The relation of problem solving behavior to the structuralization of social groups

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U n p u b l i s h e d theses s u b m i tt ed for the M a s t e r ’s and D o c t o r ’s d e gr ee s and d e p o si t ed in the N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y are open for inspection, but are to be used only with duo regar d to the right s of the authors. Bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s ma y be noted, but pa s s a g e s may be copied only with the p e r m i s s i o n of the author, and pr o p e r credit must be given in s u b s eq u en t w r i t t e n or p u b l i s h e d work. E x t e n s i v e copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of the theses in whole or in part requi re s also the consent of the D e a n of the G r a d u a t e School of N o r t h w e s t e r n University. Th is thes i s by has been used by the f o l l o w i n g persons, whose signatures attest their a c c e p t a n c e of the above restrictions. patrons

A L i b r a r y which b or r o w s this thesis for use by its is e xp e c t e d to secure the signa tu r e of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE - / ?.,

Dynamic Sociology, ed. 1911, V. 2, p. 81.

(2)

Ibid.. p. 4.

57

A similar influence can be discerned in the theories of Spencer* Cooley, remarking upon Spencer’s evolutionary concepts said:

"These

terms may be applicable to human life, as you can measure a man in inches and pounds, but they can never be essential and characteristic truth about it."^ ^)

It is probably because of this inadequacy that the

early sociologists had to resort to extra-categorical assumptions in order to account for the truly human aspects of behavior. long such terms as super-organic, desire, purpose, etc*

To these be­ Body-mind

dualism had to be resorted to as the only way out of the dilemma.

Thus

genetic forces were assumed when accounting for the genetic development, and super-organic or teleogical forces were assumed as final causes of social progress. The theory of social forces suffered from the same limitations which the general theory of forces suffered.

As was pointed out before,

the concept of force implies extraneity, i.e., that the force acts upon the medium, an element, from outside.

Daily experience gives this

assumption an unconsciously accepted verification.

The result of this

fact is that in spite of all efforts to the contrary, the theory of social forces needs to this day to deliberate as to whether the social force lies without or within a person.

As late as in 1925, Small was

deeply involved in the problem. “There are no social forces which are not at the same time forces lodged in individuals, deriving their energy from individuals and operating in and through individuals. There are no social forces that lurk in the containing ether, and affect persons without the agency of other persons";

(1)

Cooley, C.H., Sociological Theory and Social Research, ed.1930, p.276.

(2)

Ward, L., op. oit., ed. 1911, v. 1, p. 24.

58

yet on the very next page he states that:

"Persons are transputers of

physical forces into social forces; * . * or . * * they are in other persons, and exert themselves as external stimuli upon otherwise inert persons•

"

The language of these passages indicates clearly an almost

material, physical aspect of forces; the persons are only transputers of physical forces that came from the physical world and do not "become social unless they are

transmitted through persons; then in turn they act again

upon inert persons*

Thus Small did not heed his own warning*

The aspect

of externality of force asserted itself in the linguistic implications in spite of the author* s intentions to the contrary* The influence of the natural sciences showed itself not only in the use of concepts, "but also of methods*

The sociological analysis of

social phenomena into elements was stimulated "by the successes of chemistry which followed the discoveries of the chemical elements*(2) this line of endeavor sociology met problems

In pursuing

quite similar to those of

chemistry; it was, however, unable to solve them as adequately, for the simple reason that it was not able to develop appropriate techniques necessary to test the applicability of the method* Chemistry, aided by experimental evidence early discovered the limits beyond which chemical analysis could not be carried,

Thomas Graham

in the course of his work (which established colloidal chemistry by 1861) discovered that the subdivision of matter by mechanical means could proceed only to a certain point.

As the subdivision proceeded beyond

the range of molecules and neared the atomic structure (1)

(2)

"farther

Small, A.V., General Sociology, ed. 1925, pp. 532-5; see also An Introduction to the Study of Society, by Small, A.W* and Vincent,G.E. ed* 1894, p, 173. A similar analoyical use of scientific "methods" is exemplified in a recent work of G.A.^undberg* See his analysis of social phenomena in terms of equilibration in the electro-magnetic fields of energy* foundations of Sociology, part 2, "Societal Dynamics", especially chapter 6,

59

subdivision was impossible without destroying the chemical nature of* the substance^

The chemist learned that th© province of his invest-

igation did not extend beyond the "twilight zone11 of matter*

He learned

that an analysis carried too far destroyed the organization of the units and transformed chemistry into physics* The physicist had accepted an atom as an indestructible bit of matter, but found that within it there was an organization which determined its very nature*

The primary problem of the physicist today is th©

investigation of the processes and of the organization within the atom. "If all elementary atoms consist of the same two fundamental components proton and electron, it is in fact only differences of form, namely, the arrangement of these components in the nucleus and the external rings which finally determine all difference in m a t t e r 2) The endeavor of the sociologists to establish the elements of social science and methods of analysis led to an error common to other sciences, namely, to misunderstanding as to what the analytical method was to discovers

an element or a principle of organization*

In the

field of chemistry the search for organization quickly became a matter of primary importance, for without understanding the nature of the organization the laboratory techniques of compounding were impossible. Hot so in social sciences.

Notwithstanding the lack of experimental

techniques, verbal analysis could proceed unchecked without giving any insight into relationships of the social phenomena.

The early works of

G.T* Fechner and of Gestalt psychologists stress the fact that the

(1)

Findlay, A., The Spirit of Chemistry, ed. 1938, p* 419.

(2)

Bavink, B., The Natural Sciences, ed* 1932, p. 136. Concerning the state of the present day investigation in this field see: Max Bora, Hestless Universe, 1936, the chapter on "Electronic Structure of the Atom" and the chapter on "Nuclear Physics."

ao

analysis into th© elements or factors destroys the totality, because without knowing the principle of organization we are unable to reconstruct the totality from its elements. The result of these methods was that human behavior as a totality* was largely left out of formal sociological discussion.

The organiza­

tional, the relational aspects of the sociological method were neglected* The results obtained thus far, significant as they are, were rather a by­ product of the search for the social ’atom* or ’element* rather than a result of an investigation into the nature of the relationships. as late as 1931, J.K. Folsom stated that:

Even

11we have analyzed it (the

elementary process of human behavior) into the smallest possible units* How we shall begin to synthetize, to view behavior in its larger organi­ zations.**^)

He likens the study of human behavior to furniture manu­

facture which, according to him, consists of joining together pieces of wood.

His simile bespeaks quite pointedly the unconsciously assumed

premise.

(1)

Folsom, J.K*, Social Psychology, ed. 1931, p. 135.

CHAPTER V THEORIES OF SOCIAL FORCES The original concept of social force was formulated by Ward who defined it as a desire which is "the essential basis of all action, and hence true force in the sentient world*"^) into essential and non-essential.

He classified forces

The essential forces included the

preservative forces of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain; reproduc­ tive forces including direct sexual desires and indirect parental and consanguineal affections*

The non-essential forces included esthetic, (2 ) emotional and intellectual forces. Ross^3 ) in his earlier work followed Ward and divided desires into natural and cultural*

Natural desires according to him included

appetitive, hedonic (seeking pleasure), egotic (stressing self rather than organism), affective and recreative.

The oultural desires in­

cluded religious, ethical, esthetic and intellectual* Small(4)

conceived an

"individual as impelled by desires

which demanded satisfaction of certain definite wants." as follows:

These wants were

health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty and righteous­

ness (which he later changed to rightness)*

Ross objected to his

classification on the basis that each item lumped together many diverse desires thus denying them any real status as "social elements.

That

Small considered them to be such and that he followed analogically the

(1)

Ward, L., Dynamic Sociology* ed. 1911, v. 1, p. 468.

(2)

Ibid** p* 472*

(3)

Ross, E.A*, Foundations of Sociology, p* 169.

(4)

Small, A.W., and Vincent, G.E., An Introduction to the Study of Society, ed* 1894, p. 175*

62

methods of the natural sciences is obvious from the fact that he called his lists of wants social elements and placed them in a chapter called Social Anatomy. It was probably under the influence of Ratzenhofer and under the criticism of Ross* that Small abandoned the term "wants” and adopted the term "interests*”

These he assumed to be the ultimate social elements

to which the actions of human beings could be reduced, and declared specifically:

”Interests are the simplest modes of motion which we can

trace in the conduct of human b e i n g A l t h o u g h he believed that the sociological problem was the task of calculating a unique equation of interests, which, were assumed to be simple elements, the elaboration of his definition of interests points to a tremendous complexity of the phenomena so designated, and therein lies his contribution.

This frequent­

ly criticized elaboration of Small’s definition of interests^^ may not be wholly consistent, yet it singles out several aspects of behavior, such as unsatisfied want or need, capacity for such satisfaction, a problem situation, potentialities of the person to cope with the problem, probabilities of success, ete#

It is doubtful whether Small found the

indivisible social element he sought.

That is not important, however,

though sociological criticism is confined mainly to this point.

It is

significant, however, that the explicit wish to find the element, the cause of social behavior, obscured Small’s contribution, which brought to the surface the complexity of the phenomenon assumed as simple and ele­ mental.

(1)

Small, A.W., General Sociology, ed. 1925, p. 426.

(2)

Ibid. In his definition Small states: "An interest is an unsatis­ fied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition and it is predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition.” Op. oit., p. 433.

65

P.W, Bridgjnan is exceedingly difficult*

points out that such clarification of concepts Our concepts are surrounded with, a sort of

"penumbra or fuzz" he says, and this is due to the perience

is surrounded by a

fact that our ex­

sort of twilight zone which is not yet ex­

plored by experiment and which defies measurement. "This penumbra is so exceedingly tenuous that practically we are not aware of its existence and never find undiscovered phenomena within in. But in principle we must recognize that all empirical science must be of this character*"^) The definition of an interest as proposed by Small was not a definition of a simple element, but of a complex which was not made more explicit in terms of operation, i.e*, in terms of behavior*

Instead,

the term “interest" was chiefly used as an arbitrarily assigned cau3e of a behavior sequence quite in line with the general effort to find the cause of social behavior shown in the writing of the great majority of sociologists of that time. Because of this tendency innumerable controversies arose con­ cerning the basic nature of such atoms, elements or causes.

New con­

cepts and definitions advanced by various sociologists were not accept­ able to all and therefore rejected as inadequate, too static or plainly an

error

*(2)

& brief analysis of definitions of social forces advanced

by various sociologists seems to indicate clearly that each sociologist in constructing his own concept used in support of his generalization the facts abstracted from different types of social situations, or at least considered different aspects of similar situations.

Because of

this it was possible to point out the ommissions and discard the con-

(1)

Bridgsoan,

P.W., The Logic of Modern Physics, ed. 1932, p. 36,

(2)

Hayes, 6*0., "The Social Forces Error," Am* Jour* of Sociology, v.16, 1907. Although the author's objection is otherwise well taken, he suffers also from a similar limitation as do others, namely, from a belief that a definition adequate for all situations is possible.

64

cept as either inadequate or erroneous.

Rejecting a definition or a

concept validity on these grounds is equivalent to saying that one generalization is fallacious, because from, some other point of view a difference generalization is p o s s i b l e . S u c h objection is made frequently especially when the validity of a definition of a concept is measured by its applicability under all conditions* Development of the theories of social forces shows definitely such shifts from one point of view to another and from one level of analysis to another.

Thus all definitions of social forces developed

by means of analysis at the level of social behavior were rejected ifrhen an analysis in terms of the biological frame of reference was accomplished.

(2 ) '

Some attempts were made to describe the intrinsic nature of

social behavior in terms of physics,

g e o m e t r y , a n d mathematics^

(1)

For instance: A straight line is a legitimate concept within the frame of reference of Euclidian geometry and is used to advantage wherever Newtonian physics is applicable. Validity of this con­ cept cannot be denied on the grounds that the definition of this concept does not hold in other geometries, i.e., in other frames of reference.

(2)

Bernard, L.L., "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences,” Psychological Review, 1921, v. 28, pp. 96-119. An Introduction to Social Psychology, ed. 1925, o. 9. Paris," E., Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses” ? American Journal of Sociology. 1921, pp* 184-98* Allport, F*H*, Social Psychology, ed. 1924, c. 3.

(3)

Lundberg, G.A., Foundations of Sociology, ed. 1939, o. 6., where he states, ”that because of the fundamental relationship of energy conversion and activity of any Icind, societal activities may them­ selves in the last analysis be regarded as varied ways of energy transformation,” p. 232.

(4)

Lewin, K., "Pie3d Theoryi and Experiment in Social Psychology, “Am, Jour, of Sociology, v. 44, 1939, pp* 868-894.

(5)

Rashewsky, N., "Outlines of a Mathematical Theory of Human Relations,” Philosophy of Science, 1935, v. 2, pp* 413-430.

65 Th.©. chief difficulty of such procedure is the sane as accompanies "the analytical methods of other sciences, namely, that when the analysis proceeds beyond a certain point, the relationships characteristic of that level of organization disappear.

A sociologist describing social

behavior in terms of biological structure or electro-magnetic fields of energy transformations becomes a biologist or a physicist (provided that he produces an adequate analysis).

Possibility of analyzing some as­

pect of behavior in biologioal terms does not of necessity prove that the sociological analysis accomplished by a sociologist is erroneous; on the other hand, it does not mean ■that the same sociological analysis is correct.

It may be quite fallacious, but its fallacy must be shown

by a more adequate analysis within the same frame of reference and not by a shift to another.

A sociologist who resorts to biological analysis

of social behavior professes erroneously that sociological analysis is impossible.

An engineer building a bridge does not plan his bridge

structure in terms of atoms or electrons but of steel beams, although this does not indicate that he rejected the atomic theory.

Similarly,

a sociologist, although recognizing other sciences, must investigate social phenomena at the social level*

subsequently establishing more

abstract theories upon the basis of facts derived at that level. An attempt to produce an adequate analysis of causal factors in social behavior in sociological terms developed theories of wishes, attitudes, tendencies, etc.

This development shows, for instance, that

the concept "attitude** becan© late a tool in scientific analysis.

William

James, a psychologist, did not use it in his work.^1) E.B. Titohener dis-

(1)

James, William, The Principles of Psychology, first edition in 1890.

66

cussed it at length as a new and interesting subject for psychological investigation.

He developed the

concept in the course of his work on

introspection, but did not define it, as

according to his own statement

attitudes appeared in the introspective reports as vague and elusive processes.

Neither associational nor structural psychology had terms

in which to describe the dynamics involved in these processes.

Conscious

attitudes therefore were considered as made up of three elementary processes:

sensation, image andaffection?

all threewere a result

or a residue of a long course of change, The subsequent development of the concept of attitudes showed a tendency toward an elaboration in terms of physiology and also a tendency towards static denotation.

In "the language of H.C. Warren,

for instance, the definition of attitudes lost its dynamic aspect in­ dicated originally by Titchener,

According to him "an attitude is due

to repetition of neural processes of one and the same type,,,? attitudes may be classes according to the type of mental state which characterizes them,”^ )

It is because of this tendency toward stressing static as­

pects of attitudes that Thoms and Znaniecki protested vigorously: f,By attitude we understand a process of individual conscious­ ness which determines real or possible activity of the in­ dividual in the social world,.,,it is an individual counter­ part of the social value; activity in whatever form is the bond between them. By its reference to activity and thereby to individual consciousness, the value is distinguished from the natural thing. By its reference to activity and thereby to the social world, the attitude is distinguished from the psychical state*"(3)

(1) Titchpner,E.B•, A Textbook of Psychology, ed. 1910 v. 2, chapter on ‘'Thought,” pp. 505-521, esp. p, 520, (2) Warren, H.C., Human Psychology, ed, 1919,c. 17, esp. p, 361. (3)

Thomas, W.I, and Znaniecki, F., The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, ed. 1927, "Methodological Note;* p. 22.

67

1^ this herculean definition is understood as the authors in­ tended it, it means that as far as an individual is concerned, an atti­ tude is a ’’state of mind,11 At this point the terminology of the authors is as static as that of their predecessors and contemporaries • On the other hand, their stress of the cultural aspects counterbalanced the general tendency of the sociologists to account for social behavior in biological terms.

This stress must be recognized as a positive con­

tribution to social theory.

In 1934 Znaniecki redefined the attitude to

be psychologically a ’■definite appreciation of a given object as desirable or un­ desirable; this appreciation may range all the way from pure­ ly intellectual to a most irrational emotion, and from a static ’feeling 1 to a dynamic ’wish'• In objective terms the attitude is a determination of the active treatment the given value would receive the attitude is thus a potential substitute for the act,”^ / Znaniecki1s effort, common to other sociologists, to present a definition including as many aspects of a complex phenomenon as is possible to present, resulted in a statement which is almost worthless as an analytical tool.

This statement makes an extensive use of self con­

tradictory terms such as ”irrational emotion” (admitting by implication a ’’rational emotion”), ”static feeling,” ’’objective terms,” etc.

Implied

elementalism, obvious in his conception of a range of appreciation from purely intellectual to most irrational emotion, beclouds the issue still further and Is concealed only by juggling of terms used in denoting the range*

(1)

Znaniecki, F., The Methods of Sociology, ed, 1934, pp. 60-61.

68

On "the other hand, Znaniecki made a very persistent effort to avoid the pitfalls an analysis encounters in reducing sociological phenomena to a "biological level.

He stated that cultural behavior of

men was essentially irreducible to organic mechanisms which can be as­ certained by experimental techniques. in terms of action*

He ultimately defined attitudes

""The concept attitude.. ♦. covers precisely such

potential tendencies as manifested in axiological significance given by the agent to certain values of his experience.”^*)

In elaborating

further the ramifications of his definition he stated that it did not make the slightest difference whether one ascribed an attitude (a ten­ dency to action) to the persistence of certain compexes and wishes in the un­ conscious, or to the duration of biological elements and the processes in the nervous system. ..for both are in­ accessible to our observation, and all we can scientific­ ally know about the connection is what we conclude from observing the conduct***.”(2) Znaniecki's definition of attitudes attained considerable clarity and relative precision due to his consistent effort to maintain his analysis at the sociological level.

Many other sociologists and

psychologists on the other hand attempted to combine terms derived from several analytical levels in the same definition.

M*K# Thomson,

for instance, regarded ”an attitude as a composite of all subjective factors; heredity, experience and present purpose. It is a con­ scious QTtd unconscious set or readiness of the mind to react to stimulus in a given way.*.or it may be that an attitude is an affective habit or the feeling and emotional accompaniment of habit.”(3)

(1)

Znaniecki, F. Social Actions, Ed. 1936, p. 29.

(2)

Ibid., p. 28*

(3)

Thomson, H*IU, The Springs of Human Action, Ed. 1927, p. 166*

69

Even a superficial analysis shows that this definition is inconsistent within itself*

A "mind” in it is composed of heredity, etc*;

an

attitude is at once a habit or its own accompaniment! According to Park and Burgess "attitudes are mobilizati. ons and organizations of wishes with reference to definite situations**»•; the wishes enter attitudes as components**.* The fundamental wishes are the same in all situation* ** but the attitudes in which they find expression are different, , . . If the attitude may be said to play the role in sociological analysis that the elementary substances play in chemical analysis, then the role of the wishes may be compared to that of the electrons,”(1) Finally, "it is not to be gainsaid that instincts, appetites, habits, emotions, sentiments, opinions, and wishes are Involved with the attitudes."(2) The methodological shortcomings of this analysis are quite apparent*

In assuming that attitudes are mobilizations, a question

arises as to who mobilizes -them and what is the pattern of such organi­ zation*

A simple analogy to atoms and electrons does not disloee it, as

the organization of atomic structures is wholly unlike the mobilization of will, or attitude*

If on the other hand, the term "attitude” is

so broad as to include instincts, habits, emotions, sentiments, opinions, etc,, then it is completely devoid of any analytical value*

Although

the authors profess their intention to think of attitudes as behavior patterns, they lean so heavily on the methods of structural psychology in establishing the elements that they failed to concern themselves with the dynamics of action, and proceeded to analyze it in terms of social distance,

(1)

Park, G.a, and Burgess, E.W*, The Introduction to the Soienoe of Sociology* ed, 1928, pp, 438-9.

(2)

Ibid*

Park and Burgess* definition is particularly vulnerable because of the fact that it used terms all of which raise highly controversial issues and for that very reason are in need of being defined more clearly. The question of social forces has been analyzed by a host of investigators at various levels.

They were discussed at the level of

physiological behavior, e.g., McDougall* s instincts,(1) Allport’s pre­ potent drives,^) Watson’s conditioned r e f l e x e s , P a r e t o ’s residues*^) Some discussed it at the psychological level of habit formation, namely: Sumner^) and K e l l e r ^ a s folkways, Dewey as h a b i t , B e r n a r d as habit complex;^®) some other systematizations of social forces were based on dichotomies such as physical-psychical.

Within this designa­

tion may be included Spencer, Ward, Bllwood,^9 ^

Hayes,(^G) and a great

number of others.

McDougall, W,, An Introduction to Social Psychology, ed. 1921, Allport, F.H,, Social Psychology, ed, 1924, Watson, J.B., Behavior, an Introduction to Comparative Psychology, ed, 1914, Pareto, V,, Mind and Society, ed, 1935, Sumner, W.G., Folkways, ed, 1906, Keller, A.G., Societal Evolution, ed. 1931, Dewey, J,, Human Nature and Conduct, ed. 1922, Bernard, L,L., Instinct, ed, 1924, Ellwood, C.A., The Psychology of Human Society, ed. 1925. (10) Hayes, E.C., Introduction to the Study of Sociology, ed, 1915.

71

The methodological difficulties involved in all these investiga­ tions are similar*

First of* all, no analysis is maintained at one level,

but each investigator proceeds to analyze the behavior into component parts in an effort to establish basic elements.

Definitions of these

elements are usually tested by singling out one element and inquiring whether it could be identified within a specific behavior sequence* identification can always be made.

This

No one can deny the function of emotion

in an attitude, yet the test is not final, for no behavior is purely emotional, or purely intellectual*

The question of presence or of

absence of emotion with reference to this problem is meaningless* Validity of a definition cannot, then, be tested by an identification of elements*

Neither is it possible to establish an

adequate theory of human behavior by building up an exhaustive system of elements^) and by explaining the phenomena of one level in terms of another.

One can no more explain rational behavior in terms of instinct,

than one can explain insightful behavior in terms of reflexes.

This

does not mean, however, that such terms are not valuable analytical tools for an analysis in the field for which they were originally de­ signed* There is another difficulty inherent in the theories of social forces.

Because of its history, the very conception of forces imposes an

unconscious acceptance of an implication that force originates from outside*

Linguistically, most social force concepts take on the form

of nouns which convey an undesirable implication of reification*

(l)

Thomas

It is an undeniable fact that instinct theorists elaborated lists including hundreds of instincts. The same is true of interest^, needs, etc. Yet, non© of these attempts resulted in adequate theory.

72

states •that the wishes must be satisfied,^ ^ as if they were organs of the body, like a stomach which xou3t "be filled* anthropomorphic•

The concepts also are quite

They force men to action, they cause social behavior.

In sociological discussion they stand out as if apart from persons and become of primary importance in and of themselves.

By comparison with

them, persons and their behavior fade into insignificance. The assumption that the social forces are the basic elements of human nature is untenable*

A closer scrutiny might show that the four

wishes postulated by Thomas represent an elementalistically treated description of human behavior*

To live, one must meet new situations*

A wish for a new experience arises when this process is disturbed*

It

is more likely to arise in the so-called centers of civilization where contrasts are strong and the tempo of social change is artificially speeded up by comparison with others, or even ordinary instruction by means of radio, movie, advertising, etc.

“When specific conditions

curtail the means of securing satisfactions, the thwarted behavior may be described as lacking opportunities for fulness of experience, or a wish for new experience*

The term "wish” oversimplifies the situa­

tion and stresses the antioipatory aspect of it, and therefore carries a connotation as if it were previous to the experience that gave rise to it*

Similar implications are involved in the concept of the “wish

for security” • A closer analysis of behavior indicates that insecurity tends to develop in situations in whioh there is a considerable "feeling of inadequacy” in meeting problem situations.

However, the terms

"feeling of Adequacy” and "wish for security" are by no means identical.

(1)

Thomas, W.I., The Unadjusted Girl, ed. 1931, p. 40.

73 The term *feeling of adequacyn seems to refer to previous experiences s^ud results from them*

The wish for security on the other hands seems to

be an anticipation of something one yearns for, but did not experience as yet; it is a projection into the future almost wholly without reference to the past* The four wishes seem to represent four different aspects of evaluative processes involved in human problem-solving behavior*

The

first two emphasize its personal aspects, the remaining two its group aspects*

All four are invariably intertwined, and may be observed in

relative isolation or complete dominance only in very extreme cases* That Thomas presented them as separate aspects is probably due to the fact that he abstracted his theory from situations in which human functioning was severely hajipered*

In formulating his theory of

wishes he drew upon the materials coming from the description of behavior of unadjusted girls, as Freud formulated his on the basis of observation of the behavior of insane patients*

Thomas^ contribution

is great even though he failed to see the wishes in situation-processes as unified totalities* The search for one causal factor, a force, or a social atom failed to attain its avowed purpose* tensive*

This search was diligent and ex­

It was handicapped by preconceived primitive notions about the

original nature of man which lay deeply buried in the analytical con­ cepts; it was impeded by the use of conceptions borrowed from physical sciences f t by the linguistic habits which led to unconscious objectifi­ cation of terms yielded by analyses * This last condition was further

74

aggravated by a tendency to pursue an analysis up to its ultimate limits, obscuring thereby confusion of the sociological "facts11 with facts of other orders Another handicap is inherent in the very nature of analysis* No analysis can yield a totality of behavior, no matter how simple this behavior may be. fully as possible.

It must of necessity take one aspect after another as This, however, produces a distortion which cannot

be avoided, although a conscious and consistent effort must be directed towards keeping this distortion at a minimum. Just as a degree of distortion cannot be wholly eliminated from an analysis, so a description of a

sequence of action, of an "action

as it is in itself**, from a wholly unbiased point of view is impossible. Any description of behavior is made within a theoretical frame of reTerence which may be sound in a greater or lesser degree, or even wholly inadequate.

In any case, it functions in determining the selection of

facts and the emphasis given to the relationships between the facts* The necessity for a tentative formulation of a description and drawing inferences from these descriptions results from these limitations; and the inpossibility of’including everything in a description, adds another limitation*

(l)

Herrick, C.J., Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior, ed* 1924* Although he generally accepted a mechanistic point of view, he ob­ jected to explanations of "higher" levels of behavior in terms of lower levels and vice versa. He stated that ". . . attention should be especially directed toward the futility of attempting to derive intelligence and the higher mental faculties in general from reflexes, habits, or any other form of fixed and determinate behavior **« these owe their origin to the more liable and plastic components of behavior which are determined not by rigid innate organization but rather by individual experience acting through the innate and recombining them in new patterns." (p. 234).

75

Gestalt psychologists beginning with Fechner stressed con­ sistently the fact that the organisation involved in the process of the analysis is not identical with the organization involved in the process of the synthesis # A biologist is able to effect a complete analysis of a living cell, yet he cannot "create” a cell out of the products ob­ tained in the analysis.

In pursuing the analysis, a scientist does not

automatically discover the principle of organization which is peculiar to each level,

"While it is erroneous to state that the analysis

destroys the organization, it is true, nevertheless, than an analysis does not reveal it* The history of the development of sociological thought bears out the point under consideration*

The results of the analysis of

human behavior yielded a tremendous amount of sociological material which threw light upon many problems*

However, it has not as yet

yielded a consistent theory of social organization in terms of wishes, interests, attitudes or whatever the basic atom was conceived to be*

PART TWO CHAPTER

VI

THE PRESENT STATUS OP GROUP THEORIES Development of Group Concept In spite of vigorous protests coining from social psychologists denying validity to the term "group", the phenomena of group or collect­ ive living are "subject to serious thought on the part of many sociolo­ gists •"

While it is true that they differ in their points of view, yet

almost all of them have used the atomistic methods prevalent in the } sociological field. This of necessity has resulted in d ascriptions of partial, and, frequently, insignificant aspects of collective behavior. On the other hand, the interest in group phenomena has grown steadily and the recognition of their importance in understanding the structure of society has become an undisputed fact*

Even the rank "individualist,”

F*H* Allport, concedes that a group may be considered a whole (as in opposition to the sum of parts conception); that the study of groups is the province of sociology, while the study of the individual belongs to social pfcychology*^ Ward seems to be the chief individualist in the field of early American sociology*

In spite of the fact that he rejected the laissez-

faire doctrine and in his exposition of progress emphasized the necessity

(1)

Allport, F*H*, Social Psychology* ed* 1924, p. 10*

7?

of soci&l control, which is a group phenomenon, yet group phenomena did not stimulate further inquiry, and it is only fair to assume, have no place in his theoretical system.

Knowledge, ■which according to him

effects progress, is an individual achievement, and is explainable in terms of the individual.^ ^

He neglected the social and therefore group

aspects of the whole problem, Spencer, probably because of his definition of society in terms of organismic analogy, was logically forced into accepting the concept of group, although he did not think it important enough to include it in his extensive index.

However, in elaborating his analogy, he stumbled

upon an important sociological problem, namely, the relation of social contact to group structure.

To make his analogy complete he had to

account for a difference between a physiological organism composed of parts in immediate contact and a social group composed of "discrete*’ members, Sumner based his conception of society on the broadest founda­ tion.

According to him society is a group of human beings in cooperative

effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species. groups is the maintenance and reproduction of life.^^

The function of He stressed the

unity of society by pointing out that it is "not composed of sets of institutions that have been analyzed out and separately examined; is a whole acting together."^

it

He developed the concepts of "in-group"

and "out-group" quite similarly to those of Gumplowicz, both of them being

(1)

Cf. Bodenhofer, W.B., "The Comparative Role of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology" and "Contemporary American Sociology." A m . Jour, of Soc.. 1920, v. 26, pp. 273-314. (2) For a detailed statement of this problem sees Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, ed. 1936, Ch. V., where he discusses the systematization of thought and knowledge in social situations especiallyin relation to action and determination of its course, (3) Sumner, W.G. and Keller, A.G., The Science of Society, ed.1927, pp.6-7, (4) Ibid., p. 86.

78

in agreement that the cooperative processes function within the peace group and hostili-ty reigns "between the out-groups*

Sumner and Gumplowicz

differed, however, in their conception of social organization*

According

to Sumner Mthe sentiment of solidarity forms a has is for primitive group organization and indeed for any organization”

while Gumplowicz*s

social organization begins with combat and subjugation of one group by another* Gumplowicz*s contribution to the knowledge and understanding of groups is quite extensive in spite of the undue prominence he gives to group hostility.

In his analysis of groups he reveals that his interest

is not primarily sociological but political*

He assumes that the groups

always exploit each other, and wrest most of the privileges and rights for themselves and impose the burdensome duties upon other groups.

Be­

cause of these implications he was specifically interested in problems of group

organization, group power and their political uses of these

processes in advancing the interests of dominant groups. In analyzing the power aspect of group behavior he stated that "it is not the size of the social group that determines its power.*.The intimacy of the union and the resultant organiza­ tion and discipline together with mental superiority comple­ ment numerical inferiority."' He distinguished between mass and group on the basis of organization* According to him "the mass lacks organization partly because of its great bulk prtd partly because of indolence,

He also pointed out that a

small organized group may dominate an unorganized mass by appropriating

(1)

Sumner, W.G. and Keller, A.G., The Science of Society* ed. 1927, pp*6-7.

(2)

Gumplowicz, L., Outlines of Sociology, ed. 1899, p. 143.

(3)

Ibid*

79

the legislative powers with no responsibility to the dominated group* He stressed the importance of group unity and of organization not only in theoretical, but also in practical politics* The first truly sociological analysis of group unity came from Ferdinand Tonnies in 1887*

According to him all human relation­

ships are an expression of human will* wills

He distinguished two types of

one operating in Gemeinschaft and resulting in positive social

relationships, the feelingcf common bond within a group, and this he called natural will;

the other operating within Gesellsohaft and

dominated by a rational pursuit of an individual interest;

this he

called "rational will”* The Gemeinschaft relationship according to him is always one of unity and beoomes differentiated into Gemeinschaft of blood, denoting unity of being, Gemeinschaft of locality based on a common habitat, and Gemeinschaft of mind expressing community of mental life,^^

Living

together or near one another necessitates not only continued and frequent contact, but also cooperation in labor, order and management, and creates relationships which persist even during separation*

Similar Gemeinschaft-

like grouping, originate independently of kinship and neighborhood when there is a similarity of work and intellectual attitude. In the Gemeinschaft relationship action follows

(1)

Tonnies, F*, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl. by C*F. Loomis, ed. 1940, pp* 48-49*

80

"from an a priori and necessary existing unity,.,In the Gesellsc haft no such action exists •#.here everybody is by himself and isolated and there exists a condition of tension against all others. In the relationship of the Gesselschaft nothing is shared; property is sold for equal or better value. What somebody has and enjoys he has and enjoys to the exclusion of all others. The only community which comes into being in the Gesellschaft is during a transaction, when an object, passing from hand to hand, has a common value for both parties.1' (i) The clearest statement of difference between the two systems of group organization came from Parsons.

According to him in the Gesellschaft

relations the parties are held to obligations morally, but also by the terms of the contract to keep all positively defined obligations.

With­

in the Gemeinschaft relationships the obligations are unspecified and unlimited,

"It is a blanket obligation to

help in whatever contingency

may arise in the course of common living.” The social will (unity) in Gesellschaft exists only during the transaction when more than one person agree on valuation, and is called contract, "Since all relations in the Gesellschaft are based upon comparison of possible and offered services, it is evident that the relations with visible, material matters have preference, and that mere activities and words form the foundation for such relationships only in unreal way, Gemeinschaft as a bond of fblood* is in the first place a physical relation, therefore expressing itself in deeds and words. Here the common relation of the material ob­ jects is of secondary nature and such objects are not exchanged as often as they are used and possessed in common. “(2) The main distinction between the organization of the Gemein­ schaft and the Gesellschaft according to Tonnies is the difference

(1)

Parsons, T., Structure of Social Actions. ed, 1937, pp. 689-90.

(2)

Tonnies, P., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl. by C.P. Loomis, ed. 1940, p. 89,

81

■between natural and rational will.

The natural will, which is chare.cteristic

of the Gemeinschaft, is Mthe psychological equivalent of the human body, of the principle of the unity of life, supposing that life is oonceived under that form of reality to which thinking itself b e l o n g s . ^ It is the same type of thinking that Keyser describes as a type of organic thinking (physical in Tonnies terminology) and which is but the action of an organism responding to stimulus and responding thereto as a living whole. Tonnies

distinguishes the following types of natural will:

feeling, liking, (or preference), habit and memory including the learning of relationships, speech, imagination and reason.

The whole process of

natural will develops within the social situation which constitutes a matrix in which human values and conscience developed and are expressed in behavior. The rational will, on the other hand, was a product of abstract thinking which separated the ends and means from the total situation and made them paramount.

There is no place in it for creation of social

values and so rational will expresses itself in the individualistic contemplation and achievement of ends which are not related to the community, but to self.

Therefore, **self-criticism is the highest and

most intellectual form of rational will, conscience the highest or most (3 ) intellectual form of natural will.,,v 1

(1)

Tonnie3 , F., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl. by C.P. Loomis, ed. 1940, p. 119.

(2)

Keyser, C.J., Thinking About Thinking, ed. 1926, p. 7.

(3)

Tonnies, F., op. oit., p. 143,

82

Tonnies recognized three forms of rational will:

deliberation

which referred to free behavior in general (that is, action to a specific object); discrimination, a form which referred to definite actions or sequence of actions; and the third referred to the thinking (rational will) in relation to concepts. According to Tonnies, the natural will predominated in the Gemeinschaft relationship, and the rational in the Gesellschaft rela­ tionship in which he considered the calculating of isolated means and ends to be characteristic. The basic difference between the natural and rational will t* asserted by Tonnies as characteristic of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft established a definite antithesis between them. ”Gemeinschaft develops and fosters natural will, on the one hand, and, on the other, binds and hinders rational will... Gesellschaft not only frees rational will but also requires and furthers it, even makes its unscrupulous use in competi­ tion into a condition of the maintenance of the individual, thus destroying the flowers and fruits of natural will."'2; The concept of the Gesellschaft type of society is strongly reminiscent of Hobbes and his conception of the individualistic social order in which all were in war against one another.

The same scheme of

unrelated selfish ends of one individual against the ends of others prevails in both.

Analyzing the relation of ends and means Tonnies ad­

mitted that 11they were probably like Hobbes1 human being and their descendants in my 1Gesellschaft* enemies by nature, mutually exclusive, and negating each o t h e r ) Tonnies1s discussion of the Gemeinschaft relationship is quite similar to the discussion of primary groups by Cooley, although Cooley

(1)

Tonnies, P., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, brans 1. by C.P* Loomis, ed. 1940, pp. 140—1.

(2)

Ibid., pp. 194-5.

(3)

Ibid., p. 154.

83

does not introduce as strongly defined a dichotomy.

Tonnies himself

recognized that this dichotomy was not as clear-cut as his presenta­ tion asserted and he devoted some attention to the elaboration of mixed types* of situations in which both natural and rational will played a part. ti

Tonnies1 belief that modern society is preponderantly business­ like was a source of concern to him, as he considered this to be a fact symptomatic of social disorganization.

It was probably due to the

chronological sequence of events which followed the industrial develop­ ments during the early modern times that Tonnies formulated his theory of transition taking place in social relationships in terms of Gemein­ schaft and Gesellschaft.

Gemeinschaft relationships characteristic of

the past ages constituted the foundations upon which the theory of Gesellschaft relations developed.

It would be interesting to establish

to what extent Tonnies* thinking on this point was influenced by the evolutionary conception of uniform, progressive development and if so, to what extent it influenced his unconsciously accepted premise from, which he deduced the belief that the normal course of development con­ stituted a transition from the Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from organization to disorganization.

(l)

(1)

It would be also interesting to follow to what extent this parti­ cular position of Tonnies influenced American writers. For a discussion of this point basically similar to Tonnies* sees Cooley, C.H. Social Organization, ed. 1909. The whole volume is a presentation of this problem, i.e., transition from primary group towards mass society, and by implication from organization toward individuation and therefore disorganization* On the other hand, Cooley never used the term "secondary group” or "secondary ideal", although these terms are frequently ascribed to him. Queen, S.A., Bodenhofer, W.B. and Harper, E.B., Social Organization and Pis or ganization, ed. 1935, chs. 7, 8 and 9. Steiner, J.F., Community Disorganization, ed. 1928, ch. 3. Mannheim, K., Man and Society, ed. 1940, part 5, ,chs. 1 and 2. Tonnies, F., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl. by C.P. Loomis, ed. 1940,' pp." 270-3^3.

84

In analyzing the groups in which both rational and natural wills were intertwined, Tonnies pointed out the fact that even in purely Gesellschaft relations where ’’association is willed” for an individual aisi clearly defined end, and practically no social (natural will) bond exists between the parties entering into a clearly defined relationship, there begins to develop a ’’natural will.”

In this process

the clearly defined purpose of association, the specific ends, tend to vanish, and in place of it there emerges a fusion of interests common to the whole group, t* This specific point in Tonnies* theory seems significant as it touches on another and distinct line of thought, confused and seemingly incongruous with the first, but under closer scrutiny, ex­ tremely important for the theory of social groups.

It must be noticed

\P.

that Tonnies* general theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft rests upon the basis of facts drawn from historical records in chronological progression, accounting chiefly for social phenomena subsequent to the Renaissance and the industrial revolution, with the stress upon the individual and business relations.

In this sense, in terms of

temporal sequence, the development of societies could be described as proceeding predominantly from the Gemeinschaft and towards the Gesellschaft "type of organization.

On the other hand, Tonnies conceived

clearly the possibility and even the necessity of a progressive develop­ ment of social relations generally.

He accepts the postulate that social

relations begin with casual acquaintance and that

85

'•whenever people live together, there exists or develops, according to general conditions, some difference and division of enjoyment and, labor which produces a reciprocal relation between them.”' ' The relationship which holds people together is, according to him, ”understanding, which is based upon intimate knowledge of each othe£.”(2)

This

understanding is developed by experience and may be reinforced by the opinion of others and may begin to develop not only between strangers but also between the conquerors and conquered, provided social relation­ ships are present.

In this manner Tonnies arrived at two diametrically

opposed theories of social developments

one from Gemeinschaft to

Gesellschaft, i*e.^ community toward individuation and disorganization, and the other from individuation toward Gemeinschaft.

This was possible

only by means of a shift in methodology of which Tonnies himself was not fully aware.

He used historical methods in postulating his theory

of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft by showing a general trend developing for centuries.

In postulating the other he turned to analyzing the

development of social relationships within a concrete group of persons who continued association for a certain length of time* Tonnies• desire to establish a categorical difference between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft caused him many difficulties, for he shows readily that the Gemeinschaft-like relationships may develop independent­ ly of kinship and neighborhood, based upon similarity of work, intellectual attitude, etc*, provided the relationships are maintained through frequent meetings.

He pointed out the fact that associations formed at will and

(1)

Tonnies, P*, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl. by C.P* Loomis, ed* 1940, p* 45*

(2)

Ibid*, p. 54.

86

for any sort of purpose were possible in both Gemeinschaft and Gesellsohaft.

He called them special interest groups, and they were accord­

ing to him artificial persons* the term indicating his desire to es­ tablish their reality.

The chief difference between the Gesellschaft

and Gemeinschaft types of interest groups was in their legal status, **A special interest group can be founded which for its members has a full reality of a person without existing at all in the legal system,11^ A Gemeinschaft interest carries no legal obligation*

In the Gesell­

schaft society associations have definite legal character, and obliga­ tions are clearly expressed in terms of oonfcract*

In general terms,

Gesellschaft groups are those artificial persons which have existence in the legal system and the action of group members is determined by the limitation of the law. The final undemining of the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft tt

concepts came from Tonnies himself, although not with that purpose. He maintained that there is f*a contrast between the social order, which being based upon consensus of wills, rests on harmony and is enobled by folkways, mores, and religion, and an order which is being based upon a union of rational wills rests on con­ vention, and agreement is safeguarded by political legis­ lation and finds its ideological justification in public opinion* "(2) Even a brief analysis of concepts used in the above passage indicates that the greatest handicap from which Tonnies suffered was not in his lack of insight into sociological phenomena, but in his (1) (2)

Tonnies, F., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* transl. by C*P* Loomis, ed. 1940, p. 225. Ibid.. p. 261. It would be interesting to study further to what extent this passage helped later sociologists to formulate a statement that social development proceeded from sacred and rural, to secular and urban social organization.

87 implicit assumption that it is a scientific necessity to establish valid and diametrically opposed categories. sciences of his time.

This he shared with all other

Thus, according to hip,customs and mores are

categorically different from law.

Natural will, by which he seems to

mean problem solving behavior developing preponderantly at the sub­ verbal and lower ranges of thinking, he thought to be wholly unlike the rational will, dependent mostly upon the conceptual analysis of means and ends.

Neither are consensus and public opinion wholly alien to

each other.

Save for a methodological wmust” which he accepted there

was no necessity for Tonnies to state his theory in terms of extreme differences, when in fact, his whole analysis begs for a statement in terms of a range. Tonnies* methodological need

for establishing separate

categories was probably reenforced by Marxian conceptions which he accepted.

This may be seen in the fact that the point of difference

between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft was in ”limited liability” of Gesellschaft while the obligations of the Gemeinschaft were unlimited and could not be embodied in a contract. It is at this point that « * Tonnies charges Gesellschaft with destruction of Gemeinschaft because in preventing the development of the Gemeinschaft—like social organization it prevented the development of positive social values.

It is significant

to note that Tonnies made this point in his discussion of woman* s role in the Gesellschaft.

His exposition equals the old, but recently

stressed German slogan:

**Kuche, Kinder und Kirche.”

88

"As woman enters into the struggle of earning a living, ,, she will develop her rational will, enabling her to think in a calculating way*,. The woman become enlighten­ ed, coldhearted, conscious,"(l) According to him, the 11individual i o n o f women and of proletariat is the prerequisite for the formation of Gesellschaft/2 ^ Another theory of group phenomena in terms of unity came from Georg Simmel, who defined unity as a process of reciprocal influence between individuals.

He insisted that unity was not a mere sum of

the individuals, but a functional, dynamic process of reciprocal influence among individuals which created and constituted the unity (3 ) of the group,K '

Growing into unity was synonymous with socialization

of the individuals in the group who could be socialized in a greater or lesser degree. Unity was defined by Simmel was a process and as a process it develops in time and degrees,

"They may range from ephemeral association

for a promenade to the permanence of the family group, from the temporary aggregation of guests in a hotel to the intimate bond of a medieval guild, Hot only do the grohps show different degrees of socialization (unity), but also the same group becomes more and more or less and less unified. On the basis of Simmers exposition one could conceive of two types of progression, both in terms of range of unification.

(1) , .

One would

Tonnies, F,, Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, transl, by C,p, Loomis, ed, 1940, p, 261, ti

(2)

It is significant to note that Tonnies does not see why continuous destruction should proceed unhampered, "Their (women*s and pro­ letariat* s) growing group consciousness, like that of isolated thinkers, can develop and rise to a moral humane consciousness", p. 191, This implication, based upon an analysis of social living which ad­ mits development of group relations from the initial contaots to ■the level of well united groups, forms a theoretical foundation upon which the practice of group work rests,

(3)

Spykman, N,J,, The Theory of Georg Simmel, ed, 1925, p, 27,

(4)

Ibid,, p. 30,

89

permit arranging distinct and separate groups according to the degree of unification they attained.

Some of the groups would fall at the

point of the initial contacts, some at the point of greatest unity, which would have to be empirically established.

The second type of

progression may be used as descriptive of the psychological process which takes place when a group develops unity.

By implication, the

process of progressive 'disintegration** of a group may be accounted for in terms of the same theory. Suggestive as this line of thought was, Simmel did not follow it up.

His primary interest was in the analysis of social behavior

in terms of forms (equivalent in terms of American sociology to social processes).

The problem of the sociologist, according to him was

"identification, systematic arrangement, psychological explanation, and historical development of the pure forms of association.

^

Among

these he distinguished submission, opposition, and competition. mission included two subtypes:

Sub­

superordination and subordination, de­

pending obviously on the point of view taken by the observer.

Sub­

ordination could take place in relation to an individual, superior group, or an impersonal principle. for the terms of equality. competition.

There was no place in the scheme

Opposition took the forms of conflict and

He distinguished conflict in the game characterized by a

high degree of unification, legal contest, contest of impersonal interests (almost a struggle for an impersonal principle) and conflict

(l)

Spykman, N.J., The Theory of Georg Simmel, ed. 1925, p. 40.

90

between the groups.

Simmel realized that these forms (types of socializa­

tion or processes) were an abstraction from a social actuality*

He ad­

mitted that they never appeared in social life in a pure form theoretic­ ally designated; and acknowledged that different forms could have a different content, i*e«, interests, and that different interests could be expressed in different forms.

It is significant to note that Simmel

did not inquire into this difficulty and did not postulate any assumption that might explain or describe deviations from the postulated theory.

It

is at this point, the analytical method employed by Simmel (analysis into forms) helped him to discern the -types, but did not to disclose at the same time the principle of organization upon which the actual life situations developed. Numerical and spatial relations were also considered in Simmers scheme of sociological analysis.

He considered a monad as a unit of

social relations, and classified groups as dyads, triads, small groups and large g r o u p s . H e observed that the number of members in a group stood in direct relation to group structure. ”A group of a certain extent and beyond a certain stage in its increase of numbers must develop for its maintenance certain forms and organizations which it did not previously need and that on the other hand more restricted groups manifest qualities and reciprocal activities which in case of numerical extension inevitably d i s a p p e a r . ”v2) In considering the spatial relations Simmel suggested that the process of socialization, happening, so to speak, in the space

(1)

Simmel, Georg, ”The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Groups,” Amer. Jour, of Sociology. V. 8 (1902) pp. 1-48; pp. 158-196.

(2)

It may be mentioned at this point that von Wiese’s line of thought follows explicitly Siimnel’s outline and from this point of view it may be considered more an elaboration than an original contri­ bution*

91

between persons, may be conceived as space-filling.

Two persons isolated

from one another were separated from, each other by an empty space. Functional reciprocity then, manifested itself in space anH the spatial form becomes therefore characteristic of the reciprocity as a whole, He thought the investigation of the spatial aspect of sociological forms would throw light on the oharacter of the process of socialization.^) In his discussion of the concept of distance and proximity he stressed the fact that the relations between the persons are greatly modified quantitatively and qualitatively by purely spatial relationships*^^

Had

he referred back to his own concept of space, he would not have over­ simplified his statement so greatly, but would have gone into considera­ tion of events developing while the Mspatial” relationships were changing.

(1)

Simmel, Georg, ”The Humber of Members Determining the Social Form of the Group, American Journal of Sociology, v, 8, (1902), p. 2, At the present time Kurt Lewin proposes an exception to this point of view basing his opposition on the similarity of geometric forms which persist in spite of size*

(2)

Spykman, H,J,, The Theory of Georg Simmel, ed, 1925, p, 145, According to Simmel, space was ”a subjective mental category, a form of coordinating discrete sense impression in unitary per­ ceptions, ,, what creates the characteristic phenomena of neighborliness or strangeness is not the spatial proximity or the spatial distance, but specific psychological content,” p.144, HVhile Simmel used a spatial criterion in postulating his theory he used it carefully and only to indicate the changes which followed with changes in seemingly purely spatial relations. Recently, Lewin developed in his "Principles of Topological Psychology”, a concept of "social space” making it fundamental in much more restricted and definite sense than did Simmel* In both theories the concept of space tends to overshadow other aspects, and, therefore, to obscure the importance of other relationships *

(3 )

Ibid*, p* 155*

92

Simmel was interested in the phenomena of* socialization as they affected the individual* which he expressed in terms of individual differentiation and sociological expansion* medium of this process*

The small group was the

In it the individual derived the sense of

being different, and together with it he felt one in relation to a larger social circle,

in this manner he satisfied both his need for

differentiation and homogeneity*^^ Neither the sociological thought of Tonnies nor that of Simmel found ready acceptance among the early American sociologists.

The

influence of Ratzenhofer was much stronger, probably because of an even greater enphasis upon the individual.

A.W. Small (1894) defined a

"social aggregate as a coherent combination of persons; coherence between them being psychical and not physical*”

(2)

He described the

primary group as one in which the individuals were held by voluntary and spontaneous bonds;, he admitted, however, that the distinctions between these bonds could not be definitely established.

In 1905 Small

shifted from his earlier position, asserting that "persons formed groups because inborn interests push them toward association in place of individual isolation and also stimulate antagonism to other ( 3) associations.,,v J

Here the influence of Ratzenhofer is obvious.

In analyzing spatial relationships between persons Small pro­ posed the broadest possible definition when he agreed that

(1)

Spykman, N.J., The Theory of Georg Simmel* ed. 1925, p. 212*

(2)

Small, A*W. and Vincent, G*E., An Introduotion to the Study of Society, ed. 1894, p. 197.

(3)

Small, A.W*, General Sociology, ed* 1905, p* 204*

93

"the term ’group1 serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, large or small, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together. The breadth of this formulation intended for the facilitation of systematization of group concepts introduced a confusion between to distinctly different phenomena, namely, a relation which is "thought of by an observer" and a relation which is experienced by the members of any group.

It includes on the one hand such groups whose members

function in relation to one another (and with reference to a problem at hand), and, on the other hand, purely logical construct, built upon the basis of arbitrarily selected attributes, or a quality per­ ceived as a similarity between persons.

This construct, or classifica­

tion may disclose a similarity of certain persons, but does not dis­ close in what manner they are related to each other. Small’s all-inclusive conception of the group seems to have been an opening wedge leading to tremendous confusion obvious in the sociological writings concerning the group and its phenomena.

E.E.

Eubank: summed up the whole problem in his able discussion of "human

(2)

plureIs".

He pointed out that a category, or a class, aggregations

and groups are terms used interchangeably by the great majority of sociological writers.

Such usage of these terms creates problems which

do not belong properly in the sociological field.

He attempts to

classify the issues by stating that

(1)

Small, A.W., General Sociology, ed. 1905, p. 495.

(2)

Eubank, E.B., The Concepts of Sociology, ed. 1932, ch. 8.

94

a class, a category, persons merely thought of together {such as ’radio-listeners*) are likeness-categories and not groups ... .they are exceedingly important forms of plurality.. .and most of our legislation is directed not at groups, but categories."(1; Further developments in sociological treatment of groups were due to the efforts of sociologists directed towards construction of more adequate definitions of groups. ; I ;

Giddings drew a line of

demarcation between aggregation and association, maintaining that aggregation was purely physioal, while association involved psychic reaction to which the "consciousness of kind" was b a s i c * H e de­ fined the consciousness of kind as a "state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognises another conscious being as of like with i t s e l f . " ^

In terms of this

definition, which was designated explicitly to account for human group­ ings $ the actual delimitation of the field depended upon the degree of consciousness which was chosen as a starting point.

There is nothing

in the definition itself which would confine the concept of groups to human beings.

Taking the psychological interpretation of conscious­

ness, one would have to include even the lowest forms of life in it. This, although inclusive enough, is too broad to be of great value in the analysis of human groups.

Interpreted, however, not as the

psychological problem of consciousness, but as a perception of differences and similarities on which Giddings consistently insisted,

(1)

Eubank, E.E., The Concepts of Sociology, ed. 1932, p. 157.

(2)

A similar point of view was expressed by W. Wygodzinski, who stated that "a group exists in and through consciousness within the plural­ ity of its members." See Kfflner Vt.i. ftir Sozialwissenschaften. v.l (1921), p. 45,

(3)

Giddings, FJ3*, The Principles of Sociology, ©d. 1896, p. 17.

(4)

Giddings, F.H., The Scientific Study of Society, ed. 1924, p. 14.

95

the concept ‘consciousness of kind* may be used profitably in the analysis of group formation, especially in relation to the subverbal prferences in member choices and acceptances into a group*

Suggestive

as it is, it has been little used in sociological research* Elaborating the relationship of aggregating and association, Giddings states further that one always supplemented the other, indica­ ting thereby that purely spatial relations are insignif icant, that they are invariably recognized only when other relationships are being elaborated.

According to him the problem of social psychology is the

study of the gradations of the behavioristic interactions of intimates "Sociology, (according to him) while depending on social psychology at every step, occupies itself in the main with the genesis, the carrying on and the characteristic achieve­ ments of that comprehensive group which the Latins called j5ocietas«”(2) It seems to be important to note the different ways in which Giddings uses the term, "group*"

"The smallest and the simplest

arrangement of individuals fcy position is the "bunch” ....A relatively large bunch, or a cluster of bunches is a group,

and

then "By

combination and recombination groups become the social composition.•... As small groups have combined into larger ones, they also have sub­ divided into smaller ones."^4^

Upon a closer analysis it seems quite

clear that Giddings placed all groups, such as "bunch," "cluster of bunches," and society (as a whole) at the same organization level,

(1)

Giddings, F.H., The Scientific Study of Society, ed. 1924, p. 11. It is necessary to point out in this connection that Giddings did not use the term "behavioristic" in strictly Watsonian meaning* His dualistic position seems to be an adequate indication of it.

(2)

Ibid.

(S)

Giddings, F.H., The Study in -the Theory of Human Society,” ed.1922, p. 296. Ibid., p. 270.

(4)

96

which seems to indicate that he did not see at all the problems en­ tailed in ""combination and recombination” of small groups.

He assumed

that this process was one of fusion in which the combining groups lost their identity and became one large group.

That such fusions occur, it

is true; however, they usually result in forming loosely structured groups which tend not toward higher organization, but rather toward subdivision, as Giddings accurately observed.

The same limited in­

sight into the problems of group organization is shown in his dis­ cussion of ‘’class.”

According to him "individuals of like aptitude and

interest and therefore functioning in like fashion are a class.

As an

observed fact, a class is usually made up of both gangs and isolated individuals •"(1)

If "class" is a group, then it is a mystery how an

"isolated" individual became its member and still remained "isolated" within it.

Still another meaning of the term "society" is evident in

Giddings* discussion of ""social mind" and of mores in their relation to group behavior.

He stated that

"society constrains unconsciously at first, but consciously in its later and higher development it brings pressure to bear upon its component units. It incites and restrains them. It trains and moulds them. It conforms them to norm or type and sets limits to their variation from it. Society is a type, or norm, or ffodo which in a measure controls the variation from itself."^) Here we see that society may have any one of four meanings:

aggregation.

(1)

Giddings, F.H., The Study in the Theory of Human Society," ed. 1922, p* 269.

(2)

Giddings, F. H., op. cit. pp. 201-202.

a bunch (also gang, or association at times), amalgamation (a largo group established from several small units), a cluster of groups and their folkways, or norm, which may be conceived as a verbal statement of a behavior pattern#^) The confusion quite evident in the foregoing definition seems to be rooted in the problem of "contact" with which Spencer was the first to attempt to deal# on the same foundation#^)

The problem of "group vs# individual** rests If organic continuity is set up as a

criterion for “group,** then the term “group** must be rejected as spurious#

Such wholesale rejection would, however, eliminate from

social investigation phenomena which properly belong in the sociological field#

In dealing with this difficulty without going into the problem

of contact, and into the problem of “group reality", the concept of group behavior patterns arose, indicating fcy implication that the concept of "group” was to be discarded and "group patterns" were to be considered the subject matter of sociology*

(1)

Bogardus, E#A#, probably shared Giddings* position at this point, as he classed social organization as a "type of a functional group* See his Foundations of Sociology* ed* 1905, p, 98*

(2)

That, an antagonism between group and individual, and therefore, society and individual is at times unconsciously assumed by some sociologists is clear in the following statements: **#.*any real comprehension of the science of sooiology is quite impossible when we think that# #*individual and society are in opposition and must be thought of in the antithesis, individual vs. society." Von Wiese, L*, Systematic Sociology* p* 81; yet in discussing the function of the state as that of an abstract collectivity, he says that if the people loved each other the state would not bo necessary "the function of the state is to mitigate the difficulties and friction in human sociation arising from the desire of human beings to dominate each other* It exercises this function by establishing and maintaining by force certain regulated forms of superordination and subordination," Ibid., p* 580* To interpret the function of a state in this manner, von Wiese must have unconsciously assumed an antagonism between group and individual«

98 This position was taken by von Wiese,

According to him ”the

fundamental concepts which systematic sociology uses as tools of* investigation are social process, distance and plurality pattern, Methodology of sociological investigation requires then ”analysis and classification of social processes; analysis of plurality patterns by tracing them to social processes in which they originated, and classi­ fication of plurality p a t t e r n s , i n classifying the plurality patterns, or collectivities von Wiese distinguished the following divisions:

crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities,

(3 ) 1

According

to him it was evident ”that only divisions based on differences in interhuman distance are relevant, ,,it may be better to say plurality patterns characterized by extreme closeness of association, patterns woven of less intimate relationships and patterns of the least degree of concreteness. ***4) He defined crowds as **organized and vague, but nevertheless lasting plurality patterns based on similar neuropsychic patterns (especially upon hazy notions of common experience or social destiny) present in an indefinite number of persons,”

Although he maintains that

plurality patterns alone are the subject matter of sociology and re­ iterates this assertion frequently, he distinguishes between the plurality patterns as such, and concrete crowds (composed of actual persons).

According to him the concrete crowd is one which is least

(1)

Von Wiese, L,,"Systematic Sociology, Science of Interhuman Be­ havior,” Sociology and Soc, Res,, (1930) v, 15, p, 108,

(2)

Ibid,

(3)

Ibid,, p. 419.

(4)

Ibid., p. 419,

(5)

Ibid.. p. 464,

99

abstract, "the crowd in the sense of the masses, the people, the common folk; the crowd as the residue left after the rise of the elite, and finally the crowd as the in­ tangible obstacle opposing the efforts of separate persons."(i) This definition refers directly to persons; it does not treat patterns, but persons. Abstract crowd, on the other hand, ’’may be thought of as just a unitary network of relations, as just plurality pattern.”(2) Although von Wiese denies it, he nevertheless distinguishes between the concrete and abstract crowds (crowds of persons and crowd patterns) and includes both of them within his theory*

This is obvious from his

discussion of interaction between the two; ’’The abstract and the concrete (italics mine) are in close interaction; there would be no concrete crowd if the abstract were not already present and the abstract is perpetually rebuilt and renewed by the concrete.”(3) In admitting the abstract crowds and subsequently, concrete groups, von Wiese destroyed the usefulness of his primary definition, i.e., the assumption that the subject matter of sociology is the plurality patterns alone. His assumption concerning the degree of abstractnews, indicates that he considered plurality patterns to be wholly independent, separ­ able from the persons whose behavior creates them.

Von Wiese claims

this independent by means of a simple assertion concerning crowds

(1)

Wise, von, op. cit*.p* 456; the definition used here involves other questions; for one, there is a problem of ’’arising elite” ^ which is obviously a process and therefore could never be a '”residue” devoid of potential elite; a second problem is con­ stituted in von Wiese*s theory of ’’leadership vs* masses.” Neither of these problems can be adequately treated at this point.

(2)

Ibid., p. 458.

(3)

Ibid., p. 457

100

"that plurality patterns are not identical with particular persons, but are only complexes of interhuman relations in which members may be replaced by others without introducing appreciable change in the configuration* A similar independence he sees in the plurality patterns of groups: these are "plurality patterns of the second power, and are relatively independent of mutable interactions of personal relation­ ships by reason of the fact that they are so organized that they are able to impose a consistent type of behavior in a certain sense impersonal, upon their members* Groups thus achieve a fairly high degree of abstractness."(2) The third category, "the plurality patterns possessing the highest sociative power are abstract collectivities; these largely derive their power from ideologies imposed upon or adopted by their constituents and these ideologies impart to the collectivities super-personal character which is there­ fore at the greatest possible extreme from concrete human beings*"'3 ' The line of thought underlying von YTies©1s theory of plurality patterns is strangely reminiscent of Durkheim* s theory of the "collective or common conscience*"

According to Durkheim^ collective conscience

was "independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are (4) placed" and designated "the totality of social similitudes*" Ton Wiese claimed precisely the same for his "patterns."

Both sociologists

recognized their basic concepts, i*e*, collective conscience, and

(1)

Wise, von,

op* o i t p* 458.

(2)

Ibid*, p. 420.

(3)

Ibid., p. 420.

(4)

Simpson, G*, Emil Durkheim on the Division of Labor in Society, ed. 1933, pp. 79-80; also ch. 2, on "Mechanical Solidarity Through Likeness."

plurality patterns appear to be equivalents of the older concepts of behavior patterns established within the web of folkways, customs, mores and general law.

Although similar in its basic assumption, von

Wiese* s theory represents a development beyond the analytical achieve­ ment of Durkheim. While Durkheim

conceived the collective conscience as one

system for every individual. von Wiese elaborated his scheme in terms of groups and of a degree of abstractness, and distinguished three levels:

the levels of crowds, the level of groups, and the level of

abstract collectivities.

This in turn may be interpreted to mean

that the crowd plurality patterns proceed to develop mostly as a subverbal sequences of behavior with the least reference to customs, mores, etc.; that groups although dependent to a great degree upon mutable interaction of personal relationships (subverbal behavior patterns) are regulated to a high degree by verbally stated customs and laws (constitutions drafted by groups, for instance, and all laws applicable to each of these groups); and finally that abstract collectiv ities, (such as state and church) are supposedly governed exclusively by law.

Although a classification on the basis of a degree of "abstract

ness" is possible, it is quite inadequate, for it presupposes an absolute separation of verbal and subverbal behavior. It is probably true that the behavior of a crowd (of a concrete crowd in von Tfiese's terms) develops predominantly at the level of the subverbal behavior patterns; yet conceptual behavior, no matter how limited, always functions simultaneously.

On the other

hand, institutions like the state and church, depend to some extent

102

on the subverbal "behavior patterns of those persons who are delegated to discharge duties in the name of the institution*

The Supreme

Court of the United States may serve here as a case in point*

Al­

though the constitution, the supreme law of the land, governs the official "behavior of the Supreme Court justices, the differences in the opinions they render indicate that even an abstract collectivity ^depends to a high degree upon the behavior patterns of its function­ aries.” Although von liese attempted to construct a theory com­ prising the whole range of groups, he devoted a major part of his work to the medium sized groups, which he named ”B” groups*

An ideal group

of the ”B” type was, according to him, characterized hy (l) "rel&tively long duration and relative continuity; (2) organization based on division of function among members; (3) neuropsychic patterns, symbolic of the group, present in the members; (4) the growth of traditions as the group grows older; (5) interaction with other plurality patterns.”^ ^ He adds that the group usually has a tendency to develop a specific ”group mind” or ”group spirit*”

(2)

A closer scrutiny discloses a great deal of confusion in­ volved in this definition*

First of all, von Wiese indicates that

,,patterns” are present in the members *

This, of course, is in­

admissible, as the term "pattern” is an analytical tool in the hands of a theorist and is his way of designating behavior of persons and

(1)

Von Wiese, L*, Systematic Sociology* tranl. by H. Becker, ed* 1932, p* 490*

(2)

Ibid*, p. 492.

103

la rat jareaeat In em y member, but in a conceptual sehe™

Neither

does von Wiese elaborate how a plurality pattern of the "B" type inter­ acts with other plurality patterns.

It seems that just as in the oase

of the theories of "social forces," the patterns" become not only super-personal,

^ but quite anthropomorphic and take possession of men

and make all of them behave alike. In analyzing the "B" type group, which he considered important because there were such tremendous numbers of them in every society, von M e s e maintained that the discovery of a "group standard” was an indispensable step in sociological explanation. i?or legal purposes, such formal number of members, constitution, considerable importance, but for the chief object of attention is

and numerical traits as incorporation, may be of the systematic sociologist the standard,”

according to which the group*s behavior is actually shaped.(3 ) Von Wiese has his doubts about these standards, for "such group standards are not shaped with the ideals of the great moral and ethical leaders of humanity, but on the contrary, embody the egoism or even egotisms of the g r o u p . H e

believes that the desire of people to belong to

groups constitutes a "vicious circle; every group member attempts to model himself after the group standard and at the same time renounces all goals. Concomitantly the personwho serves as astandard, or as its representative necessarilyincorporates the centrical and differential effects, i.e., the arrogance and selfishness of the group, for no man who doubts the supreme value of its goal can possibly become its model."(3 ) (1)

Von Wiese, L., Systematic Sociology, transl. by H. Becker, ed.1932, p.421.

•* "...plurality patterns are only oomplexes of inter-human re­ lations in which members may be replaced without introducing any appreciable change in the interactive configuration...", p. 458. (3) Ibid.. pp. 547. (4)

Von

^3.6 S 0 |

CZL~k 11

(6 ) Ibid.. pp. 459-60.

p|

f

104

It may be pointed out in this connection that according to von Wiese, the

standard11 is equivalent to a slogan, or extraneous symbol formally

adopted, rather than as the result of collective or group evaluation, forever changing and evolving as the group struggle with successive problem situations. Von Wiese fs conception of ”B groups** is wholly negative and so is his conception of society, since it is comprised of ”B” or medium sized groups.

This is obvious from the followings

”the observations may be repeatedly made that ”B groups” foster personal unscrupulousness to an unusual degree* (No value-judgment is intended in pointing out this fact), filhen actions are practical which would otherwise cause a great deal of shame or embarrassment, the group member comforts himself with the knowledge that the other members of his group are doing the same thing and that they even require him to behave similarly. The feeling of complete personal responsibility does not arise, or if it does, is quickly stifled The true social values, such as responsibility, accordingly, are personal virtues, developed individually, and destroyed by group living.

Al­

though it cannot be denied that there are groups of which von Wiese’s description holds true, the fact remains that his pessimistic generaliza­ tion is unwarranted and cannot form an adequate basis for group analysis. An analysis of group phenomena diametrically opposed /to the one advanced by von Tfiese was advanced by Cooley.

The central point of

his theory is the concept of the "primary group” which together with Sumner's concept of the ”we-group,” constitutes a core around which other group theories subsequently evolved and developed.

(1)

Von Wiese, op. cit., p. 538.

1C5

Cooley accepted that self and society were twin-boro and that social consciousness and consciousness of self were inseparable* According to him, personal self and social self were two aspects of the same thing:

"Descartes might have said 'we think, cogitamus*« on as

good grounds as he said *cogito’ *”(^)

By this he implied that Descartes1

statement stressed the personal aspects alone and that it neglected the social aspects*

It is significant to note that Cooley did not

deny the validity of Descartes’ position; on the contrary, he stressed the fact that both statements had equal claim to validity and factual foundation.

The difference in the form of the statement was due not

to the difference in facts, but to the difference in the point of view: one focusing upon the individual, the other upon the social aspects of the process of thinking, Cooley defined a primary group as all ’’those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation."^ '

This definition

implies a necessity of a close proximity of the members composing a group and also a somewhat extended duration of association.

The most

important types of primary groups were, according to Cooley, the family, the play group and the neighborhood or community groups of elders.

He

was cautious in indicating that he did not enumerate all primary groups but included only those which he thought most universal. (1)

(2) (3)

(3)

It must not be understood that Cooley’s theory was in any manner an answer to the problems raised by von Wiese. Cooley’s work ante­ dated the work of von Wiese; the contrast consists in the basic conception of~the nature of society: for Cooley the group is primarily a source of social virtues, for von Wiese the group is the source of irresponsibility and unscrupulousness, Cooley, C.H., Social Organization * ed. 1909, p. 9. Cooley, C. H., Social Organization* p. 24; it must be pointed out that Cooley does not say simply ’’neighborhood” or "community” but ’’neighborhood group of elders,” which makes a group of people and not a locality as is done by the writers who fb llow Cooley,

106

In contrast with Sumner, who seemed to have been influenced by Gumplowicz's and Ratzenhofer1s group theories, postulating a process of cooperation within a group and of hostility between groups, Cooley presented a statement of group theory which struck a middle ground. According to him neither cooperation, exclusively, nor conflict, as such, were characteristic processes developing within groups. Although he stressed the fact that unity was the result of continued intimate rela­ tions within a group, this unity was "always a differentiated and usually competitive unity ad­ mitting of self-assertion and various appropriate passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy and came, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit.”'' It is at this point that Cooley raised a tremendously important problem of origin of social control.

It is true that he did

not utilize these points fully, yet it seems to be quite clear that he recognized the fact that the emergence, development and crystalli­ zation of social controls originate in group relationships.

It was

probably because of this that Cooley insisted that the development of a socially-minded person depends upon participation in a primary group where "ideals" are developed.

These social ideas include kindness,

tolerance, loyalty, lawfulness and freedom, the development of which he finds is possible in a small, primary group as there "one identifies himself with a whole (and) loyalty to that whole is loyalty to himself."(2)

(1)

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, ed. 1909, p. 23.

(2)

Ibid., p. 38.

107 Within such a group there arises a definite need for a rule or law to govern the conduct of group members under concrete, specific conditions; this rule is created by a whole group to suit a definite need and is accepted by all.

(1}

J

Another problem which Cooley raised was the relation of controls arising within the primary group to the controls established within the larger society.

He stressed the fact that primary groups "are not in­

dependent of the larger society, but to some extent reflect its spirit*"^ ^ but he did not go into an elaboration of what this lfreflection of spirit1? consisted.

On the other hand, he elaborated quite fully a postulate

that primary groups were "springs of life not only for social institu­ tions, ”(3) and the "outgrowth of everything social" was inherent in the nature of primary groups. "Since groups of this sort are never obliterated from human experience but flourish more or less under all kinds of institutions, they remain an enduring criterion by which the latter are ultimately Judged."(5) Cooley’s postulation of "group-society" interrelation constitu­ tes a foundation upon which further analysis of the nature of this rela­ tionship can be made.

Such analysis must recognize continuous change

and simultaneity of the processes from which "group-soeiety" relations develop.

In terms of contemporary sociology this relation may be ex­

pressed as follows:

a primary group functions within a social frame

(1) (2)

Cooley, C.H., Social Organization, ed. 1909, Ch. 4. Ibid.. p. 27.

(3) U) (5)

Ibid. Ibid.. p. 31. Ibid.. p. 32.

108

of reference of the larger society (customs, mores and law) creating at the sane time a frame of reference of its own (customs) and consti­ tution, adjusting its own behavior in relation to the social frame of reference, with the result that both the group and social frame of reference undergo a continuous elaboration and change, Cooley conceived that the development of a socially-minded person depended upon his participation in a primary group* Further, social development depended upon the extension of the primary social ideals*

The extension of the primary ideals which persons develop in

primary group association requires the development of an organization* Cooley maintained that an efficient social organization cannot be effected by means of personal development alone, "Besides personality—or rather correlative with it-there must be an adequate mechanism of communication and organi­ zation*# .there must be also forms and customs of rational organization, through which human nature may express it­ self in an orderly and effective manner *n(l/ The growth of such organization was analyzed by Cooley into the follow­ ing phases:

communication, public opinion, sentiments, classes and

institutions *^^ According to Cooley society is composed of classes.

"Speak­

ing roughly, we may call any persistent social group, other than the (3 ) family, existing within a larger group, a class*MX Whereas the primary group develops its primary ideals by means of face-to-face

(1)

Cooley, C.H., Social Organization* ed. 1909, pp# 54-55.

(2)

Ibid.* Ch. 5,

(3)

Ibid., p. 209.

109

relationships, the classes achieve organization by means of communication, which results in public opinion, sentiment and institutions. Similarly, as the primary group develops unity, classes develop class consciousness, loyalty and class ideals similar to those in primary groups, but extended over the whole class of people.

There

is no indication in Cooley1s work of the manner in which these social groups or classes (he uses these terms interchangeably) come together in society.

In his discussion of communication Cooley paid attention

not to the part played by organization, but to the development of means, the supplementation of the face-to-face contacts by artificial means of communication.

The results of this communication were described by

Cooley in psychological rather than sociological terms although he never came so close to Durkheim as to assert ngroup mind".

Neverthe­

less, Cooley maintained that public institutions were "simply a definite and established phase of public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence."(l) According to Cooley class-organization of society consists in personal relation of an individual to an institution.

(l)

"In the individual

Cooley, C.H., Social Organization, ed. 1909, p. 313; it seems that although Cooley never ascribed "existence" to "social mind," such implication may 'be one of his unstated premises* These concepts form a foundation of his basic definitions: "Group nature or primary phase of society, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind," ibid.. pp. 29-30; later on he refers to public will and democratic mind as self direction of the group; ibid.. p. 395. "The crowd-mind is not, as is sometimes said, a quite different thing from that of the individual (unless by individual is meant the higher self), but is merely a collective mind of a low order which stimulates and unifies the cruder impulses of its members," p. 150.

110

■the institution exists as a habit: of mind and action, largely unconscious, because largely common to all groups.”

In what manner the primary

groups might be related as groups to each other and to institutions is a problem with which Cooley was not concerned.

It seems as if he

assumed that in the social organization of classes the persons who are members of the "primary groups" disperse to form larger groups, or classes.

From his description of classes it is quite evident that he

considered "classes" as organizations of individuals and not of groups. Just as the problem of social organization is, according to Cooley, a problem of individual allegiance, so is disorganization a problem of the "individual as a mind without cogent and abiding allegiance to a whole, and without larger principles of conduct that flow from such allegiance.

"(2)

The group as a unit in social organization and dis­

organization was altogether overlooked in Cooley*s presentation. That Cooley, did not seem to have a clear vision of the social organization beyond the level of integration within the primary group is indicated in the methodological shift discernible in his analysis. In his discussion of the primary group he stressed the totality of experience; it is a unity within a social situation which necessitates cooperation or conflict, development of law and of social institutions. Throughout the length of his discussion he spoke in terms of persons, their actions, and succeeded in producing the clearest exposition of

(1)

Cooley, C.H., Social Organization, ed. 1909, p. 314.

(2)

Ibid.. p. 347.

Ill

the primary groups in the whole of sociological literature.

But when

he launched into a discussion of social organization "beyond the level of the primary group, he changed his methodology and proceeded with a discussion of ideals, their extension, sentiments and classes.

This

seems to indicate that he had only a limited insight into the structural aspects of group organization beyond the levels of primary groups*

The

result of this change in methodology is an implication that social ttvirtuesH such as sympathy, social control, responsibility, morality, etc,, develop in primary groups, function in the individuals

composing

classes and determine the type of social "mind” or public opinion, bringing about automatically a desirable social organization.

In this

manner he generalized the facts derived from his knowledge of the primary group to cover the whole range of social organization. Although Cooley never subscribed to the theory postulating a progression from social organization toward disorganization, such as was postulated by Tonnies, yet he contributed indirectly toward its acceptance in the sociological field.

He presented his analysis of

the primary group with such power that this concept was accepted as denoting the initial development of group relationships.

Yet the

primary group, such as described by Cooley, denotes a group which has undergone considerable development.

The organization, or structure of

such a group, is taken for granted; yet even superficial case history points out the fact that these groups achieved the level of a primary group only after a prolonged period of association.

This is true of

the family, the play group, gang and of other groups in ivhich a

112

condition of close, stable and prolonged association prevails.

Although

Cooley clearly stated that primary groups are primary because they give the "individual his earliest and completest experience in social unity,"(l)

the meaning of the term "primary" was interpreted by his

followers as "first " or "initial" with the result, that the primary group was taken as the initial phase of group development.

The next

step in the construction of theory was to elaborate it in terns of intermediate, secondary and tertiary groups.

Such progression is

only implied by Cooley's discussion of the extension of the primary ideals and of organization of classes.

A closer analysis of his table

of contents in "Social Organization" reveals that Cooley might have accepted the theory postulating a trend in group development from the primary through the intermediate and secondary forms of social organization as a postulate so basic as to need no explicit s t a t e m e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the theories of group organization inspired by Cooley and his materials were used only inferentially by his followers.(3)

He, himself, made no

precise and definite use of a theory of organization explicitly postulating development proceeding from "primary group-towards-mass" organisation of society. (1) (2) (3)

Cooley, C. H . , Social Organization, ed. 1909, p. 27. Ibid,, pp. ix-xvii* It is interesting to note that in Introductory Sociology, ed. 1933, L.J. Carr and B.C. Angell state that human groupings may be arranged into a following order: intimate pair groups, primary groups, quasi­ primary groups and secondary groups (ch. 15, p. 210). Since Cooley is given posthumously as a co-author, it appears that the abovequoted systematization is an inherent part of Cooley's theory of groups. The text does not indicate by quotes or any other method,what parts of the work came from Cooley's pen. The preface to the volume states clearly that only ten chapters are lacking in material from Cooley's pen, and Chapter 15, which gives the above classification is enumerated among them. The credit for this chapter is given to Dr. Carr (p.vii). The authors admit that they introduced a few changes in Cooley's theory necessitated by "new concepts and theories and the data drawn from recent sociological research"; they also introduced "more systematiz­ ation." (p.v.).

115

It seems iso be quite evident that a trend toward constructing a theory of social organization in terms of diminishing group contacts, substitution of indirect means of communication, and of ’’rationality” or consciously calculated relationship as contrasted with feeling, was based upon the confusion of two methodological approaches: and psychological.

As it was pointed

Tonnies* theory of groups there of development.

historical

out previously in the analysis of

arose a need to account for two lines

The first trend was historical and shaved that social

situations changing rapidly due to the technological and intellectual conditions result in under-development of group relations, creating whole masses of persons whose primary or Gemeinschaft group experiences are almost wholly limited to family groups, or a few intimate friends. The confusion came when it was assumed that the same progression was descriptive of the development within the life-span of an individual group.

The fact that within the life-span of human groups there is a

tendency to develop a unity of feeling, of purpose and structure, was overlooked.

On the other hand,

person makes new contacts as he

it is also true that an individual grows older and joins new groups which

seldom develop relationships fully, to the primary group level.

The

analysis of this fact involves two methods which must be kept distinct for the sake of methodological clarity.

One method requires an analysis

of contacts made by a person in an historical progression within the concrete life-span of an individual.

In such an analysis we may find

that the groups which an adult joins seldom develop to the level of primary groups, and, on the other hand, we find that such primary group developments as families and lasting friendships have a definite place not only in the life of the child but also in that of the adult.

114

A different method is required in the analysis of the relationships in the "life-span" of a single group.

In such analysis

we find that, as long as persons meet and continue in association, group relationships will develop to any level possible under the con­ ditions of the situations in Y/hich the groups function. tions in some groups remain at a very low level; higher degree.

Social rela­

some develop to a

Many groups, and probably most of them, terminate

sooner or later, depending upon the conditions in which they function. A man is a member of many groups. With some persons he functions as a stranger; with others his relations develop into a profound comraunity of work, respect and responsibility or family life.

At no time should

an anlysis of social relationships confuse a history of associations of a person with the life-span and development of a group of which he is a member; although they are related, one cannot be accounted for in terms of the other.

The present theories of group organization have un­

consciously identified the two progressions. Due to this confusion another assumption was adopted, namely, that disorganization vms a

"normalV development, and since it was

acknowledged as progressive, finding some means of re-organization was recognized as imperative.

Cooley conceived such organization in terms

of extension of primary ideals, gaining personal freedom from the primary group bonds and developing a sort of individualized type of "class consciousness.”

He indicated that class consciousness was not

well developed at present and a new organization of it was necessary to prevent waste caused by groups and individuals working at cross purposes. 11

A need for reorganization was even more strongly expressed by Tonnies

116

who as early as 1912 and later in 1922 declared that the recent develop­ ments within the organization of the Gesellschaft indicated that it was becoming a destructive force in present-day society*

He considered

cooperatives as the best means of reorganization of wholesale purchasing and mass production based on the principle of ”Gemeinschaft” economy, but adapted to the conditions of the Gesellschaft society.^^

(l)

Tonnies, P., Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* transl. by C.P. Loomis, ed. 1940, pp. 227-8; Tonnies stressed the economic organi­ zation not only because of the influence of Marx, but also as a sociologist who accepted the social problem situation as an important aspect of group structuralization. E.E. Eubank’s inter­ pretation of TBnnies that the relationships of Gesellschaft ”are rational, purposive and founded upon coinmutuality (italics mine), hence represent constructive advances in the direction of sociali­ zation” is wholly inconsistent with the German sociologists* point of view. This interpretation is given in the light of the socio­ logical theory prevalent in the United States and not intended by Tonnies himself. See; ' The Concepts of Sociology, ed* 1932, p. 151.

CHAPTER VII REPRESENTATIVE THEORIES OP SOCIAL ACTION In spite of the fact that in an endeavor to establish the constituent elements of social life, sociological thought has been largely confined to atomic analysis it has not limited itself wholly to that approach.

Accounts of social action are notably a methodo­

logical exception; at least they do not conform wholly to the pre­ valent pattern of elementalization and atomistic analysis. For the purpose at hand only four accounts of social action are reviewed here, although this problem has attracted many sociolo­ gists.^^

The theories discussed are those of Lester Ward, Wilfredo

Pareto, Talcott Parsons and Florian Znaniecki, which seem to be high points of development of theories of social action, a summaU on of the results achieved by sociologists in following this line of thought. Ward's theory of teleological action seems to be among the earliest sociological discussions of social action and since it was quite inconsistent with the basic assumptions of his own social theory, it required a new methodology.

Ward was aware of the difficulty, for

he could find no justification for assuming teleological processes, and he himself indicated that such an assumption was incompatible with the genetic point of view which he accepted and whose “mechanistic

(l)

Giddings, F.H., Elements of Sociology, ed. 1915, chapter on Sympathetic Like-Mindedness and Impulsive Group Action.” McDougall, W., An Introduction to Social Psychology, ed. 1921, chapter on “Theories of Action.11"” Ellwood, C., The Psychology of Human Society,ed. 1925, chapter on "The Unity of the Group and Group Action.” Blackmar, F.W. and Gillin, J.L., Outlines of Sociology, ed.1926, chapter on "Social Activities.”

117

principles** he utilized in explaining the phenomena of social evolution* He admitted that !,viewed in the widest sense (that of general science) man is but a product of nature and his acts are the efforts of the antecedent causes* action."^ ^

In this sense there is and can be no teleological

Apparently without realising the importance of his state­

ment he recognized that the terms of mechanistic causal chains were quite inadequate for the purpose of analysis of social action, and be­ cause of it he found himself in need of assuming a dualistic position requiring two seemingly distinct categories of causess

those of the

genetic order such as environmental conditions, heredity, etc*, and those of the social orer, i«e*, "emanating from motives which lie within each individual*

They (human acts) are performed in obedience

to plans, designs, and purposes which exist in the minds of individuals.99^ ^ The difficulty which Ward encounterested was one which characterized the science of his time.

The "real” and scientifically

valid subjects of investigation were only "objective realities" of the "external world" which constituted the field of natural sciences.

The

problem met in the analysis of human behavior, such as consciousness, function, etc*, were relegated to a position of epiphenomena. There were only two ways out of the dilemma left for those who were interested in the analysis of "epiphenomena” and who desired to claim a place in the,field of sciences for their discipline*

(1)

Ward, Dynamic Sociology, ed. 1911, v* 1, p* 29*

(2)

Ibid*

One

118

was to assign to the phenomena of human psycho-social behavior a reality accorded objects; this resulted in reification*

^he other

solution was the assumption of a dichotomy between the objective and subjective phenomena, resulting in a categorical difference between the environmental causes (relationships at the level of such sciences as biology, physiology, etc*), and the "subjective causes” (relation­ ships at the level of social sciences in which the "facts" of the other sciences are subsumed). However vague and far from attacking the sources of the problem, he remained, Ward's contribution to sociological thought is great in that he courageously, although not explicitly, pointed out the inadequacies of analysis of the phenomena of the social order in terms of physical sciences.

It was probably because of this insight

that he insisted that sociology was a science the purpose of which was the understanding of social forces and of telesis which according to him, could contribute to the permanent betterment of society.^)

Progress,

in terms of his theory, consisted in telic action which in t\r n con­ sisted in the selection of means appropriate to the achievement of ends in conformance to the standards of science* The core of Ward's theory of action may be stated as follows: action could assuredly be telic, provided man acquired knowledge.

human

The criterion of telic action was the standard of science.

The assurance

with which Ward accepted science as the criterion of telic action seems to imply that he considered it to be ultimate and perfect at any given time.

(1)

On the other hand, he stated that "external reality" was know-

Ward, L., Synamic Sociology, ed. 1911, v. 2, p. 504.

119

able only as series of* approximations, which indicated that he realized that the criterion was not infallable and that its stability could be appraised only in relation to the consecutive approximations of* science, i.e., discoveries of* new and reformulations of older theories.

Ward, however, never realized the inconsistency of his

position, for he never did admit that science could be in error; he took the position that action which accorded with scientific standards was to be equated with telic action. By implication he assumed rational or telic, and non-rational or non-telic action, in that he distinguished between a commonsense criterion of daily experience which was a source of error and resulted in non-telic action, and telic action resulting in permanent progress.

Since conformance with the standard of science

was the only criterion necessary for telic action, Ward assumed that everybody could secure the necessary information and that by means of “equal distribution of extant knowledge11 telic action on a mass scale could be secured. Ward's conception of social action, although not as atomistic as his theory of social forces, is still limited to certain aspects; it is purely “intellectual istic11 and stated in terms of “reason."

In

it, the split between emotion and intellect is almost complete. Pareto concerned himself more directly with human actions than did Ward.

Like Ward, he recognized the function of the subject­

ive phenomena such as residues, derivations, sentiments, interests, etc., in social causation; but whereas Ward made them a source of error, Pareto made them the basis of non-logical action.

He assumed a catego­

rical difference between logical and non-logical thought processes, stating that “logical actions are at least in large part the result of

120

reasoning.

Non-logical actions originate chiefly in definite psychic

states, sentiments, subconscious feelings and the like.“(^)

Logical

actions according to him are actions that “logically conjoin means to ends not only from the stand­ point of the subject performing them, but from the stand­ point of other persons who have more extensive knowledge."(2) In other words, he limits them to actions that are logical both sub­ jectively and objectively.

In his judgment, most human thinking and

acting is non-logical and “far removed from realities is the hypothesis that human beings draw logical inferences from residues and then pro­ ceed to act accordingly* In activity based on residues human beings use derivations more frequently than strict­ ly logical reasonings, and therefore to try to predict their conduct by considering their manner of reasoning would be to lose all contact with the real#"'®' Pareto made an effort to classify the non-logical actions into genera; however, he himself was aware of the fact that under certain conditions the actions placed in one class fitted into several others* He attributed this particular difficulty to the human tendency to rationalize.

Had Pareto been a more competent logician, he would

have been able to analyze his problem instead of blaming human be­ havior for mixing up his classifications* According to Pareto, the criterion which establishes the categorical difference between actions is the convergence of the subjective and the scientific points of view.

The actions in which

these points of view converge are according to Pareto logical; in the

(1)

Pareto, V . , Mind and Society, ed. 1935, pp. 87-88.

(2)

Ibid.■ p. 77.

(3)

Ibid.. transl. by A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston, ed, 1935, par. 1443.

121

contrary case, they are non-logical.

Having assumed this dichotomy

Pareto was logically forced to assume a categorical difference between logical and non—logical thought processes,

A closer analysis shows,

however, that the facts do not support such an assumption.

It is quite

possible that 11non-logical” or '’wishful thinking" may dominate the actions of a non—literate man to a degree that it becomes necessary to acknowledge that the facts recognized by him do not correspond with "realiiy,"

Yet, as far as his process of thinking is concerned,

primitive man is as logical as the scientist in his laboratory, for both use as premises all the facts available to them,^^

The difference

in achievement results not from categorically different thought processes, but in the degree of precision in the use of facts available to them in the situation.

It is quite true that the erroneous use of facts

and the drawing of conclusions from them are frequent occurrences in every-day life, but similar experiences are familiar even to great scientists.

Innumerable fallacies and discarded scientific theories

are an ample proof of this fact. C. Keyser summarized the efforts of human thought directed toward the discovery of a "perfect order or science."

Human thought,

according to him, proceeds as if "in the order of nature there some­ how existed a perfect invariant, universally and eternally valid system,"^)

(1)

(2)

Malinowski, B*, Myth in Primitive Psychology, ed. 1926, chapter on "Myths of Magic"; "myth is recognized as akin to science, as it is directed towards the attainment of practical ends; like any other art or craft it is also governed by theory, and a system of prin­ ciples which dictate the manner in which the act has to be per­ formed in order to be effective," p. 82. Non-literate man uses nyths when a task is dangerous, result insecure, and whenever his ordinary means fail him. They supply the only facts he has. Keyser, C., Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking, ed. 1916, p. 53.

122

•which is ho be discovered; ”• • .when -thought, in its progress along any one of many courses, has reached a high degree of refinement, pre­ cision and certitude, then and thereafter, but not before, we call it mathematical thought...what is called mathema­ tics has been long upon the way, owing to previous stages and other designations••.common sense, practical arts perhaps, speculation, theology it may be, philosophy, natural science, or it may be for many a millennium no name at all... *they are all of them sprung from the human '’or invariant reality in a world of Where all these sciences differ is not in the type of the thinking process, but in exactitude of their statements and in approximation of the attainment of the ultimate goal. The phenomena of non-logical behavior, called non-rational by both Ward and Pareto, are prpminent in human behavior but not for the reason that there is in man a non-rational type of thinking resulting from the fact, as Ward held, the ’’extant knowledge” in not commonly shared by all, and because the knowledge of man himself is far below the exactitude of other sciences. Both Ward and Pareto held in common that human actions to be logical must meet an external standard of rationality and that the sub­ jective phenomena were sources of error or of non-logical action.

They

both denied that the subjective phenomena had any place in the logicoexperimental field in which Pareto was interested, or in the telic action which Ward considered to be of prime importance.

However great

are the differences between the two sociologists, this point they held in common and this point of view narrowed considerably their treatment of the theory of action*

(l)

Keyser, C., Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking, ed. 1916, pp, 49-50.

123

One of the latest contributions in this field of inquiry came from Parsons*

In his statement of the Mvoluntaristic theory of action1*

he proposes to include the subjective phenomena, recognizing the fact that Mthe methodological schema of scientifically valid knowledge not exhaust the significant elements of action*11^ )

do

According to him

any analytical theory must recognize them as a body of verifiable facts, resulting from the subjective manifestation of such social facts as association.

His theory admits these phenomena positively, not as a

source of error, or of random ends, but as interdependent with other elements in specifically determinate ways. While other theories of action stress conditional elements involved in action almost exclusively, the voluntaristic theory stresses a process of interaction

between normative and conditional elements.

Parsons suggests that theories of action may be arranged in a series according to the emphasis they give to these two elements.

DurkheimTs

theory of action would come at the normative extreme because of its exclusive stress upon the functions of norms, while Pareto*s theory represents the opposite extreme because of its exclusive recognition of conditional aspects*(2) In terms of the voluntaristic theory, action is a system which may be analyzed into unit acts.

The unit act is an act which still

makes sense as a part of a concrete system of action.

The structure

(1)

Parsons, T., The Structure of Social Action, ed. 1937, p. 81.

(2)

Ibid., for a detailed discussion of the symbolic representation of the voluntaristic action: see Hote C., appended to ch. 1, especially pp. 82-3.

124

the unit act involves a concrete end, concrete conditions, concrete means and one or more norms governing the choice of means to the end* At this point Parsons guards carefully and continuously against the assumption that the component elements of the unit act are entities of the same order as the units of an action system*

His argument is

rather cumbersome and confused as he applies the term ”concrete entity” to both and points to a solution by means of gin illustration instead of simply stressing that the term "action unit” refers to the objective level and is descriptive;

whereas the term '’component element of a

unit” is an analytical term on the theoretical level*

However, Parsons*

insistence upon the distinction between the two is well taken, as the confusion of these levels has produced many difficulties in the socio­ logical. field where such terms as social force, for instance, were con­ sidered objective phenomena and an intrinsic part of nature, instead of terms or analytical tools on the theoretical level. This account of the voluntaristic theory of action was another contribution*

All previous theories used analysis as a tool to break

down the complexes into their component elements.

In this process

the phenomena characteristic of the complex in question disappeared, just as the hydrogen and oxygen resulting from the analysis of water have none of water’s qualities*

It was because of this fact that

intuitionist empiricism rejected all analysis, because analysis re­ duced wholes into component parts and so "destroyed totality*" assumes an intermediate position.

Parsons

He grants the necessity of analysis

while recognizing the fact that its result cannot retain the characteris­ tics of a whole*

He maintains that

IZJ5

wsocial processes cannot be understood by the apprehension of the properties of the social elements alone. The latter must be seen as a component of a system of action. Sociology should then be thought of as a science of action^, of the ultimate common value element in its relation to other elements of action.”(l) This is evidence that Parsons realized the importance of relations and of organization, an aspect neglected in earlier analyses. According to Parsons, the rationality of an act cannot be adduced by a simple analysis of means and ends, as the rationality of an actdoes not depend wholly upon therationality of a single

rational relation of means and ends;

action unit emerges only when it is con­

ceived in relation to the whole action system and to the frame of reference.

Accordingly the frame of reference determines a point of

view from which the facts of any situation are selected and integrated. It provides a sort of theoretical position from which to proceed.

The

frame of reference includes the minimum differentiation of structural elements (ends, means, conditions and norms). elements involves a temporal sequence.

The relation of these

The end implies a future

reference, but the conception of it in the mind of the actor it must be contemporaneous with the situation and precede the employment of means.

All these precede the outcome*

In the relation of all elements

of action there is an implication of teleological action (a statement similar in some degree to that made by Ward), as action usually re­ sults in a changed state of affairs, a change which would not take place without the intervention of the actor.

According to Parsons,

the frame of reference is not considered a datum. It is recognized

(1)

Parsons, T., The Structure of Social Actions, ed. 1937, p. 440.

126

by him as a conceptual bool, as an indispensable framework from which bo describe the phenomena of action.

Frames of reference, Just as

"elements" of the earlier analyses, are assigned bo bhe analybical level and are nob bo be equated v/ibh bhe behavior itself.

In bhis

manner Parsons abbempbed bo avoid bhe confusion resulting from objeotificabion of analybical concepts* Parsons* main cribicism of obher bheories of acbion is bo bhe effecb bhab mosb of bhese bheories sbressed bhe faobs of bhe ex­ ternal world as absolubely independent of bhe subjective phenomena.

He

objected specifically bo bhe assumpbion bhab a bheory of acbion which posbulabed bhab bhe acquisibion of knowledge is in ibself an adequabe guide for persons in making passive adapbabion bo exbernal condibions • In his bheory of volunbarisbio acbion sysbems he says "an acbion is a process in which bhe conerebe human being plays an acbive, nob merely adapbive role. This creative element is theoretically formualted in bhe conception of ultimate values, or whatever form bhe value element takes in relation bo social life,"(l) lb may be added at bhis point bhab even "facts", as seen by men, be­ come facts only ■when certain relationships are perceived from a certain point of view and oriented towards some goal.

It is bhe human capacity

for evaluating relationships that creates "facts".

The apprehension

of bhe elements alone does nob give the understanding of bhe emergent characteristics bhab are of bhe utmost importance in sociological fields.

(l)

Parsons, T., The Structure of Social Actions, ed. 1937, p. 439.

127

As the title of his work indicates, Parsons* chief concern is presenting the voluntaristic theory of action is to reveal its general structure as including "both scientific and common everyday "behavior*

He tried also to keep a clear distinction between the

structure of acts, that is, actual relations developing within a system of action, and analytical tools (i.e., description and con­ ceptual analysis*}

This fact seems to indicate that he realized

the dangers of the confusion resulting from the ascribing to concepts a physical reality and existence; yet in spite of this realization he did not achieve full success.

This in itself points out the

importance of this problem in sociological methodology and also the difficulties inherent in it*

The whole question is linked with the

problem of analysis into elements and disregard of structural rela­ tions* Parsons frankly faced these problems and in his analysis of social actions recognizes the importance of relations*

He recognized

the fact that sociological methodology has leaned heavily upon analysis of a perceived whole into elements, atoms and factors, and he under­ took to show that the results of such analysis were never characterized by qualities similar to those significant of the whole.

He pointed out

the fact that an analysis into elements is always accompanied by vanishing of the phenomena of the whole and the emergence of new phe­ nomena when a new totality was organized.

(l)

According to his view,

Parsons, T., The Structure of Social Actions, ed* 1937, p. 765. “According to this doctrine what is peculiar to biological theory is the problem raised by the properties of organisms which are not to be found in their constituent physico­ chemical elements or parts. And surely the line between the physico-chemical, and the biological group is the clearest line of subdivision with the natural sciences,” p. 765*

128

©mergence is character1stic of social action, because the meaning of a unit emerges only in relation to the total system of action. He maintained that because the term ’’emergence11 is widely accepted among biologists and psychologists and is also descriptive of social action, this estab­ lished the "organicism" of the voluntaristic theory of social action. This assertion, however, is not wholly accurate, because the phenomena of emergence are not confined exclusively to the biological and social field.

They are also true of the physico-chemical group which is

inorganic• It is at this point that Parsons seems to have fallen short of his goal of maintaining a clear distinction between behavior and its description.

Emergence and disappearance of certain characteristics

are terms of description and of inference and not actual, objective be­ havior.

Both of these terms are kindred concepts and indicate a point of

view from which an analysis is made, or rather an interest in certain phenomena.

Tfifhen a bit of organic matter is analyzed into its component

chemical elements, the process may be described as emergence by a chemist who is interested in chemical phenomena and for whom the phenomena chemical elements represent a "totality"; on the other hand, a biologist will describe the same process as the vanishing of biologi­ cal phenomena in which he is interested.

The point is, that both are

right in spite of the fact that their statements about the same process are contradictory.

Both terras vanishing and emergence are not des­

criptive of behavior, but refer to tire point of view from which a des­ cription is made.

129

Having failed to recognize this limitation Parsons weakened his methodological position considerably, and yet his contribution in the field of sociological method is great, chiefly because he directed the attention of sociologists to the problems created by their tendency to analyze social behavior so far that the character of social phenomena almost disappeared.

If such analyses were consistently and generally

pursued, sociologists might be left without actual sociological sub­ ject matter and be turned into biologists, physiologists or mathemati­ cians, depending upon how far and in what direction they pushed their analyses.

In other words, since sociologists are interested in the

phenomena of social living and the atomistic and elementalistic analyses result in the disappearance of the phenomena of their field, it may be assumed that these methodological tools are not well adapted to the subject matter, and if used without full realization of their limitations they may become a hindrance rather than help in sociological methodology. Parsons* theory of social actions has for its general back­ ground political and economic theories. applicable to all social sciences.

It is broad enough to be

A theory designed specifically for

the sociological field (excluding related fields) with a detailed analysis of human action was brought out by P. Znaniecki in 1936, only a year before the publication of Parsons' work. Znaniecki* s theory of action is based on sociological data and it is probably because of this fact that cultural phenomena were assigned such prominence in it.

In postulating his theory, Znaniecki

assumed a positivistic standpoint by accepting the existence of

IS O

"natural" data quite independent of our perception of them, but pro­ tested that these data were not to be admitted in the field of social science.

According to him, the data of social science are character­

ized by a "humanistic coefficient."

Znaniecki* s understanding of

the term "humanistic coefficient" seems to be the meaning which human experience attaches to the objects of nature*

He elaborates this

further by saying that a thing, a physical object, is meaningless sociologically. value.

A thing with.the humanistic coefficient becomes a

Primary social values are persons, because they are objects

of other men* s activities. (1) v J

The secondary social values are those

which enter into social system as "particular properties, forms of behavior, relationships of those who are the chief objects of active interest."^- ^ Znaniecki considers all these definitions to be essential to the understanding of the structure of social actions.

He maintains

that the significance of social actions is in the cultural aspects and that because of this fact they help to eliminate some arbitrary and uncritical assumptions. However well substantiated was Znaniecki*s objection to the inclusion of "natural" objects as sociological data, he achieved only partial success, for his definitions involved a confusion of orders.

According to him, the term "value11 does not only

refer to certain relationships established in the process of evaluating,

(1)

Znaniecki, F*, Social Actions, ed. 1936, p. 15*

(2)

Znaniecki, F*, The Method of Sociology, ed* 1934, pp. 131-3.

131

but the very object or thing becomes a value. For the sake of methodo­ logical clarity these coneei^tions should be kept separate as phenomena of different orders, physical and psycho-social.

To equate the two

opens the possibilities of "reification” leading to confusion and crude materialism.^

In final analysis Znaniecki established three

categories of values: man-value, thing-value. and "particular property. or relation” value. This reduced man, thing and relation to a common denominator and from the point of view of methodology obscured the differences between them* There seems to be in Znaniecki1s theory a strong tendency to reducing everything to one common denominator, as for instance, in his ,!valuen analysis*

This tendency may be seen even more clearly from

his analysis of social "objects” . Here again he distinguishes three categories of objects:

an ordinary thing in nature (an object which

finds no place in sociology); an object of experience or value and a man who is an object in the experience of another man.

In thus

reducing his universe of discourse to a common denominator of objects he again establishes three categories: jects and conscious objects.

natural objects, cultural ob­

Whether the class of conscious objects

includes animals, he does not disclose*

However, it is clear that

Znaniecki himself identifies object and value and uses them inter­ changeably, thus obliterating generally accepted lines of distinction*

(l)

Money, for instance, becomes a value in itself in an economic system, while in a crude state before man got hold of it it is just metal, A piece of paper may be valued more than gold, yet it does not become value in itself. Runs on banks, inflations, etc. prove beyond doubt, that value depends in the first place on human agreements and relations.

152

Znaniecki1s methodological schema of reducing man ho object, contains another problem, namely, that according to his definition the class of conscious objects (men), treated logically, must be sub­ divided into ”subjects", those who are having the experience, and "objects", those who are the objects of another man*s experience. Methodologically, this distinction is most important to Znaniecki*s theory of action, for its implied "subject-object" relation constitutes a pivot on which his whole scheme of action hangs. Znaniecki analyzed social function into four elements.

The

first element is a person whom the social subject or agent wishes to act upon, to influence, or change in some manner.

This person in

Znaniecki*s terminology is a social object, or a primary social value. The second element is the social instrument, which must be chosen with reference to the social object: word):

(these may vary from a gun to a kind

The third element is the social method, which is a way of

using the social instrument, and of conveying meaning to the social object, and it is efficient only to the degree to which it does this* The meaning derived from the use of a social instrument (by means of a social method) is the basis of the "axiological significance" which attaches to the instrument and which is different for the social sub­ ject and social object. ,

.

product.

The fourth element is the social reaction, or

(1) Znaniecki states further that "social actions are those which

have as objects conscious beings, individually or collectively and which propose to influence those social b e i n g s . O t h e r activities not

(1)

Znaniecki, F., Social Actions, ed. 1936, Ch. 3.

(2)

Ibid., p. 65.

133

bearing upon men, but upon material things, economic values, technical achievements, are not social actions and do not belong in the field of sociology proper, but to other related fields.

It is quite evident

that Znaniecki established his definition of social action in terras of subject-object relationships, which although novel and adequate for a "subject," is wholly inadequate so far as concerns the "object." Psychological and linguistic implications of the passivity inherent in the term "object" create a new dichotony.

According to this theory

men are dynamic "agents" part of the time, ani passive recipients at other times. On the basis of Znaniecki* s theory the totality of dynamic functioning of man could be reduced to the kaleidoscopic successive alternations between the states of dynamic action and receptive passivity.

Accordingly, a description of social behavior of a

"subject" or "agent" could be made on the basis of his postulates. On the other hand, a description of the social behavior of an "object" would require for its description the concepts of older socio­ logists^^ and psychologists^^ who maintained that men were simply (1)

Park, R.E. and Burgess, Ed. 1928. Introduction to the Science of Sociology, ed. 1928. "Society stated in mechanistic terms reduces to interaction. A person is a member of society so long as he responds to social forces..the limits of society are in inter­ action, (p .341).

(2)

Hunter, W.S., Human Behavior, ed. 1928, chapter on "The Correlation of Stimulus and Response.11* Watson, J.B., Behaviorism, ed. 1925, general formulation of stimulus response hypothesis, pp. 20-24. Warden, C.J., A Short Outline of Comparative Psychology. ed. 1927. Chapter on "The Modern Experimental Movement." Titchener, E.B., A Textbook of Psychology, ed. 1910, part 2, Ch. on "Action." Murcell, J.L., "The Stimulus and Response Reaction," Psy. Review, 1922, v. 29, pp. 146-162. Wheeler, R.H., "Persistent Problems in Systematic Psychology, Ho. V. Attention and Association," Psy. Review, 1925, v, 32, pp. 472-8. The sociologists followed largely the same line of thought. The concept

13 3

recipients of* stimuli.

For this reason Znaniecki1s statement of* social

relationship in terms of* "subject—object" seems to be a restatement of* older theories or at least is undoubtedly rooted in them. In this connection it is also necessary to point out that Znanieclci devoted only an insignificant part of his analysis to the function of the "conscious object."

His main interest was in the

function of the actor, and this very fact resulted in the neglect of methodological problems actually involved in the subject-object relationship. Znaniecki* s insistent emphasis upon the function of the "actor" brings a new development in sociological methodology.

As

shown in this review, sociology developed a consistent trend towards conforming to the principles of atomistic analysis, in which the main emphasis is on social elements such as needs, interests, attitudes, instincts, etc., leaving man (as a total organization) and his function out of sociological discussion.^Gradually, however, a reaction set in against this extreme atomism, and the works of both Parsons and

of stimulus-response is basic, for instance, in the theory of social interaction, although it is recognized as inadequate by most of the psychologists. According to Eubank, "interaction is, of course, a general and inclusive concept which covers any form of reciprocal activity... It is interhuman stimulus and response in which each member of the group is both a stimulator of all others, and respond­ er to all others. Response is stimulus." See Eubank, B.E., The Concepts of Sociology, ed. 1932, p. 290. (l)

The same atomistic development was characteristic even to a greater degree in psychology; it began to change under the influence of Gestalt theory.

134

Znaniecki are examples of it.

According to Parsons, a -unit object of

social study is action and action implies an "actor.11 (1)

Znaniecki,

on the other hand, proposes a theory of the "social subjects" action, his function, and not action conceived apart from man. It is important to note that both these theories of action involve further methodological implications, namely, the relation of action to group structures.

Parsons0for instance, states that

"when actions systems involving a plurality of actors are present they may be described as groups; that is a larger aggregate may be thought of as made up of persons as their unit*•..At the same time in the present context the group schema is also to be regarded as secondary to the action schema. 'There are no group properties that are not reducible to properties of systems of actions and there is no analy­ tical theory of groups which is not translatable into terms of the theory of action."(2) Znaniecki in analyzing collective action or opposition ad­ mits that "we cannot understand the nature and explain the origin of these and similar forms of collective opposition without a rather substantial knowledge of the group structures which make such a peculiar kind of social chemistry possible.... I have come to the conclusion that a proper investigation of this problem can be made only on the dual basis of a general theory of social actions on the one hand and a theory of social groups on the other hand."(3/

(1)

(2) (3)

Parsons, P., The Structure of Social Action, ed. 1937, when he states that "These are, in a sense, concrete unite (of an "action" schema) but they cannot be thought of in a form relevant to the action schema except as elements or parts of an act, which further implies an "actor," that is, a "personality," the identity of which transcends any one of its particular acts" (p. 738). Ibid., pp. 746-7. Znaniecki, P., Social Actions, ed. 1936, pp. 452-3, "opposition" in the above quotation is indicated as one of group problems which necessitates a treatment from the point of view of the group.

135

In 'the light of the preceding review of group and social action theories, it is the purpose of this work now to analyze the relationships of human problem-solving behavior or human action to group struoturalization*

CHAPTER VIII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUP THEORIES WITH REFERENCE TO SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The assumption that, over long periods of time, a definite shift has taken place in social organization from that on the basis of primary groups to "mass11 society, or the disorganization,helps to obscure some important facts.

If we direct

our attention to the

social life of any period up to the industrial revolution, it be­ comes apparent that there are striking similarities to our own group organization.

Medieval society had family groups, groups of intimate

friends, guilds of master craftsmen (unions), mercantile associations (manufacturers' associations), etc.

In a similar manner both medieval

and contemporary societies have their masses, serfs, workers, clergy, knights, etc.

To assume that in past ages people always lived in

primary groups is contrary to fact; they like ourselves, were strangers to some, knew others slightly, and established friendly, intimate rela­ tions with still others* On the other hand, due to the difficulty of travel and communication, the great majority of people in past ages remained in the same localities and due to continued associations tended to develop group relationships to a high degree of stability.

In our times, the

economic snd technological conditions combined with the excessive stress upon

rugged individual ism1* have created a society in which rapid change

and personal mobility are the order of the day« Under such conditions the development of social relations is impeded with the result that experiences of the majority of people are confined largely to a level

137

below that of relatively stable group relationships* our society is not a mass society forming huge masses.

In this sense, Mass assemblies,

or crowds meet only sporadically, most often for a politically and socially insignificant purpose, such as entertainment. 1/i/hen we analyze our own society from another point of view, it becomes apparent that ours is not a true ’’mass" society for groups of all sorts work at solving problems which they recognize and accept as their responsibility*

Such groups include not only families, gangs,

etc*, but also a multitude of professional, political, fraternal organiza­ tions*

All these groups have participating membership, engage in

group problem-solving, although they also include membership by definition alone (payment of dues, for instance).

The organization of these

groups differs in structure and degree of formalization, and on the other hand, these groups may suffer from similar aberrations in their functioning.

It is not the nebulus

"mass” society, but these function­

ing groups that carry on the task of organized social living. If we recognize the fact that our society is composed of groups, the problems of "mass” society take on a new meaning.

If

we accept that the term group designates an assembly of persons who in the course of action enter into distinctive social relationships, which involve reciprocity between m e m b e r s ^ t h e n we must acknowledge that as a rule almost all people live in such relationships.

The

difficulty in the concept of “mass” society lies in the fact that it assumes that people live in “masses", when as a rule they live in groups.

(1)

The concept of “mass” society obscures another fact of

MacIver,R*M., ”A Textbook of Sociology, ed. 1937, p. 13, Eubank, E.B., “The Concepts of Sociology, ed. 1931, pp. 160-3. Mannheim, Karl, “Man and Society, ed. 1940, p. 277. Znaniecki, F., “Social Actions”, ed* 1936, pp. 56-64.

158

importanoe, namely, the fact, that although people live in. groups at present, they tend to confine their active group life almost exclusive ly to family, or close friends.

The problems of economic, political,

and national scope, which require not only the collective action of groups, but also the collective action of groups of higher social orders (such as federations of groups), are left to those few experts whose social experience is adequately developed to enable them to see the interrelationships and to function at this level of action. It is only recently that social sciences have become con­ cerned with the problems of "mass-inertia*' and have conceived schemes

(1),

of mass organization

admittedly, because of the fact that socially

unintelligent "inert masses" tend to become too burdensome a problem for the active few.

It is at this point that the thesis of this work

differs from the assumptions involved in the concept of "mass" society While the latter proposes to develop schemes to control the masses by "elites", this thesis assumes that it is possible and necessary to widen the sphere of participation of groups and thus institute truly

(l)

Mannheim credits fascism and Nazism with priority in achieving a relatively successful mass organization of society. Directly and also by implication, he advises that democracies have much to learn from autocracies regarding raass»control. For further discussion of this point see his: "Man and Society", part 6, Chs. 2 and 3, also his "Ideology and Utopia", Ch. 3 on "The Prospects of Scientific Politics# See also: Simon, H.F., "Revolution.Whither Bound, ed# 1935, Chs. 4,5,6; this work illustrates a lack of understanding of the problem of "mass" organization, e.i#, it confuses social organization based upon participating groups with social democracy imposed on the masses by a beloved leader: Hitler "realized that first the majority of the nation had to be permeated with and convinced of his ideals. It is decisive that the democratic character of this new development be recognized." P. 91.

139

democratic organization of society. Widely acknowledged inertia of the present day "mass" society and its inability tp take part in social problem-solving, is at times ascribed to ignorance and at times to egotism, lack of "social-mindedness”, etc.

Yet, members of the present-day society

have more opportunity for securing information than had most of those of past generations.

How widely spread is the belief that

social inertia is “caused" by ignorance is exemplified by a tremen­ dous number of discussion groups, lectures, radio broadcasts, etc. Valuable as all of these are, they fall short of a desired result; knowledge they impart stimulates little social action. The clearest statement of the problems arising from the lack of social organization is presented by Karl Mannheim,

Together with

other sociologists he accepts current theories of social disorganiza­ tion and proposes social planning as the most effective method in dealing with problems arising within mass society.

L'knnheim1s position

differs considerably from that of other sociologists.

Instead of

formulating a statement of social organization in terms of processes or classificatory schemes, he points out that the problems which society must solve determine the society’s organizational structure. According to him, the medieval social organization was produced by the industrial situations which could be and were adequately met by small groups and guild organizations.

The rate of change during these

ages was slow, permitting the development of primary groups of great

140

stability. The present day industrial situations requiring mass production and rapid change, create disintegrated mass society,(•*•) is momentary and is effected mostly by novelty.

in which integration

"It is in a society in a

stage of dissolution that such a public supplants the permanent public which was formerly selected out of well established and stable social groups*"^) Building upon the premise that industrial mass production develops situations in which changes of social organization are inevitable and result in an amorphous, disorganized society, Mannheim concluded that only a planned society could save out civilization from complete disorganization*

In anal­

yzing the problems of such planning, Mannheim did not offer new methods and suggestions, but relied to a great degree on the methods of organization of the totalitarian social system; thus it is the function of leadership, and therefore of the elite, to create and to administer such planning. (3)

(1)

The term "masses” as used by Mannheim is similar to Cooley’s "Illpaid" classes* The problems which Cooley discussed under the heading of "open classes" Mannheim places under the heading of "the forma­ tion of elites,"

(2)

Mannheim, K., Kan and Society, ed. 1940, p. 97, also the whole of part 2; also part 5, chapter 4,

(3)

It seems significant that a number of German sociologists stress also the importance of leadership* It would be interesting to dis­ cover to Ytfhat extent this stress took root in the habits of thought originating the administrative political system of Modern Gerrnaiy in which social and political functioning was left to the govern­ ment without much direct participation by the "people". It seems that German sociologists generalize too broadly upon the facts derived from the analysis of groups in which leadership dominated all other aspects of group situations and postulated that relation­ ship between leadership and group was identical in all groups. It was probably due to this fact that they identified leadership with domination. See; L. von Wiese: Systematic Sociology, transl* by H. Becker, ed* 1932, p. 495; Levin, K., Lippitt, R. and mite, R.K., "Patterns of Agressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates', "Amer* Jour* of Social Psychology* Lippit, R., "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Autocratic and Democratic Group Atmospheres," Amer* Jour * of Sociology, v. 45, (1939), pp. 26-49.

in

141

discussing the necessity of planning he indicated a need of developing social techniques such as propaganda for handling attitudes of the masses and the introduction of a "strict organization." In spite of the fact that Mannheim speaks continuously of the dynamics of society, his conception of it is limited.

.According

to him "a growing society needs pioneers; an overcentralised, rigidly disciplined mass technique leaves too little scope for individual adjustment, thus it fails to / v keep pace with problems created by social expansion.1 He maintains that the "mass11 societies of today cannot spontaneously develop an efficient social organization and will ultimately fall into chaos unless they adopt new "social techniques” necessary for "rational organization.”

It is in the discussion of "planned society”, of

"rigid organization", and of "social techniques” that Mannheim* s understanding of group structures lies deeply buried* According to Mannheim the first prerequisite of planned mass society is the successful control and management of thought and feeling*^( He maintains that "the essential feature of this new type

society is

that it affords channels not only for economic and administrative

(3 ^ activity, but also for new psychological adjustments."v } These

(1)

Mannheim, Karl, Man and Society, ed* 1940, p. 255*

(2)

Mannheim, Ibid.. p. 260. He points out that "a planned technique for influencing human behavior, offers some hope of deliverance from chaos." As an instance of successful management of attitudes he gives an example of the German ability to abolish temporarily the hatred of Poland, "the most deeply rooted of all collective sentiments,"

(3)

Ibid.. p. 135.

142

psychological adjustments are made possible by the effective use of symbols*

All symbols are substitute goals, which subsequently

develop to be a driving force in spontaneous group integration and ultimately become a rigid emblem of an organized group*

(l) According­

ly* ” The problem of felites who control the symbols is to

suppress the older mechanisms of capitalist society superimposed (italics mine) institutions of the new social technique*”(2) Mannheim holds that this is up to the leader whose foresight into human affairs is keen and who possesses intelligent mastery of human relations,

^his leader, preferably a philosopher or a social

scientist, is a person who ”can perceive the connection between his own actions and collective actions, between his own horizon and the collective horizon (understanding by the latter the integration of all the social relationships which have be­ come visible at a given stage of historical development)(3) Mannheim1s planned society would undertake not only economic and industrial organization; it would attempt to regulate the behavior of the individuals who take part in co-ordinated action. ”If this behavior is carefully calculated and completely predetermined, and its effectiveness can be appraised in more or less quantitative terms, we shall speak of ration­ alized and organized b e h a v i o r . ” (4) (1) (2) (3)

(4)

Mannheim, Man and Society, ed* 1940, p. 132. Ibid*. p* 140 Ibid,. pp. 211-2; at this point it is interesting to note that Mannheim1s conception of leadership and of the qualifications for it is not far removed from Plato's* In his Republic. Plato postulates that the guardian "shall be a philosopher, and spirited and swift and strong in his disposition.” Everyman's Library, ed. 1927, p. 59; Plato demands also that the education of guardians be very liberal if they are to be as "goodly and divine men as far as it is possible for a man to be.” Ibid.. p. 68. Ibid. . p. 293. In his faith in the possibility of such determination Mannheim is quite an adept* J.B. Watson who also believed that one could predetermine future development of a child by means of control of stimuli. See his: Behaviorism, ed. 1925, especially chs*1,2,11,12.

143

The whole scheme of mass society organization rests on the assumption that it is possible for a leader, or a leading group, to manage the attitudes and desires of people, that this leadership could be wise enough to forecast all, or most of possible social complications and to make decisions for the good of the planned society, and, finally, that such leadership will have no other interest at heart but the social interest. In Mannheim1s conception, f,in such society the individual merchants and producers and all other socially dependent human beings are forced, as a result of the increasing interdependence, to take the political and psychological probabilities in deciding how they will act. The individuals in the leading positions, who to some extent act independently, are given a sharper impetus which takes into account not merely their own immediate interests, but also the ultimate effects of their activities on society itself.,,(l) It is obvious, that these leaders must also plan the organized society, control people’s behavior by effective management of attitudes, and ultimately appraise the effects of their own actions in relation to the goals inherent in the social plan, Mannheim, himself is aware of the dangers of such organization and of such leadership.

He admits that the planning of such a society

creates its own dangers, for instance, the dictatorial monopoly of key positions.

He is fully aware that planning may lead to the

spread of democracy but also that it may establish hierarchy• The

(l)

Mannheim, Man and Society, ed, 1940, p, 212,

144

social planning based upon the inequality of classes v/ould, according to Mannheim, create such, tensions that the system would prohably not . (1) survive. '

Having given a supreme position to the planners and leaders, Mannheim proposes to muzzle them for the good of the people. ’’Whether the sovereign authority he all individual or a group or a popular assembly, it must be compelled by democratic control to allow full scope for freedom in its plan. Once all the instruments of influencing human behavior have been coordinated, planning for freedom is the only logical form of freedom which remainsv 2) ’’The central authority would make its influence felt when it was forced to modify the rules of the game in order to prevent results which may be injurious to society, or to the central plan democratically agreed upon♦*(3) Mannheim does not indicate the precise meaning of the phrase ’’plan democratically agreed upon.1’ However, it is safe to assume that mass society would not have much of a part in it.

According to him

”a planned society will provide certain forms of social groups...in which absolutely free discussion may take place without being exposed to premature and unsatis­ factory criticism of a broader public... admission to these *secret socieities* or Orders* would have to remain in close and living contact with the masses and their situations and needs. ... also... it must be constitutionally provided that any advice or suggestions coming from these exclusive groups would really reach and . have an appropriate influence on the government of the day.”'1 ' (1) (2) (3)

Mannheim, Man end Society, ed. 1940, p. 364. Ibid., pp. 378-9. Ibid.. p. 299.

(4)

Ibid., pp. cit., pp. 110-111. It is very interesting to note that the above statements are virtually identical with W.H. Johnson* s report on the Industrial organization of contemporary Russia. In Russia the communist party, and not the 7/hole nation, participates in the government. The communist cells are comparable to Mannheim* s exclusive groups. It is true, that the industrial workers form dis­ cussion groups, and the contribution yielded in the discussion is forwarded to the communist group by a communist party member vrho attends such meetings ex officio. He is neither elected by the group, nor does he represent it. He is there to see that all goes well for the ’’plan.” "The deciding bodies are the Politbureau and

From the above presentation it is not difficult to see that the social organization

Mannheim, proposes limits full civic res­

ponsibility to a rather insignificant number of exclusive groups and elites, and leaves the bulk of any national groups virtually dis­ franchised*

This position is. in complete agreement with his basic

assumption.

Having accepted mass theory of social organization as the

only theory available and recognizing the fact that masses are in­ capable of "social action" he of necessity falls in line with the totalitarian mode of social thought hoping against hope that the scheme of social organization proposed by him would bring about re­ sults diametrically opposed to those seen in the totalitarian countries He disregards the fact that the social organization of the totalitarian countries and the social organization which he proposes are almost identical.^ ^

the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and they reach their decisions after prolonged and careful discussion with the heads of the principal departments of the People's Commissars, as they are called." See-: Hewlett Johnson: The Soviet Power, ed. 1940, book two: "The Soviets Blueprint the New Society,*1 especially p* 90. (l)

To what extent is Mannheim's thinking unconsciously determined by the fact that he always lived in a country which was administered paternalistieally, is a matter of conjecture. There may be in him a great deal of nostalgic feeling for the past days of peace and order in spite of the fact that he knows the shortcomings of the administrative procedure • It seems that he accepted it un­ consciously as the best method, for otherwise he v/ould never have conceived an ideal of "rigid social organization" and of "planned society" which of necessity requires strong central authority and extensive bureaucracy. For his point of view on administration and bureaucracy, see his Ideology and Utopia, ed. 1936, chapter on "The Prospects of Scientific Politics: The Relationship between Social Theory and Political Practice."

14.6

Although Mannheim recognizes the importance of organization he fails to recognize the fact that as the problem situation and the necessity for action determine to a great degree the particular struc­ ture of a group and in the same manner the organization of a group plays a part in determining to a degree the action of its members. The structures and functions of groups are interdependent.^The lack of insight into this problem is evident in that he believes, that somehow the groups placed in a position of final authority would be paternally inclined and would work always for the good of society* (2) On the other hand, Mannheim is not blind to the dangers of the system he proposes.

He maintains that its success depends upon

"... the planned retention of ancient liberties (which) is a guarantee against exaggerated dogmatism of planning... whenever it is possible and the plan is not endangered every effort must be made to maintain the primary form of freedom - freedom for individual adjustment,”v3)

(1)

The principle of structure - function relationship is generally accepted in all fields of science. For the statement and ela­ boration of this hypothesis see: J. Loeb, The Organism as a Whole, 1916; W.E. Ritter, The Unity of the Organism, 1919; C.M. Child: Physiological Foundations of Behavior* 1924; Coghill, G.E., "Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior," Proc. of Hat11. Acadeny of Science, Oct. 1900; and others*

(2)

The 11good,’’however, is a relative term, and what is "good" in terms of the German totalitarian government, forced Mannheim to leave his country. Yet Mannheim himself believes if another group, preferably his own, were placed in a similar position, they could achieve "good" for everyone. A point of view similar to Mannheim* s is expressed by many German refugees in this country.

(3)

Mannheim, K*, Man and Society, ed. 1940, p. 379*

047

The ultimate condition of success in "the planned society "depends on whether we can find ways of 'transforming democratic, parliamentary control to a planned society. If this control is destroyed, in an effort to establish a planned society, planning will be a disaster, not a cure.”(l) A tentative outline of the coming social order, quite similar to the one drawn by Mannheim,but elaborated in far greater detail, comes from James Burnham,

He sees also an inevitable necessity of a

planned social order and is convinced that the planning will be effected by the present managers of industry.

According to the theory he ex­

pounds "the capitalist society will be replaced by the managerial society and the transition from the capitalist to the managerial society is already well under way."^)

Burnham maintains that the fourfold

division of management will be liquidated in the future except and production in this new order is not to be for profit:

the executives

concerned with profit-making will be eliminated; the same will be true of the finance-capitalists and stockholders, for private o\vnership will have no place in the managerial society.

According to Burnham,

even now a new "managerial group" is arising, which, because it has in its hands tfa greater measure of control over the instruments of pro­ duction and a preferential treatment in the distribution of the products of those instruments, will become a dominant or ruling class in the society.M(3)

(1)

Mannheim, K», Man and Society, ed. 1940, p. 59.

(2)

Burnham, J., The Managerial Revolution, ed. 1941, p. 29*

(3)

Ibid., p. 59.

148

In the opinion of Burnham, social organization of today is undergoing changes necessitated by the actual state of human affairs; the outworfc, outgrown capitalistic social system is being replaced by one able to cope with such contemporary problems as continuous pro­ duction, unemployment, defense, etc.

All human problems reduce to one

essential problem of gaining livelihood, and his assumption is that if one group fails to achieve a satisfactory solution, another can, because according to history it was always so*

In terms of Burnham1s

dialectics one needs only to add an 11etc.,M to his description of the rise and fall of the successive dominant classes and have a valid indication of future developments.

Historical interpretation is

not, however, the only limitation of Burnham* s outlook.

A far greater

problem is inherent in his implication not only that industrial management can solve all human problems, but that one segment of society

could successfully solve all the problems for everybody.

Such

organization could work effectively only if it satisfied all human needs and desires to a degree where no more problems arose.

$ince

this is not probable, there will always be a field in which a need for organization will arise and frequently work at cross purposes with the managerial order of things. theory is weakest.

It is at this point that Burnham*s

He assumes that the only problems capable of and

necessitating effective organization are the problems of management, i.e., of production and distribution.

Other problems require no or­

ganization or else managers will give them ready-made solutions for all situations. Burnham*s prediction rests on two assumptions which are clearly stated*

The first assumption is that the law of social

organization is dominance and that the social order will always be

149

dictated, by the classes arising successively to power*

The second

assumption is that the control of the means of production gives one class dominance over another* However true this may be of a well established social system, it is not true during the period of transition.

If the managerial

groups become dominant, as Burnham predicts, it will not be because they gained the control of the means of production, (the capitalist system

still holds it), but because they develop an organization which

may give them control in time. One does not gain control of production first and organize next.

It is the organization that gives power for

the solution of social problems.

It also gives dominance, but only

when organization is partial, i.e., when one group is organized and other groups (the masses) lack organization.

If the group of managers

becomes in the future a dominant group it will be not because of their great knowledge alone, but because of their efficient organization a~ gainst which the masses will be helpless.

They may become masters,

not because they will control production, but because their own organization will be effective enough to prevent group organization everywhere else.^^

The conquered countries today not only participate

in production, but are forced to participate in it.

However, the

citizens of these countries cannot be a part of the mangers' organization, neither are they permitted to organize.

CD

A similar state of affairs is seen in present day Russia and other "managerial" countries where elite of strongly organized minorities dominate unorganized masses.

150

If Burnham is correct in his prediction that the capitalistic social order is going into oblivion, it will not have been due alone to the fact that the Mmanagers11 have gained the control of the means of production, but because capitalistic organization will have been weakened while the managerial will have continued to develop and strengthen its own.' This weakening will have been due as Burnham rightly points out, not only to the lack of participation in the organization by the individual owners, but also to its ideology which helps to render the organization incongruous*

As Burnham puts it:

"according to the prevailing capitalist idea, the fundamental unit of politics, psychology, sociology, morality, theology, economics, was thought of as the single human being. This individual was under­ stood as complete in thimself,1 in his own nature, and as having only external relations to other persons and things."(1) This extreme, rugged individualism contributes much to the weakening of the organization of our society.

It obliterates from memory the

fact that the basis of any social order is organization, and emphasizes the fact that the control of material wealth in itself and by itself without an organizational structure is an adequate basis of society. The rise and fall of the dominant social groups may be, at least in part, described in terms of partial organization.

The rise

of the "managerial" society, however, is not an answer to the problem

(l)

Burnham, J . , The Managerial Revolution, ed. 1941, p. 26.

151

of humanity suffering from cycles of cataclysmic changes effected by strong organization of a part of society/1)

In the future new

organization v/ill again arise, develop and crystallize without relation to the whole society, and then a new cycle will ensue.

In this respect,

both the capitalistic and the planned society seem to be alike In thinking that a partial groiip organization may produce a sound founda­ tion for a relatively stable social order*

Such stable social order

would require organization of all citizens into functioning groups or federations of groups dealing with problems facing them.

The organi­

zation of one group to control, to dominate and to exploit the masses would be ineffectual, because there would be no ^masses11, but organized groups each contributing to the solution of social problems and effective in making its collective decisions known.

The problem of sheer dominance

then, would be resolved into the problem of the relationship of all groups to the central problem, I.e., the fullness of social living. To conceive and effect such an organization a new ideology and a new system of orientation and education is essential.

Only then the

structural aspects of social organization of a nation as a whole can be created and maintained. (1)

This point was made explicitly by P. Kropotkin: 11It is only fair to admit that the middle classes of 1789 were inspired by the ideas of liberty, equality (before the law) and political freedom,*..but these ideas,..began to develop along two lines: liberty to utilize the riches of nature for personal aggrandize­ ment, as well as liberty to exploit human labour without any safeguard for the victims of such exploitation to the middle classes.11 See Kropotkin* s The Great Revolution* transl, by N.F. Dryhurst, ed, 1927, p. 10; he also saw the problems in­ volved in the partial organization. ’'For all the transactions of the employers, there was to be complete freedom, and for the workers a strict prohibition against combinations of any sort11 (ibid., p. 9).

152

A view that contributes most significanthy to the under­ standing of social group organization is the theory of G.D.H. Cole. The chief limitation of his theory lies in the fact that he, like other Marxian theorists, confines the social organization too narrow­ ly to the problems of production and distribution and therefore restricts it chiefly to the industrial or economic and political organisation.

On the other hand, however, Cole*s understanding of

the structure and function of social groups is profound.

He states

plainly that "the chief difficulty of democratic control over the representative in the political sphere today is that, as soon as the voters have exercised their votes, their existence as a group lapses until the time when a new election is required. No body or group remains in being to direct upon the elected person a constant stream, of counsel and criticism."(1) It is quite clear that Cole has a great deal of insight into the importance of the functional group organization, although he assumes that voting as set up in the present day political system is group function.

Yet, according to his own definition, the voters within

one political unit are seldom a social group.

He does not see clearly

that the organization of such a political unit is administrative. The basis of it is not a functioning social group, but a classification: "all citizens within specified boundaries are voters.”

The function

of voting is an individual matter. On the other hand, Colefs basic assumptions and definitions regarding groups and group problems are very significant and generally

(l)

Cole, G.D.H., Social Theory, ed. 1920, p. 110.

153

sound.

His definition of society stresses one important fact, namely,

that society is not an amorphous conglomeration of persons, but a "complex of organizations.’’^-)

At this point he differs from most of

other sociologists who classify "society" as a group, a classification which tends to identify it with as of the same order, other groups such as community, neighborhood, or even a gang.

Defining society as

a ”complex of organization,” he recognizes the fact that society is an organization of groups and therefore an organization of a different order than that of a single group. The concept of ”association” as used by Cole is equivalent to the American sociological term of ’’group,"

In defining association,

Cole states that association does not include "momentary groups formed, without definite organization, to carry out some single immediate object; but it includes all organized groups possessed of a purpose entailing a course of action,”(2) no matter whether the purpose is political, social, or purely sociable and recreational.

The narrowness of Cole’s definition has, like any

definition, its advantages and drawbacks.

It immediately excludes the

"category" or "class," a point of view with which contemporary sociol­ ogists seem to concur.(3)

On the other hand, his definition is too

narrow, for it excludes momentary groups which are true social groups. There is an interesting and very important parallel between Cole’s conception of human nature and Tunnies’ understanding of natural

(1)

Cole, &.D.H., Social Theory, ed. 1920, p. 31.

(2)

Ibid., p. 41.

(3)

Eubank, E.E., The Concents of Sociology, ed. 1932, pp. 117-8.

154

will*

Both sociologists recognize the fact that the individual is

’’universal” in the sense that the potentialities of his behavior are unspecified and his actual behavior may develop in almost any direction and function in relation to any problem*

Cole insists that human

association (or better still, organization) is also capable of diver­ sified action*

It may turn in any direction and undertake the solution

of problems of most diverse nature. makes it so.(^)

Its action is specific because man

According to Cole, the chief difference between a

person and an association is that an association can always be made specific in function, while man can never be made so* In discussing community group organization Cole brings out one important point, namely, that both society and community depend for organization, not only ”on the volume and the extent of associative and institutional life in the community, but still more on the coherence and cooperative working of the various associations and institu­ tions ***The highest development of society consists not only - in general diffusion of associations over every organizable tract of human life, but also in harmonious cooperation of all the various bodies, each fulfilling its proper function within society, in harmony with others *,r^ w

(1)

An example of this is described by a student who sponsored a group organized for a specific purpose of recreation in a federal housing project in Cleveland, Ohio. This group, although organized specific ally, undertook in course of time the solution of other problems arising from the communal livings such problems as allotting facilities, property destruction, noise, etc* A similar behavior is reported in the group meetings called for a specific purpose of defense in the ’’blocks" in Chicago. In short order the groups turn to such problems as cleaning the alleys, traffic, etc* Whether politics will permit such developments is another question*

(2)

Cole, C*D,H*, Social Theory, ed* 1920, p. 32.

155

Col©1s concise statement of this type of organization of society, in­ dicates the necessity of the organization of functioning groups, federation of organized groups into institutions and the cooperative organization of all institutions*

The possibility of such organization

seemed to have shocked some sociologists, among others, Maclver, who thought that it "led too far away from the present social order,"(3.) Yet it must not he forgotten that the social order is not dependent on the social organization as such, "but rather on the ideology the society holds* direction*

Organization gives it the form, ideology, the

Maclver admitted the possibility of such political organi­

zation in the future;

it was possible, according to him, to have

,fpolitical (organization and) representation on the basis of associa­ tions, just as in the past it was on the basis of classes," Suggestions of similar organization are contained in some quite recent editions of the sociological text books,

none as

direct as the one proposed by Cole, but all of them concerned with the phenomena of federated groups and sociological problems inherent in the relationships between groups. It seems that social theories of groups are rising slowly above the individualistic conceptions.

As sociological inquiry pursued

the line of the individualistic and elementalistic analyses, the theories

(1)

Maclver, R,M., The Blements of Social Science, English ed,, 1926, p* 92,

(2)

Ibid., p. 93,

(3)

Ross, E,A», The Outlines of Sociology, ed. 1930, chapter on "The Organization of Will,” pp. 287-97; Hayes, E.C., Sociology, ed, 1931 pp, 476-477; Queen, S.A., Bodenhofer, W,B, and Harper, E*B,: Social Organization and Disorganization, ed. 1935, pp, 274-293,

15 6

of group phenomena conformed to the established analytical patterns. In summary, it has been shown that some sociologists projected their concepts of the group against an implicitly assumed background of primordial hostility and analyzed group behavior in terms of the pro­ cess of competition; kind,"

others used the concepts of the "consciousness of

acquaintance and strangeness, and therefore broadened the

field of the inquiry into group phenomena in which conflict is prominent. All of them, however, were interested in the individually motivated behavior and not in the behavior which developed primarily because of the association.

Their analyses became more detailed, and in keeping

with the elementalist method, they relied heavily upon classification, raising thereby new problems and leading away from the central problem which is a statement of group relationships.

fjr 7

CHAPTER IX THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL CROUPS To appraise the theoretical developed by sociologists,

it

foundations of group theories as

is necessary to

examine in some detail

the classification s t h ey a dv an ce in their effo rt to sys t em at i ze the seeming m ul titude and diversity of social tions the points of view, the theories, of the author,

etc. , are laid bare,

groups.

In these classifica­

the methodological

conceptions

disclosing whatever consistencies

or inconsistencies may be involved. To understand fully the difficulties of classifying one must

bear in mind that

qualities,

a classification analyzable in terms

is a methodological tool

period of science in which a static for granted,

social groups of

created by sociologists in the conception of reality was taken

and wqs analyzable in terms of qualities or categories.

Classifications were conceived as stable and immutable, of absolute differences.

and expressive

The task of science then became the dis­

covery of categories and their orderly arrangement

into

classifieatory

syst ems. As the basic tenets of science began to

change from a static

conception of absolute categories, to a conception of reality in which continuous

change became a basic assumption,

ferences are not

categorical,

but

and in which dif­

rather a matter of degree,

new

tools of investigation had to be developed. These were natural

supplied by laboratory techniques developed by the

sciences and by field

studies and case studies in the disciplines

for which the laboratory approach was either not

developed or impossible.

158

The medieval scholastic method of approaching reality by means of a priori classification, constructed upon similarities or preconceived categories, gave way to other methods and consigned classification systems to a secondary position.

That system became not a tool of

discovery, but primarily a tool of systematization, and its function became correspondingly altered* V?hat is not fully realized by many sociologists is that wthe adequacy of any system of classification of science must be estimated in terms of the general cultural situation out of which it grows.”^ ^

Jevons, as early as in 1880, stated that ’’the progress of

science during the last two centuries has caused great attention to be given to the true principles on which we can arrange a great multitude of (2 )

diverse objects in order.11

y

This point of view shifts the basis of

classification from a foundation constituted of categories, to the principles or relations established by sciences. The nature of this shift is hardly reflected in sociological literature.

For two thousand years classificatory systems have reigned

supreme and have created habits of thought which influence, frequently without our awareness of it, the way in which we construct and use them. So persistent are these habits of thought that we seldom realize that classification growing out of a static conception of reality almost in— , variably leads to the establishing of categories.

Categories which are

the product of classificatory logic are inadequate for dealing with

(1)

Benjamin, A.C., The Logical Structure of Science, ed. 1936, p* 23.

(2)

Jevons, W.S., Elementary Lessons in Logic, ed. 1880, p. 276.

150

reality conceived from the point of view of dynamics.

It is probably

because of this fact that even the sociological classifications that use dynamic concepts such as conflict and cooperation, which are in fact processes, invariably turn them into categories.

Put into a form

of classification these processes do not function as processes, but as qualities attributed to some or all persons. .Another habit of thought which functions, frequently without our awareness, is our tacit assumption that a classification is a counterpart of reality.

Because of this habit of thought, it is

necessary to point out that "whether we want it or not, every classifica­ tion is already a theory, end involves theoretic conclusions about reality which are the result of previous s t u d y T h e

adequacy of a

classification, then, depends, not only on the structural correctness of it according to the standards of logic, but also upon the soundness of theories which define the terms composing the classification. The difficulties encountered by sociologists in the construction of classifications of social groups are then, not due primarily to the peculiarities and complexities of the sociological field; they are shared by other scientists also.

These difficulties arise not solely from the

nature of phenomena, but are in an equal measure inherent in the nature of the methodology of classif icatory scheraatizntion.

The inconsistencies

and inadequacies in the sociological use of this method in describing and ordering the dynamics of social groups in terms of static categories need to be pointed out.

(1)

Znaniecki, F., The Method of Sociology, ed. 1934, p. 254.

160

In spite of the safeguards which the logicians set up to fore­ warn us regarding the limited function of classification, we still con­ tinue to conform to the medieval criteria of a 11good and useful11 classi­ fication*

These are as follows:

must exclude each other*

,!(1) The constituent species (categories)

(2) The constituent species when added together

must be equal to the genus*

(3) The division must be founded upon one

principle or b a s i s . N o

individual should be a member of more than

one class*

The division into separate species, or categories, should

always proceed by fund amentum divisionis. but division by one single principle is possible only in simple classifications, which have no great value since they do not lead to other generalizations. limit their usefulness:

These restrictions

therefore, classifications proceeding upon one

single principle are considered to be "artificial." When analyzed in the light of the criteria of logic, almost none of the classifications of groups proposed by sociologists can be considered either as adequate or as leading to further generalizations* Even a perfunctory analysis of some group classifications illustrates the difficulties and inadequacies inherent in them*

One of Giddings*

classifications of groups, for instance, is based upon the principle of blood relation.

The subdivisions in this category, according to him,

are as follows:

(1)

Jevons, W.L*, Elementary Lessons in Logic, ed* 1880, p* 105*

(2)

Chapman, F*M* and Henle, P*, The Fundamentals of Logic, ed. 1933, pp* 282-290*

16-1

1. 2*

3.

Families Ethnical societies a. hordes, b. tribes, c# confederations, d. metronymy and patronymy. Demotic societies, in which he included all those groupings outside of the family and horde, which resulted from deli­ berate action and union and not the blood bond.(l)

Since Giddings postulated the blood-bond as the principle of his classification, this principle should hold true of all the sub­ classes.

A closer analysis shows, however, that the third class, that

of demotic societies, is not based upon the blood—bond, but upon the principle of "deliberative action.**

The members of the second subclass,

tacitly assuming blood-bond, are not in fact based upon it.

What is

prominent in this classification is an hypothesis of social evolution; it simply shows that hordes were composed of families, tribes developed out of hordes, and confederations are organization of tribes.

Since

Giddings* classification is based on "blood-bond,” but includes a sub­ class that is based upon a category of "deliberative action," the prin­ ciple underlying this classification is not singular, as professed by Giddings, but two-fold:

blood-bond (or rather evolutionary conception of

social organization) and deliberative action.

Yet even this clarification

does not establish logical consistency in Giddings* classification, for the categories of the blood-bond and of deliberative action are not mutually exclusive.

It is not possible to defend a statement that there was no

organization based upon deliberative action in confederations, for instance, and on the other hand, demotic societies of necessity include families.

(l)

Giddings, F.H*, Elements of Sociology, ed. 1911, pp. 183-192.

162

Giddings1 inclusion of metronyny and of patronymy in his classification is most interesting for it constitutes a signal evidence of his inability to evaluate the possibilities and limitations of this conceptual device.

As the terms metronymy and patronymy refer to forms

of familial organization, Giddings could have included marriage and divorce within his classification of social groups. Even less consistency and a less formal structure is found in the classification proposed by Ross,^^

In his "Map of the Sociological

Field" he presents the following, all-inclusive classification of groups: 1* Fortuitous groups (crowds and publics); 2. Natural groups (families, kindreds, communities); 3. Likeness groups (castes, classes, sects, parties, professions, nations); 4. Interest groups (tribes, states, confederacies, guilds, corporations); 5. Functional groups (purposive associations, social organiza­ tion) j 6. Authorities; 7. Hierarchies. Although Ross presents this outline as one system of classifica­ tion, even a superficial analysis shows that there is no one basic principle underlying it.

Each of the subclasses is based on a separate

category and all of them overlap.

A H of the groups are functional,

for obviously every group functions in some manner; all groups have purpose and this purpose is determined by interest.

It is difficult to

discover the assumptions which prompted Ross to propose a class of "likeness groups."

(l)

The very principle of classification implies a

Ross, E.A., Foundations of Sociology, ed. 1905, p. 98*

163

method of placing the objects of classification according to significant similarities*

Likeness of some sort is inherent in every classification,

but a question arises what sort of likeness prompts Ross to place r^t-i nr»« and professions within the same category*

Such classification can in no

way function significantly as a tool of sociological analysis, for rather it conceals than discloses the nature of sociological phenomena* Ross, like Giddings includes among groups terms denoting sociolo­ gical abstractions of a higher order, analytical terms, such as social organization*

(1 )

His inclusion of authorities and hierarchies may be

questioned on the same grounds. Some of the sociological classifications are in no way classi­ fications, but lists, at times possibly practical, useful, at times gratuitous and wholly insignificant as far as their theoretical validity is concerned.

They conform to none of the criteria of classification.

The following list exeraplifies this type of classification: Ml. 2* 3. 4. 5* 6. 7* 8* 9* 10* 11*

Functional groups (largely conflict) Occupational groups (chiefly professional) Philanthropic and reform groups Religious groups Nationality groups Memory groups Symbolic groups Service and recreational groups Political groups Feminist groups Atypical groups, which are departures from the normal, i.e., Bohemians and intellectuals on the positive side and gangs on the negative*”^2)

(1)

In this respect, other writers are guilty of the same error of including among functional groups human ecology; See E,C. Hayes, "Representative Concepts in Sociology,” in Sociol. and Soc. Research, v. 12 (1927), pp* 12-17.

(2)

Anderson, N* and Lindeman, E., Urban Sociology, ed. 1928, pp. 298-99,

164

In spit© of the fact that classification may be defined as an arrangement of things, or of our notions of them, on the basis of similarity or identi'ty it does not justify unlimited freedom in disregard­ ing differences. conditions,

To be adequate, a classification must fulfill certain

Hot only must there be a basic principle which is true of

all classes, but also the differences between classes must be definitely established,

’‘Every class should be so constituted as to contain objects

significantly similar to each other in certain definite qualities, which are stated in a definition of the c l a s s . N o t only must the basic principle be clearly established, but npoints of resemblances selected to form the leading classes shall be those of importance to the practical use of the classification.” ^ ) The analysis of many of the sociological classifications shows fg ) that they fall short of this standard criterion. Park and Burgess, for instance, offer the following classification of groups:

(a) the

family; (b) language or racial groups; (c) local and territorial urban communities; (d) conflict groups (nationalities, parties, sects, labor organizations, gangs, etc.); (e) accommodation groups (classes, castes, vocational groups, denominational groups).

To test this classification

we may take, for example, a gang which this classification considers a conflict group.

Since a gang lives in some neighborhood, it is also a

(1) Jevons, W.S.,

Elementary Lessons in Logic, ed, 1880, p, 277.

(2)

Ibid., p. 279. (italics mine).

(3)

Park, R.E. and Burgess, R.W., Introduction to the Science of Sociology, ed. 1928, p. 50.

165

local urban group*

The members of a gang are known for their cooperation

among themselves, and this enables us to place the gang within the class of cooperating groups and should complicate our problem of placing it in the conflict group*

We may place it, also, in a language group.

In fact,

a gang, considered in terms of the authors quoted above, may be placed in almost every category included in their classification; therefore it must be conceded that there is no scientific defense of such a classifi­ cation.

It may also be said that when the authors place gangs and nation­

alities in the same category, the significance of such suggested similar­ ity may be questioned.

These facts raise a question regarding the purpose

for which this particular classification was constructed.

It might furnish

a basis for determining the exact number of families in a specified area, but difficulty would be encountered in counting the conflict groups.

It

is doubtful whether on the basis of this classification a sociologist would be able to go into the field and determine the number of accommodation groups, for instance, and it is even more doubtful whether a statistician would be willing to use the data collected upon the basis of this classi­ fication.

Because of this fact it is possible to infer that this and

similar classifications were constructed without reference to any practical use for the investigation of social groups as they live euad function in our society. Similar shortcomings may be found in the majority of sociologi­ cal classifications, for most of the authors assume that arbitrary cate­ gorical grouping of persons on the basis of similarity is adequate for the purpose of classification*

A* C, Benjamin, discussing the problem

of classification, points out the fact that, although classification is

166

schematic in character, it must reveal significant relations.

According­

ly, a classification is not a mirror of reality and of its complexities; it simplifies reality by selecting only those events and relations which seem important.

Hence classifications are always arbitrary, reflecting

rather a theoretical conception of things than the things themselves. Yet, with all

those limitations, "a classificatory scheme must reveal nature

in the same way that a well fitting garment suggests an underlying figure, To construct such classifications a conception of significant relations is important.

Without it, a classification achieves only a specious

systematization of unrelated bit of observation and speculation devoid of significance.

Instead of reflecting living groups and the relations

functioning within them, many sociological classifications express only those similarities which might be true of all persons in any part of the globe and in disregard of the relations between them. It is probably because of these difficulties that the biological sciences, for instance, do not at present use the standard traditional classification based upon a single principle of division.

Instead they

make an extensive use of system or natural classif ications employing as a basis such theoretical assumptions as common evolutionary descent, etc. Since group phenomena, with their almost infinite possibilities of variation in composition and organization, cannot, without confusion and oversimplification, be successfully fitted into simple classificatory schemes, it seems that perhaps a series would be a more useful tool of systematization than the use of classifications*

(l)

Benjamin, A*C*, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, ed* 1937. p . 404.

16 7

The tendency to employ a serial arrangement is at present gaining ground in the sociological field.

It has been developed under

the impact of the developments in the natural sciences, in which it has been found expedient to utilize the mathematical conceptions of series and of degree developed on the basis of calculus.

This tendency

is voiced by Lundberg who stresses the fact that the whole development in sociology has been hindered by two misconceptions:

first, that

categories with which any science deals are given in nature and be­ cause of this fact they form an adequate basis for classification; and, second, that in the classification of human groups or rlplurels,,f "dichotomous or discrete, instead of gradational or continuous cate­ gories must be used*11^ ^

Apparently Lundberg does not understand that

subdividing categories does not substantially change the method he criticizes* A tendency towards a serial arrangement in terms of degree is prominent, for instance, in Chapin* s classification, although it must be noted that his table is neither a true series, nor is it a classification conforming to the criteria set up for classification by the logicians.

At best, it is a graphic presentation of a theory

postulating social development of nsecondary society*1 on the basis of diminishing contact*

(1)

Lundberg, Gr*A*# Foundations of Sociology, ed. 1939, p. 366.

CHAPTER DC

THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL GROUPS To appraise 'the theoretical foundations of group theories as developed by sociologists, it is necessary to examine in some detail the classifications they advance in their effort to systematize the seeming multitude and diversity of social groups.

In these classifica­

tions the points of view, the theories, the methodological conceptions of the author, etc*, are laid bare, disclosing whatever consistencies or inconsistencies may be involved* To understand fully the difficulties of classifying social groups on© must bear in mind that a classification analyzable in terms of qualities, is a methodological tool created by sociologists in the period of science in which a static conception of reality was talcen for granted, and was analyzable in terms of qualities or categories.

Glassi

fications were conceived as stable and immutable, and expressive of absolute differences.

The task of science then became the discovery of

categories and their orderly arrangement into classificatory systems* As the basic tenets of science began to change from a static conception of absolute categories, to a conception of reality in which continuous change became a basic assumption, and in which differences are not categorical, but rather a matter of degree, new tools of investi gation had to be developed* These were supplied by laboratory techniques developed by the natural sciences and by field studies and case studies in the discipline for which the laboratory approach was either not developed or impossible

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170

When we analyze Chapin’s classification in detail, it becomes apparent that the whole table is set up in terms of contact.

The

generic terms, ’’group,” rests implicitly upon the theory that social ’•progression” is set between the two extremes, i.e., direct and indirect contact.

Between these two extremes Chapin establishes three categories

of groups, primary, intermediate and secondary.

The differentia is also

set in terms of contact, in spite of the fact that the fourth and fifth columns (see page 167) are labeled ’’Emotion intensity” and ’’means of communication” respectively.

If we take Chapin at his word and recognize

the fourth column as emotion, then we must question the psychological foundation of the distinction he makes, for no psychologist would support a contention that emotions may be ’’formal, superficial, or highly im­ personal” through artificial means of communication.

The differentia

which Chapin indicates, but fails to maintain consistently, is an ela­ boration of the term contact.

What Chapin’s table implies is that in a

primary group, the contact is face to face, by direct sense perception, that this contact is repeated with the same persons; that the contact is intimate, personal and informal; that this contact is made by means of oral language, gesture, and facial expression.

The fact that his

subdivisions are repetitions is obscured by his terminology•

The fact

is that once Chapin says that the contact in the primary group is in­ timate, personal and informal, he has said all that needs to be said on that score.

The means of establishing these contacts is irrelevant.

The ground on which Chapin excludes conceptual elements from the primary group field is not clear.

It would be truly difficult to

171

find a group which used concrete perceptual elements to the exclusion of concepts, for human beings are forever fond of spinning "theoretical yarns."

Neither is it true that a board of directors uses only deriva­

tive, indirect perceptions by mechanical means; their contacts are not always highly impersonal, nor do they always use artificial means of communication.

Like the family, classed by Chapin as a primary group,

the board members meet each other when necessary and write letters, use the telephone or telegraph when a need arises.

Chapin*s table implies

that under certain conditions it is possible to place a board of directors in the class of primary groups, and a family among intermediate, or even secondary groups.

This indicates that Chapin failed to establish a clear

principle of division and consequently his table is inadequate for use in distinguishing different types of groups. Queen and Bodenhafer^) offer similar elaboration, although not in the form of a table, but as a complete classification of groups; "The first type is characterized by priority in experience, face to face association, small numbers, unspecialized interests, intimacy and rela­ tive permanence. ** 1.

Primary groups 1. Intimate pairs, such as mother end child, husband and wife. 2. Families, including both kinship and marriage groups. 3. Play groups, especially of young children, 4. Neighborhoods, especially rural and village.

Intermediate groups are derivative in character, with contacts face-toface, numbers relatively small, and relationships fairly intimate.

(l)

Queen, S.A., Bodenhafer, W.B. and Harper, E.B., Social Organization and Disorganization, ed. 1935, pp. 40-41.

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