The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia: Towards an Ethical Explanation 9781529200737

Table of contents :
Cover
Series page
Series information
The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia
Copyright
Dedication
Table of contents
List of Tables
List of abbreviations
Acknowledgements
1 Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Responsibility in Southeast Asia: Provision, not protection?
Responsibility for the other: Introducing Levinas
About this book
2 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Responses from Southeast Asia
Introduction
Sovereignty: From right to responsibility
The R2P: A doctrine for the twenty-first century?
Championing the R2P
Critiquing the R2P
Southeast Asian responses to the R2P
Conclusion
3 Towards a ‘Responsibility to Provide’ (R2Provide) in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Sovereignty and responsibility in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ‘ASEAN way’?
Growing signs of regional responsibility
Nargis: Catalyst for the R2Provide?
Formulating and implementing the R2Provide
Conclusion
4 Institutionalizing Security Regionalism: Responsibility as ‘Response Ability’
Introduction
Developing responsibility and ‘response ability’ in Southeast Asia
Regionalizing security relations
A defence regionalism to call their own: The ADMM
Ancillaries and annexes
Developing responsibility and ‘response ability’ beyond Southeast Asia
ASEAN Regional Forum: A bridge too far?
ADMM-Plus: A practical regionalism?
Conclusion
5 Responsible Provision in HADR, Conflict Management and Human Rights
Introduction
Regional cooperation in HADR
HADR in Myanmar: From Nargis to Rohingya
The militarization of HADR: Pros and cons
HADR and implications for preventive diplomacy
HADR and deterrence
Regional cooperation in conflict management
Has ISIS come to Southeast Asia?
Counterterrorism strategies: Direct/hard and indirect/soft
Counterterrorism cooperation: Existing and new forms
Militarizing counterterrorism: Implications for extant convention and practice
Regional cooperation in human rights
Conclusion
6 Towards the Responsible Management of Disputes in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Regional experiences with rules
Is ASEAN going legal?
The politics behind the charter drafting process
Creating new rules or codifying old ones?
How do Southeast Asians resolve their disputes?
Trade disputes
Territorial disputes
Coding interstate conduct in the South China Sea
No rules-based imperative (yet) in Southeast Asia?
Conclusion
7 Communitarianism, Liberalism and the Limits of Responsibility in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Communitarianism and responsibility
Against totality, towards asymmetry and heteronomy
Conclusion
8 Levinas and the Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia
Introduction
Responsibility as hospitality
Responsibility without reciprocity
Responsibility and justice
The R2Provide as responsibility for the other?
Responsible provision as acts in hospitality
Responsible provision and the question of reciprocity
Responsible provision and the ‘realistic’ dispensation of justice
Conclusion
9 The Responsibility to Provide: Implications for the Region and Beyond
Introduction
This book in summary
Can the R2Provide travel?
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

Bristol studies in

See Seng Tan is Professor of International Relations at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore

Despite the long-held and jealously guarded ASEAN principle of non-intervention, this book argues that states in Southeast Asia have begun to display an increasing readiness to think about sovereignty in terms not only of state responsibility to their own populations, but also towards neighbouring countries as well. Taking account of the realities of interstate cooperation in the region, and drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the author develops a new theoretical framework reflecting an evolution of attitudes about state sovereignty to explain this emerging ethic of regional responsibility.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

“This nuanced and thought-provoking book adds a highly welcome new layer to our understanding of the evolution of norms in Southeast Asia” Linda Quayle, independent writer and researcher

SEE SENG TAN

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations combines original research and theoretical innovation to give fresh insight into the changing politics of the region.

The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia Towards an Ethical Explanation

SERIES EDITORS Yongjin Zhang, Shogo Suzuki and Peter Marcus Kristensen

SEE SENG TAN ISBN 978-1-5292-0072-0

9 781529 200720

B R I S TO L

@bristoluniversitypress www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

East Asian International Relations

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations Series Editors Yongjin Zhang, Professor of International Politics, University of Bristol, UK Shogo Suzuki, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Politics, University of Manchester, UK Peter Marcus Kristensen, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Copenhagen, Denmark This series publishes cutting-edge research on the changing international politics of East Asia. It covers the security dynamics, the causes of conflict and cooperation, and the ongoing transformation of the region, as well as the impact of East Asia on the wider global order. The series contributes to theoretical debates within the field of International Relations. Topics studied in East Asia can shed fresh light on disciplinary debates while the theoretical insights can challenge and enrich the propositions of mainstream IR theories which have been derived mostly from the European experience. In welcoming theoretically informed and theoretically innovative works, this series will play an important role in developing and establishing new Asian schools of thought in International Relations theory.

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations International Advisory Board Amitav Acharya, American University, USA Mark Beeson, University of Western Australia, Australia Barry Buzan, London School of Economics, UK Zhimin Chen, Fudan University, China Ja Ian Chong, National University of Singapore, Singapore Paul Evans, University of British Columbia, Canada Rosemary Foot, Oxford University, UK Evelyn Goh, Australian National University, Australia Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden Miwa Hirono, Ritsumeikan University, Japan Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University, Japan Weixing Hu, University of Hong Kong, China Xiaoming Huang, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Christopher R. Hughes, London School of Economics, UK Yang Jiang, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark Hun Joon Kim, Korea University, South Korea Jing Men, College of Europe, Belgium Nele Noesselt, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany John Ravenhill, University of Waterloo, Canada Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University, Japan Yu-Shan Wu, National University of Taiwan, Taiwan

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Towards an Ethical Explanation See Seng Tan

First published in Great Britain in 2019 by Bristol University Press North America office: 1-9 Old Park Hill c/o The University of Chicago Press Bristol 1427 East 60th Street BS2 8BB Chicago, IL 60637, USA UK t: +1 773 702 7700 t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 f: +1 773-702-9756 www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk [email protected] www.press.uchicago.edu © Bristol University Press 2019 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 978-1-5292-0072-0 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-0076-8 ePub ISBN 978-1-5292-0073-7 ePdf The right of See Seng Tan to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and contributors and not of The University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by blu inc, Bristol Front cover image: Gabriel Diaz @ Stocksy Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

To the ultimate ‘Other’, who calls us to responsibility.

Contents List of Tables List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements

viii ix xii

1 2

1 17

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Responses from Southeast Asia Towards a ‘Responsibility to Provide’ (R2Provide) in Southeast Asia Institutionalizing Security Regionalism: Responsibility as ‘Response Ability’ Responsible Provision in HADR, Conflict Management and Human Rights Towards the Responsible Management of Disputes in Southeast Asia Communitarianism, Liberalism and the Limits of Responsibility in Southeast Asia Levinas and the Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia The Responsibility to Provide: Implications for the Region and Beyond

Notes Bibliography Index

43 57 79 101 127 153 179

189 207 259

vii

List of Tables 1 2

ADMM-​Plus: Exercises from 2011 to the present Number of WTO disputes involving ASEAN countries, China and the US

viii

74 113

List of Abbreviations AADMER

ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response AAISW ASEAN Armies Information Sharing Workshop ACCT ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism ACDFIM ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces (or Chiefs of Staff) Informal Meeting ACIA ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement ACWC ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting ADMM-​Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus ADSOM ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting AEC ASEAN Economic Community AFC Asian Financial Crisis AHA Centre ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management AHRD ASEAN Human Rights Declaration AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights AMIIM ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting AMOIM ASEAN Military Operation Informal Meeting AMRG ASEAN Militaries Ready Group AMRO ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office APEC Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation APHR ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights APSC ASEAN Political-​Security Community ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ARF-​ISG-​CBM ARF Inter-​Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures ARF-​SOM ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting ASCC ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

ASEAN+3 ASEAN Special SOM AU CBRN CLMV CMI CMIM CMPT COC CSCAP

ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting

African Union chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Chiang Mai Initiative Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization Combined Maritime Patrol Team code of conduct Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-​Pacific CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea DSB Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDSM ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism EPG Eminent Persons Group EU European Union EWG Experts’ Working Group FPDA Five-​Power Defence Arrangements GAME Guidelines for Air Military Encounters GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief HLTF High Level Task Force ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICJ International Court of Justice IEG Intelligence Exchange Group IMF International Monetary Fund INDOMALPHI Indonesia-​Malaysia-​Philippines Trilateral Maritime Patrol ISDS Investor-​State Dispute Settlement ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea JI Jemaah Islamiyah KN Katibah Nusantara Koopsusgab Indonesian Joint Special Operations Command LAWASIA Law Association of Asia and the Pacific MALSINDO Malaysia-​Singapore-​Indonesia MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front x

List of Abbreviations

MSP MSP-​IS NATO NLD NU OCHA OEI OSCE PD PLA P5 ReCAAP RHCC RMSI RRG R2P R2Provide SADC SAF SASOP

SEARCCT

Malacca Straits Patrols Malacca Straits Patrols Information System North Atlantic Treaty Organization National League for Democracy Nahdlatul Ulama UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Our Eyes Initiative Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe preventive diplomacy People’s Liberation Army Permanent Five powers of the UN Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre Regional HADR Coordination Centre Regional Maritime Security Initiative Religious Rehabilitation Group Responsibility to Protect Responsibility to Provide Southern African Development Community Singapore Armed Forces Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-​Terrorism Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Treaty of Amity and Cooperation United Nations UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UN Humanitarian Response Depot UN Secretary General Universal Periodic Review US Indo-​Pacific Command

SEATO TAC UN UNCLOS UNHRD UNSG UPR US INDOPACOM US PACOM US Pacific Command WFP World Food Programme WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium WTO World Trade Organization ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality xi

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Acknowledgements I am indebted to the following individuals and institutions, without whom this book would likely not have been possible. Two colleagues and friends –​Professor Joseph Chinyong Liow, dean of the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (COHASS) at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), and Professor Ralf Emmers, dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at NTU –​ have been and continue to be sources of inspiration. Two developments were especially beneficial: one, Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, executive deputy chairman of RSIS, granted me a short sabbatical from my institutional obligations; two, Dr Yeo Lay Hwee, the director of the EU Centre in Singapore, kindly extended to me academic hospitality at the EU Centre –​rather appropriate for a book on the hospitality of sovereign states no less. Stephen Wenham of Bristol University Press (BUP) provided unstinting support and much needed guidance. Professor Yongjin Zhang, series editor for BUP’s Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations, furnished excellent advice that saved me from major blushes. I also thank the anonymous reviewers appointed by BUP for their helpful comments. Finally, on the home front, my wife Trina and our daughter Elisabeth are really the ones who teach me, day in and out, what true responsibility for the other looks and feels like. I thank them all.

xii

1

Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia Introduction Deeds speak the language of the great virtues far better than words do. Words limp outside the gates of the mystery of compassion for strangers. (Hallie, 1997: 42) Are Southeast Asians responsible? Are the sovereign states of Southeast Asia responsible actors that care and provide for their own people and societies? Do they hold a sense of obligation towards their neighbours in need within Southeast Asia? Do their foreign policies and neighbourly conduct reflect that sense of obligation and responsibility towards others? These questions are motivated by an incipient ‘ethos’ of intra-​ regional responsibility that appears to be emerging among Southeast Asian countries –​in an embryonic and uneven fashion, to be sure, and more evident in some than in others. This ethic or norm has been expressed in terms of acts of hospitality shown to strangers across national boundaries, who may be victims of earthquakes, typhoons and other natural disasters. It has manifested as forms of assistance given –​rendered in forms varying from relief aid, financial assistance, military equipment and training, boots on the ground and the like –​to neighbours coping with economic difficulties, problems of militancy and terrorism and so on. Arguably, it has also materialized as a mutual readiness by governments to resort to pacific and increasingly rules-​ based approaches to manage and, where feasible, resolve their disputes with one another. While ideology could well be a driver behind this sense of responsibility, the story of what I call responsible provision in Southeast Asia suggests a considerably more complex narrative that

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

sees, among other things, illiberal nations engaging in acts of hospitality, sometimes more so than professedly liberal democratic nations, towards their neighbours. On the other hand, strategic intentions and interests have been known to motivate the conduct of states, and Southeast Asian nations are obviously not exceptions. And yet it has neither always and only been due to cunning reason or realpolitik considerations that states, including Southeast Asian countries, do what they do (Jonas, 1996: 188; Peou, 2002/​03; Eaton and Stubbs, 2006).1 The foregoing considerations raise intriguing questions about the evolving relationship between sovereignty and responsibility in Southeast Asia. It is fair to say that the contemporary policy and academic debate on that issue has been dominated by the doctrine of ‘the responsibility to protect’ –​popularly abbreviated as ‘R2P’. An inadvertent outcome of this, where the purported responsibilities of nation-​states to their respective domestic constituents as well as neighbouring countries are concerned, has been to represent responsible sovereignty (or, if preferred, sovereign responsibility) in terms of the R2P. This is a rather unfortunate development because, given the Southeast Asian region’s hitherto ambiguous relationship with the R2P doctrine, it fosters the unwarranted conclusion that Southeast Asian countries are thereby always, or at least for the most part, irresponsible and/​or unethical, perhaps even immoral. This is not to imply that the Southeast Asian region stands apart from the rest of the world in its failure to exercise its ethical responsibility. After all, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this book, the mixed record of adherence to the R2P doctrine by Western liberal democracies, despite their being the most enthusiastic backers and practitioners of humanitarian intervention, suggests that Southeast Asia’s ambivalence with the R2P is not unique to the region. As Mark Duffield has ruefully acknowledged, saving strangers has become a dangerous occupation (Duffield, 2010: 53) –​ a fact that would give any government, liberal or illiberal, pause where the urge to participate in humanitarian adventurism is concerned. Indeed, the many problems associated with the R2P as a doctrine and practice (as discussed at length in Chapter 2) has led to demands for its repeal as well as, more aptly, appeals for the development of alternative and hybrid forms of peace that complement existing paradigms but also go beyond them in other ways (Groves, 2008; Richmond, 2009, 2010). Where Southeast Asian countries and the R2P is concerned, the point is not that they have never, whether by commission or omission, behaved irresponsibly or unethically  –​the travesty concerning the region’s belated and deficient response to the Rohingya refugee crisis is one such ­example –​but that they are potentially misrepresented as being completely void of responsible conduct.

2

Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia

This present work aims both to remedy that imbalance as well as seek an alternative pathway to responsibility and peace by focusing on emerging perspectives and practices among Southeast Asian countries that, in ways embryonic for some and increasingly habitual for others, embody what might be called ‘the responsibility to provide’  –​the ‘R2Provide’, if you will, as opposed to the R2P. At present, at least where Southeast Asian governments are concerned, the existing notion of sovereign responsibility is best understood as a responsibility expected of all sovereign nations to provide for the welfare of their people. In the event they are not able to do so, it is their responsibility to see what other resources they can garner, including those furnished by the international community, to provide for their people. In contrast to the R2P, this conception does not hinge on the responsibility of other nations to furnish what the nation in question lacks in providing for its population; in short, it does not challenge the prevailing principle of non-​intervention. Moreover, the presence of that norm also means that the possibility that outside help has a role at all is effectively contingent on the consent of and invitation (or request) by prospective recipient countries, without which the contributions of prospective provider countries need not apply. In practical terms, however, the institutional developments that have taken and are taking place in the region, as the following chapters in this book highlight, are impelling Southeast Asian countries to go beyond that conception’s parameters. Indeed, despite the absence of any legal obligation to assist and their longstanding normative adherence to non-​interference (a corollary of non-​intervention),2 Southeast Asian countries have shown an increasing readiness to act through the use of social persuasion on one another to open its doors to outside help –​as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did with respect to Myanmar in the wake of the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Tan, 2013a). Hence, whether as recipient or provider, Southeast Asian states arguably share the obligation and responsibility to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations: recipients through their consent, providers through their contributions of aid, assistance and the like (Tan, 2017a). To be sure, whether embryonic or mature, an ethic or norm exists only to the extent its guidelines and prescriptions are observed. Ultimately, the existence of ethical responsibility is best judged less by what is said about it –​although discourse must have its place –​than by what is actually done by those who presume to identify themselves and their interests with it, if only tacitly in most cases. In other words, responsible is not just as responsible says but as responsible does.

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

Whether Southeast Asian interstate experiences are sufficient to warrant the claim that the R2Provide exists in real terms is only part of the concern of this book. A second key goal has to do with the aim to locate a philosophical-​ethical basis for the R2Provide specifically but also for responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia more broadly. Here enter Levinas. Where ethical theory and international affairs are concerned, few ideas have seized the field of international relations in the way the ethics of the Jewish-​French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas appear to have done (Campbell, 1994, 1998; Warner, 1996; Franke, 2000; Jordaan, 2009). Levinas’ ideas go beyond what the theoretical resources presently available within the mainstream study of international relations permit ‒ beyond what realism, liberalism and constructivism have to say about subjectivity, agency and structure. Much like the R2Provide, Levinas’ ethics-​first approach is treated in this book as a philosophical ideal towards which Southeast Asian countries could work and a normative signpost from which they could take direction. Yet it neither assumes a destination already known and fixed, nor a road already paved and eminently serviceable.3 Indeed, such a path, if it exists at all, would likely prove arduous, bumpy and winding, not one for the fainthearted. Why turn to Levinas as an ethical guide for interstate conduct in responsible provision? The reason is this book’s discontent with existing explanations for responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia, which hitherto have been dominated by communitarian (including realist) and liberal ideas. To be sure, there are very good reasons to rely on communitarian and liberal resources to understand and explain Southeast Asia international relations, as many have sought to do (Walzer, 1984a; Mahbubani, 1992; Kausikan, 1993; Ibrahim, 1996; Tu, 1996; Warner, 1996; Pye, 1997; Barr, 2000; Compton, 2000; Chua, 2004; Bell, 2006;Wee, 2007; Shin, 2008; Walter and Zhang, 2012; Lopes, 2017). But as this book shows in Chapter 7, they fall short for a number of crucial reasons. That said, does this warrant turning to Levinas? Brimming with urgency, Levinas’ notion that we are infinitely and inescapably responsible for and to the other, which will be briefly introduced later and then discussed at length in Chapter 8, has understandably invited scepticism over its perceived utopianism (Zaborowski, 2000; Mao, 2014; Miller, 2017). Thus understood, can a radical theory, with the appropriate qualifications, be translated into reasonable and feasible practice in responsibility towards one’s neighbours in Southeast Asia and possibly even beyond?

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Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia

Responsibility in Southeast Asia: Provision, not protection? According to received wisdom, sovereignty in Southeast Asia is both understood and undertaken as a right rather than a responsibility and has been treated as such (Palmujoki, 2001: 107; Edge, 2015). Furthermore, this assumption is supported by the relative ambivalence of Southeast Asian countries towards the R2P. Although all ten Southeast Asian states joined their counterparts worldwide in voting to make the R2P a global principle at the United Nations World Summit in 2005,4 they nonetheless expressed reservations over the UN’s subsequent endorsement of military intervention as part of the inventory or toolkit of the R2P. Moreover, the controversies surrounding Western appropriations of the R2P in campaigns to ‘liberate’ Libya, whilst avoiding involvement in Syria despite atrocities committed therein, further fuelled Southeast Asian suspicions about the integrity of the R2P when placed in Western hands. On the other hand, Southeast Asian ambivalence towards the R2P stands in contrast to the region’s growing sense of urgency and conduct in response to the host of ‘non-​traditional’ security challenges  –​oftentimes transnational in character  –​affecting its neck of the woods, ranging from financial meltdowns, pandemics, natural disasters, humanitarian crises, to militancy and terrorism, to name a few. The post-​Cold War period has seen an emerging and increasing awareness –​in fits and starts, to be sure –​among Southeast Asians concerning shared responsibilities and mutual obligations towards one another. Seated astride the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’, the Asia-​Pacific’s inherent proneness to natural disasters began catching the attention of the region’s policymakers and security intellectuals previously preoccupied with hard/​traditional security concerns or ‘high politics’ that predominated the Cold War era, such was the pervasive nature of the geopolitical framing and/​or imaginary of the Cold War (Baldwin, 1995). Region-​wide cataclysmic events such as the 1997–​98 Asian financial crisis (AFC) or the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis quickly raised awareness of the region’s vulnerabilities (Caballero-​Anthony, Acharya and Emmers, 2006). Cyclone Nargis, which devastated significant parts of Myanmar in 2008, became a key rallying point for groups advocating the conceptual enlargement of the R2P, principally focused on protection from violence, to cover responses to natural and humanitarian crises as well (Caballero-​ Anthony and Chng, 2009; Haacke, 2009a). However, these efforts faced considerable backlash from advocates of the R2P, who sought

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

to preserve the conceptual integrity of their doctrine (Evans, 2007; Thakur, 2008). For their own purposes, Southeast Asian leaders were equally cool towards the idea of an expanded R2P. They conversely argued that their efforts to enhance the region’s ‘response ability’ amounted to a different sort of collective responsibility than the R2P, one defined in terms of a mutual readiness to provide to each other the needed assistance and resources upon request by (or at the invitation of) the affected countries.5 Such conduct in sovereign responsibility did not materialize only in the post-​Nargis context but have been part of the region’s diplomacy and security, such as the establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a reserve currency swop arrangement formed in the wake of the AFC. Together with external powers, Southeast Asian states rallied around their neighbours devastated by the Indian Ocean tsunamis and conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions. More recently, a number of Southeast Asian states have also been assisting the Philippines in response to the attack and occupation of Marawi in the southern Philippines by ISIS affiliates –​a devastating conflict that lasted from March to October in 2017. Thus understood, the post-​Nargis environment is significant in that it facilitated the context for Southeast Asian policy intellectuals and practitioners to articulate, if only loosely, a concept of responsible sovereignty that resonates with their existing practices –​practices which, it could be said, test the limits of the region’s diplomatic principle of non-​interference, at times contravening it. Nor have these efforts been kept purely ad hoc. To address the persistent and pervasive quality of the aforementioned challenges to the region, Southeast Asian countries have sought to institutionalize their cooperative initiatives –​albeit neither as deeply nor as extensively as, say, the European Union or the Organization for Security and Co-​ operation in Europe (OSCE) have done. Through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its suite of functional subsidiaries –​such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and/​or the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) –​and its wider regional offshoots –​such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit, and especially the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus (ADMM-​Plus) –​Southeast Asian countries have been working with their ASEAN dialogue partner countries such as Australia, China, India, Japan and the United States to bolster their capabilities as well as to improve interoperability in HADR, maritime safety and security, and counterterrorism. Crucially, these platforms are not conceived

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Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia

merely as arrangements that benefit individual recipient Southeast Asian countries, but which contribute to the well-​being of the Southeast Asian region altogether. Simply put, it is not just a question of outside powers helping Southeast Asian states help themselves, but equally helping and equipping them to help others. Moreover, the incessant, even perennial, challenge to build capacity and enhance capabilities of regional states also means not every one of them can or should be expected to participate in or contribute to meeting the challenges at hand. In other words, the fact that not every member country of the aforementioned regional institutions and initiatives might take part in cooperative activities does not automatically mean that Southeast Asian multilateralism has thereby failed. Rather, it is these multilateral frameworks that provide the legitimation for countries that are able and willing to collaborate proactively. Against this backdrop, this book reflects systematically and critically on the responsibility to provide or R2Provide in Southeast Asia. The theorization of this ethos of responsible provision will cover two dimensions, one conceptual and one philosophical. Conceptually, as suggested previously, the R2Provide –​not quite institutionalized as a mature norm, much less doctrine, at this stage –​is distinct from the R2P even though they overlap at certain points. The R2Provide shares some similarities with the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ popularized by Francis Deng and his collaborators, to which the R2P doctrine is wholly indebted (Deng et al, 1996). However, the R2Provide differs from ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and the R2P over the latter two’s shared endorsement of unilateral action (that ought to be) undertaken by ‘responsible’ states against their ‘irresponsible’ counterparts. They do so by ensuring the survival of their citizens in times of natural disasters and humanitarian crises, and working with the international community and/​or ASEAN to build capacity and enhance their capabilities to better address those disasters and crises (Tan, 2012a). Crucially, there is neither the intention here to insist that the R2Provide is the only or even primary concept of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia, nor that it ought to be. Simply put, contemporary regional developments appear to have shaped regional thinking such that the R2Provide has emerged as the ethos guiding international conduct within the region –​for now. Philosophically, it is argued here that the extant debate on order, security and sovereignty in Southeast Asia, which has largely pitted communitarianism (and realism), on the one hand, and liberalism on the other, can no longer adequately explain the developments and ethical practices that will be explored. While there is no question that

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

communitarian responsibility has played a role in informing and shaping Southeast Asian perspectives and conduct, it is however limited by its unequivocal adherence to non-​interventionism, refusing therefore any responsibility that extends beyond the bounds of the sovereign state. For its part, liberal responsibility also has much to offer to the region. However, as argued later, the proclivity of liberalism to be seduced by contractualism, nationalism, transactionalism and totalitarianism renders it highly problematic as a normative foundation for the notion of responsible provision addressed in the following pages. As elaborated in Chapter 7, in privileging the self over the other –​the individual self in the case of liberalism, the collective self in the case of communitarianism –​ both liberal and communitarian ethics literally end at a nation’s borders, permitting at best a responsible provision that does not oblige Southeast Asian states to assist one another so long as there is no invitation or request for them to do so. And if neither communitarianism nor liberalism is a suitable basis for the R2Provide, then what?

Responsibility for the other: Introducing Levinas In the place of communitarian and liberal explanations, this book relies on the idea of responsibility for the other, an ethics-​first theory developed by Emmanuel Levinas. As Chapter  7 shows, the idea is itself a rejoinder by Levinas to the limits of liberal ethics practised by liberal democracies, but it also serves as an equally powerful riposte to the limits of the communitarian foundations that presumably guide the ethical practices of Southeast Asia’s illiberal democracies. What this book therefore contends is that an R2Provide ethic, moulded by a Levinasian conception of responsibility, offers much better purchase for the evolution of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia. Why is this so? The overarching leitmotif in Levinas’ thought is that of responsibility: responsibility not to the self –​which, as this study shows, is ultimately where communitarian and liberal ethics end up, inadvertently or otherwise –​but to and for the other. The logic behind this understanding is social rather than economistic:  responsibility for the other therefore comes before everything else; indeed, it is the very thing that renders thought possible at all (Derrida, 1992b: 92). Unlike Western metaphysics whose putative end is the discovery or establishment of laws and concepts that are total and universal –​to which communitarianism, despite its declared opposition to liberal individualism, also aspires (Schwarzenbach, 1991) –​Levinas’ ethics are predicated on the relation with the other in terms of the self ’s service and hospitality towards the other.

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Towards an Ethos of Responsibility in Southeast Asia

Three interrelated dimensions of Levinas’ ethics are examined in this study. The first is responsibility as hospitality, where the other’s demand on my hospitality is unconditional. The exercise of hospitality is central to Levinas’ thought; however, he ‘grounds’ this not in terms of moral laws and duties in themselves but rather in one’s relationship with and to the other. While painfully aware that his concept of hospitality is extremely idealistic, Levinas nonetheless contends that the clarion call of the other cannot and must not be ignored (Caputo, 2003b). As sympathetic interlocutors such as Jacques Derrida and John Caputo have allowed, the immense difficulties in fulfilling Levinas’ demand –​indeed, even the most responsible providers are likely to fail more often than they succeed in living up to that demand all the time –​do not negate the other’s call. Responsible providers answer the clarion call to exercise hospitality despite the existence of tension and contradiction between responsibility to the other and responsibility to themselves. The second dimension is responsibility without reciprocity, which is embodied in Levinas’ startling claim that reciprocity is the other’s business, not that of the self. One’s responsibility to the other is beyond reciprocity because it exists not only prior to any social contract with the other but indeed prior to any relationship between subject and other (Bernasconi, 2002). If anything, Levinas’ expectation of a unilateral and voluntary responsibility is idealistic when compared with Western theories of ethics, most if not all of which rely on some logic of mutuality and reciprocity, and utterly anachronistic and unrealistic when compared with the transactional, calculative and commodified character of contemporary international politics. Again, in sympathetic response, scholars such as Paul Ricoeur and Tomás Tatransky have offered the notion of ‘reciprocal asymmetry’, where it is reasonable to expect that one’s exercise of responsibility to the other without reciprocity is effectively met with a similar exercise that is, to all intents and purposes, reciprocal, but which in no way undermines Levinas’ original condition (Tatransky, 2008). The third and final dimension is responsibility and justice, where one’s responsibility for multiple others confronts practical realities such as the finiteness of available resources and the longstanding political question, as Harold Lasswell has put it, of who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1936). In a world of multiple competing others or neighbours all demanding attention and assistance, how does one, indeed with whom should one, engage given the manifold limitations that constrain and curtail one’s ability to help all in need? ‘Responsibility may be infinite’, as Manderson has wryly put it, ‘but I am not’ (Manderson, 2006: 79). In response, Levinas introduces the idea of proximity –​ the other who is closest to me –​which for him makes possible the exercise

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

of justice. It is safe to say that under the delimiting conditions imposed by the proximity of third parties, the exacting requirements of Levinas’ ethics cannot and indeed can never be fully and realistically satisfied. But as in the case of the two conditions vis-​à-​vis hospitality and reciprocity discussed previously, such limitations do not and must not prevent one from exercising one’s responsibility to the other. As Simon Critchley has observed, ‘it is my experience of a demand that I both cannot fully meet and cannot avoid’ (Critchley, 2002: 22). Such then is the nature of Levinas’ conception of responsibility, where no easy resolution or reconciliation is possible between a responsibility one can neither adequately fulfil nor completely avoid altogether. It constitutes, if you will, an ‘aporia’ or irreconcilable paradox that arises as a consequence of Levinas’ acknowledgement that the self‒other relationship is in fact defined by antinomy, heteronomy and uncertainty (Doty, 1997). How these three categories of responsibility  –​as the unilateral exercise of a fair and just hospitality towards others without expectation of reciprocation –​have, if at all, been meaningfully applied to Southeast Asia through its embryonic ethic of responsible provision is critically examined in Chapter 8. But why wait till the end of the book to do so? A quick methodological justification is in order here. The discussions of various developments in regional security collaboration furnished in Chapters 3‒6 are not mere exercises in raw empiricism. Rather, they are meant to highlight emerging patterns of interstate cooperation that have arguably arisen from a growing sense of shared responsibility –​ developments hitherto understudied let alone theorized. In a sense, the approach adopted here is not unlike what proponents of the case study method seek to accomplish, namely ‘build theory’ through an inductive process of ‘soaking and poking’ within the empirical cases of aspects of cooperative activities undertaken by states in Southeast Asia as well as the wider Asia-​Pacific region (George and Bennett, 2004:  111–​14). By soaking in and poking about various apparent expressions and manifestations of responsible conduct, we are able to trace the outlines and discern the contents of a nascent ethic of responsible provision whose future growth and sustainability arguably depends on the courage and conviction of its practitioners to reach beyond the restricted confines of conventional wisdom on sovereign responsibility or responsible sovereignty.

About this book Apart from this present introductory chapter, there are eight other chapters. Chapter 2 examines extant understandings of sovereignty as

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responsibility, beginning with the idea of sovereign responsibility as conceptualized by Francis Deng and his collaborators, who, in their 1996 book on conflict management in Africa as a shared responsibility of states, contend that sovereignty can no longer be seen as a protection against interference, but rather as a charge of responsibility where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies (Deng et al, 1996). The contribution by Deng and his colleagues was foundational to the thinking behind the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), sponsored by the Canadian government, which introduced the responsibility to protect with the aim to popularize the concept of humanitarian intervention and democracy-​restoring intervention (ICISS, 2001). Since its inception and subsequent endorsement by the United Nations as an established global norm and convention, the R2P has evolved through efforts by the UN and others to enhance, operationalize as well as to implement it –​with varying degrees of success and in some instances not without controversy  –​in actual crisis situations. The chapter briefly discusses the relevance of Deng and his associates’ idea regarding sovereignty qua responsibility towards Southeast Asia –​to date, there has been little to no effort by IR scholars to do this –​and also discusses and examines the existing academic and policy debate over the R2P and its relevance to international security and sovereign responsibility, as well as its ambivalent reception in Southeast Asia. Chapter  3 introduces what I  have termed the responsibility to provide. The chapter furnishes a sense of the diplomatic, normative and political conditions from which the R2Provide emerged. The regional policy and academic debate sparked by the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 and the post-​crisis reconstruction effort played an influential part in shaping the terms and references of the evolving sense of collective responsibility among Southeast Asian countries. What emerged, at least in its raw form, was not especially surprising given its connections to existing regional convention and practices, especially the norm of non-​interference. Contrary to the R2P’s assumption that prospective targets of intervention have the obligation to justify to their prospective interveners why they do not deserve to be intervened against, the R2Provide, in deference to non-​ interference, places the onus on prospective recipients of assistance to invite or request their prospective helpers to exercise their responsibility to provide. But here is where the thesis of this book deviates somewhat from that status quo. Guided by Levinas’ ethics, I contend that both recipient and provider equally share the obligation and responsibility to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations:  the

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recipient through their grant of consent and invitation, on one hand, and the provider through their contributions of aid, assistance and the like on the other. The next three chapters continue the task begun in Chapter  3 of providing a deeper sense of the specific conditions from which the R2Provide has taken shape and add substance in a number of issue areas:  in multilateral defence/​security cooperation and institutionalization; in the building of national and regional capacities in disaster relief and counterterrorism; and in the collective pursuit of pacific rules-​based settlement of international disputes over territory and trade. Chapter  4 offers a case study of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and its wider regional spinoff, the ADMM-​Plus, which comprises the ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN and eight ‘Plus’ partner countries –​Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States. The chapter makes a case for how cooperative initiatives within the multilateral context of the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus, which have progressed and continue to evolve on instrumental and normative grounds, embody the R2Provide ethic. In contrast to the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 27-​member multilateral security arrangement formed in 1994 to service the Asia-​Pacific region, the ADMM and its wider offshoot the ADMM-​Plus, formed in 2006 and 2010 respectively, are latecomers to security multilateralism and regionalism. However, in contrast to the underwhelming performance of the ARF, the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus have hitherto surpassed expectations with their strong military-​to-​military cooperation primarily in the form of substantive multilateral exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterterrorism, maritime security, military medicine, demining and most recently cyber security, wherein, at the level of the ADMM-​Plus, all 18 member countries are actively participating. The relevance and value of the ADMM-​Plus as perceived by its stakeholders is evident in the way it has been upgraded as an arrangement that originally met triennially to now meeting biennially and, in the foreseeable future, annually. However, there are legitimate concerns over the future viability of the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus. Firstly, for all of the progress they hitherto have enjoyed, they remain largely untested, and questions abound over whether member states can overcome their mutual hesitation and mistrust and engage in collective action. Secondly, it is also unclear, despite their obvious functional relevance, whether they can meaningfully address larger strategic challenges such as the South China Sea. Thirdly, given the ADMM-​Plus will soon meet on an annual basis, whether member countries and their

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respective militaries are prepared to increase and sustain their costly and high-​tempo commitments remains to be seen. On the other hand, the possibility that member countries participate in such exercises as an indirect way of engaging in deterrence cannot be ruled out. All these considerations could get in the way of the collective development of a security regionalism that is responsible, meaningful and substantive. Chapter  5 examines how the logic of responsible provision has been applied, in fits and starts, to three areas of intra-​regional cooperation: HADR, conflict management and human rights. The section on HADR cooperation takes a brief look at how, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, crucial pieces of the regional architecture for HADR  –​ the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) on HADR, the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus, as well as national-​level assets like the Singapore-​based Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) –​have been put in place. Impressive as the build-​up has been, responsible provision in HADR in Myanmar has unfortunately gone from the much celebrated post-​Nargis reconstruction experience to the much criticized response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Belatedly, a number of Southeast Asian countries and the AHA Centre have begun providing aid and assistance. Before getting involved the AHA Centre had to circumvent the narrowly conceived mandate –​based on natural disasters –​sanctioned by the ASEAN member countries. In addition, the chapter looks at how Southeast Asia’s response to the threat of terrorism has evolved not only in terms of the militarization of national and regional counterterrorism strategies but also, on a normative note, in the growing acceptance of conflict management –​ previously eschewed because of the region’s so-​called ‘fidelity’ to non-​interference6 –​in response to the changing tactics of the militants and terrorists themselves. Finally, the chapter examines how the region has addressed the human rights challenge, at best only in a half-​hearted fashion. Chapter 6 explores how regional responsibility is expressed in the context of Southeast Asia’s slow, incremental creep towards the pacific settlement of interstate disputes –​be they over trade or territory –​as part of a broader transition towards a rules-​oriented governance of regional relations. The chapter examines the nexus between sovereignty and responsibility, which is also partly manifested in the way regional

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

countries have coalesced around the notion of a rules-​based order in the Asia-​Pacific, where responsible stakeholders presumably abide by rules-​based governance, consensually agreed codes of interstate conduct and resort to peaceful means of dispute settlement. This includes ASEAN’s slow evolution towards a rules-​based regional governance and a ‘legal personality’ in the form of the ASEAN charter. It also looks at the increasing reliance by Southeast Asian countries on international dispute settlement regimes and mechanisms such as mediation, reconciliation, arbitration and/​or adjudication as means for resolving their disputes over trade and territory. Crucially, increasing reliance on peaceful means of dispute resolution does not automatically lead to a concomitant reduction in conflicts and disputes between regional countries; indeed, it might even engender more disputes because governments are now encouraged to raise issues in the mutual expectation that contending parties are unlikely to resort to war to settle their conflicts. Against the empirical case studies in responsible conduct undertaken by Southeast Asian states provided in those chapters, the next two chapters shift gears by critically examining philosophical foundations that underpin that responsible conduct. Chapter  7 explores the ways in which liberalism and communitarianism understand and advance their respective conceptions of sovereign responsibility. The chapter retraces an older debate over East Asia between liberals and communitarians that took place in the 1980s and 1990s when communitarian academics and policy practitioners promoted ‘Asian values’ as a counterpoint to Western liberal democracy and human rights. As a concept with Western roots, the R2P is very much grounded in liberal humanist principles, which run counter to the illiberalism that still characterizes parts of Southeast Asia’s political and diplomatic life (although economic liberalization is an established convention in the region notwithstanding the protectionist proclivities of some of the region’s economies). Although the Southeast Asian region has experienced a level of democratization, the persistence and prevalence of unresolved tensions and disputes over sovereignty among most if not all Southeast Asian states –​among themselves as well as with external powers such as China –​have both underscored for Southeast Asian states the continued relevance of the non-​intervention/​ non-​interference norm and hindered their full acceptance of the R2P. In recent times a growing number of scholars have fundamentally questioned the viability of a liberal basis for sovereign responsibility and more specifically the R2P, given what they see as the flaws in aspects of liberal international thought which could conceivably, and

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ironically, render R2P anti-​liberal in some respects.7 On the other hand, various Asian scholars (and some of their Western comrades in arms) have offered a communitarian apologia of illiberal societies and politics in Southeast Asia in the form of Asian values. This chapter assesses the pros and cons of adopting liberal and/​or communitarian bases for sovereign responsibility and the R2Provide in the Southeast Asian context –​importantly, Southeast Asia is replete with both liberal and communitarian features  –​and discusses the philosophical and theoretical difficulties associated with both those approaches that render them, at least in my view, inappropriate as grounds for a meaningful and relevant implementation of the R2Provide in Southeast Asia. Chapter 8 has two interrelated aims. Firstly, it introduces Emmanuel Levinas’ ‘responsibility for the other’ notion as an alternative to the liberal and communitarian conceptions of responsibility and sovereignty. Owing to the (in Levinas’ terms) ‘totalizing’ aims and logics inherent in liberal and communitarian ethics, both therefore begin with the assumption that responsibility is first and foremost to the self. As Jacques Derrida, commenting on Levinas’ ethics, once noted, responsibility to the other comes before everything else; it is the very thing that renders thought possible at all (Derrida, 1992a: 19). The chapter discusses a number of key features of Levinas’ ethical system: the place and role of hospitality, reciprocity and justice in the responsibility for the other. As powerful as Levinas’ ethics are, they are by no means flawless. An equally important development has been the attempts by interpreters and interlocutors of Levinas –​Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, John Caputo and Simon Critchley, among others –​to engage in sympathetic debate with his work, which has evoked interesting counterpoints to Levinas’ conceptions of hospitality and reciprocity as well as justice. Their efforts help to restrain and moderate Levinas’ idealism without necessarily taking things in overly pragmatic and/​or realist directions or, worse, blunting its moral force. Secondly, the chapter assesses the relevance of Levinas’ ethics to the questions of responsible sovereignty and the R2Provide in Southeast Asia. In particular, Levinas’ ideas (re)define the terms of the relationship between responsible providers and their recipients in three key ways: one, our assumptions and expectations over one’s extension of hospitality to one’s neighbours; two, the rethinking of mutuality and reciprocity between providers and recipients; and three, the ways in which the considerations for justice (as understood within Levinasian terms) play out within the Southeast Asian context. The chapter critically applies Levinas’ notion of the responsibility for the other to the various regional developments in defence and security

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

cooperation and in the pursuit by Southeast Asian countries of rules-​ based management of their diplomatic, economic and security relations mapped and traced in the earlier chapters. The contention here is not that the region already constitutes a mature zone of responsibility, where the conduct of regional states already reflects a relatively consistent adherence to the R2Provide ethic or, considerably more challenging, the almost otherworldly terms and conditions of Levinas’ responsibility for the other. At best, extant regional practices indicate an embryonic sense and selective displays and validations of responsible provision. Be that as it may, they highlight an outlook and conduct among Southeast Asian states that can no longer be satisfactorily understood and explained by the old ‘sovereignty as right’ construct. Nonetheless, as significant as regional progress in this respect has hitherto been, it is insufficient to the demands by the other, to borrow from Levinas. Hence, as a normative consideration, Levinasian ethics, balanced by the more pragmatic ‘corrections’ furnished by Levinas’ interlocutors, offers a new extended horizon towards which Southeast Asians can and should aspire beyond the limits of their present thinking on and practice of responsible sovereignty. Finally, Chapter 9 draws the study to a close with a summary of the book’s key claims and arguments. It also explores briefly whether the R2Provide, viewed through the lens of Levinas’ responsibility for the other, can ‘travel’ as a concept and practice beyond Southeast Asia.

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2

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Responses from Southeast Asia Introduction The principle of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P) is quite possibly the most important concept to be introduced in international relations in recent times. The aim of this chapter is to trace the emergence and evolution of this norm and to examine how it has fared in the context of Southeast Asia. The region’s reactions to it can best be described as ambivalent. On the one hand, they accept for the most part of the notion that states bear certain responsibilities to protect their people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity, and should seek international assistance and enhance their capacities to implement those responsibilities. On the other hand, they have expressed reservations over the supposition that unilateral decisive action –​including military action –​can and should be employed by the international community against errant states that fail to protect their own populations. The chapter concludes by arguing that its relative ambivalence towards the R2P does not, indeed should not, preclude Southeast Asia from embracing a form of responsible sovereignty that may not satisfy all the conditions of the R2P norm, but which speaks to the particular conditions of the region in question and, as a consequence, is no less significant to the region’s international relations.

Sovereignty: From right to responsibility Despite its exalted status within international law and international relations, the concept of sovereignty  –​ variously described as a

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

‘fundamental pillar of the international system’, a ‘basic element of the grammar of politics’, and the ‘grundnorm of international society’ –​ has also been declared ‘ambiguous’ and ‘fuzzy’ (Jackson, 1993: 431; Weber, 1995: 1; Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 2; Reus-​Smit, 2001: 519; Badescu, 2011: 20). As the international jurist Lassa Oppenheim has correctly noted, ‘there exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon’ (cited in Nagan and Hammer, 2004: 142). While it is probably appropriate and necessary for Alice in Wonderland to ask whether it is right that Humpty Dumpty can make any word mean whatever he chooses, the latter’s logic has prevailed over that of the former so far as the story of sovereignty goes. In his oft-​cited book Sovereignty: Organised hypocrisy, Stephen Krasner identifies at least four types of sovereignty, namely international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty: International legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty involve issues of authority and legitimacy, but not control. They both have distinct rules or logics of appropriateness. The rule for international legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended to territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. The rule for Westphalian sovereignty is the exclusion of external actors, whether de facto or de jure, from the territory of a state. Domestic sovereignty involves both authority and control, both the specification of legitimate authority within a polity and the extent to which that authority can be effectively exercised. Interdependence sovereignty is exclusively concerned with control and not authority, with the capacity of a state to regulate movements across its borders. (Krasner, 1999: 4) Those distinctions are important because, as Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg have argued, the sovereignty of states such as those in parts of the African continent and elsewhere in the developing world ‘derives more from right than from fact’. They write: The independence and survival of African states is not in jeopardy, however, because their sovereignty is not contingent on their credibility as authoritative and capable political structures. Instead, it is guaranteed by the world

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community of states, especially as embodied in the United Nations, whose egalitarian international norms are universally accepted. This world-​wide community has not only hastened the independence of many of these states, but has also collaborated with them to maintain their independence in spite of their disorganisation and fragility. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986: 2) Jackson would go on to develop further the notion that many states in the developing world  –​‘quasi-​states’ as he calls them  –​can and do exist more by the support and indulgence of the international community than by the abilities and efforts of their own governments and people (Jackson, 1993). But what is equally interesting about the acknowledgement that sovereignty in much of the Third World is a function of right rather than fact –​that is to say, a broad adherence to a norm that has little to no factual basis –​is its indirect allusion to the ostensible lack of ‘responsible’ governance by states, either because they are incapable or they are unwilling to govern responsibly. The focus on the Third World by scholars like Jackson, Rosberg and others as the host and site of ambivalent sovereignty is quite appropriate given the number of states therein that fit into the categories of quasi-​states and failing or failed states. In many if not most of these countries, they are not responsible providers of security but oftentimes the very vectors responsible for their own people’s suffering, whether through negligence or campaigns of intimidation and wrongful incarceration, possibly even extermination.1 On the other hand, they also include states that can no longer provide basic security to their people due to a rise in violence or extreme poverty, or they might have ceded control over part of their territories to domestic or foreign terrorist groups. Here enter the seminal contributions of Francis Deng, the Sudanese diplomat-​scholar, who first made the explicit connection between sovereignty and responsibility in a 1995 article, ‘Frontiers of Security’, wherein he identifies a series of contemporary challenges to state and society  –​violent internal conflicts, systematic violations of human rights, massive denials of democratic freedoms, and frustration of sustainable and environmentally sensitive development –​as ‘human rights tragedies of grave concern to the international community’ (Deng, 1995: 249). Or at least they should be. For Deng, the focus of attention is very much on the state, for which sovereignty ought to include its responsibilities and accountability to both domestic and international constituencies in ensuring such challenges are satisfactorily addressed or, failing that, their negative consequences are meaningfully

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

redressed. In 2007, Deng would assume the post of the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide –​upgraded to an undersecretary general position, purportedly to accommodate someone of Deng’s achievements and reputation. In 1996, Deng, together with a team of diplomats, officials and scholars, co-​authored an important study, Sovereignty as responsibility, published by the Washington-​based Brookings Institution, which sought to develop a concept of and practice in responsible sovereignty in the context of conflict management in Africa. According to Deng and his associates, the social contract struck between a state and its society presupposes that the former is obligated to ‘meet the needs’ of the latter, failing which –​and this is their central argument –​the state’s right to non-​ intervention from outside actors can and indeed should no longer be assured: Sovereignty is not merely the right to be undisturbed from without, but the responsibility to perform the tasks expected of an effective government. Normatively, to claim otherwise would be to lose sight of its purpose in the original context of the social contract, taking the means for the end … The state has the right to conduct its activities undisturbed from the outside when it acts as the original agent to meet the needs of its citizens. But that right is not license. It is merely –​and normally –​the obligation of the first resort, and it is dependent on the performance of the agent. If the obligation is not performed, the right to inviolability should be regarded as lost, first voluntarily as the state itself asks for help from its peers, and then involuntarily as it has help imposed on it in response to its own inactivity or incapacity and to the unassuaged needs of its own people. (Deng et al, 1996: xviii) In other words, the state’s failure to meet the needs of its own people, whether due to its inactivity or incapacity, carries with it consequences as a result of its inability or unwillingness to fulfil its sovereign responsibility to its own citizens. According to Deng and his associates, the premise of their ‘normative analysis’ is ‘to recognise internal conflicts and their consequences as falling within the domestic jurisdiction and therefore national sovereignty’ of the country concerned, and that ‘sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable’ (Deng et al, 1996: 1). Such accountability is not only to their own

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people but to the international community as well. Deng and his collaborators continue: ‘And they are accountable not only to their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its national sovereignty’ (Deng et al, 1996: 1). Accordingly, neighbouring states and the international community ‘cannot be indifferent to conditions in a given country, especially when the consequences of state performance affect their own situations and interests’ (Deng et al, 1996: 212). The latter part of their argument is important as Deng and colleagues have clarified that they are not making their claim solely on the basis of altruistic motives, ‘but also on mutual interests grounded in the fact that both the causes and consequences of conflict nearly always affect others, particularly at the regional level’ (Deng et al, 1996: 215). And notwithstanding their focus on conflict management, their particular conception of sovereignty as responsibility could likely accommodate non-​conflict scenarios such as natural disasters, many of which also have transnational or cross-​border, spill-​over effects. As such, they insist that states are therefore ‘accountable not only to their own national constituencies, but also to the regional and international communities from which they are inseparable’ (Deng et al, 1996: 212). Needless to say, this reasoning about sovereignty is a few big steps removed from Krasner’s international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, neither of which says anything about the specific duty of the state to care for and protect its people, let alone be held accountable to the international community for failing to do so. As we shall see later, the shift in conceptual focus from sovereignty as a right to sovereignty as a responsibility paved the way to the introduction of what was arguably the first big idea of the twenty-​first century for international relations and security, the responsibility to protect. Officially presented to the world on 1 January 2001 (ICISS, 2001), its grand entrance was rudely interrupted nine months later by the events of 9/​11, whose global impact would shape the development and direction of this principle in ways unanticipated by its architects and advocates (Weiss, 2006).

The R2P: A doctrine for the twenty-​first century? It has been said, correctly, that one of the biggest misconceptions about the R2P doctrine is that it is a ‘Western’ concept –​a view frequently portrayed by both its proponents as well as its detractors (Stuenkel, 2012). As Mabera and Spies have observed, in most debates about international norms, the notion of origin, or norm ownership, often

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crops up in literature on R2P (Mabera and Spies, 2016: 208). In the early days, the academic debate on R2P was dominated by scholars from the Global North. But that has changed over time; as Edward Luck, appointed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon as his special assistant for R2P, has argued, ‘the debate over [R2P] at the United Nations these days is South‒South and North‒North as much as North‒South’ (Luck, 2008: 2). Some prominent advocates have sought to emphasize the African roots of the R2P, presumably in an effort to prove its non-​Western credentials. Paul Williams, for example, has credited Africa with being ‘one of the most important crucibles in which [the R2P] was forged’ (Williams, 2009: 397). Similarly, Luck once declared that R2P ‘emerged, quite literally, from the soil and soul of Africa’ (cited in Mabera and Spies, 2016: 211). The norm has clearly been embraced by African regional organizations.2 On the other hand, it has been argued elsewhere that whilst the principle of humanitarian intervention that undergirds the R2P may have its basis in other societies, the way R2P has been appropriated and employed by Western powers, wrongly or otherwise, in their interventions over Libya, Iraq and Darfur effectively renders it a ‘Western’ idea (Stuenkel, 2012). The remainder of this section briefly examines how the R2P has been championed by its advocates, on one hand, and censured and even dismissed by its detractors on the other.

Championing the R2P Fairly or otherwise, the R2P has been described variously as the ‘most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in 360 years’, the ‘most dramatic development of our time –​comparable to the Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide’, an ‘idea [that] has moved faster or farther [than most] in the international normative arena’ (Weiss, 2006: 741), and a principle that ‘has begun to change the world’ (Axworthy and Rock, 2009: 69; Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 23; Bellamy, 2015:  111). As one known advocate has put it, the R2P ‘is not a principle/​norm in search of a self-​validating crisis [but] an attempt to find a new consensus on a rare but recurring problem, namely humanitarian atrocities which, in the age of an internationalised human conscience, are an increasing affront to modern sensibility for a growing number of people and countries’ (Thakur, 2015: 11). Notably, critics of the R2P are generally not in disagreement about the global impact of the norm. This seems to be true even among academics and scholars who debate the norm’s axioms, associated claims and impact. In theoretical terms, the doctrine and implementation of the R2P, it has

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been suggested, are crucial to the very development of constructivist IR because of its significance to constructivist scholarship on humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Finnemore, 2004). But while realists (and, indeed, some constructivists) disagree about the practical merits of the R2P and how best to realize the tackling of mass atrocities –​indeed, whether they should be tackled at all –​there appears to be general acceptance within the academic debate over the normative worth of the underlying ideal of the R2P (Hehir and Pattison, 2016: 145). As Western and Goldstein have averred: Humanitarian interventions involve an inherent contradi­ ction: they use violence in order to control violence. Setbacks are almost inevitable, and so it is no surprise that the operations often attract criticism. Yet when carried out thoughtfully, legitimately, and as part of a broader set of mechanisms designed to protect civilians, the use of military force for humanitarian purposes saves lives. (Western and Goldstein, 2011: 59) In The Responsibility to protect –​described in one instance as ‘the single most succinct and elegant theoretical tap-​root of [the R2P] doctrine as a whole’ (Cunliffe, 2016:  234)  –​the Canada-​sponsored ICISS report insisted that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians resided with the host state and that outside intervention could only be contemplated if the host proved either unwilling or unable to satisfy its responsibilities (ICISS, 2001: 17). Indeed, its endorsements by the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Security Council in 2005 have been taken by many as a demonstration of the broad consensus that the international community should be engaged in ‘protecting populations from grave harm’ (Wheeler, 2000: 34). The R2P was adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005. This development was followed a year later by the Security Council’s reaffirmation of the R2P through Resolution 1674 and the Council’s apparent willingness to adopt appropriate measures where necessary to get the job done (UN, 2006a). But rather than a wholesale acceptance of the recommendations made in the ICISS report, the UN member countries agreed instead to a version of the R2P which, on the one hand, employed the ICISS’s language on the R2P while, on the other hand, rejecting key components called for by the ICISS, such as including criteria to guide decisions on when to intervene, a code of conduct for the use of the veto, and the prospect for the conduct of interventions not sanctioned by the Security Council.

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The UN version of the R2P comprises four key points. Firstly, all states have a responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Secondly, the international community is duty-​bound to encourage and assist states to fulfil their putative responsibility, including by helping them to build the requisite capacity. Thirdly, the international community ought to employ, through the UN and/​or regional organizations, diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means –​and as a last resort, coercive means –​to protect populations from the four crimes mentioned earlier (UN, 2005:  30). These three ‘pillars’  –​ protective responsibilities of states (pillar 1), international assistance and capacity building (pillar 2), and timely and decisive response including military action (pillar 3) –​were further elaborated in the UN Secretary General’s report, entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, that was released in 2009 (UN, 2009: 2). Fourthly, the Security Council stands ready to adopt appropriate measures to achieve those same ends (UN, 2006b). Accordingly, rather than diluting the R2P as some have argued regarding the UN version of the principle, these four points have been viewed by others as proffering ‘a substantively stronger and more operational version’ of the R2P.3 In a more recent setting, Michael Ignatieff, who contributed to the ICISS report on the R2P, offered his version of the R2P as comprising the following three points: first, the intervention must seek the protection of the civilian population as a whole, not only part of it (such as a certain ethnic group); second, it must respond to an imminent and real threat or danger; and third, protection must be the real objective, not an excuse for spurious goals (Casla, 2014). It has been argued that regular inclusion of R2P language in Security Council resolutions suggests that the R2P has become commonplace in the Council’s internal negotiations. Although R2P advocates clearly recognize that the doctrine would only ever be one aspect of the Council’s decision-​making, its regular inclusion within the Council’s internal deliberations and resolutions implies that Council members are considering their responses within the remit of the R2P (Gifkins, 2016: 151). This is arguably supported by the fact that non-​ interference and sovereignty have evidently not had as significant an impact on efforts to promote the R2P at the UN,4 even as consensus on the R2P takes for granted the need for systematic exceptions to the norm of non-​intervention. As Simon Chesterman has argued, there is little evidence to suggest that concerns over sovereignty and non-​interference/​non-​intervention inhibit states from saving strangers when they have the means and will to do so (Chesterman, 2001: 231).

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And if it is political will, not sovereignty considerations, that ultimately determines whether states take up the humanitarian mantle to intervene –​whether the motivation to do so is humanitarian or self-​ interested –​then it is equally true of other humanitarian responsibilities that their realization ultimately depends on political will rather than sovereignty considerations. Despite this evident progress, there was considerably less to cheer about where the practical and political ramifications of efforts, half-​ hearted at best, to operationalize the norm are concerned. Forging agreement on an international norm is one thing. Ensuring its implementation and persuading states –​including those that support the R2P –​to act on their commitments is quite another. For example, in 2010 a ‘state of the doctrine’ report, as it were, on the R2P concluded that little progress had been achieved in the five years since the 2005 World Summit which adopted the R2P; for that matter, disagreements persisted over the function, meaning and proper use of the doctrine, whilst disquiet over its ramifications for sovereignty continued to linger (Bellamy, 2010: 144). Although the response of the 2009 UN General Assembly to the Secretary General’s report was mostly positive –​despite the General Assembly president’s attempt to rally support against the doctrine –​the practical record of its application, and in a number of instances perceived misappropriation, was much less stellar. It is worth noting, however, that disagreements abound on what precisely ‘crimes against humanity’ are, to what situations the R2P are most suitably applied, and what forms these applications ought to assume. Further, while international support for the first two pillars of the R2P amounts to a kind of global consensus, it is the third pillar, unsurprisingly, that has elicited the most opposition, not least (as we shall see later) from the Southeast Asian countries (RSIS, 2010a: 8). Attempts to apply the R2P in a cogent fashion have met with difficulties, among them the Security Council’s dithering over how it should respond to the genocide in Darfur (Badescu and Bergholm, 2009). As Thomas Weiss has wryly noted, ‘Plotting the growing consensus about [R2P] on a graph would thus reflect a steady growth since the early 1990s whereas the operational capacity and political will to engage in humanitarian intervention –​like the transformed humanitarian system –​would seem to be on a roller coaster’ (Weiss, 2006: 742). However, for critics such as David Chandler, rather than a moral shift away from the rights of sovereignty, the dominance of the R2P in fact reflects convergence and collusion between the liberal interventionist framework and the realist norms and needs of the very backers of the R2P doctrine (Chandler, 2004: 59).

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The general failure of states to implement the R2P was not the only problem confronting the norm. Another was the evident readiness by some policymakers to employ humanitarian explanations as post hoc rationales for war, as happened in the case of the US-​led war in and occupation of Iraq. This led to reluctance on the part of some European governments to endorse the R2P for fear of it being misappropriated to legitimize the Iraq War –​as apparently happened to Jean Chrétien, former prime minister of Canada, whose attempt to promote the R2P at a conference in England in 2003 was rebuffed by would-​be supporters concerned about potential use of the norm in relation to the war in Iraq (Thakur, 2003; also see Fake and Funk, 2009). For Gareth Evans, who co-​chaired the ICISS report, support for the R2P which either emphasizes military means over and above diplomatic and modalities not based on force or justifies war on humanitarian grounds is equally flawed and ultimately detrimental to the norm itself (Evans, 2007; Bajora, 2011). On the other hand, some well-​meaning supporters of the R2P, perhaps hoping to preserve the concept from being tainted by implementation failures, reportedly insisted that Darfur should not be considered a case study for the R2P since the crisis there emerged before the adoption of the World Summit’s Outcome document in 2005. There is little question that, as a global norm, the R2P is more than a mere idea; to all intents and purposes, it is neither a policy nor a strategy in the view of many analysts, partly because of the numerous conceptual and practical ambiguities that attend the idea (Focarelli, 2008: 213). In that respect, Ramesh Thakur, one of the authors of the ICISS report, has countered with the observation that whilst the R2P might be seen by academic scholars as conceptually contested and politically controversial, policymakers do not contest the principle itself even though they might quibble over how best to implement it and what oversight and safeguards would best prevent its abuse by users with ulterior motives (Thakur, 2015: 11). Be that as it may, in the light of the US-​led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ‘war on terror’ fought in response to the 9/​11 attacks against the US, some analysts believe that national interests and humanitarianism have merged for many Western states (Bellamy, 2005; Wheeler and Bellamy, 2005: 572). According to this logic, the strategic imperative to prevent terrorism, on the one hand, necessarily entails a humanitarian imperative to prevent state failure on the other. It could also be that doctrines of preventive war in general pave the way to increased humanitarian intervention through weakening respect for and observance of sovereignty (Farer, 2003: 80). But whether this means that Western states are potentially more likely to respond decisively

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to humanitarian crises in the post-​9/​11 era than they were before it remains unclear (Bellamy, 2005: 37). This raises the question whether a decisive response must necessarily entail taking timely and direct action in response to humanitarian crises. For example, the academic debate over the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in late 2010, spilled over to five other countries –​Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain –​but faded by mid-​2012, touched on these very concerns, as reflected in the following observation: The Arab Spring has therefore given rise to several [R2P] cases under ‘pillar one’ of the doctrine as outlined in the 2009 report by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) –​‘the protection responsibilities of states’  –​where states are required to ensure that their own populations are not subject to war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Many have failed in this responsibility. This has meant that the international community has a remedial, international responsibility to respond, under R2P’s ‘pillar two’ if possible  –​international assistance and capacity-​ building –​but most clearly under ‘pillar three’ –​‘timely and decisive response’. (Hehir and Pattison, 2016: 142) On the other hand, it has also been argued that the R2P norm should not be seen as requiring the responsibility to always engage in direct action to address ongoing mass atrocities  –​so long as there is no appropriate course of action that would be better than doing nothing –​ but there is clearly a responsibility to try (Glanville, 2016:  191). According to Glanville, it is false to suggest that the absence of military intervention in Syria represents a violation of the R2P norm, since the norm does not require imprudent action that would likely do more harm than good. That said, Glanville concedes that the undeniable failure of the international community to discharge its responsibility to do what it can, short of military intervention, to protect the people of Syria since the crisis erupted in 2011 represents a violation of the R2P (Glanville, 2016: 185).

Critiquing the R2P Critics of the R2P argue that despite its acceptance at the 2005 World Summit, the norm has been resisted, not least by the great powers themselves. This much is clear from the inability or unwillingness of the great powers, most visible during UN Security Council deliberations,

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to agree on when and how to implement the principle. Before the UN General Assembly in September 2013, Simon Adams, the director of the Global Centre for R2P, stated that ‘the failure to halt mass atrocities in Syria is not a failure of the Responsibility to Protect, but a failure of the Security Council to live up to its most fundamental responsibilities’ (Adams, 2013). A similar logic appeared to be at work in the Council’s response to the Darfur genocide. For example, Resolution 1706, which took six months to find agreement –​and even then with abstentions from China, Qatar and Russia –​owing to dispute among Council members over the R2P, was described as one of the ‘worst Security Council resolutions ever’ as its mandate of legally binding peacekeeping essentially could not be implemented (Lynch, 2010). Claims such as that rendered by Adams have been viewed with scepticism by R2P critics, who argue that since the R2P has been promoted by its advocates as a norm comprising recommendations as to how states should behave, then it stands to reason that inaction by Council members over the plight of the Syrian people represents neglect if not rejection of the norm (Hehir, 2016: 178). Indeed, it has been argued that while a partial consensus among liberal states over humanitarian intervention emerged in the 1990s that led to their sanctioning of the NATO intervention in Kosovo –​which an international commission ruled as ‘illegal’ but ‘legitimate’ owing to its ‘compelling moral purpose’ (IICK, 2000: 4; Bellamy, 2005: 34; Clark, 2005: 212) –​that consensus dissipated by the 2000s in the wake of the war on terror and the credibility crisis surrounding the US and the UK over their roles in the invasion of Iraq. Why international support for the humanitarian intervention agenda seems to have dried up could be due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the US and the UN are simply exhausted by their long preoccupation over Afghanistan, Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, and therefore no longer have the stomach for humanitarian intervention (Weiss, 2004:  135). According to David Chandler, the desire to evade international responsibility lies at the heart of the paradox of the R2P doctrine, which explains the gap between the rhetorical promise of ‘never again’, on the one hand, and the reality of the lack of political will to intervene on the other (Chandler, 2009). Secondly, the justification by the US and its partners of its attack against Iraq on humanitarian grounds was seen by critics of the Iraq War as an abuse of the concept of humanitarianism, which (as Gareth Evans once lamented) effectively sullied the R2P principle (Evans, 2004). The NATO-​led military intervention in Libya in March 2011, which ended in late October that same year with the death of Muammar Gaddafi, exacerbated for many the sense that the R2P doctrine was

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little more than a convenient excuse for Western powers to rid the world of troublesome leaders and regimes that do not support Western interests.5 Justin Morris has gone as far as to argue that ‘the non-​ consensual, coercive military aspects’ of the R2P should be excised in order to salvage the doctrine from the toxicity of its post-​Libya state (Morris, 2016: 201). Fairly or otherwise, the humanitarian mantle is seen by some critics as little more than camouflage –​a ‘Trojan horse’ even (Bellamy, 2005)  –​for ‘oil-​g reedy’ and ‘anti-​Islamic’ Western powers to extend their ‘neo-​imperialist’ control over the Middle East and other parts of the world (Bricmont, 2007). While Bellamy feels that some of these arguments overstate the extent of humanitarian intervention prior to 9/​11, he acknowledges that the effort to link humanitarianism and the Iraq War has nonetheless impacted on the international debate on the Darfur crisis, unresolved since it started in 2003, because the ‘responsibility to protect’ language has now enabled anti-​ interventionists to legitimise arguments against action by claiming that primary responsibility in certain contested cases still lies with the state, and not (yet) with an international body. Given the credibility crisis confronting some of the leading advocates of humanitarian intervention, there is a real danger that appeals to a responsibility to protect will evaporate amid disputes about where that responsibility lies. (Bellamy, 2005: 33, emphasis original) Ironically, the effort to ensure that states do not abuse the R2P to justify intervention has led to setting the bar high, perhaps overly high in the view of some, such that the rigorous criteria for intervention has effectively discouraged support for intervention even when conditions warrant it.6 Elsewhere Bellamy has observed that there is an inherent tension between The Responsibility to Protect’s two strategies:  one aimed at enabling ‘genuine’ humanitarian interventions, the other at preventing ‘abuse’. The problem of indeterminacy means that there is nothing to prevent states from using the latter mechanism to prevent action in supreme humanitarian emergencies by, for example, arguing that the just cause threshold had not been crossed or that the host state rather than the Security Council should take measures to remedy the problem. (Bellamy, 2006: 148)

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This implies that rather than the egregious use of the R2P language by states against legitimate intervention, the moral consensus on the criteria for the R2P would in fact render it more, not less, difficult for states to justify their interventions on humanitarian grounds (Thakur, 2004). There is another plausible reason why states are quite happy to maintain a high bar for R2P implementation: it could prove costly to the intervening state in so many ways. As Glanville has suggested: [T]‌he R2P norm entails a positive duty. That is, rather than a duty to refrain from doing something abhorrent, it is a duty to do something good. It requires that states take action on behalf of the international community to protect vulnerable people beyond their borders. This positive-​duty norm exists in potential conflict with other cherished norms and values. Action to protect those beyond borders can be risky and costly in terms of blood and treasure. The normative impulse to act may therefore be undercut by felt duties to protect one’s own military forces and to preserve the well-​being of one’s own political community. In some situations, action thought necessary to protect distant populations will be opposed by constituencies within the target state. Thus, the R2P norm may be found in tension with well-​established norms of nonintervention and self-​ determination. (Glanville, 2016: 191) Not only is the implementation of R2P potentially costly; it is also not entirely obvious that the use of military force to achieve humanitarian objectives actually works. As Roland Paris has argued, the idea of preventive humanitarian intervention through the use of military force is in itself inimical to the R2P, and nowhere is this more apparent (as Chandler has also shown) than in the retreat by states from the transformative aspirations of liberal internationalism as a consequence of the problems wrought by military interventions conducted ostensibly for humanitarian reasons (Chandler, 2015: 1). For Paris, the assumed link between external military action and the desired outcome of preventing or stopping mass killing is complicated hugely by a number of fundamental and seemingly irremediable tensions, which together cast doubt on the feasibility of preventive humanitarian intervention and on the long-​term prospects of the R2P (Paris, 2014). Furthermore, it has been argued that far from embodying hopes for progress, the reframing of state power and political practice that lies at the core of the R2P perversely renders the exercise of power by states

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less accountable, and therefore less responsible. Granted, the R2P has been seen by some as an argument for law-​making by the Western elite (Chandler, 2002: 135). If so, then the implication here seems to be that the law which those Western elites are seeking to establish could have a contradictory and counterproductive effect that runs against the aim to develop and inculcate greater accountability and responsibility among non-​Western states. For example, according to Philip Cunliffe, by emphasizing the security and protection functions of state sovereignty at the expense of its representative functions, the R2P effectively restructures the operation of political power to produce what he calls a ‘dual paternalism’: on the one hand, the paternalism of strong states over weaker states; on the other hand, the paternalism of states over their people. As such, R2P ultimately dilutes the political responsibilities that states owe their people (Cunliffe, 2016: 235). It does this in a number of ways. Firstly, the doctrine shifts the onus of justification for intervention from the intervening state to the state being intervened in (Chandler, 2004). In other words, with the establishment of legitimate intervention comes not only a concomitant relaxing of any requirement on the intervening state to defend its violation of the non-​intervention principle, but, paradoxically, a growing demand on the state being intervened in to defend why it is entitled to be free from external interference (Stahn, 2007: 199). In a similar vein, Chandler has argued that the 2009 UN document on R2P effectively delinked military intervention from the R2P and focused instead on the national responsibilities of non-​Western states and regional responsibilities of non-​Western regions (Chandler, 2009). This is supported by Mark Duffield’s observations on the shift in the liberal way of development from the focus on security of states to that of the people living within them (Duffield, 2010), and hence facilitating the R2P’s emphasis on state responsibilities. Taking a page from the notion of the encroachment on ‘negative rights’ such as civil liberties, the demand placed on any state to justify its domestic political authority to other states essentially denies that state its rights in the international sphere that derive solely by virtue of its representing a given people. This argument is indirectly supported by the following observation from Deng and associates, who suggest that it cannot be assumed that just because people suffer at the hands of an inept or cruel government, they would automatically welcome external intervention and assistance, even if it were undertaken to ensure their own safety and security: Whether international involvement in a domestic problem is strategically motivated or driven by humanitarian concerns,

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it nearly always evokes a reaction that is both appreciative of assistance and hostile to foreign intervention. It could indeed be conjectured that when the state fails to honour the responsibilities of national sovereignty, the people will retain their consciousness of pride, honour, and independence, despite their need for external help. (Deng et al, 1996: xvi) Be that as it may, inherent within the logic of humanitarian intervention is a contradiction. Granted, as just noted, R2P places the onus on targets of intervention to justify why international intervention should not be taken against them. However, the assumption of guilt already elides any possibility that targeted states can effectively defend themselves against the allegation or indeed judgement that they have behaved irresponsibly towards their people and hence ‘deserve’ to be intervened in. Against the oft-​heard but unfair criticism that the non-​intervention principle only enables states to perpetrate genocide, Henkin has argued that behind arguments on behalf of humanitarian intervention lies the inherent assumption ‘that no individual state can be trusted with authority to judge and determine wisely’ (Henkin, 1999: 825). Secondly, by insisting that states are duty-​bound to protect their people, the R2P creates a major problem for democratic legitimacy through tying the provision of internal security to the state’s international obligations because it demands that states be responsible for people rather than to their people (Etzioni, 2006a: 72). According to Cunliffe, ‘Perversely being forced to take greater account of the international community could weaken a state’s commitment to its own people’ (Cunliffe, 2016: 238). Thirdly, R2P advocates argue that the ‘doctrine of national sovereignty in its absolute and unqualified form’ should be done away with –​not without cause since it is often upon that logic that rulers have done morally reprehensible things to their citizens –​because, as the 2001 ICISS report has put it, even the ‘strongest supporters’ of state sovereignty do not ‘claim … the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people’ (ICISS, 2001: 8; Weiss, 2007: 24). Yet this perspective seems to ignore the fact that popular sovereignty equally relies on the claim to absolute power and authority as a precondition for the exercise of popular will. Short of doing away with sovereignty, it does seem that R2P advocacy has had a potentially adverse impact on the principle of non-​intervention, to the point where legitimate reasons for its exercise have been called into question as a consequence of important developments in support of humanitarian intervention. Andrea Talentino has made the interesting

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observation that ever since US President Bill Clinton publicly apologized for failing to halt atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, among Western powers the presumption has been that non-​intervention has become a question of circumstance and expediency rather than a recognition of the classical right to non-​intervention (Talentino, 2005: 89). In short, it is no longer norms that will halt intervention but rather expediency. Whether or not one agrees with Talentino’s observation, there is a sense that the notion of the humanitarian emergency –​‘supreme humanitarian emergency’, in Wheeler’s terms (Wheeler, 2001)  –​ has assumed a salience and significance in a way and on a level not encountered or experienced before in the history of international relations.7 Such an elevation of a concept brings with it important political ramifications. As Jean Cohen has argued, ‘interventions are presented as supreme emergencies so as to block legal formalisation of rules that could carefully circumscribe exceptions to the nonintervention principle by articulating the proper authority to make the decision and the thresholds or criteria and procedures that should guide it, as well as accountability mechanisms for such decisions’ (Cohen, 2006: 496–​7). If, as noted earlier, the R2P could end up paradoxically encouraging unaccountability and irresponsibility by the very actors the norm was designed to discipline and educate, then the argument that the R2P should be treated as an ‘exceptional’ principle freed from the typical international diplomatic‒legal parameters that constrain most global norms, simply because it addresses supreme humanitarian emergencies (Cunliffe, 2017), implies that its proponents view the R2P as ‘above the law’. Fairly or otherwise, Cunliffe’s perspective can perhaps be considered part of a broader claim rendered by the so-​called ‘new sovereigntists’, who articulate a widely held view that humanitarian intervention –​and global governance more generally –​are inherently undemocratic because they undermine popular sovereignty (Spiro, 2000). Others, however, believe that in the contemporary era of increasing interdependence, the empirical conditions that facilitate the conceptions of democracy on which popular sovereignty stand no longer obtain (Goodhart and Taninchev, 2011). If anything, those conceptions appear incoherent and untenable against the challenges wrought by globalization. Ultimately, while the advocates of humanitarian intervention and the R2P are not incorrect in their insistence that sovereignty is equally about responsibility as much as right, the likelihood, as the review of the debates over the R2P has shown, is that some of the champions of the R2P norm have effectively

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and egregiously privileged responsibility over rights to such lengths that the rightful place of power in international affairs has almost been forgotten.8 Looking beyond these problems, Oliver Richmond argues that the liberal peace’s squandering of its moral capital has in fact opened up space for the search for alternative and hybrid forms of peace, which he sees as complementing the liberal state and the liberal peace project in certain ways but going beyond it in other ways (Richmond, 2009, 2010).

Southeast Asian responses to the R2P At the 2005 World Summit, all ten Southeast Asian countries unexpectedly adopted the R2P doctrine concerning the protection of populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity (UN, 2005). Their responses to UN Security Council Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed the R2P and endorsed the use of appropriate measures where necessary to ensure its implementation, were however lukewarm. As noted in the preceding section, the publication of the UN Secretary General’s 2009 report on R2P identified three key considerations aimed at operationalizing the norm, namely the protective responsibilities of states vis-​à-​vis their own populations, the obligation of states to seek international assistance and build their capacity to protect, and the need for timely and decisive responses –​ including military action  –​by the international community against irresponsible states (UN, 2009). It was that third pillar, the legitimation of robust and forceful interventionism, which Southeast Asian governments found particularly worrisome (RSIS, 2010a). The issue was further complicated by the UN Security Council’s indecisiveness over Darfur and the US-​led coalition’s invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, both of which, among other things, posed significant problems for the conceptual integrity of the R2P (Weiss, 2006). The shared caginess towards external military intervention among the Southeast Asians implied a collective adherence to sovereignty as the right of nations rather than a responsibility to the people they represent, as well as a common aversion to possible negative effects on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ principle of non-​ interference (RSIS, 2010b: 5). As a former Singapore minister once urged his Southeast Asian colleagues, any deviation from their regional organization’s longstanding emphasis on the doctrines of sovereignty and non-​interference would prove injurious to the region’s stability, since the upkeep of those principles constitutes ‘the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries

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since the founding of ASEAN’ (ASEAN, 1997). Arguably, even the academic consensus on ASEAN has continually fostered the impression, correct or otherwise, that Southeast Asian states rarely flout their non-​ interference norm (Narine, 2012; Jones, 2010). This is not to imply that developed countries thereby harbour no sovereignty-​related concerns with respect to the R2P. On the contrary, major powers of the Global North, which tend to see sovereignty in terms of the freedom of policy choice and less so territorial integrity, have been reluctant to endorse the R2P if that meant the automatic curtailment of their freedom of action (Luck, 2009: 11). For example, it has been argued that states avoid accepting protective responsibilities for fear of being obliged to act robustly in response to similar cases (Pattison, 2010). Indeed, it seems the region’s ambivalence towards the R2P has been vindicated by the latter’s weak track record in practice. In the view of many, despite the apparent widespread global support for the R2P, the dramatic increase in organized or state-​sponsored violence in the past several years exposes the pronounced lack of will among the global community to respond to crises (Melander, Pettersson and Themner, 2016). Proponents of the R2P see this not as a failure of the principle as much as the failure of states to adhere to it. As Simon Adams, the head of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, has contended, ‘The failure to end atrocities and protect civilians in Syria is not a failure of [R2P], but of the imperfect actors and institutions charged with its implementation’ (Adams, 2015: 3). Elsewhere, concern over international inaction over the Syrian crisis even led a small group of countries, the ‘Small Five’ of Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, to table a resolution before the UN General Assembly in March 2006 calling for reform of the workings of the Security Council to limit the use of the veto and enhance transparency and accountability. Later, in May 2012, the Small Five would call on the Permanent Five members of the Council to mind the misuse of their veto powers over crises involving genocide and crimes against humanity (Plett, 2012). However, against this oft-​ heard defence of the R2P, critics have countered that if state behaviour impelled the emergence of the R2P, but there is no commensurate change in the behaviour of states despite their rhetoric, then it is fair to conclude that the concept has indeed failed (Hehir, 2016). Those critics further argue that what has also hurt the R2P is the evident hubris of some of its proponents, ‘who overconfidently insisted that [R2P] had been invoked when it hadn’t and that it existed where it didn’t’ (Kersten, 2015), thereby raising unwarranted expectations about the principle’s implementation and, in a sense, setting it up for failure.

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Intriguingly, the respective positions of Southeast Asian states on the R2P reflect an interesting diversity, ranging from democratic Indonesia’s ambivalence to the concept to illiberal Singapore’s involvement in the ‘Group of Friends’ of the R2P, which aims to facilitate dialogue between likeminded states at the level of the permanent missions to the UN (Tan, 2011: 205). Nominally, Southeast Asian states can be distinguished between those willing to support the R2P –​albeit to varying extents –​and those who seem undecided. The Philippines is unique in having openly advocated, at least for a time, the R2P during its stint in the UN Security Council in the period leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1674. From a peak in 2004, Manila had, by the end of 2005, significantly reduced its usage of related language in Security Council debates and even privately resisted attempts to persuade the Council to reaffirm R2P immediately after the World Summit. This abrupt change may have resulted either from the Philippines’ departure from the Council in 2005, or from growing concern over the potential use of R2P by outside actors in order to criticize the Philippine government or intervene in the increasingly troubled peace process in Mindanao (Bellamy and Davies, 2009: 555). Be that as it may, the Philippines has consistently expressed initiatives in support of the implementation of R2P, such as capacity building, interfaith dialogue, creation of rapidly deployable reserve forces for peace operations and so forth. In 2009, the Philippines joined the Group of Friends of R2P. For its part, Thailand has also adopted a mixed position vis-​à-​vis the R2P. While Bangkok has shown some willingness to support the international community in the implementation of R2P through UN humanitarian operations, it has shown no inclination whatsoever of being willing to define any of its own internal security problems in terms of the R2P (Kraisoraphong, 2012). There are also important variations among the supporters of the principle. Notwithstanding its reputation as Southeast Asia’s only consolidated democracy, Indonesia demonstrated cautious support for R2P, but sought greater clarity on situations where the use of force might be appropriate, so as to avoid any misapplication. On the other hand, illiberal Singapore saw fit to join the Group of Friends. Indeed, both Indonesia and Singapore registered verbal support for the concept at the 2009 UN General Assembly session which debated the R2P. In the case of Indonesia, it has been argued that civil society has pressured the Indonesian government not only to show more robust support for the R2P but to be accountable to its declared acceptance of the principle.9 Vietnam started off as a ‘fence-​ sitter’ with some serious reservations over the idea as a justification for

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pre-​emptive attacks against itself. At the same time, it used the same General Assembly session to signal a significant change of mind and subsequently evolved, at the very least rhetorically, into an engager (Tan, 2011:  205–​6). But just how relevant these shows of support really were, in the eyes of critics, was partially discredited by Myanmar, whose political and practical opposition to the idea –​without explicitly rejecting it –​was ‘balanced’, as it were, by its ostensible support for it in 2009 (Bellamy and Beeson, 2010). Finally, the other Southeast Asian countries have remained more or less noncommittal. That said, despite their relative unease with the R2P, Southeast Asian states do not appear to reject altogether the idea of sovereignty qua responsibility –​at least not in its broadest sense. The foregoing discussion suggests that while Southeast Asians, in real policy terms, have neither fully embraced the R2P nor shown any willingness to do so in the foreseeable future, they are not necessarily averse to the notion of responsibility (Bellamy and Beeson, 2010). This incipient openness has been seen by some to mean that the region is effectively seeking a kind of accommodation between the two apparently competing principles –​the R2P and its emphasis on humanitarian intervention, on one hand, and the longstanding principle of non-​interference on the other –​and the evolutionary impact each is exerting on the other. Thus understood, the R2P has arguably been amended to limit its capacity to legitimize coercive interference, whereas non-​interference is in the process of being readjusted ‘to permit expressions of concern, offers of assistance and even the application of limited diplomatic pressure in response to major humanitarian crises. Thus, whilst the region remains largely hostile to doctrinal revisions to noninterference, subtle changes are evident in practice’ (Bellamy and Drummond, 2011: 179). If, as Deng and his associates have proposed, sovereignty as responsibility implies that national governments ‘are duty bound to ensure minimum standards of security and social welfare for their citizens and be accountable both to the national body politic and the international community’, it is arguably a normative basis on which the governments of Southeast Asian countries would readily agree and to which they seek to adhere (Deng et al, 1996: 211).10 Needless to say, not all analysts share the view that recent efforts to rein in the expressly coercive aspects of the R2P involve the willingness of Southeast Asian states to make accommodations. Arguing that the R2P norm has in fact not been localized in Southeast Asia and that all efforts have been on the part of external R2P advocates to make the norm more palatable to a region stubbornly resistant to change, David Capie offers the following observation:

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Constitutive localisation requires the active borrowing of transnational norms by local or regional actors who build congruence with local practices. Although some regional states have used the language of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ there are few signs that local actors are driving the reception of the norm in the region, nor have they institutionalised it. Rather, outsider proponents are the primary advocates and the norm lacks a champion or well-​connected ‘insider’ proponent among regional governments or civil society groups. Second, despite an energetic campaign by advocates, emphasising consensual and capacity building activities, many governments are still wary of [R2P] as a potential threat to sovereignty and regime security. As a result, regional states have taken an ‘à la carte’ approach to [R2P], accepting aspects of the [R2P] agenda that they find least threatening or that support their national interests, while ignoring or quietly resisting those they find challenging. Rather than localisation, what we are seeing with respect to [R2P] in Southeast Asia is a dramatic change in the way outsiders are reframing the norm. (Capie, 2012: 75) Sharing Capie’s doubts, the Indonesian scholar-​diplomat Rizal Sukma, who formerly headed the Jakarta-​based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), contends that despite Southeast Asia’s adoption of the R2P at the 2005 World Summit, there has been no significant effort among regional countries –​or indeed by ASEAN –​to deliberate how the norm might be applicable to the region. That said, Sukma allows for the possibility of change given the establishment of new institutional forms, mechanisms and blueprints within ASEAN, which in his view arguably create opportunities for introducing norms like the R2P into the region and through which the R2P could conceivably be localized to cohere with indigenous conventions and practices. For Herman Kraft, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is emblematic of these new and potentially transformative institutional forms because, so far as the R2P is concerned, the AICHR is the immediate manifestation of the ASEAN declaration of support for the promotion and protection of human rights in the region (Kraft, 2012). In similar fashion, Sukma has suggested that a logical platform to launch ‘the mainstreaming of [R2P] in ASEAN’s discourse and practice’ would be the ASEAN Political-​ Security Community (APSC), not least because the APSC –​an idea

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for which Sukma can rightly take credit as an originator  –​shares some common features with the R2P, but it could also ‘provide broad and indirect support for building the capacity of States to recognise, prevent and respond to the situations of conflict’ (Sukma, 2012: 135). Notwithstanding the merits of both these proposals, the postponement of the establishment of the ASEAN Community –​of which the APSC is one of three sub-​communities, the others being the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community (ASCC) –​from its original launch date of 2015 to 2025, and the apparent lack of commitment shown by Southeast Asian governments to the AICHR,11 render them somewhat moot. But all is not lost, at least according to Kraft, who has argued the following at least where the AICHR is concerned: Though criticised as ‘lacking in teeth’ especially on the provisions that have to do with the protection of human rights, the AICHR’s mandated functions are very generally ambiguous in the way they are presented in its Terms of Reference [TOR]. These ‘ambiguities’ arguably open up the interpretation of its functions to a more liberal perspective, more so in terms of opening the envelope on the protective functions of the AICHR. In the same context, the same ambiguities in the TOR of the AICHR may be utilised as entry points for introducing elements of [R2P] into the region. It also illustrates the need to consider a strategy of incremental localisation in pushing the normalisation of [R2P] in Southeast Asia. (Kraft, 2012: 27) Furthermore, it has also been noted that the Southeast Asian region has not been void of attempts at the highest levels to introduce and circulate what might be broadly construed as ‘constructive norms’, just not the R2P itself. As Acharya has observed, Asia differs markedly from Africa in that the former has few insider proponents of the R2P (Acharya, 2015:  68–​9). Notable exceptions have included Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, who proposed the idea of ‘constructive intervention’, or the late Surin Pitsuwan, the former Thai foreign minister and ASEAN Secretary General, who tweaked Anwar’s idea and named it ‘flexible engagement’ (Acharya, 2009: 126–​30). Yet none of these ideas approximate those furnished by African leaders and policymakers, who have advocated options ranging from military intervention to hard peacekeeping (Nkiwane, 2001; Bamidele, 2017).12

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Conclusion If the soul of the R2P has African (and hence non-​Western) origins, then the relative ambivalence of Southeast Asian countries towards the R2P might seem a tad odd to the casual observer. But lest this observation leads one too readily to the conclusion –​not incorrectly so  –​that the localization of the norm faces tremendous resistance primarily because the region’s national governments remain jealously wedded to the non-​interference principle, it nevertheless runs the risk of missing out on regional developments that, as the following chapters of this book argue, reflect the embryonic existence of an ethic of responsible sovereignty. Worse, it also risks unfairly conflating Southeast Asia with Africa. To be sure, Southeast Asian ambivalence to the norm clearly has something to do with regional concerns over the prospect of Western interference –​as suggested by the R2P-​related debates regarding the appropriate post-​crisis response to Cyclone Nargis, which devastated huge swathes of Myanmar in 2008, as we shall see later in this book (Caballero-​Anthony and Chng, 2009; Haacke, 2009a). And in the light of Africa’s embrace of the R2P, Southeast Asia’s half-​hearted disposition stands in marked contrast; as Capie has noted, unlike Africa or Latin America, there is no Southeast Asian state that has decided to place the R2P at the heart of its foreign policy and advocate for its adoption (Capie, 2012). Perhaps, with the ways in which development and security are intertwined in the Southeast Asian context (Dewitt and Hernandez, 2003), the region’s circumspection with R2P is in a sense understandable. Yet this should not lead one to a forced either/​or conclusion about where Southeast Asia precisely stands so far as ethics and responsibility go. In other words, regional ambivalence towards the R2P does and should not automatically be taken to mean that Southeast Asians eschew all meaningful semblances of sovereignty as responsibility in their regional relations. But whether that should rightly include coercive intervention/​interference remains to be seen. As the thesis of this book has it, where Southeast Asia is concerned, the space between a non-​negotiable adherence to non-​interference, on the one hand, and a responsibility towards one’s neighbours that includes coercive interference, on the other, is neither narrow nor negligible. This much is implicit in Deng’s acknowledgement of the tension, as he sees it, inherent in the unilateral exercise of one’s sovereign responsibility against a recipient state, and the obtaining the consensual agreement of that recipient state to do so. In his 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, Deng argued that ‘issues could not be left

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entirely to the states to manage’, because if their people were suffering and dying and their governments stand idly by, ‘the world would not watch and do nothing. They would find a way of getting involved’ (Deng, 2010: 10). On the other hand, he also said, ‘We cannot live on ideals that cannot be fulfilled. We have to aspire to the ideals, but we have to deal with the reality on the ground. And the reality on the ground is that we need the cooperation of the member states to fulfil our mission’ (Deng, 2010: 13). In a similar fashion, calling for a ‘higher degree of cooperation and a combination of common sense and compassion’, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the former UN Secretary General, contended back in 1991 that ‘we need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights … What is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies’ (de Cuellar, 1991: 14, emphasis added).13 It is clearly an aspiration Southeast Asians have yet to realize. But as contemporary regional developments suggest, nor have they shied away from it.

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3

Towards a ‘Responsibility to Provide’ (R2Provide) in Southeast Asia Introduction With few exceptions,1 one of the unfortunate consequences of scholarship on the R2P and Southeast Asia is its conclusion, tacit or otherwise, that the region’s weak acceptance of the R2P norm effectively denotes the relative absence of a responsible form of sovereignty there. Nonetheless, it has taken a while for the region to talk openly about what responsibility in its neck of the woods looks like or could conceivably look like, not least because security matters have long remained (and in some ways, still remain) the near exclusive preserve of policymakers and the academics and policy intellectuals who study and pontificate about it (Acharya, 2003a). As we shall see later, among the many regional developments in Southeast Asia, the region-​wide debate among academics and policy practitioners that arose in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated huge swathes of Myanmar in May 2008, was among the most useful in helping Southeast Asian leaders clarify what responsible sovereignty in their regional context could conceivably look like. Accordingly, Southeast Asian governments ought to exercise their sovereign obligation to provide for the security and well-​being of their respective populations. However, in the relative absence of any such ability, governments ought to do their utmost to ensure that other resources are brought to bear in realizing those same objectives. What this book calls the ‘responsibility to provide’ –​or the ‘R2Provide’ –​can be defined, in the words of a former defence minister from Southeast Asia, as ‘a responsibility of all national governments to provide for the

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welfare of the people. If they are not able to provide for it, then it is their responsibility to see what other resources they can garner to help provide for the people’ (Teo, 2008). However, as will be argued later, such a narrow and ultimately self-​ serving definition is insufficient, not least because it does not fully accord with the actions and activities of Southeast Asian countries themselves in their efforts as responsible providers. Granted, there is no question that when measured against the more exacting standards set by R2P, whatever sense of national and regional responsibility inherent and emergent within Southeast Asia falls short of the former. Yet it is by no means insignificant, especially seen in the light of the region’s complex and difficult history of intramural tensions and disputes. The region’s susceptibility to transnational challenges –​financial crisis in 1997; Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004; earthquakes and cyclones/​ typhoons; militancy and terrorism; piracy in the Malacca Straits; and so forth  –​has evoked a sense of shared vulnerability and common aversion, which can only be successfully addressed if the Southeast Asian countries and their external partners work together, whether on a bilateral basis or through the suite of ASEAN-​based regional arrangements including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and the ADMM-​Plus (both discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Crucially, these frameworks are not conceived merely as arrangements that benefit individual recipient Southeast Asian countries, but which contribute to the well-​being of the whole Southeast Asian region. Simply put, it is not just a question of getting the help of outside powers to enable Southeast Asian states to help themselves, but to help them help others. This chapter examines particular forms of regional responsibility that have evolved in the light of the growing shared awareness and collective conviction among Southeast Asian countries. The illustrations highlighted later –​economic multilateralism to avert future financial crisis, regional diplomacy and humanitarian assistance to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis, defence and security collaboration against the evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, and an embryonic human rights regime placed under severe strain by the Rohingya refugee crisis –​tell a mixed story that reflects the limits to the national and collective capacities and wills of Southeast Asian countries.

Sovereignty and responsibility in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ‘ASEAN way’? As noted in Chapter 2, Southeast Asians share a wariness over the R2P’s third pillar, which justifies military intervention against states deemed

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unable or unwilling to care for their own populations. Their wariness reflects a collective adherence to sovereignty as the right of nations rather than a responsibility to the people they represent, as well as a common aversion to possible negative effects on the ASEAN principle of non-​ interference, whose upkeep, according to a former Southeast Asian leader, has been ‘the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of ASEAN’ (ASEAN, 1997). As a legal principle, non-​interference has long stood alongside other social norms such as decision by consensus, consultation and informality which together make up the diplomatic‒security conventions christened the ‘ASEAN way’ (Acharya, 1997, 1998; Goh, 2003). And even if Southeast Asian countries engage in behaviours that could be construed as ‘interference’ in one another’s domestic affairs,2 the academic consensus on ASEAN has continually fostered the impression, correct or otherwise, that Southeast Asian states rarely flout their non-​interference norm (Jones, 2010, 2012). On the other hand, major Western powers, which tend to see sovereignty in terms of the freedom of policy choice rather than territorial integrity, also worry that their support for R2P could mean the automatic curtailment of their freedom of action (Luck, 2009; Pattison, 2011). As noted in the previous chapter, the respective positions of Southeast Asian states on the R2P reflect an interesting diversity, ranging from the Philippines’ robust advocacy, at least for a time, of R2P during its stint in the UN Security Council in the period leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1674, to democratic Indonesia’s ambivalence towards the concept, and to illiberal Singapore’s involvement in the ‘Group of Friends’ of R2P, which aims to facilitate dialogue between likeminded states at the level of the permanent missions to the UN (Bellamy and Davies, 2009; Tan, 2011a). However, despite their ambivalence towards R2P, Southeast Asian countries do not reject the notion of sovereignty qua responsibility in the broadest sense (Bellamy and Beeson, 2010). The logic of provision is not unique to Southeast Asia, even if regional political, strategic and possibly even cultural factors offer seemingly ready explanations as to why the norm of provision has hitherto enjoyed a more successful ‘localization’ there than the norm of protection (Acharya, 2004). Moreover, notwithstanding criticisms about the region’s relative illiberalism and preoccupation with the non-​interference doctrine, the logic of performance legitimacy typically invoked by ASEAN member states –​ to which, for the most part, they have sought to live up, successfully or otherwise –​as the basis of their moral and political authority clearly includes the element of responsibility (Alagappa, 1995).

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Arguably, the growing importance of non-​traditional and human security concerns in Southeast Asia and intergovernmental responses to these, offer a propitious environment for regional expressions of a form of responsible provision (Haacke, 2009a; Severino, 2009). And we saw in the previous chapter, this understanding overlaps the seminal proposition by Francis Deng and his colleagues who, in arguing that conflict management is a shared responsibility of states, contend that sovereignty can no longer be seen as a protection against interference, but rather as a charge of responsibility where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies (Deng et  al, 1996). Where the Southeast Asians’ conception of responsible sovereignty has hitherto differed from that of Deng and his associates is, firstly, in the former’s emphasis on non-​traditional security management rather than conflict management –​not only because of their adherence to the non-​ interference principle, but the perceptibly lower level in internal armed conflicts in Southeast Asia compared with Africa (Feindouno, Goujon and Wagner, 2016: 5). Secondly, as a consequence of the continued adherence by ASEAN states to the non-​interference norm, acts of sovereign responsibility are contingent on the consensual agreement of  –​and, crucially, invitation by  –​prospective recipient countries, without which the external implementation of responsible provision arguably does not apply. As regional experiences have shown, the non-​interference doctrine is not as sacrosanct as it has been made out to be, no matter the ad nauseam claims by Southeast Asian leaders regarding the inviolability of the doctrine. Indeed, under appropriate conditions, the principle has been contravened as often as it has been upheld for self-​interested reasons, not least the shared aim to maintain a non-​communist social order (Jones, 2010, 2012). Arguably, as the case of ASEAN’s resort to ‘enhanced interaction’ with Myanmar suggests (Haacke, 1999), wider collective concerns could have played a role in determining the regional organization’s ‘interventionist’ forays, successful or otherwise. For example, ASEAN’s collective expression of its ‘revulsion’ over the military junta’s use of violence against the clergy-​ led demonstrations in 2007 –​the ‘saffron revolution’ (The Economist, 2007) –​could be construed as interference by other Southeast Asian countries in the domestic affairs of Myanmar. As the following discussion of ASEAN’s role in post-​Nargis humanitarian assistance suggests, intra-​ASEAN interactions increasingly hold interesting implications for the non-​interference doctrine, a situation readily explained by the regional protagonists as not amounting to interference let alone intervention because (as alluded to previously) ASEAN was ‘invited’ by the troubled member in question

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(Myanmar) to assume its role as conduit. This, as we shall see in the following chapters, is also the case for the ‘rules of the road’ that undergird relations between providers of assistance and recipients of that assistance within ASEAN and the ADMM-​Plus. For example, among the terms of reference (TOR) for the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR, the following principles in that TOR document reflect the spirit of invitation and consent, such as the tenth principle –​‘The decision to deploy military personnel, assets and other resources shall remain under the prerogative of Assisting State, and upon the request or consent by the Affected State’ –​and the fourteenth principle –​‘The Affected State shall exercise the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of assistance within its territory’ (ASEAN, 2016c: 2, emphasis original). Granted, interference by invitation is not really interference at all. When applied to Southeast Asia, however, it appears, at least in some instances, that invitations of this sort require a fair bit of moral and/​or diplomatic suasion (Tan, 2013a); as Singapore’s former foreign minister, George Yeo, once mused about the ostensible efficacy of ‘peer pressure’ among ASEAN members: But little by little, as we took into account each other’s concerns, we were able to move forward. While ASEAN may work on the principle of consensus, ASEAN also works on the principle of peer pressure, and peer pressure can be very effective. And it is not easy for an ASEAN member country to take a rigid position when all the other nine countries are in opposition. (MFA Singapore, 2011) This is not only a ‘problem’ facing Southeast Asia or the developing world in general. As was noted in Chapter 2, the tension between the aspiration of responsible sovereigns to intervene in order to induce change and the on-​the-​g round realities and structural-​normative constraints has also been noted by Francis Deng in his 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Deng’s insight is worth rehearsing here: after passionately arguing that the world cannot simply ‘watch and do nothing’ when confronted with the mass suffering of strangers around them, but ‘would find a way of getting involved’, he nonetheless acknowledged that a measure of realism is necessary because ideals that cannot be fulfilled, presumably because they are too unrealistic or impractical, may have to be shelved (Deng, 2010: 13). More crucially, Deng insists that cooperation between responsible sovereigns and their targets is essential if the mission is to be fulfilled (Deng, 2010: 15). Herein then lie the facilitating conditions of possibility for successful

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implementation of a ‘responsibility to provide’, namely mutual consent and cooperation between provider countries and recipient countries.

Growing signs of regional responsibility In the post-​Cold War period, there have been indications of an emerging sense of regional responsibility among Southeast Asian countries. One of the defining moments was probably the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which led eventually to the downfall of Indonesian strongman President Suharto. It became evident that performance legitimacy, the hallmark of the illiberal governments in Southeast Asia, was not to be defined only in terms of the ability of the Southeast Asian states to sustain their economic competitiveness, but equally their capacity to provide their populations with adequate social protections in times of crisis (Nesadurai and Djiwandono, 2009). The perceived heavy-​handedness of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in forcing very difficult financial restructuring on ailing East Asian economies, as well as the US resistance against alternatives such as the Japan-​backed proposal for an Asian monetary fund (Lipscy, 2003) –​which, admittedly, would have excluded the US had it been implemented –​left an indelible impression on Southeast Asians that they could no longer rely solely on the goodwill and generosity of external parties to bail them out of trouble. Rather, regional mechanisms and solutions are needed to ensure that Southeast Asians have the wherewithal to handle their own crises, should outside help be unavailable. This shared concern led to the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative by the ASEAN+3, which comprises the ten Southeast Asian countries and China, Japan and South Korea (Stubbs, 2002; for a contrary view, see Hund, 2003). Conceived initially as a network of bilateral currency swap deals that would act as a financial safety net for the region, the CMI was reorganized in 2010 into a single multilateral accord  –​and subsequently rechristened as the CMI Multilateralization (CMIM) –​ with a fund of US$240  million (Sussangkarn, 2010). It has been argued that the ASEAN+3 and the CMI/​CMIM represent a kind of ‘reactionary regionalism’: that is, indigenous expressions of regional responsibility against perceived Western dominance (Beeson, 2003). It should however be noted that access to CMI/​CMIM funds would require IMF supervision and be subject to IMF conditionality, hence prompting the question from some as to whether the CMI/​CMIM is designed to be used at all (Hill and Menon, 2012; Sussangkarn, 2017). Be that as it may, there is no question that regional responses to the financial crisis have been seen and understood by East

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Asians themselves  –​including the Chinese, whose economy was not adversely affected and who proactively sought to assist their neighbours’ efforts at recovery –​in terms of a regional responsibility to provide (Jiang, 2010). There is also growing appreciation in the region, in the light of the glaring limitations of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a multilateral security institution, regarding the insufficiency of dialogue alone for dealing with regional humanitarian crises caused by natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunamis in 2004 and the deadly earthquakes that have rocked Indonesia, and pandemics such as the SARS crisis in 2003 and the avian flu (or H1N1) crisis in 2009. As noted earlier, as a consequence of Southeast Asia being within the Pacific Ring of Fire, the proneness of its landscape to natural disasters has created a role for regional militaries in disaster management  –​and, crucially, the imperative to ensure they are empowered and equipped to do so (Wu, 2016).

Nargis: Catalyst for the R2Provide? The region’s preference for and endorsement of regional provision over protection was most evident in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Myanmar in early May 2008 (Steele, 2013). The initial refusal by Myanmar’s ruling military junta to allow international aid to enter their country led the then foreign minister of France, Bernard Kouchner, to propose invoking the R2P to legitimize the forcible delivery of humanitarian assistance without the consent of the Myanmar government. What allegedly moved Kouchner to do so was less the disaster itself than his frustration at the recalcitrance of the Burmese generals (Junk, 2016: 81–​2). His proposal elicited a lively regional debate on R2P, notwithstanding the admonitions issued by its originators against the perceived risk of conceptual dilution through enlargement and the inclusion of issues that draw attention away from the core concern of the R2P (Evans, 2007; Thakur, 2008; Haacke, 2009a). In any case, Kouchner’s idea was firmly rejected by ASEAN, China, the United Kingdom and the United Nations, all of which variously argued that the R2P did not apply to natural disasters. Kouchner also came under fire from ICISS commissioner Ramesh Thakur, who argued that rather than Myanmar, the French minister should have directed his attention to many other places at the time that were more deserving of the application of R2P, such as Kenya, Nepal, North Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Thakur, 2008).

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Spurred in part by the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar and by Kouchner’s failed proposal, defence ministers at the 2008 edition of the Shangri-​La Dialogue, a high-​level defence forum that meets annually in Singapore, verbally agreed that multilateral cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief could be guided by three principles:  one, the responsibility of disaster-​hit countries to bring humanitarian relief quickly and effectively to their people; two, affected countries should, where necessary, facilitate the entry of external assistance; and three, any external help should have the consent of the affected countries and fall under their control (IISS, 2008: 15). Most ASEAN countries are simply unable to cope with such challenges, given their lack of technical expertise and resources for taking on disaster relief functions. Their militaries lack the requisite doctrine, equipment and preparedness for conducting HADR and/​ or search and rescue operations. In contrast to the appeal by some to broaden the R2P concept to include humanitarian challenges, the defence ministers at the Shangri-​La Dialogue sought to avoid linking any collective response to the Nargis incident with the R2P, whilst speaking instead of the ‘responsibility of governments to provide’ (Teo, 2008). Put differently, while military action on neighbouring soil remains a highly sensitive matter for ASEAN states, humanitarian emergencies are quite a different thing altogether. Thus understood, what could have conceivably tr iggered developments in 2009 –​the Philippines’ membership in the Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect, Indonesia’s and Singapore’s declared support for the R2P at the General Assembly debate and so forth –​was the post-​Cyclone Nargis situation from a year before. In May 2008, the regional debate on R2P gathered force in the wake of that devastating cyclone and possibly the unresolved tensions stemming from the Saffron Revolution of 2007. Others likewise argued that R2P could be revised and expanded to include the provision of humanitarian relief as well as protection –​‘R2P plus’, according to one formulation (Caballero-​Anthony and Chng, 2009). At the same time, the call for conceptual enlargement was aimed at rendering the doctrine more palatable and perhaps acceptable to Asians. Arguably, the region’s efforts in response to a growing host of transnational challenges could open the R2P concept up to revision in order to fit regional realities. But as noted earlier, the original architects of the R2P have mostly been sceptical towards such efforts. Gareth Evans, a co-​chair of the ICISS who drafted its 2001 report, cautioned against any move that might inadvertently unravel the international consensus on R2P by (as he

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saw it) imprudently linking it to the Myanmar leaders’ post-​cyclone blockage of foreign aid (Lee, 2008). For his part, Ramesh Thakur called for consideration of other avenues and modalities, including direct exchanges with the Myanmar authorities, encouraging rather than threatening resolutions and statements at the UN by its secretary general and the presidents of both the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council; engagement of Myanmar by the major Asian powers, China, India and Japan; and engagement by ASEAN and Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbours (Thakur, 2008). Despite the efforts of the UN Secretary General and the European Union, it was the last of Thakur’s options, ASEAN engagement, that proved the most acceptable to Myanmar’s generals. The post-​Nargis story of regional efforts to assume and exercise responsibility to assist one of their own amid worries of external intervention has a parallel of sorts in the argument of Francis Deng, the UN Under-​Secretary General responsible for internally displaced persons and, as we saw in Chapter 2, the originator of the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ concept that preceded the R2P. In the light of the Sudanese government’s half-​hearted attempt to comply with Security Council Resolution 1556 as well as its inability (or refusal) to stop the Janjaweed militia’s genocidal campaign in Darfur or disarm and prosecute the militia’s members in 2004, the Security Council arrived at a consensus that the Sudanese government, despite its failures, had primary responsibility for ending the crisis (Clark, 2004). Bellamy recounts Deng’s position on how Sudan and the African region could proceed with the task of conflict management: Paradoxically, Deng argued that although the government ‘probably’ lacked the will and capacity to disarm the Janjaweed, it retained primary responsibility for doing so. Moreover, Deng argued that the government had indicated its strong preference for cooperating with the AU [African Union] and ‘was fearful of any direct international involvement’ to such an extent that it ‘would probably resist it, either directly or through other means’. He concluded that international intervention would ‘complicate and aggravate’ the crisis by increasing the level of violence and causing the government to withdraw its cooperation. The best way forward, he argued, was to encourage the AU to increase its presence in the region in collaboration with the government. (Bellamy, 2005: 46)

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Accordingly, because the Sudanese government had declared its hostility to UN intervention, the best way forward was to encourage the AU to establish and increase its presence in Darfur, in collaboration with the Sudanese government. Deng’s view was supported by some African states, whose primary concern was averting international intervention (Bellamy, 2006). Crucially, the Security Council’s position on the Sudanese government, highlighted by Nicholas Wheeler, was that there is simply no guarantee that when confronting a humanitarian emergency, states would agree that the conditions justifying intervention had indeed been met or the precautionary principles satisfied (Wheeler, 2001: 566). Arguably, the Southeast Asian regional experience in the aftermath of Nargis seems to suggest the collective sense that regional countries retain the primary responsibility for assisting one another in the co-​management of natural disasters has led them to the quest to enhance their national and regional capacities, which regional frameworks like the ADMM-​Plus help facilitate.

Formulating and implementing the R2Provide Accordingly, Southeast Asian governments ought to exercise their sovereign obligation to provide for the security and well-​being of their respective populations. However, in the absence of any such ability, governments ought to do their utmost to ensure that other resources are brought to bear in realizing those same objectives. This ‘responsibility to provide’ –​or the ‘R2Provide’ as I have elected to call it here –​can be defined as a responsibility of all sovereign nations to provide for the welfare of the people. In the event they are not able to do so, then it is their responsibility to see what other resources they can garner, including those furnished by the international community, to provide for their people (Teo, 2008). Interestingly, the R2Provide, as understood here, is not meant to be couched in terms of the responsibility of other nations to furnish what the nation in question lacks in providing for its population. The responsibility remains with the state in question, which has a dual responsibility to provide for its own people or, failing that, to seek foreign assistance to get the job done. Why so? As should be obvious by now, this is because of the continued discursive primacy of the non-​interference doctrine in Southeast Asia, which renders unlikely the prospect for a potentially contradictory doctrine to emerge at this juncture. Notwithstanding the careful avoidance of unwarranted conflation of the R2Provide with the R2P, the preceding elite ruminations on the responsibility to provide have not precluded the appropriation of language with an uncanny

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resemblance to the first two pillars identified in the UN Secretary General’s 2009 report on the R2P, namely protective responsibilities of states and international assistance and capacity-​building (UN, 2009). Nonetheless, others have argued that the fundamental dispute ASEAN countries have with the R2P is not the notion of protection per se as much as that of military intervention as an accepted ‘protective’ response –​ostensibly to prevent external interference. According to a report on a regional consultation on R2P, Southeast Asian governments are generally agreeable to protective responsibility and provision of assistance to others, and may even grudgingly accept the need for timely and decisive intervention, but only through diplomatic and not military means (RSIS, 2010a: 3). The key exception here, of course, is the emphasis on provision rather than protection. In other words, in principle, the possibility that outside help has a role at all is effectively contingent on the consent of and invitation (or request) by prospective recipient countries, without which the contributions of prospective provider countries need not apply. This is all well and good, so long as the region is content with staying true to the letter and logic of the principle of non-​interference. Without the all-​important invitation, other countries, according to this reasoning, are not obliged to do anything –​even if the affected country and its people are visibly experiencing severe duress and trauma. Nonetheless, despite the absence of any legal obligation to assist, Southeast Asian countries have shown an increasing readiness to transgress and transcend these regional understandings –​at times to the point of contravening their own non-​interference norm (Jones, 2009, 2012) –​through the use of peer pressure and social persuasion on affected states to open their doors to outside help (Tan, 2013a). Thus understood, provider countries are or should be equally subject to international accountability, albeit in a nonbinding way, since it is the people of the recipient country and in the international community that will be the ultimate arbiters of whether or not governments of those countries have lived up to their responsibilities. It can therefore also be argued that so far as the R2Provide goes, both recipient and provider equally share the obligation and responsibility to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations: the recipient through their grant of consent and invitation, the provider through their contributions of aid, assistance and the like. The ethical rationalization for this contention is elaborated in detail in Chapter 8 through a critical appropriation of the ideas of the ethicist Emmanuel Levinas. The R2Provide could, in time, assume the following characteristics, in the form of three ‘pillars’, not sequential and analogous to the

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R2P as envisaged in the UN Secretary General’s 2009 report (Tan, 2012a:  258). First, Southeast Asian states have a responsibility to ensure the survival of their citizens in times of natural calamities (floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and the like) by providing them with food, water and shelter. Second, the international community and regional organizations have the responsibility to work consensually with individual Southeast Asian states to build capacity to be able to aid their member states when they are confronted by natural disasters. Third, when a Southeast Asian state is unable to provide for its citizens in times of natural disasters and is for whatever reason unwilling to allow international actors to do so, it is the collective responsibility of that state and its fellow ASEAN members and regional partners to come to a diplomatic solution, with respect to reasonable security concerns of that state in question, to ensure a humanitarian crisis is averted (Tan, 2012a:  258). Granted, rhetoric and sentiment alone do not a R2Provide ethos make. In this regard, recent institutional developments, specifically the ADMM and its enlarged format, the ADMM-​Plus, could conceivably become the regional mechanisms through which the responsibility to provide can be nurtured as a regularized convention/​practice throughout Southeast Asia. As the following chapter will show, a number of things have been and are being done at the regional institutional level to actualize the ethic of responsible provision. Acknowledging that ASEAN’s future was ‘increasingly intertwined with the developments of the larger Asia-​ Pacific region, and that the region would benefit from the expertise, perspectives and resources of extra-​regional countries’ (ASEAN, 2007a), the architects of the ADMM and the ADMM-​Plus endorsed the active engagement of ‘friends and dialogue partners’ in ways that would allow ASEAN to draw on ‘the varied perspectives and resources of a wide range of non-​ASEAN countries’ in addressing the security challenges facing Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2009a). What should not be missed here is the public rationale given for these formal defence arrangements. If anything, Southeast Asia’s active engagements with the defence establishments of the world’s major and middle powers –​or at least those among the eight dialogue partners in the ADMM-​Plus  –​are aimed at tapping their technical know-​ how and resources to accomplish complex tasks in maritime security, counterterrorism or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; in short, drawing on external assistance for establishing and enhancing regional capabilities (Tan, 2016). What the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus furnish, as such, are regional frameworks for institutionalizing and possibly enhancing the existing but largely informal forms of assistance

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from dialogue partner countries to the Southeast Asian countries. The perceived need to furnish relief for victims in a humanitarian crisis in a fast and effective manner and/​or to counter the threat of extremist militancy and terrorism to the people and societies of the region are some of the key expressions of the R2Provide. Moreover, while these forms of capacity augmentation are mostly concerned with the defence-​related assets of Southeast Asian governments, there is growing awareness among regional stakeholders that building local, societal-​level capacities are equally necessary to ensure more effective and rapid responses to disasters, while reducing reliance on their national governments (Kuntjoro and Jamil, 2010; Nix-​Stevenson, 2013; Simm, 2018).

Conclusion As institutional manifestations of the R2Provide ethos, the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus processes, as we shall see later, are clearly oriented towards enabling the Southeast Asian states to collectively provide, for their and their neighbours’ populations, a fair measure of respite from various humanitarian challenges. Significantly, it is the defence establishments of Southeast Asia that have taken the lead in this regard (Tan, 2016). By no means devoid of ‘sovereignty as right’ considerations, the emphasis on regional capacity-​building and assistance vis-​à-​vis non-​traditional concerns has proved sufficiently salient to warrant a collective buy-​in from regional stakeholders. But it is early days yet, with little hitherto to suggest that Southeast Asians and their external partners can successfully translate their regular conduct of military-​to-​military multilateral exercises into collective coordinated responses to real humanitarian crises. Ultimately, frameworks and work programmes, no matter how impressive, are irrelevant apart from the concerted and sustained efforts by regional countries and their defence establishments to fulfil their commitments.

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Institutionalizing Security Regionalism: Responsibility as ‘Response Ability’ Introduction Crucial as they are, words and sentiments alone do not make the R2Provide ethos. This chapter examines the efforts Southeast Asian countries, more often than not under the rubric of ASEAN and through its various functional subsidiaries and its ‘Plus’ derivatives, have undertaken to develop the requisite capabilities –​build their ‘response ability’ if you will –​that would enable them to translate aspirations regarding responsible provision into reality. So far as the regional experience goes, the regionalization of responsibility in Southeast Asia is very much inextricably tied to the regionalization of defence and security in Southeast Asia, even though the latter has had a much longer developmental history. In this respect, the place and role of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and the wider regional offshoot, the ADMM-​Plus –​whose respective formations are discussed in detail later –​are rather central to any realization of the R2Provide.

Developing responsibility and ‘response ability’ in Southeast Asia Significantly, the formation of the ADMM and then the ADMM-​Plus were by no means a given, not least in a region whose historical instincts have been to eschew overt forms of defence regionalism. This section looks at the sources and drivers of an indigenous brand of regionalism in the form of ASEAN, as well as the numerous constraints and facilitating conditions that respectively hindered and helped the rise of

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the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus. It bears reminding that the categorical rejection of collective defence, whether with or without the great powers, has long been a guiding principle of regional organization. This rejection of collective defence, according to Amitav Acharya, is one of three ‘path dependent’ dispositions common to regional institutions in Asia –​the other two being a general acceptance of Westphalian norms of sovereignty, non-​interference and territorial integrity, and a preference for ‘soft’ or non-​legalistic and formalistic regional cooperation (Acharya, 2003b: 219). The existence of the ADMM and the ADMM-​Plus reveal a contemporary Southeast Asia not averse to institutionalized multilateral defence dialogue and cooperation at the highest levels with major military powers. These forums form the apex of a burgeoning tangled web of disparate initiatives and modalities including meetings of senior officials and uniformed chiefs as well as military-​to-​military exercises and exchanges, not all centred upon or inspired by ASEAN. Southeast Asia has in fact played host to not only alliances and defence arrangements with outside powers, but equally bilateral and multiple forms of intra-​regional and extra-​regional defence cooperation.

Regionalizing security relations Although ASEAN is not a military organization, it has nonetheless permitted a gradual regionalization of defence and security ties among its member countries beginning during the Cold War period (Simon, 1992). For the five founding members of ASEAN  –​Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand  –​the US-​led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) became the antithesis of what they believed indigenous regionalism ought to be about. As Carlos Romulo, former foreign minister of the Philippines, explained regarding the raison d’être behind ASEAN, ‘We did not phase out SEATO in order to set up another one’ (cited in Acharya, 1990: 3; also see Dreisbach, 2004). Their rejection of collective defence did not allay Vietnamese suspicions about ASEAN as a US-​sponsored Cold War alliance, however. As a pundit has opined, fairly or otherwise, about the formation of ASEAN, ‘ASEAN was the product of Asian initiative. But it was hardly an Asian creation. Behind the Asian initiative was the American “support” and “discreet guidance”. Washington almost acted like a mid-​wife in the birth of ASEAN’ (Mahapatra, 1990: 6–​7). In view of such opinions, ASEAN has since its inception in August 1967 assiduously avoided being labelled as a defence organization and a Western-​sanctioned alliance aimed, at least indirectly, at preserving

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the West’s neo-​colonialist domination of Southeast Asia. In this respect, ASEAN leaders apparently felt this reasoning to be sufficiently justified, so long as there was a clear distinction between defence-​based bilateralisms like alliances and regional multilateralism like ASEAN (Tan, 2012b: 234). Be that as it may, ASEAN member countries had no qualms in exploiting the space between formal alliances and the regional organization for bilateral defence cooperation. As Ghazalie Shafie, the former foreign minister of Malaysia, once noted about ASEAN, ‘The limitation of regional cooperation within a formal framework should not prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links on a bilateral basis with one another’ (Shafie, 1982: 161–​2). As early as 1976, several ASEAN countries were led to establish bilateral border security agreements and intelligence exchanges among themselves to deal with communist insurgency at home (Acharya, 1992). Significantly, bilateral collaboration persisted despite open political squabbling between leaders of the cooperating countries in question (Acharya, 1990: 15). By 1989, bilateral military exercises had become sufficiently widespread to merit being described by then Indonesian armed forces chief and later vice president Try Sutrisno as a ‘defence spider web’ (cited in Tow, 2001:  266). It is that same proliferation of bilateral defence links, motivated by a policy pragmatism whose exercise has often come at the expense of the express aims of ASEAN’s mandate, that has contributed to the gradual regionalization of defence in Southeast Asia. Against the emerging Soviet‒Vietnamese partnership and looming Soviet naval presence in the region in the early 1980s, Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew even broached the idea –​ unsupported at the time by his ASEAN counterparts, as it turned out –​ of upgrading and expanding extant bilateral military exercises conducted among ASEAN states into trilateral and quadrilateral enterprises (Tan, 2012b: 235). However, by the mid-​1990s, trilateral military exercises among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the three ‘core’ states of ASEAN, had become commonplace (Katzenstein, 1996: 32; also see Stubbs, 1992). Foremost among their aims of creating this web of military ties was the building of confidence and trust among themselves and their respective defence establishments. As a noted security analyst observed regarding that growing web of linkages, ‘These military ties and exercises serve many purposes, the most important being to get to know and understand each other, thus removing suspicions and misunderstandings’ (Anwar, 2000: 91). The ending of the Cold War created an opening for ASEAN to be less circumspect about the primacy of security in its institutional

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remit. In 1992, the decision was undertaken by the ASEAN leaders to upgrade the status of regional security cooperation from an informal and loose enterprise to a sanctioned feature of the organization’s agenda. Notwithstanding the political impediments in Southeast Asia against multilateral security collaboration at the highest levels, aspirations for such an arrangement grew as the Cold War drew to a close. Owing to a serendipitous confluence of factors  –​the end of Cold War bipolarity, a relatively stable though uncertain regional environment, a perceived need to engage a rising China, a new post-​Cold War US administration’s ‘retreat’ from multilateralism, and the relaxation by Indonesia of its nonalignment stance that paved the way for ASEAN’s embrace of an open and inclusive security regionalism (Patrick, 2000: 437; Simon, 2006: 96), the opportunity was given to ASEAN to establish a region-​wide multilateral security arrangement that would ensure the United States’ continued engagement in the Asia-​Pacific and encourage China’s commitment to ‘good international behaviour’ (Emmers, 2001). Even then, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-​Pacific’s first security-​oriented arrangement, did not automatically lead to the formation of a defence ministerial forum not least because ASEAN-​based security regionalisms prior to the ADMM and its ‘Plus’ appendage were primarily spearheaded by the respective foreign policy establishments of the participating nations. However, the ARF indirectly contributed to the enhancement of defence regionalism in Southeast Asia through its facilitation of an emerging ‘defence track’ at the Asia-​wide level that arguably, if somewhat ironically, inspired and nurtured the subsequent development of ASEAN’s own defence track, rather than the other way around. Although reservations about pursuing more advanced levels of military-​to-​military collaboration probably persisted among some ASEAN member nations, the mood among the three ‘core’ states of ASEAN proved somewhat different than that of their fellow ASEAN members. In 1989, the Malaysian foreign minister, Abu Hassan Omar, mooted the idea of an ASEAN ‘defence community’ that presumably would ‘take the ASEAN states to new heights of political and military cooperation’, while his Indonesian counterpart Mochtar Kusumaatmatdja made a similar appeal for an ASEAN ‘military arrangement’ (Acharya, 1990). Indeed, what was equally surprising was their readiness to publicly promote a vision for a regional defence community even before the ‘One Southeast Asia’ notion  –​all ten Southeast Asian countries coming together under one institutional roof –​had become a reality with the entry into ASEAN of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam –​the so-​called ‘CLMV’ countries –​in

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the mid-​1990s (Chin, 1997). But while ASEAN enlargement left the door ajar for that possibility, the political ideologies of Leninist regimes such as Laos and Vietnam  –​despite the latter’s ostensible intent, as seen by some analysts, to bolster its ability to balance China through membership in ASEAN1 –​initially continued to impede progress as a consequence of their disavowal of military alliances with capitalist regimes (Singh, 1997). Needless to say, as we shall see later, Vietnam has since shown a willingness to accommodate ASEAN’s embrace of defence regionalism, including its enthusiastic hosting in 2010 –​as the chair of ASEAN that same year –​of the ADMM meeting that, not without some irony, inaugurated the ADMM-​Plus, which would facilitate greater security cooperation with the Americans and the Chinese, the past and current military and political ‘foes’ of the Vietnamese. Finally, the cooperative efforts at the sub-​ASEAN level by littoral states of the Straits of Malacca in combating piracy deserve mention as well. Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s shared concern over the potential strategic ramifications of the proposal by US Pacific Command (PACOM) – renamed as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in 2018 – for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which could lead to extra-​regional powers’ involvement in the straits, led them, together with Singapore, to form Operation MALSINDO. Furthermore, the decision in 2005 by Lloyd’s, the shipping insurer, to designate the Malacca Straits as a war-​r isk zone, which effectively boosted insurance costs for shipping lines using one of the world’s busiest sea lanes, furnished additional motivation for the littoral states to act decisively (Drezner, 2006). Launched in 2004, the operation involved trilateral maritime patrols by the navies of the three littoral countries –​but with each navy restricted to patrolling its own nation’s territorial waters –​aimed at interdicting piracy and smuggling activities in the straits. Thailand joined the enterprise in 2008, whereupon the operation was renamed the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols. An air element, the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ (EiS) initiative, was included in 2005, augmenting the naval patrols with maritime patrol aircraft sorties. Unlike the naval patrols, however, the air sorties, which carry on board each aircraft a Combined Maritime Patrol Team (CMPT) containing a military officer from each of the participating countries, are permitted to fly over the waters of the countries involved. Together, the naval and aerial elements make up the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) (Ho, 2009; McCabe, 2017). Other components of the MSP include the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), which subsequently developed the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-​IS) aimed at improving coordination and situational awareness at sea among

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the participating countries (Storey, 2009: 41). Furthermore, in June 2017 Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines launched the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (INDOMALPHI), which involves trilateral patrols in the Sulu-​Sulawesi seas, long a hub for transnational organized crime and militancy (Gulang, 2017; Parameswaran, 2018a).

A defence regionalism to call their own: The ADMM In June 2012 as a consequence of China’s glaring absence at the Shangri-​La Dialogue that year, a minor but not insignificant debate arose over whether the Shangri-​La Dialogue, an annual ‘unofficial’ defence forum held in Singapore and initiated by the London-​based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), or the official ADMM-​Plus is the more relevant forum for international security (Cossa, 2012; Rogin, 2012; Thayer, 2012). In any case, the success of the Shangri-​La Dialogue in drawing the regular participation of defence ministers and armed forces chiefs from throughout the Asia-​Pacific put paid to the cliché that Southeast Asia was ‘not yet ready’ for a defence ministerial forum. ASEAN did not support the proposal by the then director of the Japan Defence Agency (the precursor to the present-​day Japan Ministry of Defence), Nakatani Gen, to convert the Shangri-​La Dialogue into a formal Asian defence ministerial forum (Hook et al, 2001: 263), presumably out of concern that such a move would threaten not only the default status of the ARF as the only multilateral security forum servicing the entire Asia-​Pacific, but indeed the very centrality of ASEAN in the existing regional architecture. Yet the attraction of the Shangri-​La Dialogue is precisely because it is not an official event, which allows senior defence leaders to ‘have their cake and eat it too’ –​that is, to make assertions at the forum that approximate the official positions of their respective governments without officially attributing them as such (Capie and Taylor, 2010). A number of institutional developments took place in the first half of the 2000s that arguably paved the way towards the realization of the ADMM, although multilateral security dialogue in ASEAN –​with defence sector participation, importantly –​took place earlier. The most crucial of these was the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) of 2003, which laid out the vision for the ASEAN Community comprising economic, security and socio-​cultural pillars to be established by 2020. The original appellation for the security pillar, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), has since been amended to the ASEAN

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Political-​Security Community, whereas the deadline for achieving the ASEAN Community was dated –​hastily so, in hindsight –​to 2015.2 The first step towards fulfilment of the APSC vision was the formation of the ADMM, which took place in Kuala Lumpur in May 2006. This development marked a departure of sorts from the way Southeast Asian states had until then engaged in regional defence cooperation, not least in terms of defence multilateralism. That first ADMM had a four-​fold remit comprising:  (1) the promotion of regional peace and stability through dialogue and defence and security cooperation; (2) the provision of ‘strategic-​level guidance’ for defence and security cooperation within ASEAN (and with the consequent formation of the ADMM-​Plus, between ASEAN and its dialogue partners); (3) the promotion of mutual trust and confidence through enhancing transparency and openness; and (4) contribution to the establishment of the APSC and promote the implementation of the APSC’s Vientiane Action Programme (VAP).3 With the formation of the ADMM, there appears to be a collective sense of finality shared among ASEAN leaders, who see it as a key (and, for long, missing) piece of the architectural puzzle without which the regional organization cannot become a single community. Crucially, the ADMM is not conceived as a standalone arrangement but rather, as stated in paragraph 9 of the concept paper on the ADMM, ‘an integral part of ASEAN’, one that adds value to and complements the overall ASEAN process (ASEAN, nd). The second ADMM was held in Singapore in November 2007. There the ministers adopted three important papers –​the ADMM-​ Plus concept paper, the protocol to the ADMM concept paper, and the ADMM three-​year work programme for 2008–​10 –​which collectively charted the anticipated development of the defence ministerial in the coming years (MINDEF Singapore, 2007). The third ADMM was conducted in Pattaya in Thailand in February 2009. The outcomes from that session included the adoption of papers on the deployment of ASEAN military assets and capabilities for HADR; the principles of membership for the ADMM-​Plus; and cooperation between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organizations (CSOs) on non-​traditional security challenges (a Thailand-​led initiative) (MOD Thailand, 2009). The fourth ADMM was held in Hanoi, Vietnam in May 2010. The meeting produced two papers specific to the ADMM-​ Plus: one on its configuration and composition and the other on its modalities and procedures, which set the stage for the inauguration of the ADMM-​Plus in Hanoi that same year. The fifth ADMM was held in Jakarta, Indonesia in May 2011. With the weight of the South China Sea flare-​ups in 2010 very much on their minds, the

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ministers affirmed the importance of freedom of navigation in regional waters in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and committed to full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, with an eye towards adopting a code of conduct ‘to further promote peace and stability in the region’ (ASEAN, 2011a). The ministers also concurred on the setting up of a joint committee to coordinate the deployment of ASEAN military assets for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also accepted three papers: the first being the ADMM’s three-​year work plan for 2011–​13; the second concerning the establishment of a network of ASEAN peacekeeping centres (an Indonesia-​led initiative); and the third concerning the development of a mechanism for regional defence industry collaboration (a Malaysia-​led initiative) (ASEAN, 2011b). The sixth ADMM was conducted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in May 2012. Among other things, the meeting welcomed the second HADR table-​top exercise scheduled to be held in Brunei Darussalam in 2013,4 accepted a paper reviewing the frequency of ADMM-​ Plus meetings (which recommended that biennial meetings be held in place of the existing triennial gatherings after the ADMM-​Plus meeting in 2013)  and supported the inaugural meeting (in June 2012)  on the establishment of a network of ASEAN peacekeeping centres (MINDEF Singapore, 2012). Held in Naypyidaw in May 2014, the seventh ADMM adopted two documents, the Three-​Year Work Programme 2014–​16 and a concept paper on the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (DCL), the latter being aimed at providing rapid, reliable and confidential means for the ASEAN defence ministers to communicate with each other in times of crisis and emergency. Conducted in a pivotal year meant to roll out the ASEAN Community and the ostensible realization of the APSC, the eighth ADMM, held in Langkawi in March 2015, resulted in the defence ministers signing a Joint Declaration on Maintaining Regional Security and Stability for and by the People; adopted concept papers on ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR and the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine; and endorsed the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Utilization of Military Assets for HADR under the Framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. This new SOP was meant to augment the existing one for the SASOP that was mentioned earlier. According to Le Luong Minh, the Secretary General of ASEAN, these developments underscored the important contributions by the ADMM ‘towards a more united and effective HADR response when a disaster

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strikes the region’ (ASEAN, 2015). Finally, the ministers ‘pledged to elevate regional defence cooperation to new heights consistent with the realisation of ASEAN Community 2015’ (ASEAN, 2015). The following year, 2016, was equally significant for the ADMM, which celebrated its tenth anniversary –​hailed by Secretary General Minh as ‘a milestone in the evolution of the highest defence cooperation mechanism within ASEAN’ (ASEAN, 2016a). At that tenth ADMM held in Vientiane in May 2016, the defence ministers adopted the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine and of the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group and the concept paper on the Establishment of the ADMM-​Plus Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security. The eleventh ADMM –​together with the fourth ADMM-​ Plus –​took place at Clark, Pampanga in the Philippines in late October 2017. The twelfth ADMM –​together with the fifth ADMM-​Plus –​ took place in Singapore in October 2018, and resulted in the adoption of three initiatives: the ‘Our Eyes’ Initiative for strategic information sharing and the ‘3Rs’ –​Resilience, Response and Recovery –​concept of counterterrorism; a new network of ASEAN chemical, biological and radiological defence experts to share best practices and make quick contact during crises; and the adoption of the Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME) by the ADMM, to which the Plus countries have given their ‘in principle’ support (MINDEF, 2018d). In addition, annual ADMM leaders’ retreats aimed at facilitating more in-​depth discussions among the ministers have been conducted on a fairly regular if not annual basis.5 Moreover, these retreats have also served as venues at which to roll out major initiatives, such as at the November 2015 retreat, where the ASEAN defence ministers announced the establishment of the DCL hotline:  ‘We are now a phone call away from each other’, in the words of the Singaporean defence minister. ‘This hotline will reduce the risk of incidents at sea’ (The Straits Times, 2015a). While the ADMM understandably garners the attention of international and regional media, the ‘real work’ is carried out by the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM) Conference and its affiliated Working Group. The role of the ADSOM is to set and endorse the agendas, action plans and joint declarations for the ASEAN defence ministers, as well as receive reports on various cooperative initiatives put forth by ADMM member states. While the ADSOM was officially inaugurated the same year as the ADMM (in 2006), it should be remembered that ASEAN defence officials were in fact participating in regional security dialogue as early as 1996 through their involvement in an annual ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN Special SOM) –​a joint forum between

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senior foreign and defence officials –​as a Working Group on Security Cooperation (ASEAN, nd). Moreover, ASEAN defence officials have also participated in various ARF-​related activities, such as the ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF-​SOM), ARF Inter-​Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ARF-​ISG-​CBM), the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), and the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue (ARF-​DOD).

Ancillaries and annexes The impressive number of defence-​related meetings, conferences and activities taking place on a multilateral basis reflects a surprisingly high degree of institutionalization. These include ‘military-​to-​military’ modalities, some of which had been initiated as early as 2000, such as the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces (or Chiefs of Staff) Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), the ASEAN Military Operation Informal Meeting (AMOIM), the ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM), the ASEAN Navy Interaction, the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, the ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medicine Meeting, the ASEAN Armies Rifles Meeting, the Expert Working Group and the Workshop on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in HADR. In 2011 alone, at least ten such meetings took place.6 And although the previously mentioned initiatives are officially described as ‘outside the ASEAN framework’,7 the ADMM could arguably be seen as an overarching framework under which some if not all of these disparate activities can now be gathered. Whether they are officially inside or outside the ASEAN framework, it is nonetheless noteworthy that some of their aims and activities are entirely consistent and congruent with those of the ADMM, thereby suggesting a reasonably high level of coordination or the possibility for such between and among them. In particular, the ACDFIM, the annual gathering of defence forces chiefs, plays a significant and direct role in guiding all activities aimed at achieving effective practical cooperation among ASEAN militaries. For example, the seventh ACDFIM concluded at its March 2010 meeting that ASEAN militaries ought to pursue closer collaboration in response to non-​traditional security challenges. To that extent, the ACDFIM agreed to look into the establishment of a mechanism for cooperative activities of HADR and adopted the two-​year work plan for 2010–​11 aimed at exchanging information and expertise in maritime security, peacekeeping operations and counterterrorism among the militaries of ASEAN. The work plan also announced the inauguration of the

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ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medicine Meeting and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-​Top Exercise, the first of its kind and jointly conducted by Indonesia and Singapore, both in 2011 (Thayer, 2010). More recently, the ninth ACDFIM adopted a subsequent work plan for 2012–​13, which includes the ASEAN Information Sharing Exercise (ISX) to be conducted in Singapore in July 2012 and the second AHX to be co-​hosted by Brunei Darussalam and Singapore in 2013 (MINDEF Brunei, 2012). Moreover, the 2012 AMOIM took an important step towards furthering HADR interoperability among ASEAN militaries through its endorsement of standard operating procedures on the use of military assets for HADR via the AADMER framework. Whether this burgeoning web of defence activities highlights an ASEAN increasingly dedicated to regional problem-​solving is highly debatable, however. The relatively narrow parameters of the organization’s action-​oriented agenda, as the preceding discussion has shown, implies that regional cooperation in HADR and maritime security among ASEAN militaries is as much about the use of ad hoc preventive diplomacy measures for enhancing mutual trust and confidence as it is a nascent experiment in preventive diplomacy (PD).8 This is not to say that ASEAN defence cooperation thereby constitutes a grand exercise in preventive diplomacy even though HADR and other cooperative forms could conceivably play such a role. Likewise, the Malacca Straits Patrols and the Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols have also functioned as informal confidence-​ building exercises.9 Equally debatable is the question of whether they collectively signal the existence of a defence community in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it remains unclear if and how all of them relate together as a synergistic coherent whole. In 1991, a noted scholar of ASEAN regionalism concluded that the concept of a defence community –​by which he meant a defence alliance or pact and/​or a sort of regional industrial complex emphasizing joint arms production and procurement –​was inappropriate for ASEAN as the likelihood of the organization moving in that direction was minimal (Acharya, 1991). By 2009, ASEAN defence leaders at the ADMM Retreat in Bangkok were openly discussing the prospect for ASEAN defence-​ industrial collaboration and, more controversially, the setting up of an ASEAN Defence Industry Council (Hamidi, 2010: 3). Indeed, the case could be made that ASEAN has become more than just a diplomatic community –​albeit not quite yet a security community, certainly not a mature one in any case (Emmerson, 2005) –​ in the sense that there is today a considerably enhanced defence ‘face’ to

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the multilateral diplomacy and institutionalism that characterizes the Southeast Asian region.

Developing responsibility and ‘response ability’ beyond Southeast Asia If the regionalization of responsibility as well as ‘response ability’ is dependent on the building of national defence capabilities in Southeast Asia, then it needs the involvement of the outside powers with which the Southeast Asian countries, through their ASEAN framework, have developed relations through the ‘dialogue partner’ arrangements. Crucially, security regionalism in Southeast Asia has always been open, outward-​looking and inclusive in orientation, as evidenced by ASEAN’s active engagement of outside powers through its growing list of dialogue partner countries, many of which ASEAN has sought to engage more deeply through its various multilateral dialogue arrangements. The hitherto unrealized vision of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) –​signed by the ASEAN states as a declaration in 1971 and upgraded to a treaty as part of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 –​underscored the regional aspiration, especially prominent during the Cold War period and the early years of postcolonial independence from Western powers, to be free from extra-​regional interference (Hanggi, 1991). Needless to say, practical realities implied otherwise, especially with the continued reliance by Southeast Asian countries on their military alliances with external powers –​Thailand and the Philippines with the United States; Malaysia and Singapore with Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom as part of the Five-​Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (Emmers, 2012). In this respect, the formation of the ARF in 1994 could be understood as a formal acknowledgement by the ASEAN states, but most critically Indonesia, of the need for vigorous engagement rather than rejection of great powers that have economic, political and strategic interests in Southeast Asia and the Asia-​Pacific region. In this sense, the ‘open regionalism’ principle, which guides the unilateral trade liberalization policies of the member nations of the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Bergsten, 1997), arguably has a parallel security-​oriented version complementing it (Acharya, 1997). It is understandable why security regionalism in the post-​Cold War Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-​Pacific has been regarded as a ‘frustrated’ enterprise (Nair, 2009). Despite the growing web of security ties and activities that criss-​cross the region, the level of institutionalization therein remains relatively low, the scale of activities

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is limited and the scope of the mandates of regional arrangements is both narrow and weak. While the problems afflicting the ARF are not surprising given the primacy of sovereignty concerns and the trust deficits that characterize the region, the ARF’s apparent ‘recusal’ from the management of the major strategic challenges affecting the Asia-​ Pacific not only reflect the missed opportunities for the forum to be a key security actor, but presumably exposes the ineffectual leadership of ASEAN in the face of rising great power rivalry (Tan, 2017b). As shown later, the good start hitherto rendered by the ADMM-​Plus is a welcome contrast to the ARF, but the failure by the ADMM-​Plus to produce a joint statement in 2015 in Kuala Lumpur fostered the impression in the minds of some that it could go the way of the ARF (Tan, 2015). Fair or otherwise, it is concerns such as this that prompt the worry that the ADMM-​Plus could end up as a ‘talking shop’ that achieves little real progress. That said, the advantage afforded by these institutions remains their ability to convene conferences where strategic competitors are not only given the opportunities to interact but are able to mutually engage –​indeed, they have engaged and are engaging –​in practical cooperation.

ASEAN Regional Forum: A bridge too far? The ARF was established in 1994 to considerable fanfare and with the declared aim ‘to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-​Pacific region’ (US Department of State, 1994). Its current membership stands at 27: the ten ASEAN member states, the ten ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the US), one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), as well as North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-​Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The ARF issued a concept paper in 1995 that laid out a three-​stage roadmap on security cooperation that envisaged the institution evolving as a mechanism for confidence-​building to preventive diplomacy and finally to conflict resolution (amended subsequently, at China’s behest, to ‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts’). The concept paper also introduced two ‘baskets’ of measures, the first comprising so-​called low-​hanging fruit which was readily harvestable, the second comprising more ambitious and challenging activities. Modalities such as Inter-​ Sessional Support Groups and Inter-​Sessional Meetings were formed to support the implementation of the ARF’s goals. However, progress proved painfully slow to achieve, with the ARF seemingly unable to evolve beyond confidence-​building. Differences

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arose between activist ARF members such as the US, the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia which advocated the establishment of concrete preventive diplomacy mechanisms –​early warning systems, fact-​finding missions, enhanced good offices of the ARF chair for mediation (Boutros-​Ghali, 1992; Acharya, 1994; Cahill, 1996; Lund, 1996) –​ and those like China, Myanmar and Vietnam that were reluctant to move the ARF forward to PD for fear that their sovereignty could be compromised (Yuzawa, 2006). Despite their adoption of the ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy in 2001, ARF members took another decade to agree to and issue a PD work plan in 2011. In any event, the definition of PD that finally passed muster was so conservative that one wonders why it could not have been achieved earlier if that was as far as the ARF was prepared to go on PD. Nor did it help that the ARF’s rigid adherence to the consensus principle in decision-​making –​such that flexible consensus was replaced by a non-​negotiable unanimity –​came at the expense of progress. As I have argued elsewhere, given an increasingly unwieldy institutional design and diplomatic convention, the ARF seems destined to fail (Emmers and Tan, 2011). In this respect, perhaps, in fairness to the ARF, it cannot really be said to have failed as a PD actor because, to all intents and purposes, it never stood a chance from the get go and was let down by countries which, fearing that PD would open the door to interference in their national affairs by their more ‘activist’ counterparts, complicated the effort to find a consensually acceptable definition for PD (Leifer, 1996; Miller et al, 2016). In the post-​9/​11 era, a practical dimension has been added to the activities of the ARF, chiefly in selected non-​military or non-​traditional areas such as antiterrorism, disaster relief, maritime security, non-​ proliferation and disarmament. In 2009, at the 15th ARF meeting in Bangkok, the ARF adopted the ARF Vision Statement, which committed its 27 participants to ‘building a region of peace, friendship and prosperity’ by 2020. A  year later, the ARF members adopted a ‘plan of action’ for implementing the vision statement, which outlined goals for enhanced collaboration in a number of ‘areas of cooperation’: terrorism, transnational crime, disaster relief, maritime security, and non-​proliferation and disarmament (Severino, 2009). Supporters praised this development as a step forward in the anticipated evolution of the ARF from a talking shop to a ‘more action-​oriented’ organization (Tan, 2010). This move has been welcomed by many as a logical step given that the Asia-​Pacific region has increasingly played host to militancy, natural disasters and humanitarian crises, maritime disputes and the like (Haacke, 2009b). However, in so doing

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and as a consequence of its assiduous avoidance of complex strategic challenges facing the region, including China‒Taiwan tensions, nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula and territorial disputes in the East and South China seas, it could also be argued that the ARF has unwittingly disqualified itself as the region’s primary platform for security matters. If anything, the ARF  –​‘Avoiding Regional Flashpoints’ if you like!  –​has garnered a reputation for keeping hard security challenges off its agenda and doing little when such issues happen to force their way in (Tan, 2011b). Worse, the ARF plays second fiddle to the ADMM-​Plus in the effort to implement practical cooperation since the former lacks the operational capabilities and dispositions apposite to the latter (Leifer, 1996; Khong, 1997). Crucially, the widespread perception that the ARF had become irrelevant furnished the rationale behind proposals for a new regional security architecture to replace what some regard as an outmoded ARF, such as the ‘Asia-​Pacific Community’ idea introduced by the then Australian leader Kevin Rudd in 2008, or (of considerably lesser diplomatic impact) that of the ‘East Asian Community’ proposed by then Japanese leader Yukio Hatoyama in 2009, which the Southeast Asians rejected out of concern that ASEAN would be marginalized by any new architecture not built around it (Koh, 2009a).

ADMM-​Plus: A practical regionalism? The ADMM-​Plus was inaugurated in October 2010 in Hanoi on the basis of papers endorsed by the ADMM. Its 18 members include the ten ASEAN countries and Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the US. It started off as a triennial arrangement but has become a biennial arrangement on the basis of a recommendation made by the sixth ADMM meeting in 2013. Not unlike the ARF, the ADMM-​Plus is designed both as a mechanism for multilateral security dialogue and consultation as well as a framework for non-​traditional security cooperation. A key part of that cooperation involves the building of the capacity of Southeast Asian countries that lack the technical expertise and the operational assets and capabilities to address security challenges. In itself, capacity-​building assistance is not new. For example, since 2000 the Japanese Coast Guard has been providing direct assistance to a number of Southeast Asian states in support of antipiracy operations in a variety of ways, while the United States has been a major benefactor in facilitating counterterrorism and antipiracy activities conducted by several Southeast Asian states (Ho, 2009). To date, seven areas of practical collaboration: maritime

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security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian mine action (or demining) and, the most recent one, cyber security, have been mandated by the ADMM-​Plus for its member countries. Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) have been formed to facilitate efforts in each of those areas. Held in Bandar Seri Begawan in September 2013 –​ three years after its establishment –​the second ADMM-​Plus, by then a biennial event, was preceded by the ADMM Retreat, which met in August 2013, where the ministers discussed future directions for the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus in an informal setting. An informal meeting between the ASEAN defence ministers and their US counterpart, Chuck Hagel, also took place at the side-​lines of that ADMM-​ Plus. The third ADMM-​Plus met in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015, where the ministers affirmed the value of the ADMM-​Plus in strengthening practical cooperation between the region’s militaries in an inclusive manner, took note of the upcoming host of multilateral exercises the following year (discussed later), and discussed key security challenges such as terrorism and religious extremism, natural disasters, combating trans-​boundary haze, as well as the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the minister from Singapore urged all ADMM-​Plus members to adhere to common rules and norms and to build mutual trust; he also proposed the expansion of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to include ‘white’ shipping –​the current CUES arrangement covers only military shipping vessels or ‘grey hulls’ –​and for the ADMM-​Plus to adopt a similar protocol for the region’s airspaces (MINDEF Singapore, 2015). The fourth ADMM-​Plus met in the Philippines in October 2017, which resulted in a joint statement on countering violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism in response to the ISIS-​inspired war that erupted in Marawi in the southern Philippines from May to October that same year. The fifth and most recent ADMM-​Plus met in Singapore in October 2018, the first time the defence ministers of all 18 members were in attendance. Whether intentional or not, the defence leaders affirmed the ADMM-​Plus as ‘the de facto multilateral security mechanism in the Asia-​Pacific’ (MINDEF Singapore, 2018c). In line with their release of a joint statement on preventing and countering the threat of terrorism, the ADMM-​Plus agreed to step up practical military-​ to-​military cooperation through the EWG for counterterrorism. The meeting was also significant for the effort by Singapore, in its role as the chair for ASEAN and all ASEAN-​related meetings, to propose a set of air guidelines (mentioned previously) that would ostensibly serve

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as the air complement to the maritime CUES which the ADMM-​ Plus countries have already accepted. In response to overtures from a number of interested parties –​Chile, France, Britain and the EU have been mentioned –​to join the ADMM-​Plus, the member states agreed on the selection criteria for observers during the ADMM held earlier that month. This initiative would provide external countries that are not part of the Plus members with opportunities to contribute expertise and capabilities to the region through the EWGs. Finally, the ADMM-​Plus will begin meeting annually following the Singapore meeting (Teo, 2018). Since the inaugural ADMM-​Plus in Vietnam in 2010, joint military exercises undertaken under its aegis have grown in frequency and complexity (Tan, 2018a, 2018b). As highlighted in Table 1, from 2011 onwards the EWGs began meeting to plan for workshops, table-​top exercises and full troop exercises for each of their specific domains. In 2012, table-​top exercises in military medicine and maritime security were held in July and September respectively. In June 2013, the HADR/​ Military Medicine Exercise was held in Brunei Darussalam, which saw all 18 ADMM-​Plus countries participating. This was followed in September that same year by a counterterrorism exercise (CTX) held in Sentul, Indonesia, and the inaugural field training exercise in maritime security (MS FTX) was conducted in and around Jervis Bay and the East Australian Exercise Area. According to Commodore Peter Leavy from Australia, the overarching goal of the exercise was ‘to promote information sharing and develop a baseline for communications at sea’ between ADMM-​Plus countries (ASEAN, 2013). In February 2014, a table-​top exercise on peacekeeping was conducted in Manila. This was followed in October by the Military Medicine Senior Medical Planners’ Workshop held in Pattaya. Among other things, the medical workshop discussed the planned establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine. In 2016, the ADMM-​Plus went further, upping its conduct of exercises. In March 2016, it held a Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacekeeping Operation in Pune, India. In May 2016, it conducted a Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Exercise (MS&CT) in Brunei Darussalam and  Singapore. A  total of 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft and 40 special forces teams from all 18 countries participated in shore-​based activities in Brunei, in exercises that simulated terrorist attacks at sea between Brunei and Singapore, and in land-​based exercises in north-​western Singapore. According to the defence minister of a participating country, the scale of both the 2016 exercises themselves and the keen political investments of all member states in the ADMM-​Plus constitute a ‘very clear and

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Table 1: ADMM-​Plus: Exercises from 2011 to the present Dates

Activity

Location(s)

2011, July 19–​20

EWG in MS

Perth, Australia

2011, July 28–​30

EWG in MM

Singapore

2011, Sept 19–​20

EWG in CT

Makassar, Indonesia

2011, Nov 3–​5

EWG in HADR

Beijing, China

2011, Nov 21–​23

EWG in PKO

Wellington, New Zealand

2012, Feb 8–​10

EWG in MS

Kota Kinabalu

2012, April 3–​5

EWG in CT

Washington, DC, USA

2012, June 25–​29

EWG in PKO

Manila, Philippines

2012, July 17–​20

EWG and TT Ex in MM

Tokyo, Japan

2012, Aug 7–​10

EWG in HADR

Hanoi, Vietnam

2012, Sep 3–​7

EWG and TT Ex in MS

Langkawi, Malaysia

2012, Nov 5–​9

EWG in PKO

Sentul, Indonesia

2012, Nov 26–​28

EWG in MS

Sydney, Australia

2013, March 11–​13

EWG in CT

Jakarta, Indonesia

2013, March 12–​14

EWG in MM

Darwin, Australia

2013, April 8–​11

EWG in PKO

Wellington, New Zealand

2013, May 27–​30

EWG in MS

Penang, Malaysia

2013, June 7–​20

Combined FT Ex in HADR and MM

Brunei

2013, Sep 9–​13

FT Ex in CT

Sentul, Indonesia

2013, Sep 28–​Oct 1

EWG and FT Ex in MS

Sydney, Australia

2013, Oct 9–​11

EWG in MM

Singapore

2014, Jan 16–​18

EWG in HADR

Nha Trang, Vietnam

2014, Jan 23–​24

EWG in MS

Malacca, Malaysia

2014, Feb 11–​15

EWG and TT Ex in PKO

Manila, Philippines

2014, June 16–​20

EWG in MM

St Petersburg, Russia

2014, June 17–​20

EWG in HMA

Hanoi, Vietnam

2014, July 2–​5

EWG in HADR

Tokyo, Japan

2014, Sep 24–​26

EWG in PKO

Seoul, South Korea

2014, Oct 13–​14

EWG in CT

Singapore

2014, Oct 20–​24

EWG in MM

Pattaya, Thailand

2014, Oct 27–​29

EWG in CT

Brisbane, Australia

2014, Oct 27–​31

EWG and TT Ex in MS

Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei

2014, Dec 3–​5

EWG in HMA

New Delhi, India

2014, Dec 10–​12

EWG in HADR

Vientiane, Laos

2015, March 25–​27

EWG in PKO and Workshop on HMA

Siem Reap, Cambodia

2015, April 19–​23

EWG in CT

Sydney, Australia

2015, April 29–​30

EWG in HMA

Nanjing, China

2015, May 25–​29

EWG in MM

St Petersburg, Russia

2015, Aug 5–​7

EWG and TT Ex in HADR

Vientiane, Laos

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Table 1: (cont.) Dates

Activity

Location(s)

2015, Sep 13–​17

EWG in MS

Auckland, New Zealand

2015, Sep 14–​18

EWG in MM

Vladivostok, Russia

2015, Oct 19–​22

EWG in CT

Singapore

2015, Nov 2–​3

EWG in HMA

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

2015, Dec 9–​10

EWG in HADR

Tokyo, Japan

2016, March 2–​8

Combined FT Ex in HMA and PKO (Ex Force 18)

Pune, India

2016, May 2–​12

Combined FT Ex in MS and CT

Brunei and Singapore

2016, Sep 1–​11

Combined FT Ex in MM and HADR

Chonburi Province, Thailand

2016, Nov 13–​16

FT Ex in MS (Ex Mahi Tangaroa)

Auckland, New Zealand

2017, Jan 17

EWG in MM

Nakhom Pathon, Thailand

2017, May 11–​12

EWG in HADR

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

2017, May 17–​19

EWG in PKO

Jogjakarta, Indonesia

2017, May 23–​24

EWG in HMA

Vientiane, Laos

2017, July 17–​18

EWG in CS

Manila, Philippines

2017, July 24–​25

EWG in CT

Bangkok, Thailand

2017, Sep 12–​14

EWG in HADR

Honolulu, USA

2018, Jan 31–​Feb 2

EWG in HADR

Honolulu, USA

2018, March 19–​21

EWG in CT

Guangzhou, China

2018, April 11–​13

EWG in PKO

Bali, Indonesia

2018, April 18–​19

EWG in HADR

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

2018, April 24–​27

EWG in HMA

Xiengkhouang, Laos

2018, May 16–​18

EWG in CS

Cebu, Philippines

2018, May 30–​Jun 1

EWG in MS

Seoul, South Korea

2018, July 25–​27

EWG and TT Ex in HADR

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

2018, Aug 22–​23

EWG in CT

Bangkok, Thailand

2018, Sep 26–​27

EWG in HADR

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

2018, Oct 2–​5

EWG in HMA

Moscow, Russia

2018, Nov 7–​9

EWG in PKO

Sydney, Australia

2018, Nov 13–​16

EWG and TT Ex in MS

Singapore

2018, Nov 27–​29

EWG in CS

Auckland, New Zealand

2018, Dec 3–​6

EWG in MM

Lucknow, India

Legend: CS –​Cyber security

MM –​Military medicine

CT –​ Counterterrorism

MS –​Maritime security

EWG –​Experts’ working group

PKO –​Peacekeeping operations

FT Ex –​Full troop exercise

TT Ex –​Table-​top exercise

HADR –​Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief HMA –​Humanitarian mine action

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strong signal’ that the ADMM-​Plus takes maritime security and the threat of terrorism seriously and is prepared to mount multinational efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region (Tan, 2016: 73). In September 2016, the Military Medicine and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AMHEx) was conducted in Chonburi Province, Thailand. In November 2016, a second maritime security exercise was held, this time in Auckland, New Zealand. Similar exercises have been carried out up to 2018, which, as we have seen, included the first ASEAN‒China maritime exercise that gave Southeast Asian and Chinese navies an opportunity to conduct joint CUES-​ related manoeuvres (Parameswaran, 2018c). That said, despite its accomplishments –​indeed, the ADMM-​Plus has gone further than any existing regional cooperative framework has done –​member countries and their military establishments nonetheless face the prospect of participant fatigue stemming from the high level of activity and operations (as suggested by Table 1, showing ADMM-​Plus activities) and –​should the ADMM-​Plus prove incapable of managing tensions in hotspots like the South China Sea10 –​low returns on their investments. But for its stakeholders, for which military-​to-​military exercises under the ADMM-​Plus rubric have started to bear fruit, nothing could be further from the truth. Be that as it may, the defence forum has not been completely exempt from the troubles that have afflicted the ARF. For instance, at its ministerial meeting in November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, as a result of intractable differences among its member states, the ADMM-​Plus was forced to scrap a planned joint statement –​non-​mandatory, in any event –​on the South China Sea. At the time, it was widely (and wrongly) reported in the international press that the failure to issue a declaration was reminiscent of ASEAN’s disunity in Phnom Penh in July 2012. However, the key difference for the meeting in Kuala Lumpur was that all ten ASEAN countries –​ including the four South China Sea claimant states, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam –​stood firmly united against the inclusion of the South China Sea in the proposed joint declaration, while ensuring its mention in the chairman’s statement issued by Malaysia in its role as ASEAN chair for 2015 (Tan, 2015).

Conclusion This chapter has traced the regionalization of defence ­exercises –​and, crucially, the development of the so-​called ‘response abilities’ of regional countries and their respective military establishments –​in Southeast Asia, without which those countries would not be able to realize their

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aspirations to be responsible providers in meeting serious transnational and non-​traditional security challenges that confront the Southeast Asian region. It is clear there remain significant structural, institutional and cultural hurdles in the way of the development and settlement of the R2Provide ethic, and of sovereignty qua responsibility thinking and doing more broadly, in Southeast Asia. But even with the ‘one step forward, two steps back’ creep towards a more mature responsibility that has characterized Southeast Asian regionalism, it nonetheless seems as if the region’s governments and militaries have, in a manner of speaking, crossed a Rubicon of sorts regarding the acceptance and actualization of responsible sovereignty.

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5

Responsible Provision in HADR, Conflict Management and Human Rights Introduction As we have seen, the domains of security cooperation in Southeast Asia sanctioned and supported by the ASEAN-​based frameworks include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterterrorism, maritime security, cyber security and the like. Of late, there have been hints that responsible provision could eventually extend to cover assistance to Southeast Asian countries in the area of conflict management, not least because the terrorism threat to Southeast Asia has evolved in substance and style, which in turn has prompted regional states to introduce new methods and to muster new actors –​the military in particular –​to the ‘war on terror’. The difficulties facing Philippine security forces in their efforts to root out ISIS affiliates occupying Marawi in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao have reportedly elicited offers of assistance from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In response, the Duterte administration has accepted an offer of military assistance from Singapore out of concern that further deterioration of the situation ‘would cause instability to the rest of ASEAN’ (Channel News Asia, 2017). More recently, in response to the burgeoning Rohingya refugee crisis as a result of the Myanmar military’s offensive –​some have called it a genocidal campaign  –​against Rohingya ‘insurgents’, regional countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have variously made offers of aid and assistance to help alleviate the crisis (The Straits Times, 2017a). To the extent that these neighbourly acts constitute efforts in conflict management, the R2Provide arguably approximates the ‘sovereignty

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as responsibility’ concept proposed by Deng and associates (Deng et  al, 1996). Yet it should be noted that nowhere in the Southeast Asian practice is the notion of outside intervention entertained. Whilst Southeast Asian countries may agree with Deng concerning the putative responsibility and accountability of states to both their domestic and external constituencies, social persuasion and peer pressure, rather than outright coercion, serve as the principal means through which provider countries work with prospective recipient countries to reach consensual outcomes (Tan, 2013a). In this chapter, we explore the exercise of responsible provision in the three areas, the first being HADR, and another two areas from which the region has traditionally kept its distance because they constitute the realm of ‘domestic’ or ‘internal’ affairs of states, namely conflict management and human rights.

Regional cooperation in HADR Southeast Asia is particularly prone to natural disasters. The region sits astride the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’, a major area in the basin of the Pacific Ocean filled with sites of seismic activity and active volcanoes. According to the International Disaster Database, between 2003 and 2013 Southeast Asia alone accounted for over 31 per cent of all global fatalities resulting from natural disasters in that period, and bore, on average, more than US$4.4 billion annually over that same period (Petz, 2014: 5). As early as in 1976, ASEAN issued a Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters, the first notable effort by the original plank members of the organization –​Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines –​to identify disaster management and humanitarian assistance as a regional concern.1 However, little of consequence came out of it. With the end of the Cold War came growing awareness of non-​traditional security issues, but it was the series of major shocks beginning with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and followed by the 2003 SARS crisis, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, and so forth, that catalysed regional attention. As such, the formation of regional capacity in HADR was not something that arose as a matter of strategic foresight. Simply put, it was searing experience with those tragedies on a grand scale that served as an impetus for the region, particularly through ASEAN, to develop collective solutions to address natural disasters (Fan and Krebs, 2014). This led to the establishment and adoption, in 2009, of a unified regional framework covering all aspects of disaster management  –​ such as disaster risk reduction (DRR), preparedness, response and

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recovery –​known as the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. In the typical intergovernmental approach preferred by ASEAN, rather than concentrating and centralizing capacity within the regional organization itself, the AADMER promotes the notion that HADR capacity-​building is the responsibility of individual member states themselves. In 2011, another critical piece of the HADR architecture, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management  –​christened the AHA Centre  –​was added with the mandate to oversee the implementation of the AADMER. Established to become the driving operational force behind the implementation of the AADMER’s objectives, the meagrely staffed and resourced AHA Centre –​much like the ASEAN Secretariat –​is unfortunately hampered from carrying out the AADMER’s rather ambitious remit.

HADR in Myanmar: From Nargis to Rohingya Oddly enough, ASEAN’s relatively successful effort in coordinating the post-​Nargis relief and reconstruction effort occurred before the establishment of the AADMER agreement and certainly well before the formation of the AHA Centre. Cyclone Nargis resulted in 130,000 casualties and wrought untold damage to Myanmar (Petz, 2014: 12). As noted in Chapter 3, in the wake of the mass confusion and the suspicion of the Burmese generals towards the United Nations and international aid agencies, it was to ASEAN that Myanmar eventually turned for help, with ASEAN helping to set up the so-​called ‘tripartite model’ comprising the Myanmar government, the UN and ASEAN itself to facilitate reconstruction. Through this model, ASEAN served as a conduit for international assistance –​reportedly in excess of US$600 million –​furnished by 20 countries and the EU (ASEAN, 2010a). Maligned following the cyclone for its early inaction, ASEAN consequently became the middleman between a military junta distrustful of foreign participation and an international donor community fearful of the deliberate diversion of aid from their target recipients (Tan, 2013a). Commenting on the role played by ASEAN, an official of a humanitarian agency that participated in the post-​Nargis relief effort in May 2008 had this to say: ‘ASEAN really stepped into the breach in the third week of May and provided a really vital bridge, if you like, between two fairly mistrustful sets of stakeholders. In terms of providing some predictable humanitarian space, it has worked very well’.2 Recently, Moazzam Malik, the UK ambassador to Indonesia,

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Timor Leste and ASEAN, also shared his recollection of the role which ASEAN played: As I recall personally, ASEAN played a critical role after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. At the time I  was in charge of humanitarian operations at the UK Department for International Development. Then –​as today –​Myanmar was reluctant to allow international humanitarian agencies to deliver aid. ASEAN … stepped in. They negotiated a tripartite approach with Myanmar and the United Nations to oversee humanitarian operations in-​country. This allowed agencies with the right capability and expertise to get assistance to those in desperate need. The ASEAN led effort ended in July 2010 with the Myanmar government taking over the coordination of the aid mission. (Malik, 2018) However, the success ASEAN had with the post-​Nargis effort has hitherto not been replicated in the humanitarian crisis sparked by the actions taken by the Tatmadaw, the armed forces of Myanmar, against the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. In this instance, ASEAN’s approach has been defined by an abysmal lack of action in response to the plight of the Rohingya. State-​directed violence against the Rohingya has taken place since at least 2012 (Petty, 2012). The democratization of Myanmar initiated by then President U Thein Sein, culminating in the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) assumption of power in early 2016, was meant to mark a step forward for the Rohingya. That clearly did not happen. With every crisis evoked by a military-​backed ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the Rohingya, thousands have been forced to flee their homeland for neighbouring Bangladesh and other countries; since August 2017, more than 668,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled Myanmar for camps in Bangladesh (Doherty, 2018). As a consequence of the Myanmar government’s hardened stance on the issue, Aung San Suu Kyi’s international reputation suffered tremendously, with former confidants like the former US politician and diplomat Bill Richardson, who resigned from a board tasked with implementing the recommendations of a commission on the Rohingya refugee crisis helmed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, insisting that Suu Kyi had become a different person as a consequence of the crisis (Griffith, 2018). ASEAN’s ability to address the crisis has hitherto been minimal. Granted, the political situation is different than post-​Nargis, not least because the crisis this time is the direct consequence of what appears

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to be a state-​sanctioned policy of discrimination and decimation of a group of people. ‘It is of concern for all ASEAN countries, and yet ASEAN is not able to intervene and to force an outcome’, conceded Lee Hsien Loong, the prime minister of Singapore, at an ASEAN‒Australia meeting in Sydney in March 2018 (Channel News Asia, 2018). Yet member countries of ASEAN have talked openly and critically about the issue and, to all intents and purposes, are contravening ASEAN’s non-​interference policy. For example, Malaysian leaders and officials have censured Myanmar for ‘committing genocide through its ethnic cleansing’ and insisted ‘that the ASEAN Member States are bound by international principles on the promotion and protection of human rights, which are also enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (cited in Davies, 2017). In other words, Myanmar’s obduracy has pushed some of its fellow ASEAN members to adopt a form of protest that ASEAN has employed against Myanmar in the past, such as in September 2007 in response to the brutal crackdown on the clerics during the Saffron Revolution (MFA Singapore, 2007b). A number of Southeast Asian countries (as well as their civil society organizations) have responded to the crisis through providing humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps in Bangladesh (MFA Singapore, 2017; Ngu, 2017). In October 2017, Singapore delivered S$270,000 of aid and supplies, destined for the refugee camps near Cox’s Bazar, to Chittagong in south-​eastern Bangladesh. Likewise, Indonesia and Malaysia provided assistance in a variety of ways and by air and sea; the Malaysians have also proposed (Paul, 2017; The Washington Times, 2017) –​with the approval of the Bangladeshi government –​ construction of a field hospital catering to the refugees.3 Taking a page from the post-​Nargis relief and reconstruction mission in 2008, the AHA Centre can conceivably and indeed should play an ‘umbrella’ role ‒ that is, as mediator between the international community and Myanmar to coordinate international assistance to the Rohingya people (Malik, 2018). As mandated by ASEAN foreign ministers on 23 September 2017 in New  York, the AHA Centre has been involved in delivering assistance to the affected Rakhine region –​about 80 tonnes of relief items, according to a November 2017 report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) –​ but principally through relying on the Myanmar government as the middleman (UN, 2017). The problem with this approach is two-​fold, namely the aid delivered so far (including that from other international sources) is insufficient, while relying on the Myanmar government to distribute the aid to the very people its military forces are ostensibly

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victimizing offers little assurance that the intended recipients of that aid are in fact receiving it. A R2Provide approach, with its focus on consent, invitation and provision as and when called upon, is committed to constructive engagement to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Rohingya refugees are met. ASEAN and the international community have to work consensually with Myanmar to come to a diplomatic solution, with respect to reasonable security concerns that Myanmar has, to ensure the Rohingya crisis is peacefully managed and resolved.

The militarization of HADR: Pros and cons The demand for regional militaries to participate in disaster management and the imperative to ensure they are empowered and equipped to do so have assuredly increased. As Teo Chee Hean, the former deputy prime minister and defence minister of Singapore, acknowledged in 2008: Armed forces too have a crucial role to play in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They have the resources and manpower to fulfil an important quick response role in the crucial first stages of disaster relief and rescue operations. Armed forces can transport aid to where it is needed most in the affected locality and help in its distribution. It is not the value or quantity of the relief supplies. The question is whether they can be delivered in a prompt and effective manner to the last mile, down to the actual victims who need it, when they need it. Armed forces in turn can pave the way for civilian agencies and international organisations to follow up in the subsequent phases of disaster management. There is one key objective in such operations –​bringing relief speedily and effectively to the victims. (Teo, 2008) The perceived need to furnish relief for victims of a disaster relief in a fast and effective manner is therefore a key expression of the responsibility to provide. The ADMM work programmes and activity work plans adopted by the ACDFIM have been instrumental to the development of the SASOP (the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations), established in support of the AHA Centre’s as well as regional militaries’ implementation

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of the AADMER’s goals. These procedures include things such as a template for the roles and terms of reference for both provider countries and recipient countries that would enhance interoperability among ADMM-​Plus militaries in disaster management (MINDEF Brunei, 2010). Indeed, it could even be argued through facilitating reportage –​ voluntary, at best –​of their military assets for disaster management, ADMM-​Plus countries would actually be contributing to a limited version of a regional arms register. In this respect, ASEAN leaders are seeking to establish a regular submission process via the AHA Centre and the SASOP (Shoji, 2013: 9). Moreover, any military assistance furnished by one ASEAN state to another is conducted strictly on the basis of the agreement of and at the invitation of the affected country receiving the assistance (ASEAN, 2016c: 2). Moreover, while these forms of capacity augmentation are mostly concerned with the defence-​related assets of Southeast Asian governments, there is growing awareness among regional stakeholders that building local, societal-​ level capacities are equally necessary to ensure more effective and rapid responses to disasters, while reducing reliance on their national governments (Kuntjoro and Jamil, 2010). As evidenced by the serious constraints in early warning and post-​crisis rescue efforts following Indonesia’s ‘twin disasters’ in November 2010 –​the earthquakes and tsunami at the Mentawai Islands and volcanic eruptions at Mount Merapi –​this is a poignant concern for peripheral regions that are difficult to reach. As institutional manifestations of the R2Provide ethic, the ADMM, the ADMM-​Plus and their ancillary and adjunct processes are clearly oriented towards enabling the Southeast Asian states to collectively provide, for their and their neighbours’ people, a fair measure of respite from humanitarian challenges. Significantly, it is the defence establishments of Southeast Asia that have taken the lead in this regard (Tan, 2016, 2018a, 2018b). By no means devoid of ‘sovereignty as right’ considerations –​memorably, Indonesia’s proposal for a regional peacekeeping element in 2003 drew lukewarm responses from several ASEAN members over its potential implications for sovereignty (Bandoro, 2004)  –​the emphasis on regional capacity building and assistance vis-​à-​vis non-​traditional concerns has proved sufficiently salient to warrant a collective buy-​in from regional stakeholders. In this sense, the contributions of the Shangri-​La Dialogue deserve acknowledgement as well, not least as a context for regional debate on the R2P and the development of the responsibility qua provision ethic (Capie and Taylor, 2010). But it is early days yet, with little hitherto to suggest that Southeast Asians and their external partners

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can successfully translate their regular conduct of multilateral military exercises into collective coordinated responses to real humanitarian crises (Graham, 2013). Ultimately, frameworks and work programmes, no matter how impressive, are irrelevant apart from the concerted and sustained efforts by regional countries and their defence establishments to fulfil their commitments.4

HADR and implications for preventive diplomacy One issue that hitherto has received little analytical attention is the prospect of the ADMM-​Plus in terms of its respective potential as a security actor that can engage in preventive diplomacy. At bottom, PD seeks to prevent aggression through norms, institutions, confidence-​building measures and a wide variety of political and diplomatic processes.5 In contrast to the ARF, an institution that has sought without success to assume a role in PD, what has also been interesting about the ADMM-​Plus is its development of a capacity to engage in PD, even though the grouping has never formally declared its intentions to be a PD actor. That said, all of the frameworks and mechanisms discussed earlier –​the AMRG on HADR, the AADMER, the SASOP procedures (including another set of standard operating procedures for the utilization of military assets for HADR under the AADMER, which is meant to augment the existing SASOP), and the AHA Centre –​can appropriately be considered PD mechanisms in themselves in that they fulfil PD-​type functions. In the Southeast Asian countries themselves, supporting infrastructures and assets include the Regional HADR Coordination Centre based in Singapore and the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) based in Malaysia. Formed in 2015, the RHCC aims to fulfil the following objectives: to coordinate assistance provided by foreign armed forces for regional countries stricken by natural and humanitarian disasters; to serve as an information coordination and early warning centre; to conduct initial planning with the concurrence of the affected state for a possible multinational military HADR operation; and to support and complement the relief efforts of other bodies such as the AHA Centre and the OCHA (Chow, 2014). Formed in 2012 and based at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base at Subang, near Kuala Lumpur, the UNHRD is a hub established by the UN food aid agency, the World Food Programme (WFP), which provides storage and training facilities, logistics support and other related services to UN agencies in the region and is expected to respond within 48 hours of a crisis unfolding in the Asia-​Pacific (IISS, 2010). Hence, the potential for

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the ADMM-​Plus to conduct PD is there, but so too are manifold constraints in the way. There are reputational costs involved, as the lesson of the ARF has clearly demonstrated; for example, research has shown that the perceived legitimacy of the PD actor is a contributing factor to the success of PD (Huan and Emmers, 2016). Regrettably, the lack of action on ASEAN’s part in addressing the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis is not just another black mark for ASEAN, but an important reminder that institutional actors with experience and success in PD –​including the EU –​do not always do the needful (Greene and Kelemen, 2016).

HADR and deterrence Finally, notwithstanding the fact that HADR tends to be viewed by most if not all as a winning investment for all concerned,6 it cannot be ruled out that countries and their militaries could use, and indeed have used, their participation in HADR and/​or search and rescue operations for the purpose of deterrence, which they seek to achieve through ‘showcasing’ their defence assets and lift capabilities.7 For example, it has been argued that multinational rescue efforts in response to Cyclone Nargis, Typhoon Haiyan and the MH370 airline accident reveal intense security competition –​by proxy, for the most part –​ among relief sending states (Chang and Chong, 2016; Loh, 2016). These ‘competitions of compassion’ comprise the use of both hard and soft powers (Chong and Lee, 2018). During the MH370 rescue efforts, China deployed an impressive flotilla of 18 warships and coastguard vessels along with long-​range military transport aircraft to assist in the search. On the one hand, the deployment showcased China’s growing military capabilities and highlighted its ability to sustain operations far beyond its shores; on the other hand, China’s deployment arguably exposed its lack of offshore bases and friendly ports on which it could call (Torode and Martina, 2014). But even if deterrence were not the imperative behind a nation’s involvement in multilateral defence cooperation, unintended consequences could at times arise. For example, in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) activated Operation Flying Eagle, its biggest ever deployment of men and materiel to Indonesia and Thailand, involving some 1,500 personnel, three supply ships, twelve helicopters and eight transport aircraft (Boey, 2005).8 Yet there were anxious whispers around the region regarding what Singapore, with its force and lift capabilities on full display, could do to its neighbours if it harboured bellicose intentions. The irony

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is that, at times, even ‘altruistic’ missions like HADR and search and rescue could end up unintentionally exacerbating security dilemmas and driving security competition between would-​be rivals.

Regional cooperation in conflict management As noted in Chapter 2, Deng and his collaborators developed their sovereignty as responsibility concept in response to the challenge of conflict management on the African continent (Deng et  al, 1996). But as we have seen, Southeast Asian resistance against the military intervention dimension of the R2P has hitherto engendered a regional responsibility that has primarily emphasized disaster relief whilst stopping short of conflict management, presumably out of concern for sovereignty and non-​interference considerations. Of late, however, there have been hints that responsible provision could eventually extend to cover assistance to Southeast Asian countries in the area of conflict management, especially counterterrorism. The region has had a long, albeit mixed, history of interstate collaboration, first against the common challenge of communist subversion and later against religious militancy and terrorism.9 With the prospect of terrorist organizations like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, and the Abu Sayyaf publicly pledging their allegiance to ISIS as early as in 2014, the region faces the risk of ‘ISIS Central’ potentially linking up and formalizing ties with its Southeast Asian affiliates and other local groups to execute attacks (Singh, 2018). Not unlike the goal of the JI, which was to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia (Ramakrishna and Tan, 2003), the stated aim of groups active in the Battle of Marawi in Mindanao in southern Philippines, which lasted five months from May to October 2017, was to turn Mindanao into a wilayah or province of ISIS (Fealy, 2017).

Has ISIS come to Southeast Asia? What surprised analysts most about the Marawi conflict was the evident readiness of the militants to take the fight to the Philippine military by engaging in a drawn-​out urban war and employing tactics that initially confounded the government troops, such as the transformation of the hundreds of densely packed buildings in the city centre into a warren of improvised tunnels (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2017), and bearing, other than the ubiquitous AK47 automatic rifles, high-​powered weapons like Barrett .50 calibre sniper’s rifles and Armalite, Garand and M14 rifles (Maintem, 2017). Indeed, ISIS has shown its mettle

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and has taken responsibility for a number of attacks in Southeast Asia, including the January 2016 attack in Jakarta –​reportedly the first ISIS-​ related action –​and of course Marawi itself. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia but goes as far back as the era of anti-​ colonial struggle, with various militant groups taking to violence for ideological, secessionist and religious reasons (Liow, 2016a). Terrorism gathered pace after 9/​11 with a series of attacks perpetrated mostly by JI cells. ISIS is but the latest addition to this complex story. Despite being singled out by regional leaders, the real impact posed by ISIS is still being debated by analysts. On the one hand, it was widely reported that the Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon had been handpicked by ISIS Central as the ‘emir’ of the pro-​ISIS militants in Southeast Asia. But Hapilon, along with Omarkhayam Maute, were killed in the Marawi campaign; Hapilon’s successor as emir reportedly is either Mahmud Ahmad, Hapilon’s second-​in-​command who holds a doctorate in religious studies and was a lecturer at the University of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, or Furuji Indama, an Abu Sayyaf sub-​ commander, whose Filipino roots make him the more likely choice over the Malaysian Mahmud given the clannish nature of the Philippine militants (Chew, 2017; The Straits Times, 2017c). It is also widely known that ISIS established a group, Katibah Nusantara (KN), to help integrate Southeast Asians into the ranks of ISIS (Singh, 2015). The KN leader, Bahrun Naim, was allegedly responsible for ordering the January 2016 attack on Jakarta as well as the plot on the Marina Bay Sands resort in Singapore, the supposed target of rockets to be launched from the Indonesian island Batam just 30 kilometres from Singapore. The plot was foiled by Singaporean authorities in August 2016 (Arshad, 2016). However, KN is not without its challenges.10 On the other hand, it has been argued that at present there is no such thing yet as an ‘ISIS Southeast Asia’, nor has ‘ISIS Central’ formally declared an interest in any Southeast Asian country. The prominent conflict analyst Joseph Liow grants that the situation would worsen once there is a deliberate shift of attention of ISIS Central to Southeast Asia, but that has not happened in his view ‒ not yet at least (Au Yong, 2016). For the most part, the region is dealing with radical groups and individuals who have on their own taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS. Hence, quite apart from a well-​conceived and centrally planned strategy against Southeast Asia directed by ISIS Central, the argument here is that it is more a motley collection of local groups with local grievances, for which the abstraction that is ISIS provides impetus and inspiration, usually via the internet. The Jakarta attack in January 2016 was an example of this (Cochrane and Fuller, 2016).

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A second area of debate involves the threat posed by Southeast Asian ‘fighters’ returning from Syria and Iraq with battlefield experience and operational knowledge to either plan or mount attacks in the region. Again, this worry has not thus far materialized. The returnees in custody have largely been deportees, numbering 700‒800 and of whom 40 per cent are women and children, who failed in their attempts to enter Syria and Iraq. The numbers of this alleged threat are therefore relatively small. Tied to this is the ostensible threat posed by militants who will soon be released from prison. At issue is the weak prison system in Indonesia, and the peer-​to-​peer radicalization that occurs within prisons.11 Yet not all of these militants are necessarily ISIS supporters or sympathizers. In fact, the vast majority belong to militant groups that are reportedly opposed to ISIS. On the other hand, it has been argued that it is not returnees from Iraq and Syria, but rather returnees from Marawi in Mindanao, who pose the real threat in Southeast Asia (IPAC, 2017). According to a 2017 report published by the Institute of Policy Analysis on Conflict (IPAC) based in Jakarta, while the threat to Southeast Asia may stem more from pro-​ISIS local groups than ISIS itself, the game changer is likely to be Marawi, referred to by some as ‘the Mosul of Southeast Asia’.12 If disparate groups such as the JI, Jemaah Anshar Khilafah, the Abu Sayyaf, Ansarul Khilafah Philippines, the Maute Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and the like are able to lay aside their differences and band together –​whether under the aegis of ISIS or something else –​then it could spell very bad news for Mindanao, and, by extension, should their network become regionalized, Southeast Asia itself. But even on this score, there is disagreement, as some analysts believe the greater long-​term threat comes from a rejuvenated JI, which has a larger network and is better funded than the pro-​ISIS groups in the region (Liow, 2016b).

Counterterrorism strategies: Direct/​hard and indirect/​soft Conceptually, the national governments of Southeast Asia are united in the belief that a holistic strategy is required, one that combines retributive (or what used to be euphemistically termed ‘hard’ or ‘kinetic’) as well as restorative elements (Tan and Ramakrishna, 2004).13 But whether there is in fact a ‘Southeast Asian approach to counterterrorism’, one which ostensibly emphasizes a ‘bottom up and indirect’ strategy as has been suggested (Ramakrishna, 2005), is not immediately apparent. What is evident is that ASEAN countries have not handled terrorism in the same way. For example, Malaysia and

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Thailand have relied on more coercive, militaristic responses, whereas Indonesia and Singapore have mostly adopted a non-​militaristic, law enforcement approach to tackling the problem (Emmers, 2009b: 159). With the end of the military’s prominent role in Indonesian politics after 1998, internal threats of terrorism, communal violence and separatist activities became the primary responsibility of the Indonesian National Police. Nonetheless, dissatisfied with the ineffective response of police to terrorist attacks, the Indonesian military launched a new counterterrorism squad called the Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) in June 2015, which immediately reignited concerns about the military’s role in the country’s domestic affairs (Parameswaran, 2015). As such, while history clearly plays a role in the policy choices of these countries, contemporary experiences also affect a country’s counterterrorism strategy. In the post-​9/​11 period, there has been a growing para-​militarization of law enforcement in some Southeast Asian countries, a move which has arguably seen some success (Chalk et al, 2009: 83). Malaysian forces killed terrorist leaders Azahari Husin and Noordin Mohammad in 2005 and 2009, respectively, and arrested some hundred individuals purportedly involved in terrorist plots in 2015. Between 2015 and 2016 Singapore detained 40 Bangladeshi workers planning to target Bangladeshi military and government workers, purportedly on instructions from ISIS (so claimed the Bangladeshi group’s ringleader, Rahman Mizanur) (Chelvan, 2016). As noted earlier, Singapore also foiled in the Singapore Marina Bay Sands plot in August 2016. Some ASEAN countries have adopted measures to ‘harden’ their infrastructure. For example, in March 2017 Singapore announced that its Public Order Act would be amended to enhance measures to better guard against terrorism at events with large crowds. A new Infrastructure Protection Act was introduced in 2017 and passed by parliament in 2018 (Ng, 2017; Koh and Cheng, 2018). These measures place the onus on businesses to protect buildings and infrastructure against terrorism should they organize high-​risk and large-​crowd events. Most Southeast Asian law enforcement and security agencies retain a strongly national orientation, without in-​house expertise on groups outside their own borders. Southeast Asian states need to enhance counterterrorism cooperation and coordination, including intelligence sharing, law enforcement collaboration and military-​ to-​military exchanges to improve the effectiveness of retributive approaches and to minimize blowback against their use of force. At the restorative end of the spectrum, Singapore has also been leading the charge within ASEAN on de-​radicalization. Its Religious

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Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was originally formed to rehabilitate Singaporean JI detainees but has since expanded to promote a wide range of social discourse on extremism through dialogue sessions, publications and community engagement in schools, mosques and online communities (Salleh, 2017). The assumption here, correctly so, is that multi-​stakeholder collaboration –​a key feature of Singapore’s grassroots approach  –​ is essential in countering extremism, and it requires open engagement with civil society. In Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, two of the world’s largest Muslim organizations, have launched programmes to counter ISIS narratives (Barton, 2014; The Straits Times, 2015b). Be that as it may, Southeast Asian countries can and need to do more to prevent the radicalization of would-​be extremists and militants and to rehabilitate the veterans.

Counterterrorism cooperation: Existing and new forms Because of the region’s historical treatment of terrorism as a law and order issue, ASEAN traditionally approached terrorism as a subset of transnational crime.14 The events of 9/​11 were the game changer which brought terrorism to the forefront of national and regional security agendas. The ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was adopted in 2001. Prior to the Bali bombings in October 2002, the ASEAN states sought to enhance counterterrorism cooperation with one another. In May 2002, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (joined later by Cambodia and Thailand) signed a counterterrorism agreement to strengthen border controls, share airline passenger information, establish hotlines, share intelligence and adopt standard procedures for search and rescue. Several other nations in the region also signed similar cooperative agreements, and cooperation between governments, in particular law enforcement and intelligence agencies, increased. These efforts helped lay the groundwork for the adoption of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) in 2007, which aims to provide an overarching framework through which the respective and varied counterterrorism policies of the ASEAN member states could be coordinated, as well as to secure region-​wide endorsement. The ACCT achieved two important things. First, it introduced a common definition of terrorism in Southeast Asia, although whether Southeast Asian states are required to include it in domestic counterterrorism legislation is still subject to interpretation. Second, it established a shared understanding to exclude the nature of the motive behind the act –​be it political, religious or

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ideological –​from criminalization of terrorism, which is particularly important in a region (perhaps with the exception of Singapore), where criminal investigations and trials can easily be politicized on those grounds. That Southeast Asian countries recognize the fundamental importance of the ACCT is evident by the fact that only ratification by six out of ten members was needed in order for the ACCT to enter into force (which occurred in 2011, with full ratification by all ten members occurring in 2013). This was quite unusual for a regional organization that makes decisions by consensus. The member countries realized they needed the Convention and they needed it quickly. Much as Marawi could alter the way terrorism in Southeast Asia would henceforth be conducted, the manner in which Southeast Asian countries respond to the terrorist threat could also change in a number of ways. Firstly, their defence establishments are likely to deepen their collaboration in counterterrorism not only among themselves but with their external partners. They will do so through conducting joint exercises, sharing information and enhancing their force capabilities within the ADMM-​Plus. In the light of the Marawi conflict, these exercises could well translate into reality given the increasing probability that ASEAN militaries will have to protect their cities by force if need be. Secondly, the Marawi conflict memorably led to separate offers of military assistance from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to their imperilled Southeast Asian neighbour (Mangosing, 2017). Traditionally, Southeast Asian countries have tended to view with suspicion the prospect of one another’s armed forces setting foot on their home soil. Yet they have committed troops to one another’s aid, as Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia have been doing –​in the case of Malaysia, since 2003 –​in support of the implementation of the 1997 Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Franco, 2013). Together with external parties, Southeast Asian militaries are increasingly involved in humanitarian operations around the region. And as noted in Chapter 3, the ‘core countries’ of ASEAN have had a long history of security cooperation among themselves, including the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) and the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ initiative (Channel News Asia, 2016), whereas more recently Indonesia and Malaysia established the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (or INDOMALPHI) with the Philippines in June 2017 to patrol the Sulu-​Sulawesi seas, long a hub for transnational organized crime and militancy (Guiang, 2017). This implies that Southeast Asian countries are likely to seek new ways to collaborate against terrorism. In February 2018, ASEAN

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defence officials signed the Our Eyes Initiative (OEI), a cooperative arrangement aimed at countering terrorism (Parameswaran, 2018b). Championed most vigorously by the Indonesian defence minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu, the present membership of OEI includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Modelled after the post-​World War II ‘Five Eyes’ alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, the OEI involves the sharing of strategic –​and, subsequently, operational and tactical –​intelligence on terrorism among all member countries of ASEAN. Signed in February 2018, the OEI envisages the establishment of centres in each Southeast Asian country whose purpose would be to facilitate intra-​regional communication, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation among and across national defence (as well as homeland security) establishments. Moreover, the OEI follows closely the ASEAN emphasis on open security regionalism through cooperation with select ASEAN dialogue partner countries, as exemplified by the ARF and the ADMM-​Plus (Tan, 2017b, 2018c). Reportedly, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States have been identified as the first set of partners with which the Southeast Asian states could cooperate. Although China is not included in this set, it could be just a matter of time before the invitation is extended to the Chinese to participate, in the light of ongoing efforts by both ASEAN and China to explore concrete ways to boost their defence ties (Lim, 2017a, 2017b). However, in order for OEI to work effectively, participating countries would first have to manage and overcome the deep-​seated distrust that persists among them. In this respect, it is noteworthy that when introducing the initiative back in October 2017, Ryamizard felt the need to explain that the OEI has ‘nothing to do with politics. It is purely an initiative to fight the existence of terrorist groups and maintain peace in our region’ (The Straits Times, 2017d). Going forward, the ASEAN defence establishments are likely to leverage on these existing forms of cooperation in their quest for new and innovative approaches in response to the growing scale and complexity of the terrorist threat in their region. Developments arising from the ADMM retreat that met in Singapore in early February 2018 included the development of a cooperative framework –​labelled the ‘3R’ for resilience, response and recovery  –​to tie the region’s counterterrorism initiatives together (MINDEF Singapore, 2018a; Teo, 2018). Borrowed unashamedly from the domains of cyber security, disaster risk reduction and so forth (CRS, 2016; TEISS, 2018), the concept and language of the 3R is by no means novel and is certainly not original to the ADMM. What is interesting is the way it is being

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applied to counterterrorism in Southeast Asia. This is accomplished through building resilience in preventing terrorist attacks; coordinating counterterrorism responses to address ongoing threats; and recovering from any terrorist attacks that do occur. Reportedly, the 3R framework not only provides a coherent and comprehensive regional approach to terrorism; it also supposedly enhances ASEAN’s centrality as well as coordination and partnership among the various counterterrorism initiatives of the ASEAN member countries. Crucially, the framework acknowledges the historical differences and varying force capabilities among the Southeast Asian states and seeks as such to enhance counterterrorism cooperation among the ASEAN militaries by leveraging their niche capabilities to better complement the efforts of home front or internal security agencies. At the same time, through the 3R strategy, the Southeast Asian states also seek to shore up their capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats from terrorist groups and rogue actors. Indeed, the potential employment of CBRN weapons by such groups renders the integration of the armed forces into the overall counterterrorism strategy of Southeast Asian states all the more crucial. In that regard, ASEAN has announced the establishment of an ASEAN Armies Information Sharing Workshop (AAISW) as a way to enhance cooperation among the region’s armed forces in response to CBRN threats (MINDEF Singapore, 2018b). Not unlike the OEI, the 3R remains a work in progress with –​despite the post-​9/​11 emphasis in the region on a ‘whole of government’/​‘whole of society’ approach to counterterrorism (Tan, E.K.B., 2017) –​much work still to be done on how the plans and efforts of the armed forces and home front agencies of regional countries can best be integrated.

Militarizing counterterrorism: Implications for extant convention and practice The prospect that cooperative initiatives such as the Malacca Straits Patrols, the INDOMALPHI and the OEI could conceivably serve as models for intra-​ASEAN military collaboration against terrorism raises the question of whether such collaboration, as and when it takes place, might warrant resort by the Southeast Asian countries to the ‘ASEAN minus x’ formula. Codified in the ASEAN Charter, the formula allows member countries ready to participate in economic initiatives to do so, while those that are not ready could join in later ‒ a form of ‘minilateralism’, so to speak (Patrick, 2014). In recent years, the unity and cohesion of ASEAN, fragile even in the best of times,

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have been rocked by the South China Sea disputes, not least because of China’s efforts to ensure that the Southeast Asian states –​four of which (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) are South China Sea claimant countries themselves –​do not band together and balance against it. In the light of ASEAN’s seeming inconsequence as a diplomatic actor in the South China Sea because of its consensus model (as discussed earlier in Chapter 4), some analysts have proposed that ASEAN should consider expanding ‘ASEAN minus x’ to include the security domain as well, if only to ensure that ASEAN avoids the dire prospect of being consigned to irrelevance in perpetuity (Emmers, 2017a; Heydarian, 2017). As noted earlier, the entry into force of the ACCT, ASEAN’s antiterrorism convention, on the basis of ratification by six not ten member countries, could arguably be seen as ‘ASEAN minus x’ in operation, at least informally. However, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN states would consent to the broad application of ‘ASEAN minus x’ to security collaboration among themselves because of the possibility that they could one day end up, intentionally or otherwise, as the target of collective security action undertaken by their fellow members or, at the very least, be ‘outvoted’ by other members given that ‘ASEAN minus x’, under certain conditions, could conceivably function not unlike a majority-​rule formula despite ASEAN’s decision by consensus model.15 Needless to say, the prospect of Southeast Asian militaries joining the fight against terrorism is by no means a foregone conclusion especially in a region with a difficult history of rule by the military (Meitzner, 2012; Case, 2013). The prospect of a growing regional role in counterterrorism for Southeast Asia’s armed forces raises questions over how national governments are to avoid overstepping on civil liberties at home even as they work to protect their citizens from terrorism and violence –​not least for a region where the process of democratic transition has mostly been patchy, uneven and prone to authoritarian reversal (Neher, 1991; Case, 2009, 2015; Paul, 2010; Peou, 2014; Morgenbesser and Pepinsky, 2018). Hence, even as Southeast Asian countries brace themselves for the likelihood of a growing role for their armed forces in counterterrorism, they ought to bear in mind the consequences such a development could have for civil liberties at home as well as regional sensitivities abroad.16 On the other hand, there are regional sensitivities as well. As discussed in Chapter 3, persistent mutual distrust among Southeast Asian countries, the primacy of the deterrence logic, and the enduring preoccupation with sovereignty concerns among Southeast Asian countries have complicated and even hindered the implementation of humanitarian and search and

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rescue missions in the region (Chang and Chong, 2016; Loh, 2016; Chong and Lee, 2018). If the quest to establish deeper and more extensive intra-​ASEAN collaboration in counterterrorism is likely to be hampered by these same reasons, how much more so when the armed forces of the Southeast Asian countries enter the fray. How affected countries and societies in need of external assistance are able to host foreign troops and to facilitate counterinsurgency operations without jeopardizing their sovereignty is likely to emerge as a key concern as Southeast Asian countries and their militaries cooperate to tackle the common challenge of terrorism in their neck of the woods. To the extent that these neighbourly acts constitute efforts in conflict management, the R2Provide arguably approximates the sovereignty as responsibility concept proposed by Deng and associates. Yet it should be noted that nowhere in the Southeast Asian practice is the notion of outside intervention entertained. Any military assistance furnished by one ASEAN state to another is conducted strictly on the basis of the agreement of and at the invitation of the recipient country –​a precondition of the R2Provide. Whilst Southeast Asian countries may agree with Deng concerning the putative responsibility and accountability of states to both their domestic and external constituencies, social persuasion and peer pressure, rather than outright coercion, serve as the principal means through which provider countries work with prospective recipient countries to reach consensual outcomes (Tan, 2013a).

Regional cooperation in human rights In a distinct yet related way, the responsibility to provide rather than to protect is also arguably evident in how Southeast Asian governments have sought to institutionalize and localize the human rights regime as part of the broader regional enterprise in human security. In 2009, ASEAN surprised the world with its establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Tan, H.L., 2011). It has been argued that civil society organizations in the region played a role  –​limited it should be noted  –​in lobbying Southeast Asian governments to establish such a regional instrument (Asplund, 2014). In this respect, the contributions of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, a nongovernmental network created in 1995 on the initiative of the international grouping known as the Law Association of Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA) in the ASEAN process aimed at establishing a regional human rights mechanism, received formal recognition by the Southeast Asian states (Pisanò, 2016). This

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was followed in 2010 by the formation of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). In 2012, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was issued, the first ever Southeast Asian charter of human rights. The AHRD contains commitments not only to economic, cultural and social rights –​the traditional Southeast Asian understanding of rights –​but also to far more contentious civil and political rights. Their very establishment is quite a surprise, not least when you consider the very different positions adopted by ASEAN states in human rights domestically (Davies, 2014a). That said, these human rights mechanisms have been deemed by nearly everyone to be inadequate, incompatible with gold standards, toothless, regressive and a form of ‘window dressing’ that conveniently shields ASEAN from outside criticism against continued rights violations by its member countries (Kelsall, 2009). Indeed, given ASEAN’s relatively poor record of compliance with the standards included in treaties which the organization has ratified, there are not many analysts who feel that Southeast Asian countries can even deliver on the minimal standards of the AICHR and the AHRD, particularly since the latter contains commitments well ahead of what some ASEAN members are ‘ready for’, as it were (Davies, 2014b). Finding such a view to be overly simplistic, Hiro Katsumata has argued that: The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries –​advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialised democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN’s identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. (Katsumata, 2009: 619) If Katsumata is right, then the ostensible utilitarian quest by Southeast Asian countries for a legitimacy predicated on the responsibility to ensure and preserve human well-​being –​because that is what advanced industrialized countries do –​is an ideal worth pursuing.17 Be that as it may, it is clear that the AICHR has a limited mandate that does not entail protective measures to enforce human rights in the region; in short, the remit of the AICHR is to promote, not protect, human rights. According to Termsak Chalermpalanupap, the former director of the ASEAN Political-​Security Community, the AICHR was never

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meant to be an independent watchdog (Kranrattanasuit, 2014: 93). Given the fact that the AICHR was launched together with the 2009 Cha-​Am Hua Hin Declaration, which –​despite expressing ‘ASEAN’s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ in its preamble  –​emphasized the Southeast Asian leaders’ commitment to pursue forward-​looking strategies to strengthen regional cooperation on human rights, it thereby implied that what ASEAN member states had in mind for the AICHR did not extend to the effective protection of human rights, not at the present moment at least (ASEAN, 2009b, emphasis added). Yet it is debatable how far the Southeast Asian states have actually gone to fulfil their obligation to promote human rights. For example, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have long been considered the advocates and even champions of human rights in the region –​ a perspective tempered in recent years with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte facing allegations of crimes against humanity for his war against drugs, crime and corruption at home, and the 2014 coup in Thailand –​while Singapore and Malaysia arguably prefer a more cautious approach when it comes to human rights issues (Lopez, 2012; Brown, 2016; Kaiman, 2017; Kurlantzick, 2017; The Economist, 2017; Bello, 2018). Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam lag even further behind. At best, it is the activist or progressive members that are using the AICHR and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration as platforms to persuade their conservative counterparts to embrace human rights promotion. Not unlike the ASEAN Charter, these human rights mechanisms reflect the diversity of standards among the Southeast Asian states; they reflect ‘the “ASEAN synthesis” between progressive and traditionalist positions held by member states’, according to one view (Davies, 2013: 51; also see Ng, 2012). They are, as Mathew Davies has put it, ‘agreement[s]‌to disagree’ (Davies, 2014a). Arguably, the strongest point in the terms of reference for the AICHR is Article 4.10, which mandates the Commission ‘[t]‌o obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection of human rights’ (ASEAN, 2009c: 7). The process is, as are most if not all things with ASEAN, voluntary and nonbinding. Yet Southeast Asian states have participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council since 2008 (Voice of Vietnam, 2016). The UPR is a mechanism that assesses the human rights records of all UN member states and produces a report with recommendations on improvements. Ultimately, how far ASEAN can progress on human rights will still be delimited by existing structural, institutional and normative constraints, such as the region’s

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democracy deficit, the purported sacrosanctity of the non-​interference doctrine within ASEAN, and the predilection within the Southeast Asian region to continue viewing ‘development’ in primarily economic terms (Asplund, 2012). But as we have seen again and again in the cases examined here, the space between a non-​negotiable adherence to non-​interference, on the one hand, and a responsibility towards one’s neighbours that includes coercive interference, on the other, is neither narrow nor negligible. This much is implicit in Francis Deng’s acknowledgement of the tension, as he sees it, inherent in the unilateral exercise of one’s sovereign responsibility towards a recipient state, and obtaining the consensual agreement of that recipient state to do so.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to offer a preliminary rethink on the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility in Southeast Asia in three distinct yet related domains of regional cooperation: HADR, conflict management and human rights. Suffice it to say that the ‘rules of the road’ regarding the implementation of the R2Provide in Southeast Asia reject any notion of the imposition and enforcement of assistance by provider countries, but is completely reliant on the invitation by recipient countries in need of that assistance  –​as evidenced by the dynamics surrounding the post-​Nargis rebuilding process, the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis and the regional response to the conflict in Marawi. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the idea of a responsibility to the other that expects nothing in return is a challenging proposition in Southeast Asian international relations. Yet the long and much maligned policy of constructive engagement and enhanced interaction Southeast Asian governments practised towards a recalcitrant Myanmar could, with qualifications, be seen as a responsibility to the other which provided some but yielded little (Haacke, 1999); some might even say it brought negative returns for ASEAN. That Myanmar eventually loosened up under Thein Sein’s leadership, if only due indirectly to efforts of its fellow Southeast Asian countries, is therefore a bonus. Ultimately, the Rohingya crisis underscores the fundamental need for a responsible sovereignty to provide not only for the other who lives beyond our borders, but crucially for the other who lives within them.

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Towards the Responsible Management of Disputes in Southeast Asia Introduction So far, I have sought to develop the thesis that responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia is best understood and embodied in the notion of a shared responsibility to provide. But in a conventional sense, responsible sovereignty is equally about the willingness of states to resolve their claims to their perceived sovereign rights through subjecting disputes they have with one another to mediation, arbitration and possibly even adjudication, with the end goal of regional resolution and reconciliation –​even if they end up on the ‘losing side’. This includes the ability of states at times to dial down their nationalist and populist proclivities, whether in terms of tempering the nationalist demands of their citizenry or the resort by their political leaders to playing the nationalist card in the attempt to harness its force in support of their claims (Krebs, 2017), as well as adopting a middle approach that includes the use of tough rhetoric against a rival without overplaying the nationalist card, which reportedly describes Vietnam’s approach to the diplomatic standoff sparked by China’s deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou –​or Hải Dư ơ ng for the Vietnamese –​981 oil rig near the disputed Paracel Islands from May to July in 2014 (Nhung, 2016).1 The aim of this chapter therefore is to trace Southeast Asia’s embryonic experimentation with a rules-​based approach  –​which could involve legal means but is not exclusive to them  –​to the management of its intra-​regional and extra-​regional relations, and to assess its implications for regional order and security. Understood here, ‘legalization’ –​or ‘institutionalization’ if you like –​involves the degree

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to which common rules and norms shape the behaviours of states, whether or not they actually go before the courts (Kahler, 2000).2 Efforts in this respect include ASEAN’s on-​going (and challenging) implementation of its charter and the selective resort by several ASEAN countries to legal means to settle disputes involving trade and territorial concerns. Although Southeast Asia generally lags behind some other regions in its willingness to countenance legalization, a growing number of Southeast Asian countries have in fact relied on third-​party arbitration and/​or adjudication. That they have sought to settle disputes between themselves and external parties, on one hand, and among themselves on an intra-​mural basis, on the other, implies a slow but gradual willingness to seek legal recourse. This is so even on concerns involving sovereignty and territoriality, a fair number of which have arisen since the entry into force of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1994.3 Crucially, none of the examples on the pursuit of legal resolution of intra-​ASEAN disputes  –​including the ones discussed later  –​ involved reliance by regional states on ASEAN-​based instruments and mechanisms. Ironically, Southeast Asians are more liable to look to international legal organizations and dispute settlement mechanisms than to their own regional organization (i.e., ASEAN) for mediation, arbitration, adjudication and/​or reconciliation.4 The region’s relative ambivalence to legalization  –​ weak at the regional institutional level, with selective reliance for bilateral dispute settlement –​raises interesting questions for the outcomes, intended or otherwise, of ASEAN’s efforts in regional security integration. How, for example, might a predominantly utilitarian approach to legalization, which Southeast Asian countries seem to prefer, affect the ASEAN Community, which Southeast Asian states are still seeking to establish? And if ASEAN’s vision of regional community presupposes the necessity for institutional innovation and reform, what are the prospects for such? Liberal scholars tend to assume legalization is designed to achieve institutional change, and those who take umbrage with the ASEAN charter for its purported flaws seem to presuppose the legal turn by ASEAN should be about the innovation and transformation of that regional organization and the regionalism that has hitherto defined the region. In fairness, the language of the ASEAN Concord II of 2003 and the charter itself allude to the aspirations of its architects (ASEAN, 2003). But the instrumentality and strategy with which Southeast Asian countries approach their selective appropriations of the legal recourse in dispute settlement suggest the more likely outcome of their actions tends to be institutional continuity or stasis. Indeed,

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their relatively conservative approach to legalization at the ASEAN level is also designed to ensure maintenance of the regional status quo (or continuity, in short). This is neither to imply that prospects for institutional and regional transformation are therefore slim, nor that Southeast Asians are fundamentally opposed to change. If anything, an enhanced regional organization armed with viable compliance-​based regimes undergirding interstate relations in Southeast Asia would be integral, even essential, to the region’s future peace and prosperity, not least to ensure a sustained commitment by member countries of ASEAN  –​and, conceivably, external powers as well, such as signatories to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established in 1976 –​to peaceful means of conflict management and resolution. Ultimately, a region-​wide reliance on rules-​based management of interstate differences could mean an increasing de-​securitization of trade and of territoriality between and among the Southeast Asian countries themselves.

Regional experiences with rules On 20 November 2007, ASEAN formally adopted a charter which subsequently entered into force on 15 December 2008 (ASEAN, 2007b). This development led some observers to speculate on the changing nature of regional diplomacy in Southeast Asia from a hitherto longstanding preference for informality and consensus-​based interactions, to a rules-​based and potentially compliance-​oriented approach. This view of ASEAN regionalism builds on a conventional wisdom that Southeast Asia has traditionally been averse to legal solutions where its interstate relations are concerned. Purveyors of this argument invariably point to the diplomatic conventions and security norms and practices favoured by ASEAN, whose institutional design has long privileged consensus, consultation, informality and intergovernmentality  –​the so-​called ‘ASEAN Way’ (Haas, 1989; Acharya, 1997; Goh, 2003) –​over obligation, precision, subsidiarity and other ancillary principles typically associated with a highly institutionalized organization like the European Union. On the other hand, the member countries of ASEAN have only occasionally relied on legal means to manage and, where possible, settle their disputes with other states. Most likely, the inception of the ASEAN charter marks the initiation of a long and probably arduous trek towards a new diplomatic convention and security practice among Southeast Asians which the architects of the charter hope would be defined increasingly by rules rather than a set of loose and informal practices.

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At best, Southeast Asia’s record in rules-​based management of regional security has been patchy (Nasu et al, 2019). As noted, the apparent ambivalence with which the region’s countries have approached legalization suggests, despite the establishment of the ASEAN charter, that Southeast Asia still has a long way to go in emulating the legal character of more advanced international organizations, if indeed that is what Southeast Asians aim to do.5 To be sure, there are compelling reasons arguing against that, furnished by ‘path-​dependence’ explanations favoured by scholars of historical institutionalism (Fioretos, 2011). As a former Secretary General of ASEAN once lamented, comparisons between ASEAN and the EU are neither fair nor judicious, especially if they are motivated by the assumption that Southeast Asian regionalists not only aspire to attain the institutional and legal standards and practices adhered to by their European counterparts, but that they should therefore also be held accountable to those expectations. As Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary General of ASEAN from 1998 to 2002, has written: Will ASEAN be like the EU? Most likely not. At least not exactly. As the EU itself acknowledges, it is unique as a regional organisation and will probably remain so. But we can expect domestic and external forces, the logic of globalisation, and the imperatives of regionalism to move ASEAN to resemble the EU more closely than it does today, and as ASEAN evolves, more closely than we can foresee today. (Severino, 2001)6 What does the historical and contemporary record suggest about Southeast Asia’s engagement with rules and legalization? Two broad observations are noteworthy in this regard. The following discussion will focus first on ASEAN’s own efforts at establishing a legal personality as a regional organization, and second at the state-​to-​state level both within Southeast Asia as well as between Southeast Asian countries and external powers.

Is ASEAN going legal? What prompted the Southeast Asian states to establish a charter for ASEAN? And why especially a charter whose contents do not differ significantly from those of earlier ASEAN agreements and treaties? In short, why bother? Some socialization scholars would probably treat this as an indication of ASEAN’s concern over its legitimacy as a regional organization. By adopting a charter and crafting a vision for an ASEAN

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Community with economic and political security and socio-​cultural ‘pillars’ –​indeed, in establishing an intergovernmental human rights commission –​ASEAN could well be ‘mimicking’ the EU and other institutions in order to enhance its international legitimacy and burnish its reputation.7 As Jetschke and Murray have noted: ASEAN members have started to adopt EU-​style institutions, in particular, the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives and economic integration processes. This adoption process can be conceived as both lesson-​drawing and normative emulation from the EU. This has not led to a comprehensive and systematic copying of EU institutions by ASEAN. Rather, member states have acted selectively in line with their ‘cognitive priors’ about state sovereignty. We observe institutional change only, but not a change in behavioural practices. (Jetschke and Murray, 2012: 174) In recent years, ASEAN–​EU relations have improved vastly compared to the 1990s, putting them well past the negative experiences of their acrimonious conflict over the human rights records of Southeast Asian states and the equally intense debate over Asian values –​as happened at the World Conference on Human Rights (the ‘Vienna Conference’) held in Vienna, Austria, in June 1993. As Singapore’s George Yeo reportedly told his European audience in 2007: The European colonial legacy is partly the reason why ASEAN countries find in European integration an inspiration for our own integration. Some members of the [High Level Task Force or HLTF] drafting our ASEAN Charter have visited Berlin and are now in Brussels, precisely to learn from the EU experience. I don’t think our integration will ever go as far as Europe’s but your footsteps, including your missteps, are a guide to us in our journey. The European Commission has been most helpful to us. Last year, the Eminent Persons appointed by the ASEAN Leaders received excellent briefings on the European Union in Brussels which influenced them in the way they crafted their recommendations. (MFA Singapore, 2007a) But is this institutional learning a clear instance of socialization, wherein Southeast Asia has effectively imbibed and appropriated relevant norms and best practices from the EU? European scholars

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have debated over whether this interregional diffusion of ideas from Europe to Southeast Asia involved persuasion, that is, the EU as persuader and ASEAN as the persuaded. On the one hand, it has been argued that the EU relies on persuasion and other ‘soft’ incentives to influence institutional change in far-​flung regions given its ability to force non-​members into compliance with its standards and institutional prescriptions weakens, unsurprisingly, with distance (Börzel and Risse, 2012). On the other hand, others have argued that since ASEAN only accepted the EU’s influence following its own policy failure in the wake of the financial crisis of 1997–​98, that it was its environmental circumstances that rendered the EU model attractive, rather than the message of EU integration per se, poses analytical problems for the persuasion hypothesis. As Jetschke and Murray conclude, ‘The test for the persuasiveness of the EU message, in our view, would be whether ASEAN members would have been persuaded without a crisis’ (Jetschke and Murray, 2012: 179). Mimicry consists in shallow normative transactions and, for better or worse, the conservatism of the ASEAN Charter, as discussed earlier, appears to support the mimicking argument. But as Dian Triansyah Djani, the Indonesian representative to the HLTF, has implied, both push factors, not least the challenges posed by the rise of China and India as well as those posed by globalization, and pull factors such as the drive to enhance economic integration within ASEAN, contributed to the felt need for a charter: [I]‌t was evident in many quarters in Indonesia that the time had come for a Charter in ASEAN so as to preserve ASEAN’s relevance as a regional player. The emergence of ASEAN’s neighbours, the challenges of globalisation and the need to enhance integration within ASEAN, raised the stake to expedite the transformation of ASEAN into a formal organisation, with a legal personality and a stronger structure and mechanism. (Djani, 2009: 40) There is much to be said for affirmative interpretations of the charter, not least where liberal implications for regional peace and security are concerned, should legalization become the accepted approach among ASEAN countries for managing and hopefully resolving their intramural disputes and conflicts in an orderly, nonviolent fashion.8 Needless to say, this is contingent on the sustained corporate commitments of Southeast Asian governments to a legal regime and their refusal to defect from the regime –​even at the risk of incurring

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relative losses in the near term because of perceived absolute gains over the long haul (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982). In the language of neo-​institutionalism, such a legal regime is robust only if state actors adhere to it on the basis of ‘appropriateness’ (commitment based on the belief that rules per se are an essential and inherent good for the region) rather than of ‘expected consequences’ (commitment based on the view that legalization is a matter of instrumental choice purely in terms of self-​interest) (Goldman, 2005). Given the relative immaturity of Southeast Asia’s legal regime, it is obvious that no robust logic or ethic of appropriateness regarding legalization exists in Southeast Asia just yet. On the other hand, it could be argued, as some indeed have done, that the ASEAN Way, which continues to enjoy legitimacy in regional conduct, retains its sense of appropriateness and suitability in the eyes of the Southeast Asian states (Acharya, 2001). At the regional level, there is little question that Southeast Asian regionalism has historically eschewed legalization. ASEAN’s institutional design has long emphasized an intergovernmental structure with an informal decision-​making process based on flexible consensus and consultation, and minimal delegation to quasi-​juridical mechanisms (including a relatively weak secretariat) (Acharya, 1997). Its founding and ancillary documents are best conceived as multilateral declarations and not treaties per se (the regional organization’s preferred nomenclature notwithstanding), certainly nothing of the sort that would commit the regional organization to some form of political integration (Leifer, 1989: 25). ASEAN regionalism has emphasized dispute management rather than resolution; member nations essentially agree to shelve rather than settle their disputes. And although ASEAN’s 1976 treaty specifies a High Council that would recommend ways of resolving disputes, the provision has never actually been activated. Further, even if decisions had indeed been taken, the provision comes with no mechanism through which to enforce them. This much was clear when the foreign minister of Singapore, in his capacity as the chair of ASEAN in 2007 and faced with the Burmese military junta’s forceful suppression of dissidents in Yangon, conceded that ASEAN has ‘little leverage over the internal development [in Myanmar]. What we have is moral influence as members of the ASEAN family’ (The Straits Times, 2007).9

The politics behind the charter drafting process Apart from the ASEAN–​EU dimension, did persuasion take place at the intra-​ASEAN level among members to push the establishment of

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the charter? Although all ten Southeast Asian states officially have an equal voice in decisions, the norm of consensus does not mean that inter-​member deliberations and negotiations are necessarily civil and diplomatic all the time. Indeed, size, population and history matter a great deal in intramural relations. As Don Emmerson has noted, ‘acknowledging the formal equality and autonomy of member states need not deter big states from informally “persuading” small ones. Because of their differing endowments, some members can afford to be less polite than others’ (Emmerson, 2007: 438). In their deliberations over the drafting of the charter, it became clear that not every country was favourably disposed to the idea of a charter. Reportedly, the purported conflict that arose between supporters of the charter and those that resisted it led to some rather ‘undiplomatic’ exchanges during the HLTF’s negotiations as supporting countries (primarily the founding members of ASEAN, with Indonesia and Singapore as the most proactive actors) sought to coax and cajole their reluctant counterparts (primarily the newer members that joined ASEAN in the 1990s), some of which refused to budge on the charter (Volkmann, 2008: 80–​81). One of the disagreements that arose at the 10th HLTF meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in September 2007 involved whether the terms of reference for the proposed ASEAN human rights body should be completed before the signing of the charter. The ‘older’ members of ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, wanted the terms of reference of the human rights body deleted from the agenda, and discussion over the aims and function of the human rights body to be taken up by experts after the charter was signed. However, the ‘newer’ members of ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, insisted that the terms of reference and enabling provision for the human rights body be completed before the charter was signed, and that the body be given only consultative status –​a diminished role from what their ‘senior’ counterparts, the plank members of the organization, had hoped for. The deadlock, which lasted two days, broke only after a compromise was achieved by way of a mention in the charter regarding the terms of reference for the human rights body ‘to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ (Koh, 2009c: 62–​3).

Creating new rules or codifying old ones? The adoption of the charter has evoked intense debate on whether this step towards rules constitutes an institutional and normative advance in regional affairs, or a mere entrenchment of existing norms

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and principles long held by the regional organization. On the one hand, the charter’s arrival has been heralded as a watershed moment in Southeast Asian regionalism, marking the region’s embrace of rules that would facilitate the evolution of regionalism from a hitherto soft or minimalist variety to a more institutionalized form. On the other hand, detractors of ASEAN dismiss the charter as yet another flight of fancy that, as it has been with most visions and aspirations of ASEAN, would in due course be exposed as being long in words but woefully short in deeds (Jones and Smith, 2002). Others welcome the charter but lament ASEAN’s inability to achieve its own targets, not least in terms of driving regionalism and regional economic integration (Severino, 2007). For still others, the quibble is not over ASEAN’s intent to legalize but the particular principles privileged by the charter, principally legal-​rational norms such as sovereignty and non-​interference, and social conventions such as the ASEAN Way. Given carte blanche by ASEAN leaders to develop a wish list of things to be included in the charter, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), an advisory body convened for that very purpose, produced, by ASEAN standards, a rather remarkable list of recommendations, including the call for clear mechanisms for dispute settlement, accountability and redress (ASEAN, 2006b). Unsurprisingly, the HLTF that drafted the charter eschewed most of the EPG’s radical ideas, opting instead for a more cautious approach typical of the delicate balancing between the disparate interests, histories and sensitivities of Southeast Asian states that defines all ASEAN agreements: After a two-​year process, however, the resulting forty-​ page Charter did little more than grant ASEAN a legal personality, which means little in light of ASEAN’s institutional incapacity. To wit, the Charter simply consolidates ASEAN’s existing pronouncements, setting forth purposes and principles which largely reflect those functions found in previous Agreements. Additionally, the Charter’s procedures for the members’ rights and obligations, decision-​m aking process, and dispute settlement do not markedly differ from the ASEAN Way. The Charter also clarifies the organisation’s structure, affords ASEAN certain immunities and privileges, and sets forth budgetary protocol. Last, it provides for the organisation’s administrative functions, discusses ASEAN’s symbols, and articulates mechanisms to govern ASEAN’s legal and extra-​ regional relationships. (Leviter, 2010: 164–​5)

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ASEAN leaders have been derided for their conservatism and lack of collective will and courage in watering down the EPG’s proposals. If anything, the charter also appears to underscore the Southeast Asian countries’ evident preference for norms and principles such as ‘respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states’, ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’, ‘non-​interference in member states’ internal affairs’, ‘right to live without external interference’ and the like. As Walter Woon, who was involved in the work of drafting the charter, has clarified, where the settlement of disputes goes, the charter only concerns itself with interstate disputes (Woon, 2016: 165). For some, this development is arguably regressive since it amounts essentially to a codification of existing agreements, declarations and norms, burnishing these with a legal patina. In the words of one observer: Disappointment comes not so much from things that are found in the charter, but from things that are not but should be. The charter is by all accounts as good a lowest common denominator as could have been expected, given the disparate interests, histories and sensitivities of Southeast Asian countries. Taking in not many important recommendations from the EPG, the document reaffirms a state centric ASEAN and institutionalises age-​old values of consensus and noninterference. It lacks clear mechanisms for dispute settlement, accountability and redress. (Dang, 2008: 24) Calling the charter ‘a disappointment’, Barry Desker, noting its codification of existing ASEAN norms and preservation of the grouping’s historical identity as an intergovernmental organization, offers this blunt assessment: ‘ASEAN did less than it could have done. ASEAN had even gone backwards’ (Desker, 2008). That the HLTF comprised exclusively senior officials from the foreign ministries of ASEAN countries could also have shaped the charter’s conservative nature because of their abiding concern to protect and preserve national sovereignty (Koh, 2009b: 55–​6). Furnishing a more upbeat assessment, an HLTF member, Tommy Koh, argued instead that ASEAN is committed to establishing a viable dispute settlement mechanism through giving the ASEAN Secretary General the responsibility for monitoring the compliance of member states regarding their commitments (Koh, 2009c). For Koh, the charter represents a work

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in progress, a first step in what could be long process towards building a culture of compliance to commitments. In October 2010, ASEAN’s foreign ministers, in anticipation of the 17th ASEAN Summit, agreed to adopt two legal instruments –​the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit and the Rules of Authorization for Legal Transactions under Domestic Laws –​both of which are seen to be critical to the strengthening of the charter. The key worry, however, remains what ASEAN officials have conceded as ‘problems in implementation’ (Kassim, 2011). In this regard, the apparent failure of member countries to implement collective agreements –​the failure to follow through on institutional commitments, in other words –​is a concern that could derail ASEAN’s quest for a viable legal charter and espousal of a meaningful legal personality. Thus understood, to the extent that Southeast Asia has yet to move (in the words of one analyst) ‘beyond the ASEAN Way’ (Caballero-​ Anthony, 2005), but has in fact extended or prolonged its longstanding modus operandi, then the legalization of principles such as national sovereignty and non-​intervention/​non-​interference could conceivably indicate the existence of a logic of appropriateness, as much as that of consequentiality, concerning the region’s apparent preference for a particular diplomatic‒security convention. On the other hand, the charter’s architects, while acknowledging the political horse-​trading that invariably comes with compromise agreements of this sort, have nonetheless argued that the charter constitutes an important achievement upon which further institutional developments and embellishments could and would be made. A year after the charter’s adoption, Tommy Koh, a member of the HLTF which drafted the charter, offered the following assessment: [W]‌hat remains to be done? Negotiation on a protocol to implement the chapter in the Charter on dispute settlement is the most important unfinished business. One of ASEAN’s past failings was a culture of not taking its commitments seriously. The Charter seeks to change that by giving the Secretary-​General the responsibility to monitor the compliance of member-​states with their commitments. In the event of a dispute between two states over their commitments, the Charter sets out an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism. Such an arrangement will give assurance to partners entering into agreements with ASEAN. (Koh, 2009c)

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How do Southeast Asians resolve their disputes? The historical record suggests that the ambivalent treatment of legalization at the regional institutional level has not precluded some Southeast Asian countries from relying on third-​party adjudication to settle disputes involving trade and/​or territorial jurisdiction. To be sure, such resort on legal mechanisms has hitherto been at best selective. This is not to imply that ASEAN has no dispute settlement mechanism of its own (Caballero-​Anthony, 1998). For example, there is the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM). Also known as the Vientiane Protocol, the EDSM is a set of non-​ adjudicatory mechanisms as well as formal adjudicatory mechanisms for disputes brought under ASEAN economic agreements in general. It is modelled after the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Secondly, article 25 of the ASEAN charter includes a protocol on dispute settlement mechanisms, which goes beyond consultation, good offices, mediation and conciliation to emphasizing arbitration, by third parties if need be. Disputing parties are expected to fully comply with the arbitral awards and settlement agreements resulting from these non-​adjudicatory processes. Finally, there is also the Investor-​State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which allows investors of any Southeast Asian state, either natural or juridical persons, to bring a claim against the government of another Southeast Asian state for the loss or damage to their investment resulting from the breach of obligation under the ACIA (Ewing-​Chow and Losari, 2015: 93). By and large, these mechanisms ‘steer a middle path between compulsory adjudication and freedom of choice’, in the words of one assessment (Naldi, 2014: 105). While formal dispute settlement proceedings have been considered on a number of occasions, the fact remains that Southeast Asian states have made little use of the mechanisms provided for within their organization’s legal framework, and would rather rely on international bodies and frameworks instead.

Trade disputes In the area of trade-​related disagreements, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding has by and large been underutilized by Southeast Asian countries (see Table 2). Interestingly (and ironically), the first complaint lodged under this provision when it was introduced involved Singapore and Malaysia over import prohibitions on polyethylene and polypropylene, a case that was eventually resolved without WTO adjudication. In other words, the

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Table 2: Number of WTO disputes involving ASEAN countries, China and the US10 Country

As complainant

As respondent

As third party

Brunei

0

0

0

Cambodia

0

0

0

Indonesia

10

14

13

Laos

0

0

0

Malaysia

1

1

9

Myanmar

0

0

0

Philippines

5

6

14

Singapore

1

0

21

13

4

72

Thailand Vietnam

3

0

22

China

109

34

130

United States

109

126

131

first countries ever to use the WTO provision were Southeast Asian –​ against another Southeast Asian nation, no less –​both members of a regional organization which explicitly rejects legalization for dispute settlement. In January 1995, Singapore requested consultations with Malaysia on the issue, and followed up two months later with a request to establish a panel. However, in March 1995 the issue was settled by a mutually agreed solution (Ahn, 2003: 8). There was also the dispute involving Washington’s restriction of shrimp imports into the United States registered jointly by Malaysia and Thailand (along with India and Pakistan) against the United States before the WTO in October 1996. In February 1997, following multiple requests by the complainants, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) finally convened a panel. In May 1998, the panel upheld Malaysia’s and Thailand’s claims; two months later the United States appealed against that decision. Although the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the US measure at issue was not within the scope of measures permitted under Article 20 (or XX) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, the body nonetheless concluded that the US measure satisfied the requirements of Article 20 (Hsu, nd). The Philippines raised a number of complaints against its trading partners regarding what it perceived were unfair import restrictions on its agricultural exports: against Brazil’s prohibition on desiccated coconut in November 1995; the United States on certain shrimp and shrimp products in October 1996; Australia on fresh

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fruit (including pineapples) and vegetables in October 2002, among others. In the case with the Brazilians, the DSB established a panel in March 1996 after two requests by the Filipinos. However, following an initial dismissal by the panel of the complaint, the Philippines’ appeal was subsequently rejected by the panel the next year. The case with the Americans is still pending. In the Australian case, following multiple requests from the Philippines to establish a panel, the DSB finally did so in August 2003. Before the establishment of the WTO, Thailand brought a dispute it had with the United States on tobacco-​ related concerns before the GATT for arbitration. More recently, in April 2006, Thailand, not unlike its fellow Southeast Asian countries, brought a complaint against the United States concerning anti-​dumping measures on imports of frozen warm-​water shrimp. (Subsequently, Japan, Brazil and China followed suit in joining the consultations.) In February 2008, the panel convened by the DSB upheld Thailand’s claim that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-​Dumping Agreement, which in turn prompted the Americans to appeal the panel’s decision. In July 2008, the Appellate Body similarly upheld the panel’s conclusion. In April 2009, the United States reported to the DSB that it had taken steps to implement the latter’s recommendations and rulings. Indonesia has not been directly involved in WTO-​related disputes with any Southeast Asian country although it was a third party in the case brought by the Philippines against Brazil involving desiccated coconut. It did however bring complaints against Argentina, South Africa, South Korea and the United States over concerns involving clove cigarettes (a major Indonesian product), footwear and/​or paper. To date among the Southeast Asian countries, Thailand is the most active complainant with 13 cases (as well as third party with 72 cases) and Indonesia is the most active respondent with 14 cases (see Table 2).

Territorial disputes Nor have Southeast Asian countries shied away from resolving their bilateral disputes over territory amicably through bilateral negotiation as well as bringing their bilateral territorial disputes before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Two oft-​cited cases are the dispute over the Ligitan and Sipadan islands between Indonesia and Malaysia, which Malaysia eventually won, and the dispute over Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Puteh) island between Malaysia and Singapore, which Singapore eventually won (Merrill, 2003; Jayakumar and Koh, 2009). In the Ligitan and Sipadan case, the ICJ ruled in Malaysia’s favour by

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virtue of the ‘effective occupation’ and/​or ‘effective administration’ which Malaysia historically exercised over the islands (Colson, 2003). ‘The Court notes that the activities relied upon by Malaysia, both in its own name and as successor State of Great Britain, are modest in number but that they are diverse in character and include legislative, administrative and quasi-​judicial acts’, according to the ICJ judgement rendered on 17 December 2002. The judgement went on to say about those Malaysian activities: ‘They cover a considerable period of time and show a pattern revealing an intention to exercise State functions in respect of the two islands in the context of the administration of a wider range of islands’ (ICJ, 2002: 625). Nor did Indonesia (or the Netherlands before it) ever register its disagreement or protest with Malaysia (or Britain before it) when those activities were carried out, including the construction of lighthouses on the islands. The case of Pedra Branca, which included two nearby islets, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, was notified to the ICJ in July 2003 and formally presented by the contesting parties before the Court in November 2007. The Court’s initial conclusion was that the sovereignty of Pedra Branca was historically with the Johor Sultanate, which is now part of Malaysia. After studying the history of Johor Sultanate and the Dutch and British positions on control of Southeast Asia, and also the role of the East India Company, the Court concluded that ‘the Sultanate of Johor had original title to Pedra Branca’ (ICJ, 2008: 12). This conclusion was implicitly an objection to Singapore’s previous argument that Pedra Branca was terra nullius (ownerless), so that it was eligible for ‘lawful occupation’. In May 2008, the Court ruled in favour of Singapore on the basis of Malaysia’s historical failure to respond to Singapore’s conduct à titre de souverain, that is, its concrete manifestations of the display of territorial sovereignty over Pedra Branca. However, the Court disagreed with Singapore’s claim that Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge comprised a single entity and awarded the latter two formations to Malaysia instead. In late June 2017, Malaysia filed yet another application to the ICJ, calling on the Court to clarify its 2008 ruling. Singapore has confirmed it would oppose the Malaysian bid on the premise that it is ‘without merit’ (Cheong, 2017). However, in late May 2018, the newly (re-​)elected prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, made the surprising declaration that his government would drop its opposition to the Court’s 2008 ruling, while at the same time announcing its plan to ‘enlarge’ the Middle Rocks (Jaipragas, 2018). The preceding two cases signal an embryonic willingness by some Southeast Asian countries to adopt a rules-​based recourse to settle

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vexing bilateral disputes over territory. Questions of sovereignty and territoriality have been the chief reason behind most bilateral tensions between ASEAN countries. This is generally true of Asia as well (Emmers, 2009a). The settlement of such, to the extent they are possible, have often taken a long time to happen. For example, Hassan Wirajuda, the former foreign minister of Indonesia, noted in 2009 that it took his country and Vietnam 32 years to arrive at a bilateral agreement over their adjacent exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. In the case of Singapore, with which Indonesia had a dispute over a relatively short stretch of marine border on their respective western boundaries, it took Jakarta and Singapore five years to settle their dispute (Osman, 2009). A more recent case for the same two countries involving the joint demarcation of maritime boundaries in the eastern stretch of the Singapore Strait took three years –​with the start of technical discussions in 2011 to the signing of the treaty in 2014 –​to settle (Hussain, 2014). Whether via bilateral negotiation or through the ICJ or other third party, the readiness of states to adopt such avenues –​and, crucially, accept and adhere to decisions that go against them –​is really the key challenge. As an Indonesian observer opined following the ICJ’s judgement on Pedra Branca:  ‘This case reminds us of the earlier dispute over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, decided in 2002 between Indonesia and Malaysia. Then Malaysia won. Now Malaysia has lost. However, no matter what the result is, there is significant progress whenever territorial disputes are resolved between nations’ (Arsana, 2008). The longstanding dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the border area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple led Cambodia in April 2011 to seek an interpretation of the ICJ concerning its 1962 ruling, which had awarded the temple to Cambodia (and paved the way to a successful effort by Cambodia to have the temple included in the UNESCO World Heritage listing in July 2008). For its part, Thailand acknowledged Cambodian ownership of the temple but claimed ownership of 4.6 kilometres of land adjacent to the temple. Fighting between Cambodian and Thai forces broke out in February 2011, following which the foreign ministers of both countries appeared before the UN Security Council, which subsequently took the unprecedented move of referring the case to ASEAN. Engaging in intense quiet diplomacy between the Cambodian and Thai sides, ASEAN Secretary General Surin urged both parties, ‘Let ASEAN help mediate soonest’ (ASEAN, 2011c). Indonesia, as the sitting chair of ASEAN for 2011, took a leading role in seeking to mediate the dispute by sending Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to Bangkok

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and Phnom Penh. Although the feuding parties initially agreed to ASEAN’s proposal for Indonesian observers to be sent to the Preah Vihear promontory to monitor the ceasefire, Thailand subsequently demurred on the premise that the observers would be infringing Thai sovereignty (Hiebert, 2013). Later, Natalegawa would share his impression that there nonetheless was an overwhelming commitment on both sides to ‘address their issues through peaceful means, through dialogues and negotiations’ (CNN, 2011). Following Cambodia’s request in April that year to the ICJ for an interpretation ‘on the meaning and scope of the 1962 ruling’ (ICJ, 2013: 3), Indonesia tried to mediate between the two conflicting parties at the side-​lines of the ASEAN Summit in May –​ pursued at Jakarta’s discretion in its role as chair of ASEAN –​but its efforts proved inconclusive. In July, the Court ruled that both countries were to withdraw their troops from a newly defined provisional demilitarized zone around the temple area and to allow ASEAN-​ appointed observers to enter the zone (ICJ, 2013:  9). Further, the two claimant states were to continue working with ASEAN, with the latter playing a ‘facilitating’ role in the resolution of the conflict. In November 2013, the ICJ unanimously upheld its 1962 ruling and clarified that the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia (UN, 2013). Both countries have indicated that their respective governments and militaries would honour the ICJ’s decision (Sokheng, 2013). Finally, just outside Southeast Asia in 2018, Australia and Timor-​Leste completed a two-​year-​long conciliation process that settled a maritime boundary dispute between the two countries that had brewed for 45 years (Rothwell, 2018). As Tommy Koh has suggested, the settlement has crucial implications for the disputes involving sovereignty claims such as those in the South China Sea. According to Koh, disputants should seriously consider using conciliation to solve their disputes because, unlike arbitration and judicial settlement, ‘conciliation is nonadversarial and the outcome is consensual and win win’ (Koh, 2017). In contrast, there have been less happy conclusions to bilateral territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. The Ambalat region, an areain the Celebes Sea off the coast of Indonesian East Kalimantan and south-​ east of Sabah in East Malaysia, has been a bone of contention between Indonesia and Malaysia since the 1980s. Reportedly rich in oil and natural gas, the issue erupted following the decision by Petronas, the Malaysian state-​owned oil company, to grant a concession for oil and gas exploration to its subsidiary, Petronas Caligari, and to the Anglo-​ Dutch oil giant Shell, in a part of the Sulawesi Sea which Jakarta

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

claims as its territory (Kassim, 2005). Petronas’ action triggered fierce reactions from Indonesia, which claimed the Ambalat region pursuant to Articles 76 and 77 of UNCLOS III. Worse, it roused nationalist sentiments and both countries came to the brink of armed conflict, with Jakarta scrambling fighter aircraft and warships in response. As recently as 2009, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) accused Malaysia of having ‘breached the law’ by entering the disputed zone on no fewer than nine occasions in 2009 alone (The Jakarta Post, 2009). Further, a map produced by Malaysia in 1979, which depicted Ambalat or at least a large portion of it as under Malaysian sovereignty, evoked objections not only from Indonesia but also other Southeast Asian neighbours (the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) as well as China. Whether the ferocity of the Indonesian reaction could be attributed, at least partly, to residual anger over having ‘lost’ the Ligitan and Sipidan islands to the Malaysians was unclear. It also raised questions over whether Indonesia, having been disappointed once, would subsequently prove reluctant to bring the Ambalat dispute and/​or other territorial disputes it has with Malaysia to the ICJ or another legal body. In June 2013, it was reported that both countries were prepared to shelve their dispute in favour of joint exploration of natural resources in the region (Mattangkilang, 2013). In February 2015, following the lack of progress despite technical teams from both countries having met 26 times, both countries appointed ‘special envoys’ to initiate ‘exploratory’ negotiations over the dispute (Panda, 2015). This discussion is not complete without mention of the case initiated in January 2013 by the Philippines against China before the arbitral tribunal set up under Annex VII of UNCLOS III. As is widely known by now, the Arbitral decision of 12 July 2016 denied Chinese claims to huge swathes of the South China Sea,11 a ruling the Chinese have roundly rejected as farcical, illegal and nonbinding (Phillips, Holmes and Bowcott, 2016). While China’s refusal to participate in the initial proceedings received a great deal of attention, it was not the first time a party has chosen not to appear before an UNCLOS dispute settlement body.12 What was reportedly interesting about the Chinese case are the persistent efforts made by Beijing, despite its refusal to participate in the proceedings, to advance its legal argument through both formal and informal channels (CCTV America, 2016).13 While China’s inconsistent stance likely rendered the Arbitral proceedings more complicated than they already were, its actions arguably created the semblance of what one observer has called a ‘quasi-​appearance’ at the tribunal (Nguyen, 2015). Notwithstanding Beijing’s rejection of the 2016 Arbitral award, Chinese officials and academics have averred

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their continued support for international law whilst paradoxically questioning its rationale and seeking to reshape it to better reflect Chinese interests and preferences (deLisle, 2000). Speaking on the side-​lines of the Shangri-​La Dialogue 2017 in Singapore, Lieutenant-​ General He Lei of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), responding to the allegation rendered by the US and others that Chinese actions in the South China Sea contravene rather than uphold the rules-​based order, made the following observation: China and the Chinese government are a protector and follower of international and regional rules … China can be said to be following, supporting and safeguarding the international and regional order … But how to understand these rules? … We think international rules should represent the interest of most of the countries and be recognised by these countries. And regional rules should represent the interest of the majority of the countries of the region.14 Needless to say, this sort of ambivalence is not unique to China; some would say it is the lot of big powers to treat international law in this fashion because, as great powers, they are more often than not the makers of international rules and laws rather than takers.15

Coding interstate conduct in the South China Sea Nowhere is China’s seeming ambivalence to collective rules-​based governance more evident than in the way Beijing has approached the painfully slow process to establish jointly with ASEAN a code of conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. The precursor to the proposed COC, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), was hailed as a milestone where it was established between ASEAN and China in 2002. But it has clearly failed in its aim to foster trust among claimant states and prevent the dispute from escalating. Whilst the process to establish the COC has encountered its fair share of false dawns (Li, 2014), the process has progressed to the point where both ASEAN and China have at least agreed on a ‘framework’ (also described as an ‘outline’) for the COC (The Straits Times, 2017b). Although the framework is a step forward in the conflict management process for the South China Sea, it is short on details –​needless to say, its advocates have cautioned that frameworks and outlines are by definition skeletal in nature16 –​and contains many of the same principles and provisions contained in the DOC, which

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The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

has yet to be implemented itself, fully or even partially. The text of this ‘framework COC’ includes a new reference to the prevention and management of incidents and alludes to a stronger commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation. However, the phrase ‘legally binding’ is absent in the framework, as are the geographical scope of the agreement and enforcement and arbitration mechanisms (Storey, 2017). The COC that will eventuate from this process will likely be nonbinding and heavily watered down, and serious questions can and should be asked of its relevance. Indeed, as Mark Valencia has argued, ‘China wants to be seen as cooperative, but doesn’t want a binding COC’ (Valencia, 2017). But aside from all that, the COC will nonetheless serve as an important marker and stepping stone on which China and ASEAN states can build future China‒ASEAN cooperation. To that end, China and ASEAN should focus their energies and deliver the COC, even if the eventual product will disappoint those hoping for a legally binding, comprehensive and effective COC. More recently, in response to Singapore’s call to apply the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea, a coordinated means of communication to maximize safety at sea, to the South China Sea, ASEAN and China agreed in March 2016 to discuss Singapore’s proposal (Kor, 2016a). The South China Sea is a major confluence point for commercial and military shipping. As the growing number of tragic accidents at sea show –​the most recent, at time of writing, being the USS John S.  McCain with the Alnic MC, a Liberian-​flagged merchantman, in Singapore waters in August 2017 (Stashwick, 2017)  –​ maritime safety in the South China Sea remains critical. While the US Navy has been criticized for errors leading to these mishaps, the fact of the matter is the high level of maritime operations in the South China Sea for all navies and coastguards involved is a great cause for concern, as it means fatigue and exhaustion could open the door to further incidents. Subsequently, in Vientiane in September 2016, the two sides cemented their joint support for a voluntary and nonbinding CUES and ‘hotline’ agreement –​but one that covers only naval vessels and not coastguard vessels (ASEAN, 2016b). Further, China and Singapore jointly participated in CUES within the context of their bilateral Exercise Cooperation, which from 2015 on has included a maritime component (Lim, 2017a). In October 2017, China extended a call to ASEAN to participate in a joint maritime military exercise, a first for both sides (Gao, 2017). An ASEAN‒China maritime exercise involving more than 1,100 personnel and eight ships took place in October 2018 off the Chinese coast at Zhanjiang, presumably to be followed by a corresponding ASEAN‒US maritime military exercise further

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downstream in 2019, most likely in conjunction with the US-​led Exercise Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT). Granted, these arrangements are specific to China and the United States, but it is likely to garner the support of other regional countries not least because key actors like Japan that are already signatories to the CUES treaty under the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) signed in 2014 at Qingdao, China –​and here China deserves recognition for facilitating that development. In themselves, such joint exercises might not seem extraordinary in that they are treated as dimensions of the ADMM-​Plus framework (Tan, 2018b). But what is interesting is the way the ASEAN member states have sought to redefine such engagements with the Chinese and the Americans at the ‘ASEAN plus one’ level as proof, fairly or otherwise, of the continued relevance of ASEAN’s regional centrality (Tan, 2017c). ASEAN’s ability to collaborate separately with China and the United States on maritime security is arguably an indication that the grouping has regained the initiative in the region, at least where maritime security cooperation is concerned. As has been suggested, those efforts ‘reflect [ASEAN’s] belief that the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus are vital elements of the region’s security architecture –​providing platforms that are open and inclusive, and bringing together all-​important regional stakeholders for dialogue and cooperation’ (Tan, 2018d). What this conceivably implies, at least in the context of regional security cooperation, is an attempt by ASEAN –​through activities deemed useful by the Chinese as well as the Americans –​to position itself as still the ‘go to’ regional actor in an era of growing great power discord where its centrality in cooperative multilateralism is increasingly in question. Furthermore, what is notable about ASEAN’s conduct in this instance is an effort to demonstrate its relevance to the major powers in concrete ways, rather than relying on rhetorical declarations alone. The key challenge ultimately is how that collective commitment of all concerned to CUES can not only be proactive but sustained. Hence, as much as the ASEAN‒China CUES arrangement is welcomed, there is a dire need, as the Singaporeans have argued, to consider expanding it to include non-​military vessels in the South China Sea, since there are as many coastguard ships as navy ships, if not more; or more ‘white hulls’ than ‘grey hulls’ (as mentioned in Chapter 4). But it is not simply the surface waters that matter, but the increasingly overcrowded airspace and undersea space as well. In that respect, what is the possibility to expand CUES for the South China Sea to include over-​flight and undersea domains? The 2015 agreement between China and the United States on military air-​to-​air encounters could conceivably serve as a

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template of sorts for an overflight CUES for the South China Sea. It is considerably more complex and challenging to develop a CUES for the undersea domain, not least because submarine operations are highly confidential and no country would consent to divulging information on that. Hitherto there is no indication that the Chinese are prepared to support a CUES arrangement that includes coastguard vessels, let alone civilian craft. Given their ubiquity in the South China Sea –​Chinese coastguard vessels are among the most active and assertive, not to mention the largest, in the disputed waters (Torode, 2016) –​ China’s likely reluctance to expand CUES implies a persistent disregard for rules-​based management of its actions in the South China Sea so long as it believes such arrangements go against its interests. This section has touched on the apparent readiness of the Southeast Asian countries to establish a form of rules-​based governance, whether through adherence to third-​party mediation and/​or adjudication in disputes over trade and territory, or in their quest to establish codes of interstate conduct to ensure ‘responsible’ conduct by regional states. While there is no claim that international law is or should be the principal path to a stable and peaceful region, the following observation by Nolte, rendered in the context of sovereignty as responsibility understood as respect for international law, is equally relevant to Southeast Asia’s embryonic quest to develop an ethic of responsibility through the establishment and adherence to rules-​based governance: Sovereignty as the liberty of states within the limits of international law is open for the development of international law in the process of globalisation. This formal concept of sovereignty not only enables states to restrict their liberty in exchange for advantages, but it can also tolerate international law conceiving of rules which bind states without their consent. It precludes the use of sovereignty as a trump card against the law; it prevents the mistaking of sovereignty for raw power; and it protects states by requiring that restrictions of their liberty must be based on a more or less specific legal rule and not on the interpretation of a vague concept driven by particular world visions. (Nolte, 2005: 389) Ultimately, how Southeast Asian countries and their dialogue partners can engender and embrace a sufficiently common conception of sovereignty, one that is open to and inclusive of a sense of shared

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responsibility, might well be one of the most critical questions confronting the region for the foreseeable future.

No rules-​based imperative (yet) in Southeast Asia? In a 2016 article, Singapore’s Tommy Koh and his co-​author cited the territorial disputes among Southeast Asian countries that have been referred to the international courts or tribunals as evidence and proposed in addition to the legal route, that consensual, win‒win methods of dispute settlement, such as fact-​finding, mediation, conciliation and joint development, can and should also be considered as components of a ‘Asian way to settle disputes’ (Koh and Hao, 2016). Their allusion to an ‘Asian way’ of dispute settlement is at best premature. The aforementioned illustrations underscore the ambivalence in the attitudes of Southeast Asian states (and regional powers like China) towards legalization. Assurances given by states that they would abide by decisions taken by the WTO, ICJ, ITLOS and other legal and/​or dispute settlement bodies do not necessarily imply their normative commitment to seeking legal recourse in the future. Commitment to the legal regime remains weak and selective. They lead one to conclude that legalization in Southeast Asia is neither an imperative nor an inexorable process. That is to say, there is no general acceptance of and inevitable advance towards legalization as a standard prescription for dispute settlement –​but an instrumental and strategic choice which regional countries employ selectively vis-​à-​vis their Southeast Asian neighbours as well as extra-​regional countries (Kahler, 2000). Thus understood, ASEAN’s longstanding eschewal of legalization, not least till the appearance of its charter in 2007, cannot be adequately explained by recourse to diplomatic and security culture alone. If anything, keeping ASEAN as a consensus organization17 is a pragmatic and/​or strategic decision on the part of its member nations, not least the founding members who helped define the regional organization’s governing conventions. Paradoxically, the codification of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the ASEAN charter could prove problematic for the regional organization and its member states in that it has the potential to stultify the organization by leeching it of the flexible consensus it once enjoyed. Not unlike the way in which the ASEAN Regional Forum has suffered through an inadvertent process of formalization that arguably has hampered attempts towards progress in security cooperation (Emmers and Tan, 2011), ASEAN could face a similar predicament as a consequence of its enshrinement of pre-​existing norms and principles that hitherto

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governed intramural relations but in a sufficiently flexible way that ‘permitted’ the occasional contraventions of the ASEAN Way (as when Southeast Asian governments intervened in one another’s domestic affairs –​an infringement of ASEAN’s non-​interference norm –​in order to preserve the regional order) (Jones, 2010, 2012). The concern has to do with a potential loss of institutional flexibility. For example, existing practice among Southeast Asian economic ministers allowed member countries to agree on economic liberalization agreements on the basis of the ‘10 minus x’ and/​or ‘2 plus x’ principles. This ensured that member states that wished to embark on cooperative initiatives at a faster pace than the rest of the grouping could proceed. However, the charter allows for arrangements made on the ‘ASEAN minus x’ and other ancillary formulae for flexible participation only if there is consensus to do so (Desker, 2008). As such, what has hitherto been a practice based on a flexible consensus has now, by virtue of the charter, been transformed into an uncompromising principle based on unanimity. The irony here should not be missed: just as highly legal organizations such as the EU are today seeking to develop more flexible modalities that would give them greater manoeuvrability (Cini, 2007:  402), ASEAN appears to be moving in the opposite direction.18 There is, to be sure, a silver lining of sorts in this dark cloud for ASEAN, albeit a potentially farcical one: should Southeast Asian countries continue their poor record of successful implementation of agreements and action plans to which they have committed themselves, then they could conceivably eschew getting trapped in excessive formalization and proceduralism, while retaining a regional nimbleness. Rules-​based or otherwise, the fundamental question is whether the Southeast Asian countries are prepared to take seriously their express commitments to ASEAN regionalism. In 2010, the ASEAN senior official with oversight for the AEC implored urgently for concerted action by all Southeast Asian states to move their organization from its longstanding brand of ‘process-​based regionalism’ to a ‘results-​based regionalism’ (Pushpanathan, 2010). Likewise, in 2011 Surin urged the organization to replace its ‘centrality of goodwill’ to a ‘centrality of substance’ (Singh, 2011). The concern that ASEAN simply has not done more than it could and should have has not gone away. Indeed, shortly before he unexpectedly passed away in late November 2017 from a heart attack, Surin continued to raise public awareness on the same challenges bedevilling the organization. ‘ASEAN’s centrality is weakening on problems that are on the landscape of ASEAN and should be resolved and managed by ourselves’, Surin reportedly told the media. ‘If we don’t, others will claim centrality’ (cited in

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Chalermpalanupap and Thazur, 2017: 3). Moreover, nearly a decade after the ASEAN charter’s establishment, the perceived gap between ASEAN’s legal aspiration and reality has not significantly improved. For example, in 2016 members of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) criticized the apparent slowness with which their respective national governments are pursuing the improvement of the region’s human rights record as pledged in the charter. ‘ASEAN leaders must step up to the plate and make good on their promises’, according to the APHR. ‘That means taking concrete steps, including restoring democracy in Thailand and ending the persecution of opposition leaders in Cambodia and Malaysia, among many other to-​dos’ (APHR, 2016). Yet  all this does not necessarily imply that Southeast Asian countries are not adhering to rules, if by that we mean the older diplomatic conventions of the ASEAN Way rather than the commitments specified in the ASEAN charter.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that, on the whole, Southeast Asia’s slowness to develop a strong rules-​oriented regime within ASEAN has not precluded a number of Southeast Asian countries from seeking peaceful solutions to their disputes with one another as well as with outside countries through bilateral negotiation as well as third-​party arbitration and adjudication. Where the latter avenue is concerned, ASEAN countries have pursued settlement through international bodies, not through ASEAN just yet. Their willingness to do so implies a nascent but growing regional confidence in rules-​based management. However, their resort to rules has been conducted largely for strategic rather than normative reasons. This trend possibly suggests that reliance on rules in regional management has hitherto been aimed less at regional innovation or transformation (i.e., moving ASEAN regionalism beyond the ASEAN Way) than at regional conservation (i.e., maintaining the social order or status quo of the region). It also suggests that, while Southeast Asian states are not averse to a rules-​oriented approach, they nonetheless value the informality of the ASEAN Way –​so much so that they have made the ASEAN Way itself into a rule via the ASEAN charter. On a more charitable note, it could perhaps be said that the ASEAN Way is less under threat inasmuch as it is evolving to include increasingly rules-​based management as one among a number of implements in the diplomatic toolkits of ASEAN countries. They see international bodies like the WTO, ICJ and so on as complements to the ASEAN process.

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Granted, the adoption of rules-​based approaches by the Southeast Asian countries and China is driven as much by strategic motives as anything else. The fact that small and weak countries tend to emphasize rules –​whether through their participation in international institutions or support for international law, usually both –​is strongly supported in the international relations literature (Keohane, 2006). But where the Southeast Asian countries are concerned, perhaps it also reflects the normative belief that when confronted by a preponderant power that disregards international legal decisions so long as they run counter to its ambition –​at least where the South China Sea is concerned –​even small states have to make a firm stand for rules-​based management no matter the risks they incur. For example, at the 2016 edition of the Xiangshan Forum for defence leaders (rebranded as the Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2018), the ministerial representative from Singapore informed his Beijing audience that Singapore strongly advocates ‘a rules-​based world order’ because, as a small city-​state, Singapore ‘cannot survive in a world where might is right’ (Kor, 2016b). The remark was clearly in response to Chinese anger against Singapore for its appeal, rendered in the wake of the Arbitral ruling on the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines, to all parties ‘to fully respect legal and diplomatic processes’ (Today, 2016a). For its trouble, Singapore received numerous warnings from the Chinese, veiled and otherwise, to avoid interfering in the South China Sea disputes and, as the designated coordinator for ASEAN‒China relations (2015–​18), to focus its energies instead on promoting Sino-​ASEAN cooperation.19 The ‘progress’ garnered in 2018, which culminated in a first ever ASEAN-​China maritime exercise that gave the 11 navies a joint opportunity to conduct CUES-​ oriented manoeuvres off the Chinese coast (Parameswaran, 2018c), marked an improvement in ties. Perhaps Southeast Asian countries advocate rules-​based management of their trade and security relations not only because they see it as the appropriate thing to do, but because their own experiences at the intra-​ASEAN level have confirmed it. If Southeast Asian conceptions of sovereignty are developing a convention as well as an ethic that encompasses a notion of responsibility, there is a case to be made regarding responsible sovereignty as being about the willingness of states to resolve their disputes over trade and territory with each other through mediation, arbitration and possibly even adjudication, with the end goal of regional resolution and reconciliation. Arguably, this is also what it means to be responsible stakeholders within their regional neighbourhood.

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7

Communitarianism, Liberalism and the Limits of Responsibility in Southeast Asia Introduction Hitherto this book has explored the emergence in Southeast Asia of an incipient ethos of responsible provision, whose consolidation in the region remains hugely problematic and unsettled. It has sought to map out the material and conceptual contours and contents of the R2Provide as such in a number of distinct but interrelated domains that are ostensibly ‘non-​military’. Yet as we have seen in the context of areas such as HADR and counterterrorism, Southeast Asian states rely on their military assets and resources frequently and regularly. In this chapter and the following one, the book turns its attention to the philosophical and normative foundations that hitherto underpin responsible sovereignty or sovereign responsibility in Southeast Asia. The focus here is on the ways in which communitarian and liberal approaches  –​ which I  shall treat as ‘rival’ or contending ethical explanations to Levinas’ ethics introduced in the next c­hapter  –​ understand and advance their respective conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility in Southeast Asia. As noted in Chapter 2, the R2P is a concept with African roots but a liberal mien (Luck, 2008; Williams, 2009; Mabera and Spies, 2016). As such, some of the assumptions and expectations of the R2P run counter to the illiberalism that still characterizes much of Southeast Asian political and diplomatic life, even though economic liberalization is an established convention in the region, notwithstanding the protectionist proclivities of some Southeast Asian economies (Rahardja and Patunru, 2015).1 Although the Southeast Asian region has experienced a level of democratization,

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the persistence and prevalence of unresolved tensions and disputes over sovereignty among most if not all Southeast Asian states –​among themselves as well as with external powers such as China –​have both underscored for Southeast Asian states the continued relevance of the non-​interference norm and the ‘sovereignty as right’ idea, and hindered their full acceptance of R2P. Indeed, developments such as the military coup which brought Thai army chief Prayut Chan-​o-​cha to power in Thailand in May 2014, Cambodian leader Hun Sen’s actions against his political opposition and domestic media organizations (Pongsudhirak, 2017), the rise of President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and his administration’s brutal war on drugs and crime that –​at least according to the human rights group Amnesty International –​has reportedly caused more deaths than was the case during the Ferdinand Marcos years (Caro, 2017), and the failure by Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratically elected National League for Democracy government to halt the Burmese military’s campaign against the Rohingya in Rakhine State in western Myanmar have led to a proliferation of observations on the ‘authoritarian reversal’ taking place in Southeast Asia or, conversely, the enduring character of political authoritarianism in the region (Zeck, 2014; Pepinsky, 2017; Vatikiotis, 2017). Against this backdrop, this chapter assesses the pros and cons of adopting communitarian and/​or liberal bases for a responsible sovereignty and the R2Provide in the Southeast Asian context. It also discusses the philosophical and theoretical difficulties associated with both those approaches that render them, at least in my view, inappropriate as grounds for a meaningful and relevant implementation of the R2Provide in Southeast Asia. Communitarianism supports the rights of groups to achieve their own self-​determination, and, in order to protect these rights, discourages outside intervention  –​whether justified on the basis of the R2P principle or some other humanitarian ground –​by the new liberal international regime into the affairs of sovereign states and the communities they are said to represent (Krizan, 1997; Huang, 1998). For its part, liberalism emphasizes three big things: the importance of the individual, their freedom and their rights. In its ‘pluralist’ vein, liberalism shares communitarianism’s emphasis on the right of states to self-​determination and non-​intervention; in its ‘cosmopolitan’ vein, it prioritizes the rights of individuals over states and pushes the domestic analogy to its logical conclusion.2 Yet, as we shall see later, despite the R2P’s liberal foundations, there are good reasons to question the viability of liberal ethics as a suitable foundation for the R2Provide. Communitarianism and liberalism both engage in reification and essentialism  –​ the former of the

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community and the latter of the individual, both in ways that render them sovereign and autonomous rather than heteronomous –​hence emphasizing the separateness of people and their societies. Importantly, both communitarian and liberal features are reflected in the national and regional life of Southeast Asia. However, the shared propensity of communitarianism and liberalism towards essentialism and (in Levinas’ terms) totalization renders both those philosophical-​ethical systems troubling for a region as complex and contested as Southeast Asia.

Communitarianism and responsibility While the story of the R2P seems to suggest the persistent tendency of states to treat sovereignty as a matter of right rather than responsibility, there is an even more fundamental issue concerning the ontological assumptions undergirding the R2P, namely that (notwithstanding its ostensibly African roots) its Western liberal outlook and universalist claims do not comport with Southeast Asian sensibilities and sensitivities –​or so the communitarian argument favoured by some of the region’s leaders and intellectuals holds. This section assesses and critiques the communitarian approach to responsible sovereignty.3 Various Asian scholars (as well as some of their Western comrades in arms) have offered a communitarian apologia of illiberal society and politics in Southeast Asia and East Asia more broadly (Tu, 1996; Pye, 1997; Compton, 2000; Bell, 2006). Since the 1970s, the communitarian critique of liberalism has, in various forms, taken aim at the liberal notion of the autonomous individual by demonstrating their embeddedness in community. That said, early communitarians had trouble promoting sufficiently attractive visions of the ‘non-​liberal life’ (Chua, 2004). With the Cold War drawing to a close, some pundits were quick to hail liberal democracy and market capitalism as the winners as history ostensibly drew its last breath (Fukuyama, 1992), whilst others warned against premature celebration given the growing signs of an emerging clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). Between those two ‘extremes’, the so-​called East Asian economic ‘miracle’ presented, for communitarians, a third way. In the 1980s and 1990s, communitarian academics and policy practitioners began advancing ‘Asian values’ as a counterpoint to Western liberal democracy and human rights (Mahbubani, 1992; Kausikan, 1993; Ibrahim, 1996; also see Barr, 2000). However, to simply say that communitarianism is strongly pro-​capitalist and strongly illiberal or undemocratic is not entirely accurate. The role played by communitarian ideology was not only as a form of defence and resistance against outward encroachment

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and ‘the excesses of rapacious capitalism’, but as a positive mechanism for the creation of a nation-​state ‘from within’ through reliance on its own local sociocultural and historical resources (Chua, 1995, 1998). Nowhere has this been more clearly enunciated than in statements by Southeast Asian leaders like Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew on Asian values (Hoon, 2004; Zakaria, 1994; Emmerson, 2013). For the Asian ‘tigers’ that might have made good in economic terms –​but ever precarious, as the painful lessons of the 1997 financial crisis showed –​the cultural promotion of Asian values conceivably marked their utilitarian efforts to ‘create space’ –​ economic space, in this case, but certainly also political and strategic space –​in order for the city-​state, perceived as invariably vulnerable, to not only survive but thrive in an inhospitable international environment (Wee, 2007: 9–​10). One expression of communitarian ideology and practice common to parts of Southeast Asia is Confucianism. It has been argued that as a region, East Asia has been infused with the core values of Confucian thought  –​even, it appears, in Southeast Asian countries that have Malay Muslim majorities (Rosker, 2016). Promoted interchangeably with Asian values, Confucian ideals –​such as family and community over individuals, discipline and hierarchy over freedom and equality, and consensus and harmony over diversity and conflict, among others –​have historically played a key role in the prioritization and rationalization by Asian states and regimes of the rights and duties of individuals including especially the power and prerogatives of their rulers. As Doh Chull Shin has argued, it is not only on the design of institutions and conventions that Confucianism has had an impact, but also the formulation and implementation of political order and national security as national development goals (Shin, 2008:  3). Arguably, Confucianism has also shaped the way East and Southeast Asians understand democracy and respond to democratization. This is seen not only in how a number of regional countries have promoted illiberal and undemocratic conceptions of good governance, but also in how other countries seemingly open to democratization appear nonetheless to prefer a delegative (or ‘liquid’) form of democracy where power is concentrated within the executive rather than placed in the hands of elected representatives (O’Donnell, 1994; Ling and Shih, 1998; O’dwyer, 2003; Im, 2004). According to Shin, the cultural values of collectivism, hierarchism and conformism are likely to shape the process of cultural democratization against rather than towards the rejection of authoritarian rule, even as a state undergoes democratic transition (Ketcham, 2004; Chang, Chu and Tsai, 2005; Lindner and Bachtiger,

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2005; Shin, 2008). As the examples of South Korean or Taiwanese democratic politics –​or, for that matter, the semi-​democratic systems of Malaysia and Singapore –​might suggest, democratization in those Confucian contexts is all too often limited to the practice of free and competitive elections, on the one hand, whilst maintaining a form of soft and benevolent authoritarianism on the other (Neher, 1994; Roy, 1994; Zakaria, 1994; Hood, 1998). As Nasir and Turner have put it: The idea of ‘soft authoritarianism’, as a general description of many Asian societies, can be defined as a political system in which there are minimal components of democracy such as elections and political parties but, as a consequence of rapid modernisation, state control of the economy and an emphasis on export-​driven growth, basic social and political rights are often compromised. Typically, these states govern in the name of constitutionalism but often use the law to suppress political activity on the part of citizens. These societies have often replaced the rule of law with neo-​ Confucian rule of virtue in which the duties of the citizen to the state are more important than the responsibilities of the state towards the citizen. In these authoritarian polities, the state constructs an educational system to discipline the electorate rather than to create an informed citizenry, simply because there is low trust between leaders and electorate. The duty of the passive citizen is merely to consent to the legitimacy of the regime; the duty of the state is to provide security by weeding out citizens who are troublesome. (Nasir and Turner, 2013: 339) Accordingly, the rule of law in Confucian systems is relegated in favour of rule by law (if not rule by man).4 What this translates into is a utilitarian treatment of law that rationalizes the role of the courts as yet another instrument of nation-​building and ‘the maintenance of good government’, as best exemplified in Singapore (Barr, 2000: 323). At times it could even lead to the failure to obey the basic laws and rules of democratic politics; here the cases of former South Korean presidents in democratized South Korea jailed for bribery, embezzlement and/​or tax evasion –​Chun Doo Hwan (1980–​88), Roh Tae Woo (1988–​93), Roh Moo Hyun (2003–​08), Lee Myung Bak (2008–​13) and Park Geun Hye (2013–​17) –​as well as democracy icon Lim Dae Jung’s illegal transfer of half a billion US dollars to North Korea in the so-​called ‘cash for summit’ scandal are in a sense not surprising especially if the

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rule of law does not enjoy primacy (BBC News, 2003; The Straits Times, 2018). What such systems therefore imply is a form of democracy that is nonetheless illiberal in that they separate the component parts of liberal democracy, liberalism and democracy, and emphasize democracy –​specifically, the method of ‘free, fair and competitive’ democratic elections –​while downplaying, even relegating, liberalism (Barr, 2000: 312). Asia’s illiberal democrats –​or, in Neera Badhwar’s terms, ‘republican communitarians’ (Badhwar, 1996: 4–​5) –​believe that states themselves should be the final arbitrators of that which is good, which their members are expected to adhere to completely (Etzioni, 2006b: 70). Interestingly, despite having played a prominent part in shaping and articulating Asian values and defended this contention time and again, Southeast Asia’s communitarians have also felt sufficiently confident, in the context of the R2Provide, to acknowledge the importance of the international community in deciding whether national governments have lived up to their responsibilities (Teo, 2008). Communitarians view universal human rights as a reflection of Western values and hence in violation of their cultural exceptionalism (Franck, 2001: 192–​3), although Singapore’s Kishore Mahbubani, among the most prominent of the spokespersons for Asian values, has allowed the possibility of a future ‘convergence’ between East and West (Mahbubani, 2013). Yet as some have argued, this does not mean that communitarianism has no totalitarian inclinations of its own (Delingpole, 2011). Communitarians also strongly support state sovereignty and non-​ interference. If liberal theorists like Michael Walzer believe that the recognition of sovereignty is ‘the only way we have of establishing an arena in which freedom can be fought for’ (Walzer, 1977: 89), it is a recognition shared by communitarians who see sovereignty as the way to establish an arena in which the communitarian way of life, where the good of the social collective supplants individual interest, can be nourished and sustained. In other words, communitarians adopt a jaundiced view of any form of outside interference or intervention, let  alone humanitarian intervention, against their society (Menon, 2016). ‘As with individuals’, Walzer writes in reference to the domestic analogy, ‘so with sovereign states, there are things that we cannot do to them, even for their ostensible good’ (Walzer, 1977: 89, n20). The right of the state is privileged over that of the individual because it is within the state that the individual can best be protected. As Daniel Warner has observed of Walzer’s logic, ‘If one tears down the walls of the state … one winds up with a “thousand petty fortresses” ’ (Warner, 1993: 438).5 Non-​intervention and self-​determination take

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precedence over any external notions of justice, and outsiders have no moral standing by which to judge the state or those within the state (Warner, 1993: 437). In other words, as a consequence of his reliance on the domestic analogy and its ramifications for sovereignty, Walzer paradoxically ends up with a liberal state that no longer protects the liberal individual. Indeed, he argues that the recognition of sovereignty is ‘the only way we have of establishing an arena in which freedom can be fought for’ (Walzer, 1977: 89). Paradoxically, his conflation of the state –​and what he sees as its homogeneous community –​with the individual, which seems to lead to the inadvertent subsuming and hence supplanting of the individual by the state, almost makes him, de facto, a communitarian (or, if you like, a liberal with communitarian characteristics). As Warner has put it, ‘Because the individual is reflected in the community and the community reflected in the state, for Walzer the state comes to represent the individual and to encompass individual rights’ (Warner, 1993: 437). Another way to unpack Walzer’s ‘communitarian liberal’ conception of responsibility is to take a leaf from the reflections by a number of scholars on Max Weber’s distinction between an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ and an ‘ethic of responsibility’. For Weber, the key difference between the two ethics rest in their acceptance or absolution of accountability (Weber, 1946: 120). According to the philosopher Michael Oakeshott, Weber’s choice of Martin Luther, the seminal figure of the Protestant Reformation, as the archetypical charismatic leader, ‘who denies having any thoughts of his own to give meaning to what he says or does’ –​because he attributes all his thoughts, words and deeds to the God whom he serves –​‘and thus absolves himself from all responsibility for his actions and utterances’ (Oakeshott, 1975: 238), exemplifies a person whose ethic of responsibility is ultimately irresponsible. Why so? Because, as Daniel Warner has suggested, ‘Luther was responsible to no one but himself. Even if one argues that he was ultimately responsible to a higher calling, we, the outsiders, can never be part of his calling. From the outsider’s perspective, Luther was only responsible to himself ’ (Warner, 1993: 434). For Weber and Oakeshott, as well as Warner, the ethic of ultimate ends on which Luther purportedly grounded his moral conduct is essentially atomistic in conception and therefore realist in outlook.6 In other words, inasmuch as communitarianism seems to share common cause with the liberalism of Walzer, it is equally the case, so it seems, that a communitarian perspective of international relations is virtually indistinguishable from traditional realpolitik international relations (Gvosdev, 2005). But it is not only communitarianism’s apparent correspondence with realism that is at issue here; equally,

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communitarianism finds common cause with nationalism, at least where Walzer’s ideas are concerned. For instance, in his analysis of the biblical emancipation narrative of the Exodus and the emergence of modern Jewish national identity, Walzer’s work comes across in some respects as an affirmation of both the coherence of the Jewish people and Israeli nationalism (Walzer, 1984b). Walzer’s (self-​described) narrative is linear, undisturbed and free of contradiction and tension (Said, 1986: 86). Thus understood, the rise of the modern nation-​ state of Israel, in Walzer’s treatment, unproblematically assumes an unequivocal coherence and correspondence between national identity and territorial boundary (Shapiro, 1999: 74–​5). Undoubtedly, going in these dual interconnected directions of realism and nationalism brings with it risks especially for a discussion on ethics.7 Against this backdrop, it is therefore understandable why Southeast Asian communitarians, whether in normative or strategic terms or both, find it difficult to embrace the R2P. They generally accept the first two provisos listed in the 2009 United Nations Secretary General’s report on R2P  –​on the state’s obligations to protect its own and to seek foreign assistance in order to enhance its capacity to protect its own (UN, 2009) –​because those resonate more or less with regional thinking and praxis regarding the responsibility to provide (as suggested in my three pillars of the R2Provide discussed in Chapter 5). Indeed, it is probably fair to say that despite their reverence for the sanctity of sovereignty and non-​intervention, their willingness to become responsible providers for neighbours in need stems equally from their shared appreciation for the transnational character of the region’s humanitarian challenges and the consequent need for multilateral‒multinational responses in addressing those challenges. The security obligations of the Southeast Asian state are necessarily regional as much as national in scope; if anything, it is the ‘regionalness’ of challenges and tasks that engenders moral obligations and regional responsibility, where common purpose and common responsibility become imperative because certain problems cannot be solved by individuals or states acting alone (Fain, 1987). Yet, as we saw earlier, the challenge to translate the success the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus have had with multinational military exercises into actual relevant HADR or counterterrorism or maritime security operations remains a work in progress (Graham, 2013; Baldino and Carr, 2016; Tan, 2016). Despite the regional consensus ASEAN states share about the importance of the R2Provide, efforts to realize that and other regional aspirations have been frustrated because the region continues to suffer from a massive trust deficit, which growing strategic rivalry among the great

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powers has only worsened (Lieberthal and Wang, 2012; Hassan, 2013; Kausikan, 2014; Emmers, 2017b). Why this is so could be partly due to the communitarian insistence on cultural and political relativism. Even as Southeast Asians seek to enlarge their conception and the parameters of responsible sovereignty –​or, for that matter, to move from narrow self-​interest to an ‘enlightened’ one –​ the communitarian legacy that has informed and continues to inform the thinking and behaviour of some regional actors acts as a constraint against more ambitious security cooperation, thereby reaffirming and reinforcing the logics of anarchy. It is not sufficient to dismiss this as attributable solely to realpolitik reasoning because the notion of a purely rational and/​or prudent self-​interest, as Reinhold Niebuhr once noted, is ‘almost as rare as unselfishness’ (Niebuhr, 1932: 45; also see Osgood, 1953: 446). The governing codes in much of international relations today, given as they are to assuming pre-​given agents with autonomous and settled identities, interpret sovereignty and territoriality as manifesting natural and timeless geopolitical spaces, and are thus impervious to negotiation or contestation (Campbell, 1994:  457). The point is underscored by the vexing issue of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (as discussed in Chapter 4). Indeed, as regional countries know too well, the proclivity for sovereignty issues, historical memory and hyper-​nationalism to hamper regional efforts at crafting credible collective responses to crises happens all too often, as evidenced by the region’s inaction when Typhoon Haiyan hammered the Philippines in 2013 –​despite having in place assets and mechanisms like the AHA Centre (for disaster management) and the ADMM an ADMM-​Plus –​or when the Rohingya refugee crisis broke out in 2015 (as discussed in Chapter 5). And as we saw with Michael Walzer’s sympathetic reading of the founding of the modern nation of Israeli, the relationship between communitarianism and nationalism is undeniable (O’Neill, 1994; Archard, 1996; Vandevelde, 1997; Shapiro, 1999). Just as the prospects for dispute resolution and/​or joint resource development in the South China Sea are curtailed because of the ontological primacy accorded to sovereignty considerations (Emmers, 2009a), the prospect for the realization of the R2Provide is arguably curtailed by the prior commitment, if only tacit, of some of the region’s actors to communitarianism. Hence, while the communitarian perspective has played a key role in defining and justifying swathes of the region’s economic and political life as a way for Southeast Asians to negotiate the challenges wrought by globalization as well as a political counter-​narrative to Western liberalism, it appears more of a liability where the region’s effort to cultivate an ethics of responsibility is

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concerned simply because communitarian responsibility ends pretty much where the boundaries of nation-​states –​geographical, political, cultural –​are drawn.

Liberalism and responsibility If communitarianism is likely to limit the full extent of the region’s realization of the R2Provide, what then about liberalism? As Arthur Brooks has correctly noted, ‘Welcoming the stranger is one of the great moral traditions liberals have’ (Brooks, 2017: 10). The responsibility to provide for one’s needy neighbours is predicated upon the willingness to save –​or at least to serve –​strangers (Wheeler, 2000). Hence, even if Southeast Asian communitarians are right to question the relevance of liberalism to the shaping of this region’s socio-​political life, there is no question that at least some liberal values –​and not simply economic liberal principles alone (Walter and Zhang, 2012; Lopes, 2017) –​ have a place in Southeast Asian regionalism. But as we shall see, as with communitarianism, the notion of liberal responsibility brings with it immense difficulties where grounding the R2Provide is concerned. As good place as any to begin this discussion is to acknowledge the complexities and vagaries of the liberal tradition. As G. John Ikenberry has mused: The Western liberal tradition rests on free markets, limited government, human rights, and the rule of law. [But] those concepts originated as guides to the organisation of domestic politics, and the effort to project them onto the international system, which began in the early nineteenth century, has been marked by tensions, dilemmas, tradeoffs, and contradictions. Liberal internationalism enshrines the norms of sovereignty and self-​determination, for example, but it also has provided the rationale for imperialism, military interventionism, and postwar European efforts to transcend the sovereign state. (Ikenberry, 2014) Liberalism advances the notion of ‘unencumbered selves’ that are at once, in the hands of John Gray, individualist in asserting the moral primacy of the individual over any social collective, egalitarian in granting to all the same moral status whilst denying any rank ordering of differences in moral worth among human beings, universalist in affirming the moral unity of all humans and relegating their specific historical and cultural associations, and ‘meliorist’8 in affirming ‘the

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corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements’ (Gray, 1995:  xii). An early variant of this was the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, whose metaphorical ‘invisible hand’ ostensibly guided the elegant and smooth functioning of the market system through coordinating the choices and decisions taken by autonomous individuals in an interdependent world (Evensky, 1993:  197). Where the possibilities for international responsibility are concerned, it is cosmopolitanism that matters. Cosmopolitan liberalism first appeared in the wake of World War I  in the efforts of idealists, legalists and religionists calling for abolition of war and the establishment of an international liberal order.9 As implied in the discussion of Walzer’s conception of the state in the previous section, early notions of liberal internationalism, predicated as they were on a ‘morality of states’, highlighted the importance of state sovereignty and autonomy –​the ‘right to self-​determination’ –​to the point where non-​intervention/​non-​interference in the domestic affairs of states became a non-​negotiable norm (Doppelt, 1978; Walzer, 1980; Nardin, 1983; Beitz, 2009). This brand of liberalism would be replaced in the post-​war period by a cosmopolitanism that relaxed the connection between people and the states to which they belong, where individual human beings were deemed deserving of basic protection from states given to harming and hurting rather than serving and protecting them. Another source of concern over this classical conception of liberalism’s stress on individualism arose from awareness about the complex relationship between individuals and the economy:10 although the rise of individualism as a concept has been tied inextricably to the rise of the capitalist economy, the prioritization of individual freedom and the consequent separation of the individual from their communal support structures ends up inadvertently rendering that individual and everyone else vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market and creating significant economic inequalities (Bardhan, 2017). The two forms of liberalism have been labelled by Chris Brown as ‘pluralist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ respectively (Brown, 2007).11 Pluralist liberals regard self-​governance and self-​determination as one of the most basic and important rights and privilege responsibility to one’s own citizens over that to the rest of the world. By virtue of the domestic analogy, the state comes to embody the moral position of the individual. Whereas for liberal political theory the individual is the focus of concern, the analogy places the level of analysis with the liberal state; in Warner’s terms, the domestic analogy ends up glorifying the state in the same way liberals glorify individuals. ‘Like persons in domestic society’, as Charles Beitz has written, ‘states in international

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society are to be treated as autonomous sources of ends, morally immune from external interference and morally free to arrange their internal affairs as governments see fit’ (Beitz, 1979: 65). But as we saw earlier, the way in which Walzer understood and applied the domestic analogy sees him ending up on grounds communitarians would find familiar and comforting: with a state that protects not the individual but itself. For that matter, it appears Walzer is not the only liberal theorist harbouring communitarian-​like instincts. Even John Rawls, the liberal scholar credited for bringing community back into liberal thought, has apparently espoused a communitarian perspective of international ethics chiefly through his social liberalism, which takes the position that ‘state-​level societies have the primary responsibility for the well-​ being of their own people, while the international community serves to establish and maintain background conditions in which just domestic societies can develop and flourish’ (Beitz, 1999: 518). There would be no such conundrum with cosmopolitan liberals, who regard global citizenship as prior to any national identity and insist the political and civil rights of all people matter as much as those of one’s own citizens. As an absolutist or universalist doctrine, cosmopolitan liberalism is blind to social context, believing in the possibility of and indeed the necessity for singular answers to moral concerns across all human societies. As Brian Barry once put it, ‘I continue to believe in the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’ (Barry, 1995: 3). As bounded communities, states are seen by cosmopolitans as obstacles to universal moral emancipation and the doctrines of state sovereignty and non-​intervention are the things that prevent justice being achieved. This stands in contrast to the communitarian perspective of states as the guardians of common values and the guarantors of rights and responsibilities socially contracted with their respective societies. On the other hand, cosmopolitan liberalism has been criticized as a gendered and Western-​centric doctrine (Elshtain, 1981; Hutchings, 1999; Vidmar-​Horvat, 2013), whose goal of global justice falters owing to its neglect of global distributive justice (Beitz, 1979; Shue, 1980; Pogge, 1999). But thanks in no small part to cosmopolitan liberalism, the international responsibility of both states and individuals is now defined largely in terms of rights that are protected by an international legal regime. As former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asserted in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2001: In the 21st Century I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound, awareness

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of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface of nations or communities. We must focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation its richness and character … What is not always recognised is that ‘we the peoples’ are made up of individuals whose claims to the most fundamental rights have too often been sacrificed in the supposed interests of the state or the nation. (Annan, 2001, emphasis added) In the view of cosmopolitan liberal academic-​practitioners like Anne-​ Marie Slaughter, the growing ‘universal’ emphasis on the protection of individual rights is proof positive that Westphalian sovereignty has effectively been displaced by a cosmopolitan ‘new world order’, where the old paradigm of states as the ultimate decision-​makers has been replaced by a new paradigm of decision-​making by transnational networks of judges, regulators, legislators and technocrats (Slaughter, 2004). But what is especially fascinating for our purposes is that this new world order feted by cosmopolitans is, in their view, defined by the ‘principle of civilian inviolability’ (Slaughter, 2002; Slaughter and Burke-​White, 2002), where rights protection is operationalized and accomplished through humanitarian intervention. This brings our discussion right back to the R2P. As noted, the R2P doctrine has been seen by many as the embodiment of cosmopolitan liberal principles (Richmond, 2006). For that matter, some adherents of the ‘English school’ of international relations hold the view that the R2P’s emphasis on the legitimate resort to military intervention on humanitarian grounds, supported by international law, reflects the existence of a ‘solidarist’, as opposed to a ‘pluralist’, foundation in international affairs.12 However, a growing number of scholars have fundamentally questioned the viability of a liberal basis for responsible sovereignty and more specifically the R2P, given what they see as the flaws in aspects of liberal international thought which could conceivably, and ironically, render R2P anti-​liberal in some respects. For instance, David Chandler is of the view that the liberal peace thesis on which R2P champions base their advocacy of intervention effectively relies as much on realist assumptions and conclusions, ironically. According to Chandler, ‘rather than a moral shift away from the rights of sovereignty, the dominance of the liberal peace thesis, in fact, reflects the new balance of power in the international sphere. Justifications for new interventionist norms as a framework for

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liberal peace are as dependent on the needs of Realpolitik as was the earlier doctrine of sovereign equality and nonintervention’ (Chandler, 2004: 59). Philip Cunliffe highlights how precisely anti-​liberal the R2P is by contending that the R2P represents three ‘retreats’, so-​called, from classical liberal ideals. First, it represents a retreat from universalism, since the ICISS report acknowledges that the doctrine is not meant to be applied in a consistent fashion and could never be reasonably invoked against the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (ICISS, 2001: 37). In short, the architects of the R2P, to all intents and purposes, have effectively immunized the Permanent Five (P5) powers from the prospect of being intervened in by other states or by each other, at least where the R2P doctrine is concerned. It may be recalled here, as discussed in Chapter 2, a grouping of countries known as the ‘Small Five’  –​Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland –​which sought to table a resolution before the UN General Assembly in March 2006 calling for reform of the workings of the Security Council regarding limiting the use of the veto and enhancing transparency and accountability. Subsequently, in May 2012 and driven by widespread concern over disagreements among the P5 powers over how to deal with the growing humanitarian crisis sparked by the war in Syria, the Small Five members called on the Permanent Five members to mind their potential misuse of their veto powers over crises involving genocide and crimes against humanity. Both these efforts were roundly rebuffed by the P5. In a crucial sense, these episodes underscore the R2P’s retreat from universalism since the doctrine putatively ‘protects’ the P5 from even appeals like the ones raised by the Small Five countries. Ironically, the R2P may well end up shielding the Security Council from having to undertake needed reforms (Cunliffe, 2017).13 Secondly, the R2P represents a retreat from liberalism, since the doctrine reaffirms the state as the best means for organizing political life through substituting security for freedom –​or at least prioritizing security over freedom –​thereby elevating the principle of state power over that of representation and accountability (Cunliffe, 2014). The irony here is that it is precisely the self-​professed liberal defenders of the doctrine that fall short of liberal goals and ideals, whether those of classical liberalism or of the liberalism of the inter-​war period. Cosmopolitans like Andrew Linklater contend that existing principal harm conventions in international society are designed to maintain order between states and as such need to be revised to include the prevention of harm to individuals and non-​sovereign entities. According to Linklater, such a prospect can only be achieved if there is a global moral commitment to

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new forms of domestic and international political community beyond what is presently the case (Linklater, 2001). If so, the R2P’s retreat from cosmopolitanism implies that the doctrine, despite the veneer of newness and boldness with which its champions have sought to burnish it, is in effect a reinforcement of extant conventions that not only protect the power and privileges of the P5 members, but also maintain the extant inequalities of the international system. In fact, debased and compromised by its accommodation to the interests of powerful states, the R2P ‘offers no vision for superior forms of political organisation that might transcend the limits of the current world order’ (Cunliffe, 2014). Thirdly, it represents a retreat from peace because, not unlike the US neo-​conservative officials in George W.  Bush’s administration who employed military force as the foreign policy tool ostensibly through which to bring democracy to Iraq (Marshall, 2003; Muravchik, 2007), the advocates for humanitarian intervention are not at all shy to use military force –​or at least consider the use of force –​to achieve their desired objectives.14 As Cunliffe has argued elsewhere, by reinterpreting conflict prevention through subsuming it under the terms of the R2P, its advocates have undermined the very essence of the liberal project itself, which is to pursue the gradual restriction, suppression and eventual elimination of violence from an increasingly rational and globalized political order (Cunliffe, 2017). Instead, from the aim to eventually eliminate conflict altogether, the R2P undertakes the ongoing project of conflict management of recurring humanitarian emergencies –​a key assumption that takes an ostensibly liberal idea right back to what Martin Wight famous described of the international domain as ‘the realm of repetition and recurrence’, which admitted no higher objective than order and, ultimately, survival (cited in Linklater, 1990: 1). Furthermore, in rendering political exceptionalism into an everyday affair, the core business of the R2P becomes a constant search for ‘irresponsible states’, or agents that could be held accountable for perceived failures in carrying out their sovereign responsibility, and upon which the weapons of humanitarian war could therefore be unleashed. In this respect, William Connolly argues that the drive to establish responsible agents is part of an existential ‘resentment’ characteristic of liberalism’s unremitting quest to assign culpability: People tend to demand … a world in which suffering is ultimately grounded in proportional responsibility. We resent a world in which it appears that this is not so. But resentment must locate an appropriate object if it is to be discharged as resentment. It thereby seeks a responsible agent

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that it can convince itself is worthy of receiving the load of incipient resentment it carries. Otherwise its existential rancour must be stored or translated into something else. So, part of the drive to insistent attributions of responsibility flows from existential resentment. (Connolly, 1991b: 121, emphasis original) Thus understood, the R2P seeks neither to transcend war nor to abolish it altogether (Lanham, 2018)  –​idealism’s holy grail, realists might quip –​but persists in seeing and relying on war as a tool to achieve its purposes, and justifying its use on humanitarian grounds, over and over again. Intriguingly, neoconservatives are quite forthright in drawing a line between their views and what they see as liberalism’s shortcomings. As Irving Kristol once insisted, ‘What is wrong with liberalism is liberalism –​a metaphysics and a mythology that is woefully blind to human and political reality’ (Murray, 2005:  45).Yet what emerges from this present discussion is liberalism’s propensity to treat war quite seriously as a moral instrument. Presenting the R2P as an unfortunate reflection of how liberalism has sought to accommodate itself to the interests of power and realist logics, Cunliffe argues that the R2P is clearly neither about transforming the international order nor about abolishing war. Instead, he concludes that ‘the most that can be hoped for from the sub-​idealism of [the R2P] is a shabby dystopia of erratic global policing and intermittent global law enforcement’ (Cunliffe, 2014). To be sure, the possibility that the R2P doctrine could well be profoundly anti-​liberal is not an indictment of liberalism as such, as much as of the R2P. Although it strongly implies how the concept of sovereignty as responsibility, when taken to its logical extreme, can become totalitarian in focus, it does not automatically disqualify liberalism as a suitable foundation for the R2Provide. For this, we turn our attention to a set of interrelated features specific to liberalism, specifically, sociality, mutuality, reciprocity and the idea of the social contract. There are a number of social contract theories such as: ‘contractarianism’, whose roots are in Thomas Hobbes’ notion of morality (or responsibility) in terms of cooperation arising from mutual self-​interest (Gauthier, 1986); ‘contractualism’, which understands morality as about relations based upon mutual recognition (Scanlon, 1998); and Immanuel Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’, which has led commentators on Kant to variously read his writings as advocating federalism, world government, collective security à la the League of

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Nations, and pacifism (Hurrell, 1990). Kant understood morality and responsibility as a reasonable and rational act of an autonomous will and an application of the golden rule (‘treat others how you wish to be treated’ or ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’).15 For him, the motivation for acting hospitably to another ultimately stems from self-​interest; the desire that likewise one will receive hospitality in return. Sociality also raises interesting questions about the place of mutuality and reciprocity in any relationship between self and other. (Crucially, what is at hand here is not mutuality and reciprocity broadly defined, but as they are conceived and expressed through the lens of the autonomous and transactional subjectivity of liberalism.) According to Marcel Mauss, the giving of gifts is grounded in obligations and reciprocity; it establishes a moral bond enabling the functioning of societies (Mauss, 1990). Reciprocity is also central to the reassurance logics of constructivist international relations thinkers like Alexander Wendt, who has argued the case –​a utilitarian one, it should be said16 –​ for ‘alter casting’ as a strategy in reassurance, whereby the ‘I’ tries to induce the ‘other’ to assume a new identity by treating the other as if they already had that identity (Wendt, 1992). However, altercasting and its assumption of an eventual mutual reciprocity is ultimately limited as an ethical system. Among other things, communities based on reciprocity face a very real risk of becoming overly transactional in their relations. For instance, against former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s contention that a values-​based focus impedes America’s ability to advance its national security and economic goals, the late US Senator John McCain warned that pursuing a transactional foreign policy could render the United States blind to the world’s ‘demand for human rights and dignity, the longing for liberty and justice and opportunity, [and] the hatred of oppression and corruption and cruelty’ (cited in Savransky, 2017). Although they are neither identical nor interchangeable, there is no denying the robust link between reciprocity and transactionalism: On the one hand, if someone does something nice for me in the reciprocal community, I  want to give back, therefore creating more value for the group and further incentivising people to contribute. That’s great. On the other hand, if I give and contribute, I expect something in return. And what if that doesn’t happen? And that’s where reciprocity becomes a slippery slope, because it encourages transactional behaviour, not long-​term relationship building. (Pfortmüller, 2018)

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Moreover, it appears that reciprocity as conceived by the liberal paradigm assumes the pre-​existence of actors whose identities are already fixed or settled. Granted, it allows for the possibility of change, since self‒other relations include room for transformative change –​in and for the ‘other’, that is, but not the liberal ‘I’, which is always and already privileged and given. In other words, liberalism presupposes autonomous actors with pre-​g iven identities, always and already ontologically determined. An assumption of autonomous agency decouples ethics from subjectivity, seeing the former as something that an already formed and settled subjectivity subsequently adopts and appropriates. This is not to imply liberalism has no room for difference, which makes little sense given the theory’s known inclusivism. But whatever room it has is invariably limited and narrow because a liberal ethics and responsibility, for all of its claims, is oddly enough not particularly heteronomous (i.e., determined by something or someone other).17 Why is this so? Because liberal metaphysics, if you like, is intolerant of differences it has yet to acknowledge. As Connolly has argued: Liberalism remains a philosophy of tolerance among culturally established identities more than one of attentiveness to how these identities are established and the ways in which new possibilities of identity are propelled into being. In other words, liberalism is attentive to ‘difference’ as already defined, heterodox identities in an existing network of social relations, but tone-​deaf to ‘différance’ as that which resides in an existing network of social relations, but has not yet received stable definition within it. As a result of this thinness in the appreciation of difference, dominant forms of liberalism remain un-​attuned to the crucial role new enactments or performances play, first in generating new claims to identity, and second in retroactively crystallising violence in previous patterns of being. (Connolly, 1993b:  178, emphasis original)18 A liberal subjectivity that insists on its own universality by staying blind to its indebtedness to differences or to otherness is at risk of ruining itself. As Partha Chatterjee once observed about the paradoxical reliance by sovereign identity on difference/​otherness without which it becomes inconceivable:  ‘For Enlightenment itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever actualise itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact

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destroy itself ’ (Chatterjee, 1986: 17). In other words, a liberal ethics that refuses to acknowledge the subjectivity of the other through providing for their needs ends up destroying itself (Tan, 2006: 176). In a sense, these dire outcomes find their origins in liberalism’s construction of walls of separation (Warner, 1996: 119; also see Walzer, 1984a).

Against totality, towards asymmetry and heteronomy The work of Emmanuel Levinas is crucially important to this book; his ideas will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter. In the light of the foregoing discussion, a quick thought just to whet the appetite is in order here. For Levinas, ethical systems that rely on totalized foundations are likely to fail. The example most often associated with Levinas’ conclusion is that of liberalism because it was precisely liberalism, as he saw it, which paved the way for the Nazi regime to emerge in inter-​war Germany, while offering precious little by way of its opposition (Levinas and Hand, 1990: 63). After all, it was the Weimar Republic, arguably one of the most liberal states in history, which overwhelmingly passed the infamous Enabling Law that granted the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, the power to enact legislation without prior consent of the parliament (Kurlander, 2009). In an intriguing observation that bridges not only liberalism and totalitarianism, but also alludes to liberalism’s links with communitarianism and nationalism, Eugen Rosenstock-​Huessy noted: ‘the liberal says that the frontiers of his ideas are unlimited. And at the end, he is simply limited by the national boundaries of his language. All the liberals end in nationalism. The sons of the liberals have all become Nazis, in Germany. The end of a liberal is always that his son becomes a fascist’ (Rosenstock-​Huessy, 1949: 17). Being beholden by reason to elements of liberalism, whose ‘ontological totalitarianism’ resists and refuses any logic other than that based on an autonomous freedom, liberals therefore fail to apprehend the possibility that ethical responsibility is interdependent and hence heteronomous (Levinas and Kearney, 1986: 20; Campbell, 1994: 458). Levinas understands the self to be heteronomous before it is autonomous (Morgan, 2011:  114), which presumably implies that no subject is truly autonomous as the context of its emergence is always and already heteronomous.19 Against the criticism that Levinas is ‘anti-​human’ for having made that assertion, it may be argued that his so-​called anti-​ humanism is neither inhuman nor inhumane for the reason that it does not eradicate the human but ‘clears the place for subjectivity positing itself in abnegation, in sacrifice, in a substitution which precedes the will’ (cited in Oksala, 2005: 205). Indeed, Levinas advocates the

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denouncement of liberalism precisely ‘because it is insufficiently human’ as a consequence of its lack of consideration of alterity and otherness (Levinas, 1991: 127). Or, as Jean Elshtain once mused, ‘Virtue without limits becomes terror’ (Elshtain, 1995: 123). And so perhaps too the sort of idealistic, evangelical and terrifying virtue promulgated and forcibly imposed by liberals –​including, for that matter, liberals ‘mugged by reality’20 –​in many a war initiated and fought by liberal powers on the basis of well-​intentioned but seriously flawed reasons. Crucially, one does not have subscribe fully to the conservative critique of liberalism to appreciate what Levinas and others have said.21 Thanks to Levinas’ sustained attack on liberalism and his reflections on the failure of Western philosophy to sufficiently insure itself against evil, we are able to discern and appreciate fundamental weaknesses in Western liberal democratic systems, the most significant of which is its neglect of the processes and practices which produce new identities, including the ‘Islamization’ of Western and/​or Westernized societies. But as suggested in the foregoing discussion, communitarianism can prove just as totalizing as its liberal counterpart. Levinas did not comment on, let  alone assess, communitarian ethics in the way he did liberal ethics. Levinas’ concern was very much on the liberal conditions which paved the way towards Nazism. However, given Levinas’ opprobrium for Nazism and the overlap between Nazism and nationalism, it is not difficult to imagine his likely response to communitarianism given the totalizing disposition it shares with liberalism (Kymlicka, 1988; Cleemput, 1995). Not unlike those who would challenge philosophical, ideological and theoretical systems as totalizing and logocentric schemes which, by virtue of their comprehensiveness and exclusivity, tend to reduce genuine multiplicity and diversity to some form of uniformity and origin, Levinas was convinced that all totalities, and/​or claims to such, end up reducing the other to the same; in other words, they make sameness out of otherness (Levinas, 1969; Min, 1998: 571). Why is this so? Because, for Levinas, the totalizing narratives in Western philosophy –​from the ancient Greeks to Heidegger; from Plato’s adventure with the tyrant Dionysus to Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism in his 1933 address as rector of Freiburg University; from Ulysses’ epic journey that ends not with engagement in the other but a return to his native island (Critchley, 2002: 24; Levinas, 2003: 26; Wallenfang, 2016) –​all start with the subjectivity of the self, thereby reducing life and the human condition to idealized accounts. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is precisely this idealization, reification and reductionism of the self that render communitarian and liberal ethics highly troubling as grounds for

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the R2Provide. In their quest to find meaning in ontological questions, totalizing philosophies and theories are indifferent to the other and exhibit anti-​humanist tendencies which –​as Levinas believed –​lead ultimately to the horrors of the Holocaust and the genocides that mark the tragic history of the twentieth century (Bahler, 2014). They are not merely incapable of responding to the ethical challenges posed by the post-​Holocaust world, but are themselves partly to blame for a world of inhumanity (Bernard-​Donals, 2007). But the problem is not just the tendency of totalizing or idealizing narratives to reduce difference and diversity to sameness. For Levinas, our lived experiences exceed the totalities assumed by essentialist theories of the sort predicated on totalities such as Heidegger’s ‘Being’ (Heidegger, 2010). Levinas arrived at this understanding partly through his interpretation of Descartes’ contention that our very conception of infinity is already and always exceeded by infinity itself (Zlomislic, 2007: 71). While for Descartes this structure of infinity was applied to the divine –​that is to say, God always exceeds our conception and/​ or construction of God  –​Levinas took this Cartesian concept and applied this formal structure of thought, which emphasizes inequality and asymmetry (and, as we shall see later, non-​reciprocity) to one’s relationship to the human other. Another source who is an important guide on this issue is Franz Rosenzweig, whose critique of Hegel exposed the reductionist and inadequate quality of totalities in their apparent failure to respect the differences and particularities between God, world and man through their readiness to reduce God and the world to man (Handelman, 1990; Mack, 2003; Bielek-​Robson, 2015).22 For Levinas, the other’s absolute exteriority and infinity means that the other can never be neatly packaged into a totality crafted by oneself, simply because one’s relationship with the other always and already exceeds the limits of comprehension (Shepherd, 2014: 19). When I am speaking or calling or listening to the other, I am not reflecting upon that other –​Levinas made clear the absence of conscious reflection at such moments (Critchley, 1999a: 239) –​ but am actively engaged in an irreducible relation to alterity where I gaze upon the other before me and waive the temptation to generalize and universalize from this particular encounter. Hence, whether in terms of a reduction of difference and diversity to sameness, or a totality that boxes and caricatures a lived experience that always and already exceeds it, Western ethics relies on amnesia without which its assumptions and assertions cannot hold.23 Ethics is therefore not a conception that can be known a priori and grounded in ontology or metaphysics. Indeed, any attempt

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to ground ethics in a foundation is viewed by Levinas as an act of totalizing violence (Peperzak, 1996: 2). Any attempt to ground ethics in a foundation is an act of totalizing violence (Levinas, 1998: 88). For Levinas, the way out of this dilemma is to ‘translate Hebrew into Greek’ –​meaning the reawakening of philosophical attention to ‘resonances and echoes coming from an exteriority unsuspected by philosophy, the Biblical-​Talmudic exteriority’ (Holden, 2011: 44). This is not to imply that Levinas rejected Western liberalism altogether. As he noted on another occasion, ‘Both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress violence’ (Levinas, 1996a:  24). Nor is it to imply that Levinas downgraded Western philosophy in favour of Jewish thought. For Levinas, it was ‘never a question … of shifting from the paradigm of Athens to that of Jerusalem, but rather of recognising that both are simultaneously necessary for the constitution of a just polity’ (Critchley, 2002: 25).24 According to Philip Lawton, as a Jew, Levinas ‘may have refused the “totalitarian”, manipulative language in which Greeks (even such Greeks as Husserl and Heidegger) have reduced the Other to a moment of knowledge’, but as a Westerner, Levinas ‘reflected philosophically upon the intersubjective experience’ (Lawton, 1976: 78). Nor was he calling for the rejection of rationalism, but rather to reintroduce critical reflection and ethical responsibility back into Western philosophy –​ and, paradoxically, ethics –​that have surrendered to rational, positivist and technical reasoning. As Critchley has clarified: Levinas does not at all want to reject the order of political rationality, and its consequent claims to legitimacy and justice. Rather, Levinas wants to criticise the belief that only political rationality can answer political problems. He wants to indicate how the order of the state rests upon the irreducible ethical responsibility of the face-​to-​face relation. Levinas’ critique of totalising politics leads to the deduction of an ethical structure that is irreducible to totality: the face-​ to-​face, infinite responsibility, proximity, the other within the same, peace. Thus, Levinas’ thinking does not result in an apoliticism or ethical quietism … Rather, ethics leads back to politics, to the demand for a just polity. (Critchley, 2002: 24, emphasis original) By contrast to the economistic quality of pure political rationality, Levinas believed human existence is intrinsically social rather than

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atomized, where humans live together and in interaction with other humans in ways that cannot be reduced to sameness because the other is precisely that, namely the other.25 Hence, in contrast to the Enlightenment-​inspired notion of being as autonomous, given and therefore sovereign, Levinas understood it as a radically interdependent condition, since one’s responsibility to the other is what enables one to be ‘devoted to the other man before being devoted to [oneself]’ (Levinas, 1989: 83–​4). Crucially, Levinas wondered if true ethicality is possible at all within the autonomous and totalized self, and if it is, it is highly restricted and confined to the hermetic self, not least because the self is ultimately self-​centred and cares only for its own well-​being. As Levinas, perhaps in idiosyncratic fashion, argued: A being is something that is attached to being, to its own being, which is always a persistence of being. That is Darwin’s idea. The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle without ethics. It is a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time that Dasein is a being who in his being is concerned for this being itself. That’s Darwin’s idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself. (Levinas, 1988a: 172) Moreover, for Levinas, the subject is not ontologically prior to the other, but in effect emerges from interdependence and heteronomy.26 Hence, if ‘we’ are always already ethically situated, then ethical considerations depend less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulation, and more on the interdependencies of our relations with each other. When we comprehend responsibility in this way, it recasts traditional conceptions of subjectivity, since the origin of the subject is now found in its very subjection to the other.27 More specifically, this subjection takes place before any consciousness, identity or even freedom; indeed, subjects are constructed by way of their relationship with and to the other (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). There is, as such, an ever present indebtedness to the other that marks our very own identity and subjectivity (Levinas, 1989: 82; 1997: 293). Hence, being or subjectivity can only be properly affirmed in terms of a right to be in relation to the other, which raises fundamental questions for ethics. Thus understood, ethics is not ancillary to the existence of a subject but is in fact indispensable to the very being of that subject (Campbell, 1993: 92).28 Against the perceived totality of and totalization by the self in Western philosophy, Levinas insisted on the unequivocal privileging of

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the other over self in an asymmetrical relationship: ‘The basic intuition of moral growing-​up perhaps consists in perceiving that I am not the equal of the Other. This applies in a very strict sense: I see myself as obligated with respect to the Other; consequently I am infinitely more demanding of myself than of others’ (Levinas, 1997:  21–​2; cited in Putnam, 2002: 33–​4). It is an obligation to a transcendental other: ‘The Other who dominates me in his transcendence is thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I am obligated’ (Levinas, 1969: 215). To be ethical is therefore to live in the sensibility of an embodied exposure to the other. It is to be vulnerable, passive, open to the pangs of hunger. Elsewhere, Levinas raises the bar even higher with this following assertion:  ‘To be responsible despite oneself is to be persecuted. Only the persecuted is responsible for everyone, even for his persecutor’ (Levinas, 1990:  114–​15). Or, as Richard Bernstein has put it, ‘I am infinitely responsible for the other person whose suffering is ethically more important to me than my own suffering’ (Bernstein, 2002: 266–​7). In another place, Levinas offered a biblical basis –​or what comes closest to a biblical basis for Levinas –​for the demanding obligation and vulnerability imposed on the self and evident lop-​sidedness of a relationship that privileges the other over the self: The Bible is the priority of the other [l’autre] in relation to me. It is in another [autrui] that I always see the widow and the orphan. The other [autrui] always comes first. This is what I’ve called, in Greek language, the dissymmetry of the interpersonal relationship. If there is not this dissymmetry, then no line of what I’ve written can hold. And this is vulnerability. Only a vulnerable I can love his neighbour. (Levinas, 1998: 85)29 Unlike Martin Buber, who differentiated between the ‘I‒Thou’ relationship and the ‘I‒It’ relationship and believed that free movement and/​or choice between these two worlds are possible, Levinas offered no possibility for such because for him, there is only ‘I‒Thou’ and no ‘I‒It’.30 That said, it could be asked whether the demanding requirements which Levinas’ ethic imposes on us are in fact as absolute and categorical as those in Western philosophy with which he took issue. Notably, Levinas’ preoccupation with resisting totalization has led to the charge that his is a postmodern fancy (Spargo, 2006: 76; Wiener and Schrire, 2010:  365). As Gillian Rose has concluded, Levinas’ ‘ethical extremism’ cannot be translated into the ‘real world’ and is as

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such utterly irrelevant to real world concerns (Rose, 1992). According to Rose, Levinas’ purportedly postmodern approach to ethics fails because of what she regards as the fundamental flaw of postmodern theories’ inability or refusal to conceive a ground of meaning beneath the individual and the state, the ethical life and political institutions (Bergo, 2013: 258–​76). However, Levinas’ apparent inability to fully escape the very danger he highlighted militates against Rose’s criticism (Derrida, 1980). Indeed, it could even be said that Levinas appears to have committed the sort of totalization –​and, it has to be said, dehumanization –​from which he sought to distance himself.31 Rather than the other placed at the mercy of the self at work in Western philosophy, Levinas’ ethic merely overturns the power structure by placing the self in the hands of the other (Shepherd, 2014: 43). To manage this conundrum, rather than seeking a final resolution of the self/​other opposition (as Levinas seems to have done) by privileging other over self, or completely dismissing the problem altogether, perhaps what is more crucial for our purposes is to appreciate –​and to embrace –​the ‘tension and ambivalence between self and other’, that is to say, the facticity of aporia, without succumbing to the positivist-​ rationalist insistence to always choose and privilege one over the other (Paipais, 2011: 121).32

Conclusion Why do illiberal states –​including some of those in Southeast Asia –​ exercise hospitality towards others? Granted, they also fail to do so many times, but so too do liberal democracies, as our discussion on the ambivalent logics and record of R2P implementation has suggested. Neither communitarianism nor liberalism, because of their totalizing foundations, seem able to lead us to a new understanding of an ethics of responsibility. If anything, notwithstanding important differences between the two perspectives, the communitarian and liberal debate, so far as our concern with responsibility goes, may simply be two sides of the same coin  –​a communitarian‒liberal axis if you like. What then are the prospects for a responsibility beyond liberalism and communitarianism? According to Martti Koskenniemi, an ideal of authentic commitment  –​one that, in Warner’s terms, ‘respects the conflictual character of social life by recognising that normative commitment follows from context as well as consent’ (Warner, 1993: 447) –​is a possible way out of the conundrum posed by the dead-​ end essentialism found in both communitarian and liberal approaches to responsibility. As Koskenniemi has written:

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The ideal of authentic commitment directs normative conversation away from abstract principles of natural law, away from formal rules and the liberal ethic of consent and the market place. It recognises that normative commitment may follow not only from whatever people might have consented to (although it does regard consent as important) but also by virtue of the context in which they live. Authentic commitment means, in other words, respecting the conflictual character of social life. It tries to make life possible in conflict –​indeed, it sees life in terms of constant coping with conflict, not in terms of assimilation into nostalgic utopia. (Koskenniemi, 1989: 448, cited in Warner, 1993: 447–​8) This book’s attempt to take up just such an authentic commitment in the form of a viable foundation for responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia, one that seeks to avoid the temptation towards the essentialism and totalitarianism that grip communitarianism and liberalism, one that refuses the logic of autonomy so central to those two ideologies whilst acknowledging and embracing the antinomies and complexities inherent in heteronomy, will be pursued in the next chapter.

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Levinas and the Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia Introduction The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it explores the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, whose concept of responsibility for the other arguably provides an alternative vision of sovereignty and subjectivity in Southeast Asia to communitarian and liberal ethics. As we established in the previous chapter, both those ethical systems hold to the axiom that responsibility is first and foremost to the self, which for Levinas represents a totalizing imperative that always and already relegates and reduces the other through the all-​consuming insistence to privilege the self. Beginning with Levinas’ themes of hospitality, reciprocity and justice, the chapter also pays close attention to how sympathetic interlocutors of Levinas have engaged with and reinterpreted those themes in ways that render them more practicable and actionable –​ indeed, Levinas’ ideas can at times seem otherworldly, even excessively idealistic, a drawback which Levinas himself has acknowledged –​but without diluting their substance or diminishing their power. Secondly, the chapter unpacks the ethical and political ramifications of Levinas’ ethics for the responsibility to provide (R2Provide) as expressed in the various manifestations of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia examined in Chapters 4‒6. In particular, Levinas’ ideas (re)define the terms of the relationship between responsible providers and their recipients in three key ways: one, the assumptions and expectations over one’s extension of hospitality to one’s neighbours; two, the rethinking of mutuality and reciprocity between providers and recipients; and three, the ways in which the considerations of justice (as understood by Levinas) play out within the diplomatic and security contexts of

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Southeast Asia and, at least where responsible provision is carried out through the ADMM-​Plus is concerned, the broader Asia-​Pacific. We begin with Levinas’ ethics. The overarching leitmotif in his thought is that of responsibility: responsibility not to the self, but to and for the other. Responsibility for the other therefore comes before everything else; indeed, it is the very thing that renders thought possible at all (Derrida, 1992b: 92). For Levinas, ethics as ‘first philosophy’ is a highly problematic assumption because of the emphasis in Western philosophy –​at least until that of Heidegger, to whom Levinas’ own work is indebted but which he also sought to transcend (Heidegger, 2010)  –​on presence and self, without consideration for the other except in instrumental or utilitarian terms,1 opens it up ironically (as we shall see later) to the possibility of tyranny and evil. Thus understood, Levinas’ work has been regarded as a kind of ‘ethical metaphysics’ (Wyschogrod, 1974). However, unlike Western metaphysics whose putative end is total and universal, Levinas’ ‘metaphysics’ is predicated on the relation with the other, which immediately introduces antinomy, heteronomy and uncertainty  –​potentially irreconcilable and irresolvable, it needs to be said –​into the situation. But it is also in this respect that while Levinas’ early efforts sought to overcome the violence of metaphysics, they could not quite escape the language of metaphysics to achieve this task (Derrida, 1980).2 Unlike Western ethics with their stress on codified rules and imperatives, formulaic maxims and principles, and clear objectives, Levinas offers an ethics without anything other than ‘a passionate moral conviction that the other should be heard’ (Davis, 1996: 144; Shepherd, 2014: 37). As Derrida has observed (and cautioned) regarding Levinas’ ethics: It is true that Ethics in Levinas’s sense is an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its nonviolent purity only before being determined as concepts and laws. This is not an objection:  let us not forget that Levinas does not seek to propose … moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general … in question, then, is an Ethics of Ethics [which] … can occasion neither a determined ethics nor determined laws without negating and forgetting itself. (Derrida, 1980: 111) Understood strictly in terms of ‘service’ and ‘hospitality’ (Levinas, 1969: 300), the self is relegated in its relationship to the other. So far as Levinas is concerned, ethics cannot be ethical when it is pursued

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solely for the sake of self-​actualization. If anything, autonomous self-​ actualization is impossible because ethics can only be understood, per Levinas, in terms of heteronomous and interdependent relationships that are first and foremost affective rather than cognitive or reflective in kind (Campbell, 1998: 173; Critchley, 1999a: 239). If the other is an end in itself and with whom the self finds itself through sociality, then there can be no ethics –​indeed, no philosophy either –​without the other (Derrida, 1992b: 139; Caputo, 2003a: 1). Ethical encounters with the other must allow that other to express identity effectively from within the other’s own terms rather than those dictated by the self (Shapiro, 1999: 60). Responsibility is not dependent on recognition or on pre-​existing relationships; indeed, the other is in a key sense unknowable –​‘If we know the Other’, as Levinas once said, ‘than he is no longer the Other’ (cited in Dauphinee, 2009: 238) –​because that is presumably the only way through which the continuous protection of the other qua other and its claim on the self can be preserved (Woo, 2014).3 Such a gross relaxation of autonomy, certitude and control puts philosophy on unfamiliar grounds, but for Levinas, it is also the condition of possibility for the emergence of mutual trust and confidence in self‒other relations (Critchley, 2002: 26). As noted in Chapter 3, responsible provision as informally conceived by Southeast Asian leaders pivots on the crucial notion of the invitation or request, without which the possibility of assistance given by external actors cannot be entertained –​a reasoning that is consistent with the diplomatic principle of non-​interference. But while this essentially means that Southeast Asian states are not obligated to assist their ailing neighbours so long as there is no invitation or request from the latter for them to do so, it is a deplorable logic in the eyes of Levinas not because Southeast Asians ought to be legally obligated to help their neighbours, but because they cannot but help others when confronted with the latter’s demands for help  –​with or without invitation.4 According to Levinas’ sustained critique of Western philosophy and ethics, their emphasis on the primacy of the self, as we saw in the closing section of Chapter 7, ends up rendering ethics not about care for the other as much as the valorization of the self. Within such an absolutistic narrative, a complex world characterized by heteronomy and interdependence is reduced to a simplistic one where the other becomes little more than a prop. Three interrelated facets of Levinas’ ethics are examined later: one, responsibility as hospitality, where the other’s demand on my hospitality is unconditional; two, responsibility without reciprocity, as embodied in Levinas’ startling claim that reciprocity is the other’s business, not mine; and three, responsibility

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and justice, where my responsibility for multiple others confronts practical realities such as the finiteness of available resources and the longstanding political question of who gets what, when and how. As the following discussion makes clear, Levinas’ ideas in themselves are not without problems. This is where constructive and sympathetic critiques –​‘friendly fire’ if you will, but of the sort that strengthens rather than destroys –​from a number of Levinas’ interlocutors help make crucial contributions.

Responsibility as hospitality The question of hospitality and the welcoming of the other is central to the thought of Levinas (Doukhan, 2010). Despite the relative absence of the term ‘hospitality’ in Levinas’ Totality and infinity, Jacques Derrida nonetheless described that work as ‘an immense treatise of hospitality’ (Derrida, 1999: 21; also see Levinas, 1969: 300). As Derrida understood the intention of Levinas on the matter, ethics or responsibility as hospitality is ranked before and above all else: ‘For hospitality is not simply some region of ethics, let alone … the name of a problem in law or politics: it is ethnicity itself, the whole and the principle of ethics’ (Derrida, 1999: 50). Elsewhere Derrida elaborated further on what he meant by hospitality as the sum total of ethics itself: ‘To cultivate an ethic of hospitality’ –​is such an expression not tautologous? Despite all the tensions or contradictions which distinguish it, and despite all the perversions that can befall it, one cannot speak of cultivating an ethic of hospitality. Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality. (Derrida, 2001: 16–​17, emphasis original) Thus understood, we are not to be beholden to laws and ethical duties in themselves in our exercise of hospitality, but rather to the other ‒ that is, the absolute responsibility one holds to the other who is wholly other. Moreover, our ethical practice cannot be exercised in relation to a universal law, but in response to the other (Derrida, 1995: 77). This is in contrast to Immanuel Kant’s ethics. For Kant, ethics and morality

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are a simple given in much the same way that natural and scientific laws –​such as the law of gravity, for ­example –​are a given (Schneewind, 1993). Seen in this fashion, ethics becomes an obligation, a duty which autonomous rational beings ought therefore to obey. As we have seen with Levinas, ethics and morality stem not from law but from the alterity of the other with which the self relates. Moreover, ‘Ethics for Levinas is not “grounded” in practical reason’, as Richard Bernstein has noted. ‘It is beyond reason. For Levinas, to be ethical (moral) is not to be autonomous in Kant’s sense, it is to be heteronomous –​responsive and responsible to and for the other’ (Bernstein, 2002: 264). Granted, it shares with Kant the notion that this is equally a given, albeit expressed neither in legal terms nor with law-​like properties but in the concept of ‘infinite responsibility’  –​that is, the duty we have to the other (Shepherd, 2014: 33–​4). Moreover, Levinas’ use of ‘hospitality’ is unlike Kant’s idea of the right of ‘visitation’, but rather that of ‘residence’ (Brown, 2009: 64–​6).5 In response, Derrida notes that intrinsic to the notion of invitation is the ability of the host to set limitations on who is welcome, and when they are welcome, thereby allowing the host to retain mastery and control. For Derrida, such behaviour is hardly hospitable. He muses: ‘If I welcome only what I welcome, what I am ready to welcome, and that I recognise in advance because I expect the coming of the hôte [“guest”, in this case] as invited, there is no hospitality’ (Derrida, 2002: 363). As such, genuine hospitality would require the host to concede mastery and control. For Derrida, true or unconditional –​or as he puts it, radical –​hospitality consists in ‘receiving without invitation, beyond or before the invitation’, such as when the guest appears abruptly to disrupt and disturb our prearranged and formalized practices (Shepherd, 2014: 57–​8). Thus understood, the putative host is on permanent call to respond to demands that could arise at the most inconvenient of times and in the most unexpected of ways. This is because the conditions that militate against a Levinasian hospitality and responsibility far outstrip and outweigh its conditions of possibility. Are Levinas’ ethics overly idealistic, even fantastical? Are they actionable or implementable, as policymakers are wont to say? Andrius Valevicius points out the obvious objections: It would be wonderful to be able to believe that all men carry within themselves a feeling of responsibility for others, but there is too much evidence to the contrary. We could pour through phenomenological or psychological investigations for reassurance, but more than likely we have already seen in others if not within ourselves, that egoism,

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oppression and abuse are just as abundant as goodness … Levinas has attempted to show that we instinctively act responsibly towards others. But to say that we feel a sense of responsibility towards others as an innate, essential part of our being is excessive: some may feel it, others do not; some serve, others plunder. (Valevicius, 1988: 89–​91) Be that as it may, for Levinas, the clarion call of the other cannot and must not be ignored. As John Caputo has urged, ‘The call of hospitality calls unconditionally however helpless and humble the real conditions under which the call is issued’ (Caputo, 2003b: 16). Confronted by the call to hospitality, the hearer can run but not hide from it. Conjuring up the image of the runaway prophet Jonah faced with a command from God he could not resist, try as hard as he might, Levinas writes of such a responsibility or the sense of it: ‘If you like, it is like a Jonah who cannot escape. You find yourself before a responsibility from which you cannot escape. You find yourself before a responsibility from which you cannot steal away. You are not at all in the situation of a reflective consciousness, which, in relation, already withdraws and hides itself ’ (Levinas, 1996a: 29). Disturbed by the other’s call, I am compelled to respond to it, to accommodate its demand.6 Perhaps this sense of the holy is what Levinas himself had in mind –​indeed, he often described his ideas first as ‘religion’ and then, only on the basis of an allusion to Kant, as ‘ethical’ –​when, in a conversation he once had with Derrida, Levinas intimated the following: ‘You know, one often speaks of ethics to describe what I do, but what really interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy, the holiness of the holy (le saint, la saintete du saint)’ (cited in Derrida, 1999: 4). This is not to imply that by insisting on so demanding a vision of and invocation by the holy –​in a sense, it is almost a categorical imperative as Kant might say, despite its avoidance of lawlike-​ness –​Levinas’ responsibility notion is thereby ‘blind’ to social realities and human frailties by its apparent idealism. Rather, his vision points to possibilities beyond the self, possibilities naturally and obviously unattainable within the framework of the autonomous and totalized self, but entirely conceivable within the context of heteronomous relations between self and other.7 On the other hand, even an ethical relationship predicated on the exercise of hospitality is likely to involve a measure –​if only prospectively so –​of hostility and conflict. Derrida’s indication of the close relationship between hospitality and hostility is summarized well by Caputo:

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The hospes is someone who has the power to host someone, so that neither the alterity (hostis) of the stranger nor the power (potentia) of the host is annulled by the hospitality. There is an essential ‘self-​limitation’ built right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the distance between one’s own and the stranger, between owning one’s own property and inviting the other into one’s home. So, there is always a little hostility in all hosting and hospitality, constituting a certain ‘hostil/​pitality’. (Caputo, 1997: 110) In other words, what Derrida’s and Caputo’s respective contributions help inject into Levinas’ ethics is a sense of realism that acknowledges the likelihood of tension between sovereignty as right and sovereignty as responsibility –​a tension that is either latent or manifest but one that resists resolution. Levinas’ likely riposte to the reality of ‘hostil/​pitality’ is to insist nonetheless on the imperative of hospitality over hostility, not because the subject succeeds in resolving or reconciling that tension –​here we may recall Levinas’ rejection of Hegelian dialectical synthesis (Cornell, 2016: 53) –​but because hospitality is exercised despite the existence of tension. As Christine Pohl has observed, ‘Practitioners of hospitality are rarely romantics or cynics; they are often startling honest about their own frailties and failures, about the difficulties as well as the joys of hospitality’ (Pohl, 1999: 12). Having been a prisoner of war who moreover suffered deep personal loss as a result of the Holocaust (Jacques, 2016; Ionescu, 2017: 129), Levinas was arguably neither a romantic nor a cynic, but a man deeply concerned about the safety and security, the peace and prosperity, of the other –​even as the other poses a potential threat to his own well-​being.

Responsibility without reciprocity As if the exacting demands and conditions discussed hitherto are not enough, Levinas went one crucial step further in urging for the exercise of responsibility with no expectation of reciprocity from the other –​a ‘unilateral responsibility without symmetry’, according to one reading (Filipovic, 2011: 65). Concerning the place –​or, more accurately, non-​place –​of reciprocity in his ethic, there is no better place (pardon the pun) to begin than with this oft-​cited and rather startling statement by Levinas: ‘I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I  to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair’ (Levinas, 2000: 94–​5, emphasis added). Elsewhere he has similarly noted, ‘my

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responsibility for the other person, without concern for reciprocity, in my call to help him gratuitously, in the asymmetry of the relation of one to the other’ (Levinas, 1988b: 165, emphasis original). According to Robert Bernasconi, this radical responsibility for the other exists not only prior to any social contract with the other but indeed prior to any relationship between subject and other: ‘In Otherwise than Being the responsibility inherent in subjectivity is prior to my encounter with an other, whereas Totality and infinity had located the possibility of ethics in the concrete encounter that realised the formal structure of transcendence’ (Bernasconi, 2002: 242). In other words, the welcome of the other constitutes the pre-​ontological condition of infinite responsibility, where, ‘The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to anything said’ (Levinas, 1991: 43).8 This line of reasoning is further elaborated on by Catherine Chalier, whose analysis of Levinas’ reflections on the Talmud and the biblical example of the patriarch Abraham’s relations with others in the Book of Genesis give rise to this view: [T]‌he descendant of Abraham knows that there is no limit to his obligations towards the worker. The contract thus comes to limit my obligations toward the worker and not, as one might assume, to institute a minimum of obligation toward him. This means, very precisely, that obligations towards the other are infinite and do not depend on goodwill or choice. They precede freedom and consecrate the descendant of Abraham to an infinite service, to a responsibility that is greater than the commitments that have actively been taken on. (Chalier, 2002: 108) This is quite possibly the most challenging aspect of Levinas’ ethics, which many find an unfeasible and even impossible expectation for contemporary international relations given not only its allusion to self-​sacrifice but its insistence on the unconditional, irreducible and irreversible asymmetry of the relationship between ‘I’ and ‘other’ in favour of the latter  –​Levinas’ so-​called ‘ethical interruption of reciprocity’ (Steiner, 2001). This has led commentators such as Merold Westphal to wonder aloud why a thinker, ‘who evokes messianic peace as Levinas does’, would eschew discussing ‘the kind of reciprocity that represents both a moral and a social ideal’ (Westphal, 1999: 524). Levinas’ expectation of a unilateral and voluntary responsibility would seem anachronistic and unrealistic in this present age of creeping transactionalism  –​one that predates US President Donald Trump’s

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transactional foreign policy, it should be said (Hader, 2017) –​ where foreign aid and assistance have become increasingly if not completely tied. After all, any exercise of hospitality and gift-​g iving within the closed framework of exchange and reciprocity is likely to be transactional in kind since it assumes that one’s act of ‘generosity’ would or should be reciprocated. Under such conditions, the gift loses the very qualities that make it a gift and thereby ceases to be a gift and instead becomes a commodity. Derrida’s interventions in this respect are quite helpful. As he once reflected on the question of gift-​giving: The gift, if there is any, will always be without border. What does ‘without’ mean here? The gift that does not run over its borders, a gift that would let itself be contained in a determination and limited by the indivisibility of an identifiable trait would not be a gift. As soon as it delimits itself, a gift is prey to calculation and measure. The gift, if there is any, should overrun the border, to be sure, toward the measureless and the excessive; but it should also suspend its relation to the border and even its transgressive relation to the separable line or trait of a border. (Derrida, 2017: 91, emphasis original)9 Elsewhere Derrida, again referencing Levinas’ responsibility for the other, commented on what happens to justice when its dispensation is done in a transactional, calculative and commodified fashion: Justice, if it has to do with the other, with the infinite distance of the other, is always unequal to the other, is always incalculable. You cannot calculate justice. Levinas says somewhere that the definition of justice –​which is very minimal but which I love, which I think is really rigorous –​ is that justice is the relation to the other. That is all. Once you relate to the other as the other, then something incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or to the history of legal structures. (Derrida, 1997: 17–​18) It is fair to say that Levinas’ placement of the other at the centre of ethics and his understanding of hospitality as the base structure of inter-​human relationships overcomes the self-​interest and contractual nature of a Kantian hospitality, although he was relatively silent on why such ethical and hospitable behaviour has not always been present in inter-​human

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relations (Shepherd, 2014:  35). Worse, given his emphasis on the asymmetrical and nonreciprocal nature of inter-​human relationships in which the subject is held ‘hostage’ to the other, could Levinas’ ethics, rather than engendering the ‘messianic’ and ‘eschatological’ peace he had hoped for, not end up perpetuating the inequalities and abuses which characterize our inhospitable world (Shepherd, 2014: 95)? Nor, it would seem, did Levinas consider the possibility that reciprocity could conceivably exist sans contracts. According to Paul Ricoeur, a true friendship that recognizes and respects the initial asymmetry between self and other, but that nonetheless invites the other to ‘compensate’ for it by establishing an exchange of mutual giving and receiving –​ a mutuality and reciprocity which Levinas steadfastly rejected  –​is hypothetically possible (Holda, 2017:  74; also see Ricoeur, 1992). However, unlike what we saw earlier in Chapter 7 with liberalism, Ricoeur’s mutuality of recognition is not a matter of an economic logic motivated by a utilitarian, contractual or self-​centred spirit, but rather one where the other gives me ‘a sort of second first gift’ in the sense that the other’s gift is free and unconditional (Ricoeur, 2005: 351) –​hence leading to a condition referred to by Tatransky as ‘reciprocal asymmetry’, where inasmuch as I act hospitably towards the other without expectation of reciprocation  –​hence satisfying Levinas’ condition –​the other, in their role as subject, does likewise towards their other, namely me (Tatransky, 2008). Purist adherents of Levinasian ethics might understandably baulk at such heresy. Perhaps it is not incorrect to suggest that in Levinas’ conception of the ‘third party’ –​new others who are not just my other but are also others to my original other –​there arguably already exists a tacit acknowledgement of reciprocity in ‘other‒other’ relations that approximates the sort of mutual or reciprocal gift-​g iving highlighted by Ricoeur. It is to this question we now turn.

Responsibility and justice To speak of my responsibility for the other –​a responsibility engendered as a consequence of the proximity of the other to me –​is all well and good. However, the fact of the matter is the world is not just made up of one self and one other; there are at any given point in time multiple self‒other connections, existing or potential, that are themselves open to other connections with many other others. In a world of multiple competing others or neighbours all demanding attention and assistance, how does one, indeed with whom should one, engage given the finiteness of one’s resources? How should one extend hospitality and

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dispense justice fairly and appropriately? To this, Levinas introduces the notion of the ‘third party’ –​the other’s other so to speak. As Levinas has agonized: If proximity ordered me to only the other alone, there would not have been any problem … It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party enters. The third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow … It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? (Cited in Delhom, 2008: 78) A couple of implications arise. Firstly, the introduction of additional others (or ‘neighbours’, as Levinas also called them) and the resulting reality of multiple face-​to-​face encounters effectively constrain and limit my responsibility to the original other/​neighbour since I must now also extend my responsibility for other others/​neighbours. Resource scarcity and the need for policy prudence militate against the overwhelming demands of multiple others clamouring for attention and affection. As one commentator has asked: [H]‌ow does the universal demand of the Other of Levinas’ account get worked out in the particularities of a world of competing claims amongst different Others? In a world of infinite need, how does a finite person respond to the ‘infinite responsibility’ demanded by the many Other(s)? … If, as Levinas believes, we have ‘infinite responsibility’ for the countless Others in each of these situations, how, with the finite resources we have at our disposal, do we discern to whom, and how we respond? (Shepherd, 2014: 40–​41) And as another commentator has realistically averred, ‘Responsibility may be infinite, but I  am not’ (Manderson, 2006:  79). Secondly, the entry of other others into the picture places demands on my original other to extend responsibility to them –​just as much as the original other places that same demand on me. Moreover, because engagement with the world is necessarily ‘global’ in its scope, a world characterized by a multiplicity of subjects none of whom can singlehandedly bear the burden of global responsibility, the way in which our ethical responsibility is to be acted upon is necessarily a contested and negotiated exercise (Campbell, 1993: 99). Hence, just

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as I am responsible to the original other and the other others, so too must the original other (according to Levinas) be responsible to the other others. To resolve this conundrum, Levinas introduces the idea of proximity –​the other who is closest to me –​which for him makes possible the exercise of justice. Fairly or not, the following words have been taken by many as one way by which to adjudicate between competing neighbours to whom responsibility could be extended. In a radio interview in 1982 held just days after the massacres of Palestinians in two refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon, Levinas was asked this question by the interviewer: ‘Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the “other”. Isn’t history, isn’t politics the very site of the encounter with the “other”, and for the Israeli, isn’t the “other” above all the Palestinian?’ Levinas’ response is as follows: My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you’re for the other, you’re for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Cited in Eisenstadt and Katz, 2016: 10) Critics of Levinas were quick to see this statement as a fundamental contradiction of his own ethics, which essentially effaced –​since, as responsible subjects, we all live ‘in the face of the other’ (Waldenfels, 2002: 65) –​and dehumanized the Palestinian other as an enemy against whom the use of violence (by Israel if not others) would be justified. Be that as it may, it makes intuitive sense that as an ethical system, no matter how one commits to the prospect of treating all neighbours, without exception, as others to whom one is wholly responsible, there remains nonetheless, as a practical matter, the requirement to discern and discriminate –​in short, to judge –​between good and bad, moral and immoral. Granted, realists would no doubt insist, appropriately so, that such value judgements, when excessively rendered, risk ignoring the place of power and interests in global life. But as Hans Jonas might say (arguably with Levinas’ full endorsement), it is not always and only due to cunning reason or realpolitik that states behave badly, for such convenient rationalizations leave no room for moral depravity (Jonas, 1996: 188). Levinas did not say this, but in such instances (as he once

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averred) ‘where there are people who are wrong’, proximity (i.e., the one closest to me) could arguably be determined by the extent of depravity and iniquity shown by rulers towards their people within/​ across a community, by a group or groups towards other groups within/​across a community, or by an entire community towards other communities. Crucially for Levinas, the process of adjudication is very much endogenous in nature: rather than a judgement rendered from a position of disinterest and transcendence, it is done from one of interest and immanence. As Levinas notes, ‘The judge is not external to the conflict’ (cited in Bergo, 2013: 183). But the demand for value judgements –​with very real policy ramifications vis-​à-​vis the other –​ becomes all too real when Levinas’ insistence on responsibility comes face to face possibly with neighbours seeking to harm and destroy me or one another.10 Readers of Levinas may therefore be forgiven for thinking his ethics of justice and proximity brought on by the presence of third parties amounts to a needed injection of realism and pragmatism into what has hitherto been (seen as) an enterprise in idealism. It is safe to say that under the delimiting conditions imposed by the proximity of third parties, the exacting requirements of Levinas’ ethics cannot and indeed can never be fully and realistically satisfied. On the other hand, the recognition and acknowledgement of limits should in no way discourage or halt the exercise of responsibility; as Critchley has intimated, ‘it is my experience of a demand that I both cannot fully meet and cannot avoid’ (Critchley, 2002: 22).

The R2Provide as responsibility for the other? We have critically examined three interrelated facets of Levinas’ ethics:  responsibility as hospitality, where the other’s demand on my hospitality is unconditional; responsibility without reciprocity, as embodied in Levinas’ startling claim that reciprocity is the other’s business, not mine; and responsibility and justice, where my responsibility for multiple others confronts practical realities, such as the finiteness of available resources and the longstanding political question of who gets what, when and how. We also looked at how a number of Levinas’ interpreters and interlocutors have sought to tweak and refine some of Levinas’ key insights without blunting their moral force. In the context of the other’s categorical demand for my hospitality, the other in all their fundamental significance and salience cannot be treated as absolute and total but –​in the spirit of Levinas’ appeal to heteronomy –​needs to be set in constant tension with the self (Derrida, 1980; Paipais, 2011; Shepherd, 2014). According to Levinas, since we are always and already

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ethically situated, ethical considerations depend less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulation, and more on the interdependencies of our relations with each other. We are not ontologically prior to the other, but in effect we emerge from interdependence and heteronomy. Yet this does and should not mean any unnecessary totalization of the other since the other is also always and already ethically situated vis-​à-​vis us. Far from the resolution or rejection of tension, it is the exercise of hospitality in the face of tension that the responsibility for the other truly makes sense (Pohl, 1999). In the context of Levinas’ insistence that reciprocity has no place in the self‒other relationship, a mutual reciprocity might nonetheless be conceivable, one that is not contractual, transactional or conditional in nature, but is predicated upon ‘reciprocal asymmetry’ because the other putatively faces and –​ quite apart from my expectations for reciprocity on their part –​assumes a similar responsibility towards me as their other (Ricoeur, 2005; Tatransky, 2008). Finally, in the context of living out my responsibility in a world replete with multiple others all demanding my hospitality, the fact that the realistic appreciation and acknowledgement of my limitations should in no way discourage or halt the exercise of my responsibility in the face of demands from others I can neither fully satisfy nor at the same time avoid (Critchley, 2002: 22).

Responsible provision as acts in hospitality The notion that responsible provision by Southeast Asian states for one another’s needs constitutes hospitable conduct is arguably captured in the broad dimensions of the R2Provide. As suggested in Chapter 3, the R2Provide could assume the form of three pillars. Firstly, Southeast Asian states have a responsibility to ensure the survival of their people in times of humanitarian crisis wrought by natural disasters, interstate and intrastate conflicts and the like. A key assumption undergirding non-​traditional security is the notion that transnational or transborder flows in humans, goods, capital and other things throughout Southeast Asia have made its states and societies highly interdependent –​a fact that bears important ramifications for the national identities of states, which are assumed to have a pre-​interactional quality (Wendt, 1994; Carnine, 2015). This is also the case for Levinas, who argued that we are always and already ethically situated within a heteronomous and interdependent world and our identities emerge out of our relationships and interactions with others, then there is effectively no justification for superiority or patronage on the part of those who provide to others in need. Thus understood, the responsible provider is by no means the

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superior subject relative to its needy neighbours simply because it is in a position to offer aid and assistance to them. If the other is not an object of comprehension first and foremost and only an interlocutor second, but both at the same time (Levinas, 1996b: 6), and if the other is not seen as an abject or inferior subject with little or no agency of its own, even though they may well be ‘poor and destitute’ (Levinas, 1996a: 18), then the likelihood of logocentric conceits harboured by providers towards recipients is significantly reduced since sociality comes before comprehension in the interdependent relationship between provider and recipient. It is in this respect that the R2P, in asserting unilateral intervention as the right of responsible actors, potentially degrades countries that become targets of intervention. If anything, as noted in Chapter 2, in their 2001 ICISS report, the architects of the R2P implicitly shifted the burden of justification for intervention from intervener states to the states being intervened in (Cunliffe, 2016). As such, potential targets of intervention are expected to justify why they should remain free from external intervention –​a presumption of guilt, in short  –​whilst prospective interveners need not explain their military aggression so long as they plead the R2P. Based on the critique of communitarian and liberal ethics in Chapter  7, the R2Provide is likely to give rise to similar assignations of superiority and inferiority between providers and recipients with their attendant negative consequences if their grants of humanitarian assistance are predicated on communitarian and/​or liberal grounds. The example given in Chapter 3 of the French foreign minister’s invocation of the R2P to justify forcible delivery of humanitarian assistance to Nargis-​hit Myanmar arguably illustrates this sort of asymmetrical logic, especially if the allegation that the minister’s proposal was motivated less by the disaster itself than his personal antagonism against the Burmese leaders proves accurate (Junk, 2016:  81–​2). Indeed, when Singapore was disparaged as ‘selfish’ by its closest neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia in the early 2000s for its apparent reluctance to provide financial aid to help ease their economic and political woes, it was evident, as far as their neighbours were concerned, that Singapore’s ostensible arrogance stemmed from a self-​image of superiority vis-​à-​vis its fellow Southeast Asian nations (Agence France Presse, 2001). The second pillar of the R2Provide could be understood as follows:  together with the international community and regional organizations, Southeast Asian states have the responsibility to work consensually with each other to build capacity to be able to aid their member states when they are confronted by such crises. In Chapters 3‒5, a number of examples were examined both en passant and in detail,

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the key of which is the regional riposte to post-​Nargis Myanmar that was so crucial to helping Southeast Asian leaders formulate something like a norm akin to the R2Provide, which operates as affirmation and endorsement of what has already been taking place on the ground, such as the establishment of the ASEAN+3, CMI and CMIM, as well as the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) for monitoring, mitigating, alleviating and hopefully avoiding future financial shocks to the region. The R2Provide can also operate as an ideal towards which Southeast Asian countries can and should pursue in a more resolute and systematic way –​such as the ongoing build-​up of regional arrangements and mechanisms like the ADMM, ADMM-​Plus, AHA Centre and/​or the Our Eyes Initiative to facilitate and enhance intra-​regional collaboration and capacity against disasters and terrorism among others. As we saw in Chapter 4, the ADMM-​Plus framework facilitates a host of capacity-​building arrangements between the ‘Plus’ countries –​Australia, China, India, Japan, the United States and so forth –​and the ASEAN member countries aimed at bolstering the latter’s abilities to handle challenges such as terrorism, piracy, natural disasters and other humanitarian crises (Tan, 2018a, 2018b). The OEI relies on collaboration between some of the ‘Plus’ countries –​in particular, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States have been identified –​and the Southeast Asian states in their common fight against terrorism (Tan, 2018c). Southeast Asian countries have also assisted one another. For example, when the ISIS-​inspired war erupted in Marawi in the southern Philippines in 2017, Singapore offered to provide drones, the use of its urban warfare facilities and humanitarian aid to the Philippines in its fight against the militants (Dancel, 2017b). Finally, the third pillar of the R2Provide goes like this:  when Southeast Asian states are unable to provide for their people and are for whatever reason unwilling to allow international actors to do so, it is the collective responsibility of those states and their fellow ASEAN members and regional partners to produce the needed diplomatic solutions, with respect to reasonable security concerns of the disaffected states in question, to ensure those crises are mitigated, contained and, where possible, prevented. This third condition has certainly been present in the cases examined previously, where Southeast Asia’s general reliance on open regionalism has resulted in its readiness to work with international organizations and agencies such as the United Nations as well as major and regional powers with which they share strong security and economic ties. As with a number of other examples (discussed in Chapter 5), the post-​Nargis relief and reconstruction effort in 2008 reflected all three conditions of the R2Provide at work, with ASEAN

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serving as the principal conduit through which an initially reluctant Myanmar opened its doors to international aid and assistance from a host of extra-​regional powers and agencies under UN auspices (Tan, 2013a). As a humanitarian emergency specialist has observed regarding the evolving regional perspective of and approach to non-​traditional security challenges in Southeast Asia in recent years, as embodied in the post-​Nargis effort: Over time, the ASEAN’s approach to deal with shared issues that potentially impact the region has evolved. Internal conflicts and major disasters across borders, which potentially affect regional human security, such as the influx of refugees, epidemics, are no longer seen as national matters, but rather human rights issues. Cyclone Nargis, which hit South and Southeast Asian countries in 2008 is an example. Its catastrophic destruction mostly affected Myanmar and was a critical milestone in the ASEAN’s new way of dealing with humanitarian crises. Dubbed the first ever ASEAN led response, this approach was then considered exemplary for other interstate, joint efforts. Diplomatic ASEAN measures that successfully convinced Myanmar’s military junta to accept international humanitarian assistance was one of ASEAN’s pivotal roles in humanitarian action. (Puspitaningtyas, 2017) And while the rocky road that Southeast Asian countries are taking towards the responsible management and resolution of disputes (as examined in Chapter  6) might not immediately strike one as emblematic of the R2Provide, it nonetheless underscores their readiness to move away from treating every one of their sovereignty and territorial claims uncritically and un-​problematically as non-​negotiable –​in short, sovereignty as purely about the protection and preservation of one’s right and entitlement –​towards a mutually responsible management, negotiation, agreement and, where possible, settlement of contested boundaries and spaces. In contrast to the R2P, the liberal endorsement of unilateral intervention, even if on humanitarian grounds, does not quite apply to the R2Provide in Southeast Asia. Suffice it to say that the ‘rules of the road’ regarding the implementation of the R2Provide in the region reject any notion of unilateral imposition and enforcement of assistance by provider countries. Instead, it is completely reliant on invitation by recipient countries in need of that assistance  –​as evidenced by

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the dynamics surrounding the post-​Nargis rebuilding process, or the regional response to the conflict in Marawi. The example was given in Chapter 3 regarding the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR, whose terms of reference include principles that reflect the spirit of invitation and consent, such as the tenth principle –​‘The decision to deploy military personnel, assets and other resources shall remain under the prerogative of Assisting State, and upon the request or consent by the Affected State’ –​and the fourteenth principle –​‘The Affected State shall exercise the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of assistance within its territory’ (ASEAN, 2016c: 2, emphasis original). On the other hand, although a communitarian grounded responsibility would sit quite comfortably with the R2Provide’s emphasis on consensus and invitation, the ultimately limited horizon of its sense of responsibility, which pretty much corresponds with the boundaries of its territoriality (as we saw in Chapter 6), does not however permit a comprehensive fulfilment of responsible sovereignty under Levinas’ terms, no matter the urgency of the appeals and invitations of its needy and hurting neighbours. In this respect, there is no avoiding the fact that the region has not fully lived up to the notion of responsible provision. Without question, there have been numerous occasions in the relatively brief history of Southeast Asia, not least since decolonization and certainly since the formation of ASEAN in 1967, where regional states as well as ASEAN have turned a blind eye towards intrastate conflicts, brutal repression by regimes of their people, and non-​traditional security shocks such as when a number of the region’s economies experienced financial meltdown in 1997 and the devastating consequences that engendered for their respective societies (and which the subsequent creation of the ASEAN+3 and CMI/​CMIM was meant to address) (Narine, 2002). Where regional states have sought to address some of those challenges, their efforts have often seemed half-​hearted and grossly insufficient relative to the size and severity of the crises in question. For instance, the fact that a number of Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN, through its AHA Centre, furnished aid and assistance to Myanmar’s Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh does little to hide the fact that their responses have been belated and token at best. On the other hand, it bears noting that the ‘core mandate’ of the AHA Centre is to respond only when natural disasters strike to the exclusion of other complex humanitarian issues such as conflict and manmade emergencies, and this has resulted in the slow progress towards alleviating the Rohingya crisis (ASEAN, 2017). However, that the AHA Centre has since been activated suggests that ASEAN has not completely hamstrung itself, although it should

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appropriately expand the mandate of the AHA Centre –​the agency’s role is all the more important given the Rohingya people’s distrust of the Tatmadaw, the military forces in Myanmar, and perhaps even Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government –​to enable it to play the sort of umbrella role that ASEAN played in the wake of Cyclone Nargis (Malik, 2018). As Levinas reminded us, ethics is not a spectator sport (Critchley, 2002: 22). The invocation of the invitation is therefore central to triggering and legitimizing acts of hospitality by the responsible provider under the R2Provide. This is not to imply prospective providers sit around and do nothing until they are invited by the prospective recipients. On the contrary, responsible providers are more likely to undertake all the necessary preparations in anticipation of a possible invitation to act, whilst working in tandem with the rest of the international community to persuade –​crucially, sans the threat of outside intervention –​the recalcitrant target state to act responsibly by opening its doors to external assistance in order to ensure its stricken populace receives succour. Granted, the notion of an invitation to assistance that is essentially free of intervention is, in a manner of speaking, perhaps untenable given the potential loss of absolute control by the recipient state once the invited external parties enter the picture. The line between a state’s voluntary request for assistance and its involuntary receipt of that same assistance should it baulk after saying yes is a thin one. As Francis Deng and his colleagues have argued: The state has the right to conduct its activities undisturbed from the outside when it acts as the original agent to meet the needs of its citizens. But that right is not license. It is merely –​and normally –​the obligation of the first resort, and it is dependent on the performance of the agent. If the obligation is not performed, the right to inviolability should be regarded as lost, first voluntarily as the state itself asks for help from its peers, and then involuntarily as it has help imposed on it in response to its own inactivity or incapacity and to the unassuaged needs of its own people. (Deng et al, 1996: xviii) Here there is little guidance from Levinas, whose discussions on the invitation focused solely on the host/​self, rather than on the guest/​ other, as the source of the invitation. In Derrida’s terms, genuine hospitality occurs either before or beyond the invitation because to invite means the prerogative lies in the hands of the host/​self to set

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the terms and conditions of their exercise of hospitality (Derrida, 2002: 363). What then can we say of the R2Provide, which places the onus of the invitation on the guest/​other instead of the host/​ self, such that the former invites the latter’s hospitality? Since Levinas insisted we live ‘in the face of the other’ (Waldenfels, 2002:  65), the R2Provide’s concession to consensus and invitation could in a key sense be understood as an acknowledgement of the important place assigned to ‘face’ in the so-​called ‘honour-​shame’ cultures that reportedly define much of Asia including Southeast Asia (Leung and Cohen, 2011; Louie, 2014). If Nathan Bell is correct to aver that the face is ‘the locus of human dignity and to which states can be recalled to responsibility’ (Bell, 2018: 291), then perhaps by granting pride of place to the invitation by the other, the R2Provide is in a sense closer in spirit to Levinas than the R2P, whose totalizing tendencies risk effacing the face of the other altogether.

Responsible provision and the question of reciprocity Secondly, as we have seen, Levinas’ ethics of responsibility is basically an all-​consuming and unending exercise in hospitality by sovereign states towards needy others without any expectation on the part of provider countries of reciprocity from recipient countries. Ethics as understood by Levinas invites us to act without expecting and/​or receiving gratitude or a ‘thank you’ in return (Filipovic, 2011: 65). A key concern arising out of reciprocity predicated upon a social contract, even if it were only tacit, is the change in the quality of that relationship into a transactional one (Brown, 2017; Pfortmüller, 2018). Admittedly, the idea of a responsibility for and to the other that expects nothing in return is a challenging proposition not only in Southeast Asian international life but international relations in general (Keohane, 1986). After all, the focus on vulnerability –​as Levinas himself put it, ‘Only a vulnerable I can love his neighbour’ (Levinas, 1998: 85) –​runs counter to the conventional assumption and expectation that sovereign states ought to operate, to the extent possible, from a position of strength. Yet the long and much maligned policy of constructive engagement –​ relabelled subsequently as ‘enhanced interaction’ (Haacke, 1999) –​ that Southeast Asian governments practised towards an obdurate Myanmar could, with qualifications, be seen as a responsibility for the other which was predominantly non-​reciprocal in that it yielded little; some would even say it brought negative returns for ASEAN. Indeed, to the extent the expectation of reciprocity existed among Myanmar’s fellow ASEAN members, it is safe to say that longstanding frustrations with

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the implacability of Myanmar’s generals could have long led to calls for ASEAN to censure or even to drop Myanmar from its membership; as an analyst averred regarding the government crackdown on the ‘8-​8-​88’ pro-​democracy uprisings that took the country by storm in 1988, ‘Burma should be given a stiff message that it is not welcome [in ASEAN]’ (Moller, 1988). That Myanmar eventually loosened up under the tenure of President Thein Sein, if only due indirectly to efforts of its fellow Southeast Asian countries, is therefore a bonus (Zin and Joseph, 2012). Yet the unanticipated payoff of a long, difficult commitment by Southeast Asian countries to continue their engagement with Myanmar through thick and thin –​indeed, defending it in the face of Western criticism (McCarthy, 2009) –​was such that it was to ASEAN that Myanmar eventually turned for help in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, with ASEAN helping to set up the so-​called ‘tripartite model’ comprising the Myanmar government, the United Nations and ASEAN itself to facilitate the post-​Nargis reconstruction. Yet, as we have heard from Paul Ricoeur, could there not be a possibility, if not the necessity, for a reciprocity that is mutually reinforcing but not contractually defined? (Ricoeur, 2005:  351). It has been said of ASEAN, where its approach towards Myanmar is concerned, that ASEAN ‘did an excellent job in dealing with the highly sensitive [Burmese] junta, capitalising on the trust it had built up through its “constructive engagement” policy’ (Baldwin, 2009). The role that trust reportedly played in Myanmar’s decision to bring ASEAN into the picture could in a sense be understood as an act of reciprocity for the long years put in by ASEAN at building trust and confidence with the Burmese junta. It is also difficult to picture the absence of any expectation of mutual reciprocity from (as we saw in Chapter 6) the joint decisions by Southeast Asian countries to submit their trade and territorial disputes with one another and with others to bilateral negotiation among themselves or to mediation, conciliation, arbitration and/​or adjudication by third parties. Indeed, the logic of reciprocity is central in international law.11 Many if not most of these forms of dispute resolution are legal and hence contractual in nature, and therefore depend on reciprocity to work. The International Court of Justice is one such external adjudicator, which rendered rulings in no fewer than three bilateral territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries (which Chapter 6 discussed in detail): Indonesia and Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan; Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Puteh); and Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear promontory. This presumably raises the proverbial red flag for Levinas’ brand of ethics, since the integrity of such legal decisions

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by the ICJ or other legal body depends on the mutual acceptance of those decisions by the disputing parties, winners as well as losers. Be that as it may, could there not be the possibility that the mutually reinforcing reciprocity that is needed to ensure that the contesting parties abide by the Court’s ruling go beyond mere commitment to the terms of the legal decision? If Tatransky is right in proposing the possibility for a non-​contractual ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’ between self and other (Tatranksy, 2008)  –​a reciprocity based on what we, following Levinas’ concept of the face of the other, may refer to as a ‘face-​to-​face’ encounter with mutual acts of hospitality shown each other (Drichel, 2012) –​then it is conceivable that dispute settlements and indeed conflict resolutions are honoured not only because the settlements and resolutions are legally binding, but because the former disputants share allegiance to a mutually reinforcing reciprocity and responsibility for each other –​a mutual friendship, if you like –​that transcends the terms of the contract.

Responsible provision and the ‘realistic’ dispensation of justice Finally, we come to the immensely practical consideration that so rudely intrudes upon Levinas’ responsibility for the other: how, in a world full of competing claims by numerous others, do we, with the finite resources at our disposal, discern whom among our neighbours most needs our help? Third parties introduce a limit to the responsibility Levinas would have us assume for the other (Critchley, 1999b: 231). Theoretically, third parties make their presence known and felt at the point where I am already engaged in a relationship of hospitality with a singular other as well as at the point where, already and always, I am being confronted simultaneously by multiple others all demanding my hospitality. As Robert Bernasconi has noted, ‘Although Levinas sometimes presented the arrival of the third party as taking place in a subsequent stage of a narrative that began with the face to face, on other occasions Levinas described the third party as being already within the face of the Other’ (Bernasconi, 1999: 76). Of the types of aid and assistance Southeast Asian countries have provided (and are providing) to one another, these have ranged from relief and reconstruction aid given to neighbours devastated by natural disasters like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, cyclones and typhoons, to military assistance given to neighbours dealing with militancy and terrorism, economic assistance to neighbours in aid of their development, and the like. In a fundamental sense, what Levinas was referring to is a type of distributive justice  –​recall his cry, ‘What do I  have to do

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with justice?’  –​which in itself is principally concerned with the fair allocation of resources among diverse members of a community (Armstrong, 2012), but reframed in our context as the fair distribution of hospitable attention and actions among neighbours in need. As Levinas has also mused, ‘The interpersonal relationship I  establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice’ (cited in Bernasconi, 2003: 317). One visible way in which Southeast Asians have sought to pragmatically distribute justice is through their efforts to define and delimit the political and practical parameters of responsible provision. The consensual and selective focus by the Southeast Asian countries on particular non-​traditional security concerns on which collective action is to be mobilized and pursued through the ADMM and ADMM-​ Plus –​such as HADR, maritime security, counterterrorism and the like –​as opposed to other concerns is arguably one key consideration. As shown in Chapters 3 and 5, most if not all of these issues have been picked on an ad hoc basis as and when they emerged as clear and present security challenges confronting Southeast Asian states and societies. As we have seen, Southeast Asian countries have sought to compensate their lack of domain expertise, technical know-​how and material resources by sourcing for such through their ties with external dialogue partners, with the ADMM-​Plus (and, in a lesser way, the ASEAN Regional Forum) and the respective bilateral arrangements serving as the institutional platforms through which assistance is channelled. Moreover, despite the initial preference of the ADMM/​ADMM-​ Plus to avoid going into conflict management out of concern for its ramifications for the region’s longstanding bugbears over sovereignty and non-​interference considerations, the humanitarian crisis wrought by the war in Marawi led the Philippines and its concerned neighbours to set aside their anxieties in order to collectively tackle a larger problem where the cry of the other was simply too great to ignore. And as examples like the Regional HADR Coordination Centre, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre in Singapore, the UN Humanitarian Response Depot, and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-​Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia highlight, the better resourced Southeast Asian states have voluntarily assumed key roles and functions to ensure a more efficient collection as well as distribution of the requisite expertise and resources. These developments support Levinas’ acknowledgement of the necessity for

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such institutional arrangements and mechanisms in the dispensation of justice (Simmons, 1999; Gehrke, 2010). That said, as we noted in Chapter 7, the rendering of political and functional decisions regarding to whom, when and how to show hospitality must not be done in an impersonal manner, void of relations with others and appreciation for their respective circumstances. The threat of responsibility and justice being dispensed in a cold, calculated and impersonal fashion is particularly true when institutions –​regional organizations such as ASEAN and its functional subsidiaries like the ADMM and the AHA Centre, or, for that matter, international bodies like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the International Court of Justice –​enter the picture. As Eduard Jordaan has contended of the cosmopolitan liberal emphasis on institutions, by pushing the onus to care for others onto institutions, liberal institutionalists create for themselves considerable space in which to be free from responsibility for others; in short, they free-​ride by limiting their responsibility for the other through the outsourcing of personal responsibility to institutions (Jordaan, 2009:  87). With the receding of personal responsibility, the face of the other ends up being completely forgotten or ignored altogether as detached and disinterested bureaucratic forces and processes take over. On the other hand, true justice humanizes through face-​to-​face encounters with the other.12 As Levinas himself intimated, ‘Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relation’ (cited in Bernasconi, 2003:  317). Southeast Asians have in fact failed on many occasions to live up to this condition. As a consequence, ASEAN over the years has served as –​and continues to be –​the convenient target of much censure and condemnation, fair or otherwise (Jones and Smith, 2002, 2007). But it does not take away the fact that where irresponsibility is concerned, it is the respective member countries of the institution, rather than the institution itself, that ought to bear the brunt of the charge. To be sure, as this study has shown, the collective decisions taken by intergovernmental organizations are negotiated outcomes between activist members seeking a more ambitious remit and agenda for their organization, on the one hand, and conservative members for whom less is better on the other. As a consensus organization, the failure of ASEAN to dispense justice and to exercise responsibility  –​be it its inability to assist its member countries during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, its delivery of a weak charter, its incompetence in adopting a united stance on and contributing positively to the South China Sea disputes, or its tardiness in addressing the Rohingya refugee

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crisis –​falls equally on all ten member states as much as if not more than the institution.13 On the other hand, as we have also seen in the preceding chapters, that some Southeast Asian countries, in the face of encountering the face of the other, have nonetheless sought to act ethically and hospitably  –​even if selectively and instrumentally so, given the limiting conditions placed upon them by ‘third parties’ –​is perhaps an indication that the sovereign responsibility to provide in Southeast Asia is not a chimera at all.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to accomplish two things. Firstly, it has engaged with the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas on responsibility as acts of hospitality extended to my neighbour, whom I serve without expecting reciprocation for my goodwill. On the other hand, since I dispense hospitality against a complex backdrop of manifold neighbours with infinite needs and unremitting demands as well as the finiteness of my resources, the practical exercise of my responsibility inevitably involves a precarious balancing between fairness and suitability in the face of challenges and constraints. The contention here is not that Levinas has offered us a flawless conception of ethics. On the contrary, his claims oftentimes verge on dubiousness and even impossibility. Yet one cannot help but feel that Levinas knew full well the limits that push back against his claims. As the discussion on responsibility and justice as a consequence of proximity in the preceding section suggests, Levinas’ concession to what has been called ‘the unsustainability of his romance’ (Manderson, 2006: 181), rendered most explicitly and systematically in Otherwise than being, underscores his awareness of the problem. And as we have seen throughout this chapter, various interpreters and interlocutors of Levinas and his ideas  –​Derrida, Ricoeur, Caputo and the like –​have sought to introduce touches of prudence and pragmatism without blunting the moral force –​and, arguably, the necessity –​of Levinas’ ethics. Secondly, the chapter has shown how Levinas’ categories of hospitality, reciprocity and justice, reinforced by contributions from the community of Levinasian interpreters, can be applied to Southeast Asia and its embryonic ethic of responsible provision. The results of the foregoing analysis both encourage and disappoint, but it is early days as Southeast Asian countries, a number of which are still developing economies, continue to hold fast to sovereignty as right whilst selectively embracing a role and identity as responsible providers in their backyard. A number of conclusions can be drawn here. On the one

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hand, the evidence shows that despite the relative congruence between the R2Provide and the diplomatic-​security culture of Southeast Asia –​ that is, it does not fundamentally contravene the ASEAN doctrine of non-​interference, but relies on invitation by the other –​the R2Provide has not quite arrived as a fully formed norm, whose maturation is constrained by the inability and/​or unwillingness of all Southeast Asian countries to fully comply with all of its requirements in a sustained fashion. Yet there is no question that the logic of responsible sovereignty, and more specifically of responsible provision, has become common currency and achieved a level of comfort among Southeast Asian states in a way that the R2P, as we saw in Chapter 2, clearly has not. On the other hand, viewed through the radical prism of Levinas’ responsibility for the other, the R2Provide becomes a normative ideal whose requirements far exceed what communitarian or liberal ethics allow –​a demand Southeast Asian countries can neither fully satisfy nor avoid (Critchley, 2002: 22).

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9

The Responsibility to Provide: Implications for the Region and Beyond In front of the face, I  always demand more of myself. (Levinas, 1997: 294)

Introduction In an address to a symposium on human security at the University of Tokyo in February 2010, the late Surin Pitsuwan, speaking then as the Secretary General of ASEAN, contended that when states focus on securing the well-​being of human individuals, they are helping to make sure that ‘state security and state sovereignty are effectively implemented to help, to protect, to promote the welfare, the wellbeing and the dignity security of their own people’ (ASEAN, 2010b). Using language reminiscent of the ‘responsibility to protect’ or R2P but not necessarily referencing that principle or its specific terms, Surin further insisted that ‘sovereignty and national security and state security need to be implemented with responsibility to protect the people, to promote the wellbeing of the people and certainly to guard against their indignity and the suffering that they may have to suffer as member [sic] of our human family’ (ASEAN, 2010b). As his words suggest, there is no question that the R2P –​the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for which Southeast Asian countries have furnished at least their declaratory support  –​has had an impact on the regional debate in Southeast Asia within policy circles and most certainly within academia and the security studies communities. Although Southeast Asian governments have pushed back vigorously against the R2P’s advocacy of military intervention against ‘irresponsible’ states –​worrisome for

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a region where sovereignty and non-​intervention/​non-​interference norms remain sacrosanct –​it should however in no way, as this book has argued, be seen as a rejection of the notion of responsible sovereignty by the region’s leaders and elites.

This book in summary This book began with the proposition that traces of an ethos of regional responsibility are increasingly evident among the countries of Southeast Asia, some more than others, to be sure. We started the discussion in Chapter 2 by showing what this ethic is not: the UN-​endorsed doctrine of ‘the responsibility to protect’ or the R2P. However, short of external intervention, there is in fact much about the R2P –​such as the protective responsibilities of states and the timely provision of assistance and capacity-​building by the international community (UN, 2009) –​that Southeast Asian countries actually welcome if not embrace. The contention of this book has been that the empirical evidence on contemporary regional developments in security collaboration lends support to the notion that just such an ethic of responsible sovereignty –​ at best embryonic and inconsistent in practice –​exists in Southeast Asia, which this book has referred to as ‘the responsibility to provide’ or the R2Provide. The contention here therefore is not the wholesale rejection of the R2P over its perceived flaws or alleged inappositeness to the region. Rather, it is to acknowledge the R2Provide’s ‘debt’ to the R2P since the efforts by Southeast Asian policymakers and public intellectuals to articulate an ethos of responsible provision were partly in reaction to attempts by members of the international community to justify possible humanitarian intervention on post-​ Nargis Myanmar because of the ruling junta’s initial resistance to accepting international help. As highlighted in Chapter 3, traces of the R2Provide include the growing awareness of and shared concern among regional countries over the rise of transnational challenges and non-​traditional security threats and their development of institutional mechanisms aimed at enhancing their capacities to assist one another and to respond collectively and meaningfully to those challenges. As we saw in Chapter  4, a prime example in this regard is the formation of the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus multilateral cooperative frameworks in response to the growing demand to develop among regional countries the requisite operational expertise and resources in and for things such as disaster relief, counterterrorism, maritime security and cyber security, among others. As shown in Chapter 5, rather than incessantly

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barricading and shielding themselves from natural disasters and security crises affecting their neighbours, Southeast Asian countries have increasingly and proactively stepped up and out to provide aid and assistance  –​so long as they have the consensual agreement of the blighted countries to do so. To that end, regional countries have undertaken the task of responsible provision in HADR and in conflict management particularly in the area of counterterrorism. They have established regional human rights frameworks that admittedly are still declaratory in nature and require a lot more interstate commitment and determination in order to impel Southeast Asian countries towards the actual safeguarding of imperilled people and communities in their neighbourhood and beyond. More broadly speaking, as suggested in Chapter 6, the sense of regional responsibility has also included a growing readiness –​selectively and unevenly demonstrated, to be sure, but growing nonetheless –​among Southeast Asian states to seek pacific solutions to their trade and territorial disputes with one another not only through bilateral means but also through third party-​led mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. In so doing, their efforts potentially contribute not only to the further institutionalization of dispute settlement among themselves but arguably serve as a model of sorts which other regional countries and indeed even extra-​regional powers could presumably emulate where their disputes with other states are concerned. Needless to say, fidelity to the norm of non-​interference has led to glaring and even unconscionable inaction on the part of ASEAN, tragically in the case of the Rohingya refugee crisis –​although, as we have seen, a number of Southeast Asian countries as well as ASEAN have in fact played, albeit belatedly, the part of responsible providers –​ and regrettably in the case of the South China Sea disputes. But what appears to have changed is the manner in which ASEAN member countries are openly taking positions on these concerns that differ from the official position adopted by ASEAN, hence putting into doubt the very notion of ASEAN consensus and unity. For example, although ASEAN expressed solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar government at their summit gathering in November 2017 (Inquirer, 2017), it is worth noting (as mentioned in Chapter 5) that Malaysia criticized ASEAN’s neutral stance on the Rohingya refugee crisis back in September 2017 when its then foreign minister, Anifah Aman, insisted that Malaysia had chosen to disassociate itself from the ASEAN chairman’s statement (Tan, C.K., 2017). Indeed, when the ASEAN foreign ministers infamously failed to issue their customary end of meeting joint communique –​the first time this had ever happened

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in the history of the regional organization –​following their charged gathering in Phnom Penh in July 2012 (Emmerson, 2012), it possibly reflected the readiness of some Southeast Asian countries to publicly air their differences, which they had previously kept in house under the rubric of consensus.1 While it is possible that Malaysia’s conduct in this instance was driven by self-​serving interests,2 the possibility that it might equally have been acting out of a deepening sense of its sovereign responsibility towards its neighbours cannot and should not be discounted. In Chapter  7, we explored the problems associated with communitarian and liberal ethics and saw how their shared proclivity to place self before the other –​the individual self in the case of pluralist liberalism, and the collective self in the case of communitarianism (as well as cosmopolitan liberalism)  –​ ended up totalizing and essentializing the self at the expense of the other. As we have seen with communitarianism, while its prioritization of the common good over particular interests can engender civic virtue and putatively nurture a responsibility to provide for one’s neighbours, its adamant insistence on the primacy of the state over everything else –​a view far narrower than, say, an ‘English school’ pluralist-​realist’s view of the state’s relationship with and obligations to international society (Williams, 2016) –​effectively delimits any exercise of responsible conduct by the state. On the other hand, what prospects are there for a liberal basis to R2Provide? To be sure, the region is not loath to adopt elements of liberalism given its relative support for the neoliberal international economic order, which by and large has benefited Southeast Asian economies  –​the blot of the 1997 financial crisis notwithstanding (Higgott and Nesadurai, 2002). And while the region’s promotion and protection of human rights remains underdeveloped and suspect, it arguably points to an incipient readiness among some Southeast Asian countries to adopt liberal ideals and principles, if only selectively so (Davies, 2014a). However, as we saw earlier, the fact that the mixed record of Western liberal democracies in implementing the R2P suggests they too fall short, drastically so at times, in response to the humanitarian imperative (Luck, 2008; Pattison, 2011). The fact of the matter is that neither the ‘liberal’ nations of Southeast Asia (say, Indonesia or the Philippines) nor their ‘illiberal’ counterparts, so far as their foreign policy conduct is concerned, enjoy exclusive proprietorship on the concept and practice of a responsible sovereignty. Indeed, in the wake of the devastation wrought to the province of Aceh by the Indian Ocean tsunamis on 26 December 2004, democratic Indonesia initially baulked at the offer by illiberal Singapore to conduct

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a massive HADR operation to relieve the ravaged areas, partly out of concern –​and here the traditional emphasis within ASEAN on non-​ interference and non-​intervention looms large  –​over the prospect of Singaporean soldiers setting foot on Indonesian soil, even if for humanitarian reasons. Eventually, the operation proceeded on the basis of the concurrence of Indonesia to, and its acceptance of, Singapore’s offer of assistance.3 That acts of sovereign responsibility in Southeast Asia seemingly transcend history, ideology and politics imply the need for a philosophical and ethical basis other than those which presently populate the intellectual debate over Southeast Asian national and regional life. As we saw in Chapter  7, neither communitarianism, for which responsibility extends only as far as the boundaries of their territorial state and/​or nationalist identity go, nor liberalism, whose autonomic and totalized conception of responsibility  –​including, through the R2P, its advocacy for military intervention  –​remains problematic for Southeast Asians, seem particularly suitable as plausible foundations for the nascent and possibly evolving R2Provide ethic. How can the conceptualization of Southeast Asian efforts to implement the R2Provide benefit from Levinas’ idea of responsibility for the other? This is what Chapter  8 sought to accomplish. As highlighted in the introduction to the R2Provide concept in Chapter 3, the notion of responsible provision as informally defined by Southeast Asian leaders suggests that in principle, the mobilization of outside help effectively depends on the endorsement of the prospective recipient country without which the prospective provider country, in deference to ASEAN’s principle of non-​interference in each other’s domestic affairs, ostensibly has no authority to act. That said, despite the absence of any legal obligation to assist, Southeast Asian countries have sought to help one another, whether on their own or collectively through any of the ASEAN-​based regional mechanisms and platforms. Moreover, while the assisting states acted on the basis of invitation by the affected states, the likelihood of the former occasionally resorting to peer pressure to ‘impel’ recalcitrant countries among the latter to set aside reservations they might harbour about accepting outside help cannot be dismissed. Thus understood, both recipient and provider equally share the obligation and responsibility to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations: the recipient through their grant of consent and invitation, the provider through their contributions of aid, assistance and the like. Indeed, a prospective provider cannot not respond to their prospective recipient because their very identity is predicated upon conditions of sociality rather than of autonomy. The fundamental importance of the other to my very being is such that

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without the other and their infinite demand for my responsibility, there can be no ‘I’ or self; as Zlatan Filipovic has put it, ‘One is a subject only and insofar as one is awakened or “sobered up” to responsibility for the other person’ (Filipovic, 2011: 59). Against Southeast Asia’s responses to two different yet overlapping forms of responsible sovereignty –​protection and provision –​this study has argued the relevance of Levinas’ ethical model of the ‘responsibility to the other’ to the conceptualization of Southeast Asia’s ongoing efforts to be responsible providers more than protectors. While the communitarian perspective has played a key role in defining and justifying swathes of the region’s economic and political life as a way for Southeast Asians to negotiate the challenges wrought by globalization as well as a political counter-​narrative to Western liberalism, it appears more of a liability where the region’s effort to cultivate an ethic of responsibility beyond state boundaries is concerned. Indeed, as regional countries know too well, the proclivity for states to uncritically adopt ‘sovereignty as right’ positions, historical memory and hyper-​ nationalism to hamper regional efforts at crafting credible collective responses to crises happen all too often, as evidenced by the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the region’s inaction when Typhoon Haiyan hammered the Philippines in 2013 –​despite having in place assets and mechanisms like the AHA Centre and the ADMM and ADMM-​Plus –​or when the Rohingya refugee crisis broke out in 2015. And while liberalism as a putative basis for the R2Provide offers some possibilities, its unrelenting advocacy for unilateral interventionism, as evidenced by the R2P, remains unsettling for many Southeast Asians even if only for humanitarian reasons.

Can the R2Provide travel? What implications might Southeast Asia’s understanding of and practice in responsible provision have beyond the region’s boundaries? What lessons might Southeast Asia’s still embryonic experiences with the R2Provide have for the rest of the world? Hitherto, the conventional wisdom on norm diffusion has stressed the regionalization and/​or localization of global norms by regional actors (Acharya, 2004, 2009).4 On the other hand, it has long been established that ASEAN has been an effective exporter of its norms to the Asia-​Pacific region, especially through extending its ASEAN Way of consensus, consultation, informality and cooperative security to its wider regional offshoots like the ARF, the ADMM-​Plus and the East Asia Summit (Leifer, 1996; Katsumata, 2009). Notwithstanding the primary focus of this book on

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Southeast Asia as its region of immediate interest, the wider Asia-​Pacific region –​indeed, perhaps even the ‘Indo-​Pacific’ region, in the light of attempts by regional powers such as Japan, India and the United States to develop their respective strategic visions (Miyake, 2019) –​has also been included as a geographical area of focus at least where the book’s discussions on the ADMM-​Plus are concerned. In other words, the conceptual and practical relevance of the R2Provide is not confined to Southeast Asia, not least because, where the building and maintenance of the ‘regional ability’ of Southeast Asian countries go (as discussed in Chapter 3), it is really the contributions of the outside powers –​ the dialogue partner countries of ASEAN –​that play a key role in nurturing and enabling the development and implementation of the R2Provide ethos in Southeast Asia. In a key sense, despite its Southeast Asian ‘origins’, the concept and practice of responsible provision has also gained from the contributions of the non-​ASEAN members of the ARF, ADMM-​Plus and other Asia-​Pacific regionalisms. But has the R2Provide travelled beyond its regional confines? Can it? At a time when the relevance of the R2P –​indeed, of humanitarian intervention more broadly (Bellamy, 2015) –​is under critical scrutiny and facing pushback worldwide (Richmond, 2009; Cunliffe, 2014; Chandler, 2015), does the R2Provide offer a feasible notion of responsible sovereignty? The potential is certainly there. As Chapter 2 has demonstrated, there is a fair bit of overlap between the R2Provide with Deng’s ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ concept as applied to conflict management (Deng et al, 1996). Importantly, while the responsible provision in Southeast Asia started life by focusing almost exclusively on non-​traditional security concerns, the 2017 war against ISIS-​inspired militants in Marawi has essentially seen conflict management forcing its way onto the ‘agenda’ of the R2Provide, so to speak. As noted in Chapter 3, a key difference lies in the continued normative adherence by ASEAN states to the non-​interference norm. As a consequence, acts of responsible provision are contingent on the consensual agreement of  –​and, crucially, invitation by  –​prospective recipient countries, without which the external implementation of aid and assistance, no matter how dire the circumstances may be, arguably does not apply. But as the case studies examined here show, the non-​interference doctrine is not as sacrosanct as it has been made out to be, no matter the ad nauseam claims by Southeast Asian leaders regarding the inviolability of the doctrine. Through social persuasion, activist ASEAN members have occasionally been able to pressure their recalcitrant neighbours to open their doors to external help. In Filipovic’s terms, perhaps against their natural inclinations, they have been awakened or sobered up to

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responsibility for the other person (Filipovic, 2011). The combination of non-​interference and peer pressure does two things. On the one hand, it sends reassuring signals to prospective recipient states that they would not be the targets of unilateral and unsolicited external military intervention (Stein, 1991). On the other hand, assurance also comes in the form of ‘friends’ who function either as direct sources of aid and assistance to the affected parties, or as mediators and conduits between the affected parties and the international community. The R2Provide cannot and does not replace the R2P. But it could be a plausible answer to Richmond’s appeal for alternative hybrid forms of responsible peace (Richmond, 2009).

Conclusion This book has sought to accomplish three things. Firstly, it mapped a number of regional developments in defence and security cooperation in which Southeast Asian countries, individually as well as institutionally through ASEAN and its various functional manifestations and modalities, have sought to assist one another in collective responses to challenging security situations. It also traced their continued pursuit of rules-​based management of their diplomatic, economic and security relations with one another. Secondly, through juxtaposition with the global doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), it examined how an emerging norm and practice of responsible sovereignty, referred to broadly in these pages as the ‘responsibility to provide’ (or R2Provide), has taken root in Southeast Asia, albeit more deeply so in some countries than others, as well as within ASEAN and its various functional subsidiaries and spinoffs, such as the ADMM, the ADMM-​Plus, the AHA Centre and the like. Thirdly and finally, contra communitarian and liberal perspectives on ethics, it introduced and critically applied the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically his notion of responsibility for the other, to the R2Provide and more broadly to the quest for responsible interstate conduct in Southeast Asia. Are Southeast Asians responsible? Do they exhibit a sense of obligation to the urgent needs of their own citizens as well as those of their neighbours? Judging by the region’s mixed record, a ‘cup half full’ approach would allow at best the conclusion that Southeast Asian states and ASEAN are working towards realizing their aspirations and turning words into deeds. So much more remains to be done: investing more in nurturing the collective will and building national and regional capacity in order to better serve one another; empowering and equipping inadequately resourced agencies to get

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the job done; overcoming mutual strategic mistrust so that affected states would more readily accept the assistance offered by prospective provider countries –​the list goes on. Essentially, rather than the mere absence of conflict and war, I sought through the R2Provide to offer a positive conception of international relations, one that ultimately aims to improve the conditions and lives of the recipient countries and societies with which responsible providers engage –​even as, it should be said, the provider countries and societies are themselves enriched for having refreshed others. If, as Philip Hallie has put it, the opposite of cruelty is not simply freedom from cruel relationships but is in effect hospitality (Hallie, 1981: 26–​7), and if it consists in the welcoming of strangers and the adoption of ‘little moves against destructiveness’ (Hallie, 1979:  85), then the growing ethic of responsible provision undertaken by Southeast Asian countries –​selectively and unevenly, needless to say, but incrementally  –​could be the proverbial small steps leading over time to a giant leap towards a more hospitable and responsible region. Faced with the other, perhaps Southeast Asians will come to demand more of themselves.

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Granted, this interpretation follows received wisdom that political realism is an amoral view of the world. Recent readings of canonical realist texts, such as the writings of Hans Morgenthau, have suggested that realism is not only compatible with an ethical approach to international relations but indeed also supportive of it (Gorener, 2002). Described as ‘the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism’ (Acharya, 2001:  57), it is seen as sharing the key elements of the international legal principle of non-​intervention but also extending beyond it (Corthay, 2016: 39). As John Caputo, comparing deconstruction to the way ethics has been viewed and treated by philosophers more generally: ‘Deconstruction issues a warning that the road ahead is still under construction, that there is blasting and the danger of falling rock. Ethics, on the other hand, hands out maps which lead us to believe that the road is finished and there are superhighways all along the way’ (Caputo, 1993: 4). Without necessarily wanting to conflate Levinas’ ethics with deconstruction, it could nonetheless be said of my attempt here to conceptualize the R2Provide through a Levinasian lens is not to insist on an already given ethical blueprint which Southeast Asian states ought to unreflectively follow. By Southeast Asian countries, I  mean the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Put differently, it involves both the building of capacity (i.e., strengthening the individual ability of states to function or perform tasks in HADR or counterterrorism, for instance) as well as the enhancing of capabilities (i.e., developing strong systems at both national and regional levels that can deliver services and weather shocks and storms, so to speak) (Bauer, 2017). According to Corthay, while Southeast Asian states generally demonstrate normative adherence to the principle of non-​interference, their everyday conduct nonetheless suggests a lack of uniform practice among themselves where their dedication to the principle is concerned. As such, it is difficult to conclude that the non-​interference principle is accepted by each of them as a law or rule to which they must religiously adhere (Corthay, 2016: 39). This is most evident in Philip Cunliffe’s sustained  –​ and in some instances devastating –​critique, over a number of journal articles, of the responsibility to protect doctrine, as covered in relevant parts of Chapters 2 and 7.

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Chapter 2 1

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As Robert Rotberg has observed, ‘In most failed states, regimes prey on their own constituents. Driven by ethnic or other intercommunal hostility, or by the governing elite’s insecurities, they victimize their own citizens or some subset of the whole that is regarded as hostile. As in Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire or the Taliban’s Afghanistan, ruling cadres increasingly oppress, extort, and harass the majority of their own compatriots while privileging a more narrowly based party, clan, or sect. As in Zaire, Angola, Siaka Stevens’s Sierra Leone, or pre-​2001 Sudan, patrimonial rule depends on a patronage-​based system of extraction from ordinary citizens. The typical weak state plunges toward failure when this kind of ruler-​led oppression provokes a countervailing reaction on the part of resentful groups or newly emerged rebels’ (Rotberg, 2011: 6; also see Rotberg, 2004). As Amitav Acharya has argued, ‘The AU is not alone in Africa to embrace the letter or spirit of R2P. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, provides for both an early warning system as well as collective political or military interventions in humanitarian crises. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can authorise intervention in domestic conflicts in response to ethnic cleansing, genocide and human rights violations. These African mechanisms “address the need for collective responses to crises that threaten vulnerable populations through prevention as well as reaction  –​ideas that are affirmed in R2P principles”. They have been used on multiple occasions; while not always with promptness or success, they do stand in sharp contrast to the notable absence of a single such mechanisms or instance of collective military intervention in other regions such as Asia, the Middle East, or Latin America’ (Acharya, 2015: 68). According to a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-​Pacific (CSCAP) report on the R2P, the World Summit Outcome document’s interpretation of the R2P is more robust than previous conceptions for the following reasons: ‘(1) Paragraphs 138 and 139 specify the scope of application to only the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This commits the international community to taking a “narrow but deep” approach. In other words, although the definition excludes many other types of humanitarian situations such as natural disasters, it also allows for more sustained and targeted attention to those cases that fall clearly within the scope of the four crimes. (2) By their endorsement of these two paragraphs, heads of state and government committed to preventing the incitement, as well as the commission, of these four crimes. (3) Whereas earlier articulations of [R2P] noted states’ responsibility to protect their “citizens”, paragraphs 138 and 139 clearly state that protection should be extended to “populations”, an important clarification that state responsibility extends to all persons residing within their territory. (4) Paragraph 139 stresses the need for enhanced UN–​regional cooperation, including for the purpose of assisting states to build their capacity to prevent and protect. It also stresses that actors should make use of the full range of tools available under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the [UN] Charter, with the provision that these activities must fall clearly within the parameters of what is permitted under the Charter’ (CSCAP, 2010: 6–​7). For example, the former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Edward Luck, has reflected on how claims of rights to non-​interference and

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territorial integrity did not constitute the main obstacles to R2P promotion during his tenure (Luck, 2015: 503; also see Thakur, 2016). The Libya conflict clearly diminished support for the R2P, including from countries that hitherto championed the doctrine. For example, South Africa was an advocate of the R2P in the run-​up to the 2005 UN World Summit and the related idea of non-​indifference in Africa. However, its conduct while serving as a non-​permanent member of the UN Security Council and subsequent developments have raised questions about its continued commitment to these principles. In particular, Resolution 1973 on Libya, issued in 2011, has been identified as a turning point in South Africa’s perspective on the R2P (Smith, 2016). In Roger Mac Ginty’s view, it is the liberal peace project’s increasing reliance on technocratic means and approaches that has potentially shaped our understandings of the R2P. In other words, it is the discursive framing of conflict by key actors that most likely predetermined their conflict responses (Ginty, 2012). As Zaki Laïdi has mused, ‘The end of utopia has brought the sanctification of emergency, elevating it into a central political category’ (Laïdi, 1998: 11). For example, Jeremy Moses has argued that there are two distinct strands of theorizing about sovereignty, de facto and de jure. Referring to the concept of sovereignty as responsibility as a de jure understanding of sovereignty, Moses contends that sovereignty, in de facto terms, is based upon the sovereignty theories of Hobbes, Schmitt and Morgenthau, and that it is the ideas of this latter group of classical thinkers, concerned as they are with unlimited power and decision as the essence of sovereign authority, that highlight the lack of appreciation of power in not only the R2P but indeed all other existing conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility (Moses, 2013). As Lina Alexandra has argued, ‘robust development of civil society in Indonesia, as one of positive implications from process toward democracy has opened ample opportunities for the application of [the R2P] principle. Local NGOs that particularly focus on human rights issue have demonstrated the ability to put pressure on the government to exercise its responsibility as reflected in the first and second pillars’ (Alexandra, 2012: 51). Indeed, even in the case of the R2P, it has been argued that despite the ambivalence shown by Southeast Asian (as well as East Asian) governments towards the norm, there is in fact a vibrant alternative discourse taking place at the level of civil society, and arguably even in pockets of officialdom, that is apparently supportive of the R2P. As Mely Caballero-​Anthony has observed:  ‘At the 2005 World Summit, ASEAN Member States contributed to an official global consensus that states do indeed have a responsibility to protect their populations from the four mass atrocity crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. As is the case in a number of regions, however, there is a strong sense of caution  –​if not hostility  –​in Southeast Asia (and East Asia more broadly) towards the Responsibility to Protect’s provision for military interventions as a last resort, in order to protect populations from such harm. Furthermore, there is an accompanying, more general ambivalence towards the perceived relevance of the norm for Southeast Asia, due to the perceived nature and/​or intensity of conflicts in the region. Against this backdrop, this article attempts to shed light on a subaltern discourse in the region that argues that the [R2P] is not only relevant, but that it is critical it be operationalised in light of the various manifestations of conflict that plague the region’ (Caballero-​Anthony, 2012: 113).

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12

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For a detailed study of the complex challenges and prospects facing the AICHR, see Tan (2011). Indeed, as the former foreign minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, once warned, ‘We have to be wary all the time of new concepts and new philosophies that will compromise sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention, in the name of globalisation which is another form of trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country’ (cited in Acharya, 2015: 68–​9). De Cuellar also noted that: ‘The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection. With the heightened international interest in universalising a regime of human rights, there is a marked and most welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to resist it would be politically as unwise as it is morally indefensible. It should be perceived as not so much as new departure as more a focused awareness of one of the requirements of peace’ (de Cuellar, 1991: 12, emphasis added).

Chapter 3 1

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As noted in Chapter 2, research by Bellamy and Drummond examined how the R2P has been localized within the Southeast Asian national and regional contexts, so much so that the principle itself is arguably undergoing change to better fit ground realities (Bellamy and Drummond, 2011). According to Lee Jones, a senior diplomat from Singapore, Bilahari Kausikan, once acknowledged that ASEAN member states ‘have been interfering mercilessly in each other’s internal affairs for ages, from the very beginning’ (Jones, 2009: 2).

Chapter 4 1

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It should be remembered that not everyone supports the view that Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN was necessarily motivated by its desire to balance against China. For the ‘join ASEAN to balance China’ perspective, see Nguyen (2002). For a contrary perspective, see Hoang (1994). Even the most ‘progressive’ of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, has encountered difficulties toward its realization, as evidenced by the underwhelming delivery of the AEC in 2015 and the ‘postponement’ of its realization, to all intents and purposes, to 2025 under the ‘ASEAN Community 2025 Vision’. Intra-​ASEAN economic integration has been hampered less by the need to remove tariff barriers than that of non-​tariff and other regulatory impediments or ‘behind the border’ barriers (Wihardja, 2011). Moreover, the Cambodian‒Thai standoff over the borderland surrounding the Prear Vihear temple in 2011 raised serious concerns about intramural security among ASEAN member nations. All this has led the ASEAN Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, to publicly concede that ASEAN was unlikely to meet its express goal of realizing the formation of the AEC –​much less that of the APSC –​by 2015 –​a prediction that proved accurate (Kassim, 2011). The VAP comprises ten action items oriented towards (1)  strengthening and integrating the ASEAN members into a cohesive single entity, and (2) narrowing

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the developmental gap between old and new ASEAN members through practical assistance furnished by dialogue partners (ASEAN, 2006a). The ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table Top Exercise (AHX) will be discussed later. Indeed, the retreats themselves reflect the level of progress made in bilateral ties among former foes such as Vietnam and the US. As a report on the ADMM Retreat in Hanoi in October 2010 noted: ‘Vietnam has made thorough preparations for the ADMM+ to make it a great success, Mr. [Phung Quang] Thanh [Vietnam’s minister of national defence] noted. The same day, Mr. Thanh received US Defense Secretary Robert Gates who is visiting Vietnam for the ADMM+ scheduled for October 12. Mr. Thanh praised the US Defense Secretary’s participation in the ADMM+ and expressed his belief both sides will work closely to boost bilateral cooperation in national defence and contribute to the success of the ADMM+. Mr. Robert Gates spoke highly of the role Vietnam played as ASEAN Chair and ADMM+ Chair while saying the ADMM+ will give the US a chance to promote national defence cooperation with ASEAN countries, including Vietnam’ (Voice of Vietnam, 2010). Complementing these is a series of activities conducted at the unofficial (‘second-​ track” or ‘Track 2’) level under the auspices of the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI; website:  http://​www.rsis.edu.sg/​nadi/​) the officially sanctioned network of defence-​oriented research centres and think tanks that supports the ADMM (Tan and Tsjeng, 2017). Even though these activities are presumably not officially affiliated with ASEAN, it is notable that the majority of them nonetheless use the ‘ASEAN’ label to identify themselves, which suggests that ASEAN has become the default nomenclature for Southeast Asian regionalisms (ASEAN, nd). According to Brigadier-​General Ngien Hoon Ping, the Singapore Armed Forces’ director for joint operations, ‘The [first] AHX [co-​hosted by Indonesia and Singapore] will strengthen ASEAN’s capacity and capability to marshal quick and decisive military responses to natural disasters in our region’. He then quickly added: ‘The AHX will also build trust and confidence amongst our militaries, enabling future co-​operations, and contributing to peace and security in our region’ (MINDEF Singapore, 2011). For example, an air force officer who flew sorties in the early phase of the EiS initiative recounted to this author the lengths to which his team would go to camouflage its operating procedures so as to ensure their counterparts from the other participating countries in the CMPT on board their aircraft –​undoubtedly intelligence specialists, the author’s interviewee alleged –​would learn as little of their ‘secrets’ as possible. The interviewee facetiously noted that CMPT members probably spent more time checking on each other’s aircraft and operating procedures than actively looking for pirates! (Author interview, December 2007). This point has been made in the broader context of defence diplomacy in the Asia-​Pacific region, including the ADMM-​Plus (Baldino and Carr, 2016).

Chapter 5 1

According to the ASEAN Disaster Management Handbook, intra-​ASEAN collaboration in this area is four-​fold, namely, improving disaster-​warning communication, expert exchanges in the areas of disaster management, increased

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information exchange, and identifying emergency relief logistical distribution chains. Dan Collison, director of emergency programmes for the humanitarian outfit Save the Children in Myanmar, cited in Baldwin (2009). According to former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi in October 2017, the medical corps of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) would be building a 50-​bed field hospital for the Rohingya, at a cost of RM3.5 million. As Dr Ahmad Zahid told a press conference, ‘We have obtained the permission of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina and this permission was given to me and the MAF and Ministry of Health by the Bangladesh High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur. At the moment, the government is waiting for the procedure set by the Bangladesh government to allow the construction of the hospital’ (cited in Ngu, 2017). Arguably, a motivation behind the formation of the ADMM and the ADMM-​Plus was the perception held by some in regional defence circles that the ARF was simply not faring as it should. Indeed, some have even hinted that the ARF, with its inability to graduate beyond being just a talking shop, serves as a model of what not to do if progress in security cooperation were the goal. Some have also alluded to the likelihood of resentment among some regional defence practitioners for their secondary role and status in the ARF, a regional arrangement initiated and helmed by foreign policy practitioners (Emmers and Tan, 2011; Tan, 2012b). PD is: non-​military and non-​coercive; respects sovereignty and non-​interference; works on the basis of consensus and consultation; requires trust and confidence; rests on international law; and is timely and voluntary (Capie and Evans, 2007: 207). As two analysts have averred regarding China’s participation in HADR:  ‘Such HADR offers a rare opportunity for win‒win cooperation, whereby locals get free healthcare, China gains kudos, and we can help foster normal and normalising international engagement by the PLA in a weapons free and nonzero sum environment’ (Blaxland and Claxton, 2014). This much is implied in the literature on strengthening the abilities of militaries to deal with ‘full spectrum threats’ (Lim, 2005; Sathasivam, nd). As two analysts wrote back in 2005: ‘Why was the SAF able to respond so swiftly, effectively and sensitively? Partly because of the prudent development of a diverse and flexible set of capabilities, partly because of the high quality of training. Soldiers were able to perform their tasks professionally and sensitively in a manner attuned to the needs and concerns of a population affected by a major disaster. Furthermore, the SAF was able to coordinate closely with its Indonesian counterparts, thanks to many years of extensive interaction and cooperation in exercises, personnel exchanges and attending each other’s training courses, which have resulted in the development of mutual respect and understanding. An especially critical group of soldiers were the liaison officers who could speak Bahasa Indonesia and thus act as a bridge between the Indonesians and the 30 nongovernmental organisations. At the higher political and senior command levels, close ties enabled Singapore to understand the specific needs of the Indonesians and for the SAF to tailor assistance accordingly. A phone call, a quick meeting, and the thing was done. Indeed, such was the trust that the SAF was given freedom to deploy troops for relief work in and around Meulaboh without having to be escorted by Indonesian soldiers’ (Loo and Ho, 2005: 23). Although practically every Southeast Asian country during the Cold War conducted some type of counterinsurgency (COIN) operation against armed insurgencies in

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their respective domiciles, noted analyst Guy Pauker reported in 1985: ‘It is truly surprising why containment of Communist insurgencies, an interest common to all Southeast Asian governments, did not elicit more extensive cooperation [among the Southeast Asians]. Each country seems to have conducted its own campaigns’ (Pauker, 1985: 6). As Liow has noted, ‘the existence of this South-​east Asian unit [Katibah Nusantara] belied differences that prevailed between the Malaysians and Indonesians in its ranks. Indonesians were dismissive of their Malaysian counterparts based on the perception that their religious knowledge was inferior. Concomitantly, Malaysians were relegated to menial roles in the Indonesian-​led Katibah Nusantara. This explains the reluctance on the part of Malaysians to even join Katibah Nusantara in the initial stages of its formation, preferring instead to fight with other militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq (Malaysians did join eventually). In fact, even the Indonesians within Katibah Nusantara could not quite get along: one faction under Abu Jandal eventually split to form Katibah Masyaariq. Notwithstanding the bickering that beset ISIS’ South-​east Asian fighters, the reality remains that by virtue of being in a distant land engaged in the selfsame conflict, they were bonded together, however imperfectly’ (Liow, 2018). It is not just Indonesia: the JI cell leader from Singapore, Mas Selamat Kastari (or ‘MSK’ as he is popularly known), escaped from detention in Singapore in February 2008. He was recaptured in Malaysia 13 months later and repatriated to Singapore (Today, 2014). According to the report, Marawi ‘has inspired young extremists from around the region to want to join. In Indonesia, it has helped unite two feuding streams of the pro-​ISIS movement, inspired “lone wolf ” attacks and caused soul-​searching among would-​be terrorists about why they cannot manage to do anything as spectacular’ (IPAC, 2017: 1). For a more recent treatment, see Greer and Watson (2017). For an elaborate treatment of legal developments and implications in the area of counterterrorism cooperation in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, see Tan and Nasu (2016). As Dewi Fortuna Anwar, one of Indonesia’s leading political scientists, has cautioned about application of ‘ASEAN minus x’ (or ‘10-​X’, as she calls it): ‘There are already those that have suggested that a more flexible sort of consensus should be taken in the realms of politics and security, similar to that in the economic realm that uses the 10-​X formula, because the credibility of ASEAN will diminish if it too often fails to reach an agreement on strategic issues. Yet it must also be asked whether removing the consensus principle in politics and security matters, which are “high politics” and related to the core interests of a nation that are often not negotiable, will truly strengthen ASEAN or not? What would happen if Indonesia had a different view from all the other ASEAN members on an issue it feels strongly about on principle, but because consensus is no longer needed, ASEAN can still make a decision with majority rule that overrides Indonesia’s objections?’ (Anwar, 2017: 24). The likelihood of militarization is especially poignant for countries with a complicated military past, such as Indonesia (IPAC, 2015). For instance, the Indonesian military’s establishment of its counterterrorism unit Koopssusgab immediately reignited fears, unjustified or otherwise, over potential interference by the military once again in the country’s civilian affairs.

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As Deng and his associates have argued: ‘Although the institutional expression of the principles of human dignity varies accordingly to the context and the prevailing culture, the fundamental values involved are universal and are now enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as well as in other human rights instruments, both international and regional. For the most part, they have also been incorporated in national constitutions and legal norms. The essence of human rights laws is the recognition of the inherent dignity and equality of all human beings and the setting of common standards for the articulation and protection of their rights without regard to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender’ (Deng et al, 1996: 213).

Chapter 6 1

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Ordered upon nationalist principles of self-​determination and popular rule, the existing international system may endogenously produce both interstate and intrastate wars. Nonetheless, the war proneness of nationalism is typically a function of the type of nationalist ideology being used (Mylonas and Kuo, 2017). It may also be worthwhile to distinguish the form of nationalism and populism described here as the ‘offensive’ type –​that is, aimed at territorial expansion and aggrandizement –​as opposed to the ‘defensive’ type –​expressed as the xenophobic exclusion of foreigners or outsiders (Joffe, 2018). Legalization is commonly defined as the action of making something that was previously not permissible by law. My use of it here is somewhat different in that it consists in the adoption of rules, broadly defined. In the discipline of international relations, one of the most enduring efforts to introduce the concept of legalization consisted in a special issue of International Organization published in 2000, which defined and operationalized the concept as a combination of three dimensions:  obligation, precision and delegation (Bélanger and Fontaine-​Skronski,  2012). UNCLOS III, which lasted from 1973 to 1982, entered into force on 16 November 1994 following ratification by Guyana, the sixtieth state to sign the treaty. This is supported by a 2009 survey of Asian security and economic elites conducted by a leading Washington-​based think tank. Survey respondents were asked how significant regional organizations are to their national and regional security. Unsurprisingly, the majority of respondents prized national security strategies and international bodies over and above regional organizations (Gill et al, 2009). In this regard, there is a conceptual distinction between mimicry and emulation. To the extent ASEAN now has a charter and boasts a vision for building an ASEAN Community with economic, political‒security and socio-​cultural pillars  –​the language is reminiscent of the European Community and the EU –​one can say ASEAN is mimicking the EU in terms of the superficial borrowing of lexicon and institutional conventions. On the other hand, emulation involves greater effort and deep internalization of the principles, norms and practices of the organization the emulating actor seeks to emulate. At this point, it is safe to say ASEAN is a mimicker of more advanced institutions, but whether it successfully evolves into an emulator of such remains to be seen. On mimicry/​mimicking and emulation, see Johnston (2008: 45–​73). Ironically, European institutions today are showing signs of a willingness to countenance a more flexible approach (Cini, 2007: 402).

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Mimicking or mimicry is another micro-​process of socialization practised by states or institutions that adorn themselves in the accoutrements of established powers and institutions, imitate their customs and conventions, appropriate their language and terms of reference, and mimic their behaviours in superficial ways and for utilitarian reasons. Mimicry implies shallow institutional change aimed at burnishing one’s legitimacy and reputation, rather than a fundamental attitudinal and behavioural rehabilitation. In words to that effect, a former ASEAN Secretary General has identified a key purpose in having the charter as ‘[reinforcing] the perception of ASEAN as a serious regional player in the future of the Asia Pacific region’ (Severino, 2006). On mimicking or mimicry as a socializing mechanism, see Johnston (2008). As Benjamin Schiff has put it, ‘Neoliberal institutionalists explain law as a tool to reduce the realm of disorder in international relations, making it a pragmatic step for states concerned not only with relative power, but even more with absolute well-​being. Legal institutions arise as states seek to stabilise their relations by replacing political power conflict with orderly legal processes –​labeled by some observers the process of “legalisation” ’ (Schiff, 2008: 41). On the question of moral influence and social persuasion within ASEAN, see Tan (2013a). All data compiled by author as of 20 June 2016 from the World Trade Organization website at:  https://​www.wto.org/​english/​tratop_​e/​dispu_​e/​dispu_​by_​country_​ e.htm. The ruling was made by an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the Law of the Sea Convention. The role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was to provide a hosting platform/​registry but the ruling is not made by the PCA. The author is indebted to both Donald Rothwell and David Letts for clarifying this point. In 2013, the Netherlands initiated its case before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) against Russia for its seizure of a Dutch-​flagged vessel belonging to Greenpeace, the Arctic Sunrise, which was protesting against oil drilling. Russia has made clear it would not appear before the Arbitral Tribunal (BBC News, 2015). Official means include, inter alia, a ‘Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines’, put out by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 December 2014 (MFA China, 2014). Lieutenant-​General He, Vice President of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, speaking on the side lines of the Shangri-​La Dialogue, 3 June 2017, Singapore (cited in Ng, 2017). Citing approvingly from Thucydides’ ageless dictum  –​‘The strong do as they will; the weak suffer as they must’ –​Graham Allison, advancing his ‘Thucydides Trap’ thesis, has written, ‘When the Arbitral Tribunal rejected China’s objection, Beijing refused to participate in its hearings and made it clear that it would ignore the former’s ruling. The United States and others have criticised Beijing for taking this stance. But again, if we ask how other permanent members of the Security Council have acted in similar circumstances, the answer will not be one we like … It is hard to disagree with the realists’ claims that the Law of the Sea tribunals, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are only for small powers. Great powers do not recognise the jurisdiction of these courts –​except in particular cases where they believe it is in their interest to do so’ (Allison, 2017).

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Crucially, the framework COC is seen as a stepping stone to further negotiations. As Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano has suggested, he is open to an accord that is not legally binding if it will expedite the negotiations (Dancel, 2017a). According to Walter Woon, consensus in the ASEAN context means ‘no member state feels strongly enough about a matter to block it; it does not mean that everyone agrees’ (Woon, 2016: 157). This raises intriguing questions for sequencing where institutional formation is concerned. On the when and how sequencing matters in the development of institutions, see Drezner (2010: 794–​7). ‘As Singapore is not a claimant in the South China Sea’, warned Chinese Vice-​ Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, ‘we hope that the Singapore Government, on the condition of not interfering in South China Sea issues, will actively promote cooperation between China and ASEAN’ (Today, 2016b).

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This apparent tension is not only a Southeast Asian phenomenon, but is perhaps best exemplified by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s spirited defence of economic globalization at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017, despite China’s longstanding adherence to trade protectionism. According to Xi, the problems troubling the world are not necessarily caused by globalization, nor are they the inevitable outcome of it. Xi’s robust apology was surreal in the view of many, especially in the light of an impending Donald Trump presidency in the US that heralded the likelihood of trade wars. On the other hand, Xi’s pro-​globalization rhetoric contrasted starkly with protectionist policies back in China (Anderlini, Feng and Mitchell, 2017; Financial Times, 2018). According to Martin Wight, liberal and cosmopolitan optimism defies ‘the basic distinction between international and domestic politics that international politics are less susceptible of a progressivist interpretation’ (Wight, 1960:  42; also see Beardsworth, 2013). This section on communitarianism and responsibility draws partly from an earlier work (Tan, 2017a: 276–​8). For example, it has often been suggested that for the Chinese, it is rule by law, rather than rule of law, that truly matters because of the relative absence within Chinese polity and society of acceptance of natural law. However, if law is treated by the Chinese as predominantly positive rather than natural, then it raises the possibility that there could be times when rule by law might be supplanted –​or at least contested or complicated by –​rule by man. While Chinese dynasties have traditionally featured a mixture of those two ideas  –​rule by man and rule by law –​throughout China’s history, the notion that the ruling elite –​whether the dynastic emperors of yore or the CCP since its takeover of the Chinese mainland in 1949 –​should themselves be restrained by laws has however never been seriously considered (Jenko, 2010; Chin, 2014). Put differently, if communitarians demand a solution for homesickness as expressed in their protectiveness over their sovereign state, such a demand –​at least through Nietzsche’s eyes –​could well end up as a nostalgic search for a ‘politics of place’ that has no solution. As Connolly has put it, ‘It is a homesickness that construes correspondence between the scope of troubles and a territorial place of action to form the essence of democratic politics. It is nostalgia for a politics of place’

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(Connolly, 1991a: 464). If so, any notion of communitarian responsibility is hence ‘naïve in that it seeks a response where none is possible’ (Warner, 1999: 17–​18). As R.B.J. Walker has observed, ‘There is, in Weber’s view, no rational way of deciding on criteria for judging what is responsible conduct, or to what and to whom one’s responsibility should be directed. In effect, the meaning of responsibility is left hanging between a Kantian imperative to autonomous action in conformity with a universal moral law and an imperative to decide on the basis of one’s own autonomous will (or in terms of international relations, on the non-​ rational will of one’s own autonomous nation). Consequently, the sorry legacy of so much realist analysis of international relations has been either a constant relapse into the empty category of national interest or the amplification of personal judgment into appropriate criteria for state policy’ (Walker, 1993: 58, n3). For a contrarian view, see Morkevičius (2018). Referring to the metaphysical belief that progress is a real concept leading to an improvement of the world. The foreign policy of US President Barack Obama, for example, has been described by many as meliorist (Stevens, 2008). In Gorman’s view, the inter-​war period was marked by a time of purposeful, practical idealism which drove many successful attempts at international cooperation, whilst leaving important legacies for future global politics (Gorman, 2012). Norman Angell was also known for his pre-​World War I contention that rising economic interdependence in Europe would render war between countries with interlocked economies a thing of the past (Angell, 1911). For a contrary view, see Ashworth (2006). Works such as Polanyi’s The great transformation, originally published in 1944, furnished deeper understanding of those complexities (Polanyi, 2001). This paragraph draws partly from the useful discussion on liberalisms in Ainley (2006). As Hidemi Suganami has explained, ‘A key component of the pluralism/​solidarism divide has to do with the issue of humanitarian intervention, i.e., whether the society of sovereign states should accept the practice of unilateral military intervention as a legitimate response to massive violations of human rights by a regime against the people it governs. Contemporary international law does not in fact allow such a use of force but there are some who argue that humanitarian intervention ought to be made legal or ought at any rate to be accepted under certain strict conditions or that it has already become plausible to suggest that it is legally permissible under certain exceptional circumstances. Those who argue in this way are called “solidarists” or form the “solidarist” wing of the English School’ (Suganami, 2010: 25). As Cunliffe has argued, ‘More broadly, such an approach reflects the conservatism of emergency politics: a recurrent demand for imminent action in response to emergencies helps obviate the need to justify existing political arrangements in the international order. A political system that wins its allegiance through effective response to emergency makes questions of political direction, will and purpose redundant: when effective response to emergencies becomes the central question of politics, this can only work to legitimate existing institutions and forms of power’ (Cunliffe, 2017). As Cunliffe has observed:  ‘Today’s humanitarian liberals feel no compunction about expanding the normative resources available for waging war, while also holding that its worst excesses can be meliorated. To aim to “end mass atrocity crimes once and for all” without seeking to “end war once and for all” is not only

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absurd, it is also cynical and dishonest. As a political goal, it has all the limitations of utopianism without any of the redeeming nobility or consistency of purpose. If liberal idealists dreamt of a world without war, humanitarian liberals dream of a world where all wars are fought with the latest precision-​guided munitions and technology. While liberal idealists hoped to use law to restrict and abolish war, humanitarian liberals would prefer that lawyers wage war to ensure that it meets the guidelines of international humanitarian law’ (Cunliffe, 2014). According to Willaschek, the Categorical Imperative and the Universal Principle of Right are mutually exclusive concepts because while the concept of right and the authorization to use coercion are analytically connected in Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’, the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative (Willaschek, 2009). Accordingly, since the principle of right just is a principle of authorized coercion and cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative, it therefore implies that the Principle of Right cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. On the other hand, Nance believes that a satisfactory deduction of the concept of right can indeed be constructed out of the Categorical Imperative as well as the facts that we are embodied and that we act from motives other than duty (Nance, 2012). In other words, the insufficiency of the Categorical Imperative, by itself, to generate the Principle of Right should not preclude the possibility that the two concepts are mutually interdependent rather than exclusive. This is implied in what Guzzini and Leander refer to as Wendt’s effort to ‘embrace the neo-​neo synthesis’ –​that is, the assumptions shared by the utilitarian theories of neorealism and neoliberalism (Waever, 1996) –​‘within his wider “constructivist” framework’ (Guzzini and Leander, 2001: 329). It is therefore understandable that utilitarian theories would naturally view ethics in the same way as well. According to Jim George, realist –​and one might add neoliberalist –​scholarship has framed ethical theory and practice in a manner that has reduced it to little more than ‘a violent utilitarian ritual, carried out by autonomous, contingently related actors in an environment determined by anarchy’ (George, 1995: 195). As David Campbell has noted, ethical responsibility is best conceived of as a heteronomous, not autonomous, concern:  ‘In the move beyond metaphysics, ethics has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity –​that is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by autonomous agents –​to something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity. Accordingly, ethics is not ancillary to the existence of a subject (whether that subject be a person, a state, or some other figuration of identity); ethics is indispensable to the very being of that subject, because a subject’s being is only possible once its right to be in relation to the Other is claimed. This recasting of the issue refigures the moral economy in which responsibility is assigned’ (Campbell, 1993: 92). This oddly illiberal orientation within liberalism towards an intolerance of –​or, as Connolly has put it here, a ‘tone-​deafness’ to –​as-​yet-​undetermined differences can also be seen in how certain reportedly liberal thinkers have responded to the prospect of difference, real or imagined. The concern over the destabilizing pressures born of the outgrowth of liberalization and democratization is not new, as critics of the ‘democratic peace’ have observed (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Maoz, 1998); or, at the very least, peace between democracies may not be caused by the purported drivers identified by the theory’s advocates (Rosato, 2003). And as I have observed elsewhere, one only needs to go back to the concern that British philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke showed over the French Revolution and, as Burke saw it, the implications it held for regional peace and stability in a

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Europe comprised primarily of monarchies (Burke, 1967; Tan, 2013b: 124–​5). And as James Der Derian has similarly observed about Burke’s reflections on the French Revolution: ‘Burke’s indictment of the French revolutionary regime today reads like a report from some member of the Committee on the Present Danger on US Defense-​spending: “Our present danger from the example of a people, whose character knows no medium, is, with regard to government, a danger from anarchy; a danger of being led through an admiration of successful fraud and violence, to an imitation of the excesses of an irrational, unprincipled, proscribing, confiscating, plundering, ferocious, bloody, and tyrannical democracy” ’ (Der Derian, 1991:  173–​4). Granted, Burke has often been described, perhaps rightly so, as a conservative (Norman, 2014). But there is no denying his liberal credentials either –​even if only, as Lakoff has suggested, as a ‘liberal conservative’ (Lakoff, 1998). Many Western-​trained philosophers find this a challenging proposition to accept. As Merold Westphal has asked, ‘assuming that the ethical relation does not have its birth in knowledge but in finding myself addressed and put in question by the Other, what is the proper place of reflection, for moral philosophy, more traditionally conceived? Levinas regularly insists that it has a legitimate place, however secondary and derived. But how do we move from the immediacy of the Other’s claim, which in its abstractness is absolute but in its historical and empirical concreteness is in conflict with that of other Others, to the mediation in which we seek justice among conflicting claims? Do we just go back to business as usual, perhaps Rawls, for a theory of justice?’ (Westphal, 1999: 524). A phrase commonly attributed to the so-​called ‘father’ of neoconservative thought in the United States, Irving Kristol (1999). A good example of a conservative critique is Jonah Goldberg’s contention that liberals from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt to Hillary Clinton have advocated policies and principles remarkably similar to those of Hitler’s National Socialism and Mussolini’s Fascism (Goldberg, 2008). Michael Morgan has sought to explain Rosenzweig’s understanding: ‘Philosophy, like science, finds the meaning of nature, human beings, and religion in knowledge of the world, the human, and the divine. But, for Rosenzweig, the real meaning of my existence in the world is grounded in God’s revelation to me, which is an event of love and generosity and not a matter of my knowledge of God or the world or human reason. In a sense, then, for Rosenzweig, knowledge of the everyday and of a scientific kind is useful but limited. Whether it is based on a kind of idealism or realism is another issue; Rosenzweig’s point is that knowledge of this sort is limited in what it can show and do. It cannot tell us how to live, what is important in life, and what human beings should value and devote themselves to. Philosophers and scientists may know a great deal, but what they know is not a sufficient foundation on which to base a human life’ (Morgan, 2011: 96). As Connolly has observed, ‘Every moral economy also involves a certain forgetting, a forgetting of arbitrary impositions in the very pattern of equivalences it places under the star of morality. The logic of forgetting built into the equivalences of morality needs to be engaged if we are to subject morality to critical ethical scrutiny’ (Connolly, 1993a: 132). Critchley has offered a useful explanation of Levinas’ thinking on the matter: ‘This [ethical] crisis is the result of an ambiguity at the heart of the European liberal tradition, where the attempt to found a political order of peace on the “Greek

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wisdom” of autonomy, equality, reciprocity and solidarity has become a guilty conscience that recognizes how this political order often legitimized the violence of imperialism, colonialism and genocide … Responding to this crisis, Levinas wonders whether one might not ask if the ambiguous Hellenic peace of the European political order presupposes another order of peace, located not in the totality of the state or nation, but rather in the relation to the other human being, an order of sociality and love. So, if the ethical crisis of Europe is based on its unique attachment to a Greek heritage, then Levinas is suggesting that this heritage needs to be supplemented by a Biblical tradition, which would be rooted in the acknowledgement of peace as the responsibility to the other’ (Critchley, 2002: 25). For example, Levinas wrote of the ‘urgency of a destination leading to the Other and not an eternal return to self ’. Taking issue with Heidegger’s focus on things rather than relationships, Levinas also insisted, ‘Things are not, as in Heidegger, the foundation of the site, the quintessence of all the relations that constitute our presence on the earth (and “under the humans, in company with men, and in the expectation of the gods”). The relationship between the same and the other, my welcoming of the other, is the ultimate fact, and in it the things figure not as what one builds but as what one gives’ (Levinas, 1969: 51,  76–​7). As Critchley has explained: ‘That is, my first word is not Descartes’ “ego cogito” (“I am, I think”), it is rather “me voici!” (“here I am!” or “see me here!”), the word with which the prophet [Isaiah] testifies to the presence of God. For Levinas, the subject arises in the response to the other’s call. To put it another way, ethics is entirely my affair, not the affair of some hypothetical, impersonal or universal I running through a sequence of possible imperatives. Ethics is not a spectator sport’ (Critchley, 2002: 22, emphasis added). If subjectivity is only properly understood in terms of a right to be in relation to the other, then it is precisely this condition that serves as the only viable foundation for an effective ethics wherein subjectivity undergoes a ‘sustained de-​centring’ to prevent reducing everything to itself (Levinas and Kearney, 1986: 27). In short, subjectivity arises out of a responsibility for the other (Tan, 2006: 187). Campbell makes a very similar point in his 1998 book:  ‘This unique lack of choice comes about because in Levinas’s thought ethics has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity –​that is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by pre-​g iven, autonomous agents –​to something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity. Accordingly, ethics can be understood as something not ancillary to the existence of a subject; instead, ethics can be appreciated for its indispensability to the very being of the subject. This argument leads us to the recognition that “we” are always already ethically situated, so making judgments about conduct depends less on what sort of rules are invoked as regulations, and more on how the interdependencies of our relations with others are appreciated’ (Campbell, 1998: 176). Critchley’s assessment of this demanding requirement insisted on by Levinas is as follows:  ‘Levinas describes this demand, like other moral perfectionists, in exorbitant terms: infinite responsibility, trauma, persecution, hostage, obsession. The ethical demand is impossibly demanding. It has to be. If it were not so demanding then it would let us off the moral hook, as it were, and ethics would be reduced to a procedural programming where we justified moral norms by either universalising them, assessing them in the light of their consequences, or

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referring them to some already given notion of custom, convention or contract’ (Critchley, 2002: 28). Stated differently, there could be no freedom or choice prior to responsibility for the other: ‘we discern in obsession a responsibility that rests on no free commitment, a responsibility whose entry into being could be effected only without any choice. To be without a choice can seem to be violence only to an abusive or hasty and impudent reflection, for it precedes the freedom non-​freedom couple, but thereby sets up a vocation that goes beyond the egoistic fate of him who is only for-​himself … Responsibility for the Other, this way of answering without a prior commitment, is human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom’ (Levinas, 1991: 116). For example, addressing Levinas’ ‘non-​definition of the other’, the noted feminist scholar Luce Irigaray has asked, ‘Who is the other, if the other of sexual difference is not recognized or known?’ For Irigaray, Levinas’ use of words such as Other (autre) ‘without always defining or redefining them … gives a very insistent hermeneutical, metaphysical, or theological tone to his writings’ (Irigaray, 1991: 112–​13). Aporia refers to the indeterminacy and undecidability of opposites, such as the agent and structure problem in international relations theory (Doty, 1997), or the self and other concern in philosophy and ethics as discussed here. As Vassilios Paipais has correctly cautioned, critical approaches to the study of international relations have a tendency to compromise their critical edge in their engagement with the self/​other problematique. Understanding it as ‘the paradox of the politics of critique’, Paipais argues that critical approaches that understand critique as ‘total non-​violence towards, or unreflective affirmation of, alterity risk falling back into pre-​critical paths’ (Paipais, 2011: 121). This nudges critique towards either ‘a particularistic, assimilative universalism with pretensions of true universality or a radical incommensurability and the impossibility of communication with the other’ (Paipais, 2011: 121). Paipais closes by saying that ‘it is the perpetual striving to preserve the tension and ambivalence between self and other that rescues both critique’s authority and function’ (Paipais, 2011: 121).

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As Simon Critchley has put it, ‘The other person is not simply a step on the philosophers’ ladder to metaphysical truth. And perhaps the true source of wonder with which, as Aristotle claimed, philosophy begins, is not to be found by staring into the starry heavens, but by looking into another’s eyes, for here is a palpable infinity that can never exhaust one’s curiosity’ (Critchley, 2002: 27). Levinas’ Otherwise than being is typically understood as his attempt to respond to Derrida’s criticisms (Levinas, 1991). Recent scholarship has suggested that Levinas’ and Derrida’s intellectual relationship was marked by a complex and contradictory exchange that, despite their friendship, did not bring the two thinkers closer together in intellectual terms, notwithstanding their declared debts to one another (Derrida, 1999; Baring, 2018). Or as Henri Nouwen once put it, ‘The mystery of one man is too immense and too profound to be explained by another man’ (Nouwen, 2013: 62–​3). Be that as it may, as we shall see, Levinas’ ethics, particularly his third dimension of justice, tries to account for political practical limits in the exercise of his ethics. It is also where, as we shall see in the following chapter, my responsibility for the other

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may need to be adjusted according to the realities of Southeast Asia’s normative security environment. ‘Kant’s juridical account of hospitality grounds it within natural law’, as Alex Balch has observed. ‘That said, Kant does two things: first, he limits hospitality to a “right of visitation” (Besuchsrecht) rather than a “right to residence” (Gastrecht); second, hospitality in his rendition becomes dependent on the state’ (Balch, 2016: 4). As Shepherd has suggested: ‘Does hospitality exist through the act of invitation of the host, or the visitation of the guest? Does hospitality depend on reciprocal giving between ‘host’ and ‘guest’ –​if such distinctions exist –​or does it revolve around an act of unreserved generosity? Is it necessary or desirable to establish boundaries and limits to acts of hospitality, or does hospitality require the acceptance of all-​ comers?’ (Shepherd, 2014: 55–​6). Or, as Andrew Shepherd has put it, ‘The alienated self, discomforted by the disturbing Other, undergoes a makeover and is transformed into an ecclesial self; expanded to “make room” for otherness’ (Shepherd, 2014: iii). According to Caputo, Levinas’ vision of a hospitality and responsibility that transgresses the self can be described ‘in terms of a good beyond being, a good that does not exist because being does not reach as far as the good, a good that is beyond being from excess, where being always and already falls short of the good. It is not so much that the good fails to be as that being fails short of the good; the good does not fail the test of being, but being fails the test of the good. The good rises up like a command from the ashes of being. The good is without being, but this ‘without’ is not the name of a lack but an excess’ (Caputo, 2003b: 15). In Derrida’s typically challenging language, it is a ‘responsibility first of all, but of an “unlimited” responsibility that exceeds and precedes my freedom, that of an ‘unconditional yes, … of a “yes older than that of naive spontaneity”, a yes in accord with this uprightness that is “original fidelity to an indissoluble alliance” ’ (Derrida, 1999: 3). Derrida also argued that gifts cannot be a concept trapped within the circles of economy and reciprocity, but rather is a moment/​event of excess and madness, which opens up closed circles to the impossible (Derrida, 2017: 7). As Andrew Shepherd has asked: ‘In an age of “terror” where the stranger may be the refugee seeking sanctuary or the suicide-​bomber who comes as the harbinger of death, how does one discern between the malevolent and benevolent Other –​ between the Other who comes in peace and the Other who comes to bring destruction? In the context of civil or ethnic conflict in which many different Others are in conflict with one another, how does the subject in a bond of “infinite responsibility” to the Other(s) determine which of the Other’s needs/​demands/​ rights are most pressing?’ (Shepherd, 2014: 40). Referring to reciprocity as ‘a meta-​rule for the system of international law’, Francesco Paris and Nita Ghei make this observation: ‘International law, in this sense, exists in a state of nature, because there is no overarching legal authority with compulsory jurisdiction to enforce agreements. Inevitably, reciprocity has become an important element in relations between sovereign nations and in the body of existing international law’ (Paris and Ghei, 2003: 36, 123). As a young army colonel who led a humanitarian and disaster relief operation team from Singapore to Banda Aceh in Sumatra, Indonesia following that city’s devastation by a tsunami on 26 December 2004, the Speaker of the Singapore Parliament,

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Tan Chuan Jin, revisited Banda Aceh in 2014 when he was Singapore’s manpower minister. During the visit he met with villagers with whom he had laboured back in 2004 and recounted his experiences and impressions from those remarkable days: ‘I learnt about their stories too and was struck by their positive spirit despite their setbacks. [I was] inspired by their resilience and humanity’ (cited in Chong, 2014). The interpersonal relationship, while not as intimate as it could have been, was a small yet nonetheless important dimension to improving bilateral relations between Singapore and Indonesia. As an Indonesian analyst noted, ‘Singapore was also involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Indonesia, namely in the tsunami-​hit Aceh in 2004, Yogyakarta in 2006, and in search-​and-​rescue efforts for the ill-​fated Air Asia QZ 8501 in 2014. Above all, the Indonesian and Singaporean leadership remain committed to cordial ties’ (Marzuki, 2017). As Hans Jonas has intimated, ‘The disgrace of Auschwitz is not to be charged to some all powerful providence or to some dialectically wise necessity, as if it were an antithesis demanding a synthesis or a step on the road to salvation. We human beings have inflicted this on the deity, we who have failed in the administering of his things. It remains on our account, and it is we who must again wash away the disgrace from our own disfigured faces, indeed from the very countenance of God. Don’t talk to me here about the cunning of reason’ (Jonas, 1996: 188).

Chapter 9 1

2

3

4

A number of ASEAN watchers have responded in alarm to this openness, which they believe could undermine and unravel the organization if left unattended. According to Alan Chong, ‘Everyone has skeletons in his closet. We can’t go into that level of openness. History is a living ghost haunting ASEAN. There could be a problematic member of the ASEAN family on any given issue, but we never point fingers directly. That allows that member to climb down from a confrontation with the rest of ASEAN’ (cited in Yong, 2018). As a Malaysia-​based refugee expert has opined, ‘To the non-​Muslims in Malaysia, [former Prime Minister] Najib’s pledge to help the Rohingya is widely perceived to be self-​serving, given the fact that his United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the linchpin of Barisan Nasional, the multinational ruling coalition, has failed to speak up for non-​Muslim refugees facing persecution worldwide, such as the religious minorities in Iraq and Pakistan’ (Hong, 2017). It has been suggested that the prospect of the operation being undermined by lingering distrust was mitigated in no small part because of the close personal relationship between the Indonesian army commander in Meulaboh, Aceh and the Singapore Humanitarian Assistance Support Group commander, Colonels Geerhan Lantara and Tan Chuan-​Jin respectively, who were able to cut through not only the fog of distrust but also bureaucratic red tape by way of a phone call to one another (Loh, 2005; Loo and Ho, 2005). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the model of global-​to-​local flow of norms inherent in most of the global norm diffusion literature is arguably simplistic (Zwingel, 2012).

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258

Index 3R cooperative framework 94–​5 9/​11 attacks  92

A Abu Hassan Omar 60 Abu Sayyaf 88 ACDFIM (ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces (or Chiefs of Staff) Informal Meeting) 66, 67 speedy and effective disaster relief 84 Acharya, Amitav 39, 58, 190n2 Adams, Simon 28, 35 ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting) 6, 11, 54, 54–​5, 62–​6, 179 Direct Communications Link (DCL) 64 formation of 63 four-​fold remit  63 joint committee 64 leaders’ retreats 65, 193n5 location Cambodia (2012) 64 Indonesia (2011) 63–​4 Kuala Lumpur (2006) 63 Langkawi (2015) 64 Naypyidaw (2014) 64 Philippines (2017) 65 Singapore (2007) important papers 63 Singapore (2018) initiatives 65 Thailand (2009) 63 Vientiane (2016) 65 Vietnam (2010) 63 speedy and effective disaster relief 84 Three-​Year Work Programme (2014–​16)  64 ADMM-​Plus (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus) 6, 11–​12, 44, 54, 54–​5, 57–​8, 71–​6, 168, 179 accomplishments 76 air guidelines 72–​3 counterterrorism exercise (CTX) 73

formation of 57–​8 frequency of meetings 64 inauguration 71 joint military exercises 73–​6 members 71 participant fatigue 76 potential to conduct preventative diplomacy 87 practical collaboration 71–​2 stakeholders 76 table-​top exercise  73 talking shop 69 ADMM-​Plus Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security 65 ADMM Retreat 72 Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities (1997) 93 AHA Centre (ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management) 6, 12, 81, 170–​1 assistance and aid for Rohingya refugees 83–​4 Ahmad, Mahmud 89 Ahmad Zahid, Hamidi 194n3 AICHR (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights) 38, 39, 97, 98 ambiguities 39 Article 4.10 99 role of 98–​9 Alexandra, Lina 191n9 Allison, Graham 197n15 Aman, Anifah 181, 205n2 Ambalat region 117–​18 AMOIM (ASEAN Military Operation Informal Meeting) 67 Angell, Norman 199n9 Annan, Kofi 138–​9 Anti-​Dumping Agreement  114 Anwar, Dewi Fortuna 195n15 aporia 10, 151, 203n32 Appellate Body 113, 114

259

The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

APSC (ASEAN Political-​Security Community) 38–​9, 62–​3, 192n2 Arab Spring 27 Arbitral Tribunal 118, 126, 197n15 ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) 6, 49, 60, 62, 68, 69, 69–​71, 123 addition of practical dimension 70 concept paper 69 criticisms of 194n4 divisions within 70 establishment of 69 members 69 PD plan 70 reputation for avoiding responsibilities 71 Vision Statement 70 ARF Inter-​Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ARF-​ISG-​CBM)  66 ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF-​SOM)  66 armed forces 84 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 3 active engagement of friends and dialogue partners 54 adherence to non-​interference norm 45, 46 American support and discreet guidance 58 bilateral defence cooperation 59 bilateral tensions 116 collaboration with China and the US 121 comparisons with the EU 104 consensus and unity, undermining of 181 consensus organization 123, 198n17 coping with natural disasters 50 defence community 67 defence cooperation 67 engagement of outside powers 68 humanitarian crises 169 humanitarian emergencies 50 institutional design 107 justice and responsibility 176–​7 military-​to-​military collaboration  60 Myanmar assistance in 81–​2 enhanced interaction with 46–​7 invitation 47 openness 205n1 peer pressure 47, 186 performance legitimacy 45 raison d’etre 58 region-​wide multilateral security arrangement 60

regional defence community 60 regional diplomacy 103–​4 regional security cooperation 60 regionalism 107 regionalization of defence and security ties 58 relations with the EU 105–​6 relevance to major powers 121 response to terrorism 90–​1 trilateral and quadrilateral enterprises 59 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) 81 ASEAN Armies Information Sharing Workshop (AAISW) 95 ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine 64, 65 ASEAN Charter 83, 103, 104–​11 appropriateness 107 ASEAN agreements 109 derision of ASEAN leaders 110 ‘a disappointment’ 110 expected consequences 107 human rights body 108 institutional commitments 111 interstate disputes 110 legal instruments 111 mimicry 105, 106, 197n7 persuasion 107–​8 politics behind 107–​8 protocol on dispute settlement mechanisms 112 rules, codifying old/​creating new 108–​11 upbeat assessment 110–​11 ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medicine Meeting 67 ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) 98 ASEAN Community 39, 62, 63, 105 affirmative interpretations of 106–​7 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) 112 ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II, 2003) 62, 102 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT, 2007)) 92–​3, 96 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (2001) 92 ASEAN Defence Industry Council 67 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 44 ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM) Conference 65 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) 83, 98, 99

260

index

ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-​Top Exercise 67 ASEAN Information Sharing Exercise (ISX) 67 ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) on HADR 13, 47, 64, 65, 170 ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM) 66 ASEAN minus x 123, 195n15 formula 95 security domain 96 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) 125 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) 112 ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community (ASCC) 39 ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN Special SOM) 65–​6 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 103 ASEAN Way 45, 103, 123–​4, 125 ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) 6, 48 ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) 168 Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 68 Asia-​Pacific Region  185 Asian financial crisis (AFC, 1997–​98)  5, 48 Asian monetary fund 48 Asian values 105, 129, 130 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) see ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) asymmetry 150 AU (African Union) 51 authentic commitment 152

B Bali bombings 92 Banda Aceh 204–​5n12 Bangladesh 82 Battle of Marawi see Marawi conflict Bellamy, A.J. 29, 51 Bernasconi, Robert 160 build theory 10 Burke, Edmund 200–​1n18

C Caballero-​Anthony, Mely  191n10 Cambodia, territorial disputes 116–​17 Campbell, David 200n17, 202n28 Capie, David 37–​8 Caputo, John 158, 158–​9, 189n3, 204n7

Categorical Imperative 142, 200n15 CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) threats 95 Cha-​Am Hua Hin Declaration (2009) 99 Chalermpalanupap, Termsak 98 Chalier, Catherine 160 Chandler, David 28, 31, 139–​40 Chatterjee, Partha 144–​5 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 6, 48 Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) 48, 168, 170 China 87 rule by law 198n4 South China Sea code of conduct 119–​20 over-​flight and undersea domains 121–​2 territorial disputes 118–​19 Chong, Alan 205n1 Chrétien, Jean 26 Chun Doo Hwan 131 civil liberties 96 civil society organizations (CSOs) 97 Clinton, Bill 33 CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries 60–​1 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) see CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea) code of conduct (COC) 119–​20 Cohen, Jean 33 Cold War 59, 60 Combined Maritime Patrol Teams (CMPTs) 61 communitarianism 7–​8, 14–​15, 128–​9, 146, 151, 182, 184 aims of 128 Asian values 129, 130 beliefs 132 Confucianism 130–​1 critique of liberalism 129 cultural and political relativism 135 and an ethics of responsibility 135–​6 and international relations 133 and nationalism 134, 135 and the R2P 134 and responsibility 129–​36 and sovereignty 132, 133 competitions of compassion 87 conflict management 46, 79–​80, 88–​97, 185 Sudan and the African region 51 Confucianism 130–​1 Connolly, William 141–​2, 144, 200–​1n18, 201n23 constructive engagement policy 172, 173 constructive intervention 39

261

The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

constructive norms 39 contractarianism 142 Corthay, E. 189n6 cosmopolitan liberalism 137, 138 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-​Pacific (CSCAP)  190n3 counterinsurgency (COIN) operations 194–​5n9 counterterrorism 88 cooperation 92–​5 3R cooperative framework 94–​5 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT, 2007) 92–​3 defence establishments 93 military assistance 93 Our Eyes Initiative (OEI) 94, 168 growing role for armed forces 96–​7 militarizing 95–​7 strategies 90–​2 crimes against humanity 25 Critchley, S. 148, 201–​2n24, 202–​3n29, 203n1 CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea) 72, 73, 76, 120, 121–​2, 126 Cunliffe, Philip 31, 32, 140, 141, 142, 199–​200n14, 199n13 Cyclone Nargis 5, 11, 40, 43 as a catalyst for the R2Provide 49–​52 international aid and assistance 169 international financial assistance 81 Kouchner’s idea 49 Myanmar government ASEAN engagement 51, 81–​2 refusal of international aid 49 tripartite model 81, 82, 173

Derrida, Jacques 15, 154, 156, 157, 158–​ 9, 161, 171–​2, 204n9, 204n10 Descartes, René 147 Desker, Barry 110 deterrence 87–​8 disaster management local, societal-​level capacities 85 role of armed forces 84, 85 speedy and effective relief 84–​5 dispute management 101–​26 ASEAN charter 104–​11 ASEAN-​EU relations  105–​6 ASEAN regionalism 107 ASEAN Way 123 coding interstate conduct in the South China Sea 119–​23 conciliation 117 legalization 101–​2, 103, 104, 107, 123, 196n2 regional experience with rules 103–​4 resolution of disputes 112–​23 Article 25 ASEAN Charter 112 EDSM 112 Investor-​State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 112 territorial disputes 114–​19, 181 trade disputes 112–​14, 181 third-​party arbitration and/​or adjudication 102 Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (DSB) 112–​13, 114 Djani, Dian Triansyah 106 domestic sovereignty 18 Duffield, Mark 31 Duterte, President Rodrigo 79, 99, 128

D

E

Dang, T.T.H. 110 Darfur 25, 26, 28 Davies, Mathew 99 de Cuellar, Javier Perez 41, 192n13 de-​radicalization  91–​2 Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters 80 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) 119 deconstruction 189n3 democratization 130–​1 Deng, F. et al 11, 46, 80, 171 external intervention and assistance 31–​2 human rights 196n17 Deng, Francis 40–​1, 51, 52 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture (2010) 40–​1, 47 reality on the ground 41 sovereignty as responsibility 19–​21

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 190n2 Eminent Persons Group (EPG) 109, 110 Emmerson, Don 108 emulation 196n5 ethic of ultimate ends 133 ethical responsibility 145, 200n17 ethics 147–​8, 149, 150, 151 Levinas see Levinas, Emmanuel: ethics and morality 156–​7 ethos of responsibility 1–​16 acts of hospitality 1 conceptual dimension 7 forms of assistance 1 philosophical dimension 7–​8 EU (European Union) 104 mimicry of 105 persuasion 106 relations with ASEAN 105–​6 Evans, Gareth 26, 50–​1

262

index

Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) 72, 73, 74–​5 Eyes in the Sky (EiS) initiative 61, 93

human rights 97–​100, 196n17 diversity of standards 99 inadequate mechanisms 98 promotion of 99 role of AICHR 98 humanitarian emergency 33 humanitarian interventions 23, 25, 26–​7 declining international support for 28 inherent contradiction 32 undemocratic 33 humanitarianism 29 Husin, Azahari 91

F Filipovic, Zlatan 184 Five Eyes alliance 94 Five-​Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 68 flexible engagement 39

G GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 113, 114 Gen, Nakatani 62 George, Jim 200n16 gift-​giving  161 Ginty, R.M. 191n6 Glanville, L. 27, 30 Global North and the R2P 35 see also Western powers globalization 33 Gorman, D. 199n9 Group of Friends of R2P 36, 45 Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME) 65

H HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) 6, 12, 180 and deterrence 87–​8 implications for preventative diplomacy 86–​7 in Myanmar 81–​4 pros and cons of militarization 84–​6 regional capacity 80 regional cooperation 80–​8 terms of reference (TOR) 46–​7 unified regional framework 80–​1 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig 101 Hallie, Philip 1, 187 Hapilon, Isnilon 89 He, Lieutenant-​General Lei 119 heteronomy 149, 166 HLTF (High Level Task Force) 105, 106, 108 Hobbes, Thomas 142 homesickness 198–​9n5 hospitality 161–​2, 166, 177 acts of 1 Derrida 156, 171–​2 Kant 204n5 Levinas 9, 156–​9, 161–​2, 171, 172, 177 responsible provision 166–​72 see also responsibility as hospitality

I Ibrahim, Anwar 39 ICISS (International Commission on International and State Sovereignty) report (2001) 11, 23 Ignatieff, Michael 24 Ikenberry, G. John 136 illiberal democracy 132 Indama, Furuji 89 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004) 87 indigenous regionalism 58 individualism 137 Indo-​Pacific region  185 INDOMALPHI (Indonesia-​Malaysia-​ Philippines Trilateral Maritime Patrol) 62, 93, 95 Indonesia 36, 45, 61, 68, 167 assistance for Rohingya refugees 83 mediation 116–​17 promotion of human rights 99 proposal for peacekeeping element 85 rejects HADR offer 182–​3 response to terrorism 91 territorial disputes 115, 117–​18 twin disasters 85 week prison system 90 Indonesian armed forces (TNI) 118 Indonesian Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) 91 Indonesian National Police 91 infinity 147 Institute of Policy Analysis on Conflict (IPAC) 90 Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) 61 interdependence sovereignty 18 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 114–​ 15, 116, 117, 173 International Disaster Database 80 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 62 international law 119, 122 international legal sovereignty 18, 21 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 48

263

The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 123, 197n12 Investor-​State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 112 invitation 169–​70, 171–​2 Iraq War 26, 28, 29 ISIS 88, 88–​90 responsibility for attacks in Southeast Asia 88–​9 ISIS Central 89

J Jackson, Robert and Rosberg, Carl 18–​19 Jakarta attack (2016) 89 Japanese Coast Guard 71 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 88, 90 Jetschke, A. and Murray, P. 105, 106 Johor Sultanate 115 Joint Special Operations Command 91 justice 9, 10, 161 responsibility and 162–​5, 177 responsible provision 174–​7

K Kant, Immanuel 142–​3, 156–​7, 204n5 Katibah Nusantara (KN) 89, 195n10 Katsumata, Hiro 98 Kim Dae Jung 131 Koh, Tommy 110–​11, 111, 117, 123 Koskenniemi, Martti 151–​2 Kouchner, Bernard 49 Kraft, Herman 38, 39 Krasner, Stephen 18 Kusumaatmatdja, Mochtar 60

L Laos 61 Law Association of Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA) 97 Law of the Sea Convention 197n11 Lee Hsien Loong 83 Lee Kuan Yew 59 Lee Myung Bak 131 legalization 101–​2, 107, 196n2 ambivalence to 102, 104 conservative approach to 103 utilitarian approach to 102 Leninism 61 Levinas, Emmanuel 4, 15–​16, 189n3 anti-​humanism  145–​6 attack on liberalism 145–​6 on being 149 ethical interruption of reciprocity 160 ethical systems 145 ethics 148, 149, 150, 151, 157, 158, 159, 162, 165–​6, 177, 184, 201–​2n24

as first philosophy 154 postmodern approach 150–​1 self-​actualization  155 valorization of the self 155 human existence 148–​9, 202n25 liberalism and Nazism 145, 146 metaphysics 154 other and self 150, 155 unknowable 155 political rationality 148 proximity 9–​10, 164–​5 responsibility and justice 162–​5, 174–​5, 177 responsibility as hospitality 9, 156–​9, 161–​2, 171, 172, 177 responsibility for the other 154 responsibility without reciprocity 9, 159–​62, 166 self, the 145 third party 162, 163, 165, 174 totalization 146–​7, 149–​50, 151 totalizing narratives 146–​7 liberal internationalism 137 liberalism 7, 8, 14–​15, 128–​9, 151, 182 aims of 128 assigning culpability 141–​2 autonomous actors 144 classical 137 cosmopolitan 137 intolerance of differences 144 Levinas’ attack on 145–​6 and Nazism 145, 146 pluralist 137 and the R2P 199n12 and responsibility 136–​45 and the social contract 142–​3 and sociality 143 and the state 138 tradition 136 unencumbered selves 136–​7 and war 142 Libya military intervention 28–​9, 191n5 Ligitan and Sipadan islands 114–​15 Linklater, Andrew 140–​1 Liow, Joseph 89, 195n10 Lloyd’s 61 localization 38, 45 Luck, Edward 22, 190–​1n4 Luther, Martin 133

M Mahbubani, Kishore 132 Malacca Straits 61 Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) 61, 67 Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-​IS)  61 Malacca Straits Sea Patrols 61, 93

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Malaysia 61, 167 assistance for Rohingya refugees 83 disassociation from ASEAN 181–​2 response to terrorism 90–​1 territorial disputes 114–​15, 116, 117–​18 Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) 194n3 Malik, Moazzam 81–​2 Marawi conflict 88, 89, 90, 93, 168 weaponry 88, 89 Marina Bay Sands plot 89, 91 Maute, Omarkhayam 89 McCain, John 143 Mentawai Islands 85 MH370 airline accident 87 Military Medicine and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AMHEx) 76 Military Medicine Senior Medical Planners’ Workshop 73 mimicry 105, 106, 196n5, 197n7 Mindanao 88, 90 Minh, Le Luong 64–​5 Mizanur, Rahman 91 Mohamad, Mahathir 115 Mohammad, Noordin 91 morality 156–​7 Morgan, Michael 201n22 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 93 Morris, Justin 29 Moses, Jeremy 191n8 Mount Merapi 85 Muhammadiyah 92 multilateralism 7 Myanmar 37, 46–​7, 167, 172–​3 HADR missions 81–​4, 169 military offensive against Rohingya insurgents 79, 82–​3 ASEAN inaction 82–​3 humanitarian assistance 83 refugees 82 see also Cyclone Nargis

N Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 92 Naim, Bahrun 89 Nance, M. 200n15 Nasir, K.M. and Turner, B.S. 131 Natalegawa, Marty 117 National League for Democracy (NLD) 82 national sovereignty 32 nationalism 134, 135, 196n1 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 28 natural disasters 5, 49, 50, 80, 174

Southeast Asia 80 see also Cyclone Nargis; disaster management; HADR missions (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) negative rights 31 new sovereigntists 33 Nolte, G. 122 non-​interference 3, 37, 45, 185, 186, 189n2 adherence to 53 contravention of 46 as a legal principle 45 non-​intervention principle 3, 8, 24, 31 adverse impact of R2P 32–​3 circumstance and expediency 33

O Oakeshott, Michael 133 One Southeast Asia notion 60 open regionalism principle 68 Operation Flying Eagle 87 Operation MALSINDO 61 Oppenheim, Lassa 18 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 190n2 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 6 other, responsibility for 165–​77 Our Eyes Initiative (OEI) 94, 168 overcoming distrust 94

P Pacific Ring of Fire 49, 80 Paris, Roland 30 Park Geun Hye 131 Pauker, Guy 195 Pedra Branca island 114, 115, 116 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 119, 194n6 performance legitimacy 48 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 197n11 Permanent Five (P5) powers 140, 141 Petronas 117–​18 Pfortmüller, F. 143 Philippines 36, 45, 184 difficulties facing security forces 79 promotion of human rights 99 territorial disputes 118–​19 trade disputes 113–​14 political will 25 politics of place 198n5 Preah Vihear temple 116–​17 preventative diplomacy (PD) 70, 86–​7, 194n5 principle of right 200n15

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prisons 90 proximity, Levinas’ idea of 9–​10, 164–​5

Q quasi-​states  19

R R2P (responsibility to protect) 2, 4, 7, 11, 17–​41 adoption by UN 23–​4 key components of 24 African roots of 22 Africa’s embrace of 40 Arab Spring 27 championing of 22–​7 normative worth of underlying ideal 23 critiquing of 27–​34 dual paternalism 31 evading international responsibility 28 global principle 5 Group of Friends 36, 45 high bar for implementation 29–​30 impact on regional debate 179 implementation and application, problems with 25, 26 introduction 21 law-​making  31 legitimation of robust and forceful interventionism 34 Libyan intervention 28–​9, 191n5 misappropriate legitimization of war 26 misconception as a Western concept 21–​2 national sovereignty 32 and natural disasters 49 norm 22, 24, 25, 26, 27–​8, 30, 37–​8 positive duty 30 problems of military interventions 30 reaffirmation by Security Council 23, 24 reframing of state power and political practice 30–​1 responsibility over rights 33–​4 retreat from liberalism 140–​1, 142 solidarist foundation 199n12 Southeast Asian responses to 34–​9 ambivalence 35–​9, 40, 45 humanitarian intervention v. non-​interference  37 opposition to military intervention 53 protective responsibility and provision of assistance 53 and the state dilution of political responsibilities 31 duty to protect people 32 justification of non-​intervention 32 Syria, lack of intervention 27

unwarranted expectations 35 viewed as above the law 33 and war 142 wariness of 38 weak track record 35 R2Provide (Responsibility to Provide) 3, 4, 7, 11–​12, 43–​55 ADMM and ADMM-​Plus 54 conflict management 185 consensus and invitation 169–​70 Cyclone Nargis as a catalyst for 49–​52 debt to R2P 179 definition 43–​4, 52 formulating and implementing 52–​5 growing signs of regional responsibility 48–​9 international accountability of provider nations 53 liberalist approach 182 military intervention, wariness over 44–​5 mutual consent and cooperation 47–​8 non-​interference principle  45 peer pressure and social persuasion 53 potential to export 184–​6 recipient and provider obligations and responsibilities 53 responsible provision 177–​8 as acts in hospitality 166–​72 and the question of reciprocity 172–​4 and the realistic dispensation of justice 174–​7 shared vulnerability and common aversion 44 solidarist foundation 139 sovereignty and responsibility 44–​8 susceptibility to transnational challenges 44 three pillars 53–​4, 166–​9 unilateral intervention 169–​70 Rawls, John 138 reactionary regionalism 48 realism, political 189n1 reciprocal asymmetry 9, 162, 166 reciprocity 9, 143–​4, 159–​62, 166, 204n11 and responsible provision 172–​4 regional arms register 85 regional cooperation in conflict management 88–​97 counterterrorism cooperation 92–​5 counterterrorism strategies 90–​2 ISIS 88–​90 militarizing counterterrorism 95–​7 release of militant prisoners 90 Syrian and Iraqi fighters 90 in HADR 80–​8

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deterrence 87–​8 implications for preventative diplomacy 86–​7 Myanmar 81–​4 pros and cons of militarization 84–​6 in human rights 97–​100 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre 175 regional diplomacy, rules-​based 103–​4 Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) 86 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) 61 regional responsibility 48–​9 Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) 91–​2 response ability see responsibility and response ability responsibility and justice 9, 162–​5 responsibility and response ability 6 ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting) 62–​6 ADMM-​Plus (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-​Plus)  71–​6 ancillaries and annexes 66–​8 ASEAN Regional Forum 69–​71 beyond Southeast Asia 68–​76 institutionalization 66 military-​to-​military modalities  66 regionalizing security relations 58–​62 in Southeast Asia 57–​68 responsibility as hospitality 9, 156–​9, 171, 172 responsibility for the other 165–​77 responsibility to protect (R2P) see R2P (responsibility to protect) responsibility to provide (R2Provide) see R2Provide (Responsibility to Provide) responsibility without reciprocity 9, 159–​62, 166 responsible management of disputes see dispute management responsible provision 1–​2, 79–​80, 177–​8 as acts in hospitality 166–​72 and the question of reciprocity 172–​4 and the realistic dispensation of justice 174–​7 responsible sovereignty 6, 43, 101, 182–​3, 184 Southeast Asians’ conception of 46 Richardson, Bill 82 Ricoeur, Paul 162 Roh Moo Hyun 131 Roh Tae Woo 131

Rohingya refugee crisis 79, 82–​4, 87, 128, 170, 181 Romulo, Carlos 58 Rose, Gillian 150–​1 Rosenstock-​Huessy, Eugen  145 Rosenzweig, Franz 147, 201n22 Rotberg, Robert 190n1 rule by law 198n4 rule of law 131–​2 rules-​based approaches/​governance 103–​ 4, 119, 122, 126 Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit 111 Rules of Authorization for Legal Transactions under Domestic Laws 111 Ryacudu, Ryamizard 94

S Saffron Revolution (2007) 46, 50 SASOP (Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations) 13, 64, 84, 85, 86 Schiff, Benjamin 197n8 sea, accidents at 120 security 43 Security Council 28 reaffirmation of R2P (Resolution 1674) 23, 24, 34 Resolution 1556 51 Resolution 1706 28 veto powers 35 security regionalism 57–​77, 68 Severino, Rodolfo C. 104 Shafie, Ghazalie 59 Shangri-​La Dialogue  50, 62 acknowledgement of contributions 85 attraction of 62 Shepherd, Andrew 163, 204n10 Shin, D.C. 130 Singapore 36, 45, 72–​3, 126, 167, 168 assistance for Rohingya refugees 83 de-​radicalization  91–​2 Infrastructure Protection Act (2017) 91 multi-​stakeholder collaboration  92 offer of assistance 182–​3 Public Order Act 91 Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) 91–​2 response to terrorism 91 safety at sea proposal 120 territorial disputes 115, 116 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 87, 194n8 Slaughter, Anne-​Marie  139 Small Five Countries 35, 140

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Smith, Adam 137 social contract 20 theories 142–​3 social liberalism 138 soft authoritarianism 131 South China Sea 12, 63, 76, 96, 118, 119–​23, 126 ASEAN-​China maritime exercise 120 coding interstate conduct in 119–​23 high level of maritime operations 120 South Korea 131–​2 Southeast Asia 189n4 defence establishments 85 holistic counterterrorism strategies 90–​2 interstate collaboration 88 prone to national disasters 80 quest for legitimacy 98 regionalism 107 rules-​based approach to regional diplomacy 103–​4 terrorism 89 see also ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 68 Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise 121 Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-​Terrorism (SEARCCT) 175 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 58 Southeast Asian countries 5 misrepresentation of 2 non-​traditional security challenges 5 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 190n2 sovereign responsibility 2, 3, 11 conduct in 6 sovereignty 5, 17–​21, 122 accountability of governments 20–​1 de facto 191n8 de jure 191n8 Deng’s view 19–​21, 46 and responsibility 19–​20, 46 types of 18 sovereignty as responsibility 7, 37 Sovereignty as responsibility (Deng, F. et al) 20 Soviet-​Vietnamese partnership  59 state-​sponsored violence  35 state, the abuse of R2P 29 duties of the citizen 131

duty to protect people 32 justification of domestic political authority 32 responsibility to meet needs of people 20 right to non-​intervention 20, 23, 31–​2 social contract 20 victimising own citizens 190n1 see also communitarianism Straits of Malacca 61 subjectivity 149, 202n27 Sudan 51–​2 hostility to UN intervention 52 Suganami, Hidemi 199n12 Sukma, Rizal 38–​9 Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols 67 Surin Pitsuwan 39, 116, 124–​5, 179 Suu Kyi, Aung San 82, 128 Syria 27, 35

T Talentino, Andrea 32–​3 Tan Chuan Jin 205n12 Tatmadaw 82 Teo Chee Hean 84 terms of reference (TOR) AICHR 39 ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR 47 territorial disputes 114–​19 terrorism 89, 90–​1, 92 definition in Southeast Asia 92 see also counterterrorism Thailand 36 promotion of human rights 99 response to terrorism 91 territorial disputes 116–​17 trade disputes 114 Thakur, Ramesh 26, 49, 51 Thein Sein, President U 82 third party, Levinas 163, 165, 174 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) see UNCLOS III (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) three pillars 53–​4, 166–​9 totalitarianism 145 totalizing philosophies and theories 146–​7, 149–​50, 151 trade-​related disagreements  112 transactionalism 143 transnational crime 92 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC, 1976) 68 Trilateral Maritime Patrol (INDOMALPHI) 62, 93, 95

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tsunamis 5, 6 Typhoon Haiyan 87, 184

U UN (United Nations) adoption of R2P 23 key components of 24 three pillars 24 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) see UNCLOS III (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) UN Human Rights Council 99 UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) 86 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 83, 86 UN Secretary General (UNSG) 27 UN World Summit (2005) 5, 23, 25, 34 UNCLOS III (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) 64, 102, 196, 196n2 dispute settlement 118 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 99 Universal Principle of Right 15 universalism 140 US Indo-​Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) 61 US Navy 120 US Pacific Command (PACOM) 61 Utilization of Military Assets for HADR 64

V Valencia, Mark 120 Valevicius, Andrius 157–​8 VAP (Vientiane Action Programme) 63, 192n2 Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993) 105 Vientiane Protocol 112 Vietnam 36–​7, 61 accommodation of ASEAN’s defence regionalism 61 suspicions about ASEAN 58 vulnerability 172

W Walker, R.B.J. 199n6 Walzer, Michael 132, 133, 134, 138 war on terror 26, 28 Warner, Daniel 132, 133 Weber, Max 133, 199n6 Wendt, Alexander 143, 200n16 Western, J. and Goldstein, J.S. 23 Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) 121 Western powers 45 humanitarian interventions 26–​7 and R2P abuse of 28–​9 appropriation of 22 argument for law-​making 31 sovereignty as freedom of policy choice 35, 45 Westphal, Merold 201n19 Westphalian sovereignty 18, 21, 139 Wight, Martin 198n2 Willaschek, M. 200n15 Wirajuda, Hassan 116 Woon, Walter 110, 198n17 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 97 World Economic Forum 198n1 World Food Programme (WFP) 86 World Summit Outcome 190n3 WTO (World Trade Organization) 112, 123, 125 dispute settlement 113 see also Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (DSB)

X Xi Jinping, President 198n1 Xiangshan Forum 126

Y Yeo, George 47, 105

Z Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 68

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Bristol studies in

See Seng Tan is Professor of International Relations at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore

Despite the long-held and jealously guarded ASEAN principle of non-intervention, this book argues that states in Southeast Asia have begun to display an increasing readiness to think about sovereignty in terms not only of state responsibility to their own populations, but also towards neighbouring countries as well. Taking account of the realities of interstate cooperation in the region, and drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the author develops a new theoretical framework reflecting an evolution of attitudes about state sovereignty to explain this emerging ethic of regional responsibility.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

“This nuanced and thought-provoking book adds a highly welcome new layer to our understanding of the evolution of norms in Southeast Asia” Linda Quayle, independent writer and researcher

SEE SENG TAN

Bristol Studies in East Asian International Relations combines original research and theoretical innovation to give fresh insight into the changing politics of the region.

The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia Towards an Ethical Explanation

SERIES EDITORS Yongjin Zhang, Shogo Suzuki and Peter Marcus Kristensen

SEE SENG TAN ISBN 978-1-5292-0072-0

9 781529 200720

B R I S TO L

@bristoluniversitypress www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

East Asian International Relations