The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: Its History, Its Relation to British Colonial and Foreign Policy and to the Development of Canadian Fiscal Autonomy 9780773595002

Table of contents :
Cover
The Carleton Library
Title
Copyright
Contents
PREFACE TO THE CARLETON LIBRARY EDITION
PREFACE TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION
Introduction: The Point of View
Part I: Reciprocity in the Ascendant (1846-1857)
Chapter 1: Origin of the Movement for Reciprocity
I. Early Movement (1846-1851)
II. Changed Attitude of the Colonies (1852-1854)
Chapter 2: British Policy and the Treaty (1846-1854)
I. Gladstone to the Rescue
II. Grey Continues the Pressure
III. The Derby Administration and a Change of Tactics (February-November, 1852)
IV. Shrewdness of Lord Clarendon
Chapter 3: Negotiations at Washington (1846-1854)
I. The First Stage (1846-May, 1852)
II. The Fishery Controversy (May, 1852-February, 1853)
III. In the Doldrums Again (February, 1853-February, 1854)
IV. The Final Stage (February-August, 1854)
V. Analysis of the Treaty
Chapter 4: Zenith of the Reciprocity Movement
I. Treaty Passes in the Colonies and Great Britain
II. Magnanimity at Washington
III. The British Government Looks Back
IV. Popularity of the Treaty
Part II: Reciprocity in Decline (1857-1866)
Chapter 5: The Turning Point
I. The Fiscal Changes of 1858 and 1859
II. Movement against the Treaty in the United States
Chapter 6: Last Stage of the Movement against the Treaty
I. Influence of the International Situation upon American Opinion
II. Attitude of the American Executive
III. Congress and the Reciprocity Treaty
Chapter 7: British and Colonial Policies and the Abrogation of the Treaty
I. British and Colonial Policy (1863-March, 1865)
II. British and Colonial Policy (March, 1865-March, 1866)
III. Estimate of British and Colonial Policies in Relation to the Treaty (1864-1866)
Chapter 8: The Operation of the Treaty
I. Nature of the Trade Developed under the Treaty
II. The Trade in Duty-Paying Goods
III. Effect of the Treaty on the American Fishing Industry
IV. Influence of the Treaty on the Trade of the St. Lawrence
V. Immediate Effects of Abrogation and Permanent Results of the Treaty
Epilogue : Out of the Ruins: The Development of a Canadian Commercial Policy
I. Reciprocity and Confederation
II. Emergence of a Canadian Commercial Policy
Appendix A. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854
Appendix B. Statistical Tables
Notes
Index

Citation preview

DONALD C. MASTERS

e Re c i pr o c i t y Tr e a t y o f 1 8 5 4

D O N A L D C. M A S T E R S Donald C. Masters was born at Shelburne, Ontario, in 1908 and educated at Ridley College, St Catharines. He graduated from the University of Toronto in 1930 and obtained the degree of m . a . at Toronto in 1931 and of Doctor of Philosophy at Oxford in 1935. He has lectured in History at Queen’s University, Kingston; United College, Win­ nipeg; and Bishop’s University, Lennoxville, Quebec, where he has been Professor of History since 1944. Professor Masters has served on the Council of the Canadian Historical Association, and in 1953 was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is the author of several books including The Rise of Toronto, 1850-1890 (1947), The Winnipeg General Strike (1950), Canada in World Affairs, 1953-1955, vol. viii of the series sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1959), and A Short History o f Canada (1958). He has also contributed articles and reviews, chiefly on Canadian history, to the Canadian Historical Review, Queen’s Quarterly, American Historical Review, Interna­ tional Journal, and the Canadian Banker.

THE CARLETON

LIBRARY

A series o f C anadian reprints and new collections o f source m aterial relating to C anada, issued un d er the editorial supervision o f the Institute o f C anadian Studies o f C arleton U niversity, O ttawa.

DIRECTOR OF T H E INSTITUTE

P a u lin e Je w e tt

GENERAL EDITOR

R o b e rt L . M cD o u g a ll

EDITORIAL BOARD

D av id M . L . F a r r ( H is to r y ) K h ay y a m Z. P a ltie l ( P olitical S c ie n c e ) H . E d w a rd E ng lish ( E c o n o m ic s ) B ru ce A . M c F a rla n e ( S o c io lo g y) G o rd o n C . M e rrill ( G e o g ra p h y) W ilfrid E g g lesto n (J o u rn a lism ) R o b in S. H a rris ( E d u c a tio n )

DONALD

C. M A STERS

The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 I TS HI STORY, I TS R E L AT I ON T O BRI TI SH COLONI AL AND F O R E I G N POLI CY AND T O T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F CANADI AN FI SCAL AUTONOMY

T he C arleton Library N o. 9

M cClelland and S tew art Lim ited T o ro n to / M ontreal

The following dedication appeared in the original edition: T O M Y F A T H E R AND M O T H E R

© McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963 By permission of Longman’s, Green and Company, London

Reprinted 1969

D. C. Masters, The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, was originally published by Longman’s, Green and Company, London, in 1937

T h e C anadian P ublishers McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 16

Design: Frank Newfeld P R I N T E D AND BO U N D I N CANADA BY T. H . B E S T P R I N T I N G C O M P A N Y L I M I T E D

C o n te n ts

P R E F A C E T O T H E CA RL E T ON LI BRARY EDI TI ON,

vii

P R E F A C E T O T H E ORI GI NAL EDI TI ON, X introductio n

p a rt

:

T h e Point o f View, x i

i: Reciprocity in the Ascendant (1846-1857)

Chapter 1: Origin o f the Movement for Reciprocity, 2 I. E arly M ovem ent (1846-1851), 3 II. C hanged A ttitude o f the Colonies (1 852-1854), 10 Chapter 2: British Policy and the Treaty (1846-1854), 15 I. G ladstone to the Rescue, 15 II. G rey C ontinues the Pressure, 17 III. T h e D erby A dm inistration and a C hange o f T actics (February-N ovem ber, 1852), 20 IV. Shrewdness of L ord C larendon, 25 C hapter 3: Negotiations at Washington (1846-1854), 29 I. T h e F irst Stage (1846-M ay, 1852), 32 II. T h e Fishery C ontroversy (M ay, 1852-February, 1853), 34 III. In the D oldrum s A gain (F eb ru ary, 1853-February, 1854), 36 IV . T h e F inal Stage (February-A ugust, 1854), 39 V. Analysis of the T reaty, 48 C hapter 4: Zenith o f the Reciprocity M ovement, 51 I. II. III. IV.

T reaty Passes in the Colonies and G re at B ritain, 51 M agnanim ity a t W ashington, 55 T h e British G overnm ent Looks Back, 56 P opularity o f the Treaty, 59

part

i i : Reciprocity iii Decline (1857-1866)

Chapter 5: The Turning Point, 64 I. T h e Fiscal Changes of 1858 and 1859, 64 II. M ovem ent against the T reaty in the U nited States, 69 C hapter 6: Last Stage o f the Movement against the Treaty, 75 I. Influence o f the International Situation upon A m erican O pinion, 77 II. A ttitude o f the A m erican Executive, 78 III. Congress and the Reciprocity T reaty, 82 C hapter 7: British and Colonial Policies and the Abrogation o f the Treaty, 88 I. British and Colonial Policy (1863-M arch, 1865), 88 II. British and Colonial Policy (M arch, 1865-M arch, 1866), 92 III. Estim ate o f British and Colonial Policies in R elation to the T reaty (1 864-1866), 98 Chapter 8: The Operation of the Treaty, 103 I. II. III. IV.

N atu re of the T rade D eveloped under the T reaty, 109 T h e T rad e in D uty-Paying G oods, 116 Effect o f the T reaty on the A m erican Fishing Industry, 118 Influence o f the T reaty on the T rad e o f the St. Law rence, 120 V. Im m ediate Effects o f A brogation and P erm anent Results o f the T reaty, 126

Epilogue : Out o f the Ruins: The Development o f a Canadian Commercial Policy, 130 I. Reciprocity and C onfederation, 131 II. E m ergence o f a C anadian C om m ercial Policy, 133 appendix a

.

appendix b.

,

152

index,

184

notes

T he Reciprocity T reaty of 1854, 140 Statistical Tables, 145

P R E F A C E TO T H E C A R L E T O N L IB R A R Y E D IT IO N

T h e original edition o f this book was published in 1937. Owing to the destruction of the premises o f L ongm an’s, G reen and Co. in L ondon in an air attack in 1940 m ost o f the rem ain­ ing copies of the book w ere destroyed and it becam e a very lim ited edition. I am , therefore, very pleased th at a new edition is being published. I have taken advantage of this opportunity to m ake a few m inor changes in the text. M y judgem ents on th e Reciprocity T reaty of 1854 have not changed very m uch since 1937. H ow ever, after living through an additional twenty-five years o f C anadian-A m erican relations an d after twenty-five years o f university teaching, I can now see the treaty in better perspective, than I could in 1937. T h e negotiation o f the treaty appears as the end o f one swing in a pendulum -like m otion by w hich C anada has alternately draw n closer to G reat B ritain o r to the U nited States. A t times C anada concentrated her attention on relations w ith G reat B ritain as, fo r exam ple, before 1846, w hen C anadian m erchants enjoyed preferences on their grain and w heat in the British m arket. A t o th er times, w hen disagreem ents w ith G re at Britain occurred, C anada devoted m ore energy to the cultivation o f the A m erican m arket, as in the 1846-1854 period, following the repeal o f the C orn Laws. T h e Reciprocity T reaty of 1854, a high point in CanadianA m erican relations, perm itted the Canadians and the other British N o rth A m erican colonists to retain a m ercantilist point o f view but to m ake the U nited States instead of G re at Britain the area in w hich it was to be applied. T he negotiation o f the Reciprocity T reaty was followed by twelve years o f close econom ic relations between the British N o rth A m erican colonies and the U nited States. In the years im m ediately preceding C onfederation the British N o rth A m erican colonies, particularly C anada, displayed an increased self-reliance w hich m ade them less pro n e to seek econom ic salvation everyw here but a t hom e. I have described this change o f heart in the Epilogue to this volume. C onfedera­

viii - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y

tion itself provided a partial answ er to the problem s posed by th e abrogation of the Reciprocity T reaty in 1865-1866. In spite o f this increased self-reliance the D om inion of C anada continued to press fo r a resum ption o f reciprocity. Between 1867 and 1896 th ere w ere a num ber of C anadian pilgrim ages to W ashington in the attem pt to secure another reciprocity agreem ent. O ne reason fo r these pilgrim ages was the continued failure o f C anada to secure a preferred position in th e British m arket during the long period o f British free trade. A t tim es o f supposed self-sufficiency, C anada was not very eager in cultivating special concessions from G re at B ritain or the U nited States. T his was the case in 1898-99 w hen the Join t H igh Com m ission, se tu p to consider “all controversies” between C anada and the U nited States, failed to agree on a m easure of reciprocity partly because the fo u r C anadian delegates (Sir W ilfrid L aurier, Sir R ichard C artw right, Jo h n C harlton, and Sir Louis D avies) w ere distinctly cautious in advocating reci­ procity. In 1911 the C anadian people displayed an attitude of independence tow ard the U nited States in rejecting the FieldingT a ft Reciprocity agreem ent. N orm ally C anada has been anxious to secure o r m aintain tariff preferences from G reat Britain o r th e U nited States. U sually a rebuff by one o f those two countries strengthened C an ad a’s relations w ith the other. T he enactm ent o f the SmootH aw ley tariff o f 1930 by w hich th e U nited States raised the duties on m any im ports from C anada was followed by C anadian participation in the O ttaw a trad e agreem ents o f 1932. These w ere, in effect, an attem pt to increase the export o f prim ary products from the D om inions to G re at Britain, and o f m anu ­ factured goods to the D om inions. T he O ttaw a agreem ents represented the high point o f co-operation betw een G reat Britain and the D om inions w ithin the Com m onw ealth and the low po in t o f C anadian-A m erican trad e relations. T h e return o f good relations w ith th e U nited States in 1932-1935 was not the result o f a deterioration of C anada’s position vis-a-vis G re at Britain. G ood relations cam e because the D em ocratic P arty, w hich was returned to pow er in 1932-33, reversed the trend in th e U nited States tow ard high protection. U nder the sponsorship of C ordell H ull, the Secretary o f State, the U nited States governm ent inaugurated a policy o f tariff

P R E F A C E - ix

reductions. H ull’s great m easure, the T ra d e A greem ents A ct of 1934, gave the U nited States executive the right to negotiate reciprocity treaties w ith other countries. O ne result w as the C anadian-A m erican Reciprocity T reaty o f 1935, w hich was renewed in 1938. In the early 1960’s, w hen G re a t B ritain began to contem plate the abandonm ent o f C om m onw ealth preferences and a move tow ard closer econom ic relations w ith E uropean countries, the fam iliar pendulum -like p attern again em erged. O bstacles to the flow o f trade w ith one of h er m ajor p artners tended to direct C anada into closer com m ercial relations w ith the other. (I have developed this them e a t greater length in a paper entitled “H istoric and C ontem porary P atterns in C anadian T rad e R elations,” delivered a t th e F ourth Sem inar on CanadianA m erican R elations, A ssum ption U niversity of W indsor, 1962.) I wish to express my gratitude to P rofessor D avid F a rr, the subject editor in H istory o f th e C arleton L ibrary series of C anadian reprints, to the Institute of C anadian Studies of C arleton U niversity and to M cClelland and Stew art Lim ited, fo r assistance in the publication o f this new edition o f The R eciprocity Treaty o f 1854. D. C. MAS T E RS

B ishop’s University June, 1963

P R E F A C E TO T H E O R IG IN A L E D IT IO N

It has been said th at C anadian history is largely a footnote to the histories o f G reat Britain and of the U nited States. T his is well illustrated by the Reciprocity T reaty since it brings the historian in contact w ith three fields o f investigation: with the course of British C olonial policy during the laissez-faire period; with the history o f the U nited States before and during the Civil W ar; and w ith the developm ent of the British N orth A m erican Colonies in the period im m ediately preceding their C onfedera­ tion. In this volum e I have described the early m ovem ent in the Colonies fo r reciprocity, the policy o f the British G overnm ent in relation to this issue and the negotiations at W ashington before the signing of the treaty. In the latter part, I have discussed the political and econom ic results of the treaty, the m ovem ent in the U nited States leading to its abrogation, the efforts of the British and C olonial G overnm ents to secure renewal, and the com m ercial policy adopted by the C anadian G overnm ent during the period o f C onfederation. M y m ost sincere thanks are due to the m any friends who have assisted in the production o f this work, either by advice or by aid in securing access to m aterial. I owe especially abundant thanks to P rofessor C hester M artin, for m uch invaluable guid­ ance during the early preparation o f my w ork and to P rofessor Reginald C oupland, fo r continuous help and encouragem ent in the later stages o f its production. I am grateful for m uch excellent criticism to Professor H . A. Innis, to D r. V. T . H arlow , to M r. R. G. Riddell, and to D r. S. A . Saunders. F o r permission to use quotations I wish also to thank M rs. J. Castell H opkins, M r. H . P ark er Willis, and the U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press. Finally, I owe a great debt o f g ratitude to the Im perial O rder of the D aughters of the E m pire, w hose generosity m ade possible m y research in E ngland, and to the M anagers o f the Beit Fund and the Rhodes T rustees who have assisted in the expenses of publication. d .c . m

.

Septem ber, 1936

IN T R O D U C T IO N

The Point of View

A lthough chiefly considered in Britain as a purely domestic m easure the repeal of the C orn Laws in 1846 involved farreaching consequences in the British-A m erican Colonies. They had been nurtured under the benevolent influence of a m ercan­ tilism which restricted their com m erce but supplied a protected m arket for their raw m aterial, even after the m ost griping of the restrictions had been rem oved. N ow , alm ost a t a blow, the protective system was doom ed and the colonies were faced with the prospect o f open com petition in the British m arket. I t was a situation which appeared to involve the necessity of independent action, and th e British-A m erican Colonies, partic­ ularly Canada and N ew B runsw ick, canvassed the possibility of devising a substitute for the system of intra-im perial preferences. T hey were confronted with a chaos o f suggested panaceas which included protection, free trade and annexation to the U nited States. It was as a solution to this problem that the colonists began the agitation for reciprocity w ith the U nited States. O ther pow erful forces were largely responsible for the signing o f the Reciprocity T reaty in 1854; but the m ovem ent tow ard that object undoubtedly had its inception in the colonies. T h e trium ph of free trade in G re at Britain not only gave rise to the agitation for reciprocity, but it also im parted great im petus to the m ovem ent tow ard colonial fiscal1* autonom y. P artly was this so because C anada, and to a lesser extent the other colonies, would no longer regard British fiscal policy as capable of universal adoption throughout the Em pire. In addi­ tion the strength o f English laissez-faire opinion, w hich had secured.free trade, favoured a policy of releasing the colonies. T his m ade it m uch less difficult fo r the Colonial Office to concede a w ide m easure o f self-governm ent to the colonies. In the state of English opinion, a stubborn attem pt to resist colonial

xii - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y

dem ands for autonom y would not have been assured o f adequate sup p o rt a t home. T hro u g h o u t the period betw een 1846 and 1866 colonial politicians adhered in general to th e principle th a t all com m er­ cial dealings with o th er nations should be conducted on a purely reciprocal basis. In Canada, m oreover, the fiscal policy o f the G overnm ent was, as early as 1857, influenced by the dem ands o f the rising protectionist party. B oth these aspects o f the policy of the colonial governm ents w ere in direct contravention to the system of unilateral free trade w hich rem ained the dom inant feature of British fiscal policy for eighty years. F req u en t disputes between the British and Colonial G overn­ m ents were therefore inevitable, and a t tim es gave rise to considerable heat on both sides. Y et the colonies, led by Canada, m oved steadily along the p ath to com m ercial autonom y. It was a continuous progress tow ard a system w hich should include the imposition of protective and differential duties, and the British G overnm ent, infused w ith the gospel o f universal free trade, resisted w ith energy a m ovem ent which it regarded as re tro ­ grade. Y et each struggle over the vexed issue w as term inated sooner o r later in the trium ph o f th e colonists. Fiscal autonom y was, o f course, merely one phase o f the progress o f the colonies tow ard general self-governm ent. M r. P o rritt has rightly pointed out th a t fiscal autonom y m ust inevitably have followed the concession o f responsible govern­ m ent.2 T h e Colonial Office could not g rant self-governm ent and yet reserve perm anently for its own control the powers which Lord D urham had enum erated.3 F urtherm ore, the British Pos­ sessions A ct of 1846, w hich enabled the colonies to reduce or repeal the custom s duties imposed by form er Possessions A cts, placed in their hands an effective instrum ent fo r achieving fiscal autonom y.4 A fter these initial concessions the transfer o f powers to the colonies becam e an irresistible and gradually accelerating process. T h e strength of separatist opinion in E ngland at this tim e will bear elaboration. A lm ost every leading figure in English public life regarded separation o f the colonies as at least con­ ceivable. T h e C olonial R eform ers h ad been forem ost exponents of im perial unity based on local self-governm ent. But prem ature

I N T R O D U C T I O N - xiii

death cut short the careers of D urham , Buller and M olesworth. M oreover, the steady progress o f the colonies tow ard com plete autonom y soon disproved one o f the group’s m ajor premises: th at a rigid delim itation o f local and im perial powers could be laid down and perm anently m aintained.5 A m bitious schem es of im m igration under British supervision becam e at once abortive w hen the colonies secured control of Crow n Lands. By 1850 the influence o f the C olonial R eform ers was receding before the rising tide o f the M anchester School, w hich was equally opposed to extensive expenditure on behalf o f th e colonies, b u t which strongly favoured an im m ediate term ination of the colonial tie.fi A lthough of considerable intrinsic im portance the separatist views o f the laissez-faire Radicals w ere o f prim ary significance because o f their probable influence on other public men less habitually outside the G overnm ent. T he num ber w ho were definitely in favour o f separation cannot be estim ated; b u t it was undoubtedly large.7 A m ore m oderate group were inclined to regard separation as inevitable, although they w ere not over­ anxious to hasten th e process.8 L ord Jo h n Russell, on the basis o f his notorious speech o f F ebru ary 8, m ight be regarded as one o f this group in 1850.° Even those like G rey and Elgin who wished to m aintain the im perial tie w ere frequently dubious of eventual success.10 O pinion in th e colonies also appeared om i­ nous. C onstant pronouncem ents in E ngland about the necessity and desirability o f separation h ad unfortunate repercussions on colonial opinion and furthered the cause of separation.11 Indeed, afte r publication in 1849 of the m anifesto of the annexationist party in C anada, the strength o f the C anadian separatist m ovem ent was probably regarded in Britain as even stronger than it actually was. Conscious o f the precarious state of opinion a t hom e and in A m erica, the British G overnm ent was disposed to be concilia­ tory in its dealings w ith the colonists. Public official utterances o f policy during the period did not go so far as to suggest the desirability o f separation. W hatever his real opinion “ a m em ber of H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent was naturally cautious about expressing a desire to get rid o f som e o f H er M ajesty’s subjects.” 12 M r. P orritt, in his section on British indifference to the

xiv - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y

colonies between 1783 and 1859, does not show a single exam ple o f a m inister in office expressing an official opinion in favour of G reat Britain severing the colonial tie.13 O n the oth er hand, in the period im m ediately preceding th at under consideration in this work, M elbourne, Lansdow ne, H ow ick and Russell had all professed themselves strongly opposed to such a step. N ew castle look a sim ilar stand in 1854.11 Y et in the uncertain state o f British opinion on the subject o f the colonial tie, the H om e G overnm ent had recourse to a policy o f day to day opportunism in its relations w ith the colonies. In each dispute w ith the colonists it was deemed im perative that an am icable settlem ent be achieved. T he British claim m ight be vigorously advanced but n o t indefinitely m ain­ tained, because, in the event of an impasse, the G overnm ent could n ot be sure of adequate support a t hom e to coerce the colonies. M oreover, since the tie was presum ably m aintained chiefly a t the wish of the colonists, it would be quite illogical to refuse a concession which they had repeatedly dem anded.15 The eventual result of each controversy was, therefore, a foregone conclusion, and the whole tendency of the period was steadily in the direction o f colonial autonom y. Even before 1846 the way had been prepared for the m ove­ m ent tow ard fiscal autonom y in N o rth A m erica. By the passage of the C anada C orn A ct of 1843, the Peel adm inistration then engaged in securing greater uniform ity in the various tariffs of the Em pire, had recognized the claims o f C anada for special treatm ent.10 M oreover, despite the opposition of the H om e G overnm ent in 1844, C anada succeeded in retaining, and sub­ sequently renewing upon agricultural produce and livestock, duties which had originally been imposed in retaliation against the U nited States.17 T his initial success presaged fu rth er resist­ ance in the future, although E arl G rey subsequently persuaded C anada to rem ove the differential duty w hich had, in 1846, been im posed against im portations o f leather from the U nited States (see page 17 below ). A fter Peel’s abandonm ent o f the system of colonial preferences it becam e desirable for the colonists to adopt a com m ercial policy based upon a principle different from th at now adhered to by the British G overnm ent. T he first breach in the universal suprem acy of free trade w ithin the E m pire was effected when the intercolonial reciprocity agreem ent of 1850

I N T R O D U C T I O N - xv

betw een C anada, N ew Brunswick, N ova Scotia and Prince E dw ard Island, established certain differential duties in each participating colony in favour o f the others.18 Paradoxical as it m ay seem, the Reciprocity T reaty constituted a second signifi­ ca n t breach in the system of free trade. A lthough presum ably a m easure o f free trade betw een the British-A m erican Colonies and the U nited States, it involved the imposition by the colonies o f differential duties against other nations, including the U nited K ingdom and certain o th er portions o f the Em pire. T his was, o f course, only a beginning, and eventually the British G overn­ m ent found it impossible to prevent the colonists going to w hatever lengths they chose in the imposition of differential duties. W hen, therefore, the Reciprocity T reaty was abrogated by the U nited States the colonies did not revert to the British system of universal free trade. Instead, having achieved com ­ plete econom ic union in C onfederation, they continued their independent progress tow ard a national policy. A s adopted by the D om inion, it was based upon the principles of protecting native industry and of raising or low ering the duties upon im ports from foreign countries, in accordance w ith the duties w hich each country imposed upon the produce of C anada. By the year 1878 the rift was com plete and for over fifty years the com m ercial policies of G reat Britain and C anada were governed by opposing principles. T h e period under consideration (1846-1866) m ay con­ veniently be divided into two parts. U ntil 1857 reciprocity with the U nited States was distinctly in the ascendant: the first eight years were occupied w ith the negotiations w hich com m enced in 1846 and w hich, after m any vicissitudes, culm inated in the signing of the Reciprocity T reaty in 1854. T his appeared to m eet w ith general approval during the first three years of its operation. T he year 1857 m arked the turning point: an eco­ nom ic depression involved a serious falling off o f revenue in C an ad a just a t the tim e w hen an am bitious program m e of public w orks had necessitated large and unexpected advances from the provincial treasury. T he need o f revenue enabled Cayley and G alt, successive C anadian m inisters o f finance, to m eet the dem ands o f the protectionists by establishing a considerably higher tariff. T heir action precipitated in the U nited States a

xvi - T H E R E C I P R O C 'T Y T R E A T Y

m ovem ent againsM ue treaty w hich progressed steadily tow ard final abrogation in 1866. T he decline and fall o f reciprocity was accom panied by and indeed stim ulated the m ovem ent tow ard C onfederation. T he com m ercial policy w hich was an integral p a rt o f C onfederation, how ever unfair from a sectional or socialist point of view, provided a substitute fo r th at w hich had been based upon reciprocity w ith th e U nited States. *The w ord fiscal is used throughout this volum e in the limited sense o f appertaining to the custom s tariff.

i Reciprocity in the Ascendant ( 1846- 1857)

CHAPTER

1

Origin of the Movement for Reciprocity

So long as the British-A m erican colonists retained a sub­ stantial preference in the British m arket they had no great incentive to seek reciprocity with the U nited States. In 1846, however, the question of reciprocity entered the sphere of practical politics. T he agitation for reciprocal free trade with the U nited States originated in the atm osphere o f political dis­ content which, in C anada, resulted from the proposal to repeal the C orn Laws. T he m ovem ent gathered force in the econom ic depression which followed the passage o f repeal legislation. It developed in the sam e atm osphere o f com m ercial distress from which cam e also the m ovem ents tow ard free trade, national protection and annexation to the U nited States. From three of the colonies, b ut first and m ost effectively from C anada, cam e the pressure which impelled the British G overnm ent into the attem pt to secure an agreem ent with the U nited States. T his agitation reached its clim ax about 1850 o r 1851. A fter that, as prosperity returned and the prospects o f securing a treaty appeared as far off as ever, the dem ands for an agreem ent becam e less frantic. Theoretically all the colonies but N ova Scotia rem ained in favour o f a fair treaty o f reciprocity until the agreem ent was signed. But, after 1851, the Low er C olonies,1 particularly N ova Scotia, becom ing m ore aw are of the value of a fishing m onopoly,2 began to consider the possibility o f an alternative policy to reciprocity. Even in C anada the querulous­ ness w hich, in 1849, had m arked C anadian dem ands for free trade w ith the U nited States, subsided into a very real but m ore placid desire for a reciprocity treaty. Only in N ew foundland, w here the agitation had been slow to gather force, was the dem and fo r a treaty m ore vigorous after 1850 than before it. W hen the treaty was finally negotiated, the decisive influence, as will be later shown, was not pressure from the colonists, but an entirely different set o f forces.

1. E A R L Y M O V E M E N T ( 1846-185 1 )

C anada, the largest, m ost populous and w ealthiest o f the colonies, took the lead in the advocacy of reciprocity. T his is not surprising: since it was the m ost extensively agricultural province and w ithout great interest in deep sea fisheries, Canada had everything to gain and nothing to lose by the arrangem ent. T he m ovem ent had its origin in C anada W est, w here it grew and prospered in the profound discontent of the U pper C ana­ dian grain interests: farm ers, millers and forw arders alike.3 T he im perial preference on colonial bread-stuffs had diverted their attention from the U nited States: but w ith the repeal of the Corn Law s and the subsequent depression in C anada, an increasing annoyance was felt in C anada W est against A m erican restric­ tions on the im portation of C anadian produce. Expressions of dissatisfaction cam e from m any parts of the province.4 T h e view was widely held in C anada th at prosperity would only return w hen free access to the A m erican m arket was obtained. T his opinion gave rise to the annexationist m ovem ent which derived its greatest strength from M ontreal, although it had repercussions of varying intensity throughout the province. In C anada W est the grain interests w ere equally certain that A m erican fiscal restrictions m ust be rem oved. But they were disposed to canvass the possibility of securing that object by less drastic measures. Reciprocal free trade in natural products was regarded as a possible alternative: failing that, annexation m ust inevitably follow in the near future. Jacob K eefer of T horold voiced the general opinion of the grain interest of C anada W est in 1848 w hen he characterized the reciprocity negotiations as “ our forlorn hope.” 5 A year later J. M orris of Brockville, a correspondent o f W. H . M erritt’s, inclined to the sam e view.6 In C anada W est there was w idespread evidence of the popularity o f the m ovem ent fo r reciprocity.7 T he m ovem ent was taken up by m ost of the R eform press which advocated reciprocity as the best antidote to annexationist opinion.8 F orem ost in the advocacy o f the m ovem ent was the St. Catharines Journal which even presum ed to advise the English press U ptake a sim ilar stand.0 T h e organization of the reciprocity m ovem ent in C anada was largely the w ork o f W illiam H am ilton M erritt, a St. C atharines

4 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 m iller w ho represented his county in the Legislature for thirty years and was a m em ber o f the R eform adm inistration from 1848 to 1850. M erritt’s career was a lifelong crusade to m ake C anada the avenue o f trade between G re at Britain and the w estern U nited States. In 1846 h e becam e convinced that reciprocity w ould accom plish th e double purpose of satisfying the C anadian farm er and o f diverting the export o f bread-stuffs from the western states to the St. Law rence route during the sum m er m onths.10 H e therefore com m enced an energetic and effective cam paign through the St. Catharines Journal11 and in the Legislature. O n M ay 4, 1846, he proposed an A ddress to the Q ueen requesting, am ongst other petitions, th at negotiations be opened to secure reciprocity w ith th e U nited States.12 A lthough M erritt’s actual A ddress was n o t adopted the L egislature, on M ay 12, passed another containing the sam e request.13 A year later in the L egislature M erritt w as the first to propose th at the arrangem ent be effected by reciprocal legislation on the p art of C anada an d the U nited States, rath er than by treaty.14 W hile President of the Council in the Lafontaine-Baldw in G overn­ m ent, M erritt drafted the R eciprocity A ct o f 1849. A ccording to its provisions an enum erated list of natural products was to be adm itted free o f duty from th e U nited States after the rem oval of the duty on sim ilar articles w hen im ported into the U nited States from C anada. Congress, how ever, did n o t a t th at tim e respond to th e invitation.15 N o r did M erritt confine his efforts to C anada alone. H e was also in com m unication with Y oung, the Speaker of th e N ova Scotian A ssembly on the subject,16 and on July 13, 1849, he w rote to W ilmot, A ttorney-G eneral of N ew Brunswick, pro­ posing intercolonial co-operation to secure reciprocity w ith the U nited States.17 By his fervent advocacy in C anada, M erritt succeeded in m arshalling behind the G overnm ent a body o f opinion en­ thusiastic in the cause of reciprocity. A ccording to the British A m erican M agazine, “T he anticipated benefit o f such an a rra n g e m e n t. . . secured him the assistance o f a large party in urging on his project, indeed the idea o f such a treaty becam e popular in C anada.” 18 A lthough there were two changes of adm inistration during the period, reciprocity becam e in 1846 and rem ained until 1854

O R IG IN OF T H E M O VEM ENT OF RE CIPRO C IT Y - 5

an object of governm ental policy. T he Conservative adm inis­ tration sponsored the A ddress o f M ay 12, 1846, for reciprocity, and in D ecem ber th e Conservative Inspector-G eneral suggested to C athcart, the G overnor, th at the tim e was ripe for a proposal to the A m erican G overnm ent.19 T he project was no less en­ thusiastically taken up by the R eform P arty upon their accession to pow er in 1848.20 M erritt’s appointm ent as President o f the Council in Septem ber 1848 m ust have fu rth e r strengthened the policy o f the G overnm ent in relation to the question. In June 1849 Elgin was requested to press the Im perial G overnm ent to open negotiations with, the U nited States.21 Since it was L ord E lgin w ho m ade the pressure from C anada effective by bringing it to bear upon the C olonial Office, the question of M erritt’s influence upon Elgin is of very consid­ erable im portance. Reciprocity as the safety valve against annexation w as the keynote o f Elgin’s attitude tow ard the U nited States. T he assertion that reciprocity w ould counteract the m ovem ent for annexation was a fam iliar one in C anada; but M erritt was probably the first to state it clearly w hen, on M ay 4, 1846, he asserted in the Legislature, W ere our products adm itted into their m arkets . . . the Cana­ dian farm er w ould at all tim es be placed on an equal footin g , in all respects w ith the western farm er . . . he would realize the advantages he possessed and resist any political change.-2 F o r the next three years M erritt’s views upon this point were unchanged. D uring this period he was in periodic com m unica­ tion w ith Elgin and repeatedly drove hom e the point that annexation was the alternative to reciprocity.23 A lthough distrustful o f M erritt’s discretion as a negotiator,21 Elgin nevertheless accepted his statem ents as a true indication o f public opinion in C anada and fashioned his own policy in accordance w ith M erritt’s advice. H e forw arded to E arl G rey no less than five com m unications from M erritt, including a budget o f letters from M erritt’s constituents purporting to show th at a failure to secure reciprocity would involve the separation of C anada from the E m pire.20 Elgin’s covering letters show that, although critical o f M erritt’s political econom y, he nevertheless accepted his view o f the significance and im portance of reci­ procity.26 T he general agitation in the province for reciprocity

6 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

no doubt inclined Elgin in the sam e direction. In view o f his great esteem fo r H incks, m oreover, it is probable th at H incks’s influence in this m atter carried considerable weight.27 Even before he cam e in contact w ith M erritt Elgin had conceived the idea th at reciprocity w ould be a pow erful safeguard against annexation;28 but, in view of the evidence, it is reasonable to assum e that M erritt’s influence strengthened him in this opinion. F o r three years Elgin pressed upon the Colonial Office the hopes and desires o f the C anadian grain interests. H is views cam e to em brace a whole philosophy of C anadian-A m erican relations based upon responsible governm ent, freedom of com ­ m erce and reciprocity as the sheet anchors w hich were to hold C anada w ithin the Em pire. E arl G rey had already m ade his historic decision to concede responsible governm ent in the m ore advanced colonies. T he repeal o f the N avigation Law s in 1849 freed colonial com m erce o f its m ost irksom e shackle. I t re ­ m ained to convince G rey th a t reciprocity was equally necessary if C anadian loyalty was to be retained. F o r three years Elgin, insistently and adroitly, urged this idea upon G rey.20 W ith great astuteness, m oreover, he linked together the questions of reciprocity and colonial expenditure fo r defence and im m igra­ tion. G rey, as Elgin knew, was extrem ely anxious that C anada should assum e a considerable p art of these burdens. Elgin therefore seized every opportunity to point o u t th at such an assum ption o f expenditure could not possibly be expected until a reciprocal agreem ent with the U nited States should bring back prosperity to C anada.30 In N ew Brunswick, as in C anada, the agitation for reciprocity developed in the period of depression following 1846. T he lum bering interest regarded itself as adversely affected by the reduction in perference in the British m arket.31 It was antici­ pated, m oreover, th a t the repeal o f the N avigation Laws in 1849 w ould enable foreign vessels to carry freight from St. John at a cost so low th at local shipping could not com pete.32 U n­ fortunately also the harvest o f 1847 proved, to a great extent, a failure, and during the subsequent w inter the Legislature received m any petitions praying relief in consideration of the distress and destitution occasioned by the failure o f the grain and potato crops.33 In these circum stances the citizens of N ew Brunswick were

O R IG IN OF T H E M O V EM EN T OF RE CIPRO C IT Y - 7

n ot slow to com plain and to lay their ills a t the door of the C olonial Office.34 T he suggestion w as even advanced in the Legislature that, since the Im perial G overnm ent had palpably dem onstrated its com plete inability to consult the interests of the province, therefore the pow ers o f the local Legislature should be largely increased.35 N eedless to say, in N ew Bruns­ wick, as in C anada, annexation to the U nited States had its advocates a t this tim e.30 It was in this atm osphere o f com m ercial privation and poli­ tical discontent th a t the idea o f reciprocity w ith the U nited States was conceived. T he ship-building industry w anted the right to register colonial-built vessels when sold in the U nited States and the lum ber interest desired free access to the A m eri­ can m arket.37 O ther classes also were in favour of reciprocity, as was attested by a petition to the Legislature from the m er­ chants, farm ers and inhabitants o f Buctouche, praying th a t such m easures m ight be adopted as w ould effect reciprocity of trade between N ew Brunswick and the U nited States.38 In their attitude tow ard reciprocity the Executive and Legislature o f N ew Brunsw ick echoed the dem ands o f public opinion.39 T h e Executive pursued a vigorous and enterprising policy in the attem pt to secure reciprocity. O n the suggestion of W. H . M erritt, N ew Brunsw ick took the initiative in proposing an intercolonial conference at H alifax in 1849 to consider the co-operation w hich depression had rendered essential. T he Executive even professed a willingness to adm it the A m ericans to the inshore fisheries if th at w ere necessary fo r the attainm ent of reciprocity.40 I t was as a G overnm ent m easure that the Legislature on A pril 26, 1850, passed a bill em pow ering the L ieutenant-G overnor in Council to issue, when advisable, a proclam ation fo r the free adm ission o f A m erican produce into the province.41 I t rem ained for Sir E dm und H ead to com m unicate to the H o m e G overnm ent this pressure which was so insistent from 1848 to 1850. T his he did w ith a cogency second only to th at of L ord Elgin. In view, how ever, o f the low opinion w hich G rey had form ed o f his ability, it is unlikely th at H ead carried nearly so m uch weight as Elgin w ith the Russell adm inistration.42 In so fa r as his influence was effective it m ust have reinforced Elgin’s. In a considered statem ent o f his views, to Sir John Pakington

8 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

in 1852, H ead asserted th at annexation o f the colonies to the U nited States could only be avoided by obtaining access to the A m erican m arket and, at the sam e tim e, educating the colonists in the value o f English political institutions.43 I t was E lgin’s philosophy over again, and one is tem pted to inquire w hether H ead him self conceived it because of contact w ith sim ilar con­ ditions, o r w hether it was expounded to him by Elgin w hen they m et in O ctober 1850. T hat the latter hypothesis m ay be correct is suggested by H ead’s letter just afte r their conference.44 In P rince E dw ard Island the m ovem ent fo r a reciprocity treaty was taken up w ith alacrity in 1849. Before any o f the oth er colonies had taken legislative action the L egislature of the Island on M arch 19, 1849, passed an act providing fo r free trade, on a reciprocal basis, w ith the U nited States in a specified list of natural products.45 T his w as followed on M ay 1 by a joint A ddress o f both H ouses requesting H er M ajesty to relax the Convention o f 1818, the m ost recent A nglo-A m erican settle­ m ent o f the N o rth A tlantic fishery question, in order to adm it A m ericans to the coastal fisheries o f Prince Edw ard Island.40 In A ugust the G overnm ent a t once assented to the proposal, from N ew Brunswick, fo r the intercolonial conference a t w hich, of course, reciprocity was the chief object under consideration.47 Cam pbell, the L ieutenant-G overnor, declared at the end o f the year, th at the feeling o f the people was strongly in favour of the proposed m easure.48 H e therefore vigorously seconded the effort of his G overnm ent to secure a treaty, and recom m ended to E arl G rey th at H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent should intervene to procure free adm ission into th e U nited States of articles the grow th and produce o f the British N o rth A m erican Colonies.49 Even in N ova Scotia, w here steadfast opposition was later to develop, the project o f reciprocity m et a t first w ith a favourable reception. N ova Scotia, too, h ad suffered from the general derangem ent o f N o rth A m erican com m erce afte r 1846 and, like N ew Brunsw ick, experienced a partial failure of crops during the sam e period.50 A possible rem edy fo r this situation was at least w orthy of investigation. Y et, even a t the first, some indica­ tion of the w rath to com e was afforded by the extrem e caution with which the G overnm ent approached the question o f opening th e fisheries to the U nited States. T he proposal o f N ew Bruns­ wick fo r an intercolonial conference was accepted, but on the

O R IG IN OF T H E M O VEM ENT OF RE CIPRO C IT Y - 9

understanding th at this action involved no pledge to approve a concession of fishing privileges.51 I t was because o f this reluc­ tance th at the conference confined itself to a m ere form al resolution in favour of a reciprocal convention.52 Y et, during 1850 and 1851, th ere was little indication in the province that th e proposed adm ission o f A m erican fisherm en w ould later encounter such violent opposition. T his specious appearance of acceptance was only possible because public attention h ad not yet "been directed to the question a t issue.53 A m inority con­ tended from the first th a t th e fisheries should not be opened upon any condition w hatever.54 But the question un d er general discussion was w hat equivalent to exact in retu rn from the U nited States. T h e m ajority w ere disposed to exchange fishery rights fo r reciprocity alone, or, a t most, to dem and in addition the repeal of bounties on A m erican fish, the free registration of colonial-built ships in the U nited States, and participation in the A m erican coasting trade. T h e N ova Scotian authorities w ere a t first extrem ely favour­ able to the reciprocity project. In July, 1850, Y oung reported to M erritt th at the E xecutive, except fo r a few dissenting voices, favoured a straight exchange o f fiscal fo r fishery privileges.55 T h e A ttorney-G eneral on M arch 21, 1850, presented a bill, sim ilar to th a t passed in C anada, to establish free trad e in certain articles betw een the U nited States and the British N o rth A m erican Possessions. T h e bill was subsequently passed by the Legislature.50 Sir Jo h n H arvey, th e L ieutenant-G overnor, shared the opinion o f his council and w rote direct to Sir H enry Bulwer at W ashington in January, 1851, expressing “ in th e strongest term s the expectation entertained by m y G overnm ent th a t N ova Scotia and the other Low er Provinces will be included in any m easure of reciprocity th a t m ay be obtained fo r C anada.”57 As late as January 10,1852, th e G overnm ent was willing to concede the fisheries fo r (the sam e old form ula) a fair equivalent.58 U ntil 1852 the favour w ith w hich the Executive had regarded th e project o f reciprocity was on the w hole supported in the N ova Scotia Legislature. O n M arch 1, 1850, it passed resolu­ tions in w hich the L ieutenant-G overnor was urged to secure reciprocity in certain specified articles, th e privileges o f registry and entry to the coasting trade in the U nited States. A t the same tim e was rejected the am endm ent of F reem an, w ho proposed to

10 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

stipulate th at the fisheries should not upon any conditions be opened. N o r would the L egislature accept the am endm ent of Johnston, the Conservative leader, in w hich it was specified th a t the fisheries should be exchanged only for all three of the com pensatory privileges.59 Subsequently, on M arch 25, the H ouse passed an A ddress to the Q ueen in accordance w ith the resolutions o f M arch l . 60 A gain, in July, Y oung w rote to M erritt th at a decided m ajority in both H ouses considered reci­ procity in agricultural produce, w ood and fish as an adequate com pensation fo r fishery privileges.01 In N ew foundland alone of the colonies the project fo r reci­ procity m et w ith little favour a t the outset. Invited to send representatives to discuss the subject at the H alifax C onference, the Executive of N ew foundland flatly refused on the ground that the com m ercial interests o f the colony in no m anner called fo r the adoption of reciprocity with the U nited States. N o opinion on the subject, it was asserted, had been a t any tim e expressed by the local Legislature. T he message o f refusal closed with the em phatic and uncom prom ising declaration: T h e Council at the sam e tim e beg to express their entire con­ viction that no advantage, to be derived fro m a reciprocal free trade w ith the U nited States o f A m erica, w ould com pensate fo r the concession to the citizens o f that R epublic o f a participation in the Fisheries o f this C olony.52 Small w onder w as it th at Le M archant, the L ieutenantG overnor, in expressing a personal opinion in favour o f reci­ procity, w arned G rey against undertaking any negotiations on behalf of N ew foundland before th e L egislature and the leading com m ercial m en had been consulted.03

II. C H A N G E D A T T I T U D E O F T H E C O L O N I E S (1852-1854)

By the m iddle o f 1852 the intense eagerness o f the colonies fo r a reciprocity treaty had largely subsided although it did not altogether disappear, particularly in Canada. T he three Low er Provinces, w hich had been anxious to participate in a reciprocal convention, were now contem plating alternative policies. Only

O R I G I N O F T H E M O V E M E N T O F R E C I P R O C I T Y - II

in N ew foundland was there a quickened desire to secure a treaty. Elgin continued to press for an agreem ent, but adm itted to G rey in O ctober, 1850, and repeated in N ovem ber, 1853, th at enthusiasm fo r the m easure had very m uch abated in C anada even am ong the farm ers.04 Infinitely m ore independent of the U nited States than in 1849, the C anadian G overnm ent un d er H incks was now contem plating retaliatory m easures, including the exclusion of A m erican vessels from the use of the C anadian canals unless they proceeded on down the St. L aw rence.05 A lthough calcu­ lated to force the U nited States to accept a treaty, this was a very different policy from the collapse into annexation, which the C anadian farm ers, M erritt and even Elgin had declared to be the only alternative to reciprocity. Y et the adm inistration was, after all, anxious to secure reciprocity if th at w ere possible, and when prospects brightened in the autum n of 1852, it has­ tened to com m unicate to the Colonial Office the objects which C anada wished to secure in the negotiation.00 In N ew Brunswick also the anxiety fo r a treaty had distinctly abated. N ew Brunswick always expressed a willingness to open h er inshore fisheries to the U nited States in exchange fo r a fair com m ercial arrangem ent. As negotiations becam e prolonged, however, and prosperity returned, despite the postponem ent of reciprocity,07 public opinion cam e to attach a greater im por­ tance to the fisheries. F requent dem ands w ere m ade for their protection against A m erican aggression and, in place o f reci­ procity, alternative policies based upon a fishing m onopoly were considered. Both the Executive and Legislature reflected this change of attitude. Both cam e to place due em phasis upon the value of the fisheries, although professing their willingness to participate in a fair agreem ent. T he fair equivalent, as stated by both Legisla­ tu re and Executive, was declared to be reciprocity in certain enum erated articles, including lum ber, fish and products of the fisheries, the adm ission o f colonial shipping to A m erican regis­ tratio n and to the A m erican coasting trade, and free access to the A m erican fisheries with rights sim ilar to those dem anded by the U nited States. It was stipulated also th at the whole arrange­ m ent m ust be concluded in a single treaty, and that a separate convention involving only reciprocal fishing privileges, such as

12 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

was at this tim e proposed by the A m ericans, m ust not be con­ sidered.08 M eanwhile, until a treaty should be actually obtained, both L egislature and Executive w ere strongly in favour of protecting the fisheries.09 Like the other colonies, P rince E dw ard Island now began to talk sternly o f an alternative policy. O n the strong advice of L ieutenant-G overnor B annerm an, who adm itted that h e ex­ pected “no thanks” from E arl G rey, the L egislature passed a join t Address on F ebruary 9, 1852, renewing its professions of desire fo r a treaty, b u t asserting that, if such an arrangem ent could not be effected, the fisheries should be scrupulously m ain­ tained in the spirit of the Convention of 1818.70 T he Assembly, m oreover, in its reply of January 24 to th e L ieutenantG o vernor’s speech, had asserted the advisability of inviting and encouraging British capital to develop the fishing industry of the Island if no concession could be secured from the U nited States.71 W hen the o th er colonies h ad already begun to threaten retaliation and alternative policies, N ew foundland aw oke to the potential advantages o f a reciprocity treaty. A nticipating the great benefit of free access fo r the fish o f the colony to the A m erican m arket, the A ssembly on June 12, 1852, passed an A ddress requesting th at the claim s o f N ew foundland should not be overlooked in the negotiation for reciprocity between the U nited States and the colonies.72 G re at consternation was ex­ pressed by the Legislature in February, 1853, a t an announce­ m ent by the A m erican Secretary of State th at H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent was willing to accept a treaty for all the colonies, “w ith the possible exception of N ew foundland.” In a second A ddress to the C row n, the Legislature strongly reiterated the wish o f the colony to participate in the treaty.73 T his change of h eart in N ew foundland is not, however, o f great relative im ­ portance w hen it is considered th at the other four colonies now, in general, held the opinion th a t a treaty w ith the U nited States was n ot an absolute necessity. In N ova Scotia occurred the m ost pronounced reaction against a reciprocity treaty. M uch less dependent on the British m arket than N ew Brunsw ick, N ova Scotia was in a position to assum e a tone o f greater independence against the hom e gov­ ernm ent.74. . . T he m erchants, traders and fishermen residing in

O R I G I N O F T H E M O V E M E N T O F R E C I P R O C I T Y - 13

and around H alifax, in a petition to the Q ueen on January 20, 1852, expressed their regret th a t the proposed concession of fisheries should ever have been contem plated. T hey described the proposal as not only utterly ruinous to the shore fishery o f this Province, but m ost injurious to the national welfare and derogatory to the honour o f the British Crown."5 A gain on Septem ber 2 the M ayor, A lderm en and R epresenta­ tives o f the city and county o f H alifax repeated in even m ore em phatic term s their “strong rem onstrance against any such concession o f Fishing rights as appears to be contem plated.” 70 T h e agitation spread throughout the province and from many sections cam e petitions to the Assem bly, com plaining of A m eri­ can encroachm ents upon the fisheries, dem anding effective m easures o f protection and protesting against the sacrifice of this valuable heritage for any supposed advantages to be derived from reciprocity o f trade.77 T h e L egislature displayed a considerable change of front from its attitude of 1850. A fter the receipt o f so m any petitions, great concern was shown, in 1852 and 1853, for the protection o f the fisheries.78 Eventually the A ssem bly passed an Address on M arch 29, 1853, strongly urging the Q ueen to continue the policy of fishery protection and the Legislative Council passed a sim ilar A ddress on A pril 4 .79 As late as M arch, 1854, on the eve o f reciprocity, a Com m ittee of the Assembly reported in fav o u r of a continued and rigid enforcem ent of fishing regula­ tions. T h e C om m ittee insisted, “th at no participation in them should be conceded to any foreign pow er; but that the colonial fishermen should be invested w ith th e exclusive right to fish in th e w aters adjacent and belonging to the province.”80 T h e authorities of N ova Scotia, like the Legislature, adapted their policy to accord w ith the dictates of public opinion. A fter th e address o f January 20, 1852, from H alifax, H arvey strongly advised G rey against m aking the concession to w hich the petitioners were so m uch opposed.81 Bazalgette, his tem porary successor, and the Executive m aintained this policy;82 and Le M archant, the new L ieutenant-G overnor, in N ovem ber, 1852, w arned the H om e G overnm ent against surrendering the fish­

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eries and pressed fo r a postponem ent of negotiations until the interests o f the province had been fully investigated.83 Public and official opinion in N ova Scotia had becom e ex­ trem ely sceptical of the wisdom o f accepting such a reciprocity convention as was likely to be proposed. I. D . A ndrew s, special A m erican agent in the colonies, described the difficulties which confronted the G overnm ent because the O pposition, w ho were alm ost equal in political pow er, strongly opposed a surrender of the fisheries upon any term s.84 Andrew s conducted a vigorous agitation fo r reciprocity in the Low er Provinces in the latter p art o f 1853 and the spring o f 1854, during which tim e he expended some tw enty thousand dollars.85 W hile these sub­ terranean activities w ere probably not w ithout som e effect, it is certain th at the treaty w ould have encountered m ore determ ined opposition in N ova Scotia, if external forces, later to be described, had not been brought to bear.

CHAPTER 2

British Policy and the Treaty (1846-1854)

British policy in relation to the R eciprocity T reaty was dom i­ nated by m otives o f political expediency. A t no tim e during the negotiations was the G overnm ent prepared to consider the project solely on its m erits as a com m ercial m easure. Since its im m ediate effect was to establish differential duties against the U nited K ingdom , certain British colonies not included in the arrangem ent and foreign countries, th e treaty constituted a significant breach in the system of free trad e w hich had just been established as the com m ercial policy of the E m pire.1 W ith the exception o f E arl G rey, how ever, no British statesm an raised this aw kw ard question o f principle in the period preced­ ing the signing o f the treaty. T h e H om e G overnm ent was, in short, prepared to sacrifice a rigid adherence to principle fo r the attainm ent o f an im m ediately desirable object.2. . . In order to m ollify the m alcontents in British N o rth A m erica, the Peel and Russell adm inistrations agreed to undertake the negotiation of a treaty. T h e negotiations assum ed an entirely new com plexion in 1852 w hen the D erby adm inistration decided upon effective m easures for the protection o f th e N o rth A m erican fisheries. V iolent A m erican protests soon aggravated the situation; and the desire to settle this question soon becam e th e prim ary m otive behind the efforts o f the H om e G overnm ent to secure a treaty. In 1854 the dem ands of British A m erica had becom e a secondary consideration and the real object of British policy was to avoid a possible collision over th e fisheries.

I. G L A D S T O N E T O T H E R E S C U E

If indeed the Peel adm inistration ushered in the era of free trade in G re at Britain its colonial policy was scarcely less epoch-m aking. By rem oving the vestiges o f an effete colonial

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system, it cleared th e w ay fo r a new one.3 Peel abandoned the policy o f im perial preferences to w hich the C anadians had regarded his governm ent as com m itted by the passage o f the C anada C orn A ct in 1843 (see page x iv ). A t a blow, the colonial preference was abolished not only from bread-stuffs, b u t from bacon, beef and hides; while the duties were reduced on butter, cheese, spirits, sugar and tim ber. P rim arly occupied with considerations o f dom estic policy, Peel was disposed to regard colonial interests as a secondary issue and contented him self with denying th at a reduction in preference w ould injure the colonists.4 I t rem ained fo r M r. G ladstone, as Colonial Secretary in 1846, to interpret the distasteful change in policy to the colonists. T his he attem pted by propounding a theory of em pire based not on com m ercial preference but ra th e r on m utual goodwill.5 T o requests from the colonies fo r continued preferences G ladstone was courteous b u t uncom prom ising. V arious A ddresses from C anada, fo r a sm all preference on w heat, w ere all refused; no r w ould he reconsider the decision to reduce the preferences on colonial timber.® G ladstone agreed w ith Peel in asserting that these dem ands m ust be subordinated to the requirem ents o f the situation at hom e.7 L ike Peel also he attem pted to dem onstrate th at the colonists w ould not be injured by the proposed reduc­ tion in duties.8 But to men who regarded themselves as faced w ith com m er­ cial ruin it was sm all consolation to be told th at they w ere bound to G reat Britain by resem blances in origin, in laws and in m anners, by com m on traditions o f the past and hopes of the future. T angible concessions w ere essential to conciliate the colonists; and indeed G ladstone was quite prepared to com ply with every request w hich could possibly be reconciled w ith the newly adopted policy o f his governm ent. W hen the C anadian Legislature requested on M ay 12 th at steps be taken to secure a reciprocal agreem ent w ith the U nited States G ladstone was eager to satisfy its dem ands.9 H e had little real hope o f success at W ashington and w arned th e C anadians against sacrificing the substance fo r the shadow : it was unwise, he felt, to forego the im m ediate benefits of unilateral fiscal reductions in a vain endeavour to realize benefits w hich depended on the action of o th er nations and could not be secured. N evertheless to please

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the colonists, but w ith a m etaphorical shrug of the shoulders, he advised A berdeen, th e F oreign Secretary, to have negoti­ ations opened at once. P akenham , the M inister at W ashington, was accordingly instructed to bring th e m atter un d er the consideration o f the A m erican G overnm ent w hen a favourable opportunity should present itself.10 Reciprocity thus entered the orbit o f British politics; under the succeeding adm inistration it was to becom e an im portant object of British colonial policy.

II. G R E Y C O N T IN U E S T H E P R E S S U R E

T h e Russell adm inistration took office convinced o f its mission to com plete the w ork, already begun, o f rem oving restrictions from industry and o f securely establishing a system o f free trade throughout th e E m pire.11 Extensive reductions in the B ritish tariff follow ed.12 A nother notable result o f this policy was the repeal o f the N avigation Law s, largely as an act of sim ple justice to th e colonists. I t was proposed to supplem ent th e fiscal legislation o f 1846 by freeing the colonies from restrictions once rendered tolerable by privileges w hich they had now ceased to enjoy.13 O therw ise, hinted E arl G rey darkly in the Lords, another A m erican revolution was not inconceivable.14 G rey, steadfast advocate o f free trade, form ulated th e colo­ nial policy o f the G overnm ent. Russell, in substantial agreem ent w ith G rey, publicly supported his attitude tow ard both the political and com m ercial organization o f the colonies.15 T hough justly celebrated for his p art in the introduction o f responsible governm ent to British A m erica, G rey still insisted on the duty and pow er o f th e British G overnm ent to regulate the com m er­ cial policy o f the Em pire. T his suprem acy w as to be steadfastly em ployed in effecting the transition from a system of monopoly and discrim inating duties. H enceforth th e colonies w ere to enjoy free trade but not freedom to regulate their own trade.16 G rey has frequently been described as a pontifical free trader, and indeed his faith in the efficacy o f the principle of free trad e was quite unbounded.17 G rey’s tenure o f office was a protracted struggle against w hat he regarded as a stubborn adherence by recalcitrant colonists to effete principles of econom y.

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Y et, w ith all his preconceptions, G rey deviated from the advocacy o f unilateral free trad e to prom ote the cause of reciprocity. Professor M orrell has suggested th at G rey did so w ithout realizing th at his action was, in reality though not in appearance, inconsistent with the conception of a free trade E m pire: by conceding the claim fo r special treatm ent he had taken a long step tow ards granting the com ing dem and for fiscal autonom y.18 G rey ’s digression was the result of pressure from British N o rth A m erica, brought to bear by Lord Elgin, whose influence on the policy o f G rey can scarcely be exaggerated. T he G reyElgin Correspondence shows th at G rey, not w ithout an occa­ sional protest, was skilfully guided by Elgin into the course which pressure from the colonies m ade essential. So well known was the close understanding between them th at the opposition press christened Elgin “the little ‘G reyling’ in C anada,” and described his letters from G rey as “those private, confidential, fam ily epistles, w hich have created so m uch m errim ent lately in the H ouse of Lords.” 13 U ndoubtedly the chief incentive behind G rey’s advocacy of reciprocity was the view, so often reiterated by Elgin, that, unless it were obtained, the annexationist m ovem ent in Canada would get out o f hand.20 T here was, however, another consid­ eration: G rey, having noted in England a growing im patience w ith expenditure on behalf o f the colonies, was convinced that the colonists m ust in the near futu re assum e m ost o f the ex­ penditure fo r their own defence.21 But Elgin had convinced him th at no additional burdens could possibly be assumed in Canada until the depression had passed.22 G rey proposed, therefore, by helping to m aintain confidence and tranquillity in C anada until the actual return o f prosperity, to hasten the period when the Canadians m ight reasonably be asked to undertake the burdens of defence.23 O f the British statesm en concerned in the reciprocity nego­ tiations G rey alone attem pted to reconcile the treaty w ith the general system of free trade. In order to avoid the imposition o f differential duties he stipulated to Elgin, in 1848, th at the proposed C anadian act for reciprocity w ith the U nited States m ust provide for the free im portation of the enum erated articles from every country in the w orld.21 H ead and H arvey were

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later instructed th a t future reciprocity bills, in their respective legislatures, m ust contain a provision for the extension o f sim ilar privileges, on a reciprocal basis, to countries entitled to “m ost favoured nation” treatm ent by G re at Britain.05 T he question of differential duties was not again raised before the conclusion of the treaty. G rey regarded the treaty as chiefly o f value for its psycho­ logical effect: the actual benefits to be derived from reciprocity were, he felt, grossly overestim ated by the colonists.26 On one point he was particularly em phatic: the colonists m ust not impose differential duties against the U nited States in retaliation for the refusal of a treaty.27 T o hum our “the foolish wish o f the Canadians to injure themselves to spite their neighbours” G rey would m ake but one concession: they m ight refuse the naviga­ tion of the St. L aw rence and of the canals to the A m ericans in o rd er to secure fair treatm ent.28 In spite of these reservations G rey, in th e autum n o f 1849, carried the Russell adm inistration into a determ ined effort to secure a reciprocity agreem ent with the U nited States. D is­ patched to A m erica prim arily fo r the purpose o f securing a revision of the existing navigation treaty, Sir H enry Bulwer was also instructed “to press strongly for an arrangem ent for recip­ rocal free trade between the British Provinces and the U nion in agricultural produce.”20 Sir H enry w as em pow ered to offer in retu rn extensive com pensations, including the free navigation o f the St. Law rence and the C anadian canals and the free entry o f A m erican fishermen to the colonial coastal fisheries. H e was even instructed, despite the interests o f N ova Scotia, no t to insist upon the insertion o f coal in the free list, if it proved an insurm ountable obstacle to the treaty.30 T h e liberality o f this proposal was chiefly the result o f G rey’s influence. U pon his suggestion, the U nited States was offered m uch greater fishing privileges than had been proposed in the first d raft of Bulwer’s instructions.31 D espite these proposed concessions, however, Bulwer was unsuccessful and the nego­ tiations, after a prolonged and inglorious course, w ere virtually a t a standstill in D ecem ber, 1851. Before the adm inistration left office in January, 1852, G rey had concluded that the only course w as to term inate the negotiations and adopt an alternative policy.32

III. T H E D E R B Y A D M I N I S T R A T I O N AND A CHAN G E OF TACTICS ( F E B R U A R Y - N O V E M B E R , 1852)

A lthough discreetly refusing to revive the general issue be­ tween free trade and protection, the D erby G overnm ent did reverse the colonial policy of G rey in several im portant p ar­ ticulars. G rey had favoured a policy o f counteracting A m erican protectionism by C anadian free trade; this the D erby G overn­ m ent regarded as turning th e other cheek, and was inclined to substitute the m axim an eye fo r an eye. G rey also had strongly advocated the im m ediate adm ission o f A m erican vessels to navigation throughout the w hole length o f the St. Law rence; but, w hen H incks requested in 1852 th at this policy be carried into effect, M alm esbury, the F oreign Secretary, w ould not con­ sent to any fu rth er concessions until countervailing privileges w ere secured from the U nited States.33 M ost im portant o f all, the change in governm ents involved a com plete change of attitude tow ard the question o f protecting the N orth A m erican fisheries. G rey had been opposed to exclusion of A m erican fishermen from the coastal w aters o f the colonies.34 B ut the D erby G overnm ent adopted th e type of “strong” policy which one so frequently associates w ith Conservative adm inistrations. In this case it was a step destined to have a profound influence upon the negotiations for reciprocity. T he coastal fisheries o f British A m erica had long been a cause of dispute betw een th e British and A m erican G overn­ m ents which had never been able to achieve com plete agreem ent on the subject.35 By the treaty o f 1783 the A m ericans had retained equal rights w ith British subjects to use o f the fisheries around N ew foundland, in the G ulf o f St. L aw rence and on the coasts, bays and creeks of the o th er B ritish-A m erican Colonies; they w ere allowed, m oreover, to land and cure their fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and creeks o f N ova Scotia, the M agdalen Islands and L abrador. T he British, how ever, drew a distinction between the “right” o f the A m ericans to fisheries in the open sea and their “liberty,” a concession by treaty, to fish in British w aters. T h e A m ericans, on their part, did not adm it th at such a distinction could, in this case, be draw n: they re ­ garded all the above-m entioned privileges as their natural and

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inalienable right. T he difference of interpretation becam e of practical im portance afte r the w ar o f 1812, when the British G overnm ent claim ed th a t treaty rights w ere term inated by w ar and could only be re-purchased in a new agreem ent by com m ensurate advantages. T he A m ericans, having denied that any p art o f their rights was a m ere concession by treaty, now asserted th a t the pre-w ar status quo was again in force. But, after the British had begun to evict A m erican vessels from the fishing areas, G allatin and R ush, the A m erican Com m issioners in London, agreed to the C onvention of O ctober 20, 1818. T h e Convention of 1818 did not rem ove the fundam ental divergence o f opinion. U nder its term s, the U nited States was conceded certain perpetual rights, w hile th e British succeeded in restricting the area over w hich A m erican claims could be asserted. A ccording to the A m erican interpretation, however, the British G overnm ent really granted no rights o r privileges, b ut rath er th e U nited States had sim ply consented to certain restrictions in those rights and privileges already possessed. T he C onvention o f 1818, in fact, w idened the rift o f disagreem ent by producing fresh causes o f dispute. T he im portant section read: . . . the U nited States hereby renounces forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claim ed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish on, or w ithin three m arine miles o f any of the coasts, bays, creeks, o r harbours of H is Britannic M ajesty’s dom inions in A m erica not included w ithin the abovem entioned lim its; P rovided however, that the A m erican fisherm en shall be adm itted to enter such bays or harbours fo r the purpose o f shel­ ter and o f repairing damages therein, o f purchasing wood, and o f obtaining water, and fo r no other purpose whatever.30 T w o principal subjects o f dispute arose from this convention, th e first over the question w hether the A m erican fishermen were subject to regulations im posed by the territorial authorities in w aters w here they possessed equal rights w ith the British. T he chief cause of friction lay, how ever, in divergent interpretations of the clause by w hich the U nited States renounced the right to fish “w ithin three m arine miles o f any o f the coasts, bays, creeks o r harbours o f H is Britannic M ajesty’s dom inions in A m erica.” A ccording to the A m erican claim , the three-m ile lim it was to

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follow the coast-line o f the creeks, bays and harbours, whereas the British interpreted the coast-line as following a direct line from one headland to another. Since 1807 periodic seizures o f allegedly offending A m erican vessels were m ade by H er M ajesty’s navy and gave rise at times to sharp controversies.37 But no outburst o f feeling had yet been called forth in the U nited States to com pare with th at w hich now arose. Suddenly in M ay, 1852, Sir John Pakington, the Colonial Secretary, announced the intention of the G overnm ent to dis­ patch a small fleet to protect the British-A m erican fisheries. In fo rm er years the N orth A tlantic fleet had consisted o f three ships m ounting either forty-eight o r fifty-eight guns. Since lighter ships had proved m ore effective, Sir G eorge Seym our, w ho was in com m and in 1852, had at his disposal seven vessels m ounting only thirty-one guns in all.38 T he charge was repeatedly advanced in the A m erican Senate a t this tim e that the D erby adm inistration undertook to defend the fisheries effectively with the deliberate intention o f forcing the U nited States to accept a reciprocity treaty. In view of advice received from B annerm an of Prince E dw ard Island, the H o m e G overnm ent cannot have been altogether unaw are of the probable influence o f its fishery policy upon the reciprocity negotiation.39 B ut the principal m otive o f the G overnm ent seems to have been a sim ple desire to satisfy repeated dem ands from the colonies. In a confidential m em orandum of M arch 8, 1853, in th e files of th e Foreign Office, it was asserted th at the protection of the British-A m erican fisheries “ is principally a Colonial Question, inasm uch as the steps w hich have been taken on the subject have originated entirely in com plaints of our colonists.”40 T he im m ediate cause o f action was the petition of Jan u ary , 1852, from N ova Scotia, which dem anded the protec­ tion o f the fisheries in such em phatic term s (see page 13). L ater, w hen this petition had been considered, Pakington com m unicated to the A dm iralty H er M ajesty’s com m ands to dispatch a fleet to A m erica, and gave as the reason th at urgent representations against A m erican encroachm ents had been received from the G overnors o f the British N o rth A m erican Provinces.41 T h e motives of the colonies w ere m ore open to question. It may have been w ith an eye on the reciprocity negotiations that

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C an ad a and N ew Brunsw ick had agreed to com bine w ith the o ther colonies in assisting the British G overnm ent to defend the fisheries.4- T he L egislature o f Prince E dw ard Island probably shared B annerm an’s opinion th at the U nited States m ight be coerced into a treaty. B ut here, as in N ew Brunsw ick, the principal m otive was a desire to reap full advantage from the fishing m onopoly if o th er privileges could not be secured. M oreover, the spear-point o f the whole agitation was N ova S cotia;43 and N ova Scotia in 1852 was alm ost unanim ous in favour of m aintaining the fisheries for their own intrinsic worth. T h ere was no intention o f eventually bartering them for fiscal concessions. M alm esbury protested th at the action o f the British G overn­ m ent was m erely a police m easure, designed to protect British subjects in the exercise of their undoubted rights.44 T his, how­ ever, was begging the question, since the whole controversy hinged on the problem of w hat those rights were. On this point even the C abinet was far from unanim ous. M alm esbury w ould n o t prom ise th at seizures should not be m ade beyond the three-m ile lim it, and D erby took it fo r granted th at the Foreign Secretary intended to exclude A m erican fisher­ m en from the bays and harbours. D israeli, w ho was extremely uneasy on the subject, w rote to M alm esbury that Pakington, in announcing the G overnm ent’s intention to defend the fisheries, h ad w ritten w ithout a thorough knowledge o f the circum stances and was “ out o f his depth, m ore than three m arine miles from the shore.”45 D erby shared these apprehensions and proposed to advance only the m ore m odest claim to jurisdiction within three miles of the coasts o f the colonies.40 W ith dissension in its m idst the C abinet found it difficult to agree on the instructions of Septem ber 16 to C ram pton. Eventually it took deliberate refuge in am biguity w hen, on the suggestion of A ddington, P erm anent U nder-Secretary at the Foreign Office, “w ithin three miles” was am ended to read “in the im m ediate vicinity.” T his vague expression was substituted adm ittedly “ as giving rath er a w ider range o f portion of right on o u r p art w ithout going to the extent of L ord M alm esbury’s position.” 47 B ut the G overnm ent w as determ ined to m aintain its rights although uncertain as to w hat they were. M alm esbury, meeting

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Sir E dm und H ead in the street in London, greeted him w ith the announcem ent, “W ell we are not going to knock under - the orders will be just the sam e as before.”48 Both D erby and the Foreign Secretary w ere quite prepared to consider the cession of the fisheries in exchange fo r an equivalent.49 But on no account w ere they prepared to accept any relaxation of fishing restrictions except as p a rt of a general negotiation which should include reciprocity between the U nited States and the colonies. W hatever its original motive in taking protective m easures, the British G overnm ent, having once stim ulated A m erican anxiety to secure fishing privileges, was n o t slow to realize the tactical advantage o f the fisheries as a w eapon of negotiation.50 A m arginal com m ent by M alm esbury expresses in a w ord the policy o f the G overnm ent: to C ram pton’s account o f a proposal by W ebster, the A m erican Secretary of State, fo r a separate arrangem ent of the fishery question, he appended the rem ark, “I certainly think not.”51 T h e influence of this shrewd diplom acy on th e reciprocity negotiations will be later discussed. Its success in th at connec­ tion may be regarded as an indication th at it is som etim es useful to assum e a bold fro n t even when troubled w ith doubts within. It was clearly a hazardous procedure to send out a squadron fo r the protection o f rights, the extent of w hich was a subject of disagreem ent w ithin th e C abinet itself.52 Fortunately, under Seym our, the British squadron was in safe hands. Seym our’s fleet seems only to have m ade seizures w ithin three miles of the shore, an area adm ittedly w ithin British jurisdiction even according to the A m erican interpretation of the Convention of 1818.53 A m erican fleets under C om m odore Perry in 1852 and under Shubrick in 1853 were dispatched to the fishing grounds. But a collision betw een th e arm ed forces o f the two nations was avoided, thanks to th e tact and good sense o f the com m anders on both sides.54 Y et fishermen from the U nited States w ere forced into a closer observance o f th e Convention of 1818, and in 1853 Jenkins, a British naval officer, observed th at the num ber of A m erican vessels engaged in the fisheries had been m uch re­ duced since the previous year.55 B ut a catastrophe had been successfully avoided, and the season o f 1853 w as very m uch m ore tranquil than its predecessor. M uch of this tranquillity

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was probably due to the expectation th at a settlem ent o f the fishery and reciprocity questions was soon to be achieved.86 A final breakdow n o f negotiations w ould probably have revived disturbances in the fishing area. T he influence o f the fishery controversy upon the reciprocity negotiations was, therefore, very significant. T he succeeding governm ent, as a result, was destined to profit by the som ew hat reckless but fortunate policy o f the D erby adm inistration.

IV. S H R E W D N E S S O F L O R D C L A R E N D O N

F o r over a year after its assum ption of office a t the end of 1852, there was little indication that th e A berdeen G overnm ent w ould succeed w here its predecessors had failed. F o r a few fleeting m onths in 1853 the adm inistration had hopes o f expand­ ing the project o f reciprocity into a m uch m ore com prehensive arrangem ent w hich would have been, from the viewpoint of G re at Britain proper, o f real com m ercial value ra th e r than a m ere instrum ent o f political expediency. T his significant prop­ osition, w hich originated w ith the B oard of T rade, w ould have involved an extensive revision in the com m ercial relations between G re at Britain and the U nited States, including a substantial reduction in th e A m erican tariff on such British exports as coal, cutlery, and m anufactures o f iron, cotton and linen.67 U nfortunately, w hen presented by C ram pton, this proposal received scant consideration from M arcy, the A m eri­ can Secretary o f State. I t was courteously b u t sum m arily rejected on the plea th at th e w hole negotiation would collapse in a to rren t o f adverse opinion if impious hands w ere laid upon that subject sacred to th e deliberations o f Congress, the tariff.58 M arcy, on his part, proposed to restrict the scope o f the treaty to th e U nited States and the British N o rth A m erican Colonies. H is proposal was o f the kind which had been u nder discussion betw een the tw o governm ents since 1849; b ut it failed to satisfy either C larendon, the F oreign Secretary, o r the Board of T rad e.59 In F ebruary, 1854, th e British G overnm ent suspended negotiations. C larendon agreed w ith A ddington’s despairing cry:

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Is there any use in kicking against the pricks? Turn and twist the m atter how we m ay, the fa ct still is that the U nited States offer us term s which are utterly inadmissable, as entirely inadequate to the concessions which they require fro m us.c‘° C larendon’s attitude in the spring of 1854 prom ised ex­ trem ely well for the successful negotiation o f a convention with the U nited States: his desire fo r a treaty was not so great as to prejudice by undue and obvious anxiety the chances of obtaining it; yet the prospect o f settling the fishery dispute had already proved sufficiently attractive to move him to consider the advisability of overruling unreasonable opposition in the colo­ nies. H is ard our had been dam pened by th e continued failure of negotiations since the G pvernm ent took office, and probably by the growing bitterness in England against sym pathy in the U nited States for the C zar, with w hom Britain was now at w ar.61 On the other hand, C larendon undoubtedly realized th at on the eve o f the C rim ean W ar it was advisable to rem ove the possibility of an unfo rtu nate diversion in N o rth A m erica.62 B uchanan, the A m erican M inister, had w arned him a t some length on A pril 11 that a collision over the fisheries and a subsequent breach with A m erica m ight very possibly occur in the m idst o f the impending E uropean crisis.63 Tw o days later C larendon suggested to Elgin, w ho was hom e on leave, that he should undertake the negotiation at W ashington, and in reporting the interview to L e M archant, Elgin com m enced w ith the significant assertion, “It is of the utm ost im portance in the present state of the W orld th a t we should settle this fishery question.” 64 C larendon’s purpose was, o f course, tw ofold: he wished to settle the fishery and reciprocity questions on a perm anent footing.65 But of these two the first had now becom e, from the British viewpoint, the prim e consideration and the interest of the colonies was of but secondary im portance. In the H ouse of Lords, C larendon evinced m uch greater concern to rem ove the cause o f friction in the fishing area; he m entioned the com m er­ cial relations of the colonies and the U nited States only as an additional consideration.66 C larendon was even prepared in the last resort to force the colonies into a treaty. A w are th at no agreem ent was possible if the U nited States and the colonies both adhered to their present

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views, he asserted th at H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent m ight be com pelled to look rath er to imperial than to colonial interests alone. Elgin was therefore instructed to ascertain, before reach­ ing W ashington, how far the colonies w ere likely to m oderate th eir extrem e dem ands.67 C larendon deprecated the use even of m oral coercion except in a very extrem e case; but he nevertheless gave Elgin full pow er to “discountenance any unreasonable pretensions on the p art of the colonial G overnm ents.” Y et C larendon was sufficiently casual in his desire for a treaty to be in a strong position to negotiate. By no means over-anxious to conclude an im m ediate agreem ent, he was determ ined to accept no one-sided settlem ent. T his absence o f haste enabled him to approach the negotiations fo r reciprocity w ith his real intentions m asked by a covering o f apparent nonchalance. Elgin was cautioned against appearing at W ashington in the character o f an envoy especially appointed to secure a treaty, lest the A m ericans should leap to the conclusion th at Britain was prepared to m ake undue sacrifices in order to avoid a collision with the U nited States. Presum ably he was m erely to pay a casual visit to the Capitol. So well did C larendon play up this idea th at B uchanan reported to M arcy his conviction, quite erroneous of course, that Elgin had neither specific instructions nor authority upon the fishery question.68 Elgin, finally, was instructed never to forget the lesson th a t it was unw ise to assume a conciliatory attitude because Y o u r Lordship w ill also steadily keep in m ind, as a principle never to be lost sight o f in negotiating w ith the U nited States, that no concession can safely be m ade to that G overnm ent, except in return fo r corresponding concessions on its part: . . . and that so far fro m being likely to arrive at a perm anent and satisfactory settlem ent by the adoption o f a yielding tone the result in all probability w ould be the reverse. A rm ed with these shrew d instructions E lgin set sail for W ash­ ington in the attem pt to crow n w ith success the long years of negotiation. By 1854 the negotiations fo r reciprocity had been prolonged beyond all expectation, had been subject to m any vicissitudes and had occupied the attention o f four British adm inistrations. D uring the period British policy evolved or, rather, revolved

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considerably; fo r it never got far from the pole of political expediency. T he Peel adm inistration had opened the negotiation to gratify the colonists. T h e Russell M inistry, for the sam e reason, pressed it w ith m ore vigour and introduced, as a feature o f governm ental policy, the plan o f offering th e fisheries to com pensate the U nited States.00 T he D erby adm inistration, equally anxious to please the colonists, com plicated the situation by announcing, w ith a flourish o f trum pets, its intention of protecting the fisheries. T he fishery controversy had rapidly becom e inflamed and continued to be a source o f irritation until its settlem ent becam e, in C larendon’s opinion, th e prim e consid­ eration. In 1849 the fisheries had been regarded as an incidental concession (to the U nited States) w hich would m ake possible the negotiation of a reciprocity treaty. By 1854 the em phasis had shifted: reciprocity had now becom e the incidental conces­ sion (this tim e to the colonists) w hich m ust accom pany the m ain object - a settlem ent of the fishery question.

CHAPTER 3

Negotiations at Washington (1846-1854)

A p ro p er understanding o f the reciprocity negotiations can only be based on the knowledge th a t they w ere conducted in an atm osphere o f intense and violent party strife. W ashington, in this period, figured as the arena for th at struggle betw een N o rth and South which was later concluded on the battle-field. T he A m erican Civil W ar was not a contest over a m oral issue alone, b u t rath er the struggle fo r suprem acy between two civilizations founded upon different econom ic system s: the South, a nation o f great plantations, producing only raw m aterial, cultivated by slave labour and controlled by an aristocracy who desired free trade to sell their produce abroad; the N o rth , a nation of small farm s, shops and factories, individualistic and dem ocratic, supplying the hom e m arket and, therefore, protectionist, inde­ pendent o f slave labour and disposed to consider the question on m oral grounds alone. A lthough largely interdependent, these two sections w ere inevitably opposed on the subject of fiscal policy. T he rise o f the slavery agitation widened the rift and em bittered the contest by setting outraged m oral fervour against desperate self-interest. A lthough econom ic and later m oral in its origins, the contest assum ed a constitutional aspect and the rival parties w ere m ustered under the respective cries o f state rights and the suprem acy o f the federal governm ent. A lready in 1848 the struggle had progressed far tow ard the final catastrophe. From the rise of the Abolitionists afte r 1830 the situation had grown steadily worse. Feelings had becom e em bittered and the rival parties w ere slowly aligning themselves against each other. Indeed, Congress tended to consider every question w hich was introduced in its relation to the sectional struggle, and frequently the prevailing excitem ent m ade it impossible to transact any business a t all. C ram pton, describing the final sessions of Congress in the spring o f 1849, reported:

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during the debate fro m Saturday evening till Sunday m orning there were n ot 20 m em bers in either H ouse who could be said to be sober; a boxing m atch to o k place in the Senate between M r. Foote o f M ississippi & M r. Cam eron o f Pennsylvania & tw o conflicts o f the sam e nature occurred in the H ouse o f Representatives. T h e reciprocity B ill. . . shared the fa te o f every other Bill o f im portance which had been under the consideration o f Congress this session.1 In such an atm osphere the subject o f reciprocity was introduced. Its m any vicissitudes becom e intelligible w hen related to the m ore general political developm ents o f the period. Sectional strife m ade it extrem ely difficult to secure consideration of the reciprocity project at all; and even w hen the m easure was introduced in Congress sectional bias prejudiced the chance of its acceptance. Southern opposition to reciprocity w ith C anada was indeed based partly upon econom ic considerations. V irginia and M ary­ land, both w heat-producing states, feared the com petition in w heat n o t only from C anada b u t from the Baltic States. These, it was contended, by virtue of m ost favoured nation rights, m ust receive w hatever privileges w ere granted to C anada.2 B ut politi­ cal ran co u r vastly increased the opposition o f the South to reciprocity. It was unfair, contended the senators from M aryland and V irginia, to adm it free o f duty into the N orthern States from C anada, goods which the South would im port by sea from other countries a t a duty. “Southern gentlem en m any o f whom loudly profess the principles of free trade,” w rote C ram pton, “have opposed this m easure on the sole ground of its being one in w hich the N orth ern States of the U nion w ere generally anxious to concur.” 3 O f greatest significance, how ever, was another consideration. In the struggle over slavery between two evenly balanced parties any accession o f strength to the one was of vital concern to the other. T he conviction th at reciprocity w ith C anada w ould m erely hasten its annexation4 was a com pel­ ling reason for hostility from the Southerners, who regarded with jealous eyes any possible accession of free state territory to the union. This was a consideration which bulked larger as the reciprocity negotiations progressed and as the struggle over slavery increased in virulence; but already, in 1849, the taint of

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A bolitionism had been detected in the apparently innocuous reciprocity m easure. In addition to bias from sectional motives m ust be associated the general anti-British prejudice w hich had been kept alive since 1815 by the controversy over m aritim e rights, by A nglo-A m erican rivalry in C entral A m erica, and by the north-eastern and north-w estern boundary disputes. U ntil 1852 a second m ost depressing obstacle to reciprocity was the stolid and alm ost com plete indifference w ith which the prospect o f trad e w ith British A m erica was regarded in the U nited States. T hom as K eefer, who played a m inor p art in the negotiations, w rote to M erritt in 1850 th at the A m ericans were as ignorant o f C anada as the English, and C ram pton, in 1852, reported the general apathy which he had encountered in the attem pt to negotiate a reciprocity and fishery treaty.0 This indifference was partly due to the engrossing natu re o f the domestic situation and partly, no doubt, to the exclusion of m anufactures from the agreem ent although, according to W. H. M erritt, this was essential because A m erican m anufacturers w ere afraid of com petition from G re at B ritain through C anada.0 A third obstacle to the treaty was the vigilant opposition of the Protectionists; this was particularly effective during the W hig adm inistration, from 1849 to 1852, which was itself strongly protectionist.7 It is by no m eans certain, m oreover, th at the reciprocity negotiations were effectively directed before the advent of Lord Elgin. C ram pton and Bulw er both w ent through the form alities w ith conventional correctness, but w ere unable to push the negotiations through to success against form idable opposition.8 C ram pton, though genial, lacked the fixity of purpose which w ould have impelled him to suit every w ord and action tow ard the prom otion o f the object in view. L ord Redesdale, in his mem oirs, has described C ram pton’s “constitutional indolence.”9 U pon one occasion during the negotiations he created a m ost unfavourable im pression by rem aining seated while the A m erican national anthem was being played.10 L ater, when am bassador at St. Petersburg, he was severely censured by Lord John Russell for his failure to keep the Foreign Office better inform ed on Russian affairs.11 L ord Redesdale explains th at the charm s o f an Irish opera singer had diverted C ram p to n ’s attention from affairs o f state. Sir H enry Bulwer was undoubt­

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edly able and m ade an extrem ely good im pression in the U nited States. C layton, the S ecretary of State, described him as “the ablest British M inister th a t has ever been in this country.”12 But continuous ill-health and the distracting nature o f the C entral A m erican crisis vitiated the force o f his efforts to secure a treaty .13 V arious m inor circum stances contributed to the failure of each successive proposal fo r reciprocity. B ut the chief factors have been above enum erated: the interplay of sectional politics, coupled w ith a general anti-British prejudice, the paralyzing force o f indifference, the strength of protectionist opinion and, from one cause o r another, the ineffectiveness of British diplom acy.

I. T H E F I R S T S T A G E

(184 6-M A Y 1852)

In view o f the obstacles, it is not surprising th a t the early negotiations for reciprocity w ere uniform ly abortive. Sir John P akenham , in 1847, introduced the subject at W ashington, by urging upon the Secretary of the T reasury, th a t the A m erican G overnm ent consider the rem oval of duty on produce passing between C anada and the U nited States.14 W. H . M erritt and C ram pton renewed the overtures in 1848; as a result o f their efforts, the H ouse of Representatives on July 12 passed a bill providing for free trade on a reciprocal basis w ith the province o f C an ad a in an enum erated list of articles.15 U nfortunately, w hen introduced in the Senate by G eneral D ix of N ew Y ork, the bill was laid over fo r exam ination.16 But it was finally defeated in Jan u ary , 1849, by a com bination o f Southerners, northern Protectionists and those who w anted the inclusion of m anufac­ tures in the m easure. N either M erritt no r D ix h ad succeeded in rem oving the political objections o f the Southerners.17 They m ust be plainly told th at reciprocity w ould forestall, and not hasten, annexation; but it rem ained fo r som eone else to proclaim this message in the future. F rom M arch, 1849, to M ay, 1852, the cause o f reciprocity showed little sign of prom ise. H aving failed to secure reciprocity by m utual legislative action, C ram pton and M erritt now endeavoured to obtain a reciprocity treaty, but w ere again

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unsuccessful. A t the end of 1849 Bulwer, on his part, found the T aylor adm inistration “utterly averse to any such T reaty .” 18 T his w as followed by a series o f attem pts to secure reciprocity between the U nited States and the province of C anada by legislative action. Bills fo r this purpose w ere introduced in the H ouse of R epresentatives in January, 1850, by M cLane, in D ecem ber by H arris, and in the Senate in F ebruary by Stephen D ouglas w ho was later to be a prom inent candidate for the presidency. But, after encountering m any vicissitudes, each proposition cam e to nothing.10 Protectionist opinion, Bulwer’s ill-health and the distracting n ature o f the C entral A m erican crisis,20 contributed to produce this result. T he chief obstacle in 1850, how ever, was th e prolonged and violent struggle over the slavery question, w hich culm inated in the C om prom ise of 1850. This controversy, attended by intense excitem ent, diverted attention from every o th er m easure during its progress and left in its w ake a plenitude o f dom estic business w hich indefi­ nitely postponed a m easured consideration of reciprocity. Bulwer w rote to Palm erston on Septem ber 23: T h e great excitem ent . . . which has prevailed, during the w hole session, w ith respect to the slavery question under its different form s, and the interm inable speeches m ade thereupon in both H ouses, have prevented any other subject fro m obtaining a fu ll hearing or definite solution. A gain, in 1851, the Fugitive Slave Bill, a p art o f the C om pro­ m ise, provided fresh cause fo r excitem ent. This diversion, in addition to the press o f business w hich had been accum ulating fo r six m onths, thw arted every attem pt in 1851 to pass the reciprocity m easure.21 T h e period closed w ith another desultory attem pt by Bulwer and C ram pton to obtain a treaty, and by D ecem ber, 1851, negotiations w ere virtually at a standstill.22 By D ecem ber o f 1851 the cause o f reciprocity appeared to have reached the depths. C ram pton, who had been left in charge o f the negotiations, w as approached by a co rrupt group who appeared to have some connection w ith D ouglas. T hese gentle­ m en coolly offered to secure a passage o f the reciprocity bill through Congress - for a consideration o f eighty thousand dollars; on the other hand, if the m oney w ere n o t forthcom ing, they would oppose the m easure.23 C ram pton was convinced that

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the group was sufficiently strong to ensure the passage o r defeat o f any m easure introduced in Congress. But the British G overn­ m ent refused to participate in these subterranean activities. G rey voiced its' attitude when he contended that, after “the recent unblushing and disgraceful offer o f the party leaders in Congress,” the G overnm ent ought to decline all fu rth er negotia­ tion w ith the U nited States.24 A s a result o f the incident negotiations were suspended for a period o f m onths until other events precipitated their renewal.

II. T H E F I S H E R Y C O N T R O V E R S Y (M A Y , 185 2 -F E B R U ARY, 1853)

A fter colonial anxiety fo r a treaty had begun to abate, the reciprocity negotiations, under the stim ulus o f the fishery con­ troversy, experienced a sudden transition from death to life. In M ay, 1852, the D erby G overnm ent announced its intention of protecting the N o rth A m erican fisheries. T his decision produced a trem endous sensation in the U nited States and im parted a fresh im petus to th e negotiations. T he influence o f the fishery question upon the m ovem ent tow ard reciprocity m ust not be m isunderstood: only the interested classes in the U nited States desired the British N o rth A m erican fisheries for their intrinsic value. T he fishing interests and those who w ere associated with them undoubtedly expected to profit by the treaty, not only from actual access to the fisheries but also from exchanging contraband goods fo r colonial fish.25 Congress, how ever, was so little convinced o f the im portance of the fishing trade that, despite the introduction o f various proposals in 1853, neither H ouse would accept even a bill settling the fishery question alone. T h e chief significance o f the controversy lay in the fact that, as in the case of L ord C larendon, the fea r o f a collision between G reat Britain and the U nited States supplied the pressure which impelled the A m erican Executive to begin and to continue negotiations until a settlem ent was finally achieved. A second result of the controversy was to bring m ore forcibly to the attention o f the country the whole question o f com m ercial relations between the U nited States and the colonies. H eretofore the A m erican public had never been really stirred from its

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lethargy in regard to reciprocity. T he possibility o f w ar with G re at Britain brought the whole question for the first tim e under serious national consideration. “T he notion that a collision and ru p tu re w ith England m ight grow out of the m atter,” wrote C ram pton of the reciprocity and fishery question, “ has presented it in a very different light, and one which, w hatever m ay be the language of orators and newspapers, creates a very serious and disagreeable alarm am ong th e great Com m ercial and landed interests in this C ountry.”-0 T h e Fillm ore adm inistration was extrem ely anxious to settle the fishery controversy, and W ebster w rote post haste to C ram pton offering to open negotiations. In their anxiety to settle the fishery question W ebster and Fillm ore consented to include reciprocity in the discussion, although they had skilfully evaded the issue ever since their assum ption o f office in 1850.-7 Reci­ procity they regarded w ithout conspicuous enthusiasm : a section of the W hig p arty, including Law rence, the M inister in London, was strongly protectionist. W ebster himself, though professedly in favour of reciprocity, had taken the lead in rallying protec­ tionist opinion within the party.28 On constitutional grounds also, the adm inistration objected to a reciprocity treaty on the old plea th at th e Executive could not usurp the powers of Congress by negotiating a n agreem ent which em braced a change in the revenue laws. W hen the cry arose in the country and in Congress th at a reciprocity treaty m ust not be negotiated at the cannon’s m outh, the Fillm ore G overnm ent im m ediately began to tem porize and raised m any difficulties to the negotia­ tion of a general settlem ent.29 W ebster had com m enced by appearing to adm it the correctness of the British interpretation o f “bay.” O n July 6 he had declared, “It was undoubtedly an oversight in the Convention of 1818 to m ake so large a concession to E ngland____”30 Before his death on O ctober 24, how ever, W ebster had changed to an uncom prom ising assertion o f the A m erican interpretation of the Convention of 1818.31 H opes of a settlem ent again revived w hen negotiations were opened between C ram pton and Everett, W ebster’s successor as Secretary o f State.32 T ow ard the end o f its tenure of office, however, the adm inistration finally abandoned the idea of a com prehensive settlem ent. It is doubtful w hether Fillm ore, in view of frequent adverse declarations, had ever seriously con­

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sidered it. In his final message to Congress he had reverted to the idea, w hich he had proposed in Septem ber, o f settling reciprocity and the fisheries by separate conventions.33 Everett, although sincere in his wish fo r a general arrangem ent, had becom e convinced by February, 1853, th at it would be impossible to negotiate a treaty in th e short tim e which the adm inistration had to rem ain in office.34 D espite all C ram pton’s assurances that his governm ent was com pletely opposed to such a policy, Everett adopted the P resident’s plan o f attem pting to isolate the fishery question. On F eb ru ary 7, therefore, Fillm ore transm itted to Congress a report from E verett w ho advised it, pending a future reciprocity agreem ent, to pass a separate bill for the free adm ission o f colonial fish. E verett professed the thoroughly unsound opinion th a t the British G overnm ent w ould then pass the legislation necessary to open the colonial fisheries to the U nited States. In this m anner he proposed neatly to shift the blame fo r any fu tu re collision because, as he asserted, “ if the act in question should fail to produce the desired effect, which is n ot apprehended, it w ould relieve the U nited States o f the responsibility of the consequences.”35

III. IN T H E D O L D R U M S A G A IN ( F E B R U A R Y , 18 5 3 - F E B R U A R Y , 18 5 4 )

Congress dem onstrated in the early p art of 1853 th at no settlem ent, even o f the fishery dispute alone, was likely to be reached unless through the action of th e Executive. Once again anim osity between N o rth and South em erged to prejudice the chances o f legislation. Indeed, the tendency to judge every m easure in its supposed relation to the sectional struggle was illustrated by an article a t this tim e in D e B o w ’s R eview of N ew O rleans, in which the w hole reciprocity project was described as a conspiracy by th e transportation interests o f the N o rth to divert com m erce from th e Mississippi route.36 In the Senate D avis of M assachusetts introduced a bill drafted on the lines w hich E verett had suggested: reciprocal free trade in fish and reciprocal fishing privileges w ere to be established between the U nited States and the colonies w ithout reference to the broader project of reciprocity. But here the

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question of slavery cam e into play and vigilant Southerners lost no opportunity to raise the cry o f states rights. M allory of F lorida asserted that the federal governm ent could regulate com m erce over the w aters adjacent to each state, but could not “deprive the State of its property, its treasures w ithin the waters, w ithout its consent.” T his claim was advanced because, in the apparently guileless m easure, M allory had detected the virus of em ancipation: the passage o f such a bill, he asserted, would involve the introduction of free negroes from the Baham as into the Florida fisheries. D avis explained th at the proposed measure was confined to the five British N orth A m erican colonies, that there was no fear o f a black m enace from the Baham as and that, as a m atter of fact, the colonists w ould n o t use the A m erican fisheries a t all. B ut a great blow had been dealt at the bill and its prospects w ere further injured by th e extrem ists on both sides: Borland, o f A rkansas, on the one hand, who wished to extend the m easure to ships, produce and m anufactures, and, on the other, H am lin and B radbury, the two senators from M aine, who wished to restrict the bill in the interests of the lum ber and shipbuilding industries o f their own state. Chiefly by Southern votes, the m easure was defeated, m uch to th e relief o f C ram pton w ho had used his influence against it.37 In the H ouse of Representatives Seym our, o f N ew Y ork, fro m the Com m ittee o f Com m erce, on F ebruary 11, subm itted a rep o rt w hich strongly favoured a general settlem ent of the reciprocity and fishery questions.38 But the bill w hich h e subse­ quently introduced was so one-sided th a t it w ould never have been accepted by the colonies. Y et even this proposal fell, like the bill in the Senate, between the divergent views of the extrem ists: Clingm an o f N o rth C arolina and W ashburn of M aine, w ho w ished to extend the scope o f the arrangem ent, and Sabine o f M assachusetts and F uller of M aine, w ho favoured its reduction to a m ere settlem ent o f the fishery question.30 Obviously there was no hope of action by Congress. A fter a year of fishery controversy the H ouse of Representatives was so little concerned with the subject th a t it refused even to pass the resolution proposed by John C. Breckenridge o f K entucky, in which the P resident was requested to settle the questions connected w ith the British N o rth A m erican fisheries and with the com m ercial intercourse between the tw o countries.40

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T h e prospects of a settlem ent im proved with the accession of a D em ocratic adm inistration in M arch, since the D em ocrats were traditionally a low tariff party. But, as a result o f British policy, the new G overnm ent’s greatest incentive to a general settlem ent was fea r o f a collision in the fishing area. Jam es Buchanan strongly urged upon President Pierce that the anxiety o f the colonists for reciprocity should be used as the lever to force G re at Britain to abandon her claims in C entral A m erica, w here Belize and the Bay Islands were still under British control, in alleged contravention o f the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.41 B uchanan, in A pril, accepted the post o f M inister to the C ourt of St. Jam es, on the understanding th at all the subjects o f dispute between G reat Britain and the U nited States should be com ­ prised in one negotiation w hich he was to conduct in L ondon.42 Before the appointm ent was confirm ed Pierce had decided that the fishery situation m ade an early settlem ent imperative. Therefore, a t the risk o f a breach w ith Buchanan, he insisted that negotiations over the fisheries and reciprocity should at once be opened betw een C ram pton and M arcy in order to secure a speedy settlem ent. N o r would he consent to prejudice the chances o f success by introducing the question of C entral A m erica.43 B uchanan proposed as alternative plans either th at a general negotiation, including the C entral A m erican question, should be conducted at W ashington, o r that, having agreed to a fishery and reciprocity convention, the G overnm ent should w ithhold ratification until the C entral A m erican question was adjusted in L ondon.44 Pierce, how ever, stoutly resisted all B uchanan’s persevering attem pts to introduce the C entral A m erican issue. A ndrew s had w arned M arcy on June 17 that there was grave danger of trouble am ong the fisherm en;45 C ram pton, in dem onstrating his own apprehensions by a trip to H alifax for the express purpose o f conferring with Seym our, had fu rth er excited the concern o f the adm inistration. Pierce therefore adhered to the determ ination to keep the question of the fisheries and reciprocity separate from the C entral A m erican issue and w rote to Buchanan, w ho was com pelled to accept the appointm ent to L ondon on these term s: the present condition o f affairs with respect to the fisheries, and the various questions connected therew ith, have seem ed to

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dem and that they be taken up at once, where M r. C ram pton & M r. E verett left them . R ecent developm ents have inspired the belief that the fisheries, the reciprocity question etc., will leave no ground o f concession, which could be available in the settlem ent o f the questions in Central America.™ This anxiety did not prevent the adm inistration from hard bargaining w ith the British G overnm ent. In his conference with C ram pton at Berkeley Springs in A ugust, M arcy quickly brushed aside the proposal of extending the negotiations to include a reduction in th e A m erican duties on such im ports from G reat Britain as coal, cutlery, hardw are and m anufactures o f cotton, linen and iron.47 M arcy’s subsequent proposal failed to satisfy either the H om e G overnm ent or C ram pton, who observed: T he principle in Treaty m aking ascribed by M r. Canning to the D utch o f ‘granting too little and asking too m u ch ’ has certainly been religiously deserved by M r. M arcy on this occasion.48 F o r several m onths in 1854 the negotiations seemed once m ore to have collapsed, owing to the nature o f the A m erican dem ands (see page 2 5 ).

IV. T H E F I N A L S T A G E

( F E B R U A R Y - A U G U S T , 1854)

In F ebruary negotiations had com e to an absolute standstill, and the prospect of their successful term ination seemed rem ote indeed.40 Y et little m ore than three m onths later the treaty was signed. L ord Elgin, accom panied by H incks and C handler, reached W ashington tow ards the end o f M ay. H e then em barked upon an apparently purposeless round of social festivities, but a t the end o f ten days inform ed the Executive th at a reciprocity m easure was assured, in the Senate, o f a m ajority, including several prom inent D em ocrats.50 M arcy and Elgin therefore proceeded w ith the negotiations, the treaty was signed on June 5 and subsequently endorsed in the H ouse of Representatives on A ugust 3 and in the Senate on A ugust 4. A ctually the position a t W ashington in the sum m er of 1854 was m ore favourable to the treaty than appeared on the surface.

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T h e negotiations o f the previous seven years had a t least clearly defined the issues: the claim s o f each party w ere well know n, and lengthy prelim inary discussions after Elgin’s arrival were unnecessary. T he suspension o f negotiations by the British in F ebruary had had the desired effect on th e Executive which, alarm ed by C larendon’s apparent indifference, was extremely anxious to settle the fishery controversy. Should negotiations collapse M arcy could see no alternative but to enforce the A m erican interpretation o f the Convention o f 1818, w ith the probable result o f a serious collision.51 Convinced that the chief obstacle lay in the opposition o f N ova Scotia and N ew Bruns­ wick, the Executive had, in Septem ber, 1853, dispatched I. D. Andrew s as confidential agent to prom ote support for the treaty in the Low er Provinces.52 P resident Pierce now regarded this object as o f such im portance th a t A ndrew s was authorized on A pril 15, 1854, to draw on the State D epartm ent to the extent o f five thousand dollars, and M arcy w rote w ith an insistence which revealed his anxiety: I hope fo r m uch good fro m yo u r presence and efforts in the provinces. W hatever is done m u st be done prom ptly fo r the fishery season will soon com e and w ith it the apprehended difficulties. I regret the circum stances w hich have produced so m uch delay. L ost tim e m u st be m ade up if possible by prom ptness and diligence,53 Public opinion in the U nited States was now extrem ely favourable to the proposed convention. Protectionism was alm ost extinct as a political force during 1853 and 1854. Indeed the R eciprocity T reaty was p a rt o f a m ovem ent am ong the great nations of the w orld for the rem oval o f restrictions upon international trade. I t w as a m ovem ent w hich was m arked by the trium ph of free trad e in G re at Britain, by the form ation of the G erm an Zollverein and by the introduction o f the A m erican tariffs o f 1846 and 1857.5'1 N o t only was there a general decline o f protectionist opposition in the U nited States, but the attitude o f certain classes, likely to be affected by the treaty, had becom e m ore favourable. T he fishery interests w ere o f course solidly in favour o f the agreem ent. W ith them were undoubtedly associated the other classes likely to profit by the increased opportunities fo r smuggling. S upport from the grain interests

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o f the west had been secured by the argum ent, repeatedly advanced, particularly in the D etroit Free Press, th at great benefit would be derived from the free navigation o f the St. L aw rence. T o offset the fear of com petition from C anadian grain, it was pointed o u t that, o f the provinces included in the treaty, only C anada W est produced a surplus o f w heat, that C anada East and the Low er Provinces w ould provide a m arket fo r A m erican produce. It was, m oreover, asserted th a t in any case the price of bread-stuffs was fixed in th e British m arket and th a t the free adm ission of cheap C anadian lum ber w ould be of great value to the w estern states. A lthough m anufactures were excluded from the treaty, eastern m anufacturers had been won over by the assurance th a t an increased sale of their products m ust inevitably follow an inrush of colonial produce into the U nited States. It was pointed out th a t free coal from N ova Scotia w ould assist N ew E ngland m anufacturers in com petition w ith the rapidly growing industries o f Pennsylvania and the m iddle west. Even the opposition from M aine had been w eak­ ened by the insertion of a clause providing for the rem oval of the export duty on A m erican lum ber floated dow n the St. John. Only Pennsylvania and M aryland rem ained adam ant because o f the inclusion of coal in the treaty, despite the argum ent that the sale of anthracite from Pennsylvania w ould be considerably increased in C anada and th a t the bitum inous interests of M aryland w ere too rem ote to be m uch affected by com petition from N ova Scotia.CB N o doubt the conversion o f the other particular interests to su p p o rt o r a t least refrain from violently opposing the treaty, was partly the fru it of a long cam paign o f propaganda which had been conducted in th e U nited States by I. D. Andrews. T hrough his efforts the influence of such reputable periodicals as the N o rth A m erican R eview , H u n t’s M erchant’s M agazine and D e B ow ’s R eview had been enlisted in support o f the treaty. A ccording to A ndrew s, h e paid five hundred and fifty dollars to “one of the first scholars” in the country to w rite an article in favour of reciprocity in the N o rth A m erican R eview :'6 By entertaining on a som ew hat lavish scale, A ndrew s was able to bring his influence to bear on various leading politicians, m erchants and m anufacturers who happened to visit N ew Y ork and W ashington. By this m eans, asserted K eefer, som e opposi­

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tion, and m any prejudices, arising from ignorance o f the com m ercial system o f the colonies, were m et and rem oved.57 T h e political situation, so often the stum bling-block, now proved a source of great im petus to the m ovem ent for recipro­ city. In May, 1854, Congress passed the K ansas-N ebraska Bill which virtually nullified the M issouri C om prom ise and revived in even m ore virulent form the struggle to decide the lim its of slave and free territory.58 A ggrieved and disappointed a t this reverse, the N o rth was disposed favourably to entertain the suggestion that an increase in the exchanges between the two countries would hasten the annexation o f th e British N orth A m erican Colonies. Such was the opinion p u t forw ard by the N o rth A m erican R eview .50 M any believed, reported G errit Sm ith, a Whig m em ber of th e H ouse o f Representatives, in July, that the treaty w ould lead to the literal annexation o f the colonies.00 T he N e w Y o rk T im es asserted th at the political aspect o f the arrangem ent w ould probably com m end it to the N o rth ern States.01 T he Tribune, which disliked the treaty as a com m ercial m easure, found consolation in the knowledge that it would hasten the annexation of the colonies.02 These, it was asserted, would lend pow erful aid in future struggles w ith the slavery p arty fo r control o f the general governm ent.03 The T ri­ bune declared: E xpansion in the direction o f the north star - expansion fo r the purpose o f union with m ore than tw o m illions o f libertyloving, slavery-hating people . . . is not a prospect to cry out against at the present m om ent. T o “extend the area o f freed o m ,” not in hollow cant, but in sober earnest, does not, under existing circum stances strike us as very dreadful. T h e argum ent that annexation w ould follow the treaty proved quite unjustified, but was not less cogent a t this tim e on th at account. T h e U nited States T ariff Com mission of 1919 has rightly pointed out th at the C anadian annexationist m ovem ent o f 1849 strengthened the efforts o f Elgin to secure reciprocity in 1854.04 By a curious circum stance, the Southern D em ocratic sena­ tors, who had previously shared the opinion th at reciprocity would hasten the absorption of the colonies, now swung round and supported the treaty from precisely the opposite motive.

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By quieting discontent in C anada they hoped to forestall annexation and the consequent accession o f strength to the N orthern party. A t first, it is true, there were indications of opposition to the treaty from the South on the cry th at it would lead to annexation.05 It was even rum oured that the passage of the treaty in Congress, was to be im peded by a dem and fo r the return of fugitive slaves from C anada.66 H ow ever, by the end of July it had becom e evident th at the Southerners would support the treaty. T he Tribune, w hich had relied on them to defeat it now asserted th at the treaty was “a peace offering to the Prov­ inces from the South, to induce them to stay o ut o f the U nion.”67 A s an econom ic m easure the agreem ent had been rendered of g reater value to the South by the inclusion of rice, pitch, tar, turpentine and unm anufactured tobacco in the free list;68 but the political m otive was undoubtedly the prim e consideration. W hy, inquired Senator C ollam er in 1865, had the Southerners agreed to the treaty, and answered: I th in k I understand the reason. There had been a great deal o f restlessness and uneasiness in the people o f Canada fo r a long n um ber o f years. . . . W ell m ight they com plain, fo r they were penned up in that way. T hat was their condition. T hey were restless under it; and a very extensive feeling o f a desire o f annexation to the U nited States prevailed in Canada. It was very well know n. . . . I f you could give to Canada a treaty o f that k in d . . . would they not be content with their situation? O f course they would. A n d , sir, fro m the date o f this treaty you have never heard a whisper o f discontent in Canada.60 T hus was afforded the am azing spectacle o f two groups of m en, the N o rth and the South, sitting in the sam e H ouse and supporting the sam e m easure for contradictory reasons. T h e conversion of the Southerners was probably the princi­ pal fruit of L ord Elgin’s ten days of festivity in W ashington. D espite the exuberance o f Law rence O liphant, Elgin’s private secretary, it may at least be gathered from his m em oirs that E lgin devoted considerable attention to D em ocratic senators, of whom those from the South had been the m ost notorious opponents of reciprocity. “I find all m y m ost intim ate friends are dem ocratic senators,” rem arked O liphant during the nego­ tiation. “So do I,” replied Elgin drily.70 T he motive behind the

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opposition of the South was well know n and Elgin, w ho for three years assured G rey th at reciprocity w ould forestall an­ nexation, m ust have m ade am ple use of th a t argum ent upon this occasion. E lgin’s influence was probably the deciding factor in the success o f the negotiations. By his geniality, tact and adroitness he turned the social season in W ashington to brilliant account. W ithout any sinister im plications it may be said that Elgin and his staff approached the A m erican nation “with all the legitim ate wiles o f accom plished and astute diplom acy.” 71 T he oblique approach through social intercourse to a political objective was neither illicit no r unusual. F o rm er attem pts to secure a treaty had failed partly from a lack of such advocacy. It is not unlikely th at a bare treaty o f reciprocity, flung at the heads of the sena­ tors by a none too popular adm inistration, would have m et the sam e fate as the earlier attem pts to im prove trade relations.72 So rem arkable, how ever, was E lgin’s conduct of the negotiation that O liphant later reported: “T he brilliant and dashing m anner in which L ord Elgin achieved this rem arkable diplom atic tri­ um ph, apparently certain of his gam e from the first, playing it throughout w ith the easy confidence o f assured success, m ade a profound im pression upon me. . . .” 73 T hrough a continuous round o f m atinee dansantes, dinners and balls, the real end in view was never for a m om ent forgotten. “H e is the m ost thorough diplom at possible,” w rote O liphant, “ - never loses sight fo r a m om ent of his object, and w hile he is chaffing Y ankees and slapping them on the back, he is systematically pursuing that object.” 74 T hus was created an atm osphere of m utual goodwill o u t of w hich violent opposition to the treaty was unlikely to arise. A glim pse o f the background against which the negotiations w ere conducted is afforded by the report of a ball on M ay 24 a t the British legation, when M ore was accom plished last evening in the w ay o f negotiation than has been accom plished fro m the days o f A shburton to the advent o f Elgin. . . . The large and brilliant com pany broke up at a late hour, and departed fo r their respective hom es — pleased with their courtly and courteous host; pleased with the m onarchical fo rm o f governm ent in England; pleased with the republican fo rm o f

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governm ent in the U nited States; pleased with each other, themselves, and the rest o f m a n kin d .'5 In the course o f this period o f apparently aimless festivity Elgin probably helped to overcom e the opposition of the Southerners. Probably also he encouraged the other supporters o f the treaty and fused them into a coherent and effective body. H aving accom plished this purpose, he had gone fa r to ensure the success of the m easure in Congress. Elgin rallied support for the treaty a t the beginning o f June; b ut it rem ained fo r others to m aintain the pressure until its passage in Congress two m onths later. C om m itted as it was to the treaty, the adm inistration was bound to exert its influence upon Congress.70 C ram pton reported to Elgin on July 15 that M arcy had been applying th e screw lustily and not w ithout effect.77 Pierce him self, having endorsed the K ansas-N ebraska Bill, was persona grata w ith the Southerners and therefore able to carry on E lgin’s w ork of enlisting their support.78 H ow ever, as the P resident is alleged to have believed th at reciprocity w ould lead to annexation, it is unlikely th at his argum ents w ould have the cogency o f E lgin’s am ong the Southern group.71' T h e function o f m arshalling support for the final vote in Congress was, how ever, chiefly the w ork o f I. D. A ndrew s. The question of A ndrew ’s personal interest m ust not be allowed to obscure the m ore relevant consideration of w hat influence he actually exerted on the passage of the treaty. E lgin and Bulwer agreed, not perhaps w ithout justification, th at his motives in prom oting the treaty were not altogether disinterested.80 O n the o th er hand, he was highly regarded at this tim e by leading figures in the U nited States. W ebster, w ho, like Clayton, had em ployed A ndrew s as confidential agent in the colonies, de­ scribed him to Fillm ore as “ very intelligent, active and well inform ed.” 81 F ro m Septem ber, 1853, to M ay, 1854, the Pierce adm inistration had em ployed him as confidential agent in the Low er Provinces, and the A ttorney-G eneral w rote in A pril: “T h e President is expecting you to produce results which I heartily trust m ay be the case.”82 In A ugust, 1853, M arcy had interrupted his interviews w ith C ram pton in order to confer for a day w ith A ndrew s.83 In June, 1854, im m ediately after the signing o f the treaty, he seems to have been in close com m uni­

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cation with A ndrew s, to w hom he showed the treaty soon after it was signed and w hom he asked to prepare a rep o rt to m eet the objections of the coal interests.84 M arcy w rote of Andrew s to the H on. R. M. T . H u n ter on July 12: “ H e is thoroughly acquainted with public men and affairs in th at quarter [the colonies], and w ith the relations between the U nited States and the Provinces . . . and you m ay im plicitly rely upon his integrity and discretion.”85 In addition, A ndrew ’s position as au th o r of his fam ous report undoubtedly brought him prestige.86 Because o f the esteem in w hich he was then held, it m ust be realized th at Andrew s was likely to carry considerable w eight in the discussion o f reciprocity at W ashington. D espite M arcy’s optim ism there were others a t W ashington in Ju n e and July who regarded the passage o f the treaty as less assured. C ram pton reported on June 25 th at “D ouglas, Toom bs and Seward [prom inent leaders in the Senate] are by no means sanguine of its [the treaty’s] success.” T he latter had inform ed him, “th at the treaty had no chance of ratification this session, a t all events.”87 A fter an interview on July 11, C ram pton reported th at the President “was hopeful but I cannot say confident.” 88 T he W ashington correspondent of the N e w Y o rk Courier and Enquirer took it for granted in the m iddle o f July that the treaty w ould not be considered until the next session.80 W hile Elgin had undoubtedly accom plished m uch in rallying support fo r the treaty, its acceptance by Congress was by no m eans an autom atic process. Som ething rem ained to be accom plished in the realm o f persuasion. A ndrew s’s exertions during June and July w ere both ener­ getic and persevering. In close touch with M arcy, Cushing and M ason, C hairm an o f the Senatorial C om m ittee on Foreign Relations, he constantly urged them to renewed efforts to secure passage o f the treaty. M ason reported the treaty in the Senate and sponsored the bill for its passage a t the beginning of A ugust.90 But, m ost im portant o f all, was A ndrew s’s constant and energetic canvass o f senators and representatives on behalf o f the treaty. T he force of argum ent A ndrew s appears to have reinforced with a liberal use of “m aterial influence” : according to his own assertion a t least, he m ade large expenditures and undertook heavy obligations in order to secure the passage of the treaty.91 His was the w ork of keeping the m ajority up to the

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m a rk at the m om ent required. This seems clear not only from the A ndrew s file in the E lgin Papers, b u t also from much corroborative evidence. M ason asserted in 1858 th at Andrew s “w as at W ashington, I know, fo r I had a great m any interviews and conferences w ith him , while the treaty was pending, and he did render very valuable services.”02 Asked to testify to A ndrew s’s zeal in attem pting to secure the passage o f the treaty, C ram pton w rote to Elgin: “T his I willingly do as he really spared no pains o r trouble to forw ard the m atter.” 03 Even Elgin adm itted th at A ndrew s “had no doubt given him self a good deal o f trouble.”94 Sir E dm und H ead w rote to the Colonial Office in 1856: “F rom w hat I have heard on very good authority I am o f th e opinion th at but fo r his exertions there would have been great difficulty in obtaining the ratification of the treaty at W ashington.”05 Success was now close at hand. D uring the final stage o f the reciprocity m easure very little opposition was revealed in C on­ gress. O pposition in the H ouse o f Representatives, although described by A ndrew s as strenuous, was insufficient to prevent the acceptance of the m easure upon the m otion of Bayly of V irginia from the C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs on A ugust 3.06 In the Senate, the stum bling-block o f several form er m easures fo r reciprocity, the opposition was even less effective. N o t a single D em ocrat from the South opposed the treaty. Only eleven in all voted nay, and of these but two w ere D em ocrats. T he four Senators from Pennsylvania and M aryland all voted against the treaty, no doubt because the free list included coal; fortunately this objection was not of sufficient strength to swing a m ajority against the m easure.97 T he general spirit of unanim ity in the u pper cham ber was described in the N o rth A m erican R eview , which reported: There was indeed a m ost unusual and m ost felicitous co­ operation o f adverse elem ents in carrying the treaty through the Senate. M ason and Toom bs, Douglas and Seward, W higs and D em ocrats, Free-Soilers and Secessionists, N ortherners and Southerners, acted in cordial harm ony. . . . Sectionalism van­ ished fo r the tim e, and the act was sw ept through Congress with an irresistible enthusiasm , o f which our history affords no parallel.06

V. A N A L Y S I S O F T H E T R E A T Y

T h e Reciprocity T reaty was a skilfully drafted com prom ise calculated to rally support in its favour and to appease, by com pensating privileges, interests w hich w ere opposed to some o f its provisions. A rticles I and II provided for reciprocal free access to the coastal fisheries. “Salm on and shad fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers and m ouths of rivers” were, how ever, excluded, a con­ cession to the colonists upon w hich the H om e G overnm ent had insisted since 1 8 4 9 ." T w o com missioners, one appointed by each o f the H igh C ontracting Parties, w ere to settle disputes as to the application of this reserved right, o r to nam e a third person to act as um pire w hen they differed in opinion. F isher­ m en o f each nation w ere em pow ered to land upon the coasts of the other to dry their nets and cure their fish; but the rights of property and o f local fisherm en were guaranteed. T his safe­ guard had been insisted on by the British G overnm ent,100 but the actual w ording o f the clause had been first suggested by M arcy to C ram pton in A ugust, 1853.101 T o avoid opposition from M aryland it was provided th at fisherm en of one nation should not take shell-fish on the coasts of the other. British coastal fisheries on the Pacific w ere excluded from the operation o f the treaty, contrary to M arcy’s proposal of Septem ber, 1853;102 but, on the A tlantic coast, only A m erican fisheries n o rth of the thirty-sixth parallel w ere opened. This was calcu­ lated to overcom e the opposition o f F lorida, which had been largely responsible fo r the defeat of D avis’s bill in th e Senate in 1853. T h e final list of articles to be adm itted free was also a com ­ promise. T he dem ands o f C anada were fully satisfied by the inclusion of grain, flour and bread-stuffs o f all kinds; anim als of all kinds; fresh, sm oked and salted m eats; seeds and vegetables; poultry; eggs; b u tter; cheese; tallow; horns; m anures; plants, shrubs and trees. Fish was inserted to com pensate the Low er Provinces for the adm ission o f the A m ericans to their fisheries. Coal, the insertion of w hich had been insistently urged by the British and denied by the A m ericans, was included as an inducem ent to N ova Scotia.103 Seym our’s bill of 1853 had provided that tim ber should be adm itted free into th e U nited

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States only upon conditions w hich the colonies w ould never have accepted.104 But, in the treaty, the interests o f New Brunswick as well as of C anada were considered in the uncon­ ditional insertion o f “tim ber and lum ber o f all kinds, round, hewed, and sawed, unm anufactured in w hole o r in p art.” Both Seym our’s bill and M arcy’s d ra ft of Septem ber, 1853 included rice, lard, gypsum, ground o r unground, stone and m arble in its unw rought state, none o f w hich had been previously suggested. M arcy’s d raft had also included pitch, ta r and turpentine, dried fruits and firewood. These articles and unm anufactured tobacco were particularly calculated to enlist the support of the S outh.105 O n the other hand, the free list did not include printed books as proposed by C ram pton in 1852; nor did it contain unm anufac­ tured sugar and agricultural im plem ents, including axes, which had been proposed by Seym our. A m erican vessels w ere adm itted to navigation of the River St. L aw rence and C anadian canals on paym ent of charges equal to those im posed upon the vessels of H er M ajesty’s subjects. As had been always insisted, the right o f suspending this privilege was reserved to the British G overnm ent. B ut it was further provided that, during such a suspension, the A m erican G overn­ m ent could suspend the operation o f the free list in so far as C anada was affected. In such a case, how ever, the treaty rights o f th e Low er Provinces w ere to rem ain unchanged.100 To balance the opening o f the St. Law rence and C anadian canals, British subjects were freely adm itted to the navigation o f Lake M ichigan, and the A m erican G overnm ent fu rth er pledged itself to attem pt to secure the adm ission o f British shipping to state canals on term s sim ilar to those imposed upon A m erican ship­ ping. M arcy agreed to w ithdraw his previous claim o f free navigation o f the R iver St. Jo h n ;107 b u t no export duty was to be charged on A m erican lum ber floated dow n the St. John, in o rd er to com pensate the interests o f M aine fo r the rem oval of duty on colonial lum ber im ported into th e U nited States. T h e treaty did not provide fo r the free adm ission of colonial shipping to A m erican coastal privileges o r to registration, when sold in the U nited States. N o r was there any provision fo r the rem oval o f bounties to A m erican fishermen. These concessions had been widely advocated in N ew Brunsw ick and N ova Scotia and were m entioned in Elgin’s instructions as objects to be

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sought.103 But, finding M arcy adam ant, Elgin did not insist upon their insertion in the treaty. R ath er than grant the privileges of registration the A m erican G overnm ent w ould have broken off negotiations.109 T h e treaty w as to rem ain in force for ten years and further until twelve m onths after either H igh C ontracting P arty had given notice o f its intention to term inate the arrangem ent. This was a notable concession to the British G overnm ent since the article was accepted w ord for w ord as drafted by Russell in January, 1853. M arcy had only agreed to this arrangem ent in Septem ber, 1853, upon condition th at ten years should be am ended to seven.110 H e now yielded to the persuasion of L ord Elgin. C larendon had been m uch concerned lest the inclusion of N ew foundland in the treaty should give rise to com plications on account o f F rench fishing privileges on th e coast o f N ew ­ fo u ndland;111 he had even advised Elgin th a t any arrangem ent affecting th at island m ust be concluded separately. T he A m eri­ can G overnm ent, however, had insisted th at N ew foundland be included in the treaty. This difficulty Elgin and M arcy neatly avoided by declaring that th e provisions o f the treaty should extend to N ew foundland “so fa r as they are applicable to that colony.”112 Should this article be nullified by the action o f the Im perial Parliam ent, the Legislature of N ew foundland o r C on­ gress, the rem aining articles of the treaty w ere in no way to be affected.

CHAPTER 4

Zenith of the Reciprocity Movement

T h e reciprocity m ovem ent reached its zenith in the three years betw een 1854 and 1857. D uring this period the H om e G overnm ent attem pted, w ith indifferent success, to reconcile the new arrangem ent with the system o f universal free trade; b ut the treaty itself appeared to have em barked upon a career o f extrem e popularity. T he im m ediate cessation of the fishery controversy and the increased prosperity in A m erica com bined to evoke the general approval which greeted the convention, and few voices w ere raised against it in criticism . By February, 1855, the treaty had received the necessary legislative sanction from the colonies and the Im perial Parliam ent.1 W hen th at was safely accom plished British N o rth A m erica seemed abou t to enjoy an era o f friendly relations with the U nited States, the early term ination of w hich was not anticipated. Jarring notes were soon to be heard, but, in the m eantim e, conciliation and goodwill rem ained dom inant.

I. T R E A T Y P A S S E S I N T H E C O L O N I E S AND GREAT BRITAIN

I t had been stipulated in A rticle V th at the treaty should tak e effect as soon as the requisite legislation had been passed by the British Parliam ent, Congress and the colonial legislatures. Sir G eorge G rey, the Colonial Secretary, regarded w ith some apprehension the doctrine th at the assent o f the colonial legis­ latures was necessary to carry the treaty into full and entire effect. It would be dangerous, he felt, to establish a precedent by which the pow er of the C row n to m ake a treaty w ith a foreign pow er could be fettered by a colonial legislature. T he new doc­ trine m ust be interpreted w ithin proper limits. G rey therefore declared officially th at the C row n could execute a valid and

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binding treaty w ith a foreign country, and th at legislation was m erely required to abrogate existing laws inconsistent w ith the intended arrangem ent. It lay w ith the Im perial P arliam ent, he asserted, to repeal various provisions of the A ct im plem enting the Convention o f 1818, and w ith the colonial legislatures to repeal certain fishery regulations and to rem ove the duty on articles declared free under the treaty. T he Im perial Parlia­ m ent, he pointed out, was legally able to overrule such colonial legislation as was inconsistent w ith the treaty; but it w ould be co n trary to the principles which had long governed the attitude o f the British G overnm ent tow ard the colonies.2 T his deference to the colonial legislatures, in spite o f G rey's reservations, necessarily postponed the tim e when the treaty could take full effect. In the m eantim e, how ever, the British G overnm ent acceded to M arcy’s urgent request that A m erican fishermen should be im m ediately adm itted to the colonial coastal privileges: orders were at once given w ithdraw ing the British naval squadron,3 and Elgin was advised, in a m anner n ot to be gainsaid, that H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent desired that the A m ericans should a t once be adm itted to the fisheries.4 A t the sam e tim e, G rey brought strong pressure to bear upon the colonial governm ents to pass the legislation necessary to im plem ent the treaty.5 T h e colonists were now faced with the unpalatable prospect o f having their fisheries a t once throw n open, while their produce was debarred from access to the A m erican m arket until their own legislatures could give full effect to the treaty. C larendon m ay very possibly have foreseen the effect o f this policy in hastening the acceptance of the m easure in the colo­ nics. It was a phase o f the question which occurred to Elgin.® U ndoubtedly, however, C larendon’s prim e motive in opening the fisheries was the desire to com ply with the urgent request from W ashington. Since his chief object in entering the nego­ tiation had been to settle the fishery controversy, it was quite consistent that he should take im m ediate steps to avoid all possibility o f a collision in the fishing areas. But his concession to A m erican fishermen undoubtedly stim ­ ulated the legislatures of the Low er Provinces into m ore im m edi­ ate action. N o difficulty w ould have been encountered in any case from C anada.7 In the Low er Provinces, however, effective

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opposition m ight have been raised against the treaty if a contin­ uance of the fishing m onopoly had been a possible alternative. O nce the fisheries had been opened acceptance of the treaty was only a m atter of tim e.8 By the first week in N ovem ber Canada, Prince E dw ard Island and N ew Brunswick had all passed the required legislation.9 Passage of the treaty was delayed in N ew foundland only because the Legislature, occupied a t the end o f 1854 with the introduction of responsible governm ent, was unable, in the lim ited tim e afforded by a special session, to carry o ut the necessary fiscal readjustm ents. In its next regular session, however, the treaty was duly passed.10 T h e Executive and Legislature o f N ova Scotia w ere in a truculent fram e of m ind, chiefly because they had not been represented in W ashington during the negotiations, while H incks and C handler had been present to advise L ord Elgin. T h e failure of N ova Scotia to be represented a t W ashington was apparently the result of a m isunderstanding. Elgin had w ritten twice to both L e M archant and H ead, advising the dispatch of delegates to m eet him in N ew Y ork.11 U nfortunately C ram pton, through the A dm inistrator o f C anada, on A pril 10 instructed the colonies not to send representatives to W ashington until fu rth er notice.12 U nlike Sir E dm und H ead, Le M archant and his governm ent regarded C ram pton’s advice as taking prece­ dence over Elgin’s and decided not to m ove w ithout fresh instructions from W ashington.13 L e M archant and Elgin tw id­ dled th eir respective thum bs in H alifax and N ew Y ork, each waiting for the other to move. A fter vainly awaiting the N ova Scotian delegates fo r three days, Elgin proceeded to W ashington with H incks and Chandler. T his com edy o f errors proved to be a blessing in disguise. It was unlikely th a t the advice of the N ova Scotian delegates could have exerted m uch influence upon E lgin’s conduct o f the negotiations. T he delegates had been sum m oned, in the letters from L ondon, not to decide w hat the term s o f the treaty should be, b ut simply to provide H ead and Le M archant w ith a viva voce channel fo r com m unicating to Elgin any inform ation which they wished to im part.14 O n the other hand, as the oppo­ sition to the treaty developed in N ova Scotia, it becam e appar­ ent th at fortuitous circum stances had placed the G overnm ent in a m ost advantageous position.

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T he treaty encountered bitter opposition in the N ova Scotian L egislature, not only because o f its actual term s, but also on account of the high-handed m anner in which the negotiations had been conducted.15 How e and Johnston united in an unholy alliance to pour o ut the vials of their w rath upon the overbearing action o f the H om e G overnm ent. But Young, the A ttorneyG eneral, who piloted the treaty through the H ouse, took full advantage of the strong position in w hich circum stances had placed the G overnm ent. F ree of responsibility fo r the form of the treaty, he was able to advocate its acceptance, but at the sam e tim e to criticize both its term s and the m anner in which the negotiations had been conducted. All this, however, m ust be accepted as a fa it accom pli. T he fact rem ained, he asserted, that N ova Scotia had no choice but to pass o r reject the treaty in toto. Should the latter alternative be adopted, Elgin would hasten to negotiate a treaty leaving out the province. Even in its present form , concluded Y oung, the treaty, providing a free m arket fo r the agricultural produce and m ineral w ealth o f the colony, would be o f im m ense value to N ova Scotia. T o reject it would, he felt, be a suicidal policy. T he m easure was passed in the A ssembly on D ecem ber 12 by 34 to 12; on the following day it was accepted by the Legis­ lative Council and received the L ieutenant-G overnor’s assent.16 Y oung’s astute presentation of the case and the obvious advan­ tages o f the treaty to N ova Scotia undoubtedly carried weight with the Legislature. T he deciding factor, however, which rendered the result a foregone conclusion before the com m ence­ m ent o f debate, w as the know ledge that effective protection of the fisheries was no longer possible. T here is no reason to doubt the evidence o f a m em orandum in the H ow e Papers, in which it is asserted th at the m ajority supported the treaty because, now th at everything they valued was gone, they were naturally anxious to get som ething in re tu rn .17 I t only rem ained fo r the British P arliam ent to accept the treaty. H ere no opposition was offered, and the bill im plem ent­ ing the arrangem ent was passed in F ebruary, 1855.18

II. M A G N A N I M I T Y AT W A S H I N G T O N

W hat prom ised to be a fruitful source o f discontent in the Low er Provinces was rem oved by the conciliatory action o f the A m erican G overnm ent. L e M archant and D aly, in the autum n o f 1854, strongly supported by C larendon, pressed C ram pton to secure the im m ediate concession of treaty privileges by the U nited States to the colonies, since the A m ericans had already been adm itted to the fisheries.19 It was, they contended, m ost unfair, that fish taken by A m erican fishermen on the coasts of th e colonies should enter th e U nited States free, while those taken by colonial fishermen continued to pay duty. M arcy was a t first doubtful, on constitutional grounds, of his ability to rem edy the situation. M oreover, the T reasury D epartm ent had already announced on Septem ber 19 th at duties on the enum er­ ated articles w ould continue to be charged until the treaty actually took effect.20 H ow ever, ju st as C larendon was preparing to press the claims of the colonists w ith renew ed vigour, a solution was reached. C ram pton, on O ctober 9, suggested to M arcy the pos­ sibility o f Congress rem itting the duty on fish from the colonies in an A ct w hich should be retrospective in effect.21 M arcy agreed to give this plan his support.22 T he T reasury D epartm ent accordingly on O ctober 16 instructed custom s collectors to issue receipts for the paym ent o f duty upon fish im ported from the colonies o r to allow them to be w arehoused under bond. T his action was o f course taken in the expectation th at a sub­ sequent A ct o f Congress w ould provide fo r the repaym ent of the duty and the discharge of the bonds.23 T his arrangem ent was eventually extended to all articles enum erated in the free list o f th e treaty. T he C anadian G overn­ m ent had determ ined on O ctober 18 to adm it the enum erated articles from the U nited States under special bonds payable only if the treaty did not go into effect w ithin six m onths.24 In view of this action M arcy acceded to C ram pton’s request that A m erican custom s officers be instructed to adm it goods im ported from C anada upon term s sim ilar to those already extended to fish from the colonies.25 T he arrangem ent was subsequently extended to N ew Brunsw ick and N ova Scotia, in

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w hich provision w as m ade fo r the im m ediate free admission u nder bond o f the goods enum erated in the treaty.26 Finally, upon recom m endation o f the President,27 Congress fulfilled the assurances which M arcy had already given to the provincial governm ents. A n am endm ent to the A ct im plem ent­ ing the treaty was passed and, on M arch 2, approved by the President.23 By this am endm ent, the Secretary of the T reasury was em powered, w hen the treaty should go into effect, to refund the duty on “fish of all kinds, the products of fish, and all other creatures living in the w ater” im ported into the U nited States from the five colonies on and afte r Septem ber 11, the date of the prom ulgation by the President of the Reciprocity T reaty. T h e Secretary was em powered also to cancel w arehouse bonds on these articles. Similarly was he to rem it the duty and cancel the w arehouse bonds on all enum erated articles im ported from C anada, N ew Brunsw ick and N ova Scotia since the dates of th eir respective A cts adm itting the sam e products free o f duty from the U nited States. Sim ilar privileges were to be extended to P rince Edw ard Island and N ew foundland if it were proven to the Secretary that these provinces had adm itted all the enum erated articles free from the U nited States before the treaty w ent into operation. N either, how ever, took advantage o f this provision.

III. T H E B R IT IS H G O V E R N M E N T LO O K S BACK

It was during this period between 1854 and 1857 that the Colonial Office attem pted to rem ove the anom alies w hich had been created by the Reciprocity T reaty. It will be recalled that the concession of fiscal privileges to the U nited States by the colonies had involved the establishm ent of differential duties against G reat Britain, other portions of the Em pire and foreign countries. T he activities o f W. H . M erritt in 1855 provided an indication of w here this breach in the system of universal free trad e m ight be leading. As C hairm an o f a C om m ittee o f T rade and C om m erce o f the C anadian Legislature, M erritt endeav­ oured to secure reciprocal agreem ents w ith various other British colonies, and his proposals were received with enthusiasm by

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a num ber o f the W est Indian governm ents. These projected agreem ents would of course have involved the imposition of fu rth er differential duties against non-participating portions of the E m pire and foreign countries. H itherto the H om e G ov­ ernm ent h ad draw n a fine distinction between principle and practice in the com m ercial policy o f th e Em pire. N either the intercolonial reciprocity agreem ent of 1850 (see pages xiv-xv) n o r the Reciprocity T reaty was believed to affect the position of universal free trade as the dom inant principle of im perial com ­ m ercial policy. Obviously, however, if the Reciprocity T reaty were to be succeeded by sim ilar agreem ents between particular colonies it m ust be regarded not as a special concession, b u t as the first step tow ard the adoption w ithin the E m pire o f a com ­ m ercial policy w hich could n o t be reconciled w ith universal free trade. A halt, decided th e Colonial Office, m ust be called at once. T he British G overnm ent put dow n a firm official foot and prohibited further m easures o f intercolonial reciprocity involving differential duties.29 F o r the tim e being its w ord was law and M erritt’s am bitious projects cam e to nothing. T h e prohibition o f fu rth er differential duties was followed in 1856 by an attem pt o f the Colonial Office to rem ove those w hich already existed. T he H om e G overnm ent was only too well aw are th a t M erritt’s proposals were a logical corollary to th e establishm ent o f differential duties by the R eciprocity T reaty itself. T herefore, in accordance w ith a suggestion throw n o u t by M olesw orth in 1855,30 a determ ined effort was m ade in July, 1856, to repair the shattered strands of im perial com m ercial policy, by the rem oval o f th e offending duties. In a circular dispatch of July 15 L abouchere urged the five participating colonial governm ents to consider the rem oval of all im port duties on the articles enum erated in the treaty.31 N ova Scotia, he adm itted, had partly m et the situation by the passage of 15 Viet. cap. 2, w hich authorized the L ieutenant-G overnor to announce th e free adm ission o f the enum erated articles from foreign countries w hich had extended sim ilar privileges to the province. But som e differential duties still rem ained: these, he asserted, violated the m ost favoured nation rights o f several countries and encouraged propositions, such as M erritt’s, which w ere a t variance w ith econom ic principles. Labouchere’s proposal did not evoke conspicuous enthusi­

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asm from the colonies. T he C anadian G overnm ent regarded the question as a m atter n o t of principle, b u t of practical expedi­ ency. Labouchere had adm itted th at the am ount o f revenue involved was sm all and that the largest p art of it was derived from dried fruit, the im portations o f which w ere chiefly from countries other than the U nited States, including the United K ingdom and the British colonies. T herefore, as the differential duties caused little practical inconvenience, the C anadian G ov­ ernm ent could see no reason to forfeit revenue by rem oving them .82 T h e response from the other colonies was equally unsatis­ factory. L e M archant o f N ova Scotia adm itted that it was desirable to correct th e anom alies arising out of the treaty, but anticipated opposition to the free im portation o f enum erated articles from non-reciprocating countries.33 N o official notice o f L abouchere’s proposal was taken in the dispatches from N ew Brunswick to the Colonial Office.34 T he action of the N ew ­ foundland Legislature also fell sh o rt of L abouchere’s request: the offending duties were rem oved from the enum erated arti­ cles, not when im ported from any country w hatsoever, but only when im ported from the U nited K ingdom , the fo u r British N o rth A m erican colonies and the Channel Islands.35 Only P rince E dw ard Island com plied w ith the wishes of the British G overnm ent, after the Board o f T rade had declared inadequate a proposal from the Island to pass an A ct sim ilar to 15 Viet, cap. 2 in N o v a Scotia. By the year 1858 all the articles enum er­ ated in the treaty had been included in the general free list of the Island.36 T h e colonies, w ith one exception, had all opposed L abouchere’s recom m endation by a virtual policy of passive resistance. N o t yet h ad they ventured, in the face o f British opposition, to take active m easures involving additional differ­ ential duties. But they w ere equally unwilling, even upon the recom m endation of the H om e G overnm ent, to undertake active m easures fo r the rem oval o f those differential duties which already existed. Passive resistance was soon to be replaced by active opposition, and the colonies were to gain the right to follow the dictates o f their own com m ercial policy.

IV . P O P U L A R I T Y O F T H E T R E A T Y

W hile the British G overnm ent strove to rem ove the anom a­ lies created by reciprocity, the treaty itself had entered upon three years of com parative freedom from criticism , the only period of tranquillity in the whole course of its troubled his­ tory.37 C om parative harm ony prevailed in the British N o rth A m erican fishing areas and C om m ander L am bert o f H er M ajesty’s navy reported, in 1855, that he had seen several hundred fishing vessels on the fishing grounds in the vicinity o f Prince Edw ard Island and that the utm ost harm ony appeared to prevail between the fisherm en o f the tw o countries, while diligently pursuing their calling.38 D uring these early years the treaty was w ell received in the U nited States, w here great relief was felt that a satisfactory settlem ent o f this question h ad been reached.30 I t was popular also fo r reasons other than th a t of relief a t avoiding a collision. A n Oswego firm w rote to M erritt th at the treaty w ould u n ­ doubtedly becom e “exceedingly popular in its practical opera­ tion.”40 M yron D . C lark, G overnor o f N ew Y ork, inform ed H ead a t the end o f 1856 “th at the operation of the treaty was highly beneficial to them .”41 P resident Pierce, in his message o f D ecem ber, 1856, declared th at the treaty had given an immense im petus to trade between the U nited States and the colonies.42 Even from A m erican consulates, w hich later exerted their influence against th e treaty, cam e favourable reports, including th at of D orw in, w ho w rote from M ontreal: T he recent m ost wise and im portant Reciprocity Treaty is rapidly producing great and beneficial results between the two countries, and is quietly but effectually transform ing these fine provinces into States o f the Union, - com m ercially speaking.i3 T he treaty was, of course, even m ore p opular in British A m erica. W. H . M erritt, although he desired to extend the scope of reciprocity, was m ore than gratified with the operation o f the treaty so far as it w ent. In 1855 he asserted “its beneficent effect on both sides o f the boundary, has exceeded the expectations o f its m ost sanguine prom oters.”44 Sir E dm und H ead assured Labouchere in January, 1857, th a t the treaty had been of benefit

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to C anada;45 while N ew Brunswick in from the colonies States. H e asserted

L ieutenant-G overnor Sutton reported from January th at the surplus o f lum ber and fish had found a ready m arket in the U nited w ith glowing optim ism,

abundant p ro o f has been afforded that still greater benefits m ay hereafter be expected fro m the operation o f this treaty.4C D arling of N ew foundland assured L abouchere in A ugust, 1856, th at very prom ising inferences had been draw n from the effect of the treaty upon exports to the U nited States.47 In 1857 he rejoiced in the fact th at access to the A m erican m arket had sustained and augm ented the value of fish from N ew foundland during a period w hen unusual abundance would otherw ise have reduced it.48 D aly o f Prince E dw ard Island reported to L ord John Russell in A pril, 1855, th at the general acceptance of the treaty had been greeted w ith “ universal satisfaction in this Island.”49 Even N ova Scotia, despite a rankling sense o f injus­ tice, settled down to enjoy the benefits o f reciprocity. Oliphant, on a visit to A m erica in 1856, reported th at H ow e adm itted the treaty to be of im m ense advantage to the colony.50 W hen its renewal was un d er discussion, the N ova Scotian Executive, although they w anted readjustm ents, adm itted th at the treaty had been o f benefit to the colonies as well as to the U nited States.51 A lready, however, in C anada, there was evidence o f the pro­ tectionist m ovem ent w hich was soon to be the apple o f discord in C anadian-A m erican relations. Even M erritt, erstwhile advo­ cate o f free trade, had discovered th at C anada was suited to the developm ent o f m anufactures. A lthough professedly desirous o f m ore com plete reciprocal free trade, he proposed that, failing to secure it, C anada should raise h er im port duties on m anu­ factures to the A m erican level.32 O thers w ere less unblushing in their advocacy of protection. M erritt, in his rep o rt on trade and com m erce of M ay, 1855, quoted a letter from C. H atch of K ingston w ho strongly advocated higher duties on articles w hich could be m anufactured in C anada and a corresponding reduction o f duty on raw m aterial. T hree years later the A sso­ ciation fo r the Prom otion of C anadian Industry was to base its policy upon this principle. Jacob N oble and others o f St. C atharines, in a petition presented to the Legislature on M ay 2,

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1856, dem anded a tariff of not less than twenty-five p er cent on A m erican m anufactures.03 T he St. Catharines Journal took up the cry for protection w ith enthusiasm . A lready in September, 1855, the Journal com plained of the “fearful reduction” in revenue as a result of the treaty.54 By N ovem ber it had pro­ gressed to the opinion th a t the existing duty of twelve and a half p er cent was m ost inadequate to protect C anadian industry w hich required a duty o f thirty p er cent on m anufactures.55 T h ere was trouble in the offing w hen even this forem ost p ro ­ tagonist of reciprocity could have swung so decidedly in favour of C anadian protectionism w hich was shortly to prove the original cause of the m ovem ent in the U nited States against the Reciprocity T reaty.

ii Reciprocity in Decline ( 1857-1866)

CHAPTER 5

The Turning Point

I. T H E F I S C A L C H A N G E S O F 1 858 A N D

1859

E arly hopes o f a tranquil progress fo r the Reciprocity T reaty proved unjustified. Scarcely was it established w hen the econom ic depression o f 1857 com bined w ith the growth of protectionism in C anada to prejudice the treaty’s chances of popularity, and to initiate a train o f circum stances which led ultim ately to its dow nfall. T he effects of the com m ercial crisis, prevalent as it was in both E urope and A m erica,1 were felt in every colony, but particularly in Canada. “Shop bills,” asserted H ead, “rem ained unpaid, and goods lay unsold on the hands of the im porter. . . . A s a m atter o f course, im portations fell off, and com m erce was paralyzed. . . .”2 It was inevitable th at this decline in trad e should be accom ­ panied by a considerable reduction in provincial revenues. U nfortunately also this sudden unexpected decrease in revenue occurred at a tim e when a very am bitious railway program m e had saddled C anada with heavy obligations. M uch of the pres­ sure on the ways and m eans of the province was caused by the necessity o f paying the interest on this debt. T he indirect public debt o f C anada in 1858 was £ 7 ,6 3 0 ,6 4 3 bearing sLx per cent interest. P rio r to 1857 this had not been a charge upon the revenue. Owing, how ever, to the com m ercial depression, it becam e necessary in 1857 to m ake large paym ents to cover the interest, and in 1858 alm ost the whole am ount of interest had to be m et from the general revenue. G alt realized in 1859 that the indirect debt m ust, for m any years, be a charge upon the country.3 A t this tim e, also, m any m unicipalities in the province were unable to m eet the interest paym ents on debts w hich they had contracted under the M unicipal L oan Fund. This loan had been sponsored, though not guaranteed, by the province, in ord er th at the m unicipalities could obtain better term s on their

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united credit than would have been possible to each as an indi­ vidual borrow er. D efault o f its obligations by the fund would undoubtedly, how ever, have dealt a serious blow to C anadian credit. T hough not legally bound to do so the province made large advances to enable the fund to m eet its interest paym ents.4 F rom a num ber o f causes C anada was, therefore, in desperate need o f increased revenue a t the very tim e when her revenues, under the existing tariff, had been considerably decreased. T h e need o f increased revenue coincided in C anada w ith a new strength and aggressiveness on the p art o f the P rotection­ ists. T h e m ovem ent had appeared in the sam e chaotic period after 1846, out o f which had developed also the desire fo r reci­ procity w ith th e U nited States. Since th e repeal o f the Corn Laws, Isaac B uchanan o f H am ilton h ad consistently advocated a nationalist protectionist policy for Canada. T he repo rt of M erritt’s Com m ittee on T ra d e in 1855 showed the influence of B uchanan’s opinions (see pages 5 6-57). In 1858, under B uchanan’s leadership, the Society for th e D evelopm ent of C anadian Industry brought considerable pressure to bear upon the G overnm ent for effective protection to C anadian m anufac­ tures. A public m eeting o f delegates was convened in T oronto on A pril 14, 1858, “to consider the necessity of re-adjusting the present Custom s T ariff o f D uties.” U nder B uchanan’s in­ spiration, the m eeting passed a series o f resolutions in which it asserted th at th e present tariff was based on erroneous principles, adm itting as it does, at low rates o f duty, the m anufactures o f other countries, that can be m ade by a class o f labour now in Canada, unfitted fo r agricultural pursuits, and charging high rates on articles that cannot be produced in the country, thereby preventing the developm ent o f the natural resources o f the colony, as well as injuring Canada as a field fo r Im m igration. T he meeting therefore proposed a radical revision of the C ana­ dian tariff w hereby the duty should be increased to twenty-five o r thirty per cent on m anufactures of w ood, iron, tin, brass, copper, leather, india-rubber, etc., which could be produced in C anada. O n the other hand, raw m aterial and tea, coffee, sugar and molasses were to be adm itted free o r a t a very low rate of duty. A com m ittee of five, headed by Buchanan, was appointed

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to press this policy upon the G overnm ent.5 It was not surpris­ ing, therefore, that, in dealing with the necessity of increased revenue, the G overnm ent should seize the opportunity to satisfy the Protectionists whose dem ands had becom e so insistent. Cayley, Inspector-G eneral in 1858, and G alt, his successor, m et the situation by raising the duty chiefly upon the class of im ports which had been suggested by Buchanan and the P ro ­ tectionists.6 T he list included a large num ber o f m anufactured products which C anada had im ported heavily from the U nited States. C hief am ong these were wood, iron and hardw are, m achinery, leather, m usical instrum ents, tobacco, clothing, cotton and woollens. T he duty on m ost o f these articles was raised from fifteen per cent in 1856 to tw enty per cent in 1859, while a few, including clothing and leather, w ere raised to twenty-five per cent. C om pared w ith the A m erican tariff these duties were still m oderate. I t was the choice o f articles on which the increased duties w ere im posed which, from the A m erican point of view proved so unfortunate. A t the sam e tim e G alt, whose interests and sym pathies lay with M ontreal rath er than w ith T oronto and C anada W est, attem pted to increase trade by w ay o f the St. Law rence.7 D uties on articles o f foreign production such as tea, coffee, molasses and sugar were changed from specific to ad valorem , while a new m ethod of assessing ad valorem duties was adopted: these were now charged according to the value of a product in the m arket w here last bought instead of in the country from which it was originally exported. By these m eans it was hoped th at an increased flow o f im portations would enter C anada directly by sea and the St. Law rence route rather than by w ay of the U nited States. A s a further inducem ent to trade to follow the C anadian route, G alt in 1860 instituted the policy o f refunding ninety per cent o f the tolls charged on a vessel passing through the W elland C anal on the dow n journey if it continued to the St. Lawrence, and of charging only ten per cent of the tolls upon one which cam e from the St. Law rence.8 T h e fiscal additions o f 1858 and 1859 precipitated the tfam ous N ew castle-G alt controversy. A fter a mild protest N ew ­ castle, on the advice of the B oard of T rade, accepted G alt’s explanation that the additions were really the result of financial necessity on the p art of the C anadian G overnm ent.0 This was a

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repetition o f the sam e plea which had been advanced by the Canadian G overnm ent at least ten years earlier: E arl G rey, in 1848, after objecting to the C anadian tariff, had professedly accepted it for the necessity o f revenue.10 G alt, how ever, had com m enced his reply to N ew castle’s protest with an incisive vindication of C anadian autonom y.11 It was undoubtedly of considerable significance that G alt’s sweeping statem ent went quite unchallenged by Newcastle. His com plete silence in the face of this declaration m ade it clear th at the Colonial Office itself was reluctant to engage in further struggles w ith Canada over the question o f fiscal autonom y.12 Y et so long as the dom inant position o f the Board of T rade rem ained unchallenged colonial fiscal autonom y could not be regarded as unquestionably established. Since 1850, w hen Earl G rey had revived the practice of calling upon the Board to act as a deliberative body, its advice had been treated w ith the utm ost deference by the Colonial Office. In 1860 the Board was still uncom prom isingly opposed to the fu rth er establishm ent of differential and protective duties by the colonies. G alt’s attem pt in 1860 to establish intercolonial reciprocity directly involved the issue not only over protective duties but also, unlike his controversy of 1859, the question of differential duties as well. H is project evoked a stern protest from the Board, which asserted th at H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent should not consent to free trade in the produce and m anufactures of the colonies unless the resultant exem ptions from duty were extended to all sim ilar produce and m anufactures of all countries. T he Colonial Office tacitly endorsed this statem ent of policy by forw arding it to Sir E dm und H ead.13 N o t yet was N ew castle prepared to challenge the suprem acy o f the Board of T rade. T h e rem oval o f this last im portant barrier to colonial fiscal autonom y occurred at the end o f 1861. In Septem ber o f that y ear N ew Brunsw ick revived the issue over differential duties by subm itting to the Colonial Office a project for intercolonial free trade am ong the Low er Provinces.14 T he com bined influ­ ence of this proposal and G alt’s intercolonial project in the previous year, com ing as they did at the end of a long agitation, impelled N ew castle into decisive action. O n N ovem ber 5, 1861, w ithout any reservations on the score o f differential o r protec­ tive duties, he inform ed G ordon, S utton’s successor, th at no

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opposition would be offered “to any well-advised m easure which the several G overnm ents m ay think proper to adopt for pro ­ m oting a free com m ercial intercourse between the different provinces.”15 N ew castle gave his sanction not only to M aritim e com m ercial union, but to a broader project which should include C anada also. On the sam e date M onck was inform ed that H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent felt “no wish to offer an ob­ stacle to any endeavour w hich m ay be m ade by the respective Provincial G overnm ents to bring about a free com m ercial intercourse between the N o rth A m erican Provinces.” 10 T h e Board o f T rade, uncom prom ising opponents o f dif­ ferential and protective duties, was confronted w ith a fait accom pli and its suprem acy in the sphere o f com m ercial policy successfully challenged. N ew castle’s concession was an epochal landm ark on the p ath to dom inion autonom y. T he imposition o f differential duties in favour o f the W est Indies or foreign nations w ould probably have been opposed by the Colonial Office at this tim e.17 Y et great im portance m ust be attached to N ew castle’s acceptance of differential duties in so fa r as they m ight be involved in a general m easure of intercolonial reciprocity in British N o rth A m erica. T he significance o f this concession lies in the fact th at it was m ade a t a tim e when the political union o f the colonies was by no m eans assured. N o t until twelve years later did the A ustralian Colonies fight out the sam e issue w ith the Colonial Office. It m ay fu rth er be noted th at N ew castle m ade no stipulation against the adoption o f the C anadian tariff by the Low er Colonies, although the Board of T rad e was strongly opposed to such a m easure.18 As the Board had predicted in I8 6 0 ,10 the precedent established by Newcastle, in allowing w ider fiscal powers to the colonies, was destined to increase the difficulty o f resisting further breaches in the system o f free trade. By the concession of 1861 the way was prepared fo r the wide m easure of fiscal autonom y w hich the H om e G overnm ent six years later conceded to confederated C anada.

II. M O V E M E N T A G A I N S T T H E T R E A T Y IN T H E U N IT E D STATES

T he com m ercial policy of Cayley and G alt gave rise in the U nited States to an agitation which never died out until the Reciprocity T reaty had been abrogated. C ertain classes would inevitably have opposed the treaty. Even before the imposition o f the Cayley tariff the H ouse o f Representatives, upon the m otion of M r. M orrill o f V erm ont, later the author o f the M orrill protectionist tariff, had instructed the Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs to consider the expediency o f abrogating the treaty because o f its disastrous effect upon the tim ber and graingrowing regions of the U nited States.20 M oreover, th e H on. I. T . H atch asserted in 1860 th a t the farm ing and lum bering interests strongly resented C anadian com petition.21 It was inevitable also th a t the forw arding and shipping interests of Buffalo and Philadelphia should regard w ith extrem e jealousy the com petition providecTby the St. L aw rence route and by the G ran d T ru n k Railway. I t was anticipated th at the com pletion o f the V ictoria Bridge a t M ontreal in 1860 w ould furth er increase the danger of com petition from the G rand T ru n k .22 But the apprehensions o f the transportation interests w ere fur­ th er excited by G alt’s m ethod o f assessing ad valorem duties, w hich was adm ittedly calculated to benefit the St. L aw rence.23 H is policy of rem oving tolls was regarded as a deliberate discrim ination against A m erican shipping.24 T o this body of opposition was added the pow erful influence of the m anufac­ tu ring interests, particularly at. Buffalo, w ho blam ed The (Tana- , dian tarifT for the decline in t heir exportation o f such products as fu rn itu re stovesTclothing, boots, and shoes.25 T he increase in duty n ot only converted the m anufacturers into bitter and aggressive enemies of the treaty, but provided against it a m oral argum ent w hich served as a rallying cry for the various elements of opposition. As already shown, am ong the farm ing and lum bering interests discontent w ith the effects of reciprocity existed in other parts of the U nited States during this early period of agitation. But it is doubtful w hether the influence o f these outside elements could ever have been co-ordinated sufficiently to be effective w ithout the leadership o f the com pact and aggressive party in the

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State of N ew Y ork. D onahue, the British Consul in Buffalo, reported both in 1860 and 1862 that, except in Buffalo and the eastern lake ports, opposition to the treaty was not form idable. On the contrary he asserted that opinion in the north-w est strongly favoured the m aintenance of the treaty.20 R epresenta­ tions to the President in 1860 from Senator Rice of M innesota supported this contention.27 T he H on. Elijah W ard of N ew Y ork, in a general analysis o f opinion in the north and west in 1862, claim ed that, on the whole, A m erican opinion favoured a revision of the Reciprocity T reaty. H e quoted, m oreover, only one really em phatic declaration against the existent treaty from outside the State o f N ew Y ork.28 U nfortunately the leaven of opposition in the State of N ew Y ork was one which effectively perm eated the U nited States. O pponents o f the reciprocity convention rallied the opposition w ith the claim th at C anada had violated the spirit of the treaty. It was alleged th at the contracting parties had reached a tacit agreem ent that C anada should not unduly raise her tariff against A m erican im ports. Otherwise, it was claim ed, the U nited States would never have agreed to an arrangem ent which did not ensure the principal com pensating advantages which the U nited States was likely to obtain. T his outcry initiated a steady pro ­ cess which began w ith a critical exam ination o f the effects of reciprocity, and w hich resulted in a growing sentim ent against the treaty. T h e repercussions of C anadian com m ercial policy soon became alarm ingly evident in the U nited States. In February, 1859, the Senate passed the resolution, proposed by K ing of N ew Y ork, in which the C om m ittee on F inance was instructed to consider w hether the recent fiscal changes in C anada w ere not inconsistent w ith the spirit of the treaty, and w hether notice o f abrogation should not be given at the earliest m om ent authorized by its stipulations.29 N apier, the British M inister at W ashington, reported a t the sam e time th at discontent excited by Cayley’s action m ight result in a serious m ovem ent against the Reciprocity T reaty.30 In O ctober, 1859, the Constitution, the organ of President Buchanan’s adm inistration, suggested the possibility of an im m ediate partial or total abrogation. A lthough disavowed by the adm inistration, this article clearly indicated the course which public opinion was taking.31 M ore alarm ing

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still, the H ouse o f Representatives, accepting the resolution proposed by Ely o f N ew Y ork, requested the P resident to fur­ nish inform ation as to w hether C anada had violated the spirit o f the Reciprocity T reaty and w hether, in his opinion, it was advisable to am end o r rescind the third article.32 T he H on. I. T. H atc h was accordingly ordered by the Secretary of the T reasury to investigate the question. H atch, whose hom e was in Buffalo, presented a report strongly adverse to the m aintenance of the treaty. H e regarded it as the instrum ent o f a sinister and form idable conspiracy to divert A m erica’s trade to British lines. Enabled by the treaty to open a prosperous grain trade between the w estern and eastern states, C anada he asserted had undertaken an am bitious pro­ gram m e of inland com m unications to control this trade. By levying upon im portations from the U nited States unfair duties, w hich H atch seemed to regard as being paid by the A m erican producer, C anada obtained the revenue necessary to finance her program m e of public works. G alt’s new system of assessing ad valorem duties was described as an illegitimate phase o f this giant conspiracy. T hough he considered the attem pts to benefit the St. Law rence as abortive, H atch was disposed to regard the com petition from the G rand T ru n k w ith m ore concern. T he fiscal additions of G alt and Cayley were branded as violating not only the spirit, but also the letter of the treaty. O n the other hand, H atch contended th at the advantages derived from the arrangem ent by the U nited States w ere negligible, while the A m erican coal and lum ber interests had suffered from C anadian com petition. H e proposed an im m ediate term ination o f the Reciprocity T reaty.33 This rep o rt dem ands fu rth er com m ent. I t was, o f course, quite true, but by no m eans a secret, th at the am bitious building program m e o f C anada was calculated to divert the carrying trade from the A m erican route. G alt, M erritt and K eefer all adm itted this quite openly.34 U ndoubtedly, also, this building program m e had necessitated additions to the tariff which were, however, paid by the C anadian consum er and not, as H atch suggested, by the A m erican producer. W hether, in encouraging the St. Law rence route, the Canadians were taking an unfair advantage o f the existing agreem ent was open to question: although the transportation interests of Buffalo m ight object to

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C anadian com petition, it was obviously to the advantage o f the A m erican north-w est to secure reduced freight rates. G reater difficulty is provided by the question w hether, in raising the duty on A m erican m anufactures, C anada had vio­ lated the spirit o f the treaty. D uring the reciprocity negotiations the tacit consent of A m erican m anufacturers had been obtained by assurances th at an increased sale of their products in Canada m ust inevitably follow the inrush o f C anadian free goods into the U nited States (see page 4 1 ). H ad it been foreseen that higher C anadian duties would be imposed, the treaty would undoubtedly have encountered greater opposition from the m anufacturers. C anada was, o f course, legally entitled to alter h er tariff on m anufactures as she pleased. N evertheless, as Dr. S hortt points out, the change in C anadian policy had affected w hat the A m ericans regarded as their advantage un d er the treaty, while A m erican duties on m anufactures had not affected the basis o f C anadian advantage from the treaty, w hich lay in the export of free goods.35 H ere it m ay be pointed out th a t all the charges o f violating the treaty were n o t on one side. In C anada it was charged that the A m erican G overnm ent had m ade no attem pt, in accordance w ith A rticle IV o f the treaty, to secure the adm ission of colonial shipping to state canals on equal term s w ith th at of th e U nited States.30 In 185S the T reasury D epartm ent dem anded consular certificates o f origin, a t a fee o f two dollars each, on shipm ents to the U nited States of C anadian produce fo r which exem ption from d uty was claim ed under the term s o f the treaty. U ntil the rem oval o f this regulation two years later, loud protests were raised in C anada against this allegedly u n fair im pedim ent to trad e.37 F u rth e r com plaints w ere raised in C anada against the rigidity o f the T reasury D epartm ent in interpreting the term s of the treaty. Boards and planks, although only planed, tongued or grooved in w hole o r in p art w ere declared to be m anufactured and, therefore, subject to duty; while, afte r 1858, flour m anu­ factured in C anada from A m erican w heat was denied free access to the U nited States because it did not satisfy the term s o f the treaty as being the grow th and produce o f C anada.38 T h e C anadian charge in reference to A rticle IV was never authoritatively denied and appears to have been quite justified. T h e A m erican G overnm ent seems to have m ade no attem pt to

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secure the adm ission o f colonial shipping to state canals on equal term s w ith th at o f the U nited States. M oreover, just as the fiscal increases in C anada provided an unforeseen obstacle to A m erican m anufactures, so, it m ight be argued, the requirem ent o f consular certificates between 1858 and 1860 created an equally unexpected obstacle to the export o f C anadian produce into the U nited States. T h e question o f the justice of this regu­ lation is not, however, o f great relative im portance, since it was only in force for two years. T he other two com plaints were charges of violating the spirit of the treaty. Both were questions o f departm ental adm inistration, and in each issue there was a legitim ate case fo r the T reasury D epartm ent’s interpretation o f the treaty. T he C anadian G overnm ent on its p art had been no m o re liberal in its interpretation o f “turpentine,” w hich it restricted to the raw product.30 In the absence of pre-treaty assurances, virtual o r otherw ise, in regard to these issues it w ould be difficult to establish the validity of the C anadian charges. A p art from the question o f abstract justice, the grievances o f C anada are not im portant in the history of the Reciprocity T reaty. A ttention was diverted from them and concentrated on the A m erican com plaints, since it was the U nited States which subsequently abrogated the treaty. T o offset the influence of H atch, Jam es W. T aylor of St. Paul subm itted a rep o rt in M ay, I860.40 T aylor denied th at Canada had been guilty of bad faith in her relations with the U nited States. Since the articles enum erated in the treaty w ere not affected by the increase in duties, he claim ed that the C anadian G overnm ent was quite w ithin its rights. It was ridiculous, he asserted, for the U nited States to com plain of the m oderate C anadian tariff when the corresponding A m erican duties were very m uch higher. In spite of this counterblast, H atch’s report probably im­ parted considerable im petus to the m ovem ent against the treaty.41 Tw o years later his influence was still so potent that W ard, in a sim ilar report to Congress, used several o f his statis­ tical tables and substantially repeated his views on the operation o f the treaty.42 W ard differed only from H atch in advocating a revision of the treaty and not its abrogation. T he H on. F. A. Pike of M aine, attacking the treaty in Congress several m onths

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later, again recapitulated the argum ents of H atch, but concluded like W ard that a new arrangem ent was desirable.43 A t the advent of the A m erican Civil W ar the Reciprocity T reaty was, therefore, in a precarious position.44 A m erican con­ fidence in the good faith and future intentions o f the C anadian G overnm ent h ad received a severe shock. T he operation of the treaty had been subjected to critical exam ination and was re­ garded in m any quarters as unsatisfactory. W hile public opinion was seriously divided, interested classes had taken advantage of this uncertainty to com m ence a vigorous agitation. T he H atch report appeared to confirm the wildest suspicions of the treaty’s operation. T he return o f the Republicans to pow er in 1860 m ade it certain th at the futu re of reciprocity w ould be entrusted to a governm ent com m itted in principle to protection. As yet a strong body o f opinion favoured revision ra th e r than abroga­ tion; but w hether this view w ould prevail was already doubtful.

CHAPTER 6

Last Stage of the Movement Against the Treaty

W hen the future o f the treaty had already becom e a m atter o f grave uncertainty the outbreak o f civil w ar in A m erica fu rth er jeopardized the prospects o f its renewal. D uring the next four years feeling betw een the U nited States and British A m erica grew increasingly worse. T he Reciprocity T reaty was brought up for final consideration a t W ashington in an atm osphere of acute resentm ent against the colonies. Political anim osity therefore im parted a considerable im petus to the final m ovem ent against the treaty, although econom ic motives carried even greater weight, p articularly in the Senatorial debate w hich occurred after th e political agitation had begun to subside. T h e policy o f the Palm erston G overnm ent prejudiced N o rth ern opinion against G re at Britain alm ost from the o ut­ break of hostilities. Recognition by G re at Britain o f the South as a belligerent rem ained, throughout the w ar, a source of bitter resentm ent in the N o rth .1 A w idespread sym pathy fo r the South, which early m anifested itself in P arliam ent and in a section of the English press, further increased this irritation.2 T h e British G overnm ent several times threatened intervention during the war. G ladstone’s assertion a t N ew castle th at the Southern leaders had m ade a nation, produced far-reaching repercussions in the U nited States.3 T he T rent affair left behind a legacy of ill-feeling which was never wholly forgotten during the w ar. ‘ D epredations on A m erican com m erce by such raiders as the A labam a and the Florida fu rth er increased the tension.5 U nfortunately, also, local incidents, on the A tlantic sea­ board and along the international boundary, focussed A m erican resentm ent upon the British-A m erican Colonies. St. John and H alifax becam e the bases for an extensive blockade-running fleet. Even Joseph H ow e, in defence o f these activities, could

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only plead th at m ost of the capital cam e from outside the colo­ nies and th at the m erchants engaged in the trad e often suffered heavy losses.6 T he Chesepeake affair proved a source of great annoyance both in the U nited States and in the colonies. T he Chesepeake, an A m erican vessel, was seized by C onfederate conspirators w ho later abandoned her in the h arbour o f Sam bro, N ova Scotia. H ere she was discovered by tw o Federalist gun­ boats under C om m ander Clarey who seized and convoyed her to H alifax. M uch bad feeling was created by the violation of colonial neutrality on the p art o f C om m ander Clarey, and by the subsequent failure of th e provincial authorities to satisfy A m erican dem ands fo r prosecution of the conspirators and fo r surrender of the vessel to her ow ners by executive decree.7 A long the C anadian border the situation was even m ore aggravated. F o r the last two years of the w ar, but chiefly after the arrival in July, 1864, o f the H on. Jacob T hom pson and the H on. C lem ent C lay,8 C anada was the field o f extensive C on­ federate activities w hich kep t the A m erican border cities and the A m erican Executive in a constant state of alarm . T w o actual C onfederate incursions dem onstrated th at these fears w ere n ot groundless. A fter several rum ours o f such a conspiracy, a group o f C onfederates on Septem ber 20, 1864, attem pted to release th e prisoners interned on Johnson’s Island in L ake Erie. H aving been taken aboard the Philo Parsons, a D etroit vessel, at Sandwich and M aldon, C anada W est, as passengers, they seized her and, later, the Island Q ueen which inadvertently cam e alongside a t L ittle Bass Island. A fter setting out into the lake, w ith the apparent intention of attacking Johnson’s Island, they abandoned the idea and scuttled both vessels which w ere, however, salvaged." T he incident was fol­ lowed on O ctober 19 by an even m ore startling attem pt: another group of C onfederates, under L ieutenant Y oung, attacked St. A lban’s, V erm ont, from C anada E ast into w hich they escaped, although hotly pursued, after looting the St. A lban’s banks. T his incursion had a m ost unfortunate sequel on D ecem ber 13, w hen Judge Coursol a t M ontreal refused to consider the dem and fo r extradition of the raiders and released them from trial on a technicality. A t the sam e tim e he surrendered ninety thousand dollars worth of A m erican currency which had been takeiT from the St. A lban’s banks.10 Subsequently five of the

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thirteen discharged raiders w ere rearrested and tried before Judge Sm ith o f M ontreal, w ho ruled th a t they could no t be surrendered under the term s o f the treaty.11 A s the SolicitorG eneral and A ttorney-G eneral fo r C anada E ast had declared the evidence insufficient to justify a charge of violating any of the laws o f C anada, all the raiders, with the exception o f Young, were released in A pril, 1865.12 Y oung was finally discharged in O ctober.1'1T he funds rem oved from the St. A lban’s banks were, however, replaced, by a vote o f the C anadian L egislature.14 These two incidents produced the m ost intense alarm on the A m erican side o f the border. G reat excitem ent prevailed dur­ ing the first w eek in N ovem ber at Ogdensburg, N iagara Falls, Buffalo and D etroit w here raids w ere hourly anticipated.15 F o r the ensuing six m onths the State D epartm ent was bom barded w ith rum ours o f projected incursions from C anada, and with requests from the frontier districts o f the U nited States for adequate protection.10 Each com m unication was prom ptly for­ w arded by Seward, the S ecretary o f State, to the Canadian authorities. I t is conceivable th at news o f a com ing investigation, in som e cases, enabled the C onfederate conspirators to remove th e evidence and escape detection. A t any rate, except for the discovery th at a gun, apparently for use on the lakes, had been shipped from G uelph to the U nited States, subsequent investi­ gations invariably proved th e rum ours groundless.17 But all helped to increase the intense excitem ent w hich prevailed along the A m erican border.

I. I N F L U E N C E O F T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L S I T U A T I O N UPON AM ERICAN OPINION

It was inevitable th at the increasing irritation along the bor­ der should rouse A m erican public opinion against the colonies and th at this prejudice should be in som e p art directed against the ill-fated Reciprocity T reaty. A lready inclined to be queru­ lous, the A m erican press was provided, by the events of 1864, w ith fu rth er cause for denunciation. T he Johnson’s Island fiasco in Septem ber was succeeded by the St. A lban’s raid in the fol­ lowing m onth, and Coursol’s action in releasing the prisoners capped the climax. T he decision was received by the whole

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A m erican press w ith expressions o f grave concern. Restraining voices counselled against a rash policy of reprisals.18 B ut a large section o f the A m erican press was loud in its condem na­ tion o f the colonists and eager fo r m easures both preventive and retaliatory.19 M any papers affirmed that, in the event of future predatory incursions from the colonies, C anadian neutrality would be com pletely ignored by pursuers from the U nited States, w ho w ould follow and shoot down the raiders w herever they w ent.20 I t was not an atm osphere conducive to the sober, dispas­ sionate consideration of any subject relating to the colonies. In the protests w hich followed C oursol’s action repeal of the R eciprocity T reaty was frequently m entioned, and invariably as p art o f a retaliatory cam paign against C anada.21 T he treaty had already been considered in the H ouse of Representatives on the day before C oursol’s decision was announced. B ut the storm which followed the release of the raiders was the culm inating point in a m ovem ent which had already, w hen the treaty was considered, reached sufficient proportions to m ake it the deci­ sive factor in the vote of the H ouse. M oreover, in the subse­ quent debate in the Senate, political animosity, though by then considerably abated, was destined to carry at least some weight.

II. A T T I T U D E O F T H E A M E R I C A N E X E C U T I V E

In its attitude tow ard G reat Britain and the colonies the A m erican Executive was inclined to echo the opinions expressed in the press and in th e country. “ M r. Seward professes great am ity,” w rote John Rose, later C anadian M inister of Finance, after a visit to W ashington, “ but he is im pressionable & unreli­ able, & will do as his masters the great A m erican people tell him .”22 T hrough A dam s, M inister to the C ourt of St. James, Sew ard brought continued pressure to bear in protest against the British policy o f neutrality and against the alleged outrages which the U nited States had suffered on sea and land. T hrough­ o u t the w ar Seward rem ained in uncom prom ising protest against the recognition by G reat Britain o f the South as a bellig­ erent. T o this cause he repeatedly attributed all the subsequent depredations o f C onfederate raiders and disturbances along the

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border in A m erica.23 A t the sam e tim e he brought continued pressure to bear upon the C anadian authorities for effective preventive m easures along the frontier. E ach rum our o f a pro­ jected act o f aggression from th e C onfederates in C anada was rep o rted to M onck w ith suitable expressions o f concern.24 In general the British G overnm ent favoured and, a t the end o f 1864, took steps to secure a strong preventive policy in C anada. Y et it stoutly defended the recognition o f the South as a belligerent: Russell asserted to A dam s in F ebruary, 1864, “th at any other course w ould justly have exposed the country to a charge of violating the clearest principles and soundest prece­ dents o f International Law .”25 B ut he assured A dam s th at H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent w ould take vigorous m easures against subjects of either belligerent w ho abused the rights of hospitality by transgressing British law.20 M onck and the L ieutenantG overnors o f the other colonies were accordingly instructed th at the U nited States had a clear right to expect the suppression and prevention o f border raids.27 T hough not w ithout som e justification, N ew castle’s refusal in A pril, 1864, to take preventive m easures upon the lakes had u nfo rtu n ate consequences. M onck strongly urged in M arch, 1864 th at five gunboats be sent o u t to cruise upon the lakes in order to prevent hostile incursions against the U nited States.28 U nfortunately N ew castle, anticipating that the A m erican G overnm ent w ould probably reply by placing a sim ilar n um ber o f gunboats on the lakes, rejected the proposal and advised M onck instead to hire sm all coasting vessels w hich should carry police and troops.20 B ut N ew castle’s sugges­ tion was not adopted. H ad either o f these m easures been taken, the Johnson’s Island incident m ight n o t have occurred. N ew castle was not, perhaps, w holly unjustified in apprehending th a t the appearance o f British gunboats m ight have unfortunate repercussions in the U nited States. Y et, in view of the reported dem ands from the A m erican Executive fo r preventive action along the border, it is probable th at this m easure could have satisfactorily explained. Probably, m oreover, it would, in some degree, have prevented the agitation at the end o f 1864 from reaching such undue proportions. In justice to Newcastle, how ever, it m ay be noted th at he did not repudiate preventive

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m easures upon the lakes, but merely intim ated that they m ight be taken by the local authorities. L ord M onck shared the anxiety of th e British G overnm ent to satisfy the dem ands o f the A m erican Executive. T he first Johnson’s fsland conspiracy w as foiled through inform ation supplied by him to the A m erican G overnm ent.30 In spite how ever, of the deference w ith w hich M onck treated every representation from W ashington, it m ust be adm itted th at the actual preventive m easures adopted by his governm ent were extrem ely belated. Though M onck had in M arch, 1864, advised the H om e G overnm ent that disturbances w ere likely to occur upon the border,31 yet the Johnson’s Island and St. A lban’s raids were both allowed to occur before any preventive m easures were taken. It was not until N ovem ber 22, over a m onth after the St. A lban’s raid, th at M onck issued a proclam ation forbidding exportation from C anada o f w arlike stores or m unitions o f w ar.32 N o t until D ecem ber 16 did the C om m ittee o f Council endorse two reports from the A ttorney-G eneral o f C anada W est recom ­ m ending the organization o f a m ilitia force and the appointm ent o f stipendiary m agistrates to enforce the law in the border counties.33 By D ecem ber 20 these recom m endations h ad been p ut into execution and w ere subsequently endorsed by the C anadian L egislature.34 M onck’s early assurances w ere, of course, insufficient to satisfy the State D epartm ent.35 N o r did Sew ard’s attitude becom e very m uch m ore favourable after preventive measures had been taken a t the end o f 1864. O n January 16, 1865, after noting the change of heart in C anada, he nevertheless described the action of the C anadian G overnm ent as m ost inadequate. “It is regretted,” he said “that international justice wavers a t this p o int.”30 In F ebruary he was debating w hether, by her toleration o f hostilities, G re at B ritain was not actually intervening in favour of the insurgents.37 I t only rem ained, Seward concluded, for the U nited States to adopt lawful m easures of self-defence. T his, in fact, they had already done. O n N ovem ber 23, 1864, E arl Russell received form al notification th a t the A m erican G overnm ent intended to term inate the Rush-Bagot Convention.38 O n D ecem ber 6 Presi­ dent Lincoln, albeit in m easured and dispassionate words, announced this decision to Congress. H e declared also that, in

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the reconsideration o f the Reciprocity T reaty and the bonding privileges, the condition o f the b order m ust be taken into account.30 O n D ecem ber 17 the A m erican G overnm ent imposed a rigid passport regulation on all im m igration into the country except by sea. It was frankly adm itted th at the regulation was intended to apply especially to persons proposing to en ter the U nited States from th e neighbouring British Provinces.40 E xcept for a tem porary lapse into benignity in O ctober, 1863, Seward showed no disposition to interfere fo r o r against the R eciprocity T reaty.41 T h roughout 1864 he was very loath to touch the subject, although, a t least, Lyons could assure Russell in Septem ber th at th e Executive would not encourage attacks on the treaty.42 But th e neutrality of the Executive was quite as fatal as active opposition. Sew ard’s refusal to intervene in 1864 was p artly the result o f strained relations w ith the British and C anadian G overnm ents. B ut his inactivity was chiefly prom pted b y the growing m ovem ent against the treaty in the U nited States.43 A s will appear later, it was a m ovem ent based even m ore upon econom ic than upon political grounds. Econom ic considerations probably also influenced Seward even m ore directly. In this connection it m ay be noted th at his consuls at M ontreal, St. Jo h n and C harlottetow n had all given advice against renewing the treaty a t least in its present form .44 In M arch, 1865, he asserted th at even had there been no frontier disturbances the treaty could not have survived w ithout a thorough revision.45 Public opinion continued to decide Sew­ ard ’s attitude tow ard the treaty in 1865 and 1866: aware, according to Bruce, of growing personal unpopularity, he becam e increasingly unw illing to raise an issue likely to evoke violent opposition.46 A lthough Sew ard’s relations with the British G overnm ent im proved in M arch, 1865, his attitude tow ard the treaty did not change. Russell had addressed a note to the C onfederate G ov­ ernm ent protesting against its illicit activities in G re at Britain and the N o rth A m erican Colonies.47 Seward accordingly can­ celled th e notice o f intention to term inate the Rush-Bagot Convention and rescinded th e passport regulation in so fa r as it affected C anada.48 Y et h e discouraged the idea of opening negotiations fo r a reciprocity treaty until th e end of the Civil W ar.49 In July, 1865, his attitude had changed for the worse,

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and Bruce gathered from his conversation th at a form al proposal fo r negotiation w ould be answered only by com plaints on the course pursued by H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent and the colonies during the w ar.50 By Septem ber, 1865, Seward had fallen back on the veteran argum ent th a t Congress was unwilling to forfeit its right to decide questions o f fiscal policy.51 T o this view he adhered until the end of the treaty.52 F ro m a com bination of forces, partly political but even m ore strongly econom ic, the treaty was therefore deprived o f support from the Executive. H ow ever, in view of the opposition w hich developed against reciprocity, it is unlikely th at the issue would have been different, even h ad the Executive intervened.

III. C O N G R E S S AN D T H E R E C IP R O C IT Y TR EA TY

A t a tim e when popular hostility against C anada had reached its height and the Executive was exasperated w ith the supposed negligence of the C anadian authorities, the resolution to term i­ nate the treaty w as introduced fo r final consideration in the H ouse of Representatives. U ntil the crisis a t the end o f 1864 it seemed probable th at Congress would be satisfied w ith the appointm ent o f a com mission to revise th e treaty.53 O n M ay 26, M orrill’s m otion for abrogation failed by 82 to 74, and the m otion to reconsider in D ecem ber W ard’s m otion for revision passed by 80 to 74. A t this tim e W ard’s influence still appeared to control the situation, although the extrem ists were gaining in strength. Yet, in the light of subsequent evidence, it seems p robable th at the econom ic interests concerned would have defeated the attem pt to secure any new treaty, even had there been no fu rther com plicating political factors. By D ecem ber even this specious appearance of consent had disappeared. T h e Johnson’s Island and St. A lban’s raids had intervened and, two m onths after their arrest, the St. A lban’s raiders had not yet been surrendered to the A m erican authori­ ties. A t this stage in the m ovem ent against the treaty, political anim osity appears to have exerted its greatest influence. T he com m ercial argum ents, which had been urged against the treaty and w hich w ere to play a greater p art in the subsequent decision o f the Senate, undoubtedly carried weight in the final delibera­

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tions o f the H ouse of Representatives; but there can be no question th at a considerable p art of the H ouse was sw ept off its feet by political prejudice. W ashburne of Illinois, w ho opened the discussions, asserted: I think the H ouse is now prepared to adopt the resolution fo r notice pure and sim ple. I t cam e w ithin a vote or tw o o f it last session, and fro m what has transpired since, I th in k we m ust all agree that the notice ought to be given. T his statem ent o f the case w ent absolutely unchallenged. A fter the m ost sum m ary o f discussions W ard’s m otion fo r laying the whole subject on the table was decisively beaten. M orrill’s resolution, proposing that the President give notice o f abroga­ tion, was passed by a decisive m ajority.51 T he H ouse dem onstrated its tem per on the following day w hen it endorsed a resolution w hich proposed “T h at the C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs be requested to inquire into the expediency o f forthw ith providing, by negotiation o r otherw ise, fo r the protection o f our C anadian and provincial frontier from m urder, arson, and burglary, under the pretence o f rebel invasion.”55 A s late as F eb ru ary , 1865, the H ouse was still sufficiently hostile to pass a bill providing for an A m erican canal around N iagara Falls. T h e debate on this subject show ed quite clearly that motives of strategy were an im portant consideration.50 In debating the resolution on January 11 and 12 the Senate appears to have been less influenced by popular agitation.57 T he debate had taken place in the H ouse o f Representatives when Sherm an was know n to have left A tlanta and to be m arching through G eorgia. T he uncertainty which attended this move­ m ent m ust have increased the feeling o f suspense at W ashington. O n D ecem ber 20 Savannah fell and the resolution for abrogation o f the treaty was considered by the Senate in a m ore tranquil atm osphere of assured success. M oreover, energetic preventive m easures in C anada a t the end o f 1864 had considerably lulled public opinion in the U nited States, although the continued refusal to surrender the St. A lban’s raiders was still a source of annoyance. But confidence had so fa r returned by the first half of Jan u ary as to perm it considerable dissatisfaction in the U nited States against the rigours o f the passport system .58 Seward w rote to A dam s on January 16 th a t the public m ind had

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resum ed its habitual tone o f calmness, and Burnley reported privately to Russell on the sam e day th at quiet was, fo r the m om ent, restored.50 T he Senate itself was m ore favourably disposed tow ard G re at B ritain in January than had been the H ouse in D ecem ber. This was dem onstrated by the debate of Jan u ary 18 on the Rush-Bagot Convention. Sum ner, from the Com m ittee on F oreign Affairs, expressed gratification at the m anner in w hich Russell h ad received the notice th a t the convention was to be term inated.00 H e only presented the resolution for endorsing th at notice on the ground th a t the President had already acted and m ust be supported. O n this ground alone, as was show n in the subsequent debate, the resolution was accepted.61 In any case the Reciprocity T reaty was debated less hurriedly and w ith greater calm ness than in the H ouse of Representatives. D efenders of the treaty asserted th at the m otion for abrogation was rushed through the Senate. But, as Sum ner pointed out, the subject had already been before the Low er H ouse fo r several years. M oreover, w hen th e resolution was introduced in the Senate, its consideration was postponed until after the Christm as recess a t the request of S enator H ale of N ew H am pshire. In Jan uary the resolution w as debated fo r two days, before its acceptance. It is true th at the Senate did not refer the treaty to the C om m ittee on C om m erce fo r a rep o rt on its operation. T h at the treaty had been referred on Ju n e 2, 1864, to the Senatorial Com m ittee on Foreign Relations was, o f course, an indication th a t the political aspects o f the question w ould carry due weight.0- H ow ever, since four reports, those o f H atch, T aylor and two o f W ard’s, had already been introduced in the Low er H ouse the omission of th e Senate to prepare another is less reprehensible. A genuine attem pt was m ade in January, 1865, to consider the subject upon its merits. T he case advanced by th e A brogationists showed th at the treaty w ould probably have been term inated, even had there been no political anim osity against G re at Britain and th e colonies. I t m ust be rem em bered th a t the Senate was decidedly protectionist. T he R epublicans cam e to pow er in 1860 pledged to the principle of protection to hom e industry, and the M orrill tariff, m arking the end of a decade of low tariffs, was passed before the Civil W ar had begun.63 T he

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free-trading South, w hich had been instrum ental in passing the treaty, was to have no influence in preserving it. M oreover, as a result o f the war, the U nited States at this tim e was in desperate need o f revenue. T he Protectionists w ere therefore provided w ith an excellent econom ic w eapon to em ploy against the treaty. T his argum ent carried w eight w ith others besides the convinced Protectionists. F ro m a financial point o f view the treaty was found to be objectionable on two counts: first, th at a considerable am ount of revenue was sacrificed by the rem oval o f duty on im ports from C anada; and second, th at this absence o f duty m ade it im possible to levy internal taxation upon sim ilar products in the U nited States. A lready, in M ay, 1864, A m erican fiscal policy favoured the im position of im port duties to balance the increase o f internal taxation.04 T he Reciprocity T reaty interfered w ith this process.05 Sum ner, w ho introduced the resolution, based his case upon the necessity o f revenue. I t was doubtful, he asserted, w hether the treaty had been responsible for the increase since 1854 in trade between C anada and the U nited States. Increased popula­ tion and the phenom enal developm ent o f railways, he claim ed, chiefly accounted fo r this extension o f com m erce. I t was uncer­ tain w hich country had benefited from the balance o f trade. B ut there was no doubt, he concluded, th a t th e financial necessities o f the U nited States dem anded the abrogation of the treaty. S um ner asserted: Considering the present state o f the country, it w ould seem to be im provident not to give notice. W e m ust husband our resources; nor can a foreign G overnm ent justly expect us to continue a treaty w hich is a drain upon our revenue. In every direction we are turning fo r subjects o f taxation. . . . 1 know no reason w hy the large am ounts enfranchised by this treaty should enjoy the im m u n ity which has thus fa r been conceded to them. In the course o f the debate the uselessness of the St. Law rence route and other veteran argum ents were revived. But the chief cry raised against the treaty was the necessity o f revenue. I t was seized upon by alm ost every advocate o f abrogation as the dom inant factor to be considered. Support for the resolution was also derived from the convic­

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tion th at only by such a m easure could a revised treaty be secured. In o rder to understand the prevalence o f this idea it is well to note that, up to this tim e, th e C anadian G overnm ent had given no indication o f willingness to revise o r extend the free list o f the treaty.00 Sum ner himself, w hatever his subsequent annexationist opinions, appears to have anticipated the negotia­ tion o f a new treaty in the year which rem ained before the present one becam e inoperative. H e w rote privately to his friend, D r. Lieber, asserting th a t it was essential to the success o f any new negotiation that the U nited States should be released fro m the old treaty.07 T hree speakers in the course of the debate intim ated their belief th at the notice to abrogate was the only m eans of reopening the discussion in regard to the treaty. This argum ent, like th at o f fiscal necessity, was in som e cases advanced by those w ho were really acting from other motives. O ne can only regard with suspicion the assertion o f C handler of M ichigan, a notorious anglophobe, that he would be willing to consider the negotiation o f another treaty. In view o f the situation w hich had developed in 1864 one m ust assum e th at an undertow o f political prejudice undoubtedly im parted an added vigour to the efforts o f the A brogationists. H ow great was the force o f this anim osity in the Senate will never definitely be know n. In so far as it existed this prejudice took the form of a desire to be free o f all entanglem ents w ith the colonies rath er than, as has been suggested,08 to precipitate their annexation. D espite m uch wild annexationist talk in the postw ar years, there seems to have been little active sentim ent in favour of such a policy in the Congress w hich decided the fate o f the treaty. It has been show n that a n um ber of considerations influenced the Senate in its decision to abrogate the treaty. O f these, political prejudice appears to have carried less weight than in the Low er H ouse. T he constant factor in the m ovem ent against the treaty and the real foundation o f the opposition was protec­ tionist opinion, particularly in the state o f N ew Y ork. T his was the force w hich m ade abrogation eventually inevitable, w hatever the diplom ats m ight say to the contrary. T h e resolution instructing the President to give notice of abrogation was passed in its am ended form on January 12. T he H ouse o f Representatives accepted the am endm ent on January

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16,69 and on M arch 17 the British G overnm ent was officially notified of the A m erican intention to term inate the Reciprocity T reaty. In June, 1865, the eloquence of Joseph H ow e changed the Convention o f Boards o f T rade a t D etroit from sullen indifference to cheering enthusiasm fo r a new treaty w ith the colonies.70 But, despite this and subsequent efforts to avert the catastrophe, notice was never w ithdraw n. T he continued opposi­ tion o f Congress and, therefore, o f the Executive, to th e treaty, supplies fresh evidence of the strength o f econom ic forces in the m ovem ent for abrogation. A nim osity against G reat Britain and the colonies by no m eans died out altogether in 1865 and 1866, but, once the disturbance along the border had begun to abate, no difficulty was found in foregoing all the other retaliatory m easures, such as the passport regulation and the term ination of the Rush-Bagot Convention. Only abrogation of the Reciprocity T reaty, fo r w hich there w ere so m any motives oth er than political, was not rescinded. T he operation of the treaty cam e to an end on M arch 17, 1866.

CHAPTER 7

British and Colonial Policies and the Abrogation of the Treaty

“I t seems astonishing,” assert Laughlin and Willis, “th at C anada should have perm itted so valuable a com m ercial arrangem ent to slip from her grasp w ithout a determ ined effort to retain its benefits. T he danger does not seem to have been fully realized until it was too late to take effective action. G reat B ritain, especially, seems to have been indifferent to the interests o f C anada in the whole m atter.” 1 This is a m ost inadequate estim ate o f British and C anadian policy in relation to the treaty. C anada was by no m eans unaw are o f the danger of abrogation, nor was Britain indifferent to the interests o f the colonists. Y et both were equally unable to prevent th e term ination o f the treaty.

I. B R I T I S H A N D C O L O N I A L P O L I C Y ( 1 863-M A R C H , 1865)

U ntil the crisis o f 1864 C anadian com m ercial policy had been characterized by an unquestioning dependence upon the U nited States. T he G overnm ent had never really faced the possibility of abrogation and h ad never, therefore, considered an alternative policy. G alt’s action in 1859, as we have seen, was prom pted by financial necessity and pressure from the industrialists; but he does not seem to have anticipated the effect of this policy upon public opinion in the U nited States. Certainly there was no suggestion of attem pting to substitute an independ­ ent C anadian policy fo r th e Reciprocity T reaty (see pages 65-66). A s tension along the b order increased and the continuance o f the treaty becam e ever m ore uncertain, the C anadian G ov­ ernm ent was disposed to regard th e possibility of abrogation

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w ith grave and rath er helpless apprehension. Anxious appeals fo r succour were dispatched to the H om e G overnm ent. D espite the independence o f its attitude tow ard the question of defence,2 the Sandfield M acdonald-D orion M inistry turned in alarm to the British G overnm ent at this m enace to the prosperity o f Canada. A fter an unsuccessful attem pt to enlist the services o f G eorge Brown as unofficial agent at W ashington,3 the m inistry, strongly supported by the G overnor-G eneral, passed a M inute of Council which afforded conclusive evidence o f the apprehensions aroused by the threatened danger. Lord M onck was requested to inform the British G overnm ent th at the recen t proceedings in Congress had excited the deepest concern in the minds of the people of the province, and th at there was im m inent danger o f the speedy abrogation of the treaty, unless p ro m p t and vigorous m easures w ere taken by H e r M ajesty’s advisers to avert w hat w ould be generally regarded by the people of C anada as a great calam ity. T he Com m ittee o f Council pointed out the im portance o f instituting negotiations fo r the renewal o f the Treaty, w ith such m odifications as m ay be m utually assented to, before the year’s notice required to term inating it shall be given by the A m erican G overnm ent, fo r they fear that the notice, if once given, w ould not be revoked, and they clearly foresee that ow ing to the variety, and possibly the conflicting nature o f the interests involved on our ow n side, a new treaty could n o t be concluded and the necessary legislation to give effect to it be obtained before the year w ould have expired, and w ith it the Treaty.4 T his appeal was substantially repeated by the T ache-M acdonald G overnm ent on the very day after it took office.5 N o t so querulous w ere the dem ands o f the Low er Provinces. O f the four, only N ew foundland expressed concern to the H om e G overnm ent in 1864 fo r the fate of the R eciprocity T reaty .0 B annerm an, the L ieutenant-G overnor, forw arded to N ew castle an Address o f the N ew foundland Legislature containing the surprising request th at the British G overnm ent should not term inate the treaty w ithout first consulting it. Y et all the Low er Provinces w ere anxious fo r a renew al o f th e treaty, as was

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show n by the m anner in which they co-operated w ith C anada in 1865 and 1866 to secure that object. B ut the British G overnm ent, though sym pathetic, could do nothing to satisfy the urgent entreaties from C anada. T he policy o f inactivity, which it consistently pursued between February, 1864, and M arch, 1865, was the result o f advice received from Lyons at W ashington. F rom the m iddle o f 1863 until his retirem ent at the end o f 1864 Lyons was convinced th at the only conceivable policy was to keep the subject of the Reci­ procity T reaty as quiet as possible by avoiding any attem pt at intervention. In O ctober, 1863, Sew ard, in a sudden and very transitory burst of friendliness, suggested th at Lyons should m ake a form al inquiry on the subject, to w hich the Secretary of State m ight reply th at the Executive had no desire to end the treaty. Even at this tim e, though he referred the m atter to Russell, Lyons was distinctly averse to stirring up the question o f the Reciprocity T reaty at all. Russell prom ptly accepted his advice and declined Sew ard’s offer.7 By January, 1864, Lyons was even m ore firmly convinced th at the only policy was to m aintain a discreet silence and avoid discussion.8 In F ebruary Seward intim ated that, as discussion was now inevitable, a good effect m ight be produced in W ashington by the friendly but unofficial visits of influential Canadians. T hough not w ithout grave com punction, Lyons was unw illing to oppose this sug­ gestion.0 A lready, however, in F ebruary, 1864, he was resigned to the gloom y opinion that nothing w ithin the pow er o f his governm ent could have any effect in saving the treaty. But in M arch he reiterated the opinion th a t any proposal to negotiate a new treaty w ould alm ost inevitably have the effect of ending th e present one.10 Such was the advice he reported him self as having tendered to the C anadian G overnm ent in Septem ber, 1864.11 T h e appeal from C anada initiated, in M arch, 1864, a cor­ respondence between the Colonial and Foreign Offices on the subject o f the treaty. T his culm inated in the decision to take no action until the notice of abrogation had been received. Elliot, a t the Colonial Office, expressed w hat later becam e the policy of the G overnm ent when he added the following m em orandum to M onck’s dispatch of F ebruary 20:

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I f the Reciprocity Treaty could be renewed m erely by our G overnm ent’s m aking the attem pt, no one can doubt, I presume, that it is very desirable. B ut i f on the contrary the A m erican G ovt, and people are in a hum or which renders success highly improbable, one would think that m ore harm than good m ust be done by supplying fresh fu e l to agitation through a fruitless appeal to the U nited States G ovt.12 Such of Lyons’s dispatches as had been com m unicated to the Colonial Office, Elliot asserted, afforded little encouragem ent to the opening o f negotiations at that tim e. T he C anadian request was, how ever, com m unicated on M arch 15 to the Foreign Office, and Russell accordingly instructed Lyons to suggest any m easures w hich could be adopted for securing a continuance of the treaty.13 M eanwhile, despite further pressure from C anada, Elliot adhered to the view th at the state o f A m erican opinion m ade intervention a t present impossible.14 H e was confirm ed in this opinion on A pril 25 by receiving from the Foreign Office two dispatches from Lyons, w ho asserted th at a proposal for negotiation from the British G overnm ent would probably have no result except to hasten the abrogation o f the present treaty. U pon receipt of this intelligence, Cardw ell, the C olonial Sec­ retary, advised the Foreign Office on M ay 7 that, in his opinion, it was m ost prudent to preserve the attitude o f observation in the hope that the fatal resolutions should not pass both houses o f Congress.15 Russell was already loath to take the initiative at W ashington and had confessed to Lyons on F ebruary 27, “I cannot tell how to save the Reciprocity T reaty.” 10 H e now accepted C ardw ell’s advice w ith alacrity. W hile agreeing with M onck that negotiations should be set on foot, Russell declared his opinion that these should not be com m enced until the reso­ lutions fo r ending the treaty had actually been passed.17 H aving com m unicated this opinion to Lyons on M ay 20, Russell again on M ay 27 asked for such fu rth er observations as Lyons should have to offer upon th e expediency o f entering into negotiations.18 Lyons, w ho had first suggested the policy of non-intervention, naturally m ade no attem pt to change the opinion which Russell had now form ed. H aving canvassed the possibilities of an active attem pt to salvage the treaty, the G overnm ent at length fell back upon the

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policy of quietly awaiting the notice of abrogation. T his policy o f inactivity was m aintained until notice was received. O n M ay 23, 1864, M r. W atkin, form er superintending Com m issioner of the G ran d T runk, in the H ouse o f Com m ons asked the U nder­ secretary for Foreign Affairs to state the present position of negotiations in reference to the proposed term ination o f the treaty .10 M r. L ayard replied th a t no negotiations w ere pending in regard to this subject. N ine m onths later, on F ebruary 17, 1865, W atkin m ade a sim ilar inquiry, and this tim e severely criticized H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent for allowing such an im portant question to drift into its present position. Y et he received virtually the sam e answ er as before: L ayard explained th at as notice o f abrogation had not been received there were really no papers to subm it to the H ouse.20 A sim ilar request fo r inform ation a week earlier in the H ouse had already elicited from the Prim e M inister a clear indication o f the G overnm ent’s attitude. U pon th a t occasion Palm erston m erely intim ated that, upon receipt of notice, the G overnm ent w ould com m unicate the reasons advanced by the A m erican G overnm ent for its decision, in o rd er th at the H ouse m ight judge the m atter fo r itself.21

II. B R I T I S H A N D C O L O N I A L P O L IC Y ( M A R C H , 18 6 5 -M A R C H , 1866)

T h e notice o f abrogation term inated the period when any­ thing was to be gained by silence, and the British G overnm ent im m ediately com m enced the attem pt to secure a renew al of the treaty. Russell h ad sounded A dam s in a conversation on F eb ru ary 23, w hen it was already divulged th a t notice w as to be presented on M arch 17. In th at interview Russell asserted th at the C abinet had been considering w ith some anxiety the com ing abrogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty, that it had been of undoubted benefit to both parties and that, if inequalities existed in its operation, these w ere no cause for abrogation but rath er fo r revision and renewal. A dam s intim ated th at h e was n ot instructed to discuss the treaty until the middle of M arch, b ut expressed the opinion th at Russell’s proposals w ould be considered in a fair and am icable spirit by the A m erican G ov­ ernm ent.22 T his statem ent Russell interpreted as an assurance

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th at a new treaty would be negotiated during the twelve months to elapse before the existing one ceased its operation.23 A dam s’s rep o rt of this interview suggests th at he intended to convey this im pression.24 Events w ere to prove his forecast unjustified. A s soon as notice was received Russell took m easures to open the negotiation for a new treaty. Bruce, Lyon’s successor a t W ashington, was instructed on M arch 24 to inquire w hether the U nited States intended abruptly to end the treaty o r w hether the d o o r rem ained open fo r negotiation. In the latter case he was to ask Seward fo r detailed inform ation on the points upon w hich m odifications of th e treaty w ere desired. Before ex­ pressing any reply to Sew ard’s dem ands Bruce was directed to com m unicate not only w ith the H om e G overnm ent, b u t also w ith L ord M onck.25 L ater in th e year 1865, upon M onck’s suggestion, the H om e G overnm ent hit upon the ingenious device o f using the parallel m ovem ents tow ards reciprocity and C onfederation, w hich was now un d er discussion, to reinforce each other.20 Bruce was therefore instructed to inform the G overnm ents of N ova Scotia and N ew Brunsw ick th a t local, separate interests w ould carry little w eight a t W ashington, but th at a union of the colonies as one body w ould greatly facilitate the negotiation o f a reciprocity treaty. This was, in fact, a favourite idea o f Bruce’s, and he urged it upon N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick both by a form al com m unication and in an interview w ith Tilley o f N ew Brunswick in O ctober.27 Confederation as the alternative to reciprocity will be discussed later. H ere we have the opposite conception, C onfederation as the necessary precedent to reciprocity. I t is conceivable that this idea may have exerted at least som e influence upon the m ovem ent tow ards C onfederation in the colonies. Bruce, how ever, encountered difficulties w hich rendered nugatory all his attem pts to secure a renew al of the treaty. Lincoln had just been assassinated and, on the sam e evening, Seward, already injured by a fall from his carriage, had received three terrible cuts in his cheek and neck. These, although not fatal, prolonged the period o f Sew ard’s convalescence, and fu rth er postponed the tim e w hen he w ould be in a condition to receive Bruce’s overtures fo r a new treaty. Bruce w rote in perplexity to Russell on A pril 18, 1865, th at H unter, the Acting Secretary, carried no w eight in such a question, and that

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Sew ard’s illness rem oved the only person w ho m ight have represented the views o f H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent in a fair spirit.28 By July, w hen Seward was again in active w ork, his attitude had hardened and he was determ ined in no circum ­ stances to com m ence a negotiation. W hen Sir Frederick broached the subject it had, therefore, a m ost unfavourable reception.20 Russell expressed extrem e regret at the failure of Bruce’s efforts, and L ayard, U nder-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, inquired anxiously in A ugust w hether a further m em o­ randum to Bruce upon the advantages o f reciprocity m ight not facilitate the negotiations.30 Sew ard’s attitude, however, did not im prove, and Bruce could do little but explain the situation to Russell. Ju st before the treaty expired Bruce m ade a final attem pt to salvage it by again com m unicating to Sew ard the willingness of the British G overnm ent to consider a new treaty.31 This eleventh hour proposal was, also rejected.32 It is n ot certain th at Bruce pressed the negotiation w ith all the vigour which m ight have been em ployed. G alt w rote scath­ ingly of the scant assistance which he afforded to the colonial delegates who visited W ashington in January and February, 18 66.33 It m ust be adm itted, how ever, th at Bruce had excep­ tional difficulties w ith w hich to contend. O bjections to the treaty on the score of financial necessity m ight conceivably have been avoided by the m utual imposition o f a low duty on m any o f the articles in the free list. Y et m any o f the com m ercial interests which had attacked the old treaty w ere equally opposed to the negotiation of a new one: the attitude of M orrill and the C om ­ m ittee of W ays and M eans (discussed below ) indicated the opposition which any new project m ust encounter from the Protectionists. Political anim osity to G re at Britain, though not so violent as at the end o f 1864, had by no means disappeared. M oreover, Seward him self show ed not the slightest disposition to com m ence the negotiation fo r a new treaty. I t is unlikely th at even Elgin or Lyons could have m ade any headw ay in the face o f such a situation. T h e British-A m erican Colonies had been, of course, only too eager to open negotiations a t W ashington. C anada had clam oured for intervention in 1864 at a tim e w hen Lyons and the H om e G overnm ent regarded it as inexpedient. T he C ana­ dian delegation, M acdonald, C artier, G alt and Brown, w ho

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w ere dispatched to England in M arch, 1865, had urged the renewal of the Reciprocity T reaty.34 As soon as Cardw ell gave his consent, the colonial governm ents took active m easures, in collaboration with Bruce, to secure a new treaty. U nfortunately the efforts o f the colonists w ere no m ore successful than those w hich Bruce him self was m aking a t the sam e time. A pprised by Cardw ell th at negotiations w ere to be opened at W ashington, the C anadian C abinet on July 15 dispatched G alt and H ow land, the Postm aster-G eneral, to confer w ith Bruce.35 A t the sam e tim e M onck conveyed to the other colonies the assurance th at at the p roper tim e they w ould be given the o pportunity to act in concert w ith C anada and to assert their ow n interests in the proposed negotiations.30 T he N ova Scotian G overnm ent, w hich was afraid o f being left out of the negoti­ ations, showed its keenness a t this tim e by telegraphing to W ashington th at it was as ready as C anada to com m unicate w ith Sir Frederick Bruce.37 D uring the sum m er of 1865, also, T u p p er and W. A. H enry o f N ova Scotia, in conferring with C ardw ell, urged th at all the interested provinces should be con­ sulted “in regard to a Reciprocity T reaty affecting the w hole.”38 G alt and H ow land had indecisive conferences w ith Bruce and M cCulloch, the Secretary o f the T reasury, in W ashington and w ith the Revenue Com m issioners a t N ew Y ork. In a m em o­ randum of A ugust 3 to the C anadian Executive th e tw o dele­ gates were unable to rep o rt any appreciable progress in the cause o f reciprocity.39 G alt, having been later dispatched to W ashington to confer w ith Bruce in reference to the Fenian invasion, seized the opportunity again to press the cause of reciprocity.40 A fter conferences with W ells, C hairm an of the Revenue Com m ission, D erby, w ho was preparing a repo rt on the Reciprocity T reaty, M cCulloch and M orrill, G alt urged upon Seward the advisability of tem porarily extending the present treaty. Seward suggested th at he return after the opening o f Congress in order to ascertain w hether such an extension could be secured.41 A fter Septem ber, 1865, when the C onfederate Council at Q uebec considered the problem o f reciprocity, the Low er Provinces w ere associated w ith C anada, nom inally a t first and later actively, in the effort to secure a new treaty. T he Council, w hich was com posed o f representatives of the five colonies,

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declared the present treaty acceptable to the Provinces, which ought, how ever, to consider reasonable proposals from the A m erican G overnm ent for modification. In the event o f a new treaty being negotiated, it was considered highly desirable th at the coasting trad e and the registration o f vessels should be included in its provisions. If negotiations fo r renewal were opened before M arch 17,1866, H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent was to be requested to arrange an extension o f the present treaty pending the negotiations. T he H om e G overnm ent was likewise to be requested to authorize the m em bers of the Confederate Council or a com m ittee appointed from it to proceed to W ashington and advise the British M inister in the event of an opening o f negotiations.42 O n D ecem ber 22 the C anadian G overnm ent, on G alt’s recom m endation, accepted the principle th at the “com m ercial rights” involved in the treaty could, if necessary, be settled by reciprocal legislation. It was fu rth er resolved, on G alt’s recom ­ m endation, to com m unicate w ith Bruce in order to secure a tem porary extension o f the treaty. Tw o m em bers of the Execu­ tive w ere to p u t themselves in com m unication with Bruce and w ith the A m erican authorities. A t the sam e tim e the other colonies w ere to be inform ed th at C anada had no intention of acting separately in the ultim ate discussion and decision o f the questions involved. T he Low er Provinces w ere to be invited to send representatives to W ashington and to be inform ed th at the C onfederate C ouncil would be sum m oned at O ttaw a as soon as the position o f the negotiations should w arrant this procedure.43 In accordance w ith this decision Belleau, the C anadian Prem ier, telegraphed to the other Provincial Prem iers, inviting them to send representatives to W ashington.44 U nfortunately the subsequent conference of January and F ebruary, 1866, between representatives o f th e Provinces and the Com m ittee of W ays and M eans of the H ouse o f R epre­ sentatives, dem onstrated conclusively th at there was no hope of securing any im m ediate com m ercial agreem ent with the U nited States.45 T h e colonial delegates w ere conciliatory to a degree. Since the principal A m erican objection to a new treaty was presum ably the necessity o f revenue, G alt and his fellowdelegates proposed th at all the articles in the free list o f the present treaty, supplem ented by such others as m ight be agreed

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upon, should be dealt w ith on the basis o f im posing customs duties to equal the internal taxes o f the U nited States. In order to prevent smuggling o f spirits, beer, tobacco and cognate articles into the U nited States they agreed to unite w ith the A m ericans in im posing such duties as m ight be determ ined by the best revenue standard. T hey regarded the present settlem ent o f the fisheries and of navigation as satisfactory, but were prepared to enter into engagem ents on the subject of improving th e St. Law rence route. T hey agreed w ith the A m ericans that the bonding privileges accorded by each to the other should be m ade uniform . T he only additional advantage to the colonies w hich they proposed was th at the coasting trade should be m ade reciprocally free. G alt even intim ated th a t the C anadian G ov­ ernm ent w ould agree to free adm ission, upon a reciprocal basis, from the U nited States o f agricultural im plem ents, m achinery, edge tools and coarse m anufactures o f various kinds. But the C om m ittee of W ays and M eans, ardent Protection­ ists, offered term s w hich the colonies could not possibly have accepted. T he free list was to be reduced to burr-m illstones, unw rought; cotton and linen rags; firewood; grindstones, rough and unfinished; gypsum o r plaster, unground. T he only one in which C anada had any interest, and th a t quite inconsiderable, was firewood. All the articles in which so large a trad e had been developed betw een the tw o countries w ere included in a second schedule. T he duties w hich th e Com m ittee of W ays and M eans proposed to charge upon these w ere, according to G alt, prohibitory in alm ost every case. A duty o f tw enty cents per bushel was to be imposed on w heat, twenty-five p er cent ad valorem on flour, fifty cents a ton on bitum inous coal and a varying scale o f duties on fish and lum ber. T o this proposal the colonial delegates could offer nothing b u t a categorical negative. T he suggested fiscal concessions they regarded as by no m eans an equivalent fo r the rights o f fishery w hich the A m ericans on their p art required from the colonies. T h e colonial delegates could only conclude that the A m erican offer was founded not upon the principle of collecting revenue but on th at o f protection. T he discussions w ere therefore term inated.

III. ESTIM A TE OF B RITISH A ND C O LO N IA L PO LICIES IN R E L A T I O N TO T H E T R E A T Y ( 1864-1866)

T he policy of the colonies in relation to the treaty during its last two years does not require extended com m ent. Oblivious to the danger o f abrogation they certainly w ere not; but, until notice had been received, the W ashington legation did no t encourage their intervention. A s soon as the H om e G overnm ent w ould allow it, the colonies, un d er the leadership of Canada, hastened to utilize every available means to secure a new treaty. But the position was hopeless before their influence could be brought to bear. T o no small extent, how ever, the hopelessness of the situation a t W ashington in 1865 and 1866 was a result of the previous policy of the C anadian G overnm ent. T he influence o f C anadian Protectionists, reflected in the m easures o f G alt and Cayley, had im parted a very considerable im petus to the m ovem ent against reciprocity. G alt’s rep o rt o f D ecem ber 19, 1865, to the C anadian Executive and his proposals to the Com m ittee of W ays and M eans in 1866 suggested that C anada was prepared to accept a considerable extension o f the free list of the treaty. P rio r to the receipt o f notice o f abrogation, how ever, the C anadian G overnm ent had m ade no attem pt to allay opposition to the treaty in the U nited States by indicating its willingness to com ply with A m erican dem ands in this respect. F urtherm ore, by its early laxity in not moving to prevent border disturbances the G overnm ent helped in a large m easure to create the atm os­ phere a t W ashington w hich had so unfortunate an effect on the debates over reciprocity. T he preoccupation o f the G overnm ent with the subject o f C onfederation may explain but does not justify its failure to act in tim e. Since N ew castle had declined in A pril, 1864, to place gunboats upon the lakes, the British G overnm ent m ust be held partially responsible fo r subsequent disturbances. But his refusal did not acquit the C anadian G overnm ent of all responsibility fo r action either on land or on the lakes. H ad the G overnm ent taken, earlier in 1864, the preventive m easures which w ere later adopted, th e border “situation” would probably never have developed. Its prolonged inactivity despite frequent w arning cannot be condoned. A fter the exposure of the first conspiracy against Johnson’s Island in

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the sum m er o f 1863 it m ust have been obvious th at sim ilar attem pts w ould be m ade in the future. From at least the beginning o f 1864 the A m erican G overnm ent was bringing repeated pressure to bear upon C anada for effective preventive m easures. Y et the attem pt on Johnson’s Island on Septem ber 26, 1864, and the St. A lban’s raid o f O ctober 19 w ere both allowed to occur w ithout any general preventive action having been taken. It was not until N ovem ber 22 th at the export of arm s from the province was prohibited; the m ilitia w ere not called out no r were the stipendiary m agistrates appointed until the middle of D ecem ber. By th at tim e the resolution for abro­ gation had already passed the H ouse o f Representatives. Before the senatorial debate on the resolution the preventive measures in C anada had exerted a tranquillizing effect on A m erican opinion. Y et political anim osity continued, although in a lesser degree than form erly, to stim ulate opposition to th e Reci­ procity T reaty. U ndoubtedly th e C anadian G overnm ent, in co-operation w ith the other colonies, displayed considerable energy in 1865 and 1866 in the effort to secure a renewal o r a revision of the treaty. Y et th e failure o f C anada to prevent border disturbances considerably increased the feeling of irritation a t W ashington w hich helped to m ake it impossible for the British G overnm ent to open negotiations in 1864. In 1865 A m erican feeling tow ards the colonies indeed im proved, b ut n o t to such an extent th at it was possible, in the face of all the obstacles, to rescind the m otion for abrogation once it had been passed. C anadian fiscal policy and the subsequent abovem entioned inactivity of the G overnm ent helped to create those obstacles, w hich w ere to render abortive the efforts o f the colonies and of the British G overnm ent to prevent abrogation after notice had been received. T h e im portance o f British policy in connection w ith the abrogation of th e treaty should not be overrated. T he British G overnm ent did, indeed, fail to intervene on behalf of the treaty before notice was given. But the opposition from eco­ nom ic causes alone, to say nothing o f C anada’s p art in arousing political anim osity, was probably so great as to have rendered useless any diplom atic pressure. As the policy of non-intervention did not save the treaty it can scarcely be regarded as successful. But the G overnm ent’s

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prolonged inactivity w as deliberate and arose from the convic­ tion th at intervention in the interests o f the treaty would only have stim ulated the m ovem ent against it. Lyons’s continued insistence on this policy was based on the opinion that, in view o f the opposition w hich h ad already developed against the treaty, a m ore energetic policy could only have hastened its doom . In this opinion Lyons was probably correct. It m ust be considered that h e was in close touch w ith the actual situation a t W ashington. F o r three troubled years, m oreover, h e had guided the relations betw een Britain and the U nited States w ith great tact and adroitness. T h ere is no reason to suppose th at his judgm ent in this case was any the less sound than it had been in regard to the other problem s w hich, during th e war, he had treated w ith such consum m ate skill. It m ight be argued th at Lyons and Russell w ere unjustified in rejecting Sew ard’s sug­ gestion in 1863 th at they should m ake a form al inquiry as to the attitude o f the A m erican G overnm ent tow ard the Reciprocity T reaty. Even had such an inquiry been m et w ith a favourable reply from Seward, he w ould certainly have repudiated it during the crisis in D ecem ber 1864. Probably even in 1863 Lyons was quite justified in supposing th at nothing was to be gained by stirring up the question. L yons’s was a choice of two evils: he was faced w ith the problem o f choosing betw een two courses, both unlikely to succeed, the one w hich had the greater chance of success, or rath er the lesser chance o f failure. O n the basis of the evidence w hich we have already considered it seems fair to assum e that his judgm ent was not at fault, and th at a prem ature opening of negotiations w ould only have had the result which he foresaw. T h e failure o f the British G overnm ent to intervene, before the receipt of notice o f abrogation, was partly the result of causes over which the British G overnm ent had no control. In so far as this failure was a result of British policy, the responsi­ bility m ust be fixed not upon Lyons, but upon his governm ent because o f its general A m erican policy. In m ore favourable circum stances negotiations for a revised treaty would probably have been com m enced long before M arch, 1865. But the H om e G overnm ent was paralyzed by the result o f its A m erican policy, the unfortunate influence of which had been further increased by the laxity o f the C anadian G overnm ent. Recognition o f the

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South as a belligerent produced in th e N o rth a feeling of resentm ent against G reat Britain. This initial irritation steadily increased as the British G overnm ent contem plated m ediation and as the policy o f neutrality resulted in depredations on the high seas. T h e failure of the C anadian G overnm ent to prevent incursions along the border fu rth er aggravated the situation. By 1864 the explosive atm osphere a t W ashington m ade inter­ vention in the interests o f th e treaty impossible. Russell fully realized the effect o f his general policy upon the m ovem ent against the treaty, but was prevented by other considerations fro m doing anything to rem edy the situation. Inform ed by A dam s that the British interpretation o f neutrality m ust inevi­ tably jeopardize the Reciprocity T reaty, Russell could but express his regret th at nothing could be done about it.4G T he situation w hich m ade it impossible fo r th e British G overnm ent to open negotiations in 1864 was, in the first instance, the result o f the general British policy in relation to the U nited States, b ut was later m uch aggravated by th e border disturbances. T h e verdict w hich is passed upon the reluctance o f the British G overnm ent to com m ence negotiations m ust depend, therefore, upon o u r estim ate of its general A m erican policy during the Civil W ar. T his, o f course, is a controversial subject. Professor E. D. A dam s, in his w ork on G re at B ritain and the Civil W ar, is disposed on the whole to justify o r a t least to condone the general policy of the British G overnm ent.47 U ndoubtedly, how ever, the British attitude was rendered less friendly because o f com petition between G re at Britain and the N o rth fo r the Southern m arket, and because of the possible effect o f a Southern victory upon the dom estic situation in Britain itself. F u rth er extensions o f the franchise m ight be resisted by the ruling class, upon the ground th at the great dem ocratic experim ent in A m erica had failed. Professor A dam s suggests, in fact, th a t the trium ph of the U nion exerted an influence upon the passage of th e Second R eform Bill in G re at Britain. It was only after the fortunes of w ar had begun to change th at the British G overn­ m ent developed an increased concern for its duties, to the N o rth , as a neutral. In addition, Russell himself adm itted that he was w rong in awaiting the report o f the Law Officers o f the C row n before attem pting to delay the A labam a.48 E ven on

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general grounds, therefore, the British policy in relation to the U nited States cannot be entirely justified. In so far as this policy was a contributing factor, the abrogation o f the treaty m ust be regarded as one o f its m ost unfortunate results. A s already shown, however, there w ere other and m ore im portant causes o f abrogation. In the field o f British and colonial policies m uch the m ost fatal, in its influence upon the history of the treaty, was probably the fiscal policy of Cayley and G alt.

CHAPTER 8

The Operation of the Treaty

T he interplay o f other forces, econom ic and political, during the operation o f the treaty, makes it extrem ely difficult to estim ate the effect o f reciprocity upon the trade of the colonies and o f the U nited States. I t w as a period o f phenom enal devel­ opm ent in both countries, w here new lands w ere being opened to settlem ent and population was rapidly increasing, particularly in the region bordering on the G re at L akes.1 A trem endous increase in the production o f grain and m eats in the A m erican N orth-W est, and of grain and lum ber in C anada, o f course, accom panied this developm ent. A t the sam e tim e, m anufactur­ ing industries in the U nited States were extensively developed. M oreover, the decade between 1850 and 1860 was a period of extensive railway construction both in the U nited States and in C anada. A ccording to H arvey, in his essay on the Reciprocity T reaty, the total mileage com pleted in seven o f the N orth ern States and in C anada rose from 3,512 in 1850 to 16,932 in 1860. In this decade the mileage in C anada increased from 12 to 1,974.2 N o t only did the im provem ent in com m unications tend to facilitate the flow of trade between th e U nited States and C anada, but also the investm ent o f great sum s o f English capital in the construction of C anadian railways during this decade involved large purchases of m aterials and supplies in the U nited States.3 M oor, the Consul a t M ontreal, in 1860 inform ed the Secretary o f State th at a large p art o f the balance of trade against C anada in the years from 1852 to 1858 was produced by the im portation o f iron m aterial from the U nited States for the construction o f C anadian railroads w hich had been built by foreign capital.4 “ M oney was poured out like w ater upon the building of the G rand T ru n k and G re at W estern Lines, and, between 1852 and 1857, there was a period of speculative m ania which sent governm ents, m unicipalities and corporations into a wild rivalry of expenditure and extravagance.” 5 A sim ilar

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period o f railway developm ent occurred in the Low er Colonies. Between 1853 and 1866 N ew Brunswick constructed 218 miles o f railroad and N ova Scotia 147. D uring the period N ova Scotia spent on construction w ork alone about seven and a half m illion dollars and paid in interest nearly two and a half millions, while th e expenditure in N ew Brunswick was probably som ew hat larger.0 N ew facilities for m arketing w ere therefore provided by linking H alifax w ith the F undy shore o f N ova Scotia and of St. John with the north shore o f N ew Brunswick. As in C anada, m oreover, the heavy outlay could not fail to increase trade, both internal and external. External developm ents, w hich led to a rapid expansion of w orld trade, were o f great advantage to th e British A m erican Colonies, during the period, by increasing the dem ands fo r sailing ships. T hese w ere still suprem e for bulky cargoes and distant voyages. T h e value o f ships built a t Q uebec for export, chiefly to the U nited K ingdom was £ 3 0 3 ,2 6 9 (currency) in 1856 and £ 4 8 0 ,8 9 8 (currency) in 1865.7 D r. Saunders, in his study o f the trad e o f the L ow er Colonies under the treaty, estim ates the average annual export of ships from N ew Bruns­ wick, N ova Scotia and P rince Edw ard Island at a value of £ 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 . T h roughout the operation of the treaty a succession of abnorm al events prejudiced th e course o f trad e and increased the difficulty o f estim ating the probable effects o f reciprocity in a com paratively norm al period. T he C rim ean W ar (1854-1856), depriving B ritain o f one o f h er principal sources o f supply, increased the dem and for agricultural products and advanced their prices. A considerable portion of the increased export of food-stuffs to E urope was shipped by C anada and the U nited States, from each, to a considerable extent, via the transporta­ tion systems o f the other. This fortuitous increase in the export o f th eir staple products increased the purchasing pow er o f the colonists and thus facilitated the im portation of m anufactures from the U nited States.8 In 1857 the reaction from the ex­ travagances w hich had attended the C rim ean W ar produced in Britain a financial crisis w hich passed to N o rth A m erica. C anada was particularly affected, since the depression called a halt to the heavy capital investm ent and brought the boom period to an abrupt term ination. C anadian im ports and exports

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 105

were considerably reduced. T he crisis was fu rth er aggravated by the p oor harvest of 1858 in C anada, and w ould have involved wholesale bankxupcty had not the G overnm ent subsi­ dized the railroads and m unicipalities to m eet their interest calls.0 Scarcely had' N o rth A m erica em erged from the depres­ sion o f 1857 w hen the outbreak of the A m erican Civil W ar fu rth e r disrupted the norm al course of trade.10 A lthough cut off fro m the S outhern m arket, the colonies w ere m ore than com pensated by the increased dem and in the N orth ern U nited States fo r their produce, particularly horses, m eat, wool and lum ber. T he shipping industry o f the Low er Colonies, already prosperous, was fu rth er benefited by the concentration of A m erican shipbuilders upon the construction of w ar vessels and not m erchantm en. N ova Scotian m erchants derived large profits from successful running of the blockade, and colonial fishermen gained from th e decrease in the A m erican fishing fleet after 1862. N ova Scotia becam e a m ore im portant distribution centre fo r W est Indian products after the outbreak o f w ar, and in 1865 re-exported sugar to the value of $309,459 and molasses to the value o f $ 139,011 to the U nited States.11 M oreover, the colonies in general profited from th e increase in prices in the U nited States during the Civil W ar. In addition, by raising the duties on th e im portation from other countries of products adm itted free from the colonies un d er the term s o f the treaty, the high w ar tariffs o f the N o rth fu rth e r increased the preference in favour of colonial products. O n the other hand, the export of A m erican m anufactures to the colonies was checked by w ar conditions, high prices, taxation and the scarcity o f labour in the U nited States. D uring th e w ar the exportation of livestock from the U nited States was prohibited, and fo r a tim e a sim ilar restriction was placed upon the export o f anthracite.12 D uring the sam e period, m oreover, the A m erican export trade was fu rth e r crippled by the exaction of excessive securities on cargoes shipped from A m erican ports on the A tlantic seaboard to the colonies.13 T he producers of w heat and bread-stuffs in the N orth-W est, how ever, sought to recoup in E urope the loss of the Southern m arket, and, in order to avoid the risk of capture by Southern raiders, sent a considerable portion of their exports by way o f C anada. In the final year o f the operation o f the treaty, when it h ad become apparent th at abrogation in M arch,

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1866, was inevitable, a trem endous quantity o f colonial produce was rushed across the border to escape the reim position of duty, and the total o f colonial exports reached the hitherto unparalleled sum o f forty-eight million dollars.14 T he treaty influenced tw o aspects of trad e betw een the colonies and the U nited States. T o a considerable extent it increased the consum ption in each of the other’s products. B ut it also fostered the use by each of the other’s transportation lines for the purpose o f re-exportation to outside m arkets. This applied particularly, of course, to the trad e in bread-stuffs, which was o f dom inant im portance to the Province o f Canada. O f the other causes which com bined to stim ulate these two econom ic developm ents, railway construction in the colonies and the expansion o f agriculture and lum bering in C anada were, in tu rn , partly a result o f the im petus given to trade by the treaty. It is scarcely fair, therefore, to discrim inate rigidly between them and the treaty in estim ating the cause o f the increase in trade during the period. Y et it is clear th at a m arked grow th of com m erce between the U nited States and the colonies w ould have occurred even had there been no treaty.15 F rom the table on page 108 it appears th at the increase in trade during this period was p art of a m ore general increase w hich had com m enced before th e treaty cam e into operation and con­ tinued after it was abrogated. T he lines o f econom ic com m uni­ cation between the m erchants of C anada W est and N ew Y ork had already been established in 1852, as was show n by the vigorous and effective protest which found expression in the T oronto G lobe w hen H incks threatened to injure this trade by discrim inatory legislation.10 W. H . M erritt found occasion to com m ent in 1855 upon the grow th in trade between C anada and the U nited States in the preceding six years.17 T he increase in population and in agricultural production, the developm ent o f railways, the dem and fo r shipping from the Low er Colonies, the effects o f the C rim ean and A m erican Civil W ars, would all have exerted a considerable influence in any case. C halfant Robinson has pointed out th a t the U nited States could not itself have m et the dem and for certain C anadian natural products which com prise a large p art o f the export from the colonies during this period.18 L um ber and barley, which in 1866 made up nearly a third of the total C anadian export to the U nited

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States, w ere both indispensable to A m erican industries, and w ere im ported in increasing quantities after the reim position of d uty.19 M oreover, as tastes in the two countries w ere sim ilar, a large num ber o f A m erican m anufactures, such as agricultural im plem ents, m achinery, plum bing supplies, leather, w ood and m etal goods, w ere suited to C anadian needs, while proxim ity favoured quick delivery and reduced costs. Since the effects of the C rim ean W ar, natural developm ent and the investm ent of British capital during the decade after 1850 w ould inevitably have contributed to the purchasing pow er o f the colonists, it is reasonable to assum e th a t a heavy dem and for A m erican m anufactures w ould just as inevitably have follow ed.20 It must, therefore, be realized that the Reciprocity T reaty was only one o f several factors w hich com bined to produce in British A m erica the prosperity which followed its negotiation. U ndoubtedly the treaty im parted an appreciable im petus to the trad e between th e U nited States and th e colonies.21 T he influence of the other forces, w hich com bined to produce the prosperity o f the period, was o f course increased by the fact th at they coincided w ith a period of exceptional fiscal freedom between the colonies and the U nited States. As already sug­ gested, these other forces w ere, to som e extent, created by the im petus w hich the treaty had im parted to trade. D uring its opening years, m oreover, the treaty probably exerted an indirect influence upon the developm ent of trade by establishing better political relations betw een the U nited States and the colonies. Its effect in this connection, though not capable of being esti­ m ated, was, according to the U nited States T arilf Commission, undoubtedly considerable.22 Y et the presence of so m any other forces, which w ould have exerted a very great influence even had there been no treaty, m akes it extrem ely difficult to estim ate exactly how great w ere the effects o f reciprocity. C ontem porary opinions,23 w hich credited the prosperity of the colonies alm ost altogether to the treaty, w ere m uch exaggerated. O n the whole, the influence of the treaty, while considerable, was som ew hat less th an has frequently been supposed.24 I t now becomes im perative to exam ine the trade returns of the period in the light of the preceding p art o f this chapter. H ere it is necessary to point out that the statistics o f both countries, especially those relating to exports, are not m athe­

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m atically accurate. T hey are useful as approxim ate indications o f the rise and fall o f trade; b u t they cannot be regarded as precise records of the absolute changes in the am ounts o f trade. A lso w orthy o f notice is the charge of G eorge Brown and Sir Edw ard T ho rnton th at an inflated value was placed by A m eri­ can custom s authorities upon the free goods im ported from the colonies during th e Civil W ar.25 T h e following table, show ing the total trad e between the U nited States and the colonies, illustrates the pronounced rise w hich, from various factors, occurred during the operation of t h e t r e a t y . 26

1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862

S 14,695,491 17,049,810 15,699,053 18,960,156 32,857,820 42,860,097 50,301,963 46,247,398 39,389,362 47,397,059 46,268,724 44,401,002 39,084,095

1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890

$ 45,104,600 56,183,360 62,093,805 73,357,508 46,064,307 50,342,156 52,675,237 61,604,582 64,497,661 63,990,211 77,085,448 80,900,792

In T able N o. V (A ppendix) it is shown th at the trade o f C anada with th e U nited States rose very considerably during the opera­ tion o f the treaty. F rom Tables Nos. V I and V II it appears that the trade of the Low er Provinces on the w hole shows a rise, although the gross increase was not very great. C anadian trade w ith the U nited States, afte r increasing sharply in 1855 and 1856, fell away in 1858 and 1859 as a result o f the depression of 1857. D uring the Civil W ar, exports from the U nited States to the colonies rem ained at a surprising height in view of the chaotic nature of the period. A large increase in the export of grain from the A m erican N orth-W est to C anada tended to balance the paralyzing influence o f w ar conditions upon the m anufacturing trade.27 M eanw hile the com bined effect o f an increased dem and fo r colonial produce, increased preferences (w hich were only m ade possible by the existence of the tre a ty ), and the know ledge of im pending abrogation, raised the total of exports from the colonies to a hitherto unequalled height.

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T h e balance of trad e which had, w ith the exception o f 1860, favoured the U nited States turned, during 1865 and 1866, in favour of the colonies.

I. N A T U R E O F T R A D E D E V E L O P E D U N D ER TH E TREATY

U n d er the operation o f the treaty the export o f goods, adm itted free o f duty into the U nited States, from the Provinces rose to tw enty m illion dollars in 1856, and continued until 1866 to com prise m uch the greater portion o f colonial exports to the U nited States. T he export of free goods from the U nited States to th e Provinces experienced a sim ilar, though m ore gradual, rise w hich reached its peak during the Civil W ar. In 1862 and 1863 the export o f free goods from the U nited States into C an ad a was equal to the flow o f free goods in the opposite direction.28 M oreover, if there is tru th in the assertion of T ho rn to n and Brow n th a t an inflated value was placed by the A m erican custom s authorities upon free im portations from the colonies, the returns of trade represent an even m ore pronounced swing in favour o f the A m erican export of free goods. T h e com m erce developed un d er the treaty was largely w hat F red erick H aynes has called a com m erce o f convenience. W ith the exception of Indian corn [maize], w hich was not grow n in the colonies, and o f gypsum, barley, soft pine and com bing wool o f the Leicester and Cotswold sheep, which w ere not produced in the U nited States, m ost o f the enum erated articles were com m on to both countries, although not com m on to all sections of either. I t was often m ore convenient for portions o f Canada to obtain supplies from the adjoining states rath er than from m ore rem ote districts o f C anada itself, and m ore convenient fo r p arts of the U nited States to obtain supplies from C anada instead of from their own country. O ften, too, in the case of products nom inally the sam e, differences in quality and adapta­ bility to different purposes also contributed to the developm ent o f trade betw een the two countries. These were factors, the U nited States T ariff Com m ission rem arked, which would have asserted themselves independently o f the treaty, b u t the re­

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m oval of duties facilitated their operation and added to the gross effect. M oreover, in the case o f several com m odities, one country was enabled by the treaty to utilize the other as an avenue of transit to an outside destination. T he advantage of the trade of convenience is a feature of the period which cannot be shown in any statistical table, but m ust nevertheless be taken into account.29 T he m ost striking exam ple of the w orking of the principle of convenience was the trade between the U nited States and the colonies in flour and grain, particularly w heat. It may be noted th at w heat and flour w ere by far the greatest C anadian export to the U nited States, and in 1856 com prised over tw o-thirds of the total A m erican im ports from the province. T he position of C anada W est as a wedge between the N orth-W estern States and the E astern U nited States m ade it inevitable th a t w heat gathered a t Chicago, M ilwaukee, D etroit and Toledo should be exported to C anada at its w estern extrem ity and should appear later, sup­ plem ented by C anadian w heat, or until 18 5 8,30 m anufactured in C anada into flour, a t Buffalo, Oswego, O gdensburg and C ape V incent to reach N ew Y ork by the C ham plain C anal and the H udson River o r Boston and P ortland by rail. A greater quantity o f w heat from the A m erican W est entered C anada at K ingston and continued its journey to M ontreal. O ut o f a total reported export o f 1,655,641 bushels in 1857, E dw ard W ilkins, the British Consul at Chicago, asserted th at nearly a million bushels were shipped from Chicago fo r K ingston and M ont­ real.31 T h e returns indicate th at in 1856 C anada im ported nearly three m illion dollars w orth of grain from the U nited States and exported w heat and flour to the approxim ate value of eight and four million dollars respectively.32 A lthough the greater p art o f this total was com posed o f C anadian w heat and flour m anufactured from C anadian w heat, yet a considerable portion consisted o f produce w hich was originally A m erican. W hile C anada W est served largely as a convenient route of transportation for a considerable quantity o f A m erican grain, the E astern U nited States in its turn was utilized as a sim ilarly convenient channel fo r the export of C anadian bread-stuffs to oth er countries: a large p a rt of this C anadian export to the U nited States was re-exported either to the Low er Provinces o r to E urope.33 D uring the operation of the treaty the export of

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flour from the U nited States to the Low er Provinces rose considerably, w hile the direct export from C anada fell off. M uch o f the flour w ith which the A m ericans supplied the Low er Colonies was o f C anadian origin and shipped through Boston and P o rtland.34 T his entrepot trade had already reached the sum o f $1,230,865 in 1854 and $1,270,057 in 18 5 5.35 It is impossible to tell how great was the re-exportation of C anadian bread-stuffs to the Low er Colonies in the subsequent years: in both the U nited States and the colonies all im ports not paying d uty were considered as destined for hom e consum ption, and no distinction w as m ade betw een such dom estic and foreign products in the returns o f exports. T he continued im portance of the re-export trade in flour is, how ever, suggested by a m arginal en try in the N ew Brunsw ick returns to the Colonial Office in the years after 1856: “A considerable quantity o f the F lour im ported from the U. States was the produce and m anufacture o f C anada.” M uch o f the export o f C anadian bread-stuffs was consum ed in th e E astern States where the fine w heat and flour o f C anada was preferred.30 O n the other hand, the spring w heat produced in Illinois and W isconsin secured a ready m arket, because of its cheapness in C anada E ast. I t was, to a great extent, in response to this dem and that the export o f w heat from Chicago and also from Oswego to K ingston and M ontreal had developed.37 C anada exported heavily in rye and oats to the U nited States while, owing chiefly to a fortuitous influx of beer-drinking G erm ans into th e U nited States, the returns of barley im ported from the colonies show ed an increase from eleven thousand dollars in 1859 to a m illion in 1862 and to four m illion in 18 66.38 O n the other hand, C anada im ported a large quantity of Indian corn from th e U nited States.39 Since the high price o f w heat in E urope coincided w ith an exceptional dem and for labour in C anada, owing to railroad construction and tow n building, m any farm ers in C anada W est confined their attention to w heat and neglected other articles o f agricultural produce. A lthough m ost of these articles m ight have been obtained from rem ote parts o f C anada, large qu an ­ tities w ere im ported from m ore accessible parts of the U nited States to supply T oronto, H am ilton and other C anadian cities, to the infinite disgust of the Canadian M erchant’s M agazine, in which it was asserted:

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Possessing a soil and clim ate equal, if n ot superior, to that o f the neighbouring states, with no large m anufacturing cities o f our ow n to supply, we are y e t im porters o f a large am ount o f agricultural produce fo r h om e consum ption. T his is particularly the case as regards W estern Canada. . . . It is no w onder that m oney is scarce in this part o f the country, when we im port not only our m anufactured goods fro m the other side, but our very b ee f and m utton, butter, cheese, apples, eggs and vegetables.40 T h e principle o f convenience operated in other articles of trad e u nder the treaty. A considerable rise occurred in the export of coal, both anthracite and bitum inous, from P enn­ sylvania and O hio to Canada. T his was balanced to some degree by the increased export of bitum inous coal from N ova Scotia to the E astern States, w here it was used to supply Boston and the oth er N ew E ngland cities.41 Several forces com bined w ith the rem oval o f fiscal restrictions to develop this increase in the export o f N ova Scotian coal. Chiefly these o th er forces were the dem and in N ew E ngland fo r coal adapted to use in gas works, forges and furnaces, the opening o f new mines and the fact that the railways had n o t then gone very fa r in granting com m odity rates on low grade freights. M oreover, the pressure of the Civil W ar delayed the opening o f A m erican m ines and the extension o f A m erican railways, w ith the result th at the dem and o f N ew E ngland industrial areas raised the price in Boston to eight dollars p er ton about 1864, afte r which the price steadily fell.42 T he exportation o f coal from N ova Scotia to the U nited States is reported as $150,940 in 1854, $275,346 in 1858 and $1,085,745 in 1865. T he returns o f coal im ported by C anada from the U nited States w ere $108,220 in 1853, $385,360 in 1856 and $455,890 in 1866. T he export of fish from the colonies, chiefly o f course the L ow er Provinces, to the U nited States rose from $845,448 in 1853 to $1,879,878 in 1856 and $1,703,472 in 1860. A ccording to D r. Saunders, a fair am ount o f the dried and pickled fish im ported from the colonies was re-exported fro m Boston and N ew Y ork which afforded g reater opportunities for assorted cargoes than was possible fro m any o f the N ova Scotian ports.43 C anada is reported as having im ported from th e U nited States fish to the value of $59,952 in 1853, $152,532 in 1856 and $265,146 in

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1866 and fish oil to the value o f $249,192 in 1856 and $67,873 in 1866. M uch o f this im portation by C anada was, according to D r. Shortt, p a rt of the increased export from the Low er Colonies to the U nited States.44 T h at a re-export trad e already existed in 1855 is suggested by a stipulation in the Congressional A ct o f M arch 2 that, in the case o f fish and the products o f fish im ported from the colonies after Septem ber 11, 1854, the T reasury should refund the duties paid thereon “which have n o t been refunded on exportation.”45 A m utual exchange in anim als and their products occurred. “T he C anadian farm er w ho grows oats,” w rote H arvey, “ breeds horses and cattle, and th e A m erican w ho grows corn converts it into pork.” In the export of horses and cattle to the U nited States C anada devel­ oped a large trade which was trem endously augm ented during th e latter p art o f the Civil W ar. O n the other hand, large quantities of beef, pork and ham s raised in the N orth-W est w ere shipped, chiefly via Chicago, to C anada either fo r home consum ption o r fo r re-exportation to Liverpool.40 T he returns o f anim als im ported by the U nited States from the colonies w ere $37,331 in 1853, $1,389,348 in 1856, $3,166,703 in 1864 and $9,716,899 in 1866. T he im portation of m eat by C anada from the U nited States was reported as $104,236 in 1853, $1,417,772 in 1856, $1,238,923 in 1863 and $760,895 in 1866. T h e increased export o f C anadian lum ber to the U nited States was largely a result o f the rapid extension o f the lum ber industry w hich a t this tim e occurred in C anada W est.47 R em ote­ ness from the sea-board forced the supply of lum ber from C anada W est upon the A m erican m arket irrespective o f tariffs, although the rem oval of fiscal restrictions tended to increase the trade and therefore to stim ulate C anadian production. A t this tim e occurred also in the Eastern and M iddle States and in M ichigan, W isconsin and M innesota an increased dem and fo r this staple; it was reported in the Chicago press that the Chicago lum ber m arket was supplied with large quantities of the best C anadian pine.48 T he trad e in lum ber developed in spite of the fact that the A m erican authorities considered themselves entitled to treat as m anufactured, and therefore subject to duty, boards, if so m uch as grooved and tongued, and shingles if so m uch as dressed.49 T he returns o f tim ber and lum ber im ported free by the U nited States from the colonies w ere $2,832,922 in

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1856, $4,511,419 in 1864, and $5,003,040 in 1866.B0 T he returns o f lum ber exported from N ew Brunsw ick to the U nited States under the treaty also show an increase, as the returns of exports to the U nited States w ere £ 3 4 ,3 8 8 in 1852, £ 108,043 in 1860 and £ 110,836 in 1864.51 H ow ever, p art o f this increase was com posed of lum ber really destined fo r G re at Britain, large shipm ents o f w hich were cleared first for A m erican ports in o rd er to evade the deck-load law. U nder the treaty, however, N ew Brunswick developed a considerable export o f lum ber and box shooks to the W est Indies by way o f the U nited States.52 T he dem and for the lum ber of the Low er C olonies in th e U nited States itself was disappointingly small. Since the m ost accessible tim ber stands in N ew England, with the exception o f M aine, w ere showing signs o f depletion by 1850, these states would presum ably have provided an outlet for the lum ber of the Low er Provinces. T he non-fulfilm ent o f this expectation was chiefly the result of com petition from th e lum ber area w est of the A ppalachians in the region of the G reat Lakes. A lthough m uch o f the production from this area was utilized locally o r in the Plains region to the W est, by 1860 m ore than ninety m illion feet were floated dow n the E rie C anal. D ifferences o f quality and adaptability in the wool produced in C anada and the U nited States m ade the trade in this com m odity of m utual advantage. C anada exported to the N ew E ngland States fo r m anufacture as w orsteds a large quantity of the Leicester and Cotswold com bing wools w hich were o f a quality not produced to any great extent in the U nited States. T he returns o f raw wool im ported by the U nited States from the colonies w ere $53,530 in 1853, $376,799 in 1856, $524,359 in 1859 and $1,210,779 in 1866. “T he free w ool o f C anada,” asserted A. L. H ayes to the N ational A ssociation of W ool M anufacturers, “has been an inestim able favour to ou r w orsted m anufacturers. . . . W ould it be wise, while we are com peting w ith E urope fo r the production o f $15,000,000 of worsteds, to check the introduction o f the long and silky fleeces produced in the cold and m oist clim ate of C anada, and send that staple abroad to aid ou r rivals?” C anada, on the other hand, as M r. H ayes pointed out, im ported annually three hundred thousand pounds of A m erican clothing w ool.53 T his process of exchange w ould have been carried on even had

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 115

there been no treaty, but it was undoubtedly facilitated by the rem oval of duty. As D r. Shortt has pointed out, therefore, the principal articles o f im port by C anada from the U nited States - grain, m eat, flour, livestock, coal, fish, fish-oil and tallow - were very largely the articles which the colonies w ere chiefly exporting to the U nited States. T rad e under the treaty between the Low er Provinces and the U nited States has already been m entioned from tim e to tim e in this chapter. T he M aritim es, o f course, benefited by obtaining free access to the A m erican m arket. T he p art played by the treaty in developing the fish, lum ber and coal trades has been discussed. O n the whole, how ever, the effect of the treaty on the trade o f the Low er Provinces was disappointing. Several causes prevented it from reaching a larger figure a t this time. A ccording to H aynes, N ew E ngland had not yet com e to need the raw m aterials of which the Low er Provinces possessed an abundance, and, therefore, the resources of those colonies rem ained undeveloped during the continuance of the treaty.51 C om petition from the W est n o t only curtailed the lum ber m arket of the Low er Provinces in N ew England, b u t also destroyed any prospect of those colonies developing a profitable w heat trade w ith the E astern States.55 Beef and pork were am ong the m any com m odities the production of which in the W est fo r the eastern m arket was rapidly increasing. Just at the close of the period of the Reciprocity T reaty the introduction of refrigeration m ethods robbed N ew E ngland and the M aritim es o f the advantages they would otherw ise have possessed in supplying fresh m eats to a growing and nearby m arket. An exam ination of the return of exports from the Low er Colonies to the U nited States in 1865 reveals that, of agricultural produce actually grown within these provinces, the only items of any im portance were, from N ova Scotia, vegetables $148,734 and, from Prince E dw ard Island, oats, meal and flour (chiefly oats) £ 6 1 ,1 1 9 , potatoes and vegetables £ 5 ,5 9 9 .5G T he advantages possessed by Prince Edw ard Island in the trad e in oats was soon, how ever, m ade negligible by the sam e forces which had already practically killed the production of w heat in the Low er Colonies. It was not until some years later that there arose the possibility of considerable profits from potatoes, root crops, and from a

116 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

variety o f sm aller items such as eggs and poultry. T he principle o f convenience, already described, operated also in the Low er Colonies: it was possible fo r one section o f a province to have a surplus for export of some article which another section of th e sam e province was obliged to im port. It has been shown, how ever, th at in general, as D r. Saunders rem arks, “very little was achieved in taking advantage o f the large A m erican m arket as an outlet for the agricultural products of the Low er Provinces.” O f the articles enum erated in the treaty, the chief im ports by the Low er Provinces from the U nited States con­ sisted o f grain and flour, m eats and tobacco. O f these, by far the largest was th at o f w heat flour w hich was reported as am ounting to £ 6 1 5 ,0 9 8 in 1858 and £ 7 2 7 ,0 5 2 in 1864. As has been already pointed out, a large p art o f this im portation was com posed of flour originally im ported by the U nited States from C anada.57

I I . T H E T R A D E IN D U T Y -P A Y IN G

GOODS

Possibly the greatest cause of A m erican discontent with the treaty was its failure appreciably to increase the export in duty-paying goods from the U nited States to the colonies. As has been shown, the assent o f eastern m anufacturers to the treaty had been captured by assurances th at they would benefit from the increased consum ing pow er o f the colonies. Y et, in 1866, D erby, in his prelim inary report on the operation o f the treaty, voiced a widely held A m erican grievance w hen he asserted of C anada she buys but little, if any, m ore o f our m anufactures than she d id before the treaty - although, in the last tw elve years, she has added tw o-fifths to her population, and nearly doubled her productions and consum ption.58 T h e return o f dutiable im ports by C anada, the centre of controversy, from the U nited States, corroborates D erby’s assertion.59 It will be noted th a t the largest retu rn of dutiable im ports by C anada was in 1854, the year before the treaty came into full operation. A bout two million dollars w orth of this total

DUTIABLE IM P O R T S IN TO CANADA FR O M T H E U N IT E D STATES

$ 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856

5,803,732 6,981,735 7,613,003 10,656,582 13,449,341 11,449,472 12,770,923

1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863

$ 9,966,430 8,473,607 9,032,861 8,526,230 8,338,620 6,128,783 3,974,396

was com posed o f goods w hich w ere subsequently, under the term s o f the treaty, adm itted free o f duty from the U nited States.00 T herefore, o f those im ports w hich w ere subject to duty before and after the signing o f the treaty, the returns in 1855 were approxim ately the sam e as those o f 1854. In 1856 cam e a decided increase which was, how ever, slight com pared w ith the rap id rise o f the trade in free goods.61 T h at the im port of dutiable goods by C anada from the U nited States rem ained at this high figure during the first years o f the operation o f the treaty was, of course, a result of the general prosperity which prevailed a t this tim e in C anada. T he treaty, as already pointed out, was a considerable facto r in producing th at prosperity. N evertheless, on the whole, the effect o f the treaty on the export o f dutiable products from the U nited States into C anada had been distinctly disappointing. A fter 1857 the im portation o f dutiable products from the U nited States shows a gradual decline. T he com pletion o f public w orks w hich had necessitated heavy im portations from the U nited States, the depression o f 1857 and th e consequent reduction o f C anadian purchasing pow er and, later, the paralyz­ ing effect o f civil w ar upon A m erican production were all, of course, im portant causes o f this decline.02 It is im possible to escape the conviction, how ever, th at the fiscal policy o f G alt and Cayley had a considerable influence in producing the sam e result. Between 1856 and 1859 the duty upon tw o-thirds of the duty-paying goods was raised from twelve and a half to twenty per cent.68 T he increases involved such A m erican m anufactures as cotton and woollens, iron and hardw are, leather goods, m achinery, m usical instrum ents, m anufactured tobacco and wooden goods; also articles o f foreign production such as coffee, tea, sugar and molasses w hich were re-exported to Canada. A t the sam e tim e C anadian m anufactories o f m any of these products w ere established a t T oronto, H am ilton and other

118 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

C anadian cities. D erby asserted in 1867 th at good progress was being m ade in the production of boots, shoes, leather, woollens, linen, tools, m achinery and wooden furniture.'14 D onahue, the British Consul a t Buffalo, tells m uch the sam e story.05 G alt boasted in 1859: The duties im posed are m oderate, and since they have been raised fro m 12V2 per cent to 15, various m anufactories have been created, have thriven, and are still thriving, and I am not aware that during the recent extraordinary m onetary crisis they have suffered to any extent.00 T h e fiscal additions imposed by the C anadian G overnm ent, and the developm ent o f m anufactures which was both a cause and an effect of th at policy, undoubtedly exercised a depressing effect on A m erican exports to C anada. In discussing the furni­ ture, stove, clothing and boot and shoe industries o f Buffalo, D onahue asserted: I grant that the late tariffs in C anada have had the effect of, in a great measure, annihilating the business form erly carried on in the articles m entioned above.°7 M oor, the A m erican C onsul-G eneral at M ontreal, and D erby in his rep o rt of 1867, took a sim ilarly grave view of the havoc w rought by C anadian fiscal policy.08 N o t only was the trade of the U nited States affected by C anadian com petition but, in some cases, the increase in duty caused dim inished consum ption in Canada. G alt him self adm itted in 1862 th at the experience of past years had show n augm ented duties to result in diminished consum ption. As p ro o f he described the leather trade. In this, as in the case of other articles upon w hich the duties were increased, G alt’s experience had been acquired to a great extent at the expense o f the U nited States.00

III. E FFE C T O F TH E TR EA TY O N T H E A M E R IC A N F IS H IN G

IN D U S T R Y

A lthough the free list of the treaty was regarded as m ore favourable to colonial than to A m erican exports, it was expected th at the balance w ould be readjusted by other concessions to the

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 119

U nited States in the treaty. M ost valued in anticipation w as the opening o f the coastal fisheries to the A m ericans. In so far as the chief object o f M arcy and Pierce had been to allay friction in the fishing area and so to avoid a possible breach w ith G reat Britain their expectation was, as shown in C hapter 4 of P art I, fully justified by the event. A s in the question o f the treaty’s influence upon trade between the U nited States and the colonies, so, in this phase of its operation, the interplay o f other forces makes it difficult to estim ate the effect of the arrangem ent upon the A m erican fishing industry. T he fluctuations which occurred in the industry during this period can largely be explained by the existence o f these other forces. It w ould be difficult to prove th at the treaty exerted a very considerable influence in stim ulating the fisheries o f the U nited States. O n the other hand it is equally difficult to estab­ lish the charge th at the com petition o f colonial fish, adm itted free under the treaty, was highly injurious to the A m erican industry. T h e period between 1852 and 1864 was one o f great prosperity fo r the cod fishery of N ew E ngland.70A s this period com m enced before the treaty cam e into operation, the pros­ perity of the industry cannot by any m eans be wholly attributed to its influence. A m erican citizens had, indeed, obtained access to the m ost im portant cod fisheries on the British coast under the Convention of 1818.71 H ow ever, the landing privileges which were secured to the U nited States by the treaty probably stim ulated the A m erican industry. T he chief concession to th e U nited States, under th at p art of th e Reciprocity T reaty w hich dealt w ith the fisheries, was the adm ission o f A m erican fisherm en to legal participation in the m ackerel fishery on the coasts o f the colonies. In spite o f this concession, the treaty failed to prevent a decline of the A m erican m ackerel industry between 1852 and I8 6 0 .72 Since the decline com m enced in 1852, the treaty, although failing to prevent it, cannot be regarded as the sole o r indeed an im portant cause o f this depression. T he greater inducem ents offered to labour and capital in other occupations in the U nited States at this time w ere probably the chief reason for the decline.73 In this connec­ tion may be noted the assertion of M rs. G ra n t that opportunities fo r em ploym ent in other industries exerted a sim ilarly depress­

120 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

ing effect upon the C anadian fisheries after 1886. M oreover, according to the sam e authority, a cause o f the increase in the Canadian fishery during the preceding period (1869-1886) had been the lack of em ploym ent in other industries.74 A m erican fishermen attributed the decline in their industry to the free adm ission of fish from the colonies. But the export of colonial fish to the U nited States w as never of sufficient proportion to im pair seriously the A m erican industry. M oreover, as already pointed out, a considerable p a rt o f this increased colonial export was probably re-exported to the W est Indies and to C anada (see pages 112-113). T h e im provem ent of the m ackerel industry during the next six years was chiefly the result of an increased catch. Since the rem oval o f legal restrictions assisted the A m erican fishermen in taking advantage of a period o f plenty in the m ackerel fishery, this increase m ay be regarded as partly a result of the R ecipro­ city T reaty. But the Civil W ar undoubtedly exerted a potent influence in stim ulating the industry by creating an increased dem and fo r food-stuffs. Owing to the scarcity o f labour, since a large num ber o f fishermen had enlisted fo r service, a slight reduction in the catch occurred in the last three years of the war. H eavy w ar taxes on salt and other m aterials also tended to cripple the industry. Y et, because o f the stim ulating effect of the w ar upon prices the value of the m ackerel fishery was, however, greatest during 1864, 1865 and 1866. “T he m ackerel,” w rites Professor M cF arland, “was king o f the sea in w ar tim e.” 75

IV . IN F L U E N C E O F T H E T R E A T Y ON T H E T R A D E O F T H E ST. L A W R E N C E

G reat expectations had been entertained fo r the developm ent of trad e on the St. Law rence under the treaty. W. H . M erritt had confidently predicted th at u nder its operation this w aterway w ould become the great avenue o f trade, both outgoing and incom ing, between the N orth-W estern States and Europe. D uring the period of negotiation the free navigation of the St. L aw rence had been held out as a concession of great advantage both to A m erican shipping o n the G reat Lakes and to the

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 121

farm ers o f the N orth-W est, w ho w ould thus obtain an excellent outlet fo r the export o f their produce to Europe. These expectations proved to be, on the whole, unjustified. A m erican shipping on the G re at Lakes did not take any considerable advantage o f the free navigation o f the river to develop a direct trade w ith Europe. D uring eight years o f the operation o f the treaty, between 1855 and 1863, only forty-four vessels with a total tonnage of fifteen thousand passed dow n the St. Law rence, and but thirty-tw o w ith a total o f eleven thousand returned.70 C om pared w ith the huge trad e of the E rie Canal, these figures are not impressive, despite the assertion o f the C hicago B oard o f T rade in 1860 th at the navigation o f the C anadian canals and the St. Law rence was of the utm ost im portance to th e A m erican lake m arine.77 N o r did the export trad e in bread-stuffs by w ay o f th e St. Law rence achieve the anticipated results. D uring this period the o u tp u t of grain in the A m erican N orth-W est and C anada experienced a phenom enal increase. A m erican official statistics quote the returns o f grain sent eastw ard from eight western states and C anada in 1856 as fifty-seven m illion bushels. In 1866 the total had risen to one hundred and ten million bushels.78 Com pared w ith this developm ent and w ith the gain achieved by the Erie C anal the export o f bread-stuffs by w ay of the St. Law rence, although it increased considerably in the early years o f th e w ar, was m ost disappointing. T his will be seen in the following ta b le :79

1853 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1866

E x p o rts o f w heat via the S t. Law rence $ 875,547 260,400 1,068,142 1,178,810 688,581 53,360 1,914,828 3,808,805 2,609,443 1,487,419 279,770 52,245

E x p o rts o f flo u r via the S t. Law rence $ , 2,021,471 880,248 2,038,653 1,075,290 1,066,823 759,182 1,831,576 3,342,157 3,119,324 2,695,928 645,109 1,162,099

A s will appear from Table N o. X I the E rie Canal, although its rate o f toll was m uch higher than th a t o f the St. L aw rence,80

122 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

captured a large p art o f the increased output from the N orthW est, while other A m erican routes to the ocean, including the railways, helped fu rth er to divert the trade from the St. Law rence. C ontem porary evidence from both sides o f the border bears out this conclusion. Indeed, one o f the great problem s confronting the statesm en o f C anada during this period was how to prevent the diversion of trade to the A m eri­ can route. W. H . M erritt reported in 1858 th at in the year 1856 the trade diverted to the seaports of the U nited States am ounted to over six million tons com pared with a scant six hundred thousand which reached C anadian seaports.81 T he Com m is­ sioner of Public W orks for C anada reported in 1859 that in the preceding five years the arrivals a t Buffalo and Oswego had averaged 1,313,227 barrels of flour and 27,527,088 bushels of grain, while the average shipm ents seaw ard from C anadian ports had been only 205,821 barrels of flour and 972,625 bushels of grain.S2 His successor declared in 1862: A vast stream o f traffic has been diverted fro m the St. Lawrence, and continues to flow through the E rie Canal with augm ented volum e notw ithstanding the railway com petition it had to encounter in later years.83 In 1861 the Legislative Council afforded striking evidence of the situation by appointing a Select C om m ittee “ to enquire into the causes which have directed trad e of the west through the U nited States by way o f the H udson and P o rt of N ew Y ork.” 84 A num ber o f causes com bined to favour exportation by the A m erican route. T he St. Law rence, which had not been fully opened until 1847, was at a disadvantage in the attem pt to divert a trade which had already been established over the Erie route.85 Since N ew Y ork rem ained the im porting m arket for the W est, a large supply of vessels was available fo r transportation o f the down-coming produce. Freight rates to Liverpool were therefore m uch cheaper from N ew Y ork than from M ontreal, w here the num ber o f vessels was lim ited.80 H igher insurance rates because of the m ore precarious state o f navigation in the Low er St. Law rence and the G ulf, the expenses of tow ing and pilotage by the C anadian route and, according to W. H . M erritt,87 the effect of the British postal subsidy to th e C unard L ine com bined furth er to increase the disparity in freight rates. A ccording to

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 123

K ingsford, in 1865 the freight on a barrel of flour from M ontreal to Liverpool was twenty-five o r thirty cents m ore than from N ew Y ork.88 Finally, the banking facilities in N ew Y ork en­ couraged exporters to follow the A m erican route by m aking possible a speedy realization of shipm ents.89 Equally signal was the failure of the St. Law rence rou te to capture the trade in E uropean exports to the N orth-W est. As already pointed out in connection with the down trade, New Y ork rem ained the m arket for western im ports. T he free navi­ gation of the W elland C anal enabled a large trade to develop between N ew Y ork and Boston and the W estern States by way o f Oswego and Ogdensburg. O f the 976,656 tons of m erchandize transported over the W elland in 1856, tw o-thirds was from and to A m erican ports.90 W ilkins, the British Consul in Chicago, inform ed M erritt in 1858 th at the only im ports to Lake M ichigan via the St. Law rence w orthy of notice were railway iron and salt.91 T he im portation of foreign goods by way of the St. Law rence to Chicago, asserted W ilkins, had been small in 1854, less in 1855 and still less in 18 5 6.92 “In vain,” w rote Kingsford in 1865, “ do we look for im ports by the River for the W est. T he im portations do not com e by the St. Lawrence. Chicago and kindred cities turn to N ew Y ork alone, and it is there that all the im portations are delivered to be sent forw ard by the Erie C anal.”93 T he Select C om m ittee of the Legislative Council in 1861 reported that in the previous year goods to the value of only $21,505 had passed through C anada for consum p­ tion in the U nited States. C anadian railways, notably the G rand T runk, suffered in the attem pt to secure the eastern trade in breadstuffs, because of the failure of the St. Law rence route to attract a rem unerative inbound traffic. “Successful com petition for bulky raw m aterials with low freight rates was handicapped by the effectiveness of N ew Y ork and the A m erican roads in attracting m anufactured products.”94 A ccording to T hom as K eefer, the great C anadian engineer, this last factor proved particularly disastrous to C anadian railways.95 T he G rand T ru n k could tap the western grain reservoir at Chicago and secure an alm ost continuously descending stream , though not a paying one; but it could not capture the incoming and m ore rem unerative traffic.

124 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

T h e failure o f C anada to capture any considerable p art of the N orth-W estern im port trade is, no doubt, largely attributable to very m uch the sam e difficulties as those w hich have already been enum erated in connection w ith the export trade. In addi­ tion, the stringency w ith w hich A m erican fiscal regulations w ere enforced also discouraged w estern m erchants from im porting their goods by w ay of the St. Law rence. G oods purchased in bond a t M ontreal were subject in the U nited States to duty on their m arket value in C anada. Even though m erely trans-shipped in C anada, they were likely to be assessed in the sam e m anner unless certain exacting conditions w ere fulfilled.96 O n the other hand, goods purchased in bond on the A m erican seaboard were assessed for duty according to their value in the m arket w hence last im ported - an inducem ent w hich operated strongly in favour o f the A m erican route. N o t only did C anada fail to secure the carrying trade in im ports to the A m erican N orth-W est but, to a large extent, the im portations by C anada itself from other countries tended to follow the A m erican route. T he following table shows in general the extent o f the C anadian im port trade both of goods passing through the U nited States in bond and o f foreign goods such as tea, coffee and sugar which were purchased in the U nited States for re-exportation to C anada.97 Passing through the U nited States in bond

1856 1857 1858 1861 1862 1863 1865 1866

% 4,926,920 5,582,640 2,057,024 5,688,950 5,508,422 6,172,483 6,511,771 12,751,548

P u rch ased in the U nited S tates Produce N o t produce o ) the U nited o f the U nited S tates States

S 18,171,620 16,434,332 11,444,742 16,141,426 21,128,078 20,287,762 16,485,625 14,616,167

$ 5,119,116 3,790,316 3,847,162 4,927,958 4,045,080 2,821,598 3,103,430 2,284,715

T otal Im p o rts into C an ad a

$ 43,584,384 39,430,600 29,078,524 43,054,836 48,600,633 45,964,493 44,620,469 53,802,319

It was against the im port trad e in non-A m erican produce from the U nited States that G alt’s change of 1860 in the m ethod o f assessing ad valorem duties was calculated. It will be noted th at the returns in this class o f produce show a considerable reduction in 1863, 1865 and 1866. H ow ever, although G alt’s

T H E O P E R A T I O N O F T H E T R E A T Y - 125

policy m ay have had some effect in producing this result, the Civil W ar, as the U nited States T ariff Com m ission points out, was probably a m ore potent factor in reducing the am ou n t of C anadian purchases of foreign products in the U nited States.98 T h e charge o f E dw ard Stanw ood th at G alt’s policy cu t off the re-export trade of the U nited States, appears, therefore, to be grossly exaggerated.99 It m ay be noted that the decline in the im portation of foreign goods by C anada from the U nited States had already com m enced before the Cayley and G alt tariffs had com e into effect. A ccording to the A m erican returns, the export o f foreign produce from the U nited States to C anada reached its peak in 1855; by the year 1857 the returns had decreased from $8,769,850 to $3,550,187; while, a t the sam e tim e, expo rt of A m erican dom estic produce to C anada rose from $9,950,764 in 1855 to $13,024,708 in 1857. T his suggests th at already the C anadians w ere finding it unprofitable to purchase foreign produce in the U nited States, even before G alt’s m ethod of assessing ad valorem duties had com e into effect and before the Civil W ar had raised prices in the U nited States. U ndoubtedly the canal, railroad and shipping interests of the U nited States derived large profits from the transp o rt of C anadian im ports and exports. G eorge Brown and Sir Edw ard T ho rn to n quoted the C hief o f the A m erican Bureau o f Statistics as saying th a t the average ocean freight on m erchandize was not less than eight p er cent. “I f the ocean freight on ordinary m erchandise is eight per cent,” continued their m em orandum , “how greatly m ore m ust be the percentage o f overland freights; and how infinitely greater m ust be the percentage on the value o f farm produce than on ordinary m erchandise?”100 T he D etroit B oard of T ra d e supplied even m ore striking evidence of the profits derived by the A m erican forw arding interests in estim at­ ing th at on three hundred thousand bushels of C anadian w heat im ported at D etro it and eventually exported a t N ew Y ork, A m erican m erchants w ere paid $108,296, of which eighty thousand was expended after transfer of the w heat a t Buffalo.101

V. IM M E D IA T E E F F E C T S O F A B R O G A T IO N A ND PER M A N EN T RESU LTS OF TH E TREATY

In the years im m ediately following 1866 the effect of abroga­ tion upon A m erican-C anadian trade was not so great as might have been expected. T he total trade between them indeed fell sharply in 1867 (see page 108). But the disparity between the returns fo r 1867 and those o f the two preceding years can largely be explained by the fact th at the im pending abrogation of the treaty had precipitated an eleventh-hour rush o f goods from the colonies into the U nited States. T ra d e between the two countries im m ediately began to rally until by 1870 it reached very nearly the height achieved in 1865. F urtherm ore the real im provem ent in trade during the post-treaty period was greater than is shown in the returns because of the im provem ent which at this tim e occurred in the A m erican currency.102 T he A m eri­ can dem and fo r a num ber of C anadian staples such as lum ber, barley, peas, wool, hides, sheep and horses rem ained good and constant. So far as these articles w ere concerned the chief result of abrogation was to burden the A m erican consum er with increased duties.103 T he potential blow to C anada from the loss o f the treaty was m oderated by several factors, such as the recovery o f the A m erican currency, the readm ittance o f colonial fish, lum ber and other products to the Southern m arket, the increased dem and fo r certain C anadian products which was produced by reconstruction and, finally, the establishm ent of m ore settled business connections in the U nited States.104 Crushing taxation kep t produce a t a high price in the U nited States. This fact, com bined w ith the revival o f interest in the m arkets o f the Low er Provinces, rendered the grain-growers of C anada less anxious for the renewal of the treaty. The effects of abrogation w ere felt in the Low er Colonies which suffered from the increased A m erican duties on fish;105 while the export of lum ber from N ew Brunswick to the W est Indies by way of the U nited States was seriously affected.100 T he decline in the export of N ova Scotian coal to the U nited States was the result not so m uch o f abrogation as of other factors: the introduction by A m erican railroads o f low rates for coal, especially from mines situated along the various roads, the increased cost o f production in N ova Scotia as the mines deepened, and the determ ination of

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o f A m erican railways to reserve to themselves all the traffic possible.107 T he transportation interests in the U nited States suffered by losing the profitable carrying trade in C anadian produce w hich was now diverted from the A m erican route.108 Because of the m itigating influence already m entioned, the balance o f trad e did not, as anticipated, swing heavily against the colonies. T he A m erican returns, in fact, show a slight balance in favour of the colonies in each o f the four years from 1868 to 1871.103 T he C anadian returns show a very slight balance in favour of the U nited States in 1868 and 1871, b ut a rath e r m ore considerable balance in favour of C anada in 1869 an d 1870.110 T he revival o f irritation in the fishing areas, although it m ight have been expected to follow the abrogation o f the treaty, was, in fact, largely avoided because of the British G overnm ent’s reluctance once m ore to enforce its interpretation of the C on­ vention of 1818.111 T he colonies adopted the policy o f adm itting A m erican fisherm en to the inshore fisheries, upon the purchase o f a licence. T he system, however, proved unsatisfactory, as m any of the A m ericans deliberately refrained from securing licences.112 F riction between C anada and the U nited States was n o t altogether avoided, as in 1868 even this m ild policy evoked strenuous protests from Congress.113 In 1870 the Dom inion G overnm ent ended the system of licences and m ade provision to prevent illegal encroachm ents upon C anadian w aters. In the following year, however, the question was settled until 1885 by the T reaty o f W ashington under the term s o f which A m erican fishermen were once m ore adm itted to the coastal fisheries of tiie provinces.114 T h e consequence o f abrogation was, therefore, less unfor­ tu n ate than had in som e quarters been anticipated. T he trade o f British A m erica w ith the U nited States soon recovered from the decline of 1867. G re at Britain and the U nited States, m oreover, w ere not again brought to the verge of w ar by a renewed agitation in the fishing areas. Y et even had a more a c u te com m ercial crisis followed the abrogation of the treaty it is unlikely, as will subsequently appear, th at this w ould have disturbed the connection between the colonies and Britain. D uring the operation o f the treaty trade between the United States and the colonies had m ore than doubled. W e have already

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noted how great a p a rt of the exports from one country to the oth er was destined eventually fo r Europe, and particularly for G re at Britain. Y et there was also a considerable increase in the products o f each country consum ed in the other. T o a consider­ able extent the increase in trad e between the U nited States and the colonies was a result o f the C rim ean and Civil W ars, and of the n atural econom ic developm ent which occurred during the period in both countries. T he treaty, how ever, had been a considerable factor in producing the increase, because it encour­ aged the re-export trade and com bined with other factors to foster a m utual trad e in goods for dom estic consum ption. T he grow th in trade, although beneficial to the U nited States, was of m uch greater relative im portance in the com m ercial develop­ m ent of the P rovince of Canada. A ccording to the U nited States Tariff Com m ission, the trade between the U nited States and the colonies during the operation o f the treaty constituted fifty-two per cent o f the trade o f the colonies, but only about six p er cent of the total foreign trade o f the U nited States.115 I t has been suggested that, in som e m easure, the treaty stim ulated the building of railways in the colonies, the production o f foodstuffs and lum ber in C anada and, to a lesser extent, the production of coal in N ova Scotia and o f lum ber in N ew Brunswick. In so far as this was so, the treaty assisted the econom ic developm ent of the colonies. In som e degree also it assisted in th e econom ic developm ent of the A m erican N orth-W est.116 It has been already noted th a t trade between the U nited States and Canada, except for tem porary lapses, continued to increase after the abrogation o f the treaty. A considerable portion o f this increase was undoubtedly due, as Frederick H aynes asserts, to the natural increase o f business, to the increase of w ealth and to im provem ents in production and transportation.117 But, once established, trad e tends to continue in a certain course despite the subsequent influence of econom ic forces calculated to divert it. I t seems fair to assume, therefore, as M r. H aynes is disposed to do, th a t the perm anent effects of the treaty were, to som e extent, responsible fo r the continued increase in trade after its abrogation. A large trade had been developed between the two countries in the period 1854-1866. T h at it continued to develop after 1866 m ay be regarded, in some m easure, as a result of the Reciprocity T reaty.

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It may be observed th at neither the influence of the Reci­ procity T reaty no r the loss o f preference in the British m arket had succeeded in destroying the trade of British N o rth A m erica w ith the U nited K ingdom . In three o f the colonies, including C anada, the trad e w ith the U nited K ingdom was considerably g reater in 1865 than it had been in 1854. T he export returns of C anada to the U nited K ingdom rose from eight million dollars in 1854 to twelve m illion in 1860, and fourteen million in 1865. T h e retu rn o f im ports, after a period of decline fo r six years after the signing o f the treaty, rose to and rem ained until 1865 at the height reached in 1854; in 1866 the retu rn o f im ports from the U nited K ingdom was six m illion dollars greater than in 1854. P a rt o f the C anadian export to G re at Britain was, o f course, com posed of A m erican produce. This was m ore than balanced by the extensive indirect trade, particularly the export of breadstuffs, conducted by the province w ith E urope through the U nited States. T he greater p art o f this trade was with the U nited K ingdom (see page 110). T he following table illustrates the trade of the Low er Colonies w ith the U nited Kingdom . I t will be noted that, in spite o f fluctuations, the trade of N ova Scotia and P rince E dw ard Island w ith the U nited K ing­ dom , on the whole, increased during the period o f the treaty, while th at of N ew foundland shows an increase in im ports and a decrease in exports. Only the trade o f N ew Brunsw ick shows an appreciable decrease in this period. In general, therefore, the trade of the colonies w ith G reat Britain bore up rem arkably well during the period of the treaty. N o v a Scolia E xports Im ports

1852 1856 1861 1863 1865

£ 427,532 545,424 485,769 775,139 1,263,198

£ 62,675 88,887 91,579 64,068 152,948

N ew Brunswick E xports Im p o rts

1854 1856 1861 1863 1865

£ 972,557 538,501 360,213 540,682 479,600

£ 811,108 747,790 642,508 601,767 540,552

P rin ce E d w ard Island E xports Im ports

(1854

£ 86,054 129,867 82,371 122,880 160,131

£ 35,282) 34,943 35,638 21,949 64,876

N ew foundland E xports Im ports

£ 361,779 396,392 410,374 450,938 429,415

£ 446,187 462,136 379,302 405,365 343,678

EPIL O G U E

O ut of the R uins: The Development of a Canadian Commercial Policy

It was feared by the C anadian G overnm ent th at the abrogation of the Reciprocity T reaty m ight lead to a revival of the annexationist movem ent. U nder the operation of the treaty, fiscal privileges in the U nited States had been substituted fo r the recently abolished preference in the British m arket. Now , presum ably, the colonies w ere to be excluded from both. T he C anadian Executive regarded such a prospect w ith apprehen­ sion, although C anadian com m ercial policy had been an im p o rtan t factor in precipitating the m ovem ent against the treaty. O n F ebruary 19, 1864, in a M inute of Council which M onck was requested to com m unicate to the British G overn­ m ent, the Executive professed to scorn the suggestion th a t the loyalty of their countrym en to the Crown would be dim inished in the slightest degree through the m ere loss of com m ercial privileges with the U nited States. These brave w ords were, however, belied by a subsequent om inous reference to “the connexion which is usually found to exist between the m aterial prosperity and the political contentm ent o f a people.”1 Y et these forebodings o f a revived annexationist m ovem ent proved groundless. T he repercussions o f abrogation w ere not, of course, as sharp as the G overnm ent anticipated. M oreover, the strength o f the econom ic as well as o f the political tie between G reat Britain and the colonies provided one safeguard against annexa­ tion. T h e progress already m ade by industrialism in C anada provided another. A third very im portant safeguard was the federative policy now adopted by Canada, w ith the support of the two Low er Colonies, to m eet both her political and com ­ m ercial problem s. T his provided a substitute for the policy which had been based upon reciprocity with the U nited States.

i. R E C I P R O C I T Y A N D C O N F E D E R A T I O N

C onfederation was not only the result of constitutional deadlock in C anada and the supposed necessity of defence against A m erican aggression. O f very great influence w ere the expected econom ic advantages of the project, especially to the C anadian industrialists and the M ontreal financial and forw ard­ ing interests, as well as to the producers o f natural products. Particularly am ong the latter class, the econom ic aspect of the question derived added weight from the impending abrogation of the Reciprocity T reaty. It is clear from the debate on the Q uebec resolutions in the C anadian Legislature, th at consid­ erable value was placed upon those advantages which were expected to m itigate the shock o f exclusion from the A m erican m arket. G reat benefits w ere anticipated, as suggested by G alt, from opening the m arkets o f all the provinces to the industries o f each. C onfederation, G alt predicted, w ould possess a diver­ sity of resources to protect it against the reverses w hich so frequently overtake a country depending upon one branch of industry. G reat prosperity, he felt, w ould be achieved by a com m ercial system which com bined the wheat-grow ing area of C anada West, the coal and fisheries of the L ow er Provinces with the finest navigable river in the world. Such a country, asserted Brow n, would speedily develop a foreign trad e quite as profit­ able as th at now carried on by the colonies with the U nited States. T here was, however, an even m ore urgent com m ercial m otive. It was regarded as not unlikely th at the A m ericans w ould abolish the bonding privilege as well as the Reciprocity T reaty. In this case the Province of C anada would have been severed, during the w inter m onths, from all connection with Europe. O ne speaker after another stressed the fact that C onfederation and the early construction o f the intercolonial railway w ere essential in order th at C anada should be assured o f a w inter route to the ocean, independently of the U nited States.2 It was urged, m oreover, th at the proposed union of the provinces w ould facilitate the transference of control o f the N orth-W est from the H udson’s Bay C om pany to the Dom inion. T h e weight which this argum ent m ust have carried in the Province of C anada is suggested by the long and aggressive cam paign which hpd been conducted by C anada, spurred on by

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the fea r of A m erican imperialism. T he prospect of “a D om inion from sea to sea” m ust have exerted a pow erful influence upon the m inds of C onfederation statesm en; equally cogent, however, from the C anadian viewpoint, was the realization o f the eco­ nom ic possibilities of the W est as an alm ost limitless field of expansion and as the avenue o f a transcontinental railway which w ould link the E astern colonies w ith the gold-fields o f British C olum bia and m ake possible the reorganization o f the G rand T ru n k Railway on a m ore rem unerative basis.3 T his general C anadian national policy was very well-suited to gain the approval o f the C anadian industrialists and o f the M ontreal financial and forw arding interests, of which the last, a t any rate, had derived little advantage from the Reciprocity T reaty. G alt’s efforts to benefit these classes had, o f course, been extremely influential in precipitating the A m erican m ove­ m ent against reciprocity. Subsequently it was their influence, in addition to the necessity o f revenue, w hich impelled the D om inion to adopt a protectionist fiscal policy. In the press o f the m aritim e colonies, as well as in C anada, great em phasis was placed upon the com m ercial advantages of C onfederation.4 Sterling use was m ade o f the argum ent that com m ercial union was quite impossible except as an integral p a rt of federation. T upper, the P rem ier o f N ova Scotia, asserted th at he failed to understand how com m ercial union was ever to be realized except in connection w ith a political union.5 M uch prom inence was also given to the prom ise th at an intercolonial railw ay and a consequent im m ense increase in m aritim e trade would follow C onfederation. In the buoyant atm osphere of holiday excursions and after-dinner speeches, the C anadian delegates who visited the Low er Provinces painted glowing pictures of the im m ense trad e so soon to be developed. “Build the road,” said M acdonald, “and H alifax will soon becom e one of the great em porium s o f the world. All the resources o f the W est will com e over the im m ense railways o f C anada to the bosom o f your harbour.”0 In describing the weight carried in the M aritim es by com m ercial considerations, T upper later asserted: “T he term ination o f the Reciprocity T reaty hit us a hard blow, and but fo r th at circum stance we should probably have been unable to convince the people o f N ova Scotia and N ew Brunswick th at ou r future was in a union with the U pper

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C anadian provinces.” 7 T he com m ercial advantages of union, enhanced by the im m inence o f abrogation, were probably a facto r in developing the attitude of the Tilley G overnm ent in N ew Brunswick tow ard C onfederation. Probably also this m otive carried w eight in the election of June, 1866, w hen C on­ federation was endorsed by the province, but there w ere even m ore cogent influences a t w ork, such as th e w ar scare on the A m erican border and pressure from the British and C anadian G overnm ents. T he com m ercial advantages of union, however, can have had no influence upon the attitude of th e antiC onfederation S m ith G overnm ent, w hich held office from M arch, 1865, until June, 1866. A gain, in N ova Scotia, com ­ m ercial motives no doubt helped to move the T upper G overn­ m ent to bring the province into C onfederation; but the expected advantages of union w ere not strong enough to stem the tide of opposition w hich ran so strongly against C onfederation in 1868.

II. E M E R G E N C E O F A C A N A D IA N C O M M E R C IA L P O L IC Y

As early as 1865 the forces which culm inated in C onfedera­ tion had developed in th e C anadian G overnm ent a new spirit o f self-reliance. C onstitutional deadlock, itself partly the result o f underlying econom ic causes, had m ade the existent system o f governm ent unw orkable. T he A m erican crisis threatened abrogation of the Reciprocity T reaty and, conceivably, w ar. The m ovem ent fo r westward expansion was already far advanced in the province. Pressure o f the C anadian provincial debt rendered m o re desirable a union w ith the other colonies w hich would share the burden, while C onfederation would provide a basis for new loans. In the background, but exerting a pow erful influence, were the C anadian com m ercial and financial interests. T he G overnm ent derived strength not only from the necessity of m eeting all its problem s, but also from the prospect of achieving a general solution in C onfederation. A t the end o f 1865 the C anadian G overnm ent was quite willing to postpone the deci­ sion of the Reciprocity T reaty, for the declared reason that, since C onfederation w ould probably soon take place, it was

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desirable that any arrangem ent w ith the U nited States should be discussed in the Legislature of the confederated provinces.8 In the sphere o f com m ercial policy the changed C anadian attitude became particularly apparent in 1865. We have noted the rath er helpless apprehension with w hich the Canadian G overnm ent in February, 1864, regarded the prospect of abrogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty. In 1865 the coalition C abinet, showing a capacity fo r vigorous, independent action, attem pted to deal w ith the situation in a constructive m anner. C anada not only led the effort o f the colonies to save the treaty, b ut also took vigorous m easures to devise an alternative policy to reciprocity, based upon co-operation am ong the colonies. T he m ethod of intercolonial conference and co-operation to m eet com m ercial problem s had previously been em ployed from tim e to tim e, although not always w ith happy results. This m ethod was now vigorously em ployed by the C anadian G ov­ ernm ent. T he ultim ate object of such a policy, from the C ana­ dian viewpoint, was, o f course, com plete political and econom ic union. But, in 1865, the efforts of the C anadian G overnm ent, in the com m ercial sphere, were directed m ore particularly tow ard the developm ent of a concerted intercolonial policy. T h e success which attended the efforts o f C anada to secure intercolonial co-operation in the com m ercial sphere was an im portant prelude to actual federation. Evidence of the changed C anadian attitude tow ard recipro­ city was afforded by the C anadian delegation which was dispatched to England in M arch, 1865. T he delegates urged the renewal of the Reciprocity T reaty; yet the regarded the prospect o f its abrogation with anything but despair. “We explained,” read their report, “the im m ediate injury th at w ould result to C anadian interests from the abrogation o f the T reaty, but we pointed out at the sam e tim e the new and ultim ately m ore profitable channels into which our foreign trade m ust, in that event, be turned, and the necessity o f preparing for the change if indeed it was to com e.”9 T he crisis over reciprocity exerted a considerable influence in fostering the habit o f intercolonial co-operation. T he C ana­ dian G overnm ent, in its m inute o f M arch 3 1 ,1 864, had suggested the advisability o f co-operating with the Low er Provinces if negotiations w ere opened, and in A ugust, 1865, M onck, on

E P I L O G U E - 135

behalf o f his governm ent, reiterated this opinion.10 T he E xecu­ tive of N ova Scotia in M ay, 1865, called the attention of the L ieutenant-G overnor to a rep o rt adopted by the A ssem bly in which it was recom m ended that the Executive should co-operate w ith the other colonial governm ents in an effort to secure the continuance o f the treaty.11 M acD onnell, the LieutenantG overnor, accordingly intim ated to the other colonies that his governm ent w ould willingly co-operate in any measures proposed for the discussion of th e question.12 L ater in the same year T upper and H enry urged upon Cardwell the advantages of intercolonial co-operation n o t only in the negotiation o f a new Reciprocity T reaty, but also as the best m eans of m eeting the situation in case the treaty w ere not renew ed.13 A nother exam ple o f colonial co-operation under Canadian leadership was presented by the C onfederate Council o f Sep­ tem ber, 1865. D espite th e views of the participating N ew Brunsw ick G overnm ent, this was a m ilestone on the road to political and com m ercial federation. As the first dem onstration o f the federal principle in actual practice it m arked an advance tow ard C onfederation. F urtherm ore, the Council was a land­ m ark in the progress of the colonies tow ard a participation in their external affairs. A lready has been described the process by w hich the colonies gradually secured the right to regulate their tariffs as they saw fit. Conventions with foreign powers were, how ever, another question. T he Reciprocity T reaty in 1854 and the fishing treaty w ith F rance in 1857 had indeed been subm itted to colonial legislatures fo r ratification (see pages 5 1-52). In 1854 even this privilege was o f doubtful significance, since over-ruling legislation from the British Parliam ent was by no m eans beyond the bounds of possibility if any of the colonies had rejected the treaty. In 1857, however, the British G overn­ m ent had refused to ratify the treaty w ith F rance because of opposition from N ew foundland. Y et neither in 1854 nor in 1857 had the H om e G overnm ent recognized the right of the colonies to be consulted before the negotiation w ith a foreign pow er o f a convention affecting their com m ercial interests. Now , however, Russell com m unicated to the Colonial Office his opinion that it w ould . . . save m uch em barrassm ent delay and difficulty if the faculty o f giving an opinion to H er M ajesty’s G overnm ent

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in the negotiation o f C om m ercial Treaties were vested in a Confederate Council chosen by all the N o rth A m erican Prov­ inces and presided over by the G overnor-G eneral o f Canada.1* In M ay, 1864, Cardwell had suggested to Russell that differences o f opinion am ong the colonies in regard to a new treaty of reciprocity should be settled in private conference before the opening of negotiations w ith the U nited States.15 T h e G overnm ent o f N ova Scotia had requested that, before the negotiation o f a new treaty, the local governm ents should have an opportunity o f m aking know n their views.1''- Russell, there­ fore, m ade the above-quoted suggestion to Cardw ell, who com m unicated it in turn to M onck. Russell’s proposal was enthusiastically taken up by the C anadian G overnm ent, on the recom m endation o f which the Council was forthw ith convened by M onck at Q uebec.17 T he three m aritim e colonies and N ew ­ foundland were represented at the conference.18 T he seven resolutions adopted by the Council contained the germ s o f a com m on, far-reaching com m ercial policy for the British-A m erican Colonies. Five resolutions dealt w ith the proposed negotiation for a renew al of the treaty and w ere not of especial significance, except in so far as they showed a new vigour in meeting the situation.10 But, of the other two resolu­ tions, one laid down the m ethod of procedure to be follow ed in the future when “in the event of the abolition o f the T reaty by the U nited States G o v e rn m e n t...a ll the British N orth A m erican Provinces should com bine cordially together in all com m ercial m atters, and adopt such a com m on com m ercial policy as will best advance the interests o f the w hole.” T he other suggested a particu lar field o f activity in which the “com m on com m ercial policy” could be utilized to advantage: by reciprocal concession trade was to be fostered between the British Provinces and the W est Indies, the Spanish colonies, M exico and Brazil. T h e Council had not only enunciated a general principle, co-operation am ongst the colonies in m atters o f com m erce; it had outlined a constructive policy by m eans of w hich that principle could be p u t into practice. T rade am ongst the colonies and w ith other countries was to be extended despite the loss of the A m erican m arket. In accordance with these recom m endations, a new policy

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was inaugurated to secure fresh and adequate m arkets for the products of British N o rth A m erica. T he W est Indian incident in the w inter of 1865-1866 dem onstrated at once the new spirit and the growing independence o f the C anadian G overnm ent. O n G alt’s recom m endation the C anadian Executive on Septem ber 23, 1865, requested the British G overnm ent to sanction the appointm ent o f Com m issioners to investigate the possibility of arranging reciprocal fiscal concessions w ith the W est Indies, M exico and Brazil.20 This proposal was accepted by the C olonial Office, w hich invited each of the Low er Provinces to appoint a representative to the Com m ission.21 Clarendon, the F oreign Secretary, w as careful, how ever, to stipulate th at the m em bers o f the Com m ission should not attem pt to conclude treaties w ith foreign governm ents, but should conduct their investigations under supervision of the British M inister in each foreign country. A fter already having appointed its Com m issioners,22 the C anadian G overnm ent, in D ecem ber, 1865, ventured to take a very high-handed action. G alt suggested the im portance of instituting a sim ilar inquiry into the existing trade between British N o rth A m erica and the countries bordering on the M editerranean. H e therefore recom m ended th at R yan, one of the C anadian Com m issioners, be detached from the W est Indian Com m ission and instructed to visit F rance, Spain, P ortugal and the other M editerranean countries. T he G overnm ent accepted G alt’s recom m endation and R yan was directed to investigate the possibility of extending colonial com m erce in these countries and to note, w here practicable, the disposition to prom ote direct trade w ith British N o rth A m erica. A lthough declared subject to the approval of the British G overnm ent, these instructions were forw arded w ithout any previous reference to the Colonial Office.23 T h e storm which this unauthorized step m ight have produced was, in fact, avoided. Elliot discovered th at M onck, then in E ngland, M cD ougall, another o f the C anadian Com missioners, and R yan him self were all opposed to this departure from the original plan. R yan accordingly left England for St. T hom as’s w ith the other Com m issioners before th e arrival of his instructions to visit the E uropean countries.24 Cardw ell there­ fo re refrained from criticizing the action o f the C anadian

138 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

G overnm ent. But the incident provided a striking indication o f the audacity w ith which it was moving in practice toward autonom y.25 T h e appointm ent o f the W est Indian Com m ission was chiefly significant in displaying the enterprising spirit o f the C anadian G overnm ent. T he Com mission did subm it a list o f recom m en­ dations for the developm ent o f trade am ong the British N orth A m erican Colonies and with the W est Indies, Brazil and Mexico. But no im m ediate trade agreem ents followed the presentation of these suggestions.20 In Jan u ary and F ebruary, 1866, representatives o f the colonies conferred w ith the C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans of the H ouse of Representatives in an effort to secure a new reciprocal arrangem ent w ith the U nited States, (see pages 96-97). This conference m arked a further practical advance tow ard the subsequent control by C anada o f her external relations. It afforded evidence o f the new and vigorous tone of independence w hich C anada was beginning to assum e.27 G alt’s concluding rem arks w ere partly, o f course, the result of annoy­ ance a t the intransigence o f the A m ericans. But his independence was also an evidence of the newly developed self-reliance o f the C anadian G overnm ent and presaged M acdonald’s subsequent decision to “go it alone.” G alt asserted to the C om m ittee of Ways and M eans: W e shall probably m ake such concessions to other countries as we were prepared to m ake first to you - our best neighbours. W e shall tell our people that the m arket o f the U nited States is practically shut. W e shall direct their attention to the supply o f the L ow er Provinces w ith flour and breadstuffs, and shall endeavour to find in the W est Indies and the M editerranean a m arket fo r our lum ber and fish. It was, of course, m any years before C anada finally aban­ doned the attem pt to secure a second Reciprocity T reaty w ith the U nited States.28 B ut never again w as the attitude o f the C anadian G overnm ent so dependent upon reciprocity as was that o f the G overnm ent of the Province of C anada in February and M arch, 1864. This new spirit o f independence was, as we have shown, the product alike of the necessities and achieve­ m ents of the period. We have noted the growing autonom y of

E P I L O G U E - 139

the colonies, particularly o f C anada, in their relations with the British G overnm ent. C onfederation m ay be regarded as a culm inating point in the m ovem ent tow ard autonom y. In his dispatch of D ecem ber 3, 1864, approving th e project o f C on­ federation, Cardwell m ade no reservation in regard to fiscal policy except to express a pious hope that taxation in the various colonies would not be unduly increased.2:1 A knowledge of the advance, in national status, so soon to be achieved by C onfed­ eration, m ust have helped, in the case of C anada, to produce the new spirit of independence w hich is here under consideration. A t the beginning o f our period the C anadian G overnm ent, according to D r. Skelton, was capable only “of looking every­ w here fo r salvation but a t hom e.” N ow G alt could talk grandiloquently o f “ the establishm ent of a separate and distinct nationality.” In the face o f such optim ism , abrogation of the treaty began to appear at least bearable.

Appendices A ppendix A

T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

[2nd Session, 61st Congress, Senate Documents, No. 357] T h e G o v e rn m en t o f the U n ited States being equally desiro u s w ith H e r M ajesty the Q ueen o f G re a t B rita in to avoid fu rth e r m isu n d er­ sta n d in g betw een th eir respective citizens and subjects in re g ard to th e extent o f th e rig h t o f fishing on th e coasts o f B ritish N o rth A m erica, secured to each by A rticle I o f a con v en tio n betw een th e U n ited States a n d G re a t B ritain signed a t L o n d o n on th e 2 0 th day o f O ctober, 1818; a n d being also desirous to reg u late th e com m erce a n d n a vigation betw een th e ir respective territo rie s and p eople, and m o re especially betw een H e r M ajesty ’s possessions in N o rth A m erica a n d th e U nited S tates, in such m a n n e r as to re n d er th e sam e re cip ro ca lly beneficial a n d satisfactory, have, respectively, nam ed P len ip o ten tiaries to c o n fe r a n d agree th ere u p o n , th a t is to say: T h e P resident o f th e U nited S tates o f A m erica, W illiam L . M arcy, S e c retary o f S tate o f th e U nited States, and H e r M ajesty th e Q ueen o f th e U nited K ingdom o f G re a t B rita in a n d Irela n d , Jam es, E a rl o f E lgin a n d K incardine, L o rd B ruce a n d E lgin, a p e er o f th e U nited K ingdom , K nig h t o f th e m o st a n cien t a n d m o st n oble O rd e r o f the T h istle , a n d G o v e rn o r G en eral in and o v er all H e r B ritannic M a jesty ’s provinces on the c o n tin e n t o f N o rth A m e ric a, a n d in and o v er th e island o f P rin c e E dw ard; W ho, a fte r having c o m m u n icated to each o th e r th eir respective full pow ers, fo u n d in good a n d d u e form , h av e agreed u p o n th e follow ing A rticles:

A R T IC L E I

I t is agreed by th e high c o n tra ctin g parties th a t in ad d itio n to th e lib erty secured to th e U nited States fisherm en by th e abovem entio n ed conv en tio n o f O c to b er 20, 1818, o f taking, curing, and drying fish on c erta in coasts o f th e B ritish N o rth A m erican C olonies th erein defined, th e in h ab itan ts o f th e U nited States shall have, in co m m o n w ith th e subjects o f H e r B ritan n ic M ajesty, th e lib erty to tak e fish o f every kind, except shell-fish, on th e sea-coasts and shores, an d in th e bays, h a rb o rs, a n d creeks o f C a n a d a , N ew B runsw ick, N o v a Scotia, P rin c e E d w a rd ’s Islan d , a n d o f th e several islands th ere u n to adjacent, w ith o u t being restricted to a n y d istance fro m th e sh o re, w ith perm ission to land upon th e coasts a n d shores o f those colonies an d th e islands th ereo f, and a lso up o n the M ag d alen Islands,

A P P E N D I X A - 141

fo r th e p u rp o se o f dry in g th eir nets a n d cu rin g th eir fish; provided th at, in so doing, they do n o t in te rfere w ith th e rights o f private p ro p e rty , o r w ith B ritish fisherm en, in th e p e aceab le use o f a n y p a rt o f the said co ast in th e ir o ccu p an cy fo r th e sam e purpose. I t is und ersto o d th a t the abov e-m en tio n ed liberty applies solely to th e sea fishery, a n d th a t th e salm o n a n d sh ad fisheries, a n d all fisheries in rivers a n d th e m o u th s o f rivers, a re hereby reserved exclusively fo r B ritish fisherm en. A n d it is fu rth e r ag reed th at, in o rd e r to p rev en t o r settle any disputes as to th e places to w h ich th e reserv atio n o f exclusive right to B ritish fisherm en con tain ed in this A rticle, and th a t o f fisherm en o f th e U n ited States co n ta in ed in th e next succeeding A rticle, apply, each o f th e high c o n tra ctin g p a rties, on th e ap p licatio n o f e ith e r to th e o th er, shall, w ithin six m o n th s th ere afte r, a p p o in t a C om m is­ sioner. T h e said C om m issioners, b e fo re pro ceed in g to any business, shall m ak e a n d subscribe a solem n d eclara tio n th a t they w ill im p ar­ tially a n d carefully exam ine an d decide, to th e best o f th eir judgm ent, an d a ccording to ju stice a n d equity, w ith o u t fe a r, fa v o r, o r affection to th e ir own c o u n try , u p o n all such places as a re intended to be reserved a n d excluded fro m th e co m m o n liberty o f fishing u n d e r this and th e n e x t succeeding A rticle; and su ch d eclara tio n shall be e n te re d on th e re co rd o f th e ir proceedings. T h e C om m issioners shall n a m e som e th ird person to a ct as an A rb itra to r o r U m p ire in any case o r cases on w hich they m ay them selves differ in o p inion. I f they should n o t b e able to agree upon th e n a m e o f such th ird person, th ey shall each n a m e a person, and it sh a ll be d e term in ed by lo t w hich o f th e tw o p erso n s so nam ed shall b e th e A rb itra to r o r U m p ire in cases o f difference o r disagreem ent b etw een the C om m issioners. T h e perso n so to be chosen to be A rb itra to r o r U m p ire shall, b e fo re p roceeding to a c t as su ch in any case, m ak e and subscribe a solem n d e clara tio n in a form sim ila r to th a t w hich shall a lre ad y h av e been m ad e and subscribed by th e C om m issioners, w hich sh a ll be en tered on th e re co rd o f their proceedings. In th e event o f th e d e ath , absence, o r incapacity of e ith e r o f th e C om m issioners, o r o f th e A rb itra to r o r U m pire, o r of th eir o r his o m itting, declining, o r ceasing to a ct as such C om m is­ sio n er, A rb itra to r, o r U m p ire, a n o th e r a n d different person shall be a p p o in ted o r n a m e d as a fo resaid to a c t as su ch C om m issioner, A rb itra to r, o r U m p ire, in th e place a n d stead o f th e person so orig in ally a p p o in ted o r nam ed as a fo resaid , a n d shall m ak e and subscribe such d e clara tio n as aforesaid. Such C om m issioners sh all proceed to exam ine the coasts o f the N o rth A m e ric an provinces and o f the U nited States, em braced w ithin the provisions o f th e first a n d second articles o f this treaty , a n d shall designate th e places reserved by the said articles fro m the c om m on right o f fishing th erein . T h e decision o f th e C om m issioners and o f th e A rb itra to r o r U m p ire shall be given in w riting in each case, a n d shall be signed by th em respectively.

142 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

T h e high c o n tra ctin g p a rties h e reb y solem nly engage to consider th e decision o f th e C om m issioners conjointly, o r o f the A rb itra to r o r U m pire, as the case m ay be, as ab solutely final and conclusive in each case decided upon by them o r him respectively. A R T IC L E

II

It is agreed by th e high c o n tra ctin g parties th a t B ritish subjects shall have, in co m m o n w ith th e citizens o f the U nited States the liberty to tak e fish o f every kind, except shell-fish, on th e eastern sea-coasts and shores o f th e U nited States n o rth o f the 36th p arallel o f n o rth latitu d e, a n d on the sh ores o f the several islands th ere u n to adjacent, a n d in th e bays, h a rb o rs, a n d creeks o f th e said sea-coast a n d shores o f th e U n ited States a n d o f th e said islands, w ith o u t being restricted to any d istan ce fro m th e shore, w ith perm ission to land upon the said coasts o f the U n ited States and o f the islands aforesaid, fo r th e p u rp o se o f dry in g th e ir nets a n d cu rin g th e ir fish: P rovided, th at, in so doing, they do n o t in te rfere w ith the rights o f priv ate pro p erty , o r w ith th e fisherm en o f th e U n ited States, in the peaceable use o f a n y p a rt o f the said coasts in th eir o ccupancy fo r the sam e purpose. It is u n d e rsto o d th a t th e a b ove-m entioned liberty applies solely to th e sea fishery, a n d th a t salm o n a n d shad fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers and m o u th s o f rivers, a re h ereby reserved exclusively fo r fisherm en o f th e U nited States.

A R T IC L E

III

It is agreed th a t th e articles e n u m e rate d in th e schedule hereu n to annexed, being th e g row th a n d p roduce o f th e aforesaid B ritish C olonies o r o f th e U nited S tates, sh a ll be ad m itte d into each c o u n try respectively fre e o f d u ty :

Schedule. G ra in , flour, a n d breadstuffs, o f all kinds. A nim als o f all kinds. F re sh , sm oked, and salted m eats. C o tton-w ool, seeds, a n d vegetables. U ndried fruits, d ried fruits. F ish o f all kinds. P ro d u cts o f fish, a n d o f all c re a tu re s living in the w ater. P oultry, eggs. H ides, furs, skins, o r tails, undressed. S tone o r m arble, in its c ru d e o r u n w ro u g h t state. Slate. B utter, cheese, tallow . L ard , h orns, m anures. O res o f m etals, o f all kinds. C o al.

A P P E N D I X A - 143

P itch, ta r, tu rp en tin e, ashes. T im b e r and lu m b e r o f all kinds, ro und, hew ed, a n d saw ed, u n m an u fa ctu re d in w hole o r in p a rt. F irew ood. P lan ts, shrubs, a n d trees. P elts, w ool. Fish-oil. Rice, b ro o m -co rn , and bark. G ypsum , g round o r ung ro u n d . H ew n, o r w ro u g h t, o r u n w ro u g h t b u rr o r grindstones. D yestuffs. F lax, hem p, a n d tow , u n m an u fa ctu re d . U n m a n u fa c tu re d tobacco. Rags.

A R T I C L E IV

It is agreed th a t th e citizens a n d in h ab itan ts o f th e U nited States shall have th e rig h t to n a v ig ate th e R iv er St. L aw rence, a n d th e c an a ls in C a n ad a used as th e m ea n s o f co m m u n icatin g betw een th e g reat lakes and th e A tlan tic O cean, w ith th e ir vessels, boats, and c rafts, as fully a n d freely as th e subjects o f H e r B ritan n ic M ajesty, subject only to th e sam e tolls a n d o th e r assessm ents as now a re , o r m ay h e re a fte r be, exacted o f H e r M ajesty’s said subjects; it being u n d ersto o d , how ever, th a t th e B ritish G o v e rn m en t retain s th e right o f suspending th is privilege on giving d u e n o tice th e re o f to th e G o v e rn m en t o f th e U nited States. It is fu rth e r ag reed th a t if a t a n y tim e th e B ritish G o v e rn m en t should exercise th e said reserved right, th e G o v e rn m en t o f the U n ited States sh a ll have th e rig h t o f suspending, if it th in k fit, th e o p e ratio n s o f A rt. I l l o f th e p re sen t treaty , in so f a r as th e province o f C a n a d a is affected th ereb y , fo r so long as th e suspension o f th e free navigation o f th e R iv er St. L aw rence o r th e c an als m ay continue. It is fu rth e r agreed th a t B ritish subjects shall h av e the rig h t freely to n a v ig ate L ak e M ichigan w ith th e ir vessels, boats, and c rafts so lo n g as th e privilege o f n a vig ating th e R iv er St. L aw ren ce, secured to A m e ric an citizens by th e above clau se o f th e p resen t article, shall co n tin u e; a n d th e G o v e rn m en t o f th e U n ited S tates fu rth e r engages to u rg e u p o n th e S tate G o v e rn m en ts to secure to th e subjects o f H e r B ritan n ic M ajesty th e use o f th e several S ta te c an a ls o n term s o f equ ality w ith the in h ab itan ts o f th e U n ited States. A n d it is fu rth e r ag reed th a t n o e x p o rt duty, o r o th e r duty, shall be levied on lu m b e r o r tim b e r o f any kind c u t on th a t p o rtio n o f the A m e ric an te rrito ry in th e S tate o f M a in e w a tere d by th e R iv er St. J o h n a n d its trib u taries, and floated d o w n th a t riv er to the sea, w hen th e sam e is shipped to th e U n ited S tates fro m th e p rovince o f N ew Brunsw ick.

144 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 A R T IC L E V

T h e p re sen t tre a ty shall ta k e effect as soon as th e law s required to c a rry it in to o p e ratio n sh all have been passed by th e Im perial P a rlia m e n t o f G re a t B ritain a n d by th e P ro v in cial P a rlia m en ts o f those o f the B ritish N o rth A m e ric an C olonies w hich are affected by this tre a ty on th e o n e h a n d , a n d by th e C ongress o f the U n ited States on th e other. Such asse n t h aving been given, th e tre a ty shall rem ain in fo rce fo r ten y ears fro m th e d a te a t w hich it m ay c o m e into o p e ra tio n , and fu rth e r until th e ex p ira tio n o f tw elve m o n th s a fte r e ith e r o f th e high c o n tra c tin g p a rties shall give n o tic e to th e o th e r o f its w ish to term in ate th e sam e; each o f th e high c o n tra ctin g parties being a t lib erty to give such n o tic e to the o th e r a t th e end o f th e said term o f ten years, o r a t any tim e afterw ard s. It is c le arly u n d e rsto o d , how ever, th a t this stip u la tio n is n o t intended to affect th e re serv a tio n m ad e by A rticle IV o f th e present treaty , w ith re g ard to th e rig h t o f tem p o rarily suspending the o p e ratio n s o f A rticles III a n d IV thereof.

A R T IC L E V I

A nd it is h e re b y fu rth e r agreed th a t th e provisions a n d stip u la ­ tio n s o f th e fo reg o in g A rticles shall e xtend to th e islan d o f N e w fo u n d lan d , so fa r as th ey a re applicable to th a t colony. B u t if th e Im p erial P a rlia m en t, th e P rovincial P a rlia m e n t o f N e w fo u n d ­ la n d , o r th e C ongress o f th e U n ited States shall n o t em brace in th eir law s, en acted fo r c arry in g this tre a ty in to effect, th e colony o f N e w fo u n d lan d , th en this A rticle shall be o f n o effect; b u t the om ission to m ake provision by law to give it effect, by e ith e r o f the legislative bodies a fo resaid , shall n o t in any w ay im p a ir the rem a in in g A rticles o f this trea ty .

A R T IC L E V II

T h e p re sen t tre a ty shall b e duly ratified, and th e m u tu a l e xchange o f ratifications shall ta k e place in W ashington w ithin six m o n th s fro m th e d a te hereof, o r e a rlie r if possible. In fa ith w h e reo f we, the respective P lenipotentiaries, h av e signed this tre a ty a n d have h e reu n to affixed o u r seals. D o n e in trip licate, a t W ashington, th e fifth day o f Ju n e , anno D o m in i one th o u sa n d eight h u n d re d a n d fifty-four. [Sea/.]

[Seal.]

W . L. MARCY. ELGIN and KINCARDINE.

A ppendix B

S T A T IS T IC A L T A B L E S TA B LE N O . I CANADA WEST

1852

Population Lands held Lands under cultivation Value o f farms Value of livestock W heat raised O ther grain raised

952,004 9,826,417 acres 3,695,763 acres

12,675,603 bus. 14,616,836 bus.

1861

1,396,091 13,354,907 acres 6,051,619 acres $295,162,315 $53,227,486 24,620,425 bus. 28,520,944 bus.

( Ind ia n Corn, R ye, O ats, B u ckw h ea t a n d B arley)

Flax and Hemp raised

50,650 lbs.

1,225,934 lbs.

CANADA EAST

1852

Population Lands held Lands under cultivation Value o f farms Value o f livestock W heat raised O ther grain raised

890,261 8,113,379 acres 3,605,076 acres

3,480,343 bus. 12,276,563 bus.

1861

1,110,664 10,375,418 acres 4,804,235 acres $171,513,069 $25,781,798 2,563,114 bus. 23,534,703 bus.

{Ind ia n Corn, R ye, Oats, B u ckw h ea t a n d B arley)

Flax and Hemp raised

1,867,016 lbs.

975,827 lbs.

C en su s o f the C anadas, 1851-1852, vol. 1, Personal Census, Presented to Both Houses o f Parliam ent by Com mand of His Excellency, Quebec. Printed by John Lovell, M ountain Street, 1853, pp. xvii, xix, xxiv-xxvi. C en su s o f th e C anadas, 1860-1861, Quebec, printed by S. B. Foote, M ountain Hill, vol. 1, Personal Census, 1863, pp. 43, 78; vol. 2, Agri­ cultural Produce, Mills, M anufactories, etc., 1864, pp. 90-92 94 215 219, 221. Speech o f th e H o n . A . T . G a lt . . . on introducing th e B u d g et o f 1862, Together with Statistical and Finance Statements. Delivered in

the Committee o f Ways and Means, M ay 16, 1862 [Returns o f Wheat and other grain raised in C anada East in 1861].

146 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 T A B L E N O . II ACRES OF IMPROVED LAND IN FARMS

S ta te

Illinois Indiana Iowa Michigan M innesota Mississippi Missouri Ohio Wisconsin

1850

1860

5,039,545 5,046,543 824,682 1,929,110 5,035 3,444,358 2,938,425, 9,851,493 1,045,499

13,096,374 8,242,183 3,792,792 3,476,296 556,250 5,065,755 6,246,871 12,625,394 3,746,167

T h e S even th C en su s o f the U n ited States: 1850, J. D. B. DeBow, Superintendent o f the United States Census, W ashington: Robert Armstrong, Public Printer, 1853, p. lxxxii. Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Superintendent of Census, A griculture o f the U nited S ta tes in 1860 ; compiled from the original returns of the eighth census, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1864, p. vii. TA B LE N O . I ll GRAIN SENT EASTWARD FROM THE LAKE REGIONS INCLUDING CANADA

(Returns in Bushels) 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862

F lour

W heat

C orn

O th er Grain

T otal

3,865,442 3,397,954 4,499,613 3,760,274 4,106,057 6,533,869 8,359,910

19,505,358 16,763,285 21,843,859 16,865,708 32,334,391 46,384,444 50,699,130

14,282,632 8,779,832 10,495,554 4,423,006 18,075,778 29,524,628 32,985,923

4,592,569 2,256,944 5,035,097 4,264,051 7,712,032 10,686,115 10,844,939

57,707,769 44,789,851 59,872,566 44,354,225 78,652,486 119,264,233 136,329,542

Statistics o f th e F oreign and D o m estic C o m m erce o f th e U nited States, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1864. PRODUCED IN TH E LAKE STATES

W heat Corn

1850

1860

40,000,000 bus. 185,000,000 bus.

88,000,000 bus. 319,000,000 bus.

AMERICAN EXPORTS OF PORK IN BOXES

(chiefly from the North-west)* 1859 9,000,000 lbs. 1860 20,000,000 ” 1861 70,000,000 ” 1862 130,000,000 ” 1863 300,000,000 ” *In round numbers. F irst session, 39th Congress, H ouse E xecutive D o cu m en ts, no. 128, L etter from the Secretary of the Treasury enclosing report of James W. Taylor on commercial relations with British America, June 6, 1866.

A P PEN D IX B TABLE NO. IV TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES

Y ear Ending June 30

Exports from the United States

Im p o rts by the U nited S tates

$ $ 9,515,991 5,179,500 11,770,092 5,279,718 10,229,608 5,469,445 12,432,597 6,527,559 24,073,408 8,784,412 27,741,808 15,118,289 29,025,349 21,276,614 24,138,482 22,108,916 23,604,526 15,784,836 28,109,494 19,287,565 22,695,928 23,572,796 21,676,513 22,724,489 20,573,070 18,511,025 Second Session, 53rd Congress, 106. 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862

Y ear Ending Ju n e 30

E x p o rts fro m the U nited States co n t.

Im p o rts by the U nited S tates co n t.

$ 27,619,814 26,574,624 28,829,402 24,828,880 21,020,302 24,080,777 23,381,471 25,339,254 36,225,735 30,775,871 40,124,907 41,503,812

$ 17,484,786 29,608,736 33,264,403 48,528,628 25,044,005 26,261,379 29,293,766 36,265,328 28,271,926 33,214,340 36,960,541 39,396,980 S e n a te E x e c u tiv e D o c u m e n ts , f1

1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890

TABLE NO. V TRADE OF THE PROVINCE OF CANADA W ITH THE UNITED STATES

Im ports from the U nited S tates

1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858

$ 6,594,860 8,365,764 8,477,693 11,782,144 15,533,096 20,828,676 22,704,508 20,224,648 15,635,565

E xports to the United Stales

$ 4,951,156 4,071,544 6,284,520 8,936,380 8,649,000 16,737,276 17,979,752 13,206,436 11,930,094

Im p o rts from the U nited S tates co n t.

1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1865 1866

$ 17,592,916 17,273,029 20,206,080 22,642,860 18,457,683 14,820,577 15,242,834

Exports to the U nited S tates co n t.

S 13,922,314 18,427,918 14,261,427 15,063,730 18,426,891 21,340,350 32,587,643

J o u r n a ls o f th e L e g is la tiv e A ss e m b ly o f th e P r o v in c e o f C a n a d a ,

1851-1859 S e s sio n a l P a p e r s o f th e P r o v in c e o f C a n a d a , 1860-1867. Exports in 1851, 1853 1854, and 1855 are from R e p o r t o f th e M in is te r o f F in a n c e o n th e R e c ip ro c ity T r e a ty w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s . The returns 1850-1863 are for the fiscal year ending December 31 and 1865-1866 for the fiscal year ending June 30.

148 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 TABLE NO. VI TRADE OF THE LOWER COLONIES WITH THE UNITED STATES

(U nit £1,000) N e w B ru n sw ick

5 oH

1850 1851 1853 1854 1855 1856 1858 1859 1860 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866

&«. 4-5 262 330 574 711 782 714 564 675 688 616 739 691 636 779

S'4* 77 83 121 97 123 173 163 236 248 185 259 263 361 386

N o v a S colia P rince E dw ard Is.

&

£■5 322 283 415 575 738 678 583 576 651 605 771 860 865 808

0*3

197 151 277 318 481 413 408 456 446 362 373 489 723 645

N e w fo u n d .

5 S'o >>

E c** •S’S 8 16 37 39 43 52 42 62 56 46 71 83 90 74

£■5 11 20 24 16 33 27 63 87 78 43 105 77 120 21

! i 153 201 177 237 354 388 323 361 364 345 344 306 348 291

20 20 41 28 79 109 113 106 81 47 60 41 109 88

C olonial O riginals a n d B lue B o o ks. A cc o u n ts and Papers [of the British Parliament], 1857-1858, vol. lviii; 1866, vol. Ixxiii; 1867, vol. Ixxii; 1867-1868, vol. Ixxi. Journal a n d Proceedings o f th e H ouse o f A sse m b ly [of N ova Scotia], 1856. Journal o f the H ouse o f A ssem b ly o f Prince E dw ard Isla n d , 1857.

TABLE NO. VII TRADE OF THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES OTHER THAN CANADA WITH THE UNITED STATES

Im ports from the U nited Stales

1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857

S 3,618,214 4,085,783 3,791,956 5,311,543 7,266,154 9,085,676 8,146,108 7,637,587

E xports to the U nited S tales

$ 1,358,992 1,736,650 1,520,330 2,672,602 2,206,021 2,954,420 3,822,224 3,832,462

1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863

Im p o rts fro m the U nited States co n t.

E x p o rts to the U nited States co n t.

$ 6,622,473 9,213,832 8,623,214 8,383,755 8,236,611 11,382,312

$ 4,224,948 5,518,834 4,989,708 4,417,476 4,046,843 5,207,424

Statistics o f th e F oreign a n d D o m estic C o m m erce o f the U nited States.

A P P E N D I X B - 149 TABLE NO. VIII IMPORTS BY THE UNITED STATES FROM THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES

Year Ending June 30

Year Ending June Free

Dutiable

$ $ 4,856,863 1850 322,637 5,003,070 1851 276,648 1852 339,435 5,130,010 1853 395,091 6,132,468 1854 495,995 8,288,417 1855 8,085,678 7,032,611 1856 20,454,890 821,724 1857 21,281,172 827,744 1858 15,293,104 491,732 Second Session, 53rd Congress, 106.

1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866

Free cont.

Dutiable cont.

$ 18,553,850 22,902,386 22,204,078 17,981,767 16,503,591 27,946,755 31,962,960 43,029,389

$ 733,715 670,410 520,411 529,258 981,195 1,661,981 1,301,443 5,449,239

S en a te E xecutive D o cu m en ts, No.

TA B LE N O . IX

Im p o rts b y th e P rovince o f C anada fro m th e U nited S ta tes D u tiable F ree $ %

1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863

5,803,732 6,981,735 7,613,003 10,656,582 13,449,341 11,449,472 12,770,923 9,966,430 8,473,607 9,032,861 8,526,230 8,338,620 6,128,783 3,974,396

791,128 1,384,030 864,690 1,125,565 2,083,757 9,379,204 9,933,586 10,258,221 7,161,958 8,560,055 8,746,799 11,867,460 16,514,077 14,483,287

Im p o rts b y the U nited S tates fro m th e P rovince o f Canada Free D utiable

$ 636,454 1,529,685 761,571 1,179,682 380,041 6,876,496 16,487,822 17,600,737 11,267,618 13,703,748 18,427,141 18,287,217 15,026,093 13,358,127

$ 3,649,016 3,426,786 3,828,398 4,098,434 6,341,498 5,305,818 640,375 691,097 313,953 504,969 434,532 358,240 227,059 567,677

R e p o rt o f th e M in ister o f F inance o n the R ecip ro city T reaty w ith th e U n ited States, S ta tistics o f th e F oreign and D o m estic C om m erce o f th e U nited States. The Canadian returns are for the year ending

December 31 and the American for the year ending June 30. Returns o f Coin and Bullion deducted from the return o f free imports, 18611863.

150 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 TA B LE N O . X AMERICAN TONNAGE ENROLLED IN THE COD AND MACKEREL INDUSTRIES

C od fishery

M a ckerel fishery

1852 72,546 102,659 1853 109,227 59,850 1854 102,194 35,041 1855 102,927 21,624 1856 95,816 29,886 1857 104,572 28,327 1858 110,896 29,553 1859 120,577 27,069 1860 136,653 26,110 1861 127,310 54,295 1862 122,862 80,596 1863 117,289 51,018 1864 92,744 55,498 1865 59,228 41,208 1866 42,796 46,589 Third session, 41st Congress, H ouse E xecu tive D o cum ents, No. 94, Letter from the Secretary o f the Treasury, transmitting a report [J. N. L arned’s] on the state of trade between the United States and the British N orth American possessions, February 3, 1871.

TA BLE N O . X I

T o ta l G rain sent E astw ard fr o m eight W estern S ta tes R eceived at a n d C anada B uffalo

1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866

bus. 57,707,769 44,789,851 59,872,566 44,354,225 78,652,486 119,264,233 136,329,542 116,367,548 81,252,000 89,249,777 110,329,000

bus. 26,239,791 20,052,689 28,219,855 22,215,425 37,133,461 61,460,601 72,794,188 64,603,690 50,000,000 51,415,818 58,338,087

Sent via M ontreal

bus. 5,811,877 5,315,552 5,332,481 3,902,897 6,782,135 16,575,765 18,041,839 13,742,671 9,604,000

A P P E N D I X B - 151 P ercentage o f T o ta l M o v e m e n t o f Grain R eceived at B u ffa lo a n d O swego

1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863

66.3 67.1 68.9 67.0 66.1 68.0

Statistics o f th e F oreign a n d D om estic C o m m erce o f th e U nited S ta tes [Total Grain Sent Eastw ard 1856-1862]. 2nd session, 39th C on­ gress, H ouse E xecu tive D o cu m en ts, No. 78, Report o f Hon. I. T. Hatch,

January 30, 1867 [Total Grain Sent Eastward 1863-1866, Received at Buffalo 1856-1866]. William Kingsford, T he C anadian Canals, Toronto, Rollo and Adam, 1865, pp. 134-135 [Sent via M ontreal 1856-1864, Percentages 1858-1863].

NOTES

L IS T OF A B B R E V IA T IO N S A .D .S. C .O . E. F .O . G. L .C . P .A .C . P .R .O .

= = = = = = = =

A m erican D ep artm en t o f State, W ashington, D .C . C olonial Office. Executive. Fo reig n Office. G overnor-G eneral. L ib rary o f C ongress, W ashington, D .C . P ublic A rchives o f C an ad a, O ttaw a. P ublic R ecord Office, L ondon, E ngland.

IN T R O D U C TIO N 1. T he w ord fiscal is used throughout this volum e in the lim ited sense o f app ertain in g to the custom s tariff. 2. E dw ard P o rritt, The F iscal a n d D iplom atic Freedom o f the British O versea D om inions, O xford, 1922, p. 216. 3. L o rd D u rh a m ’s R ep o rt on th e A ffairs o f B ritish N o rth A m erica, ed. Sir C. P. L ucas, O xford a t the C laren d o n Press, 1912, vol. 2, p. 281. The subjects proposed by D u rh a m to b e reserved w ere “ the constitu­ tion o f the form o f governm ent, - the regulation o f foreign relations, and the tra d e w ith the m o th er country, the o th er B ritish Colonies, and foreign nations, - and the disposal o f the public la n d s.” 4. 9 & 10 V iet. cap. 94. 5. C harles B uller, R esponsible G overnm ent fo r C olonies, L ondon, Jam es Ridgw ay, Piccadilly, 1840, p p. 53-62. C. A . B odelsen, Studies in M idV ictorian Im perialism , G yldendalskc B oghandel, 1924, pp. 19-20. 6. John M o rlcy , The L ife o f R ic h ard C obden (U n w in e d itio n ), pp. 934935. P o rritt, o p . c it., p p . 325 ff. P o litical Science Q uarterly, vol. 14, 1899, Jo h n D avidson, “ E n g lan d ’s C om m ercial Policy tow ards her Colonics since the T reaty o f P aris,” I , p p . 50-51. B odelsen, o p . clt., p. 32. 7. Ib id ., p p. 49 ff. R am say M u ir, A S h o rt H istory o f the British C om m onw ealth, L ondon, G eorge Philip & Son, L td ., 1927, vol. ii, p a rt v, p . 420. 8. B odelsen, op. cit., p. 43. L e tte rs o f F red eric L o rd B lachford, U nder­ sec re ta ry o f S tate fo r the C olonies, 1 8 6 0 -1 8 7 1 , edited by G . E . M arindin, L ondon, 1896, p. 299. 9. H a n sa rd , I I I , vol. cviii, p p. 535 ff. 10. P .A .C ., E n g lan d M iscellaneous, G rey-E lgin C orrespondence, Grey to Elgin, Ju ly 20, 1849. 11. B odelsen, o p . cit., p. 59. 12. Ib id ., p. 42. 13. P o rritt, o p . c it., pp. 283-358. 14. H a n sa rd , III, vol. xxxix, pp. 1495-1501; vol. xl, p p . 866, 882; vol. xlix, p. 153; vol. liii, p. 1063; vol. liv, p p . 747-748; vol. lv, p p. 268-269; vol. cxxxiv, p. 159. 15. Jo h n M orley, The Life o f W illiam E w art G ladstone, T h e M acm illan

N O T E S - 153 C o ., 1903, p p . 359-363. C harles S tu art P a rk e r, S ir R o b ert Peel, L ondon, Jo h n M u rray, 1899, vol. iii, pp. 388-389, Peel to A berdeen M ay 16, 1842. P o rritt, o p . c it., p. 332. 1 6 .6 & 7 V iet. cap. 29. A substantial p reference w as accorded to C an ad ian bread-stuffs by substituting, in place o f th e sliding scale im posed in 1842, a fixed duty o f a shilling per q u a rte r o n w heat im ported fro m C an a d a and a p ro p o rtio n ate duty o n C an ad ian flour. 17. P .R .O ., Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 521. M em orandum o f D alhousie a t the B o ard o f T rad e, Septem ber 11, 1844. S tatu tes o j C anada, 7 V iet. cap. 1 a n d cap. 2; 8 Viet. cap. 1 a n d cap. 3. 18. P rio r to 1842 colonial legislatures had frequently im posed differential duties. T h e Peel adm inistration a ttem p ted to p u t an end to this p ractice an d , despite opposition from Jam aica and N ew S outh W ales, m et w ith fairly general success. See W . P . M orrell, British C olonial Policy in the A ge o f P e e l an d Russell, O xford a t the C laren d o n Press, 1930, p p . 188-192. Y et there was n o fu n d am en tal breach in principle betw een the im position o f differential d uties and the general system of m oderate colonial preferences w hich was, until 1846, th e policy of the Peel adm inistration. D ifferential d uties could n o t, how ever, be reconciled w ith the system o f free tra d e w hich dem anded th a t, when duties w ere im posed fo r purposes o f revenue, th ere should be no discrim ination between the im ports fro m one country an d those from an other. I t was fo r this reason th a t th e intercolonial agreem ent of 1850 an d la te r the R eciprocity T reaty assum ed so g re a t a significance.

PART I CHAPTER 1 (PP. 2-14) 1. T his term and also the term “ Low er Provinces” refers to New B runsw ick, N o v a Scotia, Prince E d w ard Islan d and N ew foundland. 2. A lm ost from the beginning o f th e negotiations the A m ericans de­ m anded access to the colonial coastal fisheries in o rd e r to b alance the greater benefit w hich the colonies w ould derive from a reciprocity treaty. A significant fe a tu re o f the la te r negotiations (1852-1854) w as the w idespread reluctance in th e L ow er C olonies to op en the fisheries. T h e B ritish G overnm ent, how ever, becam e equally intent upon arran g in g w ith the U n ited States a settlem ent o f the fishery question. T h e policy o f excluding the A m ericans fro m the fisheries h a d created so m uch friction th at a breach w ith the U nited S tates w as considered n o t unlikely. See C h ap ters 2 and 3, P a rt I. 3. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, M iscellaneous P apers, Elgin, Grey, P a p e r by W ilson on “ C an ad a C om m ercial an d A gricultural D istress - P o litical D isaffection an d A nnexation.” 4. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, O ctober 28, 1847. P .A .C ., Series G , vol. 136, G rey to Elgin, Jan u a ry 9, 1850. P .R .O ., Series F .O . 5 , vol. 485, C ram p to n to P alm erston, M ay 8, 1848, enclosures. 5. P .A .C ., C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary, M erritt to Elgin, M ay, 1848, enclosures. 6. P .A .C ., M erritt P ap ers, vol. v. M o rris to M erritt, D ecem ber 24, 1849.

154 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 7. C ram pton to Palm erston, M ay 8, 1848, enclosures. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 549, Elgin to G rey, Jan u a ry 4, 1848, enclosure; vol. 560, E lgin to G rey, N ovem ber 8, 1849, enclosure. C. D . A llin and G . M . Jones, A nnexation, P referen tial T rade a n d R eciprocity, M usson B ook C o ., T o ro n to , C an ad a, p. 332. 8. Ib id ., pp. 330-331. 9. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, D ecem ber 13, 1849. 10. P.A .C ., M erritt P ap ers, vol. i, M errit to Elgin, M ay 10, 1848. 11. A llin and Jones, o p . cit., p p. 330-331. 12. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, M ay 14, 1846. 13. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an a d a , 1846, pp. 229-230. 14. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, Ju ly 15 and A ugust 19, 1847. The G lobe, T o ro n to , Ju ly 7, 1847. 15. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, 1849, vol. 8, p p. 126, 164-165. Statutes o f C an ad a, 12 V iet. cap. 3. 16. A rchives o f O ntario, M erritt P ap ers, package 21, Y oung to M erritt, Ju ly 31, 1850. 17. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , N ew Brunsw ick Executive Council M inutes, 1849, Ju n e 1-July 31, N o. 25, M e rritt to W ilm ot, Ju ly 13, 1849. 18. British A m erican M agazine, vol. 1, p. 245. 19. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 534, C ath ca rt to G rey, D ecem ber 9, 1846, enclosure. 20. Ib id ., vol. 550, E lgin to G rey, A pril 8, 1848, enclosure. G reyElgin C orrespondence, Elgin to G rey, M ay 4, 1848. P .A .C . Pam phlet 4253, The H o n b l. F ran cis H incks’ Views on the C om m ercial Policy o f C anad a, 1846, 1847, and 1852. Thos. C. K eefer, A Sketch o f the R ise and Progress o f the R eciprocity T reaty , T o ro n to , Lovell and G ibson, 1863, p. 4. A dam S h o rtt, A rth u r G . D oughty, G eneral Editors, C anada an d Its Provinces, T o ro n to , Glasgow , B ro o k & C o., 1914, vol. v, p. 228. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd Session, 30th C o n ­ gress, pp. 327 ff. 21. P.A .C ., Series E , State B ook J , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], Ju n e 30, 1849. 22. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, M ay 14, 1846. 23. P .A .C ., M erritt P apers, vol. i, M erritt to the Provincial Secretary, F ebruary 6, 1847; M erritt to C ram p to n , A p ril 25, 1848. M erritt to Elgin, M ay, 1848, enclosures. C orrespondence o f the G overnorG eneral's S ecretary, M erritt to Elgin, Ju n e 8, 1849. 24. “ M erritt’s zeal fo r reciprocity o f tra d e w ith the U nited S tates w ould c arry him any length . . G rey-Elgin C orrespondence, Elgin to G rey, A ugust 27, 1849. 25. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 550, Elgin to G rey, M ay 24, 1848, enclosures. 26. Ib id ., vol 559, Elgin to G rey, Ju n e 15, 1849, enclosure. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, Elgin to G rey, N ovem ber 8, 1848, enclosures, and Ju n e 25, 1849, enclosure. 27. B room hall, S cotland, Elgin P ap ers, E lgin to S ir G eorge G rey, Sep­ tem ber 9, 1854. S h o rtt and D oughty, o p . c it., p. 228. 28. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 541, Elgin to G rey, M arch 26, 1847. 29. G rey-Elgin C orrespondence, Elgin to G rey, M arch 29, 1849. 30. Ib id ., Elgin to G rey, M arch 2, M arch 17, Ju ly 5, A ugust 2, 1848; N ovem ber 8, 1849. 31. Jo u rn a l o f the H ouse o f A ssem bly o f the Province o f N ew B runswick, Jan u ary 19-M arch 30, 184S, p p. 186-188. U nited S tates T ariff C o m ­ mission, R eciprocity and C om m ercial Treaties, 1919, p.64, S h o rtt and D oughty, op. c it., p. 230.

N O T E S - 155 32. G . E. Fencty, P o litical N o tes an d O b sen ’ations, F red erictio n , S. R. M iller, 1867, vol. i, pp. 329-330. 33. Jo u rn a l o j th e Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, Jan u a ry 19-M arch 30, 1848, p. 170. 34. E lgin P ap ers, H ead to Elgin, M ay 14, 1S50. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssembly o f N ew B runswick, Jan u a ry 19-M arch 30, 1848, p p . 186-188; F eb ru ary 6-A pril 13, 1851, p. 373. D avidson, o p. c it., ii, p p . 221-225. Fenety, o p . c it., pp. 348-349. 35. Ib id ., pp. 345-347. 36. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 559, Elgin to G rey, P riv ate and C onfidential, July 9, 1849, enclosures. 37. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 11, H e ad to G rey, Ju ly 3, 1848, enclos­ u re. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, H ead to E lgin, F eb ru ary 27, 1850. H ead to Elgin, M ay 14, 1850. 38. J o u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, Jan u a ry 31-A pril 14, 1849, p . 120. 39. Series G , vol. 136, G rey to Elgin, M ay 11, 1850, enclosures. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, F e b ru a ry 7-A pril 6, 1850, pp. 339-347. 40. M erritt to W ilm ot, Ju ly 13, 1849. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , New Brunsw ick Executive C ouncil M inutes, 1849, Ju n e 1-July 31, Schedule o f P ap ers fo r C ouncil, Ju ly 31, 1849. A .D .S ., Special A gents 1849 , Isra e l D . A ndrew s, vol. 16, A ndrew s to C layton, P riv ate, Ju ly 31, 1849. T h e reluctance o f the G overnm ent o f N ova Scotia to pledge itself to the policy o f opening th e fisheries prevented th e conference fro m effecting com bined action am ong the colonies to secure a treaty. 41. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 11, H ead to G rey, O ctober 27, 1848, enclosure. Jo u rn a l o f th e Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, Jan u a ry 31A p ril 14, 1849, p. 337; F eb ru ary 7-A pril 6, 1850, p. 357. N ew B runs­ w ick A cts, 13 V iet. cap. 24. 42. P .R .O ., G ifts a n d D eposits, Series 22, [R ussell P a p e rs ], vol. 6, Grey to R ussell, Private, Ju ly 6 an d Ju ly 26, 1847. Grey based his opinion on H e a d ’s alleged m ism anagem ent o f the P o o r Law Com m ission. 43. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 13, H ead to Pak in g to n , S ep arate and C onfidential, D ecem ber 16, 1852. 44. Elgin P ap ers, H ead to Elgin, O ctober 12, 1850. G rey-Elgin C orre­ spondence, E lgin to G rey, O ctober 6, 1850. 45. Prin ce E d w ard Islan d A cts, 1849 to 1850, N o . 758, cap. 3. 46. Jo u rn a l o f th e H ouse o f A ssem bly o f P rin ce E d w ard Islan d , 1849, pp. 139, 140, 142. P .R .O ., S eries C .O . 2 6 6 , vol. 75, S ir D o n ald C am pbell to G rey, Ju n e 12, 1849. 47. Ofiice o f the Provincial Secretary o f N o v a Scotia, M inutes o f the Executive C ouncil o f N o v a S cotia, vol. 199, p p . 331-332, F . H. H a v ilan d to the Provincial Secretary o f N o v a Scotia, A ugust 17, 1849, enclosure. 48. Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 76, C am pbell to G rey, D ecem ber 19, 1849, enclosure. 49. Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 76, C am pbell to G rey, Septem ber 21, 1849. 50. Jo u rn a l and P roceedings o f the H o u se o f Assem bly o f the Province of N o v a S co tia, 1848, p. 9; 1849, p. 207. 51. M in u tes o f the Executive Council o f N o v a S cotia, vol. 199, p. 324, A ugust 8, 1849. E lgin P a p e rs, H ead to Elgin, P riv ate, Septem ber 14, 1849. 52. J o u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f N ova Scotia, A ppendix, Jan u a ry 17M arch 28, 1850, A ppendix 17, p. 56.

156 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 53. P.R .O ., Series C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 210, Le M arch a n t to Pakington, N ovem ber 22, 1852. 54. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s Secretary, H arv ey to Elgin, M arch 9, 1850. 55. Y oung to M erritt, Private, Ju ly 31, 1850. 56. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f N o v a Scotia, 1850, p p. 572, 574, 575; 1851, p p . 639-640. 57. Ib id ., A ppendix, Jan u ary 23-A pril 7, 1851, A ppendix 20, H arvey to B ulw er, Jan u ary 29, 1851. 58. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, H arv ey to Elgin, Jan u a ry 10, 1852. 59. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly of N o v a Scotia, 1850, p p . 514, 516-519. 60. Ib id ., p. 587. 61. Y oung to M erritt, Private, Ju ly 31, 1850. 62. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, A ppendix, Jan u a ry 17M arch 28, 1850, A ppendix 17, Jam es Crow dy, Provincial Secretary of N ew foundland, to H ow e, A ugust 22, 1849, enclosure. 63. P.R .O ., Series C .O . 1 9 4 , vol. 132, Le M arch an t to G rey, P rivate and C onfidential, D ecem ber 31, 1849. 64. Elgin to G rey, Private, O ctober 6, 1850. Elgin P ap ers, E lgin to C ram p to n , A p ril 29, 1852. P.R .O ., Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 27, M erivale to A ddington, N ovem ber 23, 1853, enclosure. 65. Series E ; S ta te Book M , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], Septem ber 18, 1852. The G lobe, T o ro n to , Ju n e 10 an d 12, 1851. 66. Series E , State Book M , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], Septem ber 23, 1852. 67. Elgin P ap ers, H ead to Elgin, F eb ru ary 12 and M ay 14, 1850. Fenety, o p . cit., p. 464. 68. “ Y ou will see by the ‘A ddress’ o f o u r Legislature th a t w e a re very fierce on th e subject o f the fisheries.” Elgin P ap ers, H ead to Elgin, A p ril 11, 1853. Series E , D espatches R eferred to the Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], H e a d to Elgin, A pril 11, 1853, enclosures. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 13, H ead to P ak in g to n , D ecem ber 16, 1852, enclosure. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, F eb ­ ru ary 24-M ay 3, 1853, pp. 188, 192-195, 197-198. F enety, o p . c it., p. 448. 69. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, F eb ru ary 6-A pril 13, 1851, pp. 197-198; Jan u a ry 7-A pril 7, 1852, p p. 408, 418, 427, 429, 430. P.A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 13, H ead to Pakington, Septem ber 10, 1852, enclosure. 70. Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 79, B annerm an to G rey, N ovem ber 15, 1851; B annerm an to M erivale, Private, N ovem ber 24, 1851; vol. 80, B annerm an to G rey, F eb ru ary 12, 1852, enclosure. P.A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 33, B annerm an to H e ad , J a n u a ry 22, 1852. Jo u rn a l of the Assem bly o f P rin ce E d w ard Islan d , 1852, p p . 34-35. U n d e r the term s o f the C onvention, the U nited S tates forfeited the rig h t of access to th e fisheries w ithin th ree m arine m iles o f the coasts o f the colonies. 71 .I b id ., pp. 11, 12. 72. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ew foundland, A nn. D ec. Q uint. Viet. R eg., pp. 289-290. 73. Ib id ., A nn. D ec. Sext. V iet. R eg., pp. 45-48. 74. In 1852, o u t o f a total ex p o rt o f £97 0 ,7 8 0 N o v a Scotian exports to G re a t B ritain totalled only £ 6 2 ,6 7 5 , while N ew B runsw ick exported

N O T E S - 157 £602,295 w orth o f goods, o u t o f a to ta l o f £796,335. A ccounts a n d P ap ers [o f th e B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1852-1853, vol. xlii; 1856, vol. lvii. 75. Series E , D espatches R eferred to the Executive Council [o f C a n a d a ], H arvey to Elgin, Jan u a ry 21, 1852, enclosure. 76. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, L e M archant to E lgin, Septem ber 5, 1852, enclosure. 77. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1852, pp. 77, 79, 84, 86, 90, 103, 105, 114, 122, 136, 137. 78. Jo u rn a l o f the Proceedings o f the Legislative C ouncil o f the Province o f N o v a S co tia, 1852, p p. 72 73, 77; 1853, p p. 97, 105. Jo u rn a l of the A ssem bly o f N ova S co tia, 1853, p p. 367, 373. 79. Ib id ., p p . 354-355. Jo u rn a l o f the Legislative Council o f N o v a Scotia, 1851, p. 127; 1852, p. 32. Series C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 211, Le M arch an t to N ew castle, A pril 11, 1853, enclosure. 80. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ova Scotia, 1854, A ppendix 45. 81. Series C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 208, H arvey to G rey, F eb ru ary 19, 1852. 82. Ib id ., B azalgette to Pak in g to n , Ju n e 9, 1852. Series E , D espatches R eferred to the Executive Council [o f C a n a d a ], Bazalgette to Seym our, Ju n e 23, 1852. M inutes o f the Executive Council o f N ova S co tia, vol. 200, p . 61, A ugust 9, 1852; p. 84, N ovem ber 19, 1852; p. 101, A pril 12, 1853. 83. Le M arch an t to P ak in g to n , N ovem ber 22, 1852. 84. A .D .S., Special A gents 1 8 4 9 , Israel D . A ndrew s, vol. 16, A ndrew s to M arcy, P riv ate a n d C onfidential, M ay 13, 1854. 85. L .C ., F ran k lin Pierce P ap ers, vol. iv, pp. 794-820.

CHAPTER 2 (pp. 15-28) 1. Series G , vol. 151, L abouchere to H ead , Ju ly 15, 1856. 2 . A ccounts an d P a p e rs [o f th e B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1856, vol. xliv, B ooth to M erivale, Ju n e 26, 1855. U n ited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 22. 3. W . P. M orrell, B ritish C olonial Policy in the A ge o f Peel an d R ussell, p. 200. 4. H a n sa rd , I I I , vol. lxxxiii, p p. 1036-1037. M orrell, o p . c it., p p. 194195. 5. M orley, The Life o f W illiam E w art G ladstone, pp. 359-363. 6. Series G , vol. 123, G ladstone to C ath ca rt, M arch 31, 1846, enclosures; vol. 124, G ladstone to C ath ca rt, A pril 1, A pril 18, M ay 4, 1846. 7. Ib id ., vol. 123, G ladstone to C ath ca rt, M arch 3, 1846. 8. Ib id ., vol. 125, G lad sto n e to C ath cart, Ju n e 3, 1846. G ladstone to C ath ca rt, M arch 31, 1846. 9. G ladstone to C ath ca rt, Ju n e 3, 1846. Series G , vol. 125, G ladstone to C ath ca rt, Ju n e 27, 1846, enclosures. Paul K naplund, G ladstone and B rita in ’s Im p erial P o licy , L ondon, G eorge A llen and U nw in L td., p. 51. 10. P .R .O ., Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 91, A berdeen to P akenham , June 18, 1846. 11. E a rl G rey, The C olonial Policy o f L o rd Jo h n R ussell’s A dm inistra­ tio n , L ondon, 1853, vol. i, p. 4. M orrell, o p . c it., p. 224. 12. Ib id ., p p. 209-210. v 13. H a n sa rd , I I I , vol. cii, p p. 682 ff., F eb ru ary 14, 1849.

158 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 14. Ib id ., vol. cv, p p . 54 ff., M ay 8, 1849. 15. Ib id ., vol. cvi, p. 242, Ju n e 14, 1849; vol. cviii, p. 535, F eb ru ary 8, 1850. 16. E arl G rey, o p . c it., pp. 281-282. G rey to H e ad , Private, A p ril 19, 1850, H ow ick P ap ers, published in M orrell, o p. c it., p. 221. 17. S eries G , vol. 126, G rey to Elgin, N o . 10, D ecem ber 31, 1846. G reyElgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, Jan u ary 10, 1850. 18. M orrell, op. c it., p p. 224-225, 230. 19. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, L etters o f L o rd G rey, 1846-1849, news­ paper clipping. 20. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 497, G rey to P alm erston, N ovem ber 8, 1849. 21. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, A ugust 22, 1849. E arl G rey, op. c it., p. 43. 22. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 8, G rey to R ussell, M arch 25, 1850. 23. G rey to Elgin, A ugust 22, 1849. 24. Scries G , vol. 132, G rey to Elgin, D ecem ber 21, 1848. 25. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 32, G rey to H ead , Ju ly 4, 1851. P .A .C ., D espatches fro m the Secretary o f S ta te to th e L ieutenant-G overnors o f N ova S cotia (P h o to sta ts ), vol. 89, G rey to H arv ey , D ecem ber 20, 1850. 26. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, M ay 18 an d N ovem ber 30, 1849; F eb ru ary 13, 1851. 27. Ib id ., G rey to Elgin, F eb ru ary 13, M ay 9, 1851. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 29, G rey to H ead , M arch 22, 1848. E a rl G rey, o p . c it., p. 251. 28. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, M ay 9, Ju ly 4, 1851. 29. Ib id ., O ctober 24, 1849. T his was the first atte m p t to a rra n g e reci­ procity by treaty ; several attem p ts had already been m ade to secure the sam e end by m utual legislation. See C h ap ter 3, P a rt I. 30. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 104, Palm erston to B ulw er, N ovem ber 1, 1849. F ro m 1852 to 1854 the B ritish G overnm ent w as p articu larly deter­ m ined upon the necessity o f including co al in th e free list. 31. G rey to P alm erston, N ovem ber 8, 1849. Series F .O . 5 , voL 497, M em orandum fro m G rey on B ulw er’s Instructions, received a t the F.O ., N ovem ber, 1849. 32. Grey-Elgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, Jan u a ry 9, 1852. 33. Series G , vol. 141, P akington to Elgin, Ju n e 30, 1852, enclosures. 34. E a rl G rey, o p . c it., p. 286. 35. H . L. K eenlcyside, C an ad a a n d the U nited States, N ew Y o rk , 1929, pp. 255 ff. 36. T h e italics a re my own. 37. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 33, Bazalgette to H e ad , Ju ly 30, 1852, enclosures. Second session, 32nd C ongress, H o u se Executive D o cu ­ m ents, vol. 3, N o. 23, L orenzo Sabine, “ R ep o rt o n the Principal F isheries o f the A m erican Seas,” p p. 392 ff. 38. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, Seym our to Elgin, A ugust 11, 1852. 39. Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 79, B annerm an to M erivale, Private, N ovem ber 24, 1851; vol. 80, B annerm an to G rey, N o. 10, F eb ru ary 12, 1852. 40. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 26, M em orandum , M arch 8, 1853. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 121, M alm esbury to C ram p to n , A ugust 12, 1852. Series G , vol. 141, P akington to Elgin, M ay 27, 1852. H a n sa rd , III, vol. cxxvi, p. 146, Speech by M alm esbury in the H o u se o f L o rd s, A pril 21, 1853. E a rl G rey, o p . c it., p. 286. 41. M em orandum in the F oreign Office, M arch 8, 1853.

N O T E S - 159 42. Sabine, R ep o rt on the P rin cip al Fisheries o f the A m erican Seas, p. 437. 43. Ib id ., p. 391. 44. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 121, M alm esbury to C ram pton, A ugust 10 and Septem ber 24, 1852. 45. E a rl o f M alm esbury, M em oirs o f a n Ex-M inister, L ondon, Long­ m ans, G reen & C o., 1885, pp. 260-261, D israeli to M alm esbury, A ugust 13, 1852. It w as in this letter th a t D israeli m ade his notorious statem ent, “These w retched colonies . . . a rc a m illstone round our necks.” 46. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 543, D erby to [A d d in g to n ], Septem ber 11, 1852. M alm esbury, op. c it., p. 264, D erby to M alm esbury, Septem ber 15, 1852. 47. Ib id ., A ddington to D erby, Septem ber, 1852. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 121, M alm esbury to C ram p to n , Septem ber 16, 1852. 48. Elgin P ap ers, H ead to Elgin, Septem ber 8, 1852. 49. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 543, M alm esbury to A ddington, Septem ber 9, 1852; D erby to [A d d in g to n ], Septem ber 11, 1852. 50. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 121, M alm esbury to C ram pton, O ctober 7, 1852. P.A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 33, P akington to H e ad , O ctober 29, 1852. 51. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 547, C ram pton to M alm esbury, Private, Septem ber 6, 1852. 52. T h e dangers o f a collision over the fisheries are discussed by John M acG reg o r, “ T he U nited States an d the British A m erican Fisheries,” T a il’s Edinburgh M agazine, N ew Series, vol. 19, 1852, p. 548. 53. Seym our to Elgin, A ugust 11, 1852. A .D .S., S t. Jo h n , N ew B runsn'ick, vol. 3, A ndrew s to W ebster, A ugust 21 an d 24, 1852; Perry to H on. Jo h n P. K ennedy, A ugust, 1852, enclosures. 54. P erry to H o n . Jo h n P. K ennedy, A ugust, 1852, enclosures. F irst session, 33rd C ongress, H o u se Executive D ocum ents, N o. 21. S hubrick to D obbin, A ugust 16, 1853. 55. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary, Seym our to R ow an, N ovem ber 23, 1853, enclosures. 56. L .C ., M arcy P ap ers, vol. 48, M arcy to B uchanan, M arch 11, 1854. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 27, C ram p to n to C larendon, O cto b er 3, 1853, enclosure. 57. S eries F .O . 9 7 , vol. 28, Booth, C om m ittee o f the Privy Council fo r T rad e, to L o rd W odehouse, A pril 20, 1853. 58. Ib id ., 5 , vol. 566, C ram p to n to C larendon, Septem ber 5, 1853. 59. Ib id ., 9 7 , vol. 28, B ooth to A ddington, N ovem ber 18, 1853. Ib id ., 1 1 5 , vol. 136, C larendon to C ram p to n , F eb ru ary 2, 1854. 60. Ib id ., 9 7 , vol. 27, A ddington to C larendon, D ecem ber 31, 1853. 61. M arcy P ap ers, vol. 47, B uchanan tn M arcy, Jan u ary 28, 1854. W ar w as declared on R ussia on M arch 28, 1854. 62. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 27, M erivale to A ddington, P riv ate a n d Confi­ dential, M arch 13, 1854, enclosures. 63. A .D .S., E ngland, Jam es B uch an an , vol. 65, B uchanan to M arcy, A pril 14, 1854. 64. A rchives o f N ova Scotia, F oreign C orrespondence, R ecord Commis­ sio n , 1852-1866, vol. 387, Elgin to Le M arch an t, A p ril 14, 1854. 65. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 589, C laren d o n to Elgin, D ra ft, N o . 1, Secret, M ay 4, 1854. 66. H a n sa rd , III, vol. cxxxiv, p. 730, C larendon in the H o u se o f Lords, Ju n e 27, 1854.

160 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 67. F o r some tim e the G overnm ent had been growing im patient w ith the attitu d e o f N o v a Scotia. Series C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 211, L e M arch a n t to N ew castle, M arch 31, 1853, enclosure, M em orandum appended by Blackw ood. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 27, M erivale to W odehouse, N ovem ­ b e r 30, 1853. M erivale to A ddington, P rivate and C onfidential, M arch 13, 1854, enclosures. 68. M arcy P ap ers, vol. 50, B uchanan to M arcy, M ay 16, 1854. 69. T h e idea o f com bining fishery concessions and reciprocity in one convention h a d already been suggested by I. D . A ndrew s to the A m erican G overnm ent in N ovem ber, 1848. C layton, the Secretary of S tate, had discussed the subject w ith M erritt in Ju n e, 1849. A .D .S., Special A gents 1 8 4 9 , Isra e l D . A ndrew s, vol. 16, C layton to M erritt, Ju n e 30, 1849.

CHAPTER (p p . 29-50)

3

1. Elgin P apers, C ram pton to Elgin, M arch 6, 1849. 2 . Scries F .O . 5 , vol. 515, B ulw er to Palm erston, Septem ber 23, 1850. Elgin P ap ers, C ram p to n to Elgin, A ugust 15, 1848. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 30th C ongress, pp. 46, 61-62, 68, 182 ff., 327 ff. 3. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 498, C ram p to n to Palm erston, M arch 5, 1849. 4. Elgin P ap ers, C ram p to n to Elgin, A pril 15, 1852. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 13, H ead to Pakington, Separate an d C onfidential, D ecem ­ be r 16, 1852. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, p p. 204 ff. 5. A rchives o f O n tario , M erritt P a p e rs, package 21, K eefer to M erritt, D ecem ber 23, 1850. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 547, C ram p to n to M alm esbury, Private, Septem ber 6, 1852. 6. Scries F .O . 5 , vol. 500. C ram p to n to P alm erston, Ju ly 9, 1849, enclosures. U n ited States Tariff Com m ission, R eciprocity a n d Com ­ m ercial T reaties, p. 67. 7. C ram pto n to P alm erston, Ju ly 9, 1849. B ulw er to P alm erston, Sep­ tem ber 23, 1850. Elgin P ap ers, B ulw er to Elgin, O ctober 1, 1850. Series G , C orrespondence w ith H e r B ritannic M ajesty’s M inister a t W ashington, 1840-1860, B ulw er to Palm erston, M arch 31, 1851. 8. M arcy P a p e rs, P riv ate L etters o f W . L. M ., M arcy to B uchanan, N ovem ber 3, 1854. 9. L ord R edesdale, F u rth e r M em ories, L ondon, H utchinson & C o., 1917, pp. 292 ff. 10. M arcy P a p e rs, vol. 47, B uchanan to M arcy, Jan u a ry 28, 1854. 11. P .R .O ., S eries F .O . 6 5 , vol. 549, Russell to C ram p to n , Jan u a ry 7, 1860. 12. L.C ., C layton P ap ers, vol. 9, C layton to L aw rence, M ay 2, 1850. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 9, Palm erston to R ussell, N ovem ber 17, 1851; vol. 15, C laren d o n to R ussell, A ugust 2, 1865. Grey-Elgin C o rre ­ spondence, Elgin to G rey, M arch 11, 1850. 13. Ib id ., Elgin to G rey, O ctober 6, 1850. 14. Series G , vol. 128, G rey to Elgin, Ju n e 22, 1847, enclosure. 15. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary, M erritt to E lgin, M ay, 1848, enclosures. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 485, C ram pton to P alm erston, M ay 8, 1848, enclosures. T he bill called fo r reciprocity

N O T E S - 161

w ith C an a d a in grain and bread-stuffs o f all kinds, vegetables, fruits, anim als, hides, w ool, tallow , horns, salted an d fresh m eat, ores of all k in d s o f m etals, tim b er, staves, w ood and lum ber o f all kinds. 16. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 30th C ongress, p. 964. 17. Elgin P ap ers, C ram pton to Elgin, Jan u a ry 9, 1849. P.A .C ., M erritt P a p e rs, vol. i, M erritt to C ram p to n , A pril 25, 1848; M erritt to Elgin, M ay 10, 1848. See also notes 2, 3 and 4, this chapter. 18. A .D .S ., G re a t B ritain , N o tes to, vol. 7, C layton to C ram p to n, June 26, 1849. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 511, B ulw er to P alm erston, Jan u ary 6, 1850. B ulw er to Palm erston, M arch 31, 1851. 19. Ib id ., C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 31st C ongress, vol. xxiii, pp. 22, 203, 750-752. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 513, B ulw er to P alm ersto n , Ju n e 3, Ju ly 15, 1850; vol. 515, Bulwer to P alm erston, O ctober 7, 1850; vol. 527, Bulwer to Palm erston, F eb ru ary 24, 1851. 20. T h is controversy arose over the conflicting claim s o f G re a t B ritain an d the U nited S tates fo r co n tro l o f the N icarag u a canal route in C en tral A m erica. It cam e to a crisis in F eb ru ary an d , fo r a time b efo re the negotiation o f the C layton-B ulw er treaty, relations between S ir H enry and the A m erican G overnm ent b ecam e som ew hat strained. A ccounts a n d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1856, vol. lx, C orrespondence w ith the U nited S tates respecting C en tral Am erica. T he C am bridge H isto ry o f B ritish Fo reig n Policy, 1923, vol. ii, pp. 266 ff. 21. B ulw er to Palm erston, February^24 and M arch 31, 1851. 22. Series G , C orrespondence w ith H e r B ritannic M ajesty’s M inister a t W ashington, 1840-1860, Bulwer to Elgin, A p ril 1, 1851. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 529, B ulw er to P alm erston, Ju n e 22, 1851, A ugust 12, 1851. C orrespondence o f th e G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary , B ulw er to Elgin, Ju n e 24, 1851. 23. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 531, C ram p to n to Palm erston, P rivate a n d Confi­ dential, D ecem ber 1, 1851, enclosure. 24. G rey-Elgin C orrespondence, G rey to Elgin, Jan u ary 9, 1852. 25. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary, L e M archant to Elgin, Septem ber 5, 1852, enclosure. 26. C ram p to n to M alm esbury, Private, Septem ber 6, 1852. S t. C atharines J o u rn a l, A ugust 19, 1852, ex tract fro m th e N ew Y ork Jo u rn a l of C om m erce. T he G lobe, T o ro n to , Ju ly 27, 1852. A .D .S ., R eciprocity N eg o tiatio n s, 1 8 4 8 -1 8 5 4 , P etitio n to W ebster fro m the citizens of G loucester. 27. F le tc h e r W ebster (c o m p .), T he P riv ate C orrespondence o f D aniel W ebster, B oston, 1857, vol. ii, p. 539, W ebster to Fillm ore, July 17, 1852. S eries F .O . 5 , vol. 546, C ram p to n to M alm esbury, C onfidential, Ju ly 26, 1852, enclosures. 28. C ram p to n to M alm esbury, Private, Septem ber 6, 1852. B ulw er to P alm ersto n , M arch 31, 1851. 29. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxiv, P a rt III, p. 2049; vol. xxv, p p. 894 ff. C. H . V an T yne (c o m p .), T he L etters o f D an iel W ebster, M cC lure, P hilips & C o., N ew Y ork, 1902, p p. 535-536, W eb ster to Fillm ore, Private a n d C onfidential, A ugust 4, 1852. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 546, C ram p to n to M alm esbury, C onfidential, A ugust 9, 1852. 30. Q uoted in K eenleyside, o p . c it., p. 266. 31. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 547, C ram p to n to M alm esbury, Confidential, S eptem ber 6, 1852. A .D .S ., G re a t B ritain , In stru ctio n s, vol. 16, W ebster to L aw rence, A ugust 28, 1852. L .C ., D an iel W ebster Papers

162 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 (typew ritten tran scrip ts o f m iscellaneous letters), 1841-1860, W ebster’s last official letter, N o. 687, O ctober, 1852. 32. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 548, C ram p to n to M alm esbury, D ecem ber 19, 1852, enclosure. 33. Second session, 32nd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, vol. 1, P a rt 1, N o . 1, M essage o f P resident F illm ore to the Senate a n d the H ouse o f R epresentatives, D ecem ber 6, 1852. 34. M assachusetts H isto rical Society, E verett P ap ers, vol. 102, E verett to W . H . T resco tt, Ju ly 11, 1853; E verett’s Jo u rn al, vol. 171, p. 229, vol. 172, p p. 25-27. P .A .C ., M e rritt P ap ers, vol. 5, b, E v erett to M erritt, F e b ru a ry 25, 1853. 35. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxvi, p. 538. H o u se Executive D ocum ents, 2nd session, 32nd C o n ­ gress, vol. 4, N o . 40, M essage from Fillm ore, F eb ru ary 7, 1853, transm itting E verett’s rep o rt, F e b ru a ry , 1853. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 563, C ram pton to R ussell, F eb ru ary 13, 1853. 36. D e B ow 's Review , vol. 14, Ju n e, 1853, pp. 525-535, “ R eciprocal Treaties o f C om m erce” ; vol. 15, N ovem ber, 1853, pp. 433-442, “ W hat is F a ir and E qual R eciprocity?” 37. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxvi, pp. 499, 514, 582, 604, 953-957. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 26, C ram pton to Russell, M arch 7, 1853. 38. Second session, 32nd C ongress, H o u se R ep o rts, N o. 4. 39. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxvi, pp. 567-568, 662-663, 1 1 1 , 803-804, 824; vol. xxvii, A ppendix, pp. 197-199, 210, 229. 40. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxvi, p. 1154. 41. M arcy P ap ers, vol. 38, B uch an an to M arcy, Ju n e 7, 1853. Jo h n B assett M oore (com p.), T he W orks o f Jam es B uch an an , Philadelphia, J . B. L ippincott C o., 1909, vol. ix, p. 1, B uchanan to Pierce, Ju n e 11, 1853; pp . 2 and 3, B uchanan to Pierce, Ju n e 14, 1853. 42. Ib id ., p. 12, M em orandum by B uchanan o n his ap p o in tm en t as M inister to E ngland, d ate o f m em orandum conjectured fro m internal evidence as Ju ly 12, 1853. R oy F ran k lin N ichols, Fran k lin P ierce, Young H ickory o j the G ran ite H ills, 1931, Philadelphia, U niversity of Pennsylvania P ress, pp. 257, 263. 43. M oore, op. c it., p. 6, Pierce to B u ch an an , Ju n e 26, 1853; p. 10, Ju ly 2, 1853. 44. B uchanan to Pierce, Ju n e 14, 1853. M oore, op. c it., p. 7, B uchanan to Pierce, J u n e 29, 1853. 45. M arcy P a p e rs, vol. 39, A ndrew s to M arcy, Ju n e 17, 1853. 46. Pierce to B uchanan, Ju n e 26, 1853. 47. See p. 25. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 26, C ram pton to C larendon, Ju n e 13, 1853. M arcy P ap ers, D iary , vol. E , pp. 1-12. 48. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 566, C ram p to n to C larendon, Septem ber 5, 1853, enclosure. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain, N o tes to , vol. 7, M arcy to C ram pton, Septem ber 1, 1853. Series F .O . 9 7 , vol. 27, C ram p to n to C larendon, Private, O ctober 9, 1853. 49. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 70. 50. Law rence O lip h an t, Episodes in a Life o f A d v en tu re, F o u rth Edition, W m . B lackw ood & Sons, L o n d o n a n d E dinburgh, p p. 45-56. 51. M arcy P ap ers, vol. 48, M arcy to B uchanan, M arch 11 and 12, 1854. 52. F ranklin Pierce P ap ers, vol. 4, M arcy to A ndrew s, Septem ber 12, 1853.

N O T E S - 163 53. M arcy P ap ers, vol. 49, M arcy to A ndrew s, C onfidential, A pril 15, 1854. 54. P o rritt, Sixty Years o f P rotection in C an ad a, p. 116. Proceedings of the M assachusetts H isto rical Society, vol. xlvii, E dw ard Stanw ood, “ T rad e R eciprocity w ith C an ad a,” p. 145. The A m erican, vol. 3, O cto b er 1 5 ,1881-April 8, 1882, “ O u r N eighbours N o rth w a rd ,” p. 213. U nited S tates TarifT Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 67. 55. D etro it F ree P ress, M ay 27, Ju n e 1, Ju n e 10, Ju ly 19, Ju ly 26, 1854. N ew Y ork Jo u rn a l o f C om m erce, Ju ly 20, 1854. H u n t’s M erchant's M agazine a n d C om m ercial Review, vol. 30, M ay, 1854, C h arles Levi W oodbury, “ C om m erce w ith C an ad a an d w ith the British N o rth A m erican C olonies.” N o rth A m erican R eview , vol. lxxiv, January, 1852, “ C om m ercial In terco u rse w ith B ritish A m erica,’ p p. 186, 193; vol. lxxix, O ctober, 1854, A rticle IX , “T h e R eciprocity T rea ty ,” pp. 480-481. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Scries, 2nd session, 37th Congress, A ppendix, p p . 288-292. P o rritt, Sixty Years o f Protection in C anada, p. 117. Laughlin and W illis, R eciprocity, pp. 41-42. C h arles C. T ansill, T he C anadian R eciprocity Treaty o f 1 8 5 4 , B altim ore, T he J o h n s H opkins Press, 1922 (Jo h n s H op k in s U niversity Studies in H isto rical an d P o litical Science, Series X L , N o. 2 ) , pp. 76-77. 56. Elgin P a p e rs, A ndrew s to Elgin, u n d ated (in the A ndrew s b u n d le ). 57. K eefer, A Sketch o f the R ise and P rogress o f the R eciprocity T reaty, p. 15. 58. In 1820 the dispute betw een the free and slave p arties had been tem porarily settled by the M issouri Com prom ise. U n d e r this arrange­ m ent slavery was “ forever” prohibited in th a t p a rt o f the Louisiana purchase n o rth o f la titu d e 36° 30". T h e K an sas-N eb raska Bill reo p en ed the whole question by repealing the C om prom ise in so fa r as it p ro h ib ited slavery in any o f the territories. 59. N o rth A m erican Review , vol. lxxix, O cto b er, 1854, A rticle IX , “T he R eciprocity T reaty ,” pp. 482-483. 60. Speeches o f G errit Sm ith in Congress, N .Y ., M ason B ros., 1855, pp. 316-317. 61. N ew Y ork D aily Tim es, Ju n e 12, 1854. 62. N ew Y ork D aily T rib u n e, Ju n e 2, Ju n e 17, 1854. 63. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 37th C ongress, A ppendix, pp. 288-292. Laughlin and W illis, op. c it., p. 43. St. C ath arin es Jo u rn a l, F e b ru a ry 5, 1852. 64. U n ited S tates T ariff C om m ission, o p . c it., p. 66. 65. N o rth A m erican R eview , vol. lxxix, p p. 482-483. N ew York Daily Tim es, Ju n e 12, 1854. 66. T he D aily D em ocratic P ress, C hicago, Ju n e 21, 1854. 67. N ew Y ork D aily T rib u n e, Ju n e 23, Ju ly 24, 1854. Laughlin and W illis, o p . c it., p. 43. 68. A .D .S., R eciprocity N egotiations, 1848-1854, B ronson to M arcy, July 3, 1854. 69. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, p. 210. 70. O liphant, o p . c it., p. 49. 71. M arg aret O liphant W . O liphant, M em oir o f the Life o f Law rence O liphant, second edition, W illiam B lackw ood & Sons, E d in b u rgh and L ondon, 1891, vol. 1, p. 109. 72. Laughlin and W illis, o p . c it., p. 39. 73. Law rence O lip h an t, o p . c it., p. 57. 74. M arg aret O liphant, o p . c it., pp. 120-121. 75. D aily Evening S ta r, W ashington D .C ., M ay 25, 1854.

164 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 76. E lgin P ap ers, E lgin to H e ad , Ju n e 28, 1854. 77. Ib id ., C ram pton to Elgin, Ju ly 15, 1854. 78. N ichols, Fran k lin Pierce, p. 343. 79. Proceedings o f th e G rajto n an d C oiis B ar A ssociation, Septem ber 2, 1892, H on. Sidney W ebster, “ F ran k lin P ierce a n d the C anadian R eciprocity T reaty o f 1854,” p. 380. 80. G rey-Elgin C orrespondence, Elgin to G rey, N ovem ber 22, 1850. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 515, B ulw er to Palm erston, O ctober 7, 1850. See m y article, “ A F u rth e r W ord on I. D . A ndrew s and the R eciprocity T reaty of 1854,” C anadian H isto rical R eview , Ju n e, 1936. 81. T he P rivate C orrespondence o f D a n iel W ebster, vol. ii, p p . 545-546. E v erett P ap ers, E v e re tt’s Jo u rn a l, vol. 171, p. 227. 82. A .D .S ., Special A gents 1 8 4 9 , Isra e l D . A ndrew s, vol. 16, C. Cushing to A ndrew s, A pril 12, 1854. 83. M arcy P ap ers, D iary , vol. E , p p . 1-12. 84. Ib id ., vol. 50, A ndrew s to M arcy (Ju n e 8 ) M onday. A .D .S ., Special A gents 1 8 4 9 , Isra e l D . A ndrew s, vol. 16, M arcy to A ndrew s, Ju n e 9, Ju ly 15 (1854). 85. Ib id ., M arcy to the H on. R. M . T. H u n ter, Ju ly 12, 1854. 86. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 37th C ongress, A ppendix, p p. 288-292. 87. Elgin P ap ers, C ram p to n to Elgin, Ju n e 25, 1854. 88. Ib id ., C ram p to n to Elgin, Ju ly 12, 1854. 89. The Sem i-W eekly G lobe, T o ro n to , Ju ly 20, 1854. The D aily D em o ­ cra tic P ress, C hicago, A ugust 3, 1854. 90. R eciprocity with C an ad a, C om pilation o f D ocum ents . . . P rin ted /o r the C om m ittee o n Fin an ce, U nited S tates S enate, F eb ru ary 18, 1911, R ep o rt fro m the C om m ittee on Fo reig n R elations, 1st session, 33rd C ongress, S enate, Ju ly 11, 1854. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 33rd C ongress, vol. xxviii, p a rt I I I , p. 2212. Elgin P ap ers, A ndrew s to Elgin, July 28, 1854. 91. A ndrew s la te r claim ed th at, in his capacity o f p arliam en tary agent of th e reciprocity bill a t W ashington, he had expended $118,000 in subsidizing som e ninety individuals, including m em bers o f Congress and others. Sec Series E , S ta te B ook Q , pp. 640-642, quoted in W m . D . O verm an, “ I. D . A ndrew s an d R eciprocity in 1854,” C an a­ d ia n H isto rical Review , N ew Series, vol. xv, Septem ber, 1934. 92. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 35th C ongress, vol. xxxvi, p a rt III, p. 2572. 93. E lgin P ap ers, C ram p to n to Elgin, A ugust 13, 1854. 94. Ib id ., E lgin to C larendon, A ugust 25, 1855. 95. Series G , vol. 462, H e a d to L abouchere, F eb ru ary 9, 1856. 96 . Elgin P a p e rs, A ndrew s to Elgin, u ndated (in the A ndrew s b u n d le ). H ouse Jo u rn a l, 1st session, 33rd C ongress, p. 1325. Congressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 33rd C ongress, vol. xxviii, p a rt III, pp. 2109, 2135, 2137. 97. H on. Sidney W ebster, “ F ran k lin Pierce and the C an ad ian R eciprocity T rea ty of 1854,” p . 380. 98. N o rth A m erican Review , vol. lxxix, O ctober, 1854, A rticle IX , “T he R eciprocity T reaty ,” pp. 483-484. Sidney W ebster, F ranklin Pierce a n d his A d m in istratio n , N ew Y o rk , D . A ppleton & C o., p. 15. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 33rd C ongress, vol. xxviii, p art III, p. 2212. 99. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 104, Palm erston to B ulw er, N ovem ber 1, 1849. 100. Ib id ., vol. 128, R ussell to C ram p to n , Jan u ary 15, 1853, enclosure.

N O T E S - 165 101. M arcy P apers, D iary , vol. E , pp. 1-12. 102. C ram pton to C larendon, Septem ber 5, 1853, enclosures. Series F . O. 5 , vol. 589, Elgin to C larendon, Ju n e 12, 1854. 103. C ram pton to M alm esbury, D ecem ber 19, 1852, enclosure. Russell to C ram p to n , Jan u a ry 15, 1853, enclosure. C ram pton to R ussell, F e b ­ ru ary 5, 1853. C ram p to n to C larendon, Septem ber 5, 1853, enclosures. M arcy P ap ers, D ia ry , vol. E , pp. 1-12. 104. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 32nd C ongress, vol. xxvii, A ppendix, pp. 198-199. 105. T ansill, o p . c it., p p . 76-77. 106. Elgin to C larendon, Ju n e 12, 1854. 107. Elgin to C larendon. Elgin P apers, M arcy o t Elgin, Ju n e 4, 1854. 108. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 589, C laren d o n to Elgin, N o. 1, Secret, M ay 4, 1854. 109. E lgin to C larendon, Ju n e 12, 1854. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 595, E lgin to S ir G eorge G rey, D ecem ber 18, 1854. M arcy to B u ch an an , M arch 11, 1854. 110. R ussell to C ram p to n , Jan u a ry 15, 1853, enclosure. C ram pton to C larendon, Septem ber 5, 1853, enclosure. 111. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 589, C larendon to Elgin, N o . 5, M ay 4, 1854; N o. 6, M ay 19, 1854. 112. C ram p to n to R ussell, F eb ru ary 5, 1853. C ram p to n to C larendon, S eptem ber 5, 1853. E lgin to C larendon, Ju n e 12, 1854.

CHAPTER 4 (pp. 51-61)

1. N ew foundland did n o t pass the treaty until Ju ly 7, 1855, but, as provided in A rticle V I, this did n o t prevent the tre a ty com ing into force in the o th er colonics, once the necessary legislative sanction h ad been obtained. 2. S eries G , vol. 146, S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, A ugust 24, 1854. See also N o rm an M cL. R ogers, “ N otes on th e Treaty-M aking Pow er,” C anadian H isto rical R eview , vol. vii, M arch , 1926. 3. Series C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 213, Le M arch an t to S ir G eorge G rey, O ctober 12, 1854. 4. Series G , vol. 146, C larendon to Elgin, A ugust 18, 1854, enclosures. 5. Ib id ., S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, A ugust 30, 1854, enclosures. 6. Elgin P ap ers, Elgin to Sir G eorge G rey, A ugust 5, 1854. I . Series E , S tate B ook O , M inute o f th e Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], A ugust 18, 1854. 8. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary , D aly to Elgin, Septem ber 26, 1854. 9. Series G , vol. 146, S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, N ovem ber 22, 1854. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral"s S ecretary , Sutton to Elgin, N ovem ber 10, 1854; D aly to Elgin, O ctober 10, 1854. 10. Series C .O . 1 9 4 , vol. 142, H am ilton to S ir G eorge G rey, D ecem ber 9, 1854, enclosure. N ew foundland A cts, 18 and 19 V iet. cap. 2. I I . S eries C .O . 4 2 , vol. 594, Elgin to N ew castle, Ju n e 17, 1854, enclosure. Fo reig n C orrespondence, R ecord Com m ission [o f N o v a Scotia], 1852-1866, vol. 387, E lgin to Le M arch an t, Private, A p ril 14, 1854: Elgin to Le M arch an t, Private, A p ril 28, 1854.

- T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 12. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, C ram pton to R ow an, A pril 10, 1854; R ow an to Le M arch an t and H ead , Telegram , A pril 17, 1854; R ow an to Le M archant, H e ad , B annerm an and H am ilton, A pril 17, 1854. E lgin P a p e rs, C ram pton to Row an, A pril 10, 1854. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 34, R ow an to H e ad , C onfiden­ tial, A pril 11, 1854; Elgin to H ead , Ju n e 14, 1854, enclosures. 13. Elgin P ap ers, Le M arch an t to Elgin, M ay 3, 1854; a lso exchange of telegram s betw een Le M arch an t an d Elgin. Elgin to H ead , Ju n e 14, 1854, enclosures. Elgin to N ew castle, Ju n e 17, 1854, enclosure. 14. Elgin P apers, E lgin to S ir G eorge G rey, Ju ly 1, 1854, enclosure. 15. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ova S co tia, 2nd session, 1854, pp. 567584. The N o v a Scotian, H alifax, D ecem ber 13, 1854, H o u se of A ssem bly, D ecem ber 5; D ecem ber 25, 1854, H o u se o f A ssem bly, D ecem ber 7. T he M orning C hronicle, H alifax, D ecem ber 14, 1854, H ouse o f A ssem bly, D ecem ber 6. The M orning P o st, Halifax,' D ecem ber 14, 1854, H ouse o f A ssem bly, D ecem ber 6. 16. J o u rn a l o f the Legislative C ouncil o f N ova S co tia, 1854-5, p p . 19-21. 17. P .A .C ., H ow e P ap ers, vol. 28. 18. H a n sa rd , I I I , vol. cxxxvi, p. 1502, F eb ru ary 19, 1855. 19. S eries G , vol. 288, C ram pton to D aly, Septem ber 14, 1854; vol. 146, S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, O ctober 24, 1854, enclosures. 20. Ibid. 21. Series G , vol. 146, S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, N ovem ber 8, 1854, enclosures. 22. Ib id ., Sir G eorge G rey to Elgin, N ovem ber 15, 1854, enclosures. 23. Series G , vol. 146, S ir G eorge G rey to Elgin, N ovem ber 15, 1854, enclosures. 24. Series E , S tate B ook O , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], O ctober 18, 1854. O n A pril 17, 1855, the Legislative Assem bly passed a resolution fo r the discharge o f th e bonds and the re tu rn o f d uties already p aid o n articles in the enum erated list im ported a fte r the O rders in Council which th e C an ad ian G overn­ m ent, in acco rd an ce with its decision o f O ctober 18, had issued on th a t date and o n N ovem ber 6. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f C an ad a, 1854-5, vol. 13, p a rt 2, p. 852. 25. S eries G , vol. 146, Sir G eorge G rey to Elgin, D ecem ber 14, 1854, enclosures. 26. Ib id . C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral’s S ecretary, S utton to Elgin, N ovem ber 11, 1854. S eries G , vol. 147, Sir G eorge G rey to H ead, Jan u a ry 6, 1855, enclosures. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f N ew B runsw ick, O ctober 19-November 3, 1854, p p. 68-69. M inutes o f the E xecutive C ouncil o f N ova S co tia, vol. 200, p. 163, D ecem ber 15 1854. 27. Second session, 33rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, vol. 1, no. 1. 28. S tatutes a t L arge a n d Treaties o f the U nited S tates o f A m erica, B oston, Little, B row n and C o ., 1855, vol. x, cap. 269. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, C ram pton to H e ad , F eb ru ary 9, 1855, enclosure; M arch 7, 1855. 29. A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1856, vol. xliv, Custom s D uties (C an ad a and the W est In d ie s), R etu rn to A ddress of the H ouse o f C om m ons, M ay 30, 1856. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly of C anada, A ppendix to vol. 13, 1854-1855, A ppendix D .D .D .D ., R eport on T rad e and C om m erce, M ay 26, 1855. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 35, Russell to S u tto n , C ircular, Ju ly 12, 1855.

N O T E S - 167 30. A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1856, vol. xliv, M olesw orth to C olcbrooke, Septem ber 18, 1855. 31. S eries G , vol. 151, L abouchere to H e ad , Ju ly 15, 1856. P .A .C ., D espatches fro m the Secretary o j S ta te to the L ieutenant-G overnors o f N o v a S cotia, vol. 100, L abouchere to Le M arch an t, Ju ly 15, 1856. P .A .C ., S eries C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 36, L abouchere to S u tto n , Ju ly 15, 1856. Series G , vol. 290, L abouchere to D aly, Ju ly 15, 1856. 32. Series E , S tate B ook Q , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C an­ a d a ] , O ctober 31, 1856. T h e In sp ecto r G eneral, P. M . V ankoughnet, rep o rted th a t the repeal o f the duty o n all articles enum erated in the T reaty w ould involve a sacrifice o f revenue by C an a d a o f some £.12,000 o r £13,000. 33. Scries C .O . 2 1 7 , vol. 218, Le M arch an t to L abouchere, Septem ber 2, 1856. 34. P .R .O ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 . 35. N ew foundland A cts, 1857-1863, 21 V iet. cap. 4, sect. 3. 36. Series G , vol. 290, L abouchere to D aly, N ovem ber 10,1856, enclosure. P rin ce E d w ard Islan d A cts, 1858-1861, N o . 1005. 37. A rth u r H arv ey , T he R eciprocity T reaty , Q uebec, H u n te r, R o se & Co., 1865, p. 5. 38. Series G , vol. 150, L ab o u ch ere to H e ad , C onfidential, M ay 12, 1856, enclosures. 39. F irst session, 36th C ongress, H o u se Executive D ocu m en ts, N o . 96, 2, R ep o rt o f the H o n . Israel T . H atch upo n th e O peration of the R evenue Law s and the R eciprocity T reaty u pon the N o rth ern F ro n ­ tier, Ju n e 18, 1860. T h ird session, 41st C ongress, H o u se Executive D ocum ents, N o. 94, L e tte r fro m the Secretary o f the T reasury, w ith a re p o rt (J. N . L arn ed ’s) on the state o f tra d e betw een th e U nited S tates and the British N o rth A m erican possessions, F eb ru ary 3, 1871. W illiam A . F o ster, C an a d a F irst, T o ro n to , H u n te r & C o ., 1890. 40. S t. C ath arin es Jo u rn a l, A ugust 24, 1854. 41. A ccounts an d Papers [o f th e B ritish P a rlia m e n t], vol. x, 1857, p. 11, H ead to L abouchere, Jan u a ry 17, 1857. 42. T h ird session, 34th C ongress, Senate Executive D o cu m en ts, N o. 5, P resident’s A nnual M essage, D ecem ber 2, 1856. 43. A .D .S ., M o n treal, vol. 2, C. D orw in to M arcy, F eb ru ary 3, 1857; C harlo tteto w n , vol. 1, A lb ert G . C atlin to C ass, O ctober 1, 1858. 44. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, N ovem ber 29, 1855. 45. H ead to L abouchere, Jan u a ry 17, 1857. 46. A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], vol. x, 1857, p. 24, S u tto n to L abouchere, J a n u a ry 23, 1857. 47. Ib id ., p. 30, D arling to L abouchere, A ugust 31, 1856. 48. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 37, D arlin g to Sutton, A pril 14, 1857, enclosure. 49. Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 85, D aly to R ussell, A p ril 10, 1855. 50. E lgin P a p e rs, C larendon to Elgin, D ecem ber 4, 1856, enclosure. 51. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's Secretary, D oyle to M onck, A p ril 28, 1864, enclosure. 52. R ep o rt on T rad e and C om m erce, M ay 26, 1855. S t. C atharines Jo u rn a l, N ovem ber 29, 1855. 53. J o u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f C an a d a , 1856, vol. 14, p. 410. 54. S t. C ath arin es Jo u rn a l, Septem ber 6, 1855. 55. Ib id ., N ovem ber 22, 1855; A pril 24, 1856.

168 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854

P A R T II CHAPTER 5 (p p . 64-74) 1. D . M orier E vans, T he H istory o f the C om m ercial C risis o f 1 8 5 7 -1 8 5 8 , L ondon, G ro om bridge & Sons, 1859, p. 34. 2. A ccounts an d P a p e rs [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1860, vol. xliv, p. 144, H ead to N ew castle, A ugust 29, 1859. 3 . Series E , Proceedings in C ouncil [of the C an ad ian E x ecu tiv e], N ovem ber 12, 1859, R ep o rt o f th e M inister o f F in an ce, O ctober 25, 1859. 4. T h e H o n . A . T . G alt, C anada: 1 8 4 9 to 1 8 5 9 , Q uebec, P rin ted a t the C anada G azette Office, 1860, p . 29. 5 . Series G , vol. 157, Stanley to H e ad , C onfidential, M ay 25, 1858, enclosures. 6 . S tatutes o f C an a d a , 19 V iet. cap. 10 [tariff o f 1856]; 22 V iet. [1 st session, 6 th P arliam en t] cap. 76 [tariff o f 1858]; 22 V iet. [2nd session, 6th P arliam en t] cap. 2 [tariff o f 1859]. 7. R ep o rt o f the M in ister o f F in an ce, O ctober 25, 1859. O . D . Skelton, T he Life a n d Tim es o f S ir A lex an d er Tilloch G a lt, T o ro n to , O xford U niversity Press, 1920, p. 274. S h o rtt and D oughty, C an ad a a n d Its Provinces, vol. v, p p. 251-257. 8. B lue B ook, C an a d a , 1862, G eneral R ep o rt o f the C om m issioner for P ublic W orks fo r the Y ear ending D ecem ber 31, 1862, p. 7 . 9. S eries G , vol. 160, N ew castle to H e ad , A ugust 13, 1859, enclosure; vol. 162, N ew castle to H ead , Jan u a ry 31, 1860, enclosures. R ep o rt o f the M inister o f Finance, O cto b er 25, 1859. 10. Series G , vol. 130, G rey to Elgin, M arch 31, 1848. 11. R ep o rt o f the M inister o f F in an ce, O ctober 25, 1859. “ R espect to the Im perial G overnm ent m ust alw ays dictate the desire to satisfy them th a t the policy o f this co u n try is n e ith e r hastily n o r unwisely form ed; and th a t due resp ect is had to the interests o f the M other C o u n try as w ell as o f the Province. B ut th e G overnm ent o f C an a d a acting fo r its Legislature and people can n o t, th ro u g h those feelings o f deference w hich they owe to the Im perial authorities, in any m an n er waive o r dim inish the rig h t o f the people o f C an ad a to decide for themselves b o th as to the m ode and extent to which taxation shall be im posed.” 12. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 626, S ir W . F . W illiam s to N ew castle, Jan u a ry 2, 1861, enclosure, M em orandum by N ew castle, M arch 13, 1861. 13. P .A .C ., M acd o n ald P ap ers, S ir A lexander G alt, 1859-1879, N ew ­ castle to H ead , A pril 12, 1860, enclosure. Secretary o f S tate to the L ieutenant-G overnors o f N o v a Scotia, vol. 104, P a rt I, N ew castle to M ulgrave, A pril 8, 1860. enclosure. G a lt’s controversy with the hom e governm ent over intercolonial reciprocity in 1860 m ust be distin­ guished fro m his controversy in 1859 over the C an ad ian tariff o f th a t year. 14. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 41, N ew castle to G o rd o n , N ovem ber 5, 1861. 15. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 41, N ew castle to G o rd o n , N ovem ber 5, 1861. 16. Series G , vol. 166, N ew castle to M onck, N ovem ber 5, 1861. 17. P .A .C ., S eries C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 39, N ew castle to Sutton, Septem ber 17, 1859, enclosures.

N O T E S - 169 18. N ew castle to H e ad , A p ril 12, 1860, enclosure. W illiam s to N ew castle, Jan u ary 2, 1861, enclosure, M em o ran d a appended by N ew castle and E lliot. 19. N ew castle to H ead , A pril 12, 1860, enclosure. 20. F irst session, 35th C ongress, H ouse Jo u rn a l, p. 390. 21. F irs t session, 36th C ongress, H ouse Executive D ocum ents, N o . 96, 2, R ep o rt o f the H o n . I. T . H atch upo n th e O peration o f the R evenue Law s and the R eciprocity T reaty u pon th e N o rth ern F ro n tie r, June 18, 1860. 22. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 3, W ym an B. S. M o o r to C ass, N o . 4, Jan u ary 30, 1860. 23. R ep o rt o f th e M inister o f Finance, O ctober 25, 1859. 24. Series G , vol. 167, N ew castle to M onck, C onfidential, M ay 26, 1862, enclosure. T h ird session, 40th C ongress, H o u se Executive D ocum ents, N o . 36, R ep o rt o f the H o n . I. T . H a tch u pon the C om m ercial R ela­ tio n s o f the U nited S tates w ith the D om inion o f C an ad a, Jan u ary 12, 1869, p. 22. F irst session, 44th C ongress, H ouse o f Representatives R ep o rts, N o . 9, W a rd fro m the C om m ittee on C om m erce, Jan u ary 18, 1876. 25. Series G , vol. 163, N ew castle to H e ad , Ju n e 13, 1860, enclosure. H arv ey , The R eciprocity T reaty , p. 5. 26. N ew castle to H e ad , Ju n e 13, 1860, enclosure; C onfidential, M ay 26, 1862, enclosure. 27. C orrespondence o f the G overnor-G eneral's S ecretary, Lyons to H ead, Jan u a ry 21, 1860, enclosure. 28.R e p o rts o f C om m ittees (.H o u se ), 1861-1862, vol. 3, N o . 22, R eport fro m the C om m ittee o n C om m erce o n th e R eciprocity T reaty w ith G re a t B ritain, F eb ru ary 5, 1862. 29. Second session, 35th C ongress, Sen ate Jo u rn a l, p p . 209, 292-293. 30. R ep o rt o f th e H o n . I. T . H atch u pon the O peration o f the Revenue L aw s a n d the R eciprocity T reaty u p o n th e N o rth e rn F ro n tie r, June 18, 1860, N ap ier to H e ad , F eb ru ary 28, 1859. 31. Series G , vol. 229, L yons to H ead , O ctober 17, 1859, enclosure. 32. F irst session, 36th C ongress, H o u se Jo u rn a l, p. 589. 33. R ep o rt o f the H o n . I. T. H atch u pon th e O peration o f the Revenue Law s and the R eciprocity T reaty u p o n the N o rth e rn F ro n tie r, June 18, 1860. 34. G alt, op. c it., p. 27. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, A ppendix to vol. 13, 1854-1855, A ppendix D .D .D .D ., R ep o rt o n T ra d e a n d C om ­ m erce, M ay 26, 1855. T h o s C. K eefer, T he C anals o f C an ada, their Pro sp ects an d Influence, T o ro n to , A ndrew H . A rm o u r & C o., pp. 48-56. 35. S h o rtt an d D oughty, op. cit., p. 255. V irtually the sam e opinion is expressed in L. C . A . and C. M . K now les, The E conom ic D evelopm ent o f the B ritish O verseas E m pire, London, G eorge R outledge & Sons, L td ., 1930, vol. ii, p. 376, an d in E. B. B iggar, R eciprocity, T he T rade T reaty o f 1 8 5 4 -1 8 6 6 betw een C an ad a a n d the U nited States, BiggarW ilson, L td ., T o ro n to , p. 15. 36. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, Ju n e 1-August 16, 1858, P a rt II, vol. 16, P a rt II, p. 793. 37. R ep o rt o f the M in ister o f Finance on th e R eciprocity T reaty w ith the U nited States, 1862. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 618, H ead to N ew castle, C onfidential, Ju n e 13, 1859. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 3, M o o r to A pple­ to n , D ecem ber 11, 1858. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, A ppen­ dix to vol. 16, 1858, A ppendix N o. 2, R etu rn to A ddress from the

170 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 Legislative Assembly, Ju n e 10, 1858; A ppendix to vol 17, 1859, A ppendix N o . 25, M essage fro m the G overnor-G eneral, F ebruary. 1859. 38. R eport o f th e M inister o f F in an ce on the Reciprocity T rea ty w ith the U nited States, 1862. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f C an ad a, 1859, vol. 17, p. 63; A ppendix to vol. 16, 1858, R ep o rt o f the C om m ittee on T rad e, Ju ly 27, 1858. R etu rn to A d d ress fro m the Legislative Assembly, Ju ly 10, 1858. 39. Series E , S tate Book P, M inute o f the Executive Council [o f C an ad a] Septem ber 25, 1855. 40. F irst session, 36th C ongress, H o u se Executive D ocum ents, N o . 96, R eport o f Jam es W . T aylor, M ay 2, 1860. 41. P orritt, Sixty Y ears o f P rotectio n in C anada, p. 139. 42. R eport fro m the C om m ittee on Com m erce on the R eciprocity T reaty w ith G reat B ritain , F eb ru ary 5, 1862. 43. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 37th C ongress, A ppendix, p p . 288-292. 44. Series G , C orrespondence w ith H e r B ritannic M ajesty’s M inister at W ashington, 1840-1860, Lyons to R ussell, N ovem ber 5, 1860.

CHAPTER 6 (pp. 75-87) 1. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain , N o tes to, vols. 10, 11, 12 and 13. Ib id ., G reat B ritain, In stru ctio n s, vols. 19 and 20. T he principal docum ents are printed in P ap ers R elating to F oreign A ffairs, accom panying the A nnual M essage o f the P resid en t, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, P a rts I and II; 1st session, 39th C ongress, P arts I and II. Series G . vol. 165, N ew castle to the Officer A dm inistering the G overnm ent o f C anada, Jan u a ry 16, 1861. 2. A .D .S., P ap ers R elating to Fo reig n A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C o n­ gress, P a rt I, A dam s to Sew ard, D ecem ber 17, 1863. 3. M orley, The Life o f W illiam E w a rt G ladstone, vol. ii, pp. 75-86. 4. T he G lobe, T o ro n to , Jan u a ry 2 a n d 7, 1862. L o rd N ew ton, L o rd Lyons, L ondon, E dw ard A rn o ld , 1913, vol. i, p. 74, Lyons to Russell, D ecem ber 31, 1861. E. D . A dam s, G reat B ritain an d the A m erican Civil W ar, Longm ans, G reen & C o ., L ondon, N ew Y ork, etc., 1925 vol. i, pp. 203 ff. 5. A .D .S., P ap ers R elating to Fo reig n A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C on­ gress, P a rt I , A dam s to Sew ard, Jan u a ry 15, 1864, enclosures; F eb ru ary 26, 1864. 6. H ow e P apers, vol. 28, P ap ers prep ared fo r S ir F . B ruce, Ju n e, 1865. 7. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain , N o tes, vols. 57, 58, 60, 66, 69, and 76; G reat B ritain, N otes to , vols. 10, 11 an d 13; G re a t B ritain . In stru ctio n s [to A d a m s], vol. 19. P ap ers R elatin g to F oreign A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, P a rts I and II. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vols. 43, 45, 46; Series C .O . 1 8 9 , vols. 8 and 9. T he G lobe, T o ro n to , Jan u a ry 1 and M arch 11, 1864. 8. C anadian H isto rical Review , N ew Series, vol. ii, 1921, M arch, W ilfrid Bovey, “ C o n fed erate A gents in C an a d a during the A m erican Civil W ar.” 9. T w o raids w ere projected ag ain st Jo h n so n ’s Island. T h e first conspir­ acy of Ju ly and A ugust, 1863, w as ab andoned because the A m erican

N O T E S - 171 auth o rities h ad been w arned by Lord M onck. T he second and more no to rio u s p ro ject is h e re discussed. A .D .S., G reat B ritain , C h as. F . A dam s, vols. 85 and 88. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 962, Lyons to Russell, O ctober 28, 1864, enclosure. T he G lobe, T o ro n to , Jan u a ry 22, Septem ­ b er 22, 24, 27, 1864. 10. A .D .S ., G reat B ritain , N o tes, vols 71-77; G reat B ritain, N otes to, vols. 12 and 13; G reat B ritain, In stru ctio n s [to A d a m s], vols. 19 and 20; G re a t B ritain, C h as. F . A dam s, vol. 88. Papers R elatin g to F o r­ eign A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, P a rt II; 1st session 39th C ongress, P a rts I and I I . Series G , vol. 172, Cardw ell to M onck, D ecem ber 31, 1864, enclosures; vol. 217, M onck to C ardw ell, January 26, 1865. T he G lobe, T o ro n to , D ecem ber 16, 1864. 11 .S e rie s C .O . 4 2 , vol. 644, M onck to C ardw ell, D ecem ber 24, 1864; vol. 649, M onck to C ardw ell, A pril 8, 1865. 12. Ib id ., vol. 644, M o n ck to C ardw ell, D ecem ber 30, 1864; vol. 649, M onck to C ardw ell, A p ril 21, 1865. 13. Ib id ., vol. 650, M onck to C ardw ell, O ctober 27, 1865. 14. P ap ers R elating to F oreign A ffairs, 1st session, 39th C ongress, P a rt II, Sew ard to B ruce, Septem ber 19, 1865. 15. The G lobe, T o ro n to , N ovem ber 2, 4, 7 and 8, 1864. J . M . C allahan, T he N eutrality o f the A m erican L akes, T h e Jo h n s H o p k in s Press, B altim ore, 1898, p. 154. 16. S eries G , vol. 234, B urnley to M onck, D ecem ber 5, 1864, enclosure. 17. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 405, H am m ond to Lyons, D ecem ber 9, 1864, enclosures. 18. B oston D aily A dvertiser, D ecem ber 16, 1864. The P ress, Philadelphia, D ecem ber 16, 1864. D etro it F ree P ress, D ecem ber 16, and 20, 1864. 19. N ew York Tim es, D ecem ber 14, 1864. Philadelphia In q u irer, Decem ­ b e r 14, 1864. N ew York H e ra ld , D ecem ber 15, 1864. 20. Philadelphia In q u irer, D ecem ber 15, 1864. D etro it A d v ertiser and T rib u n e, D ecem ber 16, 1864. B uffalo M orning Express, D ecem ber 15, 1864. N ew Y ork Tim es, D ecem ber 15 and 16, 1864. F o r o th e r expres­ sions o f opinion, see the B uffalo C om m ercial A dvertiser, N ew York D aily T rib u n e, S ain t P a u l Press, extracts fro m the A m erican press in The G lobe, T o ro n to . 21. D ecem ber 15, 1864, issue o f th e N ew Y ork H erald , Philadelphia In q u irer, Saint P a u l P ress, Buffalo C om m ercial A dvertiser. R ochester D aily D em o crat, Jan u a ry 11, 1865. 22. P .A .C ., B aring P ap ers, G .T .R ., 1860-1865, R ose to B aring, M arch 10, 1862. 23. A .D .S ., G reat B ritain , Instructions, vol. 19, Sew ard to A dam s, Jan u a ry 6, 1864; vol. 20, Sew ard to A dam s, Jan u a ry 16, 1865; N o. 1336, A pril 4, 1865. 24. F o r Sew ard’s relations w ith the B ritish G overnm ent see files of the D e p artm en t o f S tate as quoted in notes N os. 7 and 10 o f this chapter, also Series G , vols. 215, 233, 234. 25. S eries G , vol. 171, N ew castle to M onck, F eb ru ary 23 ,1 8 6 4 , enclosure. S eries F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 405, R ussell to Lyons, N ovem ber 26, 1864. 26. A .D .S ., G re a t B ritain , C h as. F . A dam s, vol. 85, A dam s to Sew ard, F eb ru ary 12, 1864, enclosure; vol. 88, A dam s to Sew ard, D ecem ber 22, 1864. 27. Series G , vol. 172, C ardw ell to M onck, N o . 94, D ecem ber 3, 1864; vol. 173, Cardw ell to M onck, C onfidential, Jan u ary 7, 1865. P.A .C ., S eries C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 45, C ardw ell to G o rd o n , Jan u a ry 21, M ay 19, 1865. S ecretary o f State to the L ieutenant-G overnors o f N o v a Scotia,

172 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 vol. 109, P a rt I, C ardw ell to M acD onnell, S ep arate, A pril 15, 1865. 28. Series G , vol. 215, M onck to N ew castle, M arch 19 and 31, 1864. 29. Ib id ., vol. 171, N ew castle to M onck, C onfidential, A pril 30, 1864. 30. A .D .S., P ap ers R elating to F oreign A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C on­ gress, P a rt I , Sew ard to A dam s, N o . 789, D ecem ber 20, 1863. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain, C has. F . A d am s, vol. 85, A dam s to Sew ard, F eb ru ary 19, 1864, enclosures. 31. M onck to N ew castle, M arch 19 and 31, 1864. 32. Series G , vol. 216, M onck to C ardw ell, N ovem ber 25, 1864. 33. Ib id ., M o n ck to C ardw ell, D ecem ber 17, 1864, enclosures. 34. Ib id ., M o n ck to C ardw ell, D ecem ber 29, 1864; vol. 234, M o n ck to B urnley, D ecem ber 20, 1864. J o u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C anada, Jan u ary 19-M arch 18, 1865, vol. 24, p p . 31, 49, 59-63, 67. 35. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain , N otes to , vol. 12, Sew ard to Lyons, N ovem ber 3, 1864. 36. Sew ard to A dam s, Jan u ary 16, 1865. 37. A .D .S., G reat B ritain , In stru ctio n s, vol. 20, Sew ard to A dam s, F e b ru a ry 21, 1865. 38. A .D .S., G reat B ritain , C has. F . A dam s, vol. 88, A dam s to Sew ard, N ovem ber 25, 1864, enclosure. 39. M essage fro m the p resid en t o f the U nited S tates to the tw o H ouses o f C ongress, a t th e com m encem ent o f the second session o f the thirtyeighth C ongress (W ashington, G overnm ent Printing Office, 1864). 40. Series G, vol 234, B urnley to M onck, D ecem ber 17, 1864, enclosure. 41. Sew ard suggested to Lyons in O cto b er, 1863, th a t if H e r M ajesty’s G overnm ent should inquire w hether the G overnm ent of the U nited S tates w ere in fav o u r of term inating the R eciprocity T reaty , he m ight be able to answ er th at it had n o desire to d o so and m ight take occasion to say som ething h andsom e as to the satisfactory relations existing betw een the two G overnm ents. Sew ard’s assurances w ere extrem ely indefinite and Lyons him self w as dubious a s to the wisdom o f stirring up th e question. On his advice Russell did n o t tak e up th e suggestion. R ussell P apers, vol. 37, Lyons to R ussell, P rivate and C onfidential, O ctober 26, 1863; P riv ate, D ecem ber 15, 1863. 42. Ib id ., vol. 38, Lyons to R ussell, Private, M arch 22, A ugust 9, Septem ­ b er 16, Septem ber 23, 1864. 43. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 38, Lyons to R ussell, O ctober 28, 1864; Bruce to R ussell, C onfidential, Ju ly 27, 1865. 44. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 4, G iddings to Sew ard, Unofficial, O ctober 15, 1863; vol. 7, P o tte r to Sew ard, A ugust 23, 1865; S t. J o h n , N .B ., vol. 5,’ H ow ard to Sew ard, Jan u ary 30, 1864; C harlottetow n, vol. 2, Sherm an to Sew ard, Jan u a ry 10, 1864. 45. A .D .S., G re a t B rita in , In stru ctio n s, vol. 20, Sew ard to A dam s, M arch 10, 1865. 46. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 38, B ruce to Russell, P riv ate, Ju n e 19, Ju ly 20, 1865; vol. 97, R ussell to B ruce, A ugust 12, 1865. 47. A .D .S ., G re a t B ritain , C has F . A d am s, vol. 88, A dam s to Sew ard, F eb ru ary 16, 1865, enclosure. 48. Series F .O . 5, vol. 1016, B urnley to R ussell, M arch 13, 1865. Series G, vol. 173, C ardw ell to M onck, C onfidential, A pril 3,1865, enclosure; vol. 235, B urnley to M onck, M arch 8, 1865, enclosures. 49. Sew ard to A dam s, M arch 10, 1865. 50. R ussell P a p e rs, vol. 38, B ruce to R ussell, P riv ate a n d Confidential, July 24, 1865; C onfidential, Ju ly 27, 1865.

N O T E S - 173 51. Ib id ., B ruce to R ussell, P riv ate, Septem ber 5, 1865. 52. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain , N o tes to; vol. 13, Sew ard to B ruce, February 17, 1866. M acd o n ald P ap ers, R eciprocity, 1865-1866, M em orandum o f G a lt and H ow land, F eb ru ary 20, 1866, including G a lt’s verbal re p o rt to the Executive C ouncil, D ecem ber 18, 1865. 53.R e p o rts o! C om m ittees (H o u s e ), 1861-1862, vol. 3, N o . 22, R eport fro m th e C o m m ittte on C om m erce o n the R eciprocity Treaty with G re a t B ritain, F eb ru ary 5, 1862. P o rritt, Sixty Years o f Protection in C an ad a, p. 145. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 1st session, 38th C ongress, pp. 9, 19, 1387, 2333, 2364 ff., 2453, 2476 ff., 2502 ff. F irst session, 38th C ongress, H ouse R ep o rts, N o . 39, R ep o rt o f W ard from the C om m ittee o n C om m erce, A p ril 1, 1864. 54. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, pp. 31 ff. 55. Ib id ., p. 36. 56. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Scries, 2nd session 38th C ongress, pp. 537 ff. 57. Ib id ., pp. 95 ff., 204 ff., 226 ff. A n am ended resolution, though not substantially different in content, was introduced in the Senate, as th a t passed in the H o u se o f R epresentatives was regarded as too offensive to G re a t B ritain. Series G , vol. 173, C ardw ell to M onck, F eb ru ary 11, 1865, enclosures. 58. D ecem ber an d Jan u a ry files o f the N ew Y ork Tim es, N ew Y ork D aily Trib u n e, N ew Y ork H erald , B ufjalo M orning Express, Rochester D aily D em o crat, B oston D aily A dvertiser, P hiladelphia Inquirer, D etro it A dvertiser an d T ribune, D e tro it F ree P ress, The G lobe, T o ro n to . 59. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 38, B urnley to R ussell, Private, Jan u a ry 16, 1865. 60. Both Russell and P alm ersto n freely adm itted th at th e U nited States was quite justified in the circum stances in term inating the convention. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 405, Russell to Lyons, N ovem ber 26, 1864; vol. 432, Russell to B urnley, F eb ru ary 24, 1865; Instructions to Bruce, Fo reig n Office, M arch 24, 1865. H a n sa rd , I I I , vol. clxxvii, p. 141; vol. clxxviii, p. 68. 61. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Series, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, pp. 311 ff. 62. Ib id ., 1st session, 8th C ongress, p. 2651. 63. The A m erican, P h iladelphia, vol. 3, p. 213, “ O ur N eighbours N o rth ­ w ard .” Jo h n M aclean, Protection an d F ree T rad e, M ontreal, John Lovell, 1867, p. 15. 64. Series F .O . 5 , vol. 950, Lyons to R ussell, M ay 31, 1864. 65. Second session, 40th C ongress, H ouse Executive D ocum ents, N o. 240, R ep o rt o f G eorge W . B rega, M arch 27, 1868, p. 14. N ew E nglander. vol. 53, L. E. M anson, “ A C om m ercial U n io n w ith C an a d a ,” pp. 6-7. Proceedings o f the M assachusetts H isto rical Society, vol. xlvii, Stanw ood, “ T rad e R eciprocity w ith C an ad a,” p. 158. Biggar, R eciprocity, The T rade T reaty o f 1 8 5 4 -1 8 6 6 betw een C an ad a a n d the U nited S tates, p. 5. 66. T h ird session, 40th C ongress, H ouse Executive D o cu m en ts, N o. 36, R ep o rt o f the H o n . I. T . H atch upo n th e Com m ercial R elations of th e U nited S tates w ith the D om inion o f C an ad a, Jan u a ry 12, 1869, p. 22. 67. W idener L ibrary, H a rv a rd U niversity, Su m n er M SS., A m er., I, 61, C orrespondents L-Z, Sum ner to L ieber, Jan u a ry 20, 1865. T h e new treaty presum ably w ould have provided fo r th e m u tu al im position of

- T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 a com paratively low duty o n m any o f the articles which w ere free under the present treaty. Such a t least w as the principle on w hich the C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans based its pro p o sals in Jan u ary . 1866 See pp. 96-97. 68. R ussell P apers, vol. 38, B ruce to R ussell Private, Ju ly 17, 1865. H . A . H ill, Review o f the Proceedings o f the D etro it C onvention. B oston, J . H . E a stb u rn ’s Press, 1866, pp. 36-37. 69. C ongressional G lobe, N ew Scries, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, pp 276-277. 70. H ow e P ap ers, vol. 28, R eciprocity T reaty D e tro it C onvention. H ill, o p . cit., p p. 35, 40. J . A . C hisholm , K .C. (c o m p .), T he Speeches and Public L e tte rs o f Joseph H ow e, H alifax, T he C hronicle 'Publishing C om pany, L td ., 1909, vol. ii, p p. 438 ff.

CHAPTER 7 (pp. 88-102) 1. Laughlin and W illis, R eciprocity, p. 56. 2. It passed a very m odest m ilitia bill in 1862 despite the clam o u r in G re a t B ritain fo r a w ide assum ption o f the burdens o f defence by the colonies. 3. A lexander M ackenzie, T he L ife a n d Speeches o f H o n . G eorge Drown (T oronto , 1882), p p. 83 ff. 4. S eries E , S tate B ook Z, M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C an ad a] F eb ru ary 19, 1864. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 640, M o n ck to Newcastle! F eb ru ary 20, 1864, enclosure; C onfidential, M arch 15,1864, enclosure.’ 5. Series E , State B ook Z, M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], M arch 31, 1864. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 641, M o n ck to N ew castle, A pril 1, 1864, enclosure. 6. P .R .O ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vols. 140, 141: Series C .O . 2 2 6 , vol. 100; Series C .O . 1 9 4 , vol. 172, B annerm an to N ew castle, A pril 16, 1864 enclosure. 7. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 37, L yons to R ussell, P rivate and C onfidential, O ctober 26, 1863, Private, D ecem ber 15, 1863; V ol. 97, R ussell to Lyons, N ovem ber 14, 1863. 8. L ord N ew ton, L o rd Lyons, vol. 1, p. 123, Lyons to M onck. Jan u ary 28, 1864. 9. L ord N ew ton, L o rd Lyons, vol. i, p. 125, Lyons to R ussell, F eb ru ary 9, 1864. 10. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 38, Lyons to R ussell, M arch 4, 1864. 11. Ib id ., Lyons to R ussell, P riv ate, Septem ber 23, 1864. 12. M onck to N ew castle, F eb ru ary 20, 1864, enclosure, M em orandum o f M arch 8 by Elliot. 13. S eries F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 402, R ussell to Lyons, M arch 22,1864, enclosures 14. M onck to N ew castle, C onfidential, M arch 15, 1864, M em orandum of A pril 8 by Elliot. M onck to N ew castle, A p ril 1, 1864, enclosure, M em orandum o f A pril 18 by Elliot. 15. Series G , vol. 171, C ardw ell to M onck, C onfidential, M ay 7, 1864 enclosure. 16. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 97, R ussell to Lyons, F eb ru ary 27, M arch 26, 17. S eries F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 403, Russell to Lyons, M ay 20, 1864, enclosures 18. Ib id ., Russell to Lyons, M ay 27, 1864, enclosures.

N O T E S - 175 H a n sa rd , 111, vol. clxxv, p. 587. Ib id ., vol. clxxvii, p. 410. Ib id ., p. 141. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 432, R ussell to B urnley, F e b ru a ry 24, 1865. H an sard III, vol. clxxviii, p. 68. A .D .S., G reat B ritain, C has F . A dam s, V ol. 88, A dam s to Sew ard, F eb ru ary 23, 1865. 25. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 432, In stru ctio n s to B ruce, F o reig n Office, M arch 24, 1865. 26. R ussell P apers, vol. 15, C ardw ell to R ussell, Septem ber 2, 1865; vol. 97, Russell to B ruce, Septem ber 4, 1865. 27. Scries F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 435, Russell to B ruce, Septem ber 14, 1865. R ussell P apers, vol. 38, B ruce to R ussell, C onfidential, Ju ly 27, 1865; vol. 15, B ruce to R ussell, Private, O ctober 9, 1865. 28. R ussell P ap ers, vol. 38, B ruce to R ussell, P riv ate, A pril 18, 1865. 29. Ib id ., B ruce to R ussell, P rivate and C onfidential, July 24, 1865. 30. Ib id ., vol. 97, R ussell to B ruce, A ugust 12, 1865; vol. 15, L ay ard to R ussell, A ugust 21, 1865. 31. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain, N o te s, S ir F red erick W . A . B ruce, vol. 81, B ruce to Sew ard, F e b ru a ry 16, 1866. 32. A .D .S ., G reat B ritain, N o tes to , vol. 13, Sew ard to B ruce, February 17, 1866. 33. M acd o n ald P ap ers, Sir A . G alt, 1859-1879, G a lt to M acdonald, F eb ru ary 4 , 1866. 34. Series E . S tate B o o k A B , M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], M arch 24, 1865; A ugust 14, 1865. Series G , vol. 174, C ardw ell to M onck, Ju n e 17, 1865. A series o f conferences w as held betw een the C anadian m inisters and m em bers o f the B ritish G overn­ m en t: T h e D u k e o f Som erset, E a rl de G rey, G ladstone a n d C ardw ell. T he chief subjects u n d e r discussion w ere C onfederation, D efence and the R eciprocity T reaty. 35. Cardw ell to M onck, Ju n e 17, 1865. Series E , State B ook A B , M inute of the Executive Council [o f C a n a d a ], Ju ly 15, 1865. 36. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 46, M o n ck to G ordon, Ju ly 15, 1865. M inutes o f the Executive C ouncil o f N o v a Scotia, vol. 202, p . 120, July 27, 1865. 37. Ib id ., p. 112, Ju n e 20, 1865; p. 120, Ju ly 27, 1865. 38. Jo u rn a l o f the A ssem bly o f N ova Scotia, A ppendix, 1866, A ppendix 4, p. 1. 39. M acdonald P apers, R eciprocity 1865-1866, M em orandum o f G a lt and H ow land, F eb ru ary 20, 1866, including M em orandum o f A ugust 3, 1865. B ruce to R ussell, C onfidential, Ju ly 27, 1865. 40. H on. J . H . G ray, C onfederation o r the P o litical an d Parliam entary H istory o f C an ad a, T o ro n to : C opp, C la rk an d C o ., 1872, vol. 1, p. 322. 41. M em orandum o f G a lt an d H ow land, F e b ru a ry 20, 1866. 42. M acd o n ald P apers, R eciprocity 1865-1866, M inutes o f the Proceed­ ings o f the C onfederate Council o f the B ritish N o rth A m erican Colonies. 43. M em orandum o f G a lt and H ow land, F e b ru a ry 20, 1866. M acdonald P apers, R eciprocity 1865-1866, R ep o rt o f th e M inister o f F in ance to the G overnm ent, D ecem ber 19, 1865. T his issue p recip itated the resignation fro m the G overnm ent o f G eorge Brow n w ho was opposed to reciprocity by legislation, ra th e r th a n by treaty , and w ho claim ed th a t G a lt and H ow land h a d exceeded th eir au th o rity in proceeding

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

176 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 to W ashington an d conferring w ith the A m erican authorities. G ray, o p . c it., p p. 311 ff. 44. M acdo n ald P ap ers, R eciprocity 1865-1866, T elegram , N . F . Belleau to Tupper, Sm ith, Shea and Pope, D ecem ber 20, 1865. 45. Ib id ., R ep o rt o f th e C onferences betw een the C olonial D elegation and the C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans o f the H o u se o f R ep resen ta­ tives. 46. A .D .S., G re a t B ritain, In stru ctio n s, vol. 19, Sew ard to A dam s, F e b ­ ru ary 8, 1864; P a p e rs R elating to F oreign A ffairs, 2nd session, 38th C ongress, P a rt I, A dam s to Sew ard, F e b ru a ry 26, 1864. R ussell “ could say no m ore than th a t he regretted such a consequence, a t the sam e tim e th a t he saw n o p resen t w ay o f avoiding it.” 47. E. D . A dam s, G re a t B ritain an d th e A m erican Civil W ar, vol. 1 pp. 110-111; vol. 2, pp. 116, 271. 48. Jo h n , E a rl R ussell, R ecollections an d Suggestions, 1 8 1 3 -1 8 7 3 , London, Longm ans, G reen & C o., 1875, p. 362.

CHAPTER 8 (p p . 103-129)

1. See Tables N os. I, II and III. U nited States T ariff Com m ission, R eciprocity an d C om m ercial Treaties, p. 79. K now les, The E conom ic D evelopm ent o f the B ritish O verseas E m pire, vol. 2, p. 367. F . E. H aynes, T he R eciprocity T reaty with C an a d a o f 185 4 , B altim ore, 1892, (P u b licatio n s o f th e A m erican E conom ic A ssociation, vol. vii, no. 6 ), p. 31. Tables N os. I to X I will be found in A ppendix B. 2. T h e seven states w ere N ew Y o rk , Pennsylvania, O hio, In diana, M ichigan, Illinois and W isconsin. H arvey, The R eciprocity T reaty, p. 10. K now les, o p . c it., p. 367. S h o rtt and D oughty, C an ad a a n d Its Provinces, vol. v, p. 246. H aynes, o p . cit., p. 31. 3. U nited S tates Tariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 78. F irst session, 38th C ongress, H o u se R ep o rts, N o . 39, R ep o rt o f W ard fro m the C om m ittee on C om m erce, A pril 1, 1864. 4. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 3, M o o r to C ass, Jan u a ry 30, 1860. 5. J . Castell H o p k in s, Progress o f C an a d a in the C entury, T he Linscott Publishing C o., T o ro n to an d P hiladelphia, 1902, p . 332. 6. D alhousie Review, vol. xiv, 1934, p. 355, S. A . Saunders, “ T he M aritim e Provinces and the R eciprocity T rea ty ,” p p. 369-370. 1 . A ccounts a n d Papers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1857-1858, vol. lviii; 1867, vol. Ixxii. 8. S hortt an d D oughty, o p . c it., p p. 244, 247. U nited S tates Tariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 78. 9. M oor to C ass, Jan u a ry 30, 1860. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 3, M o o r to C ass, O ctober 1, 1859. S h o rtt and D oughty, o p . c it., p. 249. H opkins o p . cit., p. 332. 10. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p p . 79-80. Second session, 39th C ongress, Senate Executive D o cu m en ts, N o . 30, M essage from the President, F eb ru ary 16, 1867, with re p o rt o f E . H . D erb y on the practicability o f establishing reciprocity w ith the B ritish N o rth A m eri­ can provinces, p . 204. In d u stria l C an ad a, vol. xi, 1910-1911, H on. W allace N esbitt, “ C an a d a ’s A ttitu d e T ow ards R eciprocity,” p. 541. Laughlin and W illis, R eciprocity, p. 63.

N O T E S - 177 11. A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the British P a rlia m e n t], 1867, vol. lxxii. D alhousie Review , vol. xiv, Saunders, “ T h e M aritim e Provinces and the Reciprocity T re a ty ,” p. 370. 12. T h e prohibition o f th e ex p o rt o f an th racite, after having been in force from A pril 14, 1862, w as relaxed in the case o f C an ad a on July 30, 1864, after the C an ad ian G overnm ent h ad prohibited its export fro m the province. S cries G , vol. 233, M o n ck to Lyons, A ugust 8, 1864; Lyons to M onck, Ju ly 30, 1864, enclosures. 13. P.A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 44, Cardw ell to the Oflicer A dm inister­ ing th e G overnm ent o f N ew Brunsw ick, M ay 5, 1864, enclosures; C ardw ell to G ordon, Ju ly 11, 1864, enclosures. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 9 , vol. 8, G o rd o n to N ew castle, M arch 14, 1864. 14. See T a b le N o. IV (A p p en d ix ). R ep o rt o f E. H . D erby on the pra c ti­ cability o f establishing reciprocity with the B ritish N o rth A m erican provinces, p. 204. A .D .S., S t. Jo h n , N .B ., vol. 6, Jam es L. H ow ard to Sew ard, O ctober 12, 1865. Laughlin and W illis, o p . c it., p. 63. The C anadian fiscal y ear closed in 1865 and 1866 on Ju n e 30, while the N ova Scotian y ear closed on Septem ber 30, and those o f the other th ree m aritim e colonies o n D ecem ber 31. T he colonial retu rns for 1866, therefore, include nine m onths o f treaty privileges fo r C anada, six for N ova Scotia and three for the o th er colonies. SceT h e C anadian Jo u rn a l o f E conom ics a n d P o litical Science, vol. ii, N o . I, S. A . Saunders, “ T h e R eciprocity T reaty o f 1854: A R egional Study,” pp. 42-43. 15. U nited States T ariff Com m ission, op. c it., p. 79. Laughlin an d W illis, op. cit., p. 64. 16. The G lobe, T o ro n to , O cto b er 5, 9, 19, 28, 1852. 17. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C anada, A ppendix to vol. 13, 1854-1855, A ppendix D .D .D .D ., R ep o rt on T rad e and C om m erce, M ay 26, 1855. 18. C halfant R obinson, A H istory o f Tw o R eciprocity T reaties, P a rt I, p. 64. Laughlin and W illis, o p . cit., p. 64. 19. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o. 106. U nited States T ariff C om m ission, op. c it., p. 88. C om m ercial R ecipro­ city betw een the U nited S tates a n d the B ritish N o rth A m erican Provinces, M em orandum o f the B ritish P lenipotentiaries, Edw ard T h ornton and G eorge B row n, W ashington, D .C ., A pril 27, 1874,p. 15. 20. U nited S tates TarifI C om m ission, op. c it., p. 90. 21. Ib id ., p. 87. H aynes o p . c it., p. 56. 22. U nited S tates T ariff C om m ission, op. c it., p. 87. 2 3 . C anadian M onthly a n d N a tio n a l Review, vol. 1, 1872, “ J . M cL .,” “ O ur C om m ercial R elations w ith the U nited States,” p. 216. The G lobe, T o ro n to , Jan u a ry 14, 1865. 24. B iggar, R eciprocity, T he T rad e Treaty o f 1 8 5 4 -1 8 6 6 betw een C anada a n d the U nited States, p. 32. 25. B row n-T hornton M em orandum , p. 6. B row n and T h o rn to n w ere the B ritish Plenipotentiaries a t W ashington in 1874 in an ab o rtiv e attem pt to n egotiate an o th er R eciprocity T reaty . U n ited States T ariff C om ­ mission, op. c it., p. 80. H aynes, o p . c it., p. 31. 26. C om piled fro m T ab le N o. IV (A p p en d ix ). 27. See A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1857, vol. xxxviii; 1857-1858, vol. lviii; 1866, vol. lxxiii; 1867, vol. lxxii. Jo u rn a l of the A ssem bly o f C an ad a, A ppendices, 1857, N o . 2; 1858, N o. 2; 1859, N o . 6. Sessional P ap ers, C an ad a, 1860, N o. 23; 1861, N o. 2; 1862, N o. 2; 1865, N o. 39; 1867, N o. 1. Blue B ook, C an a d a , 1863, A ppendix I . U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 79.

178 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 28. See T ables N os. V III and IX (A p p en d ix ). 29. U nited States T arifI Com m ission, o p . cit., p. 80. S h o rtt and D oughty, op c it., p . 248. H aynes, o p . c it., p p. 35-36, 56. 30. I t w ill be recalled th a t in 1858 th e A m erican Custom s au thorities refused to ad m it un d er the term s o f the treaty flour m anufactured in C anada fro m A m erican wheat. 31. Statistics o f the Foreign a n d D om estic C om m erce o f the U nited States, 1864. F irst session 36th C ongress, H o u se M iscellaneous D o cu ­ m ents, N o. 89, Proceedings o f the Chicago B oard o f T rad e, M ay 28, 1860. A .D .S., M o n treal, vol. 3, M oor to A ppleton, D ecem ber 11, 1858. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, A ppendix to vol. 16, 1858, R eport o f the C om m ittee on T rad e , July 27, 1858, A ppendix A , N o . 1, W ilkins to M erritt, July 6, 1858, A ppendix A . C anadian M erch an t's M agazine an d C om m ercial Review , vol. 1, 1857, pp. 53 ff., “T h e T rad e o f T o ro n to ” ; p. 335, “ C hicago and the C an ad ian T rad e .” The G lobe, T oro n to , Jan u a ry 27, 1864. C h alfan t R obinson, op. cit., p. 48. S hortt and D oughty, o p . cit., p. 251. H arvey, o p. c it., p. 19. 32. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an ad a, A ppendices, 1858, N o . 2. A ccounts an d P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rliam e n t], 1857, vol. xxxviii. 33. H u n t’s M erch an t’s M agazine an d C om m ercial Review, N ew Y ork, vol. 44, 1861, “ R eciprocity - U nited States and C an ad a,” R ep o rt of the C om m ittee o f the Oswego B oard o f T rad e , p. 167. S h o rtt and D oughty, o p . c it., p. 249. Laughlin and W illis, op. c it., p. 42. 34. P.R .O ., C olonial Blue B ooks and O riginals: N ew Brunsw ick, Series C .O . 1 9 3 , vols. 31-47; N ova ScoUa, Series C .O . 2 2 1 , vols. 61-76; Prince E dw ard Island, Series C .O . 2 3 1 , vols. 31-49; N ew foundland, Series C .O . 1 9 9 , vols. 44-62. H arvey, o p . c it., p. 19. H aynes op. cit., p. 43. S h o rtt and D oughty, o p . c it., p p. 248, 252. Laughlin and W illis, o p . cit., p. 42. 35. Statistics o f the F oreign a n d D om estic C om m erce o f the U nited States, 1864. 36. R eport o f the C om m ittee o f the Oswego B o ard o f T rad e , p. 168. 37. Ib id . E . H . D erby, A Prelim inary R eport on the Treaty o f R eciprocity with G reat B ritain , to regulate the trad e betw een the U nited States and the Provinces o f B ritish N o rth A m erica, Prepared . . . a t the request o f the Secretary o f the T reasury o f the U nited States, Boston, Jan u ary 1, 1866, p. 255. C an ad ian M erch an t’s M agazine a n d C om ­ m ercial Review, vol. 1, 1857, p. 55, “T h e T rad e o f T o ro n to ” ; pp. 511512, “ F lo u r T rad e with M o n treal and Q uebec.” 38. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o. 106. R eport o f the C om m ittee o f the Oswego B oard o f T rad e , p. 168. H arvey, op. c it., p. 20. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 80. S h o rtt an d D oughty, op. c it., pp. 251, 257. H aynes, op. c it., p. 36. 39. See n o te N o . 27, this ch ap ter. R ep o rt o f the C om m ittee o f the Oswego B oard o f T rad e , p. 168. 40. C anadian M erch an t’s M agazine a n d C om m ercial Review, vol. 1, 1857, “ O u r p resent C ondition and A dvantages, considered w ith Reference to A gricultural D evelopm ent,” pp. 290-292. S h o rtt and D oughty, op. c it., p. 247. H opkins, o p . c it., p p . 328-329. J . Castell H opkins ( E d .) , C an ad a: A n Encyclopedia o f the C ountry, T h e Linscott Publishing C o ., o f T o ro n to , C an ad a, vol. 1, p p. 297-299. 41. See n o tes N os. 27 and 34, this ch ap ter. Series C .O . 2 2 1 , vols. 61-76. D erb y , A Prelim inary R eport, pp. 231, 256. H arvey, o p . cit., p. 22. H aynes, o p . c it., p. 36. 42. D erby, A Prelim inary R ep o rt, pp. 231, 256. D alhousie Review, vol.

N O T E S - 179 xiv, Saunders, “ T he M aritim e Provinces and the R eciprocity T reaty,” pp. 366, 367. 43. D alhousie Review , vol. xiv, p. 368. 44. S h o rtt an d D oughty, o p . c it., p. 248. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o. 106. See also notes N os. 27 and 34, this chapter. 45. The S tatu tes a t L arge a n d Treaties o f the U nited S tates o f A m erica, B oston: L ittle, B row n and C o., 1855, vol. x, cap. 269. Sec also p. 120. 46. See n ote N o. 27, this ch ap ter. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o . 106. D erby, A Prelim inary R ep o rt, p. 254. R ep o rt o f the C om m ittee o f the Oswego B oard o f T rad e , p. 166. H arvey, o p . c it., pp. 20-21. 47. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o. 106. 48. Second session, 40th C ongress, H ouse Executive D ocum ents, N o. 240, R ep o rt o f G eorge W . B rega, M arch 27, 1868, pp. 6, 8. H arvey, op. c it., pp. 23-25. C anadian M erch an t’s M agazine a n d C om m ercial Review, vol. 1, 1857, p. 335, “ Chicago and the C an ad ian T ra d e .” 49. W ilkins to M erritt, Ju ly 6, 1858, A ppendix A . H arvey, o p . c it., pp. 24-25. 50. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, No. 106. 51. Series C .O . 1 9 3 , vols. 31-47. 52. D alhousie Review, vol. xiv, Saunders, “T h e M aritim e Provinces and the Reciprocity T reaty ,” p p. 362-364. 53. D erby, A Prelim inary R ep o rt, p. 255. S ir S. M orton Peto, The R esources a n d Prospects o f A m erica, A lexander S trahan, London and N ew Y o rk , 1866, p. 256. H arvey, o p. c it., p. 21. 54. H aynes, op. c it., p. 43. 55. D alhousie Review, vol. xiv, Saunders, “ T he M aritim e Provinces and the R eciprocity T reaty ,” p p. 364-365. 56. A ccounts a n d P ap ers [o f the British P a rlia m e n t], 1867, vol. lxxii. 57. See n ote N o. 34 in this chapter. Professor H a ro ld Innis, o f the University o f T o ro n to , h as suggested in a p riv ate letter to me, that the rig h t o f fishing in inshore w aters involved a considerable extension of sm uggling from the U nited S tates in to the colonies. 58. D erby, A Prelim inary R ep o rt, p. 232. 59. R ep o rt o f the M inister o f F inance on the R eciprocity T reaty w ith the U nited States, Q uebec, 1862. S tatistics o f the F oreign an d D om estic C om m erce o f the U nited Stales, 1864. 60. A ccounts a n d P ap ers [o f the British P a rlia m e n t], 1857, vol. xxxviii. The total o f goods, afterw ard s adm itted free un d er the term s of the treaty, im p o rted by C an ad a in 1854 w as $2,452,468. O f this total, goods to the value o f $232,572 w ere already adm itted free u nder the term s o f 12 V iet. cap. 1. T his leaves a to ta l o f $2,219,896 o f goods, afterw ards adm itted free u n d e r the treaty , which entered C an a d a as dutiable im portations in 1854. 61. See T a b le N o. V III (A p p en d ix ). 62. M o o r to C ass, O ctober 1, 1859, Jan u a ry 30, 1860. 63.S ta tu te s o f C an ad a, 19 V iet. cap. 10, 22 V iet. [1st session, 6th P arliam en t] cap. 76, 22 V iet. [2nd session, 6th P arliam en t] cap. 2. Series G , vol. 162, N ew castle to H e ad , Jan u a ry 31, 1860, enclosures. 64. R ep o rt o f E . H . D erby on th e practicability o f establishing reciprocity with the B ritish N o rth A m erican provinces, p. 200. 65. Series G , vol. 163, N ew castle to H e ad , Ju n e 13, 1860, enclosure; voL

180 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 167, N ew castle to M onck, C onfidential, M ay 26, 1862. 66. Series E , Proceedings in C ouncil [o f the C anadian E x ecu tiv e], N ovem ber 12, 1859, R eport o f the M inister o f Finance, O ctober 25, 1859. 67. N ew castle to H ead , Ju n e 13, 1860, enclosure. 68. M oor to A ppleton, D ecem ber 11, 1858; M oor to Cass, O ctober 1, 1859. R ep o rt o f E. H . D erby o n the practicability o f establishing reciprocity w ith the British N o rth A m erican provinces, p. 204. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., pp. 85, 87. E. B. Biggar, op. cit., p. 20. 69. Speech o f the H o n . A . 1 . G alt, M inister o f Finance o f C an ad a in introducing the B udget o f 1 8 6 2 , Together with S tatistical an d Finance S tatem ents. D elivered in the C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans, M ay 16, 1862. G a lt supplied the following d a ta : L eath er. Im p o rtatio n s in 1852, $185,000; in 1857, $514,000. D u ty in 1852, 14 p er cent; in 1857, 15 per cent. T h e duty w as then increased to 20 p er cent. Consequently the value o f leath er im ported in 1861 was only $281,000. B oots and Shoes. Im p o rtatio n s in 1852, $230,000; in 1855, $765,000. T h e duty was then increased to 25 p e r cen t and im portations decreased to $280,000 in 1861. 70. R aym ond M cF arlan d , A H isto ry o f the N ew England Fisheries, U niversity o f Pennsylvania, D . A ppleton & C o ., A gents, N ew Y ork, 1911, p. 170. 71 .S e rie s C .O . 4 2 , vol. 595, Elgin to S ir G eorge G rey, D ecem ber 18, 1854. 72. See Table N o . Mj (A p p en d ix ). M cF arlan d , o p . c it., p. 172. 73. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 76. 74. R uth F u lto n G ra n t, The C an ad ian A tlan tic F ishery, T h e Ryerson Press, T o ro n to , p. 17. 75. M cF arlan d , o p. c it., p. 172. 76. Statistics o f the F oreign a n d D om estic C om m erce o f th e U nited States, 1864. 77. Proceedings o f the B oard o f T rad e o f the C ity o f C hicago, M ay 28, 1860. 78. See T able N o . X I (A p p en dix ). 79. J o u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C an a d a , A ppendices, 1857, N o. 2; 1858, N o. 2; 1859, N o. 6. Sessional P apers, C an a d a , 1860, N o . 23; 1861, N o. 2; 1862, N o. 2; 1865, N o . 2; 1867, No. 1. Blue B ooks, C anada, 1853, 1863, A ppendix I. T he re tu rn s for 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1866 in the second colum n a re fo r flour and m eal. B oth retu rn s fo r 1864 are fo r the h alf y e ar ending Ju n e 30. 80. Blue B ook, C an ad a, 1862, G eneral R ep o rt o f the Com m issioners for Public W orks for the Y ear ending D ecem ber 31, 1862, p. 9. 81. R eport o f the C om m ittee o n T rad e , Ju ly 27, 1858, A ppendix A , N o. 2. 82. B lue B ook, C an ad a, 1859, R ep o rt o f the C om m issioner o f Public W orks, 1859. 83. G eneral R ep o rt o f the C om m issioner for Public W orks fo r th e Y ear ending D ecem ber 31, 1862, p. 6. 84. B lue B ook, C an ad a, I8 6 0 , A ppendix, R ep o rt o f the Select C om m ittee to enquire into the causes which have directed th e trade o f the west through the U nited S tates by way o f the H u d so n and P o rt o f N ew Y ork, 1861. 85. G eneral R ep o rt o f the C om m issioner for P ublic W orks fo r the Y ear ending D ecem ber 31, 1862, p. 7.

N O T E S - 181 86. W illiam K ingsford, The C anadian C anals, T o ro n to , R ollo a n d A dam , 1865, p. 140. 87. R ep o rt on T rad e and C om m erce, M ay 26, 1855. 88. K ingsford, o p . cit., p. 140. 89. R ep o rt o f the C om m issioner o f Public W orks, 1859, p. 11. 90. R ep o rt o f the C om m ittee on T rad e , Ju ly 27, 1858, A ppendix A , N o. 2. W ilkins to M erritt, Ju ly 6, 1858, A ppendix B. 91. W ilkins to M erritt, July 6, 1858. 92. Ib id ., A ppendix B. 93. K ingsford, o p . cit., p. 142. 94. H . A . In n is and A. R. M . L ow er, Select D ocum ents in C anadian E conom ic H istory 1 7 8 3 -1 8 8 5 (T o ro n to , 1933), p. 494. 95. H . Y . H in d , T. C. K eefer, e t a l.. The D om inion o f C an a d a (T o ronto, 1867), p p . 247-248. 96. W ilkins to M erritt, Ju ly 6, 1858, A ppendix B. I f goods w ere to qualify for the low er assessm ent the following conditions had to be fulfilled: “ 1st. It m ust a p p ea r they w ere intended fo r a particular port. 2nd. T h e ir identity m ust be traced by affidavit o f trans-shipper. 3rd. O w nership m ust n o t have changed in C anada. 4th. T h e continuity of the voyage m ust n o t have been broken fo r an unreasonable time; and, 5th. T he whole am o u n t nam ed in the invoice m ust be forw arded for en try .” 97. J o u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f C anada, A ppendices, 1857, N o . 2 ; 1858. N o . 2; 1859, N o. 6. Sessional P apers, C an a d a , 1865, N o. 39; 1867, No. 1. A ccounts and P ap ers [o f the B ritish P a rlia m e n t], 1857-8, vol. lviii; 1860, vol. lxv; 1866, vol. lxxiii; 1867, vol. lxxii; 1867-8, vol. lxxi. 98. U nited S tates Tariff Com m ission, o p . c it., pp. 85-86. 99. Proceedings o f the M assachusetts H isto rical Society, vol. xlvii, Stanw ood, “T ra d e R eciprocity with C an ad a,” p. 150. 100. B row n-T liornton M em orandum , p. 8. C h alfan t R obinson, op. c it., p. 49. 101. The G lobe, T o ro n to , D ecem ber 10, 1864, R eport o f the D etroit B oard o f T rade. 102. U nited S tates TarifE C om m ission, op. c it., p. 88. 103. U nited States Tariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 89. B row n-Tliornton M em orandum , pp. 15-18. 104. T h ird session, 40th C ongress, H ouse Executive D ocum ents, N o. 36, R ep o rt o f the H on. I. T. H atch upo n the C om m ercial R elations of the U n ited States with the D om inion o f C an ad a, Jan u a ry 12, 1869, p. 8. R ep o rt o f G eorge W . B rega, M arch 27, 1868. U n ited States T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., p. 88. 105. Ibid. R. G . H alib u rto n , In terco lo n ial T rad e O ur O nly Safeguard A gainst D isunion, p. 30. G ra n t, op. c it., p. 11. 106. D alhousie Review, vol. xiv, Saunders, “ T he M aritim e Provinces and the R eciprocity T reaty ,” p. 364. 107. Ib id ., vol. xiv, p. 367. 108. U n ited S tates Tariff Com m ission, op. c it., p. 89. B row n-T hornton M em orandum , p. 16. 109. Second session, 53rd C ongress, Senate Executive D ocum ents, N o. 106. 110. C an ad a Y ear B ook, 1908, pp. 187-188. 111. Series G , vol. 175, C ardw ell to M onck, C onfidential, M arch 3, 1866. 112. Ib id ., vol. 180, Buckingham to M onck, Septem ber 3, 1867, enclosure; vol. 558, Buckingham to M onck, M arch 4, 1868, enclosures. 113. Ib id ., vol. 559, Buckingham to M onck, Ju n e 1, 1868, enclosures,

182 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 114. A ccording to the T reaty o f W ashington reciprocity in fish was established between the U nited S tates and the colonies, A m erican citizens w ere given the right to p articip ate in all colonial sea fisheries, the colonists received sim ilar concessions n o rth o f the thirty-ninth degree o f n o rth latitu d e and provision w as m ade for a bo ard o f arbitratio n to settle the claim th a t the concessions m ad e by the Em pire w ere o f g reater value than those obtained fro m the U nited States. T he b o a rd m et subsequently a t H alifax and aw arded G reat B ritain $5,500,000. 115. U nited S tates T ariff Com m ission, o p . c it., pp. 87, 89. 116. Biggar, op. c it., p. 32. 117. H aynes, o p . c it., p. 33.

E P IL O G U E (pp. 130-139) 1. Series E , S tate Book Z, M inute o f th e Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], F eb ru ary 19, 1864. 2. P arliam en tary D ebates on the Subject o j the C onfederation o f the B ritish N o rth A m erican Provinces, Quebec, 1865, G alt, pp. 63-64; Brow n, pp. 104-106; M cC rea, p. 172; R oss, p. 397; M cG iv em , p. 466; J. S. M acdonald, p. 650; R ose, p. 801; H arw o o d , p. 826. 3. H a ro ld A . Innis, A H istory o f the C anadian Pacific R ailw ay, London, P. S. K ing and Son, L td .; O rch ard H ouse, W estm inster, T o ro n to , M cC lelland and Stew art, L td ., 1923, pp. 35-45. 4. The G lobe, T o ro n to , N ovem ber 4, 1863 [e x tra c t from S t. Jo h n (N .B .) Globe]-, Jan u ary 8, 1864 [e x tra c t from S t. Jo h n (N .B .) M orning N e w s ]; S eptem ber 20, 1864 [ex tract fro m C harlottetow n Islan d er]', Septem ber 29, 1864 [e x tra c t from St. Jo h n M orning N e w s]; D ecem ­ ber 30, 1864; Jan u ary 4, 1865 [ex tract fro m the H alifax W itn e ss]. 5. The G lobe, T o ro n to , O ctober 17 and 31, 1864. 6. E dw ard W helan (c o m p .), T he U nion o f the B ritish Provinces (C harlo tteto w n , 1865), p p . 45-46. 7. T he R t. H on. S ir C harles T up p er, R ecollections o f Sixty Y ears, Cassell & C o ., L td., L ondon, N ew Y o rk , etc., 1914, p. 160. 8. M acdonald P ap ers, R eciprocity, 1865-1866, M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], D ecem ber 22, 1865. 9. Series E , S tate Book A B, M inutes o f the Executive Council [of C a n a d a ], M arch 24 and A ugust 14, 1865. Series G , vol. 174, Cardw ell to M onck, Ju n e 17, 1865. T h e italics a re my own. 10. Series E , State Book Z, M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [of C a n a d a ], M arch 31, 1864. M inutes o f the Executive C ouncil o f N ova Scotia, vol 202, p. 123, A ugust 22, 1865. 11. Ib id ., p. 105, M ay 25, 1865. 12. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 46, M acD onnell to G ordon, Ju n e 5, 1865, enclosure. M inute o f the Executive C ouncil o f N o v a Scotia, vol. 202, p. 112, Ju n e 20, 1865. 13. Jo u rn a l o f the Assem bly o f N ova S cotia, A ppendix, 1866, A ppendix 4, p. 1. 14. Series E , Proceedings in Council [o f th e C anadian E x ecu tiv e], January-D ecem ber 1865, T rad e , Cardw ell to M onck, Ju ly 22, 1865, enclosure. C anadian H isto rical Review , N ew Series, vol. vii, D ccem -

N O T E S - 183 b er, 1926, N o rm an M cL . Rogers, “ T he C onfederate C ouncil of C an a d a .” 15. Series F .O . 1 1 5 , vol. 403, Russell to Lyons, M ay 20, 1864, enclosure. 16. M acD onnell to G o rd o n , Ju n e 5,1865, enclosure. G ray, C onfederation, vol. 1, p. 190. 17. M inute o f the Executive C ouncil [o f C a n a d a ], A ugust 14, 1865. 18. Series E , Proceedings in C ouncil [o f the C anadian E xecutive], January-D ecem ber 1865, T rade. 19. M acd o n ald P ap ers, R eciprocity, 1865-1866, M inutes o f th e Proceed­ ings o f the C onfederate Council o f the B ritish N o rth A m erican Colonies. See pp. 95-96. 20. Series E , S tate Book A C, M inute o f the Executive Council [o f C a n a d a ], Septem ber 23, 1865; D espatches R eferred to the Executive C ouncil, 1865, G ordon to M ichel, N ovem ber 22, 1865, enclosures. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1S8, vol. 45, C ardw ell to the Officer A dm inistering the G overnm ent o f N ew Brunsw ick, O cto b er 28, 1865, enclosures. 21. P .A .C ., Series C .O . 1 8 8 , vol. 45. Series G , vol. 174, C ardw ell to the Officer A dm inistering the G overnm ent o f C anada, O ctober 28, 1865. 22. Series E , Slate Book A C , M inute o f the Executive Council [o f C a n a d a ], N ovem ber 18, 1865. In stru ctio n s by th e M inister o f Finance to M cD ougall, R yan and D unscom be a t th e end o f the volume. 23. Ib id ., M inute o f the E xecutive Council [o f C a n a d a ], D ecem ber 18, 1865, including G a lt’s instructions to R yan, D ecem ber 22, 1865; Proceedings in C ouncil, January-D ecem ber, 1865, D ecem ber 18, 1865. 24. Series C .O . 4 2 , vol. 650, M ichel to C ardw ell, D ecem ber 18, 1865, M em oranda appended by E llio t and V . I.; M ichel to C ardw ell, D uplicate, S ep arate, D ecem ber 23, 1865, M em oranda by V . I. 25. Series G , vol. 175, C ardw ell to the Officer A dm inistering the G overn­ ment o f C an ad a, Jan u ary 6, 1866. 26. Sessional P ap ers, C an ad a, 1866, vol. xxvi, no. 43. G ray, o p . c it., p. 340. H opkins, A n Encyclopedia o j the C ountry, p. 301. A s M exico was in its custom ary state o f revolt the Com m issioners very discreetly “ deem ed it inexpedient to delay their re tu rn by a visit to the capital of th a t E m p ire.” 27. M acdonald P apers, R eciprocity, 1865-1866, R ep o rt o f the Conferences betw een the C olonial D elegation and C om m ittee of W ays a n d M eans of the H o u se o f Representatives. 28. T h e d reary tale o f fruitless pilgrim ages to W ashington did not end until the tu rn of the century. T h e m em ory o f these hum iliating experiences exerted a considerable influence in the repudiation by the C anadian people o f the L aurier-T aft agreem ent in 1911. 29. Series G , vol. 172, C ardw ell to M onck, N o. 93, D ecem ber 3, 1864.

INDEX

A berdeen, E arl of, 17; Policy o f his adm inistration, from 1852 to 1854, in relation to the fishery controversy an d the reciprocity negotiation, 25-7. See also C larendon A dam s, C harles F ran cis, 78, 79, 83, 92, 101 A dam s, E. D ., 101 A ddington, British U nder-Secretary for F oreign A ffairs, 23, 25 A labam a, 75, 101 A m endm ent to A m erican A ct im ple­ m enting the R eciprocity T reaty, 1855, 56 A m erican B ureau o f Statistics, C hief of, 125 A m erican C anals, 49, 72, 73, 83, 144 A m erican currency, 126 A m erican G overnm ent, 5, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 45, 49, 50, 161m; action to give im m ediate treaty privileges to the colonies in 1854, 55-6; 72, 76, 17In ; attitu d e tow ard renew al of the R eciprocity T reaty, 78-82, 87; 82, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 100, 113, 141, 144 A ndrew s, I . D .; agitation fo r reci­ p rocity in the Low er Colonies, 14, 38, 40, 161«; cam paign in the U nited S tates before the passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 41, 45-7 A nim als, 161/i; trad e u n d e r the R eci­ p rocity T reaty, 113, 143 A nnexationist M ovem ent in C anada, xi, xiii, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 42, 43, 44, 130 A ssociation for the Pro m o tio n of C anadian Industry, 60, 65-6 B annerm an, Sir A ., 12, 22, 23, 89 Barley, 106, 109, 111, 126, 146 Bayly, T . H ., 47 B azalgette, A cting Lieutenant-G over­ n o r, 13 B eef, 16, 112, 113, 115 Belleau, S ir N arcisse, 96 B oard o f T rade, B ritish; proposal in 1853 to extend the scope o f the reciprocity negotiation, 25 ; relations w ith N ew castle and the colonies over protective and differential du­ ties, 66 - 8 , 169m B onding Privileges, 81 , 97 , 131 B orland, Solom on, 37 B oston, 110, 111, 112, 123 B radbury, J. W ., 37 B razil, 136 , 137 Bread-Stuffs, 3, 4, 16, 41, 48, 161m; tra d e under the Reciprocity T reaty, 105, 106, 110-11, 121-22, 129, 138, 143. See also G rain , F lo u r, W heat B reckenridgc, John C ., 37 British-A m erican C olonies, xi, xii, xiv, xv, 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 31, 34, 37, 40, 42, 46, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 68, 75, 76, 79, 81, 84, 87, 93,

94, 97, 98, 99; tra d e un d er the R eci­ procity T reaty , 103, 104, 106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145; tables, 148, 149 B ritish A m erican M agazine, 4 British C olum bia, 132 B ritish G overnm ent, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, 2, 5, 7, 8, 12; sum m ary o f its policy, fro m 1846 to 1854, in relation to the proposed reciprocity agreem ent, 15, 27-8; 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 34, 36, 39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 56-8, 59, 67, 68, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 159m; policy in connection with the ab rogation o f the Reciprocity T reaty, 88, 90-4, 99-102, 96, 98, 127, 130, 133, 135; the W est In d ian inci­ dent, 136-38; 139, 144. See also C olonial Office, F oreign Office B ritish Legation a t W ashington, 44, 98 B ritish Parliam ent, 50, 51; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty, 51-2, 54, 75, 135, 145 B ritish Possessions A ct of 1846, xii Brow n, G eorge, 89, 94, 108, 109, 125, 131, 176m, 178m B ruce, Sir F red erick , 81, 82, 93; efforts to save the R eciprocity T reaty , 9394, 95, 96 B uchanan, Isaac, 65 B uchanan, Jam es, 26, 27; failure to influence the policy o f Pierce in re­ lation to the reciprocity and fishery issues, 38, 70 Buctouche, In h ab itan ts of, Petition, 7 Buffalo, 69, 70, 71, 77, 110, 118, 122, 125, 151-2 B uller, C harles, xiii Bulw er, Sir H enry, 9, 19, 31; negoti­ ations a t W ashington fro m 1849 to 1851, 33, 45 Burnley, H um e, 84 B utter, 16, 48, 112, 143 C am eron, Sim on, 30 Cam pbell, Sir D onald, 8 C an ad a, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, 2; m ove­ m ent for reciprocity, 3-6, 7, 9, 10-11; A ddresses to British G overnm ent in 1846, 16, 18, 23, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 43, 48, 49; passage o f the R eci­ procity T reaty , 53, 55, 56, 60; evi­ dences o f the protectionist move­ m ent, 1855-1856, 60-61; C anadian fiscal policy, 1858-1859, 64-66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85; C anadian policy and abro g atio n o f the Reciprocity T reaty, 88-90, 94-99, 102; trade u nder the treaty, 103-07, 108, 109-15, 116-18; 120-25, 126-29; C onfederation, 130, 131, 132, 133, 139; 141, 144; tables, 148, 150, 151

I N D E X - 185 C an a d a C o m A ct o f 1843 , xiv, 16 , 154m C an a d a E ast, 41 , 76 , 77 , 146 C anada W est, 3 , 41 , 66 , 76 , 80 , 106 , 110 , 111, 113 , 131 , 146 C anadian C anals, 11, 19, 49 , 144 C anadian G overnm ent, xii, 4 , 5 , 11 , 55 , 58 ; fiscal policy 1858- 1860, 64 - 6 ; relations with N ew castle and the B oard of T rad e over protective and differential duties, 1858- 1861 , 66 - 68 , 73 , 74 , 77 , 79 ; efforts in 1864 to p re ­ vent disturbances on the A m erican border, 80 , 81 , 82 , 86 ; C anadian policy and the ab rogation o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 88 -90 , 94 - 99 , 100- 102, results o f the G alt and Cayley tariffs, 117 - 118, 127, 130 ; em ergence o f a C an ad ian com m er­ cial policy: the delegation to E ng­ land, M arch 1865, the C onfederate C ouncil, the W est In d ian C om m is­ sion, the delegation to W ashington, 133-139 C anadian Legislature; A ddress o f M ay 12, 1846, 4, 5, 9, 16; passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 53; 5 6 ,6 0 ,7 7 ,8 0 , 167/i; debates on C onfederation, 131 C anadian M erch an t’s M agazine and C om m ercial Review , 111 C anadian Tariff, 65-66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73 C ape V incent, 110 C ardw ell, E dw ard, 91 , 95 , 135 , 136 , 137, 138 C artier, G . E ., 94 , 176m C ath ca rt, E arl, 5 C attle, 113 Cayley, W illiam , xv; tariff o f 1858, 66 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 98 , 102, results o f the C ay­ ley and G alt tariffs, 117- 118, 124-125 C entral A m erica, A nglo-A m erican rivalry in, 31 , 32 , 33 , 162m ; policy of the Pierce adm inistration, 38-39 C ham plain C anal, 110 C handler, E. B., 39 , 53 C handler, Z achariah, 86 C harlottetow n, 81 Cheese, 16, 48 , 112, 143 C hesepeake A ffair, 76 C hicago, 110, 111, 113, 121, 123 Civil W ar, A m erican, 29 , 74 , 75 , 81 , 84 , 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 117, 120, 121, 125, 128 C larendon, L ord; policy in relation to the fishery controversy and the reci­ procity negotiation, Instructions to L ord Elgin, 25 - 27 , 34 , 40 , 50 ; agrees to im m ediate adm ission o f A m eri­ cans to colonial fisheries, A ugust, 1854, 52 , 55 , 137. See also A berdeen C larey, C om m ander, 76 C lark. M yron D ., 59 Clay, H on. C lem ent, 76 C layton, Joh n M ., 32 , 45 , 161/ 1. See

a lso Zachary T aylor C layton-B ulw er T reaty , 38 , 162n Clingm an, T. L., 37 C oal, 19, 25 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 71 , 97 , 105, 159m ; trade un d er R eciprocity T reaty , 112 , 115, 126, 128, 131, 143 C od Fishery, 119 C ollam er, Jaco b , 43 C olonial Office, xi, xii, 5 , 6 , 7 , 11, 47 , 56 - 58 ; relations with the B oard of T rad e and the colonies over protec­ tive and differential duties, 66-68, 169m ; 90 . 91 , 111, 135, 137. See also B ritish G overnm ent C olonial Reform ers, xii C om m issioner o f Public W o rks for C an ad a, 122 C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans, U nited S tates H ouse o f R epresenta­ tives, 94 , 174m ; conference w ith the colonial delegates, 96 -97 , 138 C om m ittee on C om m erce, U nited States H ouse o f R epresentatives, 37 C om m ittee on C om m erce, U nited States Senate, 84 C om m ittee on Finance, U nited States S enate, 70 C om m ittee on Foreign A ffairs, U nited States H o u se o f R epresentatives, 47 , 69 , 83 C om m ittee on F oreign Relations, U nited S tates Senate, 46 , 84 C om prom ise o f 1850, 33 C onfederate C ouncil; m eeting a t Q ue­ bec, 1865 , 95 -96 , 135-136 C onfederates, 76 , 77 , 78 , 81 C onfederation, xv, xvi, 93 , 98 ; inter­ action o f reciprocity and C onfedera­ tion, 131- 133; em ergence o f a C ana­ dian com m ercial policy, 133-139 C ongress o f the U nited States, 4 , 25 , 29- 30 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 ; failure in 1853 to act in relation to the fishery con­ troversy o r the proposed reciprocity agreem ent, 36- 37 ; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty , 39 , 42 , 43 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 50 , 51 , 55 -56 , 73 , 80 , 82, 86 , 87 , 89 , 91 , 95 , 113, 127, 145. See also H ouse o f R epresentatives, Senate C onstitution, 70 C o n su lar C ertificates, 72 , 73 C onvention o f 1818, 8 , 12, 21 , 24 , 35 , 40 , 52 , 119, 127, 141. See also Fish­ eries C orn Laws, xi, 2 , 3 , 65 C oursol, Judge, 76 , 77 , 78 C ram pton, Jo h n , 23 , 24 , 25 , 29 , 30, 31 ; his ch arac te r, 31 ; negotiations at W ashington in 1848 and 1849, 32 , 33 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 ; negotiations with M arcy, A ugust, 1853, 39 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 53 , 55 C rim ean W ar, 26 , 104, 106, 107, 128, 160m

186 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 C row n, B ritish, 12, 13, 51, 101, 130 C unard Line, 122 C ushing, C aleb, 46 D aily Evening S ta r, W ashington, 164/1 D aly, D om inick, 55, 60 D arling, L ieutenant-G overnor, 60 D avis, Jo h n ; failure o f his fishery bill, 1853, 36-37, 48 D e B ow ’s Review, 36, 41 D em ocrats, A m erican, 3 8 ,3 9 ,4 2 ,4 3 ,4 7 D erby, E a rl of, 15; policy o f his gov­ ernm ent in relation to the fishery controversy and the reciprocity ne­ gotiations, 20-25, 28, 34. See also M alm esbury, Pakington, etc. D erby, E. H „ 95, 116, 118 D etroit, 76, 77; convention o f Boards o f T rad e , 1865, 87, 110, 125 D etroit F re e P ress, 41 D ifferential D uties, in the BritishA m erican C olonies, xi, xiv, xv, 15, 17, 18; attem pt o f the B ritish G ov­ ernm ent to rem ove those created by the R eciprocity T reaty , 56-58; p ro ­ posal o f G a lt and N ew Brunswick in 1861, N ew castle’s concession, 67-68 D israeli, Benjam in, 23 Dix, G eneral, 32 D onahue, Denis, 70, 118 D orion, A . A ., 89, 175/1 D orw in, C ., 59 D ouglas, Stephen, 33, 46, 47 D urham , L ord, xii, xiii, 153/1 E astern States, A m erican, 71, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 Eggs, 48, 112, 116, 143 Elgin and K incardine, E arl of, xiii; connection with M erritt and influ­ ence upon E arl G rey, 5-6, 17-18; relations w ith H ead , 7-8, 11; com ­ missioned to negotiate the R eci­ procity T reaty, 26-27; negotiations a t W ashington, Ju n e, 1854, 31, 39, 42, 43-44; 45, 46, 47, 50, 52; N ova Scotia’s failure to send delegates to W ashington in 1854, 53-54, 94, 141, 145 Elgin P apers, 47 Elliot, T. F ., 90-91, 137 Ely, A lfred, 71 E rie C anal, 114; influence o f the R eci­ procity T reaty, 120-125 E rie L ake, 76 E v erett, Edw ard, 12; action in relation to the fishery controversy and the proposed reciprocity agreem ent, 3536, 39. See also Fillm ore Federalists, 76 Fenian R aids, 95 Fillm ore, M illard; attitu d e o f his a d ­ m inistration tow ard the fishery con­ troversy and the reciprocity negoti­ a tion, 35-36, 45. See also Everett, W ebster

Fiscal A utonom y, C olonial, xi, xii, xiv-xv, 18, 58; progress in 18581861, 66-68, 169/r, C onfederate Council o f 1865, 135-136; W est In ­ dian incident, 137-138; delegation to W ashington, 138; C onfederation, 139 Fish, 10, 11, 12, 21, 36, 48, 55-56, 60; trad e un d er the R eciprocity T reaty, 112, 115, 118-120, 126, 138, 180/i; clauses in the treaty, 141-143 Fisheries, N o rth A m erican, 2, 7, 8-10, 11-14, 15, 19, 154/1, 156/r, sum m ary o f the fishery controversy u p to 1852, action o f the D erby adm inis­ tratio n , 20-25; attitu d e o f Lord C larendon, 25-27; influence o f the fishery controversy upon the reci­ procity negotiation, 34-35; attitude of the Fillm ore adm inistration, 3536; failure o f Congress to act in 1853, 36-37; attitu d e o f the Pierce adm inistration, 38-39, 40; fishery interests su p p o rt R eciprocity Treaty in 1854, 40; discussion o f fishery clauses in the treaty , 48, 49, 50, 51; colonial coastal fisheries o pened to the A m ericans, 52-53, 54, 55-56, 59, 60, 97; fisheries un d er the treaty, 105, 118-20, 180/i; period a fte r the treaty, 1866-1871, 127, 131, 135; clauses in the treaty , 141-143 F lo rid a, 75 Flo rid a, 48 Flo u r, 48, 72, 97; tra d e u n d e r the R eciprocity T reaty , 110-111, 115, 116, 121-122, 138, 143, 147, 179/1. See also Bread-Stuffs F o o te , H . S., 30 F oreign Office, 22, 23, 31, 90, 91. See also British G overnm ent F ree T rade in G re a t B ritain, xi, xii, xiv, xv, 15, 17, 18, 51, 57, 68 F ru its, D ried, 49, 58, 143 Fugitive Slave Bill, 33 F uller, T. J. D ., 37 Fundy, Bay of, 104 G allatin , A lb ert, 21 G alt, A. T ., xv, 64; tariff policy o f 1859, change in the levy o f tolls, 66; controversies w ith N ew castle and the B oard o f T rad e, 1859-1860, 6668, 69, 71, 88, 94, 169/1, 176/i; ef­ fo rts to save the R eciprocity T reaty, 1865-1866, 95, 96; conference with the C om m ittee o f W ays and M eans, 96-97, 98, 102, 138; results o f the G a lt and Cayley tariffs, 117-118, 124-125, 131, 132, 181 n ; the W est In d ian incident, 137-138; delegation to W ashington, 138, 139 G ladstone, W illiam E w art; actio n in 1846 to secure a reciprocal agree­ m ent, 16-17, 75. See also Peel G o rdon, S ir A . H ., 67

I N D E X - 187 H udson R iver, 110, 122 G rain, 3 , 6 , 40 , 48 , 69 , 71 , 161m ; H u d so n ’s Bay Com pany, 131 trad e under the R eciprocity T reaty, 103 , 109- 111 , 115, 116, 120- 122, 126 , H u n ter, H on. R. M . T ., 46 H u n ter, W illiam , 93 143 , 146, 147 , 151-152 H u n t’s M erch an t's M agazine, 41 G ra n d T runk R ailw ay, 69 , 71 , 103, 132 Illinois, 83 , 111, 147 G ra n t, R. F ., 119 In d ian C orn, 109 , 111, 113, 146 , 147 G re a t B ritain, xi, xiv, xv, 4 , 15 , 16, 19 , Innis, H . A ., 180m 25 , 26 , 27 , 31 , 34 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 56 , 75 , In terco lo n ial C onference o f 1849, 7 , 8 , 78 , 80 , 81 , 84 , 88 , 94 , 100, 101, 104, 10, 156m 114 , 119, 127, 162m , 174m ; trad e with Intercolonial R ailw ay, 131 , 132 th e colonies, 1854 - 1866, 129 , 130 Intercolonial R eciprocity; agreem ent G re a t Lakes, 103 , 114, 121 o f 1850, xiv, 57 ; p roposals of G alt G re a t W estern R ailw ay, 103 a n d o f N ew Brunsw ick, 1860 - 1861 , G rey, E arl, xiii, xiv (H o w ic k ), xiv; his N ew castle’s concession, 67-68 relations w ith Elgin, 5 - 6 , 17- 18 ; re­ Iro n , 39 , 66 , 103, 117, 123 lations with H ead , 7 , 10, 11, 12, 13, Islan d Q ueen, 76 15 ; action from 1846 to 1852 , to se­ Jo h n so n ’s Islan d , 76 , 77 , 79 , 80 , 82 , cu re a reciprocal agreem ent, 17- 19 , 99 , 171m 20 , 34 , 44 , 67 . See also Russell Joh n sto n , J . W ., 10; o pposition to the G rey, Sir G eorge; attitu d e tow ard the Reciprocity T reaty, 54 question o f colonial legislation to K ansas-N ebraska Bill, 42 , 45 im plem ent the R eciprocity T reaty , K eefer, Jaco b , 3 51-52 K eefer, T hom as, 31 , 41 , 71 G uelph, C an ad a W est, 77 K ing, P resto n , 70 H ale, Jo h n P ., 84 K ingsford, W illiam , 123 H alifax, 7, 10; petitions against fishery K ingston, 60 , 110, 111 concessions, 13, 38, 53, 75, 76, 104, 132 L abouchere, H enry, 57- 58 , 59 , 60 H am ilton, 111, 117 L a b ra d o r, 20 H am lin, H an n ib al, 37 Lafontaine-B aldw in G overnm ent, 4 H arris, S. W ., 33 Laissez-faire in G re a t B ritain, xi, xiii H arvey, A rth u r, 103, 113 L am bert, C om m ander, 59 H arvey, Sir Jo h n , 9, 13, 18 Lansdow ne, M arquis of, xiv H a tch , C ., 60 L aughlin, J. L aw rence, 88 H a tch , H on. I. T ., 69 ; rep o rt on the L aw rence, A bbot, 35 R eciprocity T reaty , 71 , 73 , 74 L ayard, A . H ., 92 , 94 H ayes, A . L., 114 Legislative C ouncil, o f C an ad a, 122, H aynes, F rederick, 109 , 115, 128 123 H e ad , S ir Edm und; urges reciprocity Le M arch an t, Sir G asp ard , 10 , 13 , 26 ; upon the B ritish G overnm ent, 7 - 8 , failure o f N o v a Scotia to send dele­ 18, 24 , 47 , 53 , 59 , 64 , 67 , 157m gates to W ashington, 1854, 53 , 55 , 58 H enry, W . A ., 95 , 135 L ieber, D r., 86 H incks, Francis; influence upon Elgin, Lincoln, A b rah am , 80 , 83 , 84 , 86, 93 6, 11, 20 , 39 , 53 , 106 L ittle B ass Island, 76 H orses, 105, 113 , 126 Liverpool, 113 , 123 H ouse o f C om m ons, 92 L ivestock, xiv, 105, 115 , 146 H ouse of Lords, 17, 18, 26 L ow er C olonies, 2 , 9 , 10 , 14 , 4 0 , 41 , H ouse of R epresentatives, o f the 45 , 49 , 52 , 55 , 67 , 68 , 89 , 95 , 96 , 99 , U nited States, 30 ; passes bill for 154m ; tra d e un d er the R eciprocity reciprocity w ith C an ad a, Ju ly 12, T reaty, 104 , 105, 106, 108 , 110, 111, 1848 , 32 ; abortive attem pts to pass 112, 114, 115- 116, 126, 129 , 130, 131; a reciprocity bill in 1850 , 33 ; failure interest in the com m ercial benefits o f Seym our’s bill, F eb ru ary , 1853, of C onfederation, 132 - 133, 134, 137, 37 ; passage o f the R eciprocity 138 ; tab le, 149 T reaty, 39 , 42 , 46 , 47 , 69 , 71 , 78 ; L um ber, 6 , 7 , 11, 37 , 41 , 49 , 60 , 69 , passage o f resolution fo r the a b ro ­ 71 , 72 , 97 , 161m ; trad e under th gation of the treaty, 82- 83, 84 , 86 , Reciprocity T reaty , 103, 105, 106, 99 . See also C ongress 113- 114 , 115, 126, 128 , 138 , 144 H ow e, Joseph, opposition to the R eci­ Lyons, L ord, 81 , 173m ; unwellingness procity T reaty , 54 , 60 , 75 ; D etro it to intervene on behalf o f the Reci­ speech in defence o f the treaty, procity T reaty , 1863 - 1864 , 90 , 91 , 1865, 87 93 , 94 ; estim ate o f his policy in rela­ H o we P apers, 54 tion to the treaty, 100 H ow land, W . P ., 95

188 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 M cCulloch, H u sh , 95 M acdonald, Jo h n A ., 80, 89, 94, 132, 138, 176m M acdonald, Sandfield, 89, 175 m M acD onnclI, Sir. R. G ., 135 M cD ougall, W illiam , 137 M cF arland, Raym ond, 120 M ackerel Fishery, 119, 120 M cL ane, R. M ., 33 M agdalen Islands, 20, 141 M aine, 41, 49, 114, 144 M aldon, C anada W est, 76 M allory, S. R ., 37 M alm esbury, E arl of, 20, 23-25 M anchester School, xiii M anufactures, 25, 31, 37, 39, 41 60 61, 65, 67, 69, 72-73, 97, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112, 114, 116, 117-118. See also Protectionist M ovem ents M anufacturers, 41, 69, 72, 88 116 118, 131, 132 M arcy, W . L., 25, 27, 38; negoti­ a tions with C ram pton, A ugust, 1853, 39; negotiation o f the R eciprocity T reaty, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55-56, 119, 141, 145. See also Pierce M aryland, 30, 41, 47, 86 M ason, Jam es M., 46, 47 M eal, 115 M eats, 48, 103, 105, 112, 115, 143. 161m M elbourne, L ord, xiv M erritt, W . H .; Im p o rtan ce in the early m ovem ent fo r reciprocity, 3-6, 7 , 10, 11, 31 , 161 n; negotiations a t W ashington in 1848 and 1849, 32 ; action of his C om m ittee o f Trade and C om m erce, 56- 57 ; 59 , 60 , 65 , 71 , 106 , 120, 122, 123 , 182m M exico, 137 , 138, 184m M ichigan, 86 , 113, 147 M ichigan, L ake, 49 , 123, 144 M iddle States, A m erican, 41 , 113 M ilw aukee, 110 M innesota, 70 , 113, 147 M issouri Com prom ise, 42 , 164m M olasses, 65 , 66 , 105, 117 M olcsw orth, S ir W illiam , xiii, 57 M onck, L ord, 68 , 79 , 171m ; anxiety to prevent disturbances on the A m eri­ can border, 1863- 1864 , 80 , 89, 90 91 , 93 , 95 , 130, 134, 136, 137 M ontreal, 3 , 59 , 66 , 69 , 76 , 77 , 81 , 103 110 , 111, 118, 122, 124 , 131 , 132! 151 M oor, W . B. S., 103, 118 M orrell, W . P ., 18 M orrill, Ju stin S., 69, 82, 83, 84 94 95 M orris, J., 3 M unicipal Loan F un d , C an ad ian , 64 N apier, L ord, 70 N a tional A ssociation o f W ool M anu­ facturers, 114

N a tio n al Policy in C an ad a, xv N avigation Law s, 6, 17 N ew Brunswick, xi, xv; m ovem ent for reciprocity, 4, 6-8, 11-12, 23, 40, 49, 157m; passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty, 53, 55, 56, 58, 60; proposal fo r intercolonial reciprocity, 1861, 67-68; 93; trad e under the treaty, 104, 111, 114, 126, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 141, 144; table, 149 New Brunswick Executive, 7, 11, 93, 135 N ew Brunswick Legislature, 6, 7, 11; passage o f Reciprocity T reaty, 53 N ewcastle, D uke of, xiv; relations with the colonies and the B oard o f T rad e over protective and differen­ tial duties, 66-68, 79, 89, 98 New E ngland, 41, 112, 114, 115, 119 N ew foundland, 2; m ovem ent fo r reci­ procity, 10-12, 20, 50; passage o f the Reciprocity T reaty , 53, 56, 60, 89, 129, 135, 136, 161m; clause in the treaty, 145; table, 149 N ew foundland Executive; refuses to send delegation to intercolonial con­ ference o f 1849, 10 N ew foundland Legislature, 10; A d­ dresses o f the Assembly, Ju n e 1852 and Feb ru ary 1853, 12, 50; passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 53, 58, 89, 145, 166m N ew Y ork (C ity ), 41, 53, 70, 106, 112, 122, 123, 125 N ew York (S la te ), 70, 71, 86 N ew York C o u rier an d E nquirer, 46 N ew York D aily T ribune, 42, 43 N ew York Tim es, 42 N iagara Falls, 77, 83 N oble, Jaco b , 60 N o rth , A m erican, 29, 30, 36; attitude tow ard the R eciprocity T reaty in 1854, 41-42; 43, 47, 70, 75, 101, 105 N o rth A m erican Review, 41, 47 N orth-W est, A m erican, 4, 41, 70, 71, 72, 103, 105, 108, 111, 113, 115, 120, 122, 123, 124, 128, 147, 151-152 N orth-W est, C an ad ian , 131, 132 N ova Scotia, xv, 2; m ovem ents for and against reciprocity, 8-10, 12-14; 19, 20, 22, 23, 40, 41, 48, 49; failure o f N ova Scotia to send delegates to W ashington, 1854, 53; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty , 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 93, 95; trad e u n d e r the treaty, 104, 105, 112, 115, 126, 129; 132, 135, 141; table, 149 N ova Scotian Executive, 8; attitude tow ard reciprocity, 1850-1852, 9, 13; passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 53, 54, 60, 76, 93, 95, 135, 136 N ova Scotian Legislature; attitu d e tow ard reciprocity, 1850-1852, 9; resolution for reciprocity, M arch 1,

I N D E X - 189 1850, A ddress to the Q ueen, M arch 25, 1850, 10; changed a ttitu d e to ­ w ard the fisheries, 13, 53; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty, 54; 135 O ats, 111, 113, 115, 146 O gdensburg, 77, 110, 123 O hio, 112, 147 O liphant, Law rence, 43, 60 Oswego, 59, 110, 111, 122, 123 O ttaw a, 96 P akenham , S ir Jo h n , 17, 32 Pakington, Sir Jo h n , 7, 22, 23 Palm erston, L ord, 33, 75, 92 Passp o rt R egulation, 81, 83, 87 Peel, Sir R obert, xiv, 154n; colonial policy of his governm ent, action to secure a reciprocal agreem ent, 1517, 28. See a lso G ladstone Pennsylvania, 41, 47, 112 Perry, C om m odore, 24 Philadelphia, 69 Pliilo P arson s, 76 Pierce, Frank lin ; failure o f Buchanan to influence his policy in relation to reciprocity and the fisheries, 38-39, 40, 45, 56, 59, 119. See also M arcy Pike, H on. F . A ., 73 P o rk , 113, 115, 147 P o rritt, E dw ard, xii, xiii Portland, 110, 111 Potatoes, 6, 115 P oultry, 48, 116, 143 Prince Edw ard Island, xv; m ovem ent fo r reciprocity, 8, 12, 22; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty , 53, 56, 58, 59, 60; trad e u n d e r the treaty, 104, 115, 129, 141; table, 149 Prince E dw ard Island Executive, 8 P rince E dw ard Island Legislature; passage of A ct fo r reciprocity with the U nited States, 1849, joint A ddress to British G overnm ent, 8; join t A ddress o f F eb ru ary , 1852, A ddress o f A ssem bly, January, 1852, 12, 23; passage o f the R eci­ procity T reaty, 53, 58 Protectionist M ovem ent in C anada, xii, xv, 2; evidences o f the move­ m ent, 1855-1856,60-61,64; influence on tariff policy o f Cayley a n d G alt, 66, 98, 132 Protectionist M ovem ent in the U nited States, 31, 32, 35, 40, 74; opposition to the renew al o f the R eciprocity T reaty, 84-85, 94, 97, 98 Q uebec (C ity ), 95, 104 Railways, 64, 85, 103, 105, 106, 111, 112, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128 R eciprocity A ct o f 1849, C an a d a , 4 R eciprocity T reaty, xi, xv, 15; negoti­ ation o f the treaty, its passage in C ongress, 39-47; analysis o f the treaty, 48-50; passed in the colonies an d G re a t B ritain, 51-54; extension

o f im m ediate treaty privileges to the colonies, 55-56; attem p t o f British G overnm ent to rem ove differential duties, 56-58; popularity of the treaty, 59-60, 61, 64; m ovem ent in the U nited States against the treaty, 1858-1860, the H atch and Taylor reports, 69-74, 75, 77, 78; renew al o f the treaty not pressed by the A m erican Executive, 81-82; C on­ gress passes resolution fo r abroga­ tion, failure o f later attem p ts to save the treaty, 82-87; British policy and abro g atio n o f the treaty, 88, 90-94, 99-102; the colonies and abrogation, 88-90, 94-99, 102, 103, 105, 106; general estim ate o f the treaty’s results, 107-109, 127-128; n a tu re of trad e developed un d er the treaty, 109-115; tra d e o f the Low er Colo­ nies, 115-116; trad e in duty-paying goods, results o f the Cayley and G alt tariffs, 116-118; the tra d e in fish, 118-120; trade o f the St. Law ­ rence, 120-125; im m ediate results of abrogation, 126-127; trade o f the colonies with G reat B ritain, 18541866, 128-129; in teractio n of reci­ p rocity and C onfederation, 131-133, 134, 135; proposals a t the C onfed­ e rate Council fo r negotiating a re ­ newal o f the treaty, 136; failure of the colonial delegates a t W ashing­ ton, Jan u a ry , 1866, 138 R edesdale, L ord, 31 R eform P arty , C anadian, 5 Republican Party , A m erican, 74, 84 R esponsible G overnm ent, xii, 6, 17, 53 Rice, H enry M ., 70 R obinson, C h alfan t, 106 R ose, Jo h n , 78 Rush, R ichard, 21 Rush-Bagot C onvention, 80, 81, 84, 87 Russell, Lord Jo h n , xiii, xiv, 7, 15; action o f his governm ent, 1846-1852, to secure a reciprocal agreem ent, 17-19, 28, 31, 50, 60, 79, 80, 81, 84; reluctance to intervene on b ehalf of the R eciprocity T reaty, 1864, 90, 91-92, 100-101, 177n; efforts to save the treaty, 1865, 92-94; 100, 101, 135, 136. See also E arl Grey R yan, C anadian C om m issioner, 137 Rye, 111, 146 Sabine, L orenzo, 37 St. A lb an ’s R aid, 76-77, 80, 82, 83, 99 St. C atharines, 60 S i. C atharines Jo u rn a l, 3, 4, 61 St. Jo h n , 6, 75, 81, 104 St. Jo h n River, 41, 49, 144 St. L aw rence, G ulf o f, 20, 122 St. Law rence R iver, 4, 11, 19, 20, 41; discussion o f clause in th e R eci­ procity T reaty , 49; attem p ts of G alt

190 - T H E R E C I P R O C I T Y T R E A T Y O F 1854 to increase trade, 66, 69, 71, 85, 97; influence of the treaty , 120-125; 131; clpuse in the treaty, 144 Sam bro, N ova Scotia, 76 Sandw ich, C anada W est, 76 Saunders, S. A ., 104, 112, 116 S avannah, 83 Second R eform Bill, G re a t B ritain, 101 Secretary of the T reasu ry o f the U nited States, 32, 56, 71 S enate, of the U nited States, 22, 30; defeat of reciprocity bill, January, 1849, 32; failure to pass a reci­ procity bill in 1850, 33; failure o f D avis’s fishery bill in 1853, 36-37; passage of the R eciprocity T reaty, 39, 42-47, 48, 70, 75, 78, 82; passage o f resolution for ab rogation o f the treaty, 83-87, 99. See also Congress S eparatist O pinion in E n gland, xii-xiv Sew ard, W illiam , 46, 47, 77; attitu d e tow ard the renew al o f the R eci­ procity T reaty, 78-82, 83, 90, 93-94, 95, 100 Seym our, D avid L ., 37, 48, 49 Seym our, S ir G eorge, 22, 24, 38 Sherm an, G eneral, 83 Sh o rtt, A dam , 72, 113, 115 Shubrick, C om m odore, 24 Skelton, O. D ., 139 Sm ith, A . J ., 133 Sm ith, G erritt, 42 Sm ith, Judge, 77 S o uth, the A m erican; attitude tow ard reciprocity, 29-31, 32; a cause of Congressional inactivity in 1853, 3637; attitude tow ard the R eciprocity T reaty in 1854, influence o f Lord Elgin, 42-45, 47, 49, 75, 78, 85, 101, 105, 126 Stanw ood, E dw ard, 125 S tate D epartm ent, A m erican, 40, 77, 80 Sugar, 16, 49, 65, 66, 105, 117, 124 Sum ner, C harles, 84, 85, 86 Sutton, M anners, 60, 67 Tach6, E tienne, 89 Tallow , 49, 115, 143, 161/1 T aylor, Jam es, W .; re p o rt o n the R eciprocity T reaty , 73, 84 T aylor, Z achary, 33 Thom pson, H on. Jaco b , 76 T h o rn to n , Sir E dw ard , 108, 109, 125, 178n

Tilley, S. L ., 93, 133 T im b er, 16, 48, 69, 72, 161/i; trad e u nder the R eciprocity T reaty, 113114, 144 T obacco, 43, 66, 97, 116, 144 Toledo, 110 T oom bs, R obert, 46, 47 T o ro n to , 66, 111, 117 T oronto G lobe, 106 T reasury D epartm ent, o f the U nited States, 55, 72, 73, 113 T reaty o f P a ris o f 1783, 20 T reaty o f W ashington o f 1871, 127, 183/1 T ren t A ffair, 75 T upper, C harles, 95, 132, 133, 135 T urpentine, 43, 49, 73, 144 U nited K ingdom , xv, 15, 58, 104, 129 U nited States T ariff C om m ission of 1919, 42, 107, 109, 125, 128 V egetables, 48, 112, 115, 161/j Victoria Bridge, M ontreal, 69 V irginia, 30 W ard, H on. E lijah , 70, 73, 82, 83, 84 W ashburn, I., 37 W ashburne, E. B ., 83 W ashington, 9, 16, 26, 27; background to the reciprocity negotiations, 2930; 32, 38; position a t W ashington in the sum m er o f 1854, 39-44; 46, 47, 52, 53, 70, 78, 80, 83, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 145, 184/1 W atk in , E d w ard , 92 W ebster, D aniel, 24; attitu d e tow ard the fishery controversy and the reci­ procity negotiation, 35, 45. See also F illm ore W elland C anal, 66, 123 W ells, D . A ., 95 W est Indies, 57, 68, 105, 114, 120, 126, 136, 138 W estern States, A m erican, 41, 71 W heat, 30, 41, 72; trad e un d er the R eciprocity T reaty, 105, 109-111, 115, 121-122, 125, 131, 146, 147. See also Bread-Stuffs W ilkins, E dw ard, 110, 123, 182/1 Willis, H . P a rk e r, 88 W ilm ot, L. A ., 4 W isconsin, 111, 113, 147 W ool, 105, 109, 114, 126, 144, 161/j Y oung, W illiam , 4, 9, 10; passage o f the R eciprocity T reaty , 54 Y oung, L ieu ten an t, 76-77

SUGGESTIONS FURTHER

FOR

READING

Pioneer works on the Reciprocity Treaty are: Frederick E. Haynes, The Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854 (Baltimore, 1892); Charles C. Tansill, The Canadian Reci­ procity Treaty of 1854 (Baltimore, 1922). L. B. Shippee, Canadian-American Relations, 1849-1874 (Toronto and New Haven, 1939) devotes some 160 pages to the Treaty. The following studies of British imperial policy supply background to the period: C.A. Bodelsen, Studies in MidVictorian Imperialism (London, reprinted, 1960); W. P. Morrell, British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell (Oxford, 1930); E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (London and New York, two volumes, 1925). The Elgin-Grey Papers, 1846-1852 (Ottawa, four volumes, 1937) provide a wealth of material particularly with reference to the thinking of Grey and Elgin in regard to reciprocity. The standard lives of Elgin should be consulted: W. P. M. Ken­ nedy, Lord Elgin (“Makers of Canada Series,” Anniversary Edition, London, 1926) and J. L. Morison, The Eighth Earl o f Elgin (London, 1928). Lawrence Oliphant, Elgin’s secre­ tary, has written an amusing account of the negotiations at Washington in 1854 in his Episodes in a Life of Adventure (London and Edinburgh, 1887). S. A. Saunders, “The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854: A Regional Study,” an article in the Canadian Journal of Eco­ nomics and Political Science, II (February, 1936) describes the operation of the Treaty in the Maritime colonies. Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845-1851 (New Haven, 1936) contains a chapter on the reciprocity movement in this period. Two recent essays by D. C. Masters place the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 in its setting in the long story of CanadianAmerican commercial negotiations: Reciprocity, 1846-1911 (Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 12, Ottawa, 1962) and “Historical and Contemporary Patterns in Cana­ dian Trade Relations,” Fourth Seminar on Canadian-American Relations (Assumption University of Windsor, 1962).

1 . l o r d D u r h a m ’s r e p o r t ,

edited and with an Introduction by

Gerald M. Craig 2 . T H E C O N FED ER A TIO N DEBATES IN T H E PRO V IN CE O F CANADA, 1 8 6 5 ,

edited and with an Introduction by P. B. Waite 3.

l a u r ie r

:

a st u d y in

Ca n a d ia n

p o l it ic s

by J. W. Dafoe, with an Introduction by Murray S. Donnelly 4 . C H A M P L A IN : T H E L IF E O F F O R T ITU D E

by Morris Bishop, with a new Introduction by the author Book I, edited and with an Introduction by Donald V. Smiley t h e u n r e f o r m e d s e n a t e o f c a n a d a by Robert A. Mackay revised and with an Introduction by the author

5 . T H E R O W E I.L /S IR O IS R E P O R T , 6.

7 . T H E J E S U IT RELA TIO N S AND A LLIED D O C U M E N T S : A SELE C TIO N ,

edited and with an Introduction by S. R. Mealing by Chester New, edited and with an Introduction by H. W. McCready t h e r e c i p r o c i t y t r e a t y o f 1 8 5 4 by Donald C. Masters, with a new Introduction by ihe author

8 . l o r d D u r h a m ’s m i s s i o n t o C a n a d a 9.

1 0 . PO L ITIC A L U N R E ST IN U P P E R CANADA, 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 3 6

by Aileen Dunham, with an Introduction by A. L. Burt Volume I, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, with a new Introduction by the author A H ISTO R Y O F TRA N SPO RTA TIO N IN CANADA, Volume II, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook

1 1 . A H ISTORY O F TR A N SPO RTA TIO N IN CANADA, 12.

1 3 . T H E EC O N O M IC BACKGROUND O F D O M IN IO N -PR O V IN C IA L RELATION S

by W. A. Mackintosh, with an Introduction by J. H. Dales 14.

by M aso n W ade, w ith a new In tro d u ctio n by th e a u th o r

the f r e n c h - c a n a d i a n o u t l o o k

1 5 . T H E W E ST E R N IN TER IO R O F CANADA: A RECORD O F GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY, 1 6 1 2 - 1 9 1 7 ,

compiled and with an Introduction by John Warkentin 1 6 . T H E C O URTS AND T H E CANADIAN C O N S T IT U T IO N ,

compiled and with an Introduction by W. R. Lederman 1 7 . M O N E Y AND BANKING IN CANADA,

compiled and with an Introduction by E. P. Neufeld Vollimel, compiled and with an Introduction by Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin

1 8 . FR EN CH-CA N AD IA N SO CIETY ,

1 9 . T H E CANADIAN C O M M ER C IA L R E V O LU TIO N , 1 8 4 5 - 1 8 5 1

by Gilbert N. Tucker, edited and with an Introduction by Hugh G. J. Aitken 2 0 . J O S E P H h o w e : v o i c e o f n o v a SCOTIA,

compiled and with an Introduction by J. I T- ~ v / Beck ..HC I, by O. D. Skelton, edited and! with an Introduction by D a ^ M fl .^ a r r J ~

2 1 . L IF E AND L E T T E R S O F SIR W IL F R ID LA U RIER, »

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