The Rise of Indonesian Communism 9781501742651

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Introduction
I. Communists, Socialists, and the Colonies
II. Birth of the Revolutionary Movement
III. Becoming a Communist Party
IV. Joining the Comintern
V. The Bloc Within
VI. Elective Affinities
VII. Semaun’s Program
VIII. The Bloc Above
IX. International Relations
X. Deviation
XI. Making a Revolution
XII. The Rebellions
XIII. Turning Points
Notes and Index

Citation preview

The

Rise of

Indonesian

Communism

*

THE RISE OF INDONESIAN COMMUNISM Ruth

T.

McVey

Prepared under the auspices oj the

Modern Indonesia

Project

Southeast Asia Program Cornell University

Cornell University Press Ithaca

,

New

York

Copyright

©

1965 by Cornell University

All rights reserved

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published

1965

J'Q 77?

/

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-13205

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY VAIL-BALLOU PRESS,

INC.

To 102 West Avenue Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

Preface

THE

formative years of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) are

of interest both for scholars concerned with

modern Indonesia and

Communism. One of the first political groupings in Indonesia, the PKI reflected in its early period many characteristics of a movement bridging the gap from traditional to

for students of international

modem

concepts of political organization and goals. As such,

hibited openly

many

traits

that today are

it

ex-

muted but nonetheless

strong in Indonesian politics, and a study of the nature of

appeal contributes greatly to our ability to appreciate

its

its

early

position as

the most popular Indonesian political party today. At the same time, the early

PKI contributed by both

its

actions

and

its

ideas to the

evolving Indonesian independence movement, and neither the growth

movement nor the colonial government’s response to it can be fully comprehended without an understanding of the Communists’ role. The importance of the PKI in the international Communist movement stems chiefly from the fact that it was one of the very few Asian Communist parties to develop something of a mass followof that

ing in the early years of the Comintern. of comparison for the evolution of

It

therefore provides a point

Comintern policy

in China, the

chief arena of the Third International’s activity in underdeveloped Asia. This

is

particularly relevant in that the bloc-within strategy, the

culmination of the Comintern’s China policy in the period 1920-1927,

was first evolved in Indonesia, and this prior Indonesian experience was then consciously applied in China; in Indonesia, however, as the author of the present book demonstrates, application of this strategy had a very different outcome. Most studies of Communist parties tend to concentrate either on their role on the indigenous stage or on their participation in international Communist affairs. However, to provide a balanced

view of the PKI’s development, Miss vii

McVey

has given her attention

Preface to

both aspects of

its

early

and

existence,

doing so she has

in

demonstrated the interplay of domestic and international factors determining the party’s growth. She consider Indonesian

Communism

in

is

in

unusually well equipped to

both

lights,

having received her

Harvard University’s Soviet Area Program, where her work was primarily concerned with the development of Comintern colonial policy, and then in the Department of Governacademic training

ment and

first

in

the Southeast Asia

Program

at Cornell University,

her doctoral work centered on Indonesian government and

Miss

and

McVey

has been studying Indonesian

in her present

Modern Indonesia

position

Project

is

as

is

guages.

Research Associate

carrying this

present volume, conceived as the

PKI,

Communism

first

forward.

draws not only upon extensive interviews but

Miss

McVey

The

part of a general history of the

mass of material hitherto largely unexplored. data,

since 1953,

the product of research in five countries and as It

politics.

the Cornell

in

research

where

On

many

also

lan-

upon

a

the basis of these

provides a solid documentation of events and

presents an account and analysis of the party’s internal workings that

goes beyond,

I

believe,

any other study of Communism

in Asia.

George McT. Kahin Ithaca July

9,

1965

Contents

Preface

vii

Introduction I

II

Communists,

xi

Socialists,

and the Colonies

1

Movement

7

Birth of the Revolutionary

III

Becoming a Communist Party

34

IV

Joining the Comintern

48

V The

Bloc Within

76

VI

Elective Affinities

105

VII

Semaun’s Program

125

The Bloc Above

155

International Relations

198

Deviation

257

Making

290

VIII

IX

X XI

a Revolution

XII

The Rebellions

323

XIII

Turning Points

347

Notes

359

Index

493

—

Introduction

THE

Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has attracted considerable

attention in recent years because

it

the largest such organization

is

outside the Sino-Soviet bloc and the most powerful political party in

PKI itself is not: it can claim to be the oldest major Indonesian party and the first Communist movement to be established in Asia beyond the country. This notoriety

its

is

of recent vintage, but the

borders of the former Russian Empire.

began

It

as a Marxist socialist

organization, founded in the Netherlands Indies a

few months before

World War I. By the time of the Soviet seizure of Russia it had been divested of its non-Bolshevik elements,

the outbreak of

power in and early the

first

1920

it

what

is

in

in

officially

in

1914 to

title

Communist. This volume

planned as a general history of the Indonesian

Communist movement birth

took the

—concerns

the

PKI’s

temporary eclipse

its

in

development from

its

1927 after a disastrous

revolutionary attempt.

This period has not previously been investigated by historians of international

Communism. The double language

barrier of Indonesian

and Dutch has combined with the PKI’s peripheral position as an object of Comintern interest to preserve its obscurity. The principal studies dealing with the development of Indonesian Communism during the colonial period were sponsored directly or indirectly by the Netherlands Indies government in the

wake

of the

1926-1927

both their objectives and their point

rebellion

and are limited

of view.

Indeed, Indonesian political development in the colonial

in

part of the twentieth century territory; in the past

is,

as a whole,

still

relatively unexplored

decade several important scholarly investigations

have appeared that add considerably to our understanding of the period, but much more needs to be done before our grasp of it can

be considered

in

any way

satisfactory.

As an active participant both

in the xi

Comintern’s Asian activities

Introduction

and

independence movement, the early

in the evolving Indonesian

PKI contributed

two

to

Communist movement

part of the world

Communist party other than

is

the Chinese in

colonial” Far East that both possessed legality role in the political life of

so in a

its

International

illegal

country; and

it

were therefore rather

it

different

or politically impotent counterparts

colonial world. to

its

was the only the “colonial and semiand played a significant was the only one to do that

European-governed possession. The PKI’s relations with the

Communist of

major importance as

historical streams. Its

They were more

from those

elsewhere in the

intimate, in that the

PKI was able

maintain active and meaningful relations with the Comintern,

and

more

also

strained, in that, as a

movement

had achieved the Indonesian party had its that

by its own efforts, own vested interests and its own concepts of the proper path to power. Physical distance added to the complexity of the relationship, for, having no direct access to the Indies and no means of imposing its opinion on the party, the Comintern was forced to deal with the PKI through the Dutch Communists and the highly opinionated Indonesian party representatives abroad. Under these circumstances political significance

the lines of communication knotted into a political entanglement, the

snarled skeins of which were spun of national, factional, and personal differences within the

Communist

leaderships concerned.

The most extreme development

of the

program

of alliance with

revolutionary nationalism, which the Comintern followed from 1920

whereby a Communist party’s members entered a nationalist mass movement and worked to capture it from inside. The strategy was followed in two countries, Indonesia and China. The result in China has been widely discussed by both Communist and non-Communist historians, for this was the program that culminated disastrously in the defeat of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. The Indonesian bloc within has never really been considered as an aspect of international Communist policy, but it was in Indonesia that the strategy first developed and it was fitted to political conditions there and not in China. The course of the to 1927,

was the

so-called bloc within,

—unfolding Comintern—

Indonesian bloc within terference

by the

Chinese experience that

debated episode

Though

the

in this case

offers

may be

and contrasts

useful in evaluating that

in the history of

PKI was never

parallels

without effective

Communist

still

to

in-

the

warmly

strategy.

a large party in the colonial period,

its

Introduction place in the Indonesian politics of to

its

numerical

members, but

In 1924 the party

size.

at the

same time

greatest popular following of Its relations

its

all

it

day was out of itself

all

proportion

had barely one thousand

had by common concession the

the Indonesian political groupings.

with the other elements in the Indonesian opposition were

of long-standing

if

scarcely harmonious intimacy; the nature of these

connections and the attitudes of the non-Communist leaders toward

PKI

the

as

an

they reflected

and source of ideas are of interest because the organizational and ideological leanings of the

ally, rival,

Indonesian political

elite

—leanings

which, in several important re-

spects, are similar to those of the country’s leadership in the period

The PKI’s relations were not confined to the elite, however; much the same as the party today, it had no special appeal for the well-educated but drew its cadres from the ranks of since independence.

those

who found

cally

on the border between Indonesia’s traditional and modern

worlds.

Though

Javanese,

it

themselves socially, economically, and psychologi-

extended

religiously orthodox,

was urban,

core

its

its

and ethnically

appeal to Outer Islanders, merchants, the

members

peasants, in addition to

lower-class,

and

of the lesser aristocracy,

and wealthier

some places even in exclusion of Communist support. Frankly playing

in

more familiar sources of upon popular messianic traditions, it thus gathered a heterogeneous following whose only common characteristic was bitter discontent at the colonial status quo. In accomplishing this, the party sowed the

the seeds of too

its

much on

own

destruction, demonstrating the danger of relying

the anarchist element which

is

a part of

Communism’s

appeal: the price of the PKI’s popularity was the promise of revolution,

and

in the

end

it

found

itself

knew could not succeed. The PKI’s early career spanned

leading a rebellion

its

leaders

a fateful period in the development

Dutch colonial policy, for the outcome of which the party itself was in good measure responsible. At the beginning of the century the Ethical Policy, which stressed the promotion of Indonesian social, economic, and political progress, became the guiding philosophy of Indies government. The last aim was always the policy’s weakest, and with the rise of an Indonesian political opposition it was increasingly questioned by Ethicism’s numerous foes. The history of

which Indonesian Communism first developed is one conflict between those who were convinced that only a

of the era in of bitter

Introduction sympathetic approach to Indonesian political movements would en-

and those who feared political freedom was a Pandora’s box, the opening of which would result in revolution. It was a losing battle for the Ethici; scholars sure the healthy development of the colony

when

disagree on just

blow

the tide turned against them, but the final

was the Communist rebellion of 1926-1927, which ended Dutch efforts to compromise with the Indonesian opposition and so left the Indonesian parties no real middle road between revolution and disengagement from the problem of their cause received

is

clear:

it

achieving independence.

There

is

reason enough, then, to undertake a study of the early

PKI. The problem, however,

how

Anyone attempting to deal with the history of a Communist movement outside the USSR must decide whether to consider the party primarily as a component of a world movement or to view it as a part of the domestic political scene. In some cases the nature of the available materials or the course of the party’s history makes the choice a fairly simple one; in is

to

go about

it.

the case of the early PKI, however, the problem international

and

its

vexing. Both

is

its

domestic connections were important to the

party’s development; at the

same

time, the history of the

PKI provides

useful material for understanding both the Indonesian independence

My

movement and the colonial policy of the Comintern. tion, having come to the PKI by way of an interest Communism, was to focus chiefly on the party’s component

Comintern and

of the

only as a background for I

its

to deal

in the history of

character

as

a

with the domestic scene

relations with the Third International.

found, however, that the closeness of the party’s

environment,

initial inten-

when combined with

ties

to

its

local

the fact that these surroundings

have not yet been adequately studied, forced

me

either to gloss over

problems that were of cardinal importance for the party’s attitude

toward the world movement or domestic as to

its

to

devote as

international setting.

The

views the party in both environments and

is

much result

attention to is

a

work

its

that

directed at students of

Indonesian as well as Communist history. This has meant that

I

have

included some information which, though doubtless familiar to one

group of readers,

some problems to both. I this

is

needed by the other and that

does not

irritate

have discussed

germane to one set of interests but not to weave my account closely enough so that the reader; so far as I have not succeeded in

that are

have tried

I

xiv

Introduction

hope the advantage of having both presented in one work will outweigh the this, I

The paucity arose

made

Communist

sides of the

coin

drawbacks.

stylistic

of studies concerning the period in

limitation of the subject difficult, but

it

which the PKI provided a clear

choice in another matter. Although treatments based on conceptual

frameworks are often more stimulating than chronological accounts, it

seemed

me

to

would be more record of events. The

that at this stage the latter approach

would provide an easily accessible fact that the work is devoted to analysis and suggestion as much as to annals led me to the same conclusion. Communism, nationalism, and colonialism are subjects on which few people agree, and I felt the reader would accordingly be best served by an account that provided enough detail, arranged in a chronological and thus undirected framework, to enable him to interpret the events for himself. Since I am dealing with the PKI on several levels, I have not always been able to adhere to a presentation through time I have useful, as

it

—

—

—

deviated from tions with the

most notably

it

Comintern and

sources of support

—but

this

communicaorganization and social

in describing the party’s

in discussing

its

has remained the basic structure of the

study.

document my account closely. There are a number of points at which my version of events differs from that given in other histories, and heavy documentation is necessary if this is not to become just one more divergent source from which the bewildered reader must choose. Furthermore, although a comparatively rich amount of primary sources and contemporary accounts of the early PKI exist, not all the story could be pieced together from these, and it seemed to me important that the reader be Similar reasons

able to check

how

prompted me

close a source

the fact that an account

accuracy. writings

A

is

to

was

to the event

firsthand

it

described. Finally,

by no means guarantees

its

high degree of personal and partisan feeling colored the

and statements

of participants in the events described here;

even government intelligence reports

classified for internal

use and

dealing with matters observed firsthand were often heavily slanted

by

their compiler’s prejudice against or in favor of Indonesian political

activity.

Neither the Indies Dutch nor the Indonesian-language press

was noted

for

checking stories before printing them;

the

major

Indonesian papers, for that matter, functioned more as journals of

debate than of record and were not overly concerned with recounting xv

Introduction events. In consequence, widely differing presentations of facts

alone motives

— appear

in

contemporary sources on the events

which the PKI was involved. One way

the survival of the account in subsequent writings

by

in addition to

in the

many

in

is

to trace

—particularly those

that version. I have supplied later references

contemporary ones wherever cases

let

judge whether an event did

to

or did not take place as described in a firsthand account

of the side injured

—

where the

it

was possible

firsthand sources might

to

do

so,

be considered

skewed by bias. In an important sense, the sharp disagreement of contemporary sources on the early PKI is all to the good. It has not been necessary for me to rely to any great extent on the analytical techniques of what has become popularly known as Kremlinology: no lacquer of monolithic unity hid the splinters of debate in the early phase of the

Indonesian party. Not only was intraparty disagreement on major issues aired publicly, but the Indies tralized,

Communist

was decen-

with regional journals reflecting the thinking and the popular

approach of the provincial party leaders until

press

who

ran them. Moreover,

about 1924 the PKI was closely tied to the other components of

movement; it was not a closed group, and its various non-Communist observers were relatively well aware of what was going on within it. They themselves might be highly prejudiced in their views, but there was no firm division into pro- and the Indonesian national

anti-Communist

we

in Indonesian politics of the period;

contemporary outside accounts of the party’s

find

flecting a

wide range

of approaches to the subject

consequently, activities re-

and a correspond-

ingly rich store of analysis.

Differences in attitude toward the emergence of Indonesian nationalism similarly lent variety to the interpretations appearing in

government

reports.

Moreover, certain Dutch

officials

and scholars

added to their private libraries the classified documents, intelligence and police reports, and accounts by local administrators to which they were given access. Thus materials dealing with a broad spectrum of the party’s activities, which might otherwise have been lost or hidden away in archives, were available to me; and I am grateful to the Indonesian government for associated with the Indies government

granting

me

permission to use them.

The

existence of such materials,

along with those of government-sponsored sociological investigations into the

two major areas of

rebellion, a xvi

few important

bits of partv

— Introduction correspondence, advice and criticisms

—some very outspoken —by the

PKI’s advisers abroad, and the oral accounts of surviving party lead-

period

ers of the

and from many that separates

the party in visible

than

made

it

possible to consider the

PKI on many

levels

The result is that, in spite of the span of years the early PKI from a present-day observer, the nature of its first stage of development is in some ways more

its

angles.

present personality.

I

hope that

to revealing that character and, in

volume contributes

this

consequence, aids in our under-

standing a formative period in the development both of Indonesian

and

politics

of Asian

Communism.

Since the research for this study took place over a

many

a great I

am

number

individuals and institutions contributed to

particularly indebted to

its

of years,

realization.

George McT. Kahin, of Cornell Uni-

without whose encouragement and painstaking guidance the

versity,

work would never have reached completion. I should further express my thanks to Mario Einaudi and Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell,

who

advised

my

like to

also of

study of Marxist ideology and Asian revolu-

tionary history, and to Merle Fainsod, of Harvard,

who guided me

to

the study of Comintern colonial strategy. In the Netherlands, Professors

W.

F.

Wertheim and G.

time and advice; B. Coster II et Vrije

made

Woord, which he once

F. Pijper

were generous with

available to edited,

me

their

the surviving set of

and A. van Marie and James

Holmes made the vital contribution of first suggesting that I study the Indonesian Communist movement. In Indonesia I should particularly like to thank Semaun, Darsono, the late Alimin, and Djamaluddin Tamin all of whom were extremely patient and frank in answering my endless questions about the movement they once led as well as Mansur Bogok, who was most helpful in introducing me to these and later leaders of Indonesia’s revolutionary left. Finally, I wish to express my very great gratitude to those who were with me as graduate students in the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University; their companionship made study a pleasure, and their ideas and criticisms did much to discipline my work and broaden its apS

—

The major

part of

my

research was done in the following libraries,

the staffs of which were most helpful to me: in the United States,

New

York Public

at Stanford; in

the Nether-

the university libraries at Cornell and Harvard, Library, and

Hoover Memorial Library

lands, the libraries of the Royal Tropical Institute, the International xvii

Introduction Royal Library, the Documentation

Institute for Social History, the

Bureau

Law, the Ministry

for Overseas

for

Overseas Territories, and

the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography, and Ethnography; in

England, the British Library for Political and Social Sciences and the library of the Royal Institute for International Affairs; in the

USSR,

Moscow and the libraries of the Institute of Asian Peoples in Moscow and Leningrad; and in Indonesia, the library of the Museum at Djakarta. My study in them was made possible by the Lenin Library in

Cornell

University,

Modern Indonesia

its

Southeast Asia Program,

and the Cornell

which supported various phases

Project,

research at Cornell and in the Netherlands as well as

my

my

of

visits

to

England and the USSR; by the Ford Foundation, which granted

me

work

and the United States; by the Russian Research Center, a fellowship from which supported my work at Harvard; and by the Fels Foundation, which made possible the writing of the study. Needless to say, none of them is in any way responsible for the views presented fellowships

in the

for

in

Netherlands,

the

book.

Most introductions end no exception:

I shall

in a flurry of technicalities,

close with a note

on

spelling.

and the Dutch orthographies were revised in this

now

one

this

is

Both the Indonesian

after the period dealt

with

are thus spelled differently at different times. Recent

in Indonesian

erally use the

new

chosen to use in

it

and Dutch referring

to the earlier period gen-

rather than the original spelling of names. Because

the present spelling

change

and

volume. The names of people and organizations existing both

then and

works

Indonesia,

is

more akin

except in the

titles

Indonesian spelling

is

to

actual pronunciation,

of publications.

the substitution

I

have

The only significant of u for the Dutch-

derived oe. In Dutch, the major changes have been the dropping of

doubled vowels and the ch

in sch

wherever

their presence did not

affect pronunciation.

Ruth Ithaca June, 1965

XVtll

T.

McVey

I

Communists,

Socialists,

and the Colonies ONE

Comintern by

of the major tasks assigned the

Communism

create a role for

in that act of the

its

founders was to

Asian revolutionary

drama which was played out between the two world wars. In part, this concern for revolution in the East was a product of Russian proximity to the major Asian countries and the Soviet Union’s consequent desire to influence events in those lands. The International’s interest did not stop with Russia’s neighbors, however, for its efforts in Asia were only one part of an attempt developed areas

The East

—

this is

all

to

make

a place for

Communism

under-

in

over the world:

not only the oppressed Asian world.

The East

is

the whole

colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples not only of Asia, but also of Africa

and South America:

rests the

might of

in a

word,

all

that world on

whose

Europe and the United

capitalist society in

exploitation

States

1 .

This belief that the colonies played a vital role in shoring up the capitalist

system was not part of the original Marxian system: the

which the European revolutionary socialists were raised not only tended to ignore the colonial problem in general but also went tradition in

so far as to

deny that the Communists had a part

backward areas

of the world.

this,

destruction of capitalism through

absorbed the attention of the movement’s founders;

socialist revolution

and

The

to play in the

they held, could only take place in highly industrialized West-

ern Europe, where a massive proletarian class groaned under the rule of the bourgeoisie

2 .

ing holocaust, but their

nor the fuel for

would be consumed in the spreadpopulations would provide neither the spark

Other

societies

it.

The colonial question was thus peripheral in Marxian thought, and it was not until some years after his death that Marx’s followers began to 1

— Rise of Indonesian

Communism

reinterpret his system to allot the East a

more important

role.

The

was the unprecedented prosperity the capitalist nations enjoyed at the turn of the century. Marx had pictured Europe’s future as one of deepening economic crises and mounting proletarian misery. The capitalist states, however, became more prosperous than ever, and even more surprising to the revolutionaries the economic and social position of the working class distinctly improved. Marx was thus apparently wrong, and his system had to be either abandoned or reinterpreted to explain the new development. In response to this ideological crisis, the main body of continental socialists abandoned the belief that socialism could be gained only through revolution. The progress made thus far by organized labor showed, they held, that the proletariat could gain sufficient strength by parliamentary means to force the capitalists to accede to its demands and, eventually, to take over the government itself. This revision of Marx’s theory had tremendous implications for the socialists’ attitude cause of

this reappraisal

—

on international questions:

for

if

the proletariat did have a chance to

and eventually control the affairs of its country, it then followed that the working class had a stake in the nation’s welfare and participate in

that Marx’s dictum that the proletariat

had no fatherland was no

longer valid.

The consequences of this position were vividly illustrated in 1914, when the socialist parties of the great powers decided to back their governments in war; but the implications had also been evident some years before in the debate on the colonial question at a congress of the

Second

International held in Stuttgart in 1907. At that

(Socialist)

meeting, the majority of the delegates from the major powers sup-

ported a proposal to abandon the International’s previous policy of

condemning colonialism outright. They reasoned that possession of colonies was not an evil in itself, for the exploitation of underdeveloped areas brought prosperity to European workers and economic and political development to the colonies. 3 What should therefore be combated, the reformists held,

was the misuse

possession of colonies per

This

left

to

power and not the

4

the colonial question, so far as the Revisionists

cerned, where terest.

se.

of colonial

it

had been

They tended

for

to see the

Marx

—on the periphery of

problem

as

one on which

were con-

socialist in-

their stand

had

be determined on general humanitarian grounds rather than by the

Communists, immediate

interests

to support colonial

Socialists,

and the Colonies

and desires of the European working class. Indeed, independence frequently meant to oppose those in-

and desires, for such a stance offended nationalist feelings and alarmed those who thought that the loss of the colonies would bring poverty and unemployment to the metropolitan workers. When we terests

consider that the Revisionist leaders staked their hopes on parliamentary success

—and

thus on securing widespread popular support

why

can readily understand

they generally

—we

allowed the colonial

question to rest as a side issue in their party platforms and

why

they

placed far more emphasis on reform in the colonial governments than

on speedy independence for the colonies.

The

Revisionist proposal

combination of

was defeated

socialist delegates

at the 1907 congress

from the

lesser noncolonial

by

a

powers

and representatives of the second major stream of Marxist thought, the Left or Orthodox socialists. This was the ideological faction to which Lenin belonged and which, after much splitting, was to form the core of the Third

(Communist)

held that the reason

been

fulfilled

was

why

International.

radical group generally

Marx’s prophecy of capitalist

into less developed parts

of theories

by expanding of the world: in other words, by imperialism. on the imperialist phenomenon were develits

lease on life

oped by the radical Marxists, but the most important that set

forth

for our purposes

by Lenin. The Russian revolutionary

capitalism, because of sults in

had not

crisis

that the capitalist system in the industrially devel-

oped Western countries had renewed

A number

The

its

is

asserted that

anarchic, competitive nature, necessarily re-

overproduction of goods and capital. The capitalist nations are

forced to take up an imperialist policy in an effort to find

new

areas for

and to ensure that a sufficient area will be available to them, the capitalist powers reserve underdeveloped areas by placing them under colonial rule. The state is thus used by capitalist interests capital investment;

to further their expansionist policies,

hitherto a progressive force,

is

and

in this process nationalism,

twisted into an imperialist weapon.

During the imperialist period, the upper levels of the working class the metropoles may enjoy some small share of the colonial profits;

in in

return for this, they tend to identify with their “national interests” rather than with the interests of the proletariat as a whole.

When,

however, the division of the world among the great imperial powers has been completed, there will be increasingly savage wars among the 3

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

master nations for control of subject areas; these conflicts will force

such great

upon the workers

sacrifices

that they will eventually revolt

and bring down the capitalist system. As I have stated, this theory was developed in response to the situation in Western Europe rather than in Asia. In explaining capitalist prosperity, however, it succeeded in bringing the colonial question from the outskirts of Marxist thought to

stage

depends for

capitalism

developed regions, politan

it

its

very center: for existence

if

in its imperialist

on dominating under-

follows that removing those areas from metro-

would mortally

control

its

injure

the

capitalist

Dur-

system.

Communists never came to the extreme conclusion that could be drawn from Lenin’s theory that is, that the colonial areas, as the “soft underbelly of capitalism,” were actually a more important arena of revolution than was industrial Europe. The doctrine did, however, keep the Comintern from viewing the colonial issue simply as a side line to the revolutionary campaign ing the existence of the Comintern, the

—

in Europe.

Although the requirements of Russian foreign policy would,

of themselves, have forced a considerable

awakening of expressed first

Asia,

itself as

two decades

Communist

we may doubt whether consistently

after the

this

interest in the

concern would have

and uncompromisingly

October Revolution, had

it

as

it

did in the

not been for this

ideological incentive.

Lenin did not publish

his full theoretical analysis of imperialism until

1917, but the divergence

the subject

and, as

we have

congress. 5 sky,

had been

between the right and

left socialist

views on

clearly apparent since the turn of the century

seen, led to a major dispute at the 1907 Stuttgart

The debate

in that

advocating retention of

assembly was dominated by Karl Kaut-

socialist anticolonial

views on behalf of the

and the Dutch representative, H. van Kol, who urged adoption of a resolution which had been proposed by the Revisionistdominated colonial commission of the congress and which provided as Orthodox

left,

follows:

The congress

affirms that the usefulness of colonial policy in general,

especially for the working class,

is

strongly exaggerated.

not reject every colonial policy on principle and for socialist

regime

it

Van Kol was

could have a civilizing

all

However,

it

and does

time, since under a

effect. 6

the principal colonial expert of the Netherlands Social

Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP); he prided himself on the 4

practi-

Communists, cal

view of

Socialists,

affairs that ten years'

and the Colonies

experience in the Dutch parliament

had given him, and he let Kautsky know plainly that his advocacy of economic and technical assistance instead of socialist colonialism was sheer folly:

Today we have heard once again the old wives’ tale of colonial oppression, which has become boring enough for a congress of socialists. We in Holland have the right and the duty to impart our experiences to the comrades of the other countries. We Dutch socialists have won for ourselves .

helpless victims of the natives.

.

we Europeans go [to underwith tools and machinery, we would be the Therefore we must come with weapons in our

the confidence of millions of Javanese.

developed areas] armed only

.

...

If

7

hands, even

if

“We have

achieved significant advantages for our Dutch colonies

through our

Kautsky

calls this

imperialism

.

Van Kol

socialist action in Parliament,”

he assured the other

declared,

and

they would not be thanked for

socialists that

a persistently negative attitude toward colonialism: “If you wish to

achieve for yourselves the confidence of the natives, you too must take an active part in colonial affairs.” As for Kautsky

proposals — of disinterested economic assistance “Booklearning! And he wants a country that way!” — the portly Hollander conjectured that s

to

civilize

“the natives might destroy our machines: they might in

which case (stroking

ence over Kautsky.”

8

his

When

stomach)

I

fear

I

kill

or even eat us,

would be given

prefer-

the congress finally formulated a resolution

Orthodox and Revisionist views, the Dutch delegation was the only one to object, abstaining from the final vote on the that satisfied both

grounds that the compromise did not tive aspects of colonialism

Van

acknowledge the

posi-

9 .

attitude reflected the

Kol’s

sufficiently

main stream

of

thought in the

Dutch socialist party, which was one of the most conservative members of the Second International. To the SDAP leaders, civilization was equivalent to Westernization, and socialism could be accomplished only by fully developed capitalist societies: “The leap from barbarism to socialism is impossible.” 10 The advanced countries must therefore visit civilization on the less fortunate areas, whether they liked it or not; and they must encourage indigenous private enterprise in the colonies, for only with the development of nativeowned heavy industry could the civilizing process be considered accomplished and the transfer to independence and socialism be contemplated

11 .

5

Rise of Indonesian In later years, the

SDAP

Communism

gradually modified

its

views on the benefits

of colonialism

and the economic prerequisites

nonetheless

maintained a very moderate attitude, within the main

it

for

independence, but

stream of liberal nonsocialist Dutch thought on colonial party’s interest in the

whole subject was peripheral,

Revisionist group, basing electoral success,

pletely

it

its

all

concentrated

true before

The

for as a primarily

hopes on labor union organization and its

and interests almost comthe Dutch working class 12 This

efforts

on the immediate concerns of

was above

affairs.

World War

.

I,

when Van Kol was

virtually

the only socialist leader to take a real interest in the colonial question.

Yet

it

was

in this period,

and from

the seeds of revolutionary Leninist

this

conservative movement, that

Marxism were planted

6

in Indonesia.

II

Birth of the

Revolutionary IN 1913

Movement

Dutch-owned sugar company

a

untoward course of recent events

in Java

was moved by the

in that island to publish the following

notice in several Indies newspapers under the candid

title

of “Ter-

rified”:

Required, with an eye to the rising unrest Java, a capable

management

N ethcrlands-Indies

among

the native populace in

military officer, willing to advise the

of several large enterprises concerning the preparation of their

installations against attack. 1

The advertisement reflected all too well the state of nerves then prevailing among many Indies Netherlanders, who were convinced that the specter of revolution

was

stalking Java.

Echoes of

alarm

their

spread to Europe, where the exiled Lenin was cheered by

new

this

threat to imperialist rule: It is

by the popular masses of Java, among an Islamic nationalist movement. Second, by an intelbeing by the development of capitalism. It consists of

being carried forward,

whom

there has risen

ligentsia

brought into

Europeans acclimatized

first,

in the

colony

who demand independence

for the

Dutch Indies. Third, by the fairly large Chinese population in Java and the other islands, which brought over the revolutionary movement in China.

.

.

.

The amazing speed with which is

the parties and unions are being founded

one of the typical developments of the prerevolutionary period.

The workers tion this

of the

advanced countries follow with

interest

powerful growth of the liberation movement,

in

all

.

.

.

and

inspira-

its

various

forms, in every part of the world. 2

The cause of this disturbance was the emergence of the first mass political movement in Indonesia, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). 7

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Commercial Union Sarekat Dagang Islam in Surakarta (Solo), capital of one of the two remaining princely territories of Java. Its original purpose was to protect the interests of Javanese batik merchants from increasing

The

had been founded

SI

at the

end of 1911

as the Islamic

—

—

competition by Indies Chinese traders; however,

it

swiftly caught the

popular imagination and emerged as something far broader than a merchants’ protective group. In 1912 the association was reorganized

under the leadership of commercial portion of

Umar

its

Said Tjokroaminoto and, dropping the

name,

set itself

economic progress of the Indonesian Solo,

it

moved

very rapidly

it

its

up

to

promote the

social

and

common man. Banished from

headquarters to Surabaja, the capital of East Java;

gained adherents throughout the island, and by 1913,

though nebulous

in discipline

and purpose,

it

was

clearly a force to

be

seriously reckoned with. 3

The Sarekat Islam

arose at a time of considerable ferment in Java-

The

was already beginning to feel the burden of overpopulation: in many areas there was very little unused arable land, and peasant holdings were being divided into smaller and smaller portions in order to take care of the growing number of cultivators. Villagers became increasingly dependent on work provided by plantations, on sharecropping arrangements, or on finding work in the towns. This process was accompanied by a gradual impoverishment, which had become sufficiently marked by the turn of the century to bring about a major revision in the Dutch colonial program. The Ethical Policy adopted at this time aimed both at improving the social and economic lot of the Indonesians and at preparing them to associate with Europeans in governing the colony. Its immediate result was a considerable increase in the visible participation of the colonial government in Indonesian affairs. Hitherto the Dutch had relied heavily on indirect rule via the traditional Indonesian nese social, economic, and religious

life.

island

under the Ethical Policy, however, the European administration was greatly expanded, technical services were added, and Western authorities began to play a direct role even at the local social

structure;

development inevitably produced in the population a heightened awareness of the European presence: moreover, it fur-

level.

This

thered the decline of traditional authority, both indirectly and as the deliberate product of the governments efforts at social administrative modernization.

In the

same period the European economic 8

role in the Indies

was

Birth of the Revolutionary

Movement

expanding rapidly, creating a marked dichotomy between modern and

economy. This contrast was most evident in East and Central Java, which was both the heartland of Javanese high culture and the area where Western enterprise and government were traditional sectors of the

penetrating most deeply. Plantation agriculture was well established there;

was devoted primarily

it

panded rapidly

to the production of sugar,

after the turn of the century

which

and was Indonesia’s

cipal export crop prior to the Great Depression.

The sugar

ex-

prin-

plantations

shared the irrigated lowlands with the rice-cultivating peasantry. The estates

owned no land themselves but

rounding the sugar

mills,

leased

it

from the villages

rotating their portion with

sur-

every cane-

growing season. The traditional and modern economic sectors were thus closely interlocked; the sugar-growing areas, already centers of dense

became increasingly crowded as people from neighboring areas moved in to seek work on the plantations, while the local peasantry, in chronic need of cash to pay taxes and debts, was inclined to lease out more land than it could part with and still remain selfrural population,

sufficient

The

4 .

great burden of population on the land and the dependence of

the peasantry on

its

powerful plantation partner provided ample op-

portunity for friction and abuse, and the Ethical colonial government

new

aimed at controlling peasant-planter relations and developing the economy of the area. The benefits of its policy were not always apparent to the people, but the burdens were. Improvements in roads and irrigation works meant more introduced a host of

regulations

and

taxation in labor for their maintenance,

services

and the general increase

in

meant greater taxation in perennially scarce cash. The traditional sources of rural leadership seemed incapable of mediating between the villagers and the impinging outside world: they appeared helpless in the face of superior European power, too closely government

activity

identified with the colonial

government and/or plantations, or simply

and requirements imposed on the villagers. As a result, people began to look beyond the traditional authorities for representation and leadership, and the Sarekat Islam seemed to them a promising alternative. Having unable

to

master

the

proliferating

regulations

begun among the urban commercial class, it spread rapidly to the poorer population of the towns and then began to acquire a considerable rural following. The swiftly multiplying outposts of the SI took on the aspect of complaint bureaus, to which a vast and varied number 9

— Rise of Indonesian of grievances

were presented

Communism

in the' hope of redress;

and Tjokroaminoto

was acclaimed by many as the Ratu Adil, the Prince of Righteousness promised by tradition to lead the people in their hour of need. The speed of the Sarekat Islam’s expansion and its attraction for the uneducated peasantry in itself caused considerable European concern. It was feared that, by assuming the function of popular spokesman, the SI would cut through the established channels of authority and drive a dangerous wedge between the administration and the people. The adand the disorganized and sometimes disorerly character of the association seemed potentially explosive factors, and even those who sympathized with the Indonesian popular awakening felt that it would be necessary to check the movement’s growth. A less immediate but ultimately more alarming prospect was the ulation of Tjokroaminoto

religious identification of the SI.

indirect rule

The Dutch had

on the pre-Islamic customary

(

built their

system of

adat ) structure, supporting

where necessary against the claims of Islamic rivals for popular leadership, and in general tended to discount the strength of the Muslim religion in the archipelago. However, the recently ended Atjeh War had illustrated the folly of neglecting Islam as a focal point of leadership, and the emergence of Pan-Islamism as a dynamic force in Asia, combined with the recent revival of religious energy in Java under the it

impact of modernist Islamic teachings, made the creation of a giously based resistance

movement seem

all

too possible. In the ab-

sence of the concept of an Indonesian nation generally lacking

among

reli-

—and

this

idea was

the peoples of the archipelago at the time

Islam appeared to be the most likely source of unity against foreign rule;

and

selves to

in their early dealings

be painfully aware of

The Sarekat faith,

this fact.

Islam’s followers

were united by

tiieir

profession of

but they were not agreed on their interpretation of religion or on

the role

many

with the SI the Dutch showed them-

it

should play in the

santri, strict

Si’s activities.

Muslims who wished

The movement

to see

it

attracted

promote either the

modernist religious interpretations that were becoming popular among the urban commercial groups or the older forms considered orthodox in

abangan Javanese, whose Muslim faith was mixed with a considerable portion of pre-Islamic beliefs and who opposed the religious purism of the santri. It drew some of its the countryside;

it

backing from lesser

also included

prijaji

(gentry)

who

objected to the rigid conserv-

atism of the Indonesian regents or the princely regime in Surakarta; at

10

Birth of the Revolutionary

Movement

same time it acquired support from traditionalists who opposed the program of Westernization put forth by Budi Utomo, a cautiously progressive movement that had been founded by younger Javanese prijaji in 1908. In short, the SI was extremely heterogeneous in composition; it expressed the malaise felt by a society undergoing profound change, and the very vagueness of its organization and aims allowed it to include those whose dissatisfaction took contradictory forms. This the

made it most difficult for the Sarekat Islam’s leaders to movement and for the authorities to evolve a coherent

varied following

channel the

policy toward restlessness,

it.

Moreover,

once collected

against foreign rule

—the

both modernizers and

it

posed the danger that such generalized

in a single organization,

might be turned

one obvious element that could appear

traditionalists, santri

to

and ahangan, Javanese and

non-Javanese as the cause of their frustrations. 5

To

the great majority of Europeans resident in the Indies, the Sare-

kat Islam presented a disruptive force that the government could not

The number

Dutch inhabitants

had been increasing rapidly since the end of the nineteenth century; most of the newcomers viewed the archipelago as a temporary abode and had afford to tolerate.

little

of

of the colony

interest in Ethical experiments with native progress, particularly

when

this

seemed

own

to threaten their

Binnenlands Bestuur, the European

and dominated the

prijaji - run

civil

securitv. J

The

officials of

the

administration that paralleled

Indonesian bureaucracy, were over-

whelmingly against tolerating the

SI.

They pointed out

that the Ethical

was predicated on the assumption that the loosening of traditional ties, the spread of education, and the encouragement of an Indonesian awakening would result in a gradual evolution in friendly apprenticeship to the Dutch. This, they asserted, was dangerously unrealistic; instead, the Indonesian people would pass from domination by custom to domination by demagogues. They must therefore be kept Policy

as long as possible in the bottle of traditionalism, for

once they

caped, they would inevitably do so as a revolutionary force.

vainly sought recognition from

him

was

ban the (Indies Party), which had

Governor General Idenburg’s duty, the conservatives held, Sarekat Islam as he had the Indische Partij

It

es-

to

in 1912.

Idenburg, however, saw the SI as something very different from the Indische

That organization had had frankly revolutionary

incli-

had been oriented toward the Eurasian population and thus could not be

nations, clearly

Partij.

whereas the SI showed no disloyalty; moreover,

11

it

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

however, appeared to represent a step toward the popular awakening that was a goal of the Ethical Policy: “We must therefore rejoice over it, even if we find this somewhat difficult. We wanted this at least we said we did and have encouraged it through our education.” 6 The considered to represent Indonesian opinion.

The Sarekat

Islam,

—

—

movement, he considered, could serve the useful purpose of opposing arbitrary action by employers, plantations, and government officials; its “complaint bureau” function might prove useful as an escape valve for popular frustrations

weakened

and

as

an indicator of local grievances.

traditional authority

by bypassing

it,

this,

If

the SI

he held, was be-

cause that authority was no longer able to represent and guide the people; such popular

replace

movements

to

therefore took a sympathetic attitude toward

new movement, but although

ister of

might help

7

it.

The Governor General the

as the Sarekat Islam

his stand

was supported by the Min-

Colonies and the Dutch parliament

among most mistake. 8

To them,

Wild rumors

was opening

SI stood for Salah Idenburg

—Idenburg’s

felt

of native conspiracy

was being organized by the

aroused great alarm

the government

of the Indies Dutch,

the door to chaos.

who

it

SI;

were

circulated: a revolt

Surakarta royalty was secretly behind

were putting pressure on plantation workers to join the movement; the Indonesian railway workers were organized to cut off communications when the time came to revolt. For some months a mood close to panic prevailed among the Indies Dutch; the rebellion; the native police

nearly

sugar estates took precautionary measures against attack, and

all

some established arsenals. 9 Idenburg was by no means insensitive to the fears of the Indies Europeans; moreover, he was himself seriously disturbed by the Si’s rapid and undisciplined growth. Consequently, when the sugar estate operators sent a deputation to express their concern about the Sarekat

was able to assure them that he did not allow the movement to expand unchecked. On June 30, 1913,

Islam, the Governor General

intend to

he informed the SI leaders that he could not recognize the association on a centralized

and

basis, since

financial responsibility.

had yet to demonstrate organizational However, its local groups might continue it

and the central leadership could act as a contact such time as it proved itself ready to assume the responsibil-

to exist autonomously,

body ities

until

of control. 10

In the midst of the alarms and excursions surrounding the rise of

12

Birth of the Revolutionary the Sarekat Islam, a

young Dutch labor

Movement

leader, Hendricus Josephus

Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, arrived in the Indies.

He was

a gifted

and

ardent propagandist, a mystic whose search for salvation had begun

with Catholicism and ended with “the Richness, the Beauty, the Luster of the Social Democratic Religion. For social

understood, more than a political teaching.

It

democracy

brings with

rightly

is,

it

the heavy

burden of bearing witness, of sowing the seed of propaganda at all times and in all places.” 11 Sneevliet had come to the Indies simply to seek employment, but his sense of a revolutionary vocation inevitable that his major activity

would be the preaching

made

it

of his politi-

cal beliefs.

made him demanding

Sneevliet’s zeal cally incapable of

sure of his

own

compromise, but

at

and chronithe same time he was never so of his colleagues

interpretation of the socialist faith as to

from changes of denomination. In

this,

he followed

his

be immune

own

crises of

conscience rather than the exigencies of political self-interest.

mained ists

in the Revisionist

left

it

to

SDAP when

most of

his fellow radical

He

Marx-

form the SDP, precursor of the Communist Party

Holland. In 1912, however, he switched to the radical group reformists refused to back a dockworkers’ strike in

break with the moderates cost him

his job, for

up

re-

when

of

the

Amsterdam. This

to that point Snee-

had been chairman of the S DAP-controlled railway workers’ union (NVSTP). No other employment as a unionist was available, and since private industry showed little inclination to hire such a well-known firebrand, he decided to seek his fortune in the Indies. Before he left

vliet

Holland, however, Sneevliet experienced another change of heart: dis-

turbed at the SDP’s decision to run in the Dutch elections against the Revisionist party

—he

left it

—and thus,

in his estimation, to split the socialist vote

and rejoined the older group. During most

of his stay in

Indonesia Sneevliet was thus, in spite of his revolutionary

member

of the

moderate

SDAP

activities, a

and not of the proto-Communist

movement. 12 Fortunately for Sneevliet, educated Europeans were in considerable

demand

and

at that time in the Indies,

therefore no bar to employment.

Soerabajaasch Hanclelsblad

,

He

first

his political

background was

joined the editorial staff of the

the principal newspaper of East Java

and the voice of the powerful Sugar Syndicate. Shortly thereafter a fellow socialist, D. M. G. Koch, left his job as secretary of the Semarang Handelsvereniging (Commercial Association) and got Sneevliet 13

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

appointed his successor. The move to the Central Javanese capital was politically propitious, for

was the

Semarang, a rapidly expanding urban center,

seat of such radical activity as the Indies then possessed.

The

atmosphere of the town was considerably more

liberal than that of the

other major Javanese

was a center

pean commercial

cities, in

interests that

part because

hoped

to

it

for Euro-

develop an internal market in

Java and thus looked favorably on the Ethical Policy’s goal of raising the Indonesian standard of living. 13 It

was these

houses, banks, and manufacturing establishments vliet’s

employers, and

were extremely

initially their relations

cordial. Sneevliet did

capitalism during his working hours,

no objection

interests

—that

with their

—import

were Snee-

new

secretary

an excellent job of promoting

and the Handelsvereniging made

to his extracurricular efforts

on behalf of socialism.

asked that he not set about actually organizing a revolution; but

It

only

this

is

what Sneevliet proceeded to do. 14 Semarang was the headquarters of the Indonesian railroad workers’ union (VSTP), an organization in which Sneevliet took a natural interest because of his former association with its Dutch equiv-

The VSTP was one of the oldest Indonesian labor unions, founded some five years previously; it was also progressive for its time, welcoming both skilled Dutch and Indonesian members into its ranks. 15 Within a year of his arrival in Semarang, Sneevliet had succeeded in moving the union along more radical lines, shifting its conalent.

cern toward improving the lot of the unskilled and impoverished

Indonesian workers. 16 Early in 1914 Sneevliet added to his full-time job in the capitalist

world the task of editing the VSTP’s newspaper,

De

Volharding (Per-

same time he busied himself learning Indonesian and Javanese in order to communicate his beliefs to the local population. 17 This was not enough, however, to satisfy his desire to spread the socialist faith: real work, he felt, could only be accomplished through sistence); at the

the organized efforts of ingly,

on

on

May

his initiative a 9,

all

the socialists already in the Indies. Accord-

group of

sixty social

democrats met

1914, to found the Indies Social

in

Surabaja

Democratic Association

(Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging; ISDV). 18

The ISDV was one day but

its first

to

become

Communist Party, was either Indone-

the Indonesian

meeting gave doubtful evidence that

it

Communist. Nearly all those present were Dutch, and the few Eurasians and Indonesians who attended remained in the background.

sian or

14

Birth of the Revolutionary

Movement

members belonged to the SDAP and not to its more radical rival. 19 Nearly all had become socialists while in the Netherlands and had come to Indonesia as fairly recent immigrants. Most

of the charter

Their reactions to the totally unfamiliar social conditions in the colony

some abandoned Marxism

differed sharply:

was

so far as Indonesia

concerned, advocating Ethical gradualism as the only practical ap-

proach

to so

backward a

society; others, stung

by the grave

injustices

of the colonial system, insisted on the applicability of revolutionary

principles regardless of the country’s stage of development. 20 This latter

group was the more powerful one, and

ence of petus of

The

the adher-

members to the moderate group in Europe, the main imthe ISDV was toward the extreme left. This was of considera-

its

ble importance at at the

so, in spite of

its first

very start over

tire

wished

rightists

meeting, for the moderates and radicals question of the organization’s function.

to see

the association

exchanging ideas among the European fact-finding

bureau for the

not think

would be appropriate

it

nesian political

life

split

itself,

socialists in

first

center for

and a the Dutch parliament. They did socialists in the Indies

for the

in the

become a

ISDV

to participate in Indo-

place because the association

members had

neither a sufficient knowledge of Indonesian society nor

the necessary

command

of the local languages to have an influence

on

native politics. Moreover, they held the evolutionary theory that social-

ism was meaningful only in countries with a well-developed industrial proletariat; in precapitalist Indonesia, they considered, socialist agita-

tion

would be

at best useless

and would

at

worst lend support to

ir-

responsible revolutionary elements in the Indonesian political world. 21

Those socialists who shared Sneevliet’s viewpoint saw the ISDV’s main task as propagating socialist principles in the Indies; they thought socialism could play a direct role in colonial areas, particularly

by

encouraging revolutionary anti-imperialism. After a heated debate the radical majority tion

was

had

its

way, and

it

was declared

that the party’s func-

to unite the Indies socialists, to inform the social democratic

Dutch parliament of conditions in the Indies, and to spread socialist propaganda throughout the land. Now it was all very well to elect for participation in Indonesian politics; it was another thing to find a means of doing so effectively. The ISDV, though it included nearly all the socialists then in the Indies, was hardly an imposing organization: in 1915 it had only 85 members and a year later 134. 22 It had neither funds, nor influence, faction in the

15

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

nor a program comprehensible to the mass of the Indonesian popula-

and the moderate socialists had been perfectly right in pointing out the drawbacks inherent in an organization composed almost entirely of Netherlanders. If the party was to be effective at all, therefore, it seemed imperative that it seek an alliance with a larger movement that would act as a bridge to the Indonesian masses. For a time the ISDV made no move in this direction, partly because the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent collapse of the Second International brought the Indies socialists into a temporary state of ideological shock. 23 For the first year or so of its existence, the ISDV restricted itself to theoretical discussions of the colonial problem and to collecting money for the socialist election effort in the Netherlands. 24 Indeed, at its 1915 congress there was a strong move to allot the bulk of the party’s income to the movement in Holland, and only after the congress were Sneevliet and his associates able to defeat tion;

it.

The party did attempt to increase its influence by establishing a newspaper, Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word), the first issue of which appeared in October 1915. 25 The paper was published in Dutch, which severely limited its circulation among Indonesians it was nearly two years before the party established an Indonesian journal but Het

—

—

Woord

Vrije

did provide a public platform from which the

ISDV

could

view. This proved to the party’s great advantage in 1916,

express

its

when

secured the admiration of radically inclined Indonesians by

it

stand on two issues which were then creating a considerable the politically conscious public.

article critical of the

Vrije

Woord

among

the arrest of a leading Indo-

Mas Marco Kartodikromo, who had published an

nesian journalist,

I let

One was

stir

its

,

government attitude toward the Sarekat Islam;

like

most of the Indonesian-language

strong stand on Marco’s side.

The second

(Arm

to establish

the Indies)

campaign

Dutch command. Originally the

26

press, took a

was the Indie Weerbar an Indonesian militia under

issue

project of Netherlanders

who

feared a

Japanese or Australian (English) move on the archipelago during

World War

I,

it

achieved surprising popularity

number

whom saw

among

the politically

means of persuading the Dutch to broaden their political rights. Het Vrije Woord campaigned against the scheme on the grounds that it would serve militarist and imperialist ends, and its objections were shared by those conscious Indonesians, a

of

16

it

as a

Birth of the Revolutionary

who were

Indonesians

skeptical of the government’s willingness to

reward cooperation with

political concessions.

The Indonesians who approved have directed of

of the newspaper’s position should

virtually the organ of centrist,

wing of the ISDV, for in spite a whole Het Vrije Woord was

their admiration to the left

claims to represent the party as

its

Movement

revolutionary faction. Westerveld, a plodding

its

found himself no match

for the

two

whom

agitators with

shared the editorial board, Sneevliet and Adolf Baars. The

he

latter, a

protege of Sneevliet, was the second most important of the Dutch founders of Indonesian neering school at Delft radicalism

—then

recent graduate of the engi-

considered a hotbed of Dutch student

—he was employed as a teacher in the government-run tech-

school

nical

Communism. A

Surabaja.

in

Like

Sneevliet,

he was an enthusiastic

had a considerable knowledge of Marxist theory, his desire for revolution sprang more from a romantic and unstable nature than from lifelong dedication to the socialist cause. The result, as we shall see, was that in times of emotional crisis his enthusiasm was likely to give way to blackest despair. 27 Baars was extremely active as an editor of Het Vrije Woord. Completely innocent of tact, he expressed himself continuously and vitriolically on its pages. His importance did not, however, lie in his accom-

revolutionary; but although he

plishments as a journalist or in his ability to alienate the moderates, but rather

in

his

work

of

establishing

contact

with

Indonesian

the

movements. Like Sneevliet, he was convinced of the need

among

the Indonesians; and he

direction, for of all the

most

fluent

was able

Europeans

in the

to agitate

to accomplish

more

ISDV he had

acquired the

in this

knowledge of the Javanese and Indonesian languages.

was Baars who

in

1917 established the

first

It

Indonesian-language social-

journal. 28

The paper, Soeara Merdika (The Free Voice), ceased publication after little more than a year; but Baars, undiscouraged by its failure, came forth in March 1918 with a new Indonesian-language ist

organ, Soeara Ra’jat (The People’s Voice), 29 which was one day to

become

the theoretical journal of the Indonesian

Communist

Baars was also responsible for the establishment of the

first

Party.

Indone-

sian socialist group, a Surabaja-based organization that called itself

Sama Rata Hindia Bergerak (The Indies on the March toward Equality). The association was not a large one in 1917, when it was founded, it had 120 members 30 but even so it was nearly the size of

—

—

17

Rise of Indonesian the

ISDV, and

it

Communism

placed before the older organization a question of

considerable potential importance:

Would

it

be better to merge the

Sama Rata movement with the main body of the ISDV on the principle that the socialist movement should not split on national or ethnic lines, or should the new organization be used to contain the socialists’ Indonesian mass following? This question was pondered for some time by the ISDV;

31

no clear decision was made, but after about a year Sama

Rata was quietly allowed

to expire.

One of the reasons no further action was taken on the Sama Rata movement was that the ISDV leaders had in the meantime established contacts with already existing Indonesian organizations that foreshad-

owed

a completely different relationship between the socialist party

and the mass movement. In population, they arrived

their search for a bridge to the Indonesian

first

at

an alliance with Insulinde, which was

then the most radical and politically well developed of the non-

European organizations. The movement, which had been founded

in

much

of

1907 as a nonpolitical, Eurasian-oriented association, inherited the

membership and character

of the Indische Partij after that ill-fated

party’s dissolution in 1913. Its radicalism derived largely

from the

so-

by the Eurasian group from the increasingly exclusive European community and the economic threat of the growing number of educated Indonesians, who were paid a lower wage scale and thus were cheaper to hire than Eurasians. Insulinde’s leaders sought to overcome this disadvantage by forming an alliance between Eurasians and educated Indonesians to secure rights equal to those of the European population. To this end they promoted an “Indies nationalism’' aimed at creating a sense of common identity based on residence in the cial rejection felt

Indies rather than ethnic origin.

The

leaders of this

in their

campaign

socialists

had

movement had sought

the support of the

SDAP

to gain legal recognition for the Indische Partij; the

listened sympathetically, but this did not prevent the

banning of the party or the banishment of

Douwes Dekker (Setiabuddhi),

Tjipto

Surjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantoro)

—

its

principal heads

—E. F. E.

Mangunkusumo, and Suwardi for

engaging

in rebellious ac-

The exiled leaders went to Holland, where they were taken up by members of the SDAP who objected to the government’s abrogation of their civil rights. At the outset, therefore, there was a basis for

tivity.

cooperation between Insulinde and the socialists in the Indies. Moreover, although the organization

was 18

largelv Eurasian,

it

did include

Birth of the Revolutionary

Movement

some prominent Javanese in its leadership, and in Semarang, which became its headquarters, it had a following among the urban Indonesian population. It was much larger than the ISDV, comprising some 6,000 members in 1917, and was extremely active; in addition, its Eurasian element made -it more akin culturally and linguistically to the socialist group than were the purely Indonesian movements. 32 In spite of these advantages, the alliance with Insulinde proved a

mistake almost immediately. For one thing, the Eurasian-oriented

movement was hardly a gateway to the Indonesian masses. Moreover, its socialist sympathy was admittedly opportunistic, for its leaders were openly interested in replacing the European ruling

elite

Eurasians and educated Javanese; they therefore had radical socialists’ emphasis

on the

with one of

little

use for the

and the plight of the

class struggle

who

had been greatly impressed by Insulinde leader Tjipto Mangunkusumo, 33 was soon attacking him for insufficient dedication to the proletarian cause, and Tjipto himself came to resent Sneevliet’s efforts to turn his party in a more radical direction. 34 Within a year the alliance was out. At its Indonesian workers and peasants. Sneevliet,

June 1916 congress the

ISDV

decided to break

cooperation and requested that party Insulinde cease participating in

it.

at first

off

members who

general political also

belonged to

35

Even before the entente with Insulinde collapsed, the ISDV revolutionaries began to look for more verdant political pastures. This time their attention was drawn to the Sarekat Islam, which by 1916 had hundreds of thousands of members and was far and away the giant among the Indonesian movements. Some Indonesian members of the ISDV had already become prominent in the Sarekat Islam, and both Sneevliet and Baars had addressed SI gatherings and stood well with the movement’s leaders. 36 Nonetheless, the revolutionary socialists hesitated to use this opportunity: the Islamic character of the SI

and

its

made even the most enthusiastic propowonder what the ISDV could hope to accomplish

very hazy political orientation nents of mass action

with

it.

The

increasing popularity of the Sarekat Islam persuaded

them, however, that of the Chartist

it

could perhaps be seen as an Indonesian version

movement and

therefore as a

fit

object for socialist

attention. 37 Consequently, Baars cautiously introduced the subject of a

new

We

partnership for the socialists: are quite well aware that this group, in spite of the fact that

view

is

completely inimical to the

socialist

19

one and

is

much more

its

world

receptive

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

means great progress in the native world, if only insofar as it brings people to self-awareness and independent thought. However, the experiences we have had with Insulinde will prevent us from attempting to do missionary work in those circles which are necessarily closed to our to bourgeois ideals,

propaganda. 38 Baars’

comment had

its

immediate inspiration

in the

SFs

first

national

which was held in Surabaja in June 1916. The meeting did not show an overwhelming desire for alliance with the ISDV, since its chairman cut off the speech of the socialist spokesman Semaun after congress,

39

only five minutes;

At

its

but

it

did show a growing antigovernment feeling.

founding convention three years before, the Sarekat Islam had

Dutch regime; now it cautiously began to raise the question of self-government. The congress criticized the administration’s agrarian policy and considered promoting a labor movement. Moreover, it brought up the subject of amalgamating Islamic and socialist principles, an idea that was backed not only by the young radicals already attracted to the ISDV but also unconditionally proclaimed

among

its

loyalty to the

leading representatives of the urban santri merchant class.

was already becoming a word that meant, very roughly, opposition to foreign domination and support of a modern, prosperous, and independent Indonesia. 40 At the 1916 congress the revolutionary cloud on the SI horizon was "Socialism”

still

exceedingly small; but within a year

it

threatened the original

movement. This sharp upsurge in the radical of the Sarekat Islam reflected in good part the hardships and

leadership’s control of the spirit

uncertainties that

World War

progressed, isolating

was imposing on the Indies. As the war the colony and restricting shipping, prices rose I

steeply, accentuating the decline in Indonesian real income, a decline

that

began

in 1914

The unfortunate

and continued

until 1924. 41

effects of the

war added

greatly to the doubts of

the Indonesian intelligentsia about the blessings of a foreign-controlled capitalist

economy.

scious of

its

It also

made

the general populace increasingly con-

disadvantaged position. This was particularly the case

the sugar-growing areas of Java, where the peasantry

showed

in

consider-

able dissatisfaction with the rents they received for land leased

by the

had been bad, and with importation hindered by the wartime shipping shortage, the price of that staple began to soar. Pinched by the general inflation and well aware of the high

plantations. Rice harvests

price they could obtain for rice, the peasants felt increasingly the in-

20

Birth of the Revolutionary

Movement

adequacy of the amounts the plantations paid

fo lease irrigated land. 42

The prospects for ISDV influence over the Sarekat Islam, enhanced by this general discontent, were further aided by a structural peculiarity of the mass organization. The Sarekat Islam, it happened, was a body whose head was attached by the most insubstantial of necks. We will remember that in 1913 the Governor General had refused to charter the organization on a national basis. Each branch of the Sarekat Islam therefore enjoyed independent status, and the central leadership

was forced

to carry

on in the form of a coordinating board called the

movement nabut by that time its

Central Sarekat Islam (CSI). Idenburg recognized the

one of

tionally in 1916, in

his last acts of office;

was already set, and CSI authority over the branches remained extremely weak. As a result of this loose organization, a forceful local charter

leadership found

little

to prevent

from propagating

it

movement. might have done the ISDV very

its

ideas within

the rest of the

Even

this

little

good

if it

had had

to

seek an ordinary political alliance with the Sarekat Islam, for the socialist

organization was

on the question of political

most

still

its

small,

weak, largely European, and so divided

task in the Indies that

it

was unable

program. However, another structural condition

political

movements

in the Indies

—made

it

to publish a

—shared

by

possible for the rev-

olutionaries to function not only alongside the Sarekat Islam as representatives of their itself.

own

This was the practice of

parties at once, a

members of the SI holding membership in two or more

party but also within

it

as

custom which seems to have arisen because most

Indonesian movements had not begun as political parties per

The

and assembly in the Indies was of the Regeringsreglement (Government Regula-

right of political association

denied by Article tion),

se.

III

which had functioned

as the colony’s constitution since 1854.

Article 68c of the Decentralization tion for organizations

Law

of 1903

removed the prohibi-

and meetings exclusively intended for recomthe local and regional councils established by

mending members for this act. It was not until 1915 that the general right to political association and assembly was recognized, however, and not until three years later that its limits were defined by law. 43 Although the local councils established by the Decentralization Law contained elected members after 1908, suffrage was at first limited exclusively to those of European status; it was later extended to Indonesians, but only to a severelv restricted group. There was thus little reason for the Tndone21

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

sians to organize for electoral purposes before 1918:

even the Indies

Europeans seem

they showed no

to

have seen

little

need

to

do

so, for

notable interest in political party formation at this time.

This meant that the early Indonesian organizations were founded not as parties but as organizations to promote various social, cultural,

and economic their

interests; inevitably

they were politically oriented, since

concerns involved government policy and reflected attitudes

toward the colonial relationship, but they did not possess the exclusive character of political parties.

Membership

in

one group did not pre-

among the educated elite, it as many groups as promoted projpossible for members of the ISDV

clude membership in another; particularly

was common

for individuals to join

was thus Budi Utomo, Insulinde, or the Sarekat Islam

ects of interest to them. It

to belong to

casionally to

As we

—and

oc-

all four.

shall see, this peculiarity of early

Indonesian political struc-

was to inspire the Comintern’s “bloc within” strategy, whereby Communist party members entered a mass movement and worked to ture

seize control of

it

from within. In

dual membership was

its initial

less useful in

Indonesian phase, however,

bringing

ISDV members

into the

— the European revolutionaries did not become members of the Muslim organization — than bringing gifted young SI rad-

Sarekat Islam

44

icals into

the

ISDV and

in

guiding them in a revolutionary

socialist direc-

and Baars were very successful in this, and they soon gathered a coterie of young idealists who were troubled by opportunism and dishonesty in the CSI leadership -and who found an inspiring tion. Sneevliet

alternative in the

uncompromising

“scientific” idealism

preached by

their revolutionary mentors.

The most prominent figure in this early group of Indonesian Marxists was Semaun, who was the ISDV’s spokesman at the 1916 SI congress. Born near Surabaja, the son of a minor railroad

official

and himself a

was an early member of the Sarekat Islam, joining its Surabaja branch in 1914 and shortly thereafter becoming that chapter’s secretary. He soon became involved in union work in the railroads, which brought him notoriety as one of Indonesia’s first labor agitators; it also brought him in contact with Sneevliet, who was then beginning his work with the VSTP. Semaun admired the efforts of the European revolutionary on behalf of the Indonesian workers, and in 1915 he joined the ISDV; a year later he was vice-chairman of its Surabaja branch. Semaun was verv voung when he rose to prominence railroad employee, he

22

Birth of the Revolutionary in the revolutionary

movement;

in 1916,

Movement

when he

first

old. 45

he was seventeen years

Shortly after the Sarekat Islam congress of 1916 ferred

by

his

enters our story,

Semaun was

trans-

employers from Surabaja, the headquarters of the CSI, to

Semarang, the stamping ground of Sneevliet and the VSTP. The Central

Javanese capital already possessed a well-organized SI branch,

which was much under radical

and

talented

fiery

influence.

Semaun gave

the group a

spokesman; at the same time the young revolution-

was considerably enhanced by his association with this dynamic political machine. The Semarang SI expanded rapidly, claiming 1,700 members in 1916 and 20,000 a year later. 46

ary’s position in the SI

Almost immediately tion: its appeals,

it

developed into a

expressed in the newspaper Sinar

Hindia ), were directed primarily

more

radical

rival of the

demands

for social

at the

Surabaja organiza-

Djawa

(later Sinar

urban SI branches and stressed

and economic

justice

than were ex-

pressed by Tjokroaminoto’s Oetoesan Hindia , the unofficial organ of the CSI.

The Semarang cizing the

SI leadership devoted nearly as

CSI leadership

foreign capital.

as

it

much energy

to criti-

did to condemning the government and

Semaun attacked

the CSI’s planned participation in the

Volksraad, a consultative assembly being set up by the government as a first

step toward political representation,

Weerhar

and he

also led a

campaign

which had support from important leaders of the Surabaja organization. The struggle over Indie Weerhar greatly agitated Sarekat Islam circles, particularly when the CSI

against the Indie

elected to send one of

its

action,

members, Abdul Muis,

to the Netherlands as

part of a delegation to plead for an Indonesian militia.

The Semarang

CSI action, and shortly before the Sarekat Islam congress of 1917 it announced that it would offer a resolution against the Indie Weerhar effort. Incensed, the CSI informed the Semarang branch that unless the resolution was withdrawn, it would break off connections with that local. Semarang replied that if the central leadership did not behave, Semarang might very well start its own SI led the protest against the

SI center. 47

This

crisis

coincided with a threatened break between the Sarekat

The CSI had become increasingly upset at the dog-in-the-manger attitude taken by the ISDV, which in one breath Islam and the ISDV.

professed a burning desire to cooperate and in the next unmercifully criticized the

CSI

leaders.

The Muslims 23

finally

had enough when Baars

Rise of Indonesian

Communism on the tender

violently attacked the SI leaders in a public debate

subject of Indie

Weerbar 48 The CSI decided .

Islam congress of October 1917 that off.

49

The prospect

ment threw the socialists’

demand

all relations

at the Sarekat

with the

ISDV be

of losing their link with the Indonesian

radical leaders of the

Sneevliet, calling

to

on the SI heads

ISDV

cut

move-

into something of a panic.

to reconsider, assured

them

of the

upright intentions: “Personally oppose you? Dispute your

leadership over your organization?

—What nonsense.” But, chronically

incapable of compromise, he ended his appeal with an attack on the SI leadership as violent as any before. 50

As it turned out, the socialists need not have worried. At the congress it was apparent that Semarang had strong backing among the other SI branches, and Tjokroaminoto, whose instinct was to preserve unity at all costs, backed down. The proposals to deal with the ISDV and the Semarang SI were quietly buried, and although the congress did not adopt the radicals’ view on Indie Weerbar and the Volksraad, CSI spokesman Abdul Muis did take a long step in their direction by announcing that

if

parliamentary action should prove unfruitful, the

Sarekat Islam would not hesitate to revolt. Moreover, the congress

condemned

dom

“sinful”

— that

is,

foreign

—capitalism and

of political organization, radically

legislation,

and

demanded

free-

improved labor and agrarian

free public education. 51

The revolutionaries thus won their first round with the SI leadership in a game of bluff that was the pattern for relations between the two groups for the next few years. The upsurge of radical power continued, owing partly to good organization and propaganda work by Semarang and partly

to the increasing

big-city branches.

was the

importance the CSI

The major reason

itself

for this turning

attached to

its

toward the urban

was at best undependable. Although the movement’s claimed membership continued to rise steeply reaching a peak of two and one-half million in 1919 this increase was largely illusory. Membership was acquired with a low initiation fee; after that, contributions were appreciated but centers

realization of the SI leaders that their rural base

—

—

not required. As a result the those

who

lost interest.

rolls

recorded those

In consequence,

who

many branches

joined and not that flourished

on paper had simply faded out of existence in reality. This problem was most acute in the countryside, where, we will remember, the peasants looked to the movement to secure the redress of their grievances.

They

joined the SI in droves and

24

overwhelmed

its

Birth of the Revolutionary units with their

them

demands. However,

that the local SI leaders

it

Movement

very soon became apparent to

—who possessed

little

education or organ-

knowledge and who were usually regarded unfavorably by both European and native officials were no more able to secure satisfaction than were the traditional village leaders. Disappointed, the izational

—

rural SI adherents lost interest almost as rapidly as they joined.

The

ephemeral nature of the movement’s peasant membership was already becoming apparent during 1916, and this led the SI leaders to attach increasing importance to

more

better organized,

the urban branches,

to the left. 62

and further

active,

which were usually Semarang’s

was thus doubly alarming, and CSI 1917 and after were aimed not only at placat-

threat to start a rival SI center

concessions to the left in ing

Semaun and

urban loyalty as

The ISDV

but also at drawing to

his following

it

much

itself as

could.

radicals

were

jubilant at the results of the 1917 SI con-

gress:

We merely two days following

wish to point out that

of the congress, that it

will

have

economic needs of

its

to

has become clear, particularly in the

the SI leadership wishes to preserve

if

devote

its

it

had we not brought forth

alleviate their suffering. It has also

been

political puttering of the

a powerful push in the direction of this insight; this criticism,

had we,

in order to preserve our

“influence,” tagged along uncomplainingly behind that leadership

agitated in a “diplomatic” manner, the

obvious lesson

mass

greatest attention to the deeply felt

proved that our outspoken campaign against the central leadership gave

its

last

exploited masses and to the radical economic and

which alone can

social reforms

it

and only

CSI would never have learned

this

63 .

The ISDV had every reason

upswing in its fortunes, for it had recently undergone a crisis that had weakened it considerably but left it revolutionarily more pure. Only a few weeks before the party had been sundered by a final split between the moderate

and revolutionary

to rejoice in this

socialists.

A

breach between the two groups

had long been pending, and since March them had been extremely bitter.

The occasion 18,

sioned

article,

day

between

March disagreement had been the overthrow news of which reached Indonesia on the evening

of the

the Russian Tsar,

March

of that year relations

1917. Sneevliet immediately sat

down

to write

of of

an impas-

“Zegepraal” (Triumph), which appeared the following

in the Insulinde

paper

De

Indier. In

25

it,

he strongly hinted that

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

Dutch

would go the way of the Tsar if only the minds to it. The article horrified the socialist

rule in the Indies

Indonesians set their

moderates and, more important for colonial authorities.

its

general impact,

it

alarmed the

The government promptly took measures

cute Sneevliet and to suppress discussion of the uprising, serving to

make

to proseits

efforts

the Russian revolution a cause celebre in Indonesia.

Semarang executives of the ISDV and Insulinde asked official permission to hold an open meeting at which the revolution would be discussed; the request was Shortly after the

first

news

of the revolt, the

refused on the ground that not enough was yet to

form the basis

rang

ISDV was

known about

for objective discussion; a later petition

When

denied without explanation.

government permission

to

granted only on condition that invite Sneevliet to address

new branch

form a

it.

it

in

the event

by the Sema-

Insulinde asked

Bandung,

this

was

not discuss the Russian revolution or

In Surabaja an

ISDV

request to discuss

was refused because such a meeting would constitute “a gathering of political nature which would, in addi54 tion, form a threat to the public peace and order in this colony.” Sneevliet’s trial lent additional publicity to the March Revolution. The public prosecutor’s attempt to bring the socialist leader to trial was the Tsar’s overthrow publicly

denied by the Semarang courts; only

when

the case reached the Indies

Supreme Court was it decided the grounds were sufficient for prosecution. The trial took place in November; Sneevliet conducted his own defense, which consisted mainly of an impassioned anticolonial speech lasting nine hours 55 It won him both considerable publicity and an acquittal; the state was unable to reopen the case, though it appealed the decision up to the Supreme Court 56 .

.

Sneevliet, of course, enjoyed privileged civil status as a

nonetheless,

it

was generally

European;

characteristic of the colonial authorities to

exercise widely varying control over political expression. Authoritarian colonial attitudes

Dutch parliamenmuch a compromise between the

were mingled with the precepts

tary democracy; the result

was not

so

of

two as the inconsistent application of the one philosophy or the other, depending largely on which individual or branch of government decided the case. As a result, people were jailed for the mildest criticisms, while at the same time outspoken revolutionaries urged the overthrow

government with impunity. Since the reaction of the authorities criticism depended largely on their philosophv of colonial govern-

of the to

ment, the leeway for political expression was far greater in the major

26

Birth of the Revolutionary cities

—especially

moderate

in Ethically inclined

socialist

Movement

Semarang, which acquired a

—and

mayor, D. de Jongh, in 1916

urban radicals an edge

in

efforts

at

this

gave the

winning popularity through

boldness.

Though

won

had more difficulty in gaining acquittal from the ISDV moderates. The Batavia branch, which headed the gradualist wing of the party, published a Sneevliet

the government

trial

handily, he

declaration denouncing the revolutionary activity of the radicals: It

was Marx who,

in dealing

with revolutionary romanticists and half-bour-

geois anarchists, proclaimed that only at a certain

through organization and

political

education

is

economic phase and

—an

a fruitful action possible

which does not work with revolutionary phrases, but is directed at formulating demands which proceed directly and logically from the social needs of the community. ... It is the task of the Indies social democrats to teach this naive and easily aroused population to control itself though organization and discipline in the struggle for its goals. We social democrats ought not only to take the firmest possible stand against the rulers whenever they misuse their economic and political power, but also against those Euroaction

peans who, driven exclusively by political passion, hold the people back

from

their historical course of

development.

We

should also oppose those

who, ignoring the unity of the native population groups necessary for the achievement of national independence and freedom, drive a wedge into it through their so-called

socialist internationalism. 57

May, the Batavia leader Schotman repeated the Revisionist objections to promoting revolution and urged the ISDV to consider seriously the realities of its situation. As an organization, he pointed out, the party was small, isolated, and ineffective, lacking even a program to call its own; its only hope for a meaningful existence lay At the party congress

in affiliating

with the

in

SDAP

as

its

Indies branch.

Westerveld agreed with Schotman’s

by supporting

criticism,

The

centrists

under

but they feared to force

Dutch party. The revolutionaries made their standpoint quite clear: Semaun declared that if Schotman’s plans were accepted, he, among others, would resign; and Sneevliet bore his usual witness for the class struggle, for cooperation with the SI, and for mass revolutionary agitation. 58 Those hopelessly diverging viewpoints were reconciled by a compromise, the only visible purpose of which was to postpone the schism as long as possible. The congress determined that “premature resistance" should not be encouraged, and at the same time it pronounced that

a

crisis

with the

left

his

27

motion

to join the

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

was innocent

Sneevliet

engaging in such

of

Sneevliet’s acquittal, the left

coming Volksraad

approved

election. This

—and particularly

Semaun

ISDV

In return for

activity.

participation in the forth-

agreement did not prevent the radicals

—from

going right ahead with their cam-

paign against the Volksraad. Moreover, the continuing

push the Indonesian movements

revolutionaries to

efforts of the

in a radical direc-

were seriously alienating the leaders of those groups, and the ISDV moderates, although they were not interested in agitation among tion

the Indonesian masses, did desire constructive cooperation with the

heads of the Indonesian organizations.

We

have seen that relations between the

ISDV and CSI were

nearlv J

terminated in 1917. Those with Insulinde were actually severed: the

had cooperated against Indie Weerbar and in some local eleccampaigns after the breakdown of their formal alliance the year

parties

tion

before, but Sneevliet’s criticisms proved too

which announced on August

leadership,

the socialists were at an end. 59 For the last straw.

Indies

On September

30, 1917, that all relations

ISDV

with

moderates, this was the

to the

hung on to the older was minimal and at the end of

other centrists

organization, but their influence on

went over

for the Insulinde

8 they resigned en masse and established the

SDAP. Westerveld and some

the year they

much

it

moderate group. 60

November Revolution, then, the ISDV was reduced to a group essentially Communist in attitude. We might therefore expect the party to have greeted the Bolshevik seizure of power

By

the time of the

with clamorous approval, especially after the great publicity accorded the overthrow of the Tsar. However, the

ISDV responded

to the

news

of the second revolution almost hesitantly. Reports of the Russian up-

was not until late in November that the first news of it was published in Het Vrije Woord 61 The early accounts left the ISDV in the dark as to the outcome of the revolt, and this was undoubtedly a major reason for its cautious handling of the news. Succeeding communiques brought increased hope, however, and soon Baars was able to write: rising trickled slowly

through

to the Indies;

it

.

The hope

that

we

dared not express

—

seem to us here in capitalism still reigns supreme and where our small group to form the organization that will do battle with it all so impossible did

it

—

deep, joyful certainty.

And

time being.

more secure

we

almost

this land,

where

almost dared not cherish, the expectation that

The

proletariat

every day of

rest,

now

62

28

just

this

beginning

has

become

rules in Russia, at least for the

of proletarian order,

.

is

makes

its

mastery

Birth of the Revolutionary

For the European revolutionaries

meant the

lution

by arguments

in the Indies, the

of Indonesia’s backwardness,

socialist revolution.

its

lack of a proletariat,

the factors assumed necessary for a

all

Elsewhere

November Revo-

stubborn refusal to be dissuaded

justification of their

and the absence of nearly

Movement

Europe there were

in

signs of

coming

and the ISDV could hope that the wave of the revolution would sweep over Holland and perhaps even wash the shores of the Indies.

revolt,

The mercurial

Baars,

who was

finding the frustration of colonial

upon the Communist

increasingly difficult to bear, seized

On

Russia with desperate enthusiasm.

life

victory in

Christmas Day, 1917, he ex-

horted a rally in Batavia:

The lower

must be organized! You must organize now, the Russian example must be followed now. Do as in Russia and the victory is classes

.

.

.

yours! 63

As party chairman, he announced the ISDV’s commitment Bolshevik pattern at

its

The Russian Revolution not believe

—

to judge

May

the

to

1918 congress:

naturally dominates our thoughts at present.

from reports

European

in the

socialist

papers

I

—

do

that

more strongly under the influence of the Russian movement than we ourselves. We, too, must take the path which the Bolsheviki have chosen, even though the situation here is differthere

is

any group of

socialists

which

is

.

ent.

Where

capitalism exists, socialism

is

.

.

also possible 64 .

same speech Baars mourned that in the light of events in Europe, “it is bitter to be doomed to helplessness here.” 65 The ISDV, however, had been far from inactive in response to the Bolshevik Revolution. At the end of 1917, it began organizing soldiers’ and sailors’ soviets on the Russian example; and within three months it had gathered over 3,000 members into this movement. 66 The Red Guardist action began among the sailors and was centered at Surabaja, the In the

major naval base of the Indies.

and although

It

soon spread to the soldiery, however,

was evidenced more by alarming rumors than visible activity, it caused the government considerable concern. At that time the Indies army consisted of some 9,000 Europeans, 10,000 Ambonese, 18,000 Javanese, and 3,000 other Indonesians a force the modest size of which had for some time worried Dutch residents of the Indies. The European officers were felt to be reliable, but the Ambonese were restless; the Javanese were not notably enthusiastic soldiers and might well prove less than loyal if it came to putting down a revolt on their island. The Dutch common soldiers had little love for the its

existence

—

29

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Indonesian population, but they also had the European civilians,

who

treated

little

them

reason to identify with

as outcasts not

much

better

than the natives. The government realized that their enthusiasm for the

Red Guardist

action

their position,

and

economic

status.

it

in

good part from deep resentment

instituted measures to

Such reforms took time

momentum

improve

to achieve,

their social

of

and

however, and with

movement in became problematical whether they might not come too late

the growing

Europe,

it

stemmed

to prevent military

of the socialist revolutionary

apathy or alignment with the

socialists in a

bid for

power.

At the May 1918 ISDV congress, the party discussed how best to encourage “revolutionary defeatism” as Lenin had done, arguing that if the colonial troops could generally be persuaded not to fight, the

Red

Guardists could seize power handily. 67 At the same meeting the party, finally possessing a

consensus in the absence of the socialist moderates, 68

drew up

its first

policy of

work among the Indonesian masses. The debate engendered

on the

program

of

demands

latter subject gives us a

and attempted

to formulate a

glimpse into the party’s early struggles

with a question that was to perplex

many

a

Communist leader

—how

to

deal with nationalism.

The ISDV

executive proposed that the party’s statement of purpose

declare:

The

Indies Social Democratic Association aims at the organization of the

Indies population, especially the proletariat and the peasantry and without

regard to race or religion, into an independent political party which will lead the class struggle in

its

native land against a ruling capitalist class of

foreign race, thereby carrying on the only possible struggle for national gives

possible support to every economic

liberation.

It

movement

of the subject population insofar as those

all

and

political

movements strengthen

the position of that population against the ruling class 69 .

The Semarang group moved that the world-wide character of the movement should be emphasized by cutting out the reference to oppressors of “foreign race” and by adding that the party’s struggle against the ruling class in the Indies would “strengthen the international class struggle and at the same time lead the only possible struggle for national liberation.” Surabaja, however, felt that even this did

not go far enough, and wished to cross out the entire reference to national liberation.

It

was only

after a

30

heated debate that the Surabaja

— Birth of the Revolutionary

branch was

ISDV would

satisfied that the

Movement

continue to value economic

amended

revolution above national liberation and the declaration, as

by Semarang, was adopted. 70 Not surprisingly, the chief opposition from the

ISDV

central executive,

and from the

party’s Indonesian

statement in

original form.

its

to the

Surabaja position came

dominated by Sneevliet and Baars,

members, who wished

That they were not able

maintain the

to

good part because the European members of the ISDV notable exceptions of Sneevliet, Baars, and the

VSTP

was

to prevail

—with

in

the

leader Bergsma

were ill-equipped by language or interests to work among the Indonesian population. For the most part they occupied themselves with

and

discussions of Marxist theory, observation of events in Europe, agitation

among

most engaged

work

fellow Indies Europeans. Typically, the

Red Guardist

their energies, the

action, revolved

a Dutch-speaking part of the population; similarly, the party’s

Day

celebration, held in Surabaja in 1918,

was considered

only to Europeans, and no Indonesians attended.

that

around

first

May

of interest

The Bolshevik

vic-

Europe brought new energy and influence to this Europocentric faction, and at the 1918 congress they succeeded in moving party headquarters from Semarang, and the increasing hopes

tory

center of activity

among

for revolution in

the Indonesians, to Surabaja,

pean branch and the most radically

Economic conditions

its

internationalist of

largest Eurodivisions. 71

its

worsened during 1918, as rice harvests remained poor and the shipping shortage reached an acute stage. The Indonesian parties were more critical of the government in the Indies

and produced a disturbing debates. In Holland the

flood of criticism in the

SDAP,

first

hitherto a small minority,

Volksraad

emerged

as

the second largest party in elections to the lower house of parliament; the

new

cabinet was right of center, and the socialist opposition to

assumed an increasingly rebellious the

German

from tion

SDAP

revolution, the

his post in parliament.

aspect. In

The

November, inspired by

leader Troelstra preached revolt

first

reports of the Troelstra Revolu-

threw the Indies government into something of a panic,

for their

incompleteness lent considerable scope to the imagination. Rumors culated that the

SDAP was

and a police watch was Volksraad

socialists, for it

it

cir-

organizing a seizure of power in the Indies,

on the house of Cramer, head of the was thought that he would lead the march

set

on the Governor General’s palace

to

SDAP. 72 31

demand power

in the

name

of the

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

The

SDAP had

Indies

socialist

no thought of seizing control unless a Dutch

government authorized

it

to

do

but

so,

it

responded

to the

news of events in the Netherlands by calling a meeting of SI, Budi Utomo, and Insulinde representatives to formulate a plan of action. The conference, which met on November 16, agreed that the movements would urge their followers to maintain peace but at the same time would press the government to turn the Volksraad into a popularly elected parliament within the next three years. 73

.

Not

groups were so inclined to the parliamentary path.

all

strations

soldiers

were organized by the Red Guardists among the European and

sailors,

pages of the

ISDV

and there were

On

with the police. 74

scuffles

the

Soeara Ra’jat, Darsono urged his fellow Indone-

sians to follow the Russian example: “It

power, but the people. Let the red flag

not the ruler

is

fly

once he begins to rebel? Let the red

who

has the

everywhere, the sign of hu-

manity, equality, and fraternity. What can stop the if

Demon-

wave!”

flag

75

common man

The CSI

Oetoe-.

son Hindia published his writings approvingly, noting that

if

the

government did not concede extensive reforms immediately, revomight well be the

lution

Even Europe left

result. 76

the Indonesian revolutionaries placed their hopes in events in rather than the Indies, however. As

Semaun

indicated in the

SI Sinar Hindia, the chances for violence lay in colonial resistance

to a

Dutch

There

will

socialist

regime rather than

undoubtedly be an attempt

in

Indonesian rebellion

up

[to set

itself:

a separate Indies capitalist

regime], but there are also socialists such as Sneevliet and Baars in the Indies.

These comrades, who have many followers among the

the warships and

party

members

many

a great part of the

soldiers,

have fellow

and thereby can reckon on the support of thouamong them many policemen in the cities and native

of

whom

Sneevliet party will gather socialists in the

European

from

in the SI

sands of natives, soldiers,

among

sailors

are

now members

all its

forces to

Undoubtedly the carry out the mandate which the

Netherlands will send, and

of the SI.

we

believe that even so

it

WILL COME TO A PARTICULARLY SHARP STRUGGLE HERE

IN

Semaun did not

Dutch as the movement was still

THE INDIES

77 .

envision a complete divorce from the

outcome of a socialist victory. The native socialist too weak, he pointed out, and it was likely that the leadership of the country would fall into the hands of those who would turn it over to capitalism vliet,

:

“Therefore

we must

Baars, and Brandsteder,

ask the help of socialists such as Snee-

and

of the [European] sailors

32

and

sol-

Birth of the Revolutionary diers, so that capitalists

from countries

invade our newly liberated country.”

like

Movement

Japan and England

will not

78

The November crisis passed as quickly as it had come. The opposition was restless but not ready for revolt; in Holland the stra

Indies Troel-

Revolution fizzled out in a shower of rhetorical sparks. As soon as

he received word that the Dutch government would not

fall,

Governor

General van Limbug Stirum pacified local tempers with broad but

vague promises of reform. 79 Soon thereafter a reaction the governments of the Netherlands

and the

such challenges to their authority should not to consolidate their position

almost

all

the

which were

envisioned reforms

less tolerant attitude

The government

toward extremist

to

among

Indies; determined that

rise again,

to lead to the

and

set in

the

they took steps

abandonment

of

adoption of a far

agitation.

was matched by deepening despair in the ISDV. Its hopes had been based so completely on a Dutch revolution that the European leadership of the movement sank into a depression that bordered on paralysis. As Sneevliet later remarked, the end of 1918 closed the ISDV’s first period of growth. After that the party was forced to face the unpleasant facts that the German revolution would not spread to the Netherlands, that the Indonesian leaders were at least temporarily taken with Van Limburg Stirum’s November promises, and that the government was now moving serirevival of confidence

ously against the revolutionaries. 80

33

Ill

Becoming

Communist ONCE

the general situation

attention to the

was

Red Guardist

a

Party

in hand, the

government turned

its

action as the most intolerable challenge

armed forces who refused duty or were suspected of fomenting trouble, and civilian leaders who were in government service were transferred to out-of-the-way places or expelled from the Indies. By the end of 1919, the movement was virtually dead. 1 At the same time, the authorities to

authority. Stiff sentences

its

were imposed on members

of the

took steps to rid themselves of their most outspoken political oppo-

Dutch ISDV

nents, expelling the

The

first

leaders one

go was Sneevliet, for

to

whom

by one from the

country."

expulsion proceedings were

seemed certain the Dutch government would survive. That revolutionary had long irritated Indonesian as well as government leaders, 3 but in the heated atmosphere of November 1918 the Indonesian opposition promptly adopted him as its martyr. 4 The government added to the drama of Sneevliet’s departure by taking elaborate security measures to prevent possible riots, 5 and it strengthened the Indonesians’ feeling of solidarity with him by following up his banishment with the arrest of Darsono, Abdul Muis, and a initiated as soon as

it

succession of lesser Indonesian figures.

pathy for

his

the burst of sym-

departed mentor to extract promises of financial support

not only from the of his

Semaun used

move was

ISDV and VSTP

but also from the CSI. The purpose

to provide Sneevliet

with aid until he found employ-

ment and also to solidify the connections between the Indonesian mass movement and the European socialist revolutionaries; but since the quid pro quo was that Sneevliet would represent his supporters in the Netherlands

it

also

gave the departed leader a basis for speaking

inter-

nationally in their name. 6

Shortly after Sneevliet’s departure, Baars

34

abandoned the Indies

of

— Becoming a Communist Party his

own

free will.

He had

teaching job in October 1917,

lost his

when

the government decided that his political utterances had exceeded the

permissible limits for those in

time to running the

employ. After that he devoted

its

ISDV and Het

Vrije

Woord but ,

full

this revolutionary

was not enough to satisfy him. Unlike Sneevliet, who alternated between enthusiasm and distress but never abandoned faith in his work in Indonesia, Baars finally lost both his temper and his interest. Convinced that his calling lay with the revolution in Europe, he set forth to tilt at the Dutch bourgeoisie: activity

Oh, there

is

much

so

that

is

depressing. Naturally, that

is

no reason

in itself

same time the firm conviction that you cannot do better work elsewhere, if, on the contrary, you are continually overcome by the passionate desire to join in the struggle abroad, where you could fight in another and better fashion and with greater understanding from others then your strength is consumed by doubts, strength that is not renewed by the warm sympathy of those you are struggling to to leave.

However,

if

you do not possess

at the

—

help.

.

.

.

European can’t hold out in the tropics in this manner. And really, if I had had to stay in that deadly hot Semarang another few years, with after my day’s work the directing, conferring, meeting, speaking, etc., etc. all this with the same result we have achieved up I

often said to Sneevliet that a

—

to

now, namely that the masses applaud but are not ready

it

do anything

would have broken down completely in mind and body. had been necessary I would have perhaps made even this sacrifice; but is if I must sacrifice myself, then I’ll do it in the heat of battle. 7

no, it

to

I

think that

I

If

as

—

The

rest of

1919 was a series of disasters for the European members

of the

ISDV,

for during the course of the year the

government im-

prisoned, banished, or instituted proceedings against most of them.

Loss of their best leaders, arrest and fear of

arrest,

and discouragement

movements in Europe and Indonesia all diminished the Dutch role in the ISDV, which many of its European members regarded as a dying movement. 8 By early 1920 the number of active Dutch members of the organization was reduced to a fraction of what it had been. Had the fate of the ISDV depended on its Dutch leadership, the party would now have faced dissolution. What took place, however, was not the degeneration of a vital center but the atrophy of a now unnecessary limb. The reason for this was a change in the substance of the party that had been taking place since 1917. In that year, we will

at the failure of the revolutionary

35

Rise of Indonesian

remember, the ISDV the splitting off of

lost a

its less

Communism

good part of

its

radical elements.

membership

Those who

as a result of

left

were mostly

who entered thereafter were Indonesian. Beginning in ISDV membership began to increase as a result of Sema-

Dutch; those late 1917,

rang’s victory at the Sarekat Islam congress, the party’s effort to gain converts

the increasingly the

May

major

throughout Java, 9 and the discontent created by

bad economic

situation. In addition, the decision of

1918 congress to establish the

own

first

ISDV

as

an Indonesian move-

make a special effort to attract Indonesian adherents without too much regard for whether they understood or even approved of the movement’s Communist ment

in its

right caused the party to

goals.

was an extremely rapid expansion of membership, 10 which gave the ISDV some of the character and some of the problems of a mass movement. It also complicated relations between the central executive and the party branches, since the Europeans kept firm control of the center, while the branches gave more prominence to their Indonesian adherents. 11 Whether the European leaders would in

The

result

—

—

the normal course of things have yielded gracefully their control of the

ISDV

is

an open question. This was certainly their ultimate intention,

but whether their ideas about the proper timing and extent of the transfer of

power agreed with those

of their Indonesian colleagues

quite another matter. This particular problem

is

was avoided, however,

by the gradual expulsion of the European leaders from the colony. Fortunately for the ISDV, its Indonesian adherents possessed the talent, if not the experience, to enable them to replace the absent Europeans. In addition to Semaun, the party had acquired a first-class leader in Darsono, a young Javanese aristocrat who had dropped in on Sneevliet’s trial in 1917 and been converted on the spot to revolutionary socialism. He was one of Sneevliet’s closest co-workers during that leader’s last year in the Indies, and he was also closely associated with Baars and the labor organizer Bergsma. Darsono was one of the few Indonesian Communist leaders to make a serious studv of Marxism; indeed, he frequently had trouble adjusting his Western Communist ideas to Eastern conditions. He was a great admirer of the Bolshevik Revolution, which he enthusiastically urged his fellow Indonesians to

emulate; this led, in

December

1918, to his arrest

and a

year’s impris-

onment. 12

The Indonesian

leaders of the

ISDV 36

devoted particular attention

to

Becoming a Communist Party developing relations with the Sarekat Islam, to which they also be-

They were aided by deteriorating economic conditions and general restlessness in 1918, which had a considerable effect on the spirit of the SI. The extent to which ISDV slogans found response in the popular movement was indicated by the temper of the 1918 Sarekat Islam congress, which was distinctly revolutionary: not only did longed.

the meeting protest sharply against the authorities, but attack on the charge that the government

based

it

was the protector

its

of “sinful”

capitalism. 13

The ISDV

also

improved

position within the Sarekat Islam at this

its

meeting, as at the SI congress the previous year, by means of a threat

from Semarang

to split the

movement. Shortly before the 1918 SI

meeting, Darsono had written a series of articles attacking the prominent anti-Semarang CSI leader Abdul Muis, and

pamphlet accusing Muis of having feathered

known

issued a

his financial nest

by sup-

Weerbar 14 Muis’ position at that time was rather delihe had become the editor of Neratja a newspaper that was

porting Indie cate, since

Semaun

.

,

to rely financially

on the government.

15

In

it

he published a

arguing that a restriction of sugar plantation acreage

series of articles

—then urged by the SI and other Indonesian parties in the face of a growing food shortage — would

in the interests of increased rice production

not advance the public welfare. This was a highly unpopular stand to

and the Javanese SI leaders questioned whether Muis’ Sumatran heart was really with their people. For a while it seemed possible that Muis would be dropped from the CSI at its 1918 congress, and the

take,

radicals’ concerted attack tion.

on him aimed

However, Muis toured Sumatra

just

encouraging such a rejec-

at

before the meeting and was

greeted there with great enthusiasm; he thus appeared at the SI congress as the

head

of a powerful

faced with a very nasty problem:

might secede;

if it

if it

yielded to the

leftists,

Outer Island branches might well form

The Muis-Semarang

fight

The CSI was now met Muis’ demands, Semarang

Outer Island

faction.

the increasingly important

their

own movement.

erupted as soon as the congress opened,

and Tjokroaminoto quickly called a closed session of the CSI to settle it before the breach became irreparable. As a result, Darsono and Se-

maun promised promised

to cease their personal attacks

to follow the SI

on Muis, who, in turn,

and not the government

line in

running

Muis was kept on as vice-president of the CSI, and the Semarang branch was satisfied by the appointment of Darsono as official CSI

Neratja.

37

Communism

Rise of Indonesian propagandist and of Java.

16

ISDV, leftist

Semaun

as

CSI commissioner

charge of Central

in

This last nomination represented a significant advance for the for

it

meant

now

leaders

that the

most popular and able of the Indonesian

held a powerful position in the directorate of the

Sarekat Islam. 17

During 1919 the Indonesian ISDV leaders increased

and the economic

influence the Sarekat Islam in a radical direction, situation continued to aid their project.

By

this

time inflation and poor

harvests were bringing conditions of near famine to rice shortage

was

so severe that the

their efforts to

government

some

instituted

grain collection, which caused considerable resentment ants

who

The

areas.

compulsory

among

peas-

did not want to part with their crop at the government price.

In 1918, the Sarekat Islam had begun a campaign to transfer a part of the land under contract to sugar plantations to the peasants for grow-

Limburg Stirum, who considered such a measure necessary until rice shipments were received from abroad. The sugar interests were by no means amenable, however, since they were counting on the very high prices their product would bring on the postwar market, and to the Indonesians’ distress the Governor General did not feel he could impose more than moral suasion on the industry. The SI, Budi Utomo, Insulinde, and Indies SDAP sponsored a Volksraad motion to petition the Dutch paring rice; this was supported by Governor General van

liament to restrict the sugar acreage, but the conservative Indonesian regents and nonsocialist Europeans in the assembly the proposal.

liament

itself,

The SDAP

in

combined

Holland thereupon introduced

it

to defeat

into par-

but only the Ethically inclined Vrijzinnige Democrati-

sche Partij supported

it.

The

sole result

was

that the Governor General

appointed a commission of inquiry into conditions in the sugar areas,

on which Tjokroaminoto was invited until 1921,

Whether

by which time the

crisis

to

its

sit;

was long

report

was not ready

past. 18

or not restriction of sugar acreage

would have ameliorated

the immediate food problem, the Indonesian parties attached a great

deal of importance to

it,

and

their failure to achieve

any

satisfaction

on

them to view the Indies government more than ever as the servant of Dutch capital. Even cautious, upper-class Budi Utomo took on a radical tint and at its 1919 congress expressed a desire

the subject caused

for closer contact with the masses. Rallies held in Batavia to protest the

refusal to limit sugar acreage collections

and the use of force

in

government

were supported not only by Insulinde, the 38

SI,

rice

ISDP, and

.

Becoming a Communist Party Budi Utomo but

by the conservative regional associations Sarekat Sumatra (Surnatranenbond) and Pasundan. 19 In the rural areas there were increasing signs of dissatisfaction. Peasalso

ants in the sugar districts set fire to cane fields, in the famine-struck

region of Kediri troops had to be called in to combat disorder, and

West Java the forced rice collections produced a series of incidents. More alarming to the government than these sporadic and unplanned disturbances, however, was the apparent involvement of Indonesian in

political

The

groups in resistance movements.

first

to

be accused was Insulinde, which associated

itself in

early

1919 with agrarian unrest in the Surakarta region of Central Java. In recent years the government had been endeavoring to put through

agrarian reforms in this princely territory so as to bring conditions in line

with those in the directly administered regions. The reforms pro-

ceeded very slowly, and many peasants were disturbed

at their delay,

particularly in the matter of substituting a direct tax for the burden-

some corvee

duties. Others objected to their taking place at

all,

substituted incomprehensible requirements for the personal iar relationships of that highly traditional area.

The

result

for they

and

famil-

was general

discontent, in the form of refusal to render corvee duties: the reformists

claimed that their preservation was unjustified, and the tradition-

alists

argued that they had not been sanctioned

by customary some six months,

as before

The movement, which lasted was headed by Hadji Misbach, who was the de facto leader decrees (peranatan)

linde in the Surakarta region as well as an active SI

president of the ISDV-sponsored agricultural workers.

The

PKBT,

of Insu-

member and

vice-

a union of peasants and

national leadership of Insulinde took con-

siderable interest in his efforts; Tjipto

Dekker both made propaganda tours

Mangunkusumo and Douwes of the area. The government

decided that Insulinde was responsible for the change of peasant concrete

dissatisfaction

into

Dekker were

arrested,

protest;

Hadji

and Tjipto Mangunkusumo was banished

from the Javanese-speaking areas of the

A

Misbach and Douwes

conflict over corvee also

broke out

island. 20 in

Celebes at

this time,

and

was less widespread than the Surakarta passive-resistance movement, it was viewed more seriously by the authorities because it resulted in the murder of a European official. This time the Sarekat Islam was held responsible. That organization had appeared in the Outer Islands as a reform movement demanding greater legal rights for although

it

39

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

power of the petty autonomous was the substitution of taxation for

the population and a decrease in the rulers;

one of

its

principal projects

which the government had already undertaken

corvee,

The Sarekat Islam made considerable

administered areas of Java.

headway on Celebes

in the directly

in the face of opposition

from the association of

adat rulers (Perkumpulan Radja), which was backed, as usual, by the

European advisers on the grounds that reforms, even when contemplated by the government, should not challenge the structure of customary authority. In May 1919 Abdul Muis toured the island on behalf of the CSI; his visit sparked new enthusiasm for the movement, local

and

some

in

began to refuse to render corvee. A month the Dutch controleur De Kat Angelino was killed in

areas people

after Muis’ trip,

when he

Toli-toli

obligations.

visited that center of unrest to enforce the corvee

The Sarekat Islam

as a

whole was considered

at fault,

and

proceedings were instituted against Muis for having instigated the assassination

The

by

his visit. 21

was particularly distressing to the Ethici, for the murdered official had been considered a progressive man who had tried to improve local conditions as well as shore up traditional rule. Moreover, Muis— a member of the Volksraad, opponent of Semarang, and former editor of Neratja had been thought one of the more reaToli-toli incident

—

sonable of the Sarekat Islam leaders. so serious a breach of the peace,

had been

right in

was

If it

even he were to contribute

to

not likely that the conservatives

warning that the Ethical program was dangerously

utopian in tolerating an Indonesian opposition?

These suspicions seemed

to

be confirmed the very next month,

for in

July the government, investigating the shooting of a Garut peasant

family that had resisted the forced rice collections, discovered the existence of a secret SI organization that

throw of the government. This group

—known

in

to

aim

at the over-

Indonesian as the

S.I.

—

Af deling B (Section B) was the Priangan region of West Java. It had been started

ke-Dua (Second SI) and concentrated in

appeared

in 1917

by a Hadji

charms

(

in

Ismael,

Dutch

who had encouraged

djimat ) guaranteed to

secret association

as

make

resistance

by

selling

the wearer invulnerable. Ismael’s

had gained momentum with peasant objections

the forced rice collections;

it

seems

to

to

have acted outside the authority

CSI but not in opposition to it. That the SI leadership was directly involved was not at all clear, but Sosrokardono, the partv

of the

40

Becoming a Communist Party secretary,

put on

was immediately arrested and

Tjokroaminoto was also

trial.

ISDV members

Although some Indonesian

—were ultimately implicated

Musso

Much

proved of the conspiracy. hardly support a

and was said

We

later

to

as

it

approved of revolution,

we must keep

to

make no

to place

more

all

The Garut

affair-

their conservative

work

could

non-Muslims on Java:

both feet on the ground and not

For the time being we

further judgment of Hadji Ismael’s association

faith in the

it

the wealthier rural santri

idealize obscure groups without sufficient evidence.

wish

Alimin and

in the affair, the party itself disap-

movement that appealed to have in mind the murder of

are of the opinion that

—notably

of such people as

Semaun and Darsono

horrified the Ethically inclined

opponents pounced upon

it

and continue 22 .

Europeans, and

as proof of the correct-

The incident created a stir not only in the Volksraad but also in tire Dutch parliament. The Adviser for Native Affairs, Ilazeu, who was noted for his sympathy with the Indonesian movements, was forced to resign, and the embattled Ethical Governor General van Limburg Stirum faced even more heated opposition than before. The Europeans who remained optimistic about a peaceful Indonesian transition to the modern world became much more cautious in their opinion of the ability of politically oriented popular movements ness of their predictions.

to aid in this process.

Islam could

guided into

officials

who

considered that the Sarekat

perform a useful function thought that

still

less

Those

it

must be

dangerous channels; and the SI leaders, alarmed by

both the sharp government reaction and their inability to curb their rural following,

were only too ready

For both the government and the

to agree. SI,

the answer seemed to

lie

in the

The conditions of the Indonesian wage earners at that time can only by described as deplorable; a government investigation concluded that the income of unskilled workers was too low to provide a “hygienically sufficient means of existence” and had

organization of labor unions.

led to the serious undernourishment of a large portion of the population 23 Private enterprise .

which was by

—and

far the largest

particularly the plantation

employer

industry,

—turned a deaf ear to the gov-

ernment’s moral arguments, and so the authorities encouraged the labor unions as a

means

of forcing the desired

overt government action. Moreover, they

41

hoped

improvements without that

economic

activity

— Rise of Indonesian

would

divert the energies of the popular

dangerous to the state than the far

Communism movement

political lines

into channels less

along which

it

had thus

moved. 24

The ISDV was

at least as interested as the

government in turning the

SI to labor organization, although for very different reasons.

the proletariat

would probably increase the influence

A

turn to

Semarang, the

of

SI branch most closely identified with labor. It might also

make

the

CSI leaders more receptive to the ideological views of the radical socialists and less inclined to stress religion. Moreover, the ISDV was sadly aware that its own ability to organize Indonesian labor was restricted. Although the party had considerable influence among the developing organizations of skilled and semiskilled urban workers notably the VSTP, the most powerful union of this sort it had virtually no following among the plantation workers, coolies, and landless farm laborers who formed the vast bulk of the Indonesian proletariat. Nor did it influence the various associations of Indonesian petty officials and lower white-collar employees that were emerging at the time. The ISDV leaders, conscious of their limited urban appeal, had made an effort to organize rural labor in the sugar areas, which seemed

—

an obvious point of potential unrest. In 1917 Porojitno, an association \

of peasants

and unskilled

laborers,

was founded on the

party’s initia-

was reorganized into the Workers’ and Peasants’ Association (Perhimpunan Kaum Buruh dan Tani, or PKBT). The movement was headed by Suharijo, an SI-ISDV leader from Demak, but its guiding spirit was Baars, who at the time was an enthusiastic proponent of agrarian action. 25 The purpose of the organization was to unite the peasantry of the sugar districts, who wanted higher rents paid for their land and higher wages for work at harvest time, with the landless laborers employed in the cane fields and mills. It also was supposed to function as a cooperative, which would bypass the middlemen in marketing rice. The association led a precarious existence throughout 1918, changing its leadership and headquarters with disorganized rapidity; the combination of peasant and plantation labor proved unsuccessful, and it was split into two divisions, the Peasants' Association (PKT) and the Estate Workers’ Association (PKBO). At the beginning of 1919 it moved to Surakarta and came under the hegemony of Hadji Misbach; after his arrest it found a new chief in the CSI leader Surjopranoto. 26 The PBKT was far overshadowed in importance by Surjopranoto’s tive,

and

in

January 1918

it

42

Becoming a Communist Party

own PFB, which he began in Jogjakarta in April 1917 as Adidarmo, the Army of Labor, an association of vast and hazy purposes. In 1918 Adidarmo developed a special division to support laid-off sugar factory workers and the families of deceased laborers; this branch became known as the Union of Factory Personnel (Personeel Fabrieksbond, or PFB ) and began to organize the sugar workers for improved wages. In December 1918 it had only about 700 adherents, but at its first congress a year later it claimed 6,000 full members and 2,000 candidates. 27 The PFB’s rapid rise was due not only to Surjopranoto’s abilities as a popular leader and to the rural restlessness of 1919 but also to the status of

its

chief,

who

Paku Alam appeared

modem The

as a

member

of the Jogjakarta royal house of

to the inhabitants of that princely state

both as a

labor organizer and as a traditional defender of his people.

other branch of labor that resisted

ISDV penetration,

the Indone-

was dominated by the pawnshop employees’ union (PPPB), which had been founded in 1916 and was led by the CSI secretary Sosrokardono. Its vice-president was Alimin, a member of the sian petty officials,

ISDV

executive. Alimin, however, divided his loyalties equally be-

tween the ISDV, Insulinde, and the Sarekat Islam; in union matters he was very conscious that Indonesian government employees could not afford to for too

With ful

be too

radical, so the socialist revolutionaries could not

much from little

this

toehold in the pawnshop workers’ organization.

apparent prospect of being able

itself to establish

unions outside the urban proletariat, the

chance was

to

hope

influence

ISDV saw

the labor organizations led

that

success-

best

its

by the

SI,

a

more promising because both Surjopranoto and Sosrokardono entertained radical notions and depended on flam-

strategy that looked the

boyant personal leadership rather than a disciplined organization to

A

program

be

car-

ried out via a trade union federation, something the socialist group

had

control their associations.

of penetration could best

1915. 28

Economic hardship and increased unrest caused the ISDV to step up its efforts during 1918, but it was not until the following year that its campaign was successful. In May 1919, at a congress of the pawnshop workers’ union in Bandung, labor leaders from the ISDV and SI Sosrokardono, Alimin, Semaun, and Bergsma outlined a plan to unite the unions of the two parties in a common front. They envisioned a Revolutionary Socialist Federation of Labor Unions, which would become the upper house of a “true Volksraad,” the lower chamber of which would be composed of

been trying

to

establish

since

—

—

43

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

delegates from the Indonesian political organizations. If the plan could

be put

into effect, Sosrokardono asserted,

by ourselves a government

“we

be able

will

for the people of Indonesia,

to achieve

and

able to change the capitalist society into a socialist one.”

unanimously decided

to establish a

headed by Surjopranoto assigned to draft

As

its

It

be

was

committee of union representatives

to prepare the federation,

declaration of purpose and

this action indicated, the

29

will

its

and Semaun was

constitution.

Sarekat Islam leaders were most san-

guine about their prospects in the labor

field.

A

strike

wave

that broke

out in 1918 reached major proportions the following year, and because of government encouragement of the unions

business during 1919

The workers, seeing that

it

in

and the sharp upswing

was by Indies standards extremely the unions the same quick remedy

had caused the peasantry

successful. 30 for their

to flock to the rural SI, joined the

organizations in rapidly increasing numbers. During 1919 the of labor unions

came under

grew

swiftly,

and the majority

in

ills

new

number

of organized workers

SI leadership.

At the October 1919 congress of the Sarekat Islam, the

ISDV

distrib-

uted a pamphlet urging the delegates to “join in the class struggle” and declaring that “the task of the SI

which the

is

to create the organization

proletariat of the Indies will liberate

itself.

The

through

SI should

become the organization of the worker and small peasant class.” 31 The response to this call was more than encouraging, for the meeting exhibited an almost hysterical verbal radicalism that seemed to derive in good part from a desire to cut a defiant figure before the Dutch in the face of the reaction engendered by the Garut and the Toli-toli affairs. Both Tjokroaminoto and Surjopranoto argued in favor of the program evolved at the pawnshop workers’ congress, asserting that the government would be unable to ignore the demands of the people united by the “true Volksraad.” The normally conservative Hadji Agus Salim urged endorsement of the revolutionary

socialist title for the labor

would frighten off arguments, the CSI leaders

federation in the face of Alimin’s objections that this the workers in public employ. In their identified the

government more closely with the

capitalist

system than

ever before, declaring that the Indonesian proletariat must force the capitalists to grant

them needed reforms,

if

necessary

by means

of a

general strike. 32

The ISDV was greatly pleased by this demonstration of radical intent, the more so since it had taken place without much goading from 44

Becoming a Communist Semarang. With cause

Vartxj

hope that the less radical SI leaders could be either won over or worked out, its view of that movement brightened considerably. The 1919 congress, Het Vrije Woord declared, had

shown

to

that the Sarekat Islam

was exchanging

its

religious character for

a secular socialist one, for at that meeting “the struggle

was directed

squarely against capitalism and was not, as in previous times, an attack

by a few on

‘sinful capitalism,’ a

misunderstanding of socialism.”

combination of concepts that 33

The

body movement.

was needed was to get rid of the SI” 34 for it to become a true

of

were serious

SI leaders proved that they

ments by moving immediately

on a

All that

the “weak spots in the sturdy

workers’ and peasants’

rests

in their congress state-

to establish Indonesia’s first labor fed-

which came into being on December 25, 1919, at a convention of SI and ISDV unions in Jogjakarta. It consisted of 22 unions with a total of 72,000 workers; the majority of the unions were under the eration,

control of Semarang, but the greater

CSI-influenced unions. 35

number

of workers belonged to

had been generally assumed that Surjopranoto, head of the largest member union, would lead the federation. However, Semaun outmaneuvered him at the convention and was appointed head of the interim executive of the federation, which established

its first

It

headquarters in Semarang. 36

In the beginning, the convention decided that the

new

federation

would bear the title provisionally approved by the recent SI congress. However, Semaun alarmed many delegates by identifying revolutionary socialism with Bolshevism in a speech on the significance of the Russian November Revolution for the Indonesian struggle. The union representatives did not feel they wished to go so far as to tie the federation publicly to Bolshevism,

and

to avoid giving

any impression

were doing so they asked that the revolutionary socialist label be dropped. Much to the disgust of his fellow ISDV members, Alimin played a major part in this retreat, declaring that, although he that they

personally favored the Bolshevik standpoint, so radical a

merely frighten -

the issue,

emerged

off

title

would

the white-collar unions. Seeing himself outvoted on

Semaun acceded

to a

change of name, and the association

Labor Movements (Persatuan Per-

as the Concentration of

gerakan

Kaum

Buruh, or PPKB). 37

the

ISDV

failed to obtain a Bolshevik title for the labor federa-

If

tion,

it

did

manage

With the establishment of the social-democratic label had become increas-

to secure

the Comintern in 1919,

one for

45

itself.

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

ingly identified with the gradualist adherents of the Second Interna-

and unacceptable for those of a revolutionary viewpoint. The Dutch SDP had acknowledged this promptly by becoming the Communist Party of Holland ( CPH ) and some of the European members

tional

,

of the

ISDV

thought that their party should also assert

By no means

its

Comintern

them felt the need, however, and the question might have remained open had the party not been presented by its moderate rivals with a linguistic dilemma. At its congress of June 1919, the Indies SDAP decided that it had been a mistake to establish itself as a branch of the Dutch socialist movement; casting about for a name of its own, it ended by becoming the Indies Social Democratic Party (ISDP). 38 Not only was this title sympathies in

this fashion.

all

of

very similar to that of the revolutionary socialist organization, but

was almost impossible

it

to differentiate in Indonesian: that language,

possessing no “v” sound, substitutes a “p” instead, with the result that

ISDV members were discomfited by erate title. 39 Since the ISDP showed no

being referred to by the mod-

the

name, the older organization decided According to Alimin, 1919, but no action

40

to

inclination to

do

plans to assume a

was taken

annual congress, principally,

that year. it

change

its

new

so.

new

title

were made during

The party did not even hold

its

seems, because the European leader-

was decimated and the two principal Indonesians, Semaun and Darsono, spent much of their time in jail. 41 It was not until January 1920 that the party was able to gather, but this sixth congress was a hurried affair that only marked time until the seventh convention, scheduled for the ISDV’s usual meeting month of May. At the seventh congress, the principal topic of discussion was the proposal to change the name of the ISDV to Perserikatan Kommunist ship

di India

(

Communist Party

in the Indies

42 )

.

Among

its

principal spon-

was Baars, who had returned from Holland in March, having found neither revolution nor employment there. He had been rescued from political and economic idleness by the Semarang municipality, which appointed him an engineer in its department of public works; the nomination understandably raised a furor, but the government sors

blocked neither his return nor his reinstatement

At the congress Baars spoke the organization to distinguish

declare

its

for those itself

in public

employ.

ISDV members who wished

from Revisionist socialism and

kinship with the parties then aligning about the Comintern.

He was backed by

the powerful Indonesian-led

46

Semarang

faction,

Becoming a Communist Party which had adopted a resolution advocating the proposed change of title a few weeks before. For the Indonesian majority, a principal ground for backing the change appears to have been the desire for a name in their

own

language, one that avoided the problem of the letter “v.”

43

It

was a

become a Communist party, but a sufficient one: the motion passed by a good majority, and on May 23, 1920, the ISDV became the Indonesian Communist Party the first such organization to be established in Asia beyond the borders of the

humble reason

for deciding to

—

former Russian Empire.

47

IV

Joining the Comintern

WRITING

from Europe when the Comintern was formed

in 1919,

ISDV can state with pride which is now recognized by the

Baars assured his Indies comrades that “the that

it

has always worked in the

Third International as the

spirit

spirit of

any congruence between the

ever,

Communism.” policies

1

At the time, how-

advocated by the Comin-

and the practices of the Indonesian party was largely coincidental, for the ISDV had very little information concerning Soviet Russia or the Communist International. About the only reports on events in Sotern

viet Russia that

appeared in Het Vrije

Woord

regular wire-service accounts of the civil war. 2

by the

festo issued

on

it,

first

und

The ISDV

Kolonialpolitik

did print the mani-

It

Comintern congress, but

either then or later. 3

sky’s Sozialismus

during 1919 were the

it

made no comment

journal also serialized Karl Kaut-

—a

study which, though

it

pre-

sented an Orthodox interpretation of imperialism, was written by a

who had been anathema to the Leninists ever since he supported the German war effort in 1914. The ISDV leaders were not, in fact, completely sure that they wished to impose on their own party the Marxist

strict ideological

conformity that the Bolsheviks were impressing on the

emergent Third International. They were not even certain about the Soviet revolution

January 1920 als” to

ISDV

itself: as

party chairman Hartogh remarked at the

congress, they did not have the “objective materi-

form a clear opinion about the Bolsheviks. However, he added

that “Russia

still

stands in the center of our interest” and that from

available indications the Soviet regime

seemed

to

be traveling

in the

right direction. 4

Concern ropean

We

for international ideology

ISDV

will

leaders,

remember

who were

was limited almost

solely to

Eu-

deeply divided as to the party’s course.

that at the

ISDV

congress of 1918 the party

had resolved to transform itself into a political organization of some mass substance instead of remaining an elite group dependent for its 48

Joining the Comintern popular following on the Sarekat Islam. This endeavor was soon

brought

to a virtual halt,

that: “not

much

has

and Hartogh noted

come

of the reorganization decided

Semarang congress, because charged with carrying to

it

at the following congress

of the expulsion of Sneevliet,

On December response to

its

been defeated

at the

who was

we have not been able in which we have been

For the time being

out.

do more than keep ourselves functioning,

relatively successful.”

upon

5

12, 1918, the

ISDV

executive held a conference in

leaders’ realization that the Troelstra Revolution

had

Holland and that the Indies government was not

in

going to concede anything more than

November

its

The

Promises.

meeting determined that the party should emphasize organization and ideological training rather than

Should capitalism maintain

mass revolutionary

itself for

some time

than has been the case until now, consider least a

thorough

socialist

here, in order to equip

In this

manner we

Although situation,

it

it

it

agitation:

to

come,

our

first

we

must, far more

duty to cultivate at

knowledge and sympathy among a proletarian to

appear as the leader of a future, inevitable

will fulfill the prerequisites for a true

this resolution

was framed

who succeeded

In his view, the purpose of the party was,

clash.

action. 6

in response to the

also represented the general concept of

Hartogh, the Surabaja leader

mass

elite

immediate

mass action held by

Baars as party chairman. first,

“to

supply

socialist

information and to cultivate a core of socialistically thinking and feeling people,” and, second, to influence in a socialist direction such prole-

were to be found in the other Indonesian movements. 7 To this end he refused to charter any new party branch unless he knew it would contain at least one or two members with thorough tarian elements as

socialist training

—no small requirement for Indonesia in those or

later

Hartogh submitted, must come the organization and the knowledge; only then could there be mass action. 8 The perennial argument over party membership standards was thus days. First,

reopened; as before, the whole question of the purpose of the ISDV was debated. The developments of 1919 the increased government

—

restrictions, the

growing popular unrest, the discovery of Section B,

and the ambivalence

of the Sarekat Islam

pute; they convinced the

revolutionary

proved

Semarang group

word while popular

just as clearly to the

—only aggravated the of the

feelings

still

need

to

dis-

spread the

ran high, but they

Surabaja leaders the need to preserve the

49

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

party as a small, tightly disciplined organization that could ride out the gathering reactionary storm.

Hartogh was plainly alarmed by the

members developing a Section B since the Surabaja leadership

Indonesian

had

ISDV members, some

of their little

of

of

possibility

own

—not

some party

unreasonably,

control over the activities of

whom, we

will

remember, were

implicated in the SI plot. 9 This was one reason for his refusal to

was sure they would contain who could control them: as Hartogh put it,

charter branch organizations unless he

a trained core of socialists

unless the party maintained tight discipline,

it

might find

compromising situation that would allow the government

By and

large, the

ISDV chairman added

itself in

to

wreck

a it.

in defense of his policies at

the January 1920 congress, the Indonesian workers joined the party too carelessly, were indifferent to discipline, and did not pay their dues.

The

was held to confirm the Surabaja policy, which it did by re-electing Hartogh as chairman. 10 The meeting lasted only one day January 3, 1920 and no vote was taken on the policy itself. Semarang maintained that the congress was steamrollered and subsequently refused to accept its decisions as legitimate. 11 Bergsma voiced the Semarang objections in an editorial note appended to the account of the congress in Het Vrije Woord. The opposition, he stated, believed that the party should not allow fear of being compromised to interfere with the establishment of new branches where there was a demand for them. Only with a large number of branches could the socialist message really be spread, since propagandizing could only be effective with direct missionary effort. 12 The debate continued on the pages of Het Vrije Woord, 13 and inevitably it became a major topic at sixth party congress

—

—

the

May

By

1920 congress.

the time of the

May

meeting, Surabaja was apparently ready to

yield control of the party, for ters

it

approved a

shift of

ISDV headquar-

—and thus party leadership—back to Semarang “for practical rea-

sons.” Nonetheless,

Hartogh made a strong plea

ing as before that the

ISDV

should be an

elite

for his

program, argu-

organization devoted to

spreading “socialist information” and to strengthening the proletariat against “capitalist oppressors of

all nationalities.”

14

Hartogh asserted that the Comintern represented the only true

so-

and that the world revolution was at hand, but he and the outgoing Surabaja executive rejected the Semarang proposal that the partv assume the Communist label. The Indonesian masses did not cialists

50

Joining the Comintern

understand the

be committed If

ISDV

the

ABCs

to

of socialism, he pointed out;

then could they

one of socialism’s many “European nuances’?

wishes to agree to the change in name, then

accede to the criticism expressed about the “false countries.

how

— and

Are there

measure

I

it

it

will also

socialists” in this

very generously

have

and other

—ten members

association capable of the independent criticism necessary for this? not. Party formation in the Indies

tion

is

is still

in

Utomo

one of our branches.

I

at

is

could

the same time a

name more such

of our

I

think

an embryonic stage; differentia-

only beginning to take place. At the

executive of Budi

to

moment a member of the member of the executive of

cases.

Moreover, the proposal for the change of name has not come from a majority of our members, but from a few leaders. In

reason to object to

this,

provided a majority

the arguments pro and con, will of the nature of the majority of

am

merely stating a fact

case

is

itself

there should be no

found which,

after hearing

come independently to a decision. In view our members I mean this not as a slur; I

—

—there can be no doubt

that this will not

be the

15 .

Bergsma, Baars, and Semaun argued against Hartogh that only a

change

in

name was involved

in order to distinguish the

ISDV from

would not, they assured, imply a shift in policy, for the ISDV had always been sympathetic to Bolshevik socialism: “We have been Communists for a long time now,” Bergsma asserted. Hartogh pointed out, however, that the ISDV members, even if they all sympathized with the Russian the “false socialists”

and

identify

it

with the Comintern.

It

Revolution, did not unanimously endorse for Indonesia such institutions as the dictatorship of the proletariat

and the

soviet system,

which

Baars himself had just mentioned as essentials of the Communist pro-

ISDV was too small to were too many useful things

gram. The

indulge in sectarianism, he held; and

there

it

to

could do without committing

itself

one corner of the revolutionary arena. Finally, he announced that

the party approved the proposal, he

function in

it

would have

to refuse

if

any leading

10 .

The motion was put to a vote; only the Dutch-dominated branches of Surabaja and Bandung and a member-at-large from Ternate opposed the transformation of the ISDV into the PKI 17 A new executive was accordingly elected, consisting of the Semarang-based core group of Semaun (chairman), Darsono (vice-chairman), Bergsma (secretary), Dekker (treasurer), and Baars (commissioner); members outside Semarang were Stam (Tuban), Dengah and Kraan (Surabaja), .

51

Rise of Indonesian

and Sugono (Bandung ). 18 For the

Communism

first

time Indonesians were given

the top posts in the party. Moreover, the Netherlanders in the

executive core were noted proponents of agitation

among

new

the Indone-

sian masses.

The new party

leadership was committed to greater activity

the local population, but

on which

this

it still

work would take

among

faced the problem of defining the terms place.

Should the Communists aim

first

of all at preserving their influence in the Sarekat Islam, or should they sacrifice this

favor?

if

necessary by competing with the SI leaders for popular

How much

of

industrial Indonesia,

rant of

—or

Communist doctrine could be insisted on in prewhere even the party’s leadership was often igno-

willing to ignore

—the

Marxist tenets? Similar questions

were being asked at this time in Soviet Russia, where the Comintern was preparing to convene a congress that would devote considerable attention to

Communism

in the East.

The

task of the Third Interna-

was not an easy one, for although Lenin’s doctrine on imperialism had given an ideological basis for Communist interest in the colonial question, it provided only the haziest indication of what Asian Communist parties should do. Moreover, the problem of balancing circumstances in the precapitalist East against the need to preserve overall unity in Communist policy was an exceedingly difficult one, for which in fact the International never achieved a satisfactory solution. Behind all Comintern decisions stood the red eminence of Soviet Russia, and it was Russia’s experience and interests which, beyond the tional

requirements of ideology the

first

itself,

played the greatest role

in

determining

Asian program of the International. The Soviet victory was,

in

Communists could assume power in a country generally regarded as backward. Of equal significance so far as the colonial question was concerned was the fact that this victory was the

first

place, proof that the

achieved largely without the active participation of the peasantry. Peasant acquiescence and approval were obtained by the promise of bread, land, and peace, but the seizure of power cities,

and

soldiery. It

its is

active elements likely that

much

took place in the

and the common the Comintern attitude toward the

were the of

itself

proletariat

peasantry in the Asian revolution derived from this experience, which

tended to reinforce the ideologically based disregard of the Communists for the political potential of the peasantry. Neither

had had much regard

for the peasants; they

Marx nor Engels

were considered too unor-

ganized, too backward, and too possessed of a “pettv-bourgeois” desire

52

Joining the Comintern to

own

land to be an effective revolutionary force. At some points Marx

and Engels had maintained

that the landless peasants might adhere to

the proletarian cause, but this affiliation they considered to be of a

wholly subordinate nature and of

The peasantry did not therefore

As we

it

little

consequence

for the revolution.

constitute a distinct class, they claimed,

and

could not be an independent force in the class struggle.

shall see the International considered that peasant

should be a principal part of the Asian Communist program

demands

—

just as

had used peasant demands to gain popular support for their cause but at the same time it was assumed that the peasantry would be a docile follower of the proletariat and that the urban workers would thus be the dynamic force of the revolution. This resulted in a curious ambivalence in the Comintern program, whereby the International insisted that the Asian revolution would be agrarian in nature and that the support of the peasantry was vital for its success, at the same time cautioning that the peasants could not play a truly active revolutionary role and that the Communists should refrain from relying on them too greatly. The Comintern never abandoned this dual attitude, and it was not until the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China that Soviet policy makers came to realize that the peasantry might be a driving the Bolsheviks

—

force

and not

The

just a vehicle in the

Asian revolution.

Soviet experience in the period just after the revolution

was

also

important in the development of the Comintern colonial program. This

was partly negative, since Russia’s greatest hopes and fears lay in the West hope for a revolution in Europe, fear of Allied intervention in the civil war and this, added to the then prevalent belief that Communist rule in agrarian Russia could be ensured only by influence

—

—

proletarian victory in a highly industrialized land, led the Bolshevik

leaders to neglect the Asian question. In another sense, however, the civil

war period did

force the Soviets to consider the East:

Russia

desired to maintain the loyalty of the Tsarist Central Asian territories

Russian influence vis-a-vis that of the British in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Soviets were in no position to use

and

to maintain

force in these areas,

and so

it

was necessary

to rely

on persuasion. The

semifeudal rulers of Central Asia could hardly be appealed to with Marxist slogans, and so the two themes given the greatest emphasis in

Russian propaganda

in the

Incongruous though

upon

it

East were Islam and independence.

was

religion, the Bolsheviks

for atheist

Communism

to base

its

plea

were well aware that Islam struck the 53

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

deepest emotional chord in the areas where they were anxious to gain

between 1917 and 1920 saw a proclamations, congresses, and propaganda empha-

allegiance. Consequently, the period

steady stream of

Muslim peoples. The first Soviet declaration on the colonial question was an Islamic appeal the proclamation “To All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East,” issued a few weeks after the Bolshevik seizure of power. In addition to promising sizing Russian friendship with the

—

religious it

freedom

called on the

to the Islamic peoples of the

Muslims of Turkey,

Persia,

against imperialism. In February 1918 a missariat” East,

and

was formed in

former Russian Empire,

and India

“Mohammedan

to further revolution in the

November

of that year

to take

up arms

Central

Com-

Muslim areas

of the

and the next the Soviet govern-

ment sponsored the first and second All-Russian Congress of Communist Muslim Organizations. 19 These activities were spurred mainly by the need for Central Asian support, but the Soviets were also intrigued by the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic movement, which seemed then to be growing into a powerful force in the Muslim world. Seeing in it the same antiWestern potentialities that the Indies authorities had feared earlier in the century, they called for a “revolutionary tie with the Muslims of the English, Italian, French, German, Dutch and other colonies, who find themselves under the oppression of the European imperialists.” 20 The League for the Liberation of the East, formed in November 1918, took up the question of Pan-Islamism and concluded: This

movement

is,

to

be

sure,

basically national

still

has always been an active, political religion; the

and

religious.

But Islam

Mohammedans

are not

exclusively or even predominantly a theological people, but a political one; their religious life

is filled

with a

political, militant spirit.

thus also be used for political purposes

ment

for national

independence

—

especially for furthering the

21

December 1918 the Central Bureau of the Russian Communist Party announced partment of International Propaganda

was

to carry the revolutionary

principally via Islamic

ties,

move-

.

In

office

Pan-Islamism can

for

for the Eastern Peoples. This

message beyond the Soviet borders,

“We, the Muslim Communists, who

know better the language and the way who are Muslim in our great majority, active part in this sacred work.”

Muslim Organizations of that it would establish a Dethe

of life of the peoples of the East,

are duty-bound to take the most

22

These sweeping gestures were inspired by emergency conditions; 54

Joining the Comintern they were thus concerned with slogans and tactics rather than analysis

and grand

and they contributed

strategy,

Communism. The

program

to a

little

for Asian

was the League for the Liberation of the East (Soiuz osvobozhdeniia Vostoka), which was established as a pilot organization from which it was hoped to develop a “special single exception

International of the East, in accordance with the peculiar circum-

stances under

which the various nations of the East

its

founding convention

— the

first

have devel-

23

oped, and will necessarily continue to develop.”

At

exist,

occasion on which the Bolshe-

viks discussed the unification of the East against imperialism

League

Communist

role in

it.

bourgeoisie, declaring that only the working class artisans

—the

program that analyzed the nature of the Asian

set forth a

revolution and outlined the

and aim

24

—could carry on the revolution

It

rejected the Asian

—peasants, laborers,

against imperialism.

The

movements should be to create governments based on “healthy nationalism”: these were to be “workers’ republics,” which would embody the principles of both national and class selfdetermination. In spite of Asia’s backwardness, the League held, it would not be necessary for the workers’ republics to pass through the capitalist stage, for with the world socialist revolution already begun the masses could seize power themselves from the feudal classes and thus avoid the period of bourgeois rule. The program envisioned the unification of these republics into a giant federation, which would be “unselfishly” exploited by Soviet Russia 25 In addition, the League outlined an action program for the Asian revolutionaries that was of the anti-imperialist

.

adapted directly from the experiences of the Bolshevik Revolution This attempt at establishing an Asian

26 .

Communist program proved

completely abortive; nothing further seems to have been done with the

Second All-Russian Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, held a year later, the League’s ideas were almost comLeague, and

at the

The congress passed resolutions calling for the Asian Communist parties that would become sections of

pletely contradicted.

formation of

the Comintern and for support of the Asian national liberation move-

ments

as a

means

of overthrowing

Western capitalism. Lenin, address-

ing the meeting on the immediate duties of the Asian

Communist

movements, declared:

The

task

the true the

is

to arouse the toiling

Communist

more advanced

doctrine,

masses to revolutionary

which was intended

activity, to translate

for the

Communists

of

countries, into the language of every people; to carry out

55

Rise of Indonesian

Communism merge

those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to

with the proletarians of other countries in a

You

will

have

common

struggle.

.

.

.

base yourselves on that bourgeois nationalism which

to

awakening, and cannot but awaken, among those peoples, and which has historical justification.

At the same time, you must

and exploited masses

of every country

understand that their only reliable of the international revolution,

only ally of

all

find the

way

is

its

to the toiling

and tell them in the language they hope of emancipation lies in the victory

and that the international

proletariat

is

the

the hundreds of millions of toiling and exploited peoples of

the East. 27

This view was typical for Lenin,

who had been

a consistent propo-

nent of cooperation with Asian “bourgeois nationalism” on the grounds

and nationalism were progressive forces. 28 Bolshevik opinion was not united on this interpretation, however, and not only the League for the Liberation of the East but the 1919 congress of the Russian Communist Party held for a struggle against the Asian bourgeoisie. 29 At the same party congress Bukharin advocated a policy that went much further than Lenin’s toward collaboration with nonproletarian forces. The Bolsheviks, he declared, should exercise extreme opportunism in supporting movements in Asia, since anything that would hurt the imperialists would that in precapitalist areas the bourgeoisie

help the world revolution: If

we propound

the solution of the right of self-determination for the colo-

Negroes, the Indians,

nies, the Hottentots, the

On

we

the contrary,

foreign imperialism.

etc.,

we

whole

gain; for the national gain as a .

.

.

The most

ample, that of the Hindus,

is

outright nationalist

by

lose nothing will

damage

movement,

only water for our mill, since

it

it.

for ex-

contributes to

the destruction of English imperialism. 30

On

was a minor one, since that class represented a small and feeble segment of Asian society; but the matter had implications that went beyond the bourgeois class itself. First of all, the Asian nationalists might be won by a program that attacked foreign capitalism, but they would dislike a the face of

frontal assault

on

it,

the question of the Asian bourgeoisie

their

own

struggling middle class, especially

if

this

diverted energies from the effort against colonial rule. Moreover, most of the Asian nationalist leaders

were members

of the intelligentsia;

they were thus by Marxist definition bourgeois, and the Communists referred to the

movements they

led as “bourgeois nationalist.”

identification of nationalism with the bourgeoisie

56

made

the

The

Commu-

Joining the Comintern

toward cooperation with Asian nationalism dependent on view of the Asian bourgeoisie; and this lent great importance to

nists’ attitude

their

the question of the Comintern’s attitude toward that class.

By

the time the Comintern

was founded,

in 1919, there

been a good deal of agitation about Asia but very a

Communist

little

had thus

progress toward

policy in the East. There existed only Lenin’s fragmen-

tary contributions on the relations

between Communism and Asian

and these had been contradicted in other Bolshevik statements. There had been virtually no discussion of Communist policy toward the Asian peasantry, 31 and the statements on Islam had been nationalism,

largely opportunistic, based

on the needs of the Russian emergency. create an organization and policy for Asian Com-

The only attempt to munism had failed completely, which, considering that program’s provisions, was just as well. The first Comintern congress added nothing to this meager progress toward a Communist colonial policy, mentioning the Asian question only in passing as a minor aspect of the world revolution. In July 1920,

however, the second Comintern congress

set itself to

amend

the Inter-

national’s previous neglect. Zinoviev, reporting for the Comintern’s

executive committe (ECCI), apologized to the congress for the committee’s failure to

pay adequate heed

to the Asian situation. 32

A Commis-

and Colonial Questions was appointed to outline a Communist program in the East; reflecting the importance the congress accorded the problem, Lenin himself assumed its chairmansion on National

ship.

The his

secretary of the commission

Comintern name, Maring. 33

He

was

Sneevliet,

who appeared under

attended the congress as the repre-

sentative of Indonesia, extrapolating for the purpose tions given

him by Indies organizations

at the

from the colony. Although he clearly spoke

Communist

time of his expulsion in

rather than as an advocate of the CSI,

erable activity at the congress

on the authoriza-

his

capacity as a

much

of his consid-

was directed toward securing Comintern

approval of cooperation with the Sarekat Islam. His reservations re-

garding the ISDV’s close relations with the Muslim movement seem to

have vanished when he left the Indies. Arriving in Holland to find the radical socialists despondent over the failure of the Troelstra Revolution

—which doubtless made the Indies situation seem relatively bright

—he

had assured a welcoming rally that the Sarekat Islam was a “proletarian movement” and that “the Mohammedan religious tend57

:

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

movement was only a' side issue.” 34 At the August 1919 congress of the SDP, now the Communist Party of Holland (CPH), he had spoken in the name of both the ISDV and “our comrade-in-arms,

ency of

this

the left

wing

The Sarekat Islam

—

so

after

all,

and assured the meeting

of the Sarekat Islam”

continues to hope for revolution, and

the Third International has committed

the oppressed peoples in the areas exploited

The news

sian

justified in

itself to

doing

the liberation of

by European

capitalism. 35

Sneevliet subsequently received from the Indies seems only to

have strengthened gress he

it is

that:

made

this conviction, 36

and

at the

second Comintern con-

a strong plea for international support for the Indone-

Communists’ strategy:

This organization, although

achieved a class character.

—Sarekat Islam—

name When we its

is

a religious one, has

realize that the struggle against sinful

capitalism stands in the program of this

movement,

that the struggle

is

not

only directed against the government but also against the Javanese nobility,

we

can appreciate that

to establish firm I

am

the duty of the socialist revolutionary

bonds with

this

movement

mass organization, with the Sarekat Islam. mass action can a truly

socialist

or revolutionary resistance be organized, that only in this

way can

of the opinion that only through

movement

capitalism be opposed

Sneevliet’s

may

it is

by genuine power. 37

view fortunately coincided with Lenin’s

well have been

The Russian

why he was named

—indeed,

this

the commission’s secretary.

leader presented to the commission a set of theses on the

colonial question

which emphasized the necessity of cooperation with

bourgeois-democratic nationalism There

is

no doubt that every

nationalist

movement can only be

of a bour-

geois-democratic character, because the great mass of the population of the

underdeveloped countries consists of the peasantry, which

is

the representa-

would be utopian to think that insofar as it is possible for them to exist in the first place would be capable of carrying out the Communist policy

tive of bourgeois-capitalist relationships. It

proletarian parties, in these countries,

underdeveloped countries without having a definite relationship with the peasant movement, without in fact supporting it. 38

in the

In Lenin’s view, the

Communists should pursue the following

line in

underdeveloped regions: Support of the peasant movement in the backward lands against the landowners and all forms and remnants of feudalism. We must above all strive to

58

Joining the Comintern

movement

give the peasant

organize the peasants and possible,

and thus

revolutionary a character as possible, to

as

all

the exploited people into soviets wherever

to create a close connection

and the revolutionary movement the colonies and the underdeveloped areas.

proletariat

The Communist an

alliance,

ward

International

of the peasants in the East, in

to create a

is

between the West European

temporary cooperation, even

with the revolutionary movement of the colonies and the back-

countries;

it

must

however, amalgamate with

not,

it

absolutely the independent character of the proletarian

only in embryo form It

was lucky

but must maintain

movement

—

albeit

39 .

for Sneevliet that

opinions, for other

members

disagreed sharply with

he had such a distinguished

of the

ally in his

committee on the colonial question

view. In the end, even Lenin’s great prestige

this

could not bring unity, and the committee reported two separate sets

The alternate theses, which were proposed by Indian Communist M. N. Roy, called for Communist opposition to

of theses to the congress.

the

bourgeois nationalism as a force basically opposed to social revolution.

Roy considered proletariat

the landless peasantry to be the natural ally of the

and counted on increasing landlessness

munist domination of the political movement nationalists,

he accused, would

cated peasant

it

and thus the Communists must do ture the peasantry

40 .

about Com-

The bourgeois

in Asia.

try to take control of the less sophisti-

movement and use

bourgeois nationalism

to bring

own, nonsocialist ends;

for their

their best to prevent the spread of

Lenin, on the other hand, argued that by na-

was bourgeois-democratic, and he did not

see the

landless peasants as a considerable force distinct from the rest of the

peasantry. Both

would be

Roy and Lenin thought

essentially agrarian; but their differing analyses of the class

role of the peasantry led the

nationalist

movement and

one to argue for cooperation with the

the other to reject

So powerful were the objections to

make some amendments

palatable

that the colonial revolution

to

the

more

41

to Lenin’s theses that

he was forced

to his original proposal in order to

radical

changes consisted chiefly

it .

members

of

the

in the substitution of the

ary” for the term “bourgeois-democratic”

when

make

it

committee. These

word

“revolution-

referring to nationalist

movements, an increased emphasis on the need to form peasant soviets, a denunciation of religion and religious movements, and a demand that Communists expose those privileged classes in the colonies which benefited from and supported the rule of the imperialists

59

42 .

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

In view of the difficulties Lenin’s program experienced in committee, further debate

seemed

of the congress. Sneevliet,

who

likely

when

the two proposals reached the floor

The Comintern, however, was saved from argument by commission secretary effectively sabotaged Roy’s

as

proposal: I

see no difference between the theses of

They

are basically in agreement.

The

Comrade Lenin and Comrade Roy.

difficulty consists

merely

in finding the

proper attitude toward relations between the revolutionary nationalist and socialist

movements

this difficulty

in the

does not

underdeveloped lands and colonies. In practice

exist. It is

necessary in practice to work together with

the revolutionary nationalist elements, and task

if

we deny

movement and put

this

we

will

accomplish only half our

ourselves forth as doctrinaire Marx-

ists 43 .

This

move presented

theses

a diplomatic

way

out of the situation, and both

were adopted by the Comintern. Actually, however, only Lenin’s

was used during the period with which we are dealing 44 The Asian revolution, the Comintern thus decided, would be bourgeois-democratic in form, and the Communists must call first for land analysis

.

reform on the basis of small peasant ownership. capitalist stage

would be

the other hand, the

could be skipped and a peaceful transition to socialism

possible: “If the revolutionary, victorious proletariat organ-

izes a systematic

aid with

On

all

propaganda and the Soviet governments come

possible means,

it

is

correct to

assume that the

to

its

capitalist

stage of development will not be necessary for these peoples .”

45

saw the Comintern adopt a favorable view on the vital issue of alliance with bourgeois nationalism, he found it opposed in another matter of importance to the Indonesian Communists. This was the question of Pan-Islamism, which, we will remember, the Rolsheviks had previously encouraged primarily because of their weakness in CenIf

Sneevliet

tral Asia.

By

the time of the second congress the Soviet position in that

area of the world had improved to the point where the stick as well as the carrot could be employed to maintain Russian influence; consequently,

it

was no longer

regional sentiments. centrifugal forces,

On

upon their Islamic and these feelings were now felt to be

so necessary to play

the contrary,

which interfered with the establishment of Soviet

authority. Thus, in spite of the manifest interest of Sneevliet

that the

Comintern

utilize Islamic solidarity, or at least

the subject, the second congress declared:

60

and others

be neutral on

Joining the Comintern necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and the Pan-Asian move-

It is

ment and

similar currents of opinion

for liberation

which attempt

to

combine the struggle

from European and American imperialism with a strengthen-

ing of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large

landowners, the clergy, etc

The Comintern

46 .

position on this point

was

to create a serious

problem

Communists in their relations with the Sareket Islam, for not only was Pan-Islamism then gaining powerful adherents within the Indonesian movement, but the thesis was an open invitation for the PKI’s opponents to declare the Communists hostile to Islam. The party’s immediate objections to the Comintern program were not based on the religious issue, however, but on the decision to

for the Indonesian

support bourgeois nationalism.

One might have expected

the

PKI

to

approve the Comintern en-

dorsement of cooperation with the bourgeois nationalists of

its

in

view

implications for the alliance with the Sarekat Islam, but in fact the

Indies

Communists viewed any open concession

to

nationalism as

anathema:

We

have fought against nationalism. We,

but are of the opinion that quickest

manner through the

this

too, desire

an independent Indies,

can only be achieved lastingly and

in the

—thus

struggle against imperialism as a whole

through struggling against imperialism together with the other workers outside the Indies,

One

and thus by being international

47 .

reason for the vehemence of Indies Communist opposition to

nationalism was the presence of Netherlanders in the party leadership.

The Dutch members tended text,

seeing in

movement

to

view nationalism

in

its

European con-

had undone the socialist World War I. Acutely aware of their minority in the indigenous movement,

the reactionary force that

it

at the

outbreak of

precarious position as an alien

they tended to identify nationalism with xenophobia; moreover,

though they desired the overthrow of colonial

rule,

al-

they viewed a

revolution that barred foreigners from the archipelago as a disastrous

prospect:

Suppose that

all

[non-Muslims] were to leave the country at once: then

own countrymen would starve to death, since the Indies social organism functions in such a way that the leadership of a large number of trained technical personnel is indispensable. The persons who are

thousands of your

61

Communism

Rise of Indonesian capable of giving that leadership are out of the country and in the large

still

cities

chiefly non-Islamic.

you

will

Throw them

have famine and plague. 48

The Europocentric Surabaja group was particularly disinclined to make any concessions to Indonesian nationalist sentiment. We will remember that in the discussion of the party program at the 1918 congress Surabaja had opposed even mentioning national liberation as a feature of the Indonesian revolution. The Semarang Dutch leaders were more willing to accede to Indonesian feelings on the importance of national

independence as a revolutionary goal; however, partly be-

cause they were strongly inclined toward syndicalism, they also refused to separate national

from

class revolution.

Thus, although Bergsma

argued the importance of the Asian anticolonial struggle tarian revolution in Europe,

method

national liberation;

seemed

A

he concluded that “only the Communists”

(by which he meant

of struggle”

for the prole-

and he regretted the

class

warfare) could bring

fact that

few Asians

really

to appreciate this. 49

striking

example

of this

tendency

to

eschew

activity that could

be

construed as nationalist rather than socialist was seen at the founding

December 1919. We will remember that the PPKB was envisioned by the SI leaders as the upper house of a “true Volksraad,” the lower chamber of which would consist of political party representatives. This body was formed at the same time and place as the PPKB and was called the Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements (Persatuan Pergerakan Kemerdekaan Rakjat; PPKR The program it adopted was close to the Communists’ own, and, speaking for the ISDV, Bergsma declared that the only thing wrong with it was the assumption that it could be carried out under a

of the Concentration of

(

)

Labor Movements

in

.

nonsocialist regime. 50

Tjokroaminoto had stated

at the Concentration’s

founding conven-

was admirable but would have to wait until after the liberation of Java; this separation of the two elements of revolution was totally unacceptable to the ISDV. Accordingly, the party refused tion that socialism

to join the Sarekat Islam, Sarekat

ISDP

Hindia (formerly Insulinde), and

and Bergsma wished the new grouping a speedy demise. It was one thing to cooperate with non-Communists in a labor federation, for unions had an implicit class character; it was another thing to cooperate with the same people in a political alliance oriented toward independence. Acknowledging that its refusal to join in the Concentration,

political alliances

on a national, nonclass basis might well lead to the 62

Joining the Comintern party’s isolation, it

would have

ISDV chairman Hartogh

to take:

"Even

organization every one of us,

and propagate

man

individually.”

it

this

if

declared that

this

was a

risk

viewpoint temporarily destroys our for

man,

will continue to

defend

it

51

The antinationalism of the ISDV/PKI was not simply a product of its Dutch element, however; to discover the sense in which this sentiment was shared by the party’s non-European membership we must first

understand the position of nationalism in the Indonesian independ-

ence movement at the time.

It is

important to realize that there was

then a very real distinction in the Netherlands Indies between the

and “nationalist” movements. Most of the Indonesian parties compromising the independence movement at this stage, although they were “national” in the sense of being Indonesian, were either founded “national”

on a regional-cultural basis Sarekat Sumatra

—or

—

as

were Budi Utomo, Pasundan, and the

were international

in

their

ideological back-

ground. The PKI belonged to the latter group, and so did the Sarekat Islam,

which

in the

words of one

of

its

leaders, “cherishes the idea of

same time through religion international.” 52 Although these groups became increasingly conscious of a national identity, they did not take an Indonesian national state to be their supreme goal; this was left to a new generation of parties that arose only at the end of the period discussed in this volume. There was, however, one Indies party of this era that was vociferously nationalist; this was Insulinde, which maintained that religious, ethnic, and economic differences must be subordinated to the achievement of an independent national state. But Insulinde was nationalist without being national for it was primarily Eurasian in origin, and one of its chief reasons for promoting an Indies nation-state was to overcome the ethnic and religious barriers between that group and the main body of the Indonesian population. Insulinde’s principal leader and ideologue was E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, whose political ideas mingled radicalism of both left and right. A believer in the naturally superior man he was an admirer of the racist theories of Houston brotherhood;

it is

national, but at the

—

—

Stewart Chamberlain

— Douwes Dekker argued that the Indies suffered

from being exploited by a foreign

elite rather

than by

its

own. The

would be based on the class struggle must be

nationalist regime that should replace colonial rule social justice

but would not be

socialist;

subordinated to the national struggle, and ers to support the Indies bourgeoisie in

63

its

it

was the duty

of the work-

bid for power. Outside aid

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would probably be necessary to seize power; this might be had from America or from Japan in return for the promise that their capital would be allowed to enter the country, or perhaps from Soviet Russia, which seemed interested in promoting anticolonial revolution. This last suggestion was greeted by the Indies Communists as rank opportunism: “Bolshevism may be viewed by some nationalists as a welcome guest, but time will teach them that Bolshevism will also cause many of these nationalists’ ideals to go up in smoke, since in a Communist society there is no place for the national capitalism of which so many nationalists dream.”

53

Since nationalism in the Indies was embodied in Insulinde,

it

did not

appear to be a viewpoint that sprang naturally from the indigenous anticolonial

movement but was

certain faction

wanted an

rather, like

essentially

Marxism, an ideology that a

uncommitted national movement

The nationalist-Communist competition in this sense was very real, for Douwes Dekker’s movement and the ISDV/PKI were struggling at the time for control of the Sarekat Islam. Insulinde was at the height of its activity in 1919, for all three of its major leaders had returned from exile and were making vigorous efforts to increase their political influence. In June, Douwes Dekker took his followers out of to adopt.

Insulinde and formed the Sarekat Hindia in order to break the identification of the

(Union of the Indies)

movement with

the increas-

community and to strengthen it among radically inclined Indonesians. The Sarekat Hindia then made a major bid for influence in the SI, urging the mass movement at its 1919 congress to ingly conservative Eurasian

abandon its religious orientation on the grounds that it provided no sound basis for political action, change its name to Sarekat India, and adopt a program of national liberation and social justice. 54 Much as the Communists desired the SI to reject its religious label, they refused to support the Sarekat Hindia’s urgings, arguing instead that

if

the SI were to change

Sarekat Internasional.

its

name,

it

would do best

They were unwilling

to call itself the

to give their rivals

any ad-

vantage, for the Sarekat Hindia’s revolutionary nationalism attracted

members of the SI but also a number of Indonesian Communists; it was in fact the ISDV member Alimin who made the Sarekat Hindia’s principal plea for alignment with nationalism. Dogmatic inclinations were thus reinforced by practical motives in opposnot only various

ing nationalism: to prevent the SI from getting

its

political inspiration

from the Sarekat Hindia rather than from the Communists, and to 64

Joining the Comintern

keep

tlie

primary loyalty of

the SH, the

ISDV/PKI

to seek social justice,

support, and

its

its

own members who

belonged to

also

stressed the hollowness of Sarekat Hindia claims its

opportunistic search for foreign imperialist

desire to replace colonial with Indies capitalist oppres-

sion.

The Eurasian

origin

and the

kat Hindia lent credence to the

political theorizings of Insulinde/Sare-

Communist arguments

diat nationalism

was an instrument used by an aspiring bourgeoisie to secure its own hegemony; it thus did not appear to many Indonesians to be mere Marxist casuistry when the Communists argued that “Insulinde is dangerous for the Indonesians because dies

it

seeks independence for the In-

but not for the native population.

country alone will be useless, at least for

.

its

.

.

The freedom

of the

natives.” 55 Moreover, the

energy die nationalists displayed during 1919 proved their undoing, for Insulinde participation in the Surakarta anticorvee action resulted in the arrest of several of

portant part of

its

major leaders and the disruption of an im-

organization.

its

dia proved a mistake, for

it

The establishment

of the Sarekat Hin-

did not acquire the image of a purely

Indonesian movement, and the government withheld the charter necessary for that the

its

existence as a legal party.

movement was

to lose their fear of

The

it

as

By 1920

in serious trouble,

was already evident and the Communists began it

an alternative focus of revolutionary discontent.

failure of the Sarekat

Hindia did not lessen Indies Communist

opposition to nationalism. Rather,

it

seemed

to

them

to prove the cor-

rectness of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of nationalism:

it

was an

ex-

pression of bourgeois ambitions, and since in the Indies the middle

was composed overwhelmingly of non-Indonesians, its lack of appeal to the indigenous population was only natural. To the Communists this feebleness meant that the Indonesian revolution would combine the national liberation and proletarian stages of struggle and thus aim directly at establishing a socialist state. For that reason, they considered, the Indonesian revolutionary effort was on a higher plane than that of other Asian countries, where a rising native bourgeois class existed and where the independence movement was in nationalist hands. 56 This interpretation was expressed by the major Dutch menclass

tors of the Indies

Communist movement

Communists who achieved riod;

it

was, in

fact,

57

and by

all

the Indonesian

international importance during this pe-

one of the very few points on which they agreed.

This analysis was not accepted by the Comintern, and

65

it

was even-

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

become an important point of conflict between the ECCI and the PKI. The Indonesian party was later charged with left deviation, an accusation that was true so far as the PKI rejected support of nationalism as such and continued to aim for a socialist and not a national-democratic revolution. On the other hand, PKI opposition to nationalism by no means meant that it refused to cooperate with the “national” movement. The Indonesian Communist leaders therefore were not in the same category as India’s M. N. Roy, who consistently opposed cooperation with non-Communist mass movements; they supported Indonesian participation in the SI but argued that that movement was in essence neither bourgeois nor nationalist. Since the antinationalist view was held by the Semarang as well as the Surabaja faction and by the Indonesians as well as the Dutch, the transfer of power that took place at the May 1920 party congress did tually to

mean a change in policy. Indeed, Baars stressed that the change name to PKI would not entail this: “we have always made it a point

not

honor and a point of our practical policy to direct our glance to the events taking place in the

and principled

internationalists,

world

at large;

first

we have been

of of

of all

strong

combating nationalism here as a thing

and peasant population.” 58 meeting, a referendum was held among the party

fatal to the proletarian

After the

May

branches to confirm the decision to change the organization’s name.

The party locals showed themselves overwhelmingly in favor of the Communist title, and when the results of the poll were received, the executive called a special congress for December 24, 1920, to consider affiliation with the Comintern. 59 The party leadership stated plainly that

it

expected the congress to rubber stamp the proposal:

In point of fact the executive views this congress as a formality. In deciding to

name

would

“Communist party” we made it self-evident that we ourselves to the international Communist organization. 60

ourselves a

also affiliate

The reason

was explained, was to head off any possible objections from Indies Communists or the Comintern as to the procedure by which affiliation was decided. It was not expected that there would be any objections to the proposal itself: after all, the executive for the meeting,

it

pointed out, there had been no protests about Sneevliet representing the

PKI

this

only after

PKI and

Comintern congress. The party had learned of the meeting was over, and the Semarang branch of the

at the recent

SI

had immediately acted

to

66

remove any doubts

as to his qual-

Joining the Comintern ifications this

by authorizing him

necessary in his opinion.”

is

Affiliation

two

to represent the

parties “wherever

61

with the Comintern was not so simple a matter as the

executive indicated, however; the party

still

had

to adjust

its

views to

On November

the Asian policy outlined by the International.

20,

two

PKI executive announced its intention to link the party to the Comintern, Het Vrije Woord published the first detailed reports of the International’s decisions on the national and colonial question. 62 Baars, speaking for the editors of Het Vrije Woord, chose first to emphasize the similarity between the Comintern theses and the PKI view:

weeks

after the

The international congress in Moscow has thus accepted our tactic as a Communist one in the sense that the delegates there have, on theoretical and practical grounds, determined a standpoint and prescribed a line of action which for us no longer needs to be determined and prescribed because

it

has already long been our

As he proceeded, however, he In point of fact, nothing

own

63 .

let his

reservations be

was determined

known:

[by the theses on the

for us

national and colonial questions], for on reading the theses

will

it

be clear to

everyone that they were drawn up with a special view to India and Egypt.

among the nationalists in those countries can who are driven wholly by idealism and who do

Conditions there are different:

be found

real revolutionaries

not shrink before

difficulties;

and the attitude

thus be a different one from that taken here.

Even

so,

.

of the .

Communists there can

.

the theses concede, in our opinion, too

much

to nationalism. It

is

Communist International has gone beyond the slogan that freedom” must come before the class struggle; but it still expects

true that the

“national too

much from

“It is

nationalism and therefore spares

it

too greatly.

understandable and forgivable,” Baars explained, “that

Russians most of

all

who do

oppressed middle classes

enormous help

this,

the

them the nationalism of the Egypt, and elsewhere really is an

since for

in India,

in the struggle against

tente.” His estimation of the

it is

England, the leader of the En-

importance of Russia’s national interest

in

shaping the colonial theses was very

much

that he was, Baars allowed that

Indonesia had been a British de-

if

to the point,

and Russophile

—

pendency “it would have been very possible that in order to help our Russian comrades and thus to deal the ruling power’s imperialism a very serious blow we would seek closer relations with nationalism.”

—

We

can almost hear Baars’ sigh of

67

relief,

however, as he found

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

draw the conclusion that, inasmuch as Indonesia was a colony and Holland was too busy making money to take part in European politics, this gesture of solidarity need not be made. Anyhow, he concluded, Indies nationalism was not really against Dutch

himself able to

rule:

Here, however, nationalism not fear

it,

is

not revolutionary, and the ruling power does

but on the contrary

flirts

with

it.

We

can thus proceed

in

which we have followed without hesitation until now, thereby acting completely in the spirit of the Communist International. precisely the

If Baars’s

there

is

same

line

views were opposed as unorthodox by any of his comrades,

no record of

it.

There was one point on which Comintern decisions did change PKI policy, however, and that was the matter of Volksraad participation. At its

1920 congress, the International determined that Communist move-

ments were

to

conclude alliances with parties of the non-Communist

where possible, to participate in elections, and to use their parliamentary position to strengthen the leftist alliance. This strategy, known as the “united front from above,” was advocated by the Comintern from 1920 to 1927; its opposite number, the “united front from below,” was followed from 1928 to 1934 and called for the Communists to attack rather than to ally with the leadership of the non-Communist left in an effort to win over its supporters to their own party. The ISDV/PKI strategy on parliamentary participation had been culeft

up to this point. The party had always taken part in town council ( gemeenteraad ) elections in the major Javanese cities, had formed alliances with other parties for electoral purposes, and had riously schizophrenic

taken committee work in the councils seriously. 64

Its

Volksraad was extremely ambiguous, however. At

first

planned

the party had

to participate in the elections to the 1918 Volksraad,

joined with the SI, Budi

ISDV

position on the

Utomo, and Insulinde

leader Westerveld as a

common

to

candidate.

and

it

support the centrist

The

radicals

were

never more than lukewarm to the idea, however, and Semaun was violently

opposed (we

will

remember

that his attacks

on Volksraad

were an immediate cause of the Revisionist departure from the party). When the ISDV’s partners in the electoral alliance wished to water down the campaign platform that the ISDV executive participation

presented them, the party was only too willing to withdraw from the coalition and campaign against those who did participate. 65

68

— Joining the Comintern

The 1SDV boycott

of the Volksraad

was motivated

by the thought that the assembly was doomed to political failure. Such a body had been debated in the Dutch parliament for twenty-five years, and by the time it was finally established no one, Indonesian or Dutch, expected much to come of it. Its functions were purely advisory, and its method of selection made it seem highly unlikely that the left oppoprincipally

would receive any representation at all. 06 With so little prospect of achieving anything by participation, it is not surprising that the ISDV decided to boycott the Volksraad in the hope of being able to say “I told you so" to the opposition groups that tried dieir luck. This tactic proved to be a mistake, for although Abdul Muis was the sition

only

member

of the Indonesian opposition to

be elected, Governor

General van Limburg Stirum appointed to the council some of the

more outspokenly

anticolonial political leaders in an effort to

draw the

Indonesian opposition into cooperation with the government.

them were Tjipto Mangunkusumo

of Insulinde

the Sarekat Islam; the latter barely to

assume the

managed

Among

and Tjokroaminoto

of

to gain party permission

was a strong noncooperation element in doubted that the appointment should be ac-

post, for there

the SI, which seriously cepted. 67

had been as conservative as had been widely prophesied, the ISDV could have hoped that the participating members of the Indonesian opposition would have been frustrated and angered by their experience. However, it happened that the conservative Europeans, uninterested in what they considered an unnecessary appendage to Indies government, did not bother to form parties, and those who did take an interest were largely from the If

the general composition of the Volksraad

Ethically inclined minority. Consequently, the elections resulted in a

NIVB, a party that stood solidly behind Van Limburg program of Indonesian-Dutch association in colonial govern-

victory for the

Stirum

s

ment. 68 Together with the representatives from the “radical” parties

Budi Utomo, Insulinde, Sarekat Islam, and

SDAP (ISDP) —this

group

formed a majority of the council. With the Volksraad so constituted, there seemed a chance that the participating Indonesians, instead of being antagonized by their European colleagues, would find

common

ground with them and would thus be influenced away from the revolutionary

left.

An even

greater danger to the

ISDV was posed by

the Radical Concentration in response to the events of 6.9

the creation of

November

1918.

Rise of Indonesian

The party was not excluded from part with the proviso that

it

Communism

this alliance, for

it

was invited

to take

cease opposing participation in the assem-

Although some Semarang adherents were beginning to have second thoughts on the uselessness of Volksraad participation, 69 the

bly.

ISDV

refused to change

its

was due

stand. In part this

to the

same

prompt the ISDV to reject the Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements. It did not wish a nonclass alliance, and certainly not one that included the conservative Budi Utomo. Moreover, it wished to isolate the Sarekat Islam leaders as much as possible from the ISDP and Insulinde, both to preserve its own influence on them and to prevent their seeking to redress the advance of Semarang within their organization by gaining outside supdislike of multiparty alliance that

port.

Consequently, the

ISDV

was

to

refusal to participate in the Radical

Concentration was coupled with frantic

The attempt

efforts to

keep the SI out

to prevent Sarekat Islam participation failed,

though the Radical Concentration never became an

also.

and

effective bloc,

70

alit

did provide a basis for day-to-day contact between key leaders of the

ISDP, and Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia. In the Volksraad context, the moderate socialist ISDP presented the chief danger to the CommuSI,

nists, for its representatives, familiar

with parliamentary procedure and

eager to influence the Indonesian delegates, gave them considerable advice and support.

The ISDP was

able at this time to exert a rather

considerable influence on the CSI, 71 with the result that the

ISDV

saw their position as principal European advisers to the mass movement seriously reduced. Moreover, the Volksraad participants were able to use the assembly as a podium from which to make parlialeaders

mentarily

immune

attacks on

government

policy,

and

this

became

increasingly important with the steady restriction of free expression that took place after 1918.

the

wisdom

of

its

to question

Volksraad boycott, for the party could have used

delegates there both to

parliamentary

The ISDV accordingly began

make propaganda and

to pry the SI

from

its

allies.

At the same time, however, powerful voices within the Semarang party faction opposed participation in any representative assembly. At the beginning of 1920

work

Semaun

refused to take part in the committee

Semarang town council, of which he was a member, on the grounds that parliaments were useful to the revolutionaries only as a means of publicizing their views; serious participation, he declared, of the

merely took up time that could be devoted to extraparliamentary activ70

Joining the Comintern

He was backed by

ity.

who argued

the syndicalist-inclined Bergsma,

was self-defeating, since it could result in reforms that would only weaken the class struggle. 72 Semaun’s principal opponent in this argument was the Surabaja leader Hartogh, and the transfer of the party chairmanship from him to Semaun in May 1920 accordingly lessened the likelihood of PKI parliamentary activity. New elections to the Volksraad were scheduled for early 1921, but the party continued its boycott and refused to put up any candidates. Then came the news that the second Comintern congress had decided in favor of the united front from above; this tipped

that constructive participation in the councils

die balance in favor of pro-Volksraad opinion.

On December

days before the special congress to discuss PKI

Comintern, Het Vrije a second item on

Woord announced

with the

affiliation

that the meeting

21, three

would have

agenda: participation in the Volksraad. 73

its

In the same issue of the party journal, Baars argued for reversal of

PKI parliamentary

policy. In

doing

so,

he warned that although the

opinion of the Comintern should be weighed in reaching a decision,

it

should not be the sole reason for changing course:

We

could content ourselves with calling on the decision taken in Moscow,

which leaves no doubt that the Communists must take part elections and must assume seats in parliament if elected. tendency among the European following the

congress the

with saying

parties,

Moscow congress, which way a Christian does his

“it

as has

parliamentary

in .

.

.

There

a

is

appeared from the events

attempts to treat the theses of that

and which wishes

to suffice

off further discussion.

However

Bible,

must be done,” thus cutting

much we must applaud true internationalism as a mighty step forward, we feel it necessary to guard most strongly against a spirit which demands .

blind subjection to Moscow’s

.

.

commands. 74

Baars went on to remark that Comintern decisions had been generally

made with an eye

more developed countries than Indonesia, lands where the revolution was closer at hand and Communist parties could think of organizing workers’ and peasants’ soviets to seize power: Here nings:

in the Indies,

to

however, there

is

no question

here our abstention [from the

first

of soviets or their begin-

Volksraad elections] was con-

nected with the fact that in our opinion no real parliament existed.

must determine our position anew on the occasion of the second the Volksraad in

—keeping

Moscow, but

also

in

mind, naturally, the

knowing

spirit of

Now we

elections for

the decisions taken

that conditions like those in the Indies

not taken into consideration there. 75

71

were

Rise of Indonesian

As

if

to

Communism

emphasize that the International’s attitude would not be the

sole reason for a policy change, the party executive placed the question first

affiliation,

and

almost solely in terms of the situation in Indonesia.

The

on the agenda, before the matter of Comintern

discussed

it

was between Baars, the proponent of participation, 76 and Bergsma, who pointed out that the PKI could never hope to win an elected seat it was too late to enter a candidate for the 1921 elections anyway and that it would therefore have to rely on appointment by the Governor General. This, in Bergsma’s view, was entirely too humiliating a method. Moreover, he maintained, Moscow’s ideas about having Communist spokesmen in parliament were fine in principle, but in practice the PKI needed all its capable people for work among the chief debate

—

—

masses. 77

Semaun, previously the most vehement spokesman against participation, was ready to reverse himself on the grounds that there were too

few other opportunities

for publicly criticizing the government.

pointed out that the candidate would have to be a Dutchman, since

He all

the competent Indonesian party leaders were disqualified because they

had served prison terms. This

Dutch role in the party; he maintained that the European members were little qualified by language and customs to deal with the Indonesian masses and could fitted his idea of the

therefore well be spared for the peripheral function of parliamentary representation. 78

After a lengthy debate a vote was taken, and Volksraad participation

was overwhelmingly approved. 79 The congress named J. C. Stam, an executive member from Surabaja, as its candidate. Not long afterward, however, the PKI discovered that its candidate was due to go to the Netherlands on leave, a fact he had somehow neglected to mention at the congress. 80 The party therefore appointed Baars in his stead. He hardly was in the category of useless European; however, he was well aware that his return to the Indies had been something of a fluke; anxious to avoid expulsion, he had avoided public activities that might give cause for banishment. 81 Under these circumstances, being able to air his opinions with parliamentary immunity undoubtedly seemed attractive, for Baars was not a man who bore silence easilv. The party debate on Volksraad participation was curiously unrealistic,

for

it

rested on the assumption that the Governor General

appoint a representative of the PKI. seats in the

first

Van Limburg Stirum had

would

assigned

Volksraad to prominent Indonesian opponents of the 72

Joining the Comintern

regime with the idea of persuading them

to

be more cooperative; he was

who guaranteed to toward moderation among the Indonesians.

hardly likely to appoint a European representative

sabotage any tendencies

Moreover, the Governor General had grown increasingly dubious of original decision, for

he had been greatly disturbed by the sharp

his

criti-

cisms the Indonesians leveled at the government in the opening Volks-

raad debates. The opposition parties were

and

all

noto,

less

cooperative than ever,

three major Indonesian leaders in the Volksraad

Abdul Muis, and Tjipto Mangunkusumo

—Tjokroami-

—had been implicated

in

the violent resistance of 1919.

The PKI seemed

to realize the futility of

its

plan during the Volks-

raad campaign, for as soon as the election results were announced, declared that

it

had been a mistake

appointment, although

it

to offer a delegate for

it

government

apparently did not withdraw Baars’ candi-

82

The party campaigned

against

participation

in

the

Volksraad,

reminding the other Indonesian parties that the Indian National Congress refused such collaboration with the British authorities. 83 The

Governor General made

his stand clear

candidate, declaring that as a matter of

by ignoring the Communist principle he was opposed to

Communists in the Volksraad; shortly afterward the government added insult to injury by expelling Baars from the colony. 84 Het Vrije Woord, commenting on the Volksraad nominations, consoled the party with the remark that at least “we’ve done our duty.” 85 The December 1920 PKI convention was held in the Sarekat Islam headquarters at Semarang. The walls were decorated with red and green (it was, after all, Christmas Eve), and one of the party members had made a hammer-and-sickle design in batik, “so that the always charming color combination of the Javanese could prove that it, too, was suitable for the emblems of the revolution.” 86 Few executive members attended the meeting: Darsono and Dengah were in jail, Sugondo had moved to Borneo, and only Stam was present of the executive members from outside Semarang. Indeed, there was only one other delegate from beyond that city, a representative from Bandung. A great many people were present from Semarang itself; the congress report described them as “thousands,” most of whom must have been seating

spectators.

We

can only speculate about the poor participation from

beyond Semarang; perhaps sending delegates year was more than most locals felt they could 73

to three congresses in a

afford, particularly since

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

the outcome of the issue to be discussed (the Volksraad question

was

not brought up until a few days before the meeting) was considered certain.

had been settled, Semaun announced that the rest of the meeting would be held in closed session, since not everything that would be said on the matter of Comintern affiliation would be legally permissible to publish, especially if there were oppo-

Once the Volksraad

who had

nents

issue

be convinced

to

87 .

Het

Woord

Vrije

described the

ensuing scene: Slowly, with dragging feet, the masses leave the scene; and finally, after half

having convinced themselves that those

an hour, the police have also

left

remaining are

members.

all

really party

The shrunken group from

all

it,

collects in the

middle of the

hall, as far as possible

the walls with ears; and in a hushed tone further explanations are

given 88 .

We

do not know

what went on in this conspiratorial huddle; it seems, however, that there were indeed objections. The major problem appears to have been the Comintern denunciation of Pan-Islamism. That had been a sore subject ever since publication of the Lenin theses in Het Vrije Woord, for the anti-Communist faction in the SI had just

meant opposition to Islam in general. It was finally decided that the party would do its best to explain just what was meant by Pan Islamism in the Comintern decree: “however,” it was added, “we cannot do anything else to prevent the demagogic use of those theses.” 89 There appear to have been further protests about the applicability of Comintern strategy to the Indies. A major point of the International’s colonial program called for the Asian Communists to advocate land redistribution and the abolition of large landholdings in order to attract peasant support. It was noted in the PKI discussion that this had little immediately and successfully claimed

it

application in Indonesia: “the clause on land distribution

here in the Indies, where large landownership

and

village

ownership

is

is

is

not correct

virtually nonexistent

the norm.” “If necessery,” the gathering con-

cluded, “this will be pointed out at a future international congress.” Finally, the party

cause to consider a

90

determined that the Comintern program gave no

shift in basic policy.

their

and the Volksraad question, the PKI they and not Moscow knew the Indies and that

earlier discussion of nationalism

leaders considered that

As had been evident from

74

Joining the Comintern they had been in the business of colonial revolution long enough to

determine party policy for themselves. With sublime assurance in the previously chosen course, the

rightness of

its

pronounced

that:

PKI executive

therefore

As has previously been explained, we have followed the Communist tactic here before there existed “orders from Moscow” concerning it. We therefore need change nothing following our of struggle are concerned.

.

.

affiliation as far as

our tactics or method

.

Long live the Indies Communist Communist International! 91

party, Netherlands Indies

75

branch of the

V

The Bloc Within

ALTHOUGH for the East,

eration

was

the second Comintern congress adopted a general policy

it

to

how

did not indicate just

Communist-nationalist coop-

be achieved. The Lenin theses had emphasized the need

had conceded very little to the Communists’ prospecpartners: “The idea is this, that we as Communists will only

for alliance but tive

support the independence movements in the colonial lands

movements are

truly revolutionary,

if

their representatives

these

if

do not op-

pose our training and organizing the peasantry and the great masses of the exploited in a revolutionary manner.”

1

Such conditions would be

hard to obtain under any circumstances, and the feebleness of Asian

Communism made

it

most unlikely that the

ordinary alliance on these terms.

If

the Comintern really wished to

establish Communist-nationalist cooperation, its

demands

would make an

nationalists

it

would have

to

modify

radically or permit a relationship other than the equal

partnership for Communists and their

allies

envisioned in the Euro-

pean united front from above. The International eventually chose the latter course, “I

and Sneevliet played an important

might also suggest,” Sneevliet remarked

congress, “that a propaganda office of the

role in the choosing.

to the

second Comintern

Communist

International be

organized in the Far East and also in the Middle East; since the [Asian revolutionary]

movement

is

of such great significance at the

would be very useful to unite under one office the work that is taking place in that region and to carry on a concentrated propaganda effort, which could not be directed satisfactorily from Moscow.” 2 There seems to have been some initial hesitation regarding his proposal, but the Comintern concluded that the idea was a good one and decided to establish a Far Eastern bureau in China 3 Sneevliet was present time

it

.

chosen as

its first

appointment

director, reportedly

in preference to a

on Lenin’s recommendation

4 .

Russian or an Asian would seem to

dicate general Comintern approval of the ideas he

76

had expressed

His in-

at the

The Bloc Within second congress,

if

not Lenin’s personal endorsement.

We

will

remem-

ber that at the meeting Sneevliet had not only advocated cooperation

with non-Communist Asian revolutionaries but had also sought approval of the relationship the Indonesian party had achieved with the

Sarekat Islam. Sneevliet left Russia in the early for a

few months before going

fall

of 1920

and returned

to the East. His contact

to

Holland

with Lenin at

him completely on the Soviet experiment; he now thoroughly endorsed Russian domination of the International and maintained more confidently than ever that “the Communists must everywhere work among the masses and penetrate into [other] organizations.” 5 Leaving Holland at the end of 1920, he reached Singapore in May 1921, where he was joined by Baars, on his way to Russia after being expelled from the Indies, and by Darsono, who was making a pilgrimage to Moscow for the third Comintern congress. 0 The three revolutionaries landed in Shanghai in early June; 7 Baars and Darsono the congress

had

sold

continued on their journey while Sneevliet settled

down

to

Comintern

business.

The

office Sneevliet established

was

to

prove of some comfort to the

was not overly active in establishing links with Asian Communist movements outside China. 8 This was not Sneevliet’s major purpose, however; he was in China principally to observe the situation there and to suggest a future course of Comintern action in that country. In July 1921 he attended the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai but Indonesian Communists, but during

its

first

year

it

apparently only as an observer; he played no really active role at the meeting. 9

He met Sun

Yat-sen in Kweilin during August or September

and reportedly lectured him on the need to establish the Kuomintang as a strong, multiclass party that would unite the Chinese people and particularly the workers and peasants to support the national revolution. Sun is said to have agreed with Sneevliet’s comments, but no formal commitment was made by either side. 10 It seems unlikely that Sneevliet had hoped for a commitment by either the Chinese Communists or the Kuomintang at this stage. Accounts differ as to whether he was instructed to deal primarily with the Kuomintang or to negotiate with any likely revolutionary force, 11 but his own comments on the Chinese situation at the time do not betray marked enthusiasm for any group. The Kuomintang, he indicated, was

—

—

interested in the

working

class solely for its

77

own

purposes. 12 As to the

— Communism

Rise of Indonesian

socialistically inclined groups, there existed

only

Chen

Tu-hsiu’s Can-

had elected to form a Communist Party; a Marxist study circle in Peking; and a heterogeneous collection of students and teachers in Shanghai. The Chinese proletariat was, in his view, much less socially conscious than were the workers of Java. “In view of these ton coterie, which

facts,”

he concluded, “the immediate prospects for the development of

movement

either the labor

Much weaker

very slim.

lands Indies.” Sneevliet

or revolutionary socialist

than in Japan,

much worse

propaganda are

than in the Nether-

13

is

said to have found his 14

first

meeting with Sun Yat-sen a

any event, Sun did not then appear a successful revolutionary, for he was on one of his periodic flights from Canton. In disappointment;

December

in

Hunan,

1921, however, Sneevliet left Shanghai for a tour of

Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces. 15

Much

of his three-month trip

where he was delayed by the South China seamen’s strike. 16 During his visit, Sneevliet was able to take another look at the Kuomintang, which now appeared an increasingly attractive revolutionary possibility. For one thing, Sun’s military position had improved considerably, and the Kuomintang was now a force to be was spent

in Canton,

seriously reckoned with; for another, Sneevliet ’s opinion of Sun’s social-

ism was

much

seamen’s

strike. 17 Finally,

districts

higher, in large part because of the progress of the

the Comintern envoy noted that of

masses was the region in

the

which it was possible which Canton was located

he had visited in China, the only one

to organize the

all

in

—

Kwangtung province since its warlord, General Chen Chun-ming, had fuzzy socialist views that put him more or less on the side of the workers. 18 Sneevliet

left

China shortly

after this journey, firmly con-

vinced of the revolutionary value of the Kuomintang. Stopping in the

Netherlands on his

way

to

Moscow, he declared: “There can be no

doubt that Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement possesses leanings, even

though

Chinese philosophy.”

On

its

socialist

leader also bases his principles on traditional

19

July 17, Sneevliet reported on the Chinese situation to the

intern executive.

He

Com-

declared that the International’s best chances lay

with the Kuomintang, and he sharply criticized the Chinese

Commu-

nists for their secretarian refusal to take part in the practical politics of

South China. 20 His opinion was

later

nal:

78

published in the Comintern jour-

The Bloc Within If

we Communists

.

.

wish to work successfully,

.

friendly relations are maintained

we must

between the South China

see to

it

nationalist

that

move-

ment and ourselves. The theses of the second congress are to be implemented in China, where the proletariat has as yet developed only to a very small degree, by giving active support to the revolutionary nationalist elements of the South.

It

is

our task to attempt to hold these revolutionary

nationalist elements together

Sneevliet’s

and

to drive the

whole movement

view that the Communists must

revolutionary

movement

who had been working

in the

for the

to the left 21

link themselves

.

to

the

South was supported by Markhlevsky,

Comintern

in the north of China. It also

appears to have found the ready approval of the ECCI, for immediately after the July meeting 22 Sneevliet returned to China, this time as “Philips,”

Far Eastern correspondent of Inprecorr and the Communist

International

23 .

He

brought with him a

letter

signed by Voitinsky for

the Far Eastern Section of the Comintern, ordering the Central

Com-

Communist Party to move immediately to Sun Yat-sen’s movement, and to “do all its work

mittee of the Chinese

Canton, the center of in close contact

an

ECCI

with Corr. [Correspondent] philipp,” in accord with

decision of July 18, 1922. 24

and there got Sun Yat-sen to agree that the Communists could enter the Kuomintang individually; that is, they would belong to both the KMT and the CCP, which would continue to exist as separate organizations. This done, he summoned the Chinese Communist leaders to meet with him; they did so in August Sneevliet proceeded to Shanghai

1922, at a special conference of the

CCP

central committee:

Shortly after Sneevliet arrived in China, there took place on the Western

Lake at Hangchow a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, at which Maring (pseudonym of Sneevliet) urged in the name of the Comintern that [the Chinese Communists] enter the KMT. He was personally a proponent at that time of a closer cooperation between the

Communist Party and the bourgeois-democratic movement, though naturally only if political independence and conscious influencing of the movement were allowed; and this was chiefly on the basis of his experiences in Indonesia. The executive of the Chinese party, however, unanimously rejected this policy, which in its opinion would be a hindrance to the carrying out of an independent policy. Only on the grounds of international discipline was it prepared to execute the decisions of the Comintern

79

25 .

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

by former associates of Sneevliet who had access to his papers) leave some question whether the Chinese Communists were so opposed to the strategy that 26 However, it had it was necessary to impose Comintern discipline undoubtedly not been their idea of the proper relationship between the Other accounts of

this

meeting

(

the one quoted here

is

.

two movements,

month before they had decided at their pursue an alliance with the Kuomintang on

for only a

second party congress

to

the basis of equal partnership.

Since Sun Yat-sen indicated about the time of the

CCP

conference

was not interested in an alliance except through individual Communists joining the Koumintang, it has sometimes been suggested that the strategy originated with him 27 What appears most likely, however, is that Sneevliet described to Sun the relationship between the Indonesian Communists and the Sarekat Islam; he may have done so as early as their first meeting, where, we will remember, he reportedly lectured the Kuomintang on the proper composition and function of a revolutionary mass movement. To Sun, this form of cooperation had distinct advantages: it helped secure Soviet support, it did not that he

.

force the ally,

and

KMT into it

equal partnership with a numerically insignificant

provided a means of controlling the Communists through

Knowing that this it was advocated by

the organizational discipline of the Kuomintang.

kind of arrangement existed elsewhere and that the Comintern representative in China, he

was hardly likely to have agreed to an alliance that conceded anything more to the CCP. For Sneevliet, this method of partnership was not simply the best that the Communists could reasonably hope for in their weak position vis-a-vis the

Kuomintang.

Communist

He

was, as

we have

seen, a staunch advo-

which they could influence to the left through their superior organization and their energy in propaganda. If they were fortunate, they could win the non-Communist leadership to their side or drive it out, capturing the whole movement for themselves; if they were less successful, they could at least hope to emerge from the broken alliance with a good part of the mass movement’s supporters. This had been his experience in working within the Sarekat Islam, and he is said to have pointed out the Indonesian example to the Chinese Communists 28 The Chinese Communist leaders objected to Sneevliet’s project on cate of

participation in larger mass movements,

.

the grounds that

it

ignored the class interests represented by the vari-

ous parties. Doctrinally,

this

was

a very reasonable protest, for Sneev-

SO

The Bloc Within concept contradicted the orthodox Marxist belief that political

liet’s

parties represent the interests of a single class. Sneevliet, however,

argued that the Kuomintang was actually a multiclass party, containing both proletarian and bourgeois elements, and could therefore contain

Communists as well as nationalists. 29 The Chinese classes, he claimed, were “not differentiated”; the Kuomintang was led by revolutionary bourgeois intellectuals, followed by the urban proletariat of the South, and supported by the Chinese great bourgeoisie living abroad. 30 Similarly, the ISDV leaders of Sneevliet’s day had viewed the Sarekat Islam as a movement of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie led by the bourgeois intelligentsia. The class character of the leadership was less important than the character of its following, for by working within the movement they could develop the

where they realized

ness of the masses to the point

Communist

lay with the

faction

and not with

class conscious-

that their interests

their formal bourgeois

Thus Baars could comment on the 1918 SI congress that, although the mass movement was still dominated by religious and nationalist elements, it would be brought to socialism by class agitation leaders.

among That

will not

among

On

following:

its

it

will inevitably

the heterogeneous elements which are

now

still

—

times bitter this

produce clashes

collected in the SI.

matter our young, enthusiastic organizers await

this

For

be easy to accomplish;

many

—and some-

experiences.

reason

it is still

absolutely necessary that a separate organization

where they and the others who come they can garner socialist knowledge and exist,

to us

can be fully

find

renewed strength

socialist,

where

after the

defeats that inevitably await them.

But loses

at the

its

that this

and

in its

in the

end, that

it

recommendation

to

higher unity of socialist mass action. 31

ECCI

meeting of July 1922 went so far cooperate with the Kuomintang as specifi-

not certain whether the

cally to

its

nationalist character

from the (purged) SI

It is

development of the SI reaches

and assumes exclusively a class that moment the imported ISDV need only abandon its distinc-

religious

character, at tion

moment

endorse the bloc within

—although

it

seems unlikely that

would have refrained from arguing for his pet theory there, or that if it had been rejected he would have urged it on the Chinese Communists immediately afterward. The ECCTs first public endorsement of the Chinese line came in a resolution of January 12, 1923, which might indicate that Sneevliet had acted on his own initiative or Sneevliet

81

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

that the

Comintern was too uncertain of the

endorse

it

the

feasibility of the project to

openly before he had succeeded in arranging

ECCI pronouncement

it.

32

However,

coincided with Sneevliet’s transfer from

China: two days earlier the Comintern executive had determined to

move

its

ECCI

resolution called on the Chinese

agent to

Far Eastern

its

Kuomintang rather than resolution was intended not the

office in Vladivostok.

Communists

to start joining to

it,

34

to

it is

33

Since the

“remain within”

possible that the

announce a new policy but

to confirm

Sneevliet’s tactic, despite his withdrawal.

Although individual Communists had been entering the Kuomintang ever since the August 1922 conference, the bloc within was not for-

CCP

summer of 1923, at its third congress, 35 and only in January 1924 did party members join the Kuomintang en masse. Increasingly, however, the strategy became a domimally adopted by the

until

the

nant factor in the Comintern’s view of Asia, in large part because

it

became involved in the Stalin-Trotsky feud. The ideological basis for this quarrel was Stalin’s support of alliance with the reformist socialists in Europe and the bourgeois nationalists in Asia. Trotsky fiercely opposed

this,

attacking the idea of a multiclass party as particularly

reprehensible: In China, India, and Japan this idea

hegemony

is

mortally hostile not only to the

of the proletariat in the revolution but also to the

most elementary

independence of the proletarian vanguard. The workers’ and peasants’ party can only serve as a base, a screen, and a springboard for the bourgeoisie. 36

China, which experienced the extreme development of tion

and was

policy,

at the

became the

same time

this

coopera-

a major objective of Soviet foreign

chief issue in their argument.

The

passions of the

China feud inevitably affected Comintern policy elsewhere East, especially since the International’s

in the

Far

decisions characteristically

generalized practical considerations into universal theory.

The

result

was an ever-increasing emphasis in Comintern Asian policy on the need to cooperate with bourgeois nationalism and a steadily growing pressure on Asian Communists to pattern their action on the Chinese example.

Both

in Indonesia

and

in

China the bloc within proved an

effective

Communist influence within the national revolutionary movement. The nationalist-Communist alliance was, however, assumed bv the Communists to be impermanent. The strategy for the rapid expansion of

82

The Bloc Within nationalist leadership to

might

try to consolidate

its

position

by refusing

allow the Communists sufficient leeway to develop

their

own

Communists might build their popular support to the point where a subordinate position was no longer necessary or profitable. As Stalin said, the bourgeois nationalist movement was to be squeezed like a lemon and then thrown away. The problem for the Communists was to determine when the lemon was ready to be disstrength; or the

carded. In China, the course of the bloc-within strategy was affected consid-

erably by Soviet interests, which required the alliance with the Kuo-

mintang

to

be maintained

to the bitter end.

Moreover, the strategy was

not well suited to a situation of armed revolution, for the Kuomintang

power to turn the tables and throw the Communists away. The bloc within was better fitted to the Netherland Indies, where there was no question of control over armed strength or a state apparatus and where competition was solely between the partners for the favor of the masses and the loyalty of local and regional political leaders. Nonetheless, the Indonesian bloc within had its limitations; even before Sneevliet introduced it in China the strategy had broken down in the Indies. By 1920 the Indies Communists were asking themselves whether the Sarekat Islam had not been squeezed dry. Indeed, the aftermath of the Section B affair seemed to have drained the movement of its vital juices. Several hundred SI members had been arrested, and the major branches in the Priangan were so unnerved that only extensive missionary efforts by Alimin and Tjokroaminoto prevented them from voting their own dissolution. SI membership rapidly dwindled as a mass

as senior partner controlled a military force that

exodus occurred of those

who disapproved

gave

of Section

it

B

the

or feared that

Sarekat Islam membership would be held against them. these, of course,

were only token members, but

help the movement’s shaken prestige. better-situated moderates

icalism

and

its

who

Some

Many

of

their desertion did not

of those

who

left

were

did not approve of the movement’s rad-

involvement in Section B; they tended to join more

movements or purely religious groups. By far the largest number, however, were peasants, most of whom had been inactive for years, and they joined no new movements. 37 The result was to increase the influence of Semarang over the SI rank and file, for those who left the movement were mostly adherents of the moderate wing, and those who remained were sympathetic to the Communists’ radical conservative political

83

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

urban appeal and to charges that the CSI was weak

in its opposition to

the government. 38

At the same time that the Semarang-oriented membership of the Sarekat Islam increased

its

relative strength, the central SI leadership

became more impervious to influence by the Communist left. Semarang was now too obvious a challenge not to be viewed with alarm; moreover, the CSI leaders, badly shaken by the government reaction to Section B and anxious to keep out of trouble, found their Communist component an embarrassment. As a result, they began to look for a field of activity that would avoid challenging the government and also circumscribe the activity of the Communist element. The need to consolidate the mass movement around a coherent program had long been apparent to its leaders; as had been widely remarked at the time of the SI 1918 congress, the Sarekat Islam had passed the point at which popular expectations and Tjokroaminoto’s personality could provide it with momentum and cohesion. 39 That congress had represented the high point in the movements revolutionary inclination and in ISDV influence over it; although there was considerable rivalry on the leadership level, a general polarization into right

and

left

wings had not yet taken place. The outlines of such a

were already evident, however, and CSI secretary Sosrokardono summarized them as follows: differentiation

1.

The

right

wing looks

the party of the

left is

first

to Islam

and seeks

content as long as

its

to

faith

propagate that religion; is

not

made

subject to

other religions in Indonesia. 2.

The

right

while the

left

wing

desires a struggle against domination

by another

sees racial domination as a result of sinful capitalism

race,

and

therefore wishes to struggle primarily against sinful capitalism on the side of

the workers and peasants, an effort directed against foreign rather than native capital.

Both parties encourage native capital formation: the right wing approves of the development of large Indonesian landowning and private 3.

enterprise, while the left enterprises. 4.

The

wants nationalization of the land and cooperative

Both wish state exploitation of major industries and monopolies.

right

wing

is

anxious for [colonial] government aid and

cerned for the welfare of the country as a while, while the reliance

and places the

interests of the

common

people

first.

left

is

con-

urges

self-

The

left

wing

takes part in the international proletarian struggle against big capital and

against imperialism. 40

84

The Bloc Within In 1919-1920 these divergent tendencies sharpened into a serious

and file, alarm at government reaction to the events of 1919, and growing personal bitterness among the faction leaders divided the movement. The cleavage, as the increase in

leftist

influence over the rank

wing within the Sarekat Islam looked, of course, to Semarang, where the SI executive was identical with the local PKI leadership. The right wing came increasingly to turn to Jogjakarta and to center about the CSI members Surjopranoto, Abdul Muis, and Hadji Agus Salim. Muis had an abiding dislike of the Semarang group since the time of the Indie Weerbar action, and Surjopranoto was Semaun’s chief rival for leadership of the labor federation. Salim was a moderate socialist, with close connections in the IS DP, and was also a proponent of the modernist movement in Indonesian Islam. Neither Muis nor Surjopranoto was particularly concerned for religious action; but Jogjakarta was the center of Islamic reformism in Java, Salim was becoming increasingly powerful in the SI, and religion was a cause that was popular, nonrevolutionary, and not exploitable by the left. The weight left

of Jogjakarta influence in the SI thus favored a religious orientation.

Between these two groups stood Tjokroaminoto. Far more than any other leader he symbolized the Sarekat Islam, and the mass following the SI had acquired was in great part loyal to him rather than to the movement itself. He was a strongly charismatic leader; his political style was similar to that of his sometime protege, Sukarno, and his influence lay in his acknowledged primacy as a popular leader and in his ability to balance rival factions against each other. He was an orator and not an organizer; unlike the faction leaders, he represented no special interest within the movement but attempted to represent a synthesis of its various interests. His principal concern was to preserve the unity of the Sarekat Islam; his position depended on this, and he realized also that once the SI appeared to represent particular interests it

would

lose

its

remaining prestige as the representative of

all

Indone-

sians.

By 1920, Tjokroaminoto’s primacy was in serious question. The Section B affair had shaken his position severely; not only did the government blame him for it, but those who earlier had questioned his policies

were given added reason

ness. It

was not a time

and

for oratory

discipline, they argued.

for retrenchment, for

to think

he had outlived

and emotion, but

his useful-

for consolidation

Tjokroaminoto himself agreed on the need

government investigations of the Section B were 85

Communism

Rise of Indonesian placing him in an increasingly

might end

in prison.

awkward

all

SI

and

seemed

it

that he

Consequently, his defiant expressions of the 1919

SI congress were soon replaced

appealed to

position,

members

to

by words

of caution; in June 1920 he

avoid controversy and not

irritate the

authorities. 41

Tjokroaminoto’s caution annoyed those SI all

from the Semarang faction

a popular leader

was one

members

—by

no means

—who thought that the proper stance for

of heroic defiance

and that he was abandon-

ing his accused colleagues in their hour of need. Moreover, Tjokroami-

noto seemed no longer able to take the political

initiative.

He had

sup-

ported SI involvement in the labor movement as a means of taking the SI out of political controversy; but he of his

two major

rivals,

Semaun and

had thus played

into the

hands

Surjopranoto, for the strength of

was increasing alarmingly within the movement. Tjokroaminoto was not overly concerned with ideology, but he was not the labor-oriented left

willing to concede the leadership of his organization.

forgive the stinging personal criticisms the

ISDV/PKI

quently addressed to him, attacks to which he grew tive as his position

hope

to

all

weakened. Neither was he blind

He

could not

had frethe more sensi-

leaders

to Surjopranoto’s

succeed to the SI chairmanship via his role as Indonesia’s

“strike king.” 42

To

offset the

advance of

began increasingly

his labor-oriented rivals,

Tjokroaminoto

to support a religious focus for the SI, a course

he

had toyed with on previous occasions. This brought him closer to Hadji Agus Salim and his ally Hadji Fachrudin, the vice-chairman of the Muslim educational and social welfare association, Muhammadijah. Both these Jogjakarta leaders were modernists, who advocated the purification of Indonesian Islam from local traditions and its adjustment to the requirements of the times. They were also Pan-Islamists, and in June 1920 Tjokroaminoto joined them in setting up a committee for the defense of the Turkish Chalifate. He hoped thereby to generate a religious momentum for the SI, but his effort was immediately opposed by Semarang on the grounds that politics and religion did not mix. All this meant that the SI chairman became increasingly dependent on the Jogjakarta wing of his movement, and the effective headquarters of the CSI accordingly began to shift from Surabaja, Tjokroaminoto’s home, to Jogjakarta. 43 Under these circumstances, the Communists began to ask themselves whether it was useful for them to continue to endorse Tjokroaminoto’s 86

The Bloc Within leadership of the mass

movement by

of the SI. Their attitude

professing loyalty to

him

as

head

toward the movement had always been a

patchwork of contradictions, the inconsistency of which could be nored only as long as the SI appeared to be moving direction.

Thus

power from

in a revolutionary

assumption had been that Sema-

far the party’s tacit

rang’s rising strength in the national

ig-

movement would

lead to a seizure

would presumably take place before independence, since the PKI viewed the Indonesian revolution as aiming directly at socialism and thus not requiring bourgeois democratic leadership. By 1920, however, it was apparent that the Communists had reached the limits of the pressure they could put on the SI leaders. If the party wished to remain effective within the SI, it would have to be far more considerate of non-Communist sensitivities, temper its bid for popular support, and try to win Tjokroaminoto back to a more neutral position. Alternativelv, the PKI could press a radical antigovernment program and destroy Tjokroaminoto’s personal prestige in an attempt to loot the mass movement of the membership that remained to it. This action, outwardly more radical, would in fact reflect a more conservative view of the political situation; for it would mean that the Communists had given up hope of claiming revolutionary authority over the broader mass movement in order to build an organization that would stand through a long season of reaction and of

within; this

retreat.

The Dutch party members were

particularly strong advocates of the

As we have seen, they were greatly disturbed by the Section B affair; no less than the CSI leaders, they felt that the incident

second

line.

and the government’s response necessitated consolidating and disciplining the mass movement. At first, encouraged by SI interest in labor organization, they sought to achieve this goal within the Sarekat Islam

framework. 44 However, when

were interested

in

it

became apparent

that the SI leaders

unions as an escape from revolutionary politics

rather than as an avenue to

it,

their reservations

about subordination to

non-Communist leadership were strengthened. In August 1920 Baars and Bergsma published on behalf of the PKI a detailed set of theses to guide the party’s more distant branches in formulating their relationships to non-Communist groups. The theses formed a striking contrast to those Sneevliet was then supporting at the second Comintern congress, for they resembled Roy’s view and not Lenin’s. In summary, they were as follows: 87

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

“Every popular movement must be carried on by the action of the most completely oppressed [part of the] masses.” Any popular movement, therefore, that is led by classes or groups occupying a more 1.

or less preferred position to

compromise and

members

—and

this includes skilled labor

will desert to the

of proletariat

enemy camp

have developed a

—

is

doomed

as soon as the true

class consciousness of their

own.

The above statement is true of Indonesian popular movements, shown by the fact that they have inevitably ended by compromising

2.

as

and betraying the workers. 3.

The

terized

make

action of the privileged group in Indonesia

by an anarchic and aimless nature;

its

also charac-

is

leaders do not strive to

the masses socially conscious. Instead, “the present-day move-

ment very consciously puts a new

spiritual slavery (the

power

of the

leaders) in the place of the old (respect for authority).” 4.

“An Indies

solely

socialist

movement

will

have

to

derive

its

support

from the proletarianized agricultural workers and the industrial

proletariat.”

There

is

no use

for the

Communists

to

work with other

groups, not even with such organizations of skilled workers as the chauffeurs’ in

and truck

any case doomed 5.

The

Indies

drivers’ union, since “all these organizations are

to bourgeoisification.”

Communists must consider

the proletarian masses to self-consciousness Until this

is

achieved,

all

it

their first

and a

duty to bring

spirit of resistance.

actions will be ineffective.

“The present na-

movement is absolutely powerless precisely because it is a bourgeois movement and does not desire the consciousness of the masses.” 6. The first object is therefore to organize the industrial proletariat and to teach it socialism, at the same time carrying on propaganda among the proletariat organized in the Sarekat Islam, Sarekat Hindia, and Budi Utomo. The bourgeois nationalist leaders must be exposed, tive

not collaborated with: “Agitation together with bourgeois leaders for

bourgeois purposes has no use.” 7.

As long

activities

leaders

The

as the workers’

movement remains

must be carried out cautiously

may not be lost through

as

weak

in order that the

as

few

it

is,

its

existing

arrest.

theses concluded with the following advice to the

new branches

being established outside Java:

We have

had enough sad experience

in

Java with regard to cooperation with

bourgeois and semibourgeois elements, and

88

we

cannot advise our comrades

The Bloc Within in

the Outer Islands too strongly to follow our policy and avoid

that sort.

It is

expand rapidly and eventually have

basis rather than to

which was begun with such enthusiasm

The PKI

and

better to remain small for the time being

all

actions of

to lay a

break

to

sound

off that

45 .

dogma by profoundly

theses reflected a retreat into radical

disenchanted Europeans, but at the same time they were not unrelated to the general

Indonesian political mood. The

SI,

Sarekat Hindia, and

even uncompromised Budi Utomo were also concluding that what was

now needed was

not broad popular influence and alliances but organi-

zational discipline

own

of their

and

insistence that

group. Inevitably, this

members adhere to the principles led them to reconsider the long-

established custom of multiparty membership.

Utomo adopted

In

June 1920 Budi

the principle of party discipline, which forbade

mem-

bers of the association to belong to other movements. Although disap-

B

was a major reason for this decision, an exception was made for membership in the SI in order to placate the younger and less conservative Budi Utomo adherents. 40 Sarekat Hindia and the PKI responded with party disciproval of the Sarekat Islam’s role in the Section

affair

pline requirements of their own, again excepting the all-important

Sarekat Islam. For the time being, the CSI took no action discipline, destroying the last

was

hope

of a unified Indonesian

itself.

Party

movement,

would accept only if all other alternatives Moreover, such an action would reduce the Si’s stature from

a course Tjokroaminoto

failed.

one of implied primacy

Within the Jogjakarta

to that of equality

faction,

favor of expelling those

with the other parties.

however, voices began to be heard

who would

in

not be loyal solely to the Sarekat

and Bergsma, the Jogjakarta leaders thought the

Islam. Like Baars

time had come to abandon the idea of leading an amorphous mass

movement and

that ideological

and organizational

discipline

must be

the order of the day. In the

first

framework PKI-SI

half of 1920 polarization developed principally within the

of the

PPKB,

alliance. Relations within the federation

plex, since the executive

unions,

the latest and last cooperative effort of the

which were

had

practically

were exceedingly com-

no control over

its

component

loyal to the heterogeneous political viewpoints of

4 their individual leaders.

'

Moreover, the rivalry between Semarang

and Jogjakarta within the PPKB was heightened because its two prinSurjopranoto and Semaun both wanted Tjokroamicipal leaders

—

noto’s position as chief of the SI.

—

The competition between Semarang 89

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

and Jogjakarta within the federation was thus particularly intense, with tlie result that the PPKB more often resembled a political battlefield than a functioning labor organization. Surjopranoto was,

we

will

remember, the head of the sugar workers’

PFB. During 1919 and early 1920 acute unrest abled the

PFB

March 1920

to organize the plantation

the union sent a

containing various

workers rapidly; and in

memorandum

wage demands and

in the sugar areas en-

Sugar Syndicate

to the

the request that the

PFB be

recognized as the sugar workers’ bargaining agent. The employers replied that they

would

fire all

taken. At this point the try that

it

would not

members

of the

PFB

government took a hand;

if

assured the indus-

it

tolerate political strikes, but

any action were

it

sharply criticized

the planters for refusing to negotiate or to improve wages.

The Gover-

nor General ordered the Residents in the sugar areas to investigate

working conditions on the plantations, taking evidence not only from estate administrators but also

men

(that

is,

PFB

might be forced

from workers and

representatives).

to recognize the

therefore decided to back

It

began

PFB

down on

to

their

chosen spokes-

seem that the

estates

as a bargaining agent; they

their employees’

economic de-

mands, and they doubled wages and improved benefits considerably. 48

PFB

was a hollow one. It had gained what the workers wanted but not what the union needed its recognition as a bargaining agent. Such acceptance was doubly necessary because Indonesian workers of that day were inclined to view unions solely as associations formed to lead strikes; they joined them in times of hardship, but once their basic economic demands were satisfied or the strike failed they lost all interest in the organization. This was a phenomenon that plagued the Indonesian labor movement as a whole, and it was particularly marked among the less skilled wage earners in private enterprises, who were least inclined to organize, least able to pav dues, and most vulnerable to employer retaliation. 49 Realizing the precarious position in which nonrecognition placed both his union and his For the

this victory

—

—

—

political ambitions,

momentum ment

the

Surjopranoto determined to take advantage of the

PFB had

built

up

to force a strike for the

acknowledg-

of his union as the sugar workers’ bargaining agent.

In June, shortly before the beginning of the harvest season (the onlv

time

when

the plantations were in need of a full labor force and hence

vulnerable) Surjopranoto declared to a wildly cheering rallv that a general sugar strike would take place unless the employers agreed

90

The Bloc Within immediately to recognize the PFB. The estates had not yet

power

felt

the

of the union, he declared; of the thirty-six sugar strikes thus far,

only three had actually been sponsored by the PFB. This was no com-

pliment to union organization, but to Surjopranoto

spirit,

not disci-

was the essence. He asserted that the union’s lack of a war chest and its inadequate preparation need not discourage the strikers; the workers were used to poverty and hardship, and temporary loss of income would therefore not make much difference to them. 50 Tjokroaminoto backed Surjopranoto’s demand, although his enthusiasm was understandably limited. Hadji Agus Salim strongly supported Surjopranoto, in good part from a desire to embarrass Semarang and

pline,

The leftist leaders themselves were in a very unpleasant predicament. They had no desire to bolster the Jogjakarta-based labor movement or to enhance Surjopranoto’s position; moreover, it seemed obvious the strike would be a disaster since it was unlikely to be strongly supported by either die to take control of the labor federation

away from

it.

workers or the government.

At the same time, they could not so” to a defeated

sit

back and wait

to say “I told

PFB. The Semarang leaders had won much

you

of their

movement by arguing that the CSI was a donothing leadership, and it would ill serve them to allow the accusation to be reversed. Caution was too easily equated in the popular mind support in the mass

was supposed

be a hero,

with cowardice

in politics or labor; a leader

willing to face

overwhelming odds without fear of the consequences.

to

Communists refused to participate actively in the strike, their opponents would probably blame them for its failure, and a good deal of this blame might stick. Already it had been publicly suggested in Jogjakarta that the Communists be expelled from the PPKB; the PKI could ill afford to refuse to endorse the strike at the federation’s forthcoming congress, for this would almost surely mean a Moreover,

split

if

the

on unfavorable terms for Semarang. 51

The labor federation’s meeting was held in Semarang on August 1. The fires of disagreement burned briskly at the meeting, and they were industriously stoked by European advisers on both sides ( Communists for Semarang, ISDP socialists for Jogjakarta) who did not share the common Indonesian preference for unity above ideology. Semaun debated hotly with Surjopranoto over the strike plans and

his refusal to

cooperate with the PPKB, and for a while a break seemed unavoidable.

As

usual,

it

was Tjokroaminoto who compromised the 91

crisis, this

time

— Rise of Indonesian

Communism

by a truly heroic effort in which he declared, on the one hand, that he was in principle a Communist and, on the other in order to avert demands that the PPKB take decisions on discipline and union organization that would favor Semarang that the congress was not the place to discuss federation policies. The meeting ended by confirming Semaun as chairman of the federation; but its headquarters were moved

—

—

to Jogjakarta, its

with Tjokroaminoto’s backing, thus hopelessly tangling

lines of control 52 .

Immediately

was held

to

after the congress

proper a meeting of

complete the plans for a sugar

strike.

already indicated what he wanted from Semarang

and a

VSTP

PPKB

leaders

Surjopranoto had

—help with agitation

strike against railroad lines serving the sugar mills.

The

Communists agreed, but they must have done so with heavy hearts the sugar harvest was ending, and Semaun and Bergsma were engaged in VSTP wage negotiations that would have been ruined by a pro-PFB railway strike. An ultimatum was accordingly issued to the Sugar Syndicate by the PFB, accompanied by a general strike warning from the labor federation. Meanwhile, the various sponsors of the sugar strike scattered to

maun self

whip up enthusiasm among the

traveled about the district assigned to

potential strikers.

As Se-

him and acquainted him-

with grassroots disinterest, he became convinced that the strike

would be a disaster of much greater magnitude than he and Bergsma had imagined. Desperately he wired his findings to PFB headquarters in Jogjakarta and asked for another meeting to reconsider the strike plan. His messages were promptly intercepted and published by an enterprising Dutch reporter 53 At this painful moment, the Sugar Syndicate rejected negotiation with the PFB on any basis, and the Resident of Jogjakarta warned that the government would take firm measures against strike leaders and agitators if the union proceeded any further with its plans. The SI leaders breathed a sigh of relief, for it enabled them to retire gracefully from what had promised to be a catastrophe. The affair by no means improved their feelings toward Semarang, however; nor did it further unity in the PKI itself, for Baars, long a proponent of agrarian action .

centered in the sugar areas, denounced Semaun’s reversal as “undisciplined and un-Communist.” Shortly after this the

54

PFB

declined into obscurity, the victim of

discouragement and employer retaliation

55 .

No

further efforts to or-

ganize the sugar workers (or any other plantation laborers) succeeded

92

The Bloc Within during the colonial period. Moreover, the failure of the effective political activity

which had on Java.

The PFB nists.

so long

among

the rural masses of the sugar areas,

seemed the obvious center

disaster also

ended

Salim and Surjopranoto

of revolutionary activity

Jogjakarta’s tolerance of the

moved

Sarekat Islam by announcing a

PFB concluded

Commu-

Semarang from the conference of the CSI to be held in to dislodge

Jogjakarta at the end of September, to set a date for the next SI

The idea was to declare that, contrary to all expectations, there would be a convention in October. A congress meeting in that month would have to do without a number of the principal SI chiefs, among them Tjokroaminoto, who were either in jail or appearing at the Section B trials. That, however, was just what was wanted by the congress.

Jogjakarta group, for the missing leaders were mostly from the center

and therefore might be reluctant to break with the Communists. Consequently, Salim and Surjopranoto ignored Tjokroaminoto’s telegraphic appeal to delay the convention and set the date for October 16 only two weeks away. 56 Semaun was unable to attend the CSI meeting that called the congress, and he sent Darsono as his emissary. Darsono was denied admission on the grounds that he was not a full CSI member, but as soon and

left

—

as the

meeting adjourned he made

effective

manner.

On

his presence felt in a disastrously

October 6 he began

to publish a series of articles

implicating Tjokroaminoto in the gross misuse of SI funds and asking for a full investigation of the association’s finances. 57

There was good reason for the

to think that Darsono’s allegations

CSI treasury was notoriously empty. Financial

were

true,

responsibility

was not one of the characteristic virtues of the SI leadership, and the Communists themselves do not seem to have been completely free of weakness

in pecuniary matters. 58

Understandably, however, Tjokroaminoto viewed Darsono’s move as a stab in the back. 59 His public image was struck a blow

it

could

ill

endure, for the popular ideal was that of a “pure” leader, the image of the Ratu Adil.

Much

could be forgiven a public hero as long as he

maintained an aura of nobility and authority, but once the idol had

become tarnished it quickly lost its worshipers; and Tjokroaminoto’s appeal had already been seriously compromised by Section B and its aftermath.

The

Jogjakarta SI leaders were not included in Darsono’s attack;

93

60

Rise of Indonesian nonetheless, his accusations

damaged

Communism their position considerably, for

they needed Tjokroaminoto’s prestige as a non-Communist SI leader to obtain the support necessary to jettison the

left.

When

the accusations

brought no ready reply from Tjokroaminoto, they concluded that

it

would be unwise to face up to Semarang; and so, suddenly discovering that few SI leaders could attend, they postponed the congress 01 The attack was by no means a complete disaster for them, however, for it threw Tjokroaminoto into their hands. The SI chairman could not even rely on his own Oetoesan Hindia for support, and the Surabaja SI organization was almost totally demoralized 02 Directly after the congress postponement the Jogjakarta leaders announced the removal of CSI headquarters from Surabaja to their own city. A few days later Salim and Surjopranoto met with Tjokroaminoto in Batavia and secured his acquiescence in this transfer and in a reorganization of the CSI that took all real control of the movement away from him 03 Tjokroaminoto and the Jogjakarta leaders now exchanged polemics with Semarang over Darsono’s criticisms. The tirades were instructive both for their attacks (which showed what they felt the public would believe and disapprove of about their opponents ) and for the points on which they protested their own innocence. Both sides announced first of all that they did not want to split the Sarekat Islam: unity of the national movement must be the first consideration. Both insisted they only wished to purify the association of undesirable elements that were harming it. Semarang declared it wished to do this by ridding the SI of corrupt and vacillating leaders; Jogjakarta sought to accomplish it by expelling the disruptive Communist component. Both sides agreed that the principal struggle must be against capitalism, and the Jogjakarta leaders generally stated the opinion that Communism must be Indonesia’s economic goal. Semarang claimed that its opponents were insin.

.

.

cere in their anticapitalist protestations; Jogjakarta approved of the

Communists’ principles but not of

their divisive

methods

64 .

While the Jogjakarta leaders concentrated on painting the Communists as disrupters of Indonesian unity and slanderers of self-sacrificing leaders, they also developed two other lines of argument that were deeply embarrassing to the PKI. The first was that the Communists, for all

their revolutionary talk,

were

in fact

cowards when

it

came

opposing the government. Surjopranoto brought up Semaun’s

grams

at the

effort.

tele-

and charged that these This attack was the more damaging because

time of the threatened

had defeated the

PFB

to

94

strike

The Bloc Within Semarang had not been involved in the major antigovernment incidents of 1919, and it was not Communist leaders who were currently on trial. Moreover, 1920 had been a year of great labor activity, with workers in all fields demanding higher wages to meet the increased cost of living; frequently they struck and, facing defeat, appealed to

the Semarang-led

PPKB

for aid.

The

federation had managed, princi-

some success in a printing strike in Semarang earlier in the year. However, it was in no position to rescue most of the labor groups that asked for help, 65 and Semaun found himself repeatedly admonishing labor organizers that warm hearts must be accompanied by cool heads. Moreover, he and Bergsma were engaged in VSTP negotiations to acquire wages and bargovernment support,

pally because of

to achieve

gaining rights for private railroad workers equivalent to those employees

on the state-owned

ment

line.

Since their best hope lay in securing a govern-

ruling on the matter, they cooperated with the authorities

opposed wildcat

strike efforts, a strategy that

and

caused some of the more

militant private-line employees to charge that the

VSTP

represented

the privileged group of state workers. All this gave Jogjakarta a

chance

to

fit

the shoe of

weak

leadership to Semarang’s foot, and the

anti-Communists made the most of

A

it.

66

PKI was provided by the Comintern. We will remember that Lenin’s theses were published by the PKI in November and furnished grounds for the charge that Communists were against Islam. The attack was led by Pan-Islamists Salim and second

line of attack against the

Fachrudin; they declared that the thesis opposed “the unity of Islam,”

and

not, as

Semarang

tried to claim, “the evil use of Islam,” that

utilization of religion to justify

is,

the

greed and oppression. The Communists

hotly denied any incompatibility between their principles and Islam,

and replied

to charges that included (since the antithesis to Islam

was

popularly seen not as atheism but foreign-imposed Christianity) that of being a tool of

PKI admitted effective

A

way

at

Dutch imperialism and Christian missionaries. 67 The its December 1920 congress, however, that it had no

to repulse these blows.

was opened on the labor front when the PFB and the pawnshop workers’ PPPB announced that they refused to cooperate with the Communists in the labor federation. Each side blamed the other for having paralyzed the PPKB with factional fighting, and a 68 Nonetheless, a break did split in the organization seemed imminent. not take place; although the PPKB was anything but a functioning third salient

.95

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

was still a symbol of Indonesian unity and neither side wished to be blamed for destroying it. Each faction therefore maneuvered to achieve a situation in which its opponent would be forced to make the break. At this point, however, it was not to anyone’s advantage to bring matters to a head. The Jogjakarta faction, its position shaken along with Tjokroaminoto’s, did not feel ready to push the issue; Semarang had no practical interest in a split, for in spite of Jogjakarta’s counterattacks it had the initiative in the Sarekat Islam, where its influence among the rank and file continued to grow. 69 Moreover, SI morale was visibly deteriorating under the impact of the dispute; branch activity seemed at a standstill, and its unions were split by dissent. The Dutch-language press had capitalized on the revelations of corruption and factional self-seeking, and the arrest of various Indonesian opposition leaders in November added to the protests that Semarang and Jogjakarta were only serving the Dutch by feuding. If the SI centers were to coexist, however, it was apparent that they would have to find some basis for relations other than the hotly traded insult. The first moves were made by the Communists; Semaun, in particular, seems to have had serious reservations about Darsono’s attack and about the desire of his more sectarian colleagues to break with the Sarekat Islam. 70 Darsono was one of the Indonesian politicians jailed in November, and immediately afterward the Communist journals, under Semaun’s direction, began to publish articles deploring the disruptive effects of the dispute and assuming a more or less neutral stand on Darsono’s action. 71 At the- end of December the CSI announced that, in view of the PKI's positive attitude at its recent congress, it was willing to end the dispute. This was followed by a PFB decision not to abandon the trade union federation, 72 and the Jogjakarta SI declared that it would be content if Darsono were expelled at the next SI congress. Just before the SI convention, which was held on March 2 to 6, 1921, Semaun and Hadji Agus Salim drew up a program founded on Islamic and Communist principles, which they presented organization,

to the

In

all

it

meeting as a basis of agreement:

[its]

policies

and

aspirations the Sarekat Islam

is

inspired

by the

and precepts of Islam: Regarding state power, there must be a people’s government, with the to appoint and discharge officials in the common interest.

principles a) right

b)

Regarding management of the various types of

96

labor, councils

must

The Bloc Within be formed composed of the leaders of these groups of workers direct c)

them

will

at their tasks.

Regarding production and the seeking of a

work with

who

all his

living,

every person must

may he

strength and heart, but in no wise

appropriate for

himself the fruits of another’s labor; which requirement can be met at present by returning the wealth and property used for production to the

common ownership

of the people.

d) Regarding the division of the fruits of

toil,

Islam forbids anyone from

common interest be goal of human equality.

hoarding these for himself, requiring instead that the served by using the results of It is felt this is

in the

all

labor to further the

can be achieved only

the distribution of products and profits

if

hands of a popular representative assembly

The March

SI congress continued this

major issues were disposed of having been disavowed by

fairly

his party

to Tjokroaminoto, apologized for the

of his accusations

74 .

He was

theme

73 .

of disengagement.

The

quickly and amiably; Darsono,

and attacked by SI delegates

loyal

manner though not the substance

appointed

member

of a committee to

CSI funds, thus effectively burying that issue ( for it was tacitly assumed that nothing would come of the investigation), and motions of confidence in both Tjokroaminoto and Semaun were then passed. The PKI chairman forestalled religious criticism by declaring his admiration for the Islamic faith and stating that he investigate Tjokroaminoto’s use of

Communists to become rivals of the Sarekat Islam. Reportedly, he commented at several points that the Communists should function as intellectual leaders who would influence the mass movement from within and that as long as the Sarekat Islam followed the new unity program it would not be necessary for the PKI to establish itself as an independent party 75 Semaun was clearly inclined to go far to preserve participation in the Sarekat Islam. For one thing, he generally favored unity above purity, and for another his position as Tjokroaminoto’s rival in the movement was now very strong, for Surjo-

saw no reason

for the

.

pranoto, the only other serious contender, had faded completely as a

popular

figure.

The Salim-Semaun unity program was, after some confusion, adopted by the congress. Its statement of principles was far enough to the

left to

border on the Communists’

condemned

capitalism: “It

is

own

position, for

it

unreservedly

the conviction of the Sarekat Islam that

the evil of national and economic oppression must be considered exclusively a product of capitalism, so that the people of this colony,

97

if

they

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

must necessarily struggle against capitalism to the best of their strength and ability, above all through labor and peasant unions.” 76 At the same time, however, Tjokroaminoto and

wish to be freed from that

evil,

Salim announced reassuringly that the declaration was based solely on the Koran and could be accepted by any Muslim.

More important than this as a practical gesture toward compromise was the withdrawal of a Jogjakarta motion forbidding SI members to join other political organizations. In

accord with Tjokroaminoto’s ad-

was put off until a special congress, tentatively scheduled for the end of August 1921. Meanwhile, the SI locals were to discuss the question among themselves and to inform the CSI of their

vice,

the question

views;

if

a branch wished to introduce party discipline

itself, it

could

do so without the consent of the CSI. Although the PKI was among the potentially prohibited organizations,

Semarang voted

which was passed unanimously by the congress. 77 In spite of these public demonstrations of good agreement was very left

wings had

in

will,

Before the March congress, the

filled their

powerful voices less.

thin.

for the motion,

the veneer of Si’s right

journals with mutual denunciations, 78

and and

both camps had argued that cooperation was use-

Baars, while he maintained that the SI could provide an important

peasant-based complement to the workers’ movement, declared that

under

its

current leadership nothing could be expected of that organi-

zation:

The

SI has degenerated and decayed, principally

ble mistakes of

its

leadership, through

its

by reason

of the irrepara-

absolute lack of any sense of

and through the boundless ambition of various prominent members, who have found fatal imitation in nearly all the branches. Contin-

responsibility,

ued

in this

manner,

it

can end in nothing but a stinking morass

full

of

poisonous gases. 79

At the congress, the Jogjakarta faction distributed a Pan-Islamic brochure by Hadji Fachrudin, which denied that Communism and Islam were at

The Jogjakarta SI leader Abdul Muis and the Dutch PKI member Van Burink engaged in a verbal duel that brought the meeting into an uproar. Van Burink also quarreled with Semaun: he wished the Sarekat Islam to join the PKI in boycottall

compatible.

ing the Volksraad, but Semaun, anxious to repair his relations with Jogjakarta, urged that Hadji

Agus Salim be given leave from the CSI to accept a Volksraad appointment from the Governor General. Discussion of the new SI program led to further conflict and confusion, and 98

The Bloc Within Tjokroaminoto and Semaun managed to keep the congress centered on the

theme

of unity only with the greatest effort. 80

number of Europeans in the PKI demanded at the time of the March congress that the Communists break with the CSI on principle. 81 Certainly, Het Vrije Woord gave every sign that it considered a breach inevitable and would not regret one: “We do not wish to promote the schism; the interests of the workers demand the contrary. However, if it is pushed through by the other side, we will Reportedly, a

accept

it.

It

will

be seen afterward which party has chosen the side of

the workers and peasants.”

seemed

to revive their

82

Nonetheless, events at the congress

hopes that something could

still

be gained from

the bloc within. Baars was not entirely pleased with the Salim-Semaun

compromise (“We cannot be completely content with this program”) but he considered the congress a victory for the left and promised to be

more

polite to the

To summarize our

non-Communists impression,

in the future:

we may

state that iron necessity has driven

by the Communists, even though they were extremely upset by the manner indeed, not gentle in which they were urged in that direction. It has appeared, however, that we must revise that method of pressure, since otherwise personal sensitivities can do too much damage to the affair. We shall indeed keep this feeling in mind in the future, though of course we cannot weaken the pressure itself. 83 the SI leaders to pursue the path pointed out

—

—

In general, the

PKI

leaders

seem

had represented a showdown and

to

have thought that the congress

that they

had won; they exhibited

considerable optimism just after the meeting and opined that future differences

would be even more

easily resolved. 84 In their pleasure

over the immediate achievements of the congress, the Communists

seem

to

have forgotten that the meeting also gave the Jogjakarta

leaders something they wanted: time. Tjokroaminoto’s position

very weak at the March congress

—even

was

Oetoesan Hindia had sug-

gested that “younger forces” assume the party chairmanship

—and had

a fight over party leadership occurred, the results would have been difficult

to

predict. 85

danger and sought

The opponents

to avoid

of

Semarang appreciated

this

an immediate contest; as soon as the con-

gress adjourned, they set about strengthening their position.

To do

so,

they had to revive the non-Communist energies of the movement,

which were by now seriously weakened. Of the 200-odd registered Sarekat Islam branches, only 57 had sent delegates to the congress and none came from outside Java. Contact between the CSI and 99

its

locals

— Communism

Rise of Indonesian

had

down, and

largely broken

listlessness

and discouragement seemed

to characterize Indonesian politics as a whole.

The

chief figures rallying the anti-Semarang SI

and Hadji Agus Salim. The

were Tjokroaminoto

had been charged with preparing

latter

the proposed reorganization of the Sarekat Islam, munists’ displeasure, for they correctly viewed

gerous opponent.

The two

him

to the

as their

Com-

most dan-

non-Communist and priming them to

leaders toured the various

branches of the movement, reviving their interest expel Semarang. Their arguments

could not hope to survive,

much

for

much

made

less

united behind a single leadership and

three points:

regain

its lost

became

First,

the SI

influence, unless

it

a real party instead of a

The PKI, Sarekat Hindia, and Budi Utomo had instituted party discipline for their own movements, making an exception for membership in the Sarekat Islam because it was

collection of warring factions.

the key to the masses.

drained

Why

should the SI suffer these parasites,

strength and preserved

its

it

who

in confusion?

Secondly, religion should be the keystone of SI action, for Islam was the factor that united the Indonesian people and contained, in addition to spiritual values, all the

braced by Marxism.

major economic and social principles em-

Thirdly, the

PKI was openly connected with the

European Communist movement, particularly the Dutch; hence, the PKI was a tool of European colonialism. Europeans, no matter what they professed, could have no real interest in a socialist Asia.

Had

not

the Comintern theses opposed Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism, and thus the unity of Islam and Asia? In the last analysis, they argued, the

PKI was an instrument whereby the Dutch policy of divide and rule was extended to the Indonesian independence movement. On the other hand, the SI was genuinely Indonesian, genuinely Islamic, and witness

therefore,

recently adopted program

—genuinely

Communist. Why, adopt a foreign product when you could have a native one

its

that possessed additional virtues?

86

The fragility of the congress agreement was revealed in June 1921, when the neutral Union of Native Public Works Employees (VIPBOW) called its fellow PPKB members together to discuss the possibility

of restoring the

shattered unity of the federation.

The

labor

organization had greatly declined in membership from the peak of a 87

had occurred principallv within Surjopranoto’s PFB and other non-Communist unions. Semarang, on the other hand, was riding out the slump rather well; in fact, its major claimed 150,000

in

mid-1920;

this loss

100

— The Bloc Within union, the

by

VSTP, had more than doubled

its

membership and was now

Of the unions represented at the sugar and pawnshop workers’ unions

far the largest unit in the federation.

the conference, only two

—

were partisans of Jogjakarta; three were neutral but opposed schism, and ten supported Semarang 88

to

.

Understandably, Semaun thought himself in a strong position meeting, for

it

seemed

that his opponents could not possibly control

the conference; hence, the onus of any schism

would

fall

on them. lie

PPKB

began by pointing out the

all

too obvious fact that the

effectively inoperative, for half

its

executive refused to cooperate

therefore

was

at the

with the other

half.

The only

solution

was

to elect a

new

the conference, he asserted, provided the opportunity. karta unions naturally opposed this suggestion, and

it

executive,

and

The two Jogjawas eventually

acknowledged that the meeting did not constitute a PPKB congress and thus could not elect officials. Not satisfied with this, however, the

by Muis and Salim, outlined their reasons for refusing to cooperate with Semarang. The Communists, they charged, made slanderous attacks on their colleagues, were tools of the Dutch, and were cowards when it came to really putting on a strike. Semarang’s supporters replied in kind, and the session ended in a shambles. This quarrel apparently convinced the Semarang unions that their initial willingness to compromise had been foolish, for they reintroduced the matter of electing a new leadership on the second day and the whole debate began again. At this point, Semaun and Bergsma made a fatal slip: the Jogjakarta unions had argued that a new executive could be elected only if all members of the old one resigned, and Jogjakarta unions, led

so they declared the current leadership to

be dissolved. Immediately

Semarang members wished to resign, they themselves no longer need do so, for their sole objection to the PPKB had been the presence of Communists in it; the federation executive would therefore continue without Semarang mem89 bers. With that they broke up the meeting This political sleight of hand was performed in an atmosphere of near chaos, with both sides making wild personal attacks on their opponents. The leftist leaders attempted to recoup some of their losses by holding a rump conference at which they announced the creation of a Revolutionary Federation of Labor Unions (Revolutionnaire Vakcentrale, RVC), to be centered in Semarang. A portion of the title originally urged by the ISDV for the labor federation was thus resurrected. the Jogjakarta representatives declared that

.

101

if

the

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Times had changed, however, and the Communists could better appreciate the public servants’ fears of being compromised; there was no mention of Bolshevism

founding of the new federation, and

at the

it

had been chosen to distinguish the new federation from the old and not to indicate any desire to

was

stressed that the term “revolutionary”

overthrow the government.

The RVC’s

first

move was

to issue a manifesto, in the

classical

fashion of the united front from below, to bid for the allegiance of

opponents’ membership. The

PPKB

replied in kind,

its

and the next few

months were taken up with the battle. The RVC controlled fourteen unions, all loyal to Semarang and composed mostly of blue-collar workers; of these, the

The PPKB

VSTP was by

controlled three unions

far the largest

whose

and best organized.

directorates interlocked with

PPKB, PFB, and Sarekat Postel (post, telephone, and telegraph workers). Of the neutral unions, VIPBOW was initially inthe CSI: the

clined toward the

RVC

but soon turned to the CSI-led federation,

along with the teachers’ associations. These unions remained on the periphery of the PPKB, however. Less politically oriented than the core

group of Jogjakarta unions, they desired a single labor association that

would balance off factional tendencies; thus they mediated between the two federations, although they were basically more conservative than either of them 90 The collapse of the SI-PKI labor alliance presaged events in the political movement. The initial optimism of the Communists vanished soon after the March congress; for a time they continued to rail against .

party discipline, but their arguments lacked energy. Indeed, they

seemed undecided what stand

to take:

some Semarang voices urged

that there be no party discipline in Indonesian politics before inde-

pendence, others that party discipline be imposed but not for the PKI;

was stated that the bloc within the SI seemed doomed and that the Communists should therefore seek alliance on another basis 91 After the split in the labor movement, the Communists no occasionally

it

.

longer gave special emphasis to the party discipline measure; apparently persuaded that the

CSI leaders could not again be won

compromise, they devoted themselves

to a

to attacking their opponents.

The special congress that was to discuss the party discipline issue was set by the CSI for October 92 Late in August, Tjokroaminoto was arrested and charged with perjury in the Section B investigations, and .

he was imprisoned to await

trial.

This ended anv chance of a compro-

102

a

The Bloc Within meant Jogjakarta would control the meeting and would probably prevent any last-minute attempts by Tjokroaminoto to preserve the movement’s unity. The SI chairman’s absence by no means strengthened Semarang, for his imprisonment made him a martyr and mise, since

it

therefore politically unassailable. Just as Sneevliet’s Indonesian oppo-

nents had rallied to praise

him

in his

hour of

exile, so

the Communists

ceased to attack Tjokroaminoto and instead expressed sympathy for his plight. 93

The

was held in Surabaja from October 6 to 10; the effect of Salim’s spadework was immediately evident, for the meeting was entirely under his control. 94 The Semarang faction seems to have been unsure whether to attend, and Semaun did not at first take his place on the podium with the other members of the CSI executive. On the third day, the major agenda items were put before the delegates: the program adopted by the March meeting, and the proposal for party discipline. Salim interpreted the program and explained that the SI was revolutionary in the sense that it strove for the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity and that it acknowledged the possibility of violence in achieving those aims. However, he continued, the SI congress

movement did not seek therefore

it

these goals for one class but for

did not base

character, but

it

was

itself

on the

all classes;

was national in was based on reli-

class struggle. It

also international

because

it

gion; so far as nationalism represented the interests of a single class

probable reference to the Sarekat Hindia’s “national

would oppose

tions), the SI

it.

(

capitalist’’ inclina-

95

Semarang did not object to this exegesis, but reserved its arguments until Salim and Muis moved to tie acceptance of the program to party discipline. At that point Tan Malaka, a rising young Communist leader, urged that an exception be made for the PKI, since Communism was the natural ally of Islam in the struggle against imperialism.

Were

not

the Bolsheviks allies of the Muslims in the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan,

and Bukhara; were not the

British imperialists so afraid of this

union that they demanded the Soviet government abstain from propa-

ganda

should take a lesson its

was religiously international, then it from the Islamic community abroad and preserve

in those countries? If the SI

alliance with

Communism.

Semaun, taking another wing,

it

would

beginning

—a

lose the

tack,

argued that

if

masses and return to

abandoned what it had been

the SI

its left

in the

minor union of Muslim merchants. Religion alone was 103

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

not a sufficient basis for the Indonesian popular movement, for

it

could

serve a capitalist ideology as well as a socialist one. Moreover, not

all

Indonesians were Muslim; what of the Christian minority, whose support was so important in winning the native soldiery over to independ-

ence? The struggle must be for restrict

and

it

to

one religion was

all

oppressed Indonesian classes; to

to follow the

government policy of divide

rule.

Salim replied to these arguments that everything stated by Marx was already contained in the Koran, even the principle of dialectical materialism. It

was true

that the

Muslims of the Middle East accepted aid

from the Bolsheviks, but they were independent of them and did not allow them in their midst.

The

SI could not go on being a battlefield

for other parties, unable to determine

its

own

course;

if it

lost

members

would do so in order to build a wellknit, purposeful cadre that in the end would be far more effective than nebulous mass support. A vote was taken, party discipline was approved by a great majority, and so far as the CSI was concerned the bloc within was ended. The collapse of the alliance represented more than the end of a period for the Indonesian Communist party. It marked a great and fatal schism in the Indonesian independence movement, which re-

by imposing party

discipline,

it

sulted in the retirement of the general populace from the political

scene for the rest of the colonial period. Of the 196 branches claimed

by the Sarekat Islam

at the

time of the October congress, only 36 sent

delegates to the meeting and only one

the mass

who

movement had

fallen

on

came from outside

evil times;

believed that discipline would give

were never more wrong.

104

it

Java. Clearly,

but those on both sides

momentum and

direction

— VI

Elective Affinities

THE

acceptance of party discipline by the October 1921 congress

ended the bloc within the Central Sarekat Islam but not

in the SI as a

whole. This apparent contradiction arose because the association,

which had originally been forbidden to organize on a centralized basis, had allowed only a coordinating function to the CSI. The central board could expel only

its

own

associates; the right to

determine

who

should

or should not belong to the SI branches lay with the locals themselves.

A

proposal to transform the Sarekat Islam into a centrally controlled

party was on the agenda of the October congress, but no action was

taken on

it

at the time; as a result, the party discipline decision applied

CSI and to those who represented locals before the central body. When the measure was passed, Semaun and the representatives of the five branches that opposed it at the congress Semarang, Salatiga, Sukabumi, Kaliwungu, and Surakarta severed their connections with the CSI and left the meeting. 1 Their disaffiliation was only personal: it was agreed that they would present the question of party discipline to their respective locals for a vote, and if only to

members

of the

—

the branches disagreed with them, other leaders

would be elected

to

represent their locals before the CSI.

This meant that the same battle would

when

now be

fought out in the

was completed would the symbiotic Communist-SI relationship be entirely ended. The separation of the two elements promised to be no easy task. In spite of the longstanding feud between Semarang and the CSI, factional divisions within the movement were not clearcut. By no means all Semarang Sarekat Islam branches, and only

it

adherents were PKI members; the Communist party had counted 269

members policy,

it

in

1920 and,

in spite of the

contained fewer a year

certain even

among

this

rescinding of Ilartogh’s restrictive

later. 2

Ultimate loyalties were not

core group: Alimin, for example, was generally

considered a CSI supporter

in

spite of his long

105

membership

in the

— Communism

Rise of Indonesian

PKI/ISDV. Personal

rivalries

and ambitions determined

factional lean-

and

ings to at least as great a degree as did ideology,

in spite of

elements in both Jogjakarta and Semarang factions that urged

reli-

ance on a small, ideologically pure group, neither side was willing to

impose undue pressure sonal

and too

for

commitment. Leadership was both too per-

scarce: alienation of a local political figure

might lose the

support of an entire branch, and loss of a leader of national rank would

be a serious blow

to a faction’s general prestige.

Many lesser

politicians,

concerned either for the unity of the Indonesian movement or for their

own position demand for

as SI officials,

were not inclined

many branches

a decision. Moreover,

weaken themselves and

to cooperate

with the CSI

did not wish to

by ousting their pro-Semarang members. Consequently, a large number of SI units refused to declare themselves either for Semarang or for Jogjakarta: a flagrant case was that of the radical Bandung SI, which, to the helpless disturb personal friendships

indignation of the Jogjakarta leadership, took part in a CSI-sponsored regional conference that followed the break

member

ative the only

Communist party

of

its

executive

by sending

who

as

its

represent-

did not belong to the

3 .

In short, separation of Semarang’s following from the Sarekat Islam

by no means followed automatically from the October congress decision. The process would, it was clear, involve intensive and delicate efforts on the part of both factional centers to commit their following. In this effort the activity of each side’s most popular leader was indispensable. As

was

in jail

it

happened, neither was available,

and Semaun

left

split.

Tjokroaminoto

the country shortly after the congress.

Furthermore, neither side was sure carry the

for

at this point

how

far

it

wished

to

In arguing for party discipline at the October meeting,

the Jogjakarta leaders had stressed that the end of the bloc within did

not preclude cooperation with the Communists on other bases. Within the

PKI

itself

the influence of the radical purists had declined; the

Indonesians were becoming increasingly independent of their remaining European advisers, and two major opponents of compromise

Baars and Darsono

—were

no longer

feeling in the party that the

in the colony.

CSI desire

for

There was some

comprehensive party

disci-

was justified and that cooperation on the basis of a simple alliance would be more profitable to both sides 4 Semaun did not share

pline

.

this

view, but neither did he contest the congress decision. Instead,

with a

final

plea to his erstwhile colleagues not to tread the path of

106

Elective Affinities Islamic capitalism, he urged cooperation on specific projects via com-

mon membership

0

“National Committee. According to

in a

he and Semaun pressed the CSI leaders

ment

to join in

agreement.”

at the

Tan Malaka,

meeting for a commit-

such a committee and managed to secure their “semi-

5

Both the Semarang leaders and

their rivals

were acutely aware of the

would have on the popular following of both factions. The CSI treasury was empty, its adherents apathetic; Semarang’s base of support was more active, but it also was greatly discouraged. Malaka, who succeeded Semaun as PKI chairman, considered the split a disaster and did not hesitate to blame his party

demoralizing effect all-out

for helping to bring

As a newcomer I

about:

it

to the

hostilities

movement,

I

tried to see a just cause for the break.

was, however, unable to find such a reason.

I

only saw that the polemics in

Octoesan Hindia and Sinar Hindia had no connection with principles but

were instead concerned almost solely with personal matters, and were accompanied by slanderous remarks. Polemics which were based on insults and which did not provide accurate accounts were causing the common people to lose a good deal of their faith the PKI.

I

in the leaders of

both the CSI and

feared that this split would not be limited to the CSI and the

[executive of the] locals, those led

PPKB

but would continue to spread throughout the

both by the CSI and by the PKI.

A

schism of this

sort,

taking place in a period of reaction, would be exceedingly dangerous for the

people and would make

much

easier the

work

of the reactionaries

Malaka’s feeling that unity was required was

throughout the Indonesian political world. Budi

6 .

generally shared

Utomo had been

urging coordination of effort through a national committee since late 1920; the

ing

life

CSI leaders had devoted considerable into the Concentration of People’s

effort in

1921 to breath-

Liberation Movements,

and the Sarekat Hindia pressed proposals that the opposition parties fuse into one mass organization. None of these efforts was successful, for personal and political differences prevented any lasting alliance, but cooperation on specific projects did increase during 1921. In August,

a

Committee

for

Strengthening the Spirit of the

Movement

(Comite Meneguhkan Keberanian Pergerakan) was formed by Budi

Utomo, the CSI, and a number of labor unions in Jogjakarta to coordinate their efforts and support those in difficulty with the authorities. In November, the Communists surrendered their objections to multiparty cooperation and sponsored a meeting against government interference 107

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

with Si-sponsored schools and against the continued existence of seignorial lands.

The demonstration,

in

which Budi Utomo, the Sarekat

and Sarekat Hindia participated and which was attended by an estimated 5,000 persons, was viewed by the authorities as the year’s Islam,

high point in antigovernment cooperation. 7 This desire for unity was in part a defensive reaction to the changing policies of the colonial

government.

We have

noted the mutual

sionment between the government and Indonesian during the

latter part of the 1910s;

political

movements

both sides had expected too

each other, and disappointment led to

distrust. In addition,

disillu-

much

Dutch

of

colo-

was undergoing a reaction from the Ethical assumptions of the early years of the decade. The war and its accompanying fears for Dutch power in the Indies contributed to this; even more important were the great expansion of the Indies export economy and the increasnial policy

ingly conservative character of the postwar Netherlands governments.

Ethical arguments for the social and economic development of the

Indonesian population gave

good

for

way

to the rationalization that the highest

both motherland and colony was served by promoting and

protecting European enterprise.

was a concept that appealed vastly to the Indies Dutch, who had long been impatient of “sickly Ethicism,” but it was not one that attracted the Indonesians, who saw it as proof of the radicals’ argument that colonial rule could benefit only the It

Europeans.

By

1920, Ethical proposals found support in the Netherlands parlia-

ment only from the Nonconfessional Democrats, Socialists, and Communists, an ineffective and incompatible minority. A stubborn battle for Ethical principles was led by the Leiden professors Van Vollenhoven, Snouck Hurgronje, and Carpentier Alting; but although these scholars enjoyed wide respect, their arguments were totally unacceptable to postwar Dutch opinion. Increasingly, “Leiden” came to mean not the scholarly conscience of colonial policy but woolv-minded interference in the hardheaded politics of imperial rule. 8 With the change in policy came a change in rulers. When Idenburg resigned as Minister of Colonies in November 1919, he was replaced by the archconservative Simon de Graaff. When Governor General van Limburg Stirum finished his tour of duty, he was replaced, in April 1921, by one of his most vociferous critics, Dirk Fock. The new Governor General was a laissez-faire Liberal, and one of the chief points on which he had attacked his predecessor was the rapid increase in gov108

— Elective Affinities

ernment expenditures

for

Van Limburg

education, and government services.

Stirum’s

He saw

program

his principal task as

ernor General as balancing the Indies budget; this was no taking, for the previous

of welfare,

government had gone heavily

Gov-

mean underinto debt

many of the new taxes it had imposed had not yet been by the home government and Fock had assumed office at

partly because

sanctioned

—

the onset of an international recession, which severely hurt the colony’s

export economy. Fock was not a

man

however; he promptly introduced a

to boggle at drastic remedies,

series of

bone and increasing taxes con-

ures, cutting public expenditures to the

began to of the declining economy government

siderably. In addition, the taxes proposed

be implemented, so that

in spite

draconian financial meas-

by

his predecessor

receipts rose sharply.

The

great weight of this increase

fell

on the already overtaxed Indo-

nesian population, for Fock proceeded on the conservative premise that to get an

economy going

when he

again, the

burden on industry should be

money by an excess profits tax on the petroleum industry, he was turned down by the Minister of Colonies, to whom the oil interests made it clear that, although they could afford to pay, they did not choose to do so 10 The eased

9

.

Moreover,

did attempt to raise

.

Indonesians naturally looked on this with extreme misgivings, the more so since the government’s arguments of dire necessity in cutting welfare

items in

its

budget were vitiated by a simultaneous campaign

crease considerably the Indies military forces and

fleet.

to in-

Both within

and without the Volksraad, Indonesian spokesmen protested the government’s tax policy, but the result of their efforts was very close to zero 11 Their failure impressed upon them the political helplessness of the Indonesians in the face of determined government opposition, and .

it

contributed to the growing feeling that there could be no community

between themselves and the Dutch. The trend toward extreme economic and social conservatism was accompanied by decreased government tolerance for Indonesian politi-

of interests

cal opposition. In part, this continued the process of disillusionment

had begun before Fock; however, in spite of the mutual suspicion that marked the last years of Van Limburg Stirum’s rule, the Indonesians looked on that governor as an enlightened and sympathetic ruler. Not so Fock, however; his tenure has gone down in Indonesian nationalist histories as a time of black reaction, and it was seen thus by Indonesians of that day. The characterization is somewhat unfair, for, that

109

Rise of Indonesian especially

when compared

Communism

to the Indies

regimes of the 1930s. Fock’s

was not completely intolerant. Like a number of other Dutch Liberals, he had once supported the Ethical program; although he now gave priority to Netherlands economic interests, he continued to think that he was following a basically Ethical course. As a lawyer and a Liberal, he was concerned for due process of law and for the rights of political expression; before he assumed office, he had indicated that he intended to expand the freedom of the Indies press. He was, however, a rigid and stubborn man one who said what he meant, had no patience with vagueness or haggling, and equated compromise with weakness. Although he had lived in the Indies earlier and Van Limburg Stirum rule

—

had

he was far

not,

predecessor,

less

who was by

understanding of the Indonesians than his nature, philosophy,

and diplomatic training

able to see and respond to other points of view.

Though Fock upheld

libertarian political principles, his concern for

was severely limited by his belief that unthe colony was produced by troublemakers rather than by genu-

their application in the Indies rest in

ine popular grievances. In his view, unwise toleration of such elements

had resulted

in the disturbances of

1918-1919;

now

that the Indies

was

in

was more necessary than ever that the government take a firm stand against any attempts to undermine its authority. It was a very short step, given the gap that separated the Indonesian movements from the colonial regime, to equate all criticism with subversive opposition, and Indonesian political groups aca period of radical economic retrenchment,

cordingly found themselves subjected to

it

much

greater restrictions. At

the same time, Fock did not wish to abandon his principles or to deny the right to criticize; he rights.

was therefore reluctant

to

reduce existing

civil

This ambivalence accentuated the contradictory aspect of colo-

nial political liberty that

criticism

might result

we

earlier:

in severe reprisal;

tions of revolutionary intent

Indonesians were

noted

and

in

one case the mildest

in another, overt declara-

might be tolerated. This meant that the

less certain of

the permissible limits of opposition, and

the possibility of an Indonesian orientation that was neither one of revolution nor

one of noncooperative quietism accordingly decreased.

autonomy movement of 1921-1922 reflected this loss of a middle ground. Autonomy for the Indies was originally a goal of the Ethici, who saw it as part of the process whereby Indies inhabitants of all races would govern the archipelago as partners. Proposals drawn up by the Revision Commission, established to redesign the

The

fate of the

110

Elective Affinities Indies

constitution

in

accord with

the

November autonomy; but it was

concessions

1918, provided for a considerable increase in

of

very soon apparent that these suggestions were opposed by the domi-

nant conservatives, and especially by Colonial Minister de Graaff. In an effort to rescue something of the commission’s program, a

Autonomy was established in December 1921. It consisted of prominent Indies Dutch Ethici and Indonesian regents and Volksraad members. The committee aroused considerable interest among the Indonesian elite and attracted not only the main parties but Committee

for Indies

and the leagues of reSuch were the conservative European objections to

also professional groups, regional associations,

gents and princes.

associationist reform,

however, that

in spite of the committee’s politi-

cally respectable leadership, the limitation of

the Revision Commission,

and the

fact that

its it

goals to those set

by

neither sought nor re-

was widely accused in the Indies Dutch press of desiring Communist support and of being at least indirectly revolutionary. Shortly after its establishment, the movement was dealt a severe blow by the Governor General, who objected to the ceived the backing of the PKI,

it

presence of three regents on a delegation the committee proposed to

send to Holland. In March 1922

it

received the coup de grace

when

Colonial Minister de Graaff announced that he considered revision of

The Leiden Ethici attempted to revive the campaign in the Netherlands by organizing an autonomy committee to influence the parliamentary elections that year. None of the candidates they recommended was elected, the new government was more conservative than the last, and De Graaff, the prime target of their attack, was kept on as Minister of Colonies. 12 the Regeringsreglement unnecessary.

This effectively ended the political influence of Leiden;

marked the political

failure of

it

moderate European-Indonesian association

instrument or goal. The autonomy

movement

also as a

continued, but

moderate aegis of the National Committtee, which had been founded about the same time as the autonomy committee by under the

less

Douwes Dekker and

the radical Ethici Fournier and

Van Hinloopen

Labberton. This committee, which was supported chiefly by the IS DP, Sarekat Hindia, and Sarekat Islam, drew up a national unity program that

aimed

at a federation

composed

of the East Indies, the

West

and the Netherlands on the basis of equality and broad autonomy. The group was inclined toward noncooperation, a leaning that Indies,

was

strongly expressed at the All-Indies Congress

111

it

organized

in

June

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

was associationist in composition, the committee’s members were coming to doubt the benefits of EuropeanIndonesian partnership. As one of its leaders remarked, it was no 1922. Moreover, although

it

longer realistic to seek self-rule together with the Europeans; that goal

would have

To added

to

be achieved by Indonesians and

for their

own

people. 13

the Indonesians’ sense of identity against the Europeans

was

growing awareness of an Indonesian national

self.

at this time a

In 1921 the

word “Indonesia” began

in political discussions;

in intellectual

seriously about an Indonesian state,

Bahasa Indonesia

to replace the colonial “Indies”

—began

to

circles

people began to talk

and Indies Malay

The

existing parties did not lose

their essentially regional or international orientation,

result a

few years

The impulse

future

be spoken instead of Dutch by Indo-

nesian delegates to the Volksraad. 14

deeply affected by

— the

this sense of

but they were

an Indonesian identity, which was

to

later in the first true nationalist groups.

for a unified nationalist political effort

was

greatly

strengthened by the noncooperation campaign then being carried on

by the Indian National Congress under Gandhi’s leadership. The relative effectiveness of the Congress and its ability to overcome regional and religious differences made a deep impression on the Indonesian political elite, whose own organizations lay scattered and stagnant. In all the major parties emulation of the Congress was urged, but the Indian example was particularly useful to the left wing. Semarang could point out that the Indians were united and strong while the Indonesians quarreled and were weak, and could charge that Gandhi braved imprisonment while Tjokroaminoto visibly cowered at the thought. The example of the Congress served both to belabor PKI opponents and to urge them to radical unity; understandably, then, Indonesian Communists did not see Gandhi’s nationalism in the same light as the it

to

be the

mind

in

hybrid patriotism of the Sarekat Hindia. Instead, they held sort of truly revolutionary leadership the

Comintern had

in

advocating nationalist-Communist cooperation. The Interna-

tional itself

was not

so sure;

its

own

organs were at

first

ambivalent and

then sour in their view of the Indian leader, but the PKI continued for

some time to praise Gandhi as an inspiring example for the Indonesian national movement. 15 The moral imperative of Indonesian unity was visible in the willingness of the October 1921 SI congress to consider forms of alliance other

than the bloc within;

it

was even more apparent 112

at a

conference of the

Elective Affinities

PPKB

that took place in the final days of the congress. Although the

meeting was composed of non-Communist unions,

it

was not united on

the question of party discipline and responded favorably to Semaun’s

plea to resume cooperation between the sundered branches of the labor movement. Salim, tion of relations with

who

Communist

reunification, the details of

well have

felt,

led the conference, did not favor restora-

unions, but in the end he agreed to

which were

left to

principles aside, that he could

The VIPBOYV was leading

ill

a later date. 16 afford to

He may

do otherwise.

the non-CSI unions in urging either unifica-

tion or establishment of a third labor center tied neither to

rang nor to Jogjakarta. Pro-Semarang leaders

in

the

Sema-

PFB had

re-

and the union was now moribund and hopelessly split. The PPPB was anticipating a strike and needed all the help it could get; moreover, its Bandung branch, which headed all the

cently ousted Surjopranoto,

Priangan divisions, had elected Communist leaders,

who were

actively

opposing the union’s CSI central command. 17

combined with the exigencies of politics to prevent a real severing of relations between Jogjakarta and Semarang. In effect, the October congress decision left the PKI half in and half out of the Sarekat Islam, and in this awkward position it remained another year and a half. The ambiguity of its condition was illustrated at the Communists’ eighth congress, convened in Semarang at the end of the year. The theme of the meetings was unity; in calling the convention, the PKI executive declared that it hoped to discuss methods

The

ideal of unity thus

by which Indonesian movements could coordinate their efforts against government restrictions on their activities. To this end, it invited the participation of representatives from the CSI and Sarekat Hindia as well as from the PKI and the SI units loyal to Semarang. Two notable concessions to the non-Communists were made in the announcement: it stated that the party hoped for cooperation through a national committee or federation, thus abstaining from a campaign to revive the

bloc within, and

it

specified that the Indonesian struggle should

aimed against “modern organized

be

capital,” a secular phrase for the

18 “sinful” foreign capital the SI opposed.

The meeting, which opened on December 25, was attended by some 1,500 persons, among them representatives of ten PKI branches, fourteen SI locals, and a delegation from the CSI. 19 Portraits of Marx,

Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Lenin, and Trotsky covered the walls of the meeting room, reminding the delegates of the party’s 113

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

international orientation; but hanging with

them were not the

pictures

Dutch leaders from the CPH and PKI that generally looked down on Indies Communist gatherings but likenesses of Sentot, Diponegoro, and Kijai Modjo, heroes of earlier Indonesian struggles against Dutch rule 20 The keynote address was given by Tan Malaka, who for six hours argued for unification of the Indonesian mass movement. His of

.

compared the achievements of the united Indian National Congress and the failures of the divided Indonesian parties. The Congress, he pointed out, was able to organize a noncooperation movediscussion

ment

that the British could not suppress, but the Indonesian opposi-

tion,

which took no such radical

weaker Dutch. Solidarity made the

action,

was paralyzed by the

far

difference: the English did not dare

Gandhi because they knew the Indian people were united behind him. If the Indonesians would only close ranks in similar fashion, the Dutch would be unable to defeat them and they would reverse the arrest

diminution of their political liberties

21 .

By either its persuasiveness or its length Tan Malaka’s speech wore down the opposition, and he noted with satisfaction that both Communist and Islamic response was much more favorable than even he had expected 22 The conciliatory moves were interrupted, however, when .

Abdul Muis, who arrived at the meeting after Malaka had spoken, reopened old wounds by denouncing the past behavior of the PKI within the Sarekat Islam 23 His charges were immediately taken up by the more irascible Communists, and Malaka’s effort seemed doomed, when aid came from an unexpected source. The PKI spokesman was rescued by a widely respected religious .

who was Muhammadijah. He

teacher and CSI leader, Kjai Hadji Tubagus Hadikusumo,

attending the congress as the representative of the

spoke to the quarreling factionalists

in favor of cooperation, using in-

stead of the example of the Indian National Congress the

still

more

powerful argument of the interests of Islam. The Indonesian people, he declared, were in the great majority Islam; this karta.

The

was true

members

of the

Community

of

of Semarang’s adherents as well as those of Jogja-

chief goal of the Indonesian

movement was

to struggle

against the oppression of unbelieving foreign rulers; this struggle could

be carried on effectively only by a united people, and those

who

worked against unity were serving the enemy and acting against Islam. The proper attitude between Indonesian Communists and non-Communists, the

Muhammadijah

leader concluded, should be one of

114

mu-

]

Elective Affinities tual respect

and tolerance

the interests of the greater struggle

in

against the Dutch. 24

This intercession, reflecting doubts

about the CSI’s wisdom

cles

in

felt

even

in

deeply religious

cir-

choosing purity of principle over mass

had a tremendous impact on the congress. As the Malaka described it,

unity,

Hadji Hadikusumo’s message was

like that of a healer

[

grateful

dukun

Tan

bringing

succor to a person on the brink of death. Insults and disputes were buried completely.

From

the side of the

Semarang-oriented stroy their

and

own

SI,

friends

and

RVC

were

CSI and PPKB

as well as

from the PKI,

the voices that sought to slander and de-

stilled.

This was a great victory for both parties

for the entire people. 25

Muis and the anti-Communists suddenly saw their position reversed; they had previously based their arguments against Semarang principally on the incompatibility of Communism and Islam, but they now found the anti-Islamic label threatening to attach itself to them. They accordingly abandoned their opposition, and the meeting decided that both groups would cooperate closely on specific

projects

and would develop some

sort of central

organ through

which their efforts could be coordinated. 26 In addition, a conference between the CSI, the Semarang-oriented SI, the PKI, and the two labor federations was to be held in April 1922 to agree on cooperation in labor and political affairs. On this cautiously optimistic note, the Communist meeting closed to the distant

—but not before sending a telegram of greetings

author of

much

of

its

success, the Indian National

Con-

gress. 27

As

it

made

progress toward an alliance, the congress also

moved

to

end the bloc within by approving a Sarekat Islam Association (Persatuan Sarekat Islam, PSI) to unite the SI units that had left the main body when the Communists were expelled. On October 25, a meeting

had been held

PKI headquarters

Semarang to consider a response to the SI congress decision for schism; it was suggested that an effective way to organize the pro-Communist SI members and win away SI members would be to create “Red” SI units to compete under PKI direction with the regular Sarekat Islam branches. The decision to organize the PSI was made in early November, after lengthy debate. at

in

At the time, the Bandung leader Gunawan suggested that the pro-

Communist

locals

drop the confessional 115

title

and

call

themselves Sare-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian kat Rakjat (People’s Union), but this

was apparently

felt

too radical a

step. 28

In declaring it

its

intention to form the PSI,

hoped the new center would

other

Indonesian

join the

organizations

a

in

Semarang emphasized

that

PKI, CSI, Sarekat Hindia, and

Committee, which,

National

though undefined, was clearly envisioned as an Indonesian counterpart to the Indian National Congress.

Such emphasis on unity and coopera-

tion did not hide the fact that the center

was part

of the competition

with Jogjakarta for the allegiance of the SI rank and this aspect, the

PKI

invited

all

SI locals

and not

ones to participate in the formation of the

membership

file;

just the

new

league.

reflecting

Communist The actual

was limited, however; it consisted of ten locals, 29 all from the general Semarang area. In fact, it formalized the hegemony the Communist-led Semarang regional SI organization had long exerted over locals in northern Central Java. 30 The PSI did not represent the total number of SI units of leftist sympathies, let alone all the individual Sarekat Islam members who looked to Semarang rather of the PSI

than Jogjakarta; that phase of the

split

was yet

to

come.

Three more features of the PKI congress deserve meeting decided

to press the

Comintern

to

abandon

attention.

its

The

stand against

Pan-Islamism, for the religious issue was a powerful weapon for Jogjakarta

and had been used repeatedly

to

urge party discipline. The

Com-

munists, while maintaining that politics should be secularly based, had

attempted to counter these arguments by supporting religion themselves.

They referred, for example, to Koranic passages expressing sympathy for the poor and condemning oppression and greed; they argued that communism was taught by the Prophet and was therefore the basis of Islam, whereas capitalism was the system of the unbelieving West. 31 Efforts to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and Communism were particularly marked in the last months of 1921, perhaps because Tan Malaka, who came from a strongly Muslim area, wanted particularly to avoid a religious quarrel and was sanguine about the revolutionarv potential of Islam. Shortly after the October SI congress, Semarang organized a Hadj Committee to modify government regulations concerning the Mecca pilgrimage that were burdensome or conflicted with Islamic law. The committee secured an audience with the Governor General, and as a result some of the more troublesome hadj rulings were changed. The Communists could thus claim that they were doing as

much

for Islam as Jogjakarta was.

116

Malaka, as

we know,

did his best

Elective Affinities to point out Soviet support of Islam; but the

way

Lenin theses lay

solidly in

and they were brought up again by CSI adherents at the PKI congress. Nothing would suffice, it seemed, but their withdrawal, and the party chairman’s personal feelings on this score were only strengthened when the Muhammadijah invited him after the meeting to address its leaders on the subject of Commuthe

nism.’1

of his argument,

*'

The PKI congress

also discussed Volksraad participation,

surprisingly in view of the party’s previous experience

by the government

that

somewhat

and the reiteration

under no circumstances would Communists be

appointed to the assembly. Apparently some delegates drew hope from the fact that the

PKI had

recently elected four

members

to the

Sema-

rang town council with Sarekat Hindia support, and they speculated that

if

those

the government introduced

who urged

to take

some

electoral reforms as a sop to

constitutional revision, the

Communists might be able

advantage of the urban-skewed voting qualifications, alliance

with other radical groups, and their strength to gain

an elective

seat.

33

in the

Semarang

district

In the end, however, the congress endorsed

Bergsma’s argument that the PKI should lead the other Indonesian

groups in noncooperation, and the subject was permanently buried.

Tan Malaka party chairman. 34 One of Indonesia’s major revolutionary figures, he was born Sutan Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka in Suliki, a small town in the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, during the last decade of the nineteenth century. 35 He was not born into the downtrodden masses; he came of gentry stock, his father was head of his village, and he enjoyed After

its

public sessions, the PKI congress elected

European-style basic schooling. Malaka attended the teacher training school in Bukit Tinggi (then Fort de Kock); according to his account, the

Dutch

assistant director of that institute

families of Suliki to establish a fund to send

him

persuaded the leading to

Holland

to continue

his studies, 36

students in

and he thus joined the then very small elite of Indonesian the Netherlands. He began work at the Haarlem teachers

college in 1913 of education in

and

later studied for a principal’s

Bussum.

demic experience over, the climate

in the

He was

far

diploma

at the school

from a dull student, but

his aca-

Netherlands was no unqualified success; more-

and careless

living

encouraged tuberculosis, which

was several times to endanger his life. While he was in the Netherlands, World War I and the presence of a socialist in his boardinghouse caused Tan Malaka to be swayed by the 117

Rise of Indonesian ideological

Communism

winds that were then roaring over Europe.

Germany

sche and developed an enthusiasm for

He

read Nietz-

that inspired

volunteer for the Kaiser’s army, only to be informed that possess a foreign legion.

He

to

did not

it

read Carlyle and became a passionate

admirer of the French Revolution

advantage of that nation’s

him

—not so much, however, foreign enthusiasts.

facilities for

Russian revolutions came, Tan Malaka began to take

as to take

When

socialist

the

propa-

ganda more seriously, reading Marx, Kautsky, and the outpourings of the early Dutch Marxists. He became more and more attracted to a revolutionary viewpoint but

was not sure

that

it

was appropriate

to

Indonesia. In 1916 he had joined the Indische Vereniging, the association of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. 37

However, when he

was asked by Suwardi Surjaningrat to talk about the Indonesian national movement at a congress of Dutch Indologists in 1918, he first

knew

declined on the grounds that he

little

about the movement and

was not sure he wished to support it publicly. 38 The turning point came, as it did for many Indonesians who studied in Holland, when he returned at the end of 1919 to second-class citizenship in the Indies. For a coolies

little

over a year, Malaka taught contract

on a Sumatran rubber plantation

which, he related,

filled

him with hatred

burning desire to better the early 1921 he

moved

lot

to Java,

of the

—a

disheartening experience,

for the colonial

Dutch and

a

downtrodden Indonesians. In

ready to devote himself to

political

action.

Shortly after he arrived on the central island, to Jogjakarta to visit Sutopo, a friend

Tan Malaka journeyed who was one of the leaders of

Budi Utomo’s progressive younger generation. His trip coincided with the March 1921 SI congress, and his host took him to the meeting to acquaint him with the Indonesian leaders gathered there. Malaka made an immediate impression on Semaun, who was delighted to come

upon an educated and

The PKI chairman suggested that the young revolutionary join him in Semarang and there help establish a school that the Semarang SI was to sponsor. Malaka accepted, and the Indonesian Communist movement gained one of

its

enthusiastic admirer of Marx.

greatest revolutionary talents. 39

The new recruit came to Semarang in July and took up residence in Semaun s house, which was then a gathering place for Semarang’s young revolutionary set. 40 As Malaka later recalled, the radical spirit in the city was then at an ebb, since the exciting days of the soldiers’ 118

Elective Affinities

and

had become only memories and increasingly strict police supervision was depressing both the membership and the spirits sailors' soviets

of the Indonesian organizations

41 .

His

own

project,

however, did not

partake of the general malaise: the Semarang SI school was an immediate success, cities

42 .

and soon branches were established

The Dutch

ment, for

in other

Javanese

were not pleased at this accomplishthey disliked the mushrooming Indonesian-sponsored “wild authorities

which purveyed the ideas of Semarang. Malaka soon became a well-known political figure, launching himself on a long career as ideologue of the Indonesian revolution with a work on parliamentary and soviet government, in which he concluded that the principles of the latter more closely fitted Indonesian traditions 43 Semaun gave him a role in labor organization through bequeathing him the chairmanship of the newly organized miners’ and oil workers’ union, Serikat Buruh Pelikan Indonesia 44 and soon thereafter Malaka schools,” especially those

.

,

inherited the entire party.

Tan Malaka agreed thoroughly with Semaun on

the need for a uni-

movement; he did not, however, approve of his predecessor’s emphasis on caution and consolidation, and accordingly he ignored Semaun’s admonition to continue in that vein 45 As he saw it, a major cause for schism and apathy was PKI concentration in the past year on party organization and Marxist indoctrination instead of a broad campaign of protest against the government. What was needed, he thought, was not a detailed and specifically Communist program fied revolutionary

.

but a wholehearted

effort to force the

government

“extraordinary rights” and other restrictions on

campaign could unite

all

to relinquish the

civil liberties;

Indonesian movements, for none of them

could flourish while the government held these powers. Above

PKI must do and not Certainly

be very

we need

brief.

to

greatly

have a program

in the Indies,

The program must not have chapters

and consistent

impede and

all,

the

talk:

contain only one word, and that for a clear

such a

goal,

but that program must or paragraphs:

it

must

by the Indies proletariat the withdrawal of the powers which so

is

action. Action

injure the popular

movement

46 .

Malaka’s idea to base PKI action on the extraordinary rights issue

may

well have been inspired by the fact that the

Dutch Communists

had raised a parliamentary storm on this subject during his last year in the Netherlands and had been supported by SDAP and other members 119

Rise of Indonesian of the legislature

who were

Communism

4 particularly concerned about civil rights.

'

The Indonesian opposition was certainly agreed on the issue, for all parties except Budi Utomo had had leaders banished. Moreover, since 1919 48 officials had the right of political association had been restricted, been reminded sharply that political opposition was not compatible with government employ, 49 and the number of arrests under the press and speech laws increased considerably/’ 0 To attempt to reverse such a trend would doubtless have been popular with other parties in principle; whether in practice unity would have resulted

is

another matter. Although

tested the limitation of their freedom, central issue.

One

reason

thought the subject had

may have been

that a

may have been

little

all

opposition groups pro-

none had made

civil rights

a

that the mass-oriented parties

interest for the general populace; another

campaign

of direct protest against

government

policy involved risks the parties were only sporadically willing to undertake.

How Tan

Malaka would have gone about organizing the

effort

remains a mystery, however, for events immediately following the PKI convention led him in an entirely different direction.

The cause of this diversion was a pawnshop workers’ strike in January 1922. Members of the PPPB, as low-ranking state employees, were among the first to feel the gathering depression in the form of layoffs and wage cuts under Fock’s economy drive. By mid-1921 they nervously began to threaten a strike if any of their number should be dismissed, and they showed considerable impatience with their leaders’ failure to obtain assurance of their security. Since the PPPB was the principal Jogjakarta union and was headed by Tjokroaminoto, Muis, and Salim, it made an excellent target for Semarang. The RVC made concerted and rather effective efforts to take advantage of the pawnshop workers’ unrest, and the CSI leaders fought back with the argument that the Communists talked much but could not be counted on to back a strike. 51 Government assurances of job security allayed tensions temporarily; but the momentum of unrest was too strong, and by the end of the year the workers had found a new issue on which to walk out. 52

The immediate cause

pawnshop

was a quarrel over requirements that employees carry articles from the pawnshop to the place of auction. For some years this had been a burning issue in the pawnshop service, a government-run institution that played an imporof the

strike

tant role in providing scarce cash for paying taxes

120

and debts. The

— Elective Affinities

pawnshop

officials,

whose

status

was

in a

limbo between white and blue

members of the gentry class from which the bureaucracy was traditionally drawn and for whom manual labor was out of the question. The government, on the other collar, aspired to

be recognized

as prijaji,

hand, took the position that the “continued existence of medieval Javanese attitudes and sentiments regarding the inferiority of manual labor'

was

be discouraged

to

that a

53

and issued a

pawnshop employee’s

instant dismissal. Until 1921

series of directives to the effect

refusal to carry objects

would

most pawnshops had a man of

result in

work;

all

but this deus ex machine vanished with the economy drive, and the

pawnshop officials turned to were not eager to act, for the likely to bring disaster.

their

issue

union for help. The

PPPB

was not negotiable and

However, they could not afford

allegiance of this last major

leaders

a strike

to lose the

CSI union, whose members were begin-

ning to question whether they should continue to support leaders did not defend what they regarded as a

union heads gave

was

who

vital interest. In the end,

the

in.

pawnshop workers’ union was committed, the PPKB was also involved, for that union was the federation’s principal component and the directorates of the two groups interlocked. Nor could the Communist federation refrain: to do so would have been contrary to the direct action policy endorsed by Tan Malaka and Bergsma, would probably have ended the chances of reuniting the labor movement, and would have shown that their earlier wooing of the pawnshop workers had been insincere. As Malaka put it, “The time had come for the Communists to show that at their congress they had not been talking with their mouths alone, but also with their hearts.” 54 The pawnshop strike was Indonesia’s first really large-scale unionsponsored work stoppage. It was not actually started by the union; what the PPPB decided, in effect, was that if the workers struck, it would support them. Consequently, the conflict began locally with the walkout of one employee in a small Central Javanese town and

Once

the

— —

spread in rapid but ragged fashion throughout the island. 55 Within

two weeks height,

it

it

affected 79 of 360 pawnshops,

extended through the

and

in late January, at its

districts of Jogjakarta, Tjirebon,

Peka-

Rembang, Kediri, Surabaja, and Pasuruan 56 The immediate all areas in which the CSI and PKI were most active. government response was to dismiss all who refused to return promptly to work, and the main activity of the labor federations in the strike was longan, Kedu, Semarang,

121

Rise of Indonesian to organize

stand.

On

enough support

January

and Bergsina,

which

in

it

general strike

persuade the authorities to soften

to

RVC

issued a manifesto, signed

effort for

the government stood

if

this

by Nlalaka

called on the Indonesian proletariat to sup-

pawnshop workers’

port the

reinstatement and hinted at a

by the

dismissals. 5

On

'

January

held a mass meeting in Jogjakarta, where leaders from

PPPB

25, the

18, the

Communism

all

the major Indonesian parties and labor unions spoke in support of the

Tan Malaka, who represented the RVC, presented a message of encouragement from the revolutionary federation; this was to be the immediate cause of his expulsion from the Indies. At the same time, unrest among the oil workers, the VSTP, and the dockworkers added strike.

emphasis

to the

RVC threat of a general strike. 58

In these actions the Communists

won

considerable public attention,

but they did not allay the suspicions of the CSI labor leaders. The extent

PKI was

of Jogjakarta’s doubts about the

the strike,

when

area: in spite of

illustrated

toward the end of

the government forbade meetings in the Jogjakarta

Communist

Agus Salim, who then led

urgings, Hadji

the union, refused to transfer the center of the strike organization to

Semarang, because he feared the Communists would take over the

movement once jt was on

Had

their

home

grounds. 59

the other Indonesian organizations seen the immediate cause of

the

pawnshop workers’ walkout

the

PPPB might have found

as the only reason

difficult to

it

secure

nesian associations disapproved of the action

behind the

allies, for

strike,

most Indo-

They viewed

itself.

it,

however, as a product of the general nervousness and insecurity of the time and related lessness

in

it

to their

political

own

affairs.

feeling of

deep frustration and help-

The government’s unbending

seemed symptomatic

of the rigid conservatism of the

which

five

fired

mented

one out of

itself

pawnshop employees

on having thus contributed

to the

in

Java

new

60

economy

attitude

regime,

and compli-

drive. 61

Con-

sequently, the strikers got widespread support, even from moderate

Budi Utomo.

The government

also

saw the

mediate cause. In spite of the

was

strike as representing

more than

strikers’ insistence that their

related to the dismissals, the authorities

viewed

it

its

im-

support

as a revolution-

ary demonstration against foreign rule. 62 Even the leaders of Budi

Utomo, which not long before had been declared the “association which most closely approaches the most desirable form of political action for real progress of this country,”

122

63

were informed that “the

Elective Affinities action of their support for the strikers can be described as nothing less

than revolutionary.”

64

As a "revolutionary” organization, Budi Utomo

was informed that until further notice it could hold meetings only with government permission; apparently the government feared criticism for this punishment of a widely respected party, however, for the Budi Utomo executive was initially instructed to keep secret the restrictions placed upon it. Of the political organizations involved in the strike, the CSI suffered the heaviest damage. The pawnshop workers’ union collapsed after the strike,

putting Jogjakarta permanently out of the race for control of the

movement. 65 Abdul Muis was arrested midway through the strike and subsequently sent out of Java, thus depriving the non-Communist SI of one of its top leaders. The PKI won consider-

Indonesian

labor

able popular sympathy through

strong support of the strike and

its

was inactive; moreover, the government’s sharp retaliation convinced more people than ever that revolution was the only answer. Nonetheless, the Communists also suffered. Malaka and Bergsma were arrested in mid-February and shortly thereafter deported. 66 Their efforts had not increased the desire of the Jogjakarta to cooperate with Semarang, for the CSI chiefs were now more than ever convinced that the wisest course was to avoid trouble in general and the Communists in particular. With Bergsma’s departure, Dutch participation in the PKI came to an effective end; Hot Vrije Woord, long kept alive almost solely by his efforts, effectively rebuffed the

ceased publication

in

argument that

May

it

1922.

For the labor organizations the defeat was a

bitter one, as the strike

had been their first attempt at a large-scale work stoppage; it had been backed by most of the Indonesian organizations and had been undertaken against the government, hitherto a much more pliable opponent than private enterprise and it had failed completely. Moreover, the authorities had treated the action as revolutionary in spite of effort

—

the union’s disclaimer of political motives, thus raising grave doubts

about the

feasibility of strike efforts in the future.

The immediate

result of the defeat

Indonesian opposition were cal losses

stilled,

was

paralysis. All

branches of the

exhausted not only by their physi-

but also by the psychological shock of the experience. The

them from the government had been harshly illuminated; it was now so great that no real communication across it was possible. Both sides had retreated from the early days of hopeful congulf that separated

123

Rise of Indonesian frontation,

and they now withdrew

reliance on force tion.

Communism

still

further

and the Indonesian groups

— the government into

into sullen noncoopera-

For the PKI, the hazards of a policy of direct challenge were

all

Malaka and Bergsma, the only two first-rank party leaders in the colony, virtually beheaded the Communist movement. Clearly, Tan Malaka’s action program could not be continued if it brought such results. It was in this period of general discouragement and indecision that the two major figures in the mass movement, Tjotoo clear: the arrest of

kroaminoto and Semaun, resumed the leadership of their battered organizations.

124

— VII

Semaun’s Program

AT

the end of October 1921, the

unions journal that

On

its

VSTP

chairman had temporarily departed:

Leave. Beginning this month Comrade

some time; the reason under a considerable

is

executive announced in the

Semaun

known,

he

is

must compose his mind, since he has been from the work he has carried on in behalf of the

strain

lest his just-described

be confused by reports rest

on the

We

cannot say where he

naturally not planning to let his place of retreat be

purpose be frustrated by

are bringing this to the attention of the

do not

going on leave for

that he

people in general and the workers in particular. will stay, since

is

in the

VSTP members

letters

and such.

We

so that they will not

white press and thus entertain suspicions that

truth. 1

Semaun’s secluded spot was Soviet Russia, from which he returned

late

May, 1922. The rumors to which the announcement probably referred were the widely circulated stories that the PKI chairman had in fact gone to Russia and that he had done so because members of his party particularly the European ones were concerned that he was straying from the orthodox internationalist path. 2 in

—

Semaun did he stressed

not deny that he had doubts before his journey; indeed,

this point at the

stated cause of his disquiet

much emphasized

in the

meeting that welcomed him home. One

was the famine

in Russia,

which had been

anti-Communist Indies press during 1921 and

which the PKI had ceased to deny: “Reports of the confused condition of the administration under the leadership of the Bolsheviks in Russia caused me to go there in order to see for myself just what the situation was.” 3 Furthermore, he maintained that he had been uncertain whether

Communism was merely

a servant of Russian interests, as

its

opponents

claimed:

We

can give assurance that the reactionaries’ accusation that

Communists

are only a tool of the Russians

125

is

we

Indies

simply a slander and untrue.

— Communism

Rise of Indonesian

We

thought

me

inspired itself.

by

For

from the beginning, but the many reactionary reports

this

on the truth or

to pass

if

a person’s convictions are attacked on

losing faith himself

truth

is

on his

if

form

reflect

to

many

from within Russia points,

may end

he

he cannot come forth with strong proof that the

side. 4

In judging these statements,

may

falsity of these reports

an actual

crisis

an Indonesian

we

should bear

of conscience for

Going on

political gambit.

holy and rather inaccessible spot,

is

mind that, while they Semaun, they also con-

in

in the

retreat, usually to a

Javanese mystical tradition;

one returns from the journey, having received

spiritual

guidance

through meditation, with strength renewed and doubts resolved. In politics, a

ing a

leader might undertake such a withdrawal before announc-

momentous

decision, or

he might use the custom

to explain

absence necessitated by other reasons. Semaun was no stranger to

an

this

technique: returning from prison in 1919, he compared his experi-

ence to that of a hermit who, having separated himself from worldly affairs,

partook of the grace of

and conviction. 5 Thus cal, for

God and

his expressions of

thereby gained

new

doubt may have been

strength rhetori-

the purpose of emphasizing restored faith on his return; in this

case they

would have

significance not for Semaun’s

own

state of

mind

but as questions he thought his Indonesian audience might have about the

PKI and

Soviet Russia.

Quite aside from

this

possible personal

maun’s policy within the PKI reports that that leader

doxy. Semaun, as

we have

emphasizing the need

movement and

was

itself

crisis,

provides a likely basis for the

sent to Soviet Russia to improve his ortho-

noted, guided the party along cautious lines,

to consolidate

its

position within the Indonesian

to avoid a direct challenge to the

brought criticism within the party from those strategy for a rebellion

Communist movement was

aimed

a conflict over Se-

who

government. This

felt

that the proper

Bolshevik-style revolution

directly at establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat

through the creation of

soviets,

with

its

chief

weapon

the general

These advocates of a “Russian” policy, who seem to have been the most part Europeans, were joined in increasing numbers bv

strike.

for

party followers who, like

Tan Malaka, thought

that the prevailing

Indonesian sense of frustration and insecurity should be exploited in a massive protest action that would revive the momentum and cohesiveness of the popular

movement.

This pressure for a forward policy

126

came

to a

peak over a railroad

Semauns Program which many VSTP members had been urging since 1920. Semaun had been the principal spokesman against such a move, but at strike,

the

VSTP

was such

congress of

December 1920

the pressure for a stronger stand

would consider a strike against those private companies that did not accept the government pay scale and hours by October 1, 1921. In mid-1921 there was a renewed tendency toward wildcat striking by private-line employees; as a result, the VSTP expelled an important branch that had promoted such an effort, thus giving the PPKB excellent ammunition in its postschism combat with the Communist labor leaders. By late September the strike deadline was drawing near, and most companies had not met the demands. Semaun began to hedge, however, arguing that the depression had altered the situation considerably since the ultimatum had been set; the balance of power was now in the hands of the capitalists and not the workers, and even on the state line the wage scale, part of which consisted of a cost-of-living bonus, was that the union declared

it

endangered. Largely because of his urging the union again postponed action,

on the grounds that a recession was not the proper time

wage demands. The VSTP chairman was sion aroused considerable unrest among tended to react

to the depression in the

for

right enough, but the deci-

the railroad workers,

same way

as the

who

members

of

pawnshop union: that is, the increasing economic uncertainty made them restless and doubly resentful, and they wished to lash out at then-

the

foreign masters without considering practical consequences. 6

With the “Russian pattern”

more radical an unfortunate diversion from Communist

lenge, Semaun’s refusal to act

members

of the

PKI

orthodoxy, 7 and they

as

identified with a policy of direct chal-

may

must have appeared

to the

well have thought that a journey to the

heartland of the revolution would bring him back in there

is

considerable reason to believe that

another purpose than the First

official

line.

Semauns journey was

one of representing Indonesia

Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. In the

meeting, held

and February

in

Irkutsk in

1922,

In any event,

November 1921 and

was organized

in

first

Moscow

for

at the

place, that in

January

for the countries of the northern

8

Semaun, the only delegate from Southeast Asia, was clearly an afterthought. 9 True, Sneevliet was then urging from Shanghai that Far East;

the Indonesian party should establish as

many

contacts as possible with

other Asian revolutionary movements; according to Semaun, Sneevliet

secured the inclusion of Indonesia in the congress by arguing that the

127

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would occupy a strategic position in a future Pacific war and that the Netherlands was a participant in the Washington Conference, which the congress was called to protest. 10 But why send Semaun, who knew none of the languages spoken at the congress, 11 and leave the PKI in the hands of Bergsma whose role was limited by the fact and Tan Malaka who had belonged to the party that he was Dutch only a few months? Darsono would have been a far more logical choice: he was already in Europe working for the Comintern; he had represented Indonesia at the International’s third congress in mid-1921, and Indies

—

—

—

he spoke German.

It

therefore seems likely that Semaun's pilgrimage

was arranged, perhaps by the European members of the PKI in collaboration with Sneevliet, to convince him by a stay in Russia of the need to travel the Bolshevik path.

Unfortunately, such expectations were disappointed, for Semaun’s Soviet experience had precisely the opposite effect. Very

little

Comin-

tern activity since the International’s second congress related to the East;

what

activity there

was

chiefly represented vain efforts

by the

advocates of radical proletarianism to incorporate their views into

Comintern

policy.

The

sole

meeting devoted

to Asia before

1922 was

the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, 12

which opened on Baku on September 1, 1920. Sneevliet represented the Dutch and Indonesian Communist movements there: he addressed the delegates in the name of the CPH, PKI, and Sarekat Islam. 13 Apparently, he did not expect much of the meeting, however, for he had already assured the second Comintern congress that “we shall next attend the congress in Baku. However, we are not under the

great significance for the Far East. This

The meeting drew up

have

illusion that this congress will is

impossible.”

14

resolutions calling for agrarian revolution,

opposition to both foreign and native capitalism, and establishment of

workers’ and peasants’ soviets that would unite against foreign and native oppression. Although Comintern representatives Zinoviev and

Bela

Kun acknowledged

that Asian

Communism

could succeed only

with the help of revolutionary democratic nationalism, the general tenor of the congress reflected an extreme antibourgeois

many

spirit,

which

Soviet and Asian

Communists held in spite of the decisions of the second Comintern congress. 15 The Baku gathering was not a policvmaking assembly, however, and its chief characteristic was confusion. It

did establish a Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of

the East, which

was apparently designed 128

as a

Comintern junior execu-

Semauris Program charge of Asia. 10

Far Eastern division,

was given charge of China, Korea, Mongolia, Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan. Indonesia was thus very far from its center of attention, and the only apparent advantage that the Indies Communists gained from the Baku meeting was that they were able to use one of its several florid demonstrations (the proclamation of a d jihad [Muslim holy war] against imperialism ) as an argument against those who accused the Bolsheviks of tive in

Its

in Irkutsk,

hostility to Islamic unity. 17

Baku meeting, overt Russian interest in the Eastern revolution seemed to decline. The Soviet government was bending all its efforts toward restoring relations with the European powers, and this both drew its attention away from Asia and made it generally less willing to support actions that would alienate West European governments. A general retreat in revolutionary agitation was declared, and emphasis was placed on improving organization and discipline instead. This was demonstrated very clearly at the third Comintern congress, which met in June and July 1921. At the meeting Darsono represented After the

the Netherlands Indies. 18

Sneevliet in Singapore in

He had, we will remember, joined May 1921 and sailed from there to

then he and Baars continued by

voted

gram

itself to

of

rail to

Baars and Shanghai;

Moscow. 19 The congress de-

the problems raised by Russia’s withdrawal from a pro-

immediate world revolution, by

with Western Europe, and by Lenin’s

its

desire for normal relations

New Economic

Policy,

which

was bringing about a compromise with capitalism in the Soviet economy. So far was the subject of Asian revolution from the attention of the Comintern that the congress was not originally scheduled to discuss it seriously. The Asian delegates were unhappy at this neglect and finally managed, with Lenin’s backing, to get the Eastern question on the agenda. 20

The

colonial commission thus created uncovered considerable dis-

agreement with the Comintern

line

on the East. The dissidents were by

no means united, however: their criticisms reflected two diametrically opposed points of view. One group, chiefly delegates from the Near East,

wanted

and a multiclass allithat was later to be employed

a policy that favored Pan-Islamism

ance similar to the bloc of four classes

was sharply opposed by India’s M. N. Roy, who repeated his argument against bourgeois nationalism from the second Comintern congress and emphasized particularly the need to oppose the Pan-Islamic movement. 22 Chang Tai-lei, of China, produced a set in China. 21 This

129

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

was impossible for the Asian workers to fight on two fronts at the same time; therefore, Communists should cooperate with the national bourgeoisie until imperialism had been which argued that

of theses

defeated:

The

it

23

communists of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the follows: without surrendering their independent program and

task of the

East

as

is

organization, the communists

must gain predominance

in the national revo-

movements; they must draw the participating masses away from the domination of the national bourgeoisie, and they must force the bourgeoisie to follow the movement for the time being under the slogans “away

lutionary

with the imperialists” and “long the

moment

live national

arrives, this bourgeoisie

when movements 4

independence.” However,

must be cut

from the

off

Chang’s interpretation was favored by the Comintern at

this time,

but Zinoviev’s explanation of Soviet support for Kemalist Turkey also

made

it

apparent that the Comintern might be willing to go quite a

bit

where Soviet policy was bird in the hand over the

further in practice than in theory, especially

concerned.

A

Communist

birds in the bush

We

know

preference for the nationalist

was

implicit in his declaration:

quite well that in Kemalist Turkey, for example, the

Communists

murdered in just as foul a manner as in social-democratic bourgeois Germany. Of course the Communist International will fight most sharply against such methods of struggle and against the persecution of Communists are

in general.

However, where a

nationalist, but really revolutionary

tional will support this

alism,

and the world

—

movement perhaps semiprogress, the Communist Interna-

really revolutionary

movement

—

is

in

insofar as

proletariat will

it is

march on

directed against

in the

vanguard

all

imperi-

25 .

In spite of their disagreement, the Comintern leaders gave no additional attention to the

program

for the East.

The

colonial commission

appears to have been only a sop to the dissatisfied delegates; Roy vigorously protested that “the commission, which was not formally installed, thanks to the disorder prevailing at the congress,

to

draw up

a theoretical resolution on the Asian question .” 26

discussion of Asia on the floor of the congress session (the twenty-third), in

which the speeches

gates were held to five minutes each

the Comintern heads

Asian revolution at

We regret

decided not

made

clear

how

27 .

was limited

to

The one

of the Eastern dele-

Replying to Roy’s objections,

little

importance they attached to

this time:

that the congress has no time to treat the Asian question with the

necessary thoroughness; but this

is

not a great misfortune, since this ques-

130

Semauris Program tion has already

Communist

been dealt with exhaustively

International,

at the

second congress of the

from which the theses on the colonial question

have been adopted. This question was likewise discussed

at the

Congress of

the Peoples of the East, which took place in August of last year; and

convinced that

it

will

be thoroughly considered

I

at other congresses

am and

other meetings.

For

us,

the most important thing on this occasion was to achieve a

demonstration of the international solidarity of the Western proletariat and

The demonstration has taken

the oppressed peoples of the colonies. that

the main

is

In the end, the Asian

Communists had

to content themselves with

Zinoviev’s brief declaration on the colonial question, in strong

which reiterated

terms the theme that Communist cooperation with revolu-

tionary nationalism

pean

place;

thing. 28

would

benefit both the Asian masses

and the Euro-

proletariat:

The Communist

International has decided to advance the principles of the

movement, the principles of a Communist movement, in all oppressed nations, in all colonial lands: this is the first task of the Communist Internalabor

The Communist

tional.

International, however, has decided at the

to support every really revolutionary

movement

of the oppressed peoples of

the colonial countries against imperialism, since the tional

same time

Communist

Interna-

convinced that only the victory of the proletarian revolution can

is

really liberate the

oppressed peoples. Our slogan

tries

and oppressed

mon

struggle against imperialism, for

nationalities of all countries,

is:

Proletarians of all coun-

you must unite for a com-

Communism

29 .

Thus cooperation with nationalism rather than imitation of the Bolshevik proletarian revolution was confirmed as the Comintern colonial strategy.

Moreover, the general discussions of the congress, asserting

the “temporary stabilization” of world capitalism, endorsed the Soviet

from revolutionary confrontation internationally and

retreat

nomic

policies at

practice

was

Comintern theory nor Soviet convince Semaun that his party should rely on

home. In

likely to

in eco-

short, neither

doctrinaire proletarianism or adopt a forward stance in opposing the

government.

The PKI chairman had ping on the First

way

traveled to Russia via China, probably stop-

30 to see Sneevliet.

He

then went to Irkutsk for the

Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which opened on Novem-

ber 11, 1921. Although the meeting was intended primarily as a dem31 it was clear even onstration against the Washington Conference, before

it

convened that

it

would review the Comintern Asian 131

strat-

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

was probably one reason why after its first session the convention moved to Moscow, where it reconvened on January 21, 1922. 33 The argument resembled the dispute within the PKI in that it involved a protest against current policy by a radical group that wanted a more “Bolshevik” strategy in the East. This time the objections came not from discontented Asian radicals but from the Russian 34 left, including the Comintern chairman himself. The published congress records present a confused picture, in which the major Russian 32

egy;

this

speakers expressed varying reluctance to cooperate with the bourgeois nationalist

movements; according

gress secretary, Shumiatskii,

and

Stalin to

an account written by the con-

took the personal intervention of Lenin

impose the more tolerant orthodox view. 35

Semaun, whose as

it

to

linguistic difficulties

probably made him as innocent

any participant of the nuances of the arguments, declared

his

com-

agreement with the radical keynote address delivered by Zinoviev

plete

and presented a message of greeting that placed such exclusive emphasis on the proletarian nature of the Indonesian movement that one who

know

did not

his policies in Indonesia

adherent of the

left.

36

would have considered him an

Whether because

of this apparent agreement

with the radical views of the congress leaders or because they were

impressed to discover that the distant Indies had a well-established revolutionary labor movement, the directors of the meeting decided to

ignore Semaun’s linguistic handicap and the congress presidium

union movement

and of a

make him

nesian representative had opened its

member both

new

if

the presence of the Indo-

horizons in Southeast Asia, the

concluding manifesto not only to the countries

of the northern Far East but also to Indo-China, the Indies, If

and the

of

special commission to discuss the trade

in the East. 37 Finally, as

assembly addressed

a

Dutch East

38 islands of the Pacific.

the Southeast Asian delegate impressed the leaders of the con-

gress,

Semaun does

not appear to have been overwhelmed by the

meeting. Aside from the linguistic barrier,

it is

possible that he felt the

polemics of the congress leaders did not apply to Indonesia. The argu-

ments of Zinoviev and

his

“nationalist bourgeoisie,”

and

nists not

were directed largely against the we have seen, the Indonesian Commu-

allies

as

only accepted a limited definition of nationalism, which ex-

cluded the Sarekat Islam, but held that their country’s position was unique in that it lacked a native bourgeois class strong enough to plav a real political role. In any event,

when Semaun 132

returned to the Indies,

Semaun s Program he did not mention the congress

at all. Instead,

he referred

to advice

given him by various “leaders of the Communist party in Russia

foremost

among them

itself,”

Lenin, to the effect that he should not mimic too

closely the Russian pattern of revolution but should

make adjustments

to the situation in his country. 39

Semaun has

since stated

conference with Lenin

in

40

that the major basis for this claim

connection with the congress;

this

was a

may have

represented the “personal intervention” that Shumiatskii declares Lenin

undertook take an

to correct the left deviation of the meeting.

official

part in the congress; he

Semaun, limited himself tions,

was

to receiving the

seven or eight persons in

all.

still ill

Lenin did not

and, according to

heads of the Asian delega-

Semaun, who

in spite of his activity

possessed to a considerable degree the Javanese tendency to be shy,

when Lenin was informed that this was the representative from Java, he made quite a fuss over the delegate from farthest away. When Semaun offered polite apolotook a back seat at the meeting. However,

gies for the smallness of the Indonesian party

and

its

ignorance of

Marxist principles, Lenin replied that the important thing was to unify

The Bolshevik leader, according to Semaun, then discussed the revolutionary movement in Asia, pointing out that the tactics of the Russian Communists could not the people for the anti-imperialist struggle.

be duplicated by Asian parties facing quite different conditions; addition, he noted that the revolution

to

world economic

was having

to retreat via the

must adjust

conditions and that at present even Russia

in

New Economic Policy. 41 we

was expressed at the Comintern congress later in 1922, was just what Semaun had hoped to hear, and perhaps enthusiasm caused him to embroider it. At any rate, he mainThis view, which,

tains that

when he

with the idea that but

returned to the Indies he presented his analysis not it

deviated in any

the belief that this

in

shall see,

way from

was the essence

of

the Comintern program

what the Soviet leader had

stated.

some ten days after his return to Indonesia, Semaun addressed a homecoming rally in Semarang. To the 3,000 persons assembled there, he explained what his Soviet experience had taught him

On

June

4,

1922,

about the Bolshevik pattern: At present,

we

in

the Indies are faced with the problem whether the tactics

employed by the Russians

in their

country must also be followed by us

133

in

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

our land, in view of the differing strengths of the parties and the different situations prevailing in Russia

my

In

opinion, there are

sian people

and

many

in the Indies.

differences in the aspirations of the Rus-

of the people here; moreover, in Russia a greater

and

industries provide the necessities of life than here. In

believe that

we

in the Indies

manner than has been done situation in our

own

country.

in Russia, for all its actions

the situation there; but

Communists

must shape our in Russia, a

We

view of these

of

factors, I

political tactics in a different

mannner

that corresponds to the

are not contradicting the

and decisions are correct and

we

number

Communist Party

in

agreement with

are not so foolish as merely to imitate the

there, since the different situation in our country, the relative

youth of the movement

in

the Indies, as well as the differing desires of the

people in Russia and the Indies make

it

impossible for us to follow exactly

the example of our comrades in Russia.

Moreover,

minded on

foreign visitors that the

Party leaders in Russia have themselves re-

movement

agreement with the situation

in

The

many Communist

Communist

in

each country must be carried

in that particular country. 42

would follow the same general lines, Semaun continued, but this was because all countries were affected by world economic conditions rather than because of Comintern activity of the

parties

discipline:

The type

of action in each country should accord with the times. Interna-

tional activity will take place at approximately the

nomic conditions economic action ica

is

and elsewhere

many

in

time, since eco-

the various countries are so closely connected that

the

same everywhere.

rises,

of our essentials

in the Indies

same

the cost of living

come from abroad;

If

the price of necessities in Amer-

.in

the Indies also increases, since

in this

manner action

will

along the same lines as in other countries, without a

develop

command

from Moscow. 43

The speech caused an immediate furor. To the non-Communist press Semaun seemed to be rejecting Comintern authority; reports reaching the exiled Tan Malaka in the Netherlands caused him to declare that he hoped his colleague had not said what the papers were claiming he had. 44 The newspapers could hardly be blamed for drawing this conclusion, for the speech produced a hot debate within the PKI itself. Semaun was accused of faintheartedness and of rightist inclinations, and it was doubted that he had accurately reported the Comintern advice. The argument had begun even before the June 4 meeting; only a few days after he arrived, the PKI journal had found it necessary to denv 134

Semauns Program that there

was a

split in

clearly stood to the right

the party, although

and others

There was certainly reason thodox views.

He

it

admitted that Semaun

to the left in

to believe that

its

ranks. 45

Semaun could hold

maintained that the overproduction

crisis

unor-

could be

solved by increasing the purchasing power of the world’s population

through a moratorium on international debts and diversion of arma-

ment funds ment. 46

He

to

an international scheme for planned economic develop-

wage

declared that

protests

were

during the

justified

current Indies depression because penny-pinching government policies

reduced public purchasing power and so made the situation worse; on the other hand, he asserted, resistance should not be carried to the

point where both parties to the dispute were so injured by the conflict

would be reduced even more. This

that the standard of living

limit

could be ascertained only through organized, disciplined pressure as-

by Indonesian labor and political organizations. 47 Such an analsounded more like Revisionist than Orthodox Marxism, for it did

serted vsis

not appear to point inevitably to revolution. Indeed, in his

own

we

will achieve the

Dutch

or through our

June 4 speech that “we do not know whether

Indies’

independence through the

strength,”

48

will of the

a quite extraordinary

Semaun declared

comment

in

view of Indonesian

opposition feelings at the time.

This point was not the real cause of the quarrel over Semaun’s orthodoxy, however.

He

clearly did not think his philosophy incompatible

way or maintain that the PKI should claim more independence from Moscow than the International wished to give. He may well have interpreted with Communism; neither did he

criticize Soviet

Russia in any

Soviet opinion on Comintern-PKI relations very broadly, though

Tan

Malaka, visiting Russia later that year, also received the impression of great flexibility in the Soviet attitude:

A

truly professional revolutionary

from any country must,

like

an expert

in

any science, maintain an open mind regarding the problem of revolution in other countries. In general, the view of the most prominent leaders in Russia while

I

was there (1922) was

views regarding the content of the India, or China),

foreign countries

and they

up

to the

this,

left

ideas on the action to be undertaken in

Asian leaders. They also understood that there

an “X,” an intangible factor, with

They did not dictate their own revolutionary movement ( Indonesia,

of this nature.

in

each individual area.

...

is

In connection

the discussions and debates in the congress and in the Comintern

135

Communism character. We did

Rise of Indonesian executive were of the broadest possible

any of the “top brass” would be “insulted”

that

if

not have to fear

he received any criticism

Furthermore, unquestioning obedience to orders from hardly a basic tenet of the PKI leadership of the time.

49 .

Moscow was

We will remember

had been specifically rejected by the principal European party members ( who could be expected to be the most oriented toward orthodoxy and international discipline), and the PKI Indonesian leadership that

it

in Marxist-Leninist doctrine nor

was neither well versed

in general

inclined to accept outside opinion as law. 50

The reason Semaun was

who advocated an

criticized for deviation

Bolshevik experience. As

maun, were wrong on

would not have urged the PKI

we have

this point.

that those

based on the proletariat refused

actionist policy

believe that the Russians

was rather

seen, however, they,

The

to

to imitate the

and not Se-

returning chairman was orthodox

in saying that revolutionary action centered

about a general strike was

impractical under the prevailing economic and political conditions.

The revolutionary

tide

was

at a

temporary ebb, he explained, and the

party should therefore concentrate on organization and propaganda

and should not attempt a major

strike or other action

ing forces with the ruling powers.

When

aimed

at

match-

economic conditions had im-

proved and the workers’ organizations were

in better

shape,

more

aggressive activities might be considered; but until then the advocates of a “Russian” revolutionary policy

called on the party to adopt a

thus to

abandon the

were

unrealistic. In conclusion,

new and more

audience

left

was forced

to

cautious program and

direct action concept that

absence. 51 Reportedly, some of the more radical

he

had prevailed

members

in his

of his June 4

the meeting in protest at these remarks, 52 and

Semaun

defend himself:

As has been declared by Comrade Sukendar, we may under no circumstances weaken the action: I have only said that if our activity does diminish it will be in connection with economic and other conditions in the Indies. Our action cannot be made more or less intense by any one person, but depends on the conditions in which the people exist. Whether I have been a great troublemaker, as I was called two years ago during the printers’ strike in Semarang, or whether I have been a coward, as I was considered last year during the PFB strike, or whether I am a person of weak character, .

as

I

am now

before

still

consistent in

held to be,

I

leave to those

who

others adopt these attitudes, let

my

.

.

hold such opinions. However,

me

state

that

I

have been

views, but that activity must be adjusted to the circum-

136

— Semauris Program stances.

by the be so

...

I

reactionaries, for

foolish as to

Semaun did was

only hope if

now that we will not be rendered panic-stricken we wish to proceed according to plan we must not

engage

in

desperate adventures. 53

not hesitate to point out that his analysis of the situation

same one he had urged before his Russian visit; nothing he had heard in the Soviet Union had altered that analysis, and certainly nothing he found on his return to the Indies indicated that he had been wrong in urging caution. As he later described it, he came back to a scene of desolation: essentially the

was delegated to go to Moscow, spoke with our great leader Lenin, was shown all about our first workers’ republic, returned to find new destruction wreaked by the reactionaries. Comrades Malaka and Bergsma expelled, many comrades in prison, the workers’ fighting spirit slackened by the hard-won improvement in conditions, the labor organization in a decline, our positions in the national movement and especially in the SI as good as lost because of the abandoning of that organization by the masses a result in part of the sabotage committed by national-capitalist leaders while at the moment the PKI was too shattered to offer those masses a place In 1921

I

—

for their aspirations. 54

Though personal it

interest

may

well have lent color to Semaun’s brush,

movement pawnshop workers’ strike. 55 This was

could not be denied that the Indonesian revolutionary

had

fallen

on dark says since the

particularly true of

its

labor organizations:

declined from a peak of 16,975

maun departed

October 1921, when Sethe time of his return. 515 Conse-

members

the Indies, to 7,731 at

VSTP membership had

in

quently, his opponents were in a poor position to revolt

when Semaun

announced the Communist program was consolidation and retrenchment and that the railroad workers should not consider a strike even if

wages were reduced. Cries of rage soon gave way to sighs of resignation, 57 and the PKI returned from a crusading policy to the improvement of its position within the general Indonesian movement. Semaun’s first concern was to restore the Communists’ labor strength, and in particular that of the VSTP. What with policy disagreements, the arrest or absence of its top leaders, and the general decline in spirit, in 1921 the railroad union had not even been able to their

58 it

was therefore no small task to revive the organization and persuade its members to accept an unpalatable program of caution. However, Semaun and other top VSTP leaders hold

its

annual congress;

137

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

toured Java, addressing locals and urging unity, discipline, and cau-

and within a few months the VSTP was well in hand. 09 The recovery of the VSTP was matched by a general rise

tion,

in

union

and an increase in Communist influence throughout the labor movement. This success stemmed partly from the PKI’s energetic propactivity

aganda

efforts

and partly from the disintegration

of Sarekat Islam

pawnshop workers’ strike. Abdul Muis, who had led the PPPB into that conflict, was arrested midway through the strike; he was later sent to his native West Sumatra and retired temporarily from Indonesia-wide politics and permanently from the labor movement. Hadji Agus Salim also abandoned union activity; the Sarekat Postel, which he had headed, soon fell into Communist hands. 60 Tjokroaminoto took over the pawnshop workers’ union when he left prison, but his leadership was constantly chalinfluence in the labor field following the

lenged, and after a turbulent year pro-Semarang elements gained

Communist hands, 61 and with this the organizations that had formed the basis of the CSI labor effort came under PKI direction. In addition, the Communists moved to expand their new-found influence among public servants by control.

The sugar workers' union

establishing

ai}

also fell into

Indonesian policemen’s union, and they attempted to

revive the flagging interest of the privately employed urban proletariat

by establishing a new union for automobile mechanics, metal workers, and drivers. 62 It was generally conceded, however, that the major reason for the marked PKI success in reviving trade union activity was the onset of the depression. that

day tended

I

have already remarked that Indonesian workers

to

be interested

in

unions only during a

1921 workers in private enterprises had

felt

crisis.

of

Before

the pinch most sharply and

had been the most active source of unrest; now it was the state employees, who had enjoyed a cost-of-living bonus during the earlier inflation, who were first and hardest hit. 63 In consequence, Indonesian labor militancy shifted from the privately to the publicly employed

workers; and though the sis

PPPB

strike disaster led to

temporary paraly-

of their unions, most recovered rapidly in the second half of 1922.

Moreover, the anticapitalist and antigovernment feelings engendered

by the depression, by budget-cutting, and by the treatment of the PPPB strikers made the civil employees more radical, and they lost

many

of their reservations about cooperating with the

We will

remember

that the

PKI and CSI had agreed 138

Communists. in principle in

Semauris Program October 1921 to establish a single labor federation. The

first

moves

were not made by either party, however, but by the neutral public works employees’ union, VIPBOW, which spontoward realizing

this goal

Vakbond Hindia (PVH, Indies Madiun on December 3, 1921. The new associa-

sored the founding of a Persatuan

Labor Federation} tion

was

to

in

provide a middle

way between

factions of the existing federations,

and

the warring political

specifically to

oppose the gov-

ernment’s planned removal of the cost-of-living bonus granted to state

employees. 64 The

PVH

was not supported by the politically oriented unions, and it seems to have vanished with the pawnshop strike. However, Semaun allied with its sponsors on his return from Russia, and in

June 1922 the

VIPBOW

called a meeting of public employees’ unions

to discuss the reunification of the labor

had little desire to associate with the now more powerful Communist-led unions; but the conference decided

posed the conference, for far

movement. 65 The PPKB op-

that

the

if

would seek

it

CSI federation would not modify

stand, the

VIPBOW

an independent league of government employ-

to establish

ees’ unions. 66 Since the

its

new

would have absorbed nearly all the effective non-Communist unions and would in all likelihood have allied with Semarang, Tjokroaminoto conceded the issue and bestowed on center

the effort his not unqualified blessings. 67

The united labor federation was unions called by the satuan

VIPBOW

Vakbond Hindia,

it

to organize opposition to

means

as large as the

established at a convention of

on September

was, like

its

3,

1922.

the Per-

shortlived predecessor, assigned

wage and employment

PPKB had been

Named

in its

cuts. 68 It

was by no heyday, and it was com-

posed almost entirely of government workers. 69 Suroso of the VIP-

BOW became

its

chairman, and the executive was dominated by non-

Communists. 70 The founders stipulated that the

PVH

of representatives in the Netherlands to further

anti-budget-cutting

would avoid political questions, 71 but the Indonesian unions were no more able to untangle politics from economics in labor activity than was the government; one of the first decisions of the PVH was to appoint a committee efforts.

These spokesmen were

to

its

be Tan Malaka, Bergsma, and either

Gunawan, both nationalist students then in Holland. 72 At its first congress, in December 1922, the new federation drew up a program of what were, in the Indonesian context, unrevolutionary but also unrealizable aims. The program betrayed a strong desire for state Sutomo

or

participation in the

economic process, a feature that probably 139

indi-

Rise of Indonesian cated

less

the

Communist

whelming proportion if

of Javanese

among

its

members than

government employees;

the overfor

them,

was neither well understood, highly valued, nor

private enterprise better paid. As

leanings

Communism

to forestall criticism,

however, the

PVH

stipulated

was not against capitalism but only against its abuses, which it hoped to influence the government to correct 73 In spite of the modest overt role of the Communists in the PVH, they exercised considerable power because Semarang controlled the federation’s largest and most active union (the VSTP) and was far that

it

.

better provided with leadership

and money than

preponderance of resources was evident

which was moved

its

74 .

on the

Semaun and his other members

preferred the

PVH

as a

PVH

Madiun headquarters and had

Semarang’s invitation to pay there

at the first

partners. This

congress,

minute because the federation could not

at the last

finance the gathering at

its

allies

all

expenses

do not seem

if

to

to accept

the meeting were held

have pressed

their

views

of the federation, however; apparently they

symbol of the cooperation possible between

Communists and non-Communists if only the non-Communist leaders were willing. The non-Communist politicians were not willing, however. Small wonder, for even with the PKI partly dismissed from their ranks Semarang’s influence grew among the Sarekat Islam branches, making it clear to the SI leaders that at all, they

if

they wished to control their organization

must not embrace the PKI again. Moreover,

in spite of their

Communists could not refrain from occasional stabs the CSI members, particularly on the sensitive subject of the move-

best intentions the at

ment’s finances; this did

little to

improve the temper of the SI

chiefs,

whose personal dislike of their Semarang rivals had reached a point at which any real cooperation would have been unlikely even if both sides had greatly desired it 75 The increased strength of the left after the SI congress was most notable in the regions of Semarang, West and Central Priangan, and North Kediri 76 In the larger centers, the PKI was often able to spread its influence through the SI schools, which, as one of the few concrete .

.

activities of the

Sarekat Islam, played an important role in the move-

ment and in the towns where they were established. The schools, which were largely though not entirely influenced by Semarang, expanded rapidly, for the officially approved educational system was sadly inadequate to popular demand for schooling, and Indonesian-run 140

Semauris Program “wild schools” were springing up to schools on the battle for cally illustrated in

hegemony

the gap. 77

fill

The

in the Sarekat Islam

Madiun, where the establishment

of

such

effect of

was graphi-

an SI school

in

the latter half of 1922 soon led to predominance of pro-Semarang

views

in that

branch of the

SI. 78

made

This increase in Communist strength discipline both

more necessary and more

As one CSI member

the extension of party

difficult for the SI leadership.

movement spent

later recounted, the

the period

following the October 1921 decision in a state of severe

thousands of lesser SI chief; the result

was

activists

locals,

for

looked to Semaun as their principal

a running debate in the branches on the

of the party discipline decision. 79 In the

divided

crisis,

end two

Madiun and Sukabumi, proposed

of the

wisdom

most badly

that at the next SI

congress the party discipline resolution be rescinded. 80 This was what

Semarang wanted, for when Semaun returned from Soviet Russia he ended the formation of the PSI, declaring that the task of the Communists was to ally with the national revolutionary movement and not compete with it. 81 His Soviet experience and the situation he found on his return had apparently convinced him that the proper course was to renew the PKI effort to gain hegemony within the Sarekat Islam; and so, after Semaun resumed command of the party, the Communists engaged in a vigorous

campaign

They pointed out

that

in greater disunity

and

to restore the bloc within.

the party discipline measure

had only resulted

confusion in the SI, that most major SI locals had not carried

and that more mudslinging between the

would which was

it

out,

rival leaders

seriously

—

painfully

diminish the movement’s popular support

all

of

true. 82

In Semaun’s effort

who,

we

will

much depended on

remember, had been

party discipline decision was taken.

the attitude of Tjokroaminoto,

in preventive detention

He had been

released in

when

May

the

1922,

but because he had been convicted of perjury and was free pending

appeal to the Indies supreme court, he did not immediately resume public life.

In August he

was acquitted, but he

still

remained carefully non-

committal on the subject of party discipline, giving Semarang cause to

hope he might support a reconciliation. 83 Gradually, however, it seemed that Tjokroaminoto was repeating the performance he gave after the March 1921 SI congress: having disarmed the opposition by raising hopes of a rapprochment, he was working to strengthen his influence

among

the SI locals and turn them against his rivals. 84

141

He began

publi-

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

cation of Islam dan Socialisme (Islam and Socialism), a

work on an

Is-

Com-

lamic socialist philosophy intended as an ideological substitute for

munism in his movement. 85 In November 1922 he chaired, and Hadji Agus Salim commanded, the first Al-Islam congress; inspired by India’s All-Muslim League,

it

was intended

to

promote the

interests of Indo-

nesian Islam and also to further political orientation in a religious

The PKI could hardly have been enthused about the gathering, since it was strongly Pan-Islamic and implicitly anti-Communist; however, the party was anxious not to open itself to attack on religious direction.

grounds, and not only refrained from criticizing the congress but sent a representative to

In the

last

it.

80

months

began an intensive camthe creation of cadres ( warga

of 1922, Tjokroaminoto

paign to centralize the SI by calling for

rumeksa) within every SI

local to

guard the unity of the branch; these

members of a Partai Sarekat Islam ( Sarekat Islam Party), into which it was hoped the CSI and its branches would eventually be totally absorbed. The aim of the new party, Tjokroaminoto declared, would be to support the people of the Indies in a struggle for cadres would also be

independence based on Koranic principles. 87 This he proposed

to sub-

mit to the next SI congress as his solution to the party discipline ques-

and the CSI announced that since it seemed certain Tjokroaminoto’s proposal would be accepted, an official organ for the party was

tion;

being established under his editorship. 88 appeared; in

it

A

few days

Tjokroaminoto declared that

his

if

later the first issue

concept were not

accepted, he would resign as chairman of the SI. 89

The Communists continued

to

minoto’s activities naturally gave

urge the bloc within, but Tjokroa-

them pause. 90 Accordingly, they

about for an alternate form of alliance in order, as Semaun put avoid breaking connections with the national possible expulsion from the SI.”

91

This was not

cast

it,

“to

movement through difficult, for

a

the events

had created an atmosphere favorable to coalition efforts. The Indian National Congress had provided the example and the autonomy of 1922

movement an

issue for attempts at unification, the

which, in June 1922, was the All-Indies congress. 92

most notable of It

was not

until

November, however, that more than ephemeral coordination was achieved, via the establishment of the Radical Concentration, which was intended as a grand alliance of all the major Indonesian movements. 93 As its name suggests, the Radical Concentration was a descendant of the Radical Concentration of 1918 and the Political Concentration 142

Semauris Program (League

Movements)

of People’s Liberation

with the government and the example

new

Volksraad but

and

it

alliance decided

its

by the Indian National Confield of action was not in the

set

chief

mass extraparliamentary pressure on the

in

extended farther to both the right and the

political

There were two

however: assessing the increased disillusionment

significant differences,

gress, the

of 1920.

spectrum than had

active participation of

Budi Utomo

On

the Indonesian

had the and the regional movements

forerunners.

its

left of

authorities;

94

the right,

it

Pasundan, Sarekat Ambon, and Sarekat Minahassa; on the cluded for the

time the PKI. 95 The Communists attended the

first

ISDP-led meeting that founded

PKI is the PKI

VERY

and Semaun stressed to his followmuch in agreement with the Concen-

it,

ers that “the

very,

tration, for

desires with all

its

heart to further the welfare and

Unity of action toward a be emblazoned on the banner we all hold

progress of the people of the Indies.

common

must now

goal: this

high, the banner of the

At the larly to

PVH

common

itself to

the

new

.

.

.

needs of the people of the Indies.”

congress in December,

commit

left it in-

Semaun urged

96

the federation simi-

political alliance. 97

The new united front was imposing in its outward dimensions, and so general was the sentiment against the Indies government’s recent policies that its members were able to agree on a broad program of demands. 98

Had

it

achieved real cohesion, the Radical Concentration

might have inaugurated a new period for the Indonesian national movement; but solidarity was unfortunately not the coalition’s most notable quality.

It is significant

that the alliance

was inspired by the

Dutch-led IS DP; the Indonesian leaders themselves, no matter clearly they

saw the need

be more conscious

for a

common

how

front in principle, continued to

in practice of their differences.

Nor was

the Radical

Concentration given time to establish a tradition of cooperation, for very soon after

its

founding a clash between two of

the entire Indonesian

movement and created

its

adherents shook

enmities that would have

disrupted the sturdiest alliance.

This conflict was, not surprisingly, a quarrel between the Sarekat

Islam and the PKI. The congress at which the CSI was to reopen the party discipline issue had finally been set for February 1923, and both sides quietly prepared their forces for a battle royal. In public,

can judge from the arguments presented

we

Communist and CSI

two opponents restricted themselves to fairly This mildness was perhaps due on the Communist

press at this time, the

oblique sparring.

in the

if

143

Rise of Indonesian side

to

vestigial

Communism

hopes for reconciliation," and on the SI side to

Tjokroaminoto’s disinclination to give his opponents cause to attack

him

directly; in addition, neither side

wished

be accused of taking

to

an unconstructive, disunifying position. There was no direct struggle over the issues, but instead the two rivals used disagreement on the site

wanted to hold it in its own stronghold) in order to bring each other’s good faith into doubt. 100 By the time the congress met, from February 17 to 20 in Madiun, it of the congress (each naturally

was

clear that Tjokroaminoto

was not

to

be persuaded from

his course.

According to the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo, Tjokroaminoto told him shortly before the meeting that

he had concluded Islam was the only

element that could unite the Indonesian people and that he intended to

make

this the basis of the

munists in the leadership,

SI,

Sarekat Islam’s activities. As for the

Com-

they had done their best to spread distrust of the CSI

and the movement was better

them. Their

rid of

fate,

he

would be sealed at the congress. 101 The meeting itself was heavily attended, and 1,200 to 1,500 onlookers filled the schoolhouse where it was held and overflowed into an adjoining thatched shed. There were 117 delegates representing about forty branches more divisions than had been represented at the October 1921 congress, but no improvement considering the spadework that had preceded it and the fact that, unlike its predecessor, it was not the movement’s second convention in less than a year. Those who did attend were solidly on Tjokroaminoto’s side, however. Semarang’s viewpoint was supported by only three pro-Red branches (Madiun, Tjepu, and Ngandjuk), all of them from East Java and all said,

—

with divided

loyalties;

PKI had announced

Semaun

himself did not attend. 102 Indeed, the

would including an agenda

several days before the gathering that

hold a special congress immediately thereafter,

it

that clearly reflected expectation of a complete break. 103

At the SI convention, Salim and Tjokroaminoto acted as a team, making sure that the initiative remained constantly in their hands. Opening the meeting, Tjokroaminoto announced that it had been decided to discuss establishment of the PSI openly rather than in closed session, as

had been scheduled. Salim then spoke,

stressing the Islamic

nature of SI socialism. After this Tjokroaminoto announced that he had visited fifty-two SI locals before the congress

them had declared themselves

and that

in favor of the PSI;

forty-five of

he asked the dele-

gates therefore to affirm the branches’ approval. At this point the Corn-

144

Semauris Program munists tried to argue that a decision on the PS I should properly follow a discussion of party discipline. Tjokroaminoto instead declared the proposal for establishing the PSI accepted, and only then opened the meeting to discussion of party discipline, instructing the nists to state the principles of their organization

religion.

and

its

Commu-

attitude toward

Sukendar, the chief PKI representative, responded with a

statement that was well argued but highly theoretical, concerned with labor relations in industrialized societies, and partly in Dutch, and

hence beyond the reach of most of the audience. The Red delegates

was no essential difference between their principles and those espoused by the CSI; although they asserted that Communists need not be unbelievers, they had to admit that on the subject of religion their movement was “neutral” (that is, secular). This was bad enough from the religious representatives’ point of view, but Sukirno, stressed that there

an undiplomatic Red delegate from Madiun, made

it

worse by

criticiz-

ing the money-grubbing and hypocrisy of the pious. This threw the

meeting into an uproar, and the unfortunate speaker was forced the

podium

in order to

to flee

escape a beating. The party discipline measure

was passed by an overwhelming majority; the delegates reportedly maintained the same position in voting that they had held on arriving at the congress. 104 All this took place on the first day; by the end of it the Communists were permanently out of the SI, which went on to work out a formula for a Partai Sarekat Islam in accordance with Tjokroaminoto’s concept. It was decided that the executive of the new party would be the same as the CSI; gradually the older mass move-

ment would be transformed

into a

cadre-composed PSI commanding a

substructure of occupationally based “unions,” which would contain the rank and

file.

105

Like the 1921 party discipline decision, drastic in

appearance than

in fact:

this

program was more

SI leaders apparently feared to

alienate local politicos, for the proposed PSI units maintained the right to decide their

own membership, and

the

mechanism

for securing

was the same one that proved so inadequate after the previous congress. 106 It was immediately evident, however, that this time neither side was reluctant to force its adherents to choose. Tjokroaminoto announced that he would visit places where SI locals were under Communist control and set up rival pro-PSI units, and he did so promptly thereafter. 107 The PKI held its own congress and drew up a plan of battle, and the two groups exchanged recriminaadherence

to party discipline

145

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

108 tions so violent as to jeopardize the entire Indonesian opposition.

wreaked havoc on the Radical Concentration and PVH; even more serious was its impact on the mass membership of the Sarekat Islam, which was deeply disillusioned by fighting within the

The

battle naturally

local SI executives

and by the accusations the national leaders flung

at

each other. Almost universally, Indonesian opinion expressed distress

and urged that the opponents forget

at the dispute

common

favor of the

their quarrel in

struggle against the Dutch. 109 However, the

rancor stored up during a long and unhappy partnership could no longer be

dammed;

it

flooded the entire

movement and ended hopes

for unity at this stage of Indonesia’s national

The

first

development.

Semaun’s objectives after he returned

of

unification of Indonesian political forces

to the Indies

—was thus destroyed;

thereafter his second project, the establishment of a powerful

— the

shortly

and

dis-

movement, died a still more violent death. The precipitating event was a strike by the VSTP, the result of the long-suppressed effort of the railroad workers to achieve their demands of 1920 and to ward off the consequences of the depression. The railway union had increased steadily in membership and income from dues during the ciplined labor

latter half of 1922, the direct result, as the

VSTP

pointed out, of the

rail

and tram workers’ fear of the depression. 110 Pressure increased within the union for action to prevent the crisis from affecting the workers; at

the same time the government and private companies began to lay off

employees and

wages and the

VSTP

and moved toward reducing bonus. It. seemed increasingly likely that

raise job requirements,

cost-of-living

would be forced either into an aggressive action, which they realized would be unsuccessful, or into a surrender of much of their prestige among the workers. Gradually, as a government report described, Semaun began to lean toward the first alternative: the

leaders

In the course of the year 1922 the preachings of the reformer

with a

new

following

—

were mixed

which found greater response among the mass of the PKI of a strike forced on the workers through hunger as a result

tone,

that

of the rationalization their leaders.

Now

measures or through the government’s actions against

here and

now

there,

strongly, his urging to direct action

sometimes weakly and sometimes

made

suited to that group of the urban proletariat

itself

heard, an appeal better

upon which the misfortune

of

the times pressed than were admonitions to calculated preparation and

undiminished exertion for a goal which lay

in the indefinite future.

When

the partial withdrawal of the cost-of-living bonus was eventuallv announced,

146

Semauris Program a spirit of resistance arose

among

members of the most powerful and tramway personnel (VSTP). 111

the workers, and especially

would

stated they

day. that

the

first

bonus reduc-

cost-of-living

rail lines

had

announce major wage and personnel cuts on

that

on January

also

the

best-led organization, that of the rail and

The government had announced tion, to take effect

among

1923,

1,

and the private

The VSTP therefore decided to hold its twelfth congress soon after date. The central issue of the meeting would be a proposal by the

Tjirebon

VSTP

branch

to consider

whether the rationalization meas-

put through as planned, should be protested by an industry-

ures,

if

wide

strike or

by

down, mass resignation, or some other form

Announcing

this,

whether a slow-

strikes against individual firms, or

VSTP

the

wage

support actions for

of protest should

executive declared that

it

did not intend to

during the depression, but

raises

be made.

would

it

the pay scale not drop below that of the state-line level of

insist that

1921. If the companies wished to rationalize, the executive asserted,

they could best do so by lowering their highest salaries and holding their lowest ones at a reasonable level. 112 Until the congress met, both the

VSTP and

the

government affected.

PVH

and

methods

tried other

discontent

alleviating

of putting pressure

among

Depression Committees were formed,

workers

on the already

anti-budget-cutting

demonstrations were held, cooperative enterprises for the unemployed

were discussed, and appeals and protests were addressed

to the Volks-

and the government in Holland. 113 The joined in protesting the government refusal to

raad, the Governor General,

other Indonesian parties

compromise on the laborationist

founded

to

PEB

and even the colUnion), which had been

drastic rationalization plans;

(Political-Economic

encourage Indonesian

political activity outside the opposi-

tion,

protested the government’s handling of the issue. 114 Their efforts

were

of

no

avail, for the

beginning of 1923 brought the promised across-

the-board reduction in the cost-of-living bonus, and nation was set for six months

congress in February 1923,

it

later.

When

the

inevitably centered

its

complete elimi-

VSTP convened its

its

discussion on a

strike. 115

At the meeting the railroad union leaders emphasized that the if it

strike,

came, would not be the result of unreasonable demands by the

workers but of the government’s stubborn refusal to yield plans to cut wages of

its

lowest-paid employees.

147

Semaun

at all in

its

polled the

Rise of Indonesian representatives of the locals, almost

Communism

all of

whom

reported that their

members wanted an industrywide strike held as soon as possible. 116 The VSTP leader agreed to this demand but asked that the action be round of negotiations with the authorities and the private companies concerned. The strike, he emphasized, must be well disciplined and properly timed, and must not consist of local postponed

to allow for a last

ventures at wildcat walkouts and sabotage. 117 his

arguments, and the

final

decision to strike

The congress yielded to was thus postponed once

again.

Even before the VSTP that

any

state railway

missed. 118 Semaun,

congress, the government

workers

who gave

who

had announced

would be

struck

instantly dis-

every indication of realizing the con-

was thus in the unhappy position of the leaders of the pawnshop workers’ union a year before. Nor did the government offer any crumbs of concession on which a face-saving retreat could be based. On the contrary, it went out of its way to indicate that it had no intention of dealing with Semaun at all. The PVH had proposed him as its representative to the Salary Commission, which the government had formed to determine a general wage policy for state employees; the nomination was promptly and rather acidly rejected on the grounds that it was “political.” The refusal upset the Indonesians considerably, for the PVH had made its nomination in good faith. Semaun was not only the head of what was currently Indonesia’s major union, but the government had in previous years indicated that in spite of his political views it considered him to be one of Indonesia’s more responsible labor leaders and had consulted him regarding government labor policy during 1920-1921. 119 At its December 1922 congress, the PVH proposed to seek an audience with the sequences of a

strike,

Governor General to reverse

this decision;

the idea, however, arguing that there

was

Semaun himself opposed

little

reason to put faith in the

commission, and after some debate a motion of no confidence in the Salary Commission was passed. 120

The Salary Commission’s prospects could was already apparent

that the

certainly be doubted, for

government had

in

mind

a

it

wage system

highly unpalatable to the Indonesians. In 1913 the government had established a single salary scale, with an extra allowance only for cials

brought from the Netherlands.

to

now thought

that this

was un-

High salaries were deemed essential to attract Indies government service, and the Eurasians, who filled

necessarily expensive.

Europeans

It

offi-

148

Semauris Program most of the middle-level functions, were thought

to

need a higher

standard of living than Indonesians in public employ. As a

result, a

was proposed, one that was to all intents and purposes racially based. Not only did it place the Indonesians at the low end of a wide wage range, but it seemed to confirm that the classification of the population into European, Native, and Foreign Asiatic legal categories ( a measure introduced in 1919 ) was to be used three-step salary scale

to institutionalize the subordinate status of the ethnic Indonesians. This

was what eventually happened; the new salary scale contributed to the process by removing any remaining community of interest between the various racial groups in public employ. 121 The Salary Commission contained only one Indonesian representain fact

but

tive,

it

consulted with leaders of the major Indonesian public

employees’ unions. The 19,

first

meeting took place

in Batavia

1923, with representatives of the teachers’ union

Semaun and Najoan planned pay

raises,

of the

on February

(PGHB) and

VSTP. Both unions asserted

that the

intended to restore partially the cost-of-living

bonus, were so set up that they would benefit only the higher-paid (that

is,

non-Indonesian)

budget was

employees.

for higher-paid officials; this

Half of

the

salary-increase

meant, Semaun pointed out,

that the bulk of the Indonesian public servants could expect a raise of 5 to 8 per cent in place of a

objections

were voiced

in

25 per cent cost-of-living bonus. Similar

Jogjakarta at the commission’s next discus-

where the spokesman for the union of teachers training school employees (Kweekschoolbond) denounced the intended wage scale. sions,

At the

final session,

held in Surabaja on February 24, the

VIPBOW

attacked the commission even more sharply, demanding the govern-

and establish a two-step wage scale, based on whether the employee was an Indies resident or an imported specialist. These complaints were received unsympathetically, and the debate became so heated that the Indonesians walked out before the

ment

restrict salary differentiation

conference ended. 122

These developments did much Indonesians, the great

body

of

to alienate the politically conscious

whom worked

They accordingly sympathized with

for the

government.

the railroad workers,

who grew

increasingly impatient for a strike after further discussions with gov-

ernment and private employers closed meeting of

VSTP

leaders

failed.

On March

was held

in

8 and

9,

1923, a

Bandung; they decided,

reportedly without Semaun’s approval, 123 to go ahead with plans for

149

— Rise of Indonesian

One

Communism

round of negotiations took place on April 9 and 12; the government and private spokesmen refused to concede on any of the points offered by the unions, and thereafter an industrywide

strike.

last

Semaun and his fellow VSTP leaders accepted a strike as inevitable. 124 Having made this decision, the VSTP chiefs began an intensive sympathy and support for the coming conflict, pressing the argument that a strike was being forced upon them. The government, which had been observing this progress with disfavor, now stepped in; on April 18 Semaun and the recently returned Darsono campaign

to gain

were informed that if they did not moderate their actions they would be in immediate danger of internment. 125 The effect of this warning

was unhappy, for Semaun lost his temper and said that if any VSTP leaders were arrested, the union would immediately strike. 126 His challenge was a political error, for it aroused the criticism of otherwise sympathetic Indonesian moderates. As the Budi Utomo leader Sutopo remarked, Semaun possessed the admirable qualities of honesty and sincerity, but he had evidently fallen prey to the “sins of the West” pride and stubbornness. 127 His declaration was also a major strategical blunder, for it gave the government an opportunity to force the strike before the union was prepared and before the sugar harvest, when the railroads of Central and East Java functioned at peak capacity. On May 8, two days after his challenge to the government, Semaun was carted off to jail, charged with having breached the speech laws a month before. The Semarang tramway personnel struck as soon as they heard of his arrest, and they were joined by demonstrative walkouts of sellers in the public markets, machine shop employees, and automobile and truck drivers from that city. Within a few days the strike had spread to Pekalongan, Tegal, Madiun, Surabaja, and Tjirebon, and it then advanced rather raggedly to the other railroad centers of Java. 128 In a short time most VSTP adherents (though, as in the pawnshop strike,

only the Javanese ones

D. M. G. Koch,

who was

129 )

were out on

strike.

then editor of the East Java edition of the

Indische Courant, visited strike

rallies in

Surabaja and nearby

Wono-

kromo on the evening before the VSTP stopped work: That night journey is clearly etched working class houses, where fifteen to instructions

from

local leaders. It

in

my

memory.

thirty railroad

We

visited several

workers received their

was impressed on them that they were

to

handle their equipment properly and, before leaving the railway installations and workshops, to replace tools, drive the locomotives into the sheds after

150

Semaaris Program commit absolutely no sabotage. The mood was embittered and determined. They were reminded of the seriousness of the strike plan, and the duty of solidarity was stressed 130

putting out the

and

fires,

in general to

.

The

was predictably disastrous in spite of such avoid unnecessary hostility. The government dismissed all

result of the strike

efforts to

striking employees, established strict military control over the rail lines,

prohibited the right of assembly for the VSTP, and drastically restricted

for all organizations in the residencies of

it

Madiun, Pekalongan, Priangan, and Surabaja. ures against the strikers.

There was

Koch

Weeping women

a drizzling rain.

weeks

My

move

the morning the strike

out of those houses; police and

sat

ment had

let it

warned

police commissioner

I

it

was “support

although according to the law

it

go so

in

with babies

we were making

that

article

far that I

was a criminal

The law which made punishable days after the strike

women

for the strike,”

wrote a sharply worded

antistrike action did not

Article 161 bis,

a misera-

with their few possessions on the roadside,

be known that any form of support

punished. Shocked,

was

our house. Their husbands naturally also came

in the outbuildings of

A

It

she took along in the car and installed in a few

selves liable to prosecution:

was

On

wife went over and met a couple of

whom

old,

to us for shelter.

official

to

rail line.

dragged furniture and household goods from them.

ble sight.

rooms

took stern meas-

neighborhood of about three hundred company

in Surabaja a

began the people received orders

several

It also

recalled:

houses for lower personnel of the state

soldiers

Semarang, Kediri,

our-

and the govern-

for the strike

over the

would be

affair;

was prosecuted

but the for this,

offense 131 .

the sheltering of strikers’ families

which was added had broken out:

to the Indies criminal

code two

He who,

with the intent of disturbing the public peace or disrupting the

economic

life

of the

community, or knowing or being

in a position to

know

that such disturbance of the public peace or disruption of the economic

life

community would be the result, causes or abets that several persons abandon or in spite of lawfully given order refuse to carry out work for which they have contracted or to which they are bound by virtue of their of the

employment, fine of not

will

be punished with imprisonment of up to

more than ten thousand

five years or a

guilders.

The Dutch socialists attacked the law as a juridical monstrosity, drawn up to enable the government to prevent any act it might choose to interpret as connected with what it defined as a strike. It showed, too, the

SDAP

accused, that Fock’s government was bent on destroying

151

all

Rise of Indonesian Indonesian opposition; in protest, the joining with the

CPH

Communism

soeialists

to offer parliament a

took the unusual step of

motion

criticizing the Indies

government, urging Fock’s removal, and asking an end

to the extraor-

and the measures imposed in connection with the In the Volksraad, Indonesian, ISDP, and some NIVB dele-

dinary rights strike. 132

gates protested the government handling of the strike, but without effect.

The

great weight of

and applauded political weapon: ures

The magistrate no

Article 161 bis precisely because

at a

straight

VSTP

it

did constitute a

against notorious leaders

moment when they have committed

which the law does not forbid Sudibio [anodier

away warrants

longer has to salt

employ them

in order to

European opinion approved the firm meas-

a deed

happened with Semaun, and again with

(as

leader]); instead, he can haul the mischief-maker

from the podium

at the very

moment he

oversteps this law. This can

only serve to improve respect for law 133 .

Under the new law many VSTP and other

radical leaders

arrested, seriously impairing the leadership of both the union

were

and the

PKI. 134 Partly as a result of the government measures, which included restriction of the union’s use of the mails

partly as a result of tive

was

its

own poor

virtually cut off

from

organization, the

its

could not give leadership to the

and telegraph

VSTP

service,

and

central execu-

branches outside Semarang, so that

strike.

Sugono had been named

it

“strike

and temporary chairman of the union following Semaun’s and a “Central Leadership of the Rail and Tram Strike in the

dictator” arrest,

Netherlands Indies” was formed as soon as the strike broke out. appears, however, to have been unable to communicate in any

with the

VSTP

branches, and

it

had

little

way

idea of the general progress

of the strike. Moreover, because of the restricted it

It

freedom of assembly,

could not meet with more than two strikers at a time. 135

Within a few weeks the for

finances, substantial

though they were

an Indonesian union of that day, had been exhausted, 136 and the

workers,

who

their jobs

soon saw the hopelessness of their cause, began to ask for

back again. 137 The union accepted the inevitable and

to negotiate the

was

VSTP

set up,

reacceptance of the

strikers.

A

tried

“council of mediation”

and Sugono and Kadarisman held discussions on behalf

of

VSTP; but since they refused to negotiate without a guarantee that all strikers would be taken back, they very quickly reached an impasse. 138 The government was adamant, and the private companies the

were both disinclined

to deal

with the union and eager to take advan-

152

Semauns Program tage of the strike to

make

broken, the strike lingered

nounced

its

wage and personnel cuts. Its back on until July, when the government an-

drastic

Semaun; then it quietly succumbed. severity by arguing that the strike was

intention to banish

The government justified its inspired by political and not economic motives. It pointed out Semaun’s arrest had been the immediate cause of the walkout, and the

VSTP

On

the other hand, the state railroad authorities

fore the illegal,

leaders

VSTP

and

their allies tried to turn

it

strike of the year before. It thus

would have taken the same

had said even bewould be considered

similarly called “political” the

seems quite

that

into a general strike. 139

congress was held that a strike

and the government had

that

PPPB

likely that the authorities

attitude regardless of Semaun’s action or

The government interpretation of the nature of the conflict was protested not only by the Communists, who insisted that it was purely economic, 140 but also by the less radical Indonesian groupings. It could hardly be claimed that the strike was pushed upon the workers by their leaders, since, as the government’s own reports pointed out, the reverse was patently the case. Union demands had been nonpolitical and were in most instances justified: the railroad workers were among the most underpaid in the state employ, and elimination of the cost-of-living bonus would reduce their wages by one-fourth. As for the striking employees of the private lines, most of them had not benefited from the wage raises granted in many other industries; their demands were essentially the same as those presented in 1920, at which time the authorities had thought them rea-

the calls for a general strike.

sonable.

In spite of the abject failure of the strike

gained some advantages for the

left:

itself,

the

VSTP

action

Indonesian opinion nearly unan-

imously denounced the harsh measures taken to suppress the strike, thus increasing sympathy for the radicals and disillusionment with the

government. 141 The Communists had gained their martyr: Semaun, Sinar Hindia proudly announced, nesia. 142

had become the Gandhi

The martyr gained was not worth

the leader

lost,

of Indo-

however;

and the increased general sympathy with the revolutionary standpoint did not make up for the discouragement and disorganization inflicted on the Semarang-oriented labor movement. Like the pawnshop workers’ union before it, the VSTP went into a state of shock from which its recovery seemed for a long time dubious. 143 The rest of the unions sank into profound apathy, and the PKI executive frankly admitted that it was having trouble maintaining contact with its

leftist

153

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

branches, collecting dues, and publishing the party paper. 144

The restrictions on the right of assembly prevented the Communists from convening in their major centers: no PKI meeting was held in Semarang, for example, from early May until October 1923, after the ban was

lifted.

145

The middle

saw both major branches of the Indonesian opposition in a state of distress. The Communists had been crippled by the VSTP defeat, and the SI was feeling deeply the effects of the split with Semarang. The attempts to unite the Indonesian movement through the Radical Concentration and the PVH disintegrated amid of 1923 thus

these turbulent events: both of these organizations expired in June,

almost unnoticed in the wake of the railroad

strike.

146

The Indonesian

was not again united in a single coalition until 1939; the non-Communist labor organizations retired from politics and thenceforth functioned more as white-collar professional associations political opposition

than as unions.

Semaun, who had ended by doing what he had warned

his followers

against, departed for the Netherlands in August. Sinar Ilindia hopefully predicted his return:

We

cherish, however, the

the Indies

soil

hope that you

will

once more. The portents of

some day be allowed

this

to tread

can already be seen

in

the

Europe (which has now begun in Germany) to destroy the capitalist system, root and branch. It is, in short, the world-wide people’s movement which will make it possible to bring you and other comrades back

people’s struggle in

from

exile 147 .

He was not to return,

however, for more than thirty years.

The events surrounding the VSTP strike strengthened the trend among the Indonesian political elite to bifurcate along revolutionary and quietist lines. This same separation appeared in the mass membership of political movements, with the result that popular support for

the less radical leaders melted into indifference, leaving the politicallv active

remnant committed

that, in the

period

we

to the revolutionary left. It thus

came about

are about to discuss, the energy

of Tjokroaminoto’s Sarekat Islam faded very rapidly,

and popularity and by the end of

1923 the PKI was visibly the only major representative of the Indo-

The bloc within had ended, but in this case quite differently from that in China of the 1920s. Of the two competing wings, the Communists emerged the victors; but they had gained comnesian popular movement.

mand

of a dying

movement. 154

VIII

The Bloc Above

ON MARCH

Communists convened a special “Congress of the PKI and Red SI” to decide what steps to take after their expulsion from the Sarekat Islam. The meeting was held in Bandung, with a session two days later in Sukabumi; 2,000 to 3,000 persons attended, including delegates from fifteen PKI branches, thirteen Red SI locals, and thirteen labor unions. 1 The PKI executive was not so well represented: only Semaun, Subakat, and Sukarsono appeared, for the other members of the party’s current governing board Tan Malaka, Bergsma, Harry Dekker, Gondojuwono, and Dengah were either in prison or exile. 2 They were present in spirit, however, for portraits of Malaka and Bergsma, Sneevliet and Baars lined the red-festooned walls of the congress hall, together with pictures of the newly returned Darsono and the PKI’s international heroes, Marx, Lenin, and Gandhi. 3 The atmosphere was charged with stored-up resentment of the “White” Sarekat Islam, and Semaun and other Communist leaders bit4,

1923, the

— —

denounced Tjokroaminoto and the CSI. Some of their audience thought they went too far, in fact, and various complaints were addressed from the floor. The only objector to receive satisfaction, however, was a Bandung student, the future Indonesian president Sukarno, who censured Pladji Misbach for the personal nature of his attack on Tjokroaminoto and won both considerable applause and an apology from the Muslim Communist leader. 4 The Sarekat Islam, Semaun and Sukendar charged, no longer repreterly

sented the people’s interests; only the PKI could do

this, for it

alone

was the defender of the poor and the leader of the fight for independence from foreign capitalist rule. Marxist and Koranic teachings were similar, Misbach and Sugono stressed; the PKI strove for freedom of religion and defended the right of Indonesia’s Muslim population to the unfettered exercise of idyllic past,

its

religion. It

sought to recapture Indonesia’s

Darsono declared; before the advent of foreign 155

capital, the

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

people had enjoyed prosperity and social state that the party

was

it

to this

for a popularity contest with the Sarekat

up the major

Islam, the party took

and

to return. 5

wished

Laying the foundations

justice,

on which the recent SI

issues

congress had hoped to gain mass support and formulated even stronger positions:

It

tax measures

adopted resolutions denouncing the government’s

and the contract

coolie system

and

to further the interests of the peasantry

Indonesian political groupings. 0 that,

although

based

it

hoped eventually

socialist system,

it

its

to cooperate

intention

with other

the last point the party declared

to see the

country adopt a soviet-

realized that in a colonial land like Indonesia

could be attained only gradually and through parliamentary

this goal

action.

On

and declared

latest

The PKI

campaign

would concentrate its political agitation in a parliament and would cooperate with all parties

therefore

for a real

that shared a sincere interest in this reform.

The Sarekat

Islam,

it

emphasized, was not sincere. Since the CSI was basing

its

argument against the Communists

PKI meeting was

largely on religion, a major object of the its

to

proclaim

support of Islam without abandoning the stand that religion and

politics did not mix. It

could do so because of the colonial govern-

ment’s promotion of Christianity and

its

attempts to regulate Muslim

religious affairs:

Muslims! Community of Islam. Will the PKI be able to represent the interests of the Islamic faith? of course! Here is the proof: read!

The standpoint decided

in the

of the

PKI regarding

the defense of the Islamic faith

is

following motion:

Resolution

VI

The congress of the PKI and Sukabumi March 6 at Sukabumi, etc.,

SI,

gathered on Tuesday morning,

recognizing that in the Indies religious instruction in Islam

through government regulations,

is

restricted

to wit, that religious teachers are obliged to

secure permission for the giving of instruction from the head of the regency, declaring that the

PKI does not agree

to

governmental intervention

in

religious affairs,

resolves: to call

on the executive of the PKI to take the necessary steps toward the

rescinding of this regulation [and] toward the liberation of religion from the state. 7

156

The Bloc Above The most important

by the congress were, however, on the organization of the movement’s mass following. The PKI declared it intended to win the members of the non-Communist Sarekat Islam in the same manner the SI had indicated at its preceding congress it would use against its opponents: everywhere a White SI branch existed, the Communists would found a competing unit. To distinguish them from their local rivals, they would take the name Sarekat Rakjat (People’s Union), a name that the PKI hoped (overoptimistically, as we shall see) would soon be assumed by all the Red SI branches. At the same time, the party made clear that it did not intend to create a rival to the CSI, as it had decided after the October 1921 schism, but would subordinate the mass units openly and directly to the PKI itself: 1.

In

places

all

resolutions taken

where Red

Sis exist, a branch of the

PKI

be estab-

will

lished. 2.

The Red

3.

This cooperation will center about the struggle against capitalism.

4.

All

SI and

major matters

the executive of the 5.

At

PKI branches

least

will

PKI

in

will

work

together.

be referred by the PKI and Red SI branches Semarang, attention of Chairman Semaun.

once a year the PKI will hold a congress,

delegates of the

Red

Sis

to

and the PKI

will

determine policy

at

in

which the

defense of the

interests of the people of the Indies. 6.

The Red

SI units need pay no dues to the PKI; they have only to pay

the costs of sending delegates to the annual congress.

be obtained from PKI branches (80 per cent of the funds received by PKI units must be deposited with the central executive). 7.

PKI funds

8.

The Red

of their

will

Sis will thus be in a financial position to defend the interests

members,

for they

need not contribute

they pay the expenses of such PKI and

Misbach, Darsono, Abulrachman,

to the

Red

PKI

executive nor need

SI propagandists as Hadji

etc.: their travel costs will

be paid by the

executive of the PKI. 9.

lish a

the

Wherever

a capitalist SI a la Tjokroaminoto exists, the

PKI

will estab-

party branch and an SR, which will work together in the same

PKI and

the

Red

way

Sis do.

10. Further information

on

this

matter can be obtained from the PKI

executive. 8

“It is

now

clear,” the party proclaimed, “that the Reel SI

and the future Sarekat Rakjat are united one front

into

for the defense of the interests of the

one

fortress,

one army,

people of the Indies.”

In effect, this decision reversed the position of the

757

and the PKI !*

PKI on the mass

Rise of Indonesian

movement;

for

whereas the Communist party had previously acted as a

bloc within the mass organization,

The system

it

Communism

it

now

set itself

openly

at the

head.

proposed was similar to that envisioned by Tjokroami-

noto for the relationship between the PSI and the mass following of

we

same concern the desire to create an organization in which mass participation was subject to the strict control of a disciplined and ideologically cohesive elite. It was, however, far from clear that the PKI strategy corresponded with Comintern ideas on Asian Communist relations with the

the Sarekat Islam, and, as

shall see,

it

arose from the

—

mass movement.

The International’s support of a close relationship with Asian nationalists had been expressed pointedly at its fourth congress, which convened in Moscow in November 1922. At this meeting the Comintern formally announced the end of the revolutionary period that had followed World War I. The capitalist system, it stated, had now temporarily stabilized; therefore, the European Communists must pursue a defensive tactic, consolidating their forces and working for reforms in

program for Asia, Karl Radek warned that the Eastern Communists must be cautious and remember that soviets could not be formed overnight in the Orient. The Asian Communist parties, he said, were all too often ineffective alliance with socialist parties. Interpreting this

v

groups of intellectuals

who

To

lacked any contact with the masses.

remedy this, the Communists must increase their activity in the labor movement and among the peasantry; they must associate with the revolutionary bourgeoisie and,

if

necessary,

even with feudal

ele-

ments. 10 Unless the Asian Communists showed some practical achieve-

ment along

these lines,

Radek warned, they could not expect the

Inter-

national to give great attention to the Eastern question or to place

its

confidence in the Asian parties.

The Comintern,

it

was obvious, was increasingly impressed by the

prospects of association with Asian nationalism; for although the colo-

Communist movements had not progressed much beyond embryo stage, nationalism was a visible revolutionary force. The masses, it seemed, were with the nationalists; and “To the Masses!” was the slogan proclaimed by the fourth congress as world Communism’s imnial

acknowledgment of this, the Asian parties were called on to participate in any movement that would give them access to the people. 11 The bloc within, newly adopted in China, was suggested as a method for this approach, and Chinese Communist representative Liu mediate

task. In

158

The Bloc Above Jen-ch ing explained

how

his party

Chinese revolutionary movement

hoped thereby

to gain control of the

12 .

Comintern support of the bloc within

for all Asia was, however,

no means unambiguous: the same congress warned the Asian nists at various points that in

by

Commu-

forming their partnership with national-

ism, they should not forget to retain their proletarian purity, to criticize

the local bourgeoisie, to adopt a program of agrarian revolution, and to struggle against reformism within the labor

parent that the International was

Communists should go tionalist partners.

On

in

still

movement

undecided as

to

13

was ap-

It

.

how

far Asian

distinguishing themselves from their na-

the one hand, concessions to nationalism seemed

imperative; on the other, powerful voices purity of the Asian proletariat.

The terms

from above could not be ignored,

lest

still

opposed

of the

sacrificing the

European united

front

the unity of the international line

be broken; nor could the Comintern overlook the problems created by

which in the Middle East were served by militant anti-imperialism and in Western Europe were opposed to an Soviet diplomatic interests,

outspoken stand.

These conflicting considerations, when combined with a general norance of the situation in the countries concerned (and a not

quent indifference

to the

whole subject), led the congress

to

ig-

infre-

adopt a

Communists to have their cake and eat it too. The Asian Communists, however, wanted to be supplied with the recipe for the cake, an understandable desire in view of Commu-

program

that advised the Asian

nist claims to scientific

situation

understanding of

political events.

To make

more complicated, Asian delegates usually had very

the

definite

ideas on certain ingredients of the recipe, depending on their interpretation of the situation in their individual countries,

when

accordingly upset

The

the International

seemed

and they were

to exclude

them from

was considerable unhappiness on the part of the Asian delegates at the way in which the Eastern question was handled, and they ended by formally protesting to the meeting 14 The objecanalysis.

its

result

.

tion,

when read

out on the floor of the congress, received a hearty

round of applause

15 ,

an unusual demonstration of rebellion even

fairly liberal first years of the

in the

Comintern. Nonetheless, the move was

quite unsuccessful.

The India’s his

central dissenting figures

among

M. N. Roy, who, although he was

the colonial delegates were willing to soften

views about alliance with the nationalists,

159

still

wanted

a

somewhat more inde-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

Tan Malaka, who thought, on the contrary, that not enough concessions had been made to nationalist feelings. Malaka had arrived in the Netherlands to begin pendent

policy, 16

proletarian

May

and

Indonesia’s

had spent July and August in Berlin, 17 visiting Darsono at the Comintern’s West European headquarters and then, after a brief return to Holland, had proceeded to Soviet on

his exile

1,

1922; he

Russia. At the beginning of

November he attended an ECCI

session

devoted to preparing for the forthcoming Comintern congress; as the

was given an advisory (nonvoting) place

representative of “Java,” he at the meeting. 18

At the congress

he served on the committee

itself,

that discussed the Eastern question,

which by

his

account was a scene

of hopeless confusion:

The Comintern (its Oriental that the Communist Parties

Section) put forth a “thesis,” which asserted

must aid and work against imperialism. This thesis was

in the colonial countries

together with the nationalist parties

introduced and defended by the Russian and Indian Communists. Surely everyone

is

for cooperating with

how

agreed on the need to give help to the nationalists and

them

as a matter of abstract principle, as theory.

to bring this into practice,

—

how

But

to realize concretely this cooperation

up to the time I left for Indonesia. At the time I left Moscow, the Comintern leaders were simply leaving the matter up to one’s own judgment and the local situation. It is true that I became involved in a heated debate that had been going on for some time between the defenders of the thesis and its opponents. One and aid

this [the

Comintern 1 had not been able

to decide

had returned from a visit to a factory near Moscow, a Japanese Communist, the late Sen Katayama, who had been attacking a point in the thesis, asked me to continue the argument against evening, rather

late, just after I

the provision in question.

The

.

.

which seemed small enough

difference in view,

clearly great

.

when we descended from

the concrete world of fact.

When my

at

first,

became

the airy, abstract heights of theory to

argument touched on

actualities,

such

Pan Islamism, the gap between the abstract and the concrete, between theory and practice became visible. For example, the English Communists declared their objection to a boycott of English as boycotts or noncooperation or

goods by the Indian people, inasmuch as in

England. Therefore,

how

this

could one ask the English workers to cooperate

with the boycotters in India and elsewhere?

The ing,

if

debate, which at I

remember

first

would increase unemployment

.

.

.

went smoothly, gradually became heated,

rightly, for three days.

Comintern, assuming charge of the

thesis,

160

At

last

forbade

last-

the representative of the

me

to speak.

I

replied to

— The Bloc Above this

with a strong protest against the manner of handling the Asian question,

which was

so

complex and foreign

to the

of the West. 19

Communists

Tan Malaka’s particular concern was to repeal the denunciation of Pan-Islamism by the second Comintern congress. We will remember that the 1921 PKI congress had decided to take this matter up before the Comintern, and that, in addition, Malaka was a personal proponent of alliance between

Communism and

revolutionary Islam.

He had

continued to assert his views in the Netherlands, arguing in the Dutch

Communist newspaper

that support for Pan-Islamism

would serve the

revolution and not, as the Comintern had argued, the interests of imperialism:

Among

the European Muslims in the Balkans,

among

Arab Muslims, the African, Hindustani, and, yes, even the Indonesian Muslims there is but one hope: Liberation from the Western imperialist powers. the

.

The attempt

Muslim countries coincides with [the from the yoke of foreign rule. The victory of Kemal is

reawakening the old self-confidence.

.

.

.

Indies will not remain behind. It

lims of Sumatra, the people of Djajnbi

hope

.

at reunification of the

struggle for] liberation

Our

.

to Istanbul.

.

.

is

especially the revolutionary

and Atjeh, who

still

look

Mus-

up with

.

Alongside the crescent, the star of the soviets will be the great battle

emblem stan,

of approximately

and our

May

250 million Muslims

of the Sahara, Arabia,

Hindu-

Indies.

our comrades in Indonesia understand

this.

May

they keep in mind

the significance of the thousands of Muslims in the Sarekat Islam. Lastly, let us realize that the millions of proletarian

attracted to an imperialist Pan-Islamism as to

Not one

to

be stopped by indifference

Muslims are

as little

Western imperialism. 20

to his pleas in committee,

he put

the matter before the entire congress, explaining the harmful effect the

Comintern stand had had

A

split

in Indonesia:

[between the SI and PKI] occurred

criticism of the leaders of the Sarekat Islam.

agents,

made

gress of the

use of this

Communist

The Sarekat their stomachs,

split,

and

The government, through

its

second Con-

International to fight against Pan-Islamism.

.

.

.

propaganda. They are with us “with

but with their hearts they remain with the Sarekat Islam

with their heaven, which

we

cannot give them. Therefore, they boycotted

we could not carry on propaganda any longer. ... If we split, we may be sure that the government agents will be there

our meetings and

have another

1921, owing to tactless

also of the decision of the

Islamists believe in our ’

in

161

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

again with their Pan-Islamism. Therefore, the question of Pan-Islamism

very important.

.

.

is

.

At present Pan-Islamism

is

a national-liberation struggle, because Islam

Moslems is everything: not only religion, but also the state, the economic system, the food, in fact everything. Thus Pan-Islamism now means the fraternity of all Mohammedan peoples and the liberation not only of the Arabian, but also of the Indian, Javanese, and all other oppressed for the

Mohammedan

This

peoples.

against the British,

fraternity

French, and Italian

world capitalism. Such

is

called

is

the

capitalists,

we

is

new

our

task,

and

the meaning of Pan-Islamism in India

just as

we

is

how

far

we

if

we

are to support

it.

the

are willing to support the national war,

250 million Mohammedans who are subject once more

among

being carried on.

shall also support the liberation struggle of the very active

fore, I ask

struggle

consequently against

oppressed colonial peoples for which secret propaganda This

liberation

to the imperialist

and energetic

Powers. There-

should support Pan-Islamism in this sense, and 21

Tan Malaka was supported by a representative from Tunisia and by the Dutch delegate Van Ravesteyn, who made the congress keynote speech on the colonial question and asked that Pan-Islamism be supported as an anti-British weapon in India and in the Middle East

The

Russians, as

v

we have

noted, had not been blind to the uses of Pan-

Islamic sentiment in the past, and they continued to employ 23

22 .

on

was one thing to make use of it in ad hoc fashion outside the Soviet Union and another to give it a public imprimatur. At the congress, Tan Malaka recounted, “I did not receive any answer at all, although my speech had received considerable applause from the entire congress.” 24 The International again condemned Pan-Islamism; 25 the only benefit of Malaka’s efforts was that Indies Communists could quote his remarks to prove that their party defended Islam 20 Comintern obection to Pan-Islamism did not mean that the Internaoccasion

.

Pan-Islamism was a two-edged sword, however;

it

it

.

tional disapproved of the

PKI

alliance with the Sarekat Islam. Quite

was pointed out at the conshould be employed through-

the contrary, the Indonesian bloc within

example of the strategy that out the East. Replying to a delegate who feared that alliance with bourgeois nationalism would prevent the development of a solid Communist labor movement, Safarov pointed out that, “as we have alreadv

gress as an

remarked, the Communist Party of the Dutch East Indies, which is small but active and rich in ideas, has been able on the one hand to develop its work among the proletarian masses and on the other to

162

— The Bloc Above exercise

a

significant

influence

revolutionary movement.” It is

on the

left

wing

of

the

national-

27

questionable whether the Comintern was completely aware of

unhappy state of the PKI-SI alliance by that time; beside the slow arrival of news from such a distance, most of the Indies emissaries to Moscow had been passionate proponents of the bloc within and had tended to portray it very favorably. The articles published by PKI and CPH leaders in the international Communist press between 1921 and

the

early 1923 stressed the importance of the relationship with the Sarekat

Islam,

and those written

in the latter part of this

period gave the

general impression that with the reunification of the labor

movement

in

1922 the breach in the alliance had been healed. 28 At the second Profintern congress

(held at the same time as the

November 1922

Comintern convention) Tan Malaka attacked the Profintern spokes-

man on

the colonial question,

who had

innocently referred to the Sare-

kat Islam as a “radical nationalist” movement. This characterization

was not accurate, Malaka insisted: 90 per cent of SI members were workers and poor peasants, and what bourgeois elements it had contained were fast leaving the movement; moreover, in 1921 it had adopted the PKI program almost in toto 29 The Comintern’s Indies informants were no more accurate in por.

Tan Malaka

traying the situation even after the final break with the SI.

attended a June 1923

ECCI

meeting as rapporteur for Indonesia and

submitted a report that noted comfortably that the PKI “enjoys a considerable influence within the ‘Sarekat-Islam.’

from

later in

right

and

left

that year occasionally

wings of the

International realized that

SI,

PKI

” 30

Comintern accounts

remarked a

split

between the

but they do not indicate that the influence on the radical branch of

movement was now exercised not within but over it party was disinterested in alliance with non-Communist

the mass

or that

the

groups.

The Comintern yearbook

for 1923 followed Malaka’s report in an-

nouncing the PKI’s “considerable influence” within the Sarekat Islam; the Profintern executive reported to

its

31

July 1924 congress that the

Indonesian Communists were carrying on their

efforts

within the

framework of a united front formed by the Radical Concentration which had then been dead for over a year. 32 Such assertions seem to have been based on misleading accounts Malaka,

who

claimed that “the

[1923], brought not only almost

last all

163

like that of

Bergsma and Tan

[PKI] congress, held

in

the trade unions and the

March Red SI

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

under Communist influence, but also the nationalist Indian party [Sarekat Hindia] and the Budi-Utomo.”

33

The Comintern’s informants may not have been mislead

it;

consciously trying to

they themselves were forced to base their analyses on infre-

quent and not always accurate information from the Indies. Moreover, their

own

notions about

PKI

what news

policy colored their view of

they did receive. Thus Bergsma, a passionate supporter of alliance with the Sarekat Islam, wrote in 1925 that “the quarrel that lasted for a long

time between the Communists and the ‘Sarekat Rajat’ on the one side

and the ‘Sarekat Islam’ on the other has come

to

an end, which pro-

vides the possibility of forming an anti-imperialist bloc”

34

—a

state-

ment about as far from actual fact as anything that could be said at that time. Nor can we discount the human tendency to portray one’s activities to others in a form calculated to please and impress the party in Java to its correspondents abroad, and they in turn to Comintern headquarters. Finally, the Indies Communists continued to think, as we noted in their affiliation to the International, that the Comintern had no particular expertise on Indonesian affairs. “The methods of work adopted by our comrades in the Indies are not always understood in Europe,” Majaka and Bergsman explained. “But to be understood is not the main thing. We must look to the results. And those are supremely favourable to us in Java.” 35 With such an attitude, it was very

—

tempting to gloss over differences antness between the party and

The

its

in policy that

international center.

peculiarities of the PKI’s international

tailed in

Chapter

9; it is

might create unpleas-

enough now

communications are de-

to note that the

Comintern, what

with distance, misinformation, and a relative lack of concern, did not criticize the

new PKI

strategy until 1925.

When

had been

the decisions of the 1923 congress

it

did

left

so, it

found that

deviationist ones,

which had ignored the importance of the nonproletarian masses; and it urged the PKI to return to a system whereby it would work from within and not from above the mass movement. Tan Malaka hoped eventually to return to Indonesia, but since the Indies government was unlikely to allow him to do so legally in the near future and since the Comintern felt that the Indies movement was vulnerably dependent on one trained leader, it was decided that Darsono should join Semaun. Darsono, we will remember, had represented Indonesia at the International’s 1921 convention; after a few months in

Moscow he had been

sent to

work

at the

164

Comintern West European

The Bloc Above secretariat in Berlin.

time in that

city,

Tan Malaka described him

immersed

in Marxist theory

as having a

wonderful

and the German Commu-

movement. 36 Reluctantly, he heeded the International’s call and, after stopping for about two months in Holland, sailed for home. He

nist

arrived in Batavia in February 1923; there, to his great distress, the

customs

officials

confiscated his extensive library of Marxist litera-

ture. 37

Darsono’s arrival, coinciding with the complete breakdown of the

new speculation about Semaun’s Moscow had threatened to cut off aid

Indonesian bloc within, generated orthodoxy.

It

was rumored

to the party unless

that

Semaun’s un-Bolshevik policies were reversed;

38

was thought that Darsono was responsible for the aggressively anti-SI line taken by the PKI congress. 39 This seems unlikely, since the March decisions moved away from and not toward the Comintern stand; both Semaun and Darsono have denied that the latter effected a policy change, and other commentators on PKI history of this period have pointed out that there was no visible alteration of course. 40 The agenda for the March PKI congress, published before Darsono arrived, made it evident that the party was determined to break with the SI and reorganize its forces. 41 It thus does not appear that Darsono was responsible for a change in PKI strategy; on the other hand, it is likely that he helped influence party policy along lines that were doctrinaire, internationalist, and isolated from the other Indonesian political groups. In general, he had never been very diplomatic toward non-Communist politicians, and his opinion of the SI leadership was outspokenly low. Moreover, he was by nature inclined to be absorbed by theoretical questions, and his German experience had strengthened this tendency. Like most European Communists of the time, he was convinced that the proletarian revolution would imminently take place in Germany, and he believed that it would then spread, if not over the whole world, at least to the Netherlands. A Communist Holland would automatically mean an independent Indonesia, he thought; thus the future of the Indies would be decided in Europe. The PKI’s duty was therefore not primarily to prepare a revolution against the Dutch but to strengthen itself and its following in order to assume control when the capitalists were defeated

less spectacularly,

it

in Holland. 42

PKI

after Se-

although, taking a lesson from his predecessors’

unhappy

Darsono was the

maun

left,

tacitly

acknowledged leader

165

of the

Rise of Indonesian experiences, he

assumed no

official

Communism

executive funtion in order to avoid

occasion for banishment. 43 His views were therefore of great impor-

tance for the party, although since he kept in the background to assign

any particular decisions

plainly evident, however,

when

in

to his influence. His thinking

on the world

s

was

1923 the International Red Aid (a

Comintern-sponsored association for channeling funds tress) called

hard

it is

Communists

to parties in dis-

to contribute to the

German

workers. Darsono took a publicly active role in organizing mass meetings to set off a money-raising campaign.

However,

at the

opening

Semarang and Surabaja, the campaign was so strongly attacked by those who felt that PKI charity could best begin at home that the party leaders were forced to agree that a token contribution would suffice as a sign of PKI international solidarity. 44 In spite of this evident lack of the proper spirit on the part of less cosmopolitan PKI members, the party laid great stress after Darsono assumed command on internationalism and the need to remember that world capitalism and not the Netherlands was Indonesia’s enemy. 45

rallies in

Darsono’s view of the function of the Indonesian party, coupled with his ideological

development

in the anti-Revisionist, antinationalist at-

mosphere of Gqrman Communism, may of

its

statement at the March 1923 congress, the PKI

revive a

common

front with the

cal Concentration collapsed

ing

also help explain

its

own

non-Communist

and devoted

itself

why,

made no

in spite effort to

parties after the Radi-

instead to strengthen-

forces at their expense. This policy did not reduce the party

to a proletarian splinter group,

however; instead, the PKI could state

truthfully in less than a year after the 1923 congress that

only significant popular

movement

it

was the

in the country. 46

This triumph partly reflected the failings of the other parties, for

none of the

movements could give the PKI a run for the money. Budi Utomo had never had a general appeal, and now its energies were absorbed by a running battle between its right and left wings. 47 The Sarekat Hindia was so unsuccessful that in 1923 it died out entirely. Nowhere, however, was the decay of the non-Communist movement more evident than in the Sarekat Islam, for very soon after

existing Indonesian

its

break with the Communists

it

was

clear that the

purge

would bring not renewed vigor but a mortal decline. 48 Tjokroaminoto’s overwhelming victory at the Madiun congress proved to be no real indicator of the actual situation within the to his

program arose almost immediately 166

movement. Objections

after the SI meeting, not only

The Bloc Above from the

left

but also from those

who opposed

Sarekat Islam into a religiously oriented leaders

who

felt

the attempt to turn the

movement and from

rival SI

threatened by the decision to create a disciplined PSI. 49

As a result, the Sarekat Islam branches were riven by quarrels, and even the SI stronghold in Jogjakarta broke in half under the strain. 50

None of the major plans of the congress were carried out, the PSI mummified in embryo, and the financial situation of the movement went from desperate to catastrophic. In March 1923 Oetoesan Hindia ceased publication for lack of funds; Tjokroaminoto’s new journal, Partij S.J., went the same way soon after. At the end of 1923, financial exhaustion was such that the SI executive hardly functioned, and

branches had

lost

almost

all

contact with the center. 51

Among

its

the local

non-Communist leaders, resistance to Red SI competition was almost lethargic, and Tjokroaminoto’s attempt to create counterorganizations had no visible result. Not even Semaun’s arrest could revive the fortunes of the movement; Tjokroaminoto had already lost too much influence to take advantage of the absence of his most serious competitor.

More and more,

in a religious,

“worked

ganda

the SI

came under the

Pan-Islamic sphere.

itself into

for Islam

It

a political impasse.

control of Salim

and moved

had, as one observer remarked,

With the carrying on

and against Communism the CSI’s

of propa-

activity

was

ex-

The popular movement continued on, leaving it behind.” 52 When the Sarekat Hindia came to an end in mid-1923, the Communists sympathetically offered a political home to its adherents. A number of them did go to the PKI, and when an attempt was made later in 1923 to resurrect the nationalist organization, the Communists understandably if unfraternally denounced the project. 53 The dissension and hausted.

discouragement that followed the 1923 SI congress provided a similar opportunity to

solicit

adherents at

all levels,

and

as a result a

number

more prominent SI figures began to appear in and around the Communist camp. One was Surjopranoto, who broke with the CSI after its February 1923 congress; the PKI congratulated him, 54 and, according to Surjopranoto, Semaun invited him to act as “adviser” to the Red SI. 55 Another was the former CSI secretary Sosrokardono, who on his release from Section R imprisonment in 1923 was solicited eagerly by both the Sarekat Islam and the PKI. For a year he remained of the

loyal to the SI; then, protesting

joined the

Communist

its

excessive stress on religion, he

party. 56

These and similar defections from the CSI were useful 167

to the

Com-

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

munists only for prestige; Surjopranoto merely

flirted

with the PKI,

and Sosrokardono soon associated himself with a deviant Communist group, Sudiro’s New SR. However, two other leaders, Alimin and Musso, were to play more substantial roles. They had been members of both the CSI and PKI before their imprisonment for the Section B affair;

however, they had been noted for their loyalty to Tjokroami-

noto, in

whose defense they had perjured themselves, and had been

criti-

cized in Darsono’s 1920 attack for unquestioningly supporting the SI

chairman. Both camps seemed to consider

it

a matter of prestige to

secure the loyalty of the two

men when

1923. Hints of high position

were given: Sinar Hindia hopefully pro-

claimed that the PKI exiled

now had two

they

left

prison in September

leaders capable of replacing the

Semaun; within the Sarekat Islam they were suggested

as suc-

cessors to Tjokroaminoto. 57 Since they did choose the

rank

among

their

backgrounds

the major leaders of

Mas Alimin

is

PKI and were Indonesian Communism, a sketch

to

of

relevant.

Prawirodirdjo was born in Surakarta in 1889; his family

was poor, but at the age of nine he became the foster son of G. A. J. Hazeu (later Adviser for Native Affairs) and so was able to obtain a good education. He attended European schools in Batavia and became and Dutch; he

added Sundanese to his native Javanese, which later helped him to be effective politically in West as well as his native Central Java. Hazeu had hoped he would enter government service, but Alimin was drawn to Indonesian politics and journalism; he began a newspaper, Djawa Moeda (Young Java) and entered the Budi Utomo. Soon after the Sarekat Islam was founded, he joined and became an early member of the CSI; for a time

fluent in French, English,

he stayed

also

in Surabaja at Tjokroaminoto’s boardinghouse, a center for

minded young Indonesians. Alimin was also associated with Tjipto Mangunkusumo; he joined Insulinde and was coeditor of its Bapolitically

tavia journal, Modjopahit.

He became

active in organizing printers

interested in labor affairs

and was

and the seamen and dockworkers

of

was a founder of Baars’s rural union, the PKBT, and was vice-chairman of the pawnshop workers’ union. For a while he was employed in the Batavia offices of the Japanese firm Mitsui, but he Batavia; he

soon

the penalty for political activity in colonial Indonesia: he fired at the request of the Indies authorities. 58 felt

Alimin rounded out the

ISDV

;

in

his place in the

Indonesian opposition by joining

1918 he became chairman of

168

was

its

Batavia branch and a

The Bloc Above of the central party executive. 59

member

The Communists were not

happy with him, however, for he took a syncretic attitude toward politics and refused to commit himself wholly to any one of the groups he had joined; until 1920 they thought him too close to Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia, and in the Jogjakarta-Semarang conflict he sided with the CSI. When he left prison, he was for a time politically unclassifiable, although he successfully revived the pawnshop workers’ union 00 and joined Musso and Sosrokardono in a shortlived attempt to revive the CSI organ Oetoesan Hindia. 61 Gradually, however, Alimin’s activities became one-sided: he appeared as a major speaker at a Red SI/SR convention in April 1924, and thereafter he starred at numerous Comtoo

munist meetings, giving the SI increasing cause alty. 02 Finally,

China

as the

he made

PKI delegate

Musso was born

He

his position

to a

to question his loy-

completely clear by appearing in

Comintern-sponsored conference.

in 1897 in Pegu, a village in the residency of Kediri.

attended high school and teacher training school in Batavia; there

he was a friend of Alimin and a protege

first

of

Hazeu and then

of the

educator, theosophist, and Ethical reformer D. van Hinloopen Labberton. Like Alimin, he lived for a time at the Tjokroaminoto board-

inghouse in Surabaja, where he met Sukarno, with

day

whom

he was one

compete for control of Indonesia’s revolutionary Republic. Like Alimin, too, he divided his loyalties between several political organizations and was in his case, Insulinde, Sarekat Islam, and the ISDV to

—

—

considered in the Jogjakarta-Semarang competition as an ally of Tjok-

He was

roaminoto.

and political form but not ready style confessed

writer;

described as very bright and a good organizer

he was an imposing figure on the speaker’s

a particularly brilliant orator,

in his public

and he affected a rough-and-

appearance. At the Section

when confronted with evidence

that he

Tjokroaminoto; but Musso defiantly refused to do

damn-the-consequences attitude that was

more than once

in its later history. 03

plat-

B

Alimin

had

lied to save

so,

exhibiting a

to serve the

He was

trials,

PKI

fatefully

treated rather badly in

prison (Salim protested this to the Volksraad), and the experience

embittered him deeply against the Dutch. However, he did not exhibit revolutionary inclinations immediately

when he was

released, perhaps

because Van Hinloopen Labberton planned to take him as

on a teaching assignment ally decided,

He was

his assistant

The Japanese government eventuMusso was not eligible for appointment.

to Japan.

however, that

to teach Indonesian languages, in English,

169

and although he

.

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

commanded sufficiently

the requisite tongues, the Japanese decided he lacked a

high academic degree

(

we might

although

suspect that his

and prison record also entered into their consideration ) Immediately after his rejection, Musso announced that the Batavia PKI branch had been revived under his leadership. 64 An Indies government report, considering the decline of the Sarekat

radical politics

Islam during 1923, attributed

The misfortunes

it

largely to a retreat into abstraction:

of the SI during the past year

seem

to confirm

anew

the

proposition that neither a Pan-Islamic nor a socialist ideal, neither a striving

governmental-economic questions such as tax

for all-Indies unity, nor cies or

noncooperation,

concerns of daily finds response tuals.

move

the great majority; but local grievances, the

do accomplish

life,

Whoever makes use

from the crowd; whoever denies

sometimes awaken a degree of SI,

expression distrust,

this.

it

of this fact

can only attract

intellec-

popular leader mixes the one [aspect] with the other he can

If a

The Red

poli-

is

interest in

on the other hand, did given, openly

and

and disappointment

plantation owners

—

all

broader and higher concern

attract the people, “because in

no uncertain terms,

in

65 .

it

to the bitterness,

government, the authorities, the

in the

Westerners, in short, insofar as they do not

stand on their side as Communists

—

for in this

manner the

leaders

arouse the expectation that they will act more strongly [than their rivals]

in the interests of those

Moreover,

this association

who

feel

themselves disadvantaged.

has more funds and makes better use of

them than the Sarekat Islam locals did previously.” 66 Certainly Communist militancy was the principal reason for PKI success in capturing the mass movement, since people tended to be interested in politics only as an active protest against the status quo. At

the

same

time, the Sarekat Islam’s ideological stand contributed to

decline, for although

its

its

leaders appealed to the religion of the great

mass of the Indonesian people, whereas the PKI professed an

alien,

had actually chosen the narrower base. To begin with, the schism in the Sarekat Islam reflected in some ways a separation between secular and religious orientation that was to beproletarian doctrine, the SI

come

a perennial division in Indonesian politics; the

of the labels

“Red” and “White”

probably arose as

much from

two major Javanese

religious

to identify the

wide popular use

warring SI factions

their traditional identification

communities as

it

with the

did from European

revolutionary usage. In Javanese, aban(g) (the equivalent of the In-

donesian merah

)

means red

or brown; the

170

kaum abangan were

thus

The Bloc Above means white, and the kaum putihan (a popular term for the santri ) were accordingly the Whites. Because the abangan felt their world view threatened by the stricter imposition of Islam and by the relatively individualistic and competitive values of the santri, they have tended to prefer political movements that were “neutral” about religion. Thus Budi Utomo (an organization of the prijaji, who share the general abangun ethos) declared that if it had to choose between the religious attitudes of the PKI and those the CSI advanced, it would prefer the Communists/57 Nor did the Sarekat Islam’s religious standpoint appeal universally to the santri. The CSI had become closely identified with the modernist viewpoint of the Muhammadijah, which in 1924 declared that Islam and Communism were incompatible and hence that no real Muslim could adhere to the PKI. 68 The Muhammadijah was at the time the only articulate spokesman for Javanese Islam, but its religious interpretations were not uncontested. Its views may be seen as at the extreme White end of the abangan-santri scale in the sense that it wished to purify Indonesian Islam of local tradition. The Muhammadijah was chiefly influential among the more sophisticated, entrepreneurially oriented santri of the towns; its greatest strength was in Jogjakarta, and this was the only place where the Sarekat Islam offered the PKI any

the Reds; putih

serious popular resistance after 1923.

the

Muhammadijah

tion of the

Many

seem

religious viewpoint

White SI more inimical

santri

who

have found the posi-

to

to their values than the secularism

of the Red. This, coupled with the position of the

protest

did not share

PKI

movement, may explain why a number of those

as a radical

santri

who

sought political expression aligned themselves with the party and professed a religious variant of

In Java, Islamic

Communism.

Communism was

karta area; the following

is

particularly strong in the Sura-

an example of

its

argument,

in

which

elements of indigenous tradition, Islam, and Marxism are visible:

was considered by the people to be their greatest and universally acknowledged need; its execution rested with the king, who in his capacity [as judge] was raised above all other mortals and honored, and the masses subjected themselves completely to him. When, however, many persons began to compete with each other in the pursuit of riches, justice could no longer be meted out as it should; for the rich people In bygone centuries, justice

who had committed

a crime could bribe witnesses

out of the charges against them.

From

this

171

and thus buy

their

way

time on the king was seldom able

Rise of Indonesian to judge correctly.

Communism

The human mind, once

led along crooked paths, so that

mans

sins

became dishonest and became greater and the world

upright,

was full of cruelty. The rich could profit by the means which God gave, through the person of His Prophet and in the form of a religious teaching, for the benefit of the world and of mankind; for they had the opportunity [to study the teachings], while the proletariat, on the other hand, had to spend the whole day working to earn its food. When the rich people began to assume an interest in religious affairs they also introduced politics into religious instruction; and after the passing of the Prophet they were able to use their influence [on religion] to make their riches secure. Religious leaders, priests, and teachers were paid by the capitalists, and in this manner the capitalists were able to achieve their goal of seeing the interests of wealth placed above the interests of the people.

The

duties of giving zakat

and alms], prescribed by man should be placed above the welfare of

and

Islam, prove that the welfare of

fitrah

[tithes

goods. But as soon as the leadership of Islam no longer rested with the disciples of the Prophet, these duties

rich

no longer thought of zakat; and many prohibited goods were dealt with

in trade

with other parts of the world,

the goods in the world

Russia;

it is

until

became impure.

capitalism has arisen. There are

still

It is

from the standpoint of Islam therefore no

wonder

is,

and that they unite

no laws against capitalism, save in agitation against

it,

all

that sinful

high time that the workers and peasants began to realize

evil capitalism

and

were no longer obeyed. Many of the

in

how

for their rights

for a decent existence 69

The

.

chief teacher of this creed

dealer, Hadji Misbach.

The

first

was the son

of a Surakarta batik

act that brought

him

the law was his refusal in 1915 to repair his house.

He

in contact

undertook

with this

was then attempting to impose various requirements in house construction and maintenance; its object (the improvement of public health) was praiseworthy, but to many Indonesians it was an uncomprehended and unwarranted interference in their private affairs. Misbach, who was at heart both a radical and a traditionalist, felt this most strongly; in spite of a heavy fine he refused to make the necessary changes and, when all else failed, simply abandoned the dwelling. He joined the SI in its early years, edited religious journals in the Surakarta area, and helped found the Bala Tentara Nabi Muhammad (Army of the Prophet Muhammad), a project of Tjokroaminoto’s to combat insulting references to Islam. Concerned for the lot of the poor as well as for religion, he peculiar form of political resistance because the government

172

The Bloc Above became involved with Insulinde when

it

replaced the SI as the chief

vehicle of social protest in the Surakarta area during the mid-1910s.

Misbach was, we

will

remember, a leader

during 1919. Placed under preventive detention, he was released

effort

October of that year, only

in

of the Surakarta anticorvee

speech laws in

When he

May

left

to

be reimprisoned

1920.

prison in August 1922, Misbach resumed the leadership

Medan Moeslimin (Muslim Arena) and

of

for violating the

Islam Bergerak (Islam on

Communist views. decision and chose for the

the March), which were already expressing Muslim

He

disapproved of the CSI’s party discipline

PKI at the Sarekat Islam’s 1923 congress. Misbach was, according to Dutch accounts, motivated by idealism rather than ambition in his career,

an accolade the Europeans accorded few Indonesian radicals of

He was

that day.

extremely popular in the Surakarta region, and his

teachings had such appeal that he was soon a figure of major importance.

This

greatly alarmed

the authorities,

who

thought his

in-

digenously oriented arguments were particularly dangerous; after a

bomb-throwing incident

in Surakarta later that year, they seized the op-

portunity to accuse him of having organized a terrorist group called

“Sabotage” to do the job. The case was so obviously weighted with perjured testimony as to arouse general complaint; the state was unable to

prove

its

charge and had to resort to the extraordinary rights to banish

him to New Guinea. This action was protested in both the Volksraad and the Dutch parliament, the more so since his place of exile was considered unhealthy. 70 The Dutch Communists, seeing an opportunity to make a grand gesture toward Indonesia and Islam, named Misbach a candidate for the 1925 parliamentary elections, the second Indonesian to

be nominated Islamic

to that

Communism

body, although he was quite ineligible. 71 in

Java by no means expired with Hadji Mis-

Medan Moeslimin increased publicamonthly, and religious Communism in that

bach’s banishment. In Surakarta tion

from twice

to thrice

area was virtually identical with the Mu’alimin movement. This was

sponsored by an Islamic Communist association, Mardi Busono, which reportedly had several thousand

members

in the Princely Territories

by

early 1926; the Mu’alimin courses, held in prayer houses, explained the

Koran along Islamic Communist lines, opposed the modernist interpretations of Muhammadijah, and protested government interference in

The movement became sufficiently popular to alarm government, which began to break up Mu’alimin meetings; it im-

religious affairs.

the

173

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

prisoned some half-dozen leaders in February 1926, causing a riot of

Mu’alimin followers before the great mosque

in Surakarta.

Other

Is-

lamic Communist groups were reported to exist in Tegal, under the leadership of Hadji Adnan, and in the pesantren (religious school)

Whether they had any connection with the PKI

center of Ponorogo. unclear; their chief tion

to

the

common

characteristic

seems

to

is

have been opposi-

Muhammadijah. The Communist party drew on such

antimodernist sentiments in

its

appeals for religious support, declaring,

even as the modernist association had banned the party to

all

good

Muslims, that no true believer could belong to the Muhammadijah. 72

Although Javanese Islamic

Communism was

was

antimodernist, this

not so in Sumatra, where religious reform movements had an inde-

pendent history and were not amenable penetrate the area.

Muhammadijah attempts

spread to the island,

Muslim Minangkabau area

in the strongly

sumed

When Communism

to

a religious form.

Hadji Datuk Batuah,

Its

who had been one

was Achmad Chatib

of the

as-

gelar

pupils of Hadji

first

Rasul, a prominent teacher of Islamic modernism.

Lawas

centered

West Coast and

of the

chief proponent

it

to

He came from Kota

Padang highlands and was a teacher and executive officer in the Sumatra Tawalib, which sponsored schools providing modernistoriented instruction in Padang Pandjang, Fort van der Capellan (Batu Sangkar), and Fort de Kock (Bukit Tinggi). In early 1923 he resigned in the

these positions and, together with a pupil, set out on a trip through

northern Sumatra. In Atjeh he

is

said to have

come

Natar Zainuddin, a tramway conductor and sometime

in contact

with

journalist,

who

had recently returned from Java and who was a zealous propagandist for the VSTP. It is not certain whether Batuah was converted to Communism by Zainuddin, or whether he had already come to a Communist

viewpoint before he undertook his journey. Zainuddin himself had

been born on the West Coast, and he returned in response to the

there.

VSTP

tion with

Zainuddin and

it

in

May

1923,

when

Resident of Atjeh expelled him from

strike the

Soon thereafter Batuah

to

also returned,

his role in the

resuming both

his associa-

Sumatra Tawalib school

in

Padang Pandjang. He now preached a clearly Communist-oriented Islam, and he soon gathered a considerable following both among the people of his

home

district of

Kota Lawas and among the Sumatra

Tawalib pupils. In the Tawalib system the teachers taught only the highest classes; their pupils, in turn, instructed the

lower ones.

174

A

teacher with a strong

The Bloc Above was able to exert great influence, and Batuah soon had gathered a wide circle of student propagandists. He cooperated with Zainuddin in setting up two journals, the popular Djago ! Djago! (Up and At ’Em! ) which was edited by Zainuddin, and the more theoretical Pemandangan Islam (Islamic Outlook), which was run by Batuah and Djamaluddin Tamin, a Tawalib teacher who was the son of a Minangkabau kijai (religious teacher) and who had followed Batuah into Communism. They also founded the International Debating Club, a Marxist social study group, and made plans to establish a school that would teach religion and politics as well as the three Rs. Hadji Batuah’s emergence as a proponent of Communism created something of an uproar among the notables of the West Coast. A secular PKI branch had been established in Padang in March 1923 by a handful of young people under the leadership of Magas, a local boy who had joined the party during a sojourn in Java; but they were viewed simply as wayward youth. Zainuddin’s activities had also not aroused comment: half Indian and married to an Indian woman, he had no place in matrilineal and clannish Minangkabau and could only hope to influence fellow outsiders. But Batuah, a man of rank by both religious and customary reckoning, a hadji, a penghulu adat the world seemed to have turned upside down. In the consternation accompanying the rapid spread of his religious Communist ideas, the wildest rumors were spread: the village heads of Kota Lawas were going to revolt, there would be a massacre of Europeans, the Assistant Resident of Padang Pandjang would be the first victim, and so on. Hadji Rasul and other modernist leaders tried to bring Batuah to his senses, but to no avail. They then tried to influence the alim ulama (religious scholars) against him, and Budi Tjaniaga, an association of notables by pre-Islamic customary law, tried to keep the adat leaders from his influence. These efforts proved insufficient, and so various personality

,

—

hitherto opposing groups united into the Karapatan Minangkabau,

which sponsored a major gathering in Padang Pandjang on November 4, 1923, and decided on a political program that opposed the noncooperation urged by the Communists. The Dutch authorities were no less concerned by the rapid spread of Communist influence

some days

later

in the area;

Hadji Batuah and Natar Zainuddin were arrested, and

were banished under the extraordinary rights. 73 After Batuah’s arrest the PKI continued in Sumatra’s West Coast region under secular direction, but it retained a strong religious cast. later they

175

,

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

from the modernist younger generation; a good part of the movement’s propagandists were Sumatra Tawalib graduates who had been unable to find fitting employment in the depression. However, the movement also included figures prom-

The Muslim Communists were

largely

inent in various other Islamic groupings;

colonialism as the

embodiment

of rule

its

denunciation of Dutch

by unbelievers had no

sectarian

limits:

The communists

really

and prosperity should 1

Has not Allah

do desire what

all

is

right,

namely, that religion, adat,

be improved.

said,

“Do

not obey the

commands

of the kafir?"

And

what do we do? 2 Our adat, which used to govern us, yea and what not, have been ruined by the government and the capitalists. 3 Now we work only for the benefit of the capitalists, not for the benefit of ourselves and our families. In all these matters the communists seek to bring improvement. The hour has almost struck!

Whoever

joins those

ranks of those

who do

who do wrong

right,

or give

does right himself. Whoever joins the it

their approval, does

wrong

himself!

The communists wish to do right but are prevented from doing so by the capitalists. Whoever does not join the communists and whoever speaks ill of them are themselves capitalists. Whoever, when the time shall have come for the fight against the Dutch, is

not a communist, has ranged himself on the side of the

he would have become a communist. Think

it

kafirs.

Otherwise

over. 74

Another variant of religious Communism,

this

time a heretical, aban-

gmi-oriented group, developed in northern Central Java. In the late nineteenth century Kijai Samin, a religious leader from Blora, began to

preach what he called the

which called century the

Agama Adam

for a return to the simple

movement became one

(the Religion of

life.

Adam),

In the early twentieth

of passive resistance, apparently as

a protest to the increasing disruption of traditional village

life.

Samin

preached that the people should regard themselves as free (merdeka ) which, in Ja vanese tradition, connoted freedom from tax and labor obligations to the ruler.

The

Saminists, arguing that they

were

free of

the Indies government, were reluctant to render taxes and rejected the Ethical rural improvement projects, which they regarded as interfering

with their

way of life.

Samin and

his chief followers

were banished 176

in 1907,

but their

atti-

The Bloc Above tudes lived on and eventually found a political outlet in

The PKI,

well aware that attitudes epitomized

prevalent in a

on

its

much

Communism.

by the Saminists were

larger part of the population, laid particular stress

opposition to the taxes imposed by the government and

its

desire

to set free the people as well as the state. In the rural areas of the

Semarang and Rembang residencies, where Saminism had its most enduring influence, it combined with Communism to produce a highly mystical version of the political movement. In 1924 this variant found a

who

leader in Sudiro, chairman of the Wirosari SR,

Sarekat Rakjat (S.R.-Baru) about

surrounding

districts, as far as

it.

Sudiro’s

organized the

movement spread

New

to the

Surakarta; and since, unlike the other

was headed by a leader who had broken with the regular Communist organization, it was a source of schism in a key area of PKI activity. 75 Communist secularism thus did not hinder PKI popularity as it might have and as the SI leaders had hoped it would. Religion, however, was not the only argument that could have been used against the Communists, and we might wonder why some other issues, such as the PKI’s foreign connections and the alien nature of Marxism, were not employed more effectively by its opponents in the struggle for popular support. As we have seen, such points of attack were not ignored by the CSI; on the other hand, the White SI leaders were strongly inclined to the internationalism of Pan-Islamism, and Salim, the chief author of their anti-Communist arguments, was closely identified with the Dutchgroups mentioned,

led,

it

moderate Marxist ISDP. This made

it

awkward

argue that the PKI was not sufficiently indigenous in

for Jogjakarta to its

orientation, for

the accusation could cut two ways.

Probably another reason for the failure to

ments was that nationalism was not then a orientation.

Congress

aimed

in

distinct

and

vital ideological

Tjokroaminoto did attempt to form an Indies National 1923-1924, patterned after the Indian

at obtaining swaraj. It did not generate

though the PKI executive was horrified sar

stress nationalist argu-

Communist had

joined

its

much

to discover a

movement and enthusiasm,

al-

prominent Makas-

Celebes committee; and

it

ran into the

determined resistance of the colonial authorities. In January 1924 the

PKI

participated in a conference with representatives from a wide

range of Indonesian organizations (including the SI and

Muhamma-

dijah) on the Congress question, apparentlv in deference to Indonesian

and Comintern

feelings that the national

177

movement should be

united

Communism

Rise of Indonesian in a

common

front.

The

participating groups could

agreement, and shortly thereafter the Congress

come

to

no real

effort collapsed. This,

coupled with the demise of the Sarekat Hindia, gave the Communists

no reason

abandon

to

phenomenon

their

argument that nationalism was a European

of the nineteenth century

and not a

real issue in the

Indonesia of their day. 76 This estimate of nationalism did not liberation

framing

from Dutch rule

its

arguments

its

its

that the

goal or that

it

made

PKI played down

consistently insisted on

in doctrinaire Marxist terms.

considerable effort was

and emphasize

as

mean

On

the contrary,

to interpret the ideology into local

terms

concurrence with popular values. To overcome the

alien identification of

Communism,

the

PKI had the advantage

that

Marxist concepts acquired general usage at an early stage of Indonesian political development.

We

will

remember

that capitalism, impe-

and the class struggle were heatedly debated early SI congresses, and they were also widely found in the

rialism, internationalism,

issues at

Indonesian-language press, appearing even in moderate Outer Island

by 1918-1919. As the PKI expanded into the focal point of popular unrest, the number of newspapers adhering to its viewpoint increased. Except for the two main party journals ( Soeara Ra’jat and Sinar Hindia, which in August 1924 changed its name to Api [Fire] ) these were generally the

journals

organs of local leaders,

who tended

to

be

political chiefs, journalists,

and organizers of one or more labor unions all at once. Chronic financial anemia and government persecution plagued these papers; moreover, they could reach at best only a very small portion of the population, since

Indonesia was more than nine-tenths

illiterate.

The people

they did reach, however, were the elements from which the rank and file of the party and the cadres of the mass movement were drawn: those with enough education to realize that things could be different,

enough ambition tion from village

to feel life to

burning social discontent, and enough alienaseek a cosmopolitan philosophy. In spreading

the rudiments of ideology in local terms, the journals of the left per-

formed an important function popular to a degree that

for the PKI,

later surprised the

making Communist ideas Dutch:

Various reports that have been received concerning the recent resistance movement indicate very clearly that the extremist propaganda, especially on the islands of Java and Sumatra, had assumed

178

much

greater dimensions in

The Bloc Above and depth than had been suspected. In general, not only the top leaders but also those of lower rank appeared to be very knowledgeable of

both

size

the principles of

were

Communist doctrine and

same time

at the

of revolutionary organization

firmly convinced that the revolution

and

would succeed

in

had succeeded in penetrating deep into the countryside, winning a broad segment of the population for the SR through a system of propaganda which they fitted in a strikingly effective manner to the particular social environment of the groups involved and even to the ability of the individuals to comprehend 77 its

time. It further appeared that the propagandists

.

Communism,

In the popular presentation of

capitalism

was

associ-

ated with greedy exploitation, in particular that of the Indonesians by

was

the Dutch, and the class struggle

man, equated with the

that of the Indonesian

common The

proletariat, against the ruling Westerners.

was often compared to the coming of the Ratu Adil, the Righteous King, which would mark a new era, that of Communism, which was pictured as freedom in its broadest sense. The revolution was seen as a sudden and total change but not necessarily a major armed struggle. Undoubtedly, denials of violent intent were largely aimed at the government; but there also appears to have been, on the one hand, a belief that Communism would sweep triumphantly and revolution

without effective opposition to the Indies from abroad and, on the other, a feeling that the

when

it

collapse

came 78

end of the Dutch era was

the people need only rise

In any event there was, as

.

up

we

hand and

at

that

for the colonial apparatus to

shall see, real confusion

even

among the major party leaders about what they were undertaking when they decided to make a revolution. The concept of a revolution aimed not just at national independence but also at drastic social change was thus not limited to doctrinaire leftists in

the central party leadership;

it

was an

integral part of the

PKI’s popular appeal. This revolution was not to require a dictatorship of the proletariat or

any other intermediary

at the classless society in

mutual

aid.

If

after liberation

the

PKI

have seen

was

aim

directly

was replaced by voluntary

is

it;

they offered

their followers could define as they liked.

shown by

PKI on almost any

the fact that opponents preferred

issue except

how Tjokroaminoto and

Semarang struggle

to

leaders gave thought to organizing the state

which

of this appeal

to attack the

state

it

from the Dutch, they did not express

utopia, the nuances of

The power

which the

stage;

Communism

Salim emphasized

that they supported

179

itself.

We

in the Jogjakarta-

Communism but opposed

the

Rise of Indonesian tactics of the

sion of the

PKI; they continued

Communists

to

Communism do

so

even

after the final expul-

in 1923. 79

PKI had the great advantage that Communism could appear as both past and future. On the one hand, it could claim to represent the newest and most radical European conIn seeking popular support, the

cepts;

on the

other,

it

could refer to the traditional view of the imper-

an

fect present as a corruption of

idyllic past.

Communism,

in this

sense, represented a return to the pristine values of Indonesian society

was ideally pictured before the coming of the Dutch. For example, one argument was that in bygone days the Indonesian people had planted their- rice without interference from outside, had prospered, and had thus given employment to craftsmen and tradesmen. The prijaji were close to the people, for the villagers gave them part of their harvest and this strengthened the bond of mutual interest between them. But then came the Europeans, who brought foreign capital and plantations; the people became poor, lost control of their land, and were forced to seek work in the factories and on the estates. The government forbade the prijaji to receive gifts from the people, saying as

it

it

did so to protect the villagers, but actually doing so in order to

the prijaji

its

servants and the people’s enemies.

The

villagers

make were

where they were forced to compete with each other and with machines; they endured ever-deepening misery, and all this was the result of capitalism the system of the foreigner, of greed, of driven to the

cities,

—

competition, of the exploitation of

man by man. Under Communism,

however, there would no longer be economic or

political competition:

would be based on cooperation. There would be no poverty. People would work because they wanted to and at the tasks they preferred; there would be no masters, no servants, and no seeking of profit. The problems of government would be easily solved, for there need be no army or navy, no legal rights of ownership, no laws other than those of all

custom, no prisons, orphanages, or any of the other apparatus of the exploitive state. 80

The

international character of

Communism was an

messianic popular appeal in that

wave

it

asset to the PKI’s

strengthened the party's image as

and supported the claim that its feebleness before the colonial regime would soon be overcome by aid from outside. Plere the party could play upon popular legends such as one predicting that the coming of the Ratu Adil would be prepared by the the

of the future

legions of Prince Djojobojo. After the Russo-Japanese

180

War, Djojobojo

The Bloc Above had been widely

among

Communist following of the 1920s he was identified with Soviet Russia ( and sometimes with Kemalist Turkey, which was seen as the Muslim ally of Russia and identified with the Chalifate). 81 For the politically more sophisticated, the idea of receiving revolutionary aid from abroad was not at all unusual. The Insulinde/Sarekat Hindia leaders had speculated in their day on the possibility of Japanese or American help. The CSI, in 1919, had evolved a project to send Hadji Agus Salim to Europe, where one of his tasks would be to present the SI side of the Section B affair to the Dutch and another would be to see what he identified with the Japanese;

could obtain in the

way

revolutionary socialists. 82 intern

of foreign aid, preferably

A

the

from Germany’s

year later there were rumors that the

was sending agents and gold

to the Indies;

Com-

Oetoesan Hindia

expressed great enthusiasm, particularly for the financial side of this prospective support. 83

As we have seen

in the case of Darsono’s

German

siasm for international help tended to be a one-way

aid project, enthuaffair

even among

news reaching the Indies about postrevolutionary events in Russia caused that country to lose some of its utopian luster, and people began to ask questions that the PKI was hard put to answer. 84 On the whole, however, the image of Russia as the source of world revolution, and of the Comintern as a potential backer the Communists. Moreover,

of efforts to overthrow colonial rule, seems to

have prevailed; the

in-

creasing tendency of the government and the Dutch-language press to attribute

all

outspoken opposition to Bolshevik inspiration probably

had a good deal to do with this. The principal PKI strength lay

in the large cities of Java,

both of the party’s proletarian origin and of the the countryside and outlying regions.

Its

by reason

difficulty in organizing

influence radiated from

rang to the surrounding countryside and to the smaller

cities

Sema-

along the

railway lines organized by the VSTP. Like the other Indonesian opposition parties,

Section

B

it

affair

was it

largely

composed

of ethnic Javanese; but after the

acquired strength in Sundanese West Java, for

cal activity revived there

under the Red

SI.

The PKI expanded

politi-

rapidly

months of 1923, and a government report observed that by the end of that year it could no longer be considered simply a party of the urban proletariat. To the surprise of many officials, it showed itself

in the last

capable of acting as spokesman for local discontent in various rural areas,

where

it

led protests against a food shortage on the

181

Bandung

Communism

Rise of Indonesian plateau, against higher school fees, It

had become

cially in

and against increased taxes on land.

active along Java’s north coast (Pasisir) districts, espe-

Pekalongan, Brebes, and Tjirebon. Bandung became a center

of influence second only to

Semarang, with PKI strength extending

to

Sukabumi and the general plateau area. In eastern Java, the party’s major centers were Madiun and Ngandjuk, and it also had influence in Kediri. In short, the PKI had more than recovered from the paralysis that followed the

VSTP

strike,

although

it

did not achieve even a minor

part of the following that the Sarekat Islam

had once been able

to

claim. 85

move outside Java in the early 1920s; it did so in a patchy manner, for Communist teachings were usually brought by persons who had been to Java or to Outer Island areas where the movement already had adherents. The bearer of the doctrine might be a native of the area, or he might come from a different PKI

strength also began to

region but succeed in interesting local leaders or groups in his message;

Menadonese soldiers who had been attracted to the Communists via the Red Guardist action played this role in various outlying districts. In some areas identification of the Communists with one eth-

reportedly,

nolinguistic group seems to

have precluded securing adherents

other: in East Java, for instance, the party

the resident Madurese, and in Atjeh the Atjehnese. In general, the

it

in an-

made no headway among

attracted local Malays but not

movement gained adherents

in

urban

and sometimes market towns; if its leader was locally prominent or a gifted political agitator, and if there was an issue to exploit, it might spread with grassfire swiftness. Inasmuch as the Outer Islands were considerably less politicalized than Java, and their administracenters

tions

were

less tolerant of opposition,

brief careers, at the close of

which the

such leaders usually had very local

movement

often collapsed.

The PKI achieved its greatest Outer Island strength in Sumatra, which was undergoing rapid economic and administrative development and where the disorienting effects of change were thus more strongly felt than in the other outer provinces. In the

West Coast

Minangkabau ) residency, the movement was able to take advantage of Muslim sentiments, friction between the populace and the local (

administration, resentment of taxation

and depression hardships, and a

relatively high level of education

The arrest secular PKI leadership, put

sian political world.

1924, of the nist activity;

and contact with the outside Indoneof Zainuddin and Batuah and. in March

temporary stop to Commuwithin a few months, however, it revived under Said gelar 182

a

The Bloc Above Sutan Said

Abdul Muis.

A

Minangkabau

and one-time follower of former government teacher, he resigned a post as secre-

Ali,

a

aristocrat

tary of a local merchants’ association, the Saudagar Vereniging tra, to

organize the PKI. Attempts by the

West Sumatra PKI

Suma-

to

keep

publications going were generally unsuccessful, for the government systematically arrested editors on charges of breaking the press laws;

but the party activists were more than able to make up for energetic personal propaganda tours. for the

Karapatan Minangkabau

fell

They had very

little

this

by

opposition,

apart as soon as Batuah and his

had been gotten out of the way. By the end of 1924 the Communists had gained adherents in many portions of the Padang, Padang Pandjang, Bukit Tinggi, Pajakumbuh, Solok, and Sawahlunto districts. There were Sarekat Rakjat branches in nine towns in the area, and the government estimated that they had about 1,000 members. 86 In the Moluccas a lively Communist movement developed. In 1919 some Javanese residents in Ternate organized Budi Mulia, an association initially thought by the authorities to be, if anything, pro-SI. It was not very successful, and in order to rescue it from an early demise its leaders sought outside support. One of them was an old friend of Semaun, who had just become chairman of the PKI; he paid him a visit and requested aid for the Ternate organization, and thus the Communists’ first Outer Island base was established. C. Dengah, a MenadoJ. nese ex-soldier who had been a member of the ISDV/PKI executive, was sent by the party to help organize Ternate. However, the real expansion of Communist influence began in 1921, when the movement came under the leadership of Raden Mas Gondojuwono, a descendant of the nineteenth-century Javanese rebel prince Diponegoro. With the aid of Dengah and Said Hamid Assor, a local man and former chatib (mosque official), he made the Ternate PKI into a vigorous movement of popular protest. Acting as a complaint bureau and promising freedom from taxes and service to the authorities, it extended itself by means of utusan, political circuit riders who brought the message as far as the Sula Islands. The Ternate PKI published a weekly newspaper, organized local seamen, sponsored a dockworkers’ strike, and held lecture courses, which, according to government reports, were widely attended. The movement subsided in 1922 with the arrest of its leaders and the restriction of political freedom in the area, but when Gondojuwono returned, in 1924, it again spread rapidly and another clampassociates

down was

necessary.

Elsewhere

in

the Outer Islands,

183

Communist

strength

was more

—

:

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

ephemeral. There was some PKI activity in Langsa (Atjeh, northern

Sumatra) and Palembang (southern Sumatra), and

ernment thought

detected rising sympathy for

it

in 1923 the gov-

Communism

in the

Indonesian-language press of Sumatra’s East Coast. In 1920 the party sent (

Sukendar, an

Celebes ) but the ,

ISDV/PKI propagandist, to organize Makassar movement did not really get under way there until

which year the Communists gained control of the hitherto nonpartisan newspaper Pemberita Makassar. In Pontianak (Borneo) PKI supporters began publication of Halil intar, which did battle with the Si-controlled Suara Borneo. During 1924 government reports also 1923, in

noted that propaganda for the Communists was being made Bali,

in

Timor,

and Lombok. 87

PKI expansion, much depended on commanding the loyalty of influential leaders, and with literacy and organizational experience very scarce, this was a chronic party problem. In the urban centers, leadership was usually associated with the labor unions ( especially the VSTP) and consisted at the lowest level of clerks, literate foremen and skilled workers and the semieducated unemployed. In the smaller towns and rural areas it came principally from those who, as a result of In the

superior education, ambition, or contact with urban tration with the status quo.

life, felt

deep

frus-

Such persons might be traders and cash-

crop farmers distressed by the depression, better-situated villagers often hadjis

—angered

over burdensome and complicated taxes,

reli-

gious teachers opposed to kafir rule and regulation of religious activity, or local notables

and

officials

done them by higher scribed in the

been

by injustices they felt had been The process of dissemination de-

alienated

authorities.

Bantam (Banten) region

of

West Java seems

to

have

fairly typical

The number going over to

members was increased by persons with a certain influence the movement and bringing with them virtually all those who

of

came under their influence. Nevertheless a group of this sort did not join all at once. The most prominent went over first, often members of one family which little by little joined in its entirety; only after this had happened did the hangers-on follow suit quickly or gradually. Soon after

person had been parent

won

a large increase in

some influential membership would become ap-

88 .

This was typical enough of a society in which the process of politicalization was only beginning, and it was also the pattern the Sarekat

Islam followed during

its

rise.

However, 184

it

created obvious problems

The Bloc Above for the

Communists because

of the clash

between the

egalitarian, pro-

letarian, secular orientation of the central party leadership

and the

frequently individualistic, “petty-bourgeois,” and religious values of local leaders outside the cities.

The requirements

of education

and the

course, with the rank of the leader,

and

ability to

command

rose, of

in the highest echelons of

and central party leadership a number of important figures came, as in the other Indonesian movements, from the gentry. However, they were individual mavericks and represented no trend among the prijaji, which as a social elite and the Indonesian arm of the colonial bureaucracy had no reason to find the PKI attractive. As we have seen, the party did appeal to traditionalism, and in some outlying areas regional

was not the case in the upper levels, where the party’s class position was better defined and where members of the gentry were more directly bound to the Dutch 89 The party did not think it necessary to define its role as antifeudal as well as anticolonial: the prijaji was a bureaucratic rather than a landed elite, and insofar as members of the gentry were willing to turn against the Dutch it was only too happy to make use of their talents and influence. Most of the principal PKI leaders, like those of the other radical opposition parties, became involved in politics at an early age from disaffected elite groups aligned themselves with

it;

but

this

.

—

idealism, ambition, or lack of challenging or appropriate employment.

They

what

often found that

permanent commitment,

for

started as a youthful fling

ended

as a

once a radical reputation was established

was hard to get back into the good graces of the authorities, and private employment was all too often unacceptable or unavailable. Such political leaders tended willy-nilly to become professionals, relying on their movements for financial support. Much the same was true of union leadership, which was composed for a good part of politicians it

or of politically affiliated professional labor organizers;

90

the

VSTP

was the exception among Indonesian unions of this period, in that leaders had all been employed by the industry they had organized. Because of the great importance of personal leadership popular following, the

critical

its

in securing a

shortage of organizational talent, and

by

the constant disruption of leadership

arrests, the

Communists put a

premium on securing individual leaders and were inclined to forgive 91 The PKI attitude toward the grave deviations by influential ones teachers of religious Communism is an outstanding example. The party .

185

Rise of Indonesian was, after

avowedly

all,

secular;

Communism

on the other hand,

to separate itself

would have removed an important source of popular support and furthered the accusation that the PKI was against Islam. The PKI executive was too well aware of the popular appeal of Islamic Communism to denounce it, but at the same time it could not from

its

Islamic following

wholeheartedly endorse so unorthodox a source of support. As a

Muslim Communist groups were semiautonomous,

the

of the party

On

in

result,

but not quite

92 .

much

same was true of other elements in the party. Communist mass support, though better articulated than the Sarekat Islam had ever been, still resembled a movement of leaders and their followings rather than an organization of branches with wella lesser scale,

the

defined memberships. Local leaders, depending for their position on their

own

supporters rather than on the central party leadership, were

and since these were drawn from a wide range of discontent, Communism appeared locally in incarnations that inclined to reflect local views;

often

had

pline of

To

little

to

central

its

do with the doctrinal aims or organizational

disci-

command.

the colonial authorities this catchall character seemed particularly

dangerous;

it

was not the party ideology

that disturbed them, but the

PKIs

or international connections

potential as a de facto nationalist

movement: Theory

kept in the background here, and attention

is

is

devoted

to the

matters that concern the masses, their daily difficulties and grievances.

These, naturally, do not spring from a Communist world view; rather the concepts of the

common

make themselves ist

people are expressed.

And when

the peoples advocate they automatically

current. If the authorities wish to

measure the unrest

the popular assemblies of the Sarekat Rakjat or

Red

the

Communists

sail in a

national-

in native society,

SI are of

much more

than the quasi-academic pronouncements of the superstruc-

significance

ture 93 .

It

also disturbed the

of the party that the

so small

movement was

Moreover, that

was

PKI

were

its

all

leadership, however, for the proletarian core

and

in

its

cadres so

ill

disciplined ideologicallv

danger of drowning

in

its

own

deviations.

membership, consisting of the deeply disaffected elements that remained of the politically active masses, adhered to

the party because they expected

it

to

produce radical action; particu-

urban centers, the Communist appeal aroused messianic expectations that were not amenable to urgings of patience and larly outside the

186

The Bloc Above discipline.

Local leaders, sharing their followers’ emotions or fearing

would lose them support, also pressed for action instead of organization. Even high in the party voices urged a program of ‘revolutionary political violence" in which the proletariat, descending on the enemy “like a whirlwind" would crush it and thus achieve that inaction

Communism. 94 Concern

for the

been expressed

consequences of undisciplined mass support had

earlier

by the European leaders

of the party, but the

Indonesians had been absorbed in the struggle for the loyalty of the Sarekat Islam following. Attention had been paid to popularity, not to

some “Communist courses" had been held in Semarang in 1920-1921 in order to improve theoretical and organizational knowledge, but this was the only observable effort in this direction before 1923. 95 As long as the PKI was under the umbrella of the Sarekat Islam, it was not likely to be held responsible by the authorities for adventures unless the party itself was directly involved. When Communism emerged as the sole radical protest movement, this protection vanished. The consequences were demonstrated in 1923, after Semaun’s departure, when bomb-throwing incidents took place in Surakarta and Semarang. The Communists were automatically held responsible: their headquarters were raided, and a number of their top leaders were arrested. 96 No evidence was found that the party had been involved, but two of the imprisoned leaders were banished and the rest were discipline;

held for four months. There was every reason to think that

if

an

inci-

dent occurred where Communist participation could be shown, the

government would take measures

far

more

drastic than those

employed

after the incidents of 1919.

After the bombings Darsono held a meeting of the Semarang explain that the party must under no circumstances tation of terrorism.

The PKI must follow

the

fall

into the

Communism

PKI

to

temp-

of Marx, not

the anarchism of Bakunin, he declared: and although he could well

understand to

why

condemn

it.

the people resorted to terrorist activity, he was forced

Increasing restrictions

made

it

hard for the party to

must be based on legal activities. Within five years, he assured, European capitalism would collapse in a new world war, in which the Indies would inevitably be involved; the result would be a soviet government that would encompreserve

itself

pass the globe. disciplined,

above ground, but

It

was the duty

and strong

in

its

efforts

Communists to be united, the coming cataclysm. They

of Indonesian

preparation for

187

Rise of Indonesian

must not indulge

Communism

in nationalist race hatred

government bodies and spread the idea

but seek representation

in

of the abolition of private

property and the establishment of soviets, for

capitalism collapsed

if

quickly in Europe, they might assume power directly and without violence.

Above

he concluded, the party must concentrate on the

all,

education of the Indonesian workers, for they were the inheri-

political

tors of the Indies future. 97

Darsono’s analysis reflected in part the sectarian view common, as the Comintern noted, to Asian

Our comrades

Communists

along the paths of

in the colonies often err

Themselves educated by a

literature

dictatorship of the proletariat,

it

is

of that day:

communism.

left

which proclaims the

fight

the

for

only with the utmost difficulty that they

can adapt themselves to combining the work of gathering together the

young

proletariat

and the craftsmen of China, Corea, India and Egypt,

against the foreign and native bourgeoisie, with the attempt to support the

national emancipation

movement

national emancipation

among

young native bourgeoisie against the capitalist center by which it is being suppressed. Decades will again have to pass before actual practice will be successful in combining the struggle for lution in

of the

the colonial peoples with the proletarian revo-

Europe and America. 98

This tendency to think in the terms of European Marxism was evident in the

new

party constitution, which the

A

ordered drawn up. 99

PKI

action program, statement

was published in draft form in November and with minor alterations it was adopted by the June 1924 PKI

of purpose,

1923,

revision of the

March 1923 congress had

and

statutes

congress. 100

By

all

rights the

differed greatly tionaries fact,

who

Communist

action

program

from the one proclaimed

in

of 1924 should

have

1918 by European revolu-

expected the imminent world overthrow of capitalism. In

however, the

new program was

almost startlingly the same. 101

It

was not that the old program had been too European but instead that it had been social-democratic rather than Communist; and indeed, the changes made were largely in the direction of the left. 102 The is

significant that the reason the party

new in

gave for having issued

PKI standpoint

declaration of principles tried to explain the

popular terms,

103

but

it

did not water

down

it

those

principles

from the proletarian internationalism of the 1918 version. contrary, the class struggle

PKI took pains to point out and not a national one: 188

that

it

was

On

the

interested in a

The Bloc Above The

fact that there

and

tionality

religion

tween workers and

—hides

makes it struggle, which

class

capitalist class.

The

Indonesia

—

a difference of na-

The oppression under which

difficult or is

in

the economic conflict, which

capitalists.

lation groans

regime

a foreign

is

a struggle be-

is

the native popu-

impossible for the native workers to see the

between the working

the conflict

indignities to

class

which the native population

give the workers of this nationality the feeling that

it

is

and the subjected

not economic

is

oppression but national oppression which causes these wretched conditions.

[Explanation of the proposition that the struggle that only

economic revolution

case, then

it

proletariat to

not merely

is

awaken

to achieve the

is

really

economic and

will bring welfare to the people.] If this its

own

interests

is

the

which force the Indonesian

to the struggle against capitalism,

but

it is

also

its

desire

independence of Indonesia and the welfare of the people

which leads the Indonesian

proletariat to

oppose capitalism, even in

its

own

country. In this struggle against capitalism the Indonesian proletariat will join

hands with other groups of workers, without regard to nationality or Therefore the effort of the proletariat here must be an international

religion.

means the summoning every religion and nationality 104 one, for this

of

all

the forces of the proletariat, of

.

Neither in the

new

action

program nor

in the statutes

and statement

was the Sarekat Rakjat mentioned. Instead, a provision for “extraordinary membership" in the party was adapted from the statutes of purpose

of 1918:

may become extraordinary members of the Party while maintain their own name; but to this name must be added the

Local associations continuing to

words

“

substructure of the PKI”

“PKI Cell”

if it is

one and

also enter the Party as extraordinary

members

of another nature.

Regional associations if

this association is a political

if

may

the Executive of the Party so allows.

become a member of the Party will be viewed as a collective request by all the members of the associations in question. However, the entrance of the associations as members of the Party does not mean that their members become members of the Party. Associations which have become members of the Party are bound by the decisions of the Party, no matter what the nature of these decisions. These Such a request

associations will

ments of

to

still

maintain fully the right to govern the internal arrange-

their groups themselves, as long as their decisions

not in conflict with the principles of the Party, decisions If

its

and

activities are

action program, or the

which have been taken by the Party.

the Executive refuses to admit an association to extraordinary

ship, that association

may

member-

appeal to the Party’s annual congress. This con-

gress will then decide on the request 105 .

189

Rise of Indonesian

framework the Sarekat Rakjat was

Into this

placed directly under the PKI, in the

but

it

Communism

spirit of

fitted.

the

SR branch was

joined the party; each

Not only was

March 1923

it

congress,

declared to be a PKI

“member” and subject to party discipline. To ensure Communist control, the PKI also decided that the SR units, although each had only one vote, could never have more than one-third the total votes at a congress and that no SR could be established unless six PKI members (a party cell) resided in that locality. 106 This last provision, had it been followed literally, would have practically eliminated the movement in the rural areas; in practice, a compromise was reached whereby the SR branches in the towns developed “subsections” in the surrounding villages, which worked under their guidance and thus under the indirect control of the nearest PKI unit. The reason for placing the SR in a close and subordinate relation to the party, Semaun later stated, was to ensure PKI domination of the mass organization and to prevent it from diluting the party’s proletarian character. 107 Doctrinaire leftism doubtless contributed to this insistence

policy

on overt and stringent control of the mass movement, but the

was

at the

same time conservative,

reflecting

much

the

same

sort

had undertaken after the Section B affair. Like the CSI, the Communist executive was feeling the unreliability of its mass support and pondering whether it would not be in the long run better to exist as a disciplined and ideologically trained urban core rather than as a focal point for general of agonizing reappraisal that the Sarekat Islam leaders

unrest.

The mixed

feelings the

PKI

central leadership

following resulted in great ambiguity in

1923-1924. Although the nonproletarian, the

its

had about

its

mass

popular approach during

Red SI/SR membership was overwhelmingly

PKI leadership centered

the urban working class; although

its

program myopically on mass following was strongly antiits

Dutch, the Communist executive strenuously insisted that the party

was

internationalist

although

its

and did not oppose the Netherlander

as such;

adherents were at least nominally Muslim, the PKI leader-

ship emphasized that

it

was

nonreligious.

As a

result,

party pro-

nouncements were very confused; what was said by the PKI executive and what was preached by the leaders in the hinterlands was often completely opposed.

How much support

is

this

acted as a brake on the expansion of PKI popular

difficult to say,

but

it

seems 190

likely that

its

effect

was consid-

The Bloc Above The March 1923

erable.

decision to transform the

Red

Sis into the

Sarekat Rakjat and place them directly under the party was received

When

Semarang SI members were confronted with the proposal, they responded with dead silence, and their leaders decided 108 it would be better not to put the matter to a vote right then. It is reasonable to assume that if the SI branch traditionally identified intimately with the party was so hesitant, less closely associated units must have been even more so. Although the PKI congress had expressed the hope that the Red Sis would change their title, with its nationalist and religious flavor, to Sarekat Rakjat, this did not generally happen in

reluctantly.

the

1923, even in Semarang. 100

Red Sis would adopt the new name. A statement of leaders from sixteen West Java Red SI and SR units declared that the leftist units would thereby distinguish Not

until April

1924 was

it

announced

that

all

themselves from the SI and proclaim their belief that religion was too

noble to be involved in

politics.

ideological orthodoxy

and

state is

is

The meeting gave

self-control desired

little

evidence of the

by the

party. “Every

a deception,'’ Alimin reportedly declared, “in every state there

oppression”;

110

and other speakers expressed equally

bitter griev-

ances against authority. Apparently, the question of adopting the Sare-

was

was discussed in closed session; the decision does not seem to have been generally carried out by the units of the mass organization until after it had been reiterated by the June 1924 party congress. kat Rakjat

In

title

still

something of a hot

efforts to give the

its

movement

issue, for

it

a sense of proletarian discipline,

the party leadership campaigned energetically during 1923-1924 to

improve the ideological and organizational

level of

both PKI and SR

branches. Courses in Marxist theory were given; indoctrination and

propaganda were carried on by the Red SI

which had changed 111 and their name to Sekolah Rakjat (People’s Schools) in April 1924, by adult literacy courses. Tracts on the Communist program and principles were published, including the first Indonesian translation of the Communist Manifesto, and a campaign was begun to increase circulation

PKI-sponsored periodicals. 112

of

A

schools,

Center for Revolutionary

Propaganda (CORP) was established in Semarang under the chairmanship of Subakat, one of the party’s chief theoreticians; it was to provide funds and direction for Communist propaganda and indoctrination,

and

tion, the

it

110 In addireportedly also established several schools.

party attempted to consolidate

191

its

publications, resolving to

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

concentrate on a few strong daily papers rather than on the plethora of financially

(and ideologically) unstable provincial journals

sessed. 114 Here, local

it

then pos-

however, there seems to have been resistance from

Communist

leaders,

opportunities of their

own

who wanted

the prestige and propaganda

papers; despite reiteration of this decision

by the June 1924 PKI congress, there was no visible reduction in the number of minor journals or increase in the central party organs. Sarekat Rakjat members were encouraged to improve their knowledge to the point where they were able to join the party. The system for absorption into the PKI seems to have differed from place to place, but in the Semarang area it was reported that an SR member received a green card on first admission; this entitled him to participate in general activities but not to attend closed meetings.

If investigations

showed that he was not a spy or a troublemaker, he received a white card, which indicated that he was a full member but not ideologically trained. If

he followed several indoctrination courses successfully, he

was given

a red card,

gandist. 115

An SR member

(

1

)

entitled

him

to

be a leader or a propa-

could (at least in theory) join the PKI

if

2 ) he had a sufficient knowledge of Communist (3) he was sufficiently familiar with the organization, (4)

he was

doctrine,

which

literate,

(

he was completely trustworthy, (5) he would subject himself to party discipline without reservation, and (6) he was willing to carry on

Communist propaganda work. 116 The necessity for discipline and indoctrination was also the theme of the PKI convention of June 7-10, 1924. “This congress will not, like the previous ones, be concerned only with arousing the masses and winning their hearts, but must be one which will gather the revolutionary forces into an organization ruled by strict discipline,” the party journal explained. “The time of agitation alone, the time of making one’s voice heard only through meetings and in newspapers, is now past, and the moment has come to form an organization.” 117 The meeting was held in Batavia, at the Arab athletic club Al-Hambra at Pasar Senen; the actual number of delegates was quite small (seventy-six, from thirtytwo party branches), but its open sessions were heavily attended by the public and many stood outside to listen. It took the important steps of ratifying the new PKI program and statutes and electing a new executive; Winanta, a former minor official of the state railway line

a leader of the

Communist movement

chairman. 118

192

in

and

Bandung, became the party

The Bloc Above This ninth congress voted to change the organizations

name

to

its

present one, Partai Komunis Indonesia, for with the party discipline

debates “partai” had become the term for a tightly organized, inde-

pendent as

political

movement, and “Indonesia” was by then widely used

an anticolonial name

for the Indies. In addition, the

cided to transfer party headquarters from capital city of Batavia. to taunt the colonial It

in

The move,

it

was

its

home

Semarang

to the

would enable the party

stated,

regime and the ISDP

in

meeting de-

socialists in their stronghold.

probably also reflected the growing importance of the PKI strength

West Java and

its

difficulties in

restrictions of political activity in the

bombings had had

Central Java, where arrests and

wake

of the

VSTP

and the

strike

a severe impact on party activities. Since proximity

to party headquarters affected local activity

and the influence of

re-

command, the move shifted further PKI sources of strength and weakened the Semarang-based leaders 119 We might note in this connection that the PKI did not use the Soviet gional leaders on the central

.

party system of Central Committee, Politburo, Secretariat, and so on,

but maintained the Dutch forms: the party was headed by a hoofdbe-

main executive, consisting of chairman, vice-chairman, secretreasurer, and commissioners (members) located in the head-

stuur, or tary,

members representing major units outside that city. Policy decisions were taken in the name of the Hoofdbestuur, which was the equivalent of a Central Committee and was sometimes quarters city, together with

referred to as such (for example, in correspondence with the Comintern). Day-to-day affairs (

were

officially

handled by a dagelijks bestuur

executive in charge of routine administration ) which consisted of the ,

main executive members

in the

headquarters

city. Actually,

however,

which was empowered to place candidates for office before the congresses and to lead the party in “extraordinary circumstances.” Members of the Dageultimate control lay with the party branch of the center

lijks

bestuur were

almost

invariably

also

officers

city,

of

this

branch

executive.

Because of

its

leading role, and because

it

was

easier for leaders in or

near the headquarters city to attend party conclaves, the central

was a very imperfect one, however: because the party organization was more dependent on leaders than the leaders were on it, the central branch could not generally impose its will over strong objections from powerful outlying units. As PKI activities outside Semarang became branch effectively dominated the PKI machine. The machine

193

itself

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

more important, the

move

power

relative

of the leading

branch declined. The

to Batavia facilitated this process because, although party activ-

West Java was of growing importance, the recently revived Batavia branch was not yet a significant organization nor was Batavia the site of major PKI unions. Conversely, the Semarang branch, though greatly weakened by reverses, remained an important center of PKI ity in

activity, particularly in the labor field;

it

continued to put out the

PKI publications and remained the headquarters the most powerful party leaders. Expansion of the PKI

number

principal

of a

of

thus implic-

itly

threatened central control of the party.

At the June 1924 congress, the keynote speech was made by Darsono. “Lengthy and vigorous applause resounds as he enters,” the government rapporteur recounted;

“his

appearance

is

modest and

polite;

he has the pleasant manner of the cultured Javanese. His large glasses give him the appearance of a scholar, and indeed much of what he says smacks of the study lamp.” nationalism, clared,

is

120

His main themes were discipline, inter-

and proletarianism.

A

party without discipline, he de-

a wall without cement, a machine without screws; but with

discipline even a small party can, like the Bolsheviks in Bussia, achieve

great victories.

The PKI must be

international

and must not forget that

The party must not forget that the trade unions are its basis, but at the same time it must also increase its work among the youth, the women, the peasants, the intellectuals, the Chinese minority, and the Indonesian members of the armed forces the

Dutch workers are

and

police. It

their

great

allies.

must especially endeavor

ness of the peasantry. taxes

its

The

to increase the social conscious-

villagers only

know

that they

must pay more

and that taxes go to the Dutch; therefore, they view the Dutch as enemy. They must be taught through the Sarekat Rakjat that it is

international capitalism

and not

just the

Dutch

that

is

at fault.

party must concentrate on organization and not on agitation; ers

must avoid giving provocation

trained to

make up

for losses

for

arrest,

its

The lead-

and cadres must be

through imprisonment. Terrorism must be

rejected, for the revolution will

come when

the time

is

ripe;

premature

make easy the Darsono concluded. “He who wishes

action will not serve the cause. “Our party desires to birth of the

Communist

era,”

peace must prepare himself for war, so that fear ?

his

opponent gives

in

from

121

Other speakers emphasized the same themes. Aliarcham discussed the failure of the nationalist

movement and predicted 194

that Tjokroa-

The Bloc Above minoto’s national-religious effort would also

nesian petty capitalists,

who

fail,

for

it

served the Indo-

could not possibly survive the competition

Only the PKI would endure, for it alone was organized about the economic struggle. Soviet Russia and Turkey must be Indonesia’s examples, he declared, and the congress cheered. Subakat urged the party to become strong enough to demand a of foreign big capital.

parliament elected by universal suffrage. Unlike the March 1923 meeting, the congress did not

view

this issue as a basis for

cooperation with

other parties: the speakers had only harsh words for the Sarekat Islam, the ISDP, and Budi Utomo. Instead,

it

was argued, the plank was

a

useful

first

step toward the establishment of soviets, which, in the spirit

of the

new

action program,

and island

provincial,

were envisioned

levels,

at village, factory, district,

under the command of a central

soviet.

At the June congress, outgoing party secretary Sukendar presented an important

Malaka)

122

set of theses

(drawn up,

it

has been claimed, by

Tan

analyzing the nature of the Indonesian revolution and

outlining the tasks of the party. In Indonesia, he declared, the revolution

would be

proletarian, for “the absence of a real national bour-

any successful effort by nationalist parties.” 123 The PKI must rely on the urban working class, the only objectively revolutionary group. The petty and part of the great bourgeoisie were geoisie precludes

subjectively revolutionary in the colonial situation, but they reliable

and should not be taken

into the party:

A Communist

party like that in Indonesia must bear in

revolutionaries

become Communists. The

tarians

were not

mind

that not

all

millions of Indonesian semiprole-

(on the sugar plantations), poor peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie,

craftsmen, and merchants are

all

economically oppressed: a great part of

—

them are revolutionary, but only subjectively so only in their minds. Their ambition is that their small fortune may become a large one, or that from being a small capitalist they may become a big capitalist 124 .

The PKI must

therefore keep

itself

purely proletarian;

it

did not matter

had the masses behind it. The subjectively revolutionary groups should be in an organization subordinate to the party, like the SR. The PKI should instruct and organize them, not in order to make them party members but to secure their if

the party were small as long as

sympathy bear

in

for the revolutionary cause. In

mind

that after the imperialists

geois elements nists

it

would cease

must then be

to

doing

so,

the party should

were defeated, the petty bour-

be revolutionary and that the

in a position to neutralize

195

them.

Commu-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

The PKI, Sukendar continued, must also improve its connections with other Communist parties, and especially with the Comintern. Perhaps, too, the party could form a union with other colonial revolution-

ary movements, for respects, they

must aim and workers

were

if

all

the peoples of the subject areas differed in anti-imperialist:

at establishing connections

It

with the revolutionary nationalists

(with nationalists from Africa, India, the Philip-

of the East

and China, and with

pines,

many

all

the workers of Asia and Africa).

single orientation for such cooperation

is

an

“

The

best

anti-imperialist union,” a revo-

lutionary front of the peoples of the East against the imperialists of other

continents 125 .

At the same time, the PKI should not forget that

it

must struggle

against the Asian bourgeoisie as soon as the imperialists were defeated.

In conclusion Sukendar said that “the duty of the just to

make propaganda

but, especially

by

its

PKI

at present

is

not

organization and tactics,

and assemble the revolutionary forces of Indonesia, to inthem, and to lead them by its tactics and strategy to victory. If it

to arouse struct

can become strongly united, then the International.”

it

will

make

itself

a valued section of

126

PKI worked energetiIncreased vigor was shown, espe-

In the months after the Batavia congress, the cally to develop the Sarekat Rakjat.

among

West Java and the Outer Islands. Efforts were made to increase the number of women participants in the movement; the congress devoted a special session to this project, and a Youth Front (Barisan Muda) was established to recruit and indoctrinate younger members of the movement. The People’s School system continued to expand in the face of interference by the authorities. 127 Yet in spite of the party’s successes, a number of PKI leaders had growing doubts. Was it wise to have tied their still small and poorly disciplined cially

—

party

less

the SRs of

whom paid their non-Communist masses? Was it wise to

than 1,000 members, not

so closely to the

much energy

Was

it

of

to the nonproletarian elements,

partv efforts gave tient?

all

little

which

dues

128

—

devote so

in spite of the best

hope of becoming disciplined,

faithful, or pa-

wise to have committed the PKI to a project which was

and which necessarily drew government attention to the Communist threat? Did not the sharp increase in government interference in 1924 and the subsequent decline in popular participation in necessarily public

SR

activities

129

suggest that the effort with the mass organization

196

The Bloc Above might be

like that of a squirrel

these fears justified

Semarang; and

in

on a treadwheel? One who thought

was Aliarcham, the PKI executive member

for

mid-1924, with the imprisonment of Winanta, he

became the party chairman.

197

IX

International Relations

THUS

far

we have

discussed the

ties that

bound the PKI

national

Communist movement only

and not

in regard to day-to-day communications.

now reached conflict

the point at

that conflict,

is

it

as they affected general policy,

However, we have

which the PKI became involved

with the Comintern, and

in

The

necessary to consider in greater detail the paths by of each others

description here, because of the secret nature of most of

these communication routes, can be no

may

in a serious

order to understand the course of

which the International and the PKI were informed doings.

to the inter-

more than

a bare sketch, but

it

provide an impression of the major channels used and the prob-

lems involved.

,

In the period with which

we

are dealing, China

was the major focus

was given consideration as a potential source of revolution on the Soviet periphery and as a traditional object of Russian diplomacy, but the Southeast Asian lands were too much on the perimeter of Soviet interest and knowledge to be important in the of the

Comintern

in Asia; India

International’s calculations. Nonetheless, the

made what were under

USSR and

the Comintern

the circumstances rather extensive efforts to

improve their knowledge of and contact with the distant Indonesian

movement. Indonesia’s colonial status and Soviet Russia’s political isolation

made

between the two countries impossible. The only effort that appears to have been made in this direction was an attempt in

direct contact

1924 by an

official of

Java in order to other products.

was

Centrosoiuz, the Soviet trading agency, to

make arrangements for the purchase of tea, sugar, and The British authorities seem to have thought that he

interested in trade

and not

intrigue, for

the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, and India; the in

visit

he was granted visas

for

Dutch consulate-general

Shanghai, after conferring with Netherlands representatives in Pe-

king, similarly

approved

his projected visit to the Indies.

19S

The

visa

was

International Relations

withdrawn on the order of Governor General Fock, however, who argued that it would set a precedent leading to the establishment of a Centrosoiuz

he feared

office in the colony; this

for political reasons. 1

In spite of various rumors of Bolshevik infiltration, circulated chiefly

the Dutch-language press, there

is

by

no indication that any clandestine

foreign emissaries actually arrived in the Indies. 2

In the absence of any direct link with the Indies,

Moscow depended

knowledge of the movement there on information supplied it by Indonesian and Dutch associates. These were neither unbiased nor

for

agreement, and the Comintern possessed no knowledgeable and ble Indies specialists

who

could

sift

its

in

relia-

through the partisan claims. The

Bolshevik leaders were themselves conscious of the disadvantages of

Communists for information on contemporary nonSoviet Asian affairs; in December 1920 the Russian government estab-

relying on foreign

lished a Marxist center for research

Union)

on Asia, the All-Russian

Scientific Association for Oriental Studies. This project

been pressed by the Academy of the General missariat of Nationalities; the association’s

Commissariat, and

who

(later All-

its first

Staff

and

had

Com-

Stalin’s

work was supervised by the

head was Mikhail Pavlovich

(S. Vel’tman),

and Propaganda for the Peoples of the East, set up by the Baku congress. However, such were the demands of the Russian domestic situation and the difficulties of also directed the Council for Action

mobilizing a politically acceptable body of Asia experts that

it

was

January 1922 before the organization actually came into being. 3

The

tasks confronting the association

ucts of the

first

generation of

were immense, and the prod-

Communist Asia

specialists

were admit-

tedly often of slight use. 4 Southeast Asia presented a particularly

knotty problem because of ist

its

colonial inaccessibility

Russia had had no real interest in

on the area

it.

and because Tsar-

Consequently, Soviet expertise

up very slowly and was probably of no particular aid Comintern policymakers in the period we are dealing

built

to Soviet or

with.

Other

institutes

were established

to provide the Russians with a

knowledge of the contemporary East; they included the School of Asian Studies of the Red Army Workers’ and Peasants’ Military Acad-

emy

Moscow, the Military College for Asian Studies in Tashkent, the Institute of Living Asian Languages in Petrograd, and a number of other specialized organizations. 5 These, however, were primarily conin

cerned with Soviet Asia or the countries on Soviet Russia’s borders and

199

Rise of Indonesian not with Southeast Asia.

were the

work

Of

greater importance for the distant colonies

“universities’’ established

in the

Communism

during the 1920s to train Asians for

Communist movements

in their

own

countries, for they

provided both a point of contact with colonial revolutionaries and an opportunity to train a politically reliable corps of Communist leaders.

The establishment Sneevliet,

who

of these schools

was

first

publicly suggested by

put the matter before the second Comintern congress

in

1920: I

propose that the Communist International give to the leaders from the Far

East the opportunity of living here for half a year and attending several

Communist courses in order that they will be able to understand correctly what is taking place here and will be able to carry out the principles of the theses [the second congress passed will

work

be able

on the colonial question], so that they

to create a Soviet organization

and

to carry

on Communist

in the colonies. 6

The most prominent

was the Communist University of the Toilers of the Far East (KUTV), established by a Soviet government decree of April 1921 and at first attached to the Commissariat of Nationalities. The university was set up in Moscow, with branch faculties in Irkutsk, Baku, and Tashkent; in July 1922 it counted 700 students of fifty-seven nationalities. The elaborate course of lectures and field work in Soviet Asia was scheduled to consume four or five years of the students’ time no small period for Asian Communist movements short on leadership of any caliber. 7 A few years after the founding of the "KUTV, two other major centers for training Asian party members were established: one was Sun Yat-sen University (later called the Communist University of the Toilers of China), which was set up in Moscow in September 1925 and began courses two months later; 8 the other was the International Lenin University, which was ordered by the March 1925 ECCI plenum and began sessions during 1926 in Moscow. 9 From the ECCI report on its efforts to establish the last-named school we can see some of the difficulties that surrounded the setting up of such institutions. In the first place, there was the question of housing for the school and its students, a critical problem in Russia at that time. Another major difficulty was an adequate teaching force, which, after half a year the ECCI still had not found. This was quite understandable: the lecturers had to be politically reliable, know their of these institutions

—

200

I n tern ational

Marx and Lenin

well,

and give

Rela tions

classes in three languages (French,

and German). 10 In Soviet Russia of the 1920s these qualificawere rare enough to assure their owner generally of higher status

English, tions

than teacher in a school for propagandists.

A

third task

was

was concerned

this

to find qualified students,

and so

far as Indonesia

was a practically insoluble problem. Both the International Lenin School and Sun Yat-sen University requested, through the ECCI, that Communist parties abroad do what they could to provide students. 11

On August

25, 1925, the

Comintern executive wrote

PKI requesting that it dispatch students for Sun Yat-sen University; it was most important, the letter pointed out, that Asian Communists be trained at that institution, and six or seven more candidates could be placed. 12 The response was hardly enthusiastic, however; the party replied that it cost too much money for the PKI to send students there and it was unaware of any private individual who could afford it. 13 the

Financial difficulties did not keep

all

Soviet training schools, for Semaun, in Holland, sent

Indonesians from attending the

who was

then PKI representative

about half a dozen students. They were, however,

mostly seamen from the ships that plied between the Netherlands and the Indies; their revolutionary spirits were high but their educational

was not, and they had almost no knowledge of the languages in which the schools were run. The result was something less than success; one student left after only six months, a few returned to Indonesia only to be arrested, and the rest never got in touch with the Comintern or the PKI after their return to the Indies. 14 The names of some of these early trainees Kamu, Johannes Waworuntu, and Clemens Wentuk are known to us because they were arrested after they returned to the Indies. 15 They were all from northern Celebes. Only Waworuntu, who had been a figure of some level

—

—

movement since its ISDV days, 10 was prominent in Indonesian Communist circles before his Moscow experience. In announcing the internment of Waworuntu and Wentuk, the government standing in the

claimed that the two seamen had

left their

ship in Rotterdam in 1924

and, through the mediation of Semaun, were sent to the

KUTV

in

Moscow, where they remained for two and one-half years. When in 1927 they were considered sufficiently trained (and when the Comintern was beginning efforts to revive the Indonesian Communist movement) they were sent, with advice and money from Semaun, to Vladivostok and thence to Indonesia, where they arrived in early 1928. The 201

Rise of Indonesian

government claimed arrival

and

to

to

Communism

have been aware of

have intercepted some of

their activities after their

their reports

on the Indies

USSR; they were alleged to have communicated through messages given to Indonesian seamen and via addresses in Shanghai and Berlin. 17 situation to

Semaun

in the

Another of Semaun’s students achieved notoriety

Comintern congress; much sian representatives,

to the

in

1928 at the sixth

embarrassment of the other Indone-

he attacked Bukharin’s presentation of the

colo-

and defended the left-wing position on cooperation with Asian bourgeois nationalists. 18 Alimin and Musso attended the Lenin nial theses

school for several years after their return to Russia in 1927;

PKI leader Mohammed

Ali,

who escaped

to

Moscow by Subakat and

munists then stationed across the

and the

the mass arrests that

lowed the 1926-1927 revolutionary attempt by

was reportedly sent

19

fol-

fleeing to Singapore,

other Indonesian

Com-

After training in Soviet

Straits.

was claimed, he returned to Singapore, where he was arrested in 1930 together with Djamaluddin Tamin and other members of the Indonesian Communist group in that city. 20 As we have seen, none of these students of revolution finished his training in the period with which we are concerned, and their training thus belongs to our Russia,

it

story only peripherally. 21 tional experience

None

of the major early leaders with interna-

—Tan Malaka, Darsono, and Semaun—attended such

formal training courses, though they

all

spent some time in Moscow. 22

Distance and the mutual isolation of Indonesia and the Comintern center lent particular importance to the international contact points

Moscow. The first attempt we know of to establish such a headquarters for Asia was the founding of the Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East by the Baku Con-

established outside

gress of 1920.

We

have already described

this organization

and noted

was generally ineffective; moreover, its areas of concern in the Far East were the regions on Russia’s borders China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan and not the distant countries to the south. that

it

—

—

up about this time in Irkutsk and Vladivostok to Soviet and non-Soviet Far East 23 directed their atten-

Similarly, offices set

deal with the

tion chiefly to the easily available north.

was not until Soviet interest ment brought Comintern agents It

tional established

Indonesia.

an

office

in

Sun

Yat-sen’s revolutionary

move-

China that the Internawithin practical communicating distance of to southern

The Comintern’s South China 202

office

was

set

up

in

Canton

International Relations

and

later,

when

the

was

Kuomintang

forces captured the city, in Shanghai;

was assured that that bureau would do its best to contact the Indies. There seems to have been fairly steady contact between Shanghai and Indonesia during Sneevliet’s administration (steady, that is, in comparison with PKI contact with the international Communist world at other times). Copies of the major Indonesian Communist newspapers were apparently sent to him by the Indonesian Communists, and articles by the former ISDV leader occasionally appeared in Het Vrije Woord or Soeara Ra’jat. According since Sneevliet

director,

first

it

Netherlands Indies government, the Shanghai

to the

sent letters ates.

its

and Communist reading material

Mohammad

Bergsma, Dekker,

and Tan Malaka were said

to

to the

office regularly

PKI and

its affili-

Kasan, Darsono, Najoan, Semaun,

have corresponded with Sneevliet; and

Subakat, Najoan, Darsono, and

Semaun

reportedly met with him in

Shanghai. 24 Sneevliet, however,

to the

Comintern Vladivostok

January 1923, perhaps because his views on the Chinese policy

office in

of the

was transferred

Comintern were beginning

tional. 25

From then on, he seems movement in Indonesia. Toward

to deviate to

from those of the Interna-

have been out of touch with the

the end of the year he resigned his

and returned to Moscow. We have only a few scraps of information on his activities in the Soviet capital; they indicate he was busy renewing his position as an authority on Indonesia and establishing new means to contact the PKI. On February 23, 1924, he addressed the Scientific Association for Oriental Studies on “The Comintern position

Economic and

26

Political Significance of Indonesia”; 27

to the Eastern Section of the

Comintern that an

and he suggested

office for

Indonesian

up in the Netherlands under the direction of Communists there who were acquainted with the Indies situation. This proposal was accepted; when Sneevliet returned to Holland a few months later, he resumed his work with the Indonesian Communist movement, affairs

be

though

set

now

in a

new and

less felicitous capacity.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands Indies govenment had been tightening its restrictions on correspondence and published materials from Communists abroad. Before

May

30, 1922, the

exchange of correspondence

and publications seems to have met no major restrictions, although there were complaints that letters had been opened and delayed. Sinar Hindia, Soeara Ra’jat, and Het Vrije Woord received exchange numbers of International Press Correspondence, but on

203

May

30,

1922,

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

copies of the Comintern newspaper belonging to Sinar Hindia were

by the customs authorities. At the same time restrictions on correspondence were sharply inreased. 28 After this it became more and more difficult for the PKI to communicate legally with the outside world, although contact with the party in Holland was not so severely confiscated

limited as communication with the Comintern or other contact points

Dutch sphere. The government also took steps to remove the last Dutch Communists from the Indies. Harry Dekker, a railway employee who had taken over the VSTP during Semaun’s Russian sojourn, was sent back to Holland by his firm, on the government’s urging, in 1922. In June 1923 Sneevliet’s wife, who had been teaching in the Semarang SI school and whose correspondence with her husband in Shanghai was viewed by the authorities as a probable source of international contact, was ordered to leave the Indies. Shortly thereafter VSTP member and former party treasurer Van Koordenoordt was transferred home, and in this fashion the last active Dutch Communists were removed from the Indies by the end of 1923. 29 The government, Soeara Ra’jat charged, was trying to divorce the Indonesian Communists from their European brothers by this action. Whether the party actually thought their departure an entirely bad tiling is questionable, however; as Darsono later remarked to the Comintern, the departure of the Netherlander had its advantages: “The very fact that the leadership of the Party was outside the

in the

hands of native comrades

still

further raised the prestige of the

we must

not forget that in a

colonial country like Indonesia, the masses are

somewhat prejudiced

Party in the eyes of the masses, for

against the

Dutch comrades.”

30

In spite of the narrowing opportunity for legal communications and

Holland and the Dutch PKI members, the

for contact via

ECCI

re-

ported to the 1924 Comintern congress that the link between the PKI

and the

during the preceding year. 31

due

had been greatly strengthened possible that this improvement was

International’s Eastern Section

to efforts

Shanghai

by

office,

It is

Voitinsky, Sneevliet’s successor as director of the

but his energies seem to have been almost wholly

absorbed by the events

in

China and there

devoted any particular attention

to

is

no indication that he

Southeast Asia.

It

seems more

likely

was due to the opening up of other channels of communication, one of which ran via the exiled PKI leader Tan that the progress

Mai aka. 204

International Relations

Banished from the Indies in March 1922, Tan Malaka had gone to Holland. He promptly became involved in Dutch politics, for the CPH

named him one elections.

He

of

also

parliamentary candidates in the 1922 general

its

made

his first contact

June 1922 the

ECCI

Communists

Amsterdam

in

Peace Conference.

A

with the International, for in

organized a meeting of prominent European to protest the socialist-sponsored

good many

Hague

of the expected participants could not

come; Malaka was the only Asian present, although India’s M. N. Roy sent greetings.

The Indonesian delegate made

a speech stressing the

importance of the revolutionary East, but the gathering does not seem to

have had further importance

for Asia. 32

From Holland Tan Malaka went

where he joined Darsono for a few months at the Comintern’s West European secretariat, and then to Moscow to represent Indonesia at the fourth Comintern congress. Although Malaka’s role at the Comintern meeting hardly showed him as an unquestioning servant of the party line, the International leaders resolved to make further use of him. Malaka remained in Mos-

cow

for

approximately a year.

He

to Berlin,

recounted later that he was given a

room in a former hotel and told to sit down and write a book that would give the Comintern a picture of the Indonesian situation; that is, he was to provide the facts and the Russians would fill in the anallarge

ysis. 33

The January 1923 issue of the Profintern journal listed Tan Malaka and Semaun as the permanent Indonesian correspondents of the RILU, and

in

June Malaka took an active part

in the

ECCI

plenary session as

would thus appear that at or shortly after the fourth Comintern congress he was given a position of some responIndonesia’s representative.

It

regarding Indonesia for the International. This,

sibility

would explain an otherwise puzzling passage Bergsma to Semaun in February 1923: I

know

had a

congress

with the others,

fills

in a letter written

the whole congress with speeches, the delegates are so grateful

let this

do what the see that the

by

I

that they reward the speaker with a position in the executive.

haven’t

any event,

was strongly against this and even but you know how it goes: if someone at such a

that they recently elected Jep;

fight

in

bother you.

interest of the

PKI does not

From another

letter

it

On

the contrary, as a good

working

class

I

hope you

Communist you

demands, and that

is

will

naturally to

die out. 34

appears that Bergsma was

in

Moscow about

the

35 time of the Comintern congress and that “Jep” was Tan Malaka.

205

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Bergsma’s remarks indicate that he and Semaun were

less

than en-

chanted with their erstwhile protege; perhaps they thought that Malaka,

having risen far and

fast in the

movement, had gotten somewhat

too big for his boots.

In mid-1923 (thus about the time of the

Tan Malaka

later claimed, the

ECCI

session he attended),

Comintern named him

its

supervisor for

Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Vietnam, and the Philippines,

with charge over such Communist movements as existed or could be

founded

in those countries. 36 This

been a subject

assertion has

considerable argument, not only because Malaka himself later

of

became

Communist world, but also because his status in relation to the Comintern was an important factor in the PKI deviation of 1924-1926. The substance of this quarrel is not a controversial figure in the Indonesian

so

much

east Asia

his claim of

—

it

seems

ative in that area

37

having held a post for the International in South-

fairly clear that

—

he did act

Comintern represent-

as

as his description of the extent of his authority.

Malaka claimed that he had the

right to veto policies of the

Commu-

movements under his charge when necessary. 38 The possession of this power by a Comintern representative was by no means unique. The Dutch Communist leader Van Ravesteyn held it with regard to at least some of the Indonesian party’s activities; he exercised this right through the Netherlands bureau of the PKI, which seems to have had roughly the same relationship to the Indonesian party as did Tan Malaka’s office in Canton. On the other hand, the PKI leader Alimin asserted that Malaka had received no such mandate from the ECCI and that, if he had been granted any such power, it had been given without central authorization by the International’s representatives to the Pacific Transport Workers Conference of June 1924: nist

Tan Malaka to the

.

.

.

feels insulted

we two

—Musso and Alimin—went

Far Country [the Soviet Union] without

Country we were able People

because

who know

to learn just

what

knowledge. In the Far

his

rank and authority meant.

his

the policies of that country will be “surprised” to hear

such effusive self-praise and advertisement. Perhaps “Thesis” role]

is

[the still

pamphlet

thinking of

the

writer of

the

which Tan Malaka annoimced his Comintern comrades like O. Hell [Leo Heller, the chief in

.

Profintem worker in the Far East] and M. Voit

.

.

.

.

[G. Voitinsky],

.

who

worked for some time as regular officials in the Pacific. These two people did not work in the Main Office [the ECCI?], but only helped with work within the labor movement. They were people of the Prof [Profintem?]. Per.

206

.

.

International Relations haps

it

who did not have the right to decide “mandate,” who gave the “authority,” who gave the

was these two arrogant

who gave

anything,

the

officials,

Tan Malaka. Those two propagandists afterward were punished because of their defense of the anti-Soviet movement of the Trotskyists. People who are honest and understand the work of a propagandist are not people who claim “importance” and “authority”; they would never advertise themselves or publicly claim connection with the Main Office. Ordi-

“great power” to

narily, a

person

who

really

works

for the

good of the working

class,

not

looking for notoriety and admiration or seeking to be “in the limelight,”

would never disclose secrets regarding the method of underground work. We know what the Main Office means in the eyes of the imperialists. 39 Alimin had very good reason to deny Malaka’s authority over the PKI,

and he

is

patently unfair in his description of the roles of Heller and

Voitinsky in this period; and so

we

should look on his denunciation

with considerable reserve. However, Semaun has also claimed that Malaka’s position for the Comintern in Southeast Asia involved propagandizing, organizing, and advising but did not include a veto right;

40

Semaun was in a position to know through his membership in the ECCI and when he provided this information was generally sympathetic to the Murba Party group, which consists of Tan Malaka’s spiritual heirs. According to Semaun,

Comintern discipline

Malaka was not authorized

to bring a party into line except

to use

with specific

Moscow. However, because of the increasing difficulty of communications between his office, the Southeast Asian movements, and the Comintern headquarters, he began to exercise this power without first obtaining directives from Moscow, a process that eventually ended in his establishing a heretical Southeast Asian Communist organorders from

ization.

Veto right or no veto

right,

Malaka

set off for

China and arrived

Canton, according to his recollection, in December 1923.

He

in

claimed

was introduced to Sun Yat-sen by Tan Ping-shan, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, in a meeting held in Sun’s house on the Pearl River; others present were Sun Fo, Liao Chung-kai, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei. In their conversation, Sun suggested that Tan Malaka might find the Japanese useful allies in his work. Malaka claims to have found this unthinkable, since as a Communist he was as much opposed to Japanese imperialism as to that of the West (a scruple, I might add, that Malaka’s critics have said he did not always entertain). 41 Canton remained Tan Malaka’s base of that shortly after his arrival he

207

Communism

Rise of Indonesian operations for over a year, and from

it

he made occasional expeditions

on International business. In June 1924 he attended the Pacific Transport Workers Conference, which the Comintern and to Southeast Asia

had organized in Canton to improve connections with the Far Eastern labor movements. The international organizations were represented there by Voitinsky and Heller; Malaka identifies them in his autobiography as a Comintern representative with whom he was connected at that time and a Profintern agent whom he had known well in Moscow and with whom he was to be associated in the future. 42 According to Tan Malaka, they approached him as soon as he arrived and informed him that the International had decided to establish a Red Eastern Labor Bureau in Canton to maintain contact with the workers’ movements in the Far East and to be connected directly with them and with Moscow; Tan Malaka was to be its Profintern

head. 43

The work

was to be carried out with the aid of a secretariat of representatives from Indochina, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Japan; it was to publish a bulletin in English and Chinese to guide the transport workers of these countries and keep them in touch with the revolutionary movement in the West. The secretaries were to translate these bulletins into the languages of their countries and arrange for printing and distribution at home. In addition, “seamen’s clubs” were to be organized under the sponsorship of the Canton office in the major port cities of the Pacific, beginning with Hong Kong, Manila, and Batavia. These clubs, Heller noted, were to improve contact between the Profintern and the Asian Communist movements. They would play a vital role in the International’s activities, since improved communications were necessary if the Comintern program for the East was to be carried out. “It must be confessed on this occasion,” Heller added, “that the revoluof the bureau, as Heller later described

tionary trade union effect

among

movement has not had

it,

a satisfactory, practical

the workers in the colonies; and the majority of the

decisions taken at our congresses have remained on paper.”

This

may have been

the International’s blueprint for the bureau, but

according to Tan Malaka the Canton practice.

years in first

Although he

44

office

did not work this

way

became fluent in Cantonese and lived China, Malaka was a fish miserably out of water during later

sojourn in that country.

food worse

(

his

He found

the climate wretched

in

for his

and the

ignorance of the language restricted him to taking his

208

International Relations

meals at a Chinese-American restaurant, which provided a legible

menu,

if

not an edible dinner). Malaka’s main function as the labor

head and only member resident in Canton was to publish an organ of advice and encouragement to Far Eastern labor movements, The Dawn. This journal was supposed to appear in English, and Malaka was handicapped in his function as editor, publisher, and sole correspondent because he knew only the barest rudiments of that language. However, he reasoned that he had picked up enough German in two or three months in Berlin to enable him to communicate at Comintern meetings, and he ought to be able to do the same with English. He sat down with a grammar, only to discover that learning German in Germany with a fluent knowledge of Dutch was most different from learning English from a book in China. He tried to get a coworker to help with the Chinese and English aspects of the job; but when he finally found an assistant, he vanished within two days, snatched up by a better-paying revolutionary organization. Malaka finally settled unhappily for the fruits of his own study of Basic English; but when he produced a few articles in that version of the language he was faced with the problem of getting it printed. With the help of the Canton CCP he eventually located the only printery in the city willing to handle the job. The first issue came out but was unreadable. The words, in Tan Malaka’s description, swayed across the page like the tracks of a broken-down cart; the printer, not having enough type, had substituted capitals and then signs for missing letters, and finally, before half the issue was set, he had given up entirely. Malaka was in despair; months had gone by, and the journal had not yet appeared.

office

What would

On

the International say?

45

top of his journalistic tribulations, Malaka became seriously

and began

to think of returning

home. By

ill

was not work with the PKI, and

his account, sickness

renew his Canton was too distant a base from which to maintain contact with the Southeast Asian countries. He wrote the PKI for its opinion on an attempt to return, and the party replied that there was no harm in

his only reason:

trying. 46

On August

eral a request to

He

he also wished

29, 1924,

promise not to engage

send

as fervent a its

he accordingly sent the Governor Gen-

be allowed a return

asked permission to

was

to

reply via

to Indonesia for reasons of health.

settle in Java;

he was willing

in political activity,

if

necessary to

but he assured Fock that he

Communist as before and asked the government to PKI headquarters. 47 Both the Dutch and Indonesian 209

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

Communists agitated for Malaka’s return, the CPH sponsoring a mass meeting on his behalf at which the main speakers were Semaun and Harry Dekker, 48 but the Governor General refused to allow him to come back except under conditions that amounted to banishment. 49 On April 16, 1925, Tan Malaka gave up the effort and wrote the Governor General an indignant

withdrawing his request. 50

letter

Shortly after, Malaka relates, he determined to re-enter the Indies illegally.

He

journeyed south as a stowaway, but soon after he had

reached a place for Indonesia,

from which he intended

in Southeast Asia

to

he received word from Canton to return immediately to

consult with a Profintern representative newly arrived from

Two weeks

embark

Moscow.

Malaka was back in Canton, only to find that the man he was supposed to see had been called back to Moscow himself. Exhausted, ill, and undoubtedly enormously irritated, Malaka abandoned the Canton office in June 1925 and went to the Philippines to later

recuperate. 51

While

in the Philippines,

Tan Malaka seems

ble contact with nationalist leaders.

It

to

have had considera-

has been said that he was instru-

mental in setting up the Communist Party of the Philippines, though this

is

questionable. 52 As for his contact with the PKI,

been quite regular while he was

it

seems

to

have

Canton and Manila. According

to

Malaka, Aliarcham wrote him a report once a week until his arrest

in

early 1925;

53

Mohammad

he also received

in

visits

from PKI members, among them

Sanusi and Alimin. 54 Since shipping connections between

and Manila were good and there were always Indonesian sailors who were willing to help smuggle messages, the problem of communications was not too great. On the other hand, distance meant Java, Canton,

delay and also inability to influence people directly, a drawback of

major proportions when dealing with a party whose decisions were

much

arrived at emotionally at least as shall see,

Tan Malaka, though he

as through calculation.

As

we

exercised a very considerable influ-

ence on the PKI, could not determine party policy

in a contest of wills

with the PKI leaders on Java.

Tan Malaka’s Far Eastern aegis of the

activities

were not carried out under the

Comintern alone; he was equally responsible

work to the Profintern, or Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). This federation of Communist-oriented trade unions was officially founded in 1921, but plans for establishing it had been announced the year before; 55 thus it happened that the matter of joining the organization 210

in his

International Relations

was

first

brought up in the Indonesian labor movement

congress of

December

1920.

What was decided

meeting

at that

something of a puzzle. Semaun reported that the

VSTP

at the

VSTP

is

decided to

affiliate to

the “Third International” thus presumably to the nascent

Profintern.

Other accounts, however, maintained that the congress del-

egates balked in spite of pleas by

way union

Semaun and Bergsma

that the rail-

to declare itself in favor of joining the labor international;

after a stalemate that

was

said to have lasted

two days, the meeting

was still so divided that the whole matter was dropped. 56 Inasmuch as the VSTP did not join the Profintern during 1921 and did so eventually under rather unclear circumstances,

seems

it

likely

showed no great enthusiasm for affiliating. Since the VSTP formed the most solidly Communist section of the Indonesian labor movement and its meeting was held immediately after the PKI that the congress

congress that decided to

affiliate

of considerable interest.

We

objections

VSTP

made

with the Comintern, such hesitation

will recall that there

appear

to

is

have been

at the party congress to joining the International; the

was as negative as described, might indicate that the PKI leaders pushed through their project only by a relatively narrow margin. Indonesian contact with the Profintern, once it had been officially reaction,

if it

founded, started

from Java

shown

an equally left-footed manner: a representative

founding congress of July 1921 seems never to have Shortly thereafter, however, Indonesian relations with the

to the

up. 57

Profintern

off in

assumed a more

solid character. In mid-1921,

we

will re-

member, the PPKB broke up, and Semarang adherents formed

their

own

revolutionary labor federation. In October the executive of the

RVC

announced

(

to the Profintern

its

decision to affiliate with the

although the declaration rather elaborately remarked that

it

RILU

had been

considered better not to hold a congress to confirm this move).

To

the Executive Bureau of the Profintern

Semarang, October At the session of the Executive Committee Federation

we have decided

remark here that

sway

in

of the Revolutionary

3,

1921

Labor

to affiliate ourselves with the Profintern.

We

connection with the reaction which at present holds

Dutch East Indies it is out of the question to place this question on the agenda of a congress, since we would run the danger that the courts would dissolve our Revolutionary Labor Federation or take even stronger in

the

measures of

reprisal.

211

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

In connection with the above-mentioned circumstances

we hope

that the

declaration of our affiliation will be regarded as completely sufficient and that

we

our

affiliation.

from the Executive bureau regarding

will receive a favorable reply

We

likewise

hope

to take further part in the

be able

to

leadership of the Profintern in the future.

With comradely greetings The Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Labor Federation

The

58

was successfully maintaining contact with the Indonesian labor movement, and it also noted that a representative of the RVC (probably Semaun, who had just attended the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East) had taken Profintern reported in April 1922 that

it

part in the February 1922 plenary session of the Profintern executive. 59

The RVC, however, was dissolved in September 1922, when the Communist and non-Communist unions allied in the PVH. In its stead, the

VSTP

entered the Profintern as Indonesia’s representative. There

some question

as to

when

it

did

is

however. Some sources (including

so,

the Netherlands Indies government and the present chairman of the

PKI) itself

state that

it

joined in

declared that in 1922 the

tention to participate in in fact,

tion

all

1923, 60 but the labor international

March

VSTP announced

its affiliation

and

its in-

future Profintern congresses. 61 Indonesia was,

represented at the second

(November 1922)

Profintern conven-

by Tan Malaka, who attended the concurrent fourth Comintern

congress.

It is

unclear, however, whether he acted as a delegate of the

VSTP, the PVH (which did not belong to the Profintern but whose mandate he had to represent it “in Europe”), or the Indonesian workers in general. If

the

VSTP

without polling

union since

its

executive did its

affiliate in

membership,

for

1922,

it

must have done so

no congress had been held by the

eleventh convention of

December

The report of November 1921

1920.

was distributed to the VSTP branches in for discussion and for consideration at the twelfth congress, 62 which would normally have been held in December together with the PKI convention. The congress did not take place, however, until February that meeting

1923. Dissension over domestic issues

Semaun’s absence

and the decline

may have determined

tradition of yearly meetings. It

disagreement over the Profintern

is

this

in

morale during

departure from the

VSTP

possible, however, that continuing

issue, still

hanging

fire

from the 1920

meeting, influenced the decision to postpone the twelfth congress.

212

If

International Relations this

were

still

a delicate issue within the union,

discrepancy in dates of

VSTP

to the labor international:

affiliation

namely, that the union executive declared 1922 but did not make the

official

it

would explain the

it

its affiliation

public in Indonesia until after

acquiescence of the union membership at

its

to it

Moscow

in

had secured

February 1923

congress.

At

its first

congress the Profintern indicated

its

interest in the colonial

problem with a resolution on the Eastern question, 03 and

in early

1922

the Profintern participated in the First Congress of the Toilers of the

Far East. Semaun reported on the Indonesian labor movement meeting.

A Profintern delegate later recounted that his

to that

information

came

as a revelation: If

we had

received at least occasional reports on the revolutionary struggle in

Japan, China, and Korea, indefinite as they lutely nothing about the

Dutch East

may have

Indies.

.

.

.

The

been,

we knew

abso-

sole representative of

Dutch East Indies at the Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East, Comrade Semaun, who reached Moscow only after overcoming great difficulties, gives in his comprehensive article extremely valuable and interesting material on the life of the toilers in the Dutch East Indies and on their struggle for liberation from the yoke of capitalism and imperialism. 64 the

That the Profintern was delighted is

to learn

more

of

its

distant affiliate

understandable enough, for the PKI was one of the few Asian Com-

munist movements in zation. Its Executive

emphasized

When we

this

period to boast a functioning labor organi-

Bureau report

to the third (July 1924) congress

this point:

consider the geographic position of the Netherlands Indies be-

and Indian Oceans, and the exceptionally high revolutionary spirit of the Indonesian proletariat compared with the backward countries in the Near and Middle East, it is impossible not to conclude that from

tween the

Pacific

the viewpoint of the struggle of the working class the

Dutch East Indies

was the estimate of Indonesia the Profintern, which throughout the

represents an extremely strategic point. This

made by

the Executive Bureau of

entire period [since the tion to

its

November 1922

congress] devoted particular atten-

connections with Java and the Communist and revolutionary labor

organizations there. 65

At

its

plenary session of July 27, 1922, the Executive Bureau had

heard a report from Sneevliet (Maring) on the expulsion of Bergsma and Tan Malaka from the Indies for their part in the pawnshop workers’ strike earlier that year;

the Profintern executive thereupon resolved

213

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

on governmental abuse of the labor movement in Dutch colonies, which it hoped to have published in the French and

to collect information

Italian press 66

—presumably

in order to arouse international disap-

proval of the Dutch. This active interest continued; by

its

own

count,

the Profintem executive discussed the Indonesian situation on ten

between 1924 and 1928. G7

different occasions I

shall not discuss

here the various resolutions passed by Profintern

congresses about colonial labor

movement

policy; suffice

it

to say that

they were noticeably more radically proletarian than those propounded

by the Comintern,

particularly on the subject of cooperation with

bourgeois nationalist movements. 68 This conflict between the various international

most clearly

Communist bodies over Asian revolutionary policy was expressed in China, where the Comintern, Profintern, and

Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

represented. 09

It is

(

Narkomindel) were directly

probably safe to assert that

it

was

of

much

less

importance for policy in Indonesia, where communications with the

Comintern and Profintern were generally

Europe and Tan Malaka

in Asia,

both of

filtered

whom

through Semaun in

gave more evidence of

trying to persuade the international organizations toward their

views than of reflecting the Nonetheless, disagreement

own

finer differences in the international line.

among

the various offices and individuals in

movement because Moscow served as the link between Semaun’s European PKI office and Tan Malaka’s Asian base, which had virtually no direct contact. Moscow the International affected the Indonesian

should have kept the two informed of each other’s ions,

but in fact

it

activities

and opin-

did not; according to Semaun, this was largely

by factional and departmental rivalries. 70 As a result, the PKI’s European hand did not know what its Asian hand was doing, and this caused considerable frustration and

because the International was

split

confusion.

The importance

of the Profintern for Indonesia lay chiefly in

efforts to establish contact points

between the Asian

parties

its

and the

Communist organizations in the West. Its first move in this direction was to found in February 1922 an office equivalent to the Comintern’s Eastern Section, headed by Profintern staff workers Reinstein, Andreychin, and Eiduss. 71 At the Profintern’s second congress, in November 1922, the labor international resolved to strengthen

its

ties

with the

Asian unions in four ways: by urging metropolitan labor organizations to establish special sections to maintain contact with the colonial labor

214

International Relations

movements; by creating tate

among

offices in the

major seaports, which would agi-

colonial maritime workers;

by

calling a conference of revo-

lutionary labor organizations from the Eastern countries,

which would meet simultaneously with the next Profintern congress and which would work out concrete programs for the labor movement in each of the lands represented; and by holding a meeting of the transport workers in the countries bordering on the Pacific. 72 Although the Profintern called for immediate action on these resolutions,

response to

first

its

demand was

executive session of June 25 to July its

2,

initially disappointing.

1923, the

RILU

In

its

complained that

directive for the metropolitan parties to establish colonial contact

bureaus had nowhere been carried out. This neglect must be rectified within three months, the executive warned; and that “our

Dutch

were

noted particularly

partisans are charged with maintaining a close

effective connection with the labor cially

it

movement

and espeThese urgings

in Indonesia

with the revolutionary labor unions on Java.” to little avail; the

and

73

Western labor organizations refused

to

become

colony-conscious, and the Profintern’s subsequent references to this as-

program carried a distinctly fretful air. 74 Greater progress was made in realizing the second demand, and on January 5, 1923, the Profintern executive announced its decision to establish harbor offices in Rotterdam and Vladivostok. 75 Contact through the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam was naturally of con-

pect of

its

siderable

significance

for

Indonesia,

not only because

Indonesian

seamen proved ready recruits to the radical cause but also because the converts provided a much-needed courier service between the Indies and the Communist workers abroad. Semaun, who was named a member of the Profintern Executive Bureau as well as the ECCI in 1924, 76 established the Indonesian Seamens Union (Sarekat Pegawei Laut Indonesia; SPLI) in

Amsterdam

early in that year. This organization

functioned not only as a union of seamen on the European run but also,

according to Semaun, as the effective headquarters of the PKI

was the western partner of the Semarang-based Union of Seamen and Dockers (Serikat Laut dan Gudang; Serilagu), which became quite active in 1924. The Serilagu/ SPLI attempted to attract both Indonesian and Chinese seamen. They organized a “group” on each large steamship and harbor installation in which they were active, with a “consul” in charge of each group. On abroad. As a labor organization

it

the Holland-Indonesia run, these consuls served as couriers for the

215

Communism

Rise of Indonesian PKI. 77 Serilagu shifted

its

headquarters

officially to

Holland

in 1924 in

order to avoid the Netherlands Indies authorities. This, a Profintern

account noted, was the

first

instance of a labor union establishing

its

headquarters abroad for strategical reasons since Russian unions had

done so

to avoid the Tsarist police. 78

a temporary measure, however,

and

The maneuver was conceived

in early 1925 the official

as

headquar-

Communist maritime activities were transferred back to Indonesia. The SPLI continued, but as an affiliate of a new Indies-based union that combined all the PKI-run sailors’ and dockworkers’ groups. The last of the Profintern projects produced the Pacific Transport Workers Conference, held in Canton in June 1924. The inspiration for this meeting had originally come from the Australian spokesman at the fourth Comintern and second Profintern congresses in November 1922; he had proposed that those international bodies sponsor a gathering of workers from countries bordering on the Pacific. The idea was favorably received, since at that time Russian fears of a Far Eastern war and ters of

of being barred

from the

assert itself in die area.

ever,

and the plan

Pacific

made

the Soviet government eager to

Soon afterward the war scare receded, how-

for a general Pacific conference

was shelved;

in its

place, the Profintern executive brought forth an idea for a meeting of

transport workers from the countries of the Far East. This to catalyze the

ers

would serve

development of the movement among a group of work-

most susceptible

to radical organization

and would

also

improve

international connections in that area. 79

Semaun had been

originally scheduled to

Indies representative, but this plan

the

fifth

go

to

Canton

as the

main

was shelved. Instead he attended

Comintern and third Profintern congresses, held

in

Moscow

in

Hamburg for a transport among other things, collabora-

June and July 1924, and then journeyed to workers’ conference, which discussed, tion

with the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) led

by the radical socialist Edo Fimmen. We shall hear more of this later. As his Canton replacement Semaun sent a trusted comrade from the seamen’s union, who was first to go to the Indies, bringing /2,000 to the PKI from the Comintern, and there pick up other representatives of the

Indonesian movement for the journey to China. 80 Unfor-

tunately, Semaun’s trust

was misplaced,

for the

comrade in question money, and he never

handed the party very little of the International’s went to Canton. In his stead, the PKI appointed Alimin and Budisutjitro to represent it at the conference. They joined Tan Malaka, who 216

International Relations

was then

in Southeast Asia

and the three

(apparently Singapore) on International

them proceeded

Canton together. According to Malaka, they experienced considerable delay on their journey and arrived in Canton after the conference opened on June 17. 81 The Canton conference got off to a poor start. The Indian and Japa-

business,

of

to

nese representatives were prevented by their governments from attending,

and thus

it

was limited

to delegates

from Indonesia, China, and

the Philippines; moreover, the most prominent labor organization in

attendance, the Chinese railway workers’ union, had just suffered

crushing defeat in a

strike. 82

And

was the eternal language probthose from North and South China

there

lem: of the twenty-five delegates,

could not underestand each other; one of the Filipinos spoke only a Philippine language, two others

knew

Spanish, and one English; and

one of the Indonesians could not be understood. 83

The Canton Bureau, which Tan Malaka

was appointed to head, has already been described. Other port offices were soon established in Shanghai, Manila, and the Indies. Undoubtedly, the Canton office and its affiliates improved revolutionary communications to some extent, but we do not know enough about their activities to form any real judgment of their usefulness. The Canton center was abandoned by Tan Malaka in mid- 1925; he reported that he turned it over to another worker, 84 but that.

it

claims he

seems to have existed only a brief time

after

At the fourth plenary session of the Profintern executive (1926),

Heller reported that the international revolutionary link in the East

was

still

extremely weak; the Canton conference had not been a real

success since the revolutionary base in the individual countries con-

cerned was too weak to respond to decided, would not do at a time the East

it

adequately. 85 This, the Profintern

when

the revolutionary

was becoming increasingly important;

have a new conference of

would

in

therefore resolved to

Pacific labor organizations

special Profintern office in the East that

and publish a

it

movement

and

to establish a

act as a contact center

journal. 86 All this indicates that the

Canton

office

and

The Dawn no longer existed. The new contact center, which was not established until after the period in which we are interested, was envisioned in the Profintern resolution as the joint project of the RILU and the International Red Aid. The latter organization (also called by its Russian initials, MOPR) was established in 1922 to lend moral and material support to revolutionarv movements around the world. It paid very little attention to the 217

Rise of Indonesian colonial

1923

it

movements before

Communism

1927, 87 but the

ECCI

reported that during

provided financial aid to some 2,000 Javanese workers impover-

ished by the ill-fated railway strike. 88 In his report on the 1924 Comin-

Semaun mentioned

was considering an additional grant to the Indonesian revolutionaries, 89 and later he noted that the ECCI session of March-April 1925 had discussed financial help to the Indies movement. 90 Just how much the Comintern decided to grant and whether it actually reached the Indies party is not known, but it is certainly true that the Indonesian Communists received funds from abroad, either through the IRA or other organizations. Communications do not appear to have been a great problem, for money was easier to smuggle than revolutionary reading material, and articles in PKI-oriented newspapers indicate that the movement was kept fairly well supplied with international Communist literature. Apparently small sums were frequently transferred from Holland by money order, for the police claimed to have uncovered correspondence between the PKI and sympathizers in Holland in 1925 in which the Indonesian party requested its Dutch correspondents to stop sending contributions directly to Java, since party mail was frequently opened and confiscated; instead, the tern congress,

that the International

party suggested, donations should be sent via trusted addresses in Singapore. 91 Larger amounts were brought by sympathizers returning

from abroad, although as

comrade” who was not without

to attend the

Most

risk.

we have

seen in the case of the “trusted

Canton conference,

of the funds

seemed

to

this

method was

have traveled

to the

Indies via Holland, since that presented the easiest line of

communications. According to Semaun, the Dutch Communist Party was not an important primary source of help; it was willing to assist its Indonesian colleagues, but its own financial situation was too precarious to allow

much

in the

way

Dutch party on

of foreign aid. 92 Relations

financial

between the PKI and the matters were by no means entirely smooth,

who

acted as business manager for PKI funds in Holland, was on exceedingly bad terms with Semaun, the party repre-

for Brandsteder,

sentative in that country.

The amount

of

money

received by the

have been modest, since Indies

more frequently

PKI from abroad seems to Communist newspapers succumbed

poverty than to government measures, and concern about failing party finances was expressed bv the PKI conclaves of to

218

— International Relations

December 1924 and December 1925. 93 On the other hand, Sarekat Islam leaders accused the PKI executive in 1924 of having received /12,000 from Moscow, for only a small part of which it had accounted. This was part of the mutual smear campaign in which PKI and CSI leaders had engaged since 1923; it flared to new heights in mid- 1924, and Darsono’s old accusations of Tjokroaminoto’s financial unreliability were renewed. The SI chairman was charged specifically with being

by the Sarekat

responsible for the disappearance of the funds collected

Islam in 1919 for Hadji Agus Salim’s projected trip to Europe, where,

we

remember, one of his tasks was to seek foreign aid for the movement. Since the CSI charges fit the current accusations so well, we might suspect that they were simply payment in kind for Comuwill

nists’ allegations,

and therefore deserving

PKI

of

little

credence. Api, how-

had embezzled the money; it neither confirmed nor denied that the party had received it but left the distinct impression that it had. After all, the party newspaper remarked, /12,000 was really just a drop in the revolutionary bucket; something in the nature of hundreds of thousands was necessary to ever, denied only that the

really get the

movement going

leaders

in the Indies. 94

Twelve thousand guilders was no small windfall for an Indonesian political party, no matter how deprecatingly Api referred to it, although the paper’s remark may indicate the scale of aid the PKI hoped to acquire from the Comintern for its revolutionary effort. It is conceivable,

however, that

in spite of the

much Semaun had

newspaper’s implication the

gift

amount perhaps the /2,000 that tried to send the party and which was indeed embarrassingly unaccounted for. In later and more emphatically nationalist days, the Communists did their best to deny rumors of Russian gold; but, as I have remarked earlier, that was not the PKI’s attitude at this time. The Indonesian party instead placed great emphasis on being part of a world movement of irresistible strength and never actually existed or was

great resources.

The PKI may

accusation of embezzlement to

smaller than the stated

therefore have felt its

first

could turn the

own advantage by implying

reeeived a good deal of aid and was expecting more.

been the

it

It

had would not have it

time such tactics had been used: only a short time before

Alimin had revealed that a similar maneuver accounted for the “disappearance” of the funds for Salim’s 1919 the

PKI

hint of funds from

trip.

Moscow was 219

95

There

fictitious,

is

no proof that

but none of the

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

government reports on the tions

party’s activities in 1924 or

on

connec-

its

with the Comintern took the implication seriously enough to

mention

it.

was by no means a one-way affair. When Dutch members of the ISDV/PKI were expelled from the Indies, it was the party’s charitable custom to allot them a stipend to help them along until they were able to support themselves in Holland, and this was a relatively large expense. When Darsono returned from Europe in 1923, International aid

he did

his unsuccessful best to interest the Indonesian proletariat in

German brethren; in this connection he had Committee for Red Aid in Semarang, to pave the way

supporting their

estab-

lished a

for

an

IRA branch in Indonesia. 96 Reporting on the 1924 Comintern congress, Semaun also urged the establishment of an IRA branch in the Indies, arguing that

if

one helped brother

help in return in times of

crisis.

97

one could expect

parties,

In early 1925, the

PKI

set

up a

Workers’ Aid fund, 98 which was intended to become the Indonesian

branch of the IRA. Given PKI poverty and in

supporting foreign movements,

party did not contribute

much

to

it is

its

effort

in

interest

probably safe to assume that the

world Communist welfare, although

the police claimed to have found in 1926 a lutionary

members’ lack of

list

of donors to the revo-

China. 99 This probably represented funds col-

lected in connection with the

PKI China

action,

to

be discussed

presently.

Another international Communist organization with which the PKI

was associated was the Peasant International (the Krestintern ),

estab-

We

might

lished with

much

fanfare in the Kremlin in the

fall

of 1923.

suppose that an organization oriented toward the peasantry would

have a particularly close association with colonial Communism, since

it

was recognized that the Asian revolution would be agrarian in nature. This was not the case, however. Although its opening meeting did issue an appeal little

to the peasants of the colonies, the Krestintern

attention to Asia.

semicolonial East on

(Ho Chi Minh). 100

its

It

The only

paid very

representative of the colonial and

eleven-man presidium was Nguyen Ai Quoc devoted

itself

instead to promoting peasant

unrest in eastern Europe and to increasing rural sympathy for the proletariat’s cause. Its efforts

were therefore of

less interest to

the Asian

Communists than to the European parties; at that, it accomplished little enough. At the ECCI plenary session of February-March 1926, the best Zinoviev could say was that “the Krestintern, still a young 220

International Relations organization which

aged

up

now

to

has shown not a few failings, has man-

in the course of the last year to achieve

true, inconsiderable

its first

—successes,” and Trotsky

organization had so

—although

later

still, it is

remarked that the

impact that no one bothered to announce

little

its

end. 101

In spite of

general impotence and lack of concern with the East,

its

the Krestintern did have some relations with Indonesia. Iwa sumantri, an Indonesian student after graduating

who

visited

Moscow

from the University of Leiden, was

in

later

Kusuma-

1925-1926

charged by

the Netherlands Indies government with having earned part of his for the Krestintern. 102

keep there by working as a correspondent

pseudonym

der the

of S. Dingley,

pamphlets on the situation

Movement

in Indonesia,

criticism of

PKI

There were

was

asserted,

he had written

one of these, The Peasants’

in the Indies;

a major source for international

Communist

deviations in the 1924-1926 period. 103

also attempts to establish a Krestintern affiliate in Indo-

Semaun, advising the PKI on the decisions of the 1924 Comin-

nesia.

tern

is

it

Un-

congress,

urged the establishment of a separate Indonesian

peasant organization that could join the international grouping. Here-

he noted, such

tofore,

affiliation

had been impossible because the Indo-

nesian Communists had possessed no exclusively peasant association.

Outlining the procedure for establishing such an organization, he continued: In order that peasant affairs

must be formed

in

every Sarekat Rakjat

interests of the peasants.

for

may be handled

The

effectively,

local,

peasant committees

where they

will represent the

various local committees should be organized

coordinated work into a Central Peasant Committee, which will be

controlled

should

which

by the Executive

affiliate is

itself

located in

as

of the PKI.

The Central Peasant Committee

soon as possible with the Peasant International,

Moscow.

It will

be the duty of the Indonesian Central

Peasant Committee to write the Peasant International every month, reporting on

its

program, on any movements that

may

peasantry, on weaknesses wherever they occur, the peasant

movement

in

among the Indonesian and on how others can help arise

our country. 104

This idea was elaborated in an Indonesian-language pamphlet which

was published

in

Amsterdam

tained an account of the

lengthy introduction,

peasant demands. This

its is

in the spring of 1925

first

and which con-

congress of the Krestintern. 106 In a

author set forth a program of Indonesian

something of a landmark 221

in

Indonesian Corn-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

was the movements first detailed agrarian program and was drawn not from European Communist slogans for rural action but from demands peculiar to the Indonesian peasantry. 106 The publication of the program was a lonely event, however, for it was not munist history, for

it

mid-1950s that the party seriously undertook to ascertain

until the

peasant demands and rally rural support.

The pamphlet acknowledged that neither the Sarekat Rakjat nor the PKI could adequately represent peasant interests, the former because it included workers and shopkeepers as well as peasants, and the latter

because

spoke

it

first

of

all

movement

for the proletariat: “so the

to

carry out this peasant program of ours will surely get mixed in

with other demands. This can make matters ‘unclear’ for our movement,

because of

this ‘unclearness’

we

peasants might lose interest in working

through the Sarekat Rakjat and the Communist Party.”

107

As in Se-

maun’s recommendations, the solution was seen as peasant committees within the

SR

rather than an entirely separate organization. These

committees would

on

exist

and

central, regional,

district as well as

would elect delegates to an Indonesian Peasant Congress, meetings of which would be held just after SR congresses, which in turn met after PKI conventions. The peasant congress representatives could thus be chosen from among those who were attending the PKI and SR conventions, whether or not they were peasants. “In this fashion,” the pamphlet somewhat disingenuously obvillage levels. Local units

served,

expenses

“the

agreement will be easy a Central

Committee

movement can be kept down and reach.” 108 The peasant congress would elect

of to

the

representatives to congresses of the Krestintern in

Indonesian peasant movement of peasants

we

and workers

of the

would send

Moscow,

“so that our

may be connected

with the movement

whole world.

And

.

.

.

in this fashion

Indonesian peasants will soon gain freedom and a decent living, as

well as the general good of In 1925 the

calls,

all

mankind.”

PKI created an agrarian

(Peasant Union).

ST

in turn

which

of Indonesian Peasants,

Its

decision to do so

though the concept appears

to

109

organization, the Sarekat Tani

may have been

spurred by such

have been somewhat

different; the

units existed in addition to or as substitutes for Sarekat Rakjat

locals rather

ing the

than as groups within them.

A

same name, had been proposed

decided at

its

1923 congress to establish

similar organization, bear-

by the SI, which a Sarekat Tani system to earlier

revive SI rural strength through class-oriented agrarian action. 110

999 mJ mii

The

International Relations

PKI Sarekat Tani probably did not have much international contact. By the time it was formed the PKI and its affiliates were well on then-

way

to illegal status; the peasant organization enjoyed only a fitful

existence,

and

in early

1926

its

leaders were jailed.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the various attempts in period to organize and link with in the

Moscow

the

this

Communist movements

East was the absence of any real effort to create an Asian anti-

imperialist forum.

Such an organization would have served

as a

means

between Soviet Russia and the Asian Communist movements and as a valuable propaganda device. The idea was not lacking of contact

(we of

remember the attempt to create a League for the Liberation the East), and it was never entirely abandoned, for in 1922 the First will

Congress of the Toilers of the Far East called for an “Alliance of the Toilers of the Far East” fintern, at its

for

under Comintern sponsorship. 111 The Pro-

1922 congress and at several points thereafter, had called

regular conferences of the Eastern labor movements, but for

and technical” reasons not even the first of these was convened during the period under discussion here; the Canton transport workers’ meeting had been a separate undertaking. 112 Interest in a link between the Asian revolutionary movements was by no means absent on the Asian Communist side. Sukendar’s theses urged such a union, we will remember, and the Indonesian delegation “organizational

reportedly pressed establishment of an association of Asian revolu-

movements at the Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference in 1924. 113 While in Canton, Ho Chi Minh established an International Union of Oppressed Peoples of the East, which held its first conference in the summer of 1925. 114 Indonesia was not represented, for Tan Malaka had left Canton for the Philippines; he, however, enthusiastically advocated a Pan-Asian revolutionary link and called in particular for greater unity between the peoples of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya. 115 The Comintern seems to have been at best unimpressed by such

tionary

projects. Its indifference

may have

originated in the USSR’s desire to

prevent Pan-Asian tendencies, which might have damaged Russia’s position in Soviet Central Asia interests of Japan.

and might,

in the

Moreover, an organization

in

Far East, serve the

which non-Communist

groups were included might be more than the Comintern could handle: for example, any real attempt to clarify the ambivalent relationships

between Asian Communists and non-Communist revolu223

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

might destroy nationalist sympathy rather than increase it. Even a forum where only Communist groups were represented might

tionaries

not be completely controllable, for Asian Communists had shown a

discouraging amount of independence:

if

they combined outside the

central sphere of the Comintern, an unpleasant conflict might develop.

Moreover, while the Stalin-Trotsky feud raged, the Comintern was not eager to establish centers that might be attracted to the this,

in

left

opposition;

according to Semaun, was a major reason for Moscow’s disinterest

any

real center for Asian

International,

although concerned to improve contact with Asian

117

Communists

work outside Moscow. 116 In any event the

and

to publicize

back an anti-imperialist union

and Colonial Oppression

it

anticolonial efforts, did not really

until the

League against Imperialism

in 1927.

The Comintern’s reluctance did not imply that

its

to sponsor

an Asian revolutionary center

disapproved of Asian Communist movements

taking an interest in the activities of their brother parties. Quite the contrary:

as

tutelage to

the Chinese Communists proceeded under Comintern establish

a

bloc within the Kuomintang,

example was increasingly held up by the International other Asian of the

KMT

The news

Communist groups to follow. Writing and CCP, Voitinsky declared:

in

Chinese

the

as a

model

for

1924 on the union

Kuomintang has penetrated into the French colony of Indochina, the American colony of the Philippines, the Dutch colony of the Malay archipelago, reached Singapore, Malaya, and India.

this

of the reorganization of the

At the

Pacific Transport Workers’

year delegations from almost

all

Conference

in

Canton

in

June of

these areas saluted the Kuomintang,

although to some extent they tended to idealize

its

program and

activities.

There can be no doubt that even the partial victory of Sun Yat-sen over the attempted counterrevolutions in Canton and over their instigators the Anglo-American-French imperialists will raise the authority of this party in

—

—

Ocean to a new height and movement of these peoples 118

the eyes of the colonial peoples of the Pacific will serve as a stimulant to the liberation

The presence

.

and rapidly expanding Chinese minority in Indonesia naturally had considerable bearing on the usefulness of the Chinese example to the PKI. It meant, on the one hand, that developments in China had repercussions in the Indies, where the local Chinese community had supported the Kuomintang from its beginof a large

nings and followed the revolution with great interest.

On

the other

hand, the Indies Chinese had a different legal status from the ethnic

224

1 international

Relations

Indonesians and, as the great part of the independent middle

class,

enjoyed a generally superior economic position. Particularly on Java they were popularly stereotyped as moneylenders and merchants and

hence were considerably distrusted. Too close association with the

would thus endanger the party’s mass support, particularly in the rural areas, which the Chinese penetrated rapidly during the 1920s and where, since they could not own land, they almost invariably assumed the moneylender-merchant role. At the same time, the Indies Chinese were not notably interested in participating in Indonesian political movements. Beyond promoting their local concerns as a minority, they were mainly attracted to movements in China. This was particularly true of recent immigrants, who were also the most attracted to the left Kuomintang by reason of their acquaintance with that movement at home and by the radicalism resulting from their poverty and uncertain position. In attempting to engage Chinese sympathies the PKI thus faced the highest cultural and linguistic barrier to cooperation precisely at the point where its ideological attraction might have been the greatest. In view of these factors militating against cooperation with the Chinese minority, it might have seemed practical for the party to point to the revolutionary example of China but to make no effort to recruit the local Chinese. This, however, would have run counter to the party’s Indies Chinese

ideological rejection of ethnic boundaries; throughout

PKI

stressed

though

this

its

refusal to

oppose the Indies Chinese

stand has sometimes cost

it

dearly.

its

history, the

as a minority,

was probably

It

this

combined with the presence of large Chinese populathe Communists’ early bases of Semarang and Surabaja, that

consideration, tions in

prompted the party to secure local Chinese support even before Communism emerged as a political element in China. In 1918 Sneevliet and Baars attended the Surabaja,

where they

May Day celebration of a Chinese union in proffered ISDV sympathy and aid; 119 and at the

time of the October 1918 Sarekat Islam congress

Semaun

reportedly

proposed to the CSI that the movement adopt a cooperative attitude

toward the Indies Chinese, provided they supported

and did not hinder journal

its

its

political efforts

struggle against capitalism. 120 In 1920 the party

declared optimistically that the Indies Chinese proletariat

would soon

join its

was subject to 1922 the PKI urged sup-

Indonesian counterpart, for

121 and in increasing capitalist oppression,

port for a China relief drive sponsored

225

by the

it

too

local minority,

arguing

Communism

Rise of Indonesian that

if

the Indonesians helped the Chinese now, they could expect

them to reciprocate in the future. 122 Such efforts, sporadic and ineffective, had the character

of reminders

of proletarian internationalism rather than real campaigns.

They were

oriented toward the Indies Chinese and not toward China: that coun-

was Gandhi and the Indian National Congress rather than Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang which the party saw during the early 1920s as the most significant expression of the Asian national liberation movement. After Semaun’s departure in mid- 1923, however, Gandhi ceased to be held up as a hero. We might suspect that Darsono played a considerable part in his rejection, for he was better acquainted with the Comintern’s unfavorable view of Gandhi and may have been affected by the even stronger opinions of M. N. Roy, who operated from Berlin at the time Darsono was at Comintern headquarters there; 123 Tjokroaminoto’s attempts to try

was not seen

as a revolutionary example, for

it

promote an Indies National Congress and the PKI loss of interest in multiparty alliance also helped jettison the Indian example. At the

same

time, the rising strength of the

manifest support of for a

new model

it

made Sun

Kuomintang and the Comintern’s

Yat-sen’s

movement

the natural choice

of national revolution.

\

At the principal PKI celebrations in 1924, Sun Yat-sen’s portrait replaced that of Gandhi in the party gallery of heroes. 124 Efforts to attract the Indies

Chinese were renewed and

this

time reached the

The attendance of Chinese at PKI and SR meetings was carefully noted in Communist newspaper accounts, and considerable publicity was given to the progress of the

proportions of a major campaign.

revolution in China.

A Committee

(Comite Kehormatan Bangsa) was legal rights to both Indonesians

for the Respect of Nationalities set

up

to press for granting full

and Indies Chinese, and a fund was

established to aid flood victims in China. 125

At the June 1924 PKI congress, Darsono stressed the party’s need to attract Chinese; it should denote most of its attention to those locally born, he said, for the immigrants already felt themselves internationalists

thanks to the influence of Sun Yat-sen. 126 Apparently to further

this project, the

PKI appointed

its first

Chinese executive member, Kho

Tjun Wan, who represented the Semarang division of the partv. 127 At a mass rally at Semarang in August 1924, PKI leaders stressed the need for closer cooperation with the Indies

Chinese and for aid

to

the

Chinese revolution. The fact that the local Chinese were largely en-

226

International Relations

gaged

in

commerce need not deter such cooperation,

Darsono and other speakers discoursed on the traders

and market

it

was

asserted.

difficulties the small

were having, and a motion was passed

sellers

against government interference with peddling and selling and for the

support of the Indonesian and Chinese petty merchants.

It

was

also

emphasized that China’s liberation from imperialism would mean a

good deal

to Indonesia’s struggle;

if

the Indonesians supported the

Chinese now, their aid would be reciprocated. Sugono warned that

became

if

buy imported goods, Indonesia would suffer an even worse depression than it was then enduring; Sumantri offered the more idealistic argument that support should be the Chinese people

too poor to

given because national boundaries did not count for the proletariat,

and Darsono described the piteous conditions he had observed in China during his stay there in 1921 on the way to Soviet Russia. 128 All

when the hat was passed for the was collected. The relief committee efforts

these pleas brought forth scanty fruit;

China aid fund, only /31.03 seem to have elicited much the same objections aid the initial

German

proletariat,

as Darsono’s project to

and nothing much was heard

of

it

after the

burst of activity. 129

The death for the PKI Kuomintang;

of

Sun Yat-sen

to stress it

held

its

in

March 1925 provided

sympathy

rallies

to

for the Indies

mourn

a major occasion

Chinese and the

the departed leader, and

its

adherents attended local Chinese demonstrations in Sun’s honor. Condolences were cabled to the Kuomintang in China, and the

West Java

PKI leader Gunawan produced a highly flattering biography of Sun. 130 The Shanghai incident of May 1925 gave new fuel to PKI arguments for an anti-imperialist alliance with the Chinese. The affair aroused the Indies Chinese, who began collecting money for the support of the Shanghai workers, to which project the PKI lent its enthusiastic assistance. 131

There was some sharp criticism outside the party of PKI foreigners rather than to Indonesians in need, 132 but the

relief to

campaign

does not seem to have met the same degree of resistance within the

movement as the earlier party campaigns for German and Chinese aid. The sums collected seem to have been small, but numerous rallies on China’s behalf were reported in various major and secondary cities in Java.

do not adequately explain this display of energy, since they had not sufficed in earlier times; it seems likely that Ideological principles alone

227

Rise of Indonesian

PKI

the less internationalist

Communism

leaders expected material advantages to

come of their campaign. For one more able and willing to donate

Chinese were far

thing, the Indies

China than the Indo-

to causes in

nesians were to contribute to activities at home, a characteristic the 138 Indonesians viewed with both admiration and jealousy.

some

Indies Chinese population could be persuaded to divert

money

to the local

would have been

Communist

If

the

of this

cause, the party’s financial agonies

greatly eased. Moreover, the Indies

Kuomintang was

highly disciplined and accustomed to underground activity, whereas the

inept at conspiracy. 134

PKI was

trouble maintaining communications with both

the

movement abroad;

local

the party had great

By 1925

its

units at

home and

Chinese associations, had they had a mind

might have helped preserve these contacts. Finally, by

to cooperate,

1925 the PKI was seriously considering insurrection and was inclined to

encourage

possible sources of revolutionary aid.

all

By

demonstrat-

ing friendship for both the Indies Chinese and the Kuomintang, the

PKI might hope both and that

Chinese support and to acquire

was constantly stressed that China was relaaid for China now would mean Chinese aid in the

help from abroad, for tively near

to attract local it

future. \

The appeal

to the Indies

1925 probably did

to

little

nesians, but emphasis

Chinese and the contributions to China

in

enhance PKI popularity among ethnic Indo-

on the revolution

in

China was not without

The Kuomintang’s advance showed, as not only the Communists pointed out, what the Indonesians might achieve by national solidarity and determination. Moreover, the PKI argued that Kuomintang allieffect.

ance with Soviet Russia and promotion of the interests of the Chinese

working

class

showed

that national liberation

and

socialist revolution

argument made no point of Chinese Communist strategy, or indeed of the existence of the CCP. For one thing, the PKI had abandoned the bloc within; to stress its use in China

went hand

in hand. This

might merely serve the

may well have

critics of its

own

policy.

Moreover, the party

thought that the support of the Indies Chinese would be

better secured

by concentrating

exclusively

on the symbol of the

Kuomintang.

The PKI

used the Chinese revolution as evidence that Soviet help was disinterested. In an effort to secure the support of the young also

Indonesian intellectuals,

who were

then forming the

clubs” that began the true nationalist movement,

it

first

of the “studv

declared:

International Relations In China the intellectuals proclaim their sympathy for the Russians, and Russia will value that sympathy highly. Just as Russia gives aid for the liberation of colonial countries, so

it

will surely take into consideration the

request of the Chinese nationalists now; what sort of government will later

emerge

China

in

is

left

to the Chinese people to determine themselves.

Russia will only help in getting rid of foreign imperialism. 135

Above

all,

the

PKI used

the events in China to demonstrate that

was no longer a distant European affair, that it was spreading toward the Indies, and that Soviet aid was a reality. It implied that if the anti-imperialist effort could succeed in China, where the interests of so many capitalist nations were involved, then surely it could triumph in the Indies, where only the relatively weak Dutch need be faced. The argument, as we shall see, was perhaps too persuasive. "Beside the demonstrations in support of China our party proclaimed the struggle for unification with the awakening Chinese working class,” Semaun proudly declared at the end of 1925. “This development is a constant topic of discussion in the Indonesian press, and makes the capitalists wild with anger.” 136 If not as distraught as Semaun described, the colonial authorities were certainly seriously concerned at the prospect of PKI-KMT cooperation and the danger of radical Kuomintang ideas influencing the Indonesian population. The

revolution

Advisor for Chinese Affairs was a prominent participant in a major

which the Communist threat was discussed; after the meeting the authorities undertook to remove Chinese revolutionary influence from the colony by restricting immigovernment conference

in July 1925 at

and deporting a number of radically inclined Chinese residents. 137 Government fears were largely unfounded, however. Algration

though during 1925 a greater number of Indies Chinese attended China-oriented PKI gatherings in Java (the only island where such

meetings were held) and although pro-Soviet sympathies were sometimes expressed in the Indies Chinese press, 138 the

PKI attempt

secure Chinese participation was generally unsuccessful.

A

to

few did

movement, 139 but the vast majority preferred to stay out of Indonesian politics, and especially out of a movement that offered many prospects for trouble and almost none for success. Those few Chinese the PKI did attract seem to have been born in and oriented toward Indonesia, and there is no indication that the party had connecenter the

tions with China-oriented organizations or relied to

229

any extent on the

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Chinese minority financially or for communications within the archipelago and abroad.

By 1925

the problem of maintaining foreign communications

acute for the PKI, both because

it

was engaged

the Comintern and because most of fled

abroad or been

exiled.

From

became

in a controversy

with

top leaders had by then either

its

the party’s point of view Singapore

was easy to reach both legally and illegally (thanks to the smuggling trade) and an Indonesian visitor could easily melt into the Malay crowd. It was, however, very far from the areas of Comintern power and interest, and this was probably the major reason why it was not important as a communication center.

was a natural contact

center, since

it

However, some Indies government accounts reported that during 1925 a center for propaganda in French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies was opened in Singapore under the supervision of ECCI and Profintern representatives; tives

it

was

said to

be composed

of representa-

from the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Indo-

Communist movements, with

nesian

a total staff of thirty persons,

divided into a section for propaganda and a section for direct action. 140

The origin of this claim seems to have been a statement reportedly made at a PKI conference in December 1924 about plans for such an but

office,

it

seems unlikely that one actually existed outside the minds

Communists and worried government offiFrom the description of the center, the reports seem to have

of enthusiastic Indonesian cials.

sprung from rumors in connection with the Comintern-Profintern

bureau established

Trade Union

in

Canton

in

1924 or the Shanghai-based Pan-

which was not set up until 1927 but had been talked about for some time before. Another possible source is the Nan Yang [South Seas] Communist Party, which emerged among the Singapore Chinese from the Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, was reportedly authorized by the International to deal with movements in the English, British, Dutch, and French colPacific

Secretariat,

onies of Southeast Asia,

However,

it

insignificant

and was responsible

to the

CCP

in China. 141

most unlikely that this organization, which was both and illegal, received such authorization before the collapse is

PKI made

Communist organization in Southeast Asia. Chinese Communist activity had reportedlv begun in Singapore in 1925, and although it is claimed that Indonesian Comof the

it

the only functioning

munists were instrumental in starting

230

it,

the reports of Indonesian

International Relations

Communist

more

exploits in Singapore during the mid-1920s are

nota-

ble for their failure to reflect contact with the Malayan Chinese radicals

than for any evidence of

it.

142

Darsono has said that if the PKI had contact with the International through Singapore, he was not aware of it. 143 If a Comintern office or agent was in Singapore in the 1925-1926 period,

it is

most remarkable

that neither the International, the party on Java, or the quarreling factions then exiled in that city appealed to

it

or brought

in

it

PKI

any way

into their negotiations; but this the reader can observe for himself in

The

the following chapters.

idea of linking Indonesia to the outside

Communist world was not unthought of, however. Semaun has recounted that he broached to the Dutch Communists and the Comintern a proposal to move PKI foreign headquarters from the distant center of Amsterdam to a spot in the Far East, preferably Singapore.

He pushed

this particularly

of the Indies

own

Communists, Aliarcham’s

CPH made

quarrels with the

when

during 1925,

him

the increasing isolation

leftist policies,

and Semaun’s

feel strongly that

it

would be

better to have the party’s major link with the International so situated

PKI leaders. (According to Semaun, he had almost no idea at this time what Tan Malaka was doing about the Indonesian party. ) Semaun said that he discussed his plan with Sen Katayama and M. N. Roy, who were themselves interested in establishing a base for Asian revolutionary work outside Moscow. The final reaction of the Comintern was negative, however. Then in the midst of that he could confer directly with

its

conservative stabilization-of-capitalism phase, with the Soviet Union

trying to normalize tional

was not eager

and particularly not

to

its

new

agitators to colonial areas of the East,

its

climax, the Comintern did not

immediate control those whose ultimate

guarantee; and

A PKI

send

Western powers, the Interna-

to a British possession. Moreover, with the Stalin-

Trotsky feud nearing out of

relations with the

its

office

it

want

loyalties

it

to

send

could not

could not guarantee Semaun’s. 144

was

in fact established in

Singapore in 1925, though

apparently not on the initiative of the Comintern. Subakat, editor of the party newspaper Api and one of the older and

PKI members,

fled the Indies to

more responsible

escape internment for his revolution-

ary writings. 145 In Singapore, he set himself up as liaison

man

for the

PKI, having contact with Semaun in the Netherlands and later with

Tan Malaka (but none,

so far as

we

can

with the International’s representatives 231

see, directly in

with

Moscow

or

China). The Singapore

Rise of Indonesian center as

became an

Communism

increasingly important contact and conference point

government measures cut down on PKI

activities

within Indonesia;

became a major headquarters for the party leadership. In spite of all its agencies and offices for contact with the East, the major link between the Comintern and the PKI was not one of the International’s own organizations but the Communist Party of Holland. It was a general Comintern policy to hold the West European parties responsible in some degree for the training and guidance of the colonial movements ( a logical practice, since the metropolitan Communists had greater access to and knowledge of their countries’ dependencies than did the Moscow organization itself). The extent to which the Comintern linked the metropolitan and colonial parties together was in 1926

it

reflected in the International’s organization: the Administrative Secre-

which was composed

tariat,

of sections in charge of

ity in individual countries or

same

geographic areas, placed colonies

slot as the countries that

the fourth section, which

England and

Communist

had

activin the

ruled them. Thus Indonesia belonged to jurisdiction over the Netherlands

and

their possessions. 146

This use of metropolitan Communist movements as a main source of contact with the colonies had definite advantages, but

it

was not

completely felicitous system. For one thing, the problems of the

munist movement

in the

a

Com-

metropoles differed from those in the colonies,

and the difference resulted

at times in a conflict of interest.

We

will

remember Tan Malaka’s description of the argument between the metropolitan and Asian Communists within the colonial commission of the 1922 Comintern congress. Moreover, few metropolitan Communists had any great interest in the colonies, and they thus gave the colonial question less attention than it deserved and certainly much less than the Asian Communists thought it merited. In spite of the Comintern’s repeated admonitions to the metropolitan parties to increase their

acti-

on behalf of the colonies, 147 the European parties could not satisfy their colonial comrades’ expectations of assistance, a fact of

vities

which the Asian Communists made the Comintern well aware. Dutch Communist interest in the Indies can be traced from the 1914 congress of the party’s revolutionary socialist forerunner, the SDP. Stirred by contact with the Dutch Marxists in the Indies, who had recently formed the ISDV, and by agitation in the SDP organ De Tribune about a plague threat on Java, the meeting devoted considerable attention to the Indies. Its most important act was to adopt the

232

International Relations slogan “Indie los van Holland”

(

the Indies free from Holland

)

as part

action program. 148 This

was not in itself a demand for Indonesian sovereignty, since “los van Holland” was at the time also an extreme statement of the demand for autonomy. However, since the SDP called for political and economic changes that would have reof

its

sulted in Indonesian control of the country,

demand

No

for

other

its

Dutch party adopted I

a similar slogan in the period with

SDP

specifically rejected “los

SDAP

1919 founding congress, and the

and Dutch

socialists stressed that

Indonesian independence; nonetheless, excellent point

on which

to

adopted the

it

this time,

its

socialists

CPH

Both the

were insincere

1929 congress the

however, the

had meanwhile altered

little its

SDAP

appeared to

and too

own

in

was not an

it

socialist action

the Indonesian radical nationalists as both too ticularly since the

as

gave the Communists an

van Holland” slogan but stressed that

“los

immediate goal; by

“free

year. 149

it

they did not oppose eventual

argue that the

supporting the Indonesian cause. At

van Hol-

denounced

same

irresponsible in the Indies budget debate the

Indies

constituted in effect a

independence and was recognized as such.

which we are concerned; the land” at

it

late,

par-

version to read

from Holland now.” Similarly, when the subject of changing the

Netherlands Indies’

name

arose during the 1921 parliamentary debate

on revising the colony’s constitution, the “Indonesia” whereas the Indies)

was going

In general, the

SDAP

CPH

urged the newly current

thought Indie or Oost Indie (East

far enough. 150

CPH

remained a step ahead of

its

socialist rival in

appealing to radical nationalist sympathies in the 1920s.

It

demon-

more often and with less restraint on the colony’s behalf than did the SDAP, which was reluctant to devote much energy to a cause at best tangential to its campaign for domestic popular support. The SDAP was basically more friendly to nationalism as such (the CPH took a stand on that issue to the left of the Comintern’s), but by its strated

moderation

it

failed to appeal to the emotional ingredients of radical

nationalism; the

CPH

did this with flamboyant support of the anticolo-

nial struggle. Accordingly, the radical nationalists of the

Perhimpunan

Indonesia, the association of Indonesian students in Holland, devel-

oped closer ties with the CPH than who the SDAP; and since the Perhimpunan Indonesia played a key role in the development of the nationalist revolutionary movement, this was a significant factor. In addition to adopting the “free from Holland” slogan, the 1914

233

Rise of Indonesian

SDP

congress called for abolition of

nesian political freedom, and

Communism all

named

it

regulations restricting Indo-

a commission to

draw up

a

program based on these demands. World War I and the ensuing European revolutions drew the party’s attention away from the colonial

colonies, however,

devoted

its

and

it

was not

until

1919 that the

SDP

again

attention to the East.

Sneevliet returned to the Netherlands early in 1919, and from the

time of his arrival dates to the party’s real interest in Indonesia. 151 In the spring of that year the

SDP

took part for the

first

time in the Dutch

parliamentary debate on the Indies budget, entering resolutions to abolish the extraordinary rights, to withdraw the

ban on

Sneevliet’s

presence in the Indies, and to grant amnesty to those punished as a result of the

SDP

November 1918

Van Ravesteyn acted helped him prepare a speech

disturbances.

spokesman, and Sneevliet

as the stress-

ing that the question of Indonesia’s freedom was “necessary and ur152

SDP, now renamed the Communist Party of Holland, held its tenth congress, at which the most important event was Sneevliet’s speech on behalf of the ISDV and the left Sarekat Islam. 153 The congress named the former ISDV leader to the CPH secretariat and provided him with a job as party propagandist. He was by no means happy with this role, particularly since it left him gent.’’

In August of that year the

too poor to bring his wife and children to Holland, and he therefore

appealed to the government

were sible. 1

to ’

4

to allow his return to Indonesia,

even

if it

an outlying island where political activity would be impos-

The

CPH

supported his

efforts,

but the government did not

grant Sneevliet’s request; shortly thereafter the Dutch party lost his services

when he departed

for the

second Comintern congress and a

subsequent career with the International.

Dutch Communist movement was soon more than filled by other expellees, and within a few years there were enough of them to form a powerful pressure group within the Dutch party. In 1920 die CPH established an Indies RevoluSneevliet’s place as Indies adviser to the

tionary Infonnation Service to

sift

through material on Indonesia for

PKI was requested to send information on to this Indonesian Communists were also asked, even before they

party use, and the office.

155

joined the International, to furnish information and copies of their

Amsterdam and Berlin offices of the Comintern. 156 The Amsterdam bureau had been established by a conference organized in February 1920 by the CPH, on the mandate of the ECCI, to publications to the

234

International Relations discuss

Comintern communications with America and West Europe.

“representative of the revolutionary

was

(probably Sneevliet)

Indies”

movement

present,

as

A

the Netherlands

in

well

comrade” who represented no particular organization.

as It

a

“Chinese

was perhaps

because of their presence that the meeting, which decided to establish

an

office in

ment

Mexico

to act as a contact point for the

Communist move-

would also serve as a link with the movements in the Far East. Had the Amsterdam bureau been a success, it might have given the Dutch Communists a more influential position in the Comintern-CPH-PKI triangle; but the Mexican venture proved a fiasco, and the Amsterdam bureau was soon denounced as ultraleftist by the ECCI, with the result that the rival in the Americas, declared that the base

international office in Berlin

West European At the

won

out as the center for the Comintern’s

activities. 157

CPH congress of

1920 Indonesia appeared only as a side issue,

was not the case at die party convention of November 1921, which was attended by the first of the Indonesian Communist visitors to Europe. Darsono, fresh from Moscow and the third Comintern congress, greeted the assembly in the name of the PKI and described his party’s struggle against the colonial regime. CPH chairman Wijnkoop invited him to join the party leaders on the podium, and much was made over the Indonesian Communist movement, which, as Wijnkoop acknowledged, seemed more promising than the movement in the Netherlands. Even greater publicity for the colonial effort was given by the Dutch police, who arrested Darsono in the midst of the proceedings, throwing the congress into an uproar and eliciting a flurry of motions promising protest and support. Darsono was released in a few hours’ time, and the delegates, complimenting themselves that their quick action had saved their colleague from durance vile, returned to but

this

their deliberations. 158

Darsono soon

left for

Berlin, but before

the

headquarters in

he departed he made several suggestions to the

Dutch Communists regarding

CPH

ECCI West European

their effort for the Indies.

He

urged the

congress to strengthen the bonds between the Indonesian and

Dutch

proletariat

by

the Indies, which

it

On

its

the occasion of

greetings to

its sister

issuing a

did on

message of sympathy

November

people of

17:

Dutch Communist Party sends the East Indies, which constitutes so small yet

twelfth anniversary, the

party of

to the

235

— Rise of Indonesian so brave a

vanguard of a

Communism

and which has taken up the struggle

different race,

against the colonial exploitation of the East Indies peoples

by Dutch and

international capitalism, as well as the fight for the final overthrow of race as

well as class rule.

The Dutch Communist Party and reinforce the

Dutch

this fighting

proletariat

will

do everything

vanguard, inasmuch as

it

in its

power

to inspire

particularly seeks to stir

wherever possible against the Dutch regime

in these

distant countries.

The Dutch Communist Party

the suffering of the oppressed, but also

and a itself

revolt against capitalist rule,

among

its

sincere

no matter

in

what form

may

it

manifest

the masses of the East Indian peoples, in Java as well as in the

among the peasantry as The Dutch Communist Party is conscious

rest of the iat.

sympathy not only with with the beginning of a reawakening

expresses

East Indies,

well as

among

of an inner

the proletar-

bond with the

hopes and ideals of these masses which constitute a part of the whole International, embracing millions of workers and exploited.

And we promise

means at our disposal to aid and reinforce these masses in their struggle and aims. One great aim in particular must be achieved the solidarity of the Dutch proletariat and the millions of workers and peasants of the East Indies. Long live the East Indian Communist Party! Long live the Communist International! Long live the World Revolution! 159 to use all

—

Darsono’s second suggestion concerned the long-neglected matter of

drawing up a colonial program. The Netherlands Indies authorities charged that such a program was produced about this time with the help of Darsono and the ECCI.

when he

Tan Malaka, however, wrote

that

arrived in the Netherlands in 1922 and inquired about the

Dutch Communist program for the Indies, he was informed that the party intended to draw one up but had not yet finished the task indeed, it had not even started it. At any rate, the CPH went into the general election campaign of 1922 with the liberation of Indonesia as point 10 of

its

ten-point program. 160

These elections were the subject of Darsono’s third suggestion: he urged that the CPH name an Indonesian as one of its candidates. 161

CPH

would be the first Dutch party to do so, it would gain the Communists considerable Indonesian sympathy. Happily for this project, the Indies government exiled Tan Malaka, thus providing the CPH with an Indonesian Communist who was well known, spoke fluent Dutch, and had no prison record to make him ineligible in short, a Since the

—

236

International Relations

ready-made candidate. Malaka conveniently arrived

May

Day;

their

list

in

Holland on

Dutch colleagues whisked him off to the party celebration at the Diamond Exchange in Amsterdam, which was turned into a pro-Indonesian demonstration. Although he had not been listed as a speaker before the meeting, Malaka addressed the audience on the events that led to his banishment. Wijnkoop then spoke solely about Indonesia; urging greater cooperation between the Dutch and Indonesian proletariat, the CPH chairman said he was beginning to believe the Indonesian people would throw off the yoke of European capitalism before the Europeans themselves did. The rally ended with Tan Malaka being carried about the hall on the shoulders of the Dutch Communists; after it was over CPH leaders approached him to join his

of candidates for the lower house of parliament.

and thus became the

The

CPH

first

nomination was aimed in the

According

to

accepted

Indonesian to run in a Dutch election. 162

to the Indonesians that the Netherlands side.

He

Tan Malaka,

first

place at demonstrating

Communists stood on

their

the Indonesian students in the Nether-

Dutch party’s gesture in naming him a candidate. Although only a few of the fifty-odd members of the Indische Vereniging (the future Perhimpunan Indonesia) were at all attracted to the Communist movement at that time, those sympathizers

lands were quite taken with the

persuaded the association

to

endorse Malaka’s candidacy as a protest

against the extraordinary rights

and the Indies government persecution

of the SI schools. 163

The candidacy

of

Tan Malaka

also

helped publicize party endeavors Gover-

to abolish the extraordinary rights, in particular the right of the

nor General to banish and expel political undesirables. The

power formed the Indonesian movement and

realized that this

a major obstacle to the

CPH

well

development of

Dutch Communists’ ability to play a role in it; in addition, the extraordinary rights were one of the few subjects on which the CPH could get non-Communist parliamentary support. On May 12, the day after Malaka’s candidacy was announced, the CPH introduced a new motion into parliament to remove to the

the extraordinary rights; the socialists felt obliged to support

it,

al-

though, anxious to establish themselves as a politically respectable group, they expressly declared their disapproval of the Indonesian

Communist movement. 164 In the election campaign, the size the

CPH

called on

Indonesian question, announcing:

237

its

members

to

empha-

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

meantime the Party Executive, together with comrades Bergsma and Malaka, will decide on further measures so that in the next two months [before the elections] they can make the necessary propaganda in this country for the struggle of the Indonesians against exploitive Dutch imperialism. For the time being, you are requested not to turn to Bergsma and In the

Malaka personally concerning

this

propaganda but,

if

you

find

it

necessary,

consult with the Party Secretariat. 165

For a few months Malaka campaigned vigorously; he

also

helped

Wijnkoop prepare parliamentary speeches against Dutch policies in the Indies. As third man on a slate that would be hard put to place two candidates, he had little hope of actually winning a seat, and even before the results were announced he left to visit Darsono in Berlin. As

showed Malaka’s extraordinary ability to gain followers on short notice: he came in considerably ahead of the second man, Van Ravesteyn, thus placing the CPII in the awkward position of having to choose between him and its principal theoretician and parliamentary speaker. Malaka, however, turned out to be too young for a member of parliament, a fact that he and/or the CPPI had apparently neglected to make known to the electoral authorities, and it was not for another decade that an Indonesian entered the Dutch parliament. 166 In early September 1922, Bergsma announced that he had received a cable from the founders of the newly created PVH informing him of the reunification of the Indonesian labor movement:

it

happened, however, the election

\

tally

•

To

P.

Bergsma

At the meeting of both trade union federations day before yesterday

on September 3)

it

was decided

to

combine both labor groups

(i.e.,

into

one

federation.

Bergsma, T. Malaka, and Sutomo or Gunawan (the students) are in

named

as representatives of the

last

two medical

Indonesian Labor Federation

Europe.

The Second Chamber has been cabled

that

we

protest most strongly

against the withdrawal of the cost-of-living bonus from the lowest-paid

personnel. Call on the representatives to provide information to the

members

Parliament.

Suroso

167

Semaun 238

of

— International Relations

The career of the PVH European representation is obscure; doubtless Tan Malaka’s departure took most of the substance from it. Bergsma’s report is less interesting for its announcement of the committee’s creation than for his editorial comments on it. The message proved, he declared, that Semaun was not the deviationist he had been called when he returned to Indonesia several months before and that the PKI had not split over his policies. Moreover, it showed that the breach in the bloc within had been sealed: “The ‘miracle’ has occurred. It seems no miracle to us, however, for it was not a difference of principle that led to disagreement, but chiefly a misunderstanding, a failure to com-

prehend each other.”

168

Bergsma, therefore, had

still

been worrying over Semaun’s program

and the condition of the PKI; moreover, he was convinced that the schism in the mass movement was not fundamental and could be indeed, had been healed. Bergsma was a fervent proponent of the alliance with the Sarekat Islam; as we have seen, he stressed this in his writings for the Comintern and in the process demonstrated that he saw agreement where not even the possibility existed. He shared this tendency with Sneevliet, who returned to Holland in mid-1924 and

—

who argued even sential

and

in

1926 that restoration of the bloc within was

that only ill-advised

had caused the

PKI

es-

criticism of Sarekat Islam leaders

split.

This stubborn insistence on a bygone policy showed that the Dutch

mentors of the PKI tions that

had

still

judged the Indonesian situation by the condi-

existed during their stay in that country.

No

doubt, too,

the popularity of the united front from above and the Chinese bloc

Communist world, the impotence and isolaDutch Communist movement, and the visible

within in the international tion of the unallied

decline in Indonesian mass interest in politics helped convince these

Communists must act in concert with other components of the national movement. Since, however, the PKI proceeded in exactly the opposite direction, there was bound to be conflict

leaders that the Indonesian

with the heads of the Indonesian party.

was a major reason for the diverging CPH-PKI viewpoint, and this was not only because of measures taken by the Netherlands Indies government but also because the Indonesian Communists could not be bothered to write. In early 1923 Bergsma was to Lack

write

of information

Semaun

as follows:

239

Rise of Indonesian

You have,

I

hope, received

my

previous

Communism letters. I

am

very pleased that you

you have and that the situation has been improved. However, I would also have wished that we heard more from the PKI. How are things really going there, comrade? You don’t write a word about it; and as a Communist that’s after all the first thing. You understand that in order to create a good impression outside [on the Cominfellows have brought things as far as

tern?]

it is

absolutely necessary that

Who

fighters in the PKI.

To be

sure,

your attention

would

I

is

now

in the

don’t doubt your

is

we

good

maintain a good core of conscious Executive? will;

it’s

Who

is

chairman?

.

.

.

because you are busy and

much by your work in the PKI. What I you would sometime tell me how things are going at

distracted too

like is that

present in the PKI. 109

This missive reflects a considerable lack of contact: the

man who was

then the Dutch Communists’ principal authority on Indonesia did not

Semaun, to whom he was writing, was then the PKI chairman. Presumably he thought the party had held its annual congress in December 1922, and he had no way of knowing that the meeting had

know

that

not taken place. Although of

all

the returned

the best able to get along with Semaun, 170

Dutchmen Bergsma was

we can

well imagine that

frustration taxed his diplomatic qualities to the utmost.

The

Indonesians, for their part, seemed to regard

CPH

ignorance of

Dutch Communists’ own fault; when later that year Semaun departed to Holland and exile, Sinar Hindia expressed the pious hope that with Semaun’s aid the CPH would improve 171 its knowledge of the Indonesian situation. Semaun arrived in the Netherlands on September 20, 1923, and was greeted by a large delegation of Dutch Communists. Three days later he was presented to the public at a mass demonstration held in the Amsterdam Concertgebouw, and he then settled down in Bergsma’s home in that city to begin his work as PKI European representative. 172 With Semaun’s arrival, the Netherlands became a major base for PKI activity. His efforts extended in several directions: one was agitation among the Indonesian seamen, whom, we will remember, he organized into the SPLI, a union that acted as a major communication line between the PKI and Europe. Secondly, Semaun did his best to Indonesian

affairs as

the

attract the Indonesian students in the Netherlands a task facilitated

because the Perhimpunan Indonesia had been moving toward a radical nationalist position

and

in 1923 declared itself for noncooperation. Ac-

cording to Semaun, these students, as members of the Indonesian

240

elite,

:

International Relations

had very little interest in the proletarian struggles of the CPH, but they were attracted by the Comintern’s proclamations on the colonial question and by the Leninist explanation of imperialism. 173 Their sympathy was reflected in the memorial volume that the association published in 1923 to commemorate its fifteen years of existence. There it was noted that the PKI was the only party that seemed able to attract the enthusiasm of the Indonesian people and that, should Communism prove the victor in the Indies, this might not be so bad After

all,

human freedom does

the salvation of

not

lie

exclusively in the so

highly praised political systems of the Western lands. Other institutions are

which may perhaps possess a greater effectiveness and a more appropriate character for the development of an Eastern society 174 also imaginable,

.

In 1923, Iwa Kusumasumantri, a law student in Leiden University,

Perhimpunan Indonesia. He was a close associate of Semaun, with whom he roomed for a time; in addition to moving the student group leftward, he became secretary and then

became chairman

of the

acting chairman of the SPLI. 175 After finishing his studies in 1925 he

went on Semaun’s urging at

to Russia,

where he studied and

later

one of the schools for Asian revolutionaries established

taught

in

Mos-

cow. 176 In addition, the Indies government charged, he worked for the Krestintem.

The Perhimpunan Indonesia did not frown on Soviet sojourn.

vember

8,

On

the contrary,

1925, expressing

its

its

its

ex-chairman’s

executive wrote the

ECCI on No-

appreciation of the Comintern position

on the national revolutionary movement and declaring:

The Board

Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Indonesian Union) a nationalrevolutionary Union of students coming from Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo etc.) authorize Mr. Semaoen and Mr. K. Soemantri to of the

represent and to promote the interests of our union with regard to the fight against the world-imperialism.

The Board

The student group able to represent

at

this

Perhimpoenan Indonesia

Boediarto,

president

Sartono

secretary

M. Hatta

treasury 177

Semaun and Iwa Kusumasumantri as Clearly, the organization had moved

thus saw both its

interests.

rapidly and far toward the trolled

of

point.

Its

left;

however,

members were 241

it

was not Communist-constrongly

inclined

toward

Rise of Indonesian

Marxism, partly because of the

intrinsic

Communism appeal of the Leninist explana-

tion of imperialism to revolutionary colonial intellectuals

and partly be-

cause the only Dutch groups with which they had meaningful political contact were Marxist. Moreover, the Comintern’s relatively pronationalist

Semaun carried student group) made the

stand (which

with the

alism and tion,

for

Communism

a good deal further in his dealings line

between revolutionary nation-

so blurred as to

be almost

illegible.

In addi-

only the Comintern seemed a likely source of international support

an independence struggle, support that seemed

all

the

more impor-

young people who saw revolution as their country’s only salvation but had little idea of how to go about it. Soon after Semaun arrived in Europe, the CPH executive announced it was forming a committee to improve cooperation between the Indonesian and Dutch proletariat. It was to formulate measures to exchange information, improve analysis of materials coming from Indotant to

nesia,

and carry out

activities

the Netherlands to support the

in

Indonesian struggle. 178 This was probably inspired by Semaun,

CPH appreciation

who

and activity for the Indonesian movement and who saw himself as head of an Indonesian Communist Representation (Perwakilan Kommunis Indonesia; Perkommind) in wished

to

improve

of

Europe. Meanwhile, however, Sneevliet was suggesting establishment

Moscow; it was to be situated in Holland and to consist of Communists there who knew the colony, and its principle purpose would be to advise the party in Indonesia. The two concepts emerged as one office, but they obviously arose from very different ideas and their conflict of purpose soon became all too of an Indies

Bureau

to the

Comintern

in

apparent.

The major product of the Indies Bureau/Perkommind was a periodical, Pandoe Merah (The Red Guide), which was to act as an organ of advice and support for the Communist movement in Indonesia. The journal, first issued in Amsterdam in May 1924, was edited by Semaun, Sneevliet, and Bergsma (the members of the bureau) and declared its purpose as follows:

When we

begin the publication of this

a dual task. In the in

first

Holland and those

place,

who

we wish

little

monthly organ,

we

set ourselves

to direct ourselves to the Indonesians

are interested in the

awakening of Indonesia,

in

order to inform them in another manner [than that provided by regular sources of information] about the important events which

ing of the

brown masses.

We

mark the awaken-

therefore appear as the defenders of the

242

s

International Relations

movement and desire to give and to the Communist element in

revolutionary popular

just

radical nationalist

this

dues both to the

movement.

It is

a

matter of course that in a land where, in spite of rapid modernization, no national bourgeoisie of significance has been able to form, extreme national-

Communism in the liberation movement. On the other hand, we wish through the publication of this organ to bring help to our brothers in the Indonesian movement, which we have followed with undimmed interest since our expulsion and which we have continued ism goes together with

to serve to the best of our abilities, in the

continued in spite of

shown

that our

all

hard struggle which they have

persecution and through which they have so clearly

movement

in that

country

is

not the creation of a few

persons but has developed out of economic relations there. that this aid can be of only very limited use, but

place in improving the contact of the Indonesian national

movement, and

if

we

We

are aware

succeed in the

movement with

first

the inter-

in the second place in contributing to the strength-

ening of the cadres in that movement,

we

feel that

we

will

have accom-

plished the aim of this journal. 179

Pandoe Merab’ history, in spite of its hopeful beginning, was brief and quarrel-ridden. As one Indies newspaper noted, the publication devoted itself more to denouncing European social democrats and the Netherlands Indies government than to discussing anything of practical use for the Indonesian

Communists. 180 In September 1924 the

government, apparently as a result of decisions for sharper anti-Communist action taken at a conference earlier that month, banned the import of the journal through the mails.

seamen found smuggling the organ rate of couriers

was

The arguments

also took to arresting

into the Indies,

so high that after a

Pandoe Merah decided

It

and the mortality

few months the

editors of

to give up. 181

that surrounded the journal reflected the serious dis-

agreement between

its

Indonesian and Dutch managers concerning the

Indonesian party’s strategy and their function in guiding

it.

We

have

Merah statement of purpose strongly supported To Sneevliet and Bergsma, however, this meant

seen that the Pandoe radical nationalism.

the Sarekat Islam, which they

still

regarded as the organization that

could best appeal to the Indonesian masses. all

desire to cooperate with the SI leaders

To Semaun, who had

lost

and who had seen the rapid

disintegration that followed the SI congress of 1923, such association

was unthinkable. Their quarrel was carried over into the Comintern, where, at the ECCI plenum of February/March 1926, Semaun bluntly declared: “To the comrades in Holland I would like to say: ‘do not try 243

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

to interfere in our tactics of leading the national

Sarekat Islam

onto our

etc.,

as very great

line,

movements

as the

changes have taken

place in the last few years in Sarekat Islam of which our Dutch com” 182

Semaun thought the future lay with radical secular nationalism, represented by the Perhimpunan Indonesia; as it happened, he was quite right. To the minds of his Dutch colleagues, Semaun was overly attracted to the student group’s rades

know

nothing/

For

his

own

part,

point of view; diey had not forgotten the rumors of heresy that had

surrounded

his return to the Indies in 1922,

and they accused him

of

nationalist inclinations. 183

The other aspect in the

of die quarrel concerned the role the

PKI

advisers

Netherlands were to play regarding the Indies party. Should

they be directors, advisors, or just a link with the Comintern? Should the expellees in the Netherlands form a branch of the Indonesian party

work from widiin die CPH? How great was the Dutch party’s responsibility for work within the Indonesian movement; should it only provide support, or should it also advise and there, or should they only

censure

when

it

felt

the

PKI had

fallen into error?

On

these questions

was deep and exceedingly bitter. This quarrel took place against the background of a Dutch Commu184 nist movement both weakened in numbers and riven by conflict. From behind theoretical barricades syndicalist, Trotskyite, and Centrist groups blazed away at each other, and it was not before 1930 that die party was reduced to peaceful if dreary Stalinist solidarity. Until 1925 the CPH was under the leadership of Wijnkoop and Van Ravesteyn, widi Sneevliet and most of the other Indies expellees in the left opposition. A conflict with the Comintern, which emerged during 1924-1925, led to the downfall of diis leadership, and Wijnkoop formed a CPH of his own in 1926. 185 Sneevliet, Schilp, and the revolutionary poetess Henriette Roland Holst now came to power, only to be sacrificed in 1927 to the Stalin-Trotsky feud; diereupon Sneevliet set up his own Revolutionary Socialist Party, which eventually allied with the the disagreement

Trotskyite Fourth International.

With

so

much

of

could not devote

its

energy absorbed in internecine warfare the

much

advantages, however, as

attention to Indonesia.

Semaun was quick

The

situation

CPH

had

its

to observe, for his position

and the expellees could be strengthened by currying favor with the Wijnkoop group. Accordingly, Semaun secured for against Sneevliet

Wijnkoop a post

in the

PKI Dutch

office,

244

and he

in turn

was provided

International Relations

CPH

with a place in the

Central Committee. 186 This was

strictly a

marriage of convenience, for the Dutch party chairman and his associates,

although they were considered to be otherwise on the right wing,

took a position on nationalism considerably to the

left of that

advo-

cated by the Comintern. Their analysis of the national question was

more akin

to that of

Rosa Luxemburg than

to that of Lenin: holding to

the orthodox Marxist view that the proletariat had no fatherland, they

did not wish to see the Communist struggle sidetracked by support of bourgeois nationalism. 187

Needless to say, the subject with Semaun,

the

PKI

CPH

who

component

to a

leaders soon

came

into conflict

on

this

feared that Wijnkoop was trying to reduce

of the

Dutch

proletarian

movement. 188 Their

quarrel was aired publicly at the Comintern congress of 1924, a meeting that also

saw Ho Chi Minh attack the French and Roy the

British

Communists for paying insufficient heed to the colonial movements. The Indonesian section of the ECCI report on its activities since the 1922 meeting remarked that the CPH “does very little for the support of the Communist Party of Java.” 189 No doubt Semaun, who was elected to the ECCI at the 1924 congress, had something to do with this unkind cut; Wijnkoop certainly did not, for he hastened to set the record straight:

We

think that the most important point

is

our attitude toward the Indian

We

have already achieved something in connection with this question. Already some years ago, we drafted the following program: complete emancipation of the Dutch East Indies from Dutch capitalism. And we [Indies] Party.

have this

to record considerable

program

achievements in the practical carrying out of

190 .

Nonsense, Semaun replied, the

Comrade Zinoviev was Parties

must work

right

CPH

had been no help

when he

in close cooperation

said that the

at all:

European Communist

with the Colonial Communist Parties.

Dutch Communist Party had been very active in the colonies, but this is not really so. If the movement in the Dutch colonies is strong, this is not due so much to the influence of the Dutch Party, as to the influence of the Russian revolution. In fact, the work within

Comrade Wijnkoop

asserted that the

Dutch Communist Party was greatly impeded by the dissensions within the Dutch Communist Party. When the railwaymen’s strike broke out in Java last year, the party was occupied in settling its dispute with the National Trade-Union Federation (N.A.S.). The strike ended in failure and scores of our comrades were imprisoned. Therefore, our advice to the Dutch the

245

Rise of Indonesian

Communist Party

is

that they

the Executive that they pay

De

work more

more

Communism energetically in the future,

and

to

attention to the colonies. 191

Dutch delegation replied with some heat to these accusations: “In connection with comrade Semaun’s statement that Wijnkoop exaggerated the influence of the Dutch party on the Indian movement and that it was in reality the Russian revolution which had influenced the movement, I will merely remark that already in 191 1— 1912 [sic] a number of Dutch comrades were very active in the Indian movement. Semaun himself acknowledged at various meetings that the Dutch Party had carried on a thorough and energetic agitation.” 192 Since both Semaun and Wijnkoop were members of the ECCI, we can well imagine that the Comintern was not allowed to forget the quarrel. Nor did it end with Wijnkoop’s ouster: at the ECCI plenary session of March 1926 Semaun again attacked the CPH for claiming much while doing nothing. The Dutch party spokesman indignantly replied that while the recently purged CPH had had its faults in handling the colonial question, its new leadership had an entirely constructive attitude which, if his Indonesian colleague would bring his head down out of the clouds long enough to look, he should easily be able to Visser of the

—

see. 193

Semaun’s attitude was by no means entirely small size,

its

poverty, and the fact that

bitter internal warfare, the

CPH

its

justified.

Considering

its

energies were sapped by

paid rather considerable attention to

compared with other European parties’ activities on behalf of their colonial comrades. This was partly because Indonesia occupied a much larger place in the Dutch cosmos than did any one colony of the other imperial powers; moreover, as Wijnkoop had acknowledged, the PKI was a more significant movement than the CPH at the time, and ex-members of the Indonesian party formed an influential bloc in the Dutch movement. The real nub of the dispute was not the quantity of CPH activity but its type. The Dutch Communist leaders viewed their task as providing advice and guidance to their younger and more inexperienced colonial comrades, whereas the Indonesians, and particularly Semaun, wanted material and agitational support but in no case the supervision reminiscent of colonial paternalism. The group most concerned with advising the PKI was the expellees,

the Indies, particularly

who found months

that the

after

CPH

did not offer them sufficient scope.

Semaun’s arrival

in

A

few

Holland, they accordingly broached

246

:

R ela tions

I ntern ational

the subject of establishing a

PKI branch

in the Netherlands. This, they

home

argued, would furnish a spiritual

for the Indies

PKI

resident in the Netherlands, represent

interests in

Communists Europe, and

provide guidance, which the ill-trained Indonesian leadership sorely

CPH

needed and which the

Semaun wanted was affairs;

sian party themselves.

eral feelings

tive

in

last

meddle

to

thing

in

PKI

touch with the Indone-

We may suspect that Semaun suggested the PKI his gen-

about the role of the Dutch of our

as a section of

body.

but they got

The

no doubt the Indonesian party leaders shared

About the proposal group

issue,

to give.

chance

to give the expellees a

he stalled on the

reply, although

was not equipped

We

comrades

Holland

in

to recognize

your [Semaun’s]

our party, having a mandate from us as our representa-

have discussed

this carefully

and

often. Organizationally

impossible to have a section of our party in Holland, because

have a brother party

Our

there.

decision

is

opinion that

it

weak and we cannot expect anything from is

already

thus not in favor of these

is

comrades’ (the Dutch comrades’) proposal. However, since

Dutch party

we

it is

it,

we know we are of

the

the

necessary to have a station of our party in Holland; this

depend on your remaining in Holland. If there are comrades who wish to become members of our party, please tell them to enter the Dutch one. It is not necessarily in our interest to give a mandate as our representative body to a section of our party in Holland; it is enough to give a mandate to one comrade. However, in case you are of the opinion that it is necessary for your work in supplying information to the

will

[CPH] parliamentary of old comrades;

you, and

As a that in

we

and so

power

you may create a body composed mandate in this question. It is up to

on,

give you our full

give you our full

of attorney 194 .

no PKI branch was established in the Netherlands. Note keeping the Dutch out without declaring expressly and uninterresult,

nationally that

cluded

we

fraction

all

it

did so because they were Dutch, the

also ex-

Indonesians resident in Holland

who wished

to join the

CPH

instead. This

was not

party and instructed them to join the

great significance during the period with which it

PKI

was an important

factor in the

we

of

are concerned, but

development of the Indonesian Com-

munist movement after the destruction of the legal PKI

195 .

The maneuverings between the CPH leadership, Sneevliet, the Comintern, Semaun, and the PKI would probably take chapters to describe if we knew them all. The few bits of correspondence available do, however, give some glimpses into the course of the battle. On Novem247

)

Rise of Indonesian ber

Semaun wrote

15, 1924,

Communism

a report to the Eastern Section of the

International in reply to a report sent that

on October retort

it is

to task.

29.

We

do not have

body by Sneevliet

Sneevliet’s account, but

(

Maring

from Semaun s

evident that he had taken his Indonesian colleague severely

He had

also apparently objected to the existence of both

Tan

and the PKI office in Holland as advisers to the Indonesian movement and suggested that only one be maintained, preferably the Dutch one. Secondly, he seems to have claimed that Semaun had opposed the association of the Amsterdam office with the Colonial Bureau in Paris, which had been established as a center for metropolitan work among the colonies in response to a demand by the Malaka’s Canton

office

(1924) Comintern congress that the European parties make a

fifth

Communist effort. In addition, he had objected to the Semaun- Wijnkoop deal and the banishment of Brandsteder from the Dutch office of the PKI. Finally, Sneevliet apgreater contribution to the colonial

parently opposed participation of the

VSTP

in the International Trans-

port Workers’ Federation (ITF), in which the Comintern, doggedly

pursuing the united front from above, hoped to ally the Communist

by the radical socialist Edo Fimmen. Semaun began his rebuttal by declaring that both the Canton and Dutch connections were necessary, the Chinese one particularly because of the large number of Chinese proletarians in Indonesia, which

transport unions and those led

PKI was

the

trying to bring under

had once been

all for

how

consistent of

was

also necessarv

.

.

.

its

influence. Sneevliet,

the China link, and

comrade

Sneevliet!

As

now he wished

for the

he noted,

to destroy

Dutch connection,

it;

that

because of the postal connection, the connection with our Javanese

sailors,

the political link, and other factors of considerable importance for

the revolutionary

ianism and

movement

on the condition that the sectar-

Dutch so-called “revolutionary” movement is Indonesia. Our PKI knows this very well, fortunately. Com-

left sickness of

not exported to

in Indonesia,

the

rade Maring, in wanting to destroy these two stations or one of them,

working against the

comrade Maring’s

interests of our

PKI, and

we

take notice of

this.

is

About

assertion that, contrary' to the advice of

comrade Rov, our bureau in Holland is not working in cooperation with the colonial bureau in Paris, I know nothing. I spoke with comrade Roy during the last congress in Moscow. He told me nothing about this; and later, when comrade Roy came to

Holland

illegally

Roy, also prominent

(and when, even more often, in

the colonial

his wife

came [Evelyn

Communist movement]), comrade Mar248

International Relations ing did not

me

tell

Roy was

that

there, so that

I

could not speak with him.

Comrade Maring talks about the Paris-Amsterdam connection, and yet he did not want to connect me with comrade Roy. Of course, I am eager to

—

have such a connection, not only with Paris but with every section of our International.

Warming

right over the

Semaun took up work of the PKI office:

Our bureau

Holland

to his subject,

in

questions handled tant

by

it

is

a communications bureau,

are thus technical

work the representative

right can only

be used

the matter of Wijnkoop’s veto

of the

and

and the most important

financial ones. In this impor-

Dutch party has no veto

right.

The veto

in questions of:

work (political) of the PKI in Holland, b. the work of the Dutch Party in Java. However, even on these questions the Dutch party can impose a veto only a.

the

until the Eastern

Section [of the Comintern]

[Maring’s] argument that the national

question against us ist

member

or

besides, there

is

is

decides the question.

movement

.

.

.

will use the veto right

Our bureau is a secret one and no nationalBudi Utomo will know anything about this;

nonsense.

of the SI or

the fact that in practice this so-called veto right

is

not at

all

important for the work of our bureau, so that even a nationalist will not be able to use this question against us

not at

if

he finds out about

it.

This question

is

Second-Intemationalistic or against the spirit of the theses of our

all

second congress. In any case, our PKI will remain independent from the

CPH, even

our PKI bureau in Holland; they will only be disciplined by

the Comintern, and are not willing to be dictated to by the

CPH

or

by the

Dutch comrade Maring.

Turning

to the matter of the

CPH’s work on the Indonesian

question,

Semaun continued: Until

now

the practice has been that comrade Wijnkoop received from

me

the written speeches about the colonial question which he presented in

parliament, and last October he reaction in Indonesia tions

on

from the opposition

rade Wijnkoop,

my

made an

interpellation in parliament

request. Until

in the

now

Dutch party

who was working together Ph.D. who knows every line

on the

there have been no objec-

to the colonial policy of

com-

with me. But comrade Van

by Karl Marx, etc., lives in Rotterdam and has had no connection with me; his mistakes were not the mistakes of our bureau. In the future there will be no

Ravesteyn, this

such mistakes, because

now

of the books written

our connections [with the

CPH]

via our bureau

and via the Central Committee of the Dutch Party will prevent it, connections which we did not previously have. Then we must consider the contents

249

Rise of Indonesian of our organ

Pandoe Merah.

organ should contain

It

was. decided by our last meeting that this

Indonesian language, so that the

articles in the

with the world movement

cal line presented there in connection

by me; Wijnkoop and the

Communism

is

politi-

controlled

others, not understanding the language, can thus

not use the veto right here.

It is

movement when [Maring]

as

true that

deviation

leftist

danger to our

a

is

the editor informs our Javanese comrades

about a Right Comintern and Trofmtern

who wish

make

to

a united front

with Amsterdam [the International Federation of Trade Unions] and so on, without explaining clearly our general tactic on

question.

this

And what

comrade Maring has written is law. For example: in the first number of our Pandoe Merah he wrote: “In Indonesia there does not exist a national capitalism, in spite of the fact that foreign capitalism has penetrated ex-

tremely rapidly.”

opposed

I

this conclusion,

analyzed the history of capitalism

in

being of the opinion

Indonesia

—

—having

that [national] capitalism

does not exist there precisely because of the fact that foreign capitalism has penetrated so rapidly, which fact national capitalism. But

made

impossible the normal growth of

comrade Maring did not want

taken point of view without argument, perhaps because sufficiently educated.”

ship of the

Now

it.

.

.

A

am

a dangerous one,

and

it is

his mis-

“politically not in the editor-

good that he has

.

about comrade Brandsteder, the Dutch knight

against the united front. rade.

I

change

— My experiment with comrade Maring

Pandoe Merah was

resigned from

to

I

who

sallies

have had quite some experience with

this

forth

com-

year long he kept our brochures in Holland and did not send them

Four months long he sent no money for Java, because he did not know how to send it perhaps because he has had practical experience in organizational questions. It was only when I was deported to Holland that I could take over this work, using my own methods of creating a connection to Java.

—

had asked many times for comrade Brandsteder’s support, but I received very little and often had to wait a long time for it. Our great comrade had so much to do, and the between Indonesia and Holland. In

this

work

I

brown Javanese could come back again at Brandsteder’s convenience. Such What support did comrade is the custom of the Dutch ruler in Java. Brandsteder give? Nothing more than to keep our own money safely and to put it in the Bank. My work among the seamen, building up an organization there, composing statutes [for the SPLI], etc., I had to do by myself. Our Brandsteder was supposed to arrange for the printing of our materials, and he brought them to a private printing firm and not to the Dutch party one, so that we got into trouble with the brother-party. We wanted our own money? Good, boy, come back again tomorrow. I have your money now, but I don’t want to hand it over, and tomorrow I shall decide. Understand

—

—

Semaun? This

sort of thing

has taken place

250

many

times in Holland, and

I

1 nternational

have had

to use all sorts of diplomatic

comrade. Oh,

would have

it

manoeuvres

anything from

to get

movement end my connection with him long

wasn’t so necessary for our

liked to

my

Sumantri,

if

Relations

in

this

Indonesia,

I

(Comrade

ago.

has also been in conflict with Brandsteder.) This

assistant,

Dutch comrade, who is so full of ruling-race-superior-fancy, worked only among the Dutch navy men and soldiers in Indonesia, does not speak Malay, and looked with disdain upon the brown masses, the very stupid coolie class. Yes, he was deported for his revolutionary activities, but his activity was on a Dutch basis. In place of the Dutch capitalistic governor general you have the Dutch dictator Brandsteder, and the Indonesians must recognize the superiority of Dutch leadership! Does comrade Maring think that I am so ingenuous as not to understand this and to devote myself like a slave to the Dutch? I thank him for it, but I am of the opinion that it is a very good thing that comrade Brandsteder is now discharged from our bureau. If he should come back there, our bureau would become a battlefield, with a very small capacity for work. Let him go and dictate to the syndicalist members of his own transport workers’ union, which has a very small number of Dutch seamen as members. This will be better for our work on behalf of the movement in Java, though perhaps not so good for comrade Maring’s efforts in his own behalf. Now about our railway trade union and Fimmen’s ITF. What is Maring

—

.

talking about? Until

now we have

.

.

waiting for instruction about this from the Profintem. opinion about the so-called “experiment” here.

General against the United Front Movement,

dangerous

to let the

this,

I

am

it

to

I

just

want

is

into the

in

our country

our trade unionism

is

ter of

PKI. this

our trade unions;

It is

is

show

is

the

Dutch is

its

Opposing

lines.

(2)

is

a histori-

the working class

and economic

political

it

the trade unions in

(1)

revolutionary;

doubly oppressed by the

imperialism, so that there

my

ITF because

be influenced along reformistic

of the opinion that the facts

why

to give

of the opinion that

Indonesia have been created by our political party, and so there cal reason

are

Comrade Maring,

young Javanese trade union

youthfulness will allow

we

not yet joined the ITF, because

policies of

an objective basis for the revolutionary charac-

(3)

the trade unions are led

therefore clear that our trade unions are

by members

of our

by nature revolutionary;

being the case, no reformist will be able to influence our trade unions

along reformist

work

inside the

lines.

On

the contrary, our young

Amsterdam

movement

will

[International] for our purposes.

be able

The

to

experi-

ence of our trade unionism has shown clearly that our party alone controls

movement, and the social democrats not one per cent. Why then does comrade Maring fear this danger? Well, he fears it because he is against the united front, and nothing more. It is very wrong of him to talk nonsense about Javanese trade unionism for his own ends while

75 per cent

of the labor

251

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Amsterdam danger. Let him guard himself from the sickness of leftism; it would be healthier for him! He would then be balanced in mind and would no longer try to destroy a decision of our third RILU congress, namely, to make me a declaring that he wants to protect our

member members it

of the Executive

Bureau of the

of our Profintern,

and

movement from

the

Profintern. His trade unions are not

—he wants

what

to dictate to our Profintern

should do.

Semaun continued

in this vein for

to fight with Sneevliet,

some

sorry to have

was

length; he

he declared, but the Dutch leader had unfortu-

nately fallen into error. Apparently, too, Sneevliet persisted in believ-

ing the

about

“lies

my

speeches” on his return to Indonesia and was

convinced that Semaun was immature. However, both he and the PKI

were well able young, but

movement

to take care of themselves: “Yes, our

it is

no longer a

little child. It is

is still

a strong young adult with

an independent character, which does not want

be a child of the

to

Dutch but only a child of Leninism.” Sneevliet, Semaun asserted, had written to the PKI denouncing him; fortunately, he too had written the party, informing it of Sneevliet’s plottings, and so the PKI was not taken in. 196 “In conclusion,” Semaun stated, “I propose you reject comrade Maring’s protest and not follow the proposals at the end of his letter. Please help us to keep every sectarian Dutch comrade away from the ranks of the Indonesian revolutionaries.”

A month

later,

on December

Moscow had decided

25, 1924,

197

Semaun wrote

in his favor in the quarrel

the

with the

PKI

that

CPH. 198

Whether it actually had is a question, since both Semaun and his Dutch opponents seem to have embroidered the truth when that served their side of the struggle. Meanwhile, the PKI had written to the Comintern on December 17 (presumably in connection with its just-concluded Jogjakarta conference), expressing

work

in

its

views on the

Holland. Apparently the message was not plain, for the

intern, in a letter of

Semaun wrote were Bergsma’s

May

5,

1925, requested clarification.

to the Indonesian party

Com-

On May

30,

denouncing what he claimed

intrigues against him, saying that

it

was a great

pity

that he did not have a clear authorization to handle the party’s Euro-

pean

affairs,

response to

its

and asking the PKI letter of

to write the

ECCI

as follows in

May 5:

The meaning of our letter, dated 17 December 1924, was only: 1. To demonstrate that comrades Semaoen, Malaka and eventually

new comrades, which we send probably from 252

other

Java, are our real representa-

.

International Relations

which we believe

tives,

to

work

in the interest of the

tern, thus also in the interest of the revolutionary

Red Trade Unions,

general (PKI, 2.

movement

in Indonesia in

etc.);

That consequently other representatives

can be only those comrades

Comintern and Profin-

who

are elected

in

Holland and somewhere

by comrades Semaoen

Holland can be elected; Bergsma, van Munster, Dekker, van Burink,

Malaka and other 3.

there

is

is

this

so that he

matter

very complicated, so

we

and that the revolutionary that we cannot be responsible for

too far from Indonesia

the detailed work of the

but in

etc.),

real representatives;

That Holland

movement

(in

Perkommind

believe in

Dutch movement and others, comrade Semaoen as our real representative, in the

responsible also for election of our second representative in the

is

Perkommind bureau Holland (comrade Bergsma was not elected by us as second member of that bureau, but elected by comrade Semaoen and we could agree with

Consequently as

it)

we have

not any objection against comrade Bergsma as long

he will work harmoniously with comrade Semaoen,

who

is

responsible for

everything in Holland before our party. 199 If

Semaun

seem

himself harassed by Dutch intrigues, the expellees

have considered themselves victims of

to

efforts.

felt

In June 1925 Sneevliet and the former

Dekker addressed themselves in desperation and Sugono at PKI headquarters in Java: Dear

to

his empire-building

VSTP

leader Harry

Tan Malaka

in

Canton

friends,

We

turn to you concerning the cause which

is

of such great importance

which we have given years of our lives, and which, although far from the scene of battle, we view with undiminished concern: the movement in Indonesia. for all of us, to

1.

Our

isolation.

We begin

directly with a bitter complaint about the fact

that we, through various circumstances, are completely isolated from the

movement. For some time no news has reached us other than reports from irregularly from the Sinar Hindia, later the the bourgeois papers and

—

—

Api. In spite of the fact that here in Holland there exists a so-called Indies

Bureau, in which Semaun, Bergsma and Wijnkoop (as representative of the

CPH)

a certain degree the is

Semaun in particular manages to keep us and bureau member Bergsma out of things. Why he does

are currently seated,

unknown

to us. If

it is

due

to the consideration that only Indonesians

to

so

must

un-Communist and in our special case is anything but comradely. It cannot be completely unknown to Semaun what we once were and still can be for the Indies movement. His attitude handle these

affairs, that is

absolutely

253

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

leaves the impression that the Indonesians (that

who

think the

way he

is

to say, the Indonesians

does) are grateful to the Indies Government for the

expulsions and forced resignations which have been employed against prominent Europeans in our

Dear 2.

movement.

Semaun

friends, the attitude of

The Indies Bureau. When

in this

Sneevliet

was

matter still

in

is

absolutely wicked.

Moscow

1923 and

in

1924, he suggested to the Eastern Section [of the Comintern] that for the

handling of Indies

affairs a

bureau be formed

rades acquainted with the Indies

agreed

The bureau was formed

to.

up the organization

of the

who were

Holland from those comThis was

living in Holland.

Semaun-Brandsteder-Bergsma;

of

seamen

in

in

it

took

Holland, in which at the beginning

Brandsteder rendered good services as a union man, and published the

Pandoe Merah,

The

originally

under the editorship of Bergsma, Semaun, and

was not taken with this and wished to have a say; and during the fifth world congress, which Dekker and Semaun attended for Java (on this occasion, too, Semaun kept comrade Dekker out of all discussions over the bureau), the Wijnkoop-Semaun combination managed to get comrade Brandsteder removed without redress from the bureau ( Brandsteder, who had been expelled from the Indies and who had done his work without recompense of any sort), and in place of him named Wijnkoop Sneevliet.

as third

leadership of the CPPI

member with

political questions

extraordinary privileges, even the right of veto in

concerning the Indies. To the great amazement of the

Semaun lent his cooperation in this. Semaun’s aim was clear: he calculated that Wijnkoop would not bother

British Indian Roy,

with the

affairs of

the bureau, and he intended to

work

forming of a

for the

one-man bureau, a Semaun-bureau. So far this has not yet been achieved, though Semaun’s attitude toward Bergsma proves that nothing is coming of the collective leadership. It

occurs to us that this effort does not have the support of responsible

Indonesian comrades.

On

the contrary,

we

are certain that they prefer

and thus mutual consultation. Even though it is understandable that Indonesian comrades act with reserve toward Westerners they do not know, and are not happy with their interference, we do not collective [action]

believe that they approve such an attitude toward those

who

them

clearly

at

the head of the

work

in

the Indies and

confidence of the comrades while there.

Semaun informs comrades who work. facts:

What

written above

We

do not

who know

in

stood with

had the

what manner

ask about us and about our place in the

however, an exact representation of the Semaun has systematically broken every connection between us and is

the Indonesian work; and

newspaper

articles

and the

is,

when he like,

praises us for our “former” services in

he makes himself guilty of one of

dishonesties.

254

his

many

International Relations

What

PKI and Sarekat Rakjat is just as true for the labor movement, the railway workers’ union, in whose development we took a considerable part. Repeatedly we ask Semaun for addresses, so that

we

could write ourselves.

never receive

It

He

and with such an attitude on

addresses,

we

true for our contact with the

is

letters directly

always claimed not to possess such his part

from your

made

it

us doubly sorry that

side.

occurs to us that the Indies Bureau would be able to do good work

if,

in

would be formed of persons nominated by the leading organs in Indonesia and the Eastern Section [of the Comintern], and further, that the comrades in Holland who are acquainted with the Indies be drawn into the work and that consultation with these comrades be provided

the

first

for.

We

place,

it

know very

well that the usefulness of such a bureau

limited at such a great distance; but

how

In

it

could be

Bureau has succeeded

far the

Indonesian seamen

is

naturally

much

greater than

in really building

unknown

to us.

We

is

up

it

always

now

is.

a union of

notice nothing here of

the activities of this organization. 3.

Semauns

policy.

The

Semaun gave on

presentation which

occasions was, in brief, this:

When

he returned

to Indonesia in

various

May

1922,

everything was, according to him, in a mess. But four months later every-

was

months there came, so far remarkable public appearance of Semaun which he now thing

in order. In those four

as

we know,

that

labels a tactical

manoeuvre and which at the time made a number of comrades wonder whether Semaun had suddenly changed his allegiance. As soon as he returned, everything was naturally fine. He uses unbelievable statistics for membership, particularly of the Sarekat Rakjat, and in general seems to us to 5. give a completely false picture of the real situation.

Moscow

A

short while ago

rejected his political policies, that nonsense with the substructure

and the superstructure and the alienation from the nationalist movement. We do not know in how far direct reports from the Indies and from Canton were

influential in this.

At the moment a

series of articles

from

his

pen are

appearing in the Tribune, inaccurate by their incompleteness, and apparently

aimed

Since

at praising his

own

Moscow disapproved

part in the

work

as highly as possible.

his political line there

is

a double reason

why

Indonesia should work to put a speedy end to the personal leadership of the Indies Bureau

and thus

to the one-sided information

provided by

this

Bu-

reau.

The Colonial Bureau, which concerns itself with the movements in English and French colonies, should extend its efforts to include the Dutch colonies, in which way a better control over policy regarding Indonesia 4.

could also be achieved.

Canton and Indonesia. Malaka can help

It is

to influence the

manner comrade Indonesia and at the same time

not clear to us in what

work

255

in

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

avoid that his advice does not at times differ completely from that which goes to Indonesia via Holland (a possibility which

is

not unimaginable).

There should be a connection [between Holland and Canton]. The

Canton seems like to

importance for various reasons, but

to us of great

know something more about

tie

with

we would

these matters.

At the same time Malaka would do us a great pleasure

and then inform us about conditions

in

if

he would now

South China. These change so

them without information from other

rapidly that one can’t keep track of

than newspaper sources. 6.

Information about Indonesia. First of

all,

we

appeal to comrades Su-

gono, Kadarisman, Subakat, Gondojuwono, and others to provide a system

we

by which

will periodically receive information

movement. [There then follows

a closely

about the situation

in the

typed page of questions regarding

the Indonesian situation which reveals that Sneevliet and Dekker were quite truthful in claiming that they

knew nothing about what had been going on

there.] 200

This plaint seems to have gone unheeded, for on August 25, 1925, the

PKI had

Semaun Amsterdam office was

executive answered the Comintern with the reply that dictated, 201

and

his

domination of the

assured.

Undoubtedly, .the whole Comintern, since

it

affair

was an enormous headache

reduced the value of

with the PKI very considerably.

Its

its

for the

most important connection

contacts with the Indies thus tenu-

ous and dependent on information supplied by the PKI’s strongly opinionated friends and relatives abroad, the International was unable to intervene effectively in Indonesian

Comintern took no great

affairs. Little

wonder,

too, that the

interest in the Indonesian question. 202

The

PKI was not the only party to badger the International with its feuds and deviations; because it was one of the most distant and little known, it doubtless also seemed one of the least important of Comintern adherents.

As

vliet for

one seemed convinced that they were a gross exaggeration.

dominated the Indonesian mass movement, who could be sure they were right? Snee-

The

for

its

representatives’ claims that the party

had neither a pressing reason nor a reliable basis for intervention. Thus lightly held, the Comintern rein was not sufficient to check the PKI. During 1924 the party took the bit between its teeth; two years later, it bolted. International therefore

256

Deviation

ALL

1924 had been a good year for the PKI.

in all,

It

had

clearly

bested the Sarekat Islam in the competition for popular support, had

expanded

its

mass organization considerably

in

West and Central

Java,

and had made marked progress in establishing footholds on the Outer Islands. Nonetheless, at the end of the year storm clouds gathered on

PKI horizon, and a special conference convened by the party December took place in an atmosphere of impending crisis.

the

Among

in

the signs of coming trouble were the development of Indo~

nesian anti-Communist organizations in certain areas, the appearance

competing radical groups here and there

of

minor but ist

in the countryside,

and a

SR units to undertake individual terrorintransigent Communist following was being eaten

rising inclination for

actions. 1

The

less

away by discouragement, while

the

more

irascible

PKI adherents were the existing order by

becoming impatient of the party’s failure to attack stronger means than words. Moreover, there was the very shaky state of party finances to consider. Although the PKI had abandoned its original promise to supply free propagandists to the Sarekat Rakjat and

was now requesting both SR and party branches cover

all travel

to

send money to

expenses with their request for an agitator, 2 the central

executive was beginning to run seriously into debt.

PKI

affairs

were

in this parlous state partly

because the rapid expan-

sion of the Sarekat Rakjat, to a considerable extent, did not

add

to

PKI

work among the urban proletariat but replaced it. The activists who had gone to work in the SR were in good part labor leaders whose unions had been hit by the VSTP strike and its aftermath, the virtual 3 collapse of the PKI Semarang-based network of labor organizations. Communist labor activity was dormant during 1923 and most of 1924, and the movement expanded outside the urban proletariat. This threatened the PKI’s proletarian character, and it created a serious financial problem for the party executive, since the unions were more 257

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

Pliable sources of funds than either the

SR

or the party branches

more successful in colmembers, both SI and PKI

themselves. Because labor organizations were

and contributions from their the early 1920s had drawn income from the unions rather

lecting dues

leaders of

monetary support, combined with the ties,

made

The loss of much of this added costs of far-flung activi-

led. 4

than from the political groups they

the central executive’s position increasingly precarious.

In addition, the party leadership was becoming increasingly con-

cerned by the attitude of the authorities. For some time Governor

General Fock had been under pressure from conservative opinion, reflected in the majorities in the Volksraad

and Netherlands parliament

and by the Minister of Colonies, to take additional measures against the Communists. Fock was, we will remember, a libertarian by inclination, and he had been reluctant to increase the number of sanctions at his disposal, though he applied the available ones much more strongly than his predecessors. 5 These weapons were, as we have seen, considerable. The government was empowered to restrict drastically the right of assembly when it felt the public order threatened, and in Jogjakarta, Surakarta, and Semarang this became almost a permanent state of affairs. Articles 155 and 156 of the Criminal Code gave it great leeway to restrict the freedom of speech and press. 6 In addition, the lack of habeas corpus in Indies law (which, like that of the Netherlands, was based on the Napoleonic Code) made it possible for the government to hold prisoners indefinitely on suspicion; this was increasingly used as a political weapon, so that major PKI leaders could usually count on spending several months of each year in jail." This greatly hindered PKI organizational development; moreover, when it was massively applied, as it

with the arrests of party executive members

in

October 1923,

could virtually paralyze the party central command. 8 Impressive as

it

was, this arsenal soon appeared insufficient to check

the revolutionary movement, and after the

Governor General was at his

move

command. The in the

tightened

its

new

VSTP

less reluctant to increase

law was the

antistrike

strike of

1923 the

the punitive measures

first

and most notable

direction; in the ensuing year the

government

also

supervision and restriction of “wild school’’ instruction,

refused various political leaders permission to reside in areas of their principal influence, introduced a passport system to curb the

ment

of political undesirables in the

immigration and residence

rules,

Outer Island

narrowed

25S

its

move-

areas, strengthened

conditions for recog-

Deviation nizing Indonesian organizations, stiffened

its

requirements for political

orthodoxy in public and private utterances by government

officials

and

teachers, increased the authorization necessary for the holding of public

meetings, encouraged the indirectly administered Outer Island re-

gions and Princely Territories to restrict political activity, and openly

contemplated drastic measures to control the Indonesian press. 9

Although these measures were aimed

in the first place at the

Com-

employed against other Indonesian political movements. Thus the non-Communist wild schools suffered as well as the SR system from restrictions on private education; Abdul Muis was refused permission to continue residence in his native West Sumatra (leaving the field free to the PKI, which he had been opposing there); the Sarekat Ambon and Sarekat Hindia were denied official recognition as political organizations; and the position of public servants with any but the most conservative political inclinations was made extremely uncomfortable. Although the proponents of stern repressive action stressed the foreign connections of the PKI they did so not to distinguish the party from the rest of the Indonesian opposition but rather to

munists, they were also

equate

all

outspoken dissent with revolution, hence with Communism,

and thus with

alien,

“unnatural” ideas used to arouse a basically con-

tented but unfortunately naive populace.

The government’s concept

of

was extremely broad, for in the Netherlands a rising spirit of nationalist possessiveness had by now effectively overwhelmed arguments for gradual emancipation: “We must

what was

potentially subversive

hold the Indies! Because welfare

is

Indies!”

10

so greatly

we

feel the ties of history!

dependent on the

Indies.

Opposition to colonialism was from

.

.

.

We

Because our

must hold the view

this point of

herently revolutionary, and non-Communist as well as

PKI

in-

critics of

by the growing official conviction “every propagandistic action which is directed toward or capable

the government were thus affected that

of leading to an

undermining of authority or a disturbance of the

public peace and order must be opposed disposal of the authorities.”

by

all

legal

means

at the

11

This attitude served to drive the Indonesian parties further toward

noncooperation, and in 1924 and 1925 both the Sarekat Islam and Budi

Utomo were shaken by debates on the wisdom of continuing Volksraad participation. The SI decided in 1925 to withdraw from the assembly and be noncooperative. Budi Utomo came to the same conclusion a year

later; it

soon reversed this policy but thus alienated

259

its

younger

a

Rise of Indonesian generation.

became

The PKI,

for

Communism

as the chief object of the

many non-Communists

government

attack,

a martyr in the popular cause;

moreover, the great alarm the authorities showed concerning the party

made

it

therefore

appear that the Dutch were mortally afraid of its

it

and that

strength must be far greater than appeared on the surface.

This was a principal cause of the steep rise in the Sarekat Rakjat’s

Utomo warned; 12 and the Communists, well aware of its usefulness in creating a bandwagon effect, emphasized the governmental dismay in their agitation among the common following during 1924, Budi

was a principal theme of a series of mass meetings sponsored by the PKI at the end of August 1924 to protest recent police measures and to call on the Comintern and the Dutch and Chinese Communist parties for support. 13 The August demonstrations were prompted by fear of new restrictions as well as objections to current ones. By mid- 1924 it was apparent to the government that ad hoc application of its legal weapons might maim but not destroy the Communist movement. Coordinated measures were needed, and the Governor General accordingly called high officials to his palace in September to confer on a campaign against the Communist movement. The meeting, which was secret, produced a series of directives calling on officials to take a sharper stand against public expression of unrest and particularly against orpeople. This

ganizations associated with the PKI.

The Governor

General’s conference caused the Communists’ hearts

—

ban on party activities move that was in fact under consideration. 14 The PKI was by no means in a position to go underground. It did not have the organizational cohesion necessary for effective illegal existence, and it would become immeasurably more difficult to attract and hold a mass following. Because of the extremely high illiteracy rate, the printed word was almost worthless as a means of communication with the SB rank and 15 the PKI therefore relied on its cadres and traveling propaganfile; dists to bring the word to the villages. The meetings they held could continue illegally only if they were much smaller (which meant an increase in their number, and thus in the number of trained propagandists) and if those attending them kept silence (which meant greatly improved discipline). Money, cadres, and discipline the PKI possessed in greater measure than had the Sarekat Islam, but even so the Comto skip a beat, for they feared a general

munists were scarcely rich in these resources. As the partv

260

itself re-

Deviation marked, the June congress directives, urging that work in the mass movement proceed in a manner that was both more disciplined and less likely to attract the

unfavorable attention of the authorities, had by

September nowhere been carried

The

out. 16

PKI response to the Governor General’s conference was sharply to reduce the number of public SR rallies, concentrating instead on informal gatherings either open to members only or involving a few persons at a time. To allow for public attendance at closed meetings, it was arranged that SR “membership” could be acquired simply by paying a small admission fee. This maneuver bore the danger that the Sarekat Rakjat, hardly tight-knit to begin with, would become an audience rather than an organization. This tendency was somewhat offset, however, because SR members were often treated unfavorably by the local authorities, particularly in the rural areas, where village heads had considerable personal contact with and control

first

over the people under their jurisdiction. Since the police checked

membership cards

at

meetings and wrote

reduced substantially the number

who

down names,

probably

this

took out membership cards

without intending to participate seriously in the movement.

new

On

the

was that Communist propagandists reached fewer people but worked more inwhole, a government report noted, the result of the

among the audience they did on SR membership and meetings

tensively than before

The new

tactics

gap measure,

for there

was every reason

tactic

obtain. 17

constituted a stop-

to believe that the govern-

ment’s next step would be to act against the closed meetings as well.

The Communists, although they asserted that the Governor General’s conference merely showed how afraid the authorities were, admitted in the same breath that the future of the party was in grave peril. The PKI press continued to declare its opposition to terrorist actions and to underground work, which it prophesied would lead to a breakdown in the central executive’s control, particularly in the crucial area of

nance. At the same time, however,

it

warned that government policy and revolution, using arguments

was forcing the PKI toward illegality reminiscent of those employed by the VSTP leadership

as

stand from opposition to support of the ill-fated railway

The PKI executive met on September 27 tion.

fi-

it

shifted

its

strike. 18

to 28 to discuss the situa-

After this conference, the party announced that, as a result of

would no longer work to expand the mass movement but would instead intensify its work among the proletariat,

government

restrictions,

it

261

Communism

Rise of Indonesian particularly in plantation, enterprises.

A few

days

rail,

later,

communications, harbor, mining, and

the party leadership wrote to

its

oil

branches

urging them to develop their labor union work and to consider the possibility of replacing the existing

SR

sections with

PKI branches. 19

This decision, involving a drastic change in the movement’s structure

and

activity, reflected a shift in

power within the PKI executive

to a

group led by Aliarcham, which wished to see a purely proletarian action aimed at preparing a revolution. Just where Darsono stood on the matter

is

not clear, although since he spoke out against

congress three months

later, it is

it

at a party

probably safe to assume that he did

become notably less Batavia when party headquar-

not sponsor the move. Darsono had, however, active in

PKI

affairs;

he did not move

to

were transferred there, and during the latter part of the year he was not often in Semarang. The authorities speculated that he was withdrawing from the public view to avoid internment; 20 it is also ters

possible that his position in the

the ensuing year

it

is

PKI

was on the wane,

leadership

increasingly difficult to observe his influence on

PKI policies. The executive’s recommendations were not without in the party.

So strong were the objections, in

withdrawn on October be discussed

for in

12,

at a special

their

opponents

fact, that

they were

was announced that the issue would conference to be held in December. 21 This and

it

meeting convened from December 11

Kutagede, a suburb of

to 15 in

was attended by 96 delegates from 38 PKI sections, representing 1,140 members, and from 46 SR branches, representing 31,000 members. 22 The party executive presented a plan to jettison the Sarekat Rakjat in favor of purely proletarian activity. The proposal was defended by Aliarcham, who was a graduate of teachers training school and an ardent theoretician. It was this interest in doctrine, Alimin later charged, that led him astray: “Because at that time Aliarcham did not have a sufficiently deep understanding of Marxist concepts and the ways of putting them into practice, he clung stubthe city of Jogjakarta;

it

bornly to the basic principles of Marxism.

.

.

.

Aliarcham was unable

Marxism according to the conditions prevailing in Indonesia at that time.” 23 The PKI chairman was also an extremely principled and courageous man, who, as he was later to demonstrate in exile, was

to utilize

willing to maintain a position literally to the bitter end.

Aliarcham’s character and interests

made him an unbending oppo-

nent of those elements in the party he considered inclined to compro-

262

Deviation mise

in

the

anti-imperialist

moreover,

struggle;

his

opinion

was

by the now very real prospect of the mass movement’s collapse under increasing government pressure. If the Communists were to live up to their principles and choose revolution instead of political silence, Aliarcham declared, they would have to change their policies radically, especially as far as the Sarekat Rakjat was concerned. That

bolstered

organization possessed imposing proportions but value, for class:

its

little

revolutionary

peasant members held the petty bourgeois values of their

they only considered their immediate economic interests, had no

concept of the Communist purpose, endangered the party’s proletarian

and were

up in despair or go over into terrorism. The SR was too bulky and too undependable to organize illegally; at the same time its public existence meant open gatherings and hence an opportunity for the authorities to arrest Communist character,

all

too inclined to give

leaders for their antigovernment statements.

In addition to these strategical considerations, Aliarcham continued,

the party must realize that

its

attempt to organize the masses had been

Communist party was after all supposed to concern itself with the proletariat and not with the peasantry. The party should instead work on the organizations it had neglected so shamefully since 1923 the revolutionary labor unions. Here the Communists would be in their own element; they could organize without such a great risk of government reprisal, and they could form a discidoctrinally incorrect, for the

—

plined machine with a secret, insurrectionary character. Henceforth the party’s for

work

in the labor

movement should concentrate

economic ends but on preparation

not on strikes

for revolution, for insurrec-

The peasant masses were not in themselves a revolutionary force and would be roused to rebellion only when the uprising was clearly under way; hence, the object of the PKI must be to create a proletarian revolt, the momentum of which would be so powerful that it would sweep the peasantry along with it. 24 It has been claimed that a major consideration behind the PKI executive recommendation was the program laid out by the fourth Comintion

must be led by the

tern congress

and the

proletariat.

Pacific Transport

Workers’ Conference, which

in

June of the same year had urged on the Communists greater proletar2 ian purity and increased emphasis on revolutionary trade unions.

'’

According little

to

part in

Darsono and Alimin, 26 international opinion played very the debate on the Sarekat Rakjat; however, the PKI con-

gress did consider the decisions of those meetings,

263

and since the ques-

Rise of Indonesian tion

is

Communism

an important one for understanding the subsequent relationship

PKI with the Comintern, we shall here review the advice they expressed in order to see what further light it sheds on the subject. The Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference undeniably emphasized the organization of the proletariat understandably so, for it was originally a Profintern project and was intended to deal specifically of the

—

with labor unions. At the meeting, the representatives of the Chinese railway workers’ union were hostile to the alliance with the Kuomintang,

and were supported by the Indonesian delegates, Alimin and

Budisutjitro.

The

Profintern representative,

radical inclinations of his organization

Leo

Heller, expressed the

by holding up the Indonesian

and Chinese railway union delegates as the really revolutionary element at the conference, but Comintern spokesman Voitinsky charged them unfavorably with forming the “left wing” of the meeting. The Indonesian delegates, he noted, “gave a cold and dubious reception to the declaration of the responsible representative of the Kuomintang Party, who called upon the workers to form a united front with the peasantry and intellectuals, but not under the hegemony of the proletariat.” Eventually, they were persuaded to join in the conference appeal for a united front, but they insisted that such an alliance must be “under the leadership of the real revolutionary organizations in which there is sufficient Communist influence.” 27 Comintern opinion at the Canton conference was thus to the right, not the left, of the PKI delegates’ stand. It should be noted, however, that the Indonesians objected not to the type of relationship the party

enjoyed with the Sarekat Rakjat but to the one Sarekat Islam

—

in other

it

had had with the

words, to the bloc within. They did not protest

cooperation with organizations the Communists controlled, and the

conference

itself

made

it

clear that

work with

the nonproletarian

masses was essential:

Such organized struggles historical period

when

of the colonial peoples against imperialism in this

the proletariat, organized in revolutionary parties

and led by a revolutionary center against the strongholds of capitalism, necessitates the formation of militant peoples’ parties in the colonies, consist-

ing of workers, peasants, intellectuals and nonpropertied classes in the

Such

parties will not only unite the struggling forces for

cities.

independence inside

movements of the East in contact with the world revolutionary labour movement. Toiling masses of the East! We call upon you to assist in the organization the colonies, but will also bring the national revolutionary

of peoples’ parties for the struggle against imperialism 28 .

264

Deviation

The equivocal wording

which did not make clear be under Communist control,

of this declaration,

whether the popular parties were

to

may have been a concession to leftist opinion at the conference, or it may have originated in the demand for Comintern-sponsored “people’s which currently formed a minor theme in the Comintern’s Asia program. The International seems to have adopted this line on the

parties”

urging of those revolutionaries

who

feared putting

all their

become a major point

eggs in the

program for the East, very likely because the top Comintern leaders were not at heart convinced the Communists could themselves organize mass movements that extended beyond the proletarian class; therefore, they bourgeois basket;

it

did not

in the

preferred to rely on alliance with non-Communist mass groupings. In

any event,

Canton conference did not want abandon work among the nonproletarian masses; on the contrary, manifesto clearly approved SR-type organizations. There

is

it

is

clear that the

to its

no evidence that the Indonesian delegates, returning home

afterward, represented the Transport Workers’ meeting as opposed to the Sarekat Rakjat. Alimin objected to Aliarcham’s proposal at the De-

cember meeting, and the tjitro faithfully

he and Budisu-

existing account indicates that

repeated the Canton recommendations of support for

nonproletarian movements, together with

its

call for

increased labor

union work. Alimin was reported to have described the conference’s principle topics as follows:

(a)

The of

unity of the transport workers in the whole of Asia, the strength

which could be employed

action

(b)

as a

weapon when

the time for radical

had come;

cooperation with

all political

movements

of a revolutionary nature in

the whole of Asia, in order to rebel against Western and Eastern

imperialism by force, in which connection

—according

to the speaker,

Red Eastern Labor [Secretariat] of which Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka was also a member, had been established in Canton. This body was designed to maintain the link between the transport workers’ the

associations, in particular those of the

dockworkers and seamen

in Asia, viz.,

China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, India, Singapore, Siam,

The communists should not, however, confine themselves to working among the dockworkers and seamen (though these should be canvassed first

etc.

and leading positions among transport workers, industrial workers, and miners, in order to be prepared at the outbreak of war in the near future in Asia and the Pacific,

and foremost), but should

also try to obtain influence

when America and Japan would be

the

first

265

belligerents 29 .

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

Budisutjitro discussed the conference recommendations concerning co-

operation with non-Communist movements and reportedly said that,

although the Kuomintang and the Philippines independence movement

were

Communists should Communism championed the struggle

largely bourgeois nationalist in character, the

support them inasmuch as

against imperialism as well as capitalism. For this reason, he declared,

the Javanese delegation to the Canton conference had stated

ingness to cooperate with

Asian revolutionary movements, regard-

all

whether they had a Communist character. 30

less of It

thus seems most unlikely that the Pacific Transport Workers’ Con-

ference, concerned as

it

was

for proletarian action, inspired the aban-

doning of the Sarekat Rakjat. fifth

its will-

Much

the

Comintern congress, which opened

in

same may be

said of the

June 1924. At the time the

apparent success of Communist policy in China and the

stirrings of

revolt elsewhere in the East contrasted sharply with the stagnant condition of the revolution in Europe; as a result, the International’s inter-

was rekindled, and

est in Asia

attempted to make up for previous

it

The theme

neglect of the East

by elaborating

the

recommendations was stated by the Comintern

International’s

its

colonial program.

of

chairman before the meeting began:

The

task of the Fifth Congress will consist in working out

more concretely

the application of the national policy of the Comintern in various countries,

and especially

in the countries of the

gle for national

tionary talism.

independence

movement The proper

is

East and the Colonies where the strug-

developing more and more into a revolu-

directed against the domination of international capisolution of the national question will help

all

parties to

win over the masses to our side. It is the national and agrarian questions that most of all distinguish the Comintern from its predecessors, the Second International conditions,

and even the

raised

these

First International, which,

questions only in an

owing

to historical

abstract manner.

Without

solving the national and agrarian questions in the spirit of Leninism, the

Comintern cannot win over the majority latter,

As

we

cannot enter the decisive

usual,

movements.

M. N. Roy opposed “It is true that

it

and without doing the

battle. 31

close relations with

we must

these national movements, but

of the toilers

non-Communist

always have a connection with

seems

to

have been overlooked that

these connections have not always been successful,” he pointed out.

“What practical results has our connection with the national liberation movement had hitherto? None, except in the one or two cases where a 266

Deviation

Government has had

nationalist State State.” 32

Not surprisingly

in

friendly relations with the Soviet

view of the current success of the Chinese

bloc within, the International did not share his views but proclaimed favor of cooperation with nationalist revolutionary

itself heartily in

movements.

The Asian left.

discussion therefore gave

However,

keyed

in

its

little

grounds for a turn to the

general policy recommendations, which were

to the situation in

Europe, the congress took a

much

less san-

guine attitude toward alliance: In view of the danger of the “right” aberrations, which were revealed in the application of the tactics of the united front to a far larger extent than could

be anticipated, the Executive rejected as an opportunistic interpretation any attempt to construct the tactics of the united front into anything more than

method of agitation and mobilization of the masses, as well as any attempt to make use of the slogan of “workers’ and peasants’ government” not for agitation in favour of the proletarian dictatorship, but for a coalition of bourgeois democracy 33 a revolutionary

.

Both the

fifth

Comintern and concurrent third Profintern congresses

emphasized the need the

Communist

to increase labor

parties

union work and to “bolshevize”

by strengthening

their proletarian orthodoxy.

This lent an air of radicalism to the meetings, though the Interna-

were based on a conservative assumption, namely, that an uprising in Europe was no longer likely and that the Communists’ best hope for success lay in long-term infil-

tional’s

motives for urging

this action

non-Communist labor movement, a process that demanded both increased concentration on the proletariat and the

tration of the

guarantee of orthodoxy in the parties themselves.

We could reasonably suspect that this

stress

on proletarianism might

have influenced the PKI’s decision to reject its nonproletarian base, had not the congress specifically endorsed the SR. The Indonesian case

was brought up by Manuilsky in the keynote address; he noted with approval Communist participation in the “workers’ and peasants’ party Dutch East Indies” (which he appeared to consider an outwardly independent unit with which the PKI was cooperating as a bloc within ). 34 The objection that the SR might infect the party with a petty bourgeois spirit was not without foundation, he acknowledged; it in the

was a problem Thus the

that generally confronted Asian Communists:

sections [of the

Comintern

in Asia]

are faced with a two-fold

danger: the danger of ignoring the phenomena which are revolutionizing the

267

Rise of Indonesian and the danger of losing

East,

we

petty bourgeoisie;

Communism

their character

by collaboration with the

are faced with the question not only of revolutionary

Com-

collaboration in existing parties of this kind, but of the advisability of

munists taking the initiative in organising such parties in countries with a

low standard of economic development

35 .

In attacking questions of this type, Manuilsky charged, the Asian

Com-

munists had generally erred on the side of caution. They had ap-

proached collaboration with other classes “with great timidity,” with

many

the result that in tion

movement which

cases

“we

lose control over the national libera-

passes into the hands of the native nationalist

elements.” As for the danger of falling into petty bourgeois error,

Manuilsky stated optimistically that the International hoped to counter this its

tendency by supervising more closely the day-to-day

activities of

Asian adherents, principally by improving contact between the colo-

nial

and metropolitan

There

therefore

is

parties. little

reason to suppose that the Comintern

spired the abandoning of the Sarekat Rakjat

—unless,

in-

of course, the

Indonesian delegation reported Comintern opinion back to the PKI in

way

such a

as to

was Indonesia’s fifth

imply

its

disapproval of the SR. Semaun, however,

Comintern conventions

30 .

He was

hardly one to take a narrowly

proletarian line or to reject the Sarekat Rakjat, sored;

and

and

principal representative to the third Profintern

this attitude

was apparent

which he had spon-

in the report

he wrote to the PKI

about the Comintern meetings. Semaun outlined both the

ECCI

tude on cooperation with nationalism and Roy’s objections to

atti-

it;

he

then described the congress decision in favor of increased collaboration

with non-Communist groups and the intention deviation

by advising more

to avert the

danger of

closely the activities of the Asian parties.

The International approved the Sarekat Rakjat, he reported; in fact, it had decided to set up similar mass organizations in other colonial countries, including India 37 .

The ECCI,

to

which Semaun had

just

been

elected, held a plenary

he reported, the colonial question was further discussed and a resolution on the Far East was drawn up. The declaration reaffirmed the need for the Communists of session following the fifth congress; there,

and participate in mass anticolonial movements. “In meet this need,” he asserted, “the Communist parties in the countries must bring about a campaign for unity which will

that area to form

order to colonial

gather together the workers, peasants, petty merchants, intellectuals

268

)

:

Deviation

and

women

manner

ECCI

common

in

opposition to the foreign capitalists (in the

Semaun

resolution,

which read

in part as follows

producing good

is

The

reported, contained a section on Indonesia,

The Indonesian Communist Party which

38

of the Radical Concentration in Indonesia in 1923

the working class

already following a correct policy,

is

results, in that

movement and

it

has attempted to gain control of

and control over the

to secure its influence

mass peoples’ movement, the Sarekat Rakjat.

While accomplishing

movement its efforts

this

purpose and achieving

its

leadership of the mass

for national independence, the Indonesian party

must continue

and lead workers’ and peasants’ groups them toward a class struggle. 39

in

to organize

as to orient

While thus noting the correctness

such a

of the general line followed

way

by the

PKI, Semaun suggested far-reaching changes in the party structure that

he held were

in line

with the Comintern congress decisions. 40 The

Semaun reminded, had decided

International,

Communist

that

parties

over the world should be organized on a place-of-work basis rather

all

had been frequently employed and which the PKI had heretofore used. This would greatly alter the nature than on the

bases

territorial

tiiat

of the party’s local units; since the place-of-work principle could oper-

ate only in industrial areas, the

be organized

two

in

based party units

Communist movement would have

different ways,

in the villages

to

maintaining both territorially

and factory-based PKI

cells in

the

cities.

The Communist to

have

must therefore

their groups in the factories

Our party

We

Parties

in

bear

drastically reshape themselves so as

and no longer on a

Indonesia must also reorganize

in

itself in this

village or city level.

manner.

mind, however, that the majority of the Indonesian people are

them there can he no group other than a village-based party. The groups of peasants who have become members of the Sarekat Rakjat must therefore continue to he located in the villages. However, it must be otherwise with our workers’ groups in the cities. In the cities the

still

peasants,

and

for

kampung [neighborhood] committees of our party should organize their working class members into party or Sarekat Rakjat groups in their factories or other places of work. 41

Contact between the factory-based workers’ groups and the ally

territori-

based units of peasantry and petty bourgeoisie would not occur

below party

officials of

the intermediate level,

269

Semaun

explained, and

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would prevent the proletarian core of the PKI from being diluted by elements from other classes that had attached themselves to the party. Having thus dealt with the problem of preserving party orthodoxy, he turned to the Sarekat Rakjat, which he asserted should remain the mass base of the Communist movement. Greater attention should be paid to agrarian policy, and a central peasant organization should be created with committees in every SR unit to ensure that peasant interests were apprehended and treated with sympathy by the party. 42 Clearly, then, Semaun did not contemplate abandoning the nonprolethis

tarian masses.

The PKI

executive thus seems to have adopted

independently;

it

did

so,

its

SR

stand on the

moreover, knowing that the Comintern ap-

proved the Sarekat Rakjat. The PKI leaders had had plenty of time

to

absorb the content of the Communist conferences, for Alimin and Rudisutjitro returned to the Indies not long after the

Canton meeting

(on July 20 the former spoke to the pawnshop workers’ union on the conference decisions). 43 Semaun ’s report on the fifth Comintern con-

was published in the journal of the PKI office in Holland, Pandoe Merah, in September 1924. 44 Significantly enough, it was not printed in the party newspaper Api until February 1925. 45 It had certainly been available to the PKI before that, for it had been printed earlier in a West Sumatra Communist journal, 40 and its suggested reorganization of the party on a place-of-work basis had been discussed before the Kutagede conference and was officially inaugurated by that meeting. Moreover, the opponents of Aliarcham’s proposal brought up Semaun’s report at the conference: had not the International’s fifth convention decided that the Communists must cooperate with nonproletarian elements, and had it not approved the PKI relationship with the Sarekat Rakjat? 47 This was the only reference the party newspaper account of the Kutagede gathering made to Comintern opinion being used in debate; and we will note that it was introduced by the

gress

opposition. Although the party executive certainly did not state

such,

its

program

in effect rejected the

Comintern

line,

and

it

it

as

was

accordingly a step of the gravest importance.

The

executive proposal

the delegates objected to

was not unopposed; indeed, the majority it.

48

of

Interestingly enough, the center of op-

was not the more rural segments of the party but Europeanminded Darsono and the proleterian Semarang branch of the PKI. 49 However, the opponents of the executive proposal did not disagree position

270

Deviation with the claim that the

and

that

it

SR was an

would eventually have

unreliable, petty bourgeois element

to go;

what they objected

to

was the

timing. If the party cut itself off so quickly from the Sarekat Rakjat,

they argued,

it

could lose

its

connection with the masses,

who might

would be an unnecessary and unfortunate loss, for not only had the Comintern declared for cooperation with the petty bourgeoisie, but in Indonesia conditions were particularly favorable to such cooperation: the Indonesian petty bourgeois had no opportunity to enter the great bourgeoisie, which was composed of foreign minorities, and hence he was a candidate proletarian and not a candidate capitalist. The executive argument that activity in the Sare-

revert to the Sarekat Islam. This

kat Rakjat drained the party’s strength was, the opposition thought,

exaggerated: the activists

who had gone

to

work

labor leaders and not organizers from the party

unions were recovering, these people would

normal the

field of activity.

SR would,

whom

To hasten

this

SR were former itself; now that the

in the

back into

drift

their

process by suddenly abolishing

they argued, result in a number of unemployed agitators

would have to find work or funds for support. 50 In the end, the two viewpoints compromised on a more gradual realization of the party executive’s wishes: the Sarekat Rakjat was not to be abandoned immediately but was to be maintained, without adding new members, until its adherents had been winnowed out. Those current SR members who took a special course on Communist theory and otherwise proved themselves worthy would be taken into the PKI itself, and the rest would either drop out of themselves or join a Communist-led agrarian cooperative movement, which was thought more

for

the party

suitable to their unrevolutionary spirit. 51 In this

way

the Sarekat Rak-

would die a slow but natural death, while the PKI doubled its size (to some 3,000 members), with which army it would attack the governmental Goliath. 52 “The conference’s decision was certainly a wrong jat

one,” the PKI’s foreign advisers later charged, “since

it

did not furnish

a proper line of policy for the development of the national-revolution-

ary movement, in order to mobilize the oppressed native middle class for a struggle against imperialism; nor did

good

relations

it

indicate a

way

of effecting

between the proletarian movement and the peasan-

try.” 53

This decision was by far the most controversial one taken by the

was not the only important one. A new and Aliarcham was replaced by the West Java

Jogjakarta conference, but

executive was elected,

it

271

Rise of Indonesian

PKI leader Sardjono. According

Communism

to Darsono, Aliarcham’s

removal was

connected with his extreme stand on the Sarekat Rakjat. However, the

official

reason was that Aliarcham was expecting to be imprisoned;

he had been convicted of overstepping the press laws and was currently free

pending appeal. This may well have been the motive

(Aliarcham went to

jail

in

January 1925 for

six

months), although the

prospect did not prevent the party from naming him head of

central

same token, howAliarcham’s stand could not have been very great,

labor organization just after the conference. ever, disapproval of

By

its

the

were seen as forming the center of future party activity. He was replaced by vice-chairman Sardjono, who had been a teacher in the SI school system and the leader of the Sukabumi Red SI. Sardjono had played a prominent part in making the Priangan area of West as the unions

Java a center of Communist activity, and a government oberver at the

March 1923 PKI/Red

commented on

SI congress

his outstanding ora-

and remarked that some said his ability to sway a meeting approached Tjokroaminoto’s. 54 He did not give much evidence of such tory

talent as party chairman, however, possibly to avoid incarceration.

The PKI

also took note of

the heavy burdens of

its

its

financial condition, which, considering

envisioned program, was clearly a sickly one.

Therefore, in spite of the conference’s emphasis on the need for ideological training, ical journal,

decided

it

and

to

to dissolve

abandon Soeara

CORP,

Ra’jat, the

party theoret-

the central organization for revolu-

tionary propaganda. 55 Party

and SR dues were raised, and a new budget for the central executive was drawn up. Its projected income was a minimum of /1,000 a month, of which /400 was to go for administrative expenses, /400 for the payment of propagandists, and /200 for a strike fund. Members of the executive were to receive /30 to /35 a month and propagandists / 10; 56 since this was an inadequate income for people

was presumably to be suppleunion heads, journalists, and so on.

on their economic

mented by earnings as The Kutagede conference

level,

also

tionary intelligentsia, a necessary

it

adopted a resolution on the revolu-

move

since the

first

nationalist “studv

clubs” were then being formed in the Indies: 1.

Foreign imperialism can rule over a colonial possession as long as

can draw to

itself

it

a part of one of the classes from the population of that

colonized land: that part must have or be capable of having political and

economic influence over the

class

which supports the

the exploited group.

272

society; that

is,

over

Deviation In the beginning the class which was used in Indonesia as the intermediary between the exploited people and the exploiting foreign imperialism was

With the disappearance of the influence of this class, the group of the intellectuals was drawn to and used by imperialism as a means for the exercise of its suzerainty here. Through the

the class of the ningrats [nobility].

weakness of the

class of the native bourgeoisie, as well as

pressure of foreign imperialism and capitalism gentsia here to take a unified stand intelligentsia

—namely,

and

open the way

to

it

was

through the heavy the

difficult for

intelli-

program

to carry out their

for a native capitalism

as

(national

bourgeoisie). 2.

The

revolutionary character of the intelligentsia as a class

based on anti-imperialist nationalism, which urally 5.3.

in these

necessarily

is

[colonies]

must

nat-

combat Western imperialism.

In the late capitalist period the capitalist economic circumstances have

everywhere driven the

intellectuals

resulted in the intellectuals

into

economic

which has

difficulties,

becoming revolutionary, even though

their revo-

lutionary character has no definite direction. 4.

As a

result of

intellectuals proletariat,

the economic pressure which has been laid on the

and which placed them

many

circumstances

it is

in the

same

social

position as the

them developed a proletarian attitude. Under these the duty of the Communists to attract these elements to

of

movement. At meetings, in propaganda, newspapers, pamphlets, etc., the Communists must draw the intellectuals to them through convincing them that freedom (independence) and the new society, which will be capable of

their

giving the intellectuals the place they deserve, can only be achieved through the class struggle, which

is

being fought by the proletarians against the

capitalists. 57

The most important conference decision, however, was to prepare for rebellion: “Concentrate and shape the passions of the revolutionaryminded people that they become a single, passionate desire for power!" the party workers were urged. 58 The last issue of Soeara Rajat, which was devoted to the meeting, declared that since nothing further was to be gained by legal revolutionary action, the party must attempt revolt. The urge to power, it asserted, must be felt by the population as strongly as the urge to eat; it must become a fire that would consume capitalist oppression in

congress, Aliarcham ize the

PKI

its

revolutionary blaze. 59 In his address to the

had placed great emphasis on the need

for this role, arguing that

it

to reorgan-

should develop an

illegal

organization but at the same time oppose individual terrorist actions,

273

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

which would only compromise the major revolutionary effort. Accordingly, the meeting decided to form groups of ten men, gathered under an experienced party member. These cells would exist sub rosa and

would be connected with each other only on the leadership level. When sufficiently trained, each member would gather ten men under him, and in this manner party organization and influence could spread without public notice. 60

At the same time that

abandoned the principle

it

took up the ten-man system, the party

of democratic centralism. Previously all im-

portant questions confronting a the central party executive for

mined

SR section had to be referred to decision. Now, however, it was deter-

PKI

or

that a local unit could act independently, without informing

party headquarters, so long as

its

decisions

were

in line

with the PKI

and by-laws. 61 The new system, “federative centralism,” was a sharp departure from normal Communist practice, and the party eventually regretted it bitterly. It is not entirely clear just why the PKI undertook this step; we have noted, however, that the power of the constitution

leading branch of the party, and with

it

the authority of the central

command, had been eroded, and it may have been that such a grant of autonomy was necessary to put over the executive’s controversial program. Moreover,

it

may

well have been diought

branches desiring greater freedom of action

—or argued, by those

— that

a system of close

supervision was too unwieldy,

what with poor communications and growing government interference. The VSTP was similarly reorganized in 1926, and the reason was given that its executive was so restricted by the authorities that the organization might collapse if it were too dependent on its central command. 62 This combination of illegality and decreased supervision did not encourage the disciplined preparation for revolution that the party leaders desired,

which became

all

too

evident during the next two years.

“Devote yourselves with

all

your strength to the labor movement!”

was the slogan on which the Kutagede meeting had concluded, 63 and immediately after the conference the PKI set out to put it into practice. No labor activity of note had occurred during the first half of 1924, but after the PKI executive’s September announcement of its proposed concentration on the proletariat there were increasing reports in the Communist press of the revival of dormant union locals and the planned establishment of new organizations. This revival doubtless owed its organizational impulse to Communist emphasis on proletarian 274

Deviation on economic developments that increased the restlessness of the workers. The dying depression, by now largely overactivity,

come

but

also rested

it

in the public services,

affected private industrial

employees severely. Wages

still

and

clerical

in Surabaja, the chief industrial city,

had

generally risen until 1923 but suffered sharp setbacks in 1924 and 1925;

Semarang, Indonesian

in

skilled

workers and white-collar employees

were hard hit by wage reductions and unemployment, which increased markedly during 1925. 64 Labor unrest, and with it Communist union activity, thus

returned to

its

pre-1921 concern, the workers in private

employ.

The PKI’s

proletarian action

was

officially

inaugurated at a meeting

and union leaders in Surabaja on December 20 and As the party newspaper explained:

of top party 1924. 65

has been brought

It

home

longer seek our strength so transfer part of our

work

to us

much

with increasing clarity that in

21,

we must no

our previous areas of activity but should

to another field, that of the proletariat.

We

must build up a strong organization for the workers in the sugar factories as quickly as possible. In the machine shops and other factories, and more especially among the transport workers, such we must also establish workers’ organizations.

When

this

as drivers

has been achieved, the time will have arrived

able successfully to

ward

off

and so on,

when we

are

the attacks of the reaction. 66

The conference resolved to join the PKI-minded unions in a Secretariat of Red Indonesian Labor Unions. There had been no central labor grouping since the collapse of the PVH in the wake of the railroad strike, although Darsono had urged a Red Labor Federation at the June 1924 party congress. No action seems to have been taken at that time, but renewed emphasis on the unions gave the question new importance. Moreover, the Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference had

urged establishment of proletarian contact bodies and had

Red Eastern Labor

Secretariat

(Tan Malaka’s

office)

in

set

up the

Canton; the

Indonesian organization, as the Surabaja conference declared, would

be

tied to the

Canton body and

to the Profintem. 67

The Red Labor PVH, which the

was envisioned as existing alongside the Communists were attempting to revive under their own aegis, 68 apparently in an effort to do whatever they could to influence the nonCommunist unions. This endeavor was quite unsuccessful, for by now the political breach between Communists and non-Communists was secretariat

275

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

too wide for any real cooperation, and the non-PKI labor organizations,

composed overwhelmingly

of civil servants,

were neither under

pressure to strike nor anxious to engage in controversial activity.

The headquarters which

of the secretariat

as Indonesia’s

were established

in Surabaja,

major industrial center became the chief area of

was appointed its chairman, and among its executive members were Sugono, Sukendar, Kadarisman, Surat Hardjomartojo, and Musso. 69 It is not clear how the party’s proletarian campaign. Aliarcham

well the secretariat succeeded in organizing the unions outside Sura-

where contact was easy, since the secretariat and the major PKI unions were all housed in the same building), for very little mention of its activities was made either in government reports or in the Communist press of the time. It might be noted, however, that several

baja

itself

(

important unions retained de facto headquarters in Semarang,

though they were

officially

al-

centered in Surabaja; presumably this

occurred because the clientele of their leaders was in Semarang and they therefore did not wish to move.

PKI executive unions;

70

effective

It

was not

until

mid-1925 that the

sent the draft statutes of the secretariat to

its

member

not long after that a disastrous series of strikes brought an

end

to

Communist union

activity.

In addition to forming the labor secretariat, the Communists unified the existing Indonesian seamen’s and dockers’ unions into one organization, the Sarekat affiliate

Pegawei Pelabuhan dan Lautan (SPPL).

It

was

to

with the Amsterdam-based SPLI, which Semaun had estab-

lished earlier that year. 71

The

unification of the harbor unions

had

Communists for some time, not only in connection with the benefits to be gained by coordinated action but also because of the Canton conference decisions for more work among the seamen and dockers and Semaun’s establishment of the SPLI. That unification was interested the

not achieved earlier

we may possibly

in urging a single union

ascribe to a leadership conflict, for

both the Batavian PKBP, led by Marsum and

Alimin, and the Semarang Serilagu, led

by Sumantri and Surat Hardjomartojo, made it clear they wanted to control it. 72 The SPPL was set up in February 1925, announcing it would publish a monthly newspaper, Djankar (Anchor). In March of the same year the headquarters of the SPLI were moved officially from Amsterdam to the SPPL office in Indonesia. The SPPL elected to join both the PVH and the Red Labor Secretariat and announced that it would seek international con276

Deviation tact via Canton, Manila,

and other ports where

offices

were being

set

up under Profintern auspices. 73 The Communists further decided to intensify their efforts with the VSTP and the Sarekat Postel and to revive union activity among the sugar workers, 74 and to combine the various machine-shop and metal factory workers’ locals into the Sarekat Buruh Bengkel (Union of Machine-Shop Employees). This union, which later absorbed the electrical workers’ organization and became the Sarekat Buruh Bengkel dan Elektris (SBBE), was headed by Prawirosardjono, a Surabaja machinist and member of the PKI executive for that city. Together with Musso, who had established himself in the East Java capital as head of the Sarekat Postel and editor of the local Communist newspaper, Proletar (The Proletarian), he was the major leader of the PKI Surabaja-based labor campaign. Finally, in June 1925, the PKI called for establishment of a Transport

Buruh Transport); it was branch of the economy and

Workers’ Federation (Federasi

to unite all unions to affiliate

Kaum

connected with that

with the radical

national Transport Workers’ Federation, 75 which,

we

socialist Inter-

will

remember,

had been one of the issues in the Semaun-Sneevliet quarrel. All these decisions were accompanied by feverish activity within the PKIsponsored labor movement, and this, coupled with the precarious economic position of the urban workers, made possible a rapid increase in the influence and revolutionary temper of the PKI unions. While this reorganization was taking place, news of the party decision to abandon its mass base reached the PKI’s international advisers. Semaun had heard of the proposed abolition of the Sarekat Rakjat even before the Jogjakarta meeting but apparently too vene:

it

was not

until

December

25,

1924, that

late to inter-

he wrote the PKI

executive pleading for the retention of the mass organization.

If

there

no revolutionary organization for the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, he warned, these elements might very well go over to the existed

Sarekat Islam. As the

fifth

Comintern congress had pointed

groups would be converted to fascism place for them.

The PKI must not

if

the comrades,

if

such

the Communists offered no

retreat into proletarian extremism

but must continue to place the national revolution

and he assured the party that “the

out,

leftist

first,

course which

is

he declared, proposed by

they really intend to abandon the peasants, will not be

approved by the Comintern.”

76

277

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

When Semaun

by the Jogjakarta conference, he was greatly relieved. Perhaps he had not expected that the SR would be allowed a stay of execution, or perhaps he

was not

heard of the compromise plan arrived

informed of the decision

fully

at

die

to let the organization

PKI on February 16, 1925, the Sarekat Rakjat was retained and

gradually. At any rate, he wrote the

to

express his gratification that

to

remind the Indonesians of committees in the

SR

his earlier instructions to establish

units

Meanwhile, the PKI

and

them with the

affiliate

grudgingly modified

itself

its

peasant

Krestintern. 77

stand to reduce

and Semaun’s report on the fifth Comintern congress. Immediately after his report was published in February 1925, the party newspaper printed “The Communist Guide,” a series of articles devoted to the history and principles of the movethe contrast between

ment, in which

it

for secret activity

its

declared that there was a time for open and a time

and

that the party

tional factors as well as

edged

that the party

proletariat alone:

decisions

must base

on the situation

its

strategy on interna-

in Indonesia. It also

acknowl-

must avoid a putsch and must not rely on the

“The revolution

will not

succeed with the help and

leadership of the party alone; the party must always

bend

efforts

its

not

only to achieving the support of the greater part of the organized

working to

class

but also to making certain that the revolution

by the peasantry.”

78

It

implied strongly, however, that

the time for moderation past, and

and

to cooperation

functory.

The

its

it

agreed

considered

references both to the peasantry

with non-Communist groups were distinctly per-

concessions were not enough to bring the

with the views of the Comintern; only complete reversal of could have accomplished

PKI

is

PKI its

in line

decisions

this.

embodied

was taken up by the International at a plenary session of the ECCI during March and April 1925. The Comintern’s entire colonial program was discussed at length in that meeting, and it was apparent from the theses presented on that subject that the PKI program stood little chance of approval. “The national question in the colonial and semicolonial countries and policy, as

not only in those countries

in its Jogjakarta decisions,

—

—

is

in large part a

peasant question, for the

peasants constitute the majority of the population in those lands,”

Zinoviev asserted. “The experience of the various countries and various situations

shown that in the Communists have comlast

years has

mitted the same error of underestimating the national question, an error which had made it impossible for the Communists to achieve an

278

Deviation

among

important, not to mention decisive, place

The

colonial

the population.”

79

Communists, he declared, should adopt the following

strategy in regard to the peasantry:

Wherever peasants cial constitution,

are organized into political parties of heterogeneous so-

the Communist party must court the

formed of small peasants,

in

them

wing, which

is

order to separate them out at an opportune

moment and form an independent organization. The Communist parties should form a bloc with subjecting

left

to all their ideological influence

the small peasant parties,

and propagating the idea

of

the necessity of an alliance between the workers and peasants for a successful struggle of the toilers against the exploiters.

.

.

.

Wherever the peasant question is connected with a national question, the Communist parties must pay particular attention to the latter. To ignore the national factor in such cases would not only be an error but a political crime

80 .

The ECCI did not

condemning the PKI current strategy; instead, it reviewed the whole question of SR-PKI relations and called for a drastic reorganization of the Indonesian movement. The executive charged that PKI handling of the Sarekat Rakjat had been wrong from the beginning, and Semaun, who attended the meeting for the PKI, duly apologized for his part in it 81 The ties between the two organizations had been too close and too public, and because of this stop with

.

the fear that the Sarekat Rakjat endangered the party’s proletarian

character had been justified.

The Sarekat Rakjat should not have been

an open subordinate of the PKI, nor should

its

leadership and

its

program have been publicly those of the Communist party; this limited both the appeal and the maneuverability of the SR and tempted the

Communists

to dilute their

own program

compatible with the needs of

make

more the nonproletarian organization. The in order to

it

Sarekat Rakjat should have been created instead as an entirely separate organization, “a genuine national revolutionary organization working in conjunction

munists.”

with and under the intellectual leadership of the

82

In effect,

what the ECCI wished the PKI

Sarekat Rakjat as

would operate different

as

do was establish the a mass organization through which the Communists a bloc within. The new relationship would be vitally to

from the Chinese and previous Indonesian blocs within,

real control over the

PKI

Com-

mass movement would

leaders; this, however,

lie

would hardly be 279

from the

start

for

with the

a disadvantage, since

it

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would eliminate the cardinal weakness of that strategy. Thus sheltered within the larger movement, the PKI could both perfect the organization of the proletariat and take advantage of the SR’s officially independent character

to

appeal broadly to the peasant masses.

Semaun, elaborating on the Comintern decisions

an open

in

letter to

the PKI, said that the Indonesian party was not only to revive the

SR

but also to make further concessions to non-Communist Indonesians by

renewing

ties

its

with the Sarekat Islam and uniting

organizations into one anti-imperialist front. This

all

Indonesian

was not only possible

but should actually prove relatively easy, he argued, since Indonesia’s lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie

meant

that the native antirevolution-

ary forces were weaker than in other colonies.

No

matter

how

impor-

might become as the representative of the

tant the Sarekat Rakjat

some portion of the potentially revolutionary masses would remain by the SI and other nationalist or seminationalist organizations. If the Communists attacked the leadership of those bodies, it would only alienate their supporters and weaken the revolutionary movement as a whole. “Therefore,” he concluded, “it is necesIndonesian people,

sary for us to infiltrate into the organization of the Sarekat Islam, to

carry on the revolutionary policy there, in order to tionary masses to the side of our party.”

Not only the

Muhammadijah, the Budi Utomo, and other groups should be penetrated: and with the utmost

Patiently, carefully,

but also the

SI,

intellectual

revolu-

and regional

we must work

and with unnecessary annoyance at us.

tact

these organizations, avoiding every cause for

And we can

draw the

in

best carry out those tactics toward the national parties under

the slogan of

one

flag for Indonesia,

the flag of a Radical National Front movement. (Call

it

whatever the majority of those

not important)

.

.

.

affiliated

with

it

desire: the

name

is

.

Our party must, as the Comintern resolution says, create a united party movement such as an anti-imperialist front, or, if this already exists in embryo form, cause it to be developed further. That our labor movement will take part in

We

it is

had made

a matter of course.

this tactic a reality in

Radical Concentration, and

we must now

the beginning of 1923 with the

repeat

it

again and again, even

though the complex situation should repeatedly prevent the establishment of a stable united front, until a Soviet Indonesia makes its existence no longer necessary. 83

280

:

Deviation Outlining the program the Communists should put forth in their

campaign

for a united anti-imperialist front,

Semaun proposed

slogans

more moderate than anything the PKI had previously advocated. The first demand should be “independence for Indonesia.” The Com-

far

munists should ask for universal suffrage for

residents of the Indies

all

above eighteen years of age, regardless of race or should not

demand

nationality.

They

a parliamentary democracy, for parliamentary gov-

ernment depended on a well-developed bourgeoisie, good communica-

and an effective press. Since Indonesia lacked these, and because it was ethnically, culturally, and linguistically so diverse, there was a danger that a parliamentary system would break down under communal conflicts. Therefore, the PKI should abandon its demand that the Volksraad be turned into a regular parliament. Instead, the Commutions,

should advocate division of the country into ethnically based

nists

autonomous regions; the lower councils directly elected

and the higher ones

party should drop slogan had

Now

little

demand

its

indirectly.

for a soviet state, since such a radical

meaning under the current circumstances

that a temporary depression in our active

Soviet system can be seen in the ruling West,

ganda

We

in this matter.

must

.

.

.

The

resolution of the

mass movement toward a

we must

revise our propa-

Comintern says

agitate within the national revolutionary

which

state

would be Semaun added that the

of this federation

movement

will not alienate the revolutionary bourgeois forces

which, on the contrary, will bring them to realize that

we

this clearly.

for a

form of

from us but

are their friends in

the struggle against imperialism. Therefore [we must urge] universal suffrage, not for a parliament, but also not proletarian suffrage for a Soviet state 84 .

The Comintern opinion was conveyed to the Indonesian party not only by Semaun but also by the ECCI itself, which wrote the PKI Central Committee on May 4, 1925. 85 It called on the party to “draw up a platform for the general national struggle, which must give first consideration to the interests of the peasantry and must also contain a

minimum program for the workers.” The SR was to be separated from the PKI and made “ a genuine national revolutionary organization working

in conjunction

with and under the intellectual leadership of

Communists.” Mobilization of the peasantry was, the ECCI declared, inextricably bound up with the participation of non-

the

Communist diately

parties in the revolutionary struggle; the

campaign

for

PKI must imme-

an anti-imperialist bloc consisting of 281

all

national

Rise of Indonesian revolutionary parties.

ECCI

would, the

pendence

Communism

The following stereotyped program

of

thought, be attractive to the nationalists:

demands (1) inde-

(2) withdrawal of foreign troops and estab-

for Indonesia;

3 ) an Indonesian Popular Assembly to establish an Indonesian People’s Government; (4) universal suffrage,

lishment of a national militia;

independent of

(

sex, national origin, or

(5) recog-

place of residence;

nition of the native languages as the official languages of the state;

agrarian reforms (confiscation of great landholdings and redistri-

(6)

bution

among

the peasantry, abolition of oppressive taxes and of tax

farming, an end to the system of leasing peasant lands to sugar estates);

(7) eight-hour working day,

child labor,

and protective measures

minimum wage,

for female labor;

abolition of

(8) advanced

public education and establishment of an extension education sys-

tem. 80 Instead of complying with these instructions, the

PKI protested

to

the International. 87 Not only did this constitute a breach of international party discipline, but

Communist body tween those two phase,

politic

—the

giants,

was expressed

it

touched a very sensitive sore on the Stalin-Trotsky feud.

which was

at this

in the international

The

struggle be-

time entering

its

Communist movement by

debate over the effectiveness of die united front from above.

who had championed

critical

diat policy, advocated a

a

Stalin,

broad united front from

Europe and the further development of the Chinese bloc within; Trotsky, on the other hand, thought such a strategy played into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and he urged the Communists to rely above

in

on a revolutionary

effort

based on the proletariats strength

in the

cities.

Though

the

PKI

program in conscious the struggle ( nor were they ever accused

leaders did not choose their

alliance with Trotsky’s side of

by the Comintern), it is understandable that the party position was opposed by the Stalinist forces. Stalin himself, lecturing on the of this

nature of

left

deviation in colonial

Commimism, noted

that this con-

sisted of .

.

.

overrating the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation

and underrating the importance

of an alliance

movement

between the working

class

and the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. The Communists Java,

who

ment

for their country, suffer,

in

recently erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet governit

seems, from this deviation.

282

It is

a deviation

Deviation to the

Left,

which threatens

masses and to transform

it

to

alienate the

Communist Party from

the

into a sect 88 .

PKI continued along its did make in the Jogjakarta

In the year that followed these warnings the

deviant path, and the modifications that

it

by Indonesian circumstances rather than by Comintern admonitions. The most notable concessions were those made in early 1925 to restore cooperation with non-Communist groups. Indonesian opposition opinion outside the Sarekat Islam and the PKI had persistently deplored the continuing feud between the two bodies; and by late 1924 bitterness toward the government, fear for the fate of the entire opposition, and a rising sense of Indonesian nationalism caused some leaders to propose a truce. Abdul Muis, once a principal line were,

enemy

it

appears, decided

of the PKI, called

meetings (as

it

on the Sarekat Islam

had been doing

to cease disrupting

SR

in the Jogjakarta area) in the interest

Muis argued that the government was concentrating its fire on the Communists because they were currently the strongest group; in their day the Sarekat Islam and Sarekat Hindia had borne the brunt of the government attacks, which were ultimately aimed at crushing the whole Indonesian political movement. What was needed, he concluded, was to unify the opof restoring the unity of Indonesian political forces.

position forces in a nationalist front. s9

A

meeting of the Indies National Congress committee

in

January

1925 provided another occasion to urge a united front. Hopes for such a

body were centered on

the recently organized Indonesian Study

Club, a Surabaja-centered association of young nationalist intellectuals.

As a new and neutral body, the Study Club seemed the tor

between the established groups;

SI heads,

its

and the PKI had seemed

leaders to

likeliest

were acceptable

approve

it

mediato the

in its Jogjakarta

conference resolution on the nationalist intellectuals. In February 1925

Musso attended the Club’s first convention, where he expressed his sympathy and the wish that the group would develop close ties with the

common

people. 90

In March, the neutral opposition newspaper Kemacljoean Hindia

managed by Singgih, a leader and PKI to set aside their quarrel in (then

of the Study

Club) urged the SI

the interest of national unity and

suggested a conference of Indonesian groupings to form a commission of neutral persons for the purpose of purging Indonesian

283

movements

of

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

and forming a supraparty executive to settle disputes and develop a common line of action. The CSI agreed in principle but wanted the initiative for the congress to come from the uncommitted insincere leaders

Study Club leaders. The PKI, commenting favorably on the Surabaja Study Club, declared: It

does not matter

in this

country whether a person

or whatever; as long as he

ist,

is

is

Communist, national-

really sincere in his intention to see the

people freed as quickly as possible from oppression he will be forced to follow a single political road, the road of revolution.

.

.

We

.

are therefore

only too glad to form a united front with any popular party, provided this

union

is

91 of a revolutionary nature .

As was

to

be expected

in

view of the bitterness between the Sarekat

Islam and PKI leaders, the efforts at reconciliation soon to

name

calling.

The Communists announced

fell

victim

that their executive

had

contacted other groups “to form a united front against war and militarist politics”

the

hand

of

and that Salim and Tjokroaminoto had promptly bitten friendship 92 ( understandably enough, since the PKI had

given no sign that

it

had changed

its

opinion of them

)

.

This effectively

ended attempts at a united front, for the other parties, all of which were more conservative than the SI in their attitudes toward the government, would cooperate with the Communists only for the sake of unifying the entire Indonesian opposition.

The Comintern recommendations did not

PKI attitude non-Communist

soften the

toward the Sarekat Islam; instead, the party’s view of

groups, including the nationalist intellectuals in the Study Club and the

younger generation of Budi Utomo, grew progressively not the issue of nationalism per se that held

down

cooler. It

was

the party’s enthusi-

asm. Although the PKI continued to maintain that Indonesia’s road to revolution

munism,

it

was

internationalist

was, as

it

and aimed

had declared

willing to overlook this

in

in

its

directly at establishing

Com-

comments on the Study Club,

the interests of securing revolutionary

—

support. That support, however,

had to be revolutionary for, determined on revolt, the PKI saw no use in establishing what would of necessity have been a moderate alliance. Consequently, in supporting a united front, it had specifically rejected an alhance of the sort represented by the Radical Concentration (which, we will remember, Semaun recommended) on the grounds that it was insufficiently revolutionary

93 .

With

a

formal partnership thus excluded,

284

PKI hopes

for

non-

Deviation

Communist support lay in arousing the sympathies of individual opposition members and if possible winning them over to the cause of rebellion. 94 Wooing away members of other organizations most notably the SI still continued at the local level in some areas, but in the higher echelons., of the political movements partisan lines were by now too deeply drawn. By mid-1924 the differentiation of the Indonesian opposition was essentially completed; relations with other parties

—

—

and leaders, once intimate and a matter of cardinal concern to the Communists, thereafter became tangential and guarded. The Communists

enjoyed the respect of a number of non-SI opposition leaders

because they were persecuted by the Dutch, but too qualified to help the

PKI gain

influence

ism of the Study Club intellectuals at

this

this

sympathy was

among them. The

time was

(

far

national-

in contrast to that

Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland) gradualist rather than revolutionary; furthermore, the PKI was obviously heading for disaster, and political leaders outside the party did not want to share the destruction. The PKI became increasingly impatient with this aloofness and ascribed it to the fact that the nationalists came from a privileged of the

elite:

“In these tense times the intellectuals

may

they do not feel that their schooling and the gotten from the proletariat and the that their feelings are dead? Let

common

PKI

failure to

criticism

conform

to the

it’s

tilings

people;

them continue

Should the people wait for them? No,

take thought! Perhaps

they enjoy are not clear

if so, is it

to disport themselves.

too late!”

95

Comintern strategy brought continuing

from party advisers abroad. At no time, however, did Mos-

cow’s disfavor extend to outright denunciation of the

and party

efforts against the colonial

PKI

regime continued

leadership,

to

be noted

with appreciation. The PKI leaders were probably saved from

inter-

national disgrace in good part because of poor communications be-

tween the Comintern and the Indies. The information passed on by PKI representatives abroad seems to have been contradictory and misleading. Thus or

Semaun and Bergsma,

influenced by wishful thinking

by misleading reports from Indonesia, described

fictional

PKI

at-

tempts to conform with Comintern advice: In accordance with the latest resolution of the Enlarged Executive, the

and adapted the propaganda more to the requirements of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. ... As a matter of fact, success has not yet been reached in welding the national and

Communist Party has

altered

its

tactics

285

:

Rise of Indonesian

movement

revolutionary

however go

conditions

revolutionary groups

Communism

into a united anti-imperialist Bloc.

The

existing

prove that a comprehensive organization of

to

all

indeed possible. 96

is

Inadequate contact also kept the International from playing

group within the Indonesian party against another, and the exchange of opinions between the

ECCI and

the

it

off

one

prevented

PKI executive

from assuming the character of a debate. The Comintern, at odds with both the party in Indonesia and the quarreling PKI advisers abroad,

had no one whose opinion not

know

to

whom

it

it

could

trust;

hence, as

we

shall see,

it

did

could turn for a solution.

At the end of 1925 the fourteenth Soviet party congress celebrated Stalin’s victory in the

question of cooperation with the peasantry and

other nonproletarian elements. His triumph was reflected in the

plenary session of February and March 1926,

when

ECCI

the Comintern

executive favored more strongly than ever increased concentration on the peasants and reliance on the bloc within.

The

success of the Kuo-

mintang was proving the correctness of the Comintern course, the

ECCI

proclaimed; and

to the

Chinese example for a model on which

it

charged the Indonesian Communists to look to pattern their political

strategy. 97

At

meeting,

this

Semaun

cast himself as

an honest broker between

the Comintern and the PKI. His attitude toward the Indonesian situation

seems

to

have been somewhere between that of the PKI

in Indonesia

and that of the ECCI; his report to the Comintern executive’s 1925 plenum had allegedly been criticized for its negative attitude toward cooperation with non-Communist Indonesian movements. 98 This attitude was not evident in his letters relaying the plenum’s advice to the PKI, but

it

does appear in an article he wrote for the Comintern

journal later in 1925,

where he denied the importance

of bourgeois

nationalism for Indonesian revolutionary politics

we consider that the working class is on a higher level than the peasantry, we will realize that the movement of the Indonesian people against oppresIf

sion

is

directly

and

indirectly a proletarian class struggle against capitalism

and imperialism. This

is

Communist Party and by

witnessed by the successes of the the fact that every national

nonproletarian program and tactics Islam).

working

.

.

.

class

The ardent is

is

doomed

to defeat

desire of the best elements

a Soviet Indonesia,

movement with

286

a

(e.g.,

the Sarekat

of the

Indonesian

which might become part

federation of free Soviet republics. 99

Indonesian

of the

world

Deviation At the 1926

ECCI

session,

Semaun attempted

to forestall

ble effort to brand the Indonesian party as Trotskyist

PKI

any

possi-

by explaining

was not willful defiance of international advice but a tragic necessity forced upon it by circumstances beyond its control. “In our party/’ he declared, “we have neither right nor left that the deviant

strategy

among these, he asserted, in PKI affairs by the Dutch

deviation, but other difficulties exist.” Chief

were government persecution, interference Communists, and the danger of losing contact with the outside revolutionary world. “By now,” he noted, “the government has succeeded in isolating our

movement from

all

other revolutionary

world, and recently even from Moscow.”

The

movements

in the

party’s ability to control

the mass will to rebellion was being sorely tested, and further govern-

ment persecutions would only strain it more by inflaming popular opinion. Such action would “promote the propaganda of the Indonesian anarchists,

who

advocate incendiarism against the sugar industry, the

and tobacco works. For the illiterate masses plunged into misery such propaganda is attractive and it will be difficult for the Party, driven into illegality, to oppose it with our own methods of

oil

wells

fighting.” 100 It

seems evident that Semaun,

like the

PKI

leaders in the Indies,

was

deeply worried about the consequences of the party’s inability to offer its

following definite prospects for revolution.

The Indonesian

people,

which had aligned themselves behind the Communists, supported the PKI because they felt it promised release from the Dutch. This had been the key to the Sarekat Islam’s popularity in the days of its success, and the Si’s retreat from a revolutionary position was a cardinal cause of its death as a mass movement. The PKI was now faced with the same question the SI leaders had confronted, and it could ignore the popular mood only at the risk of suffering the same or at least that part

fate as the Sarekat Islam.

Semaun attempted

to explain this to the

fourth session of the Profintern Central Council, which

the

ECCI

met

session. Citing the case of the Sarekat Islam,

just after

he declared

PKI must conform to what the people expected of it: “Every movement whose program corresponds to the people’s interest will be well received; every other program will be rejected. But even when an that the

organization has already succeeded in drawing the masses to

cannot rest content with

this

but must bend every

a correct tactic, lest the masses turn from

begin anew.”

101

287

it

it,

it

effort to carrying out

and the whole process

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

The ECCI did not accept Semaun’s analysis of the PKI’s troubles, although he was made a member of the ECCI presidium at this session 102 The Comintern executive quite realistically pointed out that .

however desirable revolution might be

in the long run, the Indonesian

Communists simply were not in a position to carry it out in the near future. It was true that the PKI was in difficulty because it could not offer the Indonesian people the immediate hope of rebellion, but this was because it did not have anything to offer them beside rebellion. The party could retain its popular support and gain the necessary additional backing it needed for a successful revolt only if it made a major effort to attract the people to it with a program designed to appeal to interests broader than those of the proletariat alone. In other words, the PKI must carry out the previous had, the executive noted, already

ECCI

resolution.

made some motions

The party

in that direction

and had received a favorable response from the national groupings, which (especially Budi Utomo and the SI) were turning more and more to the left; but these gestures were not enough: It

must, however, be said that our Indonesian comrades have not shown

satisfactory activity regarding this process [of attracting the nationalists into

a united anti-imperialist bloc].

The Communist

attention to the question of the united front

which could bring together

all

much

press pays

and the creation

too

little

of a platform

national revolutionary elements.

The party

has not yet discovered appropriate methods of approach to those masses

which are under the influence

of the reformist leaders.

The Communist

Party has not been able to hold those revolutionary elements

who

despair of

the reformist tactics of their leaders, with the result that they turn to terrorism.

.

.

.

Individual spite of

its

facts

activity,

show

.

.

that the

Indonesian Communist Party,

has not been able to develop a satisfactory action

the peasantry and to win of the last

.

it

ECCI plenum

for the general national

its

On

movement. The resolution

transformation into an independent national

revolutionary organization with close ties out.

to

the broad

the peasants

masses has not

the other hand, the political activity of the peasants,

that most oppressed part of the Indonesian population, result of increasingly

among

regarding the gradual separation of the “Sarekat

Rakjat” from the party and

been carried

in

is

steadily rising as a

heavy tax pressures and the continuing dispossession of

by foreign

capital. If the party

regarding the peasantry in time, the political

does not take a correct line

movement

pass over the party, as has already been the case to radical nationalist elements.

of the peasants will

some extent with the

Only the complete and unconditional execution

288

Deviation of the resolution of the last isolated position

and unite

it

ECCI plenum with

all

can bring the party out of

its

the active anti-imperialist forces of the

Indonesian people. 103

The PKI did not follow received

it,

this advice.

may not even have ECCI conference tilings

Indeed,

for in the time since the previous

it

had gone badly for the Indonesian party. By 1925, the Dutch authorities had become sufficiently alarmed at the Communist success to conclude that the PKI and its sympathizers must be rendered inactive at all costs. Government determination, plus a disastrous strike campaign led by the PKI during 1925, had by the end of that year reduced the Communists’ legal role to the vanishing point. Hence, the Comintern’s repeated emphasis on long-term public activity had less and less meaning for the Indonesian Communists. If there was one thing in the PKI that grew stronger during this period, it was the will to revolt; and not unnaturally, the more impatient party leaders resented the Comintern’s caution. At a meeting of PKI leaders in Singapore in early 1926, Alimin reportedly vented his spirit

of

slackening,

dissatisfaction

and dissension

retrogression

Moscow”; he declared that

it

with the accusation that “A

was the

is

prevailing

in

task of the “millions of Eastern

peoples, the last reserves of mankind,” to save the dictatorship of

the proletariat in Russia. 104 In this set

spirit,

about to make their revolution.

289

the Indonesian

Communists

XI

Making

ON FEBRUARY it

Api voiced

distress that

most of the deci-

December 1924 PKI conference had remained on paper,

sions of the

and

12, 1925,

Revolution

a

called for the immediate implementation of those decisions

affecting the reorganization of the party.

These plans incorporated the

suggestions contained in Semaun’s report on the 1924 Comintern congress,

which

fitted well

with the PKTs

own

desire to proletarianize the

party and to avoid the public eye. As Api outlined called for the creation of cells

Communist

(

benili ) as the chief

influence; these should

of-work basis: “Wherever there

is

it,

the

new program

means

of spreading

be organized primarily on a place-

a group of workers

we must have

a

member whose duty it is to spread Communism among his fellowlaborers. We must now begin to train people from various areas of work to become Communists, so that they may take up the duty of

party

carrying on our propaganda.”

The

cell

leaders should be

section concerned,

known

only to the executive of the party

the newspaper continued, for

found out what was going on they would surely

fire

if

the employers

those responsible.

was to teach Communism to the workers, the cell organizers were to be given special instruction in Marxist theory by the executive of their party section. When several cells had been formed in an enterprise, they would be gathered into a group (grup), and these groups were to be the basic units of the party. The function of the cells was both to gain recruits and to collect money; as Api noted, the cell organizer, who saw his comrades at work every day, was a more reliaAs

their task

ble collector of funds than the previous system of passing the hat at

general propaganda meetings. Moreover, the take

some

new

organization

would

of the responsibility from the shoulders of the party section

who had hitherto borne the entire weight of organizing local activities. The new pattern, Api hoped, would improve party work and discipline and would pave the way for a soviet svstem. heads,

290

Making a Revolution The program for a cell network was directed by a committee headed by the VSTP leader Mohammad Ali, who was a member of the Semarang town council and who assumed the chairmanship of the PVH when it was revived by the Communists. In addition to its work in and offices, the committee also attempted to establish cells in the armed forces, but without notable success. Cells were also to be organized on a territorial ( neighborhood ) basis, although this was confactories

ceived as a secondary aspect of party activity. Propaganda was spread

through informal meetings at private homes, and various local groups, such as burial associations, were used as a cover for PKI meetings and

propaganda work. In Bandung and other

a snowball system

cities,

was

reportedly used, whereby a propagandist and up to seven interested

home

Communist teachings; when sufficiently indoctrinated, each student would seek seven additional people to teach, and so on. 1 In such ways, by substituting persons met in someone’s

small, closed meetings for

open

for instruction in

affairs,

the party sought to build a

and avoid the attention of the authorities. 2 At a meeting in Jogjakarta on June 19, 1925, the PKI leadership called for a “strong and lasting proletarian discipline” based on groups of five rather than the ten envisioned by the December 1924 conference. The party would, it was declared, be divided into major territo-

reliable organization

rial units

responsible directly to Batavia headquarters; the former party

new

branches would become subsections of these

units,

planned to expand the number of such subsections Their administration was placed in the hands of

who were

and

it

to seventy-five.

five

commissioners,

Each

also to cooperate with the executive of the local SR.

commission was

to

be aided by

five directors

(

was

pengurus ) of

its

choos-

and each director selected five aides ( pembantu ) Each aide was to have under him five cadres ( kepala warga), party members who were each given charge of a number of SR members who lived in their ing,

.

neighborhood. 3

At the June conference Alimin tactics for

is

reported to have discussed the

unleashing the rebellion, calling for a strike wave centered

on railways and harbors and culminating action

would weaken the

in a general strike.

imperialists economically,

Such

he asserted, and

would also help isolate the Dutch forces in the Indies. 4 This strategy would concentrate PKI effort in the field where its labor strength was greatest, namely, the communications and transportation sector. Moreover, international authority could

be cited

291

for

such a method,

since,

Rise of Indonesian

we

will

stressed

remember, the

Communism

Pacific Transport Workers’

the revolutionary importance of the

transportation unions.

More

recently,

Conference had

communications and

Tan Malaka had

written a tract

giving his views on the tactics to be used in an Indonesian revolution,

and there he had also stressed the importance of the transportation unions and a general strike. The West Java PKI leader Mohammad Sanusi visited Tan Malaka in Canton in March 1925, and Alimin reportedly also saw him early in that year and was informed of his views on PKI strategy. 5 All this would indicate that the PKI was shaping itself into a tightly knit, well-disciplined revolutionary force; but between party plans and practice there was a very considerable gap. This was frankly conceded by the PKI leaders, who were concerned by the declining payment of dues, the decreasing contact between the central executive and the provincial units, and the failure to implement the decisions of the December 1924 congress. Lack of income, the party complained, was preventing following,

a

wage

it

from publishing the materials necessary

and

it

was forcing the PKI

to

pay

its

to indoctrinate

its

propagandists too low

to ensure their diligence in the party’s cause. 0

In part, this disorganization resulted from heavy opposition by the

was almost impossible for the PKI to hold public meetings now without being dispersed by the police. In the Semarang district court alone, thirty trials for political crimes were held during 1925, and in the same year the directors of Api were put on trial twenty four times. 7 Communist activity by no means ceased with the arrest of these leaders, but organizational continuity was damaged. One of the restrictive measures taken was to tighten regulations forbidding attendance at political meetings by persons under eighteen years of age. One result of this was that the PKI Youth Front was replaced by the Organization of Indonesian Youth (OPI, Organisasi Pemuda Indonesia), ostensible authorities. It

a nonpolitical scout group. 8

new

provision that

were not minors

if

More

minors

serious consequences arose

—or

persons

who

from the

could not prove they

—were found at a meeting, the leader of the gathering

or the executive

members

liable to arrest. Since

it

was

of the sponsoring organization

would be

rarely possible to control attendance in this

where closed meeting-halls were not generally available and where few people could prove their age, the measure posed a considerable threat to PKI and SR organizers and was the basis for numerous arrests.

fashion, particularly in villages,

292

Making a Revolution The reader might well ask why the government tolerated the PKI at all by this time, for the party had made no secret of its December 1924 decision to attempt to seize power. this

A

strong current of opinion urged

—and had done so for some time. However, the very vehemence of

this

attitude,

which saw

therefore impermissible, arate

its

ban the

all

made

outspoken criticism as “extremist” and it

impossible for the government to sep-

treatment of the PKI from that of the rest of

its

opponents.

To

would have meant admitting that even the “conservative Ethical” approach had failed and that Western democratic concepts must be abandoned as far as the colony was concerned. At the same time, the opponents of such a revision could point to the fact that the PKI and its allied organizations were visibly suffering from a growing sense of “being threatened and trapped.” 9 They no longer showed their former energy in areas where they had been prominent; their most important leaders hesitated to make public appearances; and the projects on which they publicly embarked soon failed. There was an obvious similarity between the December 1924 PKI conference and the Sarekat Islam congress of 1919, which had masked in revolutionary phrases a decision to avoid genuine confrontation. The PKI, too, was rejecting its unruly rural following in favor of disciplined organization in the cities, and the strike law and the improving economic situation should keep it from becoming much of a nuisance there. Why, then, ban the party and drive it completely underground, where it could not be watched and where it would have no choice but to prepare for violence? It should be possible to reduce the Communist movement piecemeal, by gradually removing its leaders and discouraging malcontents from joining; it might be necessary to continue restricting political liberties in this party, or to undertake

process, but not to

As

we have

mass

arrests,

throw overboard libertarian

principles.

noted previously, parliamentary democracy at

authoritarian rule in the Indies resulted in curiously

home and

mixed responses

to

challenge on the part of the colonial regime. Thus, although the PKI

announced with impunity an ordinary

woman

its

intention to overthrow the government,

declaring in public that

my life depended on my son-in-law” could be

“if

it,

would not want a government official for and was sentenced to a year in prison for expressing contempt for authority. 10 In 1925 this contrast was sharpened when the government I

urged Indonesian administrators to take sterner steps against the development of Communism in their areas. As a result, extreme pressure 293

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

was exerted on party and SR members and those suspected of adhering to the movement, with the chance of rehabilitation offered if they recanted and asked absolution from the appropriate official. In some areas this was reportedly quite effective. However, it was easily open to abuse, for

—outside the contradiction

it

entailed in keeping

nism within the law but placing the Communists outside conservative

tended areas

aristocrats

to consider

where

West Coast

who

any objection

their authority

the

staffed

it

Commu-

—the highly

Indonesian administration

to traditional rule as revolutionary. In

was not completely accepted,

as

on the

of Sumatra, this aided the rebels in the end:

who dared to speak their minds conditions, who lodged complaints, who

Persons

frankly, to criticize situations

and

were, in short, a nuisance, risked

being charged with being communists, which charge was sufficient to set the

whole administrative machine

in

motion against them. Such individuals

were checked by perpetual orders “wanted,” and

this

to

appear

helped to prepare the

soil for

at

“the office,” they were

the favourable reception of

communism. If they were punished by the magistrate, as sometimes happened at Fort De Kock [Bukit Tinggi], Padang, and Solok, the disciplinary treatment often consisted of degrading them in a most childish way making them carry stones uphill at a run and the like. ... In other places the taxes of those classed as “communists” were raised. The only result of all this, however, was to increase the agitation 11 the seed of

—

.

In several parts of Java, most notably the Priangan, this pressure

took the form of encouraging or condoning anti-Communist strong-arm

groups among the populace. The government cherished the hope that “in the society itself

suppress the alien,

countermovements

artificial,

will

develop and organize to

anarchist spirit of resistance,

disharmony with the Native folk consciousness,”

which

is

in

12

and there were in fact signs of increased resistance in 1924. These were part of the continuing SI-PKI feud and centered in Jogjakarta. At the end of August Darsono, Gondojuwono, and Subakat found themselves shouted down by SI and Muhammadijah supporters at a rally in Jogjakarta, and

when

in

proper,

December it

the party tried to hold

its

conference in Jogjakarta

could not find a meeting place and was forced to

outlying Kutagede. 13 Such opposition

may have

move

to

inspired the official

promotion of anti-Communist movements, but it was soon clear that the two countermovements had quite different sources.

During the second half of 1924, the vigorous development of Communism 294

authorities, in the

concerned by the

Sumedang

area of the

)

Making a Revolution Priangan, encouraged the formation of anti-Communist mutual aid associations.

Each

village

or executive, but everyone

gent of

Sumedang and

its

own, and there was no central body

knew

the groups were backed by the Re-

had

the Indonesian officials under him.

By

early

1925 such associations had spread through the Priangan and were making their appearance in Bogor, Tijirebon, Kediri, Ngawi, Madiun, and

Djepara.

Though they had no formal connection and bore

various

—

names Perkmnpulan Tolong-Menolong ( Mutual Aid Association and Kaum Pamitran (Friendship Group) in the Priangan, Sarekat Hitam (Black Union) and Sarekat Kemantren Tjerebon in Tjirebon, and Anti-Communisme in Bogor they became generally known by the name of the Sumedang grouping, Sarekat Hidjau (Green Union). 14 They broke up party and SR meetings, disrupted SR schools, beat up Communist followers, destroyed Communist property, and where

—

possible drove

PKI adherents from

their villages. Their size

is

some-

thing of a mystery and probably varied greatly, but at least in the

Priangan they seem to have had a considerable following, for newspaper reports spoke of incidents involving bands of several hundred. The

PKI found

it

necessary to establish a guard system in neighborhoods in

which party leaders lived, not only in the affected areas but also in Batavia and Semarang, where threats were made on the lives of top party chiefs. Appeals to the European administration for police protection or for judicial redress did very

little

good, particularly in the

Priangan, where the police were then clamping activities,

the

down on Communist

with anti-PKI groups acting as their informal

auxiliaries.

same time a campaign was launched by the administration

At

in the

SR cards in to the local had broken with Communism; many did so,

Priangan to get people to turn their party or officials as

some

a sign that they

voluntarily

and others because force was applied by

their village

chief. 15

The anti-Communist groups sometimes made use antithesis,

of the

Red-White

but their action was not related to the conflict between the

Sarekat Islam and the Communists. 16 All the Indonesian opposition

condemned the groups, which they commonly labeled fascist. They saw in them evidence of a government decision to turn back the clock and substitute repression for reform in dealing with opponents. The most vocal critic of government encouragement of strong-arm groups was the PKI’s archenemy, Hadji Agus Salim. The government, he warned, was playing with fire in encouraging violence and placing parties

295

Communism

Rise of Indonesian its

opponents beyond the protection of law; in the end, such a course

could only sabotage

becoming evident

all

respect for authority. Indeed, this

to the

was already

government: at the February 1925 Palace

Conference several Residents doubted whether they would be able to

keep the Sarekat Hidjau groups in hand. 17 Salim’s arguments

were inspired by more than a concern

for the rule

of law, for the Sarekat Hidjau groups soon extended their attacks to

the Sarekat Islam. As a proponent of religious reform, the SI was currently campaigning against the dedication of Friday ices to the regent; this

brought

and the inclusion of raids. The situation was cials

down upon

it

mosque

the wrath of those

servoffi-

and Pamitran Tjokroaminoto and

SI adherents in Sarekat Hidjau

alarming for

sufficiently

Sjahbudin Latief to journey to the Priangan and there confer with local SI leaders, on

The PKI

whom

leaders,

they urged passive resistance to the attacks. 18

although they fulminated against the Sarekat

Hidjau and kindred groups, also adopted what was essentially passive

Bandung an Anti-Ruffian League (Anti-Ribut Bond) was established by those who felt threatened by the Sarekat Plidjau; its purpose was to repay strong-arm actions in kind. The initiative does not seem to have come from central PKI headquarters, however. The party newspaper at first cautioned against the League as containing dubious elements, although later it seems to have acquired more positive support and was established in other areas where anti-Communist fighting groups existed. 19 The Communists acknowledged that the roots of the reaction went deeper than mere hooliganism and that many Sarekat Hidjau adherents had formerly been in the SR. They had not been attracted to the Sarekat Rakjat solely by gentle persuasion (the Communists had used social pressure, boycotts, and direats of future reprisal in place where they were strong ) and this had naturally brought repercussions. Moreover, the PKI had been active in the Priangan for several years, and its utopian promises had not yet been fulfilled; people who had given the party their support and their money began to feel they had been gulled. The Sarekat Islam, which had used similar tactics to gain adherents, had run into the same problem in West Java in its heyday. 20 The reaction was all the more dangerous because it was now pushed by traditional leaders, in an attempt to make people shift their grievances from the established authorities resistance. In

,

to the opposition. It

might not be feasible

popular discontent permanently, but

296

it

to reverse the course of

might well be possible seriously

Making a Revolution weaken and

by a popular revulsion against it. In an effort to repair the situation, the PKI issued an appeal “To the Members of the Sarekat Hidjau, Kaum Pamitran, and People of the Priangan,” calling them to forget their quarrel with the Communists and unite with them against the Dutch. 21 The trouble was, as Api declared, that the people were ready to revolt but not to be indoctrito

discredit the party

nated:

As long

People only believe that

as the

ciently understand the theory of

Because of their

difficult lot

to us.

immediate can easily result of if

These

is

good but do not

Communism, our party

the People are unhappy.

propaganda everywhere and promise

drawn

Communism

will

be

suffi-

in danger.

And because we make

improve conditions, the people are

to

insufficiently trained

people understand only their

own

and nothing more. And they think that these interests be achieved, if only they follow the Communists. What is the final interests,

such a situation?

If

suffering results, the people

end they may turn against

by the Communists fail, and and abandon our ranks; in the

the campaigns led

become

afraid

us.

Half our comrades, the party paper continued, think theory unnecessary;

the essential thing for them

leaders. This,

is

that the party possess daring

however, leads to fascism and not to

Communism

—we

happen in Italy. The party must emphasize an understanding of Communist principles, for only if the people understand what the PKI is aiming at and what the risks are will they remain faithful to us in adversity. Indeed, the Comintern itself stressed this point, for had not its fifth congress emphasized that Communist parties must improve

have seen

it

their understanding of bolshevik theory? 22

Now

there were two possible roads for the

One was

to take in this crisis.

by the December 1924 conference: concentrate the party and its proletarian adherents and let agitation

that outlined

on disciplining in the

PKI

unruly agrarian sector go, on the assumption that

moved, the countryside would

abandon

its

follow.

when

the cities

But could the party

nonproletarian support? Could

it

in fact

be sure that leaders

in

the hinterlands, already poorly controlled by the center, would not act in the party’s

Would

name and

bring disaster to the whole organization?

not abandoning the countryside also increase the likelihood that

Communist would turn

rural adherents, disillusioned

by the

party’s loss of interest,

PKI in a wave of reaction that would demoralize the entire movement? Moreover, could the party be sure that action by the proletariat would in fact create a revolutionary situation without against the

297

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

the help of agitation outside the cities? If the party really intended to carry out a rebellion and not simply to retreat into

its

proletarian shell,

was it not better to draw the support of restive elements by whatever means possible, in order to secure a wide base of support for the revolt?

In the end, both courses were pursued

—that

no

to say,

is

visible

choice between them was made. Both proletarian organization and rural agitation

gram was

were carried

on, but because of

effectively gutted, for

the

it

December

pro-

purpose was to establish an organi-

its

zation the party could be sure of controlling, which it

headlong and unprepared into rebellion.

at the direction in

would not plunge Some persons were alarmed

which the PKI was heading, but they presented a

grim alternative:

We

Communists can only wait and see what will happen. Although we hope to continue to act and speak freely, if the government really prohibits and penalizes our freedom of action we shall not be able to nullify the government’s decision.

It

the government, after

is

that possesses the power.

all,

The only thing now is for the Communists everywhere to be on guard and to work harder and in a more disciplined manner than at

their

pres-

ent 23 .

Most party leaders preferred not

Many who

to consider so

gloomy a prospect.

favored an all-out effort for rebellion doubtless believed

and outside assistance they would overthrow the rest, some may have reasoned that a revolt, even

that with popular backing

the Dutch. As for if it

failed,

would increase the

contribute to

later,

restlessness of the population

successful rebellion. 24

Still

others

and thus

were probably

motivated simply by the reason Darsono later gave the Comintern: believed that

it

would be

“We

better to die fighting than to die without

fighting.” 25

The perversion

of the course decided

on

apparent at a conference of PKI leaders held in 1925.

was already Batavia on March 22,

at Jogjakarta

The meeting discussed the implementation

decisions on organization

form ten-man groups

and issued

of the

December

directives to the party branches to

we

remember, bv the fiveman system) and to reorganize party activities on a cell basis. The cells, it was declared, would serve to subvert non-Communist groups:

“The planting of workers

who

are

(later replaced,

will

cells is of especially great still

importance among those

under the leadership of other 298

parties.

By means

Making a Revolution of these cells

we

now have been

be able

will

their leaders,

to eliminate the other parties

and we

will

be able

who up

to replace

to

thm by

assuming that leadership ourselves.” Ultimately, however, they were intended as an instrument for overthrowing the regime and as the basis for postrevolutionary

power: “the main aim

is

to use these cells for the

great struggle, namely the conquest of political

once

this struggle

realization of

has succeeded

Communism,

we

make use

in the country;

of these cells for the

in other words, for the organization of the

which

state

on a proletarian

ment

of proletarian dictatorship.” 20

So far

will

power

basis,

will

be preceded by the

establish-

The same meeting, however, took Sarekat Hidjau. The instructions issued to the

in the Jogjakarta tradition.

up the problem

of the

party branches on this subject denied that such groups could be considered fascist (as Api

had hitherto labeled them) because they did not

movement but only criminal hirelings of Nonetheless, PKI organizers were not to oppose the

represent a distinct political the authorities.

elements from which these groups were drawn: they could be used to

would be more advantageous for the PKI to have them on its side. 27 The party was clearly not referring here simply to recovering disaffected SR members; it had in mind securing the adventurers, who would be attracted to the party by its defiance of authority and not by class interests or by doctrine. Reportedly, it was Alimin who brought the matter up at the March conference. 28 We might note that as a CSI leader in 1919 he had urged the Sarekat Islam heads to define their stand on such illegal movements as the Section B. Such groups might be useful at a future point, he declared; he did not feel the CSI should endorse them at that time, since it was not ready to assume power, but it must give the serve the party as well as to fight against

it,

and

it

matter serious consideration. 29

The suggestion

that the

PKI

recruit elements that

outside the law for the purpose of rebellion

were

essentially

was not without precedent

or practical value. Various areas in Java (to mention only that island)

had long harbored outlaw groups, which were commonly enlisted by those who sought to overthrow established rule. The phenomenon was not eradicated by Dutch control, and areas where such groups operated continued to form centers of social dislocation and rebelliousness. 30

Although they were essentially predatory, such elements were viewed by the populace with awe as well as fear: thus djuara (one of 299

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

who

the words for this sort of person) “denotes someone

who

age to defy the laws of the land and others to

do

Those who

his will

by

has the cour-

prepared and able to force

is

threat of injury, deprivation or death.”

31

themselves up as leaders did not operate simply as

set

heads of criminal gangs but sought to create an aura of extrapersonal

power tions

to gain followers, impress the population,

more

palatable.

They might thus claim

and make

their exac-

mystical

possess

to

powers, particularly the secret of invulnerability, the benefits of which they could confer on their followers. Moreover, since they were outside the law but not necessarily outside the society of the area (somewhat like

Robin Hood )

,

movements. Where they were

active,

intensified social disorientation

such groups both reflected and

and alienation from authority; hence,

movements were rather more

protest

might lead messianic protest

in times of unrest they

likely to erupt into violence there

than elsewhere. 32

The

rise of

mass

political

movements

in

Indonesia permitted such

elements to attach themselves to or act in the

name

of the larger

organization; this seems to have been the case with Section B,

which

was not the only such group to arise about the Sarekat Islam. 33 Communism, a movement that portrayed itself popularly as world-wide, irresistible, and achieving paradise through violence, undeniably attracted such adventurers, which compounded the disciplinary problem Darsono later described to the Comintern “There was a time when the propaganda of our theories was mocked at. We were told it is not :

theories but deeds that

bomb-throwing and

change the world.

On

acts of individual terror

the basis of these ideas,

were engaged

the case in Russia at the end of the last century.”

34

decision to encourage adventurers consciously did

was

in, as

The March 1925

little

to

overcome

this failing.

Apt s the

articles

December

on strategy

in this period similarly alternated

line of tight, proletarian organization

of widespread, rebellious agitation.

clared that events in the Priangan little

this

attention to educating

had been

its

its

official line

On March

and the

21, for

between

alternative

example,

it

de-

showed the party had devoted too

followers in Marxist theory, although since the June 1924 congress.

therefore concentrate on the proletariat

It

must

and on strengthening discipline; a certain amount of work must be done in the villages, but the uneducated peasantry would be less accessible to an effort of this sort. On March 23 and 24, however, the paper published leading articles 300

Making a Revolution arguing that propaganda must be carried out

among both workers and

peasants in terms they understood, avoiding complicated or unattractive ideas

and

stressing the utopian aspects of life

under Communism.

Such ambiguity combined wfth the weakening hold of the party central command to give increasing autonomy to the movement in the provinces. Gathering

momentum toward

doctrine. Thus, in

The Communists showed

Communist

used appeals alien to or in

in the outlying districts freely

Communist

rebellion,

leaders

with

conflict

Bantam:

great

skill

and keen

insight in the

way

in

which

they spread expectation of the success of the rebellion and promises of a Utopia. For every group they had ready a separate ideal suited to the

was always called kemerdekaan [freedom], but each group had its own ideas of what that meant. The more well-to-do were promised a Utopia where they could keep everything they possessed, would not have to pay any taxes, and would even get positions with the new government. The descendants of the sultan and the other title-bearers were promised the establishment of a new sultanate and “their own sultan”; this state was represented as an Islamic state to the religious orthodox. The followers of the religious leaders who were preparing for the rebellion were enticed with the prospects of the glories of paradise, the reward which would await them as warriors victorious in Allah’s name, or as martyrs who have died for his cause. Where it was of service the common man was given visions of sama rata sama rasa [equality for all], but this did not often occur, as it proved sufficient to win the support of eminent citizens. However, everyone was led to expect the blessings of cheap rice or free rice and free transport in cars and trains, etc. But nothing much was said about distribution of property belonging to the wealthy because an attempt was made to get the wealthy to join also. Side by side with the illusions of fortune for those who would rebel were of course the threats for those who would not. They would not partake in the advantages of Utopia; on the contrary they would be oppressed: their property would be confiscated for group’s conditions. This ideal

the founders of the

new community. 35

The freewheeling use

of such appeals

by

local leaders, tied to the

expectation of imminent rebellion, led to a general increase in

munist activity outside the urban centers during 1925-1926 the party decision to concentrate on the

movement was marked

in the

cities.

Outer Islands;

it

The

Com-

in spite of

extension of the

proceeded by

On

fits

and

the

West

Coast of Sumatra, the Communist movement was aided by a

new

starts,

being thwarted

in

one area only

to arise in another.

government regulation that forced the return of 301

political undesirables

Rise of Indonesian to their

home

Communist

areas; this

leaders

Communism

brought back a number of Minangkabau

who had been

active elsewhere

and thus helped

overcome a decline in activity brought about by other repressive measures. Both secular and religious Communist propaganda increased, and new branches of Communist unions were formed. Labor unions were also

founded

in

East Sumatra, and Communist influence became

marked among Javanese contract

coolies

on the

district’s

numerous

and other major private firms with the government’s, and unrest

plantations. This challenge caused estates to pool their intelligence services

was checked by jailing or firing suspected leaders. The movement in Atjeh, which developed rapidly during early 1925, was curbed by similar measures and by the drain imposed by the forced return of a number of its leaders to their native Minangkabau. In Palembang die Communists gained considerable popularity by preaching self-government under a Muslim ruler, with no corvee and few taxes; this even attracted some adat heads, who were accordingly cashiered. In the Lampung district Communists were particularly active during 1925, and in the Batak areas (including Mandailing, where they called for an Islamic state ) the movement gained rapidly in early 1926. A PKI section was established on Nias Island in January 1926 and was sufficiently disruptive that troops were sent there to restore authority. In Celebes, die movement showed considerable vigor in the Makassar area, and a number of unions and peasant organizations were formed. The Moluccan organization did not recover substantially from the repressive measures taken in 1924, most of which were still in effect, although union activity revived. In Timor an anticorvee movement expanded rapidly during 1925 and then decayed with equal alacrity when its leaders were imprisoned; in Bali and the Riouw archipelago some peripheral activity was noted. 36 In Java, the most notable PKI activity was penetration into Bantam, die northwestern part of the island. Communism had been known to diat area in earlier years, for Hasan Djajadiningrat, younger brother of the Regent of Serang, had been not only head of the SI in Bantam but also a member of the ISDV. Although his personal views were very moderate

(his political career resulted

from a family decision

to

have

members participate in movements that were attracting die masses), he was appointed to the party’s central executive in 1918 and remained a respected ISDV/PKI member until his death in late 1920. one of

its

Probably as a result of his dual membership, die Serang SI (the chief

302

Making a Revolution Bantam unit) took a neutral stand in the Jogjakarta-Semarang quarrel and after the 1923 split was one of the SI units that urged Tjokroaminoto’s replacement by Musso and Alimin. 37 It was not the Serang SI, however, but the VSTP unit of that city that brought Communism to Bantam, by sponsoring a rally early in 1925 at which Musso and Alimin spoke. After a false start in which the Communists professed a neutral attitude toward Islam, they assumed a hyperreligious stand

—

when the local party chairman before sundown during the fasting

to the extent that

was found drinking a cup of coffee month, he was immediately removed from office. Thereafter the movement caught on rapidly, attracting peasants of all economic levels, including village heads. Bantam was a bastion of conservative Islam (hence opposed to the modernist Muhammadijah), and the Communist movement there aimed at a holy war to overthrow kafir rule. Some religious teachers opposed it, but many supported the party and others, by their neutrality, did nothing to make people feel it was in conflict with Islam. Bantam was also an area with a tradition of outlawry, and a relatively large proportion of the movement’s adherents were drawn from

this

dfuara element. 38

As violence seemed more imminent, the preachings of the Communist propagandists in the outlying areas took on an apocalyptic urgency, which in various areas communicated

itself to

the general

population and formed an important source of support. Here

example of

this sort of

is

an

argument, used in West Sumatra, in which

Lenin appears as the traditional hero overthrowing the rule of the wicked, a holy war

is

urged, the benefits of acceptance are contrasted

with the penalties of refusal, and, above that time

is

all,

the impression

is

created

running out:

Communist Party is Russia. The Communists have seized freedom in Russia. The leader of the Communists was named Lenin. He had an older brother, who was sentenced to the following punishment by the Emperor ( Radja ) of Russia: one leg was bound to a horse and Brothers, the birthplace of the

the other to a second horse; the horses were then the

left

and the other

to the right, so that his

made

to gallop, the

body was tom

in

one to

two and he

died.

power with the Communists, arrested the Emperor and burned his body. The ashes of the body have been preserved. When the time has come here we may see the ashes of

When

that

the time of revenge came, Lenin seized

body with our own

eyes, that

we may be 303

convinced.

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

Now

Russia

Everyone

free.

is

is-

equal there,

mistreatment and oppression from the government.

already free from

is

Communism

all

spread over

was not content with the we need only await the time; we,

the whole world, even here, to the Indies. Lenin liberation of his country alone.

.

.

.

Now

the people of this place, are the only group that has not yet joined the

Communist

But when the time has come we may no longer

Party.

we must

Therefore the Dutch.

.

.

enter now, so that

shall

be able to help drive away

.

faithful

may

the Dutch are

kafir,

The

we

join.

take no kafir for their ruler; he

and must be driven away

we become Communists,

may

only be a believer;

at all costs.

...

It is

better

come here from Russia to drive out the present Dutch government. Whoever is no Communist will be killed immediately by the Russians. To become a member of the Communist Party you need only to pay /0.83. What would you rather do, brothers, pay that

for

Communists

will

/0.83 or be killed by the leaders of the Communists? nist

If

you

join the

Commu-

Party you will live free and pleasantly, and will be safe; you will need

pay no more taxes

to the

government and

village. 39

In areas where Communists were strong, heavy social pressure was exerted to secure adherents; in Silungkang,

West Sumatra, one could

not purchase rice at the market without a red card, for the rice merchants belonged to the party; in Solok social occasions

and

in trade. In

nonmembers were boycotted on

South Tapanuli the owners of small-

holder coffee plantations were forced to join to avoid being boycotted

by

their workers,

and

in other areas

shopkeepers would not

sell

to

persons without a red card. All this was done in the expectation of

imminent Armageddon:

in

West Sumatra

it

was

said the Russians

and

Chinese would come with battleships and airplanes, to establish a gov-

ernment

Kemalist Turkey; in Bantam

was told that the soldiers and religious teachers had gone over to the Communists and that outside aid would come from airplanes sent by Kemal Ataturk. In the Moluccas it was declared that two Communist ships would come, the first with a white flag, the second with a red; those who had not joined by the time the second ship arrived would be thrown into the sea. The first ship had already come; there was not much time. 40 How rapidly the PKI following increased under these conditions is hard to say. However, a 1926 campaign in the Batavia area to induce people to turn in their red cards and ask forgiveness of the authorities yielded 10,000 cards in a few weeks, and it was estimated that almost the entire Indonesian population of the area had bought them. 41 In Bantam, the police estimated after the revolt that there were about like that of

304

it

Making a Revolution 4,000 party members, but the government investigation into the causes

number of those who had district was probably very much

of the rebellion suggested that the actual

taken out membership cards in that higher. 42

Such support was,

of course, of a crisis character, wholly

on the atmosphere of impending

rebellion.

The

dependent

chief practical signifi-

cance of the red cards was to create a sense of commitment and to provide

money

for the party.

The cards

cost

(

depending on the area or

the time of purchase) anywhere from /0.25 to

/3.; in

addition, contri-

uang derma) were given by or pressed from more affluent followers. Some of the money went to the central executive, but the great part of it seems to have been collected and used locally for the activities of the movement, the support of its leaders, and the purchase

butions

of arms.

(

The

central leadership itself took to selling “shares” in the

PKI, an idea inherited from the early Sarekat Islam, in order to im-

prove

its

still-floundering financial position. 43

Membership in the PKI as well as in the SR was sold, blurring the division between members and fellow travelers of the party. In West Sumatra it was decided to dissolve the existing SR units after the December party conference and take its members into the PKI as candidates, a course which the conference itself had rejected. In Bantam the SR never existed; all followers of the movement were considered members of the party. In various aeas, Sarekat Tani groups were formed during 1925; sometimes they replaced the SR and sometimes they were simply the name given to SR-type units founded after the Jogjakarta conference. 44 There was no noticeable organizational difference between these groups and the Sarekat Rakjat: indeed, there was little evidence anywhere outside the cities of regular organizational structure or cohesion other than that provided by personal leadership. Investigations of the two areas where rebellion took place disclosed that there was no sign that the five-man and ten-man systems had ever existed, except in rudimentary form in the towns housing the section headquarters. 45 From all outward appearances the same was true in other outlying regions.

While

this

inchoate expansion was taking place in the provinces, the

central party leadership devoted

itself, in

line

with the December 1924

policy decisions, to consolidating and extending

its

strength

among

the

hope that the workers would provide a more disciplined and obedient source of strength was disappointed, however. The PKI’s proletariat. Its

305

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

proletarian followers, like their country cousins,

were more interested

and the increased revolutionary agitation, added to the already present feeling of economic and social injustice, caused them to press the Communist-led unions to strike back at the Dutch. The party could not resist this pressure, and the manner in which it gave way showed how deeply divided its leadership was and in action than in organization;

how

little

authority the center possessed over even

established

its

proletarian units. Originally,

it

is

general strike for that date

PKI had considered a demonstrative 1925, to commemorate Semaun’s arrest on This idea was quashed by the VSTP, which

reported, the

May

8,

two years before.

had learned a painful lesson on the timing

of strikes

and refused

cooperate without an adequate basis for a really serious

effort.

to

The

plan was therefore discarded, only to be reconsidered after a few

weeks

form of a proposed

in the

refusal to let

Tan Malaka

While the major union

strike to protest the

return to Java; but again the

hesitated, however, the smaller

government

VSTP and

refused. less

cau-

and between May and July 1925 a number of wildcat strikes broke out, all of them on a small scale and most of them unsuccessful. In Semarang the mood of the unions was particularly tense, and in late July major strikes began to break out in that city, facing the Communist leaders with the problem whether to tious labor organizations chafed at the bit;

turn their backs on the unplanned action or to seize the opportunity

and transform

On August

it

5,

into a general strike. 46

the

PKI executive

issued a directive to

its

branches

declaring that the world revolution had been delayed by the stabilization of the capitalist forces tactics that

and consequently the party should adopt

recognized the absence of a revolutionary situation. 47

It

was a belated response to the earlier criticisms of the ECCI and Semaun, and a victory in principle for the advocates of caution. In practice, however, the PKI did nothing to alter its revolutionary course. The provincial party leaders showed no moderation in their agitation, and those at the PKI’s proletarian center made their seems

likely that this

Semarang strike. On August 5, the same day the cautioning directive was issued, twenty representatives of the Communist unions held a secret meeting at Semarang to discuss whether to turn the local effort into a general strike. Their decision was favorable, and Mardjohan was named strike director over stubborn VSTP objections that the time was not yet attitude clear in their reaction to the developing

306

Making a Revolution ripe. 48 Typically, the

Communists did not then

campaign but decided

of its

to allow each

set

down

a unified plan

union to determine individually

role in the general strike, deciding the matter at meetings of their

members. 49

Even before preparing

the

Semarang

new measures

strikes

began, the authorities had been

check the PKI: in a conference held

to

at

the Governor General’s palace on July 22, a program for combating the

Communists was discussed and the drastic restriction of civil liberties and labor union activity was proposed. 50 Once the strikes had begun, the government moved quickly to implement the measures decided at this

meeting, as well as

its

powers under the

strike

August 6 the right of assembly was prohibited

in

law of 1923.

On

Semarang, which

prevented the unions there from meeting to formulate plans for a general strike; this ended the effort to universalize the Semarang

The backbone of the walkout was broken, although the strike lingered on in some concerns for nearly a month in spite of the largescale importation of strikebreakers by the affected employers. As in previous major labor conflicts, a large number of those who walked out action.

were not allowed to return to their jobs, and this, plus disillusionment and discouragement, extinguished the unions that had sponsored the strike. 51 Those labor leaders who had not made the move to Surabaja now did so: what remained of the Semarang leadership of the SPPL; Ngadino, chairman of the sugar workers’ SBG and printers’ SBT; and Sukendar, leader of the machinists’ SBBE. 52 Of the Communist labor organizations, only the powerful

mained centered

in

and

as yet

uncompromised VSTP

re-

Semarang.

number of union organizers under the strike law, the government moved to rid itself of various PKI leaders. Darsono and other Semarang leaders were arrested, and in early SepIn addition to arresting a

tember the Attorney General proposed that Alimin, Aliarcham, Dar-

and Mardjohan be banished. Alimin was no longer available, however. He had eluded police surveillance in July and managed after various narrow escapes to make his way to Singapore. 53 From there he traveled to Canton and then to Manila, where he joined Tan Malaka. sono,

Measures

to prevent undesirable political activity increased signifi-

Communist groups had to be held in secret. Restrictions on SR schools were tightened, and special classes in Dutch were established to draw away children who had been attending them in order to learn the language that was the key to adcantly, so that almost all meetings of

307

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

was increased, especially over the party daily Api. Official approval had to be secured for each issue before it was distributed, and during 1925 the police began to vancement

in the Indies. Press supervision

confiscate as evidence not only the copies of the disapproved issues but

from which they were printed, thus preventing Api from

also the type

publishing until the type was given back.

The most severe blow

dealt

the paper, however, occurred after the government looked at the Api subscription

list:

somewhat

to their

embarrassment, the authorities

dis-

covered that the journal’s financial mainstay consisted of Indonesian civil service officials,

most of

whom

subscribed in connection with their

ban was therefore placed on the purchase of Communist by state employees, which reduced Api to near-bankruptcy by

duties; a

journals

the end of the year. 54

Communists no alternative between surrender and rebellion; at the same time, removal of top PKI leaders placed the party in the hands of men whose desire to create a revolution was by no means matched by their ability to plan one. Even in the more rebellious provinces, however, some leaders became concerned about the rapid and disorganized pace at which the party was proceeding toward violence. In West Sumatra, the party held a conference on October 3, where it decided to transform the local Sarekat Rakjat and Sarekat Tani branches into subdivisions of the PKI in order to prevent their leaders from interfering with the implementation of instructions from party headquarters. This was done in the face of objections by the local PKI chairman, Mangkudun Sati, who charged that it was not the officials of the SR and ST but rather certain subordinate leaders of the party itself who, though they were well aware of central headquarters desires, were too hotheaded to refrain from inflammatory and irresponsible agitation. 55 The rebellious elements were not to be contained, however, and even in the relatively cautious VSTP an actionist movement developed that wished to unseat the union’s Increasingly, there

seemed

to the

moderate chairman, Sugono. 56 In the urban areas, continuing political and economic unrest was

expressed in

which broke out in Batavia, Medan, and Surabaja part of 1925. 57 Of these, the Surabaja disputes were

strikes,

during the later

the most significant; beginning in September, they reached their climax at the

end

general

same

as

of the year,

strike. it

The

when

role of the

had been

in

they approached the proportions of a

PKI

in the

Surabaja action was

much

the

Semarang: having aroused the enthusiasm of 308

Making a Revolution was unable to hold a ragged and disorderly

the workers for a walkout, the party leadership

them

in check, so that the strike

broke out in

fashion, with disastrous results.

The Surabaja

action began with a strike at a printing plant on Sep-

and was extended to a machinists’ strike on October 5. During October there were rumors of an impending harbor walkout, and the employers announced to members of the seamens’ and dockers’ union that they would be fired if they engaged in any agitation. The machinists’ strike began with the firing of a labor organizer; to the distress of the other employers, the management of the factory involved acceded readily to a compromise favorable to the workers. Encouraged by this, the union of machine-shop and electrical workers (SBBE) presented a list of demands to the seven major machine factories of Surabaja, the chief points of which were a five-and-a-half-day week, an eight-and-a-half-hour day, a wage increase, and recognition tember

1,

1925,

of the

SBBE

mined

to present a united front

14, the

as a bargaining agent.

The Surabaja

and

reject all

factory heads deter-

demands.

On December

down

their tools; in

workers at the four largest factories laid

two other concerns there was a high rate of absenteeism. On December 21, the employees of the drydock company also walked out. Reportedly, the Communists hoped to extend the strike to the harbor workers, gas and electric workers, and some government services, but they were prevented from doing so by police measures. 58

One

reason the Surabaja strike

wave

lasted as long as

it

did was that

demands on their own merits and accordingly recommended a much-needed improvement of working conditions and pay instead of taking immediate repressive action. The Governor General took a quite different view, however, and sent his own men to Surabaja to suppress the strike. 59 The police ordered the strikers to return to work and arrested the Resident of Surabaja, Joordan, tended to view the union

not only the leaders of the striking unions but also those of the Surabaja

SPPL and

PKI. This destroyed whatever organization the strikers

had had and disrupted the Surabaja party

organization; the

PKI asked

union locals outside that city not to correspond with headquarters there because of the prevalent disorganization and the possibility that

the police effort

would

intercept the mail. 60

ground to a

halt,

representative to the

and

PKI

By

the end of the year the strike

as a final disaster Sutigno, the Surabaja

central executive,

funds collected by the unions of that

city.

309

61

made

off

with the strike

)

Communism

Rise of Indonesian Displaying the ambivalence that

still

characterized

its

response to

few weeks

all

but about a

challenge, the government released after a

dozen of the 150 persons arrested in connection with the Surabaja walkouts, and those who remained in prison were acquitted ten months later of

breaking the strike law. 62 The employers took a

attitude; they blacklisted

workers suspected of

less lenient

Communism and

insti-

tuted a fingerprinting system to prevent employees from shifting jobs at will

and

to

keep blacklisted workers from finding employment under

an assumed name. They tended,

who

government report noted,

as a

could read and write, on the grounds that

blacklist all

workers

intellectuals

were easy prey

to

Communist

ideas; this

tion of literate skilled workers in the Surabaja area

although the rate of

workers

who were

to

illiteracy in the Indies

made

the posi-

an unenviable one,

was such

that excluding

familiar with the alphabet did not seriously reduce

the labor supply. 63

The Surabaja

more

blow for the party than the Semarang failure hed been, for ever since its December 1924 conference the PKI had placed its hopes on the revolutionary future of Surabaja, the industrial center of Java. 64 As we have seen, it had concentrated its unions in that city, uniting them under the same roof with its Red Labor Secretariat. Even so, it had not been able to control them. According to Musso, the machinists’ strike was to have begun a defeat was an even

general insurrection, but

it

serious

broke out prematurely. 65 The authorities,

had the impression that the strikes took place too soon: May 1, 1926, had been increasingly rumored as the date for a revolutionary outbreak, and a strike in that month would have been a serious matter, for it would have affected the heavy orders for machinery that the sugar industry had placed for the 1926 harvest season. 66 The events in too,

Surabaja thus not only destroyed the second major center of PKI urban support but took the proletarian teeth out of the revolution before

it

began.

The Surabaja

strike

wave was followed by

a

new

series of general

government measures against the Communists. These included universal prohibition of free assembly in Surabaja and Surakarta ( the latter to suppress the

burgeoning Islamic Communist Mu’alimin movement).

Moreover, the right of assembly was denied to the PKI, the SR, and their allied unions in all areas

These measures forced

tire

where there organizations

cancellation

of a series of congresses the party, the

310

(

existed. 67

at least as public gatherings

VSTP, and the youth organiza-

Making a Revolution OPI had scheduled for Surakarta during December. On December 22, a conclave of PKI leaders at the Semarang VSTP headquarters made the first move to adjust to an illegal position by outlining plans

tion

for

an underground organization. 08 However, the main decisions were

taken at secret gatherings held in or near Surakarta, where various high party leaders had already gathered for the canceled congresses. 69

The most important

was held in the town of Prambanan, which is located on the border between the princely states of Surakarta and Jogjakarta and is the site of one of the great monuments of Java’s Hindu civilization. The conference convened on December 25 70 and seems to have consisted of about eleven of the top party leaders. 71 According to a present-day PKI account, it was opened by Sardjono as chairman of the central executive. He and other speakers explained that matters had reached a point where it was necessary to

make

of these meetings

concrete plans for insurrection. Sardjono, according to this ac-

count, suggested that the action begin with strikes

and culminate

in

armed violence, with attempts being made to draw both the peasants and soldiers into the revolt on the Communist side. 72 Accounts of the Prambanan conference generally report that it decided the revolt should begin approximately half a year hence, but they disagree widely whether the date was May, 73 June, 74 or July It

seems quite possible that the meeting did not actually

specific date for the

75

1926.

settle

on a

outbreak of the revolution but set a deadline by

which participants should be ready. The rest would depend on when preparations had been completed and outside support had arrived, and it was apparently considered that this could be expected sometime around May or June, 1926. This inteq^retation seems in line with the party leaders’ later actions

and

also with the

minutes of a PKI conference held in January 1926.

This record noted that the question of preparations for revolt had been settled in in

December. Preparedness

two ways:

in order to

first,

for revolution

would be determined

by conferring with the executives

of unions involved

determine the date of a twenty-four-hour general

second, by observing the support that such a strike received.

strike;

Commu-

would be kept secret, and the action would ostensibly be to demand a general wage increase and to express popular grievances against the government. The strike would doubtless be called for sometime in 1926 (no further indication of a date was nist responsibility for the strike

given in the report);

if

it

received considerable response, the party

311

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would go over into revolution. If not, further preparations would be made and the test repeated until the working class was ready for a Bolshevik-style revolution.

When

the final decision

had been reached,

would send coded telegrams to each section, informing them of the date; these branches would wire their subsections, which would spread the word among the rank and file. 76 These provisions indicate that the date for rebellion had not been firmly fixed by the December 1925 meetings, and this helps explain the widely conthe party executive

flicting

rumors that circulated among party branches during the

first

part of 1926 regarding the date for the revolutionary outbreak.

The VSTP congress originally

accompanied the Prambranan meeting had been planned for Semarang in the latter half of 1925, but that

assembly in that

as a result of the prohibition of

city,

union leaders

decided to hold the meeting in Surakarta on December 25 and 26. Its

main business was

May

to discuss a

1926. 77 At the last

ban on public

moment

major railroad

strike,

proposed for

the congress was canceled

when

the

was extended to Surakarta; it emerged instead as a “social gathering.” The participants in the outing gathered at the Hotel Pasar Pon, on December 25; there were eighty-two union delegates in attendance, all PKI members. The day was passed in walks through the park and a visit to the movies, with the police in close attendance to see that no matters of business were discussed. Late that night, however, the merrymakers gathered in a hotel bedroom, having set lookouts to warn them in time to pretend slumber whenever the activity

authorities checked. 78

Sugondo, PKI vice-chairman, opened the conclave by declaring that the recent police measures against

Communist

leaders should be pro-

by a day-long general work stoppage. Winanta, likewise a member of the PKI executive, attempted to whip up enthusiasm for a revolt: It was the VSTP’s duty to participate in a rebellion, he said, since it was the oldest and largest Indonesian labor organization and had committed itself to Communism; moreover, restrictions on its activities were such that there no longer remained an alternative to revolution. Both Sugono, the union chairman, and Samsu, PKI executested

tive

member

for Tjepu, discussed the

sembly for the movement. Since

consequences of prohibited

as-

was no longer possible to meet legally, Samsu argued, it was essential that the members penetrate other organizations, wooing their leaders with sweet words and converting their followers to the Communist way of thinking. Sugono it

312

Making a Revolution went a

step further, arguing that the

entity:

it

was not the party and

PKI should

its

dissolve itself as a legal

allied organizations that

portant but die viewpoint they taught; therefore,

Communist

the

leaders joined other groups

it

would be

and spread

were imbetter

if

their views

through them. The sense of die meeting favored preparation for a strike leading to revolution,

of die

Semarang meeting

the matter

At the

of

was decided, in line with a decision December 22, to conduct a referendum on

and

it

among the VSTP locals. 79 Prambanan conference it had been decided

that the

first

armed outbreak would take place in Padang, headquarters of the powerful West Sumatran Communist group, after which violence would be extended to Java. 80 The purpose of this was to draw the Dutch forces away from Java and thus give the main push on that island a better chance of success; as we shall see, it was in line with a strategy that Tan Malaka had been urging and may well have originated widi his ideas. The December meetings also called for the creation of a secret party structure, the Double or Dictatorial Organization (DO). This, as its name implied, was to be the real party leadership, and the official structure would serve as a front to distract die authorities and absorb their blows; it was to be highly disciplined (hence “Dictatorial”) and responsible for concrete preparations for rebellion. 81 In addition to such domestic arrangements, the conferences took up the matter of help from abroad. There was reason for the Communists to cherish

hopes on

the International

this point:

Red Aid

they had, after

after the

VSTP

all,

received funds from

strike of 1923,

and

in his

Semaun had held out the promise not only of more IRA help but also of support from the West European Communist parties:

report on the 1924 Comintern congress

The

parties in England,

France and other countries would also have to help

us in Indonesia with demonstrations and so on

enemies

to gather their forces. This fact

movement will

is

in

the time comes for our

very important for the people’s given by general strikes abroad

in Indonesia, since the assistance

be of great value

when

the critical time

when

reaction has mobilized

[against us]. 82

The Indonesian limitations, it

seem

rebel leaders, to

have taken

was worth, and they

its

later

who had this

little

idea of the Comintern’s

statement for a good deal more than

complained

bitterly to the

poor support. Semaun had also reported that at

313

Comintern about

its

plenary session

Rise of Indonesian

ECCI had

March-April 1925 the

of

PKI

to enable

it

to

Communism

discussed financial support to the

withstand government pressures. However, he had

continued,

and

tion

tactics in order to

we

in

Indonesia must revise our organiza-

make more

effective our resistance to the reac-

along with this international aid

tionaries.

We

make no

shall

Bulgaria out of Indonesia.

enemies’ provocations

.

.

.

but shall

now

We

shall not accept our

reorganize ourselves as the

Com-

intern resolution advises 83 .

Semaun’s warning against a putsch and

ECCI

instructions

his

demand

adherence to

for

went unheeded by the PKI, and the Comintern

for

part seems to have supplied only vocal support in the ensuing

its

period.

was obviously showing much more the Indonesian movement than before. The Profintern issued

The

interest in

International, however,

a special resolution protesting the police measures taken against the

Semarang and Surabaja

strikes

and

calling

demonstrate against their government’s tion to the

movement

in Indonesia,

on the Dutch proletariat

policies. It

which published

cabled it

to

this resolu-

as proof that the

was deeply concerned with the fate of the Indonesian proletariat. 84 The Dutch Communists had earlier done their part to assure the party of international support by wiring it in connection Profintern

with the Sarekat Hidjau reaction:

The NAS (Netherlands Labor land), and the

Aid; their effort

BKST is

(?)

Secretariat),

CPH

(Communist Party

of Hol-

are forming a branch of the International

meeting with success. Semaun represents the PKI

Red

in the

Central Committee; he vigorously defends the freedom of political action in Indonesia, in connection with aid for the Priangan and Ngawi; the Comintern

(the

Communist

International, centered in

proclamation of support

all

over the world. Agreed?

Api, publishing the message, joyfully

Moscow)

is

to spread a

85

appended “Agreed! and declared that it was now awaiting the results of Moscow’s proclamation (although apparently the expected resolution was lost in the ECCI criti’

cism of the Indonesian party line).

Whatever weight the PKI assigned such gestures, it had China before it as an example of successful revolution carried out with Soviet support. As we have noted, Indonesian Communist utterances during 1925-1926 increasingly emphasized the Chinese revolution;

this devel-

opment earned the PKI the compliments

which was

314

of the Comintern,

Making a Revolution interested,

not for precisely the same reasons, in having the Chinese

if

by the colonial parties. 80 As for the PKI interpretation, Darsono was probably expressing the view of the prorebellion party leaders more accurately than he knew when he wrote: situation studied

Without doubt the victoiy of the Cantonese National Army was a great influence in the revival of the national-revolutionary

The more

movement

the influence of the imperialist powers in China

is

in China.

diminished as a

by the National Army, the more eager for combat Indonesia become. If the masses of China can be

result of the stand taken

the toiling masses of

mobilized against the Great Powers,

why

should not the Indonesian masses

be capable of being led against the relatively weak Dutch imperialists?

That

this

argument was used

to

whip up enthusiasm

for rebellion

87

and

shame those who urged a more cautious approach is evident from the record of the Pasar Pon meeting: Winanta, introducing the subject of revolt, stressed the examples of the nationalist revolution in China and Abdulkarim’s rebellion in Morocco. daring to

act,

Was

it

not simply a matter of

he asked, and were the PKI, the VSTP, and the people of

Indonesia less courageous than those of China and Morocco?

The very improbability

88

of independent success fed hopes for inter-

December 1924 congress had had been rife within the Communist move-

vention from abroad. Ever since the

decided for

ment

revolt, tales

of military support

from the

USSR

—or

from Turkey, Arabia,

China, or Japan. 89 Presumably the wilder rumors were believed only

by the rank and file, although there is some reason to believe that the leaders of the Prambanan group thought the Comintern would be willing to run in guns with the aid of Soviet warships. 90 It was, in any

December meetings to appeal to Moscow, and Alimin was to make this contact. 91 The primary purpose was to secure authorization for the rebellion, but it was quite clear that the party expected that approval would bring material as well as moral supevent, decided at the

port. 92

While these meetings were taking

On December

place,

the government acted

announced

would banish Darsono, Mardjohan, and Aliarcham. Mardjohan, who had led the Surabaja dockers’ and printers’ unions during the strikes in that against the party leaders.

17,

it

that

it

had been arrested on November 24; Aliarcham had been jailed on December 5. They were sent to New Guinea, where they later died. Darsono, however, was allowed to go into exile, the last time the city,

315

Rise of Indonesian colonial

government granted

Communism

this alternative to a political

opponent.

Unlike his predecessors, he did not go to the Netherlands but was

allowed to travel directly to the Soviet Union. 93 In January the police searched for Musso, Budisutjitro, and Sugono,

but they were not to be found. 94 Several other members of the PKI high

command were

also missing. Like the three

quietly slipped out of the country

and gone

to

wanted men, they had Singapore. There they

met with Subakat, the party agent in Singapore, and with Alimin, who had been staying with Tan Malaka in the Philippines. Malaka himself remained in Manila, fighting a new round in his battle with tuberculosis.

According to Alimin, the conferees (himself, Musso, Sardjono,

Mohammad

Sugono, Subakat,

Sanusi, Winanta,

and Budisutjitro) held

a three-day meeting and confirmed the decision to revolt.

It

was

decided to send Alimin to Manila to secure Tan Malaka’s cooperation in

an appeal

to

Comintern headquarters. 95 Accordingly, Alimin ad-

dressed himself to the exiled leader, but he found Malaka’s attitude distinctly cool. 96

“Tan Malaka

feels himself

bypassed” Alimin

later replied to

Malaka’s

Prambanan decision. 97 And indeed, there was good reason for Tan Malaka to feel left out of things. For the past year, ever since the December 1924 conference, he had observed the development of party policies with increasing misgivings. 98 In response to the 1924 meeting he had written a tract, Naar de “Republiek-Indonesia ” (Toward the Indonesian Republic), 99 in which he criticized the PKI plan to abandon the Sarekat Rakjat and gave his own views on a criticism of the

party program.

The Sarekat

Malaka maintained, should be transformed into a national party nominally separate from the PKI. The PKI itself should adopt a program that would appeal to all the noncapitalist Indonesian classes, for, as he reminded the party, the mass of the Indonesian people were “national-socialist” rather than proletariansocialist in their orientation. 100 Malaka suggested a sample program; it is

Rakjat,

too lengthy to be described here, but

as a revolutionary

it

program that did not

may be

roughly characterized

call for nationalization of all

land, socialization of small businesses, the dictatorship of the prolesoviets. 101

Communist leadership and the lack of an Indonesian bourgeoisie would, Malaka thought, assure 102 but that revolution could proletarian hegemony in the revolution, only succeed if the Indonesian people were solidly behind it. This unity tariat,

or

government by

316

Making a Revolution could only be achieved held in

common

if

the

Communists emphasized the

goals they

with the rest of the population instead of insisting on a

purely proletarian program. Therefore, he declared, “the

SR must

become more and more the organization of all the enemies of imperialism.” 103 The result of the revolution would be, in its first stage, a government with a mixed economy,

had a

in

which nonproletarian elements

voice:

In order to assure

[the

economic

continuation of]

opportunity must be given after national freedom

More than

that, the state

have played a

struggle

we

Indonesia an

achieved for the nonpro-

must give them material and moral

support in order to increase production. ians

in

(on a limited scale) private ownership and capitalist

letarians to exercise

enterprise.

is

life

.

.

.

role as great or greater

will not

be able

to consider the

Especially

if

the nonproletar-

[than the proletariat] in the

immediate establishment of a

soviet system in Indonesia. 104

Naar de “ Republiek-Indonesia was moderate about the goals of the revolution, it was militant concerning its execution. Malaka declared that he expected a Pacific war between America and Japan; this conflict would probably present the best opportunity for Indonesia to move. However, such a war was not likely in the immediate future, nor was it so inevitable that Indonesia could rely completely on it as the occasion for its revolution. Therefore, “the question as to when would be the best time to act for absolute and complete political freedom must, we feel, be answered with ‘Now and not later.’ Otherwise there may come a time when we will be forced to admit, ‘We let the oppor” tunity slip through our fingers then.’ 105 So saying, he outlined a revolutionary strategy centered on an attack on the Solo Valley area of Java Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Madiun, Kediri, and Surabaja. In a subsequent tract, written in 1925 ( Semangat Moeda The ’

If

—

Young

—

Spirit),

Tan Malaka was more

Comintern views or

his

own

cautious, either because of

sober second thought; he emphasized that

although the party should prepare for revolution,

beginning one until

it

was sure the

it

could not consider

entire population

was behind

it:

“Any Indonesian revolt will be in vain unless the people are ripe for rev” 106 olution. We must distrust and oppose ... all forms of ‘putsch.’ When the people were ready, however, the revolutionary action should begin. Commencing with strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, it should proceed through terrorist actions to an all-out revolt. The first 317

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

be made on the Outer Islands, he now thought; only after the Dutch had been weakened and distracted there should terrorism thrust should

begin in Java.

was concerned, the Prambanan decision was akin to, if not derived from, Malaka’s analysis; the question was whether or not the situation was ripe for revolt, and here Tan Malaka and the party were, by early 1926, in utter disagreement. Malaka appears to have learned of the Prambanan resolution just after the meeting via a letter from the PKI; according to him, Alimin was at that time still staying with him in Manila and had agreed with Malaka’s opinion that 107 it was foolhardy. He had corresponded with the party in Singapore about it, and when Alimin returned and added his voice to the arguments for revolt, he became highly indignant: So

I

far as strategy

come to Singapore, but not THE PKI WAS READY to lead

was asked

OR NOT and

HOW to

in order to

to

carry out such a revolution.

I

in order to discuss

WHETHER Dutch

a revolution against the

was asked

to

come

proceed from there to Moscow with Musso. There

and moral support, since the decision taken against Comintern rules 108

for approval

at

to

Singapore

we were

to ask

Prambanan went

.

In reply, he prepared a set of theses in which he warned that the party

was heading for a putsch and not a rebellion; it must check its course before it was too late. 109 Elaborating on the dieses shordy afterward in a third pamphlet, Massa Actie (Mass Action), he declared: To bring about a place soldiers

a putsch in a country like Indonesia (especially on Java), in

where capital is concentrated, well organized, and protected by and spies in the modern Western fashion, and where on the other

hand the people is

one

s

own

are

still

completely superstitious means to play with

fingers that will get burnt.

fire

—

it

These anarchists who are accus-

tomed to saying that the well-knit forces of the West can be crushed bv a few “exploding eggs” are being no more intelligent than a man who tries to beat in a stone wall with his head 110 .

Only an organized mass action, Malaka declared, would overthrow the Dutch: to achieve this, he urged die party to take advantage of all the legal opportunities that

still

remained

to

it.

Such

efforts

should

include strikes, boycotts of Dutch goods, campaigns for the extension of political rights, and, in the

Volksraad

gees as akin to

—

if

the opportunity presented

itself,

participation

which must have struck the Singapore refuand no more appropriate than the advice they had all

of

318

.

Making a Revolution received earlier from the Comintern and Semaun.

Malaka

heterogeneous character into

stated, to transform the PKI’s

that of a truly disciplined, proletarian elite; “until

not had a revolutionary party,” he asserted;

and

tions of people of ‘assorted’ views

time, however, the party rank

and

now

Indonesia has

has only had associa-

“it

political activities.”

At the same

should participate more in mak-

file

by musjawarah

ing decisions, which should be reached

Bureaucracy and autocracy

was necessary,

It

in the party

(

consultation )

apparatus should be strongly

opposed. The PKI must secure the backing of the masses, through either a national front or the

development of the Sarekat Rakjat, which

the party should influence as a bloc within: “If a ‘single party’ system

is

be used, the proletarians and nonproletarians will be gathered in one revolutionary organization, within which party the more conscious

to

and educated workers

will

form a

‘left

wing.’ This left

wing

will be-

come the driving force of the Indonesian movement.” 111 The PKI, Malaka continued, should pay special attention to building up its labor union strength and establishing an underground organization. It

must, however, be sure of controlling

argued (in contrast ous because

it

its

forces; terrorism,

Semangat Moeda ), was dangeruncontrollable, anarchist adventures. In any

to his position in

led to

must not now proceed to violence, for rebelliousness, it had waned in strength:

event, the party

had waxed

in

In several local actions for limited objectives the

shown

their strength

and

capacities.

if

international one). In the

mean

its

If [the

name

PKI and SR have

However, they are

“really

freedom and humanity,

of

party] acts in the

[it

already

and

(let

this fact

truly”

alone an

must not

intends to] this will clearly

plunge into an error as deep as that made by the bourgeois parties

(especially the party of Tjokroaminoto tion of

way

movement

the

not strong enough to carry out a general national action

be hushed up.

he

assembly was ordered

at the

and Company).

end of

last year,

we

When

the prohibi-

did not give voice to

our objections. Eight months have passed since then, and

still

nothing has

happened. Where are the hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in Java, Sumatra, the Celebes, who directly stand under our leadership or who

by us? Where have the faithful revolutionaries gone, in those eight months, who were gathered in the VSTP, SPPL, SBG, SBBE, etc., and are influenced

those

who

are not organized but

who sympathize

was our task campaign] against the

with us?

speedily to mobilize and attract the people [in a

It

issuing of the assembly prohibition, against the imprisonment, banishment,

and death of comrades Sugono, Misbach, appropriate and enthusiastic.

319

etc.,

with a mass action which was

Rise of Indonesian

We

should not have remained

Communism

silent in the face of the

enemy’s attacks, to

the point where a disagreement has arisen within the revolutionary ranks

which cannot be bridged, and where taken matters

their

in

own

hands,

anarchistically inclined

members have

persuading their comrades

join

to

them. 112

Indeed, Malaka concluded, even

if

the government’s current course of

action should destroy the legal party organization, Indonesian

munism would

lose less than

if

it

extinguished

itself in

Com-

an abortive

revolt.

Tan Malaka gave

his theses to Alimin, declaring that

he himself had

Prambanan group before the Comintern and that the International, which viewed the current period as one in which the capitalist forces had stabilized themselves, was not at all likely to support an ill-conceived and foredoomed rebellion. He proposed that the expedition to Moscow be scrapped and that instead a conference to develop a more realistic plan be held in Singapore between himself and representatives from the Indonesian no intention of sponsoring the proposals

of the

he declared, should be temporarily trans-

party. Party headquarters,

ferred to Singapore to avoid police interference

and

to facilitate inter-

and the PKI should reorganize itself and the SR in accordance with his suggestions and the ECCI resolution of April 1925. 113 Malaka later claimed that he could have vetoed the project outright, although his power to do so is, as we have seen, a matter of some dispute: national contacts,

Now six

I

regarded

it

beyond

as

my

authority to decide to call for a revolution

months hence, a revolution which had been agreed upon by a few

leaders of a

Communist party which was held

tern in one of the

most

Communist

made

as to

be a section of the Comin-

vital areas of the world.

Such a decision would have other

to

parties;

in

to

be made

Moscow an

whether [the party] had

in

Moscow

in consultation

investigation

sufficiently

would have

with

to

be

considered the nature of

Indonesian society, the class struggle (within that society), the Communist consciousness of the

members

of the PKI,

and the readiness

of other

Com-

munist parties to lend support to an Indonesian revolution led by the PKI. Although I had the veto right, I did not want to make use of this power. Before [the party] asked for support from Moscow,

I

wanted

to hold a

conference in Singapore which would be attended by representatives of its

all

major branches.

My

action in 1926

was thus not

to forbid the rebellion but to state

opinions and criticisms of the decision taken at Prambanan. 114

320

my

Making a Revolution Alimin reportedly agreed with Malaka’s proposals, although he could hardly have been happy with them, since he was one of the more enthusiastic proponents of revolt.

He

then departed for Singapore,

where he was to present the theses to the PKI leaders and request them to wait until Malaka was well enough to join them in discussion. Accounts of the ensuing events agree that Alimin met with the emigre leaders immediately on his return to Singapore. They differ, however, as to whether he presented Malaka’s theses or indicated his disapproval of their project. The most likely version is that he declared Tan Malaka had been too ill really to discuss the matter, that he had refused to back their project, and that they would have to make their appeal to Moscow alone 115 This they decided to do, with Musso and Sardjono reportedly taking the lead in insisting that the revolt be carried out at any hazard 116 Apparently Alimin did report Malaka’s warning that the Comintern would not back the project (we will remember his bitter remark that in Moscow “a spirit of slackening, retrogression and dissension is prevail.

.

5

and Musso to Russia to present the party’s appeal, it also discussed what to do if their request were denied. According to Semaun, the decision was this: if the International supported the endeavor, the two emissaries would ing'

),

for although the conference decided to send Alimin

send a message to delay action until material support had arrived and then set

off

a full-scale revolt. If the Comintern reaction was negative,

PKI would engage in guerrilla and terrorist actions on its own. In other words, the Communist leaders were intent on violence; the Comintern’s decision would affect the manner but not the occurrence of the combat 117 Just how quickly these decisions were reached is a matter of some the

.

mystery, given the conflicting dates at which the various meetings are

Manila, finally

11 s

However, Malaka, waiting impatiently in received a letter from Alimin asserting that it had been

said to have taken place

.

impossible to arrange the requested conference with the party leader-

and that he and a companion were planning to depart for Moscow 119 As soon as he was able, Malaka left for Singapore, where his worst suspicions were confirmed. He arrived at the place where the PKI leaders had been staying (the lodging house of Ki Masduki, in Kebun Pisang Geylang Serai, a Malay neighborhood in Singaship

.

pore), but he found no one there. Alimin and

Musso had

Canton and Russia; the other party leaders had returned 321

set off for

to Indonesia

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

and only Subakat, the permanent PKI agent 120 in Singapore, remained there when Malaka arrived. Tan Malaka quickly discovered that the theses had not been handed over by Alimin and that he had been badly outplayed by the to prepare for the revolt,

Prambanan

faction;

but he was not one to concede defeat so

easily.

Fortunately Subakat was a ready sympathizer for his viewpoint (reportedly he had never favored the Prambanan proposals ) and the two

them sat down to write the PKI executive on Java about Malaka’s views and the trick that had been played him. 121 Malaka demanded of

consultation with representatives of the party leadership; the prorebellion

heads were hardly pleased by

request completely, for by

now

badly divided. Accordingly,

this,

but they could not reject the

opinion in the central executive was

they sent the

current

vice-chairman,

Suprodjo, to talk with Malaka. After conferring for a few days with the

Singapore leaders he became convinced of the correctness of Tan

The three major leaders ( Malaka, Subakat, and Suprodjo) then composed and signed a new set of theses, to which was added the original Manila statement, which, according to one source, had been found secreted inside the rattan suitcase Alimin had carried with him from Manila. 122 This done, Suprodjo returned to the Indies Malaka’s

view.

and called a party conference to discuss the rejection of the entire Prambanan line. It was now June 1926, but instead of being ready for revolution the PKI was being split wide open.

322

XII

The WHILE

Rebellions

the party leadership outside the Indies

PKI

expedition to Russia, the

January

at

home was preparing

13, 1926, representatives of the

leaders of

its

units

was negotiating the

party central

from outside Batavia met

at

for revolt.

On

command and

PKI headquarters. 1 The

conference, apparently held to acquaint the provincial leaders further

with the revolutionary plans and to secure their agreement, affirmed that legal political activity

was no longer

possible

and that revolution

was die only hope: Propaganda work alone

is

not enough for the party to seize

power

in the

many workers who ask to join us because they are attracted by our propaganda does not mean that they can be trusted by us to take part when the time for fighting has come. Because of this we must begin taking extraordinary measures to consolidate and

country. Simply because there are

strengthen ourselves. In connection with the abolition of the right of assembly

we must

exercise caution

and must work

secretly,

but at the same time

more energetically than before. Our stress must not lie in propaganda alone, but must be directed most of all toward working on people who have already been attracted by our propaganda in order to train them to prepare and to carry out resistance.

Members

of the revolutionary party

may be referred to as the now on to act in fact as this

by the prohibition

who

are to participate in the fighting

we must teach them from how much we are hindered in

soldiers of the party; for soldiers,

no matter

of our right to hold meetings. 2

Trusted party members must be divided into three groups, declared: soldiers,

who would

it

prepare for the coming campaign;

was

spies,

who would check on what the enemy was planning; and propagandists, who would infiltrate other organizations and encourage a revoluwas candidly admitted, would not only the eventual revolt but give PKI adherents a renewed sense

tionary attitude. This, as

prepare for

of participation, for with the closing ities their

down

of the party’s public activ-

only function had been to pay dues. 3

323

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

The January conference further, stated the party conviction that the PKI revolutionary task was different from that of other Communist Europe the Communists aimed at class warfare and the overthrow of capitalism and in democratic countries could use parliamentary activity, the Indonesian path lay outside the law and was directed against foreign imperialism. The party must therefore overcome regional and ethnic differences, which the imperialists exploited to divide and rule the people, and must unite the population in a national, anti-Dutch struggle: “To the outside world we maintain whereas

parties:

that our

in

movement

is

based on internationalism and

and imperialism, but

capitalism

internally

we

is

directed against

also bear the

freeing the Indonesian people from the oppression

aim of

and slavery

of

Dutch imperialism.” 4 The decisions of the December 1925 meetings on the general procedure for revolt were reiterated at the Batavian conference. Some members wanted more concrete discussion, but this was refused. The Prambanan decisions were in fact very vague as to both timing and tactics, and an attempt to define party plans more clearly might well have revealed a serious division in its counsels. As it was, one such clash occurred: Abdulkarim, a fiery Atjehnese, suggested that the party

ought

to teach

people the art of

bomb

throwing as preparation for the

them by way of practice into the Indies’ various representative assemblies. Sugono (who had not yet left for Singapore) reacted with horror; such nihilism, he said, would merely bring the party into deep trouble before it was prepared for conflict. 5 Sugono himself seems to have been ambivalent ahout the proposed rebellion. He said as much in an article on the December 1925 VSTP “congress,” warning the union that its enemies were purposely driving it to compromise itself through violence. Anger alone would not bring victory, revolt, tossing

he pointed tion to

is

out,

“and

now

is

not yet the time, even though the associa-

well ordered, to take up the battle toward which they are trying

push

us.”

6

According to Tan Malaka, Sugono opposed the other PKI leaders their plans for revolution at the Singapore meeting; his

becoming a focus

blind

little

home.

7

Probably a recalcitrant

influence, however, for the party’s

commitment

but any chance of

of opposition vanished with his arrest

in prison after arriving

have had

in

to rebellion.

“A pine cause

is

Surakarta party organ declaimed at the time of the

324

and death Sugono would

mood was one

of

worth death!” the

December

confer-

The Rebellions ences. less:

“A

is

life

without reason, based solely on

not better that one dies? Struggle, but for a definite goal.

it

Come, comrades, forward, our goal

if

we

wait

Marx and not

We

close ranks!

shall not

be able

to reach

come to an end!” 8 Two years remember that the Communism

the world has

till

before Darsono had urged the of

self-satisfaction, is use-

PKI

to

the anarchism of Bakunin must govern the party; but

now Api quoted Bakunin

as

In a letter issued to the

its

PKI

guide. 9 locals

on February

1,

the

PKI executive

expressed the sense of impending conflict that gripped the party at

this

stage:

The time

for talking has passed; that for organizing our units has arrived.

Existing trade unions must be strengthened wherever they are already in

where no such unions are yet in existence, none should be set up, since that would only cause a loss of time. On estates which so far have no union, however, we must plant cells which will be ready when the time comes. Furthermore all tani [peasants] should follow us even though they existence, but

members nor provisional members of our party, agree with the movement and our leadership. 10

are neither sincerely

as long as they

The party headquarters also appealed to the branches for money; it was incurring no more than the usual deficit, it declared, but “costs have increased because of the ban on public meetings and other obstructions which are forcing us to work harder; this is the more difficult since

we

of fear that the

are forced to change our tactics.” Moreover, because

government would clamp down on the transfer

orders to the executive,

it

was necessary

of

money

to collect the funds as quickly

as possible. 11

The sense

of urgency

was

at least as great

lowers. Expectation of an uprising on

May

1,

among

1926,

the party fol-

had been

rife since

1925 and had even been assigned to groups other than the PKI. 12 As

became unbearable in the areas where the PKI was most active: “News of the rebellion traveled from mouth to mouth, yet its source was never known and remained a matter of conjecture; all the time the threats grew increasingly reckless. the time approached, the tension

Is

it,

then, surprising that in the eyes of

many people May

1,

the day of

became the most likely day for the outbreak of the insurrection?” 13 There was good reason to believe the Communists had intended May 1 to be marked at least by strikes or other demonstrations, and certainly the Dutch were convinced of it. the international proletariat,

325

Rise of Indonesian

Major railroad and sugar

strikes

Communism March the advise plantation man-

were expected, and

Attorney General instructed the Residents to

in

and arm their personnel in expectation of revolutionary outbreaks on that day. The Governor General called for preparedness, and predictions of disaster filled the Dutch-language agers to secure food supplies

press. 14

Conscious of

own weakness and

its

May

intercept action on

of

government preparations

Day, the PKI leadership decided

to avoid

any

chance of a confrontation. In April the party executive instructed branches and allied organizations not to celebrate to

May

Day,

to

its

in order

prevent the arrest of cadres whose services were needed “so that the

hour of the struggle will find us

be ours.”

15

all

prepared and victory will certainly

Consequently, the only salvoes fired on

those set off

by the

authorities.

May Day were

The most important government meas-

ure proclaimed that day was the addition to the criminal code of Article 153 bis

and

ter,

which subjected

to stiff

punishment those who

“intentionally express in word, writing, or illustration conditionally, or in disguised terms

— approval

—be

it

obliquely,

of disturbance of the

public peace, or overthrowing or interference with the established authority

in

the

Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies, or

who

and those who “distribute, sort. The immediate result of

create an atmosphere favorable to this,” exhibit, or publicize” materials of this this

was the

closing

down

of the revolutionary press

and the formal

May 3, of the units of the PKI and Sarekat Rakjat. 16 was now effectively underground. It was not illegal, al-

disbanding, on

The party though membership was forbidden could not hold meetings and

it

for

employees of the

could not express

itself

state;

openly

sarongs with hammer-and-sickle motif were banned by the

That the government did not move simultaneously

but

it

—even

new

law. 17

to arrest the remain-

was probably due to their inactivity on May Day and to the feeling that the PKI was a dying organization. The central party, it was known, was having a great deal of trouble collecting dues and maintaining the interest of the SR members. In the major Javanese cities, and especially in the Red strongholds of Surabaja and Semarang, government action seemed to have brought the movement to a halt. ing major party leaders

The

party’s

remaining functioning union, the VSTP, was rapidly decay-

and police raids on the Communist organizations in the Semarang area were so heavy that the (legal) PKI and SR units in that region ing,

had already been dissolved on April 326

26. 18

True, a

number

of incidents

The Rebellions were taking plaee

in the hinterlands:

an armed attack in Tegal and an

dump

attempt to blow up a munitions

in Jogjakarta

disorder in Banjuwangi in April, an attack on a

during March,

jail in

Pulau Tello

(Nias) in May, clashes in Atjeh during June, incidents of arson and

murder in Surakarta during July and August, and bombings in Batavia and disorder in Bantam during August and September. 19 This was disturbing, but it was in a tradition of disorganized local protest with which the government was familiar and which, it seemed, could best be dealt with by eliminating local Communist leaderships (these outbreaks were followed by the arrest of numerous party leaders in the areas concerned) and by moving troops or constabulary forces into disturbed areas rather than by acting directly against the party as a whole. 20 It

was a boon

to the

PKI

were persuaded

that the authorities

of the

Communists’ growing weakness, but the very factors that led the gov-

ernment

to this conclusion also

concerned the PKI leaders. The labor

unions of Java, which were to have provided the major revolutionary

were

thrust,

in a state of collapse. Secret terrorist organizations

been established

in

some

over them. In spite of the tions for

had

regions, but the center

December

decisions

little

or

no control

and subsequent

establishment, the disciplined, centrally controlled

its

had

resolu-

DO had

not yet been set up. Police raids on central and section headquarters in Java, carried out in early

of the

PKI

May, had supplied the

authorities with

archives. Contact with the outlying party sections

much

was poor,

and the transmission of the center’s ideas had depended to a great extent on its now-banned publications. There were conflicts within the regional party organizations, and even subsections showed increased independence of section leadership. 21 Disorganization and nervousness had led to a fear of spies in the movement’s ranks of such proportions that the executive had to caution its followers against too much zeal in denouncing their comrades. 22 With the formal dissolution of the PKI, the party executive finally established an illegal organization. In May PKI headquarters were

moved

to

Bandung, apparently

to

make

it

less

convenient for the gov-

The popular reaction in the Priangan, as elsewhere in Indonesia, had largely died out during the latter part of 1925, and Bandung was the only major city in Java outside the capital where the PKI organization was still relatively intact and where a general prohibition of assembly was not in effect. The ernment

to

observe party

activities.

327

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

now

consisted of Sardjono (chairman), Budisutjitro (secre-

tary, replaced

during his imprisonment by Karmani and Baharuddin

executive

and Winanta (treasurer, replaced on his arrest by Suprodjo, who was also vice-chairman ) The party tried to improve contacts with its sections and to prevent unauthorized persons from presenting themselves to outlying units as emissaries of the central executive ( there had been problems of false representation and of local groups refusing to accept real delegates ) 23 The DO was finally brought into being under Saleh),

.

.

Winanta’s leadership; reportedly,

its

departments, one to recruit members of cure

Red Guards, one

So far as

we

can

see,

money, and one

to collect

however, the

centrally controlled force,

and

were divided into four the army and police, one to pro-

activities

DO

to provide supplies. 24

did not become important as a

remained largely

guerrilla organization

in local hands.

The Bandung PKI position, for

by

this

leadership found

itself in

an

all

but untenable

time the more impatient party branches were

pressing the executive to proclaim a general uprising in a matter of

weeks; other units indicated that

if

rebellion started, they could not

be

counted on. Moreover, developments on the Dutch side added a new element of uncertainty: in March 1926, after a lengthy cabinet the

De Geer government was formed

Koningsberger, the

first

crisis,

in the Netherlands, with V. C.

chairman of the Volksraad, as

its

Minister of

Colonies. Koningsberger appointed A. C. D. de Graeff to replace

Fock

September 1926. De Graeff had been a close coworker of Idenburg and Van Limburg Stirum; his nomination was Governor General

as

as of

generally seen as a criticism of Fock’s hard-handed treatment of the

Indonesian opposition and an attempt to restore cooperation between the Indonesians and the government. 25

PKI could thus argue that it would bring before engaging in the

who were

The more cautious leaders of was better to see what the new regime

a hopeless rebellion; however, to those

seemed the revolt must be carried out before the new Governor General had calmed Indonesian emotions bv his

intent

on violence,

it

moderation.

From June 20

to

26 a conference at party headquarters assessed the

preparedness of the sections for a revolutionary attempt. Of the major units represented there only four

(

Batavia, Bantam, the Priangan,

South Sumatra ) indicated they were ready for

revolt.

Lengthv discus-

sions showed, however, that although the party branches

divided on a number of issues,

and

were widely they were almost unanimously in favor 328

The Rebellions was therefore decided to go through with the plan for revolution but to postpone for some months the deadline by which all the sections must be ready for action 20 No sooner had this agreement been reached than Suprodjo returned from his conference with Tan Malaka. He immediately held a council of war with the other members of the executive in Bandung and presented Malaka’s position. The only result was to deepen divisions within the PKI command, for although some members tended to agree with Suprodjo’s arguments, party chairman Sardjono was able to prevent the rescinding of the Prambanan program 27 Suprodjo was not willing to let matters rest with this, and during July he toured the Javanese branches of the party, explaining Malaka’s standpoint and urging the sections to reconsider the Prambanan commitment. Meanof rebellion in the near future. It

.

.

while, one of the regional representatives to the June party conference,

PKI leader Djamaluddin Tamin, stopped in Singapore on his way home from Java. After some argument he was persuaded to Malaka’s position and joined him and Subakat in their letter-writing campaign against the Prambanan project and for a new convention of PKI leaders at Singapore 28 The effect of this pressure, added to the hesitations already felt by a number of the less emotional party branches, was evident in deliberations held during July between the PKI executive and section representatives. The cause of the discussions was the demand by the most hotheaded Communist locals, Tegal in Java and Padang Pandjang in

the Sumatran

.

Sumatra, that the party take revolutionary action in the near future; the other branches did not agree, they hinted, they would their

own

29

they were supported by

dragged

the uprising

its

heels,

would be

allies

among who,

if

all

30 .

In this view

the Sumatran sections; most of Java, how-

and the executive decision was,

held, but not right then

In August the battle his

move on

Bantam, Bengkulen, and Batavia joined them, urging

.

revolution before Governor General Fock departed

ever,

if

waxed

fiercer:

as before, that

31 .

from the

Straits

Tan Malaka and

continued their correspondence, winning

the hesitant Javanese sections but also

among

allies

not only

the Sumatrans,

they were generally more determined on revolt, were also

inclined to listen with respect to the arguments of their island’s most

prominent Communist. The PKI executive, whose own feelings on the

by now much less than certain, attempted to soften Malaka’s blows by assuring him that the Prambanan decision had in-

uprising were

329

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

would have gone over into revolt only if it had proved successful and if aid came from Russia. Since it was impossible to hold a strike, and since other preparations had failed entirely, the executive argued, this plan had become a dead letter. Instead, the Java leadership declared, it would tended not a revolution but rather a general

strike that

wait until conditions were favorable to declare a revolution. 32

Malaka, however, was not only interested in renouncing immediate plans for revolt. In the

first

he

place,

replied, the

Prambanan

decision

must be formally rescinded and the PKI must concentrate not on preparing a revolution but on reorganizing its ranks. The party, he charged, had lost whatever discipline it had possessed; its trade unions, which were to have been the basis for the revolution, were in disorder; on Moscow for aid had been born of a refusal recognize that the people of the Indies, on whom the revolt must

and the decision to

to rely

depend, were not then in a

mood

to support a revolution themselves. 33

word to the deed, he refused to accept shipments of arms Alimin and Musso had ordered for transmission to the Indies, and

Fitting the that

they lay piled in a warehouse in Tanjong Pagar, Malaya. 34 Malaka’s arguments leaders, this

who saw

their

made all movement

too

much

Bandung anarchy. By

sense to the

visibly dissolving into

time their contact with the party sections was nearly severed, and

some

units refused to

answer even their urgent missives. Consequently,

Bandung on August 22, voted to send messengers to all the sections to review with them the general situation and discuss Malaka’s proposals, and it warned the party branches not to take independent action in starting a revolt. A major point it hoped to put across was the need to restore party discipline: the “federative centralism” inaugurated in December 1924 would have to be replaced, it was asserted, by the tight control of the party’s earlier days. 35 In Sumatra, this reversal created enormous confusion. Padang Pandjang, which was more than ready for rebellion and was already engaged in terrorist activity, appealed to Tan Malaka in the hope that the executive, meeting in

he could be persuaded

to give the signal for revolt. 36

Meanwhile, on

group of thirteen Sumatran revolutionaries conferred in Singapore (Malaka was at this time absent from the city) and estab-

August

31, a

lished an “Indonesian Trading Association”

(Sarekat

Dagang Indo-

which was to provide the framework for a party machine to be placed in the hands of Alimin and Musso when they returned from Russia. The organization would be centered in Penang and would have nesia),

330

The Rebellions branches in Singapore, Johore, and Kota Tinggi; Tan Malaka would be a key participant but not the

This

new body

man

in control. 37

appears to have existed only as long as Tan Malaka

remained out of town; on September 12

Tamin

led a meeting at

disband.

The gathering

pressed for

denounced the Musso-Alimin expedition, the revocation of the Prambanan decision, and called for

the formation of a ership.

and Djamaluddin which the “trading association'’ was ordered to he, Subakat,

new

also

executive in Penang under

Tan Malaka ’s

lead-

Malaka’s viewpoint on the uprising was thus endorsed; the

organizers of the trading association were ordered to return to Su-

matra, and the four messengers

who had brought Padang

Pandjang’s

appeal were given the meeting’s decisions to take back as their reply.

Within a few days, the Dutch spy

at the

PKI Singapore center

reported,

prominent party leaders were expected to arrive from Java, and it looked to him as if the whole PKI would then be brought under Malaka’s control. 38

The Singapore tic,

and one reason

realize

The

agent’s

view of Malaka’s position was overly optimis-

misjudgment may have been that he did not

for his

how much Bandung’s

control over the party

had

deteriorated.

ringleaders of the opposition in Java were the party units of the

northern coast (Pasisir) towns of Tegal, Tjirebon, and Pekalongan. Of these, Tegal

was the most impatient

for action. Grievances in that area

was eager to avenge the death of his brother, VSTP chairman Sugono; PKI adherents desired to avenge the casualties they had suffered in conflicts with the Sarekat Hidjau and the police in the surrounding villages; and the population as a whole was in a desperate and angry mood because the regional authorities, having gotten four years behind in their collections, were now forcibly extracting the payment of all back taxes. 39 Tegal therefore wanted no delay, and it called on the PKI central executive and the neighboring party sections to aid in an uprising that would extend over the north coast of Java and aim at assassinating Europeans and government officials. 40 In response to this demand, a meeting between representatives of the Bandung executive, Pekalongan, Tegal, and Tjirebon was convened in a rice field outside the town of Tegal on the

were numerous: the party

leader, Suleiman,

night of August 22, 1926. In the debate that took place at this gathering, the conferees split in three directions.

The Tegal spokesman declared

delay no longer and that

it

should not concern 331

that the party should itself

unduly over the

Communism

Rise of Indonesian organization of the rebellion.

Once the

uprising

had begun, the

hesi-

would be forced to join in, since they could not afford to see it defeated. PKI secretary Budisutjitro, the representative of the Bandung headquarters, took the opposite view. Having come to agree with Tan Malaka’s analysis of the situation, he urged that the party give up its plans for revolt as suicidal and devote its energies to building up its organization and popular support. Salimun, the representative of the Pekalongan section, attempted to mediate between them, urging that the PKI take immediate steps to prepare for revolution, but at the same time warning against an isolated attempt at tant party sections

revolt. 41

was finally decided to send a representative of the Pasisir branches to Bandung for a full-dress debate with party headquarters. Salimun was selected, and on August 29 he returned from his mission and conferred in Tjirebon with the PKI section there and with representatives from Tegal. The executive, he reported, had rejected Tegal’s proposal; it had implied that revolt would begin in the near future but had said the first task was to re-establish party discipline and central It

control. 42

Neither Pekalongan nor Tegal liked the executive stand, but they disagreed on

how

far to defy

Tegal declared that

it:

no command

it

would wait a

were given in the near future, it would act independently; Pekalongan disagreed, saying that an isolated uprising would be madness. The result was a decision to little

longer, but

if

for revolt

poll the other party units in order to find out their views

win them

on revolt and

an early action. Accordingly, Salimun of Pekalongan and Abdulmuntalib of Tjirebon set out to visit the other to

over,

if

possible, to

Java branches of the party. 43

On September result of the poll

16 the two delegates

had been overwhelmingly

the small Central Javanese branch of

ready for

met again in

The

in Tjirebon.

Pekalongan’s favor: only

Temanggung had declared

itself

important centers of Jogjakarta, Magelang, and Surakarta the party was completely disorganized, and in Madiun the

police

found.

revolt. In the

were so watchful that no chance 44

On

for a conference could

be

the following day, Herujuwono, a leader of the Batavia

party section and newly appointed head of the underground

DO,

rived in Tjirebon and sympathized with Pekalongan’s view. 45

On

tember 18 the group called on Tegal

to

send representatives

to

ar-

Sep-

them

to

discuss the situation. That recalcitrant unit sent onlv one delegate,

332

The Rebellions Sumitro; he apparently showed

little

inclination to water

down

his

branch’s views, for the final compromise reached by the conference

represented a virtual victory for Tegal.

It

was decided

that although

the Batavia, Pekalongan, and Tjirebon leaders continued to feel on principle that a revolution should be carried out in a centralized fashion,

they would neither oppose nor encourage an independent

tive

by Tegal; and

if

that branch, bearing in

ions of the other Javanese sections, its

was

still

initia-

mind the negative opindetermined on rebellion,

neighbors on the Pasisir would aid in the struggle. 40

Tegal was

all

too ready to take advantage of even a grudging

acquiescence. Several days after the conference Salimun,

who had

returned to Pekalongan, received a wire from Tegal announcing that

would revolt on September 28, only a few days off. Would Salimun come to Tegal and discuss his branch’s part in the uprising? The Pekalongan party leader was reportedly horrified at this announcement of revolution on so short notice; but neither he nor the Pekalongan PKI secretary Tajib could make the trip to Tegal, for by now they were being closely watched by the already suspicious police. Consequently, they stood by helplessly, waiting for the imminent ex-

that section

plosion in the neighboring city. 47

While Tegal was thus teetering on the brink of revolution, other plans for an uprising were being made in Batavia. The capital was one of the areas in

which party

sections,

having raised both enthusiasm and

cash by preaching imminent revolution, were finding themselves in an exceedingly

difficult position

when

they failed to produce a revolt. In

some places people, caught up by chiliastic emotions, had responded to party appeals for funds by selling literally all their possessions. By now this exultant faith had given way to bitterness, and the Communists were in danger of being turned on by what had been their most fervent supporters. In order to check the anti-Communist backlash in

community, the Batavia section sponsored a

series of

bomb

own

its

throwings

during August and early September, as a result of which a number of

Communists were

arrested.

Those subsequently released found the

pressures for rebellion as high as ever and, smarting from rough handling

by the

police,

were determined

own

to take matters into their

hands. 48

Sometime during the

latter

part

of

August Sukrawinata,

vice-

chairman of the Batavia branch, drew up an independent plan revolt,

based on his belief that an attack on the capital was

333

all

that

for

was

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

necessary to set the whole country in flames.

which was intended

of the Revolution,

He formed

to rally the

a Committee

Communist

revolu-

49 tionary forces outside the authority of the hesitant central leadership.

On

September 13 he and other impatient leaders from both Java and Sumatra (Herojuwono, Samudro, Baharuddin Saleh, Mahmud Sitjintjin, and Hamid Sutan) met in Batavia and formed the Committee of Supporters of the Indonesian Republic (Komite Penggalang Republik Indonesia). 50 This group, which was

and was kept

secret

members out

its

to

first

headed by Baharuddin Saleh

from the Bandung headquarters, decided to send the party sections in Java and Sumatra in an at-

acknowledgment of the Committee as the organthe revolution. 51 There were thus, in the latter part of Septem-

tempt

to secure their

izer of

ber 1926, three centers claiming authority over the Communist Party of Indonesia:

Tan Malaka and

his supporters across the Straits, the revo-

lutionary committee in Batavia, and, last official

clearly least, the

headquarters in Bandung.

The reader has

whom we

last

may comfort himself that his puzzlement by Tan Malaka, who was expecting them any day in

months before.

was shared

what had become in all this saw leaving for Moscow some

possibly been wondering

time of Alimin and Musso, five

and by now

If so,

Singapore, 52 and by the

he

Bandung

which was hoping their appearance would rescue it from its desperate position ( not to mention the Malayan Chinese merchant in Tanjong Pagar, in whose warehouse all

executive,

those impaid-for weapons were stored). So

far,

however, no word

two had been received, and they seemed to have vanished. This was far from the case, however; and to discover what had happened to them we must turn back to June 12, 1926, and observe M. N. Roy, who of the

was sitting at his desk in Moscow writing a very worried letter. As the man then in charge of colonial affairs on the ECCI presidium, Roy had every reason to be concerned over the state of the Indonesian party. Reports reaching Moscow were alarming: At

first

sight the situation appears favorable.

looks less encouraging.

Most

.

.

to the

white

it

are afflicted with the “infantile disease

.

any extensive

of leftism”; neither can they develop to the police

closer examination,

of the stalwart fighters are either in exile or

prison, while those left at large

known

But on

activity, since

and are constantly shadowed by

terror, the organisation links of the

spies.

they are

all

Moreover, owing

party have been considera-

bly loosened, and the influence of the Central Committee on the separate

branches

is

not sufficiently strong;

53 .

.

,

334

The Rebellions Darsono had arrived some two months before, and presumably his account had done little to put the Comintern at rest; at the same time, as

Roy noted

in his letter,

in the party long

enough

brief period in

to prevent

him from being

of

much

help to

way to deal with the situation. was directed to Sneevliet, who in 1926 was enjoying a the Communist sun as chairman of the CPH; it in-

the International in

Roy’s missive

he had been out of touch with developments

its efforts

to find a

formed him that the International thought the

situation in Indonesia so

would send one of its own observers to find out just what was going on. Communications with the Indonesian party, Roy complained, were almost nonexistent, and there was good reason to believe that the PKI was under an ultraleft leadership that was leading it toward a putsch. This suspicion had been supported by letters from Tan Malaka received a month before 54 and by reports from some Javanese Communists that Bergsma had sent on to the Comintern. In dealing with this situation the ECCI was handicapped by the fact that alarming that

it

the Indonesian representatives to the International, although they did

not agree with the Prambanan endeavor, took positions that were no

more orthodox: Semaun insisted on his own interpretation of the Indonesian revolutionary movement and its needs, and Darsono had agreed with him and was therefore no help. Semaun had drawn up an action program for the Indonesian party which was too unorthodox for the Comintern to accept; but at the same time the International did not want to fight on two fronts by declaring itself against both Semaun and the party in the Indies. In view of this most delicate situation, the

agent the International proposed to send

(

a

man named

Miller,

whom

Roy described as quite unsuitable, but the only one available for the job) 55 was instructed only to observe, to talk with the party leaders, and

to get their reactions to the Comintern’s suggested

he reported back, the

The next

step,

ECCI would

program. After

decide on firmer steps.

Roy continued, was

to

put the agent in contact with

the party on Java; and this promised to be no easy matter. Neither

Darsono nor Semaun could recommend any regular party leaders still at large who were reliable and safe enough from police surveillance for

The only address they could give was that of Batavia, 56 whose membership in the party was sup-

Miller to use as contacts.

a Dr.

Kwa

in

posedly a secret but might already have been discovered by the police

which suspicion, we might say, Semaun and Darsono were quite right). Semaun had remarked that one or two of the Javanese studying (in

335

Rise of Indonesian

Communism

accompany Miller and help him contact the party in Indonesia, but the two people he could suggest ( Subardjo in Leiden and Gatot Tarunamihardja in The Hague) were not party members. Semaun had proposed that he or Darsono go to Holland to talk to the young men he had in mind and, if they proved willing, to instruct them on their mission; but this procedure seemed too risky and too expensive to the Comintern. Instead, the ECCI was sending Miller to Holland to see Sneevliet, who was to supply him with instructions and addresses in Indonesia, which decision, Roy warned, was to be kept secret from Darsono and Semaun, who had violently opposed Miller consulting with the Dutch Communists and therefore had not been

in

Holland might be willing

to

told.

On

July 10 Sneevliet wrote back.

The Indonesian

situation was,

he

agreed, a very touchy one, and the comrades in the Indies were unfortunately inclined to act without thinking of the consequences. As for

the Comintern draft program for the Indies, which

he

felt that

it

was too

Roy had

enclosed,

radically nationalist to permit the party to

operate on a legal basis, as the International wished: the Dutch authorities,

he reminded, were extremely upset by references to independ-

ence. Semaun’s

program was

of course all wrong,

he agreed; and

at the

same time he put in a plug for his own ideas by remarking that Tjokroaminoto and the SI were due to regain their momentum and that it was a shame stupid PKI criticisms had destroyed the bloc within. As for the International’s emissary, Sneevliet opined that try as he might he would never be able to comprehend the situation in the Indies at a glance. The best thing, he suggested, would be to order Tan Malaka to risk a few weeks’ journey to Java during August or September in order to contact the party and the Comintern representative and to help the latter straighten things out. Finally, Sneevliet

himself be invited to

Moscow

Indonesian question and, tern’s colonial office.

if

urged that he

to participate in the discussion of the

possible, to find

employment

in the

Comin-

57

seem

have run into the sand: Sneevliet did not get his job with the International, Tan Malaka did not return to the Indies, and there is no sign that Miller arrived either in Singapore or in All these proposals

to

Indonesia. Indeed, the Comintern agent

cow, for

just after

Roy wrote

may

not even have

his letter to Sneevliet the

whole

left

Mos-

situation

was changed by the arrival of Alimin and Musso. 58 They first talked to Darsono and Semaun, informing them of their proposed petition to the 336

The Rebellions Comintern. 59 Immediately afterward the four leaders were brought

The Internationals worst suspicions about PKI plans were now confirmed, but at least there was the comfort that the Comintern now possessed two more likely agents to send to the Indies. before the ECCI.

According

to

Semaun, Zinoviev and the other representatives of the

failing Trotskyist left

for they

were eager

and

encouraged the two emissaries to strengthen their influence

in their project,

among

the foreign

was not proper for proletarian revolution in the East. 60 Musso and Alimin, who had as little idea of what was going on in Russia as the Comintern did of events in Indonesia, were at first attracted by this support; but after having absorbed some advice from their more knowledgeable compatriots and seen just what the Soviet situation was, they thought better of backing the Trotskyist horse. In any event, the Comintern power relationship was made quite clear by the first ECCI decision on their request for support, which was an unequivocal no, based on the Stalinist reasoning that the current period of world economic prosperity was

parties

to disprove Stalin’s contention that the time

not conducive to revolutionary success. 61

The two PKI

leaders, the

ECCI

for the time being in order to

declared,

were

to

remain

in

improve their Communist

Moscow training,

which, according to Alimin, consisted chiefly of instruction on the of Trotskyist deviation. 62

new program

During

this

evils

period the Comintern drafted a

and Semaun composed a sufficiently orthodox letter of criticism to the PKI. According to Semaun, the International’s criticisms and suggestions were roughly the same as Tan Malaka’s had been, 63 and this claim is bolstered by two lengthy discussions of the Indonesian Communist situation that appeared in journals of the International in November 1926. They were written before the uprising in Java, but it seems most unlikely that they were composed before the Comintern discussed the Indonesian question or without knowledge of it, since one of the writers was Darsono, who was privy to the whole affair. Declaring that the PKI must greatly improve its discipline and its ideological level, Darsono urged that the party concentrate on building up its mass national revolutionary base on the example of the Chinese bloc within: “The task of the Indonesian Communists in this period is the same as that of the Chinese comrades. They must support the for the Indonesian party,

Indonesian national revolutionary movement with

and

after that strive to seize

its

all

their strength

leadership for themselves.”

337

64

An

— Rise of Indonesian appearing

article

at the

PKI aberrant course

same time

Communism

in the Profintern press decried the

as follows:

In general, attempts to attract the masses into the labor unions in Indonesia

are not being carried on with sufficient energy.

found not only itself.

in

government

The unexpectedly

terror,

but also

The reason in the

swift industrialization

for this

is

be

to

nature of the country

(principally in the field of

agriculture), the head-turning successes of the revolutionary

movement

in

1923-1924, together with the absence of battle-trained industrial cadres of the proletariat, created the situation referred to by comrade Stalin in 1925 the simultaneous overevaluation of the revolutionary possibilities of the

lib-

eration

movement and

the underestimation of the significance of an alliance

of the

working

with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperi-

alism.

.

.

class

.

The present period of reaction which we are experiencing demands other methods of united work and contact with the masses. The successes of Anglo-Dutch capitalism

in

Indonesia

call for the

organization of a broad

struggle on the economic level as the primary step. In the immediate future

Communists] are faced with the task of carrying out long-

[the Indonesian

term, methodical, painstaking

work

for the establishment

of connections

with the masses on the basis of representing their daily economic and cultural needs. This

when

the period

government

is

a very difficult task, but

it is

absolutely necessary during

the proletarian forces are gathering themselves against

reaction.

The experience

of the Soviet labor unions has

shown

that such a skillful adaptation to changing circumstances, such a systematic

and thorough penetration into the very depths of the working mass, such a slow and patient guiding of its various elements however small they be

—

into the revolutionary struggle gives assurance of victory at the

moment

of

engagement with the government and the bourgeoisie. 65

the decisive

some three months the Indonesian delegates met again with representatives of the ECCI, this time in the presence of Stalin himself. After

Stalin declared himself not unfavorable to revolution at the time

as 1926

wore

was such

—

for

on, the International’s situation, particularly in China,

began to talk increasingly of a revolutionary upsurge but he was opposed to an effort that showed every sign of

that

in the East

—

it

disorganization and

Musso began

little

promise of success. 66 As a

their journey

back

result,

Alimin and

to the Indies, bearing instructions

denouncing their program and calling

for restoration of the party’s

and for radical nationalist agitation. It was now earlv Octomonths from the time they had left Singapore.

legal status ber, six

This was the result of the Alimin-Musso expedition as the Comintern

338

)

The Rebellions saw

it;

We

will

but according to Semaun, there

a

is

little

more

to the story

67 .

remember that while meeting in Singapore the Prambanan leaders had discussed the possibility of Moscow’s opposition to their project; they had then decided that in case of a Comintern refusal they would carry on the battle by guerrilla warfare. The arguments of the International in rejecting the PKI plan were accepted readily enough by Alimin, but not by the strong-willed Musso. That leader, after chafing for a time at his enforced inactivity in Moscow, with little hope that the Comintern would reverse its position, determined to send off the message that would set in motion the alternate Singapore plan. The problem was how to get the word through, and the key to this was Semaun, who before leaving the Netherlands for Russia had arranged with the

CPH

for an address through which, in cases of extreme need,

messages could be forwarded to the PKI contact

knowing Semaun,

of this, asked

Semaun

whom Musso had

inadvisedly told of the Singapore confer-

he next proceeded

remember, seems

and

told

him

to

to

do

Musso was not

so.

Semaun’s assistant (who,

off

we

will

said that he might send a message via

the secret address. Sure enough, the ruse worked, and

phantly sent

easily de-

have been the student Iwa Kusumasumantri

Semaun had

that

Musso,

him with the address; but

to provide

ence’s alternate decision, refused to feated, however;

in the Indies.

the fateful wire

Musso trium-

68 .

Semaun soon discovered what had happened, and he was now faced with a very uncomfortable problem. Should he confess what had taken place to the Comintern, thus bringing the wrath of the

ECCI upon

his

head? No, discrete silence would prevent unpleasant feelings all around. Semaun thus determined to say nothing, and shortly thereafter,

when

the meeting with Stalin took place, three of the four Indo-

nesian participants

home

knew

to the Indies with

it

to

that

Alimin and Musso journeyed

farce.

no great haste;

embarrassing to arrive before It

be a

it

was too

it

would, after

all,

have been

late.

would form a dramatic conclusion to our story if we could recount the PKI had received Musso’s message and proceeded to battle as

planned. Unfortunately, however,

we have no

evidence, either from

the available police reports, or from confessions of the leaders of the uprising, or from circumstantial evidence, that the party ever received

Musso’s command. In the Dr.

Kwa, was not

the message.

On

first

place, the

so secret as supposed,

the other hand,

if

Communist contact on

Java,

and he may never have gotten

the government had intercepted the

339

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

would probably have made much of it in later reports on the Communist uprisings, since it was eager to prove the Communists were inspired by commands from abroad. Could the Dutch Communists have gotten wind of the affair and re-

wire and interpreted

correctly,

it

fused to transmit the message?

however, that Dr.

have given

formed the

it?

Kwa

We

have no record of

command,

received the

Presumably

official

it

whom would

to the party leaders in

executive and

the Singapore conference

to

who

who were

still

Assuming,

this.

he

Bandung, who

included those participants in at large. 69

We

have observed,

however, that the Bandung executive had been growing increasingly disturbed by the party’s descent into anarchy and had concluded that

must be restored before any further move toward revolt was message assuring Comintern support might well have altered

discipline

made. its

A

position radically, but not one refusing aid;

ceived Musso’s message,

showed no

it

tee,

revolt.

As

that leadership re-

swayed by it. Tan have flatly opposed an

signs of being

Malaka’s executive-in-exile would, of course,

independent

if

for the rebels gathered in the Batavia

commit-

they were already determined for an uprising, and Musso’s mes-

sage would merely have echoed the decision already taken. In point of

had already passed well beyond the stage where Musso’s command would have made any difference. When we left the PKI on Java to recount the adventures of the mission to Moscow, it was September 1926, and the party section in Tegal was about to revolt on its own. The uprising was to take place toward the end of the month, and it was decided to give the sign by fact,

the situation

exploding a firecracker. Unfortunately, the gentleman to signal

was entrusted misunderstood the

date,

and so the

whom

the

local revolu-

on one night but the firecracker did not go off until the next. The Tegal rebellion was thus literally stillborn, and the Indies tionaries gathered

was preserved temporarily from

revolution. 70

The public peace did not remain undisturbed the Batavia committee, to which the initiative

ceeding apace with

its

for long,

now

however, for

passed,

was pro-

plans for revolution. In the middle of October

Dahlan, a West Sumatran Communist and one-time student at the school for native officials (Stovia), returned to the capital and took over the leadership of the committee; in handing over control to him. Sukrawinata is reported to have advised him not to contact the Ban-

dung executive because Meanwhile,

the

of

that

body’s “weak-kneed viewpoint.”

committee members 340

71

had been polling the PKI

The Rebellions branches about the Batavia plans for immediate revolt: Baharuddin Saleh went to Padang (which agreed),

Mahmud

to

Makassar (uncer-

and Herujuwono to Surakarta (uncertain), Surabaja (refused), Semarang (refused), Tjirebon (refused,) and Tegal (agreed). Sukrawinata went to Bantam and the Priangan (agreed), and Bakar, a friend of Mahmud, went to Palembang (which refused). 72 In spite of this very mixed reception the leaders of the Batavia committee, meettain),

ing in the capital at the end of October, set their action for the night of

November

On

barely two weeks

12, 1926,

the night of

November

6,

off.

73

the rebel leaders met in Tjirebon to

discuss final arrangements for the uprising.

At

this conference,

claimed, Herujuwono was put in charge of the action in

Salimun and Abdulmuntalib were given

command

West

it

is

Java,

over Central Java,

and the Semarang leader Mohammad Ali was entrusted with East 74 The revolt was set definitely for midnight on November 12; all Java. Java and the West Coast of Sumatra were to rise up. Final instructions, it was stated, would be sent out to the sections by the revolutionary headquarters, which would henceforth be located in Tjirebon, where police surveillance was relatively lax. 75 Dahlan remained in the capital to organize the action there. On November 7, meetings were held by various party units on Java to commemorate the Bolshevik revolution and to receive the news of the revolt plans, 76 and on November 8 Herujuwono is reported to have conferred in Tjirebon with the leaders

VSTP, who with much reluctance agreed with a strike on November 13. 77 of the

to support the uprising

Meanwhile, the revolutionary emissaries visited the major PKI tions to inform to

them

of the

impending

revolt:

sec-

Abdulmuntalib traveled

Semarang, but he was too closely trailed by the police to contact the

party there;

Mohammad

Ali journeyed to East Java and, having shaken

was able to talk with Communists in that area; Herujuwono went to West Java and talked to the leaders in Batavia and Bantam. The net result was, reportedly, that all the party sections his trackers,

consulted declared their support except those of Surakarta, Jogjakarta,

Madiun, and some units from the eastern tions for the uprising

9 and 12, and the

tip of Java.

The

last instruc-

were sent out from Tjirebon between November

final

go-ahead was given barely twenty-four hours

before the revolt was to begin. 78 Just

events

how much is

the party leadership in

unclear, although

it

Bandung knew

seems most unlikely that 347

it

of these

was

corn-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

authority.

The

Singapore center was certainly aware of the Batavia committee’s

exis-

pletely ignorant of so widespread a plot against

its

few days before the revolt Djamaluddin Tamin wrote Dahlan and begged him and Baharuddin Saleh to come to Singapore

tence, for a

as soon as possible to discuss party policy. 79

rebel leaders,

Bandung made

November by

issuing a circular to

referendum

to

one of the

a last vain effort to avert disaster in

purge of the party and a return

PKI branches

calling for a

had

to the strict centralization that

On November

conference.

new

for the election of a

the

all

December 1924

prevailed before the

According

executive was called for

10, a

by the

Priangan section and Bandung subsection (the “leading unit” of the party),

which nominated the antirebellion leader Suprodjo

man. 80 By

however, the central leadership actions were quite

this time,

beside the point; the situation was far out of

We

might

its

control.

what the police were doing at this these events were unknown to them. Indeed, the

also ask ourselves just

time and whether

all

attitude of the authorities all

as chair-

is

very curious, for they were well aware of

but the immediate details of the

plot.

From

British intelligence

and their own spy in PKI Singapore headquarters they knew of Musso and Alimin’s journey and of the debate between Tan Malaka and the party leaders in the Indies; they were also well acquainted sources

with the Batavia committee and sources

have used

I

its

intentions, for

to describe this organization

is

one of the major a government re-

port written not after the uprisings but in October 1926. 81

lands Indies intelligence service had

some

known

The Nether-

the secret party code for

and the correspondence between the sections presented it difficulty. They knew and shadowed the leaders of the rebel-

time,

with

little

lion;

but they did not

On November

act.

Abdulmuntalib sent a coded wire to the Pekalongan party chairman which gave the moment for the revolt; the local 7,

authorities deciphered

importance.

The wire

it

but somehow did not think

it

a matter of

read, decoded:

Urgent. Salimun, Pekalongan; also for Temanggung.

The time is set for November 12/13, 1926, between midnight and 2 a m The people every.

where must muntalib, It

revolt; all

November

was not

until the

government

7,

officials

.

and police must be

killed.

Abdul-

1926. 82

evening of November 11 that someone thought

of sufficient interest to

show

it

to the Resident of

342

this

Pekalongan. That

The Rebellions gentleman, being of a somewhat more nervous nature, warned Batavia

and ordered the arrest of the Communist leaders in his district. 83 While the government was rousing itself to action, Tjirebon’s final instructions were being sent out to the party branches. The method by which these messages were distributed was (we will remember here the plans laid

down

in

December 1925)

that

coded messages were

brought, generally by railroad and tram conductors, to the major party branches, which then put them into another code

own

had its The instructions were (

each

district

and sent them on to the section leaders. then decoded, written on little red notes, and distributed, generally by women, to the group leaders. 84 One of the three main messages sent by the Tjirebon PKI was ad)

dressed to Abdulmuntalib, who,

we

will

the Central Java revolt. He, however,

remember, was

had been

so closely

in

charge of

watched by

the police that he could not accomplish anything in Semarang; instead,

he had returned on November 12 to Tegal. There he stopped

which the police took up their vigil. Their attenwas soon rewarded, for a woman appeared looking for the PKI

Chinese tion

at a

leader;

inn, outside

when they searched

the lady, the police discovered the instruc-

tions for the Central Javanese rebellion. 85

With knowledge of the party plans in Central Java now gained from two sources, the authorities arrested the leaders in that area and thus prevented the outbreak of revolt in the districts that had inspired it: Pekalongan, Tegal, Tjirebon, and Temanggung were silent on the night of November 12. 86 Surabaja and Semarang, once the main source of PKI strength, were similarly inactive; and in Jogjakarta, Madiun, and Magelang there was no sign of revolt. In Kediri and Banjumas some preparations for an uprising had been made but, owing partly to the arrest of local leaders and partly to disorganization and lack of support, they yielded only a few belated scuffles. In the Surakarta area of Central Java there were disturbances; these took place five days after the uprising began and were led not by the regular party leaders, who were against participation, but by local unionists and, reportedly, remnants of the Mu’alimin movement. 87 In West Java, uprisings did break out on the night of November 12. They were not entirely unexpected. In Batavia, reports of coming action had been circulated for several days, and on the afternoon of November 12 it was learned that the railway workers were planning to set off a general strike on the following day. However, partly because 343

— Rise of Indonesian

Communism

harmony between the European and Indonesian administrators of the area, no real preventive measures were taken. Toward midnight a number of armed bands appeared in the streets; clashes with policemen and watchmen took place, an attack was made on Glodok prison, and the telephone exchange was seized. Bands comprising up to three hundred persons also appeared in the Tangerang and Meester-Cornelis ( Djatinegara) areas, fought with police patrols and of a lack of

passers-by, started

barracks.

officials

and

Tangerang) invaded a small police

(in

were certain general objectives communications, opening prisons, and attacking police and

It

cutting off

fires,

was apparent

—but

that there

the attempt was, to say the least, badly organized.

By

and the revolution in the capital was over. 88 Three hundred persons were immediately arrested and more were added as investigations revealed the names of others thought to be involved. Reportedly, an attempt was made to continue the fight by Suriasuparno, a previously undistinguished group leader who was pro-

morning order had been

restored,

claimed “resistance dictator”; but the authorities soon discovered and arrested him. 89

The

Bantam and the Priangan, for the government did not know enough about the West java revolutionary plans to act in time against the leaders; at the same time rural unrest was of such proportions that the disorders extended into the countrysituation

was more

serious in

and consequently took longer to beginning on the night of November

side

quell. Incidents in the Priangan, 12, consisted of

sabotaging com-

munications lines and assaults and arson committed by armed groups.

showed purpose, they were directed against and lower Indonesian officials. In Bantam, the

Insofar as their actions village heads, police,

area of widest revolt, the uprising took a religious character; those participated in

it

felt

who

themselves to be engaging in a sabil-illah (holy

by the appropriate rituals. 90 As in other areas, they were armed mostly with knives and cutlasses ( kele wang), but a few possessed firearms. Incoming troops and constabulary forces found communications lines cut and roads blocked, but they met with little or no resistance; the population did its best to vanish. The resistance took the form of brief, uncoordinated raids; during one of them a Dutch railroad official was killed. Although the murder of Europeans and Indonesian officials seems to have been a principal desire of the participants in the revolt, and although this would have been easy enough to accomplish phvsiwar) and prepared themselves

for

it

344

The Rebellions cally, the

momentum

barrier to this

of the rebellion never

overcame the psychological

most extreme rejection of the

European, and no Indonesian

official

social hierarchy:

no other

above the rank of wedana, was

harmed, although some raids were made on houses of those

who were

not home.

The actions that put down the main part of the Java revolt were made on the orders of the Residents of the areas concerned. It was only on November 17 that the Attorney General ordered the arrest of all persons known to be Communists and to have any sort of leading capacity. This was followed by mass arrests and the rapid decline of the movement; by December the uprisings were effectively over, although disorder and incidents of arson continued for some time. The revolution had not come to an end in Sumatra, however: indeed, it had not begun. On November 4 Bakar, a representative of the Batavia committee, had been sent to that island to inform its leaders of the plans to revolt on the night of November 12. However, Arif Fadillah, the erstwhile prorebellion chairman of the Padang PKI section, declared that he would go along with an uprising set off by the official party executive but not by the Batavia committee. 91 Bakar traveled up and down the West Coast arguing with the local party units, but met mixed reactions and was himself arrested on November Meanwhile, conferences were being held between the leaders of

22.

Communist groups to agree on a date: one meeting decided on November 15, another wanted November 16, and the Sarekat Djin (Ghost Union, a Sumatran Communist terrorist group) decided that its units would revolt on November 21. Always someone disagreed or something went awry, however; and so the arguments continued into

various

December, with the party leadership meanwhile disintegrating under a

wave

of arrests. Finally,

proceeded All

we do

to act,

1,

1927, local groups in Silungkang

having come to the conclusion that:

talk, talk,

is

on January

and once again

of meetings, but nothing else. This

talk.

way we

We

are having an endless string

will never get

go on meeting until nothing comes of the whole rebellion. go back. Whoever wants to stop us father, our

own

mother’s brother!

goes against us, then

The

it

now And

seem

to

if

We

—even

if

We will

can no longer

he

is

our

the subsection committee

own itself

will die, too! 92

rebellion spread rapidly; fighting

rebels

gets killed

anywhere.

was heavier than

in Java,

and the

have been better armed. Nonetheless, resistance was 345

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

broken by January

4,

and by the 12th

it

was

all

over.

As

in Java,

one

European was killed. While all this was going on, Alimin and Musso were wending their way back from Moscow. By the time they had gotten to Shanghai, they heard of the Java revolt; according to Djamaluddin Tamin, they wired the Singapore party center to expect them in from Bangkok on De-

cember

15. 93

They next proceeded

false passports

from the

office of

where they obtained the Kuomintang foreign ministry, and to Canton,

then traveled, via Hongkong and Bangkok, to Singapore. Conveniently for the authorities there, their telegram

had been planted

in

had been

sent to the spy

PKI Singapore headquarters. The

who

police did

not close in immediately, however, and they were thus able to meet

with Subakat and present the Comintern’s sives. 94

sadly outdated mis-

Umar Giri, Hadji Moham-

Together with Subakat and another companion,

they proceeded to Kota Tinggi, Johore;

mad Nur them

now

it

seems that

PKI leader who had negotiated with the Sumatra rebellion, had made some

Ibrahim, the Sumatra

for procuring

arms for

arrangements to meet them

Subakat and

Umar

Giri,

in

Johore on their return. 95

having good reason to suspect they were

being followed, urged their companions not to stay in Johore. Musso

become alarmed, but they did not calm their escorts, who fled alone. 96 This, it turned out, was the course of wisdom as well as panic, for on December 18 Musso and Alimin were arrested. At the time they were carrying with them $2,500 in U.S. banknotes, which they declared had been given them by sympathizers from the Philippines; it was apparently all the material aid forthcoming from the International. 97 With this, the adventure on which the PKI had embarked in December 1924 was brought to an inglorious end. and Alimin refused

to

346

XIII

Turning Points

The Communist

International

welcomes the revolutionary struggle

peoples of Indonesia and pledges

Workers of the world!

Do

its

of the

complete support.

not permit the Dutch imperialists to drown the

struggle for freedom of Indonesia in blood! Hasten to the aid of the Indonesian fighters! Organize

rection in Java,

mass meetings, express your sympathy

and protest against imperialist

terror.

for the insur-

Organize demonstra-

Dutch Embassies and Consulates and demand freedom for the Indonesian people and the military evacuation of the colony. Suppressed peoples of the world! The insurrectionary Indonesians are your advance guard, they express the will to freedom which is your common property. Do everything in your power to support them in their struggle! Down with imperialist terror! Long live the united anti-imperialist front of the workers and the suppressed peoples of the world! Long live the free tions before the

people of Indonesia!

1

With this manifesto, adopted by the ECCI on November 20, 1926, and made public the next day, the Comintern announced its acceptance of the Indonesian fait accompli and its full support for the revolutionary effort.

We might

done otherwise and imperialist effort.

still

One

well ask whether the International could have

demonstrated

its

support for the colonial anti-

possible alternative

was the response taken by

Dutch Communist party. When it heard of the Java uprising, the CPH announced that the rebellion had been consciously provoked by the Indies government in an effort to smash the revolutionary movement; it called for an investigation into its causes and urged amnesty for those who had been arrested. 2 In other words, it treated the affair as the end product of a government campaign of persecution rather than as a spontaneous revolt against Dutch rule, and its response was aimed at exposing the injustices committed by the authorities and not the

at urging a continuation of the fight.

The ECCI

rejected this alternative, instructing the

347

CPH

to

adopt a

Rise of Indonesian

more

Communism

toward the Indonesian

positive attitude

rebellion. 3

At

seventh

its

November 22, 1926, the Comintern Dutch party attitude; speaking for the

plenary session, which began on executive further criticized the

ECCI, I

Czech delegate Smeral declared:

the

have seen extracts from the Dutch press that the Communist paper,

in-

stead of advocating for the Javanese insurgents the Leninist principle oi national self-determination to the point of separation of an independent state, have proposed Social Democrats, a plan for a Java. This

is

to

be found

and the establishment

and supported

jointly

mixed investigation committee

in the press of

to

with the

be sent

to

our Party during the days in which

blood flows in Java. At such a time the party demands that the government grant Java “self-administration” such as Great Britain has condescended to grant India.

We

are informed that the Party even tolerates in

its

midst such

a trend of thought as implies that the great mass uprising in Java

work

of provocateurs

CPH

4 .

representative

criticism

was the

by assuring

De

ward off the stream of the Dutch Communists had seen their misVisser attempted to

that

take and altered their position:

How

did

it

happen

that the

Dutch Party did not immediately take

a sharp

W

T

hen the first reports concerning the uprising were and correct standpoint? received, the Party was of the opinion that this was another provoked struggle.

But since the Party recognized that the Javanese workers had gone

over to an armed uprising,

it

did everything in

its

power

to support

them

5 .

had been the CPH’s misfortune to have been a political step behind the International. It was only a short space for, as De Visser reminded the ECCI, the minimum program of demands for Indonesia, which the CPH had presented at the time of the revolt’s outbreak, had been drawn up with the help of the Orgburo (Organization Bureau) of the Comintern itself. 6 Nonetheless, the distance was important, for it marked the International’s progress from the “stabilization of capitalism” period, with its emphasis on alliance with non-Communist groups and on organization rather than agitation, toward a more outIt

—

spokenly revolutionary

line.

Chief among the reasons for

this

change were the Chinese revolution

and the Stalin-Trotsky feud: Trotsky, although his position had been greatly weakened, could not be completely written off as a political force, particularly since his criticisms of

Chinese revolution seemed to be proving

348

Communist

strategv in the

true. Since earlv 1926,

Chiang

Turning Points Kai-shek had shown signs of breaking with the Chinese Communists;

having consolidated his power within the Kuomintang, he began to

CCP members

remove

from important functions and, in the coup

March 20, 1926, moved against the Communist organization in Canton. The Comintern was thus forced to consider whether it should advocate a strategy that would give the CCP greater independence from the Kuomintang (a move that would inevitably hasten a d’etat of

break) or whether

it

should continue to support the bloc within the

KMT,

if

Chiang did decide

hoping that

Communists, he would

to break

with the Chinese

at least continue his alliance

with the Soviet

Union.

The

International decided on the latter course, for Stalin wished

neither to lose the advantages of a Soviet alliance with China nor to

had been right in the quarrel over Chinese Communist strategy. At the same time, the Comintern sought to cover its retreat before Chiang and to prepare for a possible break by adopting a theoretical analysis of the situation further to the left. The period of capitalist stabilization was in its final stages, it was announced; a new revolutionary wave was rising in the East, and this meant both that the struggle against imperialism would take a sharper form than before and that differences between the truly revolutionary and the hesitant elements in that struggle would ingive the Trotskyists a chance to claim that they

crease.

In claiming that the revolutionary tide in the East was on the

rise,

was faced with an embarrassing problem: it had very little evidence for this. Chiang Kai-shek, it is true, had made remarkable progress in his campaign to secure north China, but Chiang was an increasingly doubtful revolutionary element from the Communist point of view. As for the rest of the East, it showed no noticeable revolutionary stirrings. Under these circumstances, the outbreak of the Javanese rebellion just before the ECCTs seventh plenum came as a most welcome event. Here was proof that the Comintern colonial strategy had been correct, that the period of capitalist stabilization was coming to an end, and that the flame of revolution was beginning to lick from China to the other countries of the East. “The revolt against imperialism is spreading from one country to another. From China it the Comintern

has extended to Java,” the

ECCI

manifesto on the Indonesian revolt

proclaimed. 7 Bukharin, opening the plenum, saluted both the Chinese

and the Indonesian peoples

for their revolutionary effort,

349

and Manuil-

Communism

Rise of Indonesian

sky described the glowing revolutionary prospects the Comintern

China policy had brought

to the East:

At the same time liberated China will become the magnet for

who

of the yellow race

islands of the Pacific.

inhabit the Philippines, Indonesia,

China

become a major

will

all

the peoples

and the numerous

threat for the capitalist

world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism because the

problem of spreading

Pacific confronts

even more intensely than

this task

among

it

its

gigantic population out over the it

does Japan. China will

the island inhabitants of the Pacific, not with

fire

fulfill

and sword,

but bound up with the process of the revolutionization of the native popula8

tion

.

“That [the Comintern’s] judgement over the role of the Chinese revolution

is

nesia.

well-founded,” he observed,

proved by the uprising

“is

in Indo-

J

Semaun, who

for

once did not have

the International, announced to the

had sparked a

The Chinese

“real civil war”:

to apologize for

plenum

“Now

a great uprising has broken out.

revolution has exercised a great influence on the Indoits

resort to arms.”

That

under Communist leadership and

not,

under the aegis of a bloc within he ascribed to the

fact

had occurred

as in China,

to

that the rebellion in Java

nesian population and thereby contributed to the revolt

PKI behavior

directly

that Java possessed no national bourgeoisie

and hence no

real nation-

Dutch would suppress the revolt, but, he assured, others would soon break out. “Long live the Communist movement! Long live the Comintern!”, he concluded, and was rewarded with resounding applause 10 In nearly every Comintern reference to the Indies in this period, it was stressed that the rebellion justified the Comintern’s China polalist

leadership. Perhaps the

.

icy:

The Chinese tion for the

Indies)

is

revolution

is

becoming more and more a great centre

of attrac-

awakening masses of the Colonial East. Indonesia (the Dutch

already in a state of revolutionary ferment which in some places

has passed into an open

civil

war against foreign

That the [Indonesian] revolt should occur be attributed

no mean degree

in

recent events in China.

It is

to the

capital,

above

just at this time,

is

all

Dutch

doubtless to

powerful effect produced by the

the victories of the Canton army, which have

strengthened the confidence of the Indonesian people in their power.

The Indonesian will

11 .

.

.

.

revolution will be victorious, just as the Chinese revolution

be victorious!

12

350

Turning Points The Chinese Revolution

becoming a centre of attraction for the awakening of the Far East. This has been proved by the rising which has taken place in Indonesia against Dutch imperialism 13 is

.

On November

25 the Profintern followed the

and

calling for demonstrations

revolution.

On December

announced

that “blood

and renewed

By

this

its call

23,

it

strikes in

ECCI

with a manifesto

support of the Indonesian

issued a second proclamation, which

running in rivers in West and Central Java” for support of the “heroic fighters of Indonesia.” 14 is

time Java was hardly running red with blood, although the

rebellion that took place a

week

later in

Sumatra prevented the proc-

lamation from seeming entirely unreal. However, such emphasis on a continuing Indonesian revolution was maintained in Comintern writings

some months

ing

command

had become clear that the rebellion was quite dead. It may be doubted that the International’s leaders themselves had expected that the Indonesian revolt would achieve major proportions, let alone lead to Communist victory. Not only had it recently rejected the proposals for rebellion on the grounds that the ill-prepared adventure was foredoomed, but Semaun left for Holland in the middle of the ECCI’s plenary session in order to sign an agreement bequeathafter

it

movement to the move he would hardly have made if he had

over the Indonesian revolutionary

Perhimpunan Indonesia, a thought the PKI had any chance of success. It had, in fact, been clear from the outset that the rebellion would be a disaster. The Dutch Communists had based their response on this fact, but the defense of the Comintern’s China policy at the seventh

plenum caused the ECCI

to

deny

it.

Once having introduced

nesian revolution as a major evidence of tional

found

it

its

the Indo-

Asian success, the Interna-

hard to admit that the revolt had fizzled out, particu-

was becoming increasingly clear that the China program was itself to end in disaster. Not long after the Indonesian revolts, Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Communist coup brought down the house of cards which the Comintern had so hopefully erected in China. For a time, the International insisted that that edifice still stood, and during larly since

the

it

same period

faith

was

still

expressed in the continuance of the Indo-

nesian revolution; but gradually the Comintern forced facts in

itself to

face the

both China and the Indies, and by the early summer of 1927

continuing revolutionary activity in Indonesia was rarely mentioned.

This development, coupled with the Soviet Union’s rapid retreat

toward proletarian isolationism

in

1927-1928, ensured that the argu-

351

:

Rise of Indonesian

ments the Comintern offered

Communism

to explain the failure of the Indonesian

revolt took an entirely different line than those

made

in the

ECCI

and 1926. Gone now were the accusations that the PKI had ignored other political parties, that it had not made enough concessions to nationalism, and that it had not established itself as a

criticisms of 1925

bloc within the SR. There was no intimation that the rebellion should

not have been undertaken

—merely

that

it

should have been better

prepared

The whole course political

of the revolt, however, betrayed the lack of earnest

and organisatory preparation

of this

movement

as a whole. It

is

extremely characteristic that the revolt was under the general slogan of the

Dutch imperialism, and without a concrete political and economic slogan which would have mobilized broad masses and would have made the revolt the last and deciding point of a general strike and a peasant insurrectionary movement. The Communist Party sent out its best forces to occupy the various government institutions, without having sufficiently prepared them beforehand, and thus enabled the government to overcome fight against

easily the

advance guard of the national-revolutionary movement

in

Indo-

nesia. 15

This situation was no doubt enjoyed greatly by Alimin and Musso

upon

They had been held

by the Singapore authorities, and then, much to the annoyance of the Dutch (who had long been irritated by the haven afforded Indonesian Communists across the Straits) they were released because there was no evidence their activities had threatened the peninsular status quo. 16 Expelled from Singapore, they returned via China to the Soviet Union, their return to Russia.

to discover that their once-rejected policy

for a short time

was now

justified in spite of

the fact that the revolution had proved an utter failure. Alimin took full

advantage of

this at the

ensuing Comintern congress

(

the sixth, in

August 1928), freely offering criticism of the International’s new colonial program, which he considered insufficiently radical, and declaring that the major failing in the Indonesian rebellion

had been the Com-

intern’s:

The Indonesian

delegation considers

it

necessary to give a short report

regarding the latest events and the uprisings in Indonesia. The Party Indonesia

is

very young, since

the development of the Party,

Communist

it

in

was only established in 1920, and during we worked without any guidance of the

International, so that mistakes

were

inevitable.

Despite the extraordinary and brutal white terror of the Dutch Govern-

352

Turning Points ment, our Party grew rapidly and gained great influence among the masses.

During our

from the year 1920

was able to eliminate the reformist leaders of the national movement and to create through the revolutionary movement Communist tendencies in the trade unions and peasant movements. These unions are completely in the hands of the Communist Party. Our influence was not limited to the proletariat

legal existence,

to 1925, our Party

but extended also to the peasantry, the army, police force and some

intellectuals.

The government

ordered the closing of the

and deported hundreds

Communist leaders, Party headquarters and arrested the members of

arrested

of

the Central Committee.

We

consider

a serious mistake

it

—

that during the uprising

two months, the Communist International remained

which

inactive.

lasted

The blame

cannot be put on our Dutch Party because our comrades did what they could support the rebellion.

to

The Communist

International

ought to have

Germany, France and America to support the uprising and to make a campaign with demonstrations, through the press, etc., in favour of it. But this has not been done. It is a sad experience of the Communist International and we hope that such a mistake will instructed

all

its

sections, especially in

not occur again. 17

“The task of the Communist Party,”

was declared at the sixth congress, “is to reconquer its legality, so that it can once more carry on 18 its propaganda openly.” This, however, was impossible. Measures had been taken to destroy the Communists’ mass following, 19 and 13,000 persons had been arrested in connection with the revolts. A few of them were shot for having been involved in killings; 5,000 more which 4,500 were sentenced to This relieved the authorities of those persons whose

were placed

in preventive detention, of

prison after

trial.

participation in the revolt could

whom

it

be proved; however, many others

they considered dangerous (including the great part of the

PKI

leadership) could not be convicted under the existing laws. Consequently, the government decided to use

its

powers of banishment on a

and ordered the removal of 1,308 persons, and such family members as desired to accompany them, to a spot on the upper

massive

scale,

reaches of the Digul River in

New

successfully escaped from the camp, of

Guinea.

movement

of the internees

and only a very few

them Sardjono) survived physically and

the

None

(

most notable

ideologically to take part in

20 after the fall of the Indies regime.

This action put an effective end to Communist activity in the Indies for the

remaining period of Dutch

rule.

353

Thereafter an occasional real

Rise of Indonesian or imagined agent

was discovered

to

Communism

have been sent

to the colony,

and

an occasional real or imagined plot was unmasked; but the movement itself showed no signs of returning to life. More than that, however, all

seemed to have been brought to an end by the defeat of the revolt. The Communist debacle seemed to have finished popular hope that anything was to be achieved by political action, revolutionary or otherwise; and the Indonesian masses retired from the stage, not to return until Japan’s victory over the Dutch proved once mass

and

political activity

for all that the white ruler

was not

invincible.

The PKI had been the last of the older generation of Indonesian political movements to play an active role; the others, as we have seen, had either given up entirely or retired from the struggle against Dutch rule. The removal of the Communists from the political scene caused the

new

which had hitherto been gathering in the backoccupy the center of the stage. These were the

generation,

ground, suddenly to secular nationalists,

who saw

their anti-Dutch efforts directly in terms

of a striving for an Indonesian nation-state rather than in the internationalist

framework

of Islam or

Communism

cultural particularism of the regional

or in the political

and

movements. The leaders of

this

group were to become the leaders of the Indonesian revolution, and their

appearance on the

political stage thus

formed a major turning

point in the development of the national movement. Willy-nilly, the organizations

founded by the new generation were

Not only was the general population apathetic to political proselytizing, but the government no longer allowed its opponents any benefit of doubt. The uprisings, setting off a violent reaction of Netherlands and Indies Dutch opinion, ended the political leeway afforded by the coexistence of Western democratic and colonial authoritarian standards. Those who had predicted disaster at the time tolerance was shown to the infant Sarekat Islam were proved correct, it seemed; political freedom could not be allowed to the population; the state should check and not encourage the transformation of Indonesian society, and it must be concerned above all else with preserving its authority. Abuse was heaped on those who had sought “to apply the slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the Eastern peoples, against all reality and from humanitarian and sentimental considerations, having lost their belief in the mission of fatherland and race.” 21 Even moderate opinion did not defend the Ethical stand on politics, restricted to the elite:

but sought

to disassociate

it

from that

354

policy’s other goals:

Turning Points

When we

think

how much

have been spent both

25 years

in

good

intelligence,

in the

will,

energy, money, and time

motherland and the Indies

during the past

itself

attempts to achieve the ideal of granting political rights to the

— Western-inspired blessing which has neither desired would not have been nor appreciated —we ask ourselves have

native population

a

it

better to

if it

expended that enormous devotion on the economic advancement

of the

people, a gift that the Oriental mentality also understands and values. in

It is

our view not too late to change course, henceforth abandoning politics

insofar as possible, in the

called political parties,

first

place ceasing to organize the people in so-

and instead cooperating

to devote all energies to

making the population stronger economically, through providing more practical knowledge and more capital. 22

Governor General de Graeff, who

it

with

in his inaugural address to the

Volksraad had declared his desire for a reconciliation between the

government and the non-Communist Indonesian opposition, found hopes shattered.

“I

cannot conceal from you that

pointed,” he wrote Idenburg.

“Wary

came here with the purest Government an atmosphere of

deeply disap-

hoping

to create

about

and cooperation; and

after

of motives,

the

trust

I

am

of everything that smelled of

‘politics’ I

fourteen months of unceasing labor

I

his

see as the only result that the gulf

between white people and brown is wider than ever, that race instincts reign supreme, and that sober, reasonable arguments fall upon deaf ears.” 23

He

soon found himself participating in the extension of

pressive measures to the nationalists,

who were

re-

themselves growing

more intransigent in the face of an intolerant Dutch conservatism, which was convinced that “the militant nationalists are as much the enemies of their own people as the Communists are” 24 and which viewed all political criticism as an attack on the state. The stage was being set for the emergence of revolutionary nationalism, intellectually derived from the West but emotionally rejecting its institutions, which was to

become the dominant

strain in Indonesian political thinking

provide the context for a resurgent Communist movement.

355

and

to

Notes and Index

CHAPTER 1.

Mikhail Pavlovich,

deniia”

(The Tasks

Vostok,

I

(1922),

I

“Zadachi Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi

of the All-Russian Scientific

Academy

assotsiatsii

vostokove-

of Orientology),

Novyi

9.

2. The revolution which modern socialism strives to achieve is, briefly, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a new organization of society by the destruction of all class distinctions. This requires not only a proletariat that carries out this revolution, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society have developed so far that they allow the final destruction of class distinctions. The bourgeoisie, therefore, in this respect also is just as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the pro.

.

.

a man who will say that this revolution can be more easily carried out in a country, because, although having no proletariat, it has no bourgeoisie either, only proves that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism.

letariat itself.

Hence

Friedrich Engels,

“On

Social Relations in Russia,” in Karl

Engels, Selected Writings (Moscow, 1955), II, 49-50. 3. Marx himself had not completely denied that

brought progress

the

Marx and Friedrich metropolitan

powers

he noted that they destroyed the traditional “feudal” social systems and replaced them with Western, capitalist forms, thus bringing the colonies further along the road to socialist revolution. It was, however, a purely involuntary contribution, arising from no kindly intentions on to

their colonies, for

the part of the metropolis: it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was activated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing

England,

about that revolution. Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India,” in I,

Marx and Engels, Selected Writings,

351.

For a more thorough development of these views, see Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (London, 1919), pp. 169-175, and the same author’s “Probleme des Sozialismus” (Problems of Socialism), in his Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Sozialismus (Berlin, 1904), Part II, p. 96. Bernstein was the major theoretician of the Revisionist school of socialist thought and was one of the sponsors of the move to soften the socialist attitude toward colonialism at the 1907 congress. 5. For Lenin’s view of the 1907 congress, see his article, “The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart,” in Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in 4.

the East 6.

(Moscow, 1957),

Internatioruiler

(International

1907), 7.

Van

p. 40.

Sozialisten-Kongress zu

Socialist

Stuttgart,

Congress at Stuttgart, Aug.

18

bis

24 August 1907

18 to 24,

1907)

(Berlin,

p. 112.

Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress, pp. 36-37. For a general description of Kol’s attitude toward the colonial question at this time, see D. M. G. Koch,

Batig Slot. Figuren uit het oude Indie

(Favorable Balance:

Figures from the

Bygone Indies) (Amsterdam, 1960), pp. 91-92. Koch, like Van Kol a moderate socialist, was later to become the SDAP’s principal colonial expert. For the SDAP’s official account of its colonial policy in this period, see Daan van der Zee,

359

Notes pp. 5-12 ,

De

S.D.A.P.

en Indonesie

(The

SDAP

and Indonesia)

(Amsterdam, 1929),

pp. 31—36. 8. Internationaler Sozialistcn-Kongress, pp. 36-37. 9. Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress, p. 40.

Van Kol Van Kol

1907 congress. Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress, p. 36. 11. did not begin to urge independence for Indonesia as a final goal until 1919-1920 (Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 94—95). He advocated a native-owned heavy industry for Java not only because of his intequetation of socialist doctrine but also because of his admiration for Japan. To help finance this development, he suggested that Holland sell off all the Indies archipelago save Java, Sumatra, and the Lesser Sunda Islands. The theme of industrialization was taken up by Van Kol’s successor as SDAP parliamentary spokesman on colonial affairs, Viiegen, who held that the establishment of Indonesian-owned heavy industry was a prerequisite to independence. See Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 30-31, 34—36; H. A. Idema, Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1891-1918 (Parliamentary History of the Netherlands Indies, 1891-1918) (The Hague, 1924), pp. 295-296, 327. 12. Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., p. 5; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 92. 10.

at the

CHAPTER

II

Advertisement appearing in the Soerbajaasch Handelsblad on July 15, 1913; quoted in F. L. Rutgers, Idenburg en de Sarekat Islam ( Idenburg and the Sarekat 1.

Islam) (Amsterdam, 1939), p. 75. 2. Lenin, “The Awakening of Asia,” Pravda,

May

7,

1913, in Lenin, National

Liberation Movement, pp. 59-60. 3. For accounts of the Si’s beginnings, see Robert van Niel, of the

Modern Indonesian

Elite

The Emergence (The Hague and Bandung, 1960), pp. 89—95; and

Beschciden betreffende de vereeniging ‘Sarekat Islam (Information Concerning the Association “Sarekat Islam”) (Netherlands Indies Government, classified, ’

Batavia,

Sarekat

Mas

1913),

Dagang

pp. 1-19. A predecessor of the Surakarta organization, the Islamijah, had been founded in Batavia (Djakarta) by Raden

Tirtoadisurjo in 1909. Tirtoadisurjo also established an organization called

Dagang Islam

Buitenzorg (Bogor) in 1911, and was afterward asked to come to Surakarta by Hadji Samanhudi to organize the batik merchants’ associSarekat

in

Samanhudi wished

promote. The Surakarta organization was not related to its short-lived predecessors, and Samanhudi rather than Tirtoadisurjo is generally given the credit for founding it. 4. For a summary of the then current arguments concerning the effect of the sugar industry on peasant agriculture, see A. Neijtzell de Wilde, Een en ander omtrent den icelvaartstoestand der Inlandsche bevolking (Concerning the State ation

that

to

of Welfare of the Native Population)

Weltevreden, 1911), pp. 98-128. 5. For analyses of the Sarekat Islam’s character and its implications, presented to the Governor General by the Adviser for Native Affairs for consideration in determining whether to legalize the association, see Bescheiden betreffende de vereeniging ‘Sarekat Islam/ pp. 8—59. 6. Idenburg, letter to Kuyper, June 1913; quoted in Koch, Batig Slot, p. 14. 7. See B. J. Brouwer, De houding van Idenburg en Colijn tegenover de Indo(

(The Attitude of Idenburg and Colijn toward the Indonesian (Kampen, 1958), pp. 47^49; Idema, Parlementaire, pp. 293-294;

nesische beweging

Movement)

Bescheiden betreffende de vereeniging ‘Sarekat Islam, ’ pp. 41-42, 71-77.

360

Notes pp. 12-14 ,

Koch, Batig Slot, p. 15. 9. See Rutgers, Idenburg, pp. 68-75; B. Alkema, De Sarikat Islam (The Sarekat Islam) (Utrecht, 1919), pp. 14, 16-20; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 14; Brouwer, De bonding, p. 45. 10. For Idenburg’s decision, and documents on its execution and justification, see Bescheiden betreffende de vereeniging ‘Sarekat Islam,’ pp. 60-77. 11. Sneevliet, quoted in Voor vrijheid en socialisme (For Freedom and Socialism) (Rotterdam, 1953), p. 44. The book, hereafter cited as VVS, is a memorial to Sneevliet by some of his former associates. See also Koch, Batig Slot, 8.

p. 110, for a

character sketch of Sneevliet.

For these data on Sneevliet’s life, see VVS, pp. 45-47; W. van Ravesteyn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland (The Development of Communism in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam, 1928), pp. 128-129; A. Baars and H. Sneevliet, Het proces Sneevliet. De social-democratie in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Sneevliet Trial. Social Democracy in the Netherlands Indies) (Semarang, n.d. [1917]), pp. 77-78; and Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 110—112. 13. See D. M. G. Koch, Verantwoording; een halve eeuw in Indonesia (Justification: A Half Century in Indonesia) (The Hague and Bandung, 1956), pp. 69—72, for a description of the political atmosphere in Semarang at this time. It might be noted that the city’s principal newspaper, De Locomotief, was one of the very few European journals in the Indies to support the Ethical position; its coverage of Indonesian political activity in the first quarter of the century was considerably more extensive and objective than that provided by the other Dutchlanguage dailies. 14. See Koch, Verantwoording, p. 76, and Batig Slot, p. 112, for descriptions 12.

of Sneevliet’s relations with the Handelsvereniging. 15.

The

first

union

in

the Indies, the Staatsspoorbond, was also a railroad

organization, founded in 1905

was open

to

by employees

of the state-run rail line.

both Dutch and Indonesian workers, but

its

The union

leadership remained in

Dutch and its character was essentially that of an association of salaried employees. The membership of the VSTP (Vereniging van Spoor- en Tram wegpersoneel— Association of Rail and Tramway Personnel) was originally drawn almost exclusively from the NIS, a major private line. The union soon began to organize other companies, appealing particularly to the lower-rank workers, and drew to itself a good part of the Staatsspoorbond’s blue-collar the hands of the

following. See “Vereeniging van Spoor- en

Tram wegpersoneel

in N.-I.” (Associa-

and Tramway Personnel in the Netherlands Indies), De Indische Gids, XXXI (1909), 1240-1241; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 114; Van Niel, Emergence, p. 122; Aidit, Sedjarah Gerakan Buruh Indonesia (History of the Indonesian Labor Movement) (Djakarta, 1952), p. 37. 16. VVS, p. 51; Semaun, interview, 1959; Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 36; Ezhegodnik Kominterna (Comintern Yearbook) (Moscow, 1923), p. 774. On its establishment in 1908, the VSTP had 200 European and 10 Indonesian members; in 1914 it contained 900 Indonesians and 1,500 Europeans, and by 1917 it consisted of 3,000 Indonesian and 700 European workers (Pervyi s’ezd revoliutsionnykh organizatsii Dal’nego Vostoka [First Congress of Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East] [Moscow/Petrograd, 1922], p. 284). This source bases its account of the Indonesian labor movement on a report provided by Semaun. 17. Sneevliet, “Het ontslag Sneevliet” (Sneevliet’s Resignation), Het Vrije

tion

of Rail

Woord 18.

(hereafter

Blumberger,

HVW), May

10, 1917, p. 141;

De communistische heweging 361

VVS, in

p. 51.

Nederlandsch-Indie

(The

Notes pp. 14-17 ,

Communist Movement in the Netherlands Indies [Haarlem, 1935], p. 2, hereafter cited as Communist ); VVS, p. 51; Maring, Die okonomische und politische Bedeutung Indonesiens (The Economic and Political Significance of Indonesia) (n.p., 1924), p. 15. “Maring” was Sneevliet’s Comintern name; this source, an address before the All-Russian Scientific Association for Oriental Studies,

is

here-

Oekonomische. 19. Maring, Oekonomische, p. 15; Koch, V erantwoording, p. 89. 20. See D. M. G. Koch, Indisch-koloniale vraagstukken (Indies-Colonial Questions) ( Weltevreden, 1919), p. 31. 21. Maring, “Le mouvement revolutionnaire aux Indes Neerlandaises” (The Revolutionary Movement in the Netherlands Indies), in Le Mouvement communiste international (Petrograd, 1921), p. 393; D. M. G. Koch, Om de vrijheid: de nationalistische beweging in Indonesia (For the Sake of Freedom: The Nationalist Movement in Indonesia) (Djakarta, 1950), p. 50. For an elaboration of the moderate point of view, see Westerveld, “Moet de ISDV bij den Inlander ‘revolutionnair sentiment’ opwekken?” (Must the ISDV Awaken “Revolutionary Sentiment” among the Natives?), HVW, Nov. 10, 1916, p. 22; and Westerveld and Sneevliet, “Toetreding van Europeanen tot de S.I.” (Entrance of Europeans into the SI), HVW, Nov. 10, 1916, p. 21. 22. “Verkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vergadering der I.S.D.V.” (Abridged Report of the Fourth General Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 10, after referred to as

1917, p. 168. 23. Maring,

“Niederlandisch-Ost-Indien.

Bericht

fur

den zweiten

Kongress

der Kommunistischen Internationale” (The Netherlands East Indies. Report for the Second Congress of the

Communist

International), in Berichte

Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg, 1921),

zum p.

zweiten

409; here-

after cited as Niederlandisch.

Oekonomische, p. 15; HVW, May 17, 1919, p. 298. 25. The paper described itself in the beginning as a “general independent semimonthly organ” (HVW, Oct. 10, 1915, p. 1) and only admitted officially to being the ISDV’s paper in June 1916 (HVW, June 25, 1916, p. 165). Some idea of the paper’s early circulation may be gathered from the fact that at the time of its fifth issue there were 517 subscribers* of which 228 were located in Semarang, 112 in Surabaja, and 35 in Batavia (HVW, Dec. 10, 1915, p. 1). In October 1916 the newspaper estimated that 10 per cent of its subscribers were 24. Maring,

Indonesians

(HVW,

publication until

it

Oct. 10, 1916, p. 1). Het Vrije appeared three times a week.

26. See A. Miihlenfeld,

“De

pers in Indie”

(The

Woord

gradually increased

Press in the Indies), Koloniale

V

(1915), 10; ‘Courantier Djawa,’ “Uit de Inlandsche pers” (From the Native Press), Hindia Poetra, 1 (1916), 58. Marco was editor of the Indonesian-language journal Doenia Bergerak and head of the Native Journalists’ Association (Inlandse Joumalistenbond). 27. For comments on Baars’s character, see Idema, Parlementaire, pp. 366-367; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 113; HVW, Mar. 1, 1919, p. 192. 28. Soeara Merdika was begun in April 1917, its existence being guaranteed Tijdschrift,

by funds from the ISDV executive.

Its

were Semaun, Notowidjojo and

(HVW,

Apr. 10, 1917, p. 119). 29. See Maring, Oekonomische, p.

Baars

editors

15;

HVW,

Mar.

1,

1919, pp.

124,

192;

Hartogh, “Jaarverslag 1917-18 van den Secretaris” (Annual Report of the Secretary, 1917-1918), HVW, May 10, 1918, p. 198. 30. Mededeelingen omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeen belang. Afgeslo-

362

,

Notes pp. 17-20 ,

ten 1 September 1917 (Communications Concerning Several Subjects of General Interest.

ment

Terminated Sept.

reports

is

1,

1917) (Batavia, 1918),

p. 7.

This series of govern-

hereafter cited as Medcdeelingen, together with the year of the

report’s conclusion. See also

De

lndische Gids,

XXXIX

(1917), 1466. 31. See Sneevliet, “De nieuwste wandaad” (The Newest Misdeed), 1IVW, Oct. 30, 1917, p. 17; “Verkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vergadering der I.S.D.V.,” p. 168; Sneevliet, “Onze taak” (Our Task), HVW, June 25, 1917, p. 189; De lndische Gids XXXIX (1917), 1466.

For discussions of the lndische Partij’s fate and of Insulinde’s early association with the ISDV, see P. H. J. Jongmans, De exorbitante rechten van den Gouverncur-Gcneraal in de praktijk (The Extraordinary Rights of the Governor General in Practice) (Amsterdam, 1921), pp. 129—137; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Indo-Europeesche beweging in Nederlandsch-lndie (The Eurasian Movement in the Netherlands Indies) (Haarlem, 1939), pp. 35-43; W. de Cock Buning, “Politieke Stroomingen” (Political Currents), Koloniale Studien, October 1917, pp. 19-20; De lndische Gids, XL (1918), 1123; Medcdeelingen 1917, p. 6; “Communisme” (Communism), Encijclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndie (The Hague, 1932), VI, 527; Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 120-123. 33. Tjipto was allowed to return to the Indies in 1914, Suwardi in 1917, and 32.

Douwes Dekker See

in 1918.

HVW,

Feb. 10, 1916, p. 81. 35. “Verslag van de derde algemeene vergadering der Ind. Soc. Dem. Ver.” (Report of the Third General Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 25, 1916, p. 34.

178. 36.

noto.

H. O. His

S.

Tjokroaminoto, Hidup dan Perdjuangannja (H. O.

Life and

referred to as

Struggle)

(Djakarta,

HOS, was published by

n.d.),

p.

115.

S.

Tjokroami-

This work, hereafter

a present-day descendant of the Sarekat

biography of the Si’s founder. See also A. Arx, L’Evolution politique en Indonesie de 1900 a 1942 (The Political Evolution of Indonesia from 1900 to 1942) (Fribourg, 1949), p. 185; VVS, p. 52. One of the important points for personal contact between the leaders of the Indonesian movement was the boardinghouse run in Surabaja between 1913 and 1921 by Suharsikin, the wife of the SI leader Tjokroaminoto. Among the young students who stayed there were Sukarno, Alimin, Musso, and Abikusno; the house was also used as headquarters for the SI, and among those who frequently participated in the discussions there were the ISDV leaders Semaun, Darsono, Islam, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, as

Baars, 37.

and Sneevliet (HOS, pp. Maring, Oekonomische, p.

its

53, 55-56). 15.

Bandoeng” (The SI Congress at Bandung), 1916, pp. 166—167. This was the first article Het Vrije Woord

38. Baars, “Ilet S.L congress te

HVW,

June 25, devoted to the Sarekat Islam.

17-24 Juni 1916 te Bandoeng (Sarekat Islam Congress [First National Congress] June 17—24, 1916, at Bandung) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1916), p. 20. Semaun, a member of the Surabaja chapter of both the ISDV and the SI, acted as the 39. Sarekat-lslam congres (le nationaal congres)

spokesman. 40. At the congress, Hasan Ali Surati, a wealthy Surabaja backer of the argued that:

socialist

SI,

The righteous teacher, our Lord the Prophet Mohammad, was the man who removed all inequality between the sexes, did away with the difference between

363

Notes pp. 20-23 ,

and subject, between rank and class. And all these changes were brought about by the Socialist par excellence, by our Prophet Mohammad.

ruler

carried out the socialist idea of equality in all branches of government affairs; economic and religious policy and administration were ruled by

The Prophet

this idea.

1916, p. 32. See also HOS, p. 63; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 127-131; Mededeelingen 1917, p. 4, for comments on the congress. The chief proponent of labor union work at the meeting was Mohamad Jusuf, a member of the Sarekat Islam’s central executive who also belonged to the ISDV. Sarekat-lslam congres

.

.

.

For discussions of the decline in the Indonesian living standard in this period, see J. W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Huender, Onderzoek ruiar den belastingdruk op de Inlcindsche bevolking (Investigation of the Tax Pressure on the Native Population) (Netherlands Indies government, Weltevreden, 1926), pp. 2-12; and W. Huender, Overzicht van den economischen toestand der inheemsche bevolking van Java en Madoera ( Survey of the Economic Situation of the Indigenous Population of Java and Madura) (The Hague, 1921), pp. 243-247; for the cost of living increase, which continued through 1920, see Prijzen, indexcijfers en wisselkoersen op Java 1913—1926 (Prices, Price Indexes, and Exchange Rates in Java, 1913-1926) (Netherlands Indies government, Batavia, 1927), Charts III and IV (Index Numbers of the Cost of Living) and Table VII (Index Numbers of the Retail Prices of Articles of Consumption of Native Origin). 42. See Mcdedeelingen 1917, p. 4; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 19; Blumberger, Communist, p. 3; Maring, “Le mouvement,” p. 395. 43. A draft law replacing Article 111 was introduced to parliament by the Dutch cabinet in 1912, and thereafter the prohibition was very loosely enforced by the Indies government. See Idema, Parlementaire, p. 308; Mededeelingen 1920, 41.

pp. 16-18. 44. In HOS, p. 116, it is claimed that Sneevliet became a member of the SI in 1915. This seems unlikely, however, since in late 1916 he asked the central

membership in the SI (Westerveld and Sneevliet, “Toetreding,” p. 21), which would hardly have been necessary if he had already joined it. Baars stated that the ISDV Europeans did not join the SI because it was, after all, an .association for Muslims (Baars, “Een nieuwe A.P.-sche koloniale specialiteit,” [A New AP Colonial Specialty], HVW, Aug. 23, 1919. p. 411). It was not SI policy to admit non-Indonesians, though some exceptions were made for Arab residents of the Indies. 45. Interviews with Semaun and Darsono, 1959; Rapport betreffende de neutraliseering en bestrijding van revolutionnaire propaganda onder de inheemsche bevolking, in het bijzonder van Java en Madoera (Report Concerning the Neutralizing and Combatting of Revolutionary Propaganda among the Native Population, Especially on Java and Madura) (Netherlands Indies government, classiSI leadership about the possibility of Europeans holding

Weltevreden, 1928), pp. 70-71, henceforth referred to as Neutraliseering; Chaudry, The Indonesian Struggle (Lahore, 1950), p. 50; Malaia entsiklopcdiia po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu (Small Encyclopedia of the International Trade Union Movement) (Moscow, 1927), col. 1622; HVW, Apr. 25, 1916, p. 130. 46. Sarekat-lslam congres ... 1916, p. 93; Sarekat-lslam congres (2e nationaal congres) 20— 2 i October 1917 te Batavia (Sarekat Islam Congress [Second National Congress], Oct. 20-27, 1917, at Batavia) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1919), p. 73. Larger branches in 1917 were Surabaja (22,000), Palembang (20,349), and Sukabumi (20,079); Tjirebon claimed the same number of members as Semarang. fied,

47. Sneevliet,

“Het noodwcndige gevolg” (The Necessary Consequence), H\TV,

364

Notes, pp. 23-26 Oct. 20, 1917, p. 13.

The Semarang

SI

demanded

that the

movement organize

members, as the Semarang branch had already done in the conviction that this was the proletarian manner. It further asked that the CSI take a stand against coolie contracts, for improved education, and for the introduction of elected councils to which the village heads would be responsible. Semarang also required the CSI to publish a statement of principles and submit a work program to the branches for discussion at least four months before each congress— a demand that embarrassed the badly organized CSI leadership and which, if carried out, would have allowed the relatively well-knit and dynamic Semarang group to formulate better its precongress campaigns among the other SI branches. See Baars, “Het aanstaande S.I. congres” (The Forthcoming SI Congress), HVW, Oct. 10, 1917, p. 7. 48. See Hartogh, “Jaarverslag 1917-1918,” p. 198. The debate— between Muis, Hartogh, Baars, and Tjokroaminoto— was held on Sept. 12, 1917. 49. De Roode S.I.’er, “Het S.I. congres te Batavia” (The SI Congress at itself

groups according to the occupation of

in

its

HVW,

Nov. 10, 1917, p. 29. 50. Sneevliet, “Het S.I. congres te Batavia” (The SI Congress

Batavia),

HVW,

at

Batavia),

Oct. 20, 1917, p. 9.

The proceedings

1917 congress can be found in Sarekat-Islam congres 1917. See also G. A. J. Hazeu, Geheime missive van den Regeeringscomissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische zaken van 23 Augustus 1918 (Secret Communique of the Government Commissioner for Native and Arab Affairs of Aug. 23, 1918) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, n.p., 1918), p. 2, Roode S.I.’er, “Het S.I. congres,” p. 29; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging in N ederlandsch-Indie (The Nationalist Movement in the Netherlands Indies) (Haarlem, 1931), p. 65, hereafter cited as Nationalist; HOS, p. 112; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 134-138. 52. See Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 120—121. Alkema (De Sarikat Islam, p. 22) thinks the SI momentum reached a peak in 1916, its decay thereafter being shown by dwindling attendance at its congresses. Some indication of SI membership patterns can be gained from the lists of branches represented at the congresses supplied in government accounts of the proceedings. These are not very reliable, since they are based on the membership claimed by each branch and do not list branches not represented at the congresses. They show, however, a rather steady increase in the size of the big-city organizations and a tendency of the more rural branches both to decline in relative importance and to fluctuate greatly in membership from year to year. The total membership indicated in these lists is far less than the total membership claimed by the Sarekat Islam for any given year; this discrepancy is doubtless due in part to the fact that not all branches were represented at the congresses, but it probably also indicates more realistic estimates of branch size, since losses as well as gains are reported. 53. Note by the editors of HVW, attached to Roode S.I.’er, “Het S.I. congres,” 51.

.

.

of

the

.

p. 30.

“Geweigerde vergadering te Semarang” (Prohibited Meeting at Semarang), HVW, Mar. 25, 1917, p. 104; Sneevliet, “Vergaderingen geweigerd” (Meetings Prohibited), HVW, Apr. 10, 1917, p. 115; “Reactic in 54. See Sneevliet,

Indie” (Reaction in the Indies),

An account

HVW, May

10, 1917, p. 137.

most part of Sneevliet’s address, was published privately as Baars and Sneevliet, Het proces Sneevliet, by the two ISDV leaders. Koch described Sneevliet’s plea as masterly, “a feat of propaganda rarely equaled in the Netherlands Indies” (Koch, Batig Slot, p. 116). 56. VVS, pp. 55-57, 144; Koch, Batig Slot, p. 115. 55.

of the trial, consisting for the

365

Notes pp. 27-30 ,

HVW, May

57.

10, 1917, p. 147.

For an account of the congress proceedings, see “Verkort verslag van de vierde algemeene vergadering der I.S.D.V.” (Abridged Report of the Fourth General Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 10, 1917, pp. 164-168; also De Cock Bunin g, “Politieke Stroomingen,” pp. 21-22. 59. The ending of all cooperation between the two groups did not prevent some Indonesians from maintaining prominence in both organizations— notably Mara Sutan and Alimin, who continued to edit Insulinde’s Batavia newspaper, 58.

Mocljopahit, along with Tjipto

king

Mangunkusumo. See

als volkspartij” (Insulinde’s

De

Sneevliet, ‘Insulinde’s afdan-

Resignation as a People’s Party),

HVW, May

30,

XL

(1918), 333-334. 60. Hartogh, “Jaarverslag 1917-1918,” p. 198. 61. This was an article by Baars, “De Russische revolutie” (The Russian Revolution), HVW, Nov. 25, 1917, pp. 35-36. 62. Baars, “De Russische revolutie” (The Russian Revolution) HVW, Dec. 10, 1918, p. 210;

lndisclie Gids,

1917, p. 59.

De

Tribune (The Tribune, newspaper of the Dutch Communist 21, 1921. No immediate action was taken against Baars by the authorities for this speech, but it was given as one of the reasons for expelling him from the Indies several years later. 64. “Verslag van de vijfde algemeene vergadering” (Report of the Fifth General Meeeting), HVW, May 30, 1918, pp. 210-212. 65. “Verslag van de vijfde algemeene vergadering,” p. 212. 66. See VVS, p. 58; “Communisme,” p. 527, col. b; Indie een hel. De externeering van Brandsteder (The Indies a Hell. The Expulsion of Brandsteder) (Rotterdam, 1919), pp. 3-8. The action began with a sailors’ meeting in Surabaja on Dec. 11, 1917, and was extended to the soldiers shortly thereafter. It should be noted that politically oriented associations of military personnel were not unusual or illegal for the Dutch: both in Holland and the Indies there were

Quoted party), June 63.

soldiers’

and

in

sailors’

organizations, akin to unions,

and secular

which were

tied to various

Brandsteder, the principal leader of the soviet action, had organized sailors for the socialists while in Holland; in the Indies, confessional

parties.

he was secretary of the Surabaja-based Bond van Minder Marinepersoneel (Union of Noncommissioned Naval Personnel), which was ideologically allied with the ISDV. Other ISDV leaders who played a major part in the soviet action were Baars, Sneevliet, Van Burink, Bergsma, and Harry Dekker. 67. “Verslag van de vijfde algemeene vergadering,” p. 234. 68. Since this was the first Indonesian Communist program-a second was not drawn up until 1923— it is worthwhile summarizing its points: Election of local, regional, and national legislative bodies; extensive local and regional autonomy. b. Universal suffrage for men and women over twenty; direct election of local and regional legislatures. a.

Freedom of Compulsory

political action, speech, strike,

and assembly. public d. education to the age of fourteen; instruction in the local language, with Malay (Indonesian) as a second language. e. Separation of church and state. f. Abolition of the armed forces. g. Equality before the law. h. Improved labor legislation: eight-hour working day, protection for workc.

ing i.

women and

free

children, social insurance, etc.

Abolition of proprietary land ownership

366

(that

is,

ownership of land sold

Notes, pp. 30-34 by the government, usually to non-Indonesians, and bearing semifeudal rights over the population living on it); farming to be carried on under the direction of

the village councils;

and

prohibition

of

land leasing; extensive government aid

credit to peasant agriculture.

Nationalization of monopolies, banks, and vital regulation of medical services and food distribution. j.

industries;

government

Housing aid, rent control, etc.; prohibition of usurious moneylending. Uniform taxes, with emphasis on a graduated income tax; abolition l. unpaid services to the state. m. Prohibition of nonmedicinal alcohol and opium. k.

“Ontwerpen

of

en gemeente-program der Ind. Soc. Dem. Vereeniging” (Draft Statutes, Rules, and Action and Community Programs of the Indies Social Democratic Association), HVW, Apr. 20, 1918, pp. "179-180. 69.

May 70. 71.

statuten, huishoudelijk reglement,

“Ontwerp beginselverklaring”

strijd-

(Draft Declaration of Principles),

HVW,

10, 1918, p. 199.

“Ontwerp beginselverklaring,” pp. 212-213. See Sneevliet, “Onze eerste 1 Mei-viering (Our

HVW, May

First

May Day

Celebration),

196-197; Maring, Oekonomische, p. 15. 72. Koch, Verantwoording, pp. 98-99; Brouwer, De bonding, pp. 70-72. 73. See De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 374—375, for an SDAP account of this meeting. The parliamentary system envisaged by the conference was to be similar to that of Australia; suffrage was to be granted to all males who knew either Dutch or an Indonesian language and were literate or who possessed a certain

10, 1918, pp.

amount

of property.

Oekonomische, p. 15; see also De Indische Gids, XL (1918), 997-998, XLI (1919), 258-259; Oetoesan Hindia, Nov. 27, 1918, in Overziclit van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche pers (Survey of the Native and MalayChinese Press), no. 48, 1918, p. 26, hereafter cited as IPO; and the Handelingen (Proceedings) of the Volksraad, First Session, 1920, pp. 257-259, 334-340, 348-349. 75. Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 16, 1918, in IPO, no. 46, 1918, p. 3, emphasis in the text; see also Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 1, 1918, in IPO, no. 44, 1918, p. 5. 76. Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 2, 1918, in IPO, no. 49, 1918, pp. 22-23; see also articles by Darsono in Oetoesan Hindia, Nov. 30 and Dec. 2, 1918, in IPO, no. 48, 1918, p. 27, and no. 49, 1918, p. 21. 77. Sinar Hindia, Nov. 18, 1918, in IPO, no. 47, 1918, p. 10; emphasis in the 74. Maring,

text.

78. Sinar Hindia, 79. In

Nov.

18, 1918, in

a speech to the Volksraad,

IPO, no. 47, 1918,

p.

11.

Van Limburg Stirum promised

that

the

between that body and the government would change and that the Volksraad would be given additional functions. He further spoke of contemplated reforms in the sugar districts, among the armed forces, and in the matter of civil rights. See Brouwer, De bonding, p. 71; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 144-145, 183-184; Ch. C. Cramer, Koloniale Politick (Colonial Policy) (Amsterdam, 1929), Part 1, pp. 56-58. 80. Maring, Oekonomische, p. 15.

relationship

CHAPTER 1.

HVW,

and VVS,

III

Sept. 27, 1919, p. 450; Oct. 4, 1919, p. 4; Oct. 11, 1919, pp. 14-15;

p. 59.

367

,

,

Notes 2.

The

expulsions were authorized

,

p.

34 by the 1854. These powers, which

by the “extraordinary

rights” held

Governor General under the Regeringsreglement of permitted the authorities to act when there was no legal basis for prosecution, allowed the government, in the interests of the public peace, to expel from the Indies those who had not been bom there and to choose the place of residence for those of Indies birth. For a discussion of the application of these rights, including their use in the cases of Sneevliet, Baars, and Brandsteder, see P. H. C. Jongmans, De exorhitante rechten van den Gouverneur-Generaal in de praktrjk (The Extraordinary Rights of the Governor General in Practice) (Amsterdam, 1921). 3.

Sneevliet accused the

from the Indies during

Weerbar

(Sneevliet,

CSI leader Abdul Muis

of having urged his removal

1917 trip to the Netherlands on behalf of Indie “De heer Abdoel Moe'is volksleider” (Mr. Abdul Muis, his

Leader of the People), HVW, Oct. 10, 1917, p. 7; and see the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (New Rotterdam News), July 6, 1917. For that matter, Sneevliet’s political agitation was too much for many radical socialists. His contract with the Semarang Handelsvereniging expired in May 1917; the association offered to renew it if he would refrain from revolutionary activity, which he refused. Sneevliet then became secretary-general of the VSTP, but he was forced to resign the following year because the union felt he devoted too much time to party work and was too outspoken politically. He thereafter was employed as a propagandist for the ISDV. See

HVW

Feb. 11, 1919, p. 125. 4. Of the reactions to Sneevliet’s expulsion in the Indonesian press reported in IPO only the government-subsidized Neratja approved, and its view was attacked so strongly by the other Indonesian papers that its editors were forced

Nov. 18, 1918, in IPO, no. 47, 1918, p. 12; Neratja, Nov. 25 and 27, 1918, in IPO, no. 48, 1918, pp. 2, 5; Neratja, Dec. 12, 1918, in IPO, no. 50, 1918, pp. 4-5. For other non-Semarang Indonesian comments, all expressing sympathy for Sneevliet, see Oetoesan Hindia, Nov. 21, 1918, and Djawi Hisworo, Nov. 20, 1918, in IPO, no. 47, 1918, pp. 12, 24-25, B/I; Pesisir Oetara, Nov. 28, 1918, in IPO, no. 48, 1918, p. 29; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 5 and 7, 1918, in IPO, no. 49, 1918, pp. 27, 31; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 10, 1918, Darmo Kondo, Nov. 11, 1918, and Islam Bergerak, Dec. 1, 1918, in IPO, no. 50, 1918, pp. 25, B/2, C/4; and Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 18, 1918, in IPO, no. 51, 1918, p. 19. For comments in the Dutch-language Indies newspapers, overwhelmingly approving Sneevliet’s expulsion, see De Indische Gids, XLI ( 1919), 384-386, 656-657. 5. Sneevliet’s account of his departure is given in the pamphlet Mijne uitzetting (My Expulsion), which he published on his return to the Netherlands. For other accounts of his extemment, see Jongmans, De exorhitante rechten, pp. 139-142; E. A. A. van Heekeren, “Sneevliet verbannen” (Sneevliet Banished), De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 65-69; Neratja, Dec. 21, 1918, and Sinar Hindia, Dec. 17 and 18, 1918, in IPO, no. 51, 1918, pp. 4, 10. The final order for Sneevliet’s expulsion was given on Dec. 5, and he left on Dec. 17. The immediate reason given for his banishment was his agitation among the soldiers, expressed in several to apologize. See Neratja,

articles in

Hct

Vrije

Woord.

For an account of the CSI meeting that agreed to support Sneevliet, see Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 23, 1918, in IPO, no. 52, 1918, pp. 22-23. Semaun’s proposal met considerable objection and was only passed, very narrowlv, on T jokroam inoto’s urging. Subsequently the CSI set up a Fund for Martyrs of the Independence Movement, which was to aid both Indonesians and non6.

368

Notes pp. 34-36 ,

Indonesians prosecuted by the government. There

no indication, however, that the CSI provided aid to Sncevliet on a regular basis, as the original agreement had stipulated; in view of the movement’s precarious financial state, it seems most unlikely that its leaders were serious in their plan to put him on their payroll. He may have received some funds from the VSTP, but his principal source of support from the Indies was money sent by the ISDV. 7. A. Baars, “Waaromfik heenga” (Why I Am Leaving), HVW, March 1, 1919, p. 188. Het Vrije Woord offered the following comments on Baars’ decision:

The ISDV could hardly have been of these

is

blow than by the departure was embodied. ... If Sneevliet

struck a harder

two men. In them the ISDV’s

activity

was the man of fiery propaganda, the man of impetuous action, of elan, of dedication, Baars was the sober thinker, the cool intellect, the man of clear, penetrating study. Baars will not take it amiss if we state that he still had a great deal to learn as a political leader. Though he was Sneevliet’s master as far as theory was concerned, he simply did not possess Sneevliet’s gift of leadership. And it is this which one must have in this period of reaction, with its numerous trials, in order to maintain one’s balance and to work on cheerfully, irrespective of the .

immediate

.

.

results

of

that

work. These results were disappointing, and Baars

allowed it to depress him. The S.I. as a whole had remained idle and last but not least the native population had shown itself ready to bear sickness and hunger to a degree inconceivable to the Western mind. This failure of the native population and the native movement to react to stimuli which would have fanned a Western land to a blaze was the thing which most depressed Baars. He did not possess Sneevliet’s inner strength, which had helped [that leader] over all disappointments and which made it possible for him to show the same cheerful face and inexhaustible energy no matter how great his defeats. .

.

.

;

HVW,

Mar. 1, 1919, p. 192. 8. See “Mededeeling der redaktie” (Announcement of the Editors), HVW, Sept. 6, 1919, p. 425; “Komende excessen— Sneevliet terug” (Coming Excesses— Sneevliet Returned), HVW, Oct. 4, 1919, p. 435; Hartogh, ‘Ons vierde jaar” (Our Fourth Year), HVW, Oct. 4, 1919, p. 3: and Maring, Oekonovusche, p. 15. 9.

This was a propaganda tour undertaken by Baars at the end of 1917; see

HVW, 10.

Jan. 4, 1919, p. 114.

The Semarang ISDV branch, which had had 49 members

in

February 1918

HVW,

Feb. 20, 1918, p. 124), had nearly 700 in August (HVW, Sept. 10, 1918, p. 309). Total ISDV membership at the time of the May 1918 congress had been only 740 (Hartogh, “Jaarverslag 1917-18,” p. 198). At a meeting of the (

Semarang ISDV

September 1918, Van Burink spoke on the shift in the movement’s strength from Dutch to Indonesian members; see Sinar Hindia, Oct. 1, 1919, in IPO, no. 40, 1919, pp. 13-14. 11. The May 1918 congress attempted to deal with this situation by appointing, in addition to a Dutch-controlled central executive, a number of leaders from the major branches, most of them Indonesians, as representatives of the executive in its relations with the local units. The central body named at the congress was composed of Baars, Hartogh, Van Wezel, and Darsono. Representatives of the branches outside Surabaja were Semaun and Sneevliet (Semarang), Coster (Malang), Alimin (Batavia), Hasan Djajadiningrat (Serang), Judohadinoto (Bandung), and Barkah (Jogjakarta). “Verslag van de vijfde algemeene vergain

dering,” p. 229; Sneevliet, 30, 1918, p. 208.

“Na ons kongres”

369

(After

Our Congress)

HVW, May

Notes, pp. 36-38 12.

Raden Darsono was born

in

1897, a

member

of the lesser nobility

and

the son of a police official in the Javanese city of Pati. After a European-style

primary education, he attended the School of Agriculture in Sukabumi and later taught agriculture in Bodjonegoro. Leaving his job, he drifted to Semarang,

where he was attracted to the revolutionary socialists and went to work for the leftist newspaper Sinar Djawa. When ISDV headquarters moved to Surabaja in 1918, Darsono, who had been named to the party executive, was also transferred; shortly thereafter he was appointed the movement’s first full-time Indonesian propagandist.

The proceedings

1918 SI congress are recorded in Sarekat-lslam congres (3e nationaal congres) 29 Sept. -6 Oct. 1918 te Soerabaja (Sarekat Islam Congress [Third National Congress] Sept. 29-Oct. 6, 1918, at Surabaja) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Batavia, 1919). See also “Derde Nationaal Congres der Centrale Sarekat Islam” (Third National Congress of the Central Sarekat Islam), De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 223-225; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 142-144; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 67; S. J. Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging tot 1927” (The Indonesian National Movement to 1927), Politick en Cultuur, Jan. 1926, p. 47. At the congress, the Semarang branch claimed the Si’s second largest membership, with 30,000 alleged adherents. Palembang (Sumatra) claimed the greatest number, 37,700; Surabaja claimed 22,000 ( Sarekat-lslam congres 1918, pp. 71-72). 14. Semaun, Anti Indie Weerbaar, Anti Militie dan 3e Nationaal Congres Sarekat Islam (Against Indie Weerbaar, Against a Militia, and the Third National Congress of the Sarekat Islam) (Semarang, 1918); see also Overzicht van de gestie der Centraal Sarikat-Islam in hot jaar 1921 (Survey of the Activity of the Central Sarekat Islam in the Year 1921) (Netherlands Indies government, 13.

of the

.

.

.

1922), p. 3, hereafter Overzicht CSI 1921. Limburg Stirum, anxious to have his Ethical viewpoint publicly appre-

classified, Batavia,

15.

Van

and finding the existing newspapers inadequate to the purpose, subsidized both Neratja and the Dutch-language Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad. Their editors were sympathetic to his policies, and this seems to have been the only thing the Governor General relied on for their favorable presentation of the news; however, many Indonesians understandably felt they were government tools. See Koch, Verantwoording, pp. 112-113; Van Niel, Emergence, p. 135. Muis resigned his editorship at the end of 1918 and was replaced by Hadji Agus Salim. 16. For the text of the mutual promises, see Sarekat-lslam congres 1918, 75-76. Specifically, Semaun and Darsono declared that they would adhere pp. principles of the CSI and that their quarrels with Muis would be disto the the SI with central body cussed before being aired publicly. If a controversy did reach the newspapers, they promised, the argument would be based on ciated

.

.

.

principles rather than personalities.

ISDV member in the CSI executive. Of the fourteen CSI commissioners elected at the 1918 congress, Mohamad Jusuf, Hasan 17.

Semaun was not

the only

and Prawoto Sudibio also belonged to the socialist organization. All three of them bore the aristocratic title of Raden; Mohamad Jusuf had preceded Semaun as leader of the Semarang ISDV, and Hasan Djajadiningrat, the younger brother of the Regent of Serang, was a member of the ISDV executive. However, their primary loyalties under the multiple-membership system did not lie with the revolutionary socialist group: Jusuf was generally seen as a Budi Utomo advocate, and Djajadiningrat was considered a proponent of the Sarekat Islam; both were considered moderates, even by the Dutch. Thev were Djajadiningrat,

370

Notes pp. 38-39 ,

both CSI members of long standing. Prawoto Sudibio was newly elected in 1918

and represented the leftist group in Jogjakarta. 18. The report, which contains a detailed analysis of grievances in the sugar districts, was published as Verslag van de Suiker-Enquete Commissie (Report of the Sugar Inquiry Commission) (Surabaja, 1921). For accounts of the attempts to introduce the sugar-restriction motion into the Volksraad and parliament, see Brouwer,

Gids,

De

bonding,

XLI (1919),

776;

J.

Van der Zee, De Stokvis, “Van Limburg

p. 77;

E.

S.D.A.P., p. 50; De lndische Stirum,” Indonesia, 1 (1948),

25-26. For comments on the rice shortage and sugar controversy in the Indies Dutch papers, see De lndische Gids, XL (1918), 886-889, 1002-1004; XLI (1919), 238-239, 377-378, 632-633, 650-653, 775-780, 917-918, 1021-1022. 19. Mededeelingen 1920, p. 2. This report on the development of the Indonesian movements during 1919 summarized the year’s activity as follows:

For political life in the Netherlands Indies 1919 was a significant year, chiefly because the efforts of the various groups were directed more consciously and openly toward goals that were stated more sharply than before, so that the sum of their activities and attitudes formed a recognizable whole. The repercussions of the events in

Europe forced them

to define their standpoints.

The

steep

and swift

rise in the prices of literally all— and particularly the basic— necessities provided a powerful stimulus and led to increased activity in economic affairs, in which the groups furthest to the political left did their best to gain a more or less important part in the leadership. A great deal of activity was displayed. The spirit of the masses seemed more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda than before, and those who held it their task to make clear to the masses that they were suffering miserable social conditions did not hesitate to profit from this. The “making conscious” of the masses became the object of an intensified expenditure of effort.

Mededeelingen 1920, p. 1. See also “Sarekat Islam,” Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Hague, 1927), Part V, p. 370, col. a, hereafter SI V. 20. The peasants in the sugar- growing areas of the princely territories of Java were required to make half their land available for leasing to plantations, as opposed to one-third in the directly governed territories. The 1918 land reform regulations guaranteed the sugar estates that this amount would be available

them for the next fifty years. In addition, the peasantry in the princely territories was obligated to render unpaid labor to the plantations for the next five years. Above a certain customary maximum, forced estate labor was paid at a rate determined by the government; however, as Acting Adviser for Native Affairs Kem noted in a letter to the Governor General, it was hard enough to decide on a fair rate in normal times and quite impossible in periods of rapid inflation such as the Indies was then experiencing. As it was, the greatest part of the peasant’s time was taken up in unpaid labor for the estates, for sugar cultivation required far more labor than rice. The condition of the population was one of “slavery under a veneer. At best it is highly unfree. It has been that way as long as anyone can remember: but what the people earlier endured passively, in their former lethargic state, they no longer will bear. Hence the enthusiastic agreement which the popular leaders found, the recurring resistance to forced labor, even though people knew very well they were laying themselves open to punishment. The changed mentality of the native, his consciousness or whatever one wants to call it, is no longer reconciled to conditions in the princely territories, neither with conditions as they are now nor with them to

.

as

they will

essentially

remain after the completion

371

of

the

.

reform.

.

In

this

Notes, pp. 39-42 atmosphere the appearance of Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Hadji Misbach had the same effect as foxes in a henhouse.” R. Kern, letter to Governor General Fock, dated Weltevreden, Aug. 18, 1921, no. 166, classified, p. 5. For a detailed account of the Surakarta anticorvee movement and the measures taken against it, see Medecleelingen 1920, pp. 19-25. Other accounts may be found in De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 1029-1032, 1144-1155, 1197-1198, 1273-1274; and M. Balfas, Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo (Djakarta and Amsterdam, 1952), pp. 102-

A

by the June 1919 Insulinde congress; De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 1165. He was also received with applause by the SI congress that year, which discussed and defended the movement. See Sarekat-Islam congres (4e nationaal congres) 26 Oct. -2 Nov. 1919 te 107.

vote of thanks to Hadji Misbach was tendered

Soerabaja (Sarekat Islam Congress [Fourth National Congress], Oct. 26-Nov.

2,

1919, at Surabaja) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, 1920), pp. 35-37. 21. See Medcdeelingen 1920, pp. 28-31; Koloniaal Verslag, 1918, Iloofdstuk B, cols. 72-74; De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 1449-1450; Sarekat-Islam congres

1919, pp. 33-35 (report by Abdul Muis). Muis, according to the government account, had urged the abolition of corvee but had cautioned his audiences .

.

.

to fulfill the obligations as

Kat Angelino’s

fatal

long as they were sanctioned by the government.

mistake seems to have been that he offended

strict

De

Muslim

where relations between the authorities and the people were already weakened by a quarrel over the succession to the local throne, by making his visit during the month of Ramadan and refusing to postpone the execution of unfulfilled corvee until the end of that fasting period. 22. C. S., “Op den tweesprong” (At the Crossroads), HVW, Oct. 11, 1919, p. 12. The Dutch Communist parliamentary leader Wijnkoop attempted to absolve the Sarekat Islam leadership by asserting that Section B represented a religious reaction to the CSI, led by hadjis who opposed its increasingly secular orientation. See Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, Ticeede Kamer (Proceedings of the States General, Lower House), 1919/1920, p. 1147; hereafter cited as Handelingen 2e Kamer. For discussions of the affair and its aftermath, see Handelingen 2e Kamer, pp. 1158-1162 (report of the Colonial Minister) and 1108-1113 (remarks by the SDAP spokesman Albarda); Handelingen Volksraad, First Session, 1920, pp. 435-438; Second Session, 1920, pp. 364—365 (Abdul Muis’ remarks); Mededeelingen 1921, p. 7; Oetoesan Hindia, Sept. 8, 1919, in IPO, no. 36, sentiment in

Toli-toli,

1919, pp. 31-32; Neratja, Aug. 19, 1922, in IPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 294; SarekatIslam congres 1919, pp. 24-33; Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Het communisme in Indie : naar aanleiding van de relletjes (Communism in the Indies: In Connec.

.

.

(Bandung, 1926), p. 12; HOS, pp. 117-118; Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 145-150; Brouwer, De bonding, p. 80; De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 1201-1202, 1269-1272, 1298-1305, 1446-1449, 1450-1455. 23. Mededeelingen 1921, p. 24. See also Koch, V erantwoording, pp. 125-127. For a general discussion of the relationship between the sugar industry and the

tion with the Disturbances)

population in the plantation areas during the colonial period, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca, 1962), pp. 262-284. 24. See Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 4-5, 10. An Indies official later described the policy as follows:

Not only was the government advised to maintain the favorably neutral attitude which it had thus far shown toward the SI, but denying completely the enormous differences between the European and native societies, it was advised to accept not only favorably but even heartily the new trend in the SI, which placed the

372

Notes, pp. 42-44 economic struggle in the foreground and aimed at organizing the peasants in the villages and the workers on plantations and factories for a struggle to better their lot; and this was done on the grounds that the modern labor union tactics practiced in Europe seemed not to have proved harmful for the growth of the social organism there.

van Helsdingen, no. 20974/4, Banjumas, Dec. 11, 1926, p. 8; referring to the very secret letter of the Government Commissioner, Dec. 9, 1918, no. 588, p. 8. Emphasis in the text. 25. Thus Baars responded to the revolutionary events of November 1918 by

Instructions of the

Resident of Banjumas,

urging the Indonesian movements to form:

“We want

distribution

rent

of

communal

demand

no words or reports now;

J.

rural instead of parliamentary re-

we must

see deeds.

Improve the

dams everywhere, away with the land Nationalize the sugar factories; make all proprietary lands

water,

ordinance!

J.

build irrigation

property. After that village administration ought to be reformed;

only then can a parliament do useful work.” Soeara Ra’jat, Dec.

6,

and

1918, in IPO,

no. 15, 1918, p. 3.

HVW,

Mar. 10, 1918, p. 136; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 20 and 31, 1918, in IPO, no. 44, 1918, pp. 20, 24; Paso Pati, Nov. 14, 1918, in IPO, no. 46, 1918, p. 7; Koemandang-Djawi, Dec. 9, 1918, in IPO, no. 50, 1918, p. 3; MedanBergerak, Jan. 1919, in IPO, no. 5, 1919, p. 5. 27. Mededeelingen 1921, p. 13. 28. In October 1915 a meeting was held between the executives of the ISDV and various unions in which the socialists had influence in order to form a committee to coordinate labor and political actions. The committee was established, but to the radicals’ displeasure it only included the labor unions; nothing seems to have resulted from it, probably because of the growing split between right and left socialists and between Indonesian and European-status employees (HVW, Nov. 10, 1915, p. 24; Jan. 25, 1916, p. 68; Aug. 16, 1919, p. 402). In mid-1916, the VSTP endorsed Semaun’s proposal to sound out other unions about a general action for a cost-of-living bonus; this resulted in February 1918 in formation of a multiunion committee. Attempts to develop it into a federation foundered, however, because of the divergent interests of European and Indonesian workers; thereafter attempts to unite European and Indonesian unions were abandoned ( Sinar Hindia, July 31, 1920, in IPO, no. 31, 1920, p. 16; history of the establishment of the first Indonesian labor federation [PPKB] by its secretary, Najoan). 29. Quoted in HOS, p. 113; see further Hartogh, “De Wensch— de vader der gedachte” (The Wish— the Father of the Idea), HVW, Aug. 16, 1919, p. 402; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 133; Aidit, Sedjarah, pp. 40-41; SI V, p. 370, col. b; HVW, Mar. 10, 1918, pp. 136-137; HVW, May 24, 1919, p. 308; De Indische Gids, (1919), 1023-1027; Darmo Kondo, Oct. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 48, 1923, pp. 33-34. 30. According to statistics provided by Semaun, a total of 7,000 workers went on strike in 1918, 66,000 in 1919, and 83,000 in 1920. The 1918-1920 strike wave had in general economic rather than political aims, and only about one-quarter of the actions ended in complete defeat. See Semaun’s report in Pervyi s’ezd revoliutsionnykh organizatsii Dal’nego Vostoka, pp. 284-286; hereafter cited 26. See

XU

as Pervyi s”ezd.

31. Luistert/Dengarkanlah!

See also Hartogh, “De wensch,” p. 403; HVW, Mar. 15, 1919, pp. 207-208; C. S., “Op den tweesprong,” p. 13; Nota (Note [on the 1919 SI congress] (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, 1920), p. 15. (Listen!)

(Surabaja,

373

1919).

,

Notes, pp. 44-46 32. C.

S.,

“Het S.I.-congres” (The SI Congress),

HVW,

“Vierde S.I.-congres” (Fourth SI Congress), H\rW, Nov.

b-371, col. Aidit, Sedjarali, pp. 41-42. pp. 370,

col.

a;

Blumberger, Nationalist,

S.,

“Het

34. C.

S.,

“Op den tweesprong,”

p.

1,

p. 69;

S.I.-congres,” p. 33. See also Hartogh,

33. C.

Nov.

1919, p. 33; 1919, p. 35; SI V, 1,

HOS,

pp. 113-114;

“De wensch,”

p. 403.

13.

Zakaznikova, “Profsoiuznoe dvizhenie v Indonezii v 1918-1926 gg.” (The Trade Union Movement in Indonesia, 1918-1926), in lugoVostochnaia Aziia, ocherki ekonomiki i istorii (Moscow, 1958), pp. 154-155, the 35. According to

E.

P.

mid-1920 the sugar workers’ union (30,000 members), VSTP (over 8,000), dockworkers’ (3,000), Semarang printers’ union (2,000), pawnshop workers’ (5,000), teachers’ (4,000), public works employees’ (2,000), and the metal workers’, oil workers’, chauffeurs’, and other smaller unions. See also Tan Malaka, “Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung auf Hollandisch Ost-Indien” (The Trade Union Movement in the Dutch East Indies), Rote GewerkschaftsInternationale (no. 5/6), 1923, p. 543. For a description of the federation’s organization as outlined at the December 1919 convention, see Mededeelingen 1921 p. 10. 36. Nota, p. 22; SI V, p. 371, col. b; P. B. [Bergsma], “De Vakcentrale” (The Concentration of Labor Movements), HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 109; HOS, p. 114. Surjopranoto became vice-chairman; Najoan ( ISDV-SI ) was named secretary, but he was soon replaced by Hadji Agus Salim (CSI). Bergsma was made treasurer, and the other executive members— Sjahbuddin Latief, Kartosubroto, H. Sutadi, Sugeng, and Tjokromidjojo— were CSI adherents. See H. Sutadi, article in Darmo Kondo, Oct. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 48, 1920, p. 33. federation

combined

in

“De

Vakcentrale,” p. 109. 38. “Jaarvergadering Indische S.D.A.P.” (Annual Meeting of the Indies De Indische Gids, XLI (1919), 1171-1172. 37. P. B.,

39.

See “Jaarvergadering S.D.A.P.” (Annual Meeting of the SDAP),

June 21, 1919,

SDAP),

HVW,

p. 21.

40. Alimin, Riwajat

Hidup (Autobiography) (Djakarta, 1954),

pp. 14-15. 41. Dec. 27, 1919, p. 97, “Verslag van de zevende jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.” (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 1,

HVW,

1920, p. 253.

The use of the word Perserikatan, which strictly translated in its present usage means “association” or “union rather than “party,” does not seem to have had any special significance, for the official Dutch equivalent was Partij der Kommunisten in Indie— Party of the Communists in the Indies. See HVW, May 5, 1920, 42.

’

229; “Verslag van de zevende jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.” HVW, June 1, 1920, p. 254. Since it did not consider that adopting a new name meant becoming a different party, the PKI of the 1920s continued to refer to this meeting as its seventh

p.

The December 1920 and March 1923 congresses were not numbered, presumably because the former was “extraordinary” and the latter a “Congress of the PKI and Red SI/SR. The December 1921 party congress was held at the time congress.

be the eighth and the June 1924 congress the ninth. However, the January 1947 party convention, meeting during the war of independence, called itself the fourth congress, presumably in order to make clear the distinction between the Indonesian-led PKI and the Dutch-led ISDV. Subsequent Communist congresses have followed this numbering. Postcolonial party historians have stressed a qualitative difference between the ISDV and PKI. Usually they have referred to the May 1920 congress as the party’s first, though not invariably. For example, Njoto/in his to

374

Notes pp. 46-50 ,

report to the 1959 congress, gives the

December 1921 meeting

as the

first;

Bintang

Merah (Red Star, the present party journal), special sixth congress issue, 1960, I, 178. The second and third congresses are placed before 1925 in recent party hisbut otherwise their dating is quite arbitrary. 43. Api, Aug. 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 32, 1924, pp. 279-280; interviews with

tories,

Darsono and Semaun, 1959.

CHAPTER 1.

in

Baars, “Brieven uit Holland” (Letters from Holland), dated 24 Apr. 1919;

HVW, 2.

IV

July 21, 1919, p. 364.

The ISDV newspaper published numerous

reports

on the revolutionary

situa-

Germany, however; it also ran as a serial the account by a British journalist, Arthur Ransome, of his “Six Weeks in Soviet Russia.” An indication of the state of information and the slowness with which news was received is that on Aug. 30, 1919, Het Vrije Woord published a report of Maxim Gorky’s death— a large, black-bordered report, for Gorky, after Lenin, was the paper’s favorite Russian revolutionary. It was not until January 1920 that the ISDV discovered Gorky was still alive; it had received a copy of the Dutch Communist newspaper De Tribune of Nov. 1, 1919, in which Gorky’s current activities were mentioned (P. B., tion in

“Maxim Gorky,” HVW, Jan. 10, 1920, 3. The manifesto was published in

p.

108).

installments in

HVW,

Oct. 4, 1919 (pp. 437-438, 446, 452-453, and 6-7). 4. “Verslag van de zesde jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.”

Annual Meeting of the ISDV),

HVW,

Sept. 13, 20, 27

and

(Report of the Sixth

Jan. 10, 1920, p. 113; hereafter cited as

Verslag zesde. 5. 6.

Verslag zesde, p. 113. The ISDV executive decision of

December 1918,

as

quoted by Hartogh

at

the sixth party congress (Verslag zesde, p. 114). 7. Verslag zesde, p. 114. 8.

9.

Verslag zesde, p. 114. See vBr.-H., “De jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.” (The Annual Meeting of the

ISDV),

HVW,

At the

Jan. 17, 1920, p. 120.

May

1920 party congress Hartogh

again took up the problem of Section B, declaring that, although it was understandable for such clandestine organizations to arise, it was necessary for the

popular leaders to keep clearer heads. He reprimanded those PKI members who were too admiring of the Section B action; Tjokroaminoto and a number of other

him sharply for acting as if he felt the entire SI were involved. See “Verslag van de zevende jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.” (Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, June 1, 1920, p. 253, hereafter

non-Communists

criticized

cited as Verslag zevende; Soeara Ra’jat,

May

26, 1920, in

IPO, no. 23, 1920,

p. 2.

who made

themselves available were re-elected; the new leaders were Hartogh (Dutch, chairman), Dengah (Indonesian, secretary), Kraan (Dutch, treasurer), Cluwen (Dutch, executive member representing Lawang), and Semaun, Bergsma, and Darsono (executive members repre10. All

members

of the previous executive

senting Semarang). See Verslag zesde, p. 123. 11. Statement by Waworuntu on behalf of the

1920 congress, der I.S.D.V.,” 12. vBr.-H, 13.

in Verslag zevende, p. 254.

Semarang delegation

See also vBr.-H,

“De

to the

May

jaarvergadering

p. 120.

“De

jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.,”

p.

120.

See vBr.-H, “Het nieuwste gevaar” (The Latest Danger),

375

HVW,

Jan. 31,

,

Notes, pp. 50-55 1920, pp. 135-136; P. B., “De ‘donime’ massa” (The “Stupid” Masses), HVW, Jan. 31, 1920, pp. 136-139; and Hgh., “Dom” (Stupid), HVW, Feb. 21, 1920, p. 161. 14. Verslag zevende, p. 253.

De

Tribune, Aug. 16, 1920, p. 4; and see Verslag zevende, p. 253. Baars accused Hartogh of opposing the name change because the party for which he felt 15.

the most

sympathy— the German

USP— had

not adopted the

Communist

title.

He

added, however, that in his estimation Hartogh was not at heart an independent socialist but a Communist, albeit a cautious one ( Verslag zevende, pp. 267-268). 16. Verslag zevende, pp. 254, 265-268; see also De Tribune, Aug. 16, 1920, p. 4;

Aug.

17, 1920, p. 2;

Aug.

18, 1920, p. 2.

De

Tribune, Aug. 19, 1920, p. 2. The rundown of votes given in D. N. Aidit’s history of the movement refers to the results of the 17. Verslag zevende, p. 254;

referendum held

later

among

the party branches (Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 44); see

HVW,

Oct. 20, 1920, p. 9. 18. Verslag zevende, p. 254.

See Elias Hurwicz, Die Orientpolitik der Dritten Internationale (The Eastern Policy of the Third International) (Berlin, 1922), pp. 12, 15, 26; Edward 19.

Hallett Carr,

The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (New York, 1953),

III,

232,

234, 236; L. A. Modzhorian, “Bor’ba demokraticheskogo lageria za natsionahnuiu nezavisimost’

i

natsionahnyi suverenitet” (The Struggle of the Democratic

Camp

Independence and National Sovereignty), Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, January 1953, p. 57; Xenia Eudin and Robert North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957), pp. 46, 77-79; A. A. Guber, “Izuchenie istorii stran Vostoka v SSSR za 25 let” (Twenty-Five Years of Research on the History

for National

of the

East in the

(Moscow, 1940), 20.

Achmed

p.

USSR),

in

Dvadtsat’ pint’

let

istoricheskoi nauki

v

SSSR

232.

Zalikov,

“The

New

Russia and the Peoples of the Orient,” Novaia

Zhizn

Jan. 19, 1918, as quoted in Hurwicz, Orientpolitik, p. 14. 21. Quoted in Plurwicz, Orientpolitik, pp. 17-18. 22. Zhizn

NatsionaVnostei (no. 5), Dec. 8, 1918, as translated in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 162. This department developed twelve country sections, which extended its authority beyond the exclusively Islamic areas to include China, Korea, Japan, and India (Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 78).

Vostok” i revoliutsiia (The East and the Revolution) (Moscow, 1918), pp. 66-67; and see Hurwicz, Orientpolitik, pp. 17-18. The League was created at a conference that began in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1918. 24. Troianovskii, Vostok ”, p. 65. Troianovskii, one of the founders of the League, 23. K.

Troianovskii,

sets forth the

program drawn up by the League

at

its

first

congress.

25. Troianovskii, Vostok”, pp. 66-71; see also Hurwicz, Orientpolitik, pp. 19-23. The League, apparently reflecting Russian concern over Japanese expansion in the

East, declared that since the varied

development of different Asian nationalities made possible an Asian imperialism, it would be best for Eastern countries to unite on a basis of equality: “It can begin with a narrower federation, say the Indian, and expand to a broader one, to a federation of the whole broad Asian continent, to the United States of Asia” ( Troianovksii, Vostok ”, p. 67). The program further announced: In its economic policy the League for the Liberation of the East proceeds from the principle of the natural international division of labor and the highest utilization of the economic and technical bases of this backward, predominantly agrarian continent. The League therefore does not put forth the reactionary slogan of “Asia for the Asians” but, on the contrary, strongly supports freedom of entry and

376

Notes pp. 55-57 ,

penetration into Asia for all those who wish to exploit its inexhaustible resources by peaceful and cultural methods and at the same time to develop the productive capacity of the countries of the East. Troianovskii, Vostok”, p. 69. The only countries capable of such altruistic exploitation, the League continued, were the European socialist republics, of which

happened

be the sole extant example. 26. The League’s action program for the Asian revolutionaries included popular seizure of transportation and communications facilities, the end of foreign monopolies and concessions, the replacement of indirect taxes by a progressive income tax, the nullification of state debts and war loans, the demobilization of the army and its replacement by a people’s militia, the replacement of the existing credit system by non-interest-bearing loans from the state or commune, the abolition of castes (the only visible concession made to Asian conditions), and no restrictions on international trade. This last was probably linked to the plans for peaceful and cultural Soviet exploitation. (Troianovskii, Vostok ”, pp. 70-71). 27. “Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East,” in Lenin, National Liberation Movement, pp. 235-236. 28. For an early expression of this view, see his 1912 article on “Democracy and Narodism in China,” in Lenin, National Liberation Movement, p. 43. For a detailed discussion of Lenin’s early views on the East, see Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York, 1954), pp. 12-46. Soviet Russia

29.

The congress

letarians

to

resolved to adopt a “policy of bringing together the pro-

and semi-proletarians

of different nationalities for a

common

revolu-

and bourgeoisie,” a struggle that was to countries ( Vos’moi S”ezd RKP[b], p. 49, as translated in Carr,

tionary struggle against the landowners

include the colonial

Bolshevik Revolution,

III,

236).

30. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 235-236.

Ahnost the only recognition of the agrarian base of the Asian revolution expressed before the second Comintern congress was in a speech by Bukharin to the Third All-Russian Congress of Chinese Workers: 31.

We

shall fight capitalism in its centers— in Paris,

you

will help us

by overthrowing

it

in Asia.

You

London, and other places; and will be able to do this if you

mobilize the broad masses of the population and give them definite aims. There can be here two watchwords; First, “The fight against European capitalism,” which is clear to everyone. The second watchword therefore is, “Throw out the estate owners.” The aim, consequently, is an agrarian revolution. You will be able to accomplish the rising of the masses through the war cry, as the slogan “Seize the land from the estate owners” is clear to everyone. .

.

.

June 22, 1920, translated in The Second Congress of the Communist International (Washington, 1920), pp. 133-134. Emphasis in the text. Since this meeting was held just before the second Comintern congress, it is quite possible that Bukharin’s statement reflected the theses Lenin had prepared for that gatherIzvestia,

ing.

ECCI had

organized two conferences with representatives from China, Korea, Armenia, Persia, Turkey, and other Eastern lands 32. Zinoviev

added

that the

during the previous year, but these had not been enough to give the young revolutionary movements in those countries the direction they needed. G. Zinoviev, Bericht des Exekutivkommitees der Kommunistischen Internationale an den

II.

Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Second World Congress of the Communist International) (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 35-36. 33. See VVS, p. 60; The Second Congress of the Communist International,

377

Notes pp. 57-60 ,

HVW

Dec. 21, 1920, p. 43; Der Tribune, July 24 and Aug. 14, 1920; , zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (The Second Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg, 1921), p. 783 (hereafter cited as p. 40;

De

The last-named source

Kongress).

II

lists

two delegates from the Netherlands

seems probable that this is a faulty statistic, however, since the unnamed second delegate never spoke at the congress and was not mentioned in any other sources. He could not have been an Indonesian, for Sneevliet declared to the meeting his hope that there might be real natives of that country to represent it at the next congress (II Kongress, p. 189). It is also unlikely that he was Dutch, since the Netherlands Communist newspaper listed Sneevliet as the only delegate going from Holland to represent Indonesia; none of the three delegates representing the Netherlands proper had been identified with the movement in the Indies (De Tribune, July 24 and Aug. 14, 1920). Indies;

it

De

Tribune, Feb. 18, 1919. 35. “Het tiende jaarcongres van de communistische partij” (The Tenth Annual Congress of the Communist Party), HVW, Aug. 23, 1919, pp. 414-415. 36. Just how close Sneevliet’s contact with Indonesia was after his expulsion is 34.

difficult to say. self,

his wife

Het

(still

Woord complained that registered mail between himIndonesia), and the ISDV was not coming through and

Vrije in

accused either British or Dutch officials of intercepting it (HVW, Apr. 26, 1919, p. 270); but certainly he was by no means cut off from the movement in the Indies. In his report on the Indonesian party to the second Comintern congress Sneevliet revealed that he knew the ISDV was planning to assume the name PKI at a forthcoming congress, but apparently he did not know that the meeting had taken place nearly two months before (Maring, Niederlandisch, p. 409). Since, however, he

Aug. 14, 1920),

had

this is

left

Holland for Moscow

in

May

(according to

De

Tribune,

not surprising.

37. II Kongress, p. 192. 38. II Kongress, p. 139. 39. II Kongress, pp. 230-231. 40. II Kongress, p. 149.

41. for other points of difference

Bolshevik Revolution,

III,

42. II Kongress, pp. III,

254.

144-145, 230-231; and see Carr, Bolshevik Revolution,

254-255.

43. II Kongress, p. 194. 44. It has been pointed out that

the

between Roy’s and Lenin’s views, see Carr,

wording of

his

theses

Roy was

considerably,

finally

persuaded by Lenin

particularly

to

modify

in

those sections dealing with bourgeois nationalism. By mistake, however, the original version was included in the stenographic report of the congress and in subsequent reprints of its proceedings; it was not until a second edition of the report w as made in 1934 r

that corrected; see Whiting, Soviet Policies, pp. 51-56. A good bit of Roy’s analysis was later adopted by Stalin as part of his theory on the colonial question, and the view presented in the theses became an important part of the Comintern’s explanation of the Asian situation between 1928 and 1934, when the International held a less tolerant attitude toward the colonial bourgeoisie. In geneial, the origin of these ideas w as not mentioned— certainly they were not credited directly to Roy, who had since been estranged from the Comintern. When, however, the matter of the supplementary theses w^as brought up during this later period, it w^as explained that they represented the situation in the more highly developed dependent countries, such as India and China, where a

the error

was

r

378

Notes, pp. 60-64 had been reached, and that Lenin’s program had been framed for the more backward Central Asian territories ( Strategiia i taktika Kominterna v natsionaV no-koloniaV noi revoliutsii, na primere Kitaia [Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution, after the Example of China] [n.p., 1934], p. 10; hereafter cited as Strategiia) This is interesting if somewhat precarious reasoning, for it implied that Lenin’s program did not apply in those areas which were the focus of Comintern interest in the East. Certainly Lenin’s theses derived much from Russia’s Central Asian concern, but they were intended to apply to all dependent countries. greater degree of class differentiation

.

45. II Kongress, p. 142. 46. II Kongress, p. 230. in Russia’s Central

The

showed

original draft of Lenin’s theses

Asian interests clearly, for

it

its

origin

neglected the Pan-Asian angle

and read: Thirdly, it is necessary to struggle against Pan-Islamism and similar currents of opinion which attempt to combine the movement for liberation from European and American imperialism with a strengthening of the position of the khans, landlords, mullahs, etc.

Lenin’s theses, as given in Strategiia, p. 34. Lenin apparently thought the question of the Communist attitude toward the Islamic movement a knotty one, for when

he sent his proposed colonial program to the congress delegates for criticism shortly before the Comintern meeting, he included the provision on Pan-Islamism

among

those on which he particularly desired comment;

text

of Lenin’s

note

reproduced in Strategiia, p. 31. 47. Or. S., “Een mooie vergadering” (A Fine Meeting), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 118; opinion of the sixth ISDV congress on participation in the Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements (see below). 48. “Het S.I. congres en de Vakcentrale” (The SI Congress and the Concentration of Labor Movements), HVW, Aug. 10, 1921, p. 4. 49. P. B., “De actie der bolsjewisten” (The Action of the Bolshevists), HVW, to the congress delegates, as

Jan. 17, 1920, p. 117. 50. “Politieke Concentratie” p.

108.

but

it

(Political Concentration),

HVW,

Jan.

10,

1920,

The Concentration’s program does not seem radical by present standards, was not much different from that adopted by the ISDV in 1918. Briefly,

called for (1) a popularly elected parliament, (2) decentralization of government, (3) prohibition of child labor and restriction of woman labor, (4) a miniit

mum

(5) recognition by the authorities of labor unions as bargaining agents for workers organized by them, (6) abolition of all indirect taxes in

wage,

favor of taxes on profits and capital, (7) enterprise in state hands wherever possible, (8) universal free public education. See Verslag zesde, p. 115; SI V, p.

371, col. b.

Quoted in vBr.-H., “De jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.” (The Annual Meeting of the ISDV), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 121. 52. Hadji Agus Salim, explaining the difference between “national” and “na51.

tionalist”

orientations to

the October

1921 Sarekat Islam congress; quoted

in

See also “Nationalistische beweging” (Nationalist Movement), Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-Indie, V, 878, col. a, for a concise differentiation between the protonationalist and nationalist phases of the IndoSI V, p. 377, col.

a.

nesian independence movement. 53. P. B.,

and the

“Het Bolsjewisme en het proletariat

Proletariat

in

the East),

HVW, 37.9

Mar.

6,

in

het Oosten”

1920, p.

(Bolshevism

179 (response by

Notes pp. 64-66 ,

Bergsma to a favorable nationalist reaction to Troianovskii’s work on the East and the revolution). See also P. B., “Communisme contra nationalisme” (Communism against Nationalism), HVW, Feb. 7, 1920. For a general impression of Douwes Dekker’s political ideas, see his pamphlet Een so cio genet ische grondwet (A Sociogenetic Constitution) ( Semarang, n.d.) and his autobiographical 70 Jaar Konsekwent (Seventy Years Consistent) (Bandung, 1950). 54. See Alimin Prawirodiredjo, “Louteren wij ons!” Open brief aan elk lid van de Sarekat Islam (Let Us Purify Ourselves! Open Letter to All Members of the Sarekat Islam) ( Weltevreden, October 1919), pamphlet circulated by the Sarekat Hindia at the time of the SI congress. See also C. S., “Het S.I.-congres,” p. 33; Nota, p. 2; SI V, p. 372, cols, a and b. The Sarekat Hindia’s Dutch-language title was Nationaal Indische Partij (National Indies Party); its official program may be found in the Volksraad Jaarboekje (Volksraad Yearbook), I (1922-1923), 52-59.

Mohammad

Kasan, article in Sinar Hindia, Aug. 25, 1919, in IPO, no. 35, 1919, p. 15. See also Dengah, editorial in Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 10, 1919, in IPO, no. 38, 1919, p. 1; and the debate between Douwes Dekker and Bergsma at 55.

the 1919 Insulinde congress, 56.

The most

De

Indische Gids,

XLI (1919), 1169-1170.

extensive treatment of this thesis in

PKI

literature

is in

Soegiman,

Bankroetnia Partai Kebangsaan di Hindoestan (The Bankruptcy of the Nationalist Party in Hindustan) (Malang, 1926). This booklet ascribes the differences be-

tween the Indian and the Indonesian movements

to the fact that in India

it

was

necessary for the Communists to struggle against both foreign imperialism and a native bourgeoisie, whereas in

allowed the popular movement

Indonesia the lack of a native middle class to concentrate singlemindedly on the fight against

the Dutch (see especially pp. 13-15, 52).

Sugiman concluded:

The Indonesian movement, though it does not possess such advocates as Gandhi and Das used to be, faces imperialism and capitalism more directly. The indusworkers, who are oriented about the PKI, and the suffering people, who follow the Sarekat Rakjat [the mass movement then sponsored by the PKI], will sooner reach their final objective than the workers or peasants anywhere else in Asia. This is not because the inhabitants of Indonesia are of a higher level than the other inhabitants of Asia, but because- of the nature of the economic and class conflicts in Indonesia between the people and Dutch imperialism. trial

Soegiman, Bankroetnia,

p. 61.

and Bergsma were the most prominent proponents of this viewpoint, but it seems to have been rather generally accepted throughout the CPH, for party chairman Van Ravesteyn emphasized it in a major meeting on the 57. Sneevliet

Indonesian question; see De Tribune, Feb. 27, 1925. 58. Verslag zevende, p. 265; emphasis in the text. Baars was a consistent and outspoken antinationalist, as Indonesia’s future President recalled:

when

I was sixteen and at high school in Surabaja, I was influenced by the name of A. Baars who gave me lessons; he said: do not believe in nationalism, but believe in the humanity of the whole world, do not have even the least sense of nationalism. That was in 1917. But in 1918, thanks be to God, there was another man who recalled me, and that was Dr. Sun Yat Sen. In his work San Min Chu I, or The Three People’s Principles, I found a lesson which exposed the cosmopolitanism taught by A. Baars. I

confess that

by a

socialist

Sukarno, speech of June 1, 1945, translated in The Birth of Pantja Sila (Djakarta, 1961), pp. 13—14. Baars had been particularly vocal in his opposition to Indo-

380

Notes, pp. 66-69 nesian nationalism since his return from the Netherlands: “We know nationalism and social patriotism here” he emphasized, “only as our opponents.” A. B., “Mei-

It

(May Thoughts), HVW, May

1920, p. 230. 59. The referendum was set up at a meeting of the executive on July 14, 1920. took some time for the poll to be held; the results, announced in HVW, Oct. 20,

overpeinzingen”

5,

showed 33 branches in favor, 2 opposed, and 1 abstaining. A large number of ballots were received after the deadline and were therefore disqualified. 60. HVW, Nov. 5, 1920, p. 13; from the executive’s announcement of the December congress. 61. Sneevliet’s participation in the Comintern meeting was announced in HVW, Sept. 5, 1920, p. 317; the paper said that it was learned from reports in the Dutch Communist press. The Semarang PKI/SI letter of authorization was dated the same day; it is reproduced in VVS, plate facing p. 60. The executives of the Semarang branch of the PKI and SI were at that time virtually identical; they authorized Sneevliet to “act in the names of these parties, present proposals, and perform tasks assigned him by the above-mentioned parties” as he saw fit. 62. This date is, of course, a good time after the July 1920 meeting of the International. However, Russia’s isolation and the lack of international press interest in the less spectacular aspects of the Comintern meeting may well have meant that detailed news of the congress traveled back to Holland with the Dutch Communist delegation, which arrived home in September 1920, and from there came by sea mail to the Indies, a voyage then lasting about two months. In any event, November 20 is the first date on which Het Vrije Woord published more than the bare descriptions of congress events that it could receive from normal news sources. Only the Lenin theses were reported; if the PKI was aware of Roy’s alternate proposals, it did not mention them. 63. A. B., “Moskou” (Moscow), HVW, Dec. 4, 1920, p. 33; Baars’s other comments are taken from this article, pp. 33-34. 64. Among the ISDV/PKI members that had held town council seats during 1919-1920 were Baars, Coster, Semaun, Hartogh, Hekket, Mohammad Jusuf, Reeser, Snel, Wakker, and Mohammad Kasan. Hgh., “Semaoen’s standpoint,” p. 106; P. B., “Een benoeming” (An Appointment), HVW, Jan. 17, 1920, p. 122; 1920, p.

9,

Verslag zevende,

Batavia but threw Insulinde; in

by Insulinde. tions),

HVW,

p. its

253.

In

the

1918

elections,

the

it

Sneevliet,

did

not

run

in

worked with the SI and formed a combination with the SI that was opposed

votes to Insulinde; in Surabaja

Semarang

ISDV

it

“Gemeenteraads-verkiezingen”

(Town Council

Elec-

Sept. 10, 1918, p. 309.

van het hoofdbestuur der I.S.D.V. betreffende de Volksraadverkiezingen” ( Declaration of the Executive of the ISDV concerning the Volkeraad Elections), HVW, Jan. 10, 1918, pp. 81-82. The ISDV campaign platform called for ( 1 ) a Volksraad elected directly and without property qualifications for the voters; (2) recognition of the rights to political association and assembly, the right to strike, freedom of speech, etc.; (3) opposition to Indie Weerbaar; (4) heavier taxes on profits to ease the tax burden on the common people. The chief opposition to this platform came from Budi Utomo, which found it too radical; Insulinde tried vainly to mediate the dispute. 66. The first Volksraad was composed of a chairman, named by the Crown, and 38 members, half of which were appointed by the Governor General and half chosen by a 650-man electoral college, of which 500 members were named by the Governor General and 150 chosen by town and regency councils. According to law, at least one-fourth of the appointed and one-half of the elected 65. See “Verklaring

381

-,

Notes pp. 69-72 ,

be native Indonesians; in the first Volksraad there were five appointed and ten elected Indonesian members. Most of them belonged to the native bureaucracy ( pangreh pradja) and were very conservative. Indonesian

members were

to

Volksraad was formed; it was restricted to those who had an income of at least 1,200 guilders a year and a knowledge of Dutch equivalent to that obtained by graduation from an HIS This resulted ( school for natives in which Dutch was the language of instruction ) in an extremely skewed electorate: according to Van Ravesteyn, there were 68 suffrage

was introduced

in

May

1918, after the

first

.

Indonesian and 2,000 European registered voters in Surabaja in 1919 ( Hande lingen 2e Kamer, 1918/1919, p. 2024). There were various complaints that qualified Indonesians did not bother to register, either from lack of interest or (particularly in the case of SI adherents) as a gesture of noncooperation; this

seems to have kept the Indonesian electorate below what the restrictions allowed. See De Indische Gids, XL (1918), 995. 67. Three-fourths of the branch executives of the SI voted on Tjokroaminoto’s participation in the Volksraad; of these, 28 favored it, 26 opposed it, and 22 abstained. One-third of the CSI members abstained in the vote on the subject; the result was 6 for and 5 against. It was therefore decided that Tjokroaminoto would assume his seat, but the final decision was left to the 1918 SI congress.

De

XL

(1918), 994. The strong opposition to participation may explain why Tjokroaminoto and his radical colleagues criticized the government so much in the first sessions of the Volksraad; it pained the Governor General and other Europeans who had hoped for constructive cooperation, but it also increased the backing in their own organizations for participation. See

Indische Gids,

For a discussion of the creation of the first Volksraad and the elections for it, see Brouwer, De houding, pp. 52-69. 69. See, for example, Sinar Hindia, Dec. 31, 1918, in IPO, no. 1, 1919, p. 17. 70. Of the members of the 1918 ISDV executive, only Coster favored giving up the party’s anti- Volksraad stand and accepting the invitation to attend the Radical Concentration’s founding conference; his sole reason for urging this was to persuade the Sarekat Islam representation at that meeting to keep out of the proposed alliance. The executive finally decided to send a telegram to Tjokroaminoto informing him that the ISDV would not attend the conference and urging him to send an SI representative as soon as possible to Surabaja to confer with the ISDV. Tjokroaminoto, however, did not respond; and so the executive sent Semaun to Batavia, where he made a final unsuccessful attempt to keep the CSI leader from committing his movement to the Concentration ( 68.

HVW

Feb. 15, 1919, p. 176). 71. See Cramer, Koloniale Politiek, p. 53. 72. Semaoen, “Mijn standpunt” (Mv Standpoint), HVW, Jan. 16, 1920, pp. 106-107; V erslag zesde, p. 113; Hartogh, "Nog eens, Semaoen’s standpunt” (Once Again, Semaun’s Standpoint),

HVW,

HVW,

Jan. 29, 1920, pp. 126-128.

Dec. 21, 1920, p. 37. 74. Baars, Ons buitengewoon congres’ (Our Extraordinarv Congress), Dec. 21, 1920, pp. 37-38. 73.

75. Baars,

“Ons buitengewoon congres,”

HVW,

p. 38.

Baars gave the following reasons for advocating Volksraad participation: (1) the \ olksraad would provide an outlet for PKI propaganda; (2) its members enjoyed parliamentary immunity; (3) the administration could be attacked directly by Volksraad members; (4) the PKI would be in a better position to prevent the “weaker” opposition parties from being enticed into collaboration with /6.

the government through the Volksraad. Against these arguments, he noted, the

382

Notes, pp. 72-73 PKI must also consider that 1 ) the party might concentrate too much of its efforts on parliamentary activity; (2) it would be necessary to accept nomination by the Governor General in order to get a seat. He did not bring up the Comintern in his discussion. See “Verslag van het buitengewoon congres der (

P.K.I.”

(Report of the Extraordinary Congress of the PKI),

HVW,

Dec. 31,

1920, p. 47. 77. “Verslag van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47; see also the arguments by Bergsma (P. B.) in “Ons buitengewoon congres,” p. 39.

van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. For Semaun’s comments on the function of the European and Indonesian party members, see Semaoen, “Mijn standpunt,” p. 107. 79. The final vote recorded only the Bandung delegate and Mrs. Sneevliet (Semarang) as opposed. “Verslag van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. 78. “Verslag

80.

HVW,

Feb.

5,

1921, p.

9.

Sowjet-Russland in de practijk. Indie tot leering (Soviet Russia Practice. A Lesson for the Indies) (Rotterdam, 1928), p. 5; De Tribune, June

81. Baars, in

21, 1921, p.

“De

1.

(The Result of the Volksraad Elections), HVW, Feb. 5, 1921, p. 5; Blumberger, Communist, p. 26. Blumberger claims that the PKI candidate was withdrawn from the race for nomination, which would have been the logical step for the party to take at this point; however, from the account in Het Vrije Woord of the subsequent appointments to Volksraad seats, it appears that Baars had not been removed from the list. 82.

der Volksraadverkiezingen”

uitslag

“Verblijdende duidelijkheid” (Pleasing Clarity), 83.

84.

HVW,

Mar. 18, 1921,

p.

101.

“De uitslag der Volksraadverkiezingen,” p. 5. The immediate grounds for Baars ’s expulsion, which was ordered on May

1921, were two articles written for Het Vrije Woord, one protesting the arrest of his fellow PKI member Van Burink and the other discussing the German 8,

By

had achieved quite a reputation as a Bolshevik agent; rumors were widely current that he was receiving silver, arms, blank passports, and a voluminous correspondence in Russian from the Soviet republic. See De Tribune, June 21, 1921, p. 1; Baars, Sowjet-Russland in de practijk, p. 5; P. Eyquem, “Aux Indes Neerlandaises: le syndicalisme musulman et la Ille Internationale,” Revue du monde musulman, III, December 1922, p. 73. Baars announced that he would go to Soviet Russia to help build socialism there, and he departed with a speech in which he promised that “the waves of the world revolution will wash us hither again, just as the wave of world reaction has temporarily washed us away” (De Tribune, July 12, 1921, p. 1; a somewhat different version of this speech is quoted in Eyquem, “Aux Indes Neerlandaises,” p. 73). He stayed in Russia until late 1927, most of which time he served in an “autonomous colony” of foreign engineers headed by the Dutch Communist S. J. Rutgers and dedicated to building up industry in the counterrevolution.

this

time

Baars

Kuznetsk Basin. He returned to Holland with his opinion of Russia the reverse of what he had expected and wrote a series of newspaper articles on his experience, Sowjet-Russland in de practijk, which appeared in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Jan. 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, 1928. The Indies government thereupon rescinded its ban on his presence in the colony in the hope that he would convey his new viewpoint to the Indonesians ( Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, May 6, 1929; Algemeen Harulelsblad, Aug. 3, 1929). Baars, however, had given up the salvation of humanity as a bad job; he stayed in Holland and died an adherent of the fascist right.

85. “Verblijdende duidelijkheid,” p. 10.

383

Notes pp. 73-77 ,

86. “Verslag

87. “Verslag

88. “Verslag 89. “Verslag 90. “Verslag

91. “Verslag

van van van van van van

het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 46.

het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 47. het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” p. 48.

CHAPTER V 1.

II Kongress, p. 140.

2.

II Kongress, pp.

On

195-196.

from the Comintern congress, Dutch Communist party chairman Wijnkoop announced: “We for our part can disclose, on the basis of the various meetings devoted to the [colonial] question by the [Comintern] executive that outside Moscow there will nowhere be established a center for propaganda by the Third International” Wijnkoop, “De Oostersche kwestie in de 3.

.

.

his return

.

Exekutive” (The Eastern Question in the Executive),

De

Tribune, Sept. 27, 1920, Wijnkoop sat on the colonial commission of the

emphasis in the text. Comintern congress together with Sneevliet; this remark possibly reflected some hostility between them, as they frequently disagreed on questions of policy. 4. VVS, p. 62. Sneevliet was preceded as Comintern representative in China by Voitinsky, who had arrived in China in the spring of 1920. See Robert North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1953), p. 54. 5. “Sneevliet over Rusland” (Sneevliet on Russia), HVW, Dec. 21, 1920, p. 44. This is a report of a farewell speech made to the Dutch transport workers’ union. 6. Sneevliet traveled overland to Austria and then boarded the Lloyd Triestino ship Acquila for the journey to the Orient ( H. Sn., “Op reis naar het Oosten” [On the Way to the East], HVW, July 20, 1921, p. 3; interview with Darsono, 1959). He traveled under an assumed name in order, he claimed, to avoid the humiliations the Indies Dutch passengers aboard ship would bestow on a notorious revolutionary. His movements were followed, however, by the Austrian police and by the British authorities along his route, who kept the Netherlands Indies government informed of his progress toward China. Bataviaasch Nietiwsblad, June 1, 1924; H. Sn., “Op reis,” pp. 3-4. 7. Interview with Darsono, 1959; H. Sn., “Op reis,” p. 4. Baars and Sneevliet celebrated their reunion and arrival in China by sending a postcard from their Shanghai hotel to the comrades in the Netherlands; text in De Tribune, July 20, p.

1;

1921, p.

2.

At the 1921 Comintern congress one delegate charged that Sneevliet’s bureau had never put itself in contact with the European Communist parties, that it played “only a platonic role” in the Far East, and that the Comintern 8.

should take steps to correct the office’s inactivity. Protokolle des dritten Kongresses der Kommunistisclien Internationale (Protocols of the Third Congress of the

Communist International) (Hamburg, 1921), p. 1034; Kongress. The charges were leveled by a member of

hereafter

cited

as

III

the French delegation disagreed on the colonial question with the Comintern leaders, however, and there is no evidence of any official response to his complaint. 9. See Nym Wales, Red Dust (Stanford, 1952), p. 39; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 139; Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 237. Chen T’an-ch’iu does not mention Sneevliet in his account of the first CCP congress and states that

who

at the first congress the party

had no organizational connections with the Comin-

384

Notes, p. 77 which

second convention. Tschen Pan-tsiu, “Erinnerungen an den I. Parteitag der K.P. Chinas” (Reminiscences of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party), Die Kommunistische Internationale, Sept. 30, 1936, pp. 900-904. Chang Kuo-t’ao, who attended the meeting, claimed that Sneevliet was not invited to the congress because he was disliked by Li Ta and Li Han-chiin (manuscript autobiography, cited in C. Martin Wilbur, introduction to Ch’en Kung-po, The Communist Movement in China (New York, 1960), p. 18; hereafter cited as Wilbur, Introduction. Other participants in the meeting recalled, however, that two foreigners were present, Sneevliet and a Russian; Chou Fu-hai and Tung Pi-wu, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 18. Chou’s account stated that the Russian was Voitinsky; Jean Chesneaux gives his name as Lizonsky in Le mouvement ouvrier chinois de 1919 a 1927 (The Chinese Labor Movement from 1919 to 1927) (Paris and The Hague, 1962), p. 258; he says Lizonsky participated in the first session of the meeting on Sneevliet’s invitation, in order to present a report on the newborn Red International of Labor Unions. Ch’en Kung-po, “I and the Communist Party,” in the collection Han Feng Chi, I, 206—207, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 53, note 23, recalled that on the urging of Chang Kuo-t’ao the congress passed a resolution forbidding party members to belong to other organizations; but the following day Chang reversed his recommendation on the advice of the “Russian representatives” there. May, June, and July have been given as dates for this congress; Wilbur, Introduction, pp. 15-21, discusses the possibilities and concludes that it probably took place in late July. If Sneevliet was involved, it could not have occurred before tern,

it

elected to enter only at

its

June.

Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How (eds.), Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China (New York, 1956), pp. 139 and 497, notes 5-8, citing the following sources: Hu Hua, Chung-kuo hsin minchu chu-i-ko-min shih (an orthodox Communist historv of the Chinese revolution published in 1951), p. 6; Li Chien-nung, Tsui-chin san-shih min Chung-kuo cheng-chih shih (a non-Communist history of modem China issued in 1930), p. 546; Wang Ching-wei, “On Separating the Communists from the KMT at Wuhan,” in Ko-ming yii fan-ko-ming (a series of essays on the Chinese revolution published by the Left Kuomintang leader in 1928), p. 593. See further Shao Chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and Communism ( New York, 1960), pp. 55-56, citing Tsuo Lu, Chung-kuo-min-tang shih-kao (Draft History of the Kuomintang), 1944, p. 304. Ch’en Kung-po, “I and the Communist Party,” pp. 117-119, cited in Wilbur, Introduction, p. 7, asserted that shortly before the meeting with Sun he saw Sneevliet in Canton. The Comintern representative had come from Shanghai together with the Kuomintang leader Chang Chi, who 10. C.

was taking him

to

meet Sun

in Kweilin.

With Chang

T’ai-lei acting as interpreter,

KMT

they discussed the possibility of an amalgamation of the and CCP, although the in terms of Kuomintang this was not framed taking in the Communists as

members. Ch’en stated that he felt sure Chang Chi and Sneevliet had already reached agreement on the matter; Chang was enthusiastic, and Sneevliet mentioned that he intended to discuss it with Sun. 11. Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 237, asserts that Sneevliet’s mission “was apparently no more than one of surveying the situation and establishing friendly contact with

all

sources of revolutionary activity.”

On

the other hand,

it

is

stated

memorial volume that the International defined his task as bringing the CCP and Kuomintang into contact with each other “in accord with the decisions of the second congress of the Comintern”; VVS, p. 62.

in the Sneevliet

385

,

Notes, pp. 77-79 comment datelined Shanghai, Sept. 4, 1921, Sneevliet remarked: “I am at the moment unable to report on the results of the successive actions of the workers in Canton; I only know that up till now the labor groups there 12. In a

have been used solely as instruments for establishing the Sun Yat-sen party. De Tribune, Nov. 10, 1921. 13. De Tribune, Nov. 10, 1921; see also Sneevliet’s comments in De Tribune, Nov. 9, 1921, and Oct. 17 and 18, 1921 (report dated Shanghai, August 1921). 14. Li Chien-nung states that Sneevliet commented on this to the Chinese Communist leader Liao Chung-kai after the meeting (cited in Wilbur and How,

Documents,

497).

p.

complained that since his arrival in Shanghai the Dutch consulgeneral had kept his eye on him through his Japanese houseboy. His sudden departure caused the Dutch and other European consulates to instigate a police search for him, and after he returned they continued to observe his activities. Sneevliet, letter dated Shanghai, Mar. 19, 1922, published in De Tribune, May 6, 15. Sneevliet

1922. 16.

De

Tribune,

May

6,

1922.

Sneevliet recounted that he left Canton for

ended (Mar. 16, 1922). Chiang Kai-shek stated in his diary that Sneevliet met with Sun Yat-sen in Canton on Dec. 25, 1921 (Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng-Min-kuo skill- wu-nien-i-ch’ien chili Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng, III, 100, cited in Wilbur and How, DocuShanghai as soon as the

strike

ments, pp. 139, 497); according to Sneevliet’s account of his trip, however, he did not reach Canton until Jan. 23, 1922 ( De Tribune, May 6, 1922). 17. See Sneevliet’s remarks on the Kuomintang and the strike in De Tribune,

May

6,

workers in 18.

and

1922,

De De

De

comments on the problem

his

May

Tribune,

Tribune,

May

8,

organizing the

of

Chinese

1922.

1922.

8,

Tribune, June 21, 1922, reporting a speech by Sneevliet in Amsterdam, was that its discipline June 16, 1922. Sneevliet’s major criticism of the was too strict: “The new popular party, whose influence is again on the increase, 19.

KMT

has an iron discipline, and

be doubted whether such rules as the one requiring a member to execute immediately every task given him by the chairman can be maintained in the long run even in China.” See also De Tribune, June 14, 1922, for an account of Sneevliet’s return to Holland. 20.

“The Session

it

is

to

of the Executive

Committee

of the

Communist

International

on July 17th,” International Press Correspondence (the newspaper of the Communist International, hereafter cited as Inprecorr) July 28, 1922, p. 470; see also “The Situation in China and Japan,” Inprecorr, Aug. 25, 1922, p. 542. According to T’ang Leang-Li ( The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution [New York, 1930], p. 155; see also Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 517, note 2), Sneevliet at first advised the Soviet government to maintain its relations with Pei-fu as

Wu

well as to cultivate Sun Yat-sen. If this

he seems to have revised this opinion before the ECCI meeting. According to Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1951), p. 62, Sneevliet’s report persuaded the Comintern to abandon the previously favored “Irkutsk line,” which favored Pei-fu; Whiting tends to discount this, however (Whiting, Soviet the warlord is

true,

Wu

Policies, p. 301, note 4).

“Die revolutionar-nationalistische Bewegung in Siid-China” (The Revolutionary-Nationalist Movement in South China), Die Kommunistische Inter21. Maring,

nationale (no. 22), 1922, p. 55. 22. Isaacs,

Tragedy,

p.

62,

and Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen,

386

p.

57, state

Notes, pp. 79-82 that Sneevliet’s meeting with the

ECCI

took place in September 1922, but this

does not correspond with the Comintern reports of that period and would mean that his August conference with the Chinese Communists took place before the

Comintern meeting, which seems unlikely. 23. VVS, facing p. 60; a photograph of a document to this effect signed by Karl Radek for the Comintern and dated July 24, 1922. Sneevliet’s new alias is spelled “Philipp” in another document. 24. VVS, facing p. 61 (photograph of the letter). The order to remove the Chinese Communist headquarters to Canton could not then be obeyed, for the Kuomintang had recently been forced to flee that city. 25.

VVS,

p. 60.

informed him in 1935 (after he had broken with the Comintern) that he had had no specific instructions from the International and that the majority of the central committee had accepted his proposal. Ch’en Tu-hsiu, CCP secretary-general at the time of the conference, claimed that the policy was imposed only through international discipline. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 52; Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 41; Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen, p. 59. Chang Kuo-t’ao, who attended the conference, stated he could not remember that Sneevliet had asserted the International’s authority openly, though he may have done so in private (Wilbur and How, Documents, pp. 84 and 493, note 25). M. N. Roy, who also served as a Comintern representative in China during the 1920s, states that “the original cornegative attitude of the Communist leaders was an ultra-left stupidity rected under the guidance of the Communist International,” but he does not make it clear whether the “original negative attitude” refers to the CCP’s stand at its first or second congress or whether Comintern “guidance” meant pressure or advice. See Roy, Revolution and Counterrevolution in China (Calcutta, 1946), p. 534. The German edition is equally ambiguous; Revolution und Kontrarevolution in China (Berlin, 1930), p. 411. 27. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, Documentary History, p. 68; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 533; Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen, p. 60; Wilbur and How, Documents, p. 83. 28. Interview with Chang Kuo-t’ao, cited in Wilbur and How, Documents, pp. 84 and 493, note 25; see also the account of the Hangchow conference quoted 26. Isaacs, Tragedy, p. 61, claims that Sneevliet

.

.

.

above. 29.

Ch’en Tu-hsiu, cited

in

Brandt,

History, p. 52. 30. “The Session of the Executive

on July 17th,”

the Recent SI Congress), 32.

Some

Committee

and Fairbank, Documentary

of the

Communist

International

p. 470.

“De beteekenis van

31. A. B.,

Schwartz,

HVW,

het jongste

S.I.

congres” (The Significance of

Oct. 12, 1918, p. 23.

indication that the Comintern endorsed the bloc within before the

resolution of January 1923

is

found

in

Sun Yat-sen ’s

letter to

Chiang Kai-shek

Nov. 21, 1922, where the KMT leader stated that “the leaders in Moscow have advised the Chinese Communists to join the Kuomintang” Tsung-li ch’ Honshu (Complete Writings of President Sun), X, Part 2, 924-925, quoted in Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat-sen, p. 60. of

33.

The

dium on

decision to transfer Sneevliet

Jan.

10, 1923.

The minutes

was

officially

made by

of this session declared:

387

the

ECCI

presi-

Notes, pp. 82-86 Comrade Maring Comrade Maring is named as the

Point 7: Transfer of

third

member

of the Office of the Eastern

Section of the Comintern in Vladivostok. Comrade Maring’s previous mandate is canceled. The Presidium declares it desirable that Comrade Maring as well as Comrade Voitinsky take part in the next conference of the Chinese Communist Party. The Eastern Section will decide about Comrade Maring’s further work. For the Secretariat of the ECCI

V. Kolarov

VVS,

plate facing p. 60; the original version

34.

For the

text, see Strategiia, p.

112;

is

in

German.

and Whiting, Soviet

Policies , pp.

240-

241.

According to Chang Kuo-t’ao, Sneevliet attended the third CCP congress and there pushed hard for formal adoption of the bloc within the KMT, opposing moves to restore some of the party’s independence. In Chang’s view, the manifesto of the third congress expressed Sneevliet’s views, as endorsed by the Comintern (interview with Chang, cited in Wilbur and How, Documents, pp. 85, 87). Sneevliet’s attendance at the congress seems to accord with Comin35.

tern orders at the time of his transfer (see above, note 33). 36. Trotsky,

Van

The Third

International after Lenin

(New

York, 1936), p. 223.

Emergence, pp. 148-151; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 69-70; HOS, p. 119. The last-named source estimates the membership loss immediately following the Section B affair at hundreds of thousands. 38. See (Ch. O. van der Plas), Rapport betreffende de neutraliseering en bestrijding van de revolutioniuiire propagamla onder de inlieemsche bevolking, in liet bijzonder van Java en Madoera (Report Concerning the Neutralization and Combating of Revolutionary Propaganda among the Indigenous Population, Especially That of Java and Madura) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, 1928, p. 8, hereafter cited as Neutraliseering ): Kahin, Na37.

Niel,

and Revolution, pp. 71-72; S. J. Rutgers, Indonesia. Het coloniale systeem in de periode tussen de eerste en de tweede wereldoorlog (Indonesia: The Colonial System in the Period between the First and Second World Wars) (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 153, hereafter Indonesie: Koch, Om de vrijheid, pp. 71-72. 39. Neratja, pointing this out, regretted that the SI leaders seemed to have no clear idea which path the movement should take: Semaun urged revolutionary political action, Abdul Muis parliamentary political action; Tjokroaminoto seemed to be leaning to a religious course, and the author of the article (probably Hadji Agus Salim) wanted the SI to become “a purely political association having general leadership over various labor unions, thus approximately what the SDAP tionalism

Nov. 2, 1918, in IPO, no. 44, 1918, pp. 8-9. 40. Sosrokardono, statement on behalf of the CSI in response to Semaun’s statement of his position at the time of the 1918 SI congress; in Sarekat-Islam Congres 1918, p. 24. See also Mededeelingen 1918, p. 4; Mededeelingen 1922, p. 8; “De agenda van het S.I. congres” (The Agenda of the SI Congress),

is

in the Netherlands.” Neratja,

.

.

.

HVW,

Feb. 28, 1921, p. 1. 41. Oetoesan Hindia, June

4,

1920, in IPO, no. 23, 1920, pp. 30-31; text of

the appeal.

CSI 1921,

Overzicht CSI 1922, p. 5. 43. For discussions of Tjokroaminoto’s position and the growing influence of the Jogjakarta faction, see Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 2, 5, 64, 67; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 2-3; Neutraliseering, p. 7. Pan-Islamic agitation began in Indonesia 42. Overzicht

p. 8;

388

,

:

Notes, pp. 86-91 during World

War

with the aid of the Turkish consulate-general and money from India. At first it was a movement of the Muslim Indian minority, but it secured adherents among the Jogjakarta SI leaders in 1919. See Overzicht CS1 1922, p. 3; Mededeelingen 1922, p. 8; Mardeka, June 21, 1920, in IPO, no. 27, I,

1920, p. 13. 44.

Aug.

Thus Hartogh wrote, 16, 1919, p.

in

an early reaction to the Section

B

affair

(

HVW

403)

a conversation with leading SI people we expressed our opinion that the same tactic that is now followed by the ISDV must also be pursued by the SI. In addition to the establishment or promotion of workers’ and peasants’ unions and cooperatives, particular attention should be given at present to intensive political propaganda, in contrast to the almost exclusively extensive propagandizing which has hitherto been carried out. In place of confused, centrifugal groups there must come a strictly disciplined corps of cadres, which will carry on the struggle for a better society under the slogan “one for all and all for one.” One should not assume that this organizational work will be easy, that everything will go smoothly just because one desires its success. But it will come about! If you just hold on like a bulldog to your work and don’t let go. Then it will come about! In

45. “Ter orienteering”

(By

Way

HVW,

Aug. 25, 1920, p. 313; for a statement of principles of a similar nature, see “Bij den zesden jaargang,” p.

of Orientation),

1.

46. Sri Djojobojo, June 14, 1920, in IPO, no. 25, 1920, p. 11; Boedi

Oetomo

IPO, no. 50, 1920, p. 57. 47. See P. B., “Samenwerking in de vakbeweging” (Cooperation in the Labor Movement), HVW, Dec. 4, 1920, p. 21, for a Communist comment on this characteristic. According to Bergsma, the unions affiliated with the PPKB made very little effort to keep in contact with each other or with the central body, with the result that the federation frequently did not know when one of its unions was about to strike. In an earlier article (P. B., “De Vakcentrale,” p. 277),

(Dutch-language edition), Dec.

10, 1920, in

Bergsma bemoaned the difficulty of building a stable labor organization in Indonesia and added that the PPKB was having trouble collecting dues from member unions. In the face of these difficulties and lacking trained leaders, he said, the labor federation could not be expected to accomplish anything noteworthy in its first few years. For the time being, Bergsma held, the organization should concentrate on building up its existing unions on a sound basis and persuading some of the smaller groups to combine into unions of significant size. 48. Mededeelingen 1921, pp. 12-15, 22; Handelingen Volksraad, 1920-1921, First Session, pp. 90-97, and Bijlagen, Ond. I, Afd. I, Stuk 7, pp. 3-6. 49. See Soeroso, “De Indonesische vakbeweging” (The Indonesian Labor Movement), Indonesia, Jubileum-nummer (Leiden, 1938), p. 212; Mardjohan, Api, June 8, 1925, p. 2. Suroso was a prominent non-Communist leader of the early Indonesian labor movement; Mardjohan was a PKI labor leader. 50. Neratja, June 14 and 15, 1920, in IPO, no. 24, 1920, pp. 6-7. The meeting was held in Batavia on June 13; it was sponsored by the pawnshop and postal workers’ unions (both CSI) and led by Surjopranoto, Tjokroaminoto, Hadji Agus Salim, and Alimin. Semarang and PPKB representatives were notably absent, for Surjopranoto demonstratively kept his union out of touch with PPKB headquarters on the grounds that he did not want it infiltrated by Communists. 51.

The expulsion

of the

Communists was urged by Sutan Mohammad Zain

389

Notes pp. 91-93 make it easier for PPKB unions ,

to negotiate with emNeratja (July 29) to ployers (IPO, no. 31, 1920, pp. 5-6); the suggestion was denounced in the same issue by Abdul Muis. Zain was head of the Indonesian teachers union ( PGHB ) and also Muis’ chief rival in the Sarekat Sumatra; probably their in

quarrel on the issue 52. Overzicht tionalist, p. 135;

was influenced by

CSI 1921, H. Sutadi,

p.

6;

article

this competition.

Blumberger, Nain Darmo Kondo, Oct. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 48, in Sinar Hindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, Overzicht CSI 1922,

p.

4;

1920, p. 34; Surjopranoto, article 1920, pp. 24-25. The executive elected

by the congress consisted of Semaun (chairman), Surjopranoto (vice-chairman), Najoan (secretary), Bergsma (treasurer), and Hadji Agus Salim, Tedjomartojo, and Alimin (members). Semaun, Bergsma, and Najoan constituted the Semarang faction. 53. Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 6-8; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 4-5; Semaoen, “Ondisciplinair en on-Kommunistisch” (Undisciplined and un-Communist), HVW, 1920, p. 33; Neratja, Aug. 12, 1920, in IPO, no. 33, 1920, p. 1; Oetoesan Hindia, Aug. 12, 1920, in IPO, no. 33, 1920, p. 15; Oetoesan Hindia, Aug. 25,

Dec.

4,

1920, in IPO, no. 34, 1920, p. 17; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 25-28; Neratja, Dec. 7, 1920, in IPO, no. 50, 1920, p. 4; Handelingen Volksraad, 1920-21, Second Session, Bijlagen, Ond. I, Stuk 5a, pp. 2-3. 54. Baars

had wanted the SI

to sponsor a sugar strike in 1919;

he cited his

dis-

gust at Tjokroaminoto’s refusal as the immediate reason for his decision to leave the Indies (Baars,

“Waarom

ik

heenga,”

p.

189). Furious at the attack by Baars, whose

domineering he had long resented, Semaun replied that he did not consider Communism to require irresponsible leadership and concluded: “I do not intend to discuss this matter any further, no matter what you say to overawe me!” Semaun, “Ondisciplinair en on-Kommunistisch,” p. 33. Accordiing to Surjopranoto, Bergsma and Van Burink told him that Semaun’s handling of the PFB strike was not approved of by the party; Smar Hindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 26-27. 55. At the height of Surjopranoto’s influence, the PFB claimed 31,000 members and the PKT and PKBO— the workers’ and peasants’ organizations inherited by him from Semarang— another 33,000. By 1922 the PFB could claim only 400 adherents, and the PKT and PKBO had vanished entirely. Sinar Hindia, Oct. 13, 1921, in IPO, no. 42, 1921, p. 134; Soeroso, “De Indonesische vakbeweging,” pp. 211-213; Overzicht CSI 1922, p. 6.

CSI 1921,

Overzicht CSI 1922, p. 7; Oetoesan Hindia, Sept. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 37, 1920, p. 16; Oetoesan Hindia, Sept. 22, 1920, in IPO, no. 39, 1920, p. 18; Neratja, Oct. 19, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, pp. 5-6. Tjokroaminoto further indicated his desire to avoid a split by publishing a declara56. Overzicht

name

CSI

p.

12;

on all SI branches to concentrate on the struggle against capitalism ( Oetoesan Hindia, Sept. 25, 1920,

tion in the

of the

calling

their efforts in

IPO, no.

39, 1920, pp. 18-19).

The

were published

and 9, 1920, in IPO, no. 41, 1920, pp. 7-11; according to Darsono, he released them specifically for the edification of delegates gathering for the SI congress. He also tried to run them in Soeara Rajat, but this Surabaja-based PKI journal was printed by workers organized by the anti-Communist labor leader Jahja; they struck the paper, which was forced to move to Semarang in order to resume publication. 58. Commenting on Darsono s revelations for the Dutch Communist newspaper, Baars expressed a discouragement that seemed to refer to more than just Tjokroa57.

articles

in Sinar Hindia, Oct. 6, 7,

minoto’s SI:

390

Notes pp. 93-94 ,

Yes,

when we Western

revolutionaries

become involved

in the

movement here

we

are often brought to the brink of despair by this absolute lack of a sense of solidarity, which means that nearly every native who gets a few pennies belonging to the movement in his hands uses the money for his own benefit. And the universality of this evil is terrifying. I remain of the opinion that it is in fact that low, ideal-less nationalism, which speculates on the coarsest of human feelings, which has given rise to this kind of movement. In any case, it will be some time before a core has been formed here of people who— like the Russian Communists— voluntarily take all the heavy and responsible work upon themselves, without thought of any reward.

De

Tribune, Jan. 7, 1921, p. 1. For comments on Darsono’s charges, see “Bij den zesden jaargang,” p. 1; Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 12-13; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 7-8; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 69-70.

Darsono was accused by the Jogjakarta faction of having broken the pact made at the time of the 1917 SI congress. Technically he had not, since his and Semaun’s promise applied specifically to attacks on Abdul Muis; moreover, Darsono had discussed his charges with Tjokroaminoto before publishing them; Overzicht 59.

CSI 1922,

p. 9.

were leveled at Tjokroaminoto, Brotosuhardjo (accused of embezzling SI funds), and Alimin and Musso (accused of accepting Tjokroaminoto’s leadership unquestioningly ) Later— apparently in an attempt to mollify the Jogjakarta leaders— Darsono described Tjokroaminoto’s weakness as a reliance on dishonest characters like Brotosuhardjo and not on upright and selfsacrificing associates like Salim and Surjopranoto; Darsono, article in Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 44, 1920, p. 19. 61. Neratja, Oct. 11, 1920, in IPO, no. 41, 1920, p. 5; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 15, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, p. 11. By this time a number of Outer Island delegates had already arrived; moves were made to hold a rump congress under Surjopranoto (who may have seen some promise in the situation to replace Tjokroaminoto), but they were quickly abandoned; see Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 19 and 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 42, 1920, p. 13, and no. 43, 1920, p. 18. 62. Oetoesan Hindia took an increasingly neutral attitude in the dispute over Darsono’s criticisms. In November its acting editor, Partondo, resigned. Although he was not a PKI member at the time, he was immediately invited by that party to edit Soeara Rajat; Oetoesan Hindia, Nov. 11, 1920, in IPO, no. 46, 1920, p. 13; Soeara Rajat, Nov. 16/30 1920, in IPO, no. 47, 1920, pp. 28-29. By January 1921 the condition of the Surabaja SI organization was such that it had to cancel its annual conference because too few members appeared; Oetoesan Hindia, Jan. 22, 1921, in IPO, no. 4, 1921, pp. 22-24. 63. The transfer of CSI headquarters was announced in Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 16, 1920; see IPO, no. 42, 1920, pp. 11—12. On Oct. 22, Tjokroaminoto and Surjopranoto jointly confirmed the move; CSI affairs were placed in the hands of an executive consisting of Tjokroaminoto (chairman), Surjopranoto (vice-chairman), Hadji Agus Salim (secretary-treasurer), and Alimin (commissioner). All regular business would be handled by the vice-chairman and all financial affairs by the secretary; the chairman would thus be left free to make propaganda for the SI and to engage in “overcoming obstacles.” Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 43, 1920, p. 18; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 60. Darsono’s original criticisms

.

19-20.

For examples of these arguments, see Neratja, Oct. 42, 1920, pp. 5-6 (Tjokroaminoto); Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 64.

391

19,

1920, in IPO, no.

16, 1920, in

IPO, no.

,

Notes, pp. 94-96 42, 1920, pp. 11-12; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 25, 1920, in IPO, no. 43, 1920, pp. 18-19 ( Surjopranoto ) Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 44, 1920, pp. 18—20 (Darsono) and 20-23 ( Reksodiputro ) ; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 23 and Nov. 3, ;

1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 8-12 (criticisms of and defense by Darsono). 65. Alededeelingen 1921, pp. 10-12; Soeroso, “De Indonesische vakbeweging,” pp. 211-212; Koch, Verantwoording, pp. 96-97. The Resident of Semarang pre-

vented the failure of the printers’ strike by intervening with employers. 66. For an account of the VSTP effort in 1920, see Mededeelingen 1921, pp. 16-18. The government, as is stated in this report, considered the union’s de-

mands justified and the employers’ standpoint unreasonable. For the attitude of Semaun and the VSTP executive toward rail strike agitation, see Si Tetap (the VSTP journal), May/June 1920, in IPO, no. 28, 1920, pp. 1-3; St Tetap August/ September 1920,

IPO, no. 46, 1920, pp. 16-17; Sinar Hindia, Sept. 7, 1920, in IPO, no. 37, 1920, p. 10; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 14, 1920, in IPO, no. 43, 1920, pp. 11-12. In a general statement of his attitude toward labor organization ( Perasaan May 4, 1920, in IPO, no. 22, 1920, p. 1), Semaun argued that strikes should not be called without adequate organizational and financial preparation and should be undertaken, at this stage of Indonesia’s development, only for economic demands. 67. See Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 9, 1920, in IPO, no. 50, 1920, pp. 21-22; Islam Bergerak, Dec. 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 51, 1920, p. 51; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 21 and 22, 1920, in IPO, no. 52, 1920, pp. 8-9; Pemberita C.S.I., Jan. 24, 1921, in IPO, no. 15, 1921, pp. 115-116; Soeara Ra’jat, Jan. 16/31, 1921, and Sinar Hindia, Feb. 12, 1921, in IPO, no. 7, 1921, pp. 18-19, 33; “Moskow en het PanIslamisme” (Moscow and Pan-Islamism ) HVW, Feb. 8, 1921, p. 13; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 14, 1921, in IPO, no. 8, 1921, pp. 6-8; Soeara Ra’jat, Feb. 16/28, 1921, in IPO, no. 11, 1921, p. 22; Sinar Hindia, June 2, 1921, in IPO, no. 23, 1921, p. 459; and Sinar Hindia, July 25, 1921, in IPO, no. 31, 1921, p. 219, for attacks on the Lenin theses and Communist denials of being anti-Islamic. 68. Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 23, 1920, in IPO, no. 44, 1920, pp. 21—23 (Reksodiputro, for the Jogjakarta faction of the PPKB); Sinar Hindia, Nov. 3, 1920, in IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 22-28 (Surjopranoto, announcing the PFB standpoint); Sinar Hindia, Nov. 9, 1920, in IPO, no. 46, 1920, pp. 9—11 (reply by Semaun and Bergsma for the PPKB); Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 9, 1920, in IPO, no. in

,

50, 1920, pp.

21-22

(

Tjitrosubeno, for the

69. Neutraliseering,

p.

8;

Koch,

Om

PPPB).

de

1921, pp. 15, 18; Overzicht CSI 1922, p. by the sociologist B. F. O. Schrieke; from appears also to have been written by him.

9. its

pp. 71-72; Overzicht CSI Overzicht for 1921 was signed

vrijheid,

The style

and approach the 1922 report

Bergsma and Semaun issued a statement that attacked the CSI but denied the PKI had authorized Darsono’s articles; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 11, 1920, in

70.

that

IPO, no. 45, 1920, pp. 9—11. In his report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in early 1922, Semaun declared that Darsono had honestly wished to purge the movement of corrupt elements but that his action was ill advised and disrupted Communist relations with the SI and weakened the movement as a whole; Semaun, “Indiiskoe dvizhenie v Niderlandskoi Indii” (The Indies Movement in the Netherlands Indies), Pervyi s’ezd, p. 275. Whether or not Darsono consulted with his colleagues, it seems probable that the attack was his own

and that, were quite

inspiration

as

he claimed, he had had

assaults

in

his

political style,

392

mind for some time. All-out and he had made similar but thinly it

in

Notes pp. 96-98 ,

veiled charges immediately on his release from prison the previous June; Sinar

Hindia, June 21, 1920, and Octoesan Hindia June 28, 1920, in IPO, nos. 25 and 26, 1920, pp. 18, 40-43. ,

16/30, 1920 (issued in November), in IPO, no. 47, 1920, pp. 28-29; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 17, 18, 23 and Dec. 14, 1920, in IPO, no. 47, 1920, pp. 12-15; no. 48, 1920, p. 9; no. 50, 1920, pp. 8-9; 13. Darsono had been an editor of both papers before his arrest. See also Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 9. 71. Soeara Ra’jat, Oct.

72. Overzicht

CSI 1922,

p. 11;

HVW,

B, “De Com-

Jan. 21, 1921, pp. 4, 6; P.

munisten en de Vakcentrale,” p. 4. 73. Oetoesan Hindia, Mar. 12, 1921; point 13 of the declaration. On the subject of international relations, it read as follows: “The Sarekat Islam is convinced that these aims are in accordance with the goals of the majority of popular movements and workers all over the world. Therefore the Sarekat Islam desires cooperation with the international people’s movement which seeks these goals for all mankind, in accordance with the precepts of Islam. In so doing the Sarekat Islam, bearing

mind the character

and the teachings of religion, refuses to become dependent on any part of the international movement, but jealously guards against all others its independence and the purity of its goals” (points 15 and 16). 74. This was taken care of at a closed meeting held on the first day of the congress, to the annoyance of many Indonesian intellectuals, who wanted the charges discussed openly; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 12—13. 75. Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 22; Overzicht CSI 1922, p. 13. There seems to have been some feeling in the PKI that the party discipline motion on the congress agenda aimed not at direct expulsion of the Communists but at stricter control over factional activity. Thus Darsono, writing a few days before the congress opened, opined that the motion was a response to his attacks on Tjokroaminoto and presaged a demand that there be no open criticism of the movement’s leadership. In principle, he declared, the PKI had no objection to such a requirement: “We Communists are not afraid of such discipline, since we already possess something like a discipline ourselves. However, we will always speak out whenever in

of the world

used for dubious purposes.” Darsono, “Partijdiscipline” (Party Discipline), HVW, Feb. 28, 1921, p. 3. 76. Point 11 of the declaration of principles, as quoted in De Tribune, May 7, 1921. The CPH newspaper commented: “A cheering sign ... is the declaration From the of principles adopted by the Sarekat Islam at its recent congress. that they have proclaimed that statement now lying before us it appears Islam is not in conflict with Communism.” 77. Oetoesan Hindia, Mar. 18, 1921, in IPO, no. 12, 1921, pp. 15-16. The other associations in which membership might be prohibited were Budi Utomo, Sarekat Hindia, ISDP, Pasundan, Sarekat Sumatera, Sarekat Ambon, Sarekat Menado, PEB, and NIVB. For further accounts of the March 1921 congress, see Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 19-31; Overzicht CSI 1922, pp. 12-13; “Kongresmaand” (Congress Month), HVW, Mar. 18, 1921, pp. 2-3; Budisutjitro, Verslag Sarekat-Islam Semarang dalam Tahoen 1922 (Report of the Semarang SI for 1922) (n.p., n.d.), p. 2; Rutgers, Indonesia, pp. 153-154; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 71-72; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 28-29; Eyquem, “Aux Indes Neerlandaises,” pp. 71-72. 78. Oetoesan Hindia, Feb. 22 and 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 9, 1921, pp. 20-26; Pemberita CSI, Jan. 17, 19, 21, in IPO, no. 9, 1921, p. 55; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 21, that discipline

is

.

.

1921, in IPO, no.

9,

.

.

.

1921, pp. 10-11; Sinar Hindia, Mar.

393

.

1,

2,

and

3,

1921,

in

Notes, pp. 9S-102 Oetoesan Hindia, Mar. 2, 1921, in IPO, no. 10, 1921, pp. 18-19; Sinar Hindia, Mar. 7, 1921, in IPO, no. 11, 1921, pp. 5-6; Soeara Boemipoetera, Mar. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 16, 1921, p. 204.

IPO, no.

10, 1921,

pp

10, 11-12;

“De agenda van

79.

het

congres”

S.I.

(The Agenda

of

the

SI

Congress),

HVW, 8,

Feb. 28, 1921, p. 2. 80. Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 1921. 81. Overzicht

82.

HVW,

CSI 1921,

9, 21,

23-26, 28-30;

De

Locomotief, Mar. 7 and

p. 21, 65.

Jan. 21, 1921, p. 3.

“Kongresmaand,” p. 3. Similarly, the editors of Sinar Hindia apologized on Mar. 9 for an attack on the CSI published two days earlier. It had been printed before they had learned the results of the congress, they explained; henceforth the paper’s attitude toward the CSI would be different. IPO, no. 11, 1921, p. 8. 84. “Kongresmaand,’’ pp. 2-3; P. B., “De Communisten en de Vakcentrale,” p. 4; Sinar Hindia, Mar. 9, 1921, in IPO, no. 11, 1921, p. 8 (Sudibio); Sinar Hindia, Mar. 12, 1921, in IPO, no. 12, 1921, pp. 32-33 (Semaun); Oetoesan 83.

Hindia, Mar. 24, 1921, in IPO, no. 13, 1921, 17-19; Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 21, 32.

85. Overzicht

CSI 1921, pp. 22-23; Oetoesan Hindia, Feb.

23, 1921, in

IPO,

no. 9, 1921, p. 27. 86.

For these arguments, and the maneuvering

in

some

SI

locals

over the

party discipline issue, see Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 32-35, 51, 55, 64; and also Overzicht CSI 1922, p. 3; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 73. Salim developed most of these lines of attack; as

PFB

had presented a number of them at 21, 1921, p. 6, and P. B., “De Com-

secretary he

January 1921 congress; see HVW, Jan. munisten en de Vakcentrale,” p. 4. 87. Soeroso, “De Indonesische vakbeweging,” p. 213. 88. Neratja, June 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, p. 565. This source states that fifteen labor groups were represented at the conference and lists them as the unions of dockworkers, metal workers, printers, employees of the Delft Petroleum and Lindeteves companies, the coordinating council of Semarang SI unions (Vakgroep S.I. Semarang), railroad workers and forestry personnel (all centered in and loyal to Semarang); the drivers’ and tailors’ unions (with headquarters in Jogjakarta but loyal to Semarang); the neutral unions of public works employees, teacher training school employees, and teachers; and the PPPB and PFB. HVW, June 20, 1921, p. 7, states that there w’ere seventeen unions present but does not list them. The meeting took place in Jogjakarta on June 18 and 19; for its announcement and agenda, see Oetoesan Hindia, May 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 22, 1921, pp. 452-453. 89. Neratja, June 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 565—569; see also Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 34-35; HVW, June 20, 1921, p. 7; P. B., “De conflict in de vakbeweging’’ (The Conflict in the Labor Movement), HVW, July 20, 1921, its

p.

1.

The

third

Semarang representative on the PPKB executive, Najoan, was

in

prison at the time.

For the manifesto of the RVC, see Sinar Hindia, June 25, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 577-579; for the manifesto issued by the Jogjakarta PPKB executive after the conference, see Boedi Oetomo, June 22, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, pp. 580-581. The RVC executive consisted at the outset of Semaun (Vakgroep S. I. Semarang, chairman), Budisutjitro (forestry workers, secretary), 90.

Bergsma

(VSTP,

Malaka), Sukindar

treasurer),

Wigno

(dockworkers,

(VIPBOW, member;

member), Sugeng

394

by Tan member), and

replaced

(printers,

Notes, pp. 102-105 Najoan (teamsters, member). The PPKB was reconstituted at the PPPB congress of July 3 and placed under the temporary leadership of the pawnshop workers’ union (chairman, Tjokroaminoto; vice-chairman, Muis); Oetoesan Hindia, July 9, 1921, in IPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 67-68. Statistics on membership of unions belonging to the PPKB and RVC are given for various years in the appendix to Semaun’s report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East; “Indiiskoe dvizhenie,” pp. 283-285. Semaun warned in his report (p. 254) that the figures were at best estimates, since no real statistics existed for the Indonesian organizations. One can only add that his statistics correspond with those usually claimed at the time. According to his estimates, the united PPKB contained at the height of its strength in 1920 about 60,000 Indonesians, 75 Indies Chinese, and 150 persons of European status. In 1921 the RVC had about 27,000 Indonesians, 75 Chinese, and 100 Europeans; all the Europeans were in the VSTP. The 1921 postschism PPKB contained 25,000 Indonesians, 10 Chinese, and no Europeans. All unions of both groups, except the VSTP, declined markedly in membership between 1920 and 1921. 91. See, for example, Soeara Ra’jat, Mar. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 13, 1921, pp. 26-27; Si Tetap, Mar. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 16, 1921, p. 201; Sinar Hindia, Apr. 18, 1921, in IPO, no. 17, 1921, pp. 176-177; Sinar Hindia, May 17, 1921, in IPO, no. 21, 1921, p. 361. 92. For the announcement of the meeting and its agenda, see Oetoesan Hindia, July 27 and Aug. 8, 1921, in IPO, nos. 31 and 33, 1921, pp. 218, 313-314. 93. For before and after views of Tjokroaminoto by Semarang, see Sinar Hindia, Aug. 4, 11, 31 and Oct. 3, 1921, in IPO, nos. 32, 33, 41, 1921, pp. 266267, 322-323, 98; Soeara Ra’jat, Aug. 16 and 31 and Sept. 16, 1921, in IPO, nos. 34, 37, 39, 1921, pp. 400, 644, 34. 94. Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 48. According to this account, Salim

had the congress so well in hand that he was able to put over his opinion even on matters where the meeting generally disagreed with him. See also the comment on the

De

Locomotief, Oct. 20, 1921. The following members of the central SI executive attended the Surabaja meeting: Abdul Muis, Hadji Agus Salim, congress in

Semaun, R. Wiradimadja, Sjahbuddin

Latief,

and, on the second day,

Surjo-

pranoto. 95. Overzicht

CSI 1921, pp.

See also Oetoesan

50, 55; for accounts of the SI congress, pp. 44-57. Hindia, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in IPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 128-131

(the same version was given in Sinar Hindia; see pp. Nationalist, p. 73; Blumberger,

Communist,

p. 29;

De

136-137); Blumberger,

Locomotief, Oct. 20, 1921;

Malaka, Toendoek kepada Kekoeasaan, tetapi tidak Toendoek kepada Kebenaran (A Step toward Might but Not a Step toward Right) (Berlin, 1922), p. 37, hereafter Toendoek.

CHAPTER

VI

Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in IPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 130-131; Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 56-57. Another vote against the party discipline measure was entered telegraphically by Gunawan, head of the Bandung SI; it was disallowed by the congress officials, however. The Semarang faction’s newspaper commented that there was some doubt whether the Sukabumi SI would agree with the decision of its representative, Sardjono, to break with the CSI; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 44, 1921, p. 242. 2. Semaun provided the following figures on ISDV/PKI membership in his 1.

39.5

Notes pp. 105-112 ,

report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (Semaun,

Tndiiskoe

dvizhenie,” p. 283):

Europeans 1915 1919 1920 1921

Chinese and Eurasians

Indonesians

0 5 4 3

3 300 250 200

100 25 15 5

IPO, no. 45, 1921, p. 281. 4. in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 386, editorial by Budisutjitro. After the March 1921 SI congress Budisutjitro had been one of the PKI leaders who argued for party discipline with an exception for PKI members.

31-Nov. 5, 1921, Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 1, 1921,

3.

Neratja, Oct.

5.

Malaka, Toendoek, Malaka, Toendoek,

6.

in

p. 37.

p. 37.

Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 1-7, 11-12; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 19, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 370. See also Koch, Om de vrijbeid, p. 67; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 111. For arguments on the overriding need for greater Indonesian unity, see Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 3-15, 1921, in IPO, no. 42, 1921, p. 124; DarmoKondo, Nov. 19, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, pp. 454-455; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 43, 1921, p. 240; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 17, 1921, in IPO, no. 7.

47, 1921, p. 370.

change from Ethical to conservative Dutch colonial policy may be found in Brouwer, De bonding, pp. 86-108; and Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 185-196, 201-207. 9. The parliamentary debate on the 1925 Indies budget brought out the arguments for and against Fock’s budget-cutting and tax policies with particular sharpness; for a summary and the government’s reply, see “Begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor 1925” (Budget for the Netherlands Indies for 1925), Bijlagen van lwt verslag der handelingen van de Tiveede Kamer der StatenGeneraal, 1924-1925, Bijlage B, pp. 195-199, hereafter Begrooting 1925. It was estimated that at that time an Indonesian family on Java with the income of /125 8.

Stimulating analyses

of

the

a year paid /17 to /18 in taxes.

Brouwer, De bonding, pp. 102-103, citing charges made by Idenburg in the upper house of parliament. 11. Salim, together with Rivai of the Sarekat Hindia, led the Indonesian attack on the 1922 budget in the Volksraad; for their arguments as presented to the Indonesian public, see Neratja, Oct. 31-Dec. 3, 1921, in IPO, nos. 44-49, 1921, 10.

pp. 278-279, 316-319, 357-358, 442-444. 12. For Indies press accounts of the

autonomy committee, see De Indiscbe Gids, XLIV (1922), 290—292, 350-353, 354-355 (denial by the committee’s secretary of Communist leanings), and 431^136. Fock’s action against the participation of the regents was criticized in parliament; see Handelingen 2e Kamer, 1921-1922, pp. 2760-2762 (interpellation by Marchant). General accounts of the efforts on behalf of constitutional revision and autonomy may be found in Brouwer, De bouding, pp. 86-91, and Koch, Verantwoording, pp. 116-125. Suwardi Surjaningrat, in Panggoegab, Apr. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 230-231. For the socialists’ growing reservations on autonomy and associationism, see Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 56-57, 81. For the text of the national unity program, see De Indiscbe Gids, XLIV (1922), 87-88; for Indies Dutch 13.

396

Notes pp. 112-115 ,

press reactions to the All-Indies congress, see

De

Indische Gids,

XLIV

(1922),

816-820. 14.

Mededeelingen 1922,

p. 3.

impact of the Indian movement on the political thought of the Indonesian elite was second only to that made by the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904; Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 64. For some Indonesian arguments urging emulation of the Congress, see Oetoesan Hindia, Feb. 23, 1921, in IPO, no. 9, 1921, p. 27; Dcirmo Kondo, Nov. 12, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, pp. 375-376; Benih Merdeka, Nov. 5-15, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 379; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 21-26, 1921, in IPO, no. 48, 1921, pp. 410-411; Darmo Kondo, Nov. 19, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, p. 455; Soeara Ra’jat, Dec. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 52, 1921, p. 573; Islam Bergerak, Feb. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 17, 1922, p. 159; Soeara Ra’jat, May 16, 1922, in IPO, no. 23, 1922, p. 395; Matahari, Aug. 3, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 241; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 3, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 525. 16. For a description of the PPKB meeting, see Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 5862; for a Communist appeal for a new and united labor federation, see Sinar Hindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 44, 1921, p. 240. 17. In September 1921 the Bandung PPPB elected Gunawan its chairman and Sugono vice-chairman; they were heads of that city’s pro-Semarang SI branch. Sugono had repeatedly warned the meeting that he was a Communist and that it would not be proper to elect him, but he was chosen anyway. Neratja, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 53-56. 18. Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 21-26, 1921, in IPO, no. 48, 1921, p. 410. 19. De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921. One of the CSI delegates was Abdul Muis. According to Tan Malaka, he and Semaun had gotten Muis’ promise to attend the October SI congress; they had also gotten Salim’s promise, but he did not turn up. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 37. 20. De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921. 21. De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921. In Toendoek (pp. 37-42) Tan Malaka described his further arguments for reconciliation: (1) Indonesian unity was necessary in order to defend the country in case of war between the great powers in the Pacific; (2) the schism worked in the interests of Dutch divide-and-rule strategy; (3) the majority of CSI members were genuine revolutionaries and the disagreement was not on grounds of principle. 22. Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara (Bukit Tinggi, n.d. ), I, 74; hereafter cited as DP I. The increased tendency toward reconciliation is confirmed in Mededeelingen 1922 (p. 17) and in Overzicht CSI 1921 (p. 66); the latter report credits the appeal to the example of the Indian National Congress as the argument that persuaded the CSI leaders to agree to reconsider a common effort. 23. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 112; Malaka, DP I, p. 74; Malaka, Toendoek, p. 42; De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921. 24. De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921; Malaka, Toendoek, p. 42; Malaka, DP I, p. 15. In the opinion of B. F. O. Schrieke, the

75. 25. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 42. 26. De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921; Overzicht

CSI 1921,

p. 62;

Mededeelingen

1922, p. 17.

Mededeelingen 1922, p. 17; De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921; Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 22, 27; Malaka, DP I, p. 78. The telegram was signed not only by the Communist groups but also by the CSI, the SI locals, and the PPKB. The 27.

397

Notes, pp. 115-119 Indies government, which strongly disapproved of the Indian Congress, utilized this telegram as a reason for banishing Tan Malaka. For further praise by Tan

Malaka

the

for

De

Exile),

Congress and

May

Tribune,

Gandhi,

see

Malaka,

“Mijn verbanning

’

(

My

20, 1922.

28. Sinar Hindia, Oct. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 43, 1921, p. 242; Soeara Ra’jat,

1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 386; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 7, 1921, in IPO, no. 46, 1921, p. 328; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 5, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 366; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, p. 451; De Locomotief,

Nov.

1,

Feb. 21, 1922. 29. Malaka, Toendoek,

p. 20.

30. SI V, p. 377, col. b.

For examples, see Siruir Hindia, Nov. 21, 1921, in IPO, no. 48, 1921, p. 409; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, p. 447; Soeara Ra’jat, Oct. 16, 1921, in IPO, no. 43, 1921, p. 256; and Sinar Hindia, Dec. 5-10, 1921, in IPO, no. 50, 1921, pp. 487-488. 32. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 43. Malaka was arrested a week before he was 31.

scheduled to talk. 33. The Volksraad electoral system was changed in 1923; Indonesian members, instead of being selected by a college composed of regency and town councils

from the entire colony, were chosen separately by twelve districts, in which the electors were members of the regency, and town councils in that district. The proponents of participation mostly represented units outside Semarang; see De Locomotief, Dec. 27, 1921.

Malaka states in his autobiography that he was much surprised by the appointment (DP I, p. 74). This seems undue modesty, however, for it is clear that he had been considered Semaun’s heir ever since October, when Semaun left the Indies; he had chaired the December party congress in Semaun’s place. This view is supported by Semaun, “Bung Tan” (Brother Tan), Peringatan Sewindu Hilangnja Tan Malaka, Bapak Murba dan Republik Indonesia (In Commemora34.

tion

of

Murba

Eight Years Since the Disappearance of Tan Malaka, Father of the [Party] and the Indonesian Republic) (Djakarta, 1957), pp. 23-24, here-

after cited as Peringatan.

35.

bom

Malaka was

in 1897, according to the chronology of his life given in

Peringatan (p. 29); in 1894 according to another biographical sketch (Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia [Indonesia’s Heritage], Bandung, 1951, p. 208); and in 1893, according to Mohammad Dimyati (Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia [History of the Indonesian Struggle] Djakarta, 1951, p. 122). 36. Malaka,

DP

p. 21; Peringatan, p. 29;

Tamar

Djaja, Pusaka, p. 209. 37. Hindia Poetra, September/ October 1916, inside back cover. This organization later it

was

became

I,

the radical nationalist

Perhimpunan Indonesia, but

at that

time

nonpolitical.

38. Malaka,

DP

I,

pp. 35-36.

except as noted, from 39. Malaka, 40. Malaka, 41. Malaka,

DP DP DP

DP

I,

The account

of Malaka’s life until 1921

taken,

pp. 24-68.

I,

pp. 68-69; Semaun, “Bung Tan,” p. 24. 66, 70; Semaun, “Bung Tan,” p. 24.

I,

67.

I,

is

The Semarang

school began with 80 students and had 180 bv February 1922; shortly after its establishment a branch was begun in Salatiga with 65 pupils and in Bandung with 200; Malaka, Toendoek, p. 23, and Mededeelingen 42.

1922, p.

pamphlet,

7. S.

Tan Malaka described 7.

the aims and program of the schools in a

Semarang dan Onderwijs (The Semarang SI and Education)

398

.

Notes, pp. 119-120 (Semarang, November 1921), and in a series of articles published in the Dutch Communist Tribune, May 29-31, 1922. 43. “Parlemen atau Sovjet?” (Parliament or Soviet?) appeared in Soeara Ra’jat, June 1-Aug. 16, 1921, in IPO, nos. 29, 33, 34, 1921, pp. 134, 341-342, 400-401; it also was published by the PKI executive as a pamphlet under the same title (Semarang, 1921). 44. Malaka, DP I, 74; Peringatan, p. 30. 45. Semaun, “Bung Tan,” pp. 23-24. The essentially introvert nature of PKI activity during the period before Malaka assumed office is remarked in Mededeelingen 1922 (p. 18). That Semaun intended it to remain that way seems indicated by his report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, in which he asserted that the depression had weakened the labor movement without really increasing revolutionary ferment, inasmuch as those who were without work in the cities could usually find a livelihood by returning to the villages. “At present, therefore, tion in

on

study.’

we

are experiencing a period of

‘rest’

and

‘internal concentra-

Both the leaders and rank-and-file workers are seriously engaged

preparation for future activities, the study of international questions, etc.”

(Semaun, “Indiiskoe dvizhenie,” p. 276). In this report Semaun stressed the importance of the Semarang-sponsored schools and hoped the party would soon seminar to provide teachers for a nationwide Communist school system (p. 274). It was such activity, he claimed (interview, 1959), on which he had hoped Tan Malaka would concentrate. We might note that the use of schools as an ideological instrument was not uncommon in Indonesia in the 1920s; the most successful were Suwardi Surjaningrat’s Taman Siswa schools, which start a training

avoided

but stressed cultural nationalism. 46. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 33. 47. The debate centered about Sneevliet’s expulsion; the Dutch party was not only concerned with the issue per se but wanted to support Sneevliet’s efforts to get permission to return to the Indies. For the major arguments, see Handelingen 2c Kamer, 1918-1919, p. 2047 (Albarda); 1919-1920, pp. 1148-1149 (Marchant), 1163 (Minister de Graaff), 1124-1125 (Van Ravesteyn); and Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P., pp. 52, 55, 131-133. politics

Although the right of association and assembly was recognized in 1915, it was only defined by the Royal Decree of Dec. 17, 1918, no. 38. This determined that no official permission was needed to found a political association, but in order for one to be recognized as a corporate entity its statutes had to be approved by the government. Associations deemed by the Indies supreme court to be in conflict with public order were forbidden, as were secret societies. The police might attend and dissolve public meetings but not closed ones, and prior permission was needed only for open-air meetings. After the unrest of 1919 it was decided that in any part of the colony where disturbance was threatened, the right of assembly could be restricted by requiring prior permission for all public meetings, police attendance at all meetings, and five days’ notice for closed meetings, which could be forbidden. These restrictions were widely employed in the sugar areas during 1920. Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 17-18. 49. See Mededeelingen 1920, pp. 41-43. The government stated that too many officials failed to draw the necessary conclusions from Baars’s dismissal from his government teaching job; the memorandum pointing this out became commonly known as the “muzzling memorandum” (muilkorfcirculaire ) 50. The SDAP spokesman in the tipper house of parliament charged that during 1920 “prosecution for infractions of the speech and press laws was carried 48.

399

,

Notes, pp. 120-122 such an excess that a secret memorandum was issued by the Attorney General to the prosecuting officials asking them henceforth not to undertake such action without informing him as head prosecutor” (Mendels, speech of Mar. 31, 1922, to

quoted

in

Van der

Zee,

De

S.D.A.P., p. 143).

June 25, 1921, in IPO, no. 26, 1921, p. 578; Soeara Boemipoetra, July 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 27, 1921, pp. 48-52; Oetoesan Hindia, July 9, 1921, in IPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 67-68; Neratja, July 13 and 14, 1921, in IPO, no. 28, 1921, pp. 115-118; Neratja, July 19, 1921, in IPO, no. 29, 1921, pp. 154-155; Soeara Boemipoetra, July 15, 1921, in IPO, no. 30, 1921, p. 197; Neratja, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51-56. 52. For descriptions of PPPB debates on strike plans, see Kaoem Moeda, Sept. 26-Oct. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, p. 49; Neratja, Sept. 29, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, pp. 51-56; Oetoesan Hindia, Sept. 26-Oct. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, p. 61; Soeara Boemipoetra, Dec. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 49, 1921, pp. 467-469. 53. Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. The background of the strike presented here is derived from Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 21-29; Tan Malaka’s accounts in Toendoek (pp. 12-13) and “Mijn verbanning” (May 20, 1922) give approximately the same analysis in less detail. Other comments may be found in Ovcrzicht CSI 1921 (p. 62) and Blumberger, Communist (pp. 29-30). 54. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 49; see also Malaka, DP I, 75. 55. The strike began in Ngupasan, near Jogjakarta, with the firing of a pawnshop official who refused to carry an article to the auction place. Thereupon forty coworkers left their jobs in order, as they put it, to seek justice from the Assistant Resident. They were discharged. The following day the strike spread to the surrounding areas, and so on until it covered most of Central Java; Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 24-26; Tan Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 12-13; and “Mijn verbanning,” May 20, 1922. The walkout was not completely spontaneous: the official who began it had conferred with the PPPB executive the day before, and this body negotiated with the local pawnshop service heads the evening before the strike; Mededeelingen 1922, pp. 27-28. However, the action was clearly not pressed by the union leaders upon the workers; the reverse was true. 50. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 30. The exact number of the workers who took 51. Sinar Hinclia,

not known; some sources give 1,000 (out of a total of 5,000 pawnshop workers on Java, 2,000 of whom belonged to the PPPB). Guber, Indoneziia : SotsiaVno-ekonomicheskie ocherki (Indonesia: Socio-Economic Outpart in the strike

is

(Moscow, 1933),

331; Blumberger, Communist, p. 30. Tan Malaka, however, stated that 2,000 were involved ( Toendoek pp. 12-13); and this was also the figure given by Sinar Hindia (May 15-20, 1922, in IPO, no. 21, 1922, p. 282). Not all the strikers seem to have been union members, and not all the

lines)

union members went on

p.

A Communist

report on labor activity in this period laid the defeat of the action chiefly to the lack of solidarity shown by the pawnshop workers; Boedisoetjitro, Verslag, p. 1. It was complained that only the strike.

Javanese struck and the government replaced them with Sumatrans; Neratja, Sept. 25-30, 1922, in IPO, no. 40, 1922, p. 4. For that matter, the PPPB, although it contained the great majority of the organized pawnshop employees, did not include them all; Dutch and higher Indonesian officials belonged to the PBOH and PPB. According to the government, the number of participants in the strike was

nowhere so great

that the

pawnshops could not do business; Mededeelingen 1922

p. 31.

I,

57.

Mededeelingen 1922,

58.

“Communisme,”

p. 30;

“Communisme,”

p.

532,

col. b.

532, col. b; Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 3, 12-13; and 75; Mededeelingen 1922, p. 30. p.

400

DP

,

Notes, pp. 122-125 59. Overzicht

CSI 1921, pp.

62, 66.

Mededeelingen 1922, p. 30; the exact number was 965 (out of 5,000). This is the government figure; Neratja declared that the number who lost their jobs as a result of the strike was 1,400 (May 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 347); Sinar Hindia claimed that it was about 2,000 (June 7, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 412; Aug. 27, 1922, in IPO, no. 32, 1922, p. 198). 61. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 32. 62. Mededeelingen 1922, p. 31; Neratja, Apr. 10, 1922, in IPO, no. 16, 1922, pp. 88—89. For Indonesian Volksraad criticism of the government attitude toward the strike and Budi Utomo’s role in it, see Handelingen Volksraad, 1922, First Session, pp. 104-108, 131, 185-187, 189-192 (speeches by Salim, Dwidjosewojo, and Sutadi); for Indies Dutch views, see pp. 200-203. 63. Mededeelingen 1921, p. 9. 64. Letter from the Assistant Resident of Surakarta to the Budi Utomo executive, Feb. 22, 1922; letter of the Budi Utomo executive to B. F. O. Schrieke, Mar. 4, 1922; see also Handelingen Volksraad, 1922, First Session, Bijlagen, Ond. 1, Aid. I, Stuk 6, pp. 9-10. The most radical action with which Budi Utomo had been connected during the strike was Sutopo’s acceptance of the chairmanship of a committee to assist the strikers; this was promptly disapproved by the party’s executive, however, and he resigned in favor of Suwardi Surjaningrat. Handelingen Volksraad, 1922, First Session, p. 187 (Salim). 65. As a result of the strike, the membership of the PPPB dropped, according to one account, from 2,000 to 200 (Guber, lndoneziia, p. 311). See also Neratja, Apr. 10, 1922, in IPO, no. 16, 1922, p. 89. 66. The action against Malaka and Bergsma was not because of their part in the PPPB strike, although this was added to the charges against them; the Attorney General had proposed their banishment to the Governor General on Dec. 23, 1921. This was before Malaka had become chairman of the PKI; presumably the government thought him dangerous because of the great success of the SI schools. Bergsma was expelled from the Indies by a government decree of Mar. 2, 1922; the same directive banished Malaka to Kupang, on the island of Timor. He requested to be allowed instead to leave the Indies, and, as was customary, this was granted; at the end of March he sailed for Holland. Malaka, DP I, 78-79, 88, and Toendoek, pp. 3-4, 12; De Indische Gids, XLIV (1922), 531-532; “Communisme,” p. 532, col. b. 60.

CHAPTER

VII

IPO, no. 51, 1921, p. 543. 2. See Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, Aug. 15, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 22, 1925, for accounts of the speculations current after Semaun’s departure. On the other hand, rumors were circulated after Semaun’s return that he had not really been in Russia at all, causing the VSTP to circulate two “torpedo letters” in indignant refutation ( Neratja Oct. 9—14, 1922; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 15, 1922; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1922; in IPO, nos. 42, 43, and 45, 1922, pp. 127, 1.

Si Tetap, Oct. 31, 1921, in

171-172, 272). 3. Sinar Hindia, June 6-10, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, p. 406; hereafter cited as SH. A similar exposition of Semaun’s purpose is given in Soeara Rajat, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143. Formation of a committee to aid the starving Russian children had been an item on the agenda of the 1921 PKI congress ( Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383). Semaun declared on his return that he had decided “the poor conditions are not to be

401

,

,

,

Notes, pp. 125-128 blamed on incorrect administration by the Bolsheviks but on the many enemies that make things difficult for the Soviet Republic”— namely, opportunists in the party, non-Communists who still held important positions, the economic boycott of Russia, and capitalist sponsorship of counterrevolution ( SH p. 406). 4. SH, p. 407; Goenawan, Semaoen (Semaun) (Bandung, 1924), p. 12. The latter work is a pamphlet defending Semaun and his program; it quotes most of Semaun’s homecoming speech verbatim. 5. Semaun, editorial in Sinar Hindia, Dec. 1, 1919, and Soeara Rdjat, Dec. 19, 1919, in IPO, no. 48, 1919, p. 1, and no. 51, 1919, p. 1; and see Djawa Tengah, Dec. 3, 1919, in IPO, no. 49, 1919, p. 2. 6. For the development of the railroad strike issue during 1921, see Sinar Hindia, June 20, 1921, and Oetoesan Hindia, July 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 27, 1921, pp. 12-15; Si Tetap, June 30, 1921, in IPO, no. 30, 1921, pp. 200-203; Oetoesan Hindia, July 11, 1921, in IPO, no. 29, 1921, pp. 118-119; Si Tetap Aug. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1921, p. 86; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 13, 1921, in IPO, no. 42, 1921, pp. 135-136; Si Tetap, Sept. 20, 1921, in IPO, no. 46, 1921, pp. 353-354; and Mededeelingen 1921, p. 18. 7. That this was the main substance of the quarrel was evident from the dispute in the party on Semaun’s return. Accounts that claimed Semaun had been urged to visit Russia by European PKI members who considered him to have deviated from the orthodox international path also declared that the principal objection to his policies was that he refused to take sufficiently strong antigovernment action ( Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, Aug. 15, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 22, 1925). The same view of the essence of the quarrel is taken in the government reports Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand in 1923 (Survey of the Internal Political Situation in 1923) (Netherlands Indies government, Weltevreden, March 1924), p. 2, and Mededeelingen 1924, p.

2.

The summons

congress was

addressed to the workers of Korea, China, Japan, and Mongolia. See Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 145; G. 8.

Safarov,

to

the

“Von Washington

bis

Moskau” (From Washington

to

Moscow),

In-

(German-language edition of Imprecorr) Jan. 17, 1922, pp. 54-55; and “Theses Adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the Washington Conference,” Inprecorr, Oct. 1, 1921, p. 3. 9. Semaun, interview, 1959; First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (Petrograd, 1922), p. 237, hereafter cited as Toilers; Ch. E. [Eiduss], “Der erste Kongress der revolutionaren Organisationen des Femen Ostens,” (The First Congress of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East), Die Rote Gewerkachafts— Internationale (organ of the Profintem, hereafter RGI), no. 9, September 1922, p. 603. 10. Semaun, interview, 1959. 11. As Semaun stated in apology to the congress, he began to study English, the language of the meeting, only two months before it gathered in Moscow (thus, presumably, after he arrived in Irkutsk); and as there was no one at the meeting who could interpret Dutch or Indonesian, he was reduced to silence prekorr

Toilers

pp. 151, 191). 12. In addition to the better-known accounts of the meeting, a lengthy description written by Sneevliet can be found in “Het kongres van Bakoe” ( The Congress (

Baku), De Tribune, Nov. 1, 2, and 4, 1920. According to this report, the meeting started late, because the special train carrying the ECCI and its retinue from Moscow did not reach Baku until 2 a.m. Revolutionary spirits were not

of

402

Notes, pp. 128-129 dampened by

the delay, and the delegates poured into the

Baku

theater,

where

an orchestra played, everyone sang the “Internationale,” Zinoviev made a speech, and greetings were read from innumerable participating and sympathizing organizations. Then everyone went home to bed; the following evening formal sessions began. The day after that was Friday (Muslim sabbath), and the delegates did not work but were entertained by a parade that culminated in the unveiling of a statue of Marx, with explanations of his meaning for the East. Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau were burnt in effigy. On the next day, the proceedings were embarrassed by the presence of Enver Pasha, whose wish to address the meeting had to be diplomatically ignored. On the last

two days 7,

practical policy discussions

1920. 13.

The

may be found

“De Hollandsche Communisten Oosten” (The Dutch Communists to the Peoples of the

text of the greeting

aan de volkeren van het

in

De

Tribune, Oct. 22, 1920, p. 1; see also De Tribune, Oct. 25, 1920, p. Nov. 3, 1920, p. 3. 14. II Kongress, p. 195. This unenthusiastic comment may refer to the pri-

East), 3;

were held. The congress ended on Sept.

marily Central Asian orientation of the meeting or to the fact that the original plans for the convention, which congress,

had been superseded by the events eight

of that meeting. According to Carr,

260, the only Far Eastern representatives at the meetChinese. Sneevliet, however, mentions that among the 1,891

Bolshevik Revolution, ing were

had been made before the second Comintern

III,

32 national groups there were small delegations from Korea, China, and India (“Het kongres van Bakoe,” Nov. 2, 1921)— in addition,

delegates

representing

of course, to himself for the Netherlands Indies.

For the congress resolutions, see Pervyi s”ezd narodov Vostoka (First Congress of the People of the East) (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 183-186. 16. Huricz, Orient politik, p. 33, suggests that the Baku meeting was intended to establish the Asian International called for by the League for the Liberation of the East two years before. However, Wijnkoop’s confident statement after the second Comintern congress that there would be no center for Asian propaganda outside Moscow indicates that the council may have been thought up after that meeting or at the Baku congress itself. The head of the council was Mikhail Pavlovich ( S. VePtman), who also became the first director of the AllRussian Scientific Association for Oriental Studies. For descriptions of the council’s functions and career, see Pervyi s”ezd narodov Vostoka, pp. 211-213; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 260-268; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 82-85. 17. “Moskou en het pan-Islamisme,” p. 3 (a statement by the PKI executive). 18. The minutes of the congress list no delegate from the Indies; see Protokolle des dritten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Protocols of the Third Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg, 1921), pp. 10681071, hereafter III Kongress. But it seems certain that Darsono was there ( Darsono, interview, 1959; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 76; Djoehana, “History of the Indonesian National Movement,” The Voice of Free Indonesia, no. 15, 1946, p. 8). It is quite possible that he was included in the Dutch delegation or that 15.

the congress listing

is

incomplete.

Darsono, interview with G. McT. Kahin, 1955, and with the author, 1959. Darsono had learned German, the principal Comintern language, while in prison 19.

and he made his report to the congress in that tongue. 20. According to one Soviet source, Lenin was persuaded by a group of Near Eastern delegates who were disturbed at the persecution of the Turkish Commu-

in the Indies,

403

Notes pp. 129-131 ,

by Kemal and the collapse of Communist rule in Gilan (B. Z. Shumiatskii, “Iz istorii Komsomola i Kompartii Kitaia” (From the History of the Youth Movement and Communist Party of China), Revoliutsionnyi Vostok, no. 4/5, 1928, nists

218).

p.

21. Shumiatskii, “Iz istorii,” p. 219. 22. Shumiatskii, “Iz istorii,” p. 219.

pp. 219-220. Chang’s theses are given on pp. 220-222 and are translated in part in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 144. 24. Conclusion of Chang’s theses, as translated in Eudin and North, Soviet 23. Shumiatskii,

“Iz istorii,”

Russia, p. 144. 25. Ill Kongress, p. 1010. 26. Ill Kongress, p. 1018. Although

Roy

stated that “not one single

member

European and American delegations opposed this,” he was supported by the French delegate Julien, who declared that the French Communists had come to Moscow prepared to ask for changes in the theses of the second Comintern congress that would make possible still greater cooperation with the nationalist movements (pp. 1029-1035). Julien’s criticism was not, however, backed by the other French representatives. 27. Ill Kongress, p. 1016. In fairness to the Comintern, it should be pointed out that limitation on the speaking time of the Eastern delegates was due at least in part to Asian insistence on talking at great length and in resounding generalities. As one commentator put it, “Western indifference and Eastern flowery eloquence had combined to reduce the discussion on the Oriental question to a sort of necessary evil, to be gotten over with as quickly as possible.” Demetrio Boersner, Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question (1917-1928) (Geneva and Paris, 1957), p. 109. 28. Ill Kongress, p. 1035. This comment was made by Kolarov, speaking in

of the

the

name

of the presidium.

29. Ill Kongress, p. 30.

Semaun claimed

1016; emphasis in the to

text.

have visited China on the way;

and Goenawan, Semaoen, pp.

A

SH

,

pp.

406, 407,

claimed in Mataram, Oct. 24, 1922; Javasclxe Courant, Aug. 16, 1923 (statement of the reasons for Semaun’s banishment, in the official Netherlands Indies government journal); A. K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia (History of the Indonesian Popular Movement) (Djakarta, 1950), p. 38; and Tamar Djaja, Trio Komunis Indonesia (Three Indonesian Communists) (Bukit Tinggi, 1946?), p. 29. Sneevliet, it has been claimed, accompanied Semaun to Moscow; J. H. Francois, 37 Jar lndonesische vrijheidsheweging (37 years of the Indonesian In11, 13.

visit to

Sneevliet

is

dependence Movement) (n.p., n.d.), p. 16. It is also asserted that Sneevliet cave him some letters to take back to Indonesia ( Mataram Oct. 24, 1922). That Semaun saw' Sneevliet in Shanghai seems only natural; one would expect, too, that Sneevliet gave him some message to take back to Java. If he accompanied Semaun at all, however, it was probably no farther than Irkutsk, since w'e know that Sneevliet was in China at the time Semaun was in Moscow. I have seen no ,

other sources that indicate Sneevliet

made

a trip to Russia at this time.

Semaun

claimed to have stopped for a time in Siam— whether going to or from Russia is unclear, but the latter seems more likely— and in his homecoming speech he commented brieflv on the political situation in that countrv. also

31. Shortly after the

Baku congress the ECCI decided

to hold a

Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, in Siberia; Izvestiia, Sept. 29, 1920, as cited in Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 77. See also Carr. Bolshevik Revolution, III, 525. This

404

Notes, pp. 131-132 was apparently an attempt to make up for the almost exclusively Central Asian orientation of the Baku meeting. Nothing further came of the project until the summer of 1921, when the great powers announced plans for a conference on arms limitation in the Pacific; Russia was not invited, and the Soviets saw in the snub an indication of imperialist intentions to keep them out of the Pacific. The ECCI, meeting just after the third Comintern congress, determined to reply with a demonstration of Asian opposition to the conference, through the medium of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. 32. The meeting had been originally planned as a demonstration to which

to this threat

all

revolutionary anti-imperialist organizations of the Far East should be invited.

Disagreement arose, however, apparently as to whether bourgeois nationalist organizations should be included. The problem was put off temporarily by deciding to invite everyone and to determine which delegates should be admitted to the congress at Irkutsk itself; Shumiatskii, “Iz istorii,” pp. 223-224, referring to a letter to this effect written by Chang T’ai-lei to the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern on July 29, 1921. 33. The Congress met in Moscow imtil February 1 and held a final session in Petrograd on February 3. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), the move and the delay occurred because of Lenin’s illness; at any rate Irkutsk was an out-of-the-way spot for a congress in which major Russian leaders had become interested.

The

34.

interpretations given the published record of the congress

scholars have

differed

rather widely:

Zinoviev representing the

Boersner,

whereas Whiting, Soviet

pp.

114-115, sees

wing

in the contro-

Bolsheviks,

wing and Safarov the

left

right

by Western

74-86, finds the entire meeting controlled by a Zinoviev-led left. Carr, Bobhevik Revolution, III, 526-528, depicts Zinoviev as taking a dogmatic revolutionary view oriented about the Japanese proletariat and Safarov adopting a somewhat more cautious but still leftist stand. The official language of the meeting was English, but the English-language account of the proceedings ( Toilers ) is less complete than the Russian one ( Perviji s”ezd), which contains additional reports, including Semaun’s. In the English versy,

account,

Semaun

is

Policies, pp.

referred to as Simpson, delegate

from Java.

35. Shumiatskii, "Iz istorii,” p. 227. Since Shumiatskii wrote in the period of

ascendancy, he possibly exaggerated that leader’s role in correcting the deviant trend of the meeting; on the other hand, Stalin, who was then Commissar of Nationalities, seems to have been interested in the meeting even though not Stalin’s

officially

connected with

it;

see Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 528. Lenin’s in-

remarked in Semaun’s account; see below. 151 (Semaun’s statement of agreement with Zinoviev). In

terest in the gathering is

36. Toilers, p.

greetings to the congress,

The

Semaun observed:

industrial proletariat that has

our country

is

his

sprung up due to the foreign capital invested in move on the road of the revolutionary strugThe peoples of the Far East, and also the pro-

already beginning to

gle against the imperialists.

.

.

.

Java and the Dutch Indies will play, due to their geographical posiand they will be the chief base for the coming imperialist war. But the future war will be used by the proletariat of Java and the Dutch Indies, as well as the proletariat of India for the purpose of making a joint attack with the proletariat of the Far East upon world imperialism. At this congress

letariat of

tion, a decisive part,

comrades from the Far East, who will find means of uniting the proletariat of the entire world for the decisive struggle against imperialism and for the achievement of the final victory of the proletariat. I

hope

to find

405

,

,

Notes pp. 132-134 ,

Toilers p. 15.

Most Asian representatives

to the congress took a far less specifically

proletarian stand, the tenor of their speeches being anti-imperialist rather than Communist; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 528, and Boersner, Bolsheviks, p.

Of the Asians attending the congress, only about half were declared Communists; the others were mostly revolutionary nationalists of one sort or another. Carr, p. 526; see also Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 146. Semaun’s message was probably written for him— perhaps by Sneevliet— considering his poor English at the beginning of the conference, when it was delivered. Semaun also presented a detailed report on the Indonesian movement; he was unable to deliver it orally because of translation difficulties ( Toilers p. 191), but it was published later in the Russian-language account of the congress ( Pervyi s’ezd, pp. 254116.

289).

“Gewerkschaftsfragen auf dem Kongress der Werktiitigen des Femen Ostens” (Labor Union Questions at the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East), RGI, Mar. 1922, pp. 214-216; “Die Tiitigkeit des Vollzugsbiiros der R.G.I.” (The Activity of the Executive Bureau of the Profintem), RGI, no. 2, Feb. 1922, p. 148. The commission was formed on the initiative of the Profintem (Red International of Labor Unions), which had been established the summer before and which found in the congress an opportunity to get in touch with the representatives of the Asian labor movements. According to the Profin37. Toilers,

tem

p.

6;

commission evolved into a separate conference of Far Eastern labor union representatives which acted independently of the congress and did not report back to it. The meeting was headed by Lozovsky, the Secretary General of the Profintem. Work proceeded slowly at first, the account states, since the European and Asian representatives knew very little of each others’ movements; but the results of three days’ discussions were very useful. As for the Indonesian representative on the committee, he is referred to as chiefly concerned with the inequality of pay for European and native workers in his country. 38. “Manifest des Kongresses der Werktiitigen des Femen Ostens an die Volker des Femen Ostens” (Manifesto of the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East to the Peoples of the Far East), lnprekorr, Feb. 14, 1922, pp. 143-144. 39. SH, p. 407; the meeting with Lenin is also referred to in Semaun, “Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten” (Letters on the Struggle in the East), De Tribune, June 6, 1925. It has been suggested that Semaun’s policy of caution was the result of ECCI instructions not to push revolution in Indonesia, advice inspired by the Soviet desire not to provoke the West at that time; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 481, note 1. This may have been the case, but no evidence has been article first cited, the

offered for

it.

Semaun, interview, 1959. Semaun was then no longer a Communist Party member. 41. According to Semaun, Lenin made his remark on the NEP specifically in connection with the question whether the soviet system should be advocated by Asian Communist movements. Zinoviev had urged this at the congress of the 40.

Far East; see Toilers, p. 154. Lenin, as we will remember from the account of the second Comintern congress, thought the idea too radical and had included it in his theses only as a compromise with the more leftist sentiToilers of the

ment

of the congress colonial commission.

SH, pp. 406—40/; Goenawan, Semaoen, p. 12. 43. SH, p. 408; Goenawan, Semaoen, pp. 13-14. 44. Tan Malaka, “De beweging in Indie” (The Movement 42.

Tribune, Sept.

5,

1922; see also

Eyquem,

406

in the Indies),

Aux Indes Neerlandaises,”

De

pp. 80—81.

Notes pp. 134-137 ,

Tan Malaka complained that the Dutch papers were reporting that Semaun had said, “Moscow cannot support the Indies; the Indies must help themselves; the Indies still need the Netherlands’ aid.” Malaka said he couldn’t believe Semaun had said this, but that even if he had, it should be viewed as the aberration of an individual and not of the whole Indonesian Communist movement. 45. See

further

SH, pp. 408-409; Djoehana, “History,”

p.

8;

Blumberger,

Nationalist, p. 112; Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp. 38-39. 46. Semaun, article in Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 149.

He

has maintained this position to the present day; see the analysis presented in

Semaun, Konsepsi Perckonomian Dunia (A Concept

of

World Economics) (Dja-

karta, 1957).

47. Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in

IPO, no. 30, 1922,

p.

148. See also Oetoesan

Hindia, July 22, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128, reporting a speech by Semaun to the Tjirebon VSTP.

SH, p. 407; Goenawan, Sernaoen, p. 13. Semaun may have been referring to independence achieved by overthrowing capitalism in Holland, as had been hoped in the revolutionary' days of 1918, but he did not so qualify his statement. 49. Malaka, DP I, p. 98. Since this autobiography was written long after Malaka had broken with orthodox Communism, it is unlikely that his remarks were colored by considerations of loyalty. 50. For an analysis of the early leadership’s deviationist tendencies by the present party chairman, see D. N. Aidit, “The Birth and Growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia” in his Problems of the Indonesian Revolution (n.p., 1963), 48.

pp. 68-72.

For Semaun’s arguments, see Goenawan, Sernaoen, pp. 13-14; SH, pp. 408—409; Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, pp. 148-149; Soeara Ra’jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Soeara Ra’jat, May 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 143; Oetoesan Hindia, July 22, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; Sinar Hindia, Aug. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 35, 1922, p. 300. See also Sernaoen, “Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten,” June 6, 1925; Blumberger, Communist, p. 311; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 112; Djoehana, “History,” p. 8; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3; Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp. 38-39. 52. Tan Malaka, “De beweging in Nederlandsch Indie,” Sept. 5, 1922, citing reports in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. 53. SH, p. 409. 54. Sernaoen, “Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten” June 6, 1925. 55. See comments by Ngadino in Sinar Hindia, May 29-June 3, 1922, in IPO, no. 23, 1922, p. 377; by Dachlan in Soeara Ra’jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; and by Sudarman in Sinar Hindia, Jan. 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 4, 1924, p. 148. Also Poesaka VSTP (Heritage of the VSTP; Semarang 1923), pp. 17-19; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 141-142; Islam Bergerak, July 1 and 10, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 245-246. 56. VSTP membership was broken down by a union publication as follows: 51.

Beginning 1920

End 1920 October 1921 End 1921 June 1922 End 1922

Indonesian

Dutch

Chinese

6,235 12,084 16,831 15,621 7,642 9,549

236 95

23 34 40 46 44

407

104 102

45 43

15

Total

6,494 12,213 16,975 15,769 7,731 9,607

Notes, pp. 137-139 Poesaka VSTP, p. 19. During Semaun’s absence the VSTP was led by Harry Dekker; Sinar Hindia, Jan. 5-12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 290. 57. See Semaun, in Si Tetap, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, pp. 148149. For discussions of Seamaun’s advice, see Soeara Ra’jat, June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 234; Sinar Hindia, Aug. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 35, 1922, 300; and Oetoesan Hindia, July 22, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 128; “Communisme,” p. 533, col. a; Overzicht 1923, p. 2; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3. p.

58.

Programma Congres, ka 12

(Program of the Twelfth Congress

3-4 Februari 1923 the VSTP, February 3-4, 1923) (Sema-

dari of

V.S.T.P.

tanggal

rang, 1923?), leaflet.

For accounts of these propaganda

tours, see Si Tetap,

June 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 149; Sinar Hindia, Aug. 21-30, in IPO, no. 36, 1922, p. 349; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 2; Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand (April-December 1924) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation [AprilDecember 1924] ) ( Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden? 1924?). p. 2, hereafter Overzicht 1924; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 141-142. 60. Sinar Hindia, May 1-7, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 204-205; reporting a Sarekat Postel congress that elected Sudibio ( PKI ) chairman of the union. None of the previous executive members attended the meeting, which charged them with neglect leading to the union’s virtual collapse. 61. Sudibio also became chairman of this union. It was remarked in Sinar Hindia, Dec. 19, 1922 (IPO, no. 52, 1922, pp. 591-592), that the new executive had done its best to revive the PFB but that the sugar workers were generally content with the gains of 1920 and thus showed little interest in the union. 62. Motor, January 1923, in IPO, no. 4, 1923, p. 166; Oetoesan Hindia, May 2-6, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 210-211. This union, the ABBH, was chaired by Suradi; the Inlandsche Algemeene Politiebond (General Native Police As59.

sociation)

The

was led by Prawirosardjono.

on Java rose steeply until 1920. The index price of poorest-quality rice was 110 in 1916 and 289 in the last quarter of 1920 (1914 100) and it then dropped rapidly to 147 in 1923; Prijzen, indexcijfers, pp. 73—78, Table VII. Moreover, it appears that in some sectors wages of private employees were not reduced in spite of the slump; a government survey of wages in Surabaja, the center of such industry as the Indies then possessed, stated that wages actually rose on the average until 1923. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, June 29, 1926. 64. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 118, speech by Suroso to the December 1922 PVH congress. 65. See Oetoesan Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 58. The meeting was attended by representatives from the VIPBOW, the Surabaja branch of the Sarekat Postel, Kadasterbond (union of employees of the land-registrv offices), Opiumregiebond (union of employees of the opium service), Inlandsche Douanebond (union of native customs officials), Inlandsche Politiebond (union of Indonesian police), and Landskas Bond (union of treasury employees). 66. Oetoesan Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. *58. The new league, it was declared, would be the Verbond van Inlandsche Landsdienaren 63.

cost of living for Indonesians

=

(Association of Native Public Servants). 67. See Soeara Boemipoetera,

Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 506. rjokroaminoto stated that he hoped the new bodv would be an alliance rather than a union, since a close relationship between Communists and non-Communists

408

,

Notes pp. 139-141 ,

PPKB had

proved eminently unsuccessful. “May this praiseworthy effort bear handsome fruit,” he concluded, adding his regrets that he was too busy to attend the founding meeting. 68. Neratja, Sept. 25-30, 1922, in IPO no. 40, 1922, p. 3. 69. The federation claimed at its first congress ( December 1922 ) to represent eighteen unions, with 32,120 members. Of these, 13,000 belonged to the VSTP, like that in the old

4,500 to the

4,000 to the PGB (assistant teachers), 2,200 to the rest to fourteen smaller unions; report of the congress, in Sinar

VIPBOW,

PPPB, and the

Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 17. This figure is undoubtedly too large, however; the PPPB, for example, could claim some 2,200 members before its strike but not afterward, and the VSTP elsewhere gave its strength at

1922 as 9,607 ( Poesaka VSTP, p. 19). The PVH chairman later claimed the federation had about 23,000 members at the start. Of these, only 1,600 were in private employ, 400 of them representing the PFB; Soeroso, “De Indonesische vakbeweging,” p. 213. Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 141-142, estimates the federation at about 25,000 members. The (socialist) International Federation of Trade Unions gave PVH membership as nineteen unions and about 33,000 members; De Indische Gids, XLVII, 1925, p. 452. 70. The first permanent executive of the PVH, elected at its December 1922 congress, consisted of Suroso (chairman), Mardikun (secretary-treasurer), Djokosuwamo, Kartodarmodjo, and Ngadino; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 21. 71. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 21; Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand in 1923 (Survey of the Internal Political Situation in 1923) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, Weltevreden, the

end

of

Overzicht 1923. 72. P. B., “Het Eenheidsfront in Indonesia” (The United Front in Indonesia), De Tribune, Sept. 8, 1922, quoting a telegram signed by Suroso and Semaun p. 2, hereafter

1923),

for the

PVH. According

to

draw up a bonus, which the

Suroso, Bergsma helped

the impending withdrawal of the cost-of-living

protest against

PVH

sent the

Dutch parliament; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 18. The idea for a Netherlands committee probably stemmed from the decision of the June meeting of government employees’ unions to send a representative to Holland to plead for exemption of the Indonesian public employees from the budget-cutting campaign; Oetoesan Hindia, June 28, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p.

58. 73. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 18, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, pp. 547-548,

program

and statement of principles of the PVH. The program contained many demands characteristic of postindependence Indonesian labor attitudes. In addition to the statist

orientation,

emphasized welfare provisions, job security, and payment rather than economic criteria; all these have been continuing

it

according to social features of the Indonesian labor viewpoint. 74. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in

IPO, no.

1,

1923, p. 18; Sinar Hindia,

Dec. 16/18, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 546. 75. This opinion is expressed in Blumberger, Communist, pp. 31-32; “Communisme,” p. 533, col. a; Overzicht CSI 1921, p. 66; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 1.

Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 1, 3. SI schools was particularly notable

76. Overzicht 1923, p. 3;

77.

The expansion

of

in

West

Java.

One

pro-Semarang newspaper in the district reported that in short succession schools were founded in Sukabumi, Sumedang, Tasikmalaja, Tjirebon, and “other SI

409

Notes, pp. 141-142 Aug. 3, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 240. The major West Java SI school was in Bandung; Gunawan, head of the Bandung PKI/SI, had been a prime mover in establishing the SI school system. 78. Boedi Oetomo, Feb. 24/26, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418. 79. HOS, p. 134, quoting a letter by Wondoamiseno. 80. This proposal was entered formally at a congress of the PPPB in August 1922, after PKI and Semarang SI delegates pleaded for an end to party discipline. Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491. centers”; Matahari,

81. Overzicht 1923, p. 7.

For some of the Communist arguments against party discipline, see Matahari, Aug. 27, 1922, in IPO, no. 37, 1922, p. 415; Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491; Matahari. Sept. 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 41, 1922, p. 97; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 173-174; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 9, 1922, in IPO, no. 46, 1922, p. 299. 83. At the August 1922 PPPB congress Tjokroaminoto declared he was undecided on the party discipline issue but thought it should be discussed at the next SI congress; this apparently satisfied the PKI, for Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 31, 1922, p. 491, remarked that Tjokroaminoto’s return to political life was a saving medicine for the ailing movement. 84. A government account of this period considered Tjokroaminoto’s attitude toward reunification at least in part due to political naivete: “[The quarrel] centered once more about the principle of unity, for the Communist [Semaun], who was in this respect more experienced, recognized better than Tjokroaminoto then did how weak the position of the Indies popular movement was, in this socially underdeveloped and geographically divided land, when confronted with the united forces of foreign capital and the power of the colonial authorities; and he appreciated more fully how much preparation and exertion were required to begin the realization of the desired better social order.” Mededeelingen 1924, 82.

p. 3.

The study was first published serially in the PPPB poetera, which Tjokroaminoto edited, beginning with the 85.

1;

Nov.

1924, p. 4; SI V, p. 379, 87. Neratja,

issue of Sept.

Boemi1,

1922.

1922, in IPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 249. The congress confor accounts of its role in the CSI-PKI feud, see Mededeelingen

86. Sinar Hindia,

vened on Nov.

journal, Soeara

4,

col. b.

Oct. 30— Nov. 2,

1922, in IPO, no. 45,

1922, p. 240; Oetoesan

Hindia, Dec. 5 and 12, 1922, in IPO, nos. 50 and 51, 1922, pp. 490-491, 536; and see Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 3-4; Overzicht 1923, pp. 3-4; Blumberger,

Communist,

p. 31.

88. Neratja, Jan. 3, 1923, in 89. Tjokroaminoto,

Kaoem

S.I.

di

Indies), Partij

“Partij

Hindia” (The S.I.,

IPO, no.

S.I.:

S.I.

2,

Voorstel Party:

A

1923, pp. 59-60.

terhadap kepada Sekalian Saudara Proposal to All SI Comrades in the

Jan. 11, 1923, pp. 7-10.

For the arguments on party discipline presented by both sides in this period, see Sinar Hindia, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 173-174; Neratja, Oct. 30-Nov. 2, 1922, in IPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 240; Sirnir Hindia, Nov. 9, 1922, in IPO, no. 46, 1922, p. 299; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 21, 1922, in IPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 398399; Oetoesan Hindia, Nov. 16, 1922, in IPO, no. 47, 1922, p. 347; Soeara Ra’jat. Nov. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 48, 1922, pp. 420—421; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 5, 1922, in IPO, no. 50, 1922, pp. 490-491; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 13, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 544; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 14, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, p. 545; 90.

410

Notes, pp. 142-144 Sinar Hindia, Dec. 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 51, 1922, pp. 545-546; Oetoesan Hindia, Jan. 23, 1923, in IPO, no. 5, 1923, p. 191; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 349. 91.

Semaoen, “Brieven over den

strijd in

het Oosten,” June

6,

1925, referring

to the Radical Concentration.

For Indonesian comment on these efforts and on the All-India Congress, see Panggoegah, Apr. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 19, 1922, pp. 230-231; Neratja, May 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 23, 1922, pp. 371-372; Neratja, June 6, 1922, in IPO, no. 24, 1922, pp. 417-418; Darmo Kondo, June 24, 1922, in IPO, no. 28, 1922, p. 60; Islam Bergerak, July 1 and 10, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, pp. 244-246; Matahari, Aug. 3, 1922, in IPO, no. 33, 1922, p. 240. The last is an article by the PKI leader Mohammad Sanusi, in which he supported the All-Indies Congress and the attempts to unite the Indonesian movements and at the same time warned that these efforts should not be based on race or religion, since in the Indies these were divisive elements. 93. The Radical Concentration was founded on the initiative of the ISDP at a meeting of Indies opposition parties held in Batavia in November 1922. See Sinar Hindia, Dec. 18, 1922, in IPO, no. 52, 1922, p. 589; J. Stokvis, “Vobvaardig parlement voor Indonesie?” (A Real Parliament for the Indies?), Het Volk, Nov. 17, 1939; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 31. Its headquarters were also established in the capital city, under a permanent interparty committee; Boedi Oetomo, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, p. 103. 94. Budi Utomo had broken with the Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements after a short flirtation with the argument that the coalition was too radical. Now, however, growing disillusionment plus a rising young progressive element in the Javanese party caused it to declare adherence to the new alliance on the grounds that the reactionary forces had become so powerful that a united front against them was necessary; Boedi Oetomo, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, p. 103; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 31. 95. A list of major participating organizations and a summary of its manifesto is given in Sinar Hindia, Jan. 9, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 75. 96. Semaoen, Sikapnja Partij Kommunist India (P.K.I.) terhadap pada RadicaleConcentratie (Viewpoint of the Indies Communist Party toward the Radical Concentration) (Semarang, 1923), pp. 14-15, emphasis in the text. See also Semaun, in Soeara Ra’jat, Jan. 1923, in IPO, no. 5, 1923, pp. 212-213. 97. See the resume of Semaun’s speech to the congress in Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27/29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 22. 98. This program consisted of five basic demands on the government: 92.

Freedom of political action, assembly, speech, exile, and political arrest. 1.

2.

etc.;

an end

to

banishment,

Increased government aid for the unemployed; an increase in public works;

equal pay for

all races.

Adequate government support for health and education. 4. Government encouragement of new industries; reduced military expenditures; increased taxation of large industries and decreased taxation of the common people. 5. Fulfillment of the promises for increased independence for the Indies made by the government in November 1918. 3.

“1923— Indonesia— 1924,” Indonesia Merdeka, Apr. 1924,

p. 29;

Semaoen, Sikapnja,

pp. 11-14. 99. It is interesting to note in this connection that, as far as

411

we can

see from

Notes pp. 144-146 ,

Communists did not attack Tjokroaminoto directly before the congress. The one heated debate in which Semarang

the press digest accounts, the

months just engaged was with Salim’s Neratja, not with Tjokroaminoto’s Oetoesan Hindia. The only article at all directly critical of Tjokroaminoto himself was one that declared his inconsistencies a hindrance to the orderly development of the Indonesian movement but also described the SI leader as a Communist and an internationalist at heart. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 349. 100. The date of the meeting was also an issue: Semarang wanted it held as soon as possible, and Tjokroaminoto wanted it delayed until he had completed his campaign. Semarang offered to pay the costs of the congress if it were held in that city. For the arguments, see Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 28, 1922, Soeara Ra’jat, Nov. 1, 1922, and Sinar Hindia, Nov. 9 and 21, Dec. 12, 14, and 20, 1922, in IPO, nos. 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 1922, pp. 218, 299, 399, 420-421, 503, 545-546; Neratja, Dec. 30, 1922, and Jan. 6, 12, and 13, 1923, and Sinar Hindia, Jan. 3, 6, and 10, 1923, in IPO, nos. 1-3, 1923, pp. 22-24, 65, 107-110. 101. Sutopo, article in Boedi Oetomo, Feb. 24 and 26, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418. The following account of the congress is drawn chiefly from E. Gobee, Kort versing van het verlxandelde op het congres der “Centraal Sarikat-Islam” te Madioen van 16-20 Februari 1923 (Short Report on the Transactions of the Congress of the “Central Sarekat Islam” at Madiun on Feb. 16-20, 1923) (typescript, by the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs). See further De Indische Gids, XLV (1923). 529-533; SI V, pp. 380, cols, a-b; Overzicht 1923, pp. 4-5; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 4-5; A. A. Guber, “Natsional’no-osvoboditernoe dvizhenie v Indonezii” (The National Liberation Movement in Indonesia), Revoliutsionnyi in the

Vostok, no.

1,

1933, pp. 190-191;

HOS,

p. 111.

been claimed that it was because Semaun realized the Communist cause would not stand a chance that he did not attend the congress; Overzicht 1923, p. 5, and Mededeelingen 1924, p. 5. This may well be true, but the Communists claimed that Semaun was absent because he had to attend a meeting of the government’s Salary Commission in Batavia at the time of the SI congress; and since this meeting was one in which the fates of Semaun, the PVH, and the VSTP were heavily involved, this was at least a substantial excuse. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 352. 103. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 296. 104. Overzicht 1923, p. 5. The vote was 33 for the unlimited application of party discipline and 3 against. The Communists complained bitterly that representatives of their viewpoint were not given enough time to speak, that they were shouted down, and that the meeting’s chairman patently sided with the opposition. Matahari, Feb. 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 417; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 21, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, pp. 419-421; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 27-Mar. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, pp. 482-483. 105. De Indische Gids, XLV (1923), 530-532; SI V, p. 380, cols, a and b. The details of the transformation were worked out in a closed meeting of the CSI, held on Feb. 20, 1923; Oetoesan Hindia, Feb. 28 and Mar. 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, pp. 471-472. 106. Oetoesan Hindia, Feb. 28 and Mar. 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, p. 472; Neratja, Feb. 26 and 28, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418. 107. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 22 and Apr. 14, 1923, in IPO, nos. 9 and 16, 1923, 102. It has

pp. 421, 118-120. 108. For examples of these tirades, no. 9, 1923, p. 417; Neratja, Feb.

26

to

see

Mar.

412

Matahari, 1,

Feb.

22,

1923,

in

IPO

,

1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 418;

Notes pp. 146-147 ,

1923, p. 419; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 27Mar. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, pp. 482-483; Oetoesan Hindia, Mar. 3 and 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 577-578; Sinar Hindia, Mar. 15 and 17, 18 21, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 588-591; Sinar Hindia, Mar. 20-24, 27, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 667-670; Islam Bergerak, Mar. 10 and 20, 1923, in Sinar Hindia, Feb. 21, 1923, in IPO, no.

9,

IPO, no. 13, 1923, pp. 683, 685; Sinar Hindia, Apr. 3-9, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 72-74; Islam Bergerak, Apr. 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 85-86; Rasa Doenia, Mar. 1-22, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, p. 95; Sinar Hindia, Apr. 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, pp. 118-120; Alatahari, Apr. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 129-130. 109. For examples, see Darmo Kondo, Mar. 3, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, p. 467; Doenia Baroe, Mar. 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 11, 1923, pp. 548—549 (article by Surjopranoto ) Doenia Baroe, Mar. 14 and 21, 1923, in IPO, no. 13, 1923, pp. 674-675, 677; Boedi Oetomo, Mar. 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 50-51; Panggoegah, Apr. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 88-89 (article by Suwardi Surjaningrat ) Panggoegah, Apr. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 89-91 (article by Sumarsono Sastrosumarto ) Kemadjoean Hindia, Apr. 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, p. 115; Panggoegah, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. ISO131 (article by Suwardi Surjaningrat); Darmo Kondo, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 148-149. The only Indonesian-language periodical reported in the press survey as wishing a plague on both houses was Kaoem Moeda, the organ of the PEB (Politiek Economische Bond). 110. For reports on VSTP income and comments on the reasons for its increase, see Si Tetap, Aug. 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, pp. 507-508; Sept. 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 45, 1922, p. 272; Oct. 31 and Nov. 30, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, p. 43; Dec. 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 387; January and February, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 635. The number of new branches and correspondencies increased sharply over the preceding year. This growth was heavily influenced by the feeling that the union would ward off the threatened wage reduction; this is shown by the collapse of the units formed that year, following ;

;

;

the failure of the

VSTP

strike:

New

Same

units

formed 32 21 35

1920 1921 1922 Poesaka VSTP,

inactive

p. 19.

According to

units

by June 1923 1

4 34

VSTP membership passed 10,000 strike in May it was about 13,000.

this source,

1923 (p. 19); at the time of the 111. Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 2-3; and see Overzicht 1923, pp. 2-3. 112. Si Tetap, Nov. 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, pp. 43-44. 113. Si Tetap, Aug. 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, pp. 507-508; Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 16, 1922, in IPO, no. 43, 1922, p. 190; Oetoesan Hindia, Oct. 23, 1922, in IPO, no. 44, 1922, p. 217; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 16, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, in January’

pp. 19-21. 114. Kaoem

IPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 166-167; Pantjaran Berita, Sept. 19-21, 1922, in IPO, no. 42, 1922, p. 133; Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 4 and 12, in IPO, nos. 50 and 51, 1922, pp. 488-489, 535; Boedi Oetomo, Feb. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 394; Doenia Baroe, Mar. 3, 1923, in IPO, no. 11, 1923, pp. 553-554.

Moeda, Oct. 6-14, 1922,

413

in

Notes, pp. 147-149 The congress was held in Semarang on Feb. 3 and 4, 1923; according to meeting’s report, it was attended, in addition to the general public, by

115.

the

100 representatives from 79 branches of the union, representing a total of 9,007 votes out of a total VSTP membership of approximately 11,000. In addition to the regular VSTP speakers, the meeting was addressed by the Semarang Sarekat Hindia chairman, Robbers, and by Langkemper, the secretary of the Netherlands

(NTAS), a Dutch labor grouping of CommunistA new executive was elected, with Semaun again as

Transport Workers’ Syndicate syndicalist

inclinations.

chairman; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, pp. 289-296. 116. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, pp. 293-294, gives the arguments of some of the delegates. According to Soeara Ra’jat, Feb. 16, 1923, in IPO, no. 10, 1923, p. 508, only three locals represented at the congress op-

posed a

strike.

117. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 5 to 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, pp. 293-294, 295; see also Si Tetap, Dec. 31, 1922, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 387. The latter reference

by Semaun reviewing the VSTP congress (the December 1922 number of Si Tetap was published after that meeting); and Si Tetap, January-February, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 636-637 (article by Semaun). That the decision to delay was the result of Semaun’s efforts in the face of opposition by the branches is maintained in the government reports Mededeelingen 1924, p. 3, afid Overzicht 1923, p. 3; and in “Communisme,” p. 533, col. a.

is

an

article

1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, pp. 379-380; Boedi Oetomo, Feb. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 9, 1923, p. 394. 119. As a result of the labor unrest of 1919-1920, the government had formed 118. Soeara Ra’jat,

a

Feb.

1,

commission to determine whether

ment councils had been one

it

should institute govemment-labor-manage-

to settle disputes in public services

and

vital enterprises;

Semaun

Indonesians consulted by the commission. He, as well as the non-Communist leaders, had opposed the councils, arguing that of the principal

they feared the government and

On

the union representatives.

management members would tend

to ally against

the other hand, neutral “arbitration courts” were

long-standing objectives of both the

PPPB and

the

VSTP and

figured prominently

demands. Indies courts of law were considerably more neutral in judging claimed infractions of political restrictions than were administrative officials, and this may explain the preference of both Communist and non-Communist labor organizations for a system of courts in which the unions would have no representation to one of councils in which they would have a voice. For comments on the labor commission and its negative results, see De Indische Gids, XLIV (1922), 259-260, 388-392. 120. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 27-29, 1922, in IPO, no. 1, 1923, pp. 20-22, with as strike

the text of the resolution. 121. See Koch,

and

J.

V erantwoording,

pp. 164-166; Brouwer,

Hulshoff Pol, “Het Indische bezoldigingsvraagstuk”

De

De

houding,

p.

120;

(The Indies Salary

XLV

(1923), 577-584, for discussions of the salary question. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 205-207, discusses the division of legal status along ethnic lines; the 1919 measure, this account points out, was taken with an associationist eye to facilitating the absorption of the population into European status, but the conservative attitudes prevailing after 1920 reversed Question),

its

Indische

Gids,

function. 122.

Kemadjoean Hindia, Mar.

Sinar Hindia, 123.

May

5,

1923,

“Communisme,”

in

24,

IPO, no.

1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 112-113; 19, 1923, pp. 253-254.

p. 533, col. a.

414

Notes, p. 150 124.

The

discussions on April 9 were with the railroad companies’ representa-

Semarang; those on April 12 were with the state railway officials, in Batavia. The VSTP asked for an eight-hour working day, postponement of the cost-of-living bonus removal until workers’ salaries had been raised to compensate, compulsory arbitration of labor disputes by an independent government body, and an end of dismissals without cause; leaflet comprising a VSTP manifesto, written by Semaun, dated Apr. 23, 1923. The text of the manifesto is also given in Sinar Hindia, May 5, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 254-255. 125. Sinar Hindia, Apr. 18, 1923, in IPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 163; “Communisme,” p. 533, col. b; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 7-8; VSTP manifesto dated Semarang, Apr. 23, 1923. To the last-named leaflet was attached an announcement from the VSTP executive, which relayed the warning and assured that Semaun was willing to sacrifice his freedom for the workers. Sinar Hindia, Apr. 21, 1923, ventured more hopefully that the warning was probably intended as a joke; IPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 164. 126. Sinar Hindia, May 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 256-260; Medetives,

in

deelingen 1924, p. 8; “Communisme,” p. 533, col. b. Semaun uttered this challenge first at a VSTP meeting on April 30 and then before a mass VSTP-sponsored gathering in Semarang on the

May

May

6 meeting: according to

The Sinar Hindia article it, Semaun and other VSTP

6.

above reports leaders emphasized, cited

was being forced on them; both speakers and audience were extremely agitated, and the speeches were interrupted by cries of “Strike, strike!” The Minister of Colonies’ report on the strike to parliament gives a detailed account of the manner in which it spread from Semarang; see “Begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor 1924” (Budget of the Netherlands Indies for 1924), Bijlage B of Bijlagen van liet verslag der handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der as usual, that the strike

Staten-Generaal, 1923-1924, pp. 195-196; hereafter Begrooting 1924. 127. Boedi Oetomo, May 16, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 338. 128. It

is

clear that the

VSTP had

not reckoned on such a prompt response

Semaun’s challenge; in fact, it seems likely that it had not counted at all on Semaun’s arrest before the strike began. The VSTP manifesto of April 23 said that in case of a walkout Semaun was appointed “strike dictator” and would coordinate all strike actions. According to Sinar Hindia, May 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 20, 1923, p. 803, Semaun was just about to form the strike organization when he was arrested. In his speech to the May 6 VSTP gathering Semaun announced a mass demonstration for June 5, before new discussions of the railroad workers’ demands; Sinar Hindia, May 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, p. 258. It may be that the strike was to begin after the predictable failure of these talks. 129. The actual total of railroad workers who joined the strike is not known, since the available accounts disagree: Blumberger, Communist, p. 33, gives the number as 2,500, and the Netherlands Indies wire service estimated it at 8,000; Aneta, cited in Sinar Hindia, May 31, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, p. 433. A contemporary Profintem report stated that 3,000 workers began the strike and that 8,000 eventually joined; L. Heller, “Zur Gewerkschaftsbewegung im Osten” (On the Labor Union Movement in the East), RGI, August, 1923, p. 736. Sneevliet said 12,000 workers were involved; Oekonomlsche, p. 17. De Tribune, July 31, 1925, gives the number as 13,000 out of a total of 20,000 rail and tram employees on Java, and Aidit agrees; Sedjarah, p. 54. A Profintem account, Mezlidunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924 gg. (International Trade Union Movement 1923-1924) (Moscow, 1924), pp. 290-291, gives 12,000; and the Profintem encyclopedia, Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu (Small Ento

415

,

,

Notes, pp. 150-153 cyclopedia of the International Labor Union

Movement) (Moscow, 1927),

col.

560, gives 13,000. The available Netherlands Indies government reports do not give any estimates. The railroad workers in Sumatra did not join in the strike; Tjaja Sumatra May 14, 1923, in IPO no. 22, 1923, p. 387. According to another account, only the Javanese workers struck, and the employees of Madurese

and Sundanese origin remained at their jobs; Darmo Kondo, July 21 and 28, 1923, in IPO, no. 31, 1923, pp. 197-198. Another report said that few employees of the NIS line, where Conditions had been relatively good, had joined in the walkout; Kemadjoean Hindia, June 2, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 418-419. 130. Koch,

Verantwoording,

p.

V erantwoording,

p.

135.

Koch was, however, sent to jail for several days for having written that the government had used Semaun’s challenge to provoke the strike before the harvest season; he gives an amusing account 131. Koch,

136.

of his experience in his autobiography,

Verantwoording,

pp. 139-143. According Java (Batavia) edition of the Indische

Koch, Belonje, the editor of the West Courant, also sympathized with the strikers; Lievegoed, of De Locomotief, disapproved of the strike but asserted that wages were too low and the workers to

had

serious reason for discontent;

p.

136.

The

rest

of the Indies

Dutch

press

shared the government view of the action. S.D.A.P., pp. 76-78; and see Koch, Verantwoording, pp. 136, 139. Subsequently the SDAP presented its own motion asking only for 132.

Van der

Zee,

De

withdrawal of Article 161 bis, but this was also rejected. 133. De Locomotief, quoted in De Indische Gids, XLV, 1923, 786; see also pp. 827 (comments from the Sumatra Post ) and 892-893 (comments from the Algemeen Handelsblad) The journal of Indies police commissioners, on the other hand, found the strike law and the new restrictions on the right of assembly confusing and vague; pp. 893—894, comments from the Nederlandsch-Indische .

Politiegids.

more prominent of those arrested are given in Sinar Hindia, May 12, 14, 16, 19, 22-28, and 31, 1923, in IPO, nos. 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1923, pp. 300, 305, 349, 380, and 433. According to Sneevliet, 120 leaders were arrested, of which 110 were Communists; 50 of these were kept in prison after the strike had ended; Oekonomische, p. 17. The Dutch Communist newspaper claimed that 140 strikers were arrested and that those sentenced received terms of three months to three years; De Tribune, July 31, 1925. 135. Sinar Hindia, May 12, 19, 22, 24, and 26, 1923, in IPO, nos. 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1923, pp. 303, 351-352, 383, 428, and 429-430. 136. See Mededeelingen 1924, p. 8. Collection of funds to support the strikers’ families was, after some confusion, prohibited by the Resident of Semarang 134. Lists of the

under the regulation forbidding aid to illegal strikes. 137. See Sinar Hindia, May 22 and 23, 1923, in IPO, no. 22, 1923, pp. 381-382. In these first reports of strikers returning to work, the newspaper strongly disapproved their action. 138.

VSTP

issued June 4, 1926. According to Sugono, the state railways (SS) and the NIS took back no strikers, and the four other affected companies ( SJS, SCS, SDS, and OJS) took them back as new workers, with reduced leaflet

wages; Si Tetap, Jan. 31, 1924, in IPO, no. 8, 1924, p. 440. 139. Sinar Hindia, May 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 19, 1923, pp. 258-259; leaflet issued by strike headquarters on May 10, 1923; leaflet issued during the strike by the "Committee of White-Collar Employees” to the “white-collar workers in all offices in Semarang.”

416

Notes pp. 153-154 ,

May

IPO, no. 21, 1923, p. 351, quoting a manifesto issued by the VSTP; Sinar Hindia, May 22 and 26, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 425-428, 431; Soeara Ra’jat, June 1-16, 1923, in IPO, no. 27, 1923, pp. 36-37; leaflets issued by the VSTP headquarters at the time of the strike. 141. See Neratja, May 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 20, 1923, p. 291 (announcement that the CSI had committed itself to support the strike); Kemadjoean Hindia. May 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 20, 1923, p. 287 (PVH manifesto in support of the strike); Boedi Oetomo, May 12 and 16, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, pp. 338-339; Neratja, May 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 21, 1923, pp. 347-348; Oetoesan Alelajoe, May 24, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, p. 536; Perohahan, June 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923; Doenia Baroe, June 6/13, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, p. 554; Kemadjoean Hindia, June 21 and 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 26, 1923, pp. 574-575; Oetoesan Melajoe, June 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 26, 1923, p. 585; Sri Djojohojo, May 15 and 23, 1923, in IPO, no. 22, 1923, pp. 392-393; Boedi Oetomo, May 28 and 31, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 403-404, 408; Darmo Kondo, May 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, p. 411; Kemadjoean Hindia, May 31, June 1 and 2, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, pp. 416-419; Panggoegah, May 23, 1923, in IPO, no. 23, 1923, p. 442; Panggoegah, May 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 491492, 492-493; Sri Djojohojo, May 26, 1923, in IPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 502-503; Boedi Oetomo, June 12 and 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, pp. 514-516; Darmo Kondo, June 9, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, pp. 519-520; Kemadjoean Hindia, June 14, 1923, in IPO, no. 25, 1923, pp. 523-524. Of these, all except Suwardi Surjaningrat’s neutral comment in Panggoegah of May 23 and the Boedi Oetomo articles expressed general sympathy with the strike, although some were critical of Semaun’s handling of it. The comment in Boedi Oetomo ranged from sympa140. See Sinar Hindia,

thetic

to

mildly

critical,

19, 1923, in

reflecting

the

dissension

within

that

party,

whose

younger generation was much disturbed by the conservative leaders’ refusal to support the strike. The result of this dispute was reduced party activity during 1923; “Boedi Oetomo,” p. 940, col. b. 142. Sinar Hindia, May 29, 1923, in IPO, no. 24, 1923, p. 472. 143. Correspondence between the Bandung and Tapanuli locals of the VSTP and union headquarters, July 1923; Matahari, Sept. 6, 1923, in IPO, no. 37, 1923, p. 496; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 1, 1924, p. 19; Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 444-445; Zakaznikova, “Rabochee dvizhenie,” p. 166. According to this last account, the membership of the railroad workers’ union sank to 500 after the strike. The prohibition of assembly for the VSTP was maintained until Oct. 1, 1923, and only after that did the union begin to revive. 144. Soeara Rajat, July 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 30, pp. 169-170. 145. Sinar Hindia, Oct. 8, 1923, in IPO, no. 42, 1923, p. 99. The restrictions on the right of assembly were lifted in September 1923 except in Madiun, where the large number of unemployed former strikers made it inadvisable, the govern-

ment thought,

to allow free expression of public opinion;

Mededeelingen 1924,

p. 8.

du mouvement syndicaliste Indonesienne” (History of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement) Revue Indonesienne (Paris) I (n.d.), no. 2, 146. “Histoire

p. 2; Suroso,

“De Indonesische vakbeweging,”

PVH

p. 213. In the

last-named

article,

the

chairman stated that the federation had not been consulted by the VSTP on the strike plans. The present PKI chairman maintains in his history of the Indonesian labor movement, however, that at a PVH meeting of Apr. 29/30, 1923, in Surabaja, it was decided that an industrywide rail strike would be held if anv labor leaders were arrested; Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 55.

417

;

Notes pp. 154-156 ,

1923, in IPO, no. 34, 1923, p. 355. Before his was presented by the government with 102 questions about

147. Sinar Hindia, Aug. 21,

extemment Semaun

which he replied with a general essay of defense. Since there was no question about his fate, one might have expected an all-out attack on the authorities. Instead, he said that even after his return from Moscow he had believed the government should help destroy capitalism and introduce Communism in the Indies. It should have worked in this direction by developing the country’s natural resources and industry and raising the living standard through a broad program of developmental projects financed by heavier taxes and forced loans from big business and by borrowing from America; De Indische Gids, XLV, 895-897. Given Semaun’s previous heretical inclinations, it is possible that he had in fact entertained these theories. However, he said, his arrest had disillusioned him, and he proved it when he arrived in Holland by writing a pamphlet explaining that he now believed the colonial relationship could only end in violence; Semaun, Hoe het Hollandsche imperialisme lwt hruine millioenen-volk aanzet tot een massamord op Europeanen in Indonesia (How Dutch Imperialism Encourages the Brown Millions to a Mass Murder of Europeans in his political activity, to

Indonesia)

(n.p.,

1923?).

CHAPTER

PKI branches were Wirosari, Rantjaekek, Bandung, Surakarta, Sukabumi, Semarang, Randublatung, Bogor, Sumedang, Jogjakarta, Salatiga, Tjirebon, Madiun, Surabaja, and Tjitjalenka; the Red SI delegates were from 1.

The

VIII

fifteen

Semarang, Wirosari, Bandung, Tasikmalaja, Jogjakarta, Purwokerto, Salatiga, Madiun, Sukabumi, Kaliwungu, Kendal, and Ungaran. In addition, there were representatives from thirteen labor unions and from the Sarekat Hindia, Budi Utomo, Pasundan, a League against Unemployment (Bond tegen Werkeloosheid), and a local political action group (Plastselijk Comite voor Politieke Actie); Sinar Hindia, Mar. 7-12, 1923, in IPO, no. 11, 1923, p. 545. A slightly different number of attending units is given in the government report Uittreksel uit een rapport van den wedana Landjoemin gelar Datoe’ Toemanggoeng ter beschikking van den Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Z aken over het P.K.I. congres gehouden op 4 Maart te Bandoeng 6 Maart 1923 te Soekaboemi (Excerpt from a Report by the Wedana Landjumin gelar Datuk Tumanggung, for the Use of the Acting Advisor for Native Affairs, Concerning the PKI Congress Held on Mar. 4 in Bandung and Mar. 6, 1923, in Sukabumi), hereafter referred to as Uittreksel according to it, sixteen PKI and fourteen Red SI branches were represented p. 1 ) A report to the Governor General on the congress by Acting Adviser for ( Native Affairs E. Gobee (untitled typescript, dated Mar. 13, 1923, no. E. 61, classified), hereafter cited as Report, states that there were delegates from sixteen PKI locals and thirteen (out of a total of twenty-one) Red SI branches .

(p. 3). Possibly these discrepancies reflect different attendance at the

and Sukabumi

sessions.

3.

Sinar Hindia, Mar. 7-13, p. 543; Uittreksel, p. Sinar Hindia, Mar. 7-13, p. 543.

4.

Uittreksel, pp. 10-11, 12.

5.

Uittreksel, pp. 4-12;

2.

Bandung

1.

and see Sinar Hindia, Mar. 7-13, 1923, pp. 544-545;

SI V, pp. 380, col. b-381, col. a; Overzicht 1923, p. 6. 6. See Sinar Hindia, Mar. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 591-594 (texts of the motions passed at the Bandung and Sukabumi sessions); also Uittreksel, pp. 13, 23; Gobee, Report, p.

4.

418

Notes pp. 156-160 ,

7.

1923, p. 594. Emphasis in the text. According to the congress also resolved at its Sukabumi session to sup-

Sinar Hindia, Mar.

Gobee

(

Report, p. 4

)

,

15,

name

port the replacement of the

of the regent

by

that of the Chalif at the

Friday services (presumably on the grounds that the naming of the regent involved mingling church and state). This embroiled the party in an extremely sensitive religious issue, for the use of the regent’s

which those do not seem

name was

a local tradition

had a very lively interest in preserving. The Communists to have pushed this issue subsequently, but the Muslim modernists did, for they also opposed the naming of the regent as an impurity of Islamic practice in Java. It became, in fact, a favorite project of Hadji Agus Salim, and, as we shall see, it was to lead to violence in West Java in which both the SI and PKI were victims. 8. Sinar Hindia, Mar. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, pp. 594-595 (text of the officials

resolution on formation of the SR).

Sinar Hindia, Mar. 15, 1923, pp. 594-595. For comments on the resolution, see S. Dingley, [Iwa Kusumasumantri?], The Peasants’ Movement in Indonesia 9.

1926?), pp. 38-40; Overzicht 1923, pp. 6-7; A. Guber, “Natsional’noosvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii” ( The National Liberation Movement in (Berlin,

Indonesia), Revoliutsionni/i Vostok (no. 1/2, 1933), p. 191; P. Bergmeijer, Het Comrrmnisme in Indie (Communism in the Indies) (n.p., 1927), p. 3; “Com-

munisme,” 10.

p.

534,

col. a.

“Discussion on the Eastern and Colonial Questions,” Inprecorr, Dec. 7,

1922, p. 895; Fourth Congress of the Communist International (London, n.d.), pp. 222-224; Bericht iiber den vierten Kongress der Kommunistischen Interna-

on the Fourth Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg, 1923), pp. 141-142; hereafter Bericht IV Kongress. 11. Bericht IV Kongress, p. 213; Resolutions and Theses of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (London, n.d.), p. 59, from the theses on the Eastern question. 12. For Liu’s remarks, see Protokoll des vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Protocol of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg, 1923), p. 615, hereafter Protokoll IV Kongress, and Eudin and North, tionale (Report

Soviet Russia, p. 151. 13. See Resolutions

and Theses, pp. 55-56, 59; Bericht IV Kongress, p. 213. At the other extreme the congress agrarian program for the East provided (with an eye to Kemal Pasha’s government, which Russia was then eagerly courting) that in cases where feudal landowners were also engaged in the anti-imperialist struggle, the Communists should not push agrarian revolution; Protokoll IV Kongress, p. 14.

833.

Bericht

IV Kongress,

p.

135.

The

Japan, Egypt, England, Turkey, Angora India, Persia, Tunisia, and Mexico. 15.

Bericht

16.

Roy

IV Kongress,

stressed

p.

protest [sic],

was signed by delegates from

Poland, Belgium, Java, Australia,

138.

that alliance with

the bourgeois nationalists could only be

temporary and that therefore it was necessary to develop a strong and independent revolutionary core. Referring to the united anti-imperialist front, he denied the ability of the bourgeois nationalists to form or lead such an alliance and said these tasks must be carried out by Communists; “Report on the Eastern and Colonial Questions,” pp. 988-990. 17. Tan Malaka, DP I, pp. 93-94; Tan Malaka, Revolusi, dan Repuhlik Indonesia (Tan Malaka, the Revolution and the Indonesian Republic) in Peringatan, p. 50; Peringatan, p. 30. His departure from the Netherlands was unannounced,

419

Notes pp. 160-162 ,

and the pro-Communist Matahari in the Indies published anxious speculations as to his fate (Aug. 10 and 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 34, 1922, p. 277), until it was assured by the better-informed Sinar Hindia that Malaka had merely gone to “another country” in order to “broaden his vision” (Aug. 21-30, 1922, in IPO, no. 36, 1922, p. 347).

1922, pp. 1497—1498. The ECCI session of Nov. 2 determined the voting strength of the delegations at the fourth congress, divid18. Inprekorr,

Nov.

8,

them 45, 30, This system heavily favored Russia and the West European ing the countries into five ranks and allotting

20, 10, or 5 votes. parties; of the

Far

Eastern countries represented, Japan received 30 votes, India and China 10 each,

and Java

5.

Malaka, DP I, pp. 99-101. Emphasis in the text. 20. Malaka, “De Islam en het Bolsjewisme” (Islam and Bolshevism), De Tribune, Sept. 21, 1922; emphasis in the text. 21. “Discussion on the Report of the Executive,” Inprecorr, Dec. 5, 1922, pp. 875-876. See also Protokoll IV Kongress, pp. 186-189. 19.

IV Kongress, pp. 131-132; Protokoll IV Kongress, p. 590, 607; “Report on the Eastern and Colonial Questions,” pp. 979-988. 23. In 1926 the first World Islam Congress was held in Mecca; the Soviet Union sent six delegates. During the congress they voted consistently in favor of the Saudists, made anti-European propaganda, and contacted numerous Muslim delegates including Tjokroaminoto and Hadji Mansur; the latter represented the Al-Islam Congress, which had been made a permanent organization 22. Bericht

promote Pan-Islamism

According to Indies government 1927) reports, the Soviet delegates told them that, although they had hitherto concentrated on contacting the Muslims in India, they now thought it time to establish links with Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. They stated that they hoped to meet with important Muslim figures from these areas during the had’j; Politieke nota over de Partij Kommunist Indonesia (Political Note on the Indonesian Communist Party) (Netherlands Indies government, classified, pp. 16-17, hereafter Politieke nota PKI; Neutraliseering, p. 16. Returning from the Mecca congress, Tjokroaminoto transformed the Al-Islam Congress into the Mu’tamar al-Alam al-Islami far’al Hind Asj-Sjarqijjah ( MAIHS, World Islam East Indies Branch); in 1927 Hadji Agus Salim went to Mecca as Congress, 1928) MAIHS representative. At this meeting it became clear that the World Islam Congress was not to become a permanent body; Soviet and Indian delegates joined Salim in establishing the Dam’ijat Ansarul Haramain ( Union of Supporters of the Two Holy Cities), and the MAIHS became its Indonesian branch; Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand (1924-15 April 1928) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation [1924-April 15, 1928]), in Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeen belong ( Weltevreden, col. 22. For a Soviet discussion of the political aspects of the Chalifate question and the 1926 Mecca congress, see N. A. Smirnov, Islam i sovremennyi Vostok (Islam and the Contemporary East) (Moscow, 1928), pp. 96-108. 24. Malaka, DP I, p. 101; see also Protokoll IV Kongress, p. 88; Boersner, Bolsheviks, p. 125. Tan Malaka was interrupted by the chairman of the meeting, who announced that his time was up; unabashed, the Indonesian delegate replied with a few pointed remarks about Western Communists who thought they could decide the situation in Asia without knowing anything about it. 25. Resolutions and Theses, pp. 54-55. 26. See, for example, Matahari, Apr. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 126-127. to

in

Indonesia in

,

,

420

1924.

Notes pp. 163-165 ,

na IV. Kongresse Komintema” the Fourth Comintern Congress), Novyi

27. G. Safarov, “Natsional’no-kolonial’nyi vopros

(The National-Colonial Question

at

Vostok, 1922, p. 74. 28. See Kan [sic] Malaka and

Van Reesem, “Die Gewerkschaftsbevvegung in ) Indo-China ( Hollandisch-Ostindien ” (The Trade Union Movement in Indochina [sic] [the Dutch East Indies]), RGI, October 1922, pp. 660-661; Hammar, “Revolutionary Movement in Dutch East India,” lnprecorr, Dec. 7, 1922, p. 890; P. Bergsma, “A Great Political Strike in Java,” lnprecorr, June 21, 1923, p. 436; G. Vanter, “Dutch Imperialism in the East Indies,” lnprecorr, Jan. 6, 1922, p. 11. Similarly, Tan Malaka, in the 1922 Dutch election campaign, and Sneevliet,

when he

China sojourn, made speeches in which they noted favorably the restoration of the SI-PKI alliance; De Tribune, June 20 and 21, 1922. The only notable exceptions were two articles sharply critical of the SI leaders: Praniero, “The Communist International in the Dutch Indies,” lnprecorr, Aug. 12, 1922, pp. 541-542; and Soedjammo, “The Labour Movement in the East Indies,” lnprecorr, Nov. 22, 1921, p. 81. These reports were apparently written by Indonesians, though “Praniero” and “Soedjammo” are not recognizably the names of PKI leaders. We might suspect Darsono, who was working for the Comintern in Europe at the time, who did not usually publish his writings for the International under his own name, and who had an admittedly low opinion of the SI leaders. 29. Vtoroi kongress Krasnogo Internatsionala profsoiuzov v Moskve 19 noiabria2 dekabria 1922 goda (Second Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow, Nov. 19-Dec. 2, 1922) ( Moscow/Petrograd, 1923), p. 263; Malaka was referring to a report by Leo Heller given on p. 260. 30. Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale 15. Dezember 1922-15. Mai 1923 (Report of the Executive of the Communist International, Dec. 15-May 15, 1923) (Moscow, 1923), p. 47. Tan Malaka referred to the Sarekat Islam as a “giant, revolutionary people’s party, counting one and one-half million members.” “Our Communist party,” he continued, “numbers about 13,000 members.” The reason for the Sarekat Islam’s size and radical nature, Malaka explained, was that Indonesia had little in the way of a native bourgeoisie, and industrialization and plantation agriculture had created a large proletariat, indebted peasantry, and landless laboring group; “these relationships thus approach the line of a class struggle against the factory and foreign plantation owners.” 31. Ezhegodnik Kominterna (Comintern Yearbook) (Petrograd/Moscow, 1923), returned to Holland from his

first

p. 773.

32. 33.

Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg., p. 286. P. Bergsma and T. Malaka, “Communism in Java,” lnprecorr, Aug.

16,

1923, p. 607.

Bergsma, “Progress of the Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia,” lnprecorr, Dec. 31, 1925, p. 1366. 35. Bergsma and Malaka, “Communism in Java,” p. 607. Emphasis in the text. 36. Tan Malaka, DP I, p. 94. 37. Sinar Hindia, Feb. 19, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 354 (article by Darsono); Darsono, interview, 1959. 38. Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, Aug. 15, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 34. P.

Sept. 22, 1925. 39. See Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 99-100. 40. Semaun and Darsono, interviews, 1959; Blumberger,

Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp. 38-39.

421

Nationalist, p.

113;

Notes pp. 165-167 ,

Darsono landed on Feb. 15; the congress agenda was published in Sinar Hindia on Feb. 12. 42. See Sinar Hindia, Mar. 27 to Apr. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 14, 1922, pp. 18-21 (essay by Darsono, who was then in Europe); Sinar Hindia, Feb. 19, 1923, in IPO, no. 8, 1923, p. 354 (message by Darsono on his return to the Indies); Sinar Hindia, Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, nos. 45 and 46, 1923, pp. 265267, 302—304 (speech by Darsono to the Semarang PKI, Oct. 28, 1923); Sinar Hindia, Dec. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 52, 1923, pp. 615-618 (speeches by Darsono and Abdulrachman [the PKI secretary] to a mass meeting sponsored by the Semarang PKI on Dec. 16, 1923); Sinar Hindia, Oct. 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 45, 1923, p. 267, and Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 46, 1923, p. 304 (speeches by Darsono and Abdulrachman to a meeting of the Semarang PKI on Oct. 28, 1923). 41.

43. Darsono, interview, 1959.

4 and 13, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 525; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 17, 1923, in IPO, no. 52, 1923, pp. 614-619; Kemadjoean Hindia, Dec. 31, 1923, in IPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 43-45; Sinar Hindia, Jan. 2 and 3, 1924, in IPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 54-55; Sinar Hindia, Feb. 28, 1924, in IPO, no. 10, 1924, p. 414; Verslag van het Ode Kommunisten kongres (P.K.I.), gehouden te Batavia op 7, 8, 9 en 10 Juni 1924 (Report of the Ninth Communist Congress [PKI], held at Batavia on June 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1924), typescript, signed by R. Kern, Acting Adviser for Native Affairs, p. 22, hereafter Verslag 9de; see Alededeelingen 44. Sinar Hindia, Dec.

1924, p. 11; Overzicht 1923, p. 11. 45. See Sinar Hindia, Oct. 30, 1923, in IPO, no. 45, 1923,

267; Sinar Hindia, Nov. 1 and 5, 1923, in IPO, no. 46, 1923, p. 302, 309-310; Sinar Hindia, Dec. 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 1, 1924, p. 20; Kemadjoean Hindia, Dec. 31, 1923, in IPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 43-45; Siruir Hindia, Jan. 2 and 3, 1924, in IPO, no. 2, 1924, pp. 54-55; Sinar Hindia, Jan. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1924, p. Ill; Doenia p.

Mardeka, Jan. 15, 1924, in IPO, no. 4, 1924, pp. 162-163; Matahari, January 1924, in IPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 203; Sendjata Rajat, January 1924, in IPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 258; Socara Ra’jat, January 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, p. 298. 46. Soeara Ra’jat, Jan. 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, pp. 296-297. See Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 12-13, 25; Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 116; “1923— Indonesia —1924,” pp. 29-32; Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand ( Fehruari 1926-Maart 1927) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation [February 1926March 1927]) ( Netherlands Indies government, classified, typescript), pp. 23—24, hereafter Overzicht 1927. 47. See Blumberger,

Nationalist,

pp. 32,

115-116; “Boedi Oetomo,”

p.

941,

col. a.

For comments on the SFs decline, see Blumberger, Nationalist, pp. 75-83; “Sarelcat Islam,” pp. 945, cols, a-b, 948, col. b; Overzicht 1924, pp. 22—24; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 5; Kemadjoean Hindia, Dec. 5, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 513; Kemadjoean Hindia, May 19-24, 1924, in IPO, no. 22, 1924, pp. 369370; Kemadjoean Hindia, June 29-July 5, 1924, in IPO, no. 28, 1924, pp. 62-63. 49. See articles by Surjopranoto, Doenia Baroe, Mar. 7 and 21, 1923, in IPO, nos. 11 and 12, 1923, pp. 549, 679-681; by Suwardi Surjaningrat in Panggoegah, Apr. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 88—89; by Sumarsono Sastrosumarto in Panggoegah, Apr. 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 15, 1923, pp. 89—91; and by Suwardi Surjaningrat in Panggoegah, Apr. 11, 1923, in IPO, no. 16, 1923, pp. 130-131. 50. In a meeting held to reconcile differences in the Jogjakarta group, the 48.

executive

four in favor of the party discipline decision, four against, and (the chairman) neutral. The result was two separate Sis in that

split,

Surjopranoto

city; Neratja, April 21,

1923, in IPO, no. 17, 1923, p. 154.

422

.

Notes pp. 167-170 ,

51.

Kemadjoean

llindia,

Dec.

5,

1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 513;

Mede-

deelingen 1924, pp. 17-21. 52. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 83. 53. Sinar Hindia, June 26, July 4, Dec. 12, 1923, in IPO, nos. 28 and 51, 1923, pp. 68, 74-75, 571-573. 54. Sinar Hindia, Mar. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 12, 1923, p. 589. 55. He was considering the offer, he declared, and at the same time he hinted—

European sojourns enjoyed by some PKI leaders— that he also would be interested in going to Holland to help strengthen the bonds between the Dutch and Indonesian workers’ movements; Doenia Baroe (Surjopranoto’s newspaper), Mar. 7, 1923, in IPO, no. 11, 1923, p. 549. Nothing seems to have come of these projects, however. He soon returned to the SI fold and made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort to keep the pawnshop workers’ union from falling into Communist hands, for which he was rewarded at the 1924 Sarekat Islam congress by an appointment as CSI commissioner. Verslag van het lie kongres der Centrale Sarikat Islam, gehouden te Soerabaja op 8 t/m 10 Augustus 1924 (Report on the 11th Congress of the Central Sarekat Islam, Held at Surabaja, Aug. 8 to 10, 1924) (undated typescript, signed by the Adviser for Native Affairs, R. Kern), p. 7. He finally achieved his trip abroad as a CSI representative to the Cairo Chalifate conference of 1926; see F. von der Mehden, “Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia” (Berkeley, Cal., diss., 1957), thinking, perhaps, of the

Islam, p. 188. 56. Kemadjoean Hindia, Aug. 15, 1924, in IPO, no. 35, 1924, p. 428 letter

(open

by Sosrokardono )

1923, in IPO, no. 41, 1923, p. 55; Kemadjoean Hindia, Dec. 5, 1923, IPO, no. 50, 1923, pp. 513-514; Neratja, Dec. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 51, 1923, p. 570. 57. Sinar Hindia, Sept.

58.

Neutraliseering,

pp. 36-38;

HOS,

p.

16,

pp. 70-71; see also Tamar Djaja, Trio Komunis Indonesia, 105; Alimin, Riwajat Hidup (Autobiography) (Djakarta?,

10-14; Alimin, “Tjokroaminoto Pemimpin jang Revolusioner dan Anti-Imperialis” (Tjokroaminoto, a Revolutionary and Anti-Imperialist Leader), 1955), pp.

in

HOS,

7,

p. 32.

HVW,

June 10, 1918, p. 229; Sept. 30, 1918, p. 327. 60. Boedi Oetomo, Mar. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 11, 1924, p. 444; Sin Po, May 28, 1924, in IPO, no. 23, 1924, pp. 423-425. 61. Kemadjoean Hindia, Oct. 15, 1923, in IPO, no. 43, 1923, p. 143. A month later he and Musso resigned their editorship of the paper after a conference at Tjokroaminoto’s home; Kemadjoean Hindia, Nov. 26, 1923, in IPO, no. 48, 1923, p. 409, and lava Bode, Feb. 7, 1925. 59.

62. Neratja, Apr. 26,

1924, and Sinar Hindia,

May

12, 23,

and

24, 1924, in

IPO, nos. 18, 20, and 22, 1924, pp. 196, 277, 381, 383. 63. Oetoesan Hindia and Neratja, May 17, 1921, in IPO, no. 21, 1921, pp. 349351. For biographical information, see Dimyati, Sedjarah, pp. 16, 193; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 29, 1925; Soerabajasch liandelsblad, Oct. 17, 1925; Neutraliseering, pp. 70-71; Vergadering van de Sarikat Rajat te Bandoeng (Meeting of the Sarekat Rakjat at

Bandung)

Handelingen 226 (Hadji Agus Salim); Darsono, “Toenemende verwarring in Indonesie” (Increasing Confusion in Indonesia), De Vlam, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 4; HOS, pp. 53, 55; “Hendak Kemana Kamu, Musso?’ (Quo Vadis Musso?), Madjallah Merdeka, Oct. 2, 1948, p. 3. According to the last source, Musso attended the agricultural college at Bogor (Buitenzorg) after finishing teachers training school. His name is frequently spelled Muso.

V olksraad,

(typescript, 1924), pp. 6-8;

1922, First Session, p.

423

Notes, pp. 170-174 Mar. 3 and 18, 1924, and Neratja, Mar. 6, 1924, in IPO, nos. 10-12, 1924, pp. 420-421, 463, 526. Djamaluddin Tamin, written statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono Djojoprajitno, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka (PKI-SIBAR Against Tan Malaka) (Djakarta, 1962), p. 19, claims that both Musso and Alimin were converted to Communism in Tjipinang prison by a fel64. Sinar Hindia,

low internee, the PKI leader Gondojuwono. It is quite possible that Gondojuwono played a major part in making up their minds, for he was by all accounts extremely successful in securing followers for the party. However, both had belonged to the ISDV before their imprisonment, and, contrary to Djamaluddin Tamin’s account, they resumed connections with the SI as well as with the Communists on their release. 65. Mededeelingen 1924, p. 25. 66. Mededeelingen, 1924, p. 12; and see R. Kem, Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand, bestemd voor de besprekingen bij de aanstaande Residentenconferentie, afgesloten 9 Februari 1924 (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, as of Feb. 9, 1924, Intended for the Discussions at the Forthcoming Residents’ Conference) (typescript, classified), pp. 7-8; hereafter cited as Overzicht Residentenconferentie.

Boedi Oetomo, May 13, 17, and 20, 1924, in IPO, nos. 21 and 22, 1924, pp. 314-315, 319. There were three varieties of Islam on Java, Budi Utomo argued: that of the Muhammadijah (with which the CSI was identified), of the traditionalists, and of the Muslim Communists; all were based on the Koran, and none exclusively commanded the truth. Budi Utomo objected both to the attempts of the Muhammadijah to impose its own interpretation and to its approval of individualism, capitalism, and imperialism ( the last presumably referred to its Pan-Islamic tendencies). For other comments on the religious limitations of the White SI appeal, see Bijlage van het algemeen verslag over 1924; politick overzicht (Supplement to the General Report for 1924, Political Survey) (typescript, signed by the Resident of Semarang, dated 1925), p. 7, hereafter Bijlage Semarang; Verslag 9de, p. 25; Overzicht CSI 1921, pp. 67, 71. Although the PKI of the 1920s was not a clearly abangan party, as it has been since the Indonesian revolution, the Communists were occasionally labeled abangan by their SI opponents; for example, Moh. Usman, in Neratja, Sept. 20, 1922, in IPO, 67.

no. 39, 1922, p. 477.

May

7-8, 1924, in IPO, no. 20, 1924, p. 274; Boedi Oetomo, May 13 and 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 21, 1924, p. 314. 69. Islam Bergerak, May 20, 1922, in IPO, no. 29, 1922, pp. 206-207. 68. Sinar Hindia,

70. Bijlage Semarang, pp. 12-13; Indische Courant, Feb. 23, 1924; Bataviaasch

Nieuwsblad, July 2, 1924; Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, June 1, 1926; Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, Oct. 29, 1925, and May 26, 1926; Koch, Verantwoording, p. 155;

"Communisme,”

p. 534, col. a;

Java Bode,

May

26, 1926.

May

22 and 26, 1925. Misbach was exiled to Manokwari, North New Guinea, in June 1924. At first he maintained contact with the movement, sending articles to the Muslim Communist journals in Java and attempting to organize Sarekat Rakjat branches in New Guinea; as a result, the government clamped down on his correspondence. His wife, who joined him in exile, died in 1925; he then petitioned the government to be allowed the alternative of 71. Api,

This was granted, but he had no money for the trip, and the PKI, which tried to raise funds for him, did not collect enough. He died in early 1926. residence in Holland.

72. Api, Mar. 10, 1926, in IPO, no. 10, 1926, p. 495.

424

For the general back-

Notes pp. 174-178 ,

ground of the post-Misbach Islamic Communist groups, see the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Mar. 15 and 16 and May 2, 1926. For the suppression of the Mu’almin movement, see Api, Feb. 16, 1926, Darmo Kondo, Feb. 20, 1926, Mowo, Feb. 4 and 18, 1926, and Njala, Feb. 19, 1926, in IPO, no. 9, 1926, pp. 423-433, 437-438, 448-450, 456-457; and Api Mar. 10 and 23, 1926, in IPO, no. 10, 1926, pp. 493-495, 498-499. 73. This account of Batuah’s career is drawn primarily from R. Kem, Schets van den politieken toestand der residentie Sumatra’s Westkust (Sketch of the Political Situation in the Residency of Sumatra's West Coast) (typescript, dated Batavia, June 30, 1924, by the Adviser for Native Affairs), pp. 19-22, 26-28; L. dt. Toemenggoeng, Geheime nota voor den Adviseur voor Inlandsche zaken over het communisme ter Westkust van Sumatra (Secret Note for the Adviser for Native Affairs Concerning Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra) (typescript, dated Weltevreden, July 30, 1925), pp. 1-3; and R. Kem, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, July 23, 1924, no. F/206, classified (typescript, advising on the internment of Batuah and Zainuddin), pp. 1, 5-7. See also Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 13-15; IPO, no. 45, 1923, pp. 281, 287; Djago! Djago!, Oct. 8, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 541; “Moehammadyah,” Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-lndie, VI, 915, col. b; Dimyati, Sedjarah, pp. 19-20; “Verslag van bestuur en staat van Nederlandsch-Indie, Suriname en Curasao 1925” (Report on Administration and Government of the Netherlands Indies, Dutch Guiana, and Curasao, 1925), Bijlagen van het verslag der handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1925-1926, Bijlage C, pp. 9-10, hereafter cited as Verslag bestuur 1925; Api, Mar. 4, 1925; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan Hidup (Memoires) (Djakarta, 1951), I, pp. 68-76. The last source, by one of Indonesia’s major ,

young man to the teachings of Padang Pandjang. The PKI account Pemberontakan

literary figures, describes his

own

reaction as a

Communists in November 1926 (The November 1926 Rebellion) (Djakarta, 1961), p. 73, gives the West Sumatra party leadership at this time as Hadji Datuk Batuah (chairman), Djamaluddin Tamin (secretary), Natar Zainuddin, Datuk Mangkudun Sati, M. A. A. Perpatih, Achmad Chatib, Abdul Aziz, and Mahmud (members). 74. Leaflet sent from the West Coast to a number of religious teachers in South Tapanuli and Djambi and presumably also distributed in the Minangkabau area itself; quoted in B. F. O. Schrieke, “Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra,” in Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies (The Hague and Bandung, 1955), I, 155. For a discussion of the religious background of Islamic Communism in the Minangkabau area, see pp. 149-159. See also Hendrik Boiunan, Enige beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch nationalisme op Sumatra’s Westkust (Some Observations on the Development of Indonesian Nationalism on Sumatra’s West Coast) (Groningen, 1949), pp. 68-71; von der Mehden, Islam, pp. 205-207. 75. Bijlage algemeen verslag: politiek overzicht 1925 (Supplement to the General Report: Political Survey 1925) (typescript, February 1926, signed by the the Islamic

Resident of Semarang, p. 11; hereafter Bijlage 1925); Bijlage Semarang, p. 8; Politiek verslag over 1926 in het Gewest Semarang (political Report for 1926 in the Semarang Region) (typescript, February 1927, signed by the Resident of

Semarang,

p. 18, hereafter Politiek

Verslag 1926); “Verslag

S.

I.

Merah dan

S.

R.

Semarang Tahoen 1924” (Report of the Semarang Red SI and SR for 1924), Api, May 26 and 27, 1925; Api, Nov. 3-18, 1924, in IPO, no. 46, 1924, pp. 292293; Api, Mar. 11 and 18, 1925; Mowo, Dec. 7, 1925, in IPO, no. 51, 1925, p. 615. 76. Soeara

Ra’jat,

Aug.

1,

1923, in IPO, no. 35,

425

1923, pp. 419-420;

Sinar

,

Notes, pp. 178-179 46 and 51, 1923, pp. 302304, 309, 571-573; Sinar Hindia, Apr. 19, 23, 30, May 23, and 24, 1924, in IPO, nos. 17, 19, and 22, 1924, pp. 161-162, 230-232, 382. 77. Overzicht 1927, pp. 23-24. There follows a list of some Indonesian journals that represented the PKI or were very close to the movement from 1921 to 1925. Many were very shortlived; however, Blumberger, Communist, p. 127, estimates that the 1926 ban on the Communist press affected about twenty publications. Sinar Hindia, later Api (Semarang, Red SI/SR, ed. Semaun, Samsi, Subakat); Soeara Ra’jat (Semarang, PKI, ed. Partondo, Abdulmuntalib ) Islam Bergerak, later Ra’jat Bergerak (Surakarta, Islamic Communist, ed. H. Misbach); Medan Moeslimin (Surakarta, Islamic Communist, ed. Harun Rasjid); Bendera Merah (Temate, Moluccas, PKI, ed. R. M. Gondojuwono ) Djago! Djago! (Padang Pandjang, W. Sumatra, Islamic Communist, ed. N. Zainuddin, Djamaluddin Tamin); Pemandangan Islam (Padang Pandjang, W. Sumatra, Islamic Communist, ed. H. Dt. Batuah); Persatoean Ra’jat (Surakarta, later Salatiga, New SR, ed. Sosrokardono, Sudiro); Senopati (Surakarta, SR, ed. Sandjojo, S. Basah Sentot); Barisan Moeda (Semarang, Barisan Muda, ed. Suleiman); Petir (Padang, W. Sumatra, Communist, ed. Baharuddin); Hobromarkoto (Surakarta, SR, ed. S. Sastrodihardjo ) Krjahi-Djagoer (Batavia, Communist, ed. Subagio); Kromo Mardiko (Jogjakarta, PKI, in Javanese, ed. Wignjosumarto); Matahari (Bandung, Red SI/SR, ed. Sanusi, Gunawan, Winanta); Oetoesan Rajat (Langsa, Atjeh, radical, ed. Abdul Karim); Mataram (Bandung, Red SI, ed. Gunawan, Winanta); Sendjata Ra’jat (Pekalongan, SR, ed. Salimun); Soerapati (Bandung, in Sundanese, PKI, ed. K. Kartawirja); Doenia Achirat (Bukit Tinggi, W. Sumatra, radical, ed. Zain Almaliki); Halilintar (Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. A. C. Salim, S. M. Anwar); Doenia Merdeka (Purwokerto, SR); Sasaran Ra’jat ( Solok, W. Sumatra, SR); Persamaan (Sibolga, N. Sumatra, Communist, ed. Abdulkarim, St. Said Ali); Njala (Batavia, PKI, ed. Gondojuwono); Signal (Sawahlunto, W. Sumatra, SR, ed. Hadji Arif); Torpedo (Padang, W. Sumatra, SR, ed. Madjid); Battery (Langsa, Atjeh, SR); Berani (Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. Careem); Pelita Ra’jat (Makassar, Celebes, SR); Warta Borneo (Pontianak, Borneo, SR, ed. Boulie); Proletar (Surabaja, PKI, ed. Musso); Mowo (Surakarta, in Javanese, PKI); Titar (Bandung, SR); Djam (Palembang, Communist); Guntur (Medan, Communist). There were also a number of PKI-oriented union journals, the most important of which was Si Tetap (Semarang, VSTP, ed. Sudibio). 78. For example, Samsi, an editor of Sinar Hindia, referring to the Djojobojo prophesy (see below), noted that it was said that when the kalaras (dried banana leaf) banner waves, the Ratu Adil would come. This interpretation, he declared, was wrong: it should be at the kolos rasane mati (the time of most extreme need) that the promised ruler would appear. He would, however, not come in the form of a monarch but as a people’s government, for there were now so many people that no one man could rule them justly. The just rule inaugurated by the Ratu Adil would be Communism; it would spread over the entire world and would not need to be founded by armed struggle in Indonesia as it had in Russia. Hindia, Nov.

and 5 and Dec.

1

11, 1923, in

IPO

nos.

;

;

;

The new era would bring universal prosperity; it was still uncertain when it would come, but it was the duty of the Indonesian people to prepare themselves for

Sinar Hindia, Jan. 13, 1921, in IPO, no.

1921, p. 12. For a discussion of the Ratu Adil belief and examples of nineteenth-century movements oriented about it, see G. W. J. Drewes, Drie javaansche goeroe’s. Hun leven onderricht en messiasprediking (Three Javanese Gurus. Their Life, Teaching, and Messianic it.

3,

,

Prophecy) (Leiden, 1925). Drewes remarked that the Ratu Adil belief was used

426

Notes pp. 179-181 ,

by movements

that sought to introduce

new

ideas; the

most recent phenomenon

he noted, was the equation of the socialist utopia with the Just Realm of the Ratu Adil (p. 182). He considered the marked decline in traditional messianic movements after the nineteenth century to have resulted principally from the rise of the modem Indonesian political organizations. These might use the Ratu Adil belief as a propaganda tool, but by providing an alternate outlet for the expression of popular protests and hopes and by channeling them in organized and modernizing directions, they were fundamentally changing the way in which the populace expressed itself (p. 192). That elements of the messianic traditions exist in present Indonesian political behavior is the argument of Justus M. van der Kroef, “Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1959, pp. 299-323. Nonetheless, a considerable shift in favor of more “modem” appeals for of this sort,

popular support has taken place since the revolution, as is evidenced in an interesting comparison between the approaches of the modem PKI and the Gerinda (a party basing itself doctrinallv on the Ratu Adil concept) in the Jogjakarta area; Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta, pp. 185-194.

Thus

commenting

on the desertion of CSI leaders to the PKI, declared that they could not have done so on grounds of principle because the principles of Communism and the CSI were the same; Neratja, May 8, 1924, in IPO, no. 20, 1924, pp. 267-268. 80. The description of society under Communism is taken from an essay by “D” (Darsono?), in Soeara Ra'jat, June 10, 1920, in IPO, no. 25, 1920, p. 9; the characterization of past society and the European effect on it from an essay by Darsono that appeared in Soeara Rajat, Sept. 1, 1920, in IPO, no. 36, 1920, p. 1, and also in Oetoesan Hindia and other opposition journals. Darsono was jailed for some months for this widely publicized attack on European rule. 81. A connection with Turkey was sometimes consciously propagated by PKI leaders among the religiously oriented rank and file. For example, at a major meeting of the Surakarta Sarekat Rakjat it was claimed that when Alimin attended the Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference in Canton (see below), he met with delegates from Egypt and with Kemal Pasha, who declared that he was in agreement with Communism and desired a firm union with the Communists; Medan Moeslimin, Nov. 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1925, p. 147. Since the leaders of the Surakarta SR (Marco and Harun Rasjid) were fairly highly placed in the Communist movement and must have known the character of the Canton meeting, it seems highly unlikely that this represented a naive response to rumors by provincial Communists. 82. Oetoesan Hindia, Dec. 11, 1919, in IPO, no. 50, 1919, p. 21; Kaoem Moeda, Dec. 17, 1919, in IPO, no. 51, 1919, pp. 5-6. 83. Oetoesan Hindia, Jan. 8, 1920, in IPO, no. 1, 1920, p. 19; Sept. 22, 1920, in IPO, no. 39, 1920, pp. 15-16; Sept. 29 and Oct. 1, 1920, in IPO, no. 40, 1920, pp. 8-9. The September rumors seem to have started with an article in the Amsterdam newspaper De Telegraaf that the Third International was planning to establish a propaganda center on Java and had sent gold to the Netherlands for the purpose. Oetoesan Plindia pointed out encouragingly that it would be easier for the Comintern to influence British India from Java than from its propaganda base in Tashkent. 84. The PKI acknowledged the Russian famine by establishing a committee to aid starving children in that country; Soeara Rajat, Nov. 1, 1921, in IPO, no. 47, 1921, p. 383. Nothing seems to have come of the project, however. The 79.

Neratja,

editorially

427

Notes, pp. 181-183 party explanation of the hard times in Soviet Russia was along the same line as that given by Semaun on his return to Indonesia. Another aspect of Soviet

was resumption of international trade; this indicated that the country still relied on a money economy, whereas (money being equated with profit-seeking, capitalism, and European rule) many PKI followers thought that under Communism there should be only barter trade. The party journal explained that Russia’s policy was necessary because it still stood alone; when the rest of the world had become Communist, barter would prevail. Soeara life

that raised popular doubts

IPO, no. 44, 1921, pp. 256-257. 85. The actual membership of the PKI and Red SI/SR during this period is difficult to state, since statistics rarely agree. In 1922, a Comintern article claimed that the party had 200 members on Java; Praniero, “The Communist International in the Dutch East Indies,” p. 542. The report of the fourth Comintern congress later that same year placed the number of PKI members at 1,300; IV Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala. Izbranmje doklady, rechi i rezoliutsii (Fourth World Congress of the Communist International. Selected Reports, Speeches, and Resolutions) ( Moscow/Petrograd, 1923), p. 20. The first total may well have been based on the 1921 figures provided in Semaun’s report to the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. The CPH Indonesia specialist Ra’jat, Oct. 16, 1921, in

Rutgers also gives 1,300 as the PKI’s membership in 1923; the party had then, he claimed, sixteen branches and the Red SI/SR had 30,000 to 55,000 members; Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging tot 1927,” p. 48. Sneevliet, in

February 1924, said that the Red SI/SR had sixteen sections and 50,000 members and the PKI had 2,000 members; Oekonomisclie, p. 17. The same total of PKI members in 1924 is given in the Profintern encyclopedia, but the Red SI/SR following is stated as 60,000, organized in fifty-six sections; Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu, col. 562. At the June 1924 PKI congress party membership was stated as less than a thousand; Verslag 9de, p. 5. According to Semaun, the SR had 100,000 members in early 1925; Semaoen, “Brieven,” June 10, 1925. Tan Malaka also claimed this (for the “Red Islamitic Party,” which he said had been formed at the March 1923 congress from the units that broke away from the SI), in T. Malaka, “Die Arbeiter in der Zuckerindustrie auf der Insel Java” (The Workers in the Sugar Industry on the Island of Java), RGI p May/June 1923, p. 546. Bergsma declared that after the 1923 split with the Sarekat Islam the PKI had thirty-two sections and, together with the Red SI, 50,000 members; Bergsma, “A Letter from the Dutch East Indies,” Inprecorr, Sept. 27, 1923, p. 699. Tan Malaka is said to have told the ECCI session of June 1923 that the PKI had 13,000 members; Bericht der Exekutive—15 Mai 1923, p. 47. This was also claimed in Bergsma and Malaka, “Communism in Java,” p. 607. Either this was intended as the combined total for PKI and Red SI membership, or it should have read 1,300. 86. Verslag hestuur 1925, p. 9. See also Overzicht

van den politieken toestand Sumatra’s Westkust aansluitend op het overzicht ddo. 6 April 1927 (Survey of the Political Situation on Sumatra’s West Coast, Continuing the Survey Dated Apr. 6, 1927) (mimeo, dated Padang, May 10, 1927, signed by the Resident of the West Coast of Sumatra and the Chief of the Regional Intelligence), ter

pp. 2-30; hereafter Overzicht

SWK; De

Indische Gids, XLVI, 1924, 266-270; L. pp. 3-4; Kern, Schets van den politieken toestand, pp. 27-28; B. F. O. Schrieke, “Political Section of the West Coast of Sumatra Report,” in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Ithaca, N.Y., dt.

Toemenggoeng, Geheime

nota,

428

Notes pp. 183-184 ,

I960), pp. 100-104. The last is a translation of Schrieke, De gang der Communistische beweging ter Sumatra’s Westkust (The Course of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra) (Netherlands Indies government,

For an analysis of the sociological aspects of the movement, see Schrieke, “Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra,” classified,

Weltevreden, 1928), Part

I.

pp. 95-166. 87. Kern, Overzicht Resident enconferentie, pp. 11-13; Harian Rakjat, July 17, 1962; Koloniaal Verslag, 1923, pp. 26-27, 122; Verslag bestuur 1925, pp. 8, 13, 23, 26-28, 30—31; Soeara Ra’jat, Oct. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 43, 1922, pp. 192-194; De Indische Gids, XLIV, 1922, 725-727, Blumberger, Communist, p. 42.

Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings, p. 41. Interesting material on the social background of the Communist leadership can be found in W. M. F. Mansvelt, “Onderwijs en Communisme” (Education and Communism), Koloniale Studien, XII (1928), Part I, a study of 1,000 people 88.

“The Bantam Report,”

who were

in

interned after the revolts of 1926-1927. These were

all

persons con-

have been leaders of the Communist movement; however, most of them claimed to have been only ordinary members of the PKI or Sarekat Rakjat or to have belonged to neither. No doubt, as Mansvelt remarks, this was due in good part to their reluctance to compromise themselves any more than was necessary; it might also be noted that the decisions to intern were taken rather summarily and based on considerations that differed from area to area; an investigation in 1930 showed that many of those interned actually had little or nothing to do with the party. In other words, the sample probably consists mostly of persons with some standing in the movement but also contains simple followers and some outsiders. With this caveat in mind, we might note that Mansvelt reports the average age of the internees to have been 31 years; 71.6 per cent were literate, compared with 5.91 per cent literacy for Indonesia as a whole and 5.07 per cent for Java and Madura at the time (p. 206). None had had higher education; 2.4 per cent had had some academic secondary education, 9.7 per cent had attended trade school, 64 per cent had attended primary school, and 23.9 per cent had had no schooling. Few graduated from the schools they attended, but considering the highly pyramided structure of the Indies educational system, they had done rather well (pp. 208-209). Of the 857 primary schools attended at one time or another by the internees, 48 were village (desa) schools, 62 Islamic religious schools, and 511 second-class and standard schools; of the last, 236 used a European language. The internees thus tended to belong to the subelite, which had had some Western-style schooling but not enough to be classed with the educated elite (pp. 211-212). They changed sidered

by the

authorities to

27.2 per cent of the total number of jobs held were in state employ, 19.6 per cent in the employ of Western enterprises, 45 per cent in the native economic sector (farming, small manufacturers, and espeprofessions rather frequently;

and transport); 2.9 per cent were in journalism, 3.8 per cent teaching in native schools, and 1.5 per cent miscellaneous. The large number of jobs in the native economic sector is somewhat misleading, Mansvelt notes, as they reflect employment these persons resorted to when they lost jobs in the Western sector (pp. 215-217). Five internees were from the high nobility, bearing the title Raden Mas; fifty-two were from the lesser prijaji (Raden or Mas), and fiftynine were hadjis. Moreover, the fact that 45 per cent had enjoyed some Westerncially trade

style

schooling in the early years of the century indicated that their parents

had some means and were either large cities.

lesser prijaji or well-off peasants

They themselves could not be reckoned

429

to

living near

the advantaged groups

Notes pp. 184-186 ,

employment, however; Mansvelt therefore rejects the thesis that the revolutionary movement was led by an emergent middle class and argues that it appeared to have been headed by people experiencing proletarianization (pp. 218-220). 89. An example of PKI support from local traditional elites was adherence either

by standard

of living or rank of

of

the noble association

in

1925.

Rukun

The PKI did not

Asli to the

party

when

it

penetrated

Bantam

usually address specific appeals to the prijaji at a

done— for example, Semaun’s pamphlet Kehasilan Indonesia jang Diangkat Ketanah Belanda Tiap2 Tahoen jaitoe 500.000.000 (/500, 000,000 in Indonesia Profits Are Taken to Holland Each higher level, although occasionally this was

(Europe, January 1925), which urged the prijaji and the Indonesian soldiery (appealed to as ksatrija, warriors) to join in the struggle against the Dutch because colonialism injured all Indonesian classes. 90. Thus Musso offered himself as leader of the Sarekat Postel, saying that although he knew nothing of postal affairs, he would throw himself energetically into the workers’ cause; Soeara Postel, May 1920, in IPO, no. 22, 1920, p. 3, Year)

by Musso. Tjokroaminoto and Salim, who then led the CSI-sponsored union, gave him a position in it. The SI leaders lost interest in the Sarekat Postel after the pawnshop strike; for a while it languished, but in 1924 Musso again took it in hand; Soeara Postel, May 31, 1925, in IPO, no. 27, 1925, pp. 45— 46. In a similar vein Prawirosardjono, leader of the Surabaja Red SI/SR, explained to the August 1924 CSI congress why he had chosen to exchange his allegiance to the Sarekat Islam for loyalty to the PKI: he was in need of financial support after imprisonment for a political offense; none had been forthcoming from the SI, and so he had switched to the Communists; Verslag van het lie Kongres der Centrale Sarikat Islam, p. 12. The importance of the movement as a source of employment is stressed in Mansvelt’s study of Communist internees. Noting that they lost jobs frequently for political and other reasons and often were unemployed for considerable periods, Mansvelt found it small wonder article

that they took positions, even at very low remuneration, as

propagandists, and as party, union, and functionaries often

had an

had

SR

officials.

to support themselves

“Since

it

SR

school teachers,

appears that these

from the dues they received, they

expanding the number of members [of the organizations they headed],” he added; Mansvelt, “Onderwijs en Communisme,” p. 220. 91. An instance of this tolerance was the PKI attitude toward Mas Marco, the journalist the ISDV had defended in 1916. Marco had become a party member and had a popular following in the Surakarta area. In late 1920 he was wooed away from the PKI by a CSI offer of its secretaryship. He promptly appeared as a major anti-Communist agitator, attacking the party on the sensitive subject of the Lenin theses and religion. Soon, however, he had a spat with the CSI and announced his retirement from politics; the PKI expressed sympathy and was rewarded by his return to its camp. 92. Typical of the ambivalent PKI attitude toward religious Communists, the party newspaper did not mention the Dutch Communist nomination of Hadji Misbach for parliament (although the CPH had obviously intended it to be accorded wide publicity in Indonesia) except to announce, on inside pages, his nomination and rejection; Api, May 22 and 26, 1925. At other times, however, Api expressed strong concern for religion, usually to defend “true Islam” against interest in

Muhammadijah. For other comments on the varied nature

the “perverted doctrine” of the 93. Verslag 9e, p. 24.

of the discontent mobilized by the Communists, see Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 101-

430

.

Notes pp. 186-188 ,

103, 108-112; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 6, 10, 12-13; Blumberger, Nationalist ,

pp. 115-116; “Communisme,” p. 553, col. b. 94. Sinar Hindia, Jan. 22, 1924, in IPO, no. 5, 1924, p. 194; from an editorial expressing admiration for the program of Auguste Blanqui. 95. Soeara Ra’jat,

May

26, 1920, in IPO, no. 23, 1920, p. 2; Sinar Hindia, Apr.

IPO, no. 17, 1921, p. 176. The latter article offers a week-long “Communist course,” open to all at a ten-cent entrance fee; it was to deal with Communist theory, history, and organization and also with oratory, journalism, and 18, 1921, in

how

to lead the people.

Mededeelingen 1924, p. 11; Overzicht 1924, p. 11; “Verslag S.I. Merah dan S.R. Semarang Tahoen 1924,” May 26, 1925; Api, Jan. 5 and 20, 1925. Among those arrested, on Oct. 23, 1923, were Aliarcham, Partondo, Budisutjitro, Suradi, Rabijan, Ambijah, Misbach, and Suwamo. All were released for lack of evidence on Feb. 24, 1924, except Suwamo and Misbach, who were banished. 97. Sinar Hindia, Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, nos. 45 and 46, 1923, pp. 264-267, 302-304. 98. K. Radek, “Lenin’s Life and Work,” Inprecorr, Mar. 6, 1924, p. 147. Radek was then chief of the Eastern Section of the Comintern. 99. When it announced plans to convene after the February 1923 SI congress, the PKI had indicated its intention to discuss a new program and declaration of principles; this was done in a closed session at the March 1923 meeting. Sinar Hindia Feb. 12, 1923, in IPO, no. 7, 1923, p. 296; Api, Feb. 28, 1925. 100. The draft version was published as Padoman Persarekatan Kommunist India (Guideline for the Communist Party of the Indies) (Semarang, November 1923), together with the Indies Communist Manifesto of 1920 (which explained in terms of the European Socialist-Communist schism why the ISDV changed its name to PKI) and the 1918 ISDV program for its town council election campaigns. A second preliminary version of the action program was published in Soeara Ra’jat, Feb. 1, 1924; the final version of the program, statement, and statutes was published as Partai-Reglement dari P.K.I. (Constitution of the PKI) 96.

(

Weltevreden, 1924). 101.

The items

of the

1924 action program are summed up

a.

Establishment

g.

Prohibition of receiving interest.

as follows:

form of soviets (village, factory, district, province, island, and central soviets). (The reader who was not acquainted with the soviet system was referred in a footnote to Tan Malaka’s Parlemen atau Sovjet?) b. Freedom of political action, speech, press, assembly, and strike. c. Labor legislation, an eight-hour day, no night work where possible, no labor for children under seventeen, protection of working women, extensive social insurance for workers, improvement of working conditions, labor inspection, abolition of the contract coolie system, aid to orphans and abandoned children, abolition of unpaid labor for village and state authorities ( heerendiensten and desadiensten ) d. Abolition of proprietary lands; farming to be carried on under the direction of village councils; government aid and interest-free credit to Indonesian agriculture; no government aid to the big plantations; prohibition of land-leasing. e. Nationalization of monopolies, banks, and all essential industries. f. Steps to remove all encouragement of the desire for selfish gain and undesirable rivalry among the various groups of the working people. of

representative

bodies

431

in

the

Notes pp. 188-190 ,

Universal taxation based on a steeply graded income tax, with the only

h.

direct tax a luxury tax.

Universal free education until the age of seventeen, in the local language, with Malay as a possible second tongue. Education compatible with local customs and needs; more technical, agricultural, and university education. i.

Equality before the law; free legal aid; no imprisonment without charge.

j.

Improvement

k.

of prison conditions.

Separation of church and state, no government aid to religion.

l.

m. Replacement of the armed forces by a people’s militia. n. Law enforcement by people’s councils. o. Improved public health and hygiene; food distribution

to

be directed by

public bodies. p.

Improvement

q.

Strict

of housing conditions.

prohibition of nonmedicinal alcohol and drugs.

r.

Open diplomacy.

s.

Avoidance

of

all

other countries or involve

it

in

could

that

policies

worsen

relations

with

w ar.

pp. 13-20. might be noted that the draft of the

Partai-Reglement

Indonesia’s

?

clari P.K.I.,

new

program published in November 1923 w'as almost identical with the 1918 version. The February draft did not contain the June 1924 demand for soviets but kept the passage on free and secret elections from the 1918 program (but left out in the final 1924 versions). It called for Malay (Indonesian) as the first language of instruction, although the June 1924 program reverted back to the 1918 demand that the regional language be given first place with Malay as a possible second language. The February draft did contain the final version’s new provisions 102. It

against the

acquisitive

spirit

(no.

6),

against

receiving

open diplomacy (no. 18), and against involvement This

last

provision

against a

presumed

sion also contained a provision that

interest

(no.

in foreign conflicts

7),

for

(no. 19).

Comintern campaign attack Soviet Russia. The February ver-

probably originated imperialist plot to

action

in

the

current

Indonesia should recognize Soviet Russia

overcome the depression in the Indies; this was omitted from the final version. This may have been a concession to nationalist sentiment, or it may reflect the objections to Soviet engagement

and

establish trade relations with

it

in order to

we

noted earlier. 103. The November 1923 draft statement of principles is contained in Padoman Persarekaten Kommunist India, pp. 1-4; the June 1924 version was published first in Soeara Ra’jat, June 20, 1924 (IPO, no. 28, 1924, p. 91), and then in Partai-Reglement dari P.K.I., pp. 3-11. The declaration described how capitalism,

in international trade that

had risen in Europe and spread to America and Japan and how in Indonesia it had separated the people, who had once lived freely, from their means of existence and made them slaves of the factories and plantations. Workers, peasants, and intellectuals all suffer under this system, the declaration stated, and they must all unite against it; their struggle must be class-based and international and must not be affected by nationality or religion. 104. Partai-Reglement dari P.K.I., pp. 7, 9. Emphasis in the text. 105. Article 4, “Statuten dari Partai Kommimist Indonesia” (Statutes of the Communist Party of Indonesia), Partai-Reglement dari P.K.I., pp. 23-24. 106. Dingley, The Peasants’ Movement, p. 39. This system of SR organization had already been put into practice by the latter part of 1923; Kern, Overzicht the

embodiment

of greed,

432

Notes pp. 190-191 ,

Residentenconferentie, pp. 7-8. Blumberger, Nationalist, p. 122, gives a somewhat different version of the limit on SR voting strength at PKI congresses:

he

states

the

maximum was

one-fourth the

number

of votes possessed

by the

PKI branches could send up

to ten delegates to a congress, but SR branches could send only three. See further Semaoen, “Brieven,” June 10, 1925; Guber, “Natsional’no-osvoboditernoe dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, p. 191; Mededee-

party

7

;

lingen 1924, p. 10; Bergmeijer, Het mates that about half the Sarekat

Communisme

“Dingley” estiRakjat membership was poor and middle peasants, and another quarter small shop owners, traders, artisans, and so on in Indie, p. 3.

(p. 40).

Semaoen, “Brieven,” June 10, 1925; and see Dingley, The Peasants’ Movement, p. 39; Guber, “Natsionarno-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, p. 191; S. Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging tot 1927,” p. 48. 108. Police report on the Semarang SI meeting of Apr. 15, 1923 ( typescript, n.p., n.d. ), at which Aliarcham, its chairman, reported on the recent SI and 107.

PKI

congresses.

Some

were established in that year, but these seem to have been new groups introduced to combat the local White SI in accord with the decision of the 1923 PKI congress; there were not many of them. See Kemadjoean Hindia, Oct. 10, 1923, in IPO, no. 42, 1923, p. 89. Other new leftist mass units were established not as SRs but as Red SI branches; see Sinar Hindia, Jan. 9, 1924, in IPO, no. 3, 1924, pp. 110-113. 110. Quoted in Vergadering van de Sarikat Rajat te Bandoeng (Meeting of the 109.

Sarekat

Rakjat

units

Sarekat Rakjat at Bandung) (unsigned typescript, dated 1924, Stokvis Collection, Internationaal instituut voor sociaal geschiedenis, Amsterdam), p. 5. For description of the congress, see pp. 4-17. See also Algemeen Indisch Daghlad, Apr. 22,

1924; De Locomotief, Apr. 26, 1924; Soerapati, Apr. 20, 1924, and Matahari, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 19, 1924, pp. 240-241, 246. The meeting took place in Bandung on Apr. 20-21; its first public session was attended by a claimed

The gathering was

by Alimin and Musso (Batavia), Sardjono (Sukabumi), Kartawirjia, Winanta, Mohammad Sanusi, Gunawan, and Bassach (Bandung), Djunaedi (Tjiamis), Muchtar (Bogor), and Sastrosuwirjo (Tjirebon). Aliarcham, chairman of the Semarang SI, represented that unit and PKI head1,200 people.

led

quarters.

Semarang on Apr. 22-24 by the FOISO (General Fund for SI Education), a supervising body for the school system established at the March 1923 congress. At the same meeting the FOISO changed its name to Fund for the People’s Education (Fonds Onderwijs Rakjat; FOR). Since the SR schools were foci of Communist influence, note the places where they then existed: Semarang, Surabaja, Bandung, Kertosono, Pare, Sumedang, Tjimahi, Purwokerto, Tjirebon, Ngandjuk, Salatiga, Ungaran, Ambarawa, Madiun, Sukabumi, Tjiwidej, Tjitjalenka, Tjiamis, Kintelan, Ngoro, and Ngrambe. The FOR congress discussed whether political education should continue to be given in the schools, apparently because the penalties for it were so great; it was decided that it was important to educate the children in the proper political spirit. Plans were also made to establish trade schools, publish school books and periodicals for young people, and to spread the school system outside 111. This

was decided

at a congress held in

Java. Sinar Hindia, Apr. 25, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, pp. 198-199. 112. Soeara Ra’jat, Jan. 16, 1924, in IPO, no. 7, 1924, p. 299. The Manifest

Kommunist oleh Karl Marx dan Friedrich Engels Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) (Semarang, 1923) was translated by Partondo, (

433

,

Notes, pp. 191-195 explanatory introduction in which he apologized for the awkwardness that resulted because the document, which was about European conditions, could not be rendered easily into Indonesian (p. 1). It was published

who provided an

Soeara Ra’jat, beginning on Apr. 12, 1923, and subsequently issued as a pamphlet. The 2,000 copies of this edition, printed on the VSTP press in Semarang, were sold out within a year. A second edition was put out in 1925, this time with an introduction by Axan Zain (Subakat); Manifest Kommunist serially in

oleh Karl

Marx dan Friedrich Engels (Semarang, 1925)

p. 1.

113. Indische Courant, Sept. 18, 1924. 114. Hobromarkoto, Nov. 9, 1924, in

IPO

no. 50, 1924, p. 498.

De

Locomotief, Sept. 30, 1924. 116. Overzicht van het resultaat van het gehouden onderzoek der 115.

heweging

commu-

de afdeeling Pati (Survey of the Result of the Investigation of the Communist Movement in the Pati District) (typescript copy of a Netherlands Indies government report, Stokvis collection), hereafter Overzicht Pati. 117. “Ons congres” (Our Congress), translation into Dutch of an article in Soeara Rajat, May 30, 1924, pp. 2, 5; emphasis in the text. See also the summary nistische

in

of this article in IPO, no. 25, 1924, pp. 568-569. 118. Other members of the executive were Budisutjitro

(secretary-treasurer)

and Marsum (commissioner); members-at-large were to be appointed from Semarang, Surabaja, Padang, and Temate. This made a total of seven executive members, although nine were required by the party statutes; this was pointed out by Sinar Hindia, June 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 27, 1924, pp. 19-20. Possibly the party was reluctant to put more leaders than absolutely necessary in prominent positions because of the danger of arrest. The newly elected leaders were by no means straw men, however, in spite of the fact that several of them were relative newcomers to the organization. Djamaluddin Tamin, written statement, dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, pp. 18-19, justifiably describes the election of the June 1924 executive as marking a major shift in party power. The account of the congress presented here is drawn from Versing Ode (the report of its proceedings by the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs) and from Overzicht 1924, pp. 3-7. The congress agenda was published in Sinar Hindia, May 19, 1924, and in Soeara Ra’fat, May 10, 1924 (IPO, no. 21, 1924, pp. 329, 441. 119. The branches

represented at the ninth party congress were primarily from West Java: Batavia, Bogor, Sukabumi, Tjiandjur, Bandung, Tjimahi, Garut, Tjibatu, Tasikmalaja, Radjapelah, Tjiamis, Bandjar, and Tjirebon. Other Javanese branches attending were Semarang, Salatiga, Ambarawa, Djepara, Wirosari,

Tjepu, Randublatang, Surabaja, Purworedjo, Kebumen, Jogjakarta, Klaten, Madiun, Blitar, and Kertosono; from the Outer Islands Padang, Langsa, Makassar,

and Temate sent delegates. 120. Verslag 9de, p. 4. 121. Verslag 9de, p. 9; emphasis as in the text of this account of the highlights of Darsono’s speech.

122. Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. According to Djamaluddin Tamin, one of 1 an Malaka s most prominent disciples, the theses were given to Alimin

when he

February 1924; we do know that Alimin made a Singapore at that time. Neratja, Apr. 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 18, 1924, p. 196, and see Sinar Hindia, Mar. 8, 1924, in IPO, no. 11, 1924, p. 47. Later publication visited Singapore in

trip to

PKI pamphlet indicates that they were considered very imSukindar, These bagi Keada an Social dan Ekononiis serta Tjara bagi

of these theses as a

portant;

434

Notes, pp. 195-199 Mengadakan Organisatie dan Taktiek di Indonesia (Theses on the Social and Economic Situation and on the Formulation of Organization and Tactics in Indonesia) ( Weltevreden, 1924). If Malaka was indeed the author of the theses,

it

is

endorsement of the relationship between the

interesting to note his

Sarekat Rakjat and the PKI. These, p. 22; see also the Verslag 9de, pp. 19-20. 124. Sukindar, These, pp. 25-26. 123. Sukindar,

summary

of Sukendar’s report in

125. Sukindar, These, pp. 33-34. 126. Sukindar, These, p. 34. 127.

The PKI reported on

the

Sekolah Rakjat school system that although

removed many teachers (in some cases forcing the schools to close), the schools were generally able to take advantage of the many unemployed teachers after the government curtailed its education budget. Similarly, although parents in public and private European employ withdrew their children from the schools for fear of dismissal, new pupils were easily gotten because the demand for education was far greater than the supply of schools. S. W. Parmono, “Sekolah Ra’jat Akan Diboenoeh?” (Will the People’s Schools Be Stopped?) Api, Jan. 2. 1925. A Comintern report on youth activity in Indonesia claimed that by 1926 there were some fifty schools, with 4,500 students, and it gave the Barisan Muda membership as over 1,000; “YCI,” Inprecorr VII (1927), no. 47, 1060. The FOR sponsored a monthly publication, Barisan Moeda, for the youth group and pupils in the SR schools. 128. For financial complaints, see Soeara Ra’jat, June 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 26, 1924, pp. 628-629, and June 30, 1924, in IPO, no. 29, 1924, pp. 144-145. The membership was given by Darsono at the June 1924 congress; Verslag 9de, p. 5. 129. See Soeara Ra’jat, Apr. 30, 1924, in IPO, no. 23, 1924, p. 440, and May 20, 1924, in IPO, no. 25, 1924, p. 567; De Locomotief, Sept. 30, 1924; Mededeelingen 1924, p. 13; “Communisme,” pp. 534, col. b, 535, col. a. the authorities

CHAPTER

IX

Begrooting 1927, pp. 209, 229 (parliamentary query and government reply on the refusal of entry to the Centrosoiuz agent Kossalopov). 1.

1921, p. 8) responded to an article in De Locomotief, which said that Baars was trying to arrange for Communist propa2.

Het

Vrije

Woord (Mar.

18,

be brought from the Netherlands to the Indies, that they were to come not from Holland but Soviet Russia. Very likely this was sarcasm; in any event, there was no sign that such efforts bore fruit. 3. Pavlovich, “Zadachi Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi assotsiatsii vostokovedeniia,” p. 9; and M. Pavlovich, “Zadachi sovetskogo vostokovedeniia’’ (The Tasks of Soviet Orientology ) Novyi Vostok, no. 16/17, 1927, pp. iv-v. Novtji Vostok (The New gandists

to

,

East) was the journal of the association. 4.

A. A. Guber, “Izucheniia

istorii

stran Vostoka

v SSSR za 25

let”

(Twenty-

Years of Historical Research on the Countries of the East in the USSR), in Varga, Volgin, and Pankratov, eds., Dvadtsat’ piat’ let istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR five

(Moscow/Leningrad, 1942), pp. 274-275. Guber was one of the few Soviet Southeast Asia scholars of stature in this early period; he began publishing on Indonesian political and economic history in the mid-1920s. According to his essay, the first Communist Asia experts were greatly handicapped by lack of contact with the countries of interest and by language barriers. Their first products

435

Notes pp. 199-202 ,

tended to be

political

tracts

notable

more

for

revolutionary

fervor

than for

knowledge of the area concerned. After a time there was a reaction against this, resulting in concentration on Asian social and economic conditions, particularly the agrarian problem; but these efforts were also frequently of limited value. 5. For a discussion of these institutions, see I. Borozdin, “Izuchenie Vostoka sovremennoi Rossii” (Research on the East in Contemporary Russia), in SultanZade, ed., KoloniaTnyi Vostok (Moscow, 1924), pp. 345—353; Rapport sur la preparation par le gouvernement sovietique des revoltes coloniales (Report on the Preparation of Colonial Revolts by the Soviet Covemment) (The Hague, n.d.), pp. 16-25; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 87; Gustave Gautherot, Le Bolchevisme aux colonies et V imperialisme rouge ( Bolshevism in the Colonies and

Red Imperialism) 6.

1930), pp. 33-40. II Kongress, pp. 195-196.

7.

The

first

Nationalities.

(Paris,

was Broido, then Deputy Commissar of not apparent which government body controlled the uni-

director of the university It

is

versitv after the dissolution of the

Commissariat of Nationalities

in

1924, but in

1936 it was directly under the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 85. See further pp. 85-89 and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 268-269; Pravda, July 25, 1922; N eutraliseering, p. 9, note 3. 8. Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 86-87. According to this source, the school was restricted to Chinese nationals. Karl Radek, its rector, so stated in a press interview, at which he also declared that it would be strictly scientific and not involve itself in propaganda of any sort (“De Chineesche universiteit te Moskou” (The Chinese University at Moscow), De Indische Gids, XLVII, 1925, 1105. Presumably this claim was to mollify European opinion concerning Soviet encouragement of colonial revolution; Indonesians were in fact asked to attend the university, and a Netherlands Indies government report, based on British intelligence sources, claimed that there were also Japanese, Koreans, and Indochinese attending. Politiek politioneel overzicht over de maand November 1927. Extremistische beweging (Political Police Survey for the Month of November 1927. Extremist Movement) mimeo, (n.d., classified), no. 11, p. 43. 9. Otchet lspolkoma Kominterna (ApreV 1925g.-Ianvar 1926g.) (Report of the Executive Committee of the Comintern [April 1925-January 19261) (Moscow/Leningrad, 1926), pp. 50-51. 10. Otchet lspolkoma Kominterna, pp. 50-51. 11. The March 1925 ECCI plenum sent directives to all its sections announcing the plan to establish courses and asking for students; Otchet lspolkoma Kominterna, pp. 50-51. 12. Politieke nota PKI, p. 9. The Comintern letter said that four students who had already arrived were progressing well but does not indicate whether these were Indonesian students. It was added that the candidates should be in good health and have had adequate preparation for their study; a knowledge of French, English, or 13. Politieke nota

German was recommended.

PKI,

p. 9.

14.

Semaun, interview, 1959.

15.

Blumbercer, Nationalist, p. 358; “Communisme,” p. 955, col. b. See HVW, May 25, 1917, p. 160; HVW, Feb. 20, 1918, p. 124. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Mar. 18, Apr. 14, and Aug. 6, 1929.

16. 17.

18. Inprecorr, Sept. 4,

1928, pp. 1042, 1186, 1206; Oct. 4, 1928, pp. 12291231, 1250, 1254. The delegate, who used the name “R. Alphonso,” is usually assumed to have been Tan Malaka; but according to Darsono and Semaun (in-

436

Notes pp. 202-203 ,

Malaka was not at the meeting. Malaka does not claim to have attended it in any of his later writings, and his orthodox Communist opponents, although anxious to pin the Trotskyite label on him, have not made a point of this incident. According to Darsono, “Alphonso,” whose real name seems to have been Mohammad Tohir, went to Moscow about 1925 or 1926 after attending a youth conference in China. This may be the 1926 Communist Youth Congress held in Canton, to which the PKI had indicated its intention of sending a delegate; see Politiek verslag 1926, p. 16. He remained in the Soviet Union until about 1933, but his career as a Comintern agent ended when he refused to follow the party line. 19. Alimin, interview, 1959; and Alimin, Riwajot Hidup, pp. 24-28. Alimin stated that he began his studies after the sixth Comintern congress and remained terviews, 1959),

at the school for three years.

Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 8, 1930. This story is very interesting if true, since Subakat, Djamaluddin Tamin, and the other members of this faction had set out in an independent direction under the leadership of Tan Malaka; although they did not openly reject the Comintern nor were they rejected 20. Nieutce

by

it,

they did not feel themselves bound by the International’s decisions.

however, exclude the possibility that Indonesians other than revolutionary trainees and established party leaders may have visited Soviet Russia during the early period. In 1923, for example, a Sumatran newspaper published a letter puqmrtedly written by “Mohammad Thahir” from Vladivostok, expressing enthusiasm over the conditions he had observed there; Pantjaran Berita, May 9-13, 1923, in IPO, no. 24, 1923, pp. 484-485. Thahir’s identity is unclear; possibly he was an ordinary seaman, but he may have been the “Alphonso” of the sixth Comintern congress (see footnote 18 above), or perhaps even Mohammad Taher gelar Mara Sutan, who was active in modernist Islamic education in West Sumatra, had once helped Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Alimin edit the Batavia Insulinde journal Modjopahit, and was involved with the 21. This

does not,

Communist movement 22.

Darsono

and

his stay in Russia in

in its

ISDV

days.

Semaun, interviews, 1959. Tan Malaka, who describes some detail in his autobiography, does not mention having

attended any school there. Baars, writing after his break with Communism, claimed that he had met Semaun and Darsono a number of times during their sojourns in Moscow; according to him, they worked for the Comintern and Profintern there and spent their time reading newspapers and letters for news

from Indonesia, from which they could then write reports. They lived in a hotel with other foreigners, he claimed, and led very isolated lives; Baars, Sowjet Russland in de practijk, p. 9. 23. See Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 84-85. 24. Soeara Rajat, Sept. 16, 1921, in IPO, no. 39, 1921, p. 34; Javasche Courant, Aug. 16, 1923; De Locomotief, Feb. 21, 1922; Tamar Djaja, Trio, p. 22; Malaka, “Mijn verbanning,” May 10, 1922; Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 18, 25-27, 32. Sneevliet himself reported having conferred with Subakat on PKI affairs while in Canton; De Baanbreker, Feb. 15, 1930. Malaka also related that not long before his banishment in 1922 Najoan “vanished” from Indonesia and was reported variously in Shanghai and Bombay; it was rumored that his trip was somehow connected with his activity as leader of the dockworkers’ union; Malaka, Toendoek, p. 87. 25. Sneevliet’s disillusionment with the Comintern began, according to some of his former associates, while he was in China; VVS, p. 62. His unhappiness with certain aspects of Communist policy came out strongly in an article written

437

Notes pp. 203-205 ,

Canton strike of February 1923; Maring, “Krovavyi epizod v istorii Kitaiskogo rabochego dvizheniia” (A Bloody Episode in the History of the Chinese Labor Movement), Kommunistischeskii Inter natsional, (no. 26/27), 1923. As Whiting remarks, Soviet Policies, p. 101, the article displayed marked evidence of un-Communist “bourgeois sentimentality” in its condemnation of the violent and futile affair. Oddly enough, the Comintern journal published the on the

ill-fated

report, although

26.

VVS,

27. This

its

editors noted they did not completely agree with

it.

p. 62.

the report cited as Maring, Oekonomische.

is

28. Sinar Hindia,

Soeara Ra’jat,

May

May 29—June

3,

1922, in IPO, no. 23, 1922, pp. 377-378;

31, 1922, in IPO, no. 30, 1922, p. 144.

and Boedi Oetomo, Nov. 2-16, 1922, in IPO, nos. 46 and 47, 1922, pp. 300, 331; Sinar Hindia, July 4, 1923, and Soeara Ra’jat, July 16, 1923, in IPO, nos. 28 and 32, 1923, pp. 72, 369; De Indische Gids, XLV, 1923, 831-833; Mededeelingen 1924, pp. 8-9; Begrooting 1925, pp. 198, 29. Sinar Hindia, Nov. 11, 1922,

216. 30. Samin,

“The

Situation in Indonesia,” Inprecorr, Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1245 (co-

report on the colonial revolutionary

For comment of Soeara Ra

jat

movement

on Aug.

Comintern congress). 1923, see IPO, no. 35, 1923, pp. 419-

1,

at the sixth

420. 31.

From

the Fourth to the Fifth

World Congress (London, 1924),

p.

103.

At the third Profintem congress, which ran concurrently with the 1924 Comintern meeting, it was announced that the Profintem had succeeded in the “establishment of regular connections with Dutch and British India”; Alezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg., p. 6. 32. De Tribune, June 26 and 27, 1922. The foreign leaders present were listed as Cachin from France, MacManus from England, Pieck from Germany, and Tan Malaka from Indonesia. 33. Malaka, DP I, p. 102. The work, Tan Malaka, lndone ziia i ee mesto na probuzhdaemsia Vostoka (Indonesia and Its Place in the Awakening East), was published by the Krasnaia Nov’ (Red News) publishing house in 1924, and then, apparently considered worthy of wider distribution, was reissued by the govern-

ment publisher (Gosizdat) Puretskin, review in Pechat

in

1925.

It

received very favorable reviews; see B.

1, 1926, p. 214; and Kim, review in Novyi Vostok, no. 10/11, 1925, pp. 325—326. In another account of his Soviet stay, Malaka remarked that he did not have much time for reading but was absorbed in studying Communism in action and in writing on Indonesian affairs for the Comintern; Malaka, Madilog: Materialisme, Dialektika, Logika (Madilog: ’

i

Revoliutsiia, no.

Materialism, Dialectics, Logic) (Djakarta, 1951), p. 14. 34. Bergsma in Franeker, the Netherlands, to Semaun in Semarang, Feb. 20, 1923. This is the omitted portion of the letter quoted on p. 240.

“Be” (Baars’ wife?) dated Feb. 2, 1923, Bergsma wrote: “At the end of December I returned from Moscow. Was there about a month. Jep is staying in Moscow for the time being. He’s studying.” Bergsma further remarked that he had neither money nor a job: “The party in Holland does nothing for me,” he complained, not even helping him pay for material sent to Jep in Moscow or to the party in Indonesia. The PKI, however, had sent some money to help him out. He had received a letter from Sneevliet the week before; 35. In a letter to

.

“He was

in

Moscow.

through though.” 36. Malaka, DP

I,

Still

p.

had the plan

104;

to

Tan Malaka,

438

come

here.

Thesis

I

don’t

know

if

it’ll

.

.

go

(Bukit Tinggi, June 1946),

,

;

Notes pp. 206-210 ,

and see Peringatan, p. 30. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 80, states, however, that Malaka claimed he was assigned the post of Comintern representative for Southeast Asia at the Comintern congress of November 1922, effective at the beginp. 39;

ning of 1923.

be brought out

37. In addition to the evidence to

in the course of this narra-

we have Semaun’s support for Malaka’s claim (interview, 1959), although Semaun said he received his appointment at the Pacific Transport Workers’ Conference in 1924. In Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York, 1956), p. 6, reference is made to a Japanese intelligence report from World tive,

War in

1925 Tan Malaka was the chief Comintern representative

II stating that in

Southeast Asia; Tsutsui, Chijin,

Mampo

gunsei-ron (Military Government in

the Southern Regions) (Tokyo, February 1944), p. 335. Postcolonial PKI accounts tended to deny or minimize Malaka’s claims to a role in the Comintern until the

November 1926 an account compiled by

publication in 1961 of Pemherontakan

the

work Malaka is described as having represented the PKI in the Comintern and having been a member of the secretariat of an ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, based in Shanghai, in which he represented the PKI (p. 123). It does not appear that Malaka actually worked in Shanghai during this period, but Comintern China headquarters were for a time located in that city. Possibly the account confuses the Comintern office with the Red Eastern Labor Bureau in Canton (see below).

party’s Historical Institute.

In this

38. Malaka, Thesis, p. 39; see also Kahin, Nationalism, p. 80, note 52. 39. Alimin, Analysis

(Jogjakarta,

1947), p. 14.

Semaun, interview, 1959. 41. Malaka said he also inquired of Sun the possibility of obtaining a Chinese passport; Sun replied that he could be of little service, since a Kuomintang pass would be worse than nothing as far as travel outside KMT territory was concerned. However, he suggested, if Tan Malaka were to contact the Seamen’s Union in Hongkong, that organization might be able to help him to a more serviceable document. Malaka, DP I, pp. 105-107; and see Tamar Djaja, Pusaka 40.

Indonesia, p. 211; Peringatan, pp. 30, 50. 42. Malaka, DP I, p. 114.

DP

announcement of the establishment of the office, see Tretii kongress Krasnogo lnternatsionala profsoiuzov 8-22 iulia 1924g. (Third Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions, July 8-22, 1924) (Moscow, 1924), p. 345, hereafter III Kongress Krasnogo and Api, Apr. 4, 1925. 43. Malaka,

For references

I,

p.

114. For an

to Malaka’s position

with

this office, see Politieke

nota PKI, p. 4;

Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, Aug. 26, 1924. 44. L. Heller, “Die Pazifik-Konferenz der Transportarbeiter in Kanton” (The

Conference of Transport Workers in Canton), RGI, July/August 1924, 54; and see Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu, col.

Pacific p.

1808. 45. Malaka, 46. Malaka,

47. Malaka,

DP I, pp. 116-119. DP I, pp. 120-121. DP I, p. 120; the text

of the request

is

given in Api, Jan. 3, 1925,

Java Bode, Mar. 17, 1925. Malaka wrote that he had been working as a correspondent for Chinese and Philippine newspapers for about a year, but he refused to name the papers or the doctors he had consulted in Canton. He asked to go to Sukabumi or Salatiga or some other place on Java, saying that he had friends in those places who could nurse him. 48. De Tribune, Feb. 27, 1925. p. 1; see also

439

Notes pp. 210-211 ,

The

government reply, dated Mar. 12, 1925, is reprinted in Api, Apr. 30, 1925. See also Api, Mar. 17, 1925; Java Bode, Apr. 24, 1925. The government said it would determine Tan Malaka’s place of residence, that he would not be informed of it beforehand, but that in any case it would not be 49.

text of the

Java. 50. Text of Malaka’s letter in Api, Apr. 30, 1925;

C ourant,

June 51. Malaka,

he had

3,

and Nieuwe Rotterdamsche

1925.

DP

pp. 121-123; Peringatan, p. 30. Malaka said that in Canton gotten to know a “Miss Carmen,” the daughter of a former Philippine I,

whose mother ran a hostel for Filipinos there. She had given him valuable tips on Philippine life and had taught him some Tagalog, which he picked up easily since it was related to Indonesian. He also got to know a guest of the hostel, Dr. Mariano Santos, who was on his way home from Europe and was to become vice-president of the University of Manila. Santos was a proponent of the unity of the Indonesian peoples; since Tan Malaka was already strongly drawn to Pan-Indonesianism, the two of them struck up a friendship, according to Malaka, and maintained contact until World War II. 52. Semaun, interview, 1959; “Pidato Semaun: Adjaran2 Tan Malaka Sewadjar dengan Adjaran Marx, Engels dan Lenin” (Semaun’s Speech: The Teachings of Tan Malaka Are in Accordance with the Teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin), in Peringatan, p. 103. The Communist Party of the Philippines was established in 1930; Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958 (New York, 1958), p. 140, claims that Tan Malaka “paid a quiet visit” to the Philippines in 1929 and there got in touch with several Filipino Communist leaders who had been in Moscow and who subsequently founded the party. Malaka revolutionary,

however, does not claim in his autobiography to have been in the country after 1927 or to have been connected with the founding of the group; since he was not reticent about describing his revolutionary accomplishments, his participation is dubious. More probable is the suggestion by Dapen Liang, The Development of Philippine Political Parties (Hong Kong, 1939), p. 256, that Malaka helped inspire moves that ended in the formation of the party by his contact with sympathetic Filipinos during his 1927 sojourn in the country. 53. Malaka, Thesis, p. 47; and Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 54. Api, Mar. 16 and Apr. 7, 1925; Java Bode, Apr. 24, 1925; Malaka DP I, p. 143.

55.

The establishment

of a

Red

labor international

was

called for in July 1920;

(The Profintem in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1928), pp. 9-11. In the following month a sort of pre-Profintem, the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions, was established (pp. 12-15). 56. Si Tetap, Jan. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 8, 1921, p. 31 (article by Semaun on

see Profintern v rezoliutsiiakh

the

VSTP

congress);

De

Locomotief, Feb. 21, 1922, citing

De

Volharding (Dutch1/2; Javasche Courant,

language organ of the VSTP) of February 1921, no. Aug. 16, 1923. The PKI journal, publishing Zinoviev’s call for the unification of the labor movement in the Profintem at the RILU founding congress, called on Indonesian workers to become conscious enough of their own strength to join the world movement. This indicates that no Indonesian union had yet affiliated with it; Soeara Rajat, Aug. 31, 1921, in IPO, no. 37, 1921, pp. 643-644. 57. Letter from Walter C. Smith (an American Communist) to W. A. van

Kordenoordt in Semarang, dated Seattle, May 21, 1923. The delegate was presumably Darsono, who attended the concurrent third congress of the Comintern. Smith’s letter included an inquiry, on behalf of some American Communists who

440

Notes pp. 211-214 ,

had attended the congress, about the missing Indonesian delegate.

On

the other

hand, Profintem records of the congress listed as present one delegate from Java, who possessed voting rights; Desiat’ let Profinterna v rezoliutsiiakh (Ten Years of the Profintem in Resolutions) (Moscow, 1930), p. 36; see also Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, III, 401. It is possible that Darsono was there on

paper but not

in fact.

58. “Brief des revolutionaren Gewerkschaftszentrums

an das Vollzugsbiiro der R.G.I.” ( Letter of the Revolutionary Labor Federation to the Executive Bureau of the RILU), RGI, November 1922, p. 328. See also Ezhegodnik Kominterna, p. 775; Musso, “How the Influence of the Amsterdam International Is Penetrating Eastern and Colonial Bulletin, no. 11, November 1929, p. 22. 59. “Aus der Gewerkschafts-Bewegung in Niederlandisch-Indien” (From the

in Indonesia,”

Labor Movement in the Netherlands Indies), Inprekorr, Apr. 11, 1923, p. 368. 60. “The Governor General’s Report” in Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings, p. 5, note 4; Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 53; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 27-28.

The first-named accoimt is a translation PKI prepared for public consumption.

of the abridged version of Politieke nota

Krasnogo Internatsionala profsoiuzov v Moskve 19 noiabria-2 dekabria 1922 goda (The Second Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow, Nov. 19-Dec. 2, 1922) ( Moscow/Petrograd, 1923), p. 260, hereafter 11 Kongress Krasnogo; Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdunarodnomy 61. II. Kongress

profdvizheniiu, col. 558. 62.

Programma Congres, ka 12

dari V.S.T.P. Tanggal

2-4 Februari 1923,

63. See Profintem v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 95-96. 64. Ch. E., “Der erste Kongress der revolutionaren Organisationen des

Ostens,” p. 603. Emphasis in the text. 65. Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg.

Movement, 1923-1924) (Moscow, 1924),

p. 1.

Femen

(The International Labor

291; see also II Kongress Krasnogo, p. 291, for expressions of admiration for the revolutionary quality of the Indonesian labor movement. Semaun was elected to the presidium of this congress as the representative for the

p.

Far East. The discussion

of the Profintern’s activities

and semicolonial areas was led by Leo Heller, with Semaun as one of the two coreporters. There were two delegates from Java listed as present at the congress, one with and one without voting rights. The former was probably Semaun and the latter the Dutch former VSTP leader Harry Dekker, who attended the concurrent fifth Comintern congress as a representative of in the colonial

Indonesia. See Desiat

’

pp. 121-122. Vollzugsbiiros der R.G.I.

let Profinterna,

66. “Tatigkeitsbericht

des

September,” RGI, October 1922, 67. L’l.S.R. au travail 1924-1928

bis

1928),

p. 11. In contrast,

tive in the eighteen

die

Zeit

von

Juli

p. 687.

(The RILU

at

Work 1924-1928)

(n.p.,

“Java” was discussed only once by the Profintem execu-

months between

its

1922 and 1924 congresses; Detsiat’

Profinterna, p. 125. 68. The most striking Profintem deviation

from the Comintern

ing Indonesia during this period was the favorable sions of the

fiber

PKI congress

of

December 1924

in

line

comment accorded

let

concernthe deci-

the Profintem executive report

(1928) congress. Die Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1924-1927 (The International Labor Movement in the Years 1924-1927) (Moscow/Berlin, n.d.), p. 64. In Comintern accounts, including that of the sixth (1928) convention, these PKI decisions were consistently decried as an example to its fourth

of the “infantile disease of leftism.”

441

Notes pp. 214-216 ,

69.

Thus a leading student

of the early history of Chinese

Communism

has

remarked:

With remarkable

consistency, attitudes on each of these issues [bourgeoisie, peasantry, proletariat, intelligentsia, political groupings, and role of the foreign powers in China] differed according to definite groups within the Comintern, and among

the Comintern, the Narkomindel, and the Profintem. Far from being monolithic, the Soviet structure of the early twenties presents a fascinating picture of clash and conflict, rooted both in theoretical differences and in political intrigue. .

Whiting, Soviet Policies,

.

.

p. 9.

Semaun, interview, 1959. 71. “Die Tatigkeit des Vollzugsbiiros der R.G.I.” (The Activity of the Executive Bureau of the RILU), RGI, February 1922, p. 148. The functions of this bureau are described in some detail in LI.S.R. au travail 1924-1928, pp. 82-84. In the resolution setting up the office, its task was described as “developing a 70.

broad agitational activity among the workers of the East”; Profintem v rezoliutsiiakh, p. 96.

319-320; Second World Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (Chicago, n.d. ), p. 38; Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg. (1st ed.), p. 108; Profintem v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 99-101. 73. “Resolutions and Appeals of the Third Session of the Red International of Labor Unions,” Inprecorr, Dec. 6, 1923, p. 725; Profintem v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 101-103. 74. Ill Kongress Krasnogo, p. 345; Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 192372. II Kongress Krasnogo, pp.

1924gg.,

1st

ed.,

p.

108;

2d

ed.,

p.

105.

Also IV sessiia Tsentral’nogo soveta

Krasnogo Internatsionala profsoiuzov, 9-15 marta 1926g. (The Fourth Session of the Central Council of the Red International of Labor Unions) (Moscow, 1926), pp. 85, 87.

“Die Tatigkeit des Exekutivbiiros der R.G.I. vom 15. Dezember 1922 bis 1. Juli 1923” (The Activity of the Executive Bureau of the RILU from Dec. 15, 1922, to July 1, 1923), RGI, May/June, 1923, p. 579. For a further description of these offices and their function, see A. Chain, “Die intemationalen Hafenbiiros” (The International Harbor Offices), RGI, August 1923, pp. 751753; and Gautherot, Bolchevisme, pp. 104-106. 76. Malaia entsiklopediia po mezlulunarodnomu profdvizheniiu, col. 1623; O. I., “Osnovnye momenty istorii Profintema” (Basic Moments in the History of the Profintem), Krasnyi Internatsional Profsoiuzov, July/ August 1925, p. 39. Semaun was appointed to this post at the Profintem congress of July 1924. 77. Semaun, interview, 1959; “Communisme,” p. 536, cols, a and b; Bijlage Semarang, p. 9; “Gezagschemering in Nederlandsch-Indie (Twilight of Authority in the Netherlands Indies), Volk cn Vaderland, Sept. 21, 1935, p. 7; Overzicht 1924, p. 8; M. A., “Die Arbeiterbewegung in Indonesien” (The Labor Movement in Indonesia), RGI, December 1924, p. 288; Java Bode, Nov. 21, 1924; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Nov. 23, 1929. 78. M. A., “Die Arbeiterbewegung in Indonesien,” p. 288. According to this 75.

SPLI contained 3,000 seamen and 2,000 dockers. In 1925, according to the Profintem encyclopedia, the union contained 3,000 seamen and 9,000 dockworkers; Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdunarodnomu profdvizheniiu, col. 559. This is probably the total after it had joined forces with the SPPL, which absorbed all the PKI-sponsored seamen’s and dockers’ unions in that year. 79. L. Heller, “Die Pazifik-Konferenz,” p. 42; Heller, “The Trade Unions Con-

account, the

442

Notes pp. 216-219 ,

ference of the Pacific Inprecorr, June 23,

Ocean Countries and the Labour Movement in the Far East,” 1927, p. 763; Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg.,

2d. ed., p. 108; Profintern v rezoliutsiiakh, p. 83. 80. Semaun, interview, 1959.

DP

pp. 110-111, 114. Because the original leader of the delegation deserted, the trip was probably a last-minute affair; Alimin, in any case, was still making speeches at Red SI meetings in late May; Sinar Hindia, May 23 81. Malaka,

and

I,

24, 1924, in IPO, no. 22, 1924, pp. 381-382.

“Die Pazifik-Konferenz,” pp. 53-54. Tan Malaka related that Sun Yat-sen was supposed to address the meeting, but since security conditions in Canton at that time were poor the CCP leader Liao Chung-kai was the major Chinese speaker; Malaka, DP I, p. 115. 83. Heller, “Die Pazifik-Konferenz,” p. 55. According to this report, one of the Javanese spoke no Indonesian; but this must be wrong. What is likely, however, is that one of the Indonesians ( Budisutjitro) spoke no internationally useful 82. Heller,

tongue. 84. 85. 86. 87.

Malaka DP I, p. 123. 7V sessiia TsentraVnogo,

p. 85.

IV sessiia Tsentral'nogo, pp. 85, 87; Profintern v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 90, 110. Ten Years of International Red Aid (USSR, n.d.), p. 177; for the found-

ing and purposes of the organization, see pp. 15-16. 88. From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress (London, 1924), p. 99. 89. Semaun, Ropotan hal kongres 2 di Moskou dan hal konferentie di Ham-

burg (Report on the Congresses in Moscow and the Conference in Hamburg) (mimeo, 1924?), pp. 35-36. 90. Semaun, “Brieven,” June 6 and 8, 1925. Also note that on Mar. 9, 1926, Api printed, with enthusiastic editorial comment, a letter from a provincial Russian IRA group expressing sympathy and promising moral and material aid; the message, dated Aug. 8, 1925, seems to have been not designed specifically for Indonesia but the product of a letter-writing campaign. 91. Politiek verslag 1926, p. 11.

Semaun, interview, 1959. On the other hand, the government claimed that the police uncovered correspondence between the PKI and Sneevliet’s NAS ( National Labor Secretariat, a Communist-syndicalist labor federation) concerning financial support for the 1925 strike effort. Of the money reportedly sent by this organization, /200 was allotted to Surabaja; Politiek verslag 1926, p. 11. This was probably the bulk of the grant, since Surabaja was considered by the Communists at that time to be the most important strike area. 93. Thus the Indische Courant, commenting on speculations of foreign support for the PKI, noted that the party’s allies abroad seemed better at providing the Indies Communist press seemed it with reading material than with money: well acquainted with what Soviet and Dutch party leaders were saying, but the PKI, VSTP, and SR were perennially out of funds, their newspapers were continually being bankrupted, and even Api was appearing irregularly. Sept. 17 and 92.

18, 1924.

94. Api, Oct. 18, 1924, in IPO, no. 43, 1924, pp. 156-157. 95. At the time of Darsono’s 1920 attack, the Jogjakarta

group had replied (then associated with Alimin Tjokroaminoto and that Musso would be able ) only they were out if of prison, the issue since they had been involved to clear up was not really Musso informed or he was led by partisan in the affair. Either at major charge a Sarekat Islam rally on May 25, 1924; zeal to renew Darsono’s

443

Notes pp. 219-221 ,

this set off a

Baroe,

May

new round

31, June 2-7

in the

and

10,

Mata Hari, May 26, 1924; Hindia 1924; Sinar Hindia, May 28 and June 10, 1924;

SI-PKI

fight.

IPO, nos, 22—24, 1924, pp. 395—396, 413—418, 4/ /—479, 483—485, 532r-534. Musso stated that Alimin had given the funds for Salim’s trip to Tjokroaminoto; his opponents denied it, and Alimin himself was unavailable, presumably on his way to Canton. When he returned in July, he was pressed for an answer and he gave one: the funds had never existed. Contributions from the SI branches in

had not come in, and so the receipt shame the delinquent locals into doing

of the

money was announced

their part;

H indin

in order to

Baroe, July 24-30, 1924,

IPO, no. 31, 1924, pp. 220-221. This explanation had the ring of truth, and Salim’s Hindia Baroe published it in exoneration of Tjokroaminoto. However, at the Sarekat Islam congress a month later, another version of the affair was presented as part of the meeting’s anti-PKI drive. Salim and Tjokroaminoto claimed there that the money had actually existed and gave a long list of legitimate purposes for which they said it had been used, demanding that the Communists reciprocate by providing a public accounting of the funds they received from Moscow and Shanghai; Verslag van het lie Kongres der Centrale Sarikat Islam, in

pp. 13-14. 96. Sinar Hindia, Dec. 4, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, p. 525;

Semaun, Rapotan,

pp. 48-49. 97. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 48—49. 98. Penolong Kaum Buruh (PKB). This organization

had sprouted from an older fund, the Penolong Isteri Korban Pergeraken (PIKP, Fund for the Aid of Wives of Victims from the Movement). At the same time it announced the establishment of the PKB, the party also declared its intention to found a Fund for Victims in the Cause of Freedom (Fonds Korban Kemerdekaan ) this in response to a proposal by the nationalist leader Sutomo; Api, Mar. 28, 1925. 99. The list was found in a raid on the Sarekat Postel headquarters in Surabaja; it was designated for “Support for China and Canton”; Politiek verslag 1926, ,

p. 18.

“The Peasants International to the Peasants of the Whole World,” lnprecorr, July 19, 1924, p. 440; “Hands off China,” Inprecorr, Sept. 11, 1924, p. 769. There were two other Asians on the Krestintem executive, Sen Katayama and Ken Hayashi, both of Japan. For the text of the Krestintem appeal to the colonies, see Der Weltbund der Bauern (The Peasant International) (Berlin, 1924), pp. 48-49. The Krestintem also challenged the August 1925 congress of the Second International to act on behalf of the peasants in the colonies; it did so, it claimed, on the urging of several members of Asian national revolutionary organizations. The text of this message was reprinted in Api, Jan. 23, 1926. 101. Shestoi rasshirennyi plenum lspolkoma Kominterna (Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern) (Moscow/Leningrad, 1927), p. 3; Leon Trotsky, The Third International after Lenin (New York, 100.

1936),

p.

346, note 74.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche C ourant, July 27, 1930, reporting the government decision to intern Iwa Kusumasumantri. It is possible that he was working for the International Agrarian Institute (MAI), which opened in Moscow on Mar. 8, 1926, as a research branch of the Krestintem. The institute published a journal, Agrarnye Prohlemy (Agrarian Problems), which was also put out in Berlin as Agrarprohlcme. The MAI was divided into four departments, of which one was concerned with the international peasant movement; one section of this division devoted itself to Asia. “The International Agrarian Institute of the 102.

International Peasant Council,” Inprecorr

.

444

May

13,

1926, p. 665.

)

Notes, pp. 221-222 103. S.

The

Dingley,

Farmers’ and Peasants’

Feasants

Movement

Indonesia

in

[Krestintem],

International

R.

L.

(Library

Prager,

of

the

Berlin,

n.d.

[1926]). In the government’s charges against Iwa Kusumasumantri, this pamphlet

is

referred to as Bor ha Krest’ ianstva,

sian version:

S.

which

is

taken from the

Dingli, Bor ha Krest’ ianstva v Indonezii

title of its

Rus-

(The Struggle of the

Peasantry in Indonesia) (Biblioteka Krestintema, Moscow, n.d.). 104. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 45-46.

Wongso, Kitah Tani; Boekoe Boeat Kaoem Tani Indonesia (The Peasant’s Guide; a Book for the Peasants of Indonesia) (Amsterdam, May 1925, no indication of publisher or printer). “Wongso” is almost certainly a pseudonym. My best guess as to the author is Semaun, although if it is he, it is puzzling that he did not use his real name as in his other writings from abroad. The pamphlet is written in very simple Indonesian, almost market Malay, and its author 105.

assumes the role of a peasant talking to his fellows. 106. The demands were as follows: a. Proprietary lands should be confiscated and distributed without charge the peasants living on them. b.

also c.

The lands

of the

Sunan

of Surakarta

to

and the Sultan of Jogjakarta should

be confiscated and distributed among the peasants of those regions. Taxes on the peasantry should be reduced to accord with the general

wishes of the peasants.

Unpaid labor

Outer Islands should be completely abolished, and not simply replaced with cash payments. e. The payment of premiums or rewards to village heads or other state officials involved in fixing and collecting taxes should be halted. f. Plantations should be strictly forbidden to give rewards to village officials d.

who

for the authorities

(

rodi , heerendienst

in the

influence the renting of lands to sugar factories or other capitalist enterprises.

The

should prohibit the leasing of land by sugar fatcories for more than one cane-growing season, and the rent should be calculated anew each g.

state

season. h.

The peasants should be given

and control of the

a right to participate in the

management

irrigation systems, so that the plantations cannot arbitrarily

dispose of the water supply. i.

Numerous

rural

banks should be established, providing cheap credit for

the peasantry.

Moneylenders who ask exorbitant interest rates should be punished. k. Schools and courses should be set up to spread literacy among peasants of both sexes. l. Sufficient schools for peasant children should be provided. m. Schools of agriculture should be established from primary to advanced j.

levels.

Rural community centers should be set up to provide libraries, courses on agrarian and general affairs, art work, etc. arms should be given to the o. The defense budget should be reduced; workers and peasants in order that they may establish an independent nation, n.

and domestic capitalists. p. Villagers should be given the right to regulate local affairs by meetings in which all villagers eighteen years and over have the right to participate and vote. q. Village officials should be elected yearly by the town meetings and may be dismissed by them at any time. adult peasr. Representatives to district assemblies should be elected by all free of foreign

445

,

Notes pp. 222-223 ,

ants, workers, petty bourgeois,

and

intellectuals in a ratio of

about

1

for 3,000

people. s.

There should also be assemblies

for every

by the district assemblies. The bangsa- level assemblies should

major ethnic group

(

bangsa )

elected t.

elect

members

to

an Indonesian People

s

Assembly. elect executives at their respective levels,

above bodies should

u. All the

and

in

such a manner as to ensure the inclusion of peasants in them. months v. Assemblies above the village level should meet at least every six to determine school arrangements, the government budget, foreign affairs, etc., and, having chosen people to state affairs, should disband, so that every delegate could return to the assembly that had elected him and report on what had been transacted. The decisions would thus be passed back down to the people themselves,

who would put them

into practice.

w. Local and regional assemblies should have the power to govern their individual districts, in accord with the general line provided by the Indonesian People’s Assembly. Indonesian People’s Assembly should have the right to elect an x. The Indonesian People’s Government and to determine affairs affecting the country as a whole.

Wongso, Kitab Tani, pp. 14-19. 107. Wongso, Kitab Tani, p. 21. 108. Wongso, Kitab Tani, p. 23. 109. Wongso, Kitab Tani, pp. 24-25. 110. During the Madiun congress the CSI devoted a conference to the agrarian question, which decided to form a Sarekat Tani. Its program was to protect peasants from disadvantageous land-rent contracts made with plantations by the village heads or closed by the peasants themselves for ready cash. All landowners except village officials could belong to it; the members were to pay dues to the local branch of the association and not rent land or borrow money without consulting the local. The ST groups were to use their funds for crop loans, the purchase of tools, seed, and livestock, and, if possible, to start cooperaMar. 11-21, 1923, in IPO, no. 18, 1923, p. 223. Nothhave come of this project, probably because of the general collapse

tive enterprises; Partij SI,

ing seems to of the SI.

111. “Manifest

Volker des

Femen

des

Kongresses

Ostens,” p.

der Werktiitigen

des

Femen

Ostens an die

144.

“The Trade Union Conference of the Pacific Ocean Countries and the Labour Movement in the Far East,” p. 763; Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-1924gg., 2d ed., p. 108; Projxntem v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 105, 110; A. Lozovsky, “Kuda idet razvitiia mezhdunarodnogo profdvizheniia?” (In What Direction Is the International Labor Movement Developing?), Krasnyi Internatsional Profsoiuzov, February 1926, p. 144; IV sessiia Tsentral’nogo, p. 85. 112. Heller,

113. Politieke nota PKI, p. 4. 114. See G. Lai-Shou, “The International of the East,” Inprecorr, Dec. 24, 1925, p.

Union

1350.

The

of

the

Oppressed Peoples

organization

is

called the

Oppressed Peoples in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 280, and Association of Oppressed Peoples of Asia in People’s China, Dec. 16, 1950, p. 14. The Chinese Communist leader Liao Chung-kai was also instrumental in setting

League

of

up the Union.

Its constitution

declared

its

purpose to be the “gathering together

of all forces of the oppressed nationalities in order to carry through the liberating

revolution”;

Lai-Shou, “The International Union,” p.

446

1350. At

first

the Union

Notes pp. 223-226 ,

concerned itself with China and the countries bordering it (India, Indochina, and Korea), but at its second conference in 1925 it declared its intention to establish connections with the revolutionary movement in Japan and with na-

and Africa (p. 1350). There is no evidence that the Union linked with the PKI in the Indies, though it may have established connections with the PKI group in Singapore. It ended in 1927, with the break between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. 115. Api, Apr. 4, 1925, citing Tan Malaka’s paper, The Dawn. 116. Semaun, interview, 1959. 117. One of the more esoteric projects for this purpose was to utilize a radio station owned by the Trade Unions Council of New South Wales to relay short-wave messages from Moscow and Canton to the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia; M. P., “Rabochee dvizhenie Avstralii i Tikhookeanskaia konferentsiia profsoiuzov” (The Workers Movement of Australia and the Pacific Conference of Labor Unions), Krasnyi Internatsional Profsoiuzov, November 1926, p. 439. tionalist

organizations

the

India,

in

118. Voitinsky, “Go-min’-dan

Philippines,

Java,

kompartiia Kitaia v bor’be

imperializmom” ( The Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China in the Struggle with Imperialism), Novyi Vostok, no. 6, 1924, p. xxvi.

“Onze

i

s

was described as a gathering of the [seamen’s?] union Kung Tan Hwee Koan, which had its headquarters in Shanghai and several hundred members in its Surabaja division. Apparently the ISDV leaders’ appearance was not very successful; Sneevliet noted that language was a major stumbling block. 119. Sneevliet,

De

eerste 1 Mei-viering,” p.

197. This

1919, 642. According to this report, Semaun urged the Sarekat Islam to ask the Indies Chinese organizations to influence the govern120.

ment

Indische Gids,

China

I,

and freedom of political activity for all residents of the Indies. This may have been an appeal to the widespread feeling that the recent advances in the legal rights of Japanese and Chinese residents of the Indies were due largely to their identification with foreign states. The CSI was not particularly taken with the idea, however: it rejected it, according to this report, six to three and one abstention. 121. Soeara Ra’jat, Aug. 10, 1922, in IPO, no. 32, 1920, p. 4. 122. Sinar Hindia, Sept. 13, 1921, in IPO, no. 40, 1922, pp. 11-12. 123. Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960), pp. 40-42. 124. At the May Day celebrations in Semarang, pictures of Lenin, Marx, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Sun Yat-sen, Semaun, and Tan Malaka were displayed; IPO, no. 19, 1924, p. 233. The same constellation was shown at the June 1924 congress; Verslag 9de, p. 2. 125. Bataviaasch Handehblad, July 21, 1924; Bijlage Semarang, p. 12; Overzicht 1924, p. 8; Politiek verslag 1926, p. 2; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Aug. 4, 1925; Bijlage 1925, pp. 14-15; Semaun, “Der internationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens” (International Imperialism and the Communist Party of Indonesia), Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1925, Sonderheft, p. 58; Siruir Hindia, June 27, 28, and 30 and July 1, 1924, in IPO, no. 28, 1924; Api, Aug. 19-23, 1924, in IPO, no. 35, 1924, pp. 415-417; Api, Aug. 25-30, 1924, in IPO, no. 36, 1924, p. 457. The last-named source reports the formation of the China flood committee (Comite Penjokong Korban Bahaja Kebandjiran di Tjiongkok); its chairman and secretary were Indonesians and its in

to press for equality

treasurer an Indies Chinese. 126. Verslag 9 de, p. 7. 127. Soeara Rajat, Aug. 20/30, 1924, in IPO, no. 37, 1924, p. 545.

447

Notes, pp. 227-229 128. Api, Aug. 19-23, 1924, in IPO, no. 35, 1924, pp. 415-417. 129. Overzicht 1924, p. 8; IPO, no. 37, 1924, pp. 503-506. 130. Api, Mar. 30, Apr. 14 and 16, 1925; Si Tetap, Mar. 31, 1925, in IPO,

Goenawan, Tiongkok dan Dr. Sun Yat-sen Marhoem (China and the Late Dr. Sun Yat-sen) (Bandung, 1925). 131. Api, June 22—27, June 29—July 4, July 6—11, July 12—17, July 20—25, 1925,

no. 21, 1925, p. 341;

IPO, nos. 27-31, 1925, pp. 3-6, 52-54, 99-100, 107, 109-110, 148, 202-203. The paper urged that contributions be sent to Sin Po and declared that money collected by PKI-affiliated organizations was being transferred to that newspaper, which was oriented toward the Indies-born Chinese and took a radically nonco-

in

operative stand toward the colonial regime. 132. See, for example, Sedio Tomo (a Budi

organ), July 13, 1925, and Sri Djojobojo (an SI paper), July 16, 1925, in IPO, no. 25, 1925, pp. 170-171,

Utomo

189.

133. See, for example,

the articles

July 18 and 22 and Sept. 10, 1925, in

by Hadji Agus Salim in Hindia Baroe, IPO, nos. 30 and 38, 1925, pp. 162, 165-

166, 546. 134. For remarks on the

the 1920s, see

Ong Eng

Kuomintang

conspiratorial groups in the Indies during

Die, Chineezen in

Nederlandsch-lndie

(Chinese in the Chineezen in Neder-

Netherlands Indies) (Assen, 1943), p. 257; J. Th. Moll, De landsch-Indie (The Chinese in the Netherlands Indies) (Utrecht, 1928?), p. 31. 135. Api, July 16, 1925, in IPO, no. 30, 1925, p. 147. 136. Semaun, “Der intemationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens,” p. 58. See also the comments in Samin, “Der Aufstand auf

Java und Sumatra

)

(

Indonesien ”

(The Uprising

in

Java and Sumatra [Indo-

Kommunistische Internationale, Apr. 12, 1927, p. 742. The latter is an article by Darsono, who used “Kijai Samin” as his Comintern name. 137. Soerabajasch Handelsblad, Aug. 8, 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Oct. 5, 1925. The government continued to be concerned for the revolutionary influence of the KMT after the destruction of the PKI: in early 1927 it distributed a memorandum to its officials in which it noted that insofar as Communist sympathies were found among Kuomintang supporters, “then the highest interests of our authority are naturally immediately involved, and propaganda for these principles— whether or not in connection with the native Communist movementmust be considered impermissible.” Overzicht 1926, Chapter V, p. 2; and see also pp. 12—13. The fear of Kuomintang revolutionary influence persisted even after the final rupture between the KMT and CCP; see Ong, Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indie, pp. 257-258. 138. Thus Sin Po published an article on June 11, 1925, stating at some length that the only white men who had supported the Chinese struggle were the Reds, and especially the Russians. Api reprinted and praised the essay, though it expressed the hope that Sin Po did not mean to include the socialists in the “Red” group. Api, June 15, 1925, in IPO, no. 26, 1925, pp. 555-557. 139. One of the principal PKI efforts during 1925 was to secure Chinese workers in its various unions. Pramudya Ananta Toer, Hoa Kiau di Indonesia (Overseas Chinese in Indonesia) (Djakarta, 1960), pp. 94-95, lists a number of PKI-sponsored unions in which Chinese were said to participate, but their numbers must have been small. Chinese were not noted by government reports as having participated to any extent in the PKI-sponsored Surabaja and Semarang labor protests of 192o. An Indies Chinese, Tan Ping Tjiat, was appointed to the executive of the SPPL (Seamens and Dockers’ Union), which was formed at nesia]), Die

448

Notes pp. 229-232 ,

was probably because the archipelago would enter it. “Communisme,” the end of

1924; this

it

was hoped Chinese

p. 536, b; Toer,

sailors

in

Hoa

Kiau, p. 94. eutraliseering, p. 10; and see M. M., “De 140. Politieke nota PKI, pp. 7-8; Partai Kommunis Indonesia, de stem van Moskou” (The Communist Party of

N

Moscow), Internationale Spectator, May 16, 1951, p. Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background (London, n.d.), pp.

Indonesia, the Voice of 141.

110 - 112

6.

106,

.

142. Hanrahan,

The Communist Struggle

in Malatja

(New

York, 1956), p. 6, cites wartime Japanese military intelligence documents to the effect that Alimin,

stopping in Singapore in the early spring of 1924 on his

way

to the Pan-Pacific

Workers’ Conference], seems to have carried out limited recruitment among radical elements there. He evidently made a full report on his activities to the Comintern at the conference, this account continues, for early in 1925 Tan Malaka persuaded CCP leaders in Canton to infiltrate left-wing groups in Singapore; accordingly, a special CCP representative, reportedly named Fu Ta-ching, was sent to Malaya to effect a liaison with resident Chinese and Indonesian revolutionaries. If Alimin did take up contacts with Malayan radicals in 1924, it seems more likely that he did it on his earlier visit (where he reportedly met with Tan Malaka, who gave him the theses presented at the June 1924 PKI congress) than on the way to Canton: what we know of his schedule indicates that he spent very little time in Singapore on the second journey. Since it also appears that Tan Malaka spent some time in Singapore before the Canton conference and that he found Canton inconvenient as a base, we may well wonder whether he and not Alimin initiated the idea for activity in Malaya. Neither Malaka nor Alimin mention playing such a role in their autobiographies, and I have found no corroborating evidence for it, although (given the patchy and unreliable nature of the available reports) this is not to say something of the sort might not have taken place. 143. Darsono, interviews with the author in 1959 and with George McT. Kahin

Labor Conference

[sic;

Pacific Transport

in 1955.

Semaun, interviews, 1959. 145. Just when Subakat arrived in Singapore is not certain. According to Darsono (interview with G. McT. Kahin, 1955), he had been planning to leave at the time of the December 1924 PKI congress, since proceedings for his internment were already under way. A possible clue is an article published in Api by “Exter” (Extemeerd, Exiled?), datelined Johore and apparently written before May Day, which said that its writer had been in Pontianak, Borneo, had stayed there about a month, and had then traveled to the Riouw Islands, Singapore, and Johore. On the way he had tried to recruit seamen for the SPPL but without much success; he also noted that although there were many workers in Singapore, it looked as if they would be hard to organize. Api, May 22, 1925. 146. Organisation et activite de V Internationale Communiste (Organization and 144.

Activity of the

Communist

International)

of the “semicolonial” lands, to

which no

(Paris, n.d.), pp.

15-16.

The

parties

specific metropolis could

be assigned (China, Korea, Mongolia, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine), were assigned to the eleventh section. This secretariat arrangement was distinct from that of the Comintern Eastern Section, which was subdivided into Near, Middle, and Far East groups and was concerned primarily with supplying the Comintern with information on the Communist movements in these areas and with overseeing the execution of

der Exekutive 15.

ECCI

decisions in the Asian countries. See Bericht

Dezemher 1922-15. Mai 1923,

449

p. 9.

Notes pp. 232-235 ,

147. Jane Degras, ed.,

The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents

(London, 1956), I, 327, quoting an ECCI resolution of Mar. 4, 1922; Losowsky, “Vor dem dritten Kongress der R.G.I.” ( Before the Third Congress of the Profintem), RGI, June 1924, p. 335; “Theses on Tactics, Inprecorr, Aug. 29, 1924, p. 652; “Resolution on the Question of the Relations of the Comintern with the International Peasants Council,” Inprecorr, Sept. 5, 1924, p. 686. 148. Van Ravesteyn, De wording van het Communisme in Nederland, 19071925, p. 140. 149. “Jaarvergadering Indische S.D.A.P.,” p. 1174; 1918-1919; pp. 2044-2045 (speech by Albarda).

Handelingen 2e Kamer,

1921-1922, pp. 270-274. In the Volksraad the autonomy action leaders Van Hinloopen Labberton (NIVB), Cramer (ISDP), and Vreede (ISDP) had urged the adoption of Indonesia, the Dutch-language equivalent of Indonesia. Van Ravesteyn declared in the Dutch parliamentary debate that this was not going far enough; only the completely Indonesian version would do. The SDAP spokesman Albarda maintained, however, that Indo150. Handelingen 2e Kamer,

nesia/Indonesie, like the earlier sobriquet Insulinde,

and that colony’s

was only necessary

it

to

was a “fad

of the

moment”

remove the possessive Netherlands from the

title.

Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202. 152. Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202; Handelingen 2e Kamer, 1918-1919, pp. 2022, 2027. Van Ravesteyn also called for a halt to further development of a commercial economy in the Indies, on the grounds that only through improving peasant agriculture could the population be fed. The SDAP, we will remem151.

development of indigenously run industry in the colony, and the Socialist spokesman Albarda denounced the CPH position as reactionary and aimed at preserving Indonesia as a preindustrial area; Handelingen 2e Kamer, 1918-1919, pp. 2047-2048. The Communists may have realized how unfavorably the argument could be construed, for they did not make a point of it again. 153. “Het tiende jaarcongres van de communistische partij” (The Tenth Annual Congress of the Communist Party), HVW, Aug. 23, 1919, p. 414-415; Van Ravesteyn, De wording, p. 202; vBr., “Sneevliet Slamat!” (Hurrah for Sneevliet!), HVW, Aug. 23, 1919, p. 409. The last article notes that the Indies Comber, favored the

munists had expected the Dutch party to give Sneevliet an important post immediately on his return; they had been puzzled by its failure to do so, but apparently its leaders had wanted to wait until the partv congress. It had also

De Tribune, the article continued; that position would probably have been more to Sneevliet’s liking, but the CPH leadership seemed to prefer him in the role of propagandistbeen proposed that Sneevliet

join the editorial staff of

administrator.

HVW,

and 28, 1920, pp. 161—163, 171-172. Van Ravesteyn appealed to the Minister of Colonies to review the case and introduced parliamentary motions to abolish extraordinary rights and abrogate the decision exteming Sneevliet; the first was defeated 19 to 36, the second 20 to 26. HVW, Jan. 10, 154.

1920, p. 155.

Feb. 21

1.

HVW,

Oct. 20, 1920, p. Roland Holst, Het

1.

Amsterdamsch bureau der Communistische In(The Amsterdam Bureau ternationale” of the Communist International), HVW, 156. H.

Feb. 28, 1920, p. 170. 157. “De intemationale International

communistische

Communist Conference

in

conference

te

Amsterdam”

Amsterdam), De Tribune, Mar.

450

(The

20, 1920,

.

Notes, pp. 235-241

De Tribune, July 8, 1920; Theodore American Communism (New York, 1957), pp. 233-234. 158. De Tribune, Nov. 14, 16, and 18, 1921; Gerald

supplement, p.

of the

159.

1;

Dutch Communist The resolution as

Draper, The Roots of Vanter, “The Congress

Party,” Inprecorr, Dec. 13, 1921, p. 134. translated

Gerald Vanter, “Dutch Imperialism in 1922, p. 11; emphasis in the text. For the in

the East Indies,” Inprecorr, Jan. 6, Dutch text, see De Tribune, Nov. 18, 1921. 160. Tan Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 32-33; Javasche Courant, Aug. 16, 1923; Tribune, June 22, 1922, supplement, p. 1. 161. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 98. 162. De Tribune, Apr. 29, May 2, 3,

Malaka,

DP

I,

and

11, 1924;

Malaka, Toendoek,

De

p. 98;

p. 92.

163. Malaka, Toendoek, p. 98. 164. Handelingen 2e Kamer, 1921-1922, pp. 2756, 2762-2765, 2772. Wijnkoop also protested the persecution of the Temate PKI leaders, the action taken

Abdul Muis and Reksodiputro as a result of the pawnshop strike, and the general restrictions on freedom of speech and press. His motion was defeated, 60 to 23. 165. De Tribune, May 11, 1922 (from the announcement of Tan Malaka’s against the SI leaders

candidacy ) 166. For information on Malaka’s campaign, see Malaka, DP I, pp. 92-93; Malaka, Toendoek, pp. 98-99; De Tribune, June 22, 1922, supplement; Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 1, 1922, in IPO, no. 39, 1922, p. 491; Gerard Vanter, “Die Situation in Holland” (The Situation in Holland), Inprekorr, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 1514. The CPH vote in the 1922 elections was Wijnkoop, 44,054; Van Ravesteyn, 1,709; Tan Malaka, 5,211; Kruit, 577; De Visser, 1,006; plus five minor candidates. 167. P. B., “Het eenheidsfront in Indonesia” (The United Front in Indonesia),

De

Tribune, Sept.

8,

1922.

“Het eenheidsfront in Indonesie,” emphasis in the text. 169. Letter from Bergsma in Franeker, Holland, to Semaun in Semarang, Feb. 168. P. B.,

20, 1923.

170.

Semaun, interview, 1959.

171. Sinar Hindia, Sept. 27, 1923, in IPO, no. 41, 1923, p. 56.

172. Sinar Hindia, Sept. 26, 1923, in IPO, no. 41, 1923, p. 56; Sinar Hindia,

Nov. 1, 1923, in IPO, no. 46, 1923, p. 305 (letter from Semaun); Goenawan, Semaoen, pp. 17-18. 173. On Dec. 16, 1924, the government claimed, Semaun wrote the PKI executive a letter describing his efforts among the students and opining that he seemed to be getting good results; Neutraliseering, p. 10. Semaun stated (interview, 1959) that he found it easy to work among the students; this was not particularly because of their attraction to Communism, though a few did become party members, others sympathized strongly with the movement but did not join it, and still others were Marxists but not pro-Communist. Nationalist emotions were, he declared, the real drawing card. 174. “Communistische invloeden in het Oosten” (Communist Influences in the East), Gedenkboek 1908-1923. Indonesische Vereeniging (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1 18— 119.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, July 27 and Sept. 3 and 23, 1930; Neutraliseering, p. 10; “Communisme,” pp. 536, col. a; Java Bode, Nov. 21, 1924. 176. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 3, 1929 and June 30 and July 27, 1930; Rapport over de S.K.B.I. (Report on the SKBI) (typescript report by the 175. See

451

;

Notes, pp. 241-246 Dutch

Indies socialist party [ISDP] to the

Which it

of the universities

is

socialist party,

[SDAP],

Semaun

not apparent; according to

n.d.), pp. 2, 7.

(interview, 1959),

was the Lenin School, but the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, July 27, 1930,

reporting the

government’s charges, refers to

thus perhaps the

it

the

as

“Eastern

University,’

KUTV.

From

the original English as quoted in Neutraliseering, p. 13. 178. Semaoen, Hoe het Hollandsche imperialisme het bruine millionenvolk 177.

aanzet tot een massamord op Europeanen in Indonesia, p. 30; announcement by the CPH executive following the text of a pamphlet written by Semaun shortly after his arrival in Holland.

[May, 1924], p. 1. 180. Indische Courant, Sept. 18, 1924. From the summaries of Pandoe Merah contents in the Indonesian press survey, this would seem a quite accurate remark. See IPO, no. 34, 1924, pp. 407-408; no. 37, 1924, p. 564; no. 46, 1924, 179.

“Onze taak” (Our Task), Pandoe Merah,

I,

1

p. 339.

Semaun, interview, 1959. The first government action against the importation of Pandoe Merah and other Communist material from Holland was a raid on the incoming passenger ship Insulinde the police confiscated a suitcase full of letters and publications brought in by a cabin boy who was the “consul” for the SPLI on that ship. Api, Oct. 1 and 2, 1924, in IPO, no. 41, 1924, pp. 52-53. 181.

And

see Java Bode, Sept. 30, 1924.

182. “Discussion of the Report of

Comrade

Zinoviev,” Inprecorr, Mar. 10, 1926,

p. 278.

Semaun and Darsono, interviews, 1959. 184. In May 1920 the SDP/CPII had boasted between 3,000 and 4,000 members. Wijnkoop, “Ueber die hollandische kommunistische Bewegung” (On the Dutch Communist Movement), in Berichte zum zweiten Kongress der Kom183.

was noted that membership had shrunk to 1,480; Bericht der Exekutive 15. Dezember 1922—15, Mai 1923, p. 47. It was thus about the same size as the PKI in the mid-1920s. 185. See Leerboek voor de arbeidersbeiveging (Textbook for the Workers’ Movement) (Amsterdam, 1953), p. 142 (a history of the Dutch Communist movement from the Stalinist viewpoint), and Otchet Ispolkoma Kominterna (apreV 1925g.-ianvar 1926g.) (Report of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, April 1925-January 1926) (Moscow/Leningrad, 1926), pp. 26-27. According to the latter source, 518 of the 1,526 members of the CPH had voted for the “rightist” ( Wijnkoop-Van Ravesteyn) group when the party split. At the beginning of 1926, when the report was written, the dust was still settling from the feud, and the Communist Party was really functioning only in Ammunistischen Internationale,

p.

250. At the beginning of 1923

it

sterdam.

Semaun, interview, 1959; and see the text of the Sneevliet-Dekker letter below. Semaun’s appointment had certain publicity advantages for Indonesia; it was noted enthusiastically, for example, in the Budi Utomo organ Sedio Tomo, June 8, 1925, in IPO, no. 25, 1925, p. 534. 187. Leerboek voor de arbeidersbeiveging, pp. 111-112. 188. Semaun and Darsono, interviews, 1959. 186.

189.

From

the Fourth to the Fifth

World Congress,

p. 71.

190. Inprecorr, July 23, 1924, p. 488. 191.

“The V. World Congress

of the

Communist

International;

Continuation

of the Discussion of the Report of the Executive,” Inprecorr, July 24, 1924, pp. 500-501. Semaun’s own account of his dispute with the at the fifth

CPH

452

Notes pp. 246-258 ,

Comintern congress can be found in Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 15-16. There he added that the European Communist parties should “begin now to really help our movement in the colonies and stop simply talking big while doing nothing.” 192.

“The V. World Congress

of the

Communist

International:

of the Discussion of the Report of the Executive,” p. 504. 193. “Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zinoviev,”

Continuation

Inprecorr,

Mar.

10,

1926, p. 278; Inprecorr, Mar. 13, 1926, p. 304; and see Boersner, Bolsheviks, pp. 198-199. 194. Letter to

Semaun from Aliarcham, dated

July 20,

1924, appended to

Semaun, Report to the Eastern Sections of the Comintern and Profintern (typescript, dated Moscow, Nov. 15, 1924), hereafter cited as Eastern. Semaun translated the letter into English; I have made some grammatical changes for the sake of readability. 195. 196.

Semaun and Rustam EfTendi, interviews, 1959. At this juncture Semaun appended the letter by Aliarcham quoted above;

presumably, therefore, Sneevliet had been instrumental in pushing the creation of a Dutch section of the PKI (though it had first been proposed before his return to the Netherlands) and had done so at least in part to counter Semaun’s position as the PKI’s sole

European representative.

Semaun, Eastern, pp. 1-5. The original of this report is in English; since Semaun’s grammar in that language was rather shaky, I have made changes in the interest of readability while attempting to preserve his imagery. Emphasis is as in the original. Presumably the quarrel over printing materials on a nonCPH press referred to Pandoe Merah, which was put out by a private Amster197.

dam

firm.

198.

Neutraliseering,

p.

13.

199. Politieke nota PKI, p.

8;

from the original English as quoted by

this

source.

200. Letter from

Sneevliet

and Dekker

to

Tan Malaka and Sugono, dated

June 1925. The Comintern denunciation of Semaun’s policies to which the letter refers is in all likelihood the April 1925 ECCI session, where the PKI leftist deviation and the party’s relation to the Sarekat Rakjat were denounced. The articles in De Tribune are Semaun’s “Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten” (Letters on the Struggle in the East), in which he reported the ECCI decisions and, although admitting his error in placing the Sarekat Rakjat under the PKI, made the most of his role as chairman of the Indonesian party. 201. Politieke nota PKI, p. 8. 202. Both Semaun and Darsono emphasized in interviews in 1959 that the Comintern had little knowledge of or interest in the Indonesian movement.

CHAPTER X 1.

Bijlage Semarang, p. 8;

“Communisme,” pp. 534,

col.

b and 535,

col. a.

Sinar Hindia, July 8-29, 1924, in IPO, no. 31, 1924, p. 230. It was also asked that requests be made in writing, apparently to avoid later denial that 2.

the propagandist 3.

had been sent on the branch’s

initiative.

Api, Dec. 16-17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 603. The PKI executive reported that from May through September

1924 it received a monthly average of /28 in entrance fees, /6 50 in contributions and dues from the party, /20 in contributions and dues from the SR, /35 from the sale of pamphlets and /210 from the press; expenses were about /800 a month. 4.

453

Notes pp. 258-259 ,

This would indicate the executive was able to keep its head above water; but whereas the party had a balance of /159.22 in May 1924, it reported itself /1 17.49 in debt at the end of September; Soeara Ra’jat, Oct. 10/20, 1924, in IPO, no. 50,

month

1924, p. 541. In contrast, the VSTP had reported that in the prestrike of December 1922 it had received /2831.60 (in January 1923, /2757.08)

and had a total of /1797.15 in its press fund; Si Tetap, December, January/February 1923, in IPO, nos. 8 and 12, 1923, pp. 387 and 635. Semaun, although he was chairman of both the PKI and the VSTP, drew salary only from the union, which paid him the Europeanscale wage of /250 a month. 5. For expressions of Fock’s attitude, see the government reply to Volksraad demands, following the expulsion of Tan Malaka and Bergsma, that all Communist and revolutionary socialist activity be prohibited; Handelingen Volksraad, 1922, First Session, Bijlagen, Onderwerp 1, Afd. I, Stuk 8, pp. 8-9. See also its reply to demands that the Dutch PKI member G. van Munster be removed from his position as head of a government school; Onderwerp 1, Afd. V, Stuk in contributions, J449.62 (/248.20) in entry fees,

8, p. 2.

These laws, popularly called the hate-sowing articles ( liaatzaai-artikelen ), made liable to punishment those who made public “a writing or illustration, in which feelings of hostility, hate, or contempt toward the Government of the Netherlands or of the Netherlands Indies are awakened or encouraged” (Article 155) and those who “intentionally awaken or encourage feelings of hostility, hate, or contempt among or toward groups of the population of the Netherlands Indies” (Article 156). Both laws were much objected to by the Indonesian opposition, particularly the latter provision, which was not employed against Indies Dutch journalists, though the government itself complained of the derogatory manner in which the Dutch-language press tended to refer to the native population. In 1923 the Attorney General urged the addition of a temporary censorship in times of tension and the expansion of the hate-sowing articles with a prohibition on sowing class hatred, “which would provide a simple weapon, in the opinion 6.

of

its

proponent, especially against the Native press”;

Kem, Overzicht Residenten-

conjerentie, p. 37.

During the 1920s numerous complaints were addressed to the government in the Volksraad and Dutch parliament about preventive detention for political purposes; however, the government was generally reluctant to furnish information on the subject. It did state in the 1923 Volksraad budget debate that at the end of 1921 there were 12,346 persons in preventive detention but that it could not specify which were held on political grounds; Handelingen Volksraad, 1922, First Session, Bijlagen, Ond. 1, Afd. II, Stuk 7, p. 3. It was similarly disinclined to furnish information on the number of prosecutions for breaches of the speech and press laws: in the 1927 parliamentary Indies budget debate the Minister of 7.

Colonies replied to long-standing demands for the number of such arrests for 1923 and 1924 by saying that he had not yet received word from the Indies on the subject; Bcgrooting 1927, p. 224. 8. After the arrests the party newspaper requested the PKI branches to be patient about replies from the executive, for the imprisonment of Aliarcham and Budisutjitro,

who had

charge of

correspondence, publications, and financial matters, had thrown its affairs into confusion; Sinar Hindia, Oct. 22, 1923, in IPO, no. 43, 1923, p. 149. Presumably this also affected foreign communications, since Aliarcham and Budisutjitro handled contact with Tan Malaka. 9.

its

For a summary of the main measures taken during 1923-1924, see

454

De

Notes

,

p.

259

Indische Gids, XLVII, 1925, 163-169; and further, XLV, 1923, 632-633, 736738; XLVII, 1925, 243-244, 263-264, 354-357; Overzicht 1924, pp. 11-12;

Begrooting 1924, pp. 181-182, 196; Begrooting 1925, pp. 197-198, 214-216; Api, July 9, 1925, in IPO, no. 29, 1925, pp. 103-105. The restrictions on travel and residence were chiefly aimed at preventing the spread of political activity from Java to the Outer Islands. The Attorney General

1918 travel regulation in November 1922, and the response was such that an even more restrictive measure was drafted, giving to the Residents the power to keep persons out of their territory or to admit them only under special conditions. The Adviser for Native Affairs strongly opposed this, asserting that the Residents could not really be expected to know who was currently dangerous and who not among Javenese political leaders, especially the minor ones, and that as the Residents were inclined against taking chances this would mean “that the outer territories will be closed for political persons from Java. ... In point of fact nothing remains of the 1918 regulation; as the General Secretariat’s note states, a ‘silent burial’ is being prepared for it’’; R. Kem, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, July 4, 1923, no. E/194, classified, p. 3. He pointed out that the Residents had expressed considerable satisfaction with recent security conditions in the Outer Islands, whereas in the years preceding the 1918 regulations the government had had to quell unrest by force of arms in Celebes (1911, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916), Amboina (1911), Bali and Lombok (1911, 1914), Sumatra’s West Coast (1912, 1915), Tapanuli (1912, 1914, 1916), West Borneo (1912, 1913, 1914, 1915), Benkulen (1914), Temate (1914), Palembang (1915, 1916), Djambi (1916), South and East Borneo (1917) (p. 6). Why, he asked, should it be necessary to tighten regulations now when it had been thought possible to relax them then? (p. 6). His argument was unsuccessful for, as Kem himself certainly realized, what had changed since the 1918 regulations was the government’s whole attitude toward the spreading of modem political concepts and organiza-

had

originally suggested the tightening of the

among the Indonesian population. 10. De Standaard, Sept. 12, 1923, quoted in Brouwer, De bonding, p. 92. The article was probably written by H. Colijn, the eminence grise of Dutch colonial policy during De Graaff’s ministry; he was chief political editor of De Standaard, the organ of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. 11. Minister of Colonies de Graaff, memorandum of reply to the lower house of parliament in the debate on the 1925 budget; Begrooting 1925, p. 214. To

tions

which deviations from the customary were ascribed to Communism, especially by Binnenlands Bestuur officials outside Java. A local religious controversy arose in Celebes. Its source appeared to be one Ibrahim Mulla, a trader in batiks and religious books from Makassar, who was a disciple of Sheik Ahmad Surkati, an Arab leader of the A1 Irsjad religious school system in Java. The district controleur, on investigating the dispute, reported with alarm that “this Mulla is also a proponent of rather Communist tendencies in religion, maintaining for example that all men are equal, that powerful men must take no alms, and in short that he wishes more equality in religion. Where the Mohammedan religion in its old-fashioned form is a force opposing Communism, it would seem appropriate to view with reserve every effort and tendency toward modernization and democratization of the religion, which will indirectly further Communism even though it is aimed at another goal. I therefore thought it necessary to report this to Your Excellency, the more so because Hadji Ibrahim alias Guru Nandi and some others, who give an example of the ease with

455

Notes pp. 259-260 ,

sympathize with the new line of Ibrahim Mulla, are said to belong to the PKI, although they let nothing be observed of this outwardly.” Letter from H. T. Lanting, Controleur of Sidenreng-Rappang, to the Assistant Resident of Pare-pare, dated Aug. 24, 1924, no. 24, classified, n.p. The Assistant Resident agreed with his concern and passed the report on to the Governor of Celebes,

seem

to

pointed out that Islamic modernism did not necessarily lead to Communism. Letters from the Assistant Resident of Pare-pare, De Wilde de Ligny, to the Governor of Celebes, Aug. 29, 1924, no. 24/ classified; from the Governor

who

Adviser for Native Affairs, Kern, Sept. 8, 1924, no. LXIV/classified; and from Kem to the Governor, Dec. 18, 1924, no. 1367. In this case more enlightened opinion won out, but it was not always so, nor were the liberals themselves always a force for tolerance. The Ethici had a very deep sense of personal involvement in the Indonesian movement. They were likely to be most tolerant of opposition by Indonesians whose educational

to the

background was not European and who therefore could not be expected to appreciate fully their efforts on the population’s behalf. They tended to be deeply aggrieved when members of the Western-educated elite, with whom they had had personal contact, did not evidence complete faith in them. Thus Kern opposed the proposed banishing of Hadji Misbach for his part in the 1919 anticorvee movement, but urged it for Tjipto Mangunkusumo; Tjipto, he argued, had been decorated for his service as a physician during the Malang plague, only to throw away both income and honor for the sake of irresponsible political activities. He had become, Kem asserted, sly, hardened, and careful not to lay himself open to legal prosecution; Kem, letters to the Governor General, Weltevreden, Aug. 18, 1921, no. 166, classified, pp. 6—7. Similarly, Kem was unenthusiastic about the internment of Hadji Batuah and Zainuddin but approved the January 1924 proposal by the Resident of Sumatra’s West Coast to banish Abdul Muis from that area. He rejected the Resident’s opinion that Muis had been responsible for the Toli-toli incident and the pawnshop workers’ strike; moreover, Muis, the only anti-Communist political leader of any stature in West Sumatra, was the chosen spokesman of the Karapatan Minangkabau, and Kem was currently arguing that only a strong, locally led anti-Communist movement would check the spread of PKI influence in the area. However, he found Muis guilty of “dishonesty and bad faith” and a general lack of frankness and concluded that expulsion would teach him a good lesson; Kern, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, July 9, 1923, no. E/203, classified, pp. 3-5. Something of the extent of this personal feeling was conveyed to me in an interview in 1960 with Professor G. F. Pijper, who had worked in the office of the Adviser for Native Affairs since the 1920s and later became Adviser for Islamic Affairs. Discussing Hazeu’s career as Adviser, he remarked that Hazeu’s associates had thought he placed too much tmst in the Indonesians and that they considered it the most telling mark of ingratitude that Alimin, whom he had raised in his own home, became a Communist. I mentioned that I had visited Alimin some months before, and he had taken me about his house, showing me the pictures on the walls and lecturing me on their significance for him. They were all of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin except for the first, a photograph which hung above his desk and which showed him in the midst of the Hazeu family, for which he expressed great affection. Professor Pijper seemed most surprised and gratified to hear this and stated that he would tell the story to some

and

cultural

of his acquaintances

who

indignation at the Indonesian betrayal of Hazeu. 12. Sedio Tomo, Oct. 21-25, 1924, in IPO , no. 44, 1924, p. 223. still felt

456

Notes, pp. 260-263 Aug. 25-30, 1924, in IPO, no. 36, 1924, pp. 461^471; Soeara Ra’jat, Oct. 10/20, 1924, in IPO, no. 50, 1924, p. 541. 14. The government was considering prohibiting both public and closed Communist meetings, which would in effect have made the movement illegal; 13. Api,

Overzicht 1924,

p. 15.

15. Sinar Hindia,

Mar.

3,

1924, in IPO, no. 16, 1924, p. 123.

Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 39, pp. 656-657. 17. Overzicht 1924, p. 10. The Resident of Semarang reported a great increase in the number of SR meetings in that region as a result of the new tactics: 16.

1,003

gatherings were

recorded for

The chief subjects aims of Communism; (3)

1924.

were

discussed

the importance (1) the poverty of the people; (2) the of joining the SR; (4) protests against the antistrike law and extraordinary

(5) the need for women to support their husbands in the anticapitalist struggle; (6) the importance of sending children to the SR schools; (7) homage to imprisoned and banished leaders and assurances that the struggle would rights;

(8) government efforts to increase Indies defense expenditures; (9) the necessity of paying entrance fees and dues promptly; (10) the coming Pacific war; (11) unequal justice for European and Indonesian inhabitants of the Indies. Bijhge Semarang, pp. 2, 5.

continue in spite of persecution;

15-20 and Oct. 13-18 and 24, 1924, in IPO, nos. 37, 39, 43, and 44, 1924, pp. 512-513, 615-619, 160, 203-204, 1924; and Soeara Ra’jat, Sept. 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 39, 1924, pp. 656—657. 18. Api, Sept.

19.

4 and

Overzicht 1924,

6,

p.

16.

20. Bijlage Semarang, p. 11. In August, retired Indonesian government official and

her parents’

at

home

Darsono married the daughter of

much

thereafter spent

of his

a

time

in Salatiga.

21. Overzicht 1924, p. 16.

Mataram, Dec. 22,

22. Api, Dec. 16-17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 600;

1924; Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 56. According to the last-named source, Alimin chaired the meeting.

Riwajat Hidup, p. 47. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), Aliarcham had opposed his concept of a mass revolutionary movement led by a 23. Alimin,

small

Communist

elite— the idea behind the Sarekat Rakjat.

Djamaluddin Tamin

had spoken against the SR to the party leadership at the June 1924 congress; at that time his views were rejected, for the other PKI leaders were still too enthusiastic over SR growth to consider it. Aliarcham is virtually the only PKI leader of the 1920s to be viewed favorably by both the present-day PKI and Murba (Tan Malaka faction) histories of the period; both groups claim him as their own martyr because of his refusal to compromise in any way with the authorities during his internment in spite of disastrously poor health. See Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, for the Murba view and Pemherontakan November 1926 for that of the present PKI. 24. This account of the executive recommendation is drawn from the descriptions in Api, Dec. 16 and 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 600-604; Soeara Ra’jat, Dec. 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 604—607; Semaun, “Brieven,” June 10 and 11, 1925; "Communisme,” pp. 535, col. a— 536, col. a; Schrieke, Political Section, pp. 105-106; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 45-46; Dingley, Peasants’ Movement, p. 43; Guber, “Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, pp. 192—193; Politieke Nota PKI, pp. 1—3; Aidit, Sedjarah, pp. 56— (interview,

1959)

asserted that Aliarcham

57.

25.

"The

Governor

General’s

Report

457

of

January

1927,”

pp.

4-5;

“Corn-

Notes , pp. 263-269 munisme,” p. 536, col. a; Rapport van het hoofd van het Kantoor van arbeid over de arbeidstoestanden in de metaalindustrie te Soerabaja ( Report of the Head of the Labor Office on Labor Conditions in the Surabaja Metal Industry ) (Netherlands Indies government, Weltevreden, 1926), p. 96, hereafter cited as Rapport van het hoofd; “De Partai Kommunis Indonesia, de stem van Moskou,” (The Partai

May

Komunis Indonesia, the Voice

of

Moscow), Internationale

Spectator,

1951, p. 6. 26. Interviews, 1959. 16,

Workers of the Pacific,” comment, see L. Heller, Die

27. G. Voitinsky, “First Conference of the Transport

Inprecorr, Sept.

11,

1924, p. 705. For Heller’s

Pazifik-Konferenz,” p. 53. 28. The conference manifesto,

as

quoted

in

Voitinsky,

“First

Conference,

pp. 705-706. 29. 30.

31.

“The Governor General’s Report “The Governor General’s Report G. Zinoviev, “The Fifth Congress

of January 1927,” p. 4. of January of the

of G. Zinoviev to all the Sections of the p.

231. Emphasis in the

1927,” p.

Communist

4.

International: Circular

Comintern,” Inprecorr, Apr. 17, 1924,

text.

32. Inprecorr, July 25, 1924, pp. 518-519.

on the Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International,” Inprecorr, Aug. 29, 1924, p. 646; see also “Theses on Tactics,” Inprecorr, Aug. 29, 1924, p. 652. 34. Fifth Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Report of Meetings Held at Moscow June 17th to July 8th 1924 (London, n.d.), p. 188. 33. “Resolutions

35. Fifth Congress

International, p. 188. 36. According to his account, Semaun traveled to .

.

.

Moscow from Holland

in

May a

1924; he returned to Amsterdam in the middle of August, after attending Profintem-sponsored conference of Communist labor unions in Hamburg;

Semaun, Rapotan, p. 15. At the Comintern meeting, he represented Java on the committee that discussed the national and colonial question; Piatii kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (Fifth Congress of the Communist International) (Moscow, 1924), p. 252. According to the Comintern account of the fifth congress, Semaun was not the only Indies representative. The other delegate is referred to in the Comintern report as “Joseph”; Piatii Kongress, pp. 252, 296. He was the former VSTP leader Harry Dekker, who, we will remember, had left the Indies in 1922. Apparently he did not speak at the meeting, and he is not mentioned in other accounts, including Semaun’s. 37. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 30, 32. 38. Semaun, Rapotan, p. 32. The ECCI had asserted at the meeting that, “in addition to winning the support of the peasant masses and of the oppressed national minorities, the Executive Committee, in its instructions, always emphasized the necessity for winning over the revolutionary movements for the emancipation of the colonial peoples and for all peoples of the East so as to make them the allies of the revolutionary proletariat in the capitalist countries”; “Resolutions on the Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International,” p. 642. 39.

Semaun, Rapotan,

p. 34.

the Comintern’s original decision on the reorganization of the colonial parties had provided that the International’s Eastern Bureau and Organi40. Actually,

zation Bureau were to cooperate in drafting

These statutes were

first

model statutes for Asian parties. published by the Comintern on Jan. 29, 1925, and

458

Notes, pp. 269-272 were presented to the ECCI for approval in its session of March and April, 1925. 41. Semaun, Rapotan, p. 38. Emphasis in the text. 42. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 45-46. 43. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, July 21, 1924. In August, Alimin was reported as giving an extensive description of his Canton trip to an SR meeting in Tasikmalaja; Api, Aug. 12-18, 1924, in IPO, no. 34, 1924, p. 370. 44. Pandoe Merah, no. 5, 1924, as reported in Politieke nota PKI, p. 2; Neutraliseering, p. 10; Blumberger, Communist, p. 56. Reports on the fifth congress had been published earlier in Pandoe Merah, no. 3, July 15, 1924, in IPO, no. 37, 1924, p. 564. In August 1924 the PKI theoretical journal published a translation of Zinoviev’s speech to the congress, accompanied by an editorial asserting that the speech disproved opposition claims that the Communist position was unreasonablv far to the left; Soeara Ra’fat, July 30/Aug. 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 35, 1924, p. 437.

Api

45. It appeared in the

issues

of

Feb. 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and

19, 1925.

and Jan.

1924, pp. 208-209. 47. Api, Dec. 16 and 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 602. 48. Dingley, Peasants’ Movement, p. 43; Darsono, interview, 1959; Djamalud46. Petir, Dec. 20, 1924,

10, 1925, in

IPO, no.

4,

din Tamin, interview, 1959; Rapport van het hoofd, p. 96; over den strijd in het Oosten,” June 10, 1925. 49. Dingley, Peasants’

Movement,

p.

Semaun, “Brieven

43; Guber, “Natsionarno-osvoboditel’noe

dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, p. 193; Guber, Indoneziia, SotsiaV no-ekonomicheskie ocherld, pp. 314-315. 50. This accoimt of the opposition arguments

is

derived from Api, Dec. 16 and

1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, pp. 601-604; “Communisme,” p. 536, col. a; Semaun, “Brieven,” June 10, 1925; Dingley, Peasants’ Movement, p. 43; Guber, 17,

“Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, p. 193; Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging,” p. 159; Aidit, Sedjarah, pp. 56-57; Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 105-106.

X

51. Politieke nota PKI, p. 24; Report of the Assistant Demang Koto, Sutan Bandaharo, to the Demang First Class at Padang Pandjang (typescript, dated

Padang Pandjang, Feb. According to the latter for graduation from SR

Report of the Asst. Demang. source, the December conference listed the requirements

15, 1925, pp. 3-4; hereafter

to

PKI membership

(1) payment of dues; (2) prepossession of a revolutionary spirit;

paredness to act as a propagandist; (4) respect for party discipline;

as

(3) extension of knowledge through attending (5)

open meetings and party courses and by reading PKI literature. 52. According to the Report of the Asst. Demang, p. 4, it was decided to divide the PKI sections into four classes based on size; the first-class sections, of which there were five ( Surabaja, Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, and West Sumatra), were to aim at achieving 250 members each; the ten second-class divisions were to have 75 members apiece, twenty-five third-class sections were to have 25 members, and thirty fourth-class sections were to have 10 members each, for a total of 2,925 members. 53. Dingley, Peasants’ Movement, p. 43. Criticisms of the PKI decision from the international Communist viewpoint continued even after the post-1927 Comintern turn to the left; see Guber, “Natsionarno-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii,” 1933, pp. 192-193; Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging,” pp. 159-160. 54. E. Gobee, untitled report to the Governor General, dated Mar. 13, 1923,

459

,

.

Notes pp. 272-275 ,

(typescript account of the

no. E. 61

March 1923 PKI/Red

SI congress

by the

Acting Adviser for Native Affairs, classified), p. 5. According to Darsono (interview, 1959), Sardjono was not the first choice for the post: it was first proposed that Darsono become party chairman, but since he expected to be arrested and did not wish to hasten the evil hour, he declined; the second choice was Subakat, and when he refused for similar reasons, the honor fell to Sardjono. For the

IPO no. 52, 1924, p. 607; Demang, Feb. 15, 1925, p. 3. In

election of the executive, see Api, Dec. 20, 1924, in

1925; Report of the Asst. addition to Sardjono, the new executive consisted of Budisutjitro (secretary), A. Winanta (treasurer), Aliarcham and Alimin (commissioners); executive members outside party headquarters were Mardjohan ( Semarang ) Abdulkarim ( Atjeh

Java Bode, Jan.

2,

,

and East Sumatra), Sutan Said Ali (West Sumatra), S. H. Assor (Ternate), Suwarno (Surakarta), Kusno (Bandung), Prawirosardjono (Surabaja), and

Sukimo

(

Tjilatjap

)

55. Report of the Asst.

Demang, Feb.

15, 1925, p. 3; “Verslag S.I.

Merah dan

Semarang Tahoen 1924,” p. 1. Soeara Ra’jat had required a subsidy of /50 a month from the party; PKI executive announcements would henceforth be conveyed by communique or through Api and the Batavia PKI paper Njala. CORP had not been used by PKI units outside the Semarang area, and this may have prompted the party to drop it; Rijlage Semarang, p. 5. Responsibility for publishing PKI literature was given to the Commission on Reading Materials ( Komisi Batjaan) of the Semarang PKI (the VSTP press, the only one owned by the Communists, was in Semarang). 56. Report of the Asst. Demang, Feb. 15, 1925, pp. 3—4; Mataram, Dec. 22, 1924. SR dues were raised from /0.75 a year to /0.10 a month. A monthly basis may have been chosen to make payment easier and to weed out those who did not show sufficient interest to pay regularly. 57. Text of the resolution, as given in Mataram, Dec. 22, 1924; see also S.R.

Soeara Ra’jat, Dec. 17, 1924, 58. Api, Dec. 16, 1924, in 59. Soeara Ra’jat, Dec. 17, 60. Politieke nota PKI, pp. Asst. col.

Demang, Feb. a.

It

is

possible

15,

IPO, no. 52, 1924, IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1-2; Rapport van het in

1925, p.

this

3;

pp. 606-607. 600.

1924, pp. 604-605. hoofd, p. 98; Report of the “Communisme,” pp. 536, col. b and 952,

concept was patterned on the “Ten-Man Leagues,”

forms of Kuomintang organization in the Indies. 61. B. F. O. Schrieke, Notes on the Java Uprisings (untitled manuscript, Schrieke Collection, University of Leiden), p. 1; hereafter cited as Notes; referring to a statement made by the PKI leader Marsudi to the police in 1927.

one of the

illegal

1926 in het gewest Semarang (Political Report for 1926 in the Semarang Region) (Netherlands Indies government, typescript, signed by the Resident of Semarang, dated February 1927), p. 12. 63. Api, Dec. 17, 1924, in IPO, no. 52, 1924, p. 604. 64. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Feb. 22, 1926 (report by Mayor de Jongh to the Semarang town council), and June 29, 1926 (report by the government committee investigating the Surabaja strikes of 1925). 65. See “Communisme,” p. 537, col. a; Bergsma, “The Sharpening of the Class War in Indonesia,” Inprecorr, Mar. 5, 1925, p. 261; Java Rode, Jan. 19, 1925; Politieke nota PKI, pp. 4-5; Rapport van het hoofd, p. 98; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 44. Fifteen hundred people were present at the meeting’s one public session; they included representatives of the VSTP, PPPB, Inlandse Douanebond (customs officials’ union), Sarekat Buruh Tjetak (printers’ union), 62. Politick verslag over

460

Notes pp. 275-277 ,

Chauffeursbond Indonesia (drivers’ union), eleven branches of the several harbor workers’ unions, the PKI, SR, and Madureezenbond (Madurese League). 66. Api, Jan. 6, 1925, editorial.

Die Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1924-1927 (The International Trade Union Movement in the Years 1924-1927) (Berlin, n.d. ), p. 267; Tan Malaka, DP I, p. 112; Api, Feb. 24, 1925; “Communisme,” p. 537, col. a; Java Bode, Jan. 19, 1925; Overzicht 1924, p. 6; Pemberontakan November 67.

1926, p. 44. 68. See Api, Feb. 24 and 25, 1925. 69. p.

Die

Gewerkschaftsbewegung

internationale

in

den

Jahren

1924-1927,

267.

Rapport van het hoofd, p. 100; Politieke nota PKI, p. 6. 71. Api, Feb. 24, 1925; Rapport van het hoofd, p. 96; Politieke nota PKI, pp. 4-5; Aidit, Sedjarah, pp. 58-59; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 44. The SPPL was formed from the Sarekat Kaum Buruh Pelabuhan ( Dockworkers’ Union) of Surabaja, the Perserikatan Buruh Pelabuhan dan Lautan ( PBPL, Harbor and Seamen’s Association ) of Batavia, and the Serilagu ( Serikat Laut dan Gudang, Seamen’s and Dockers’ Union) of Semarang. The last-named union had been formed in August 1924 after a strike by harbor coolies in Semarang; Api, Aug. 9 and 12-18, 1924, in IPO, nos. 33 and 34, 1924, pp. 324-325, 369-370. The first SPPL executive included R. M. Gondojuwono (chairman). Tan Ping Tjiat, and Sundah; “Communisme,” p. 536, col. b. Gondojuwono was arrested almost immediately after his appointment to the chairmanship of the new union; Bergsma, “The Sharpening of the Class War in Indonesia,” p. 261. Sjamsuddin then became chairman; Overzicht van den Politieken toestand ter Sumatra’s Westkust aansluitend op het overzicht ddo. 6 April 1927 (Survey of the Political Situation on Sumatra’s West Coast, Continuing the Survey Dated Apr. 6, 1927) (Netherlands Indies government, mimeographed, signed by the head of the regional police and the Resident of Sumatra’s West Coast, dated Padang, May 10, 1927), 70.

p. 7, hereafter cited as

Overzicht

SWK.

For the Serilagu appeal, see Api, Sept. 22-30, 1924; for the declaration of the PKBP, see Api, Oct. 1-4, 1924, in IPO, nos. 40-41, 1924, pp. 14, 53-54. A description of the SPPL organization and the statutes adopted at its founding congress of Dec. 20, 1924, is given in Djankar, January 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, pp. 442-443. It was stated in this account that the union faced considerable organizational difficulties because its executive members were located in widely separated cities; it was also having financial troubles because member units were not paying their dues. Although the headquarters of the SPPL were officially in Surabaja, its journal was printed in Semarang, which seems to have been its effective center during the first half of 1925. 72.

73. Api, Feb. 24, 1925.

At the beginning of 1923 the PKI began to organize the sugar workers in the Surabaja and Kediri areas, but it ran into too much resistance from the authorities and plantation owners to have much success; Musso, Prinuditel’nyi trud v Indonezii (Forced Labor in Indonesia) (Moscow, 1929), p. 17. In 1924 the party promoted an Association for Workers on Sugar Estates (Perkumpulan Untuk Kaum-Buruh Ondememing Gula), which, however, proved very weak; 74.

Overzicht 1924, of the union

In the

31.

of

its

new

effort

among

the sugar workers, the

name

Buruh Gula (SBC, Sugar Workers’ Union); driving spirits. At the beginning of 1924 the party had

was changed

Musso was one also

p.

founded the Sarekat

to Sarekat

Kaum Bnmh Ondememing (SKBO, 461

Plantation Workers’

Notes, pp. 277-282 workers on all types of plantations except the sugar estates. The two unions were kept separate because the sugar plantations were in low, thickly settled parts of the country and the other estates were generally in hilly, sparsely populated areas. Within a year, according to Musso, the SKBO claimed

Union),

to organize

12,000 members in West Java, but in East and Central Java government pressure was too great for the organizers. When the PKI was made illegal in early 1926, the SKBO leaders were thrown in jail and the union came to an end; Musso, FrinuditeVnyi trud, pp. 17-19. 75. Api, June 8, 1925; Bijlage 1925, pp. 7-8. Government reaction to the strike wave that broke out just after the union was established prevented it

from gaining much substance, and establish international 76.

Semaun,

it

doubtful

is

if

actually took

it

steps

to

ties.

letter of

Dec. 25, 1924, quoted in Neutraliseering,

p. 10.

77. Neutraliseering, p. 10. 78. Api, Feb. 27, 1925. Api

24;

began publishing “Soeloeh Communisme” on Feb. issued by the party in Semarang as a pamphlet,

the articles were later

under that

title.

de V Internationale Communiste. Compte rendu analytique de la session du 21 mars au 6 avril 1925 (Enlarged Executive of the Communist International: Abridged Report of the Session of Mar. 21 to Apr. 6, 1925) (Paris, 1925), p. 270, hereafter cited as Executif. The PKI history Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 123, says Tan Malaka made a pro-Trotskyist speech at this meeting. He did not attend; probably this is an erroneous reference to Semaun’s report to the session, which was said to have been criticized. 80. Executif, p. 286, and see also Bukharin’s speech on the peasant question, pp. 133—152. Bolshevisitig the Communist International (London, n.d.), pp. 7173, 157-159, 169-180. 81. Semaun, “Brieven,” June 10, 1925. At the ECCI meeting, Semaun sat on the Peasant Commission, the Trade Union Unity Commission, the Dutch Commission, and the Colonial Commission; Inprecorr, June 4, 1925, pp. 350-351; 79. Executif Elargi

Bolshevising the

ECCI

82.

Communist

letter,

International pp. 12, 14, 15. quoted in Neutraliseering, p. 12; emphasis in the text. ,

The

addressed to the PKI on May 4, 1925, is partially reproduced in the original English in the above-cited government report; the full text in Dutch is contained in Semaun, “Brieven over den strijd in het Oosten,” June 19, 1925. For other references to the ECCI opinion, see Inprecorr, Apr. 28, 1925, p. 513; letter,

Dinglev, Peasants Movement, p. 58; Guber, “Natsionarno-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Indonezii, 1933, p. 193; Rutgers, “De Indonesische nationale beweging,” Aidit, 159-160; Sedjarah, p. 57. pp.

Semaun, “Brieven,” June 12, 1925; emphasis Semaun, “Brieven,” June 17 and 18, 1925.

83.

84.

in the text.

85. Neutraliseering, p. p. 138.

tion,

The

quarters late in

12; Politieke nota PKI, p. 18; Schrieke, “Political Secoriginal letter was found by the police in a raid on PKI head-

1926.

The date (a month

after

ECCI

session

had concluded)

leads one to think that discussion of the the regular plenary sessions had closed.

Indonesian question continued after We know, for example, that Semaun

remained in Moscow for over a month after the ECCI meeting had officially ended, for he attended a Comintern Information Conference there on May 6, 192o; Inpiccoi r, May 6, 1925, p. 532. During his absence from Holland, Bergsma

was

in

86.

charge of the PKI

ECCI

program was

letter of

May

also given in

office there; 4,

Api, Feb. 24, 1925.

1925, as quoted in Neutraliseering, pp. 12, 64.

Semaun’s report.

462

The

Notes, pp. 282-287 Movement, p. 44. 88. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (London, 1936), 220; from a speech to the Communist University of the Toilers of the East,

87. Dingley, Peasants’

p.

May

8,

1925.

Kaoem

27-Nov. 10, 1924, in IPO, no. 46, 1924, pp. 307-308. Muis’ suggestions brought no immediate official response from the PKI, but they seem to have been favorably received by some party leaders; see, for example, the enthusiastic comments by A. C. Salim in Halilintar Hindia, Nov. 26, 1924, in IPO, no. 50, 1924, pp. 543-544. 90. Kemadjoean Hindia, Feb. 12, 1925, in IPO, no. 10, 1925, p. 471. 91. Api, Mar. 30, 1925; emphasis in the text. See further Kemadjoean Hindia, Mar. 10, 1925, and Soeara Perdamaian, Mar. 12, 1925 (reply of the CSI), in IPO, no. 12, 1925, pp. 569, 587-588; and Sutardjo, “Tingkat Baroe dari Pergerakan Kebangsa’an” (A New Step by the Nationalist Movement), Api, Mar. 12, 1925. 89.

Abdul Muis,

series of articles in

Kita, Oct.

92. Darsono, “Salim Pendoesta” (Salim the Liar), Api,

May

13, 1925.

93. Api, Mar. 30, 1925.

For example, on Nov. 3, 1925, the PKI executive wrote the East Java party leader Sugiman that “some sections [in your book]— in the light of the tactics to be adopted by our Party vis-a-vis the Indonesian nationalists, such as the B.U. and also the former N.I.P. [Sarekat Hindia] at the present time— create a rather spiteful impression; we are therefore changing the passages, so as not to give offense to the nationalists whom we have hopes of winning over to cooperation with us”; quoted in Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 142, note 97. The publication in question was probably Sugiman, Bankroetnja Partai Kehangsaan di Hindoestan (The Bankruptcy of the National Party in Hindustan) (Malang, 1926). It denoimced the Indian National Congress and affirmed that only Communists were consistently anticolonial. 95. Api, Jan. 2, 1926, reviewing events in 1925. Emphasis in the text. 96. P. Bergsma, “The Revolutionary Movement in Java,” Inprecorr, Oct. 8, 1925, p. 1088. Semaun declared that “our party is working for the creation of a national anti-imperialist bloc, and Muhammadijah, the Sarekat Ambon, and other national organizations are currently making progress in the revolutionizing of their spirit and the number of their members, though not so quickly as our party and the Sarekat Rakjat organization, which is under the influence of the Communists.” Semaun, “Der intemationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische 94.

Partei Indonesiens,” p. 59.

Kommunistischcn Internationale 19251926 (Report of the Executive of the Communist International 1925—1926) (Hamburg, 1926), p. 362; “Resolution on the Chinese Question,” Inprecorr, May 13, 1926, p. 649; “The World Economic and Political Situation,” Inprecorr, Jan. 22, 1926, p. 104; Semaun, “Der intemationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens,” p. 58; IV sessiia Tsentral’nogo soveta Krasnogo internatsionala profsieuzov, p. 4; Bergsma, “Progress of the Revolutionary Movement in Indonesia,” Inprecorr, Dec. 31, 1925, p. 1366; Bergsma, “Labour Struggles in the East Indies,” Inprecorr, Oct. 15, 1925, p. 1106; Darsono, “Die Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens” (The Situation of the Indonesian Popular Movement), Die Kommunistische Internationale, Nov. 9, 1926, pp. 415, 419. 97. Tatigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der

98. Aidit, Sedjarah, p. 57. 99.

Semaun, “Der intemationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische

Indonesiens,” p. 60. 100. “Discussion of the

Report of Comrade Zinoviev,” Inprecorr,

1926, p. 278.

463

Partei

Mar.

10,

Notes, pp. 287-292 (The Trade Union Movement in Indonesia), Krasnyi Intematsional Profsoiuzov, March 1926, p. 356. Semaun also urged at the Profintem meeting that the PKI form cells 101.

Semaun,

“Professional’noe

via labor unions in as

many

dvizhenie

v Indonezii”

enterprises as possible;

it

should unite

its

unions

Committee of Trade Unions and should put forward slogans for the Indonesian independence movement such as “Indonesia for the Indonesians,” “A Federal Government Structure,” and “A Central People’s Assembly”; pp. 350, in

a Central

356.

plenum ispolkoma Kominterna (17 fevralia—15 marta 1926g.) (Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Feb. 17-Mar. 15, 1926) ( Moscow/ Leningrad, 1927), p. 7. Other Asian members of the ECCI presidium at this time were listed as Sen Katayama (Japan), Roy (India), and Su-fan (China). 103. Tatigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale 1925102. Shestoi rasshiremji

1926, pp. 362-364. 104. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 145.

CHAPTER 1.

Soerabajasch Handelsblad, Aug.

system was used principally

10,

among urban

XI

1925; according to this account, the workers.

algemeen verslag: Politick overzicht 1925 (Appendix to the General Report: Political Survey 1925) (Typescript, signed by the Resident of Semarang, dated Semarang, February 1926), pp. 1-3, hereafter cited as Bijlage 1925; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 8, 1925; Politiek Verslag 1926, pp. 2-5. During 1925 only one open meeting was held by the PKI and SR in Semarang, as against two executive and nineteen membership meetings of the PKI and four executive and fifty-five membership meetings of the SR. In the regency of Salatiga 188 meetings were held in all, in Kudus 140, and in Pati 33— an illustration of the tactic of holding numerous small gatherings; Bijlage 1925, p. 2, and see De Telegraaf, Jan. 1, 1926. In Bandung alone, the PKI held 50 separate meetings on Jan. 1, 1925; Api, Jan. 2, 1925. 3. Rapport van het hoofd, p. 99, footnote 1; Overzicht Pati, p. 15, outlining a meeting of the Semarang PKI in October 1925, at which the reorganization was set down for that area; and De Telegraaf, Feb. 1, 1926. In actual practice there seems to have been no universally adhered-to system, however; in early 1926 the organizational pattern reported to be in general use in the Semarang region had each party subsection run by five members (chairman, secretary, treasurer, and two commissioners); these were aided by twelve directors, who were given the rank of sergeant. Under each of these directors was a cadre, and each cadre had charge of ten ordinary members, or soldiers; Politiek verslag 1926, 2.

Bijlage

p. 8.

Politieke nota PKI, p. 7. 5. For Sanusi’s trip to Canton, see Api, Mar. 13

4.

and Apr.

7,

1925; Java Bode,

Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959) claimed Alimin visited Tan Malaka in early 1925 and was informed of his ideas on party strategy; Malaka mentions in his autobiography that Alimin visited him twice while in Apr. 24,

1925.

journey to the Philippines in 1925; DP I, p. 143. Malaka’s pamphlet, Naar de ‘Republiek-Indonesia (Toward the Indonesian Republic), was written at the end of 1924 and was first published in Canton in April 1925; it is exile before his

further described below.

464

Notes pp. 292-296 ,

Api, Apr. 27, 28, and 29, 1925. 7. Bijlage 1925, p. 3. 6.

Api, July 12-17, 1925, in IPO, no. 30, 1925, pp. 154-155; Mowo, Dec. 7, 1925, in IPO, no. 51, 1925, p. 614; De Indische Gids, XLVII (1926), 456-457; 8.

Politiek Verslag 1926, p. 16.

quarters in Semarang, ers’

homes were raided

According to the

was a pet

last

account, the OPI, with head-

project of Darsono’s. Its headquarters

in early 1926,

and

it

and lead-

thereupon expired.

Overzicht 1924, p. 10, describing the situation at the end of 1924. 10. See “Nadere beantwoording van bij de behandeling der begrooting en

9.

begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor het dienstjaar 1926 gestelde vragen” (Further Reply to Questions Submitted During the Discussion der

suppletoire

Budget and Supplementary Budget of the Netherlands Indies for 1926), in Begrooting 1927, p. 244, hereafter cited as Nadere 1927. The case was that of VVoro Ati, who had made the statement at a public SR meeting in 1925; she was sentenced by the Malang district court in January 1926. 11. Schrieke, “Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra,” pp. 146-147. Such pressure was considered to have been used with success in Atjeh, the Lampung districts, and Palembang, however; Verslag 1926, pp. 11, 14-15; Verslag

of the

1927, p. 21. 12.

De

Graaff,

memorandum

of

reply

1925 Indies budget; Begrooting 1925,

and

p.

to

parliament in the debate on the

214.

1924, in IPO, no. 37, 1924, pp. 508-510, 511-512; Api, Feb. 16, 1925; Soerabajasch Handelsblad, Sept. 2, 1924; Overzicht 1924, 13. Api, Sept. 1, 2,

pp.

8,

3,

16.

Kem, Oprichting van contra-vereenigingen tegen (Establishment of Counterassociations Against Communism) 14. R.

by the Adviser

for Native Affairs to the

het

communisme

(typescript report

Governor General, dated Weltevreden,

June 15, 1925, no. G/189, classified), pp. 1-3. 15. Kem, Oprichting van contra-vereenigingen, p. 7. The turning in of cards had a particular force, as Kem notes, because of the great weight Indonesians gave to symbols. To hand in a card was regarded as a tme sign that its owner had broken with Communism, and those who did so often became enthusiastically

and violently anti-PKI. 16. Api reported roaming bands in the Priangan who asked people whether they were “White” or “Red” and beat those who answered “Red”; Feb. 20-23, Mar. 2-7, 1925, in IPO, nos. 9 and 11, pp. 412, 503. The stated goals of the Sarekat Hidjau were to cherish and protect religion, prince, government, teachers, father, and race; Soerapati, June 8, 1925, in IPO, no. 28, 1925, p. 385. The purpose of Anti-Communisme was said to have been to fight Communism, promote religion, and keep an eye on Indonesian political movements in general; Hindia Baroe, Feb. 15, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, p. 420. The Kaum Pamitran, which was centered in Bandjaran, had been founded several years before as an amateur theatrical group, with the broader purpose of strengthening ties between the prijaji and the people; in 1924 it turned into an anti-PKI mutual aid association in response to local SR activity. The Communists did not accuse the SI of being involved in any of the Sarekat-Hidjau type of organization. 17. Kem, Oprichting van contra-vereenigingen, p. 4. Two other reports in the Kem collection deny vehemently any government connection with the Sarekat Hidjau groups, which are described as purely spontaneous associations of respectable and orderly Indonesians defending themselves against Sarekat Islam and SR aggressiveness; letter from Attorney General Wolterbeek Muller to the

465

Notes, pp. 296-299 Governor General, dated Weltevreden, May 28, 1925, no. 1978 A.P., classified, and report from Resident of Priangan Eijken to the Attorney General, dated Bandung, May 19, 1925, W. 180/25/Z.G., classified. Apparently these were composed to mollify Volksraad deputies who had charged the government with collusion in Sarelcat Hidjau violence and demanded an inquiry. For Salim s articles against the Sarekat Hidjau, see Hindia Baroe, Feb. 19 and 26, 1925, in IPO, nos. 9 and 10, 1925, pp. 416—418, 463—464, and in Kaoem Rita, Feb. 9-19, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, p. 420. For other statements condemning the Sarekat Hidjau and similar organizations in the non-Communist opposition press, see Hindia Baroe, Feb. 15 and 18, 1925, Balatentara Islam, Feb. 14-21, 1925, and Panggoegah, Feb. 18, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, pp. 418, 420, 431, 434-435; Sri Djojobojo, Feb. 14, 1925, in IPO no. 10, 1925, p. 484; Darmo Rondo, Mar. 4-7, 1925, Hindia Baroe, Mar. 5-11, 1925, Raoem Rita, Mar. 2-9, 1925, Remadjoean Hindia, Feb. 28, 1925, in IPO, no. 11, 1925, pp. 508-509, 511-514, 516-519, ,

522; Hindia Baroe, Mar. 12-18, 1925, Raoem Rita, Mar. 11-16, 1925, Remadjoean Hindia, Mar. 9-14, 1925, Sedio Oetomo, Mar. 10, 1925, in IPO, no. 12, 1925, pp. 560-563, 567, 574-575. 18. Hindia Baroe, Mar. 5—11, 12-18,

Raoem Moeda, Mar.

3,

Raoem

Rita,

IPO, nos. 11 and 12, 1925, pp. 511-514, 519, 560-568. 19. The first report of the League, in an enthusiastic letter by “Merah,” was published on the first page of Api, Mar. 25, 1925. However, the editors commented that the writer should investigate more closely before he committed himself to the organization. It seemed to be composed of heterogeneous class elements (the letter had mentioned not only PKI followers but also members of the Chinese, Arabs, and Dutch [Eurasian?] minority groups who felt themselves Mar. 11-16, 1925,

in

threatened by the Sarekat Hidjau), and the party therefore must warn against it. See also Api, Mar. 31, 1925. One of the government reports on the Sarekat

Hidjau refers to the League as having both SR and SI members; Eijken to the AtDingley, Peasants’ Movement, p. 44, speaks of the leagues as endorsed by the party, however. According to “The Governor General’s Report,”

torney General,

p. 3.

they were recruited from strong-arm elements and existed in Batavia, Pekalongan, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Kediri, and Tjiandur in the Priangan. p.

10,

Congres (3e nationaal congres), pp. 6-7, describes the discussion of this point at the 1918 SI congress; see also “The Bantam Report,” p. 47. 21. Api, Mar. 24, 1925; the appeal, written in Sundanese by the Bandung Communist leader Gunawan, was spread about the area in leaflet form by the PKI. See also Api, Feb. 26 and Mar. 25, 1925, for similar appeals. 22. Api, editorial of Feb. 15, 1925. For a similar analysis of the problem confronting the PKI, see the editorial in Panggoegah (Suwardi Surjaningrat’s paper), Feb. 18, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, pp. 434-435. 20. Sarekat-lslam

23. Api, editorial of Jan. 6, 1925.

was claimed by some rebel leaders to have been their calculation, according to Overzicht van den imoendigen politieken toestand (Februari 1926Maart 1927) (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, February 1926-March 24. This

1927)

(Netherlands Indies government, typescript, classified),

p.

24.

Samin [Darsono], “The Situation in Indonesia,” Inprecorr Oct. 4, 1928, p. 1246 (coreport on the revolutionary movement in the colonies, presented to the sixth Comintern congress). 26. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 122, quoting Instruction No. 2 issued bv PKI headquarters on Mar. 24, 1925. The reference to proletarian dictatorship here is one of the relatively rare instances in which it was stated that there 25.

466

Notes pp. 299-303 ,

achievement of Communism after the revolution. 27. Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 122-123, citing Instruction No. 2, Mar.

would he any prelude

to the

24, 1925. 28.

“The Governor General’s Report,”

p. 3.

Alim in, Lonteren wij ons! p. 85. 30. D. H. Meijer, “Over het bendewezen op Java” (Concerning Gangs on Java), Indonesia, III, .September 1949, p. 188, suggests that the reason not much 29.

note was taken of these groups during the colonial period was that they operated

only

among

the Indonesian part of the population, that local officials were either

and that the regents did not like to bring these groups to the notice of the Dutch, who would only accuse them of being unable to keep order. For an explanation of the phenomenon in psychological terms, see P. M. van Wulfften Palthe, Over het bendewezen op Java (Concerning Gangs on Java) (Amsterdam, 1948?). 31. “The Bantam Report,” p. 23. 32. Special areas for outlawry have been cited as North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, Bogor, Tjirebon, Indramaju, and Krawang in West Java; Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and the north coast of Central Java; and Madiun, South Kediri, Patjitan, Bodjonegoro, Ngawi, Gresik, Puger, and Kraksaan in East Java; Meijer, “Over het bendewezen op Java,” p. 179; D. H. Meijer, Japan wint den oorlog: Documenten over Java (Japan Wins the War: Documents on Java) (Maastricht, 1946), pp. 26, 96. The Communist units that most strongly urged rebellion during 1926, or engaged in the uprising, were from North Bantam, the Priangan, Batavia, and Tjirebon in West Java and Surakarta and the north coast of Central Java. Anti-Communist fighting groups were from the Priangan, Bogor, Tjirebon, Kediri, Ngawi, Madiun, and Djepara, and Anti-Ruffian Leagues were in the Priangan, Batavia, Pekalongan, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, and Kediri. 33. Others included the SI-Anjar (Sukabumi), Sarekat Sedjati (Semarang), Sarekat Abangan (Klaten), and Sarekat Setya Warga (Southeast Borneo); SI V, p. 374, col. a. Similarly, such groups in West Java took advantage of the Dutch collapse at the time of the Japanese invasion to extract contributions from the population in the name of the advancing Japanese (who were portrayed as bringing the promised utopia) and to present themselves to the incoming forces as the effective local leaders; Meijer, “Over het bendewezen op Java,” pp. 182-193, citing Slamet Sudibio, “Perampokan” (Banditry), series of articles in Asia Raya, afraid to complain or in league with them,

1942.

“The Situation in Indonesia,” p. 1247. 35. “The Bantam Report,” pp. 42-43. For a similar description of propaganda in the Minangkabau area, see Schrieke, “The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra,” p. 161. 34. Samin,

36. Verslag 1925, pp. 9-33; Versing 1926, pp. 8-33; Overzicht SWK, p. 8. 37. Kemadjoean Hindia, Dec. 5, 1923, in IPO, no. 50, 1923, pp. 513-514.

An

Serang SI may have been the reason for one of the more curious charges in the Jogjakarta-Semarang feud that followed Darsono’s attack on Tjokroaminoto. At the time (late 1920 and early 1921) participation in the second Volksraad was debated in the SI: the left generally urged noncooperation and the right wanted to accept a seat. Serang supported the candidacy of F. van Lith, S.J., a well-known West Java missionary who outspokenly supported toleration of the Indonesian national movement; see H. C. Heijting, Java’s onrust (Java’s Unrest) (Amsterdam, 1927), pp. 10-12. Presumably it did so not for reason of religious sympathy (Serang was a center of Islamic orthodoxy), but

earlier action of the

467

Notes, pp. 303-305 thought his presence in the Volksraad would provide the Indonesian opposition with a defender who, being European and Christian, could not be

because

it

considered

a representative

of

the

SI

itself.

Serang’s

initiative

also

received

some backing from the pro-Semarang Bandung SI. Their sympathy for the Jesuit’s candidacy seems the most likely reason why Jogjakarta, accusing the Communists of being Christian agents, declared them tools of the Catholic Church. For Hasan Djajadiningrat’s entrance into politics, see A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat ( Memoirs of Prince Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat; Amsterdam and Batavia, 1936), pp. 286-287. 38. For a discussion of the source of PKI support in Bantam, see "The Bantam Report,” pp. 40-47; P ember ontakan, November 1926, pp. 58-62. 39. Arguments presented at a PKI meeting in Sawah Lunto, July 1926, in Reports of the Resident of Sumatra’s West Coast to the Attorney General of the Netherlands Indies on the Extremist Organizations in the Sawah Lunto Area (untitled, mimeographed, transmitted by the Attorney General to the Governor General with the date Jan. 10, 1927, no. 39/A.P., classified), no. 1227, pp. 3-7; hereafter cited as Reports of the Resident. The story of Lenin, the Tsar, and the Tsar’s ashes seems to have been widely popular in West Sumatra; it was reported going the rounds in the Silungkang area at the time of the rebellion. De Locomotief, Feb. 4, 1927. 40. Schrieke,

"The Causes and

Effects

of

Communism on

Sumatra’s West

Coast,” p. 148; Reports of the Resident, no. 1229, p. 5; “The Bantam Report,” p. 43; Verslag hestuur 1926, p. 30. An Indonesian official assigned to study the

development of the movement in West Sumatra reported that Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, a well-known anti-Communist religious teacher from the Minangkabau, had told him that, "Before I left for Batavia a short time ago, my mother asked me: ‘Will the Hadji stay long in Batavia?’ I answered: ‘No. But why do you ask that, Mother?’ She replied: ‘I have just heard that it will not be much longer before the people of Kota Lawas and Pandai Sikat will go to war with the Therefore

”

asked the question, for I fear the report is true.’ It was the Hadji’s opinion that three-quarters of the men, women, and children in Kota Lawas were Communists. (L. dt. Toemenggoeng, Geheime nota voor den Adviseur voor lnlandsche zaken over het communisme ter Westkust van SuHollanders.

I

matra, p. 8).

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Oct. 19, Nov. 2 and 7, 1926. Api, July 7-11, 1925, in IPO no. 29, 1925, p. 97, reprinted an article from Musso’s Surabaja paper, Prolctar, which suggested that Communist girls should no longer demand 41.

,

that their husbands merely join the party; they should also have

made propamovement and brought at least 500 members into the Sarekat Rakjat. Either the ladies of the PKI were seen as being extremely choosy or it was easy to get people to buy SR cards. 42. "The Bantam Report,” p. 40. On Sumatra’s East Coast, it was estimated ganda for the

that about 1,200 persons entered the party within a

few months

in 1925;

Verslag

hestuur 1926, pp. 11, 14. 43.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,

Sept. 25, 1925.

How much

of the locally

hard to say; it seems, however, to have collected money been a relatively small proportion. According to a government investigation of the movement on the West Coast of Sumatra, only 30 per cent of contributions and dues was sent on to the section treasurv by the local units; some of this was then transferred to the main executive, but the report does not note how much; Overzicht SWK, p. 10. From the way in which the revolutionary preparareached the center

is

468

Notes pp. 305-308 ,

developed it would not appear that the center had any financial preponderance over the major party units; there is no indication that possession of money or arms by the center influenced the arguments whether or not to heed its decisions when the party split in 1926 over staging the revolt. 44. Sarekat Tani groups were most important in West Sumatra, but they also existed in Java and Celebes. The name varied: sometimes they were referred to as Sarekat Kaum^Tani, Sarekat Tani Indonesia or (in Java) Perkumpulan Kaum Buruh dan Tani (apparently an attempt to resurrect the movement tions

founded earlier by Baars). 45. “The Bantam Report,”

p.

46;

Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp.

106-107.

“Communisme,” p. 537, col. a. The strike first broke out among the printers at the end of July and spread to the hospital employees and dockworkers; in addition, unrest was noted on plantations in the Semarang area. The various strikes were met with extensive police measures; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, July 28 and 31, Aug. 1, 2, and 5, 1925; Bijlage 1925, p. 6. 46.

47. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p.

1925.

5,

it

114, citing Instruction no. 8, dated Aug.

48. Politieke nota PKI, p. 5; Bijlage 1925, pp. 6-7. The VSTP indicated that would not be prepared for a general strike before May 1926. Reportedly, the

PKI executive assigned Winanta to visit the VSTP sections in West Java in order to win them over to the idea of a general strike; he was only able to confer with the section in Batavia, however, and was told there by the union executive that the VSTP would only participate in such an action if it were so well prepared as to be guaranteed to spread over

all

Java and receive general popular

support. 49. Politieke nota PKI, p. 6, note 5. 50. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, July 22, 8,

1925; Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, Aug. 1925. Those present at the conference included the members of the Council

(Road van Indie), the director of the Civil Service, the Attorney General, the government spokesman to the Volksraad, the advisor for Chinese affairs, and the Governor General. 51. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Aug. 6 and 9, 1925; Bijlage 1925, pp. 6 and 8. of the Indies

52. Bijlage 1925, p. 8. 53. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, July 31

and Aug. 20, 1925; Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, Dec. 29, 1925; Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, pp. 15-20. Kern, the Adviser for Native Affairs, strongly opposed both the government’s uncompromising

and the proposal to banish the PKI leaders. He argued that such policies, unaccompanied by reforms, merely made martyrs of the Communists, attracting more half-baked youngsters to their ranks and giving them the impression that the government was afraid of the PKI. “The Attorney General now proposes to banish four rather arbitrarily selected Communists,” he attitude

on the

whom

remarked, “of

Communists. in

strikes

I

Communist

the only thing that can be said

is

that they are prominent

fear that their banishment will perhaps result in a brief decline activity, but that it will swiftly recover. Others stand ready to

take their place; they too can be banished, will find replacements, and where is the end?” R. Kem, letter to the Governor General, dated Weltevreden, Sept. 25, 1925, no.

G/234,

remarks on the strike countermeasures, see Kem, letter to the Governor General, Aug. 13, 1925, no. G/21d, pp. 1-3. 54. Bijlage 1925, pp. 3, 10; De Telegraaf, Dec. 29, 1925; Overzicht Pati, p. 10. 55. Report of the Asst. Demang, (no. 51, classified), Oct. 9, 1925, p. 1. classified, p. 3; for his

469

Notes Similar alarm

was expressed

Pandjang on Oct. of anarchist

at

,

pp. 308-310

16; Arif Fadillah, a

activity

and

of

PKI heads in Padang major Sumatran PKI leader, was accused

a meeting of Sumatran

ignoring the party executive’s instructions not to

provoke government reprisals unnecessarily. In view of his importance it was decided, however, to warn rather than expel him; Report of the Asst. Demang (no. 52/G, classified), Oct. 21, 1925, pp. 1-2;

and

see Schrieke, “Political Sec-

114-115.

tion,” pp.

Sugono had argued at the beginning of 1925 that the workers should accept a grim immediate future and realize that organization was the only hope; St Tetap, Jan. 31, 1925, in IPO, no. 9, 1925, p. 444. The rapporteur of the December 1925 VSTP congress, apparently reflecting general concern over irresponsible radicalism in the union, appended to his notes a 56. Bijlage 1925, p. 7.

list

of thirty-two

VSTP/PKI

anarchist tendencies;

Pasar-Pon,

Surakarta

whom the VSTP

leaders

Minutes of (untitled

typescript,

he considered to display dangerous Meeting, Dec. 25/26, 1925, Hotel in Indonesian) pp. 6-7, hereafter

cited as Minutes.

employees and customs officials went on strike in August 1925; in Belawan Deli, the port of Medan, harbor workers walked out in early October. There were also minor strikes at Padang and Makassar. 58. For a detailed description of the strike, see Rapport van het hoofd, pp. 77-102; this was the report of a government inquiry into the strike, drawn up at the request of the Governor General. See also Niemve Rotterdamsche Courant, Nov. 3 and Dec. 28, 1925, and Jan. 12, 19, and 31, 1926. 59. Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 31-32; Verantwoording, pp. 137-139. A difference of opinion between the central and local authorities also seems to have occurred in the Semarang strikes: Mayor de Jongh of Semarang complained that the government had prohibited assembly in that city (to which he objected) without explanation to the local officials; Niemve Rotterdamsche Courant, Feb. 22, 1926. Government measures against political and labor unrest aroused considerable complaint in parliament. See the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Apr. 26, 1926; Begrooting 1926, pp. 199 and (the Minister of Colonies’ reply) 218; Van der Zee, De S.D.A.P. en Indonesia, pp. 91-94. Resentment over its action was the immediate reason for Budi Utomo’s noncooperation decision at its April 1926 congress; “Boedi Oetomo,” p. 942, col. b. 57. In Batavia, the hospital

60. Api, Jan. 16, 1920, appealing to units of the sugar workers’, postal workers’, printers’,

61.

and

sailors’

Geheim Verslag

and dockers’ unions. dari Conferentie Verspreide Lid Hoofdbestuur Partij

Com-

munist Indonesia pada tanggal 13 Januari 1926 (Secret Report of the Conference of the non-Batavia Members of the Main Executive of the Communist Party of Indonesia on Jan. 13, 1926) ( typescript, drawn up by a PKI rapporteur), p. 1, hereafter cited as Geheim verslag. In spite of Sutigno’s assurance that he would replace the cash in good time, the party expelled him at this conference. 62. Koch, Batig Slot, p. 32; Api, Jan. 13, 1926. Among those kept on in

jail

were Prawirosardjono and Sukendar. 63. Rapport van het hoofd, pp. 87-88. 64. Alim in is said to have encouraged concentration on Surabaja in letters sent from Canton after his escape from the Indies; De Courant, Jan. 21, 1926. According to this source, which claims to be based on letters written by Alimin to the party on Java and apprehended by the police, Alimin obtained funds in Canton to support the Surabaja strike effort, but he was unable to send them to the PKI because of the close police check kept on him.

470

Notes pp. 310-311 ,

Mauawar

[Musso], report to the sixth Comintern congress, Inprecorr, Oct. 17, 1928, pp. 1324-1325. Musso was viewed by the government as the architect of the Surabaja strikes; Rapport van liet hoofd , p. 86. He could not have 65.

been directly responsible for their outbreak, however, as he was in prison from August to mid-October. 66. Rapport van het hoofd, pp. 86, 100; Politieke nota PKI, pp. 5-6. 67. The prohibition of the right of assembly was imposed for the PKI, SR, sugar workers’ union (SBC), and union of machinists and electrical workers ( SBBE ) by government decision of Nov. 28, 1925; on Dec. 15 this was extended to include the SPPL, VSTP, and the naval station employees’ union, SBME.

“Communisme,” p. 538, col. 68. Geheim verslag, p. 1.

a.

1925, in IPO, no. 51, 1925, p. 614. Among the party leaders listed as having arrived were Sardjono, Winanta, Aliarcham, Sutan Said 69.

Ali,

Mowo, Dec.

7,

Kusnogunoko, Hadji Umar, Samsuri, Wirasuharta, Atmasumarta, Marco, and

Sastrowidjono. 70.

The

exact date of this gathering

is

uncertain, although most likely

it

was

Dec. 25. Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 115-116, mentions a letter written on Dec. 16 on behalf of the PKI executive reporting the meeting. However, according to Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959, and written statement, dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 24), the date was Dec. 25, the same day the VSTP congress convened in Surakarta. This date is also given in the PKI account Pemherontakan November 1926, p. 51. Both these recent accounts give the place of the meeting as the Prambanan shrine itself, which is possible, as it is customary for people in the general area to visit the major monuments of Borobudur and Prambanan on holidays, and a small group would have had an ostensibly legitimate purpose in going there and could be inconspicuous in the general crowd. That the Surakarta and Prambanan meetings were essentially two parts of the same discussion is indicated in the PKI confidential report of a conference it held shortly thereafter; Geheim verslag, p. 5. December 25 is also the date referred to in an account by Tan Malaka; Malaka, Thesis, p. 38. At any rate, all the existing reports (see, in addition, Politieke nota PKI, p. 11; G. J. van Munster, “The Background and History of the Insurrection on Java,” Inprecorr, Dec. 16, 1926, p. 1499; Djoehana, “History of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement,” no. 15, p. 9) agree on December as the month of the Prambanan meeting, except for Musso’s report to the sixth

Comintern congress (Mauawar, report in Inprecorr, Oct. 17, 1928, p. 1324). Either by a slip of the tongue or for reasons of his own, Musso said the conference had taken place in October 1925. 71. According to Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959 and written statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 19), the group consisted of eleven persons, five of whom were members of the PKI central executive; they included Sardjono, Alimin, Musso, Budisutjitro (mentioned in interview) and Winanta (mentioned in statement). Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 116, also lists eleven participants: Alimin (in charge of the meeting), Sutan Said Ah (representing the West Sumatran PKI), Budisutjitro, Jahja, Aliarcham, Sugono, Surat Hardjomartojo, Jatim, Sukirno, Suwamo, and Kusno (-gunoko). If Alimin attended the meeting, he must have slipped back to Java secretly. There is no further evidence that he did, and he claims (interview, 1959, and Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, p. 20) that he met with the other PKI leaders only after they arrived in Singapore.

The PKI account 471

of

the

rebellion

lists

,

Notes pp. 311-315 ,

“among

Sugono, Suprodjo, Kusnogunoko, Najoan, Gondojuwono, Sutan Said Ali, Abdulmuntalib, and

others’’ Sardjono, Budisutjitro,

Herujuwono, Winanta, Marco; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 52. The VSTP leader Ongko D also gave the number of participants in the meeting as eleven; written statement, dated Apr. 14, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR Contra Tan Malaka, p. 64. 72. Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 52. 73. Darsono, interview,

statements

1959; Reports of the Resident, pp. 3—4, referring to by Sutan Said Ali and Dahlan on their return from the con-

made

ference.

was the date given by Tan Malaka ( Thesis p. 38), by Damaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959, and statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, pp. 19, 24), and by Nurut (statement dated Apr. 19, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 86); Pemberontakan November 1926 also gives June (p. 53). 75. Mauawar (Musso), in Inprecorr, Oct. 17, 1928, pp. 1324-1325; “Com74.

June

munisme,”

1926,

18,

Schrieke “Political Section,’’ p. 116, citing a letter sent the PKI branches on Dec. 16, 1925, signed by Sardjono, Winanta, and p.

951, col. b;

Budisutjitro on behalf of the party executive

and

calling

on the Communists to

be ready to revolt in July 1926. 76.

Geheim

verslag, pp. 3-5.

77. Bijlage 1925, pp. 7-8. See also Politek verslag 1926, p. 2; Api, Dec. 21-25,

1925, in IPO, no.

1,

78. Minutes, pp.

1926, p.

5.

That

1-2.

all

eighty-two representatives were at this meet-

ing seems unlikely, unless the hotel were run dormitory style; but the minutes of the conference do not indicate that it was a smaller group.

Geheim verslag, referendum of PKI units. and

79. Minutes, pp. 1-7; meeting had called for a

80. Politieke nota PKI, p. to

see

11, citing a letter written

PKI executive on Java on June

the

pp.

12,

1,

5.

The Dec. 22 party

by Subakat

in

Singapore

1926; and see Schrieke, “Political

Section,” p. 116.

Geheim

Musso, “The White Terror in Indonesia,” Inprecorr, Mar. 8, 1929, p. 13; Blumberger Communist, p. 59. The initials were taken from its Dutch name (Dubbele or Dictatoriale Organisatie ) its Indonesian name, rarely used, was P.K.I. ke-Dua (Second PKI), which was reminiscent of the Indonesian-language name of the Section B (S.I. ke-Dua). 82. Semaun, Rapotan, pp. 35—36. 81.

verslag, p. 1;

;

83. 84.

1925,

Semaun, “Brieven,” June Api, Nov. 16, 1925. The is

1925; see also the issue of June 6, 1925. text of the resolution, which was dated Oct. 26, given in “Doloi terror v Indonezii” (Down with the Terror in Indonesia), 8,

Krasnyi lnternatsional Profsoiuzov, December 1925, pp. 122-123. See also “The Struggle of the Indonesian Proletariat,” Inprecorr, Nov. 12, 1925, pp. 1214-1215. 85. Api, Mar. 9, 1925.

signed by Bergsma;

The cablegram was

seems

datelined Amsterdam, Mar.

8,

and

have been an outgrowth of a major protest rally sponsored by the Dutch Communists in Amsterdam on Feb. 26, 1925, which adopted resolutions against the government’s Indonesia policy and supported independence; De Tribune, Feb. 27, 1925. The parenthetical information seems to have been supplied by Api; I have no more idea than the newspaper what

BKST

stood

it

to

for.

86. Tatigkeitsba rich t der Exekutive der

Kommunistischen Internationale 1925-

1926 (Report on the Activity of the Executive of the Communist International 1925-1926) (Hamburg, 1926), p. 362; see also Semaun, “Der intemationale

472

Notes, pp. 315-316 Imperialismus und die Konimunistische Partei Indonesiens,”

“Labour Struggles lutionary

58; P. Bergsma,

East Indies,” p. 1106; P. Bergsma, “Progress of the Revoin Indonesia,” p. 1366.

Movement

87. Darsono,

p.

in the

“Die Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens,”

p. 418.

88. Minutes, p. 3. 89. For example, see the Report of the Assistant Resident of Pati, to the Resident of

68)

Semarang

p. 2, hereafter cited as

Overzicht Pati,

(untitled typescript, dated Nov. 25, 1926, no.

43;

p.

9741/

Report of the Assistant, Pati; “The Bantam Report,”

1926, pp. 8-9; damsche Courant, Mar. 10, 1925, and July 13, 1926.

p.

Ranneft,

27;

Politick

verslag

Nieuwe

Rotter-

Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959), this solution to the arms procurement problem was proposed by Alimin in discussing the Prambanan decision with Tan Malaka in early 1926; Semaun (interview, 1959) stated that it was suggested to him by Alimin and Musso when they arrived in Moscow a few months later. 91. Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 115-116, citing the report on the Prambanan conference issued by the PKI executive on Dec. 16, 1925; and see Minutes, 90. According to

p. 4.

92.

Tan Malaka,

According to

Moscow was

the

main purpose

of

the

PKI

emissaries’

Comintern authorization; Malaka, Thesis, p. 38. This was also stressed by Darsono (interview with G. McT. Kahin, 1955). Musso declared that the PKI chiefly hoped for Comintern aid in preparing a program that would appeal to the broad national revolutionary forces of Indonesia ( lnpre corr, Oct. 17, 1928, pp. 1324-1325), but his statement was probably tailored to what the Comintern actually decided to do about the Indonesian proposal. At the Pasar Pon meeting, Sugono discussed “secret business of the VSTP which will also be taken up with Soviet Russia via a secret route; when this has eventually been worked out, it will be possible to carry on a very violent resistance.” He also read passages from a confidential letter sent by the Perhimpunan Indonesia from Amsterdam in October 1925, which, he declared, promised strong support if the VSTP undertook resistance and assured that aid would also come from “other Red countries”; Minutes, pp. 4-5. How much Sugono was reading into the PI expression of sympathy, it is difficult to say; the part of the letter quoted directly in the minutes of the meeting simply expressed general anti-Dutch and prorevolutionary nationalist feelings. Djamaluddin Tamin (interview, 1959) said he had visited PKI headquarters on Java just after the December conferences and was informed then of the decision to revolt. The party leaders explained that pressure from below was such that action could no longer be delayed, and since they could not finance a rebellion, they had trip to

decided to appeal

to seek

to

Moscow

for aid.

and 22, 1926. Darsono sailed for Singapore on Jan. 29, 1926, and proceeded from there under police escort to Shanghai, where he stayed a short time before continuing to Vladivostok and Moscow; Darsono, interview, 1959. 94. Bataviaasch Nieuwshlad, Jan. 13, 1926; Api, Jan. 12 and Feb. 1, 1926; 93. Politiek verslag 1926, pp. 1-2; Api, Jan. 18

Java Bode, Feb. 5, 1926. 95. Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, pp. 20, 22; and see Tan Malaka, DP, I, p. 143. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), the PKI leaders first wanted Semaun to come to Singapore to discuss the situation with them, since as a member of the ECCI presidium he was the top Comintern representative for Indonesia

(and because they knew Tan Malaka disapproved the Prambanan proposals?).

473

Notes, p. 316 However, the Comintern rejected

and the party leaders

his going to Singapore,

then decided to appeal to Malaka. The PKI history of the rebellion asserts that the party executive first sent Alimin and later Musso to contact one of the

ECCI

representatives in the Far East in order to get an opinion on the

decision.

They heard nothing from

Prambanan

mission for some time, and so Sardjono

this

and Budisutjitro were sent as envoys to Singapore to meet with Tan Malaka. Malaka refused to leave the Philippines, and so Alimin was sent to see him in Manila; Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 53-54. It does not seem likely

PKI contacted either Semaun or other ECCI representatives in the time between the Prambanan conference and Alimin’s visit to Tan Malaka, in view of the distance and difficulty of communication. What is possible is that the party had made earlier efforts to arrange a meeting with Semaun (we will remember that there were attempts to bring him to Singapore during 1925) to

me

that the

and that Alimin tried to press this or to get in touch with International representatives in the Far East during his visit to Canton in about August 1925. However, Alimin does not mention such efforts in his autobiography or his polemic with Tan Malaka. Musso is recorded as attending the Prambanan conference in one of the three lists of participants, and the Dutch-language press reported only that the police had missed him since early January 1926. He could not have left Indonesia much before the Prambanan conference, as he was in the country in late November. I have seen no further evidence for a mission by Musso at this time. Nor does it seem likely that Sardjono and Budisutjitro left Indonesia simplv as emissaries. Thev were not the only ones to depart after the December meetings; virtually the whole of the top partv leadership appears to have left Indonesia between January and early April 1926. It seems to me most probable that the entire executive expected to be arrested and its members sought to avoid this by decamping to Singapore, where they could more easily contact Comintern representatives and where they could safely wait out any further repercussions of the Surabaja strikes. 96.

1926;

Tan Malaka, Schrieke,

Thesis, p. 38, says he

“Political

Section,”

p.

met with Alimin

163,

at the

end

places their meeting in

of

March

February';

and Djamaluddin Tamin, in a statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.S1BAR Contra Tan Malaka, pp. 24, 30, said that Alimin left Singapore for the Philippines early in January, was persuaded b\' Malaka’s viewpoint after a week or two of arguing, and then spent more time discussing the theses Malaka was drawing up and making arrangements for communications between Manila and Singapore. He left Manila on Feb. 15, having been about a month in the Philippines. A January or February meeting would seem likely if Sugono attended the second Singapore conference, which it seems probable he did. Other references to the Malaka-Alimin meeting may be found in Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54; Politieke not a PKI, p. 12, which cites as the source of its information a letter written by Subakat in Singapore, dated June 12, 1926, to PKI headquarters on Java; and also “Dibelakang Lajar Komoenis” (Behind the Communist Veil), Santapan Rakjat, Sept. 18, 1948, p. 1; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 82; Dimyati, Sedjarah,

p. 24.

97. Alimin, Analysis, p. 14.

Tim Malaka said he had received weekly reports on PKI developments from Aliarcham when the latter was party chairman. Malaka had heard from him of the decision to abolish the SR and had written him protesting the decision; 98.

but Aliarcham was jailed while they were p. 47. In addition,

Malaka

is

debating the point; Malaka, Thesis, said to have taken up the December conference still

474

,

Notes pp. 316-321 ,

program with Alimin on when he visited the Philippines in 1925; Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 99. According to Tan Malaka, he wrote this pamphlet in China in the last days of 1924; Malaka, DP I, p. 113. It was published first in Canton in April 1925 and then in Tokyo in December of the same year. The Dutch Communist paper received a copy of the China edition and reviewed it very favorably;

De

Tribune, July 24, 1925.

Naar de “Republiek-Indonesia” (Canton, April 1925), pp. 26, Tan Malaka, Semangat Moeda (The Youthful Spirit) (Tokyo,

100. T. Malaka,

36-37; see also

January 1926), pp. 58-65, 73-74.

program are given Semangat Moeda, pp. 59-65;

101. Versions

of the

Naar de “Republiek-Indonesia,” Tan Malaka, Massa Actie (Mass

in

21-23; Action) (Djakarta, 1947), pp. 69-75. 102. Naar de “Republiek-Indonesia,” p. 27; Semangat Moeda, pp. 72-73. 103. Naar de “ Republiek-Indonesia ,” p. 26; and see Massa Actie, pp. 48, 51. 104. Naar de “Republiek-Indonesia,” pp. 18-19. 105. Naar de “ Republiek-Indonesia ,” p. 47. For Malaka’s comments on the Pacific war, see pp. 41-43, and on revolutionary strategy, pp. 34-36. 106. Malaka, Semangat Moeda (Tokyo, 1926), p. 86. For the comments on revolutionary strategy, see pp. 73-75. pp.

DP

pp. 143-145. Elsewhere, however ( Thesis p. 43), Malaka stated that he had heard of the decision only when Alimin returned from Singa107. Malaka,

I,

pore. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 135, stated that

Malaka

first

learned of

it

through “the written report of Aliarcham and Budisutjitro”; but it is unlikely that Aliarcham helped write such a report, as he had been in jail since Dec. 5. 108. Malaka, Thesis, p. 38. Emphasis in the text. 109. Malaka, Thesis, p. 38; Schrieke, “ Political Section,” pp. 153-154. 110. Malaka,

Massa

Actie, p. 48. This

pamphlet was

first

published in Singa-

pore in 1926.

47-50 on legal activities, 51 on party democracy, pp. 55-56 on the national front, and pp. 62-63 on

111. Malaka, p.

Massa

Actie, p. 56, note 1;

Massa

Actie, p. 61.

and

see pp.

terrorism.

112. Malaka, 113. Malaka,

Thesis,

p.

38;

Schrieke,

“Political

Section,”

p.

154;

Politieke

nota PKI, p. 11, citing the Subakat letter of June 12, 1926; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 82.

114. Malaka, Thesis, p. 40. 115. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 154; Politieke nota PKI, p. 11, citing the Subakat letter of June 12, 1926. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 82, and Djamaluddin

P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 27, claim, however, that Alimin did not indicate Tan Malaka’s opposition. The PKI history Pemberontakan November 1926 does not mention the theses as such, but states that Alimin presented Malaka’s opinion, which did not agree with the Prambanan decision (p. 54). The second Singapore meeting took place in April 1926, according to Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 154, and Politieke nota PKI, p. 25. Djamaluddin Tamin, however, gives it as Mar. 11, 1926; interview, 1959. If Sugono took part, it is likely it was held in March, as he was arrested when he returned to Indo-

Tamin,

in Sudijono,

on April 7; Politiek verslag 1926, p. 11. The meeting was attended by Sugono, Budisutjitro, Winanta, Musso, Subakat, Suprodjo and Alimin, according to Djamaluddin Tamin; interview, 1959, and statement in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 25. Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, mentions Sardnesia,

475

Notes,

p.

321

jono and Sugono as present in Singapore throughout this period.

Tan Malaka men-

Sugono’s participation in the second meeting; Thesis, p. 38. However, Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 154, and Politieke nota PKI, p. 25, note as par-

tions

above except Suprodjo and Sugono; and Alimin, Riivajat Hidup, p. 22, mentions only three conferees— Musso, Subakat, and himself. 116. Politieke nota PKI, p. 25, states that Musso played the major role in urging adherence to the Prambanan decision; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, claims that party chairman Sardjono denounced Malaka’s position and gave the orders for the Musso-Alimin expedition and the return of the other party leaders to Indonesia. Both Musso and Sardjono were subsequently prominent in preventing any retreat from the Prambanan position. 117. Semaun, interview, 1959. According to Semaun, Musso knew the code that was to relay the message from Moscow, but Alimin did not. 118. Malaka claimed he did not hear from Alimin for nearly two months after his departure from Manila; Malaka, DP I, p. 146. The most probable dates are those given by Djamaluddin Tamin, and they place Alimin’s departure from Manila on Feb. 15 and his letter from Singapore on Mar. 16, a lapse of a month. Possibly the letter was sent by a circuitous route and took several weeks to arrive; if so, it would provide a reason other than illness for the delay in Malaka’s departure from Manila. 119. Malaka, DP I, p. 146. However, according to Malaka’s disciple, Djamaluddin Tamin (statement dated Apr. 2, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, pp. 27-28), Alimin sent a letter to Tan Malaka on Mar. 16, 1926, the day he and Musso departed for Moscow. The letter stated that the party executive had refused to accept Malaka’s views and had decided to send' Alimin and Musso to Moscow. Malaka felt that the PKI leadership would not have rejected his theses unless there had been foul play on Alimin’s part, and so he made every effort to get to Singapore as soon as he was able. The PKI account Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, states that Musso and Alimin were first to go to Canton to contact a representative of the Comintern Eastern Section and then to Moscow to confer with the ECCI. Politieke nota PKI, p. 11, says that Alimin and Musso intended either to confer in Canton with Borodin or to go to Moscow and talk to Comintern leaders there (the latter alternative would presumably have been in case Borodin was unwilling or unable to approve the project himself). Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, p. 22, mentions that lie and Musso w-ent to Russia by way of Canton and Shanghai. It is most likely that they did get in touch with Soviet or Comintern representatives while in China, if only to arrange for travel to Russia. No awareness of their impending visit w'as shown by the head of the ECCI Eastern Section, M. N. Roy, in a letter written to Sneevliet on June 12, 1926; however, this may have been due to faulty communications. The length of time involved in their trip (nearly three months, if we take Mar. 16 as the date of their departure) is plausible considering their illegal status, inadequate funds, and lack of prior Soviet permission for the trip. We have no indication what discussions, if any, Alimin and Musso had with Comintern representatives in China; however, one bit of information may provide a clue. Budisutjitro w^as arrested in Ternate on his way back from the Singapore meetings; it w-as reported that he had gone from Singapore to Hong Kong and Shanghai, returning through Hong Kong and Manila to Ternate, where he was captured; Nietiwe Rotterdamsche Courant, June 15, 1926. This indirect itinerary suggests that he might have accompanied Alimin and Musso on the first leg of their journey; I can think of no other obvious reason why he would ticipants all the

476

Notes,

p.

322

His Manila visit might have been simply to make connections for Indonesia, or he might have intended to inform Tan Malaka of what had been done. Apparently he did not meet with Malaka; very

have gone as

far afield as Shanghai.

he arrived after Malaka had left for Singapore. Nurut, the then vice-chairman of the Makassar PKI, has recounted that Budisutjitro unexpectedly appeared in Makassar in May 1926; written statement dated Apr. 19, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, pp. 84-85. likely

He was

using a false passport and, disguised as a trader, was trying to avoid the police. Nurut, who had known him earlier, met with him in a brief and

him that at the beginning of 1926 he had secretly left Batavia for Singapore and had received a mandate from the party executive for a mission abroad. He had been forced to return in roundabout fashion, via Makassar to Surabaja. He did not mention the Prambanan conference (about which, according to Nurut, the Makassar branch had still received no news) and said only that the PKI had been forced to dissolve as a legal organization, that unexpected events might take place, and that the Communists must guard against provocation. The next day, according to Nurut, he left for Surabaja. Temate is hardly on the way from Makassar to Surabaja, but Budisutjitro may have had what he thought was safe passage aboard a vessel making the trip through the eastern islands and then around to Java. If Nurut’s story is true, it is strange that Budisutjitro would not have informed the Makassar party branch of the Prambanan decision, for it was certainly never intended to keep the revolt plans secret from the outlying PKI sections. The only likely reason seems furtive conference. Budisutjitro told

that, either

because of his

own

sober second thought or because of his knowl-

edge of the reaction the Alimin-Musso expedition received in China, he had come to doubt that the plan would in fact go through. Accounts differ as to Budisutjitro’s attitude when he left prison, but he ended up on the antirebellion side.

120. Malaka,

Thesis, pp.

36, 38-39;

Pemberontakan November 1926,

p.

54;

P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 28. According to Malaka, he arrived in Singapore on May 6. See also Dimyati, Sedjarah, p. 24; Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 28. He was spotted aboard a Japanese ship headed from the Philippines for Malaya on Apr. 30, according to a Report of the Attorney General to the Resident of Sumatra’s West Coast (untitled, mimeograph, dated Weltevreden, Sept. 27, 1926,

Djamaluddin Tamin,

in Sudijono,

Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 155, gives the date of his arrival as early June. This seems unlikely unless Suprodjo’s journey (see below) classified), p. 2.

was unusually

hasty.

from Singapore to the Java executive; Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 155. Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.I.SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 29, states that Malaka wrote the first of a series of letters to the Java party on May 6, the day of his arrival in Singapore, calling on all members of the executive to come to that city in order to learn from him the truth of what Alimin had done and to rescind the Prambanan decision. He also requested them to send comrades representing the outlying party sections, in order that he might explain the situation to them and give instructions for launching local activities that would culminate in a national mass action. According to this account, the first reaction received from Java was a letter from Sardjono stating that the Prambanan decision was not subject to discussion and that further correspondence on the question was not desired. 122. Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 30. 121. Politieke nota PKI, p. 11, citing letters

477

Notes pp. 322-325 ,

see also Malaka, Thesis, p. 39; Dimyati, Sedjarah, pp. 24-25, 35; Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 155. According to Pemberontakan November

For Suprodjo’s

visit,

Sugono as well as Suprodjo came to Singapore at Malaka’s request, and Sugono was arrested when he arrived back in Indonesia. This does not seem likely: Sugono was captured on returning from Singapore, but on Apr. 7, thus presumably after the Singapore executive meetings and before Malaka arrived'. This account is also the only one to place Suprodjo among the group in Singapore from 1926,

p. 54,

January through March. Dimyati’s history states that Suprodjo arrived in Singapore on June 15, 1926, and spoke in Bandung, after his return, on June 29. Djamaluddin Tamin’s account says that he arrived in Singapore about the end of June and was back in Bandung at the beginning of July. Schrieke’s account states that he returned to Bandung, then PKI headquarters, at the end of June, having traveled there via Bandjermasin and Surabaja. If he had returned by late June or early July ( which seem probable both because of the agreement of the accounts and the subsequent chain of events) it is not possible that he arrived in Singapore at the end' of June and unlikely that he came as late as June 15 if he took the circuitous route described by Schrieke.

CHAPTER

XII

were Sardjono, Winanta, Osman gelar Sutan Keadilan, and Dawud. There were four representatives from the most important (class I) sections: Sutigno (Surabaja), Sugono (Semarang), Sardjono (Batavia), and Sutan Djenain (Bandung). From the class II branches were Samyarata (Jogjakarta), Marco (Surakarta), Sosroatmodjo (Madiun), Tarmudji (Kediri), Muchsin (Tjirebon), Salimun ( Pekalongan ), S. Prapto (Tegal), Engku Djamaluddin Rasad (West Sumatra), Abdulkarim (Atjeh), A. C. Salim (Makassar), Samsjudin (Medan), and O. Najoan (Temate); Geheim verslag, p. 1. 1.

Central

executive

2.

verslag, p. 2.

5.

Geheim Geheim Geheim Geheim

6.

Article

3. 4.

representatives

verslag, pp. 2-3. verslag, p. 2.

verslag, p. 3.

by Sugono

in

Si

Tetap,

Dec. -31,

1925,

in

IPO, no.

6,

1926,

p.

300. 7.

1926, p. 11. Sugono’s opposition may the PKI history Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54, claimed that

Malaka, Thesis,

explain

why

p. 38; Politiek verslag

he had met with Tan Malaka in Singapore. The government version of Sugono’s death was that he committed suicide in prison six weeks after his arrest; the Communists claim he died under questioning and that the police therefore al-

lowed only

his

immediate family

November 1926, pp. 54-55. 8. Mowo, editorial of Dec.

to prepare his

body

1925, in IPO, no.

for burial;

Pemberontakan

1926, pp. 35—36. 9. Beginning with the issue of Jan. 2, 1926, Api published quotations from Bakunin on the character of revolutionary action. They were printed in italics

on the

first

18,

1,

page; nothing similar was done at the time for statements by any

other political thinker.

The

Api was then Herujuwono, one of

editor in chief of

the most active proponents of a resort to arms. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. Feb. 1, 1926. 10.

11.

Schrieke,

"Political

Section,” p.

119, quoting

120,

West Sumatra,

478

letter no.

59,

quoting circulars sent to PKI sec-

tions for distribution to subsections, dated Jan. 23,

decided, at least in the case of

PKI executive

1926. However,

it

was

later

that only regular dues should

Notes pp. 325-327 ,

be sent on to the center. Gifts use at

its

own

(

uang derma) were retained by the

Schrieke,

discretion;

“Political

Section,” p.

section for

120, citing a letter

from PKI headquarters to the Padang section, dated Mar. 11, 1926. The West Sumatran group decided that the proper use for its money was to buy arms and' arranged to buy guns abroad; Hadji Mohammad Nur Ibrahim seems to have been the chief figure in the arms procurement effort and to have negotiated with Alimin and Musso to secure guns from across the Straits; p. 120. 12. In the western Priangan, plans for a May revolution were popularly assigned to the Asror movement, a secret society whose members belonged to the SI and which taught the secret of invulnerability; Nadere 1927 p. 244. In Atjeh, people were told by PKI leaders that the uprising would commence in June; Verslag bestuur 1927, p. 8; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Sept. 9, 1926. ,

13. Schrieke,

Section,” p.

“Political

referring to

151,

the situation in

West

Sumatra. 14. A. p.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,

50;

June

3,

De Opbouw, June 15, 1926, May 25 and 31, 1926; De Telegraaf,

“Indische chroniek” (Indies Chronicle),

J.,

1926.

Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 153, quoting Instruction no. 5 of Apr. 13, 1925. In the Semarang area, party leaders were reported to have been busy dur15.

ing April visiting their followers and instructing them that the section executive

had decided against any

May Day

celebration that year; Politick verslag 1926,

The vice-chairman of the Makassar section reported that in May a communique from the party executive was received; it bitterly criticized the government measures, which it admitted had severed the center’s connections with the outlying branches. It advised all local leaders to continue their work as best p.

8.

they could and above

avoid responding to provocations. Nurut, written statement in Sudijono, P.K.I.-S1BAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 85. This may have all

been the executive’s Apr. in

to

13 instruction, which could well have arrived late

Makassar. 16.

ants’

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, May Movement, p. 49.

hammer and

3,

11,

and

18, 1926; Dinglev, Peas-

and crescent (the SR emblem) were favored by Mu’alimin adherents; manufactured by the Surakarta batik industry, the subversive sarongs also found a good market on the West Coast of Sumatra. It was forbidden to sell or wear them; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Nov. 2 and 8, 1926. 18. Politiek verslag 1926, pp. 9-11, 16—17. The VSTP had had 66 branches and 9,000 members at the beginning of 1926 but sank to 6 locals and several hundred active members during the course of the year. Communist union activity in the Semarang area was halted, according to this report, partly because so many suspected leftists were fired from their jobs that the workers were afraid to have anything to do with the revolutionary unions. 19. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; “Communisme,” p. 952, 17.

Batik cloths with the

sickle

or star

Verslag bestuur 1927, pp. 8-9, 19.

col. a;

The

Indies government belief in the ineffectiveness of the

PKI in 1926, knowledge concerning the real state of affairs in the areas where the movement was becoming a serious threat, was stressed to the writer by Professor G. F. Pijper (interview, 1960), who in 1926 was assistant to the Adviser 20.

and

its

lack of

for Native Affairs.

West Sumatra leadership, see Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 116; for the Semarang area, see Politiek verslag 1926, p. 8. The lack of contact with outlying sections is illustrated by a letter sent by the central 21.

For complications

in the

479

Notes pp. 327-329 ,

which data on the number of PKI members, candidates, and SR and union members was requested, with the explanation that “our activities are being rendered increasingly more difficult; executive to the

now we

are

West Sumatra PKI on June

no longer allowed

to publish a

7,

in

paper carrying information concern-

We

hope that you, comrade, will send us a detailed and clear report concerning all movements in your Section. In this report you are urged not to omit a description quoted in Schrieke, Political of popular sentiment vis-a-vis our movement ing the overall situation of the movement.

therefore very sincerely

‘

.

.

Section,” p. 155, note 125. 22. Api, editorial of Jan. 13, 1926; Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 153, citing a communication from the central committee to the Padang party section.

On

June 9 the executive issued an instruction providing that “representatives of the Central Committee have to be in possession of an authorization from us, written on the back of their personal photographs. The authorizations will also be provided with a rubber stamp from the Central Committee, and with the signatures of the Central Committee chairman and secretary or their alternates. Persons unable to produce photographs and authorizations as explained above are not to be accepted as our representatives”; quoted in Schrieke, 23.

“Political Section,” p. 153.

The VSTP

according to this report, acquired a Double Organization, under the chairmanship of Saleh, a Semarang union leader of notably rebellious inclinations. The Batavia branch suggested that the union also organize itself in sections and subsections in the manner of the PKI, 24. Politick verslag 1926, p. 12.

also,

but Kadarisman, chairman of the union and of the Semarang PKI, refused on the grounds that he doubted the party structure was sound. 25. Brouwer, De houding, pp. 116-118; Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 35-39. 26.

Musso

Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959.

It

was perhaps

this

meeting which

referred to in his report to the sixth Comintern congress as the PKI’s

third conference

on the revolution,

at

which

it

was decided

to

postpone the

date of the revolt; Inprecorr, Oct. 17, 1928, p. 1325. According to Djamaluddin Tamin, who represented South Sumatra at the meeting, he opposed the decision

go through with the rebellion after the other units indicated the degree of their unpreparedness. However, no one else shared this view, and he was persuaded to change his mind. 27. Dimyati, Sedjarah, p. 35. According to this source, the meeting took place on June 29. See also Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 55; Djamaluddin Tamin, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 30. 28. Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959; Schrieke, “Political Section,” pp. 155-156; Malaka, Thesis, p. 39; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 82-83; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 125. The last two sources claim Djamaluddin Tamin returned to Java to propagandize the party; he denies it. According to his account and that given by Malaka, none of the three Singapore leaders attempted to return to Indonesia in this period. The reason for this, outside of fear of being arrested, appears to have been that Malaka hoped that if he could get the PKI executive to convene with him in Singapore he could persuade it to stay in that city. Malaka and Subakat had urged this in letters to the party in Indonesia, declaring that if the drain of leaders through internment continued the party would not recover for another decade; Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 155. Some of the correspondence between the Singapore and Bandung groups was found in a police raid on Suprodjo’s house; according to the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, to

Feb. 20, 1927, the argument was framed in theoretical concepts concerning the

480

Notes, pp. 329-330 party program and

plans for revolt;

its

the

two groups seemed

to

misunder-

stand each other completely. 29. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 156; Schrieke, Notes, referring to a police

report of Sept. 25, 1926. 30. Schrieke, citing

“Political

a statement to

[Alimin?]’s

comment

the in

pp. 156-157, note 128; Schrieke, Notes, police by the PKI leader Marsudi. See also Alim

Section,”

“The Terror

in

Indonesia,” Inprccorr,

p. 429, that the progressive promise of the

Indonesian revolutionary

new governor

Mar. 24, 1927,

general weakened the

spirit.

According to Marsudi, a poll was taken in which Bantam, Batavia, Tjirebon, Pekalongan, Tegal, Makassar, and all the Sumatran sections supported the proposal; Semarang, Kediri, Surabaja, the Priangan, and Magelang opposed it, Tjilatjap and Surakarta were undecided; and Banjumas, Jogjakarta, Rembang, Pasuruan, Besuki, and Madiun did not vote. The executive opposed the proposal on the grounds that it was still waiting for reports from Alimin, Musso, and Tan Malaka. 32. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 156, citing a letter from Sardjono to Tan Malaka, dated Aug. 13, 1926. The PKI may actually have revised its plans. In June, it was reported, the original Prambanan strategy of a feint in Sumatra followed up by a major action in Java was abandoned, and Herujuwono was sent to visit the various PKI sections to work out a new plan of action with them; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. 33. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 156. This may be the letter from Tan Malaka which Schrieke elsewhere refers to as having been dated Aug. 17, 1926; Schrieke, Reconstructie van de opstandsplannen in Augustus-September te Cheribon-Pekalongan-Tegal (Reconstruction of the Uprising Plans in AugustSeptember at Tjirebon-Pekalongan-Tegal) (manuscript notes), p. 1, hereafter 31. Schrieke,

Notes, citing Marsudi’s statement to the police.

cited as Reconstructie. 34. Report of the Attorney General to the Resident of Sumatra’s

West

Coast,

1926, pp. 2-3, hereafter cited as Report of the Attorney General, transmitting reports from a spy for the Netherlands Indies government who was Sept.

27,

highly placed in the Singapore party councils. According to this source, Alimin

and Musso had ordered the weapons; Tan Malaka had said there were 2,000 pistols in Singapore, 200 of them destined for Medan, 300 for Atjeh, and the rest for Surabaja; in Manila thei'e were 2,000 pistols on order for Padang. Whether Malaka refused primarily on principle or because he could not pay for the weapons was not stated. See also Overzicht SWK, p. 10. Reconstructie, pp. 1-2; “Political Section,” pp. 156-157. 36. Report of the Attorney General, p. 2. See also Schrieke, Notes and “Political Section,” p. 157. This appeal was contained in a letter brought to Singapore on 35. Schrieke,

Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 75-76, a committee to organize the West Sumatra revolt had been formed under the leadership of Mangkudun Sati. He approached the German assistant administrator of the Sawah Lunto coal mines about acquiring arms and found him ready to help supply revolvers and carbines. Likewise, the manager of a gun shop and the director of a firm in Medan, both Dutchmen, were willing to procure small arms. Other weapons were homemade; grenades were concocted with gunpowder purchased from Batavia and Surabaja. By the end of 1926, according to this account, over one thousand carbines, revolvers, rifles, and homemade guns had been collected in West Sumatra, in addition to grenades, sharp weapons, and Sept. 10, 1926. According to

four automobiles.

481

;

,

Notes pp. 331-332 ,

according to this account, Malaka was then in Batu Pahat, Malaya. The meeting was attended by the Dutch spy in the Singapore PKI. The chairman of the “trading association” was Babusanah, 37. Report of the Attorney General

p.

2;

Dutch spy, commissioners Salem and Marah, and propagandists Abdul Murad and Narbi. It was decided that Tan Malaka, Megas, Abdulkarim, and Suprodjo would be stationed at the Penang headquarters; Musso, Subakat, and the spy would be in Singapore; Alimin, Budisutjitro, Ongko D, and Zainul Abidin would be in Johore; Umar and Bukera would be in Kota Tinggi; and Djamaluddin Tamin would be stationed either in Penang or Singatreasurer Jusuf, secretary the

pore.

General, p. 2. According to the spy, Suprodjo (Bandung), Ongko (Surabaja), and Djamaluddin Tamin (Padang; he had gone to the Malay peninsula at the time the spy’s report was written) were supposed to arrive in Singapore in a few days; also expected shortly were A. C. 38. Report

of the Attorney

D

Salim (Padang Pandjang) and Abdulkarim (Atjeh). We know that Djamaluddin Tamin did return, but there is no sign that the others appeared or that the conference was ever held. A. C. since Sept. 13,

was

arrested in

Salim,

who had been

hiding from the law

Oct. 12; Schrieke, Notes. He may have to Singapore. PKI leaders reported visiting Singa-

Medan on

been trying to make his way pore in October were Murrad gelar Sutan Maharadja, Mahmud Sitjintjin ( Mohammad Jusuf), and Afandi; Schrieke, Notes. 39. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; Geheime actie der communistische leiders (Secret Action of the Communist Leaders) local administration of

Pekalongan

to the Resident of

(report of the

Pekalongan, no. 1048/G,

dated Pekalongan, Oct. 27, 1926, typescript, classified), p. 2, hereafter cited as Geheime actie letter from the Resident of Pekalongan to the Attorney General in Weltevreden (typescript, dated Pekalongan, Sept. 28, 1926, no. 1074, classified'), pp. 1-2. Because the authorities had not exercised sufficient supervision, a great backlog in tax payment built up between 1921 and 1925. This was discovered by the internal revenue inspection in the middle of 1925, and payment

was then demanded but generally not received. Forcible collections of all unpaid taxes were therefore begun in 1926, as a result of which there was considerable unrest. According to Pemherontakan November 1926, pp. 69—70, Tegal, Tjirebon, and Pekalongan were linked by a regional commissariat headed by Abdulmuntalib. 40. Geheime actie, p. 2. According to this source, Tegal first conferred with the Tjirebon section on this plan; Tjirebon advised Tegal to take the matter up with Bandung before proceeding further. See also Nieuwe Rotterdamsche

C ourant,

Dec. 28, 1926. 41. Schrieke, Reconstructs, 42. Schrieke, Reconstructs,

Geheime actie, p. 2. p. 1; Geheime actie, p. 3. 43. Schrieke, Reconstructs, p. 2; GeJsime actie, pp. 3-4. Abdulmuntalib, who took Tegal’s view, visited Batavia and Bantam and presumably also consulted with his oval section in Tjirebon; Salimun went to Semarang (Sept. 7-8), Temanggung (Sept. 8-9), Jogjakarta (Sept. 9-11, where he also consulted with a representative of Magelang), Surakarta (Sept. 11-13), and Madiun (Sept. p.

1;

13-15). 44. Schrieke,

Reconstructs,

p.

2;

Geheime

actie,

pp.

damsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. 45. Geheime actie, p. 4; Schrieke, Reconstructs, p. treasurer and first DO leader, had been arrested in Batavia bomb incidents of August 1926: he was banished

482

Nieuwe

4,

9:

2.

Winanta,

connection to

New

Rotter-

the

PKI

with

the

Guinea

at the

Notes pp. 333-334 ,

beginning of September; Nietiwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 20, 1926. Herojuwono also used the names Herujono, Heromuljono, and Heropranoto. He had been active in the party in Semarang and was editor-in-chief of Apt when it took to admiring Bakunin; he had also been chairman of the PKI section in

Pekalongan and propagandist

in Tegal.

Geheime actie, pp. 4, 9; Schrieke, Reconst ructie, p. 2. 47. Geheime actie, pp. 4-5. It has been claimed that this plan had been entertained by Tegal ever since the end of August; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 46.

Dec. 28, 1926. On August 25, the authorities heard of an SR meeting in Tegal that had decided in favor of terrorist action; a few houses were burnt, but none of those responsible could be found; Letter from the Resident of Pekalongan Attorney General, Sept. 28, 1926, p. 1. 48. Schrieke, Notes, from Sukrawanata’s statement to the police, Jan. 18, 1927; Schrieke, Reconst ructie, p. 1; Ongko D, statement dated Apr. 14, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-S1BAR contra Tan Malaka, pp. 65—66. A similar backlash apto the

pears to have been responsible for some of the violence involved in the Sarekat

Hidjau the year before. In some areas of the Priangan, it was reported, people were led to expect that the revolution— the day when the new order would begin, the land would be equally divided, and one would no longer have to pay taxes— would take place on Feb. 1, 1925; when nothing happened, they turned on the local Communists. R. Kem, Oprichting van contra-vereenigingen tegen het communisme, p. 7. The Batavia violence was called the Credit Action (Credit Aksi) by its sponsors, according to Ongko D’s account; it was carried out chiefly by djuaras from the Kampung Karet neighborhood, and the Bandung executive apparently did not know of the decision to set it off. Party members who asked the Bandung leaders about the incident were told that it had no significance and that they should continue working as before. Ongko D, a Surabaja PKI leader, claimed that on the urging of that branch party secretary Kusnogunoko was sent to Batavia to discuss the affair with the section leaders there, only to report back that local leaders refused to meet with him. 49. Schrieke, Notes, remarks that Sukrawinata told the authorities he was quite aware that his view was in conflict with Malaka’s analysis. According to Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 185, Sukrawinata declared that “it is not necessary that all the Netherlands Indies take part; it will be enough if Batavia acts, for it is the center of the government.” Schrieke further says, Re const ructie, p. 2, that Herojuwono was appointed as this committee’s chief propagandist. The title is given in Dutch as Comite van de Revolutie and sometimes as Uitvoerende Comite van de Revolutie ( Executive Committee of the Revolution ) in documents of that time. It is possible that the latter refers to the Batavia group as head of the revolutionary committees set up by various other party branches on its urging. I have seen the Indonesian name Comite Pemberontak ( Rebellion Committee) used only in the recent PKI account Pemherontakan November 1926 and in the pro-Malaka reply by Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka. Neither of these histories (except for Ongko D’s account given in the preceding footnote) imply that the revolutionary committees acted outside the approval of the Bandung executive; in fact, the PKI account states that Kusnogunoko was assigned to form them; Pemherontakan November 1926, p. 52. The PKI history asserts that the committees were set up to implement the Prambanan decision and, although it gives no date, implies that they were founded' soon after that conference. However, all the activities referred to that I have been able to check took place just before the rebellion, so that it does not seem probable the

483

Notes pp. 334-335 ,

committees were founded before the- dates given here or that they were the same as the DO. Both the PKI and pro-Malaka accounts have reasons for wishing to identify the committees with the regular party leadership: the PKI version because it wishes to stress party sponsorship of an important rebellion against the Dutch and because it seeks to emphasize the enormity of Tan Malaka’s opposition to the Prambanan decision; the pro-Malaka rejoinder because it wishes to underline the foolishness of those who would not listen to reason as revealed by Tan Malaka. What we know of events from accounts contemporary to the rebellion makes it seem most unlikely that the Bandung executive as such sponsored or approved' of the Batavia committee. However, the executive was not

an attempt was made just before the Java revolt to replace Sardjono as chairman by the moderate vice-chairman Suprodjo. If the Bandung executive’s retreat from rebellion reflected not a change of heart on Sardjono’s part but a weakening of his power in that body (as seems probable, given his diehard adherence to the Prambanan project in earlier arguments), then an interesting alternative possibility arises. It is not inconceivable that Kusnogunoko, who is described in both PKI and pro-Malaka accounts as a principal ally of Sardjono, was in fact received by the Batavia committee leaders on his visit to that city (see the preceding footnote) and that he informed them the central executive was falling under the control of supine elements and the only solution was for the Batavia group to mobilize revolutionary forces in the party without the authorization of the official leadership. 50. Schrieke, Notes and Reconstructie, pp. 1-2. Baharuddin Saleh hailed from Kota Anau, Sumatra; he had been PKI chairman in Padang Pandjang from September 1924 to May 1925. He was imprisoned for sedition and released in August 1926. He then went to Bandung, where he acquainted himself with Tan Malaka’s position as interpreted by Suprodjo; but apparently the PKI vice-chairman did not convince him. Mahmud Sitjintjin, who also used the name Mohammad Jusuf, was a leader from the Padang Pandjang section; he had' just returned from Singapore, where he had talked with Tan Malaka but had not been persuaded by his arguments. Schrieke, Notes; “Political Section,’’ p. 158. Samudro took over the leadership of the DO from Herojuwono. 51. Mahmud was named secretary and Sukrawinata commissioner; in addition, Herojuwono, Hamid Sutan, Kamari, and Samudro were named' assistants to the united;

as

executive.

we

shall

Schrieke,

see,

“Political

statements of Sukrawinata and

Section,”

p.

Mahmud

158;

Schrieke,

Notes,

referring

to

According to Baharuddin Saleh’s statement to the authorities, the idea for the committee had been suggested to him the day before by Sukrawinata, who proposed Herojuwono and Samudro as participants; Baharuddin Saleh had suggested Hamid Sutan

and Mahmud; Schrieke, Notes. 52. When he went to Batu Pahat that he be informed as soon as

Sitjintjin

to

the police.

Tan Malaka had left instructions Alimin and Musso arrived in Singapore; Report in August,

of the Attorney General, p. 2. 53. Dingley Peasants’

Movement,

58. “Dingley” further

remarked that the from a populist group, which ignored the differences between the proletariat and peasantry, a left wing that believed a soviet government in Indonesia was the party’s immediate goal, anarchist tendencies in the SR and the party itself, Islamic Communist deviations, and a very serious syndicalist tendency. A thorough reorganization of the party was necessary, he considered. His pamphlet seems to have been written around June, 1926. 54. M. N. Roy, in Moscow, to H. Sneevliet, in Amsterdam; dated June 10,

PKI

p.

suffered

484

,

Notes pp. 335-337 ,

might be noted that Tan Malaka mentions in his autobiography that while he was in Manila he had written the Comintern on the Prambanan decision and his feelings toward it; Malaka, DP I, p. 146. 55. Conceivably, this may be the Miller mentioned* in the Profintem encyclopedia as having been a revolutionary railroad union leader in India; Malaia entsiklopediia po mezhdtinarodnomu profdvizheniiu, cols. 1222-1223. However, Miller is hardly an uncommon name, and it may not even have been his own, although Roy did not use Comintern aliases elsewhere in this correspondence. 56. This was Kwa Tjoan Siu, a Chinese-Indonesian medical doctor in Batavia, who acted as mentor to the Indonesian revolutionary movement, both Communist and nationalist, before and during the war against the Dutch. 57. Sneevliet in Amsterdam to Roy in Moscow, letter dated July 10, 1926. 58. According to Darsono and Semaun (interviews, 1959), the two delegates arrived in Moscow about mid-June; Darsono even mentioned (also in an interview with G. McT. Kahin in 1955) that he remembered the date as June 12, thus the same day that Roy wrote to Sneevliet. There is no indication from Roy’s letter that Musso and Alimin had already seen him or that Miller’s mission had been conceived as an emergency response to their proposals; so that if Darsono is correct as to the date, it seems that the letter had been sent off before the two Indonesians got in touch with Roy. From Sneevliet’s letter of July 10 it would appear that the International had not yet informed him of their arrival. 59. According to Semaun (interview, 1959), Darsono at first sympathized with their project, but Darsono (interview, 1959) claimed that he had always opposed the Prambanan decision, which he first heard from his brother at the dock on departing from the Indies. 60. Semaun, interview, 1959. According to Semaun, Musso was especially involved with the Zinoviev group at first. 61. Darsono and Semaun, interviews, 1959. Alimin, in his account of the meeting ( Analysis p. 22), relates that the four Indonesians “received* a favorable impression” from the meeting, but he does not say whether this impression related to the Comintern attitude toward the Prambanan program. Elsewhere, he virtually admits the International’s rejection in attacking Malaka’s position on the revolt: “Those people who disassociated themselves from and condemned what happened in 1926 were correct— they did not act wrongly. They did not act wrongly because they did not act at all; and a person who does not act cannot possibly act wrongly.” Analysis, p. 15. In his autobiography Alimin, although he discusses the meetings with the Comintern, does not mention the 1926.

It

International’s response to his mission; Riwajat Ilidup, p. 32. the rebellion states only that Alimin and Musso met Stalin

The PKI history of and then returned

home; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 54. The pro-Malaka critique of this account twits the PKI for failing to mention the results of the discussions in Moscow, saying the obvious reason is that the Comintern rejected the project. Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra Tan Malaka, p. 10. In the same volume, Semaun asserts that the Comintern agreed with Malaka’s judgment of the Prambanan project and ordered the Musso-Alimin expedition to return to Indonesia, bearing a resolution that declared the PKI must become more a mass party before it could contemplate revolt; Semaun, written statement dated Apr. 9, 1962, in Sudijono, P.K.I.-SIBAR contra

Tan Malaka,

p. 39.

62. Alimin, Analysis, p. 12.

63.

Semaun, interview, 1959. This

(interview,

1959),

who

said

that he

is

also

had seen the

485

Tamin Comintern program when

claimed by Djamaluddin

Notes pp. 337-341 ,

Alimin and Musso presented it to the PKI leaders in Singapore. Semaun said he had criticized the party in his letter for trying to act independently in the matter of revolution and particularly for attempting to revolt without an adequate mass base; he called on the party to renew its work with the peasant masses

through the SR. 64. Darsono, “Die Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens” (The Situation of the Indonesian Popular Movement), Die Kommunistische Internationale, Nov. 9, 1926, p. 419. 65. Urm, “Indoneziia:

Rabochee dvizhenie i zadachi Kompartii” (Indonesia: The Labor Movement and the Tasks of the Communist Party), Krasmji Inter66. 67.

November

1926, p. 498. and Darsono, interviews, 1959.

natsional Profsoiuzov,

Semaun The following account

is

based on interviews with Semaun, 1959.

We

might note that in listing its justifications for interning Iwa Kusumasumantri a few years later, the government mentioned intercepting a letter from him to Musso in Singapore at the end of 1926, inquiring whether the secret address he had given him was still safe. The government also claimed that it knew Alimin and Musso had informed Iwa Kusumasumatri in the summer of 1926 of their plans for an uprising; Nieuwe Rotterclamsche Courant, July 27, 1930. 68.

Of those who reportedly took part in the Singapore meeting, Budisutjitro and Sardjono were on the Bandung executive, Winanta was in prison, Subakat had not returned to the Indies, and Sugono was dead. 70. Nieuwe Rotterclamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. According to this report, the police noticed a large crowd gathered behind the Tegal movie house on the evening of Sept. 27 and heard a loud explosion on Sept. 28; but only later did 69.

they learn the reason. See also the Letter from the Resident of Pekalongan to the Attorney General, Nov. 13, 1926, p. 2. The Tegal Communist leaders, temporarily taken aback, are reported to have met on Sept. 28 and decided to

on Abdulmuntalib of Tjirebon to help organize a new attempt. The mainspring of the second action was to be the organization Rahasia ( Secret ) a guerrilla group the Tegal branch of die party had organized. Reportedly, Rahasia’s members, who after a trial period were sworn in and put under “military discipline,” were promised a regime that would be free from taxation, corvee, and other onerous call

,

duties;

Geheime

actie, pp. 5-6.

71. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 158. 72. Schrieke, Notes, statement of Sukrawinata to the police; “Political Section,”

pp. 158-159. 73. Schrieke, Notes, statement to the police to

Mahmud,

he,

by Mahmud

Baharuddin Saleh, and Dahlan attended

hand

of a date so close at

we

this

Sitjintjin.

meeting.

According

The choice

shall see that its nearness

aroused strong objections, particularly in Sumatra) can perhaps be explained by the Batavian leaders’ impatience and lack of realism, or perhaps by the fact that the numerous arrests of PKI adherents during October panicked them. This latter possibilitv is suggested by a Dutch Communist commentator; Van ter “The Insurrection in Java,” (

Inprecorr, Nov. 25.

1926. According to another insurrectionary, Dahlan’s plan had originally been to attack the clubhouse Societeit Concordia in Batavia on the

evening of Dec.

4,

when

Dutch colony would be gathered for would be followed by other disturbances Day; Schrieke, Notes, statement of Marsudi to the

the leaders of the

their celebration of St. Nicholas Eve; this in

Batavia on

New

Year’s

police.

74. In addition to these leaders, a representative

4S6

from Sumatra’s West Coast

Notes, pp. 341-343

Mohammad Nur

Ibrahim) also attended, as did the Tegal leader Suleiman and an unknown Indonesian woman; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926, and' Kort verslag betreffende den politieken toestand in het gewest Pekalongan ( Short Report Concerning the Political Situation in the Pekalongan District) (typescript, addressed from the Resident of Pekalongan to the Governor General, dated Pekalongan, Nov. 20, 1926, classified), pp. 4-5, hereafter cited as Kort verslag Pekalongan. 75. Kort verslag Pekalongan, pp. 4-5; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Nov. 30 and Dec. 28, 1926. The Resident of Tjirebon at first denied this report, understandably enough, but it was confirmed by various confessions of the rebel leaders, including that of Abdulmuntalib; Kort verslag Pekalongan, p. 5. 76. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; Van Munster, “The Background and History of the Insurrection in Java,” Inprecorr, Dec. 16, 1926, p. 1499. 77. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. The government report Kort verslag Pekalongan (pp. 2-3) implies that the central leadership of the VSTP did not learn of this plan then, for Abdulmuntalib went to Semarang on November 9 to inform the union of it; as it turned out, he was not able to con(perhaps

tact the

Communists

in that city.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Nov. 30 1926; and Van Munster, “The Background and History of the

78. Kort verslag Pekalongan, p.

and Dec.

28,

3;

Insurrection in Java,’’ p. 1499. 79. Letter from Djamaluddin

Nov.

9,

that the

Tamin (“Malaria”) to Dahlan, dated Singapore, 1926. Djamaluddin Tamin related in this missive that he had concluded PKI course was completely un-Communist and would lead to destruction;

was necessary, he argued, to revoke the decision for revolution and to concentrate on mending PKI weaknesses. He enclosed a letter for Baharuddin Saleh and asked Dahlan to remind that leader to come to Singapore as soon as possible, which indicates that Baharuddin had previously been urged to make the journey. 80. Schrieke, Notes, referring to Marsudi’s statement to the police; and see it

Schrieke “Political Section,” p. 158. 81. This is the account referred to as Geheime actie, a report by the local administration of Pekalongan to the Resident of Pekalongan, dated Oct. 27, 1926. 82. Kort verslag Pekalongan, p. 1. 83. Kort verslag Pekalongan, p.

84. 85.

1.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; Kort

verslag Pekalongan,

p. 3.

Kort verslag Pekalongan, pp. 3-4; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; Blumberger, Communist, pp. 78-79. 87. The Surakarta Communist unions were joined in a Trade Union Council (Raad van Vakbonden); they and not the party section formed a revolutionary 86. See

committee to organize the local revolt; Pemberontakan November 1926, p. 16, and see the obituary of Suhadi in llarian Rakjat, July 3, 1962. For comments on Mu’alimin participation, see the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 28, 1926; and for the details of the Surakarta disturbances, see Blumberger, Communist, pp. 79-80.

The PKI

history of

the rebellion states that only in Batavia,

had

Bantam, and

been carried out. In East Java there was very little rebel organization except in Ked'iri; in Sumatra there was very little outside the West Coast, several places on the East Coast, and in Sibolga. A considerable amount of money for the revolution was collected several places in the Priangan

revolt preparations really

487

Notes pp. 343-347 ,

in

Temate,

western

report asserts,

this

which

Borneo,

failed

and there was a belated attempt at revolt in because its leaders were arrested beforehand.

Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 83, 116. 88. For a description of the Batavia uprising and the events immediately see A. Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen, pp. 332-341; Djajadiningrat Regent of Batavia at the time. One of the major objectives in Batavia was

preceding

was

it,

500 persons gathered for the attack, but it did not take place because those who were to lead it failed to appear. One of the participants later recounted that he and his comrades believed that someone sent from China would temporarily take control over the country, in order, when the situation was in hand, to turn it over to Semaun; the final goal of the revolution would be to restore power to the Javanese princely houses; De Telegraaf, June 7, 1927; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, June 17, 1927. 89. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Dec. 20, 1926. 90. For the religious aspects of the Bantam revolt, see “The Bantam Report,’’

to storm Tjipinang prison;

pp. 44-45.

was one of those won over to Tan Malaka’s viewpoint by Mansuar, a West Sumatran deputy of Malaka. He went to Singapore, according to this account, and thereafter actively opposed the revolt plans. Pemberontakan November 1926, pp. 12491.

The PKI

history of the rebellion charges that Arif Fadillah

125. 92. Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 177, quoting a statement reported to

have

been made by Kamaruddin, one of the rebel leaders. For a description of the Sumatra revolt and the events leading up to it, see pp. 159-177; also Overzicht SWK, pp. 10-19; and Blumberger, Communist, pp. 80-91. 93. Djamaludclin Tamin, interview, 1959. In his autobiography Alimin says they chose the Shanghai-Canton-Hongkong-Bangkok route because it was the only safe one at the time; Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, p. 22. 94. Alimin, Riwajat Hidup, pp. 22-23; Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959.

SWK, p. 10; Schrieke, “Political Section,” p. 166, citing the Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim (who had been arrested on Nov.

95. Overzicht

notebooks of 14, 1926).

Hidup, pp. 22-23; Djamaluddin Tamin, interview, 1959. 97. “The Governor General’s Report,” p. 8, note 8; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche 96. Alimin, Riwajat

Courant, Jan. 24, 1927.

CHAPTER 1.

XIII

“Manifesto of the E.C.C.I. on the Insurrection in Indonesia,” lnprecorr,

Nov. 25, 1926,

The

p.

1390.

immediate response to the uprising was, for the Communists, extremely moderate. Apparently in an effort to do what it could to soften the retaliation against the PKI, it sent De Graeff a wire blaming everything on his predecessor: “NAS-CPH executives in combined meeting view uprising WestJava as result misrule by former Governor General Fock. Provocative stand of authorities paved way for this expression despairing resistance. True guilty persons former Governor and his advisers. Protesting against numerous recent arrests we ask general amnesty for political prisoners, persecuted people, and internees. With this deed beginning of new course could be demonstrated in visible manner. NAS: Sneevliet, Dissel; CPH: De Visser, Bergsma. Nov. 13, 1926.” Quoted in De Arbeid, Nov. 20, 1926, p. 1. 2.

party’s

488

,

Notes, pp. 348-352 Vanter, “The Revolts in Indonesia,” Inprecorr, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 102. 4. Inprecorr, Dec. 1, 1926, pp. 1430-1431. 3.

1926, pp. 1635-1636. Protokoll. Erweiterte Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale. Aloskau,

Inprecorr Dec.

5. 6.

1,

November— 16. Dezember 1926

22.

munist

Moscow,

(Protocol. Enlarged Executive of the

22-Dec.

(Hamburg/Berlin, 1927), pp. 480-481, hereafter cited as Protokoll. The program had called for amnesty for political prisoners, compensation for the victims of the “White Terror” in the Indies, and the appointment of a workers’ commission to investigate the International.

Nov.

Com-

1926)

16,

situation in the colony.

on the Insurrection in Indonesia,” p. 1390. See also “Ocherednye voprosy mezhdunarodnoi revoliutsii”

“Manifesto of the

7.

Emphasis

in the text.

E.C.C.I.

(Special Questions of the International Revolution), BoVshevik, Jan.

1,

For an analysis of the Soviet attitude toward the Chinese situation

in 1926,

in particular of the role of the

seventh

ECCI plenum

regarding

1927, p. 4.

CCP

and

strategy,

Communism,

pp. 54-60, 79-83. Manuilsky, “Discussion of the Report on the Situation in China,” Inprecorr,

see Schwartz, Chinese 8.

Dec. 30, 1926,

1595. Emphasis in the text. For Bukharin’s remarks, see Proto-

p.

koll, p. 5.

Protokoll, p. 345.

9.

10. Protokoll,

pp.

Agrarian Commission at presidium; pp. 12-13. 11.

Dec.

Bucharin, “The 3,

12.

Semaun

on the Chinese Commission and the the seventh plenum and was re-elected to the ECCI

8-9.

World

sat

Situation

and the Tasks

of the Comintern,” Inprecorr,

1926, p. 1456.

Semaun, “The Rebellion

in

the

Dutch East

Indies,”

Inprecorr,

Dec.

2,

1926, p. 1438.

Teachings on the Colonial and National Revolutionary Movement and the Current Problems of the Revolutionary Movement in the East,” Inprecorr, Jan. 13, 1927, p. 95. See further Van Munster, “The Background and History of the Insurrection in Java,” p. 1499; “Before the Sixth Congress of the Comintern,” Inprecorr, June 7, 1928, p. 566; Kjai Samin [Darsono], “Der Auf stand auf Java und Sumatra (Indonesien)” (The Uprising on Java and Sumatra [Indonesia]), Die Kommunistische Internationale, Mar. 29, 1927, p. 643; “The Echo of Chinese Events in India,” Inprecorr, Feb. 4, 1927, 13. Kitaigorodsky, “Leninist

pp. 24.5-246. 14. Krasntji

Inter not sional

Profsoiuzov,

December

1926,

p.

644.

For

the

November

manifesto, see Inprecorr, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 1438. 15. “The E.C.C.I. on the Tasks of the Communists in Indonesia,” Inprecorr,

For other criticisms, see “Before the Sixth Congress of the Comintern,” p. 566; and Semaun, “Vokrug vosstanie na lave” (Concerning the Uprising on Java), Krasnyi Internatsional Profsoiuzov, January 1927, p. 71. Semaun ’s report criticized the poor coordination of the revolutionary efForts, which prevented the rebellion from spreading throughout the country. Neither, he claimed, had sufficient work been done to subvert the soldiers and police. “. In the political aspect, too, the uprising was prepared in a far from satisfactory manner. This is apparent from the fact that the masses d'id not support the armed outbreaks in sufficient measure, either by powerful strikes or by the seizure Dec.

.

8,

1927, p.

1562.

.

of banks, etc.” 16.

their

seem to have taken the attitude that Indies counterparts were heavy-handed and unsubtle in dealing with their

The

British authorities for their part

489

Notes pp. 352-353 ,

opponents.

See

interrogation of

comments of the Singapore police commissioner on his Alimin and Musso; Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background the

(London, 1947?),

p. 110.

Darsono ( Samin ) explained the failure of the revolution to the sixth congress on more orthodox lines: it lay, he said, in the mistaken line developed by the December 1924 congress, the arrest of party leaders and the consequent inexperience of those at its head, the failure to draw the Indonesian masses into the struggle, the lack of an effort to subvert the police and armed 17. Inprecorr, p. 849.

forces, inadequate organization

and

political preparation, failure to present clear

popular demands, and lack of contact with the Comintern and other Communist parties; Inprecorr, pp. 124.5-1246.

Musso, writing a few years later on the Java uprising, rejected the claim that the revolt had not been sufficiently well prepared: “The uprising was well prepared, but unfortunately it began too late; that is, when it began all the experienced leaders had already been arrested and thrown in prison. Aside from this, the slogans which could have drawn the discontented peasantry and working class were not popularized enough. Although even the Dutch government expected that the uprising would become a general one, it only included Batavia, Bantam, and the Priangan.” Musso, Prinuditel’niji trud v lndonezii, p. 19. 18. “The Situation in Indonesia,” p. 502. Emphasis in the text. 19. For example, the Resident of Banjumas, Van Helsdingen, ordered in his instructions to the Assistant Residents of Probolinggo, Purwokerto, and Tjilatjap and the Regent of Banjumas (typescript, dated Banjumas, Dec. 11, 1926, no. 20974/4) that in the rural areas Communists were to be boycotted by putusan desa (village decision, nominally reached by consensus) to the effect that “(1) their part of communal propertv shall be denied them; (2) they shall be granted no help in building houses, the cultivation of their land, or at funerals or other occasions; (3) they shall be denied permission to hold celebrations; (4) they shall be allowed no loans from the village bank or grain storehouse.” Monthly lists of villages applying these measures and the persons against whom they were enforced were to be provided the Resident; pp. 1—2. 20. For a description of government measures in response to the rebellion, see Blumberger, Communist, pp. 107-123. The thousand internees of Mansvelt’s study (made before most of the West Sumatran internment decisions were made but after nearly all those from the other districts had been determined) were from the following regions: Bantam 84, Bogor 16, Central Priangan 18, other West Java residencies 193, Pekalongan 38, Semarang 125, Rembang 17, Banjumas

Kedu

Madiun 47, Surabaja 41, Kediri 77, Pasuruan 32, Besuki 21, Djember 1, Madura 1, Lampung 8, Palembang 5, East Coast of Sumatra 19, Benkulen 23, West Coast of Sumatra 11, Tapanuli 9, Atjeh 1, Menado 2, Celebes 9, Pontianak 11, Moluccas 33. Eight were women and thirteen were Chinese; none had European status; Mansvelt, “Onderwijs en Communisme,” pp. 204-205. The regional origins of the first 838 persons interned 20,

21, Jogjakarta 34, Surakarta 83,

may be foimd

in

“Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand

(

1924-April

1928)” (Survey of the Internal Political Situation, 1924-April 1928), Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeen hclanz (Weltevreden, 1928), col. 2. More internees were added after the original 1,300: there were about 3,000 in the Digul camp at the beginning of 1930; De Telegraaf Feb. 18, 1930, citing a statement by the Dutch government. The following year, however, the government began to reduce their number after an investigation showed many were not dangerous or had been banished for insufficient reason; ,

490

Notes, pp. 353-355 see

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,

Jan. 14, 25, 31,

and Mar.

3,

1931. As the

major concentration colony for opponents of the Indies regime, the camp on the Digul became a prime nationalist revolutionary symbol. For descriptions of the camp and life of the internees, see “Overzicht van den inwendigen politieken toestand (1924-15 April 1928),” cols. 11-18; Aage Krarup-Nielsen, “Met de communisten naar den Boven-Digoel” (With the Communists to the Upper Digul), Haagsch Mdandblad, 1927, pp. 233-244; L. J. A. Schoonheyt, BovenDigoel (Upper Digul) (Batavia, 1936); Mev. Philippo-Raden Soekasih and G. van Munster, Indonesia, een politiestaat (Indonesia, a Police State) (Amsterdam, n.d.), pp. 6-10; Sjahrazad [Sutan Sjahrir], Indonesische Overpeinzingen (Indonesian Reflections) (Amsterdam, 1945), pp. 50-70. 21. H. H. A. van Gybland Oosterhoff, Het Communisme tegenover de gekleurde rassen (Communism against the Colored Races) (reprint from De Nederlander, Oct. 29 and 31 and Nov. 2, 1927), p. 10. 22. H. G. Heijting, Java’s onrust (Java’s Unrest) (Amsterdam, 1927), p. 38.

Emphasis

in the text.

23. Letter of Oct. 30, 1927,

Brouwer, De bonding, p. 119. in Indie: een analyse der hedendaagsche In-

quoted

M. W. F. Treub, Het gist landsche beweging (Ferment in the Native Movement) (Haarlem, 1927), 24.

in

Indies: p.

61.

491

An

Analysis of the Contemporary

INDEX Entries followed in the

by an

book by short

title.

Figures appearing in

424n (67) ABBH (Drivers and Mechanics Union), 408n (62) Abdul Aziz, 425n (73) Abdul Murad, 482n (37) Abdulkarim, 324, 426n (77), 460n (54), 478n (1), 482n (37, 38) Abdulmuntalib, 332, 341, 342, 426n (77), 472n (71), 482n (42, 43), 486n (70), 487n (77) Abdulrachman, 157 Abidin, Zainul, 482n (37) Abikusno, 363n (36) Achmad Chatib, 425n (73) Adat, 10, 40 Adidarmo, 43 Adnan, Hadji, 174 Afandi, 482n (38) “Agenda van het S. I. congres,” 388n (40)* Abangan,

10, 11, 170,

Agrarian activity, 20, 92, 93, 222, 278, 37 In (20); see also Peasantry, Sugar districts Aidit, Sedjarah,

works cited later parentheses are note numbers.

asterisk represent first references to

361n (15)*

A1 Islam Congress, 142, 420n (23) Ali, Mohammad, 202, 291, 341 Aliarcham, 194, 197, 210, 231, 262, 265, 270, 273, 276, 307, 315, 431n (96), 433n (108, 110), 454n (8), 457n (23), 460n (54), 471n (69, 71), 474n (98) Alimin Prawirodirdjo, 41, 43-46, 64, 83, 105, 168, 191, 202, 206, 210, 216, 219, 262-265, 270, 276, 289, 291, 292, 299, 303, 307, 315, 316, 318, 320. 330, 336, 339, 346, 352, 363n (36), 366n (59), 369n (11), 389n (50), 390n (52), 391n (60, 63), 434n (122), 437n (21), 438n (110), 443n (81, 95), 449n (142), 456n (11), 457n (22), 459n (43), 460n (54), 471n (71), 473n (90), 474n (95, 96), 475n (98, 115), 477n (121), 479n (11), 481n (31, 34), 482n (37), 485n (58, 61), 486n (68)

“Louteren wij ons!” 380n ( 54 ) * Riwajat Hidup, 374n (40)* Alkema, Sarekat Islam, 361n (8)* All-Indies Congress, 111, 142 All-Muslim League, Indian, 142 All-Russian Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, first, 54, 55 All-Russian (later All-Union) Scientific Association

for

Oriental

Studies,

199, 403n (16) Almaliki, Zain, 426n (77)

Ambarawa, 433n (111), 434n (119) Ambijah, 43 In (96) America, 61, 64 Anarchism, 88, 187, 287, 319, 325, 484n (53)

Ansor movement, 479n (12) Anti-Communist groups, 257, 294 196,

223

Antistrike law, 258, 310 Anwar, S. M., 426n (77) Api, 178 Arbitration courts, 414n (119) Arif, Hadji, 426n (77) Arif Fadillah, 345, 470n (55), 488n

(91)

Anti-imperialist organization,

Anti-Ribut Bond, 296

Army

Adidarmo and ter, 326 Articles 155 and 156, 258 Article 161 bis, 258, 416n (132) Evolution, 363n (36)* Arx, of Labor, see

Article 153 bis

V

Associationism, 69, 111 Assor, Said Hamid, 183, 460n (54) Atjeh, 10, 182, 184, 302, 426n (77),

460n (54), 464n (11), 478n (1), 479n (12), 481n (34), 482n (38), 490n (20); see also Langsa Atjeh War, 10 Atmasumarta, 471n (69)

Baars, Adolf, 17, 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 36, 42, 46, 48, 49, 51, 66, 67, 71, 72, 73, 77, 87, 92, 98, 99, 106,

493

362n (28), 363n (36), 366n (66), 368n (2), 369n (7, 9, 155, 168, 225,

)

)

.

*

)

Index Baars, Adolf

(

373n (25), 376n (15), 380n (58), 381n (64), 383n (84), 384n (7), 390n (54, 58), 399n (49), 437n ( 22 ) “Brieven uit Holland,” 375n (1)* “Het aanstaande S. I. congres,” 365n (47)* “Ons buitengewoon congres,” 382n (74)* “Russische revolutie,” 366n (61)* Sowjet-Russland in de practijk, 383n (81)* “Waarom ik heenga,” 369n (7)* and Sneevliet, Het proces Sneevliet, 361n (12)* Babusanah, 482n (37) Bahasa Indonesia, 112 Bakar, 341, 345 Baku congress, see Congress of the PeoII)

first

Bakunin, 187, 325, 478n (9), 483n (45) Bala Tentara Nabi Muhammad, 172

302 Bandjar, 434n (119) Bandung, 51, 73, 106, 115, 155, 182, 291, 327, 331, 340, 342, 395n (1), 418n (1), 426n (77), 433n (110, III 434n (119), 459n (52),460n (54), 468n (37), 478n (1), 482n (38, 40), 483n (48), 484n (49) Banjumas, 481n (31), 490n (20) Banjuwangi, 327 Bantam, 184, 301, 302, 304, 305, 327329, 341, 344, 430n (89), 467n (32), 481n (31), 482n (43), 487n (87), 490n (20) “Bantam Report,” 429n (88)* Barisan Muda, 196, 426n (77), 435n (127) Barkah, 369n (11) Bassach, 433n (110) Bali, 184,

,

Batavia, 27,

193, 295,

298, 304, 308, 323, 327, 328, 329, 332, 333, 340, 343, 345, 426n (77), 433n (110),

434n (119), 459n (52), 466n (19), 467n (32), 478n (1), 481n (31), 482n (43, 45), 484n (49), 487n (87)

Batuah, Hadji Datuk, 174, 182, 426n (77), 456n (11) “Before the Sixth Congress of the Com-

489n (13)* Begrooting 1924, 415n (126)* Begrooting 1925, 396n (9)* Benkulen, 329, 490n (20) intern,”

in Indie,

419n (9)*

,

ples of the East,

Communisme

Bergmeijer, Het

continued

Bergsma, 1

Pieter, 31, 36, 43, 50, 51, 62,

71, 72, 87, 92, 95, 101, 117, 121,

122, 123, 124, 128, 137, 139, 155, 163, 203, 205, 211, 238, 242, 252, 253, 285, 335. 366n (66), 374n

375n (10), 380n (57), 390n (52, 54), 394n (90), 401n (66), 409n (72), 438n (35), 462n (85), 488n (2) “Labour Struggles in the East Indies,” 463n (97)* (36),

“Revolutionary

Movement

in

Java,”

463n (96)* “Sharpening of the Class War in In) donesia,” 460n ( 65 Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale 15. Dczember 1922—15. Mai 1923, 421n (30)* Bericht IV Kongress, 419n (10)* Bcscheiden hetreffende de vereeniging

360n ( 3 ) * Besuki, 48 In (31), 490n (20) Bijlage 1925, 425n (75)* Bijlage Semarang, 424n (67)* Binnenlands Bestuur, 8, 11, 455n Blanqui, Auguste, 431n (94) ‘Sarekat Islam /

(11)

Bloc within, 22, 79, 82, 102, 104, 105, 113, 141, 158, 239, 267, 279, 282, 337, 349, 352 Blumberger, Communist, 361n (18)*

365n (51)® Bodjonegoro, 467n (32) Boersner, Bolsheviks, 404n (27)* Bogor, 295, 418n ( 1 ) 433n (110), 434n (119), 467n (32), 490n (20) Nationalist,

Bolshevising tional,

the

Communist

Interna-

462n (80)®

Bond van Minder Marinepersoneel

(

As-

Noncommissioned Naval Personnel ) 366n ( 63 Borneo, 467n (33), 488n (87); see also sociation of

,

Pontianak Boulie, 426n (77) Bourgeoisie,

1,

55, 56, 59, 65, 81, 88,

130, 132 Boycott, 490n (19) Brandsteder, 32, 218,

248,

250,

254,

368n (2) Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank. Documentary History, 387n (26)® Brebes, 182 Brotosuhardjo, 39 In (60) Brouwer, Houding, 360n (7)® Budi Mulia, 183

494

Index Chen Chun-ming, General, 78

Budi Utomo, 107, 108, 118, 120, 122,

Chen

143, 144, 150, 164, 166, 171, 259,

280, 284, 288, 38 In (65), 393n (77), 401n (64), 470n (59), 411n (94), 417n (141), 424n (67) Budiarto Martoatmodjo, 241 Budisutjitro,

7, 76-83, 129, 135, 203, 239, 260, 267, 282, 304, 315, 337, 384n (9), 388n (35), 488n (88) Chinese example, 82, 224, 239, 286, 314,

337

216, 264, 265, 270, 316,

328, 332, 394n (90), 431n (96), 434n (118), 452n (186), 454n (8), 463n (94), 471n (71),

474n (95), 475n (115), 482n (37), 486n (69) Verslag, 393n (77)° Bukera, 482n (37)

396n (4), 443n (83), 460n (54), 472n (75), 476n (119),

Tu-hsiu, 78, 387n (26)

China,

Chinese minority, 7-8, 194, 224, 304,

447n

(

131, 139),

490n

Christianity, 95, 104

Cluwen, 375n (10)

Comintern,

1,

4, 22, 45, 46, 50, 52, 57,

66, 74, 79, 95, 112, 116, 158, 198;

see also

ECCI

Amsterdam

office, 205, 234, 235 Berlin office, 165, 234, 235 Canton Bureau, 230, 248 Colonial Bureau, 248, 255

Prijaji

Bureaucracy, Netherlands Indies, see Binnenlands Bestuur Burink, G. van, 98, 253, 366n (66), 383n (84), 390n (54)

Canton, 78, 230, 256, 277 Canton Bureau, see Comintern Canton Conference, see Pacific Transport Workers Conference Capitalism, 1-3,

5, 55, 60, 65, 84, 107,

128, 140 national, 65, 84, 103, 107, 128, “sinful,” 24, 37, 45, 58, 84, 113

137

Eastern Section, 79, 248, 249, 255, 431n (98), 449n (146), 458n (40), 476n (119) Far Eastern Bureau, 76, 129, 203

PKI

affiliation with, 66, 1

fourth

376n (19)° Celebes, 39, 455n (11), 490n (20); see also Makassar, Menado, Toli-toli Center for Revolutionary Propaganda (CORP), 191, 272 Central Leadership of the Rail and Tram

fifth

Strike in Netherlands Indies,

152

Centrale Sarekat Islam, see CSI Centralism, democratic, 274 Centralism, federative, 274, 330

28

Centrosoiuz, 198 Ch. E. “Erste Kongress,” 402n (9)* Chalifate, Turkish, 86 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 63

T’ai-lei, 129,

387n (10), 405n

(9),

385n

Chartism, 19 Chaudry, Indonesian

(1922), 133, 158, 216, 232,

263

Carr. Bolshevik Revolution,

Chi, 385n (10) Kuo-t’ao, 385n

74

Comintern congresses first ( 1919 ), 48, 57 second ( 1920), 57, 58, 68, 71, 76, 79, 87, 128, 131, 377n (31) third (1921), 77, 128, 129, 164

Careem, 426n (77) Carpentier Alting, 108

Chang Chang Chang

120), 448n

Cock Buning, W. de, “Politieke Stroomingen,” 363n (32)° Colijn, IT, 455n (10)

Bukhara, 103 Bukharin, Nikolai, 56, 349, 377n (31) Bureaucracy, Indonesian, 11; see also

Centrists, 27,

(

(20)

Struggle,

(45)* Chauffeursbond Indonesia, 461n

(26) (32)

364n

(1924), 245, 248, 266, 268, 290, 297, 458n (34)

sixth (1928), 352 Comite Kehormatan Bangsa, 226 Committee for Indies Autonomy, 111 Committee for Red Aid, 220 Committee for Strengthening the Spirit of the Movement, 107 Committee for the Support of Flood Victims in China, 447n (125) Committee of Supporters of the Indonesian Republic, 334 Committee of the Revolution, 334, 345, 483n (49) “ Communisme 363n (32)* Communist International, see Comintern

Communist Communist Communist Communist

(65)

495

Manifesto, 191 Party of Holland, see CPH Party of Indonesia, see PKI University of the Toilers of China (Sun Yat-sen Universitv), 200, 436n (8)

)

Index Communist University

of the Toilers of

155, 157, 160, 164, 187, 194, 202, 203, 204, 219, 220, 226, 227, 231,

the Far East (KUTV), 200 Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements (PPKR), 62, 70, 107,

379n (50), 41 In (94) Congress of Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East, 54

235, 262, 263, 270, 272, 275, 298, 300, 307, 315, 325, 335, 363n (36), 369n (11), 370n 16), 375n (10), 390n (57),

143,

Congress of the Peoples of the East, first, 128, 129, 131 Congress of the Peoples of the Far East,

404n (31) Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, '

first,

127, 131, 213, 223,

399n

(45),

405n (31) Cooperatives, 84, 271 CORP, see Center for

Revolutionary

391n (59), 392n (70), 393n (75), 437n (22), 440n (57), 443n (95), 448n ( 136), 457n (20),460n (54),473n (93), 485n (59), 490n (17) “Lage der Volksbewegung Indonesiens,” 463n (97)° Dawn, The, 209, 217 Dawud, 478n (1) Decentralization Law of 1903, 21 Degras, Communist International, 450n

Propaganda

(

Correspondence, restrictions on, 203 Corvee, 9, 39, 65, 173, 372n (20), 43 In (101), 445n (106), 486n (70) 382n Coster, B., 369n (11), 38 In (64), (69) r , i Council for Action and Propaganda tor the Peoples of the East, 128, 199,

202

CPH

„

of Holland), 129, 13, 46, 58, 108, 114, 119, 128, 242, 152, 173, 203, 206, 232, 235,

(Communist Party

260, 287, 339, 347, 452n 488n (2) Cramer, Ch., 31

(185),

CSI CSI

147)*

Dekker, Harry, 155, 204, 210, 366n 441n (65), 458n (36)

(66),

Dengah, J. C„ 51, 73, 155, 183, 375n ( 10 ) Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples, 54 Depression, 120, 127, 138 Depression committees, 147 Dercle nationaal Congres, 370n (13)* Desiat let Profinterna, 44 In (57)* Detention, preventive, 459n (7) Digul concentration colony, 353, 490n ’

(

Koloniale Politick, 367n (79)° Credit Action, 483n (48) C. S., “Het S. I. congres,” 374n (32) “Op den tweesprong,” 372n (22)* CSI (Centrale Sarekat Islam), 21, 22, 23, 25, 34, 37, 70, 84-86, 89, 91,

294, 337, (12,

20 )

Dimvati, Sedjarah, 398n (35)* Dingley, S., 221 Peasants’

Movement, 419n (9)*

Discipline, party, 89, 98, 100, 102, 104,

105, 116, 141, 145, 274, 330,

393n

(75)

97, 99. 102, 105, 113, 114, 116, 120, 123, 140, 145, 284, 365n (47), 369n (6), 446n (110), 447n (120);

“Discussion of the Report of Comrade Zinoviev,” 452n (182)* Djago! Djago!, 175 Djajadiningrat, Hasan, 302, 369n (11),

see also Sarekat Islam conference, September 1920, 93-94 congresses

Djam’ijat Ansarul Haramain, 420n (23) Djankar, 276

1916, 1917, 1918, 191 9,

370n (17)

Djember, 490n (20)

20 23-25

37, 81, 84, 225, 370n ( 13) 44, 86, 293, 372n (20) March 1921, 96, 102, 118, 141 October 1921, 102—105, 112, 113, 116 February 1923, 143—146, 412n (100)

Dahlan, 340, 341, 342, 486n (73), 487n (79) Darsono, 32, 34, 36, 37, 41, 46, 51, 73, 77, 93, 94, 96, 106, 128, 129, 150,

Djenain, Sutan, 478n ( 1 Djepara, 295, 434n (119), 467n (32) Djoehana, “History of the Indonesian National Movement.” 403n (18)* Djojobojo, 180, 426n (78)

Djokosuwarno, 409n (70) Djuara, 483n (48) Djunaedi, 433n (110)

DO

(Double Organization), 313, 327, 328, 332, 480n (24), 484n (49,

50) “Doloi terror v Indonezii,” 472n (84)*

496

)

Index Douvves Dekker, E. F.

Fonds Korban Kemerdekaan, 368n (6), 444n (98) FOR (People’s Education Fund) 433n (111), 435n (127) Foreign aid, 313, 315, 369n (6), 443n (93), 473n (92); see also Interna-

E., 18, 39, 51, 63,

64, 111, 203, 253, 254,

363n (33),

380n (53)

Eastern, 453n (194)°

ECCI,

337

57, 66, 79,

tional

ECCI

sessions

July 1922, 81 November 1922, 160 June 1923, 163, 205 July 1924, 268 March 1925, 200, 278, 286, 314n (313) February 1926, 243, 246, 286 November 1926, 348, 351 Eiduss, Ch., 214 Elections, 21, 28, 68, 71, 111, 117, 236, 38 In (65); see also Parliamentary action,

Town

councils, Volksraad

Engels, Friedrich, 52 England, see Great Britain Enver Pasha, 403n (12) Ethical Policy, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 69, 108, 110, 293, 354, 456n ( 11 ) Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, 376n

Gandhi, 112, 114, 153, 155, 226, 380n (56)

Garut, 40, 44, 434n (119) Gautherot, Bolchevisme, 436n (5)°

Geheime Geheime

*

Gorky, Maxim, 375n (2)

Government

14,

15,

17,

21, 22, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 46, 48, 52, 61, 62, 65, 70, 72, 87, 91, 99,

106, 123, 125, 126, 128 Executif, 462n (79)° Executive Committee of the Revolution,

(16)°

Five-man system, 291, 305 Fock, Dirk, Governor General, 108, 109,

February 1925, 296 “Governor General’s (60)°

FOISO

(Sarekat Islam Education Fund),

433n (111)

20, 34,

Simon

Report,”

44 In

de, Minister of Colonies,

108, 109, 111, 258 Graeff, A. C. D. de, Governor General,

328, 355,

488n (2)

Great Britain, 67, 114 Gresik, 467n (32) Guber, A. A., 435n (4) lndoneziia, 400n (56)° “Izuchenie istorii,” 376n (19)° “Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe

110, 111, 116, 120, 151, 199, 209, 258, 309, 326, 329, 372n (20),

488n (2)

12,

July 1922, 307 September 1924, 259

Graaf,

Fachrudin, Hadji, 86, 95, 98 Fascism, 277, 295, 297, 299 Federasi Kaum Buruh Transport, 277 “V. World Congress of the Communist )° International,” 452n ( 191 Fimmen, Edo, 248, 251

11,

258, 259, 292, 307, 310, 326, 353, 368n (2), 416n (132), 459n (7), 470n (59), 479n (17), 490n (20); see also Ethical policy; Rights, civil; Rights, extraordinary Governor General’s conferences

483n (49) Extraparliamentary action, 143 Ezehegodnik Kominterna, 361n

policy, 8,

36, 90, 92, 108-110, 113, 119, 203,

7, 8, 11, 12, 18, 30,

152

0

(71)

65, 108, 148 69,

482n (39)° verslag, 470n ( 61

actie,

Gemeenteraad, see Town councils Germany, 118, 130, 154, 376n (15) “Gewerkschaftsfragen,” 406n ( 37 ) a Gobee, Kort verslag, 412n (101)° Goenawan, Semaoen, 402n (4)* Gondojuwono, 155, 183, 256, 294, 424n (64), 426n (77), 461n (71), 472n

19) Eurasian minority, 11, 18, 19, 63, 64,

European party members,

World

the Fourth to the Fifth Congress, 438n (31)° Front, anti- imperialist, 280 Front, national, 283, 319 Fu Ta-ching, 449n (142)

(

European minority,

Red Aid

From

manifesto on rebellion, 347

dviz

henie,” 412n (101)°

Gunawan, 115, 139, 227, 238, 395n (1), 397n (17), 410n (77), 426n (77), 433n (110)

497

)

-

Index Indie Weerbaar, 16, 23, 24, 28, 37, 85,

Haatzaai-artikelen, see Hate-sowing ar-

381n (65)

ticles

Indies Bureau, 242 Indies National Congress, 177, 226, 283 Indies Revolutionary Information Serv-

Hadikusumo, Kjai Hadji Tubagus, 114, 115 Iiadj Committee, 116 Hamid Sutan, 334, 484n ( 51 Handelingen 2e Kamer, 372n (22)° Handelingen Volksraad, 367n (74)* Hartogh, J., 48-51, 63, 71, 105, 369n (11), 375n (10), 376n (15), 381n (64)

“Jaarverslag 1917-18,” 362n (29)* “Ons vierde jaar,” 369n (8)*

221

“Wensch,” 373n (29)*

Harun

Indonesian Study Club, 283 Indramaju, 467n (32) Inlandse Algemeene Politiebond ( Native General Police Association), 138, 408n (62) Inlandse Douanebond, 460n (65) Institute of Living Asian Languages, 199

426n (77), 427n (81) Hate-sowing articles, 454n (6) Rasjid,

Hatta, Mohammad, 241 Hayashi, Ken, 444n (100) Hazeu, G. A. J, 41, 168, 456n (11) Heerendiensten, see Corvee Heller, Leo, 206, 208, 217, 264, 44 In

Insulinde, 18, 19, 26, 28, 32, 38, 39, 63, 64, 68-70, 381n (64, 65); see

J

(65)

“Pazifik-Konferenz,” 439n (44)* “Trade Unions Conference of the Pacific Ocean Countries and the Labour Movement in the Far

East” 442n (79)* “Zur Gewerkschaftsbewegung im Os* ten,” 415n ( 129 ) Herojuwono, 332. 334, 341, 471n (71),

Hinloopen Labberton, 169, 450n (150)

du

D.

mouvement

van,

403n (16) Second (socialist), 2—5,

International,

46

(MAI),

444n (102)

111,

syndicaliste

Hu

Han-min, 207 Hurwicz, Die Orient politik, 376n (19)* Idema, Parlementaire, 360n (11)* Idenburg, A. W. F., Governor General, 11, 21, 355 Imperialism, 1-4, 52, 55 Income, see PKI finances, Sarekat Islam finances

380n (56) 1

Comintern

Trade and Industrial Unions, 440n (55) International Debating Club, 175 International Lenin University, 200 International Press Correspondence ( In precorr ), 203, 386n (20) International Council of

Red

International

Indian National Congress. 73, 112,

272

International, Asian,

International Agrarian Institute

Ho Chi Minh, 220, 223, 245 H.O.S., 363n (36)*

14—

397n (15, 22), 398n (27), 447n (114), 463n (94) Indie een hel, 366n (65)* “Indie los van Holland,” 233 116, 142, 143, 226,

Intellectuals, 20, 22, 56, 81, 112,

16,

Indonesienne,” 417n (146)*

India,

Sarekat Hindia

also

*

International, Third, see

478n (9), 481n (32), 483n (45, 49), 484n (50, 51) “Het tiende jaarcongres,” 378n (35)* Het Vrije Woord, 16, 17, 35, 45, 99, 123, 203, 362n (25)

“Histoire

234

ice,

Indische Partij, 11, 18 Indische Vereniging, 118, 237; see also Perhimpunan Indonesia Indochina, 132, 436n (8), 447n (114) Indonesia, first use of name, 112 Indonesian Central Peasant Committee,

Aid,

166, 217, 313,

443n (90), 444n (98) International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), 216, 248, 251, 277 International Union of Oppressed Peo-

223 Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den Jahren 1924-1927, 441n ples of the East,

(

68 )*

Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress,

359n (6) Internationalism, 61, 63, 66,

103,

125,

180 IPO, 367n (74)* IRA, see International Red Aid Isaacs, Tragedy, 3S6n (20)* ISDP (Indies Social Democratic Party),

498

46,

62.

152,

(93)

69,

193,

70, 85,

233,

91.

Ill,

143,

393n (77), 41 In

)

)

)

Index ISDV

Indies Social Democratic Asso-

(

ciation

)

conference

(

December

1918), 49 ISDV congresses first (1914), 14, 15, 26, 58 second (1915), 16 fifth (1918), 30, 36, 48, 62 sixth (1920), 46, 48, 50

Communism,

203, 381n (64) Katayama, Sen, 160, 231, 444n (100),

464n (102)

Kaum Kaum

185,

302,

Ismael, Hadji, 40, 41 I.S.R. au travail 1924-1928, 441n (67)° ITF, see International Transport Workers’ Federation Ivva Kusumasmnantri, 221, 241, 339, 444n (102), 486n (68)

S.

D. A. P.,”

374n (38)°

(

1

Kediri, 39, 121, 140, 151, 182, 295, 317,

343, 461n (74), 466n (19), 467n (32), 478n (1), 481n (31), 487n (87), 490n (20) Kedu, 121, 490n (20) Kemal Ataturk, 161, 181, 304, 404n (20), 419n (13)

Kendal, 418n (1) Kern, Schets, 425n (73)* Kertosono, 433n (111), 434n (119)

Kho Tjun Wan, 226 433n (111) Klaten, 434n (119), 467n (33) Koch, D. M. G., 13, 150, 416n (131) Batig slot, 359n (7)* Om de vrijheid, 362n (21)* V erantwoording, 361n (13)* Kol, H. van, 4, 5, 359n (7) “Kongressmand,” 393n ( 77 ) * Koordenoordt, W. A. van, 204, 440n

Kintelan, S.

D.

A.

P.,”

374n

(39)° Jahja, 471n (71) Japan, 61, 64, 82, 129, 315 Jatim, 471n (71 Java, (31) 7, 9, 20 Central, 9, 14, 193 East, 9, 13

(32)193, 196 West, see also individual cities and districts Jogjakarta, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 101, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122, 167, 258, 294, 305, 317, 327, 332, 341, 343, 418n

426n (77), 434n (119), 466n (19), 467 n (32), 478n (1), 481n 482n (43), 490n (20) (1),

,

Jongh, D. de, 27 Jongmans, Exorbitante

rechten,

363n

*

(57) Korea, 129 Kort verslag Pckalongan, 487n Kraan, 51, 375n (10) Kraksaan, 467n (32) Krawang, 467n (32) Krestintern, 220, 221, 278,

Mohammad, 364n

264,

370n

(17), 381n (64), 482n (37)

266,

286,

79, 225, 226, 228,

349,

385n

(10),

448n (137) Kusnogunoko, 460n (54), 471n (69), 483n (48, 49)

KUTV, Kadarisman, 152, 256, 276, 480n (24) Kalimantan, see Borneo Kaliwungu, 105, 418n (1) Kamari, 484n ( 51

444n (100)

Kung Tan Hwee Koan, 447n (119) Kuomintang, 77, 78,

(40),

(74)*

Kudus, 464n (2) Kun, Bela, 128

Judohadinoto, 369n (11) Jusuf,

abangan, see Abangan putihan, see Santri

Kebumen, 434n (119)

424n (67), 455n (11)

“Jaarvergadering

Mohammad,

Kasan,

Kautsky, Karl, 4, 48, 118 Keadilan, Osman gelar Sutan, 478n

171,

“Jaarvergadering Indische

433n

(77),

110 ) Kartodarmardjo, 409n (70) Kartosubroto, 374n (36)

(92), 455n (11) Soviet support of, 117 Islam Bergerak, 173 Islam dan Socialisme, 142 Islamic

426n

K.,

(

(7), 430n

(73), 419n

Karapatan Minangkabau, 174, 175, 183, 456n (11) Karmani, 328 Kartawirja,

Islam, 7, 10, 19, 20, 53, 54, 57, 59, 62, 84, 85, 86, 95, 96, 98, 100, 114116, 129, 142, 144, 156, 170, 301,

303, 393n

Kamu, 201

see Communist University of the Toilers of the Far East Kwa, Dr. Tjoan Siu, 335, 339, 484n

(56) Kweekschoolbond, 149

499

Index Labor federations,

42, 43, 45, 62, 91, 96, 120, 137, 257; see also PPKB,

PVH, RVC Labor unions,

6, 20, 41, 42, 44, 86, 87,

90, 120, 262, 274, 306, 327,

373n

54, 55, 56, 223, 376n (23, 24), 377n (26), 403n (16) Leerboek voor de arbeidersbeweping, 452n (185)° Leftism, 66, 188, 277, 282, 441n (68)

(28), 408n (62), 414n (119), 460n (65), 487n (87) automobile drivers and mechanics,

Leiden, 108, 111 Leng and Palmer,

138; see also ABBH communications workers, see Sarekat

Lenin, V.

(

officials,

see Inlandse

Dou-

anebond machinists, see Sarekat Buruh Bengkel and Sarekat Buruh Bengkel

dan

Elektris

metal workers, 138 miners and oilworkers, see Serikat Buruh Pelikan Indonesia

pawnshop workers, see PPPB plantation

workers,

see

Adidarmo,

Perkumpulan Untuk Kaum-Buruh Onderneming Gula, PFB, PKBO, PKBT, SBG, SKBO policemen, see Inlandse Algemeene Politiebond printers, see Sarekat Buruh Tjetak public servants, see Verbond van Inlandse Landsdienaren public works employees, see VIPBOW railwav workers, see Staatsspoorbond,

VSTP seamen and dockers,

122, 276,

Serilagu, SPLI,

teachers, see

SPPL

PGHB

teachers training school employees, see Kweekschoolbond transport workers, 277

Labor Unions, Revolutionary Socialist Federation of, 43 Lampung, 302, 465n (11), 490n (20) Land reform, 60, 74 Land-leasing, 20, 431n (101), 445n (106), 446n (110) Lands, seignorial, 108 Langsa, 426n (77), 434n (119) Latief, Sjahbuddin, 296, 374n (36), 395n (94) Leadership,

9, 83, 85, 89, 91, 93, 106,

142, 184, 260, 297, 308,

429n (88),

430n (90), 434n (118) League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression, 224 League for the Liberation of the East,

500

I.,

3, 4,

6,

7, 30,

55-58, 60,

East, 359n (5)° Liao Chung-kai, 207, 443n (82), 446n (114) Liberalism, 14, 108, 110 Liebknecht, Karl, 113, 447n (124)

Limburg Stirum,

J.

Gov-

P. graaf van.

ernor General, 33, 38, 41, 69, 72, 90, 108, 109, 367n (79), 370n (15) Lith, F. van, 467n (37)

Liu Jen-ch’ing, 158-159 Lizonsky, 385n (9) Locomotief, 361n (13)

Lombok, 184 Lozovsky, G., 406n (37)

Luxemburg, Rosa, 113, 447n (124)

M.

“Arbeiterbewegung in Indonesien,” 442n ( 77 ) * Madiun, 141, 144, 145, 150, 151, 182, A.,

461n

(65, 71); see also PKBP, Sarekat Kaum Buruh Pelabuhan, SB ME,

385n

Yat-sen,

76, 87, 113, 129, 132, 133, 137, 303, 378n (44), 405n (33), 406n (41), 447n (124) National Liberation Movement in the

Postel

customs

Sun

10 )°

295, 317, 332, 341, 343, 418n (1),

4 33n

(111), 434n (119), 467n 478n (32), (1), 481n (31), 482n (43), 490n (20) Madura, 490n (20) Madurezenbond, 461n (65)

Magas, 175 Magelang, 332, 343, 48 In (31), 482n (43) Maharadja, Murrad gelar Sutan, 482n (38)

Mahmud

Sitjintjin,

334, 341, 425n (73),

482n (38), 484n (

MAI,

(50, 51),

486n

73) see International Agrarian Insti-

tute

MAIHS, 420n (23) Makassar,

184,

302, 341, 426n (77) 434n (119), 478n (1), 481n (31) Malaia entsiklopediia, 364n (45)° Malaka, Tan, 103, 107, 114-117 121124, 126, 128, 135, 137, 139, 155, 160, 163, 164, 195, 202-205, 214 216, 223, 231, 236. 248. 252, 253

)

Index Malaka, Tan

(

zoek, 364 n (41)*

continued

Menado, 490n (20)

265, 292, 306, 307, 313, 316, 329, 334, 337, 394n (90), 397n (19),

398n (27), 401n (66), 420n (24), 435n (122), 449n (142), 454n (8), 480n (28), 481n (31), 484n (52), 485n (54) DP I, 397n (22)°

Merdeka, 176

407n (44), 447n (124), 474n (98), 482n (37),

Messianism, 126, 180, 186, 300, 303, 333, 426n (78) Mezhdunarodnoe profdvizhenie 1923-

1924

485n (55) Minutes, 470n (56)* Miller, 335,

Misbach, Hadji, 39, 42, 155, 157, 172,

(35)* Actie, 318*

Massa

319, 372n (20), 424n (71), 426n (77), 430n (92), 431n (96), 456n ( 11 )

“Mijn verbanning,” 398n (27)* Naar de “ Republiek-Indonesia 316* Semangat Moeda, 475n (100)* Toendoek, 395n (95)* Malaya, 449n (142)

Modjo,

Central Commissariat, 54 Moluccas, 183, 302, 304, 490n (20); see also Sula Islands, Ternate MOPR, see International Red Aid

Datuk, 308, 425n (73), 481n (36) “Manifesto of the E.C.C.I. on the In-

Morocco, 315 Mu’alimin movement, 479n (17) Muchsin, 478n (1) Much tar, 433n (110)

Sati,

488n

Indonesia,”

(l)* Manila, 276, 481n (34), 485n (54)

Muhammaddijah,

Mansuar, 488n (91) Mansur, Hadji, 420n (23) Mansvelt, W. M. F., “Onderwijs en Communisme,” 429n (88)* Manuilsky, D., 267, 489n (8) Mao Tse-tung, 52 Mara Sutan, 366n (59) Marah, 482n (37) Marco Kartodikromo, 16, 362n (26),

174,

117,

171,

303,

424n

(67),

85,

98,

101,

103,

114,

115,

120,

368n (3), 370n 372n (21), 388n (39), (15, 16), 390n (51), 395n (90, 94), 397n (19), 451n (164), 456n (11) 123, 138, 259, 283,

Multiclass alliance, 129 Multiclass party, 81-82 Munster, G. J. van, 253,

454n (5) (70)* 471n “Background,”

Musso, 41, 168, 169, 201, 206, 276, 277, 283, 303, 310, 316, 318, 321, 330, 336, 339, 346, 352, 363n (36), 391n (60), 426n (77), 430n (90), 433n (95, 110), 460n (74), 471n (65, 71), 473n (90), 474n (95), 475n (115), 476n (116, 117),

Onder-

Nadere 1927, 465n (10)* Najoan, O., 149, 203, 374n (36), 390n

447n (124) and Engels, Selected Writings, 359n 52, 104, 118,

2 )* Masduki, Ki, 321 (

(34) Moeslimin, 173 Megas, 482n (77) Meijer Ranneft and Huender,

114,

48 In

Marsum, 276, 434n (118)

(

343,

479n (11), 481n (31, 34), 482n (37), 485n (58, 60, 61), 486n (68), 490n (17) PrinuditeVnyi trud v Indonezii, 461n (74)* Muzzling memorandum ( muilkorf circulate), 399n (49)

Marsudi, 460n (61), 481n (31)

Medan, 308, 426n (77), 478n

294,

310,

Muis, Abdul, 23, 24, 34, 37, 40, 69, 73,

see also Sneevliet

1,

280,

86,

173,

463n (96)

427n (81), 430n (91), 471n (69), 472n (71), 478n (1) Mardi Busono, 173 Mardikun, 409n (70) Mardjohan, 306, 307, 315, 389n (49), 460n (54) Maring, “Mouvement,” 362n (21)* Niederlandisch, 362n (23)* Oekonomische, 362n (18)*

Marx, Karl,

114

Mohammedan

Manchuria, 129

in

Kjai,

“Moehammadyah,” 425n (73)*

Malayan Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, 230

surrection

415n (129)*

Military College for Asian Studies, 199

“Gewerkschaftsbewegung,” 374n

Mangkudun

gg.,

1),

Medan

501

)

)

Index Najoan, O.

(

continued

(52), 394n (89), 395n (90), 437n (24), 472n (71), 478n (1)

Nan Yang

[South Seas] Communist Par-

230 Narbi, 482n (37) NAS (National Labor (92), 488n (2) ty,

Secretariat),

443n

National committee, 107, 111, 113, 116 Nationalism, 3, 7, 10, 18, 30, 55, 56, 58-61, 63, 66, 67, 76, 77, 88, 103, 112, 129, 130, 132, 177, 186, 283, 284, 286, 354, 355 “Nationalistische beweging,”

379n

(52)* Neratja, 37, 40, Neutraliseering,

370n (15) 364n ( 45 *

Youth), 292, 311, 465n (8) Oprichting van contra-vereenigingen,

465n (14)* Or. S., “Een mooie vergadering,” 379n (47)* Otchet Ispolkoma Kominterna, 436n (9)* Outer Islands, 37, 89, 196 Outlawry, 299, 303, 464n (32) Overzicht CSI 1921, 370n (14)* Overzicht 1923, 409n (71)* Overzicht 1924, 408n (59)* Overzicht 1924 15 April 1928, 420n (23)* Overzicht 1927, 422n (46)* Overzicht Pati, 434n (116)*

—

Overzicht

)

New Economic Policy, 129, 133 New Sarekat Rakjat (SR-Baru),

(

168,

426n (77) Ngadino, 307, 409n (70) Ngandjuk, 144, 182, 433n (111) Ngawi, 295, 467n (32) Ngoro, 433n (111) Ngrambe, 433n (111) Nias Island, 302, 327 “1923 Indonesia 1924,” 41 In (98)*

Residentenconferentie,

424n

66 )*

Overzicht

SWK, 428n (86)*

177,

—

NIVB

—

(Netherlands Indies Nonconfes-

sional Association), 69,

152,

393n

(77) Njoto,

374n (42)

Nonconfessional Democrats, see Vrijzinnige Democratische Partij Noncooperation, 110, 111, 112, 117, 124, 259, 382n (66) Notes, 460n ( 61 * Notowidjojo, 362n (28) November Promises, 49, 111 Novyi Vostok, 435n (3) NTAS (Netherlands Transport Workers’ Syndicate), 414n (115) Nur Ibrahim, Hadji Mohammad, 346, 479n (11), 487n (74) Nurut, 477n (119) NVSTP (Netherlands Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel), 13

Oetoesan Hindia, 23, 94, 99, 107, 167, 169 Ongko D, 471n (71), 482n (37, 38), ^ 483n (48) Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background, 449n (141)* “Ontwerp beginselverklaring,” 367n (64)* OPI ( Organization of Indonesian

Pacific Transport

Workers Conference,

206, 208, 216, 223, 224, 263, 275, 277, 292, 427n (81), 439n (37) Pacific war, 128, 317

Padang, 341, 434n (118, 119), 481n (34), 482n (38) Padang Pandjang, 329, 330, 482n (38)

Padoman Persarekatan Kommunist

In-

dia, 431n (100)* Palembang, 184, 302, 341, 426n (77), 465n (11), 490n (20) Pan-Asianism, 61, 100 Pandoe Merah, 242, 250, 254, 270, 452n (181) Pan-Indonesianism, 440n (51)

Pan-Islamism,

10,

60,

74,

86, 95,

98,

100, 116, 129, 142, 161, 167, 177,

379n (46), 388n (43) Pan-Pacific Labor Conference,

449n

(142) Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, 230 Pare, 433n (111) Parliament, Netherlands, 15, 113, 119,

258 Parliamentary action. 2, 3, 5, 12, 15, 24, 32, 68-74, 117, 119, 143, 156, 173, 195. 281; see also Elections, Town councils, Volksraad Partai Partai

Komunis Indonesia, see PKI Reglement dari P.K.I., 431n

100 )* Partondo, 39 In (62), 426n (77), 43 In (96) Pasundan, 39, 63, 143, 393n (77) Pasuruan, 121. 490n (20) (

Pati,

502

464n (2)

)

Index Patjitan,

467n (32)

Philippines,

Pavlovich, Mikhail, 199. 403n (16) “Zadachi Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi assotsiatsii vostokovedeniia,” 359n

PKBO

350,

the,

(Estate Workers’ Association),

42

PKBP

(Harbor

Workers’

Union),

276

PKBT

(Workers’ and Peasants’ Association), 39, 42, 168 PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia),

10, 20, 24, 38, 39, 52,

66, 96,

100,

128,

374n

181, 326,

(42), 381n (59) agrarian program, 222

98, 128, 181, 269, 278, 288; sec also Agrarian activity, Sugar dis-

constitution, 188

tricts

finances, 157. 220, 228, 257, 261, 272,

(Political-Economic Association),

(73) 393n 147,

Pekalongan,

290, 292, 325, 368n

(77), 413n (109)

121,

150.

151,

466n (19), 478n (1), 481n (31), 482n (43), 483n (45), 490n (20) P ember ontakan November 1926, 425n *

(55),

Penolong Isteri Korban Pergerakan, 444n (98) Penolong Kaum Buruh, 220, 444n (98) People’s parties, 265 People’s schools, see Sekolah Rakjat

(69),

(110),

program of demands, 30, 62 see also

June 1925, 291 December 1925 (Prambanan conference), 309, 311, 320, 324, 447n (121), 48 In (32), 483n (49), 485n (54, 55, 61) January 1926, 311, 323 June 1926, 328

M. A. A., 425n (73) Perserikatan Buruh Pelabuhan dan Lautan ( Harbor and Seamen’s Association), 461n ( 71 Perpatih,

India,

ISDV

PKI conferences December 1924, 252, 257, 262, 274, 290, 293, 297, 310, 316 March 1925, 298

(74)

46,

374n (42) Pervyi s”ezd, 36 In (16)* Pervyi s”ezd narodov Vostoka,

409n

279, 290, 291, 434n (118)

Perkommind, 206, 242 Perkumpulan Radja, 40 Perkumpulan Untuk Kaum-Buruh Onderneming Gula ( Association for Workers on Sugar Estates), 46 In

di

(91),

organization, 181, 193, 258, 269, 274,

see also Indische Vereniging Peringatan, 398n (34)*

Kommunist

395n

428n (85), 429n (88), 433n (106), 452n (184), 459n (51), 479n (18) name, 45-47, 50-51, 374n (42) Netherlands bureau, 203, 206, 242 413n

Perhimpunan Indonesia, 233, 240, 244, 285, 351, 398n (37), 473n (92);

Perserikatan

443n

(6),

(93), 444n (98), 448n (131), 468n (43), 470n (64), 478n (11) membership, 22, 24, 36, 105, 154, 186, 192, 261, 262, 305, 364n (44, 46), 365n (52), 369n (10), 370n (13), 374n (35), 390n

331,

182,

342, 343,

PFB

346,

Communist Party of 440n (52) “Philips,” 79 Piatii kongress, 458n (36)*

55, 57, 58, 59, 76, 81, 83, 93, 94,

PEB

316,

210,

Peasant International, see Krestintern Peasant organizations, 39, 42, 168, 221; see also Sarekat Tani 8, 9,

266,

Philippines,

(l)* P. B. (Bergsma) “Een benoeming,” 381n (64)° “Het eenheidsfront in Indonesia,” 409n (72)° “Vakcentrale,” 374n (36)° Peasant committees, 278

Peasantry,

210,

439n (47), 440n (51), 447n (114), 474n (95); see also Manila

PKI congresses 403n

May

1920 (seventh), 46, 50, 66

December

1920,

66,

(15)*

extraordinary,

(sugar workers’ union), 90, 92, 95,

71-74, 95 December 1921 (eighth), 113, 116, 117 March 1923 (with Red SI), 144, 155, 43 In (99)

100, 102, 113, 138

90-94, 136, 390n (54) Indies Teachers’ Union), 149

strike,

PGIIB (Netherlands

503

))

)

Index PKI congresses June 1924

(

continued )

(ninth),

Proletariat, 2, 14, 15, 25, 42, 43, 53, 55,

113,

192,

56, 59, 79, 82, 88, 131, 181,

261,

434n (118)

PKI

meeting 261 1924), P.K.I. ke-Dua, 472n (81)

PKT

executive

(

September

Protokoll *

436n ( 8 ) (75)° 425n Politiek verslag over 1926 in het gewest Semarang, 460n (62)* Politieke nota PKI, 420n (213)° Ponorogo, 174 Pontianak, 184, 426n (77), 490n (20) Populism, 484n 53 Porojitno, 42 PPKB (Concentration of Labor Unions), Politiek politioneel overzicht, Politick verslag 1926,

(

89, 91, 92, 95, 101, 107, 113, 115, 121, 127, 139,

45, 62,

153,

128,

(54)

Prambanan Conference, see PKI conferences, December 1925 Prapto, S., 478n ( 1 Prawirosardjono, 277, 430n (90), 460n (54), 470n (62) Prawoto Sudibio, 370n (17) Press, 110, 120, 134, 178, 192, 308, 399n (50), 426n (77) Priangan, 40, 83, 113, 140, 151, 294, 295, 327, 328, 341-342, 467n (32), 479n (12), 481n 483n (48), 487n (87), 490n 121, 180, 185, 429n

Rabijan, 43 In (96) Radek, Karl, 158, 436n (8) Radical Concentration, 69,

(31),

(20) (88),

364n (41)*

(31),

Profintern congresses

1921 (first), 211, 440n (56) 1922 (second), 163, 212, 216, 223 1924 (third), 163, 252, 267 Profintern v rezoliutsiiakh, 440n (55)* Programme Congres, ka 12 dari V.S.T.P. tanggal 3-4 Fcbruari 1923, 408n

(58)* 277

Proletarianization,

430n (88)

154, 163, 166, 269, 280, 284,

382n

452n (185) Wording, 361n (12)* Rebellion, 272, 288, 298, 317, 324,

353

Red Eastern Labor Bureau, 208 Red Eastern Labor Secretariat, 265, 275 Red Guardists, 29-32, 34, 182, 328 Red Indonesian Labor Unions, SecretarRed

406n (37), 438n

441n (68)

Proletar,

146,

275, 276, 310 International of Labor Unions, see

iat of,

Profintern, 208, 210, 264, 275, 287, 314,

(9),

142,

(70), 41 In (93) Radjapelah, 434n (119) Rahasia, 486n (70) Randublatang, 418n (1), 434n (119) Rantajaekek, 418n (1) Rapport van het hoofd, 458n (25)* Rasad, Engku Djamaluddin, 478n (1) Ratu Adil, 10, 93, 179-180, 426n (79) Ravesteyn, W. van, 162, 206, 234, 238, 244, 249, 380n (57), 450n (150),

Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, 404n (30)* 351, 385n

(Indies Trade Union Federation), 139, 143, 146, 147, 148, 154, 193, 238, 275, 276, 291, 409n (72, 73),

417n (147)

272, 344,

430n (89) Prijzen, indexcijfers,

Purworedjo, 434n (119)

PVH

137-138,

395n (90), 400n (55), 460n

Prijaji, 10, 11,

(HI)

Raad van Vakbonden, 487n (87)

see Concentration of People’s Liberation Movements PPPB (pawnshop workers’ union), 43, 120,

489n (6)* TV Kongress, 419n (12)*

389n

PPKR,

113,

126

PSI (Sarekat Islam Association), 115116 PSI (Sarekat Islam Party), 141-142, 144-145, 158, 167 Puger, 467n (32) Purwokerto, 418n (1), 426n (77), 433n

102,

394n (88), 395n (90)

101,

Labor federations,

Labor unions Protokoll,

(Peasants’ Association), 42

95,

also

Proletariat, dictatorship of, 51,

Poesaka VSTP, 407n (55)°

(47),

see

(63);

408n

Profintern

“Red” SI, 115 Referendum, 66, 381n (59) Regents, 10, 38, 111, 419n (7) Regeringsreglement, 21, 111 Reksodiputro, 451n (164)

Rembang, 121, Report, 418n (

177,

481n

(31),

490n

(20)

* 1

)

Report of the Asst., Pati, 473n (89)* Report of the Asst. Demang, 459n ( 51 * Report of the Attorney General, 477n )* ( 120

504

)

)

Index Reports of the Resident, 468n (39)° Resolutions and Theses, 419n (11)* “Resolutions on the Report of the Execu-

Saleh, Baharuddin, 328, 334, 341, 342,

426n (77), 480n (24), 484n (50), 486n (73), 487n (79) Salem, 482n (37) Salim, A. C., 144, 284, 426n (77), 478n (1), 482n (38) Salim, Hadji Agus, 44, 85, 86, 91, 93-

Committee of the Communist International,” 458n (33)* tive

Revision, constitutional, 117

Revision Commission, 110-111 Revisionism, 2-4, 5, 13, 15, 27, 28, 46,

96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 113, 120, 122, 138, 142, 167, 169, 177,

135

60, 68,

Revolution, Russian

(March 1917),

319n (7), 370n (15), 374n (36), 388n (39), 389n (50), 390n (52), 391n (60, 63), 393n (73), 395n (94), 396n (11), 397n (19), 444n (95) Salimun, 332, 333, 342, 426n (77), 478n (1), 482n (43)

26,

181, 219, 295,

118 Russian (November 1917),

Revolution,

29, 45, 51, 118 Revolution, Troelstra, 31, 33, 49, 57 Revolutionary Socialist Party, 244

Riau Islands, 302 Rights,

civil,

Sama Rata Hindia

34, 36, 70, 110, 113, 114,

119, 120, 151, 152, 154, 258, 307308, 368n (2), 399n (48, 50), 455n (9), 459n (7), 479n (17); see also Government policy Rights,

extraordinary,

119,

152,

Samin, Kijai, 448n (136) “Aufstand auf Java und Sumatra (Indonesien),” 448n (136)* “Situation in Indonesia,” 438n (30)* Saminism, 176 Samsi, 426n (77) Samsjudin, 478n (1) Samsu, 312 Samsuri, 471n (69) Samudro, 334, 484n ( 50, 51 Samyarata, 478n ( 1 Santos, Mariano, 440n (51) Santri, 10, 20, 41, 171

173,

175, 234, 237, 368n (2) International of ions), see Profintern

Labor Un-

Roland Holst, Henriette, 244 Roode S.I.’er, “Het S. I. 365n (49)*

congres,”

RILU (Red

Roy, M. N., 59, 60, 66, 87, 129, 130, 159, 226, 231, 245, 248, 254, 266, 268, 334, 378n (44), 381n (62), 387n (26), 404n (26), 464n (102), 476n (119), 485n (58) Rukun Asli, 430n (89) Russia, see Soviet

Sanusi, 210, 292, 316, (

the,

Union

475n (115),476n (116),478n (1), 484n (49), 486n (69) Sarekat Ambon, 143, 259, 393n (77), 463n (96) Sarekat Buruh Bengkel, 277 Sarekat Buruh Bengkel dan Elektris (SBBE), 277, 307, 309, 319, 471n

1919 con-

56

Russian example, 126, 133, 134 Rutgers, S. J., 383n (84) “Indonesiche nationale beweging,”

370n (13)* Indonesia, 388n (38)* Rutgers, S. L., ldenburg, 360n

RVC

(

110 )

(95),

54

gress,

426n (77), 433n

Sardjono, 272, 311, 321, 328, 329, 353, 395n (1), 433n (110), 460n (54), 471n (69, 71), 472n (75), 474n

Russian Communist Party, Central Bureau of the Muslim Organization of

Russian Communist Party,

Bergerak, 17, 18

(67)

Sarekat Buruh Tjetak, 307, 460n (65) Sarekat Dagang Indonesia, 330 Sarekat Dagang Islam, 8 Sarekat Djin, 345 Sarekat Hidjau, 295, 299, 314, 331, 465n

1 )*

(Revolutionary Federation of Labor Unions), 101, 115, 120, 122, 394n (90)

(16, 17),

483n (48)

Sarekat Hindia, 62, 64, 65, 88, 89, 100, Safarov, G., 162, 405n (34) Said Ali, Sutan, 183, 426n (77),

103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 116,

460n

(54), 471n (69, 71) Salary Commission, 148, 149

418n (1), 426n (77), 433n (111), 434n (119), 464n (2)

Salatiga,

105,

164, 166, 167, 259, 283,

393n

(77),

463n (94) Sarekat India, 64 Sarekat Internasional, 74 Sarekat Islam, 10-12, 19, 21-22, 38, 49,

505

)

Index Seaport

Sarekat Islam ( continued 52, 57, 61-64, 66, 68-70, 77, 80,

215, 217 Sectarianism, 51 Section B, 40, 49, 50, 83, 85, 87, 89, 93, 300, 372n (22), 375n (9), 472n

81, 83, 85, 88, 89, 93, 97, 106, 111, 128, 132, 137, 138, 155, 166, 243,

259, 271, 280, 283, 287, 288, 294, 296, 336, 465n (17); see also CSI finances, 93,

(84)

Sekolah Rakjat, 191, 196, 435n (127) Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jog-

97

jakarta, 372n (23)* Semangat Moeda, 317 Semaoen, Anti Indie Weerbaar, 370n (14)* “Brieven,” 406n (39)*

membership, 83, 146 program, 97-98, 103

398n 399n (45), 401n (66), 409n

schools, 108, 118, 119, 140, 237, (42),

(77)

Hoe

Hollandsche imperialisme, 418n (147)* “Internationale Imperialismus und die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens,” 447n (125)* “Mijn standpunt,” 382n (72)* “Ondisciplinair en on-Kommunistisch,” 390n (53)* Rapotan, 443n (89)* Sikapnja, 44 In (96)* Semarang, 14, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31,

Sarekat Islam congres, 1916, 363n (39)° Sarekat Islam congres, 1917, 364n

(46)* Sarekat Islam Party, see PSI Sarekat Kaum Buruh Pelabuhan, 46 In (71)

Sarekat Menado, 393n (77) Sarekat Minahassa, 143 Sarekat Postel, 102, 138, 277, 408n (60), 430n (90), 444n (99) Sarekat Rakjat, 115-116, 157, 189, 221, 255, 257, 260, 261, 262, 265, 267, 277, 279, 283, 288, 305, 308, 316, 319, 326, 433n (109), 435n (122),

73, 83-86, 89, 91, 94, 101, 112, 113, 116-118, 120-122, 144, 151, 166, 177, 182, 187, 193, 225, 226, 258, 270, 275,

Sarekat Sumatera, 39, 63, 393n (77) Sarekat Tani, 222, 305, 308, 446n (110), 469n (44) Sarongs, subversive, 479n (17)

140,

191,

478n (1), 479n (15), 481n (31), 482n (43), 490n (20) Semarang Handelsvereniging, 13, 368n (33),

Sastrowidjono, 47 In (69)

'

Sugar Workers’ Union), 307, 319, 46 In (74), 471n (67) SBME (Union of Naval Station Employees), 47 In (67) School of Asian Studies of the Red Army Workers’ and Peasants’ Military Academy in Moscow, 199

(3)

(

Semaun,

20, 22, 25, 27, 28, 32, 34, 38, 41, 43-46, 51, 68, 70, 72, 74, 85, 86, 89, 92-94, 96, 98, 101, 103,

105, 106, 113, 118, 119, 124, 125, 127, 132, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146. 150, 152, 155, 164, 190, 201, 203, 205, 207, 210. 211, 213, 218, 221, 229, 231, 238, 240, 248, 268, 277, 280, 285, 286, 306, 313, 319, 321, 335, 339, 351, 362n (28), 368n (6),

Schools, SI, see Sarekat Islam, schools Schools, wild, 258

Schotman, 27

“Communism on

the

West

Coast of Sumatra,” 425n (74)* “Political Section,”

105,

276, 295, 306, 326, 341, 343, 365n (47), 418n (1), 426n (77), 433n (110, 111), 434n (118, 119), 459n (52), 460n (54, 55), 464n (2, 3), 467n

Sartono, 241 Sastrodihardjo, 426n (77) Sastrosuwirjo, 433n (110)

Schrieke,

het

37, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 62, 66, 70,

471n (69)

SBG

offices,

428n (86)°

CPH

241, 288, 350,

369n 375n (10), 381n 54), 392n (70), (94), 397n (19), (7), 404n (30),

370n (16), (64), 390n (52, 394n (90), 395n 399n (45), 402n 488n (88 ), 489n (10) “Bung Tan,” 398n (34)* “Indiiskoe dvizhenie.” 392n (70)* (11),

Reconstructie, 481n (33)* SDAP ( Social Democratic Workers’ Party), 4, 5, 13, 15, 18, 27, 31, 38, 103, 119, 151, 233. 450n (150) SDAP, Indies, 28, 32, 38, 69 SDP (Social Democratic Party), 13, 46, 58. 232-234; see also

202, 216,

Sentot, 114

506

Index Sosrokardono, 40, 43, 44, 84, 167, 169.

467n (37) Serikat Buruh Pelikan Indonesia, 119, 122 Serilagu, 215, 276, 461n (71) “Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on July 17th,” 386u (20)* Setiabuddhi, see Douwes Dekker SH, 401n (3)* Shanghai, 129, 203 Shestoi rasshirennyi plenum, 444n Serang

(

SI,

388n (40), 426n (77) Soviet Union, 1, 4, 47, 53, 60, 64, 67, 82, 83, 103, 125, 130, 187, 216, 282, 315, 435n (2) famine

406n (41), (102), 484n

(101),

432n

(53)

SPLI (Union

101 )*

Seamen),

of Indonesian

215, 240, 241, 255. 276, 442n (78),

452n (181)

SPPL

(

Indonesian Seamen’s and DockUnion), 276, 307, 309, 319,

ers’

442n (78), 448n (139), 449n 461n (71), 471n (67)

167 Siam, 404n (30) Sibolga, 487n (87)

[SR]

Sinar Hindia, 23, 32, 107, 168, 178, 203 Singapore, 129, 230, 289, 316, 320, 329,

434n (122), 446n (114), 449n (142), 474n (95), 476n (119), 481n (34), 482n (38), 484n (50), 486n (69), 487n (79), 488n (91), 490n (16) Sjamsuddin, 461n (71) Workers’

Union),

Sneevliet, H., 13, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24-28, 31, 36, 49, 57, 60, 66, 76, 77, 80,

also

Sekolah

306, 311

203, 204, 213, 225, 234, 235, 239, 242, 244, 248, 253, 335, 363n (36), 364n (44), 366n (66), 368n (2, 3, 5, 6), 369n (7, ll),378n (33, 36),

Strikes, 13, 44, 90, 95,

120, 122, 126-

127, 136-138, 151, 153, 306, 308, 326, 373n (30), 400n (56); see also

380n (57), 381n (61), 384n (3, 7, 8), 385n (9), 387n (33), 388n (35), 399n (47), 404n (30), 437n (24, 25), 438n (35), 443n (92), 450n (153), 485n (58), 488n (2) “Het noodwendige gevolg,” 364n (47)* “Na ons Kongres,” 369n (11)* “Onze eerste 1 Mei-viering,” 367n (71)* “Toetreding,” 362n (21)* Snouck Hurgronje, C., 108 Soeara Merdika, 17, 362n (28) Soeara Ra’jat, 17, 178, 203, 272, 390n

PFB, PPPB,

VSTP

Study clubs, 221, 272, 283 Subagio, 426n (77) Subakat, 155, 191, 195, 202, 203, 231, 256, 294, 316, 322, 331, 346, 426n (77), 434n (112), 437n (20, 22), 449n (145), 460n (54), 475n (115), 480n (28), 482n (37), 486n (69) Subardjo, 336 Sudibio, 152, 408n (60, 61), 426n (77) Sudijono, P.K.l. Sibar, 424n (64)* Sudiro, 168, 177, 426n (77) Sugar acreage, restriction of,

Sugar

districts, 7, 9,

(101), 445n (110), 461n (79)

431n

Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, 13 Soeroso, “Indonesische vakbeweging,”

389n (49)*

Red

38-39

12, 20, 37, 38, 41,

42, 90, 92, 93, 108, 277,

(57)

Sosroatmodjo, 478n (1)

see

Strike, general, 122, 126, 136, 153, 291,

82, 83, 87, 103, 127, 129, 131, 155,

Guardists, Soviets

307;

(18)* “Volwaardig parlement,” 41 In (93)* Strategiia, 379n (44)*

461n (74)

Soldiers, 29-30, 291, 311; see also

schools,

(145),

Rakjat SR-Baru, see New Sarekat Rakjat Staatspoorbond, 361n (15) Stalin, J., 82, 83, 132, 282, 286, 337, 338, 349, 378n (44), 485n (61) Stalin-Trotsky feud, 282, 348 Stam, J. C„ 51, 72, 73 Stokvis, “Van Limburg Stirmn,” 371n

339, 342,

(Plantations

427n (84)

156, 158, 195, 281, 290,

431n

S. I. Partij,

SKBO

125,

Soviets, 51, 59, 71, 118, 119, 126, 128,

Shumiatskii, B. Z., 132, 133 “Iz istorii,” 404n (20)* SI V, 37 In (19)*

"

in,

371n

(106),

Sugar syndicate, 13, 38, 90, 92 Sugeng, 374n (36), 394n (90) Sugiman, 463n (94) Sugondo, 312

507

(20),

446n

)

Index Sugono, 52, 152, 155, 227, 253, 256, 276, 308, 312, 316, 319, 324, 331, 397n (17), 470n (56), 471n (71), 473n (92), 474n (96), 475n (115), 477n (122), 478n (1, 7), 486n (69)

42 Sukabumi, 105, 141, 155, 182, 272, 395n (1), 418n (1), 433n (110, 111), 434n (119), 467n (33) Sukarno, 85, 155, 169, 363n (36), 380n

Suharijo,

(58)

Sukarsono, 155 Sukendar, 184, 195, 223, 276, 307, 394n (90), 470n (62) Sukindar, These bagi, 434n (122)* Sukirno, 145, 460n (54), 471n (71) Sukrawinata, 333, 340, 341, 483n (49),

484n (51) Sula Islands, 183 Sulaweis, see Celebes Suleiman, 331, 426n (77), 487n (74) Sumantri, 227, 251, 276 Sumatra, 330, 481n (31) East Coast, 184, 460n (54), 487n (87), 490n (20) North, 302, 426n (77) South, 328 West, 117, 182, 294, 301, 303, 305, 308, 313, 341, 345, 426n (77), 459n (52), 460n (54), 478n ( 1, 11), 487n (87), 490n (20) see also Atjeh, Benkulen, Lampung, Langsa, Medan, Nias Island, Padang, Padang Pandjang, Pal-

embang, Riau Islands Sumedang, 294, 418n (1), 433n (111) Sumitro, 333 Sun Fo, 207 Sun Yat-sen, 77-80, 207, 224, 226, 227, 3S0n (58), 386n (12, 20), 443n (82), 447n (124) Sun Yat-sen University, see Communist University of the Toilers of China Sundah, 461n (71) Suprodjo, 322, 328, 329, 342, 472n (71), 475n (115), 478n (122), 482n (37, 38), 484n (49, 50) Surabaja,

8, 14, 17, 20, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, 49, 50, 51, 62, 66, 86, 94, 121, 150, 151, 166, 225, 275, 276,

391n 426n (1), (77), 433n (118, 119), 443n (99), 460n (54), 461n (74), 481n (31, 34), 482n

308, 310, 317, 326, 341, 343,

418n (111), 434n 459n (52), 478n (1), (38), 490n (20) (62),

Suradi,

408n (62), 431n (96)

Surakarta,

8,

10,

12,

39, 42,

65,

105,

173, 174, 187, 258, 310, 311, 317, 327, 332, 341, 343, 372n (20),

418n (1), 426n (77), 460n (54), 466n (19), 467n (32), 478n (1), 481n (31), 482n (43), 490n (20) Surat Plardjomartojo, 276, 471n (71) Suriasuparno, 344 Surjopranoto, 42-45, 85, 86, 89-94, 97, 113, 167, 374n (36), 389n (50), 390n (52, 54), 391n (60, 61, 63), 395n (94), 423n (55) Suroso, 139, 238, 389n (49), 409n (70,

72) Sutadi, H., 374n (36) Sutigno, 309, 470n (61),

478n (1)

Sutomo, 139, 238, 444n (98) Sutopo, 118, 144, 150, 401n (65) Suwardi Surjaningrat, 18, 118, 363n (33), 399n (45), 401n (64) Suwamo, 431n (96), 460n (54), 471n (71)

Syndicalism, 62, 71, 414n (115), 484n (53)

Tdtigkeitshericht

der

Exekutive

der

Kommunistischen Internationale 1925-1926, 463n (97)* Tajib, 333 Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia, 398n (35)* Trio, 404n (30)* Tamin, Djamaluddin, 202, 329, 331, 342, 425n (73), 426n (77), 437n (20), 482n (37, 38), 487n (79) Tan Malaka, Revolusi, 419n (17)* Tan Ping Tjiat, 448n (139), 461n (71) Tan Ping-shan, 207 Tapanuli, 490n (20) Tarmudji, 478n ( 1 Taskimalaja, 434n (119) Tawalib schools, 174-175 Taxes, 9, 109, 120, 396n (9) Tedjomartojo, 390n (52) Tegal, 150, 174, 327, 329, 331, 340, 341, 343, 478n (1), 481n (31), 482n (39), 483n (45), 486n (70) Temanggung, 332, 343, 482n (43)

Ten-Man Leagues, 460n (60) Ten-man system, 274, 298, 305, 460n (60) “Ter orienteering,” 389n (45)® Temate, 51, 183, 426n (77), 434n (118. 119), 451n (164), 460n

508

,

Index continued ) (54), 476n (119), 478n (1), 488n (87)

Termite

Third International after Lenin, 444n )° ( 101 Trotskyism, 207, 287, 337 Turkey, 53, 54, 61, 86, 130, 181, 195,

(

Terrorism, 187, 193, 194, 257, 273, 300, 324, 327, 333, 345, 482n (45), 486n (70); see also Anarchism Theses, Lenin, 58, 59, 67, 71, 74, 76, 79, 95, 100, 117, 131,

304, 315, 389n “Uitslag

377n (31),

381n (62), 430n (91) Theses, M. N. Roy, 59-60 Theses, PKI (1920), 87-89 Theses, PKI (1924), 223, 434n (122) Timor, 184, 302 Tjepu, 144, 312, 434n (119) Tjiamis, 433n (110, 111), 434n (119) Tjiandjur, 434n (119), 466n (19) Tjibatu, 434n (119) Tjilatjap, 460n (54), 481n (31) Tjimahi, 433n (111), 434n (119)

der

(43), 427n

(81)

Volksraadverkiezingen,”

383n (82)° Uittreksel, 418n (1)* Uitvoerende Comite van de Revolutie, see Executive Committee of the Revolution

Umar, 482n (37) Umar, Hadji, 471n (69) Umar Giri, 346 Underground activities, 228, 260, 261, 273, 311, 326; see also

DO

19, 39, 69,

Ungaran, 418n (1), 433n (111) Unions, see Labor unions United front from above, 68, 76, 113,

363n (33), 366n (59), 372n (20), 437n (21), 456n (11) Het communisme in Indie 372n )° ( 22

United front from below, 68, 102, 267 United States of Asia, 376n (25) Utusan, 183

Tjipto

Mangunkusumo,

73,

18,

239, 282, 288

168,

Tjirebon, 121, 150, 182, 295, 331, 341, 343, 418n (1), 433n (110, 111),

434n (119), 467n (32), 478n (1), 481n (31), 482n (39, 43), 486n

v.

Van

Tjokroaminoto,

Umar

Said,

8,

10,

24,

37, 38, 41, 44, 62, 69, 73, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 99, 100, 102, 106, 112, 120, 124, 138,

139, 141, 144, 155, 166, 219, 284, 296, 319, 336, 363n (36), 368n

375n

382n

70), 388n (39), 389n (50), 390n (56), 391n (60, 63), 395n (90), 408n (67), 410n (84), 412n (99), 420n (23), 444n (95) “Partij S. I.” 410n (89)° Tjokromidjojo, 374n (36) (9),

(67,

Toemenggoeng, Geheime nota, (73)° Toilers, 402n (9)* Toli-toli, 40, 44, 372n (21)

Emergence,

360n

Traditionalism, 8,

9,

11,

12,

126,

duidelijkheid,” 383n (82)° Verbond van Inlandse Landsdienaren, 408n (66) “Verkort verslag van de vierde alge-

meene vergadering der

I.S.D.V.,”

362n (22)° Verslag bestuur 1925, 425n (73)° Verslag 9de, 422n (44)* Verslag S. I. Merah, 425n (75)* “Verslag van de vijfde algemeene vergadering,” 366n (64)* “Verslag van het buitengewoon congres der P.K.I.,” 383n (76)*

van (55)*

Verslag

425n

het

lie

Kongres,

423n

Verslag zesde, 375n (4)*

Veto right, 206 “Vierde S. I. congres,” 374n (32)* VIPBOW (Union of Public Works

councils, 21, 68, 70, 117

180,

185 Tribune, De, 366n (63) Troianovskii, K., 376n (24), 380n (53)

V os-tor,

Robert,

“Verblijdende

418n (1), 433n (111) Tjiwidej, 433n (111) Tjitjalenka,

Town

Niel,

)° ( 3

(70)

(6),

Br.-H., “Jaarvergadering der I.S.D.V.,” 375n (9)°

Em-

ployees), 100, 102, 113, 139, 149 Visser, Louis de, 246, 348, 488n (2) Vladivostok, 82, 388n (33) Voitinsky, G., 79, 204, 206, 208, 224,

376n (23)°

264,

Trotsky, Leon, 82, 113, 221, 282, 348,

447n (124)

384n

(4),

(9),

(33) “First Conference,”

50.9

385n

458n (27)*

388n

)

Index V olharding,

De, 14

Volksraad, 23, 24, 28, 31, 32, 38, 68, 169,

71, 98, 109, 111, 112, 143, 258, 259, 318, 367n (79), 381n (65, 66), 382n (67, 76), 398n (33) Volksraad, “true,” 43, 44, 62 Vollenhoven, J. van, 108 Vrijzinnige Democratische Partij, 38,

tive,”

(

Union

of

Rail

and Tramway

Personnel), 12, 14, 22, 34, 42, 92, 95,

101,

102,

122, 125,

127,

137,

140, 147, 211, 261, 274, 303, 306, 308, 310, 312, 319, 326, 341, 361n (15, 16), 368n (3), 369n (6), 392n (66), 413n (110), 414n (115), 460n (65), 469n (48), 471n (67), 473n (92), 479n (18), 480n (24),

487n (77) 193, 257, 258, 313 Vtoroi Kongress Krasnogo Internatsionstrike, 146,

ala,

421n (29)°

in

de

Exeku-

Wilbur, Introduction, 384n (9)®

and How, Documents, 385n (10)® Winanta,

A., 192, 197, 312, 315, 316, 328, 426n (77), 433n (110), 469n (48), 471n (69, 71), 472n (75),

475n (115), 478n (1), 482n (45), 486n (69)

108

VSTP

Kwestie 384n (3)®

“Oostersche

Wirasuharta, 47 In (69)

418n (1), 434n (119) Wongso, Kitab Tani, 445n (105)® Workers’ and Peasants’ Association, see Wirosari,

PKBT World Islam Congress, 420n 23 World War I, 6, 20. 61, 108, 117 Wu Pei-fu, 386n (20) (

Zainuddin, Natar, 174, 182, 425n (73), 426n (77), 456n (11) Zakaznikova, “Profsoiuznoe dvizhenie,”

374n (35)® Zee, D. van der, S.D.A.P., 359n (7)®

Wang

Ching-wei, 207 Washington Conference, 128 Waworuntu, Johannes, 201, 375n (11) Wentuk, Clemens, 201 Westernization 5, 11 Westerveld, 17, 27, 28, 68 Wezel, van, 369n (11) Whiting, Soviet Policies, 377n (28)°

Wignjosumarto, 426n (77) Wijnkoop, D„ 235, 237, 244, 253, 372n (22), 384n (3), 452n (185)

510

Zinoviev,

G„

57, 128. 130-132, 220, 278,

337, 377n (32), 405n (34), 406n (41), 485n (60)

II

Kongress, 378n (33)®

II

Kongress, Krasnogo, 441n (61)®

384n (8)® III Kongres Krasnogo, 439n (43)® IV Sessiia TsentraV nogo, 442n (74)® III Kongress,