The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West 9781474470650

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THE RISE OF HUMANISM IN CLASSICAL ISLAM AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST

A TOI, NICOLE

On the Dignity of Man

0 Slave of the body! how you toil to serve it! Where there's nothing but loss, you seek to profit. Turn to the mind, which you need to perfect: You are man, not by the body, but by the intellect. 1a khadima 'l-jismi.' kam tashqa bi-khidmatih1J Li-ta!luha 'r-rih~a mimmafih! khusr{mu. Aqhil 'ala 'n-nafsi wa 'stakmil farja' ilaha: Fa-anta hi 'n-nafsi, Ia hi '1-jismi, insanu. Abu '1-Fath al-Busti (d. 363(973-4, or c. 400)

(Munta;;.am, VII, 73) I have read, reverend Fathers, in the works of the Arabs, that when Abdala the Saracen was asked what he regarded as most to be wondered at on the world's stage, so to speak, he answered that there was nothing to be seen more wonderful than man.

Legi, patres colendissimi, in Arahum monumentis interrogatum Ahdalam Sarracenum, quid in hac quasi mundana scaena admirandum maxime spectaretur, nihil spectari homine admirabilius respondisse. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (d. 1481), Oralio

de dignitate hominis, Oration on the Dignity of Man (PRR, 476; Latin, 213)

THE RISE OF HUMANISM IN CLASSICAL ISLAM AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SCHOLASTICISM

GEORGE MAKDISI

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS

© George

Makdisi 1990

Edinburgh University Press 22 George Square, Edinburgh Set in Lasercomp Baskerville printed and bound in Great Britain by

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Makdisi, George The rise of humanism in classical Islam and the Christian \Vest: with special reference to Scholasticism. I. Title 144.09 ISBN 978 0 852 21/)30 6

v

CONTENTS

Preface

XlX PART ONE

SCHOLASTICISM Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Historical Background of the Scholastic Movement A. Shafi'i versus the Mutakallimun B. Three Landmarks of Traditionalist Triumph The Inquisition The Defection The Declaration of Faith c. The Two Dimensions of Shafi'i's Science of Jurisprudence D. Shafi'i, the First Champion of Traditionalist Islam Creation of the Guilds of Law: The Madhabs A. Guilds in Classical Islam Terminology Definitions B. Controversy Regarding the Guilds Louis M assignon 's Thesis Claude Cahen's Conditions and Questions Gabriel Baer's Conditions Other Considerations c. The Professional Legal Guilds Legal Guilds in the Ninth Century Change in Designation of Madhab Middle Road Between Kalam Rationalism and Hadith Fideism Impact of Law on Hadith Significance of the M adhab 's Change in Designation

2 2 5 5 5

7 12 14 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 19 19 20 20

VI

Contents

Baer 's Conditions Fulfilled Legal Guilds and the Professionalization of the Law Comparative Diagram of the Tripartite Division of Guilds Claude Cahen's Objections Answered

Chapter III.

Chapter IV.

The Professionalization of Legal Studies: The Guild Colleges and the Doctorate A. Creation of the Colleges of Law: Mosque-Inn and Madrasa The Mosque-Inn College of Law The Madrasa College of Law The Stipulations of the Nizamiya Waqf Deed B. Creation of the Doctorate of Law: The Magisterium The Licence to Teach Master, Doctor, Professor The Doctorate in Law Alone The Doctorate an Intrusive Element in Christian Learning c. Academic Freedom Mufti and Mustafti The Role of Dissent in Islamic Law D. The Jurisconsult's Two-Fold Magisterium The Magisterium in Christianity Competence and Jurisdiction E. Origin and Development of the Doctorate Rationalist Infiltration of Traditionalist Institutions A. Inauguration of Two Rival Madrasa Colleges The Nizamiya College of Baghdad The Baghdad Shrine College of Abu Hanifa B. The Clandestine Rationalist Role of the Nizamiya College c. Infiltration of the Guilds of Law D. Infiltration of the Curricula of the Colleges Notes

20 21 22 22 24 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 28 30 30 32 33 33 35 37 39 39 39 40 41

42 42 43

Contents

Vll

PART TWO

TYPOLOGY OF ADAB INSTITUTIONS Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Chapter III.

Waqf Institutions A. Maktab and Kuttab B. Jami'-Mosque C. Masjid-Mosque D. Madrasa E. Libraries Independent Public Libraries Libraries Attached to Madrasas The Library's Humanistic Impact on the Madrasa The Librarian as Teacher of Humanism Other Attached Libraries Private and Government Non-Waqf Institutions A. Private Institutions Literary Circles, Clubs, Academies Homes Bookshops Outdoors B. Government Institutions Chancery Schools Royal and Princely Courts Books and the Law of Waqf A. The Waqf and Books on the 'Foreign Sciences' B. The Cult of Books C. Libraries and the Collection and Sale of Books D. Some Manuscript Traditions The Practice of Unauthorized Transmission The Process of Book Production E. Some Reputed Books F. Movement of Books Notes

48 48 50

52 53 54 54 54 57 57

59 60 60 60 62 63 63

64 64 66 67 67 70 71 76 76 77

80 81 83

Contents

Vlll

PART THREE

INSTRUCTION: THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Humanism in the Organization of Religious Knowledge A. Divisions of Knowledge B. Terminology of Humanistic Studies c. Definitions, Characteristics and Scope Yaqut on Humanism and Scholasticism Akfani on Humanism D. Humanists an Intellectual Class E. Eloquence the Essence of Humanism F. Benefits of Adab Humanism Relation of Adab to Authority, Hadith and Law A. Adab and Authority B. Adab and Hadith c. Adab and Law D. The Scholar-Humanist E. The Humanist and Secularism Notes

88 88 88 89 91 93 94 95 96 97 97 99 105 109 113 115

PART FOUR

INSTRUCTION: MAJOR FIELDS OF ADAB-HUMANISM Chapter I.

Chapter II.

Grammar A. Early Origins of Grammar and the Studia Adablya B. Reason Given for the Science of Grammar C. Who's Who Among Early Grammarians D. Grammar and Religious Studies E. Grammar an Affair of State F. Authority in Grammar G. Madhabs in Law and in Grammar H. Place of Grammar in the Studia Adabzya I. Grammar and Lafm

121 121

122 123 123 124 124 125 126

Poetry A. Terminology

130 130

122

Contents

IX

B. Collection of Pre-Islamic Poetry Evidential Value of Pre-Islamic Poetry for Adab D. Composers and Genres of Poetry E. Epic Poetry F. Poetry to Prose and Prose to Poetry G. Training of the Poet H. Illiterate Poets I. Qualities and Benefits of Poetry J. Fear of the Poet's Tongue K. Poets Compared and Judged

c.

Chapter III.

132 133 133 134 135 136 137 137 138 139 141 141 141 141

Eloquence A. Eloquence and the Koran The Koran as Model The Doctrine of Inimitability and the Koranic Challenge B. Eloquence and Rhetoric c. Eloquence and Grammar D. Lists of Men of Eloquence E. Ex temporality

144 146 146 146

Chapter IV.

Oratory A. Terminology B. Subjects Treated in Oratory c. Lists of Famous Orators

148 148 149 152

Chapter V.

Epistolary Art A. Terminology B. Manuals c. Epistolographers and their Formularies D. Four Epistolographers E. Two Kinds of Letters: Official and Private

153 153 154 155 160 161

Chapter VI.

History A. Terminology B. Akhbar and Ta'rlkh C. The Historical Novel D. Humanistic Studies (Based on The Sovereign's Conduct in the Administration of the State of Ibn Abi 'r-Rabi')

163 163 163 165 169

X

Chapter VII.

Contents

Moral Philosophy A. Development of the Academic Sermon Typology of Sermons Genesis of the Academic Sermon B. Writers and Preachers of the Academic Sermon Abu 's-Sari Mansur b. 'Ammar (d. c. beg. of third/ninth c.) Abu Zakariya Yahya b. Mu'adh ar-Razi (d. 258/872) Abu Muhammad al-Hasan b. 'Ali b. Khalaf al-Barbahari (d. 329/941) Abu '/-Hasan 'Ali b. Muhammad (d. 338/950) Abu '/-Hasan 'Ali b. Ibrahim al-Husri (d. 371/982) Abu Hafs 'Umar b. Ahmad Ibn Shahin (d. 398/995) Khadija Bint al-Baqqal (d. 437I1045) Khadija ash-Shahjaniya (d. 460/1068) 'Ubaid Allah Ibn Shahin (d. 440/1048) Ibn Sam'un (d. 387/997) 'Abd as-Samad (d. 397/1007) Impact of the 'Fellows of 'Abd as-Samad' c. Development of the Majlis al-Wa';z as an Academic Chair D. Eleventh-Century Hanbali Chairs for the Academic Sermon Abu Muhammad at-Tamimi (d. 488/1095) Ibn 'Aqil (d. 513/1119) E. Training from Youth for the W a';z Sermon F. The Academic Chair for the Wa';z Sermon G. The Chair of the Nizamiya College for the Academic Sermon H. Two Twelfth-Century Hanbali Chairs for the Academic Sermon Ibn Hubaira (d. 560/1165) Ibn al-Jauzi (d. 597/1200) Notes

171 173 173 173 176 176 177 177 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 179 179 182 186 186 186 187 188 189 191 192 192 193

Contents

Xl

PART FIVE

INSTRUCTION: THE METHODOLOGY OF LEARNING Chapter I.

Memory A. Capacity for Memorization B. Active Memory C. Retention D. Memory and Understanding E. From Memorization to Creation F. Dependance on Books Criticized G. Memorization as Central to Humanism as to Scholasticism

202 202 203 204 205 207 207 207

Chapter II.

Mudhakara A. As Instructive Conversation B. As a Test of Knowledge C. As Disputation

208 208 208 209

Chapter III.

Munazara A. As Disputation B. Questions as Keys to Knowledge C. Quaestiones Quodlibetales D. Disputation As a Means of Advancement E. Speculative Grammar

210 210 210 210 211 211

Chapter IV.

Tools of the Humanist A. Two Main Tools: Inkwell and Notebook B. Step by Step Description of their Use C. Extensive Recording D. Indexing

213 213 213 214 214

Chapter V.

The Method of Dictation

215

Chapter VI.

Self-Teaching A. Works for the Guidance of the Autodidact Thabit b. Qurra's Mariitib al-'uliim Farabi's Kitab Il.J.~ii' al-'uliim wa-tartibihii Khawarizmi's Miftiib al-'uliim Ibn an-Nadim's Fihrist Ibn Hindu's Miftiib at-tibb Ibn Sina's Taqiisim Ibn Abi Sadiq's Commentary on Galen

217 218 218 219 219 220 221 221 221

Contents

Xll

Mansur b. '!sa's Book on the Sequential 222 Order of Studying Medical Books Himyari's Shams al-'ulum 222 B. Advice of the Humanist 'Abd al-Latif al- 223 Baghdadi C. Other Works for Self-Teaching 224 D. Some Autodidacts 224 E. The Case For and Against Self-Teaching 225 Notes 227 PART SIX

THE HUMANIST COMMUNITY Chapter I.

The Patron and the Scholar-Humanist A. Officials of the Governing Power B. Non-Humanist Patrons C. Humanist Patrons D. The Court of as-Sahib Ibn 'Abbad E. Humanists and the Governing Power

232 233 234 235 235 236

Chapter II.

The Student-Humanist A. Terminology B. Posts and Income Terminology Monthly Salaries Rizq-lncome Piece- Work Compensation Bonuses and Honararia Compensation from Grateful Former Students

239 239 241 242 242 244 245 245 247

Chapter III.

Amateur Humanists A. Physicians Ibn Rabban a!- Tabari (d. c. 240/855) Ahmad b. at- Taiyib as-Sarakhsi (d. 286/900) Thabit b. Qurra (d. 288/901) Sinan b. Thabit (d. 331/942) Thabitb. Sinan (d. 365/975) Abu Bakr ar-Razi (Latin Rhazes; d. 313/925) Ibn as-Samina (d. 315/927) al-Farabi (Latin Alfarabius; d. 339/950)

248 248 248 249 249 249 249 250 250 250

Contents

X Ill

Abu Sulaiman as-Sijistani (d. after 391/1001) Abu Sahl al-Masihi (fl. 401/1010) Abu 'l-Faraj b. Hindu (d. 420/1029) Ibn Sina (Latin Avicenna; d. 428/1037) Ibn al-Haitham (Latin A/hazen; d. 430/1038) Abu 'l-Faraj 'AbdAllah b. at-Taiyib (d. 435/1043) Ibn Abi 's-Salt ('al-Adib al-Hakim'; d. 529/1134) Ibn Bajja (Latin Avenpace; d. 533/1138) Ibn al-'Ainzarbi (d. 548/1153) Abu 'l-Hakam 'Ubaid Allah b. al-Muzaffar (fl. second half of sixth century) Abu 'l-Muzffar ( Bulmuzffar) Nasr b. Mahmud b. al-Mu'arrif Ibn al-Mutran (d. 587/1191) Sulaiman b. Musa ('ash-Sharif al-Kahhal'; d. 590/1194) Abu Bakr az-Zuhri al-Qurashi (d. between 611-1214 and 620-1224) Muhammad b. al-Mujalli ('Al-'Antari'; d. c. 650/1252) Muhadhdhab ad-Din b. al-Hajib (fl. sixth/twelfth c.) The Ibn az-Zuhr Family Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Marwan Ibn Zuhr (d. 422/1031) Abu Marwan 'Abd al-Malik Abu '/-'Ala' Zuhr (d. 525/1131) Abu Marwan 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Zuhr (Latin Avenzoar; d. 557/1162) Abu Bakr az-Zuhri al-Hafid (d. 595/1199) Abu Muhammad (fl. seventhfthirtenth c.) B. Jurisconsults Institutions Posts Studies C. Notaries and Ars Notaria Terminology The Notariate in Eastern Islam The Notariate in Western Islam Formularies

251 251 251 251 252 252 252 252 252 253 253 253 253 254 254 255 255 255 255 255 256 256 256 256 256 257 257 258 259 259 259 260 260

XlV

Contents

Notaries in Government and SelfEmployed D. Calligraphers, Copyists, Booksellers, Stationers Terminology Calligraphy Instruction in Calligraphy Calligraphers and the Arabic Humanist Scripts Copyists Employed and Self-Employed Booksellers-Stationers and the Production of Books Piece-Copying = The Pecia Income Many-sidedness (tafannun) Forgery Chapter IV.

Professional Humanists A. Tutors Terminology Travelling Tutors Philologists as Tutors Some Tutors from the Seventh to the Thirteenth Centuries 'Ubaid Allah b. 'AbdAllah al-Hudhali (d. 98/716-17) 'Ubaida b. al-Hamid al-Kufi (d. 190/806) Yahya b. al-Mubarak al-Yazidi (d. 202/817) Abu 'Ubaid (d. 224/838) Muhammad b. Hubaira (third/ninth c.) Ahmad b. Sa'id ad-Dimashqi (d. 306/918) Al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898) Az-Zajjaj (d. 311/923) 'AbdAllah b. Sulaiman al-Makfuf (third/ninth c.) Milhan b. 'Ubaid Allah (third/ninth c.) Abu 'AbdAllah Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Hakim (d. 331/943) Walid b. '!sa (d. 352/963) Al-Husian b. Badr b. Hila! (d. 366/977) Muhammad b. Ja'far Ibn al-Maraghi (d. 376/986) Abu Bakr az-Zubaidi (d. 379/980) Ahmad b. Faris b. Zakariya (d. 395/1005)

262 262 262 262 263 263 265 266 267 268 269 270 272 272 272 272 272 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274

Contents

XV

Ahmad b. Muhammad b. as-Saffar (d. 416/1025) Muhammad b. Yunus al-Hijari (d. 463/1070) Muhammad b. Hibat Allah (d. 477/1084) Hibat Allah b. 'AbdAllah b. as-Sibi (d. 478/1085) 'Abd al-Wahhab b. Hibat Allah (d. 504/1111) Abu Talib al-Karkhi (d. 585/1189) Social Mobility and Economic Status Relations between Tutor and Pupil Risks of Courtly Life B. Mutasaddirs Terminology Functions Accession to Post C. Librarians D. Secretaries Terminology Two Major Divisions Typology of Secretaries with Respect to Posts Typology of Secretaries with Respect to Functions Typology of Secretaries with Respect to Writing Ability Who's Whos of Secretaries Role of the Secretary of State The Secretaryship a Humanist Post Origin and Development The Chancery: A School for Secretaries Manuals on the Discipline of the Secretary Distinctive Dress: The Employed Secretary Distinctive Dress: The Unemployed Secretary E. Boon Companions Tenure Qualifications Risks of Courtly Life Rivalry Decline of the Profession F. Some Fields of Boon Companionship G. The Profession's Fall Out of Favor Notes

274 274 274 274 274 274 274 276 276 277 277 277 277 278 279 279 280 280 280 281 282 282 282 283 283 284 284 284 284 284 285 285 286 286 287 287 288

Contents

XVI

PART SEVEN

CLASSICAL ISLAM AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST Chapter I.

Studies on the Origins and Antecedents of Humanism A. B.L. Ullmann B. Roberto Weiss C. Sem Dresden D. Paul Oskar Kristeller Grammar Poetry Rhetoric: The Letter and The Speech History Moral Philosophy Conclusion Medieval Antecedents E. Reynolds and Wilson F. Remarks on the Foregoing Studies

294 294 295 296 296 298 298 299 299 299 300 300 301 301

Chapter II.

Jacob Burckhardt's Civilization of the Renais- 303 sance in Italy The State 303 The Individual 304 Many-sidedness 304 Fame and Glory 305 Ridicule and Wit 305 Biography 306 Italy and Islam 307

Chapter III.

Institutions of the Scholastic Movement: The Masjid-Inn Colleges and the London Inns of Court A. Parallel Systems of Native Law B. Parallel Colleges for Legal Studies C. The 'Temples' of London and the Templars of the Levant D. The Templars in the Islamic World E. Inns and Colleges F. Unincorporated Guilds in London and in the Levant G. Parallels in the Two Legal Systems H. Parallels in the Legal Professions, in their Law Schools, and in their Teaching of the Literary Arts

309 309 310 312 313 313 315 315 315

Contents

XVll

Parallels in the Professionalization of Legal Education Parallel in the Terms 'Apprentice' and 'Faqih'

316

Instruction: The Amali and the Dictamina A. Origin, Meaning, Content Wilhelm W attenbach Ludwig Rockinger Charles Thurot Louis J. Paetow Franz-Josef Schmale and H.M. Schaller William D. Patt B. Remarks on the Foregoing Studies c. Origin of the Terms for 'Dictation' D. The Role of Dictation in Classical Arabic E. The 'Amali' Genre of Literary Composition F. Two Phases of Humanism in the Christian West G. Classical Latin versus Medieval Latin and the Vernaculars H. Channels of Communication I. Alvaro's Complaint and Its Significance

318 319 319 319 320 321 321 321 322 323 324 326

I.

J. Chapter IV.

Chapter V.

Instruction: The Humanistic Studies Studia Humanitatis and Studia Adabiya Humanistic Studies and the Liberal Arts A. Grammar and Lexicography B. Poetry and Oratory c. Ars Dictaminis and Ars Notaria From Ars Dictaminis to Ars Notaria From Ars Dictaminis to Humanistic Epistolography D. Eloquence the Mark of the Humanist E. History Historical Criticism Biography F. Moral Philosophy Notes

CONCLUSION Law Humanism Law and Humanism

316

327 327 329 330 332 332 332 332 333 333 336 336 337 338 338 338 339 344 348 350 350 351

Contents

XVIII

APPENDICES Appendix A: Ibn al-Athir's al-Mathal as-sii'ir fl adab alkiitib wa 'sh-shii' ir ('The Popular Mode/ for the Discipline of Writer and Poet') I. Ibn al-Athir's Eight Requisites for Writer and Poet II. Elaboration of Each of the Eight Requisites A. Grammar, Including Syntax and Morphology B. Lexicography c. Proverbs of the Arabians and their Battle-Days D. Study of the Poetry and Prose of the Ancients E. The Science of Government F. Memorization of the Koran G. Memorization of the Prophetic Traditions H. Knowledge of the Two Sciences of Metrics and Rhyming III. Methodology of the Discipline of the Secretary: The Steps to be Followed Objection Answer A. Deconstruction of the Koranic Verses B. Deconstruction of the Prophetic Traditions Objection Answer IV. On Sham Secretaries

355 355 355 356 356 357 357 357 358 359 359 359 361 361 362 363 363 363 364

Appendix B:

Baihaqi's (459-565/1106-1169) Bibliography

366

Appendix C:

A Sample List of Prime Ministers, Chancellors, Secretaries of State, and Other Professional Humanists

370

BIBLIOGRAPHY

372

INDEX

384

PREFACE Humanism and scholasticism are two movements that dominate the intellectual history of classical Islam. Humanism is the subject of the present study, which includes special reference to scholasticism, subject of a previous study, The Rise of Colleges. The approach to these two studies is the same; namely, that intellectual movements are made intelligible in the extent to which they are studied in reference to the forces which produced them; and intellectual products, in the extent to which the methods of instruction, study and composition are understood in their essential details. The present study, like its companion and predecessor, seeks to throw light on the development of education in classical Islam, but neither study is meant as a survey of Islamic education. The Rise of Colleges is essentially a study of the scholastic movement, with its representatives, its institutions, its 'licence to teach', the doctorate, and the scholastic method leading to it. The present study treats of the rise of humanism, with its representatives, its institutions, its 'art of dictation', and its emphasis on books for autodidacts. In both studies an attempt was made to answer the questions what? and who?, when? and where?, how? and, especially, why?. For it is especially the answer to the question why? that holds the key to the origins of these two intellectual movements. We have an adequate answer to the question of origins in the case of Islam; we do not in the case of the Christian West. In classical Islam, each of the two movements has its raison d'etre, distinct from the other; yet both sprang from concern for a common source: the Sacred Scripture. The history of their developments is one of interaction in which there was conflict, but never a clean break. The day of humanism dawned some time before Islam's first century came to an end. The movement arose because of deep concern for the purity of the classical Arabic of the Koran as the living language, as well as the liturgical language, oflslam. Scholasticism owed its rise to a struggle between opposing religious forces, the conflict coming to a head in the third-/ninth-century inquisition (mihna), over a century after the dawn of humanisn. The conflict turned on the question of whether the Koran was the uncreated co-eternal Word of God. Both movements aimed for orthodoxy: humanism, for 'orthodoxy' in language; scholasticism, for orthodoxy in religion.

Preface The two movements had their roots in religion; but owed their impetus to external forces. For humanism, the external force was the influence of foreign tongues on that of the Arabians. For scholasticism it was the influence of Greek philosophy on the development of the Prophet's religion. Humanism began as a scholarly philological movement back to the purity of the Arabian language, at its source in the Arabian Peninsula, untouched by foreign matter. Scholasticism was a scholarly religious movement, away from the excesses of a philosophical theology inspired by Greek thought, towards a juridical theology more in conformity with the nomocracy of Islam. The Sacred Scripture supplied the substance of Scholasticism, and served as a model for humanistic eloquence. The combined periods of rise and develpoment ofboth movements stretch roughly from the first/seventh century to about the eighth/ fourteenth. Both movements begin in Eastern Islam, and move westward from Iraq, to Syria, Egypt and the rest of North Africa, Spain and Sicily, and from there to other parts of the Christian West. The arrival of the two movements in the Christian West was at about the same time, in the second half of the eleventh century; but the sequence of their full development was the reverse of that of Islam. In the following pages it will be seen that the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the reception of both movements, scholasticism and humanism, from classical Islam by the Christian Latin West. It is generally known that this influence existed in such fields as philosophy and medicine, mainly because of the translation of books in those and other fields of the sciences, from Arabic to Latin, as well as the adoption of Arabic terms. It is however not generally known that books in the field of humanistic studies have also been translated from Arabic to Latin and other European languages, and that terms of humanism in the West are terms of classical Arabic humanism. XX

The relationship between scholasticism and humanism in Islam explains why special reference is made to scholasticism in the present book. What I say about scholasticism in Part One is the result of research done after the publication of The Rise of Colleges, and supplements it. For full details on the movement of scholasticism and its institutions the reader is kindly referred to that book. It will be noticed that the format of the present book, though not exactly the same as that of The Rise of Colleges, can easily be matched with the plan of that book. The first six Parts of the present book deal with the Islamic scene as did the first three chapters of its predecessor; and Part Seven of the present book, like Chapter Four of its predecessor, deals with Islam and the Christian West. Thus a cursory glance at the Tables of Contents of the two books will be sufficient to indicate their related sections.

Preface xx1 Much excellent work has been done by Arabists in the fields related to humanism, and many such studies are indicated in the footnotes in abbreviated form, fully identified in the Bibliography, except for works appearing in the past two years when the manuscript was already in the hands of the publisher. To my knowledge, no one has suggested a connection between the Islamic studia adabiya and the studia humanitatis of the I tali an Renaissance; nor between the Islamic scholasticism as described in the two Rises and that of the Christian West. Highly worthy of mention, however, is the reference of Charles James Lyall, in his Translations of Ancient Arabian Poetry (London, 1885, 1930), to the early Islamic philologists as 'the great Humanists' ( 1930 edition, p. xxxix ff.), a name which Reynold A. Nicholson applauds in his A Literary History of the Arabs (London, 1907; Cambridge, 1930, p. 32), though neither eminent Arabist makes an explicit connection between the humanism of Islam and that of the Christian West.

When only one date is given in the text it is usually the Christian date, otherwise it is followed by the letter 'H.' for hijra. In order to reduce the frequency of italicization, Arabic words in transliteration are italicized and given with diacritics only when presented as terms, otherwise they appear in roman letters and without diacritics when they can be found in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Names of persons are usually identified with their dates of death when first mentioned in the text, and/or in the general index, in order to locate them in time and to facilitate their being located in the biobibliographical dictionaries by the interested reader. Arabic proper names appear in the text without diacritics; these are fully supplied in the general index. All translations, including those of poetry, are by the author, except as otherwise indicated in the footnotes; the same is true of translations in The Rise of Colleges. Besides the bibliographical abbreviations, given in full detail in the Bibliography, the following have also been used: b. = ibn, born; c. = circa; d. = died; fl. = floruit; fo. = folio (a = recto; b = verso); pl. = plural; sg., sing. = singular. In the footnotes the numbers enclosed in parentheses following the page number indicates the line number(s) on the page cited. I wish to express my thanks to my assistant, Ms Susan Hoffsommer, for her help in keeping me supplied with books, for guidance in the use of the computer, and her help in compiling the Index. My thanks are also due to Mrs Vivian Bone and her editorial staff of the Edinburgh University Press for their expert assistance in the preparation of the manuscript for press. I also take this opportunity of thanking the following publishers for the use of some of my previous studies: G.-P. Maisonneuve-Larose (Paris); lnstitut fUr Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main); and Wesleyan University (Connecticut, USA). Philadelphia

October, 1989

PART ONE

SCHOLASTICISM

SCHOLASTICISM

2

Chapter I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SCHOLASTIC MOVEMENT Classical Islam produced two intellectual movements, humanism and scholasticism, in that chronological order. Because I believe they were both closely related, the present study on the humanist movement begins with special reference to the scholastic movement. Humanism was concerned with philology and literary arts; scholasticism's concern was legal science. In a previous work, The Rise of Colleges, I dealt with the colleges of law as institutions of learning of Islamic Traditionalism. Traditionalism was the only scholastic movement in Islam, contrary to what has long been identified as such, namely kalam, the movement of philosophical theology. Strictly speaking, kalam was not scholastic; it was, in fact, excluded from the schools. As a philosophical theology it was banned from the school curricula, especially so from the colleges oflaw: the masjid-inn and the madrasa. Kalam had been dubbed 'scholastic' on the anachronistic analogy of Christian theology in the Latin West, which was appropriately called scholastic because it was taught in the schools, the newly founded universities, especially Paris. Teaching theology to students in the classroom, and writing it in the summae were characteristic of the scholastic method. 1 The only truly scholastic theology in Islam, practised from the latter part of the ninth century, was that created by Shafi'i (d. 204/820). Taught also in the schools, Islamic scholastic theology had law as its subject matter. Thus the only theology taught legitimately as part of the curriculum was ajuridical theology. On the other hand, kalam, being a philosophical theology, was excluded from the schools by the adversaries of kalam, the doctors of the law, interpreters and guardians of the law of waqf, the charitable trust on which the schools were based. A.

SHAFI'r VERsus THE MuTAKALLIMUN

The dawn of scholasticism in Islam begins with the Risa1a of Shafi'i. His career heralds the events that led to the creation of the guilds of law in the struggle against Mu'tazilism. In his works Shafi'i refers to the Mu'tazilis as Ahl al-Kalam, literally, 'The Partisans ofWords.' The term denotes technically the philosophical theologians (mutakallimun), with the connotation that their words were idle, because devoid of the

Historical Background of the Scholastic Movement

3

authority of the Sacred Scripture. The translation of kalam as 'scholastic theology' is rather ironical, because the true school movement came into existence as one opposing philosophy in general, and kalam in particular. Simply put, the two antagonists, namely Shafi'i and the Mu'tazilis, respectively personify the opposition of religious law to philosophical theology. The scholastic movement was truly a movement of schools, guild schools oflegal science, brought into existence by the movement ofjuridical theology against the theology ofkalam. The movement which produced the legal guilds and their schools was prepared by the efforts of two leaders who have since remained highly venerated throughout Islamic religious history down to our day. The legacy of the first, Shafi'i, was a legal science, which he raised to a system of juridical theology, wherein the Sunna of the Prophet, that is, his words, deeds, and tacit approvals, vehicled by the hadith, was exalted to the stature of Sacred Scripture alongside the Koran. The legacy of the second leader, Ibn Hanbal, was twofold: his passive resistance to the Inquisition shortly after Shafi'i's death, the effect of which was to defeat the Inquisition, and to uphold the Koran as the eternal, uncreated word of God; and his painstaking work on the hadi th arranged according to the chains of transmitters, to fulfill the needs of historical criticism brought to bear on the sources of hadith to test their authenticity. Against the philosophical theology of the Mu'tazila, Shafi'i devised a science of jurisprudence in his book entitled ar-Risala ('The Treatise,' or 'The Letter'). This work was said to be written in answer to the request of a colleague. 2 Shafi'i's Risala has long been considered as the first comprehensive book on the science that was later to be called the science of u{ul al-jiqh. Though the translation of this term as the legal theory and methodology of the law is correct in depicting U!ul al-jiqh as it had developed by the end of the tenth century, as it stands in Shafi'i's Risala it contains no legal theory or philosophy whatsoever. But it does contain a juridical methodology of the religious law of Islam which covers the civil as well as the religious life of the Faithful. A few years before his death, Shafi'i bequeathed to the Traditionalist movement a potent antidote to kalam; potent, because Shafi'i'sjuridical theology was based squarely on the Sacred Scriptures: the Koran and the Prophetic Traditions. The twelfth-century Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi (d. 606/1209) chose the correct term to designate this science founded by Shafi'i, namely, 'ilm ash-shar', the science that treats of the revelation, the revealed law. He contrasts it with 'ilm al-'aql, 'the science of reason,' which, though associated with Aristotle, was also the appanage of the Mu'tazilis, Ahl al-Kalam, those who deal with kalam and stand for the primacy of reason. 3

4

SCHOLASTICISM

The student of the history of u{itl al-fiqh is faced with some striking phenomena, not the least interesting is the lapse of time between the appearance of Shafi'i's Risaia around the end of the second/eighth century, and that of the first comprehensive works reaching us on u/itl al-fiqh, the subject of the Risala. The first such important works belong to authors who died at the dawn of the eleventh century, two centuries after Shafi'i. That such works had been written before that time is clearly established from quotations in later works. A perusal of these works shows that they have definitely deviated from the path taken by Shafi'i in his Risala; and the references to earlier writers show that the deviation began in the time of Shafi'i. What was the nature of the deviation? Shafi'i's work does not treat a single problem ofkalam, or even oflegal philosophy. Throughout his book he keeps within the strictly circumscribed field of law, positive law or legal methodology, rooted in the scriptural texts. By the time two centuries have passed after Shafi'i, the science he founded against kalam had in the meantime acquired authors whom he had previously dubbed 'The Partisans of vVords.' Here are some of the problems of philosophical theology and legal philosophy treated in these later works: I. the problem of the determination of good and evil (at-tabszn wa 't-taqbl/;); 2. the relation between reason and revelation (al-'aql wa 'sh-shar'); 3. the qualifications of acts before the advent of revelation (bukm al-a.fal qabl wurud ash-shar'); 4. prohibition and permission (al-ba;:r wa 'l-ibaba); 5. the imposition of responsibility or obligation beyond one's capacity (takfifma layutaq); and 6. the imposition of legal obligation on the non-existent (mas' a/at al-ma'dUm). None of these problems is found in Shafi'i's Risala. Joseph Schacht pointed out that Shafi'i does not consider the question with which legal philosophy is concerned, namely, 'whether every act is to be regarded as allowed on principle, unless it is specifically forbidden, or as forbidden on principle unless it is specifically allowed'. 4 The celebrated al-Ghazzali (Latin Algazel, d. 505/llll), a Shafi'i jurisconsult and theologian, deals at length with the inroads made by other sciences into the field of u~ul al-fiqh. He points out that works or this science are often loaded with too much positive law, or philosophical theology, or grammar, depending on the special interest of the particular author. Then he says, addressing the reader: After having told you of their excesses in this kind of mixing [of the sciences], it is nevertheless not our opinion that we should keep this work free from admixture; because weaning from what is familiar is hard to take, and minds turn away from the unusual. 5

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5

He then proceeds to give a complete work on logic, saying that this science does not particularly belong to u{ul al-fiqh, and advising his students that those among them who do not wish to write down this prolegomenon may begin the book from the first qujb, [i.e. the first part, exclusive of the introductory book on logic] for that is the beginning of u~ul al-fiqh proper. 6 What brought about this change in the character of u~ul al-fiqh? Purely Traditionalist at the outset, this legal science, completely devoid not only of philosophical kalam, but also oflegal philosophy, is found later to be mixed with topics properly belonging to kalam, and composed by Mutakallimun, members of that movement held in abhorrence by Shafi'i: 'there is nothing more hateful to me than kalam and its practitioners' (ma shai'un abgharja ilaiya mina 'l-kalami wa-ahlih). 7 An answer to this question must be sought in the history of the intervening centuries. It will be found in three century beginnings, each of which brought its own important event: an inquisition, a defection and a declaration of faith, three significant landmarks in Islamic religious history.

B.

THREE LANDMARKS OF TRADITIONALIST TRIUMPH

The Inquisition Begun with the blessings ofal-Ma'mun (caliphate 813-833), the Great Inquisition (Mi~na) continued under three caliphs, al-Mu'tasim (caliphate: 218-27/833-42), al-Wathiq (227-32/842-7) and al-Mutawakkil (232-4 7j84 7-61). It lasted some fifteen years, from 218 to 33 (833 to 48 of our era). When it ended in the second year of Mutawakkil's caliphate, it did so to the detriment of the Mu'tazilis. In the middle of the ninth century A.D., the Traditionalist movement emerged triumphant over Mu'tazili Rationalism, under the banner of the Inquisition's surviving hero Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855). 8 If we consider Shafi'i's career as one of triumph over the rationalism of his day, in that he was the successful champion of Traditionalism, then Ahmad's triumph did not signal the first, but rather the second defeat of Rationalism. Between these two defeats, Mu'tazilism had harnessed all its strength with a view to crushing the stubborn resistance of the Traditionalists. During this period, Mu'tazilism had the support of the secular arm during three caliphates and the initial part of the fourth, when Mutawakkil, deserting this Rationalist movement as a lost cause, opted for its adversaries. The Mu'tazilis, though finished in the political arena, were far from finished intellectually; they still had their Rationalist weapons. The Difection Ash'ari (d. c.324j935) defected from Mu'tazilism and joined the

6

SCHOLASTICISM

Traditionalist camp. In his /b(ma, said to be his last work, he places himself under the banner of Ahmad b. Han bal. He declares himself clearly and flatly to be a follower of Ahmad b. Hanbal, professing what Ahmad professed, and avoiding those who dissented from his belief: because he is the excellent Imam and the perfect leader, through whom God declared the truth, removed error, manifested the modes of action, and overcame the innovations of the innovators, the deviation of the deviators, and the skepticism of the skeptics. 9 Ash'ari's sensational defection was another triumph for Traditionalism at the expense of the Rationalists. Still other triumphs were in store for Traditionalism during this century. Such, for instance, was the trial of Ash'ari's contemporary Ibn Shannabudh (d. 328(940), whose teaching of the aberrant variant readings of the Koran almost cost him his life. To save it, he signed a retraction abjuring the condemned readings. During the Inquisition, the Mu'tazilis had sought to force their doctrine of the 'created' character of the Koran upon the juridical theologians, but lost their cause. Had they won it, Ibn Shannabudh would not have had to retract his aberrant readings. That he was forced to do so is an illustration of the sacrosanct character of the Koran, preserved intact by the failure of the Inquisition.10 The tenth century is recorded as the century that saw the spread of Shafi'i law throughout the world of Islam. It is also the century that saw the maturing of u{ul al-fiqh on the basis of the fully developed art of disputation (muna:;:ara). 11 As for hadith, Schacht indicated the importance given to it by Shafi'i: in his doctrine it became synonymous with the Sunna. By thus raising the Prophetic Traditions to the level of the Koran, Shafi'i was establishing Traditionalism on a solid foundation in its struggle against Rationalism. With Shafi'i, Fiqh law, developed from the hadith along lines differentiating it from thefiqh in the doctrine of Abu Hanifa (d. 150(767) and his followers. In Hanafi law the element of personal opinion was predominant, in contrast with Traditionalist law where predominance was accorded to hadith, a 'law ofhadith' (i.e.,fiqh al-~adZth) contrasting with a law of personal opinion (i.e., ra'y). The development of fiqh was subsequently enhanced by the introduction of dialectic to deal with the disputed questions (al-masa'il al-khilaflya), raising legal disputation to an art. In the circles of jurisprudents, the term 'ilm, knowledge, learning, became synonymous with fiqh and legal studies generally. The reason for the importance of fiqh and its methodology, u{ul al-fiqh, was that, as the juridical theology of Islam, it lay at the basis of the magisterium, i.e. the jurisdictional authority to teach on matters of faith and practice. When in the eleventh century, the Shafi'i jurisconsult, Abu Ishaq

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7

ash-Shirazi (d. 476/1083), wrote his Who's Who among jurisprudents, 12 his declared purpose was to establish the lines of authority in the field oflaw. He studied the scholarly pedigree ofjurisconsults back to the Prophet, through the Imams chosen as eponyms of the Sunni madhabs, the 'patron saints,' so to speak, of the guilds of law. He traced the chains of authority of all the extant guilds of law back to the Prophet. He indicated the transmission of authoritative knowledge from the Prophet himself, as the first mufti-jurisconsult, across the generations, down to his day, to drive home the idea that hadith and law- not kalam andfalsaja (philosophy) -have their origins in the teaching of the Prophet. And to indicate that Shafi'i - not Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767) -is the true champion of the Prophet's sunna, Shirazi relates two anecdotes involving dreams wherein the Prophet was seen and asked whether the personal opinion (ray) of Abu Hanifa, or the teaching of Shafi'i, should be followed. On both occasions the Prophet's answer is said to have been: Follow whatever there is in the personal opinion (ray) of Abu Hanifa that is in conformity with the sunna; but Shafi'i's doctrine is not personal opinion; Shafi'i simply adhered to my sunna, and refuted those who went against it. 13 The significance of the study of pedigree was to establish the basis of the magisterium. It was not long after the death of Ash'ari, who had defected from Mu'tazilism and declared his adherence to Hanbali Traditionalism, that the tenth century was also witness to the emergence of a new Rationalism, called Ash'arism, bearing a nominal relationship to the professed Traditionalist position of its eponym, Ash'ari. It was a movement meant to be taken as moderate, in contradistinction to Mu'tazili Rationalism, which was considered extreme. There is no way to tell at present when exactly this movement emerged. But after the turn of the century we find it coming to grips, not only with the Traditionalist movement to whose camp Ash'ari had defected, but also with Mu'tazilite Rationalism. Extant chronicles have presented these struggles not as theological movements, and therefore as Mu'tazilis versus Ash'aris, or Traditionalists (Ahl al-ljaizth, 'The People of the Prophetic Traditions') versus Rationalists; but rather under the misleading designation of their affiliation in the madhabs oflaw. Thus they wrote of 'Hanafis' being against 'Shafi'is', rather than of Mu'tazilis against Ash'aris, and so on. This terminology has for a long time thrown historians off the track, and left the new Ash 'ari Rationalism parading as the identical twin of Shafi'i Traditionalism. The Declaration

of Faith

It was in the first years of the eleventh century that the long struggle of Traditionalism against all forms of Rationalism came to a head,

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SCHOLASTICISM

culminating in the promulgation of the Traditionalist creed by alQadir (caliphate 381-422/991-1031), whence its designation as the Qadiri Creed (al-i'tiqad al-qadirl'). This profession offaith was a manifesto of an ever resurgent Traditionalism that condemned deviations from Traditionalist teachings. Its transmission was secured by Traditionalists of the Han bali and Shafi'i madhabs. It was recorded in the Munta;:am of the Hanbali Ibn al-Jauzi (d. 597/1200), on the authority ofhis teacher ofhadith, the Shafi'i Abu '!-Fad! Ibn an-Nasir (d. 550/ 1155), who had learned it from the Han bali Abu '!-Husain b. alFarra' (d. 526/1133). The text of this Creed is cited verbatim among the events of the year 433 H. (A.D. I 041-42) .14 Abu '!-Husain gives 432 H. as the date of its public reading. 15 It had frequent public readings during the caliphates of al-Qadir and that of his son alQa'im (422-677/1031-75), according to the historian of Baghdad, a!-Khatib al-Baghdadi (d. 463/1071) . 16 It has been translated into German, 17 English 18 and French. 19 Henceforth any Muslim individual engaged in an activity liable to cast doubt on the genuineness of his orthodoxy could easily remove that doubt by a profession of orthodox faith. To be convinced of this, the reader need only compare the essential points of the Qadiri Creed to those of such individual creeds; they will find them in place, often expressed in practically the same terms. Such credal declarations may be found in the biographical dictionaries of the various professional guilds of law, but nowhere as numerous as in those of the Hanbali guild, among the Hanbali sufi jurisconsults. 20 The Qadiri Creed had been long in the making. It was the result of a series of Epistles (Rasa'il) promulgated by the Caliph al-Qadir, beginning with the years 408jl017 and 409/1018. A study of this Creed shows that its contents were directed against the anthropomorphists, the Karramiya, the Shi'a (especially the extremist Rafida and lsma'iliya), the Ash'ariya, and the Mu'tazila. 21 Such is the Creed's negative aspect. On the positive side, it defines u~ul ad-din ('the roots of religious faith') as the fundamental articles ofbelief, distinguishing this field from the philosophical theology of kalam; whence the banning of kalam-theology as a subject of study in the curriculum of the colleges of law, indeed in all institutions of learning based on the charitable trust, waqf. Moreover, there is a significant correlation between the Qadiri Creed and adh-Dhahabi's (d. 748/1347) list of leading scholars at the head of the fifth/eleventh century, a list preserved in the latter's biographical notice on al-Qadir who promulgated that Creed. Both the list and the Creed convey the same Traditionalist message. Looking back on the eleventh century, the Traditionalist Shafi'i biographer-historian, Shams ad-Din adh-Dhahabi, drew up a list of the leading personalities who had died in the first years of that

Historical Background of the Scholastic Movement

9

century, a list that calls for close scrutiny. It is found in the biographical notice (sub anno 422(1031) ofal-Qadir, the Caliph responsible for the promulgation of the Creed just mentioned. What needs to be noticed here is the close connection between the content of the Creed and the content of adh-Dhahabi's list, especially as regards the movements against which Traditionalism was opposed. Dhahabi's list is preserved in Suyuti's (d. 911(1505) Tarzkh al-khulafo' ('History of the Caliphs'). In it Dhahabi is quoted as follows: In this period the head of the Ash'ariya was Abu Ishaq allsfara'ini [d. 418(1027]; the head of the Mu'tazila, Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar [d. 415(1024]; the head of the Rafida, ash-Shaikh al-Mufid [d. 413(1022]; the head of the Karramiya, Muhammad b. Haidam. 22 The head of the Koranic scholars was Abu '1-Hasan alHammami [d. 417 ( 1026]; the head of the hadith scholars, 'Abd al-Ghani b. Sa'id [d. 409(1018]; the head ofthe Sufis, Abu 'Abd ar-Rahman as-Sulami [d. 412(1021]; the head of the poets, Abu 'Amr b. Darraj [d. 421 ( 1030]; the head of the calligraphers, Ibn al-Bauwab [d. 413(1022]; the head ofkings, the Sultan Mahmud b. Sabuktakin [d. 421(1030V 3 Dhahabi's list consists of leaders who died in the first part of the fifth/eleventh century. I divide it into two parts because I believe that these leaders represent for Dhahabi two distinct groups, the first of which he holds in contempt, distinct from the second, which he respects. It will be noticed that the leaders named in the first group are cited according to their affiliation to Rationalist movements. Dhahabi was a Traditionalist Shafi'i. The persons named in the second group are leaders in the Islamic sciences, and the ancillary fields, that Dhahabi held in respect, as he did the last-named person, the Sultan Mahmud b. Sabuktakin, who had vigorously implemented, in the lands under his sway, the Traditionalist policies of alQadir.24 Very significant also in this list is the absence of the legal sciences, fiqh (positive law) and u{ul al-fiqh (legal theory and methodology). Nor are these two fields cited in the supplementary list of Suyuti. 25 Legal studies had developed and spread throughout the realm of the Eastern Caliphate; Dhahabi could not have been unaware of this dramatic development. As previously mentioned, the tenth century was the century of the colleges of law, the century in which dialectic, and the ta'liqa were developed in legal studies, leading to the writing of the great summae. 26 The second half of the century was thus taken up with the rise oflegal studies and the institutions in which they were taught. How then could Dhahabi, author of the monumental History rif /slam/ 7 fail to mention the top scholars of the legal sciences, fiqh and u{ul al-fiqh?

10

SCHOLASTICISM

The answer, I believe, is that Dhahabi did in fact mention these scholars, but did not mention the legal scholarship for which they were known only too well. He preferred to bring out their Rationalist affiliations which could otherwise be overlooked, and which he wanted to dramatize. The first two scholars listed were leading scholars infiqh and u{ul al-fiqh; but Dhahabi preferred to cast light on their affiliations with the Ash 'ari and Mu 'tazili Rationalist movements respectively, as scholars ofkalam-theology. Both belonged to the Shafi'i madhab oflaw, as Dhahabi did. But Dhahabi belonged to the opposing camp of Shafi'i Traditionalism. Dhahabi knew that Abu Ishaq al-lsfara'ini, the first-named in the list, was a leading scholar in fiqh and u{ul al-fiqh, one of the greatest jurisconsults of the Shafi'i madhab in his day. There were others that Dhahabi could have listed instead of Abu lshaq al-Isfara'ini; he could have listed a Traditionalist Shafi'i, Abu Hamid al-Isfara'ini (d. 406/ 1016), and he could have cited him as top man injiqh and uiitl al-fiqh, closer than Abu Ishaq to the beginning of the century; but he did not mention him at all. Why this glaring omission of a fellow Traditionalist? It certainly could not have been because Dhahabi did not know Abu Hamid or appreciate his title to fame; for he devoted a biographical notice to him in his '!bar in which he portrayed him as, 'the jurisconsult, Master-Professor of 'Iraq [Baghdad J, Leader of the Shafi'is, the man with whom the leadership of the Shafi'i madhab of law wound up' (al-jaqzh, Shaikh al-'!raq, wa-Imam ash-Shafi'!ya, wa-man ilaihz 'ntahat riyasatu 'l-madhhab) .28 Dhahabi then continued speaking in very appreciative terms of Abu Hamid as the most successful masterjurisconsult of his day who had covered the earth with his disciples (tabbaqa 'l-arrja hi l-aJ~ab), and who had composed a ta'llqa 29 of approximately fifty bound volumes. His course on law was attended by seven hundred students. 30 Thus Dhahabi not only knew of Abu Hamid, he also had the highest regard for him as the leading jurisconsult of his day. Or it might be thought that Dhahabi was interested in citing a leading Ash'ari, and Abu Hamid was not an Ash'ari. But here again Dhahabi chose Abu lshaq as an Ash'ari, rather than al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013), who had died in 403/1013, whom he held in very high regard, pointing out that he had a successful study circle (~alqa) in the Mosque of al-Mansur in Baghdad. 31 No doubt Dhahabi was also aware of the high regard that his own professor, the famous Han bali Ibn Taimiya (d. 728/1328), had for Baqillani, saying that he was 'the most excellent ofAsh'ari kalam-theologians among whom there is no one like him among his predessors or successors' .32 Ibn Taimiya went on to cite passages from Baqillani's Kitab al-Ibana showing approval of the way he treated anthropomorphic passages in the Koran according to the doctrine of bi-la kaif. 33

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It is quite evident that Dhahabi did not overlook either Baqillani or Abu Hamid al-Isfara'ini, both of whom he treated with respect and admiration in his Kitab al-'Ibar. But he does not seem to have devoted a biographical notice to Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, ifwe are to judge by the fact that Ibn al-'Imad (d. 1089jl679) did not quote the '!bar in his notice on Abu Ishaq, whereas he did so in the two other cases, and it was his habit to rely on the '!bar. Nor did Ibn a!-'I mad quote from the '!bar in his notice on the Mu'tazili 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1024). If these two kalam-theologians were treated in the '!bar, it would seem that their notices could not have been such as to warrant their being quoted by Ibn a!- 'I mad, that they were probably very brief. It should also be noted that Dhahabi cited Abu lshaq al-Isfara'ini and Qadi 'Abd al-J abbar along with the head of the Rafida and the head of the Karramiya, both movements, like Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism, hostile to Sunni Traditionalism; moreover both Abu lshaq and 'Abd al-Jabbar were, like Dhahabi, members of the Shafi'i madhab of law. I would venture to say that Dhahabi listed the first four names in the order in which he held them in contempt, the first scholar all the more so for contaminating the Shafi'i madhab with the new brand of Ash'arism, in its dissimulation more dangerous than Mu'tazilism, the well-known old enemy, represented by the second scholar in the list. Thus indications are that Dhahabi wished to point out that the legal sciences at the head of the eleventh century were contaminated not only with the kalam-theology of Mu'tazilism, but also with that of the new brand of Ash'arism. Traditionalist jurisconsults among the Shafi'is, the Hanbalis, and even the Hanafis, were well aware of this development which they dreaded. Kalam-theology, banned from the curriculum, had infiltrated into the science of jurisprudence, U!ul al-fiqh, a Rationalist accomplishment of far-reaching effect. This religious science, founded by Shafi'i as a vindication of Traditionalism, was now riddled with Rationalist kalam. U!ul al-Jiqh came to be written (and later categorized) according to two methods: 'the method of the jurisconsults' (!arzqat al-Juqaha'), and 'the method of the kalam- theologians' (!arzqat al-mutakallimzn). The intrusion ofRa tionalist, philosophical theology into jurisprudence had already taken place by the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries, and the Traditionalist master-jurisconsult, the other Isfara'ini, Abu Hamid, was up in arms against it. On the reactions of this and other Traditionalist Shafi'is, we have the statement of Ibn Taimiya, Dhahabi's professor of hadith: The severity of Abu Hamid (al-Isfara'ini) against the kalamtheologians is well-known. He went so far as to make a distinction between Shafi'i's U!Ul al-fiqh and that of Ash'ari. This distinction was noted by the leading scholar Abu Bakr ar-Radhakani whose

12 SCHOLASTICISM ta'fzqa I have. It was the example of ar-Radhakani that Professor Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi (d. 4 76/1083) followed in his two books, al-Luma' 34 and at- Tab!ira. 35 Even when the doctrine of al-Ash 'ari agreed with that of the Shafi'is, he maintained the distinction between them, saying, 'this is the opinion of our (shafi'i) colleagues, and it was also professed by the Ash'aris', thus avoiding to count them among the followers ofShafi'i. The Shafi'is washed their hands of the Ash' aris and of their doctrines in their methodology of the law (u!ul al-jiqh), let alone the roots of religious faith (U!ul ad-din) !36

C.

THE Two DIMENSIONS OF SHAFI'I's SciENCE OF jURISPRUDENCE

Shafi'i's science of jurisprudence has two dimensions: one legal, the other theological. So far, scholars have concentrated on the legal dimension. Ignaz Goldziher was the first to draw attention to it, seeing Shafi'i's purpose as consisting in the disciplined application of qiyas, reasoning by analogy, as a legal source. Goldziher was not interested primarily in Shafi'i's contribution; for him, Shafi'i was simply a point of reference for the Zahiri school of law, an aberrant offshoot of the Shafi'i madhab denying the use of qiyas altogether. He none the less pointed out the value of studying Shafi'i's work, if and when it is found. On the other hand, Joseph Schacht, chiefly interested in Shafi'i, and taking his lead from Goldziher's suggestion, made a detailed study ofShafi'i's contribution to legal science, characterizing it as 'a magnificently consistent system and superior by far to the doctrines of the ancient schools' of law. 37 While the legal dimension ofShafi'i's contribution has been placed in full view, thanks to Ignaz Goldziher and, particularly, Joseph Schacht, the anti-Rationalist, Traditionalist theological dimension, unsuspected, has remained out of focus. This is, in part, due to the fact that Shafi'i does not directly show his hostility to the Mu'tazilis, or Ahl al-Kalam, in his Risala. But he does make two significant statements which characterize his work as fundamentally Traditionalist. It is such statements as these, drawn together with various historical facts, which point directly to the theological dimension of Shafi'i's contribution. Both significant statements appear in Shafi'i's introduction to his Risala. The first statement, at the beginning of the introduction reads as follows: Praise be to God ... Who is as He has described Himself, and Who is exalted above all the attributes given to Him by those among His creatures who have described Him (al-bamdu li'llahi ... 'f-fadhz huwa kama Wa!afa najsah, wa-jauqa ma ya!ifuhu bihz khalquh). 38

Historical Background of the Scholastic Movement

13

The allusion is unmistakable. The Traditionalists accept God's own description of Himself, His own attributes as He Himselfhas revealed them in His Book and through His Messenger. The Ahl al-Katam, i.e. the Rationalist Mu'tazilis, attribute to God additional attributes resulting from their own speculations, considered by the Traditionalists to be abominable, heretical innovations. The second statement, coming at the end of the introduction, reads as follows: no event shall befall an adherent of God's religion but that there is a guide in the Book of God showing the right way to be followed (fa-laisat tanzilu bi-abadin min ahli dini ltahi nazilatun illa wa-fi kitabi 'llahi 'd-dalilu 'ala sab'ili 'l-huaaji-ha). 39 The implication is clear: there is no need to look beyond the Sacred Scriptures. Later, an Ash'ari doctrine developed requiring na:;;ar, speculation in philosophical theology as the means of access to salvation, a doctrine Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) exposed in his 1/.rya' 'ulum ad-din (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences) .40 The Hanbali Ibn Qaiyim al-Jauziya (d. 751/1350), in a work in which he treats of Uful al-:fiqh, cites these two statements of Shafi'i, as well as other statements attributed to him, as evidence of the latter's hostility towards the Mutakallimun. 41 When the above statements of Shafi'i are considered with the following facts, already discussed in these pages, the Traditionalist, anti-Rationalist, theological dimension of Shafi'i's Risala comes into focus: 1. Shafi'i's attitude of hostility against the partisans of kalam; 2. the total lack of philosophical theology (kalam) and even of questions of legal philosophy in the Risala; 3. the dramatic transformation which uful al-:fiqh underwent, by the dawn of the eleventh century, from the thoroughly Traditionalist content of the Risala, two centuries previously, to one in which kalam and legal philosophy played a prominent part; 4. the perennial preoccupation of authors of opposing camps with the justification of what they considered as the contents of Uful al-:fiqh; 5. the reaction ofTraditionalist authors against the encroachments of kalam in uful al-:fiqh; 6. the continuing centuries-old struggle between the two camps, a struggle the landmarks of which are clearly seen across the centuries, marking triumph after triumph for the Traditionalists, inaugurated with Shafi'i's championship ofTraditionalism, and culminating in the Traditionalist Qadiri Creed. That the theological dimension ofShafi'i's contribution has remained out of focus may be seen in the erroneous classification of works on Uful al-:fiqh. One error consists in characterizing such works as belonging to one of two categories: ( 1) 'the Uful of the Shafi'is or that of the Mutakallimun', and (2) 'the Uful of the Hanafis'. 42 The error in the

14

SCHOLASTICISM

first category consists in associating the name of Shafi'i with kalam and the Mutakallimun, the science he abominated and its authors his arch-enemies; the error in the second is the implication that this category is strictly juridical, contrasting with the kalam-theology of the first category. Thus once again, this legal science of Shafi'i is thrown back out of focus. Perhaps the most egregious error of all is the listing of Shafi'i himself and his Risala at the head of a category entitled 'the method of the Mutakallimun', which is then contrasted with another category entitled 'the method of the jurisconsults'. 43 Thus, wittingly and unwittingly, Shafi'i's message has been distorted down through the centuries, ending up misunderstood by modern scholarship. For Shafi'i's Traditionalist methodology of the law, conceived as an antidote to the philosophical theology of the Mutakallimun, was by this time so twisted out of shape as to become identified with it.

D.

SHAFI'I, THE FIRST CHAMPION oF TRADITIONALIST ISLAM

Shafi'i, the first champion of Traditionalist Islam and Ahmad b. Hanbal, the second, were both imbued with a deep sense of piety in their submission to the Koran, the word of God, and the hadith, the record of the words, deeds and tacit approvals of His Prophet. For Shafi'i, as for Ibn Hanbal, Mu'tazilism was the great enemy of true Islam; true Islam being unconditional surrender (cf. bi-la kaif) to the message of God, and emulation of His Messenger, the first muslim. In his Risala, Shaji'i had asked no philosophical questions regarding legal obligation ( takfzj). The sources of obligation for him, as for the Traditionalists generally, were the Koran and the Sunna, the word of God and the exemplary life of His Messenger. Man owes submission, islam, to God. The legal system of Islam is one of divine voluntarism. Law is command and prohibition (al-awamir wa 'n-nawah'i). In such a system there is no room for the concept of natural law. In Islamic law, obligation does not inhere in the nature ofthings, 44 and thus indirectly in God who determines that nature; 45 it is based directly on God's revealed law. The job of jurisprudence consists in supplying the methodology to bring out dearly all that man needs to know of his obligation toward God ('ibaaat), and those toward his fellow man (mu'amalat). U{ul al- fiqh, as originally conceived by Shafi'i, is a juridical theology, a study of God's law, as distinguished from kalam, the study of God Himself. It is a study of God's commands and prohibitions, not of whether God is, or what He is. And as far as theology is concerned, the Traditionalist prefers 'u~ul ad-din', i.e. the fundamentals of obedience to God, of religious faith, the study of what one should believe, to kalam, 'words' speculating about God Himself. Shafi'i's Risala is basically a work on methodology. In it the author

Historical Background of the Scholastic Movement

15

is in effect saying: kalam is not the business of Islam; scholarly research, ijtihad, based on the Sacred Scriptures, is the essence of Islamic religious science, and this Risala gives you the method to follow, shows you how to go about it. lfShafi'i had been asked to give a name to the subject of his book, he would perhaps have replied that it was nothing new, that it simply had to do with u{ul ad-din, the roots of religion; and if the term 'u!ul a-fiqh' could have been suggested to him, he would perhaps have accepted it in the sense of 'the roots of God's revealed law', which, after all, are the roots of the religion of Islam. Shafi'i's purpose in writing the Risala was to counter any system of religious knowledge that pretends to go beyond the Koran and the Prophet's sunna. In contrast to kalam, which went beyond the Scriptures to speculate about their author, God Himself, Shafi'i's doctrine declared the Scriptures to be all that was needed for salvation. For Shafi'i believed that the divine revelation, as expressed in the Koran and the Prophet's Sunna, provides for every possible eventuality. 46 This is a Traditionalist theme that runs through the course of Islamic religious history. Taking his lead from Shafi'i, over five centuries later, the celebrated jurisconsult and theologian Ibn Taimiya, towards the end of a tumultuous life in controversy with the Rationalist Ash'aris of his day, devoted one of his most significant treatises to this theme, in his Ma'arij al-wu!ul ila ma'rifat anna U!ul ad-din wa-furu'ahu qad baiyanaha 'r-rasul (The Steps Leading to the Knowledge that the Messenger of God Has Already Made a Clear Exposition of the Roots and Branches of Religion). The significance of this work, recalling Shafi'i's doctrine in the very title of the treatise, was justly appreciated by the eminent Islamist Henri Laoust half a century ago. 47

16

SCHOLASTICISM

Chapter II

CREATION OF THE GUILDS OF LAW: THE MADHABS In order to insure themselves against a recurrence of Rationalist hostility, the Traditionalists set about constructing a bulwark which could prevail in perpetuity against their adversaries. To stem the tide ofRationalist thought, deflect its course and neutralize its effects, they formed themselves into guilds, created institutions of learning and clothed them with the protective mantle oflegal perpetuity. The new mosque-colleges of law they founded were based, like all religious institutions oflearning, on the charitable trust, waqf, the only form of perpetuity in Islam, over which, in their capacity as jurisconsults, they exercised exclusive and complete control. The rise of the schools of law, which I treated at length in The Rise of College/8 was, in effect, the rise of the guilds of law, in Islam. But there can be no discussion of these guilds without an attempt to settle a longstanding controversy among Islamists regarding the question of the existence of guilds in classical Islam.

A.

GuiLDS IN CLASSICAL IsLAM

Terminology

A number of terms have been used in the Arabic and European languages to designate the kind of association referred to here as a 'guild'. The Arabic terms are ~irja, {a'ija, fariqa, !inf; and the European, confraternity, brotherhood, craft, metier, corporation, hanse, jurande, guild (gild). Whatever term is used, the thing that matters is the thing itself. To this I shall therefore confine myself first to defining, and then to dealing with the conditions scholars have listed recently as necessary if one is to justify the existence of guilds in classical Islam. Definitions

The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition for 'guild': 'A confraternity, brotherhood, or association formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members, or for the prosecution of some common cause'. Webster's Third .New International Dictionary defines 'guild' as 'an association of men belonging to the same class, engaged

Creation of the Guilds of Law

17

in kindred pursuits, or having common interests or aims'. The encyclopaedias follow much the same general terms in their definitions. 49 B.

CoNTROVERSY REGARDING THE GuiLDS

Louis Massignon's Thesis The first to speak of guilds in classical Islam was Louis Massignon, in an article published in 1920. Massignon's thesis, elaborated in a number of articles, gave rise to a long and sustained debate on both sides of the problem. The controversy revolves around the question whether there existed in classical Islam, somewhere between the ninth and eleventh centuries, such organizations as are referred to in English as 'guilds'. No one denies their existence in Islam as of the end of the Middle Ages; it is only in the previous period that their existence in Islam is either doubted, or denied altogether. Claude Cahen' s Conditions and Questions Claude Cahen, in his objections to the thesis of Louis Massignon, lists the conditions required for a guild. Involved are three essential points. One has to do with the period that should be studied; the other two, with the forms of organization: its professional form, and its juridical form. As for the period, he makes it clear that no one denies the existence of guilds in Islam from the end of the Middle Ages; but what has yet to be proved is whether Islamic guilds existed in the previous period. Massignon believed they existed as of the middle of the ninth century. As for the professional form of organization, the question Cahen raised was whether it was the profession that defined and constituted the framework of the organization, or if the organization was founded on some other basis. The question concerning the juridical form asked whether the organization was of a corporate type, a spontaneous organization encompassing, to a greater or lesser extent, the lives of its members, or whether it was a product of the administrative apparatus of the State. Cahen summarized these points as follows: did there exist in that age called classical in Islam private associations with a professional base and a professional role, or conversely, was the professional organization based on private, spontaneous associations? 50

Gabriel Baer' s Conditions Another scholar, Gabriel Baer, defines the guild as a 'professional organization', placing the emphasis first on professional, then on organization. Addressing himself to economic guilds, he says: It would seem to us that one may be justified in speaking of the existence of guilds if all the people occupied in a branch of the urban economy within a definite area constitute a unit which

18

SCHOLASTICISM

fulfills at one and the same time various purposes, such as economically restrictive practices, fiscal, administrative or social functions. A further condition is the existence of a framework of officers or functionaries chosen from among the members of such a unit and headed by a headman. 51

Other Considerations Other writers on the subject have also given their opinions, which are either encompassed in those given by the two writers just mentioned, or are, in my estimation, based on inadmissible criteria for guilds, whether they be Islamic or European. An instance of an inadmissible criterion is the notion that guilds are necessarily fictitious legal persons. Islam recognizes legal personality only for natural, physical persons, not for abstract entities. The statement of David Santillana notwithstanding, classical Islam showed no signs of recognizing the waqf, or the public treasury, or the decedent's estate, or, for that matter, anything else, as a fictitious legal person. 52

C.

THE PRoFESSIONAL LEGAL GuiLDS

Legal Guilds in the Ninth Century The essential conditions that Claude Cahen and Gabriel Baer laid down in their articles are all applicable to the juridical madhabs, i.e. the legal professions and their institutional organization of legal education, from the ninth century. The first steps towards the professionalization of legal studies were taken after the Inquisition, which ended close to the midpoint of the ninth century. For the tenth century the extant sources make possible the recognition of the first institutions of learning, i.e. the mosque-colleges, where law was taught. In the eleventh, the legal professions reached the height of their development with yet a new set of institutions, the madrasacolleges, and a clear-cut structure of scholastic personnel, with various grades and functions. 53 Change in Designation of Madhab To understand the rise of the guilds of law in Islam it would be well to review briefly the origins of the madhabs, i.e. what we have come to call, for want of a better term, the 'schools of law'. The ancient madhabs of law in Islam were designated geographically, e.g. the lraqians, the Medinese, the Basrians, the Kufians. Such groups changed in designation from those indicating geographical distribution to those indicating allegiance to a person: the ancient 'geographical schools' were succeeded by the 'personal schools'. This change took place after Shafi'i, following the failure of the Inquisition in the middle of the ninth century. Henceforward such groups took on

Creation of the Guilds of Law

19

'personal' designations. The first 'personal schools' of the four surviving 'schools of law' were those of Shafi'i and Ibn Hanbal, i.e. the Shafi'i and Hanbali madhabs, in imitation of which the earlier lraqians became the madhab of Abu Hanifa, and the earlier Medinese became that of Malik (d. 179/795). Many other schools had in the meantime come into existence, then disappeared from the scene. The persons whose names were used to designate the four 'personal schools' were simply eponyms, not founders. They were the 'patron saints' of the new legal guilds. 54 Middle Road between Kalam Rationalism and Hadith Fideism

As a system of thought law occupied a position between two extremes in the Islamic religious sciences. On the one hand, the philosophical theology called kalam, in its Mu'tazili form, advocated the primacy of reason; the data of Sacred Scripture were accepted in so far as they were corroborated by reason; on the other hand, extreme Traditionalism, falling back on an exaggerated fideism, sought refuge in the Koran and Sunna of the Prophet, hardly making any place for reason. Law took the middle road of the primacy of revelation, tempered with reason as its handmaid. Thus, on the one hand, law dismissed philosophical theology as foreign to Islam; and on the other, it outgrew its partnership with Traditionalism in its fideist form, as lacking in vitality. Between these two movements which it considered extreme, the legal movement sought the middle road of moderate Rationalism, opting for a progressive Traditionalism. It shunned equally the rampant Rationalism of the philosophico-theological movement, and the effete fideism of the hadith movement, and went its own way to find its equilibrium in both reason and authority. Impact

rif Law

on Hadith

It is a mistake to view the rise of the guilds of law as due to the so-called 'codification' of the Prophetic Traditions, i.e. the hadith. It was the other way around: the legal profession, already in place, needed collections of hadith arranged specifically for its professional legal studies. The arrangement of these compilations according to the chapters of the law books is a clear departure from their arrangement according to the chains of transmitters. The science of hadith criticism, focusing on the transmitters to determine authenticity, had developed the musnad-type of compilation, hadith criticism being based primarily on the chain of authorities (isnad) preceding the text (matn) of the Prophetic Tradition. The term Jibab (pl. of Jab"ih), meaning sound traditions, was applied to these books to emphasize that the hadiths contained therein were 1;0 less authentic than those contained in the musnad works, despite their radical rearrangement for the particular needs of legal studies. The term did not mean that the

20

SCHOLASTICISM

six books contained the only authentic hadiths oflslam. If indeed they were the codification of the only authentic hadiths oflslam, it would then be necessary to explain the following facts: 1. the radical change in the arrangement of the hadiths; 2. the continuing process of composing the musnad type of collection after the six so-called fab"ib collections; 3. students of hadith continuing their extensive travels in order to collect sound hadiths from the mouths of authorized transmitters; oral transmission, accompanied by the written licence (ij(u:,a) to transmit, was the requirement for authoritative transmission. The methodologies of the two sciences, hadith and fiqh, differed radically from one another, and echos of the hostility of some die-hard hadith experts were still being heard well into the eleventh century when the lawyer Tamimi addressed these lines to his opponents: Some mindless men have censured legal learning; But there's no harm to us from their disdaining. The morning sun that's shining does not mind The fact its light is not seen by the blind. 55

Significance of the Madhab's Change in Designation In imitation of the Prophet and his Companions, the madhabs made the transition from the geographical designation to a personal one. This act signified allegiance to a venerated masterjurisconsult, as the vicar of the Prophet, assimilating the members of the guild to his Companions ({abib, pl. a~bab). In this transformation of the madhabs, the followers oflbn Hanbal and Shafi'i took the lead. It was not long before the 'personal' madhabs reportedly proliferated into the hundreds. However, by the end of the third quarter of the eleventh century their numbers in Baghdad had diminished to the four that have survived in modern times. This diminution appears to have been due to the realization that proliferation tended to be divisive, and not conducive to the development of a united front against the enemy, Rationalism. The eleventh century is the period which witnessed the highpoint of the professionalization of the schools of law as guilds of law, with their legal education professionalized from the apprenticeship (mubtadi': mutajaqqih) through the companionship-fellowship (~abib:jaq"ih), to the master-jurisconsultship (faqih: mujfz). The masterjurisconsult was accredited as such by the licence to teach law and issue legal opinions (ijaza bi t-tadris wa 'l-ifta'), i.e. the degree or dignity of the doctorate. Baer's Conditions Fulfilled At this point we can turn our attention to the basic conditions laid down by Gabriel Baer as those necessary for the existence of a guild. His statement may be analysed into six conditions,- conditions which

Creation of the Guilds of Law

21

the Islamic legal profession fulfilled as tidily as though Baer had conceived them with that profession in mind. The words enclosed in quotations are Baer's; the interpolations refer to the guilds of law. Baer states that one may be justified in speaking of the existence of guilds if: !. 'all the people occupied in a branch of' learning, i.e. legal studies; 2. 'within a definite area', i.e. an Islamic city, e.g. Baghdad; 3. 'constituting a unit', i.e. a madhab; 4. 'which fulfils at one and the same time various purposes, such , as, (a) 'restrictive practices', e.g. restricting legal studies to the members of the madhab; restricting fellowships to graduate students chosen by the master; restricting the mastership (doctorate), to graduates who have fulfilled the requirements to the satisfaction of the master-jurisconsult; (b) 'and social functions', e.g. issuing legal opinions to the people soliciting them; providing education in the religious sciences and the auxiliary literary arts; and (5) 'the existence of a framework of officers or functionaries chosen frorn among the members of such a unit', e.g. professors of law, deputy-professors, repetitors, monitors, etc.; (6) 'and headed by a headman', i.e. by ra'is al-madhab, which means the head of a madhab, in a given locality. In his article, 'Le corps des metiers et !a cite musulmane', Louis Massignon spoke of the Islamic city as originating essentially in a market place which consisted of four fixed points: the exchange, the qaisiir!ya where merchandise was stored, the thread-market, and the 'university'. By this last term, he meant the center of higher learning, called the madrasa. It is the commerce of science [he said) set up between the students and masters, and it is moreover through competition that the student becomes a master.

Legal Guilds and the Professionali:::.ation of the Law It is indeed the juridical madhab-guilds that professionalized the teaching oflaw in its law schools; it was the madhab-guilds also that developed the medieval scholastic method, the constituent elements of which were the khiliij, thejadal and the munii:;.ara. These elements were later to be found in the Christian West, specifically in the sic et non (khiliifJ, the dialectic a ljadal) and the disputatio (munii:;.ara), the constituents of the method of disputation (!ariqat an-na:;.ar), the scholastic method. Learning this method demanded long years of study and training in classical Islam, as it did later in the Christian West, years that led to the doctorate, with its exclusive authority to teach. In

22 SCHOLASTICISM Islam this licence to teach was the iJazat at-tadrzs, the verbatim Latin translation of which, in the Christian West, was the licentia docendi. Through disputation, i.e. the defence of one's theses, i.e. opinions, against all objections, the student eventually became a master. It is after this Islamic experience that practically identical experiences took place in the university of Bologna, in the London Inns of Court, as well as in Paris, Oxford and elsewhere. Comparative Diagram

of the

Tripartite Division

of Guilds

While medieval guilds were not all cast in the same mold, they did share certain characteristics. One of these was the tripartite structure of guild personnel. The shop of a trade guild, for instance, consisted of master, journeyman and apprentice. The following comparative diagram shows the tripartite structure in higher education and in the craft guilds, in Islam and in the Christian West.

HIGHER EDUCATION

Medieval College/University

College

l.

2. 3.

Islam mutafaqqih fabib mujfz /mudarris

France escoldtre bachelier magister/maitre

England scholar fellow magister/master

CRAFTS AND TRADES

Islam

l.

2. 3.

Classical Period mubtadi' /khadim fani'lfl'il •ariffamzn (etc.)

Damascus XIX century mubtadi' /khadim fani'lfl' il mu'allim

Christian West France

England

apprenti/ valet compagnon maitre

apprentice JOurneyman master

Claude Cahen's ObJections Answered There is no question in the minds of historians of medieval colleges and universities in the West that the university and college movements were guild movements. If, on the other hand, there has been some question as to whether Islamic colleges, the ma,Uid-and madrasa-colleges, belonged also to guilds, it is because we have misread the history of their genesis and development. The following arguments have been advanced in order to show that the madrasa did not qualify as a guild: 56

Creation of the Guilds of Law

23

1. Teaching in Islam, which had been by individual, private, masters, became in the eleventh century, State-endowed and public in the madrasa, an organized college with endowed chairs. 2. Islamic law prohibits waqf foundations for the benefit of a professional category [i.e. guilds J. Such foundations, when instituted, may be for the benefit of the poor of that category, and even that was rare. Indirectly through foundations for the benefit of a mosque or a madrasa, or a hospital, etc., a waqfmay be established for the benefit of all those included in it professionally, but not for the benefit of the profession itself as a whole. 3. Not only the chief physician but also the instructors [i.e. the teaching staff of a college] were appointed by the government and controlled by the governmental agent called the mu~tasib [i.e. the inspector of markets]. I shall reiterate briefly my answers to these arguments which I have treated at length elsewhere: 57 I. Teaching in Islam, both before as well as after the advent of the madrasa, was conducted by individual, private, masters. This situation did not change with the college. Neither the madrasa-college nor the masjid-college which preceded it were State-endowed and public; on the contrary, they were endowed by private founders in their capacity as solvent Muslim individuals. The law of waqf makes provision for endowments by private individuals only, not by the State. The institutions of learning were exclusive, admitting students who belonged to one of the legal guilds (madhhabs), the one the founder specified in the waqfinstrument, to the exclusion of all others. 2. Islamic waqf-law did not prohibit foundations for the benefit of a category, or a segment of the Islamic Community. It gave the founder complete freedom of choice in this regard. The only limitation it placed upon his freedom was that there must be nothing in his deed offoundation which could be construed as inimical to the tenets oflslam. Instances are not lacking of waqfs established for the benefit, not only of the four legal professions, but also for the benefit of the profession of hadith-scholars. 3. The government, for reasons of public health and welfare, did indeed control the chief of physicians, but had no control over the professors of law whose education from start to finish was in the hands of the legal profession itself, including their reception into the rank of doctor; appointments to professorial chairs were made by the founder of the madrasa, or the person designated by him in the waqfinstrument, not by the government. Thus the madhab of law in classical Islam was a professional guild oflaw. In keeping with the facts ofhistory, the terms 'school oflaw' and 'college oflaw' should be reserved for the masjid-inn and the madrasa, and not be applied to the madhab, the professional guild of law.

24

SCHOLASTICISM

Chapter III

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF LEGAL STUDIES: THE GUILD COLLEGES AND THE DOCTORATE A.

CREATION oF THE CoLLEGES oF LAw: MOSQUE-INN AND MADRASA

Having created the guilds, autonomous and independent of all outside forces, the Traditionalist jurisconsults professionalized the teaching of the law with the aim of producing the professional jurisconsult. No longer was it possible to claim knowledge of the law simply through having memorized the Sacred Scriptures. The aspirant to the position of jurisconsult had to undergo a rigorous professional training, consisting offour years of undergraduate education, followed by a lengthy period of graduate studies lasting some ten to twenty years. Not only did he have to master the source materials of the law, but also the art of disputation, in order to defend his legal opinions against all objections. Prior to the colleges oflaw, two kinds of mosques had developed in medieval Islam: the jiimi', and the masjid. The jiimi'-Mosque (henceforth referred to with a capital letter) is the great Mosque where the Friday Service is performed, and the Friday Sermon (khutba) preached. The masjid mosque (referred to with a minuscule) is the small mosque of the various quarters of the Islamic city. It was this small mosque which evolved into the first type of Law College in the legal guilds oflslam. This type of mosque had existed from the early days of Islam, and had served as the school for the religious sciences and the ancillary literary arts. The Mosque-Inn College of Law. 58

Since the mosque served as the school of the religious sciences, how could it be identified as being specifically a law college? One characteristic of the mosque as specifically a college oflaw tells the tale: small mosques with adjoining inns began to proliferate in the tenth century. Badr b. Hasanawaih (d. 405/1015), 59 governor of several provinces for a period of thirty-two years, under the Buwaihids, established

Professionalization of Legal Studies

25

throughout the realm of his administration three thousand mosques with adjoining inns. The chronicler makes the following statement: he built anew, in the provinces of his administration, three thousand mosques [ma.~.fid] and inns [khan], [the !a tter J for those away from home. 60 The masjid's adjacent inn served as a place of lodging for law students from out-of-town. During the four years of the undergraduate law course, the student pursued his legal studies with the institution's professor of law. It was from such a masjid-college that Shirazi, the first professor of the eleventh-century Nizamiya Madrasa, accepted the offer of the founder, Prime Minister Nizam al-Mulk, to teach at the new institution. 61

The Madrasa College of Law. 62 The creation of the new type of law college, the madrasa, did not change the character of the institution, neither in the curriculum, nor in the main objective of producing professional jurisconsults. It did change the legal status of the institution to the advantage of its founder. Both the masjid-college and the madrasa-college were based on the law of the charitable trust. The difference between the two institutions involved the legal relationship of the founder to his foundation. The college that was basically a mosque, once instituted as a charitable trust, became free of its founder's control. Its waqfwas said to be a waqf ta~iir, i.e. a waqf of emancipation. The legal relationship between it and its founder was likened to that existing between an emancipated slave and the emancipating master who relinquished his rights over him. In contrast, the madrasa, instituted as waqf, came under the control of its founder, and that of his descendents, in perpetuity, if he so desired and stated his desire in the waqf instrument. Thus the mission of the mad rasa-college remained as it was in the mosque-college; the change affected its legal relationship to the founder. The Stipulations of the Nizamiya Waqf Deed Unfortunately for the history of Islamic institutions of learning, the waqf deeds of these colleges are for the most part lost. The earliest college waqf deed in existence is only a fragment, the part dealing with the personnel. In light of the foregoing pages on the struggle between the juridical and the philosophical theologians, the surviving stipulations of the waqf deed of the Nizamiya College of Shafi'i Law in Baghdad take on new significance. The eleventh-century document stipulated that certain academic posts were to be held by scholars who were Shafi'i not only in positive law (fiqh), but also in juridical theology (u!ul al-fiqh). This stipulation applied to the following college personnel: the professor of law, the preacher-writer of the academic sermon, and the librarian. 63

26

SCHOLASTICISM

Now, it is to be expected that a college ofShafi'i law would require that its sole professor of law belong to the guild of Shafi'i law. What would at first blush appear surprising, however, is the stipulation that he should be Shafi'i in the legal theory and methodology of juridical theology, U!Ul al-fiqh. This field of knowledge was not identified with any particular guild of law; it was practised by members of all the guilds without exception, there being five such guilds at the time of the foundation of the new college. To add u!ul al-fiqh to the stipulation as a requirement was to indicate that this field ofknowledge could be other than what its founder, Shafi'i himself, had intended it to be. It could be of Rationalist inspiration, particularly an Ash 'ari U!ul al-fiqh to which the first incumbent of the chair of law, Professor Shirazi, for whom Nizam al-Mulk had founded his college, was clearly and definitely opposed. 54 Thus the colleges, whether mosque or madrasa, were Traditionalist institutions which systematically excluded the Rationalists as such, and the Traditionalists had succeeded in legalizing the exclusion.

B.

CREATION OF THE DocTORATE oF LAw: THE MAGISTERIUM

The Licence to Teach Now that they succeeded in creating schools over which they had complete control, and established a professional curriculum from which they excluded philosophical theology (kalam), the Traditionalist jurisconsults had one more task to accomplish. They set out to secure their gains by placing the jurisconsult in the seat of authority. They provided him with a licence that gave him sole jurisdictional authority in matters pertaining to the religious law, which covered both the civil and religious life of the faithful. This they did by creating the doctoral degree, and restricting it to the field of legal studies. None but the jurisconsults as such could aspire to the dignity of the doctorate. Let us here retrace the history of this doctorate and its concomitant, academic freedom. Historians of the Latin Christian West have traced the doctorate of the modern university back to the medieval 'licence to teach,' called in Latin 'licentia docendi'. This licence conferred upon its holder a teaching authority the origins of which, to my mind, are deeply rooted in monotheistic religion. Thus it was not a product of the culture of ancient Greece, or of ancient Rome. But neither was it a product of Christian Byzantium, which continued the classical education it had inherited from Greece. Nor was it a product of the Christian Latin West, where, once it had found its way there, it was bound to come into conflict with the already existing teaching authority, the magisterium of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

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What then were the origins of this doctorate? What was its impact on medieval and modern intellectual culture? There could be no real doctorate without academic freedom; for the doctorate, at its origins, consisted not only of competence, but also of the authority, the right, to teach. The licentia docendi meant a permission, an authorization, a 'licence to teach.' Why should there have been any need for permission to teach? Permission from whom? To teach what? Academic freedom is one of the most prized possessions of academia. The German language coined two technical terms for it: Lehifreiheit and Lernfreiheit; that is, the professor's 'freedom to teach,' and the student's 'freedom to learn.' What were the origins of this academic freedom, which we still have and which we have long taken for granted? As this freedom is a university freedom, the prerogative of 'academics,' and as it is linked to the doctorate in the case of the professor; and in that of the student, to his status as a bona fide member of the university community, our inquiry must go back to the birth of the university, and to the forces that brought it into existence.

Master, Doctor, Professor Long before the licentia docendi appeared in the medieval Christian university, it had already developed in Islam, with the same designation, expressed in Arabic, word for word: ijazat at-tadrls, al-ijaza bi 't-tadris, 'the licence to teach.' Thus the doctorate may be said to have travelled through three periods of history, from the Middle Ages down to modern times, under three main designations: (l) the classical Islamic-Arabic ijazat at-tadrls, (2) the medieval Christian-Latin licentia docendi; and (3) the modern doctorate. In its first and third periods, this licence shared the same essential attributes; whereas in the middle period, the Christian-Latin Middle Ages, it was subjected to modification required by the circumstances of its new environment. The modern doctorate involves not only the ascertainment of the doctoral candidate's competence in a given field of knowledge. Competence was always a requirement for teaching in any intellectual culture worthy of the name. It involves also the doctor's right to do research and to publish his findings in the classroom, as well as in public through his publications. It is this right that is referred to as 'academic freedom' based on the authority to teach, called in medieval Latin, the magisterium. Some centuries before the licentia docendi appeared upon the scene as a teaching authority, a magisterium, Christianity had developed the councils in which the magisterium devolved upon the college of bishops in union with the pope. This magisterium is defined in the New Catholic Encyclopedia as the perennial, authentic, and infallible teaching office committed to the Apostles by Christ and now possessed and exercised by

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SCHOLASTICISM

their legitimate successors, the college of bishops in union with the pope. 65 In view of such a definition, how could a professor of theology, in a medieval Christian university, claim an independent teaching authority? Herein lay the reason for the modification which the licence had to undergo in the Christian West. Note that early in the universities of the Middle Ages, all of which were Christian, three terms were applied to the 'teacher'. These terms are said to have been synonymous; it would seem, however, that each term laid stress on a particular attribute or function. These terms were 'master,' 'doctor,' and 'professor.' 'Master' (in Latin: magister) put the accent on mastery, competence; 'doctor,' meaning 'teacher' (from the Latin verb docere, to teach), emphasized the teaching and guiding function; and the term 'professor' emphasized the professing of one's own personal opmwns. Authority to teach in our day is conferred upon the doctoral candidate who has proven his mastery, his competence in a field of scholarship to which he has contributed an original thesis. His academic freedom to profess his thesis, his 'opinion', is recognized, and the thesis is accepted and applauded for its originality, because it is based on his own intellectual labor. Henceforth the new doctor, the new professsor of original personal opinions, based on his personal research, is authorized to profess these opinions freely, unhindered by any outside force, be it religious or secular.

The Doctorate in Law Alone Such, in summary, is the doctorate's authority, the dignity of the doctoral degree, in its third modern period of development. Such also was the doctorate's dignity in its first Islamic period of development. For nowhere in the world of the Middle Ages did this phenomenon first come into being except in classical Islam, in the sole field of the religious law. The doctorate, as just described, was that of the Muslim doctor of the law, the jurisconsult, calledfaqzh, mujtahid, and mujfi. He was a member of one of the Sunni madhabs. These madhabs, as mentioned above, were the professional guilds of the religious law. As a masterjurisconsult, in one of these professional guilds of law, the doctor had the authority to profess opinions regarding the law, based on his own personal research. There was no higher authority, religious or secular, which could force him to submit his opinions for approval before professing them. Islamic law is fundamentally individualistic. The Doctorate an Intrusive Element in Christian Learning The licence to teach, an institution of the religious law of Islam, was an intrusive element in medieval Christendom. Christianity had no need for it. Its own teaching authority was already in place, solidly

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established for well over a millenium. The new licentia docendi was a source of conflict to the established order. It had come to the Christian West along with all the knowledge that medieval Christendom was avidly importing from Islam. It had come as part of the tools and methods that were part and parcel of that knowledge. I have said that this licence of religious origin was not the product of ancient Greece or ancient Rome. Could then this licence, deeply rooted in religious law, have developed in Christianity or in judaism? The religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam share the same concept of a personal, omniscient and omnipotent God. However, in addition to being of religious origin, the licence to teach was the product of an individualistic system; as such, it could not have developed in an ecclesiastical hierarchy, nor in any other system of authority higher than that of the individual doctors. It was specifically the product of a guild, a group of individuals who were subjected to the same specialized training, whose authority, once duly granted, was independent of all outside forces, and above which there was no other earthly authority. Consequently, it could not have developed in Christianity with its ecclesiastical hierarchy; nor inj udaism where the high authority of the Gaon was recognized, the head of the Academy in Babylon (Iraq), 'the major seat of learning and authority in the Jewish world'. 66 It is true that the functions of the Jewish rabbi and the Muslim mufti were parallel; but they were parallel only up to a certain point. Judaism did not encourage the layman to seek out more than one rabbi, when in need of an answer to a question on the religious law. The layman went to the highest authority in his locality and ventured no further. In Islam, however, the layman was free to consult a number of muftis, and he was free to make his own choice from among the opinions he received. This distinction between the two systems is essential, as will be seen presently. Nor could the doctorate have originated in Shi'ite Islam, which may be described as a 'church of authority', in contrast to Sunni Islam, a 'church of consensus.' In Shi'ism, the teaching authority was vested in the imams; they represented the highest authority. Any Shi'ite religious doctrine, to be regarded as authentic, had to be referred back to the authority of one of the imams. 67 The teaching authority inherent in the doctoral degree, as known in modern times, derives, in its origins, from a religious system fundamentally consensual; that is to say that the final criterion of a doctrine's orthodoxy was the unanimous consensus of the doctors of the law, considered as equals. This is how the system worked in Sunni Islam; it differed from that of Shi 'i te Islam, as well as from those of Judaism and Christianity.

SCHOLASTICISM

30

C.

AcADEMIC

FREEDOM

Mufti and Mustajti The road leading to consensus began with the layman soliciting a legal opinion from the jurisconsult on a point of law. Each of the elements of this process was designated by a technical term. The layman, when soliciting an opinion, did so in his capacity as mustaftz (i.e., one who seeks an opinion from a mufti on a point oflaw). The opinion he solicited was called a Jatwa (i.e., a legal opinion). The jurisconsult, in this capacity, was known as the mufti (i.e., the professor of legal opinions). The process itself, when viewed from the position of the soliciting layman, was called istifta' (i.e., the solicitation oflegal opinions); and when viewed from that of the jurisconsult, ifta' (i.e., the issuing of legal opinions). The legal opinion, when received, did not obligate the layman to accept. It was only a legal opinion, handed down by a jurisconsult; it was not a legal decision, handed down by a judge. The layman was free to solicit yet a number of other opinions, from as many jurisconsults, on the same point of religious law. These opinions were generally presented in written form, in answer to written requests. With all the opinions now laid out before him for consideration, the layman was free to choose the one to follow. This practice was much the same as the modern day practice of soliciting second and third opinions from medical practitioners; the only limitation being, in both cases, the solicitor's will and the size of his purse. When the layman made his eventual choice from among the opinions received, his choice was referred to as taqlid. This technical term has usually been misunderstood in the case of the layman. In reality, the term has two quite opposed meanings. In the case of the mustajtl; the layman, the term meant 'investing with authority', 'clothing with authority'; the choice he made clothed with authority the opinion chosen. It was the layman's right to practice taqlid. Commendatory when applied to him, taqlid was, on the other hand, a term of disapprobation when applied to the mufti, the jurisconsult. A mufti had no right to 'clothe with authority' the opinion of another mufti. Therefore, in his case, taqlid was considered 'servile imitation.' A servile jurisconsult was one who had abdicated his authority, violating his sacred mission and the process leading to consensus. He eventually lost his reputation, and was no longer considered an authoritative jurisconsult. Authority was attributed to the jurisconsult who, conscious of his sacred mission, based his opinion on his own personal research, an activity called technically ijtihad (literally: the unsparing exertion of one's effort, the doing of one's utmost). As a

Professionalization of Legal Studies

3!

practitioner of that activity he was called mujtahid, an authoritative jurisconsult. If two laymen were to choose, from among the opinions they received on the same point of doctrine or practice, diametrically opposed opinions, each would be free to follow the opinion chosen, though neither of the opposing opinions had the sanction of consensus. Pending that eventual sanction for one or the other opinion, each would have the sanction of the layman's taqlid, investing it with authority, in the meantime. Orthodoxy thus functioned on two levels: ( 1) the initial level of the layman's taqlid, and (2) the subsequent level of the consensus of the jurisconsults, the scholars of the law, the doctors of juridical theology. The jurisconsult, in arriving at his opinion, did so on the basis of his own individual research (lj"tihad), based on his own interpretation of the sources. He performed his task alone, not as part of a committee of jurisconsults, though the result of his research could well be in agreement with that of another, or others, on the same question. He was not bound by the opinions of any jurisconsults, past or present, not even by those of his own guild of law. More than this, he could not follow even one of his own past opinions on the same, or a similar, problem; he had to arrive at a fresh opinion resulting from a fresh effort of research. He was free to form his own personal opinion independently of all outside forces. No power or authority could legitimately coerce him to arrive at a predetermined one. Not only was he free and independent to practice his research and proclaim his findings, he was encouraged to do so by a promise of reward in the Hereafter. A Prophetic Tradition (badlth) rewarded the jurisconsult for his research, even if eventually he was proven to have been mistaken; he was doubly rewarded if he proved to be right. Another such Tradition held every jurisconsult to be right, in the sense that he had discharged his obligation conscientiously to the best of his ability. These two freedoms, the layman's and that of the doctor of the law, could not exist in a religious system that had an ecclesiastical hierarchy, with councils and synods to determine orthodoxy. Islam had neither councils nor synods; it therefore had to determine its orthodoxy through a process consistent with its own circumstances. As the individual answers of the doctors of the law to the questions of the laymen gave rise to conflicting opinions; as the doctors, in relation to one another, stood on an equal footing; and as there was no higher religious authority oflast resort to appeal to for solutions to controversies, the method adopted was that of consensus, i.e. the consensus of the doctors of the law. But Islam had no formal organization for the determination of consensus; indeed there could never be certainty that any organized effort to collect the opinions of the doctors could be complete. Yet the consensus had to be unanimous; even one authoritative dissent could vitiate it. In view of such considerations,

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the consensus had to be determined retroactively, negatively, and provisionally. It was determined by whether authoritative doctors had raised their voices in the past against a certain doctrine. In the absence of a dissenting opinion, the doctrine was considered as having been accepted as orthodox. And as the consensus of a given period could possibly be modified by the consensus of another on the basis of new evidence, the consensus was provisional. Dissent was therefore the single most important element in the process of determining orthodoxy. In Islam, dissent was not merely allowed, or simply encouraged, it was virtually prescribed as an obligation incumbent upon each and every Muslim. It was a fortiori incumbent on each and every doctor of the law, when, in conscience, he considered an opinion to be at variance with the truth as he saw it. In dissenting, the jurisconsult was following the precept of 'ordering the good and prohibiting evil'. This precept not only enabled him to proclaim his dissent, even when his opinion was not solicited by a layman, it enjoined him to do so, discouraging his silence. If through timidity, apathy or negligence, he remained silent, his silence was taken as tacit approval (taqrzr); it had positive value. Between consent and dissent, the system made no room for abstentions.

The Role of Dissent in Islamic Law The importance of dissent in Islam explains the existence of, and the role played by, one of the most prolific genres of Islamic legal literature, called khilaj, 'dissent'. The abundance of this literature was noticed by the eminent Islamist Ignaz Goldziher, at the end of the nineteenth century. Sensing its importance, he felt the need to draw attention to it, calling for the detailed study of its bibliography. 68 Over half a century later, Franz Rosenthal rightly reiterated the need, reminding lslamists that Goldziher's call had not yet been answered. 59 At the outset, one may well be puzzled by this prolific legal literature that 'codified,' so to speak, dissenting opinions on matters of doctrine and practice. The uncertainty disappears, however, when one grasps the function of dissent in the determination of orthodoxy. Khilaf-works were in fact all that Islam needed to determine orthodoxy on the two levels previously mentioned. The initial level of orthodoxy consisted of the contrary opinions regarding a given doctrine or practice; and the second level of consensus was determined by the absence of dissenting opinions. This explains why Islam does not have a legal literature 'codifying' orthodox doctrines. The literature of dissent performs that function negatively. Khilaf-books, though negative in aspect, were positive in their effect. They served to define orthodoxy on the two levels previously mentioned: ( 1) if the question was cited with conflicting opinions, this meant that no consensus was reached, and that the opinions were therefore equally orthodox on the

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initial level; and (2) if the question was cited with only one opinion, the absence of conflict meant that the opinion was orthodox on the level of consensus. In the first case, the jurisconsult-author of the khilaf-work could give preponderance to one opinion over another or others; but the layman was left with his freedom of choice. In the second case, the absence of authoritative conflict indicated consensus. D.

THE juRISCONSULT's TwoFOLD MAGISTERIUM

Issuing legal opinions and defending them was the jurisconsult's primordial function, his right. For then, as with modern graduates with doctor's degrees, the new doctor did not always succeed in finding a teaching post. But unlike the modern-day doctor, the muftijurisconsult still had the authority to profess his opinions, and he was paid for them by the soliciting faithful. This authority inhered in his position as mufti. His doctorate was in fact a twofold authorization. The full title of his licence expressed his twofold magisterium: 'the licence to teach law and to profess legal opinions' (al-ijaza bi 't-tadr"is wa '1-ifta'). This means that he had the authority to teach law in the classroom and to issue legal opinions to the laymen among the faithful (i.e. those who were not jurisconsults) who chose to solicit them from him. For this professorship oflaw and oflegal opinions he was granted a lifetime tenure, responsible to God alone. His competence to teach, to do research, and proclaim his findings in legal opinions and in publications, were matters strictly within the control of the individual doctors of the law, acting in the context of the professional guilds of law, free and independent of all outside forces. He received his twofold authorization from his own professor of law, a doctor of juridical theology in one of the professional legal guilds. The governing power had no say in the matter whatsoever.

The Magisterium in Christianity The give-and-take of disputation, of argumentation and debate, was vital to the Islamic process of determining orthodoxy. Islamic orthodoxy owed its determination to the free play of opinions of the doctors ofjuridical theology. In classical Islam, the method of disputation was thus not only a school exercise. On the other hand, that is exactly what it had to be, at .first, in the medieval universities of Christendom. Here, where Christianity had its councils and synods to determine orthodoxy, the method of disputation, one would think, could hardly be anything but a school exercise. It had come from Islam as part of the influx of Arabic learning, the translation and assimilation of which lay at the basis of the rise of universities in the Christian West. But it was not long before the method of disputation was to revert to its primordial function, and thus to perform in Christianity the function for which it was created in Islam, and to become a disruptive

34 SCHOLASTICISM force in Christendom. That is to say that Christendom was to witness the rise of another teaching authority in its midst, another magisterium, which was exercised, not by the college of bishops in union with the pope, but rather, as in Islam, by the doctors of theology. From its beginnings in Christian antiquity down to the rise of universities, the magisterium consisted in the faithful transmission of the teachings received, and apostolic succession was the form and the guarantee of the Tradition, with the bishops often performing the role of theologians. With the rise of universities in the Middle Ages, and the advent of the scholastic method of disputation, the doctorate, or magisterium, which was the end result of the scholastic method, came into existence. It paralleled the pastoral magisterium, and threatened to outclass the authority of the bishops. St Thomas Aquinas distinguished between these two magisteria: ( 1) a pastoral magisterium, which he called the magisterium cathedrae pastoralis or pontijicalis; and (2) a professorial magisterium, which he called the magisterium cathedrae magistralis. The first represented jurisdictional authority; the second, a personal competence publicly recognized. According to StThomas, the pastoral magisterium has jurisdictional authority behind it; it is concerned with preaching and public order in the church. This magisterium, which belongs exclusively to the bishops in union with the pope, is the only authoritative magisterium. 70 On the other hand, the professorial magisterium is concerned with academic questions; the professors teach through knowledge and argument, rather than by their official status. Their conclusions are as valid as the evidence they are able to adduce, no more. Though they may be valid, they do not become authoritative unless and until they are adopted by the pastoral magisterium. By itself, the professorial magisterium is without religious authority. 71 The forms of the magisterium and its relation to the doctors have been studied by the French theologian Yves Congar, who also studied the semantic history of the term magisterium. 72 Over a century before the studies of Father Congar, back at the midpoint of the nineteenth century, Charles Thurot had drawn attention to this phenomenon, in his work on education at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages. Here is a translation of his text on this subject: the Faculty of Theology assumed the power of passing final judgment on whether a religious doctrine was true or false, orthodox or heretical. The bishop and in the last resort the Pope could only exercise judicial and coercive power; they simply applied the punishment. Indeed it was necessary to give a theological reason for the condemnation; and this was impossible without having recourse to the science of theology, that is to say, to its depositories, the doctors of theology. Accordingly, the pope

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himself could not pass final judgment in matters of dogma. Such was the system applied by Peter of Ailly, in 1387, before Pope Clement VII. As this situation was a curious development in the Christian world, Charles Thurot goes on to explain: These pretensions were not illusory. Composed of regulars of all the orders and of seculars from all the nations, the Faculty of Theology of the University ofParis was, so to speak, the only one. No other university was composed of more members and of more distinguised doctors. All the nations were admitted to the Sorbonne; all the religious orders were represented in Paris by the elite of their Brethren. It looked as though there could not be found anywhere else a more impartial and more enlightened tribuna!. 73 Thus we witness in Christianity an interesting phenomenon: a metamorphosis of a method that was, in the Christian West, strictly scholastic, a school exercise, which then reverts to its original role of determining orthodoxy. This role, in Christianity, had been strictly ecclesiastical and exclusively in the hands of the bishops in union with the pope. The scholastic method's role of determining orthodoxy was in essence Islamic, necessary in a religion with no ecclesiastical hierarchy; it did not belong in a religion endowed with such a hierarchy and charged alone with the 'teaching authority', the magisterium.

Competence and Jurisdiction The substance of the theologian's magisterium consisted in his scholarly competence; on the other hand, the substance of the pastoral magisterium consisted in the jurisdictional authority of the bishops in union with the pope. In the period before the rise of universities, magisterium simply meant the post, function or activity of someone in the position of magister, that is, a scientific or technical competence in a definite field. But with the rise of universities, in the latter part of the twelfth and early part of the thirteenth centuries, the Islamic seeds were planted for what was soon to become a second magisterium in Christianity, that of the doctors of theology. Such was the situation described by Charles Thurot and Yves Congar. This phenomenon was something new; it had never existed before. This new role of the theologians reached its climax at the Council of Basel, a climax which Congar calls 'malsain' (pernicious). At this Council, the thirty-fourth session held on 25 June 1439, there were 300 doctors of theology, as compared with only 13 priests and 7 bishops! This, says Father Congar, explains the importance that Luther placed later on his title of doctor (i.e. his function and mission as doctor). Long before this council, even the level-headed theologian Godefroid de Fontaines (d. 1306) upheld the right of the doctors of

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theology not to follow the episcopal decision, but rather to 'determine' (in technical scholastic terminology, a 'determination' meant a resolution, a solution; taqr"ir, in Arabic-Islamic scholastic terminology) in those matters belonging to the jurisdiction of the pope: because, Godefroid said, 'ea quae condita sunt a papa possunt esse dubia' (those matters that are established by the Pope can be uncertain). 74 In Christianity, conflict over the magisterium came about after the rise of universities with their doctors of theology. In Islam, that conflict took place bifore the creation of the guild colleges of law. In Islam, the magisterium flowed from the Prophet down to his disciples (a.f~ab, .)a~aba), and to their followers in succession, in their capacities as teachers of the !a w. The conflict in Islam occurred after the introduction of Greek learning from Byzantium. The failure of the Inquisition had the effect of re-establishing the jurisconsults squarely in the seat of authority. Solidly settled in that position, they created, as previously indicated, their professional guilds of law, established their programme of professional legal studies in exclusive colleges of law and systematically excluded philosophical theology from the curriculum. The colleges were charitable trust foundations that encompassed the endowed buildings, and the farmlands and other properties whose revenues paid the beneficiaries, namely the teachers, the students and the administrators. The jurisconsults, authors of the law of the charitable trust, were its interpreters and its guardians to boot. Nothing was to be the object of a charitable trust which could be construed as inimical to the tenets of Islam; and the doctors of the law were on hand to decide what was inimical to those tenets. The institutions which had served as learning centres for the philosophical theologians, among others, called 'House ofWisdom' (Dar al-lfikma), 'House of Learning' (Dar al-'Ilm), and so on, gradually disappeared, in favour of Traditionalist institutions called 'House of the Koran' (Dar al-Q,ur'an), and 'House of the Prophetic Traditions' (Dar al/fadith). Thus Islam, and later Christianity, experienced conflict over the question of the legitimate teaching authority, the magisterium. In the one case, the authority to teach was transmitted from the Prophet; in the other, from Christ. In Islam, there being no ecclesiastical hierarchy, the Prophet's successors were the scholars of the religious law; in Christianity, the successors of Christ were the college ofbishops and the pope, i.e. the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The conflict in both cases occurred when a foreign element was introduced. In Islam, this element was Greek philosophy, a pagan element in the midst of a monotheistic religion; in Christianity, it was the doctorate, having its raison d'etre in Islam, but not in Christianity where it became a new teaching authority superimposed on the legitimate authority already in place. Islam, lacking councils and synods, was in need of a

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'teaching authority', and the doctors of juridical theology supplied it; Christianity, already endowed with a teaching authority, had no use for a rival authority.

E.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DocTORATE

Transplanted from Islamic soil, the doctorate had to become acclimatized to its new environment, in which an already long-established teaching authority resided in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. As in Islam, teaching in Christendom was also a religious function; therefore the granting of the licence to teach became an ecclesiastical act. The licence had to be obtained from the chancellor of the cathedral church. Historians of the medieval university tell of the protracted conflict between the chancellor and the university professors. Even when the professors finally escaped from the control of the chancellor, they did so only to come under that of the pope. The professors did not achieve that complete autonomy enjoyed by their peers in the Islamic guilds oflaw; and the failure was, of course, predictable. They failed not only in Paris, but also in the University of Bologna, where Honorius III in 1219 enjoined that the doctorate could not be granted without the consent of the Archdeacon of Bologna. Authority belonged to the ecclesiastical hierarchy alone; the university professors of theology taught by virtue of the hierarchy's mandate. Thus in the Christian West there was a distinction between the two concepts of pastoral jurisdictional authority and professorial competence. In Islam, however, authority and competence were both invested in the professors of the religious law, an investiture which set them apart from all other professors in Islam. Classical Islam produced an intellectual culture that influenced the Christian West in university scholarship. It furnished the factor which gave rise to the university, namely the scholastic method, with its concomitants the doctorate and academic freedom. This freedom can only have existed in an intellectual culture in which all the 'teachers' involved were considered equal in their authority or right to teach. It could not have existed where the teaching authority belonged exclusively to an ecclesiastical hierarchy. Academic freedom in classical Islam, in the jurisconsult and in the layman, is coterminous with the modern concept for that freedom in the university professor and the student. 75 In modern university scholarship, as in the religious scholarship of classical Islam, orthodoxy is consensual; that is to say that the 'orthodoxy,' so to speak, of the results of scholarly research is judged by the eventual consensus of the community of scholars themselves. Dissent plays a vital role in these two intellectual cultures. But in a religion where the legitimate teaching authority is vested in an ecclesiastical hierarchy, dissent is bound to be considered, in the words of Yves

SCHOLASTICISM 38 Congar, as leading to heresy, and eventually to separation from the communion of the faithful. Classical Islam, having no ecclesiastical hierarchy, had to develop a mechanism for the determination of orthodoxy. That mechanism was scholarship in the religious law, based on the method of disputation, with the arbiter being the unanimous consensus of the doctoral scholars of the law. Its learning and methods influenced the medieval university, and through that institution, university scholarship in modern times. The roots of the doctorate are firmly implanted in the legal scholarship of classical Islam, in its scholarly research, and in the freedom of its jurisconsults and laymen. That is to say that classical Islam's legacy in the realm of intellectual culture is to be found, among other things, in the doctorate and the academic freedom of professor and student.

Rationalist Infiltration of Traditionalist Institutions

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Chapter IV

RATIONALIST INFILTRATION OF TRADITIONALIST INSTITUTIONS With Islam's institutions securely in the hands of the Traditionalists, there was only one way open to their Rationalist adversaries: infiltration. What has been described in the foregoing pages covered the period stretching from the century ofShafi'i's Risala to the century of al-Qadir's Creed (from the eighth to the eleventh). By the end ofthat period the Hanafi and Shafi'i guilds oflaw had been infiltrated by the two Rationalist movements, Mu'tazilism and its successor, Ash'arism. A Sunni Muslim was identified as such by his membership in one of the guilds of law; a Mu'tazili or an Ash'ari was a Sunni Muslim by virtue of his membership in such a guild. In this way, Traditionalism exercised jurisdictional authority, on the reins of which it kept a firm grip; and Rationalism, though shorn of its political support, was still able to keep its adversary engaged in an intellectual dialogue, through which it had its measure of influence on the course oflslamic religious thought. A.

INAUGURATION oF Two RIVAL MADRASA CoLLEGES

The Nizamiya College of Baghdad As previously stated, the waqf of a madrasa-college allowed the founder to retain control over his foundation, if he so desired. He could also pass that control on to his descendents, in perpetuity. Nizam's madrasa-colleges were based on this type of waqf. He founded his madrasa-colleges for his own control, and for that of his descendents after him, not, as some still believe, for the control of the Saljuq Sultan under whom he served as Prime Minister. It was not in an official capacity that a Muslim founded a waqf institution, but rather as a private individual. Moreover, Nizam's madrasas were restricted to Shafi'i students; as his Sultan was a Hanafi, his children or any other Hanafi applicants could gain admission only by choosing to become Shafi'is. Every legal guild had its own colleges of law. Nizam, like Badr b. Hasanawaih before him, was an astute politician. In his policies, he was highly sensitive to local socio-religious and

40

SCHOLASTICISM

political sentiment, in the various provinces under his administration. In Khurasan, where Rationalist Ash'ari sentiment prevailed, he supported Ash'arism; in Baghdad, stronghold of the Traditionalists, he supported the Shafi'i Traditionalists. Evidence of this expedient show of support may be seen in the previously mentioned waqf deed of his Nizamiya Madrasa in Baghdad, a fragment of which has survived, making Shafi'i legal theory and methodology a prerequisite for appointment to certain sensitive college posts. It is very likely that the following stipulations were included in the foundation deed of the College at the insistence of the professor of law, Shirazi, for whom Nizam founded the College: l. the Nizamiya constitutes an endowment for the benefit of members of the Shafi'i madhab who are Shafi'i in bothfiqh (positive law) and in u{ul al-fiqh (legal theory and methodology); 2. the property with which the Nizamiya is endowed is also for the benefit of those who are Shafi'i in both fiqh and uful al-jiqh; 3. the following members of the staff must be Shafi'i in bothfiqh and uful al-fiqh: a. the professor of law (i.e. of juridical theology) b. the preacher-teacher of the academic sermon (wa'~), c. the librarian (who taught humanistic studies); 4. the Nizamiya must also have a teacher of Koranic science to teach the Koran; 5. it must also have a grammarian to teach the Arabic language; 6. each member of the staff receives a definite portion of the endowment revenue. 76

The Baghdad Shrine College of Abu Hanifa It was not Nizam, but rather Abu Sa'd al-Mustaufi (d. 494(1101), Financial Minister of the Saljuq Sultan who, not to be bested by Nizam, built a rival Hanafi madrasa for Hanafi students. Both of these colleges were built in the same period of two years (from 457(1065 to 459(1067). The historian Bundari (fl. 623/1226) records the event in his history of the Saljuqs of 'Iraq. Here is the pertinent text, written in the excessively ornate and highly obscure rhymed prose of this humanist historian: (Sharaf al-Mulk Abu Sa'd al-Mustaufi) found that the lieutenants of the Prime Minister Nizam al-Mulk had already begun building the (Nizamiya) madrasa; so, taking advantage of his ability to do the same, he built a shrine and a madrasa for the members of his (Hanafi) madhab, on the (location of the) tomb of Abu Hanifa- May God have mercy on him!- in the Quarter of Biib at-Tiiq, thus giving evidence of the recompense he will receive (from God) for its (quality as a) place of pilgrimage. 77

Rationalist Infiltration of Traditionalist Institutions

B.

41

THE CLANDESTINE RATIONALIST RoLE OF THE NIZAMIYA CoLLEGE

In the light of the foregoing pages, especially regarding the significance of UJul aljiqh as the juridical theology of the Traditionalists, and the antidote to the philosophical theology of the Rationalists, the stipulations of the Nizamiya waqf deed take on new significance. Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi was the first doctor oflaw to be offered its chair in that field. In the controversy that flared up regarding the refusal of Shirazi to accept the chair, and the abortive appointment of Ibn as-Sabbagh lasting for twenty days, Nizam al-Mulk reacted by making it clear that he had founded his College for Shirazi: 'for whom did I found this College if not for Abu Ishaq [ash-Shirazi]?' 78 If Shirazi was the founder's choice for the chair, it was because he had the necessary qualifications: he was Shafi'i not only infiqh, but also in UJul aljiqh. That Nizam wished his College to be Shafi'i is no cause for surprise; it was his privilege as founder (waqif) of the college. What may well call for surprise, however, are the stipulations' specific mention of not only Shafi'ifiqh, but also ofShafi'i uJul aljiqh, as the two qualifications necessary for appointment to certain posts of the teaching staff in the College. To say that the professor oflaw, for instance, must be Shafi'i infiqh, law, is merely redundant; for to say 'Shafi'i' is to say 'Shafi'i law.' But to say 'Shafi'i UJul aljiqh,' the science of legal theory and methodology, is to indicate that this science could be other than what Shafi'i had intended it to be in his Risala; that it could be a Rationalist UJul aljiqh, specifically an Ash'ari UJul aljiqh, to which Professor Shirazi, the one for whom Nizam founded his College/9 was clearly and definitely opposed. It was well-known that Shirazi was antiAsh'ari in uJul aljiqh; his own statement quoted by Ibn Rajab, and his own books, attest to this fact: 'these are my books on UJul aljiqh wherein I profess doctrines opposed to those of the Ash'aris.' 80 Of Shirazi's works on UJul aljiqh, his published al-Luma' contains several statements of doctrine opposed to the Ash'aris and confirming Ibn Rajah's quotation. 81 The stipulation of 'Shafi'i UJul aljiqh' is clearly in consonance with the teaching of Shirazi in that field. But the designation of uJul aljiqh as 'Shafi'i' should not be taken to mean that each of the guilds oflaw had its own variety of uJul aljiqh, in the sense that there were five varieties of this juridical religious science, one for each of the five Sunni guilds oflaw existing at that time. UJul aljiqh does not lend itself to this kind of categorization. 'Shafi'i UJul aljiqh' designated the uJul aljiqh of Shafi'i himself, as set out in his Risala, and followed by the Traditionalists of all the guilds of law.

42

SCHOLASTICISM Thus Nizam al-Mulk's policy was clear. If, as a Shafi'i, he supported the Rationalist Ash'ari Shafi'is in Khurasan, as a Shafi'i again, he supported the Traditionalist Shafi'is in Baghdad, at least in so far as the stipulations of the Nizamiya College's deed were concerned. The struggle was one between Traditionalism and Rationalist Ash'arism (as well as Mu'tazilism), even within the Shafi'i guild oflaw itself, by now infiltrated by the Rationalist Ash'aris. Nizam's support for the one faction or the other depended on the strength of the faction in a particular locale. What was certain was that institutions of learning, of whatever type, based on the charitable trust, excluded all fields outside the pale ofTraditionalist orthodoxy; and this meant especially philosophical theology, kalam. This being the situation, the Rationalists resorted to infiltration; they infiltrated the guilds of law, and they infiltrated the curricula of the guild colleges. C.

INFILTRATION oF THE GuiLDS OF LAw

Any Sunni Muslim could belong to any one of the Sunni guilds oflaw, the madhabs. But, as in all kinds of guilds, he had to abide by the guild's rules and regulations. It was therefore easy for a Sunni Muslim, member of a Rationalist movement, to become also a member of a Sunni guild of law. In the tenth and eleventh centuries two of the five existing guilds were on the wane: the Maliki and the Zahiri; the latter ceased to exist in Baghdad by the end of the third quarter of the eleventh century. The Ash'ari movement, in search of a home in one of the remaining three guilds, had only one choice open to it: the Shafi'i guild. The Hanafi guild had already been preempted by the Mu'tazili movement. As for the Hanbali guild, it was too Traditionalist to be available for either of these two movements. When a Han bali strayed into one of the Rationalist movements, two options were available to him: he had either to abjure his Rationalist leanings, 82 or he had to leave the Han bali guild. 83 The details of the infiltration of the guilds of law have been discussed in a previous study. 84

D.

INFILTRATION oF THE CuRRICULA oF THE CoLLEGES

Certain fields of the religious sciences were used by the Rationalists as trojan horses for their teaching. Saifad-Din al-Amidi (d. 631/1233), a Han bali who then joined the Shafi'i guild oflaw, was known for his excellent knowledge of the 'foreign sciences'. He was sacked from his chair of law of the 'Aziziya Madrasa for teaching philosophy and philosophical theology. 85 Another philosophical theologian was known to teach that science under the guise of the Prophetic Traditions (~adith) .86 But the religious science that was the object of the Rationalists' particular attention was that of U!ul al-fiqh, the science of juridical

Rationalist Infiltration of Traditionalist Institutions

43

theology that Shafi'i had put in the service of Traditionalism. After Shafi'i, as previously mentioned, works on UJul al-jiqh authored by Rationalists, show that this science had taken on new characteristics. Rationalism had infiltrated the guilds and the curricula of the guild colleges. U}ul al-jiqh was eminently receptive to two Rationalist instruments of methodology: logic and, more particularly, dialectic. Such receptivity is illustrated by the work on logic in Ghazzali's al-Mustaifa min 'ilm al-u}ul (i.e., UJul al-jiqh), 87 and the work on dialectic in Ibn 'Aqil's al- WruM .fi uJul al-jiqh. 88 Such was the situation with scholasticism, a creation of the Traditionalist movement engaged in a constant struggle against the movement of Rationalism. Humanism was to experience the effects of the tension between these two opposing camps. The rise of humanism predates by some two centuries the advent of scholasticism in Islam. As humanism proceeded on its course of development, it was to come under the influence of Traditionalism, the persistent force of which was to guide its course in a direction consistent with the ideals of the Traditionalist scholastic jurisconsults. NOTES TO PART ONE 'Sec, in ROC, the following three sections: 'The Scholastic Method as Form: the Ta'llqa-Report,' Ill ff.; 'The Scholastic Method as Function: the Muna~ara-Disputa­ tion,' 128 ff.; and 'The Scholastic Method as Finished Product: the Summa', 245 ff. 2 For the details, see Shaji'!, which is at the basis of this section. 3 See A.M. Shakir (ed.), Risala, with Introduction and Notes (Cairo: Halabi Press, 1358/1940), 13 of the Introduction, apud Manaqib, 57). 4 Cf. the problem of al-~a~r wa 'liba~a, no. 4 in the text above. See OM], 134. 5 Mustaifa, I, I 0. 6 Loc. cit. 7Shadharat, II, 9, apud Dhahabi's '!bar. For other such statements, see Ta~r!m, esp. 12 (English translation), 17 (Arabic text, paragraph 26. 80n the history of the Inquisition, sec Mihna. 9 /ba~a, 8-9; English translation, 49.

10 0n Ibn Shannabudh, see TB, 280/281; Munta~am, VI, 275 and 307-8; Ibn Taimiya, F'/T, I, 314-15. "ROC, 108 ff., and index, s.v.,

I,

muna~ara.

TFS. 0p. cit., 86 and 87. 14 Munta~am, VIII, 109. 1.sTHY, II, 197. 16 TB, IV, 37-8; see also Munta~am, vii, 161; TSS, III, 2; Shadharat, m, 222. 17 Renaissance, 198-20 I. 18 English translation, in Renaissance (Eng. tr.), 207-9 19 Ibn 'Aq!l, 304-8. 20 See esp. THY, and Dhail, passim. 21 Thus the Qadiri Creed was opposed not only to the Mu'tazilis. Cf. Renaissance, Joe. cit., where there is some confusion between the promulgations of the Creed by al-Qadir in 408H., requiring the Mu'tazilis to make public retractions, and the event of 433H. (or 432H.) when the Qadiri Creed was publicly read during the caliphate of al-Qa'im, 12

13

44 the son (not promulgated by alQadir, dead some ten years earlier). 22 TK (apud Dhahabi), 276; cf. Shadharat, m, 222. 23 Shadharat, loc. cit. Suyuti, unaware of Dhahabi's purpose, adds other names to the list, some of which belong to the previous century; TK, op. cit., 222-3. 24 See Ibn 'Aqzl, 300. 25 The following list is added by Suyu ti: the head of the zindlqs (heretics), the Fatimid Caliph alHakim bi-Amr Allah (caliphate: 386-411/996-l 021); the head of the philologists, al-J auhari (d. 398/ 1008); the head of the grammarians, Ibn Jinni (d. 392jl002); of the rhetoricians, Badi' az-Zaman alHamadhani (d. 398/1008); the head of the orators, Ibn Nubata (d. 405/ 1016); the head of the Koranic exegetes, al-Hasan b. Habib anNisaburi (d. 406/1016); and the head of the Caliphs, al-Qadir, whom Ibn as-Salah (d. 643jl243) considered as a Shafi 'i doctor of law. 26 See ROC, Ill ff., 245 ff. 27 This work, Tarzkh at-Islam, is still in manuscript. 28 See Shadharat, III, l 78 ( 7-8), apud Dhahabi's '!bar. 29 0n the ta' fzqa and its significance, see ROC, Ill ff., and index, s.v .. 30 Ibid. (line 15). 31 Shadharat, III, 169 (3), apud Dhahabi's '!bar. 32 1bid. (line 15). 33 Ibid. (line 17 ff.). 34 Cairo: Subaih Press, 1347/1928. 35 This is the title the author himself gives to this work written after al-Luma' (rather than atTab~ira fi u{ul al-jiqh as in the MS. copy of the Azhar Library in Cairo, call no. u/ill al-jiqh 1785; see Luma', 2 (5). 36 See Ibn Taimiya, Kitab atTis'zn!ya, in his FIT, v, 239. 37 0M], 137. 38 Risala, 8 (3-4). 39 0p. cit., 20 (3-4). 40 Ghazzafz.

SCHOLASTICISM flam III, 466-7. 42 See, for example, UF