’ in either the Winter War (1939–​40) or the Second World War. Sweden’s ambiguous attitude also manifested itself after 1945: not only was Sweden centrally involved in the proposition of a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1948, it also operated a clandestine nuclear weapons programme until 1966 (Agrell 2002). In 1949, the Riksdag agreed on a specific conception of the foreign policy principle as ‘non-​alignment in peacetime, and neutrality in war’.While the main rationale was to build a more credible record of impartiality, Swedish neutrality policy throughout the Cold War was all but straightforward that way (Eriksson 2003; see also Dalsjö 2014):  Swedish authorities upheld strong ties with the West (breaching the principle of impartiality), particularly in the area of intelligence (Agrell 2006; Petersson 2006), pursued policies of ‘armed neutrality’ and ‘total defence’ (Agius 2012) as well as a distinctive form of diplomatic internationalism (Bergman 2007; Gebhard 2005). Contemporary Swedish defence is conditioned by both the transatlantic and European frameworks: Sweden is actively involved in both the EU’s CSDP and –​through PfP –​various NATO-​directed operational activities and programmes. Neutrality does not appear to inhibit any practical involvement of Swedish officials and troops with either framework. As for other non-​NATO member states like Finland (but also Austria and Ireland), the EU ‘solidarity clause’, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, has raised questions about how the security and defence policies of these member states could be perceived as non-​aligned anymore. Moreover, despite its continued official status as non-​aligned, Sweden takes full part in NATO exercises 257

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and operations and uses NATO standards in its force transformation and capability development programmes, resulting in oft-​praised levels of interoperability. Meanwhile, the country continues to contribute to all parts of NATO’s areas of operational engagement albeit, at the political level, most of the time in a somewhat less forthcoming and enthusiastic manner than Finland. In October 2013 (five years after Finland), Sweden joined the NATO Rapid Response Force, contributing a ‘fighter unit’ that is deployable under NATO command within 90  days, mainly providing Swedish Air Force fighter aircraft for NATO operations (Nyberg 2015). As of 2016, Sweden (and Finland) also provide Host Nation Support to NATO forces through the provision of logistical and operational support sites, essentially allowing allied forces to be stationed on their territory, including in times of peace (NATO 2014). If not already throughout the Cold War, Sweden has definitely come to be seen, particularly from the point of view of Russia, as –​at the very least –​an ‘ambivalent neutral’ (Rieker 2006) if not an outright undercover NATO ally. This raises questions over whether there is any residual meaning in Sweden’s official ‘neutral’ stance at all. It has been argued (e.g. Agius 2012) in turn that Swedish reluctance to integrate fully into the alliance or certain aspects of European integration is more related to a general aversion against the transfer of sovereignty than any true concern with the consequences for neutrality. An attack on Sweden’s territory, for instance, as staged in a Russian military exercise in March 2015 on the Swedish island of Gotland, might be a game changer but, as things stand, Sweden firmly remains out with the alliance. This is not least due to the perceived lack of popular enthusiasm. Public opinion on the matter indeed shifted under the impression of Russian aggressions against Ukraine in 2014, showing somewhat stronger support for Swedish membership in NATO: 48 per cent were in favour, compared to an average of 35 per cent in comparable surveys between 2007 and 2013 (Gell and Stenbäck 2015). However, observers are divided over whether this really marked a lasting change in public acceptance or whether support levels would not eventually bounce back. Public support for NATO membership would possibly take a turn if the debate in Finland moved in that direction. That, however, seems unlikely in its own right (see section on Finland). Affiliations with NATO aside, Sweden has been a key actor within NORDEFCO, building in particular on long-​standing cooperation with Norway as a partner with very similar defence structures (Saxi 2011: 13). Swedish political investment in this regional forum is in line with ongoing domestic discussions about budgetary pressures and a shift in priorities following the refugee crisis that has been present since 2015.

Denmark Denmark’s modern history as a strategic player in both the North and Baltic Seas has been one of serial military defeats and continual territorial decline. Since the Middle Ages, the Kingdom of Denmark has seen a series of cessions, the last one of which, the loss of Schleswig-​Holstein to Prussia (1864), marked a key turning point in Danish foreign policy (Mouritzen 2014): The former empire and regional hegemon had turned into a small state that adopted neutrality as a foreign policy doctrine. Denmark remained formally neutral throughout the First World War (Bludnikow 1989), later reaffirmed its stance, and signed a non-​aggression pact with Nazi Germany in May 1939 (see Leistikow 1939 for a contemporary analysis). This did not protect the country from German invasion less than a year later, in April 1940, as well as from the British occupation of both the Faroe Islands and Iceland (then part of Denmark) to pre-​empt further German occupation in the region (Dethlefsen 1990). 258

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By 1945, Denmark found itself a former imperial power, a small state that had been painfully reminded of its material limitations and their repercussions for its strategic room for manoeuvre. Consequently, the country seems to have turned to multilateral cooperative arrangements as and when they arose: in 1949, attempts at establishing a Scandinavian Defence Union had failed; at that time, regardless of whether or not a Nordic alliance would have come about, however, Denmark would be sure (yet reluctant) to be one of the founding members of NATO. Alliance membership appeared less an opportunity and more of a strategic requirement or ‘necessary evil’ given the very particular systemic conditions at the time (Wivel 2013a: 82). In 1961, Denmark was also the first Nordic country to apply for membership in the EC; unlike the later case of Finland, however, the underlying aspirations were not linked to specific strategic concerns. While European integration certainly benefited Danish strategic interests by providing for a stable and institutionalized environment of interdependence, there was little appetite within the public or political leadership to compromise the unique standing of the Alliance as Western Europe’s security umbrella. Ever since joining as a full member of the Communities (with some delay, in 1973), Denmark has adamantly refrained from any commitments towards a European security and defence policy (Svensson 1994). Meanwhile, Denmark’s conduct within NATO throughout the Cold War has been described as ‘reactive’, ‘pragmatic’ and typical of a ‘small state’ (Wivel 2013b: 299). Danish defence policy at the time seemed deeply embedded in a Nordic ‘third way’ and an inherent focus on multilateral peace politics.The country’s leadership was repeatedly criticized for not meeting NATO capability targets and for upholding a defence budget below the agreed thresholds (Ringsmose 2009). In the 1980s, Denmark’s distinctively reluctant attitude became known as ‘footnoting’; that is, as a habit of including amendments and exemptions in multilateral agreements, thus undermining solidarity and political unity for the sake of particular interests. Although there were specific domestic reasons for the frequency of such occurrences at the time (see Pedersen 2013), the phenomenon has been seen as symptomatic for Denmark’s conduct as a ‘quasi-​ outsider’ up until fairly recently (Adler-​Nissen 2013: 131). Others (e.g. Pedersen 2012; Petersson and Saxi 2013; Rieker 2004) have characterized Danish alliance strategy after the end of the Cold War as increasingly ‘activist’ as well as distinctively pro-​US or ‘Atlanticist’ (Mouritzen 2007). Common examples are situations in which Denmark promptly sided with the United States even if there was general European –​for not to mention intra-​Nordic –​reservation; for example, in the context of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, or more generally in relation to Denmark’s active involvement in the ‘Global War on Terror’ (Petersen 2012). This perception of a radical shift in Danish defence cooperation from reactivist pragmatism to the relative activism since the end of the Cold War, however, has been found to overstate the degree to which current Danish conduct within NATO in particular departs from the attitudes of previous decades (Wivel 2014). Looking at Denmark’s role within the EU, there is a substantive continuity of the country acting as the least ‘adapted’ Nordic (including Norway) (Rieker 2004: 385). In 1992, the Danish public rejected the Treaty of Maastricht, which was to bring about first steps towards a political union including a fledgling security and defence dimension of common foreign policy. To rescue the treaty, Denmark was offered opt-​outs from the monetary union, justice and home affairs, EU citizenship and in all matters related to defence cooperation and military security. In practice, this continuous Danish ‘self-​exclusion’ (Manners 2013) creates increasingly difficult institutional fault lines as the EU’s external governance continues to mature.5 There is in turn very little evidence that Denmark itself has suffered any substantive disadvantages (Nissen 2015; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005). That said, Denmark’s somewhat awkward position within the EU is likely hampering more recent attempts at rekindling Nordic defence cooperation in 259

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the context of NORDEFCO. In fact, despite being a potentially suitable candidate to take the lead, Denmark has seemed relatively reticent thus far (Saxi 2011), particularly when it comes to recent trends towards the reterritorialization of defence postures in the European North (Lehtonen and Isojärvi 2015). Overall, Denmark is said to be seeing ‘more limited space’ for enhanced intra-​Nordic defence cooperation than its regional partners (Wivel and Marcussen 2015: 209); its focus obviously remains on NATO.

Finland Talking about contemporary Finnish defence and alliance strategy in a meaningful way also requires a treatment of the country’s history of neutrality or ‘non-​alignment’, which in turn cannot be discussed in isolation from its unique relationship with Russia (and formerly, the Soviet Union and Russian Empire). Finland has an extensive history marked by external domination, which spans several centuries into very recent times. It was part of the Kingdom of Sweden from the thirteenth century until 1809, when it was annexed by Imperial Russia. After declaring independence in 1917, Finland found itself fighting wars with the Soviet Union twice: the Winter War (1939–​40) and the Continuation War (1941–​ 4). While it ultimately retained its independence, Finland’s history of external dominance did not end after 1945. In 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed an agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which defined specific conditions for Finnish sovereignty and self-​defence and established limitations for Finnish foreign policy in general. This treaty also forced Finland to become a non-​aligned but armed neighbour to the Soviet Union.6 For decades to come, foreign policy became a careful balancing act between complying with Soviet expectations and retaining a somewhat neutral stance in the view of the West. Finland’s relative success in terms of persisting in this situation of extreme geostrategic exposure has often been ascribed to the diplomatic skills and foresight of political leaders such as Urho Kekkonen (Lukacs 1992), unlike in the Swedish case, where similar success in the face of great power had largely been ascribed to luck and coincidence (Agrell 1998; Linder 1998). This has been so prominent that ‘Finlandization’ became a common, albeit disreputable, synonym for the constant policy adaptations and strategic concessions this kind of asymmetric relationship entailed (see Majander 1999).7 The downfall of the Soviet Union therefore marked a dramatic turn in Finnish politics, including in its defence and strategic self-​understanding. On 20 January 1992, Finland and Russia signed a friendship treaty in Helsinki, marking the abrogation of the FCMA. This ended an era of external domination and strategic limitation. Some of the first steps for the newly liberated Finland were a deal with the United States to buy F-​16 fighters (Steinbock 2008: 204), joining the NATO PfP and applying for EU membership. These can all be seen as deliberate choices in an attempt at crafting a new strategic context for establishing a new political track record for the country. From then onwards, it seems, Finnish leadership embraced any opportunity to tie the country to Western political and strategic arrangements. Unlike Sweden, Finland’s rationale for EU membership was not primarily an economic one; in fact, the very aspects of integration that Sweden was to meet with reluctance (e.g. the implications of a political union, the prospects of a monetary union) constituted particular incentives for Finland (Rieker 2004). Being closely entangled in the sphere of a Western supranational institution was perceived a guarantee against Russian influence, and it was promoted that way to the public. The domestic discourse at the time also framed political integration with Western Europe as a sort of ‘homecoming’; a return to a cultural identity 260

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that had been suppressed (Browning 2002).8 This strong sense of belonging and readiness for commitment as a ‘pragmatic adapter’ (Rieker 2006) remains very present in contemporary Finnish security and defence policy; although otherwise an active and committed EU member, Finland appears to be particularly devoted to NATO programmes and initiatives and in defence matters; less so to the EU’s CSDP. Meanwhile, however, full NATO membership remains an unlikely and unpopular option for the country. To many observers and international partners, this ambivalence in Finland’s alliance strategy has been a source of perplexity and frustration. It is indeed rather surprising that Finland did not simply drop its neutral stance after 1992 given that it had not been more than a temporary geostrategic necessity imposed by a strategic giant. In the last two decades, political attitudes over the issue changed repeatedly –​often in line with the general standing of the alliance, and relatedly, the position of the United States within it. While in the 1990s, under PM Lipponen and President Ahtisaari, NATO membership was discussed fairly openly, 9/​11 and the ensuing US call to invoke Article V caused then President Halonen to become much more cautious. Various political leaders have since attempted to rekindle the debate, receiving mixed reactions from the population, and, most importantly, provoking defensive Russian reactions (Steinbock 2008). Apart from the concern that Finnish NATO accession could provoke undesirable Russian counter moves, the debate in Finland continues to be determined by public opinion (Arter 2015), which has traditionally been sceptical towards the notion of full NATO membership.9 Finnish awareness of the Russian threat informed and conditioned several strategic choices after the end of the Cold War; it is also a key factor for explaining why Finland has maintained a conservative defence posture after 1989. While Sweden and Norway, and Denmark in particular, increasingly turned to crisis management and expeditionary operations, Finland preserved substantive conventional capabilities. These substantive regional differences also show in the practical reality of NORDEFCO, where Finland has established itself as an enthusiastic and committed partner but also one that maintains its national strategic idiosyncrasies (Saxi 2011: 13). Its geostrategic exposure will remain a particular concern for the country in the foreseeable future. The annexation of parts of Ukraine has revived Finnish apprehension over the demilitarized Åland Islands in particular, which Russia makes no effort to diffuse: in March 2015, the Russian military staged an exercise that included practising the capture of the islands (along with other geographically exposed regions of Norway and Sweden).

Norway Norway’s history is deeply entangled with its Nordic partners; our discussion starts with the non-​violent departure of Norway from the personal union with Sweden in 1905, which marked the origins of today’s independent Kingdom of Norway.10 Before 1945, Norway had also made attempts at neutrality and non-​alignment, but the Norwegian experience was quite different from that of neutral Sweden or Finland: during the First World War, Norway saw itself pressured to side with the UK. Later, during the Second World War, Norway (like Denmark) was invaded by the Wehrmacht and remained under German occupation until 1945. That neutrality did not suffice to truly keep Norway out of either of the great wars has served as a historical lesson that conditions Norwegian strategy to this day: despite a changing strategic environment, Norway has retained a defensive and relatively conservative defence posture, which reflects an innate lack of trust in its allies. In part, however, there is also a legacy of ‘neutrality and peacefulness’ in the 261

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country’s security doctrine, making Norway a somewhat ‘ambivalent ally’ (Rottem 2007; see also Kelleher et al. 2014 on Norwegian ‘soft power’). Under the impression of looming great power conflict and after failed attempts at establishing a Scandinavian Defence Union, Norway decided to seize the opportunity to join the Alliance in 1949. Throughout the Cold War, however, Norway was also careful to not upset the ‘Nordic balance’, trying to strike a difficult balance between allegiance with NATO, deterrence and reassurance to the Soviet Union (Riste 2001). Like Denmark, also a founding NATO member, it refused to have nuclear weapons deployed or foreign troops stationed permanently on its territory while there was no specific threat of an attack, a stance that became known as the ‘Norwegian base policy’ (Holtsmark 1995: 425). Along with Denmark, Norway was also reluctant towards allied military activities near the Russian border as well as in the Baltic Sea (Moen 1998). Norway otherwise maintained a low profile within the Alliance, and its conduct was not received with nearly as much criticism by fellow allies as that of Denmark (Petersson and Saxi 2013). Norwegian involvement in the European integration project is marked by two failed referenda on accession (1972 and 1994). The Norwegian political elite met post-​Maastricht ambitions to set up a security and defence component for the Union’s foreign policy, and in particular one that would include an operational branch, with pronounced scepticism (Græger 2005). Once EU plans started to materialize, however, Norway assumed a pragmatic stance, even pushing for a formal arrangement of mutual consultation and exchange of information. Although in practice Norway’s access to the decision-​making and decision-​ shaping process nevertheless remained limited, Norway eventually became quite proactively involved in CSDP operations as well as in the dealings of the European Defence Agency (EDA) (see e.g. Sjursen 2014). As a third country, Norway has arguably been more engaged in EU-​related security and defence matters than Denmark (Rieker 2006). That said, some have argued that Norway’s turn to Europe in the formative years of the CSDP in particular was more of a momentary reaction to the unilateralist US policy on Iraq as much as a simple attempt to increase the visibility of Norway in the burgeoning CSDP; that is, what Græger (2002) referred to as a ‘troops-​for-​influence’ strategy. This links to the more general suggestion that post-​Cold War Norway was a ‘small state seeking international standing’ (Carvalho and Neumann 2014). Some would argue that this Norwegian quest to be perceived as an international player is directly reflected in the country’s budgetary ambitions. Indeed, Norway is the only Nordic country with firm plans to (further) increase defence spending (from 1.4 to 1.58 per cent of GNP in 2016). Relatively speaking, the Norwegian expenditures have often been the highest in the region, which has been ascribed to ‘Norwegian prosperity as well as Norway’s dual ambition to secure defence of its (northern) territory and to participate actively in international military operations’ (Wivel and Marcussen 2015: 211). This ‘dual ambition’ reveals that there is more to Norwegian defence activism than a simple attempt at increasing international standing. There are sentiments that go back to Norway’s pre-​1945 experience. Even more so than Finland, Norway has been consistently reluctant to compromise on its territorial defence capabilities. Of all the Nordic countries, Norway’s post-​ Cold War defence and alliance policy has been most consistent with its pre-​1989 position (Steinbock 2008). Norway’s insistent focus on the Russian Threat often made the country seem ‘out-​of-​touch with priorities in the post-​Cold War alliance’ (Petersson and Saxi 2013:  761), predominantly in view of increased expectations for Norway to engage in and prepare their forces more ambitiously for multinational crisis management, and from a NATO perspective, for expeditionary ‘out-​of-​area’ deployments. 262

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Consecutive Norwegian governments have been cautiously aware of the country’s geopolitical position and never ceased to push for the Alliance to up its operational engagement in the High North. In the summer of 2013, Norway requested that NATO increase its military presence in the Arctic to create a strategic counterweight to Russia’s intensifying rearming activity in the region.This, however, was met with reluctance and eventually rejected with reference to the need for ‘cooperation, not confrontation’ (NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh-​ Rasmussen, cited in O’Dwyer 2013). Then PM Jens Stoltenberg (as of October 2014, NATO Secretary General), largely unimpressed by rhetorical reassurances of major allies like the United States and the United Kingdom or Obama’s soft initiative to launch a ‘US–​Nordic Security Dialogue’ (White House 2013), has since continued to push for a greater involvement and focus of the Alliance on the European North (see e.g. Stoltenberg 2015). However, ongoing concerns over developments in Syria have somewhat taken away the momentum this had gained in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Within NORDEFCO, Norway has established itself as a key contributor both materially and politically. Norway’s particular readiness to increase its military budget as well as its continued focus on NATO, however, have added to the asymmetry of this regional forum, thereby contributing to the limitations of a more cohesive Nordic defence framework (Saxi 2011).

Iceland Iceland’s history as a fully sovereign country is short given that much of its past was determined by foreign rule, first under Norway (1262–​1380), and, until a peaceful release in 1918, under Denmark. Iceland was occupied by UK and US forces during the Second World War and first gained full independence from Denmark as the contemporary ‘Republic of Iceland’ in 1944. After 1945, despite having become a fully sovereign country, in security and defence terms, Iceland continued to rely heavily on external support. Based on a defence agreement, US forces (Iceland Defence Force) were stationed on the NATO base in Keflavík in Iceland between 1951 and 2006, providing an important strategic hub for US military aviation and serving as a security umbrella (see Ingimundarson 2003, 2012). Despite being a founding member of NATO, Iceland has not had a standing army to this date. However, the Icelandic Coast Guard patrols Icelandic waters and maintains the Air Defence System, which performs the ground surveillance of Iceland’s air space. Since 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also operated a Crisis Response Unit (Íslenska Friðargæslan), which has been deployed to multinational peacekeeping operations (NATO, OSCE, UN). Like non-​EU member Norway, Iceland has also played an active role in the CSDP, despite its obvious material limitations. Debate on Icelandic EU membership culminated in 2008, when Iceland put in an application in the aftermath of the economic crash; however, the accession process was put on ice when a new centre-​r ight government came to power in 2013. The popular Icelandic perception of the EU as a ‘bully supporting larger states oppressing a small, defenceless neighbour’ was expressed in a wave of post-​crisis nationalism that charged the public discourse for years to come (Thorhallsson 2015: 44; see also Bailes and Ólafsson 2014). After the withdrawal of US troops in 2006, Iceland had a vacuum to fill in its alliance strategy. Although the country remains subject to the Alliance’s mutual defence guarantees and despite the launch of a NATO Air Policing scheme in 2008, there have been clear incentives to reactivate intra-​Nordic ties, in particular with fellow NATO members Denmark and Norway (Ingimundarson 2009). For some time, Iceland also reached out to the UK again but this connection suffered substantively under the ‘fallout’ over the banking crisis (Saxi 2011: 29). Iceland has recently tried to reframe its foreign policy around the increasing strategic salience of the 263

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Arctic while at the same time adamant to not ‘securitize’ the region as the site of potential great power competition (Ingimundarson 2009: 75). Within NORDEFCO, Iceland cooperates closely with its Nordic partners on aspects related to dual-​use procurement, education and training but remains offside when it comes to most of the military components of cooperation (Saxi 2011).Within its given material and geographical reality, particularly in security and defence matters, it seems as though Iceland will continue to be the ‘reactive small state on the periphery’ (Thorhallsson 2015: 34). Icelanders proudly uphold their self-​determined national identity yet remain painfully aware that they lack the capability to defend it, at least militarily. This awareness is also what will inform Icelandic strategy in the mid-​term future: a focus on non-​material security, most importantly cyber security, and a distinctive prioritization of societal security, civil emergency management and, more generally, civil protection, not primarily in view of a potential military attack but of natural disasters, such as the 2010 volcanic eruption (Utanríkisráðuneyti 2014).

Conclusions: comparative outlook From a realist pragmatist point of view, the continued divergence between the defence and alliance policies of the Nordic countries and their asymmetric ties to either NATO, the CSDP or both seem much like a ‘deadlock’; an impediment to a ‘rational long-​term solution’ for regional defence (Forss and Holopainen 2015). In practice, however, the fault lines are much less pronounced than such an assessment would suggest. Arguably, coordination costs are often limited to technical or institutional issues and do not routinely arise from substantive political disagreements but rather from diverging priorities. Such divergence would likely be found in any grouping of states, even if they were all small, culturally entangled with and neighbouring each other. Based on a long-​standing perception of the Nordic Five as a more or less unified bloc, however, there are obviously expectations that they would fare dramatically better at coordinating each other’s defence and alliance policies. The creation of NORDEFCO arguably constitutes a novelty in Nordic cooperation; in times of austerity, however, defence cooperation in the form of pooling and sharing is a necessity; and one that the Scandinavians share in common with many other European countries.The mere existence of NORDEFCO therefore does not yet signify a substantive revival of inter-​ Nordic relations more generally (Forsberg 2013). Beyond obvious short-​term practical merits, it remains to be seen whether NORDEFCO will lead towards a truly ‘common’ Nordic defence, fundamental reforms and force transformation within each Nordic country, let alone towards the build-​up of a post-​national Nordic military. Budget limitations and the lack of a common strategic vision have been mentioned (Saxi 2011) as likely inhibitors for NORDEFCO to truly serve as a catalyst for renewed Nordic unity. Criticism has also been raised over the lack of substantive successes and tangible outcomes to date, particularly in the areas of joint procurement and pooling. Rieker and Terlikowski (2015) identify challenges that will unlikely become eradicated any time soon: national industrial interests differ, as does legislation on, for example, procurement procedures. More profound harmonization is needed before the framework can yield the ambitious results set out in the founding memorandum (NORDEFCO 2009). That said, strong new incentives have arisen from the recent internationalization of strategic debates in the region following renewed territorial confrontations with Russia in 2014. In April 2015, the Nordic defence ministers announced closer cooperation in reaction to aggressive Russian behaviour towards neighbouring Ukraine (Bentzrød 2015). While NORDEFCO seemed to be the obvious institutional avenue, the statement strongly emphasized intra-​Nordic linkages more broadly. 264

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Arguably, there are instances of the Nordic countries moving closer together (e.g. statements at a recent Nordic Defence Minister meeting in Stockholm, see NATO 2015), which might indicate increasing Nordic unity. Meanwhile, global awareness of the direct territorial threat emanating from Russia increases, and the adjacent Arctic is increasingly recognized for its geostrategic importance (Keil and Raspotnik 2014; Knecht and Keil 2013; Kraska 2011; Sergunin and Konyshev 2014). These general strategic trends might change the long-​term perceptions of the North and lead to the renewed politicization of the region.

Notes 1 At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, Sweden and Finland signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NATO that effectively allows Allied forces to be stationed on their national territories in both peacetime and war (NATO 2014). This will arguably bring them as close to de facto membership as possibly conceivable. 2 That said, as discussed below, both are closely involved in the practical dealings of the CSDP as third countries. 3 The Nordic countries first developed functional defence cooperation after the end of the Cold War, starting with the establishment of a framework for the coordination of defence research, development and procurement programmes (Nordic Armaments Co-​operation –​NORDAC) in 1994, and the establishment of a Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) in 1997. 4 With the exception of Iceland, which did not have a separate budget line for defence until 2008 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2016). 5 The inclusion of both civilian and military aspects of the CSDP in the mandate of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been a particular case in point where the Danish opt-​out created substantive practical problems. 6 The main aim of the agreement from the Soviet perspective was to contain Western influence in Finland and to maintain a buffer along its north-​western border. 7 ‘Finlandization’ is not an academic term but has instead found prominent (and controversial) use in political discussions over post-​independence sovereignty in particular (e.g. in Austria but also in the Balkans and post-​colonial Africa). The concept has recently seen a contested revival in the context of discussions over Finnish concessions to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine (Milne 2014). 8 European integration was a welcome opportunity to openly integrate with the West and one that Finland seized to the fullest by taking a progressive and unorthodox approach to the multiple pressures of integration on national policy, structure and identity. 9 According to recent polls, general support for membership has not changed over the years despite substantive changes in the strategic environment; it sits at a constant low of 25–​27 per cent, with a majority 57–​59 per cent that is opposed to the idea (see TNS Gallup poll discussed in Raeste 2015). 10 Preceding the Swedish–​Norwegian Union (1814–​1905), Norway had been part of a personal union with the Kingdom of Denmark (1376–​1814) until Denmark had to cede the kingdom to the King of Sweden. After its defeat in the Norwegian–​Swedish War in 1814, Norway was forced into a personal union with Sweden albeit remaining, with the exception of foreign policy, a largely autonomous state.

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C. Gebhard Petersson, M. and Saxi, H. L. (2013) Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–​2009. Journal of Strategic Studies 36(6): 761–​788. Raeste, J.-​ P. (2015) Kotimaa:  HS-​ gallup:  Enemmistö suomalaisista vastustaa yhä Nato-​ jäsenyyttä. Helsigin Sanomat, 5 March 2015. Available at:  www.hs.fi/​kotimaa/​a1425450355649 [Accessed 7 July 2016]. Rieker, P. (2004) Europeanization of Nordic Security: The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States. Cooperation and Conflict December 39(4): 369–​392. Rieker, P. (2006) Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States. London: Routledge. Rieker, P. and Terlikowski, M. (2015) The Limits and Achievements of Regional Governance in Security: NORDEFCO and the V4, PISM paper. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs. Ringsmose, J. (2009) Paying for Protection Denmark’s Military Expenditure during the Cold War. Cooperation and Conflict 44(1): 73–​97. Riste, O. (2001) NATO, the Northern Flank, and the Neutrals. In:  Schmidt, G. (ed.), A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Rottem, S. V. (2007) The Ambivalent Ally:  Norway in the New NATO. Contemporary Security Policy 28(3): 619–​638. Saxi, H. L. (2011) Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War. Series: Oslo Files on Defence and Security, March 2011. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Sergunin, A. and Konyshev,V. (2014) Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: between Hard and Soft Power? The Polar Journal 4(1): 69–​87. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2016). Available at: www.sipri.org/​databases/​milex [Accessed 12 December 2016]. Sjursen, H. (2014) Demokrati eller handlingskapasitet? Paradokser i Norges tilknytning til EU på det utenriks-​og sikkerhetspolitiske område. In:  Fossum, J. E. and Eriksen, E. O. (eds), Det norske paradoks: Om Norges forhold til Den Europeiske Union. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Steinbock, D. (2008) NATO and Northern Europe: From Nordic Balance to Northern Balance. American Foreign Policy Interests 30(4): 196–​210. Stoltenberg, J. (2015) Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Stavanger. Available at:  www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​opinions_​123767.htm [Accessed 11 July 2016]. Svensson, P. (1994) The Danish Yes to Maastricht and Edinburgh. The EC Referendum of May 1993. Scandinavian Political Studies 17(1): 69–​82. Thorhallsson, B. (2015) The Outsiders: Norway and Iceland. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union:  Still the Other European Community? London: Routledge. Utanríkisráðuneyti (2014) Þjóðaröryggisstefna í mótun. Fréttir og fréttatilkynningar frá utanríkisráðuneyti. Available at: www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/​frettir/​nr/​7985 [Accessed 11 July 2016]. White House (2013) US–​Nordic Security Dialogue: Joint Statement by Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, Republic of Iceland, Kingdom of Norway, Kingdom of Sweden, and the United States of America. Available at:  www.whitehouse.gov/​the-​press-​office/​2013/​09/​04/​joint-​statement-​kingdom-​denmark-​republic-​ finland-​republic-​iceland-​kingdo [Accessed 11 July 2016]. Wivel, A. (2005) The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States:  Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor. Journal of Common Market Studies 43(2): 393–​412. Wivel, A. (2013a) A Pace-​Setter out of Sync? Danish Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the European Union. In: Miles, L. and Wivel, A. (eds), Denmark and the European Union. London: Routledge. Wivel, A. (2013b) From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark’s Great Power Politics. Swiss Political Science Review 19(3): 298–​321. Wivel, A. (2014) Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Origins of Denmark’s Pragmatic Activism. In: Hvidt, N. and Mouritzen, H. (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2014. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Wivel, A. and Marcussen, M. (2015) In the Shadow of History? Explaining the (Lack of) Europeanisation of Nordic Security and Defence Policies. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the Other European Community? London: Routledge.

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21 SCANDINAVIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Pragmatic functionalism reconsidered Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel

Introduction: two tales of Scandinavia in international society The Nordic countries are renowned for their activism when it comes to strengthening international society (Browning 2007; Ingebritsen 2002).1 They have actively promoted causes such as peaceful conflict resolution, human rights, combating poverty, global inequality and environmental degradation, and they have played an active role in strengthening and developing organizations such as the United Nations at the global level and the Council of Europe at the European level. In their own ‘quiet corner’ of Europe (see Archer 2005: 398), the Nordic countries have nurtured an ideologically driven but functionally implemented ‘cob-​web integration’ taking its point of departure in the values of nineteenth-​century Scandinavism and the Scandinavian welfare states but pursuing cooperation and with a focus on ‘low politics’ and cultural and educational exchange.2 At the same time, intra-​Nordic cooperation has served as a platform for extra-​Nordic influence, and the Nordic countries have been widely recognized for their particular way of doing politics domestically and internationally and for their international contribution. They continuously top international rankings such as the Global Peace Index and the Good Country Index. And they are recognized by the world’s only superpower for making the world ‘more secure’ and ‘more prosperous’, as President Obama declared in his welcome to the five Nordic prime ministers for a White House meeting and state dinner in May 2016 (Harris 2016).3 In short, the Nordics are at the same time doing good and doing well with regard to international society in general. The Scandinavian approach to EU integration seems to provide a marked contrast to this overall picture. Historically, the Scandinavian approach to EU integration is reluctant and self-​ serving (Miljan 1977; Wallace 1999). As of 2016, two of the Nordics remain outside of the EU (Norway and Iceland), albeit with extensive cooperative arrangements via-​à-​vis the EU; two countries are members but with opt-​outs (Denmark and Sweden); and the last one, Finland, was the teacher’s pet in the EU classroom until the financial crisis from 2008 and the migration crisis from 2015. Since then, the Finns have increasingly moved away from the EU mainstream. In short, according to this tale, the Nordic countries are neither homogenous nor consistent with respect to EU integration. 269

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We argue that the contrast between Scandinavian behaviour in the EU and in other contexts is less marked than it might initially appear. Scandinavian EU policies are characterized by a ‘yes, but …’ approach, guarding their exceptionalism but taking advantage of any opportunities that may arise to maximize their interests (Grøn et al. 2015a: 244). Furthermore, the self-​serving interventions of Nordic states in EU politics are typically at the same time attempts at protecting and/​or spreading the core values of the Scandinavian welfare state. From this starting point, we discuss the origin(s) and content(s) of the Scandinavian approach(es) to EU integration. Scandinavia has been described as ‘the other European community’ (Turner and Nordquist 1982), and the Nordic countries share a number of political, societal and cultural characteristics, which lead actors both within and beyond these countries to consider them a bloc within the EU or perhaps even a community (Archer 2005: 397; Grøn et al. 2015b: 1).We explore whether these similarities amount to a Scandinavian model for EU integration; and to the extent this is the case, then what characterizes this model. The chapter proceeds in five steps. First, we briefly identify the historical origins of Scandinavian engagement with the EU followed by two sections exploring different ways of understanding the relationships between the Nordics: how they relate to the EU in terms of specific policies and how they engage with EU institutions. The fourth section discusses Nordic grand strategies in the EU and the role of Scandinavia in these strategies. Finally, we conclude by summing up the main characteristics of the Nordic model(s) in EU integration.

From ‘the other European community’ to ‘expert and experienced bridge-​builders’? Two buzzwords are typically bandied about when characterizing Nordic–​European relations with respect to European integration. The Scandinavians are ‘reluctant Europeans’ (Miljan 1977) and they nurture ‘the other European community’ (Turner and Nordquist 1982); that is, intra-​Nordic cooperation. However, these characterizations are only true with significant qualifications. Scandinavian reluctance towards European integration is qualified by the very high degree of compliance with EU legislation and regulation by Nordic EU and EEA member states and by a relatively high degree of electoral support towards membership. Also, even the two Nordic non-​members participate fully in EU market integration and in EU’s research cooperation (as far as Norway is concerned) (with the notable exceptions of the agricultural and fishery sectors). Thus, even though two Nordic countries remain outside of the EU and two of the three members have opted out of parts of the integration process, all of the Nordics are highly involved in the European integration processes. The Scandinavians are more accurately described as European latecomers, although even this characterization requires unpacking. When the EU was established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, there were no Nordic participants. Denmark first joined in 1973, and any real debate in Sweden and Finland on joining only surfaced after the end of the Cold War as formal membership of the European integration project was viewed as potentially undermining their neutral Cold War posturing. As early as 1947, however, Denmark displayed interest in plans to create a European Customs Union, and Denmark considered joining the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952–​3 (ECSC). From the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, strong interest groups (particularly from agriculture) and government officials considered membership a real option. According to these actors, it was an option with more benefits than the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) of which Denmark, Norway and Sweden were founding members in 1960 (Olesen 1995: 10). Like Denmark, Norway and Iceland were 270

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Scandinavia and the European Union Table 21.1  EU applications of Nordic countries and results Year

Event

1961 1962 1967

First EU application, Denmark (vetoed in negotiations along with UK application by France) First EU application, Norway (vetoed in negotiations along with UK application by France) Second EU application, Norway Second EU application, Denmark Vote on accession, Norway, 53.5 per cent vote against accession Vote on accession, Denmark, 63.3 per cent vote in favour of accession Denmark joins the EU Danish referendum on the Single European Act, which is adopted Sweden applies for EU membership Third application, Norway Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which is rejected Finland applies for EU membership Danish referendum on the Edinburgh Agreement, which is adopted Second referendum, Norway, 52.2 per cent vote against accession Swedish referendum on accession to the EU, 52.3 per cent vote in favour of accession Finnish referendum on accession to the EU, 56.9 per cent vote in favour of accession Sweden and Finland joins the EU Danish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, which is adopted Danish referendum on accession to the euro, which is rejected Swedish referendum on accession to the euro, which is rejected First EU application, Iceland Application put on hold, Iceland Danish referendum on participation in the EU patent court, which is adopted Application retracted, Iceland Danish referendum on participation in justice and home affairs, which is rejected

1972 1973 1986 1990 1992

1993 1994

1995 1998 2000 2003 2009 2013 2014 2015

founding NATO members in 1949 and as such positioned squarely in the Western camp during the Cold War. Rather than a lead-​in to European integration, however, ‘[t]‌heir geopolitical location on the margin of Europe and their associated Atlanticism have led to and compensated for their unwillingness to participate fully in the European project’ (Thorhallsson 2015: 46). Norway might otherwise have become a member as early as 1963. In 1962, Norway applied for membership together with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, but the negotiations ended with a French veto against British membership. The Norwegian decision to apply was a reaction to the applications from Denmark and in particular the UK, as membership had previously been a non-​issue (Archer and Sogner 1998: 26–​27). In 1967, Norway reapplied together with the UK, Denmark and Ireland, and even though the negotiations were suspended due to another French veto, they resumed in 1970 and were concluded in 1972. In contrast to the Danish electorate who supported membership with a majority of 63.3 per cent, however, the Norwegian electorate rejected membership by 53.3 per cent. After the Cold War, Norway re-​ applied for membership in 1992, once again in a Nordic context, with three Cold War-​neutral Western European countries Sweden, Finland and Austria. The EU succession negotiations ended successfully in 1994, but membership was once again rejected by the electorate in a referendum; this time by 52.2 per cent. Sweden joined with 52.3 per cent in favour, Finland with 56.9 per cent. Iceland, an EEA member since 1994 and Schengen member since 2001, first applied for EU membership following the financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing collapse of 271

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C. H. Grøn and A. Wivel Table 21.2  Nordic affiliation with EU-​integration: EFTA, EEA, Schengen and EU membership (including opt-​outs) Country

EU (opt-​outs)

Denmark

X (the euro, justice and home affairs, citizenship, defence cooperation) X

Finland Iceland Norway Sweden

EFTA

x

X X X (the euro)

EEA and Schengen

x x x x

the Icelandic economy, which left Iceland ‘trapped within the European Economic Area without having the shelter inherent in membership of the European Union’ (Thorhallsson 2016: 54). Its bid was officially retracted in 2015, however, as the Icelandic economy rebounded.4 If we measure the European reluctance of the Nordic countries in terms of their engagement in ‘the other [Scandinavian] European community’, Nordic cooperation does not come out as the unequivocal winner. Negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1947–​8 failed as the United States refused to back the plans, and Denmark and Norway subsequently opted for NATO membership. Plans for a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) –​an alternative to European integration –​failed in 1968–​70 when Finland withdrew its support and Denmark subsequently joined the EU.The history of Nordic cooperation is littered with grand schemes that never materialized. In that sense, the Nordics are not just reluctant Europeans, but even more reluctant Scandinavians.5 At the same time, this ‘narrative of failure’ is complemented by a ‘narrative of success’ emphasizing the Nordic security community and the numerous low-​ key, low-​politics examples of cooperation between private, public and third-​sector actors as well as many examples of policy learning (Strang 2016: 3–​9). More accurately, we can characterize the Nordic countries as a group of highly and increasingly Europeanized and globalized states that never subscribed to the European idea but have increasingly found it in their national interest to advocate an integrated but differentiated Europe, acting themselves as ‘expert and experienced bridge-​builders’ (Miles 2015: 29). Taking in this role, they negotiate the connections between their Nordic welfare states, their geopolitical interests vis-​à-​vis the United States, Russia and the large EU member states, and seek to reconcile the politics of choice in their Nordic models with the politics of necessity in relations with Europe and the rest of the world.

Scandinavia and EU policy areas: divided on sovereignty, united on the welfare state The EU has been described as an Unidentified Political Object or sui generis (e.g. Caporaso 1997) compared to other types of state cooperation. However, the EU increasingly makes policy in areas affecting the domestic constitution of member state societies as well as the everyday lives of the citizens in these societies.6 As small, trade-​dependent nations, all of the Nordics participate in the common market: Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as a consequence of their EU membership, and Norway and Iceland, as a consequence of their membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), which leaves them inside the market but without formal channels for influencing the EU legislation that determines the rules of play. Thus, it is of no surprise that 272

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Denmark, Sweden and Finland typically support the internal market and promote liberalization in EU negotiations (Nedergaard and Jensen 2017). Commitment to free trade also serves as part of the material and ideational underpinning of the Scandinavian welfare states. Using free trade as a tool for economic growth since the nineteenth century, it was argued that ‘protectionism would only stifle economic growth and put the burdens on those who were the least able to bear them, namely the poor’ (Schouenborg 2013:  99). Similarly, the Nordics find strong commonalities in issues relating directly to the construction of their welfare states. This pertains to labour market policies, such as minimum wages, which are traditionally the result of negotiations between employers’ organizations, trade unions and government representatives rather than being negotiated by parliament and decided by law in the Nordic countries. Thus, the Nordic countries share a common interest in curbing legislation that limits the room for national collective bargaining. Similarly, the free movement of labour has challenged both the (high) negotiated wage levels among Nordic workers (Jensen 2015) as well as the universal Scandinavian welfare models, particularly in relation to the question of welfare benefits.Whereas Finland and Denmark have defended their national models most proactively in this area (Kuisma and Nygård 2015: 168), all of the Nordic countries seek to maintain a delicate balance between keeping the core aspects of the welfare state while at the same time reforming it and adapting it in line with European and global developments. Similarly, Denmark and Sweden in particular have been strong defenders of a ‘green’ agenda in the EU, promoting stronger environmental regulation and an active climate policy (cf. Liefferink and Andersen 1998; Wivel 2009; see also Chapter 5 in this volume). There are differences as well. As pointed out above, two Nordic EU member states have opt-​ outs, whereas the two Nordic countries outside of the EU participate in selected aspects of EU integration, albeit without any formal channels of influence on EU decision-​making. Denmark has four opt-​outs, three of which still have policy relevance: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and defence cooperation. Similarly, Sweden has an opt-​out regarding the EMU. In Justice and Home Affairs, despite its non-​membership, Norway has gradually moved closer to the EU core as a consequence of Schengen participation and subsequent efforts to curb cross-​border crime and illegal immigration (Adler-​Nissen 2015: 100).

Justice and Home Affairs IS

DK N

F, S

Internal Market N, IS

OUTSIDE

F, S, DK

The Euro IS, DK, N, S

F

Defence Cooperation DK

IS, N

F, S

Agriculture and Fisheries IS, N

F, S, DK

Figure 21.1  Nordic countries inside and outside central EU policy areas

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In contrast, Iceland, the other Nordic non-​member, has not had the same incentives to JHA integration due to its geographical location in the North Atlantic Ocean, which practically isolates it from most of the adverse consequences of de facto abolishment of physical borders in the Schengen area. Sweden and Finland both participate extensively in JHA. Sweden even used the area for pushing a classical Scandinavian agenda with the Stockholm Programme of 2009, which provided a framework for policy responses regarding development cooperation and social, educational, employment and health issues with a particular focus on gender equality and human trafficking (European Union 2009). Conversely, Denmark is formally bound by an opt-​out and further limited by the salience of the question of immigration in Danish domestic politics. The country has remained reluctant regarding JHA participation and confirmed the continuation of the formal opt-​out in a referendum on 3 December 2015, despite warnings from senior police officers that this would most likely have repercussions for continued Danish participation in Europol. This overall image of ‘misty boundaries’ between member and non-​member states is repeated with respect to EU defence cooperation.7 Sweden and Finland participate fully in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and Norway and Iceland have been participating in EU military operations. Denmark has a formal opt-​out from defence cooperation, which prohibits the country from participating in EU military missions as well as the development and acquisition of military capabilities in the context of the EU. With the exception of Finland, however, the EU plays a marginal role in the defence policies of the Nordic countries, with NATO and the UN traditionally having a much stronger impact on official strategy and public discourse (Wivel and Marcussen 2015). One might get the impression that Denmark is the most reluctant European in the Nordic family. Turning to the EMU, however, it becomes clear that Sweden joins the team of sceptics on this issue. Whereas Finland joined the Euro due to geopolitical concerns over Russia, Sweden stayed outside, with an option to join, whereas Denmark obtained a politically driven opt-​out, choosing to peg its currency to the euro (Korkman 2015). Whereas these policy areas all convey an image of ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic EU member states and EU non-​member states, the primary sector, agriculture and fishery, has served as a de facto ‘selector’ on EU membership in Scandinavia. In Norway and Iceland, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) are ‘seen to pose grave threats to the primary sectors. The fisheries sector is closely associated with the way of life in both of these states, but it is also by far the most important economic sector in Iceland’ (Thorhallsson 2015: 47). Similarly, agricultural policy has been an issue in the two countries’ accession negotiations (Skinner 2010). In contrast, Denmark and Sweden are both in favour of reforming the CAP in a more market-​based direction (Jensen and Nedergaard 2015: 139). Finland, on the other hand, has defended the CAP (Kola 2008); a position matching the structure of the Finnish agricultural sector and serving its interests. As with the EMU, however, geopolitics also play a more direct role in Finnish EU policy than in the other Nordics, leaving the most eastern Nordic country with a more restricted action space when it comes to protesting EU policies and opting out of policy areas. In sum, the Nordics remain united in defence of the core aspects of the Scandinavian welfare state, including core policies on health and the labour market as well as a protective stance towards the environment and human rights, and they are sceptical but divided over policies pertaining more broadly to sovereignty-​related issues. Two factors seem to have played a particularly important role when it comes to opting in and out of policy areas as well as the EU. First, geopolitics, leaving Finland with a narrower action space than the other Nordics, due to its proximity to Russia combined with its lack of alliance membership, and leaving Norway and Iceland on the Atlantic coast at the margin of Europe, isolated from at least some of the adverse 274

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consequences of increasing interdependence driving the European integration project from its outset. Second, primary sector policies, in particular the CFP, viewed as threatening the way of life in Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and the economic interests of the latter three of these nations (Thorhallsson 2015: 47) (see also Chapter 16 in this volume).

The Nordic countries and EU institutions The most fundamental differences in Scandinavian institutional strategies in the EU pertain to the fact that Norway and Iceland are not EU member states and, therefore, not embedded in its institutional structure. Norway and Iceland do not negotiate in the Council of Ministers, they do not have a commissioner amongst the College of Commissioners, and they have no members of the European Parliament. On this background, they are left to pursue EU institutions more like a lobby group than a member state (see Thorhallsson 2000). However, there are important differences in terms of how many resources each of the countries allocates to lobbying the EU; Norway has a substantial presence in Brussels, matching more or less the presence of a country such as Denmark,8 whereas the Icelandic presence is much more limited.9 There are also notable differences between the three Nordic EU member states. Whereas Denmark is illustrative of a classical small state approach, working within the political parameters set by the great powers, Sweden acts more like a middle power, refusing to accept small-​state status to the same extent as Denmark. Swedish officials and politicians therefore tend to politicize, for example vis-​à-​vis the Commission bringing their own independent ideas and visions to the negotiation table, even at the risk of conflict and confrontation, whereas Danish officials point out the importance of keeping things technical, not causing too much trouble and being seen as a constructive player (Grøn 2015). Similarly, there are institutional differences when it comes to the involvement of national parliaments in EU policy. Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, it has been an official EU aim to increase the involvement of national parliaments in policy-​making. While this plays into traditional Nordic ideals of broad public involvement in societal developments dating back to nineteenth-​century Scandinavism and beyond, there are marked differences in the implementation of this aim between the Nordic EU member states, with Denmark and Finland serving as extreme examples of each end of a continuum. Whereas the Danish Folketing has been an active and constructive player in the process, going so far as to assume the role as coordinator for other parliaments, the Finns have been very reluctant to take on the role as an independent actor at the EU level (Cooper 2015: 113). This is curious considering that the Finnish parliamentary practice for how to handle EU affairs is strongly inspired by the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament. Despite these differences on institutional access and policy substance, there are strong similarities among the Nordic countries following from their relatively similar institutional traditions. Over the past decade, small EU member states have been challenged by the weakening of the European Commission, which was traditionally the ‘best friend’ of the small states due to its role as the impartial caretaker of the common interest and a source of information and technical expertise (Bunse et al. 2005; Geurts 1998). Conversely, the European Council and the Parliament have gained influence as a result of post-​Lisbon Treaty decision-​making rules, and informal great power ‘directorates’ have gained legitimacy and influence, thereby increasing the importance of informal negotiations outside of official forums and creating a platform for big member state influence (Grøn and Wivel 2011). However, the relatively resourceful, merit-​based and well-​functioning civil services of all of the Nordic countries put them in a privileged position vis-​à-​vis other small states to take advantage of this development (see Haverland and Liefferink 2012 on lobby resources). Thus, the 275

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Nordics have proven relatively successful in informal negotiations, and Finland and Denmark are both in the top five of the most active countries in lobbying EU institutions, whereas Sweden is in eighth spot (Panke 2011: 132).When it comes to developing high quality position papers in time for Council negotiations, Sweden, Denmark and Finland are all among the highest ranking member states (Panke 2010). When measuring the success of member states in changing the texts of European directives and regulations in accordance with their national positions, the Nordic member states also rank highly, Sweden taking second (after the UK) and Finland (sixth) and Denmark (eighth) also in the top ten (Panke 2016: 63–​64). Moreover, Nordic member states have successfully established a forerunner reputation and technical expertise within a number of issue areas, including conflict prevention and civil crisis management, allowing them to play a role as norm entrepreneurs influencing decision-​makers in the Commission and the European Parliament (Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2008; Jakobsen 2009). At the same time, the Nordic countries face two challenges to institutional influence. First, the three Nordic EU member states are facing or have faced issues of recruitment of own nationals to the EU institutions, most prominently the recruitment of civil servants to the European Commission (Grøn 2015; Heeger 2015). In recent years, the Danish government has continuously encouraged more people to pursue a career in the EU.10 Second, the Nordic countries like playing by the rules, which can be both an advantage and a disadvantage in a political system that is not always very akin to how the Nordic countries work (Grøn 2015; see e.g. the classical discussion by Coombes 1970; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 67ff.). While playing by the rules has been instrumental in creating a Nordic brand as trustworthy partners willing and able to deliver on their promises, the increasing importance of informal forums means that Nordic civil servants must navigate in a negotiation space with opaque or non-​existent rules. The Nordics are likely to do so with varying degrees of success, Sweden and Denmark representing the extremes. Swedish negotiations typically take their point of departure in a top-​down model with a policy position clearly defined from Stockholm and with limited action space for negotiators on the ground, whereas Denmark typically works with broader mandates allowing for greater flexibility in negotiations and the negotiator enjoys greater autonomy.

Nordic strategies in the EU Which strategies do the Nordic countries employ to maximize influence in the EU? And what role does Scandinavia play in these strategies? One such strategy is the actor strategy. As illustrated above, the Nordic countries have common policy interests on a number of material and ideational issues as well as common institutional traits. These commonalities allow the Nordics to appear as a unified actor in relation to selected issues on the European stage, such as the drive for increased transparency in EU institutions and an EU strategy for the Baltic region. With two Nordic states outside of the EU there are also clear limitations to this approach, however, leaving Sweden, Denmark and Finland to act within the formal EU channels. A second limitation marking this strategy is the fact that, even as a bloc, the three Nordic countries are not of a size to make them matter in the Council of Ministers. While they may be successful in agenda-​ setting issues, other allies are necessary if agenda-​setting is to be converted into legislation. When it comes to negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the Nordic cooperation may rather be seen as an arena. Nordic cooperation within the EU is often a matter of sharing information and informally testing arguments rather than building coalitions and agreeing on detailed policy positions. Therefore, they have institutionalized meeting forums where they 276

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can pool and share information and expertise and test their arguments (Rûse 2015: 64). The Nordic Council of Ministers provides an institutional setting emphasizing Nordic cooperation and has increasingly focused on the EU in recent years (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015: 33), although usually as a forum for debate rather than a platform for coalition-​building (Rûse 2015). Finally, Nordic cooperation is occasionally little more than an appendix to how the Nordic countries deal with EU policies. As argued above, there are a number of issues where the Nordics clearly do not have common interests, such as agricultural policy. Furthermore, the fact that two of them are outside the EU possibly makes it less compelling for the insiders to coordinate with them. While the rhetorical support for Nordic cooperation is strong and the Nordic EU members do coordinate (Rûse 2015), there is a mismatch between how the Nordic countries traditionally have been presented as a community and how they deal with EU politics on a daily basis. Hence, the Nordic cooperation may be more of a toast on special occasions than a central policy tool for ensuring national interest. Nordic relations with the EU are increasingly normalized in the sense that a particular Nordic position or Nordic bloc has become less discernible as the combined effects of globalization and Europeanization have led Nordic decision-​makers to amend what was the Social Democratic Scandinavian welfare state to approximate societal models in the rest of Europe (Brandal and Bratberg 2016; Grøn et al. 2015a: 245–​250). Consequently, there may be fewer and fewer functional arguments in favour of a particular role for Nordic cooperation.

Conclusions The Nordic approach to the EU is most accurately described as pragmatic and functionalist. The Nordic countries have pursued their national interests pragmatically without European or Nordic bindings. Rather than a Nordic alliance on EU politics, there is more a Nordic cluster exchanging information and being comparatively effective and rule-​abiding when engaging in negotiations and implementation. Pragmatic functionalism takes place in the context of the Scandinavian welfare state, which at the same time serves as a platform for action, as in conflict prevention and environmental protection and other areas concomitant with the fundamental values of the welfare state, and as a protective shield for the Scandinavian welfare state. Thus, Scandinavians pragmatically opt in and out of policies, creating a map of ‘misty boundaries’ between the three Nordic members of the EU and the two non-​members. The Nordics all engage actively with the EU, but at the same time they all maintain firm bastions against EU integration, particularly in relation to their welfare states. The Nordic positions in Europe are basically conditioned by attempts at securing the survival of how the Nordic societies have been organized in policies where ‘value’ and ‘interest’ are difficult to disentangle. Thus, looking across policy areas, we find that national positions on EU policies largely reflect domestic interests, be they material (e.g. dealing with fisheries) or more ideological in nature (e.g. JHA opt-​outs). Does this make Scandinavians reluctant Europeans? Not any more than they are reluctant Nordics or even reluctant globalizers. Rather than the two distinct tales of Scandinavia in international society told in the introduction of this chapter, Nordic policies towards the EU seem to be a subset of a more general Nordic approach to politics. Thus, just as there are ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic members and non-​members of the EU, there are also ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic EU policy and global policy. The ‘Nordic international society’ values reflect those of the welfare state (see Schouenborg 2013), and they are typically pursued with the same pragmatism. Perhaps not surprisingly in this context, the EU has subsumed the Nordic bloc in international relations since the end of the Cold War (Laatikainen 2003). In that sense, 277

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Scandinavia in the EU may not be as much of an outlier in Nordic politics as it is a magnifying glass allowing us to see some of the aspects of Scandinavian international politics more clearly, as they are exposed by European developments and the Nordic responses to these developments.

Notes 1 In accordance with the use of the concepts in the rest of the volume, we use ‘Nordic’ and ‘Scandinavian’ interchangeably. 2 See Andrén (1967), Nedergaard (2009) and Strang (2016) for discussions of intra-​Nordic integration. 3 See Chapter 19 in this volume on Scandinavian diplomacy and http://​goodcountry.org/​index/​overall-​rankings and www.visionofhumanity.org/​#/​page/​indexes/​global-​peace-​index. 4 www.theguardian.com/​world/​2015/​mar/​12/​iceland-​drops-​european-​union-​membership-​bid. 5 See also the discussion on ‘reluctant Nordics’ in Arter (2008: 297–​313). 6 See Cini and Borragán (2016) for an overview of EU policy areas. 7 For a general discussion of ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic EU member states and non-​member states, see Miles (2005), who also coined the phrase. 8 See e.g. www.eu-​norway.org/​mission/​STAFF/​#.VzWd_​OTzJ3g and http://​eu.um.dk/​en/​about-​us/​ staff-​members/​. 9 www.iceland.is/​iceland-​abroad/​be/​embassy-​information/​personnel/​. 10 See e.g. http://​ufm.dk/​aktuelt/​nyheder/​2014/​flere-​danskere-​skal-​arbejde-​i-​eu (accessed 10 June 2016).

References Adler-​Nissen, R. (2015) Through the EU’s Front and Back Doors: The Selective Danish and Norwegian Approaches in the Area of Freedom. Security and Justice. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union:  Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Andrén, N. (1967) Nordic Integration. Cooperation and Conflict 2(1): 1–​25. Archer, C. (2005) Still Nordic after All These Years: Nordic Security in the Post-​Cold War Period. Security Dialogue 36(3): 397–​401. Archer, C. and Sogner, I. (1998) Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security. London: Sage. Arter, D. (2000) Small State Influence within the EU:  The Case of Finland’s Northern Dimension Initiative. Journal of Common Market Studies 38(5): 677–​697. Arter, D. (2008) Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Björkdahl, A. (2008) Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy 15(1): 135–​154. Brandal, N. and Bratberg, Ø. (2016) Small-​State Scandinavia:  Social Investment or Social Democracy? In: Baldersheim, H. and Keating, M. (eds), Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Browning, C. S. (2007) Branding Nordicity:  Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27‒51. Bunse, S., Magnette, P. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2005) Is the Commission the Small Member States’ Best Friend? SIEPS Report 2005:9. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. Caporaso, J. A. (1997) Does the European Union Represent an n of 1? ECSA Review 10(3): 1–​5. Cini, M. and Borragán, N. P.-​S. (2016) European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coombes, D. (1970) Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C. London: George Allen and Unwin. Cooper, I. (2015) The Nordic Parliaments and the EU. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. European Union (2009) The Stockholm Programme:  An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens. Available at:  https://​ec.europa.eu/​anti-​trafficking/​eu-​policy/​stockholm-​programme-​open-​ and-​secure-​europe-​serving-​and-​protecting-​citizens-​0_​en [Accessed 8 June 2016]. Geurts, C. (1998) The European Commission:  A  Natural Ally of Small States in the EU Institutional Framework? In: Goetschel, L. (ed.), Small States inside and outside the European Union. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

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Scandinavia and the European Union Grøn, C. H. (2015) The Nordic Countries and the European Commission. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Grøn, C. H. and Wivel, A. (2011) Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy. Journal of European Integration 33(5): 523–​539. Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (2015a) Mr. Svensson Goes to Brussels:  Concluding on the Nordic Countries and the European Union. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (2015b) Still the other European Community? The Nordic Countries and the European Union. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Harris, G. (2016) Obama Warms up to Nordic Leaders. New York Times, 13 May 2016. Available at: www. nytimes.com/ ​ 2 016/ ​ 0 5/ ​ 1 4/ ​ world/ ​ e urope/ ​ o bama- ​ warms- ​ t o- ​ n ordic- ​ h eads- ​ o f- ​ s tate.html?_ ​ r =1 [Accessed 13 July 2016]. Haverland, M. and Liefferink, D. (2012) Member State Interest Articulation in the Commission Phase:  Institutional Pre-​Conditions for Influencing Brussels. Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 179–​197. Heeger,T. (2015) Mangel på danske EU-​embedsmænd truer Danmarks indflydelse. Berlingske, 8 November 2015. Available at:  www.b.dk/​globalt/​mangel-​paa-​danske-​eu-​embedsmaend-​truer-​danmarks-​ indflydelse [Accessed 13 July 2016]. Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 37(1): 11–​23. Jakobsen, P. V. (2009) Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP. Journal of Common Market Studies 47(1): 81–​102. Jensen, C. S. (2015) The Nordic Labour Market(s) and the European Union. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Jensen, M. D. and Nedergaard, P. (2015) Market Integration in Europe and the Nordic Countries: The Ambivalent Path Dependency. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Kola, J. (2008) Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy and Agriculture in Finland. Agricultural and Food Science 7(2): 181–​196. Korkman, S. (2015) EMU: Joining or Not –​Does It Matter? In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union:  Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Kuisma, M. and Nygård, M. (2015) The European Union and the Nordic Models of Welfare:  Path Dependency or Policy Harmonisation? In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Laatikainen, K.V. (2003) Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy on Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict 38(4): 409–​441. Liefferink, D. and Andersen, M. S. (1998) Strategies of the ‘Green’ Member States in EU Environmental Policy-​Making. Journal of European Public Policy 5(2): 254–​270. Miles, L. (2005) The North. In: Mouritzen, H. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Geopolitics of Euro-​Atlantic Integration. London: Routledge. Miles, L. (2015) Bridging Interdependency? Nordic ‘Yes, but…’ –​Integration from a Historical Perspective. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Miljan, T. (1977) The Reluctant Europeans? Hurst: London. Nedergaard, P. (2009) Policy Learning Processes in International Committees:  The Case of the Civil Servant Committees of the Nordic Council of Ministers. Public Management Review 11(1): 23–​37. Nedergaard, P. and Jensen, M. D. (2017) You’re Gonna Have to Serve Somebody: A Comparative Analysis of the Polish, Danish and Cypriot EU Presidency Discourses. Comparative European Politics 15(2): 286–309. Nordic Council of Ministers (2015) Vatten, natur och människor: Program for Finlands ordförandeskap i Nordiska ministerrådet 2016. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Olesen, T. B. (1995) Introduction. In:  Olesen, T. B. (ed.), Interdependence Versus Integration:  Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe 1945–​1960. Odense: Odense University Press.

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C. H. Grøn and A. Wivel Panke, D. (2010) Good Instructions in No Time? Domestic Coordination of EU Policies in 19 Small States. West European Politics 33(4): 770–​790. Panke, D. (2011) Small States in EU Negotiations Political Dwarfs or Power-​Brokers? Cooperation and Conflict 46(2): 123–​143. Panke, D. (2016) Small States in EU Decision-​Making: How Can They Be Effective? In: Baldersheim, H. and Keating, M. (eds), Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2011) Public Management Reform:  A  Comparative Analysis:  New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-​Weberian State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rûse, I. (2015) Nordic Cooperation in the EU Council:  Does Institutional Embeddedness Matter? In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Schouenborg, L. (2013) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–​ 2010. London: Routledge. Skinner, M. S. (2010) Political Culture,Values and Economic Utility: A Different Perspective on Norwegian Party-​based Euroscpeticism. Journal of Contemporary European Research 6(3): 299–​315. Strang, J. (2016) Introduction: The Nordic Model of Transnational Cooperation. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Thorhallsson, B. (2000) The Role of Small States in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Thorhallsson, B. (2015) The Outsiders: Norway and Iceland. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union:  Still the other European Community? London: Routledge. Thorhallsson, B. (2016) Do Small States Need Shelter? The Economic and Political Turmoil in Iceland. In: Baldersheim, H. and Keating, M. (eds), Small States in the Modern World: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Turner, B. and Nordquist, G. (1982) The Other European Community: Integration and Cooperation in Northern Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Wallace, W. (1999) Small European States and European Policy-​Making: Strategies, Roles, Possibilities. In Wallace, W., Jacobsen, B., Kux, S., Andersen, S. S., Notermans, T., Sejersted, F. and Hagen, K., Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union. Arena Report No. 1/​99. Oslo: Arena. Wivel, A. (2009) Hvad har klimaet nogensinde gjort for Danmark? En midtvejsevaluering af dansk klimapolitik som udenrigspolitisk strategi. Politik 12(1): 27–​35. Wivel, A. and Marcussen, M. (2015) In the Shadow of History? Explaining the (Lack of) Europeanisation of Nordic Security and Defence Policies. In: Grøn, C. H., Nedergaard, P. and Wivel, A. (eds), The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the other European Community? London: Routledge.

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22 THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NORDIC FOUR Cautious sceptics, committed believers, cost–​benefit calculators Peter Viggo Jakobsen Introduction Had this stocktaking exercise taken place in the 1990s, it would have read like a classic Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale: the main characters, the four largest Scandinavian states1 –​Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden –​maturing from ugly ducklings sceptical of the United Nations (UN) to beautiful (blue) swans renowned and respected for having played leading roles in shaping UN development assistance and peacekeeping operations.2 Leading roles in these two areas underpinned by close, institutionalized Nordic coordination and cooperation and strategic narratives promoting the Nordic brand created the international perception that these four countries constituted a united, progressive force in the UN during the Cold War, seeking to build bridges between East and West, North and South. Since the 1990s, this fairy tale has been transformed into a Greek tragedy characterized by declining unity, declining UN altruism and the rise of national interest (Development Today 2010; Jakobsen 2006; Norwegian Church Aid et al. 2015). This chapter describes how the Nordic–​UN relationship has undergone three distinct phases: An early period characterized by scepticism, a second dominated by a high degree of altruism and unity, and a third characterized by a more business-​like approach dominated by cost–​benefit calculations and national approaches. The analysis has three parts: The first reviews the literature and constructs a framework of analysis guiding the empirical analysis in part two. A conclusion at the end summarizes its main points and assesses its implications for the future Nordic–​UN relationship.

Making sense of existing research As noted by Olesen (2003: 6) in her review of the literature on Nordic–​UN foreign policy cooperation, it ‘is extremely limited, rather old and takes an overwhelmingly positive view of all aspects of Nordic cooperation’. Stenius and Götz (2009: 10) concur with her assessment, characterizing the literature on Nordic–​UN cooperation as ‘easy to survey and neither comprehensive nor particularly profound’. This chapter focuses on the literature analysing the Nordic contributions to UN development and peacekeeping, as it was the Nordic leadership in these fields that set them apart from other UN members and created the Nordic UN brand. It is the 281

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UN peacekeeping model

Driven by altruistic motives Institutionalized Nordic cooperation and coordination at all levels Top contributions of UN development aid Top contributions of troops and force commanders Focus on poverty eradication and soft issues such as Focus on peaceful conflict resolution and non-​ good governance, democracy, gender and human use of force rights Leadership reputation enabling the Nordics to punch above their weight at the UN Sources: Engh and Pharo (2009); Jakobsen (2006); Norwegian Church Aid et al. (2015: 7).

rise and fall of this brand that has attracted the greatest political and scholarly interest, and since their aid and peacekeeping contributions reflect the varying importance that the four states have attached to the UN over time, this focus serves as a perfect prism for understanding and explaining the evolving nature of this relationship. The Nordic cooperation on decolonization, disarmament and the fight against apartheid in South Africa will not be addressed here, as doing so would add little value.The Nordic cooperation on these issues was similar to the cooperation on development and peacekeeping but the Nordic countries made less difference in these three areas (Midtgaard 2009: 50–​55; Olesen 2003). There is consensus in the literature that Nordic development and peacekeeping models are characterized by the five features presented in Table 22.1. The emergence and evolution of these models are approached in two different ways in the literature. One group of scholars uses the puzzle that they constitute for power and interest-​ based perspectives as their point of departure. Their principal focus is to determine the extent to which the Nordics were more altruistic and humane than other states and to explain why. They agree that this was the case and ascribe it to the emergence of the Nordic welfare states, which created the identities, interests and practices that drove their UN policies (Bergman 2007; Ingebritsen 2002; Lawler 1997; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995; Stokke 1989). The second group of scholars questions this conclusion, arguing that the Nordic four were less exceptional than the first group suggests (Browning 2007; Brunbech 2014; Brunbech and Olesen 2013; Ekengren and Götz 2013; Götz 2004, 2008, 2009, 2016; Jakobsen 2006; Koponen and Siitonen 2005; Lancaster 2007: 190–​211; Midtgaard 2009; Olesen and Pedersen 2010; Pharo 2013; Stokke 2005; van der Veen 2011). The principal conclusion emanating from this body of work is that the rise of the Nordic models was driven by a mutually reinforcing combination of altruism and interest, and that it is misleading to view these factors as competing and mutually excluding by definition (Brunbech 2014; Ekengren and Götz 2013; Jakobsen 2006; Midtgaard 2009; Pharo 2013; Tvedt 2006). The framework of analysis in Figure 22.1 has been inspired by the two main conclusions that can be derived from the research presented above: (1) that the Nordic–​UN relationship has been shaped by continuous interaction between international and national factors, the relative importance of which varies over time; (2) that support for the UN is strongest and most stable when driven by both interest and altruism and internalized in national identities so that UN support becomes routine and a policy objective in its own right. Figure 22.1 reflects the reality that, as small states, the Nordic countries have limited influence on the international 282

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National Identity UN R’ US Automatic support National Interest

Altruism

Security

Peace

Prestige

Law-based order

Figure 22.1  Willingness to meet international/​UN demands for aid and peace operations

scene. Simply put, if the UN does not launch peace operations or the UN and the international community do not demand aid contributions, the Nordics cannot contribute. The Nordics do determine the nature and level of their contributions and they are conceptualized as the outcome of interaction of national interests, altruistic values and national identities. National interest is broadly understood as all of the arguments in favour of UN aid and peacekeeping that emphasize national security, welfare, international prestige and position together with cost–​benefit calculations related to the possible risks in blood and treasure. All of the arguments suggesting that the Nordics should make aid and peacekeeping contributions for their own sake are lumped together in this category. Altruism is operationalized as arguments favouring aid and UN peacekeeping that emphasize the common good; that the Nordics should support the UN to ‘do good’, help others in need, enhance international peace and security, reduce the risk of great power war, promote peaceful conflict resolution and the establishment of a rule-​based international order where might is not necessarily right. While such arguments also contain elements of self-​interest, they will be regarded here as altruism because the emphasis is on helping others rather than promoting narrow national interests. Arguments that support UN aid and peacekeeping with reference to identity, habit and role conceptions –​we support UN aid and peace operations because we have always done so, because we cannot say ‘no’ to the UN etc. –​will be regarded as evidence of how supporting the UN has been internalized in the national identity or strategic culture to such an extent that support is regarded as a duty; is more or less automatic, triggering little domestic debate; and constitutes a source of national pride.

Cautious sceptics Scepticism and cautiousness served as the guiding stars for the Nordic–​UN relationship for the first two decades after the UN was founded in 1945. While Nordic cooperation became institutionalized in the form of bi-​annual foreign minister meetings, routine exchanges of national UN instructions, and weekly meetings between the delegations in New York, this cooperation consisted primarily of consultation and coordination. The ambition was not to achieve a common binding position, but the Nordics generally ended up taking the same position, typically one that enabled them to stay clear of the East–​West confrontation. Denmark and Norway used 283

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Nordic cooperation to distance themselves from Western policies that they disliked, Finland used Nordic cooperation to signal independence from the Soviet Union, whereas Sweden sought a middle position between the two blocs (Jakobsen 2006: 21–​24). The Nordic scepticism and caution manifested itself in a number of ways. Initially, they all did their utmost to avoid serving on the Security Council, fearing entrapment in the Cold War. Norway, serving its first term in 1949–​50, had sought to avoid being granted the ‘honour’ (Götz 2009: 633). Denmark refused to serve in 1950 and kept a very low profile when it did finally serve its first term in 1953–​4. Sweden did the same during its first stint in 1957–​8, and Finland did not seek election to the Council until 1968 (Jakobsen 2006: 21). The fear of Cold War entrapment caused the Nordics to abstain from voting in the UN General Assembly when the superpowers clashed and they steered clear of controversial UN operations. The three Scandinavian states declined American requests for combat troops for the Korean War in 1950. Finland withdrew from the UN peacekeeping operation in Egypt in 1957, fearing that long-​term engagement might jeopardize its neutrality. This concern also induced Finland to reject a demand for troops for the UN operation in the Congo in 1960, and it was first in 1963 that Finland began attending the regular minister meetings held by the Scandinavian defence ministers on UN peacekeeping matters (Jakobsen 2006: 16–​17). Neutrality concerns also led Sweden to reject the first UN request for troops to Cyprus in 1964, the Swedish government only relenting when two other neutrals (Finland and Austria) agreed to take part. The problem surfaced again two years later when Sweden opposed the establishment of a joint Scandinavian battalion because Denmark and Norway were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Jakobsen 2006: 25). Nordic peacekeeping participation was driven more in the early years by an interest in preventing great power war than altruism. It was regarded more as an unwelcome burden carrying political risks and harming national defence than as a welcome source of national pride, international prestige or opportunity to create a safer world. This concern was strongest in Finland and Sweden, which did not enjoy the protection that NATO membership afforded Denmark and Norway (Jakobsen 2006: 25–​26). The initial Nordic aid contributions were also driven more by international pressures than altruistic desires to make the world a better place.The aid provided in the 1950s and early 1960s was primarily justified by security concerns and the need to prevent countries from falling to communism. While the idea of giving aid for reasons of international solidarity resonated well with the missionary tradition and the social democratic understanding of solidarity in the Norwegian and Swedish national identities (Brunbech and Olesen 2013: 91; Engh 2009; Pharo 2013; Ruth 1984: 67–​68; Stokke 1989: 212), this was not in itself sufficient to increase the levels of aid provided. It was only when the United States began using annual examinations and aid rankings produced by the Organisation of Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to shame its allies into increasing their development assistance that the three Scandinavian countries began putting their money where their mouths were, so to speak. When DAC was established in 1961, their aid contributions were so low that the United States did not even bother inviting them and they remained aid laggards at the bottom of the DAC rankings of Western aid donors throughout the 1960s (Pharo 2013: 52, 69). The initial Scandinavian reaction to the creation of DAC was one of scepticism. When told by the United States in 1961 that the price of admission to DAC would be a radical increase in Danish development aid, the Danish government decided not to join (Brunbech 2014: 155). Sweden was also reluctant to join, fearing that doing so might jeopardize its non-​aligned 284

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foreign policy stance. Norway was admitted to DAC in 1962 as the first Nordic nation, having pledged to increase its aid to 0.25 per cent of GNI within three years. Denmark joined in 1963, having been assured that it would not be pressured to increase its aid too rapidly (Brunbech 2014: 155). Sweden followed suit in 1965, whereas Finland waited another decade before joining.

Committed believers The Nordic rise to international stardom was underpinned by intensified and institutionalized information-​sharing, cooperation at the Nordic level and by the creation of national institutions to manage the increasing aid and troop contributions. In the field of peacekeeping, the Nordics established working groups, standby forces for UN operations (1964), a joint Nordic–​UN peacekeeping training programme for officers and non-​commissioned officers (1965–​73) and published the Nordic Standby Forces manual (1973), the so-​called Blue Book, which became widely used as a basis for establishing and training UN peacekeeping contingents. This enabled them to provide 25 per cent of the troops serving on UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War as well as a large number of chiefs of staff, chief military observers and force commanders (Jakobsen 2006: 10). In the field of development aid, the Nordic governments formulated national aid programmes, established national aid organizations, sponsored a fast-​g rowing forest of national development Non-​Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and increased their aid budgets. Sweden reached the 0.7 per cent GNI aid target in 1975, Norway and Denmark joined the 0.7 per cent club in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and all three states have been card-​carrying members ever since (see Table 22.2). The process in Finland followed the same trajectory as the Scandinavian countries except that it was a decade behind. Finland was a net recipient of development assistance from the World Bank until 1968, joined DAC the following year, and gradually increased its development aid over the next decade and a half until reaching 0.8 per cent of GNI in 1991. The onset of a severe economic recession then saw the level fall back to 0.3 per cent in 1994 (Koponen and Siitonen 2005: 222), and the 0.7 per cent level has not been met since (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016). Table 22.2 illustrates the considerable time lag in all four Nordic nations from when promises to meet the UN aid targets were made until they were actually achieved. The DAC bottom rankings shamed Denmark, Norway and Sweden into increasing their aid contributions because the demands for international solidarity and the redistribution of wealth resonated with the national values and ideals that had driven the establishment of their welfare states and their foreign policy interests. This fit between national values and interests was most obvious

Table 22.2  Nordic promises and goal achievement with UN aid norms

Sweden Norway Denmark Finland

UN aid target commitment 1960: 1%; 1970: 0.7%

UN aid target attainment

1962: 1% 1969: 1% 1967: 1% 1980: 0.7%

1975: 0.7%; 1976: 1% 1976: 0.7%; 1982: 1% 1978: 0.7%; 1993: 1% 1991: 0.7%

Sources: Brunbech and Olesen (2013: 94, 105); Ekengren and Götz (2013: 22); Engh (2009: 72); OECD (2006: 19); Stokke (1989: 207).

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in Sweden, which led the way and set an example that the other Nordic states followed. Here, international solidarity in the form of aid, mediation and peacekeeping came to be seen as a logical extension of the welfare state as well as effective instruments enabling Sweden to play a leading role in the Third World (Bergman 2007; Engh 2009; Lawler 1997; Ruth 1984). In the course of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the domestic constituencies favouring greater aid allocations expanded as the number of people working in the national aid organizations, aid research institutions and development NGOs grew in number, and labour and business organizations realized their potential for jobs and orders. The creation of ‘aid and peace industrial complexes’ in the three Scandinavian countries contributed to the depoliticization of their aid and peacekeeping policies, as all of those involved in the decision-​making process favoured high contributions for a broad variety of both altruistic and self-​interested reasons (Jakobsen 2006; Olsen 2005; Tvedt 2006). From an interest perspective, while aid and peacekeeping enabled Denmark and Norway to support their NATO allies (the UN peacekeeping operations in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were primarily driven by France, the United States and the United Kingdom) in a manner acceptable to the Soviet Union, it made Finland appear more independent from Soviet influence and enabled Sweden to signal independence from both superpowers. It did not endanger national security because the aid and peacekeeping contributions were organized and financed in a way that did not affect the defence of the homelands adversely, the risk of casualties was low, and aid and peacekeeping were perceived as an effective way to generate international prestige and influence. Maintaining a position of international leadership thus became an ambition in its own right; quantity became more important than quality (Brunbech 2014;Tvedt 2006). Interest and the altruistic desire to help create a safer and more just world went hand in hand, and aid and peacekeeping became internalized in the foreign policy identities in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Being Nordic meant providing more aid and peacekeeping troops (in relative terms) than anyone else (Jakobsen 2006; Olsen 2005; Pharo 2013: 87; Stokke 1989: 161–​62, 173, 313; Tvedt 2006). The absence of this powerful cocktail of altruism, interest and identity is crucial for understanding why Finland proved incapable of sustaining its aid at the 0.7 per cent level after 1991. Finland internalized peacekeeping but not international solidarity as part of its national identity to the same extent as the other Nordics because it was slower to establish its welfare state and its development aid institutions (Noël and Thérien 1995: 545). Its efforts to meet the 0.7 per cent threshold in the 1980s were primarily driven by an interest to escape the Soviet sphere of influence and establishing its credentials as a Nordic and hence Western country; it never had the ‘humanitarian great power’ ambitions underpinning the aid and peace efforts in Norway and Sweden, and it did not sustain the 0.7 per cent aid level long enough to internalize it as part of the Finnish identity. When the interest-​based motivation for maintaining the 0.7 per cent aid target disappeared with the Finnish entry into the European Union (EU) in 1995, there was no identity-​based motivation for maintaining it either. Finland has since used the DAC and EU averages as the minimum it must respect in order to be considered a Western state in good standing (Koponen and Siitonen 2005: 239).

Cost–​benefit calculators The Nordic aid and peacekeeping contributions to the UN have dramatically fallen off since the end of the Cold War. The Nordic share of troop contributions to UN-​led peace operations has fallen from the Cold War high of 25 per cent to a minuscule 0.7 per cent in December 2015 (United Nations 2015). The decline is illustrated in Figure 22.2, and UN officials now 286

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The United Nations and the Nordic four 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2000

2002

2004

2006 DK

2008 NO

2010 SE

2012

2014

2016

FI

Figure 22.2  Nordic uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping operations 2000–​15

regard the Nordics and most other Western countries as practitioners of ‘peacekeeping apartheid’ (Guéhenno 2005), because they provide far more personnel to the EU and NATO than the UN. The picture is the same with respect to aid donations. During the Cold War, the Nordic countries gave up to 50 per cent of their development aid to the UN as core funding. This percentage had fallen to 11–​13 per cent by 2009 (see Table 22.3), and Finland gave more core funding to the EU than the UN. The Nordics now consistently give less than a third of their development aid to the UN. It would be wrong to regard the declining UN contributions as evidence of declining Nordic altruism, however.3 Most decision-​makers in the three Scandinavian countries continue to view the 0.7 per cent GNI target as a ‘boundary of shame’ below which their aid contributions cannot be allowed to drop (Ekengren and Götz 2013: 26), and no Finnish government has yet dared to give up the ambition to reach it. All four states have also increased their budgets and contributions to peace operations significantly since the end of the Cold War (Jakobsen 2006: 84–​85, 91–​92, 117–​118, 122–​123, 147, 151–​152, 180–​181, 185–​186). The big difference is that the Nordic countries give most of their contributions to other actors, notably the EU, NATO and national NGOs, which are often seen as better alternatives in terms of both interest and altruism. These developments are closely related to the end of the Cold War in 1988–​91 and the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The end of the Cold War initially led to a dramatic increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations, which was also reflected in increased Nordic troop contributions, especially to the UN operations in the Balkans (1991–​5). Yet traumatic peacekeeping failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) discredited UN peacekeeping efforts, and the number of troops operating under UN command plummeted from a record high 79,000 in 1993 to less than 15,000 by 1997. NATO took over from the UN in the Balkans and has been the Western and Nordic international organization of choice ever since for conducting peace operations, a position it consolidated after 9/​11, when 287

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P. V. Jakobsen Table 22.3  EU and UN shares of Nordic development aid 2009 (US$ million) Bilateral and non-​core multilateral aid

EU funding Core

UN funding Non-​core

Norway

77% of aid total

Sweden

66% of aid total

$298m

$28m

Finland

60% of aid total

$216m

$28m

Denmark 65% of aid total

$271m

$1m

Unspecified

UN total

Core

Non-​core

$504m 13% of aid total $579m 13% of aid total $145m 12% of aid total $282m 11% of aid total

$590m ​15% of aid total $475m ​10% of aid total $133m ​11% of aid total $88m ​3% of aid total

$1,094m ​28% of aid total $1,054m ​23% of aid total $278m ​23% of aid total $370m ​14% of aid total

Note: Core funding is not earmarked; non-​core funding is earmarked. Source: OECD Development Co-​operation Report 2011, 50th Anniversary Edition.

it became involved in a decade-​long operation in Afghanistan to which most Western countries and all of the Nordics contributed. The EU also became involved in peace operations, became a major contributor to civilian crisis management operations and established itself as the world’s largest development aid donor (Jakobsen 2009). While the UN has retained its position as the world’s largest and most legitimate peacekeeper and the most important agenda-​setter with respect to development goals, it has lost the monopoly that it enjoyed in these fields during the Cold War. In addition to running its own peace operations and aid programmes, the UN now also mandates and supports operations and activities carried out by the EU, NATO and other regional organizations. Where the UN had served as the Nordics’ only avenue for influencing the international order during the Cold War, it has since been reduced to one of several possible avenues for securing international influence. The marginalization of the UN in the management of the armed conflicts in the Balkans in the course of the 1990s meant that Nordic decision-​makers increasingly focused on the EU and NATO in their efforts to enhance their own national security and to contribute to a safer, more stable Europe. Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, Norway significantly enhanced its cooperation with the EU in the field of conflict management, and all four Nordic states played key roles in developing the EU’s capacity for civilian conflict management (Jakobsen 2009).Yet since Nordic cooperation and the Nordic brand did not prove as effective with respect to generating prestige and influence within the EU and NATO as it had been in the UN during the Cold War, Nordic cooperation lost out to other forms of cooperation as each Nordic country sought to create its own distinct national foreign policy profile (Björkdahl 2007; Jakobsen 2008, 2009; Løj 2007; Tvedt 2006). This was partly caused by the Norwegian non-​membership of the EU and the Danish EU defence opt-​out, which prevents Denmark from participating in EU-​led military operations, and the Finnish and Swedish non-​membership of NATO. But it also reflected a greater national interest in establishing closer bilateral relations with the Western great powers, which played key roles in the EU, NATO and UN in the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s because no non-​ Western great powers were in a position to challenge them or threaten the Nordic countries directly. The more flexible forms of cooperation established by the Nordic countries in the EU and NATO carried over into the UN, where the Nordics now take the same positions as the other 288

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EU members on most issues (Laatikainen 2003).The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the Non-​Aligned Movement and the coherence of the developing world also rendered it easier to cooperate with other non-​Western countries. So while the Nordics continue to cooperate and coordinate at the UN as they have traditionally done, Nordic cooperation has lost its privileged position. Cooperation at the UN has become increasingly context-​dependent and issue-​oriented. The result is the dilution of the Nordic brand. The Nordics are no longer regarded as a coherent bloc or UN leaders in New York. They are instead viewed as part of a larger group of like-​minded countries working to promote development, good governance, gender equality, peacebuilding and other ‘soft’ causes within the UN system (Carrel-​Billiard 2013: 27; Tarp and Hansen 2013). These changes have altered the UN’s position in the foreign policy identities of the Nordic countries. Support for the UN is no longer internalized and automatic, as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. It has become more cost–​benefit oriented. In the late 1980s, all of the Nordics started making some of their contributions to UN organizations and programmes conditional, occasionally punishing UN organizations that failed to meet their demands for reforms and top posts (Bach et  al. 2008:  506–​510; Olsen 2005; UNRIC 2014). The more instrumental approach also becomes evident in terms of how all four Nordic governments reacted to the increased costs of managing the growing influx of refugees and asylum seekers in 2015 by proposing large cuts to their UN aid contributions (Development Today 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). While large UN cuts were implemented in Denmark, Finland and Norway, the proposed cuts were significantly reduced in Sweden. It is worth noting, however, that the principal argument for dropping the cuts in Sweden did not rest on identity and altruism but rather on foreign policy interest. It was the argument that drastic cuts to UN development support would kill the Swedish bid for a seat on the UN Security Council that carried the day (Amland 2016). The Swedish example and the debate triggered by the UN development cuts in the other Nordic countries illustrate how the UN continues to resonate positively in the Nordic countries. Nordic decision-​makers are sensitive to accusations that they have abandoned the UN. They routinely and vehemently reject the notion that their reduced support for UN development aid and peacekeeping signal an abandonment of the UN and its ideals. They counter that their aid and troop contributions to the EU and NATO also support the UN, as most EU and NATO peace missions are conducted on the basis of mandates provided by the UN Security Council and because the EU aid programmes are guided by the development goals set by the UN. Yet the UN has clearly lost its privileged position in the cost–​benefit calculations and in the Nordic foreign policy identities that it enjoyed previously.

Conclusions This analysis has explained the evolution of the Nordic–​UN relationship as the result of continuous interaction between international and national factors and argued that the level and nature of Nordic support for the UN has ebbed and flowed depending on how their interests, ideals and national identities interacted. Nordic support for the UN was low in the early years because the UN was viewed with scepticism and seen as a potential source of entrapment in the Cold War. Peacekeeping contributions were made reluctantly and the Nordic aid contributions were ranked at the bottom in the annual DAC statistics. This changed in the second half of the 1960s as Nordic decision-​makers realized that by cooperating with each other and supporting the UN, they would be able to enhance their own security, promote their values, generate pride at home and enhance their international prestige and influence abroad. The Nordics became 289

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P. V. Jakobsen Table 22.4 The evolution of Nordic–​UN relationship Cautious sceptics

Committed believers

Cost–​benefit calculators

UN contributions

Low

High

Medium

Nordic UN Narratives Alternatives to UN/​ Nordic cooperation International image

Interest > Altruism None

Interest + Altruism = Identity The preferred option

Laggard

Leader

Interest ≥ Altruism One option among many Like-​minded

UN believers, playing leading roles within the fields of development assistance and peacekeeping. Maintaining this position became a foreign policy objective in its own right, which was internalized as part of their national and Nordic identities. Being Nordic meant making greater contributions (in relative terms) to UN development aid and peacekeeping than most other nations. This changed with the end of the Cold War when the UN’s position as the world’s sole development donor and peacekeeper was challenged by a series of failures and the rise of new actors eager to take over. The Nordics increased their aid and troop contributions to the EU and NATO for a combination of interest-​based and altruistic reasons, which came at the cost of the UN’s position in their foreign policy identities. The Nordics have not abandoned the UN, however. While troop contributions to UN peace operations have been reduced to a minimum, the Nordics continue to provide considerable support to UN development organizations and programmes and they support UN peace operations in other ways. But the Nordic–​UN relationship has become more instrumental. Support for the UN is no longer automatic and a question of identity.The UN has become one instrument among others that the Nordics use to pursue their interests and altruistic objectives, and the UN is only chosen when it is perceived as the best avenue for so doing. The prospects for a major Nordic comeback to the UN do not look bright. Since Nordic UN support is no longer identity-​driven and automatic, any major return would have to be underpinned by a mutually reinforcing and sustained combination of self-​interest and altruism. As Nordic national interests and values are currently tied closely to the actions of the other EU and NATO members, a major Nordic return would have to be part of a major Western return. This seems unlikely in the near future due to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and the continuing, low-​intensity conflict in eastern Ukraine. This conflict will bind considerable EU and NATO resources to the defence of the (NATO) homeland and the stabilization of the eastern front. While the civil wars in Libya and Syria are likely to create demands for UN peacekeepers that will have to be met by the Nordic and European countries, most of the challenges in the European neighbourhood will require joint action from the European organizations and the UN. It is therefore difficult to envisage a situation where the Nordics would again begin to privilege the UN as their preferred instrument for generating power, prestige, peace and pride as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Danish UN officials, Gorm Rye Olsen, Anders Wivel and members of the Danish UN Friends Group for very useful comments and assistance, which significantly improved the quality of this chapter. 290

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Notes 1 I use the term Nordic when referring to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, as they were long perceived as a Nordic bloc in the UN. ‘Scandinavia(n)’ will be used here to refer to Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 2 The other Scandinavian countries and dependencies Iceland, Faroe Islands, Åland Islands and Greenland never played any significant roles in the fields of development and peacekeeping, which are at the heart of this chapter. Their relationships to the UN are therefore not analysed in this chapter. 3 For a graphic illustration of the Nordic aid contributions in the period 1960–​2013, see Figure 23.1 in Chapter 23 in this volume.

References Amland, B. H. (2016) Swedish Race for UN Security Council Seat Tests Feminist Foreign Policy. Development Today, January 2016. Available at:  www.development-​today.com/​magazine/​2015/​dt_​16/​news/​swedish_​race_​for_​un_​security_​council_​seat_​tests_​feminist_​foreign_​policy [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Bach, C. F., Kaur-​Pedersen, S., Olsesen,T. B. and Pedersen, J. (2008) Idealer og realiteter: Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–​2005. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Bergman, A. (2007) International Welfare Obligations:  The Case of Sweden’s Social Democratically Inspired Internationalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 73–​99. Björkdahl, A. (2007) Swedish Norm Entrepreneurship in the UN. International Peacekeeping 14(4): 538–​552. Browning, C. S. (2007) Branding Nordicity:  Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27–​51. Brunbech, P. Y. (2014) Size, Targets and Purpose:  An Analysis of Danish Aid Policy and the Emerging International Spending Targets 1945–​70. In:  Hvidt, N. and Mouritzen, H. (eds), DIIS Foreign Policy Yearbook 2014. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Brunbech, P. Y. and Olesen, T. B. (2013) The Late Front-​Runner:  Denmark and the ODA Percentage Question 1960–​2008. In: Olesen, T. B., Pharo, H. Ø. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Akademika. Carrel-​Billiard, F. (2013) Taking Stock, Moving Forward Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012 Elections to the United Nations Security Council. New York: International Peace Institute. Development Today (2010) Farewell to the Nordic Aid Model. 20th Anniversary Issue, 21–​22. Available at: www.development-​today.com/​magazine/​2010/​dt_​21-​22/​news/​f arewell_​to_​the_​nordic_​aid_​model [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Development Today (2015a) Finnish Aid Workers and Diplomats Face Lay-​offs as Historic Cuts Take Their Toll. Available at:  www.development-​today.com/​magazine/​2015/​dt_​10/​news/​finnish_​aid_​workers_​ and_​diplomats_​face_​lay-​offs_​as_​historic_​cuts_​take_​their_​toll [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Development Today (2015b) Blue-​Blue Government Pressed to Accept Record-​High Norwegian Aid Level. Available at:  www.development-​today.com/​magazine/​2015/​dt_​15/​news/​blue-​blue_​government_​ pressed_​to_​accept_​record-​high_​norwegian_​aid_​level [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Development Today (2015c) Denmark, Sweden Spend 30% of Aid at Home. Available at: www.development-​ today.com/​magazine/​2015/​dt_​15/​news/​denmark_​sweden_​spend_​30_​of_​aid_​at_​home [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Ekengren, A.-​M. and Götz, N. (2013) The One Per Cent Country: Sweden’s Internationalization of the Aid Norm. In: Olesen,T. B., Pharo, H. Ø. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Akademika. Engh, S. (2009) The Conscience of the World? Swedish and Norwegian Provision of Development Aid. Itinerario 33(2): 65–​82. Engh, S. and Pharo, H. (2009) Nordic Cooperation in Providing Development Aid. In: Götz, N. and Haggrén, H. (eds), Regional Cooperation and International Organizations:  The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. London: Routledge. Götz, N. (2004) Prestige and Lack of Alternative:  Denmark and the United Nations in the Making. Scandinavian Journal of History 29(2): 73–​96. Götz, N. (2008) In a Class by Itself: Cold War Politics and Finland’s Position vis-​à-​vis the United Nations, 1945–​1956. Journal of Cold War Studies 10(2): 71–​96.

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P. V. Jakobsen Götz, N. (2009) The Absent-​Minded Founder:  Norway and the Establishment of the United Nations. Diplomacy & Statecraft 20(4): 619–​637. Götz, N. (2016) From Neutrality to Membership:  Sweden and the United Nations, 1941–​ 1946. Contemporary European History 25(1): 75–​95. Guéhenno, J.-​M. (2005) Statement by Under-​Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Challenges Project. London, 2 March 2005. Available at: www.un.org/​en/​peacekeeping/​articles/​article020305.htm [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 37(1): 11–​23. Jakobsen, P. V. (2006) Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? London: Routledge. Jakobsen, P. V. (2008) NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress. DIIS Report, No. 15. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Jakobsen, P. V. (2009) Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP. Journal of Common Market Studies 47(1): 81–​102. Koponen, J. and Siitonen, L. (2005) Finland:  Aid and Identity. In:  Hoebink, P. and Stokke, O. O. (eds), Perspectives on European Development Co-​operation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. London: Routledge. Laatikainen, K. V. (2003) Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict 38(4): 409–​441. Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lawler, P. (1997) Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 35(4): 565–​594. Løj, E. M. (2007) Denmark’s Membership of the UN Security Council: What Came Out of It? In: Hvidt, N. and Mouritzen, H. (eds), DIIS Foreign Policy Yearbook 2007. Copenhagen:  Danish Institute for International Studies. Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–​1989. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Midtgaard, K. (2009) Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations during the First Cold War: Between Internationalism and Realpolitik. In:  Götz, N. and Haggrén, H. (eds), Regional Cooperation and International Organisations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. London: Routledge. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2016) Development Cooperation Appropriations. Available at: http://​f ormin.finland.fi/​public/​default.aspx?nodeid=49314&contentlan=2&culture=en-​US [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Noël, A. and Thérien, J.-​P. (1995) From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid. International Organization 49(3): 523–​553. Norwegian Church Aid, Helland, A.  M., Hallonsten, G., Qvist-​Sørensen, B.  and Hemberg, J.  (2015) The End of Nordic Exceptionalism? Report commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Chuch Aid, DanChurchAid and Church of Sweden. Available at:  www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/​globalassets/​ utviklingskonf-​2015/​end-​of-​nordic-​exceptionalism.pdf [Accessed 21 July 2016]. OECD (2006) DAC in Dates the History of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. Paris:  OECD Publications. Olesen, L. R. B. (2003) Norden i FN, 1956–​65: en undersøgelse af nordisk politisk samarbejde i FN. Århus: Jean Monnet Center. Olesen, T. B. and Pedersen, J. (2010) On the Side of the Angels:  Altruism in Danish Development aid 1960–​2005. European Review of History 17(6): 881–​903. Olsen, G. R. (2005) Danish Aid Policy in the Post-​Cold War Period: Increasing Resources and Minor Adjustments. In: Hoebink, P. and Stokke, O. O. (eds), Perspectives on European Development Co-​operation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. London: Routledge. Pharo, H. (2013) Side Show to Centre Stage:  The Transformation of Norwegian Development Aid. In: Olesen, T. B., Pharo, H. Ø. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Akademika. Ruth, A. (1984) The Second New Nation: The Mythology of Modem Sweden. Daedalus 113(2): 53–​96. Stenius, H. and Götz, N. (2009) Forskning om det nordiska samarbetet: Bokslut och framtidsperspektiv. Available at: www.helsinki.fi/​cens/​pdf/​ns_​PMnordisktsamarbete.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2016].

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The United Nations and the Nordic four Stokke, O. O. (ed.) (1989) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Stokke, O. O. (2005) Norwegian Aid Policy:  Continuity and Change. In:  Hoebink, P. and Stokke, O. O. (eds), Perspectives on European Development Co-​operation:  Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. London: Routledge. Tarp, M. N. and Hansen, J. O. B. (2013) Size and Influence: How Small States Influence Policy Making in Multilateral Arenas. DIIS Working Paper 11. Available at:  http://​diis.dk/​files/​media/​publications/​ import/​extra/​wp_​2013_​11_​size_​and_​influence.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Tvedt, T. (2006) Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og den norske modellen. Historisk Tidsskrift 85: 59–​85. UNRIC (2014) Norway Cuts UN Contributions by 20%, United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 9 October 2014. Available at: www.unric.org/​en/​latest-​un-​buzz/​29452-​norway-​ cuts-​un-​contributions-​by-​20 [Accessed 10 March 2017]. United Nations (2015) Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations. Available at: www. un.org/​en/​peacekeeping/​resources/​statistics/​contributors.shtml [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Van der Veen, M. A. (2011) Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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23 SCANDINAVIAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES Thorsten Borring Olesen

Introduction The Scandinavian countries got off to a slow start as development aid donors. While they participated early on in the various UN-​funded technical and development aid schemes, they were originally much less involved as entrepreneurs in setting up their own bilateral projects. Consequently, their annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributions stood at no more than approximately 0.1 per cent of GNP in the early 1960s, much less than the OECD average of approximately 0.5 per cent (Brunbech and Olesen 2013: 89ff.; Ekengren and Götz 2013: 21ff.). From this time on, however, Scandinavian aid saw a steep and continuous increase. Within a decade, the Scandinavians became absolute top donors in the world as measured on an ODA/​GNI basis, with levels often exceeding 1 per cent annually. Combined with a number of the specific features of their development aid effort, such as its internationalist orientation and poverty-​focused approach, this achievement has earned the Scandinavian countries the reputation of being extraordinarily committed to aid and even ‘humane internationalists’ (Lancaster 2007; Pratt 1989; Stokke 1989). While it is true that the Scandinavian countries have been high-​profile aid donors, as we shall see below, it must be stressed that the aid approach and priorities of the individual countries have also varied considerably. The top donor level –​and with it the humane internationalist label –​has only been achieved by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland has often stated its ambition to meet the UN norm of contributing 0.7 per cent of GNI in development aid but has only managed to do so for a brief period in the late 1980s (see Figure 23.1). In 2013, Finnish aid stood at 0.45 per cent and is forecast to fall dramatically in 2016. Iceland is a relative newcomer to aid and in 2007 its ODA only stood at 0.25 per cent of GNI, or US$48.4 million. However, Iceland has also committed itself to reaching the UN-​recommended level for developed-​nation donors of 0.7 per cent, having developed a bilateral programme and establishing a national aid organization, ICEIDA, to oversee these efforts (ICEIDA 2007; OECD STATS 2015). All the same, the Icelandic experience will not be considered in the following, as development aid has never –​either in terms of budget allocation or as a foreign policy tool –​played a significant role.

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Scandinavian development policies

The Finnish experience will occasionally be considered because Finnish aid from the 1980s on became more closely linked to Nordic development aid cooperation.

Aid volume and aid disbursement Since the late 1960s, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have been among the OECD countries with the highest aid disbursements in relative terms. In 1960, the UN General Assembly had urged its developed member states to commit at least 1 per cent of GNI in financial transfers (public and private) to the developing countries of which very many were newly independent, former colonies. The decolonization process created a completely new world map calling for the redefinition and restructuring of international relations. One of the remedies of that process became development aid, as symbolically expressed by the UN decision to declare the 1960s the ‘decade of development’. This challenge also prompted the Scandinavian countries to adopt their first development aid legislation in 1962. In Norway, development aid even came to figure (until 1975) as a special contribution on each citizen’s tax return. The Swedish development aid legislation of 1962 and 1968 stipulated that the rationale of aid was to promote economic growth, democracy, social equality and independence –​phrasing that was almost echoed verbatim by the Danish amendment in 1971 of its 1962 aid legislation (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2006: 8ff.; Pedersen 2008: 199ff.; Simensen 2003: 106ff.). The passing of these laws created the background for the rapid expansion of aid volumes that followed. In 1970, the UN changed the aid target to one that only comprised public transfers and now set the yearly transfer goal of Official Development Assistance at 0.7 per cent of GNP (later changed to GNI). At that time, Sweden had already decided to aim for an ODA contribution of 1 per cent, which was also attained for the first time in 1982 –​a border also crossed by Norway the same year and by the Netherlands a year earlier. The Danish increase was slightly more modest, reaching the 0.7 per cent target for the first time in 1978 from which, as the Figure 23.1 demonstrates, it continued to grow, crossing the 1 per cent threshold for the first time in 1992. The Danish aid figures slid back, however, and have never exceeded 1 per cent since 2001. In real terms (current US$), Danish net ODA disbursements in 2013 stood at 2.8 billion, Norwegian at 4.0 billion and Swedish at 4.7 billion. Overall, as Figure 23.1 reveals, the aid from all three countries since the late 1960s has significantly surpassed the average of the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is a major reason for the ‘humane internationalist’ label accorded Scandinavia. Another important reason for the label is the high Scandinavian aid disbursements through the UN system. The basic defining principles of internationalism are related to concepts like interdependence and international cooperation, arbitration and conciliation through world institutions such as the UN. The Scandinavian countries have all granted a substantial portion of their development aid as multilateral aid, today typically around 25–​30 per cent. Historically, the Danish multilateral contribution also used to be much higher, with an ambition of reaching a 50–​50 balance between bilateral and multilateral aid, much of which went to UN organizations. In the late 1980s, the Nordic countries alone thus financed some 30 per cent of the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) budget, contributing three times as much as the United States (Olesen 2008: 314ff.). As of 2013, Norway and Sweden have continued to disburse a substantial part of their multilateral aid through the UN. According to DAC figures, Norwegian and Swedish UN aid has increased roughly 2.5 times in the period 2001–​13 to reach US$629  million and 754  million, respectively, while Danish UN aid during the same period has in fact declined from US$278 million to 274 million.1

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T. B. Olesen 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

Denmark

Norway

Sweden

DAC

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

1968

1966

1964

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1960

0

Finland

Figure 23.1  Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish ODA/​GNI ratio (and DAC average) 1960–​2013

Aid profile The international image of Scandinavia as a dedicated aid donor not only hinges on its relatively high aid volume and internationalist orientation but also on aid practice and quality. It is important to stress, however, that Scandinavian aid practices have never merely been the product of indigenous creativity or priority. The Scandinavian countries have been actors in the international aid regime and been strongly influenced by international aid thinking and priorities. The international aid business has always been ripe with strategy headlines and labelling, such as development through economic growth (trickle-​down) (1960s), basic needs (1970s), structural (market) adjustment through aid conditionality (1980s), good governance, human rights/​ human development and sustainable development (1990s), poverty reduction, health improvement and gender equality, as set forth in the Millennium Development Goals (2000s), global partnership and once again both human rights and sustainable development (2010s). The Scandinavians have helped shape (some of) these headlines and the practical aid approaches linked to them, but they have in themselves also left a strong impact on Scandinavian aid (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 3ff.; Ridell 2007: 30–​49; Stokke 2005a). Like most other donors, the Scandinavian countries have also experimented with various aid modalities, including project aid, programme aid, infrastructure aid, aid for health and education, humanitarian aid, human capacity and civil society aid, private sector aid and post-​conflict aid. It has been a huge and complicated learning process and, like other donors, they have all seen manifest failures, not least related to large-​scale aid projects such as the Norwegian fishing project at Lake Turkana in Kenya in the 1970s and the Danish multi-​sector integrated Noakhali development project in Bangladesh in the 1970s–​1980s (Brunbech 2011; Ruud and Kjerland 2003: 116ff.). Likewise, all three countries have experienced numerous setbacks and failures in 296

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their ambition to help sustain development in Tanzania –​a country which for decades has been an absolute recipient darling for all of the Scandinavian countries. The Scandinavian countries have also had to look on as their development efforts became embroiled in political controversy, as in relation to the Norwegian and Swedish-​supported population control projects in India in the 1970s and 1980s involving forced sterilization or in relation to the Nordic cooperative project in Tanzania, which was accused of indirectly supporting President Nyerere’s forced collectivization programme of the early 1970s (Engh 2008; Paaskesen 2011).The many problems related to documenting development effects and the involvement in politically controversial projects have also produced Scandinavian contributions to the international criticism of the dysfunctional aspects of development aid; Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal and Danish economist Martin Paldam are some of the most prominent examples (Olesen 2008: 287ff.; Paldam 1997; Ruud and Kjerland 2003: 153ff.). Despite its failures and inconsistencies, Scandinavian aid has always emphasized poverty eradication. As maintained by Swedish aid scholars Odén and Wohlgemuth: ‘The basic objective of Swedish aid was established in the Government bill 1962:100 to raise the living standard of the poor. This has never been seriously challenged’ (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 14). More than mere rhetoric, this understanding has also coloured the Scandinavian countries’ respective aid profiles in practice.The Scandinavian countries have disbursed a comparatively high proportion of aid to the poorest countries of the world –​to the ‘needy’ rather than the ‘speedy’2 –​and been dedicated to targeting the poorest areas and segments within these countries. For many years, the pronounced emphasis to support projects or programmes aimed at improving conditions for women in development must also be seen as a strategy –​in addition to improving gender equality –​to promote development and reach some of the poorest sections in the developing countries. In 2011–​12, all of the Nordic countries, including Iceland and Finland, disbursed more than 50 per cent of their aid in the so-​called Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the world with a strong focus on Africa, Denmark reaching the highest percentage at 57 per cent (OECD/​DAC 2014a: 407, Table A.10).3 However, while Nordic aid for the LDCs lies well above the ODA average, the 2011–​12 figures mirror the fact that earmarking aid for poverty reduction can be very difficult, as the contemporary aid agenda has become very complex and threatened by an overload of different objectives and priorities. When the poverty approach has to integrate or even compete with the paradigm of sustainability, human rights dimensions, post-​conflict aid and terror-​prevention, goal diffusion and confusion often occur. The Scandinavian countries have tried to counter this tendency by paying close attention to policy coherence and coordination by developing much more comprehensive global strategies in which trade, investment, technology and security aspects and concerns are integrated into the development aid approach (Engberg-​Pedersen 2015a; Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013; Stokke 2005b). The restructuring of the Danish Foreign Ministry into North and South Departments already in 1991 heralded the new approach, as did the Swedish government’s adoption of a new Policy of Global Development in 2003. The Norwegian reform of 2004 should be understood in a similar light, as it curbed the independence of the development agency NORAD by integrating it and transferring some of its portfolios into other sections of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Today, NORAD is a directorate serving both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Climate and Environment (NORAD 2015; Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 20; Olesen 2015: 30ff.). Thus, in all three countries, development aid has become strongly integrated into broader global policies with a strong coordinating role played by the respective ministries of foreign affairs. Like many other donors, the Scandinavian countries have recently been very preoccupied with measuring and securing their quality of aid as defined by DAC’s High-​Level Form 297

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on Aid Effectiveness (2011) in Busan, South Korea, stressing the importance of the ownership of development priorities by aid-​receiving countries through the establishment of inclusive partnerships and attention to results, transparency and accountability. In the recent (2013) DAC peer reviews of Norwegian and Swedish development aid, both aid programmes are hailed –​ individually –​for delivering ‘quality assistance in partner countries, maximising the impact of its support, as defined by Busan’ (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 8ff.; OECD/​DAC 2014b: 20; OECD/​DAC 2014c: 20). The DAC has not conducted a recent, similar peer review of Danish aid, but in the much-​cited annual ‘Ranking of the Rich’ carried out by the Center for Global Development (CGD), Denmark again tops the 2015 ‘Commitment to Development Index’ (with Sweden, Norway and Finland occupying spots 2–​4). According to the Center, Denmark has the best overall score due to its very good and consistent performance across the board, with top marks in aid quality and technology (CGD 2015). This position may be difficult for Denmark to uphold in the coming 2016 ranking due to the ongoing radical transformation of the Danish aid approach.

The dynamics of aid-​giving In his internationally acclaimed book from 1993, Moral Vision in International Politics, David Lumsdaine argued that altruism has been the determining impulse behind foreign aid: ‘Over a period of forty years, developed countries provided foreign aid mainly because of their belief that they had a humane responsibility to do so’ (Lumsdaine 1993: 283). Furthermore, according to Lumsdaine, this interpretation was even more valid when applied to the aid dynamics of countries with a strong domestic welfare ideology, such as the Nordics (Lumsdaine 1993: 39ff.). A similar conclusion was reached four years earlier by Norwegian aid specialist Olav Stokke. According to Stokke, the humane internationalist profile of the Scandinavian countries was a result of the fact ‘that socio-​political values in the donors’ domestic society have been the main determinants of most dimensions of aid policy’ (Stokke 1989: 313).4 Stokke’s view has been repeatedly endorsed by other scholars and more recently reconfirmed by Swedish aid scholars Odén and Wohlgemuth, who argue that solidarity has always been the major underlying aid motive for Sweden (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013:  14). Likewise, American aid expert and scholar Carol Lancaster, in her comparative book on foreign aid from 2007, entitled her chapter on Denmark, ‘The Humane Internationalist’ (Lancaster 2007). Conversely, many researchers claim that aid is primarily given due to various kinds of national interests.This holds true both for researchers dealing with the Cold War period and/​or the time since. Some of these scholars have been flexible enough to acknowledge that altruistic motives have played a stronger role for some countries than for others. The Scandinavian countries are typically singled out as belonging to such a category of states, but even for the Scandinavian humane internationalists, it is argued, altruism and solidarity have not been the only dynamic forces, maybe even not always the dominant ones.5 As Swedish aid scholars Ekengren and Götz have argued, however, the real question to answer in relation to Swedish (and Scandinavian) aid is not if altruism or self-​interest was predominant but rather ‘how altruism and instrumental considerations have been intertwined in a specific political culture and in what way a mutually reinforcing relationship of these factors was and can be maintained’ (Ekengren and Götz 2013: 34ff. and 48). Thus, in addition to the altruistic6 and solidarity/​welfare state ideology impulses behind Scandinavian aid-​giving, a number of other factors, international and domestic, must be mentioned when explaining how and why a mutually reinforcing relationship of altruistic and 298

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instrumental considerations has been created in the Scandinavian aid culture. At the international level, the creation and development of an aid norm (the 0.7 per cent norm) and the aid regime have obviously influenced the Scandinavian aid approach. As seen above, the Scandinavian aid contribution was very modest and clearly below the DAC average in the beginning of the 1960s. The launch by the UN of the aid norm and the systematic efforts by the DAC to inspire member states to honour the norm were very important for the increased and sustained aid effort delivered by the Scandinavian states since the mid-​1960s. Likewise, the Scandinavian approach to aid has been highly influenced by the evolving agenda and priorities of the international aid regime. Domestic factors have also played an important role. In addition to the strong welfare ideology in all three states, three domestic factors should be stressed: (1) the influence of civil society and public opinion; (2) the workings of parliamentarian politics and the corporatist national aid systems; (3) foreign policy priorities. All of the Scandinavian countries have had strong civil society groups dedicated to the aid issue. This has helped produce and sustain a rather pro-​aid public opinion that again has influenced the political support for aid. In Scandinavia, where government power has relied heavily on coalition politics, small centrist parties have often held the decisive key to the formation of either centre-​r ight or centre-​left governments. Almost all of these centrist parties have had a very strong aid commitment and have managed to make or support aid as a priority issue for sitting governments. The relevance of this argument can be observed when comparing the recent Swedish and Danish aid history. When a conservative-​led government came to power in Sweden in 2006, it did not result in any aid cuts but rather in a consolidation of the 1 per cent target, which was largely owing to the presence of smaller pro-​aid parties in the coalition (see Figure 23.1; Ekengren and Götz 2013: 28ff. and 42ff.). In Denmark, in contrast, the aid commitment shrank from 2001 as a consequence of the shift from the centre-​r ight/​left system to one of a liberal–​conservative government supported by the populist Danish People’s Party (DPP). The important feature here is that the DPP does not belong to the pro-​aid political constituency in Denmark. Obviously it is also highly relevant to observe that despite this shift, Danish ODA did not drop below 0.8 per cent and thus continued to honour the UN norm in the period 2001–​11, where this new parliamentary constellation was at work. The logic preventing a full break with tradition is probably succinctly captured by Carol Lancaster, who has argued that, ‘while political leadership can change dramatically, fundamental policies and broadly shared values, identities and understandings do not shift so rapidly’ (Lancaster 2007: 211). A further moderating influence may be found in the corporatist-​like organization of the Danish aid system in which all of the stakeholders, the government (represented by the Foreign Ministry aid administration Danida), interest groups (industry and agriculture), the ‘aid industry’ (aid consultants and experts, aid organizations, aid grassroots) as well as the aid-​ concerned academic community, had a pronounced interest in maintaining high aid levels in order to protect their specific political, professional and commercial interests (Brunbech and Olesen 2013). The third factor –​the role of development aid in foreign policy, including foreign economic (commercial) policy –​has also been crucial for the high priority accorded to aid in Scandinavia. In Sweden, the high ODA profile has fit hand-​in-​glove with the Swedish neutrality policy, especially after this policy changed gears in the 1960s to become less cautious and more activist, as personified in the global and internationalist profile of Olof Palme. Solidarity, and thus development aid as an expression of solidarity, were put up front as an international and foreign policy priority. In so doing, a high level of ODA became an essential and embedded part of the independent, alliance-​free, Third World-​friendly Swedish profile. For Sweden, which was a member 299

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of neither the EC/​EU nor NATO, development aid helped create and sustain a political and commercial foothold in the post-​colonial world. This nexus has not changed fundamentally in the post-​Cold War period, although Swedish development aid policy has become somewhat more ‘Europeanized’7 since joining the EU in 1995 and more tied to Swedish military engagements overseas, not least in Afghanistan (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 42ff.).8 Similar linkages can be observed in Denmark and Norway, although the foreign policy link has functioned somewhat differently. The Danish case has seen more controversy over the last decade. Due to its membership of NATO, Realpolitik and idealism functioned more separately than in Sweden during the Cold War period. Aid –​and with it other UN-​related policy areass –​often had a long-​term, balancing rationale in contrast to the short-​term, hard security pursued through NATO. As in Sweden, however, aid became a robust foreign policy instrument, combining elements of altruism and instrumentalism and creating the same kind of mutually reinforcing aid culture. In the post-​Cold War period, the tendency towards the foreign policy compartmentalization of idealism and realism has dissolved, and idealism (and with it aid) has been more fully integrated into the foreign policy of the two countries. In this manner, one might argue that the instrumental side of aid has also become more visible –​and ‘nationalized’ (see more below) –​not least as a consequence of the increased linkage to the fight against terror, military engagement and aid. Recent research has thus shown that both Norway and Denmark have experienced manifest dilemmas related to the so-​called ‘mixed mission’ concept in Afghanistan in which civil (aid and humanitarian work) and military activities have been understood in theory as reinforcing one another; in practice, this has rarely been achieved (Friis 2013; Stepputat et al. 2012). Despite valuable attempts at integrating the political and cultural context and to prioritizing the need for sustainable government into the gradually introduced counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, short-​term military needs and requirements have generally tended to take precedence over long-​term development priorities, while in the (battle and aid) field, the close link between the military campaign and the aid effort rendered it very difficult for aid workers to be trusted as ‘neutrals’ (or to work at all, leaving responsibility for aid to combat soldiers) and to ensure that aid was distributed according to basic principles, such as transparency and non-​ corruption. These dilemmas have led Norwegian security analyst Karsten Friis to the tentative conclusion that ‘civilian–​military cooperation is most efficient in the stabilization phase of a war, where it can reinforce a political settlement. Civilian efforts require more time to achieve the desired political effects than military efforts do’ (Friis 2013: 16). In this light, it seems fair to argue that the result in Afghanistan has been for aid to support the military rather than to produce and sustain any mutually reinforcing nexus. A final aspect to address in relation to the aid dynamics is the role of cooperation and competition on aid among the Nordic states. Since the early 1960s, the Nordics have cooperated on the aid issue in various ways:  on running joint Nordic aid projects, on policy coordination and representation in international institutions (the UN, World Bank), and during regular formal and informal government meetings between ministers and heads of the national aid administrations. This type of cooperation reflects in itself the high element of shared value orientation and the commonality in the approach to aid and have undoubtedly given the Nordic approach a stronger voice on the international stage. At the same time, Nordic cooperation has also been marked by an element of competition in terms of controlling the Scandinavian aid agenda. In this sense, the ambition to be the teacher’s pet in the ‘school of international aid’ has acted as a dynamic impulse for the Nordic race to the top of the aid charts (Olesen 2008: 332ff.).

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Whether such an inter-​Nordic aid dynamic or model of aid continues to function is doubtful. Nordic aid priorities increasingly appear to follow different aid trajectories, and inter-​Nordic cooperation appears to have become much more informal and ad hoc than in the late twentieth century.This is partly due to the EU membership of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, which often renders the EU common development platform more rewarding for them to cultivate than the smaller Nordic one. More fundamentally, it also seems as though there has been a genuine lack of Nordic commitment for some time, which is likely due to both internal (the transformation of the Nordic welfare state) and external factors that reflect a deeper identity crisis about what it has come to mean to be ‘Nordic’. All of these factors seem to pose a real challenge to the Nordic aid model –​possibly even to the humane internationalist approach to aid itself. Thus, there are many indications at the time of writing that the Nordic aid approach is in a phase of transition (Elgström and Delputte 2016; Kettunen et al. 2016; Odén 2011; Olesen and Strang 2016; Staur 2015).

Conclusions: humane internationalism in decline? There has been ongoing debate among Danish historians and political scientists in recent years concerning the character of Danish foreign policy since the Cold War. The real dividing line in this debate concerns the policy of the twenty-​first century; that is, the policy pursued since the Liberal–​Conservative Fogh Rasmussen government took power with the active support of the right-​wing populist Danish People’s Party in 2001. The crucial question is whether the policy of successive Fogh Rasmussen governments (2001–​11) marked a shift from a policy of active internationalism to one of international activism. The main characteristics of the alleged shift consisted of a declining role for UN internationalism in exchange for strong bilateral attachment to US foreign and security policy, most manifestly expressed in the very active Danish military involvements in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Jacobsen and Wivel 2015; Pedersen and Gram-​Skjoldager 2015; Petersen 2010). Another aspect of this ‘new’ foreign policy relates to the developments in Danish development aid policy during the same period. As we have seen, Danish ODA declined relatively, multilateral aid was downsized (especially to and through UN organizations), and aid was increasingly linked in both discourse and practice to a national security and commercial agenda rather than an internationalist one. At the same time, Danish aid maintained many of its historical features by continuing to respect the UN norm and by upholding a pronounced poverty orientation. On this background, Carol Lancaster argued in 2007 that Danish aid had not seen any profound shift, whereas this author has argued that the shift has been pronounced and has departed, at least partly, from the humane internationalist tradition (Brunbech and Olesen 2013: 119ff.; Lancaster 2007: 210ff.). No similar debate has addressed the Norwegian and Swedish aid policies, mainly because they have basically maintained their traditional profiles. But the policies in the latter two countries may also be undergoing change, and a rapid one it would seem, provoked by the so-​called refugee crisis in Europe of 2015. The change is so manifest that a recent report commissioned and published by the Nordic church aid organizations critically discusses if this marks the end of Nordic (aid) exceptionalism (Norwegian Church Aid et al. 2015).9 In itself, the reception of refugees is indeed compatible with humane internationalism, but the critical aspect occurs when the Nordic states apparently are bent on financing the cost of the increased refugee influx through their development aid budgets. Norway and Sweden are actually increasing their aid budgets but insist at the same time on using 20–​30 per cent of these funds on costs related to national refugee reception –​a practice that Sweden has actually increasingly resorted to in recent years (Norwegian Church Aid et al.

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2015: 18).10 This is compatible with DAC rules but creates massive problems related to financing traditional development aid programmes, as there will be substantially less funding available for such purposes. It is already clear in the Norwegian case that multilateral aid will suffer in 2016, large cuts being predicted to hit various UN programmes (Norwegian Church Aid et al. 2015: 14ff.). In Denmark there will be an outright cut in aid –​in addition to budget transfers to refugee reception –​to the absolute minimum UN norm level of 0.7 per cent, whereas Finnish aid will decline by a staggering 43 per cent, casting serious doubt about ever reaching the UN norm (Norwegian Church Aid et al. 2015: 20ff.; Ritzaus Bureau 2015). This development demonstrates the extent to which humane internationalism is under severe strain throughout Scandinavia.The greater challenge may not even be the present refugee challenge but rather the fact that the European and global agenda is changing more profoundly.  The North–​South relations are undergoing solid transformation, with parts of the South becoming both politically and economically more assertive. The role of development aid is decreasing as other flows, trade, investments and remittances are becoming increasingly important for countries in the South. At the same time, the anchor of modern internationalism, the UN system, appears weakened due to a lack of the institutional modernization that is crucial for catching up with the changes the world has undergone since 1945. Nevertheless, the UN has been the central entrepreneur for the rather successful implementation of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and has managed more recently to replace this framework with the so-​called 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG); however, the primary focus of the new framework is sustainable development, not poverty eradication (Engberg-​Pedersen 2015a; Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013: 3–​13). The transformations and challenges mentioned above appear to indicate that humane internationalism cannot and will not continue to guide Nordic development aid policy, but also that aid policy in itself is in need of a profound rethinking. Or as Poul Engberg-​Pedersen has stressed:  What is needed is a new political narrative concerning the need for international engagement that avoids overselling the potential impact of aid. This would constitute ‘true Nordic exceptionalism and leadership’ (Engberg-​Pedersen 2015b: 50).

Notes 1 Figures on multilateral aid are drawn from OECDstat, Flows by Donor, at http://​stats.oecd.org/​Index. aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1#. More detailed information on each Scandinavian country’s aid disbursements, including multilateral aid disbursement, can be found at the following on-​line sources: http://​ openaid.um.dk/​da/​oda/​main-​categories/​?Y=2013/​; www.norad.no/​om-​bistand/​norsk-​bistand-​i-​tall/;​ www.openaid.se/​sv/​aid/​2013/​ (all accessed 3 December 2015). 2 This expression is taken from the captive article title by Monika Pohle Fraser (2008). 3 A recent study commissioned by the Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies (Baulch 2016) confirms that Denmark is the Scandinavian country with the highest poverty focus in its aid. 4 In addition to the Scandinavian countries, Stokke’s (1989) conclusion also covered the Netherlands and to some degree Canada, which were all branded ‘the like-​minded (aid) countries’. 5 For a more detailed and comprehensive argument on the dynamics of Scandinavian aid-​giving, see the national chapters on Danish, Norwegian and Swedish aid and the conclusion, ‘Aid Norms:  Foreign Policy and the Domestic Context’, in Olesen et al. (2013).When not otherwise indicated, the argument below in this section of the chapter is based on the latter. 6 Altruism is a rather complex concept. Adam Smith already knew that altruism also had various ‘rent-​ seeking’ dimensions. On altruism as a concept and its role in Danish aid, see Olesen and Pedersen (2010). 7 It is interesting to note, however, that Elgström and Delputte (2016) argue –​as Laatikainen (2003) did about EU UN policy –​that it has been relatively easy for the Nordic states to adapt to EU development policy because the latter has largely been ‘Nordified’; that is, has adopted a number of the characteristics of a humane internationalist approach.

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Scandinavian development policies 8 In 2000, Afghanistan was not among the top-​ten recipients of Swedish aid. In 2011 it was third and in 2014 the country receiving the highest share of Swedish bilateral aid (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2013:  35; 2014 figure from Swedish Open Aid homepage, at http://​openaid.se/​sv/​aid/​sweden/​all-​ countries/​2014/​ (accessed 29 December 2015)). A similar pattern can be observed also in Denmark and Norway. 9 Nordic exceptionalism is defined as the Nordic states sharing an approach to aid which to a very large degree reflects the defining criteria for humane internationalism (Norwegian Church Aid et al. 2015: 6ff.). 10 Of the Nordic countries, Sweden has received the largest share of refugees by far (also in relative terms) in recent years. In 2015, Sweden was forecast to handle approx. 160,000 asylum seekers, whereas the other Nordic states were to receive approx. 20,000–​30,000 (Sommer 2016).

References Baulch, B. (2016) The Poverty Focus of Swedish Bilateral Aid: A Comparative Analysis. European Journal of Development Research 28(4): 758–775. Brunbech, P. Y. (2011) The Poor of Noakhali:  Danish Development Assistance Policy and Rural Development Policy in Bangladesh. Contemporary European History 20(2): 183–​205. Brunbech, P. Y. and Olesen, T. B. (2013) The Late Front Runner: Denmark and the ODA Percentage Question, 1960–​2008. In: Olesen, T. B., Pharo, H. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and Its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo:  Akademika Publishing. CGD (Center for Global Development) (2015) Brief: Commitment to Development Index 2015. Available at: www.cgdev.org/​publication/​ft/​commitment-​development-​index-​2015 [Accessed 21 July 2016]. Ekengren, A.-​M. and Götz, N. (2013) The One Per Cent Country: Sweden’s Internalisation of the Aid Norm. In: Olesen,T. B., Pharo, H. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners. Official Development Aid and Its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Akademika Publishing. Elgström, O. and Delputte, S. (2016) An End to Nordic Exceptionalism? Europeanisation and Nordic Development Policies. European Politics and Society 17(1): 28–​41. Engberg-​Pedersen, P. (2015a) Fremtidens bistand: Udviklingssamarbejde I krydsfeltet mellem fattigdomsreduktion, bæredygtig udvikling og globale fællesgoder. Økonomi & Politik 88(2): 56–​67. Engberg-​Pedersen, P. (2015b) Exceptionally Important: Nordic Development Cooperation Towards 2030. In: Norwegian Church Aid, Helland, A. M., Hallonsten, G., Qvist-​Sørensen, B. and Hemberg, J. (eds), The End of Nordic Exceptionalism? Report commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Chuch Aid, DanChurchAid and Church of Sweden. Available at: www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/​globalassets/​utviklingskonf-​2015/​end-​of-​nordic-​exceptionalism.pdf [Accessed 21 July 2016]. Engh, S. (2008) From Northern Feminists to Southern Women. In: Pharo, H. Ø. and Fraser, M. P. (eds), The Aid Rush: Aid Regimes in Northern Europe During the Cold War.Vol. 1. Oslo: Unipub. Fraser, M. P. (2008) Not the Needy, but the Speedy Ones: West German Development Aid and Private Investment in the Middle East, 1960–​67. In: Pharo, H. Ø. and Fraser, M. P. (eds), The Aid Rush: Aid Regimes in Northern Europe During the Cold War.Vol. 2. Oslo: Unipub. Friis, K. (2013) The Norwegian Approach to Afghanistan: Civil–​Military Segregation. Nupi Working Papers, 825. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. ICEIDA (2007) Icelandic International Development Agency (ICEIDA). Aims and Work. Available at www.iceida.is/​media/​pdf/​Kynningarbaklingur_​-​_​enska.pdf [Accessed 30 November 2015]. Jacobsen, S. G. and Wivel, A. (eds) (2015) Dansk udenrigspolitisk aktivisme: Fortid, nutid, fremtid. Politik 18(4): 1–​45. Kettunen, P., Lundberg, U., Österberg, M. and Petersen, K. (2016) The Nordic Model and the Rise and Decline of Nordic Cooperation. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. Abingdon: Routledge. Laatikainen, K. V. (2003) Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations. Cooperation & Conflict 38(4): 409–​441. Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949–​1989. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Norwegian Church Aid, Helland, A. M., Hallonsten, G., Qvist-​Sørensen, B. and Hemberg, J. (2015) The End of Nordic Exceptionalism? Report commissioned by Norwegian Church Aid, Finn Church Aid,

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T. B. Olesen DanChurchAid and Church of Sweden. Available at: www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/​globalassets/​utviklingskonf-​2015/​end-​of-​nordic-​exceptionalism.pdf [Accessed 21 July 2016]. Odén, B. (2011) The Africa Policies of the Nordic Countries and the Erosion of the Nordic Model: A Comparative Study. Discussion Paper, 55. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. Odén, B. and Wohlgemuth, L. (2006) Svensk biståndspolitik i ett internationellt perspektiv. Perspectives 1: 1–​43. Odén, B. and Wohlgemuth, L. (2013) Swedish Development Cooperation Policy in an International Perspective. Perspectives 24: 1–​73. NORAD (2015) Homepage. Available at: www.norad.no/​om-​norad/​ [Accessed 2 October 2016]. OECD/​DAC (2014a) Development Co-​operation Report:  Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development. Paris: OECD. OECD/​DAC (2014b) Development Co-​operation Peer Review Norway 2013. Paris: OECD. OECD/​DAC (2014c) Development Co-​operation Peer Review Sweden 2013. Paris: OECD. OECD STATS (2015) Category: Flows by Donor. OECD.Stat database available at: http://​stats.oecd.org/​ Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1# [Accessed 11 November 2015]. Olesen, T. B. (2008) Stabilitet og turbulens:  Udviklingspolitikken 1975–​ 89. In:  Due-​ Nielsen, C., Feldbæk, O. and Petersen, N. (eds), Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–​2005. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Olesen, T. B. (2015) Prioritering, profilering og politisk orientering:  Engagement og aktivisme i dansk udviklings-​og bistandspolitik 1962–​2015. Politik 18(4): 23–​36. Olesen, T. B. and Pedersen, J. (2010) On the Side of the Angels: Altruism in Danish Development Aid, 1960–​2005. European Review of History 17(6): 881–​903. Olesen, T. B. and Strang, J. (2016) European Challenge to Nordic Institutional Cooperation: Past, Present and Future. In: Strang, J. (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. Abingdon: Routledge. Olesen, T. B., Pharo, H. Ø. and Paaskesen, K. (2013) Conclusion:  Aid Norms, Foreign Policy and the Domestic Context. In: Olesen, T. B., Pharo, H. Ø. and Paaskesen, K. (eds), Saints and Sinners: Official Development Aid and Its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Akademika Publ. Paaskesen, K. (2011) A Bleak Chapter in Nordic Development Aid History? The Nordic Co-​operative Assistance Project in Tanzania 1968–​88. Scandinavian Journal of History 35(4): 451–​470. Paldam, M. (1997) Dansk u-​landshjælp: Altruismens politiske økonomi. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Pedersen, J. (2008) Det bilaterale program i støbeskeen. In:  Bach, C. F. (ed.), Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie, 1945–​2005. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Pedersen, R. B. and Gram-​Skjoldager, K. (2015) International aktivisme i dansk udenrigspolitik 2001–​ 2009. En tværfaglig forskningsstatus. Historisk Tidsskrift 115(1): 163–​188. Petersen, N. (2010) Hinsides den kolde krig:  Danmarks internationale ordenspolitik 1990–​2009. In: Due-​Nielsen, C., Mariager, R. and Schmidt, R. (eds), Nye fronter i den kolde krig. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Pratt, C. (1989) Middle Power Internationalism and North–​South Issues:  Comparisons and Prognosis. In:  Pratt, C. (ed.), Internationalism under Strain:  The North–​South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ridell, R. C. (2007) Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ritzaus Bureau (2015) Sådan skærer finansloven i ulandsbistanden. Ritzau Plus, 21 December 2015. Ruud, A. E. and Kjerland, K. A. (2003) Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer, 1975–​89. Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. Vol. 2. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Simensen, J. (2003) Norge møter den trdje verden 1952–​1975. Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. Vol. 1. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Sommer, M. (2016) Rekord: Sverige tog imod 163.000 asylansøgere i 2015. DR Nyheder, 1 January 2016. Available at:  www.dr.dk/​nyheder/​udland/​rekord-​sverige-​tog-​imod-​163000-​asylansoegere-​i-​2015 [Accessed 21 July 2016]. Staur, C. (2015) Interview conducted via e-​mail by the author with Carsten Staur who from 2001 to 2007 headed the Danish FM’s aid programme (Danida); 2007–​2013 he acted as the Danish permanent representative to the UN in New York and is presently permanent representative to the UN in Geneva. Stepputat, A., Engberg-​Pedersen, L. and Fejerskov, A. M. (2012) Dansk bistand som sikkerhedspolitisk instrument, 1992–​2009. DIIS Report 2012:01. Copegenhagen: Danish Institute of Intwernational Affairs.

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Scandinavian development policies Stokke, O. (1989) The Determinants of Aid Policies: General Introduction. In: Stokke, O. (ed.), Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. Stokke, O. (2005a) Norwegian Aid Policy: Continuity and Change in the 1990s and Beyond. In: Hoebink, P. and Stokke, O. (eds), Perspectives on European Development Co-​operation:  Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. Abingdon: Routledge. Stokke, O. (2005b) The Changing International and Conceptual Environment of Development Co-​ operation. In: Hoebink, P. and Stokke, O. (eds), Perspectives on European Development Cooperation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. Abingdon: Routledge.

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24 CONCLUSIONS Scandinavian polities, politics and policies reconsidered Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel

Introduction: what are the issues at stake? As stated in the introduction, the main objective of this book has been to provide a critical assessment and comprehensive overview of Scandinavian politics as provided by leading experts in the fields of Scandinavian comparative politics, foreign policy and public administration. The authors have critically discussed the state of the art in the field and identified the main characteristics of contemporary Scandinavian politics together with the most important trends. We have aimed to provide a nuanced understanding of Scandinavian politics today and over time by unpacking the similarities and differences between the Scandinavian countries and tracing how they have developed over time. Scandinavia (or the Nordic countries; the two concepts are used interchangeably throughout the book as well as in political discourse more generally) has become a symbol of the advanced postmodern society. In addition to unpacking the current state of Scandinavian politics and identifying the most important political trends in the region, the authors of this volume have investigated the roots of this symbol and whether or not it actually corresponds to reality on a number of issues concerning the polities, politics and policies in this region of the world.1 This chapter summarizes the findings of the handbook –​organized in sections on polity, politics, and policies –​and connects them to the expectations from the literature on Scandinavian politics identified in Chapter 1. Based on this summary, we conclude the book with a discussion as to whether Scandinavian politics is becoming normalized and how much remains of the Nordic model(s).

Change and continuity in Scandinavian polities, politics and policies Scandinavian politics are often characterized by outsiders and insiders alike as progressive, activist and egalitarian. However, breaking down the overall subject of Scandinavian politics into three subcategories –​polities, politics and policies –​allows us to unpack the characteristics of Scandinavian politics and how it is changing.

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Polities In the chapters on Scandinavian polities, the authors analyse the Scandinavian welfare states as well as how the concepts of equality, corporatism and ‘greenness’ play out in contemporary Scandinavia. In Chapter 2, the authors stress how the Nordic welfare model is not static; it is continuously being reformed. Nevertheless, it has retained some of its fundamental characteristics –​stateness, universalism and equality –​even though changing demographics (i.e. ageing populations) and immigration are putting these characteristics under pressure. The authors conclude that the welfare states in the Nordic countries have been reconstructed (i.e. ‘less of the same’ and stricter eligibility criteria) rather than deconstructed. The authors of Chapter  3 on equality take the same middle-​of-​the-​road position as the authors of Chapter 2. They conclude that the Nordic welfare states are changing in directions that seem to move away from an ‘egalitarian paradise’. However, several of the distinguishing features of the Nordic welfare model remain. It would therefore be inaccurate to frame developments in terms of an ‘egalitarian paradise lost’. At the same time, the Nordic welfare model is in a process of re-​organization: social benefits are scaled back and income inequalities are on the rise. The theme of Chapter 4 is Scandinavian corporatism. As in the two previous chapters, the author of this chapter takes a ‘middle’ position; corporatism in Scandinavia is not dead, but interest groups are less important than previously. In addition, the traditionally strong interest groups representing labour, employers, industry and agriculture are now supplemented with a broader set of interest groups, many of which are citizen groups. The author’s prognosis is that the Nordic countries will have strong and encompassing interest groups for many years to come. According to the author of Chapter 5, the Scandinavian countries are indeed ‘green’ polities, as they are all frontrunners when it comes to action on the environment and climate change. The uniformity of the climate policies of the Nordic countries might seem surprising given their very different geographical and geological conditions. The explanation for this is found in a combination of strong popular support for green policies on the grassroots level and a strong hegemonic ecological modernization discourse enabling broad compromises and ambitious climate policies that are combined with economic growth based on green technologies. In sum, the Scandinavian polities remain egalitarian, consensual welfare states (see Chapter 1), but they are increasingly normalized, (slowly) gravitating towards the European norm for welfare provisions and broadening the base for representation beyond the traditional (economic) stakeholders of the welfare state. Still, when we turn to one of the iconic examples of post-​modern politics –​the environment and climate politics –​we find traits of the traditional Scandinavian welfare state, such as an activist state and the inclusion of national stakeholders in the policy process.

Politics In the chapters on Scandinavian politics, the political entrenchment of the welfare states, the administrative traditions, the cabinets and ministerial turnover, the parliaments, the party systems, the public opinions, the political populism, the social capital and the role of the media are analysed as far as the Nordic countries are concerned. Chapter  6 analyses the entrenchment of the welfare states in Scandinavia. In contrast to Chapter 2, the focus is not least on the contemporary and future problems that the welfare states

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are currently facing and will come to face in the future. The authors arrive at the prognosis that the Scandinavian welfare states will only remain competitive if and when they make heavy investments in education for large segments of the public. The Nordic administrative traditions are at the centre of attention in Chapter 7. Here, it is revealed that even though there are some specific features of a Nordic administrative tradition, there is no such a thing as a consistent Nordic administrative model. However, the traditional differences between east (Denmark, Norway) and west (Sweden, Finland) as far as the administrative models are concerned might still be relevant in some regards. At the same time, the Nordic administrations are affected by both European integration and the New Public Management reform movement. In Chapter 8, the focus of Scandinavian politics is on the cabinets and ministerial turnover in the various countries. There are similarities in this regard. All five countries form their respective governments under negative parliamentarism, with the involvement of a head of state or someone similar to select who forms the government. However, the outcome in terms of government type varies considerably. The most notable difference is the very strong tradition for majority coalition governments in Finland and Iceland as opposed to minority governments in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Also when it comes to the parliaments of the Scandinavian countries in Chapter 9, there are similarities as well as differences. The Nordic region is one of the most stable regions in the world of parliamentary democracy. The combination of parliamentarism with proportional electoral systems has led to multiparty systems. Consequently, collaboration in parliament is very common, regardless of whether the country in question traditionally has minority or majority coalition governments (see Chapter 8). Scandinavian parliaments are strong in international comparison even though European integration and Europeanization processes (which also affect non-​EU countries) have strengthened the executive. In short, Scandinavian parliaments are still at the centre of the political system, but to a lesser extent at the centre of power. According to Chapter 10, as we have seen in most of the other chapters, the Nordic voters and party systems are both similar and dissimilar. The left–​r ight dimension (i.e. the ideological continuum of economic redistribution) continues to act as a strong compass when navigating among the Nordic political parties.While electoral volatility has increased, most of it takes place among closely related parties. At the same time, there are also marked differences between the party systems of the Nordic countries; for example, the role of the populist parties varies from pariah (Sweden) to government party (Norway). Public opinion and politics is the theme of Chapter 11. Again, the focus is on the similarities and dissimilarities of the Nordic countries; and once again, as we see in other fields, despite differences, they also have a great deal in common. Trust in the parliament and how democracy works has been stable and higher for more than a decade in all of the Nordics than the European average. Public opinion on immigration policy is also rather stable, although there is some variation connected to party voting and support for populist parties. The last issue on populism is further investigated in Chapter 12. Populism is a long-​lived political phenomenon in Scandinavia. For decades, the populist presence has been due to the successful mobilization of many different societal niches against issues such as anti-​taxation, anti-​immigration and anti-​EU. The Scandinavian populist parties have been transformed from marginalized positions to parties with governmental credibility (except for Sweden).The populist political forces have also influenced policy-​making directly and indirectly in many ways. Chapter 13 reviews the question of whether the Nordics are exceptional in term of social capital. The evidence suggests that they rank high on two dimensions of social capital: social trust and associational involvement. There is, however, considerable variation in social capital 308

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between them.The countries also vary internally, although much more in associational involvement than in trust.The high levels of social capital in the Nordic countries have both deep roots and are of a more contemporary nature (with an increase in social capital over the last 30 years). The last chapter on Scandinavian politics is Chapter 14 on the role of the media in Scandinavia. As so often before (see above), it is shown that the Scandinavian countries are not uniform; neither concerning press structure and press subsidies nor in the financial models of public broadcasting. At the same time, the Scandinavian countries still have a number of important media features in common: the coexistence of commercialism and political concerns through state subsidies in order to secure media diversity. Other parts of Europe have similar traditions, but the combination of these elements is unique to Scandinavia. In combination, the chapters on Scandinavian politics show that what makes Scandinavian politics ‘different’ is a combination of several factors rather than one or two distinguishing features setting Scandinavia apart from other parts of Europe and the rest of the world. We can confirm the characterization identified in Chapter 1 –​parliamentary democracy, rule of law, corporatism and trust-​based politics –​but we should add that the combination of these characteristics produces politics that are stable and marked by citizen involvement through various associations that go well beyond the traditional model of corporatism.

Policies In the chapters on Scandinavian policies, various policies of importance for the countries are examined:  fiscal policy, fisheries policy, education policy, immigration policy, diplomacy and foreign policy, defence policy, EU policies, UN policies and development policy. Fiscal policy is the subject of Chapter  15. Even though the Scandinavian countries have recently been considered fiscal policy role models with a firm grip on public finances, they have not always been strong fiscal performers.They have all experienced their own crises, which have led to major fiscal consolidations and reforms. Doubts concerning the long-​term sustainability of fiscal reforms are often related to general distrust in the political process about distributional effects. In Scandinavia, public confidence –​perhaps in contrast to the rest of Europe –​is enhanced by the transparency of the policy and the political process. Fisheries policy is more important in many parts of Scandinavia than is the case elsewhere in the developed world. As explained in Chapter 16, there is a common backdrop for the fisheries policy in the Nordic countries. Technical improvements increase fishing capacity and put pressure on the fish stocks. While the policy responses to this development have been similar in the Nordic countries, the reaction times have been very different. Nevertheless, the trends for all of the Nordics are clear as the number of vessels and fishermen have been reduced and the value of landings has remained stable or increased. Chapter 17 analyses the education policies of the Nordic countries. In an international perspective, the Nordic countries have retained what might be called a social democratic perspective on the policy area consisting of policies of a public, unified education system founded on social inclusion and solidarity. The prognosis here is that the persistent belief in public investment in free primary, secondary and higher education continues to be the cornerstone of the education policies in the Nordic countries, even though there is and always will be considerable variations in the choice of organization and steering mechanism between them. Chapter 18 examines one of the most sensitive policy areas in contemporary Scandinavian politics: immigration. All five Nordic countries are facing major challenges in relation to international migration, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. Regardless, immigration has become a central driver for economic, social and political change in the region –​particularly in 309

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Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which have seen the largest waves of immigration. The aim of this change is to reform the Nordic social model in order to make it more robust by increasing the incentives to find employment and restrict access to welfare benefits. The scope for action is rather narrow, however, due to systemic hindrances for reform and international agreements that limit the manoeuvring space. The foreign policies and diplomacy of the Nordic countries and their diplomatic expression is examined in Chapter 19. This chapter demonstrates that although there are many important similarities between the Scandinavian diplomatic models, differences also exist. These differences primarily relate to how the individual countries have chosen to organize their foreign services and how much money they spend on diplomacy. However, the general trend is to have a slimmer foreign service in Scandinavia. Despite this scaling down of the foreign services, the Nordics typically rank at the very top or close to the top in international image rankings, reflecting the continued strength of the Nordic ‘brand’ in international relations. Chapter 20 analyses the defence and alliance policies of the Nordic countries. As in many of the social and economic policies examined above, these countries are also perceived in the rest of the world to be different in terms of how they handle security and defence matters. Scandinavia is traditionally regarded as the ‘quiet’ corner of Europe, leading some to refer to Scandinavia as a textbook case of a ‘security community’. On this backdrop, however, it is worth noting that the Scandinavian countries have had diverging strategic ties during the Cold War and pursued different alliance strategies since 1989. Arguably, there are now instances of the Nordics moving closer together, which might indicate increasing Nordic unity –​not least due to the possible threat from Russia. Chapter 21 examines Scandinavian EU policies. Generally speaking, the Nordic approach to the EU is most accurately described as pragmatic and functionalist. There is no alliance on EU policies, but the Nordic cluster exchanges information on EU issues. At the institutional level and as a result of the specific Nordic approach, the Scandinavian countries opt in and out of policies, creating a map of ‘misty boundaries’ between the three Nordic EU members and the two non-​members. All of the Nordic countries engage actively within the EU (including the non-​members) but often also reject further EU integration, especially concerning their welfare states (see Chapters 2 and 6 of this volume). Chapter 22 examines the UN policies of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. Nordic UN support has varied, depending on how interests, ideals and national identities have interacted. Nordic support for the UN was low in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War because the UN was viewed with scepticism as a potential entrapment early in the Cold War.The Nordic countries quickly became UN believers, however, playing leading roles within the fields of development assistance and peacekeeping. This changed with the end of the Cold War when the UN’s position was challenged by a series of failures and new actors.The prospects for a major Nordic comeback in the UN are not promising unless tied closely to the activities of the other EU and NATO members. A major Nordic return would have to be part of a major Western return. Scandinavian development policies is the theme of Chapter 23. The Scandinavian countries started slowly as development aid donors. Scandinavian aid increased rapidly in the early 1960s, however, and within a decade the Scandinavian countries had earned a reputation for being extraordinarily committed to aid and even ‘humane internationalists’. In contrast, recent trends in development aid signal that humane internationalism is under pressure in Scandinavia. The reason is that the role of development aid as a development tool is decreasing, since other flows, trade investments and remittances are becoming more important for the countries of the South. Nordic development policies are likely on the brink of fundamental rethinking and reform. 310

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Comparing these analyses of Scandinavian policies with the characteristics identified in Chapter 1 –​pragmatic and incrementalist, liberal, activist and with emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution at home and abroad –​we re-​discover all of these characteristics of the literature on Scandinavia in the analyses in this book. However, the emphases of these policy elements are changing. Nordic policies are increasingly pragmatic adaptations of general trends of Europeanization and globalization –​and fewer and fewer attempts are made at carving out a specific Nordic response to these trends. This is an interesting finding, as it problematizes the Nordic brand discussed in Chapter  1 and goes against the oft-​voiced self-​perception of the Nordics as activist trendsetters. However, the great irony seems to be that as the Nordic polities, politics and policies become less distinct and more ‘normalized’ European states, the more the same countries seem to be hailed and branded as the ‘strange and rare animals of the zoo’ (cf. Hegel 1991 [1820]). Thus, the Nordic countries are like Hegel’s ‘owl of Minerva’, which first takes flight when the night shadows are gathering.

The normalization of Scandinavian politics? The Nordic countries are becoming increasingly ‘normalized’; that is, increasingly exposed to the same global and European trends as other states in the region and responding to these trends by adapting to European rather than specifically Nordic policy choices and practices. Thus, Scandinavia has become less a case of ‘the other European community’ than it was 50, 25 or even ten years ago (see Turner and Nordquist 1982). To be sure, there are variations of the three dimensions that we have used as an organizing principle for our book. Scandinavian polities remain distinctly Nordic, whereas politics are less Scandinavian and policies are even less distinct. Normalization has had a stronger impact on foreign policies than domestic policies. Thus, it has become more difficult to discern what constitutes a ‘Scandinavian international society’ based on international practices mirroring the norms of the welfare state in the form of democratically accountable foreign policies and active support for human rights, Third World political and economic development, environmentalism, and a strong commitment to multilateral conflict resolution (Ingebritsen 2002; Schouenborg 2013). Externally, this volume confirms that the combination of social democratic welfare state values and cosmopolitan duty, which was particularly strong in Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War (Bergman 2007), has lost value as a foreign policy instrument and that Sweden and its Scandinavian followers can no longer legitimately ‘stand up and “teach” the rest of the world what is forwards and backwards when it comes to societal development’ (Mouritzen 1995: 9). However, we also show that by pragmatically adapting and aiming for a role as elite students in the globalization class, Scandinavians took advantage of the transformed global and European environment, smartly tapping into the dominant discourses and establishing forerunner reputations within selected issue areas, although challenges remain (see Björkdahl 2008; Grøn and Wivel 2011; Jakobsen 2009). Thus, Scandinavia is less of a self-​contained international society than it used to be but remains an important starting point for political action and policy choice. Domestically, the Scandinavian polity can still be said to exist, but it is increasingly embedded in European and global society. Moreover, global and European trends are not transmitted uniformly through Scandinavian polities and politics to identical policy choices in the five Nordic countries. The effect of the Scandinavian model(s) is not to transmit policy options into uniform Scandinavian policy choices like a light tube transporting light to its designated location. Instead, the Scandinavian model(s) affect policies like a prism reflects the light: by bending it in all kinds of different –​and sometimes unexpected –​ways; that is, leading to policy choices 311

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affected by a common Scandinavian heritage but leading to different interpretations and results in the individual countries.2 This book has uncovered and unpacked the details in this regard, and we hope the chapters –​ taken together –​are received as both a contribution to the research into the Nordicity phenomenon mentioned in the introductory chapter as well as a recommendation to take up the task of producing new and interesting research on the phenomenon that is the Nordic countries.

Notes 1 See also Strang (2016) for a recent collection of analyses on Nordicity, albeit with a focus on Nordic cooperation. On Nordicity as a brand and identity, see Browning (2007). 2 The prism metaphor is inspired by Miles and Wivel (2014: 232).

References Bergman, A. (2007) Co-​constitution of Domestic and International Welfare Obligations:  The Case of Sweden’s Social Democratically Inspired Internationalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 73–​99. Browning, C. S. (2007) Branding Nordicity:  Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism. Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 27‒51. Björkdahl, A. (2008) Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy 15(1): 135–​154. Grøn, C. H. and Wivel, A. (2011) Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy. Journal of European Integration 33(5): 523–​539. Hegel, G. W. F. (1991 [1820]) Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ingebritsen, C. (2002) Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict 37(1): 11–​23. Jakobsen, P. V. (2009) Small States, Big Influence:The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP. Journal of Common Market Studies 47(1): 81–​102. Miles, L. and Wivel, A. (2014) A Smart State Handling a Differentiated Integration Dilemma? Concluding on Denmark and the European Union. In:  Miles, L. and Wivel, A. (eds), Denmark and the European Union. London: Routledge. Mouritzen, H. (1995) The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall. Journal of Peace Research 32(1): 9‒21. Schouenborg, L. (2013) The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–​ 2010. London: Routledge. Strang, J. (ed.) (2016) Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition. London: Routledge. Turner, B. and Nordquist, G. (1982) The Other European Community: Integration and Cooperation in Northern Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

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2020 goals 50, 56–​8, 60 abortion 154, 158 ‘academic crisis’ 223 activism 1, 3–​4, 7, 189, 241–​3, 251, 259, 262, 269, 301 administrative traditions 80–​8, 307–​8; Continental Napoleonic Model 82; Continental Federal Model 82; Anglo-​Saxon Model 82; Scandinavian Model 39, 82, 270, 311; East European Model 82 Afghanistan 22 Aftonbladet 178 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) 302 agriculture 37, 58, 60, 125, 206, 273–​4, 299, 307; agricultural cooperatives 166; agricultural policies 39, 205, 274, 277; agricultural production 37; agricultural sector 17, 37, 177, 270, 274 Aho, E. 97 Ahtisaari, M. 261 Åkesson, J. 157 Albania 131 Alexander II 166 Alternativet (the Alternative) 53 Althingi 104, 107 altruism 281–​4, 286–​7, 289–​90, 298, 300, 302 Anders Lange’s Party (ALP) 150 Andersson, B. 94 Arctic 263–​65 arm’s length principle 42 ‘Atlanticist’ 259 Auken, S. 49 Australia 244–​5, 247 Austria 5, 21, 244–​5, 247, 257, 265, 271, 284 authoritarianism 151–​2, 154; authoritarian systems 15; authoritarian policies 147–​8, 157

Bangladesh 296 benchmark 29–​30, 241, 248 Benediktsson, B. 99 benefits; cash benefits 16, 30–​3; cost-​benefit 283, 286, 289–​90; pension benefits 196–​7; unemployment benefits 38, 42, 72, 194; welfare benefits 17, 22, 25, 30, 38, 71, 73–​4, 214, 273, 307, 310 Bevara Sverige svenskt (BSS, Keep Sweden Swedish) 151 bicameral system 105, 107; bicameral legislature 94 bilateral agreements 209–​10 bloc politics 106, 110; bloc coalition 96 border 170, 274; border conflicts 242; border control 229; cross-​border crime 242, 273; cross-​border system 59, 62; open-​borders policy 22 Borelius, M. 94 Borten, P. 97 Bosnia 287 Bratteli, T. 98 Bright Future 129 Britain 13, 72, 162, 244–​5, 247 Brundtland, G. H. 49, 98 Brundtland Report 55–​6 budget deficits 41, 192, 195 Budget Law 193 budgetary restrictions 41, 189, 193 Bulgaria 131 bureaucracy 81, 83, 85, 99, 170 business cycle 32, 193–​4, 198–​9 Business Sweden 250 cabinet 7, 84, 92–​101, 104–​6, 149, 155, 307–​8; cabinet formation 92–​3; cabinet ministers 93, 97 Canada 13, 163, 244–​5, 247, 302

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314

Index candidate-​focused campaigns 120 capitalism 1–​2, 13–​15, 25, 240 Center for Global Development (CGD) 298 centralization 87, 118, 250 Centre Party (Finland) 93, 97, 119, 129, 135, 142, 148 Centre Party (Iceland) 119, 126–​7 Centre Party (Norway) 130, 136 Centre Party (Sweden) 119, 130, 178 centre-​left 106, 119, 126, 152, 157, 192, 198, 299 centre-​r ight 30, 59, 74, 76, 93–​4, 97–​8, 106, 119, 126, 148–​50, 155–​7, 192, 263, 299 China 247 Christian Democratic Party (Norway) 117, 119, 130, 136, 143 Christian Democrats (Sweden) 129, 136 Christian People’s Party (Denmark) 119, 129, 135, 142 church 13, 16, 71, 164, 281, 301–​2 citizenship 13, 69, 82, 233, 259; civic engagement 164; civil liberties 137, 154, 158; civil servants 36–​7, 43, 45, 81, 83, 86, 276; civil society 17, 36, 82, 85, 163–​4, 166–​8, 296, 299; social citizenship model 13 Civic Movement (Iceland) 119, 129, 135, 142 civil war in Libya 290 class voting 41, 45 class-​divided society 218 cleavage structures 13, 106; cleavage theory 114–​17, 122; ideological cleavage 125–​6, 152 coalition building 42, 96, 231; stable coalition patterns 101 Coast Party (Norway) 119, 130, 136, 143 COCOPS 87 collective bargaining agreements 15 Comintern 38 commercialism 138, 309 commercialization 175 committee system 39–​40, 104, 107 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 205, 274 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 205–​6, 274 common good 74, 214, 222, 224, 283 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 274 communism 1, 15, 284; communists 18, 38, 116, 167 community spirit 217 compensation 27, 42, 209 compliance 211, 270 Confederation of Danish Employers 37 Confederation of Trade Unions (Denmark) 37, 178 conflict mediation 243 consensus-​making 18, 39, 41, 49, 51, 82, 85, 107, 161, 214; bipartisan consensus 216; consensus-​building 18–​9; social consensus 124

conservatism 151; conservatives 115, 117, 134, 167; neo-​conservative positions 223; value-​conservatism 151 Conservative Party (Denmark) 119, 129, 135, 142 Conservative Party (Norway) 119, 130, 136, 143, 155 Conservative Party (Sweden) 116, 119, 130, 136, 143, 178, 299 constitution 84, 97, 104–​6, 152, 180, 272 consumption 61, 181; energy consumption 50; fossil fuel consumption 50; private consumption 204; public consumption 40, 192, 204 convention 18, 54, 151, 209, 223, 230, 236 convergence programme 192 cooperation 15, 36, 60, 71, 82, 87, 106, 161, 168, 217, 234; defence cooperation 3, 255–​60, 263–​4, 272–​4; development cooperation 249, 254, 274, 295, 300; European cooperation 125, 156, 276; intergovernmental cooperation 60, 242, 248; international cooperation 242, 295; media cooperation 180; non-​cooperation 155; Nordic cooperation 1, 4–​5, 14, 18–​20, 60, 269–​70, 272, 276–​7, 281–​5, 288–​90, 300–​1; parliamentary cooperation 118, 155; Scandinavian cooperation 7, 240, 251; tripartite cooperation 233 COP15 meeting 54 cordon sanitaire 157 corporatism 36–​45, 124, 307, 309; administrative corporatism 43; corporatist policy-​making 41, 43, 45; Danish corporatism 37; Finnish corporatism 38; modern corporatism 36, 44; Nordic corporatism 39; Scandinavian corporatism 36–​7, 40–​1, 44, 71; social corporatism 44; Swedish corporatism 37 corruption 3, 83, 127, 161, 168–​9, 245 credibility 193, 198; governmental credibility 83, 155, 157, 308 credit market 193 crime 140, 144–​5, 147, 154, 158, 161, 242, 273 cultural affiliation 234 currency 195, 274; floating currency 195 curriculum 214, 217, 220–​3 Cyprus 131, 284 Czech Republic 131 Dagens Nyheter 179 Dahl, K. T. 150, 156 dailies 175, 178; non-​dailies 176 Danish Confederation of Trade Unions 37, 178 Danish Export Council 250 Danish People’s Party 118–​19, 129, 135, 142, 147, 150, 152, 154–​6, 301 Danish Social Democratic Party 38, 53, 95, 116, 118–​19, 124, 129, 134–​5, 142, 156 Danish Social-​Liberal Party 119, 129, 135, 142 Danmarks Naturfredningsforening 52

314

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Index decentralization 95, 217, 223; decentralized administrative structure 43, 82 decolonization 282, 295 defence policy 259, 261, 274, 309 deliberation 42, 107, 110, 254 democracy 6, 81, 120, 124–​5, 127, 130, 132–​3, 144, 152, 161–​2, 174, 181, 234, 240, 295; bourgeois democracy 37; consensual democracy 17, 37; democratic corporatist heritage 175; democratic rights 152; democratic satisfaction 120, 125, 127, 130, 132–​3, 137, 144, 150, 161; democratic values 217; majoritarian democracy 107; parliamentary democracy 103, 105, 110, 308–​9; representative democracy 85; social democracy 214, 224, 232 demographic changes 21–​2, 196, 222, 307; demographic challenges 198; demographic development 25; socio-​demographic groups 115 deregulation 153–​4, 158, 193, 217, 222–​3 development aid 244–​6, 248, 250, 282, 284, 286–​8, 290, 294–​5, 297–​302, 310 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 284, 295 development policy 248–​9, 264, 309 digital age 180; digitalization 181, 243; digital revolution 175, 181; digital strategies 179, 243 diplomacy 240–​56, 309–​10; ambassador 241; diplomatic internationalism 257; diplomatic practice 240, 245, 247; diplomatic representations 243; economic diplomacy 243–​4; small state diplomacy 243 discourse 51, 55, 62, 217, 260, 301, 307, 311; green growth discourse 56; immigration discourse 236; political discourse 2, 14, 126, 162, 306; public discourse 180, 231, 263, 274 discrimination 155, 158 diversity 223, 225; cultural diversity 230, 234; geographic diversity 181; media diversity 181, 183, 309; political diversity 181 dominance 116, 119, 175, 260; economic dominance 245; military dominance 245 DONG 52 DR 180, 182 Dublin Agreement 231 Eastern Bloc countries 125 economic marginalization 230 editor 177–​9 editorial freedom 178, 180 education 1, 3, 29, 75–​7, 115, 117, 122, 167, 169, 198, 213–​25, 244, 247, 308, 309; compulsory education 215; education policy 40, 215, 217, 224; educational exchange 269; ‘equivalent’ education 224; higher education 122; home-​schooled 216; lower secondary school 216; preparatory academic studies 216; primary education 220; results-​oriented education

system 217; secondary education 220; teacher education 221; universal education 214; upper secondary education 216, 218 Education Act (Denmark) 217 Eduskunta 84 EEA (European Economic Area) 84, 110, 232, 250, 270–​2 efficacy 221 efficiency 86, 204, 223; economic efficiency 183, 210–​11; energy efficiency 50, 57, 59, 62 egalitarianism 6, 124, 224 election 14, 20, 92–​100, 106, 114, 116, 118, 122, 126, 128, 133, 141, 174; Danish election 53–​4, 95, 100, 116, 134, 150; election campaigns 174; electoral volatility 114, 118–​19, 122, 308; Finnish election 52, 96–​7, 100, 105, 148–​9, 232, 284; Icelandic election 98–​99, 100, 134; National Election Surveys 76, 125; Norwegian election 53, 97–​8, 100, 156, 179–​80, 231; Swedish election 53, 93–​4, 100 eligibility criteria 22, 307 emancipation 75, 233 emigration 231–​32 employment 16–​17, 27, 42, 75, 77, 115, 149, 198, 204, 210, 213, 218, 230–​4, 236, 274, 310; employers’ associations 15, 17, 71; sector employment 211; unemployment 3, 25, 32, 38, 41–​3, 69, 71, 75–​7, 192, 197; unemployment benefits 22, 42, 72, 194; unemployment insurance 16, 30–​2, 38, 71; unemployment protection 72 energy crises 41 enforcement system 211 enlightenment 5, 73, 180 entertainment 181 environmental groups 40 equality 15–​17, 19, 69–​70, 83, 138, 168, 213, 218, 220, 224–​5, 233–​6, 295, 307; gender equality 1, 154, 158, 161, 213, 274, 289, 296–​7; income inequality 25–​7, 30–​3, 130–​1, 134; inequality 22, 25, 169, 269; social inequality 20 Erlander, T. 93–​4 Esping-​Andersen, G. 13–​14, 19, 27, 30, 33–​4, 70, 233 Estonia 131, 231 ETC 178 EU 3–​4, 19, 26–​8, 31, 33, 38, 53–​4, 56–​8, 61–​2, 82, 109–​10, 149, 153, 156, 195, 198, 214, 229, 231, 259, 270–​3, 275, 277, 287–​90, 300; anti-​EU 54, 117, 157, 232; EU authority 154, 158; EU coordination 249–​50; EU criticism 154; EU debt criterion 190; EU decision-​making 241, 273; EU defence cooperation 254–​6, 259, 262, 274; EU deficit criterion 190; EU enlargement 154, 158, 230, 236; EU externalities 234; EU fishery policy 202, 205, 207–​11; EU free mobility 234; EU integration 269–​70, 272–​3;

315

316

Index EU labour 237; EU legislation 110–​11, 270, 272; EU legitimacy 275; EU membership 154–​5, 158, 206, 255, 260–​1, 263, 272, 274, 286, 301; EU military missions 274, 288–​9; EU obligations 192; EU policy 111, 150, 156–​7, 270, 273, 277, 309–​10; EU politics 277; EU scepticism 152, 154–​5, 262; EU solidarity clause 255, 257, 259; EU strategy 276; EU strengthening 154, 158; EU summits 61; euro 19, 179, 272–​4; euro zone 156, 191; Euro-​Atlantic sphere 255; European Coal and Steel Community 270; European Defence Agency (EDA) 255, 262; European directives 276; European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 250, 255, 270; European Green Party 53; Europeanization 3, 22, 109–​10, 277, 308, 311; Europol 274; Eurostat 195; Internal Market 231, 250, 273 EU institutions 270, 275–​6; College of Commissioners 275; Council of Ministers 4, 60–​ 2, 109, 248, 275–​7; European Commission 191, 197, 211, 275–​6; European Council 109, 275; European Parliament 53–​4, 61, 130, 151, 275–​6 European community 270, 272, 311 evaluation 73, 195, 214, 217, 222, 241, 244; self-​evaluation 222 evidence 85, 192, 217, 221, 241 exceptionalism; Nordic exceptionalism 1, 25, 33, 114, 162, 168, 301–​2; Swedish exceptionalism 150 executive accountability 86 expenditure ceiling 193, 195 export 199, 242, 244, 248–​50; fish export 206–​7; oil export 51 export council; Danish Export Council 249–​50; Export Council (Finpro) 250 Facebook 176–​7 Fälldin, T. 94 feedback mechanisms 70, 74 feudalism 168 financial crises 14, 19, 190, 192, 199, 309; 1991 banking and currency crisis 26–​7, 30, 33, 191; 2008 financial crisis 14, 20, 25, 87, 99, 118, 132, 189–​92, 195, 237, 269, 272; European Monetary crisis 195 ‘Finlandization’ 96, 159, 260, 265 Finnish civil war 38, 105, 167–​8 Finnish independence 105, 260 Finnish public broadcaster (Yle) 180, 182 Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue) 117, 148 Finnish Social Democratic Party (Finland) 129, 137, 142 First World War 37, 257, 261 fiscal policy 189–​90, 309; austerity measures 189; automatic stabilizers 194; contraction 192;

Danish fiscal policy 196–​7; expansion 192; fiscal activism 189; fiscal balances 189–​90; fiscal consolidation 190, 192, 199, 309; fiscal constraint 25, 193; Fiscal Policy Council (FPC) 195; Fiscal Rule (FR) 193–​4; fiscal sustainability 193, 196; Norwegian fiscal policy 193–​4, 197; Swedish fiscal policy 195–​6, 198 fishery policies 202–​11; fishing rights 202, 204, 211; fishing sector 209–​10 fishing technologies 208 Fitch Ratings 244 flash parties 148 Flickr 176 Folketing 53, 95, 105, 275 foreign policy 3, 18, 96, 240–​2, 244–​5, 249–​51, 257–​8, 260, 262, 285–​6, 288–​90, 294, 299–​300, 306, 309; active foreign policy 3, 242–​3, 250–​1; ‘ambivalent ally’ 262; ‘ambivalent neutral’ 258; ‘armed neutrality’ 257; Atlanticism 259, 271; Danish foreign policy 258, 301; embassy 241, 250; Finnish foreign policy 96, 243, 260; ‘footnoting’ policy 259; foreign policy profile 241; Icelandic foreign policy 263; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 97, 250, 263, 297; Norwegian foreign policy 243; Swedish foreign policy 257, 311; ‘total defence’ 257; ‘US–​Nordic Security Dialogue’ 257, 263; see also UN foreign policy fossil fuel consumption 50, 58, 60 fourth estate 174 France 38, 84–​5, 131, 245, 247, 271, 286 Fraser, N. 235 free flow of information 223 freedom of choice 75, 223, 234 freedom of expression 137, 174, 180 Fremskridspartiet 231 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) 260 Fukuyama, F. 2, 81 gas production 52, 61, 193–​4 gender differences 16–​17 geopolitics 274; geostrategy 254, 257, 260–​1 geothermal energy 51 Germany 5, 14–​15, 29, 38, 54, 61, 84–​5, 108, 131, 163, 170, 183, 244–​5, 247, 258 Ghent system 38–​9, 43 Glistrup, M. 150 global market 197, 223, 242 globalization 1, 20, 32, 125, 214, 222, 225, 251, 277, 311; global competition 217; global leadership 49; global solidarity 49, 55; reluctant globalizers 277 Google 176 governance 13, 15, 17–​19, 83, 85, 87, 217, 236; active governance 230; consensual governance 17; European governance 109, 259; global

316

317

Index governance 242; good governance 282, 289, 296; governance capacity 81; immigration governance 234; neo-​corporatist system of governance 15 government 15, 17, 41–​2, 49, 61, 74, 81–​3, 92–​101, 103, 107–​11, 148, 155, 174, 194, 223, 233, 251, 285, 289, 299, 308; coalition governments 18, 56, 82, 93, 100–​1, 104–​6, 308; Danish government 94–​6, 301; e-​government 86; Finnish government 96–​7; ‘good government’ 81; government budget 189; ‘government credibility’ 155; government effectiveness 83; government financing 220; government popularity 93, 101; government terminations 92–​3, 100; Icelandic government 98–​9; local government 54–​5, 82, 195; majority governments 41, 92, 100, 104–​5, 308; minority governments 15, 18, 41, 45, 82, 93, 104–​6, 108, 110, 308; Norwegian governments 97–​8, 193, 199, 263; single-​party government 94–​5, 97, 99; Swedish government 93–​4 Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) 193, 197 Great Depression 38 Great Strike 167 Green League (Finland) 119, 129, 135, 142 Green Party (Sweden) 53, 119, 130, 136, 143 greenhouse gas emissions 49–​50 Greenlandic economic zone (EEZ) 209 Greenpeace 54 Gröndal, B. 99 Guðmundsson, A. 99 Haarde, G. 99, 101 Haarder, B. 95 Haavisto, H. 97 Hafstein, J. 99 Hagen, C. I. 150 Halonen, T. 261 Hansen, H. C. 95 Hauga, Å. 98 health care 22, 70, 72, 76, 197 Hedtoft, H. 95 Heiberg, A. 98 Henriksson, S. 94 heterogeneous society 222–​4 hierarchy 75, 87, 217 homogeneity 83, 164–​5, 168, 214; ethnic homogeneity 168, 214 homosexuality 154, 158 Høyre 150 human capital 75, 225 Hungary 131, 247 Iceida 294 Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RÚV) 180

idealism 242, 300 identity; see also national identity ideology 14, 118, 125, 128, 151–​5, 166, 174, 213, 224, 298; ideological orientation 175, 178; integration ideology 230–​1, 234–​5; school ideology 223; ‘thin’ ideology 147; welfare ideology 298 immigration 7, 21, 33, 77, 117, 134–​44, 149, 152, 154–​5, 157–​8, 222–​3, 229–​38, 274, 307–​10; anti-​immigration 125, 137–​8, 144, 147–​8, 150–​1, 157, 308; arranged marriages 236; assimilation 151, 234; asylum seeker 21, 29, 155, 158, 198, 230, 236, 303; family immigration 236–​7; illegal immigration 273; ‘immigration countries’ 229, 231, 233–​4; ‘immigration election’ 150; immigration policy 22, 29, 33, 156, 231–​8, 309; immigrant population 232; immigration-​sceptical 117–​18, 125; labour immigration 230–​1; legal residency 233, 236; migration flows 77; ‘new immigrants’ 229–​30, 233; refugee immigration 29, 231, 236; refugee policy 231, 237 imperial power 259 Inatsisartut 105–​6 incentives 42, 57, 59, 62, 196, 198, 211, 260, 263–​4, 274, 310; financial incentives 196, 204; selective inducement 38, 43; work incentives 30 income distribution 17, 26–​7; income inequality 25–​7, 30–​3, 130–​1, 134; income replacement 30–​3 Independence Party (Iceland) 119, 129, 135, 143 individuality 222–​3; individual competencies 217; individual freedom of choice 223; individual responsibility 22 industrialization 13; post-​industrialization 27, 125 inflation 41, 199; inflation targeting regime 193–​5; ‘techflation’ 257 infrastructure 61–​3, 110, 181, 243, 244, 296 Inglehart, R. 75 Innovasjon Norge 250 innovation 3, 237, 247 ‘institutional turn’ 81 integration; ‘cob-​web integration’ 296; integration ideology 230–​2, 234–​5; institutionalized integration 41; see also EU integration interdependence 4, 259, 275, 295 interest groups 36–​45, 299, 307; agricultural interest groups 270, 299; economic interest groups 45; environmental interest groups 40; interest group integration 41, 43 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 205 internationalism 295; diplomatic internationalism 257; humane internationalism 301–​2, 310; international commitments 205; international conflicts 236 Iraq 22, 231–​2, 259, 262, 301

317

318

Index Ireland 21, 29, 82, 131, 245, 247, 257, 271 Israel 131 Italy 5, 38, 71, 84–​5, 131, 137, 165, 245, 247

Liberal Party (Iceland) 119, 127, 129, 143 Liberal Party (Norway) 119, 129, 136, 143 Liberal Party (Sweden) 119, 130, 136, 143 liberalization 166, 234, 237; liberals 14, 18, 115; libertarian economic views 118; neo-​liberals 14 life chances 16, 215, 225 Lijphart, A. 37, 107, 161 Lipponen, P. 261 Lipset, S. M. 115 Lithuania 131 lobbying 275–​6 local representation 164 Löfven, S. 49, 53, 93 logic of appropriateness 80 Løgting 105 longevity 196, 198–​9 ‘low politics’ 269 Luxembourg 21, 120, 247 Lyng, J. 98

Jäätteenmäki, A. 97 Japan 244–​5, 247 Johannesson, O. 99 journalism 174, 175, 177, 179–​80, 183; journalism schools 177; journalistic professionalism 175, 177, 180; journalistic workforce 183; political journalism 179–​80 Juncker, B. 95 Kalmar Union 4 Kampmann, V. 95 Kekkonen, U. 96, 148, 260 Kenya 296 Kjærsgaard, P. 150 knowledge 40, 107, 179, 211, 217, 221, 223; knowledge-​based economy 216 Koivisto, M. 96 Konjunkturinstitutet 198 Korea 247, 284 Korean War 284 Korpi, W. 73, 76, 233 Korvald, L. 98 Krag, J. O. 95 Kristjánsdóttir, H. B. 99 Kullberg, H. 97 Kyoto Protocol 49, 56–​7 LA21 52, 54–​5 labour market 14–​15, 17, 22, 27, 33, 37, 39, 42, 69, 71–​2, 76–​7, 231, 233, 274; flexicurity 1; job insecurity 27; labour market compromises 38; labour market inclusion 233–​4; labour market integration 235; labour market models 231; labour market negotiations 17, 42–​3, 273; labour market policies 1, 3, 14, 39–​40, 42–​3, 69, 72, 230, 233, 237; labour market reform 42, 198; labour movement 36–​7, 43, 69–​71, 166–​7, 215; retirement age 22, 196, 198 Labour Party (Norway) 98, 119, 129, 136, 143 Lagtinget 106 Lange, H. 98 Law on Planning 54 lean organization 252 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 297 Left Alliance (Finland) 53, 119, 129, 142 Left Green Movement (Iceland) 129, 135, 143 Left Party (Sweden) 53, 119, 130, 136, 143 legislation 43, 45, 57, 107–​8, 162, 193, 195, 264, 273, 276, 295; see also EU: EU legislation legitimacy 83, 194, 236; policy legitimacy 17, 40; welfare legitimacy 22; see also EU: EU legitimacy Liberal Party (Denmark) 119, 129, 134–​5, 142

macroeconomic policy 27, 192–​3 majority population 230–​1 management 80–​1, 85–​8, 193, 215, 243; budget management 250; civil management 264, 276, 288; co-​management 211; crisis management 192, 261–​2; economic management 195; fiscal management 189; fisheries management 202–​5, 208–​11; management philosophy 243; management systems 202, 210–​1; performance management 86; Rights-​Based Management (RBM) 202, 204–​5, 209–​10; see also New Public Management Marine Protected Areas 209 marine resources 202, 211 marketization 74, 85–​6, 222; market economy 213–​14; market pressures 181; market-​based arrangements 62 marxism 14, 125 media systems 175, 181; Liberal (North Atlantic) Model 175; media organizations 174, 176; media welfare state 180; Polarized Pluralist (Mediterranean) Model 175; state involvement 175, 181 mediatization 45, 84, 174; media dramaturgy 174; media elites 155; media houses 176, 178–​9; media logic 174; news media diversity 183; news selection criteria 174; radio broadcasting 180 Metroexpress 176 military build-​up 242, 264 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 296, 302 ‘ministerial rule’ 84; cabinet ministers 93, 97; junior ministers 94; ministerial responsibility 83; ministerial turnover 92–​4, 97–​8, 101, 104, 307; ministers 39, 42, 53, 60, 62, 84, 94, 98, 101, 264, 284, 300 Ministers for Nordic Co-​operation 60

318

319

Index Ministry of Economy and Employment 250 Minorities 152, 234–​5 modernization 148, 234, 302; ecological modernization 55, 62, 307; economic modernization 16 monetary policy 193–​4, 197, 199 monism 84 monopoly 175, 180–​1, 249, 288 Moody’s 244 moral policy 154, 158 Morocco 230 multiculturalism 138, 149–​50, 155, 230; multicultural ideology 235; multicultural thinking 234; multicultural pluralism 223 multilateral agreements 259 municipalities 16–​17, 27, 40, 45, 55, 61–​2, 155, 165, 193 National Audit Office 196 national autonomy 4–​5, 22, 44, 106, 109, 167, 276; autonomy of schooling 220; bureaucracy autonomy 83–​4, 87; individual autonomy 225; local autonomy 54, 61, 82, 223; press autonomy 175, 178 National Coalition Party (Finland) 129, 135, 142 national curricula 215, 220–​1 National Financial Management Authority 196 National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) 195 national tests 217, 223 nationalism 5, 151–​2, 154–​5, 157–​8, 263; national autonomy 5, 22; national identity 154–​5, 158, 264, 283, 286; ‘reluctant Nordics’ 5, 277; welfare nationalism 6 nativism 152 NATO 3, 19, 251, 254–​5, 284, 287–​9, 300, 310; NATO Air Policing Scheme 263; NATO allies 258, 286; NATO membership 18–​19, 179, 258, 261, 271–​2, 284, 290; NATO Rapid Response Force 258; NATO Security General 263; non-​NATO member states 257–​8 NEET 218–​19 neo-​liberalism 22, 223 Netherlands 21, 27, 29, 54–​5, 61, 71, 84, 87, 124, 131, 245, 247, 295 neutrality policy 257, 299 New Alliance/​Liberal Alliance (Denmark) 119, 129, 142 New Public Management 81, 84, 86–​8, 308; post-​NPM 81, 87–​8 New Zealand 13, 244–​5, 247 non-​profit organizations 169, 217 NORAD 250, 297 Nordic Association of Civil Associations 5 Nordic Committee for Co-​operation 60 Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for Energy Policy 61

Nordic Committee of Senior Officials for Environmental Affairs 61 Nordic community 214, 222, 255 Nordic Convention on Social Security 18 Nordic Council 5, 18; Nordic Council for Fisheries and Aquaculture 60; Nordic Council of Ministers 4, 57, 60, 62, 277; Nordic Council of Ministers for the Environment 60 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) 255–​7, 260, 263–​4 Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) 5, 272 Nordic education model 213–​17, 220–​2, 224–​5 Nordic Green Left Alliance 54 Nordic social model 213–​15, 310 Nordic–​UN relationship 281–​3, 289–​90 norm entrepreneurs 276 Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) 180 Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (the LO) 178 Norwegian krone 197 Norwegian Media Business Association 178 Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (Naturvernsforbundet) 52 Norwegian State Petrol 152 nuclear power 51–​3; nuclear weapons 257, 262 Obama, B. H. 2, 257, 263, 269 OECD 17, 19, 21, 83, 85, 189–​90, 205, 214, 216–​17, 219, 220, 229–​30, 246, 284, 294–​5 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 294–​5 oil sector 32, 194, 197, 199; oil prices 193–​4, 197, 199 Olson, M. 36 opt-​out 255, 273–​4, 288 Organisation for Information about Nuclear Power 51 Organisation for Renewable Energy 52 organized business groups 36 OSCE 263 outcome competition 222 output gap 191 owners; business 115; land owners 116; newspaper owners 117; school owners 217; see also social classes Pakistan 230 Palme, O. 94 Palsson, T. 99 parental leave 22, 30–​3 parliamentarism 104–​6, 308; ‘decline of parliaments’ 103; deparliamentarization 103; negative parliamentarism 18, 92–​3, 98–​9, 101, 308; parliamentary defeat 100; parliamentary elections 20, 53, 105–​6, 148–​51, 156–​7; parliamentary monarchies 104, 114

319

320

Index participation 17, 37, 85, 108, 124, 148, 166, 216, 222, 271, 274; citizen participation 85, 162; government participation 150, 155–​6; labour market participation 72, 77; peacekeeping participation 284; stakeholder participation 83, 211 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 255 party system 96, 114–​25, 174; ‘anti-​party-​ism’ 150; frozen party system 117; intra-​party rivalry 93; multi-​party system 106; Nordic party system 115–​16, 122, 125; party-​affiliated newspapers 175; party affiliation 177, 179; party coalition 100; party leadership 148, 150, 157; party primaries 122; single-​issue party 151 path-​dependency 63, 80 peace 251, 254, 258, 283, 286; peace-​creating missions 245; peace negotiations 243; peace operations 283, 287–​8, 290; peace politics 259 pedagogy 215, 220–​1 pension system 30, 195–​9; pension scheme 14, 32; public pensions 195; state pensions 70 Philippines 232 Pirate Party 129 Poland 131, 162 polarization 127, 167, 179; de-​polarization 125; left-​polarization 127 policy-​making 6, 37, 40–​1, 43–​5, 70, 82, 84–​5, 108–​9, 156–​7, 217, 233, 236, 238, 250, 308; policy deliberations 42, 254; policy entrepreneurs 42; policy implementation 43–​4; policy instruments 56–​7, 59–​60, 62–​3; recognition policy 235 political communication 174, 177; political commentators 179 political culture 5, 83, 168, 170, 215, 298 political logic 42, 174 political parallelism 175, 177, 179, 183 political upheaval 189 politicians 36, 45, 71, 83, 87, 114, 130, 151, 162, 164, 176, 189, 275 politicization 84, 87, 265 popular mass movements 166; labour movement 36–​7, 43, 69–​71, 166–​7, 215; peasant movement 166–​7; populist movement 22; religious movement 166–​7; sports movement 166–​7 populism 147–​55, 307–​8; agrarian populism 147, 155; anti-​establishment position 147–​9, 152, 154–​5, 158; neo-​populist trend 151; new populism 148; populist movements 22; populist parties 22, 117–​18, 134, 144–​5, 147–​8, 150–​3, 155–​7, 231, 308; populist right 117–​18, 122, 125, 231 portfolio saliency 101 Portugal 29, 85, 131, 149, 247 post-​materialism 152 postmodern society 1, 306 post-​war era 234

poverty 3, 15, 17, 20, 25–​9, 30–​4, 55, 196–​7, 269, 282, 294, 296–​7, 301–​2; population risk groups 33; poverty measurements 27; poverty trap 196 power politics 254, 257 pragmatism 259, 277; pragmatic functionalism 269, 277; reactivist pragmatism 259 presidency 96, 148 press 174–​6, 181–​3, 309; local press 176; press freedom 174–​5; press support 181; press–​party parallelism 177–​8 prime minister 49, 92, 96, 118, 250 principal agent 215 privatization 22, 85–​6, 152–​4, 158, 222; privatization of welfare 22 professionalism 87; bureaucratic professionalism 82; neutral professionalism 175 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 216–​17, 219, 222; ‘Scandinavian PISA Shock’ 216 Progress Party (Norway) 119, 130, 136–​7, 139, 143, 147, 150, 152, 155, 231 progressive income tax system 17 Progressive Party (Iceland) 99, 119, 127, 129, 135, 143, 147 progressiveness 215 property rights 202 proportional electoral systems 169, 308; proportional representation 105–​6, 169; proportional voting 37 protectionism 147, 273 Public Interest Culture 82 public opinion 72, 76, 124–​7, 137, 139, 144, 166, 258, 261, 299, 308 public professionals 72 public service broadcasting 176–​7, 180 public service ethos 87 public stakeholders 40 punishment 154 Putnam, R. D. 165–​6 Queen Margaret I 4 quota 205–​6, 208–​9, 211; individual quotas (IQ) 205; individual transferable Effort Quotas (IEQs) 210; individual transferable quotas (ITQ) 204–​5, 209–​10; non-​transferable quota system 205–​6; quota rights 210 quota refugees 232 race-​to-​the-​top mentality 217 ‘radical right-​wing’ 134, 137, 152 Ramin-​Osmundsen, M. 98 Rantanen, P. 97 Rasmussen, A. F. 95, 237, 263, 301 Rasmussen, L. L. 237 Rasmussen, P. N. 156 RE certificates 62 readers 179–​81

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Index realism 300 recession 21, 26, 77, 192–​4, 285 recruitment 215–​16, 225, 230, 276 Red–​Green Alliance (Denmark) 53–​4, 119, 129, 134, 142 redistribution 17, 25, 32–​3, 70, 122, 147, 215, 218, 235, 285, 308 reform 6, 15, 20–​2, 41–​2, 81, 85–​8, 182, 189–​90, 199, 216, 225, 237, 248, 250, 297, 308, 310; administrative reform 80–​1, 87–​8; anti-​reform forces 42; education reforms 217, 222; reform agenda 189; reform strategies 42; pension reform 198; retrenchment reforms 42; societal reforms 2; structural reforms 189; welfare reform 196 Reformation 71 refugee crisis 77, 134, 229, 232, 258, 301 Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) 211 regional defence 264 relativism 233 renewable energy 50–​2, 57, 59, 62 rights 52, 137, 149, 235–​6; animal rights 54; constitutional rights 174; democratic rights 152; editor’s right 178; human rights 3, 19, 167, 230, 235, 269, 274, 282, 296; minority rights 157; social rights 16, 77, 233–​4; women’s rights 236; workers’ rights 43; see also voting rights and fishing rights Rigsfællesskabet 4 Riksdag 53, 93–​4, 104–​5, 107, 151, 180, 231, 257 Rød-​Larsen, T. 98 Rokkan, S. 114–​15, 122; Rokkan’s triangle 115–​16 Royal Examiner 94 rule of law 6, 81–​3, 309; rule-​based international order 283; rule-​based policy 193 Russia 4, 167, 189, 209–​10, 231, 245, 258, 260–​1, 264–​5, 272, 274, 310 Russian annexation of the Crimea 261, 290 Russian revolution 4 ‘Russification’ 167 Rwanda 287 saving 195–​96, 252 scandal 95, 99, 101, 179 Scandinavian Defence Union 5, 257, 259, 262, 272 Scandinavian model 39, 82, 270, 311 Scandinavism 5, 269, 275; cultural pan-​Scandinavism 5 Scandinavist movement 4–​5 Schengen Agreement 231 school system 213, 216–​18, 220; autonomy of schooling 220; private schools 220; public schools 220; school culture 217; school inspection system 217; school leadership 214; school market model 222; school performance

216; schooling 215–​17, 220–​1, 223; see also education Second World War 14, 16, 18–​19, 38, 40–​1, 167, 175, 224, 234, 257, 261, 263, 310 secularization 223 security community 8, 272, 310 security matters 254–​5, 262, 264, 310; security concept 242; security identities 255 segregated society 216 Sigurðardóttir, J. 99 Sigurðsson, B. G. 99 Singapore 247 Slovakia 131 Slovenia 131 social capital 161–​70, 307–​9 social classes 19, 224; business owners 115; landed gentry 17; land owners 116; middle class 70, 73–​4, 76; peasantry 17; working class 17 social community 216 Social Democratic Alliance (Iceland) 119, 127, 129, 143 social democrats 14, 18, 20, 38, 74, 93, 95, 97, 99–​100, 115–​18, 124, 134, 156, 167; ‘golden era’ 215; social democratic ideology 213; ‘Social Democratic Order’ 214 Social Democrats (Sweden) 18, 20, 38, 93, 94, 100, 115–​16, 119, 124, 130, 136, 143 social division 22; social engineering 234; social justice 152–​3; social security 14, 16–​18, 27, 197, 237 social inclusion 22, 218, 220, 222–​4, 309; immigration inclusion 230, 234; labour market inclusion 233 Socialist Left Party (Norway) 53, 119, 129, 136, 143 Socialist People’s Party (Denmark) 53, 95, 119, 129, 135, 142 soft power 245–​7, 262 solidarity 6, 74, 213, 217, 222, 224, 242, 246, 284–​6, 298–​9, 309; cross-​class solidarity 215; global solidarity 49, 55 Somalia 231, 287 South Africa 282 South Korea 298 sovereignty 5, 104, 106, 223, 258, 260, 272, 274 Soviet Union 1, 15, 18, 96, 148, 260, 262, 284, 286, 289 Spain 71, 85, 131, 137, 162, 247 specialization 87, 221 SR 180 stability 30, 80, 97, 101, 148, 206; cabinet stability 93, 96; financial stability 193, 195; government stability 94; political stability 1, 19, 170, 244; social stability 19 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 193 Stampen 178 Standard and Poor’s 244

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Index state-​building 168 stateness 15, 17, 73, 307; state–​market relations 152 Stockholm Programme 274 Stoltenberg, J. 97, 263 Stortinget 104, 107, 178 Sträng, G. 94 strategic player 258 Strøm, K. 97 structural balance 192 student riots 196 subsidies 3, 39, 59, 74, 175, 181–​3, 206, 210, 309 sui generis 272 superpower 234, 269 supervision 217, 233 supranational level 109, 195, 206 surplus 61–​2, 74, 191, 195, 198, 203–​4, 252 sustainability 6, 49, 52–​6, 193, 196, 199, 236 Sustainability Development Goals 2030 49 SVT 180, 182 Sweden Democrats (Sweden) 117, 119, 130, 136, 139, 143, 147, 150–​1, 154–​5, 157 Swedish Air Force 258 Swedish employers’ organization (SAF) 43 Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 198 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 250 Swedish krona market 195 Swedish Metro 176 Swedish People’s Party (Finland) 97, 119, 129, 135, 142 Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature 52 Switzerland 21, 39, 131, 244–​5, 247 Syria 22, 229, 263, 290; civil war in Syria 229, 263, 290 Syse, J. P. 98 tabloid 176, 178 Tamil case 95 Tanzania 297 taxation 22, 50, 96, 124, 154, 213–​14; anti-​taxation 308; tax revenue 189 teachers 72, 214, 221–​2; teachers’ unions 40; teaching practices 169; teaching profession 215, 221 television 150, 180–​1 territory 5, 106, 258, 262; territorial threat 265; see also sovereignty terror 242, 243, 259, 287, 297, 300; War on Terror 243 Thailand 232 Thors, O. 99 tolerance 125, 137, 140, 217, 235 trade union 16–​17, 43; ‘age of associations’ 166 tragedy of the commons problem 204 transparency 82–​3, 86–​7, 199, 245, 276, 298, 300, 309

treaty: Amsterdam Treaty 271; Treaty of Lisbon 110–​1, 255, 257, 275; Treaty of Maastricht 259, 271; Treaty of Rome 205, 270 triple-​AAA ratings 244 True Finns/​the Finns Party Christian Democrats (Finland) 117, 119, 129, 135, 139, 142, 147–​9, 153–​5, 232 trust 6, 18–​19, 22, 74–​5, 83, 86, 114, 125, 127, 130–​7, 144, 169, 213, 240, 243, 261, 309; anti-​trust 214; distrust 137, 150, 199, 309; local trust 170; political trust 114, 124–​5; social trust 161–​6, 168, 224, 231 Tuomioja, S. 97 Turkey 230 TV 2 180, 182 Twitter 176 Ukraine 131, 258, 261, 263–​4, 290 Ullsten, O. 93–​4 UN 3, 19, 55, 130, 242–​3, 251, 263, 274, 281–​8, 294–​5, 299–​302, 309–​10; UN aid 283, 285, 295; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 209; UN foreign policy 243, 281, 289; UN internationalism 301; UN operation 283, 285, 287, 290; UN peacekeeping 254, 282–​7; UN policy 282, 309–​10; UN Refugee Convention 236; UN support 282, 290, 310; UN system 289, 302 UN institutions: UN General Assembly 49, 284, 295; UN Secretary General 2, 263; UN Security Council 289 under-​developed countries 242 UNFCCC treaty 49 unicameral parliaments 104–​5, 107; unicameral legislature 94, 104; unicameral system 104 unionization 36, 38, 40; blue-​collar unions 43; union membership 38–​9, 43 unitary organization 284 unitary state 82 United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) 295 universalism 15–​17, 19, 77, 215, 222, 233 urbanization 13, 148 USA 2, 45, 168, 243–​4, 247, 257, 259, 261–​3, 283, 301 values 2, 6, 51, 75–​6, 82, 88, 115, 124–​5, 137, 148, 152, 168, 217, 222, 234, 254, 269–​70, 277, 289, 298–​9; administrative values 81, 85; altruistic values 283; bureaucratic values 85; cultural values 83, 117; family values 147; institutionalized values 80; national values 155, 158, 285, 290; public sector values 86; Scandinavian values 7; universal values 242–​3; welfare state values 69, 242 Väyrynen, P. M. 97 Virolainen, J. 97 voluntary organizations 13, 16, 166

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Index vote 52–​3, 84, 92–​3, 97–​9, 114, 116, 120, 125–​8, 133–​4, 139, 141, 144, 148–​51, 271; class voting 41, 45; compulsory voting 120; party voting 308; preferential voting 114, 120, 122; voter self-​placement 119, 127; voter volatility 45; voting behaviour 118, 120, 125; voting choice 125; voting rights 104, 235 wage 30, 32, 43, 273; wage competition 233; wage differentials 213–​14; wage gap 32 Wagner’s Law 75 ‘Washington consensus’ 22 Weber, M. 81, 85, 87–​8; neo-​Weberian state 85, 87; Weberian organizations 243 welfare regime 13, 19; ‘corporatist-​statist’/​ conservative regime 14; ‘liberal’ welfare regime 14; ‘social democratic’ welfare regime 14, 34, 222 welfare state 1–​2, 6–​7, 13–​22, 25, 27, 30, 32, 41, 75–​7, 118, 124, 153, 168–​9, 180, 194, 196–​8,

213, 215–​16, 222, 224–​5, 230–​2, 234–​6, 272–​3, 277, 286, 298, 307, 311; Danish welfare state 197; European welfare state 14, 33; Finnish welfare state 148; modern welfare state 13; Nordic welfare state 14–​15, 19–​20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 33, 140, 168, 272, 301, 307; Norwegian welfare state 32; Scandinavian welfare state 7, 16, 69–​73, 75–​7, 270, 273, 277, 307; Swedish welfare state 169, 215; welfare capitalism 14, 25; welfare chauvinism 147, 155; welfare state institutions 17, 22; Western welfare state 13, 19 Willoch, K. 97–​8 Winter War 257, 260 World Bank 83, 244, 285, 300 WWF 54 xenophobia 125 YouTube 176 Yugoslavia 230

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