The relation between the annexation of Korea and the security of Japan

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THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA AND THE SECURITY OF JAPAN

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Political Science The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by Goethe Mansfield Lindblad June 1942

UMI Number: EP63726

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o' This thesis, written by

...... .GOETHE.JjlM^FIHL.D...LINDBLAI?..... under the direction of h.XQ F a c u lt y Committee, a n d a p p r o v e d by a l l its m em be r s, has been presented to and accepted by the Council on Graduate Study and Research in p ar tia l f u l f i l l ­ m e n t of the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Secretary D a te

June.*.. 19.4S

F a c u lty Com m ittee

CLaxibfccmJ G .TCcrdLeX

PREFACE In the consideration of "Relation Between the Annex­ ation of Korea and the Security of Japan," I have kept two problems in mind.

I have attempted to show on the one hand

that Korea, due to the imperialistic rivalries that arose over her territory, could not stand alone.

On the other

hand why Japan finally felt compelled to annex Korea.

I

have tried to avoid being influenced by the present World War and I have endeavored to secure the opinion of author­ ities writing of the period in question. I particularly wish to thank Dr* Harley for his kind criticism and helpful suggestions.

I wish to acknowledge

Dr. Ellis for his excellent advice and suggested material, since his familiarity with the writers on the Far East has been invaluable.

Thanks is extended to Dr. Rodee for his

help and criticism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER

I.

PAGE P R E F A C E ..................................

ii

INTRODUCTION...............................

1

The problem

• • • . • ...................

Questions

................ . . . . . . . .

1 2

Importance of the p r o b l e m ............. * . . Organization of thesis . . .

..............

4

..........

4

The historical "background

Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea 1868-1895

•

5

Russo-Japanese rivalry over Korea 1895-1905

5

Protectorate . . .........................

5

Annexation of Korea

..............

6

..................

6

Summary and conclusion II.

3

HISTORICAL B A C K G R O U N D ........... Korea to 1868

7

. . . . • • • • ...........

7

China’s administration of subject states . . .

11

Foreign relations of Japan 1858-1868 ........

13

Brief survey of Russian expansions in Asia to 1895 ....................... ......... .. . Western Powers and Korea 1866-1886 .......... III.

17 ZZ

SINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER KOREA (1868-1895) Japanese-Korean relations (1868-1873)

....

28

Japanese-Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1876)......... Convention of Chemulpo ( 1 8 8 2 ) .............

31 35

iv CHAPTER

IV.

PAGE Renewal of Convention of Chemulpo (1885) . .

39

Treaty of Tientsin (1885)

42

. . . ........ ..

Sino-Japanese W a r ................... . . .

45

Treaty of Shimonoseki

. . . . . . . . . . .

52

RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER KOREA (1895-1905)

55

Activities of the TDrei B u n d " ............

55

Russian Ascendancy at the Korean Court (1896)

60

Yamagato-Lobanov Protocol (1896).........

65

Li-Witte negotiations and the Li-Lobanov Treaty . . .

. . . . . . .

Nishi-Rosen Protocol (1898) Russian Lease of Port Arthur

• ............

71

............

74

Diplomatic rivalry in Korea (1892-1902)

V.

68

. .

79

The Boxer Rebellion and the Russian demands

82

Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) ............

85

The Russo-Japanese War • • • . . • • • • • •

88

PROTECTORATE .

............................

102

Japanese-Korean Protocols of February and April 1904 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905

VI.

.

102

. . . . . . .

104

The Japanese-Korean Protocol of 1905 . . . .

105

The abdication of the E m p e r o r ............

110

ANNEXATION OF K O R E A ........................

114

The assassinations of Mr. Stevens and Prince I t o ...................................

115

V

CHAPTER

TO.

PAGE Annexation of K o r e a ........................

116 ;

After annexation

• * ................... .

120

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS......................

122

S u m m a r y...................................

122

Conclusions...............................

130

BIBLIOGRAPHY

.

.......... .......................

133

CHAPTER I IN TRODUC TXON Korea, the Land of the Morning Calm, was the bone of contention in the Far East for over three decades.

The

rivalry over her territory resulted in two major wars, one which disclosed the weakness of China, and the other the defeat for the first time of a white power by an oriental nation.

By the second, Japan was able to make her voice

heard and to take her place among the powers of the world* To the Western Powers as well as to the Oriental Powers, Korea became a pawn in the^ game of world politics until she fell a victim to the more wily of them all, Japan*

Most of

the absorbed peoples of the world have, in time, become reconciled to their subjugated status, but not so the Koreans.

There exists no greater hatred than that of a

Korean for a Japanese in spite of the fact that the former has benefitted in a material way* I*

THE PROBLEM

The problem consists of a study of "The Relation Between the Annexation of Korea and the Security of Japan." This thesis will attempt to determine whether there existed a relation between the annexation of Korea and the security

2

of Japan.

From what did Japan seek to secure herself and

why was Japan insecure without Korea is the problem that the writer wishes to solve.

A critical study of the history of

the period involved will lead the reader to a conclusion. A summary of events leading to the annexation of Korea is found in books written about Korea or on the Far East, but no special work is solely devoted to this particular ques­ tion. II.

QUESTIONS

In formulating this problem and in surveying its scope, several questions arose in the mind of the writer as to the justification that Japan might have had in annexing Korea. The answer to these questions might be found in the various chapters of this thesis. 1.

Was Japan*s national security menaced through

Korea by China and Russia? The opening of Japan brought with it an increased trade with the Asiatic mainland, and especially with Korea. The eastward expansion of the Russian Empire reached the shores of the Faeific and came in conflict with Japanese vital interests.

China9s loose control of Korea was incom­

patible with Japan9s growing trade and commercial concerns in Korea.

Did Chinese and Russian activities constitute a

3 menace to Japan? 2*

Did Japan seek to establish for the Koreans a

responsible and independent nation? Can the political and diplomatic activities of Japan in Korea from 1876 to 1907 be interpreted to indicate that she sincerely tried to set up a government in Korea which would be responsible and Independent?

Was it neeessary for

Japan to take upon herself this task contrary to the wishes of Korea? 3«

Was the annexation of Korea necessary?

What were the conditions that prevented Japan from establishing for the Koreans an independent nation?

This

thesis may reveal why Japan felt it necessary to take this drastic step in search for security* III.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Apparently the conquered and subjugated countries of Asia are more or less satisfied with their new rulers, but not so the Koreans.

They have kept up a constant agitation

for their freedom ever since their annexation in 1910.

The

annexation of the other countries did not result in the polit­ ical disturbances that of Korea caused.

China waged a costly

war to defend her suzerainty of Korea and through it revealed to the world her utter weakness.

Russia’s determined eastward

4 march of empire was halted by Japan when the Russo-Japanese War ended in victory for the latter.

The Anglo-American

Alliance of 1902 was intimately connected with the question of the independence of Korea.

The "open door" policy of the

United States and the Western Powers was in tarn, at that time* enhanced by that Alliance* Had not the world been involved indirectly in the problem of Korea$ she might have passed into oblivion as have the other annexed countries of Asia.

Boohs and agita­

tion by able leaders keep the problem in mind.

It is an

endeavor to determine Just how and especially why the annex­ ation was accomplished that this thesis is written* IV.

ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The historical background.

In Chapter II is discussed

the condition of Korea and the interest which she aroused in other states. is included.

A brief history of Korea up to the year 1868 The foreign relations of Japan during the

period of 1858 to 1868 is interesting and necessary* and they have a distinct bearing upon this study.

To understand

the attitude of China toward Korea* a short account of her relation to her vassal states is given.

The Russian inter­

est in Korea can only be explained by tracing briefly her expansion in Asia to 1891.

The diplomatic relations of the

5 Western Powers with Korea has a direct bearing on the events that transpired in Korea from 1868 to 1910* Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea 1868-1895.

In Chapter

III the Chinese and Japanese interests in Korea and their ef­ forts to secure control of Korea are discussed in chronolog­ ical order*

The rivalry that developed and which led to the

Sino-Japanese War and the victory of Japan forms the major topic of this chapter* Husso-Japanese rivalry over Korea 1895-1905.

Chapter

IV outlines the rivalry which developed between Russia and Japan over Korea between the years 1895 to 1905*

We shall

see how Russia in her quest for a warm-water seaport for her navy and a terminus for her newly constructed trans-Siberian Railroad came in conflict with Japan’s aims on the Asiatic mainland.

To Japan these activities on the part of Russia

endangered her interests not only in Koreat but also in Manchuria*

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 brought to an

end this intense rivalry and a victory for Japan. Protectorate.

The steps by which Japan established

a protectorate over Korea are discussed in Chapter V*

Japan

considered that a protectorate was the only means to guar­ antee a stable government in Korea*

6 Annexation of Korea.

The failure of the Japanese

protectorate and the reasons for the annexation are given in Chapter VI.

A few remarks regarding the results of the

annexation are included* Summary and conclusion. the thesis is given.

In this chapter a summary of

This summary includes an account of the

rivalries in Korea and the steps taken by Japan to annex Korea. The conclusion contains a series of observations rather than opinions, since so many divergent views are held by authori­ ties on the Far Fast*

CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND To begin the study of the rivalries that developed over Korea between Japan, China, and Russia from 1868 to 1905 without first discussing the condition of Korea and the interests which she had aroused in other states, would leave the reader without sufficient background to follow the sequence of events* 1868 is included.

A brief history of Korea up to the year The foreign relations of Japan during the

period of 1858 to 1868 is interesting, and they have a bear­ ing upon this study in that many Japanese diplomatic activ­ ities which she later applied to Korea, were learned from the Western Powers.

To understand the attitude of China

toward Korea, a short account of her relation to her vassal states is given.

The Russian interest in Korea can only be

explained by tracing briefly her expansion in Asia to 1891* The diplomatic negotiations which ended in the treaties of the Western Powers has a direct bearing on the events that transpired in Korea from 1868 to 1910* I*

KOREA TO 1868

Korea, the land of the Morning Calm, lies between China, Japan, and Russian Siberia, and has an area of ninety thousand square miles, which includes the "Ten Thousand

Islands” that line its western and eastern coasts.

It is

six hundred miles long and 130 miles wide and has a coastline of 1,940 miles with many splendid harbors.

The harbor of

Wonsan is of the northeast coast, Fusan and Masampo at the southern end, and Chemulpo, Chennampo, and Yongampo of the west are the principal ones on the peninsula* The history of Korea dates from 2333 B. G., the year of the founding of the Kingdom of Tan-Koon.

This dynasty

developed a high degree of civilization, such as the art of writing, crop cultivation and the domestication of animals. In 1122 B. C. King itija came from China with several thousand Chinese and introduced Chinese ideographs, a stable govern­ ment and wise laws, and he gave Korea its traditional name, Ch’ao-hsien.^ According to the Japanese tradition, Korea was invaded by the Japanese in the year A. D. 200 under the lead­ ership of Ihapress Jingo.

This the Japanese say is why the

Koreans promised to send annual tribute.

By means of these

tributary missions the culture of China was introduced into Japan.2

The Sila dynasty brought with it elements of Hindu

civilization through the introduction of Buddhism.

The

history of Korea is not a peaceful one, since these people

■*“ H. B. Morse and H. F. MaeNair, Far Eastern Inter­ national Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), P * 32 • 2 Ibid.. p. 33.

9 experienced invasions and counter-invasions from China and Japan, such as the invasion of Gengis-Ehan in 1218f and the 3 Japanese invasion under Hideyoshi in 1592* The annexation of Korea in 1910 saw the end of the Yi dynasty founded in 1392 by Yi T ’a-Jo.

In 1392 Yi T fa-Jo had

been sent out to invade China, but had used his army to usurp the Korean throne.

To secure the friendship and support of

the Chinese Emperor, he formed an alliance with China.

Under

his rule Korea was unified, and tribute was no longer sent to 4 Japan except that occasionally embassies were exchanged* Korea from then on maintained a relationship with China based on the support that China gave.

However, it did not prevent

Korea from making her own laws independent of China.

The

Manohus brought Korea into subjection in 1637 and when the former became the ruler of China in 1644, Korea resumed its position of vassalage to the Chinese Emperor.5 The Hideyoshi invasion was successfully repelled with the aid of China.

He had asked Korea to renew her tribute-

bearing missions and her aid in Invading China.

When Korea CL

refused, he landed his invading armies on Korean soil. 3

Henry Chung, The Case of Korea (New Yorks Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921), pp. 32-34. 4 Morse and MaeNair, oj). cit.. p. 33* 5 Ibid.. p. 383. 6 Ibid.. p. 33.

Daring the coarse of the straggle, which lasted for seven 7 years, Korea lost 20 per cent of her population. McKenzie writing of this invasion says, ". . . after terrible fight­ ing, the Japanese were driven back.

They left Korea in

ruins, carrying off everything they could, and destroying 3 all they could not carry off#* Since Korea has never re­ covered from the damages of the invasion, it is of more than historic importance.

"The memories," says McKenzie, "of their

terrible sufferings at the hands of the Japanese ground into the Koreans a hatred of their neighbor, handed down undimin­ ished from generation to generation, to this day#"9 After the war Japan made repeated requests that Korea should resume the old custom of sending tribute-bearing em­ bassies to Japan.

It was not until 1617, however, that

friendly relations were again restored with Japan, and forty Japanese junks a year were permitted to trade at the port of-~ Fusan where the Japanese were permitted to retain their fac­ tory#

It was also agreed that Korea would send periodic

missions of respect to Yedo, the Japanese capital.

The ex­

penses of these missions were defrayed by the Japanese Shogun. 7

Chung, 0£. cit.. p. 42#

8 F. A. McKenzie, Korea *s Fight for Freedom (Hew York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920), p. 16# 9 Ibid., p. 17.

11 Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Korea was told that the missions need not proceed farther than to Tsushima, where it could discharge its offices with the representatives of the S h o g u n . T h e mission of 1811 was the last that Korea sent.

The 1837 mission, the next one that should have been

gone, was not sent and the mission of 1853 did not go to Japan due to the burning of the castle at Yedo.

Political

disturbances of Japan prevented the sending of other missions, and it was not until the new government was formed in Japan in 1868 that Korea was requested to again resume sending missions*

11

This request and Korean refusal to comply is

discussed in the following chapter. II*

CHINA'S ADMINISTRATION OK SUBJECT STATES

To the middle of the nineteenth century, the outstand­ ing country of Asia was China.

China possessed a well-

developed center of political administration.

Around this

center existed states of minor importance and also tribes, all of whom paid allegiance to this central authority*

At

the same time each was permitted varying degrees of local autonomy and at times to a considerable extent.

Although

^ J* H* Longford, The Story of Korea (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 198* ^ Fayson J* Treat, The Far East (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing Company, 1928)7 P» 284*

12 this allegiance and control over the surrounding tribes was originally gained by war, military administration was, as soon as expedient, replaced by local and native administra­ tions, China maintaining merely a nominal connection with them*

From this it is apparent that China wished not to

assume too much responsibility over conquered peoples, but wished to shake it off as much as possible in the shortest time*

In other words China accorded the right of local

self-government to her tributary states*

Yet, at times,

China expanded the scope of administration from the center, not so much in the desire to interfere with these small states, but for reasons of defense* passed China always withdrew.

After the danger had

In case a nation bordering

on one of China's loosely-held states attempted to disturb the status quo, China would interfere to re-establish former conditions* China*

Korea by 1867 was in just such a relation to

She owed a weak allegiance to China and recognized

China's suzerainty over her. The Western Powers, in the early part of the nineteenth century, successfully disputed China's loose suzerainty over many of the tributary states of her vast empire*

MeCordock

summarizes the activities of the European powers: Despite opposition, the influence of the for­ eigners increased steadily and China was powerless to prevent several of her tributary states being

13 taken from her by European countries* Three prov­ inces of Cochin China were taken by France in 1867* Russia in 1881 secured a portion of Xli* Japan took the Liuchu Islands in the same year and was exhibit­ ing an interest in Formosa. China took up arms against France in 1884-1885 in an effort to retain jurisdiction over Annam, but, although her armies gave a good account of themselves, that territory was acquired by France. In 1862 Great Britain annexed Lower Burma and, shortly after the Franco-Chinese war, acquired Upper Burma as counter-weight to French ac­ quisitions in Indo-China.3-2 Japan, no doubt, was considerably influenced by the methods adopted by the Europeans*

Then, too, she construed the Korean

missions of respect, previously mentioned, as giving her the right to regard Korea as a vassal state*

It was over this

point that China and Japan began their rivalry in Korea which ended in the Sino-Japanese War* III.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF JAPAN 1858-1868

The first formal agreemeht^made between Japan and an k

*

occidental state after two hundred years of isolation was concluded by Admiral Perry on March 31, 1854.

Perry suc­

ceeded, where others had failed, to have the Japanese law set aside which had prohibited free international relations. ^ It was a treaty of peace and amity between the United States and Japan and included provision for limited trade relations,

12 R. Stanley McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 71. 3 *5

Morse and MacNair, op* cit.. p. 301,

14 and the most-favored nation clause.

It was not until Russian

and English naval squadrons were engaged in combat in Japanese \

waters during the Crimean War (1854-1856) that they attempted to open treaty negotiations with Japan.

The commander of the

English fleet* Rear Admiral Sir James Sterling, went to Nagasaki and demanded the conclusion of convention for the opening of Japanese ports to English ships.

A convention was

signed on October 15, 1854 whereby the ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate were opened to English ships for repairs and coaling. In February 1855 Russia for the first time obtained a treaty with Japan.

14

Although the Netherlands had a monopoly of

the trade at Nagasaki, they obtained a formal treaty in January, 1855.

These treaties opened the ports of Shimoda,

Nagasaki, and Hakodate for obtaining provisions and coal*15 Townsend Harris, of the United States, was sent to negotiate a formal treaty, but when he arrived the anti?*foreign feeling was so high that at first even a permanent residence at Shimoda was denied him.

After many months of

persistent efforts, he succeeded in gaining an audience with the Shogun.

He tactfully explained to the Shogun that if

Japan made a treaty with the United States, all the other

14 Ibid.. p. 302. Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Oreat Powers (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1940), p. 61.

15 foreign countries would make similar treaties.

Hishida

speaking of Harris’ conversations says: . . . He alluded to the case of China, and the forcible measures for opening the country taken against her by England, France, and Russia, with ensuing territorial encroachments and other complications. He intimated that if those powers should open Japan by force, the result would be the same as in C h i n a . 16 On February 26, 1856 Harris succeeded in having the Shogun agree to sign a treaty of amity and commerce. on April 21, 1858.

This was done

However, due to the strong anti-foreign

feeling and the opposition of the Imperial Court, the sanc­ tion to a new treaty was withheld.

By this time American

and Russian men-of-war arrived in Yedo Bay#

Harris took

advantage of the report that the British and French fleets were sailing for Japan to press the Shogun to sign the treaty. Fearing that delay would bring upon Japan misfortune similar to those experienced by China, he signed the treaty without Jbhe sanction of the Emperor on July 29, 1858.

Thereafter,

the English, French, Russian, and Dutch envoys concluded treaties like the one between the United States and Japan. In general, these treaties provided for:

diplomatic repre­

sentation at the Japanese capital; foreign trade and resi­ dence; extraterritoriality; a conventional tariff at the treaty ports; for foreign residence only at Yedo; and for 16

Ibid., p. 62.

16 trade only at Asaka.

17

"When the Shogun was forced," says Latane, "to agree to the treaties with the United States and other foreign powers, the feudal barons raised a great outcry against him and appealed to the Emperor ."*LS

Prince of Nagato, one of the

most powerful of the barons, tried to prevent the execution of the treaties by attempting to close the straits of Shimonoseki and drive the foreigners from his dominions*

The

British proposed an expedition to the powers concerned to open the straits and punish the Prince.

The British furnished

nine vessels, France three, Holland four, and the United States one.

The Shogun approved of the action and when the expedition

returned-he made concessions to the foreigners and agreed to pay an indemnity of #3,000,000.19 Every concession the Shogun made to the foreign powers was opposed by the nobles, and Japan was on the verge of civil war.

In 1867 the Shogun in order to save the country

resigned and restored the government to the Emperor*

The

Shogun had been forced to resign for granting concessions to the hated foreigners, yet the first thing the Emperor

1 7 i b i a ♦• p*

64*

18

John Holladay Latane, American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday Doran and Company, Inc., 1927), p. 333. 19 Ibid.. p. 354.

17 did was to receive the foreign representatives in person. Latane says of the Emperor and his advisors: . . . When he and his advisors were faced with the responsibility they had to do precisely what the Shogun had done. The nobles patriotically sup- . ported the Emperor, for they understood that only a centralized government could successfully cope with the foreigner.20 The diplomatic methods of the Western Powers were well learned by Japan during the years between 1854 to 1868.

These

lessons she translated into action when she became interested c in Korea and China. Having once opened her doors to western ideas, she left no stone unturned in completing her transfor­ mation from a medieval empire to a world power with all that the latter represents. IV.

BRIEF SURVEY OF RUSSIAN EXPANSIONS IN ASIA TO 1895

In order to understand Russia's eastward expansion, the history of it must be briefly surveyed.

If it were not

for the fact that this expansion led ultimately to an effort to control Korea and to a disastrous war, we would not concern ourselves with it.

The eastward drive of empire in time came,

to absorb the Russian mind to such an extent that it was con­ sidered an integral part of her national policy.

80 Latane,

0£.

cit.. p. 353.

18 From the time of Ivan the Terrible, Russia had unified her European possessions and moved eastward until she con­ trolled much of Central and all of Northern Asia*

Russia

seemed to have been fitted for such a role of expansion, for her economic organization did not suffer from internal dis­ orders, while her autocratic government enabled her to carry out the policy of expansion.

If Russia was to realize the

objective of her expansion eastward, she must have a warm** water seaport on the eastern side. with Japan.

Here she came in conflict

In regard to this expansion Price asks:

. . . But how it was that, with all the energies and resourcefulness of the new state presumably fully absorbed in consolidating itself with Europe, it was yet possible for Russia to thrust out eastward across the Urals and take within its dominions all of Central and Eastern Asia north of the Altai ranges and the Amur River to the Pacific, and then push on until the flag of Russia had been established on the North American continent, and accomplished this in almost exactly two hundred years, remains one of the puzzles of human history.21 The definite steps in Russia's eastward expansion, if they had been successful, might have led to the control of Eorea* By the middle of the nineteenth century Russia had gone so far eastward that she laid claim to the Eurile Islands and the whole of Sakhalin and some other parts over which Japan had exercised a long standing but vague sovereignty# 21

Earnest Batson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore: The Joiuas Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 8*

19 The attitude held by Russia toward China by 1867 was the result of a series of treaties*

These treaties led

Russia to believe that China was no longer important in Asia; that China was a land to be exploited whenever conditions 32 allowed it* In violation of the treaty of Nerchinsk (August 1689), Russia occupied more eastern Chinese terri­ tory, establishing Nikolaivsk in 1850, Mariinsk in 1851, Alexandrovsk on the island of Sakhalin in 1855*

The Crimean

War resulted in Russia being driven from her newly acquired Pacific holdings.

This had the effect of pushing her back,

again, to the territory north of the Amur River. The treaties before 1858 between Russia and China were negotiated in an atmosphere of mutual respect, but the series of treaties after this date were negotiated under different circumstances.

In 1858 China was worn out from a long civil

war, and her capital was under siege by the British and French.

Of China’s predicament Woodhead observes:

Holy Russia had reached the Amur, but had done so without hostilities or bloodshed. But Russian appetite grew by what it fed upon, and Muraviev was not slow to take advantage of the pressure then being exerted upon Peking, by Britain and France to extend still farther the boundaries of his Siberian Empire ♦ . .23

22 Ibid.. p. 9. prz

H. G. W. Woodhead, Occidental Interpretation of the Far Eastern Problem {Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 306#

So it was that at Aigun, on May 28* 1858, China entered into a treaty with Russia giving Russia the territory north of the Amur and the right of navigation of its two confluents from the south*

Again* on June 13 of the same year* China

signed with the Russian delegate, Putiatin, the Russian treaty of Tientsin whereby Russia secured all the technical advantages acquired by the French and British through force of arms*^4

Two years later the territory south of the Amur

was annexed to Russia by China through the skillful efforts of the Russian minister, Ignatief, at Peking.25

He had

acted as mediator between China and the Allied Governments of France and England after China’s defeat by these powers* By this territorial annexation Russia could transfer her naval headquarters from Peterpavlofsk in Kamchatka to Nicolaiefsk at the mouth of the Amur River and again to Vladivostok at the southern end of her new territory* This accession of territory cut China off in Manchuria from an outlet to the sea.25 Speaking of these three treaties Professor Treat states: . . . From the point of Russo-Chinese relations the three treaties of Aigun, Tientsin, and Peking com­ prise one treaty settlement. With a few modifications ■'

1 ■■|pi" ■ '

.

24 Price, op* eit*» p. 10* 25 Amos S. Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906), Treat, op. cit.. p. 13.

31 they formed the basis of the relations between the tw© countries until the end of the century. The territory acquired by Russia north of the Amur and along the Manchurian coast included approximately 550,000 square miles, and was by far the greatest portion of the old empire to pass into the hands of a Western Power. Before the Russian possession of the coast was assured by the Peking treaty, Muraviev, in July, 1860, had founded Vladivostok, close to the Korean frontier, which he believed would justify the name he gave it . . ."dominionof the East."27 While Japan was

in the midst of civil war, Russia took

advantage of the situation by attempting to seize the Japanese Island of Tsushima in the Korean straits from which they with­ drew only at the instance of Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister and the British fleet. island of Sakhalin wasplaced and Japan, but in 1875

Six years later the

under joint possession of Russia

it was ceded to Russia for which Japan

received the Jturile Islands* The weakness of China had permitted Russia’s expansion to the very frontier of Korea. desire for a warm sea outlet.

Of eourse her drive was the According to Professor Hershey:

Ever since the days of Peter the Great, who first discerned the possibilities of the future, the for­ eign policy of Russia has been largely controlled by a desire to obtain access to the sea in four direc­ tions, viz. . • . the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific Ocean#28 P7

Ibid.. p. 125.

28 Hershey, op. cit.. p# 5*

2a To gain this end she would go to any extreme.

Korea, with

a long ice-free coastline* weak and isolated, was a country that tempted Russia* and she would some day attempt to con­ trol it if the cost was not prohibitive*29 This constant eastward pressure brought Russia upon the threshold of Japan.

As the following pages will show,

Russia had only begun her eareer in Eastern Asia.

Vladivos­

tok was completely icebound a large part of each year, and so Russia could not be expected to be completely satisfied in having her naval headquarters there, when during the winter her fleet was obliged to winter in Japanese harbors. Russia’s eastward expansion was inactive until 1891 when it was decided to build the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The ice­

bound harbor of Vladivostok was not very desirable as a terminus of the railway and further expansion became an urgent necessity.

To overcome this obstacle an opportunity

presented itself towards the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895*

Here we will leave the Russian expansion to resume

it again from the year 1895* V*

WESTERN POWERS AND KOREA 1866-1886

Up to the last half of the nineteenth century, Korea 29

Longford, op* cit*. p. 302*

23 refused all intercourse with foreign nations.

Ships that

approached the unchartered coasts were fired upon.

When

outside governments made friendly advances and offers to show Korea the wonders of modern civilization, they were told that Korea was satisfied with its own civilization. Many attempts were made by foreigners to get into the coun­ try*

French priests smuggled themselves into the country as

early as the eighteenth century and kept on coming until 1866, when they and their converts were wiped out.

The

French Minister at Peking determined to punish the Koreans for the death of the priests and told the Tsungli yamen 30 that it was the intention of France to annex Korea. He sent a strong expedition to the Han River, and the forts on Kangwha Island were bombarded.

Even though the French had 31 superior weapons, they were forced to retire. To the

Koreans this meant that the French had been repulsed*32 This same year an American vessel, the Surprise, was wrecked on the Korean coast near Wang-hai.

Oddly enough

the Americans were treated with consideration, and were sent home through Manchuria with the officials conducting them as they traveled through the land. 30 31

Again in 1866, an American

Morse and MacHair, op. cit., p. 382. McKenzie, op. cit.. pp. 16-18*

32 Morse and MacNair, op. cit.. p. 382. 33 McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 18-19#

ship, the General Sherman, set out for Korea from Tientsin with the purpose of trading with the Koreans,

When it reached

its destination, the Tatong River, it was destroyed and the crew killed because it had not secured permission to enter the country,

As a result Secretary Seward proposed that

France and the United States take joint action to obtain satisfaction,®4

The Japanese Shogun offered to mediate be­

tween the United States and Korea fearing the result if Korea became involved with one of the Western Powers, but before he could do this the Shogunate was abolished.

The United

States took action by sending Captain Shufeldt, commander of the Wachusset, to ask for an explanation. plea of justification.

The reply was a

The United States was determined to

punish the Koreans and a fleet was sent to destroy the forts on the Han River.

In 1871, Mr, Low, the American Minister to

China, supported by five warships, tried to secure a treaty. A surveying party was fired upon, and the Americans destroyed five forts in retaliation.

The Koreans would neither apolo*-

gize nor negotiate a treaty. After the Japanese had secured a treaty with Korea, Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Chihli, advised the Koreans to 35 open their doors in order to keep Japan and Russia out. 34 35

Treat, op. cit,. p. 286* McKenzie, op. cit.. p. 22*

25 He intimated to representatives of the Western Powers in Peking, that Korea would now listen to their requests for treaties.

Commodore Shufeldt, in 1880, was commissioned to

negotiate a treaty with Korea.

His first attempt was not

successful because he opened negotiations with Japanese representatives at Seoul.

He failed to obtain a satisfactory

reply to several of his letters.

Li was willing to assist

Shufeldt if he would proceed through Chinese channels. ' The next year a draft treaty was drawn up by Shufeldt and Li.

Li, however, was not able to include a clause to the

effect that Korea was regarded as a vassal state of China. Shufeldt, no doubt, was aware of the correspondence of 1871 between Mr. Low and the Chinese Foreign Office in regard to the status of Korea.

Of this Henry Ghung states:

. . . In 1871 the Chinese Foreign Office wrote to the Chited States Minister in Peking, Mr. Frederick F. Low, in response to Mr. Low’s inquiry concerning the relations between Korea and China: "Korea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, yet she is wholly independent in everything that relates to her gov­ ernment, her religion, her prohibitions, and her laws; in none of these things has China hitherto interfered."38 The draft treaty was sent to Korea in a Chinese vessel, and when Shufeldt arrived in Seoul, in May 1882, he secured the 36

Morse and MacNair, op. cit., p. 389.

37 Treat, op. cit.. p. 288. 38 Henry Chung, Korean Treaties (New York: H. S. Nichols, Inc., 1919), p. aci.

26 signatures of the Korean officials. a letter

to the

Presidentof

isquoted fey Henry Chung,

The King of Korea sent

the United States, part of which

in which the King declared the in­

dependence of Korea be saying: How as the Government of the United States and Korea are about to enter into treaty relations], the inter­ course between the two nations shall be carried on in every respect on terms of equality and courtesy, and the King of Korea clearly assents that all the Arti­ cles of the Treaty shall be acknowledged and carried into effect accordingtothe laws of independent states.39 By the terms of the treaty extraterritoriality was granted to the United States.

Each would exert their good

offices in case of disputes between either of the two nations and a third power.

Mr. Dennett comments on this treaty.

But there was less interest in the Far East among Americans in 1882 than there had been in 1868, and, so far as the American Government is concerned, the treaty of 1882 may truly be claimed as an aet of absent-mindedness, the consequence for which for many years few thought to e x p l o r e . 40 Tyler Dennett maintains that the United States-Korean Treaty was the second wedge which separated Korea from China; the first being the Japanese Treaty of 1876.

By the former,

China assented to the claim first made by Japan that Korea was as independent as Japan*41 39 Ibid., p. xi. 40 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925), p. 103. Jbid.. pp. 461, 462#

A treaty between Great Britain and Korea was con­ cluded the same year, but the following year Great Britain secured another treaty more to her liking.

Germany nego­

tiated a treaty in 1883 and Italy in 1884.

The French

treaty of 1886 provided that French students and teachers would be assisted in their work; a provision that Korea later protested realizing that it opened the country to missionary propaganda• The relations of the United States and Korea have been discussed at length in that it reveals the peculiar relationship which existed between China and Korea and also that the United States treaties was followed by the treaties of other powers.

C H A P ® III SINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER KOREA (1868-1895) I*

JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS (1868-1873)

Korea in 1868 acknowledged vassalage to China and continued the old custom of sending periodic tributary congratulatory to her. Since 1811 she had not sent a simi­ lar mission to Japan.

However, Korea cherished her connec­

tions with China more than with Japan, and met her obliga­ tions with the former with more readiness, and also accepted China’s recommendations in the selection of her kings, her laws, and calendar.

Nevertheless, Japan claimed that her

rights in Korea were of an earlier origin than those of China.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Japan based

her claim on the legendary invasion of Korea in £00 A* B* by Empress Jingo. After the opening of Japan, the trade with Korea in­ creased rapidly#

It was natural that this trade sprang up

as Korea was Japan's nearest neighbor and they mutually enjoyed what was essentially a similar way of life.

At

first Japan followed the general technique of the West in insisting on the right of carrying on and protecting trade with the kingdom of Korea, and disputed China's authority to solely determine Korea's foreign trade policy and

29 relations.

1

When the Shogunate had been overthrown, the Japanese notified Korea of the change and requested that the customary tributary missions which Korea had failed to do for some time, be continued,

2

and sent a mission to Korea "to announce the

recent change in Japan and the desire of the new government to continue peaceful intercourse*"

But Korea, ruled by the

Tai Won Kun who had just repulsed the French effort to punish Korea, rejected this friendly advance and refused to comply with the wishes of Japan by sending an insulting note to the Japanese Emperor.

Professor Hershey comments on this refusal. (

This invitation was met with an insolent refusal at Seoul, and the war-party in Japan clamored for. war; but the Japanese Government resisted this clamor and tried to reestablish its influence in the pen­ insula by peaceful means*4 The Tai Won Kun "disliked extremely the innovations which had begun in Japan and deemed her false to the spirit of the East."5 Of the contempt in which the Korean government held Japan, General Greene says: 1

Earnest Bateson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. p. 11* 2 H. B* Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern Inter­ national Relations, p. 386* 3 Payson J* Treat, The Far East, p. 268* ^ Amos S. Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 40* 5 Shid*»

286.

30 • . . After the restoration in Japan in 1868 her relations with Korea were disturbed by the mani­ festations of contempt which the rulers of that country took every opportunity to cast on the adoption by Japan of western customs.6 Even though China and Japan had opened their doors to the West, Korea desired to hold fast to her isolation.

The next

year as well as the year following, Japan sent three separate missions to Korea but each returned home bearing Korea’s insulting refusals to enter into friendly relations#

7

The

first mission reported that Japan should adopt measures to safeguard Korea's independence in view of secret designs of Russia and China for political control of Korea* When, after sending these fruitless missions and the contents of the Tai Won Kun's note were finally revealed, the Samurai indignantly demanded that Japan’s honor be vindicated, by bloodshed if necessary.

Nothing came of this outburst

because of the internal condition of Japan due to foreign and domestic problems and also to the lack of military and 8 naval arms. The question of China’s responsibility for the actions of Korea was considered in 1873 when Japan entered into her first treaty with China.

Treat states that:

0 General Francis V. Greene, "The Genius of Russia," World’s Work, 7:4708, 1903-1904. 7 Morse and MacNair, op. cit.» p. 386* 8 Ibid«• P. 387.

31 • . ♦ China waived any responsibility by maintain­ ing that Korea, though a vassal state, still pos­ sessed the right to make war or peace.9 This, of course, was what the Japanese wished to determine and gave them a clear hand to handle future troubles inde­ pendently of China’s authority.

In 1874 the Koreans prom­

ised to receive a letter from the Japanese government and to send an envoy to Japan, but failed to keep that promise. XI.

JAPANESE-KOREAN TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE (1876) In 1875 a Japanese gunboat, allegedly stopping for

wood and water at the mouth of the river Han, was fired upon* However, it was later shown that the boat was on reeonaissance duty.

The fire was returned and the fort was taken

and the greater part of the garrison of 250 men killed.

The

Japanese Samurai again cried for revenge knowing that Japan with her efficient but small army and navy could punish Korea.

The government could not act too hastily because

China, Korea’s suzerain, might resent such action and come to her vassal’s assistance.

In lieu of military action,

therefore, diplomacy was employed in hope of bringing Korea to terms.

In writing of this diplomatic action Professor

Treat states: 9

Treat,

0£.

cit.. p. 287*

32 Instead of proceeding to severe punitive measures the Japanese ministry decided to profit from their own experience and apply the methods which, when used by Commodore Perry, had proved so successful in their own ease. In fact, the American minister at Tokyo was asked to lend them an account of Perry’s mission.10 China advised Korea not only to agree to the Japanese proposals, but also to accept them, and that China could not be expected to send military aid.

China had found it impose

sible to reject foreigners, and told Korea to follow her ex* ample in dealing with outside powers.

When Japan felt secure

of China’s neutrality, an expedition was fitted out and in 1876 sailed for Kang-Wha.

Japan hesitated to use force but

sent enough troops to repel the Koreans if necessary.11 strategy was successful.

The

Fortunately the Japanese-hating

Tai Won Kun had been replaced by the young King who wassur­ rounded by young and progressive officials.

The termsof

the

Japanese were accepted and on February 26, 1876 a treaty of "Peace and Friendship" was negotiated which ended forever Korea’s national isolation and dependence on China.

Stanley

McCordock remarks that "Japanese Statesmen were quick to take advantage of China’s failure to assert her suzerainty at crucial moments."12 10 11

Treat, loc. cit* Morse and MacNair,

0 £*

cit*. p. 388.

12 Stanley R. McCordock, British Far Eastern Polioy,

35 This treaty recognized Korea as a free and independent state*

The factory at Fusan was abolished, and that city and

two other ports were opened to trade and residence of Japanese citizens*

The rescue and treatment of shipwrecked sailors

was provided for*

Consuls were to be sent to the opened ports

and a legation established at the capital*

The treaty gave

to the Japanese extraterritorial privileges.

Of this Longford,

in his history of Korea, says: The same extraterritorial clauses that Perry had forced on the Japanese when they were ignorant of all international usages, of which they afterwards so bitterly complained, were introduced by them into their first treaty with Korea, and it may be noted here that this was only the first of many incidents in Japan's intercourse with Korea that found their exact counterpart in the story of her own relations with European powers.13 H. B* Morse says regarding this treaty: The treaty of 1876 is the first clear announcement of Japan's foreign policy as regards Korea. . . . Neither China nor any other nation was to be allowed to substantiate its claim to suzerainty, and thereby interfere with the liberty of the Japanese nation to trade with Korea on the ground of free competition. With the sending of a mission to Tokyo to repay the visit of the Japanese envoy, their mutual relations came to a halt due to the Satsuma rebellion which broke out in Japan. It was not until 1880 that a Japanese minister was sent to 13 14

Joseph H. Longford, The Story of Korea, p. 303* Morse and MacNair, o£. cit., p. 389.

34 the Korean capital, and the three treaty ports opened to Japanese traders.

With the opening of Korea, western ideas

entered with which the young king was in accord.

The advise

of Li Hung Chang, a leading statesman of China, strongly sup­ ported the new ideas coming into Korea.

As a result of this

new outlook Korea, within the next few years, negotiated treaties with the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy.

With respect to these treaties

Hishida says: The Japanese minister to Korea, seconding the efforts of the progressive party, advised the Korean king to heed the request of other nations for treaty relations.15 These reforms were welcomed and sponsored by the liberals but like Japan, observes Professor Hershey, "This ’open door’ policy was violently and bitterly opposed by the ’Exclusionist’ faction in Korea."'*-6

In Korea, as in Japan,

the liberal statesmen were opposed by groups of their coun­ trymen for doing a thing that would have been foolhardy not to do.

In 1882 the only foreigners in Seoul were the

Japanese minister and staff and a small guard, however, their presence was resented by the Koreans.

15 Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Great Powers» p. 84. 16 Hershey, op. cit., p. 41.

35 XII.

CONVENTION OF CHEMULPO (1888)

The Tai Won Fun, who had been out of office since 1873, was aware of the liberal changes, but continued to hold his own views which he spread among the soldiers and the people.

By intrigue and with the help of dishonest

Korean officials who furnished rice mixed with sand to the 17 soldiers, he succeeded in stirring up the soldiers and the people.

Officials whom the mob thought were responsible for

the "new order" were not spared, and even the palace was in­ vaded where the rebels cut down officials in the King’s very presence.

Had not the Queen escaped, they would have killed

her because of her apparent pro-Japanese leanings. The mob next turned its attention to the Japanese on the streets killing them wherever found. tion came next in their line of march.

The Japanese lega­ The legation staff

was forced to leave the city and succeeded in escaping only after many Japanese had been wounded.

At the port the lega­

tion personnel were again attacked, but were able to flee in an open boat which was later picked up by a British ship, the Flying Fish, and taken to Nagasaki. This outbreak permitted the Tai Won Fun to return to power, and since the Queen was now in hiding, the young

17 Longford,

0£.

cit., p. 309.

36 king was completely in his power#

The Japanese could not

permit this attack to go unpunished; they returned in force, supported by warships determined to obtain redress.

By the

Convention of Chemulpo, signed on July 27, 1882, the Tai Won Kun was compelled to accept the Japanese demands for an apol­ ogy, and for punishment of the leaders of the mob* along with the right to station troops for protection of the lega­ tion.

The Koreans were to erect barracks for the Japanese

troops*

This demand was practically the same as that made

upon Japan by the Western Powers, when they not only demanded that Japan erect barracks for the troops stationed in Yoko­ hama, but also pay for their upkeep.

The Koreans were to

pay an indemnity of 550,000 yen, later reduced to 150,000 yen

when the Korean Government became better disposed

toward Japan.

Concerning this reduction Professor Treat

observed that "In this way Japan followed the action of the United States in returning to her the Shimonoseki indemnity 19 only a few months earlier." Although Korea had declared that she was an independent state by the Korean-Japanese treaty of 1876, China responded to Korea’s plea for help, when the latter became alarmed over the presence of Japanese troops stationed at Seoul#

18 Morse and MacKair, op. cit.» p. 392# Treat, oj>. cit., p. 291.

37 China sent a large force of trained soldiers, but due to the friction between the troops that soon developed, the Chinese troops withdrew to the outskirts of the city where they re** mained; it was stated they were there to protect China*s vassal king against his rebellious subjects and to protect his throne.

After Japan had negotiated the new treaty with

Korea, all the Japanese troops were removed except for a legation guard of two companies of infantry. China did not recall her troops, for Li Hung Chang was determined that China should continue to play a part in the life of Korea.

20

MeCordock asserts that, "In 1882 China,

changing her attitude, endeavored to regain the authority over Korea which she had lost during the preceding decade," and he adds, "As China*s new policy coincided with British interests, it is felt that English diplomacy was instrumental in urging the Tsungli Yamen more vigorously to assert its suzerainty over K o r e a . L i

went so far as to send a com­

missioner to take active part in Korean domestic affairs. The Tai Won Kun was invited to visit the Chinese camp, and when he arrived, he was taken prisoner and sent to Tientsin where he remained for three years.

With the Tai Won Kun out

of the way, the king continued his relations with the Western 20

21

Morse and MacNair, op. cit.. p. 392* McCordock, op. cit.. p. 77*

38 Bowers, and the queen returned from hiding.

The removal of

the Tai Won Kun was beneficial to Korea, but by his arrest China was thereby playing a double role, that of declaring the intention of not interfering in Korean affairs, and then openly helping the King to keep his throne« During the two years after the outbreak of 1883, a mission of apology was sent to Japan.

When the official

business was completed, many of the delegates remained to study the progress that Japan had made under Western ideas* Other Koreans visited Japan and on returning home hoped to achieve for Korea what Japan had accomplished.

The queen,

however, did not favor the Japanese way of life, even though she opposed the reactionary, Tai Won Kun.

Her dislike was of

the man, not of his ideas which were sympathetic toward China and her civilization.

As a consequence, two opposing parties

were formed; one representing the queen and her relatives who supported conservatism, friendship and protection of China; the other favoring reform, and active collaboration with Japan.

Continuing her new policy of establishing connection

with the outside world, Korea made a treaty with Great Britain through the efforts of an able British statesman who, in 1884, was ambassador to Japan.

This same policy, as brought out in

another section of this paper, led to treaties with other Western Powers*

39 IT.

RENEWAL OF CONVENTION OF CHEMULPO (1885)

By 1884 Korea had established diplomatic relations with many nations of the outside world which produced a de­ cided change of mind in the people and government toward foreigners♦

New treaties were signed, and foreign diplomats

took up residence in Seoul.

A special mission was sent to

Washington headed by Min Yong Ik, a progressive noble of the court.

On his journey he visited Japan and was profoundly

impressed by that country’s progress.

On his return he ex­

pressed the view that Korea’s hope lay in following Japan’s example and was able to convert the King to this point of view.

Everything spelled success for the new government

policy when, once again, Korea became the victim of party strife.

The progressives wished to modernize the country

but were met with strong opposition from the reactionaries. In order to dispose of this opposition from the court, they resorted to murder, a practice of long standing in Korea. The celebration of the opening of the new post office, on the night of December 4, 1884, was chosen for the disturb­ ance and assassinations.

All the foreign diplomats, except

the Japanese attended the affair, which was held in the palace.

Min Yonk Ik, who by this time had returned from the

United States, was there.

A fire started in the palace, Min

Yonk Ik was attacked when he ran out to see what had caused

40 it*

22

During the confusion, the King was advised that his

safety lay in securing the aid of the Japanese*

The Japanese

minister complied by leading his guard of 130 soldiers to the palace.

The soldiers were stationed at all the gates and in

the King's chambers.

The King was, by this action, cut off

from his conservatist ministers.

The reformers compelled

him to sign death warrants for several of his ministers whose offices were then filled with reformist leaders* The conservatists appealed to the commander of the Chinese troops stationed outside the capital to protect the King from the conspirators and the Japanese.

Since this was

the duty for which these troops were there, they proceeded to the palace where they succeeded in driving the Japanese guard away and in killing the reformist leaders who did not eseape to the Japanese legation* 23 triumph only two days*

The reformers had enjoyed their

The question whether the Japanese ambassador was in­ volved in this disorder has never been answered, however, critical investigation leads to the conclusion that he was both a tool and conspirator.

He had not attended the court

celebration; his legation guard was on full parade with arms 22 23

Morse and MacNair, op. cit*, p. 393. Longford, op* cit*. p* 323*

41 and ammunition and ready to march when the messenger arrived. Then, too, the ambassador and

his staff had

been on such close

terms with the reformers that

the party was

called "The

Japanese Party*"

Finally he had made no effort to save the

chief eunuch of the palace from death in his very presence* Since the days of the Hideyoshi invasions, the lower class Koreans had hated the Japanese, and the disorder at the capital only served to fan this hatred. the reform leaders and pillaged their homes.

They sought out 1/hen no more

could be found they turned upon the Japanese homes in like manner.

Finally they attacked the legation, where were hud-

died the Korean and Japanese refugees— altogether three . hundred persons.

This entire

group was foreed to leave and

fight its way to the coast through snow

and

cold.

Withrefer­

ence to this attack Professor Treat states: • . . Although the attack upon the legation was much the same as that which occurred in 1882, there was a profound difference: Chinese troops had taken part in this outrage, and for this offense Japan must deal directly with China*2^ After lengthy negotiations a settlement was reached. A mission was sent to Seoul where, according to Professor Treat, . . . The Koreans, alarmed at the possibility of stern reprisals, quickly met the Japanese terms— an indemnity of 110,000 yen, punishment of the 24

Treat, op. cit.. p. 291*

42

guilty, a mission of apology, and a statement that the Japanese minister was not concerned in the coup d ’etat*25 This mission was sent over the protest of the Chinese Com­ missioner who, as Hishida says, "claimed the right, by virtue of China’s suzerainty, to arbitrate the question" but Hishida adds that "the representatives of Japan insisted that the matter should be settled as between *two sovereign states, without any cooperation of a third power. ”’26

A s a conse­

quence, on January 9g 1865 a convention was concluded by which Japan obtained the same terms granted her in 1882# V*

TREATY OF TIENTSIN (1885)

A Japanese mission, with Count Ito as its head, was sent to China to demand reparation for the part Chinese sol­ diers had played in the attaek on the Japanese legation at Seoul*

Its purpose was to provide, by diplomatic arrange­

ment, against future acts of Chinese aggression in Korea* Even though France offered military cooperation against China, Ito refused this, preferring to settle the dispute without the assistance of an outside power.

An agreement

was signed at Tientsin in April 1885 which outlined the 25

Treat, loc. cit*

26 Hishida, o£. cit.. p. 86.

basis of future Japanese and Chinese relations in regard to Korea.

The Li Hung Chang-Ito Treaty provided that each party

should withdraw their troops from Korea and not send armed forees to the Peninsula in the future without previous no27 tice to the other# Li also gave Ito a note of apology for the Chinese attack on the Japanese in Seoul. Japan succeeded i i in compelling China to recognize her equal rights in Korea. Both countries plotted and counter-plotted in Korea.

China

desired to maintain her suzerainty over Korea and her right to interfere in its affairs.

Japan wanted to establish her­

self there as a predominant power.26 The triumph of the reformers was short lived; the leaders escaped to Japan and their followers were punished# The Queen, at heart, was a conservative; she was a lover of Chinese culture, and surrounded herself with persons holding similar views#

The conservative leaders firmly believed that

Korean security rested on China’s support#

Yuan Shik~kai,

who had been on military duty in Korea since 188G, was ap­ pointed Chinese resident at the capital and for the next nine years was virtually the de facto king of Korea.

He constahtly

worked for reform, but insisted upon Korea’s dependence os 27

Horse and MaoNair, op. cit#. p. 394#

28 Ibid.. p. 396.

44 China.

In spite of the Korean**Japanese understanding of

1883, permitting the construction of a telegraph line from Fusan to Seoul by Japan, Yuan secured a concession to build a telegraph line to Seoul and to control all the services in the peninsula.

Three years later China openly asserted her

claim to suzerainty by trying to prevent the acceptance of a Korean minister to the United States*

S. T. Williams, a

student of the Far Fast, says that when he arrived in Washington and: . . . was about to present his credentials, the Chinese Minister endeavored to prevent such action exoept through the agency of the Chinese Legation. This, of course, the American government would not permit . . on the contention that the Korean minister was the representa­ tive of an independent state. Not content with interfering with the international relations and internal affaifs, Yuan, in 1889, sponsored and supported a Korean decree prohibiting the exportation of beans to Japan.

This decree caused the Japanese traders,

who had made advances to the Korean producers, to lose 1,400,000 yen.

Japan pressed for payment of damages but

because of the objections raised by the Chinese commissioner at Seoul who controlled all customs houses in Korea, this 39

Edward Thomas Williams, China Yesterday and To-day (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1937), p. 405.

45 claim was not settled until 1893* VX#

SINO-JAPANESE WAR

We have seen how Japan and China clashed over Korean affairs since 1876.

The Japanese had insisted on Korean in-

dependenee and administrative reform which alone could have enabled Korea to establish internal order and to live up to treaty obligations. The Sino-Japanese war had for its immediate cause a rebellion which had its roots in the Tong Haks and their ap­ parent desire to avenge the death of Kim Ok Kuin.

He had

been one of the leaders in the conspiracy of 1884 and had escaped to Japan.

He had also been a member of the mission

to Japan in 1882 and while there had created a good impres­ sion upon everyone.

On his return home he joined the pro­

gressive party and became involved in the conspiracy of 1884.

During his stay in Japan, he intrigued to overthrow

the Korean government for which the Japanese were finally compelled to exile him.

After several years he was permitted

to return to Tokyo upon a promise to refrain from plotting, but back in Tokyo he was again involved in plots and intrigue* The Korean government considered him an enemy of Korea and made many attempts on his life, one of which was successful. Of the assassination of this man McCordock says:

46 • . • Kim had resided in Tokyo for ten years but had been lured to Shanghai in 1894 and shot by a partisan of the Korean government. His body was dispatched to Seoul on a Chinese warship, was later quartered and sent to various parts of Korea. The murderer, on the other hand, was shown every courtesy by the Korean government. Japan felt that China had been partly responsible for the murder, and the cul­ prit proudly boasted that he had only executed a commission given him by the Korean king.30 Japan deeply resented this assassination but could do nothing about it, nevertheless, it contributed to the ill feeling be­ tween the three nations. Nothing had been heard of the Tong Haks in Korea since 1866.

Although the principles of Kim ok Kuin and the Tong

Haks were opposed to each other, the latter took this oppor­ tunity to come from hiding.

They instigated a revolt in the

province of Chollo, which spread from east to west with such speed as to alarm and even threaten the government.

The re­

volt was not motivated by disloyalty but was an attempt to remove from the side of the king all foreigners and the Japanese.

The movement was intensely nationalistic and

therefore antiforeign.

The Korean government became alarmed

and appealed to China for help.

The king issued an official

request to Li Hung-chang to send troops.

Li, in complying,

notified Japan of China1s action as the latter was compelled to do in accordance with the treaty of Tientsin. 30

McCordock, op. cit.. p. 87*

Japan, as

47 was her right, sent troops, but by June of 1894 there were over eighteen hundred Japanese troops in Korea, whereas the Chinese only had three thousand.

31

In the notice to Japan, Li had explained that the troops were sent "in order to restore the peace of our trib­ utary state."

To this statement Japan objected by declaring

that she had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of China.

Mr# Komura, Japanese charge at Peking, was instructed

to notify China that: t

The Imperial government had never recognized Korea as a tributary state of China. Japan dispatched troops by virtue of the Chemulpo convention of 1882 and in so doing she has followed the procedure laid down in the treaty of Tientsin. As to the number of troops, the Japanese government is compelled to exer­ cise its own judgment. Although no restriction is placed upon the movement of the Japanese troops in Korea, they will not be sent where their presence is not deemed necessary.32 On June 17 Japan proposed to China that they both join in measures to improve the financial administration, and to establish an independent Korean army.

Professor

Hershey states, in regard to this action, that: Japan, incensed by the murder of her protege, Kim ok Kuin, at Shanghai, was determined to solve the Korea question by the introduction of certain reforms, as well as the suppression of the rebel­ lion. 33 31

Morse and MacNair, op. cit.. p. 397.

32 Hishida, op. cit.. p. 88. 33 Hershey, op. cit.. p. 43#

48 To this proposal China replied that these reforms must be left to Korea herself,

H. B« Morse says that China

"declared that, on the basis of Korea’s dependence on China, the suzerain had not the habit of interfering with the inter­ nal affairs of the vassal; but if Korea were to be considered independent, neither country had the right to interfere."

*ZA

Japan was in no mood to quibble over terms, and as one con­ temporary periodical puts it: Japan took the position that the Korean Government, which was primarily responsible for the turbulence of its subjects, should be compelled to reform itself, and she invited the aid of China in enforcing this advice, China refused to accept her share of the task, • . .35 With her troops near the capital, Japan was determined to act on her own responsibility and advised China to the effect that: , • • The interests propinquity as well and far-reaching to ence the deplorable kingdom.33

of Japan in Korea, arising from as commerce, are too important allow her to view with indiffer­ condition of affairs in that

Before acting on her own initiative Japan demanded that Korea state whether she was an independent state or a tributary of China.

Korea replied that she was independent.

H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1918), p. 22. 35 Greene, pp. cit.. p. 4708. 33 Treat, op, cit. , p. 296,

4:9 Japan then presented a program of reform which included the examination of the Korean financial administration; the selec­ tion of central and local officials; and the establishment of an army necessary for national defense and peace of Korea* These reforms were to be introduced and performed by Japanese officials.37 Aware that such sweeping reforms would mean the end of the conservatives and the pro-Chinese party in Korea* China suggested to Great Britain and Russia that they lend their influence to settle the difficulty.

Li Hung-chang

even asked the United States to join with other powers in requesting Japan to withdraw her troops from Korea, but was informed that the United States government could not go be­ yond the independent tender of good offices.38 The Korean government requested that the Japanese troops be withdrawn, contending that reforms would be diffi­ cult to introduce if they remained.

Japan replied by asking

Korea to dismiss the Chinese troops, and Korea answered that the Chinese troops had come at the request of Korea and would not leave until they were in a similar manner ordered to do so.

Japan did not consider that her troops had not been 37

Robert T. Pollard, "American Relations with Korea 1882-1895," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. XVI, 1932-1933 (Peiping, China: Quarterly Publication of the Chinese Social and Political Science Association, 1932-1933), p. 466* 38

PP» 460-463*

50 invited by Korea.

Li, in sending Chinese troops, had sug­

gested to Japan that she send two gunboats to protect Japanese residents in Korea.

It was apparent that Korea did not intend

to comply with Japan’s wishes.

Accordingly, Japanese troops

attacked the King’s palace at Seoul, seized the royal family, and set up a new government by which, on the following day . . . a decree was issued which abrogated Korea’s treaty with China and intrusted to the Japanese troops the expulsion of the Chinese forces at Asan.39 Li Hung-chang had decided to increase the Chinese forces in Korea, even before Japan secured control of the person of the king.

About July El, and a few days there­

after, eight steamers with eight thousand troops left Tientsin for Korea.

Learning of this Japan sent out three

cruisers and on the twenty-fifth met the two Chinese warships, guarding the troopships, near Asan, and shots were exchanged. On the same day Japanese troops landed in Korea.

On July E9

the Chinese troops were defeated at Asan. The conduct of the war is not important to this study. However, it is necessary to review the reasons for which each belligerent went to war, inasmuch as they are the crystalli­ zation of the rivalry between them.

On July 31, two days

after the battle of Asan, China severed relations with Japan 39

Treat,

0£.

cit.> p. 298.

51 and on August 1 declarations of war were issued by both countries*

Japan based her action on the recognized fact

that Korea was an independent state and that China had at- * tempted to prevent the adoption of the much needed adminis­ trative reforms, and had ignored the treaty of Tientsin. The Japanese declaration asserted, says Treat: Such conduct on a direct injury to empire; but also a tranquility of the

the part of China is not only the rights and interests of this menace to the permanent peace and orient.40

China, in her declaration of war, completely ignored the independence of Korea which she had often recognized by declaring that Korea had been her tributary for over two hundred years.

Chinese troops had been requested, but that

the Japanese had sent theirs without just cause.

Japan, the

declaration added, had tried to force changes upon Korea, and had refused to confer in a friendly spirit. On August 20, 1894, during the war, a treaty of al­ liance was signed by Japan and Korea in order to expel the Chinese and to reaffirm the independence of the country* Korea was not asked to furnish troops but only to give aid in transporting Japanese troops.

By September 15 the Chinese

were driven out of Korea* From the very first the Chinese fared badly; this 40

Ibid.. p. 299*

52 was contrary to the expectations of the world*

The first

naval encounter was disastrous to China; four ships were lost and one was blown up by its crew.

This gave Japan control

of the sea and permitted the landing of troops,

Manchuria

was invaded by one army, while another captured Port Arthur# On the loss of Port Arthur China sent her first peace mis­ sion to Japan* was taken.

During the winter the fortress of Weihaiwei

From this base Japan could press on to Peking

with little opposition.

By April, 1895, China suffered so

many reverses that she sued for and was granted an armistice# After many proposals and counter-proposals a treaty was ne­ gotiated,

but only after Japan gave China four

days in which

to accept

an ultimatum.

on April17,

The treaty was signed

1895. VII*

TREAT? OF SHIMONOSEEI

This treaty ushered in a new era in the Far East. Its main features were: 1. China recognized the independence of Korea. (Japan had done so in 1876.) 2. China ceded to Japan the Liaotung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores. 3. China would pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels within seven years, with interest of five per cent. 4* Four additional treaty ports in China would be opened to Japanese trade and residence. (Which meant that all the treaty powers in China might enjoy them.)

53 5* A new treaty of commerce and navigation would be negotiated, but until that time Japan should enjoy in China the privileges of the most»favored nation.43China, by this treaty, was compelled to recognize the full and complete independence of Korea and thus gave up her old claims of suzerainty and the right to interfere in Korean affairs.

This issue, which had been the cause of friction

for over two decades, was settled.

China had not only re­

fused Japan’s offer to jointly introduce needed reforms in Korea, but also had endeavored to thwart Japan in so doing. Japan was now free to follow her own will and policy in this respect.

As far as territorial acquisition was concerned,

a contemporary writer, D. W. Stevens, observes: . . . The acquisition of territory formed no part of Japan’s original design. It was the result of the fortunes of war and not of deliberate 'in­ itiative. 42 The independence and territorial integrity of Korea had been ignored by both countries and they went to war to determine which of the two should have the right to interpose in Korea.

Japan wished to protect and expand her trade with

Korea without fear of opposition from China.

China, on the

other hand, desired to maintain her suzerainty and her right to supervise the affairs of Korea.

To do this she went so

41 Ibid.. p. 303. 42 D. W. Stevens, "Japan’s Attitude Toward China," Forum, 30:84, October, 1900.

54 far as to ignore her treaty agreements which Japan insisted be strictly observed*

There is no doubt but what K o r e a was

a pawn between the two stronger powers and fell into the hands of the stronger.

CHAPTER IV RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER KOREA (1895-1905) I.

ACTIVITIES OF THE "DREI BUND"

When it became apparent that Japan would insist upon enjoying the fruits of her victory over China and request territories on the mainland, Russia, France, and Germany joined hands in opposing the Japanese demands.

Their action

was not solely of their own initiative, because Li had re­ quested their good offices in having Japan modify her demands Li pointed out that the balance of power in Asia would be destroyed by Japanese ascendancy, and that Russian interests would be menaced in Manchuria and Korea.

Russia instructed

the Russian Finance Minister, Witte, to advise Japan . . . To desist from the occupation of Southern Manchuria because such an occupation would injure our interests and would be a constant menace to the peace of the Far East; in case of Japan’s refusal to follow our advice, to declare to the Japanese Government that we reserve to ourselves freedom of action The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895 and was later to be

formally ratified.

Mr. Williams isof

the opinion that, • • • Before the signature of the treaty, the Chinese negotiator, Li Hung-chang, apparently had received

1 Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Great Powers, p. 97.

56 assurance from Russia that any cession of territory of the mainland would he protested. For her protest she probably had been promised certain compensation by China.2 On April 23 the three powers, as Hershey puts it, . . . joined . . ., in a ’’friendly recommendation” to the Japanese Government, to the effect that the contemplated possession of the Liaotung Peninsula by Japan would not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but also render the inde­ pendence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, ”in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan” they canceled the Japanese Government ”to renounce the definitive possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula.”3 In a series of cabinet meetings Japan concluded that it would be best to comply rather than to risk war but in­ sisted that it would be a ” *concession to the three powers but no concession to China* as the basis of a new negotiation.”4 Japan agreed to relinquish all territorial demands except that of Port Arthur, which she stated she would retain until China had fulfilled all the other treaty obligations.

To

this modification Russia objected contending that Japan’s retention of Port Arthur was dangerous not only to Korea and Manchuria, but also to the Russian border to the North. T. J. Lawrence, writing of Japan’s inability to withstand

^ Edward Thomas Williams, China Yesterday and Today, p. 408. 3 Amos S. Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 7. 4

Hishida, oj>. cit., p. 99.

57 Russia’s demands, notes: Japan was in no position to defy them; and accordingly the Emperor published along with the ratified treaty an Imperial Rescript, in which he ’’yielded to the dictates of magnanimity and ac­ cepted the advice of the three powers." But the pill was none the less bitter because it was swallowed with a smile;5 Another writer in condemning the action of the ndrei bund" says: . . . But before the ratification of the treaty could be exchanged, the inexperienced government of Japan received its formal introduction to Western diplomacy. She found herself confronted by a joint note, in which Russia, Germany, and France united, informing her that the peace of Asia required that there should be no territorial aggression against Chinaj and suggesting in terms not easily misunder­ stood that, aside from the island of Formosa, a cash indemnity from her late enemy was the only fruit of her victory which she would be permitted to retain.6 * Japan, however, in agreeing to renounce the disputed territory, did insist that China ratify the treaty as it stood, and that China later pay an added indemnity for the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula.

China ratified the

treaty and the details of the retrocession were concluded— not so much with China as with the three powers— at Peking in November, 1895. 5

For the retrocession of the Liaotung

T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East,

p. 11. fi

Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver, "Significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," North American Review, 174:597, March, 1902.

58 Peninsula China paid Japan an additional 30,000,000 taels. However, China refused to promise that she would not cede the Peninsula to any other power, when Japan requested that assurance. Professor Treat in dealing with this intervention declares that, It is not yet possible to trace the origin of the three-power intervention. The best available evidence points to Russia, but there are some who held either Prance or Germany responsible. In any ease Russia was concerned with keeping Japan, a growing power, out of Port Arthur, for Manchuria was already considered the next field for Russian penetration.7 If it were not for the fact that England had played an important part in Far Eastern affairs, and continued to do so, especially in that period prior to the Russo-Japanese War, she would not be mentioned in relation to this interven­ tion of the three powers.

Viscount Grey writing of this period

declares that ♦ . • France, Germany, and Russia invited us to join in an intimation to Japan that she would not be al­ lowed to take all the fruits of victory that she claimed* Lord Kimberley refused to join in putting pressure on Japan; the three other Powers acted with­ out us and Japan had to give way to diplomatic force majeure.8 In writing thus he was aware that it had been the policy of 7 Payson J. Treat, The Far East. p. 304. ® Viscount Grey, Twenty-Five Years. 1893-1916 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 22.

59 England to protect herself by friendly buffer states. to 1894 China had served such a function.

Down

China lay next

to Russia1s eastern empire, therefore, as long as China remained friendly and served as an obstacle to the Russian advance, England secured a degree of safety.^ As stated in another part of this paper, Russia, in 1891, had started to build the great Trans-Siberian Hailway having as its eastern terminus the port of Vladivostok. Japan, of course, knew of the strategic value of this port and consequently wanted firmly to establish Korean independ­ ence before the road was completed.

But Russia, as McCordock

points out, realized "that unless Port Arthur remained under Chinese control, Russia’s long cherished dream of acquiring a warm-water port on the Pacific would be unattainable. This intervention had far-reaching effects and, accord­ ing to Professor Hershey, it influenced Japan’s foreign policy.

This writer observes:

If Japan had entertained any delusions regarding the ultimate designs of Russia or the real character of European diplomacy, these illusions now vanished forever, and Japan realized, as she never had before, the necessity of straining ever to increase and strengthen her naval and military arms to the utmost, if she desired to assume a leading role in the affairs

9 Tyler Bennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 52. 10 R. Stanley McCordock, British Ear Eastern Policy. p. 10.

60 of the Orient, or perhaps even to maintain her independence.Il II.

RUSSIA ASCENDANCY AT THE KOREAN COURT (1896)

The Russian Ascendancy at the Korean Court in 1896 had its roots in the administrative reforms which Japan intro­ duced in Korea*

As has been shown Japan claimed that she

fought China chiefly to secure reform of the corrupt admin­ istration of Korea which was not only endangering Korean independence hut also the peace of the last.

Japan did not

wait until the close of the war to begin reforming Korea. Many laws were introduced and a ”council of state” was set up to prepare reform measures.

On New Tear’s Day, 1895, the

King, Yi Hyeung under Japanese pressure, proclaimed the fundamental law of the land.

In brief, this law affirmed

again the independence of Korea; that the ruling power lay in the hands of the King which was to be exercised only with the advice of his ministers and council; that all administra­ tive measures were to be according to law; that the old feudal­ ism and social classes were to be abolished; and finally, that a new educational system was to be introduced.

Since the

£|ueen and her relatives had interfered with the King, and had opposed the reforms, the new constitution provided that she could no longer do so. 11

Hershey, o£. cit., p. 9.

61 To accomplish these reforms Count Inouye was appointed advisor to the Korean Government.

Pak Yong Hyo, a leader of

the reform party, who had fled to Japan after the 1884 dis­ order, was recalled and made minister of the interior.

Even

though many reforms affecting every detail of government were introduced, these were poorly executed.

Inouye made a

mistake in thinking that Koreans were as receptive as the Japanese. Hishida comments on these reforms: It must be frankly admitted that the Japanese advisors, in their reforming zeal, made a gross error in introducing into Korea radically new institutions for which there was no desire and which conflicted with established customs and traditions. . . . Even the Japanese assimilation of modern institutions was the work of several decades.13 Although Count Inouye had warned the Q,ueen not to interfere in the government, she continued to do so after he was recalled to Japan.

As a result of plots and counter­

plots, led by the Q,ueen and her supporters, Pak Yong Kyo had to flee again to Japan.

According to Professor Hershey these

reforms . . • were resisted by the Court party at Seoul, headed by the queen and the Min family to which she belonged. (This faction was doubtless aided by the intrigues of M. Waeber, the Russian repre­ sentative at Seoul). Early in October, 1895, the 12

J. H. Longford, The Story of Korea, p. 553.

15 Hishida, oj>. cit.. p. 103.

62 queen planned a coup d’etat with a view to disband­ ing the soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers, and of replacing the pro-Japanese partisans of reforms in the Korean Cabinet by her friends.14 This plot never came to fruition due to the activities and counter-plots of the Tai Won Kun, who represented, for the time, the reformists who in turn were supported by the Japanese.

Lawrence writes of this episode:

• • • Meanwhile a keen diplomatic conflict was going on between Eussia and Japan at the Court of Seoul, where the former power played the part taken by China in the period before the war of 1894. The weapons employed were intrigue, bribery, and even assassination.15 Count Muira had been sent to replace Count Inouye at Seoul.

His appointment was a bad mistake in that he was in­

capable of managing Korea as Inouye had done.

Although a

good soldier, possessing executive ability, he lacked diplo­ matic finesse, so necessary in Korea at that time.

Early

in October, 1895, he lent his support to a plot planned by the Tai ?/on Kun and the reformists for the removal of the Queen.

The Tai Won Kun, on October 8, headed a crowd of

Koreans and Japanese Soshi.

The Japanese element included

members of the legation staff.

The palace was attacked by the

mob and everyone who opposed them was killed.

W h e n the Queen

was found, she was killed and her body burned.

On this point

Williams says: Hershey, op. cit., p. 43. Hershey*s.) Lawrence, o£. cit. . p. 18.

(Note:

Inserts are

63 The pro-Japanese party took possession of the government, but public opinion demanded an investi­ gation of the crime. The evidence of Muira’s complicity was convincing. He was recalled by his government and brought to trial. The court found that he had taken part in the planning and assassina­ tion but that there was no evidence of his participa­ tion in the murder. As a result of this successful coup d’etat the King was com­ pletely in the hands of the reformers who forced him to sign numerous additional laws. The participation of the Japanese in the plot, and the enactment of the radical reforms provoked opposition to Japan, and led to the active interference of Russia in the affairs of Korea.

Russia rushed to take advantage of the

effects of the plot by suggesting that the Royal family of Korea was insecure.

The conservatives were quick to accept

the support of Russia because of their hatred for Japan. While the royal guard was absent, the conservatists staged a riot at the palace.

The King and his son were persuaded to

flee to the Russian legation for safety where, as Tyler Dennett explains ” . . .

under the tactful and gentle manipulations of

Waeber, the Russian representative, Russian influence immedi­ ately became apparent.”!7

The day before, the Russians had

landed a force of Russian Marines at Chemulpo ostensibly to

16 Williams, ££. cit., p. 407. 17 ^ Dennett, o£. cit., p. 98.

64 guard the legation.

The King reorganized his cabinet along

conservative and pro-Russian lines.

For over a year the

King and his court lived at the Russian legation.

Under

Russian guidance all the reforms and administrative improve­ ments sponsored by the Japanese were abolished.

Says Professor

Treat w . . . Japanese influence had been entirely destroyed. Japanese officers were dismissed from the Korean army and Russians employed."18 Professor Hershey states that: A brief period of Russian ascendancy now followed, during which Japan saw herself deposed from the posi­ tion in Korea to which her victories entitled her, by a nation which appeared to be both an upstart and a usurper on the Sea of Japan.19 While Japan lost much ground, the Russians gained.

During

the Kingfs sojourn at the Russian legation, the Russians gained among other things, large timber concessions on the Yalu River, and a mining concession along the Tumen River.

20

Hishida states that according to the memoirs of Rosen, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, some sort of a protec­ torate had been promised to the Korean King and that the Russians wanted an ice-free port in Far Eastern waters, pre0*1

ferably the port of Masampo at the southern end of Korea. x 18 Treat, op. cit., p. 367. 19 Hershey, op. cit., p. 44. 20 k . Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904), p. 263. 21 Hishida, op. cit., p. 104.

65 These concessions gave the Russians as important a position in Korea as that enjoyed by Japan. III.

YAMAGATO-LOBANOV PROTOCOL (1896)

Japan departed from its adopted historic policy of safeguarding Korea*s independence, to seek Russian cooperation toward the same end, in order to prevent further encroachment by Russian influence.

In May, 1896, the Russian and Japanese

Ministers exchanged memorandums dealing with matters of immediate interest to the two powers.

The first article of

the memorandums provided that M. Waeber was to advise the King to return to his palace, and that M. Komura was to keep the Japanese political bravoes under strict watch.

Article

II recognized the existing cabinet, and that Russian and Japanese Ministers were to give friendly advice to the King. The third and fourth articles dealt with the disposition of the guards of each country in Korea. In July of the same year the occasion of the coronation of the Tzar at St. Petersburg saw the conclusion of still another agreement between Russia and Japan in regard to Korea. The Yamagato-Lobanov Protocol is of great importance, and is therefore included in this thesis.

It provides:

Article I. The Japanese and Russian Governments should, with the object of remedying the financial embarrassments of Korea, counsel the Korean Government to suppress all unnecessary expenses and to establish an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If, as a result of the reforms which should be considered

66 indispensable, it should become necessary to have recourse to foreign debts, the two Governments should, of a common accord, render their support to Korea. Article II. The Japanese and Russian Governments should try to abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and economic situation of that country should permit, the creation and the maintenance of an armed force and of a police organized of native subjects, in proportions sufficient to maintain internal order, without foreign aid. Article III. With a view to facilitating communica­ tions with Korea, the Japanese Government shall con­ tinue to administer the telegraphic lines which are actually in its possession. It is reserved to Russia to establish a telegraphic line from Seoul to her frontier. These various lines should be purchased by the Korean Government, as soon as it finds means to do so. Article IV. In case the principles above expounded require a more precise and more detailed definition, or if in the future other points should arise about which it should be necessary to consult, the Represent­ atives of the two Governments should be instructed to discuss them amicably.^2 In February, 1897, the Korean King returned to his palace, but this did not prevent Russia from exerting her influence at the court.

Professor ffoodhead thus describes

Russian activity: Advisers were sent. Concessions were secured. Intrigue was rife. All to the end that Russian in­ fluence and Russian power might overcome the opposing wave of Japanese influence and Japanese power and reach to the very foot of the p e n i n s u l a . 23 22 Asakawa, op. cit., p. 264. 2^ H. G. W. Woodhead, Occidental Interpretation of the Far Eastern Problem. P« 209.

67 Russia apparently did not intend to abide by the terms of the Protocol; that very month (June, 1896), she decided that the Korean troops should be instructed by Russian officers. In April, 1897, M. Waeber suggested that Korea accept one hundred sixty officers and men, and by September the Korean§ army came under Russian military education and officers. Professor Hershey comments: The Protocol of June, 1896, was no sooner signed than Russia began to violate its terms. In the same month Russia decided to try to gain control of the Korean army by giving it Russian military instruc­ tion and dicipline. This plan was partly carried out in the following year.24 The new Russian Minister, M. Speyer, who had replaced M. Waeber, requested that all disposition of taxes and customs be placed in the hands of M. Kir Alexieff, although Mr. Brown, a British subject, had not completed his term as financial advisor to the King.

In spite of protests by the

British Consul, the change was made, and a Russo-Korean bank was organized to handle all the financial affairs of Korea. But "Mr. Brown," as Professor Hershey notes, "was soon re­ stored to his former office in consequence of a visit to Chemulpo by seven British men-of-war on December E7, The Russian ascendancy was complete.

1 8 9 7 ."2^

The Koreans

accepted the doubtful security that Russia offered in order 24 Hershey, 0£. cit., p. 46. 25 Loc. cit.

68 to get away from the Japanese.

Japan was not sufficiently

powerful to deny the Russians a place in Korean affairs. Therefore, as Asakawa says: . . . Japan now admitted into the peninsular politics on an equal footing with herself a power which.owed its bright success to a mere diplomacy of less than two years standing, • • .26 IV.

LI-WITTE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LI-LOBANOV TREATY To assist China to pay the indemnity exacted as a

result of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, through a French syndicate, advanced 400,000,000 francs at the low interest rate of 4 per cent.

This loan was to be guaranteed by Russia,

and was made on July 6, 1895, shortly after the three-power intervention.27

As a reward for these services, Russia en­

deavored to obtain important concessions in Manchuria.

As

we have seen, the Yamagato-Lobanov convention advanced Russia’s position in Korea somewhat akin to that of Japan.

Russia

next secured a railway concession in Manchuria by the Li-Lobanov secret convention, which gave her the right to construct a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok. The negotiations for this convention were conducted by Witte who conceived the idea of building the trans-Siberian railroad across Chinese territory to Vladivostok. 26

Asakawa,

ojd .

He reminded

cit. , p. 267.

27 Earnest B. Price, The Russ-Japanese Treaties of 19071916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. p. 15.

69 Li Hung-chang of Russia’s many services to China, and of Russia’s desire to maintain Chinese integrity.

If Russia was

to uphold that principle, it could only he accomplished hy joining European Russia with Vladivostok hy rail so that if necessary Russia could lend military assistance*

He went so

far as to say **although during China’s war with Japan, we did dispatch some detachments from Vladivostok, they moved so slowly because of the absence of railroad communication that when they reached Kirin the war v m s over.”28

Li at first

objected but was finally persuaded to agree.

These agreements

were incorporated into the Li-Lobanov Treaty of June 3, 1896. This treaty provided: (1) an alliance to support each other by ”all land and sea forces*1 at their disposal in ,fany aggression directed by Japan against the Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or territory of China or that part of Korea**; (2) all Chinese ports to be open to Russian warships during military operations; (3) China’s consent to the construction of a railway across Manchuria in the direction of Vladivostok by the Russo-Chinese Bank of Russia,29 This treaty was not exposed until 1910 and explained what Asakawa, in 1904, could not know but which he refers to as the **secret agreement” between China and Russia,

There

should now be no doubt why M. Speyer was successful in forcing Korea to accept Russian military instruction and the services of M. Kir Alexieff even against the wishes of the British, 28 Hishida, 29 Loc, cit.

0 £.

cit., p. 108.

70 This treaty may help to explain the Russian ascendancy in Korea; by its nature it was virtually..a military alliance against Japan.

Of the effect of this treaty Lawrence observes:

While at Moscow the aged Viceroy signed a treaty in May, 1896, by which the government of the Czar and that of China agreed jointly to resist any aggression made by Japan on the Asiatic dominions of either power. Russia’s designs on Korea were indicated by the fact that any Japanese attack on that kingdom was to be Resisted by both China and Russia.3* Although the Li-Lovanov Treaty of June 3, 1896 was secret, the contract for the construction of the railroad across Manchuria was not, but it did follow as a result. This railway was under the name of the Chinese Eastern Rail­ way, and was to be constructed by the Russo-Chinese Bank. The construction of a railway was of course natural but the terms of the contract were sufficient to cause deep concern to Japan.

Hishida has briefly summarized the terms of the

contract, (1) the company would have ”the absolute and exclu­ sive right of administration” in the railway zone; (2) no interference would be permitted with regard to the movement of Russian troops and ammunition; (3) all imports and exports by the railway would be admitted at a rate of duty one-third less than those passed at Chinese seaport custom houses.3^

30 31

Lawrence, o£. cit.» p. 106. Hishida, o£. cit.. p. 109.

71 V.

NISHI-ROSEN PROTOCOL (1898)

Because of the overhearing conduct of the new Russian representative, M. Speyer, many Koreans who had leaned toward Russia now formed a Korean Independence League.

It had for

its aim the restoration of the military and financial control to the Koreans.

On March 7, 189832 M. Speyer went so far as

to inquire whether the Korean Government desired the services of the Russian experts.

Fasvolsky writes, that the Korean

Government responded to the effect: . . . that order had been established in the country and that the presence of foreign advisers was no longer necessary. The Russian Government replied to this that it was quite willing to cease all active participation in the affairs of Korea, provided Korea had really established order and was in a posi­ tion to defend her independence. Otherwise Russia would consider it necessary to take measures to insure this. This reply was obviously a mere formal­ ity on the part of the Russian Government, • • .53 As a consequence of this and other incidents, M. Speyer ordered all the military and financial advisors recalled to Russia. Bank.

Before leaving his post he closed the Russo-Korean Asakawa points out that this action was due to

Russia*s increasing activity in China, and the negotiations that were being undertaken to reach an agreement between Japan and Russia in regard to Korea. 32 Asakawa, o£. cit., p. 18. 33 Leo Pasvolsky, Russia in the Ear East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 27.

72 Baron Rosen, Russian Minister to Japan, in 1897, warned his government through Count Muravieff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that a continuance of Russian encroachments in Korea would lead to war with Japan.

He argued against

the Russian War Departments plan for the organization of a Korean army hy Russian officers and strongly suggested that an understanding with China and Japan he reached.

The

Foreign Minister presented Rosen*s arguments to the Emperor, though it meant incurring the displeasure of the latter.34 On the side of Japan there were a few Japanese states­ men who worked for a friendly solution of differences and the establishment of friendly policy toward Korea.

Rosen

writes35 that Baron Motono, Japanese Charge d*Affaires in St. Petersburg, had been instructed by his government to determine under what condition Russia would be willing to come to a friendly understanding.

In this connection Rosen

says: He (Baron Motono) had been unable to elicit from anyone in authority anything but the vaguest assur­ ances of good will, and now, in despair, had come to me as newly appointed minister to Japan, in the hope that I might be able and aid his endeavors to bring about such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 36 Rosen admits that another Japanese statesman, Nishi, Japanese 34 Price, o£. cit.» p. 18. ^

kQQ. cit.

36 Ibid., p. 19.

73 Minister of Foreign Affairs, evinced an earnest desire for a friendly understanding with Russia,

Rosen suggested that

Nishi propose that Russia enter into a reciprocal agreement ,ftto refrain from any interference with each other*s policy; Russia’s in Manchuria and Japan’s in Korea.’”37

■pnis Hishi

did but Rosen upon transmitting the proposal to his govern­ ment received this reply.

”’?friile accepting Japan’s offer

not to interfere with Russia’s policy in Manchuria, [Russia] declined to accept a similar limitation on its own policy in Korea.'"38 These negotiations demonstrate that officially Japan wanted to come to an understanding with Russia but that Russia refused to give any assurances other than vague promises. Nevertheless, due to the swift movement of events, there was concluded on April £5, 1898, the Nishi-Rosen Protocol which was more in Japan’s favor than the agreements of 1896.

This

Protocol recognized the independence of Korea and the special economic interests of Japan in Korea.

The text of the

Protocol follows: Article I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitely recognize the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct interference in the inter­ nal affairs of that country. 37

Price, loc. cit.

38 Loc* cit.

74 Article II. Desirous of removing all possible causes of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should have recourse to the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, with­ out having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject. Article III. In view of the great development of the commercial and industrial enterprises of Japan in Korea, as also of the considerable number of the Japanese subjects residing in that country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.39 There is no doubt but that Russia wanted to placate Japan in some manner, as was certainly necessary, after having occupied the Liaotung Peninsula only two years after Japan had been compelled to retrocede it to China.

Hershey has

said that "Russia found it advisable to try to conciliate Japan."40 The rapid movement of events refers to Russia’s new activities in Manchuria which were of such importance, for the time as to overshadow her interests in Korea.

A discus­

sion of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula will be found in the following section. VI.

RUSSIAN LEASE OF PORT ARTHUR

The lease of Port Arthur by Russia, some authorities have said, was prompted by the German occupation of Kiaochow

39 Asakawa,

0 £.

cit., p. 271.

40 Hershey, o£. cit.. p. 47.

75 Bay.

Just what connection the Russian Lease had with the

German occupation is still difficult to determine.

One

editorial writer, speaking of Germany’s action, states that "It is rather a matter of inference than of historical fact that the occupation of Kiaochow was preceded hy an under­ standing with Russia."4-*- However, it is more than possible that Germany expected some compensation from China for having joined the "drei bund" against Japan in 1895.

It is a known

fact that Germany desired a seaport in the Far East and considered Kiaochow the best one on the Chinese coast. 42

A

favorable opportunity arose late in December, 1897, which gave her, she thought, a right to demand a naval station at Kiaochow and control of the Shantung Peninsula.

On March 6,

1898, a treaty was signed with China, even though China had endeavored in vain to gain British, French, and Russian sup­ port in her rejection of the German demands.

Of Germany’s

action Williams says: . • • Before March, 1898, Germany had decided to demand the leases of the Bay, having in the meantime obtained, as it seems, the consent of Russia, who in the secret treaty of 1896 had been promised a lease of the place. The lease of Kiaochow Bay for 99 years was signed of March 6, 1898, and carried with it the right to build certain railways, to work mines in a specified region, and an option on all public works in the province of Shantung requiring

Editorial Comment, World’s Work, 7:4709, March, 1903-04. 42 Hishida, o£. cit., p. 111.

76 foreign capital or skilled l a b o r .43 Russia took advantage of C-ermany’s action for the purpose of securing an ice-free base for the Russian Navy. Count Muraviev, the new Russian Foreign Minister, insisted that the time was opportune and "proposed to the Tsar to secure a naval base for the Russian Fleet, making use of the ports taken away from Japan in

1 8 9 5 ."44

jn a series of im­

perial conferences, in which the framers of Russian Far Eastern policies were included, it was decided to draft de­ mands providing for the lease of the Kwantung Province for thirty-six years without compensation to China, and the right to construct a branch line from Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Before this conclusion was reached,

however, one Russian minister went so far as to say that a port on the Korean coast would be preferable to that of Port Arthur.45

Baron Korff says that,

. . . In spite of Witte’s protest and the warning of other Russian statesmen, Muraviev and the Court circles pressed the Tsar to adopt this project and carry it through. . . * Count Witte opposed these decisions on the ground that they went contrary to Russia’s declared policy of maintaining 43 Williams, o£. cit., p. 409. 44 Baron S. A. Korff, Russia’s Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19ZZ ) , p. 63.

4:5 Hishida, o£. cit., p. 110.

77 Chinese integrity, which she had so forcibly announced when forcing Japan out of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Nevertheless,

Witte was persuaded to carry out this new policy.

China, of

course, refused to agree to these demands, but the Chinese statesmen, Li Hung-ehang and Chang Inghuan, under the stimulus of a large bribe, succumbed to the w i s h e s of Russia. Of the action of these two men, Miner, writing of the period says: . . . Perhaps the historian will never record whether it was force or gold or hypnotism which transferred this key of North China to the hands of her insidious foe.46 On March 6, 1898, over the objections of English and Japanese diplomats, Russia concluded a convention with China, whereby Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur, Tailienwan and the right to construct the branch line connecting these ports and the Chinese Eastern Railway.

"Thus, this officious

friend of the panic-stricken Chinese court" comments Senator Dolliver in reviewing the Far Eastern events of this time. He continues that Russia • • . by a stroke of the most cheerful diplomacy ever before practiced in this world, ousts the victorious armies of Japan, diverts the terminus of the TransSiberian railroad from Vladivostok to the genial climate of the Corean Bay and literally takes possession of the industrial and commercial possibilities of Northern China.47 L. Miner, "Muscovite Designs on Manchuria," North American Review. 174:316, March, 1902. 47 Dolliver, o£. cit.. p. 598.

78 Maurice Low, in discussing the antecedents of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, declared that Russia occupied Port Arthur "by seizing, under the euphonious name of a lease, the strategic base in Northern China that had been torn from Japan. The occupation of Port Arthur might not have aroused Japan had not Russia filled the place with troops, and closed the harbor to all except her own vessels.

When Russia was

asked by England if she intended to respect China*s sovereign rights and treaty privileges of other powers in the leased territory, she replied that she did not intend to transform such a military port into a commercial port.49

"This act,”

according to an editorial in W o r l d s Work magazine of 1904, "brought home to Japan, in the most forcible way, the essen­ tial incompatibility between her own safety and the continued advance of Russia.”5^ This action of Germany and Russia was quickly followed by the occupation of Kuangchow Wan by France and Wei-hai-Wei by the English.

"Worst of all," says Baron Korff, "For Japan

were the events which followed the loss of Port Arthur, which alone was an insult to her pride" and adds, "Not many months 48 A. Maurice Low, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Forum. 33:201, 1902. 49 Asakawa, 0 £. cit., p . 126. 50 Editorial, World*s Work, 7:4709, March, 1903-04.

79 passed before those very European powers who claimed to stand for the protection of China began themselves to grab her territory.”5^- This view is supported by Viscount Grey when he states that, "The very powers who had upheld against Japan the principle of the integrity of China proceeded to violate it themselves*”

He observed further:

. . • Japan was now thus confronted with the estab­ lishment of three new European bases opposite her own shores, after having been forcibly prevented from taking one herself* The integrity of China was to be a principle sacred against Japan, but not against European powers, who had proclaimed it after Japan’s victory over C h i n a § 2 The lease of Port Arthur by Russia no doubt explains why she was willing to conclude with Japan the Nishi-Rosen convention of April, 1898.

Japan would have been satisfied

with the Russian lease of Port Arthur and the Nishi-Rosen convention had not Russia foi’tified the port and soon after disregarded the convention and interfered in the Korean peninsula in a manner that was not only prejudicial to Korean independence but also to Japanese interest there. VII.

DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY IN KOREA (1898-1902)

By 1899 Russia and Japan had new ministers at Seoul, who tried to gain the ascendancy of his particular country.

51 Korff, o£. oit.. p. 76. 52

Grey, o£. cit*, p. 23.

80 The Japanese Minister, G. Hayashi, tried diplomatic finesse, and the Russian Minister, Paul Pavloff, used outright coer­ cion* The Russians desired a port between Port Arthur and Vladivostok for naval facilities.

When Masampo was opened

for foreign trade, Pavloff and his military aid met Admiral Makaroff there, and surveyed the coast for the best site for a naval station.

He notified the Koreans that the selected

site would be bought by a private steamship company.

On his

return to Masampo he was told that the land had been bought by Japanese subjects, whereupon the Russian demanded that this sale be cancelled and the land resold to the Russian company.

The local authorities refused to cancel the sale.

The new Charge, Stein, informed the Korean Government that his Foreign Minister had instructed him to take such action as to protect Russian interests, if the sale was not cancelled. On. October 4, 1899, he warned that the land would be taken forcibly, if the Korean Government -would not comply.53 sale was not cancelled.

The

Professor Hershey writes of Russian

efforts to secure a seaport on the Korean coast: The first efforts of Russia (1899-1901) were directed toward acquiring certain leases at Masampo on the southern coast of Korea, with a view of trans­ forming this valuable harbor into a base for the use of the Russian navy, but M. Pavloff found himself outwitted and checkmated at every turn by the Japanese,

Asakawa, o£. cit.. pp. 273-278.

81 wlio had managed to secure possession of every val­ uable and important site within the three-mile limit open to foreign purchase. But Russia succeeded in obtaining some leases of little practical value, and secured from the Korean Government a "pledge not to alienate any part of the Kojedo Island, near Masampo," Russia herself agreeing not to seek such alienation on her part.54 In March, 1901, Russia tried to repeat her old methods. Mr. Brown, Director General of Korean customs, was ordered by the Korean Government to surrender his post.

When the

British Consul asked that this order be revoked, another order was issued for delivery of the customs building.

This last

order was revoked through an "earnest representation" made by Mr. Hayashi to the Korean Emperor.

Certain loans were to

have been made by a French Syndicate, which according to Asakawa, were backed by Russian interest. These activities on the part of Russia were contrary to the agreements reached regarding Korea.

Russia appeared,

according to Hershey . . . in most cases to have been the aggressor, repeat­ edly violating the Protocols of 1896 and 1898, while Japan seems to have confined her commercial and indus­ trial interests in the peninsula. Nearly every move made by the bold and enterprising Pavloff was check­ mated or duplicated by the cautious but persistent Hayashi, and on the whole, it may be said that Japan regained and maintained her former commercial and financial ascendancy in Korea.55 54 Hershey, o£. cit.. p. 49. 55

Ibid., p. 48.

82 VIII.

THE BOXER REBELLION AND THE RUSSIAN DEMANDS

A discussion of the Boxer Rebellion would not be included were it not for the fact that it gave Russia an opportunity to amass large bodies of troops in Manchuria. Her reluctance to remove them was one of the more direct reasons for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Hishida says that

the Russian War Minister on receiving notice of the rebel­ lion said that it would give Russia an excuse for seizing Manchuria.56

While negotiations were going on at Peking for

the settlement of the Rebellion, Hit was the Russian policy” says James Dixon as quoted by Dennett, "to act in cooperation with the other powers as little as possible, to oppose a common settlement; and in any case to keep the Russian claims for damages in Manchuria segregated from the claims of the other powers. • • #"57

Directly aimed at Russia, England

concluded with Germany an agreement regarding Chinese affairs. Its real object was to prevent any one power from violating the principle of commercial equality in China or Chinese territorial integrity.

Russia openly accepted this agreement,

but in secret was preparing to make a separate treaty with China.

A warning was issued by all the powers to China not

to enter into a separate treaty with Russia.

Hishida, o]D. cit., p. 129. 57 Dennett, op. cit.» p. 124.

The Chinese were

83 finally forced to divulge a summary of the proposed treaty, which is summarized hy Hishida as follows: . . . By the terms of the convention. (l) Manchuria was to be restored to China, but Russia was to re­ tain a body of troops in Manchuria, in addition to those designed for railway protection, until China should have fulfilled "the last four provisions" of the convention; (2) in case of disturbance, the Russian soldiers were to afford every assistance to China (art. 3); (3) China was to agree not to estab­ lish an army, nor import munitions into Manchuria (art. 4); (4j China was to dismiss those governors and high officials who were antagonistic to friendly relations with Russia; a police force was to be organ­ ized by China, but she was not to employ in it the subjects of any other power (art. 5); (5) nor were the "subjects of any other Power" to be employed "in training Chinese soldiers and sailors in North China" (art. 5); (6) "China’s autonomous rights in the city of Chinchow" were to be abrogated (art. 7); (7) mining and railway concessions or leases of land to other Powers in Manchuria, Mongolia and other domains of H i , Kashgar, Yarkand, except Newchang, were for­ bidden; nor were the Chinese themselves to build rail­ ways without Russian consent (art. 8); (8) Russia was to construct a railway from the Trans-Manchurian line in "the direction of Peking up to the Great Wall."58 The other powers warned China again not to enter into a sep­ arate agreement.

Russia modified the original text and

threatened to break off negotiations if the modified conven­ tion was not signed by March 26, 1901.

Pasvolsky comments

on this attempt by Russia to virtually annex Manchuria: Quite carried away by the success which had at­ tended so far its imperialistic ventures in the Far East, the Russian Imperial Government became more and more ambitious in its Far Eastern policies. There were groups that even urged an annexation of

Hishida, o£. cit., p. 130

84 the whole of Manchuria in lieu of the Boxer indem­ nities, to which Russia was entitled hy the terms of the settlement following the Boxer uprising.59 Japan realized that the Russian aggression in Manchuria threatened the integrity of China and also the independence of Korea and her interests in that country.

In an editorial

comment the Current Literature Magazine of 1904 observed, "The more tightly Russia fastened her grip upon Manchuria, the more settled grew the determination of Japan to preserve Korea from a like fate," and adds that, "She (Russia) no longer takes the trouble to attempt even to conceal the fact that the absorbtion of Manchuria is but a preliminary step to the absorbtion of K o r e a . B e c a u s e of the inability of some of the powers and the policy of others, Japan decided to act alone in preventing Russian aggression in Manchuria. Due to the requests of the Japanese Government, through her Minister, Kato, at St. Petersburg, the Russians finally agreed not to press for signature of the treaty, and temporar­ ily withdrew it.

After the signing of the Boxer Protocol at

Peking on September 7, 1901, Russia again opened negotiations with China regarding the Russian demands, and again the United States, Great Britain, and Japan warned China not to sign.

Russia then set the date for the evacuation of her K Q

Pasvolsky, o£. cit. , p. 30.

60 "Korea, The Bone of Eastern Contention," Current Literature, 36:159-160, May, 1904.

85 troops, for three years hence.

Professor Woodhead states

that Russia By subtle intrigue during the negotiations at Peking, after the Boxer trouble, Russia secured the right to remain in Manchuria nearly two years longer. Before this time expired she presented new demands to China which furnished ample evidence of her in­ tentions to stay until she was put out. IX.

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE (1902)

Russia’s renewed activity in Korea and her aggressive­ ness in Manchuria left two courses open to Japan.

Marquis

Ito, a leading Japanese statesman favored the course of coming to terms with Russia on the basis of not disputing Russian domination of Manchuria.

On the other hand, Viscount

Katsura, the new Premier, took the other course, that of securing an alliance with England.

To him this course was

wisest because even though Russia might recognize Japan’s special interests in Korea, that recognition would be in danger once Russia’s interests were secure in Manchuria. Professor Korff maintains that An understanding with Russia would have been so much more natural, even if it had no moral background of sincerity. Tokyo had learned not to rely too much on morals when dealing with Europe. However, the Russian’s spoiled this chance and the scales began to lean towards E n g l a n d . 6 2

Ifoodhead, o£. cit» » p. 208. 62 Korff, on. cit., p. 80.

86 Marquis Ito was sent to St. Petersburg to sound out the Russian Government regarding a definite understanding concerning Korea, but the conversations held there reached an impasse because the Japanese Government refused to admit that Russia*s interests in Manchuria were equal to Japan*s in Korea.

Baron Hayashi, Minister to England, was instructed

by Japan to begin negotiations leading to a treaty of alliance with England.

The desire for an alliance was mutual, for as

Maurice Low states: Great Britain and Japan were constantly menaced by Russia. The time had come to call a halt, and make it plain to all the world that treaty rights must be respected and that Russia could not play fast and loose in China to the detriment of every other power. Baron Hayashi, as quoted by Hishida, in explaining Japan’s reasons for an alliance, states: • • • the interests of Japan in Manchuria are only indirect; but if Russia should one day occupy a part of Manchuria and extend her influence in those parts, then she would be able to absorb Korea, against which Japan would be obliged to protest. What Japan wants is to prevent Russia from coming into Manchuria, and if to do this she would be involved in war with Russia, she wants to prevent, a third party coming to the help of Russia. As for pur general policy in regard to China, we wish to maintain the principle of the open door and to maintain the territorial integrity of China, as I said at our last conversa­ tion. 64 To this Lord Lansdowne replied:

63 Low, op. cit., p. 205. 64 Hishida,

0 £.

cit.. p. 134.

87 As regards Korea, England has very little interest in that country, but she does not wish to see Korea fall into the hands of Russia. As regards China, our policy is identical with Japan’s, namely, the main­ tenance of territorial integrity and the open door. I believe that in time we might adopt measures for the mutual protection of our interests in Eastern Asia.65 England had accepted Japan as a new power, and the possibility of her becoming a barrier to Russian expansion to the south.

Xn view of their mutual aims in Asia, "Co­

operation with Japan was the obvious method" to prevent fur­ ther Russian expansion, observes Professor Woodhead.66 Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded in 1902.

The

England

recognized Japan’s interests in China, and in a particular degree, in Korea, politically and commercially.

Both were

to remain neutral in case either country went to war in defense of their interests in the Far East, and also to lend their efforts in preventing a third power from joining in hostilities against the warring partner of the alliance. "This assured Japan,” observes Woodhead, "that when she and Russia came to blows, she could count on British support, if any third power entered the fray on Russia’s side.”67 Viscount Grey commenting on the treaty states: It was in the Far East that Russia seemed now to be concentrating. This was a menace more serious to Hishida, loc. cit. 66 Woodhead, o£. cit.. p. 209. 67 Loc. cit.

88 Japan than to us; the recollection of the diplomatic coercion of Japan in 1895 by Russia, Germany, and France, and of British refusal to join in that coercion, made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance an easy, almost an obvious, transaction.68 The editorial comment of the Review of Reviews of 1901 writing of the treaty and its immediate affects reported: The prevailing opinion seems to be that the intention of this treaty is to prevent the conclu­ sion of the agreement between Russia and China regarding the occupation of Manchuria that the Russian ambassador, M. Paul Lessar, has been strenuously urging at P e k i n g . 69 Since Russia had repeatedly agreed to respect Korea’s integrity and Japan’s interests, and as many times disregarded those agreements, and as English interests were also endangered in the Far East, it is obvious why England and Japan felt it necessary to form an alliance.

The United States, reported

the Review of Reviews of 1901, ’’regards Lord Lansdowne’s treaty as guaranteeing the ’open door’ for her trade. X.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The repeated attempts by Russia to interfere in the affairs of Korea and the manner in which these attempts were carried out were the indirect causes of the war.

68 Grey, ^

0 £.

The direct

cit., p. 47.

Editorial. Review of Reviews, 25:278, February,

1901. 70 Xbid. , p. 485.

89 causes lay in her activities, in 1903, along the northern frontier of Korea, and the demands she made on China for the final evacuation of Manchuria.

It became clear to Japan,

and to the rest of the world that Russia intended to obtain one means or another what she desired.

It appeared to

one editorial writer of the period that Russia, of course, does not want to fight with Japan, but Russia intends nevertheless not only to retain and fully annex Manchuria, but also, by a gradual and quiet process of encroachment, to secure Korea also in due time.71 Another editorial commentator said, "Russia moves farther and farther in her Asiatic encroachments, and Japan’s influence in Korea is threatened.”72 On April 8, 1902, Russia concluded an agreement with China in which she promised to evacuate Manchuria in three successive steps of six months each. one, but only partially the second.

She fulfilled the first Instead of evacuating

the treaty port of Newchang, Russia seized the customs and took over the municipal administration, and the forts of the Liao River were occupied a month later.

Then on April 8,

1903, additional demands on China were made.

Russia desired

that China promise not to alienate Manchuria; to employ Russian advisors and experts in the bureaus pertaining to

7^ Editorial, Review of Reviews, 29:4, January, 1904. 72 Editorial, World's Work, 7:4173, March, 1903-1904.

90 mining in North China; and to close all ports in Manchuria except Newchang to all hut Russia.

Had China agreed to

these demands, Manchuria would have been brought under com­ plete Russian control.

Backed by American, British, and

Japanese protests, China refused to comply. The activities of Russia in northern Korea along the Yalu River was an immediate and pressing concern to Japan, in April, 1903.

In evacuating troops from the City of Mukden,

in Manchuria, the Russians concentrated those troops on the northern border of Korea.

At this time Russia decided to

begin operations on the concessions granted to her, when the Korean king was staying at the Russian legation in Seoul in 1896.

Early in May, 1903, Russia sent many persons to

Yong-am-Po on the Korean side of the Yalu River.

According

to Asakawa some of these persons were Russian soldiers dressed in civilian clothes.

These soldiers were increased

from one hundred to two hundred who purchased, through a Korean citizen, houses and land contrary to the wishes of the local authorities.

When the Korean Government requested

the evacuation of the Russians, the Russian Government de­ manded that the Korean Government protect the Russians in Yong-am-Po.

Russia was determined to exploit the concessions

by every possible means, as the construction going on at Port Arthur required vast amounts of timber.

Of the Russian

activity on the Yalu River, Mr. Dennett says that the

91 "Prospects of great Profits was held out, and a select group of grand dukes, court favorites, and even the Tsar himself were led to make heavy investments of capital."73 To this Baron Korff adds: A few unscrupulous adventures, a former officer of the guards, Besobrasoll, and admiral Abaza, and a few less known men had success in persuading the Tsar of the wonderful possibilities of exploiting the natural resources of Korea.74 This undertaking was opposed by Count ¥£itte, Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, and the War Minister Kuropatkin who feared that war would result with Japan as a consequence of the violation of their mutual agreements, but as Dennett comments, Promises meant nothing to Russia even though they sometimes embarrassed Witte and even Lamsdorff. The Tsar had been nurtured in the comfortable belief that he was responsible to none but the Almighty whose viceregent he w a s . *75 The Tsar felt sure of himself and the strength of his army and he firmly believed that an easy victory could be had over the Japanese, if they cared to make an issue of this encroachment.

The Tsar regarded the concession as a personal

affair and would not permit any opposition to it. of the Tsar's attitude, Korff writes that

73 Dennett, o£. cit.» p. 139. Korff, op. cit.» p. 82. 73 Dennett, o£. cit.. p. 131.

Speaking

9E The psychology of the Tsar in this case is explained hy his absolute contempt of Japan, on the one hand, perhaps even with a tinge of vengeance at the back of it, for he was wounded in the head by a Japanese at the time of his visit to the Far East, and on the other hand, by his conviction that he, the Lordfs anointed, could do no wrong (espe-~ cially in dealing with inferiors) The fact that the occupation of Yong-am-Po took place at the same time as the suspension of evacuation from Manchuria, and that the Russian military were active in Korea and in Manchuria produced apprehension in Japan.

Japan felt that

the continued Russian expansion in Korea was contrary to their agreement, and especially, of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April, 1*898.

This present situation added to the others

made it imperative that Japan open direct negotiations with Russia with a view to arriving at a final and definite under­ standing regarding their positions in Korea. Before resorting to direct negotiations, the leading Japanese statesmen held meetings in an endeavor to arrive at a conclusion as to just what the negotiations should include. They felt compelled to negotiate, because as Hishida says: • . . The Russian occupation of Manchuria and her encroachment in Korea had produced a strong war feeling in Japan; even the conservative papers, Fiji and Asahi, were'demanding a decisive settlement of the Manchurian and Korean question.77

Korff, o£. cit., p. 83. 77

Hishida, o£. cit. , p. 141.

93 The cabinet finally decided to recognize railway rights in Manchuria, and for this they expected Russia to recognize Japan’s interests in Korea and to discontinue in­ tervention in that country.

However, it was not until July,

1903, that Russia was notified of Japan’s official desire to enter into negotiations.

Foreign Minister Lamsdorff expressed

the willingness to negotiate.

The aims of each rival have

been nicely put in an unsigned article appearing in the Current Literature Magazine of 1904: ♦ • . T o Russia it is a question of solidifying her Manchurian possessions and of the control of the seas between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. To Japan it is a question of a natural outlet for a dense population, of strengthening her leadership in the higemony of the yellow races and of safe-guarding her national existence; for Russia firmly entrenched in Korea, would not only mean her supreme ascendency in China, but also her domination of the straits of Korea, which would lead to the final subjugation of Japan and end her national life.78 The provisions of the proposed settlement which

Japan sub­

mitted to Russia on August IS, 1903, are summarized by Treat as follows: 1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires and to maintain the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries. S. Reciprocal recognition of Japan’s preponder­ ating interests in Korea and Russia’s special interests in railway interprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be Editorial, Current Literature Magazine, 36:158, 1904.

94 necessary Tor the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement, 3. Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those indus­ trial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not incon­ sistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this Agreement, Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korea Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines. 4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of pro­ tecting, the interests mentioned in Article Z of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international compli­ cations, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished. 5. Recognition on the part of Russia of the ex­ clusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance. 6. This Agreement to supplant all previous ar7q rangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea. To this proposal Russia made her formal reply on October 3, 1903, which took the form of a counter-proposal. Russia was willing to recognize the independence and terri­ torial integrity of Korea and Japan’s preponderant interests therein. 79

Both countries were not to use Korea for strategic

Treat, op. cit., p. 369.

95 purposes and to establish a neutral zone entirely on Korean territory*

But Russia maintained that Manchuria was outside

Japan*s sphere of interest.

No mention was made of China*s

territorial integrity nor of the right of equal economic opportunity of all nations in Manchuria.

Russia did not

wish to bring Manchuria into the negotiations.

Dennett

comments on this last point by saying that "Russia was wholly willing to join in a definition of Japan’s rights in Korea but was equally unwilling to admit that Japan had any rights whatever in Manchuria."

AO

Japan insisted that Russia recognize China’s terri­ torial sovereignty in Manchuria and a pledge not to interfere with Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria.

She also stated

if a neutral zone be established for Korea, that it extend fifty miles on either side of the border.

Russia on November

12, 1903, maintained that Manchuria concerned only Russia and China.

Japan remained firm in her revised demands, but

Russia insisted upon her counter-proposal, and now would only tolerate Japanese advice for reform of Korea’s civic affairs. According to Professor Hershey, Russia felt secure in her position to dictate to Japan.

He writes in this connection:

On August 13, 1903, Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy of the Far East. His policy appears to have been, "on the one hand, to deal with Japan’s overtures lightly and leisurely, but, on the other, to hasten

80 Dennett, o£. cit., p. 142.

96 the establishment and on the Korean time be compelled terras dictated by

of Russian control in Manchuria frontier, so that Japan might in to bow to the situation and accept Russia.

Japan contended that her right to give advice to Korea should not only extend to civic affairs, but should also include military assistance.

She proposed that neither country

should undertake any military work on the Korean coast that might endanger the free navigation of the Straits of Korea. Russia again modified her proposals by recognizing treaty rights in Manchuria on the condition that a neutral zone be established in Korea and that Japan was not to use Korean territory for strategic purposes.

Russia continued to refuse

to guarantee the territorial integrity of China and insisted that Manchuria lay outside of Japan’s sphere of interest. To this amended proposal Foreign Minister Komura presented the last Japanese-amended proposal.

Again Japan

wanted Russia to recognize China’s territorial integrity of Manchuria.

Japan was willing to grant that Manchuria lay

outside of her sphere of interest.

However, Japan proposed

to eliminate the clauses concerning the neutral zone and the use of Korean territory for strategic purposes.

Russia was

asked to recognize Korea as beyond her sphere of interest. During the month of January, 1904, according to Hishida, Q "I

Hershey, o£. cit., p. 56.

97 Russian troops were massing along the Yalu River on the Korean frontier, and the formidable Black Sea squadron of Admiral Wirenius was proceeding to the Par East, On February 1, the Japanese commercial agent at Vladivostok was formally notified that the port might be put in a state of siege and was re­ quested to prepare for the withdrawal of Japanese residents, Japan, interpreting these actions to mean that the Russian Government did not expect an amicable settlement but intended to dictate its own terms by force if necessary, came to the con­ clusion that further delay would be dangerous to her interests.82 As a consequence, on February 5, 1904, Japan ended the negotiations by addressing a note to the Russian Government to the effect that the discussions were futile and that she now reserved the right to take such steps as would protect her interests and established rights.

On February 8, Admiral

Togo’s fleet attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

Thus

war was started as a result of their inability to understand each other’s position and interest. The outcome of the war is a matter of history and is found recorded in every history book dealing with the Far East.

Suffice to say that it ended as a victory for Japan

in that she secured most of the demands for which she went to war.

The Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the war recog­

nized her political, military and economic interest in Korea. She gained the lease of Port Arthur and the Russian railway south of Changchun.

The southern half of the island of

Sakhalin and certain fishing rights were granted to her. 82 Hishida,

0£.

cit. , p. 148.

As

98 to Manchuria both nations agreed to evacuate that territory, and Russia declared that she possessed no territorial ad­ vantages or exclusive concessions there that were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty or with the "open door" policy.

They

both agreed hot to obstruct any measures which China might take for developing the commerce and industry of Manchuria. Russia and Japan were to exploit their railways in Manchuria for commercial purposes and not for strategic ends. -The Russo-Japanese War ended the commercial and dip­ lomatic rivalry in Korea, which had existed since 1884 and especially since 1895.

The Manchurian question, as far as

both countries were concerned, had been solved to their apparent satisfaction.

But of Russia, Professor Woodhead

observes: . . . Russia’s dream of a great Asiatic empire had faded into a more distant future. The Liaotung peninsula, now known as South Manchuria, with the railroad south of Changchun, was gone; Japan had the same rights in northern Manchuria as Russia, the Russian influence in Korea was forever broken; ... 83 As far as Korea was concerned, she was completely dis­ regarded and treated as a pawn in the quest for empire by both Japan and Russia.

Japan desired to maintain and protect

her growing interests in Korea and wanted Russia to recognize her interests there as paramount.

At the same time Japan was

willing to recognize and not interfere with Russian treaty 93 Woodhead, o£. cit., p. 209.

99 rights in Korea,

The Review of Reviews in 1905 observed;

¥/ith better diplomacy and statesmanship, Russia could easily have avoided the war, won and proffered friendship and alliance of Japan, and still retained all of her prestige in the Far East, supported by her navy and by her great stronghold at Port Arthur. But she trifled with her promises in the matter of evacuating Manchuria and opening it to commerce, and she showed reckless folly in her encroachments upon Korea.84 Professor Hershey thus comments on the Russian attitude: The aggressive and exclusive policy of Russia in Manchuria— dangerous as this policy was to the interests of Japan and other Powers in China— might perhaps have been tolerated by Japan had it not been similar encroachments in Korea, long since regarded by the Japanese as within the sphere of their special or predominant interests. The penin­ sula of Korea, although goegraphically and histori­ cally connected with the Manchurian Hinterland, faces Japan, as a Japanese statesman has graphically said, "like an arrow with the point aimed at her heart."88 In this chapter we have seen how Japan was deprived of the fruits of victory of the Sino-Japanese War by the efforts of Russia, when the latter prevented Japan from re­ taining the Liaotung Peninsula; how Russia, three years later acquired that territory for herself.

Japan would have been

satisfied with this action had not Russia fortified the port and manned it with numerous troops.

In order to arrive at

an understanding in regard to their mutual interests in Manchuria and in Korea, Japan sponsored the Nishi-Rosen con­ vention of 1898.

It was evident from subsequent Russian

84 Editorial, Review of Reviews, 32:388, February, 1905. 88 Hershey, o£. cit., p. 36.

100 activities in these countries that she had no intention of abiding by the provisions of the convention.

The Russian

demands upon China following the Boxer Rebellion convinced Japan of Russia’s aggressive designs in Manchuria and Korea* Finally the Russian fortification of the northern frontier of Korea and her activities in the Yalu River timber conces­ sions was sufficient proof to Japan that she intended to go on at all costs with her program of expansion in northern Asia.

These activities of Russia had cost her the distrust

of many of the great powers, including Great Britain and the United States. The self-determination of small countries was a prin­ ciple which did not have as much force in 1905 as it does today and consequently Korea was the victim of large-power ambitions.

Whether or not Japan had as much right in Korea

as Russia or China is beyond the point.

The fact was that

Korea was a sovereign independent state and should have been allowed to determine her own destiny.

Nevertheless, from an

historical standpoint, Japan had taken the view ever since the Meiji era (1868) that no strong power other than herself should control Korea.

Russia had tried by every means to

establish herself in Korea where she had neither great economic nor political necessity. ensued which resulted in war.

A conflict of policies

From a review of the historical

Asiatic expansion policies of Russia, it becomes apparent

101 that if Bussia had been victorious she would have controlled Korea, as did Japan*

To Japan this would have meant a

forceful abandonment of her interests in Korea and would have placed Russia in a position to dominate the Nipponese Empire.

CHAPTER V PROTECTORATE I.

JAPANESE-KOREAN PROTOCOLS OE FEBRUARY AND APRIL 1904 Although, the protectorate over Korea was not estab­

lished until November, 1905, the steps taken to accomplish this end began immediately after the start of the RussoJapanese V/ar in 1904, and should be briefly surveyed.

On

February 24, 1904, a protocol was signed between the two countries which established a modified protectorate of Japan in Korea.^

By the articles of the Protocol Japan vowed to

guarantee the "independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire."^

The Protocol also provided for the security

of the imperial house, and gave to Japan the right to use Korea as a basis for military operations.

In agreeing to

this, Korea made herself liable to seizure in case her new ally lost the war.

In case Korea was endangered by a third

power or by internal disturbances, Japan was to have the right to take necessary steps as circumstances required. Dennett,

commenting on Japan’s interests in Korea says,

H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern Inter­ national Relations, pp. 522-523. 2 Henry Chung, Korean Treaties, p. 231.

103 "A disorderly government in Korea would always expose trade and friendly relations to disturbance, while a hostile power in possession of this strategic area would be a menace . . .«3 Concerning this protocol Lawrence says: There is an air of unreality about all the asser­ tions with regard to the integrity and independence of Korea. For ten years Russia and Japan have been rivals for influence over that country. Korea, too weak and too corrupt to protect herself, has been swayed alter­ nately by one and the other of the neighbouring Empires. She cannot stand alone. The real question is, which shall prop her up, and prop her up in its own interest rather than in hers. Japan controlled her in the war with China. Japan controls her now, and by the recent treaty of February 27 has assumed what amounts to a protectorate over her.9* This protocol was followed by the agreement of April 22, 1904, between Japan and Korea, whereby it was agreed that Korea should engage a Japanese financial advisor, "and all matters concerning finance shall be dealt with after his council has been taken."5

This action was taken after it was

disclosed that the finances were in a corrupt state.

As an

illustration of the way in w h i c h money was spent Edwin Maxey points to the "#1,000,000 appropriated for the funeral expenses of the Crown Princess and #27,7&1 for all public schools

^ Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 97. ^ T. J. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 22. 5

' Chung, oj>. oit*, p. 214*

104 outside the capital.”** The Korean Government also was to engage a foreigner who was to supervise foreign relations, f,and all important matters concerning foreign relations shall 7 he dealt with after his council has been taken.” The last article, according to Henry Chung, provided that: The Korean Government shall previously consult the Japanese Government in concluding treaties and conventions with foreign powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as the grant of concessions to or contracts with for­ eigners.8 II.

ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1905

Before the final step, which was to make Korea a pro­ tectorate was taken and, before the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, Japan negotiated the second Anglo-Japane3e Alliance. It was of vital importance to Korea because it excluded any reference to her territorial integrity and independence. This was significant because Japan evidently wanted to con­ tinue the process of establishing a protectorate over Korea without infringing on the treaty obligations with England. The new alliance recognized the paramount political, military, and economic interests of Japan in Korea and the right of fi

Edwin Maxey, ”Korea, an Example of National Suicide,” Forum. 39:282, October, 1907. 7

Chung,

0 £.

8 Loc. cit.

cit., p. 215.

Japan to take such measures therein as necessary for the guidance, control and protection of Korea.

These measures

were not to interfere with the "open door” policy.

Lord

Landsdowne, as quoted by Asakawa, said in regard to differ­ ences in the two treaties: . . . The treaty at this point differs conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident Korea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire, and to its inability to stand alone, must g fall under the control and tutelage of Japan. . . . Since the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, also omitted reference to the integrity of Korea, it became evident that Japan wished to consummate the process of estab­ lishing a protectorate over Korea. III.

THE- JAPANESE-KOREAN PROTOCOL OF 1905

Before discussing the final step in setting up the protectorate, it is necessary to note that during the Portsmouth negotiations William H. Taft, United States Secretary of War, visited Japan.

The conversations he held

with Prime Minister Katsura were reduced to a memorandum in which it was stated that Japan would not harbor any aggres­ sive designs on the Philippines, and that the President-*-0 would concur in Taft’s view on Japanese control of Korean 9 K. Asakawa, "Korea and Manchuria under the New Treaty, Atlantic Monthly, 96:706, November, 1905. 10 Morse and MacNair, o£. cit., p. 525.

106 foreign affairs.^

This may explain, as we shall see, why

the United States held the official view they did when the protectorate was set up. With an assurance from the United States, Great Britain and Russia, that they would not object to a protectorate over Korea,

12

Japan sent a note to the Korean Emperor.

The note

informed Korea that Japan intended to establish a protectorate over this country.

The Emperor saw what would happen to his

people and his country and determined to do all he could to prevent Japan from carrying out her purpose.

He appealed to

the United States for assistance, basing his request on the Treaty of 1882 between the two countries.

Japan got word of

this note, and Marquis Ito was immediately sent to Korea with instructions to compel the Emperor to agree to Japanese suzerainty.

He tried by numerous conferences to get the

Emperor to accept the Japanese proposal, but the latter stood firm on the Treaty of 1904 by which Japan had guaranteed Korean independence. Up to this time Japan had followed a more or less legal course in her dealings with Korea, but with the refusal of the Emperor to accept a protectorate, an openly coercive and illegal method was adopted.

^

The Japanese realized that the

Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Great Powers, p. 171.

12 Ibid., pp. 525-5E6.

107 Korean note would soon reach Washington. necessary.

Q,uick action was

Marquis Ito called a meeting of the Korean

cabinet to demand acceptance of a treaty placing Korea under Japan.

Carlton Waldo Kendall describes this effort of the

Marquis: Ito— "the Bismarck of Japan”— packed the streets of Seoul with Japanese soldiers, surrounded the Palace with a cordon of troops and forced the dis­ traught Emperor and his Ministers, literally at the point of the bayonet, to sign the infamous Treaty of Seoul* But despite all this coercion, the Treaty was signed by neither the Emperor’s Prime Minister nor his Minister for Foreign Affairs. And the Treaty was vitiated by the non-affixion of the great seal of the State Council and of that of the Foreign Office. Even under force, the great seal was not produced; and like a gesture of despair, the seal of the Foreign Office was flung into a lotus pond just as the Ministers were being driven into the Council Chamber by armed Japanese.13 In this manner Japan negotiated the treaty with Korea. Before the Emperor’s message reached the United States, Japan announced "that Korea had voluntarily become a pro­ tectorate of the Japanese Government and that all future dip­ lomatic business would be conducted through the Japanese Embassy.”!4

On November 2S, 1905, the Japanese Government

sent a note to the Korean Emperor giving the following reasons for the establishment of a complete protectorate:

13

Carlton Waldo Kendall, The Truth about Korea (San Francisco: Korean National Association, 1919), p. 76. 14

Ibid., p. 13.

The relations of propinquity have made it neces­ sary for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience * of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures of guidance alone.15 Dennett, writing of President Roosevelt’s attitude in regard to Korea, states that "in any event it appears to have been evident to the President that Korea, long a derelict state, a menace to navigation, must now be towed into port and secured.”

And he adds, "To Japanese ascendancy in the

peninsula the American Government had no objections.

Japanese

control was to be preferred to Korean mis-government, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy,”16

"President Roosevelt,

says Dennett, "reached an early conclusion with reference to Korea and then gave the subject little further thought."!7 The United States soon issued orders to close the American legation at Seoul.

This action was followed by Great Britain,

France, Germany, China, and Belgium. The Treaty of Seoul surrendered to Japan control of Korea’s foreign relations and provided that Japanese diplo­ matic and consular officers should have charge of Korean subjects and interests abroad, and that Japan would be ^

Chung, o£. cit*, p. 222.

16 Dennett, o£. cit., p. 97. 17 i£id*» P* 110*

109 responsible for the execution of any Korean engagement between Korea and any other power.

Japan declared that she would

respect all existing treaties so that commercial and indus­ trial interest of those powers would not be prejudiced.

The

agreement called for the appointment of a Japanese Resident General at the court of the Korean Emperor, who was to supervise all matters relating to diplomatic affairs, and to advise the Emperor on general administration.18 In conforming to this last provision, Marquis Ito, President of the Privy Council, was chosen as the first Japanese Resident-General in Korea.

Of him McKenzie has

said: . . . There could have been no better choice, and no choice more pleasing to the Korean people. He was regarded by the responsible men of the nation with a friendliness such as few other Japanese inspired. He was a man greater than his policies. Everyone who came in contact with him felt that, whatever the nature of the measures he was driven to adopt in the supposed interests of his Emperor, he yet sincerely meant well by the Korean people.1* The Resident-General became dictator of Korea, although certain branches of local affairs were conducted through native officials.

He was energetic in the building of new

roads and railways; however, they were for military purposes

1R

^

Morse and MacNair, ojd. cit. , pp. 523-524. F. A. McKenzie, Korea1s Fight for Freedom, p. 104.

110 rather than for commerce or industry.

The local police were

disbanded and their place taken by Japanese gendarmerie, but they in turn were soon returned to Japan and replaced by civilian constables.

This new arrangement proved more sat­

isfactory because the gendarmerie had earned a bad reputation in the country districts.

Then, too, Ito put a closer con­

trol on Japanese immigrants and sent the more undesirable ones home to J a p a n . A l t h o u g h Marquis Ito was personally liked by many, it was in the Japanization of Korea where he met a growing opposition which resulted in a more intense hatred for the Japanese.

He issued ordinances affecting the

everyday life of the people; the clothes they should wear, and the manner of hairdress was dictated.

Missionaries

traveling in Korea were mistreated and insulted. IV.

THE ABDICATION OF THE EMPEROR

The Emperor and the Court Party, from the first, pre­ sented the strongest opposition to the Japanese.

Patriotism

and selfish interests combined to intensify the resistance of its members.

The Emperor led the opposition, although in

many respects he wavered in his leadership of the discontented elements.

There was one point, however, on which he was

steadfast, he would not consent to the treaty of November of

Morse and MacNair, o£. cit., p. 527.

Ill 1905.

In an endeavor to force him to accept the Japanese

occupation of Korea, Marquis Ito made him a virtual prisoner. The idea was to prevent Koreans of doubtful loyalty to Japan from reaching the Emperor, and to surround him with enthu­ siastic advocates of Japan in the hope that in this way he might be coerced or influenced into submission.

The Emperor

did not weaken in his determination not to accept the treaty. The Emperor took every opportunity to send messages abroad protesting against the treaty.

Even as a prisoner,

he managed to contact his friends, but almost everything he did was known to the Japanese.

In 1907, the Emperor saw an

opportunity to strike a blow for freedom through the Hague Conference.^

It was his thought that if he could convince

the powers that he had never consented to the treaty, they would bring pressure to bear upon Japan and cause her to relax her control of Korea.

Yfith great secrecy three high

ranking Koreans were dispatched to the Hague.

When they

reached the Hague, they were refused a hearing and the pp Conference would have nothing to say to them. The Outlook Magazine commented on the attitude of the United States re­ garding this incident: . . . It was made clear that our government had al­ ready looked into the question of the duties of the

21 Ibid., pp. 527-528. 22 Ibid., p. 528.

112 United States toward Korea under the treaty of 1882, and that it found no warrant for taking any active proceedings in the way of interference between the Korean people and their r u l e r s . This too was the attitude of other members of the Hague Conference. This act of the Emperor gave Marquis Ito the excuse he had been looking for.

The cabinet was reformed, and the

new members were not only nominated by the Emperor, but also by the Resident-General.

The Emperor was deprived of admin­

istrative and executive power.

The new cabinet officers

were the tools of the Japanese and as such would act as dic­ tated by Marquis Ito.

The formation of a new cabinet was

necessary because the Japanese, legally, could not demand the abdication of the Emperor.

The cabinet held a meeting at

the Residency-General to decide their policy of punishment for the Emperor; they did what they were told.

The Emperor

was asked to abdicate to save the country from being absorbed by Japan.

When he refused to comply with their wishes, their

insistence grew.

Since no word of assurance or help came to

him from abroad, he realized the danger he was in and was forced to comply.

He abdicated and named as temporary Emperor,

his son, the Crown Prince. The young Emperor was weak in intellect and could be no more than a tool in the hands of his pro-Japanese advisors.

23 Editorial comment, Outlook, 86:755, July, 1907.

113 However, his father intended to assist him and rule through him.

On July 24, 1907,24r the Japanese, says McKenzie "had

prepared a new treaty, providing still more strictly for the absolute control of everything in the country by Japan."25* After the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese could have abided by their treaty promises to England and Russia and to the Korean Government to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Korea.

Instead Japan followed a scheme,

already prepared, which included the establishment of a protectorate and a complete subjugation of Korea.

There is

no doubt that Japan could have maintained her interests in Korea and at the same time been of considerable help and assistance in securing for that country a stable and respected government.

What Japan could have done is only speculative,

whereas what she did is a matter of historical fact.

24 Chung, pp. cit.» pp. 223-224. 25 McKenzie, op. cit., p. 124.

CHAPTER VI ANNEXATION OF KOREA For two years an attempt was made by Japan to secure administrative reforms under the protectorate.

During Ito*s

term as Resident-General much was accomplished, but his powers were negative rather than positive.

He could give

advice and veto undesirable legislation but he could not carry out his reform measures in the face of strong opposi­ tion.

McKenzie says of his task:

He had an exceedingly difficult task. He had to tear up an ancient administration by the roots, and substitute a new. This could not fail to be a pain­ ful process. He had the best and the worst instincts of a nation aroused against him, the patriotism and loyalty of the Korean people, and also their obstinacy and apathy. He was hampered by the poor quality of the minor officials who had to carry out his orders and still more by the character of the settlers from his own land. The necessities of Japanese Imperial policy compelled the infliction of much injustice on the Korean people.1 Ito had the interests of Korea at heart, and realized that the ill-treatment of her people injured Japan more than it did them.

Eis subordinates did not always agree with him,

and a large majority of the Japanese immigrants look upon the Korean as a barbarian and upon themselves as of a chosen race, with the right to exploit their inferiors.

The type

of immigrant that went to Korea is described by Arthur J • Brown,

^ F. A. McKenzie, Korea* s Fight for Freedom, p. 171.

115 who states: The camp followers and civilian immigrants who soon poured in were not the best type of Japanese. Americans know the breed— the lawless characters in the frontier mining camps of a generation ago, who did their ruthless pleasure in Alaska, and became the carpet-baggers in the Southern States after the Civil War. . . .2 Although Ito was himself as lenient with the Koreans as he could be, the laws which he instituted met with bitter resentment and resulted in sullen opposition, unrest, in­ trigues, and violence. I.

THE ASSASSINATIONS OF MR. STEVENS AND PRINCE ITO By this time the indignation of Koreans living abroad

was raised to a white heat.

When Durham W. Stevens, formerly

a Japanese-sponsored advisor to the Korean Court, arrived in San Francisco in March, 1908, he was assassinated by a group of Koreans. A-fter endeavoring for several years to establish a workable basis for the protectorate, Prince Ito— now he had been made a Prince— came to the conclusion that complete control of the Korean administration could alone guarantee progress of the Japanese policies. posed annexation for over two years.

He had consistently op­ In the spring of 1909

Ito went to Tokyo and expressed the desire to retire from his

2 Arthur J. Brown, Japan in the World Today (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1928) , p. 148.

116 post*

Prince Katsura, Japanese Minister, held a meeting at

which was discussed the annexation of Korea* raised no objections.

Prince Ito

On July 6 he formally resigned and on

that same day the annexation decision was approved by the Emperor of Japan.

The decision was kept a secret, and

Viscount Sone, successor to Prince Ito, was to put it into effect, when a proper opportunity presented itself. On a journey to Manchuria, in October, 1909, Prince Ito was assassinated by a Korean.

McKenzie says that "a

deadly blow was struck at the Korean cause by the men who thus sought to serve her/1 and, he added, "The murder of Prince Ito was a cruel blow for Korea."4 II.

ANNEXATION OF KOREA

The opportunity above referred to had presented itself. Viscount Terauchi, Minister of War, was appointed as ResidentGeneral to take the place of Viscount Sone— who had resigned because of ill health— to carry out the annexation program of the Japanese Government.

Viscount Terauchi was leader

of the military party in Korea, and was an avowed exponent of the policy of annexation, believing in one thing: and the glory of Japan.

Japan

He regarded the Koreans as a people

3 Seiji Hishida, Japan Among the Great Powers, p. 175. 4 McKenzie, o£. cit. , pp. 175-174.

117 to be eliminated.

McKenzie says of him, "Where Ito had been

soft, he would be hard as chilled steel." Before Viscount Terauchi left for Seoul preparations were made to reorganize the Korean administration under the direct control of a Japanese Governor-General, and to deal with the Korean royal house and the people under a basic lav/.

The first step was to transfer the Korean police

administration to the Japanese authorities in order to main­ tain order, when the annexation would be announced.

The size

of the police force was increased to thirteen hundred by an order issued by the Japanese garrison under Lieutenant General Akashi.

These preparations being made, Viscount Terauchi

arrived in Seoul on July 23.

Of his arrival and subsequent

actions McKenzie writes: Viscount Terauchi settled in the capital, and it was as though a chill had passed over the city. He said little in public. Callers, high and low, found him stern and distant. "He has other things to think of than pleasant words," awed Secretaries repeated. Things suddenly began to happen. Four Japanese papers were suspended in a night. An item in their columns was objectionable. Let others be very care­ ful. The police system was reversed. The gendarmerie were to be brought back again in full force. Every day brought its tale of arrests. Fifteen students were arrested this morning; the old Korean President of the Railway Board had been hurried to prison; the office of a paper in Pyeng-yang had been raided. It was as though the new Governor-General had deliber­ ately set himself to spread a feeling of terror.$

5 Ibid., p. 174. 6 Ibid., p. 176.

118 The Koreans guessed what was in the air. nev/s came out.

Then the

The decree announcing the annexation acknowl­

edged the failure of the Japanese administration.

The open­

ing paragraph as quoted by McKenzie announced: ~ Notwithstanding the earnest and laborious work of reforms in the administration of Korea in which the Governments of Japan and Korea have been engaged for more than four years since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1905, the existing system of government of that country has not proved entirely equal to the work of preserving public order and tranquility, and in addition a spirit of suspicion and misgiving per­ vades the whole peninsula. In order to maintain peace and prosperity and the welfare of the Koreans and at the same time to ensure the safety and repose of foreign residents, it has been made abundantly clear that fundamental changes in the actual regime of government are actually essential.7 The annexation was put in the form of a treaty between the Emperors of Japan and Korea.

Henry Chung records it as

follows: THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION, SIGNED AUGUST 29TH, 1910, BETWEEN RESIDENT -GENERAL VISCOUNT TERAUCHI AND MR. YI WAN YONG, MINISTER PRESIDENT OF STATE OF KOREA ARTICLE I. The Emperor of Korea to make complete and permanent cession to the Emperor of Japan all rights of sover­ eignty over the whole of Korea. ARTICLE II. The Emperor of Japan to accept the above-mentioned cession, and to consent to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. ARTICLE III. The Emperor of Japan to accord to the Emperor of

7 Ibid., pp. 178-179

119 Korea, ex-Emperor and Crown Prince of Korea and their Consorts such titles, dignities and honours as are appropriate to their respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants to be made for the maintenance of such titles, dignities and honours. ARTICLE IV. The relatives of the Emperor of Korea also to receive due dignities, titles, honours and solatia. ARTICLE V. The Emperor of Japan to confer peerages and monetary grants upon Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving such special recognition. ARTICLE VI. In consequence of the aforesaid Annexation, the Government of Japan will assume the entire govern­ ment and administration of Chosen and undertake to afford full protection for the life and property of Koreans obeying the laws in force, and to promote the welfare of all such. ARTICLE VII. The Government of Japan, so far as circumstances permit, will employ in the public service of Japan Koreans who accept the new regime loyallyand in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service.® By this treaty Korea had ceased to exist as an inde­ pendent, or separate country.

Japan had finally absorbed her,

and the Emperor of Korea was to step from his throne.

After

four thousand years the throne of Korea was to be abolished. The Resident-General was to become Governor-General. the name of the country was to be wiped out. was to be Chosen, a province of Japan.

Even

Its new name

"Thus the curtain,"

® Henry Chung, -Korean Treaties, pp. 225-226.

120 says Brown, "fell on the scene of the passing of old Korea" and he then quotes Lord Curzon’s reflections on Korea: • • ."this shuttlecock among the nations," as Lord Curzon characterized her, "who treated her from entirely different and wholly irreconcilable stand­ points according to their own interest or prejudices, and at whose hands she was alternately--nay even simultaneously— -patronized, cajoled, bullied and caressed." . . .9 From what transpired during the protectorate and the manner in which it was established, it becomes very clear that Japan wanted Korea.

"The only justification" for Japan’s

seizure according to McKenzie was: The good old rule— the simple plan, That he shall take who has the power, That he shall keep, who c a n . 10 "From the Korean point of view the step was a pathetic step" says Professor Treat, "especially when we remember that the abdicated Emperor had come to the throne before the Meiji Emperor of Japan, and in the lifetime of these two monarchs Korea had fallen into the abyss of political annihi­ lation while Japan had risen to become a great Power. III.

AFTER ANNEXATION

The material progress of Korea after annexation was Q

Brown, ojd. cit. , p. 147. McKenzie, o£. cit. , p. 181. Payson J. Treat, The Far East, pp. 391-392.

121 considerable.

The foreign trade increased with leaps and

bounds, increasing from 58,698,599 yen in 1910 to 450,658,807 yen in 1 9 2 1 . No region in the Far East showed such mate­ rial progress.

In other respects Japan did not consider

certain vital interests of the Koreans.

Among the Japanese

residents were many of an unruly type who took advantage of the helplessness of the Koreans.

Professor Treat states

that, "It was also true that the Japanese, with their long years of isolation were peculiarly unprepared to deal with other people," and adds "Many of the Japanese reforms, while desirable in themselves, were unpopular with the Koreans, who did not understand or appreciate their wisdom.

After

the annexation these measures could be forced through with little consideration for Korean dissatisfaction."-^ It is not the purpose of this study to discuss the results of annexation; however, the above was included to indicate that in some respects the annexation proved bene­ ficial, while in others, injurious to the pride and spirit of the Koreans.

Ibid., p. 392. 13 Ibid.. pp. 392-393.

CHAPTER T O SUMMARY AM) CONCLUSIONS I.

SUMMARY

A brief summary is necessary in order to obtain a clear understanding of the events which occurred in Korea from 1868 to 1910, and which led to her final subjugation by Japan.

These events, as we have seen, were caused by

foreign powers whose expanding trade and empire involved the territory of Korea# Russia, by conquest and annexation and treaties with China, had expanded her empire until it touched the shores f

of the Pacific Ocean and pressed upon the borders of Korea# Once at the Pacific, she struggled to attain her age-old quest for a warm-water port for her navy.

With the objective

within grasp, she did not intend to permit any country to stand in her way*

By 1876 Russia had become a threat to

China and Korea, and the year 1895 saw Russia in conflict with Japan. Korea was a vassal state of China since the fourteenth century, and whenever her territory was in danger, she ap­ pealed to her suzerain.

This vassalage was openly admitted

by Korea up to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895#

However,

Japan also claimed to be Korea's suzerain, basing her claim

123 on the fact that Korea had repeatedly sent missions of re* spect to Japan, which Japan maintained were tribute-bearing missions*

In order to determine the exact status of Korea,

the Chinese declared in the Sino**Japanese treaty of 1873 that, although Korea was a vassal state of China, Korea still possessed the right to make war and peace*

This was

what the Japanese desired and mow they coaid deal with Korea independently of China*

The Japanese-Korean treaty of 1876

recognized Korea as an independent nation and with this treaty ended China’s claim of being the suzerain of Korea* China had advised Korea to accept the provisions of the treaty. The disturbance at the Korean capital in 1882 re­ sulted in the convention of Chemulpo whereby Japan was given the right to station guards at her legation* had appealed to China for help*

Korea

China ignored the provi­

sions of the Japanese-Korean treaty of 1876 by sending troops into Korea, thereby asserting her suzerainty*

The

conspiracy of 1885 was more complicated because the Chinese troops stationed at Seoul since 1882 were involved.

These

troops assisted the Koreans to drive the Japanese from the city*

Some blame ean surely be placed on the Japanese for

the part they played in the conspiracy*

After lengthy

negotiations another convention was signed between Japan

124 and Korea.

The Koreans, over Chinese protests, sent a mis­

sion of apology to Japan# Since the Chinese troops had fired on the Japanese, it was necessary that an understanding be reached with China regarding Korea.

As a consequence the Treaty of Tientsin

was signed in 1885 which provided that each country was not to send troops into Korea without first giving notice to the other.

The treaty also stated that Japan possessed rights

in Korea equal to those of China.

Although both countries

possessed equal rights in Korea, China appointed a Resident at Seoul, and for the next nine years he was virtually the de facto King of Korea. China did not abide by the Treaty of Tientsin, but continued to assert her suzerainty over Korea.

She tried to

prevent the sending of a Korean ambassador to the United States, however, the latter received him as a representa­ tive of an independent state# During the Tong Hak rebellion, Korea appealed to China for help in quelling the rebellion.

Li Hung-ehang, the

Chinese viceroy, complied with the request, and notified Japan of the action.

However, he said in the notice that

the troops were sent to restore peace in China’s tributary state.

Japan objected to this reason, stating that she did

not consider Korea a tributary state of China.

Japan

125 proposed that both countries join in establishing certain administrative reforms in Korea*

China replied that any

reform must be instituted by Korea herself, and that Japan having recognized Korea's independence could not introduce the reforms.

Japan did not quibble over terms and proposed

to the Koreans certain reforms.

China requested the United

States, Great Britain, and Russia to lend their support by asking that Japan withdraw her troops, but was informed that they would not interfere*

Japan insisted that Korea

adopt the reforms and China decided to increase the number of Chinese troops.

On July 25, 1894, shots were exchanged

and the Sino**Japanese War began.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki

ended the war and the Japanese emerged victorious.

By this

treaty China was compelled to recognize the independence of Korea*

Japan was now free to follow her own will and policy

in Korea* Japan had wished to protect and expand her trade with Korea without fear of opposition from China.

China had de­

sired to maintain her suzerainty and her right to supervise the affairs of Korea.

To accomplish this China went so far

as to ignore her treaty agreements which Japan insisted that China strictly observe* After the Sino**Japanese War, Japan was not permitted to enjoy the fruits of her victory.

Russia, France, and

126 Germany stepped in to prevent her from acquiring the Liao­ tung Peninsula, on the ground that the territorial integrity of China was not to be violated.

Contrary to this principle,

Russia, a mere two years later, secured possession of the Liaotung Peninsula for herself. A s soon as the Chinese influence had been removed from Korea, Russia took her place.

Following the Sino-Japanese War

Russia gained the ascendency over the Japanese at the court in Seoul.

However, this was due to the manner in which Japan

forced her reforms on the Koreans.

Japan did not consider

that these reforms were not wanted by the Korean people. Russia took advantage of the condition of the country and suggested that the King reside at the Russian legation, where he remained for over a year.

While at the legation,

the King granted the Russians many lumber and mining conces­ sions.

By the Yamagato-Lobanov Protocol of 1896 Japan and

Russia arrived at an understanding regarding Korea.

By this

agreement Japan admitted Russia as an equal into the affairs of Korea.

However, Russian activities increased in the penin­

sula to the extent that Russian officers were furnished to Korea to act as military instructors. Russia and China, in 1896, entered into a secret mili­ tary alliance that was aimed at Japan.

A s a result of this

agreement, the Li-Witte Treaty, Russia secured from China

127 the right to construct a railway across Chinese territory to Vladivostok and the right to station troops in the railway zone. To arrive at a more definite understanding regarding Korean affairs, Russia and Japan, in 1898, negotiated the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, whereby Russia recognized the inde­ pendence of Korea and the special economic interests of Japan there.

This agreement was an attempt on the part of

Russia to placate Japan, for the Russian acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula. The efforts of Russia, in 1899, to acquire a port on the coast of Korea between Vladivostok and Port Arthur aroused the suspicions of Japan, but she was able to forestall the attempt.

Then in 1901, Russia again, as she had done before,

sought to interfere in the affairs of Korea by insisting that the Director-General of Korean customs be removed.

These

activities were in violation of the Nishi-Rosen agreement. The manner in which Russia desired China to settle the Boxer Rebellion indemnities to her, aroused not only Japan, but also the Western Powers.

Her refusal to evacuate

her troops from Manchuria in accordance with her promises alarmed Japan, and threatened the territorial integrity of China, and endangered Korea.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

was a direct result of the activities of Russia in the Far

128 East.

This alliance gave Japan the confidence and courage

to come to grips with Russia# The repeated attempts of Russia to interfere in the affairs in Korea were the indirect causes of the RussoJapanese War#

The direct causes lay in the maimer in which

Russia occupied the Yolu River concession and her refusal to come to a conclusive agreement with Japan regarding Korea and Manchuria.

The Russo-Japanese War ended the commercial

and diplomatic rivalry in Korea and the Manchurian question was settled. From a review of the Asiatic expansion of Russia# it is apparent that if Russia had been victorious she would have controlled, as did Japan, the country of Korea, and possibly Japan itself. During the Russo-Japanese War, Japan established a modified protectorate over Korea.

This was accomplished

by the protocol of February 1904, which provided that Japan would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

This protocol was followed

by an agreement dated April 22, 1904, which'sbt*forth

,/ .

that Japan would appoint a financial advisor to the Korean government#

The agreement further provided that Korea

should consult with Japan before entering into treaties with other countries#

129 In 1905 Japan renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which excluded any reference to the territorial integrity of Korea*

This was significant because Japan evidently

wanted to continue the process of establishing a protecto­ rate over Korea*

However, the alliance did recognize Japan's

paramount political, military, and economic interests in that country# The protectorate was fully established in November 1905*

The Japanese had received assurances from the United

States, Great Britain, and Russia that they would not object to a Japanese protectorate.

However, the Emperor appealed

to the United States, basing his appeal on the treaty of 1882 between the two countries.

When the Japanese discovered

what the Emperor had done, the protectorate was proclaimed. The Japanese could not compel the Emperor to affix the seal of state to the treaty setting up the protectorate.

It was

when the Emperor appealed to The Hague, that the anger of the Japanese compelled him to abdicate in favor of his son. For two years Japan tried to secure administrative reforms under the protectorate.

When Count Ito, the

President-General, became convinced of the failure of the protectorate, the Japanese took steps to annex Korea.

Japan

waited for a suitable excuse to announce the end of protec­ torate and the annexation of Korea.

It came when Count Ito

130 was assassinated by a Korean.

On August 29, 1910, the

Emperors of Japan and Korea signed a treaty of annexation. II.

CONCLUSIONS

As stated many times in this thesis, Korea was a pawn in the game of world politics that was played in the Far East.

Her territorial integrity and independence were guar­

anteed by many treaties and agreements and as many times ig­ nored.

The principles of international justice

were not as

powerful forty years ago as they are today and Korea, as a consequence, fell a victim to economic expansion and quest for empire.

It was the intention, in this paper, to examine the

history of the period in order to determine why China, Russia, and Japan desired to control Korea, and why Japan felt that the control of Korea was necessary to her security. China failed to live up to her treaty agreements in regard to Korea, which were forced upon her by Japan.

Japan1s

growing commercial interests and financial investments were based on the responsibility of the Korean Government to maintain order and good government.

Had China tried to

promote and sponsor a good government in Korea, which, as Koreafs suzerain, she could have done, there might not have developed the conflicts which arose over the instability of the Korean Government.

Peace might have been maintained in

131 Korea had China and Japan joined in efforts to introduce administrative reforms.

Due to China’s unwillingness to

cooperate, a costly war ensued and Japan forced the reform measures, upon Korea as a result. Russia, when her expanding empire brought her to the shores of the Pacific, realized that, water seaport was within her grasp. conflict with China and Japan.

.at last, a warm-

Her expansion came into

The control of Manchuria, the

hinterland of Korea, by Russia became a menace to Japan’s interests in Korea.

The fortification of Port Arthur and

occupation of the Yalu River was a direct threat to Japan and the security of Korea.

The rise of Japan to a position

of importance in the East did not impress Russia which did not question her own ability to subdue the little oriental nation if need be.

Had Japan not won the Russo-Japanese

War, the chances were that Korea would have fallen to Russia, and the interest of Japan in Korea would have been lost to the latter.

Even Japan’s national existence might have

been endangered* The methods adopted by Japan in Korea, of course, are subject to severe censure.

Then, too, the Japanese who

went to Korea to settle were of a class not likely to induce love or even respect.

Had Japan selected and controlled her

nationals in Korea, the same smoldering dislike which the

Koreans had for the Japanese might not have hurst into intense hatred#

The Koreans would have been unworthy of any sympathy

if they had not resented the Japanese and hoped for a restor­ ation of their national independence.

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