The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe 1003256899, 9781003256892

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
CONTENTS
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
Introduction
PART I: Eastern Europe
1. The Serbian Far Right, Football Hooligans, and Their Instrumentalisation by an Authoritarian Regime: Serbia as Case Study
2. The Far Right in Ukraine
3. The Russian Far Right: A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate
PART II: Central Europe
4. Subnational Politics and Far-right Strength in Germany: The Importance of the East-West Divide
5. The Austrian Far Right: Historical Continuities and the Case of the Ulrichsberg Commemorations
6. Four Cycles of the Czech Far-right’s Contention
7. Hungary’s Goulash-nationalism: The Reheated Stew of Hungary’s Far Right
PART III: Southern Europe
8. The New Populist Radical Right in Portugal: The Chega Party
9. The Radicalisation of the Italian Mainstream: Populist Radical Right Parties and Extreme Right-wing Movements in Italy (2012–2022)
10. The Far Right in Greece: A Foretold Story
11. The Greek-Cypriot Far-right Space, Its History, and ELAM’s Trajectory
PART IV: Northern Europe
12. The Evolution of the Extreme Right in Norway Since the 1990s
13. The Far Right in Sweden
14. The Shift to the Right in Denmark
PART V: Western Europe
15. The New Horizons of the French Extreme Right: Fragmented but Dynamic and Better Socially Embedded
16. The Dutch Identitair Verzet and the European Identitarian Movement: Alone at the Table
17. Radical Right-wing Politics on the Island of Ireland
18. The Contemporary UK Far Right and Its Organisational Trajectory Since 2009: Towards a Truly Post-organisational Movement?
EPILOGUE: Selected Current Issues in the European Far Right
19. “America Coughs, and We Catch a Cold”: Mapping the Relationship between the American Far Right and British and European Activism
20. Gendering the Far-right Continuum in Europe
21. Misogyny as a Gateway to Far-right Hate: A Quantitative Exploration in Great Britain
Index

Citation preview

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe is a timely and important study of the far and extreme right-wing phenomenon across a broad spectrum of European countries, and in relation to a selected list of core areas and topics such as anti-gender, identitarian politics, hooliganism, and protest mobilisation. The handbook deals with the rise and the developments of far-right movements, parties, and organisations across diverse countries in Europe. Crucially, it discusses the main topics and issues pertaining to far-right ideology and positioning, and considers how central and less central actors of far-right milieus have fared within the given context. Comprising a wide range of subject expertise, the contributors focus on far-right organisations on the margins of the electoral sphere, as well as street-level movements, and the relationship between them and electoral politics. The handbook spans nearly twenty European country cases, grouped according to geographical/regional area. It includes case studies where the far right has gained increased momentum, as well as countries where it has been much less successful in mobilising public opinion and the electorate (e.g. Ireland and Portugal). Another important feature is the inclusion of street-level mobilisations, such as football firms, thereby expanding and updating existing research, which is primarily focused on political parties and organisations. Multidisciplinary and comprehensive, this handbook will be of great interest to scholars and students of Criminology, Political Science, Extremism Studies, European Studies, Media and Communication, and Sociology. Katherine Kondor is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo and a Visiting Fellow in Media and Illiberalism at Loughborough University. She studies recruitment practices, pathways into farright organisations, and far-right cultural production, particularly in the Hungarian far right. Katherine has published on the Hungarian far right, online extremism, the use of the digital space in the study of the far right, and audience engagement with media. Mark Littler is an Associate Professor of Criminology and deputy head of the School of Law and Criminology at Liverpool Hope University. He was previously senior lecturer in Criminology and Security Studies at the University of Huddersfield, and a lecturer in Criminology at the University of Hull. He is a series editor for Routledge Studies in Digital Extremism, an associate editor of Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression, and Co-chair of the European Society of Criminology’s Working Group on Terrorism, Extremism, and Radicalization.

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

Edited by Katherine Kondor & Mark Littler

Cover image: © Getty Images First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Katherine Kondor & Mark Littler; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Katherine Kondor & Mark Littler to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Chapter 20 Gendering the Far-Right Continuum in Europe was supported by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsradet, VR) under grant 2019-03363. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kondor, Katherine, editor. | Littler, Mark (Lecturer in criminology) editor. Title: The Routledge handbook of far-right extremism in Europe / edited by Katherine Kondor & Mark Littler. Description: First Edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2022. | Series: Routledge international handbooks | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022061712 (print) | LCCN 2022061713 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032187976 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032187983 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003256892 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Right-wing extremists--Europe. | Right and left (Political science)--Europe. | Conservatism--Europe--History. Classification: LCC HN49.R33 R676 2022 (print) | LCC HN49.R33 (ebook) | DDC 303.48/4094--dc23/eng/20221222 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022061712 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022061713 ISBN: 978-1-032-18797-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-18798-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-25689-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892 Typeset in Sabon by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

CONTENTS

List of Figures List of Tables List of Contributors

viii ix x

Introduction Katherine Kondor

1

PART I

Eastern Europe

7

1 The Serbian Far Right, Football Hooligans, and Their Instrumentalisation by an Authoritarian Regime: Serbia as Case Study Jovo Bakić

9

2 The Far Right in Ukraine Tamta Gelashvili

21

3 The Russian Far Right: A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate Mihai Varga

39

PART II

Central Europe

53

4 Subnational Politics and Far-right Strength in Germany: The Importance of the East-West Divide Sabine Volk and Manès Weisskircher

55

v

Contents

5 The Austrian Far Right: Historical Continuities and the Case of the Ulrichsberg Commemorations Michael C. Zeller 6 Four Cycles of the Czech Far-right’s Contention Jan Charvát, Ondřej Slačálek, and Eva Svatoňová 7 Hungary’s Goulash-nationalism: The Reheated Stew of Hungary’s Far Right Katherine Kondor and Rudolf Paksa

67 83

100

PART III

Southern Europe

115

8 The New Populist Radical Right in Portugal: The Chega Party Riccardo Marchi

117

9 The Radicalisation of the Italian Mainstream: Populist Radical Right Parties and Extreme Right-wing Movements in Italy (2012–2022) Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James F. Downes 10 The Far Right in Greece: A Foretold Story Vasiliki Tsagkroni 11 The Greek-Cypriot Far-right Space, Its History, and ELAM’s Trajectory Giorgos Charalambous

129 145

156

PART IV

Northern Europe

171

12 The Evolution of the Extreme Right in Norway Since the 1990s Anders Ravik Jupskås and Tore Bjørgo

173

13 The Far Right in Sweden Anders Widfeldt

189

14 The Shift to the Right in Denmark Mette Wiggen

202

vi

Contents PART V

Western Europe

215

15 The New Horizons of the French Extreme Right: Fragmented but Dynamic and Better Socially Embedded Nicolas Lebourg and Marlene Laruelle

217

16 The Dutch Identitair Verzet and the European Identitarian Movement: Alone at the Table Sting Daniёls and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

230

17 Radical Right-wing Politics on the Island of Ireland Shaun McDaid and Jim McAuley 18 The Contemporary UK Far Right and Its Organisational Trajectory Since 2009: Towards a Truly Post-organisational  Movement? William Allchorn

244

258

EPILOGUE

Selected Current Issues in the European Far Right 19 “America Coughs, and We Catch a Cold”: Mapping the Relationship between the American Far Right and British and European Activism Paul Jackson 20 Gendering the Far-right Continuum in Europe Ov Cristian Norocel

275

277 288

21 Misogyny as a Gateway to Far-right Hate: A Quantitative Exploration in Great Britain Antoinette Raffaela Huber, Gavin Hart, and Mark Littler

300

Index

311

vii

FIGURES

2.1 2.2 2.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 9.1 10.1 11.1 12.1 12.2 12.3 13.1 13.2 16.1 16.2 16.3 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4

The roots and contemporary manifestations of the Ukrainian far right Types of far-right protest events in Ukraine 2004–2020 (n = 560) Issues of heavy violence protest events, 2004–2020 Xenophobia in Austria, 1990–2017 Criminal offences in Austria with a far-right background Comparison of per capita far-right criminal offences in Austria and Germany FPÖ vote share in Austrian regional (Länder) elections since 1985 Electoral support for political parties in Italy (2019–2022) Classification of Greek far-right parties Lineage of the far right in Cyprus Number of votes in local elections (every fourth year starting with 1991) and national elections (every fourth year starting with 1989) for the extreme right in Norway, 1989–2021 Number of followers for three extreme right groups in Norway, 2015–2019 Number of protest events by extreme right actors, 2008–2020 Number of granted asylum applications and asylum-related family reunifications in Sweden, by year, 1989–2020 Proportions mentioning immigration and/or integration as one of the three most important issues in Sweden, 1987–2019 Forms of cooperation Cooperation instances initiated by Identitair Verzet Distribution of cooperation events by month Number of far-right social movement organisations in the UK (Q1 2009–Q4 2020) Main reasons of far-right mobilisation (Q1 2009–Q4 2020) Total number of ideological rationales given for UK far-right mobilisations per quarter (Q1 2009–Q4 2020) Number of tactics used by the UK far-right (Q1 2009–Q4 2020)

viii

26 31 33 69 69 70 74 132 153 158 179 181 182 190 191 234 236 238 267 267 268 269

TABLES



1.1 1.2 1.3 5.1 5.2 6.1

6.2 6.3 9.1 11.1 13.1 21.1 21.2

Elections results of the SRS during the 1990s Elections results of the SRS 2001–2012 Elections results of the SRS 2013–2020 Austria’s major far-right movements FPÖ vote percentage in national elections Main characteristics of the logics of political parties, social movements, and subcultures Overview of most relevant actors and their ideological positions throughout the four Czech far-right cycles The key characteristics of the four cycles of the Czech far right Electoral results of the center-right coalition between 1994 and 2018, general elections Electoral results of far-right parties at Greek-Cypriot parliamentary elections (1974–2021) Performances of Swedish Populist Radical Right parties in parliamentary elections, 1988–2022 Linear regression results for misogynistic attitudes and demographic controls Linear regression results for misogynistic attitudes and the expression of far-right attitudes

ix

10 13 14 71 75 85 86 87 131 160 194 305 306

CONTRIBUTORS

William Allchorn is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at Richmond, the American University in London. He is the author of a book on anti-Islamic protest in the UK and on narratives of the contemporary global far right. He has also written several other reports, book chapters, and articles on the topic of far-right extremism. His PhD studied political responses to the English Defence League in five UK locations. Jovo Bakić is an Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology. He has mostly been dealing with the national conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and far-right ideologies and parties in both successor-states of former Yugoslavia and Europe. He is the author of three and editor of two monographs. In addition, he published about forty shorter studies in scientific journals and monographs. He was visiting scholar at the University of Oxford (2003–2004), the University of Helsinki (2009), the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (2010), and Charles University in Prague (2018). Tore Bjørgo is director of the Center for Research on Extremism: The Far Right, Hate Crime and Political Violence (C-REX), a professor at the University of Oslo, and an adjunct professor at the Norwegian Police University College. His main fields of research have been rightwing extremism, terrorism, disengagement from violent groups, prevention, and policing. Amongst his 15 books are Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses (1997), Nation and Race: The Euro-American Racist Subculture (1998), The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway (2016), and Vigilantism against Migrants and Minorities (2019). Valerio Alfonso Bruno is a fellow of the Far-Right Analysis Network (FRAN), a member of the Center for European Futures (CEF), and a research fellow at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, where he collaborates with Polidemos. Bruno works on European and Italian politics, in particular on populist radical right parties. He is currently working on the books The rise of the Radical-Right in Italy with Downes and Scopelliti and Brothers of Italy: Organisation, Leadership and Ideology with M. Morini. His analyses have appeared, among others, in The Financial Times, The Economist, Al Jazeera, and The Sunday Times.

x

Contributors

Giorgos Charalambous is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nicosia, working in the field of comparative European politics and political sociology. He specialises in party politics, political ideologies, mobilisation, political behaviour, and the domestic politics of European integration and southern Europe. Charalambous is also currently serving as book reviews editor of The Cyprus Review and co-coordinator of the Communism Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (PSA), as well as member of the Research Advisory Group for the Leventis Foundation Research and Innovation Programme on Cyprus, at the Hellenic Observatory, LSE. His academic publications include a number of books and book chapters and many articles, amongst other journals, in Party Politics, European Political Science Review, Mobilisation, Government and Opposition, International Studies Review, and South European Society and Politics. Jan Charvát is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. He studied political science at Charles University in Prague and political sociology at Högskolan Dalarna in Sweden. He is the author of book Současný politický extremismus a radikalismus (Contemporary Political Extremism and Radicalism, 2007, Portal) and editor and co-author of the books Mikrofon je naše bomba: Politika a hudební subkultury mládeže (The Microphone is Our Bomb: Politics and Youth Music Subcultures, 2018, Togga) and Out of Step. Politics and Subcultures in the Post-Socialist Space (2021, Dokořán). Sting Daniëls has an MSc in Crisis and Security Management from Leiden University. He currently works as an OSINT researcher at the Dutch Ministry for Justice and Security. James F. Downes is an Assistant Professor (I) in Comparative Politics and International Relations, in the Department of Social Sciences at Hong Kong Metropolitan University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Global Europe Centre at the University of Kent/Brussels School of International Studies, alongside the Far-Right Analysis Network (FRAN). His recent publications relating to Populism and the Radical Right have appeared in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies and Electoral Studies, with a forthcoming co-authored book on the Radical Right in Italy to be published (2023). Tamta Gelashvili is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Oslo, affiliated with the Center of Research on Extremism (C-REX). She is also a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). She holds an MPhil degree from the University of Oslo and an MSc degree from the University of Amsterdam. Her PhD project focuses on a comparative empirical analysis of far-right social movements in Georgia and Ukraine, with an emphasis on political opportunities for mobilisation and interaction amongst far-right parties and extra-parliamentary groups. Gavin Hart is a Lecturer in Criminology at Liverpool Hope University. He has previously held posts at the University of Huddersfield. His research focuses on a range of issues connecting hate crime and political extremism. His recent work has largely focussed on racism and extremism in Northern Ireland and the spread of misinformation in online spaces. Antoinette Raffaela Huber is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Liverpool Hope University. She has previously held academic posts at the University of Chester and Liverpool John

xi

Contributors

Moores University. Her research interests centre on image-based sexual abuse, violence against women, misogynistic extremism, digital criminology, and pornography. Paul Jackson is Professor in the History of Radicalism and Extremism at the University of Northampton who specialises in the history and contemporary dynamics of fascism and the extreme right. He is the curator of the Searchlight Archive at the university, which is one of the UK’s largest collections of material related to the recent history of extreme right groups. He has engaged widely with the media, including national and international press, as well as for BBC radio and television, and he has written articles for the Guardian and the Huffington Post. He has engaged widely with policymakers, professionals, and activists, including creating bespoke training packages related to risks posed by the extreme right. Anders Ravik Jupskås is a political scientist, senior researcher, and deputy director at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo. His PhD from 2015 was entitled ‘Persistence of Populism: The Norwegian Progress Party, 1973–2009’. His research mainly focuses on right-wing extremism, party politics, populism, and political violence. He has published in Scandinavian Political Studies, Swiss Political Science Review, and Party Politics, as well as chapters on right-wing populism in recently published edited volumes with Routledge. Katherine Kondor is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo and a Visiting Fellow in Media and Illiberalism at Loughborough University. She studies recruitment practices, pathways into farright organisations, and far-right cultural production, particularly in the Hungarian far right. Katherine has published on the Hungarian far right, online extremism, the use of the digital space in the study of the far right, and audience engagement with media. Marlene Laruelle, PhD, is Director and Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. At IERES she is also the Director of the Illiberalism Studies Program, a CoDirector of PONARS (Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia), and the founder and Director of the Central Asia Program. She works on the rise of populist and illiberal movements in post-Soviet Eurasia, Europe, and the US. Trained in political philosophy, she explores how nationalism and conservative values are becoming mainstream in different cultural contexts. She focuses on Russia’s ideological landscape and its outreach abroad. Nicolas Lebourg is a historian who specialises in the extreme right in Europe. He is a researcher at the University of Montpellier and a member of the program “Violence and Radical Activism in France,” run by the National Agency for Research. LeBourg is the author of Far right politics in Europe (2017, with Jean-Yves Camus), and The Violence of the Political Margins in France (Paris, Riveneuve, with Isabelle Sommier). Mark Littler is an Associate Professor of Criminology and Deputy Head of the School of Law and Criminology at Liverpool Hope University. He was previously Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Security Studies at the University of Huddersfield, and Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Hull. He is a series editor for Routledge Studies in Digital Extremism, an associate editor of Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression, and Co-chair of the European Society of Criminology’s  Working Group on Terrorism, Extremism, and Radicalization. xii

Contributors

Riccardo Marchi is an integrated researcher at the Center for International Studies of the ISCTE-IUL and invited professor at the Universidade Lusófona (Lisbon, Portugal). His research fields are right-wing radicalism (political thought, parties and movements). He was PI of the New Euro-American Radical Right project granted by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (2018-2022); scholarship researcher of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (2015); post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon – ICS-UL (2008–2014). Since 2014, he is a member of the executive committee of the international research network “Direitas, História e Memória.” Jim McAuley is a Professor of Political Sociology and Irish Studies at the University of Huddersfield. He has been a visiting research scholar at several institutions in Sweden, Canada, and the USA. McAuley has continued to write extensively on issues around political conflict and division; his major approach is to analyse the organisational structure of organisations engaged in political violence and their relationships over time. As such he has researched those involved in interactions with such organisations and the social movement sector closely. He has studied all aspects of the cycle of those engaged in political violence – engagement, involvement and disengagement, mainly in the context of Northern Ireland, including the role of religion in motivating terrorism that is grounded in an ideological and socio-political framing. Shaun McDaid is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Leeds Trinity University. He is interested in conflict, radicalisation, and radical politics and has published widely on the politics and political history of Ireland. He is the author of Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972–75 (2013) and co-author (with Catherine McGlynn) of Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Higher Education (2018). Ov Cristian Norocel (DrSocSci University of Helsinki, Finland) is Senior Lecturer in Gender Studies, at Lund University (Sweden). Norocel applies an intersectional lens to issues of farright ideology, communication, and mobilisation in comparative perspective, by means of critical discursive methodologies, digital ethnography, and big data analysis. Norocel’s work has been published in: Big Data & Society, European Journal of Cultural Studies, Men & Masculinities, Politics and Governance, Social Media + Society. He has co-edited Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe (Springer 2020). His contribution herein was supported by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet). Rudolf Paksa is an expert on far-right populism in Hungary and the interwar period. Graduated as a historian and history teacher from ELTE Budapest in 2006, and received a PhD from the same university in 2012. Between 2009 and 2022 Paksa was a fellow member of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (from 2019 Eötvös Loránd Research Network) and has lectured at several universities in Hungary. Paksa has published three books in Hungarian: a monograph on the Hungarian National Socialists (Magyar Nemzetiszocialisták), a biography of their leader Ferenc Szálasi (Szálasi Ferenc és a Hungarizmus), and an overview of the history of the Hungarian far right from its beginnings to the present day (A Magyar Szélsőjobboldal Története). Ondřej Slačálek works at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague. He has published scholarly articles in Patterns of Prejudice, Slavic Review, and Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, inter alia, and essays in xiii

Contributors

Eurozine, A2larm, and LeftEast. Together with Pavel Barša and Zora Hesová, he edited the book Central European Culture Wars: Beyond Post-Communism and Populism (Prague: Faculty of Arts, Charles University 2021) and together with Ágnes Gagyi he edited the book The Political Economy of Eastern Europe 30 years into the ‘Transition’, New Left Perspectives from the Region (2022). Eva Svatoňová works at the Department of Sociology at Copenhagen University as a postdoctoral member of a team working on the “Extreme Identities: A Linguistic and Visual Analysis of European Far-Right Online Communities’ Politics of Identity” project. She also works as a researcher at the Political Science Department at Charles University in Prague, where she participates in the “Political Polarization and the Human Rights Backlash” project. She holds a PhD degree from Aarhus University. In her dissertation, “How Feminists Became Baby Snatchers. The Making of the Czech Anti-gender Discourse,” she studied the emergence and increasing popularity of anti-gender discourse in Czechia. Her work focuses on far right, culture wars and anti-feminist movements in Central Europe. Vasiliki (Billy) Tsagkroni is an assistant professor of comparative politics at the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University. Their main research includes far-right parties, populism and radicalisation, political discourse, narratives in times of crisis, political marketing and branding, and policy making. Their work has been published in numerous peer-reviewed journals, and edited special issues, and books. They hold a PhD from Queen Mary University London (2015), a MA from Panteion University of Athens (2008), and a BA from the same institution (2005). Mihai Varga (PhD 2011, University of Amsterdam) is a sociologist at the Institute for EastEuropean Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. His work is primarily about the political and socio-economic outcomes of market reforms in post-communist countries. His latest research focuses on poverty, subsistence, and food production in Ukraine and Romania; and on illiberalism and (far-)right-wing organisations, networks and ideologies in Eastern Europe. His work appeared in outlets such as Word Development, Journal of Development Studies, New Political Economy, Land Use Policy, Critical Sociology, Review of International Political Economy, Sociologia Ruralis and Routledge. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage is an assistant professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from the University of St Andrews in Scotland. His research expertise covers propaganda and the creation of online narratives promoting terrorism, the historical development of terrorism, right-wing extremism, and transnational links of right-wing extremist groups. In addition, he is interested in the diffusion of ideological and technical knowledge amongst terrorist movements and the use of evolutionary approaches to social science; his first book, How Terror Evolves (2020), addresses these topics. Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage is a Fellow and member of the editorial board of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (UK), a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and was a Senior Fellow of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS). Sabine Volk is an early career researcher in political science at the University of Passau, Germany, and at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. She is affiliated with the Horizon 2020 project “FATIGUE” (since 2018), and with the project “Hegemonic Mobilisations xiv

Contributors

in Central and Eastern Europe” at the University of Helsinki (since 2021). Sabine’s research focuses on populism and the far right in eastern Germany. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as European Politics and Society, German Politics, and Journal of Genocide Research, and in edited volumes. Manès Weisskircher is a political scientist at the University of Oslo. He holds a PhD from the European University in Florence. His research interests are political parties, social movements, democracy, and the far right. He is the author of “Gains and Losses. How Protestors Win and Lose” (with James Jasper et al.) and editor of the special issue “New contentious politics. Civil society, social movements, and the polarization of German politics” (German Politics, with Swen Hutter). His articles have been published in journals such as the European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics, Government and Opposition, Political Studies, and Social Movement Studies, amongst others. Anders Widfeldt is a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Aberdeen. His research interests include right-wing radicalism, extremism and populism, political party organisations, and party membership. Mette Wiggen is a lecturer in politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. She holds a PhD from the University of Leeds and researches and publishes on racism, welfare chauvinism, and mainstreaming of the far right in Scandinavia. She has contributed to several books and published in CARR, OpenDemocracy, Fair Observer, The Conversation, and Institute for Public Policy Research – Radical Review. Michael C. Zeller is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld. His research interests include social movements, far-right socio-politics, political violence, and qualitative methodologies. Dr Zeller worked as an associate researcher on the EU Horizon-2020 BRaVE (Building Resilience against Violent Extremism and Polarisation) project and as a principal investigator for the Proscribed Right-Wing Extremist Organisations (PREO) project; he is currently a project leader of the European Violent Right-Wing Extremism Monitoring (EVREM) project supported by the European Commission. His research has been published in the journals Mobilization, Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics, and Social Movement Studies. He completed his doctorate in Political Science at Central European University.

xv

INTRODUCTION Katherine Kondor

While not a new phenomenon, it feels as though the far right is becoming increasingly prevalent in our everyday lives, sneaking into many facets of politics and society. The most extreme manifestation of the far right in the 21st century is the numerous far-right attacks seen in Europe: from the deadly Utøya attack in Norway in 2011, the 2016 murder of MP Jo Cox in London, to the 2019 German Halle Synagogue shooting. Contrary to media reports, however, incidents of far-right violence have not risen in recent years and naturally vary by national context (Ravndal et al., 2022). Furthermore, in recent decades, countries across the European continent have seen a rise in far-right demonstrations, the increased mainstreaming of far-right values, the election of far-right parties, and the influence of far-right ideology on government decisions. The far right is a heterogeneous phenomenon, in terms of its organisation, ideology, culture, strategy, and tactics. There is little consensus as to the appropriate terminology for such organisations, since the landscape of far-right activism is ever-changing, continuously creating new types of organisations and making others obsolete. Further complicating the consensus is that parties and movements are not static in their policies, beliefs, and practices and may evolve over time (Hainsworth, 2008). While there is a growing consensus on terminology for these types of organisations, movements, and parties characterised by nationalism, nativism, xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2000), this consensus is by no means complete. The ideologies of such organisations and parties have been described in numerous ways, such as extreme right (Caiani & Parenti, 2013; Wolfreys, 2013), far right (Akçalı & Korkut, 2012; Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; Pirro & Róna, 2018), radical right (Rydgren, 2018), right-wing radicalism (Minkenberg, 2002), right-wing extremism/radicalism (Carter, 2018), right-wing populism (Wodak et al., 2013), far-right extremism (Treadwell, 2013), right-wing extremism (Mammone et al., 2013), extreme right activism (Jackson, 2015; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006), and anti-minority mobilisation (Busher, 2015), amongst others. Thus, some examples of the terminology used to describe those types of organisations and parties ascribed to the above-mentioned attitudes are radical right (Minkenberg, 2002), far right (Froio & Ganesh, 2018; Pirro & Castelli Gattinara, 2018; Pirro, 2023), extreme right (Mammone et al., 2012; Mudde, 2000), populist radical right (Grimm & Pilkington, 2015; Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2019; Pirro, 2014), and populist street movements (Bartlett et al., 2011). These are, of course, by no means exhaustive lists. DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-1

1

Katherine Kondor

For a volume such as this one, spanning different historical and cultural contexts, a more general term is required. Far right will be used as an umbrella term (Pirro, 2023) encompassing several types of organisations from subcultures, social movement organisations (see Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2018), to movement parties (Kitschelt, 2006), and political parties (e.g., Mudde, 2012). It is because of its heterogeneity that a more general and encompassing term like far right is necessary. This Handbook of far-right extremism focuses not only on those organisations subscribing to democracy but also emphasises the importance of more grassroots anti-democratic movements that in particular see “the struggle between natives and non-natives as vital” (Pirro, 2023, p. 106). Because of this we have added the term ‘extremism’ to the title of the Handbook. As extremism in general, and far-right extremism in particular, may vary by national culture and context, a minimal definition of this concept is necessary. Building from others like Mudde (2000), this minimal definition has been proposed by Carter (2018) to include exclusionary nationalism, authoritarianism, and anti-democratic attitudes, while being accompanied by characteristics such as xenophobia, racism, and populism. As suggested by Mammone et al. (2012), far-right extremism is a transnational phenomenon with shared common basic features. This makes the parties and movements in various national contexts immediately comparable, while of course considering their own political and national culture: “they represent the different permutations of a wider (transnational/European) ‘extremism’” (Mammone et al., 2012, p. 3). Examining the far right by individual national context allows us, while considering a common minimal definition, to explore how individual histories, cultures, and societies can influence the various natures of far-right extremism.

In the fourth wave of the European far right Scholars such as Cas Mudde (2019) have suggested that Europe has seen a fourth wave of the post-war far right since the year 2000. This follows the previous three waves of the post-war far right, as described by Klaus von Beyme (1988): Neo-Fascism (1945–1955), Right-Wing Populism (1955–1980), and the Radical Right (1980–2000). Given the military defeat of fascism after 1945, the first wave of the post-war far right is characterised by a context hostile to fascist ideas, where neo-fascist organisations in most of Europe only existed on the fringes of society. After 1955, the second wave was mainly concerned with anti-taxation and antimodernisation, and saw smaller right-wing populist parties form around Europe (Mudde, 2019). Fuelled by unemployment and high levels of immigration, in the third wave in Western Europe parties began to promote anti-immigration attitudes and radical right parties in parliament. Furthermore after 1989, the far right began to again emerge in post-socialist countries, with the formation of both grassroots movements and political parties. The most recent, fourth, wave is characterised by the mainstreaming of the far right and the growth of the non-party sector, spanning from 2000 until the present day (Mudde, 2019). This fourth wave has seen several crises that proved beneficial for far-right support: the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, the recession of 2008, the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. While similar to the third wave, it is the normalisation of the far right in wider society, aided by the aforementioned crises, that makes this wave a greater threat to liberal democracy. The far right is inherently peripheral to the mainstream: its values, ideas, and culture understood to be remote from an imagined centre. While the mainstreaming of ideas by the far right is not a new phenomenon (Kallis, 2015), it is clearly continuing into the present at force (Mondon & Winter, 2020) and has become a central issue for society and liberal democracy. 2

Introduction

The most recent wave is also characterised by a further rising heterogeneity in the far right. Beyond the multiple ideologies and types of grassroots far-right movements and organisations, there are many new far-right political parties in Europe. In addition to parties that have grown out of other older far-right party traditions, Europe is now seeing conservative parties that have transformed into far-right parties, such as the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland (Kondor & Littler, 2020; Mudde, 2019; Pankowski, 2012). Indeed, far-right parties are gaining power in many European nations, even in some that have not previously supported the far right. At the time of writing, four European countries have far-right parties in power (Hungary’s FIDESZ, Italy’s Brothers of Italy and Lega, Poland’s Law and Justice, and Switzerland’s Swiss People’s Party), with a further six countries with far-right parties in supporting roles in parliament (Armenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Serbia, Sweden, and Turkey). Furthermore, Europe has recently seen a rise in far-right movement parties, defined as “coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition” (Kitschelt, 2006, p. 280). While far-right movement parties are not a new phenomenon, they now manage to draw attention to certain issues not covered by mainstream politics (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2018). Far-right movement parties have recently found success in several European countries particularly due to conspiracism surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Our Homeland Movement in Hungary and Revival in Bulgaria. This Handbook offers two main contributions in addition to presenting up-to-date analyses by country experts and scholars of the far right. Firstly, existing literature on the far right focuses extensively on the political arena (for example: Akkerman et al., 2016; Caiani & Císař, 2018; Rydgren, 2018) and less on non-institutional aspects of the far right: this volume attempts to bridge that gap by moving the conversation beyond the focus on political parties. That being said, several contributions in this Handbook do focus on the relationship between parties and movement parties, which speaks to the importance of national context in the study of the far right – this is generally the case in countries with a significantly smaller grassroots far-right movement, such as Portugal (Chapter 8), Greece (Chapter 10), Cyprus (Chapter 11), and Denmark (Chapter 14). Furthermore, several contributions in this Handbook highlight the increasingly blurred boundaries between the far right in electoral and protest politics (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2018), such as Bakić’s chapter on Serbia (Chapter 1) and Bruno’s and Downes’ chapter on Italy (Chapter 9). Secondly, this Handbook offers to broaden the geographical scope of research on European far-right extremism, as the literature on the far right in Europe has been dominated by a focus on Western Europe (Castelli Gattinara, 2020). Our Handbook proposes to do this by offering contributions from countries which are often overlooked in the English literature, like post-socialist and Eastern European countries: these countries often have a wealth of scholarship in their native languages but lack contributions in English. Therefore, this handbook provides contributions from scholars of the far right in such countries as Czechia (Chapter 6), Russia (Chapter 3), Serbia (Chapter 1), and Ukraine (Chapter 2).

Overview of chapters This handbook is arranged in five sections divided by region, plus an epilogue. Our 21 contributions, written by established, and up-and-coming scholars of far-right extremism, range across a variety of disciplines. While each author has attempted to cover aspects of the far right from the grassroots level to the institutional, this will vary by chapter according to both the author’s current research and the prevalence of the far right in their respective countries. 3

Katherine Kondor

The book begins by looking towards the east, with three Eastern European countries covered in the first section: Serbia, Ukraine, and Russia. In Chapter 1, Jovo Bakić examines the convergence of football hooliganism and the far right in Serbian politics. Chapter 2 provides a thorough overview of a country that has to date been understudied in terms of the far right: Ukraine. In this chapter, Tamta Gelashvili highlights the importance of understanding the historical roots of the Ukrainian far-right movement, and the unique characteristics of the contemporary Ukrainian far right. The final chapter in this section, Chapter 3, turns to Russia, where Mihai Varga traces the development of the Russian far right and argues that despite the decline of the Russian far right in the last decade, they have successfully transformed their spaces of hate to ultimately survive. The second section looks at four Central European countries: Germany, Austria, Czechia, and Hungary. In Chapter 4, Sabine Volk and Manes Weisskircher highlight the importance of subnational politics to explain the far right’s strength, by closely examining far-right strategies in (east) Germany. Chapter 5 turns to Austria, where Michael Zeller examines historical grievances in the Austrian far-right movement, particularly through the lens of the Ulrichsberg commemorations. In Chapter 6, Jan Charvát, Ondřej Slačálek, and Eva Svatoňová outline the development of the Czech far right since 1989, paying particular attention to the relationship between the subcultures, social movements, and institutional politics. In Chapter 7, Katherine Kondor and Rudolf Paksa outline the development of the Hungarian far-right movement and the historical characteristics of the contemporary Hungarian far right. The third section turns to Southern Europe, looking at Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. In Chapter 8, Riccardo Marchi discusses the development of the Chega party and their relationship to the traditional Portuguese far-right movement. Chapter 9 turns to Italy, where Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James Downes examine the radicalisation of the Italian political landscape, paying particular attention to the relationship between far-right political parties and the extreme-right movement. In Chapter 10 Vasiliki Tsagkroni outlines the evolution of the Greek far right, highlighting important far-right parties and the more recent transformations of the Greek far right. Finally to this section is Chapter 11, where Giorgos Charalambous presents an overview of the Greek-Cypriot far right and examines the Cypriot National Popular Front (ELAM). The fourth geographical section looks to Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. In Chapter 12, Anders Ravik Jupskås and Tore Bjørgo present a comprehensive overview and trace the evolution of the Norwegian extreme right since the 1990s. The following Chapter 13 turns to neighbouring Sweden, where Anders Widfeldt outlines the development of the Swedish extreme right and Populist Radical Right parties in Sweden, with special emphasis on the Sweden Democrats. Finally, Chapter 14 by Mette Wiggen analyses the development of the Danish far right, with particular focus on the Danish People’s Party, the mainstreaming of the far right, and the influence of the Danish People’s Party on Denmark’s political culture. The final geographical section covers Western Europe: France, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Chapter 15 looks to France, where Nicholas Lebourg and Marlene Laruelle pay particular attention to the fragmentation of the French far-right movement, including an overview of banned far-right organisations and far-right terrorist attempts in France. In Chapter 16 Sting Daniels and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage present an examination of the Dutch Identitair Verzet and the transnational nature of the European Identitarian movement. Chapter 17 turns to Ireland, where Shaun McDaid and Jim McAuley analyse the electoral performance of the Irish far right, and the discourse and rhetoric deployed by the far right in Ireland. In our final chapter, Chapter 18, William Allchorn presents an overview of the far right in the United Kingdom and explores the argument for a post-organisational phase in the United Kingdom’s far-right movement. 4

Introduction

The Handbook concludes with an epilogue, highlighting some of the most important developments in the European far right: gendered perspective in the study of the far right and the influence of the American far right. In Chapter 19, Paul Jackson maps the relationship between the North American and European far right, focusing on the far right of the United States and Britain. In Chapter 20, Ov Cristian Norocel provides an excellent overview of gender and the far-right continuum, mapping the relationship between gender and the ideological traits central to the accepted definitions of the far right. In the final chapter, Chapter 21, Antoinette Huber, Gavin Hart, and Mark Littler examine the relationship between misogyny and the far right through a quantitative analysis in Great Britain.

References Akçalı, E., & Korkut, U. (2012). Geographical metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-Turanism in Hungary. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53(5), 596–614. Akkerman, T., de Lange, S., & Rooduijn, M. (2016). Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream? Routledge. Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & Littler, M. (2011). The new face of digital populism. Demos. Busher, J. (2015). The making of anti-Muslim protest: Grassroots activism in the English defense league. Routledge. Caiani, M., & Císař, O. (2018). Radical right movement parties in Europe. Routledge. Caiani, M., & Parenti, L. (2013). The Italian extreme right and its use of the internet: A ‘bi-front’ actor? In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of right-wing extremism in Europe (pp. 217–232). Routledge. Carter, E. (2018). Right-wing extremism/radicalism: Reconstructing the concept. Journal of Political Ideologies, 23(2), 157–182. Castelli Gattinara, P. (2020). The study of the far right and its three E’s: Why scholarship must go beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. French Politics, 18, 314–333. Castelli Gattinara, P., & Pirro, A. L. P. (2018). The far right as social movement. European Societies, 21(4), 447–462. Froio, C., & Ganesh, B. (2018). The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter. European Societies, 21(4), 513–539. Grimm, R., & Pilkington, H. (2015). ‘Loud and proud’: Youth and the politics of silencing. In H. Pilkington, & G. Pollock (Eds.), Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe (pp. 206–230). John Wiley and Sons. Hainsworth, P. (2008). The extreme right in Western Europe. Routledge. Jackson, P. (2015). #hitlerwasright: National action and national socialism for the 21st century. Journal for Deradicalization, 1, 97–115. Kallis, A. (2015). When fascism became mainstream: The challenge of extremism in times of crisis. Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascism Studies, 4, 1–24. Kitschelt, H. (2006). Movement parties. In R. S. Katz, & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp. 278–290). Sage. Klandermans, B., & Mayer, N. (2006). Extreme right activists in Europe: Through the magnifying glass. Routledge. Kondor, K., & Littler, M. (2020). Invented nostalgia: The search for national identity among the Hungarian far right. In A. Hellström, O. C. Norocel, & M. B. Jorgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between politics of culture, welfare, and migration (pp. 119–134). Springer. Mammone, A., Godin, E., & Jenkins, B. (Eds.) (2012). Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: From local to transnational. Routledge. Mammone, A., Godin, E., & Jenkins, B. (Eds.) (2013). Varieties of right-wing extremism in Europe. Routledge. Mieriņa, I., & Koroļeva, I. (2015). Support for far right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis. In H. Pilkington, & G. Pollock (Eds.), Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe (pp. 183–205). John Wiley and Sons. Minkenberg, M. (2002). The radical right in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative observations and interpretations. East European Politics and Societies, 16(2), 335–362.

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Katherine Kondor Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2020). Reactionary democracy: How racism and the populist far right became mainstream. Verso. Mudde, C. (2000). The ideology of the extreme right. Manchester University Press. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2012). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? European Journal of Political Research, 52(1), 1–19. Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity. Pankowski, R. (2012). Right-wing extremism in Poland. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Pirro, A. L. P. (2014). Populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The different context and issues of the prophets of the Patria. Government and Opposition, 49(4), 599–628. Pirro, A. L. P. (2023). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 29, 101–112. Pirro, A. L. P., & Castelli Gattinara, P. (2018). Movement parties of the far right: The organization and strategies of nativist collective actors. Mobilization, 23(3), 367–383. Pirro, A. L. P., & Róna, D. (2018). Far right activists in Hungary: Youth participation in Jobbik and its networks. European Societies, 21(4), 603–626. Ravndal, J. A., Tandberg, C., Jupskås, A. R., & Thorstensen, M. (2022). RTV Trend Report 2022: Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990–2021. https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/ english/publications/c-rex-reports/2022/rtv_trend_report_2022.pdf Rydgren, J. (Ed.) (2018). The Oxford handbook of the radical right. Oxford University Press. Treadwell, J. (2013) The English Defence League and the counter jihad. Criminal Justice Matters, 93(1), 8–9. Von Beyme, K. (1988). Right-wing extremism in Western Europe. West European Politics, 11(2), 1–18. Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., & Mral, B. (Eds.) (2013). Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse. Bloomsbury. Wolfreys, J. (2013). The European extreme right in comparative perspective. In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of right-wing extremism in Europe (pp. 19–37). Routledge.

6

PART I

Eastern Europe

1 THE SERBIAN FAR RIGHT, FOOTBALL HOOLIGANS, AND THEIR INSTRUMENTALISATION BY AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME Serbia as Case Study Jovo Bakić

The far right has authoritarian nativism as its ideological core. There are two kinds of far right: (1) the extreme right, which openly rejects the idea of democracy and uses physical violence against its enemies, and (2) the radical right, which does not use physical violence against its enemies, but is obsessed with xenophobic nationalism and law and order, while presenting itself as the champion of democracy (Bakić, 2019; Mudde, 2007). Although nationalism was rooted in the constitutional framework of a socialist ethnofederation (Bunce, 1997), Tito and the Communist Party controlled and punished any massive nationalistic manifestations.1 The only channel of expressing nationalism relatively openly was a competitive high-level sport, especially football, although authorities tried to control it as well (Mills, 2018; Nielsen, 2010, p. 89). By the same token, “in the case of Serbia, an examination of the nexus of football, fan clubs, paramilitary forces, state security services, politics and organized crime remains necessary,” especially in the context of the violent destruction of Yugoslavia (Nielsen, 2010, p. 88). However, part of the nexus should be examined in the aftermath as well. This chapter provides a brief overview of the far-right development in Serbia 1990–2022. It is inseparable from the development of the main far-right actor Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), its offspring the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka, SNS), and their connections with Serbian and foreign far-right groups, football fan tribes, and organised crime. One can identify three successive periods of the Serbian far right, which roughly follow general development of the Serbian multi-party system: (1) the Milošević authoritarian regime in the 1990s; (2) the oligarchic regime 2001–2012; and (3) the Vučić authoritarian regime since 2012. Football fan tribes (Vrcan, 2002),2 led more often than not by men who are actively engaged in organised crime, have gradually become significant political actors since the 1990s. Although they have constantly nourished extreme right ideology and practice, they build informal coalitions with various regimes and parties which are not necessarily far-right oriented. The coalition making is dependent on the political and fan tribe leaders’ interests and not on ideology. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the fan tribes have likely been the most numerous DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-3

9

Jovo Bakić

extreme-right actors. They can swarm the streets in thousands if they have a common enemy. The most available common enemies are the police and the LGBT community. That is why the Pride Parade was such a challenge, at least until 2014. However, the Vučić regime has made close connections with fan tribes leaders and other extreme right groups, and these links can explain the subsequent lack of attacks on the Pride Parade (Insajder, 2018; KRIK, 2016, 2018, 2020; NIN, 2022; NovaS, 2021).

The Serbian far right in the 1990s The far right emerged in the twilight of both Yugoslavia and Yugoslav self-management socialism and Serbia’s peripherisation within the world capitalist system. During the 1990s, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (ex-communists), led by the authoritarian demagogue Slobodan Milošević, manipulated nationalism in order to stay in power and used various farrightists, criminals, and football fans in the wars of Yugoslav succession. Indeed, during “the 1990s, football in Serbia to a significant extent became synonymous with organized crime and the criminalization of the Serbian state” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 87). All types of nationalist legacies, inherited from various defeated formations in the Second World War, were revived at the beginning of the 1990s. One can recognise two main historical inspirations for post-socialist revival of the far right. Firstly, the Chetnik military units, which appeared as loosely organised nationalistic guerilla against occupation forces and later, due to their harsh anti-communism, transformed themselves into collaborationist forces. Secondly, there were clearly fascist streams, such as Serbian Voluntary Corps (Srpski dobrovoljački korpus), led by pre-war fascist Dimitrije Ljotić, and the Serbian State Guard (Srpska državna straža), official formations loyal to the quisling government led by general Milan Nedić (Bakić, 2009, 2013). Certainly, former communist dissident, university lecturer, and convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj and his SRS (Srpska radikalna stranka) have been inspired by the Chetnik tradition, visible in the name of its paramilitary volunteers “Serbian Chetniks” (Srpski četnici).3 They were undoubtedly the most influential amongst many far-right persons and organisations, not only in the 1990s (see Table 1.1), but until 2008 and the party split. They inherited the Chetnik nationalistic demand for an ethnically pure Great Serbia4 and Islamophobic tradition,5 but Šešelj added broader xenophobic (anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Catholic, antiMasonic, anti-Semitic, etc.) and quite specific authoritarian features6 (Bakić, 2009, 2013). In addition, one can mention the Party of Serbian unity (Stranka srpskog jedinstva), an offspring of the paramilitary unit “Serbian Volunteer Guard” or “Arkan’s Tigers” (Arkanovi tigrovi), led by Željko Ražnatović Arkan, notorious criminal and leader of the Red Star football-fans “Delije”7; Serbian National Revival (Srpska narodna odbrana), led by cafe owner Table 1.1  Elections results of the SRS during the 1990s Elections

Number of votes

Percentage of votes

Number of MPs

Government

1992

1,066,765

22.58

73/250

1993 1997 2000

595,467 1,162,216 322,333

13.85 28.12 8.60

39/250 82/250 23/250

Support to minority government Opposition Government coalition Opposition

Source: Vreme (2021).

10

The Serbian far right

Mirko Jović and its paramilitary formation “Dušan the Mighty” (Dušan Silni); and the paramilitary unit “the White Eagles” (Beli orlovi), led by film and TV director, criminal, and professor at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts Dragoslav Bokan. The last one has been a follower of Dimitrije Ljotić and various European fascist ideologues since at least the 1980s. The Yugoslav People’s Army (later Yugoslav Army) to some extent lack infantry (June 1991–April 1992) due to the low level of regular mobilisation in Serbia, and these paramilitary or “volunteer” formations were deployed to supplement the army. There is no doubt that they were supplied by weapons and munition either by the Milošević regime and its secret services or by the regular army. What is more, the Milošević regime used Vojislav Šešelj and the SRS as well as Arkan and SSJ in order to fiercely attack the opposition and undermine the Parliament as a liberal-democratic institution. While Arkan, relatively unsuccessful in politics,8 criminalised football in Serbia even more than before (Nielsen, 2010, pp. 91–92), Šešelj’s brutal and shameless behaviour greatly contributed to the almost utter destruction of political culture in Serbia.9 During the second part of the 1990s, the SRS was an authoritarian nativist planet around which a few newborn satellite groups orbited, for example the Neo-Nazi National Formation (Nacionalni stroj)10 and “Patriotic Movement Obraz11” (Otačastveni pokret Obraz) which follows the traditions of the classical fascist movement Zbor (1934–1945). However, the two extreme right organisations have had no more than a few hundred activists and negligible influence on the broader public since their formation.

The Serbian far right during the second phase of multi-party system 2000–2012 The 5 October 2000 coup d’état was introduced by both internal and external factors. Amongst internal factors one can differentiate between political parties, football fans, and rebel parts of the Milošević regime, including the police, parts of the army, secret services, and criminals, as well as massive participation of the people. External factors included decisive influence of the major Western powers, i.e., diplomatic/intelligence/media community, and its material, moral, and propagandist support of the then Serbian opposition (Marshall, 2019). However, there was “little will or desire” to “disentangle the jumble of politics, football and organized crime” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 93), while the far right was relatively weak (see Table 1.1). Football hooligans, who were instrumental in the Milošević regime’s demise, were left to fight not only each other, but also the police (Živanić, 2021, p. 142). Furthermore, the hooligans were more often than not supported by the judicial system.12 Obviously, these warlike and strictly hierarchically organised (Živanić, 2021, p. 139) football fan tribes, which developed a vitriolic nationalist culture of violence during the second half of the 1980s and the1990s, have gained a reputation of being “patriotic watch-dogs” (Đorđević, 2016, p. 118) and a necessary political ally to any political party that wants election success. Moreover, many politicians of the governing coalitions and businessmen close to them (2000–2012) used to participate in the clubs’ administrations together with often criminal leaders of the fan tribes. That is why politicians of various governments have avoided conflict with both corrupt football club administrations and the criminal leaderships of the fan tribes. However, one should bear in mind that the fan tribes are not without ideology. The “Delije” to a large extent subscribe to clear clerical13 and xenophobic nationalism, based in the so-called Serbian autochthonic historical school and to strong anti-communist historical revisionism. Their nationalism is often megalomaniac, and fan-tribe members have claimed: “We are a nation that has always been among biggest powers and states in Europe and world” (Interview with “Delije” members, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 144). The “Delije” do not believe in the official “German school of history” because they consider it biased against the 11

Jovo Bakić

Serbs. Instead, they believe that the Serbs were the original inhabitants of the Balkans and the oldest nation on Earth.14 They claim this proud nation has allegedly always been threatened by external enemies, such as the European Union, the United States, the Catholic Church, Islam, and so on. Nevertheless, hatred against internal enemies – NGOs, LGBT activists, “groups of intellectuals,” Serbian atheists, political parties, and media which are “against reaffirmation of the St. Sava’s Serbian spirituality and culture,” and want to “stop any role of the Church in society” and “any people who disagree with them” about important national issues – is even greater than against external enemies (“Delije” forum, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, pp. 144–145). One could argue that such an ideology is closer to the clerical xenophobic nationalism of “Obraz,” “Srbska Akcija” (Serbian Action), or “Dveri”15 than to the secular xenophobic nationalism of the SRS16 (Bakić, 2009, 2013). Racist hatred is directed against Albanians, who are depicted as “ugly and stupid people,” “a retarded unevolved race, unique in its repulsion and wickedness”; after Albanians, the main enemies are Croats, who are understood as “renegades of Serbdom,” while Croatia is consisted of “enslaved western parts of Serbian countries” (“Delije” forum, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 146). Islamophobia,17 antigypsyism,18 and homophobia have also been regular elements of the “Delije” general xenophobic attitude.19 Homophobia might be the most distinctive of the features of the “Delije” (Živanić, 2021, p. 149), and “faggot” is “a catch-all term for enemies” amongst all the fan-tribes20 (Pejić, 2021, p. 179). Moreover, “Delije” called its members to fight Pride Parade: “Those people (LGBT) deserve to be beaten up on the street and wherever you catch them (as I and my two comrades have recently done), one should fight shits, there is no other way (…) And, when we, by a miracle, get proper patriots in charge of the state, those people will be imprisoned. There is no mercy and strategy for small groups of traitors” (“Delije” forum, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 151). Indeed, the first Pride Parade (2001) was marked by the attack of united “fan tribes” – beside “Delije,” there were supporters of FC Partisan “Grave Diggers” and “United Force” (Neo-Nazi supporters of FC Rad)21 – and other right-wing extremist groups like “Obraz” on the participants (B92, 2001). Of course, the SRS has always been ready to use the combination of social and nationalistic demagogy to further its political success (Bakić, 2009). This time it issued an announcement that clearly justified the attack by arguing that economic reforms closed many enterprises, and political reforms were reduced to extraditions of Serbs to “those who killed our children,” while “the DOS regime” tried “to introduce unnatural deviant sexual intercourse as something normal in Serbia” (Gayecho, 2021). LGBT activists wanted to hold a Pride Parade in 2009, but it was cancelled on account of the state’s unreadiness or unwillingness to provide security for the participants. Nonetheless, the Parade was not cancelled the following year, and it was followed by harsh fighting between fan tribes and right-wing extremists with police. Bearing in mind all the far-right ideological features of the fan-tribes (Pejić, 2021; Živanić, 2021), it is no wonder that the Kosovo issue, political problems with relatively unpopular extradition of indicted war criminals to the Hague Tribunal, and especially Pride Parades fuelled anti-regime feelings. That is why Pride was cancelled again in 2011. However, such a decision meant the state’s capitulation before right-wing extremism. Meanwhile, the single strongest party in Serbia, the SRS, could not participate in government bearing in mind its catastrophic image in the West. That is why the second-incommand Tomislav Nikolić and third-in-command Aleksandar Vučić decided to leave the Radicals and founded the Serbian Progressive Party after the elections in 2008, while the 12

The Serbian far right Table 1.2  Elections results of the SRS 2001–2012 Elections

Number of votes

Percentage of votes

Number of MPs

Government

2003 2007 2008 2012

1,056,256 1,153,453 1,219,436 180,558

27.61 28.60 29.46 4.61

82/250 81/250 78/250 0

Opposition Opposition Opposition Non-parliamentary

Source: Vreme (2021).

first-in-command was still defending himself before the Hague Tribunal.22 Such a decision had devastating effects on the SRS, which lost its parliamentary status for the first time in the party’s history in 2012 (Table 1.2). Nikolić and Vučić changed not only the name of the party but also its ideology, abandoning Great Serbia and accepting EU integration, thereby opening the door to international respectability.23 In addition, they took over most of the members and supporters of the SRS, which has been reduced to a patrimonial party of Šešelj, and to just one amongst several relatively insignificant far-right groups. At the time, it looked like Serbia might remain without a party that would be a stronghold for various far-right groups. Nonetheless, behind the scenes, Vučić maintains his personal ties with some of the right-extremists and with some of the football hooligans leaders who use football fans as a smokescreen for their criminal activities (Insajder, 2018; KRIK, 2016, 2018, 2020; NIN, 2022; NovaS, 2021).

Instrumentalisation of the far right and fan-tribes by an authoritarian regime after 2012 One can argue that Aleksandar Vučić, Šešelj’s erstwhile political protege, has used and created various far-right groups and especially criminals who lead fan-tribes as a bludgeon against its opposition since 2013. Furthermore, he has done the same with Šešelj himself. Interestingly enough, Šešelj between 2008 and 2010 published five defamatory books on both Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, but after his return, he limited his brutal criticism to Tomislav Nikolić. Šešelj has been frequently invited to TV-shows at televisions controlled by the Vučić regime since he returned to Serbia in November 2014. Obviously, the “political father and son” have made a deal. Nativist core supporters of the SRS, angered by the ideological treason of the Nikolić-Vučić duo, eagerly waited for Šešelj’s comeback, and the party returned to the Parliament in 2016. However, Šešelj’s obedience to the Vučić regime disappointed them, and they turned away from the SRS four years later, repeating the worst result in history, but this time with no coalition partners. SRS lost its parliamentary status again in spite of the fact that authoritarian regime lowered the election threshold immediately before the 2020 elections from 5 to 3 per cent in order to enable various desirable opposition parties, and especially farright parties amongst them, participation in the Parliament (Table 1.3). The most striking issue is the almost utter lack of homophobic attacks on the Pride Parades after 2014. The first Pride Parade that LGBT activists wanted to carry out under the Vučić regime was cancelled in 2013. Another parade was staged the following next year. Strong police forces and gendarmery were everywhere in the Belgrade city centre. The two incidents attracted the most attention. Firstly, TV cameras caught the moment when Aleksandar Vučić’s brother Andrej and Siniša Mali’s25 brother Predrag were beaten up by the gendarmerie allegedly because they failed to provide proper identification. Secondly, the gendarmerie stopped the most powerful man in Serbia’s son while he was trying, accompanied by the United Force 13

Jovo Bakić Table 1.3  Elections results of the SRS 2013–2020 Elections

Number of votes

Percentage of votes

Number of MPs

Government

201424 2016 2020

72,230 306,052 69,954

2.01 8.10 2.05

0 22/250 0

Non-parliamentary Opposition Non-parliamentary

Source: Vreme (2021).

Neo-Nazis, to fight participants of the Pride Parade.26 It looked like the Vučić regime would face similar difficulties as its predecessors. However, since 2015 the Pride Parades have become regular annual events with no incidents. It is hence striking that the most powerful politician in Serbia publicly claimed that the state is not powerful enough to fight hooliganism: “we are not powerful enough for it because one needs general social consensus for some issue (…) for such painful issues (…)” (Insajder.net, 24th May 2016). Obviously, the Vučić regime has found a modus vivendi with leaderships of the fan tribes. Indeed, a careful researcher has recently noticed the gloomy mood regarding the Parades on the “Delije” Internet-forum. They comment on the Parade regularly with the same disgust as they did before 2015, but they feel helpless: “Victory of the American value system” (Živanić, 2021, p. 152). There is only a nostalgia towards the “destruction” of the Parade in 2010. The “Delije” blame the Vučić regime for treason and protection of the Parades. Yet they consider resistance to the regime to be a bad option because of their alleged apolitical attitude, fear of the regime, and because of their greater disgust towards opposition. Forum members very rarely comment on the leaders of the “Delije.” Nevertheless, a member of the “Delije” wrote: “You have people for anything, but one has to move them. Those that should move them have nicely sat in their positions and they do not care to look out from their offices, at least occasionally, and to see in what we have transformed ourselves” (Živanić, 2021, p. 152). Indeed, the main leaders of the “Delije,” most of them criminals, obtained very lucrative deals from the Vučić regime. For instance, some of them have founded construction firms precisely in 2015. Beside money laundering, such firms have regularly entered into highly profitable deals with the public enterprises since their foundation. At the same time, Aleksandar and Danilo Vučić celebrated the birthday of younger one with them (Insajder, 2018; NovaS, 2021). In other words, peace at the Red Star stadium has been bought by the mafia-captured state. The Vučić regime created its opposition and its fan tribes as well. For instance, it created the Serbian Right (Srpska desnica). This extreme-right party consists of nationalists, organised criminals, and football hooligans, and is used to attack the regime opponents. It is led by Miša Vacić, who was previously briefly employed in the Vučić government Office for Kosovo and Metohija in 2016, having before that led another far-right movement Srpski narodni pokret 1389 (Serbian national movement 1389).27 As a notorious right-extremist, he was by virtue of the court decision under police surveillance 2017–2019. Of course, it would not be surprising and worth mentioning, if president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and his brother Andrej were not amongst Vacić’s interlocutors. It was obvious at 2020 elections that Serbian Right enjoys support of the regime, but it cannot manage to cross over election threshold. Nevertheless, Vacić established direct relations with European right-extremists – a former Protestant pastor Jim Dowson, Orange Order, and British National Party, an Italian fascist veteran Roberto Fiore, French Yvan Benedetti, who was expelled from Front National because of anti-Semitism in 2011 (L’Œuvre française), and the Neo-Nazi and forbidden Golden Dawn, amongst others – instead of his supervisor. Roberto Fiore, leader of Forza Nuova, was his host in Rome, and 14

The Serbian far right

Vacić published his speech at his Instagram account. Nonetheless, the most interesting part of the story was his fascist salute to his European comrades (Danas, 2021; Euronews.Serbia, 2021; The Times, 2021). However, the Serbian Right is not the only ostensibly independent organisation that the Vučić regime has created since 2012.28 In particular, it created what must be a unique fan tribe in the history of the world football. The “Grave Diggers,” the supporters of FC Partisan, have been strongly against Aleksandar Vučić, and used to chant: “Vučiću pederu!” (Vučić faggot!). Vučić, a member of the fan tribe “Delije” in his youth, decided to punish them. Therefore, the leaders of various fan tribes, for example Aleksandar Stanković, who was a leader of the “Delije” (FC Crvena Zvezda - Red Star) and Veljko Belivuk, who was a leader of the United Force (FC Rad - Labour), and other similar men were assembled in order to create a new fan tribe that would take over the Partisan stadium from the “Grave Diggers.”29 The newborn fan tribe was named “Janjičari”30 on account of their original affiliation with rivals of FC Partisan.31 Indeed, they were very efficient. Simply put, rival fan tribes of FC Partisan were beaten up and they had to leave the Southern Tribune. Simultaneously, new rulers took over their illegal “businesses.” They also established close connection with the Kavački klan (a Montenegrin drug mafia). At the same time, this fan tribe placed their candidates, e.g., a gendarme Nenad Vučković, who was one of the “Janjičari” leaders, and Goran Colić,32 chief of the Fifth Department of the BIA (state security service) in the administration of FC Partisan in 2014. Novak Nedić, general secretary of the government, member of the Partisan administration, supported such a choice (NIN, 2021; N1, 2021a). Furthermore, the son of the most powerful politician in Serbia has become close friends with some of them, most especially with Aleksandar Vidojević. When Vučić decided to swap the office of prime minister with that of president, they were part of the security service that abused journalists at the Presidential inauguration in 2017 (NIN, 2021). Aleksandar Stanković was killed in a mafia shooting in 2016. His bodyguard, officially employed as a prison guard, was wounded. As an answer to this murder, the Minister of Interior proclaimed war on the mafia. FC Partisan published an obituary of Stanković. Nedić, Colić, and Vučković attended the funeral; and the Partisan football players went out on the football match with t-shirts which had image of him (KRIK, 2016). Veljko Belivuk (Velja the Trouble) took over the leadership of the “Janjičari” until his imprisonment on 4th February 2021. He testified, after imprisonment, that he has allegedly been a member of the Serbian Progressive Party since 2011, and his fan tribe disciplined the Southern Tribune, enabled Pride Parades, provided security service for the regime, and put weapons nearby Vučić’s house in order to inspire media stories about ostensible assassination attempt against Vučić (NIN, 2021). *** One could conclude that the far-right ideology has clearly been very influential on people in Serbia, especially of lower social strata, due to a combination of social and nationalistic demagoguery (Bakić, 2009) since the beginning of the multi-party system and capitalist peripherisation of the country. Harsh anti-communism regularly led to xenophobic nationalism. Certainly, the wars of Yugoslav succession and the decade-long international isolation of Serbia contributed a lot to wide dissemination and deep rootedness of an authoritarian xenophobic nationalism. However, one should notice that some of the leading far-right figures, for example Aleksandar Vučić, pragmatically changed his ideological orientation after almost two decades. Certainly, if European radical-right parties were to become more successful in electoral terms, the Serbian Progressive Party would return to their far-right roots, as close cooperation with the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei and Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán has already shown.33 By the same token, 15

Jovo Bakić

leaders of the football fan-tribes had no difficulties changing the football club which they supported as well as fans whom they lead. As a matter of fact, ideologies, parties, and football club loyalties are easily interchangeable, at least in Serbia. One could argue that authoritarian nativism and massive loyalties that it demands are thick smokescreens for leaders who want to enrich themselves as soon as possible either by means of politics or by crime or both. In a country on the periphery of the world capitalist system the politics and crime are the fastest ways to enrich oneself, and nationalism and football are amongst the most effective means to camouflage one’s motive.

Notes 1 However, there was no Tito or analogous authority figure in the second half of the 1980s capable of stopping the Serbian “anti-bureaucratic revolution” 1987–1988 or other massive nationalist manifestations especially at football stadiums and media (Nielsen, 2010, p. 89). Indeed, besides the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the newspaper “Politika” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 90), the Red Star football club has become “a national symbol par excellence” (Đorđević, 2016, p. 118). 2 Tribe logic demands violence against rival fan tribes and police because of “defense of honour and knightly spirit.” Of course, hierarchical organisational structure and utter obedience to leaders as well as the readiness of fighting more numerous enemies in order to save honour are authoritarian and militant features recognisable in the extreme right (Živanić, 2021, pp. 142–143). 3 SRS has appeared since the Serbian Chetnik Movement, led by Vojislav Šešelj, united with the People’s Radical Party, led by Tomislav Nikolić, in February 1991 (Statute of the SRS, 2015). However, the main role in its formation belonged to Milošević’s State Security Service (Švarm, 2006). 4 Indeed, the title of the party’s main magazine is “Great Serbia.” 5 Chetniks massively slaughtered Muslim civilians in Serbia, Montenegro, and Eastern Bosnia (Dedijer & Miletić, 1990). 6 For instance, MPs were obliged to take an oath in the Church – despite Šešelj’s explicit secularism (Bakić, 2009) – that they will strictly follow the party’s politics and they had to sign a blank resignation form that would be immediately activated in potential cases of disobedience to Šešelj. 7 Arkan “instilled military discipline in the fans’ unruly ranks” and “eliminated the political factionalism that had divided the Delije internally, and which threatened the regime of Slobodan Milošević at a critical juncture.” It is no wonder that, under the auspice of Milošević’s State Security Service, some of the “Delije,” together with some criminals, constituted the core of the “Tigers” (Nielsen, 2010. pp. 90–91; Švarm, 2006). 8 State Security Service made Arkan a short-term MP (1992/1993) from Kosovo in the Serbian Parliament (Švarm, 2006). 9 Of course, “the synergetic nature of organized criminality and the state structure” enabled the utter criminalisation of both Serbian football (Nielsen, 2010. p. 93) and Serbian politics. Šešelj publicly threatened Croats that they will be “slaughtered by rusty spoons”; he fought Parliamentary security officers and insulted other opposition leaders in the Serbian Parliament on regular basis; and the Radicals were most infamously responsible for the expulsion of many Croats from Vojvodina (northern part of Serbia), in general, and from Hrtkovci (a town near the border with Croatia), in particular (Bakić, 2009; Fund for humanitarian law, 2019). After release from the Hague Tribunal, Šešelj showed, quite typical for him, a thorough lack of repentance when he bought a big house in Hrtkovci and painted it in the party’s light blue colour. 10 There were reliable testimonies that some the National Formation members disseminated the magazine of the SRS “Great Serbia” (Velika Srbija) through the streets of Zemun municipality in Belgrade (Bakić, 2009). The Constitutional Court forbade the National Formation because of national and religious intolerance and hatred provocation in 2011 (Radio Free Europe, 2011). Its leader Goran Davidović “Führer” ran away to Italy in order to escape imprisonment because of an attack on antifascists in 2007 (Radio Free Europe, 2020). However, the organisation has just slightly changed its name, and it functions as Srpski nacionalni front (Serbian National Front). 11 Obraz, literally means cheek, and metaphorically honour and dignity. This clero-fascist organisation was forbidden by the Constitutional Court in 2012 on account of national and religious intolerance,

16

The Serbian far right hatred provocation, and brutal violence against police (140 policemen were injured) on the occasion of the 2010 Pride Parade. The leader of Obraz, Mladen Obradović, was sentenced to two years imprisonment (Radio Free Europe, 2012, June 12). However, the organisation has just slightly changed its name, and it functions as Srbski Obraz (Serbian Obraz). After the two organisations were forbidden, an offspring of both organisations appeared; unsatisfied members of both movements, primarily with leaderships of their organisations, have founded Srbska akcija (Serbian Action), which combines the Obraz classical fascist and the Nacionalni stroj national socialist features. 12 Christian Nielsen has described in detail the Uroš Mišić emblematic case of inhuman violence against policeman Nebojša Trajković at Red Star’s stadium. Put briefly, Mišić pushed a torch into the mouths of the policeman, and it was qualified as attempted murder. The hooligan was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, but his fellow-tribesmen launched a campaign “Justice for Uroš,“ and the Supreme Court of Serbia overturned the conviction of Mišić (Nielsen, 2010, p. 95). The Appeals Court finally sentenced the hooligan to five and a half years imprisonment (RTS, 2011), while Nebojša Trajković suffered a life-lasting disability (Radio Free Europe, 2012, December 4). 13 The Serbian Orthodox Church has recognised the social significance of the “Delije’s” loyalty to the Church and one of the main leaders of the “Delije” gave an interview to the main Church journal Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy). In the interview, he said: “Let see who we are and what we are, to what extent we are Serbs, to learn through the people of religion what is Serbdom (…)” (Živanić, 2021, p. 152). Accordingly, Orthodoxy determines the proper nature of Serbdom. 14 Although supporters of a Great Serbia, the “Grave Diggers” fan tribe do not share the view that the Serbs are the oldest nation on Earth and the Balkans natives. However, it seems that there are more atheists, racists and national socialists amongst them than amongst the “Delije” (Pejić, 2021, pp. 173–174). 15 The Serbian Movement “Dveri” (Srpski pokret Dveri), led by former secondary school literature teacher Boško Obradović, is committed to Orthodox Christianity and religiously based moral, defence of patriarchal family, and the consequential moral condemnation of homosexuality. “Dveri” would, like the Putin regime, forbid the Pride Parades for the next 100 years. They used to organise “Family Walks” on the day before “Pride Parades” (Bakić, 2013, pp. 2–3). “Dveri” has promoted anti-immigrant attitude based on Islamophobia since 2015, and explicitly states that Le Pen’s Rassemblement National is a model for the organisation. 16 Yet one should notice that the Chetnik tradition of xenophobic nationalism resembles the SRS’s ideology: “The ‘politics’ of the North [the tribune of the Red Star where the ‘Delije’ rule] is the closest to the Chetnik movement. (…) above parties, pan-Serbian, anti-communist, right, Orthodox, antiCroatian, anti-Muslim, anti-Albanian, movement that defended Serbian interests, and the movement that had precisely determined the organisation (…)” (“Delije” forum, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 154). 17 The Islamophobic attitude of the “Delije” is malign: “No Islam, no problem!” (“Delije” forum, cit. acc. Pejić, 2021, p. 176). “Grave Diggers” are less Islamophobic in comparison with the “Delije,” but one can find inhuman Islamophobic messages as well: “Who will be the second, I will be the first in line to drink Turkish blood?!” (Scream from the South, n.d.). 18 “Any Gypsy has more rights than the Serbs. Roma people are stealing, and children are junkies already when they are 13. They could get houses, I am not against it, but Serbs should be first” (Interview with a leader of “Delije,” cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 147). 19 Anti-Semitism is also recognisable amongst the “United Force,” “Delije,” and “Grave Diggers.” However, the first fan group has it in its ideological core (they believe that the “Zionist Occupation Government” rules the world), while amongst the second and third ones anti-Semitism is a relatively marginal phenomenon (Pejić, 2021, pp. 175–176). 20 For instance, “the UEFA fagots,” “fagots from the West,” “the Red Star fagots,” “Croatian fagots,” “the government fagots,” etc. (Pejić, 2021: 179). 21 Undoubtedly, the most extreme amongst all fan tribes in Serbia. They are typical Neo-Nazis organised in a paramilitary way (Bakić, 2013, p. 4; Pejić, 2021, pp. 174–175). 22 Šešelj was temporarily released from the Hague Tribunal in November 2014, after almost 12 years in prison without verdict (unimaginable in any state that is based on rule of law). Finally, Šešelj was convicted of war crimes and “jailed” for ten years in 2018, but he had already served more time in the Hague Tribunal prison. 23 The Serbian Progressive Party became associate member of the European People’s Party in 2013 (Tanjug, 2013, April 24). 24 At the March 2014 elections SRS participated in a coalition with two other extreme right movements, “Srbski Obraz” and “Naši” (a local extreme right organisation from the small town of Aranđelovac,

17

Jovo Bakić infamous for its incidents at public events with liberal participants), and achieved the worst election result in its history. The main reason for such a bad result was the lack of any charismatic person in the leadership of the coalition. 25 One of the closest associates of Aleksandar Vučić. At the time, he was Mayor of Belgrade, and later he became Minister of Finance. 26 Commander of the Gendermary unit, which legitimised Aleksandar Vučić’s son Danilo, testified before the Court that Danilo Vučić was together with United Force. He also said that Andrej Vučić hit small plastic bottle on a gendarm. The Commander was immediately replaced, and soon retired. Seven gendarmes were dismissed (Birn.rs, 2020). 27 Miša Vacić was sentenced before 2012 on account of the LGBT population discrimination and unallowed owning of weapons. “1389” tried to merge with “Naši” (Ours), but the new organisation was stillborn. 28 The Vučić regime has founded Levijatan (Leviatan), a movement ostensibly interested in animal protection, while it disseminates violent anti-Gypsism and the Islamophobia based anti-immigration attitude. Levijatan is led by Pavle Bihali; ironically, he is grandson of Pavle Bihali, a Jew and founder of the famous publishing house “Nolit,” who was killed by the Gestapo, while the grandson claims that the communists shot his grandfather (Koreni, 2018). By the same token, the regime founded Narodne patrole (People’s Patrols), a far-right movement led by Damnjan Knežević, especially engaged in the anti-immigration violent activities (N1, 2021b). The regime founded GONGOs, amongst others Nacionalna avangarda (National Vanguard), ideological follower of far-right ideologue Guillaume Fei and his Archeofuturism (Manifest Nacionalne Avangarde, n.d.). 29 Aleksandar Stanković alias Sale Mutavi (Sale the Mute) was sentenced to five years in prison because of drug dealing and other crimes, but he was not sent to prison. He escaped it thanks to 12 medical exemptions (KRIK, 2016). 30 Jan(j)ičari (Turkish yeniçeri), literally new army, was Ottoman infantry, conscripted from originally Christian children who were taken from their families (devshirme), converted to Islam, and trained for military service. The most brilliant of them became high officials of the Ottoman Empire. 31 As an older “Delija” notices: “Leaders of the Zvezda and Partisan (fan tribes, JB) seat together in a café and talk about tomorrow’s match. They are together in business. Mainly drugs” (Interview, cit. acc. Živanić, 2021, p. 140). 32 Goran Colić has a rather confident and important roles. For instance, he was one of the two agents who walked narco-boss Darko Šarić from the plane, and he walked Vojislav Šešelj as well, when he arrived from the Hague Tribunal. Fifth Department is in charge of counter-intelligence protection of President of Republic and other highest state institutions as well as BIA itself (N1, 2021a). 33 Indeed, Goran Davidović Führer came back to Serbia, after the Court of Appeal abolished judgment. Moreover, he was guest at a TV-station with national frequency (Radio Free Europe, 2020).

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The Serbian far right Euronews.Serbia. (2021, June 05). Miša Vacić fašističkim gestom pozdravio učesnike skupa u Rimu (Miša Vacić’s fascist salute of the participants at the meeting in Rome). Available online: https:// www.euronews.rs/srbija/politika/3456/misa-vacic-fasistickim-gestom-pozdravio-ucesnikeskupa-u-rimu-popov-sve-sto-je-radio-proslo-je-bez-sankcija/vest Fund for humanitarian law (Fond za humanitarno pravo). (2019). Dosije: Zločini nad Hrvatima u Vojvodini (Dossier: Crimes against Croats in Vojvodina). Available online: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/05/Dosije_Hrvati_u_Vojvodini_BHS.pdf Gayecho. (2011, November 18). Gej parada 2001. – izveštaji medija i reagovanja Gej parada 2001. – izveštaji medija i reagovanja (Gay Parade 2001 – Media reports and reactions). Available online: http://www.gayecho.com/aktivizam.aspx?id=3215 Insajder. (2018, December 19). Firma iza koje stoji vođa navijača Zvezde zajedno s gradskom firmom dobila posao od EPS-a (A firm behind which stands a leader of the Zvezda fans together with a city firm made a deal with the EPS). Available online: https://insajder.net/arhiva/tema/firma-iza-kojestoji-voda-navijaca-zvezde-zajedno-s-gradskom-firmom-dobila-posao-od-eps-a Insajder.net. (2016, May 24). Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bs0l10o6lLY Koreni. (2018, October 5). Dedu su mi streljali pre skoro 80 godina, a sada ga ubija zaborav (The grandfather was shot before almost 80 years, while he has been killed by oblivion today). Available online: https://www.koreni.rs/dedu-su-mi-streljali-pre-skoro-80-godina-a-sada-ga-ubija-zaborav/ KRIK. (2016, December 12). Sud Saletu Mutavom 12 puta odložio zatvor (The Court postponed jail to Sale the Mute 12 times). Available online: https://www.krik.rs/sud-saletu-mutavom-12-puta-odlozio-zatvor/ KRIK. (2018, June 19). S kim je predsednikov sin navijao (With whom did president’s son cheer). Available online: https://www.krik.rs/s-kim-je-predsednikov-sin-navijao/ KRIK. (2020, May 05). Rat balkanskog podzemlja: Ubistva, veze u policiji i u vrhu države (War in the Balkans’ underground: Murders, police connections, and connections to top of the state). Available online: https://www.krik.rs/rat-balkanskog-podzemlja-ubistva-veze-u-policiji-i-u-vrhu-drzave/ Manifest Nacionalne avangarde. (n.d.). (The National Vanguard Manifesto). Available online: https:// www.nacionalnaavangarda.rs/o-nama/ Marshall, T. (2019). Shadowplay: Behind the lines and under fire: The inside story of Europe’s Last War. Elliott & Thompson Ltd. Mills, R. (2018). The politics of football in Yugoslavia: Sport, nationalism and the state. I.B.Tauris&Co. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. CUP. N1. (2021a). NIN: Janjičar iz BIA – veze tajne službe i huligana (NIN: A BIA’s Janičar – Connections between secret service and hooligans). Available online: https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/nin-o-vezama-tajne-sluzbei-huligana/ N1. (2021b). Crtaju mete, ometaju novinare – ko su Narodne patrole i zašto ih vlast ‘ne vidi’ (Painting targets, disturbing journalists – Who are the People’s Patrols and why the government ‘does not notice them’). Available online: https://rs.n1info.com/vesti/crtaju-mete-ometaju-novinare-ko-su-narodnepatrole-i-zasto-ih-vlast-ne-vidi/ Nielsen, A. (2010). The goalposts of transition: Football as a metaphor for Serbia’s long journey to the rule of law. Nationalities Papers, 38(1), 87–103. NIN. (2021, July 29). Šokiranje javnosti kao krizni menadžment (Shocking the public as crisis management). NIN. (2022, March 03). Ko je glavni šef (Who is main boss). NovaS. (2021, December 04). Dok Vučić skandira sa navijačima, Ultra kop dobija poslove (Vučić chants with fans, Ultra kop wins a deal). Available online: https://nova.rs/vesti/hronika/dok-vucic-skandirasa-navijacima-ultra-kop-dobija-poslove/ Pejić, I. (2021). Navijačke grupe kao regrutna baza ekstremne desnice (Fan groups as a conscription basis of the extreme right). In J. Bakić (Ed.), Istraživanja nacionalizma u Srbiji početkom 21. veka: radovi mlađe generacije sociologa (Researches of nationalism in Serbia at the beginning of the 21st century: Studies of the younger sociologist generation). Faculty of Philosophy and Dosije. Radio Free Europe. (2011, June 02). Zabranjeno delovanje “Nacionalnog stroja” (“National Formation” has been forbidden). Available online: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija_desnicarske_ organizacije_nacionalni_stroj/24213798.html Radio Free Europe. (2012, December 4). Trajković: Mišić nagrađen, ja invalid (Trajković: Mišić awarded, I am invalid). Available online: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/uros-misic-na-slobodi/24789377. html

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Jovo Bakić Radio Free Europe. (2012, June 12). Ustavni sud Srbije zabranio “Obraz” (The Constitutional Court of Serbia has forbidden “Obraz”). Available online: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/zabranjenobraz/24611790.html Radio Free Europe. (2020, February 11). ‘Firer’ na nacionalnoj frekvenciji (Führer at the national frequency). Available online: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/goran-davidovic-ponovo-u-srbiji-/ 30429149.html RTS. (2011, May 04). Pravosnažna presuda Urošu Mišiću (Uroš Mišić’s final verdict). Available online: https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/135/hronika/886310/pravosnazna-presuda-urosu-misicu. html Scream from the South. (n.d.). Available online: https://partizan.net/pesme/prilika.htm Statute of the SRS (2015). Available online: http://www.nova1.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/wp-content// uploads/2015/04/StatutSRS.pdf Švarm, F. (2006). Jedinica (Unit), Vreme i B92. Available online: https://web.archive.org/web/20070518234849/ http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/istrazuje.php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&nav_id=211418 Tanjug. (2013, April 24). SNS becomes a member of European People’s Party. Available online: http:// www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=85864 The Times. (2021, March 23). How Europe’s far-right found friends in Serbia: The Serbian president is accused of using activists to silence opponents. Available online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ serbian-president-vucic-regularly-spoke-to-leader-of-violent-far-right-group-mp-claims-r8m35kbnd Vrcan, S. (2002). The curious drama of the president of a Republic versus a football fan tribe: A symptomatic case in the post-communist transition in Croatia. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 37(1), 59–77. Vreme. (2021). (Serbian weekly Time). Documentation Centre. Available online: https://www.vreme. com/vreme/kako-smo-birali/ Živanić, J. (2021). Organizacija i ideološko usmerenje navijačke grupe “Delije” (Organisation and ideology of the fan-group “Delije”). In J. Bakić (Ed.), Istraživanja nacionalizma u Srbiji početkom 21. veka: radovi mlađe generacije sociologa (Researches of nationalism in Serbia at the beginning of the 21st century: Studies of the younger sociologist generation). Faculty of Philosophy and Dosije.

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2 THE FAR RIGHT IN UKRAINE Tamta Gelashvili

Introduction The Ukrainian far right has been overexposed and understudied: while attracting a lot of media attention, the movement has rarely been subject to as much academic inquiry as its Western European counterparts. In 2019, reports highlighted a black metal festival in Kyiv that gathered far-right activists from Ukraine and beyond (Hume, 2019). During the Russian invasion, first in 2014 and again in 2022, many worried about the country becoming an attraction for foreign fighters, including extremist activists (Harp, 2022; Rose & Soufan, 2020).1 Russian official sources and state-affiliated media have gone even further, labelling Ukraine as a whole as a “fascist state” whenever parties in power expressed aspirations for a pro-Western foreign policy. Ironically, however, the Ukrainian far right has always lacked access to decision-making institutions, only once managing to overcome the electoral barrier. For this reason, literature on the far right – mostly focusing on Western far-right parties that have achieved considerable electoral success – has paid relatively limited attention to Ukraine and its extra-parliamentary far-right movement (cf. Castelli Gattinara, 2020). As a result, empirical research on the movement has been lacking (Umland, 2020).2 This chapter aims to take a close look at the contemporary Ukrainian far right. Under the right, the chapter presupposes the political wing that sees inequality or hierarchy amongst people as natural, inescapable, or unproblematic, in contrast with the political left wing that perceives social inequality as unnatural and problematic (Bobbio, 1996). As for the far right, the chapter refers to actors with nativist and authoritarian views, or those who prioritise the narrowly defined “native” people or ideas over “foreign” people or ideas, and those who believe in the strict, authoritarian social order, where any deviation from the norm is to be punished harshly (Carter, 2018; Mudde, 2019). The chapter makes three main arguments. First, it argues that to understand the contemporary Ukrainian far right, one needs to look into the historical legacy of the interwar Ukrainian far right. The historical roots of the movement help explain how its ideology has developed over time, as well as how it engages in both conventional and contentious politics to this day. In addition, this legacy explains how other actors relate to the far right, both in Ukraine and beyond. DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-4

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Second, the chapter argues that while belonging to the far-right political family, the Ukrainian far right also stands out from the far right in other countries. This is evident in both its organisational characteristics and its ideology. Third, while the Ukrainian far right has attracted much media attention, the chapter argues that the movement is louder in words than in action. As the subsequent discussion will show, the Ukrainian far right has been excluded from formal political processes for years, limiting its participation to street-level politics. Moreover, an empirical examination of the movement’s activities over the years shows that even on the street level, the movement has mostly been peaceful. The chapter is structured as follows: it starts with a review of the historical roots of contemporary far right, showing how its ideology is rooted in its controversial history. Next, the chapter delves into the contemporary far-right movement, looking at politically marginal groups and subcultures and the more prominent and publicly active parties. Finally, the chapter discusses the political participation of the Ukrainian far right, in terms of both conventional and contentious politics.

Historical roots of contemporary Ukrainian far right: Legacy of OUN-UPA The roots of contemporary Ukrainian far right go back to the 1920s–1930s. In 1929, émigré activists established the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Vienna. The OUN was created on the basis of the paramilitary Ukrainian Military Organization, small nationalist groups and right-wing intellectuals (Shkandrij, 2015). The ideology of OUN was grounded in Western Ukrainian (Galician) nationalism, often hostile to Poles, Russians, and Jews: Poles were perceived as the dominant group in the Western part of modern-day Ukraine, associated with political and cultural elites trying to polonise Ukrainians, while Russians were resented as the dominant group in the East, associated with the russification of Ukrainians. Jews, on the other hand, were considered agents of either Polish or Russian elites, helping to subjugate and exploit Ukrainian peasants (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Shkandrij, 2015). In the interwar period, OUN embraced a radical course of action, including violence and political assassinations, and aimed at establishing an independent Ukraine, with Moscow and Soviet Communism seen as primary obstacles to this aim (Shekhovtsov, 2011; Shkandrij, 2015). In 1940, the OUN split due to internal conflict between moderate and radical factions: the former, OUN-M was led by Andriy Mel’nyk, while the latter, OUN-B (sometimes referred to as OUN-R) was led by Stepan Bandera (Umland & Yurchuk, 2020). In 1941, OUN activists created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (Shkandrij, 2015). During World War II, UPA was involved in armed confrontation against both Nazi and Soviet forces and is infamous for mass atrocities against Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians who opposed it. Examples include Lviv pogroms of 1941 that killed thousands of Jews and the Volhynian massacres of 1943–1945 (with numbers of victims estimated between 70,000 and 100,000 people) (Himka, 2011; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Shekhovtsov, 2011; Shkandrij, 2015; Snyder, 2003; Motyka, 2022). The UPA continued to fight against the Soviet regime until the 1950s, when many of its leaders were either arrested or forced to emigrate (Shekhovtsov, 2011). To this day, OUN remains controversial. As Gomza (2015, p.195) argues, “memorial hindrance” has divided scholarship and historiography on the OUN: on one hand, the organisation is seen as fascist and terrorist, guilty of Nazi collaboration and mass atrocities, while on the other, it is glorified as a representation of heroic struggle for independence. This dual view of OUN has been prevalent throughout the post-war period and continues to influence its perception in Ukraine and abroad (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014). 22

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Given that the organisation itself was far from uniform and stable, its ideology was also dynamic (Gomza, 2015; Motyl, 1980). In its early days, OUN was fascist in character, combining ideas of eugenics and national rebirth, an economic “third way” beyond liberalism and communism, and glorification of violence as a means of achieving a new political order (Gomza, 2015; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Rudling, 2019). The goal was to liberate “Ukrainian masses” from “occupiers” (primarily Poland and the Soviet Union), with Jews, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians unsupportive of OUN’s vision perceived as the main enemies (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014, pp. 67–68). A prominent ideologue at the time, Dmytro Dontsov, saw the Ukrainian nation as part of the European civilisation which faced existential threats from Russia and advocated revolutionary nationalism (Shekhovtsov, 2011). He had translated and published works and biographies of Mussolini and Hitler in Ukrainian, as well as simplified the works of Nietzsche and other philosophers to justify violent means to achieve Ukrainian statehood (Motyl, 1980; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Shkandrij, 2015). The fascist inclinations of OUN even went as far as to include efforts to collaborate with Nazi Germany. Over several years, OUN had close links with German authorities, especially the intelligence services (Berkhoff & Carynnyk, 1999). Germany was long seen as an ally against both Polish and Soviet oppression (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014). In 1941, OUN-B declared independence of Ukraine, hoping to achieve liberation from the Soviet regime with the assistance of Germany (Rudling, 2012; Shekhovtsov, 2011). These hopes were shortlived, however, as Nazi authorities demanded OUN-B leader Stepan Bandera and his deputy Yaroslav Stets’ko to withdraw the declaration (Berkhoff & Carynnyk, 1999; RossolinskiLiebe, 2014). Upon their refusal, both leaders were arrested by the security service and moved to a concentration camp until 1944 (Berkhoff & Carynnyk, 1999). While Bandera and Stets’ko were arrested, parts of the OUN underwent an ideological transformation: the Third Congress of OUN-B in 1943 marked a desire to shift away from revolutionary ideas towards a more democratic vision (Gomza, 2015). Other parts of the organisation, committed to Bandera and Stets’ko, protested this shift, arguing that it constituted merely an imitation of Western values. The release of the two leaders from prison exacerbated this conflict between revisionists and anti-revisionists. The latter argued for a superficial modernisation, implying that the internal ideology of OUN would remain unchanged, while its external face would be more democratised and liberal in order to attract supporters post– World War II (Gomza, 2015). The revisionists refused to accept this, and the conflict brought another split to OUN, this time with the formation of OUN-Z (OUN Abroad) (Shekhovtsov, 2011). Thus, by the 1950s, OUN-UPA had disintegrated into the moderate OUN-M, radical OUN-B, and more liberal OUN-Z. These internal divisions are, however, glossed over in the conflicting narratives about OUN, from the Soviet period onwards. On one hand, both Soviet and post-Soviet political elites saw Ukrainian nationalism as a threat to the pan-Slavic, Russophile identity and branded it uniformly fascist to degrade its political importance (Hurska, 2014; Shkandrij, 2015). Soviet authorities constructed a simplified narrative not only on OUN, but also on Ukrainian nationalists in general, many of whom were critical of OUN and its authoritarian ideology (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Shkandrij, 2015). Instead, in Soviet narratives, any and all forms of not only Ukrainian nationalism, but also Ukrainian anti-Soviet resistance were branded as fascist and “squeezed into the swear-word banderovtsy (Banderites) which denoted the real or alleged members, followers, or admirers of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet movement” (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017, pp.117–118; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014). These narratives were part of a cult of World War II in Soviet imagery, focusing on the struggle against and victory over fascism (Luxmoore, 2019; Tumarkin, 2003). They found 23

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continuation and expansion in post-independence Russia and especially under Putin’s presidency: pro-regime movements cultivated the image of the West and its sympathisers within and beyond Russia as parts of a larger “fascist” threat against Russia, drawing parallels with Nazi threats against the Soviet Union (Luxmoore, 2019). This equation of any and all forms of Ukrainian nationalism with fascism was reactivated in Russian narratives about the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan Revolution, and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2004, Russian political strategists involved in the electoral campaign of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych brought back the narratives of “anti-fascism” to discredit his pro-Western opponent Viktor Yushchenko (Horvath, 2011). In Russia, the Orange Revolution sparked the creation of a pro-regime “anti-Orange” movement that called itself “antifascist” and vowed to protect Russia from a domination of fascist elites coming to power through Colour Revolutions (Luxmoore, 2019). Similar narratives appeared in 2014. When then-president Yanukovych’s refusal to sign Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU sparked large-scale protests on Kyiv’s Maidan square and beyond and culminated in Yanukovych’s overthrow, Russian officials and stateaffiliated media spoke of a “fascist coup” in Kyiv (Wilson, 2014). Regime supporters in Russia, representing themselves as “anti-Maidan,” called on Ukrainians to condemn the “fascist plague seizing power in Kiev” (Luxmoore, 2019, p.830). Likewise, during the 2022 Russian invasion in Ukraine, Russian official sources and state media again invoked the image of the fascist enemy: Putin claimed that the aim of the “special military operation” was to “de-nazify” Ukraine through military force (Savchuk, 2022). On the other hand, the historiography from OUN proponents only published sources that projected a positive image of OUN and constructed the cult of Bandera, representing him as a martyr, a “national hero and … a romantic revolutionary” (Berkhoff & Carynnyk, 1999; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014, p. 22). Despite ideological disputes, different factions of OUN were committed to constructing a history of OUN as that of heroic struggle and resistance, downplaying the fascist parts of its ideology, its relationship with Nazi authorities, and its role in political violence (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014; Rudling, 2012; Shkandrij, 2015). As resistance against Soviet oversimplification of history, the nostalgic historiography of OUN remains “a profoundly anti-Soviet and anti-imperial act” (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017, p.117) beyond OUN supporters as well. This nostalgic view of wartime nationalism is not limited to OUN-supporters or to Ukraine. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states started constructing national identities to distance themselves from the Soviet legacy (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017). For many, “the victory over Nazism marked, above all, the renewal or beginning of their occupation, repression, colonisation, and/or domination by Moscow” (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017, p. 117). As a result, the historiography of the newly independent states often invigorated a whitewashed memory of wartime nationalist movements (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017). In Ukraine, too, the independence movement in the late 1980s and the nation-building narratives post-independence stressed the OUN’s struggle for independence in the interwar and post–World War II period, glossing over its violent activities (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017). These historiographic accounts emphasised the decades-long struggle against the Soviet Union and then Russia, seen as a continuous hindrance to Ukrainian independence (Shkandrij, 2015). After the Orange Revolution in 2004, memory politics associated with OUN and UPA were revitalised even more: the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, set up in 2006, was tasked with researching the history of OUN-UPA and its struggles for Ukrainian independence 24

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but “precluded, ignored, downplayed, and/or dismissed research that would contradict this shiny image” (Umland & Yurchuk, 2017, p.121; Rudling, 2012). Downplaying the antiPolish and anti-Semitic parts of their history, the memory politics stressed the heroic resistance of OUN-UPA to Soviet rule (Rudling, 2012). The image of OUN-UPA was reinvigorated during 2013–2014 Maidan Revolution too, when protesters used symbols associated with the nationalist movements of the 20th century, including the UPA red-black flag symbolising blood and soil and the OUN-associated greeting “Slava Ukrayini! Heroyam Slava” (Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!) (Kaniewski, 2018). After Maidan and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine, when Russia annexed Southeastern regions of Crimea and Donbas as a response to what it labelled as a “fascist coup” in Kyiv, the greeting “Slava Ukrayini” acquired a new meaning: rather than denoting sympathy for nationalist or far-right actors, the greeting became a marker of support towards democracy and Ukraine’s Western aspirations, as well as resistance against Russian occupation. AntiSoviet symbols were revived to denote resistance to Russia and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, including not only the Yanukovych government, but also the Russia-backed separatists and Russian forces in Southeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces fighting in Southeastern Ukraine were seen as continuing the independence struggle of OUN-UPA (Umland & Yurchuk, 2020). In 2018, the greeting became an official slogan of the Ukrainian armed forces (Kaniewski, 2018). After the Russian invasion in 2022, the greeting could be heard in demonstrations to support Ukraine inside the country and abroad. The mainstreaming of previously OUN/UPA-associated symbols played into the Kremlin’s official narratives, as Putin accused the Ukrainian state of being “fascist” (Savchuk, 2022). However, as the next sections will demonstrate, the Ukrainian far right is not remotely as successful as these narratives might suggest. In fact, the far right in Ukraine has been excluded from the formal political sphere for decades. However misleading the Kremlin narratives may be, they do seem to feed into the anti-Russian ideology of the Ukrainian far right. Although belonging to the far-right political family in terms of nativist and authoritarian inclinations, the Ukrainian far right stands out as distinctively anti-Russian3 in its words and action, as the subsequent discussion will show.

The Ukrainian far right today The Ukrainian far right today includes several different types of organisations – from informal and subcultural groups to paramilitary organisations and political parties – most of which claim to continue the legacy of OUN-UPA in one form or another. This section describes the movement and its characteristics in more detail, elaborating on different types of groups depicted in Figure 2.1.

Extreme right groups and subcultures The contemporary Ukrainian far right is largely an extra-parliamentary phenomenon. It mostly consists of extreme right groups, including paramilitary organisations and subcultural groups that have little to no electoral ambition. Most of these actors refuse to register as formal organisations, let alone contest elections, or cooperate with mainstream political parties. Perhaps the oldest group in the extra-parliamentary arena is Patriot of Ukraine, founded in the 1990s as a youth wing of SNPU (known as the Freedom party since 2004). Due to its extreme right ideology, the group actively opposed SNPU’s rebranding campaign into a more moderate Freedom in 2004 and its decision to dissolve the paramilitary youth wing 25

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26 Figure 2.1  The roots and contemporary manifestations of the Ukrainian far right.4 Source: Compiled by the author.

The far right in Ukraine

(Likhachev, 2013). Later on, however, PU activists helped establish other far-right groups, including the Social-National Assembly, founded in 2008, and the paramilitary Azov movement, founded in 2014 (Iovenko, 2015; Nonjon, 2021). Another group with a relatively long history is Trident, also formed in the 1990s. Compared to other extreme right groups that clearly endorse racism and violence, Trident has been more moderate and can more aptly be seen as a subcultural group; most of its activity has been centred around sports education, aiming to encourage “militant and patriotic spirit” in young Ukrainians (Likhachev, 2015, p. 261). Out of more recently emerging groups, a notorious actor is Sich (C-14), founded in early 2010s. The group attracted wide public attention in 2018, when it attacked a Roma camp near Kyiv (Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019; Gorbach, 2018). Another one is Tradition and Order, a group that mostly mobilises against feminist and LGBTQ+ activism (Gorbach, 2018). In addition, the extra-parliamentary arena includes numerous small groups, like White Hammer, Wotan Jugend, Sokil, and Sober and Angry Youth, amongst others (Hurska, 2014; Likhachev, 2015, 2019). Instead of organising rallies or engaging in other overtly political activities, some of these groups focus more on organising sports trainings and cultural events, like concerts and festivals (Colborne, 2020; Likhachev, 2013). Along with building networks, sports and culture have been shown to help Ukrainian far-right actors expand their support base (Nonjon, 2021; Polyakova, 2014). However, this promotion of sports and culture is not entirely divorced from politics: while endorsing a healthy way of life, these groups have also been associated with hate crimes against minorities, including immigrants and LGBTQ+ community (Likhachev, 2013, 2015). Some activists in the movement associate the commitment to purity of body (smoking-, alcohol- and drug-free lifestyle) to purity of the environment (environmental activism), as well as the society at large, which often translates into nativist attitudes against immigrants, minorities, and the homeless (Likhachev, 2013). Due to their focus on physical strength and acceptance of violence, these groups are sometimes also employed as paid thugs, hired by influential business owners to defend commercial interests (Likhachev, 2019). While attracting occasional media attention, most of these groups lack access to political processes and decision making.

Far-right parties In contrast with these extreme right groups, the Ukrainian far-right scene also includes parties that have expressed clear electoral ambitions. Contemporary far-right parties are rooted in the nationalist scene of the early independence period that tried to connect itself to the legacy of the OUN-UPA to gain legitimacy in the public eye. Sharing a nativist and authoritarian ideology, the prominent far-right parties of the 1990s – the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU, later renamed as Freedom), the Nationalist Union Ukrainian State Independence (DSU), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN), and the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) – focused on revolutionary ideas and opposition to democracy (Shekhovtsov, 2013). These actors’ claims to continuing the OUN-UPA legacy were mostly founded in their antiRussian ideology. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, anti-Soviet ideas of the Ukrainian far right were transformed into anti-Russian ideas, as Russia was seen as a successor of the Soviet Union and a continued hindrance to a strong, independent Ukraine. SNPU (later renamed Freedom) saw Russia as “the cause of all Ukraine’s woes” (Likhachev, 2013, p.69). In some cases, the anti-Russian attitude also involved opposition to ethnic Russians: for example, the program of the Fewer Words bloc of two far-right parties for the 1998 elections 27

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saw the Ukrainian nation as the “biologically superior … root of the white race,” in contrast with Russians, a “non-formed nation” and an “Asiatic Horde” (Likhachev, 2013, p.69; Iovenko, 2015). However, these attitudes did not gain much resonance; indeed, far-right parties have remained electorally marginal for decades. Unable to consolidate as a strong political force, far-right parties instead succumbed to internal disagreements. Over time, most of these parties became irrelevant and stopped contesting elections altogether, with the exception of SNPU. SNPU was founded in 1991 on the basis of several student- and youth organisations. In 2004, it went through a rebranding campaign, changing its name to Freedom as well as its logo and electing a new leader, but retaining a largely unchanged party programme (Polyakova, 2014). To this day, Freedom is arguably the most prominent far-right party in Ukraine. Freedom’s program refers to OUN-B leader Yaroslav Stetsko’s thesis on Two Revolutions as its ideological foundation (Ghosh, 2012). In interviews, its leader Oleh Tyahnybok stresses that the Ukrainian nation is a “union of blood and spirit” and brings forward the idea of a national revolution (Ghosh, 2012, p.7). Freedom’s program proposes legal preferential treatment for ethnic Ukrainians in different areas of life (Ghosh, 2012; Polyakova, 2014) and opposes migration to Ukraine. Until recently, Right Sector was also one of the most visible far-right parties. Established in late 2013 by far-right activists from different groupuscules, including the Patriot of Ukraine, Trident, Social-National Assembly, Sich, and White Hammer (Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2018), it later registered as a political party and participated in elections, only to fail to overcome the electoral barrier. The party’s founding leader Dmytro Yarosh has argued that to build the Ukrainian state, a “national revolution” under the leadership of the OUN was necessary (Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2018). Quick to rise to prominence after Maidan, not least because of the disproportionate media attention, Right Sector likewise quickly disappeared from limelight after its failed bid in the 2019 elections (Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019, p.11). Another prominent far-right party, National Corps, was formed as a political party wing of the Azov Movement (Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019). Azov was founded in the wake of the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014; its founders included members of two far-right groups, Patriot of Ukraine and Social-National Assembly (Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2018). The aim was to participate in armed conflict against Russia-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine (Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019). Although the war with Russia prompted many far-right organisations to create volunteer armed units (e.g., Freedom’s Ukrainian Legion and Right Sector’s Ukrainian Voluntary Corps), Azov stood out amongst them. Over time, the movement attracted more members and, after successful military operations, became part of the Ukrainian National Guard in late 2014 (Likhachev, 2019). Its political party wing, formed in 2015 as a potential meeting point for Azov veterans, later developed into a regular political party (Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019).

Comparison with other far-right movements While belonging to the far-right political family, the Ukrainian far right also has organisational characteristics and ideology that makes it stand out from other far-right movements. First, Ukrainian far-right actors blur the boundary between extreme and radical right: in general, literature on the far right often distinguishes between the extreme right that rejects democracy and endorses violent methods towards revolutionary change, and the radical right that may criticise liberal democracy and the protection of minority rights but does not question 28

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democracy as such (Mudde, 2019). Indeed, radical right actors operate within the established democratic constitutional order by, e.g., contesting elections and using conventional political means. While this line between extreme and radical right is pronounced in far-right movements across (Western) Europe and beyond (Minkenberg, 2019), in Ukraine, it is often less clear. This was characteristic of the far-right parties of the 1990s, as well as Freedom, National Corps, and Right Sector. They combine characteristics of both extreme and radical right. On one hand, they ostensibly accept the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional order by contesting elections and participating in democratic processes; they do not reject formal politics, as some extreme right groups do. On the other hand, their ideology also incorporates revolutionary ideas and an open aspiration towards strong leadership. They also do not shy away from violent tactics. In addition to organisational characteristics, the Ukrainian far right also stands out due to its ideology. As the next sections will show, the Ukrainian far right is strongly anti-Russian, opposing not only Russia as an actor that interferes in Ukraine’s affairs, but also Ukrainian policymakers and public officials perceived as pro-Russian. Because of its ideology, the Ukrainian far right also stands out with its attitudes towards sovereignty. Clearly, perceived threats to sovereignty and national identity mobilise the far right across countries (Umland, 2013), but in Ukraine, these threats have materialised in Russian invasion, in both 2014 and 2022. These threats to Ukrainian sovereignty increase the salience of supranational organisations associated with national security guarantees: while Western European far right leaders and parties are critical to EU and NATO and the yielding of state sovereignty to supranational organisations, the Ukrainian far right is ambivalent or positive to those (Shekhovtsov and Umland, 2014). Indeed, some far-right groups see membership in these organisations as necessary to overcome the legacy of the Soviet past and distance Ukraine from Russian influence (Ghosh, 2012). The strong anti-Russian component in the ideology of the Ukrainian far right has even tainted its relations with far-right actors in other countries. The cooperation between the Ukrainian far right and its Western counterparts goes back to the 1990s, when SNPU became a member of now-dissolved EURONAT, a loose association of nationalist parties in Europe (Hurska, 2014; Iovenko, 2015). Through EURONAT, SNPU established contacts with the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party, both of which apparently influenced its rebranding campaign into Freedom in 2004 (Hurska, 2014; Iovenko, 2015). Freedom has also participated in a number of far-right events beyond Ukraine, like the “Vision Europe” conference in Sweden, a Fiamma Tricolore conference in Italy, and a conference of the Alliance of European National Movements (Hurska, 2014). However, Ukrainian and Western farright paths diverged after many European far-right parties made Russia-friendly statements following the 2014 war. In an official letter, Freedom expressed its disappointment in the European far right being under the influence of the Russian state propaganda (Hurska, 2014). The anti-Russian attitude does not mean unequivocal support to the EU, however. Similarly to the far right in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the Ukrainian far right is euro-sceptical, but only in the sense that democratisation and European integration are associated with policy gains for minority groups that the far right opposes. For example, ethnic minority and LGBTQ+ rights are often seen as imposed upon the country through European integration (Polyakova, 2012; Bustikova, 2019). This is due to the far right in Central and Eastern Europe arising in distinct historical circumstances, in the context of “multiple modernization” after the fall of the Soviet Union (Minkenberg, 2017, p.386). This process included economic transition to capitalism, political transition towards democracy, and concurrent processes of state- and nation-building. 29

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In many countries of the region, the democratisation process awakened nationalist sentiments, as the far right associated it with increased policy gains for minorities (see Polyakova, 2012; Bustikova, 2019). However, as the next sections will show, in contrast with many CEE countries, Ukrainian far right parties have mostly been excluded from electoral politics and have limited their political participation to street-level rallies.

Modus operandi Conventional politics In terms of electoral politics, the Ukrainian far right has been marginal for decades. Although far-right activists have been elected to parliament as parts other party lists or single-member districts from time to time, far-right parties continuously fail to overcome electoral threshold, rarely getting more than 3% of the vote (Mierzejewski-Voznyak, 2018; Polyakova, 2014). The only exception was the 2012 parliamentary elections, when Freedom obtained 10.4% of votes, becoming the first far-right party to enter the Ukrainian parliament independently (Shekhovtsov, 2015). However, this success was attributed to a unique constellation of factors, mainly stemming from the polarisation between pro-Russian and pro-Western camps in Ukrainian politics at the time. Within a few years after the Orange Revolution in 2004, the pro-Western coalition elected after the revolution had split, while the pro-Russian camp, dominated by the Party of Regions, had utilised this conflict and indirectly supported Freedom to divide the pro-Western (or rather, the anti-Russian) vote (Umland, 2020). A survey of Freedom sympathisers before the elections showed that their support was rooted not in far-right ideology (nativist and authoritarian attitudes), but rather in perceived threats to Ukrainian sovereignty stemming from Russia and the pro-Russian policies of the Ukrainian President, as well as disappointment with mainstream parties and their voters (Bustikova, 2015). In subsequent elections, Freedom lost its mobilising strength: the pro-Russian camp dissolved, and the party lost monopoly on fervent patriotism (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Once the unique set of supporting factors was no longer in place, Freedom’s vote share almost halved (Bustikova, 2015; Gorbach, 2018; Shekhovtsov, 2015). In both 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections, Freedom failed to overcome the electoral barrier, despite its cooperation with two other far-right parties, National Corps and Right Sector. Even though the Ukrainian far right is not nearly as powerful as the Russian state narratives might suggest, the electoral marginality does not translate into political irrelevance (cf. Minkenberg, 2017). The conventional politics-centred approach in the studies of the far right globally and in Ukraine has been strongly criticised, and scholars have called for more attention towards extra-parliamentary politics (Castelli Gattinara, 2020; Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019; Ishchenko, 2018). To understand the role and impact of the far-right movement, the next section elaborates more on the extra-parliamentary activities of the Ukrainian far right.

Contentious politics While marginal in electoral terms, the Ukrainian far right has been active on the streets. The following section analyses the contentious political action of the movement in recent years, based on an empirical study of far-right protest events in Ukraine (Gelashvili, 2022).5,6 30

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The study shows that the movement has organised a total of 560 events since the 2004 Orange Revolution until the end of 2020. These events can be divided into 5 different categories:

• • • •

conventional events, such as press conferences; confrontational events, such as barricades, blockades, or squatting; demonstrative events, such as rallies or performances; light violence, including symbolic violence against material objects, like demolishing statues, splashing buildings with paint, or burning effigies; • heavy violence, i.e., physical attacks on people, beating, etc. Importantly, most of the 560 events include less than 100 participants. Events gathering more than a thousand people constitute only 13% of all protest events, amounting to 71 events in total over the whole period. As the study shows, the protest repertoire of the Ukrainian far right mostly involves demonstrative events, or peaceful rallies and performances (Figure 2.2). Despite the glorification of violence amongst extreme right groups especially, violent events constitute only a minority of protest. Indeed, the Ukrainian far right seems to be more violent in words than in action. The study also points to the distinctively anti-Russian character of the Ukrainian far right. Indeed, the bulk of far-right protest in Ukraine is aimed at expressing anti-Russian attitudes and is concentrated in the period when pro-Russian Yanukovych was in power, that is, from 2010 until the Maidan revolution in 2014. Anti-Russian attitudes translate into events targeting specific political officials or policy decisions seen as pro-Russian, Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine, anti-Communism and anti-Bolshevism, and memory events. Protest against political opponents has erupted most often during Yanukovych’s time in power 2010–2014. In this period, the far right often rallied against his language policy and the elevation of the status of Russian language, his plans to join the Russia-led Eurasian Customs

Figure 2.2  Types of far-right protest events in Ukraine 2004–2020 (n = 560). Source: Gelashvili (2022).

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Union (created in 2010) while refraining from closer integration with the EU, and his decision to extend the lease of naval facilities to the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea. Anti-Russian rallies often took place in front of the Russian Embassy in Kyiv to protest against Russian foreign policy moves perceived as threatening to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, such as Russian military exercises close to the Russia-Ukraine border and the organising of Russian presidential elections in annexed Crimea. Far-right actors like Freedom and UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly Ukrainian National Self-Defence) have also protested the visits of Russian officials and public figures to Ukraine, including President Putin, Patriarch Kirill, and others. Rallies against Communism and Bolshevism include calls for “decommunisation” and lustration laws. Decommunisation refers to a process of dismantling of Communist- and Soviet era legacy and has been exercised in different forms in a number of former Communist countries in Europe. In Ukraine, draft decommunisation laws had been submitted to the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on several occasions over the years (2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, and 2013) (Eristavi, 2015). In 2015, the post-Maidan parliament finally passed the decommunisation law. The law banned Soviet-era symbols and propaganda, including names of public places, streets, and settlements, as well as monuments and statues. As a result, in 2016 only, more than 51,000 streets and more than 900 cities and villages were renamed, while thousands of monuments to Lenin and other Communist leaders were removed (“Decommunization Reform” n.d.). After the law was passed, far-right rallies on decommunisation – mostly organised by the Freedom party – usually protested it not being implemented quickly enough or called for the renaming of specific places or dismantling of specific monuments. Anti-Communist and anti-Bolshevist events also include demands for lustration laws. Like decommunisation, lustration is a specifically former Communist country phenomenon; in general, the term refers to the purging of former regime-affiliated officials and banning them from being appointed for public positions. In Ukraine, the parliament has so far failed to even discuss such legislation, and the far right has been amongst many societal actors calling for such a law for years. Finally, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitude is also expressed in memory events dedicated to OUN and UPA. This includes celebratory events dedicated to the birthday of OUN-B leader, Stepan Bandera, on 1 January, and the anniversary of the death of Roman Shukhevych, the commander of UPA, on 5 March (Gelashvili, 2022). In the early 2000s, some far-right groups, including the CUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) as well as UNA-UNSO organised rallies calling for then-President Yushchenko to award the Hero of Ukraine title to Stepan Bandera. Yushchenko did so in 2010. Rallies also erupted when Yanukovych decided to withdraw this decision as he became president a couple months later. Throughout 2004–2020, CUN and Freedom have also organised numerous rallies demanding that OUN-UPA officially be recognised as participants of World War II, so that their veterans could receive the same benefits as the veterans of World War II. In addition, Freedom also demanded that 14 October be recognised as a public holiday. 14 October had been associated not only with the Ukrainian army more generally, but also with UPA, whose founders decided to establish the army on this day to emphasise their connection to Cossack traditions (who celebrated Intercession of Mother of God on October 14). In 2014, President Poroshenko declared 14 October as a new national holiday, or the “Defender of Ukraine Day,” to honour Ukrainian armed forces (Trach, 2015). In contrast with far-right actors elsewhere, the Ukrainian far right devotes little attention to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Events against minorities, such as Jews, Roma, and LGBTQ+ community are relatively rare, when compared to events against political 32

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Figure 2.3  Issues of heavy violence protest events, 2004–2020. Source: Gelashvili (2022).

opponents, anti-Communist/anti-Bolshevist events, or memory events. This becomes especially evident when looking at violent events more closely. Zooming in on heavy violence, political opponents seem to be the most recurrent target (see Figure 2.3). This includes attacks on political officials, opposition party members, or people protesting against the far right itself. Many events start as peaceful demonstrations and descend into violent confrontations with either opponents or the police. Another common target for far-right violence are Communist activists. Events dedicated to anti-Communism and anti-Bolshevism include counterdemonstrations to rallies organised by the Communist Party of Ukraine (outlawed as of 2015), including its celebrations associated with the Soviet regime or Soviet-era officials. Finally, some events combine multiple issues, with anti-Russian attitudes as a common denominator; violence erupts at events protesting Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine or Ukrainian government’s policies perceived as pro-Russian. Interestingly, the usual scapegoats for the far right globally and frequent targets of far-right violence – immigrants, religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ community – are at best of secondary importance for the Ukrainian far right, despite their prominence in their public statements and manifestos. Over the years, far-right activists from Tradition and Order and Right Sector have disrupted LGBTQ+ Pride in Kyiv and Odesa, as well as feminist and women’s marches; however, most far-right events target not minorities, but rather, political officials associated with Russia in some way. In addition, taken as part of all protest events, violent events constitute only a marginal fraction. As empirical data also shows, the Ukrainian far right is not only weaker than media attention towards it may suggest, but also significantly less violent.

Conclusion As this chapter has argued, to understand how the Ukrainian far right today speaks and acts, as well as how it is regarded by other actors both in Ukraine and abroad, it is important to look into its historical roots in the interwar far-right movement. 33

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Today, the Ukrainian far right resembles its counterparts in other countries with its ideological focus on nativism and authoritarianism, but also has distinctive characteristics. First, the boundaries between radical and extreme right are not always clear, although some actors focus more on anti-democratic attitudes and acceptance of violent tactics, while others emphasise anti-establishment attitudes but no open opposition to the democratic political order. Second, it has a different approach to Russia. The anti-Russian character of its ideology has deep roots in the World War II-era resistance to Soviet domination, which, after independence, translated into opposition to Russia. To this day, opposition to Russian influence on Ukraine and any Ukrainian political actor perceived as pro-Russian is the defining feature of the Ukrainian far right. These attitudes are expressed in a variety of protest events against Russia, Soviet legacy of Communism and Bolshevism, and memory events honouring the OUN and UPA. Despite its extreme ideology and pronounced anti-Russianness, however, the Ukrainian far right is louder in words than in action. Empirical studies of the far-right movement indicate that while active on the streets, the movement mostly engages in peaceful rallies and performances. This is not to say that the Ukrainian far right is politically irrelevant. To begin with, as Likhachev (2015) has demonstrated, many far-right activists have been associated with hate crimes and violence towards foreigners and LGBTQ+ community, as well as paid-for thug services for oligarchs and businesspeople. In addition, as research on far-right social movements has shown, the gradual mainstreaming and normalisation of far-right ideas can result in the entire political spectrum shifting towards the right. Thus, the marginal electoral performance in the short run does not render the Ukrainian far right irrelevant. In the long run, the mainstreaming and normalisation can prepare fertile grounds for electoral success as well, especially if the far right does not encounter a strong opposing response. In Ukraine, there has not been a unified cordon sanitaire from mainstream parties. ProWestern mainstream parties have often involved Freedom in their coalitions to strengthen opposition to the pro-Russian coalitions, while the pro-Russian Party of Regions, in turn, used Freedom to discredit and steal votes from political opponents (Umland, 2020). As the parliamentary elections of 2012 showed, such flirtation with the far right can bring the movement close to formal political processes. The mainstreaming and normalisation of not only the contemporary far right, but also the controversial interwar movement, has played into the Kremlin’s narratives. At the same time, the continuous denunciation of not only the controversial OUN, but also all pro-independence and later pro-Western political forces in Ukraine by Russia has further reinvigorated the cult of OUN-UPA and legitimised its image within Ukraine. Thus, the far right, as well as other political actors’ attitudes towards it, has been stuck in a vicious cycle, despite the movement having limited tangible influence in Ukrainian politics.

Notes 1 A recent report indicated that the 2022 conflict has not led to a significant flow of extremists to the war zone. Very few have actually travelled to Ukraine, and it is yet unclear how many of those are involved in combat (Rekawek, 2022). 2 Notable exceptions include Bustikova (2015, 2019); Gomza (2015); Gomza and Zajaczkowski (2019); Ishchenko (2016); Likhachev (2003, 2015, 2019); Nonjon (2021); Polyakova (2014); Shekhovtsov (2011, 2015); and Umland (2013, 2020) amongst others. 3 Far-right ideology in Ukraine also has a pro-Russian dimension: groups like the Slavic Party and the Social Patriotic Assembly of the Slavs have organised numerous pro-Russian rallies and were

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The far right in Ukraine arguably used by pro-Russian forces in Ukraine to discredit the Orange and post-Maidan governments (Ghosh, 2012; Likhachev, 2013). In addition, extremist groups from Russia have also volunteered to fight against the Ukrainian forces since 2014 (Rekawek, 2022). 4 Actors marked in grey no longer exist or have disappeared from the public space since 2022. 5 The study is based on protest event analysis of more than 4,000 news articles of the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News (UNIAN), collected through the online database Factiva. Articles were retrieved through a Boolean keyword search (keywords included contemporary far-right actors in Ukraine and terms denoting protest, such as rally, performance, picket, etc.). UNIAN was selected as a source due to its reputability, nationwide coverage, and daily updates. The decision to rely on media sources as opposed to police records or activist accounts was made due to more reliability and continuity of media sources: in general, media tend to report on events that actually took place, as opposed to events advertised on far-right groups’ own channels that may never materialise. In addition, they report on both violent and non-violent events, rather than illegal events that policy records would focus on. Thus, media-based analysis over a long enough period is best able to capture general protest dynamics. By contrast, alternative sources – namely, activist- and police records – tend to vary significantly over time and involve fewer details on event characteristics, such as the date, location, main issues, and an approximate number of participants (see Koopmans, 1998). For more information about the study and its method of data collection and analysis, see Gelashvili (2022). 6 Importantly, the study tracked far-right protests using the protest event analysis method. In line with social movement literature, protest events were operationalised as public, contentious acts of the movement that take place within a 24-hour span, in specific areas, with similar aims and participants. Thus, this definition excludes individual hate crimes. For events lasting longer than 24 hours, it is recommended to code them as a single event if protesters do not leave the area and stay overnight (cf. Hutter, 2014). The Maidan Revolution in 2014 was thus coded as a single event because participants stayed on the square continuously for three months. An alternative method of coding could thus have led to many more events in 2014 (see Ishchenko (2016) for an estimation of the far-right’s participation in Maidan).

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Tamta Gelashvili Ghosh, M. (2012). The extreme right in Ukraine. Berlin Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://lib.ugent.be/en/ catalog/ebk01:9870000000001184 Gomza, I. (2015). Elusive Proteus: A study in the ideological morphology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48(2–3), 195–207. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.005 Gomza, I., & Zajaczkowski, J. (2019). Black Sun Rising: Political opportunity structure perceptions and institutionalization of the Azov Movement in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Nationalities Papers, 47(5), 774–800. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.30 Gorbach, D. (2018, October 16). Entrepreneurs of political violence: The varied interests and strategies of the far-right in Ukraine. OpenDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ entrepreneurs-of-political-violence-ukraine-far-right/ Harp, S. (2022, June 30). Foreign fighters in Ukraine could be a time bomb for their home countries. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2022/06/30/ukraine-azov-neo-nazi-foreign-fighter/ Himka, J.-P. (2011). The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the carnival crowd. Canadian Slavonic Papers, 53(2–4). https://www.academia.edu/3181252/The_Lviv_Pogrom_ of_1941_The_Germans_Ukrainian_Nationalists_and_the_Carnival_Crowd Horvath, R. (2011). Putin's ‘Preventive Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution. Europe-Asia Studies, 63:1(1–25). DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.534299 Hume, T. (2019, December 13). A black metal festival in Ukraine this weekend is the Neo-Nazi networking event of the year. Vice News. https://www.vice.com/en/article/dygg9j/a-black-metal-festivalin-ukraine-this-weekend-is-the-neo-nazi-networking-event-of-the-year Hurska, A. (2014). Two images of radicalism in Ukraine. Between Scandinavia and the Caucasus | Tiempo devorado: Revista de historia actual. Tiempo Devorado: Revista De Historia Actual, 1(1). https://raco.cat/index.php/tdevorado/article/view/304341 Hutter, S. (2014). Protest event analysis and its offspring. In Methodological practices in social movement research. Oxford University Press. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780198719571.001.0001/acprof-9780198719571-chapter-14 Iovenko, A. (2015). The ideology and development of the Social-National Party of Ukraine, and its transformation into the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom,” in 1990–2004. Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 48(2–3), 229–237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.010 Ishchenko, V. (2016). Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: An attempt of systematic estimation. European Politics and Society, 17(4), 453–472. https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016 .1154646 Ishchenko, V. (2018). Denial of the obvious: Far right in Maidan Protests and their danger today | VoxUkraine. Vox Ukraine. https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protestsand-their-danger-today Kaniewski, D. (2018, August 24). New “Glory to Ukraine” army chant invokes nationalist past | DW | 24.08.2018. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/new-glory-to-ukraine-army-chant-invokesnationalist-past/a-45215538 Koopmans, R. (1998). The use of protest event data in comparative research: Cross-national comparability, sampling methods and robustness. EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 90–110. Likhachev, V. (2013). Right-wing extremism on the rise in Ukraine. Russian Politics & Law, 51(5), 59–74. https://doi.org/10.2753/RUP1061-1940510503 Likhachev, V. (2015). The “Right Sector” and others: The behavior and role of radical nationalists in the Ukrainian political crisis of late 2013 – Early 2014. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48(2), 257–271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.07.003 Likhachev, V. (2019). Far-right extremism as a threat to Ukrainian Democracy (Nations in Transit) [Analytical brief]. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/analytical-brief/2018/far-rightextremism-threat-ukrainian-democracy Luxmoore, M. (2019). “Orange Plague”: World War II and the symbolic politics of pro-state mobilization in Putin’s Russia | Nationalities Papers | Cambridge Core. Nationalities Papers, 47(5). https://www.cambridge. org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/orange-plague-world-war-ii-and-the-symbolic-politicsof-prostate-mobilization-in-putins-russia/8C2D9ED32A667101E8C59051785ED9F5 Mierzejewski-Voznyak, M. (2018). The radical right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780190274559.013.30

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The far right in Ukraine Minkenberg, M. (2017). The radical right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under Siege? – Michael Minkenberg—Google Books. Palgrave Macmillan. https://books.google.no/books?hl=en&lr=&id=x bXQDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=minkenberg+2017+&ots=m6bEAaKs9N&sig=janstXpzM 0PAQ9B07_Uxv-6vSrc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=minkenberg%202017&f=false Minkenberg, M. (2019). Between party and movement: Conceptual and empirical considerations of the radical right’s organizational boundaries and mobilization processes. European Societies, 21(4), 463–486. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494296 Motyl, A. J. (1980). The turn to the right: The ideological origins and development of Ukrainian nationalism, 1919–1929 (1st ed.). East European Monographs. Motyka, G. (2022). From the Volhynian Massacre to Operation Vistula: The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict 1943–1947. Brill Schöningh. Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity. Nonjon, A. (2021). Forging the body of the New Ukrainian Nation: Sport as a Gramscist tool for the Ukrainian far right. Journal of Illiberalism Studies, 1(2), 59–74. https://doi.org/10.53483/VCIV3532 Polyakova, A. (2012). The dark side of European integration. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag. Polyakova, A. (2014). From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilised in Galicia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(2), 211–225. Rekawek, K. (2022). Western extremists and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Counter Extremism Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/content/western-extremists-and-russian-invasionukraine-2022 Rose, M., & Soufan, A. H. (2020, February 11). Opinion | we once fought Jihadists. Now we battle White Supremacists. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/opinion/politics/ white-supremacist-terrorism.html Rossolinski-Liebe, G. (2014). Stepan Bandera: The life and afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. ibidem Verlag. Rudling, P. A. (2012). The return of the Ukrainian far right: The case of VO Svoboda. In: Wodak, R. and Richardson, J.E. (eds.) Analysing fascist discourse. Routledge, 228–255. Rudling, P. A. (2019). Eugenics and racial anthropology in the Ukrainian radical nationalist tradition. Science in Context, 32(1), 67–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889719000048 Savchuk, A. (2022, July 6). “Денацифікація” України. Чого ж насправді хоче Путін [Denazification of Ukraine. What does Putin really want]. Українська Правда [Ukrayinska Pravda]. https://www. pravda.com.ua/columns/2022/06/7/7351077/ Shekhovtsov, A. (2011). The creeping resurgence of the Ukrainian radical right? The case of the Freedom Party. Europe-Asia Studies, 63(2). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2011.5 47696 Shekhovtsov, A. (2013). From para-militarism to radical right-wing populism: The rise of the Ukrainian far-right party Svoboda. In: Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., and Mral, B. (eds.) Right wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 249–263. Shekhovtsov, A. (2015). The spectre of Ukrainian “fascism”: Information wars, political manipulation, and reality (WHAT DOES UKRAINE THINK?, pp. 80–87). European Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21660.12 Shekhovtsov, A., & Umland, A. (2014). The maidan and beyond: Ukraine's radical right. Journal of Democracy, 25(3), 58–63. Shkandrij, M. (2015). Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, ideology, and literature, 1929–1956. Yale University Press. Snyder, T. (2003). The causes of Ukrainian-Polish ethnic cleansing 1943. Past & Present, 179, 197–234. Trach, N. (2015, October 8). New Oct. 14 state holiday has Orthodox, Cossack roots—Oct. 08, 2015. KyivPost. https://www.kyivpost.com/lifestyle/new-oct-14-state-holiday-has-orthodox-cossackroots-399592.html Tumarkin, N. (2003). The Great Patriotic War as myth and memory. European Review, 11(4), 595–611. | Umland, A. (2013). A typical variety of European right-wing radicalism? Russian Politics & Law, 51(5), 86–95. https://doi.org/10.2753/RUP1061-1940510505 Umland, A. (2020). The far right in pre- and post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 28(2), 247–268.

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Tamta Gelashvili Umland, A., & Yurchuk, Y. (2017). The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Post-Soviet Ukrainian memory politics, public debates, and foreign affairs. Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. https://www.academia.edu/36059737/The_Organization_of_Ukrainian_Nationalists_OUN_in_Post_Soviet_Ukrainian_Memory_Politics_Public_Debates_and_Foreign_Affairs Umland, A., & Yurchuk, Y. (2020). The organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and European Fascism during World War II. Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=3595470 Umland, A. (2020). The far right in pre-and post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From ultra-nationalist party politics to ethno-centric uncivil society. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 28(2), 247–268. Wilson, A. (2014). Ukraine crisis: What it means for the West. Yale University Press.

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3 THE RUSSIAN FAR RIGHT A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate Mihai Varga

Introduction The Russian far right underwent tremendous change despite appearing at first sight extremely young with its roughly 40 years of existence. From isolated and mostly clandestine networks in the 1960s and 1970s, it grew in the early 1980s around intellectuals interested in preserving cultural sites, historical revisionism and Aryan and Eurasian mythmaking. It embraced neo-Nazism in the 1990s and White Supremacism and Straight Edge in the 2000s. It was an important protagonist of the 1993 stand-off between President Boris Yeltsin and Parliament, with many future leaders and activists defending Parliament and radicalising following their defeat to believe that foreign forces occupied their country. Following its growing organisational sophistication and rise of skinheads in clandestine organisations, it saw massive involvement in an unprecedented wave of political violence, consisting of a campaign murdering close to 500 people in 2004–2009. By the end of that decade, it faced the authorities’ strong-handed response, leading to the imprisonment or killing of many far-right leaders and outlawing most organisations. A less openly violent phase followed in the 2010s when the far right’s main protagonists invested their efforts in promoting a certain “healthy lifestyle” that honours one’s “race” or nation rather than in political campaigning. The Ukraine crisis of 2013–2014 drove a wedge between “racists” supporting the Ukrainian government and “nationalists” siding with pro-Russian separatists while providing many leaders and movement activists with an opportunity to leave the country and escape repression and imprisonment. Eurasian and Orthodox fundamentalist groups gained the upper hand. The latter took over as the far-right scene’s most important presence on the streets, leading mobilisations less against Central Asians and Caucasians, and more against “blasphemous” bands and movies, queers, and liberals. In this chapter I present the transformation of the Russian far right by detailing its main phases, from emergence to violence to organisations signalling political regime loyalty and abandonment of militant and revolutionary national-socialism. The movement’s development raises several questions regarding its transformation, that the discussion section takes up and presents in the light of research on the Russian far right. The movement’s initial growth followed the systemic collapse characterising the late 1980s and the 1990s, while the violence wave of 2004–2009 developed out of structures of armed and experienced activists that by DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-5

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that decade were capable of carrying out deadly attacks. The movement’s apparent decline since the mid-2010s has much to do with repression, the conflict in Ukraine (Horvath, 2015), and the crowding out through state-sponsored nationalism (Laruelle, 2017). Although one can interpret the situation of the far right as a steep decline and loss of autonomy since the 2010s triggered by repression, this chapter argues that the far right turned out to be capable of transformations that helped it maintain or transform its spaces of hate. In studies of the US far right, scholars have advanced the “spaces of hate”-concept to show that far-right groups are best understood as ultimately interested in preserving and diversifying such spaces of hate (Disha et al., 2011; Flint, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2015). These refer to political organisations, stadiums, youth subcultures, festivals etc., operating offline and online. Their preservation is the far right’s central organising objective, allowing it to recruit new members, disseminate its ideology, and survive. By “far right” I refer to those political currents that explain world antagonisms through ascribed, inborn differences between humans. They group people into categories, such as ethnicities/nations, races, religions, or world civilisations, justifying them through ideologies of “natural” hierarchies and inequality and seeing representatives of other categories on “their” soil as illegitimate presences of foreign forces. Concerned with the purity of their categories of preferred self-identification, far-right political currents see those minorities rejecting segregation or subordination as threats to be countered by force.

Origins Early Aryanists While most of the post-war European far right overlaps with a lineage continuing interwar fascism, the present-day Russian far right builds on multiple lineages. Although essentially agreeing on a worldview that cherishes one’s belonging by birth and ancestry to a specific culture, nation, or race, these lineages have differed in how far in time and to what origins to trace this belonging. Three large such lineages exist. The first one, Aryanism, overlaps with much of the 1990s and 2000s far right and traces national ancestry to the Bronze Age and earlier. The second lineage claims the legacy of Eurasianism to trace Russian ancestry to the Early Middle Age. The third lineage – monarchist and Orthodox fundamentalist – sees Orthodox Christianity in close union with the Tsarist state as the defining national trait. The latter lineage emerged in the 19th century and ended with the Black Hundreds being outlawed after the 1917 February Revolution and the 1920s White Emigration. It resurfaced from the 1980s on. The first and second lineages are post–World War II creations, despite having longer intellectual roots in the theosophy of Helene Blavatsky (Aryanism) or claiming the intellectual heritage of interwar emigres to France (Eurasianism). As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, by the 1980s, a growing university-educated public with degrees in philology and journalism, but rarely history, took interest in exploring national “roots.” Their attention went to the cultural preservation of architectonic monuments and sites and the discoveries of archaeological expeditions to the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, taking place since the late 1960s.1 Examples include the expeditions of Lev Gumilev, Vitaly Larichev, and Gennady Zdanovich. The latter’s discoveries and theories about bronze-era sites in the Urals were most influential, with Arkaim, in the meantime the best-known site, discovered by Zdanovich in 1987. Zdanovich would do much to transform Arkaim as a major reference for neo-pagan and New Age groups, interested in uncovering pre-Christian “Russian” traditions and history. 40

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Furthermore, the growing far-right movement would soon present the culture of Arkaim and other similar bronze-era sites as “Aryan” and “Aryans” as “Russians.” These depictions were there to stay. The “Aryan myth” would prove the binding element of a highly eclectic movement, spreading from the intellectual circles of the 1980s to the paramilitaries of the 1990s and the skinhead organisations of Neo-Nazi and white supremacist orientation in the 2000s. It would feature early on in the works of well-known far-right ideologues, such as Aleksandr Dugin and Petr Khomyakov. The latter took the idea of his country’s “Aryan” roots in the direction of vilifying Semitic, Mongol, and Muslim influences and died in prison under extremism charges in 2014. Equally important was the massive popular reception of Lev Gumilev’s works in the late 1970s and 1980s. Gumilev was one of the main figures associated with Eurasianism and an ardent opponent of Soviet assimilationist policies and claims of establishing a “Soviet people.” Instead, he argued that the ethnos was the only meaningful form of human organisation (Bassin, 2015, p. 844). In an outright rebuke of Soviet approaches on the subject, Gumilev (1902–1992) argued that the existence of ethnic groups had little to do with socio-political and economic developments. It had far more to do with “natural” and “bio-spherical” facts (idem, p. 846), all coupled with the “accumulated past” (nakaplivaemoe proshloe) reflecting an ethnos’ “stereotypical behaviour” (Gumilev, 1994). Important to note, Gumilev’s approach differed from the “Aryanist” far right that would form in the 1980s and 1990s. It took a positive stance towards the Mongol occupation of medieval Rus’ and towards Turkic, Mongol, and Muslim influences and presences in Russian culture, arguing that Eurasianism holds that Russia has two origins, Slavic and Turkic. Aleksandr Panarin (1940–1992) took some of these ideas further, calling for the political rapprochement of Russians and Turkic peoples. He invited the latter to “appropriate the Russian state” as it “also belongs to them”; he would further argue for a “Eurasian civilisation” in which a Russian-led Orthodox theocracy would play a decisive role (Laruelle, 2004). Further to the extreme right, Aleksandr Dugin would most famously appropriate the Eurasia concept for his ideological programme. Dugin’s first known episodes of intellectual socialisation were in the activities of the Iuzhinskii Circle, a group of intellectuals meeting in a flat in Moscow’s Iuzhinskii alley. After Yurii Mamleev, the group’s initiator and central intellectual figure fled the country, Evgenii Golovin and Geidar Djemal took over as the group’s informal organisers, introducing members to occult literature and the “traditionalist” works of René Guénon and Julius Evola. The group met at Djemal’s dacha and drew the participation of such (future) well-known artists as writers Vladimir Sorokin, Viktor Erofeev, Viktor Pelevin, and musician Boris Grebenshchikov (Laruelle, 2015, p. 568). Dugin joined the circle in 1980. In 1981 he translated Evola’s Pagan Imperialism into Russian. After the fall of communism, Dugin travelled to Western Europe where he met with key representatives of the European New Right, including Alain de Benoist (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Important to note, Dugin’s intellectual project was, for much of the 1990s, as close to neo-Nazi occultism, Aryanism and New Right as to Eurasianism (Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2009; Shnirelman, 2018). Much of Dugin’s energy in the 1990s went into the activities of the National Bol’shevik Party (NBP), a political organisation that Dugin intellectually inspired (and lead together with writer Eduard Limonov), despite brief involvement in Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s LDPR2 and Gennady Zyuganov’s Communist Party. However, in public perception, Dugin stays the best-known representative of Eurasianism, launching in 2003 an eponymous organisation and leaving the NBP after intense disagreements with Limonov already in 1999. Finally, the 1980s would see the establishment of the Pamiat’ (“Memory”) group that established a paramilitary wing and developed into a nationwide network of anti-Semitic 41

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activists combining Aryan mythmaking with Orthodox militancy. While before Pamiat’ several small groups of similar orientations had formed in the 1950s and 1960s, these could not break out of the underground and reach a wider audience. It was only in the 1970s that an underground scene of far-right samizdat press emerged, with its “anti-Semitic paganism” reaching the initial circle to launch Pamiat’ in the 1980s (Verkhovsky & Pribylovsky, 1996). The main intellectual influence on the group was Vladimir Chivilikhin’s book Pamiat’, receiving in 1982 the Soviet Union’s main literary prize and which bore the influences of Larichev’s works on the ancient peoples of the Russian Far-East. Pamiat’ would develop into the breeding ground for a generation of violent far-right leaders, transforming Pamiat’s preoccupation with “Aryan” roots by the mid-2000s into militant national-socialism and white supremacism. The paramilitary wing abandoned Pamiat’ to establish the Russian National Unity (Russkoie natsional’noe edinstvo, RNE) in 1990. RNE constituted the most important farright force of the 1990s, with its leader, Aleksandr Barkashov, heading his troops to take part in the armed stand-off surrounding the conflict between President and Parliament in October 1993 (Jackson, 1999; Simonsen, 1996). The 1993 stand-off became a critical formative experience for numerous scene members, irrespective of their orientation. They perceived defeat at the hands of pro-Presidential troops as proof that foreign forces “occupied” their country. Many sought to resist by participating in politics or launching publications, such as Zavtra (earlier name: Den’), the key intellectual meeting place from 1993 on for members of the scene and others who identified with the Parliament during the stand-off. Under editor Aleksandr Prokhanov, Zavtra brought together far-right Eurasianists and monarchists with communists (Faure, 2021; Griffiths, 2007; Suspitsina, 1999). The Aryanist component organised in the RNE, which by the early 2000s had lost much of its clout amongst far-right adherents (Shenfield, 2001; Varga, 2008), but set several important precedents. The “staged” displays of membership strength, carefully orchestrated to show off the organisation’s militaristic paraphernalia and national-socialist political orientation, would inspire most organisations to follow in its footsteps. And second, most leaders or influential activists of future organisations had received training or had started their careers in RNE or even Pamiat’. Pamiat’ and RNE lineage thus run like a fil rouge through much of the Russian far-right’s history. The most important organisations to replace RNE were its direct descendants, Slavic Force (Slavianskaia sila, SS) and later Slavic Union (Slavianskii soyuz, SS). As the abbreviation implies, the association with the national-socialist paramilitary organisation SS (Schutzstaffel) was intentional. The mid-2000s brought the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Dvizhenie protiv nelegal’noi imigratsii, DPNI), established and led by former Pamiat’ member Aleksandr Belov (Plotkin). The DPNI played a decisive role in organising “The Russian March,” the largest event to bring far-right organisations together, a demonstration that has taken place in Moscow yearly since 2005. The DPNI was, at least in the first years of its existence, presenting itself as an organisation loyal to the state, seeking to assist authorities in handling “illegal immigration.” But the DPNI facilitated violent mass mobilisations of members and supporters in response to alleged crimes of immigrants, most notably in the case of the 2006 Kondopoga arsons (Shlapentokh, 2010; Tipaldou & Uba, 2014). In 2004 Dmitri Rumiantsev, who had left the SS after a personal conflict with SS leader Dmitri Demushkin, established the National-Socialist Society (Natsional-sotsialisticheskoe obshestvo, NSO). The NSO was by the mid-2000s as important for the far right as the DPNI. It included some of the country’s best-known skinheads, such as the Format 18 leader Maksim Martsinkevich (also known as Tesak); a member of the Russian far-right cult-band Kolovrat; and Roman Nifontov, the author of Skinheads: Russia Awakens. The latter book was most influential amongst Russian 42

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neo-Nazi skinheads (Sova, 2012). During its early years, the NSO’s number of participants in the Russian March almost equalled that of the DPNI, arguably a sign of the organisation’s power (Verkhovsky, 2014). These organisations sought participation in local and national elections either directly (in the case of the RNE or the NSO) or by setting up larger political organisations and registering them as political parties. Alongside formally registered organisations, another critical component of the Russian far right were the parts of the skinhead subculture that adhered to racist ideologies, as outlined below (Pilkington et al., 2010; Tarasov, 2001). Gangs emerging from this subculture organised several mass attacks on people of non-Slavic complexion in the early 2000s (the Iasenevskaia market and the Tsarytsino metro station pogroms being the best known).

The violence wave of 2004–2009 Starting in 2004 and lasting until 2009, there was a steep and massive increase in levels of violence attributed to the far right of now openly national-socialist and white supremacist orientation, claiming hundreds of lives in Russia’s largest cities: Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The number of crimes went from 50 lives in 2004 to 97 in 2007, 114 deaths in 2008 (Laryš & Mareš, 2011; Varga, 2019). Over ten years in 2004–2014, far-right attacks claimed the lives of 496 people, with most attacks carried out in Russia’s largest cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg until 2009; and with strong reasons to believe that the actual number of victims was higher (Varga, 2008; Verkhovsky, 2014). The vast majority of victims died in separate, “one at a time” attacks in which one or several perpetrators lynched or stabbed their victims. The figure for deaths in bombings is below 50, depending on whether attacks could be attributed to the far right. The most significant bomb attacks were the bombing of the Cherkizovskii Market in 2006 (14 dead) with claims that the bombing of the Nevsky Express train in 2009 (27 dead) was also the work of far-right groups (Sergeev & Salagaev, 2013). The violent crimes of the 2000s are the result of the growing skinhead numbers (Verkhovsky, 2015), with a notable qualitative change from the “pogrom”-like attacks on student dormitories or marketplaces starting already in the 1990s to the wave of assassinations of the 2000s (Verkhovsky, 2014). Russian skinheads represented a violent youth subculture dominated by male adolescents, as in other parts of the world.3 According to estimates, the skinhead scene had thousands of members in Moscow by 2000 and tens of thousands in Russia. By 2005, skinhead numbers had reached some 50–65,000 in Russia, while the American Anti-Defamation League estimated total numbers elsewhere in the world at 70,000 (Kozhevnikova, 2009; Tarasov, 2004; Verkhovsky, 2015). Between the mid-2000s and 2010, several groups emerged in the skinhead scene with the overall goal of destabilising society through terror campaigns. The first one – the eight-member NSBTO (Natsional-sotsialisticheskaia boevaia terroristicheskaia organizatsiia, the NationalSocialist Combat Terror Organisation) existed between 2003 and 2006, carrying out at least nine murders before most members were arrested and the leader shot dead while resisting arrest. Legal organisations turned the victim (Dimitri Borovikov) into the first “hero” of the far right, celebrating the deeds of the group as active “resistance.” Other groups followed soon. SPAS (unclear abbreviation), led by Nikola Korolev, carried out nine bomb attacks in the Moscow region, the last bombing killing 14 in the attack on the Cherkizovskii Market (Moscow); the group’s four members were arrested in 2006 and sentenced in 2008. The same year authorities also sentenced Artur Ryno to imprisonment, accused with Pavel Skatchevskii and seven other members of 37 murders. Ryno and Skatchevskii (both underage) had been entirely unknown to wider far-right circles. Korolev claimed that Ryno was a member of SPAS, 43

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a claim difficult to verify and probably intended to place Ryno under the protection of SPAS and the wider far-right movement while in prison. Another version – advanced by journalists (Vasyunin 2008) – connects Ryno and Skatchevskii to a network of underage far-right criminals self-called the Biriulevskii front or the NS/WP Crew (National-Socialist/White Power Crew). Groups connected to the Front and uncovered by authorities and sentenced include the White Wolves (active during 2007–2008; 9 members; 11 dead); and the groups referred to in the press as “Pagan nationalists,” planning the bombing of a Moscow church and responsible for some 20 murders. The Front initially hardly coordinated actions and did little to cover up tracks, leading to many arrests. Throughout 2009–2010 members relied on their network to hide from authorities after committing attacks. In contrast, NSO-Sever, another Moscow-based group, was far more professional in its approach. NSO leader Maksim Bazylev drew up a strategy for the ensuing campaign, recruiting an experienced perpetrator and unleashing a wave of killings leaving 27 people dead. The group’s arrest in 2008 led to a substantial decrease in the number of far-right attack victims in Moscow that year (Kozhevnikova & Verkhovsky, 2009). Finally, the last group arrested in connection with the late 2000s terror campaign was the Combat Organization of Russian Nationalists (Boevaia organizatsiia russkikh natsionalistov – BORN), the group that survived underground the longest (2007–2011). BORN was the only Moscow-based group to carry out attacks using fire weapons and murdering 11 people, including the judge who led the trials in the Ryno-Skatchevskii and White Wolves cases, Eduard Chuvashov. All of these groups – NSBTO, SPAS, NSO-Sever, BORN – originated in the skinhead scene. Their leaders came from the skinhead scene’s core, consisting of well-known groups with a history traceable to the 1990s, such as Moscow’s United Brigades 88 (Obedinennye brigady 88, OB-88), Skins Legion, or Saint Petersburg’s Shultz-88. In recruiting members, the social bonds between skinheads were supplemented by other bonds: the cohesion of NSBTO members was cemented by a shared past in football hooliganism; by visiting the same “old rites” church in the case of SPAS initiators; and by having had known each other for a very long time as class-mates in the case of three BORN members.

State crackdown From 2009 on, Russian authorities dramatically changed their stance vis-à-vis far-right groups. Tens of NSBTO, NSO, BORN members, and other violent members of the far-right scene received long prison sentences; several leaders died either resisting arrests or committing suicide to escape prison sentences. The year 2010 brought one more spectacular mobilisation of the far right, with some 3,000 football hooligans and far-right activists rioting on the Kreml-close Manezhnaia Square to avenge the death of a Spartak fan at the hands of Caucasians. Participants raised their hands in Nazi salutes, clashing with police, killing one and injuring at least 40 others (Glathe, 2016). A final mass mobilisation of thousands of far-right scene members occurred in 2013, during the riots in the Biriuliovo neighbourhood near Moscow. But state authorities had picked up speed in dismantling and banning far-right organisations of “Aryanist” orientation: NSO and BORN were disbanded in 2009 and 2010; Restruct, a group of remaining NSO members around Martsinkevich was banned in 2014; the Slavic Union and the DPNI were banned following their encouragement of violence on Manezhnaia in 2010 and 2011; “Russians,” Russkie, an “association” established by DPNI and SS members to escape the ban, was disbanded in 2015. The war in Ukraine further weakened the Aryanist component of Russia’s far right from 2014, driving a wedge between groups siding with Ukraine and groups calling for 44

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overt Russian intervention (Horvath, 2015; Laruelle, 2016). Paradoxically, the seemingly defunct Barkashov’s RNE made headlines again after close to a decade and a half of lethargy by sending off recruits to fight on the side of the separatist republics in Luhans’k and Donets’k. Despite not changing its ideology and showing the same national-socialism as in the early 1990s, the RNE was spared the state scrutiny that banned other organisations. However, the war in Ukraine provided several leaders and activists of Russian far-right organisations with an opportunity to escape the reach of authorities by joining Ukraine’s far-right militias and, after participating in combat, receiving Ukrainian citizenship (Yudina & Verkhovsky, 2019).

The Russian far right after the crackdown The state crackdown targeting national-socialist and white-supremacist organisations and groups did not leave Russia empty of far-right groups and structures. However, the crackdown brought a decrease in overtly neo-Nazi groups; and a reorientation of such groups towards organising non-violent mobilisations. The top development in this respect was the discovery, in the early 2010s, of the mobilisational potential of sports, particularly martial arts, fitness (running), and body-building. Fitness clubs and fighting tournaments as new “spaces of hate” replaced the paramilitaries and “marches” of the 1990s–2000s. The most spectacular action in this respect was the organised attacks of martial-arts-trained Russians on English football supporters in 2016 in Marseille during the European football championship. The interest in sport overlapped with a broader discourse about a “healthy lifestyle,” partly promoted by authorities and partly appropriated by far-right groups. Some of the organisations active in the 2000s, such as the NSO, had campaigned for a lifestyle approximating Straight Edge ideas. By the early 2010s, Straight Edge had become widely disseminated within far-right circles – and joining “healthy lifestyle”-initiatives – resulted in organising “Russian Runs,” flashmob-like events in which people would meet to run together and then post news about completing the event (Gabowitsch, 2018). The far right would keep its traditional “space of hate” amongst supporters of certain football clubs (Glathe, 2016; Glathe & Varga, 2018). Meanwhile, organisations rooted in Russia’s other far-right lineages continue to exist. Selftermed Eurasianists maintained their network of organisations grouped around the Eurasian Movement. Eurasian organisations survived despite their past links to the forbidden far-right segments. One organisation – the Eurasian Youth Movement – co-organised the first Russian March in 2005 with the DPNI and many other Aryanist-inspired and openly national-socialist groups. As of 2006, Eurasianists stopped participating in the Russian March, denouncing the other organisers for undermining state efforts to run the country responsibly. Eurasianists became capable of punching above their weight: even though hardly having any mobilisational potential, it would be their leader, Aleksandr Dugin, who became the Russian far-right’s most prominent and internationally well-known representative. Receiving a professorship in sociology at Moscow State University in 2008, ESM leader Dugin toured Europe and Asia to network with like-minded organisations abroad, from Greece, Romania, and Moldova to Turkey, Iran and Central Asia. Most importantly, Dugin met and took a close interest in the European New Right’s Alain de Benoist. Not all Eurasianists followed in Dugin’s footsteps of rapprochement with the Putin regime. Limonov’s NBP developed an anti-regime stance causing the persecution of its members long before the crackdown targeting the “Aryanist” far right. Like other self-termed Eurasianists, Limonov too, believed in an “imperial totality,” the unity of history and geography, and Russia’s leading role in Eurasia (Razuvalova, 2019). Unlike many other far-right organisations, 45

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the NBP nevertheless survived the crackdown and by 2014 was also sending recruits to fight Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. Furthermore, tsarist and Orthodox-inspired organisations were hardly affected by the crackdown of the early 2010s; they offered members and followers of banned organisations a home. A case in point is the Movement Sorok sorokov (the “Multitude-Movement,” following here the translation suggested by Nikolai Mitrokhin, abbreviated “DSS”), established in 2012 as an initiative to protect the Orthodox Church and react to episodes such as the Pussy Riot “Punk Prayer” Concert of the same year (Mitrokhin, 2015). The organisation became the most visible initiator of pro-Church campaigning, seeking to intimidate alleged opponents, from artists to members of the LGBT+ community. New organisations of “Orthodox,” “conservative,” or “national-conservative” orientation, such as the DSS or the 2013-established National-Conservative Party, joined the longer-existing, 1992-established Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers to form a distinct paramilitary structure. DSS claims to oppose an alleged international conspiracy of anti-Russian forces headed by George Soros and their Russian enablers, from queer and liberals to artists and foreign-sponsored NGOs. Its members intervened throughout the 2010s in the public space to advance Church-close positions, pushing for the construction of churches in Moscow and other places or boycotting such films as “Matilda” in 2017 (Uzlaner & Stoeckl, 2019), depicting a love affair of Tsar Nikolay II.4 Much of the far right’s radicalism and violence-prone character became, in the 2010s, an attribute of the monarchist (tsarist) or Orthodox far-right segment. It, too, sought participation in the Ukraine conflict. Its most famous representative, Igor’ Girkin (nicknamed “Strelkov”), who had made his first public appearances in Zavtra in the 1990s, captured the Ukrainian city of Sloviansk, aggravating the Ukrainian conflict into what became the Donbas war of 2014–2015. With DSS and other similar initiatives, the violence level decreased, and the ideological content changed from NS/WS paganism and atheism to something more malleable to compromise with state-close positions. But the far-right character stayed unaltered. This becomes evident if looking beyond the ideological labels scene members use, from national-socialist and white supremacists to monarchist, conservative, and Orthodox. Instead, while such labels change, what stays a constant attribute of the scene is the othering of various minorities and political opponents as existential threats to the nation (sexual and ethnic minorities and political camps, liberal and left-wing). Amongst minorities, Jews continue to receive special attention even amongst the parts of the scene that – also due to their close relationship to Patriarch Kirill and the Orthodox Church – openly claim to distance themselves from anti-Semitism and recognise the Shoah, such as DSS. In 2021 DSS has called out the Jewish community to distance itself from two pop artists with Jewish surnames that had produced a “blasphemous” video showing people – including the two artists dressed up as priests – dancing in a (Catholic) church apparently under the influence of drugs. DSS reminded the Jewish community that it needs to respect the state-founding (“state-forming”) ethnic group – i.e., Russians – and that it “should not spit into the fountain from which it drinks.”5 This means that Jews should acknowledge their subordination to the nation they owe their existence. The DSS thus used the incident to affirm the hierarchy of ethnic groups within Russia, which has not changed for the far right since the 1990s (Casula, 2020; Malinova, 2015). The trend of accommodation and loyalty-signalling vis-à-vis authorities facilitated the survival of spaces of hate, meaning the far-right movement’s array of settings in which it disseminates its ideas, including formal organisations, public events, and currently primarily online media. Examples include the newspaper Zavtra and the media presences close to the “Orthodox businessman” Konstantin Malofeev (Laruelle, 2020). Authorities have lengthened the lists of forbidden publications and banned websites and organisations. Still, they have 46

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largely ignored the proliferation of Orthodox and Eurasian organisations committed to fighting LGBT+ groups or “liberals” from self-declared positions of loyalism vis-à-vis the political incumbents. And they have also ignored surviving groups of national-socialist and white supremacist orientation that took up fighting in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, such as the RNE, the US-sanctioned Russian Imperial Movement, or the mercenaries of the Rusich Task force.6 Looking back at the development of the far-right movement ever since the 1980s around several key organisations – from Pamiat’ to RNE, DPNI, and the DSS – most organisations initially started from positions claiming patriotism and closeness to the state. As pointed out in theories of the life course of far-right organisational behaviour, far-right groups undergo a process of “split delegitimization” (Sprinzak, 1995), meaning that they sooner or later add the state to their list of opponents. All of the far right’s opponents are illegitimate; the far right does not perceive them as acting legitimately on behalf of other social groups or categories but as under the control of conspiring forces. This trend of delegitimisation also characterises the Orthodox fundamentalist/monarchist camp. Despite their mid-2010s loyalty claims, most groups grew disillusioned with the Russian government by the early 2020s (up until the 2022 aggression against Ukraine). This happened either due to the state’s alleged lack of resolute intervention in Ukraine beyond the Donbas in 2014–2015, or because of other issues from pension reform to the protection of sexual minorities’ rights and the state vaccination programme during the Corona-pandemic. From the protector of national interests fighting back orange-like revolutionaries and “returning” Crimea, the Russian state appeared to far-right activists as the pawn of sinister globalist conspirators. The 2022 attack on Ukraine sparked a wave of sympathy interrupted by irritation over the state’s alleged tolerance of national traitors and liberals; and the state’s military incompetence (Bluhm & Varga, 2022).

Discussion Research on Russia’s far right has focused predominantly on the violence stemming from the far right. It sought to approximate the number of victims and to gather systematic information about the far-right actors involved, and document how violence changed from pogrom-like attacks in the early 2000s to the serial killings and occasional bombings of the late 2000s, and by the mid-2010s back to programme-like events (Verkhovsky, 2014). Two explanations stand out for the causes behind the violence in the 2000s, both trying to explain the emergence of politicised skinheads rather than the pursuit of violence. On the one hand, researchers stress macro factors such as – in strong connection with most attacks occurring in large cities – how urbanisation produces social disintegration in Russian cities (Belikov, 2008). They further stress the intellectual and official discourse on immigration since the 1990s, particularly since the First Chechen War (Tarasov, 2000; Wales, 2016; Zakharov, 2015). On the other hand, attention also went to the interaction within the farright movement, particularly between informal skinhead groups and legal organisations. Thus, Tarasov (2004) argues that the “constant propaganda” coming from authorities and media, but also from far-right parties, profoundly changed the skinhead scene, making it more politicised and lethal. In contrast, Verkhovsky (2014) argues that “Nazi-skinheads” changed the far-right political parties, making the far-right movement far more violent than it was in the 1990s. Varga (2019) has argued that while far-right formal organisations indeed propagated a more explicit political agenda amongst skinheads, skinheads nevertheless radicalised without much outside help. Within the skinhead scene, some groups developed into simple organisations out of concerns to increase the lethality of attacks and avoid detection rather than under the influence of ideas coming from political parties. These simple organisations concentrated 47

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their efforts on transforming the skinhead scene into a violence-prone milieu through personal examples and by disseminating ideas (setting up publications and websites). The tremendous transformation that the scene underwent since the 1990s also requires a better understanding. While most authors agreed that the scene’s virulence or militancy did not decrease, there was a significant change in the scene’s ideological preferences and manifestations. Over the first decade and a half after communism, the far-right scene underwent a trend of radicalisation towards adopting national-socialist and white supremacist ideas and networks. Over the latter decade, however, there was a transformation towards seemingly less extreme ideological positions, with the most active groups holding positions at first sight barely resembling the openly NS-apologetic groups of the 1990s and 2000s. A further transformation was that most groups position themselves as regime loyalists, framing their stance as “patriotic” militancy in support of Church and State. Explanations usually relate these trends to the changing political context. Ever since the late 2000s, the Russian state became less inclined to accept opposition to it, particularly the armed and openly violent type embodied by the far right. And since 2012, the state has become more interested in advancing political positions that directly compete with those of the far right, adopting the singling out of the Russian nation as the “state-forming” nation (Malinova, 2015), and developing its own mix of Orthodox positions, nationalism and conservatism (Bluhm, 2016; Holzer et al., 2018; Teper, 2016). An element of continuity with the 2000s is the state’s openness to accommodate those far-right factions that signalled loyalty, such as parts of the Eurasianist and militant Orthodox scenes. This signalled other far-right activists that their movement’s existence was only possible if they join the loyalist organisations. But the apparent downgrading of far-right positions leaving Aryanist positions behind, cannot obfuscate that the intensity of far-right hate in Russia has barely changed. While there is less street-level violence targeting Caucasian and Central Asian immigrants, it is “gays,” “liberals,” and “atheists” that have turned into the far-right scene’s main targets as the alleged representatives of anti-Russian international conspiracies. For parts of the scene, anti-Semitism plays the same role as in the 1990s and 2000s in explaining what lies behind such international conspiracies. Turning the perspective around from claiming that the Russian state is more capable of controlling the far right than in the 2000s, one can argue that the opposite is true. Namely, the ideological downgrading and loyalty proofs vis-à-vis Russia’s power-holders have allowed the scene to keep or establish legally existing organisations. It could thus keep older activists safe from prosecution while continuing to disseminate messages and recruit new members. Furthermore, the far-right organisations that have won the upper hand in the movement throughout the 2010s did not escape the “split delegitimization” trend, that is, increasingly vilifying the state for its lack of resolute action over the demands of the far right. The loyalist trend has yet again been diluted by a confrontational attitude, rallying against the state’s alleged protection of sexual minority rights and the anti-COVID vaccination programme, hailing the invasion of Ukraine but accusing the state of being too tolerant of internal (democratic) opposition.

Notes 1 Most research on right-wing intellectuals was carried out by Viktor Shnirelman, who argues that precisely because these intellectuals lacked studies of history, they used pre-revolutionary sources rather than historical documents, which according to Shnirelman met their anti-Semitic prejudices (Shnirelman, 2014, p. 122). 2 The LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) is the only far-right organisation with an uninterrupted presence in the Russian Parliament; the party’s initial ties to Soviet and then Russian secret services, and Zhirinovsky’s Jewish heritage made it a contested presence in the far-right movement.

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The Russian far right Nevertheless, the LDPR often offered the extra-parliamentary far right its logistical support (Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2011; Varga, 2008a). 3 For an analysis of the German skinhead subculture, see Sitzer and Heitmeyer (2008). 4 According to the Church, the film – the same as Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer of 2012 – offended the religious feelings of Russians, since the Church had sanctified Nikolai II. 5 See the statements by the DSS leader Andrei Kormukhin on vkontakte, https://vk.com/wall-53664310_ 326057 6 Both the Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich seem to operate primarily as groups of fighters or mercenaries, showing little interest in playing a public role or disseminating far-right discourse. The US State Department designated the Russian Imperial Movement as a terrorist organisation, the first time in US history that a white supremacist group was listed as a terrorist; see https://2017-2021.state.gov/ united-states-designates-russian-imperial-movement-and-leaders-as-global-terrorists/index.html

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Mihai Varga Malinova, O. (2015). Aktualnoe proshloe: simvolicheskaia politika vlastvuiushei elity i dilemmy rossiiskoi identichnosti. Politicheskaia entsiklopedia. Mitrokhin, N. (2015). Right-Wing Saints. Retrieved from https://therussianreader.com/2015/10/30/ mitrokhin-russian-orthodox-church-fascization/. Pilkington, H., Garifzianova, A., & Omel’chenko, E. (2010). Russia’s skinheads: Exploring and rethinking subcultural lives. Routledge. Razuvalova, A. (2019). The world has not petrified forever. In N. Fiess, & K. Kaminskij (Eds.), Resignification of borders: Eurasianism and the Russian world (Vol. 37, pp. 35–66). Frank & Timme. Sergeev, S., & Salagaev, A. (2013). Sovremennyi russkii etnonatsionalizm: Genezis, organizatsii, perspektivy. Uchenye zapiski kazanskogo universiteta, 155(1), 222–232. Shekhovtsov, A. (2015). Alexander Dugin and the West European new right, 1989–1994. In M. Laruelle (Ed.), Eurasianism and the European far right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia relationship (pp. 35–54). Lexington Books. Shekhovtsov, A., & Umland, A. (2009). Is Aleksandr Dugin a traditionalist?” Neo-Eurasianism” and perennial philosophy. The Russian Review, 68(4), 662–678. Shekhovtsov, A., & Umland, A. (2011). Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the LDPR. Russian Analytical Digest, 102, 14–16. Shenfield, S. (2001). Russian Fascism: Traditions, tendencies and movements. Routledge. Shlapentokh, D. (2010). ‘Kondopoga’–Ethnic/Social tension in Putin’s Russia. European Review, 18(2), 177–206. Shnirelman, V. (2014). Hyperborea: The arctic myth of contemporary Russian radical nationalists. Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics, 8(2), 121–138. Shnirelman, V. (2018). Alexander Dugin: Between eschatology, esotericism, and conspiracy theory. In A. Dyrendal, D. G. Robertson, & E. Asprem (Eds.), Handbook of conspiracy theory and contemporary religion (pp. 443–460). Brill. Simi, P., & Futrell, R. (2015). American Swastika: Inside the white power movement’s hidden spaces of hate. Rowman & Littlefield. Simonsen, S. G. (1996). Aleksandr Barkashov and Russian National Unity: Blackshirt friends of the nation. Nationalities Papers, 24(4), 625–640. Sitzer, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). Right-wing extremist violence among adolescents in Germany. New Directions for Youth Development, 2008(119), 169–185. Sova. (2012). Knigi ‘Skiny: Rus’ probuzhdaetsia’ i ‘Okhotnik’ priznany ekstremistskimi. Retrieved from Moscow: http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2012/08/d25039/ Sprinzak, E. (1995). Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 17–43. Suspitsina, T. (1999). The rape of Holy Mother Russia and the hatred of femininity: The representation of women and the use of feminine imagery in the Russian nationalist press. Anthropology of East Europe Review, 17(2), 114–123. Tarasov, A. (2000). Porozhdenie reform: Britogolovye, oni zhe skinkhedy. Svobodnaia mysl’ 21(5), http://scepsis.net/library/id_115.html. Tarasov, A. (2001). Offspring of reforms—Shaven heads are skinheads: The new fascist youth subculture in Russia. Russian Politics & Law, 39(1), 43–89. Tarasov, A. (2004). Natsi-skiny v sovremennoi Rossii. Doklad dlia Moskovskogo biuro po pravam cheloveka. Retrieved from http://scepsis.net/library/id_605.html Teper, Y. (2016). Official Russian identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: National or imperial? Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(4), 378–396. Tipaldou, S., & Uba, K. (2014). The Russian radical right movement and immigration policy: Do they just make noise or have an impact as well? Europe-Asia Studies, 66(7), 1080–1101. Uzlaner, D., & Stoeckl, K. (2019). From pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’to matilda: Orthodox believers, critique, and religious freedom in Russia. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 34(3), 427–445. Varga, M. (2008). How political opportunities strengthen the fair right: Understanding the rise in far-right militancy in Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(4), 561–579. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09668130801999854 Varga, M. (2019). Russia’s far-right violence wave: Tracing the development of terror in a NationalSocialist Organization. Problems of Post-Communism, 66(3), 200–210. Verkhovsky, A. (2014). Dinamika nasiliia v russkom natsionalizme. In A. Verkhovsky (Ed.), Rossiia – ne Ukraina: sovremennye aktsenty natsionalizma (pp. 32–61). Sova.

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The Russian far right Verkhovsky, A. (2015). Russkie pridut. Direktor IATs “Sova” o proshlom, nastoiashchem i budushchem natsionalizma. Lenta.Ru. Verkhovsky, A., & Pribylovsky, V. (1996). Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v Rossii. Istoriya, ideologiya, ekstremistkie tendentsii. Institut eksperimental’noy sotsiologii. Wales, O. (2016). Skinheads and Nashi: What are the reasons for the rise of nationalism amongst Russian youth in the post-Soviet period? Slovo 28(2), 106–30. Yudina, N., & Verkhovsky, A. (2019). Russian nationalist veterans of the Donbas War. Nationalities Papers, 47(5), 734–749. Zakharov, N. (2015). Race and racism in Russia. Palgrave Macmillan.

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PART II

Central Europe

4 SUBNATIONAL POLITICS AND FAR-RIGHT STRENGTH IN GERMANY The Importance of the East-West Divide Sabine Volk and Manès Weisskircher

Introduction While social science scholarship has long focused on far-right politics at the national level, several scholars have recently highlighted the importance of local roots and regional strongholds – a development more broadly conceived as “localist turn” in populism studies (Chou et al., 2022). So far, three debates have shaped the academic understanding of the far right at the subnational level: First, researchers have focused on explaining subnational variation in support (Bolet, 2021; Fitzgerald & Lawrence, 2011; Patana, 2020, 2021). Second, the literature has underscored the importance of far-right appeals to subnational belonging, community, and identity (Fitzgerald, 2018; Göpffarth, 2021; Heinisch et al., 2018; Zaslove, 2011). Third, scholars have investigated far-right strategies to achieve local and regional organisational strength and societal embeddedness (Martin et al., 2020; Paxton, 2020; Weinstein, 2019). Looking at far-right players specifically, the insight that “all politics is local” has broadened scholarly awareness of crucial aspects of the so-called fourth wave of the far right (Mudde, 2019) in contemporary Europe. This contribution analyses the subnational dimension of far-right politics by studying the “critical case” (Snow, 2004) of the Federal Republic of Germany. Importantly, the most striking characteristic of the German far right’s contemporary territorial stronghold – eastern Germany – is that it belonged to another (German) state until 1990: What are now the five “new” eastern Bundesländer, the states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, as well as half of Berlin, formed the state socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) until the “reunification” of post-war West and East Germany on 3 October 1990. Since then, far-right politics in reunited Germany have been characterised by an East-West divide (Weisskircher, 2020b). Moreover, reflecting the role of historically grown regions and local municipalities, German statehood is marked by its federal structure and dominant regional identities (Hildebrandt & Trüdinger, 2021) that influence both ideational and organisational features of the country’s far right. Aiming to shed new light on far-right politics, our chapter analyses the subnational politics and political strategies of key German far-right players. Taking a bird’s eye view,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-7

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we introduce the most relevant far-right actors rather than providing an in-depth analysis of variation amongst and within the different actors. Aware of the “electoralist” bias in political science scholarship (Castelli Gattinara, 2020), we underline the importance of the non-party sector in the context of subnational politics by also referring to social movement organisations and subcultural milieus, examining nonviolent players in particular.1 Crucially, our case study points to often-neglected far-right strategies: many far-right players purposefully mobilise at the subnational level, both in terms of discourse and organisation, pointing to the regional and local underpinnings of “nationalism.” Our argument draws from our empirical research, based on different methodological approaches including ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews.2 Specifically, we refer to original ethnographic data generated as participant observer of street demonstrations in the eastern German city of Dresden in 2019–2020 and via digital ethnography in 2020–2021, as well as from interviews with far-right actors in 2021–2022. Our corpus thus includes interview data as well as ethnographic field protocols, photos and videos of demonstrations, and some social media data. In the following, we set out with an overview of the most prominent actors associated with contemporary Germany’s far right, underlining how their rise and development is linked to actors and spaces in the East. We continue by explaining their regional strength, pointing to the importance of both the heritage of state socialism and the neoliberal transformation policies of the 1990s. Afterwards, we turn to the subnational strategies of far-right players, focusing on the discursive appeal to subnational belonging, community, and identity as well as the seeking of subnational organisational strength and societal embeddedness. We conclude by contextualising the strength of Germany’s far right in the East and by highlighting broader lessons for scholarship on the far right.

Key far-right actors in contemporary (eastern) Germany Post-war West Germany was an outlier in western Europe: Far-right parties long failed to establish themselves in the country, with the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany) in the 1960s and Die Republikaner (The Republicans) in the 1980s having been close to electoral breakthrough (Backes & Mudde, 2000; Decker, 2000). The three decades following the 1990 reunification of what were formerly two German states, however, brought the rise of new regional and local far-right actors and their increased success (Botsch, 2016). While old and new actors mobilised across the country, ever since reunification far-right parties, protest movements, and subcultural milieus have, by and large, been significantly stronger in the East than in the West. Already in the early 1990s, a series of infamous anti-immigrant and racist hate crimes was carried out in the territory of the former GDR. Electorally, at the end of the 1990s, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) (Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt) and the NPD (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony) temporarily succeeded in gaining representation in eastern regional parliaments. Also, some of Europe’s largest far-right demonstrations took place in the Saxon city of Dresden in the 2000s, organised by neo-Nazis from across the country and abroad to “commemorate” the city’s war-time destruction (Volk, 2020a). The presence of some far-right actors in the East – and to a lesser extent also in the West – notwithstanding, the far right long failed to establish itself in national-level politics, in particular in the country’s federal parliament, the Bundestag. Yet, the situation changed drastically in the 2010s: In the context of the intensification of the “refugee crisis” in Europe, Germany has witnessed the rise to prominence of a multitude of new far-right players, comprising 56

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of a political party in the national parliament, social movement organisations, “alternative” media platforms, “intellectual circles” as well as violent anti-immigration groups and even terrorist cells. Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine protest groups emerged, involving many new and some old players that originated from or established significant ties to the far-right scene. To be sure, even though the rise of this diverse set of players is not limited to the so-called new Bundesländer – further complicated by some prominent far-right figures active in the East, but born in western Germany – such actors are clearly most popular in eastern Germany. Amongst political parties, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) quickly became the only game in town. When established in 2013, AfD was not a far-right player yet (Arzheimer, 2015). Instead, its founders, mainly neoliberal economists and former politicians from the West, primarily targeted Germany’s Eurozone policies. The new party mirrored longterm dissatisfaction amongst Germany’s political right and what disenchanted rightists have regarded as “social-democratization” of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU, Christian Democratic Union) (Biebricher, 2018). However, when still focusing on economic issues, AfD narrowly failed to pass the five per cent threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag in the federal election in 2013. Nevertheless, the party soon entered not only regional after regional legislature, with particular ease in eastern Germany, but also the European Parliament. From the very beginning, infighting over ideology, strategy, and power shaped AfD’s development, with western versus eastern party branches as one amongst several lines of division (Heinze & Weisskircher, 2021). An early bone of contention was the party’s relationship towards the anti-immigration and anti-establishment protestors of the Dresden-based Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident). In the summer of 2015, riding the wave of PEGIDA’s public protest across the country, anti-immigration forces inside AfD, particularly dominant in the party’s eastern branches, took over the federal party – just ahead of the intensification of the “refugee crisis” (Weisskircher et al., 2022). This development marked the party’s transformation into a typical European “populist radical right party,” at least in ideological terms (Arzheimer, 2019). In 2017, AfD entered the national parliament as third-strongest party, mainly supported because of its anti-immigration positions (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019; Hansen & Olsen, 2019). At this election, the party gained a relative majority in the eastern state of Saxony, slightly ahead of the state’s traditionally dominant CDU. Even though the context of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a challenge for AfD, the party clearly was here to stay: In the federal election of 2021, while being divided over how to mobilise against the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic (Heinze & Weisskircher, 2022), it lost some voters, but easily remained in the Bundestag. It even became the most popular party in two eastern German states, Saxony and Thuringia. Crucially, AfD electoral strength in the East coincided with the party’s strategic street mobilisation against the government’s pandemic politics. In the protest arena, PEGIDA became the best-known case of far-right street activism. The Patriotic Europeans emerged in Dresden, the capital of Saxony, in 2014, almost a year before the peak of the “refugee crisis” (Vorländer et al., 2018). Founded by a dozen friends and acquaintances, the group did not emerge out of pre-existing far-right organisations, and was not related to the annual neo-Nazi “marches of grief” taking place in the city (Kocyba, 2018). Initially, PEGIDA achieved unexpected mobilisation success: Activists gathered up to 20,000 supporters in weekly street demonstrations. While PEGIDA tried to mobilise elsewhere in Germany and Europe, activists were much less successful outside of Dresden (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016; Volk, 2019). Even though participation declined sooner than later also 57

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in PEGIDA’s Saxon heartland, the group has persisted since 2014, also during the COVID-19 pandemic and “lockdown” (Volk, 2022a). Another key example of popular far-right street protest has been Zukunft Heimat (Future Homeland) in the eastern German town of Golßen, Brandenburg, founded in 2015, during a conflict over the local accommodation of asylum-seekers. Apart from protest against immigration, Zukunft Heimat has also organised autumnal thanksgiving festivities or bike demonstrations, demanding a bicycle lane. Mobilising in the city of Cottbus in 2018, the group managed to gather a few thousand followers on several occasions. Its key figure Hans-Christoph Berndt is now leading AfD politician in Brandenburg (Minkenberg & Sündermann, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, so-called anti-lockdown protest groups emerged that soon established ties with pre-existing far-right actors, drawing on organisational structures, protest repertoires, and discourses. While one of Germany’s most prominent anti-lockdown organisations, Querdenken (“lateral thinking”), emerged and spread initially in western Germany (Grande et al., 2021), it was again in the East where the movement was close to the far-right scene. For instance, neo-Nazis violently enabled anti-lockdown protestors to demonstrate despite pandemic restrictions in the Saxon city of Leipzig in 2020, and the far-right Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons) established themselves as an “umbrella organisation” for antiestablishment protest across Saxony over the course of 2021, attracting large-scale support on social media and coordinating protest events in numerous cities, towns, and even villages across the federal state (Panreck, 2021). Beyond the parliamentary and protest arenas, further actors amongst Germany’s broader far-right subcultural milieu have proven to be influential. Most importantly, the Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS, Institute for State Politics) is a far-right think tank founded in 2000. By the early 2020s, the IfS entertains the publishing house Antaios and the journal Sezession, and organises public events and seminars for (young) far-right activists in Schnellroda, Steigra, in the eastern German countryside (Backes, 2023; Volk, 2020c). As a think tank, the IfS aims to provide the theoretical underpinnings of both far-right politics and activism: Its key figure Götz Kubitschek contributed to AfD’s transformation in 2015 as one of the ghost-writers of the Erfurter Resolution (“Erfurt Resolution”), then a key document for radical forces within AfD. He also repeatedly appeared as a guest speaker at PEGIDA demonstrations. Similar to AfD and PEGIDA who claim to represent moderately “patriotic” rather than extreme positions (Volk, 2020b), the IfS understands itself as a “conservative hegemonic project” rather than a far-right organisation (Kellershohn, 2016). Beyond the circles around the IfS, Germany’s far-right subcultural milieu includes a number of both print and online “alternative news” media in German language, amongst them the prominent magazine Compact and the website Politically Incorrect News (PI News) (Weisskircher, 2020a).

The historical roots of far-right strength in eastern Germany Our brief overview of the most relevant far-right players in Germany already points to the importance of subnational strongholds and in particular their strength in the East. On average, the far right mobilises significantly stronger in the East than in the West – an observation that is valid for the electoral arena, protest politics, and subcultural milieus. Indeed, electorally, AfD has been about twice as strong in the East, with the gap increasing rather than decreasing. At their peak, far-right protests, for instance organised by PEGIDA and Zukunft Heimat, could frequently gather a few thousand supporters there. Also, subcultural milieus such as “intellectual circles,” publishing houses, and “alternative” media outlets are either based or more popular in the “new” Bundesländer.3 58

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What explains the strength of far-right forces in eastern Germany? Crucially, demand for anti-establishment politics is higher in the East than in the West. This comparatively higher demand relates to widespread perceptions of economic, cultural, and political marginalisation: In fact, three decades after reunification, more than half of the inhabitants of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia perceive themselves as “second-class citizens” (Infratest dimap, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). While anti-establishment attitudes in the East were long mobilised by the leftwing protest party Die Linke (The Left Party) – which is at least the indirect successor party of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) – AfD has now taken up this role (Olsen, 2018). As contemporary eastern Germany formed another state until 1990, dominant explanations for the rise of anti-establishment attitudes highlight specificities such as the political, economic, and cultural legacy of GDR state socialism and the consequences of the neoliberal policies in the transformation process of the 1990s (Mau, 2019; Weisskircher, 2020b), which at the same time were regional varieties of broader trends in European politics (Kollmorgen, 2021; Manow, 2018; Ther, 2019). Importantly, in the 1990s, large segments of the eastern German population, coming from a society where life was organised around the workplace, suddenly lost socio-economic status (Mau, 2019): in the context of neoliberal transformation and ensuing de-industrialisation, millions witnessed how the value of their educational profile and work experience decreased in the face of international economic competition. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, record unemployment rates in eastern Germany and subsequent record emigration flows to western Germany were immediate consequences, leaving behind older and formally less educated groups of people in increasingly depopulated rural areas (Diermeier, 2020; Otteni & Herold, 2020). Even though the living standards in eastern Germany have significantly risen after reunification, the memory of economic hardship and unemployment in the aftermath of reunification still impacts voting patterns today: In electoral districts with a history of high unemployment, AfD fares better – independent from the current economic situation (Manow, 2018). Beyond economics, the heritage of state socialism has created favourable conditions for far-right support due to the eastern German population’s comparative lack of experience with multi-cultural society as well as the externalisation of guilt with regard to the Nazi past, amongst others. Indeed, as immigration was highly limited, eastern Germans lacked experience with non-European immigration and multiculturalism, quite different from the so-called Gastarbeiter (“guest worker”) immigration to the Federal Republic in the 1960s and 1970s. Not least, while the GDR’s official “anti-fascist” self-understanding strongly condemned far-right ideology, its dealing with the Nazi past had stayed largely superficial, and the state failed to take action when far-right youth subcultures emerged in the late 1980s, which formed a considerable mobilisation potential afterwards (Wagner, 2021). Until now, nativist attitudes are considerably more widespread in eastern Germany than in the West, forming a key explanatory variable for AfD voting choices at the individual level (Arzheimer, 2023). Finally, the shortcomings of the political transformation more narrowly understood also left its mark on eastern Germany: in 1989–1990, political elites in East and West did not push for a new common constitution, enlarging the scope of West Germany’s Grundgesetz (Basic Law) instead, and thus missing the opportunity for a symbolic new beginning. Moreover, in the process of transferring western state and society structures to the territory of the former GDR, an elite transfer from the West to the East took place, leading to the underrepresentation of eastern Germans at elite levels in politics, society, business, and educational institutions throughout the following decades (Bluhm & Jacobs, 2016; Kollmorgen, 2020). 59

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The subnational political strategies of Germany’s far right Reflecting their subnational strength, contemporary Germany’s far right is not exclusively “nationalist”: According to our ethnographic observations and interview data from 2019 to 2022, localism and regionalism are of key relevance to its strategy, i.e., discourse and organisation – as well as identity. In an interview, for example, a leading AfD politician of a key eastern German AfD branch identified primarily as “eastern German” instead of “German,” stating that he feels distant to what he perceived as mainstream German culture (interview on 4 October 2021). While not campaigning for more devolution, regional autonomy, or secession, Germany’s far-right actors focus on the region of eastern Germany, Ostdeutschland, as their main constituency, portraying themselves as “representative” or “voice” of eastern German interests and identities (Begrich, 2018; Weisskircher, 2022a). Ironically, this also applies to some key far-right figures that were actually born in West Germany and later moved to the East, such as former and current AfD politicians Andreas Kalbitz or Björn Höcke. In the following, we explore the subnational dimension in reunited Germany’s far-right politics, analysing both discursive and organisational strategies.

Appeals to subnational belonging, community, and identity Amongst the core discursive strategies that far-right actors employ to appeal to eastern German identities is the recourse to regional history and collective memory, focusing on the Peaceful Revolution at the end of the GDR in 1989–1990, popularly referred to as Wende (“turn”) (Göpffarth, 2020; Volk, 2022c). Both the revolution and ensuing reunification count amongst the most fondly remembered periods in the recent German past amongst the broader public (Rudnick, 2011). Collective memory narratives of a successful, citizen-led revolution therefore offer a positive point of reference also to far-right actors (Patton, 2017). Examples for such references are numerous across the different arenas of far-right politics: Crucially, in the 2019 regional electoral campaigns AfD advertised its politics as a Wende 2.0 (Turn 2.0), thus alluding to radical system change. In the protest arena, actors claim to be the successors of the Monday Demonstrations that contributed to the demise of the GDR, presenting themselves as a form of civil opposition to the current political system. In line with our ethnographic observations in 2019–2021, at demonstrations organised by PEGIDA, speakers regularly refer to the protest organisations as “civil movements” (Bürgerbewegungen) that take to the streets “like in 1989,” construing a historical parallel with anti-government and anti-regime protest in the GDR. In addition, far-right discourse exalts the East as “real” Germany, questioning dominant perspectives that portray the West as the norm and the East as diversion. Re-evaluating the role of the East in relation to the West, such discourse directly responds to sentiments of “second-class citizenship” frequent amongst eastern German voters, as discussed above. In their revaluation of the East these actors commonly refer to two factors: First, with regard to politics, they portray eastern Germans as “freedom fighters” and “better democrats,” highlighting the importance of mass demonstrations for the demise of the GDR. Second, far-right actors exalt the East as a far-right “heartland” (Taggart, 2000; Weisskircher, 2022a) on the basis of culture and heritage, propagating that eastern Germany is culturally “pure” due to lower levels of (non-European) immigration and what the far right portrays as “Islamisation.” Throughout our physical and digital fieldwork in 2019–2021, we could observe how speakers at PEGIDA’s demonstrations celebrate the city of Dresden as “the capital of resistance” that “stands” against “Islamisation” as well as the “totalitarian” pressures of the German 60

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national government. Accordingly, the far right recommends western Germans to refer to the East as a positive example: At a rally amidst “lockdown” restrictions in May 2020, Jens Maier, then AfD Member of Parliament based in Dresden, proclaimed that “The Saxon spirit will heal Germany,” drawing from the nineteenth-century charged slogan “The German spirit may heal the world.” Such arguments are also frequent amongst far-right knowledge producers. For instance, Compact magazine, a key far-right print medium, titled in 2017 “The East shines. What the West can learn,” pointing to the cultural achievements of eastern Germany in the past and present as exemplary for Germany as a whole.

Subnational organisational strength and societal embeddedness Beyond these rhetorical appeals to community and identity, far-right actors have strategically sought to increase their regional and local organisational presence in eastern Germany. To this aim, some have adopted a type of “boots on the ground”-approach that tries to establish more direct contact between far-right players and local constituencies. For example, in our interviews many eastern AfD politicians highlighted the importance of local presence for their electoral strength. Amongst such efforts, they count the regular organisation of information stalls, citizen dialogue events, and even fairs, such as on May Day, in eastern German towns. Another dimension is the strategic cooperation and networking amongst the region’s diverse actors from across the electoral, protest, and intellectual arenas. Our data reveals that, as a loose network, many of these new players identify as part of a broader collective. They regularly demonstrate their unity in the public space, for instance in the context of the violent riots in the Saxon city of Chemnitz in 2018, as well as at the repetitive demonstrations organised by PEGIDA in Dresden. For example, in the context of our participant observation of PEGIDA’s seven-year anniversary celebration in Dresden in October 2021, we witnessed how Jürgen Elsässer, the editor of Compact-magazine and as a former left-winger a prominent figure within the scene, praised AfD, PEGIDA, the Identitäre Bewegung (IB, Generation Identity), Compact as well as the anti-lockdown protestors as the “five fingers” of a metaphorical “fist” in the fight against the “leftist establishment” (Volk, 2022b). The IfS author Benedikt Kaiser, born in western Germany and based in Saxony, has coined the term Mosaikrechte (“mosaique right”), emphasising the need for an organisational division of labour, societal embeddedness, and cultural influence (Kaiser, 2022). In addition, also fringe actors aim to build strength on the ground. In its few remaining local strongholds, most of them in Saxony, NPD organises public gatherings and engages in social activities, such as distributing household products amongst people in financial needs. Similarly, the party Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path) offers martial arts training and school coaching in certain localities. Moreover, some far-right activists have created local presence by purchasing real estate in eastern German towns and villages. These objects tend to be relatively cheap as they are located in villages whose population has severely shrunk in the course of demographic shifts and westward migration after reunification and corresponding deindustrialisation in the East (Schmidt, 2014). In 2020 in Saxony, for example, about 80 real estate objects were regularly used by fringe parties or loose networks of “settlers” and “sovereign citizens” (Kulturbüro Sachsen e.V., 2021). The most prominent case, though, was located in Halle, a university town in the region of Saxony-Anhalt where the German branch of Generation Identity ran a housing project from 2017 to 2019. Intended as cultural centre and networking space, the project was modelled after CasaPound, an Italian far-right group that runs such similar centres, most prominently in an occupied building in Rome (Froio et al., 2020). Besides providing space for IB activism, one regional AfD deputy also opened up an 61

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office in the building in Halle. However, civil society initiatives heavily mobilised against the housing project, outnumbering far-right activists on several occasions. After two years, the project failed.

Concluding remarks In line with the “localist” turn in populism studies, this chapter has examined the far right in Germany through the lens of the country’s East-West divide, emphasising the importance of far-right local roots and regional strongholds. As a critical case, our focus on the Federal Republic of Germany reveals that it is essential to consider subnational politics when seeking to explain far-right strength. An assessment of far-right organisational strategies in the East provides an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, the direct impact of the far right’s “boots on the ground”-politics is limited. For example, the influence of AfD on policy outcomes in regional legislatures is minor, despite their numerical strength in many state parliaments. Unlike other European countries, AfD is still largely excluded from legislative cooperation, also at the regional level (Heinze, 2022). Nevertheless, far-right strength in the East may have important effects, both on specific localities and on the German political system as a whole. For instance, the involvement of far-right players in municipal initiatives may contribute to the normalisation of anti-immigration discourse or even racist ideology at the local level (Nettelbladt, 2021). Moreover, in the electoral arena, AfD’s increasing success makes the formation of government coalitions more difficult. At times, conservative CDU branches in the East now need to govern with their left-wing competitors, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, Social-Democratic Party of Germany) and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (The Greens). The key instance, however, is the government turmoil in Thuringia in February 2020, when the liberal Thomas Kemmerich was elected regional governor of Thuringia by his own Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP, Free Democratic Party), CDU and AfD to prevent a candidate from the Left. This vote caused major national outrage and a crisis within the national government coalition of CDU and SPD, underlining how the subnational level may affect national-level politics. Beyond political strategies, far-right strength in the East is also linked to external factors, notably the lack of public opposition (for the importance of studying countermobilisation to the far right see Heinze & Weisskircher, 2022; Vüllers & Hellmeier, 2022; Zeller, 2021). The effective civil society mobilisation against the IB housing project in Halle being an exception, eastern far-right actors typically face less countermobilisation than in the West, creating comparatively favourable conditions for their local presence and regional strength. In the protest arena, counterdemonstrations against PEGIDA were oftentimes numerically inferior to the far-right crowd, and, at least during our ethnographic observations, mostly unable to disturb: At the pre-pandemic regular Monday rallies, around 100 counterprotestors opposed more than a thousand of PEGIDA “marchers” in the centre of Dresden. In the many rural areas of eastern Germany, there is hardly any organised countermobilisation: Focusing on small towns with a few thousand inhabitants only, Zukunft Heimat barely ever had to struggle with opposition on the streets. Similarly, the IfS confronts counterprotests only in the context of special events, such as its annual “winter schools,” when left-wing activists travel from the close-by cities of Halle and Leipzig to the tiny municipality of Schnellroda (Volk, 2020c). To conclude, it is also essential to put the subnational strength of the far right in eastern Germany into an international perspective. Electorally, the support for AfD in eastern Germany is only remarkable when contrasted with western Germany. In comparison to its 62

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European neighbours, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, or Poland, however, eastern German voting patterns rather remind of the national average of the respective farright parties. From a broader perspective, then, eastern Germany constitutes a “normal” case within the European context, whereas it is western Germany that represents a curious outlier. Overall, the German case remains exceptional due to the close intertwinement of far-right party politics and activism, especially in the East, as well as the far-right exaltation of the former socialist part of the country as the cradle of “true” Germanness.

Notes 1 Still, the subnational level is also crucial for understanding the distribution of far-right violence over time and space: With some exceptions, acts of political violence peaked in the early 1990s and mid2010s in parts of eastern Germany (König & Jäckle, 2023). 2 Ethnographic fieldwork was mainly conducted as part of the Horizon 2020 project “Delayed Transformational Fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe: Responding to the Rise of Illiberalism/Populism” (FATIGUE) funded by the European Commission (Grant No. 765224) (by Sabine Volk), while interviews were conducted as part of the project “Reaching out to Close the Border” funded by Research Council of Norway (Grant No. 303219) (by Manès Weisskircher). 3 Recently, some observers have stressed the need to consider variation within eastern Germany as well, often with the desire to reject the portrayal of a stereotypical and homogenous far-right Dunkeldeutschland (“dark Germany”). Indeed, electorally, AfD is strongest only in the south of eastern Germany, i.e., in the Federal States of Saxony, Thuringia, parts of Saxony-Anhalt, and in the countryside. However, also in the north of eastern Germany, i.e., Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and in eastern German cities, AfD is usually still much more successful than in those parts of western Germany where it fares best. Even in reunified and gentrified Berlin, AfD is clearly stronger in the eastern part of the city. While variation within eastern Germany is indeed interesting, it does not diminish the importance of the east-west divide. Still, it also needs to be emphasised that even in those parts of eastern Germany where AfD is electorally most successful, a vast majority of citizens vote for other parties (for a more thorough discussion, see Weisskircher, 2022b).

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Sabine Volk and Manès Weisskircher Bolet, D. (2021). Drinking alone: Local socio-cultural degradation and radical right support—The case of British pub closures. Comparative Political Studies, 54(9), 1653–1692. Botsch, G. (2016). “Nationale Opposition” in der demokratischen Gesellschaft. Zur Geschichte der extremen Rechten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In F. Virchow, M. Langebach, & A. Häusler (Eds.), Handbuch Rechtsextremismus (pp. 43–82). Springer. Castelli Gattinara, P. (2020). The study of the far right and its three E’s: Why scholarship must go beyond Eurocentrism, Electoralism and Externalism. French Politics, 18(3), 314–333. Chou, M., Moffitt, B., & Busbridge, R. (2022). The localist turn in populism studies. Swiss Political Science Review, 28(1), 129–141. Decker, F. (2000). Über das Scheitern des neuen Rechtspopulismus in Deutschland: Republikaner, Statt-Partei und der Bund Freier Bürger. Österreichische Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft, 29(2), 237–256. Diermeier, M. (2020). Ist mehr besser? Politische Implikationen der disparaten Daseinsvorsorge in Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 30(4), 539–568. Fitzgerald, J. (2018). Close to home: Local ties and voting radical right in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, J., & Lawrence, D. (2011). Local cohesion and radical right support: The case of the Swiss People’s Party. Electoral Studies, 30(4), 834–847. Froio, C., Castelli Gattinara, P., Bulli, G., & Albanese, M. (2020). CasaPound Italia: Contemporary extreme-right politics. Routledge. Göpffarth, J. (2021). Activating the socialist past for a nativist future: Far-right intellectuals and the prefigurative power of multidirectional nostalgia in Dresden. Social Movement Studies, 20(1), 57–74. Grande, E., Hutter, S., Hunger, S., & Kanol, E. (2021). Alles Covidioten? Politische Potenziale des Corona-Protests in Deutschland. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Hansen, M. A., & Olsen, J. (2019). Flesh of the same flesh: A study of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election. German Politics, 28(1), 1–19. Heinisch, R., Massetti, E., & Mazzoleni, O. (2018). Populism and ethno-territorial politics in European multi-level systems. Comparative European Politics, 16(6), 923–936. Heinze, A.-S. (2022). Dealing with the populist radical right in parliament: mainstream party responses toward the Alternative for Germany, European Political Science Review, 14(3), 333–350. Heinze, A.-S., & Weisskircher, M. (2021). No strong leaders needed? AfD Party organisation between collective leadership, internal democracy, and “movement-party” strategy. Politics and Governance, 9(4), 263–274. Heinze, A.-S., & Weisskircher, M.. (2022). How political parties respond to pariah street protest: The case of anti-Corona mobilisation in Germany. German Politics, online first. Hildebrandt, A., & Trüdinger, E. M. (2021). Belonging and exclusion: The dark side of regional identity in Germany. Comparative European Politics, 19, 146–163. Infratest dimap. (2019a). Regional elections survey Brandenburg. https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/ 2019-09-01-LT-DE-BB/index.shtml [deadlink] Infratest dimap. (2019b). Regional elections survey Saxony. https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/ 2019-09-01-LT-DE-SN/umfrage-ostdeutschland.shtml Infratest dimap. (2019c). Regional elections survey Thuringia. https://wahl.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2019-1027-LT-DE-TH/index.shtml [deadlink] Kaiser, B. (2022). Die Partei und ihr Vorfeld. Antaios. Kellershohn, H. (2016). Das Institut für Staatspolitik und das jungkonservative Hegemonieprojekt. In S. Braun, A. Geisler, & M. Gerster (Eds.), Strategien der extremen Rechten: Hintergründe—Analysen— Antworten (2nd ed., pp. 439–467). Springer. Kocyba, P. (2018). Pegida: A movement of right-wing extremists or simply ‘concerned citizens’? Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 4(4), 72–88. Kollmorgen, R. (2020). Eliten in Ostdeutschland. Repräsentationsdefizit und Entfremdung der Ostdeutschen? In S. Becker, & M. Naumann (Eds.), Regionalentwicklung in Ostdeutschland (pp. 31–42). Springer. Kollmorgen, R. (2021). Rechtspopulismus in Ostdeutschland. Sieben Thesen zu seiner Formierung, Attraktivität und Ausprägung aus historisch-soziologischer Perspektive. In J. Schütz, R. Kollmorgen, & S. Schäller (Eds.), Die neue Mitte? Ideologie und Praxis der populistischen und extremen Rechten (pp. 159–188). Böhlau.

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Subnational politics and far-right strength in Germany König, P., & Jäckle, S. (2023). The Violence of the Far Right: The Three Decades after German Reunification. In M. Weisskircher (Ed.), From the streets to parliament? The fourth wave of far-right politics in Germany. Routledge. Kulturbüro Sachsen e.V. (2021). Sachsen rechts unten. Kulturbüro Sachsen e.V. https://kulturbuero-sachsen. de/sachsen-rechts-unten-2021/ Manow, P. (2018). Die politische Ökonomie des Populismus. Suhrkamp. Martin, N., de Lange, S. L., & van der Brug, W. (2022). Holding on to voters in volatile times: Bonding voters through party links with civil society. Party Politics, 28(2), 354–364. Mau, S. (2019). Lütten Klein. Suhrkamp. Minkenberg, M., & Sündermann, T. (2021). Das Verhältnis von AfD und rechtsradikalen Bewegungen in Brandenburg. Der Fall Zukunft Heimat in Cottbus. In G. Botsch, & C. Schulze (Eds.), Rechtsparteien in Brandenburg. Zwischen Wahlalternative und Neonazismus (pp. 245–269). Bebra Wissenschaft Verlag. Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity. Nettelbladt, G. (2021). Disrupting dialogue? The participatory urban governance of far-right contestations in Cottbus. Urban Planning, 6(2), 91–102. Olsen, J. (2018). The Left Party and the AfD. Populist competitors in eastern Germany. German Politics and Society, 36(1), 70–83. Otteni, C., & Herold, M. (2020). Schrumpfende Regionen – frustrierte Bürger? Abwanderung und AfDWahl in Deutschland. In: H. Vorländer (Ed.), Emigration in Europa. Jahresbericht 2020, Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy. Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy (MIDEM). Panreck, I.-C. (2021). Corona-Proteste in Sachsen. In S. Kailitz (Ed.), Rechtsextremismus und Rechtspopulismus in Sachsen (pp. 109–118). Sächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung. Patana, P. (2020). Changes in local context and electoral support for the populist radical right: Evidence from Finland. Party Politics, 26(6), 718–729. Patana, P. (2021). Residential constraints and the political geography of the populist radical right: Evidence from France. Perspectives on Politics, 1–18. Cambridge Core. Patton, D. F. (2017). Monday, Monday: Eastern protest movements and German party politics since 1989. German Politics, 26(4), 480–497. Paxton, F. (2020). Towards a populist local democracy? The consequences of populist radical right local government leadership in Western Europe. Representation, 56(3), 411–430. Pickel, S., & Pickel, G. (2023). The wall in the mind – Revisited stable differences in the political cultures of western and eastern Germany. German Politics, 32:1, 20–42. Rudnick, C. S. (2011). Die andere Hälfte der Erinnerung: Die DDR in der deutschen Geschichtspolitik nach 1989. Transcript. Schmidt, A. (2014). Völkische Siedler/innen im ländlichen Raum. Basiswissen und Handlungsstrategien (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, Ed.). Amadeu Antonio Stiftung. Snow, D. A. (2004). Case studies and social movements. In D. A. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements. Wiley. Taggart, P. A. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Ther, P. (2019). Das andere Ende der Geschichte. Über die Große Transformation. Suhrkamp. Volk, S. (2019). Speaking for the ‘European people’? How the transnational alliance Fortress Europe constructs a populist counter-narrative to European integration. Politique Européenne, 66, 120–149. Volk, S. (2020a). Commemoration at the extremes: A field report from Dresden 2020. Cultures of History Forum, https://doi.org/10.25626/0110 Volk, S. (2020b). ‘Wir sind das Volk!’ Representative claim-making and populist style in the PEGIDA movement’s discourse. German Politics, 29(4), 599–616. Volk, S. (2020c, February 11). Introducing eastern Germany’s far-right intellectuals. LSE EUROPP. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/02/11/introducing-eastern-germanys-far-right-intellectuals/ Volk, S. (2022a). Explaining PEGIDA’s ‘strange survival’: an ethnographic approach to far-right protest rituals, Political Research Exchange, 4, 1. Volk, S. (2022b, June 6). Kein verflixtes siebtes Jahr: Weshalb PEGIDA noch immer in Dresden demonstriert. Philosophike, https://philosophike.de/2022/06/kein-verflixtes-siebtes-jahr-weshalb-pegida-nochimmer-in-dresden-demonstriert. Volk, S. (2022c). Resisting leftist dictatorship? Memory politics and collective action framing in the farright populist PEGIDA movement. European Politics and Society, online first.

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Sabine Volk and Manès Weisskircher Vorländer, H., Herold, M., & Schäller, S. (2018). PEGIDA and new right-wing populism in Germany. Palgrave Macmillan. Vüllers, J., & Hellmeier, S. (2022). Does counter-mobilization contain right-wing populist movements? Evidence from Germany. European Journal of Political Research, 61(1), 21–45. Wagner, B. (2021). Rechtsradikalismus in der Spät-DDR. In U. Backes, & S. Kailitz (Eds.), Sachsen— Eine Hochburg des Rechtsextremismus? (pp. 21–43). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Weinstein, L. (2019). Introduction: Political geographies of right wing populism. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. https://www.ijurr.org/spotlight-on/political-geographies-of-rightwing-populism/introduction-populism/ Weisskircher, M. (2020a). Neue Wahrheiten von rechts außen? Alternative Nachrichten und der “Rechtspopulismus” in Deutschland. Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, 33(2), 474–490. Weisskircher, M. (2020b). The strength of far-right AfD in eastern Germany: The east-west divide and the multiple causes behind “populism”. The Political Quarterly, 91(3), 614–622. Weisskircher, M. (2022a). The importance of being eastern German: The multiple heartlands of Germany’s far right. In Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (Ed.), State of the region report 2021: Identity and the far right in the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe today. Weisskircher, M. (2022b). Die AfD als neue Volkspartei des Ostens? In K. Bergmann (Ed.), Mehr Fortschritt wagen? Parteien, Personen, Milieus und Modernisierung: Regieren in Zeiten der Ampelkoalition (pp. 317–334). Transcript. Weisskircher, M., Hutter, S., & Borbáth, E. (2022). Protest and electoral breakthrough: Challenger party-movement interactions in Germany. German Politics, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.202 2.2044473 Zaslove, A. (2011). The re-invention of the European radical right: Populism, regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord. McGill-Queen’s University Press. Zeller, M. (2021). Demobilising far-right demonstration campaigns: Coercive counter-mobilisation, state social control, and the demobilisation of the Hess Gedenkmarsch campaign. Social Movement Studies, 21(3), 372–390.

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5 THE AUSTRIAN FAR RIGHT Historical Continuities and the Case of the Ulrichsberg Commemorations Michael C. Zeller

The branches of Austria’s far right are many and varied, stretching from attitudes and criminal activity to movement actors and to one of Europe’s largest radical right parties – but many of these branches share common roots. An important segment of today’s far-right attitudes and actors essentially stem from the origins of the Second Republic, formed after the Second World War. An early phase of denazification and anti-fascist precepts quickly withered away, leaving behind only a pair of laws prohibiting some far-right activity. Former Nazis were allowed to organise into a politically influential bloc, veterans were able to mobilise campaigns honouring the Nazi armed forces, and the tendrils of far-right sentiments spread. This chapter is chiefly concerned with the modern far-right activism that is an outgrowth of these origins. No single case illustrates this development better than the Ulrichsberg commemorations for Second World War veterans that took place annually from 1959 until 2018. This far-right campaign, which routinely drew thousands of participants to the mountains of southern Austria, proclaimed that martial comradeship is holy and that the Third Reich’s military fought a noble battle against Bolshevism that preserved European freedom. But as wider political developments punctured the myth of Austria as a “victim” of the Nazi regime, the Ulrichsberg commemorations became politicised and the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) under the leadership of Jörg Haider arose as the political champion of the far right. This chapter details the elements of Austria’s far-right ecosystem with particular attention to its historical rootedness, though noting several novel developments. The chapter begins by characterising Austrian far-right attitudes and individual criminal activity, identifying important movement actors, and detailing the radicalisation of the FPÖ (including how this process connects to the Ulrichsberg commemorations). Then, it presents the case of the Ulrichsberg commemorations, using it as a lens to reveal how Austria’s historical legacy and prior activism shaped some important contemporary dynamics amongst far-right actors, particularly between the FPÖ and the movement scene.

Elements of the Austrian far right Austria’s far-right ecosystem consists of three parts. First, individual attitudes and activities provide a base of social support for far-right actors, as well as spurring far-right criminal activity. Second, several social movements represent far-right attitudes in the public sphere, DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-8

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forming and mobilising nationalist, xenophobic, and antisemitic sentiments. The most important of these movements cluster around military veterans, fraternities, the Identitarians, and Reichsbürger or sovereign citizens. Third, the FPÖ provides a forceful political voice for Austria’s far-right scene. Examining these elements reveals the overall shape of the Austrian far right.

Far-right attitudes and crime Modern Austria harbours a deep undercurrent of far-right attitudes. Movements and parties spring therefrom, buoyed up by a fairly stable reserve of social support – as we shall see below in the case of the Ulrichsberg commemorations. These attitudes of course include concerns over contemporary issues, most prominently immigration, but also relate to conceptions of Austria’s post-war history, which are enduringly contentious. Similarly registering at the individual level, far-right crime is partially traceable through citations under a handful of laws. These figures show a conspicuous rise in crime rates in recent years, suggesting that these offences are no longer the exclusive preserve of individual Austrian neo-Nazis and groupuscular leaders; there are signs that far-right violence is becoming more organised. To begin with, an enduring grievance amongst Austria’s far right is the now-predominant view of the country’s wartime history. After the end of the Second World War Allied occupation promoted, and the citizenry took up with alacrity, the view that Austria was the “first victim” of Nazi aggression (Art, 2006). The Opferthese (“victim theory”) was appealing because it absolved the Austrian state and much of society of culpability for Nazi crimes; and it allowed former Nazi party members to return to political activity (Berg, 1997), joining each of the major parties and forming a particularly prominent share of the FPÖ. However, it prevented a broad reckoning with the past1 and Austrian complicity in Second World War atrocities. Yet social consensus around this perspective started to breakdown in the 1980s, sparked by the heated presidential campaign and electoral victory of Kurt Waldheim in 1986. Controversies around veteran commemorations, for example at Ulrichsberg (Arbeitskreis gegen den Kärntner Konsens, 2011), and the legacy of the Austrian military eroded the myth of Austrian victimhood. By 2011, only 37 per cent of Austrians believed the previously hegemonic notion that Austria was the first victim of Nazi aggression (Gottschlich, 2012, p. 161). But that sizeable current of far-right attitudes endures too in the area of historical memory, most notably in the form of antisemitism: 28 per cent agreed that Jews were partly to blame for the history of antisemitic persecution; 38 per cent agreed Jews have too much power in international financial markets and 44 per cent believed that “Jews rule the business world” (Gottschlich, 2012). Notwithstanding the decline of some of these sentiments, antisemitism remains a prominent part of the tableau of Austrian far-right attitudes. In recent years, antisemitic and historical memory grievances have given way to more conspicuous anti-immigrant attitudes. Data from the European Values Survey (Figure 5.1) shows that racism and xenophobia, not insignificant beforehand, rose markedly in the last two decades. However, it seems this is not a racialised manifestation of concerns about terrorism: in 2018, “only seven per cent of Austrians were concerned about terrorism,” whereas, at 29 per cent, immigration was rated as the most important issue facing the country (Counter Extremism Project, 2021). The level of far-right attitudes goes some way towards explaining the certain rates of criminal activity in Austria. The Verbotsgesetz (“prohibition law”) criminalises some neo-Nazi activities and Holocaust denial; section 283 of the Criminal Code prohibits religious-, ethnic-, 68

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Figure 5.1 Xenophobia in Austria, 1990–2017. (Data from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th waves of the European Values Survey.) A respondent is counted as xenophobic when expressing a desire not to have neighbours that are “Muslims,” “immigrants/foreigners,” or people of a different race.

and nationality-based incitement to hatred; the Abzeichengesetz (“insignia act”) outlaws certain extremist symbols; sections of the Einführungsgesetz zu den Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzen (“introductory act to the administrative procedures act”) provides sanctions against discrimination – together, these encompass the most important elements of Austria’s legal regime against the far right. Figure 5.2 shows that, although rates of these offences were fairly stable throughout the 1990s and much of the 2000s, the past decade witnessed a substantial

Figure 5.2  Criminal offences in Austria with a far-right background. Source: Statistics from reports of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Protection Office.

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rise in violations of the Verbotsgesetz, section 283, and “other offences” (sonstigen Delikten). Part of this rise may be the result of more resolute application of these laws. In particular, the conviction of long-time neo-Nazi activist Gottfried Küssel2 in 2012 marked the extension of these legal instruments into organised far-right activism online. To put these figures in a comparative perspective, Figure 5.3 shows the per capita rates of violent offences and propaganda3 offences with a far-right background in both Austria and Germany. It makes clear that although there are more offences in Germany, this should not obscure a general similarity in far-right crime rates. Moreover, Austria’s rate of violent farright offences has been consistently higher than Germany’s since the mid-1990s. The visible upswing of Austrian far-right crimes since the mid-2010s reflects a surge of Islamophobia, which not only registers at an individual level but is also represented by highly visible movement actors and by the FPÖ (see below). What is more, there is a danger of further escalation. Late in 2020 Austrian and German security services seized scores of firearms and explosive devices stockpiled by right-wing extremists. Austria hosts a disproportionate

Figure 5.3  Comparison of per capita far-right criminal offences in Austria and Germany. Source: Statistics from reports of the Austrian and German Constitutional Protection Offices.

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degree of right-wing extremist “plots and preparations for armed struggle” (Ravndal et al., 2021). Both far-right attitudes and far-right violence are interconnected with a set of movement organisations in Austria.

Movements Austrian far-right movement activity has long been overshadowed by the political presence of the FPÖ. Minkenberg (2013) characterises Austria’s movement sphere as “weak”; compared to the prodigious German far-right movement scene (e.g., Zeller, 2021), this may seem obvious, but it should not obscure the fact that Austrian far-right movements, though small, are varied and lively. As listed in Table 5.1, there are four main sets of far-right movement actors: the long-established veterans’ groups and fraternities, and the newer Identitarians and Reichsbürger groups. There are two fountainheads of contemporary far-right movements in Austria. Firstly, the end of Second World War hostilities allowed hundreds of thousands of Wehrmacht and WaffenSS veterans to return to Austria (Manoschek, 1999, p. 193). To be sure, only a minority of these were members of the Nazi party, and few were dyed-in-the-wool devotees of National Socialist ideology. Nevertheless, returning veterans rapidly began to organise in post-war Austria. Unlike in Germany, where mobilisation was largely concerned with securing welfare and state benefits for veterans (Diehl, 2000), Austrian veterans’ groups often concentrated on commemorations and demonstrative activities, chiefly “soldiers meetings.” Berg (1997, p. 529) explains that these meetings “took on the quality of a religious ritual, with a march/pilgrimage to a designated site where the commemoration, or celebration, of the sanctified [‘front experience’] occurred, the participants dressed customarily – and illegally – in old Wehrmacht or SS garb, the procession accompanied by patriotic music and singing.” These practices naturally were something of an embarrassment because their soldierly pride clashed to some extent with the Opferthese portrayal of the German Nazi domination compelling Austrian complicity. Initially, the first government of Austria’s Second Republic, elected in late 1945, took action against some of the more ostentatious shows of old military allegiances. Prohibitions against displaying Third Reich symbols and wearing uniforms were implemented (Berg, 1997, p. 525). The Allied occupation authorities also ordered several veterans’ organisations to disband, often soon after forming, justifiably wary of large congregations of veterans. While this did not prevent large-scale political organisation of veterans, these measures limited their mobilisation capacity. But after 1955, after the signing of the Staatsvertrag (“state treaty”) ending occupation and restoring Austrian sovereignty, there was a surge of veteran mobilisation. Below, the case sketch on the Ulrichsberg commemorations details the legacy and enduring political importance of this era of veteran mobilisation. Suffice it here to say that veterans of Third Reich military service had a significant influence on the development of post-war Austrian socio-politics, generally; their imprint on parts of the far-right scene endures to this day. Secondly, Austrian “fraternities” (Burschenschaften, Korporation, or Studentenverbindung), generally bastions of right-wing attitudes (Katzenmaier et al., 2017), in several instances Table 5.1  Austria’s major far-right movements

Long-established Newly established

Politically influential

Politically uninfluential

Fraternities Identitarians

Veterans’ groups Reichsbürger groups

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maintain close connections to the FPÖ and comprise an influential far-right network (cf. Lasek, 2015; Peham, 2015). Numerous fraternities espouse German nationalist ideologies, some going so far as supporting a new Anschluss, unifying Germany and Austria; not surprisingly, since many fraternities originated in the nineteenth century as clubs of German nationalists. Yet several are conspicuous for their egregious far-right views and their strong links to the FPÖ.4 Two incidents are exemplary. For many years a coalition of Vienna-based fraternities (the Wiener Korporationsring) organised a ball – part of the Austrian capital’s ball season in late January and early February – that gained notoriety for catering to far-right fraternities and public figures. Apart from Austrian participants, leaders and representatives of France’s Front National party, the radical right Swedish Democrats and the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang attended on several occasions. In 2012, though, after public pressure persuaded the venue operators to no longer extend the fraternities’ rental – at that year’s ball, the FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache made an infamous comparison about public opposition to the ball, saying “we are the new Jews” – the event was forced to demobilise (Zeller, 2021). Without missing a beat, the FPÖ has organised since 2013 a replacement event (the Akademikerball), with the same conspicuous far-right profile, but with an unassailable prerogative (as a lawful political party) to rent the venue.5 This episode typifies the close, mutually supportive cooperation of far-right fraternities and the FPÖ. A recent scandal is indicative of the ideological extremism represented by some fraternities. In 2018, an Austrian magazine revealed the songbook of the Germania zu Wiener Neustadt fraternity contained several antisemitic lines and positive allusions to the Nazis (Reuters, 2018), notably including the line “Then the Jew Ben-Gurion stood in their midst: step on the gas, you old Germanics, we can make it to seven million.” Lest this be thought a singular case, the songbook of another fraternity (Bruna Sudetia) was obtained weeks later; it too contained antisemitic invective (Pearson, 2018). Together, an extensive array of fraternities, with thousands of members and alumni, often occupying important offices and positions, provide an influential far-right network that is deeply embedded in Austrian public life. Whereas veterans and fraternities represent long-established parts of far-right scene, there are two important newcomers in Austria: the Identitarians (Identitäre Bewegung) and “Reich Citizens” (Reichsbürger) or sovereign citizens.6 The Austrian branch7 of the transnational Identitarian movement was founded in 2012 and is led by Martin Sellner. The group espouses the “new right” ideology of ethno-pluralism, arguing that the indigenous ethnic populations of states (particularly in Europe) must be preserved and protected from multiculturalism. Unsurprisingly, given this foundational tenet, the group propagates the “great replacement” conspiracy theory that elites are replacing indigenous national ethnic inhabitants with immigrants in order to more easily control the population. The Identitarians are not a traditional mass movement organisation, trying to amass broad social support. In his regular contributions to the German far-right magazine COMPACT, Martin Sellner frequently alludes to the “silent majority” that already supports the goals of the Identitarians. Accordingly, given the supposedly already extant support base, Sellner casts the Identitarians as a sort of revolutionary vanguard organisation. Austrian state authorities reported (as of 2019) there are only a few hundred actual members of the Identitarian organisation (BVT, 2020). This corps engages in three main modes of activity: intellectual work, street action, and party politics (Strobl & Bruns, 2016, p. 107). The group, and Sellner in particular, thrives off making highly visible acts of symbolic protest that attract attention and stimulate donations. Members have organised short-lived occupations of sites, disrupted theatrical productions, unfurled banners at iconic sites, and chartered a boat in 2017 to monitor refugee assistance operations in the Mediterranean. 72

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The last few years have dealt a series of blows to the Austrian Identitarians, though. In 2018, Sellner and nine other Identitarians were charged with operating a criminal organisation. Though the activists were eventually acquitted, it did not spell the end of state action against the Identitarians. The group remains under observation by state security services and the Identitarian lambda symbol was banned under Austrian law in mid-2021.8 Of greater consequence are the actions taken by mainstream social media companies. In 2020 – notably, after it came to light that the 2019 Christchurch mosques attacker had donated to the Identitarians and had personal contact with Sellner – Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube suspended the accounts of Sellner and the Identitarians for repeated violations of the platforms’ user agreements. Attempts to sue these companies were fruitless, so Sellner has been relegated to alternative platforms such as Telegram, VKontakte, Gab, and BitChute (Fielitz & Schwarz, 2020). Although Sellner has effectively drawn a large number of followers to these alternative platforms, particularly Telegram (Gartner et al., 2020), deplatforming has significantly decreased his reach: he had more than 180,000 YouTube subscribers when his account was suspended; as of late 2022, he has amassed just over 60,000 subscribers on Telegram. This consequently limits the capacity of Sellner and the Identitarians to attract attention and raise money. Nevertheless, the group remains active, most recently as regular participants at protests against COVID-19 restrictions. The other newcomer to Austria’s far-right movement scene is a set of Reichsbürger groups.9 Similar to their German counterparts,10 these groups declare the Austrian Constitution illegitimate and repudiate the state’s authority. Members often receive pseudolegal training and guidance in shirking taxes and other state duties. The largest group is the Staatenbund Österreich (“States Confederation of Austria”), with approximately 3,600 members (Haselbacher et al., 2021). It is currently the target of far-reaching criminal prosecution (cf. BVT, 2019, pp. 66–69). In 2017, the government revised the criminal code to include a provision outlawing the anti-state movement (article 247a). In 2019, particularly as a result of plans to occupy and replace the Graz Criminal Court in 2017, the group’s two principal leaders were sentenced to lengthy jail sentences for convictions of high treason; several other conspirators received short sentences (BVT, 2019, p. 66). The state also pursued legal action against hundreds of other individuals involved in the movement (ibid.). Though this forceful state action has disrupted the Reichsbürger movement, a sizeable cohort of activists and sympathisers endures. While violent far-right protest is rare in comparison to other countries (e.g., Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016), the example of the Staatenbund Österreich reveals the willingness of some far-right movement contingents to take aggressive, violent action. Though each of these movement sets – veterans, fraternities, Identitarians, and Reichsbürger – are important components in Austria’s far-right scene, the fraternities and Identitarians are particularly conspicuous for the political influence they have through connections to the FPÖ. But as we shall see below, this is a model of party-movement cooperation that was honed through the FPÖ’s engagement with the Ulrichsberg commemorations.

Party It is just as well here to refer to Austria’s far-right party rather than parties. Although other examples exist – Aktion Neue Rechte and the Nationaldemokratische Partei were notable right-wing extremist parties, both proscribed in the 1980s (Zeller & Vaughan, 2021), as well as Jörg Haider’s breakaway party from the FPÖ, the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, which endures in some localities – and the other largest parties also have histories spattered with “brown spots” (Böhmer, 2019), it suffices to focus on the Freedom Party. 73

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The FPÖ shares its origins with post-war veterans groups. The early phase of Allied occupation, 1945–1947, saw the most insistent implementation of denazification. But this faded. Though barred from participating in the 1945 elections, “over 500,000 registered Nazis were allowed to vote at the 1949 General Election” (Bailer-Galanda & Neugebauer, 1996, p. 2).11 Following the election, many of these voters organised under the Verband der Unabhängigen (“Association of Independents,” VdU). The organisation split along ideological lines in 1955, with much of the large German nationalist faction forming the FPÖ. Unrepentant former Nazis and committed German nationalists filled the top roles of the young party: the first two leaders, Anton Reinthaller and Friedrich Peter, were both former SS officers (Bailer-Galanda & Neugebauer, 1996, p. 3). Yet it did not adopt extremist or even particularly radical positions.12 The party was sufficiently moderate – and commanded fairly stable support hovering between five and eight per cent – to support Social-democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) governments in 1970 and, as a junior coalition partner, in 1983. So the radical right turn ushered in by Jörg Haider’s takeover in 1986 was also something of an ideological coup. Under Haider’s leadership the FPÖ became the prototypical populist radical right party. It pushed for anti-immigration policies and elevated divisive socio-cultural issues, such as disputes over erecting bilingual (German and Slovenian) road signs in southern Austria, and shifted from pan-pan-German nationalism towards Austrian nationalism.13 More conspicuously, anti-immigrant, nationalist, and (later) anti-EU rhetoric, all couched in anti-establishment populism, signalled the party’s shift. And most infamously, Haider was forced to resign from his role as the governor of the Carinthia region in 1991 after favourably comparing the Third Reich’s employment policies to the then-governing SPÖ-led coalition’s. In retrospect, we may well describe Haider as a culture warrior, elevating an ethno-nationalist conception of Austrian history and society. At any rate, he succeeded in broadening the party’s electoral support, both at regional (Figure 5.4) and national (Table 5.2) levels. National vote shares

Figure 5.4  FPÖ vote share in Austrian regional (Länder) elections since 1985.

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The Austrian far right Table 5.2  FPÖ vote percentage in national elections 1990 1994 1995 1996 1999 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 2013 2014 2017 2019 National 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10.0 Council European 27.5 23.4 6.3 Parliament

11.0 17.5

20.5 12.7

26.0 16.2 19.7

17.2

rose from 5 per cent in 1983 to upwards of 25 per cent in the late 1990s. Support mounted in virtually every regional election, too. The party spiralled into disarray not long after forming a coalition government in 2000. Incompetence and inexperience of several representatives undermined the party’s role in government and infighting eventually resulted in a split (Fallend & Heinisch, 2016). Yet suppositions that the FPÖ was dependent on Haider’s charisma were disproved as another charismatic leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, ascended to party leadership in 2005. A member of Burschenschaft Vandalia, a history of participating in a right-wing “military sport group” (Wehrsportgruppe), and even open praise for the Identitarians – Strache epitomised the symbiosis of the FPÖ and the far-right movement scene. Retaining and even intensifying its populist radical right narratives and strategy under Strache,14 the party steadily regained its previous levels of support. After the 2017 election, in which the FPÖ won more than a quarter of the vote (Table 1.2) and subsequently entered into coalition with the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), Martin Sellner crowed that Sebastian Kurz and the ÖVP won only because Kurz “became Strache,” referring to his anti-immigration stance (Sellner, 2017). And it is hard to gainsay this interpretation (cf. Hadj Abdou & Ruedin, 2021; Hadj Abdou et al., 2021). Recently, the FPÖ has once again fallen on (somewhat) hard times. In what has since been dubbed the Ibiza Affair, Strache, along with FPÖ deputy leader Johann Gudenus, was secretly filmed in July 2017 meeting with a woman purporting to be the relative of a Russian businessman, discussing means of enhancing the party’s political power in return for favourable government consideration. Publication of the video led to the resignation of Strache and Gudenus, the collapse of the governing coalition, and snap elections in which the FPÖ lost ten per cent of its vote share. Though additional footage released in 2020 showed Strache and Gudenus rejecting any illegal actions, the damage was long done. Nevertheless, the FPÖ is here to say. It suffered in the wake of the Ibiza Affair, but retains a solid constituency, built off its representation of interests connected to rural constituents, working class voters, pensioners, and members of the police and armed forces (Heinisch & Werner, 2019).15 The party’s strength in polarised contexts bodes well for its future prospects (Jansesberger et al., 2021). Most of all, the FPÖ thrives off its symbiotic relationship with movement organisations, both supporting and supported by the far-right movement scene.

The Ulrichsberg commemorations: Archetype of the Austrian far right The evolution of Austria’s far-right scene is well symbolised by the commemorations of Second World War veterans at Ulrichsberg. Though this social movement campaign has now demobilised (Sebestyen, 2018; Zeller, 2021), its history reflects long-standing strains of far-right attitudes in Austria, exemplifies the confluence of two movement sectors (veterans and fraternities), and exhibits the transformation of the FPÖ. 75

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For ten years after the war Allied occupation restricted the scope of veterans’ social mobilisation. Admittedly, veterans succeeded in politically mobilising for elections under the aegis of the VdU, but otherwise their activities were mostly limited to small, discrete memorial ceremonies.16 In other words, their attempts at “memory work,” honouring the fallen and their own service, were restricted (Hurd & Werther, 2016). The signing of the Staatsvertrag and restoration of Austria’s sovereignty in 1955 opened opportunities for veterans. In 1959, a coalition of veterans’ groups called the Ulrichsberggemeinschaft (“Ulrichsberg community”) organised a commemoration for the fallen and the veterans of the Second World War. Centred on an ancient hilltop religious site in central Carinthia – a region that would become a FPÖ stronghold under Haider’s leadership – the commemoration of Third Reich military veterans at Ulrichsberg long enjoyed the material and moral support of Austrian politicians and the army, which provided transportation up to the summit as well as a military band and honour guard. The event was regularly attended by several thousand veterans, their families, uniformed fraternity members, and distinguished guests; over the years several keynote speakers were sitting governmental ministers and even, in 1967, Chancellor Josef Klaus (ÖVP). It was a commemoration steeped in historical triumphalism and historical grievance. As concerns the former, events often honoured the efforts of ethnically Austrian Carinthians in a 1920 referendum to ensure, amid the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that the region remained an Austrian (rather than Slovenian) territory. Strident and exclusionary regional patriotism was a prominent component of the Ulrichsberg commemorations. Yet more importantly, embossed in the rhetoric and iconography of the event from its inception was the stamp of the Opferthese: the organisers and speakers (comprised of members from all three major political parties) praised the comradeship of soldiers, compelled to fulfil military duty, and portrayed the Second World War, particularly its latter stages, as a noble struggle to protect Europe from the evils of Bolshevism. This revisionist fiction underscored the “inherent tension between the internationally sanctioned notion of Austrian victimization during the Nazi years and the pride of many Austrian veterans in having performed their soldierly duties” (Berg, 1997, p. 513); it eschewed any Austrian culpability in the crimes of the Third Reich and recast Nazi military aggression as justified defence. Although Soviet attachés and an opposed veterans’ group (the Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs) complained about the event, for three decades the Ulrichsberg commemorations enjoyed the support of all three major political parties as well as the military. This was the consensus of the Opferthese in action. The roll of keynote speakers at the demonstrations is tellingly varied, listing governmental ministers and legislative representatives from the ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ as well as speakers representing the military or veterans organisations. Tectonic political shifts in the late 1980s eroded the consensual foundations of the Ulrichsberg commemoration. The 1986 presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim, himself a Wehrmacht veteran, though not involved in any organised veteran activity, ignited public debate about Austria’s wartime history. Coming in the wake of revelations about his service in the Balkans from 1942 to 1945, Waldheim’s claims that while serving he had no knowledge of atrocities and, like many veterans, he merely did his duty did little to assuage public concern. Old sins cast long shadows. Though elected, President Waldheim as well as Chancellor Franz Vranitzky went on to acknowledge that Austrians had been “victims and perpetrators,” subverting the Opferthese. It also led to amendment of the Verbotsgesetz to include prohibitions against “denying, grossly downplaying, approving, or justifying” Nazi genocide or crimes against humanity, which was later applied (amongst other instances) in the prosecution of David Irving. 76

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Running in parallel to this process was the rise of Jörg Haider and the concomitant transformation of the FPÖ. Previously, the party supported the Ulrichsberg commemorations in the same way as the ÖVP and SPÖ: representatives legitimised it as an apolitical memorialisation of the fallen, spoke at events, and voted for cultural funds to be directed to the Ulrichsberggemeinschaft. There was nothing exceptional in it. Haider represented an unwavering and often strident defence of the Opferthese. Speaking at the 1990 Ulrichsberg commemoration, he averred (emphasis added), It cannot be the case that those on the winning side are celebrated as heroes, while those on the losing side are labelled criminals. … Our soldiers were not culprits, they were at best victims. … There is nothing to reproach this generation of soldiers. With such stances, Haider positioned the FPÖ as defenders of veterans and the Ulrichsberg commemorations just as other parties were turning away from this tradition. These parallel political shifts stoked an emerging politicisation of Ulrichsberg. After Haider’s controversial speech at the 1990 event, active17 SPÖ politicians stopped participating. Given the heightened controversy surrounding the commemorations, the decision of Werner Fasslabend (ÖVP), the sitting Minister of Defence, to speak at Ulrichsberg in 1995 whipped up a new storm of public debate. Although his remarks were quite moderate compared to previous speeches, Fasslabend was criticised for his decision to participate at all; as a sitting governmental minister, his critics argued, he conferred legitimacy on Ulrichsberg’s historical revisionism.18 More choice comments from Haider at a preliminary event (the veterans’ meeting at Krumpendorf) only exacerbated matters (Eidlhuber, 2000): In these busy times there are still decent people who have character and who stand by their convictions even in the face of great opposition, and have remained true to their convictions to this day. And that is a foundation, my dear friends, which is also passed on to us young people. A people that does not honour their ancestors is doomed. But since we want to have a future, we will teach those people, the politically correct ones, that we are not to be killed and that decency in our world is always worthwhile, even if we are currently not able to win a majority, but we are spiritually superior to the others. (…) We give money to terrorists, to violent newspapers, to work-shy rabble, and we have no money for decent people. Irrespective of Haider’s advocacy for the “decent people” assembled at Ulrichsberg, the famous Wehrmacht exhibition (entitled “War of annihilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941–1944”) that toured Germany and Austria from 1995 to 1999, visiting Klagenfurt (near Ulrichsberg) in the month before the 1996 commemorations, discredited the notion of the “honourable Wehrmacht” that was uninvolved in Third Reich atrocities. The events between 1985 and 1996 – most prominently, Haider’s ascent to FPÖ leadership and his speeches at Ulrichsberg, Waldheim’s divisive election campaign, the nonparticipation of SPÖ representatives, the controversial participation of Werner Fasslabend, and the displays of the Wehrmacht exhibition – thoroughly politicised the event, eliminating the consensual support of all major parties and instead pushing it into the political domain of the (newly) radical right FPÖ. Yet the commemorations showed few signs of facing demobilising pressure. Events still attracted thousands of participants. State and governmental actors, regardless of politicisation, tenuously preserved the status quo: the Austrian army still provided a band and an honour guard for the commemorations, as well as jeeps to transport participants up to the memorial 77

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site. Even after the Ministry of Defence issued new rules19 in 2001 that seemingly prohibited it, army support and participation at Ulrichsberg continued. The dam broke when anti-fascist researchers revealed in 2009 that the organising group’s leader, Wolf Dieter Ressenig, was selling Nazi memorabilia online – such activity violates the Verbotsgesetz and the Abzeichengesetz. The government excluded any further army participation. Besides depriving the campaign of two central elements of the Ulrichsberg ritual, the army band and the honour guard, the withdrawal of the army’s transportation support meant that the later events literally went downhill: unable to transport infirm participants to the summit. Participation, which had stagnated through the 2000s, never surpassed 500 people after the incident. The sword stroke of withdrawn state support did not immediately end the campaign, though. Events were held throughout the 2010s, but were smaller and organised at venues other than the Ulrichsberg summit which were more accessible without army support. State funding, which the campaign had enjoyed throughout its history, was terminated in 2014. Though the organisation attempted to recruit new members to make up for this shortfall (Martinz, 2015), the efforts did not meet with much success (Sterkl, 2016). The organising group, the Ulrichsberggemeinschaft, gave up the ghost in 2018 when its chairman, Hermann Kandussi, discontinued the event. Over the course of the 2010s, the pressure of lost participation (Zeller, 2020) due to veterans dying out, the inability of organisers to attract new participants, and the withdrawal of essential state support caused the demobilisation of the Ulrichsberg commemorations. This far-right campaign, lasting for nearly six decades, drew legitimacy from its longevity: a tradition of venerating the “honourable service” of veterans. The mechanism that brought about its demobilisation is closely intertwined with Austria’s re-examination of its own far-right history as well as with the modern origins of the FPÖ, one of the largest and most influential radical right parties in the world. Politicisation that began in the late 1980s eventually culminated in the withdrawal of state support and the Ulrichsberg campaign’s demobilisation. But that same politicisation helped raise the profile of Jörg Haider and propelled the transformation of the FPÖ. Long the third party in Austria’s bipartite political system, the FPÖ became a potent political presence and positioned itself as the defender of Austria’s far-right movement scene. Even as veterans have become a less important constituency in Austria, the pattern of party-movement relations that they set endure today in the FPÖ.

Conclusion Austria’s far right is broad and deeply rooted. Enduring antisemitism and heightened antiimmigrant attitudes reveal the wide base of social support for far-right politics. A multifaceted movement scene thrives off this social support and uses it, as well as embeddedness in longstanding institutions, notably including several fraternities, to bolster their activism. Most importantly, these attitudes and movements provide resilient bases of support for the FPÖ, a prototype of European radical right parties whose levels of support make it a perennially significant political player. The case of the veterans’ commemorations at Ulrichsberg illustrates how Austria’s contemporary far-right ecosystem was formed. The simultaneous collapse of the “victim myth” about Austria’s Nazi past and the transformation of the FPÖ into a radical right party under Jörg Haider generated politicisation of the campaign at Ulrichsberg. As other parties turned away from this veterans’ event, the FPÖ was left as the political voice of far-right movements. What is more, the imprint of Ulrichsberg endures: past participants in the campaign remain 78

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influential in contemporary activism. For instance, Martin Rutter, a far-right legislator and the keynote speaker at the last Ulrichsberg commemoration in 2017, was a leading organiser of conspiracist anti-COVID-19 demonstrations. Today, Austria, like many other states, is faced with the challenge of addressing more extreme strains of the far-right scene. In answer to this challenge, the government in 2017 created an institution tasked with counter-extremism and deradicalisation (the Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung) and established an “exit” programme to support people leaving violent extremist groups. And a pair of laws (the Kommunikationsplattformen-Gesetz and the Hass-im-Netz-Bekämpfungsgesetz) aim to limit hate speech and illegal activity of social media platforms. Yet these laws and policies require committed implementation if they are to disrupt far-right activism in Austria.

Notes 1 In Germany, the phenomenon known as Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 2 Küssel is a typical far-right “movement entrepreneur” (Erb, 2006), an activist serving important networking and leadership functions (Virchow, 2013) for several decades in Austria. As early as the 1970s, he was a member of (subsequently proscribed) right-wing extremist organisations like Kameradschaft Babenberg and Aktion Neue Rechte (Zeller & Vaughan 2021). He has now twice served long-term prison sentences for neo-Nazi activism in violation of the Verbotsgesetz, most recently for operating the extremist website, “Alpen-Donau.info.” 3 Data are taken from the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung) and from the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). Whereas German state security services report “propaganda offences” (Propagandadelikte), in Austria a similar statistic is derived by totalling the offences against the Verbotsgesetz, Abzeichengesetz, and Article III of the Einführungsgesetz zu den Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzen. This is the statistic represented in Figure 1.3. 4 English-language studies of Austrian and German fraternities are few. Nevertheless, perusing the frequent references to Burschenschaften in Lasek’s (2015) catalogue of Austria’s far-right functionaries may give a helpful indication of how the country’s far-right scene is rooted in fraternity networks. 5 That venue is the publically owned Hofburg Palace. The company managing the events space may reject private rental requests, but not requests from lawful political parties like the FPÖ. 6 It is perhaps tempting to include a part of anti-COVID-19 protesters in Austria’s far-right scene. However, it is unclear at the time of writing whether this series of protest mobilisations will solidify into enduring activism. 7 NB: The French branch was proscribed in 2021 (Zeller & Vaughan 2021). 8 See §1 Z 10 and 11 of the Symbole-Gesetz. Available online: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20009040 9 NB: within this movement distinctions are often made between Reichsbürger, referring to past German imperial territory, and “sovereign citizens,” encompassing several rejections of state authority that are not necessarily rooted in any historical state. I refer only to Reichsbürger in the interest of simplicity. 10 Germany proscribed several Reichsbürger groups in 2020 (Zeller & Vaughan 2021). 11 This massive bloc of voters stirred competition between the two predominant parties (i.e., the Austrian People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party of Austria). Numerous 1949 election placards, particularly from the People’s Party, demonstrate the fervent attempts to placate and woo former Nazis, often simultaneously demonising anti-fascist actors and policies. 12 In this aspect, the FPÖ is a contrast to neo-fascist parties like the Movimento Sociale Italiano and the Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands, peopled by former Nazis and adopting a radical agenda. 13 The dispute over Ortstafeln was mostly concentrated in Haider’s region of Carinthia. The Austrian state was legally bound by the terms of the Staatsvertrag (specifically, Article 7 §3) to install bilingual road signs, as part of other measures recognising Slovenian ethnic minorities. Throughout his political career, Haider continually resisted this legal obligation, going so far as to ignore binding decisions from the Constitutional Court.

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Michael C. Zeller 14 On the particulars of FPÖ discourse, see especially the work of Ruth Wodak and co-authors (e.g., Forchtner, Krzyżanowski, & Wodak, 2013; Wodak, 2015; Wodak, & Rheindorf, 2018). 15 Tracking polls show that the FPÖ has steadily recovered from the fallout of the Ibiza Affair: https:// www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/austria/ 16 The only major exception to this observation in fact pertains to a forerunner of the Ulrichsberg commemoration. In 1946, Blasius Scheucher (later the driving force behind the Ulrichsberg campaign) helped found the Heimkehrerbund (“Returnees Association”), with one of its goals being the establishment of a commemoration for veterans at Zollfeld in southern Austria. It was quickly dissolved by the Allies (Rencher, 1999). A successor organisation, the Heimkehrer-Hilfs- und Betreuungsstelle (“Returnees Help and Support Centre”), was similarly dissolved not long after its formation, but its members continued to push for a commemoration, including by honouring veterans at a 1947 event at Zollfeld that attracted as many as 20,000 participants (Arbeitskreis gegen den Kärntner Konsens, 2011, pp. 78–79). 17 A few members of the Ulrichsberggemeinschaft who were also SPÖ members, such as Rudolf Gallob, continued to participate, though they no longer represented the party in any legislative bodies 18 Fasslabend’s participation was not exceptional, though. His predecessor as Minister of Defence, Robert Lichal, spoke at the 1989 Ulrichsberg commemoration. 19 This refers to the so-called “Traditions decree” (Traditionserlaß), point 3.c. of which declared, “The participation of clubs or associations of troops or troop units of the former German Wehrmacht as well as other organisations of the state or party of the Third Reich between 1933 and 1945 is prohibited within the framework of the tradition of the Austrian Armed Forces. Likewise, insignia of such associations, their replicas and other symbols of the Third Reich may not be carried at military celebrations and events of the federal army. Participation of soldiers of the armed forces in uniform as well as carrying insignia of the armed forces to events of such associations is also prohibited.”

References Arbeitskreis gegen den Kärntner Konsens. (2011). Friede, Freunde, deutscher Eintopf. Mandelbaum Kritik & Utopie. Art, D. (2006). The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria. Cambridge University Press. Bailer-Galanda, B., & Neugebauer, W. (1996). Right-wing extremism: History, organisations, ideology. Stiftung Dokumentationsarchiv Des Österreichischen Widerstandes, 1–13. Berg, M. P. (1997). Challenging political culture in postwar Austria: Veterans’ associations, identity, and the problem of contemporary history. Central European History, 30(4), 513–544. Berntzen, L. E., & Weisskircher, M. (2016). Anti-Islamic PEGIDA beyond Germany: Explaining differences in mobilisation. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37(6), 556–573. Böhmer, C. (2019, August 5). Braune Flecken: Wie SPÖ und ÖVP ihre NS-Vergangenheit aufgearbeitet haben. Kurier. Available online: https://kurier.at/politik/inland/braune-flecken-wie-spoe-undoevp-ihre-ns-vergangenheit-aufgearbeitet-haben/400570157 BVT [Bundesministerium für Inneres, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung]. (2019). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018. Wien. Available online: https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VSB/ Verfassungsschutzbericht_2018.pdf _____ (2020). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019. Wien. Available online: https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/ VSB/VSB_2019_Webversion_20201120.pdf Counter Extremism Project. (2021). Austria: Extremism and Terrorism. New York. Available online: https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/austria Diehl, J. M. (2000). The thanks of the fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War. University of North Carolina Press. Eidlhuber, M. (2000, February 17). Du sollst recherchieren! Die Zeit. Available online: https://www.zeit. de/2000/08/200008.reden_tabelle_2_.xml/komplettansicht Erb, R. (2006). Protestorganisation und Eventmanagement: Der Typus des rechtsextremen Bewegungsunternehmers. In. Andreas Klärner & Michael Kohlstruck (Eds.), Moderner Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland, Hamburg, 142–176. Fallend, F., & Heinisch, R. (2016). Collaboration as successful strategy against right-wing populism? The case of the centre-right coalition in Austria, 2000–2007. Democratization, 23(2), 324–344.

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The Austrian far right Fielitz, M., & Schwarz, K. (2020). Hate not found: Deplatforming the far right and its consequences. Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft. Forchtner, B., Krzyżanowski, M., & Wodak, R. (2013). Mediatization, right-wing populism and political campaigning: The case of the Austrian Freedom Party. In Media talk and political elections in Europe and America (pp. 205–228). Palgrave Macmillan. Gartner, G., Peter, V., & Walchhofer, P. (2020). Das Telegram-Netzwerk um Martin Sellner, visualisiert. Wien. Available online: https://www.addendum.org/news/telegram-netzwerk-sellner/ Gottschlich, M. (2012). Die grosse Abneigung: wie antisemitisch ist Österreich?: kritische Befunde zu einer sozialen Krankheit. Czernin Verlag. Hadj Abdou, L., Bale, T., & Geddes, A. P. (2022). Centre-right parties and immigration in an era of politicisation, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(2), 327–340. Hadj Abdou, L., & Ruedin, D. (2021). The Austrian People’s Party: An anti-immigrant right party?, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(2), 385–404. Haselbacher, M., Mattes, A., & Reeger, U. (2021). Stakeholders of (De-)Radicalisation in Austria. Wien. Available online: https://dradproject.com/?publications=stakeholders-of-de-radicalisation-in-georgia Heinisch, R., & Werner, A. (2019). Who do populist radical right parties stand for? Representative claims, claim acceptance and descriptive representation in the Austrian FPÖ and German AfD. Representation, 55(4), 475–492. Hurd, M., & Werther, S. (2016). Retelling the past, inspiring the future: Waffen-SS commemorations and the creation of a ‘European’ far-right counter-narrative. Patterns of Prejudice, 50(4–5), 420–444. Jansesberger, V., Lefkofridi, Z., & Mühlböck, A. (2021). Electoral support for FPÖ in regional and national arenas: Different levels of government, same causality? Regional & Federal Studies, 31(3), 337–358. Katzenmaier, C., Koelges, M., Mißbach, C., & Zettersten, G. (Eds.). (2017). Autoritär Elitär Reaktionär: Reader zu Verbindungskritik (2nd ed.). AStA Uni Frankfurt. Lasek, W. (2015). Funktionäre, Aktivisten und Ideologen der rechtsextremen Szene in Österreich. Rechtsextremismus in Österreich – Fakten und Hintergrundinformationen. Wien. Available online: https:// www.doew.at/cms/download/b3c9m/lasek_funktionaere_2015-2.pdf Manoschek, W. (1999). Austrian Reaction to the exhibition “War of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944. In G. Bischof, A. Pelinka, & F. Karlhofer (Eds.), The Vranitzky Era in Austria (pp. 193–200). Routledge. Martinz, T. (2015, September 15). Ulrichsbergtreffen: Gemeinschaft keilt neue Mitglieder. Kurier. Available online: https://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/ulrichsbergtreffen-gemeinschaft-keilt-neuemitglieder/152.683.097 Minkenberg, M. (2013). From pariah to policy-maker? The radical right in Europe, West and East: Between margin and mainstream. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), 5–24. Pearson, A. (2018, February 20). Fresh Nazi songbook scandal hits Austrian far-right Freedom party.Deutsche Welle. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/fresh-nazi-songbook-scandal-hits-austrian-far-rightfreedom-party/a-42665051 Peham, A. (2015). “Durch Reinheit zur Einheit”: Zur Kritik des deutschnationalen Korporationswesens in Österreich unter besonderer Berücksichtigung antisemitischer Traditionslinien und nationalsozialistischer Bezüge. Rechtsextremismus in Österreich – Fakten und Hintergrundinformationen. Wien. Available online: https://www.doew.at/cms/download/6or5r/peham_burschenschaften.pdf Ravndal, J. A., Thostensen, M., Jupskås, A. R., & Macklin, G. (2021), RTV Trend Report 2021. Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX). Available online: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/ publications/c-rex-reports/2021/rtv-trend-report/c-rex-rtv-trend-report-2021.pdf Rencher, N. (1999). Ulrichsberg-Dokumentation Nr. 1. Klagenfurt. Reuters. (2018, February 1) Austria Freedom Party’s Udo Landbauer resigns over Nazi song scandal. Deutsche Welle. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/austria-freedom-partys-udo-landbauerresigns-over-nazi-song-scandal/a-42405730 Sebestyen, M. (2018, September 12). Umstrittenes Treffen am Ulrichsberg fällt heuer aus. Kleine Zeitung. Available online: https://www.kleinezeitung.at/kaernten/5494606/Kaernten_Umstrittenes-Treffen-amUlrichsberg-faellt-heuer-aus Sellner, M. (2017, November). Der Strache-Effekt. COMPACT, 63. Sterkl, M. (2016, October 11). Ulrichsbergtreffen: Rechte zahlen für Vereinsbüro weiter keine. Der Standard. Available online: https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000045669776/ulrichsbergtreffen-rechte-bleibenmietzinsbefreit

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Michael C. Zeller Strobl, N., & Bruns, J. (2016). Preparing for (intellectual) civil war: The new right in Austria and Germany. In M. Fielitz, & L. L. Laloire (Eds.), Trouble on the far right: Contemporary right-wing strategies and practices in Europe (pp. 105–110). transcript-Verlag. Virchow, F. (2013). Führer und Schlüsselfiguren in extrem rechten Bewegungen. Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen, 26(4), 52–58. Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage. Wodak, R., & Rheindorf, M. (2018). The Austrian freedom party. The new authoritarianism, 1. ibidemVerlag. Zeller, M. C. (2020). Rethinking demobilisation: Concepts, causal logic, and the case of Russia’s for fair elections movement. Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements, 12(1), 527–558. Zeller, M. C. (2021). Patterns of demobilization: A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of far-right demonstration campaigns. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 26(3), 267–284. Zeller, M. C., & Vaughan, M. (2021). Proscribed Right-Wing Extremist Organisations. Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). Available online: https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/ resources/proscribed-right-wing-extremist-organisations

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6 FOUR CYCLES OF THE CZECH FAR RIGHT’S CONTENTION1 Jan Charvát2, Ondřej Slačálek3, and Eva Svatoňová

Introduction This chapter aims to provide a systemic outline of the dynamics of the three-decade-long development of the Czech far right that emerged after 1989. To avoid the electoral bias prevalent in far-right studies, we distinguish between far-right parties, movements, and subcultures, and claim that each has a different mobilisation potential and internal dynamics. Drawing on the differences in the organisational logic and framing between different periods of the Czech farright’s existence, we argue that its development can be divided into four distinguishable periods – “origins” (1989–1998), “many paths” (1999–2014), “refugee crisis and its aftermath” (2015–2019), “COVID-19” (2020–2021) – each composed of a rise, crisis, and fall. Our distinction loosely draws on Sydney Tarrow’s theory of cycles of contention. This theory originally referred to “a phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors” (Tarrow, 1994, 2011, p. 199). Some scholars further argued for its application in the study of single-issue movements as they also exhibit cyclical behaviour. They do not completely overlap with broader society-wide cycles of contention but aggregate to form them (Tarrow, 1994, 2011). Thus, to fully understand them, we must move beyond single movements, understand far-right contention as processes, and consider dynamic interactions amongst their allies and adversaries (Koopmans, 2004). Which is exactly the approach of this chapter: we want to trace the dynamic of each cycle and focus on how organisations and authorities interacted, came into conflict, or cooperated with movements in each period. The cycles were identified based on characteristics of their respective opportunity structures, collective action framing, new emerging actors, and organisational logic. The analysis draws on the existing literature on the given topic (see Charvát, 2007; Císař & Navrátil, 2018; Daniel, 2016; Mareš, 2003; Mazel, 1998; Prokůpková, 2018, 2021; Rataj et al., 2020) as well as on the authors’ expertise and knowledge derived from their previous research of far-right politics (Charvát, 2007, 2018, 2019; Charvát & Oravcová, 2021; Slačálek, 2018; Slačálek & Charvát, 2019; Slačálek & Svobodová, 2018; Svatoňová, 2020, 2021).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-9

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In particular, the chapter seeks to address the following questions: 1 How did the discursive and political opportunities influence the development of the far right in Czechia? 2 What role do the competing organisational logics of political parties, social movements, and subculture play in the mobilisation process? 3 How do frames affect the dynamics of the movements/parties/subcultures? The chapter contributes to the existing literature on the far right in two ways. Firstly, it provides a thorough diachronic analysis of the Czech far right. Secondly, it sheds light on the far right’s ability to mobilise people beyond its traditional circles by paying particular attention to the role of subculture, which has been overlooked in the existing scholarship. We start this chapter by briefly discussing the theoretical and conceptual framework. Subsequently, we present crucial aspects of each cycle. Finally, we finish this chapter by discussing our findings and the contribution of the chapter as well as proposing questions for further research.

Parties, movements, and subcultures: An analytical framework As Pirro and Castelli Gattinara (2019) correctly stated, in contemporary far-right politics it is possible to distinguish between political parties geared towards elections and public office, social movements which aim to mobilise public opinion, and a conglomeration of groups within the subcultural environment. Despite the existence of these distinctions, an overwhelming majority of scholars studying far-right politics focus on political parties, elections, and electoral behaviour (Caiani, 2017) – leaving the link between the non-electoral and electoral articulation of far-right politics ill-defined. Several studies attempted to bridge this gap and enriched the theory with insights from social movement studies (Caiani & Císař, 2019; Pirro & Castelli Gattinara, 2018, 2019). These studies, which focused on the interaction between parties and social movements, provided valuable insights into how to overcome electoral bias and advance the understanding of various forms of far-right politics. In the context of hybridised party and movement practices, a particularly welcome innovation was the introduction of the “movement party” concept (Caiani & Císař, 2019; Kitschelt, 2006) which our analysis applies to the Czech case. Before us, Císař and Navrátil (2018) analysed the Czech far right during the refugee crisis and concluded that we cannot speak about the party movement in Czechia because social movements are separate from party sectors. The aim of our analysis is to examine whether this thesis, formulated for the particular period, applies to the entire development of the Czech far right. Furthermore, we believe that the logics of political parties and social movements need to be complemented with another logic that has remained neglected by the extant research – that of subculture. Taitelbaum (2017) claimed that it was the fashion, literature, and, most importantly, the music of the skinhead subculture that inspired masses of white working-class youths around Europe to adopt a far-right ideology. Additionally, previous research proved that networks established through subcultures could lead to mobilisation processes (Johnston & Snow, 1998). Following our previous research (Charvát, 2018, 2019; Slačálek & Charvát, 2019), we argue that the far-right subculture played a crucial role especially in the first two cycles, and, thus, its role should not be overlooked.

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Four cycles of the Czech far right’s contention Table 6.1  Main characteristics of the logics of political parties, social movements, and subcultures Party

Movement

Hierarchy

Top-down

Bottom-up and top-down

Goal

Gain political power, mobilise voters

Means

Seats in parliament, participation in government

Subculture

Bottom-up, unstable hierarchies Promote political change, Live political values, mobilise citizens perpetrate violence, produce an activist “hard core” Full public squares, political Intense experiences, change, change of public transformation of opinion human sensitivity, concerts

The concept of subculture serves as an analytical tool that refers to particular subcultural styles and scenes (e.g., skinheads, football hooligans, hardbass) as well as an exclusive, shared experience of certain parts of society (in this context, far-right activists). Such an experience is crucial for the creation of a dominant cultural subgroup with an identity and mentality that differs from that of the rest of the society (Borgeson & Valeri, 2019; Hall, 1975; Hebdige, 1979; Muggleton, 2000; Williams, 2011). In general, we understand all three mentioned branches of the far right as political logics with different telos. To position it schematically, the political party is focused on political power, a social movement is focused on political change (Diani, 1992), and a subculture places attention on living political values (Johnston & Snow, 1998). In reality, all of these logics naturally overlap. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we distinguish them as sources of internal conflicts that prevented some actors from collaborating. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the dominance of the social movement at the expense of the subculture led to an expansion of the far-right scene, mobilising people beyond the traditional far-right circles during the third and fourth cycles. Table 6.1 presents the main characteristics for distinguishing between the three phenomena in question. The analysis will consider each cycle according to the points suggested by Tarrow. Firstly, we will examine political and discursive opportunity structures. The concept of political opportunity structure was employed to analyse what affected the emergence and impact of the far right in each cycle, taking into consideration the political context (e.g., the institutional framework, the party system, the shift in the configuration of allies and opposition, the positioning of the main established parties on certain issues, etc.) (Caiani & Císař, 2019; Mudde, 2007). The concept of discursive opportunities refers to long-term ideological positions held in a society, determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere (Koopmans & Statham, 1999) and affect the strategic use of frames by the actors (Ferree, 2003). Secondly, we focus on the innovation of repertoires such as organisational logics, ideology, the definition of enemies, the strategic choices of the most relevant collective actors, and the alliances and conflicts within the Czech far-right milieu. In our analysis, we draw on the interactionist approach and attempt to depict the dynamics of interactions not only between the organisations themselves but also those between the political elites, the larger society, and in media. Table 6.2 presents the main actors and dominant ideologies of each cycle. The actors are divided based on the types of organisational logics. Table 6.3 presents the differences between the cycles based on the opportunity structure, the dynamics including ideological and organisational conflicts, and the reactions of Czech society.

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Jan Charvát, Ondřej Slačálek, and Eva Svatoňová Table 6.2 Overview of most relevant actors and their ideological positions throughout the four Czech far-right cycles Cycle

Parties

Social movement

Patriotic League First cycle Republican Party of (Czech nationalism) (1989–1998) Czechoslovakia Patriotic Front (right-wing populism, (neo-fascism) election results: 1992: 6.5%, 1996: 8.01%, Bohemia Hammer Skins (neo-Nazism) 1998: 3.8%) Blood and Honour (neo-Nazism) Second cycle Workers’ Party (1999–2014) (right-wing populism, infiltrated by neo-Nazis – 2006 election results: 0.23%; in coalition since 2010. Workers Party of Social Justice (2010 election results: 2010 1.14%; 2013: 0.86%) National Party (Czech nationalism, 2006 election results: 0.17%) Dawn of Direct Democracy (rightwing populism, Tomio Okamura, 2013 election results: 6.88%)

Patriotic Front (fascism) National Alliance (neo-Nazism) National Resistance (neo-Nazism) Action ENOUGH (conservative activism)

Subculture

Ideologies and positions

Skinheads

Neo-Nazism Neo-fascism Czech nationalism

Skinheads Football hooligans Autonomous nationalists

Ultra-nationalism Fascism Neo-Nazism

IVČRN (Islamophobia) Third cycle Freedom and Direct Action ENOUGH (2015–2019) Democracy (right(conservative wing populism, Tomio Okamura, 2017 election activism) results: 10.64%) No to Brussels – National Democracy (racism, conspiracy theories, 2017 election results: 0.72%)

Anti-Islam Anti-EU Family values

Chcípl pes The fourth cycle Freedom and Direct (since 2020) Democracy (2021 election results: 9.56%) Free Block (right-wing populism, 2021 election results: 1.33%)

Resistance to COVID-19 restrictions Anti-vax Individualism Anti-EU

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Four cycles of the Czech far right’s contention Table 6.3  The key characteristics of the four cycles of the Czech far right Cycle

Opportunities and issues

Main ideological conflict/tension

The First Cycle (1989–1998)

Post-revolutionary Czech (anti-German) nationalism vs. chaos neo-Nazism Anti-communism Germany Anti-ziganism

The Second Cycle Post-revolutionary Absent (many parallel ideological (1999–2014) chaos streams without Anti-communism significant mutual Germany conflicts) Anti-ziganism

The Third Cycle (2015–2019)

European refugee crisis

The Fourth Cycle COVID-19 (since 2020) pandemic

Main organisational Society’s conflict/tension reaction(s) Skinhead subculture First openness, vs. Republican then closed Party opportunities and repression

Subculturally informed movements vs. political parties

Repression of the extreme Right, mainstreaming of conservative activism and right-wing populism

New xenophobia Single issue vs. biological racism movements vs. and anti-Semitism populist political party

Majoritarian acceptance of the definition of the situation, reluctance towards the proposed solution and political representatives

Libertarian resistance Party movements vs. populist to measures political parties (majority) vs. nationalist support to measures (minority)

New situation, the far right only as a minority in the broader movement

The first cycle (1989–1998): Origins Post-revolution window of opportunity After 1989, Czech society witnessed several novel developments, the products of which contributed in part to the emergence of the Czech far right. These included a fear of postrevolutionary “chaos,” austerity, disillusionment with the results of the revolution, racism (above all, anti-ziganism), anti-communism, opposition to the political left in general (including ideas of equality and communist internationalism), and new debates about the country’s relationship to Germany (Charvát, 2007). On the one hand, the context of cultural Westernisation provided an opportunity for nationalist projects to construct a threat to national values. On the other hand, it also helped the far right to exchange ideas, styles, and discourses transnationally. During the first cycle, this resulted in the transfer of the subcultural style of skinheads. Skinheads soon became infamous for street violence and dozens of deadly attacks, mostly on 87

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Roma people, but also foreign students and people belonging to the punk subculture – possibly due to the omnipresent ethos of the newly gained “freedom.” The police still had not recovered from the loss of legitimacy caused by the role it played during the communist dictatorship (Daniel, 2016; Prokůpková, 2021).

Ideological and organisational development This cycle, during which key far-right organisations were established, was marked by a split between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary far right. On the one hand, part of the Czech far-right movement became institutionalised. In 1990, the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa; SPRRSČ) was founded, establishing the foundation for the party-level far right (Mazel, 1998). During this cycle, the party celebrated some electoral success: it was part of the Czech Parliament between 1992 and 1998 with electoral gains of 5.98% and 8.01%, respectively. The party’s frames employed anti-ziganist and anti-German sentiments as well as populist rhetoric, attacking politicians as corrupted elites (Roubal, 2012). While anti-ziganism resonated with the widespread racism in Czech society, anti-German sentiments reflected the legacy of 19th-century nationalism (conserved by communist historiography) and the trauma of World War II and were reflected in the following expulsion of Sudeten Germans (re-actualised by debates about new relationships with reunified Germany). During this period, the Republicans faced discursive constraints because other political parties perceived them as extreme. As a result, the parliamentary importance of the party was significantly limited, and it had difficulties to enter any government coalition. In 1998, after two terms, it eventually lost electoral support and were unable to maintain a presence in parliament (Charvát, 2007; Rataj et al., 2020). On the other hand, outside the political sphere, the musical group Orlík, which was founded just before the revolution, brought the racist skinheads’ subculture to Czechia and laid the groundwork for the subcultural far right. This was followed by the emergence of other subcultural (i.e., skinhead) groups. Some were officially registered, such as the neo-fascist organisation the Patriotic Front (Vlastenecká fronta, VF) and the conservative and nationalist Patriotic League (Vlastenecká liga, VL). Others, such as the neo-Nazi Bohemia Hammerskins (BHS), were not officially registered (Mareš, 2003). These structures primarily consisted of racist skinhead subculture, which strictly rejected party politics and focused on cultural and violent expressions. The ideological positions of the Czech skinhead subculture underwent a major development between 1990 and 1993. Within three years, it shifted from nationalism (often anti-German), anti-communism, and anti-ziganism as well as calls for a “heavy-handed government,” to open neo-Nazism. In 1993, the BHS declared its support for national socialism and became a reference group within the entire subcultural far right. When police pressure led to the dismantling of the BHS in 1995, it was immediately replaced by a new neo-Nazi organisation, Blood and Honour (Mareš, 2003). Neo-Nazism became a significant element of the extra-parliamentary far right, which remained a subculture, never evolving into a wider social movement.

Ideological cleavages and the fragmentation of the far right The ideological positions of various participants in the far-right subculture and party-level politics during the early 1990s gradually crystallised, leading to disputes within the scene. At the beginning of the 1990s, racist skinheads supported the Republican Party, but because 88

Four cycles of the Czech far right’s contention

of their stance against party politics, their support gradually waned. Instead, most of them concentrated on building their own subculture and focused primarily on subcultural activities, such as street violence, creating zines, organising concerts (which served as platforms for ideological fortification, networking, the establishment of general contact across the movement, and, ultimately, financial gain), and, to a limited extent, sporadic demonstrations (Mazel, 1998). Furthermore, divisions between neo-Nazism (or neo-fascism) and Czech nationalism (both populist and subcultural) emerged (Slačálek & Charvát, 2019). Other ideological disputes arose between supporters of nationalist conservatism (e.g., the Patriotic League) and open neo-Nazism (Bohemia Hammerskins). It lasted until the mid-1990s and ended with the marginalisation of the Patriotic League and the clear inclination of the vast majority of skinheads towards neo-Nazism. Blood and Honour (the successor of the BHS) continued along the same lines, rejecting political activism and focusing on subculture. However, a new effort to establish a political party based on subcultural neo-Nazi ideologies arose (influenced by the German Junge Nationaldemokraten, the German youth organisation affiliated with the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany; NPD) (Mareš, 2003). This became an important basis for the mobilisation at the beginning of the next cycle.

Reaction of political elites, media, and the public In the early 1990s, political elites mostly ignored the problem of rising racism and far-right organisational structures. Furthermore, Czech media tended to downplay racially motivated crimes. Some journalists even covered the skinhead subculture with sympathy. The racist skinhead band, Orlík, was being both published by large music corporations and included on popular music charts. However, due to the rise of the subculture’s violence and racially motivated murders, the attitudes of both Czech elites and media changed around 1993. Under pressure both from abroad and from domestic human rights organisations, the government decided to recognise racially motivated acts as a separate part of criminal behaviour that is ideologically conditioned. In 1994, the Ministry of the Interior labelled the far right as “extremist”4 (Mareš, 2003). The change in these elite attitudes affected the police’s approach, which began to involve systematic actions against neo-Nazi groups. While this led to the disintegration of the Bohemia Hammerskins, it did not destroy the neo-Nazi subculture (Mazel, 1998). After 1993, Czech media started increasingly covering the far right in terms of moral panic and frequently portrayed skinheads as poorly educated young men of working-class backgrounds, who were prone to violence and had a neo-Nazi streak (the Nazi salute being a key symbol). Although the Republican Party had acquired more respect as an official political party, journalists often depicted the party as either far right, populist, scandalous, or unserious and comical. A specific moment involved the reaction of the groups, who were the most frequent targets of attacks (e.g., the Vietnamese, Roma, and members of youth subcultures). In the early 1990s, Vietnamese quasi-home-defences rapidly emerged and were quite successful in resisting attacks by racist skinheads. Similar attempts occurred to a lesser extent in the Roma community in the early 1990s. The subcultural youth also eventually resorted to a similar form of self-organisation. Anti-racist demonstrations throughout the 1990s and well after were mostly organised by anarchist movements and the punk subculture (Bastl, 2011). Together with the media’s equating of “skinhead” with “neo-Nazi,” another media analogy was created: the “opponent of the Far Right” equals an “anarchist or punk.” 89

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The second cycle (1999–2014): Many paths Sometimes half-open but mostly closed windows of opportunities The second cycle can be defined as a process of stabilisation marked by the 1999 Czech entrance to NATO and the European Union in 2004. Czechia had long been consistent in its exclusion of the far right from mainstream politics, sometimes even more so than some Western countries. For instance, the Czech parliament was absent any far-right parties from 1998 to 2013, whereas the Austrian Freedom Party was in government between 2000 and 2005. Notwithstanding, some opportunities that the far-right exploited, such as radical Euroscepticism, anti-ziganism, and anti-migration, gradually spilt over into the political mainstream, including the rhetoric of presidents Václav Klaus and Miloš Zeman. Moreover, the fall of the Republican Party created a space for another party actor in the far-right sector. However, the subcultural far-right faced constraints in the forms of societal condemnation and state repression. As a result, it failed to mobilise people beyond its traditional supporters and did not manage to transform its resources into a successful political party or expand into a strong social movement.

Ideological and organisational development and cleavages During the second cycle, the Czech far-right scene underwent significant ideological development. The cycle is characterised by the coexistence of many ideological streams: populism, conservatism, ultra-nationalism, fascism, various versions of neo-Nazism, and historical revisionism. Between 1998 and 2003, the Czech far right attempted to unify. During these years, Czechia witnessed a massive number of far-right manifestations organised by a diverse coalition consisting of Czech fascists from the Patriotic Front as well as neo-Nazis from the National Alliance (Národní Aliance; NA) and the National Resistance (Národní odpor; NO). The aim of such mobilisations, which were organised as strictly legal actions, was to gain visibility in the public space, facilitating the formation of a political party that would replace the Republicans. These attempts, which originated in the subcultural field, failed. Nevertheless, some former Republicans allied with subcultural neo-Nazis and founded the Workers’ Party (Dělnická strana; DS) in 2002. That year, a competing project, the ultra-nationalist National Party (Národní strana; NS), was founded. Despite public attention, which these two parties were able to attract, they both remained marginal in terms of electoral results (Rataj et al., 2020; Smolík, 2013). Between 2003 and 2009, the social movement arena witnessed some significant changes after new actors made ultra-conservative ideas mainstream. During this time, the new platform Action ENOUGH (Akce D.O.S.T.), inspired by the transnational New Right, emerged. It called for the defence of “traditional values” (e.g., regarding family, nation, and religion) and even received support from mainstream political party MPs and, eventually, President Klaus. Its popularity peaked in 2009 when it organised demonstrations supporting Klaus’s temporary refusal to sign the Lisbon Treaty (Rataj et al., 2020). At the same time, the activities of the already established subcultural far right continued to be perceived as controversial, and they positioned themselves directly against the mainstream. For instance, the neo-Nazi part of the subcultural far right attempted to organise a march reminiscent of the infamous Kristallnacht through the Prague Jewish Quarter in 2007. The event ended in widespread arrests of members of the far-right subculture, massive civil protests, and street violence. Eventually, members of the National Resistance and the Autonomous Nationalists (Autonomní nacionalisté; AN) strategically decided to work more closely with the Workers’ Party. After 2007 (five years after its foundation), owing to their cooperation, the party began 90

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to play a significant role in the far-right scene (Vejvodová, 2011). In 2009, Workers’ Party activities merged with social movement activism by organising provocative “home guards” and demonstrations against the Roma in Northern Bohemia. While this brought about attention, riots, and political success in some municipalities, the period was also marked by exhaustion and a collapse in the majority of the far-right scene. In 2010, the party was banned and immediately replaced by the Workers’ Party of Social Justice (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti; DSSS). Finally, the end of the cycle brought also a successful far-right populist party Dawn – National Coalition (Úsvit – Národní koalice), later renamed Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit přímé demokracie) (2013–2018), founded by the Czech-Japanese political entrepreneur, Tomio Okamura. Unlike the overly ideological and discredited long-term representatives of the far right, he harvested the votes of citizens dissatisfied with austerity measures and corruption. His success brought the far right back into the parliament. His recipe for success during the 2013 election (6.88%) was far-right populism combined with nativism, xenophobia, antiGypsism, an emphasis on “direct democracy,” and criticism of the political class (Císař & Navrátil, 2018; Maškarinec & Bláha, 2014). During this cycle, far-right conspiracy theories began emerging. After 2001, this conspiracy scene manifested a capacity to attract a much broader audience than the classical far-right milieu. Amongst the most significant far-right promoters of conspiracy theories were Petr Hájek, president Klaus’s secretary and a publisher of the far-right conspiracist website, Protiproud, and Michal Semín, a Christian fundamentalist, anti-Judaist, and leader of Action ENOUGH (Panczová & Janeček, 2015; Tarant, 2020). As outlined above, throughout the second cycle, there was a rather broad front of collaboration between various streams of the far right. After the failure of such attempts, the different streams mostly worked in parallel. However, as with the first cycle, the movement suffered from tensions caused by conflicts between its subcultural basis and the political ambitions of the movement’s leaders. While the subcultural element continued to be driven by open racism and neo-Nazism, the people engaged in Okamura’s party used a pragmatic calculation and strategically created a discourse which would attract the highest number of voters. Finally, at the end of this cycle, the subcultural far right ceased its identification with skinhead culture and developed new identities through contact with other groups (e.g., football hooligans) and styles (e.g., autonomous nationalism, hip-hop, and hardbass).

Reaction of political elites, media, and the public Similar to the first cycle, the far right was still able to exploit the xenophobia and anti-ziganism strongly present in Czech society. At the end of the second cycle, the Worker’s Party of Social Justice especially managed to attract public support through their provocative demonstrations against the Roma in Northern Bohemia. Although their support was sometimes vigorous (local inhabitants in some cases helped neo-Nazis in their struggles with the police) and, in some cases, involved political support in the municipal election, it remained local. On the other hand, anti-Semitism, as the core component of the neo-Nazi ideology, mostly created a discursive obstruction for the far right because it alienated neo-Nazis from the rest of society. Other discursive constraints were political and cultural elites who viewed neoNazis as a social pathology, banned the neo-Nazi Workers’ Party, and encouraged the police to suppress subculture groups. As a result, the propagation of Nazism started to be intensively prosecuted. However, the new, less-subcultural nationalist projects, such as Action ENOUGH, were not as constrained as some representatives of the elites shared their beliefs. 91

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Some Christian democrats and conservatives even signed Action ENOUGH’s manifesto, supported their “defence of traditional values,” and considered the National Party an alternative. Similarly, the media’s approach was much more ambivalent towards nationalists than it was towards neo-Nazis. Nationalists were sometimes mocked, but they were also considered to be a legitimate part of the political spectrum. Media also produced moral panics about Roma violence, Islam and migration, or some parts of the Left. By doing so, they contributed, at least partially, to framing the situation as opportune for the far right. In the first period of the cycle, counter-protests were mostly organised by anarchists and radical anti-fascists. Police often defended legal far-right demonstrations and violently suppressed extra-legal anti-fascist demonstrations (Bastl, 2011). After 2007, especially, counteractions such as these started to be organised by broader civil society coalitions as well. While the police kept on defending legal far-right protests, some exceptions occurred. In cases of strong civil society counter-mobilisations (e.g., in Brno and Prague’s Jewish Quarter), intense moral scandals (e.g., in Prague’s Jewish Quarter), or a heightened risk of violence (sometimes during provocation demonstrations in excluded localities), far-right demonstrations or parts of them would lose their legal status. Police would attack them but not their opponents.

Third cycle (2015–2019): The refugee crisis and its aftermath The refugee crisis as a new political and discursive opportunity The 2015 European refugee crisis provided the far right with a new opportunity structure. Although Czechia had accepted only a limited number of refugees, the issue of incoming refugees preoccupied most of the political elites, and the media largely portrayed the new influx of refugees as a threat to the Czech nation and the West (Císař & Navrátil, 2018). Consequently, this led to a rise in the significance of some anti-Islam groups such as We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic (Islám v ČR nechceme, IVČRN), which was founded in 2009 but had been operating only on online debate platforms until 2014. Additionally, other existing projects, such as Okamura’s most recent political party, Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie; SPD), redirected their focus almost exclusively onto the securitisation of Islam. However, the structure of the political opportunities was ambivalent. The majority of the Czech population shared the basic demand of Islamophobes (69% of the population asked not to accept any refugees; CVVM, 2017), and the established political parties were responsive to this demand. Thus, while there was significant space for anti-Islamic attitudes, only limited space remained for the new political initiatives of Islamophobes. Finally, the increased usage of social media opened an opportunity to appeal to wider circles.

Ideological and organisational development Shortly before this period, far-right parties and organisations established in the 1990s and 2000s became marginalised. Nevertheless, new projects were emerging or becoming more visible. On the grassroots level, the most visible initiative was IVČRN. At one point, the initiative unsuccessfully attempted to turn itself into a political party under the name, The Bloc Against Islam (Blok proti Islámu; BPI) and even attempted to establish a Czech version of the German political network, PEGIDA. On the party level, it was businessman Okamura’s SPD project: After he was expelled from his original party (ÚPD), he launched a new far-right populist party. In the 2017 Czech legislative election, in which the party campaigned with the slogan “No to Islam, No to terrorists,” 92

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SPD won 10.64% of the votes. While other political forces tried to exploit the widely shared anti-Islam positions, their attempts failed after the majority of the “anti-Islam” votes were swallowed by the SPD. Nationalist populism was the dominant ideological stream of this cycle. The far right re-articulated who its ultimate enemy was: refugees and EU elites (often signified as “evil Brussels”). Anti-Islam and anti-EU positions were connected with hatred towards liberal, antiracist, and feminist NGOs, which were blamed for promoting the “decadence of the West” (Prokůpková, 2018, Slačálek & Svobodová, 2018; Svatoňová, 2020). These newly articulated threats to national values, economy, and sovereignty replaced former enemies, such as Jews or the Roma people. This discursive manoeuvre allowed the new far right to distance themselves from racism and claim that they oppose religious and ideological (neo-Marxist) fundamentalism. This helped them to attract new supporters. Along with the topic of the refugee crisis, other issues gained in importance. Such issues allowed parts of both the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary far right (including the conspiracist scene) to ally with the ultra-conservative representatives of the Catholic Church. An issue that gained particular attention was the issue of “gender ideology.” The religiously informed grassroots organisations connected through professional and personal links to SPD, Action ENOUGH, and other far-right activists ran campaigns against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention and same-sex marriage. Frequent targets were members of the LGBTQIA+ minority and activists, gender studies scholars, and feminist activists. The main narrative of the far-right’s discursive strategy emphasised the need to protect the “traditional family” and the “silent majority” from attacks and oppression by radical “genderists” as well as to establish a defence against Western decadence (Graff & Korolczuk, 2018; Svatoňová, 2021). Often, these narratives were influenced by tropes that originated in pro-Russian online spaces and constructed the idea that the citizens of European countries were under the threat of a “great replacement” (Önnerfors & Krouwel, 2021). These ideas brought the far right close to some other actors, including former President Klaus, President Zeman and Archbishop Dominik Duka. Some prominent figures belonging to the circles surrounding President Klaus and Archbishop Duka even joined Okamura’s party. Klaus even published a book promoting the great replacement conspiracy theory (Klaus & Weigel, 2015), while Zeman gave a speech at a demonstration organised by the Block Against Islam. The main fault line in the third cycle existed between the new mainstream xenophobia (Barša, 2006), represented by the anti-Islamist movement (IvČRN, BPI), and the more radical minority of the movement around Adam B. Bartoš’s National Democracy. Spokespersons of mainstream Islamophobia, Martin Konvička and Petr Hampl, promoted a hard-line, essentialist anti-Islam and anti-EU rhetoric (including a ban on Islam and support for Czexit, sometimes demanding the sinking of refugee boats approaching European shores and concentration camps for Muslims) – allegedly to defend “European values” such as the rights of women and minorities (e.g., Jews, Roma and LGBTIQA+) as well as other liberal values. Bartoš combined Islamophobia and anti-EU attitudes with “old xenophobia,” racism, conspiracy theories (anti-vax), and virulent anti-Semitism.

Reaction of political elites, media, and the public While Czech political elites partially shared the Islamophobic definition of the situation, they also had to distance themselves from the hateful and anti-EU rhetoric of the movement. Thus, they mostly refused it, but, at the same time, they behaved according to its demands: They 93

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opposed EU refugee quotas and refused to accept refugees. By doing so, they effectively prevented the movement from becoming a greater challenge but also made it successful. Unlike other Czech mainstream politicians who officially distanced themselves from the movement, former President Klaus and President Zeman supported it. Although the police already knew how to face the traditional far right, Islamophobes were a new challenge. Their actions continued without police intervention, and the police defended them against their opponents during clashes at protests and counter-protests. Nevertheless, much to the disapproval of some prominent figures, such as President Zeman, police did include the activities of Islamophobes and that of Okamura’s SPD on the annual list of extremist activities. Similarly, the mainstream media’s approach to the anti-Islam movement was paradoxical. To some extent, they reproduced the definition of Islam as a threat. But they also described the Islamophobic movement as a threat to liberal democracy. As a result, they produced two competing moral panics – one against Muslim migrants and the other against Islamophobes (Slačálek, 2021). In general, the basic demands of the movement were supported by a large portion of Czech society, and its xenophobic rhetoric resonated on the Internet: Before IVČRN’s Facebook page was banned for hate speech by Facebook authorities, it had over 163,000 followers. This support, however, was only partially transformed into participation at demonstrations (only a few hundred or thousand participants) and was mostly not harvested by party movements. Only Okamura’s political-business project was successful in transforming it into electoral support. While there were some left-wing and liberal counter-mobilisations, they were mostly unable to outnumber the far right. The ideology of the third cycle materialised into hate crimes and attacks that particularly targeted members of anti-racist NGOs.

The fourth cycle (since 2020): COVID-19 A window of opportunity The years 2020–2022 brought a whole new dimension to the dynamics of the Czech far right. The COVID-19 pandemic itself and the way it has been dealt with by the state authorities, combined with the growing discontent of a particular part of the population, have opened up new opportunities for the far right but, at the same time, led to certain internal contradictions.

Ideological and organisational development In late 2020, a broader movement emerged to oppose the government’s measures against COVID. The former and current far right have played a significant role in the diverse movement. The former leader of the band Orlík (which had been prominent during the first cycle), Daniel Landa (who later became an important “patriotic” singer and was more or less disavowed from the political far right), played an essential role as an organiser of initiatives and spokesperson for the broader anti-vax movement. His initiative in the COVID situation went beyond the far right, seeking broad support across society, and evoking values of freedom. At the same time, it promoted radicalism through its statements and actions (e.g., “civil disobedience” in an attempt to block the activities of sanitation authorities) and by framing the situation with conspiratorial imagery. On the political party level, all opposition parties criticised the form of the measures, but SPD was the only one to openly reject them and profile itself as an anti-restriction party. In addition, a new movement party, Free Bloc (Volný blok), was founded by a former SPD MP, Lubomír Volný. By combining obstructive and scandalising speeches in the parliament with 94

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public rallies against the lockdown, he was able to attract attention. However, his project had a poor electoral result (1.33% in the 2021 parliamentary elections). Parts of Czech society holding a comprehensive mix of ideological views expressed resistance to the pandemic restrictions through various means: the promotion of individualism (based on a neoliberal narrative prevalent since the early 1990s); protests against pandemic restrictions, surveillance, and the power of pharmaceutical companies; reactions to the social problems caused by the measures; displays of concern regarding the decline of the nation; and expressions of fear over “the great reset” and newly strengthened power structures (often referencing conspiracy theories). This resistance gradually concentrated around three partially overlapping themes: (1) opposition to anti-COVID measures, (2) a mixture of conspiracy theories about the nature of COVID itself, and (3) anti-vax positions. Although the far right participated in the resistance against COVID restrictions and vaccination, it was not a dominant actor in the movement. However, former and current leaders of the far right have gained considerable opportunities through the movement and have been amongst its most prominent spokespeople. Many participants without a previous far-right background adopted specific definitions of the situation articulated by the far right – in particular, conspiracy theories. It is also true that even though the majority of people involved in the movement against the restrictions were not amongst the far right, the vast majority of the far right was against the restrictions (for exceptions, see the following paragraph). Furthermore, previous far-right activism was not necessarily an advantage: When DSSS supported Free Bloc in the election, its members could not officially become party candidates and did not make public appearances at the party’s events to avoid discrediting the new party as being affiliated with neo-Nazism. At the pandemic’s beginning, most of the Czech far right favoured the lockdown and the closing of borders. Only a handful of far-right figures opposed the measures from libertarian positions. However, throughout the pandemic, their positions changed, and most of the far right began to oppose COVID-19 measures. The only exception was a tiny section centred mainly on the remnants of the anti-Islamist movement (led by Martin Konvička and Petr Hampl), which called for firm measures based on an idea of national unity (evoking the example of Orbán) and emphasising the deadly effects of the pandemic. Most of the far right supported the initiative Chcípl PES, which was funded by owners of restaurants who could not run their businesses, and did not create their own organisations. Members of the established far-right party participated in Chípl PES’s demonstrations, but SPD’s chairman, Tomio Okamura, avoided them. The emergence of Volný’s far-right movement party, Free Blok, did not shake SPD’s position but, due to the presence of competing projects that exploited the pandemic opportunity, Okamura’s party slightly lost support in the 2021 elections.

Reaction of political elites, media, and the public The reaction of the political elites was mixed at the beginning of the pandemic. Sometimes there was a visible effort to co-opt the opposing sides into a dialogue (e.g., repeated hearings in the parliamentary petitions committee, space for Landa), reflecting the political elites’ inconsistent criticisms of lockdown measures. At other times, there was an effort at clear condemnation, exclusion, and repression, which was not very effective. The media’s reaction reflected the state of society – one that has been divided since the migration crisis. On the one hand, some media sources tried to be neutral but gradually gravitated towards promoting moral panics around the “image of disinformation” (with marginal 95

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anti-vaxxers emphasising conspiracy theories about vaccination (chips). In other words, the media continued to simplify and ridicule, invoking “common sense.” At the same time, however, other media sources heavily publicised the participation of the Workers’ Party chair in Free Bloc events, which led to the withdrawal of the Workers’ Party. The period was marked by harassment of the people associated with vaccination, such as medical experts and politicians supporting vaccinations.

Conclusion As we have seen, the more than 30-year-development of the far right has resulted in many varieties, and we cannot identify a simple pattern. Still, some conclusions can be drawn regarding our original research questions. From the point of view of political opportunities, it is not surprising that the far right has gained support in new contexts and especially in the context of a broadly perceived crisis. The analysis of the Czech case proved that long-term stability is not a fertile ground upon which the far-right thrives: It develops and finds its opportunities but it also encounters obstacles, exclusion, and the repression of a relatively stable society. When faced with a new challenge (be it a new regime, refugee crisis, or the COVID-19 crisis), the far right was able to regroup and avoid stigma and exclusion. Moments of crisis, nevertheless, provide ambivalent chances to the far right. Since their definition of the situation is often shared by a much broader set of actors, the far right is mostly unable to defend its “copyright” or “ownership” (and therefore leadership). Consequently, they must compete with other actors who can exploit these issues. Although the far right was able to exploit some discursive opportunities in the beginning, its own longue durée transformed some of its features, such as Nazism and anti-Semitism (as well as, to some extent, biological racism and violence), into discursive obstacles. When it comes to ideology, based on our analysis, we conclude that the extra-parliamentary far right succeeded in mobilising higher numbers of people when the actors dropped their identification with subcultures (and/or identities derived from broader ideologies or “isms”) and instead defined the identity of the movement based on single issues, such as the refugee and COVID-19 crisis. The main finding of this chapter is that different organisational logics complemented each other in ambivalent and mostly conflicting ways. While they interacted together and created various hybrids, their different telos often led to conflicts between political parties, social movements, and subcultures. The findings of our analysis support the conclusion of Císař and Navrátil (2018) and extend them: Segments of social movements and far-right political parties are separate, not only during the refugee crisis but also throughout all four waves. Czechia has not had a successful movement party. While both cases of successful far-right political parties can be understood more as the business projects of their leaders, Sládek and Okamura, social movements or subcultures have always failed in their attempts to establish themselves as parties. We argue that we need to enrich the conceptual dichotomy of social movements and political parties with the concept of subculture to understand such developments. The first two cycles can be characterised by the hybridisation of subculture and movement practices. On the one hand, there were subcultural aspects present that aimed at authentic expression. On the other hand, the events organised by the subculture were also intended to create a wider social movement. As such, the Czech extra-parliamentary scene oscillated between the two logics, neither of which was completely compatible with the logic of a political party. This logic and focus on political success both produce conflicts with the logics of social movements’ immediate self-expression and conflict with the idea of subcultural “authenticity” in the expression and performance of far-right values. 96

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To conclude, the proponents of Czech far-right social movements have faced a riddle of how to combine these two conflicting logics. They often understood the movements not as social movements but as bases for forming political parties (and sometimes even managed to establish them). At the same time, the movements were deeply influenced by subculture, which provided a viable source of activists and ethos. However, when the movements were to enter the political sphere, their subcultural base caused problems as members could not compromise and adopt the universalising and acceptable language needed for mainstream politics (see Marchart, 2003). This can partially explain the success of actors outside movements. Whereas during the first two cycles, the extra-parliamentary arena was dominated by the subcultural far right, the successful mobilisation of people beyond the traditional circles was possible only when the far right abandoned their subcultural aspects and became a “movement for anyone,” focusing only on single issues, such as Islam or COVID as we observed during the third and fourth cycles.

Notes 1 We would like to thank Ondřej Císař, Måns Ljungstedt, Miloš Dlouhý, and two anonymous reviewers for their stimulating comments on the first version of the chapter. 2 This chapter was supported by the NPO “Systemic Risk Institute” “LX22NPO5101”. 3 The research for this chapter was supported by the European Regional Development Fund-Project “Creativity and adaptability as conditions of the success of Europe in an interrelated world” (No. CZ .02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000734). 4 Referring to the German theory of extremism (extremismustheorie).

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Jan Charvát, Ondřej Slačálek, and Eva Svatoňová Hall, S. et al. (Eds.). (1975). Resistance through rituals. Youth subcultures in post-war Britain. Routledge. Hebdige, D. (1979). Subculture. The meaning of style. Methuen. Johnston, H., & Snow, D. (1998). Subcultures and the emergence of the Estonian nationalist opposition 1945–1990. Sociological Perspectives, 41(3), 473–497. Kitschelt, H. (2006). Movement parties. In R. S. Katz, & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp. 278–290). Sage. Klaus, V., & Weigel, J. (2015). Stěhování národů S.R.O.: Stručný manuál k pochopení současné migrační krize. Olympia. Koopmans, R. (2004). Protest in time and space: The evolution of waves of contention. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements. Blackwell. Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (1999). Ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood and the differential success of the extreme right in Germany and Italy. In M. Giugni, D. McAdam, & C. Tilly (Eds.), How social movements matter (pp. 225–251). University of Minnesota Press. Marchart, O. (2003). Bridging the micro-macro gap: Is there such a thing as a post-subcultural politics? In R. Weinzierl, & D. Muggleton (Eds.), The post-subcultures reader (pp. 83–97). Berg. Mareš, M. (2003). Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v ČR. Barrister & Principal. Maškarinec, P., & Bláha, P. (2014). For whom the bell tolls: Grievance theory and the rise of new political parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech parliamentary elections. Sociológia, 46(6), 706–731. Mazel, M. (1998). Oponenti systému, In: Fiala, P et al. (1998) Politický extremismus a radikalismus v České republice (pp. 117–277). Masarykova univerzita. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Muggleton, D. (2000). Inside subculture: The postmodern meaning of style. Berg. Önnerfors, A. & Krouwel, A., 2021. Between internal enemies and external threats: how conspiracy theories have shaped Europe – an introduction. In: Europe: Continent of Conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe. Routledge, pp. 1–21. Panczová, Z., & Janeček, P. (2015). Théories du complot et rumeurs en Slovaquie et en tchéquie. Diogéne, 249–250, 150–167. Pirro, A., & Castelli Gattinara, P. (2018). Movement parties of the far-right: The organisation and strategies of nativist collective actors. Mobilisation: An International Quarterly, 23(3), 367–383. Pirro, A., & Castelli Gattinara, P. (2019). The far-right as social movement. European Societies, 21(4), 447–462. Prokůpková, V. (2021). The limits of tolerance for intolerance. Young democracy and skinhead violence in Czechia in the 1990s. Europe-Asia Studies, 73(10), 1771–1796. Prokůpková, V. (2018). Two mobilisation cycles of the Czech anti-Islam movement. Collective actors and the identity change of the movement 2015–2016. Intersections, 4(4), 51–71. Rataj, J., Dlouhý, M., & Háka, A. (2020). Proti systému! Český radikální konzervativismus, fašismus a nacionální socialismus 20. a 21. století. Auditoritum. Roubal, P. (2012). „Smést to všechno do Vltavy.“ Proměny revolučního diskurzu Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánské strany Československa. In A. Gjuričová, M. Kopeček, J. Suk, & T. Zahradníček (Eds.), Rozděleni minulostí: Vytváření politických identit v České republice po roce 1989 (pp. 311–342). Knihovna Václava Havla. Shriver, T., Adams, A., & Cable, S. (2013). Discursive obstruction and elite opposition to environmental activism in the Czech Republic. Social Forces, 91(3), 873–893. Slačálek, O. (2021). “Inadaptable Gypsies” and “Dangerous Antiziganists”: Struggling and mirroring folk Devils. In M. D. Frederiksen, & I. Harboe Knudsen (Eds.), Modern folk devils: Contemporary constructions of evil (pp. 181–201). Helsinki University Press. Slačálek, O. (2018). The leadership of the Czech far-right 1990–2017. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 4(4), 125–136. Slačálek, O., & Charvát, J. (2019). Setkávání na okrajových scénách. Průsečíky politického a subkulturního radikalismu v polistopadovém Česku. Český lid, 106(1), 107–126. Slačálek, O., & Svobodová, E. (2018). The Czech Islamophobic movement: Beyond ‘populism’? Patterns of Prejudice, 52(5), 479–495. Smolík, J. (2013). Národní strana v kontextu krajní pravice. 2003–2012. Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. Svatoňová, E. (2020). Where have all the normal men and women gone? The representation of masculinity and femininity in the anti-feminist discourses of the women’s far-right organisation Angry Mothers. Conjunctions Transdisciplinary Journal of Cultural Participation, 7 (1), 2246–3755.

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Four cycles of the Czech far right’s contention Svatoňová, E. (2021). “Gender activists will kidnap your kids.” The construction of feminist and LGBT+ rights activists as the modern folk devils in Czech anti-gender campaigns. Helsinki University Press. Taitelbaum, B. (2017). Lions of the North. Sounds of the New Nordic Radical Nationalism. Oxford University Press. Tarant, Z. (2020). Antisemitism in the Czech Republic. Antisemitism Studies, 4(1), 108–142. Tarrow, S. (1994, 2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press. Vejvodová, P. (2011). Neonacismus. In M. Bastl, M. Mareš, J. Smolík, & P. Vejvodová (Eds.), Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR (pp. 139–186). Grada. Williams, P. J. (2011). Subcultural theory: Traditions and concepts. Polity Press.

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7 HUNGARY’S GOULASH-NATIONALISM The Reheated Stew of Hungary’s Far Right Katherine Kondor and Rudolf Paksa

Hungary has in recent years received much attention for its authoritarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, but Hungary is no stranger to fervent nationalism and a strong far right. Since the collapse of communism, Hungary has seen a new wave of the far right, with a striking similarity to several aspects of the far-right ideology of the Hungarian interwar and wartime periods. During the 20th century, Hungary was defined by repeated defeat and, essentially, a nostalgia for the regional power lost after the First World War. This stark contrast to Western European nations provides an excellent case study to examine the continuation and development of far-right culture. This chapter will open with a historical analysis of the development of the Hungarian far right, in the interwar and wartime periods and the period post-1989 after the transition out of state socialism. The second part of the chapter will analyse the main characteristic aspects of the contemporary Hungarian far right, paying particular attention to those features that clearly have historical roots: the reverence of particular historical figures, hyper-masculinity and fitness, revisionism (particularly irredentism), and finally racism and xenophobia.

The evolution of the Hungarian far right The Far right in the early 20th century At the end of the First World War, the Habsburg Monarchy and the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Hungary, which had made up the Monarchy’s eastern half, fell apart. Hungary was invaded from several directions by neighbouring states and French troops of the Entente. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to protect the country’s borders: first, in the autumn of 1918, a democratic republic was declared initiating diplomatic negotiations with nationalist movements. Then, in the spring of 1919, a Soviet republic attempted to hold the disintegrating country together by the force of arms. The counter-revolutionary forces that came to power in the autumn of 1919, led by Admiral Miklós Horthy (1868–1957), oppressed all other political groups and pacified society in the interior of the country. Horthy was elected head of state (Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary), a post he held until 1944. Thus he became the eponym of the interwar period (Turbucz, 2011). During Horthy’s regime, racist slogans tied to 100

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-10

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revisionist and irredentist ideology contributed to a type of cultural chauvinism, and “resulted in a militant rejection of liberalism, democracy and socialism, all of which were viewed as ‘alien to the Hungarian spirit’” (Hoensch, 1988, p. 114). The Treaty of Trianon was concluded on 4 June 1920, which reduced the country’s territory and population to a third. A significant number of Hungarians were incorporated into neighbouring states along the border and Transylvania. After the Treaty of Trianon was signed, Hungary went from a population of eighteen million to a small country of just under eight million (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990; Romsics, 2010). All of Hungary was opposed to the Treaty, but there were divisions as to where the country’s borders should be: some demanded settlement along ethnic lines, while others desired the pre-war borders to be reinstated (Hajdú & Nagy, 1990). The loss of territory was such a trauma for Hungarian society that the revision of the borders remained the country’s top priority until the end of the period. Political life was also changed. Whereas before 1918 the main issue for parliamentary parties was the relationship with the Habsburg dynasty, after 1918 new parties were organised on ideological bases representing social classes (Püski, 2006). This shift also marked the birth of the modern far right in Hungary: they advocated an independent Hungary, rather than restoring the Habsburg Monarchy. They also opposed the democratic republic of 1918 and the Soviet Republic of 1919, which were left-wing and considered internationalist, atheist, and Jewish-led. Instead, they wanted a “Christian and national” (i.e., not Jewish and not leftwing) country where the state would reduce the wealth gap between social groups and control the economy. Far-right groups were anti-Semitic and, due to the treaty, distrustful of national minorities. A major figure in the interwar far right was Gyula Gömbös (1886–1936), who formed the Party of Racial Defence (Fajvédő Párt) (Gyurgyák, 2012). Gömbös became obsessed with Turanism, the idea that the ancestors of the Magyars came from the so-called “Turan” region in Central Asia and that Hungarians have closer ethnic ties to Asia than Europe. This Turan region was imagined as the area which the Magyar people came from before the conquest of the Carpathian Basin, and the home of Turkic people of the steppes allegedly closely related to the Hungarians (Ablonczy, 2016). After seeing his party was unsuccessful, Gömbös moderated his views (especially publicly denying his open anti-Semitism) and joined the ruling Unity Party (Egységes Párt) in 1928. The Unity Party was a collective party promoting conservative, nationalist, and Christian values (Romsics, 2019). Gömbös’ outwardly more moderate views led to him taking power on 1 October 1932 (Vonyó, 2018). Modelling his vision of the ruling party on Mussolini’s example and taking several steps toward the far right, he was the first politician to openly label himself as a “Hungarian National Socialist.” He visited both Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, and pushed for a German–Italian–Hungarian–Austrian alliance (Ormos, 1990). While Gömbös soon lost the support of the ruling party and the conservative members of parliament, he stayed in power until his natural death in 1936. In the 1930s the Hungarian extreme right started to centre around Ferenc Szálasi (1897–1946), leader of the newly formed Party of National Will (Nemzet Akaratának Pártja) between 1935 and 1937. The party was characterised by militant anti-Semitism and suggested bringing all people of the Carpathian Basin, who were separated by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, together under Hungarian leadership (Paksa, 2013a). Szálasi, the most infamous Hungarian National Socialist leader, created the Hungarism (hungarizmus) ideology, a mixture of nationalism, socialism, and Christianity; Szálasi considered it important that all Hungarian citizens be Christian. Szálasi professed that his movement was not anti-Semitic, but rather “a-Semitic,” 101

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meaning that he advocated for all Jews to emigrate to Palestine (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Although Szálasi was a racist, he did not believe in a hierarchy of races, arguing only against miscegenation. He opposed the immigration of “foreign” ethnicities, believing that ethnic groups should remain in their own compact nation-state. Szálasi’s view on Jewish people distinguished him from other Hungarian far-right parties, arguing against placing regulations on Jewish people as he believed they should all be deported from the country. Szálasi was arrested in April 1937, and his party dissolved. On 24 October 1937, eight other right-wing groups joined what was the party to form the Hungarian National Socialist Party (Magyar Nemzeti Szocialista Párt), which subscribed to Hungarism (Hoensch, 1988). Unfortunately for Szálasi, who was again imprisoned in November 1937 for a short time, his new party was banned in February 1938. That year, Hungary’s National Socialists, encouraged by Germany’s annexation of Austria, formed the new Hungarian National Socialist Party – Hungarist Movement (Nemzeti Szocialista Magyar Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom). Their idea was that for the Hungarians to be the leading world-race, all “Judeo-plutocracies” (Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union), should be dissolved, and instead Latin, German, Slavic, Islamic, and Hungarian nations should form their own Lebensraum (Kürti, 2006). After Béla Imrédy became prime minister in 1938, his promise of harder action against the far right meant that Szálasi was again imprisoned (Paksa, 2013b). The Arrow Cross Party – Hungarist Movement (Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom), founded on 9 March 1939, was a conscious imitation of German Nazism (Kürti, 2006). They were called Hungarian National Socialists, or Arrow Crossers, because they used an isosceles cross (the so-called Byzantine cross), which ended in an arrow, as their symbol; this symbol was modelled on the swastika. The Hungarian National Socialists initially copied Hitler’s Programme, and by the late 1930s had adapted it to Hungarian circumstances. However, there were some significant differences between the Hungarian and German National Socialists (Paksa, 2010). First, they were not in power but in opposition until 1944, when the country was occupied by Germany. Second, several National Socialist parties competed with one-another in Hungary. Third, the importance of Christianity to the Arrow Cross cannot be overstated. Fourth, they did not believe in racial hierarchy or in the importance of the Aryan race. Finally, there were differences between the two movements on their views of masculinity, as the Hungarian National Socialists tended to emphasise military virtues above all else. There was a significant lack of homophobia in Szálasi’s Hungarism, as Szálasi’s resolute Christianity meant he believed all were created by God. Hungarian National Socialist opposition parties grew in the 1930s, and on several issues (mainly anti-Semitism, but also the extension of social rights) they pushed the ruling party into a pledge contest, which was gradually radicalised. During the Second World War, the ruling party split into two factions: pro-war and anti-war. In 1944, after the German invasion, the pro-war members of the governing party formed a coalition with the Hungarian National Socialists, and the anti-war members were persecuted and deported. The far right which came to power collaborated with the Germans to deport most of the Jewish Hungarians living in the countryside, c. 400,000 people, increased Hungary’s involvement in the war, and in the autumn of 1944, with German help, forced Miklós Horthy to resign, as he wanted to withdraw from the war when the Soviet army reached Hungary. Between October 1944 and March 1945, Szálasi attempted to transform the state into a totalitarian dictatorship, but the country, which had become a war zone, descended into anarchy and was defeated by the Soviet army. In 1945, all far right and conservative organisations classified as fascist were banned, and prominent fascist politicians were sentenced by the Hungarian People’s Courts parallel to the Nuremberg trials. 102

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The skinhead movement and far-right cultural production post-transition During state socialism, far-right symbols and slogans were taboo. According to police reports of the period, the swastikas seen graffitied around were not motivated by ideology, but rather by the taboo-defying vandalism of marginalised youth. This taboo-defiance was an approach of the “Oi!” bands which emerged in the 1980s, who followed their Western counterparts. Their audience at that time was a mixture of punks and would-be skinheads. In addition to an anti-establishment attitude that encouraged vandalism, also prevalent from the beginning of the movement was racism and xenophobia, most especially directed towards the Hungarian Roma minority. The Oi! audience soon split: the punks disappeared and those who preferred nationalist themes and violent attitudes became the skinhead subculture (Keresztes & Varga, 2013; Sárközi, 1994). The latter made national news in 1988 with the murder of people of colour (Szántó, 1988). It is noteworthy, however, that there was no overt anti-Semitism in the movement. After the 1989 regime change, the dogmas and taboos of state socialism largely disappeared, but the far right remained unacceptable to the mainstream press and political parties. Thus, skinheads remained a counter-culture against the liberal consensus; their racism and ultra-nationalism were complemented by growing Nazi sympathies. The second generation of the subculture became militaristic neo-nazis: their appearance became more muscular and macho, they began wearing military clothing (camo print), using militaristic vocabulary, developed interest in weapons and military themes, and organised summer combat training (Boross, 2018). Anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial were new central values, as were a rejection of tolerance, various forms of xenophobia, and homophobia – the latter of which had no prior tradition in the Hungarian far right (Kurimay and Paksa, 2014). In the early 1990s there were a few thousand skinheads in a country of ten million people (Sárközi, 1994). The government at that time took action against their public presence: in 1994 Parliament banned the public display of extremist symbols, and in 1995 a school programme was launched to promote tolerance (Bozóki & Nagy, 2004), while skinhead events were banned from the capital and several foreign neo-nazis were expelled from the country (Kurimay, 2014; Sárközi, 1994). As a result of these measures, by the late 1990s the skinhead movement had become marginalised, and its numbers sharply declined. In the 1990s there was a growing desire for nationalist themes amongst Hungarians, especially in music. Most patriotic symbols and national holidays were persecuted during statesocialism between 1945 and 1989, which meant that after 1989 there was a desire for the nationalist feelings that had been oppressed. As people were increasingly interested in preserving historical traditions, national rock music grew. Known in Hungarian as Nemzeti Rock (national rock), this style of music was nearly synonymous with the far right for decades, and became particularly prominent in the early 2000s with bands like Kárpátia and Ismerős Arcok (Familiar Faces). The roots of Hungarian national rock date back to the “irredentist” music of the 1920s and 1930s (Szele, 2016). This irredentist music proved highly inspirational for the far-right music scene post-1989, which also used elements of skinhead subcultures (Szele, 2016). The tie to skinhead culture is clear even today, with bands like Mos-Oi (a play on words for “smile”), Oi-Kor (Oi-Age), Egészséges Fejbőr (Healthy Scalp), and Romantikus Erőszak (Romantic Violence, now known as Romer) with songs such as “Mindig Skinhead” (Always Skinhead). Merchandise for these bands is sold today by far-right clothing brands. Some national rock bands, such as Kárpátia, managed to break into the mainstream. In 2001, the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom, henceforth Sixty-Four Counties), a far-right revisionist organisation, organised the first so-called Hungarian Island (Magyar Sziget).1 A festival for national rock music, during the daytime 103

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the festival had children’s activities, traditional activities (archery, horse riding, handicrafts), and history lectures. The festival has been revitalised since the COVID-19 pandemic and sees representation from several national rock bands and far-right organisations, such as the Sixty-Four Counties, the Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom), the Outlaw Army (Betyársereg), and the Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom, henceforth Our Homeland) political party. Anti-globalist conspiracy theories and esotericism were also popular in this milieu. This audience was, and still is, addressed by the alternative news portal KurucInfo, referring to the 17th century “guerrillas” who fought for Hungarian independence and appear as romantic heroes in the nationalist historiography. KurucInfo became a mouthpiece for far-right protests against the left-wing government led by Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2006; its audience grew further during the 2008 financial crisis (Karcagi, 2009). Accordingly, the portal mixes themes of Hungarian nationalism with conspiracy theories of globalism and elitism, as well as incitement against foreigners and minorities. KurucInfo is explicitly racist, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, Holocaust-denying, and anti-LGBTQ. Its tone is also different from the mainstream media, vulgar and offensive. Since the appearance of KurucInfo several other far-right alternative news media sites have appeared, such as Harcunk.info, Magyar Jelen, and Szent Korona Rádió – these all openly support Hungarian far-right organisations and values.

The Hungarian far-right movement after state socialism In 1990, Hungary saw a renaissance of far-right organisations. The first major far-right political party to emerge after the transition was the anti-Semitic Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party; henceforth MIÉP). The party was founded by nationalist writer and journalist István Csurka in 1993. MIÉP argued that the post-communist transition was led by people who were “anti-Hungarian,” which pushed the far right to connect Jews with liberalism, the Soviets, and communism (Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). This new “national radical” party was intended as a synthesis of the right-wing (government and opposition) parties of the Horthy era. Accordingly, it demanded the restoration of pre-1920 Greater Hungary and emphasised the “Christian and national” character of the country on an anti-Semitic, anti-leftist, and anti-liberal basis. Its programme promoted the anti-capitalism and statism of the interwar far right, propagated anti-globalist conspiracy theories, was antiAmerican, and opposed Hungarian NATO and EU membership. At most MIÉP achieved results just over five percent of votes in parliamentary elections, but failed to renew itself after the defeat of the right in the 2002 elections. In 2005 MIÉP joined forces with the new movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom; hereafter Jobbik). Jobbik was originally founded in 2003 as a neo-fascist political party, which openly maintained close links to far-right movements and paramilitary organisations (Kyriazi, 2016), such as the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda). The new party, under the leadership of Gábor Vona, represented “traditional social values,” such as heteronormative bigotry, xenophobia, law and order, and border revisionism (Koltay, 2003), plus anti-Roma attitudes. While together with MIÉP Jobbik only received 2.2 percent of votes in the 2006 election, Jobbik quickly became the third-largest political party in Hungary with 16.67 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections, growing to 20.22 percent in 2014. At this point their ideology was openly anti-liberal and anti-EU, and their rhetoric generally anti-LGBTQ, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma (Bartlett et al., 2012; Holdsworth & Kondor, 2017). Following the 2014 national elections, Jobbik attempted to change their image and adopt a “softer” and more moderate tone (Holdsworth & Kondor, 104

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2017). The party’s leader, Gábor Vona, even described his new vision for Jobbik as a “modern conservative party” (Thorpe, 2016). The current Hungarian far-right governing party, Fidesz, a one-time conservative party, was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party called the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége). In the 2010 elections, Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, won a two-thirds majority in parliament. The country has subsequently been gradually transformed into a corrupt autocracy. In the period after Fidesz’s election in 2010 and their second consecutive term re-election in 2014, they rewrote the Constitution, introduced a new electoral system in their favour, erected a fence along the country’s southern borders, led a highly xenophobic campaign against migrants, and turned Hungary into “a culture within which racist speech and prohibited far-right paramilitary activities are tolerated” (Fekete, 2016, p. 40). Fidesz now competed with Jobbik for far-right voters. Fidesz won the 2018 Hungarian elections by a landslide, with 49.3 percent of the vote, and 133 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian parliament. Fidesz has managed to nearly decimate their opposition, leading Hungary dangerously close to a single-party state. They have managed to do this through near-total control of the media, especially in rural areas, control over the education system and school textbooks, and large-scale propaganda campaigns. The party regularly leads campaigns, making use of billboards and “national consultations,” to create enemies against whom Viktor Orbán can “defend” the country. To date, Orbán has “defended” the country from George Soros, former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, rising overheads, Brussels, NGOs, the Central European University, migration, “sex-change kindergarteners,” the so-called “paedophile” gays, and most recently from EU war sanctions. In this way, Fidesz pulled from Jobbik’s voter base, the latter of which ultimately split in two: Jobbik has tried to appeal to moderate right-wing voters abandoned by Fidesz, while the party’s EU-critical, border-revisionist, and more recently anti-vaccine and pro-Russian radicals founded the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) in 2018. The Our Homeland Movement is led by László Toroczkai, the founder of the Sixty-Four Counties and ex-mayor of the border town Ásotthalom. The movement party is quite active on social media – although Facebook has banned the party’s page in the past (Tenczer, 2022) – and has chapters throughout Hungary. They frequently hold protests against various government actions and measures, and regularly appear to give speeches at far-right events. It is clear that the Our Homeland Movement stands for far-right ideals: a staunch ultra-Christian stance, they are anti-EU (and have suggested a referendum to leave the EU), irredentist, extremely anti-LGBTQ, and highly xenophobic. Our Homeland won nearly six percent of the vote in the 2022 national elections, gaining six seats in the Hungarian National Assembly in their first election. The Our Homeland Movement are associated with several grassroots organisations in the Hungarian far right. The most obvious of these is the Sixty-Four Counties, founded in April 2001 by Our Homeland’s leader László Toroczkai. It identifies as a radical youth nationalist movement, and primarily revolves around irredentism. The name is an homage to the Sixty-Four Counties of Hungary, excluding Croatia, before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The other organisation with close ties to Our Homeland is one of the largest far-right organisations in Hungary, the Hungarian Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom). They were formed in October 2014 out of For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense (Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem; henceforth Better Future). The Better Future movement was disbanded in 2014 for anti-Roma activities around Hungary; they became particularly wellknown in 2011 for incidents in the village of Gyöngyöspata, where the group patrolled the village for several weeks terrorising Roma residents. The Hungarian Defence Movement prides 105

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itself on being a volunteer organisation helping local communities, even organising local food and clothing drives, and organising an annual summer camp for children. They are closely related to the newer Our Homeland Movement as the organisation’s leader, Attila László, is a delegate for the movement party; they are also in good relations with the Sixty-Four Counties and regularly attend their events. The current Hungarian far-right landscape has several other organisations varying in size, from skinhead organisations like the Hungarian chapter of Combat-18, to football hooligans like the Ferencváros Ultras, neo-nazi white-power organisations like the Hungarian Legion (Légió Hungária), organisations which revolve around strength training like the Outlaw Army (Betyársereg), to other transnational organisations like the Identitarian Movement.

Hungary’s goulash nationalism Crucial to far-right organisations, to both recruit new sympathisers and foster solidarity, is a positive collective identity. Collective identity “is an act of the imagination, a trope that stirs people to action by arousing feelings of solidarity with their fellows and by defining moral boundaries against other categories” (Jasper & McGarry, 2015, p. 1). It is a “shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences amongst those who comprise the collective and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” (Snow, 2001, p. 2213). It has been suggested that a collective search for identity is an essential movement activity – collective identity derives from common interests, experiences, and a “we-feeling” of a group, which is created, activated, and sustained through their interaction in the movement (Stryker, 2000). This is crucial for maintaining membership in organisations, as people must generally feel excited to be part of a larger group they believe can help, in order to devote time and effort to protest (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015). One tool for building collective identity and culture is the use of symbols, the importance of which should not be overlooked when studying the far right (Kunkeler, 2021). National symbolism associated with situations, such as the signing of the Treaty of Trianon or 1956 Hungarian Revolution, can encourage patriotism, pride, worries, and the collective memory of past glories or humiliations (Edelman, 1985). National symbols may also place emphasis on a nation’s historical past in a way that can then be glorified, romanticised, and mythologised (Schatz & Lavine, 2007). Thus, symbols can have great political power and evoke emotional expressions of national identification, allegiance, and self-sacrifice (Schatz & Lavine, 2007). Symbols can help give ideology shape and form, allowing far-right organisations to clearly project their image to both group members and outsiders. These symbols can cover a wide array, from music, to locations, to historical figures, and colours. Several symbols are widely used by the Hungarian far-right movement, many which honour the so-called Conquering Period, a short period in the 9th and 10th centuries when the Magyars conquered the Carpathian Basin. The first common symbol is the Árpád Flag, which consists of alternating red and white horizontal stripes, originally the flag of the Magyar tribes and of the first Hungarian Dynasty. Revived by the Arrow Cross Movement in the 1930s, the flag was banned by the Soviets less than two decades later. After the end of Soviet rule in Hungary the flag has seen a rebirth in the Hungarian far right (Kondor & Littler, 2020). Other noticeable symbols of the Hungarian far right are the wearing of a tarsoly (an ornamented leather pouch worn by the Magyars), the use of ancient Hungarian runic writing, the image of turul (mythical ancient Magyar bird), and most importantly the image of Greater Hungary. Many symbols from this period have now been banned, but some are still in use – notably the SS Totenkopf, used by some skinhead organisations and football hooligan clubs (such 106

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as Ferencváros Ultras). The following sections will outline the most important ideological aspects of the Hungarian far-right movement, with particular attention to collective identity formation and symbolism. The list is by no means exhaustive. Rather, we provide a discussion of the most prominent aspects used for the building of a collective culture, and specifically those features that have historical connections to the interwar and wartime Hungarian far right: historical figures, revisionism, masculinity, and racism.

Historical figures Coming out of the Neo-Nazi Skinhead Movement of the 1990s, it is unsurprising that a reverence for Adolf Hitler is still prevalent amongst the more extreme factions of the Hungarian far right. This is especially seen in the clothing and aesthetics of the movement. For example, the Hungarian Homeland and Family Clothing brand, with their motto “Race-Nation-Culture,” includes several T-shirts with Hitler motifs. The brand describes itself as “made for warriors of national resistance, sons of Europe, who believe in an undivided Europe against the mutual enemy.” As an example, one shirt presents a silhouette of a child blowing into a trumpet, with “Jugend, we will rise again”; a clear reference to the Hitler Youth. Other clothing brands, such as Imperium clothing, are much less subtle in their symbolism with shirts that read “HTLR” and “SWASTIKA.” Other more common references are also seen outside of clothing brands, for example within the Hungarian football hooligan culture and skinhead movements, such as references to the numbers 18 and 88. Here, each number corresponds to a letter in the alphabet, with 18 referring to “AH” or “Adolf Hitler” and 88 referring to “HH” or “Heil Hitler.” The most popular historical figures in the Hungarian far-right movement, however, are the homegrown symbols of national socialism: most especially Ferenc Szálasi and Miklós Horthy. Reverence of Szálasi is often more subtle than that of Horthy, who appears to be the more acceptable symbol of the two. Szálasi is seen, for example, in Hungarian far-right clothing brands. Both the brands Imperium Clothing and Homeland and Family Clothing have T-shirts with the numbers “9323.” Imperium’s addition of “It’s better to be a hero for a moment than a slave for a lifetime” perhaps makes it clearer to some, but the meaning of “9323” is still incredibly subtle. Most, even in the far-right movement, would not immediately recognise this as Szálasi’s prisoner number. This type of coded symbolism is seen in other Homeland and Family products, for example a shirt with the cities Predappio, Braunau, and Kassa – the birthplaces of Mussolini, Hitler, and Szálasi, respectively, and stating “You killed the man, not the idea.” The reverence for Horthy is far less subtle in the far right, with songs dedicated to him (for example, Kárpátia’s “Horthy Miklós Katonája Vagyok” [I am Miklós Horthy’s Soldier]) and several busts of him around the country. Notably these busts may not be erected on public land, but the newest of these was placed in the private offices of the Our Homeland Movement in the Hungarian parliament. It is not just politicians who are important historical figures to the far right. After 1989, the Hungarian far right rediscovered the oeuvre of Dezső Szabó (1879–1945), the most influential Hungarian expressionist writer of the interwar period, who was once an icon of the far right with his political publications. But the heart of the oppositional writer’s diverse oeuvre was his eager programme to uplift the peasantry in Hungarian villages, which by 1989 had become out of date. The themes of his writing became essentially meaningless after 1989, due to the changing economy and society from 1945 onward; the peasant class, for example, ceased after the 1960s due to the nationalisation of private property. After 1989, for the far right’s voter base, the urban petit bourgeoisie and intellectuals, Dezső Szabó represented the romanticism of rural peasant life. However, it proved difficult for a wider audience to connect with the texts of this 107

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complex expressionist writer. A second-rate writer of the Horthy era, Albert Wass (1908–1998) became a nationalist symbol in the 2000s. He came from an old Transylvanian noble family, and his writings were full of national pride and irredentist nostalgia. Wass fought in the Hungarian army in the Second World War, and after 1945 he emigrated first to Germany and then to the United States, while the Romanian authorities wanted to prosecute him as a war criminal and banned his writings. In Romania he was seen as the embodiment of gentry “fascism” and revisionist Hungarian nationalism. After 2010, the Orbán government supported the spread of a veritable Wass cult, because it was able to win sympathy votes from the far right by connecting the government not to controversial politicians but to a popular writer.

Revisionism: Trianon and Transylvania The Treaty of Trianon evokes strong feelings amongst many Hungarians (see: Ablonczy, 2015, 2020). The far right often uses the symbolism of Greater Hungary, which is represented as a map of Hungary within the surrounding lost territories. This symbol is immediately recognisable and relatively accepted in Hungarian society: it often appears on flags, clothing, jewellery, and decals. The mainstreaming of the symbol is propagated by the government, with a memorial to Trianon recently erected in front of the Hungarian parliament, known as the Memorial of National Unity. While the memorial does not obviously portray the map of Greater Hungary, as other memorials elsewhere in the country do, it is still there in the form of posts which each represent the size of the lost territories. The underground memorial lists all the old towns of Hungary in Hungarian and boasts a Bible verse: “There is no peace without justice.” Trianon is almost more than a symbol of the far right – it indeed makes up a large part of the ideology and identity of the movement. It provides symbols, memorial events each year on its anniversary, and a common cause. Trianon provides a reason for transnationalisation of the Hungarian far-right movement, with new chapters of organisations forming in ex-Hungarian territories (most especially Transylvania). It also lends to far-right cultural production, appearing on clothing and in song lyrics. This use of Greater Hungary by the far right is nothing new, of course, as it was a widespread symbol of Hungarian pride during the Horthy period. New to the post-1989 far right is an obsession with Transylvania, and particularly the Szekler people. The Szekler people live in the Eastern mountain range of Transylvania, believed to historically patrol the old borders between Hungary and Romania (Egry, 2009, 2015). Many Szekler have now received Hungarian citizenship; they are considered by many to be a sortof “ultra-Hungarian,” speaking a dialect of Hungarian and seen as representing traditional Hungarian values. This veneration of the Szekler people extends to many aspects of the far right, including the political sphere: rather than a EU flag, the second flag flying on the Hungarian parliament is the blue-and-gold Szekler flag. In grassroots far-right culture there are numerous references to Transylvania and the Szekler people, particularly in music – for example, Hunnia’s “Erélyi Induló” (Transylvanian March), the skinhead band Magozott Cseresznye’s “Édes Erdély” (Sweet Transylvania), and the Sixty-Four Counties’ use of “Székely Hadosztály Indulója” (Szekler Division March)2 in videos. Furthermore, several far-right organisation travel to Transylvania, where they form chapters. In 2002 the Sixty-Four Counties travelled to the Szeklerlands, where they regularly showed their support for Szekler autonomy and clashed with police. In 2018, two members of their Szekler chapter were sentenced to five years in prison for terrorism, for allegedly planning to set off homemade bombs in 2015 at a Romanian national celebration (Horváth, 2018). The Transylvanians, and particularly the Szekler people, represent a perfect symbol for the Hungarian far right: simultaneously symbolising the ills of Trianon, tradition, and the victimisation of ethnic Hungarians. 108

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Heroism and masculinity Masculinity is at the centre of the far right, influencing their ideologies, origins, recruitment, and internal processes (Roose et al., 2022). Part of this representation of masculinity is through strength culture, which is an important aspect of many Hungarian far-right organisations. Some organisations are entirely built on strength training and masculinity, such as the Outlaw Army, while others emphasise self-defence and paramilitarism (such as the Sixty-Four Counties, Hungarian Defence Movement, and the Hungarian Legion). In Hungary, this idea of strength and the body does not link back to the Hungarian interwar and wartime periods. Rather, in the Hungarian far right there was an emphasis on valour and bravery (in Hungarian, vitézség), which was unique to the Hungarian National Socialism of the interwar and wartime period. The Order of Vitéz (Order of Chivalry) was created in 1920; anti-Semitism was rampant amongst men of the Order until it was dissolved in 1944 (Kerepeszki, 2013). The contemporary far right does, however, have clear connections to the cult of masculinity as seen in the German Nazism as well, which contrasts with the emphasis on valour (as opposed to strength) in the Hungarian National Socialist movement. Furthermore, hyper-masculinity and strong anti-LGBTQ feelings are crucial aspects of the movement. Indeed, it has been suggested that hegemonic masculinity is at the centre of anti-LGBTQ hate crime, as LGBTQ people “are antithetical to the ‘hegemonic ideal’ of manhood” (Kelley and Gruenewald, 2015, p. 6). The end of the 1990s saw a significant symbolic change in the Hungarian Skinhead Movement: they no longer gave two kisses as a greeting, as is customary in Hungary, as it was seen as “gay” (Kurimay and Paksa, 2014). Masculinity can involve a strong desire for heroism, which is evident in two ways in the movement: the worship of past soldiers and freedom fighters, and the formation of far-right paramilitary organisations. There are many commemorative events organised by far-right organisations, many of which are tied to the Second World War and the 1956 Revolution. One of the commemorations of a Second World War event is the Day of Honour, which was first organised by a skinhead group led by István Györkös in 1995 at the suggestion of a former Waffen-SS veteran. The event was supposed to commemorate the “heroism” of German and Hungarian soldiers who tried to break out of Budapest, which was surrounded by the Soviet army on 11 February 1945. This eventually became a militaristic skinhead protest in honour of Nazism, which was held in Buda Castle from 1997. The following year, foreign skinheads began to attend, so in 1999 the first Orbán government banned the event from the capital. An attempt was made to start this event up again in the early 2000s. Alongside this protest, the idea of a hike along the 60km route taken by former soldiers, known as the Kitörés (Breakout) Memorial Hike, was born in 2006. Neo-nazi skinheads, Szálasi-fans, Second World War reenactors, and former veterans all took part. Part of these commemorative events is the giving of speeches by leaders of the Hungarian far-right movement and some right-wing scholars. In these speeches, they often claim that the former German and Hungarian soldiers defended “Christian Europe” against the barbaric Soviet hordes, and in fact fought not only the Soviets but also the British and American armies in 1944.The discourse of these events shows that the memory of the Second World War is still confused in Hungary, and therefore open to appropriation by far-right groups. In recent years more of these tours have been created along various paths. One of the most important of these is the Attila Védvonal Emléktúra (Attila Defense Line Memorial Hike), organised by the Sixty-Four Counties. Beginning in 2012, this tour now has representation from most far-right organisations in Hungary, providing the check-points along the hike. The hike also sees representation from the Szent László WWII reenactment organisation, and honours 109

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the memorials of battalions, such as the Debrecen 16th Assault Gun Battalion of 1944–1945. Similarly organised by the Sixty-Four Counties is the Rongyos Gárda Memorial Hike, a 24 km hike organised since 2005. The Rongyos Gárda (loosely translated to Scrubby Guard) were a non-regular paramilitary unit that were first created in 1921 and re-established after 1938. The Guard fought against the Treaty of Trianon in 1921, when they occupied and ceded the Burgenland region of Austria; after 1938 their activities were revisionist and anti-Bolshevik (Gyurgyák, 2012). These memorial hikes offer a chance for these far-right activists to admire their heroes and to have, what seems to be, a false sense of valour; the idea that if their predecessors, who fought for National Socialism, could do it, so should they be able as well. Finally, there seems to be a perceived importance of passing these ideas to children, especially boys. Several organisations, for example the Hungarian Defence Movement, the SixtyFour Counties, and the Hungarian Legion, regularly hold summer camps for children, where they learn about Hungarian history, Christian tradition, and fighting skills. This tradition began in the early 2000s after mandatory military service was abolished in Hungary (Boross, 2018). The Hungarian Defence Movement, for example, has created a Levente Movement for children and teenagers. This is modelled after the historical Levente Movement, which was mandatory for boys to join in the Horthy period (Kerepszki, 2010; Várdai, 2019); this mainly entailed an abundance of strength and fitness activities. The movement’s traditional greeting of “Better future!” with the response “By the grace of God” is used today by the Hungarian Defence Movement. The Sixty-Four Counties also have a paramilitary youth organisation called Farkasok (Wolves), aimed at men between 15 and 35 years old. They are taught outdoor survival, physical fitness, and regularly practice with airsoft weapons.

Racism and xenophobia After 1920, antipathy towards neighbouring nations was a ubiquitous feature of Hungarian society, but between 1945 and 1989 such nationalist views were more or less taboo. After 1989, there was a resurgence of nationalism, which, with varying degrees of intensity, extended to the great powers considered hostile to Hungary: France, which was considered to be mainly responsible for the seizure of the country, as well as the United States, which had “betrayed” the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and Soviet Russia, which occupied the country after 1945. The relationship with Germany, which occupied Hungary in 1944, was always ambivalent: the occupation was attributed to the Nazis, rather than Germany itself. Hungary, unlike Western European countries, did not become a major destination for immigration in the 20th century, so its population is much more ethnically homogeneous (similar to other Central and Eastern European countries). This could be one factor leading to people of colour (before 1989 mainly African and Cuban migrant workers and Arab university students) being viewed with distain or aversion by the majority of Hungarian society (Bozóki & Nagy, 2004). The Roma minority, which has been present for a long time in the country’s history but has always lived on the margins of society, is treated in a similar way. Anti-Gypsyism increased particularly after 1989, when the vast majority of Roma lost their jobs and a significant proportion of them fell into deep poverty. However, open ethnic conflict against Roma has rarely erupted, except in 2006–2009. A series of violent crimes committed by Roma received a lot of coverage, followed by a series of anti-Roma attacks in nine municipalities in the country’s poorest region between 2008 and 2009, resulting in six deaths and five serious injuries (Tódor, 2017). It is characteristic, however, that this was not followed by a significant social outcry. The perpetrators were caught and convicted, but the case did not attract much public attention. 110

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After 1989, anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial emerged on the far right through republished anti-Semitic and neo-nazi texts. These views were made taboo by the mainstream media. The popularity of these ideas was demonstrated by the openly anti-Semitic views of the radical right-wing party of the 1990s, MIÉP, and the covert anti-Semitic views of the new far-right party of the 2000s, Jobbik. After 2006, nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism became more widely accepted through KurucInfo, which aided in radicalising the public mood. The social propaganda campaigns of the Orbán government are based on this radicalised public mood: George Soros, who is the main public enemy, is portrayed as a capitalist speculator, the embodiment of American globalisation, or the Jewish world conspiracy. This government propaganda uses short slogans and allows a wide range of interpretations in order to win the sympathy of as many people as possible. In the same way, during the so-called migration crisis, which has been a constant topic since 2015 (Kondor, 2022), the government fuelled racist fears although Hungary is obviously not a prominent destination for migration. Because of nationalist attitudes, the Orbán government is reluctant to cooperate with the governments of Romania, Slovakia, or Ukraine, where there are significant Hungarian minorities. Since 2014, Hungary has blocked Ukraine from entering NATO, citing the violation of Hungarian minority rights in Ukraine (Vörös, 2022). This has become a particularly acute conflict in the wake of Russian’s war against Ukraine.

Conclusion It is clear that the legacy of the interwar and wartime Hungarian National Socialism is still strong in the contemporary Hungarian far right. While on the surface many Hungarian farright organisations do not openly show their neo-nazi ideology or legacy, digging below the surface reveals a long-standing tradition. The labels Nazi, National Socialist, and Hungarist are stigmatised in the majority of Hungarian society, as is the use of symbols related to these concepts (in addition to their public use being prohibited by law). Despite this, many attitudes that are typical features of the far right are popular amongst broad sections of society: various forms of anti-foreignism (against neighbouring peoples, anti-Roma racism, anti-migrant attitudes, and anti-Semitism), a heteronormative anti-LGBTQ attitude, anti-capitalism, proorder, the strong desire for a leader, statism, and paternalism. In the April 2022 general elections, over half of Hungarian voters supported a far-right government which is openly xenophobic, anti-LGBTQ, anti-EU, nativist, and authoritarian, while it leads anti-Semitic campaigns and supports strong traditional and “Christian” values. This chapter has highlighted the importance of analysing far-right ideology and cultural production in terms of the unique history of respective nations. It has also become clear that more research is necessary in English in the post-Soviet space, and further discussion should be fostered between Western and Eastern European scholars of fascism and the far right.

Notes 1 The name referring to the popular Sziget festival, intended to be its “nationalist” counterpart. 2 Referring to a military division from 1918, the song was popularised in the 1970s by Tamás Cseh.

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PART III

Southern Europe

8 THE NEW POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN PORTUGAL The Chega Party1 Riccardo Marchi

Political mobilisation amongst the new and old radical right in Democratic Portugal Since the foundation of Portuguese democracy on 25 April 1974, social activism by the far right has been extremely limited and marginal. Having grown in the de-radicalised and demobilised atmosphere of the authoritarian Estado Novo regime – at least since the end of the Second World War in 1945 – the far right became ideologically marginalised after the overthrow of the regime by a military coup and, in the democratic transition, never managed to lead a social mobilisation of anti-communist parts of civil society, even during the time of greatest polarisation known as the Revolutionary Process (Processo Revolucionário em Curso – PREC) in 1975 (Pinto, 1995, p. 114). In this revolutionary phase, right-wing mobilisation was led by moderate anti-communist parties – mainly the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Social Democratic Centre (CDS) – by military factions who were actually involved in the coup that overthrew the authoritarian regime but were opposed to the radical left controlling the movement, and finally, by parts of the Catholic Church (Cerezales, 2007, p. 164; Cerezales, 2017, pp. 689, 698). In this context, small far-right organisations were involved in social mobilisation, but played an extremely marginal role, very much dependent on the main protagonists, while their importance was overblown by their adversaries and the press, as part of an outcry regarding the alleged continuing threat of a far-right counter-revolution. Indeed, their marginal importance was confirmed by their electoral irrelevance at the end of the transition period: only 0.4% of the vote was won by the radical right-wing coalition composed of the Christian Democracy Party (Partido da Democracia Cristã – PDC), the Independent Movement for National Reconstruction (Movimento Independente para a Reconstrução Nacional – MIRN), and the National Front (Frente Nacional – FN), in comparison with the moderate centre-right Democratic Alliance coalition, which won the majority of the votes, composed of the PSD, CDS, and the People’s Monarchist Party (Partido Popular Monárquico – PPM) (Gallagher, 1992, pp. 238–239). With the consolidation of democracy, the paralysis of the radical right became chronic. Over the last two decades of the 20th century, dozens of short-lived organisations succeeded each other, with some capacity for mobilisation, but only amongst students, and limited to the two large cities of Lisbon and Porto. This phenomenon was also substantially repeated in a small increase in radical mobilisation during the 1990s, DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-12

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inspired by the international skinhead movement, a trend that was more subcultural or even borderline criminal, than socially mobilising (Marchi, 2012, pp. 103–106). At the beginning of the 21st century, the situation did not register any significant changes, although a new political party appeared on the radical right panorama with the foundation of the National Renewal Party (Partido Nacional Renovador – PNR) in 1999. Always limited to traditional far-right circles, the PNR and its surrounding plethora of subcultural organisations – hard-core members of the skinhead movement and new militants of the European identitarian movement – managed to achieve a certain level of coordination and cooperation, that demonstrated some results in street activism (Zúquete, 2007). In this context, mobilisation reached its peak in June 2005, when 500 radical-right militants marched through the centre of Lisbon nominally demonstrating against criminality, but actually protesting against the multiracial and multicultural model of society (Correia, 2008, p. 120). After this demonstration, due to a judicial reaction against the far right in 2007, mobilisation by the radical right was never again able to achieve significant results. Once again, events of commemoration or protest never attracted more than a couple of hundred demonstrators, even on traditionally significant dates (the commemorations of the 10 June – Portugal Day, or 1 December – Anniversary of the Restoration of Independence from Spanish domination). In matter of fact, still in the second decade of the 21st century, political analysts highlighted the Iberian exceptionalism due to the absence of Populist Radical Right Parties (Alonso & Kaltwasser, 2015; Mendes & Dennison, 2021; Silva & Salgado, 2018). The explanation has been appointed to the lack of political supply more than to the demand side (Pereira & Cancela, 2020). The exceptionalism came to an end in recent years due not only to the economic crisis and the difficulties of mainstream parties, but also to the way in which the “shadow of the past” – the long authoritarian regimes – has been managed in the two Iberian countries in term of political culture (Manucci, 2020). According to Heyne and Manucci (2021), cultural issues more than socio-economic in Portugal and the low profile of the Partido Popular (PP) in the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain represent windows of opportunities for populist radical-right parties. The state of the radical right under Portuguese democracy experienced a sudden change with the election to Parliament of André Ventura, leader and founder of Chega – considered a populist party of the new radical right (Marchi & Lisi, 2021). According to Cas Mudde (2019), the radical right is made up of those parties or organisations that accept the rules of the democratic game and reject the revolutionary and violent path typical of the extreme right. The 2019 parliamentary elections caused a small, but significant, political upheaval in the parliamentary right. For the first time since 1974, two new political parties – Chega and Iniciativa Liberal (IL) – entered Parliament as direct competitors of the PSD and CDS, the historical representatives of centrist, conservative, liberal and Christian Democratic tendencies (Madeira et al., 2021, pp. 479–483). In absolute terms, the election of André Ventura was not particularly notable: polling only 1.29% or 67,826 votes. However, compared to the traditional radical right, this was already a significant feat, inasmuch as it demonstrated an ability to mobilise its electorate. Prior to 2019, the PNR had never exceeded 0.5% of votes – far too little to elect any deputies (Zúquete, 2013) – and in 2019, it registered a significant downturn in its electorate: 0.33% and 17,126 votes compared to 0.50% and 27,269 votes in 2015. This showed that, not only was Chega able to steal votes from the traditional radical right, but it was, primarily, able to attract votes from other non-radical parties, specifically parties of the moderate centre-right and those who had hitherto abstained. The election of André Ventura as Chega’s sole representative inaugurated a new political phase for the radical right in Portugal (Fernandes & Magalhães, 2020). First, because he did 118

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not come from the ranks of the traditional radical right, but from the PSD, while adopting a populist political approach that veered to the right. Secondly, because his entry into Parliament provoked a series of reactions in political and media circles that amplified Chega’s ability to increase its visibility and amplify its calls for mobilisation (Mendes & Dennison, 2021). Between 2019 and 2022, the party grew exponentially in terms of membership (from a few hundred in the summer of 2019, to tens of thousands today) and, in electoral terms (from 1.29% of the vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections, to 12% and around half a million votes for Ventura in the 2021 presidential elections, and 7% in 2022 general election, with 12 MPs elected). Thirdly, because the aggressive style of his discourse and political action, triggered a somewhat successful process of mobilisation around Chega, which was unusual for either the radical or moderate Portuguese right. This capacity of attraction and mobilisation generated a relationship between the political party and the social movements that was not consensual amongst the members of both the parts involved and, in some cases, quite problematic, depending on the front being mobilised. In particular, the political and media prominence it achieved after 2019, allowed Chega to approach social and political mobilisation on four fronts: the group-based mobilisation of right-wing identitarianism; the mobilisation of the Christian right; the nationalist mobilisation against left-wing identitarian and post-modern agendas; and the mobilisation of unions representing members of the security forces. These four fronts are significant indicators of the capacity of the new radical right to relate to civil society, but also of the critical consequences inherent in this approach.

The identitarian mobilisation of the traditional radical right The somewhat troubled relationship between André Ventura and the traditional far right in Portugal goes back to 2017, when the politician was head of a PSD-CDS-PPM coalition for local elections that year in Loures, an important centre of the metropolitan area of Lisbon. It was on this particular occasion that André Ventura first introduced his strategy of radicalising the political discourse of the right wing, defining his campaign by his criticism of the substantial Roma community in Loures, for its alleged illegal behaviour and dependency on welfare subsidies. This strategy ensured he attracted the attention of the nation’s media and provoked a reaction by the traditional radical right. In particular, the PNR publicly invited André Ventura to leave the PSD and join their nationalist party, giving him total freedom to pursue his arguments, without having to worry about the censure and boycotts that subsequently emanated from his own centre-right political partners (such as the CDS, which abandoned the coalition in Loures, in protest). Far from being an advantage, his endorsement by the traditional radical right worsened André Ventura’s image problems. Thus, he was obliged to publicly disassociate his candidacy from any groups, parties, and civil or political personalities he considered to be racist or xenophobic. He went so far as to explain that the purpose of his criticism of the Roma community, had been to initiate public debate on a longstanding problem that had been ignored by other parliamentary figures, and thereby prevent it being exploited by the extreme right. Thus, in declarations to the Jornal Económico on 19 August 2017, Ventura condemned the opportunism of the PNR in trying to take advantage of his campaign, and clarified that he was seeking votes from the centre-right and centre-left electorate rather than extremist, xenophobic, and racist voters, who were incompatible with his social democratic background. These statements caused the PNR to split with the future leader of Chega, who the nationalist party now denounced as a man of the regime, who the media were supporting to sabotage the true anti-system right.2 119

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However, the declared hostility of the PNR was unable to diminish the impact André Ventura had on the political area when, in October 2018, he decided to leave the PSD to found his own party. As soon as Ventura began planning his party, several PNR cadres left their party to join Chega. In particular, Pedro Perestrello, head of Chega’s national and internet organisation in 2019, exemplified the broad appeal of the new party to previously abstaining nationalist voters, militants from the liberal-nationalist wing of the PNR, affiliates from the conservative wing of the CDS and, to a lesser extent, those unhappy with the centrist line of the PSD.3 This capacity to attract discontented voters prompted the traditional radical right, to mobilise in an attempt to contain the growth of this newly emerging right-wing party, which they denounced as an instrument created by the regime itself to counter growing social dissatisfaction. The PNR’s hostility did not represent the norm in wider right-wing circles outside of Parliament. These were divided between Chega’s implacable detractors, and those interested in the new party as a window of opportunity for a segment that had always been kept on the margins. On the one hand, Nova Portugalidade (New Portugality) – a patriotic organisation associated with the myth of a transcontinental and multiracial Empire and, thus, far removed from chauvinistic nationalism – rejected Chega as representing the opposite of the universalist spirit of classic Portuguese nationalism (so-called “Portugality”). On the other hand, various militants from Escudo Identitário (Identitarian Shield) – an organisation affiliated with right-wing European identitarianism – began to look with interest at Ventura’s performances, while Nova Ordem Social – NOS (New Social Order) – an organisation linked to skinhead groups – even disbanded, because it considered alternatives to Chega were now unfeasible. On Chega’s side, the hostility of the traditional far right was seen as something positive by the party’s leader, because it helped disassociate it from the extremist arena. For the first ideologist of Chega, lawyer Jorge Castela, the danger of being identified with activism by the extreme right had been discussed with very little drama in the founding meetings of the party, because nobody had come from that political culture. Along similar lines, Diogo Pacheco de Amorim confirmed that the vast majority of Chega members had never had any connection with the extreme right in Portugal, nor any interest in the PNR, because of its media image and anti-liberal position on the economy. For Luís Filipe Graça, the Chega base did not share the nostalgic and anti-democratic political culture, commonly held within the PNR. José Dias confirmed that Chega’s members considered the extreme right to be synonymous with marginal and violent fringes, steeped in a racist and supremacist culture, with all its neo-Nazi paraphernalia. However, according to the testimony of Fernanda Marques Lopes, the party’s leadership finally began to discuss the issue of the “extreme right” more closely in early 2019, due to reports in the media of the alleged organised infiltration of extremists into the party. The issue led to the party’s number two, Nuno Afonso, to screen the process of electing Chega’s district bodies in order to detect and expel elements with any link to organised far-right movements.4 The dangerous relationship between Chega and extreme-right activism became a constant topic for the Portuguese media between 2019 and 2020. The media campaign forced André Ventura to intensify the internal monitoring of members to identify those linked with extremist, violent or racist movements. When asked in a television interview on 29 January 2020 about the effect of Chega’s appeal to far-right social movements, Ventura admitted the danger existed, but also stressed the work being done within the party to prevent its contamination by extremist fringes, and prevent its anti-system discourse being used in xenophobic or racist campaigns. 120

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The most revealing indicator of this barrier to the infiltration of more radical groups into the party, was the process of setting up a youth organisation within Chega. The creation of this youth organisation began at the start of 2020. In the initial phase, various lists of potential candidates to lead the youth organisation were drawn up. Amongst these, the most organised was Lista Futuro (Future List) consisting of a few hundred university students and young professionals from three distinct political cultures: Catholic conservatives connected to the pro-life movements, sovereignists influenced by the “alt-light” of the new American right (a less radical version of the alt-right), and by the European identitarian network. In particular, the Portuguese identitarian milieu – in line with its international homologous – is made up by activists concerned with the consequences of the globalism, like mass migration, Islamisation, “out-of-control capitalism” and threatened ethnoidentity at regional or national level (Zúquete, 2018, p. 4). The list was headed by Carlos Martins, who had already joined the cultural fray of the new right-wing movements with the publication of his 2016 book, Trump. Desafiar o status quo (Lisboa: Gladius). Carlos Martins’ familiarity with Western right-wing sovereigntist parties enabled him to present a programme that distinguished it from the other youth organisations of the centre-right parties, and even challenged the ultra-liberal direction of the party’s first programme. Shaped in these terms, Carlos Martins’ project assimilated the various mindsets of Chega’s youth, and attracted the most prominent cadres of the Portuguese identitarian movement. This began to raise concerns amongst leaders of Chega who were not aligned with the nationalist faction and, in particular, the party leader, who was worried about the potential vulnerability of this operation to attacks by the media. In fact, Carlos Martins did not intend to include Chega in the identitarian movement, to which he had never belonged, and he had always avoided any affiliation to irrelevant factions. On the contrary, he was interested in turning Chega into a platform for discussing new subjects being introduced by the Western sovereignist right. Before Chega existed, these intellectual interests had occasionally led him to collaborate with cultural initiatives by radical organisations, which has made him an immediate target of media attention as soon as his name appeared as organiser of the party’s youth wing. Once more, the press was able to link André Ventura’s party to the extreme right. In a series of articles, Sábado magazine uncovered alleged links between some of Chega’s youth members and extra-parliamentary fascist organisations. The evidence were either nostalgic references to Salazar’s authoritarian regime, statements on the protection of white Europeans, or proof of participation in extreme right-wing events. In particular, the magazine denounced links to the Ukrainian radical right, which were proven by the participation, of some of the elements from Lista Futuro, in a conference held by the Escudo Identitário, which was attended by Olena Semenyaka, spokeswoman of the National Corps, the political wing of Azov.5 The media attack was enough to make André Ventura suspend the entire process of setting up the youth organisation, under the pretext of preventing possible extremist infiltration. With no room left to manoeuvre, Carlos Martins abandoned the party, taking with him almost all of the elements linked to the identitarian and alt-light factions. As of 2021, Chega’s youth organisation ceased to have any connections with the identitarian movement, both in terms of affiliates with dual membership, and its political agenda. Topics such as ethno-cultural identity, demography, and international politics were replaced by the themes of conservative values, cultural Marxism in public education, and the problems facing young people (precariousness, the cost of living, housing, etc.). Since then, Chega has avoided any contact with far-right fringe organisations and maintains links only with the more institutionalised Populist Radical Right Parties. In July 2020, Chega has officially joined the Eurogroup Identity and Democracy (I&D), whose liders Matteo Salvini (Lega) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National) are particularly appreciated 121

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by André Ventura for their flamboyant style. However, in terms of political programme, Chega is more similar to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) party, due to its strong pro-NATO Atlanticism and its anti-Russian stances in the Ukrainian war.

Mobilisation against the post-materialist agenda and left-wing identity politics Ever since participating in the 2017 local government election campaign as a PSD candidate, André Ventura had been a target for the Portuguese left-wing, as he represented the far right that was emerging in the West, but which had hitherto had no significant expression in Portugal. The leader of Chega, in turn, took advantage of this hostility, to promote his public image and that of Chega. In this context, the new populist MP took advantage of left-wing activism, particularly that undertaken by organisations of afro-descendants regarding the struggle for the emancipation of ethnic minorities. This activism had increased in recent years, inspired by the international Black Lives Matter movement, and accentuated in Portugal by the election of two black female activist MPs to Parliament in the 2019 general elections. The leader of Chega, with the aim of making his party the leader of the social counter-movement, channelled the widespread feeling amongst the right in Portugal, who rejected accusations of structural racism directed at Portugal, and demands for the decolonisation of national culture and public space in Portugal. Thus, in the summer of 2020, in contrast with the traditional inertia of the right, André Ventura called three successive street demonstrations: on 27 June and 2 August in Lisbon, and on 18 September in Évora. The official slogan for the mobilisation, “Portugal is not racist” stressed two typical positions in André Ventura’s discourse: on the one hand, he denied that occasional racism in Portuguese society was synonymous with a racist socio-economic-political structure, consciously or unconsciously established by the white majority to discriminate against and exploit ethnic minorities; on the other hand, he denounced the exacerbation of the racial divide in public debate as a left-wing strategy – using ethnic-minority activists – to decolonise Portugal’s historical memory and deconstruct the pillars of its national identity, specifically its Judeo-Christian Western roots and its great age of Discoveries. To maximise Chega’s effectiveness in this fight, and to protect him from accusations of racism, André Ventura co-opted elements from the moderate right-wing, who were more sensitive to these issues. For the demonstration held on 2 August, he invited the lawyer Pedro Borges de Lemos – who was still a member of the CDS, but about to switch to Chega – to give a public speech, in which he declared: “Portugal has learnt that the miscegenation of blood and culture is absolutely essential for the development of the nation. And the rightwing knows this!”.6 With this move, André Ventura intended to assert Chega’s incompatibility with racial identitarianism, and associate the party with the humanist, personalist, Luso-tropicalist tradition typical of the mainstream Portuguese right. For Chega’s Second National Convention on 19–20 September 2020, Gabriel Mithá Ribeiro, a mixed-race Portuguese intellectual of Mozambican origin, was added to the party leadership by André Ventura. For years Mithá Ribeiro had been committed to the historical project of a multiracial Portugal, to denying structural racism, and to affirming the voluntary assimilation of minorities into the national fabric, as opposed to the identity politics promoted by the left. To make the most of his inclusion, Mithá Ribeiro was appointed president of the Chega Studies Office, with the mission of codifying the ideological identity of the party, in a way that was clearly more inclined to the claim of Portuguese universalism, but without denying the need to defend the European and Judeo-Christian identity of the majority of Portuguese people. 122

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This uncompromising defence of national identity had its first highly polarising moment on 28 January 2020, when André Ventura made use of a polemic proposal by the Livre party’s member of parliament, Joacine Katar Moreira, who proposed that artistic heritage in Portugal that had been taken from Africa, should be catalogued and returned to its countries of origin, as a form of reparation for the plundering suffered during colonialism. This proposal was part of the broader topic of decolonisation, which had been widely discussed in various western countries and become a banner for radical left-wing and Afro-descendant movements. The leader of Chega decided to cause stir, via a post on his own Facebook page, by using the ethnic identity of the proposer, a black woman of Guinean origin, as the pretext for a joke, in which proposed that the MP herself be returned to her country of origin, for the greater peace of mind of the Portuguese and of the Livre party, with whom she had been arguing ever since her election as its parliamentary representative. The reaction was immediate: the media and social networks were flooded with statements condemning the racism and xenophobia of Chega’s leader. In the media, the word “return” became “deportation,” echoing the concurrent commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The story was also relayed by the international news agency Reuters, which reported the reaction of the Portuguese authorities, including the Prime Minister, António Costa.7 MP André Ventura became, once again, the centre of attention. Almost 20 complaints were lodged against him at the Commission for Equality and Combating of Racial Discrimination, he was threatened with disciplinary action under parliamentary regulations protecting the honour of fellow MPs, and he was called on to retract his comment and apologise. Unperturbed by the attacks, the leader of Chega reiterated his position that it was a wake-up call against detractors of national history, committed to imposing the cultural hegemony of the “radical left” at the expense of the Portuguese people. The confrontation flared up once again in February 2021, with the death of LieutenantColonel Marcelino da Mata, a Portuguese soldier of Guinean origin, and the most decorated member of the Portuguese Army for his exploits in the African War. Long celebrated by the right as a national hero, Marcelino da Mata was not given a funeral with state honours, merely meriting the presence of the President of the Republic and a vote of condolences in the Portuguese Parliament, which only opposed by the left-wing (BE and PCP). Furthermore, the latter publicly opposed any celebration of the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Marcelino da Mata. In particular, the leader of the association SOS Racismo – Mamadou Bá, a Portuguese of Senegalese origin, declared him a war criminal, a traitor to his people in Guinea, and a puppet of colonialism and the imperialism of Salazar. Although the reaction of the right extended across mainstream parties and radical organisations, André Ventura attempted to dominate the counter-movement by presenting a legislative proposal to withdraw Portuguese nationality from naturalised citizens who disrespect national symbols and history, which he polemically called the “Mamadou Bá Law.” Although seeking polarisation, Chega was always careful not to slip into typical far-right mobilisation. In other words, it was concerned to keep its protests within the political plane, and to avoid ethno-racial aspects. This became evident, for example, at the European athletics championships in March 2021, when Portugal won three gold medals thanks to Portuguese athletes of Angolan, Cameroonian, and Cuban origin. Reacting to the medals being celebrated by the media and the political world as a response to right-wing populism, André Ventura proposed a congratulatory vote in Parliament, to highlight the non-racist nature of his opposition to left-wing identity politics.8 In general, the Portuguese right-wing parties converged on the idea that the agenda of anti-racist social movements actually concealed the radical left’s strategy of achieving cultural 123

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dominance and subverting social peace through racial division. However, while the moderate right only expressed itself on these issues sporadically in the highest profile polemics, Chega made it a fundamental aspect of its political agenda to confront the leaders of antiracist organisations and their parliamentary spokespeople, and thus gained prominence in this counter-mobilisation.

The social mobilisation of the Christian right The mobilisation of the Christian right in democratic Portugal dates back to the 1990s. The democratic transition had already witnessed major mass mobilisations, led by bishops and priests of the Catholic Church in northern Portugal, but this was a very specific mobilisation, arising from the revolutionary activism of the radical left in the more feverish months of 1975. With the normalisation of democracy, the Christian right abandoned the field of political protest. Mobilisation resumed in the last decade of the 20th century, no longer episodically, but as a medium- to long-term project, prompted by advances in the secular, post-materialist agenda on matters of importance to Christians: the decriminalisation of abortion, same-sex marriage, adoption by homosexual couples, and medically assisted death. Initially instigated by Catholic organisations and personalities linked to the PSD and CDS the social movement expanded at the beginning of the 21st century, to the smaller Portuguese Protestant community, primarily evangelicals. The formal structuring of the social movement was symbolised by the creation, in 2002, of the Federação Pela Vida – FPv (Federation for Life), an institution that brought together associations and foundations active in the social movement within a federation.9 This increased mobilisation had repercussions in the more right-wing area of the political spectrum. Social media facilitated the circulation of multimedia material produced mainly by Brazilians and North Americans Christian activists countering the left-wing agenda (particularly gender policies and LGBT activism), in turn bringing these Portuguese sectors closer to parties considered sympathetic to the political agendas of Jaire Bolsonaro or Donald Trump. In this context, in 2009, a segment of the Christian social movement founded the party Portugal Pró Vida – PPV (Pro Life Portugal), with an anti-abortion political agenda that, over the years, extended to all pro-life policies, from conception to natural death. From an electoral point of view, the PPV performed poorly, and failed to capitalise on the growing social movement: It won 0.15% of the vote in both the 2009 and 2011 parliamentary elections, and 0.05% in 2015, while in the 2014 European elections it won 0.4%. In the 2019 European elections with the new name of the Partido Cidadania e Democracia Cristã – PPV/CDC (Christian Democracy and Citizenship Party), the party became part of the Basta electoral coalition, together with the Chega, the PPM, and the Democracia 21 movement (Dem21). The coalition was undone by its meagre results – 1.49% (49,496 votes) – but represented a turning point for the PPV/CDC, which, maintained its alliance with Chega and helped elect André Ventura as deputy in the 2019 parliamentary elections. The growth of Chega after entering Parliament led to the incorporation of the PPV/CDC into Chega in the summer of 2020, with prominent positions given to its leader, Manuel Matias.10 To enhance this relationship between the party and the social movement, André Ventura stressed his background as a former seminarian. His pronouncements citing God as the inspiration for his mission to rescue Portugal were frequent, as were his public appearances at religious sites. In May 2021, for example, he prayed in front of the media at the Sanctuary of Fátima, along with Matteo Salvini, leader of Lega. The new leadership of Chega, appointed in 2021, thus included several elements linked to the Christian right: Rita Matias, linked to international Christian conservative networks, such 124

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as the European Fraternity, and Pedro Frazão, a member of Opus Dei. The latter exemplified the relationship between the Catholic right and Chega, as he joined the party to implement his Catholic agenda, but independently of Opus Dei, which always took care to avoid being associated with the radical right.11 In fact, Opus Dei had already experienced this stigma in 2009, with regard to the president of the PNR José Pinto Coelho, a teacher at the Planalto college run by the Catholic association. Although the Christians in Chega always joined in a personal capacity, the media frequently reported alleged structural links between the populist party and religious fundamentalism. In May 2020, for example, the weekly Visão revealed an alleged network of evangelical churches supporting Chega, fomented by militant evangelical activists within the populist party.12 The existence of such a network was denied by the Associação Evangélica Portuguesa – AEP (Portuguese Evangelical Association) and by Chega itself, which issued a statement, reaffirming that the party was secular in nature, and open to members of any religion. In this respect, throughout its 30 years of existence, Christian activism has never represented a window of opportunity for radical fringes. Activists from this political family have always been politically active in a private capacity, without creating internal factions. The parties themselves never tried to infiltrate and steer the social movement, other than in in a few cases that only served to demonstrate the imperviousness of the social movement. For example, in May 2012, PNR militants took part in the “Caminhada pela Vida” (Walk for Life) organised by the Federação Pela Vida, and in October 2021, Chega militants did the same. In both cases, however, the organisers of the “Caminhas pela Vida” expressed their opposition to these participations with the overt display of party insignia, and considered them improper attempts to take advantage of the event. In general, attempt to make the social movement’s agenda party-political had little success. From an electoral point of view, the PPV/CDC only managed to secure its incorporation into André Ventura’s party while, from an organisational point of view, neither the PNR nor Chega achieved structural links with the Christian social movement, although the new populist party was much more interesting to Christian activists than the PNR.

Chega and the unionised movement of the security forces The fourth front in the relationship between Chega and social mobilisation derives from the particular interest always expressed by André Ventura in the Security Forces, through the emphasis in his agenda on law and order. Since entering parliament, Chega has always nurtured contacts with the professional sectors most dissatisfied with the policies of the socialist government, specifically the nurses’ and taxi drivers’ organisations. However, there is a special relationship with the Security Forces. On the occasion of the European elections in May 2020, Chega insisted on including some members of the security forces on the Basta coalition list. Three of them, in particular, generated controversy: a soldier from the National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana – GNR); and two agents from the Public Security Police (Polícia de Segurança Pública – PSP). The GNR soldier generated controversy for being convicted of the manslaughter (“death through gross negligence” in legal language) of a Roma child, during the pursuit of a van, driven by the victim’s father when fleeing a robbery. The two PSP agents, in turn, generated controversy for being presidents of two Unions who were strongly anti-government and outside the large central unions. To strengthen ties to the security force unions, in May 2019, André Ventura invited the president of the Union of PSP Technical Staff to join the party and later brought him into the leadership of Chega as a vice president. 125

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However, the high point of Chega’s engagement with the security forces’ members’ movement came in a demonstration in November 2019, a few weeks after André Ventura’s election to parliament. Convened by the largest unions in the sector, the demonstration was characterised by a strong presence of elements associated with the Movimento Zero (Zero Movement), an informal network of police and GNR, which emerged on the social networks in May 2019, in protest against the socialist government’s policies for the sector, and against growing criticism of police action – with accusations of racist violence against minorities, underlined by convictions of agents – especially in difficult neighbourhoods. The presence of hundreds of protesters wearing the movement’s white shirt was a particularly delicate issue for the authorities and the media as, from its origins, the movement was associated with the extreme right or, at the least, considered highly susceptible to extremist infiltration. Completely indifferent to these accusations, André Ventura presented himself to journalists, on the day of the demonstration and in Parliament, wearing the movement’s shirt, in solidarity with the protesters and expressing his unconditional support for the security forces. The media impact was enhanced by the way the deputy from Chega was received by the demonstration. While other deputies got a cold reception, and even some jeering, Ventura was cheered by part of the protesters and invited to speak by elements of the Movimento Zero. The reactions of union members, politicians and analysts helped to amplify the event: the union leaders of the PSP and the GNR lamented the appropriation of an apolitical demonstration; Politicians stigmatised the exploitation and joined the media in denouncing the links between the political far right and the far right in the police forces. In this case, the media also focused its attention on the allegedly darker aspects of the event, namely the use by Movimento Zero of a “zero” sign formed with the thumb and index finger of the right hand, allegedly signifying the “OK” of the motto “It’s OK to be white” of the international white nationalist movement. Once again, the indignation of the political world and the media represented still greater exposure for the Chega party on the coat-tails of a social movement outside its organisation.

Conclusions Since entering the national parliament, Chega has paid particular attention to street activism and its relationship with social protest movements. This was due to, on the one hand, its desire to embody, in Portugal, the wave of protest populism that had been steadily spreading across the West for at least two decades, and, on the other hand, a need to attract the attention of the media to break out of the political space of the right, which had been effectively frozen since 1974. The variety of fronts for Chega’s mobilisation in the last two years has demonstrated a differentiated strategy, designed to meet the practical requirements of maximising results. In terms of its relationship with the political activism of traditional radical right parties or factions, Chega has, from the beginning, pursued a line that distanced it from this political area, by following two guidelines. On the one hand, it has allowed people with a past in radical organisations to join the party, but prevented this identity becoming an element in the formation of radical internal currents or of attempts to ascend the party’s hierarchical structure. There has been no room, for now, for sanctioning radical tendencies, and any sign of this has been immediately suppressed, even if it is just a suspicion and means the loss of valuable cadres coming from the alternative or identitarian right. On the other hand, it has rejected any formal connection to parties or organisations in the radical nationalist area, and has committed all its diplomatic capacity to building bridges with the moderate parliamentary right, with a view to participating in a future centre-right government. So far, these attempts have been thwarted by the cordon sanitaire imposed by the PSD, CDS, and IL (Mendes, 2022). 126

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In this sense, the persistence of the cordon sanitaire by the centre-right parties is making difficult for the Chega to attract the sectors of civil society close to non-socialist mainstream parties. In terms of their relationship with the social mobilisation of the Christian right and the trade union sector, Chega has always expressed its availability and preparedness to act as a spokesperson for even the most radical demands against socialist policies and the left. On these fronts, however, its results have not met expectations, due to the active hostility reserved for the party by the media, seen as counter-productive by the social movements in question. The imperviousness of the latter, or at least the difficulties in choosing Chega as a formal ally, also seems to persist after the party was consolidated as a parliamentary actor in the 2022 elections with 7% of the votes and 12 elected MPs, thus becoming the third parliamentary political force behind PS and PSD. For that reason, at the end of 2022, Chega launched its own union called Solidariedade (inspired by the Spanish homologue of the Vox party). Still incipient, the union is aimed mainly at professionals from the sectors of Health, Education, and Security Forces. Finally, with regard to the social mobilisation of the identity-based radical left, in the short period of its existence, Chega has demonstrated a remarkable ability to energise a classic social counter-movement. This ability – innovative from the point of view of mobilisation, and unusual amongst the ranks of the mainstream right – has a potential attractiveness that has always eluded the traditional radical right. A sign of this is the broad range – in terms of gender, age, and class – of its mobilised base, made up of hundreds of men, but also of women and youth, unaffected by extremist subcultures. This characteristic is mainly due to the fact that Chega’s leader and most of its officials do not belong to the political subculture of far-right nationalism. This makes its political offer – shaped by an existing political demand within the Portuguese right that the traditional actors have never fully satisfied – more appealing, because it does not come from the fringes.

Notes 1 The research was supported by funds from the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, I.P. as part of the project with reference number PTDC/CPO-CPO/28748/2017. 2 Statement by the PNR in August 2017. Document available at http://www.partidoergue-te.pt/2017/08/ causas-coragem-os-meios-oportunismo/ (Accessed 06 January 2022). 3 Interview of Pedro Perestrello by the author on 05 December 2019. 4 Interviews by the author of Jorge Castela (14 December 2019), Diogo Pacheco de Amorim (22 November 2019), Luís Filipe Graça (04 December 2019), José Dias (17 December 2019), Fernanda Marques Lopes (22 January 2020), and Nuno Afonso (13 December 2019). 5 Alexandre R. Malhado, “Jotas do Chega pertenceram a grupos fascistas” (“Chega youth belonged to fascist groups,” Sábado, 12 May 2020 Available at https://www.sabado.pt/portugal/detalhe/jotas-dochega-pertenceram-a-grupos-fascistas Consulted on 06 January 2022). 6 Arquivo Ephémera, “Chega – Manif Nacional (02 August 2020) 8/13,” Youtube [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bR1jM5nmAOY&feature=emb_title] 7 Victoria Waldersee, “Portugal minister condemns far-right MP’s attack on black colleague,” Reuters, 29 January 2020. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-portugal-politics-racism-idUSKBN1ZS2E5 Consulted on 06 January 2022. 8 André Ventura, “Chega. Proposed Congratulatory Vote no. 493/XIV,” 08 March 2021 (Available at https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/Detalhe-Votos.aspx?BID=116696& ACT_TP=VOT Consulted on 14 March 2021). 9 Interview by the author of António Maria Pinheiro Torres 23 de June 2021. 10 Interview of Manuel Matias by the author on 29 January 2020. 11 Interview of Pedro dos Santos Frazão by the author on 06 October 2021. 12 Miguel Carvalho, “Investigação: Os segredos do pregador Ventura,” Visão, 20 May 2020 (Available at https://visao.sapo.pt/atualidade/politica/2020-05-20-investigacao-os-segredos-do-pregadorventura/ Accessed on 20 October 2021).

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References Alonso, S., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2015). Spain: No country for the populist radical right? South European Society and Politics, 20(1), 21–45. Cerezales, D. P. (2007). Fascist lackeys? Dealing with the police’s past during Portugal’s transition to democracy (1974–1980). Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 6(3), 155–169. Cerezales, D. P. (2017). Civil resistance and democracy in the Portuguese revolution. Journal of Contemporary History, 52(3), 688–709. Correia, J. C. (2008). Working with nationalism as ideology. Estudos Em Comunicação, 3, 103–123. Fernandes, J., & Magalhães, P. C. (2020). The 2019 Portuguese general elections. West European Politics, 43(4), 1038–1050. Gallagher, T. (1992). Portugal: The marginalization of the extreme right. In P. Hainsworth (Ed.), The extreme right in Europe and the USA (pp. 233–245). Pinter Publishers. Heyne, L., & Manucci, L. (2021). A new Iberian exceptionalism? Comparing the populist radical right electorate in Portugal and Spain. Political Research Exchange, 3(1), 1–28. Madeira, P. M. F., Silva, K. S. N., & Malheiros, J. S. M. (2021). A geografia da direita nacionalista em Portugal: contornos de um processo emergente. Cadernos Metrópole, 23(51), 469–498. Manucci, L. (2020). The shadow of the authoritarian past in the Iberian Peninsula. Failures and success of radical right populist parties. Relações Internacionais, Special Issue, 45–59. Marchi, R. (2012). The Portuguese radical right in the democratic period. In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Mapping the extreme right in contemporary Europe: From local to transnational (pp. 95–108). Routledge. Marchi, R., & Lisi, M. (2021). Reinventing the radical right? The Portuguese case after the 2019 elections. In Oscar Barberà (coord) (Ed.), Facing the new far right in Southern Europe (pp. 66–84). Coppieters Foundation e Fundació Nexe. Mendes, M. S. (2022). The rise of Chega and its impact on the Portuguese party system. On-line. Link: https://more.bham.ac.uk/populism-in-action/2022/03/17/the-rise-of-chega-and-its-impact-on-theportuguese-party-system/ Mendes, M. S., & Dennison, J. (2021). Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: Salience, stigma and supply. West European Politics, 44(4), 752–775. Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. Pereira, J. S., & Cancela, J. (2020). Demand without supply? Populist attitudes and voting behaviour in Post-Bailout Portugal. South European Society and Politics, 25(2), 205–228. Pinto, A. C. (1995). The radical right in contemporary Portugal. In L. Cheles, R. Ferguson, & M. Vaughan (Eds.), The far right in Western and Eastern Europe (pp. 108–128). Longman. Silva, F. C., & Salgado, S. (2018). Why no populism in Portugal? In M. C. Lobo, F. C. Silva, & J. P. Zúquete (Eds.), Changing societies: Legacies and challenges: Citizenship in crisis (pp. 249–268). Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Zúquete, J. P. (2007). Portugal: A new look at the extreme-right. Representation, 43(3), 179–198. Zúquete, J. P. (2013). Between land and sea: Portugal’s two nationalisms in the twenty-first century. In P. C. Manuel, A. Lyon, & C. Wilcox (Eds.), Religion and politics in a global society comparative perspectives from the Portuguese-speaking world (pp. 205–227). Lexington Books. Zúquete, J. P. (2018). The Identitarians. The movement against globalism and Islam in Europe. University of Notre Dame Press.

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9 THE RADICALISATION OF THE ITALIAN MAINSTREAM Populist Radical Right Parties and Extreme Right-Wing Movements in Italy (2012–2022) Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James F. Downes

Introduction During the last decade Italy has distinguished itself in relation to three core political features: a The first one is the increasingly key role played by technocratic executives (“governi tecnici”), governments of national unity (“governi di unità nazionale”) or governments of purpose (“governi di scopo”), particularly during periods perceived as major national emergencies, with the executive led by Mario Draghi (February 2021–September 2022) being only the most recent example (amongst others see Parsi, 2021). b The second important feature regards the birth and the affirmation of a very peculiar populist grass-roots movement, the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S or Five Star Movement), an example of polyvalent (Pirro, 2018) or valence populism (Zulianello, 2020), that recently moved from a fully fledged moderate pro-EU position under the Draghi Executive to original populist-radical left position, after having governed with Salvini’s Lega with the Conte I cabinet (yellow-green cabinet) between 2018 and 20191; c Finally, the third feature is the presence of a right-wing coalition composed by the parties Fratelli d’Italia (FdI or Brothers of Italy), Lega (League), Forza Italia (Forward Italy) and some minor allies, a coalition that in the last years shifted towards a right-wing coalition tout court. Yet, notwithstanding the presence of two fully fledged far-right parties, much of the public debate in Italy, including media, politicians, and polling institutes, still frames the rightwing bloc as a centre-right coalition (coalizione di centrodestra).2 Precisely in relation to this last aspect, the chapter will focus on two main aspects: (a) how the Italian centre-right political landscape moved towards the radical right from 2012 to 2013 onwards and (b) how important the ties are between Lega and Fratelli d’Italia, on one side, and the extreme right-wing political movements and groups.3 One explanation to be considered is the shift of Italy’s right-wing parties, in particular Lega and FdI, towards the far-right rhetoric’s and ideas in recent years (Donà, 2022). In turn, this has led Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni, after years of relatively quiet militance in their respective parties, to seek open dialogue with extreme right-wing groups, to mobilise a certain DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-13

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type of electorate. However, we can ask ourselves how far the mainstreaming of the extreme right in Italy is a recent phenomenon and how far it has deeper roots.4 Crucially, both FdI and Lega, and in particular their leaders Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni have been the makers of this shift of Italian politics towards the far right of the political spectrum while keeping a political façade of respectability and relative moderation. In this direction, Lega prefers for itself the label of sovranista,5 and FdI uses “conservative” to identify both Giorgia Meloni’s and the party’s ideological positioning (L’Humanité, 2022). For these reasons, far-right rhetoric, alongside the use of extreme right-wing narratives and slogans, and the continuous nods to the most conservative corners of Catholicism have all been deployed and yet are tolerated without much fanfare in the Italian public debate.6 This chapter first proceeds with a comparative overview of the dynamics that have led to the shift towards the far right of the political mainstream in Italy, with a focus on the last decade (2012–2021). The chapter then analyzes the strategies developed by the two main populist radical right parties, with a focus on the League and the Brothers of Italy parties. The second part of the chapter provides a more analytical perspective, in analyzing the main actors of both the extreme right and ultraconservative groups in contemporary Italian politics. In this section of the chapter, we examine key elements from politics, religion, and sport alongside the increasingly close ties with the two main populist radical right parties in Italy.

Fratelli d’Italia, Lega and the mainstreaming of the far right: Literature review and political overview The Italian mainstream media has continued to refer to the coalitions of political parties competing against one another at the elections as the coalizione di centrosinistra (center-left coalition) and the coalizione di centrodestra (center-right coalition). In regard to the right-wing side of the political spectrum, the center-right coalition is comprised of three main political parties (i.e., Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia). In relation to the shift towards the radical right-wing of the political spectrum, some scholars have emphasised the substantial continuity of the right-wing alliance while others have emphasised the elements of discontinuity between the right-wing alliance. In a recent study on Italy’s mainstream right and its allies between 1994 and 2018, Gattinara and Froio (2021, pp. 191–192) pointed out the significant elements of change that have been taking place within the center-right coalition over the last decade: […] But things changed considerably after the failure of PDL (2009–2013) and the dramatic 2011 change of government. While this was partly due to Berlusconi’s weakening leadership, the increasing salience of issues like immigration, law and order, and EU integration seems to suggest that the political right has increasingly turned towards electorates sympathizing with authoritarian and nativist ideals associated with the silent counter-revolution. Similarly, the transformation of the League under Salvini means that the party now pursues a radical right populist agenda. […] With immigration losing importance in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the dormant conflict between the mainstream and radical components of the Italian political right became manifest again. On the one hand, the new scenario gave the survivors of Forza Italia the opportunity to break away from Salvini’s hardline strategy, attempting to appeal to moderate voters and potential allies in parliament. On the other, it marked the increasing popularity of Giorgia Meloni, exposing the double nature of Brothers of Italy as both an experienced government ally for the League and a radical competitor for Salvini’s leadership. The 130

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transformations within Italy’s right are thus far from settled. The permanent state of emergency associated with migration in Italy will soon restore the issue to centre-stage in national public debate. And as the Eurozone economy heads towards more financial trouble, the legitimacy crisis of national and EU institutions might further strengthen the predominance of radical parties over the Italian mainstream right, posing some serious challenges over the fundamentals of liberal democracy in Italy. A recent important analysis on Italy’s right-wing alliance has been provided by Albertazzi, Bonansinga and Zulianello (Albertazzi et al., 2021). The study emphasises the elements of continuity within the coalition (ivi: 192–193), pointing out that it is now “disputed who represents the ‘sun’ of the alliance; for, if the League became the largest party within the right in 2018, then FdI started growing at its expense not long afterwards” (ivi: 181–182), with the sun for a long time been identified in Silvio Berlusconi, at the center of the right-wing alliance (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2009). Moreover, it is important to note here that on Salvini’s League party, an important number of noteworthy articles have been produced.7 In contrast, the relatively little political and electoral influence enjoyed by FdI party, up until 2019, may partially explain the lack of academic research on the party, compared to other Italian parties. In addition, currently only a relatively small number of academic research exists that has primarily focused on FdI (see Albertazzi et al., 2021; Bruno, 2021; Bruno & Downes, 2020; Bruno et al., 2021a, 2021b; Donà, 2022; Gattinara & Froio, 2021).8 While it is undeniable that within the right-wing alliance there are important elements of continuity with the past and the “Berlusconi era,” we believe that the elements of discontinuity are significant. The roots of this discontinuity can be traced back to the years 2012–2013, within the unique Italian political context: The end of 2011, with the “spread crisis” (dual economic and political crisis) saw the resignation of Berlusconi IV government, replaced by the technocratic government led by the former European commissioner Mario Monti. Therefore, it is important to underscore the significance of these political developments in Italian politics.9 Before focusing on the two populist radical-right parties, we examine the overall electoral fortunes of the main parties that comprised Italy’s right-wing alliance between 1994 and 2018: Table 9.1 outlines the electoral fortunes and variations of the right-wing alliance (1994–2018). Figure 9.1 demonstrates recent electoral support for political parties in Italy (2019–2022), with a focus on the right-wing parties in the Italian political context. Figure 9.1

Table 9.1  Electoral results of the center-right coalition between 1994 and 2018, general elections Year

Forza Italia (% Vote)

AN/FdI (% Vote)

Lega Nord/ Lega (% Vote)

Center-Right Coalition (Combined) (% Vote)

1994 1996

21 20.6

MSI 13.5 AN 15.7

42.9 42.1

2001 2006 2008 2013 2018

29.4 23.7

AN 12 AN 12.3

8.4 10.7 NO COALITION 3.9 4.6 8.3 4.1 LEGA 17.4

PDL 37.4 PDL 21.6 FdI 1.9 14 FdI 4.4

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49.6 49.7 46.8 29.2 37

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Figure 9.1  Electoral support for political parties in Italy (2019–2022). Source: Politico Poll of Polls Data (2019–2022).

highlights the increasing electoral importance of both populist radical right parties, the Lega and FdI during this electoral period. Particularly prominent is the significant electoral increase for FdI post-2019 under Meloni, who is now virtually neck and neck with Salvini’s Lega. The relative electoral insignificance of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party is also shown in the same timeframe. Camera dei Deputati (The Chamber of Deputies) (The Figures have been rounded to the nearest 1 decimal place)

From CasaPound to Lealtà-Azione: Salvini’s league and the extreme right Recently, there has been a great deal of academic literature which has examined Salvini’s ideological rebranding of the populist radical-right League party, i.e., in transforming the Lega Nord into a nationalist and sovereigntist populist radical right party. Scholars such as Bruno and Parsi (2021a, 2021b), amongst others, have recently pointed out the populist and pragmatic features of Salvini’s actions, not always backed up by a core and consistent ideological substance. Salvini was elected Federal Secretary of the then Lega Nord in late 2013. From 2018 onwards, Salvini ideologically rebranded and renamed the League party as the Lega Salvini Premier10 (League for Salvini Premier). This political transformation saw the creation of a brand-new nationalist far-right party, with the party obtaining a high of 35% in the opinion polls in 2018. This marked a seismic political shift for the populist radical right League in Italy, particularly as the party had only obtained 4% of the overall vote share in the 2013 Italian General Election. 132

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We argue in this chapter that the wide spectrum of relationships that Salvini has woven testifies his ideological dexterity and political opportunism in this respect. We also outline how the League represents a unique populist radical right party case in Western Europe, primarily as these networks of collaborations/alliances for the League range from ultraconservative religious movements to extreme right-wing political groups, such as CasaPound, in whose newspaper, Il Primato Nazionale (The National Primacy) frequently praises Salvini’s leadership to the world of high finance and multinational corporations, or the links with the organisers of the World Family Congress held in Verona in 2019. Nonetheless, underneath the veneer of populism, it can be argued that not much ideological or indeed policy substance can be found within Salvini’s League party. Furthermore, two rather trivial ideological pillars that sustain the League include (a) the party consensus on the “flat tax” alongside (b) the party’s xenophobic anti-immigration policies. Therefore, in this chapter, we argue that at least four core features can be identified in defining Salvini’s League Party: 1 A first feature represented by the “historical” League, the ideological core includes deeply entrenched roots to Northern Italy, which was for many years the key bastion of support for both Umberto Bossi and Roberto Maroni. This component, although currently latent, should not be underestimated. 2 A second feature that can be considered part of the contemporary League is the party’s support of the government led by Mario Draghi. This component is well represented by the current Italian Minister for Economic Development Giancarlo Giorgetti, the most proEuropean and business-friendly part of the League. This is exemplified by the support of important European funds, around Є220 billion, that Italy is currently using under the name of the PNRR (Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) (The National Recovery and Resilience Plan) or has suggested the possibility of a “Semi-Presidenzialismo di fatto” (de facto Semi-Presidentialism) under Draghi (Fatto Quotidiano, 2021).11 This political shift is even more ironic, considering how the populist radical right League has historically adopted a “hard” Eurosceptic stance (i.e., outright rejection of the EU Project) and now bears much more ideological resemblance to that of a “soft” Eurosceptic party (i.e., seeking to reform the EU Project from within/via the mechanisms of the EU Parliament). 3 A third core feature of the League relates to that hard extreme right-wing element of the party. In essence, this ideological element consists of creating structured links with the extreme right, not only neo-fascist, but also neo-Nazi style links and allegations. This dynamic has been discussed, for instance, in a very interesting investigation by the online newspaper Fanpage (YouTube/Fanpage, 2021), or in the investigations by Paolo Berizzi (2021a, 2021b) which have emphasised, for example, the fundamental role of the extreme right-wing group, founded in 2010 in Lombardy, Lealtà Azione, in supporting the League with thousands of votes, with the promise of including its members in the party staff.12 In 2015, Casa Pound together with Salvini’s League had created a project to bring the extreme right-wing delusions to the new League of Matteo Salvini. Simone Di Stefano, leader of CasaPound at the time, stated that “Matteo Salvini has launched his project for the Center South. His programme is clear and absolutely shareable. Unfortunately, in this first phase he will have to fight with a forest of recyclers and adventurers, but I am convinced that in the end he will succeed in organising the many good people who see in his project a hope for Italy. As far as I am concerned, the best way to unite and organise all those who love their country and want to work seriously from North to South with Matteo Salvini is this new political 133

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organisation: Sovranità” (Fan Page, 2015). The relationship between CasaPound and Lega, commenced in 2014, has been very unstable, however, and at the moment seems to have lost momentum, if not stopped altogether (Open, 2019). An important element of contrast between Salvini and CasaPound may also be represented by the fact the while Salvini has always demonstrated a rather soft approach in condemning 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine, CasaPound has sided with Ukraine (Bruno, 2022a), in a contrast from Forza Nuova.13 4 Finally, a fourth core feature resembles an ideological complexity, with the more properly pragmatic and populist core represented by the leader Salvini himself. Salvini has on several occasions de jure or de facto disavowed the above-mentioned components, alongside finding a delicate balance that allows these ideologically disparate groups to coexist amongst one another.14

Fratelli d’Italia and the ambiguous use of symbols, identities, and communities In her autobiography Io sono Giorgia. Le mie radici, le mie idee (Meloni, 2021), Giorgia Meloni explains that between 2018 and early 2019, Meloni considered leaving the leadership of Fratelli d’Italia (Meloni, 183–185). In fact, five years after its foundation, FdI was unable to garner more than 3–4 per cent of support consistently in public opinion polls, whereas Matteo Salvini was leading the League to ever greater heights politically and electorally. Furthermore, Meloni identified a turning point in the European Parliament Elections of May 2019. For the first time, FdI obtained a sizeable 6.4% of the vote share. Electorally speaking, this allowed FdI to get out of the logic of the “voto utile” (“useful vote”), according to when a vote given to a party that fails to pass the barrier is in practice a useless vote (Ibid., 186–187). Ever since FdI began to rapidly climb the opinion polls (roughly speaking, in early 2020) which coincided with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of the historical and political legacy of fascism has resurfaced. Arguably speaking, events that transpired in October 2021 can be considered as the start of the revival of the old, debated question, of (neo)fascism in Italy. We draw on the work of Bruno et al. (2021a, 2021b) in providing an important synthesis of the events that took place in October 2021: In recent years, Italy has witnessed a series of disturbing events united by the resurgence of issues related to neo-fascism. Firstly, an academic at the University of Bologna, Professor Andrea Morrone was recorded and accused of having labeled the Brothers of Italy party, led by Giorgia Meloni, as “fascist” or “neo-fascist,” provoking the wrath of the party’s MPs, who are now seeking to open a parliamentary debate on what happened. Subsequently, an Italian newspaper, Fanpage, revealed the results of a long investigation named “Lobby Nera,” conducted through a journalist who infiltrated top circles of the radical-right and extreme-right wing in Milan, in particular related to Brothers of Italy. Crucially, this led to the discovery of a number of members of the Fratelli d’Italia party, including a member of the European Parliament Carlo Fidanza, who praised Adolf Hitler and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, Fidanza also displayed the Roman salute and made direct fun of Paolo Berizzi, a journalist of La Republica, famous for his important investigations and books against neo-fascist groups and movements, and currently the only journalist in Europe under escort for neo-Nazi threats. Most recently, on the 9th October in Rome, a no-vax demonstration of people against the green-pass certification led by the extreme rightwing neo-fascist party Forza Nuova (New Force) attacked the headquarters of the main 134

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Italian trade union, the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), completely devastating it. This latest event caused great shock in Italy and led to the subsequent arrest of twelve people, including the two leaders of Forza Nuova, Roberto Fiore and Giuliano Castellino. Evidently, FdI has been adopting a largely ambiguous stance towards its fascist heritage. Firstly, at the national level, the party does not seem to abandon any opportunity to employ aggressive strategies in attacking members of academia, via a barrage of criticism and parliamentary oppositions concerning people that dare to define FdI as either “fascist” or a “neofascist” party. At the local level, the party has never failed to flaunt its sympathy towards the nostalgia of fascism during (online) public assemblies of representative bodies. In addition, FdI self-identifies as a post-fascist party, yet the FdI party hierarchy under Meloni keeps including clear references to the party’s specific historical and political experiences. One example is the tricolor flame (“fiamma tricolore”) which has always been a symbol, evocative and powerful, that passed through the years and the minds of the Italian electorate.15 The fiamma tricolore is recognised by the Italian electorate (1) as resembling a “tacit connection with the fascist regime, while referring to the ‘cult of the dead’ and the funerary imagery […] providing a potential space both for memory investments and emotional projections.” When FdI was founded in 2012, Giorgia Meloni did not use the tricolor flame in the party’s logo. This was similar to other far-right parties in Western Europe, avoiding this symbol to overcome the stigma (2) of being associated with right-wing totalitarian regimes and attempting to be perceived as “normal” or mainstream in the eyes of the electorate (Bruno & Downes, 2022). Furthermore, FdI employed “by stealth” the symbol in 2014 with a matryoshka style, i.e., an old party logo with the flame, within the current party logo, and then since 2017, the FdI party logo clearly showed the tricolor flame in the logo of the party. Conceivably, (a) the question concerning neofascism and post-fascism in the recent development of Italian politics remains open; (b) given the complexity of the topic, it cannot be examined solely from a symbolic point of view but should consider policies, statements, manifestos. Yet, why would FdI keep in its logo a symbol such as the fiamma tricolore, so strongly associated with the MSI and fascism/neofascism, if the party does not want to be associated anymore with fascism? A discourse exclusively focused on the value of a symbol does not make much sense, yet it also true that a good deal of ambiguity at the level of the party and its ideology persists, facilitating the emergence of the doubt that such ideological ambiguity may suit the party that on the one hand accredits itself as institutional and “normal” while on the other hand, maintains important ties with a whole ideological tradition (Bruno, 2022c). According to a diffused narrative, the 1995 “svolta di Fiuggi” (Fiuggi turn)16 sanctioned the definitive passage of a certain right-wing tradition, marking a departure from neo-fascism to post-fascism. On that occasion, the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano), the Italian neo-fascist party par excellence, established in 1946 by veterans of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic) including Giorgio Almirante (1914–1988) and Pino Rauti (1926–2012), managed to move within the “arco costituzionale” (constitutional arch), i.e., a political party fully acceptable by the Italian rule of law and Constitution, with a brand-new name: Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance).17 Moreover, the symbol of the tricolor flame moved to Alleanza Nazionale’s own logo, until Gianfranco Fini in March 2008 accepted to federate/join Berlusconi’s Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom or PDL).18 In 2014, the flame appeared again in the FdI logo after a sixyear long absence. Currently, the majority of scholars in the academic literature accept the 135

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position of considering FdI as a post-fascist party, in substantial continuity with the rightwing alliance tradition of the “seconda repubblica” (see Albertazzi et al., 2021), however other scholars such as Gattinara and Froio (2021) have stressed a dynamic of radicalisation of the mainstream “following the failure of the PDL and the 2011 dramatic change of government the political right has increasingly turned towards electorates sympathizing with authoritarian and nativist ideals associated with the silent counter-revolution” (2021, p. 22), with the “[…] predominance of radical parties over the Italian mainstream right, posing some serious challenges over the fundamentals of liberal democracy in Italy (2021, p. 23).19

Italy’s extreme right, ultraconservative groups, and the mainstream right Based on all current recent polling projections by public opinion polls, together FdI and the League would currently obtain a combined 40% of the overall vote share amongst Italian voters. The two parties, despite often adopting far-right and even occasionally extreme right-wing narratives and rhetoric, are almost unanimously viewed in Italy as “institutional” and “parliamentary” parties, i.e., meaning they fully respect the constitutional rules of Italy’s relatively young parliamentary democracy, officially born on the 2 June 1946.20 Moreover, the political coalition they are part of, alongside Forza Italia and some minor parties, is referred to in Italy as a centre-right coalition (coalizione di centrodestra), notwithstanding the presence of two fully fledged far-right parties (Bruno, 2022c). In Italy the extreme right is ostracised by parliamentary politics and is almost irrelevant in terms of votes (Bruno, 2022b). Yet some historical groups and movements, such as the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore, CasaPound, and Forza Nuova, with the relative youthwings, alongside the Movimento Fascismo e Libertà (The Fascism and Freedom Movement) stand out within the multiple and eclectic groups that form the Italian extreme right, both in terms of (a) their longevity and (b) overall geographical distribution, as they have existed for several decades and are spread out throughout the Stivale. In addition to these four extreme right-wing groups, we have several “minor” extreme right-wing neo-fascist and neo-Nazi movements (i.e., founded more recently) whose presence is mostly restricted to specific regional areas of Italy, as the already mentioned Lealtà Azione, active in the Lombardy region of Northern Italy.21 There is currently an insufficient amount of academic research on these newer extreme right-wing groups in Italy (with some important exceptions, such as Froio & Gattinara 2017; Froio et al., 2020; Gattinara & Froio, 2014). Not that much information is readily available, with the main sources being journalistic investigations, notably the ones produced recently by Paolo Berizzi for La Repubblica or by the online journal Fanpage.22

CasaPound CasaPound was established in Rome in 2003 and has around 20,000 members, overall, according to the latest data available.23 Within the eclectic Italian extreme right-wing groups, CasaPound and Forza Nuova are often considered as the most well-known extreme rightwing political movements/groups since 2008, with strongholds ranging from Southern to Northern Italy and with international links, with the now disbanded former Greek political party Golden Dawn to the German far-right and neo-Nazi political party Der III. Weg (The Third Path). Furthermore, CasaPound has a youth wing, Blocco Studentesco (Student Block), and a journal, Il Primato Nazionale, established in 2013. The journal, which refers to itself as “Quotidiano Sovranista Italiano” (Italian Sovereignist Newspaper) has been playing a role in providing Matteo Salvini, including the already mentioned project Sovranità, and his newly 136

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ideologically revamped League party with visibility, within extreme right-wing sympathisers and circles alike.24 Di Stefano recently left CasaPound to join a new project ahead of the September 2022 general election in Italy. Alternativa per l’Italia (Alternative for Italy), the party co-founded by Mario Adinolfi, former founder of the People of the Family and known for his ultra-Catholic positions, is in fact an “anti-system” party whose name traces that of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland. The aim, according to Di Stefano and Adinolfi, is to build a common front against the Draghi government alongside any new technocratic/technical government which may emerge in the future25 (Alternativa per l’Italia, 2022).

Forza Nuova Forza Nuova (New Force or FN) was until recently an extreme right-wing neo-fascist political party, founded in 1997 by Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello.26 Forza Nuova is present in all Italian regions and often runs independently from other coalitions, with its own symbol (such as at the General Elections of 2008 and 2013). In December 2020, its national secretary, Roberto Fiore, announced that Forza Nuova would federate and combine into a bigger extreme right-wing political grouping named Italia Libera (Free Italy), together with allegedly “members of the no-mask movements,” Gilet arancioni (Orange vests), alongside former communists and former M5S members” (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2020; La Repubblica, 2020), including Carlo Taormina, lawyer, politician, jurist and academic, who is a former MP for Forza Italia and Movimento Cinque Stelle, who has also served as undersecretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior in 2001 under Silvio Berlusconi’s Governing Cabinet. Forza Nuova has tended to distinguish itself from its past violent actions and extreme rhetoric, particularly from its homophobic and xenophobic stances.27 Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Forza Nuova, as we have seen, has combined an anti-vaccination stance with violent demonstrations against the digital COVID certificate alongside other health measures, calling them a form of a “dittatura sanitaria” (“health dictatorship”). In October 2021, about 10,000 people demonstrated against the green pass in Rome, part of the demonstrators, led by Forza Nuova, then broke into the CGIL headquarters (Open, 2021).

The Fiamma Tricolore, Dascismo e Libertà – Partito Socialista and “minor” extreme right-wing groups and movements in Italy The Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement Tricolour Flame), known simply as Fiamma Tricolore (Tricolour Flame), is an Italian neo-fascist political party, founded on 3 March 1995 by Pino Rauti and those key figures of the MSI who opposed the already mentioned post-fascist turn of Fiuggi, preferring to continue its activities autonomously. In the past the party has had some informal collaborations with formations linked to the center-right, however this neo-fascist political party currently adopts positions of political autonomy, in a similar manner to Forza Nuova. The Fiamma Tricolore is widespread and rooted nationwide and is extremely active online, using social media platforms, especially Facebook, for which it has a dedicated page for each Italian region, from Abruzzo to Trentino Alto Adige. In a similar manner to both CasaPound and Forza Nuova, The Fiamma Tricolore has a youth section named Gioventù della fiamma (Youth of the Flame) which is extremely active online though the main social media, within both high schools and via the party’s newpaper Il Missino. The group Fascismo e Libertà - Partito Socialista Nazionale (Fascism and Liberty – National Socialist Party) was established in 1991. It is a particularly unique extreme right-wing 137

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movement worth mentioning for its ability to quietly “by-pass” the Constitution of the Italian Republic and the Scelba and Mancino laws regarding the crime of “apologia del fascismo” (“apology of fascism”).28 Moreover, on online social media, it is possible to find complete series of posters and flyers hailing Mussolini alongside openly neo-fascist discourse, which is freely accessible to the general public. However, the movement has not been dismantled as it declares to be “against violence and anti-democratic logic” and that the movement “has no intention to bring back to life the defunct Italian Fascist Party.” As for the case of Forza Nuova, Fascismo e Libertà clearly demonstrates the growing inadequacy of Italy’s current legal framework on the issue of fascism. Aside from “historical” groups, there are also a series of “minor” and in many cases more recently established, Italian extreme right-wing groups, based primarily in the North, NorthEastern parts of Italy, and in the city of Rome. With a certain degree of approximation,29 it is possible to divide the groups as follows (see Bruno, 2022c, for a more extensive overview). In the area of Rome there exists the following extreme right-wing movements: Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard), Rivolta Nazionale (National Revolt) and Militia. In Northern Italy, the region of Lombardy hosts the already mentioned Lealtà Azione. The city of Milan is home to the extreme right-wing group Skin4Skin, Hammerskin Italia (Hammerskins Italy) and Generazione Identitaria (Generation Identity), while Manipolo d’Avanguardia (Vanguard Formation) is active in Bergamo and Do.Ra in Varese. Furthermore, the region of Veneto hosts Fortezza Europa (Fortress Europe), based in Verona while Veneto Fronte Skinheads (Veneto Front Skinheads) is active in Vicenza. Finally, Fasci Italiani del Lavoro (Italian Fasces of Labour) is based in both Northern Italy (Mantova) and Southern Italy (Palermo). These groups, whose visibility was usually restricted to Italy’s football stadiums have also become increasingly visible during the violent anti-vaccination/anti-lockdown demonstrations in Italy, openly challenging Italy’s law enforcement. Therefore, contemporary populist radical right parties in Italian politics appear to have increasingly closer ties with extreme right-wing alongside neo-fascist, neo-Nazi groups, alongside ultraconservative religious groups. Thus, the 13 World Congress of Family held in Verona between the 29 to 31 March 2019, represented a landmark event in contemporary Italian politics.30 Furthermore, it is conceivable that the populist radical right League seems to have established the most successful ties with ultraconservative religious groups and movements, with key politicians such as senator Simone Pillon and former Minister of Family Lorenzo Fontana being particularly close to groups, such as The Family Day – Difendiamo i Nostri Figli and Fraternità Sacerdotale San Pietro (Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter). A second landmark and significant event on the ties between political and religious right-wing extremism in Italy can be considered the long discussion of the so called “DDL Zan.”31 A whole arsenal of narrative tools was shared and deployed, both by the political and the religious radical right, via media and social media, that condemned the DDL as dangerous for liberal democracy, resulting in the overall failure of the DDL.

Conclusion: Implications for the future of liberal democracy in Italian politics This chapter explored the significance of the far right in Italian politics, alongside the multiplicity of extreme right-wing political movements and groups in the contemporary Italian political landscape. Much more academic research in the literature has been devoted to examining the electoral rise and ideological underpinnings of the PPRPs in Italian politics, as opposed to the increasingly numerous extreme right-wing political movements and groups (with some notable exceptions, such as the excellent recent works by Froio and Gattinara). 138

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The implications of this chapter are wide ranging in demonstrating how in particular, The League led by Matteo Salvini has been adopting closer ties with both Italian extreme rightwing and ultraconservative groups in the contemporary Italian political landscape, whereas FdI can rely on an already well-established ideological tradition, as we have seen in this chapter. Most significantly, the sheer number and multiplicity of extreme right-wing political movements and groups across Italy such as CasaPound and Forza Nuova underlines an increasingly worrying negative pattern for the future of liberal democracy in Italy alongside the populist radical right FdI’s apparent ideological ambiguous stance towards its fascist/neofascist heritage. The fact these populist far-right actors are now polling above a combined 40%, with FdI on the eve of the general election given at 25% of the overall vote share, demonstrates the growing importance and mainstreaming of radical right discourse in modern Italian politics and more broadly across Europe during times of continued crisis (see Downes & Loveless, 2018; Downes et al., 2021). Although the role currently played by extreme-right movements in Italy is negligible in electoral terms, the constant winking at these movements, with their conspiracy theories, the violence they bring, should not be underestimated. As FdI and Lega represent fully institutionalised and normalised political subjects, it would not be a big surprise if the chaotic Italian extreme right galaxy, with its many movements, may undergo a process of mainstreaming, pushing Italy increasingly towards the extreme right-wing of the political spectrum.

Notes 1 According to Zulianello (2020), the M5S falls under the category of valence populism. “Accordingly, I operate a distinction between ‘positional’ populists (left-wing and right-wing varieties) and those that I shall define as instances of ‘valence’ populism – parties that predominantly, if not exclusively, compete by focusing on non-positional issues such as the fight against corruption, increased transparency, democratic reform and moral integrity while emphasizing anti-establishment motives.” 2 To this regards Pirro (2022) has recently argued “far-right” could be used as an umbrella concept covering both the populist radical-right parties and the extreme-right parties/movements, which share a nativist and authoritarian stance and are differentiated mainly by their stance towards democracy, as the PRRPs holds most of the time illiberal views, while the extreme-right harbours anti-democratic beliefs. An extremely important point raised by Pirro is that the boundaries between the populist radical right and the extreme right are shifting and getting more blurred, and that “the complexity of far-right politics questions the long-standing conceptual distinctions internally defining it” (Pirro, 2022). 3 After years of relative “invisibility,” some extreme right-wing political movements and ultraconservative groups have become more widely spoken about in Italian media commentary; alongside “historical” extreme right groups, are also more recently established neo-nazi and neo-fascist parties, such as Lealtà Azione, a group active in the northern region of Lombardy and particularly close to the League. 4 In 2021 an important undercover journalistic investigation exposed the deep and complex connections that exist between different political actors that share extreme ideologies. One case study example is the city of Verona, in Italy’s Northeast, which has been defined by author and journalist Paolo Berizzi (2021a, 2021b) as “the laboratory of the extreme right between Italy and Europe,” with local right-wing politics deeply entrenched within extreme-right movements, ultraconservative religious groups and heavily ideologised football supporters, forming a radical-right type of fortress. 5 Curiosly also CasaPound’s newspaper, “Il Primato Nazionale,” uses the word to define itself “Il Primato Nazionale è l'unico quotidiano sovranista Italiano indipendente.” 6 There is no doubt the two parties have developed specific “traits,” primarily due to the different (a) leadership and communication styles of both Salvini and Meloni and the (b) different historical roots of the two.

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Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James F. Downes 7 Either focusing on its (a) current “sovereignist” format (Albertazzi et al., 2018; De Luca & Fruncillo, 2019) or as (b) Lega Nord, before the “transformation undertaken under Salvini’s leadership” (see Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2005, 2010; Bull & Gilbert, 2001; Tarchi, 2003). 8 One explanation may be the close foundation of the party (in late 2012); yet for the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement or M5S), founded in late 2009 by Beppe Grillo and Gianroberto Caseleggio, scholars and analysts have devoted much more attention, producing an important number of authoritative studies and research (see Bickerton & Accetti, 2018; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018; Pirro, 2018; Vampa, 2015). On populism and elites see also the excellent works of Campati (2016) and Palano (2022). 9 These developments created the political landscape in Italy that then arguably laid the foundations for the development of the current Italian far right. FdI was founded in December 2012, whilst Matteo Salvini took over leadership of the Lega Nord in December 2013. 10 Renouncing at the least for the time being, the word “North” and with it the issue of independence for the putative “Padania.” 11 See the whole PNRR document available at: https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/PNRR.pdf. 12 In the last part of the chapter, we will devote more space to analyzing the extreme right-wing group Lealtà Azione. 13 As Bruno states (2022a, p. 47): “Forza Nuova and CasaPound have slightly changed their positions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Forza Nuova is siding more fiercely with Putin and the separatist forces than in the past when its previous stance was more ambiguous. Conversely, CasaPound is supporting in a less vigorous way the Ukrainian forces – adopting a conciliatory stance in a kind of neutrality from all forms of imperialism, away from both Putin’s Russia and NATO.” In a communiqué dated 3 March 2022, titled “Contro ogni imperialismo” (Against all the imperialisms) it stated: “Freedom from the cultural and political yoke, free to defend its sacred borders to the east from Russian and Asian imperialism, to the south from migratory aggression, and to the west from a political and cultural colonialism made up of ideas alien to our millenary history.” Moreover, on many pages of its official website and on its newspaper Il Primato Nazionale, commentators seem to side with Putin rather than with Zelenskyy’s Ukraine. It is also important to notice that CasaPound and Il Primato Nazionale have often used tones of admiration for the Russian president and his policies, as can be seen throughout the years up to the recent events.” 14 As written by Bruno and Parsi (2021b) “If Salvini easily set aside the vexed question of northern secession to embrace a wide-ranging Italian nationalism, he has never worried much about such U-turns – being driven by a deep spirit of political entrepreneurship. […] Salvini’s chameleonstyle shape-shifting led him in 2018 to form a patto di governo (governmental pact) with the Five Stars Movement (M5S), a populist party of incoherent political leanings. In February this year, in another bold and unexpected move, he granted support to an executive led by Mario Draghi, former president of the European Central Bank, including the Democratic Party – for Salvini the very definition of the buonisti (do-gooders) and barconi (ugly slang for boats transporting refugees in the Mediterranean) he had scapegoated in his party’s 2019 European Parliament campaign. Underneath the carapace of populism, not much of substance remains for Salvini’s League.” 15 On par with the crusader shield of the DC party (Democrazia Cristiana) or the hammer and sickle of the Communist party (Bruno et al., 2021a, 2021b, 12 November). 16 After the name of the small town in the province of Frosinone where a big political convention was led on 27 January 1995. 17 In particular, three programmatic points emerged from Fiuggi: (a) Abandonment of corporatism and revolutionary tones in opposition to liberal capitalism; (b) Rejection of anti-Americanism with the consequent definitive acceptance of pro-EU and pro-NATO positions; (c) Valorisation of a democratic and modern right-wing committed to the preservation of the Italian cultural and religious roots. 18 On the complex dynamic that brought suddenly AN into the PDL federation lead by Silvio Berlusconi, see the account provided by Giorgia Meloni (Meloni, 2021, pp. 86–87). 19 Giorgia Meloni while not speaking openly of fascism or neo-fascism, in her recent autobiography proudly recalls, almost on every page of the book, her militancy in the MSI and what that experience means for her, in opposition to what she defines as a “destra moderna” without tradition (2021, p. 192). Having recognised that the issue needs to be addressed not only as a debate concerning symbols (as the fiamma tricolore) but should consider policies, statements, party manifesto,

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The radicalisation of the Italian mainstream there is little doubt that FdI has a strong competitive advantage over the Lega in relation to appealing the radical-right electorate, in light of a deep-rooted historical and ideological tradition going back to the MSI and AN; differently the Lega for Salvini Premier is a relatively young populist radical-right party with different characteristics from the original Lega Nord party founded in 1991 (Bruno, 2022c). 20 Not surprisingly, the two parties enjoy to refer to themselves as “sovranisti,” a now fashionable euphemism easily and quickly adopted by the Italian media. 21 In particular, but not exclusively and with several exceptions, in the Northern-East side of Italy and in the area of Rome. 22 These risky and meritorious works have often contributed to identify and name the actors composing the most hidden part of Italy’s extreme-right galaxy (ranging from neofascist and neo-Nazi groups, violent fringes of football supporters or ultraconservative religious groups) and their ties with the mainstream right. It is worth mentioning that Berizzi is currently the only journalist in Europe being under police escort because of Neo-Nazi threats. 23 Source https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/CasaPound. On CasaPound (see Froio & Gattinara, 2017; Froio et al., 2020; Gattinara & Froio, 2014). 24 The logo of CasaPound is a turtle, allegedly representing an animal that brings with it its own house. The base of the turtle is an octagon, with the eight reminding of the symbol of the infinite (∞), with the four white arrows and the four black arrows converging to form the Nazi iron cross. 25 “No to the green pass, compulsory vaccination and political correctness!” can be read on the movement’s Facebook page while another essential programmatic point is to cancel the sanctions against Russia. 26 We mentioned previously that Forza Nuova led a violent assault against the headquarters of CGIL, the main trade union of workers in Italy, during a demonstration against the certification called “green-pass” in Rome, on 9 October 2021. Subsequently, its two leaders, Fiore and Castellino, were arrested along with ten other people, opening a debate on the possibility of dissolving Forza Nuova party and other openly neo-fascist movements (Il Corriere della Sera, 2021, October 11). 27 Furthermore, the movement has also a youth wing, named Lotta Studentesca (Student Struggle or LIS) and is part of the pan European platform party Alliance for Peace and Freedom. Even if FN is rather independent in its action, the party can count on the implicit support of the parliamentary radical right in the Italian Parliament. 28 It is worth a quick mention to the Italian legal framework for this highly sensitive area, substantially covered by the so-called Legge Scelba (1952) and the Legge Mancino (1993). The first, named after Mario Scelba (1901–1991), introduced, amongst other things, the specific offence of “apologia del fascismo” (apology or defence of Fascism); the second, named after former Interior Minister Nicola Mancino (1931–), condemns phrases, gestures, actions, and slogans having as their purpose hate speech, incitement to violence, discrimination and violence on racial, ethnic, religious or national grounds, clearly including the use of emblems or symbols related to fascism. 29 As we specified several times, it is important to recall here that apart from the works of several journalists and journals, and some other exceptions, we do not possess much information about these groups. 30 It is not by chance that the much-discussed World Congress of Family of 2019, defined eloquently by both Pope Francis and Cardinal Pietro Parolin “The substance is correct, the method is wrong” was held in Verona. 31 The DDL Zan, named from its creator, the Partito Democratico MP Alessandro Zan, envisaged tougher penalties against crimes and discrimination against homosexuals, transsexuals, women, and disabled people. The proposal sparked public debate in Italy and exacerbated divisions in parliament. According to the text of the bill, crimes related to homophobia would be equated with those sanctioned by Article 604 bis of the Penal Code, which combats racism and hatred on religious grounds, punishing discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability with up to four years’ imprisonment. The bill also wanted to establish a national day against homophobia, lesbophobia, biphobia, and transphobia, to promote a more widespread culture of respect and inclusion and to counter prejudice, discrimination and violence motivated by sexual orientation and gender identity. Zan’s law was held up for several months due to the obstructionism of the League, FdI, Forza Italia and Renzi’s Italia Viva, claiming that our Constitution already sanctions these crimes. On 27 October 2021, the DDL Zan was shelved by the Senate, with 154 votes in favour (the request not to examine the law article by article and secret ballot were approved).

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References (a) Academic Bibliography Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2005). The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own. West European Politics, 28(5), 952–972. Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2009). The parties of the centre right: Many oppositions, one leader. In J. L. Newell (Ed.), The Italian general election of 2008: Berlusconi strikes back (pp. 102–117). Palgrave. Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2010). The Lega Nord back in government. West European Politics, 33(6), 1318–1340. Albertazzi, D., Giovannini, A., & Seddone, A. (2018). ‘No regionalism please, we are Leghisti!’ The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini. Regional & Federal Studies, 28(5), 645–671. Albertazzi, D., Bonansinga, A., & Zulianello, M. (2021). The right-wing Alliance at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic: All change? Contemporary Italian Politics, 13(2), 181–195. Alternativa per l’Italia [official page] (2022). Available at: https://alternativaitalia.it/chi-siamo/ Berizzi, P. (2021a). E’gradita la camicia nera. Rizzoli. Berizzi, P. (2021b, August 13). “Durigon e gli altri nostalgici del Duce. Radiografia del fascioleghismo al tempo di Salvini”, La Repubblica, Available at: https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2021/08/13/news/ non_solo_durigon_radiografia_del_fascioleghismo-313936374/ Bickerton, C. J., & Accetti, C. I. (2018). ‘Techno-populism’ as a new party family: The case of The Five Star Movement and Podemos. Contemporary Italian Politics, 10(2), 132–150. Bruno, V. A. (2021, March 1). The Italian Far Right’s Long-Term Investment, Fair Observer & CARR Insight Blog. Available at: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/italian-far-rights-long-terminvestment/ Bruno, V. A. (2022a). Chapter “Italy”. In K. Rekawek (Ed.), Western Extremists and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Counter Extremism Project (CEP), pp. 46–53. Available: https://www.counterextremism.com/press/cep-report-western-extremists-and-russian-invasion-ukraine-2022 Bruno, V. A. (2022b). Chapter “Online use of slogans, symbols and slurs by the Italian radical right”. In V. A. Bruno, T. Hof, M. Kreter, & J.-Y. Camus, Symbols & slogans of the radical right online: Italy, Germany, France. ACS, pp. 2–64. Available at: https://www.academicconsulting.co.uk/_files/ ugd/4775ea_eb523462f5cb43beb4c72dadbce90ee1.pdf?index=true Bruno, V. A. (Ed.) (2022c). Populism and far right. Trends in Europe. Educatt UCSC. Bruno, V. A., & Downes, J. F. (2020, February 27). The case of Fratelli d’Italia: How radical-right populists in Italy and beyond are building global networks. Democratic Audit Blog. Available online: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2020/02/27/the-case-of-fratelli-ditalia-how-radical-right-populists-in-italy-and-beyond-are-building-global-networks/ Bruno, V. A., & Parsi, V. E. (2021a, May 13). Can Italy’s centre-right coalition recover from far-right influence? Social Europe. Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/can-italys-centre-right-coalition-recover-fromfar-right-influence Bruno, V. A., & Parsi, V. E. (2021b, November 24). Matteo Salvini’s League and the price of unbridled populism. Social Europe. Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/matteo-salvinis-league-and-theprice-of-unbridled-populism Bruno, V. A., Downes, J. F., & Scopelliti, A. (2021, May 28). Warning signs: From Northern to Southern Italy, the Radical Right Fratelli d’Italia is on the march. CARR Insight Blog. Available at: https:// www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2021/05/28/warning-signs-from-northern-to-southern-italy-theradical-right-fratelli-ditalia-is-on-the-march/ Bruno, V. A., Downes, J. F., & Scopelliti (2021, November 12). Post-Fascism in Italy: “So why this flame, Mrs. Giorgia Meloni?” Culturico & CARR Insight Blog. Available at: https://culturico.com/ 2021/11/12/post-fascism-in-italy-so-why-this-flame-mrs-giorgia-meloni/ Bull, A. C., & Gilbert, M. (2001). The Lega Nord and the Northern question in Italian politics. Palgrave. Campati, A. (2016). I migliori al potere La qualità nella rappresentanza politica. Soveria Mannelli. De Luca, R., & Fruncillo, D. (2019). La Lega “nazionale” di Salvini alla conquista elettorale del Meridione. Italian Journal of Electoral Studies IJES-QOE, 82(2), 49–84. Donà, A. (2022). The rise of the Radical Right in Italy: The case of Fratelli d’Italia. Journal of Modern Italian Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2022.2113216

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The radicalisation of the Italian mainstream Downes, J. F., & Loveless, M. (2018). Centre right and radical right party competition in Europe: Strategic emphasis on immigration, anti-incumbency, and economic crisis. Electoral Studies, 54, 148–158. Downes, J. F., Loveless, M., & Lam, A. (2021). The looming refugee crisis in the EU: Right-Wing Party competition and strategic positioning. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 59(5), 1103–1123. Froio, C., & Gattinara, P. C. (2017). Direct social actions in extreme right mobilisations. Ideological, strategic and organisational incentives in the Italian neo-fascist right. Partecipazione e Conflitto, 9(3), 1040–1066. Froio, C., Gattinara, P. C., Bulli, G., & Albanese, M. (2020). CasaPound Italia: Contemporary extremeright politics. Routledge. Gattinara, P. C., & Froio, C. (2014). Discourse and practice of violence in the Italian extreme right: Frames, symbols, and identity-building in CasaPound Italia. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 8(1), 154–170. Gattinara, P. C., & Froio, C. (2021). Italy: The mainstream right and its allies, 1994–2018. In T. Bale, & C. R. Kaltwasser (Eds.), Riding the populist wave. Europe’s mainstream right in crisis. Cambridge University Press. Meloni, G. (2021). Io sono Giorgia: le mie radici, le mie idee. Rizzoli. Mosca, L., & Tronconi, F. (2019). Beyond left and right: The eclectic populism of The Five Star Movement. West European Politics, 42(6), 1258–1283. Palano, D. (2022). Inventing “Populism”: Notes for the genealogy of a paranoid concept. Genealogy 6(1), 1–14. Parsi, V. E. (2021). The wrecking of the liberal world order. Palgrave Macmillan. Passarelli, G., & Tuorto, D. (2018). The Five Star Movement: Purely a matter of protest? The rise of a new party between political discontent and reasoned voting. Party Politics, 24(2), 129–140. Pirro, A. L. P. (2018). The polyvalent populism of the 5 Star Movement. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 26(4), 443–458. Pirro, A. L. P. (2022). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860 Tarchi, M. (2003) The Lega Nord. In Regionalist parties in Western Europe (pp. 161–175). Routledge. Vampa, D. (2015). Local representative democracy and protest politics: The case of The Five-Star Movement. Contemporary Italian Politics, 7(3), 232–250. Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of populist parties and party systems in Europe: From state-of-the-art to the application of a novel classification scheme to 66 parties in 33 countries. Government and Opposition, 55(2), 327–347.

(b) Media Sources (Il) Corriere della Sera (2021, October 11) “Assalto alla Cgil a Roma, i leader di Forza nuova e l’ex Nar «Pantera»: così i neofascisti si mischiano alla piazza no vax”. Available at: https://www.corriere.it/ cronache/21_ottobre_11/assalto-sede-cgil-roma-forza-nuova-castellino-fiore-biagio-passaro-aronicapantera-e27941a0-29f5-11ec-bcd6-9bba3a47f3bc.shtml Fan Page (2015, January 12) “La carica dei fascio leghisti, nasce ‘Sovranità’”. Available at: https://www. fanpage.it/politica/la-carica-dei-fascio-leghisti-nasce-sovranita/https://www.fanpage.it/ (Il) Fatto Quotidiano (2020, December 14) “Forza Nuova si scioglie: nasce Italia Libera con gilet arancioni e no mask contro la ‘dittatura sanitaria’. Dentro anche l’avvocato Taormina”. Available at: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/12/14/forza-nuova-si-scioglie-nasce-italia-libera-con-giletarancioni-e-no-mask-dentro-anche-lavvocato-di-cogne-carlo-taormina/6036814/ (Il) Fatto Quotidiano (2021, November 5) “Giorgetti parla di semipresidenzialismo de facto, embè? L’anomalia dura già da dieci anni”. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeN4Dtk81A (L’) Humanité (2022, July 26) “Valerio Alfonso Bruno: « Frères d’Italie, un parti conservateur mais aussi une lessiveuse des politiques d’extrême droite »“ Available at: https://www.humanite.fr/monde/italie/ valerio-alfonso-bruno-freres-d-italie-un-parti-conservateur-mais-aussi-une-lessiveuse-des-politiquesd-extreme-droite-758996

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10 THE FAR RIGHT IN GREECE A Foretold Story Vasiliki Tsagkroni

Introduction With the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism in the West, there is a joint effort to work towards consolidating democratic regimes in order to develop and establish more liberal, tolerant, and stable political systems (Akkerman et al., 2016; Mudde, 2017). However, far-right ideology has been consistently present throughout the 20th century in various forms and attitudes, expressed amongst others through xenophobia, nationalism, welfare chauvinism, anti-establishment populism, racism, and authoritarianism, while in action in conditions of dictatorial regimes and democratic erosion (see Mudde, 2019). Over the last few decades, parties of the far right have gained significant levels of support and success across European countries (Hainsworth, 2008), something that brought a crucial change in the political establishment of these countries (Betz, 1993). Even though in established consolidated democracies, the far right has occurred in different historical, sociopolitical, and economic contexts and circumstances, it has managed to gain legislative representation, shape policies, and even enjoy government power (Norris, 2004). It has also managed to adapt through times of crisis and to still grow in popularity and numbers by offering to the part of the electorate that felt “invisible” answers to problems that the established political scene has neglected This chapter deals with the issue of the Greek far right from 1974 onwards, which begins with the fall of the dictatorship and the political change-over, and the return to a democratic regime. It is a period of democracy, modernisation, and progress for the Western world. Greece is trying to integrate into the European Community in the context of globalisation and the model and standards of consolidating democracy of the West. More specifically, the expressions and positions of the Greek far right are presented in an attempt to compare the different forms and overriding issues occupying the national political scene in order to narrate its continuing story. Methodologically, a genealogical approach to the Greek far right is applied. By building on existing Greece-focused work and official party material, the chapter provides a complete and erudite summary of what has been developed on the Greek far right scene to date. What makes Greece interesting as a case study is the chronic status of marginalisation of the far right but, also the fact that there is some continuity from one “wave” to another in what can DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-14

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also be described as a “change of baton.” Additionally, despite the noted similarities amongst the “waves” of far-right parties, the Greek far right has multiple distinguishing, differentiated, and identifying party characteristics (e.g., pro-monarchy, liberal, neo-Nazi, Christian Orthodox, and anti-democratic) that feed the whole debate on the diversity of the far-right family in the broader European geographical area. Notwithstanding, though, it also presents a country case that is quite different from other European countries, as Greece has managed to provide unswervingly a habitat for the far right to voice its polyphonous through the years narrative and experience success both on a national and local level.

The rise of the European far right Various definitions have been given through the academic literature to understand what the far right is. Ignazi (1996, p. 4) talks based on spatial, ideological, and attitudinal criteria, where parties of the far right are categorised based on the presence or absence of a fascist heritage and the acceptance or refusal of the political system. Mudde (2007), on the other hand, distinguishes three main features that define the far right: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, while Betz (1994) identifies three common ideological elements: (a) the rejection of the individual and social equality and the political means they use to achieve this position, (b) their opposition to the social integration of certain groups and their attraction to the phenomenon of xenophobia, and (c) the rejection of the established socio-political system, without openly undermining the democratic regime. For Anastasakis (2000), there are four dimensions related to the rise and the nature of the far right: (a) historical, connected with the fascist legacy of the inter-war period, (b) structural, seen more in a socio-economic context conducive to the phenomenon, (c) political, as the role of political actors, and (d) ideologicalcultural, seen as a historical continuity and significance of radical ideas and focuses. When it comes to emergence, many scholars have argued the post-war phenomenon of the far right appearing in so-called “waves” (Mudde, 2007, 2019; Von Beyme, 1988). This wave metaphor points to a compelling explanation of the far-right phenomenon based on the post–World War II chronology of far-right development to date. The first wave is perceived as “incarnations,” or as Mudde (2016) puts it, a historical continuity of far-right movements pre-war and post-war period started just after the end of World War II in 1945. The second wave began roughly in the 1960s and provided a glance at the potential success of far-right parties in liberal democracies. Seen through the demand-side, far-right parties of this period focus on anti-tax, anti-big business, and anti-bureaucracy policies. They are supported by the so-called “losers” in post-war economic modernisation managed to have an impact on national politics. For Kitschelt (1995), this is a period of post-industrialism, and the far right is seen as an authoritarian reaction to the post-materiality of the libertarian left, while for the first time, issues of security, community, nation, and identity are introduced as part of the political debate (Ignazi, 1996). The third wave started in the 1980s and finds parties of the “new” far-right emerging in numerous Western European countries and from a more supply side scope (Rydgren, 2007), having a distinct influence on the political discourse of sociocultural and socio-political issues (Betz, 1998) and focusing on matters of welfare chauvinism, radical anti-immigration policies, referendum policies, and national priority. The fourth wave starts at the beginning of the 21st century and finds far-right parties becoming mainstream and normalised political actors, institutionalised and integrated into the political arena (Mudde, 2019). Apart from the demand/supply side of explanations, in the literature, the rise of the far right is also highly connected with the political crisis within consolidating democracies of the 146

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West and the lack of trust in the established political parties providing new political opportunities (Norris, 2004). The crisis of representation manifested in a decline of voter turnout at elections, a high degree of dissatisfaction with politics and politicians, and a realignment of voting behaviour and voter volatility away from the mainstream, as alienation from political institutions has allowed new parties to emerge as agents of change and influence, with farright filling the rising demand of this negative protest against the status quo. Additionally, the growth of multi-culturalism and more ethnically diverse societies assisted the rise of the far-right parties, bringing in the debate issues of cultural protectionism, ethnic diversity, and othering as part of their political argument (see Bekhuis et al., 2013; Lazaridis et al., 2016) In sum, since the 1980s, far-right parties have managed to become a relevant factor in West European politics (within and outside the political system). At the same time, their compact structure provides the advantage of changing the political “overtone window” and responding quickly to the electorate’s preference. Additionally, the charismatic leadership has made them the “most prominent representative of a new political entrepreneurialism” (Ignazi, 1997, p. 49) and still poses a significant challenge to the established structure and politics of West European democracy.

The Greek far right Scooting from the past At the climax of the Cold War, similar to the cases of Spain and Portugal, the dictatorship of 1967 in Greece came as a response to the fear of a potential communist overthrow and as a solution to the political instability that characterised the national scene since the end of the civil war in 1949. According to Couloumbis (1974), the political crisis of the 1960s that led to the coup d’état can be traced to the inadequate political institutions, the traditions of military interventions, the disagreement amongst insufficient political elites in dispense of democracy, and the structural effects of Greece alliance with the United States and NATO. The driven ideas of the colonels’ Junta can be summarised as the revival of a nationalist mindset based on and preserving Christian values and the protection and survival of the nation from the danger of being overthrown by its various enemies (Clogg & Yannopoulos, 1972). During the seven years of the colonels’ Junta, violent political repression was expressed in a system of exclusion and prohibitions imposed in the context of declaring the country under siege, through the imposition of martial law and the suspension of parliament, as well as a series of articles of the Constitution on fundamental rights (Nafpliotis, 2013). The fall of the regime came with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and in 1974 the transition to democracy started. As in other cases of the third wave of democratisation that occurred in the same period throughout the globe (Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Chile, etc.), Greece was faced with issues of transitional justice and political legitimacy. Under the leadership of C. Karamanlis, returning from exile, a newly formed government will work towards national unity by legalising the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), abolishing the monarchy with a referendum, establishing a new constitution the following year (1975), and a preoccupation with foreign policy issues (in order to restore the relationships after the years of country’s isolation due to the junta regime) that contributed to the stability in the new democratic regime (Sotiropoulos, 2010). Since the transformation of the Greek political system in 1974 and the establishment of the third democracy in the country, the far right didn’t seem to claim in an organised way an autonomous presence in the national political scene (Georgiadou, 2008). One of the reasons that this might be the case is the fact that in the eyes of the electorate, the ideology and the 147

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positions of initiatives of the far right were still highly connected with the dictatorship period. Despite this, though, by the late 1970s, new far-right parties made their appearance in a part of a society that was still attached to the old regime, was sceptical towards the democratic change and was still afraid of the communist threat. According to Voulgaris (2005), this is something that can be identified in the legitimisation of political ideologies that the newly formed government brought, moving from anti-communism to anti-fascism, something that isolated even further the remaining post-junta far right. The initiatives of this period are primarily led by politicians from the pre-1967 establishments, e.g., Spyros Theotokis, Petros Garoufalias, and Spyros Markezinis, amongst others and their narratives and arguments focus on the legitimisation of the Communist party, the stand towards the monarchy, and the treatment of ex-junta officials that remained in prison at the time while maintaining their strong nationalist positions (Ellinas, 2010). The first far-right party after the change-over was the National Democratic Union (Εθνική Δημοκρατική Ένωση or NDU), formed in 1974. NDU can be characterised as an authoritarian, pro-dictatorship party despite Garoufalias, the leader of the party, insisting on the party’s democratic credentials (Ellinas, 2010). In its political programme, NCU appeals to patriotism and ethnonationalism with racial references, supports law and order to save the nation from its enemies, and sees militarism as a means of preserving that order (NDU, 1974). In its short period that was active, it managed to gather the political forces of the remaining far-right supporters at the time, e.g., pro-monarchy and pro-junta, and participate only once in the national elections, those of 1974, gaining 1.1% of the popular vote, including in its ballot politicians that were actively connected with the junta regime. The growing reactions and dissatisfaction towards the policies of Karamanlis’ government following the elections of 1974, along with the outcome of the referendum against the monarchy, led to the emergence of National Camp (Εθνική Παράταξις or NC) in 1977. According to Clogg (1987), NC is a part of an ad hoc set of converging reactionaries promoting projunta and pro-monarchy, religious, and fascist narratives. In its manifesto, NC also makes racial references, for a society of equality, liberty, and justice, just for the Greeks, following the national ideals (NC, 1977). Maintaining an anti-communist and anti-systemic discourse, the party aimed to free the jailed junta leaders while promoting Greek membership into the European Community and in a more liberal scope pledging to free the economy from state interventionism (Ellinas, 2010, p. 131), and managed to get into the elections of 1977 a 6.8% of the vote and elected 5 MPs in the national parliament. Despite the success of NC in 1977, the support of the far right four years later dropped to 1.7% at a national level for the Party of the Progressives (Κόμμα Προοδευτικών or PP), included mainly the remaining members of NC as the more significant majority was of the party has fled and been absorbed by the conservative party of New Democracy. In 1984, National Political Union (Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωση or EPEN) was formed, a party formally led by the former dictator George Papadopoulos. OPEN remained close to the ideas of the Junta in terms of law and order and militarism elements while addressing anti-establishment sentiments, supporting a traditional Christian morality, and arguing in favour of privatisation in economic terms (EPEN, 1989). Despite electing a representative in the European elections of 1984, after numerous electoral failures at a national level through the years, the party eventually disappeared from the political scene. As Georgiadou points out, the vivid memory of the Junta, along with a non-contentious transition to democracy and rapid consolidation of bipartisanship, were circumstances that formed an electoral concentration around the two main political parties, the conservative New Democracy and the social democratic party of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Georgiadou, 148

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2019). Additionally, the lack of a straightforward political ideology, broader than its connections and references to the former military regime, the anti-communist elements, and the nostalgia of the monarchy, along with Taggart’s (1995) argument that the change-over from the authoritarian regime of the Junta to democracy limited the opportunities and created difficulties in shaping and mobilising a viable alternative form of far right, can provide some clarity and explain the inefficiency of far-right parties of this period to achieve a more stable electoral base.

Crawling towards the European model of the “third wave” far right Throughout the 1990s, the far right remained on the sidelines, and its various formations taking place during this period had no significant impact on the political scene. However, for Ellinas (2010), this period highlights a shift in the far-right discourse, with a new emphasis on nationalism as a core ideology. This can be observed in the case of the National Party (Εθνικό Κομμα), founded by former EPEN members in 1989, but also in the later instances of the Hellenic Front (Ελληνικό Μέτωπο or HF) founded in 1994 by M. Voridis and Front Line (Πρώτη Γραμμή or FL). Constantinos Plevris founded FL, also the founder of the 1960s organisation of August the 4th (4η Αυγούστου), a member of which would be the later leader of Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή or GD) Nikos Michaloliakos (Lazaridis & Tsagkroni, 2016). Through these parties, for the first time, the issue of internal homogenisation appears, a term close to what Mudde (2007) defines as nativism, in line with anti-immigration and xenophobia, populism and anti-multiculturalism arguments, while continuing to emphasise Christian values, argue against the political establishment and the elites and the highlighting the necessity of strengthening law and order. In the case of NP and FL, anti-Semitism is also present, with Zionism to be blamed for corrupting the Helleno-Christian traditions (NP, 1990). HF and FL managed to have an extensive presence in the national media; however only managed to have minor electoral success and get no more than 0.6% and 0.18% in the national elections (Fragoudaki, 2013). Despite the limited electoral success, what becomes clear from the parties that emerged in the 90s is a form of renewal closer to the European far-right parties at the time, following the ideological themes of the “third wave.” In an effort to seek to adopt a more centre-right profile for the party of ND (Vernardakis, 2005), Kostas Karalamanlis in May 2000, leader of ND at the time, decided to expel threetime elected MP and George Karatzaferis from the party, creating a new opportunity for the far right to emerge from the sidelines. While since the foundation of the party of ND, several members of the far-right scene have found shelter within the party, the removal of Karatzaferis shaped a new dynamic, taking out far-right supporters from the margins and generating new avenues of influence in the political arena. That would come with the newly formed party of Popular Orthodox Rally, LA.O.S. (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) by Karatzaferis, a few months after his dismissal, on the 14th of September 2000, date of religious symbolism for Greek Orthodoxy (the Holy Cross Day). The electoral debut of LA.O.S. took place in the municipal elections of 2002, acquiring 13.6% of the vote. However, in the upcoming national election of 2004, the party failed to reach the margin of 3% (got only 2.2%), but in the European elections the same year managed to get 4.1% and elected Karatzaferis as an EMP. Since then, LA.O.S. succeeded in extending its mobilisation and, in the national elections of 2007, entered the Greek parliament for the first time by getting 3.8% of the popular vote. It’s worth mentioning that by 2007, LA.O.S. had already absorbed members and supporters of HF and FL and their leaders, M. Voridis and K. Plevris, accordingly. 2009 elections would be the most successful in the party’s history, gaining 7.14% in the European elections and 5.63% at 149

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a national level. Still, in the ensuing years, the party would fall in numbers and fail to assure any more seats in the elections that followed. LA.O.S. had a lot of similarities to the fellow European far-right parties, anti-establishment rhetoric, closed structure and strong leadership, populism, and anti-immigration narratives. Arguing against the “rotten” status quo that led to the “de-Hellenisation and enslavement of the nation” (LA.O.S., 2004), the party stood for the sovereignty of the people with reverence for the Greek nation, tradition, and identity. While supporting individual liberties, for LA.O.S., migration is at the centre of the party’s narrative, opposing not only illegal immigration but also calling for a ban on non-EU migrants. Additionally, anti-communism, constitutional reform, liberalism in socio-economic issues, strengthening of national security, law and order, Christianity, anti-Semitism, suspicion towards Western powers, patriotism, and ethnic-nationalism are strongly present in the party’s discourse. In order to explain the rise and support of LA.O.S., one should look at the political developments taking place since the early 90s. The issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) sparkled a rise in nationalist and xenophobic outbursts, with Greece being intransigent against the use of the word “Macedonia” by the new state, as it is an inseparable part of the Greek identity (Ellinas, 2010). The issue of “Macedonia” was mobilised by both main political parties, that of ND and PASOK through the years that followed, led to the creation of a splinter party from ND, that of Political Spring (Πολιτική Άνοιξη) (Georgiadou, 2008), continued to play a key role in negotiations in an international level, remained a top political concern and kept strong the nationalistic sentiment amongst the population. The “Macedonia” issue was constantly present throughout the years in the LA.O.S. narrative, and the party’s firm positions on the matter granted extra visibility to the media every time new negotiations were taking place. Moreover, the political and economic scandal of Koskotas that led to the clash of the PASOK government in the late 80s to the early 90s (so-called “dirty ‘89”) increased the discourse of corruption of the political elite (Ellinas, 2004). Despite the scandal, PASOK and ND continued to rule the political scene, giving the opportunity to LA.O.S. to strengthen the argument against the corrupted establishment, proposing itself as an alternative option. In the meantime, just in the early 2000s, another issue emerged over the religious affiliation on state identity cards (Lazaridis & Tsagkroni, 2016). The decision of the government of PASOK created a radicalisation of Greek politics, with many rallies taking place throughout the country, often organised by the church, and with the support of many conservative politicians, who questioned the indissoluble links between “Orthodoxy and the nation” (Prodromou, 2004, p. 70). In this environment, Karatzaferis found space to present himself as a “true defender” of Greek Orthodoxy (Ellinas, 2010, p. 156). They managed to distribute his reverberation of the issue by getting visibility through the mainstream media, something that was reflected in the first outburst of the electoral outcome of the municipal elections of 2002 (see above). LA.O.S. also benefited from the discussion around the Annan Plan, aiming to resolve the Cyprus dispute by proposing a reunification option, as while PASOK has clearly taken a stand in favour of the plan, at the time, the conservative party of ND avoided taking an official position on the issue, leaving space for LA.O.S. to represent the nationalist part as a defender of a “patriotic” no towards the UN proposal (Ellinas, 2010, pp. 159–160). Finally, as Georgiadou (2019) points out, this period is characterised by a margin of the two mainstream parties moving closer in the ideological scale to each other, something that created fertile ground for new political opportunities to emerge, as we see in the case of LA.O.S. In the elections of 2012, LA.O.S. failed to reach the threshold, gaining only 1.6% of the vote, leaving the party with no seats in the Greek parliament. As Lazaridis and Tsagkroni 150

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(2016) address, an explanation of the party’s low support can be explained by the decision of LA.O.S. to participate in the coalition government of Loukas Papademos in 2011, which supported the EU-IMF bailout package for Greece, developing from the economic crisis of 2008, creating a classifying image of LA.O.S. as part of “the establishment.” With the public opinion rising against the established parties, as to be blamed for the economic crisis the country was facing at the time (Ladi & Tsagkroni, 2019), and with the rising issue of migration, increasing support for Golden Dawn and the newly formed anti-establish party of Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) resulted to the volatility of former supporter of LA.O.S. to these two parties.

Walking towards social nationalism Even though GD was founded by Nikos Michaloliakos in 1983, the self-identified social nationalist party failed to attract any electoral support throughout the ‘90s and 00’s, despite increasing its efforts by participating in various nationalist party coalitions with closely ideological affiliated organisations, such as Patriotic Alliance (Πατριωτική Συμμαχία) (Dinas et al., 2016). Patriotic Alliance expressed a form of ethnic nationalism ideologically, with a strong belief in the Greek nation as defined by race, blood, language, religion and culture (Patriotic Alliance, 2004). In its discourse, the party included xenophobic and welfare chauvinistic narratives, along with anti-establishment sentiments and support for traditional and religious values. With numerous unsuccessful political alliances and initiatives, GB remained on the margin of the political scene in Greece, all until the municipal elections of 2010. Despite GD being examined under the far-right umbrella, the party is a sort of exemption due to the combination of its ideological ideas and parliamentary speech it adopts and the violent street activist practices it engages in going hand-in-hand (Georgiadou, 2019). When it comes to ideology, neo-nazism and neo-fascist ideas-along with racism, populism, nativism, anti-migration, and xenophobia-can be seen as the core characteristics of GD, lengthways with anti-establishment sentiments, with nationalism seen as the “absolute and genuine revolution” (GD, 2012), offering the idea of a “nationalist solution” that would bring bout “national rebirth” (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015). For years since its appearance, the party boycotted elections, considering participating as a form of treason, claiming the corrupted political system, and undermining the role and effectiveness of parliamentary democracy. As an alternative, the party saw violent activism and street activities as means of a revolutionary overthrow. In the municipal elections of 2010, the party gained 5.3% in the municipality of Athens and elected Michaloliakos as a representative in the city council. Only two years afterwards, the party gained 6.9% of the popular vote at a national level and elected MPs in the Greek parliament. What GD managed to do, is gather the dissatisfaction towards the incapability of the established parties to respond effectively to the ongoing economic crisis and, in addition to elements of far-right anti-migration discourse, turn the vote in its favour. More specifically, the party presented itself as a protector against the corrupted elite that enslaved the Greek nation under foreign interests. In a crisis-ridden state, since 2012, GD has tried to increase its network both in the field and online, making its presence strong to a broader audience through the form of “strongholds” throughout Greece by organising “philanthropic” initiatives in the form of welfare-focused community-based activities, e.g., food and blood donations (Verousi & Allen, 2021), especially in areas with strong presence of migrants the party organised for the Greek people, to prove their support and care unlike the rest of the political parties, that were also responsible for the uncontrolled migration all in line with the extreme anti-migration discourse of the party, which securitised migration as a threat to the Greek national and racial 151

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identity. As Fragoudaki (2013) highlights, it is interesting that in contrast to the rest of the far-right parties in Europe but also in Greece, GD has no clear policy against migration but its only base is narratives on evident biological racism in the name of the race and the blood of “Greeks” that needs to be protected from the “subhuman” migrants. The controversial decision of LA.O.S. to participate in the coalition government gave the opportunity to GD to coil the supporters of the far right. What LA.O.S. failed to do, GD managed to succeed: to not only appear as an alternative to the established elites and express a democratic parliamentary narrative but also to not disappoint its core supporters by softening its narrative and means of activism, remaining loyal to the party’s original tactics since the 1980s, proving the electoral relevance that an anti-democratic party can obtain (Georgiadou, 2019). And while several members of the party have been involved in criminal acts, such as assaults, homicides, attacks on migrants, and arson, it was only in 2013, and the assassination of anti-fascist Pavlos Fyssas, that the Greek High Court of Annulment (Άρειος Πάγος) indicted the leader, deputies, and members of GD based on Art. 187 of the Greek Penal Code, which penalises the formation and participation in a “criminal organisation.” With the judicial investigation ongoing at the time, GD’s support started to decrease. With several local branches closing down, the party still managed to get re-elected in the 2015 national elections, despite most of its leadership is in jail, and gained 6.3% of the vote share. In 2015, on the pick of the migration crisis, and despite its losses in the big centres of the mainland, the extremist anti-migration and anti-refugee rhetoric of GD assisted the party is holding its public support. However, the downfall of the party continued gradually through the years. In the 2019 elections, the party failed to make the threshold, with many of its members distancing themselves from it, and in 2020 the verdict of the trial’s verdict resulted in its leadership’s conviction. To sum up, GD’s success and popular appeal are part of Greece’s historical continuum of far right. The party highlighted a risk to consolidating democracy in the country. This neoNazism threat nurtured violent tactics reflecting on the core socio-economic and political issues manifested at the time in the country. The devaluation of the political establishment (frustration against the rulers, disarray), the economic crisis (that led to unemployment, poverty, social inequalities, delinquencies, rage), the migration crisis (an increase of sentiments of racism, xenophobia, othering) in combination with intolerance and the culture of violence (something that is strong in the Greek society indiscriminately the political ideology) contributed to the rise for GD that managed to transform availability to opportunity.

Crawling back to rebuild and reform With LA.O.S. and GD not present anymore in the political scene, new prospects for the farright scene occurred. In 2019 a more moderate, fourth wave in Mudde’s (2019) terminology, the far-right party, Greek Solution (Ελληνική Λύση or GftF), entered the parliament (3.7% of the vote), building its discourse on nativism, ethnic-nationalism and anti-migration like its predecessors. Founded in 2016 by Kyriakos Velopoulos, with a reputation for conspiracy theories and peddling “letters” allegedly written by Jesus (Verousi & Allen, 2021), GS presented itself as a “solution for Greece” while toning down the far-right rhetoric and condoning any sort of violence or grassroots activism. The party self-identify as nationalist, stood against the Prespes agreement concerning the name of North Macedonia, is in favour of a strong state in its xenophobic and racist discourse, stands against multi-culturalism with a strong Islamophobic narrative that poses a threat to the Christian values and the Greek nation, supports an alliance with Orthodox Russia, and speaks out against the political elites, and managed to address a binding and sturdy far-right audience in the society. 152

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The transformation of the Greek far right in a post-GD era led to the formation of new groups beyond GS. One of them is Greeks for the Fatherland (Έλληνες για την Πατρίδα, GftF), formed in 2020 by Elias Kasidiaris, a former spokesperson and MP of GD and at the time defendant in the ongoing trial. Kasidiaris resigned from GD after his proposal for re-organisation of GD was rejected by the leadership of Michaloliakos and moved to the formation of GftF by promoting a more democratic image and legitimate image, denouncing any elements associated with neo-Nazism. With the slogan “Greece belongs to Greeks,” GftF stood for “national preservation and the revival of Hellenism,” and in its ideology, nativism, anti-migration, the anti-establishment and robust state can be traced. With Kasidiaris serving a 13-year prison sentence after the condemnation verdict of the GD trial, it seems unlikely that the party would participate in the forthcoming elections of 2023. Other formations, amongst others, include National Popular Consciousness (Εθνική Λαϊκή Συνείδηση) and Patriotic Radical Union (Πατριωτική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση) both formed by former members of GD.

Conclusion Just after the re-establishment of a democratic regime and in a period of consolidating effort, the far-right stayed in the margins of the mainstream and drew little attention for decades. However, with the memories of the junta dictatorship fading, the constant efforts of renewal, both ideological and structural, since the 90s following the model of fellow far-right parties in Europe, and the opportunities due to political, national, economic, and migrant crises, there was a new catalyst for demand for far-right parties to emerge. In the midst of the crises and with economic, societal, and political grievances thriving, the far right in Greece, despite its inner conflict and variations (structural, ideological, and expressiveness), managed to gain and maintain a strong representation that led many of its representatives to be elected in national and European level. Far-right or populist parties Old parties

National Camp

LA.O.S., Greek Solution

National Political Union

Golden Dawn

New parties

Far-right extremist parties Figure 10.1  Classification of Greek far-right parties. Source: Adopted from Georgiadou (2013).

What one can observe in this genealogical approach to the Greek far right is the chronic status of marginalisation and incapability to renovate its political discourse. In this sense, the electoral successes of Greek far-right parties are determined not by the strategic improvement or the update of the supply side of the far right, but by the crisis of the mainstream political landscape, and mainly the conservative party (ND) or of the custom competitors in the far-right scene (e.g., LA.O.S.). In this sense, the far right seems to be unable to maintain an autonomously new electorate, but only to take advantage of the existing far-right parties’ crisis and manage to attract periodically new attention. Having said that, the chronic sequential presence in the country, the characteristics of the far-right parties and their societal and political impact proves that its rise and presence are not merely episodic but more in line with other European countries. 153

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Despite the pulverisation of the far right after the revelations in the GD trial, the mediocre success of GD, and even though part of the previous supporters of the far right moved back to the conservative party of ND, a gap remains open at the far right of the political spectrum, which does not rule out the emergence of other potential contenders. The continuous presence of the far right in the country’s political scene indicates that its ideology and discourse are still appealing to a part of the electorate, which continuously offers them a space of prominence (Figure 10.1). As a metaphor, the continuous presence can be seen as a sequence connecting the ancestral parties and their descendants in this “change of baton” format. Each particular element from each formation is collected by the next one and then enriched with additional ones to strengthen their position on the political scene, continuing the country’s far-right foretold story.

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11 THE GREEK-CYPRIOT FAR-RIGHT SPACE, ITS HISTORY, AND ELAM’S TRAJECTORY Giorgos Charalambous

Introduction Situated next to a burgeoning and growing literature on the Greek-Cypriot far right, this chapter’s main contribution is to map out the historical sequence of far right and extremist mobilisation in Cyprus, aiming at a systemic description of the political, ideational, communicational and organisational aspects of the National Popular Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo; henceforth ELAM). Utilising a variety of primary and secondary sources – electoral data, party material, research into the political context, relevant texts –, it seeks to situate the Greek-Cypriot case within the conceptual terrain of a number of relevant, comparative discussions in the scholarly literature. To locate ELAM with respect to the academic debate on the far right, the chapter proceeds in four separate sections, concerning political, ideational, communicational and organisational elements, respectively. Because of ethnic conflict and its respective (Turkish and Greek) nationalisms, the political environment in the Republic of Cyprus has been fertile for ethnoreligious and conformist sensibilities. So much so that every analysis of the contemporary far right must compare it to “before” and to “others” if it is to pinpoint temporal continuity or change at one level and spatial analogy at another. Political elements are shaped through electoral trajectories, the key questions for the literature being what explains success or failure and their variability amongst far-right parties (Brils et al., 2022; Golder et al., 2003). On one level, aggregate political opportunities on average open or close for this particular party family, yet they are also variable between countries at given periods in time (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). From the analytical angle of collective action that goes beyond party politics, it has to be acknowledged in addition, that identities, ideologies and mobilisation are not exhausted by parties but manifest also through individuals (e.g. intellectuals), groups (such as social movements) and other collective actors or institutions. This makes it important to speak of the far-right space, within the party system as well as outside of it, defined by xenophobia, nationalist sentiment, authoritarian law and order, and welfare chauvinism, which is ultimately anti-egalitarianism (Rydgren, 2018). The first section considers the Cypriot context of political opportunities for the far right historically and interprets ELAM’s rise in conjunction with the party’s strategy. Regarding ideational profiling, an established academic distinction is between a radical and an extreme far right. The former has come to be understood, above all, as “illiberal democratic,” populist and ultra-conservative, a modernised entity which seeks to be incorporated 156

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-15

The Greek-Cypriot far-right space

into mainstream politics. The latter is neo-fascist, more prone to biological rather than cultural racism, as well as mostly an anti-system actor. Accordingly, far-right extremism is distinct from far-right radicalism; both are to the right of the right, but their political profiles and ideological moulds can be differentiated (Golder, 2016). The far right’s process of evolution and more specifically its incorporation as a ‘normal actor’ in political systems involves not only party agency but that of other actors as well. Nationalism as an underlying legacy can be more pronounced in situations of ongoing or frozen ethnic conflict. On another level, discourse and the media’s role in the broader public sphere are emphasised by some authors as key in the mainstreaming the far right (e.g. Brown & Mondon, 2021), although some media cultures can be more complicit than others (Ellinas, 2010; Larsen, 2018). The second section again combines party strategy and system-level political opportunities to analytically pin down the nature and factors of ELAM’s mainstreamisation. Incorporating the far right into “the system,” is driven by forces that are internal and external to the party. Insofar communicational strategy is ever present in party politics, the discursive cultures and rhetorical strategies of the far right are animated by populism as the key pillar of that strategy (Mudde, 2007). Populism itself as a label can be a normalising factor for the far right, this explains why far-right leaders, like Marine Le Pen in France, accepted it as a label (see Mondon, 2013). Yet, populist politics on the far-right infuse nationalism while translating into an exclusive conception of the people, and various types of anti-elitism (Moffit & Tormey, 2014). As concerns party organisation, while all far-right parties have an authoritarian and leadership-driven organisation, in which internal party democracy is much lower than all other party families (Bolin et al., 2017), some of them exhibit mass-like organisational features, while others are “empty vessels” that are filled with their own peculiar form of organisation (van Kessel & Albertazzi, 2021). At the same time, in various European countries now established parties of the far-right emerged out of movements that preceded them (Caiani et al., 2012). For many, although certainly not all, far-right movements, the journey between the streets and institutional office, even government participation, has been marked by internal tensions and driven through resolving strategic dilemmas and making organisational choices (Akkerman & de Lange, 2012). Section four of the chapter foreshadows ELAM’s organisational DNA and places it between adaptation and fixicity, between movement and electoral machine.

Political conjunctures of the far-right space in Cyprus In a sense, the far right in Cyprus has been moulded into organisational shape through, because of, or in relation to, Greece; this is not only a contemporary but also a historical reality. Figure 11.1 schematises the Greek-Cypriot far right across time and organised social and political space. The first appearance of the far right in Cyprus came under British colonial rule, in the form of the National Radical Union of Cyprus (EREK), established in 1931, in the midst of intensified social upheaval. EREK’s ideological stigma was foremost nationalist and by consequence anti-colonial, whereby the party advocated enosis (union with Greece), disobedience to colonial laws, and the withdrawal of elected members from the Legislative Council (a Colonialist body with quasi-parliamentary functions), the only quasi-democratic decision-making body under Colonial rule). In the 1940s and 1950s, the groups that appeared revolved around the persona of Georgios Grivas, a Nazi collaborator during Greece’s World War II occupation. In the 1940s, there was intense class conflict and the first pillars of what later would become the party system were 157

Giorgos Charalambous

Figure 11.1  Lineage of the far right in Cyprus. Note: Author’s own schematisation. All acronyms are spelled out in the text.

fashioned through mobilisation in municipal elections (Protopapas, 2017). In this climate, organisation X marked the second instance of a fascist organisation in Cyprus. Its identity was that of ultra-nationalist frenzy, pro-royal and ultra-conservative positions that stigmatised communists, articulating politics through militarism and authoritarianism. Between 1955 and 1959, Grivas led the “EOKA struggle” against the British and in favour of enosis, which commands considerable financial, social and political capital until today (Ioannou, 2021). This was a crowd with multiple characteristics. Patriotism was the driving force behind many young EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) militants but not its extremists and frantically anti-communist leadership. In 1957 and 1958 came the first killings of communists and Turkish Cypriots. They were followed by the inter-communal violence of 1963–1964. Turkish Cypriots left the then newborn Republic and eventually, after the Turkish invasion, created their own state in the northern part of the island. Grivas also led EOKA B, a para-state, terrorist military structure, formed in 1971. Extremism amongst Greek-Cypriots was paralleled by Turkish Cypriot extremism; on both sides, the far right was established after independence, as a reactionary current to the emerging status quo. EOKA B operated in full opposition to the official apparatuses of the state that had been born in 1960 and was led by Archbishop Makarios. During the years 1972–1974, the organisation was involved in plotting the coup that followed and union with Greece. Its assassinations, attacks and persecutions affected hundreds of people. In 1996, New Horizons emerge, led by Nicos Koutsou, a former member of DISY and DRASIS-KES. This party’s break into parliament in 2001 came after the shift towards a proportional electoral system, with a new threshold, down to about 1.8 per cent (until 2016, when it was raised again). The profile of New Horizons fits perfectly the definition of the populist, radical right, its main agenda being nationalism and specifically the rejection of the UN-backed Annan Plan that was being negotiated at the time between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities (Pericleous, 2009). New Horizons later merged with the European Party (another splinter party from DISY due to the right’s divisions over the Annan Plan), which was the main force to the right of the right until the 2010s. 158

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The European Party was dissolved in 2016. Like New Horizons, this was a party with xenophobic positions, anti-immigrant discourse, emphasis on law and order, as well as, most importantly, a hard-line stance on the Cyprus conflict with anti-federalism as the lowest common (policy) denominator. In the 2010s, another staunchly nationalist but also distinctly populist party emerged out of DISY’s political elite – Solidarity was led by former DISY MP, Eleni Theocharous, also against a Bi-zonal Bi-communal Federation for Cyprus, who infamously declared that if necessary for enosis, she would self-immolate at the Syntagma Square (Kathimerini, 2016). In this strain of parties, combining anti-immigrant positions, nationalism, conservatism, law and order, as well as populism, various entities were created at the time of the crisis, while DISY has been losing votes (in real numbers since 2001 and in percentages since 2011; see also, Table 11.1 further down). The Movement of Hunters and People’s Breath, Patriotic Alliance and All to the Struggle, ran at the 2016 elections and this added to the competition on the farright space. In both 2016 and 2021, the space to DISY’s right included five electoral actors. Some of these formations also ran at the European elections of 2014 and 2019. Another such formation is EDIK (Nationalist, Democratic Party), an explicitly fascist group, which emerged out of ELAM, when Loukas Stavrou, the co-founding figure of ELAM (along with its current leader, Christos Christou) and active within extremist milieus since the 1960s, left the party. KEA (Movement of Greek Resistance), another formation with a similar profile to EDIK, was eventually absorbed by ELAM. As explicitly anti-democratic, pro-EOKA B formations, KEA and EAK (Nationalist Liberating Front) have mostly operated as vigilante groups, involved in violent attacks against progressives, immigrants and Turkish Cypriots and perpetuating ultranationalist propaganda. As in many other cases, a non-partisan milieu of the radical right surrounds supports or contests far-right parties (see Caiani et al., 2012). In Cyprus, initially, it was an uncivil society, as we saw with the para-military, anti-communist, and ultra-nationalist groups, which opposed the state. In 1968, Grivas founded DRASIS-KES (Action – National Salvation Movement), a student organisation of Greek Cypriot students operating in Greece and utilised to maintain and consolidate the position of enosis. The long-standing presence of DRASIS-KES attracts 7–8 per cent in Cypriot student elections in Greek universities. In addition, football has been thoroughly politicised in Cyprus, since the main teams emerged at a time of bi-polar conflict, whereby the establishment of three left-wing football clubs in the 1950s provoked the anti-communist right (Foinikarides, 2013). Anorthosis (whose long-time President was Kikis Konstantinou, an EOKA B leader), Apollon (a team in Limassol) and above all, APOEL (see also later) have traditionally been a breeding ground for extremists. Until today, football fans associations have constituted a key agent of hate speech, burning the Turkish flag, shouting “Turks you will die on Greek soil” during football matches, projecting the swastika and attacking cars with Turkish Cypriot registration plates (Katsourides et al., 2018, p. 12). At the presidential elections of 2013, the fans of APOEL and Anorthosis supported ELAM’s candidate. A far-right civil society includes newspapers and publishing groups (e.g. the controversial newspaper, Enosis, the newspaper Pontiki or Maxi), refugee groups (e.g. Adouloti Keyneia), motorcycling clubs, various ephemeral student organisations and several news and commentary websites. The Greek Cypriot orthodox Church has featured ultra-conservative leadership, which through its massive financial wealth and influence on the ethnicised educational system has entertained xenophobic, anti-Turkish, anti-homosexual, and anti-left positions. As Katsourides et al. (2018, p. 11) explain, “The church had always placed the notion of Hellenism at the heart of the Christian Orthodox faith in a manner that deprived it from its humanistic and universal values.” 159

Giorgos Charalambous Table 11.1  Electoral results of far-right parties at Greek-Cypriot parliamentary elections (1974–2021) Parliamentary elections

Far-right parties (total number)

Far-right electoral share (total)

Far-right votes (total)

Far right seats in parliament

DISY’s electoral share/votes

1976

DEK (in alliance with DISY) (1)

N/A

N/A

0

(with DEK)

1981

PAME (1)

2.8

8,115

0

31.9% 92,886

1986

–

–

–

–

33.56% 107,223

1991

–

0.55

1,887

0

35.81% 122,495

1996

New Horizons (1)

1.71

6,317

2 seats

34.47% 127,380

2001

New Horizons (1)

3

12,334

2 seats

34.71% 142,647

2006

Political Movement of Hunters, European Party, (2)

6.01

25,308

3

34% 139,732

2011

ELAM, European Party (2)

4.96

20125

2

34.8% 138,682

2016

ELAM, Solidarity, People’s Breath, Organisation of Justice Fighters, All to the struggle (5)

10.15

35,670

3

30.69% 107,825

2021

ELAM, Solidarity, People’s Breath, Patriotic Alliance, Citizens Alliance-Political Movement of Hunters (5)

13.75

49,143

4

27.77% 99,328

Source: Cyprus Ministry of Interior, Electoral Service.

ELAM originally appeared as an attempt by Golden Dawn to organise ultra-nationalist forces in Cyprus, in the aftermath of the Annan Plan referendum in 2004. If the Plan had passed, this would reunite the island on the constitutional basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal arrangement of power (the official and UN-supported basis of negotiations over the Cyprus conflict since the 1970s), but it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. ELAM’s beginning was inextricably connected to the national conflict line. In the mid-2000s, a Golden Dawn Branch franchise was established in Cyprus to oppose a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. By 160

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2008, ELAM submitted an application to become a party, called Golden Dawn Cyprus. This was rejected leading to its current name. Both ELAM’s very establishment and its initial successes happened during a heavily bi-polar political environment. In 2008, the first left-wing President in the Republic’s history was elected. This turned ELAM and other formations – Spitha (Spark), Emprosthofylakas (Front Guard), PAK (Patriotic Anti-Occupation Movement), the aforementioned KEA, and Movement for the Salvation of Cyprus – against the power newly gained by the left and any potential momentum for the Cyprus conflict’s resolution the left’s tenure might bring about. The presidency of Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL’s) leader, Dimitris Christofias did not however exhaust the far-right’s potential. ELAM’s entry into parliament came in 2016, with two (out of 56 seats). Its electoral success, unlike the Golden Dawn whose vote share shot up at the critical 2012 elections in Greece, has played out more gradually to date. Beginning electorally in the 2009 European elections, ELAM started with 663 votes and within seven years entered parliament with 13,041 votes, despite a previous increase in the electoral threshold from 1.8 to 3.6 per cent. At the 2019 European elections, the party attracted 23,000 votes. Its share remained roughly the same at the 2021 national legislative elections, but the nature of the election (that it is not “second-tier”) unquestionably signals further consolidation and the addition of another two seats to ELAM’s representation. A somewhat linear rise to prominence may suggest that political opportunities for the far right have not opened and closed in the short-term, but have remained open for more than a decade. The far-right pool amongst Greek Cypriots hovers around 10 per cent. This does not seem to change through the years. This is roughly how much the ideological influence of EOKA B and Grivas was (close to the percentage not voting for Makarios and abstaining at the first two elections of 1960 and 1970). Considering the far right does not begin and end in ELAM, then the most logical, longitudinal conclusion is that the far right has not grown, but has recently coalesced around a party with 4 parliamentary seats. This is what counts as unprecedented, the location of the far right within and between party actors, rather than its ideological composition. More concretely, both more fragmentation away from DISY and cohesiveness in mainly one actor to its right are the signs of evolution as concerns the Greek-Cypriot far right; with fragmentation increasing since the 1990s and the consolidation of a Nazi-born organistion as the main far-right party happening effectively in the 2010s. In support of our estimation of the Greek Cypriot far-right electoral pool, Table 11.1 further illuminates the timeline sketched previously, by providing the names and number of parties, to the right of DISY and their results between the 1970s and today. Currently, the far-right space counts its highest number of parties and votes hitherto. To the current roughly 7 per cent for ELAM (22,528 votes), one can add part of the electoral coalition of Solidarity (8,254) and People’s Breath (4,585), the Patriotic Coalition (376 votes), as well as parts of the unmoved DISY voters, EDEK and the Hunters’ Movement (its total being 11,711 voters). A fair estimation would thus be that the far-right electoral space, defined as the voters choosing a party to the right of the right, is close, at present, to 35,000 voters. This is an ideological melting pot of about a tenth of voters and is fluid and volatile (i.e. voters move towards and away from these parties). The European Social Survey data for Cyprus attest to this reality. In the self-identification question on the Left (1) – Right (10) axis, between 7 and 12 per cent ranked themselves on 8, 9, and 10 in the period 2002–2018 (authors’ analysis – ESS 2019). In the 2021 elections, the same movements towards ELAM show that there is a significant degree of fluidity on the Right, of which in the most recent election, ELAM won first and foremost. Based on relevant surveys, the largest movements of voters towards ELAM have been from DISY, Solidarity and other minor formations on the right (Public Issue, 2021). 161

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The far right has been changing because the right wing of the political spectrum is splitting in Cyprus. However, as before, it continues to exist in an environment conducive to its ideology, which includes political power for the church, an ethnocentric and often intolerant education, a dominant narrative on the Cyprus problem that stigmatises “compromise,” and the institutionalisation of EOKA’s legacy. In this environment, there has systematically been what Kallis (2013) calls “ideological porosity” between the mainstream and far right.

Ideology: From extreme to radical right? The problematic of adaptation, as it has distinctively unfolded in Cyprus, is what this section deals with. Overall, ELAM’s evolution into a prominent party has been through two phases, one preceding the other, but both continuing until today. The first signalled the mainstreamisation from forces nominally external to the party and the second adaptation by the party itself so to enhance its appeal to non-extremist milieus. ELAM’s emergence is distinct from all other far-right parties or platforms that preceded it, due to the organic connection with Golden Dawn, the more or less explicit mythology of dictatorship, ties to fascist thought and praxis (i.e. anti-democracy), and a culture of militaristic violence. As concerns other actors’ contribution to ELAM’s normalisation, the examples begin from the early 2010s, about the time of the Golden Dawn’s rise. This initially included a positive coverage of the party and invitations of the party leader to channels like Mega (associated with the Church) and Sigma (associated with the Right and a hard-core stance on the Cyprus conflict) (see Charalambous, 2014). For a Nazi branch, ELAM was generously projected into the public sphere and faced almost no difficulty from journalists as to its ideology. It appears that there may even be a financial connection between the far right in Cyprus and the Church. In a widely circulated video of Golden Dawn leader, Nicos Michaloliakos speaking to supporters at a restaurant, acknowledged “help” from the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Chrysostomos II. The Archibishop himself had declared in the mid-2010s that he liked ELAM and that he agreed with their positions (Katsourides, 2013, p. 572). In a provocative move, the leader of ELAM was invited to a TV station for a personal interview, on the day after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn and the uprising that broke out against it. The only party with a systematic opposition to ELAM has been the left-wing AKEL (and to a much lesser extent the centrist Ecologists and social democrats). While the right-wing, Anastasiades government (2013-ongoing) reached out to ELAM many times, and vice versa. One notable example is the passing of the bill proposed by ELAM to commemorate in schools the so-called 1950 referendum calling for union with Greece, a few months before critical, high-level negotiations in Krans Montana. In 2018, newly appointed Minister of Education, Costas Champiaouris had stated during a meeting at ELAM’s offices that the Ministry shares the same values with ELAM (reference). In 2020 and 2021, ELAM’s vote was crucial for passing the annual budget and electing the right-wing President of Parliament, respectively. In terms of immigration and the Cyprus conflict, the far right’s presence is always picked up by DISY – Anastasiades’ drift towards an authoritarian right resonates with global developments (Berberoglu, 2021) and has not been a mere coincidence to ELAM’s appeal. In December 2011, just about when ELAM emerged as a party, a decision was taken by the majority of political parties to block the financial allowances provided for asylum-seekers. In the same vein, Anastasiades, who won the February 2013 presidential elections as a common candidate of DISY and the Democratic Party (DIKO), proposed the termination of free medical access to Turkish Cypriots and immigrants who do not contribute to the Republic’s social insurance fund (Charalambous, 2014). An early government bill submitted to parliament concerned 162

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changing subsidies to asylum seekers and all those who were in Cyprus under a status of humanitarian protection, from financial checks to coupons (ibid.). This was at a time when ELAM was not inside parliament, but had gained agenda-setting momentum. Recently, the far right criticised a policy agenda already revised towards stricter immigration criteria, something that can be rationalised in the context of a fragmenting far-right space. ELAM’s own agency in this process of mainstreamisation can be instrumentalised by looking at its ideological profile and programmatic positions – if and how they transition from the hardcore far right to the softer variant. The party has distanced itself from its profile association and organic links with Golden Dawn, which, apart from its criminalisation, also experienced complete disorganisation. Indicative of the moderation of its extremism, ELAM now speaks of a unitary state rather than a “unified defence doctrine” with Greece as the precursor of enosis. Yet, both ELAM’s mainstreaming and its initial reinforcement by systemic bodies that we saw above, preceded its moderation-by-agency. Both the Golden Dawn and ELAM had emphasised on every opportunity the bonds between them, issuing common press statements, attending jointly events in Nicosia and Athens, and allegedly forming initial communication with similar parties in the rest of Europe, such the Forza Nuova in Italy and the NPD in Germany (Kapsalis, 2021). After the conviction of the Golden Dawn (in 2020), to which ELAM referred as “our jailed brothers” during the five-year trial, the party issued an announcement which is summed up by “ELAM is one thing, the Golden Dawn another” (ibid.). It was overnight that ELAM disavowed its “brothers” and the fact it was already in parliament and thus enjoyed state funding and thus organisational independence may have contributed to this. The press remained acquiescent to ELAM’s sudden denouncement – it was never clarified how the interruption of relations with Golden Dawn was achieved, through which actions and reactions, how GD responded or other related questions (Gettos, 2020). What this story reveals foremost is that welcoming ELAM into the party system happened at the same time as the party was projecting organic connections with the Greek neo-Nazis and was involved in a series of violent incidents. Once more, ELAM’s naturalisation preceded the process of mainstreaming itself, meaning the party became successful and was only then, moderately coopted. On many fronts, the party is walking on two lines, a hardcore political culture, serving as a background ideology and a more catch-all-like communication strategy of relative political correctness. This has been the case with the pandemic, not least, where the party officially denied organising anti-vaccination events and did not oppose vaccination, but its supporters participated in the wider anti-vax movement, a phasm of apolitique, religious fundamentalists, and nationalists, traditionally associated with the far right and often voicing conspiracy theories. Nationalism is the overarching characteristic that the party ascribes to itself. In the minds of ELAM members and leaders, Greek-Cypriot nationalism is maximalist, and its ideational backbone is the identification of Cyprus as “a Hellenic island under Turkish occupation” (Baider & Constantinou, 2017), engaged in a struggle against so-called “Turkification.” Unlike most other parties in Cyprus, ELAM speaks derogatorily, not only for Turks but also for Turkish Cypriots. The latter are “other”-ised as “foreigners,” hence ELAM putting in quotation marks the Cypriot part of the word – as in Turkish “Cypriot” (Katsourides, 2013, p. 581). Baiber and Constantinou (2017) found that many ELAM supporters identify as supporters of a “nationalistic” party not as part of the “extreme” or even “far right.” Nevertheless, anti-immigration, xenophobia, and racism are products of nativism; the core of the white supremacism (based on a story of racial hierarchies), which locates the ethnos through a racial articulation and is the main ideological feature of far-right extremism (Mudde, 2007). 163

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Beyond Turkish Cypriots, “foreigners” in the Cypriot far-right context predominantly include Muslims and African populations. As in the case of Golden Dawn or the Alternative for Germany, nationalism has a biological reasoning for ELAM’s leadership (see Ellinas, 2021, p. 38) while the issue of immigration has a dual use. One is the projection of xenophobia, targeting the foreigner as a cause for social problems, while the other is linking the immigration issue with what they see as a Turkish machination to alter the nationality of the “Greeks of Cyprus.” Hence, Turkey, according to ELAM, is pushing immigrants over the internal border; indeed this is a position found amongst MPs from both the right-wing DISY and the centrist, DIKO (Democratic Party). By embedding the denigrated minority into the geostrategic interests of the ethnic other ELAM more easily demonises migrants as beneficiaries of social welfare. Anti-immigrant discourse operates on two levels at once for ELAM. ELAM supporters’ discourse, sees “an amalgam between (illegal) migrants, foreigners, and Turkey” (Baider, 2017, p. 195), and appears to intermingle nationalism, nativism, and racism, rather than addressing them as distinct questions. Simultaneously, terms such as “fascism” and “racism” are reversed both by the party leadership (see: Souglis, 2021) and the party social milieu (Baiber & Constantinou, 2017, p. 438). This happens, for example through suggesting that “Racism is being a foreigner and illegal operating at the expense of the rights of citizens in the country where you are residing or is ‘hosting you’” (ibid.). Or through challenging the claim that their ideas are anachronistic, as suggested in one of ELAM leader’s speeches that subsequently became a party motto for various occasions: “You called us bums, fascists, racists, but we’re tomorrow and you are yesterday” (ELAM, 2017). ELAM also operates through a “pseudo-socialism” or an “artificial anti-capitalism” (Petsinis, 2019). Although, neither socialism nor capitalism are key signifiers within ELAM’s language, the party, like classical fascism and contemporary extreme far-right variants, seeks to communicate social sensitivity and popular influence, adding opposition to economic memoranda, divestment and cuts central to some of its economic positions. Obviously, this is an angle close to the “national socialism” of classical fascists, rather than to left-wing positioning per se, in its relational sense. In ELAM’s rhetoric, one cannot find references to social class, because this draws attention away from and contradicts the yarn of national renaissance and the significance of racial hierarchies (Paxton, 2006). Its main contradistinction about the economy has long between “the banks” or “the economic elite” and “the people.” All the while, ELAM has been calling for the reinforcement of agricultural areas, the vindication of those who were affected by the “bank deposits haircut” of 2013, emphasis on taming high prices, reducing unemployment and providing better technological infrastructure. Economybased narratives by ELAM have also claimed resistance to “German-led” European Union, which – in their eyes – seeks to devastate the economies of the South (see Ellinas, 2020, p. 437; for many examples, see also the party website). Amongst its social milieu, evil “Zionist forces” and Jewish links to “banks” (Baider & Constantinou, 2017, p. 438), constitute a parallel “other”-isation process, whereby the economic mixes with the racial to indicate as the people’s enemies both domestic and international “oligarchies.” Lastly, there is a strong element of opposition to corruption in ELAM’s interventions. The party calls for the “paradigmatic punishment of those who stole public money” and projects itself as different from the old parties, a new, novel “movement,” untarnished by “politics as usual” and long-standing corruption patronage practices. This connects with its social milieu. In terms of demographics, young voters (ages 18–24) are ELAM’s most populous cohort and in terms of vote criterion, protest voting the most important reason for choosing ELAM as voiced by survey respondents (Public Issue 2021). Clearly then, ELAM devises a political 164

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strategy on both axes of political competition in Cyprus – the economy and socio-cultural identity issues. Corruption can be understood as their inter-subjection. Under the discursive representation of newness and pureness, a political high ethics, both economic anti-elitism and anti-politics are drawn upon in ideas, positions or attitudes. This is not a single-issue farright party, and as one would expect from acknowledging that discourse expresses ideology, it is precisely in the mixture of statism (and its cleansing), and racial nationalism that ELAM’s communication strategy rests; this is the subject of the next section.

ELAM’s ethnopopulist rhetoric and representations Against the trend of labelling radical and extreme-right parties as primarily populist, Venizelos (2021, p. 13) is right to argue that populism must not overshadow the profoundly nationalist identity of ELAM, otherwise it ends up being a “euphemism” covering up ELAM’s nativist identity. Indeed, its racism and anti-democratic slogans, graffiti, symbols, discourse, style (black clothes and war metaphors), have been registered widely. But although one should refrain identifying this party as populist above all, populist politics are central to its communication strategies. This is so in terms of binaries (otherisation and generalised blame-shifting), horizontal and vertical out-groups (the Turks, the immigrants, the elites, the two main parties), the former much more intensely, a sense of national and social crisis (a form of identity decadence) and people-centrism (Charalambous & Christoforou, 2018). In fact, “the people” is not only signified as nation, but also in relation to work, or the corrupt political establishment, which can be nationally or internationally situated; elites, for ELAM are both foreign and domestic. They include enemies within (leftists, communists, anarchists, for example), without (e.g. Turkey, migrants, foreigners, Turkish-Cypriots, British colonialists, EU elites), religious enemies (e.g. Islamists, Muslims, atheists), and economic enemies (loansharks, banks) (ibid.). In effect, like with fascism vertical and horizontal axes of otherisation interact. Above all, both people-centrism and otherisation are instilled by nationalism and nativism, as the “people’s” enemies are primarily the enemies of the nation, race and culture, including chiefly Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. ELAM’s discursive structure primes the nation, which is in turn engendered in ‘Motherland, Religion, Family’, a key triptych of Hellenic-orthodox ideals. An ethnopopulism or nationalist populism with a nativist blueprint is voiced, “it operates through the whims of metaphor, where ‘people’ and ‘nation’ (and their associated narratives and institutional arrangements) come to operate as analogical extensions of one another” (Anastasiou, 2019, p. 330). Populism is mostly filtered through ELAM’s nationalist prism and racist reasoning, so that ‘the enemy of the people’ is above all horizontally defined. Immigrants and Turkish Cypriots have ‘invaded’ from the outside as foreigners, not from the top as elites. Nevertheless, both immigrants and Turkish Cypriots are also denigrated as racially and culturally inferior, thus a vertical out-groupism is paralleled by a horizontal one. Migrants are constructed as others in a similar fashion to the Turkish Cypriots; through the use of “verbs in the active voice,” such as they “alter,” “demand,” “receive,” “damage,” “cause problems,” “invade” or “multiply,” which seek to cast them as a ‘destructive’ or parasitic group (Christou & Ioannidou, 2014, pp. 129–130). Memory and the past serve a crucial role in the performativity of ELAM’s identity. The party’s interventions include propositions for state commemorations of “new” EOKA heroes and are always on the forefront of national memorials. The production of heroes and the sustenance of a discourse about heroism is a method through which “soldier-istic,” “heroic,” and “true leader” ideals are sustained as models of the past that need to be followed in the present (Efthymiou, 2019, p. 204). Thereby, nostalgia underlines its ethnic glorifications, advocating 165

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for a return to the purities, above all the ethnic purity, of a foregone era. Courage and a genetically brave soul are dominant motives in far-right discourse, and as in the language of heroes, are utilised to stigmatise fear of “the enemy” or of a war between a massive Turkey and the Greek Cypriots of a small island (Baider & Constantinou, 2017, p. 428). In this vein, ELAM’s action groups have been called ‘Warriors’ (machites), and (machitikotita) constitutes a frequent signifier in the self-communication of its identity. According to ELAM’s story given what Greek Cypriots lack in power they can replace in bravery and commitment, then it is worth fighting and thus a more maximalist stance opposite Turkey or the EU, even one bordering on war, can be legitimate. In such discourse, genetics and militarism become reason and objective, respectively.

Organisation: From violent movement to electoral machine? ELAM’s key organisation has been provided by Greek Cypriot former students, active in Golden Dawn and returning back to Cyprus to organise in the far-right space in the climate of the Annan Plan referendum’s reverberations and through connections with local Greek Cypriot neo-fascists. (Ellinas, 2020, pp. 103–104). ELAM’s interventions, in the late 2000s and early 2010s especially but also after on certain occasions, were those of evasive and vigilante actions, violent episodes at key events related to ethnic issues, booing and shouting at politicians, physically assaulting anti-fascists, immigrants and Turkish Cypriots and penetrating high schools (FXRV, 2020). Their actions have been feeding into the politics of the northern part of Cyprus, reinforcing the respective far-right forces there, damaging also the prospects of finalised partition between the two sides. In spite of street action, effort remains focused on electoral mobilisation, which began in 2009 and has been sustained at every type of election that has followed since then. The party always ran on its own rather than in a coalition. Articles by the party were only signed with initials in its early years, in photographs of ELAM’s leader and cadres their faces were concealed (Charalambous, 2015, p. 16). A violent repertoire of action was eclipsed after the mid-2010s. In its place, arose a growing party on the ground, a standard move for stabilising a partisan milieu. A major part of electoral success is capacity to mobilise. Like Vox in Spain or the Swiss farright SVP, beyond highly centralised decision-making around the national leadership, ELAM displays also elements of mass-party organisation. ELAM saw value in creating extensive organisational structures and building membership and adherents; both online and offline. Today, ELAM has offices in all districts and the capability for pre-electoral activities in both urban and rural areas. It has a strong publicity office that frequently issues press releases, a daily updated and rich in material website, and enjoys exposure through other nationalist online spaces and some civil society actors as outlined in the first section of the chapter. Its activities, like the established parties, feature voluntarism and charity work and the social politics of memorials and commemorations. Organisationally, ELAM exhibits a mode that takes seriously, extra-parliamentary mobilisation through organisations created by the party itself. These include its youth organisation, a women’s organisation, and during the crisis, a Solidarity Body, which mimicking Golden Dawn’s practices, offered charity to ethnic “Greeks only.” Although the party utilised – and still utilises – online spaces, this has not undermined on-the-ground work. Its banning from Facebook and Twitter has clearly not damaged the organisational capacity required to mobilise voters and present its messages to the public. ELAM’s mobilisation has covered schools, universities, football stadiums, nationalist clubs (ethnikofrona somateia), citizen protests, commemorations, and community-based forms of voluntarism during times of crisis (commonly, but not only as regards the breakout of forest 166

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fires in the past years). All these constitute the means for ELAM to present itself as forming a “closeness to the people,” self-branding as a protector of “threatened” communities. Because mobilisation has apparently focused across the main areas of the Republic of Cyprus, by region, ELAM shows today a relative geographical balance in its electoral strength, between 5.53 per cent in Kyrenia and 7.7 per cent in Famagusta (traditionally, an EOKA B stronghold), where it was last elected as third party. In the last parliamentary elections, the party’s candidates were elected in Famagusta, Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol; the latter two were added as ELAM MP districts between 2016 and 2021. Therefore, historically the far right has not only witnessed electoral success under ELAM but also a spreading out in terms of electoral support. Although the party’s profile has mainstreamised and this affected its mobilisation in society, in its internal organisation the authoritarian, neo-Nazi strain is strong. The only main changes are rather presentational and rhetorical: ‘section leader’ (tomearxis), a militarist term, has been replaced by ‘Head of District Committee’, where the members are selected through unknown, “intra-party procedures.” ELAM cadres address each other publically as fellow fighters (sinagonistes), which is also a discourse utilised by the Greek Cypriot left. For key positions, that of the leader, or parliamentary candidates, ELAM does not hold elections and its cadres are appointed by Christou, according with the prototype of the Nazi principle of Führerprinzip. In the programmatic statement found on ELAM’s old website, one could read: “Every struggle needs its leader. He is responsible for the cause and its realisation. For the Struggle to go forward, all who receive orders must execute them blindly …” (Trimis, 2016). It is the only Greek-Cypriot party without a statute on its website and no other known source for such a blueprint. Party organs are not summarised in any document either. As elsewhere, the centralisation of power within the party may not only offer organisational and operational advantages due to decision-making speed, unified action whereby the opposite of loyalty is not voice but exit, and electoral manoeuvring. It is also in line with ELAM’s innate fascist mythology and state centralist ideology (van Kessel & Albertazzi, 2021). From a marginal nucleus of Golden Dawn that fitted perfectly into Duverger’s (1954) identification of the ‘party-militia’, ELAM has evolved into a relatively extensive party organisation of the ‘branch type’, investing resources and time on the recruitment and socialisation of its members, which provide it with practical and electoral benefits. During the period between its establishment and recently, conventional party membership in ELAM has been combined with unconventional and often violent forms of activism. This goes hand in hand with a very limited internal party democracy. Whereas in most other parties leadership elections are generally held (ibid., 368), even if they have the character of a confirmatory vote, in ELAM there is no known instance of such a contest.

Conclusions The preceding analysis illustrates that ELAM’s rise is connected to a number of political opportunities raised in scholarly work on the rise of the far right: institutional allies in the form of the media and the main right-wing party (see Bale et al., 2012; Caiani et al., 2012); the instability of political elites and more generally the party system (see Koopmans, 2005); the post-2008 financial crisis (Funke et al., 2016); the legacy of an authoritarian past in the form of para-military groups in the 1960s and 1970s (see Minkenberg, 2010); and low trust and confidence in democratic institutions, whereby partisan identifications erode and voting becomes more volatile (see Lubbers et al., 2002). Most importantly, however, the Greek Cypriot far right appears, again and again upon the divide that new developments on the Cyprus conflict bring about. Hence, 167

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the agendas of far-right political formations (quite a few for the past 20 years), can also be understood, as Efthymiou (2019, p. 206) argues, as “a discursive response” against perceived or actual threats to the “nationalistic, masculinist and militaristic discourses.” The rise of ELAM occurred in the context of austerity and very low political legitimacy, and thus how it framed economic issues in relation to identity politics underlies its electoral acceleration. Recent political opportunities – that concern the economy (crisis and impoverishment), the political setting (as in the Left’s historical victory in 2008) and social changes (leading to voter dealignment and realignment) – have been crucial in the rise of ELAM. Yet the party is as much a product of the past as of the present, in the sense that historically what changes the most is not the diffuse force or nature of far right and conservative politics, or their porosity, or their entrenched political opportunities, but rather their arrangement as a collective force in the Greek Cypriot party system. As we saw, rearrangement had previously come with EOKA and DISY’s formation. Out of the most recent rearrangement that began gradually in the 1990s and peaked during the economic crisis, a fragmented far-right space has more recently been paralleled with pillarisation in the organisational body of ELAM. ELAM’s heritage is fascist and anti-communist and much of that remains intact, considering both ideology and organisation. To these, one can also add alt right and radical right populist elements, altogether constituting a hybrid identity that blurs the boundaries of the radical-extreme distinction. Its organisational strategy so far certainly compounds a systemically underlying fruitful ground for right-wing radicalism and extremism, but has equally certainly contributed to why it was ELAM and not others on the Greek Cypriot far right who have succeeded. ELAM has nevertheless, consolidated itself in a party system that is both polarised and fragmented. Therefore, it did not arrive to fill a completely vacant space, but rather had to compete. Being the official (that is, organised from the outside) franchise of Golden Dawn has apparently helped, or at least it did not hinder electoral progress. Currently ELAM has entered a new phase that is well known for its counterparts in the rest of Europe, which experienced success. Especially where bi-polar politics ensue and farright volatility continues, this phase requires an inherently difficult balancing act between its position opposite a right-wing executive or party that rarely commands a legislative majority without far-right support, and its ongoing self-profiling as an actor outside of the corrupt establishment, channelling the protest vote. Since its entry into parliament in 2016, ELAM has faced a right-wing government; given the results of the February 2023 elections this will continue. ELAM is still closely aligned with the current government on moral values, nationalism and undermining Cypriot reunification, and law and order issues.

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The Greek-Cypriot far-right space Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R., & Sitter, N. (2010). If you can’t Beat them, Join them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe. Political Studies, 58(3), 410–426. Berberoglu, B. (2021). The global rise of authoritarianism in the 21st century: Crisis of neoliberal globalistion and the nationalist response. Routledge. Bolin, N., Aylott, von dem Berge, B., & Poguntke, T. (2017). Patterns of intra-party democracy across the world. In S. E. Scarrow, P. D. Webb, & T. Poguntke (Eds.), Organizing political parties: Representation, participation, and power (pp. 158––184). Oxford University Press. Brils, T., Muis, J., & Gaidyte, T. (2022). Dissecting electoral support for the far right: A comparison between mature and post-communist European democracies. Government and Opposition, 57(1), 56–83. Brown, K., & Mondon, A. (2021). Populism, the media, and the mainstreaming of the far right: The Guardian’s coverage of populism as a case study. Politics, 41(3), 279–295. Caiani, M., della Porta, D., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Mobilizing on the extreme right: Germany, Italy, and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Charalambous, G. (2014) Ideologikes kai organotikes ekfansis tis kipriakis akrodexias [Ideological and organisational manifestations in the Cypriot far right, Chronos, 13, 14 May. Available online: http:// chronosmag.eu/index.php/index.php/g-lps-elg-g-fs-p-ex.html [deadlink] Charalambous, G. (2015). Ideological and organisational aspects of the Greek Cypriot far right. In G. Charalambous (Ed.), The European far right: Historical and contemporary perspectives (pp. 13– 21). Peace Research Institute Oslo – Cyprus Centre and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Charalambous, G., & Christoforou, P. (2018). Far-right extremism And populist rhetoric: Greece and Cyprus during an era of crisis. South European Society and Politics, 23(4), 451–477. Christou, M., & Ioannidou, E. (2014). Opening networks, sealing borders: Youth and racist discourse on the internet. In L. Herrera, & R. Sakr (Eds.), Wired citizenship: Youth learning and activism in the Middle East. Routledge. Efthymiou, S. A. (2019). Nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-conflict Cyprus. Springer. ELAM (2017) “Mas Eipate Alites, Fasistes, Ratsistes – But we are Tomorrow and you are Yesterday” (Video) [You called us Bums, Fascists, Racists – But we are Tomorrow and you are Yesterday]. 10 November 2017. Available online at: https://elamcy.com/mas-eipate-alites-fasistes-ratsistes-ma-eimasteto-avrio-kai-eisaste-to-chthes-vinteo/ [accessed 15 February 2022]. Ellinas, A. (2010). The media and the far right in Western Europe: Playing the nationalist card. Cambridge University Press. Ellinas, A. (2020). Organizing against democracy: the local organisational development of far right parties in Greece and Europe. Cambridge University Press. Foinikarides, D. (2013). Podosfairo: Athlima tou Laou i ton Kommatikon Elit? [Football: A sports of the people or of party elites?]. Power Publishing. Funke, M., Schularick, M. & Trebesch, C. (2016) Going to the extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870-2014. European Economic Review, 88, 227–260. FXRV 2020 (anonymous), Fasismos, Xenophovia, Ekmetallefsi, Ratsismos kai Via stin Kipro: Arthra kai Dokoumenta apo ti Periodo, 1993-2020, 7h ekdosi [Fascism, xenophobia, exploitation, racism and violence in Cyprus: Articles and documents from the period 1993–2020, 7th ed.]. Available online at: https://movementsarchive.org/doku.php?id=el:magazines:antifaarchive:no_7 Gettos, V. (2020). I poiniki dierevnisi tou ELAM se apla vimata kai me apla logia [The legal investigation of ELAM in simple steps and with simple words], Dialogos, 10 October. Available online at: https:// dialogos.com.cy/i-poiniki-diereynisi-toy-elam-se-apla-vimata-kai-me-apla-logia/ Golder, M. (2003). Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 36(4), 432–466. Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 19(1), 477–497. Ioannou (2021) The Normalisation of Cyprus’ Partition among Greek Cypriots. Springer. Kallis, AA. (2013) ). Far-right “contagion” or a failing “mainstream”? How dangerous ideas cross borders and blur boundaries. Democracy Kapsalis, N. (2021). ELAM: I “sovari” Chrisi Avgi tis Kiprou, Imerodromos, 19 July. Available online at: https://www.imerodromos.gr/elam-i-sovari-chrysi-aygi-stin-kypro/ Kathimerini. (2016). I Aftopirpolisi tis Theocharous egine Viral [Theocharous’s Self-immolation Became Viral], 29 January 2016. Available online at: https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/230356/? ctype=ar

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Giorgos Charalambous Katsourides, Y. (2013). Determinants of extreme right reappearance in Cyprus: The National Popular Front (ELAM), Golden Dawn’s Sister Party. South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 567–589. Katsourides, Y., Moudouros, N., & Evagorou, E. (2018). Historical legacies and political agency: Hate speech in contemporary Cyprus. Nations and Nationalism, 24(1), 148–170. Koopmans, R. (Ed.) ( 2005). Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press. Larsen, A. G. (2018). Newsworthy actors, illegitimate voices: Journalistic strategies in dealing with voices deemed anti-democratic and violent. Journalism, 22(1), 104–121. Lubbers, M. P., Scheepers, P., & Billiet, J. (2002). Individual and contextual characteristics of the Vlaams Blok Vote? Acta Politica, 35(4), 363–398. Minkenberg, M. (Ed.) ( 2010). Historical legacies and the radical right in post-cold war Central and Eastern Europe. Ibidem-Verlag. Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014) rethinking populism: politics, mediatisation and political style. Political Studies, 62(2), 381–397. Mondon, A. (2013). A populist hegemony? Mainstreaming the extreme right in France and Australia. Ashgate. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Paxton, R. O. (2006). I anatomia tou Fasismou [Anatomy of Fascism]. Kedros. Pericleous, C. (2009). The Cyprus referendum: A divided island and the challenge of the Annan plan. I. B. Tauris. Petsinis, V. (2019). The ‘New’ far right in Hungary: A political Psychologist’s perspective. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23(2), 272–287. Protopapas, V. (2017). Eklogiki Istoria tis Kiprou: Politeftes, Kommata kai Ekloges stin Agglokratia [Electoral history of Cyprus: Politicians, parties and elections under British Rule, 1878–1960]. Ekdoseis Themelio. Public Issue. (2021). Vouleftikes Ekloges Kyprou: I Aktinografia tis Psifou [Parliamentary elections in Cyprus: The radiography of the vote] Available online at: https://www.publicissue.gr/parl-ele-2021/ Rydgren, J. (2018). The radical right: An introduction. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right, Oxford Handbooks (2018; online edn., 5 February 2018). Oxford Academic. https:// doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.1 [accessed 28 September 2022]. Rydgren, J. (Ed.) (2018). The Oxford handbook of the radical right. Oxford Handbooks (online edn.). Oxford Academic. Souglis, D. (2021) Poioi einai oi Pragmatikoi Ratsistes [Who the real racists are]. Available online: https://elamcy.com/poioi-einai-oi-pragmatikoi-ratsistes/ Trimis, D. (2016) Apovasi stin Kipro [Landing in Cyprus]. Efimerida ton Syntakton, 22 May. Available online: https://www.efsyn.gr/stiles/ypografoyn/dimitris-trimis/69834_apobasi-stin-kypro van Kessel, S., & Albertazzi, D. (2021). Right-wing populist party organisation across Europe: The survival of the mass-party? Conclusion to the thematic issue. Politics and Governance, 9(4), 365–370. Venizelos, G. (2021). Populism or nationalism? The ‘Paradoxical’ non-emergence of populism in Cyprus. Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321721989157

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PART IV

Northern Europe

12 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN NORWAY SINCE THE 1990s Anders Ravik Jupskås and Tore Bjørgo

Introduction In the 1990s, the extreme right in Norway – as in many other countries – was characterised by racist youth cultures, street activism, which was often violent, and stigmatised anti-immigrant movements and neo-Nazi groups (Bjørgo, 1997; Fangen, 1999). This no longer seems to be the case. Contemporary forms of right-wing extremism have become increasingly associated with anti-Islamic movements and more organised forms of neo-Nazism but have also to a large extent moved from street to online activism. Moreover, during the last decade, Norway has witnessed two terrorist attacks carried out by so-called lone actors, including an extremely lethal attack against the youth wing of the Labour Party by Anders Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011, and the foiled attack against a Mosque by Philip Manshaus on 10 August 2019. In this chapter, we ask the following question: How has the extreme right in Norway evolved since the 1990s?1 By “extreme right” we mean actors who openly reject democracy and/or universal human rights, and who may consider violence against “enemies of the people” to be legitimate. More specifically, we assess the change and continuity of the extreme right scene in terms of (1) types of activists, (2) ideology and enemy images, (3) pattern of mobilisation, including elections, protest events and violence, and (4) transnational linkages. The study combines primary and secondary sources, including interviews with practitioners in the field; mapping of online activity; surveys amongst members of two key extreme right organisations; and systematic overviews of protest and violent events carried out by extreme right actors. In sum, we find that there have been some significant changes since the 1990s: the ageing of activists, the partial shift from offline to online activism, the emergence of Islam as the new enemy, and the burgeoning of transnational processes. These changes do have an impact on how liberal democracies should relate to such milieus, and what kinds of preventive measures might be relevant and effective. Before elaborating on these changes, the chapter defines key concepts and identifies the most important extreme right actors in Norway since the 1990s.

Identifying extreme right actors What do we mean by such concepts as right-wing extremism? In research on the so-called far right, it is widely accepted amongst scholars to make a distinction between the radical right and the extreme right (e.g., Mudde, 2007). They share some form of nativism or ethnic DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-17

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nationalism, intolerance towards diversity, as well as authoritarian policies (see also Rydgren, 2018). However, radical right actors operate within democratic boundaries, whereas extreme right actors openly reject democracy and universal human rights. Some, but clearly not all, extremists also consider violence against “enemies of the people” to be legitimate. Within the extreme right, we may distinguish three types of nationalists (Teitelbaum, 2017). In Norway, the racial nationalists, often referred to as neo-Nazis, were some of the most important actors in the 1990s. Groups like Zorn 88, Boot Boys, Viking, and Vigrid were traditional right-wing extremists, advocating the idea of a superior white race and legitimising violence against various “out-groups.” The short-lived party Norgespatriotene (Norway’s Patriots) probably also belong to this category due to the organisational ties to Vigrid and the criminal record of its founder. The more ideologically oriented groups promoted a new way of organising society based on national-socialist principles. Most of the activists within these groups, particularly in the skinhead movement in the 1990s but also in some of the online forums today, were young and not very ideologically motivated or skilled. For them, neo-Nazism was more about style and identity than about ideology and strategy. While most of the neo-Nazi groups from the 1990s no longer exist, this form of nationalism has been promoted by a new group, the Norwegian branch of Den nordiske motstandsbevegelsen (the Nordic Resistance Movement, DNM) and its recent splinter group Nordisk Styrke (Nordic Strength). The first attempt in 2003 failed but new leaders succeeded in starting a Norwegian branch from 2011 onwards (Bjørgo, 2018; Ravndal, 2020a). Another group of nationalists, the ethno-nationalists, put more emphasis on ethnicity rather than race, though they may very well promote racist policies. While being relatively marginal in the 1990s, only represented by unsuccessful, one-man (or two people) based parties like Stopp Innvandringen (Stop Immigration, which was later renamed White Alliance), Norsk Folkeparti (Norwegian People’s Party, NF) and Nasjonaldemokratene (National Democrats, ND), it has become increasingly influential in recent years with loose movements like the Identitarians, the semi-intellectual group Scandza Forum, websites like Ekte Nyheter (Real News) and Malmannen, as well as parties like Alliansen (the Alliance, not be confused with White Alliance). These groups tend to argue that different ethnicities are of equal value, but that they should be kept apart to preserve its uniqueness (often referred to as ethno-pluralism). Mixing different ethnicities, including processes of assimilation, are considered harmful. Contrary to some of the cultural nationalists (see below), particularly the anti-Islamic movement (Berntzen, 2020), the ethnic nationalists often attack liberal values; instead, they advocate traditional family values. While the ethnonationalists generally do not support violence, they are extremists in the sense that they attack core human rights, including freedom of religion. The third group of nationalists is cultural nationalists. They are often referred to as either anti-immigrant or anti-Islamic and include organisations like Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring (People’s Movement Against Migration, FMI) and Fedrelandspartiet (Fatherland’s party), which were active in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as more recent antiIslamic2 groups like Selvstendighetspartiet (Independence Party), Stopp islamiseringen av Norge (Stop Islamisation of Norway, SIAN), Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and PEGIDA. Except for SIAN, all these anti-Islamic groups have proved short-lived. The vigilante group Odins Soldater (Soldiers of Odin, and now its splinter group Sons of Odin) also belong to this category, though the group political platform was a bit unclear. The most influential cultural-nationalist organisation, however, is the party Demokratene (the Democrats). The party was founded in 2002 also by a former politician from the right-wing populist Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party, FrP) (see below), Vidar Kleppe, who had previously been the vice-chairman of FrP and well-known for his confrontational rhetoric on anti-immigration issues. Since 2021, the party 174

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has been led by Geir Ugland Jacobsen, who was expelled from the FrP when he, as the leader of the Oslo branch of the party, proclaimed that FrP should become even more nationalist by turning the party into a “patriotic lighthouse” and suggested that FrP-leader at the time, Siv Jensen, was not the obvious choice as the top candidate from Oslo. In its recent manifesto, the party proclaims that children born by asylum-seekers should not be considered Norwegian. Generally speaking, the cultural nationalists are not concerned with race or ethnicity but focus on cultural differences between (what they considered to be) Norwegians and other nonNorwegians (particularly immigrants from Muslim-dominated countries). The groups believe that immigrants can stay if they assimilate, although this does not mean that immigrants become “Norwegians.” Cultural nationalists also tend to support more progressive values (e.g., gender equality and gay rights), at least rhetorically, which they believe is under attack by the Muslim population. Despite being a useful typology, the boundaries between the different groups are not always clear-cut in practice. Some actors are rather loosely organised and consist of activists or factions that adhere to different forms of exclusionary nationalism. Some activists may also move back and forth between different groups and milieus. And there are links and cooperation between actors that do not promote the same type of nationalism. For example, several activists from the neo-Nazi group DNM have appeared as candidates for the Alliance, which, despite having an antisemitic leader, do not present itself as neither national-socialist nor revolutionary. In fact, recent developments suggest that even anti-Islamic groups like SIAN are increasingly collaborating with neo-Nazis. In this sense, there seems to be blurring boundaries between the different types of nationalisms. By focusing mainly on the extreme right, the chapter does not include parties like FrP and Konservativt (Conservative, previously The Christians) even if these actors advocate cultural nationalism. The former is generally considered a right-wing populist party (Jupskås, 2016a), which consists of at least four different political factions: nationalists, libertarians, Christianconservatives, and populists (Jupskås, 2016b). The party was founded as an anti-tax party in 1973 but adopted a more anti-immigration position in the 1980s. It became the largest right-wing party in parliament in the 2009 election. In 2013, the party entered government for the first time together with the Conservative party. The party contributed to less progressive taxation, increased economic liberalisation and spending on infrastructure (particularly roads), stricter immigration and integration policies, and more public spending of Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (also known as the Oil Fund). However, the Progress Party became increasingly dissatisfied with being in government after the two centrist parties (the Christian Democrats and the Liberal party) joined the coalition in 2018/2019. In 2020, the party therefore decided to leave office, becoming the first party ever to leave a government that would remain in office. Despite returning to the opposition, the party’s electoral support has continued to decline, receiving just above 10 per cent in recent local and national elections. The Conservative is seen as part of the New Christian Right characterised by “specifically religious variant of the conspiracy theory about a Muslim takeover” (Brekke, 2019, p. 12). This party has thus far been a marginal player in electoral politics but is now considering collaborating with the Democrats to gain more influence at the local level.

Type of activists One of the most striking developments in Norway and many other countries is that right-wing extremism is no longer a typical youth problem. Instead, such organisations and movements are now almost exclusively constituted by adults. During the 1990s and early 2000s there were 175

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some rather big extreme right youth subcultures and groups in Norway and other Western countries. These movements were mainly associated with the skinhead sub-culture (in Norway represented by groups like Boot Boys), as well as white power music bands and concerts, and neo-Nazi organisations that appealed to some marginalised and vulnerable youths (e.g., Vigrid). Most participants were recruited into these scenes as teenagers, the groups themselves fulfilling some basic social needs such as friendship, identity, protection, excitement, and group belonging (Bjørgo & Carlsson, 1999). In the skinhead movement in particular, violence and hatred against opponents, immigrants, and other marginalised groups had a value on its own. Their visual style was easily recognisable in the street, which frequently led to violent clashes with opponents, such as left-wing and anti-fascist militants. There are hardly any such extreme right or racist youth scenes left in Norway today, at least offline. In 2018, the main neo-Nazi organisation, DNM, had some 30–40 activists in Norway, a few hundred members in Sweden and less than hundred in Finland (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018). The members of this organisation were mostly men, usually rather marginalised (low levels of education and unemployment) and a significant number have a criminal record. A mapping by the National Broadcasting Company, NRK, suggested that more than half the most active members (17 out of 30) had been convicted for various felonies during the last decade (Hansen et al., 2017). In terms of age, they were typically between the age of 20 and 50, and at least in Norway, there were hardly any teenagers. Apparently, the group’s very strict rules and way of life does not seem to appeal to many young people. The National Socialist ideology appears outdated. The only exception is the party the Alliance, which has had some success in targeting teenagers, partly through the Discord channel of its youth wing (Klungtveit & Skybakmoen, 2021). Norwegian teenagers are also active in in very extreme transnational online subcultures on platforms like 4chan, Telegram, and gaming forums where it is not clear whether racist, antisemitic, misogynist, and violent memes and discourse are just shit-posting and transgressive humor – or are taken literally by some (Thorleifsson, 2022). For the other extreme right actors, the pattern is even clearer. The vigilante group like the Soldiers of Odin was mainly a community of men between 20 and 40, often with a criminal record, rather than a group appealing to teenagers. Other organisations against immigration and Islamisation, like SIAN, Pegida and Norwegian Defence League, the People’s Movement against Immigration and the Democrats, typically consist of adults and elderly and there are hardly any youths to be seen in these organisations. A survey amongst members of SIAN from 2020 suggest that members are mainly older men: More than half are more than 60 years old, and three quarters are more than 50 years old (Tranøy & Jupskås, 2020). As many as 85 per cent are males. Somewhat surprisingly, the survey also showed that these older men were far less socially marginalised compared the image of a typical extreme right activist, as well as the profile of streets activists in SIAN: only 25 per cent are single, over half have a university degree, their income is average, and a significant share of the members are, or have been, members of civil society organisations, including charity organisations (17 per cent), religious organisations (17 per cent), sports clubs (19 per cent), or trade unions (17 per cent). Another survey amongst delegates to party convention organised by the Democrats in 2009 show similar findings regarding age and gender, though these party activists seemed more marginalised compared to SIAN members.3 One reason for this shift away from right-wing extremism amongst youths is the absence of attractive social arenas that can pull youths into offline extreme-right or racist movements, and neither is there a White Power music scene, as there was during the 1990s. Moreover, Generation Identity, an ethno-nationalist movement that has succeeded in recruiting students and other resourceful youths in some European countries, has not yet been able to gain any 176

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significant foothold in Norway. However, this is probably the kind of far-right movement that might have a potential to recruit amongst Norwegian youths. Another reason might be that fear of foreigners – xenophobia – has gradually been reduced amongst the younger generations in Norway. Several attitudinal surveys have shown that xenophobia is mainly retained amongst the older generations. For example, a survey conducted by the The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies amongst the general population in 2017 shows that the share of respondents with antisemitic views increases from 2 per cent to 6 per cent when comparing the youngest (below 30 years old) and the oldest cohorts (60 years and older) (see Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 95). For anti-Islamic views the share increase from 11 per cent to 34 per cent. Young people today are growing up in a multicultural society, and they are accustomed to schoolmates and friends from different cultural, religious, and racial backgrounds, or younger generations have at least become better at hiding their intolerant views (Høy-Petersen, 2022). This is not the same with elderly people, where many are much more (openly) worried by “foreign” faces and cultures. The ageing of activists has major consequences for how to prevent right-wing extremism, and which agencies possess the relevant resources and measures to do so. When the target group for prevention back in the 1990s and early 2000s were mainly teenagers, there was a large prevention apparatus in the municipalities focusing on children and youths: The school system, for instance, had tasked teachers with monitoring pupils with various problems and pupils who dropped out of school. There were school nurses, youth workers, psychosocial teams for youths, child protection services, youth clubs, sports clubs, and other leisure activities. There was also a close collaboration between preventive police, schools, and social services to monitor at-risk youth or youth involved with drugs, gangs, violence, or extremism. All these services and preventive measures – core elements in the Scandinavian welfare state – are irrelevant when the target group is no longer teenagers but young adults or elderly people from 18 to 80. New approaches are necessary and other actors and agencies must get involved. The Correctional Service (prison service), the employment service and various social and health services are important actors in dealing with these adult militants, although the police and the security service will play a major role in preventing these adult activists from committing crimes and follow them up with more repressive measures if they do.

Ideology and enemy images The organised opposition to immigration that emerged during the late 1980s with the establishment of Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring (the People’s Movement against Immigration, FMI) and similar organisations were, to begin with, a rather marginal and stigmatised movement. The movement was characterised by an extremist, rude rhetoric which justified violence against their opponents, described as “national traitors” (e.g., Bjørgo, 1995). During the last 15 years the general opposition against immigration has moved towards a more specific fight against Islam and immigration by Muslims. In an analysis based on in-depth interviews of leaders of anti-Islamic groups, Fangen and Nilsen (2021) identify several common features of their worldviews. Firstly, the main problem is the influx of Muslims and the alleged growing influence of Islam, which again is linked to the idea of an ongoing Islamisation of the Norwegian (and Western) society and the “conspiracy theory that purports Muslim design for swift world domination” (Fangen & Nilsen, 2021, p. 286). Secondly, another part of the problem is that Muslims allegedly do not integrate or contribute to Norwegian society, but instead become an economic burden. Muslims are thus presented as “welfare tourists” and “fortune 177

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hunters.” Finally, Islam is portrayed as an inherently violent religion, for which there is no space in the West. However, in terms of finding a solution to the “problem,” the leaders of the anti-Islamic movement show different degrees of extremism. While all the anti-Islamic activists who were interviewed would like to send Muslims out of the country, only the leader of SIAN supports the idea of “forced deportation of those who refuse to distance themselves from Islam” (Fangen & Nilsen, 2021, p. 289). Although anti-Islamic views can be traced back many decades in Western societies, also in Norway, such views became more prevalent in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and a series of lethal terrorist attacks in Europe during the following years. The growing fear of militant Islamism and jihadi terrorism quickly turned into a general hostility towards against Islam and was no longer mainly associated with marginal groupings but made inroads into the political mainstream. While the Progress Party, as well as more extreme rightwing parties, has been consistently voicing its anti-Islamic views since the late 1980s, members of parliament from parties, including Senterpartiet (Center Party, Sp) and Arbeiderpartiet (Labour party, Ap), have also expressed very negative views of Islam in recent decades (McNeil-Wilson & Segers, 2022). Moreover, many citizens feel that conservative Islamist customs and dress codes have spread in ways that is challenging liberal Norwegian and European values and norms. A survey from 2017 shows that between 30 and 40 per cent of the Norwegian population thinks that Muslims do not fit into a modern western society, that Muslims are a threat to the Norwegian society and that Muslims would like to take over Europe (Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 57). Another significant development is that some of the leading anti-Islamic activists have a political background which is not from the far right but rather from the radical or liberal left, from anti-religious secularism and from the feminist movement (Berntzen, 2020). In contrast to the anti-immigration movement in the 1980s and 1990s, which often appeared as traditionalist male chauvinists, many opponents of Islam today present themselves as defenders of women’s liberation, gender equality and gay rights. For some of the anti-Islam activists, these are genuine liberal values, whereas others who voice these arguments appear more as opportunists in this regard. As a result, within the anti-Islamic movements, old-fashioned extremeright attitudes live side-by-side with liberal and secular values. The boundaries for what is acceptable to express publicly about Muslims and Islam has moved considerably during the previous 10–15 years. Much of what is said in the public, would not have been acceptable if one said “Jew” rather than “Muslim.” Leading Progress Party politicians have made statements about a “sneaky Islamisation of Norway” and that Labour party is “stabbing Norwegian culture in the back” (see Jupskås, 2016a, p. 177), which contributes to a normalisation of claims that their political opponents have deliberately facilitated an Islamic “invasion” of Europe. At the same time, some of the most controversial statements are not at all accepted across the political spectrum, particularly when expressed by members of government. In 2018, the current leader of the Progress Party, Sylvi Listhaug, was forced to resign as minister of justice after accusing the Labour party, the main target in the terrorist attack on 22 July 2011, of being more concerned with the rights of the terrorists than national security. A likely consequence of pointing out Islam as the new main enemy is that an increasing share of extreme-right violence and hate crime is now directed specifically against Muslims. Particularly women wearing hijab or niqab have become victims of hateful harassment and violence. Reports on hate crimes from the capital city, Oslo, mention several examples of serious harassment of Muslim women (e.g., Hansen, 2022). Moreover, the Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence (RTV) dataset show that there have been some severe violent attacks against 178

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Muslims in recent years (Ravndal et al., 2022). In 2015, a 40-year-old perpetrator was sentenced to 90 days in jail for a racially motivated assault towards a Muslim taxi driver during a taxi ride in the wake of the Paris terror attack. And in 2017, a Somali-Norwegian woman wearing a Hijab was strangled and stabbed by two men aged around 30–40. After yet another violent attack against a Mosque in Bærum in 2019, considered to be an act of terrorism inspired by the Christchurch killings (Thorleifsson, 2022), the government decided to develop a preventive strategy against discrimination of, and hatred towards, Muslims. Although most extreme right actors have become obsessed with Muslims and Islam, antisemitism has not yet disappeared completely. For example, although DNM “is concerned with challenges posed by growing Muslim populations in Europe, they always make sure to remind themselves and others that the real cause of this “Muslim invasion” is the Jews, who have deliberately masterminded it in order to weaken European peoples and nations for their own benefit” (Ravndal, 2020a, p. 16). The leader of the Alliance, Hans-Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen, also seems obsessed with “Jewish power” and the “fake Holocaust narrative” (Dagsavisen, December 18, 2018). The Norwegian government action plan against antisemitism in 2016, which was launched in 2016, is clearly still needed.

Patterns of mobilisation Electoral arena Facing competition from an electorally institutionalised right-wing populist party with an anti-immigration platform (i.e., the Progress Party), it is perhaps no surprise that the extreme right in Norway has never been particularly successful in the electoral arena (see Figure 12.1). The most successful extreme right party in the 1990s, the Stop Immigration/White Electoral Alliance, never received more 9,000 votes (0.3 per cent) and its support declined rapidly

Figure 12.1 Number of votes in local elections (every fourth year starting with 1991) and national elections (every fourth year starting with 1989) for the extreme right in Norway, 1989–2021.

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between 1989 and 1997. The three other extreme right parties at the time, the Fatherland’s party, Norwegian People’s Party and National Democrats, typically received between 500 and 2,500 votes. Since the millennium, most extreme right parties have continued to perform badly in elections. In 2009, Vigrid and the Norway’s Patriots received less than 200 votes and Independence Party did not get more than 573 votes in 2019. In recent years, the antisemitic the Alliance has been slightly more successful, though the party has not gained more than 3300 votes. The only extreme right party with some electoral support during the period is the Democrats. Between 2001 and 2015, the party received around 2,000 votes in national elections and 4,000 votes in local elections. More recently, the party seemed to have capitalised somewhat on FrP being part of the government. In 2017, the number of votes was doubled and in the 2019 local election, the party got more than 10,000 votes. The support was particularly strong in Kristiansand, one of the major cities in the south, with 13.5 per cent of the votes. In this city, the party presented itself as the populist alternative to the establishment, exploiting the growing dissatisfaction with local issues related to infrastructure and public spending on art. At the national level, the party also seemed to gain some support when FrP decided to expel one of its local leaders for being too radical. One opinion poll suggested that as many as 70,000 former FrP voters were considering voting for the Democrats (Nettavisen, 2021). In 2021-elections, the party received an all-time high of 1.2 per cent of the popular vote, becoming the biggest party outside of parliament.

Online activism While extreme right parties continue to receive relatively low levels of electoral support, a significant change during the last decades is that the arenas for extremist activism to a large extent – but not completely – have moved from physical meetings and street activism onto the Internet in the forms of web pages (e.g., Frihetskamp.net) (Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 2021), right-wing alternative media (e.g., Document.no, Resett and Rights.no) (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019), and various types of social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, Discord, Gab, etc.). For most extreme right groups in Norway, Facebook is the most important platform. Both the Democrats and the Alliance have a relatively large number of followers compared to their electoral support with 25,000 and 7,800, respectively. Extra-parliamentary organisations also have a significant number of followers on Facebook. SIAN increased the number of followers from only a hundred in 2015 to more than 5,000 in 2016 and about 28,000 in 2017 (see Figure 12.2). Of course, not all these followers are sympathisers based in Norway. However, the growth does indicate significant online presence. FMI had a similar development, though this group has not had more than just above 15,000 followers. Importantly, extreme right presence online is not exclusively related to organised groups. Some of the activity stems from groups and pages that have no psychical presence outside of social media. The collective action frame promoted by extreme right groups on social media is incomplete, as it mainly describes the alleged problem rather than presenting political solutions and justifications for action. In recent years, Islam and Muslims have been considered the main “problem,” but the so-called refugee crisis contributed to a shift from anti-Islamic views to exclusionary nationalism in which immigrants (rather than Muslims) occupied a more central position in the online discourse. The so-called refugee crisis also contributed to a general increase in number of followers (Haanshuus & Jupskås, 2017). While one in-depth analysis suggested that social media is mainly a one-way communication platform rather than tool 180

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Figure 12.2 Number of followers for three extreme right groups in Norway, 2015–2019. (FMI = People’s Movement Against Migration; SIAN  =  Stop Islamisation of Norway; DNM  =  The Nordic Resistance Movement)

than facilitate to-way communication and diffusion of ideas (Haanshuus & Jupskås, 2017), other analyses have shown that the social media activism by these groups and other online communities play a key role in the growth of so-called alternative (far right) media (Dahlback, 2021). Online activism also plays an important role in dissemination information about offline events, showing how the two forms of activism are reinforcing one another. The only major group in Norway without any presence on Facebook is DNM. This group prefers the Russian platform VK instead, where they had just above 500 members in June 2021. As a comparison, the Swedish group and the Russian group had 2,774 and 7,315 followers, respectively. The change towards more online activism has several consequences: the threshold for participating in discussions and exchange of opinions has become lower. It is also much easier to find people sharing your views on the Internet than in traditional social arenas. In discussion fora at Facebook or other social media you can get your radical views confirmed and reinforced through interaction with likeminded peers, often referred the echo-chamber effect, leading to a radicalisation of your own worldview. The threshold is lower for expressing extremist attitudes or making hateful or threatening statements. The increase in hate speech and threats against politicians that has been measured is several studies during the last few years is mainly reflecting an increase in such statements in social media. Such hate speech and threats may become so stressful and frightening that some top politicians have considered giving up their political positions and public engagement activities (Bjørgo et al., 2022; Jupskås, 2021). Another reason for the increase in extreme-right activism on the Internet is that the risk to participate in such activities is much lower in online activism than in offline activities. While online activists might be traced and exposed by investigative journalists or anti-racist campaigners, the is little risk for being physically attacked by militant anti-racists. Indeed, more broadly, when extremist activism is mainly taking place in the virtual space there are fewer opportunities for physical and violent clashes with political opponents, which might be one reason why far-right violence appears to be declining throughout most Western European countries (Ravndal, 2018). The experience from Norway during the 1990s and early 2000s was that such confrontations could have radicalising impact on both sides and cause a spiral 181

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of violence. In Norway, this form of violent conflict dynamics has been relatively absent during the last 15 years. Hate crime in the form of violence, harassment, and threats does still happen in the physical space but most of this aggression and hatred is now coming out as hate speech and harassment on social media. Because the threshold for making such hateful statements has been lowered, the volume of it has also increased.

Protest events Although a significant part of extreme right activism now takes place online, neither street activism nor violence has ended, and some groups have even re-invigorated their street-level activity. Preliminary findings from the Comparative Far-Right Protest (CFP) dataset-which covers a wide range of non-institutional forms of political activism including demonstrative (i.e., legal actions aiming to mobilise large numbers of people), confrontational (i.e., disrupt official policies or institutions, and are therefore usually illegal, and violent events (i.e., illegal actions implying some form of symbolic or physical violence against people or things)-shows increasing protest activity in Norwegian extreme right actors. While there were around 10 events per year between 2008 and 2014, the number of protest events increased to 30 in 2015, reaching all-time high in 2018 with 60 events in total (see Figure 12.3). The most common form of protest event is demonstrative events (155), followed by confrontational activism (59), and only a few violent episodes (13). Violence is typically carried by so-called lone actors, as will be discussed below. Amongst organised actors, DNM is the only group that explicitly claims that violence will be necessary to achieve their revolution, but they do not consider it strategically useful to make use of it at this stage (Bjørgo & Ravndal, 2020). Their rhetoric is very violent, though, carrying posters with pictures of politicians and others they claim are “traitors of the people” during their demonstrations, and putting up posters saying that traitors shall be hanged.

Figure 12.3 Number of protest events by extreme right actors, 2008–2020. See text for definitions of “extreme right” and “protest events”. Sources: Media archives and the actors’ own websites.

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The CFP data also shows that the protest arena, at least since the early 2000s, is characterised by organisational instability in which new actors emerge and disappear rather quickly (see Figure 12.3). Vigrid was the only active actor in first decade of the 2000s, Pegida dominated in 2015, the vigilante group Soldiers of Odin in 2016, DNM in 2017–2018, and to some extent 2019. One reason why levels of activism often decrease so rapidly, is that these groups experience internal conflicts. DNM, for example, suffered a split in 2019, where many core members and leaders, including the leader of the Norwegian branch, started a new organisation, Nordic Strength. The outcome was that both groups were clearly weakened after the split, and the activity and membership have declined. SIAN, which is the only group that has been active throughout the whole period, has increased their street presence since 2017 and is responsible for most of the protest events in 2020. The increase in 2015 is related to the so-called refugee crisis, while the decline in 2020 is related to the pandemic, which made street protest less attractive and, at times, even illegal. It important to keep in mind that electoral results and protest events cannot be directly compared given that the former is about individual support, whereas the latter concerns number of events (not the number of people being involved). In other words, protest activity might increase even if the number of activists who are involved remain stable (or even decline). It is quite challenging to be precise about the number of activists being involved in the protest events. However, the dataset does show that largest gatherings where Norwegian activists have been participating took place abroad. These events have been organised by groups like English Defence League (in London in 2011), Stop Islamisation of Europe (in Aarhus, Denmark, in 2012) and DNM (in different cities and towns in Sweden between 2016 and 2019). The largest demonstration in Norway was set up by Pegida in Oslo, the capital city, 2015 in which approximately 200 people showed up. Although the Norwegian branch of Pegida was more successful compared similar groups elsewhere because the group “was strongly related to pre-existing radical right activist communities” (see Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016, p. 568), subsequent demonstrations by Pegida had a much lower turnout and the movement quickly faded out. Another significant demonstration took place in Kristiansand in 2017 where 70 activists from the DNM marched through the main shopping street. However, as in other public demonstrations by DNM, most of the participants were from Sweden, showing the limited number of Norwegian activists. The most recent large-scale demonstration by the far right took place towards the end of 2018 when several of the actors, including SIAN and DNM, joined a demonstration outside the parliament against the United Nation’s Migration Pact. The demonstration was organised by a former leader of the Norwegian Defence League, and between 100 and 200 activists showed up. In the period after 2015, when protest events in Norway became more frequent, most of the events mobilised only a few activists. Almost all events between 2015 and 2017 – 50 of the 60 – had less than twenty activists. And those events with more activists usually took place in Sweden. Between 2018 and 2020, almost three quarter of the events gathered less than 20 activists. In other words, while extreme right actors have been more active in the streets, they are not necessarily capable of mobilising more activists.

Violence While organised extreme right groups rarely engage in violent activities (see above), Norway has continued to experience severe violent attacks motivated by right-wing extremism. The most severe attack by far took place on July 22, 2011, when a bomb was denoted in the government district of Oslo and massacre carried out at the youth camp of the Labour party on 183

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an island outside of Oslo (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016). Seventy-seven people were killed in total, 8 in the city centre and 69 at the youth camp. The perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, seemed particularly influenced by the so-called counter-jihad movement associated with websites like Gates of Vienna and groups like English Defence League (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014), though his “manifesto,” which was distributed via email a few hours before the attack, presented ideas associated with not only islamophobia and various conspiracy theories (e.g., Eurabia), but also traditional right-wing extremism as well as American paleo-conservativism, anti-feminism, and revolutionary theory (Ravndal, 2012). During the years after his conviction, Breivik identified himself as a National Socialist. In addition to the July 22 attacks, the Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence (RTV) dataset has documented 53 severe violent attacks by far-right extremists in Norway since 2000 (Ravndal et al., 2022). Of course, this is just a tip of the iceberg, but given that less severe forms of far-right violence are difficult to document in any systematic way, this data provides a useful starting point for pointing out some features of far-right violence in Norway. The dataset shows that, since 1990, 81 people have been killed (77 on July 22, 2011) and at least 322 have been severely injured (262 on July 22) in violent attacks motivated by far-right ideology. Almost all these far-right attacks have targeted ethnic minorities in general or the Muslim community in particular (e.g., the terrorist attack in Bærum in 2019). The July 22 attack is one the few exceptions, in addition to an attack against an antifascist activist in 2013. Most violence also seems to be spontaneous in which the victims are severely beaten, though there are several examples of pre-mediated attacks where at least a few of them involves the use of firearms. While target selection remains quite stable, there seems to be a significant decrease in violence since 1990s. Despite more systematic coverage of event since 2015, there are more violent attacks in the 1990s (26) compared to 2000s (11) and 2010s (16). There is also a clear decline in organised violence and rise of so-called lone actors. In the 1990s and early 2000s, most of the attacks were carried out by neo-Nazi groups like White Aryan Terror, Boot Boys and Vigrid, while recent attacks have been perpetrated by extremists who were not part of any organised milieu, though they may have been part of an online subculture (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014; Thorleifsson, 2022). Ravndal (2020b) summarises the evolution of far-right extremism in Norway as a transition from racist skindhead violence in 1980s and 1990s to counter-jihad inspired lone actors in 2000s and transitionally embedded terrorism in the 2010s. The killing of Benjamin Hermansen by members of the neo-Nazi group Boot Boys in 2001 largely put an end to the first phase, whereas July 22 marks the end of the second period. The attack by Philip Manshaus in Bærum in 2019, is an example of the current phase we are in, as it “drew its dynamics out of subcultural behaviours and affective structures at chan platforms” (Thorleifsson, 2022). One of the consequences of activism transferring from the street to the web and social media, and that violence is carried out by so-called lone actors rather than organised groups, is that most of the activism is no longer linked to a geographical location where there is an apparatus for prevention. That means that there is not necessarily any agency who feels responsible to intervene against hate speech or individuals who cross the line. Previously, the local police often knew the individuals who had extremist inclinations. In the present situation, such individuals and incidents might be detected by or reported to central units in the police or security service – or not. These units may – or may not – send the cases to the local police and ask them to intervene. In Norway, the National Criminal Investigation Service has for some years had a so-called Net Patrol, but until now, they have not had the capacity to actively monitor the web and social media. It has mainly functioned as an Internet portal – a virtual police station – where people can report incidents. Beginning in January 2019, the National Criminal Investigation Service has set up a new centre for digital policing, tasked with 184

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more actively patrolling the internet. The police do prosecute several cases of hate speech and threats made through social media, and there have been a few convictions during the last few years. Many cases are in the grey area of legality, though. The police have also developed another measure proven to be quite effective: giving warnings and using preventive dialogue to make people change their behaviour, as well as to assess whether there is a risk that the offender might actually do something more than making verbal threats. However, legal experts have put restrictions on the use of such preventive dialogue and warnings by the police because it may conflict with the freedom of speech, which is particularly protected when it comes to political statements. Hence, such methods can only be used in cases where the statement is very close to crossing the limit to law-breaking.

Transnational linkages Globalisation is not a new phenomenon when it comes to political extremism in general and right-wing extremism in particular. Militant ideologies and modes of action have spread from country to country and inspired new groups and generations, as evidenced by Italian fascism, German National Socialism, American racism, and fascist skinhead culture from England. However, previously, this travelling of extremist ideas, social movements and action forms happened rather slowly. It took almost a decade before the racist skinhead style gained a foothold amongst groups of youths in Norway, and more than a decade before it faded away. During the last 10–15 years the diffusion of radical and extremist movements has accelerated amazingly. Concepts, names, and action forms like Pegida, the English/Norwegian Defence League and the Soldiers of Odin took merely days or weeks from they emerged in Germany or Finland until an off-shoot was planted in Norway. Within a few months in 2016, Soldiers of Odin spread to more than 20 countries. However, these off-shoots had a rapid growth before they dried out and disappeared. Apparently, they did not find a fertile ground and failed to set down roots. In addition to social media (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016), the traditional news media played a major role in the launching of most of these new, imported groups. When the Norwegian Defence League, Pegida and the Soldiers of Odin staged their first events, there were often more journalists than activists or demonstrators present, giving the upstarts a lot of publicity to start with. The contrast to these rapid-growing but failed off-shoots was the Norwegian Resistance Movement, which was an off-shoot of the original Swedish Resistance Movement. The Swedish, Finnish, and Norwegian branches have all spent years building a disciplined, hierarchical organisation with a solid stem of activists, who, though small in number, are very dedicated. Hence, DNM has become one of few successful far right, militant organisations in contemporary Europe that mobilises transnationally (Ravndal, 2020a), although the group was significantly weakened after their split in 2019. If we look beyond specific extreme right groups, transnational linkages have become more pronounced also amongst individuals with extreme right views due to the growth in modern technology. As argued by Thorleifsson (2022, p. 300), social media and particularly online platforms such 4chan, 8chan, and Endchan have contributed to the emergence of “cyberfacism” characterised by the co-production of “memetic violence ‘apart together’ that in turn can inspire other self-directed terrorists in murderous quests for supremacy and fame.” These platforms play a crucial role in connecting individual far-right activists in Norway with likeminded elsewhere. And while most of the transnational interaction consists of trolling and transgressive language, it has also contributed to violent radicalisation. Most notably, in 2019, four young, male white supremacists were directly inspired by the Christchurch perpetrator 185

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to carry out deadly attacks not only in countries know to have a significant number of violent far-right extremists (the United States and Germany), but also in Norway.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have looked at the extent to which right-wing extremism in Norway has changed since the 1990s. One of the most striking developments is that right-wing extremism is no longer a typical youth problem, but that adults constitute the core of contemporary movements and organisations. A second notable change concerns the fact that Muslims and Islam have replaced the vaguer category of “immigrants” as the key enemy, although ultra-nationalist frames became more salient during the refugee crisis and ethnic minorities in general still constitute a common target of far-right violence. Moreover, for some groups, antisemitism, and associated conspiracy theories still play an important role in structuring the core ideology. A third significant change is that the arenas for extremist activism to a large extent – but not completely – have moved from physical meetings and street activism onto the Internet in the form of web pages, blogs, and various types of social media. While there has been an increase in protest activity in recent years, street-oriented groups have largely been unable to mobilise a significant number of activists. There has also been a general decline in number of violent attacks, even if the emergence of online radicalised lone actors has made right-wing violence more deadly. The fourth finding relates to impact of globalisation and transnational diffusion. While these processes are not a new phenomenon when it comes to right-wing extremism, including in Norway, our findings suggest that the diffusion of far-right extremist movements and ideas has remarkably accelerated in recent decades.

Notes 1 The chapter builds on Bjørgo (Ed.) (2018). Høyreekstremisme i Norge: Utviklingstrekk, konspirasjonsteorier og forebyggingsstrategier. Oslo: Politihøgskolen. Thanks to Christopher Fardan for many valuable comments to this chapter. 2 The term anti-Islamic is more frequently used than Islamophobic since “phobia”, strictly speaking, refers to a type of anxiety disorder (see Berntzen, 2020). 3 Unpublished survey data collected by Anders Ravik Jupskås.

References Berntzen, L. E. (2020). Liberal roots of far right activism: The anti-Islamic movement in the 21st century. Routledge. Berntzen, L. E., & Sandberg, S. (2014). The collective nature of lone wolf terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the anti-Islamic social movement. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(5), 759–779. Berntzen, L. E., & Weisskircher, M. (2016). Anti-Islamic PEGIDA beyond Germany: Explaining differences in mobilisation. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37(6), 556–573. Bjørgo, T. (Ed.) ( 2018). Høyreekstremisme i Norge: Utviklingstrekk, konspirasjonsteorier og forebyggingsstrategier. Politihøgskolen. Bjørgo, T. (1995). Extreme nationalism and violent discourses in Scandinavia: ‘The resistance’, ‘traitors’, and ‘foreign invaders’. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 182–220. Bjørgo, T. (1997). Racist and right-wing violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, perpetrators, and responses. Tano Aschehou. Bjørgo, T., & Carlsson, Y. (1999). Vold, rasisme og ungdomsgjenger: Forebygging og bekjempelse. Tano Aschehoug. Bjørgo, T., Thomassen, G., & Strype, J. (2022). Trakassering og trusler mot politikere: En spørreundersøkelse blant medlemmer av Stortinget, regjeringen og sentralstyrene i partiene og ungdomspartiene. PHS Forskning 2021:01. Politihøgskolen.

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The evolution of the extreme right in Norway Bjørgo, T. & Ravndal, J. A. (2020). Why the Nordic resistance movement restrains its use of violence. Perspectives on Terrorism, 14(6), 37–48. Brekke, T. (2019). Conspiracy theory about a leftist-Muslim plot against Christianity in Norway. Journal of Religion & Society, 21, 1–15. Dagsavisen (2018, December 18). Står bak verbale angrep mot jøder og «det falske Holocaust-narrativet». Available online: https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/2018/12/18/star-bak-verbale-angrepmot-joder-og-det-falske-holocaust-narrativet/ Dahlback, M. (2021). Her er ekkokammeret som gjør alternative medier til virale vinnere. Faktisk. no, June 17. Available online: https://www.faktisk.no/artikler/0q4rw/her-er-ekkokammeret-som-gjoralternative-medier-til-virale-vinnere. Faktisk. Fangen, K. (1999). Pride and power – A Sociological Interpretation of the Norwegian Radical Nationalist Underground Movement. [Dr. Polit. Thesis, University of Oslo, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, Oslo]. Fangen, K., & Nilsen, M. R. (2021). Variations within the Norwegian far right: From neo-Nazism to anti-Islamism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 26(3), 278–297. Figenschou, T. U., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2019). Media criticism from the far-right: Attacking from many angles. Journalism Practice, 13(8), 901–905. Haanshuus, B. P., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2021). Recontextualising the news: How antisemitic discourses are constructed in extreme far-right alternative media. Nordicom Review, 42(1), 37–50. Haanshuus, B. P., & Jupskås, A. R. (2017). Høyreklikk! En analyse av ytre høyre på sosiale medier i Norge. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 58(2), 145–165. Hansen, I. (2022) Anmeldt hatkriminalitet i Oslo politidistrikt 2021. Oslo: Oslo Politidistrikt. URL: https://www.politiet.no/globalassets/dokumenter/oslo/rapporter/anmeldt-hatkriminalitet-oslo/anmeldt-hatkriminalitet-i-oslo-politidistrikt-2021.pdf Hansen, S., Svendsen, C., Skille, ØB., & Døvik, O. (2017) Nå marsjerer de i gatene igjen. NRK, February 27 Hemmingby, C., & Bjørgo, T. (2016). The dynamics of a terrorist targeting process: Breivik and the 22 July attacks in Norway. Palgrave Pivot. Hoffmann, C., & Moe, V. (2017). Holdninger til jøder og muslimer i Norge 2017. Befolkningsundersøkelse og minoritetsstudie. Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynsminoriteter. Høy-Petersen, N. (2022) Cosmopolitan racists: A dual-process model of racial attitudes in Norway and how to measure them. [PhD thesis, University of Oslo]. Jupskås, A. R. (2016a). The taming of the shrew: How the Progress Party (almost) became part of the mainstream. In T. Akkerman, S. de Lange, & M. Rooduijn (Eds.), Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Into to the mainstream? (pp. 169–192). Routledge. Jupskås, A. R. (2016b). The Norwegian progress party: Between a business firm and a mass party. In R. Heinisch, & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Understanding populist party organization. The radical right in Western Europe (pp. 159–188). Palgrave Macmillan. Jupskås, A. R. (2021). Norske lokalpolitikeres erfaringer med trusler, hatytringer og plagsomme henvendelser: Noen resultater fra en spørreundersøkelse i november 2020. C-REX Research report No. 2/2021. Center for Research on Extremism. Klungtveit, H., & Skybakmoen, J. (2021) Slik kobler Alliansen tenåringer med nynazister i valgkampen. FilterNyheter, May 6. Available online: https://filternyheter.no/filter-avslorer-slik-kobleralliansen-tenaringer-med-nynazister-i-valgkampen/ McNeil-Willson, R. & Segers, I. B. (2022) Norway. In E. Bayrakli & F. Hafez (Eds.), European Islamophobia Report 2021 (pp. 445–466). Leopold Weiss Institute Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. Nettavisen (2021, February 17) Ble kastet ut av Frp – nå er de et mareritt for Siv Jensen: – De er redd oss. Available online: https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/ble-kastet-ut-av-frp-na-er-de-et-mareritt-forsiv-jensen-de-er-redd-oss/s/12-95-3424089900 Ravndal, J. A. (2012). A pre-trial profile of Anders Behring Breivik. CTC Sentinel, 5(3), 6–10. Ravndal, J. A. (2018). Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarisation. European Journal of Political Research, 57(4), 845–866. Ravndal, J. A. (2020a). The emergence of transnational Street militancy: A comparative case study of the Nordic resistance movement and generation identity. Journal for Deradicalization, 25, 1–34. Ravndal, J. A. (2020b). Fra landssvik til «trollterror» – utviklingen i det norske høyreekstreme trusselbildet fra 1945 til 2019. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 37(4), 355–368.

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13 THE FAR RIGHT IN SWEDEN Anders Widfeldt

From blank spot to hotbed The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the far right scene in Sweden, as it stands in the early 2020s. Significant attention will be paid to the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD), which has grown into one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe, but smaller and more extreme groups and parties will also be considered. The presentation will follow Mudde’s (2019) definition of the far right, which can be divided into two main subcategories. The first is the radical right, which works within the scope of parliamentary democracy although it may not always fully embrace liberal democracy. To a significant extent, the radical right consists of political parties, which Mudde refers to as Populist Radical Right (PRR), a term and acronym that will be employed here. The other far right subcategory is the extreme right, which according to Mudde (2019, p. 7) does not accept “the essence of democracy.” The extreme right consists of a wide range of parties, groups and individuals, which sometimes participate in elections but also use extraparliamentary methods. The distinction between radical and extreme right can be difficult to make in practice. Especially the latter category is quite diverse, and its position on democracy is not always clear-cut or explicitly stated. Still, although Mudde’s typology may have its problems as an exact classification tool, it is a suitable point of reference. A key development in Sweden has been the growth of SD from a small extremist party into a major electoral force. This was manifested in the election of September 2022, when SD received 20.5 per cent of the vote and overtook the conservative Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet, M) as the country’s second biggest party. In the process, SD has also become increasingly legitimate and potentially influential although it has not yet become fully accepted by any other party as a potential government coalition partner. The growth of SD still represents a major transition in the Swedish party system. Before 2010, when SD first entered parliament, Sweden was regarded as a blank spot on the European map of PRR parties. This radical right “immunity” was only temporarily affected by the interlude of New Democracy (Ny Demokrati, NyD) in the 1990s. At the same time there was, and remains, a diverse extreme right scene with a range of neo-Nazi, racist and hardline antiimmigration groups. One such group, Keep Sweden Swedish (Bevara Sverige Svenskt, BSS) played a part in the formation of SD in 1988. The overall strength of the Swedish extreme DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-18

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right is difficult to assess with any exactness, but it has had a permanent presence since, at least, the 1980s. The aim of the following account is in part descriptive, but an attempt will also be made to relate the growth of SD to developments in the extreme right scene. Any such connections would be vehemently denied by SD, but as will be shown there are links. The remainder of this chapter will first look at the contextual setting, with levels of, and public opinion about, immigration. This is followed by an account of the two main PRR parties, SD and NyD. The subsequent section deals with the extreme right scene, followed by a conclusion.

The context – Migration and public opinion That Sweden has had high levels of immigration is a well-known fact, often noted internationally. Asylum immigration began to increase in the 1970s, initially from Latin America but relatively soon other countries became dominant sources, driven by conflicts such as the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the Balkan disintegration in the 1990s. Even though descriptions of Swedish migration policy as ‘open door’ were never completely accurate, asylum immigration was high, relative to the own population as well as in comparison with other countries. Between 1980 and 2020 a total of 675,307 asylum applications were approved, to which could be added another 249,804 asylum-related family reunifications. The year-by-year trend between 1980 and 2020 is reported in Figure 13.1. It should be noted that, even though the majority of asylum applications were approved, there were also rejections. Between 2000 and 2020, when 590,000 asylum applications and family reunifications were accepted, the total number of asylum applications was 768,000 (Swedish Migration Authority, 2022b). Unsuccessful asylum seekers stayed in the country while their applications were being handled, a process that could take several years. To this could be added labour immigration, which was limited between the 1970s and the 1990s but

Figure 13.1 Number of granted asylum applications and asylum-related family reunifications in Sweden, by year, 1989–2020. Absolute numbers. Source: Based on Swedish Migration Authority (2022a).

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increased in the 2000s. In line with most other European countries Swedish asylum policy was significantly tightened in the wake of the 2015 migration crisis, but the overall impression of Sweden as a high-immigration country remains unequivocal. Between 1980 and 2020 a total of 2.6 million residence permits were given, all categories included (Swedish Migration Authority, 2022a). This in a country whose population was 8.3 million in 1980, and 10.3 million in 2020 (SCB, 2022). Against this background the recent successes of the Sweden Democrats may not be surprising. What surprises more is that it took so long for a PRR party to establish a permanent foothold. Public opinion about immigration has varied considerably, depending on the data and indicators used. According to the European Social Survey, the Swedish public is at least as positive to immigration as other European countries (Widfeldt, 2015a), but much also suggests that there has consistently been enough opposition to sustain a significant immigrationcritical party. As shown by Demker (2021), there has been a consistent plurality holding negative views about refugee immigration throughout the 1990–2020 period. The differences between the proportions answering that the proposal to accept fewer refugees is a good one, compared to those thinking it is a bad proposal, have often been considerable. In 2020 it was 39 percentage points (58 per cent thinking the proposal to accepted fewer refugees is good, compared to 19 per cent answering that it is a bad proposal). At the same time, however, the saliency of immigration has varied. Between 1987 and 2014, between 7 and 27 per cent of respondents in the national SOM survey included immigration or integration in their responses to an open-ended question about the three most important issues or problems. For most years during that period the proportions varied between 10 and 20 per cent, as seen in Figure 13.2. This was well behind issues such as jobs, health care, education and the environment. In 2014 the proportion increased to 27 per cent, at the time the highest ever, but in 2015 it rose to 53 per cent, making it the most prioritised issue of all. This was followed by a gradual decline, to 38 per cent in 2018 and 2019, but it was still the most salient issue in 2016, 2017 and 2019.

Figure 13.2 Proportions mentioning immigration and/or integration as one of the three most important issues in Sweden, 1987–2019. Percentages of all respondents. Source: Based on Martinsson and Andersson (2020, p. 40).

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However brief, this background sketch suggests very strongly that there has been fertile ground for a significant PRR party in Sweden for a considerable number of years. Immigration has been high, for periods dominated by asylum seekers. Public opinion can be measured in different ways, but the data reported by Demker, cited above, do not support any notion of Sweden as a universally welcoming country. The saliency of immigration has varied, but for long periods between one in ten and one in five survey respondents mentioned the issue as an important societal problem. Since 2015 it has been one of the most prioritised issues. There is, in other words, more than enough demand to sustain a significant PRR party. The next section will look at the supply of such parties.

Populist Radical Right parties in Sweden – New Democracy and the Sweden Democrats As already noted, PRR parties broke through relatively late in Sweden. In Norway and Denmark the entry of populism into the party system is usually given as the so-called “landslide elections” of 1973 (Widfeldt, 2015a). To this could be added the 1970 breakthrough of the Finnish Rural Party, which at the time was regarded as populist but not as PRR (Sänkiaho, 1971). In Sweden the rise of populism began comparatively modestly, in subnational politics. A number of local anti-establishment parties, especially in southern parts of the country, began to emerge in the 1970s. Key mobilising issues included protest against taxes and red tape. There was criticism against the welfare system, which was viewed as too generous, and alcohol policy, which was regarded as too restrictive. There were also elements of regional separatism, whose significance has diminished. Immigration entered the agenda circa 1984–1985 (Lindström, 2003/04). This was at the same time as migration became a prioritised issue for the Danish Progress Party, and 1–2 years before the Norwegian Progress Party followed suit (Widfeldt, 2015a). In 1988 a local referendum was held about whether to accept the placement of asylum seekers in the southern council of Sjöbo. The initiators were dissidents in the Centre party (Centerpartiet, C), and the result was a clear majority against the accommodation of migrants. The Sjöbo vote received national attention, and became something of a catalyst for the Swedish immigration debate. Three years after the Sjöbo asylum vote New Democracy entered the scene. The background and brief lifespan of the party is covered elsewhere (e.g. Rydgren, 2006; Widfeldt, 2015a), but a few observations are in order. The initiative came from Ian Wachtmeister, an industrialist and pro-business campaigner, and Bert Karlsson, a multiple entrepreneur and key player in the light music industry. Wachtmeister soon emerged as the de facto and de jure leader, but the public tended to regard NyD as having dual leadership. Their political style was characterised by drastic anti-establishment attacks, delivered with humour that at times verged on buffoonery. Ideologically NyD resembled Kitschelt and McGann’s (1997) radical right “winning formula” of neo-liberal economics, nativism and authoritarianism. The electoral impact of New Democracy should not be overstated. In the 1991 election it got 6.7 per cent of the vote, and 22 seats in the 349-strong parliament. It was nevertheless a notable achievement for a party that had only existed for a few months. NyD held the balance of power between the two main political blocs throughout its only period in parliament, but failed to translate its potential bargaining power into policy influence. The government between 1991 and 1994, a centre-right four-party minority coalition led by M, could usually count on support from NyD in decisive votes. Gradually, however, internal divisions grew in NyD. A rift developed between the founders Wachtmeister and Karlsson, and Wachtmeister had an authoritarian leadership style which fuelled internal dissent. When he announced his 192

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resignation as party leader in February 1994, the party descended into chaos. It was wiped out in the election held in September that year, and folded in the early 2000s. The demise of NyD had several reasons. Rydgren (2006) has pointed out that the party was disadvantaged by an economic downturn from 1992 onwards, which meant that economic issues became more salient at the expense of immigration. At least as important, however, was the lack of personal and organisational stability in NyD. The party was above the four per cent representational threshold in the polls when Wachtmeister announced his resignation. Thus, although counter-factual statements should always be made with care, it cannot be ruled out that NyD could have survived with a more stable and durable leadership. It is sometimes forgotten that the Sweden Democrats had existed for three years when NyD appeared in 1991. SD is generally regarded as having been formed in the winter of 1988 although the exact date, location and participants of any inaugural meeting(s) are unclear. The background was that a predecessor party called the Sweden Party (Sverigepartiet, SvP) had been formed in late 1986. SvP, in turn, had been formed as a merger between the abovementioned BSS, and the populist Progress Party (Framstegspartiet, FP; the party had actually taken this name before its Danish and Norwegian namesakes). SvP received some national media attention in the first half of 1987, but soon succumbed to internal divisions and split into several rival factions. It appears that one of these factions, with roots in BSS, played a part in the formation of SD (for more on the background and foundation of SD, see Gustafsson, 2022; Widfeldt, 2015a, p. 180f). The indirect link to BSS is still sometimes given as a reason why SD is regarded by some as illegitimate (e.g. Lööf, 2021). In addition the party had other alleged links to fascism and Nazism. The first “proper” SD leader, Anders Klarström, had previously been involved with the openly Nazi Nordiska Rikspartiet, and has convictions for theft, vandalism and illegal threats (Ekman & Poohl, 2010, p. 78f).1 There were also others in the party with extremist links, contemporaneous as well as historical. According to Rydgren (2006, p. 108) SD “has its roots in Swedish fascism,” and there were “distinct overlaps” with Nazi and fascist groups during the early years of the party. It is still questionable whether SD could be labelled as fascist or Nazi, even during its earliest years, but it goes without saying that the party has a problematical background. In response, SD has hired a researcher whose remit is to write a “White Book” about the party’s origins and history. A first part of the “White Book,” published in July 2022, concludes that “a considerable part of the founding generation had its background in nazi, racist or undemocratic contexts” (Gustafsson, 2022, quote from page 60, translation by author). It is not too much of an exaggeration that SD has spent a large part of its time since the mid-1990s to tidy up its image. Mikael Jansson, who replaced Klarström as leader in 1995, openly denounced Nazism and banned the use of extremist clothing and insignia from SD meetings. In 1999 some of the party’s more radical policies were omitted from the party manifesto. Examples of the dropped proposals include a ban on the adoption of non-European children, and mandatory repatriation of all non-European migrants who had arrived after 1970. Problematical members were expelled, and from the mid-1990s onwards there was a notable reduction in the proportion of SD office holders with criminal records (Widfeldt, 2015a, p. 182). This cleansing process was further intensified under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson, who succeeded Jansson in 2005. The rewards came slowly at first, but as can be seen in Table 13.1 below, support for the party has grown exponentially since 2010. The reasons for this transformation are complex, but to speak with Ivarsflaten (2006), SD has overcome its lack of a reputational shield by making internal changes. From circa 2006 onwards the party began to provide a supply that met the demand which, as shown in the previous section, had been there for some time before SD’s eventual breakthrough. 193

Anders Widfeldt Table 13.1 Performances of Swedish Populist Radical Right parties in parliamentary elections, 1988–2022. Year

Sweden Democrats

New Democracy

1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 2.9 5.7 (20) 12.9 (49) 17.5 (62) 20.5 (73)

n/a 6.7 (26) 1.2 0.2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Note: Entries indicate percentages of valid votes cast. Numbers in brackets indicate seats (out of 349).

By the early 2020s SD had established itself as a significant component of the Swedish party system. In the 2022 election SD climbed above the 20 per cent level and emerged as the second biggest party, a position held by M since 1979. This quite exceptional growth in support has happened despite a series of scandals and ill-judged statements involving SD representatives. In 2021 an SD member of the European parliament was convicted of sexually molesting of female party colleague (Baas, 2021), and earlier in same year it was alleged that an employee at the SD parliamentary party office had connections with the organisation The Free Sweden (Det Fria Sverige, DFS) which is regarded as part of the write power scene (Dalsbro et al., 2021, see further below). There have also been news reports of problematical statements and social media postings of SD representatives in local politics (see, e.g. Rogsten, 2021), and alleged links to organised crime (Acta Publica, 2022). Irresponsible statements, links and behaviour are obviously not condoned by SD, and perpetrators are often expelled. The party still appears to attract individuals who bring it into disrepute. This is a problem it shares with many other fast-growing parties and organisations. The membership of SD has grown from 1,126 in 2003, via 5,846 in 2010 to 33,207 at the end of 2020 (Falk, 2018, p. 343; SD, 2021). The negative media stories, and frequent expulsions, are still a problem. Available evidence suggests that expulsions are significantly more common in SD than in other parties (Helmersson, 2021). For many years other parties rejected any form of co-operation with SD. Despite consistently holding the balance of power between the two main political blocs since the parliamentary entry in 2010, the policy influence of SD was minimal during the 2010–2014 and 2014–2018 parliamentary terms. To be sure, SD did use its blackmail power. In 2014 and 2018 the party voted for centre-right opposition budgets, inflicting defeat on budget bills tabled by centre-left minority governments. In response the established parties negotiated cross-bloc agreements designed to keep SD away from influence. The “December Agreement,” announced in late 2014, meant that all parties represented in parliament except SD agreed to let through budget bills by whichever of the two blocs had the most seats. In October 2015, however, the national conference of the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD) voted to abandon it, and other parties followed suit. The 2019 “January Agreement” contained 73 policy commitments agreed between the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, S), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, MP), the 194

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Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C) and the Liberals (Liberalerna, L). For example, S agreed to give employers more choice in selecting which employees could be made redundant, and income tax was cut. The purpose of the agreement was to keep the flank parties SD and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) from influence, although only V was mentioned explicitly. The December 2014 and January 2019 agreements allowed S-MP minority governments to stay in office, but illustrated that the political scene in Sweden was becoming increasingly complicated, due to the growth of SD and the inability of the other parties to respond to the situation (Widfeldt, 2015b, 2019, 2020). The January Agreement from 2019 lasted until June 2021 when it was abandoned by L. At the same time it was becoming increasingly obvious that the resolve to isolate SD was weakening. In 2019 SD leader Jimmie Åkesson met with the leaders of M and KD, and the two latter parties began to establish quite cordial relations with SD. The position of L was less clear-cut, but in 2021 the party decided to no longer rule out participating in or supporting a government dependent on SD support. Another milestone was reached in late 2021 when SD reached a shadow budget agreement with M and KD, which was adopted by parliament. It was the third time SD had contributed to the defeat of a government budget bill, and the first time the party had participated in a substantive policy agreement (Widenstjerna & Widfeldt, 2022). The 2022 election resulted in a three-seat majority for the four right-of-centre parties M, KD, L and SD. Government negotiations ensued, which led to the formation of a three-party minority coalition consisting of M, KD and L. SD was not included in the government, but had observation posts in the government office, and the SD leader would participate in regular “inner cabinet” meetings with the leaders of the governing parties. A 62-page document between M, KD, L and SD, referred to as the “Tidö Agreement,” accommodated a number of SD demands such as a further reduction of asylum immigration, repatriation of migrants deemed not to have integrated, stop and search zones and a ban on begging. The development of SD from pariah into normalisation was thus not complete. After the 2022 election, the party was still not regarded as a natural party of government by anyone except themselves. Nevertheless the direction was clear, and the momentum increasing. In 2018 SD was still rejected by all other parties; by 2022 it was moving towards a more normalised right-of-centre position – still rejected by S, V, MP, and C but increasingly tolerated by M, KD and L. The “Tidö Agreement” represented a new milestone in this process. The reasons for this development are twofold. First, the growth of SD has made it indispensable in the quest by other right-of-centre parties to unseat S from government. Second, the conscious efforts by SD to clean up its image have borne fruit. Despite remaining problems, SD of today is a far cry from what it was the 1990s. Not least apparent is the ideological transformation. It has already been noted that some of the more radical manifesto policies were dropped in the late 1990s. Another important step was when the party redefined itself as socially conservative in its Principles manifesto from 2011. Nationalism, which up to that point had been a core ideological ingredient, was toned down. References to ethnicity were largely dropped (Widfeldt, 2015a). Yet another step in this development was taken in 2019, when the section titled “The Sweden Democrats and the human being” in the Principles manifesto was revised. The word “inherited” (nedärvd) was replaced by less specific references to the possibility of human nature being driven by biological factors. Importantly, the phrase that “there is an inherited essence (nedärvd essens) in every human being” was dropped in favour of the more general wording “all humans are not born as empty and identical copies” (alla människor [är inte] födda som 195

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tomma och identiska kopior). In the proposal presented to the national party conference the party rejected attempts by political opponents to link the phrase “inherited essence” to racism. The change was still proposed, and duly approved by the conference (SD, 2019; all quotes are from the same document). The fact that the change was made, despite being regarded as substantively unnecessary, underlines the impression of a party at pains to remove all remaining obstacles to legitimacy. Other obstacles to co-operation with other right-of-centre parties were removed when SD abandoned the demand of an EU exit, and its opposition to NATO membership. Despite the deradicalisation, Elgenius and Rydgren (2019, p. 598) argue that there is a considerable degree of continuity in the SD message. Although “expressed with more caution” in official party documents, ethno-nationalism has remained a core ingredient. It can certainly be argued that the SD of the 2020s has one thing in common with the same party in the 1990s – the prioritisation of immigration. This consistency, coupled with adaptation, has arguably also been one of the keys to success for the party. It has maintained its opposition to immigration, but has refined its techniques in presenting this message in a way that avoids condemnation, making it more difficult for opponents to justify ostracisation.

The extreme right scene – Fringe parties, neo-Nazis and cultural associations The successes of SD are a key, but not the only, part of the Swedish story. The picture is complemented by quite a diverse extreme right scene. The main purpose of the following account is to provide a descriptive overview, but also a background to the growth of SD. It can be argued that as a flank party, the legitimacy of SD can be enhanced by the existence of smaller and more radical/extreme parties as points of reference. As will also be shown, there are personal links between SD and the smaller parties and extra-parliamentary groups discussed in this section. Like many other anti-establishment parties, SD has suffered from splits. There have been purges of unwanted members, but also unforced defections. In some cases these reasons for leaving SD are combined, for example when someone defects after having been de-selected as an election candidate. These splits have sometimes been followed by the formation of splinter parties. An early example was the Local Heritage Party (Hembygdspartiet), formed in 1995. This party, which later changed its name to the Conservative Party, was insignificant and only lasted a few years (Ekman & Poohl, 2010, p. 109f). Somewhat more durable was the National Democrats (Nationaldemokraterna, ND), formed by SD expellees in 2001. ND never became a serious force at the national level, but managed to gain a few local council seats. It was plagued by in-fighting and folded in 2014 (Ekman & Poohl, 2010, p. 125ff; SVT, 2014). After the demise of ND, there was no serious challenger to SD for a few years. Closest was probably The Party of Swedes (Svenskarnas Parti, SveP), a very small party with Nazi origins, formed out of the National Socialist Front (Nationalsocialistisk Front, NSF) in 2009. The name change was a thinly veiled attempt to broaden the party’s appeal. A large part of the SveP leadership came from NSF, and the party advocated an “ethnically homogenous living space” (etniskt homogent livsrum; Party of Swedes, 2011). SveP disbanded in 2015 after a disappointing performance in the 2014 election. Meanwhile relations between SD and its youth organisation SDU were getting increasingly conflictual. The SDU leadership had on several occasions taken political positions that did not go down well in SD, such as advocating an independent Palestine. The ire of the main party was in particular directed at SDU chair Gustav Kasselstrand and his deputy William Hahne. They had a strong following in SDU, and attempts by the main party to replace them were 196

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unsuccessful. In April 2015, however, Kasselstrand and Hahne were expelled by SD. They kept their positions in SDU, but stood down at the national SDU conference in September that year. When Kasselstrand’s and Hahne’s preferred candidate Jessica Ohlsson was elected SDU chair, SD cut all links to SDU and launched a new youth organisation called The Young Swedes (Ungsvenskarna), which still remains. In March 2018 the SDU dissidents formed a new party which took the German-inspired name Alterative for Sweden (Alternativ för Sverige, AfS), with Kasselstrand as leader. AfS was soon joined by defectors from the SD parliamentary party, including former SD leader Mikael Jansson. The defection by problematical elements from SD to AfS was welcomed by SD, whose head of communications Henrik Vinge said he was pleased “if it means we are spared people with racist views and disruptive behaviour” (“om det leder till att vi slipper människor med rasistiska åsikter och haveristiska beteenden”; Svensson, 2018). The radicalism of AfS was evident in the 2018 as well as 2022 election campaigns, with slogans, such as “Time to go Home” (Dags att åka hem, AfS, 2018) and “Make Sweden Swedish Again” (Gör Sverige svenskt igen; AfS, 2022a). The election platforms in both years contained several policies that have been softened, or abandoned, by SD. Examples include a tightened repatriation policy, exit from the EU, no to NATO membership and a full stop to asylum immigration (AfS, 2018, 2022a). The party supports the “replacement theory,” arguing that the transition of Sweden into a multicultural society has meant a “replacement of people where ethic Swedes are reduced as a proportion of the population” (ett folkutbyte där etniska svenskar minskar som andel av befolkningen, AfS, 2022b). The electoral impact of AfS has been limited. The party received less than half a per cent of the vote in the 2018 as well as 2022 elections, and has not gained any local or regional representation (Valmyndigheten, 2022). Another group worthy of consideration is the Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen, NMR). Originally formed in 1997 as the Swedish Resistance Movement, this is a fully fledged Nazi organisation with roots in the former White Aryan Resistance Movement (Vitt Ariskt Motstånd, VAM). NMR has sister units elsewhere in the Nordic countries (the Finnish NMR was outlawed by a Supreme Court decision in 2020; Brunell et al., 2020). The symbol is not the Swastika, which is illegal to display in public, but the T-rune (Tyr-runan). The legality of the latter symbol, which resembles an arrow, has been confirmed by court verdicts (SVT, 2021). Like other nazi movements NMR has a military structure, and its activities are often intended to provoke and intimidate (Askanius, 2021). In 2017 NMR received widespread media attention for a demonstration in connection with an annual book fair in Göteborg. The march was halted by police, and arrests were made, but serious disorder was avoided (Ranstorp et al., 2020). NMR has also appeared uninvited at the Almedalen week on the island of Gotland, an annual festival of democracy with participation from the main political parties. The presence of NMR was regarded as intimidating by many Almedalen participants and visitors (Dalsbro, 2020). Despite its movement character and military structure NMR has presented candidates in elections. The electoral return has been minimal, but during the 2014–2018 election period NMR gained local council representation by exploiting an electoral loophole. Voters could write in names of their own choice on ballot papers of a registered party. This could make a difference if a party had more seats than candidates, or when elected representatives stood down without there being candidates to replace them (Larsson, 2014; the technique had also been used by SveP). The loophole was removed in 2018. As suggested by its electoral performances the support base of NMR is unlikely to exceed 1,000, with an activist core less than half thereof. It continues to be active, however, with events regularly reported on its website (NMR, 2022). 197

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A third extreme right grouping is the above-mentioned The Free Sweden, DFS. Formed in 2017, it describes itself as an “interest organisation for Swedes, Swedish culture and Swedish distinctiveness” (Ahlin & Ranstorp, 2020; quote from p. 348). Rather than a political party it is a cultural association aiming to disseminate nationalist ideology and discourse. A final example of extreme right activism is the anti-Islam campaigner Rasmus Paludan, also discussed in the chapter on Denmark (Chapter 14). Paludan, who has dual citizenship in Denmark and Sweden due to his father being Swedish, came close to entering the Danish parliament in the 2019 election. He then began to extend his political activity to Sweden. He was a member of AfS 2020–2021, but was expelled after media reports of sexually loaded online chats with underage contacts (Miles, 2021). In April 2022 he held anti-Quran manifestations in several Swedish cities. These were met with violent protests, receiving national as well as international media attention. Paludan’s party Hard Line (Stram Kurs, SK) participated in the Swedish election of September 2022, receiving 156 votes. In this context it is also necessary to mention the rather wide range of online far right activity. Beginning in the 2000s, a wide range of alternative online platforms have emerged. Some have direct links to SD, such as the news website Samtiden (roughly “Our Times”) launched in 2014, and the online TV channel Riks (sometimes referred to as SD Riks), which began in 2020. Other platforms are more independent of SD, although some have existing or historical links to the party. One of the better-known is Nyheter Idag (News Today), first launched in 2014. It has grown more professional, and today a significant part of its contents is behind pay walls. Nyheter Idag has had a number of notable journalistic successes, such as revelations about a scandal-ridden trip to Moscow in 2017 by an SD member of parliament, who as a consequence left the party (Lindström, 2017). In late 2021 Nyheter Idag published an old photograph where a newly appointed Social Democratic minister appeared to make a Nazi salute (Frick, 2021). The minister did not resign, but received unwelcome media attention. Other online platforms include Samhällsnytt or Samnytt (Society News), a continuation of Politiskt Inkorrekt (Politically incorrect) and its successor Avpixlat (De-pixelated). Officially independent, it counts SD representatives amongst its regular contributors. Its key aim is to report news “hushed down” by the mainstream media, with emphasis on immigrant crime (Lodenius 2022, pp. 159–165). There was also a Nordic section of the US-initiated Alt-Right movement, with former SD employee Christoffer Dulny as a leading name. It was quite active in 2017–2018, when it ran a website and a podcast series. A key part of the approach seemed to be to promote co-operation amongst anti-immigration groups and organisations. For example, NMR and the Nordic Alt-Right invited each other to appear in podcasts (Ranstorp et al., 2020, pp. 202–205). After 2018, however, the Nordic Alt-Right seemed to lose momentum. It appears to have evolved into the website Motpol (Wingborg, 2021). There are many other extreme right groups, parties, individuals, and online platforms. Some are short-lived, others more resilient. Still, this far from complete account underlines the fact that Sweden is the scene of extensive extreme right activity. Its motivations could be summarised as meta-political, in other words an aim to change the societal and political climate (Ahlin & Ranstorp, 2020). It is also notable how many of these groups contain individuals with a background in SD. Needless to say SD would vehemently deny having anything to do with the groups and organisations, and most of the online platforms discussed in this section, and strictly speaking they would be correct. It is nevertheless possible to understand SD, as well as the wide array of more extremist entities, as parts of a broader anti-immigration lobby. The argument here is not to allege the existence of a far right “grand scheme,” but all these parties, movements and groups have one important thing in common – the quest to change the debate climate about migration and related issues. 198

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Conclusion That Sweden is no longer a blank spot on the European PRR map is verging on a trivial statement. The growth of SD is not showing any signs of coming to an end, as manifested in the 2022 election. What is coming to an end is the isolation of SD. After the 2022 election SD assumed the role as government support party, similarly to the Danish People’s Party 2001–2011 and 2015–2019. Government participation may still take a while, but if the party continues to grow its bargaining position will be correspondingly strengthened. The fact is that SD has so far never experienced an election defeat. At the same time this continuous growth is perhaps one of the biggest dangers for the party. All parties suffer defeats sooner or later, and it remains to be seen how SD will respond to such a situation. The serious crisis in the Danish People’s Party after its first real election defeat in 2019 may serve as a warning. At the time of writing, however, there is little to suggest that SD is about to suffer the same fate as its former role model in Denmark. As shown above, immigration has developed into one of the most, often the most, salient issues in Swedish politics after the 2015 migration crisis. The demand for a party like SD is not likely to go away. This development is reinforced by the extreme right scene. Diverse, and with no signs of co-ordination, the wide variety of groups, parties and online platforms is fighting a relentless metapolitical battle whose underlying purpose is to legitimise anti-immigration agendas and rhetoric. The likes of NMR may not come across as significant in that context but, as indicated by the Alt-Right contacts, not even Nazi groups are permanently isolated by other extreme right groups. The sophistication amongst the wide range of extreme right groups and movements varies, but many have developed increasingly effective communication techniques. Some of the contributors to online sources, such as Nyheter Idag and Samhällsnytt, are accomplished writers and the journalistic competence is growing. The above-mentioned scoops by Nyheter Idag may well be followed by more. That this will affect the political climate is not a wild guess. The relentless reporting on immigrant crime by the likes of Samhällsnytt with predecessors has already had an impact. The ground has grown increasingly fertile for SD, which is in a continuous process of fine-tuning its message and getting rid of people who bring the party into disrepute. The turbulence in the SD parliamentary party during the 2014–2018 parliamentary term was followed by more stability in the 2018–2022 cohort. We should not overstate the prospects for SD. It will not emulate the Social Democrats from the 20th century, with long periods of government dominance and a stable support base of over 40 per cent. But nor is it likely to go away. SD will continue as a significant element in the Swedish party system, and is gradually losing its pariah status. Its capacity to make a concrete political difference is set to continue growing, in an increasingly favourable political climate.

Note 1 During its first four years of existence SD had a dual leadership. Klarström was appointed to one of the leadership positions in 1989, but soon emerged as the de facto party leader, before becoming the formal single leader in 1992.

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Anders Widfeldt AfS. (2022a). Vår politik (Our policies). Alternativ för Sverige, policy platform. Available online via https://alternativforsverige.se/politik AfS. (2022b). Gör Sverige svenskt igen! (Make Sweden Swedish again). Alternativ för Sverige, repatriation policy. Available online via https://alternativforsverige.se/politik/atervandring/ Ahlin, F., & Ranstorp, M. (2020). Alternativhögern i Sverige.InM. Ranstorp & F. Ahlin (Eds.), Från Nordiska motståndsrörelsen till alternativhögern En studie om den svenska radikalnationalistiska miljön (pp. 313–379). Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och Terrorismtudier (CATS) and the Swedish Defence University. Available online via: https://www.fhs.se/download/18.aa44b1740d51053bc784/1599031490867/ Fr%C3%A5n%20Nordiska%20motst%C3%A5ndsr%C3%B6relsen%20till%20alternativh% C3%B6gern%20-%20en%20studie%20om%20den%20svenska%20radikalnationalistiska%20milj% C3%B6n.pdf Askanius, T. (2021). On frogs, monkeys, and execution memes: Exploring the humor-hate nexus at the intersection of Neo-Nazi and alt-right movements in Sweden. Television and New Media, 22(2), 147–165. Baas, D. (2021). “Peter Lundgren, SD, döms för sexuellt ofredande” Expressen 22 November. Available online at: https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/peter-lundgren-sd-doms-for-sexuellt-ofredande/ Brunell, E., Lindberg, M., & Ekholm, M. (2020). “Nordiska motståndsrörelsen förbjuds i Finland – ‘Inte alls säkert att situationen blir bättre’ säger expert”. Svenska YLE 22 September. Available online via: https://svenska.yle.fi/a/7-1489420 Dalsbro, A. (2020). “Flera domar mot Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen”. Expo, 22 December. Available online via: https://expo.se/2020/12/flera-domar-mot-nordiska-motst%C3%A5ndsr%C3%B6relsen Dalsbro, A., Leman, J., & Nilsson, N. (2021). “SD-tjänsteman aktiv i vit mark-rörelsen”. Expo, 12 October. Available online via: https://expo.se/2021/10/sd-tjansteman-aktiv-i-vit-makt-rorelsen Demker, M. (2021). Vilka var det som ändrade sig om flyktingpolitiken efter 2015? In A. Carlander, M. Grusell, & P. Öhberg (Eds.), Ingen anledning till oro (pp. 317–331). The SOM Institute, Göteborg University. Ekman, M., & Poohl, D. (2010). Ut ur skuggan. En kritisk granskning av sverigedemokraterna. Natur & Kultur. Elgenius, G., & Rydgren, J. (2019). Frames of nostalgia and belonging: The resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden. European Societies, 41(4), 583–602. Falk, E. (2018). Appendix. In K. Barrling & S. Holmberg (Eds.), Demokratins framtid (pp. 329–365). Sverige Riksdag. Frick, C. (2021). “Här heilar civilminister Ida Karkiainen till vit makt-musik”. Nyheter Idag, 6 December. Available online via: https://nyheteridag.se/har-heilar-civilminister-ida-karkiainen-till-vit-makt-musik/ Gustafsson, T. (2022). Sverigedemokraternas Vitbok. Delredovisning. No publisher. Available online via: https://via.tt.se/data/attachments/00004/2303d962-2094-4aa1-b764-c87e071f359a.pdf Helmersson, A. (2021). “Så manga har uteslutits ur partierna – ett parti sticker ut”. Dagens Arena 13 January. Available online via: https://www.dagensarena.se/innehall/sa-manga-har-uteslutits-ur-partiernaett-parti-sticker-ut/ Ivarsflaten, E. (2006). “Representational shields: Why most anti-immigration parties failed in Western Europe, 1980–2005”. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Philadelphia. Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1997). The radical right in Western Europe. A comparative analysis (1st paperback ed.). Michigan University Press. Larsson, M. J. (2014). “Kupp ger nazister SD-mandat” Dagens Nyheter, 23 September. Available online via: https://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/kupp-ger-nazister-sd-mandat/ Lindström, E. (2017). “Pavel Gamov lämnar Sverigedemokraterna”. Aftonbladet 10 November. Available online via https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/samhalle/a/vERqm/pavel-gamov-lamnarsverigedemokraterna Lindström, M. (2003/04). Skånes Väl. De skånska regionalisternas möte ned de svenska nationalisterna. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 106(1), 32–54. Lodenius, A.-L. (2022). Svart på vitt om Sverigedemokraterna. Bokförlaget Atlas. Lööf, A. (2021). “Sverigedemokraterna bildades 1988 av veteraner inom militant rasism och fascism”. Twitter posting by leader of the Swedish Centre Party. Available online at: https://twitter.com/ annieloof/status/1402991617598889984 Martinsson, J., & Andersson, U. (2020). Svenska Trender 1986–2019. The SOM Institute, Göteborg University. Available online at: https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2021-04/6.%20Svenska%20 Trender%20%281986-2019%29_v3.pdf

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The far right in Sweden Miles, J. K. (2021). “Efter sexchat med børn: Bandlyst fra højrefløsparti”. Ekstra Bladet 28 August. Available online via: https://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/politik/danskpolitik/efter-sexchat-med-boern-bandlystfra-hoejrefloejsparti/8816875 Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. NMR. (2022). Nordiska motståndsrörelsen, hemsida (Nordic Resistance Movement, home page). Available online via https://xn–motstndsrrelsen-llb70a.se/ Party of Swedes. (2011). Vidareutveckling av de politiska punkterna. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/ web/20111020200507/http:/www.svenskarnasparti.se/vidareutveckling-av-de-politiska-punkterna/; no longer available online. Ranstorp, M., Ahlin, F., & Normark, M. (2020). Nordiska motståndsrörelsen – den samlande kraften inom den nationalsocialistiska miljön i Norden. In M. Ranstorp & F. Ahlin (Eds.), Från Nordiska motståndsrörelsen till alternativhögern En studie om den svenska radikalnationalistiska miljön (pp. 146–238). Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och TerrorismStudier (CATS) and the Swedish Defence University. Available online via: https://www.fhs.se/download/18.aa44b1740d51053bc784/1599031490867/Fr%C3%A5n% 20Nordiska%20motst%C3%A5ndsr%C3%B6relsen%20till%20alternativh%C3%B6gern%20-% 20en%20studie%20om%20den%20svenska%20radikalnationalistiska%20milj%C3%B6n.pdf Rogsten, E. (2021). “SD-ledamot jämförde afrikan med avföring”. Expressen 13 April. Available online via: https://www.expressen.se/gt/sd-ledamot-jamforde-afrikan-med-avforing-/ Rydgren, J. (2006). From tax populism to ethnic nationalism. Radical Right-wing Populism in Sweden. Berghahn Books. Sänkiaho, R. (1971). A model of the rise of populism and support for the Finnish Rural Party. Scandinavian Political Studies, 6, 27–47. SCB. (2022). Folkmängden länsvis 1749–2020. Population statistics, downloadable via: https://www.scb. se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/ pong/tabell-och-diagram/helarsstatistik-kommun-lan-och-riket/folkmangd-i-lan/ SD. (2019). Justering av Principprogram (adjustment of Principles Manifesto). Presented and adopted at SD national conference. Downloaded from sd.se, no longer available online. SD. (2021). Verksamhetsberättelse 2019–2021. Annual reports, presented at national party conference. Available online via https://ratatosk.sd.se/sd/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/11200818/Verksamhetsberattelse-och-beslutsuppfoljningen-fran-LD2019-.pdf Svensson, N. (2018). “SD:s presschef: Glad om vi slipper rasistiska åsikter”. Expressen 5 March. Available online via: https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/tidigare-sd-toppen-utmanar-akesson-med-nytt-parti/ SVT. (2014). “Nationaldemokraterna läggs ned”. SVT Nyheter, 23 April. Available online via: https:// www.svt.se/nyheter/val2014/nationaldemokraterna-laggs-ned SVT. (2021). “HD prövar inte tyrrunan i NMR-demonstration”. SVT Nyheter 10 June. Available online via https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/hd-provar-inte-tyrrunan-i-nmr-demonstration Swedish Migration Authority. (2022a). Migrationsverket, Beviljade uppehållstillstånd 1980–2020. Statistics downloadable via: https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.2b2a286016dabb81a18 54f2/1614956136514/Beviljade%20uppeh%C3%A5llstillst%C3%A5nd%201980-2020.xlsx Swedish Migration Authority. (2022b). Asylsökande till Sverige 2000–2020. Statistics downloadable via: https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.4a5a58d51602d141cf41004/1643640357046/ Asyls%C3%B6kande%20till%20Sverige%202000-2021.xlsx Valmyndigheten. (2022). Swedish election authority, final results of 2022 election. Available online via: https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och-kommun/2022/valresultat.html Widenstjerna, T., & Widfeldt, A. (2022). “Sweden”. Political Data Yearbook. European Journal of Political Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12376. Widfeldt, A. (2015a). Extreme right parties in Scandinavia. Routledge. Widfeldt, A. (2015b). “Sweden”. Political Data Yearbook. European Journal of Political Research, 54, 286–293. Widfeldt, A. (2019). “Sweden”. Political Data Yearbook. European Journal of Political Research, 58, 264–271. Widfeldt, A. (2020). “Sweden”. Political Data Yearbook. European Journal of Political Research, 59, 350–361. Wingborg, M. 2021: “Alternativ höger i öppet förfall”. Dagens Arena 24 October. Available online at: https://www.dagensarena.se/opinion/alternativ-hoger-oppet-forfall/

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14 THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN DENMARK Mette Wiggen

Introduction This chapter follows the far right in Denmark over 50 years from the breakthrough of Fremskrittspartiet (FrP – The Progress Party) to the demise of Dansk Folkeparti (DF – Danish People’s Party) – and the emergence of other parties further to the right. The chapter explores the mainstreaming of far-right anti-immigration ideology and contributes to the existing literature on mainstreaming of the far right. There is a strong focus on the supply side with party dynamics and female leadership. Several women leaders of far-right Danish parties have expertly navigated the political landscape in and with parties that traditionally have a strong male bias. The extra-parliamentary scene of neo-Nazi or hardline racist groups is not very significant in Danish politics, unlike neighbouring Sweden (see Chapter 13) so it will not be covered here (Holmsted Larsen, 2018). Despite high levels of economic wellbeing, the far right in Denmark has been very successful in terms of building parties and instigating policy change, especially around immigration and welfare. Far-right parties are often called Männerparteien as they attract disproportionate support from men in their quest for preserving traditional values and norms. It is therefore worth noting that the most influential far-right party in Denmark, if not in Europe, DF, was founded and led by a woman Pia Kjærsgaard, who led the party for 17 years. She was charismatic, professional, and authoritarian and combined that with a softer, private side where she used her status as a woman and a caring mother to compensate for her “buraucratic and in some cases tyrannical leadership style” (Meret, 2015, p. 101). Kjærsgaard’s empathy did not stretch to immigrants or non-citizens, and controlling immigration was at the top of her agenda. From being one of the most tolerant countries in Europe, Denmark changed dramatically after 2001. By 2022 the image of Denmark as the strictest Western European “asylum country” was well established 2022 (Creton, 2022). The European Commission stressed in 2021 that a new Danish law to outsource asylum to countries outside the EU was incompatible with EU law (Nikolaj Nielsen, 2021). Denmark was also criticised by the United Nations for its treatment of refugees, remarkably under a government led by the left. In the 2019 election campaign Socialdemokratiet (S - Social Democrats) campaigned on the motto of “Lad os samle Danmark igen” – “let’s unite Denmark again,” stricter immigration legislation and welfare for citizens. The leader 202

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-19

The shift to the right in Denmark

Mette Frederiksen, prime minister since 2019, called for a cap on “non-western immigrants,” asylum seekers to be expelled to reception centres in North Africa and ruled it safe to send asylum back to Syria. The Danish government intends to punish refugees who are entitled to humanitarian protection under the international refugee convention and there is a longestablished legislation to make demands on refugees to work in order to be eligible for state benefits (Clante Bendixen, 2021). Far-right positions and policies especially on immigration have become normalised. The chapter´s main focus is on DF and Nye Borgerlige (NB- New Right) but will briefly cover FrP to show where DF came from. It will also include a section on Stram Kurs (SK – Hard Line) a single issue, flash party. At the time of writing the most recent party Danmarkemokraterne (DD- Danish Democrats), founded in June 2022, will also get a mention. Far-right parties broke through and prospered at times of economic stability or when Denmark suffered comparatively little from global economic crises. These parties attacked immigrants and confronted the left who have let them in and conjured up an imminent threat to existing social relations. They claimed that long earned equal rights specific to the Nordic Model are under threat from other cultures, at the same time they defended the nuclear family and women’s right to stay at home as housewives. Since the turn of the century Denmark as many other social democracies have been transformed into a neo-liberal bastion, and there has been a fast increase in inequality and insecurity (Schierup & Ålund, 2011). This development benefitted the far right, as Askanius and Mylonas put it “the corrosion of democratic identity by neoliberal social norms prompt citizens to buy into individualistic explanations of their socio-historical challenges, rather than systemic ones, and seek scapegoats for their frustrations, usually in the form of ethnic or cultural ‘Others’” (2015, p. 58). Danish far-right parties grew out of a democratic, not an extremist, fascist right-wing tradition. The first successful, modern “furthest to the right” – party in the Danish system FrP was founded as an anti-taxation protest party in 1972 (Widfeldt, 2015). Immigration became a central feature of FrP in the 1980s combined with neoliberalism for a few years before they turned to propose more state intervention in the economy to support national industry and a welfare state that should favour citizens. The far right was by then making an impact on Danish politics locally and nationally and was an accepted part of the democratic landscape. They have set the political agenda on immigration and integration since the 1980s. An increase in migration and refugees because of the Gulf wars from 1990 worked in DF’s favour (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). The global trend- and a move to the far right where many parties and politicians across the board warned against cost and potential security issues related to the increase in refugees was also welcomed by the party. DF was concerned about the cost of immigration but their characterisation and use of “culture” became increasingly important. In their strategy and rhetoric, the party used fear of the other and how cultural influences from abroad could impact negatively on what they defined as Danish culture. The party linked security concerns with fixation on earned rights to welfare and after this logic, welfare to immigrants needed to be reduced. The economic argument about limited resources contributed to a dualistic welfare state introduced by the government in 2001 where access to welfare depended on contribution (Bay et al., 2013). Since the early 2000s there has been a radicalisation of the far right and the mainstream alike on immigration, integration, and border controls with ever stricter anti-immigrant legislation. DF supported minority coalitions between 2001 and 2011 and exerted “significant influence on immigration, asylum, integration, and citizenship policies during political negotiations with the ruling parties” (Meret, 2021, p. 172). After 9/11, an anti-Muslim and 203

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anti-immigrant rhetoric and hostility to immigration sharpened in the west in general. This led to more direct verbal attacks on foreigners in general as the mainstream copied the far right’s rhetoric, populist style and their politics. Since the 1970s, the welfare state has been transformed with large scale privatisation leading to an increase in inequality and a backlash from the right where the far right took a nativist position. Nowhere else has the far right been more successful in promoting this welfare chauvinistic position than in Denmark. The far right has been particularly successful in portraying economic crises and immigration as a threat to the universal welfare state with xenophobic language warning against dangers and threats to citizens’ privileges (Bauman, 2004). By 2011 a dualistic welfare state had been normalised in Denmark and was supported by people on the left and the right. Other European countries introduced large scale austerity measures and neoliberal reforms to boost privatisation and private initiatives in the health and welfare sector, immigrants were increasingly seen as an economic burden.

The progress party, FrP – Fremskridtspartiet FrP broke through as an anti-taxation, ultra-liberal party and won 15.9% in the elections in 1973 (Kitschelt, 1997). The landslide opened up for new possible coalitions in a party system that had been seen to be “frozen” (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). FrP put anti-immigration on the agenda in the 1980s but had always used strong Islamophobic rhetoric (Meret, 2021). The first leader Mogens Glistrup was a self-declared racist. For Glistrup FrP was a protest party raising against the social democratic hegemony. Dispute over the party’s future became a major issue of conflict with those who wanted to influence politics from within the system. Pia Kjærsgaard succeeded in making the party salonfähig and stepped in when Glistrup was in prison for tax fraud in 1983. Kjærsgaard was careful not to portray herself as opposing all other parties and introduced a much more populist line than FrP of old but without conspiratorial views of society and she did not present FrP as an alternative to all other parties. The Glistrup effect came back to haunt FrP and conflict in the party escalated despite his reduced influence. In 1995 Kjærsgaard left FrP and founded DF. In a debate in 1997 Glistrup said that of course immigrants from civilisations like the Danish were welcome but not “Muhammedans, they are only here to flatter themselves and when they have done that, they will kill us when they get strong enough to do so” (TV3, 1997). FrP’s annual general meeting re-elected Glistrup as a leader in 1999 but they soon found him too extreme. The rest of the party leadership and all MPs resigned from the party. Some founded a new group called Frihed (Freedom). Glistrup’s re-election spelled the end of FrP that gained 0.6% in the 2001 elections (Rydgren, 2018).

The Danish people’s party – DF and its struggles with the mainstream The sociocultural dimension and immigration became increasingly important in Denmark, in 1994 16% found immigration important and by 1998 43% of those polled held that view. By 2001 the Eurosceptic DF dominated the agenda and DF attracted as many working class voters as the social democrats (Jupskås, 2016). Since 2001 two blocks have competed for office, the “red” and the “blue” and coalition government became the norm. These included the Liberals, Conservatives, DF, Christian democrats, and a Liberal Alliance including Social Democrats, Danish Social Liberal Party, Socialist Left, and Red - Green Alliance. 204

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Pia Kjærsgaaard became the first woman to launch a new party in Denmark (Meret, 2015). This was a time of dramatic global change, insecurity and a wave of support of the far right in Europe. After the end of the Cold War unemployment increased, insecurity and loss of identity affected especially the poorest classes in the east of Europe and hundreds of thousands migrated to Western Europe (Backer, 2000). The far-right exploited the upheaval, generated fear and warned of dangers and risks attached to multiculturalism (Wodak, 2021). DF became increasingly critical to democratic institutions, to universal human rights and in meeting international obligations much due to Kjærsgaard, a charismatic and authoritarian leader commanding strict control and party discipline. Her top down centralised party control and leadership style was imperative to avoid a similar fate as FrP. Kjærsgaard used her working class position to her advantage as well as her gender by combining being a “normal” woman reacting to threats by “saying things as they are”. In classic populist style she was motherly, caring and responsible. Kjærsgaard’s strategy maximised her chances and influenced her success, Meret (2015) suggested that models of gender relations used by party leaders would benefit from comparison with more (right wing) populist leaders like Marine Le Pen in France and Siv Jensen in Norway whose “leadership styles and gendered representations seem to have significantly contributed to the profiling of their parties” (p. 102). DF party discipline was prioritised over party democracy and members and politicians who disagreed with the leader were expelled. Kjærsgaard’s style was imperative for the party’s success, her rhetoric appealed to a broad spectrum of the electorate especially working-class men. She was welcomed by the mainstream and DF became more successful than FrP which was never embraced as a “normal” party. DF became “one of the most successful extreme right parties in Europe” in terms of impact and legitimacy (Widfeldt, 2015, p. 127). The main difference between the two parties was ideological. DF represented a clear break from FrP and could rather be compared to the Front National, FN in France and the Freedom Party – FPÖ in Austria. They shared a “fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia” and they combined this with anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2004, p. 3). DF moved away from a programme of tax reduction and by 2015 advocated for growth in the public sector and more generous unemployment benefits than both the mainstream left and right (Juul Christiansen, 2016). There are various explanations in the literature on the difference and similarities between the two parties. Some saw DF as a continuation of FrP and as a milder version of the radical right on Europe (Carter, 2005; Kitschelt, 1997; Norris, 2005). Others saw it as a very different party with a different ideology (Rydgren, 2004) which matched contemporary developments. DF used anti-immigrant rhetoric and represented a more radical and xenophobic exclusionary line than FrP. Over time the anti-immigrant and especially the anti-Muslim bias became a trademark for Pia Kjærsgaard and DF but she always stayed clear of being accused of racism. In 2001 for the first time since 1929 right-wing parties won the elections with a clear majority. FrP had disappeared with less than the 2%, the threshold needed for representation in parliament and DF gained 12% which translated into 22 seats, 9 more than the previous election. S gained just over 29% and lost 11 seats. The winners were Venstre (V – the liberal party) with more than 20% with 14 seats and the mainstream Konservative Folkeparti (K – Conservative Party) got 9%. The massive win for the right was unexpected as the economy was booming and levels of trust in politicians and politics were high and so was the turnout. The landslide enabled the leader of V, Anders Fogh-Rasmussen, to form a minority government with K. DF did not enter government but became a support party to the minority coalition and found themselves in a position where over time they achieved a significant tightening of immigration regulations and stricter integration legislation. This came at a time when the 205

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Danish economy had experienced an “economic miracle” with a reduction in unemployment by 66% and a boost in private consumption (Goul Andersen, 2003, p. 286). DF’s strategy and Kjærsgaard’s leadership with focus on restricting immigration, tightening integration, and welfare chauvinism paid off. It helped that the left had focused on unemployment and the economy; issues of less concern to the electorate. The global climate benefitted DF as normalisation of Islamophia escalated after the 9/11 terror attacks. The attacks symbolise a watershed in support for the far-right globally. Kjærsgaard’s strategy and the role played by DF during 2001–2011 marked a clear turn to the right and “has placed Denmark in the category of countries with strong right-wing populist parties such as Austria and France” (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012, p. 97). DF increased its support steadily and by 2013 more than half of the votes came from skilled and unskilled manual workers and mainly men with a low-level of academic achievements (Betz & Meret, 2013). In 2012, after 17 years, Kjærsgaard stepped down and Kristian Thulesen Dahl took over as party leader. Thulesen Dahl was a young highly educated economist and more moderate than Kjærsgaard. He moved the party towards the centre with success in the election of 2015. DF gained more than 21% of the vote and supported a minority coalition again 2015–2019, but the support for the party did not last. DF’s position as a support party cost them dearly. By 2019 they were reduced to a small party with 6% in the elections. During the 2015–2019 period DF’s issue-ownership of immigration was seriously challenged both by the left and the right. As a support party to the government DF had become too much a part of the establishment and lost more than half of their support. S had managed to gain the electorate´s trust by promising a pension reform aimed at manual workers, an issue DF had campaigned for. An early retirement deal played a central role in the elections and became law in 2021 (The Local, 2022). S had under Mette Frederiksen’s leadership embraced DF nativist policies on immigration and linked that to access to welfare. In 2019, a left wing minority government coalition was formed on a platform of xenophobia, tough border controls and welfare chauvinism. S had promised to take the climate crisis seriously an issue at the top of the agenda for many Danish voters, especially the young (Garcia Augustin & Bak Jørgensen, 2019). Protecting the welfare state against abuse from “foreigners” was still a salient issue and Frederiksen promised a more equal society but excluded immigrants much in line with DF’s demands. The government agreed punitive measures to discourage immigration, make demands on immigrants and stop “welfare tourism”. In 2015 during the so-called refugee crisis it became known that the government planned to search refugees’ bags and strip asylum seekers of their valuables (Henderson, 2015). Immigrants’ belongings were seized as a pretext to “pay for welfare” (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017). Throughout the election campaign in 2019 Frederiksen deployed an uncompromising tone as part of electioneering. The party manifesto was more moderate but two years later it became abundantly clear that Frederiksen’s views were not only for canvassing: she declared the necessity to strengthen “Danishness everywhere” (2019). Echoing Glistrup, Frederiksen said that repatriation not integration was their strategy in migration and “foreigner” policy. Frederiksen’s populist style resembled Donald Trump’s as much as Kjærsgaard’s in her call to reunite Denmark and to make Denmark Danish again. Frederiksen aimed to cap non-western immigration, expel asylum seekers to reception centres in North Africa, and to make immigrants work for their benefits. S´s line on immigration was not new, they had supported the conservative government coalition on a burqa and niqab ban introduced in August 2018 (Onyanga – Omara2018). They also supported compulsory handshakes at citizenship ceremonies. Assimilation and discriminatory elements had gone much further than immigration policy of the 1970s (Brochmann & 206

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Hagelund, 2012). In August 2022 they suggested banning headscarves in schools from year 0 to 9. Several mayors opposed the ban as discriminatory (Pabst et al., 2022). The Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor noted “We reiterate our call on the Danish government to foster and encourage a welcoming and positive atmosphere for its religious and ethnic minorities rather than prohibitive, restrictive and controlling policies that adversely harm integration and increase social exclusion” (Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, 2022). There was broad agreement on assimilation as a strategy for integration but “non- western” immigrants had been singled out as a problem by the previous conservative coalition. In 2018 the government introduced what they called a “ghetto package” with 22 proposals designed to regulate life in “hard ghettos”. Poor immigrant neighbourhoods were stigmatised and targeted with the inherent threat that the package could be increased to 57 “vulnerable areas” in total. “Ghetto” was a label simply given to an area with high levels of immigration and social exclusion (Fekete, 2018). The government’s solution was forced integration and in December 2019 the “ghetto package” became law. Obligatory pre-school for at least 24 hours a week for immigrant children was introduced to teach Danish values, language, and culture. Non-compliance would be punished with retraction of welfare payments (Witcombe, 2019). DF moved to the centre on most issues apart from immigration and opened up for collaboration with the left as well as the right in the ten years Thulesen Dahl led the party. From January 2022 a new leader Morten Messerchmidt set focus on Euro scepticism, identity and culture and promised to fight “woke and the love of multiculturalism.” DF has been compared to Lega Nord and Ressemblement National but the party might not gain much support through their strong anti-EU sentiment (Nordvang Jensen quoting Stubager in Dagbladet Information, 3 November,2022). Only 20% of Danes would like Denmark to leave the EU and some of them are on the left. Several defections from parliament in 2022 highlighted internal divisions in DF once hailed to be so successful much due to a strong supply side, party organisation and internal discipline. DF has had an immense impact on Danish politics and on the mainstreaming of far-right policies. So much so that “everyone” in parliament agreeing with them had become a problem. DF became a victim of their own success. DF was no longer a protest party and the circumstances paved the way for a new and more radical party on the far right the NB.

Nye Borgerlige – NB NB benefitted from a niche opening to the right of DF. Pernille Vermund and Sejer Christensen who founded NB in 2015 were previous members of the Conservative Party (K), Vermund a former local politician for the Conservative Party and parliamentary candidate. The party programme of 2015 declared that it was a national, conservative party with a market liberal profile advocating a minimal role of the state. By 2021 NB had doubled its support to 6% in the polls since the party stood in elections for the first time in 2019 with 2.4%. This gave them 4 members of parliament, DF got 16. NB challenged DF ideologically with a neo-liberal direction, reduction of taxes and an attack on the welfare state. DF gained support from a broad spectrum of the electorate but particularly from voters who have previously favoured V and DF. NB gained support at a time when many of the traditional supporters turned their back on DF. Over time voters had grown tired of DF now associated with the ruling “elites” they had once opposed. As DF before them NB have a professional and strong female leader in Pernille Vermund. She is an expert at using social media where people may fall for her rhetoric. She uses Facebook in a similar fashion Trump on twitter. She answers questions from the audience 207

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in live streaming sessions. FB is a good platform to reach the older echelons of the electorate and the preferred platform for far-right populist parties. In 2020 Vemund gained 55,000 new followers and had 400 posts and 2.7 million interactions (Lykketoft, n.d.). Vermund is charismatic and caring and uses that effectively in demonstrating her compassion with Danes who feel threatened by immigration and cultural change. In that way she is able to create a bond between herself and her followers as most successful populist leaders do (Žižek, 1991). Vermund uses Youtube as well as Facebook to accuse other parties and politicians of trying to curtail her freedom of speech when “only telling the truth” and constructs fear, then hope to present a solution, a familiar strategy far-right populist politicians use (Wodak, 2021). Vermund addresses the electorate directly using “networked intimacy” which makes her seem like the viewers’ friend. “They reveal details of their personal lives by discussing struggles and emotions, drawing attention to their lived experiences” (Leidig, 2021, n.p.). Most communications experts stress that social media plays an enormous role for the party and helps account for their ever-increasing popularity. Others ask whether NB is popular because they are on social media or if they are on social media because they are popular (Haug in Zissel og Eliten, 2021). Vermund is an expert at using the “politics of appearances: the self-conscious making of a spectacle that is a necessary mechanism in gathering political support. The possibility of political performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of potential voters” (Borras, 2020, p.9). She uses her looks and femininity to maximum impact and seems very natural but the “spectacle” is planned and is more compelling than most politicians can compete with. Vermund uses her gender in a calculating manner as Kjærsgaard before her but she does not try to portray herself as a part time housewife or play on homely stereotypes. She is as down to earth and authoritarian as Pia Kjærsgaard but the aspects of her life she shares have whiff of glamour rather than homely hygge. She is more likely to share photos of herself on Instagram in a bikini on a beach or relaxing with a glass of wine than in an apron or washing up in the kitchen as Kjærsgaard had done. Vermund looks glamorous and comfortable whether she is talking from her living room or from her yacht. She speaks straight into the camera when she responds to questions. Her rhetoric directly targets the political “elites” and she attacks other parties for not acting responsibly to stop immigration especially from Muslim countries. She has simple solutions to complicated issues like forcing Muslims in Denmark to assimilate or go home. NB is more successful in gaining middle class male voters than DF and had overtaken DF as the main opposition party. NB’s focus in challenging DF ideologically with a more liberal economic policy resonates with FrP in the 1970s. NB advocates for lower taxes, more reliance on a “free market” and to do away with welfare dependency (Siim & Nissen, 2021). This is a far cry from DF’s continuing support for the welfare state and for early retirement reforms. Increase in support for NB is complex but DF losing its position as a protest party combined with Pernille Vermund’s populist approach in appealing to more middle class voters helps to explain some of it. Party building and focus on local issues and local elections are also important. NB’s message is simple and clear it is about us Danes and them the immigrants threatening Danish culture and identity. NB recommends that Denmark leaves the United Nations’ refugee convention but stresses that UN refugees should be able to settle in Denmark. Their manifesto says Denmark needs a party that combines traditional values with conservative economic policies and an unambiguous opposition to conventions and supranational agreements that limit Danish democracy. NB has distanced itself from international human rights but the mainstream has also attracted attention from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees over the amendments to the Danish Aliens Act. The act allows for forcible 208

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removal of refugees and is an abdication of responsibility for vulnerable refugees laid out in the 1951 Geneva Convention (UNHCR, 2021). NB is sceptical to the EU, wants a new referendum on membership, and it recommends Denmark leaves the EU alltogether. NB claims positive aspects of the EU gained in the 1980s are lost due to centralisation and bureaucracy. NB takes issue with the European convention on Human rights that “constantly expands foreigners’ rights in Denmark.” Danes themselves should decide who to accept in the country and “refugee streams from African and Arab countries create cultural and economic problems for recipient countries” – refugees should be looked after in neighbouring countries and Denmark will not accept “spontaneous refugees who illegally cross borders” (Principprogram, 2019 n.p.). The party programme emphasises identity, borders, immigration, and the economy. Most parties used the same argument in 2022 justifying preferential treatment of Ukranian refugees over refugees who were not from “neighbouring counters”. Vermund is as uncompromising on party discipline as Kjærgaard was and any sign of infighting or criticising other NB politicians in public is clamped down on immediately. Her strategy paid off and in the local elections in November 2021 and NB increased their mandates from 1 to 64 in local government. Their goal was to get 10 so the reactions were triumphant when the results came in. Vermund rang all the successful candidates and congratulated them the same evening emphasising in her speech the importance of supporting right wing coalitions wherever they had been elected. When the candidate Erik Mortensen criticised the party line and “top-down leadership” he was immediately excluded on charges of lack of loyalty the party. Mortensen later said Vermund had done him a favour as he did not want to be member of a party that emulated a North Korean style (Dalby Ewert, 2021). Vermund’s authoritarian leadership has much in common with other successful far-right parties and is often seen as a supply side criterion for such a party to succeed (Art, 2011). The party appeals to more men than women; only a third of NB voters are women but that proportion is on the rise. The most typical NB voters are young men with business degrees, students or employed in the private sector (Siim & Nissen, 2021). NB’s trajectory will depend on how other parties and the electorate respond. It is unlikely that NB will experience a rapid rise in the manner of the German AfD as welfarism is so well rooted in Danish political structures (Worth, 2019, p. 104).

Stram Kurs – SK SK attracted international attention when they stood in the elections in 2019 on a platform on deportation of Muslims. Their leader Rasmus Paludan was later jailed for racism (BBC, 2020). Paludan appealed the jail sentence and the penalty was reduced to a smaller fine and a suspended jail sentence. In order to participate in the elections in 2019 the party needed 20,000 signatures which they gained with a good margin. With 1.8% of the vote they were 0.2% short of the threshold for representation in parliament (Lindevall, 2019). The leader and activists were on the street and attracted attention by abusing Muslims, burning Qurans wrapped in bacon or hurling Qurans around. Paludan’s favourite social media platform is YouTube. His fashion sense and extreme, theatrical stunts, attracted media attention in Denmark and abroad. As other groups like the National Front and the English Defence League in the 1990s and 2000 (Bujra & Pierce, 2011). Paludan staged provocative meetings and demonstrations in neighbourhoods where immigrants live. The multicultural Nørrebro in Copenhagen was a favoured area for his actions for maximum impact in upsetting the local population. Ironically and of much irritation to the far right that area was 209

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chosen in 2021 by TimeOut as the “world’s coolest neighbourhoood” (Hayward, 2021). After the elections in 2019 Stram Kurs fizzled out, they really were too radical and violent for potential voters spoilt for choice on the far right and did not muster enough support to stand in the elections in 2022. The dual national Paludan continued his performances but increasingly over the border in Sweden where the party gained 156 votes in the 2022 elections. The mainstream left and the right took SK very seriously especially during the election campaign in 2019. SK’s potential entrance in the parliament and the likelihood of the party supporting a far-right coalition was worrying for the left. Strong warnings came for calling on mainstream parties to rule out a coalition with SK. DF supported a minority government at the time, led by V and backed by K and the Liberal Alliance. A former minister from the Social Liberal party Morten Østergaard emphasised it was a difference between DF’s line on campaigning for preferential treatment of ethnic Danes and SK’s to deport Muslims (Boffey, 2019). The PM ruled out collaborating with SK before the elections. NB’s presence also contributed to staving off SK. Vermund said much the same as Paludan but a leader commenting on current issues from a yacht in the Mediterranean, like a fairy tale princess rather than the furious clown-like Rasmus Paludan screaming from the top of his head appealed more to the average Danish far-right voter.

Danmarksdemokraterne In June 2022 yet another far-right party was founded by yet another a woman, Inger Støjberg. At the time of writing Danmarksdemokraterne (DD- Denmark Democrats) does not have a programme but announces a strict line on immigration. The party had no members but one could become a “friend” of the party for a small fee. DD has a minimalist homepage and promises the party that will fight for Danish people “som vi er flest” (like most of us). The homepage contains a couple of very short videos where Støjbergs talks about how immigrants must assimilate if they want to live in Denmark. It promises to help people with “everyday” problems and “real” welfare and supports the Arne pension. In the polls it had 11.2% which would translate into 20 MPs in an election (TV2 Nyheder, 2022). Støjberg previously was deputy leader of V and the minister for immigration and intergration when she in 2016 ruled to separate asylum seeking couples where one partner was younger than 18. In 2021 an impeachment court ruled that she had broken Danish law and violated the European Convention of Human Rights (Euronews, 2021). Støjberg was imprisoned for 60 days and expelled from parliament. Fresh out of prison Støjberg showed no regrets and promised to uphold Danish values and to continue fighting for “young girls”.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that mainstreaming of the far right in Denmark turned the country from one of the most welcoming into one of the of the most anti-immigrant and welfare chauvinistic countries in Europe. Dansk Folkeparti as a support party to three minority government coalitions influenced legislation and policy making immensely and even the left co-opted their policies on immigration. Criminalisation and de-humanisation of asylum seekers and a disregard for international conventions and human rights is the norm. DF suffered from their own success, through compromises with the government they became more moderate and associated with the mainstream they once opposed. Internal conflict, growing distance to the grassroots and new parties on the far right contributed to their demise. 210

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The social democrats, S, successfully managed to gain “issue ownership” of immigration in 2019 and continued focusing on that. Early in 2022 only 5% saw immigration as their top political issue and polls indicated that the government coalition lead by S was set to lose in the next election. Frederiksen did a surprise comeback and in November 2022 they gained 27.5% and confimed their shift to the right by forming the first Grand Coalition since the 1970s. On the far right the new Danish Democrats were the clear winners with 8.1 % and replaced NB as the main contender to the mainstream in fast moving landscape of Danish politics.

References Andersen, J.G. (2003). The General Election in Denmark, November 2001. Electoral Studies 22 (1), 153–193. Akkerman (2016) Radical Right-wing Populists Parties in Western Europe. Routledge. Askanios, T.,& Mylonas,Y. (2015). Extreme -right Responses to the European Economic Crisis in Denmark and Sweden: The Discursive Construction of Scapegoats and Lodestars. Javnost/The Public, 22(1), 55–72 Art, D. (2011). Inside the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press. Backer, S. (2000). Right-wing extremism in unified Germany. In P. Hainsworth (Ed.), The politics of the extreme right: From the margins to the mainstream. Pinter. Bauman, Z. (2004). Europe: An unfinished Adventure. Polity Press. Bay, A. H., Finseraas, H., & West Pedersen, A. (2013). Welfare dualism in two Scandinavian Welfare States: Public opinion and party politics. West European Politics, 36(1), 199–220. Available online: https:// samfunnsforskning.brage.unit.no/samfunnsforskning-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2467457/ manus-endelig_2.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y BBC. (2020, June 25). Danish far-right leader Paludan jailed for racism. BBC. Available online: https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53185194 Betz, H.-G., & Meret, S. (2013). Right-wing populist parties and the working-class vote. What have you done for us lately? In J. Rydgren (Ed.), Class politics and the radical right. 107–121.Routledge. Boffey, D. (2019, May 5). Danish far-right party calling for Muslim deportation to stand in elections. The Guardian. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/05/danish-far-rightparty-stram-kurs-calling-for-muslim-deportation-to-stand-in-election Borras, S.M. (2020). Agrarian social movements: The absurdly difficult but not impossible agenda of defeating right-wing populism and exploring a socialist future. Journal of Agrarian Change, 20(1), 3–36. Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, H. (2012). Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945–2010. Palgrave Macmillan. Bujra, J., & Pearce, J. (2011). Saturday night and Sunday morning: The story of the Bradford Riots. Carter, E. (2005). The extreme right in Western Europe success or failure? Manchester University Press. Clante Bendixen, M. (2021, March 10). Denmark has gone far-right on refugee; Copenhagen claims Damascus is safe enough to send nearly 100 Syrians back. POLITICO. Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture, 22(1), 55–72. Creton, R. (2022, August 29). How Denmark got the image of ‘the strictest Western European Asylum country’. Netherlands Posts English. Available online: https://netherlands.postsen.com/news/61859/ How-Denmark-got-the-image-of-%E2%80%98strictest-Western-European-asylum-country% E2%80%99.html Dalby Ewert, J. (2021). Efter strid med Vermund- Nu er Erik Mortensen ekskluderet. Tvmv. Available online: https://www.tvmidtvest.dk/kommunalvalg-2021/efter-strid-med-vermund-nu-er-erik-mortensenekskluderet Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor. (2022, August 26). Denmark’s headscarf ban proposal is discriminatory, inciteful and dangerous. Euro-Med Monitor. Available online: https://euromedmonitor.org/en/ article/5304/Denmark’s-headscarf-ban-proposal-is-discriminatory,-inciteful,-and-dangerous Euronews. (2021, February 9). Inger Støjberg: Rare impeachment trial in Denmark as ex-minister accused of splitting migrants. Euronews. Available online: https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/02/ inger-stojberg-rare-impeachment-trial-in-denmark-as-ex-minister-accused-of-splitting-migra Fekete, L. (2018 July 18). Available online: https://irr.org.uk/article/islamophobia-in-denmark-fromparallel-societies-to-the-ghetto-list/

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Mette Wiggen Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2017). Refugee policy as negative nation branding: The case of Denmark and The Nordics. In Fischer, K., & Mouritzen, H. (Eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 99–125. Danish Institute for International Studies. Hayward, A. (2021, October 6). How to do Nørrebro, the world’s coolest neighbourhood. TimeOut. Available online: https://www.timeout.com/copenhagen/things-to-do/norrebro-copenhagenneighbourhood-guide Henderson, E. (2015, December 22). Refugee Crisis: Denmark Government defends plan to strip refugees’ valuables ‘to pay for their stay’. The Independent. Available online: https://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-denmark-government-defends-plan-to-strip-refugees-valuables-to-pay-for-their-stay-a6782916.html Holmsted Larsen, C. (2018). Højreekstremismen in Danmark – Udvikling, radikaliseringsporcesserne og håndteringen af den ekstreme højrefløj. Report for Trygdefonden and CERTA Intelligence and Security. Jupskås, A. R. (2016). Shaken, but not stirred: How right-wing populist parties have influenced parties and party systems in Scandinavia. In S. Wolinetz, & A. Zaslove (Eds.), Absorbing the blow-populist parties and their impact on party systems, 103–144. ECPR Press. Juul Christiansen, F. (2016). The Danish people’s party: Combining cooperation and radical positions. In T. Akkerman, S. De Lange, & M. Rooduijn (Eds.), Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Routledge. Kitschelt, H. (1997). Scandinavia: A milder version of the new radical right. The radical right in Western Europe. UMP. Leidig, E. (2021, October 26). We are worth fighting for. International Centre for Counter Terrorism. Available online: https://icct.nl/publication/women-far-right-extremism/ Lindevall. (2019, June 6). DR.DK. Available online: https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/folketingsvalg/ stram-kurs-faar-ingen-plads-i-folketinget-men-millioner-i Lipset, S.M.,& Rokkan, S.(Eds.). (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments. The Free Press. Lykketoft, A. (n.d.). Vermund vælter Facebook. K- FORUM. Available online: https://www.kommunikationsforum.dk/artikler/Hvad-kan-Vermund-paa-SoMe Meret, S. (2015). Charismatic female leadership and gender: Pia Kjærsgaard and the Danish People’s Party. Pattens of Prejudice, 49(1–2), 81–102. Meret, S. (2021). Duties first, rights next! The Danish social democrats’ right turn on migration politics. In N. Brandal, Ø Bratberg, & D. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Social democracy in the 21st century. 223–244.Emerald Publishing Limited. Nielsen, N. (2021, June 4). Commission: outsourcing asylum ‘illegal’, after new Danish law. Available online: https://euobserver.com/migration/152039 Nordvang Jensen, C. (2022). Dagbladet Information 3 November. Available online: https://www.information.dk/indland/2022/11/hoejrefloejen-vokser-smule-drivkraft-udlaendingepolitikken Norris, P. (2005). Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market. Cambridge University Press. Nye Borgerlige. (2015). Principprogram. Available online: https://nyeborgerlige.dk/principprogram/ Onyanga - Omara, J. (2018, August 1). Controversial burqa ban comes into effect in Denmark amid protests. USA Today. Available online: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/08/01/burqaban-comes-into-effect-denmark/878286002/ Pabst, M., Uldall, R., & Zander Renard, T. (2022, September 1). TV2. Available online: https://www.dr.dk/ nyheder/politik/intern-uenighed-i-socialdemokratiet-vestegnsborgmestre-afviser-toerklaedeforbud-i Rydgren, J. (2004). Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: The case of Denmark. West European Politics, 27(3), 474–502. Rydgren, J. (2018). The Oxford Handbook of the Radical-Right. Oxford University Press. Schierup, C.-U., & Ålund, A. (2011). The end of Swedish exceptionalism? Citizenship, neoliberalism and politics of exclusion. Race and Class, 53(1), 45–64. Siim, B., & Nissen, A. (2021, April 15). The Danish ‘New Right’ replacing ‘old welfare-chauvinism’ with a neo-liberal agenda. C-REX. Available online: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/ right-now/2021/the-danish-new-right.html The Local. (2022, June 22). Who can apply for Denmarks’s Arne pension early retirement. The Local. Available online: https://www.thelocal.dk/20220622/who-can-apply-for-denmarks-arne-pension-early-retirement/ TV2 Nyheder. (2022). Rød blok får værste måling i hele valgperioden, mens både V og K går frem. TV2Nyheder. Available online: https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2022-08-18-roed-blok-faar-vaerstemaaling-i-hele-valgperioden-mens-baade-v-og-k-gaar-frem

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The shift to the right in Denmark TV3. (1997). Mogens Glistrup fremmeddebat på TV3. TV3. Available online: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=OBeZdOWiReE UNHCR. (2021). News comment by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi on Denmark´s new law on the transfer of asylum-seekers to third countries. UNHCR. Available online: https://www. unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2021/6/60b93af64/news-comment-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippograndi-denmarks-new.html Widfeldt, A. (2015). Extreme right parties in Scandinavia. Routledge. Witcombe, N. A. (2019, January 19). Compulsory childcare in socially marginalised areas in Denmark. Nordics Info Aarhus University. Available online: https://nordics.info/show/artikel/compulsorychildcare-in-socially-marginalised-areas-in-denmark/ Wodak, R. (2021). The politics of fear (2nd ed.). Sage Publications Ltd. https://da.wikiquote.org/wiki/ Pia_Kjærsgaard Worth, O. (2019). Morbid Symptoms The Global Rise of the Far-right. Zed. Zissel og Eliten. (2021, 18). Med Astrid Haug -18 sep 2021. Podtail. Available online: https://podtail. com/da/podcast/zissel-og-eliten/zissel-og-eliten-med-astrid-haug-18-sep-2021/ Žižek, S. (1991). For they know what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor. Verso.

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PART V

Western Europe

15 THE NEW HORIZONS OF THE FRENCH EXTREME RIGHT Fragmented but Dynamic and Better Socially Embedded Nicolas Lebourg and Marlene Laruelle

The French far right has historically been characterised by its fragmentation into small groups. This fragmentation is so structural that even the Vichy regime had the peculiar distinction of not being a single-party system and offering up to 88 different far-right political parties and organisations for voters to choose from.1 This fragmentation tends to create the illusion that, because each far-right group outside the Front National/Rassemblement National (FN/RN) is small, even the sum of their parts would be laughable. However, when La Manif Pour Tous (LMPT: Demonstration for All) called to continue mass demonstrations against the legalisation of homosexual marriage in 2013, the extreme right (outside the FN) could line up 17,000 people under multiple banners in Paris for the “Day of Anger” demonstration on 26 January 2014, demanding the resignation of President François Hollande. The intelligence services estimated in 2019 that far-right radical groups represented 3,000 people, including 1,000 who were potentially dangerous.2 A first National Front (not related to the contemporary one) was created in 1934 precisely to counter this fragmentation: it was about achieving a unitary “nationalist consensus” between all the far-right organisations. This principle was the one constantly cited by Jean-Marie Le Pen between the foundation of the FN in 1972 and the great split experienced by the party in 1999 when half of its executives and elected officials left with Bruno Mégret and founded the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR: National Republican Movement). Since then, the FN gradually deepened its electoral impact under the presidency of Marine Le Pen – who renamed it Rassemblement National (RN: National Rally) in 2018, to symbolise its desire to repair the split and show a united front. However, in 2021, Marine Le Pen saw her leadership contested by the presidential campaign of polemicist Éric Zemmour, confirming once again that fragmentation remains a key feature of the French radical right. In this chapter we explore the extreme-right landscape (we use “extreme right” to define those groups situated to the right of the National Front/Rally), look at those minor parties which remain politically active, those which have been dissolved by the authorities since 2017, and investigate the growing number of cases in which activists opt for violence, terrorism, or the dream of a coup.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-21

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On the right of Marine’s national rally: Active movements Overall, the small parties existing on the right of the NF/RN were born from the transformation of the National Front into a family business during the 1990s. To ensure the generational passage between Jean-Marie and his daughter Marine Le Pen, the party purged its ranks of the less docile figures over several years.

Movements standing for electoral representation In 2009, former FN cadres founded the Parti de la France (PDF: Party of France) in order to re-establish the National Front of the 1980s: in its form, with the nationalist consensus, and in its substance, by advocating a liberal economy and by castigating “foreign colonisation and Islamisation.” The PDF’s purpose was to become an old-fashioned version of the National Front in the hopes of one day retaking the support of those disappointed with Marine Le Pen’s “normalisation” process (which began as early as 2002 after her father’s defeat at the presidential elections). The bet on this revival was lost, and the joint candidacies of the PDF together with other micro-groups represented only 0.3% of the votes cast in the legislative elections of 2017. The main activists of the PDF movement are the national Catholics, who had a real weight in the National Front until they were pushed out during Marine Le Pen’s rise to party leadership. The main representative body of this group is currently Civitas, an institute founded in 1999 and transformed into a party in 2016. Its program calls for Catholicism as a state religion, the prohibition of Freemasonry, and the abolition of the progressive nature of income tax. A few local candidacies gave Civitas around 1% of the votes in the legislative elections of 2017. Neither Civitas nor the PDF were able to stand in the European elections of May 2019, but, together with former RN candidates, several of their members took part in the “Reconquête!” (Reconquest) electoral list initiated by the Dissidence française (DF: French Dissent). Founded in 2011, Dissidence française was ostensibly neo-fascist, called for a Eurasian geopolitical union, and willingly quoted Aleksandr Dugin and Julius Evola. In the European elections, the Reconquest list3 won the competition with the other extreme right list denouncing the threat of the “Great Replacement” as coined by the writer Renaud Camus: 4,569 votes against 1,578 for the latter. The anti-“Grand replacement” list was led by SIEL (Souveraineté, identité et libertés: Sovereignty, identity, and liberties), a small sovereigntist party founded in 2011 with the initial aim of opening up the National Front to the moderate right. The votes for Dissidence française are firmly concentrated in France’s classic regions of radicalism (North and Rhône valley), but above all show dissemination in rural areas. Dissidence française wanted to go further by joining forces with Civitas in order to set up electoral lists in small towns without declared candidates for the 2020 municipal elections. After the failure of this tactic, the group transformed itself into the Mouvement NationalDémocrate (MND: National-Democratic Movement). This strategy has clear electoral aims: by leaving aside the esotericism inspired by Evola and his Traditionalist movement, the MND now concentrates on preserving “the Christian roots of France.” While the DF assumed a nationalistrevolutionary style that liked to play “both right and left,” the MND presents itself firmly to the right of the National Rally, considering Marine Le Pen to be giving voice merely to the “protest of the rentiers.”4 Despite the direct reference to the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, the German neo-Nazi party, in its title, the MND is more an echo of the frontism (the National Front’s ideology) of the early 1990s, mingled with the notion of absolute sovereignty and the desire to re-examine the immigrant naturalisations carried out since 1973. 218

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The “Frexiter” niche (supporters of a French version of Brexit) promoted by the Mouvement National-Démocrate has been a dead end so far: in the European elections the party of Les Patriotes (LP) under the leadership of Florian Philippot, a very mediatised figure, formerly close friend of Marine Le Pen, won only 0.65% of the votes. The party’s strategy to present itself as the political outlet for the Yellow Vests (Gilets Jaunes) movement was also a failure. Since then, Les Patriotes has spearheaded the opposition to the vaccination pass, embracing a virulent form of health populism. The demonstrations against the vaccination pass that Les Patriotes led during the summer of 2021 were able to bring together up to 200,000 people. Until the autumn of 2021, it was clear that none of these small structures had the means to challenge the hegemony of the National Rally. The electorate who could be ideologically seduced by their offers was not only sparse but knew very well that backing what Le Pen offers was more productive in terms of its potential results. For instance in the southern city of Perpignan – the only large city won by the RN in 2020 with the new mayorship of Louis Aliot, the kingpin of the “de-demonisation” strategy – the SIEL and the Reconquest lists won zero and seven votes, respectively. Reducing the vote for the extreme right to a “vote of anger” has always been a false lead: the extreme-right voter knows how to vote rationally for their ideas. Consequently, these formations have bet everything on the decline of the National Rally and of Marine Le Pen personally. Radical groups have maintained the concept of nationalist consensus, which was immediately redeployed when Éric Zemmour launched his candidacy in the autumn of 2021. Siphoning off half of Le Pen’s vote potential in the opinion polls after launching his own party, Reconquête!, dedicated to the fight against the “Great Replacement,” Zemmour’s platform served as a nationalist consensus unifying different micro-constituencies of the extreme right, such as fundamentalist Catholics, monarchists, and white nationalists. Zemmour’s platform also broke with the two markers of Le Pen’s “de-demonisation”: her rejection of anti-Semitic polemics and of ethnic/racialist approaches to identifying the nation. Zemmour has attracted to his ranks all those who were ousted by two generations of Le Pens, such as Jean-Yves Le Gallou, the former right-hand man of Bruno Mégret.

Movements without an electoral strategy Outside of the camp of small political organisations trying to fight for electoral survival, the extreme right is even more fragmented. Action Française (French Action), a royalist movement founded in 1905 adhering to the doctrine of Charles Maurras, has gone through cycles of heightened activity and of decline. It has faced the same challenges for decades: an overrepresentation of young people from aristocratic families, sometimes socially downgraded, wherein the affiliation with Action Française is transferred from father to son; an organisational apparatus that acts as a “strainer,” which means that young members leave after a few years of membership; a de facto subdivision between young activists who dream of becoming the new Groupe Union Défense (GUD), an infamously violent neo-fascist youth movement founded in 1968 and relaunched in 2023 (with an impressive protest of several hundred people in Paris’ streets in May 2023); and a much older hierarchy (Casajus, 2019). After the success of La Manif pour Tous, Action Française gained some momentum, as evidenced by the arrest of a dozen of its members in the “Day of Anger” demonstration, the brawling agitation of its Marseille section in 2016–2017, or the conviction in November 2019 of five of its members for violence in the city of Le Mans. Following Maurras’ adage, “we must be intellectual and violent,” Action Française does not limit itself to these sorts of actions alone. In 2018, the movement launched a new magazine, Le Bien Commun (“the common 219

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good,” or “commonweal”), which joined the l’Association pour la presse française libre, founded by the national Catholic daily Présent (with a daily circulation of between 5,000 and 10,000 copies) and joined by the monthly L’Incorrect (launched in 2017 with 10,000 copies), close to Marion Maréchal, the niece of Jean-Marie Le Pen in dissent against her aunt Marine. Another group is Égalité et Réconciliation (ER: Equality and Reconciliation), founded in 2007 by the writer Alain Soral when he was a member of the FN directorate, with the administrative and financial support of former members of the GUD. The initial goal was to provide the National Front with an ethnically and culturally diverse base of activists, in order to pursue the strategy of “de-demonisation” (Mestre & Monnot, 2011). Following Soral’s departure from the FN in 2009, Égalité et Réconciliation’s goal was to present Marine Le Pen in a negative light, and NF number two Florian Philippot (who had sent a signal of support in return) in a positive light (Jonathan Hayoun and Judith Cohen-Solal2019, ). ER relies primarily on its website for getting its message out, which had reached eight-million monthly views in 2016 but has since lost half of its traffic – through the closure in 2020 of its YouTube channel and its Twitter account has not diminished its audience. Égalité et Réconciliation covers a stable but limited space: it has a few thousand contributing writers for 200 active members (Montagner, 2020). Its ideological platform is built upon a virulently Anti-Semitic denunciation of “Zionism” behind everything, considering that this “Zionism” aims at the transnationalisation of the world. For example, even Éric Zemmour’s revisionist remarks on how Marshall Philippe Pétain allegedly protected French Jews were described by Égalité et Réconciliation as a tactical move by the supposed “Jewish community” to reassert its domination over France. Nevertheless, Égalité et Réconciliation no longer lives in a state of autarky. Alain Soral spoke at a January 2019 unitary meeting called “Yellow Vests, or the coming revolution!” which brought together 500 people. The other speakers were the editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper Rivarol (which has seen its weekly circulation of 50,000 during the 1960s decline by 90%); the anti-Semitic writer Hervé Ryssen, himself a former FN militant and current leader of what he claims to be the real Action Française; and the leader of the Les Nationalistes group, Yvan Benedetti. Les Nationalistes take a fascist stance, mixed with Catholicism and affirmation of pride in the white race. They took over from the Œuvre française (OF: French Mission), banned in 2013, but with only a third of its 150 remaining members. OF had received Jean-Marie Le Pen’s agreement to participate in the FN, but Marine Le Pen expelled its leader Yvan Benedetti after he declared to the press in 2011 that he was “anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic, anti-Jew.” Benedetti has a gift for being able to exercise leadership over his men, giving them political discipline, while at the same time observing how averse they are to a culture of textual doctrines.5 All those today interested in the fight against “the Zionist lobby” are difficult to lump together within a more unitary far-right struggle, and tend to perpetually accuse mutually each other of hidden Jewishness. For instance, an extreme-right periodical La Politique condemned Hervé Ryssen as a “Zionist” during his incarceration in 2020 for anti-Semitic remarks, while reproducing extracts from Rivarol making Marion Maréchal out to be “… a Jewish Zionist.”6 Hervé Ryssen and white nationalist YouTuber Daniel Conversano clashed with each other from 2017 as to who would be the least consistent in opposing Jews and Islam, but both chose to support Éric Zemmour despite his Jewishness, on behalf of the fight for the white race. White nationalism has indeed become the main unifying thread amongst the fragmented French extreme right. Its leader has long been Pierre Vial, who founded the völkisch group Terre et Peuple (Land and People) in 1994 to organise it both from within and on the fringes of the National Front. Claiming to have been ideologically trained by the former Waffen-SS 220

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member Marc Augier, Pierre Vial had been one of the main cadres of the split with Bruno Mégret. He left the MNR when Mégret reached out to French Jews after the 9/11 attacks. However, he too, like Mégret’s followers, chose to support Zemmour’s candidacy7 – a merely symbolic support, since according to one anonymous source, the Terre et Peuple magazine has just 381 subscribers. However, völkisch references as such, with their openly German origins, are no longer deemed appropriate, and a leading face of white nationalism is now the young YouTuber, Daniel Conversano. Conversano was an early collaborator of the black anti-Semite Dieudonné before becoming a full-blown racist. He pushed his racist logic to the limit by emigrating to Bucharest and inviting his friends to join a supposedly racially unaltered Eastern Europe. Hyperactive on the internet, he managed to give birth to a real group, Les Braves, from his web activism, bringing together half a thousand people with a white communitarian ideal (Marion-Bouille & Pacaud, 2022). To promote his cause, he published Racial Civil War, a posthumous work of Guillaume Faye, former member of GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d’études pour la Civilisation Européenne: Research and Studies Group for European Civilisation), who from 2000 onwards became a prophet of racial war, and died in 2019 with his ideas having widely spread to the English-speaking world (Camus, 2022). In late 2021, Conversano’s two YouTube channels had about 30,000 subscribers altogether, his Twitter account about 16,000 followers, and his Telegram channel about 10,000 – quite high numbers for the small field of the extreme right.

Failed experiments: Movements banned by the authorities Several extreme-right movements have been banned by the French authorities. Historically, the legal mechanism for prohibiting political groups in France was established by the law of 10 January 1936. Certain groups may be prohibited on the proposal of the Prime Minister by decree of the President of the Republic in the Council of Ministers. The law originally targeted far-right leagues, and this field has remained the essential object of its application, with 46.5% of the movements banned since 1936 coming under it. Although the rate has been lower under the Fifth Republic (40.7%), it has increased since 2002, reaching 51.4% of cases in this latest period.

Bastion social In 2017, the radical milieu seemed to find a spearhead with the creation of Bastion Social by the GUD of Lyon. The GUD of Lyon had at that time just recently participated in the creation of the European movement Reconquista, launched by the main Ukrainian far-right group, the Azov Division (Nonjon, 2020). They opted to found a movement with a nationalistrevolutionary tendency inspired by the Italian CasaPound, and with a strategy of social action and the systematic creation of “community pub”-type local branches. The latter strategy is supposed to insert the group into its urban fabric (not without some oddities: at the end of 2017, at night of the inauguration of such a place in Strasbourg, 20 nationalists beat up a young Algerian). It was Bastion Social participation in the Yellow Vests riots of 1 December 2018, during which the Arch of Triumph was vandalised, which justified its ban on 24 April 2019. The decree prohibiting it took care to list the small local groups on which Bastion Social relied (Les Petits Reblochons, Association Lugdunum, Cercle Frédéric Mistral, Cercle Honoré d’Estienne d’Orves, Solidarité Argentoratum, Association Arvernis). The activists reconverted 221

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into city-level associations–a method already used by radical groups following bans of their movements (Lebourg, 2019). Also involved in the vandalisation of the Parisian monument was a new group calling itself the Zouaves (after the famous French infantrymen stationed composed of Algerians), who were in turn banned in January 2022, after the violence they had committed the previous month against anti-racist activists protesting against Zemmour’s first campaign meeting. Since 2018, the name Zouaves has been used by Parisian right-wing activists for their common violent actions, beyond their individual group affiliations. Amongst these were the Identitaires, a movement whose main organisation, Génération identitaire, was banned in March 2021 but which has deeply transformed the radical right end of spectrum in Europe.

Génération identitaire The adventure of the Identitaires began with the dissolution of Unité Radicale in 2002. One of its young members shot President Jacques Chirac on Bastille Day – the attacker justified his action by the fact that the president was allegedly an “agent of ZOG” (which stands for “Zionist Occupation Government”) (Albertini & Doucet, 2016). The group’s/party’s ban allowed its young activists to renovate the methods of action: exit the fascist references, radical anti-Zionism, violent activism, typical looks, and underground propaganda. The impact of jihadist attacks on French territory also liquidated their neo-paganism, hegemonic in the radicalism of the 1980s and 1990s, and provoked adherence to cultural Catholicism. The Identitaires has broken with neo-fascist codes to assume an ethnicist/racialist line of thought such as has rarely been seen or heard in the French public square since it became taboo following the Second World War. They have claimed to espouse a more mainstream style, stating that their goal is “to scare the adversary, not our grandmothers.” However, their activists do not easily adopt this approach, and they still can be found engaging in various brawls. One of their members from Toulouse, dismissed from the army after setting fire to a mosque, ended up going to fight in Ukraine’s Donbas region on the Russian side, before reappearing in the security service of the Yellow Vests (Lebourg, 2018). The Identitaires’ relations with Marine Le Pen are especially bad, since they tried for a few years to stand for election and therefore compete directly with the National Front’s share of the conservative vote. In 2014, they called on their supporters to vote for the Le Pen party, and got around 50 of them on its lists in the municipal elections. The idea was to continue to carry out the ethnic and anti-Islam themes that the National Front could not deploy publicly, drawing inspiration from the methods of environmental activism: peaceful and symbolically strong actions intended to promote topical issues and ultimately to advance a long-term political agenda. Génération identitaire (GI) has become the flagship of these actions and the antithesis of the model of the radicalism of past decades: acting in broad daylight, faces uncovered, with women in the group and with actions designed for their potential media impact, claiming to defend those who would be oppressed by Islam. A new generation in this movement is currently taking over the reins: Damien Rieu embodies Génération identitaire on Twitter, with 86,000 followers at the start of 2020, and has since then rallied Zemmour. Younger, more masculine, and more popular than the militants of most other French political parties, mainly located in urban centres, the Identitaires have developed a strong sense of community. With their system of initiatory militancy, where the militant is gradually integrated into the organisation, the Identitaires do have a certain capacity for networking (JacquetVaillant, 2021a). They have become an international brand with the foundation of branches in Germany, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and 222

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Slovenia (Jacquet-Vaillant, 2021b). Their “summer university” also has European dimensions and, even if the photograph of the class of 2019 only showed 107 people, it served to forge common transnational cultures and practices. Their leading figure, Philippe Vardon, has long posed a problem for the National Front. He has been critical of the orientation led by Marine Le Pen, believing that “the strictly sovereignist line that some defend in the FN sometimes seems to give priority to the state over the people and their identity.”8 Although widely considered one of the most gifted politicians of the far right, Philippe Vardon caused such mistrust that in 2013 he only had the card of the Rassemblement Bleu Marine (Marine’s association intended to open up the FN) for less than 24 hours. In 2018, Vardon joined the National Office of the National Rally and participated in the organisation of the last presidential and European campaigns. He is one of the three Identitaires out of the seven aides of European deputy Nicolas Bay, vice-president of the Identity and Democracy faction in the European Parliament (which was also the former name of the Identitaires’ journal), who joined Zemmour in February 2022. However, the Identitaires’ leader had to give up his position in 2021: the repeated broadcasting of images showing him at a neo-Nazi concert in his youth had been deemed “unmanageable” by the leadership of the National Rally, as stated by one of the party’s leading figure at the Party convention. Vardon eventually joined Zemmour too, a sign that the National Rally prefers to lose than to keep those who could create internal schism. Another key Identitarian figure is Damien Rieu, who started out as an aide to Marion Maréchal, and then became the assistant to the European deputy Philippe Olivier, the brother-inlaw of Marine Le Pen before, too, rallying Zemmour. The latter borrowed from the Identitarians the notion of “localism,” the only strong new theme of the National Rally since 2017 – to the point that led to the creation a new satellite, the Parti local, in 2021. The Identitaires thus oscillated between being a cadre school for the National Rally and a transnational movement of agitprop playing the role of a radical right avant-garde.9 This dynamism has pushed them to make major plays for media attention: setting out in a boat on the Mediterranean to cut off the route of migrants, then engaging in border control operations in the Alps and then in the Pyrenees against migrants crossing the borders. This vigilante substitution for law enforcement agencies resulted in the movement’s dissolution in March 2021 – which again led to a flowering of local affiliate associations, but also to various members being drawn to the Zemmour campaign, like Damien Rieu himself.

L’Alvarium Another political structure that emerged at the local level, before being banned, was the Alvarium, founded in 2017 in Angers by the son of Pascal Gannat, former chief advisor to Jean-Marie Le Pen. The Alvarium participated in neo-fascist actions, also holding the Italian CasaPound up as a model. A community vegetable garden, for example, was launched in 2020. They also organised a squat reserved for French citizens, not migrants, that was evicted the police in the autumn of 2020, but the movement was able to keep some proximity with the conservative bourgeoisie. The magazine Valeurs actuelles (with a weekly circulation of 93,000, and close ties to the Zemmour campaign) has indeed supported the Alvarium as a social movement with rightist values. Academia Christiana, a training institute for young Catholics (including one of Marine Le Pen’s daughters), organised its summer school with the Alvarium in a school of the Holy Cross Congregation. Engaged in humanitarian support for Armenia, the leader of the Alvarium is a former National Front candidate, son of a former chief of staff of Jean-Marie Le 223

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Pen. In September 2020, he ran the local elections, only garnering 1.41% of the vote when the National Rally candidate won 9.78% (Décugis et al., 2020). The participation of Alvarium activists in various acts of violence led to the banning of the movement in November 2021. In January 2022, one of its former members was still serving his 12-month prison sentence, eight of which were for violence committed towards demonstrators protesting against the unemployment insurance reform.

The neo-Nazis On the list of extreme-right movements banned by the French state, one can also find some neo-Nazi organisations. This is the case, for instance, of Blood & Honour Hexagone (BHH), banned in 2019 following the discovery of this neo-Nazi group’s participation in arms trafficking. Like all Blood and Honour chapters, their activities were primarily those of classic skinhead subcultures, such as concerts like the one in 2015 which brought together between 300 and 350 people, including some from Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain. These gatherings were the occasion for neo-Nazi provocations, such as Algerian and Israeli flag burnings, and the display of swastikas. BHH also organised mixed martial arts tournaments and fights. Its website offered radical merchandising, such as a line of clothing “made by white people, for white people.” Limited to the Marseille region, the subdivision of the organisation into three circles did not hide the modest number of its members. BHH thus had 12 duespaying “members,” four “prospective members” (aspirants to member status in the observation phase and needing to prove themselves in combat), and seven “hexagoners” (supporters).10 President Macron himself announced the banning of BHH at the dinner of the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France: Crif), at the same time as those of Bastion Social and Combat 18. The latter actually never existed: C18 was not present in France apart from a few instances of insulting graffiti. The French authorities also banned other radical groups between 2019 and 2021: the Anti-Zionist Party, a splinter group that led a list in the Ile-de-France region during the 2009 European elections (1.3%) with Alain Soral and Dieudonné and was forbidden at the same time as some radical pro-Iranian Islamist associations; the Turkish Loups Gris (Grey Wolves), on the grounds of their violence against the Armenian community, but also with the suspicions of the co-opting of the Turkish diaspora in France by the Erdoğan regime; and the Ligue de défense noire africaine (Black African Defence League) for anti-white racism. The French authorities have then worked on dissolving both extreme far-right groups and more Islamist or “Islamofascist” associations, essentially those of national level, while allowing the smaller ones of regional size to remain (Molard, 2021).

Terrorist and coup attempts: The ultra-right realm The French intelligence services are concerned not only about radical movements that have been banned but also about the ongoing violent radicalisation of what they call the ultra right.11 The term has no ideological value: it is simply used to designate that segment of the extreme right that may be prone to violence. Statistically, the number of acts attributed to the ultra-right exploded since 1982. Originally anti-Semitic, the violence has become mainly anti-North African. Prefiguring accelerationism (the white-supremacist idea that one needs to accelerate political tensions and sow chaos in order to provoke racial wars and white “racial awakening”), neo-Nazi militants perpetrated attacks and assassinations under false Jewish or North African flags between 1987 and 1995, in the hope of provoking waves of inter-ethnic 224

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violence. Ultra-right violent attacks reached a low point during the 1990s – activists were then engaged in the National Front. Their rise today is significant: the number of cases grew in 2013 in the context of La Manif pour Tous, and then rose again following the jihadist attacks of January and November 2015 (Lebourg & Sommier, 2021). Since then, terrorist attempts and coup d’état fantasies have followed one another. However, the radical leaders of the 1960s and 1970s had never ceased to explain to their members that the dream of a putsch was a thing of the past and that terrorism was futile.12 Yet the 2015 attacks (the January one against Charlie Hebdo and the November one against the Bataclan, the Stade de France, and some bars), the Yellow Vests movement in 2018–2019, and pandemic populism in 2020–2021 have been three shocks accelerating the renewal of the ultra right. From 2017 to 2021, the French Counter-terrorist Prosecutor’s Office was given 11 cases, resulting in 48 arrests. In almost all cases, we find a combination of survivalist groups and online radicalisation (Telegram groups, usage of Protonmail), leading to offline violence.

Organisation de l’armée secrète Two dismantled groups were born directly from the aftershocks of the 2015 jihadist attacks. The first, Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS: Organisation of the secret army), took on the name of the terrorist group that fought against the independence of French Algeria in the 1960s. This neo-OAS was founded by young former militants of the Œuvre Française from Marseille. They first created a movement inspired by the Greek Golden Dawn and, after the 2015 turning point, joined the Conversano movement with the aim of building a communitarian village reserved for whites, hesitating to emigrate to supposedly “free-of-migrants” Hungary or Poland. When the OAS group was banned, its militants from the Paris region joined Dissidence française. On the first anniversary of the attacks, the members from Marseille and Perpignan set up a terrorist group inspired by such “role models” as Anders Breivik (whose 2011 attacks in Norway left 77 dead and 151 injured) and Alexandre Bissonnette (whose attack on a mosque in Montréal in 2017 left six dead and eight injured). Their plots were those of a ragtag group (such as an attack on a bar frequented by the left), but most of them were aimed at murdering people from the Middle East in order to cause more of them to flee. In October 2021, the OAS leader was sentenced to nine years in prison.

Action des forces opérationnelles With much more sophisticated plots, another group, Action des Forces Opérationnelles (AFO: Action of the Operations Forces) has a more complex history. It was born of an activist split, provoked by Volontaires pour la France (Volunteers for France), another movement born in the aftermath of the attacks of January 2015, but whose theorist Yvan Blot was a former member of GRECE and of the National Front, where he denounced the “genocide of the white race.” Then he became a member of the MNR and contributed to the pro-Russian think tank Géopragma. Although referring to Gaullism and the Resistance, while modelling their structure on that of the anti-Gaullist OAS, Action des Forces Opérationnelles was close to white-nationalist movements, with the desire to build white communities and to organise terrorism directed against Muslims–including the poisoning of halal meat. It denounced the “Great Replacement” both in its mainstream, Islamophobic, version, and in its old-fashioned variety of a supposed Jewish globalist plot. AFO’s president was a retired general, animating the association of reserve officers of the department of Perpignan. Eager to take action, AFO members were wealthy people and former police officers. Those who were interested in a more classical form 225

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of political engagement joined either the Republican Party (Les Républicains: LR) of former President Nicolas Sarkozy, or the National Front. The Yellow Vests offered a fertile soil for ultra-right radicalisation. Right-wing radicals joined the popular protests in November 2018 but were gradually supplanted by the ultra left (estimated at around 3,000 activists) in December. Yet they were still represented amongst those Yellow Vests arrested in January 2019,13 which led police departments to coin the designation of “yellow ultras.” Estimated at around 300 people, these yellow ultras were sometimes sympathisers of the National Front, but became radicalised after coming into contact with the ultra left. Some of the influential Facebook pages that contributed to the Yellow Vests movements were coming from groups close to AFO (Décugis et al., 2020). As early as March 2018, they were contemplating terrorist acts against Muslims, Freemasons, and the assassination of the president. Here again, it was impatience that led activists to rush in, and consequently to their arrests.

Opération Azur In 2019, a new network emerged that would take the name of “Opération Azur” (OA). Its leader, Rémy Daillet-Wiedemann, claimed to have joined the Croatian ranks during the war in the former Yugoslavia, but his first official political engagement was in François Bayrou’s centrist party the Modem. He then launched a website to support homeschooling, on which an ER activist and the president of Civitas also collaborated. In the autumn of 2020, DailletWiedemann began to multiply his video messages on all sorts of classic conspiratorial themes. He warned that he was preparing a coup d’état, and opened a website “For a coup d’état” in the hopes of enlisting activists via an online form. In short, his image was that of someone insane. Nevertheless, in April 2021, Opération Azur’s activists were arrested in connection with the kidnapping of an eight-year-old girl whom they thought they would save from her supposed exploitation by paedophiliac Satanist elites – a theme inspired by the QAnon culture. Then, the following October, the media reported that Daillet-Wiedemann had been indicted for leading a terrorist organisation involving dozens of people, including police and military members, and plotting attacks against Masonic lodges, 5G antennas, vaccination stations, etc. The plot was intended to culminate in a coup d’état during which the militants would make a point of taking the Élysée Palace and the headquarters of a television channel. While part of the terror plot was based on members of the neo-Nazi group Honneur et Nation (HN: Honour and Nation), the supervision of the paramilitary branch was provided by a former army lieutenant colonel decorated with the Legion of Honour (Macé & Plottu, 2021). The documentation distributed by Rémy Daillet-Wiedemann to activists by email described the Opération Azur’s worldview. According to it, “the God of the Jews is Satan. Their messiah is the Antichrist.” Judaism would have been taken up by the Khazars (the 2008 work by the Israeli historian Shlomo Sand on the supposed Khazar ancestry of the Ashkenazi Jews received an enthusiastic welcome amongst French anti-Semites): hence the repression of this supposed paedophile Satanism by Russia (the documents quote the French neo-Eurasianist site Saker, which portrays Russia very positively). Some traits of classic Nazism and anti-Semitism were to be found: the Jews would be “Turkic-Mongols” breaking in from Asia to subjugate Europe and take control of the white masses through Masonic lodges, etc. The movement thus combined all the major conspiracy theories: how The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, MK Ultra, QAnon, mind control, white genocide, the Great Replacement, the September 11 and November 13 terrorist attacks, as well as coronavirus and COVID-19 vaccines would all be Jewish actions. Although the members of Opération Azur were more classically anti-Semitic than Islamophobic, one may find amongst them a dimension typical of the radicalised “counter-jihad” 226

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activists, especially those who radicalised after the 2015 attacks. One of their members was a survivalist used to pose for photography with guns, wearing insignia such as the wolf rune or the symbol of Hydra in front of flags flanked by the swastika or the Black Sun, but another one was a professor of chemistry who got interested for the first time in the explosive substance TATP after one of his students was killed at the Bataclan.14 Half of the dozen members of Action des Forces Opérationnelles became radicalised after the November 13 attacks, and several said in police custody that they believed that war with Islam had been opened at the Bataclan. They gradually came to believe in the need for a “white jihad” under the influence of accelerationist theories.

Accelerationnism Accelerationism appeared in France not due to the rise of neo-Nazi groups, but rather of farright YouTubers: in 2018, two of them with hundreds of thousands of subscribers in total launched the creation of local teams, which gradually formed the small group Vengeance patriote (Patriot Vengeance). Vengeance patriote uses the face masks typical of AtomWaffen Division (AWD) and distributes the French translation of its bible, Siege, presenting it as “the reference work of Ironmarch and AtomWaffen Division (…) the most popular work of the radical right for its terrorist and clandestine approach to the struggle against power.”15 If the group has not drifted towards terrorist action, the Counter-terrorist Prosecutor office decided in December 2021 to indict the moderator of the website for advocating terrorism. In October 2021, two young neo-Nazi men and a young woman were arrested for both distributing AWD literature and promoting jihadist themes – a paradoxical combination that may emerge at the most radical parts of the extreme-right landscape (Newhouse, 2021). They were suspected of having wanted to prepare dual mass killings to be perpetrated on 20 April 2022, four days before the first round of the presidential election and the anniversary day of Hitler’s birth. In November 2021, a man was indicted for act of terrorism, and possession of a weapon of war and explosive substances. He was hosting a “To Hell” Telegram group discussing the Siege literature. He not only invited its members to vote for the extreme right against the Arabs or for the radical left against the Jews, but also pushed each of his readers to “become a lone wolf,” quoted white supremacist David Lane, and published poems and notes recounting the hunts for the man and mass killings of his dreams.16 He also distributed the Accelerationism: A Collective Handbook (Accélerationnisme: un manuel collectif), the French version of the British Terrorgram, comprising 136 remarkably illustrated pages and arguably the most radical document published in France since Disintegration of the System half a century ago. In the same month, 13 members of “Recolonisation France,” a small group set up on Telegram whose members were mainly from Marseilles, were arrested with 130 firearms, bulletproof vests, silencers, and other equipment in their possession.

Conclusion Fragmentation is noticeable in all extreme-rights contexts and the French case in no exception. The extreme right has always been a rhizome of interconnected small groups, with activists embedded in several structures simultaneously, but encrypted messaging systems have accentuated its nebular character. Digital socialisation obviously plays a central role in the new radicalisation processes described here. One of the members of Opération Azur was, for instance, subscribed to no fewer than 32 Telegram channels, including some from the Nationalists, Action des Forces Opérationnelles, Recolonisation France, Génération Identitaire, Alvarium, etc. 227

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The 20th-century dream of small groups hoping to become political parties, with doctrinal programs, training camps, and formally enrolled members, is over: fluidity of institutional belonging has become the new norm. Yet, this does not mean that the links between the fragmented extreme right and the main far-right political structures have been severed: while the Telegram channel Team Patriote saw its 150 members denigrating Marine Le Pen and the National Front, and promoting a “race war” as the only solution, they all declared their solidarity for Éric Zemmour’s candidacy (Laurent, 2020). Zemmour’s strength has been to re-launch the idea of a nationalist consensus that can rally from the ultras ready to engage in terrorist actions and dreaming of a coup to the notables of the conservative bourgeoisie shaped by their Catholicism and nostalgia for a mythified old-fashioned France. Zemmour’s success then raises a key question for both scholarship and policy: is national populism able to neutralise radicalism? It remains to be seen whether the former can channel the latter into more peaceful activism, or if it may contribute to radicalism by normalising radical theories and discourses. A second central question is whether the current fragmentation of French political life on the right end of the ideological spectrum (mirroring what is happening on the left) will be overcome by Marine Le Pen’s strategy, or if the centrifugal dynamics will gain momentum once again. The French far right finds itself at a turning point. With 41,45 per cent of election at the second round of the May 2022 presidential election, and in gathering 89 deputes at the parliamentary elections of June 2022, Marine Le Pen has proved the validity of her strategy of de-demonisation of the National Rally. She was able to embody a populist aggionamento shared by many European countries, where the far right posits itself as the last solution to defend European way of life against alleged Islamisation and globalisation. But while the anti-Muslim xenophobia is spreading, it also contributes to radicalise the far-right fringe, up to the terrorist temptation. Radicalisation now concerns now not only peripheral movements with open references to historical fascism, but also new groups, better integrated into the social fabric, that denounce the domination of the “elite” against the “real people.” These new radicals have different, more mainstream, sociological profiles and could recognise themselves into Zemmour’s political offer. The RN success of 2022 thus confirms that at stake today is not only the normalisation of the far right but a radicalisation of the mainstream.

Notes 1 Inspection Générale des Services des Renseignements Généraux, “Partis et groupements politiques”, 14 June 1941 p. 98, Archives Nationales/F/7/15588. 2 Parliamentary inquiry commission., La nouvelle menace d'ultra-droite: Mieux l'appréhender pour mieux la combattre. Comptes-rendus des auditions, June 2019, p. 72 (Nicolas Lebourg’s archives: NLA). 3 “Reconquest” is also the name of the party founded by Éric Zemmour in 2021. This is not a reference to the DF list but the influence on these two circles of the thought of Guillaume Faye who put fashion twenty years ago, by analogy with the history of Spain, the principle of the "Reconquista" against "the Islamization of Europe". See François and Nonjon, 2022. 4 See https://www.natdem.fr/le-mouvement (accessed 3 January 2022). 5 Interview ofYvan Benedetti with Nicolas Lebourg, 23 March 2019. 6 La Politique: Lettre d'information des Cercles Nationalistes Français, n°222, October 2020 (NLA). 7 Le Chêne, n°101, October 2021 (NLA; this is the internal bulletin of the MNR). 8 Interview ofPhilippe Vardon with Nicolas Lebourg, 11 November 2013. 9 La Revue identitaire, n°6, 2019 (bulletin of GI). 10 Superior Court of Marseille, « Réquisitoire définitif à l'encontre des prévenus de l'affaire BBH, » 30 July 2018 (NLA).

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The new horizons of French extreme right 11 For the three cases studied below, we use French services investigation documents. For the OAS: investigation documents from the Anti-Terrorist Sub-Directorate of the Judicial Police; for the AFO and the Operation Azur: investigation documents from the General Directorate of Internal Security (NLA). For a full study see Lebourg, 2021. 12 Dominique Venner, Pour une critique positive, supplément au n° 98 du 28 August 1962 de Politique éclair Hebdomadaire de l'élite française; François Duprat, Année Zéro, 1976. 13 Commission of Inquiry, op. quote. 14 Investigation documents from the General Directorate of Homeland Security (NLA). 15 We do not add footnotes with URL for movements accused of terrorism by the French Counterterrorist Prosecutor Office. 16 Telegram loop messages and manual: NLA.

References Albertini, D., & Doucet, D. (2016). La Fachosphère. Flammarion. Camus, J. Y. (2022). Guillaume Faye, from New Right intellectual to prophet of the racial civil war. In A. J. McAdams, & A. Castrillon (Eds.), Contemporary far-right thinkers and the future of liberal democracy (pp. 61–81). Routledge. Casajus, E. (2019). Images, cultures et aspirations dans les contre-cultures politisées: Le cas de l’Action française. Doctoral thesis. Université Paris Diderot. Décugis, J. M., Guéna, P., & Leplongeon, M. (2020). La Poudrière. Grasset. Hayoun, J., & Cohen-Solal, J. (2019). La Main du Diable. Grasset. Jacquet-Vaillant, M. (2021b). An Identitarian Europe? Successes and limits of the diffusion of the French Identitarian movement. Illiberalism Studies Program Working Papers (p. 7). Jacquet-Vaillant, M. (2021a). Le mouvement identitaire français: Pour une approche mixte des marges en politique. Doctoral dissertation. Université Paris 2–Panthéon-Assas. Laurent, S. (2020, July 21). Plongée dans la haine en ligne avec “Team patriote,” groupe privé de militants nationalistes. Le Monde. Available online: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/07/21/ team-patriote-plongee-dans-la-haine-en-ligne_6046790_3224.html Lebourg, N. (2018). The French far right in Russia’s orbit. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs & Open Society Foundation. Lebourg, N. (2019). Usages, effets et limites du droit de dissolution durant la Ve République. In R. Sèze (Ed.), Les États européens face aux militantismes violents (pp. 169–186). Riveneuve. Lebourg, N., & Sommier, I. (2021). La discontinuité des violences idéologiques. In I. Sommier, X. Crettiez, & F. Audigier (Eds.), Violences politiques en France de 1986 à nos jours (pp. 29–54). Presses de Sciences Po. Macé, M., & Plottu, P. (2021, November 21). Complotisme: Rémy Daillet et son putsch à clique. Libération. Available online: http://metro.co.uk/2017/12/18/twitter-suspends-edls-account-latest-purgefar-right-7169683/ Marion-Bouille, D., & Pacaud, V. (2022). Au nom de la race. Robert Laffont. Mestre, A., & Monnot, C. (2011). Le Système Le Pen. Denoël. Molard, M. (2021, November 11). Des soutiens de Zemmour tirent sur des caricatures de juifs, de musulmans et de noirs, Streetpress. Available online: https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1635850237soutiens-zemmour-tirent-caricatures-juifs-musulmans-noirs-racisme-antisemitisme-islamophobieextreme-droite-survivalisme-famille-gallicane Montagner, A. (2020). Le Nationalisme conspirationniste soralien: Une idéologie radicale et marginale de l’extrême droite française contemporaine. Doctoral dissertation. Université de Bordeaux. Newhouse, A. (2021). The threat is the network: The multi-node structure of neo-fascist accelerationism. CTC-Sentinel, 14(5), 17–25. Nonjon, A. (2020). Olena Semenyaka the “first lady” of Ukrainian nationalism. Illiberalism Studies Program Working Papers. The George Washington University.

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16 THE DUTCH IDENTITAIR VERZET AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITARIAN MOVEMENT Alone at the Table Sting Daniëls and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage Introduction Historically, the far-right movement has been “fragmented, leaderless and multi-dimensional” (Davey & Ebner, 2017). However, in the aftermath of the 2016 US elections and with the concurrent global rise of the alt-right, many academics and commentators have noted that the European far right have become emboldened (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). In this climate, far-right groups have begun to put aside their differences and cooperate to increase their influence, reach, and impact. Notable examples of such collaboration include the Defend Europe campaigns in the Mediterranean and Alps regions, which appeared to unite various national branches of the Generation Identity movement and groups associated with the pan-European Identarian movement. Nonetheless, despite anecdotal evidence that the far right is currently expanding beyond national borders, the relationship between the far right and transnational politics is both ambiguous and understudied. In order to address this knowledge gap and improve understanding of transnational collaboration within the wider Identarian movement, this chapter investigates how the Dutch identarian group Identitair Verzet cooperates and interacts both online and offline with other European identarian groups in France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Italy. In doing so, this chapter not only sheds light on the underexamined Dutch identarian movement, but also contributes to a wider debate on the role played by shared identities (including shared ideology, symbolism, and terminology) play in mobilising distinct groups across national boundaries. Using the framework inspired by the work of Hall (1995) and Ackerman and Bale (2012), and leveraging data from social media, journalistic accounts, and government and law enforcement reports, we find that Identitair Verzet – due to its small scale and divergent identity – has largely been relegated to the fringe of the wider European Identarian movement. In fact, the instances of collaboration are mostly limited to the digital sphere, are rhetorical in nature, and are generally initiated by Identitair Verzet as the group attempts to secure itself a “place at the table,” with limited success.

The Identitarian Movement The seeds of the international Generation Identity movement, which first emerged in France under the banner of Génération Identitaire, can be found in the Nouvelle Droit movement, which emerged in the early to mid-1960s. The Nouvelle Droite arose as a 230

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-22

The Dutch Identitair Verzet

synthesis of the ideological currents of the Conservative Revolution and the New Left (Bar-On, 2011), and was, in many ways, the intellectual legacy of the ultra-nationalist thinkers who founded the Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE) in 1968. The aims of the GRECE, as summarized by Bar-On (2011) were fourfold: [F]irst, to reorient the ultra-nationalist French political milieu […] towards greater doctrinal sophistication and the transcendence of internecine conflicts between various ultra-nationalist tendencies; second, to reject the right’s dominant parliamentary and extraparliamentary methods of seizing power; third, to regain cultural power from the liberal-left by seizing the ‘laboratories of thought’ throughout Europe in a right-wing Gramscian spirit, and to restore the credibility of a revolutionary right-wing milieu […] and, finally, to rethink the dominant ideological legacy of the ultra-nationalist right, which tended to be based on ethnic, biological or racist conceptions of the nation. (pp. 203–204) The Nouvelle Droite had a significant impact on the Identitarian movement’s “preference for cultural combat, rejection of universalism, embrace of differentialism, and overall critique of a system captured by a disintegrating liberal capitalism” (Zúquete, 2018, p. 11). Indeed, by the late 1980s, certain figures who diverged from GRECE, including Guillaume Faye, had split from the Nouvelle Droite and begun to develop parallel responses to what they saw as Europe’s “sorrowful state”; in particular, by refocusing the discourse on the ethnic dimension (Zúquete, 2018, pp. 12–13) with the aim of addressing “the necessity to defend the biological and cultural identity of one’s people” (Faye, 2011, p. 134). This intellectual and theoretical reorientation eventually led to the emergence of the young, practical, and proactive groups who today represent the direct-action arm of identitarianism, pioneered by the well-known French organisation Génération Identitaire. Génération Identitaire first gained widespread attention on October 4, 2012, when they posted a video on YouTube entitled “Déclaration de guerre” (“Declaration of war”). This high-quality video depicts a diverse group of young people denouncing the legacy of the French leftists of 1968. The group purported to oppose modern society, multiculturalism, and globalism. On October 20 of that year, shortly after the release of this video, at least 60 members of Génération Identitaire occupied a mosque in Poitiers, France. They scaled the building’s roof and lowered large banners reading “732, Génération Identitaire” and “Construction de mosque, immigration: referendum!” (“Referendum on Mosque Constructions and Immigration”) while waving flags bearing the symbol of the movement, lighting fireworks, and singing songs/statements in a hooligan-like fashion (France 3 PoitouCharentes, 2012). This mosque was specifically targeted because of its proximity to the site of the Battle of Tours, in which Charles Martel defended France against a Muslim invasion led by Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi in 732 A.D. (Palmer, 2019). Such outlandish and spectacular protests are typical of the current Identitarian Movement: its members “see the streets as their headquarters, the Internet as a galvanizing weapon, and they rely on the hermeneutic power of shock to awaken the lethargic consciences of Europe’s peoples” (Zúquete, 2018, p. 38). Shortly after the publication of the “Déclaration de guerre” video, identarian organisations in Germany and Austria were also formed. Although essentially separate identities, the German group Die Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (“The Identitarian Movement in 231

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Germany”) and the Austrian group Die Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (“The Identitarian Movement in Austria”) soon became deeply intertwined. For example, the two organisations collaborated in the production of the 2014 video “Zukunft für Europa” (“Future for Europe”), which can be viewed as the German-language equivalent of the French declaration of war video. The Identarian movement also continued to spread throughout Europe, with organisations being formed in Italy, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Switzerland, Belgium, Poland, and the Netherlands. Of these, a close collaboration emerged between the French, German, Austrian, and Italian organisations: these four organisations openly refer to each other as members of the Generation Identity/European Identitarian “family,” linking to each other’s websites and social media accounts. Furthermore, these groups actively collaborated in two large operations to prevent the arrival of immigrants, namely the Defend Europe campaign in the Mediterranean aimed at obstructing search-and-rescue missions by temporarily blocking their passage across the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy, and the Defend Europe Alps Mission which focused on the French-Italian border crossing at Nevache (Barthélemy, 2018). While remaining separate identities, the various identarian organisations in Europe have adopted a uniform naming convention and a common logo of an encircled Greek letter lambda (a reference to the shield of the Spartan army). The only organisation which deviates from this is the Dutch group Identitair Verzet, which instead chose the omega letter as their main logo. Identitair Verzet (“Identitarian Resistance”) was founded in September 2012, a few months after the founding of its French counterpart. In comparison to the other Identitarian Groups, Identitair Verzet is quite small with membership of roughly 15–25 active members spread out over the Netherlands (Factsheets Extreemrechts in Nederlandse Gemeentes, 2019). In 2015 and 2016, Identitair Verzet saw a brief increase in membership amid nationwide protests against the accommodation of refugees in the Netherlands. However, once these protests subsided, most of the new members left the movement again (Factsheets Extreemrechts in Nederlandse Gemeentes, 2019). Identitair Verzet’s most high-profile action was to prevent students of the Islamic Ibn Ghaldoun school in Rotterdam from taking their final exams (Tierolf et al., 2014). The group’s other activities have been in line with those of their counterparts abroad, and have mostly consisted of banner drops, occupations of public or religious spaces, the dissemination of flyers and posters, and street protests. Despite having adopted a repertoire of contention similar to that of their counterparts abroad, Identitair Verzet differs from the other Identitarian organisations in certain respects. Firstly, it was founded by a small group of people that split from Voorpost, an Identitarian organisation from Belgium and the Netherlands that was established back in the 1970s. In being founded by former members of another far-right organisation, Identitair Verzet was created in the same fashion as Génération Identitaire, but not in its image, as is the case for many of its other European counterparts. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, in addition to using a different logo than other identarian organisations in Europe, Identitair Verzet has also eschewed the standard naming conventions. The group has occasionally used the name/term “Identitaire Generatie” (Identitarian Generation) during protests and in social media clips, but they never adopted this as the group’s official name (ID Verzet, 2014). As such, the nature of Identitair Verzet ties with their foreign counterpart groups in France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Italy is somewhat unclear, and deserves further attention.

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Methodology A review of the literature reveals extensive documentation of collaborative efforts amongst protest groups and organisations within a movement, in order to engage in joint planning and actions (Beamish & Luebbers, 2009). Such literature encompasses nuclear disarmament groups (Barkan, 1979; Benford, 1993), environmentalist groups (Shaffer, 2000), feminists (Ferree & Hess, 2000), and labour movements (Fantasia & Voss, 2004). In recent years, a growing body of scholarly literature has sought to investigate the transnational nature of right-wing extremism organisations (Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Mammone et al., 2012; VeilleuxLepage & Archambault, 2019), and political parties (Caiani, 2018; Macklin, 2013; Mares, 2006), however, there is little scholarly work exaiming on how right-wing extremist in The Netherlands interact with their foreign peers. In order to partly address this knowledge gap, we conducted a study with the aim of increasing understanding of the nature of transnational collaboration within the wider Identarian movement. Data were collected from four separate sources. Firstly, tweets made by of Identitair Verzet’s Twitter account between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2019 were examined to uncover incidents of collaboration between Identitair Verzet and other Identarian groups. In addition, we scrutinized tweets from accounts belonging to spokespersons from the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (Germany), Génération Identitaire (France), the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (Austria), and Generazione Identitaria (Italy), along with the official Twitter accounts of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, Generazione Identitaria, Generation Identitaer (Denmark) and the Defend Europe campaign. Secondly, data were collected from the official websites of Identitair Verzet (idverzet.org), Génération Identitaire (generationidentitaire.org), the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (identitaere-bewegung.de), the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (identitaerebewegung.at), Generazione Identitaria (generazione-identitaria.com), and Generation Identitaer (identitaer.dk). Thirdly, we undertook a systematic search of newspapers articles published between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2019 in order to uncover additional instances of collaboration between Identitair Verzet and their counterparts. Finally, data was collected from reports published between 2016 and 2019 by the governments of the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Italy.1 For the Netherlands, these included annual reports from the Ministry of Social Affairs, the factsheet “Extreemrechts in Nederlandse Gemeenten” (Extreme Right in Dutch Municipalities) published by the Anne Frank Stichting, the “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland” (“Terrorism Threat Assessment in the Netherlands”) report published by the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, and annual reports of the national General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD); for Germany, annual reports by the national security service (BfV) and by all of the 16 regional security services (LfV); for Austria, the annual intelligence reports by the national security service (BVT); and for Italy, the annual publication “Relazione sulla Politica dell’Informazione per la Sicurezze” (Report on the Information Policy for Security) of the national intelligence agency (AISI). Each incident uncovered was coded using a framework derived from the work of Hall (1995) and Ackerman & Bale (2012), which is stated below.2 1 2 3 4

Rhetorical cooperation – Expressions of support for the (actions of) other groups Ideological cooperation – Coordinating strategies with respect to ideology Joint political mobilisation – Coordinating strategies with respect to political activity Logistical cooperation – The provision or exchange of vital materials

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5 Operational cooperation – Coordinating strategies on activity beyond political demonstrations 6 Other forms of cooperation.

Results In total, over 13,000 Tweets, over 250 newspaper articles, 72 government reports, and articles from 6 websites published between February 2016–December 2019 were reviewed. This content yielded 92 instances of cooperation between Identitair Verzet and one or several of the other five Identitarian organisations. The results will be presented in this section, focusing on the following four dimensions: (1) forms of cooperation, to demonstrate which forms occurred most often; (2) initiating actors, i.e. those who initiated the cooperation instances, to show which groups pursue cooperation most; (3) “targeted actors,” to show which groups were most “targeted” during cooperation initiatives, and (4) date of occurrence, to show the temporal distribution of the coded events. Following the presentation of the results, we relate the findings to the social movement theories of collective identity, resource mobilisation, and political opportunity. As can been seen in Figure 16.1, the vast majority of instances were coded as examples of rhetorical cooperation: this category accounts for 80 of the total 92 instances of cooperation that were detected, while the two next-largest categories, logistical cooperation and other forms of cooperation, were only detected four times each. These 80 instances of rhetorical cooperation took place in various ways. The majority of them (N = 31) took the form of (re)tweets reporting the protest actions of other organisations. All but one of these were retweets of tweets by the original actor reporting on their own performed action; the remaining instance concerned a tweet by Identitair Verzet that reported on an action by Génération Identitaire.3 Meanwhile, 22 of the 80 instances of rhetorical cooperation were (re)tweets of news or information concerning another organisation; these include a retweet by Identitair Verzet about members of the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich being investigated as members of a criminal organisation, a retweet of the Augsburg faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland announcing they had joined Twitter, and a retweet mentioning that one of their members had had his car windows smashed by a member of the antifa movement. Fifteen other cases of rhetorical cooperation were related to sharing the opinions or commentary of other organisations or their members on certain topics. Amongst these are a retweet of a tweet

Figure 16.1  Forms of cooperation.

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by Identitäre Bewegung Österreich leader Martin Sellner in which he analyses the position of the group in contemporary Austrian politics, and a retweet of a tweet by the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland in which they criticise the German police for investigating a policeman found in possession of an Identitäre Bewegung sticker. Amongst these are also two retweets of more contextual tweets by Identitäre Bewegung about replacement through migration (“the Great Replacement”) and the costs of immigration. Additionally, seven examples concerned general expressions of support or solidarity towards other groups during protest actions (as opposed to support for specific protest actions), or online activity by a particular group. The best example of this is a protest by Identitair Verzet in front of the German and Austrian embassies in the Netherlands: the goal of this protest was to show solidarity with the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland and Identitäre Bewegung Österreich and to protest against the position of the German and Austrian governments towards those organisations. After rhetorical cooperation, the form of cooperation that is coded most often is logistical cooperation, with four instances. This category is defined as the provision or exchange of vital materials or services from Identitair Verzet to another group, or from another group to Identitair Verzet. The four coded instances concern members of Identitair Verzet being trained in self-defense on a Génération Identitaire camping weekend, Identitair Verzet calling their members to join a protest by the Nordrhein-Westfalen (“North Rhine-Westphalia”) faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, Identitair Verzet members attending a political protest by the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland in Berlin, and Identitair Verzet helping to gather resources for the Defend Europe campaign. Note, though, that the last of these events is contested: this specific data was derived from the Dutch national newspaper NRC Next, and Identitair Verzet also said at the time that they were participating in Defend Europe; however, the Italian leader of the campaign has denied that Identitair Verzet was involved. Instances of operational cooperation were detected twice in the dataset. This form of cooperation regards the coordination of strategies between Identitair Verzet and the other groups with respect to activities beyond political demonstrations. This data, however, is as contested as the event mentioned above. The two coded instances of operational cooperation are derived from two separate Identitair Verzet sources stating that they were participating in the Defend Europe campaign. However, as mentioned above, it is highly doubtful that Identitair Verzet actually took part in this campaign, since the leader of the Italian group – who was the organiser of the first Defend Europe campaign around which time these statements were made – has denied Dutch involvement in the campaign. Only one instance was found for each of the remaining two categories, ideological cooperation and joint political mobilisation. Ideological cooperation is defined as coordinating strategies between Identitair Verzet and (one of) the other groups with respect to ideology. The one instance detected for this category concerns Génération Identitaire convincing Identitair Verzet to not act against immigrants from Eastern European countries: Identitair Verzet previously perceived such immigrants as a threat to the economy and culture of the Netherlands, but were corrected by their French counterparts for this errant belief. Joint political mobilisation is defined as action jointly organised and performed by Identitair Verzet and another European Identitarian organisation. The one instance detected for this category concerns a joint banner drop by Identitair Verzet and the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland at Cologne train station in December 2016. The four remaining instances of cooperation are collected under other forms of cooperation. These include two cases of Identitair Verzet explicitly identifying themselves as the Dutch branch of the European Identitarian Movement,4 one case of an undefined link between Identitair Verzet and the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich,5 and one case of Identitair Verzet informing the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland about a case of “white discrimination” in Germany. 235

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When classifying the results by initiating actors, the results are fairly homogeneous. All instances of cooperation are initiated by Identitair Verzet, except for eight cases. Amongst those eight is one case of initiation by Generazione Identitaria, in which their leader shows his appreciation for Identitair Verzet’s support for the Defend Europe campaign (i.e. rhetorical cooperation). Two instances of cooperation were initiated by the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland; both are also examples of rhetorical cooperation. One concerns the reply of the Augsburg faction to a tweet by Identitair Verzet in which they announce that the Augsburg faction has joined Twitter and advise their members to follow the account; the Augsburg faction greets Identitair Verzet and thanks them. The second case concerns the retweet of an Identitair Verzet tweet by the Hamburg faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland; the tweet in question shows a picture from an Identitair Verzet protest in the Netherlands during which they carried a banner bearing the slogan “solidarity with the Identitarian Movement” in German. Another two cases were initiated by the Génération Identitaire: these have both already been mentioned above and concern the ideological influence of the overall Generation Identity movement, and the provision of self-defense training by Génération Identitaire. The remaining three cases concern two cases of operational cooperation and one case of joint political mobilisation. These are initiated by various actors, rather than a single organisation. As mentioned earlier, however, the operational cooperation instances are contested. Given the largely homogeneous picture regarding initiating actors, it is more interesting to turn to the targeted actors; that is, the actors that were subject to the instances initiated by Identitair Verzet. Filtering the dataset on cases initiated by Identitair Verzet results in a list of 84 instances, of which 4 were directed towards Génération Identitaire, 4 towards Generation Identitaer, 15 towards the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 27 towards various organisations, and 34 towards the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland. These results are displayed as percentages in Figure 16.2.

Figure 16.2  Cooperation instances initiated by Identitair Verzet.

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Of the 27 instances of cooperation initiated by Identitair Verzet that targeted various organisations (see the “Various” category in Figure 16.2), 22 concern the European Identitarian Defend Europe campaign. All but one of these 22 cases are instances of rhetorical cooperation in which Identitair Verzet (re)tweets about the progression and/or successes of the campaign, or in which they the assume the logo of Defend Europe during protests or other offline activity. The one other case is the (claimed) donation of money by Identitair Verzet to the Defend Europe campaign. With regard to the cooperation directed towards Génération Identitaire (N = 4) and Generation Identitaer (N = 4), all eight instances concerned rhetorical cooperation. This was also the case for all but one of the instances directed at the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich and all but three of those directed at the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland. The remaining case with regard to the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich concerns an undefined link between this group and Identitair Verzet; this instance was coded as initiated by Identitair Verzet because the source phrased it to appear that way. The three remaining cases of cooperation directed at the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland concern two cases of logistical collaboration (one in which Identitair Verzet members took part in a protest in Berlin, and one in which they called upon their members to join a forthcoming protest), and one other form of cooperation. Apart from 2016, the instances of cooperation were more or less equally distributed over the years of the data collection period. In 2019, 33 instances of cooperation were detected and in both 2018 and 2017, 27 were detected. The year 2016 deviates from this pattern, since only 5 cases were detected in that year. This low amount of cooperation events in 2016 could possibly be explained by European migrations crisis, which peaked in 2015 and the first half of 2016. During this time Identitair Verzet managed to recruit a group of young new members (Factsheets Extreemrechts in Nederlandse Gemeentes, 2019), which possibly made them less oriented at transnational cooperation. Towards the end of 2016 most of the new members had left again, which could explain why the cooperation efforts rose in the next year. Further noticeable affairs concern the temporal clustering of events within the investigated years. In 2017, for example, the majority (17) of the cases took place in July (8) and August (9). This is exactly the period the first Defend Europe campaign took place in the Mediterranean. Therefore, fourteen of these seventeen cases are unsurprisingly related to this campaign. In 2018 the months with the densest clusters of events were April (7) and June (6). April of 2018 was the month in which the second campaign of Defend Europe took place in the Alps, and thus, unsurprisingly again, most events in this month were related to this campaign. All but one of the events in June of 2018 were (re)tweets about protest action by either the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, Identitair Verzet or Defend Europe. A relatively high number of offline protest actions by various actors thus causes a relatively high number of (online, rhetorical) cooperation between Identitair Verzet and the other groups (Figure 16.3). The events that took place in 2019 were more or less equally distributed over the year, except for April, in which 11 instances of cooperation were detected. Two of these instances derive from newspaper reports published in these months, but where the reported events did not actually take place in that month. Of the remaining nine cases, three concerned retweets of protests by other organisations, four concerned retweets of commentary by Martin Sellner6 on contemporary politics and news items, and two concerned a new faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich joining Twitter. This is another example of a high number of activities by other organisations leading to a high number of cooperation events in a certain month. 237

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Figure 16.3  Distribution of cooperation events by month.

Discussion The ideology of the European Identitarian Movement is based on ethnopluralist beliefs and a commitment to preserving the European identity as well as the national and regional identities of Europe. A logical result of this ideology is that all organisations associated with the movement identify themselves as Europeans and thereby share at least one collective identity, namely the European identity. As argued by McCarthy and Zald (1980) amongst others, this can influence the establishment of cooperation between social movement organisations. Besides this European identity, however, the European Identitarian organisations possibly share a collective identity at another, arguably deeper level, when they identify themselves and acknowledge each other as part of the European Identitarian Social Movement, i.e. the “Generation Identity family.” The results of this study show multiple cases of Identitair Verzet explicitly identifying themselves with this “family.” On Liberation Day in the Netherlands in 2018, for example, they tweeted a picture of a German and a French WWII soldier sharing a cigarette with the captions “no more brother wars” and “next time we fight it’s side by side,” accompanied by the logos of Génération Identitaire, the Identitäre Bewegung, and Identitair Verzet. This suggests that Identitair Verzet see themselves and these other organisations as brothers within the same family. In another example, a tweet by Identitair Verzet stated explicitly: “we are the Dutch branch of the European Identitarian Family.” Despite these tweets showing Identitair Verzet’s strong identification with the Generation Identity “family,” the group diverges from this family in some respects. For example, the symbol they adopt as their main logo is different from that of the other organisations: where the universal logo of the European movement is the Greek lambda, Identitair Verzet uses the Greek omega. Since symbols play a crucial role in the formation of unity (Kolstø, 2006), Identitair Verzet can be seen as driving a symbolic wedge between themselves and the other movements by this use of a different main logo. By using the lambda only as their secondary logo, they show that they do not regard membership of the Generation Identity “family” as their primary identity, whether intentionally or not. Moreover, Identitair Verzet differs from the other organisations with respect to the characteristics of their members. While the other organisations predominantly comprise young adults without a history in activism, a fair share of Identitair Verzet’s members are in their thirties or older and have been members of multiple far-right organisations before. Furthermore, the name “Identitair Verzet” differs in structure from the names of most of the other European Identitarian Organisations: with the exception of the German and Austrian movements, most organisations have a name that translates to 238

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“Generation Identity,” while “Identitair Verzet” translates to “Identitarian Resistance.” This can be attributed to the fact that, unlike the other organisations investigated in this study, Identitair Verzet was not created in the image of the French group Génération Identitaire. Note that even though Identitair Verzet has used the name “Identitaire Generatie” (“Identitarian Generation”) on occasions, this has never been their official name. Furthermore, although Identitair Verzet identify themselves as member of the Generation Identity “family,” they are not explicitly acknowledged as such by the other organisations. On no occasion do the other organisations mention Identitair Verzet when they speak about the Generation Identity family or other European Identitarian groups in general. This is true for their websites, Twitter accounts, interviews, and beyond, etc. lack of acknowledgement, furthermore, shows through the remarkable small number of rhetorical cooperation with Identitair Verzet by other organisations, for instance through Twitter. Only two cases of this were detected, one where a regional faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland replied to an Identitair Verzet tweet by thanking and saluting them, and one where another regional faction of the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich retweeted an Identitair Verzet tweet in which they showed footage of a protest at the German and Austrian embassies in the Netherlands, in solidarity with the Identitäre Bewegung. Both cases, however, were preceded by Identitair Verzet reaching out to the other actor by way of mentions. Other organisations do not (re) tweet (about) Identitair Verzet or their actions purely on their own initiative, albeit Identitair Verzet creates a reasonable amount of content. In order for social movement organisations to take collective action, resources must be controlled or mobilised (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Both McCarthy and Zald (1980), and Bandy and Smith (2005) have argued that resource building or provision of resources enables (transnational) cooperation between social movement(s) (organisations). This is a factor that partially explains the cooperation by and with Identitair Verzet. In comparison with the other organisations Identitair Verzet is only a small player. They have an active members base of 15–25, whereas those of the other organisations range from up to 100 (Generation Identitaer) to about 2.000 (Generation Identity France). Moreover, apart from the relatively small number of members, Identitair Verzet also struggles to maintain a healthy financial balance. On multiple occasions on their website and social media accounts7 they have stated on their website and social media accounts7 that they need money to pay fines and debts and to replace material (Niet Praten, Maar Doen – Steun Ons Nu!, 2017). Overall, this can lead other organisations to have little interest in cooperation with Identitair Verzet, because for the wider movement they offer few potential resources to mobilise, beyond their handful of members. Moreover, this certainly explains why the vast majority of cooperation instances by Identitair Verzet are of a rhetorical nature and occur through Twitter. Twitter serves as a (nearly) free resource and a vehicle for Identitair Verzet to establish cooperation with the other organisations. Since over two-thirds of this rhetorical cooperation through Twitter consists of expressions of support for (protest) activities or commentary by other organisations, Identitair Verzet relies greatly on the activeness of other organisations for their cooperative actions. The data did not show this to be true vice versa, except when the other organisations were explicitly mentioned by Identitair Verzet. This behaviour of Identitair Verzet can also be explained by the political process model: high levels of activity by other organisations are seen as an opportunity to promote the movement and ideology in their own country by means of rhetorical cooperation, and through doing so, to (attempt to) mobilise fresh resources. The notion of political opportunity refers to a chance to make a political impact, and results from “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured” (McAdam, 1982, p. 41). 239

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As argued by Bandy and Smith (2005), such opportunities are enabling factors for (transnational) cooperation between social movement organisations. Even though this could be a plausible theoretical explanation for the levels of cooperation between Identitair Verzet and the other European Identitarian organisations, we found little evidence to support this approach in the data collected for this research (with the exception of the way in which Identitair Verzet views the activity of other organisations as an opportunity for rhetorical cooperation and mobilisation of resources, as described above). At the same time, evidence for this theory is found in the cooperation between the other organisations. In his 2018 book, Zúquete addresses the help of experienced European (mainly French) identitarians in establishing and professionalising small national factions abroad in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (Zúquete, 2018, pp. 87–91). In this way, the emergence of new identitarian activists serves as an opportunity for the movement – both in France, and more broadly – to spread their ideology and expand their network. By incorporating these new organisations into the Generation Identity “family,” they create international chapters from which resources can more easily be mobilised than from isolated (potential) constituents (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This situation does not yet seem to apply to Identitair Verzet. Another decisive factor in this respect is possibly the fact that Identitair Verzet was established in isolation around the same time that the first (French) European Identitarian organisation was founded, and therefore was not created in their image. The present-day lack of emerging activists in the Netherlands may therefore indicate the absence of a political opportunity in the eyes of the Generation Identity “family.”

Conclusion In this study, the transnational cooperation within the European Identitarian Movement was researched by means of a case study of the Dutch group Identitair Verzet. This study has sought to explicate the way in which Identitair Verzet cooperates with the European Identitarian organisations in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Denmark. To this end, data was collected from Twitter, newspaper articles, the organisations’ websites, and government reports from the organisations’ countries of origin. Subsequently, this data was coded according to six categories within the framework derived from the works of Hall (1995) and Ackerman & Bale (2012) and which were complemented inductively. The collected data was then analysed using mixed methods of content analysis. In total, 92 cases of cooperation between Identitair Verzet and one or more of the other organisations were detected. Of these cases, the vast majority (84%) were examples of rhetorical cooperation, initiated by Identitair Verzet, and performed through Twitter. These results can mainly be explained by drawing on theories of resource mobilisation and collective identity. Comprising only 15–25 members, Identitair Verzet is a small organisation in comparison with the others, that moreover struggles to maintain a healthy financial balance. Firstly, this means they must be creative in managing and mobilising resources, which has resulted in them embracing Twitter as an inexpensive tool to cooperate with the other organisations. Secondly, this partly explains why most instances of cooperation were initiated by Identitair Verzet: due to their small scale, they are not seen as a (potential) resource by the other organisations and/or the wider movement. By contrast, the other organisations and the wider movement are a large potential resource for Identitair Verzet, explaining why the Dutch group initiates forms of cooperation on a regular basis. Furthermore, Identitair Verzet diverges from the other organisations in a number of respects. For example, as it was founded in isolation (and not in the image of the French 240

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Génération Identitaire like the other organisations), Identitair Verzet uses a different symbol for their main logo. As a result of such divergences, they are not explicitly recognised as part of the Generation Identity “family,” and the other organisations therefore rarely initiate cooperation with them. On the other hand, Identitair Verzet does explicitly self-identify with this “family” and thus regularly initiates cooperation with the other organisations. In this research, we found little evidence for the political opportunity structure theory as explanation for the cooperation between Identitair Verzet and the other organisations. It is possible to view the relative success of the Generation Identity “family” (in terms of member numbers) as a political opportunity that is seized by Identitair Verzet, who thereby attempt to mobilise fresh resources. The same holds for the emergence of new activists abroad, which is leveraged by the wider movement as an opportunity to establish new international chapters. However, these factors are ultimately more compelling as evidence to adopt the resource mobilisation theory and the collective identity theory, respectively, as explanations for the cooperation between Identitair Verzet and the other organisations. Finally, this study adds to the body of literature on cooperation between European Identitarian organisations, and between far-right non-party organisations in general, by investigating the cooperation between the Dutch group Identitair Verzet and five other European Identitarian organisations. The divergences between Identitair Verzet and other Identitarian organisations limit the degree to which the results of this study can be generalised to other groups; however, the research design can be used to study cooperation between other Identitarian organisations. In addition, to confirm the results of this study or those of future studies with the same design, it would be fruitful to conduct a complementary study based on indepth interviews with organisation members, and/or (participant) observations.

Notes 1 To this end the following query was made on Lexis Nexis: (“Identitair Verzet” OR “ID Verzet” OR (Dutch near/5 identita*) AND (samenwerking OR gezamenlijk OR samen OR buitenland* OR “identitare bewegung” OR “generation identitaire” OR “generation identity” OR “generazione identitaria” OR identitaer OR Frankrijk OR Duitsland OR Oostenrijk OR Denemarken OR Italie)) OR ((“Identitair Verzet” OR “ID Verzet” OR (Dutch near/5 identita*)) AND (cooperation OR joint OR together OR abroad OR “generation identitaire” OR “generation identity” OR “identitare bewegung” OR “generazione identitaria” OR Identitaer OR France OR Germany OR Austria OR Denmark OR Italy)). The query was set to include Dutch and English language articles without any limitations with regard to sources. The timeframe was set from 01 February 2016 to 31 December 2019. 2 The notions of “rhetorical cooperation”, “joint political mobilisation”, “logistical cooperation” and “operational cooperation” were derived from the work of Ackerman and Bale (2012) on research cooperation between various social movement. The idea of “ideological cooperation” is borrowed from Hall’s work (1995). 3 In this tweet, posted by Identitair Verzet on 12 March 2016, they report on an action by French Génération Identitaire activists in which they blocked roads in Calais so migrants were unable to get through. 4 On July 5, 2018, for example, Identitair Verzet responded to a question about their organisation with the statement “We are the Dutch branch of the European identitarian Family”. 5 In an NRC Next article on cooperation between the Dutch and Austrian intelligence services from 11 April 2019, the reporter states that one of the reasons for this cooperation is a link between Identitair Verzet and the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. This information was not corroborated elsewhere. 6 Martin Sellner is the leader of the Austrian Identitäre Bewegung Österreich and founded the organization, together with two fellow students, in December 2012, after visiting a Génération Identitaire convention in France. In the past Sellner has been convicted of 100 hours of social work for putting stickers containing swastikas i.e. on an Austrian synagogue.

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Sting Daniëls and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage 7 Besides the cry for financial help on their website, Identitair Verzet has posted similar calls on Twitter. For instance, on 30 June 2018, they tweeted “Want to support Identitair Verzet once for €12.00?” accompanied by a direct universal link to donate €12 via bank transfer. On 2 January 2020, they tweeted “On to 2020! Support us morally or financially...” accompanied by a link to a Facebook post, which included a link to their bank account.

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17 RADICAL RIGHT-WING POLITICS ON THE ISLAND OF IRELAND Shaun McDaid and Jim McAuley

Introduction Ireland offers scholars of radical right-wing politics an interesting case study. Far-right extremism seems to be a much lesser problem in Ireland than elsewhere, including its nearest neighbour, the United Kingdom (UK) (see for instance Europol, 2020; Holbrook et al., 2022). Unlike the UK, there have been no recent extreme-right-wing terrorist attacks in Ireland, nor are there any Irish extreme right-wing terrorist groups. Neither have radical right parties achieved an electoral breakthrough in parliament or in lower-order elections. However, in recent years, there has been increasing public discussion in Ireland about the rise, or potential rise, of the radical and far right, and its potential implications. Since the mid-2010s, Ireland has seen new players vying for a position on the right of the political spectrum. Such parties or groups often take nativist stances on issues like immigration (specifically “uncontrolled” immigration), and ultra-conservative stances concerning reproductive and LGBTQ rights, whilst sometimes simultaneously claiming to be champions of women’s equality and LGBTQ rights against an alleged radical Islamist threat (for more on ideological positions see e.g. Bergmann, 2021; Blee, 2020; Korolczuk, 2020; Mudde, 2007; Wondreys & Mudde, 2022; Zanghellini, 2012). Whilst many who espouse this brand of politics reject the radical right label, the tone is often distinctly (right-wing or national) populist or anti-political establishment. In Northern Ireland, this takes on a particular hue, mediated through the prisms of sectarianism and a contested constitutional position. Through the analysis of the electoral performances of radical right-wing groups, as well as the discourses and rhetoric deployed by the radical right in print and online, the chapter explores and contextualises the state of radical right-wing politics across the island of Ireland. In particular, we explore past iterations of the radical and far right, some of which were more organised and extreme than current manifestations. It also provides background on politicised, right-wing, socially conservative pressure groups during the 1990s, which arguably paved the way for later manifestations of the radical right. We suggest that although the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a considerable opportunity for these parties and groups, the likelihood of the radical right making a breakthrough is minimal, at least in the short-to-medium term. We conclude that rivalry on the far reaches of the right of the political spectrum, where several groups and parties compete for relatively few votes, coupled with the presence of a well-established 244

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-23

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radical left-wing nationalist party, in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, in the form of Sinn Féin, is likely to mean the radical and far right remains a fringe concern for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we also highlight the need for the mainstream parties to address issues of concern, such as reform of the health service and the provision of affordable housing, to narrow the space for radical right-wing challengers to gain a stronger foothold.

The Irish radical right in context The noteworthy rise of right-wing populism across Europe and the United States in recent years takes differing forms depending on particular political cultures and historical contexts. There is, however, a common narrative involving criticism of a corrupt elite and a claim to speak for the people. Underlying this, right-wing populism adds an overt “us versus them” (“people” versus “elite”) dimension (Abts & Rummens, 2007), locating this in nativist definitions of nationhood based on a culturally homogenous people with common interests and identity (e.g. Lutz, 2019; Krzyżanowski & Ekström, 2022).Minorities, such as migrants, are often branded as the “other.” Populist party politics, especially the radical right-wing variety, draws on this sense of belonging, resulting in ethno-centric and sometimes xenophobic directions of many such parties across Europe (although not all manifestations of populism are reactionary or exclusionary). Amongst prominent examples of populist nationalist political parties enjoying electoral breakthroughs are France’s National Rally, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS), and Hungary’s Fidesz, with southern European examples including Chega in Portugal, VOX in Spain, and the Brothers of Italy (FdI). In the European Parliament, nine radical right parties have formed a bloc called “Identity and Democracy,” expressing concerns about globalisation, immigration, and an alleged dilution of national identity resulting from these processes (Kantola & Miller, 2021). Much of this populist radical right-wing party-political organisation has, however, seemingly by-passed the island of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland remains one of few European nations with no far-right representatives in parliament, and there are no proscribed far-right violent extremist movements. Nonetheless, the Irish radical right continues to have a visible and vocal presence in political discourse, and relatively new political parties, such as the National Party (NP) or the Irish Freedom Party (IFP), have sought to bring to the stage the type of nativist populist movement that characterises the political scene in other European states. In Northern Ireland, despite several years of trying, British radical right parties and groups have failed to establish any electoral foothold. Broadly, parties of the radical right (sometimes called “national populists”) most often focus their attention on immigration, and the purportedly liberal elites that support it, as a primary cause of many social ills. Specifically, such groups have displayed elements of nativism (the idea that the native born population should enjoy privileges over immigrants), authoritarianism (a strictly ordered society against which infractions are subject to stringent sanction), and an anti-systemic populism (the notion that society is characterised by an antagonistic relationship between a “pure people” with a general will that should be given political expression and corrupt elite) (see Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). Radical right-wing populists claim to understand, and speak for, the people: in this case, the Irish people, and “defend” them from the liberal political establishment, which they see as culpable for exposing the populace to globalisation, unfettered capitalism, and social permissiveness. The potential impact of migration on Ireland’s unique culture is often at the heart of Irish right-wing politicking, finding expression in slogans such as the NP’s “Ireland for the Irish” or the IFP’s “house the Irish first.” 245

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The potential for radical right-wing parties and groups in Ireland to gain significant support has generally been met with skepticism. This is understandable, given that in the most recent general election (February 2020), the largest share of the popular vote won by a radicalright candidate in the constituency in which they stood barely amounted to two percent. Given its relatively minor impact on party politics, scholarship on those elements of the radical right with expressly political ambitions has been few and far-between, save for historical studies focusing on the early twentieth century, augmented by accounts of anti-fascist activity in Ireland published by activist groups (e.g., O’Reilly, 2012). An article by Eoin O’Malley (2008), is one of few academic treatments of the modern radical right in the Republic of Ireland. O’Malley concludes that there are several conditions which account for the absence of a radical right-wing party in Ireland, not least the absence of a conducive media environment in which its message could be propagated. To a large extent, that still applies to the mainstream media in Ireland, although the online space has provided opportunities for the populist radical right in recent years. He also points to the presence of Sinn Féin, which, although stridently nationalist, does not exploit fears about immigration. Much of his analysis remains pertinent. Since the mid-2010s, however, a distinctively vocal and populist manifestation of the radical right has emerged in Ireland. The impact of a section of radical right political opinion in Ireland has begun to be studied, particularly concerning citizenship and social cohesion (Fanning, 2021). This chapter seeks to assess the historical place of the radical right in Ireland, contemporary manifestations of that ideology, and its prospects for the future. Whilst we can see similarities between the rhetoric of these groups and movements of similar ideological bent elsewhere, radical and far-right politics is not completely “foreign” to Ireland, and has considerable historical roots there, even if its relative success has always been, and is likely to remain, minor.

The historical context: The Blueshirts and beyond The best-known, and numerically most significant, far-right grouping in Irish political life was the Army Comrades Association (ACA), or “Blueshirts,” after the colour of their attire. The Blueshirts emerged in 1932, following the accession to power of Fianna Fáil, which had formerly opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty that established what is now the Irish Republic. The ACA organised and styled itself in a manner similar to uniformed paramilitary organisations in 1920s Europe such as the “Brownshirts” (SA) of the German Nazi Party (Siemens, 2017), or Mussolini’s Voluntary Militia for National Security (the Blackshirts) (Sawer, 2007). The ACA was formed to protect former supporters of the Irish Free State, which had cracked down on the Anti-Treaty Irish Republican Army, supposedly now seeking revenge on their former Civil War (1922–1923) adversaries. The ACA’s membership figures are disputed. Some suggest around 47,000 at its peak in 1934 (Cronin, 1994, p. 237). About a quarter of the members were women (McGarry, 2005, p. 250). What is indisputable is the far-right ultranationalist character of its ideology. It was supportive of corporatism, similar to that espoused by Italian fascists (Cronin, 1995). During the Spanish Civil War, approximately 700 Irishmen, many of them associated with former Blueshirt leader, Eoin O’Duffy, went to fight alongside Franco’s Falangists. In 1934, the ACA – along with the National Centre Party and the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedhael – merged to form Fine Gael. O’Duffy was its first president, but there was a split with the party the following year, following his removal from the leadership role. The ACA dissolved in 1935, and some of its remnants became involved in O’Duffy’s new venture, the 246

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National Corporate Party (NCP). The NCP also had a quasi-paramilitary force known as the “Greenshirts” (not to be confused with the paramilitary wing of the same name affiliated to the Social Credit Party of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see Finlay, 1970). The NCP was more republican in orientation than the ACA, seeking the Irish Free State’s departure from the British Commonwealth and the establishment of a Republic in its stead. The NCP was influenced by contemporary ideas of the corporate state, popularised in continental Europe (Pinto, 2017). It hoped that Irish people would vote for a corporate state, which, once established, would spell the end of Irish parliamentary democracy (White, 1994, p. 143). It was virulently anti-communist, consistent with the devout Catholicism of many in the far-right milieu, including O’Duffy himself. Following O’Duffy’s involvement in Spain, he retired from active politics, and the NCP fizzled out by 1937. What the presence of these movements demonstrated, however short-lived they were, was that there was a small, but not insignificant, market for far-right political ideas in the early years of independent Ireland. Corporatist ideas continued to have some traction during the 1940s. Minor parties such as the Monetary Reform Alliance and Ailtirí na hAiséirghe (“Architects of the Resurrection”) continued to espouse corporatist and ultra-nationalist views during these years. Amongst the key issues for groups during this period was the partition of Ireland, and the question of migration. Unlike modern radical-right movements, however, Ailtirí was not concerned about immigration, but the scourge of emigration (Douglas, 2009a). Indeed, so concerned was the party, that it promised full employment, and avowed to criminalise leaving Ireland to seek work elsewhere (Ailtirí, 1944). Alongside its commitment to stamp out emigration, more familiar far-right themes were evident. Ailtirí’s rhetoric was deeply anti-Semitic, with Jews blamed for a range of social and economic ills (Douglas, 2009b). Party policy explicitly sought to institute discriminatory measures against Jews. Unfortunately, such anti-Semitism was not altogether unusual in Irish politics during this time. One of the leading members of the above-mentioned Monetary Reform Alliance, Oliver J. Flanagan, used his maiden speech in parliament to praise the actions of Nazi Germany for routing “the Jews out of their country” (Dáil Éireann debate. Friday, 9 Jul 1943, Vol. 91, No. 5). Some Irish republicans, however, did flirt with the idea of collaboration with the Nazis, to capitalise on supposed British weakness owing to the latter’s involvement in the Second World War. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared war on the United Kingdom in 1939, carried out attacks in Great Britain, and some high-profile IRA members collaborated with the German regime during the war. These included former IRA Chief-of-Staff, Seán Russell. Russell spent time in Nazi Germany, enjoying diplomatic privileges during his stay. He also received weapons and intelligence training from German forces. The Nazis agreed to transport Russell back to Ireland on a submarine but he died en route, having suffered a severe gastric illness. Russell was buried at sea, and the journey was aborted. Also aboard the submarine carrying Russell was his fellow IRA colleague, Frank Ryan. Ryan had earlier risen to prominence as a leading anti-fascist, having fought for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. He was eventually sprung from a Spanish prison with German assistance and, for reasons that remain unclear given his earlier strident opposition to fascism, agreed to replace Russell as an advisor on Ireland to the Nazis (see De Wiel, 2014, for more on both men). The legacy of both Russell and Ryan therefore remains problematic amongst left-wing republicans, historians, and the general public more broadly. However, much of the radical right activity in Ireland, though it bore considerable resemblance to the fascism on the continent, was distinctively less extreme than those manifestations. 247

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Such activity as there was largely a hangover from the aforementioned civil war. Another ongoing legacy of the civil war was the partition of Ireland, and subsequent conflict in Northern Ireland. And it was in that region that far-right groups, from Great Britain, sought to exploit the conflict to advance their cause.

The radical right in Northern Ireland To fully assess populist radical right-wing politics in Ireland it is necessary to consider the impact of two jurisdictions on the island. Some radical groups we examine confine themselves to the realities of two states while others do not. The National Party, primarily active in the Republic, claims to be organised on an all-island basis, but there is little evidence of organised activity in Northern Ireland to date. Thus, groups based in Great Britain tend to be most active in this region. In broad terms, while Northern Ireland does not offer exceptionality in the opportunity for the development of radical-right politics, the groups operating there often do so within a frame of reference to Britain, or the UK. A clear understanding of the situation in often muddied by the existence of Ulster loyalism. This is especially true of those who see a natural synergy between Ulster loyalism the radical right. This view, which often finds expression in polemic and populist writings, merits careful examination and exploration. Whilst there is evidence of engagement between loyalists with the radical right, this remains far from core to loyalist ideology (McAuley, 2016) or partypolitical expression (Loughlin, 2019; McAuley, 2013). Much of the association dates back to “the Troubles” (1968–1998) when loyalist paramilitaries seeking international support and sources of arms contacted organisations on the extreme right. As Loughlin (2019) demonstrates British fascism has a long and complicated relationship to Northern Ireland, dating back at least to the times of Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. This was underpinned by overt expressions of Britishness, the promotion of Empire and anti-Marxist rhetoric, which found renewed expression with the onset of the Troubles in the late 1960s. The radical right hoped to use the conflict to gain a foothold in Ireland. They projected their stance not as against Black and Asian communities, like in Britain, but against the Communist-inspired Provisional IRA’s campaign, designed, they claimed, to destroy the British nation (Durham, 2012). Since the late-1960s, radical-right groupings have tried to organise and recruit in Northern Ireland. The National Front (NF), British National Party (BNP), National Socialist Movement, Combat, 18, the White Nationalist Party, Britain First, and Patriotic Alternative (PA) have all, despite concerted attempts over many years, failed to make significant inroads in Northern Ireland (see for example, Durham, 2012; Macklin, 2020; Sunday World, 2022). The first serious attempt by the radical right to organise in Northern Ireland was by the NF, in the 1970s. It met with little success, the relationship perhaps best illustrated by one meeting held between the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the largest loyalist paramilitary group, and members of the NF. To represent him, the UDA leader reportedly sent one of the organisation’s few non-White former members to the meeting (McDonald & Cusack, 2004, p. 110). The NF made further attempts to organise in Northern Ireland in the immediate aftermath of the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in 1974 (which brought down a power-sharing executive). The NF sent a member of its national staff, John Field, to establish a shop in loyalist East Belfast. The enterprise lasted only a matter of weeks before it was “closed” by locals. Further, the lack of interest in the far right was underscored when a National Front candidate, David Kerr, contested a council seat in a 1987 by-election in the Belfast suburb of Newtonabbey, securing only 27 votes (Cusack & McDonald, 2000, p. 220). 248

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By the mid-1980s, following widespread unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the NF again tried to inspire loyalist support for their cause (Searchlight 1986) – particularly amongst those loyalists calling for an independent Ulster, declaring that: “those people currently resident in Northern Ireland who refuse to renounce allegiance to the Irish Republic and do not consider themselves British should lose their British Citizenship and, as a result, their automatic right to live on British soil” (National Front, 2011). This initiative again dissipated, partly because of lack of engagement by loyalist voters, and partly because, at the time, the NF was tearing itself apart in internal power struggles over personalities and direction. Throughout the 1990s, the BNP tried unsuccessfully to gain purchase as an electoral force within sections of loyalism. Despite almost continual efforts since then, the extreme right failed to provide a viable structural alternative to politics in Northern Ireland. Even in 2009, when the radical right achieved spectacular success with Nick Griffin and Andrew Brons elected as the Members of the European Parliament (securing 943,598 votes in Britain), the BNP did not offer candidates in Northern Ireland. In the 2011 election to the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly, the BNP stood three candidates in the loyalist heartlands of East Belfast and South and East Antrim. They amassed a merge total 1,252 votes between them and the party did not stand candidates in subsequent Assembly elections. The “alt-right” identitarian movement also sought to organise in Northern Ireland in 2018, with Generation Identity (GI) appearing at a demonstration in support of former English Defence League (EDL) leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (The Newsroom, 2018). Features magazine Grazia interviewed one of GI’s Irish leaders, who raised concerns about supposed demographic change in Europe “where our peoples are becoming a minority in their own countries” (Silverman, 2018). The use of social media was central to GI’s early attempts to mobilise and recruit, in Ireland and elsewhere, but a Facebook ban hindered these efforts (Bailey, 2018). But other groups attempted to make inroads where GI failed. More recently, manifestations of the British far right, such as “Britain First,” have sought to attract support through a brand of militant Christian rhetoric, and overt public displays of British symbolism, seeking to harness expressions of disquiet over social tensions alongside nativist ideology, giving rise to anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQ political action. Although noted more for extra-parliamentary activity, Britain First sought electoral office, and continues to field candidates in elections having re-registered as a political party in 2021. The latest display of radical-right politics is in the form of PA, formed by ex-BNP publicity officer, Mark Collett. PA promotes a manifesto white nationalism replete with antisemitic tropes and calls for the deportation of migrants from the UK. The radical right has an extensive presence online (Bowman-Grieve, 2009), and PA has reinforced this prominence, with extensive use of social media, particularly as a recruiting tool, using platforms such as Twitter (who later suspended PA’s account) to attract young people, though to little avail in Northern Ireland. Despite a small social media following, PA haven’t managed to organise significantly in the region. Neither have PA’s attempts to reach out to far-right activists in the Republic come to much (Sunday World, 2022). In Northern Ireland, whose loyalist communities pride themselves as having stood against Nazi Germany, the ideological baggage of the British extreme right often has limited appeal. The radical right, however, continues to seek to develop a base, particularly within loyalist communities. The responses of loyalism to contemporary events remain complex and multilayered, but some have turned inward, reflecting a reinforcement of a defence of ideological positions and territory (McAuley, 2011). There are also some who are attracted to narratives that find expression within the framework of the radical right in more extreme ways, such as spontaneous physical violence. 249

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Indeed, the four largest ethnic minority groups in Northern Ireland, (Chinese, Irish Travellers, South Asians and Black Africans) in the past reported increased levels of harassment (Connolly & Keenan, 2001) and are subject to racially motivated hate crimes and street violence (Corrigan, 2021; Knox, 2011). It is no coincidence that those areas showing the highest concentration of immigrants, alongside some of the most economically and socially deprived populations in Northern Ireland (NIDETI, 2006; NISRA, 2022) are also the areas of where the radical right tried to grow membership (Britain First, 2015; Campbell, 2018). Thus far in Northern Ireland, however, their gains have been modest.

Conservatism, crisis, and change During the 1990s, the Republic of Ireland underwent significant social and economic transformation. From 1993–2008, the state experienced unprecedented economic growth, fueled by inward investment by multinational corporations, and latterly a property and construction boom. During the 1990s, also, the state underwent a momentous period of social liberalisation. The influence of the Catholic church waned significantly, and contraception, which had previously been subject to restriction, was made widely available. Having previously been synonymous with emigration due to a lack of economic opportunity, Ireland soon became a sought-after destination for economic migrants seeking work, which was then plentiful. The early part of the so-called “Celtic Tiger” phenomenon witnessed significant migration from Africa as compared with earlier years, although the overall numbers were relatively small. After 2004, however, much higher levels of immigration to Ireland occurred with the enlargement of the European Union to include 8 post-communist states in Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). Ireland was one of only three EU states (along with the UK and Sweden) that did not impose transitional restrictions on free movement from these “A8” countries, many of whom quickly found work as the Irish economy expanded. Some groups emerged in the late-1990s that sought to reduce immigration. In 1997, the Immigration Control Platform (ICP) was founded. According to the ICP’s website, its purpose is “to address the phenomenon of immigration to Ireland and to lobby Government for a tight immigration policy. The organisation aims at a very rigorous policy in relation to asylumseekers, refugees, and a determined response to all illegal immigration.” The ICP goes to some lengths to distance itself from those who hold discriminatory attitudes towards minority communities, stating that nobody who holds “views of racial superiority is welcome in the group” (ICP, 2022). Whilst the ICP was not a registered political party, it did put independent candidates forward for elections. Even though it did not enjoy widespread success, the appearance of the ICP gave form to the debates concerning the issue of who should be entitled to Irish citizenship, which became increasingly politicised. As part of the peace process on the island of Ireland, the Republic of Ireland’s constitution was changed by popular vote. The change meant that anyone born on the island of Ireland would be entitled to claim Irish citizenship. This was designed, originally, to accommodate the minority community within Northern Ireland, and allow them to unproblematically claim Irish citizenship as a birthright. However, the provisions applied to all persons born on the island of Ireland, including those from elsewhere. Media coverage suggested that increasing numbers of children were being born in Ireland whose parents were non-Irish nationals, with the implication that Irish citizenship was a pull factor. The government held a referendum to tighten the citizenship provisions, meaning that a person would only be entitled to Irish citizenship if one or more of their parents was free of 250

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immigration restrictions, or was themselves an Irish citizen. Over 79 percent voted in favour of restricting Irish citizenship, although parties were divided on the issue. Centre-right parties, including the governing Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrat coalition, and Fine Gael, supported the changes, but the left-wing parties (including Labour and Sinn Féin) opposed it. But this did not signal a general rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, and although some politicians occasionally used rhetoric that could be regarded as anti-immigrant, political parties did not usually seek to exploit concerns about immigration. However, in 2008, the global financial crisis struck. Ireland, with its heavily leveraged banking system which had fueled the property boom, suffered a huge economic crash, entering into an emergency financial assistance agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. Other EU states, such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, also suffered severe economic contractions. The severity of the recession, and the return of emigration, was a stain on the Irish political landscape. The Irish political establishment, and their European counterparts, were incapable of resolving the crisis in ways that did not result in a great deal of hardship for those worst-affected countries, creating much discontent. At the same time as there was significant political and economic turmoil in Ireland, social liberalisation continued apace. In May 2015, a referendum was held on the legalisation of same-sex marriage. Some 62 percent voted in favour of the reforms. Three years later, another referendum was held which sought to liberalise Ireland’s restrictive abortion law. The reforms were passed, with 66 percent of voters in favour of the liberalisation. Whilst the above results show broad support for social reforms in Ireland, they also demonstrate the presence of a sizeable socially conservative minority. All the main political parties backed these changes, thus, in theory, there was space for a new political movement to champion the issues of concern to those who did not favour these social reforms, and also those who were skeptical about issues such as immigration and European integration. Whilst the immediate political ramifications of the crisis, and the aforementioned pace of social reform, did not herald a swift lurch to the right in Irish politics, the crisis and its aftermath did help crystalise a new form of radical right-wing political ideology in Ireland, which combined the social conservatism of past manifestations, with a distinctively anti-globalist, anti-corporate, Eurosceptic, and anti-immigration focus which became most conspicuous after 2015.

The contemporary radical right in Ireland: Ideology and policies Although the radical right in Ireland remains a small concern, it has become increasingly vocal since the late-2010s. Whilst there are a number of individuals who might be categorised as espousing radical-right views, including those who seek to cultivate followings either online or offline, we focus on parties or groups arguably in that category that have sought elected office. In 2015, Identity Ireland was launched, amid a rise in identitarian political movements, such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident), in continental Europe at the time. Such groups were concerned with what they regarded as mass-immigration from majority Muslim societies. The leader of Identity Ireland, Peter O’Loughlin, reportedly attempted to establish an Irish chapter of PEGIDA, in collaboration with Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, but faced strong opposition from anti-racist activists, and was condemned by traditional Irish republicans, including Sinn Féin (Moloney, 2016). In terms of policy, Identity Ireland was “soft Eurosceptic” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004). It did not advocate leaving the EU, but a complete reform of the institution, with a return to 251

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“a Europe of co-operation and [to] end the autocratic rule of the modern E.U. which has helped bring Europe to its knees.” It strongly advocated for very restrictive immigration policies, since, in its view, immigration “creates greater competition for scarce employment, puts pressure on social systems and can create cultural division and conflict” (Identity Ireland, 2022). For its part, Identity Ireland fielded one candidate (the above-mentioned O’Loughlin) in the 2016 Irish General election. He received 183 votes. The party also contested the 2019 European Parliament elections, receiving a total of 3,685 votes (approximately 0.2 percent of the popular vote). Since this initial flurry of activity, the Party’s social media accounts have been quiet since 2021. Even in the online sphere, the group proved to be a very niche concern. At the time of writing, the party had 6,413 “likes” on its Facebook page, and 1,760 followers on Twitter, not all of which might be attributable to people based in Ireland. In 2016, the National Party (NP) made its first appearance in Ireland. The NP seemed to be better organised and more media savvy than Identity Ireland. Its leader, Justin Barrett, was a well-established figure in Irish conservative circles, through his involvement in the antiabortion campaign group, Youth Defence. He was also an active Eurosceptic, and proponent of a “yes” vote in the above-mentioned Irish citizenship referendum. In his early career, Barrett seemed to have a profile beyond Ireland, however, having appeared at events organised by the radical-right German National Democratic Party and the Italian Forza Nuova (McDonald, 2002). The NP is explicitly Eurosceptic, but recognises that there is no prospect of Ireland voting to leave the EU in the near future. It argues instead that those rights supposedly lost to the EU should be returned to the Irish people, and advocates an adversarial approach to Brussels, “similar to what countries like Poland and Hungary have done in response to the migrant crisis” (National Party, 2022a). Should it not be possible to achieve its aims within the EU, it states, the party would advocate leaving. Unsurprisingly, the NP is strongly anti-abortion, and would seek to make the practice illegal. It seeks to end what it claims is unrestricted immigration, and to promote the “preservation” of Irish culture and identity (National Party, 2022b). The seeming implication being that Irish culture and identity is under threat from the forces of globalisation, and immigration. The NP is the largest and most active radical right-wing party, and has contested elections on several occasions. It contested the 2020 general election, gaining less than 2 percent of first preference votes (FPVs) in the constituencies it fielded candidates. Party leader, Justin Barrett, stood in a by-election in 2021, receiving 183 FPVs (0.7 percent). Thus, although a vocal presence, the NP has not yet made inroads electorally. Faring marginally better than the NP in electoral competitions, the Irish Freedom Party (IFP) constitutes the other main party that could be termed as radical right-wing in orientation. Founded in 2018 as an avowedly hard-Eurosceptic party, the IFP (Cumann na Saoirse in the Irish language) supports “Irexit”: Ireland’s departure from the EU. Opposition to uncontrolled immigration is central to its anti-EU stance. The IFP sees the “open borders” policy of successive governments as linked to the on-going housing crisis, with a lack of affordable stock to purchase or to rent (IFP, 2022a). It takes a conservative, “pro-natalist” position on abortion, but is broadly libertarian when it comes to issues such as taxation and climate change (IFP, 2022b). The party secured 5495 FPVs in the 2020 general election. In keeping with its libertarian side, the IFP has taken an anti-lockdown stance during the COVID-19 pandemic, with party activists often featuring at demonstrations against public health restrictions. In March 2021, the IFP installed a new party Chair. The former holder of that office, Professor Dolores Cahill, resigned amid a public furor over her high-profile 252

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skepticism about face masks and COVID-19 vaccines based on mRNA technology. She has reportedly been associated with so-called “common law” movements (Sunday Independent, 3 October 2021), some of which have been opposed to COVID-19 restrictions and have echoes of sovereign citizen movements internationally. Cahill contested the Dublin Bay South by-election of 2021 as an independent candidate, gaining 169 FPVs. As well as registered political parties, there are a number of organisations that espouse political views that could be described as radical right. Anti-Corruption Ireland (ACI) is an umbrella movement that stood candidates in the 2020 general election. ACI is spearheaded by former journalists, more recently active in the anti-COVID restrictions movement. Although not a registered political party, two candidates, Gemma O’Doherty and John Waters, stood as independents associated with ACI in the 2020 elections. Neither was elected. Another independent candidate, from the conservative Catholic nationalist Síol na h-Éireann (Irish Patriots) movement stood as an independent candidate on an “anti-immigration/plantation and pro-Christian platform,” in the Donegal constituency (Donegal News, 2020) where they received only 580 FPVs (0.75%). Donegal is regarded as somewhat socially conservative, but even there the radical right has so-far shown extremely poor prospects. Although there are considerable differences in emphasis and approach between the groups, and often fraught relations between groups and individuals, what unites them is the narrative of an “Irish Ireland.” This, for example, is often premised on ethnic rather than civic nationalism, as well as opposition to what they regard as “uncontrolled” immigration and ultra-conservative social attitudes, particularly on the issue of abortion. Some also express “concern” about the supposed promotion of LGBTQ identities in schools, and issues such as gender identity and sexuality. For instance, ACI’s leading activist was subject to a barrage of online ridicule after claiming she did not know any “happy” gay people (Express, 2021). Culture plays a significant role in Irish radical-right discourses, with a particular emphasis on Ireland’s Christian heritage, and supposed threats to that heritage allegedly posed by non-Christian immigration, especially Muslims (McDaid, 2020). Radical-right groups and individuals were united in their outrage that the headquarters of the Gaelic Athletic Association, Croke Park, was used by Muslim groups to celebrate the festival of Eid-al-Adha in the summer of 2020. Representatives of other faiths also attended, and the event was highly successful. The stadium, the third largest in Europe, was chosen because it could easily host a socially-distanced service. However, right-wing nationalists saw in the service a “threat” to Irish culture and tradition, and a number of activists protested at the venue, singing Christian hymns and reciting the Holy Rosary (Raymond, 2020). Some on the radical right in Ireland have echoed the idea of the “great replacement theory” (Obiadi et al., 2022), which sees Ireland at risk of being taken over by non-White, non-Christian populations due to “uncontrolled migration,” at some future juncture. Whilst it is often Muslim communities that bear the brunt of this rhetoric, those from Jewish backgrounds have also been referenced. This includes the promotion of conspiracy theories involving the financier and philanthropist George Soros, allegedly a figurehead in the “globalist” movement (see e.g. Oliver & Wood, 2014). Throughout 2020 and 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic provided a focal point for those on the Irish radical right. Although some, such as The Irish Patriots began the pandemic with community assistance programmes (Irish Patriots, 2020a, 2020b), its rhetoric swiftly became more critical, in line with other radical-right groups. Irish radical-right groups have been prominent in anti-lockdown demonstrations, and some have also opposed vaccination, particularly the requirement for vaccination passes in certain settings, or compulsory vaccinations for certain professions. 253

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Radical-right groups in Ireland have also taken a firm line against what they regard as “unrestricted capitalism and globalization.” Here, large corporations are seen as posing a threat to Irish sovereignty and culture. The anti-COVID restriction movement, in Ireland as elsewhere, has tended to frame the proponents of lockdowns and community vaccinations as being in league with “globalists,” who seek to use the pandemic (or have created a false “plandemic”) in order to erode the sovereignty of nation states, and further exploit ordinary people (Eberl et al., 2021). The announcement in January 2022 that the government would lift most of the COVID-19 restrictions in Ireland (BBC, 2022) poses a challenge for those individuals and groups that sought to use opposition to the lockdown as a focal point for mobilisation, and those who project the restrictions as evidence of an increasingly authoritarian turn on the part of the state, working in concert with other elites and the pharmaceutical industry, to restrict people’s freedoms.

Conclusion: The radical right in Ireland and its future prospects The 2020 general election results, coupled with the 2021 by-election in Dublin Bay South, in the Republic of Ireland, and its continued marginalisation in elections in Northern Ireland, do not suggest a huge appetite for the radical right in Ireland, at least in terms of political representation. Nevertheless, a considerable number of people have attended anti-lockdown protests, and, whilst these encompassed people of differing political persuasions, there may be a potential pool of voters sympathetic towards their viewpoints. Whilst, as we have shown, there has always been a distinctive and sometimes vocal radical right presence in Irish political life, on both sides of the border, it has failed to achieve significant or consistent success. The proliferation of small parties and groups is perhaps another reason why the radical right has failed to develop a greater electoral following. Given how small the vote for radical right-wing parties has been in Ireland in the last general election and in relevant by-elections (2020 and 2021) it is apparent that several groups are fishing in a very small pond for support, and until one such group is clearly dominant, the prospects of all organisations remain strictly limited. The political environment in Ireland does not, presently, appear to offer significant opportunities for radical-right political parties. As O’Malley (2008) previously suggested, the voters that might normally support radical-right parties have tended to support Sinn Féin, a nationalist party of the radical left (in economic terms), which for the past few decades has been broadly pro-immigration. Sinn Féin, which focuses on issues such as the housing crisis, had more appeal to the average voter than radical-right groups focused on immigration and the alleged “threats” to Irish (or in the case of Northern Ireland, British) culture that it brings with it. The pro-EU sentiment of the Irish electorate, which has been cemented since the UK’s Brexit vote, also limits the potential pool of support for radical-right or non-cosmopolitan nationalist parties. Despite the attempts of the radical right to mobilise on issues that have proven fruitful elsewhere, Irish electorates remain relatively unconvinced by their arguments. However, the radical right is unlikely to wither away soon. Its adherents are devoted and highly activist in nature. The internet has allowed activists a platform to communicate and organise, including developing connections with like-minded individuals outside Ireland, which may motivate some to continue their activism. Actors who have developed streams of income relating to political activity may also be encouraged to continue, even if there seems to be little chance of having the ideas they espouse actually implemented. 254

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Those opposed to the radical right might argue the size of the movement is less important than its potential impact on political debate and public life. The extent to which those who appear to be motivated by the ideology turn to more direct, or, in some cases, violent, action will remain an area of concern for policy makers, law enforcement, and wider civil society. Those concerns are well-founded, and, as we have shown, Ireland has not been immune from seeing instances of discrimination against minorities. The narratives that fuel radical-right politics are often highly divisive and undoubtedly experienced most acutely by the minority groups in society, such as ethnic or religious minorities or by LGBTQ communities. One potential future research agenda might concern how radical right actors, in both parts of Ireland, construct LGBTQ communities or abortion liberalisation as a challenge to “conservative values” in a comparative context. Across Ireland there are commonalities between the ideas and narratives projected by radical-right groups within both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Currently, however, there appears to be little or no consequential structural links between them, although they often continue to frame politics in terms of so-called shared characteristics, such as Christianity, ethnic nationalism, and social conservatism. Whilst likely to maintain a divisive presence, engage in more vocal and provocative street demonstrations, or attempt to attract support for their cause internationally, their political prospects, in both jurisdictions, remain limited for the foreseeable future.

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18 THE CONTEMPORARY UK FAR RIGHT AND ITS ORGANISATIONAL TRAJECTORY SINCE 2009 TOWARDS A TRULY POST-ORGANISATIONAL MOVEMENT? William Allchorn

Introduction The UK far right has experienced a marked transition in the past decade from parliamentary to more extra-parliamentary forms of activism (Allchorn, 2018). Initially expressed in the form of street protest movements in the late 2000s and early 2010s, signs of vigilantism and terror groupuscules1 have now been added to the picture mix as the UK far right transforms into a more fractured, post-organisational2 phase of movement development (Lee, 2020; Mulhall, 2019). Predominantly focused on anti-Muslim forms of mobilisation since the early 2000s, the UK far right experienced a shift back to more biologically racist themes in the summer of 2020 as a result of Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in June of that year. A large-scale protest attended by Britain First, the UK National Front, and Democratic Football Lads Alliance activists as well as other anti-minority protestors in June demonstrated the exploitation of anti-BLM narratives by the organised far right (Heren, 2020), and the possibility of a unifying mobilisation theme for the fractured movement, which has struggled to retain relevance after the implosion of the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP) and radical right-wing UK Independence party. In parallel with the developments at the party-political level has seen the rise of culturally nationalist3 street movements and neo-Nazi terror cells in the UK – especially in the period after the BNP’s collapse. In June 2009, the anti-Islam English Defence League (EDL) street movement emerged as a strident voice against what it saw as the “creeping effects” of “Islamisation” in UK public life (EDL Website, 2013). Able to mobilise thousands of loyal foot soldiers for its events and – in a case of cumulative extremism (Eatwell, 2006) – emerging as the result of Islamist extremists demonstrating at the homecoming of UK troops in the Bedfordshire town of Luton, it hosted over 50 major demonstrations up and down the UK – under the banner of “not racist, not violent, just no longer silent” – until the exit of its founder, Tommy Robinson, in October 2013 (Goodwin, 2013). The EDL continues to be active – hosting 13 major demonstrations in 2017, 3 in 2018 and 1 in 2019 – but the scale of its demonstrations has dropped significantly – with its best turnout in the past several years being some 200 activists (Hope not Hate, 2018, p. 19). 258

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-24

The contemporary UK far right

Yet the EDL is not the only street-based movement to emerge in the wake of the BNP’s collapse. In May 2011, another anti-Islam protest movement and political party, Britain First, emerged on the UK culturally nationalist scene. Led by a former BNP Councillor, Paul Golding, Britain First has gained notoriety for its “Mosque Invasions,” “Christian Patrol,” and demonstrations held in areas with sizeable Muslim populations in the UK that are explicitly designed to provoke minority communities. Despite garnering a significant online following (nearly 2.3 million Facebook followers), it was in fact offline actions by the group caught up with the movement in 2017 – with both leaders facing time in prison for conducting a Cardiff “Mosque Invasion” in November 2016 (Pasha-Robinson, 2016) and an aggressive leafleting campaign against an Asian-owned takeaway restaurants in May 2017 (Doherty, 2018). As of spring 2018, the movement and its leaders were banned from Facebook and Twitter and its operations have largely been relegated to Northern Ireland (Cellan-Jones, 2018). The litany of criminal charges – including terrorism – lodged against its leaders has fractured and limited the group’s largely confrontational form of activism, which never quite spilled over into violence (despite no explicit commitment to non-violence in its founding statements) (Britain First, 2021).4 In addition to Britain First, the third far-right group to emerge during the UK far right’s switch from the ballot box to the streets has been the Football Lads Alliance (FLA). Formed in June 2017 by property manager and Tottenham Hotspur fan, John Meighan, the movement successfully hosted several high-level demonstrations attracting tens of thousands of followers. “Uniting against extremism & violence” and lobbying for a harder line against Islamist terrorists (Chaplain, 2017), the group however became more extreme and fractious as time went on – with the emergence of a splinter group, the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), in March 2018 (BBC News, 2018). Many have drawn parallels between the DFLA and the EDL – with a similar emergence (again from an episode of cumulative extremism), commitment to non-violence and racism and linkages to football hooligan firms (Allchorn, 2023; Allchorn & Feldman, 2019; Allen, 2018). Added to this, we have a mestatising terror threat picture that has emerged on the UK far-right scene since the foundation of National Action in 2014 (Jackson, 2021). Becoming a serious concern for policy makers and resulting in two significant solo-actor terror attacks in 2016 and 2017 (as well as numerous foiled plots, Prevent referrals, arrests and court cases), it appears the lack of an opportunity for legitimate mainstream electoralism – and the severity with which UK security and law enforcement services now take the threat – has led to a coarsening of activism to this extreme (MI5, July, 2021). Joined by more ideologically extreme non-violent actors (such as the ethno-nationalist Patriotic Alternative movement), it appears the time is ripe to assess the signs of a post-organisational phase in the development of the UK far right as a political movement. Indeed, with many far-right movements and groups nowadays simply existing as loosely affiliated and incorporated organisations on an online Telegram chat or Discord server, commentators and scholars have remarked on the difficulty for researchers and practitioners in quantifying the movements cohesiveness, unity, and impact (Comerford, 2020; Lee, 2020; Mulhall, 2019). In this chapter, the “far right” is used to describe a broad plethora of political parties, groups and individuals in the UK that ascribe to policy ideas connected with extreme nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state (Mudde, 2000). The “far right” encompasses individuals, parties and groups who both (1) actively “espouse violence” and “seek the overthrow of liberal democracy” entirely called the “extreme right” (Eatwell, 2003a, p. 14) and (2) those that offer “a critique of the constitutional order without any antidemocratic behaviour or intention” called the “radical right” (Carter, 2005, p. 22). Cognate parties, individuals and groups in the UK case range from non-violent anti-Islam street protest 259

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movements to a range of formally constituted neo-fascist and neo-Nazi political parties as well as extreme right, lone-actor terrorists and terror cells. This chapter aims to take stock of the state of the UK contemporary far right in its postorganisational phase and test the veracity of the post-organisational thesis through an analysis of mobilisation events by the UK far right since 2009. Using the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right’s new FRGB Dataset (Allchorn & Dafnos, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c) and insights from postmodern organisational theory (Parker, 1992), it will test the ideological, strategic and organisational unity of UK far-right mobilisations within this new, putative epoch, assessing whether this movement is indeed in a post-organisational stage of development. It will factor in key changes in organisational resources, the external political opportunity structure and internal movement factors for such a shift, looking into the black box of what it means for the study of the UK far right going forward.

Context: The evolution of UK far-right parties, street protest movements and subcultural milieus, 1932-PRESENT From ugly duckling to mainstream threat: Focusing in on Britain’s historical far right Every year, the anti-fascist organisation, Hope not Hate, publishes what it calls a “State of Hate” report. Contained within it is a snapshot of how the UK far right has fared in the previous year. Fortunately for us, this usually contains a review of the parlous state of affairs within this fringe political movement. Another splintering, fragmentation or falling out, for example, it sets out to highlight the successes and failures of the movement and any exceptional developments that have happened – based on the monitoring work of one the UK’s leading anti-fascist groups. Hope not Hate’s 2015 report was however exceptionally glum in its interpretation of where the UK far right is headed. “[P]olitically marginalised, fractured, leaderless and increasingly violent,” the report suggested, Britain’s far-right is now more “isolated and in retreat” than at any point over the past 20 years – “becoming more extreme and violent” in the process (Hope not Hate, 7 February 2016). This has had the effect, not just of moving the far right onto the UK’s streets, but also transitioning the UK far right into the more pernicious (and criminal space) of online and offline anti-Muslim protests and attacks – accounting for two-fifths of all incidents in the year 2013/2014 (Feldman & Littler, July 2014, p. 3). To discount the UK far right, therefore, would be to miss out on some clearly key trends bubbling under the surface of this particular form of extremist politics and echoes the mood of the 1990’s scholarship on these types of groups, which suggested that Britain was somehow “exceptional” in resisting the throes of right-wing extremism. Before the electoral rise of the BNP in the early mid 2000’s, one key trope within the UK literature on the far right was its abject failure to make any appreciable impact on UK electoral politics. In his 1996 chapter in a co-edited book about the “Failure of British Fascism,” for example, political historian Roger Griffin likened the UK far right to an “ugly duckling” when compared to some of its Continental cousins. Limited by a political cultural consensus in the UK around “moderation, a hatred of fanaticism, an aversion to demagogy, uniforms and overt racism” (Goodwin, 2007, p. 242), this particular political movement has been left to “scratch around indefinitely without ever coming out as a swan” (Griffin, 1996, p. 163). The first major manifestation of the UK far right was Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) in the 1930’s. Led by a former Labour Minister and given support by the (then) owner of the Daily Mail, Lord Rothermere, the BUF believed in anti-communism and 260

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protectionism as well as replacing the Parliamentary democracy with a strong state and leader reminiscent of Mussolini’s Italy. Mosley’s Blackshirts had around 50,000 members at its peak in 1934 but establishment support swiftly declined after a rally in Olympia in the same year that saw anti-fascists “forcefully ejected” (Copsey, 2000, p. 16). The BUF was mainly a protestbased movement, however, and with the onset of the Second World War was eventually proscribed in 1940. The next major manifestation of far-right extremism in the UK was the Union Movement (UM). Again, another brainchild of Oswald Mosley after his detainment and eight-year exile from party politics in 1948, its ideology only slightly diverged from its predecessor, the BUF. Taking Mosley’s 1947 text “The Alternative” as its guide, the party argued for closer integration between European nations as a counterbalance to Americanism on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other (Poole, 1996, p. 69). Underlying this more mainstream façade was, however, a more radical critique of liberal democracy and its replacement with a strong executive and government by referenda. Due to the fragmented nature of the far right at the time and the strong effect of Second World War, the UM did not gain much traction; membership peaked at 1,500 members and Mosley only secured 8.1% of vote when contesting the Parliamentary seat of Kensington North in 1959 – a result described by one historian as an “abject failure” (ibid., p. 64). After the decline of the Union Movement, the British far right scene entered a period of fragmentation and disarray until the creation of the National Front in 1967. For example, in 1954, A.K. Chesterton, who had been the leading intellectual force behind the BUF, formed the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). As it names suggests, the LEL chose to oppose the dissolution of the British Empire that it saw as tantamount to treason (Thurlow, 1998, p. 221). In a more sinister vein, however, the group also viewed Bolshevism and Capitalism as part of Jewish-led conspiracy by the establishment. Symptomatic of the fragmented nature of the UK far right at the time, however, the LEL was a largely minor and ineffectual political outfit that had “little impact on the electorate” (ibid.). Despite performing a series of high-level publicity stunts between 1955 and 1961, the party only secured 1,064 votes at 1964 General Election. Shortly after, it ran into financial difficulties and collapsed. Not perturbed by this period of abject failure, A.K. Chesterton went on to help unify the UK far right under the banner of the National Front. Setup to oppose immigration and multiculturalist policies of the first Wilson Government (1964–1970), it received spikes in electoral support in 1972 and 1976 when Ugandan and Malawian Asians fled to the UK. Moreover, it polled strongly up to (and including) the 1979 Parliamentary election – with 191,000 votes and some local seats secured at its ascendancy. Its march was, however, largely abated by the populist nationalism of mainstream elites (e.g. Powell and Thatcher) as well as apparent successes by the anti-fascist, Anti-Nazi League, to brand the organisation as a “Nazi Front.” For example, in 1978, then Leader of the Conservative Party, Margaret Thatcher, talked about Britain being “swamped by alien cultures” and hardened its stance on “law-and-order” (Eatwell, 2003b, p. 340). Such comments and active opposition, however, worked; the Front splintered and entered into serious infighting that would plague the far-right scene until the early 1990’s (Eatwell, 1998). The most successful historic far-right movement in the UK of recent times, however, was the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP). Set up by former National Front chairman in 1982, John Tyndall, the BNP did not win its first electoral contest until 1993 – almost ten years after its foundation. This was mainly because of its lack of legitimacy and its tarring with the fascist brush that was not helped by its image as a “feet on the street” operation. Moreover, it was also symptomatic of Tyndall’s lack of electoral appetite and obsession with 261

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far-right esoterica (Copsey, 2008). Such reluctance did not, however, stop the party’s breakthrough at a local by-election in Tower Hamlets in 1993. This episode would pilot a successful form of community-based activism that would become the core of a much-needed modernisation of the party later in the decade (Goodwin, 2011). In 1990’s, however, a group of modernisers – that would later involve the BNP’s future chairman, Nick Griffin – aimed to lift the party out of obscurity. Going through a period of ideological moderation and professionalisation from 1999 onwards, the BNP under Griffin managed to rack up several successful local election victories throughout the early to mid2000’s in post-industrial Northern towns. General election support took off to such an extent that in 2010, it won nearly 600,000 votes. Moreover, at its peak in 2009, the BNP elected its first two representatives at national elections and could claim the most Councillors of any far-right party in British political history. Until its implosion after the 2010 General Election, then, it was widely seen as one of the most successful far-right forces in UK politics.

From electoralism (back) to street-based politics: Britain’s contemporary far right The 2010 General Election would, however, prove the zenith for this more electoral form of activism. Afterwards, the main actor on this part of the far-right scene would be embroiled in bitter infighting over the divisive figure of Nick Griffin as well as the parlous state of party finances. Already brewing, however, would be a mode of activism that would come to define the current epoch of far-right activity in the UK: street-based politics. This was signalled by the advent of the English Defence League in 2009 but also with the foundation of Britain First two years later. Moreover, a number of splinter groups or “defence leagues” (the North West, the North East Infidels, PEGIDA UK and the South East Alliance) cleaved off the main far-right vehicle of the EDL and also came to prominence at this time – all with the express intent of protesting against the “Islamification” of the UK public sphere. It is here that we can highlight three key developments that have occurred during this period.

A transition within the contemporary UK far right towards the more criminal space of anti-Islamic protest attacks (both online and offline) The first notable trend of the contemporary UK far right has been a noticeable transition towards the more criminal space of anti-Islamic protest and attacks (both online and offline) in the last nine years. As noted in the introduction and recorded by the anti-Muslim hate crime monitoring service Tell MAMA, two-fifths of all incidents in the year 2013/14 were committed by far-right activists (Feldman and Littler, July 2014, p. 3). Coming after the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby, researchers found that there was an appreciable “untick” in online and offline anti-Muslim hate crime after the attack in May of 2013 – suggesting a wider pool of violent and non-violent activity by those who may not necessarily be affiliated to any anti-Islamic far-right groups but who may sympathise with their activities. In addition, the shift by the contemporary UK far right from electoral politics to a more street-based form of activism has seen the UK’s Muslim community on the receiving end of some pretty nasty attacks by far-right protestors. At the first EDL demonstration in Leicester in October 2010, for example, far-right activists managed to break police lines and attack 262

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a burger bar where Muslim residents were trapped inside (Standpoint, 16 October 2010). Furthermore, several individuals inspired by the current wave of anti-Islamic far-right groups have either planned or went on to commit solo actor forms of terrorism. In April 2013, for example, a 25-year-old Ukrainian national, Pavlo Lapshyn, killed an 82-year-old Muslim man and planted bombs at three Mosques in Birmingham (BBC News, 25 October 2013). Moreover, and a year later, an EDL-inspired Leicestershire teenager, Michael Piggin, was detained indefinitely for plotting to conduct a Columbine-style attack on his former secondary school (BBC News, 8 April 2016). Finally, Zack Davies of the neo-Nazi group “National Action” was convicted of attempted murder after attacking a Sikh doctor with a claw hammer and a machete in June 2015 (Whelan, 25 June 2015).

An increasingly competitive “marketplace” of competing movements and ideas The second notable trend of the contemporary UK far right has been an increasingly competitive and crowded “marketplace” of competing movements and ideas (Macklin, 10 April 2016). Stripped of the strictures of formal membership to one party, a panoply of organisations and sub-groups of those organisations have sprouted forth – making the far right organisationally fragmented and weak. At this moment in time, there are four main actors on the UK far-right scene – with three key splinter groups. These range from groups with a more “moderate” anti-Islam agenda to the more extreme neo-Nazi groups. In terms of the main actors on the far right of UK politics, we have the National Front, English Defence League, Britain First, and National Action. The neo-fascist National Front has about 400 members and occasionally puts on demonstrations. The English Defence League and Britain First both came to prominence because of their direct action “march and grow” style of politics but have been more of a public order problem rather than a serious contender in electoral contests. The latter also suffered from being tarred with the brush of the BNP, with overlaps in personnel and anti-Muslim prejudice. The most worrying movement is National Action – a small group of hard-line National Socialists who came to the fore in 2014 for trolling Jewish Labour MP, Lucian Berger. They were proscribed in December 2016 under terror legislation usually used for extreme Islamist and Irish Nationalist groups, due to concerns over safety and security (Elgot, 12 December 2016). Followed by these more key actors, there are also the English Defence League splinter groups. In April 2012, for example, a leading activist within the EDL, John “Snowy” Shaw, was ejected from the group after a dispute over finances. This in turn led to the splintering and fragmentation of the EDL – with Shaw setting up the more ideologically radical and “neo-Nazi” North East Infidels. Moreover, and according to the anti-fascist organisation Hope not Hate, its partner organisation the North West Infidels (NWI) is the most active of the EDL splinter groups (Hope not Hate, 7 February 2016). With about 40–45 activists in total, NWI was able to organise 12 demonstrations in 2015 (ibid.). Thirdly, Tommy Robinson’s October 2013 departure from the EDL saw him go onto to set up PEGIDA UK (translated from German as “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West”) in January 2016 – a reboot of a previously failed attempt to establish a UK chapter of the then pan-European movement (Dearden, 4 April 2015), it also failed to gain traction (Allchorn, 15 January 2016). Finally, the third key EDL splinter group is the South East Alliance. Headed by former EDL organiser, Paul Prodromou, they have failed to attract any major support beyond a small and disgruntled group of ex-EDL activists. What unites these splinter groups are their more radical adherence to anti-Islamic and (for some) anti-Semitic forms of biological racism. 263

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A move towards the ever-increasing use of direct action, “vigilante-style” politics as a source of political mobilisation The third notable trend of the contemporary UK far right has been a move towards an everincreasing use of direct action, “vigilante-style” politics as a source of political mobilisation. A case in point here is Britain First. Drawing its lineage more directly from the BNP, Britain First has moved its (largely successful) online form of activism into the offline space – carrying out demonstrations, “Christian Patrols,” “Mosque invasions” in several areas with large Muslim populations across the UK. Drawing on an “increasingly confrontational and direct action approach” with Christianity playing “a much more significant role” (Allen, 2014, p. 360), however, Britain First distinguishes itself from its EDL predecessor – both in the level of aggression it displays, but also the religious fervour that is unique to its particular form of far-right activism. This more aggressive form of direct action is worrying for two reasons. The first is that such attacks undermine efforts to foster community cohesion in such areas where social polarisation is a problem. For example, Britain First’s main focus has been on Birmingham, Bradford, Luton, and Tower Hamlets – all areas with a significant Muslim population. The second is the threat such attacks pose to public safety. For example, when Britain First appeared on the doorstep of Bradford’s mayor, Khadim Hussain, in May 2014, this directly endangered the lives of his family (Pidd & Lloyd, 13 May 2013). Moreover, when the group performed a “Mosque invasion” in the Bury Park area of Luton a month later, this was clearly to provoke local Muslims into responding with violence (Tell MAMA, 16 June 2014). The police have recognised this – placing a nationwide injunction on the group from going near any Muslim place of worship and arresting the leader of the group, Paul Golding, for breaching this ban at the end of 2016 (Pasha-Robinson, 15 December 2016).

Literature review: Post-Organisational Theory in relation to the far-right and extremist movements Despite this current, welcome attention around a post-organisational phase of the far right in the UK, the notion of a decentralised, leaderless group or movement – at least on the far right – is not a recent development. As far back as 1992, Louis Beam coined the concept of “leaderless resistance” to describe the need for white supremacists to abandon planning in large groups, and to instead “take action in small cells of one to six men.” Coming in the wake of the 1988 Fort Smith Sedition trial, where 14 white supremacists were accused of plotting to overthrow the United States Federal Government and conspire to assassinate federal officials, and the associated belief amongst extremists that it would destroy the whole of the American white supremacist movement, Beam encouraged this shift to smaller far-right organisations in order to limit the scope of damage done by the destruction of group organisations and infiltration. Fast-forward to the present day and certainly the sheer number of both far-right and Islamist terror groupuscules, alt-right influencers, and extra-parliamentary actors – without membership lists, hierarchical structures, or formal orders of association – have blossomed as a result of the Web 2.0 and alt-tech age of the internet. With many extremist movements and groups nowadays simply existing as loosely affiliated and incorporated organisations on an online Telegram chat or Discord server, the ability to quantify movement cohesiveness, unity, and impact is becoming more and more difficult for researchers and practitioners alike. One of the more recent articles to shine a light on the nature of post-organisational phase of far-right movement development in the UK is by the head of research at anti-fascist collective Hope not Hate, Dr Joe Mulhall. In a 2019 piece, Mulhall notes that for the UK far right “social media and an array of emerging technologies and platforms offering new ways for it to 264

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engage in activism outside the confines of traditional, organisational structures.” In this sense, then, Mulhall stipulates that “we should no longer measure the strength or likely influence of the movement solely by how cohesive it is” but instead try to quantify the micro-donations of time, money and personal resources used to amplify and mainstream far-right ideas and perspectives in the online space. Another scholar to focus on the post-organisational phase of extremist movements more broadly is Head of Counter-Extremism Policy & Research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Milo Comerford. In a 2020 piece, Comerford notes that “the [now] fluid boundaries between organisations and movements, direction and inspiration, and online and offline” pose a unique challenge to researchers and practitioners. Comerford suggests that there “clear need to understand the role of wider ideological formations and online subcultures in building extremist cohesion and inspiring offline activities, including terrorist violence” rather than strict, hierarchical organisations themselves. Noting key Islamist and far-right movements that have emerged to fill this post organisational picture, Comerford implores policymakers to “to move beyond framing threats in terms of group membership and towards understanding extremist ecosystems.” A third and recent study to note the post-organisational dynamics of current extremist movements is Bruce Hoffman and Colin Clarke’s (July 2020) article on “The Next American Terrorist.” As Hoffman and Clarke note – in the American context – “new emerging [extremist] groups of individuals are devoid of the command-and-control apparatuses that counterterrorism practitioners typically seek to disrupt.” Instead, “bureaucratic organizations with hierarchical leadership structures and clearly defined objectives have been supplanted by loosely networked movements with amorphous goals that exist across the ideological spectrum that we are only now beginning to understand.” In particular, Hoffman and Clarke discuss the rise of lone wolf actors, fluidity of individuals between different extremist ideologies and the internet as accelerants for post-organisational dynamics in the US case, and shows the strengths of the ecosystems based approach championed by Comerford (2020). A fourth and final study to focus on the ongoing and developing threat of post-organisational groups and movements within the far-right space is CREST’s Dr Ben Lee’s (2020) piece on blind networks within the extreme far right. Taking the example of the UK-based HundredHanders group, Lee shows how “[u]sing encrypted messaging applications, members [of farright groups] take instructions from an anonymous central channel and also take steps to conceal their own identities. The result is a blind network in which a central handler can issue instructions to members who then carry them out and report back – entirely anonymously.” Lee stipulates that “the combination of a fragmented transnational extreme-right and communications technology has created an online pool of ready-politicised recruits for different kinds of mobilisation” where “internet-bound activists [are given] an opportunity to get involved in physical activism at minimal cost and seemingly with little risk.” Pertinently, Lee argues that “increased state scrutiny and … state action” has led more ideologically and tactically extreme groups (i.e. neo-Nazi type terror cells) down even more decentralised and non-organisational modes of organisation that eschew normal modes of organisation and simply sit as loosely affiliated members on a private encrypted chat platform or password-protected website fora. To conclude, whilst there has been greater attention focused on the post-organisational phase of extremist movement development, there has been a dearth of empirical, quantitative academic studies to investigate how systematic this trend has been. Using measures of organisational disunity and strategic diversity and ideological unity as a proxy for the level of postorganisation, this chapter shines a light on how these post-organisational dynamics work out in practice – using the UK case as a starting point for other studies within the UK far-right’s extra-parliamentary milieu. 265

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Methodology: Harnessing the FRGB dataset for post-organisational analysis, 2009–2020 Simple counts of the number of far-right groups, rationales and tactics – derived from the FRGB dataset – are used in this chapter to ascertain the level of organisational, ideological and strategic disunity, and therefore operationalise the level of post-organisation within the UK far-right scene at present. The “Far-right mobilisations in Great Britain” (FRGB) protest events dataset was chosen as it is the only UK-based dataset that maps different protest actions by UK far-right groups in Great Britain in the period just before and immediately after the putative period of post-organisation and up to present day (i.e. 2009–2020). Mobilisations captured within the dataset range from public assemblies and marches to hate crime and terrorist incidents. The Dataset relies on a specific content analysis methodology – called Protest Event Analysis (PEA), a key method of social movement research – in order to collect information on the following seven variables: (1) Date, (2) Location, (3) Social Movement Organisation, (4) Action form, (5) Reason of mobilisation, (6) Number of participants, and (7) Number of arrests. The data collection is then based on a qualitative content analysis of local and national newspapers (retrieved from LexisNexis), anti-racist websites, and independent reports. The main, small limitation is the lack of coverage of online activities, the lack of a comparative angle (i.e. different countries with most similar or most different far-right milieus, as in the forthcoming CREX CFP dataset) and the lack of ethnographic participant observation to corroborate the information specified by third-party sources. In this chapter, variables 3, 4, and 5 are used to measure the number of far-right groups, tactics and rationales according to actions by the violent and non-violent UK far right in the 2010s.

Empirical findings: Organisational (dis)unity, ideological unity and strategic diversity in the contemporary UK far right, 2009–2020 Finding 1: Organisational (dis)unity In order to assess whether the UK far right is truly post-organisational, the first test that we have to consider is to measure the extent to which the UK far-right movement is organisationally unified, as quantified by the number of groups that ebb and flow over time. Taking the UK as a case study and CARR’s FRGB dataset as a starting point: there has indeed been a consistent upward trend in the numbers of subnational far-right protest organisations in recent years. This increase in the volume of actors is not surprising for the UK scene. As written about by Dr Andreas Dafnos and myself (2020) elsewhere, the implosion of key electoral actors (like the British National Party and the UK Independence Party) and the rise of others aping key elements of the movement’s agenda has both led to broader fragmentation and to a more closed political opportunity structure – define as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain in others” (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58) – for such organisations to develop into more formal political actors (Caiani et al., 2012; Koopmans et al., 2005; Minkenberg, 2003). What is interesting in Figure 18.1, however, is the more recent slowdown in fragmentation.5 This suggests that there might be opportunities for a predominant actor to appear on the UK scene and unite otherwise disparate far-right ideological elements from the culturally nationalist to the ethnically nationalist wings of the movement, emphasising themes of white genocide and white marginalisation (Allchorn, February 2021).6 266

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Figure 18.1  Number of far-right social movement organisations in the UK (Q1 2009–Q4 2020). Sources: Allchorn and Dafnos (2020b). “Far-Right Mobilisations in Great Britain: 2009–2019” London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.

Finding 2: Ideological unity Another test that we can use in order to establish the extent of post-organisation in the UK far-right scene are the reasons that they mobilise nowadays. We can hypothesise that a greater number of rationales symbolises a wide diversity of ideological tenets and therefore a lack of a unifying grievance or cause. As shown in Figure 18.2, the most popular reasons in the past ten years have tended to be some expression of anti-Muslim bigotry (Allchorn & Feldman, May 2019), including fears about the Islamisation of UK public life or spreading false claims about the nature of child grooming being an inherently Islamic problem.

Figure 18.2  Main reasons of far-right mobilisation (Q1 2009–Q4 2020). Sources: Allchorn and Dafnos (2020b). “Far-Right Mobilisations in Great Britain: 2009–2019.” CARR FRGB Dataset Research Report 2020.1. London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. P.16.

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Figure 18.3 Total number of ideological rationales given for UK far-right mobilisations per quarter (Q1 2009–Q4 2020). Sources: Allchorn and Dafnos (2020b). “Far-Right Mobilisations in Great Britain: 2009–2019” London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.

Looking a bit more closely at the proliferation of mobilisation rationales, visualised in Figure 18.3, it is clear that the trend towards ideological fragmentation is not so pronounced as compared to the organisational perspective (see Figure 18.1). Moreover, and perhaps acting as a confounding variable in this case, the peaks in the number of rationales also coincide with spikes in the number of organisations that are present on the UK scene; an organic outgrowth of an uptick in protest activity by the likes of the Democratic Football Lads Alliance, Patriotic Alternative, and English Defence League (Allchorn & Dafnos, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). In Q3 of 2015, Q2 of 2016 and Q2 of 2018, there are however clear upticks in the range of rationales given – especially with the onset and emergence of ethno- and racially nationalistic organisations (such as National Action and splinters of the BNP and English Defence League (e.g. North-West Infidels and Patriotic Alternative)). Of course, there is a high degree of ideological unity in the core part of this period, again related to the predominance of anti-Muslim bigotry amongst the groups.

Finding 3: Strategic diversity A final test that we can use to get a better handle on this post-organisational phase is the diversity of tactics used by organisations and how they differ over time. Contrary to the trends above, what is noticeable here is how the UK far right seems to be converging on strategies of demonstrations, counter-demonstrations, and disruption/vigilante type events over time in order to mobilise their political views and instrumentalise their own particular mode of contentious politics. This is again a symptom of the closed opportunity structure when it comes to engaging in formal party politics (Caiani et al., 2012; Koopmans et al., 2005; Minkenberg, 2003). This has, however, not been a strategic dead-end for movement activism in the past ten years. It has opened up demonstrations and vigilante actions as a meeting ground for far-right activists – with many so-called “co-sponsored demonstrations” happening between the main protest movements around key events in this period (e.g., Lee Rigby’s death, the Brexit/EU referendum, and the recent Statue Defence protests in 2020 (Casey, 2018; Childs, 2013; Van Hagen, 2020)). Such alliances are of course fleeting and

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Figure 18.4  Number of tactics used by the UK far-right (Q1 2009–Q4 2020). Sources: Allchorn and Dafnos (2020b). “Far-Right Mobilisations in Great Britain: 2009–2019” London, UK: Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.

can be on the side of opportunism but it does give grounds for greater degree of issue convergence and therefore unity (Figure 18.4).

Conclusions: Where next for the contemporary, post-organisational UK far right? Having surveyed new empirical evidence about far-right street activism in the UK over the past ten years (and beyond), it appears that the supposition that all forms of far-right activism are in a post-organisational phase is slightly premature – especially in the offline context. In the UK, whilst there has been a proliferation in the last ten years of far-right organisations, ideological rationales, and tactics used to achieve political recognition and salience, the picture in recent years seems to be a partial reversal of this trend; that is greater tactical unity and reduced organisational fragmentation. The UK of course is not the only Western democracy experiencing high levels of far-right movement fragmentation due to mainstreamisation and a lack of parliamentary political opportunity structures (such as Germany, the United States, and Canada). It is simply – unlike these democracies – the UK is fairly new in its postorganisational epoch. In sum, this chapter has however been a unique look at a period of unprecedented change for the movement. Utilising a novel dataset, it has tried to add empirical bones to the postorganisational thesis already laid out by more established scholars (such as Joel Busher, 2015; Hilary Pilkington, 2016; Chris Allen, 2019; Graham Macklin, 2016, 2020) in this area. Of course, whether such a trend is durable and not based on external factors is a key matter of consideration. Moreover, data from other countries (such as those contained in the forthcoming CFP dataset, see Chapter 12 in this volume),7 a longer time period stretching back to the immediate post-war period, and an analysis of online versus offline trends would offer a fuller picture; but in the UK case – harnessing the insights obtained from the FRGB Dataset - it appears that the contemporary UK far-right movement in the past few years has become more cohesive and united, shifting towards street protest and a more ethno-nationalist or race-based – rather than cultural – forms of ultra-nationalist ideology in order to seek political salience. Whether a predominant actor will emerge is yet to be seen, but it does pose the question of what could be

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the next leading actor, and whether such an actor could bring the extra-parliamentary, postorganisational phase to an end.

Notes 1 Here, “Groupuscules” are defined as tiny, often neo-Nazi, bands of radical right extremists that establish a milieu with reference points that stretch out internationally and into the past (Jackson, 2021, p. 101). 2 Here, post-organisation is defined – in relation to the far right – as a decentralised, nonhierarchical movement that requires little or no organisational unity in order to work broadly in the same tactical direction and towards similar ideological goals (Comerford, 2020; Lee, 2020; Mulhall, 2019k). 3 Here, I use Bjørgo and Ravndal’s (2019) distinction of culturally nationalist groups that abut the mainstream. They often have distinct, culturally racist concerns about Islam that are separate from more extreme ethno-nationalist or racially nationalist actors that observe forms of misogynist and anti-Semitic prejudice. 4 See: Britain First, “Britain First Official Policies”, retrieved from: https://www.britainfirst.org/policies; Britain First, “Britain First Ideology”, retrieved from: https://www.britainfirst.org/policies; & Britain First, “Principles of the Britain First Movement”, retrieved from: https://www.britainfirst.org/ principles. 5 It is important to note here that the FRGB dataset does not always allow us to see the exact number of groups that participate in a protest event because sometimes we do not have information to hand to identify groups exactly. These are therefore based on counts abstracted from third-party sources (e.g. journalist reports, anti-fascist bulletins and social media records) that might actually be larger than those captured. 6 See Bjørgo and Ravndal’s (2019) definitional schema of the far right again for more clarity on this distinction. 7 For more information, see the CREX CFP dataset page here: https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/ groups/cfp-dataset/.

References Allchorn, W. (15 January 2016). Cut from the same cloth? Pegida UK looks like a sanitised version of the EDL. LSE British Politics and Policy Blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/pegida-ukrelaunched/ Allchorn, W. (2018). Anti-Islamic protest in the UK: Policy responses to far right. Routledge. Allchorn, W. (February 2021). Turning back to biologised racism: A content analysis of patriotic alternative UK’s online discourse, GNET Research. https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/22/turning-backto-biologised-racism-a-content-analysis-of-patriotic-alternative-uks-online-discourse/ Allchorn, W. (2023). Barriers to violence activism on the contemporary UK far right: The case of the (Democratic) football lads Alliance. Orofino, E. & Allchorn, W. (Eds.) Routledge handbook of nonviolent extremism (pp. 235–244). Routledge. Allchorn, W., & Dafnos, A. (2020a). BLM, Covid-19 and QAnon: UK Far-Right Mobilisations in 2020 (pp. 14–17). Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. https://usercontent.one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ORU-Year-in-Review-2020.pdf?media=1641548898 Allchorn, W., & Dafnos, A. (2020b). Far-right mobilisations in Great Britain, 2009–2019. Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/11/19/carr-report-far-rightmobilisations-in-great-britain-frgb-dataset-2009-2019/ Allchorn, W., & Dafnos, A. (2020c). “Far-right mobilisations in Great Britain: 2009–2019”. CARR FRGB Dataset Research Report 2020.1. Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. https://usercontent. one/wp/www.radicalrightanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/FRGB-Research-Report-1-3-1. pdf?media=1636651063 Allchorn, W., & Feldman, M. (2019). The (Democratic) Football Lads Alliance: A far right antechamber? London: Faith Matters. https://www.faith-matters.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/dfla.pdf

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William Allchorn EDL Website (2013). Mission statement. Online at: www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/ Elgot, J. (2016 12 December). ‘Neo-Nazi group National Action banned by UK home secretary.’ The Guardian.Hyperlink:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/12/neo-nazi-group-national-action-bannedby-uk-home-secretary Feldman, M., & Littler, M. (2014 July). Tell MAMA 2013/14 Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and ‘Cumulative Extremism’. https://www.tees.ac.uk/docs/DocRepo/Research/Tell_Mama.pdf Goodwin, M. (2007). The extreme right in Britain: Still an “Ugly duckling” but for how long? The Political Quarterly, 78(2), 241–250. Goodwin, M. (2011) New British Fascism: The Rise of the British National Party. London: Routledge. Goodwin, M. J. (2013, March). The roots of extremism: The English defence leagues and the counterjihad challenge. Chatham House. www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/189767 Griffin, R. (1996). British fascism: The ugly duckling. In M. Cronin (Ed.), The failure of British fascism: The far right and the fight for political recognition (pp. 141–165). Palgrave Macmillan. Heren, K. (2020, 13 June). Police pelted with bottles as hundreds including far-right activists gather to ‘guard’ London monuments. Evening Standard, online at: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/ right-wing-protesters-parliament-square-statues-a4468171.html Hoffman, B., & Clarke, C., (2020, July 2) The Next American Terrorist, Cipher Brief. https://www. thecipherbrief.com/article/united-states/the-next-american-terrorist Hope not Hate. (2016 7 February) State of Hate Report 2015. http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/features/ far-right-2015/ Hope not Hate. (2018). State of Hate: Far Right Terrorism on the rise. January–February 2018. www. hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/State-of-Hate-2018.pdf Jackson, P. (2021). #hitlerwasright: national action and national socialism for the 21st century. La Revue Populism, 1(1), 109–127. https://populisme.be/articles_sc/hitlerwasrightnational-action-and-nationalsocialism-for-the-21st-century/ Kitschelt, H. (1986). Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 57–85. Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press. Lee, B. (2020 October). Blind networks in the extreme-right. Vox-Pol Blog. https://www.voxpol.eu/blindnetworks-in-the-extreme-right/ Macklin, G. (2016 10 April). Patterns of far right and anti-Muslim mobilisation in the United Kingdom. Sicherheits Politik Blog. https://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/opus4/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/39603/file/Patterns_sicherheitspolitik-blog.de.pdf Macklin, G. (2020). Failed führers: A history of Britain’s extreme right. Routledge. MI5. (July 14, 2021). Director General Ken McCallum gives annual threat update 2021. MI5. https:// www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-annual-threat-update-2021#sthash. RjfqOn4h.dpuf Minkenberg, M. (2003). The West European radical right as a collective actor: Modeling the impact of cultural and structural variables on party formation and movement Mobilization. Comparative European Politics, 11, 149–179. Mudde, C. (2000). The ideology of the extreme right. Manchester University Press. Mulhall, J. (2019). A post-organisational far right? Hope Not Hate’s 2018 State of Hate Report. https:// www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-hate-2018/online-radicalisation/post-organisationalfar-right/ Parker, M. (1992). Post-modern organizations or postmodern organization theory? Organization Studies, 13(1), 001–017. http://doi.10.1177/017084069201300103 Pasha-Robinson, L. (2016, 15 December). Paul Golding: Former Britain First leader jailed for eight weeks. The Independent, online at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/paul-golding-jailed-britain-first-leader-8-weeks-high-court-injunction-mosque-a7477046.html Pidd, H., & Lloyd, D. (2013, 13 May) Police investigate far-right ‘invasions’ of Bradford and Glasgow mosques. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/13/police-far-right-invasionsbradford-glasgow-mosques-britain-first Pilkington, H. (2016). Loud and proud: Passion and politics in the English defence league. Manchester University Press. Poole, A. (1996). Oswald Mosley and the union movement: Success or failure? In M. Cronin (Ed.), The failure of British Fascism (pp. 53–81). Palgrave Macmillan.

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EPILOGUE

Selected Current Issues in the European Far Right

19 “AMERICA COUGHS, AND WE CATCH A COLD” Mapping the Relationship between the American Far Right and British and European Activism Paul Jackson

On 20 October 2012, Richard Spencer, an American figure largely unknown in the United Kingdom, addressed a small, far-right organisation, the Traditional Britain Society. His talk concluded with a reflection on the similarities and differences between Americans and Europeans. Spencer idealised the many national identities that white Europeans had developed, and worried about how a bland white egalitarian ideal was often found in America. He thought white people on both sides of the Atlantic needed to work together, to create an alternate future. Closing with criticism of the American Declaration of Independence’s famous opening line, stating all men are created equal, Spencer argued for a new “Declaration” articulating a different vision of the world, equally relevant for Europeans and Americans: “We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created unequal” (Traditional Britain, n.d.). For Spencer at least, white Europeans and white Americans had to re-interpret their pasts, to point the way to a new, white supremacist future. Whatever else divided them, Americans and Europeans shared a common danger: a specifically white culture and way of life faced an existential threat from liberalism and the ongoing mixing of races. As Tamir Bar-on has persuasively argued, a few years later Spencer not only established himself at the heart of the “alt-right,” but while he did so he promoted European far-right intellectuals to shape a primarily American reinvention of extreme right activism (Bar-On, 2021). Spencer’s typically outrageous – yet also quite banal – speech from 2012, as well as his later, more impactful politicking, is but one example of a much wider, quite diverse trend of variegated American and European “far,” “radical,” and “extreme” right organisations, movement and activists finding common cause.1 This chapter will map some of the main contours of this transnational relationship, past and present, from interwar fascists to present-day terrorists.2 It will underscore that such sharing of ideas and types of engagement has often been a two-way process. Moreover, these synergies, sometimes ephemeral and other times more longlasting, can be found from the early twentieth century onwards. Finally, before proceeding, a further note: readers should take care when reading the account that follows, as it inevitably suggests a “neatness” to this history that the lived realities of the activists surveyed lacked, and really offers nothing more than a highly simplified narrative of engagements over the course of a century. This chapter has been developed as a “primer,” directed principally towards students new to this area, and so seasoned experts will find little “new” in this account. DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-26

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As in Europe, America has, of course, developed many of its own deeply racist organisations, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which grew after the Civil War in the late 1860s, and again in the mid-1910s (McVeigh, 2009). Despite a few efforts to create European versions, this movement at least has always been of limited international impact underscoring how racist extremism does not always cross borders successfully. Nevertheless, a number of provocative, high-profile American figures in the early twentieth century did develop ideas of relevance to interwar fascists in Europe. For example, Madison Grant’s 1916 book, The Passing of the Great Race, became part of how some European fascists imagined their sense of Nordic superiority (Spiro, 2009, pp. 355–383). Henry Ford’s four volumed The International Jew, meanwhile, epitomised his influential promotion of antisemitic conspiracy theory themes. Europeans who took note of Ford included Adolf Hitler, who even namechecked the car manufacturer in Mein Kampf (Hart, 2018). However, while Grant and Ford were certain figures of international standing – and are both still read by some contemporary extremists today – efforts in interwar America at creating specifically fascist politics, of the type that was far more impactful in Europe, were far less significant (Steigmann-Gall, 2017). That one of the most notable of the American “shirted” movements was William Pelly’s largely inconsequential Silver Legion of America (Beekman, 2005), directly inspired by the Nazi party, underscores this point. The impact of European fascism was also felt in America through organisations, such as the Amerikadeutscher Volksbund, or German American Bund (Bernstein, 2013), which fostered links between the Nazi regime and primarily German Americans; while the Fascist League of North America (FLNA) developed a similar international outreach for the Italian Fascist regime for Italian Americas (Cannistraro, 1999). As well as such groups promoting interchange, examples of interwar European ideologues who moved through transatlantic networks supportive of fascism are also important to consider. Figures such as James Strachey Barnes helped develop links between Europeans and Americans interested in fascist political ideals. He led the Centre International des Études Fascistes (CINEF), founded in 1928 and supported by Mussolini’s regime, and by the later 1930s wrote for the American magazine Social Justice, which targeted American Catholics and offered readers a pro-Fascist bias before and during the Second World War (Baldoli, 2014, pp. 1–26). By the end of the 1930s and during the Second World War, Charles Lindbergh, a long-time friend of Ford, was another who epitomised themes of American isolationism, the promotion of nativist ideals similar to the racisms of European fascists, and nebulous white American support for Nazism (Wallace, 2003). While Americans and Europeans found areas of crossover before 1945, the emergence of a clearer shared culture of far-right activism became far more sustained after the Second World War. Transnationalism in the extreme right often occurs at the level of individuals moving across borders, and the sharing of ideas. Into the early postwar years, one notable ideologue who promoted fascist ideals on both sides of the Atlantic was the American Francis Parker Yockey. He too had published in Social Justice in the later 1930s, and had linked up with Pelly’s Silver Shirts. After the war, Yockey engaged with British fascist leader Oswald Mosley, as well as American post-war groups, such as James H. Madole’s National Renaissance Party. In 1948, he published his philosophical tome, Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics, which argued for new pan-European nationalism to counteract the decadence of liberal democracy and communism. Epitomising the ways postwar fascist organisations have been driven by dynamic personalities – and are often marked by disagreements and fallings out leading to splits and fissures fuelling new groups – Mosley had initially promised to publish Imperium but then refused to print what Yockey saw as nothing less than a second volume to Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West. Afterwards, Yockey developed a short-lived European 278

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group, the European Liberation Front, and continued to be active until his death a decade later. Imperium, meanwhile, has been read by many subsequent generations (Coogan, 1999). Another prominent American figure in the development of links between European and American extreme right cultures was George Lincoln Rockwell, founder of the American Nazi Party (Simonelli, 1999). Along with British activists including Colin Jordan and John Tyndall, then leaders of the National Socialist Movement in Britain, they co-founded the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS) in August 1962. The main principle of the WUNS was to link up openly National Socialist organisations across the globe, in a broadly similar manner to communist internationals. The WUNS network lasted as a going concern into the 1970s, and sporadically afterwards as well, mainly through the energies of its founding activists. It was able to develop genuine transnational exchange between British and European figures, as well as foster some impact on Canadian and Australian neo-Nazi cultures and was promoted in publications, such as the magazine of the American Nazi Party, Stormtrooper, as well as a range of WUNS international bulletins for members. It also created its own intellectual journal, National Socialist World, edited by William Pierce, that sought to rethink National Socialism for a new era. The energies of the WUNS helped to promote Rockwell to European audiences, and he has remained a lasting reference point for, especially, British neo-Nazi cultures (Jackson, 2019a, 2019b). The WUNS network was supported by German activists, such as Bruno Lüdke and the French-born synthesiser of Hindu and Nazi ideas, Savitri Devi (Goodrick-Clarke, 1998). The WUNS also exemplifies the limits to how successfully an American-led network could connect with European audiences. For example, the WUNS struggled to find support from groups, such as the Swedish-based Nordic Reich Party, whose leader Göran Oredsson was suspicious of importing American ideals through close association with the network. The network found challenges in establishing a lasting relevance elsewhere, too, including in West Germany, France and the Netherlands. By the 1980s, Povl Heinrich Riis-Knudsen, from the Danish National Socialist Movement, tried to rekindle the WUNS for a period, but ultimately this did not lead to lasting success. Riis-Knudsen developed a critical attitude to Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s successor and leader of the American Nazi Party follow on group the National Socialist White that People’s Party. As well as the WUNS, other efforts to promote Nazi material internationally amongst American figures included the NSDAP/AO, which presented itself as a continuation of the similarly named branch of the Nazi party for foreign members. Founded in 1972 by Gary Lauck, this eccentric organisation developed links with various European activists, including German terrorist Michael Kühnen, and focused on exporting extreme right material, quite prolifically given its size, in multiple languages (Goodrick-Clarke, 2003, pp. 19–20). While networks between fringe neo-Nazis of the 1960s and 1970s fell into decline, the 1980s saw the growth of newer phenomena that reinvigorated these links and connected with new types of activists, such as White Power music (Dyck, 2017). The Blood & Honour music network stands out as an important example of transnational activism which emerged at this time and still resonates today. Founded by British neo-Nazi and White Power music pioneer Ian Stuart Donaldson in 1987, Blood & Honour took its name from a Hitler Youth motto and openly espoused Nazi ideals. It grew from the wider racist music scene that developed in Britain and elsewhere from the later 1970s, framed around several groupings, such as the Rock Against Communism movement and later the White Nose Club, affiliated with the British National Front. By 1987, Donaldson and others became disillusioned with splits within the National Front and founded Blood & Honour to bring together activists in a new way, around racist music (Shaffer, 2017). The fanzine linked to the network, also called Blood & Honour, helped to crystallise early activism, while in America, figures such as Tom Metzger 279

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had also become interested in promoting white power music. Since its foundation, Blood & Honour has become a genuinely transnational network, as well as one marked by splits and divisions typical of the extreme right space. In America, there emerged two competing versions of the movement, Blood & Honour American Division and Blood & Honour Council USA, while in Europe variants expanded into former communist territories after 1989, such as Blood & Honour Serbia as well as a now-banned Russian group, while in Western Europe it has also been banned in Germany and Spain (Pollard, 2016). In the era of the sale of CDs, either through mail order catalogues or through websites, there was a significant amount of money flowing within these music networks, which also helped provoke divisions. For Roger Griffin, the Blood & Honour movement epitomises the “groupuscular” nature of the extreme right space, made up of a range of individuals and small-scale organisations that sometimes work collegially together, and other times competed, forming an ever-shifting network of activism (Griffin, 2003). The development of digital spaces amongst extreme right activists can be seen from the 1980s (Berlet, 2001), but really became an established aspect of the extreme right style of activism from the 1990s onwards. These have shifted from static websites and basic messaging boards to complex social media and more interactive webspaces in the 2000s, to alternate platforms and encrypted messaging apps hosting extreme content by the 2020s (Conway et al., 2019). Probably the most significant early website, still active, that has facilitated such exchange was Stormfront, developed in 1996 by former Ku Klux Klan leader Don Black. Over the years this website has evolved to include message boards, internet radio, and even online dating for racist activists. Importantly, it has become an international forum, with threads in numerous European languages as well as English. Its logo, a Celtic cross with the slogan “White Pride World Wide” exemplifies its aspirations in terms of global reach. As a hub for exchange, notably Stormfront offers activists opportunities to share ideas and engage with extreme positions. For example, echoing the title of his manifesto, Anders Breivik engaged with Stormfront using the username “year 2183” for 18 months before he killed 77 people in attacks on Oslo and Utøya Island in Norway on 22 July 2011 (Beirich, 2014). Online activism has now become standard for the extreme right, operating in a post-digital age (Fielitz & Thurston, 2018). For British groups at least, developing links with Americans led to the potential for new funding streams. The British National Party, founded by John Tyndall in 1982, developed various exchanges with American activists by the 1990s, including inviting William Pierce, founder and leader of the National Alliance, to its 1995 annual conference (Copsey, 2008, pp. 67–69). In 1999 it formed the American Friends of the British National Party, linking a small British fascist party with American figures such as former Klansmen David Duke and Don Black (Jackson, 2014). This organisation was designed to help the BNP raise funds in the United States, as well as develop new links. Other Americans influential on British activists from this time include former member of 1980s US terrorist group The Order, David Lane, whose “14 Words” slogan has become a regular feature of international neo-Nazi support, including in Britain (Michael, 2009). Another US figure with a reputation for violence, of lasting influence on British activists, was Harold Covington. He was involved in the creation of the openly violent British group Combat 18 in 1992 (Kaplan, 2018), and later upon returning to America developed through a series of novels fresh interest in the notion of a white separatist state in the Pacific Northwest, a project American activists have discussed since the 1970s often called the Northwest Territorial Imperative. As Helen Young identified, for Covington an imagined idea of European medieval society underpinned this variant of extreme right politics (Young, 2022). 280

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Another important, ostensibly more intellectual arena that has helped bring together European and American activists has been the Holocaust denial movement. In America, strong protection of freedom of expression has been one reason the denial movement has grown more effectively than in European countries such as Germany, where there are greater restrictions on antisemitism and especially denial of the Holocaust. Early European deniers include Britain’s Arnold Leese and France’s Maurice Bardèche in the 1940s and 1950s (Mulhall, 2021) while in the US figures, such as William Carto, founder of the Institute for Historical Review in 1978, were crucial in fostering an institutionalised culture promoting antisemitic Holocaust denial themes. Carto also published the Barnes Review, founded in 1994, another key outlet for Holocaust denial culture. Past editions have celebrated Europeans who promoted denial themes, such as Léon Degrelle. Another central figure in this culture was the British pseudohistorian David Irving, who became a prominent denier in America from the 1980s, speaking at the Institute for Historical Review in 1983 and delivering a series of lectures to William Pierce’s National Alliance between 1995 and 1998 (SPLC, n.d.). Irving’s influence also helped draw more recent US figures, such as Greg Johnson, into the extreme right space, while American deniers have also spoken in Europe, such as Mark Weber who addressed a conference in 2015 in London that also featured the Spanish denier Pedro Varela (Cravan et al., 2015). This growth in neo-Nazism and Holocaust denial sits alongside newer narratives found within the extreme right space. The rise of Islamophobia, especially in the wake of 9/11 and the increased securitisation of Muslim communities as part of the “war on terror,” certainly helped create a new, shared framework for American and European activists to find common ground (Mudde, 2013). Robert Spencer, for example, became a high-profile figure of relevance to wider far-right circles on both sides of the Atlantic in the 2000s, through initiatives, such as his Jihad Watch website, launched in September 2003, and his role in creating Stop the Islamisation of America (SIOA), launched in 2010. This latter group was a response to the similarly named Stop the Islamisation of Europe (SIOE), created in 2007 (Lee, 2015). On both sides of the Atlantic, such anti-Muslim groups helped to foster the “counter-jihad” movement (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013), which also found outlets on discrete groups in Europe, such as the English Defence League, and PEGIDA, as well as aspects of the Tea Party Movement in America. Prominent far-right ideologues, such as Britain’s “Tommy Robinson,” aka Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, developed as social media personalities into the 2010s and became relatively well known in Europe and America, while websites, such as Gates of Vienna have also acted as a hub for the counter-jihad phenomenon. Gates of Vienna is curious as it host blogs by various European authors, such as Fjordman who himself was highly influential on Anders Breivik, and was created by Edward May, an activist based in Virginia, United States (Jackson, 2016). Such hostile far-right cultures directed towards Muslim communities have fed into wider, shared international far-right activism opposing immigration and developing fearful stories of a “white genocide.” One variant of this concept that has become popular in recent times is the “great replacement” narrative, an idea developed by the French intellectual Renaud Camus. Initially was a term found in places, such as terrorist manifestos but is now regularly used by figures with an international media profile, such as Fox News’s Tucker Carlson. While the counter-jihad movement’s transatlantic dynamics are important to underscore, other shared narratives have also emerged. For example, the Nouvelle Droite (ND) movement that was first prominent in France from 1968 offered the far right a new approach, steeped in a “metapolitical” tactic inspired by Marxists, such as Antonio Gramsci. Leading figures of the ND, such as Alain de Benoist, recast in nuanced, philosophical tones racist themes arguing a white Europe faced an existential threat from liberalism, individualism and multiculturalism, 281

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a variant of extreme right culture that often also has an anti-American or at least an antiglobalisation aspect (Bar-On, 2013). By the 2000s, elements of ND culture percolated into American contexts. For example, Jared Taylor, an American white supremacist and central figure in the magazine American Renaissance, now the website amren.com, took great interest another founding figure of the ND, Guillaume Faye, and promoted him at American Renaissance events from the mid-2000s. These ideas include “archeofuturism,” a typically fascist neologism evoking an idealised past set alongside a call to use modern technology to evoke a vision of an alternate modernity. Another of Faye’s books read by such American activists, Why We Fight, meanwhile, argues that Europe must oppose colonisation of its territory by mass migration, expressing in a philosophical tenor the extreme right fear that white people face an existential threat from invading outsider. Others in America that also took influence from the ND, especially the metapolitical approach to influencing culture rather than direct campaigning, include Counter-Currents Publishing. Key ideologues here include Greg Johnson and Michael O’Meara, who have both sought to recalibrate such European ideas to fit American contexts. In the 2010s, as an amorphous new form of online-focused activism, often dubbed the “alt right” in the media, grew in influence and impact in America (Main, 2018), the ideas of Faye, as well as related ideologies, such as de Benoist, were reinvented again. This also responded to renewed interest in these themes amongst the European Identarian movement, and the work of publishers such as Arktos that promote such intellectualised forms of extreme right ideas; Benoist, Faye and others became celebrated amongst a new, largely online movement that sought deeper meaning in racist activism. Key voices of the emergent “alt right,” such as Richard Spencer and Jared Taylor, also helped to connect a new generation of American activists with aspects of the European ND. While figures, such as Spencer, Johnson, and Taylor were important in shaping aspects of the “alt right” movement in America, its reference points and related activism were notably diverse – and this too underscores the ways the fascist past resonate in recent times (Hermansson et al., 2020). Aspects of the “alt right” also featured contemporary American neo-Nazism, such as the provocative Daily Stormer website, named after the lurid Nazi-era newspaper Der Stürmer, and it also helped to re-energise older neo-Nazi groups, such as the National Socialist Movement. Standout events linked to the energies of the “alt right,” such as the deadly Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville in August 2017, featured a wide spectrum of US activists, though in the end failed in the goal set out in its ambitious title. Epitomising how the extreme right space in America is marked by both its own racist traditions and influences from the European fascist past, here swastika banners, fascist salutes, and torchlit parades featured alongside Ku Klux Klan outfits and confederate flags. The impact of European fascist thinkers can also be seen in the interest of figures, such as Steve Bannon in the philosophy of Julius Evola and Traditionalism. Evola’s life as an intellectual involved him in both the Italian Fascist and German Nazi regimes (Wolff, 2016), as well as his later philosophical writings that became especially influential on Italian terrorism of the 1970s, give him an aura that means that Bannon is far from the only US far-right figure interested in his evocation of an end of times leading to a new era, steeped in a renewed sense of Tradition (Teitelbaum, 2020). However, Bannon’s endeavours have not led to long-lasting successes when he has tried to influence the extreme right space in Europe. Media panic in mid-2018 about a Bannon-led European organisation bringing together various European far-right groups both speaks to the ways media discourses have needlessly heightened the profile of figures, such as Bannon, facilitating a process of mainstreaming (Brown & Mondon, 2021), while the failure of this initiative underscores the real-world limitations of extreme right transnationalism. 282

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While Bannon’s own impact as an organiser was in the end limited, it is important to reflect on the relevance of the far-right Presidency of Donald Trump. His surprise election victory in 2016 was certainly one that offered genuine inspiration to many populist radical right politicians and activists across Europe. The day Trump was elected, Frauke Petry, and Jörg Meuthen from Alternative for Germany sent a message of support describing him as a “natural ally” (DW, 2017); in March 2017, Geert Wilders, though not victorious, benefitted from positive comparisons between his style of politics and Trump’s in Dutch elections; and April 2017, Trump effectively endorsed Marine Le Pen in the French presidential campaign of that year. In Hungary, Victor Orban has been able to frame his own attacks on democracy in part by relating them to the ways Trump normalised anti-democratic challenges in America. As Mudde stresses, Hungary offers clear lessons for America in the wake of Trump (Mudde, 2022). Even smaller groups, like Britain First, were able to benefit on occasion from Trump’s symbolic role in taking the far-right agenda to international prominence, when he retweeted their online content (Dearden, 2017). There is also a degree of influence from European figures on Trump’s ability to “break through.” Nigel Farage and his leading role in the Brexit referendum of 2016 were repeatedly referenced by Trump during his campaign as an inspiration. Though it is important not to over-emphasise this synergy as simplistically causal in terms of Trump’s victory, Trumpism did respond to, and contribute to, a wider, international wave of far-right successes. Moreover, while not someone interested in developing his own international network of allied activists, Trump’s daily attacks on liberal values meant the leader of the world’s leading democracy promoted daily, for four years, illiberal and sometimes openly racist views emboldening and normalising such rhetoric internationally. Trump’s impact speaks to the unprecedented level of influence varieties of far-right politics have achieved in recent times, driven by factors ranging from the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis to rising distrust in traditional political parties. While this points to valid concerns over the future of liberal agendas and democratic systems, another concerning development is the growth of terrorist cultures and the extreme right space in online contexts. One area where the transnational networks developed by European and American activists has become particularly concerning is the rise of accelerationism in the past decade. Accelerationists are typically younger men interested in a range of ideals that propose the destruction of a liberal democratic world and who seek to actively “accelerate” a crisis, leading to the creation of a new era for white people (Jackson, 2019a, 2019b). As such this style of activism sits at the most violent and concerning end of the far-right spectrum. Discrete groups linked to this type of extreme right, and often specifically fascist, culture have been proscribed, and many influenced by these ideals have been imprisoned for terrorist-related and other violent offences. One of the originator groups that developed the contemporary accelerationist style was the British neo-Nazi organisation National Action, which emerged from the fragmentation of the British National Party in the 2010s. Its founding activists sought a new type of organisation that was openly neo-Nazi and steeped in a novel and evocative style to appeal to a new generation (Macklin, 2018). After a series of high-profile incidents, including praise for the murder of Jo Cox MP by an older British man, Thomas Mair (himself an advocate of neoNazi ideals and influenced by the Pierce’s National Alliance), this small group was proscribed under terrorism legislation in 2016. A series of follow-on movements have also emerged, such as Sonnenkreig Division and Scottish Dawn, which have also been proscribed. While National Action was active in the United Kingdom, its leading figures also networked on a Russianbased website called Iron March, active from 2011 until 2017. Set up by an activist who used the pseudonym Alexander Slavros, it promoted a range of European groups, including the 283

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Nordic Resistance Movement, Ukraine’s Azov Battalion, Greece’s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, and Italy’s openly fascist CasaPound. Iron March helped connect British and other European activists to Atomwaffen Division, a small group in America with a similar style to National Action. This too spawned an international set of copycat groups, including AWD Deutschland, AWD Russland, and AWD Finland. In America, Atomwaffen Division’s energies led to renewed promotion of the American neo-Nazi tradition. This included celebrating the work of another figure who for a time was a member of the American Nazi Party of the 1960s, James Mason. Mason’s 1980s newsletter Siege, turned into a PDF book by Atomwaffen Division, has become a central aspect of the accelerationist movement’s ideas. Mason has also been celebrated in a dedicated website and has revelled in the ways a younger generation has now taken interest in his revolutionary, racist ideas. Other aspects of the American neo-Nazi past are also celebrated by accelerationists. As well as Mason, this includes heroisation of George Lincoln Rockwell, with scanned editions of his Stormtrooper magazine regularly circulated within accelerationist webspaces, such as on the platform Telegram. The movement also promotes to a new generation the writings of William Pierce, especially his novels advocating political violence, Hunter and The Turner Diaries. Other key writings often found in accelerationist contexts include Slavros’s own musings. This includes ideological texts, such as Next Leap and Zero Tolerance. The latter attacks leading figures of the “alt right,” such as Spencer and argues that this movement was inauthentic and lacking the uncompromising revolutionary sprit needed for a white supremacist future. Slavros has also written fictive texts advocating a fascist way of life, such as A Squire’s Trial, and even celebrated the role of European art in early and contemporary fascist thinking in his The American Futurist Manifesto. Slavros’s writings are easily found on platforms, such as Internet Archive and connect readers to a wider range of texts often found in the accelerationist space. This include: Hitler’s Mein Kampf; other antisemitic texts, such as Ford’s The International Jew; the writings of interwar European fascists, such as Corneliu Codreanu; Evola’s ideals of Tradition and justifications for political violence; literatures that argue there is a “white genocide” or “great replacement” underway; and terrorist manifestos from extreme right lone attackers, such as Anders Breivik’s 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, Brenton Tarrant’s The Great Replacement, and the writings of Dylann Roof. While activism from groups, such as National Action and Atomwaffen Division have now declined, a range of newer accelerationist networks have also emerged, steeped in a culture celebrating extreme violence. Again, these reference the fascist past, and relate radical interpretations of aspects of European and American history to develop ideological justifications for revolutionary violence. To give some further examples, in 2018 The Base was created by another Russian-based activist, Rinaldo Nazarro. A man who according to BBC investigative reporting previously worked for the FBI and the Pentagon, Nazarro developed his activism from his base in St Petersburg, Russia (De Simone et al., 2020). The openly neo-Nazi accelerationist network focused primarily on American activists, and sought to create, through military-style training, a network of men who believed in a racist outlook and were prepared to engage in what was framed as revolutionary acts. Nazarro was particularly inspired by Harold Covington, and his earlier efforts to promote the Northwest Territorial Imperative. Another such accelerationist network is Feuerkrieg Division, that appears to have been first established in October 2018 in the Baltics, potentially Estonia, and again has developed an impact on European countries, such as Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, and connected with activists based in the US as well. Fueurkreig Division has also been proscribed in a number of countries, including Britain. As with other examples of accelerationist culture, 284

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Feuerkrieg Division’s networks are spread across a range of online platforms, and develop material that might be found easily, such as podcasts that highlight their views. Activists linked to these clandestine networks also develop exchanges through more difficult to monitor channels, such as Telegram and other encrypted communication apps (Lee & Knott, 2021). As well as material promoting extreme ideological positions, these online spaces also feature technical documents, such as manuals for making bombs. While only attractive to a small range of followers, and in many ways quite different from the risks posed by the likes of Trump, accelerationist networks represent an ongoing security risk. This chapter has sought to tentatively map some of the many trajectories of exchange between the European and American far right over the past 100 years. There is much here that has been simplified, and so readers should consider there are many more examples of shared activism that have not been satisfactorily documented. Despite such necessary limitations, it has sought to reveal how diverse far right activists and organisations have repeatedly developed mutual senses of camaraderie, through their indirect or direct relationships with contemporaries in different localities. Reaching out to kindred activists in another country, or even another continent, has often been a natural urge for many to help grow their networks and movements. Moreover, many of the generic concerns found amongst far-right activists have been present in both Europe and America. These include fears over immigration, instability provoked by financial crises, and perhaps most centrally a racist politics based on the belief that white people face an existential threat of some sort that needs to be challenged with newfound radicalism lacking in all forms of mainstream politics. Finally, reflecting more broadly, this survey of around a hundred years of transatlantic extreme right activism has attempted to suggest that, through the lens of transnationalism, we see that there are areas of concern that are not merely historical. The recent growth in influence of figures who are eroding democratic values by mainstreaming far-right politics, such as Trump, highlights one serious risk to political norms. Meanwhile, the growth of terrorist cultures steeped in reinvented understandings of neo-Nazism poses another specific, and potentially deadly, risk. Both phenomena have a transatlantic, transnational context, both pose tangible, ongoing threats, and both are unlikely to wane anytime soon.

Notes 1 Following Cas Mudde (2019), this chapter uses the term “far right” to identify the non-mainstream right, “radical right” to identify parts of the far right that engage with liberal democratic politics through critical of aspects of liberal democracy, and “extreme right” to refer to those parts of the far right that reject legitimate political processes, engage in developing radicalised countercultures and at times illegal activity. 2 The term “fascist” is used in this chapter to denote a revolutionary type of extreme right activism, and follows Roger Griffin’s ideal-typical definition of “palingenetic, populist ultranationalism” (Griffin, 2018).

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20 GENDERING THE FAR-RIGHT CONTINUUM IN EUROPE Ov Cristian Norocel

Introduction This chapter aims to provide a snapshot of the rapidly developing field of scholarship on farright manifestations across Europe from a gendered perspective (cf. Askanius, 2021; Blee, 2020; Blum, 2017; Coffé, 2018; Geva, 2020; Meret, 2015; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, 2017; Norocel, 2013, 2017; Petö, 2010; Sager & Mulinari, 2018; Saresma, 2018; Scrinzi, 2017; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015; Vieten, 2016). These studies argue compellingly about the importance of gender in understanding the ideological underpinnings and the modus operandi of political parties and social movements, paramilitary organisations, loosely connected networks, and subcultures that are generally associated with the wider field of socio-political manifestations further to the right from the mainstream centre-right that I label herein as the far-right continuum. Considering that the readership of the present volume may not necessarily be well acquainted with the various theoretical interpretations of gender, conceptual clarification is necessary here. What most theorisations of gender have in common is that they have decidedly moved beyond the mere chromosomal binary that distinguishes between the male and female sex (cf. Butler, 1997; Connell & Pearse, 2015; Tompkins, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 2008). Even more so, the understanding of gender at work in the present chapter pertains not only to schematic understandings of the social differences between men and women. Rather, gender is “a mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic position or their membership in ethnic and racial collectivities” (Yuval-Davis, 2008, p. 9). In other words, gender is “the structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of practices that bring reproductive distinctions between bodies into social processes” (Connell & Pearse, 2015, p. 25). These social structures are contingent to the socio-political and historical context, and serve as “a principal means to organise difference and reify hierarchies, in which the biology of sexes serves as an instrument to justify and naturalise the superiority of men in relation to women” (Norocel, 2013, p. 52; cf. Dietze & Roth, 2020, p. 8; Saresma, 2018, pp. 179–180). Furthermore, the power of these structures “to shape individual action often makes gender appear unchanging. Yet gender arrangements are in fact always changing, as human practices create new situations and as structures develop crisis tendencies” (Connell & Pearse, 2015, p. 25). 288

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-27

Gendering the far-right continuum in Europe

By gendering the far-right continuum in Europe, then, the present chapter evinces the significance of traditional conceptions about gender roles (centred on the allegedly immutable dyads of men and masculinities and women and femininities, respectively) and sexuality (privileging the reproductive heterosexual family as the norm) in understanding the ideological underpinnings of the far-right continuum. In addition, the chapter sheds light onto how different gender arrangements, contingent as they are to the specific historical, social, political, and economic circumstances in the polity under scrutiny, impact on the recruitment, mobilisation, and role of men and women in the far-right entities across Europe. With this in mind, following this introduction, I provide theoretical consistency to the concept of far-right continuum, by reviewing the various working definitions available when examining the socio-political landscape further afield to the right from the mainstream centre-right. I concentrate on the commonly agreed ideological traits of the entities on the far-right continuum, providing a gender lens to their more general definitions. I conclude the section with a practical illustration of the concept’s usefulness, examining two cases from different corners of Europe, namely France and Hungary. In the subsequent section, I map out some recent directions for an interdisciplinary research agenda, with examples from Finland and Sweden. In the concluding section, I integrate these into the wider intellectual conversation, which brings together scholars from different research traditions with an interest in delving further in the study of the far-right continuum from a gendered perspective.

The gender underpinnings of the far-right continuum: Reviewing the theoretical standpoints To begin with, I want to anchor the concept of far-right extremism, which appears rather difficult to delineate, into the wider field of socio-political manifestations further to the right from the mainstream centre-right (Carter, 2005; Ignazi, 2003; Minkenberg, 2003; Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2022; Rydgren, 2018). The aforesaid field may be best visualised as a far-right continuum reuniting parties, which some researchers label as either populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2007; Norocel, 2013), radical right parties (Minkenberg, 2003; Skenderovic, 2009), extreme right parties (Carter, 2005; Ignazi, 2003; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014), or contemporary fascist and neo-Nazi parties (Copsey, 2008), as well as extreme right social movements, paramilitary organisations, loosely organised networks and subcultures (Baele et al., 2020, pp. 3–4; Blee, 2020, pp. 416–417; Froio et al., 2020, pp. 5–7). The concept far-right continuum is to a certain extent related ideationally to the “right-wing populist complex” (Dietze & Roth, 2020). The “right-wing populist complex” is, however, a sprawling concept, which incorporates “right-wing extremism”; “religious fundamentalisms and formations of Catholicism”; “certain fractions of mainstream feminism called ‘Femonationalism’ that partake in the stigmatization of male Muslim migrants […] and refugees as a sexual threat to ‘autochthonous’ women”; and “parts of the liberal bourgeois camp that have shifted from the middle ground to the right […] via their polemics against ‘genderism’ or and an alleged ‘censorship’” (Dietze & Roth, 2020, p. 8). In contrast to this, I suggest a slightly narrower operationalisation of the subject matter. By the same measure, the concept far-right continuum is also related to understanding “the far-right as an umbrella concept” (Pirro, 2022), which is deployed to enhance conceptual precision when “the boundaries between the extreme right and the (populist) radical right start to blur” (Pirro, 2022, p. 2). However, while the “umbrella concept” is articulated around three conceptual distinctions, “defining what is ‘right’ as opposed to ‘left’; ‘far right’ as opposed to ‘moderate right’; and finally, distinguishing between the subordinate categories of the far right, that is, ‘(populist) radical right’ and 289

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‘extreme right’” (Pirro, 2022, p. 3), I argue that the concept of continuum, as developed in feminist scholarship (Kelly, 2011), provides further conceptual stringency and complexity to the matter at hand. To begin with, it draws on two dictionary definitions. The first one emphasises an elementary joint aspect that connects many different actions. The second denotes a string of events or a series of elements that blend into one another and consequently cannot be readily separated (Kelly, 2011, p. xviii). Consequently, the far right continuum emphasises, in addition to the three conceptual distinctions provided by the “umbrella concept” (Pirro, 2022), the discreet ideological connections between the many entities in the field, whereby “authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and an exclusionary and/or a holistic kind of nationalism [articulated as nativism] are defining properties […]. By contrast, xenophobia, racism, and populism are accompanying characteristics of the concept” (Carter, 2018, p. 174; cf. Froio et al., 2020, p. 5; Mudde, 2007, pp. 20–23; Pirro, 2022, p. 3; Rydgren, 2018, pp. 2–7; Wodak, 2015, pp. 10–11). Concomitantly, the continuum concept draws attention to the fact that the very categories deployed to catalogue these entities tend to shade into and out one another, especially in those contexts in which far-right entities are either co-opted to mainstream centreright politics (Brown et al., 2021) or opt strategically to radicalise further. In the following, I am mapping out these ideological traits, and connect them to feminist research in the field to evidence their gender underpinnings, thereby adding complexity to the theorising of far-right extremism.

Gender, authoritarian ideals, and anti-democratic impulses Authoritarianism and anti-democratic tendencies are shared widely across the far-right continuum, and manifest primarily as the “strong belief in the importance of an authoritarian and hierarchical structured order” (Skenderovic, 2009, p. 23), which fetishises the gendered figure of the commanding “political man”, “a deus ex machina who short-circuits the more sustained structures of debate, democratic governance, and the pursuit of justice” (Comaroff, 2011, p. 205; cf. Blum, 2017, p. 324; Blee, 2020, p. 417; Norocel, 2022, pp. 589–590). In this authoritarian conception of society and politics, the “law-and-order doctrine is directed not only against external threats (immigrants and asylum seekers) and criminal elements, but also against its critics and political opponents” (Heinisch, 2003, p. 95), amongst whom antiracist feminist emancipatory activism and politics are particularly important (Keskinen, 2013, p. 230; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, pp. 53–54; Norocel, 2017, p. 96). More clearly, there are two key configurations underpinning this doctrine: “the threat from within (feminists) and from without (the Muslims) and the need to protect and care for those who are threatened” (Sager & Mulinari, 2018, p. 151), namely native women and their (necessarily) native offspring. This stance is accompanied by strong opposition to abortion rights, and a programmatic defence of “traditional, patriarchal family structures (reflected, for example, in policies towards marriage, childcare and women’s representation), their firm opposition to gay rights, and their positions on other minority (or outgroup) rights, most notably religious ones” (Carter, 2018, p. 169). On this matter, analyses of voters’ support for radical right populist parties indicate that appeals to stricter law enforcement and individual responsibility resonate more strongly with men than with women (Coffé, 2018, p. 200; Norocel, 2017, p. 101). In addition to this, men seemingly react positively to the nostalgia-infused calls to reinstating the “natural” differences between men and women, and returning to rigid moral standards as means to counterweight contemporary “post-materialist libertarianism” (Coffé, 2018, p. 202; Ignazi, 2003, p. 34). Looking closer at the far-right continuum, some researchers 290

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note that “[b]oth fascism and national-populism are anti-systemic” (Copsey, 2008, p. 80). This notwithstanding, “the radical right is (nominally) democratic, even if they oppose some fundamental values of liberal democracy, whereas the extreme right is in essence antidemocratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people” (Mudde, 2007, p. 31), rejecting the principles of fundamental human rights, and discarding the fundamental institutions, procedures, and values of the democratic constitutional state (Carter, 2005, p. 17; Froio et al., 2020, p. 6; Wilhelmsen, 2021, p. 121).

Gender, normative sexuality, and nationalism The third ideological trait, namely nationalism (which at times morphs into nativism), is aligned closely to authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies discussed above. It rests on the mythical description of a homogeneous people (purity) inhabiting their ancestral lands (autochthony), achieved by means of “radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, other cultural and political criteria of exclusion, to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation, and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity” (Minkenberg, 2003, p. 151). Such mythological construction is useful in the pursuit of establishing an “ultra-nationalist government and reassert traditional values such as law and order, authority, community, work and family” (Copsey, 2008, p. 80), which polices both “women and men for reproductive purposes […] as a measure to ensure people’s pure racial lineage” (Norocel et al., 2020, p. 429; cf. Blee, 2020, p. 419; Wodak, 2015, p. 183). Noteworthy here, “‘woman’ in a national(ist) context is regarded as the ‘native’ woman, and discursively constructed in opposition to the ‘non-native’ migrant woman” (Vieten, 2016, p. 624), consequently equating nationhood with “gender, parentage, skin-colour – all those things that are not chosen and which, by virtue of their inevitability, elicit selfless attachment and sacrifice” (Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 434). In turn, women’s discursive association with the private sphere overlaps the patriarchal imperative to protect the “selfless mother/devout wife” with that of defending the nation and their lands (Wodak, 2015, p. 153; Wilhelmsen, 2021, p. 111; Yuval-Davis, 2008, pp. 22–23). Consequently, the politics pertaining to women’s rights are subsumed to “family politics, which covers the social role of women by models offered by the cult of [Virgin] Mary” (Petö, 2010, p. 196), whereby women resisting the imperative to bear (the nation’s) offspring stand accused of “national sabotage” (Petö, 2010, p. 196; see also, Keskin, 2018, p. 103). Keeping in mind that women’s rights are human’s rights, such a stance bridges between anti-democratic tendencies and nationalism, positing women as necessary for the survival and perpetuation of the nation, and concomitantly relegating them to a subordinated position within a rigid hierarchical gender arrangement (Norocel, 2013, p. 74; Wodak, 2015, p. 186). This notwithstanding, such far-right construction that locates women at the junction between sexual and racial settings embodied by the white nuclear heteronormative family benefits from the recruitment of a defanged and essentialising understanding of feminism, also known as femonationalism (Farris, 2017), which touts gender equality as a fait accompli in Western European societies, relegating “bad patriarchies” to “distant places and migrant bodies” (Keskinen, 2013, p. 226; see also Wodak, 2015, p. 22). In the same Western European context, a related concept, that of homonationalism (Puar, 2007), was deployed to explain the selective and contingent co-optation of homosexuality and even binary trans*1 identities by the entities on the far-right continuum (Claus & Virchow, 2017; Dickey et al., 2022; Kehl, 2018; Wielowiejski, 2020). This co-optation has a dual aim: these identities are deployed to emphasise “tolerant and progressive ‘Europeanness’” (Giorgi, 2022; Kehl, 2018); concomitantly, these identities are recruited to emphasise the privileged position of nuclear 291

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heterosexual families, and submit to the idea of normalcy this entails, by dissociating themselves from “queerness, feminism, non-binary trans*, drag queens and kings, and rainbow families” (Wielowiejski, 2020, p. 144).

Gender and the many avatars of racism The appeals to defend the nation from foreign interference, and safeguard its homogeneity from polluting elements is generally “advocated on the grounds that there are irreconcilable natural differences between groups of people and that these groups should not mix – i.e. according to a racist doctrine” (Carter, 2018, p. 164; cf. Ignazi, 2003, p. 34; Passmore, 2014, pp. 120–123). This notwithstanding, racism and xenophobia manifest on the farright continuum also in more discreet forms, which pivot from biological racism towards “ethnopluralism” (Minkenberg, 2000) and “care racism” (Sager & Mulinari, 2018). In these cases, the emphasis moves onto the alleged innate incompatibility between certain cultures and ethnicities, which calls for “a politically enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities according to geographical criteria, a global apartheid” (Minkenberg, 2000, p. 180). Ethnopluralism has been a discursive device for certain entities on the far-right continuum to refashion themselves at the behest of “self-proclaimed ‘neo-Gramscians of the Right’” (Mudde, 2007, p. 244) as manifestations of a “new right” (nouvelle droite) (cf. Blum, 2017, pp. 322–324; Copsey, 2018, pp. 113–116; Mudde, 2007, p. 191; Scrinzi, 2017, p. 133). Intellectually, then, ethnopluralism serves as the new right’s “countermodel to the concepts of multiculturalism, a modernized strategy against immigration and integration” (Minkenberg, 2000, p. 180). More clearly, researchers have aptly observed that there are several key discursive figures, which provide these far-right entities with the possibility to link authoritarianism (demands for stricter law and order), femonationalism (preserving the allegedly egalitarian gender arrangements of European societies), and its racism (safeguarding the purity of European autochthonous populations): the dangerous racialised and patriarchal Other and the vulnerable native women in need of protection (Blee, 2020, p. 419; Giorgi, 2022, p. 485; Keskinen, 2013, p. 228; Passmore, 2014, pp. 132–134; Sager & Mulinari, 2018, p. 151). In this context, “male immigrants are portrayed, both metaphorically and literally, as rapists of the nation. Racialised women (often together with their small children) are conceptualised as parasites, reproducing the racialised other and annihilating the national body from within” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017, p. 14). Furthermore, as several researchers have aptly noted (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014; Sager & Mulinari, 2018), in some cases femonationalism facilitates the distraction from such outright racist manifestations by appealing to a return to “the traditional family and its division of labour based on the understanding of men as protectors and women as caring” (Sager & Mulinari, 2018, p. 151), whereby women within the far-right continuum are called upon to fulfil their duties of care for their (traditional heteronormative) families and their national (and thus racial) community, also known as “care racism.”

Gender and populism Contemporary populism, the final ideological trait characteristic to the far-right continuum, has changed beyond the initial antagonism, which pitted the “people” against the “elites”, being in turn “directed against those who seem to be responsible for Europeanization and globalization, and especially for mass migration, against elites who have opened the doors to foreign influence and to foreigners” (Pelinka, 2013, p. 9; cf. Copsey, 2018, 292

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pp. 114–115). Indeed, populist dissatisfaction targets more widely “elites not only within the respective country, but also on the European stage (‘Brussels’) and global level (‘Financial Capital’)” (Wodak, 2015, p. 4), as well as “the clergy elite in Rome” in the Catholic countries (Giorgi, 2022, p. 491). These elites are held responsible for the presence of the dangerous “Other” amongst the “people” (Norocel, 2013, p. 43). The discursive mechanisms of such antagonism are over-simplification, polarisation, and stereotyping, and they are deployed in the articulation of “gender populism,” which “refers to a simplifying understanding of gender as a ‘natural’, essentially dichotomous order, based on positioning both women and men in hierarchical locations in terms of power” (Saresma, 2018, p. 181). This brings closer various entities on the far-right continuum and “religious fundamentalist movements, with the establishment of a strategic alliance against the so-called ‘gender ideology’” (Donà, 2020, p. 289). “Gender ideology” is “the ideological matrix of the different reforms they try to oppose, which pertain to intimate/sexual citizenship debates, including LGBT rights, reproductive rights, and sex and gender education” (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2018, p. 8).

Contextual normalisation and radicalisation on the far-right continuum To complicate matters further, the classification of entities as either “merely” part of the radical right category, or decidedly belonging to the far-right extremist category is necessarily fluid, given the continuums second quality of encompassing entities that blend into one another and consequently cannot be readily separated (Kelly, 2011, p. xviii). The labelling of these entities is contingent on the socio-political processes of mainstreaming the far right, “by which parties/actors, discourses and/or attitudes move from marginal positions on the political spectrum or public sphere to more central ones, shifting what is deemed to be acceptable or legitimate in political, media and public circles and contexts” (Brown et al., 2021, p. 9). The “normalised far-right discourses” manifest in a femonationalist manner (Farris, 2017) that “culturalises the position of minority Muslim women against a ‘pseudoemancipatory’ nativist claim of cultural superiority with respect to majority women (and men) in liberal European societies” (Vieten, 2016, p. 631). On this matter, some women appear to play a key role in helping far-right extremist entities to (mimic a) move towards the political mainstream (Geva, 2020; Meret, 2015; Scrinzi, 2017; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). For example, the political cunning and personal charisma of Marine Le Pen have helped the French National Front (Front National) seemingly to leave behind its far-right extremist roots, and to normalise (dédiaboliser) its political agenda and widen its electoral appeal (Geva, 2020, p. 37; Scrinzi, 2017, p. 128), a move also signalled by its more recent rebranding as the National Rally (Rassemblement National). By the same measure, other women politicians seem to join parties purposefully for their far-right extremist agenda, as Dóra Dúró did with the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom). Dúró was elected on the Jobbik ticket as the youngest member of the Hungarian parliament in 2010. Arguing that “in the womb lives the nation!”, she married the party’s deputy-chair and bore him three children, deploying her motherhood and vociferously embracing traditional family values to construct a successful political career (Norocel, 2018, pp. 49–51). This notwithstanding, Dúró left Jobbik in the aftermath of the 2018 parliamentary elections, as the party attempted to moderate its extreme appeal, and morph into a representative of “modern conservatism” (Cinpoeş & Norocel, 2020, p. 54). In turn, she joined Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), arguing she preferred the “Hungarian tricolour” instead of the “confusing Rainbow flag.”2 293

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Upcoming directions for research: Examples from Finland and Sweden With this theoretical mapping in mind, in this section I sketch out recent directions for an interdisciplinary agenda in the field, evidencing the contributions of three studies that examine entities that occupy different position on the far-right continuum in Finland and Sweden, two polities that for long have enjoyed a reputation of gender equal societies with strong welfare states (Keskinen, 2013; Norocel et al., 2020; Sager & Mulinari, 2018; Saresma, 2018), which have provided a specific set of conditions for the entities under examination (Aharoni & Féron, 2020; Askanius, 2021; Norocel & Pettersson, 2022). Concentrating on the Finnish context, Aharoni and Féron (2020) examine how antimigration politics and activism are gendered, in the context of the rising numbers of people seeking asylum across Europe, which led to the emergence of the far-right vigilante organisation Soldiers of Odin (SOO). It is worth noting here that SOO was founded in late 2015 by Mika Ranta, a self-professed “national socialist”3 and former activist in the Finnish chapter of the Nordic Resistance Movement (Suomen Vastarintaliike). Anchored in feminist security studies, Aharoni and Féron (2020, p. 87) identify “four recurring themes that appear in the SOO’s self-presentation which are used by members to portray themselves as part of a legitimate social movement: protective masculinity, militarized masculinity, supplement of the state, and indigenous masculinity”. The study evidences the manner in which “through gendered vigilantism, the SOO were involved in a securitization effort of public forms of gender-based violence in a way that reinforces racial stereotypes of foreign men as aggressive predators and local women as passive victims” (Aharoni & Féron, 2020, p. 100). Furthermore, references to Nordic mythology (Odin being an important god in the Nordic pantheon, associated with war, victory, and death) enforce a distinction between the native population and unwanted newcomers. Juxtaposed to SOO’s organising of street patrols across Finland, and the use of gendered depictions “imaginations to describe infiltration and protection – all echo historic configurations of national imagery in which whiteness, masculinity, and militarization are intertwined” (Aharoni & Féron, 2020, p. 101). The study adds complexity to previous analyses of the manner in which native women are relegated a position of defenceless victims in need of protection from hypersexual male Others (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017; Vieten, 2016; Wodak, 2015), by developing further the concept of “white border guard masculinity” (Keskinen, 2013, p. 227), which evidences a masculinity fixated on “borders, border-control, cultural boundary work and exclusions that are treated as necessities”. Focusing in turn on the Swedish context, Askanius (2021) analyses the Swedish chapter of the Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen). Founded in 1997 in Sweden, it was named initially Swedish Resistance Movement (Svenska Motståndsrörelsen). In 2016 it changed its name to the present one, so that to convey its transnational Nordic level of activity, with separate chapters being active in Denmark, Finland (where it was officially outlawed in March 2019, although its members are still active in other entities across the far-right continuum, see Aharoni & Féron, 2020), Iceland, as well as Norway. These chapters are “organised by a joint council with (male-only) representatives from each country in a highly hierarchical, top-down structure imposed by the leadership in Sweden” (Askanius, 2021, p. 3). Against this background, the study provides one of the few insights informed by a media and communication approach to the matter. It explores how the women “online influencers” active in the Swedish chapter negotiate their roles as “Nordic wives” and “race warriors”. First, these women play an important role in drawing attention to the entity’s approach to issues of traditional family, racial purity, and women’s role in preserving and enforcing the two as 294

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“Nordic wives”. Even more so, they allow the male leaders to position themselves unequivocally as “the self-proclaimed defenders of a victimised, threatened population embodied by white women and blond babies” (Askanius, 2021, p. 14). Second, women embody a different type of “racial warrior” (Blee, 2020, p. 420), at once “soft-spoken and hard-hitting, fragile and powerful”, who contribute to the “long-term strategy of reshaping public perception of national socialism by presenting it as an inclusive and non-threatening ideology” (Askanius, 2021, p. 14). Last but not least, scrutinising in a comparative perspective the key political speeches of the chairpersons of the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) and Finns Party (Perussuo malaiset/Sannfinländarna), Norocel and Pettersson (2022) argue that these politicians use the entanglements between gender and religion in a strategic manner as a means to break into mainstream politics and broaden their appeal to conservative constituencies. The study is part of ongoing efforts to enrich political studies approaches to gender with religious studies insights (Norocel & Giorgi, 2022). Consequently, it “adds complexity to our understanding of the ongoing process of rapprochement between the radical right populist parties and conservative and Christian democratic parties in Sweden and Finland” (Norocel & Pettersson, 2022, p. 442). Furthermore, in the analysed speeches, the two chairpersons position themselves discursively as the “true” defenders of the secularised and rationality-pursuing Swedish and Finnish people, and the only politicians defending the common Swedes and Finns from both misguided elites, and “profiteering and menacing racialised migrant Others, stereotypically portrayed as less modern, less egalitarian, and dogmatically religious” (Norocel & Pettersson, 2022, p. 443). In this context, gender equality and religion serve as useful devices for recalibrating “the politics of fear” (Wodak, 2015) into “care racism” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014; Sager & Mulinari, 2018). As such, the study stimulates a dialogue between gender analyses of politics and religious studies, illustrating the process of normalisation of the far-right discourses (Brown et al., 2021; Scrinzi, 2017; Vieten, 2016) in the two Nordic countries. To sum up, these studies showcase a couple of important aspects pertaining to the upcoming directions of research on the far-right continuum. A first aspect concerns the continuum and networked qualities of the examined entities as they both shade into and out of one another, as well as challenge neat delimitations along national borders and traditional forms of disseminating ideology (Aharoni & Féron, 2020; Askanius, 2021; Norocel & Pettersson, 2022). Another aspect concerns methodological diversity and variety of empirical materials, which range from the media framing of the connection between immigration and sexual violence as a means to justify gendered vigilitantism in Finland (Aharoni & Féron, 2020), the qualitative content analysis of the online media practices of women “online influencers” active within a Swedish neo-Nazi entity (Askanius, 2021), and the poststructuralist analysis of the discourses of the major radical right populist parties in Sweden and Finland (Norocel & Pettersson, 2022).

Conclusions The starting point of this chapter has been to acknowledge that gender plays a crucial role in grasping the ideological underpinnings and the modus operandi of the various entities, which are generally associated with the larger field of socio-political manifestations further to the right of the mainstream centre-right. I suggested the concept of far-right continuum, as a means to address the difficulty to delineate far-right extremism, and to enable a theoretical discussion informed by a gender perspective of the common ideological traits identified in research on these diverse entities. Furthermore, I argued that it is precisely such a gender 295

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perspective that allows scholars to trace ideological shifts, and become aware of discursive overlays on such important issues as the future of democracy in different European polities, and issues of national culture and demography in increasingly diverse societies (Blee, 2020; Blum, 2017; Coffé, 2018; Giorgi, 2022; Meret, 2015; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, 2017; Norocel, 2013, 2017; Petö, 2010; Sager & Mulinari, 2018; Saresma, 2018; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015; Vieten, 2016; Wodak, 2015). Concomitantly, I underlined the contingent manner in which various entities (be them parties, movements, or individuals) may position themselves on the far-right continuum across time or in different national contexts, either through a mimetic approach to the centre-right like in France (Geva, 2020; Scrinzi, 2017), or through further radicalisation like in Hungary. Subsequently, I provided a quick sketch of upcoming research directions for research on gender and the far-right continuum, in which I emphasised the benefits of an interdisciplinary agenda in the field. To illustrate that, I presented succinctly three studies focusing on Finland and Sweden, which evidence the importance of a gender perspective, from the vantage points of such diverse disciplines as security studies (Aharoni & Féron, 2020), media and communication studies (Askanius, 2021), and political science and religious studies (Norocel & Pettersson, 2022). To conclude, this chapter offered a snapshot of the growing field of scholarship that makes gender central to analyses of the far-right continuum across Europe. While the cited works in this chapter have been published in English, I encourage the readers to use their potential multilingual language skills to explore the wealth of scholarship published in other languages as well. To enable such an endeavour, I deem useful to point out that the research presented in this chapter pertains to various entities on the far-right continuum from different countries across Europe, from the Netherlands and France in the west, to Hungary and Romania in the east, and from Finland and Sweden in the north, to Italy in the south. They constitute excellent steppingstones for delving deeper in specialist studies of each of these national contexts, while hopefully remaining aware of the theoretical and transnational communalities I tried to evidence in this chapter.

Acknowledgement This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, VR) under grant 2019-03363.

Notes 1 Here binary trans* identities entail those identities that submit to traditional conceptions of gender roles, striving for a seamless transition to and assimilation into the desired category of men, or women. The asterisk is then deployed by some scholars to indicate that “trans* is [actually] meant to include not only identities such as transgender, transsexual, trans man, and trans woman that are prefixed by trans- but also identities such as genderqueer, neutrios, intersex, agender, two-spirit, cross-dresser, and genderfluid” (Tompkins, 2014, 26–27). 2 https://hungarytoday.hu/brand-new-far-right-party-emerges-from-the-ashes-of-jobbik/[deadlink](Accessed 15 May 2023). 3 https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2016/05/07/personportratt-hur-det-kom-sig-att-mika-ranta-grundadesoldiers-odin (Accessed 15 May 2023).

References Aharoni, S. B., & Féron (2020). National populism and gendered vigilantism: The case of the soldiers of Odin in Finland. Cooperation and Conflict, 55(1), 86–106. Askanius, T. (2021). Women in the Nordic Resistance Movement and their online media practices: Between internalised misogyny and “embedded feminism”. Feminist Media Studies. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2021.1916772

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21 MISOGYNY AS A GATEWAY TO FAR-RIGHT HATE A Quantitative Exploration in Great Britain Antoinette Raffaela Huber, Gavin Hart, and Mark Littler

Introduction The growth of the far right in recent decades has primarily been associated with exclusionary ideas based on strident nationalism, xenophobia, retributive stances on law and order, and forms of welfare chauvinism (Mudde, 2019). However, these ideological systems are also marked by particular conceptions of gender that find expression in the discourses of these groups (Köttig et al., 2017). Groups articulating ultra-reactionary forms of xenophobic nationalism are also commonly associated with anti-feminist ideas as part of a wider culture war against progressive politics (Norocel, 2022; Shaw, 2018; Wodak, 2021). While antifeminism as a concept has taken on a range of different forms historically, its contemporary manifestation in far-right narratives has focussed upon a sense in which the heteronormative social has been perceived to be under attack from progressive groups, dedicated to the destruction of traditional gender roles (Lindsay, 2022). Alongside these developments there has also been increasing evidence of extremist groups dedicated to the development of explicitly misogynistic narratives. While these groups espouse anti-feminist narratives, there is also evidence of a powerful and explicit hatred aimed at women. Groups (such as Incels) have demonstrated the potential for online spaces to host deeply illiberal discourses on women that are related to outbursts of extreme violence (Baele et al., 2021; Blee, 2020). The relationship between farright extremism and misogyny would benefit from greater investigation, especially as there are seemingly clear points of discursive crossover between these two ideological pools. In recent decades, sections of the far right have become increasingly adept at spreading their messages in online spaces. Lightly regulated discussion forums and social media platforms (such as 4Chan and Reddit), alongside fringe spaces on mainstream social media have been utilised by groups on the far right to communicate their ideas to a broad audience (Klein & Muis, 2019). More recently, these types of discussions have moved underground onto encrypted spaces, such as Telegram and into the shadier areas of the dark web, in response to efforts by social media providers to create a “cordon sanitaire” on their platforms against expressing of political extremism, violence and hatred (Walther & McCoy, 2021). Similar regions of the internet have been inhabited by members of the “manosphere” (Ging, 2019). The manosphere is a term that covers a variety of virtual spaces in which discussion is dedicated to the loss of masculine power and the perceived dominance of feminism in broader 300

DOI: 10.4324/9781003256892-28

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society. The manosphere covers a wide range of groups including so-called “pick-up artists,” men’s-rights activists, “Men going their own way” (MGTOW), and the Incel community (Van Valkenburgh, 2021). All of these groups have specific traits and distinctive discourses, but they are united by a common core of anti-feminist ideas (Kelly & Aunspach, 2020). This strong rejection of feminist ideas highlights areas of ideological crossover between far-right groups and extremist misogynists. This discursive overlap has raised questions about the extent and strength of the relationship between ideas associated with the far right and those discussed in misogynistic communities online (Hoffman et al., 2020; Norocel, 2022; Off, 2022). A selection of literature dedicated to assessing the threat posed by the Incel community has considered the extent of the crossover between far-right ideas and misogyny. One such contribution by Hoffman et al. (2020) notes a clear sense of overlap between the alt-right and the Incel community when the author’s state that “[a] particularly worrisome trend is how seamlessly the militant incel community has been integrated into the alt-right tapestry” (Hoffman et al., 2020, p. 572). Kelly and Aunspach (2020) similarly note a strong sense of crossover between the manosphere and far-right groups stating that: “[t]he men’s rights network also cross-pollinates with other far-right and white supremacist networks, rapidly circulating violent racist misogyny and directing traffic toward neofascist groups” (Kelly & Aunspach, 2020, p. 4). However, much of our understanding of this subject is based on speculative accounts of these connections and a presumption of discursive similarity. This chapter revolves around two principle research questions. Firstly, can we locate evidence of a relationship between misogynistic values and far-right ideas? Secondly, what can we discover about the demographics of men who subscribe to these views? It is recognised of course, that many women also hold deeply conservative views on gender politics and offer support for far-right political movements (see Allen & Goodman, 2021; Pilkington, 2017), but for the purposes of this study, we have focussed upon a sample of male survey respondents. This is achieved by drawing on the findings from male respondents in a mass-population survey data captured in the European Values Survey. The chapter uses regression analyses to provide insight into the strength of the relationship between far-right ideas and misogynistic views across this group. The piece begins by examining a pool of particularly relevant literature in this area of study. Firstly, we will examine research that explicitly looks into conceptions of masculinity and the sexual politics of far-right organisations. Secondly, we will examine literature that considers constructions of race and ethnicity in the Incel community. Additionally, we will explore the idea that misogyny acts as a gateway to far-right attitudes. By examining these areas of research, we will establish the key areas of commonality and difference in the ideological tenets of these separate, yet overlapping groups.

Far right and gender While the far right has been most commonly defined by its strongly racialised and nativist view of the world, such ideas tend to be innately intertwined with presuppositions about gender roles and sexual politics (Koulouris, 2018). It must be recognised of course, that the far right is a wide spectrum in itself, and it is impossible to speak of a single position on gender across this entire milieu. However, there is a basic thread of anti-feminist ideas that runs through the various manifestations of the far right (Agius et al., 2021). There are also a range of positions that relate more specifically to the far-right’s attitudes to homosexuality and gender fluidity (see Blee, 2020; Wielowiejski, 2020). For our purposes we will focus primarily on anti-feminist positioning though we recognise that there is a wider discussion to be had about gender politics across the far-right spectrum. The literature discussed here is primarily based 301

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upon research that has taken place in the United Kingdom and North America. It is recognised that this places certain limitations upon the breadth of the discussion, but none-the-less, the section functions to highlight the gendered dimensions of far-right politics. What follows is an attempt to characterise certain themes that underpin this anti-feminist positioning, rather than to offer an exhaustive account of anti-feminist ideas across the entire far right. One of the key themes that emerges when we begin to look into this pool of research, is based on understandings of heteronormativity and its association with the control of women’s bodies as a means to maintain racialised boundaries. Research into far-right online forums has demonstrated the importance of a specific understanding of gender relationships in the thinking of these groups. It is necessary to outline these developments to highlight the broad ideational crossover between far-right groups and extreme misogynists that have been discussed in literature on contemporary extremism. A useful place to begin is with the work of Bjork-James’ (2020), whose research into the white supremacist StormFront platform has highlighted discussions dedicated to the threats that users perceive to the heteropatriarchal family model. This model is built on a particular construction of masculinity in which women are seen as naturally subordinate figures in the family hierarchy. While homophobia and anti-feminism have long featured in the ideological positioning strategies of far-right groups, recent research suggests that these ideas are increasingly being used as a mechanism for online recruitment and radicalisation. This leads BjorkJames (2020) to conclude that “white nationalists use online venues to racialise homophobia and anti-feminism, affirming a normative white masculinity” (p. 177). While StormFront represents the more extreme end of the far-right spectrum, research also highlights the manner in which diluted forms of these ideas have become adopted in more mainstream political discourse (Wodak, 2021). For instance, evidence taken from elections in Sweden highlights the manner in which populist radical right parties have made electoral capital from antifeminist positioning in the arena of gender politics (Off, 2022). The relationship between conceptions of masculinity and the perceived attack on “traditional” male roles is an area that has been widely explored in the literature on far-right movements (Miller-Idriss, 2017). These arguments are discussed and substantiated across a much broader pool of literature that investigates the specific appeal of these ideas to the young men who comprise the vast majority of participants in contemporary far-right movements. For instance, Kimmel (2018) situates the specific appeal that far-right groups have in an aggrieved sense at the loss of a perceived sense of traditional masculinity. His in-depth qualitative research broadly suggests that young men who are experiencing a crisis of masculinity seek to blame “others” for taking their opportunities and to try to reclaim their masculinity through participation in radical right-wing groups. These ideas about masculinity are accompanied by a firmly racialised dimension related to fears about interracial sexual relationships. The far right, particularly in its more extreme forms, has a long history of seeking to police boundaries of racial identity by claiming ownership of women’s bodies (Camus & Lebourg, 2017). Such ideas still resonate strongly within contemporary far-right movements. For instance, Pearson’s (2019) research into the members of the English Defence League reveals a form of patriarchal hypermasculinity in operation whereby male group members identify themselves as the protectors of white British females from racialised others in the Islamic community. This model is buttressed with a particular conception of masculinity based on alpha-male “hardness” and the ability to take on perceived enemies in physical confrontation (Jackson, 2014). Kutner (2020) notes similar themes in qualitative research carried out with members of the “Proud Boys,” an organisation that similarly espouses traditionalist views of hegemonic masculinity and extreme nationalist views. Her research demonstrates ideas about 302

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the role of “strong” men in policing sexual boundaries and protecting women from the sexual advances of “others.” While these pieces of research suggest the operation of misogynistic and anti-feminism across the far right, it is useful to compare this with research on the Incel community and the racial dimensions associated with online misogyny.

Incels and race While the manosphere contains racist elements, the racial dimensions of discussions across spaces inhabited by Incel groups are much more complex than those found on sites specifically dedicated to the dissemination of far-right ideologies. At first glance, there is significant evidence of a strongly racist streak within the Incel milieu, particularly in the more extreme elements of the community. Elliot Rodger, the mass murderer who represents an Incel folk-hero for some within the community, used language that seems to clearly reflect similar ideas to the far right in terms of racial hierarchy and the maintenance of inter-racial boundaries (Rodger, 2014). More broadly, research has uncovered evidence of racialised forms of categorisation, and racist language being used on Incel forums (DeCook & Kelly, 2021). From this evidence, we may detect an anecdotal overlap between the policing of sexual boundaries discussed in research into the far right and studies dedicated to understanding the Incel community. For instance, research suggests that there is a further tendency to equate “cuckolding” – a key theme in Incel discourse – with an assumption that black men seek to “steal” white women from their unwitting partners, or “cucks” (Glace et al., 2021). This evidence seems to correlate with some of the ideas advanced in far-right discussions of race in which black men are discussed in terms of predatory and aggressive sexual behaviour towards white women (Castle et al., 2020). Similarly, there is evidence that elements in the Incel community discuss antisemitic ideas and conspiracy theories in which Jewish people are depicted as exerting excessive influence over Western society (Chang, 2020). Ging’s (2019) research into discourse in Incel communities also provides some evidence of powerfully Islamophobic language used to depict Muslims as rapacious and threatening to white women. This evidence points to some degree of crossover between Incel ideas and the priorities of the far right in maintaining a form of racial hierarchy. However, delving a little deeper into research on the Incel community, we can detect certain differences in the way that race is interpreted by this group that seems distinctive from ideas discussed in far-right organisations. For instance, research on racism in the Incel community highlights a discourse whereby white skin is seen as a marker of privilege. It is not uncommon to see the abbreviation “JBW” used in Incel forums which stands for “just be white” in reference to the perceived sexual advantage of those with white skin (Sugiura, 2021). Conversely, these groups often discuss minority ethnicity and darker skin tone as an additional barrier to participation in the sexual marketplace (Baele et al., 2021). Terminology such as “ricecell” are used on Incel forums to describe members with eastAsian characteristics, ‘currycell’ to describe those with South Asian features; and “Blackcell” to describe members with darker skin (DeCook & Kelly, 2021). Yet these labels are not strictly derogatory terms in this context, rather they are used to describe the perceived sexual marginalisation of certain racialised groups. On balance, research on the relationship between Incel discussion groups and racist ideas seems to suggest a much more complex interaction of racial distinctions and extreme misogyny. For instance, one of the more probing analyses of Incel discourse was conducted by Jaki et al. (2019) who used a sophisticated artificial intelligence algorithm to analyse vast swathes of Incel forum posts and concluded that just 3% of the materials that they surveyed contained explicitly racist content (Jaki et al., 2019, p. 249). 303

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Clearly, this area of extreme misogynistic thinking does not map neatly onto the discussions of racial hierarchy and the boundary maintenance concerns of far-right groups online. Nonetheless, there are areas of discursive and ideological overlap between extreme misogyny and the far-right online that merit further exploration. Both the far right and the Incel community exhibit strongly anti-feminist arguments. Both are concerned with insecurity about contemporary masculine roles. Both idealise a return to a semi-mythologised past in which men held natural dominance in the social order. The differences in these groups lie in the way they view women and race. The far right sees women as a group in need of masculine protection, at least for in-group women as defined by neatly delineated racial boundaries. Incels by contrast see women in general as the enemy of men. Furthermore, while Incels utilise the idea of racial hierarchy, many in the community seem to hold quite different views on the significance of race to those discussed in far-right groups.

Misogyny as a gateway From these brief overviews of literature on the far right and the manosphere, we can discern a sense of connection between these two pools of ideas. However, certain commentators have argued that there is a progression between holding misogynistic ideas and moving through to the adoption of far-right attitudes. The idea that misogyny can act as a gateway that leads in the direction of far-right ideas has gained traction in journalistic and scholarly accounts of the alt-right in particular. For instance, Hendrix (2019) identifies misogyny as a “gateway drug” for extremists (para 8). Similarly, it is possible to identify certain anecdotal cases in which leading figures within the manosphere have migrated towards sharing far-right views from their platforms. One such example would be “Roosh V,” who is well known amongst the “pick up artist” community. Since 2001, he ran various websites devoted to the “game,” in relation to picking up women. He also suggested the legalisation of rape on public property as a solution to stop rape (Kutner, 2016). However, from 2016 he began a movement towards a more political focus and is now considered a right-wing provocateur (Kutner, 2016). In order to investigate this apparent phenomenon, scholars have begun to turn their attention towards exploring this relationship in greater depth. In a recent analysis of online user movement between Reddit and YouTube platforms, Mamié et al. (2021) found an overlap between those engaged with manosphere content and alt-right content on both platforms. They also located a movement of users from manosphere sectors to alt-right sectors. This data was used to support an argument suggesting that antifeminist platforms could serve as a gateway to engagement in far-right communities. Ribeiro et al.’s (2021) investigation into the evolution of the manosphere also provides some insight into user migration. After examining 6.7 million Reddit posts, they found that users tended to be active across multiple different manosphere communities and that users tended to migrate from older to newer communities. Although this does not confirm a movement between manosphere and far-right groups, it does tell us that those who engage within the manosphere community are not committed to any particular group or community but instead adopt fluid boundaries of group identity and are open to engaging with different people and potentially different ideas. This is potentially dangerous given that Ribeiro et al. (2021) also found that newer communities are much more extreme than their predecessors, resulting in an influx of manosphere users becoming increasingly exposed to ever more toxic content. For example, Ribeiro et al.’s (2021b) examination of far-right YouTube communities found that users who commented on milder content eventually migrated towards commenting on more 304

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extreme content as users become enmeshed in a form of desensitisation and radicalisation. This evidence of a migratory relationship between the manosphere and far-right spaces online seems to provide a compelling narrative. Could this process help to account for the spread of far-right ideas? Or is there something more fundamental that underpins the relationship between these two pools of thought? In order to explore this more thoroughly, this investigation will consider whether misogynistic views naturally align with some of the exclusionary ideas associated with the far right. For this purpose, the investigation has drawn upon data taken from a mass population survey into political attitudes. The following section will outline the particular methodological approach that was taken to provide insight into the relationship between misogyny and far-right ideas as they occur in a general cross-section of the public.

Method The analysis utilised Great British data from the fifth wave of the European Values Survey (EVS) (n = 1,788). Principal Axis Factoring was used to form a measure approximating misogyny, following the process in Hart et al. (2022). A series of linear regression models were run with this factor as a dependent variable alongside controls for age, gender, marital status and post-secondary education. A series of measures quantifying the expression of far-right attitudinal traits were then added individually to a series of discrete models in order to isolate their impact. This resulted in the production of eight iterations, including measures of hostility to Jewish, gay, and migrant neighbours, trust in foreigners, feelings of national pride, and perceptions of immigrants and their impact on jobs, crime, and welfare.

Results A first iteration of the model was run including only demographic controls prior to the introduction of variables measuring the expression of far-right attitudinal traits. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 21.1. The first iteration of the model evidenced acceptable predictive fit (R2 = .121), with age (β = .213, p < .001), gender (β = .119, p < .001), and post-secondary education (β = −.188, p