The Reagan Revolution [1 ed.] 0367564521, 9780367564520, 0367564513, 9780367564513, 1003097839, 9781003097839

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgments
Chronology
Who's Who
Part 1 Analysis and Assessment
Introduction
Grappling with Reagan
Defining the Reagan Revolution
1 The Great Communicator
A Brief Biography
The New Deal, Keynesianism, and Conservatism
The 1964 Election and Reagan's Entry Into Politics
The 1970s
Republican Divisions
New Right and Religious Right
Colorblind Conservatism
The Crises of Jimmy Carter's Presidency
The 1980 Election
Conclusion
2 Government Is the Problem
Tax Revolts and Supply-Side Economics
Establishing Reagan's Agenda
Assassination Attempt
Tax Cuts and Budget Cuts
Deregulation and Union Busting
The Reagan Recession
Martin Luther King Jr. Day
Greed Is Good
Conclusion
3 The Reagan Doctrine
Priorities at the Start of Reagan's Presidency
Forging a New Foreign Policy
Nuclear Freeze
The Year of Fear
Central America
Middle East and Central Asia
Conclusion
4 A Moral Majority?
Abortion
Prayer in School
Cleaning Up Culture
Just Say No
HIV/AIDS
Conclusion
5 The Teflon President
1984 Election
Second-Term Agenda
Taxation and Trade
Immigration
Iran-Contra Affair
Fashioning a Comeback
Supreme Court Vacancy
Civil Rights Legislation
Conclusion
6 Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control
Reagan and Nuclear Weapons
US-Soviet Relations
Turmoil in the Soviet Union
Gorbachev and Reagan
Opposition at Home
Fall of the Berlin Wall
Conclusion
7 Assessment
1988 Election
Life After the White House
Republicans and the 'Reagan Test'
The Bipartisan Hero
Reagan in the Age of Trump
Part 2 Documents
8 Documents
Document 1 Ronald Reagan, 'A Time for Choosing' Speech, 27 October 1964
Document 2: Ronald Reagan, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery,' 28 April 1981.
Document 3: Memorandum from Elizabeth Dole to James Baker III, 'Black Strategy,' 24 February 1982.
Document 4: Patti Eslinger, 'Arms Race? or Human Race?' poster, 1982. Offset lithograph paper, 25 × 18.5 in.
Document 5: Morton Blackwell, 'Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives' memorandum, 17 January 1983.
Document 6: Ronald Reagan, 'Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,' 23 March 1983.
Document 7: Ronald Reagan, 'Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,' 27 October 1983.
Document 8: Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention,' 30 January 1984.
Document 9: Patrick Oliphant, 'There he goes again' cartoon,' Universal Press Syndicate, 8 February 1984.
Document 10: Etta Hulme, 'GOP Platform' cartoon, Fort-Worth Star Telegram, 20 August 1984.
Document 11: Ronald Reagan, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,' 6 February 1985.
Document 12: Ronald Reagan Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 November 1985.
Document 13: Mikhail Gorbachev Letter to Ronald Reagan, 14 January 1986.
Document 14: Ronald and Nancy Reagan, 'Joint Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse,' 14 September 1986.
Document 15: Herblock, 'It Didn't Happen' cartoon, Washington Post, 21 May 1987.
Document 16: Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, West Germany,' 12 June 1987.
Document 17: Senator Edward Kennedy, 'Robert Bork's America,' 1 July 1987.
Document 18: Nellie Gray Letter to Ronald Reagan, 18 September 1987.
Document 19: Gran Fury, 'When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?' Poster, 1988.
Document 20: Ronald Reagan, 'Farewell Address to the Nation,' 11 January 1989.
Glossary
Guide to Further Reading
References
Index

Citation preview

The Reagan Revolution

This book offers an overview and analysis of the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the history of conservatism in the United States from the 1960s to the 2020s. Focusing on major events of the 1980s, this book addresses the neo‑ liberal turn in economics and governance; culture war conflict over reli‑ gion, abortion, Supreme Court vacancies, civil rights, drugs, and AIDS; and the final decade of the Cold War. It pays close attention to Reagan’s domestic and foreign policies, including US‑Soviet relations and the Rea‑ gan Doctrine, and analyzes the gap between his conservative rhetoric and his often pragmatic, even bipartisan, approach to governing. Each chapter highlights the criticisms of Reagan’s policies from moderates and conserva‑ tives alike, offering a distinctive exploration of the 1980s as a period of intraparty conflict among Republicans. The book also places Reagan in a broader context through the tumult of the long 1960s, the domestic and foreign policy crises of the 1970s, and the rise of the ‘mythical Reagan’ who shaped Republican and Democratic politics into the present day. The Reagan Revolution is an accessible resource for undergraduate, postgraduate, and nonspecialist readers who have an interest in modern US history and politics. Prudence Flowers is a Senior Lecturer in US History at Flinders University, Australia. She is a historian of social movement activism, modern conserv‑ atism, and US politics. She is the author of The Right‑to‑Life Movement, the Reagan Administration, and the Politics of Abortion (2019).

Seminar Studies Series Editors:

Gordon Martel, Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Northern British Columbia, Canada Mark Stoyle, Professor of History at the University of Southampton, UK

Each book in the Seminar Studies series provides a concise and reliable introduction to a wide range of complex historical events and debates, covering topics in British, European, US and world history from the medi‑ eval period to present day. Written by acknowledged experts and including supporting material such as extracts from historical documents, chronolo‑ gies, glossaries, guides to key figures and further reading suggestions, Semi‑ nar Studies titles are essential reading for students of history. Almost half a century after its launch, the series continues to introduce students to the problems involved in explaining the past, giving them the opportunity to grapple with historical documents and encouraging them to reach their own conclusions. Independence and Nation‑Building in Latin America Race and Identity in the Crucible of War Scott Eastman and Natalia Sobrevilla Perea Capitalism and Individualism in America Gavin Benke Woodrow Wilson The First World War and Modern Internationalism Michael R. Cude The Mexican Revolution Robert Weis The Reagan Revolution Prudence Flowers For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Seminar‑ Studies/book‑series/PEASSH

The Reagan Revolution

Prudence Flowers

Designed cover image: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library First published 2025 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2025 Prudence Flowers The right of Prudence Flowers to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Every effort has been made to contact copyright‑holders. Please advise the publisher of any errors or omissions, and these will be corrected in subsequent editions. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing‑in‑Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data Names: Flowers, Prudence, author. Title: The Reagan revolution / Prudence Flowers. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2025. | Series: Seminar studies. History of Americas | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2024051991 (print) | LCCN 2024051992 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367564520 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367564513 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003097839 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Reagan, Ronald. | Conservatism—United States—History—20th century. | United States—Politics and government—1981–1989. Classification: LCC E876 .F59 2025 (print) | LCC E876 (ebook) | DDC 320.520973/0904—dc23/eng/20250228 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024051991 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024051992 ISBN: 978‑0‑367‑56452‑0 (hbk) ISBN: 978‑0‑367‑56451‑3 (pbk) ISBN: 978‑1‑003‑09783‑9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839 Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra

Contents

List of Figures Acknowledgments Chronology Who’s Who

ix xi xiii xix

PART 1

Analysis and Assessment

1

Introduction Grappling with Reagan 3 Defining the Reagan Revolution 6

3

1

The Great Communicator A Brief Biography 8 The New Deal, Keynesianism, and Conservatism 10 The 1964 Election and Reagan’s Entry into Politics 11 The 1970s 13 Republican Divisions 15 New Right and Religious Right 16 Colorblind Conservatism 19 The Crises of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency 21 The 1980 Election 22 Conclusion 27

8

2

Government Is the Problem Tax Revolts and Supply‑Side Economics 29 Establishing Reagan’s Agenda 30 Assassination Attempt 31 Tax Cuts and Budget Cuts 32

28

vi Contents Deregulation and Union Busting 35 The Reagan Recession 36 Martin Luther King Jr. Day 39 Greed Is Good 40 Conclusion 43 3

The Reagan Doctrine Priorities at the Start of Reagan’s Presidency 46 Forging a New Foreign Policy 47 Nuclear Freeze 50 The Year of Fear 52 Central America 56 Middle East and Central Asia 59 Conclusion 62

45

4

A Moral Majority? Abortion 65 Prayer in School 68 Cleaning Up Culture 70 Just Say No 72 HIV/AIDS 76 Conclusion 80

64

5

The Teflon President 1984 Election 83 Second‑Term Agenda 84 Taxation and Trade 85 Immigration 87 Iran‑Contra Affair 88 Fashioning a Comeback 92 Supreme Court Vacancy 93 Civil Rights Legislation 96 Conclusion 97

82

6

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control Reagan and Nuclear Weapons 100 US‑Soviet Relations 100 Turmoil in the Soviet Union 102 Gorbachev and Reagan 103

99

Contents vii Opposition at Home 107 Fall of the Berlin Wall 109 Conclusion 113 7

Assessment 1988 Election 114 Life after the White House 116 Republicans and the ‘Reagan Test’ 119 The Bipartisan Hero 120 Reagan in the Age of Trump 122

114

PART 2

Documents 8

Document 1 Ronald Reagan, ‘A Time for Choosing’ Speech, 27 October 1964 127 Document 2: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery,’ 28 April 1981. 130 Document 3: Memorandum from Elizabeth Dole to James Baker III, ‘Black Strategy,’ 24 February 1982. 132 Document 4: Patti Eslinger, ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ poster, 1982. Offset lithograph paper, 25 x 18.5 in. 133 Document 5: Morton Blackwell, ‘Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives’ memorandum, 17 January 1983. 133 Document 6: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,’ 23 March 1983. 137 Document 7: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,’ 27 October 1983. 140 Document 8: Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention,’ 30 January 1984. 143 Document 9: Patrick Oliphant, ‘There he goes again’ cartoon,’ Universal Press Syndicate, 8 February 1984. 145 Document 10: Etta Hulme, ‘GOP Platform’ cartoon, Fort‑Worth Star Telegram, 20 August 1984. 146

125

viii Contents Document 11: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,’ 6 February 1985. 146 Document 12: Ronald Reagan Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 November 1985. 148 Document 13: Mikhail Gorbachev Letter to Ronald Reagan, 14 January 1986. 150 Document 14: Ronald and Nancy Reagan, ‘Joint Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse,’ 14 September 1986. 152 Document 15: Herblock, ‘It Didn’t Happen’ cartoon, Washington Post, 21 May 1987. 155 Document 16: Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks on East‑West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, West Germany,’ 12 June 1987. 155 Document 17: Senator Edward Kennedy, ‘Robert Bork’s America,’ 1 July 1987. 157 Document 18: Nellie Gray Letter to Ronald Reagan, 18 September 1987. 158 Document 19: Gran Fury, ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ poster, 1988. 160 Document 20: Ronald Reagan, ‘Farewell Address to the Nation,’ 11 January 1989. 161 Glossary Guide to Further Reading References Index

165 171 179 189

Figures

1.1 Ronald Reagan giving a campaign speech for Barry Goldwater, 1964 1.2 Ronald Reagan giving a campaign speech, 1980 2.1 Ronald Reagan addressing joint houses of Congress, with George H.W. Bush, and Tip O’Neill, 1981 3.1 ‘Americans at War’ magazine cover, 1983 4.1 March for Life rally, 1979 4.2 Nancy Reagan speaking at a ‘Just Say No’ rally, 1987 5.1 Oliver North testifying before Congress, 1987 6.1 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty, 1987 7.1 A child awaits Reagan’s funeral motorcade, 2004 7.2 Donald Trump campaign advertisement, 2015 8.1 Patti Eslinger, ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ poster, 1982. Offset lithograph paper, 25 x 18.5 in 8.2 ‘There he goes again’ cartoon, Universal Press Syndicate, 9 February 1984 8.3 ‘GOP Platform’ cartoon, Fort‑Worth Star Telegram, 20 August 1984 8.4 ‘It Didn’t Happen’ cartoon, Washington Post, 21 May 1987 8.5 Gran Fury, ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ poster, 1988

12 23 33 54 66 74 92 107 118 122 134 145 146 155 160

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Allison Sambucini, Emily Irvine, Kimberley Smith, Gordon Martel, and the other editors at Routledge for helping me through the publishing process. I am also indebted to the archives and institutions who have given me permission to include primary materials in the docu‑ ments section. At Flinders University, I would like to thank my colleagues in the Col‑ lege of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences who have chatted to me about this project, particularly staff in the Gender and Inequality Theme. I feel very lucky to be in a collegial and supportive history discipline, and I am especially grateful to Alessandro Antonello, Matthew Fitzpatrick, and Catherine Kevin for their feedback on drafts and ideas. I have ben‑ efited immensely from the Flinders University Parental Leave Research Support Scheme, and in 2024 I have benefited immensely from the teach‑ ing and research assistance of Yianni Cartledge, Brenton Griffin, and Zoe Keys. I also want to express my thanks to students in my upper‑level topic Divided States of America for their enthusiasm and questions, particularly Peter Day, Simon Hoad, Andrew Johnston, and Shakira Price. I also owe an immense debt of gratitude to Daniel for his good humor, patience, encouragement, probing questions, and practical support. And of course, all my love and appreciation to Theodore and Wilfred, my funny and wild boys.

Chronology

1911 6 February Ronald Wilson Reagan was born in Tampico, Illinois. 1937 Reagan arrived in Hollywood having signed a seven‑year contract with Warner Bros. 1940 26 January Reagan married Hollywood actress Jane Wyman. She filed for divorce in June 1948 and the divorce was finalized in 1949. 1947–52 Reagan was president of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). 1947 23 October Reagan, as president of SAG, was a ‘friendly witness’ for the House Un‑American Activities Committee. 1952 4 March Reagan married his second wife, Hollywood actress Nancy Davis. 1954–62 Reagan worked as a spokesman for General Electric. 1959–60 Reagan became president of SAG again. He led the union during the first Hollywood double strike. 1964 27 October Reagan delivered the ‘A Time for Choosing’ speech in support of Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate. 1967–75 Reagan served two terms as Governor of California. 1968 Reagan ran for the Republican presidential nomination.

xiv Chronology 1976 Reagan ran for the Republican presidential nomination and was nar‑ rowly defeated by the incumbent President Gerald Ford at the Republican National Convention in August. 1979 4 November Start of the Iran hostage crisis. December 1979–February 1989 Soviet‑Afghan War. 1980 July Reagan secured the Republican presidential nomination and chose George H.W. Bush as his running mate. 4 November Reagan was elected president of the United States (US), defeating the incumbent Jimmy Carter. Republicans achieved a majority in the Senate for the first time since 1955. 1981 20 January Minutes after Reagan was inaugurated as the fortieth presi‑ dent, the 52 US hostages in Iran were released. 18 February Reagan sent ‘America’s New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery’ to Congress. 30 March Reagan narrowly survived an assassination attempt by John Hinckley Jr. Reagan’s approval rating jumped to 67 per cent. 28 April Reagan addressed a joint session of Congress on his Economic Recovery Program. July 1981–November 1982 The ‘Reagan Recession.’ 1981 5 August Reagan ended the PATCO strike by firing more than 11,000 air traffic controllers. 13 August Reagan signed into law the Economic Recovery Tax Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. 25 September Sandra Day O’Connor was the first woman to be sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice. 28 October Sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia narrowly passed Congress. 1982 May Beginning of US‑Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) negotia‑ tions on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 12 June 1 million protesters marched in New York demanding a nuclear freeze. 25 August US Marines landed in Beirut, Lebanon. 3 September Reagan signed into law the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi‑ bility Act.

Chronology xv 10 November Death of USSR leader Leonid Brezhnev. Yuri Andropov became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 12 November. December First Boland Amendment took effect, prohibiting the use of federal funds for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. December American unemployment rate was 10.8 per cent. 1983 January Reagan’s approval rating hit a low of 35 per cent. February Reagan’s essay ‘Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation’ was published in Human Life Review. 3 March Reagan delivered the ‘Evil Empire’ speech to the National Association of Evangelicals. 23 March Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 18 April Terrorist attack on the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. 28 June Human Life Federalism Amendment was defeated in the Senate. 1 September USSR shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007. 23 October Terrorist attacks on the US and French forces in Beirut, Lebanon. 25–29 October US invasion of Grenada. 27 October Reagan addressed the nation on Lebanon and Grenada. 2 November Reagan signed the King Holiday Bill into law. 7–11 November Able Archer 83 exercises in Western Europe. 20 November The Day After aired in the US on the ABC television network. 23 November USSR discontinued START negotiations after the US deployed nuclear missiles to bases in Western Europe. 1984 16 January Reagan addressed the nation and the world on US‑Soviet relations. 7 February Reagan announced the withdrawal of US Marines from Lebanon. 9 February Death of USSR leader Yuri Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko became leader of the CPSU on 13 February. 20 March Reagan’s School Prayer Amendment was defeated in the Senate. 26 April Reagan arrived in Beijing, China for a six‑day state visit. October Second Boland Amendment took effect, prohibiting the use of US government funds to support the anti‑communist Contras in Nicaragua. 6 November Reagan defeated Democrat Walter Mondale in a landslide election victory. 1985 20 January Reagan was sworn in for his second term as president.

xvi Chronology 22 January Reagan became the first president to address the March for Life rally. 6 February State of the Union address outlined what became known as the ‘Reagan Doctrine.’ 10 March Death of USSR leader Konstantin Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the CPSU on 11 March. 14 June Trans World Airlines Flight 847 was hijacked by terrorists. 17 September Reagan publicly acknowledged AIDS for the first time. 19 September ‘Rock Porn’ hearings in the Senate. 19–20 November Geneva Summit, Switzerland. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to engage in bilateral talks, including arms control negotiations. 1986 28 January Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds into its flight. 5 April La Belle discothéque, a West German nightclub popular with US soldiers, was bombed by Libyan terrorists. 15 April US bombing of Libya. July Publication of the ‘Meese Report’ on pornography and obscenity. 14 September The President and First Lady addressed the nation about drug abuse. 26 September William Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Antonin Scalia was sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice. Reagan vetoed the Comprehensive Anti‑Apartheid Act. The veto was over‑ ridden by both houses, the first time in the twentieth century that Congress had overridden a presidential foreign policy veto. 5 October A CIA plane was shot down in Nicaragua, the start of the Iran‑Contra Affair becoming public. 11–12 October Reykjavík Summit, Iceland. Reagan and Gorbachev dis‑ cussed nuclear abolition but negotiations were cut short over SDI. October–November Compacts of Free Association went into effect between the US and nations that had been part of the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. A $150 million Nuclear Claims Trust was established to compensate the people of the Marshall Islands. 22 October Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 into law. 27 October Reagan signed the Anti‑Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law. 4 November Democrats gained control of the Senate in the midterm elections. 6 November Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 into law. November The Iran‑Contra Affair broke as a national news story. On 25 November, Reagan forced John Poindexter to resign and fired Oliver North.

Chronology xvii 1 December Reagan established the Tower Commission to review the role of the National Security Council in national security matters. 1987 26 February Tower Commission Report was released. March Reagan’s approval rating was 43 per cent. 31 May Reagan made his first major speech about the AIDS crisis. May–August Joint Congressional committee investigations into the Iran‑Contra Affair were televised. 12 June Reagan delivered the ‘Tear Down This Wall Speech’ in West Berlin, West Germany. 23 October Senate rejected Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court. 8–10 December Washington Summit, US. Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 1988 2 January US‑Canada Free Trade Agreement signed. 18 February Anthony Kennedy was sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice. 16 March Reagan vetoed the Civil Rights Restoration Act. The veto was overridden by both houses of Congress. 27 May Senate ratified the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 29 May–3 June Moscow Summit, USSR. Reagan and Gorbachev contin‑ ued to engage in bilateral discussions. 10 August Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act into law, which gave repa‑ rations and an apology to Japanese American survivors of internment. 8 November George H.W. Bush defeated Democrat Walter Mondale in the presidential election. 18 November Reagan signed the Anti‑Drug Abuse Act of 1988 into law. 1989 20 January Reagan left the White House. His final approval rating was 63 per cent. 9 November The fall of the Berlin Wall. 1990 16–17 February Reagan provided a videotaped deposition in Poindexter’s trial over the Iran‑Contra Affair. 1991 31 July Bush and Gorbachev signed the START I treaty. 25 December The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 1992 24 December Bush issued pardons for six defendants in the Iran‑Contra Affair.

xviii Chronology 1994 5 November Reagan made his Alzheimer’s Disease diagnosis public. 8 November Republicans gained a majority in the House of Representa‑ tives for the first time since 1955. 2004 5 June Reagan died at the age of 93 in Los Angeles, California.

Who’s Who

Atwater, Lee (1951–91): Republican political consultant and strategist who honed negative campaign tactics and was associated with the South‑ ern strategy; Southern coordinator of the Ronald Reagan‑George H.W. Bush 1980 campaign; worked in the White House Office of Political Affairs under Reagan, 1981–83; worked on Reagan’s 1984 re‑election campaign and Bush’s 1988 campaign; chairman of the Republican National Com‑ mittee, 1989–91. Baker, Howard (1925–2014): Republican Senate Majority Leader 1981–  85; US Senator, Tennessee, 1967–85; moderate; ran in the 1980 Republican primaries; White House Chief of Staff under Reagan, 1987–88. Baker III, James (1930–): Republican statesman; moderate; ran five pres‑ idential campaigns, including Gerald Ford in 1976, Bush in 1980, 1988, and 1992, and Reagan in 1984; White House Chief of Staff under Reagan, 1981–85; Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan, 1985–88; Secretary of State under Bush, 1989–92 during the last years of the Soviet Union. Biden, Joseph ‘Joe’ (1942–): Democratic US President 2021–25; served as Barack Obama’s Vice President 2009–17; US Senator, Delaware, 1973– 2009; crafted 1986 bipartisan anti‑drug legislation; Chair of Senate Judiciary Committee, 1987–95 and led Congressional opposition to Rob‑ ert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination; ran in the 1988 and 2008 Demo‑ cratic primaries; defeated Republican Donald Trump in the 2020 elections. Blackwell, Morton (1939–): Conservative activist; worked with Richard Viguerie in the 1970s; member of the Office of Public Liaison under Reagan, 1981–84 where he was tasked with facilitating communication between the administration and conservative and Religious Right organizations. Bork, Robert (1927–2012): Conservative legal scholar and jurist; Judge of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1982–88; US Solicitor General, 1973–77 under Richard Nixon and Ford; involved in the ‘Saturday Night Massacre’ during the Watergate scandal; advocate of

xx Who’s Who constitutional originalism; nominated by Reagan to the US Supreme Court in 1987 but defeated in the Senate vote. Brezhnev, Leonid (1906–82): General Secretary of the CPSU, 1964–82; in 1968 articulated the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ which shaped the USSR’s approach to the Eastern Bloc until the late 1980s; pursued détente with the US; authorized the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Buchanan, Patrick ‘Pat’ (1938–): Conservative writer, media commen‑ tator, and politician; worked in Nixon administration, 1969–74; White House Communications Director under Reagan, 1985–87; ran in the 1992 and 1996 Republican presidential primaries; delivered the ‘culture war’ speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention. Buckley Jr., William (1925–2008): Conservative writer, media com‑ mentator, and intellectual; ‘godfather of modern conservatism’; founded National Review and was its editor‑in‑chief, 1955–90; helped found Young Americans for Freedom, 1960; prominent supporter of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Republican primaries. Bush, George H.W. (1924–2018): Republican US President, 1989–93; US Representative, Texas, 1967–71; US Ambassador to the UN under Nixon, 1971–73; Chair of the Republican National Committee, 1973–74; Director of Central Intelligence under Ford, 1976–77; moderate; ran in the 1980 Republican primaries; served as Reagan’s Vice President, 1981–89; ran as a conservative in the 1988 election and defeated Democrat Michael Dukakis; defeated for re‑election in 1992 by Democrat Bill Clinton. Carter, Jimmy (1924–2024): Democratic US President, 1977–81; Gov‑ ernor of Georgia, 1971–75; centrist; defeated Ford in the 1976 presiden‑ tial election; presidency marked by stagflation, the oil shock, and foreign policy crises; ended US posture of détente towards the USSR; defeated for re‑election in 1980 by Reagan. Casey, William (1913–87): Republican statesman; worked in the Nixon and Ford administrations in the 1970s; worked in Reagan’s 1980 presiden‑ tial campaign; Director of Central Intelligence, 1981–87; implicated in the Iran‑Contra Affair. Clinton, William ‘Bill’ (1946–): Democratic US President, 1993–2001; Governor of Arkansas, 1979–81, 1983–92; centrist; pursued welfare reform; signed North American Free Trade Agreement into law; failed to achieve health care reform; impeached and acquitted, 1998–99. Davis, Nancy: (see Reagan, Nancy). Deaver, Michael (1938–2007): Republican; recruited by Edwin Meese III to work under Reagan while he was Governor of California; worked on Reagan’s 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns; White House Deputy Chief of Staff under Reagan, 1981–85; post‑White House worked as a lob‑ byist and in public relations; investigated for violating federal ethics laws and found guilty of perjury in 1987.

Who’s Who

xxi

Dobrynin, Anatoly (1919–2010): Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the US, 1962–86; with George Shultz, central to re‑establishing relations between Reagan and the USSR. Dolan, Terry (1950–86): Conservative activist and member of the self‑proclaimed New Right; founded the National Conservative Political Action Committee, 1975; took credit for the defeat of prominent Senate liberals in 1978 and 1980 elections; closeted homosexual; died from AIDS complications in 1986. Dole, Robert ‘Bob’ (1923–2021): Republican US Senator, Kansas, 1969–96; in 1976 election was chosen by Ford as his running mate; ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980 and 1988; Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 1981–85; Senate Majority Leader, 1985–87, 1995–96; Senate Minority Leader, 1987–95; gradually shifted from con‑ servative to moderate; his wife Elizabeth Dole worked as Director of the Office of Public Liaison under Reagan, 1981–83 and was Secretary of Transportation, 1983–87; Republican presidential nominee in 1996 elec‑ tion and was defeated by Clinton. Dukakis, Michael (1933–): Democrat; Governor of Massachusetts, 1983–91; liberal; Democratic presidential nominee in 1988 election and was defeated by Bush in a landslide. Eisenhower, Dwight (1890–1969): Republican US President, 1953–61; General of the Army; Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Euro‑ pean Theater, 1943–45; Chief of Staff of the Army, 1945–48; NATO’s First Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1951–52; advanced the idea of ‘Modern Republicanism.’ Falwell, Jerry (1933–2007): Conservative religious activist and leading figure in the Religious Right; ordained pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church; televangelist known for The Old‑Time Gospel Hour; established and was Chancellor of Liberty University, 1971–2007; co‑founded and headed Moral Majority, 1979–87. Ford, Gerald (1913–2006): Republican US President, 1974–77; served as Nixon’s Vice President, 1973–74; House Minority Leader, 1965–73; US Representative, Michigan, 1948–73; moderate; narrowly defeated Reagan to be 1976 Republican nominee and was defeated in election by Carter. Gingrich, Newton ‘Newt’ (1943–): Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1995–99; US Representative, Georgia, 1979–99; con‑ servative; was the co‑author of the ‘Contract with America’ and led the ‘Republican Revolution’ in the 1994 midterms. Goldwater, Barry (1909–98): Republican US Senator, Arizona, 1953– 65, 1969–87; conservative; opponent of the New Deal, staunch anti‑com‑ munist, and critic of Eisenhower; published Conscience of a Conservative, 1960; controversial Republican presidential nominee in 1964 and was defeated by Democrat Lyndon Johnson in a landslide.

xxii Who’s Who Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–2022): General Secretary of the CPSU, 1985–91; embraced ‘new thinking’ and pursued domestic policies of glas‑ nost and perestroika to revitalize the Soviet economy and improve the lives of citizens; opened discussions with Reagan and UK Prime Minister Mar‑ garet Thatcher; signed the Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Reagan in 1987 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I with Bush in 1991; oversaw the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gray, Nellie (1924–2012): Anti‑abortion activist and lawyer; Democrat; organized the first March for Life in 1974 on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade (1973); headed March for Life, 1974–2012. Haig, Alexander (1924–2010): US Secretary of State under Reagan, 1981–82; National Security Advisor for Nixon, 1970–73; White House Chief of Staff under Nixon and Ford, 1973–74; General; Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1974–79; moderate; ran in the 1988 Republican presidential primaries. Helms, Jesse (1921–2008): Republican US Senator, North Carolina, 1973–2003; conservative; leading Congressional opponent of abortion, gay rights, and affirmative action; led Senate opposition to the King Holi‑ day Bill. Hinckley Jr., John (1955–): Attempted to assassinate Reagan in 1981 because of his obsession with the actress Jodie Foster; found not guilty by reason of insanity and was institutionalized for more than three decades. Kemp, Jack (1935–2009): Republican US Representative, New York, 1971–89; Chair of the House Republican Conference, 1981–87; conserva‑ tive; leading Congressional supporter of supply‑side economic policies and across‑the‑board tax cuts; ran in the 1988 Republican presidential prima‑ ries; was Dole’s running mate in the 1996 presidential election. Kennedy, Edward ‘Ted’ (1932–2009): Democratic US Senator, Mas‑ sachusetts, 1962–2009; liberal; ‘Lion of the Senate’; younger brother of President John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; defeated by Carter for 1980 Democratic nomination. Kirkpatrick, Jeane (1926–2006): (née Jordan); US Ambassador to the UN, 1981–85; Georgetown University Professor of Political Science; neo‑ conservative; authored influential 1979 article on dictatorships and human rights; foreign policy advisor for Reagan’s 1980 campaign. Koop, C. Everett (1916–2013): US Surgeon General under Reagan and Bush, 1982–89; pediatric surgeon; prominent opponent of abortion; played a key role in the national response to HIV/AIDS. Meese III, Edwin (1931–): US Attorney General under Reagan, 1985–88; Counselor to the President under Reagan, 1981–85; Chief of Staff while Reagan was Governor of California, 1969–74; called for the Supreme Court to embrace constitutional originalism; Meese Commission on Por‑ nography, 1985–86; was investigated but not charged in the Iran‑Contra Affair; resigned over the Wedtech Scandal.

Who’s Who

xxiii

McFarlane, Robert ‘Bud’ (1937–2022): National Security Advisor under Reagan, 1983–85; Deputy National Security Advisor under Reagan, 1982–83; Lieutenant Colonel; leading advocate for the Strategic Defense Initiative; central figure in the Iran‑Contra Affair and pled guilty to four misdemeanor counts but was pardoned by Bush in 1992. Mondale, Walter (1928–2021): Democratic Vice President under Carter, 1977–81; US Senator, Minnesota, 1964–76; liberal; Democratic presiden‑ tial nominee in 1984 election who made history by choosing Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate; defeated by Reagan in 1984 in a landslide. Nixon, Richard (1913–94): Republican US President, 1969–74; Vice President under Eisenhower, 1953–61; US Representative and then Sena‑ tor for California, 1947–50, 1950–53; defeated in 1960 presidential elec‑ tion by John F. Kennedy; narrowly won presidential election in 1968 against Democrat Hubert Humphrey; won re‑election against Democrat George McGovern in 1972 in a landslide; moderate who used conservative rhetoric; advanced the Southern strategy; pursued détente with the USSR; resigned over Watergate scandal rather than be impeached. North, Oliver (1943–): Deputy Director of Political‑Military Affairs for the National Security Council under Reagan, 1983–86; Lieutenant Colo‑ nel; central to the Iran‑Contra Affair and in 1989 was convicted of three felonies, which were vacated on a legal technicality in 1991. O’Neill Jr., Thomas ‘Tip’ (1912–94): Democratic Speaker of the US House of Representatives, 1977–87; US Representative, Massachusetts, 1953–87; Reagan’s leading Congressional opponent but also worked with the Reagan White House to achieve bipartisan goals. Packwood, Robert ‘Bob’ (1932–): Republican US Senator, Oregon, 1969–95; Chair of the Senate Commerce Committee, 1981–85; Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 1985–87; moderate who clashed with Rea‑ gan and conservatives, particularly on social issues. Phillips, Howard (1941–2013): Conservative activist, writer, and mem‑ ber of self‑proclaimed New Right; involved in the formation of Young Americans for Freedom, 1960; worked on Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign; worked in Nixon administration; founded and chaired Con‑ servative Caucus, 1974–2011; helped found Council for National Policy, 1981; senior editor of Conservative Digest; involved in the formation of Moral Majority, 1979. Phillips, Kevin (1940–2023): American writer and political strategist; in 1969 published The Emerging Republican Majority which was highly influential on subsequent Republican election strategies, particularly through the Southern strategy; in the 1990s published several books con‑ demning ‘Reaganomics.’ Poindexter, John (1936–): National Security Advisor under Reagan, 1985–86; Deputy National Security Advisor under Reagan, 1983–85; Vice Admiral; central to the Iran‑Contra Affair and during his trial, argued that

xxiv Who’s Who Reagan had approved his actions; in 1990 was convicted of five felonies which were reversed on appeal in 1991. Reagan, Nancy (1921–2016): (née Davis); First Lady of the United States, 1981–89; First Lady of California, 1967–75; actress in Holly‑ wood, 1940s–50s; married Reagan in 1952; spearheaded the ‘Just Say No’ anti‑drug campaign in the 1980s. Reagan, Ronald (1911–2004): Republican US President, 1981–89; Gov‑ ernor of California, 1967–75; actor in Hollywood 1930s–60s; president of the Screen Actors Guild, 1947–52, 1959–60; married to Jane Wyman, 1940–49; married to Nancy Reagan, 1952–2004; spokesman for General Electric, 1954–62; evolved from a New Deal Democrat to a conservative; campaigned for Goldwater during 1964 presidential campaign; narrowly defeated by Ford for 1976 Republican presidential nomination; won 1980 election in a landslide against Carter; won 1984 election in a historic land‑ slide against Mondale. Regan, Donald ‘Don’ (1918–2003): Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan, 1981–85; White House Chief of Staff under Reagan, 1985–87; forced to resign because of the Iran‑Contra Affair. Robertson, Marion ‘Pat’ (1930–2023): Conservative religious activist and leading figure in the Religious Right; ordained Baptist minister; founded the Christian Broadcasting Network, 1960; televangelist who hosted the popular television program The 700 Club, 1966–2021; founded Christian Coalition, 1987; ran in the 1988 Republican presidential primaries. Rockefeller, Nelson (1908–79): Republican Vice President under Ford, 1974–77; Governor of New York, 1959–73; liberal/moderate; ran for Republican presidential nomination to try and stop Goldwater being the 1964 nominee; inspired the term Rockefeller Republicans. Schlafly, Phyllis (1924–2016): (née Stewart); Conservative activ‑ ist, anti‑communist, and anti‑feminist; in 1964 self‑published A Choice Not an Echo in support of Goldwater; founded Eagle Forum, 1972; via STOP ERA, successfully led the campaign against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s; organized a counter‑protest of the 1977 National Women’s Conference which was the beginning of the ‘family val‑ ues’ movement. Shevardnadze, Eduard (1928–2014): Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1985–90, 1991; central player in arms control negotiations between Gorbachev and Reagan. Shultz, George (1920–2021): Secretary of State under Reagan, 1982–89; member of Nixon administration, including as a member of Cabinet; worked vigorously to ensure Reagan established connections with the Soviet Union; central to arms control negotiations with Gorbachev. Stockman, David (1946–): Director of the Office of Management and Budget under Reagan, 1981–85; Republican US Representative, Michigan,

Who’s Who

xxv

1977–81; dedicated supply‑sider who oversaw the implementation of ‘Reaganomics’ but became a public critic of the administration. Thatcher, Margaret (1925–2013): (née Roberts); UK Prime Minister 1979–90; Leader of the Conservative Party, 1975–90; fiscally conservative and staunchly anti‑communist; Reagan’s ‘political soul mate.’ Trump, Donald (1946–): Republican US President, 2017–2021; 2025–; real estate mogul and celebrity; populist/conservative; won 2016 presiden‑ tial election against Hillary Clinton; defeated by Biden in 2020 election; denied his defeat in 2020 election and implicated in January 6 US Capitol Attack; twice impeached and acquitted, 2020, 2021; won 2024 presiden‑ tial election against Kamala Harris. Viguerie, Richard (1933–): Conservative activist, writer, marketing strat‑ egist, and member of self‑proclaimed New Right; early member of Young Americans for Freedom; active in Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign; pioneered ‘direct mail’ techniques of fundraising and voter identification; fundraiser for George Wallace’s 1976 presidential campaign; founded Conservative Digest magazine and was its publisher, 1975–85. Volcker, Paul (1927–2019): Chairman of the Federal Reserve under Carter and Reagan, 1979–87; economist; pursued restrictive monetary policies that eventually ended stagflation. Wallace, George (1919–98): Democratic Governor of Alabama, 1963–67, 1971–79, 1983–87; segregationist in the 1950s and 1960s; ran for president in 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1976, three times as a Democrat and once as a third‑party candidate; in 1968 election he won five states; advanced law and order politics; paralyzed by an assassination attempt in 1972. Weicker, Lowell (1931–2023): Republican US Senator, Connecticut, 1971–89; US Representative, Connecticut, 1969–71; liberal/moderate; ran for 1980 Republican presidential nomination; vocal critic of the Religious Right; left the Republican Party at the end of the 1980s. Weinberger, Caspar (1917–2006): Secretary of Defense under Reagan, 1981–87; worked in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as a Cabinet member; central to the Iran‑Contra Affair and was indicted on five felony charges but was pardoned before facing trial by Bush in 1992. Weyrich, Paul (1942–2008): Conservative activist, writer, and member of self‑proclaimed New Right; active in Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign; co‑founded the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation, 1973; founded the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, 1976; co‑founded the Christian Voice, 1977; co‑founded the Moral Majority, 1979 (and is credited with coining that phrase); co‑published Conservative Digest with Viguerie.

Part 1

Analysis and Assessment

Introduction

Ronald Wilson Reagan’s presidency was transformative for the United States (US), ushering in seismic changes in politics, society, the economy, and international relations. His impact was felt in the triumph and main‑ streaming of conservatism but also in terms of the national mood. Reagan was widely credited with reviving American confidence and faith in their country and its institutions. When Reagan died at the age of 93, Time magazine dubbed him the ‘All‑American President’ while his obituary in the New York Times framed him as ‘one of the most important presidents of the 20th century’ (Gibbs, 2004; Berger, 2004). Contemporary scholars share this view. Gil Troy (2005: 347) concluded, ‘like him or hate him, nearly twenty‑five years after the Reagan inauguration, Ronald Reagan’s legacy continues to define his country; he remains the greatest president since Franklin Roosevelt.’ A decade later, H.W. Brands (2015) echoed this comparison with Roosevelt. Steven Hayward (2001), Sean Wilentz (2009), and many others describe the history of the US in the late twentieth and early twenty‑first century as ‘the age of Reagan.’ Grappling with Reagan Reagan was the first celebrity president. Before entering politics in his fif‑ ties, he was an actor, known to many Americans for his movie roles in Hol‑ lywood and, later, as the host of a popular television program. Reagan’s comfort in front of the cameras, his experience inhabiting many roles and speaking to a diverse range of audiences, amplified his ability to connect with people and honed his oratorical skills. While he was president, Reagan once joked, ‘There have been times in this office when I’ve wondered how you could do the job if you hadn’t been an actor’ (Howison, 2014: 118). Nicknamed the ‘Great Communicator,’ Reagan was deeply popular with the public, celebrated for his wit, stories, optimism, and belief in America. His persona was that of a genial and young‑at‑heart leader – quick to smile, an avid horseback rider, a lover of films and Jelly Belly jelly beans. This DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-2

4 The Reagan Revolution goodwill toward Reagan as an individual endured in the face of gaffes, flip flops, recessions, scandals, and sharp criticism, including from allies and former staffers. In the twenty‑first century, Reagan was regularly praised by figures on both sides of politics. Democratic president Barack Obama often claimed to be inspired by Reagan’s tenure in the White House and described him as a leader who: changed the trajectory of America in a way that Richard Nixon did not and Bill Clinton did not … he just tapped into what people were already feeling, which was we want clarity, we want optimism, we want a return to that sense of dynamism and entrepreneurship that had been missing. (Bunch, 2009) For much of the 2000s and 2010s, Republican presidential aspirants vied to be the most ‘Reaganesque,’ or as one of Reagan’s sons bitingly com‑ mented, ‘He’s their touchstone. He’s their fetish. They’ve all got to sort of genuflect to him’ (Ralph, 2015). In the weeks before Donald Trump (2015) formally announced his candidacy for the Republican 2016 presi‑ dential nomination, he posted a photograph on social media of himself shaking hands with Reagan in the 1980s, proclaiming ‘I was proud to be one of Ronald Reagan’s earliest supporters. Like Reagan, it’s time to Make America Great Again!’ Yet when Reagan was in office, there was not a universal sense that he was an inspiring or historically significant leader. During his eight years in the White House, his average job approval rating was 52.8 per cent. From the outset, there was a broad perception that Reagan was ignorant and incurious. One columnist opined that ‘the task of watering the arid desert between Reagan’s ears is a challenging one for his aides’ (Leuchtenburg, 2015: 584). Representative Tip O’Neill Jr., the Massachusetts Democrat who was Speaker of the House for most of Reagan’s presidency, wrote in 1987 that he had known every president since Harry Truman and that Reagan was ‘the worst’: Ronald Reagan lacked the knowledge he should have had in every sphere, both domestic and international. Most of the time he was an actor reading lines, who didn’t understand his own programs. I hate to say it about such an agreeable man, but it was sinful that Ronald Rea‑ gan ever became president. (Pemberton, 1998: 111) Journalists marveled at his frequent verbal slips and his tendency to con‑ fuse fiction, particularly movie plots, with fact. Rather than accuse him of

Introduction 5 lying, they concluded there was not so much a ‘credibility gap’ as a ‘reality gap’ (Leuchtenburg, 2015: 587). These accounts were not simply partisanship. In 1980, William Casey, whom Reagan later appointed head of the Central Intelligence Agency, explained he was supporting Reagan because ‘the guys who have the brains can’t get elected, and the guys who get elected don’t always have the brains’ (Pemberton, 1998: 111). According to second‑term Chief of Staff Don Regan, ‘Every moment of every public appearance was scheduled, every word scripted, every place where Reagan was expected to stand was chalked with toe marks’ (Leuchtenburg, 2015: 587). Even Martin Ander‑ son, whose memoir about working in the White House was broadly sym‑ pathetic to Reagan, commented on Reagan’s passivity and almost complete disinterest in policy specifics. In 1987, White House staffers complained in a memo to the incoming chief of staff that Reagan was ‘lazy,’ ‘inattentive,’ and ‘inept’ (Nelson, 1988). While contemporary conservatives venerate Reagan, in the 1980s they were deeply critical of him. In 1983, prominent New Right figures Howard Phillips and Richard Viguerie urged ‘Reagan not to run again,’ condemn‑ ing him for having ‘done so very little’ for conservatives and accusing him of having been ‘strongly to the left on most issues’ (Witcher, 2019: 68–9). A particular source of grievance was that Reagan, who campaigned heavily on moral traditionalism, was not willing to expend political capital or even push for Congressional votes on these matters. Viguerie (1988) claimed that a senior administration official referred to the social issues, includ‑ ing causes such as abortion, pornography, and prayer in school, as ‘the crappy issues.’ Conservative grievances were far broader than just inaction on morally traditional concerns. They condemned Reagan for his appoint‑ ments within the administration, the Cabinet, and the judiciary. They were frustrated by Reagan’s willingness to compromise and engage in bipartisan legislative negotiation. They were apoplectic over the eventual tempering of his hawkish posture toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and bitterly opposed the bilateral arms treaty negotiations Reagan conducted in his second term. As a historical figure, Reagan has been a source of endless, often bit‑ ter, debate. Was he a zealous true believer in all of the conservative issues he espoused, or did he opportunistically pay lip service to divisive causes and ideas to energize new electoral coalitions? Was his pragmatism a net positive, allowing him to resist the harsh extremes of ideology while pur‑ suing his agenda, or was he a sell‑out? Did he restore luster to the institu‑ tion of the presidency or was his tenure defined by disinterest, corruption, and scandal? Did he champion a return to older values of community and civic pride and fix the American economy, or did he endorse policies and behaviors that led to social atomization and encouraged individualism while widening the gulf between rich and poor? Versions of these debates

6 The Reagan Revolution played out in the media and among conservative and liberal commentators throughout Reagan’s presidency and have continued between historians in the decades that followed. Defining the Reagan Revolution How to define the Reagan Revolution and how to gauge its success or fail‑ ure remains contested ground. Some focus narrowly on Reagan’s economic agenda and pledge to reduce the size and reach of the federal government. During the 1980s, many conservatives believed that this was Reagan’s primary agenda and that it was at best incomplete, at worst, a failure. David Stockman, the Cabinet member nearly singlehandedly responsi‑ ble for enacting taxation and budgetary policies at the start of Reagan’s presidency, publicly held the view that the Reagan Revolution failed at its inception. William Niskanen, a first‑term member of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, concluded that there was no commitment to reducing the budget, nor were there meaningful attempts to dismantle federal pro‑ grams and agencies or curtail big government. Viguerie (1988) penned an acerbic reflection for the Washington Post, insisting that the ‘ultimate fail‑ ure of the Reagan Revolution lies with Ronald Reagan himself.’ Historians tend to share this view of Reagan’s economic policies. As scholar Michael Schaller (2011: x) notes, Reagan ‘failed to accomplish many of his stated goals, such as cutting spending, taxes, debt, and the size of government.’ However, the concept of the Reagan Revolution (or sometimes the Rea‑ gan evolution) is frequently used to convey the broader changes triggered by Reagan’s time in office. Scholar Andrew Johns (2015: 3) argues that Reagan was ‘successful in reorienting the public conversation about gov‑ ernment and its role in the lives of Americans … [and] this debate contin‑ ues to the present day largely on the basis of the parameters established during the Reagan administration.’ Troy (2005: 97, 63) suggests that while the Reagan Revolution ‘did not follow Reagan’s stated script … Reagan helped reorient America.’ In addition to ending the New Deal Democrats coalition and redrawing the electoral map, ‘many of the wedge issues sepa‑ rating “red” from “blue” were the building blocks of the Reagan plat‑ form.’ This book also approaches Reagan as a leader who had a profound impact in US history, particularly for his role in mainstreaming neoliberal‑ ism and moral traditionalism in the social and political landscape. The complexities of Reagan’s eight years in the White House are often glossed over in popular accounts of the 1980s. As this book demonstrates, there was a notable gap between Reagan’s rhetoric and his approach to governance. Synthesizing a body of contemporary scholarship, the book approaches Reagan not as an ideologue but as a ‘pragmatic conservative’

Introduction 7 (Brownlee and Graham, 2003). Through case studies that illustrate Reagan’s core concerns, the book charts what this pragmatism looked like in practice in key areas of economics, foreign policy, and social and spir‑ itual issues. In parallel, it offers a history of the issues and conflicts that rocked the Republican Party in the 1980s. In the White House, in Con‑ gress, and in the pages of conservative and mainstream media, Republi‑ cans disagreed, often bitterly, over what their party should stand for. Yet as the Assessment outlines, although the ‘Age of Reagan’ has shaped the American political and social landscape well into the twenty‑first century, popular narratives and memories have limited connection to the realities of the Reagan years. The political and social reorientation that occurred during and after the 1980s was neither smooth nor inevitable and this book brings to light the stakes of the period, the triumphs and the failures, the compromises and the unexpected opportunities, that accompanied the Reagan Revolution.

1

The Great Communicator

Reagan’s triumph in the 1980 election was a moment of rupture in twentieth‑century United States (US) history, symbolically marking the end of liberalism and the start of the conservative ascendance in American politics and life. His victory was the product of complex forces. In the post‑World War II (WWII) period, the Republican and Democratic par‑ ties, business and organized labor, as well as most voters, shared a belief in big government, the importance of the social welfare state, and active roles for industry and unions. For decades, these commonsense ortho‑ doxies relegated conservatives to the fringes of American political life. Even Reagan was a Democrat when he started as an actor in Hollywood. Reagan’s political career commenced in 1964, and his trajectory from Cali‑ fornia governor to president was shaped by the social movements and civil unrest of the long 1960s. Reagan’s ascendance was also the product of a sus‑ tained power struggle among Republicans. The self‑proclaimed New Right, and the political awakening of the Religious Right, gave Reaganism one of its signature elements, the emphasis on social conservatism. Yet beyond ideol‑ ogy, it was the events of the 1970s that made Reagan broadly appealing to voters. Reagan tapped into the discontents and paradoxes of the age, offering himself as a tonic for a nation that had suffered cumulative economic, social, political, and foreign policy shocks. Reagan used rhetoric and anecdote, as well as his personal optimism and charisma, to connect with Americans and make conservative remedies seem like the solution to the nation’s ills. A Brief Biography Ronald Reagan was born in Tampa, Illinois, in 1911. As a young man, he studied economics and sociology at Eureka College in Illinois and then worked as a radio sports commentator in Iowa. In his twenties, Reagan was offered work in Hollywood and started making films in 1937. He achieved success as an actor in the low‑budget, second feature ‘B mov‑ ies’ that screened as part of a double feature with a major studio picture. DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-3

The Great Communicator 9 Although Reagan never became an A‑list star, he was deeply embedded in the celebrity milieu of Hollywood’s Golden Age. Over Reagan’s acting career, he appeared in more than 50 films including Westerns, thrillers, war films, and romantic comedies, as well as famously co‑starring with a mon‑ key called Bonzo. His role as footballer George Gipp in Knute Rockne, All American, left him with a lifelong nickname, ‘The Gipper.’ In 1940, Rea‑ gan married Jane Wyman, an actress whom he had met on set. They had three children, Maureen, their son Michael whom they adopted hours after his birth, and Christine, who was premature and died shortly after birth. They divorced in 1949. In 1952, Reagan married Nancy Davis, another actress, with whom he had two more children, Patricia and Ronald. For the first half of his life, Reagan was a Democrat for whom Presi‑ dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) was a personal hero. In the 1930s, Roosevelt introduced the New Deal, a sweeping set of federal policies that greatly expanded the size of the federal government and its role in the economy, industry, and daily lives of citizens. Roosevelt also knitted together the New Deal Democrats, a diverse coalition of voters, including African Americans and Southern Whites, which ensured decades of Demo‑ cratic dominance in Washington, DC. Reagan proudly supported the New Deal and Democratic candidates, voting in four elections for Roosevelt and campaigning for his successor Harry Truman. However, as Reagan became more successful and earned larger pay checks, he came to oppose the progressive income tax, viewing it as a disincentive to work. Reagan was also a union leader, the head of the powerful Screen Actors Guild (SAG) from 1947 to 1952 and again in 1959 to 1960. During his second tenure, he represented the union when actors and writers walked off sets demanding better pay and conditions, the first double strike in Hol‑ lywood. Reagan’s fierce anti‑communism shaped his time as president of SAG. In the mid‑1940s, he acted as a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), reporting people he suspected of communist sympathies. Once he was the leader of SAG, he gave FBI agents access to actors’ guild files. In 1947, he was called to testify before the House Un‑American Activities Committee, which targeted Hollywood because it was seen as rife with communist activity and there was fear it was being used to produce propaganda. Reagan was a ‘friendly’ witness, reporting that communists were operating in Hollywood and blaming them for strikes and labor disputes. These hearings and the ‘Hollywood blacklist’ that followed marked the beginning of the Second Red Scare, which devel‑ oped into a nationwide witch hunt after Joseph McCarthy, a Republican senator from Wisconsin, emerged on the national stage in 1950. In 1952, Reagan supported Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower, primarily because of his Cold War policies. Reagan headed ‘Democrats for Eisen‑ hower,’ the first time he campaigned and voted for a Republican.

10 The Reagan Revolution In 1954, as Reagan’s movie parts dried up, he became a paid spokesperson for General Electric (GE), a position with public and corporate elements. He hosted General Electric Theater, a weekly national television pro‑ gram that aired 30‑minute mini‑plays featuring Hollywood stars. He also functioned as a ‘Traveling Ambassador’ for GE, visiting more than 130 factories and laboratories around the country to talk to approximately 250,000 employees. The management culture at GE extolled the virtues of the free market and private enterprise. GE was hostile to organized labor, the New Deal, government regulation, and social welfare, which were con‑ demned as statism. All GE supervisors and managers, including Reagan, were expected to read anti‑communist, anti‑New Deal books, company publications, and influential conservative magazines such as William Buck‑ ley, Jr.’s National Review. Reagan’s speeches at GE plants reflected the company’s anti‑regulation, anti‑union, and anti‑welfare values and became increasingly political. In 1962, GE fired Reagan. Scholar Jacob Weisberg (2016: 39–41) notes that while the ostensible trigger was that Reagan had described a major GE client as an example of the threat of ‘creeping social‑ ism,’ the more likely reason was that Reagan was embroiled in a significant criminal antitrust investigation involving his time as SAG president. That same year, Reagan changed his voter registration to Republican. The New Deal, Keynesianism, and Conservatism In the post‑WWII period, a consensus emerged in the US over the roles and responsibilities of government, along with the embrace of John May‑ nard Keynes’ theory that government could avoid downturns and ensure growth by actively intervening in the economy. This acceptance of Keynes‑ ian economics and big government coincided with an unprecedented period of growth and prosperity for industry, government, and citizens. Between 1945 and 1960, the gross domestic product doubled. Unemploy‑ ment and inflation were low, while wages increased and the median family income almost doubled. The 1950s were dubbed the ‘age of affluence’ and, for the first time, a majority of White Americans were part of the middle class. There were significant improvements in the living standards of many people and consumer culture reflected this sense that the good life included suburban homes, new cars, and sleek household appliances. However, the prosperity of this period was unequally distributed. Conservatives vehemently opposed FDR, the New Deal, and Keynesian‑ ism. They rejected big government because, in their view, it undermined laissez‑faire capitalism and the invisible hand of the market. They con‑ demned social welfare programs, instead emphasizing charity, community, and individual initiative. They also believed that the New Deal mirrored the centralization of power in communist countries. Conservatives viewed

The Great Communicator 11 the Republican Party as the natural home for their pro‑business, small government, anti‑regulation, and anti‑social welfare agenda. They rallied behind Robert Taft, the fiscally conservative and non‑interventionist Ohio senator who unsuccessfully ran for the Republican presidential nomination three times. However, the voice of conservatives in the Republican Party was increasingly marginalized. In the 1950s, Eisenhower championed Modern Republicanism. In his view, ‘should any political party attempt to abolish Social Security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history’ (Eisenhower, 1954). During Eisenhower’s eight years as president, the federal government intervened in the economy, extended Social Secu‑ rity eligibility, created new government departments, and funded major infrastructure projects, including the interstate highway system. The 1964 Election and Reagan’s Entry into Politics A new conservative champion emerged in the 1950s in blunt, fiery Arizona senator Barry Goldwater. To the immense disappointment of conserva‑ tive intellectuals and organizations, Goldwater initially had little interest in running for president. However, he agreed to put his name on a ghost‑ written manifesto, The Conscience of a Conservative, which became a best seller. After the 1960 election, a sustained conservative effort to ‘Draft Goldwater’ commenced, organizing and fundraising at the grassroots level, particularly in the Western and Southern states. In January 1964, Goldwa‑ ter officially declared he was running for the Republican nomination. Goldwater did not temper his conservatism during the campaign and made no effort to attract moderates. He demanded aggressive anti‑ communist action abroad, leading him to be characterized as the war can‑ didate. He talked about the tactical use of nuclear weapons, comments that were out‑of‑step with the national mood after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Goldwater proposed privatizing Social Security, criticized popular government programs, and wanted to undo the New Deal, proposing a dramatic reduction in the size and reach of the federal government. While Goldwater had endorsed desegregation in his family‑owned business and in Arizona schools, he insisted that civil rights were a states’ rights issue, rhetoric that mirrored the arguments of segregationists and White suprem‑ acists. Although Republicans were central in ensuring the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Goldwater and five other Republican senators voted against the landmark legislation. Among Republicans, a ‘Stop Gold‑ water’ movement frantically tried to ensure he was not the nominee. At the Republican National Convention, moderate Governor of New York Nelson Rockefeller, speaking over the boos and hisses of conservatives in the audience, condemned what he viewed as a hostile takeover of the party

12 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 1.1 Ronald Reagan giving a campaign speech for Barry Goldwater, 1964 Source: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

by fanatics. In Goldwater’s acceptance speech, he defiantly proclaimed that ‘extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And moderation in the pur‑ suit of justice is no virtue’ (Heineman, 2018: 59). Goldwater faced off against Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson, who had become president on 22 November 1963 after John F. Kennedy’s tragic assassination. Johnson ran on a sweeping, liberal platform, vowing to win the War on Poverty and advocating for domestic policies to end racial dis‑ crimination and ensure America became the Great Society. He also posi‑ tioned himself as the peace candidate, despite growing US involvement in Vietnam. It was an ugly election. Goldwater’s slogan ‘In your heart you know he’s right’ was countered by the barbed reply, ‘In your guts you know he’s nuts’ (Brennan, 1995: 95). Democrats highlighted Goldwater’s state‑ ments about nuclear weapons and the fact he was supported by extremist and conspiratorial groups, including the Ku Klux Klan. The 1964 elec‑ tion was a landslide for Johnson, Democrats, and liberalism. Johnson won 61.1 per cent of the popular vote, a greater share than his idol FDR, while Democrats gained enough seats to have a two‑thirds majority in both the

The Great Communicator 13 House and the Senate. Goldwater won only his home state of Arizona and five Southern states. However, although 1964 was a humiliating defeat, it ultimately proved to be the beginning rather than the end of modern American conservatism. One week before the election, Reagan delivered a televised fundraising speech for Goldwater titled ‘A Time for Choosing.’ [Doc.  1] Outlining themes developed during his decade working for GE, Reagan offered a stir‑ ring defense of reduced taxation, small government, and uncompromising anti‑communism. Although Reagan had the same overarching message as Goldwater, he was polished and personable. The speech had an electrifying impact, raising $8 million for the campaign and transforming Reagan into the new conservative heir apparent. A group of influential businessmen approached Reagan to run as the Republican candidate for California governor in 1966. His campaign pro‑ moted traditional conservative remedies and attacked Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society programs. He condemned student protests and mocked the hippies of the Haight‑Ashbury in San Francisco. Reagan also offered an early version of law and order politics, arguing that liberals had made the streets unsafe for ordinary Americans. Reagan won decisively against the Democratic incumbent, indicating that White, suburban voters responded favorably to conservative rhetoric if delivered by an appealing candidate. However, Governor Reagan acted pragmatically rather than ideologi‑ cally. Faced with a significant budget deficit, a Democratic‑controlled leg‑ islature, and political backlash, Reagan presided over a significant increase in taxes. Despite campaigning on a pledge to implement a 10 per cent cut in the state budget, over the course of his two terms in office the state budget more than doubled. In 1967, California passed the Mulford Act, pioneer‑ ing gun control legislation that prohibited citizens from openly carrying loaded weapons in public spaces without a permit. The bill was drafted by a conservative Republican, endorsed by the National Rifle Association, and supported by Reagan. It was a legislative response to the militant activism and community protection efforts of African American men and women in the Black Panther Party. Following advice from aides and the urging of Republican legislators, Reagan also signed the Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967. This abortion law reform, among the first in the country, saw the number of legal abortions performed in California increase from approxi‑ mately 5,000 in 1968 to over 100,000 in 1972. The 1970s In the 1968 presidential campaign, Reagan unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination, losing out to Richard Nixon who narrowly won

14 The Reagan Revolution the general election. During the campaign, Nixon made overtures toward conservatives but once in office, behaved like a moderate or even liberal Republican. Domestically, Nixon supported an array of environmental protection laws and the creation of new federal agencies, proposed a uni‑ versal basic income, and initially endorsed efforts to end racial and sexual discrimination in education and employment, including experimenting with affirmative action and hiring quotas. Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger pursued détente, a significant easing of relations between the US and its major communist enemies, China and the Soviet Union. The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I) was the first bilateral arms control agreement between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Nixon also sought a negotiated peace with North Vietnam. In early 1965, the Johnson administration had author‑ ized heavy bombing and sent US Marines to fight in Vietnam, the start of a massive aerial and ground war. This conflict rapidly became profoundly domestically unpopular, and Nixon prioritized ending the fighting over military victory. Nixon’s leadership and policies angered conservatives so much that they supported a conservative challenger in the 1972 prima‑ ries. Although Nixon won re‑election in a landslide, the Watergate scandal dominated his short second term. By the mid‑1970s, American confidence in leaders and institutions was profoundly shaken. The Vietnam War irrevocably challenged the nation’s understanding of itself as a force for good in the world. From 1968 onward, a majority of the public believed that sending troops to Vietnam had been a mistake. In June 1971, the leaked ‘Pentagon Papers’ revealed that multiple US leaders had escalated the conflict, ignored peace offers, and knowingly mis‑ led the American public. Although Nixon insisted that the US had achieved an honorable peace when he signed the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, few were persuaded. The fall of Saigon to communist forces in April 1975 only seemed to highlight the futility of the conflict that had ravaged Southeast Asia for decades. Domestically, the Watergate scandal involved break‑ins and illegal activities, corruption, blackmail, abuse of power, cover‑ups, and criminal conspiracy. A separate scandal drove Vice President Spiro Agnew from office in October 1973. Rather than face impeachment, Nixon became the first president to resign. On 9 August 1974, Gerald Ford became president and one month later pardoned Nixon. Collectively, Viet‑ nam and Watergate dramatically eroded faith in government. In 1964, 77 per cent of the public trusted the government in Washington most or all of the time. By 1974, only 36 per cent did. American engagement in federal politics also diminished. In 1960, 62.8 per cent of voting age Americans cast ballots but by 1980 only 52.8 per cent did. For most of the 1970s, the US was in a prolonged fiscal crisis as the long post‑WWII boom came to an end. The factors behind the economic turmoil

The Great Communicator 15 were complex. The Johnson administration poured huge sums into fighting the Vietnam War but refused to raise taxes or sell war bonds, triggering inflation. American industries were moving manufacturing jobs to cheaper non‑unionized locations in the South, increasing unemployment in the Northeast and Midwest. International competition from West Germany and Japan eroded US corporate profits. Furthermore, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed an oil embargo on nations that supported Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In America, the first oil ‘shock’ caused a stock market crash, gasoline shortages, and a major energy crisis. The country was in recession from November 1973 to March 1975 and for the rest of the decade experienced stagflation, a combination of economic stagnation and out‑of‑control inflation. The cost of living skyrocketed, while unemployment hovered between 5 and 7.6 per cent. Republican Divisions Throughout the 1970s, the Republican Party experienced a profound internal struggle. Liberal and moderate Republicans (whom conserva‑ tives derisively called Rockefeller Republicans) supported family plan‑ ning, environmental protection legislation, and civil rights action, while broadly opposing government intrusions into the private realm of the home. A prominent group of Republican feminists mobilized in favor of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), abortion rights, affirmative action, and federally funded childcare. Moderate and liberal Republicans insisted that they represented the party’s long tradition of supporting equal oppor‑ tunity and individualism. They interpreted Goldwater’s resounding 1964 defeat as proof that voters rejected conservatism. Ford and his Vice Presi‑ dent Rockefeller were moderates, as were many in the party leadership. Ford sought to chart a centrist path on economic policies and continued with the foreign policy of détente. On the so‑called social issues that were beginning to energize some voters, Ford’s stance was mixed. His wife Betty was an outspoken champion of feminist causes and he strongly supported the ERA. Although Ford expressed personal discomfort with the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade which found abortion to be a con‑ stitutional right, he sought to return regulation of abortion to the states rather than an outright ban. Reagan chose not to run for a third term as California governor, leaving office in January 1975. He remained active, writing a syndicated newspa‑ per column, providing daily radio commentary, and traveling the nation on paid speaking tours. Reagan distanced himself from his pragmatic lead‑ ership record, emphasizing a rigid politics that was fiscally conservative and hawkishly anti‑communist. Reagan also began articulating socially

16 The Reagan Revolution conservative views, including opposing the ERA, school busing for racial integration, and gun control legislation. He apologized privately and pub‑ licly for not vetoing California’s abortion law. In November 1975, Reagan announced he was running for the Repub‑ lican presidential nomination. Challenging the incumbent president was controversial and many Republicans, including Goldwater, backed Ford. Reagan positioned himself as an outsider, announcing in his first cam‑ paign press conference that the heart of the nation’s trouble ‘lies right here in Washington, DC’ (Nordheimer, 1975). Reagan denounced ‘big labor’ and condemned social welfare and government assistance, even questioning Social Security, a universally popular program. He blamed government spending for inflation, pledging that he would balance the budget. Reagan excoriated Nixon and Ford for détente, accusing them of presiding over America’s international decline. Reagan also pledged support for a constitutional amendment that would overturn Roe, vow‑ ing that he opposed abortion in all situations except to save the pregnant woman’s life. At the Republican National Convention in August 1976, Ford nar‑ rowly won the nomination. To heal intra‑party divisions, some pushed to have Reagan announced as Ford’s Vice President, an idea that would have pleased neither man. Instead, Ford selected Kansas senator Bob Dole as his running mate. As scholar Daniel Williams (2011) has detailed, Dole worked with conservative North Carolina senator Jesse Helms to bring Reagan voters back into the Republican fold via the addition of an anti‑abortion plank to the party platform. It put Republicans on record in support of ‘the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children.’ Ford thus ran on a platform that was more socially conservative than he was. In the general election, both Ford and Democrat Jimmy Carter had philosophies and records that were ambiguous to most Americans. Carter, a former Georgia governor, pledged to return morality to politics, a com‑ pelling theme in the aftermath of Watergate. Carter won a narrow victory, receiving 57 more Electoral College votes than Ford. New Right and Religious Right By the mid‑1970s, the Republican Party was in dire straits. By 1975, only 21 per cent of Americans identified as Republicans, in contrast to 43 per cent who identified as Democrats. After the 1976 elections, Democrats had significant majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Only 12  governors were Republicans. In this context, a self‑proclaimed New Right, which included Terry Dolan, Howard Phillips, Richard Viguerie, and Paul Weyrich, worked to revitalize conservatism and gain control of

The Great Communicator 17 the Republican Party. They advanced their agenda by founding an array of conservative organizations, institutions, and policy think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Con‑ gress, and the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC). Viguerie pioneered technologically sophisticated and aggressive new direct mail techniques that allowed the New Right to bypass traditional media in their fundraising and voter education efforts. The leaders of the New Right did not have official connections to or leadership roles within the Republican Party. Scholar Donald Critchlow (2007: 131) argues that this allowed them ‘to press with impunity an agenda that interjected new issues and policies into the political arena.’ One of the New Right’s innovations was to focus on traditional moral‑ ity, condemning the social, sexual, and gender shifts of the post‑WWII era. Their emphasis on defending ‘traditional family values’ was instrumen‑ tal in politically mobilizing conservative evangelical and fundamentalist White Christians. Fundamentalists had been relatively absent from Ameri‑ can politics after the 1920s, focusing instead on saving souls and religious missions and revivals. Morton Blackwell, who was a Special Assistant to the President during Reagan’s first term, later described these voters as the ‘greatest tract of virgin timber on the political landscape’ (Flowers, 2019: 21). In 1980, Time magazine estimated that there were 31 million born‑again Christians of voting age, although this did not automatically mean they were conservative. Central to the rapid growth of the Religious Right was the electronic church, facilitated by Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network. A handful of prominent televangelists pivoted from their usual sermons and spiritual exhortations toward politics. The indi‑ vidual with the greatest initial appetite for socially conservative activism was Reverend Jerry Falwell, who established Moral Majority in 1979. By the middle of 1980, the group claimed to have worked with over 72,000 fundamentalist preachers to help register between two and three million new voters. Other Religious Right groups, such as Focus on the Family, Christian Voice, Religious Roundtable, and Concerned Women for Amer‑ ica, were also established in the late 1970s. The Religious Right was alarmed by what they perceived as anti‑faith actions from the federal government. They were particularly concerned by the prohibition of prayer in public schools, the teaching of evolution, and government efforts to strip racially segregated private Christian schools of their tax‑exempt status. However, their interests were much broader, and the rhetoric of spiritual decline was instrumental in drawing previ‑ ously apolitical conservative Christians into worldly affairs. Religious Right leaders presented themselves as fighting to ‘save’ the nation before it fell forever from God’s good graces. Some developed complex arguments that linked the US’s godliness, the Cold War, and the likely outcome of

18 The Reagan Revolution the Apocalypse. Others, like the evangelical philosopher and theologian Francis Schaeffer, believed that the forces of secular humanism were work‑ ing to destroy the Christian basis of American society. Schaeffer called on conservative evangelicals to put aside their long‑standing hostility toward Catholics, Mormons, Jews, and mainline Protestants and create a mass movement based on common political goals rather than theological consensus. In the late 1970s, American conservatism was marked by a new politi‑ cal emphasis on the social issues. Focusing on topics such as the ERA, school textbooks, pornography, divorce, teen pregnancy, sex educa‑ tion, family planning, and abortion, the New Right and the Religious Right offered a broad indictment of liberalism and big government. Frequently, these issues were also a means of condemning second‑wave feminism and gay liberation, movements for equality and rights that had emerged in the long 1960s. Leading anti‑feminist Phyllis Schlafly (1972) insisted that the true agenda of the women’s movement was ‘anti‑ family, anti‑children, and pro‑abortion.’ Prominent conservative voices, including figures such as Anita Bryant, Schlafly, and Falwell, equated homosexuality with pedophilia and viewed it as perverse and immoral, insisting that heterosexuality and traditional gender roles were Bibli‑ cally ordained. Second‑wave feminists and gay activists insisted that the personal was political. Their conservative opponents agreed, viewing the intimate and the domestic as sites for intense ideological and politi‑ cal contestation. On the social issues, the New Right and Religious Right broke with long‑standing Republican values and policies. The ERA sought to amend the US Constitution to guarantee equality under the law regardless of sex. In 1940, Republicans were the first to include support for the amend‑ ment in their party platform, renewing this support every four years until 1980. On family planning and birth control, leading Republicans, includ‑ ing Eisenhower, Rockefeller, Goldwater, and future Reagan Vice President George H.W. Bush, were long‑time supporters of organizations such as Planned Parenthood. In 1973, when the Supreme Court legalized abortion, six of the seven justices in the majority had been appointed by Republican presidents. Goldwater supported abortion rights and in polling done one year before Roe, so did 68 per cent of Republican voters. Democrats, who relied on a significant bloc of Catholic voters, were much more likely to be anti‑abortion in the 1970s. On homosexuality, even Reagan did not embrace all the views of moral traditionalists. The Reagans had long had gay friends, including the Hollywood star Rock Hudson. In 1978, Reagan joined Ford and Carter in publicly opposing the so‑called Briggs Initiative, a homophobic California measure that sought to ban gay men and lesbians from teaching in public schools.

The Great Communicator 19 Colorblind Conservatism When Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law, he allegedly predicted that this marked the end of Democratic power in the South. In the 1964 election, most of the Southern states that voted for Goldwater were voting Republican for the first time since the Reconstruction era of the 1870s. In the late 1960s, political strategist Kevin Phillips identified White Southern voters as key to shattering the New Deal Democratic coa‑ lition and forging a new Republican majority. Nixon honed the Southern strategy during his first term. He criticized and eventually halted affirmative action and quota hiring practices at a federal level, unsuccessfully nomi‑ nated two pro‑segregation justices to the Supreme Court, pathologized the Black family, and pledged to fight a war on crime and a war on drugs, both of which focused on policing racial minorities. Nixon’s landslide victory in 1972 was notable in part because he was the first twentieth‑century Republican to win every Southern state. Journalist Lou Cannon (2000: 458) notes that although Reagan viewed bigotry and racial prejudice as ‘abhorrent,’ he simultaneously rejected the legislative and policy agenda of the civil rights movement. Like Goldwater, he opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He later described the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as ‘humiliating to the South’ (Lucks, 2020: 12). While campaigning to be California governor, Reagan supported an effort to nul‑ lify a fair housing law, arguing for the right of individuals to ‘discriminate against Negroes or others’ (López, 2014: 58). In 1968 when campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination, he refused to condemn George Wallace’s pro‑segregation rhetoric. On the day that civil rights leader Rev‑ erend Martin Luther King Jr. was buried in April 1968, Reagan suggested that his tragic death was the inevitable outcome of allowing people to pick and choose which laws they obeyed. Reagan was also comfortable, depend‑ ing on the audience, engaging in racist conversation. Among Republican insiders, Nixon was known for the derogatory views and language he pri‑ vately used when discussing African American and Jewish people. In Octo‑ ber 1971, Reagan telephoned Nixon to condemn votes cast by African diplomats in the United Nations. As Nixon laughed, Reagan complained, ‘To see those monkeys from those African countries, damn them. They are still uncomfortable wearing shoes’ (Naftali, 2019). The New Right called themselves colorblind conservatives. They argued that all people should be equal before the law and disavowed overt White supremacy and pro‑segregation rhetoric. However, according to scholar Louis Prisock (2018: 62), the New Right also rejected efforts ‘to eradicate racial inequality by eliminating … structural and legal barriers,’ instead insisting that ‘government [should] ignore race as a factor in policy crea‑ tion.’ They thus opposed collective remedies to problems of systemic and

20 The Reagan Revolution customary racism and believed that government had little to no role to play in combatting discrimination or protecting civil rights. In the 1970s, the New Right was highly critical of busing students to help racially integrate schools and opposed affirmative action and quota hiring programs that sought to increase opportunities in employment and education for racial minorities and women. The New Right also attacked food stamps, unem‑ ployment insurance, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. These social welfare programs were not explicitly connected to the civil rights movement but were culturally associated with minority users. Despite a handful of prominent Black conservatives, many African Americans were wary of the New Right and Reagan. In 1981, conservative campaign consultant Lee Atwater was interviewed for political science research about the South. He explained that the suc‑ cess of the civil rights movement changed how politicians made racialized electoral appeals. Atwater took it as self‑evident that it was electorally important to attract the votes of bigots, with the challenge being how to do so without facing accusations of racism: Y’all don’t quote me on this. You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘N‑‑‑‑‑, n‑‑‑‑‑, n‑‑‑‑‑.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘n‑‑‑‑‑r’– that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites. (Perlstein, 2012) Atwater was anonymized in the subsequent book but was a Republican insider who worked on Reagan’s 1980 campaign and, at the time of the interview, was a Special Assistant to the President. Reagan played a significant role in normalizing political rhetoric that exploited and amplified feelings of racial resentment. In 1976, as he chal‑ lenged Ford for the Republican nomination, Reagan introduced his cam‑ paign audiences to the ‘welfare queen’: She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax‑free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year. Journalists understood Reagan to be referencing a recent Chicago case involving an African American woman awaiting trial for using four ali‑ ases and for fraud estimated at approximately $8,000. Scholar Ian López (2014: 58–9) argues that the trope of the welfare queen propagated

The Great Communicator 21 the ‘stereotypical image of a lazy, larcenous black woman.’ When first campaigning in the South, Reagan also told an anecdote about a ‘strap‑ ping young buck’ using food stamps to buy steak, eventually changing his language to the less overtly racialized phrase, ‘some young fellow.’ Neither story directly mentioned race, instead using coded language to frame gov‑ ernment programs as being exploited by corrupt minorities. The Crises of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency The New Right’s rise occurred against the backdrop of domestic and inter‑ national crises that Carter struggled to contain. Stagflation ravaged the economy. Carter was a centrist who firmly believed he needed to reduce government spending and proposed budget cuts and reforms to signifi‑ cant social welfare services, alienating both Congressional Democrats and important segments of his electoral base. In August 1979, Carter appointed Paul Volcker, a fiscal conservative, to head the Federal Reserve. Volcker tightened monetary policy to slow spending and curb inflation. Interest rates climbed over six points in half a year, reaching 17.19 per cent by March 1980. Carter’s stance on issues of gender and sexuality was difficult to catego‑ rize and frustrated both sides of politics. He was an evangelical Christian who proudly talked about being born again, had taught Sunday school for decades, and was a member of the Southern Baptist Convention. He personally opposed abortion and supported the Hyde Amendment, a Con‑ gressional measure that blocked the use of federal dollars to fund abortion care. In 1976, Carter attracted the support of many religiously conservative and morally traditional voters, but they became some of his loudest critics. This was because Carter strongly endorsed the ERA and opposed efforts to constitutionally ban abortion. The Carter administration also sponsored the National Women’s Conference of 1977 and the White House Confer‑ ence on the Family in 1980. Conservatives condemned these conferences as pro‑feminist, pro‑abortion, pro‑ERA, and pro‑homosexual rights, claim‑ ing they were an attempt by feminist and gay and lesbian activists to use the federal government to destroy the American family. On foreign policy, Carter continued détente, including signing SALT II, another arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. However, Carter also infused US foreign policy with a moralist human rights framework. Under Carter, America condemned its allies in Iran, Argentina, South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Nicaragua for human rights abuses and, in some circumstances, suspended military or economic assistance. Con‑ servatives believed Carter was damaging diplomatic relationships and weakening American interests. Scholar Barbara Keys (2014: 267) argues they saw ‘Carter’s foreign policy [as] wallowing in “pathological” guilt,’

22 The Reagan Revolution engaging in constant ‘handwringing about the need for dialogue and mutual understanding.’ When anti‑American governments came to power in Iran and Nicaragua, conservatives held Carter personally responsible. The culmination of the Iranian Revolution in February 1979 triggered another oil crisis, which wreaked further havoc on American economic and social life. For the second time in less than a decade, oil prices doubled and there were frequent fuel shortages. In June, just 28 per cent of Americans approved of the job Carter was doing as president, a few points higher than Nixon’s rating in the weeks before he resigned from office. On 15 July, Carter (1979) delivered a major televised address, speaking to the public about what he saw as a ‘crisis of the American spirit’ and a loss of ‘confidence in the future.’ It was an ambitious speech, frankly reflecting upon the domestic and international setbacks of the past decade and calling on people to have ‘faith in each other, faith in our ability to govern ourselves, and faith in the future of this Nation.’ The speech, initially well received, was eventually dubbed the malaise speech, despite Carter never saying the word. Within a few months, it was interpreted as Carter blaming Americans for his shortcomings. Two international events at the end of 1979  added to the perception that Carter’s America was impotent. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the new fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran, was deeply hostile to the US. Iranian militants believed that America was working to foment a coup and, on 4 November, a group of students attacked the US Embassy in Tehran, taking more than 60 Americans hostage. Global media was filled with footage of Iranians chanting anti‑US slogans and burning American flags, alongside images of blindfolded hostages. Then, on 24 December, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. Conservatives viewed this as proof that détente was a fraud which had allowed the Soviets to gain the strategic upper hand. In response, Carter introduced an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union, recalled the US Ambassador from Moscow, withdrew SALT II from Senate consideration, and announced a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. Détente was over. The 1980 Election At the end of 1979, the misery index, which charted the amount of eco‑ nomic distress felt by ordinary people, reached 19.3 per cent. In January 1980, Volcker’s policies at the Federal Reserve plunged the nation into a recession. Although growth returned in July, the unemployment rate remained high. In April, a disastrous US military attempt to free the remain‑ ing American hostages in Iran led to the death of eight US soldiers and widespread negative commentary. The hostage crisis ultimately lasted 444 days. Carter, unable to compel unity within his own party, was challenged for the presidential nomination by Massachusetts senator Ted Kennedy.

The Great Communicator 23

Figure 1.2 Ronald Reagan giving a campaign speech, 1980 Source: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Although Carter won more state primaries, Kennedy only conceded defeat on the second‑last day of the Democratic National Convention. Among Republicans, Reagan seemed like the clear front runner, but an array of candidates ran in the primaries, including party moderates such as Bush, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker from Tennessee, and Representative John Anderson from Illinois. Anderson continued in the general election as an independent and gained 6.6 per cent of the popular vote. Bush, the Eastern Establishment candidate, was a second‑generation Republican politician. He won an upset victory early on and a handful of primaries. Bush sharply criticized Reagan’s fiscally conservative poli‑ cies, dubbing them ‘voodoo economics’ (a phrase he later attempted to deny). He also characterized Reagan’s foreign policy views as ‘macho’ and ‘flamboyant,’ warning of ‘oversimplification’ and ‘gross overreaction’ (Hoffman, 1988). When Reagan selected Bush as his vice president, the New Right was enraged and the Religious Right alarmed. Although Bush pledged to enthusiastically support the Republican platform, a Conserva‑ tive Digest article acerbically asked, ‘why didn’t Reagan pick a person who is a true believer in the positions [it] advocated’ (Lofton, 1980: 6).

24 The Reagan Revolution Reagan sought to build a broad electoral base. He appealed to disaffected Democrats with a Northern strategy focused on blue‑collar workers, Catho‑ lics, and what the political class dubbed ‘White ethnics.’ Reagan insisted that Democrats were beholden to liberals and minorities and no longer rep‑ resented ordinary Americans. Although highly critical of unions, Reagan presented himself as a friend to American workers and emphasized the fact that he was the first union leader to be a candidate for president. Simultane‑ ously, Reagan pursued an updated version of Nixon’s Southern strategy. The most overt incident occurred on 3 August, when Reagan launched his general campaign at the Neshoba County Fair in Philadelphia, Mississippi, only a few miles from the site where three civil rights workers were mur‑ dered by White supremacists in 1964. Reagan did not mention this violent history, instead assuring the audience, most of whom were White, ‘I believe in states’ rights,’ loaded language that he had never before used in a public speech. The visit to Neshoba was no accident. Republican officials in Mis‑ sissippi pitched it to the Reagan camp as a way of reaching ‘George Wallace inclined voters.’ Carter expressed concern about the resurrection of ‘code words’ such as states’ rights in politics, which led the media to accuse him of running a ‘mean campaign’ (Lucks, 2020: 144–5, 149). Reagan also carefully courted social and religious conservatives through his own professions of faith and via outreach to key figures and organiza‑ tions. Reagan was raised in the liberal Disciples of Christ (or Christian Church) tradition but began to attend a more theologically conservative Presbyterian church in the 1960s. In the 1980 campaign, he emphasized to reporters that he was a born‑again Christian because he affirmed his faith when he was baptized at the age of 11. He reached out to anti‑abortion leaders and appointed a prominent family values activist to chair his Fam‑ ily Policy Advisory Board. Moral Majority’s first executive director was appointed to the campaign as a religious advisor and liaison to funda‑ mentalist Christians. The most emblematic moment occurred in August in Dallas, Texas, when Reagan was part of a Religious Roundtable event alongside Weyrich, Phillips, Schlafly, Falwell, and others. Reagan, echoing a line privately suggested to him by one of the televangelist speakers, told the 17,000 conservative Christian attendees that he knew it was a nonpar‑ tisan gathering and ‘I know that you can’t endorse me, but … I want you to know that I endorse you and what you’re doing’ (Williams, 2010: 187). This is often cited as the moment when conservative evangelicals commit‑ ted wholeheartedly to Reagan. However, as one of Reagan’s top campaign advisors later recalled, ‘the bottom line with the moral majority, or what‑ ever it was called … was that they had no place to go. They had to go with Reagan … He knew that’ (Spencer, 2001). At the July Republican National Convention, divisions erupted over the 1980 platform. The most bitter fight was over the ERA, which Reagan strongly opposed, framing his objections in terms of concerns about the

The Great Communicator 25 intrusive powers of the federal government. At the start of the Detroit convention, over 4,000 people, including prominent liberal and moderate Republican politicians, marched to show their support for the amendment. Mary Crisp, co‑chair of the Republican National Committee and a Gold‑ water Republican, made a passionate speech condemning the platform committee’s retreat from supporting the ERA. Reagan publicly chastised Crisp and questioned her loyalty to the party. Scholar Lisa Young (2000: 99) suggests that from 1980 onward, the Republican Party defined ‘itself in opposition to the women’s movement and feminist issues.’ Reagan’s campaign strategists calculated that he could not win on ideol‑ ogy alone. They were wary of a repeat of 1964, particularly any association with extremism. Throughout 1980, Reagan refused to call himself a con‑ servative, claiming ‘I have always deplored labels.’ Few were persuaded, but campaign advisors argued ‘it’s a lot better to be called a sell‑out than a nut’ (Rossinow, 2015: 22–4). They believed that capitalizing on the eco‑ nomic crisis was central to victory but also knew that Reagan’s past nega‑ tive statements about government benefits, including universally popular programs such as Social Security, were fraught and politically controver‑ sial. Thus, the campaign emphasized his moderate record while governor, aiming to attract independent voters and disaffected Democrats. Reagan deftly and humorously worked to contrast the potential that he represented with the reality of Carter’s presidency, quipping ‘A recession is when your neighbor loses his job. A depression is when you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his’ (Mieczkowski, 2015: 60). Reagan also attempted to counter accusations that he was hostile to women’s equality, announcing late in the campaign that he would appoint a woman to the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity. For many voters, Reagan’s appeal did not flow from his ideology or pol‑ icy acumen. Many pointed out that, at 69, he was the oldest person to ever run for president. According to scholar Yanek Mieczkowski (2015: 59), ‘he came across as an intellectual lightweight’ and ‘oddly incurious.’ Some feared he was a reckless warmonger. However, Reagan offered a vision that was deeply appealing to many voters. His campaign slogan was ‘let’s Make America Great Again’ (Dangremond, 2018). At a time when America’s national self‑image was in turmoil, he was unabashedly patriotic, proud of the US and its history, and hopeful for the future. Reagan regularly talked about America as the ‘city upon a hill,’ rhetoric first articulated in the 1600s by Puritan colonists to describe the special, sacred purpose of their new society. In a powerful election eve speech, Reagan (1980) asked voters to think about the young Americans of the future: let us resolve they will say of our day and our generation that we did keep faith with our God, that we did act worthy of ourselves; that we did protect and pass on lovingly that shining city on a hill.

26 The Reagan Revolution The electoral race was relatively close until the end of the campaign and Reagan’s landslide result was potentially assisted by unethical actions from members of his campaign team. On 28 October, Carter and Reagan had their only debate, which Reagan was viewed as definitively winning. In Reagan’s closing statement, he asked voters what became an oft referenced question: Are you better off than you were four years ago? Is it easier for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was 4 years ago? … Is America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel that our security is as safe, that we’re as strong as we were 4 years ago? (‘1980 Ronald Reagan and…,’ 1980) It was subsequently revealed that Reagan’s campaign advisors had a stolen copy of Carter’s debate briefing book, providing them with key insights into how to defend Reagan from attacks on his controversial record. Just over a week after the debate, events in Iran made a Reagan win all but inevitable. The hostage crisis was the most emotive issue of the election and for months, the Carter administration had worked with Iran to broker an agreement to release the 52 American hostages. At the last moment, the deal was rejected. It is now widely alleged that William Casey, who Reagan put in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency, covertly worked to sabotage these talks and delay the release of the hostages until after the election. On 4 November 1980, Reagan won 489 Electoral College votes to Cart‑ er’s 49, and 50.7 per cent of the popular vote. Reagan won every Southern state except Carter’s home state of Georgia. He also won many of the Northern and Midwestern states that were usually Democratic strong‑ holds. Reagan Democrats made up more than one‑quarter of his base. However, the Reagan Revolution was not for everyone. Black Americans overwhelmingly voted for Carter. Meanwhile, among voters who felt ‘the government should not make any special effort to help [African Ameri‑ cans] because they should help themselves,’ 71 per cent voted for Reagan (López, 2014: 59). Women were 9 per cent more likely to vote for Carter, the beginning of the gender gap in American elections. Moderate Repub‑ licans also turned against the party in record numbers, with more than a quarter voting for either Carter or Anderson. Only 11 per cent of voters agreed that ideology motivated their selection of Reagan. Conservatives rejoiced at the results. Republicans won 12 seats and for the first time since  1955 had a majority in the Senate. They also picked up  34 seats in the House of Representatives. During Reagan’s first two years in office, House Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats would give him a workable majority. The New Right was particularly triumphant. They had waged a high profile negative campaign, running attack ads and utilizing Viguerie’s direct mail techniques. Dolan’s NCPAC

The Great Communicator 27 spent $7 million and took credit for the defeat of four prominent Senate Democrats. Many of the newly elected Senate Republicans won with the support of socially conservative voters. Leading figures in the Religious Right firmly believed that morally traditional voters had swayed the elec‑ tion result for Reagan and the Republicans. Falwell called the election ‘my finest hour’ (Martin, 1996: 220). Conclusion Over the course of almost two decades, Reagan brought conservatism into the political mainstream and honed a message and mode of delivery that united diverse factions and energized moral traditionalists. Significantly, he was able to appeal to, rather than alienate, ordinary Americans who did not share his conservative convictions. He presented his challenge to the status quo as common sense rather than an ideological program. However, despite his rhetoric, compromise was central to his politics both as a gov‑ ernor and as a presidential candidate in 1980. Reagan’s optimism, humor, and genial disposition significantly contrib‑ uted to his popularity. These qualities also helped him offer surety and sta‑ bility in the face of uncertainty and turmoil. While successive presidents in the 1970s grappled with social, economic, and foreign policy crises, Rea‑ gan’s message remained fundamentally the same – Americans were good people, traditional American values were honest and true, and the US was a beacon of hope for the world. These themes were increasingly appealing to the types of voters Nixon had once dubbed the ‘Silent Majority,’ the people who were uncomfortable with the challenges posed by the equality movements of the long 1960s and their critique of the status quo. Neither the general electorate nor the Republican Party had undergone a massive conservative realignment. In 1980, people voted against Carter as much as they voted for Reagan. Moderate Republicans remained an important Congressional force throughout Reagan’s time in the White House. These factors shaped Reagan’s presidency. Initially, there was a consensus that Reagan’s victory gave him a mandate to implement major fiscal policy changes to combat stagflation. Furthermore, the executive branch was usually in charge of foreign policy, a position Reagan strongly embraced. However, on the religiously and socially conservative parts of his agenda, Reagan rarely pressed for political action. The New Right became sharp and consistent critics of Reagan across a range of issues, displeased by his willingness to pursue bipartisan compromises instead of demanding political purity. Yet the passage of time revealed the historic significance of the 1980 election. Reagan’s victory marked the end of the New Deal Democratic coalition, the beginning of conservative dominance within the Republican Party, and the moment when social issues became entrenched in partisan politics.

2

Government Is the Problem

In January 1981, Washington, DC was abuzz over the arrival of the new celebrity president. The $8 million inauguration was the most expensive to date, more than twice the 1976 cost. On inauguration eve, singer and actor Frank Sinatra starred in a televised gala along with celebrities from Hollywood’s Golden Age. On the day, Reagan wore a semi‑formal stroller suit from his Beverly Hills tailor and, to the bemusement of members of Congress, requested that they put aside their business suits and dress accordingly. In the evening, Reagan wore white tie while Nancy wore a hand‑beaded, one‑shoulder, white satin gown, estimated to be worth $10,000. There were eight lavish inauguration balls with an emphasis placed on glamor and celebrity. According to the New York Times, the ‘aura of big money was everywhere’ (Rossellini, 1981). On 20 January, an unseasonably mild winter day, Reagan was sworn in as the nation’s fortieth president before a crowd of 10,000, with almost 42  million watching at home. The Inaugural Address sounded an opti‑ mistic note while frankly addressing the crisis facing the nation. Reagan insisted that stagflation, unemployment, and economic turmoil were the result of decades of misguided government policies. He condemned federal spending levels and tax rates, uttering one of his signature pronounce‑ ments, ‘government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem’ (Reagan, 1981a). In his first years in office, Reagan broke with decades of economic and political orthodoxies, implementing sweeping tax cuts, slashing the budget for social welfare programs, and pursuing a fierce anti‑union and deregu‑ latory agenda. These dramatic early shifts occurred in parallel with the Reagan Recession. Although national prosperity returned by the end of Reagan’s first term and the 1980s is remembered as a time of glitz and excess, it was also a period when the gap between the rich and poor grew significantly. By the end of Reagan’s presidency, he had ushered in a new mood in American politics and culture, transforming ideas about the social contract and the responsibilities of government. DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-4

Government Is the Problem 29 Tax Revolts and Supply‑Side Economics In the early 1970s, the United States (US) economy went into freefall, caused by significant weaknesses at home along with international events. The result was stagflation and spiraling unemployment. Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter could not get the economy under control. Public anger began to erupt at the state level in so‑called tax revolts. In June 1978, California passed Proposition 13, which mandated low property taxes and made it almost impossible for the state to increase other taxes. Tax protest organizations were founded across the country and federal politicians took heed. In 1978, Congress considered a measure, championed by Senator William Roth and Representative Jack Kemp, that proposed 30 per cent tax cuts for all income levels over three years. Although the grassroots tax revolts were dramatic, scholar Kim Phillips‑Fein (2009: 13) argues that they reflected generalized ‘economic anxiety’ rather than a broad rejection of liberalism, Keynesian economics, and big government. Central to Reagan’s conservativism was his absolute faith in the free mar‑ ket. He believed that government interventions in the economy prevented innovation and competition. He viewed most trade unions as illegitimate actors in the employer/employee relationship. He was staunchly opposed to government regulation. In the late 1970s, Reagan linked his core beliefs with an emerging conservative consensus about the path to economic recovery. During the stagflation crisis, supply‑side economics moved from the margins into the halls of power, championed by New Right think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. Supply‑siders argued that significant tax cuts for the wealthy and big business, along with deregulation of indus‑ try, would trigger economic growth and reduce unemployment by increas‑ ing the flow of money that was available for innovation and investment. Supply‑siders also shared the broader fiscally conservative view that the federal government needed to drastically reduce spending. Opponents of supply‑side theory derisively called it trickle‑down economics. For decades, Republicans had prided themselves on being the fiscally responsible party, championing balanced budgets. Significantly cutting taxes would also reduce government revenues. However, supply‑siders argued that lower taxes would stimulate people’s desire to earn higher incomes and thus cuts would eventually have a neutral impact on the budget. Reagan was among the most optimistic of the supply‑siders, assur‑ ing the public that tax cuts would generate so much new economic activ‑ ity that government revenues would increase. Not all were persuaded but Republicans and even some Democrats believed that the 1980 election result gave Reagan a mandate to pursue this radical economic departure. Reagan’s views were shared by Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK). The pair first met in April 1975 when Thatcher was

30 The Reagan Revolution the leader of the opposition. In the 1970s, the UK experienced stagflation and immense economic turmoil, along with a wave of strikes during the winter of 1978–1979. In the 1979 election that brought Thatcher to power, she campaigned on a supply‑side platform that pledged to implement broad tax cuts, deregulate industry, limit government bureaucracy, privat‑ ize public services, reduce trade union power, and cut government spend‑ ing. Thatcher was also fervently anti‑communist and vowed to increase defense spending. Thatcher and Reagan’s common outlook led to a gener‑ ally cooperative interpersonal and Anglo‑American relationship, and they are often described as political soul mates. By the end of their respective periods in office, both the UK and the US had been profoundly refashioned by a broad turn to neoliberalism. Establishing Reagan’s Agenda Reagan relied on key advisors to advance his political vision. In Reagan’s first term, the three most powerful figures were Chief of Staff James Baker III, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III, and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver. The ‘troika’ of Baker, Meese, and Deaver ran the day‑to‑day operations in the White House, controlled the flow of infor‑ mation to and contact with the President, and were tasked with advanc‑ ing the nuts and bolts of Reagan’s agenda. Reagan had a limited grasp of domestic and foreign policy details and seemingly little interest in acquir‑ ing knowledge. The press reported that he dozed during Cabinet meetings and in subsequent memoirs there are multiple accounts where he watched old movies rather than read briefing papers before important meetings. In 1981, Reagan gave only six news conferences, the fewest in the modern era, and his staff attempted to keep the press at a remove to avoid embarrass‑ ing situations for the President. Gradually, there was a widespread politi‑ cal and popular perception that it was advisors, rather than Reagan, who determined policy. Even members of the administration such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig and speech writer Peggy Noonan wondered about who exactly was making decisions in the White House. Scholar Christo‑ pher Maynard (2015: 533) characterizes Reagan’s management style as relying heavily on delegation, with staffers given ‘an extraordinary amount of latitude’ in decision making and implementation. Conservatives had lofty goals for the incoming Reagan administration. The Heritage Foundation’s 3,000‑page ‘Mandate for Leadership  1981’ was distributed to the presidential transition team, an immense tome of detailed policy and regulatory suggestions to enact a broad conservative agenda. However, the New Right was bitterly disappointed by Reagan’s personnel decisions. They thought Meese, a loyal foot soldier who had worked with Reagan since the late 1960s, was the obvious pick to be Chief

Government Is the Problem 31 of Staff. In contrast, Baker was a moderate Republican who was Ford’s campaign manager in 1976 and George H.W. Bush’s campaign manager in 1980. As Chief of Staff, Baker offered desirable jobs to people with experience in government who conservatives dismissed as ‘liberal, moder‑ ate, and non‑Reaganite’ (Maynard, 2015: 533). The entire February edi‑ tion of Conservative Digest was dedicated to criticizing Reagan’s staffing decisions and featured articles by prominent conservatives such as Paul Weyrich, Terry Dolan, Jerry Falwell, and Phyllis Schlafly. The cover image was an open letter to Reagan warning him ‘your mandate for change is in danger of being subverted’ (Conservative Digest, 1981). In March 1981, Reagan assured a conservative audience that the White House did ‘not have a separate social agenda, a separate economic agenda, and a separate foreign policy agenda. We have one agenda’ (Critchlow, 2008: 273). However, Congressional Republicans understood that Rea‑ gan’s domestic focus was passage of sweeping fiscal reforms. Here Reagan was assisted by Howard Baker, now Senate Majority Leader, who at least initially was able to compel party unity. Baker used a football analogy when discussing Reagan’s budget and tax cuts with Senate Republicans; ‘We are a team, and the President is the quarterback and we are his block‑ ers, and we can’t say now we don’t like the plays.’ Baker was also clear about priorities, warning ‘I want the big controversial social issues to wait for next year. I want this year to be Ronald Reagan’s year’ (Bailey, 1988: 99, 98). To enact Reagan’s economic agenda, the President and the White House relied heavily on David Stockman, a former member of the House of Rep‑ resentatives for Michigan and an enthusiastic supply‑sider. At 34, Stock‑ man was seen as an economic wunderkind and Reagan appointed him Director of the Office of Management and Budget. He played an outsized role in decisions relating to taxes, spending cuts, and budget deficits. Stock‑ man later bitterly marveled at the ‘fiscal and economic illiteracy among the core White House group’ (Rossinow, 2015: 54). Assassination Attempt An event early in Reagan’s presidency offered the nation a nightmarish reminder of the moment almost 18 years earlier when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. On the afternoon of 30 March 1981, Reagan was exiting a speaking engagement at the Hilton Hotel in Washington, DC. As he stopped to wave at the crowd, John Hinckley Jr. fired six shots, hitting Reagan and three of the men with him. Hinckley was suffering from psychosis and his motives stemmed from an obsession with the actress Jodie Foster. Hinckley watched the 1976 movie Taxi Driver at least a dozen times and identified with Travis Bickle (played

32 The Reagan Revolution by Robert De Niro) who sought to protect Iris, a child prostitute played by Foster. Hinckley believed that if he became a national figure, he would be Foster’s equal. He initially planned to assassinate Carter but, after Reagan’s victory, his target changed. In the initial aftermath of the shooting, the scene was chaotic and con‑ fused. Reagan and the Secret Service did not realize he had been shot, instead believing he had a broken rib from being pushed to the ground. When Reagan began to cough up blood the presidential limousine rerouted to the hospital where doctors discovered that a bullet had entered Reagan’s body under his left armpit, causing a lung to cave in and narrowly missing his heart. Reagan was rushed into emergency surgery. While there were no fatalities, White House Press Secretary James Brady was permanently paralyzed. Despite Reagan’s near‑death experience, he remained in good spirits, cracking jokes with hospital staff and his family. Time magazine published a list of the President’s quips and one‑liners, noting they ‘did much to reassure … the American public’ (‘Seriously Folks,’ 1981). His popular‑ ity, already high as the incoming President, climbed to 67 per cent in early April. Reagan’s resilience and calmness in the face of the assassination attempt and his emergency surgery helped unite the nation behind its new leader. By Reagan’s one hundredth day in office, he was supported by 51 per cent of Democrats, 70 per cent of independents, and 92 per cent of Republicans. Reagan’s recovery from surgery proved relatively straightforward and he was discharged from hospital after 13 days. As Reagan recovered, his advisors worked with Congress on budget and tax proposals while he used the phone to lobby key Democrats. On 28 April, just one month after the attempt on his life, he addressed the joint houses of Congress. Reagan called on Congress to approve his budget and tax cuts, combining his own fate with that of the nation by declaring, ‘Thanks to some very fine people, my health is much improved. I’d like to be able to say that with regard to the health of the economy.’ [Doc. 2] He received two standing ovations. Tax Cuts and Budget Cuts Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill would later say that although Democrats had a majority, he knew they had lost the economic fight the moment he saw the results on election eve. Conservative Southern Democrats, many of whom had voted for Kemp’s tax cuts in the late 1970s, rebelled against their party and supported Reagan’s fiscal policies. The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) cut the individual income tax rate for the highest earners from 70 to 50 per cent (and further tax reform in 1986 would effectively lower the top rate to 28 per cent). ERTA gradually reduced rates for all

Government Is the Problem 33

Figure 2.1 Ronald Reagan addressing joint houses of Congress, with George H.W. Bush, and Tip O’Neill, 1981 Source: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

other taxpayers with a 5 per cent cut in 1981, a further 10 per cent cut in 1982, and a final 10 per cent cut in 1983. Numerous deductions and benefits for business were added. The largest tax reduction in US history to date was signed into law on 13 August 1981. For Reagan, these tax cuts served an ideological and electoral purpose. Although he began his political life focused on tax cuts for big business and the wealthy, embracing cuts at all levels appealed to middle and working‑class Americans. Scholar W. Elliot Brownlee (2015: 134) suggests that for many in the administration, the popularity of across the board cuts was expected to ‘pave the way for other policy initiatives, and produce a more profound realignment of voters.’ Brownlee speculates that at least some of Reagan’s advisors also welcomed the prospect of high budget defi‑ cits, believing they would force Congress to slash federal spending. In the Inaugural Address, Reagan (1981a) emphasized ‘it’s not my intention to do away with government’ but rather to ‘curb the size and influence.’ He was particularly focused on the social welfare programs introduced during the New Deal in the 1930s and the Great Society in

34 The Reagan Revolution the 1960s. Reagan believed that government assistance reduced people’s incentive to work and made them reliant on federal support, triggering a cycle of dependence that damaged the initiative and drive of the individ‑ ual. In a clumsy articulation of these views, Reagan made a speech before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People arguing that government entitlement and welfare programs were a ‘new kind of bondage’ for Black Americans and suggesting that his supply‑side poli‑ cies would bring about ‘economic emancipation’ (Weisman, 1981). The speech was coolly received, as were many of Reagan’s fiscal policies, lead‑ ing administration staffers to warn that African Americans saw Reagan as a threat to the ‘gains in civil rights.’ [Doc. 3] The Reagan administration approached the Fiscal Year (FY) 1982 budget in an unprecedented way, ignoring the deliberative function of Congress and treating it as a rubber stamp for the executive branch. Stock‑ man saw the budget as a vehicle to change the size and scope of the fed‑ eral government, using cuts to dramatically shrink or even do away with agencies and programs. Reagan proposed $48.6 billion in budget reduc‑ tions. Although Stockman hoped to trim all areas of the budget, members of the Reagan administration and Congress protected Defense and Social Security. Thus, almost three‑quarters of the reductions were targeted at areas that made up under 20 per cent of federal spending, primarily social welfare programs that assisted the impoverished and unemployed, who were disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities. Speaker of the House O’Neill deplored the ‘callousness’ of the budget, calling it ‘a deliberate effort to transfer wealth from the struggling families of this country and award that wealth to those who are already wealthy.’ Normally, such dra‑ matic changes would have been considered individually in Congressional committee. Instead, as many Democrats lamented, Congress was presented with significant cuts to ‘more than 250 programs with no hearings, no deliberation, no debate’ (Tolchin, 1981). However, Southern Democrats supported Reagan’s approach and his overall budget agenda. Reagan’s foreign policies contradicted his austerity agenda. He pursued a significant peacetime buildup to project strength abroad. In 1981 and 1982, the military budget grew by 17.5 per cent, despite strong protests from Stockman. This massive increase meant that Reagan’s promises to shrink the government and balance the budget had no possibility of com‑ ing to fruition. Instead, federal spending increased significantly, while the annual deficit and the national debt almost tripled. The 1981 tax cuts con‑ tributed significantly to the growing deficit. Even factoring in the effects of the Reagan Recession, ERTA deprived the federal government of $643 billion in revenues over the first five years it was in operation. During the FY 1982 budget calculations, Stockman quickly identified continuing deficits of at least $60 billion. He and Senate Majority Leader

Government Is the Problem 35 Baker arrived at a solution to calm skittish senators: the ‘magic asterisk.’ This was used to indicate that deficit problems would be resolved by ‘addi‑ tional budget reductions, to be announced by the President at a later date’ (Greider, 1981). In Reagan’s 28 April address to Congress, he confidently assured the country that the tax cut would not prevent him from balanc‑ ing the budget by the end of his first term. After months of Congressional negotiations, Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 at the same August ceremony in which he signed ERTA into law. In late 1981, Stockman sought to make good on the magic asterisk, attempting to persuade the White House and Congress to implement a second round of cuts. Stockman was intensely concerned by the spiraling budget deficit. While Reagan was tentatively willing, there was resolute opposition from Senate Republicans. Stockman came to the conclusion that despite the radical new tax and budgetary policies he had spear‑ headed, he had failed to meaningfully implement supply‑side theories. In a scorching profile published in the December issue of The Atlantic magazine, Stockman presented Reagan’s fiscal policies as a ‘Trojan horse’ intended to make tax cuts for the wealthy and for corporations palatable to ordinary Americans (Greider, 1981). Deregulation and Union Busting Reagan believed that big government and big unions disrupted the func‑ tioning of the free market and had caused the economic crises of the 1970s. He and the supply‑siders championed broad deregulation and a wholesale attack on the power of organized labor. After the election, Stockman and Kemp drafted a 23‑page plan for Reagan titled ‘Avoiding a GOP Eco‑ nomic Dunkirk.’ They accused Congressional liberals of having created a ‘regulatory time bomb’ and demanded urgent ‘ventilation’  –  relaxing, modifying, or canceling regulations (Stockman and Kemp, 1980). Rea‑ gan used bureaucratic appointments in key agencies to reduce government power. He selected individuals who shared his economically conservative views. Neither Reagan nor his appointees differentiated between govern‑ ment regulation that prevented monopolies and regulation that protected consumers or the environment. Most appointees were people with a cor‑ porate or conservative background, often with a vested interest in reducing government control over specific industries. For example, Thorne Auchter, appointed to head the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, owned a construction firm that had been cited almost 50 times by that agency. Auchter immediately moved to restrict its authority and regulatory abilities. During Reagan’s presidency, multi‑billion‑dollar scandals ensued at the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Housing and Urban

36 The Reagan Revolution Development, and in the savings and loan industry. Scholar Peter deLeon (1993: 4) notes that an ‘embarrassingly large number’ of Reagan’s appoin‑ tees ‘were forced to resign for conflict‑of‑interest‑reasons.’ Ultimately, Reagan did not achieve his goal of broad deregulation. As scholar Michael Adamson (2015: 163) concludes, ‘ideologically driven overreach, incom‑ petence, and corruptibility  –  rather than “pragmatic conservatism” … accounts for the falter of deregulation during the Reagan years.’ Early in his presidency, Reagan also moved strongly against organized labor. In February 1981, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organi‑ zation (PATCO) began contract negotiations with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over safety and working conditions, outdated equip‑ ment, excessive hours, and pay. The Reagan White House viewed this as an opportunity to set an example for unions throughout the country. They narrowly framed it as a dispute over money, characterizing air traffic con‑ trollers as overpaid and greedy. Media coverage echoed this rhetoric. On 3 August, after negotiations stalled, PATCO declared a strike. Although federal government employees were prohibited from striking, the air traffic controllers had several reasons to believe their action would be permitted. Much of the dispute centered on issues that directly impacted passenger safety. PATCO was also one of the few unions that endorsed Reagan in 1980. Lastly, when PATCO members held a walkout in 1970, Nixon still engaged in negotiations. However, Reagan gave the striking air traffic controllers an ultimatum: 48 hours to return to work or be fired. Reagan linked his stance to his broader supply‑side agenda, insisting that PATCO’s demands were economically irresponsible and would be a bur‑ den on taxpayers. When the 48 hours were up, Reagan fired the 11, 500 air traffic controllers who remained on strike and blacklisted them, barring them from working for the FAA for the rest of their lives. In October 1981, the administration decertified PATCO as a union. Replacing striking workers had long been frowned upon as a bargain‑ ing technique and thus Reagan’s handling of PATCO sent shockwaves throughout unionized workplaces. Indeed, his actions helped legitimize this practice, making workers less willing to strike and management more inclined to see strikes as an opportunity to break unions. Although labor membership had been waning since the 1950s, the PATCO strike was an important symbolic turning point. In the 1980s, union membership fell to one‑sixth of the workforce and employers were increasingly assertive, able to extract significant concessions from unions and workers including lower wages, wage freezes, and the end of vacation leave and other benefits. The Reagan Recession When Reagan signed his tax and budget cuts into law, the country was at the start of another economic downturn. In early 1981, Paul Volcker at the

Government Is the Problem 37 Federal Reserve drastically tightened monetary policy in an attempt to get inflation under control. Beginning in July 1981, the national unemploy‑ ment rate began to climb, hitting 10.8 per cent in December 1982. Nation‑ wide, banks foreclosed on homes and farms and 17,000 businesses failed. The Reagan Recession was the worst economic downturn the country had experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As the recession worsened and unemployment grew, Reagan refused to consider increasing funding for social welfare programs. His FY 1983 budget proposed deeper cuts to the Food Stamp Programs, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. During budget negotiations, Speaker of the House O’Neill condemned Reagan for offering a ‘Beverly Hills Budget’ and deplored the ‘mean spirited, inequitable philosophy’ that underpinned Reaganomics (Troy, 2005: 99). Democrats insisted that since Reagan had championed the new fiscal policies, he was to blame for the suffering that followed. Reagan publicly expressed frustration with what he saw as the media’s undue focus on stories of individual hardship. Administration staffer Morton Blackwell (1982) sought to counter media coverage of economic suffering by encouraging conservatives to publicize stories of ‘brazen loafers, cheaters, and smug parasites.’ This contraction of the welfare state was unprecedented and was keenly felt by working‑class Americans, the newly unemployed, the poor, and racial and ethnic minorities. A million Americans were removed from the food stamp program. Over $1 billion that would normally have gone to the states for Medicaid was cut. Funding for school lunches, a near uni‑ versally popular program, was slashed, causing more than 3 million stu‑ dents to drop out of it by the end of 1982. When the downturn was at its worst, only 45 per cent of jobless people could receive unemployment insurance because Reagan appointees pushed through restrictive eligibility requirements. The situation was particularly dire in the Midwest. The Reagan Reces‑ sion, along with the administration’s anti‑union and pro‑deregulation agenda, dramatically accelerated the deindustrialization that had begun in the 1970s. Factory closures between 1979 and 1984 meant the loss of more than 5 million jobs. In heavily industrialized states such as Michigan, unemployment was over 16 per cent in late 1982. Even when the recession was over, factory and manufacturing jobs did not return to what became known as the ‘Rust Belt,’ a reference to the abandoned factories, industrial plants, and urban blight that dotted the landscape. The national economy of the 1980s was moving permanently away from the production of physi‑ cal goods. While Reagan defended social welfare cuts and even pushed to expand them, he was more flexible on other elements of his economic agenda. The spiraling budget deficits alarmed Stockman and Chief of Staff Baker, who spent much of early 1982 privately lobbying Reagan to reverse some of

38 The Reagan Revolution the tax breaks he had so triumphantly signed into law only a few months earlier. They believed that Wall Street investors and the Federal Reserve needed to be confident that the government was taking the budget deficit seriously. Reagan eventually agreed to authorize discussions with Demo‑ crats. As a face‑saving measure for Reagan, tax increases were rebranded as revenue enhancements. Conservatives, both in the administration and in Congress, were out‑ raged at what seemed like a repudiation of Reagan’s economically conserv‑ ative agenda. To Baker’s delight, several of the most ardent supply‑siders in the Department of the Treasury quit in disgust. Conservative intellectual William Buckley, Jr. (1982) characterized the legislation as ‘the collapse of Reaganomics’ and acerbically wondered if Reagan’s endorsement of tax increases had been ‘wrung from him in the middle of a coughing fit dur‑ ing which Mr. Reagan could not collect his senses.’ Members of the New Right spent much of the year arguing that the White House should focus on slashing the Energy and Education department budgets, cutting US con‑ tributions to the UN, and defunding allegedly leftist government programs such as legal services, arts funding, and family planning. Representative Newt Gingrich, along with Kemp, led a conservative Republican revolt against the tax increases. However, the compromise legislation brokered by the Reagan administration and Congressional Democrats narrowly passed and Reagan signed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) into law on 3 September 1982. TEFRA was not the end of Rea‑ gan’s first term forays into tax increases. A measure with notable long‑term implications was the 1983 amendment that made Social Security benefits taxable income. Reagan’s participation in the TEFRA negotiations was a concession on the principles of supply‑side economics, effectively reversing a third of the 1981 tax cuts. TEFRA’s advocates promised it would raise approximately $98 billion in tax revenue over three years. However, this was a drop in the ocean; in 1982, the budget deficit went over $100 billion for the first time, and a year later it was almost $200 billion. Although TEFRA angered conservatives, it seemed to reassure the financial sector. Although there is debate over Volcker’s motivations, in the middle of 1982 the Federal Reserve eased the extremely tight monetary policy. Interest rates dropped and an economic recovery gradually began. Reagan’s job approval rating plummeted over the course of 1982. Republicans, particularly in the House of Representatives, expressed alarm at the White House’s seemingly casual attitude toward the possibility of backlash in the 1982 midterm elections. Although the administration took small steps to try and energize socially conservative voters, Congressional Republicans despaired at the broadly negative media framing of Reagan’s FY 1983 budget proposal. Democrats closely linked Reaganomics to the

Government Is the Problem 39 recession and suffering. In individual contests and national messaging, Democrats argued that Reagan’s budget cuts primarily impacted poor and low‑income Americans, coining the slogan ‘It’s not fair, it’s Republican’ (Hayward, 2009: 202). Democrats also warned that Social Security might be the next target for Stockman and Reagan. On 2 November, Democrats increased their majority in the House of Representatives by 26 seats, ending the coalition of Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats that had advanced Reagan’s economic agenda. Yet based on past precedent, Democrats should have experienced a more sweeping victory in the House. Public opinion polls revealed gener‑ alized dissatisfaction with politicians. A slim majority believed that Demo‑ crats were to blame for high unemployment at least as much as Reagan, while 60 per cent agreed with the statement that ‘the national Democratic Party and its leaders criticize the Republicans instead of making their own proposals’ (Sussman and John, 1983). Reagan’s first‑term ratings were closely tied to the unemployment rate. In January 1983, a majority of Americans felt that Reagan’s presidency had made things worse for people, while two out of three respondents believed that Reagan’s tax cuts favored those with high incomes. His job approval rating was 35 per cent. However, as unemployment gradually decreased, dissatisfaction with Reagan, and by extension his economic agenda, also shifted. Reagan’s job approval rating was 54 per cent at the end of the year. By the 1984 election, Democrats effectively gave up their rhetorical strug‑ gle to define Reaganomics in terms of unfairness or inequality. Instead, they focused on the spiraling budget deficit, ceding important ground to Republicans about the purpose of the federal government and the value of a strong social welfare system. Martin Luther King Jr. Day Economic arguments also played a prominent role in discussions about issues far removed from the budget and taxation. In Reagan’s first term, Congress debated the creation of a new federal holiday to celebrate the life of civil rights luminary Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. Commemo‑ ration of King was first proposed in 1968 in the days after he was assas‑ sinated. Critics of a holiday insisted that King was not worthy of such an honor. They circulated discredited Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claims, raised his anti‑Vietnam War statements to prove his lack of patri‑ otism, and argued that King was of relevance only to African Americans rather than the nation as a whole. When legislation was debated in the House in 1979, opponents emphasized the financial cost of a paid federal holiday and proposed shifting it to the third Sunday in January to create an unpaid memorial day, a model that Reagan favored once president. After

40 The Reagan Revolution the 1982 midterms and Democratic success in the House, the legislation was reintroduced. By 1983, the mood in Congress had shifted. There was now significant bipartisan support for a paid holiday, including from Vice President Bush, Senate Majority Leader Baker, prominent conservatives such as Kemp, and party moderates such as Senator Bob Dole. Early in Reagan’s presidency, administration staff warned that he had a problem appealing to African American voters. Weeks after he was elected, Reagan told Time magazine that he had opposed the Voting Rights Act at its inception and hinted that he would not support a further extension of the signature civil rights legislation, which was due to expire in 1982. He did eventually sign a compromise measure, but Black leaders attending the signing ceremony bluntly told the press they were not confident that the Justice Department under Reagan would enforce the law. These tensions were evident in the debate over the King Holiday. The bill easily passed the House on 2 August 1983 but Reagan indicated he would not support it. He framed his position in terms of fiscal conservatism, arguing that ‘the Government ought not to be shut down for another day each year at a time when the Federal purse‑strings need further tightening’ (‘House Backs Holiday …,’ 1983). However, several days later, the media began to report that Reagan was no longer committed to vetoing the bill, a shift strongly encouraged by Senate Majority Leader Baker. Conservatives were critical of Reagan’s change in attitude. New Right figure Howard Phillips accused Reagan of giving in to his advisors and called for the sealed sections of King’s FBI files to be made public. Senator Jesse Helms led a 16‑day filibuster of the bill, during which he claimed that King was a communist, circulated material about his marital infidelities, described non‑violent protest as a ‘provocative act to disturb the peace,’ and asserted that King’s name was ‘a deeply troubling symbol of divided society.’ Helms also lent heavily on economic arguments, insisting that the productivity cost would be $12 billion per year (far more than the Con‑ gressional Budget Office estimate of $18  million annually). In response, Dole caustically enquired, ‘When did a dollar sign take its place atop our moral code?’ (Dewar, 1983). On 19 October, the bill passed the Senate 78‑22, with 18 Republicans voting nay. Scholar Daniel Fleming (2022: 42) argues that although Reagan signed the bill, this was a political calculation rather than a sincere conversion on King’s life and legacy. Indeed, Reagan’s comments during the Senate debates indicated tacit support for Helms’ incendiary claims about King. Greed Is Good In November 1982, inflation in the US dropped to 4.6 per cent, a level last seen at the start of the 1970s. By early 1983, the Reagan administration,

Government Is the Problem 41 the Federal Reserve, economists, and big business all agreed that the downturn was over. For the remainder of the decade, popular culture celebrated the booming economy, focusing on millionaires, the new rich, prosperity, and conspicuous consumption. There was a media fixation on the lifestyles of the rich and those aspiring to join them. It was in the 1980s that Donald Trump first emerged as a celebrity real estate mogul, erecting high profile buildings around the world badged with his name and adorned with gold design features. The archetypal 1980s figure was the young urban professional, nicknamed the yuppie. Predominantly White, college educated, and often working in finance, law, or business, the yuppie had a large amount of disposable income, sported a preppy style, and spent lavishly on designer clothing, imported European prod‑ ucts, new forms of technology, and other signifiers of the urban good life. They relentlessly pursued success, promotion, and upward mobility. Newsweek magazine declared 1984 the ‘Year of the Yuppie’ (Thompson, 2007: 12). The financial sector benefited immensely from deregulation and the Rea‑ gan administration’s reluctance to enforce antitrust laws. Wall Street domi‑ nated understandings of the new go‑go economy and the ever‑climbing numbers on the stock exchange seemed to represent the glorious possibili‑ ties of the free hand of the market. The decade’s unofficial motto – ‘greed is good’ – was coined by Gordon Gekko, a character in the 1987 movie Wall Street (Thompson, 2007: 14). Gekko’s line was directly inspired by the stockbroker Ivan Boesky’s 1986 commencement address to business‑school graduates at the University of California, Berkeley. However, Boesky engaged in insider trading and ultimately became a significant informant who brought down other high‑profile Wall Street financiers and served several years in prison. This was just one instance where leading brokers and traders were arrested for fraud, criminal conspiracy, and insider trad‑ ing. The savings and loan crisis cost US taxpayers over $120 billion, the largest federal bailout in history at that time and a significant addition to the national debt. The precariousness of the new economy was thrown into stark relief on 19 October 1987 when the Dow Jones lost almost 23 per cent in a single day, a bigger drop than the infamous 1929 crash at the start of the Great Depression. The economic growth of the 1980s was not evenly distributed across the population, in marked contrast to the last significant boom. Between 1945 and 1973, national wealth grew without increasing economic inequality and prosperity was broadly shared across class (although not racial) lines. In the 1980s, one in three White families was middle class or affluent, earn‑ ing incomes above $50,000 per year. This decade also saw the consolida‑ tion and growth of a distinctly prosperous African American community, with almost one in seven Black households reporting an annual income

42 The Reagan Revolution of $50,000 per year. However, the 1980s also saw significant increases in inequality which persist to this day. It was the richest, particularly the top 5 per cent, who reaped the most direct benefit from Reaganomics, with their wealth increasing steadily over the decade. In contrast, the poorest 20 per cent saw their economic situation stagnate or decline. In Reagan’s first three years in office, the number of poor people in America grew by 6 mil‑ lion. Phillips‑Fein (2009: 127) argues that Reagan’s taxation, regulatory, and budgetary policies ‘profoundly changed the way in which wealth was generated and distributed.’ In the 1980s, the poor were primarily single mothers and their children, or young men with limited education or job skills. Native Americans, Afri‑ can Americans, and Hispanic Americans were disproportionately likely to be impoverished. The 1981 and 1982 budget cuts were ostensibly color‑ blind, but they significantly reduced funding for entitlement programs that assisted these groups, exacerbating the racialized and feminized face of American poverty. Reagan was also highly critical of the minimum wage and during his eight years in the White House it was not increased, an unprecedented length of time. When the minimum wage was finally raised the rate had not kept pace with inflation. Reagan had long been a critic of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society liberalism. In Reagan’s (1988a) last State of the Union address he quipped to Congress, ‘some years ago, the Federal Government declared war on poverty, and poverty won.’ The comment was met with laughter. If Wall Street financiers, real estate moguls, and yuppies represented the glittering successes of the Reagan era, the homelessness crisis reflected its failures, standing in stark contrast to the rhetoric of the American Dream articulated by politicians and the lifestyle of excess embraced by popu‑ lar culture. At the start of the decade, researchers estimated there were between 100 and 250,000 unhoused people. By 1987, the figure stood at 500–600,000. Budget cuts, particularly to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, exacerbated the problem. Federal allocations for housing assistance and subsidized housing dropped by approximately $8 billion between 1976 and 1990. Cuts to social service agencies and welfare and entitlement programs meant fewer resources were available to assist the impoverished, the mentally unwell, and the destitute. Yet during the 1984 election, Reagan claimed that the majority of the unhoused chose to be homeless. He proposed no new federal programs to alleviate suffering or fund housing. Kevin Phillips (1990), the influential Republican strategist, published a new book titled The Politics of Rich and Poor. He dubbed the 1980s a ‘second Gilded Age,’ a time of ‘too many stretch limousines, too many enormous incomes and too much high fashion.’ Yet even as poverty and inequality increased, Reagan’s views became increasingly prevalent among

Government Is the Problem 43 politicians and the public. Democrats spent most of the 1980s accusing the President and Republicans of unfairness and of ruling for the rich. Reagan dismissed these arguments as an ‘appeal to greed and envy,’ reflective of ‘the anti‑business, anti‑success attitude that brought this country to the brink of economic disaster’ (Williams, 1984). By the end of the decade, 64 per cent of Americans shared Reagan’s view that ‘welfare benefits make poor people dependent and encourage them to stay poor’ (‘Poverty is per‑ ceived as increasing …,’ 1989). In the 1990s, the belief that government assistance needed to be par‑ simonious and accessible only in limited circumstances became part of the bipartisan political mainstream. Although the Reagan administration began the process of cutting budgets and removing people from welfare rolls, it was centrist Democrat Bill Clinton who oversaw the completion of this impulse. Clinton campaigned for the presidency with the promise to ‘end welfare as we know it’ (Zanoni, 2023: 118). In 1996, he signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, after which the number of people eligible for government assistance was effectively halved. Clinton’s reforms were the culmination of Reagan’s neoliberal ideological vision of social welfare and the role of government. Conclusion Fighting stagflation and unemployment dominated Reagan’s first years in office. Economic policy was the site of his most significant domestic victo‑ ries, the arena where he was most willing to expend political capital and wheel and deal with members of Congress. However, after 1981, Rea‑ gan and his administration demonstrated a pragmatic approach to con‑ servative orthodoxies. Major New Deal and Great Society social welfare initiatives survived, albeit in diminished form and starved of funds. Rea‑ gan championed tax cuts but accepted the necessity of (rebranded) tax increases. Reagan repeatedly promised to balance the budget and control government spending, but on his watch federal spending climbed, deficits exploded, and the national debt ballooned. Although Reagan’s approach to economics was far more flexible than his conservative supporters had hoped, the policies implemented by his administration transformed American society and politics. Rea‑ gan’s first budget represented a fundamental repudiation of almost 50 years’ worth of beliefs about the roles and responsibilities of the federal government toward its citizens. ERTA upended ideas about progressive taxation and the place of the wealthy in the social contract. Reagan’s anti‑regulatory and anti‑union agenda served the interests of industry, big business, and elites. The rich got richer from tax cuts, deregula‑ tion, and Wall Street speculation, while society adopted an increasingly

44 The Reagan Revolution hard‑hearted attitude towards the unemployed, the poor, and the unhoused. Moderate Republicans who once scoffed at ‘voodoo econom‑ ics’ embraced a new consensus about taxes, the budget, social welfare, government bureaucracy, and the deficit. Even Democrats accepted that they now operated in a rhetorical and political landscape defined by the Reagan administration.

3

The Reagan Doctrine

On 8 March 1983, Reagan traveled to Orlando, Florida, to speak at the National Association of Evangelicals convention. In his 30‑minute address, Reagan touched on many of the spiritual and social concerns of his audience: teenagers, birth control, and permissive sexuality; the need for prayer in school; opposition to abortion; and the importance of tra‑ ditional morality. Near the end of the speech, Reagan (1983a) described the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’ and warned that the Cold War strug‑ gle was a spiritual one, ‘a test of moral will and faith.’ The administra‑ tion had not intended it to be a major speech, instead viewing the address as a means of ensuring evangelicals did not endorse the popular nuclear freeze movement. However, the phrase ‘Evil Empire’ became one of Rea‑ gan’s most famous pronouncements about the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Critics worried it was a sign that Reagan embraced the fundamentalist Christian belief in Armageddon. Even supporters were concerned that after two years in the White House, Reagan’s under‑ standing of foreign policy and geopolitics was simplistic, a binary strug‑ gle between the forces of good and evil. The period between 1979 and 1985 is sometimes characterized as the ‘second Cold War,’ a time of heightened, even dangerous, levels of ten‑ sion between the United States (US) and the Soviets that was a byproduct of Reagan’s rigid anti‑communism. Reagan believed that America could only prosper if both its economic and military strength were restored. Rea‑ gan sought to re‑establish US prestige on the global stage and help Ameri‑ cans feel pride in their country and their military again. Reagan poured money into weapons development and building up the armed forces. The White House also offered material support to anti‑communist nationalist movements around the world. Yet, the administration’s approach to inter‑ national events was shaped by domestic concerns, including public sup‑ port for human rights promotion, a mass movement opposed to nuclear weapons, and a national aversion to overseas commitments. Reagan also grappled with divisions within his administration and his party, criticized DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-5

46 The Reagan Revolution by both moderate and conservative Republicans. Thus, Reagan’s foreign policy actions and approach to national security only sometimes matched his bellicose rhetoric and ideological beliefs. Priorities at the Start of Reagan’s Presidency Reagan was a hawkish Cold War warrior who was horrified by détente. In May 1975, he summarized his views in a daily radio commentary; ‘com‑ munism is neither an economic nor a political system  –  it is a form of insanity … a temporary aberration which will one day disappear from the earth because it is contrary to human nature’ (Fischer, 2020: 52). Reagan believed that the US and its capitalist allies were the free world, resisting the slave societies of the Soviet Union and the communist world. He was adamant that the USSR would never accept co‑existence and, whatever public claims they made, their goal was expansion, world revolution, and global domination. In Reagan’s first term, national security, foreign policy, diplomacy, and geopolitical events were interpreted through this lens. In the late 1970s, Reagan made common cause with the neoconserva‑ tives. He was especially influenced by the political scientist Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, who in November 1979 published an article insisting that US foreign policy should differentiate in its approach toward authoritar‑ ian anti‑communist regimes and totalitarian communist states. She argued that authoritarian regimes had the capacity for democratic reform even if they engaged in torture, abuse, and repression. She rejected President Jimmy Carter’s moralist human rights approach to foreign policy, arguing it had damaged relations with important allies and weakened America’s standing in the world. Reagan made Kirkpatrick a foreign policy advisor during the 1980 campaign and in 1981 the US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN). However, Reagan’s views sat uneasily alongside the long shadow cast by the Vietnam War. Reagan wished that Americans would accept that they had fought in Vietnam for a ‘noble cause’ and that the war had been a ‘col‑ lective act of moral courage.’ He insisted that Vietnam veterans had ‘fought as bravely and effectively as any American fighting men ever fought in any war’ and that the lesson of Vietnam was that we must ‘never again … [ask] young men to fight and die in a war that our government is afraid to let them win’ (Pach, 2003: 96). Yet, while Reagan defended the moral‑ ity of the war in Southeast Asia, he simultaneously accepted the political orthodoxy that Vietnam syndrome had left Americans wary of overseas engagements. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 also constrained foreign interventions, requiring the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing US forces to overseas engagements and restricting how long troops could be deployed without Congressional approval. Reagan chafed

The Reagan Doctrine 47 at these limits on executive authority, butting heads on several occasions with Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill over whether he had met these legislative requirements. During the 1980 campaign, the most pressing and emotive foreign pol‑ icy issue was the plight of the American hostages in Iran. After the elec‑ tion, the Carter administration continued to conduct secret negotiations with Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime. On 19 January 1981, the US signed an agreement in which America granted significant concessions to Iran, including sanctions relief and releasing almost $8 billion in frozen assets. After 444 days in captivity, the 52 hostages were released to US personnel two days later, only minutes after Reagan was inaugurated. Although the crisis was resolved, the fear that American citizens would be taken hostage by enemy powers haunted the White House for the remainder of Reagan’s presidency. Within the Reagan administration, there was constant conflict between advisors who emphasized practicality and moderation and those who stressed conservative purity. These divisions were particularly acute over foreign policy. As scholars Thomas Robb and James Cooper (2023: 960) note, in Reagan’s first year in office there was a ‘turf war’ between Secre‑ tary of State Alexander Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Haig resigned abruptly in June 1982 and the Washington Post published a lengthy account of his departure, suggesting that multiple members of the White House had conspired to push Haig out to ‘gain control over the process of making foreign policy’ (Woodward, 1982). This in‑fighting significantly undermined decision making, yet Reagan did not intervene in the feuds. Conservatives were also angered by Reagan’s picks to fill key foreign policy and national security roles. Senator Jesse Helms dubbed them ‘dip‑ lomatic retreads,’ people who had served in the Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and/or Carter administrations. Particular ire was directed toward Haig, a moderate Republican, who New Right leader Richard Viguerie accused of being a ‘disciple of détente’ (Pfeffer, 2012: 187–8). Conservative senators tried and failed to block Frank Carlucci’s nomination as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense on similar grounds. After Haig left the administration, conservatives also opposed his successor, George Shultz. Forging a New Foreign Policy Reagan sought to put pressure on the Soviets while achieving ‘peace through strength.’ His commitment to restoring US global standing had three core components: a dramatic increase in the military budget, a new assertiveness in global affairs, and renewed competition with the USSR. The US‑Soviet relationship dominated how the Reagan White House

48 The Reagan Revolution understood world affairs. When the administration grappled with civil conflict in Latin America and Africa or complex regional dynamics in the Middle East, Reagan and his advisors assumed, frequently with scant evi‑ dence, that turmoil and unrest could always be traced back to their com‑ munist adversaries. Reagan liked to tell military planners, ‘Defense is not a budget issue. You spend what you need’ (Pach, 2003: 90). However, David Stockman, tasked with implementing Reaganomics and a staunch supply‑sider, had expected to trim all areas of the budget for Fiscal Year 1982. He clashed with Weinberger, who argued that every extra dollar for the military was sacrosanct, emblematic of Reagan’s foreign policy. Stockman and Wein‑ berger took their dispute to Reagan, where Weinberger used charts that ‘dramatiz[ed] in third‑grade fashion the Pentagon view of Stockman’s cuts,’ with a big muscular soldier representing the ‘President’s Budget’ and a tiny soldier depicting Stockman’s model (Lemann, 1984). Stockman had assumed Reagan would be offended by the childishness of the Defense presentation, but the President backed Weinberger. The defense appropria‑ tion for 1982 was $213 billion, the highest level it had been since 1971 when the US was fighting the Vietnam War. Over the course of Reagan’s time in office, the defense budget doubled. The massive increase, unprec‑ edented in peacetime, was not popular. In 1983, a majority of Americans supported a reduction in military spending. Initially, the White House attempted to ignore human rights concerns but quickly experienced public and Congressional backlash. The admin‑ istration then moved to redefine human rights exclusively in terms of democracy and individual freedom, making sure this framing served Cold War ends. Totalitarian (defined as communist) governments were routinely condemned by the Reagan administration for their human rights abuses. However, the approach to anti‑communist dictatorships was far more muted. Shultz argued that America should engage in ‘democracy promo‑ tion’ among the authoritarian regimes that made up some of the US’s most devoted allies. These efforts were particularly notable in the administra‑ tion’s approach to Chile, South Korea, and the Philippines. However, scholars Robert Pee and Scott Lucas (2022: 154) argue that the Reagan administration only encouraged regime reform or replace‑ ment if it concluded that the US’s autocratic ally was creating a ‘danger‑ ous polarization in society that would spur disaffected citizens to support or join radical anti‑American forces.’ Absent this factor, the US offered almost unconditional support to repressive and abusive regimes in Argen‑ tina, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Chad. In 1986, Reagan even vetoed the Comprehensive Anti‑Apartheid Act, which imposed economic sanctions on South Africa. The legislation was championed by the Congressional Black Caucus and was strongly supported by prominent Republicans,

The Reagan Doctrine 49 including Senator Nancy Kassebaum from Kansas and Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana, then Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit‑ tee. Despite Reagan’s lobbying, for the first time in the twentieth century, Congress voted to override a presidential foreign policy veto. Reagan’s approach to foreign policy reflected a profound ambivalence about the containment strategies that had dominated much of the Cold War. As outlined in National Security Decision Directive 75 (1983), the new policy was ‘to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism.’ A particular focus was curbing communist influence in countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas. Rarely did the Reagan admin‑ istration countenance direct military intervention. Rather, this strategy centered upon assisting local anti‑communist insurgent groups in over‑ throwing communist governments, generally by waging civil war within their own country. William Casey, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), argued that the collapse of any communist regime, even small and comparatively insignificant ones, would undermine global Soviet authority and power. In Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union address he declared, We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives ‑ on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua ‑ to defy Soviet‑supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. [Doc. 11] Right‑wing commentators and former members of the administration framed this speech as an articulation of the Reagan Doctrine. They insisted that what had seemed like piecemeal first‑term foreign policy actions was a unified, ideologically informed creed. Intrinsic to this perspective was the assumption that the US had the right to determine if another country’s government was legitimate. The Reagan Doctrine underpinned American support for anti‑communist guerrillas around the world. Critically, the White House did not view all communist countries through the same lens. Like Nixon, Reagan was keen to exploit the Sino‑Soviet split between China and the USSR. From 1981, America started to lift trade restrictions and engaged in talks about the possibility of selling weapons to China. One administration official told the press that the goal was ‘to treat China as a friendly less‑developed country and no longer as a member of the international Communist conspiracy’ (Gwertzman, 1981). Reagan’s overtures culminated in reciprocated state visits. In January 1984, Chi‑ nese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Washington, DC, in April 1984, Reagan visited Beijing, and, in July 1985, Chinese President Li Xiannian visited Washington, DC. The White House saw these visits as vital to building relations on the ‘foundation of mutual trust, mutual respect, and a mutual

50 The Reagan Revolution interest in promotion of peace and prosperity’ (Flowers, 2019: 96). The administration was also responding to pressure from the US business com‑ munity and corporations keen to trade with China. This opening to China stood at odds with Reagan’s instinctive approach to communism. In his first presidential press conference he was inflamma‑ tory, insisting that the Soviets were actively working for ‘world revolution and a one‑world Socialist or Communist state’ and describing them as pro‑ foundly immoral, arguing that they ‘reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat’ to achieve their goals (Reagan, 1981b). In Reagan’s first term, he had limited interest in continuing the US‑USSR diplomacy that had developed in the 1970s. Even as Reagan ended the grain embargo Carter imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he worked to economically isolate the USSR. In Reagan’s first two years in the White House, he attempted to persuade allies in the North Atlan‑ tic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Group of Seven to either cease trading with the Soviets or impose sanctions, a suggestion that United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed with ‘unusual vehemence’ (Robb and Cooper, 2023: 967). For their part, Soviet leaders, drawing on their experiences with Nixon, had assumed that Reagan’s stri‑ dent anti‑communism would diminish once he was in office. Alarmed by Reagan’s confrontational rhetoric and actions, in May 1981 they initiated Operation RYaN, an intelligence gathering operation intended to ‘indicate the launch of a preemptive first strike’ by America (Witcher, 2019: 116). Reagan’s first term presidency relied heavily on rhetorical tropes and policies characteristic of the early Cold War. In a June 1982  address to British parliamentarians, Reagan harked back to Winston Churchill’s 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech. In the 1983 ‘Evil Empire’ speech, he emphasized the atheistic and godless nature of communism, reminiscent of the tropes of the Second Red Scare. To the alarm of the public, Reagan and his advi‑ sors also seemed to accept the possibility of the Cold War turning hot and the implied need for civil defense, another echo of 1950s strategizing. In May 1982, the New York Times published details from a five‑year defense plan which ordered armed forces to prepare for a nuclear war and coun‑ terattacks against the USSR. Several months later, the Los Angeles Times reported that for the ‘first … time the US government has declared that nuclear war with the Soviets can be won.’ Weinberger insisted this cover‑ age was ‘completely inaccurate’ and there had been no change in America’s nuclear policy (Witcher, 2019: 103–4). Nuclear Freeze In the early 1980s, a powerful new movement calling for nuclear freeze emerged in the US and around the world. Its rapid growth was directly

The Reagan Doctrine 51 connected to public concern about Reagan’s hawkishness and his plans to modernize and increase US nuclear capabilities. Public opinion polls indi‑ cated that 70 per cent of Americans believed that both superpowers should immediately stop ‘the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons’ (Pach, 2003: 103). In June 1982, approximately 1 million peo‑ ple marched in New York, while in California, 85,000 people attended the ‘Peace Sunday’ music benefit. [Doc. 4] These protests coincided with a UN Special Session on Disarmament held in Manhattan, where nuclear freeze advocates presented petitions signed by more than 2 million Ameri‑ cans to the US and Soviet missions. This grassroots movement represented Americans across class and geographical lines. As one demonstrator told the New York Times, ‘It’s not just the hippies and crazies anymore. It’s everybody’ (Martin, 2011: 19). Religious leaders in America lent moral authority to the cause. Except for fundamentalist and evangelical Christian denominations, every major religious body publicly endorsed the nuclear freeze campaign. The Rea‑ gan administration was particularly frustrated by the actions of the US Catholic hierarchy, which worked throughout the early 1980s to argue that a ‘consistent ethic of life’ meant opposing abortion, capital punish‑ ment, economic inequality, and the nuclear arms race. Reagan’s advisors concluded that the Catholic hierarchy and leadership were ‘in its staff, essentially opposed to our strategies’ and viewed them as the ‘political opposition’ (Flowers, 2019: 72). They worked methodically to undercut the 1983 ‘Challenge of Peace’ pastoral letter in which the American Bish‑ ops called for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and a bilateral and comprehensive nuclear test ban. The public push for nuclear freeze quickly translated into a biparti‑ san political cause. Senator Mark Hatfield, a moderate Republican from Oregon, was a leading Congressional supporter of the cause, along with Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy. They jointly published a book with tips for the public about influencing policy and electoral outcomes. In 1982, nuclear freeze referenda appeared on ballots at the city, county, and state level, most of which passed resoundingly. Proponents also gained strength in Congress in the midterm elections. Reagan vehemently opposed a nuclear freeze, insisting that the movement had originated from ‘foreign agents’ who sought ‘the weakening of America’ and who were ‘manipulat‑ ing honest people’ (Wittner, 2017: 279). The administration dedicated considerable energy and resources to pre‑ venting passage of federal freeze legislation. In 1982, Reagan personally telephoned undecided House Republicans, ensuring a resolution calling for an immediate freeze was narrowly defeated 204 to 202. A pro‑freeze resolution passed the House in May 1983 but was eventually defeated in the Republican‑dominated Senate. Although the Democratic Party made

52 The Reagan Revolution nuclear freeze part of their 1984 party platform, Reagan’s landslide victory spelt its end as an electoral issue. Nevertheless, scholar Bradford Martin (2011: 23) suggests that the movement’s grassroots appeal meant it con‑ tinued to ‘set limits on the aggression and scope of the Reagan administra‑ tion’s Cold War rhetoric and ambition.’ The Year of Fear Scholar Marcus Witcher (2019: 101) describes 1983 as the ‘year of fear’ when Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy ‘contributed to a global climate of fear and anxiety.’ On 23 March, two weeks after Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ speech, he gave a televised address on the defense budget and national security and made the shock announcement that the US was commenc‑ ing groundbreaking research into a missile defense system, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). [Doc. 6] He repurposed the language of nuclear freeze, imagining a world where SDI led to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Reagan had developed this project directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and engaged in almost no consultation with Shultz or Weinberger, a significant break with normal processes of policy development. SDI, referred to as ‘Star Wars’ because it seemed to belong in the realm of the popular Hollywood franchise rather than military strategy, was premised on the idea that it was possible to develop a defensive space‑based laser, X‑ray, and missile system. This was not scientifically or technologically possible in the 1980s or subsequent decades and SDI had many critics. After almost ten years, SDI was canceled by President Bill Clinton. For their part, the Soviet Union viewed the SDI announcement as an escala‑ tion of the Cold War and an attempt to give America the advantage in a potential nuclear conflict. They also argued that SDI violated the Anti‑ Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which strictly limited the number of stra‑ tegic defensive systems each superpower could have to defend itself against intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. Heightening tensions, on 1 September 1983, the commercial Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007 from New York to Seoul drifted into USSR airspace after a pilot mis‑programmed the navigation system. Soviet intelligence confused it with a US spy plane in the area and, after two hours of surveil‑ lance, a Soviet pilot fired two air‑to‑air missiles and shot down KAL007, killing the 269 people on board. 62 of the dead were American, including Representative Larry McDonald, a conservative Democrat from Georgia. The Politburo initially denied any Soviet role in the downing of the plane but then pivoted, insisting for several years that KAL007 was on a spy mission and that the incident had somehow been orchestrated by America. Reagan strongly condemned the downing of KAL007, describing the event as a ‘massacre’ and insisting ‘it was an act of barbarism, born of a

The Reagan Doctrine 53 society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations’ (Reagan, 1983b). However, he refused to cancel a grain agreement with the USSR and ruled out suspending arms control negotiations. As one administration official explained, Reagan did not see the point in ‘retaliation for retalia‑ tion’s sake.’ This attitude enraged conservatives. Viguerie told the press that Reagan should punish the Soviets and use the tragedy to push for defense budget increases and greater support for his anti‑communist poli‑ cies in Latin America. The New Right frequently blamed moderates in the White House for their disappointments and frustrations and so Viguerie was being particularly withering when he concluded, ‘maybe Ronald Rea‑ gan is really being Ronald Reagan after all’ (Cannon and Getler, 1983). On 13 October 1983, an intra‑party coup seized power on Grenada, a tiny island in the Caribbean. Reagan had long been fixated on the People’s Revolutionary Government of Grenada, which he claimed was working to ‘spread the virus [of communism] among its neighbors’ (Weisman, 1982). During the coup, the ousted leader Maurice Bishop was executed, journal‑ ists were deported, and a curfew was imposed. National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane feared that Grenada would become ‘a second Cuba at our doorstep’ and reached out to the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States to ask whether they ‘might be inclined to coordinate a call for assistance … that would legitimize our involvement’ (Pach, 2003: 99). For the White House, a significant concern was the possibility that 800 US medical stu‑ dents on the island would be taken hostage. Reagan quickly authorized military action. The invasion codenamed ‘Urgent Fury’ began before dawn on 25 October. 1900 Marines and paratroopers were deployed, the first major US military operation abroad since Vietnam. Thatcher, who had overseen her own military action in the region during the 1982 Falklands War, criti‑ cized Reagan’s incursion into Grenada, which was a member of the Brit‑ ish Commonwealth. Allies such as Canada and France disapproved of the invasion while the UN Security Council approved a resolution condemning it as a ‘flagrant violation of international law,’ which America immediately vetoed (Bernstein, 1983). The US press was also initially denied access to the military operations, leading to accusations that the White House was violating the First Amendment and censoring coverage. Two days before the Grenada invasion, American troops stationed in Lebanon sustained serious fatalities when a suicide bomber attacked the US Marine barracks (discussed in more detail later in this chapter). When Reagan addressed the nation on 27 October, he linked these two events with the shooting down of KAL 007, insisting that the insidious influence of the Soviet Union was behind the global turmoil. [Doc. 7] The invasion of Grenada was over almost as soon as it began. Within four days, the

54 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 3.1 ‘Americans at War’ magazine cover, 1983 Source: Courtesy RiskyWalls/Alamy Stock Photo

Americans had installed an ally as leader. The homecoming of the medi‑ cal students was infused with symbolic drama after the first student to disembark the plane kissed the tarmac in gratitude at being returned safely home. Ultimately, despite the opposition of the global community and domestic protests, quick victory translated into strong public approval. By early November, 71 per cent of the public supported the invasion. The administration presented Grenada as proof of the renewed strength and confidence of the US, with Reagan proclaiming ‘our days of weakness are over’ (Clines, 1983). Shultz echoed the mythos of the American Revolution when he dubbed Grenada the ‘shot heard round the world’ (Pach, 2003: 101). In his 1990 memoir, Reagan directly linked the invasion to his belief that the US needed to overcome Vietnam syndrome. At the end of 1983, the fraught relations between the two superpow‑ ers deteriorated further because of the ‘Euromissile Crisis.’ In 1977, the Soviet Union had begun deploying the SS‑20 (also known as the Pioneer), an intermediate‑range ballistic missile that put all Western Europe within striking distance. NATO allies viewed this as a significant security threat

The Reagan Doctrine 55 and, in late 1979, Carter promised that the US would modernize and deploy new nuclear weapons, the Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. In late 1981, Reagan outlined the zero option, an offer not to fulfill Carter’s promise if the Soviets removed their SS‑20s. No one, including within the White House, seriously believed the USSR would take this up. Key NATO allies, including Thatcher and the Chancellors of West Germany Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, supported US deployment. However, in October 1983, as the deadline for delivery of the weapons neared, mas‑ sive anti‑nuclear protests occurred across West Germany and in cities in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the UK, and Italy. American missiles began to be deployed at bases in Western Europe in November. The Soviets viewed the missiles, and the fact that they were aimed at targets within the USSR, as an act of aggression. It was in this context that the US and its Western European allies carried out the Able Archer 83 exercise, a test of NATO’s nuclear facilities. From 7 to 11 November, NATO and the US conducted a major military exercise from Scandinavia to Turkey involving upwards of 300,000  military and civilian personnel. During the exercise, NATO simulated a nuclear war with the Warsaw Pact and the US’s nuclear threat category moved from DEFCON (defense condition) 5 to 1, maximum readiness. While the US and NATO annually engaged in war games, the 1983 exercises were larger and far more realistic, involving a new coded form of communication, the secret airlift of American soldiers to Europe, and top members of NATO, including Thatcher and Kohl, although Weinberger participated instead of Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush. Soviet leaders became alarmed, fearing that Able Archer 83 was a West‑ ern cover story for a surprise nuclear attack. According to scholar Beth Fischer (1997: 129), under Reagan, the US had ‘established an image of military unpredictability.’ The arms buildup and the announcement of SDI deepened the Soviet concern that America might be the aggressor in a nuclear conflict. During a 5 November speech, a prominent Politburo member exclaimed, ‘Perhaps never before in the postwar decades has the situation in the world arena been as tense as it is now … [it] is white hot, thoroughly white hot.’ The USSR put multiple nuclear‑capable fighter air‑ craft on high alert and troops in East Germany and Poland prepared for a retaliatory nuclear strike. In the aftermath of Able Archer 83, members of the Reagan administration were perplexed by the volume of briefings they received about the USSR’s reaction. McFarlane and Weinberger believed it was manipulative Soviet propaganda intended to disrupt the US‑NATO alliance. However, McFarlane characterized Reagan as responding with anxiety, asking ‘Do you suppose they really believe that? I don’t see how they could believe that – but it’s something to think about’ (Witcher, 2019: 116–8).

56 The Reagan Revolution A few days later, on Sunday 20 November, the made‑for‑TV movie The Day After was broadcast on ABC. The two‑hour film depicted the terrify‑ ing consequences of a US‑Soviet nuclear war. Focusing on characters based in Lawrence, Kansas, it offered a graphic story of nuclear holocaust, mass death, radiation sickness, starvation, and human suffering. Approximately 100 million viewers tuned in to watch, and in the weeks before and after the screening it received extensive coverage across news and entertainment media. The Washington Post’s review, published shortly before the sched‑ uled broadcast, began ‘Who should watch it? Everyone should watch it. Who will be able to forget it? No one will be able to forget it’ (Shales, 1983). The White House had an advance screening of the film and Reagan wrote in his diary, it ‘left me greatly depressed. … My own reaction: we have to do all we can … to see that there is never a nuclear war’ (Fis‑ cher, 1997: 120). Paradoxically, the cumulative events in the ‘year of fear’ sharpened Reagan’s alarm at the prospect of conflict with the USSR. As discussed in Chapter 6, Reagan gradually began to change his approach to America’s superpower adversary. Central America In keeping with the Reagan Doctrine, many of the key global flash points for US foreign policy in the 1980s were far from the Soviet Union. The region of most pressing concern was Latin America, particularly Central America. In the 1970s, civil wars raged in multiple countries as communist movements fought against US‑allied right‑wing dictators. Reagan blamed Cuba and the Soviet Union for this turmoil, believing they were covertly working to increase their influence among the US’s nearest neighbors. Haig agreed, telling Reagan and the National Security Council in early 1981, ‘Just give me the word and I’ll make that fucking island [Cuba] a parking lot’ (Pach, 2003: 97). The administration was divided over how to respond to the social, polit‑ ical, and military turmoil in the Western Hemisphere. Kirkpatrick insisted, ‘Central America is the most important place in the world for the US today’ (Rossinow, 2015: 78). The conservative faction pushed for vigor‑ ous and aggressive action, including the use of military force, to assert US credibility and defend its economic and geopolitical interests. Moderates such as Baker and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver were alarmed by the hawks. Reagan was enigmatic about his preference. Scholar Chester Pach (2003: 97) argues that on foreign policy, White House staff strug‑ gled to determine ‘whether they were best serving the president by accom‑ plishing as much as possible of his agenda or by faithfully adhering to what they thought were his basic principles.’ Ultimately, the Reagan White House provided significant funds and intelligence to its allies, including

The Reagan Doctrine 57 regimes involved in human rights violations such as Guatemala, which was pursuing genocidal policies against the indigenous Mayan people in the early 1980s. The US also relied heavily on countries such as Honduras and Argentina to act as training grounds for anti‑communist soldiers. For the White House, the primary areas of foreign policy focus were El Salvador and Nicaragua. In October 1979, a military‑led right‑wing coup in El Salvador had seized power and installed the Revolutionary Government Junta. War erupted between the junta government and the communist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The atrocities committed by government forces attracted international condemnation. In December 1980, members of the Salvadoran Army abducted, raped, and murdered four American women, three of whom were Catholic nuns and all of whom were working with the poor. In response, Carter cut off aid to the junta but restored it when the FMLN seemed poised to achieve victory. The Rea‑ gan administration had no such qualms about supporting the Salvadoran regime. Kirkpatrick, speaking as a high‑ranking member of the transition team, denied that the junta was responsible for the death of the women and told a reporter that ‘the nuns were not just nuns … They were politi‑ cal activists on behalf of the Frente [FMLN]’ (LeoGrande, 2009: 63). Haig pushed to deploy US troops in El Salvador to support the junta. Direct intervention did not gain traction. Instead, the administration offered substantial financial and tactical support. Between 1981 and 1983, the El Salvadoran junta government received $744  million in American military aid. For a decade, the US also funded counterinsurgency efforts at the rate of $1  million per day. In 1981, American military advisors were deployed to El Salvador to train government troops. A White House‑ Congress agreement limited this to only 55 advisors at a time and prohib‑ ited them from entering combat. However, US newspapers quickly began reporting that American officers were playing a central role in the Salva‑ doran Civil War and ‘nothing gets done unless the Americans are consulted first’ (Chavez, 1983). Administration support continued even though the Salvadoran government oversaw death squads that murdered opposition activists and critics with impunity. The rape, torture, disappearance, and massacre of civilians were routine; newspapers reported that corpses lit‑ tered the roads and were dumped in piles near the coast. More than 75,000 people were killed during the 12‑year conflict. The UN Truth Commission for El Salvador found that more than 85 per cent of the killings, kidnap‑ pings, and torture had been committed by government agents. Reagan’s unwavering support for the Salvadoran junta government was shaped by events in nearby Nicaragua. In July 1979, after 18 months of fighting, the socialist Sandinista National Liberation Front had been victorious against the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a stalwart

58 The Reagan Revolution US ally. Carter provided foreign aid and emergency relief to the new Sandinista regime, seeking to avoid the dynamics that had pushed Cuba into the USSR’s arms in the late 1950s. Upon taking office, the Reagan administration immediately investigated claims (pushed heavily by con‑ servatives) that the Sandinistas were shipping arms to the FMLN in El Salvador. In April 1981, Reagan announced that the Sandinista govern‑ ment was ‘aiding or abetting acts of violence in another country’ and ended all aid to Nicaragua (LeoGrande, 1996: 330). The US began to organize, train, and fund the Contras, Nicaraguan anti‑communist oppo‑ nents of the Sandinistas. The Reagan administration insisted the Contras were freedom fighters even as evidence implicated them in significant human rights abuses. The Special Envoy to Central America later reflected that Nicaragua was ‘an absolute foreign policy focus’ for the White House; ‘Nothing was more important, except the Soviet Union itself’ (Schmidli, 2021: 239). US efforts to destabilize the Sandinistas were unrelenting and violated both international and domestic law. A leaked manual for training guerrillas in Nicaragua called for assassinations, leading the Washington Post to dub it the ‘CIA’s Murder Manual’ (1984). With Reagan’s approval, in late 1983 the CIA covertly mined Nicaraguan harbors, an action the UN’s Interna‑ tional Court of Justice later ruled had violated the law. When news of the mining broke in April 1984, the Republican‑controlled Senate voted 84‑12 to condemn the action, the first time it had officially opposed Reagan’s foreign policies toward Central America. Conservative icon Senator Barry Goldwater accused the CIA of engaging in an ‘act of war’ and asked, ‘how can we back [Reagan’s] foreign policy when we don’t know what the hell he is doing’ (Tolchin, 1984b). Congress also passed the second Boland Amendment, barring further federal assistance to the Contras. Reagan was undeterred. Domestically, there was widespread concern about involvement in Central America. In 1981, letters from the American public to the gov‑ ernment were 10‑to‑1 against increasing US aid to the Salvadoran junta. A 1982 Gallup survey showed 71 per cent of the public opposed deploying troops to El Salvador, even if this meant victory for communist forces. The Central American Pledge of Resistance movement engaged in strate‑ gic civil disobedience whenever Congress voted on aiding the Contras. By the mid‑1980s, as US involvement in Nicaragua became deeper and more contentious, 59 per cent of Americans predicted it might become another Vietnam and most believed the US should halt support to the Contras. Congress also placed strict limits on US financial assistance to Nicara‑ guan anti‑communist forces. Yet clandestine funding continued, and the Iran‑Contra Affair in Reagan’s second term revealed the administration’s willingness to break the law to pursue foreign policy goals.

The Reagan Doctrine 59 Middle East and Central Asia The Middle East proved to be one of the most challenging foreign policy zones for the White House. Scholar Sean Wilentz (2009: 158) argues that it was here that ‘the limitations of the Reagan Doctrine emerged earliest and most sharply.’ At the start of Reagan’s presidency, Haig told the Sen‑ ate that the administration’s goal was to develop a regional consensus to counter Soviet overtures. This aim was often at odds with two other pri‑ orities for the administration, the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the anti‑US Islamic Republic of Iran. Pre‑existing alliances and rivalries, the growth of militant groups and non‑state actors, along with the increase in asymmetrical conflict and terrorism, further compli‑ cated diplomatic relationships and foreign policy efforts and ‘made some of the area’s problems practically insoluble.’ Yet as scholar Clea Bunch (2015: 466) concludes, the Reagan administration uniformly understood Middle Eastern dictators and terrorists alike as ‘puppets that served Soviet masters.’ To further US influence in the region, the Reagan administration relied heavily on the sale of weapons and other military equipment to estab‑ lished and emerging allies, a controversial strategy reminiscent of the failed Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East. The first major clash between the White House and Congress over foreign policy centered on the $8.5 billion sale to Saudi Arabia of high‑tech radar spy planes, the airborne warning and con‑ trol system (AWACS) aircraft. The Saudis were America’s primary supplier of oil. However, they were also a significant regional enemy for Israel and Prime Minister Menachem Begin characterized the AWACS deal as posing a threat to his nation’s security. Moderate and conservative Republican Senators initially opposed the sale, as did New Right leader Terry Dolan who published an op‑ed calling it ‘the sellout of Israel’ (Tal, 2023: 686). Reagan pushed the AWACS deal for geopolitical and domestic reasons. He believed that Saudi Arabia had the potential to be a buffer against Soviet interests in the region. He also viewed the sale as an important opportunity to demonstrate that the executive branch, rather than the leg‑ islative branch, dictated foreign policy priorities. Reagan expended sig‑ nificant effort and political capital to get the AWACS sale approved. He undertook sustained lobbying, including sending a letter of assurance to the Senate and personally meeting with key votes. The White House also engaged in ‘arm‑twisting’ of Congressional moderates and conservatives and encouraged Religious Right groups to generate grassroots support for the deal (Witcher, 2019: 93–4). The final vote of 52‑48 was narrowly in favor of the administration. Senator Bob Packwood, a Republican mod‑ erate from Oregon, led a bipartisan coalition opposing the sale and 12 Republicans voted nay. Senators who voted to approve the deal questioned

60 The Reagan Revolution its logic but were persuaded that ‘to reject the sale now would damage … Reagan’s standing and ability to conduct foreign policy’ (Mohr, 1981). While Reagan supported Saudi Arabia because of Cold War concerns, his support for Iraq was triggered by a simpler calculation, what Wilentz (2009: 159) describes as backing ‘the lesser of two evils.’ In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. Publicly, the Reagan administration insisted on American neutrality. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had a brutal reputa‑ tion, was the USSR’s strongest ally in the Persian Gulf, and viewed the US ‘through a lens of suspicion and hostility.’ However, when it seemed Iran might win and gain control of Iraq’s massive oil reserves, the Reagan administration began quietly assisting Hussein’s regime. By 1983, an inter‑ nal memo noted the White House ‘would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West’ (Brands and Palkki, 2012: 627, 636). US support continued even after it became clear that Hussein was violating international law and using chemical weapons against both his domestic critics and Iranian civilians. In early 1982, the State Department removed Iraq from its list of ter‑ rorist nations, restoring full diplomatic relations in late 1984. Although the White House would not sell advanced weaponry to Iraq, it turned a blind eye when other countries sold US‑made weapons and high‑tech components to Iraq. It extended billions of dollars of credit to the Iraqis for the purchase of agricultural commodities and dual‑use goods. The CIA supplied Hussein’s government with intelligence. Much of this sup‑ port was not revealed to the relevant Congressional committees. Yet in the mid‑1980s, the Reagan White House was also cultivating a highly covert relationship with Iran, illegally selling the regime weapons. When the Iran‑Contra Affair eventually came to light, Hussein characterized US actions as ‘this injury, this stab in the back’ (Brands and Palkki, 2012: 642). By the time the Iran‑Iraq War ended in August 1988, Hussein feared a US‑Israel conspiracy and believed the Americans were intent on destroy‑ ing him. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US under President Bush went to war to contain Hussein. Occasionally, US involvement in the Middle East expanded beyond arms sales and tactical support. The most significant American intervention occurred in the Lebanese Civil War. The conflict, which began in 1975, had complex sectarian and socio‑political origins and involved violent clashes between Christian and Muslim forces. It involved four major militias: the Lebanese Front, led by the Phalangists; the Lebanese National Movement; the Amal; and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO); along with foreign participants including Syria and Israel. In June 1982, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to stop PLO attacks across the border, in the process overseeing massacres by Lebanese Phalangists in the Sabra and Shatila ref‑ ugee camps. Bunch (2015: 462) argues that Reagan saw the Lebanese Civil

The Reagan Doctrine 61 War as an opportunity for a US intervention that would end the conflict and potentially help broker a historic Middle Eastern peace deal. In August 1982, the US sent troops to Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, as part of an inter‑ national peace‑keeping Multi‑National Force (MNF). Although the MNF was neutral, within the region the Americans were perceived as acting in support of both the Maronite Christian‑dominated Lebanese government and Israel. Viewed as partisan, MNF troops became targets. On 18 April 1983, a Lebanese Shia militant drove a truck into the US Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including the CIA station chief. Local Lebanese mili‑ tias also fired mortars at US troops at the Beirut airport. In retaliation, a US battleship shelled anti‑government militia. The deteriorating situation culminated on 23 October 1983 in a major attack against MNF troops stationed in Beirut. A suicide bomber driving a dump truck packed with 12,000 pounds of explosives crashed through the gates of the US Marine barracks, while a second drove into the French paratrooper headquarters. 241 American and 58 French troops, along with six Lebanese civilians, were killed. The coordinated attack was orchestrated by Hezbollah, acting as a proxy for Iran. During Reagan’s televised address on Lebanon and Grenada he asked, ‘If we were to leave Lebanon now, what message would that send to those who foment instability and terrorism?’ [Doc.  7] However, inside the White House there was dissent. McFarlane and Shultz supported a tough response. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs insisted that Ameri‑ can troops in Beirut were vulnerable because they lacked a coherent mission. Leaks from a Department of Defense report embarrassed the administration, revealing sharp criticism of US military involvement in the conflict. Reagan authorized America’s participation in retaliatory air strikes but Weinberger refused to follow through. There was also mount‑ ing Congressional opposition to the deployment of troops in Lebanon. On 7  February 1984, Reagan announced all Marines would be swiftly withdrawn from the country. In Afghanistan, US involvement followed more traditional Cold War patterns where actions had limited repercussions for Americans, at least in the short term. On 24 December 1979, Soviet troops invaded neighboring Afghanistan, assassinating President Hafizullah Amin and installing a sym‑ pathetic regime. The USSR faced fierce resistance from the mujahideen, anti‑communist Afghan guerrilla groups. Reagan and other conservatives viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as definitive proof that the USSR had used détente to trick the world, for here was communist expansion and aggression writ large. Reagan’s advisors also worried that the invasion was an attempt by the Soviets to gain a warm water port and a toehold in the region, perhaps with the goal of disrupting the global flow of oil.

62 The Reagan Revolution While Reagan deplored Soviet actions, he eschewed direct confrontation. Instead, the US covertly supported the mujahideen, funneling money via Pakistan so that the guerrilla forces could acquire arms. Financial and weapons assistance were also provided by the UK and China. Muslim nations around the world sent aid while volunteer soldiers rushed to take up arms with the mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, future architect of 9/11. The war in Afghanistan deepened the links between Saudi Arabia and the US after the Americans secured a pledge from the Saudis to match US funding for weapons for the mujahideen ‘with few restrictions, regula‑ tions, or accounting on how the funds were used’ (Bunch, 2015: 466). From the outset, there was Congressional support for the mujahideen, notably from Representative Charlie Wilson, a Texas Democrat. This con‑ trasted with more circumspect views from intelligence agencies, the State and Defense Departments, and muted action from the Reagan administra‑ tion. Only in 1985, after Congress formed a Task Force on Afghanistan, did Reagan sign a classified order that declared it was the goal of the US to get the Soviets out of the country. By 1987, the budget for Operation Cyclone, the CIA’s covert program to support the mujahideen, had bal‑ looned to $630  million. Conservatives in the New Right and Congress wanted the administration to be much more confrontational in its response to the conflict. They were particularly critical of John McMahon, Deputy Director of the CIA, accusing him of being ‘less than zealous’ in his sup‑ port for both the mujahideen and the Nicaraguan Contras (‘No. 2 CIA Man …,’ 1986). A grassroots letter‑writing campaign delivered more than 10,000 letters to White House Chief of Staff Don Regan. When McMahon unexpectedly retired in March 1986, conservatives claimed victory, insist‑ ing he had been forced from his job. In 1986, the CIA began to supply the mujahideen with the US‑made Stinger, a portable shoulder‑fired anti‑aircraft missile. Unlike the prior cov‑ ert supply of arms, the Stinger made American involvement in the conflict undeniable. Over the course of the 1980s, the mujahideen received more than $2 billion in weapons and supplies from the US. Largely because of this external support, Afghanistan’s guerrilla fighters managed to resist Soviet control, depleting the larger nation’s energy, finances, and power. In February 1989, the Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The conflict was widely understood to be the USSR’s version of the Viet‑ nam War. In the wake of the Soviet‑Afghan War, rival factions of mujahi‑ deen vied for control of the country. By 1996, the Taliban, an extremist Sunni Islamist group, had gained power over most of the country. Conclusion Reagan’s response to world events was informed by his binary understand‑ ing of the Cold War struggle and his certainty that the US urgently needed

The Reagan Doctrine 63 to restore its prestige as a global force to counter Soviet expansionism. The Reagan Doctrine cast American ambitions in sweeping, lofty terms. The US provided arms and intelligence to allies, occasionally accompanied by US troops, while supporting efforts to destabilize adversaries around the world. Reagan rejected détente, the overarching foreign policy framework of the 1970s, and would have preferred to ignore human rights as well. Reagan’s first term was marked by strident rhetoric about the Soviet Union and communist countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, along with a major arms buildup. Yet the reality of Reagan’s foreign policy, even in his first term, was more complex than the controversial ‘Evil Empire’ soundbite conveyed. Public support for nuclear freeze and human rights, along with heightened Congressional oversight, placed limits on America’s actions. Although the administration deployed troops in Grenada and Lebanon, these missions were narrowly defined. While conservatives cheered at Reagan’s inflam‑ matory statements and vigorously supported the arms buildup and SDI, by the mid‑1980s some had begun to believe that Reagan’s words were not matched by deeds. Although it was not immediately apparent, over the course of Reagan’s first term he also became increasingly resolute in his desire to avoid a nuclear war at all costs, which led him to seriously pursue bilateral arms control negotiations. Reagan’s second‑term relation‑ ship with Mikhail Gorbachev, the new General Secretary of the Commu‑ nist Party of the Soviet Union, would become one of his major legacies as president. It was deeply opposed by his conservative supporters at home.

4

A Moral Majority?

The 1984 Republican National Convention was a confident and patriotic celebration of Ronald Reagan and America. However, to the surprise of media commentators, morality was given near equal billing with econom‑ ics and national defense. Leading social and religious conservatives, includ‑ ing televangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell and anti‑feminist Phyllis Schlafly, shaped the party platform, which endorsed morally traditional positions on abortion, women’s rights, the family, pornography, religious schools, school prayer, and social welfare. In Falwell’s closing benediction, he pro‑ claimed that Reagan and George H.W. Bush were ‘God’s instruments for rebuilding America’ (Taylor, 1984). However, behind the scenes, divisions over issues of personal morality and spirituality were sharp. Moderate and liberal Republicans, led by Senator Lowell Weicker from Connecticut, tried to challenge the Religious Right’s heightened influence in the party. Weicker compared mixing religion and politics to putting explosives in a blender, warning that Republicans were transforming from the GOP, or Grand Old Party, into ‘God’s Own Party’ (Spring, 1984: 55). In response, New Right leader Terry Dolan told liberals and moderates they could ‘help the Republican Party by leaving it’ (Reeves, 1984). While conservatives claimed to represent a ‘moral majority,’ many Americans were troubled by their agenda. [Doc. 10] Scholar James Davison Hunter (1991) argues that ostensibly unrelated battles over abortion, education, school prayer, sexuality, and the arts were linked by the way they triggered clashes between the forces of orthodoxy and progressivism. Hunter, coining the phrase culture wars, believed that the religious‑secular divide was the central fault line in 1980s America. This framing was echoed by conservative Pat Buchanan at the 1992 Republican National Convention when he insisted that the ‘cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as the Cold War itself’ was a struggle ‘for the soul of America.’ Scholar Andrew Hartman dates the origins of the culture wars to the social transformations of the long 1960s and the back‑ lash that ensued, arguing that issues relating to race, ethnicity, and gender DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-6

A Moral Majority? 65 were the central sites of conflict. Hartman argues that in the 1980s and the 1990s, ‘the culture wars, like a vortex, swallowed up much of American political and intellectual life’ and became ‘the defining metaphor for the late twentieth‑century United States’ (Hartman, 2015: 1, 3). Culture war clashes were fertile political terrain and the 1980s were marked by sharp divisions over the role of government and the state in upholding values. The Religious Right supported the entirety of Reagan’s agenda, including distinctly secular components, but they were especially energized by the way Reagan endorsed their concerns. Reagan amplified socially conservative language and arguments and regularly addressed Religious Right and single‑issue audiences. [Doc.  8] However, Reagan’s support often relied on symbolism rather than substantive policy or execu‑ tive action. He rarely championed their priority legislative causes and gen‑ erally avoided situations that might trigger fights among Congressional Republicans. When it came to issues such as abortion, prayer in school, culture, illegal drugs, and the HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) crisis, the Reagan administration advanced a politics shaped by partisan and electoral, rather than spiritual or ideological, concerns. Abortion On 22 January 1973, the Supreme Court ruled 7‑2 in Roe v. Wade that the constitutional right to privacy extended to abortion, legalizing all first and many second‑trimester abortions. In response, a movement opposed to abortion grew dramatically at the national level, seeking to end legal abortion either by amending the United States (US) Constitu‑ tion or through a Supreme Court decision overturning Roe. In the 1980 primaries, Reagan made a variety of efforts to reaffirm his credentials as a right‑to‑life candidate. Early on, Reagan reached out to anti‑abortion lead‑ ers and organizations seeking their endorsement, even promising to pick an anti‑abortion vice president. The Republican Party Platform (1980) included an anti‑abortion plank and pledged to ‘work for the appoint‑ ment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect … the sanctity of innocent human life.’ While conservatives and right‑to‑lifers were angered when Bush, who was perceived as pro‑choice, was announced as his run‑ ning mate, most were placated by assurances that Bush would respect the platform. Reagan’s resounding win, along with Republican victory in the Senate, was interpreted as a major triumph for the anti‑abortion cause. Abortion was a politically complex issue for Reagan. His vociferous opposition appealed to single‑issue voters, social and religious conserva‑ tives, and the New Right. Reagan’s advisors also viewed abortion as a way of attracting Catholics, who traditionally voted Democrat. In 1982, one

66 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 4.1 March for Life rally, 1979 Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

member of the administration used the example of abortion and urban Catholic voters to illustrate an instance where ‘even when we are on the “wrong” side of some of these issues from a public opinion standpoint, they may still be politically positive’ (Flowers, 2019: 28). Opposition to abortion was part of a broader electoral strategy to create a perma‑ nent conservative Republican majority. However, the administration was also aware that most Americans did not share Reagan’s belief that abor‑ tion should be almost completely illegal. During a 1982  legislative fight over abortion, White House staffer Lee Atwater emphasized that polling showed 22 per cent of the population was strongly opposed to abortion compared to 39 per cent who were equivalently pro‑choice. Republicans were similarly divided. Moderates in the Senate were fierce opponents of anti‑abortion legislation and were instrumental in the defeat of several measures. Republican voters were also more pro‑choice than Democrats until the early 1990s. Reagan did not lead a party or a nation that opposed abortion. Under Reagan, anti‑abortionists had high levels of political access. After Reagan was inaugurated, right‑to‑lifers were the first citizens group in the White House. He nominated opponents of abortion to key roles in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and put for‑ ward Dr  C.  Everett Koop as Surgeon General. Right‑to‑lifers also had

A Moral Majority? 67 loyal advocates in the Office of Public Liaison and the Office of Policy Development. In 1985, Reagan became the first sitting president to address the annual March for Life rally, although he never spoke in person despite the protest taking place on his doorstep. Yet simultaneously, opponents of abortion experienced significant disappointments. They were horrified in 1981 when Reagan selected moderate Republican Sandra Day O’Connor to fill his first Supreme Court vacancy. They accused O’Connor of being a feminist who supported abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment and campaigned against the nomination. The movement then experienced a bitter split over competing Congressional approaches to ending legal abor‑ tion. Reagan remained aloof from the fray, leading administration staffer Morton Blackwell to warn that right‑to‑life attention was ‘riveted on the White House to see if the President’s actions speak as loudly as his words’ (Flowers, 2019: 79). In 1983, the Human Life Federalism Amendment, a constitutional amendment which sought to return abortion regulation to the states, was defeated 50‑49, falling well shy of the two‑thirds majority required. One‑third of Senate Republicans voted against it. The White House strove to placate opponents of abortion with sym‑ bolic gestures, often calculated to coincide with the electoral cycle. In 1983, Reagan published an article entitled ‘Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation.’ Advisors carefully timed the piece to undermine a pend‑ ing pastoral letter from the US Catholic hierarchy which ‘sought to make pro‑life and nuclear freeze a package deal’ (Critchlow, 2003: 309). Reagan declared 22 January 1984, the eleventh anniversary of the Roe decision, to be National Sanctity of Human Life Day. Reagan also introduced the Mexico City Policy in 1984, which critics dubbed the global gag rule. It prohibited international non‑government organizations that received US population aid from providing advice, counseling, or information about abortion to pregnant women. Reagan amplified right‑to‑life claims about fetal pain during abortions and ‘post‑abortion syndrome,’ legitimizing and mainstreaming pseudo‑ scientific arguments that did not have an evidentiary basis. While Reagan eventually condemned the growing right‑to‑life violence, which by 1985 included the firebombing of more than 40 abortion clinics, he declined to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate whether this constituted a national conspiracy. He publicly praised the controversial right‑to‑life film The Silent Scream and the White House held a special screening. In 1987, there was a flurry of anti‑abortion policy and legislative activity, including the introduction of the ‘President’s Pro‑Life Bill’ and an attempt to change Title X regulations to prevent domestic family planning services from providing counseling or referrals for abortion. Most of Rea‑ gan’s actions did not change the status or accessibility of abortion in the US, and the more assertive 1987 initiatives failed. Nellie Gray, founder and

68 The Reagan Revolution leader of March for Life and a prominent anti‑abortion figure, condemned Reagan for valuing ‘prolife talk’ over ‘prolife action.’ [Doc. 18] However, most social and religious conservatives continued to electorally support Reagan and the Republicans who shared his vision for the party. In the long term, Reagan’s most significant right‑to‑life legacy was the legal assault on Roe. After Edwin Meese III became Attorney General he condemned ‘judicial activism’ and vowed that the Reagan administra‑ tion was committed to originalism, ‘resurrect[ing] the “original meaning” of constitutional provisions and federal statutes’ (Hager, 1985). Meese singled out Roe for especial criticism. In 1985, Acting Solicitor General Charles Fried filed an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief calling on the Supreme Court to overturn Roe. This position was not put forward by either of the parties in the case and the brief was widely criticized, including by former Republican Solicitor Generals. The White House clarified that Reagan himself had approved the brief. In 1988, Fried filed another amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme Court to overturn Roe. Fifty Department of Justice lawyers signed a petition protesting that the Department had violated long‑standing norms by being so politically partisan. Judicial vacancies, particularly those on the nation’s highest court, grew in political importance over the course of the 1980s. Although opponents of abortion had attacked the O’Connor nomination, they came to (incor‑ rectly) believe that she was a reliable vote to overturn Roe. In Reagan’s second term, he elevated conservative Justice William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and nominated staunch originalist Antonin Scalia to fill Rehnquist’s seat. Opponents of abortion and the New Right supported these picks and believed that the pro‑Roe majority had shrunk to five. In 1987, when another Supreme Court vacancy occurred, supporters and opponents of abortion engaged in unprecedented mobilization after Reagan controver‑ sially chose to nominate Robert Bork. As discussed in Chapter 5, Bork was rejected by the Senate after acrimonious hearings and the vacancy was eventually filled by Anthony Kennedy. Anti‑abortion and pro‑choice groups were correct in believing that the future of the constitutional right to abortion hung in the balance in the late 1980s. Kennedy, along with O’Connor, formed a crucial part of the majority that upheld Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Prayer in School In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Supreme Court ruled 6‑1 that mandating an official prayer in public schools was unconstitutional, a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The ruling, with its emphasis upon a wall of separation between church and state, shocked many Ameri‑ cans, particularly staunch anti‑communists who viewed the Cold War as

A Moral Majority? 69 a struggle between godlessness and godliness. A push began for a school prayer amendment, which was enthusiastically supported by Senator Barry Goldwater and Reagan in the 1964 election. However, many churches and denominations opposed the idea, concerned by potential govern‑ ment infringement upon religious liberties. Even conservative Protestant denominations were relatively silent on the issue. Only in the late 1970s, as evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants began mobilizing against secu‑ lar humanism, did they start to view prayer in public schools as crucial to restoring America’s fortunes. In 1980, the newly formed Coalition for the First Amendment united Pat Robertson, Falwell, and other Religious Right leaders in favor of an amendment. In his presidential campaign, Reagan reaffirmed his support but, once in office, ignored the issue. In advance of the twenty‑year anniversary of Engel, Religious Right groups coordinated a grassroots campaign calling for a school prayer amendment and the administration received 1  million letters. In May 1982, Reagan announced to a gathering of religious and political lead‑ ers, ‘No one will ever convince me that a moment of voluntary prayer will harm a child or threaten a school or state’ (Young, 2015: 216). He submitted an amendment to Congress 11 days later. Religious groups split in their response. Major Jewish groups and Protestant denomina‑ tions expressed disapproval, while the Catholic hierarchy and Mormon leadership remained aloof. However, the Southern Baptist Convention, the nation’s largest Protestant denomination, along with fundamentalist Reli‑ gious Right leaders and groups, lobbied on behalf of Reagan’s amendment. Evangelicals held an all‑night prayer vigil on the Capitol steps during the Senate debates. The sudden action on school prayer reflected a White House strategy to counter the perception that Reagan was primarily interested in eco‑ nomic policy. The introduction of the amendment, along with Reagan’s last‑minute lobbying to end a pro‑choice filibuster of anti‑abortion legisla‑ tion, was linked to the looming 1982  midterms. However, Republicans experienced enough defeats in the House of Representatives to effectively end their working majority with Southern Democrats. In a January 1983 strategy document, Blackwell blamed this setback on the fact that the White House had studiously avoided the social issues that had energized the ‘winning coalition’ of 1980. [Doc. 5] After the midterms, school prayer fell off the administration’s radar. Rea‑ gan expended very little political capital on his amendment. To the frustra‑ tion of Religious Right leaders, the White House was completely unaware that Senator Orrin Hatch, a conservative Republican from Utah, had pro‑ posed a rival silent prayer amendment, a model they rejected. Moderate Republicans accused Reagan of having ‘political, not legislative’ priorities. Weicker led the opposition, warning Americans they were being asked to

70 The Reagan Revolution ‘forfeit our birthright of religious liberty for a mess of speculative, political pottage’ (Tolchin, 1984a). In early 1984, after two weeks of Senate debate, Reagan’s amendment was defeated, with 18 Republicans voting nay. The school prayer amendment was shelved by the Reagan administration and the Religious Right quietly abandoned it as a priority legislative goal. Cleaning Up Culture Throughout the 1980s, social and religious conservatives called on gov‑ ernment and industry to clean up what they viewed as a sexualized and corrupted society, focusing their wrath on ‘obscene’ forms of artistic and cultural expression. The Reagan administration’s first target was the art world. The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), established in 1965 with strong bipartisan support, distributed thousands of annual grants to artists, councils, museums, and galleries to promote equitable access to and participation in the arts. Conservatives had long opposed any govern‑ ment funding for the arts and when Reagan won election, these complaints reached a fever pitch. Reagan’s transition team initially proposed eliminat‑ ing the NEA but then changed tactics, seeking instead to halve its budget. The arts community protested and, with assistance from moderate Senate Republicans, the NEA’s budget cuts remained in line with reductions in other domestic programs. From the mid‑1980s, Congressional conservatives began to focus on dis‑ crediting the grant allocation process, attempting to withdraw NEA fund‑ ing for individual artists who produced work they believed was offensive. In 1989, these efforts erupted into a broad Congressional attack on the NEA, centered on the artists Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe, who conservatives condemned for blasphemy and obscenity. Senator Jesse Helms proclaimed: The American people … are disgusted with the idea of giving the tax‑ payers’ money to artists who promote homosexuality insidiously and deliberately … and others who will engage in whatever perversion it takes to win acclaim as an artist on the ‘offending edge’ and therefore entitled to taxpayer funding. (Quigley, 1991) Helms and a coalition of conservatives amended the NEA’s legislation, adding a ‘decency clause’ as a requirement in determining grant recipients. A separate furor erupted over popular music. When 11‑year‑old Karenna played Prince’s hit album Purple Rain on the home stereo, her mother Tipper Gore was incensed by lyrics which told the story of ‘sex fiend’ Nikki who was ‘masturbating with a magazine’ (Frank, 2009: 233). Tipper was the wife

A Moral Majority? 71 of Senator Al Gore, a centrist Democrat from Tennessee (and future vice president under Bill Clinton). She found a key ally in Susan Baker, the wife of Secretary of the Treasury James Baker III, who was Reagan’s former Chief of Staff. The two women, assisted by conservative donors, established the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC) to do something about the musical ‘filth’ being produced and sold by record labels. The PMRC found a recep‑ tive audience in Congress, aided by the fact several PMRC members were married to senators on the Committee on Commerce. In September 1985, the Senate hearing on obscene music was a media spectacle. A handful of musicians testified passionately in defense of free speech and civil liberties, while members of the PMRC and conservative reli‑ gious leaders insisted that popular music and music videos were destroying young people’s morality. The PMRC claimed as victory a voluntary decision from record companies to affix ‘Parental Guidance: Explicit Lyrics’ labels to albums. From 1985, musicians and record labels were under increasing pressure to self‑censor. Although the initial targets were heavy metal groups such as Def Leppard and Mötley Crüe and pop acts such as Madonna and Cyndi Lauper, by the end of the decade African American rap and hip‑hop artists were the principal focus of these campaigns. For conservatives, the overarching thread that linked indecent music and the art world was pornography. The sexual revolution of the long 1960s, combined with successive Supreme Court cases liberalizing obscenity laws, fundamentally changed cultural depictions of nudity and sexuality. Simul‑ taneously, pornography moved into the mainstream, accelerated by new technologies such as video home system (VHS) which brought hardcore films into the home. Social and religious conservatives blamed pornogra‑ phy for an array of issues including rape, divorce, illegitimate pregnancy, and teenage promiscuity. Dr. Mildred Jefferson, a prominent anti‑abortion leader, viewed pornography as ‘part of a total movement to destroy the sanctity of life found in the Judeo‑Christian ethic’ (Frame, 1983). Decency campaigners opposed all pornography, but in the 1980s their principal focus was child pornography, that is, sexually explicit mate‑ rial featuring minors. This type of content was criminalized at the state and federal level and was condemned by the Adult Film Association of America. However, anti‑pornography activists demanded tougher laws and enforcement. Furthermore, they argued that young people’s exposure to pornographic materials constituted a form of child sexual abuse. Thus, to protect minors, all pornography needed to be closely regulated, prefer‑ ably restricted. The war against sexually explicit content brought together strange bedfellows. Socially and religiously conservative activists found common cause with a subset of radical feminists, who made civil rights arguments and asserted that ‘pornography is the theory, and rape the practice’ (Strub, 2010: 230). Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon

72 The Reagan Revolution worked with city councils to adopt ordinances which defined pornography as sex‑based discrimination and allowed women victimized by pornogra‑ phy to sue creators and distributors. Scholar Whitney Strub (2010: 180) argues that Reagan successfully used pornography to ‘mollify his religious supporters’ who were frustrated by their lack of progress in the culture wars. Unlike other social issues, por‑ nography had few political champions. Perhaps as important, it was not a source of internal conflict among Republicans. Indeed, Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate Republican from Pennsylvania, repeatedly introduced anti‑pornography legislation, albeit informed by radical feminist critiques and strategies. For his part, Reagan regularly condemned pornography in speeches and invited decency groups to the White House. When signing an anti‑child pornography bill passed with strong bipartisan support, Rea‑ gan (1984b) emphasized that all pornography was a ‘public problem’ and announced that the Attorney General would set up a national commission to ‘study the effects of pornography on our society.’ The Meese Commission was dominated by anti‑obscenity campaigners and prominent religious conservatives. The commission did not pretend toward neutrality – three‑quarters of the witnesses opposed pornography and many testified as victims. Radical feminist Dworkin was quoted at length in the final report. Commission members watched dozens of hard‑ core films, read dirty magazines, visited sex shops, and listened to phone sex chats. The commission also wrote to major chain stores, including 7‑Eleven, implying they might be cited for distributing pornography, lead‑ ing to the mass removal of Playboy and Penthouse from magazine racks. This overreach triggered lawsuits against the commission. In July 1986, the commission released its almost 2000‑page final report, which included 300 pages of graphic plot summaries and excerpts from pornographic scripts. One publisher of the report included a message on the cover warning that the explicit nature of the report would be offensive to most readers. The commission called for an array of legislative changes, as well as encouraging consumer boycotts and public protests against pro‑ ducers and distributors. Many of its recommendations fell afoul of First Amendment protections on free speech. Although Meese and the Reagan administration avoided publicly engaging with its findings, Strub (2010: 212) argues that the Justice Department began to aggressively fine and prosecute producers and distributors of mainstream adult content as ‘obscenity prosecutions reached a [repressive] fervor.’ Just Say No Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, illegal drug use became an increasingly common part of the American experience. In 1969, only

A Moral Majority? 73 4 per cent of poll respondents had tried marijuana but by 1977 24 per cent had. In the early 1970s, nearly half a million Americans were her‑ oin users, including a sizeable percentage of US servicemen in Vietnam. Cocaine was the glamorous drug of choice for 1970s celebrities. Politi‑ cal responses varied. While Governor of California, Reagan presented teenage drug use as a major problem. President Richard Nixon (1971) declared illegal drugs ‘public enemy number 1’ and established the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973. However, early in Jimmy Carter’s presidency, he asked Congress to effectively decriminalize marijuana by replacing prison sentences with fines and removing federal penalties for possession. Carter also called for reconsideration of the penalties for cocaine possession. Reagan rejected the notion of recreational drug use. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan claimed that marijuana was ‘probably the most dan‑ gerous drug in the United States’ (Lassiter, 2023: 452). In office, he used his weekly radio address to announce that the federal government was ‘going to win the war on drugs,’ warning drug traffickers ‘we’ve taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag’ (Reagan, 1982). He not only understood drugs as a domestic scourge but also viewed them as a national security problem. The federal government, with the support of Congress, poured money into narcotics control programs, drew upon the Central Intelligence Agency’s resources, involved the military in issues of drug enforcement, and dramatically expanded anti‑drug interventions in foreign countries, particularly in Latin America. By Reagan’s last year in office, annual government expenditures for the war on drugs reached $4.3 billion. First Lady Nancy Reagan was the domestic face of the administration’s crusade with her campaign targeted at young people. In 1981, she began speaking out against drugs and the ‘Just Say No’ movement became her signature issue. She visited hundreds of schools to teach children and teen‑ agers about the perils of drug use. In 1985, she invited the First Ladies of 30 nations to a three‑day anti‑drug forum. The Just Say No campaign was a mainstay in popular culture, promoted by musicians, actors, and athletes, while Nancy delivered her message in music videos, public ser‑ vice announcements, and an episode of the popular TV sitcom Diff’rent Strokes. By 1988, more than 12,000 ‘Just Say No’ clubs operated in the US and around the world. For the Religious Right and social conservatives, drugs were not a core issue. Rather, the prevalence of illegal drugs was interpreted as symptomatic of broader social degradation, a consequence of ignoring Biblically man‑ dated precepts for living. Falwell (1980: 117) blamed the increasing secu‑ larization of American culture and politics for the rising rates of ‘divorce, broken homes, abortion, juvenile delinquency, and drug addiction.’ Social

74 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 4.2 Nancy Reagan speaking at a ‘Just Say No’ rally, 1987 Source: Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

tolerance of drugs, let alone decriminalization, meant acceptance of sec‑ ular humanism and acquiescence in America’s rejection of God. Scholar Gil Troy (2005: 287) argues that the war on drugs thus served an impor‑ tant political purpose for Reagan, ‘illustrat[ing] how government could champion morality without expanding its power’ and appealing to con‑ servatives ‘without complicating the rest of Reagan’s program or exposing the Republicans’ rift between libertarian conservatives and conservative moralists.’ In the mid‑1980s, crack, a solid form of cocaine which users smoked rather than snorted, began to flood the American drug market. Crack was a cheap high, $10 or less versus the $200 per gram of powder. Cocaine was associated with celebrities and Yuppies whereas crack users, at least initially, were predominantly African American and Latino. There was an inflammatory and highly racialized discourse about the societal dangers of crack. Scholar David Farber (2019: 129) describes the media as fueling ‘the American public’s wildest fears with terrifying, if often untrue or exagger‑ ated, tales of ever‑widening drug devastation.’ Crack was presented as an existential threat that turned American cities into war zones. For several

A Moral Majority? 75 years, the New York Times, Washington Post, and other mainstream press outlets credulously reported that 100,000 ‘crack babies’ were born annu‑ ally with significant mental and physical disabilities. The press warned of a ‘damaged generation’ that would be an immense burden on educational, health, and social welfare systems (‘Slandering the Unborn …,’ 2018). The narrative of the crack baby was based on highly provisional, later debunked, research. Alarm over crack, combined with political expedience, led to the dra‑ matic escalation of the war on drugs in the lead up to the 1986 midterm elections. In May, when the President signed the Just Say No to Drugs Week proclamation, he described illegal drugs as ‘every bit as much a threat to the United States as enemy planes and missiles’ (Reagan, 1986b). In September, the Reagans made a joint televised address to explain the urgent need for anti‑drug initiatives and legislation. It was a persuasive domestic appeal, filmed in their living quarters and framed as a message from the First Family to American families. [Doc. 14] Although the Rea‑ gans were at the forefront, the 1980s war on drugs was a bipartisan effort as Congressional Democrats and Republicans called for comprehensive new drug laws. The punitive Anti‑Drug Abuse Act of 1986, sponsored and partly written by Senator Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware and future president, raced through both houses of Congress. According to Farber (2019: 139), ‘almost every politician in Washington cheered on passage of the bill, knowing that it would strengthen his or her re‑election chances.’ The 1986 legislation, along with a 1988 law, treated prison as the only way to slow the spread of drugs, mandating minimum sentences for pos‑ session of certain weights of drugs. A person found with five grams of crack (roughly the weight of a quarter) faced a mandatory five‑year prison sentence. It also established the precedent whereby crack and cocaine, which were the same drug, were treated in extraordinarily divergent ways. A person found with 50 grams of crack faced the same mandatory ten‑year prison sentence as a person found with five kilograms (or 5,000 grams) of powder cocaine, a 100:1 ratio. Scholar Michelle Alexander (2012: 6–7) notes that in the 30 years after Reagan reinvigorated the war on drugs the prison population ‘exploded from around 300,000 to more than 2  mil‑ lion, with drug convictions accounting for the majority of the increase.’ Americans of all races and ethnicities used and sold illegal drugs at roughly the same rate and Whites, particularly White young people, were more likely to engage in drug crime than other groups. However, the sentencing disparities and biases in policing had a hugely disproportionate impact. By 2000, 1 in 20 Black men over the age of 18 was in prison. The equiva‑ lent rate for White men was 1 in 80. Yet despite Reagan’s tough language and the sweeping laws passed, by the end of his time in office illicit drugs were more readily available and were cheaper than they had been in 1981,

76 The Reagan Revolution while drug use and drug‑related crime and violence continued to increase. Scholar Bruce Bagley (1988: 190) argues that the American ‘drug market remained the biggest and most lucrative in the world.’ HIV/AIDS In mid‑1981, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began to report on cases where young homosexual men in New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles presented with rare types of pneumonia or cancers that produced skin lesions. Many of these previously healthy men died within months of falling ill. This unexpected cluster of cases was briefly given the name Gay Related Immune Deficiency, but from September 1982, the CDC was calling the new illness AIDS. Medical and epidemiological research was vital to understanding and slowing the spread of the deadly new illness. Margaret Heckler, Secretary of HHS, declared that AIDS was the ‘number one health priority.’ However, she also asserted that ‘for the overwhelming majority of Americans, there appears to be little or no risk of falling victim to this disease’ (Schmidt, 1983). In 1983, the CDC defined the main groups at risk of contracting AIDS as male homosexuals, hemo‑ philiacs, heroin users, and people of Haitian descent (colloquially referred to as the 4‑H Club). At a time when there was intense fear about the dis‑ ease and no understanding of how it was transmitted, this designation led to significant discrimination toward these social groups. While almost all AIDS patients were vilified, homosexual men were singled out as disease vectors, spreaders of a modern plague, rather than victims of a new illness. Throughout the 1980s, funding for AIDS research, treatment, and pre‑ vention was hotly contested. The Reagan budget cuts of the early 1980s significantly impacted resourcing in the National Institute of Health, HHS, and the CDC. A group in Congress, led by Representative Henry Wax‑ man, a Democrat from California, fought to ensure federal resources were directed toward researching and preventing AIDS and assisting AIDS patients. Their efforts were frequently stymied by conservative Republi‑ cans. Funding remained inadequate throughout the 1980s. The Reagan administration also intervened to block Congressional appropriations for initiatives connected to the AIDS crisis and obstructed CDC prevention efforts. In February 1986, on the same day that Reagan announced that finding a cure for AIDS was the number one public health priority, the administration sent a budget to Congress that included significant reduc‑ tions in spending on AIDS research and programs for patients. Many leading conservatives reacted to the AIDS crisis, or what some called the ‘gay plague,’ with unrestrained homophobia. In 1983, Buchanan referred to homosexuals as both a ‘moral’ and a ‘public health menace’ in his nationally syndicated New York Post opinion column. He concluded,

A Moral Majority? 77 ‘the poor homosexuals ‑ they have declared war upon nature, and now nature is exacting an awful retribution’ (Young, 2024: 181). Buchanan, who had worked in the Nixon administration, became Reagan’s Com‑ munications Director in 1985. In 1986, conservative intellectual William Buckley, Jr.  wrote an op‑ed in the New York Times proposing that all gay men with AIDS be tattooed on the buttocks. He repeated this sugges‑ tion in a private letter to Reagan. In Congress, one California Republican pushed for the creation of a government register of AIDS patients, for the quarantining and deportation of those with AIDS, and for it to be a felony for anyone with the disease to exchange bodily fluids. Falwell later asserted, ‘AIDS is not just God’s punishment for homosexuals. It is God’s punishment for the society that tolerates homosexuals’ (Petro, 2015: 24). At the height of panic about AIDS, one of Falwell’s fundraising letters falsely claimed that gay men were donating blood at three times the rate of other people because ‘they know they are going to die ‑ and they are going to take as many people with them as they can’ (Klarman, 2012: 34). This intensification of homophobia occurred in a context where there were few legal protections for LGBTQI+ people. In 1982, Wisconsin became the first state to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual orien‑ tation. Seven years later, Massachusetts became the second. There were no federal protections around sexual orientation and gender identity. Almost half the states had laws which criminalized certain types of sexual activity and, in Bower v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy did not extend to same‑sex physical intimacy. Social conserva‑ tives attempted to reverse the fragile gains made by gay rights activists in the 1970s. A particular goal was passage of the Family Protection Act, which was repeatedly introduced in Congress. This omnibus bill pursued an array of socially and religiously conservative agendas, including barring federal funding for any person or group that advocated for homosexuality. For conservative gay men in the 1980s, AIDS put their sexuality and political beliefs in profound conflict. The most striking example was Dolan who at 36 died of AIDS‑related complications, although his cause of death was initially reported as congestive heart failure. Dolan remained clos‑ eted until his death but the growing rumors about his sexuality dimin‑ ished his influence within Washington’s conservative circles and he was ousted from National Conservative Political Action Committee, the group he founded. Dolan’s large Catholic funeral service was attended by sev‑ eral prominent conservatives, including Buchanan and Hatch. Speaking at the memorial service was Senator Gordon Humphrey, a conservative Republican from New Hampshire whom Dolan had helped win election in 1978. He later told the Washington Post that he never believed the ‘rumors’ that Dolan was gay and that it would trouble him ‘if it was true … [because] it is tragic when anyone embraces an unhealthy personal life

78 The Reagan Revolution style’ (Kastor, 1987). In response to media coverage of Dolan’s cause of death, his brother Tony, a speech writer in the Reagan White House, took out a two‑page advertisement in the Washington Times. He condemned the press for using his brother’s death to ‘promot[e] an anti‑conservative, pro‑gay agenda,’ insisting that Terry had had a death bed conversion and rejected homosexuality (Young, 2024: 185). Silence and inertia were the defining features of the Reagan adminis‑ tration’s response to AIDS, at great human cost. In the early years of the epidemic, White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes responded to ques‑ tions about the disease with non‑answers and homophobic quips, while journalists laughed at his jokes. Reagan did not utter the term or publicly acknowledge the disease until a September 1985 press conference, when he briefly responded to a question about infected children. That same year Hollywood actor Rock Hudson, a close friend of the Reagans, became the first celebrity death officially attributed to AIDS, galvanizing public anxiety about the disease. By the end of 1985, over 12,000 Americans had died. Reagan’s first speech about AIDS was not until May 1987. Although he talked with great empathy about certain people who had the disease, framing them as innocent victims, he did not use the words gay or homo‑ sexual once. The speech was interrupted on several occasions with hisses and boos. Outside, hundreds of people participated in a candlelight vigil to honor those who had died of AIDS. To the surprise of both liberals and conservatives, Surgeon General Koop was the most important Reagan appointee to address the AIDS cri‑ sis. Koop, an evangelical Christian and hero to the Religious Right, was a staunch opponent of abortion who disapproved of homosexuality. In mid‑1985, conservatives sent thousands of postcards to the White House calling on Reagan to ‘crack down on homosexuals and those with AIDS in the name of public safety’ and demanding Koop be appointed to the AIDS Task Force (Witcher, 2019: 76). In February 1986, Reagan asked Koop to author a report on the disease. Koop followed an evidence‑based approach to the crisis. He did not submit the report for review by the administration, seeking to avoid interference in its conclusions and recommendations. In the 36‑page Surgeon General’s Report on AIDS, which was released in October 1986, Koop insisted that it was everyone’s responsibility to undertake preventative measures to reduce the risk of exposure to and transmission of AIDS. He called for widespread use of condoms, advertis‑ ing of condoms on television, increased confidential testing services, and education about the disease for young people, starting in third grade. Koop thoroughly rejected conservative proposals such as quarantining, registers, and compulsory blood testing. While he noted the importance of absti‑ nence and monogamous relationships, he refused to make these the basis of government prevention programs.

A Moral Majority? 79 The Religious Right, the New Right, and much of the anti‑abortion movement were apoplectic about Koop’s report on AIDS. Schlafly and New Right leader Paul Weyrich accused Koop of perpetuating the ‘gay rights agenda, which is to teach children how to use condoms for premari‑ tal promiscuity with either sex’ (Witcher, 2019: 79). Gray revoked Koop’s ‘life award for outstanding service’ from March for Life and accused him of ‘condoning and even promoting the spread of AIDS through unjustifi‑ able sexual relationships and false hopes for condoms’ (Anderson, 1987). Social and religious conservatives called for Koop to resign and, if he refused, for Reagan to fire him. There was also staunch opposition within the administration to the type of approach Koop advocated. When the White House first began debating a federal response, Secretary of Educa‑ tion William Bennett and Education Undersecretary Gary Bauer insisted that abstinence and moral values were the only appropriate response to the health crisis. When appointees were chosen for the President’s Commission on the HIV Epidemic, Bauer was adamant that no gay man or lesbian be appointed, lest it ‘give homosexuality a stamp of acceptability’ (Young, 2024: 198). Nancy Reagan rejected this perspective, and her influence is likely why the President appointed an out gay man to the commission. Reagan did not meet with Koop to discuss AIDS until 1987, and that meet‑ ing was dominated by Bennett and Bauer. Reagan continued his public support for abstinence, arguing that it was the best way that young people could protect themselves from the dis‑ ease. In 1987, HHS launched a series of radio and television advertise‑ ments about AIDS that did not mention homosexuality or condoms but did promote abstinence and faithfulness within marriage. Congressional conservatives, led by Helms and acting with Reagan’s support, amended a 1987 AIDS appropriations bill to require all federally financed educa‑ tion materials to ‘stress sexual abstinence’ and prohibiting the creation of resources that ‘promote or encourage, directly or indirectly, homosexual sexual activities’ (Strub, 2010: 211). The next year, Helms’ efforts in Con‑ gress led to a ban on federal funding for needle exchange programs. How‑ ever, Koop’s message was eventually distributed. In May 1988, the CDC commenced a mailout of a seven‑page version of the Surgeon General’s report. The ‘Understanding AIDS’ pamphlet was sent to all 107  million households in the country. By the end of Reagan’s last year as president, almost 62,000 Americans had died of AIDS. In the face of government inaction, gay men and lesbians cared for one another and fought against stigma. In the early 1980s, gay and lesbian groups created prevention programs, pamphlets, and advertising to try and slow the spread of the disease, emphasizing the importance of condoms and safe sex. In March 1987, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the antiretroviral AZT, meaning a drug to treat AIDS was finally

80 The Reagan Revolution available for Americans. Gay and lesbian activism became more assertive, demanding greater political, bureaucratic, and social responsiveness. AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) and the related artist collective Gran Fury relied on protest, civil disobedience, direct action, visual arts, and street theater, functioning as what scholar Bradford Martin (2011: 172) describes as the ‘shock troops of AIDS activism.’ Their mission was to fight the institutionalized and normalized homophobia and discrimina‑ tory policies that people with AIDS experienced. [Doc. 19] They also drew attention to the disproportionate impact of the crisis on Black and Latino people, the way that the CDC’s definition of AIDS excluded women, and the significant barriers that people with AIDS, particularly those who were poor, faced in accessing health care and housing. In October 1987, over 200,000 people marched in Washington, DC, demanding action from the White House. Concurrently, the AIDS Memo‑ rial Quilt was displayed for the first time on the National Mall. This immense work of art and activism was made up of 1,920 panels, each memorializing a person who had died of AIDS. ACT UP protests in 1988 highlighted the barriers preventing AIDS patients from accessing life‑saving medicine. Wall Street was a key target, with activists drawing attention to AZT’s prohibitive price (up to $10,000 annually) and the immense profits enjoyed by its pharmaceutical manufacturer. Demonstrators also picketed outside HHS and laid siege to the FDA, highlighting the bureaucratic regu‑ lations that slowed progress on drug trials and limited American access to medications being dispensed in other countries. Only after Reagan left office did significant federal action start to occur. In 1990, with bipartisan support, Congress passed the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act, making $220 million in federal funding available to sup‑ port people with AIDS. Conclusion Fueled by the certainty that the country was in spiritual decline, Religious Right, New Right, and single‑issue groups aggressively pursued legisla‑ tive and regulatory solutions in areas of intimate personal life, areas that would once have been understood as outside the scope of politics. In 1980, Reagan carefully courted electoral constituencies that were motivated by issues of traditional morality and ‘family values.’ Throughout Reagan’s two terms as president, he regularly made statements on matters of con‑ cern to social and religious conservatives, affirming their arguments and addressing their conferences and annual meetings. Reagan used the highest platform in the nation to endorse and amplify their language and beliefs. However, this was only occasionally matched with legislative or bureau‑ cratic action. On issues such as abortion and school prayer, Reagan did

A Moral Majority? 81 not expend political capital and frequently ignored the priorities of interest groups (although the judicial groundwork to overturn Roe began during his presidency). This was in stark contrast to Reagan’s wheeling and dealing to achieve his economic goals in Congress. For anti‑obscenity campaigns, the executive and legislative branch amplified conservative perspectives but, as scholar Gillian Frank (2009: 243) argues, tended to rely on industry regulation and self‑censorship, albeit via ‘increasingly privatized and less democratic forms of governance.’ When it came to AIDS, Reagan did not publicly endorse the homophobic and stigmatizing language and policy suggestions of social and religious conservatives. However, his silence ceded crucial ground to them, allowing the politicization of a public health crisis. In contrast, Reagan was vigorous in his prosecution of the war on drugs, an issue that was not a notable priority for social and religious con‑ servatives but that attracted high levels of bipartisan support in Congress. Reagan’s behavior stemmed from a series of political calculations he and his advisors made. During the 1980s, the Republican Party was signifi‑ cantly and very publicly divided over the place of government in regulating morality. When issues such as abortion and school prayer were put to a vote, moderate Republicans led the opposition. More broadly, Reagan’s advisors understood that social conservatives represented only a portion of the electorate and Reagan needed to appeal to a broad cross‑section of society. This approach was also likely shaped by Reagan’s ideologi‑ cal understanding of conservatism wherein the economy and defense were paramount. Yet Reagan fundamentally changed cultural politics in the US. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Republican Party underwent a signifi‑ cant reorientation, gradually becoming ever more conservative on an array of social and spiritual issues. This shift occurred because of the wave of politicians Reagan inspired and the highly motivated electoral constituen‑ cies Reagan energized. After Reagan, Republican candidates, first for the White House and later for Congress and state office, assiduously courted social and religious conservatives. The Reagan years amplified and deep‑ ened polarization over issues such as women’s rights, faith, sexuality, crime, and health, embedding the ‘culture wars’ into American politics.

5

The Teflon President

Representative Pat Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat and one of the most outspoken feminists in Congress, was scrambling eggs in her kitchen when she had a breakthrough about why criticism of Ronald Reagan never seemed to cut through. In an August 1983 speech on the House floor, she sarcastically explained that Reagan was: perfecting the Teflon‑coated presidency. He sees to it that nothing sticks to him. He is responsible for nothing ‑ civil rights, Central America, the Middle East, the economy, the environment. He is just master of ceremonies at someone else’s dinner. (Lowy, 2003: 10) Schroeder believed that this insight might help Democrats scratch Reagan’s glossy exterior. However, the phrase ‘Teflon president’ became ubiquitous not as a criticism but as a shorthand that conveyed Reagan was politically untouchable. [Doc. 9] With the end of stagflation and the Reagan Recession, Reagan’s re‑ election seemed almost inevitable as voters reveled in Reagan’s positive, non‑ideological message. The only surprise in November 1984 was the scale of his victory. However, Reagan’s second term lacked an overarch‑ ing policy agenda or sense of political mandate. Initially, Reagan did not champion ideological causes and instead pursued bipartisan programs such as taxation and immigration reform. In Reagan’s last years in office, his administration was rocked by scandals and setbacks, including the Iran‑Contra Affair. In response, Reagan and his advisors pivoted, adopt‑ ing an uncompromising and divisive approach toward a Supreme Court vacancy and landmark civil rights legislation. This shift formed the basis of a broader effort to create an electoral legacy that would extend beyond his years in the White House.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-7

The Teflon President 83 1984 Election Prominent New Right figures were deeply frustrated by Reagan’s perceived inaction on social issues and growing pragmatism on taxation. Howard Phil‑ lips urged ‘Reagan not to run again,’ while Richard Viguerie accused Reagan of having ‘done so very little’ for conservatives (Witcher, 2019: 68–9). The National Conservative Political Action Committee claimed it would not run advertisements or campaign for Reagan’s re‑election. The President’s advi‑ sors sought to manage and offset conservative disappointment with symbolic politics, particularly around abortion and school prayer, but were wary of emphasizing controversial issues or policies. The White House was acutely conscious that Reagan the man was much more popular than Reagan the ideologue. Administration insiders summarized the re‑election approach as ‘relatively nonspecific … more abstract’ (Troy, 2005: 160). Reagan’s 1984 campaign was thus heavy on optimistic imagery and positive messaging and emotions. The most potent example was the ‘It’s Morning Again in America’ television advertisement, viewed as ‘one of the most effective campaign spots ever broadcast.’ Over swelling instrumen‑ tals, the voiceover summarized the economic recovery since  1980 (with no reference to the recently ended downturn), linking decreased inflation and interest rates to the hopes and dreams of ordinary people. The visuals were a golden‑hued montage of a happy, interracial citizenry – office work‑ ers, farmers, school children, pensioners, and lingering shots of a wedding party. The last 20 seconds were scenes of American flags being raised while viewers were assured that ‘under the leadership of President Reagan, our country is prouder and stronger and better’ (Beschloss, 2016). The Democratic challenger for the White House was Walter Mondale, Vice President in the Carter administration. Mondale (1984) pressed the issue of social inequality, insisting that the Reagan administration was government ‘of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich.’ However, Mondale’s focus on curbing the budget deficit and belt‑tightening did not excite voters. His earnest style and emphasis on facts earned him the nickname Mondull. He trailed Reagan in the polls. In July, Mondale announced Representative Geraldine Ferraro from New York as his pick for vice president. Ferraro was the first woman to appear on a presidential ticket for a major political party, but opponents dis‑ missed the choice as tokenism. Scholar David Greenberg (2009: 57) suggests that, by the 1980s, liberal Democrats were perceived as displaying ‘elite favor‑ itism toward minorities’ rather than having an interest in rights and justice. Ferraro, although charismatic and popular with campaign crowds, proved a controversial running mate after the media fixated on her family finances and tax returns. Ferraro, a pro‑choice Catholic, also faced anti‑abortion picketing and criticism from the United States (US) Catholic hierarchy.

84 The Reagan Revolution The only moment of hope for Democrats came on 7 October during the first presidential debate. Mondale put Reagan on the defensive on mul‑ tiple issues, including abortion, Supreme Court nominations, taxes, and Social Security. Reagan harked back to the 1980 debate, asking viewers whether America was ‘better off’ than it was four years prior. Mondale responded, ‘Well, if you’re wealthy, you’re better off.’ He then insisted that the ‘real question’ should be, ‘Are we building the future that this nation needs?’ 61 per cent believed Mondale won the debate. Commenta‑ tors noted that Reagan seemed disoriented and lacking ‘mental vigor.’ For a few weeks, the media speculated that Reagan, aged 73, had diminished capacity. However, during the second debate, Reagan avoided further dis‑ asters and offered a pithy retort when asked about his age, ‘I am not going to exploit, for political purposes, my opponent’s youth and inexperience’ (Troy, 2005: 169, 171). On 6 November, Reagan won 49 states and 525 Electoral College votes, a landslide second only to Franklin Roosevelt’s 1936 win. However, Democrats retained their majority in the House while Republicans lost two seats in the Senate, making their control of that body precarious. Given Reagan’s campaign did not highlight ideology, his vic‑ tory was not a clear endorsement of conservativism or the Republican Party. Rather, it was indicative of Reagan’s personal popularity and the economic recovery. Second‑Term Agenda At the start of Reagan’s second term, there was a significant shakeup within the White House with the dissolution of ‘the troika.’ Chief of Staff James Baker III decided, without consulting Reagan, to switch jobs with Don Regan, the Secretary of the Treasury. Regan had been ‘appalled … at the tendency of first‑term White House aides to pursue their own agenda’ and once he was Chief of Staff insisted on letting ‘Reagan be Reagan’ (Wilentz, 2009: 178). In practice, this meant the President rarely heard opposing or critical viewpoints. Michael Deaver left the White House to establish a public relations and lobbying firm, quickly attracting high profile cor‑ porate and foreign government clients keen to exploit his connections with the Reagans. In February 1985, Edwin Meese III became Attorney General, despite serious corruption allegations and an investigation by independent counsel. 31 senators voted against him, the largest dissenting vote in 60 years. Meese resigned as Attorney General in July 1988 over his involvement in a major scandal involving Wedtech, a Department of Defense contractor. Reagan’s second‑term activities were far more diverse than his first, including a mixture of bipartisan goals and new departures in US‑Soviet relations. He also responded to disasters and attacks, while overseeing the

The Teflon President 85 resolution of long‑running issues. On 14 June 1985, Lebanese terrorists hijacked the Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. The passengers and crew, which included 85 Americans, were held hostage for 17 days. On 28 January 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds into its flight. All seven crew members were killed, including high school teacher Christa McAuliffe. Reagan’s speech in the immedi‑ ate aftermath offered a powerful message to the nation, particularly the 2.5 million school children who had watched the tragedy unfold live on television. He acknowledged the immense pain of what had occurred but reminded them ‘the future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave’ (Reagan, 1986a). On 5 April 1986, three people died and hundreds were injured, including numerous American soldiers, after the bombing of a popular West Berlin nightclub. The attack was allegedly orchestrated by Libyan agents and Reagan authorized surprise retaliatory air strikes against Libyan targets and the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Over the course of 1986, the US officially terminated its 39‑year role as administrator of the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, formally recognizing the independence of multiple island nations, including the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. That same year, the US also negotiated a $150 million payment to the Marshallese, compensation for the 67 nuclear and hydrogen weapons that the US tested in the region between 1946 and 1958. Lastly, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 acknowledged the great harm of Japanese American internment during World War II (WWII) and gave surviving internees reparations and a formal apology. Taxation and Trade Reagan’s most significant second‑term domestic goal was reform of the taxation codes. Senator Bill Bradley, a New Jersey Democrat, began pur‑ suing tax reform in 1982 with his Fair Tax plan that removed exemptions and simplified rates. It wedded the supply‑side desire to cut taxes with traditional Democratic interest in making wealthy individuals and corpo‑ rations pay their share. In Baker’s last months as Chief of Staff, he made tax reform a top domestic priority and championed it once he was Sec‑ retary of the Treasury. In Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union address, he called for a ‘historic reform of tax simplification for fairness and growth.’ [Doc. 11] Tax reform faced a complex partisan landscape. Bradley lobbied con‑ tinuously in both Congressional bodies and Reagan went on a national speaking tour to generate public interest and support. However, House Republicans initially refused to back the legislation. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill rescued Reagan from humiliating defeat. If the White House could convince 50 House Republicans to support the bill,

86 The Reagan Revolution O’Neill would commit to getting it passed. Conservatives, including Representative Newt Gingrich, continued to oppose the bill, accusing Democrats of trying to ‘deform’ the tax code and calling on Reagan to ‘back off this mess’ (Tumulty, 1985). Tax reform faced a year of fierce legislative conflict and at least three occasions where it was almost sunk. During one such crisis, Reagan visited Capitol Hill to personally call on key votes. Senator Bob Packwood, Chair of the Senate Finance Commit‑ tee, was instrumental in reviving the bill and ensuring its passage. This was notable as Packwood was initially strongly opposed to tax reform and as explored in Chapter 4, was one of Reagan’s most outspoken Republican adversaries over the social issues. The 925‑page bill addressed a range of issues. It furthered Reagan’s tax agenda, slashing the rate for the richest individuals from 50 to 28 per cent and the top corporate rate from 48 to 34 per cent. It consolidated the number of tax brackets to four and raised the lowest tax rate to 15 per cent. However, there was acute Congressional concern about the spiraling budget deficit and thus a key goal was removing the many loopholes that helped minimize tax burdens. The bill also raised the tax rate on capital gains. The impact of these changes was complex. It was estimated that approximately 76 million Americans would see a decrease in taxes, while 20  million Americans (including over 10  million with annual incomes below $30,000) would owe more. As scholar W. Elliot Brownlee (2015: 143) concludes, ‘for the first time since WWII, a major piece of tax leg‑ islation picked not only winners but also a significant number of losers.’ Staunch supply‑siders and conservatives rejected the bill on ideological grounds. Opposition to the bill also came from business, particularly cor‑ porations that paid little or no tax, the tax shelter industry, the real estate industry, and certain Rust Belt industries. In 1991, celebrity real estate mogul Donald Trump testified before Congress that the legislation was an ‘absolute catastrophe’ (Kessler and Lee, 2017). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 passed 292‑136 in the House of Repre‑ sentatives and 74‑23 in the Senate. Baker watched the final vote from the Senate gallery as a ‘reminder to Republican legislators that their president needed their cooperation’ (Swardson, 1986). Nevertheless, 11 Republicans, including conservative stalwarts such as Senator Jesse Helms, opposed the final bill. Tax reform, which occurred during a divided government and in the face of opposition from traditional supporters, was a significant achievement. After leaving office Reagan would reflect that this bill, along with the tax cuts of 1981, meant ‘I’d accomplished a lot of what I’d come to Washington to do’ (Brownlee, 2015: 143). Reagan’s other significant second‑term economic activities related to trade and imports. As part of Reagan’s belief in the free market, he advo‑ cated for free trade, which was a break with the protectionist stances of

The Teflon President 87 many prior conservatives. Under Reagan, several major global agreements were reached, including a 1985 free trade agreement with Israel, the 1986  launch of the Uruguay Round of multilateral talks on global tar‑ iffs and trade, and a 1988 free trade agreement with Canada. In 1992, this expanded to incorporate Mexico, becoming the North American Free Trade Agreement. Reagan also vetoed several protectionist pieces of legis‑ lation. Yet in practice, Reagan’s record was mixed, shaped by protectionists in Congress and public attitudes, along with broader concerns about trade imbalances and the spiraling budget deficit. The administration added a significant number of quotas and broader barriers and restraints to foreign imports. In 1980, only 5 per cent of imports had a trade restriction but by the late 1980s approximately 18 per cent did. Immigration The other central area of domestic achievement in Reagan’s second term was immigration reform. By the late 1970s, the immigration system was broadly perceived to be in crisis. Legal immigration had skyrocketed while international events, including war and economic downturn, triggered the migration of large numbers of undocumented immigrants people as well as high profile cases of refugees seeking asylum. In the post‑WWII period, Republicans had championed expansive immigration policies to allow the easy flow of workers, a goal supported by business. However, in the 1970s, some Republicans began to derive political benefit from accusing new arrivals of putting pressure on school and health systems, increasing welfare costs, and taking jobs. Reagan (1989) strongly rejected restrictionist tendencies. In one of Rea‑ gan’s last presidential speeches, he insisted that immigrants made the coun‑ try ‘a nation forever young, forever bursting with energy and new ideas … If we ever closed the door to new Americans, our leadership in the world would soon be lost.’ These views extended to those who entered the coun‑ try without documentation. In the 1980 Republican primaries, in response to a question from the audience, he opposed the idea of erecting a fence along the Mexico border. During the 1984 election, Reagan disavowed mass deportation and supported amnesty. However, as scholar Douglas Massey (2013: 262) highlights, Reagan simultaneously framed control over borders as vital to security, claiming that ‘terrorists and subversives were just “two days driving time from the nearest border crossing.”’ At the start of Reagan’s first term, he created a Task Force on Immigra‑ tion and Refugee Policy and asked Congress to pass a comprehensive leg‑ islative package. However, after Baker and Meese told the President it was a ‘no‑win’ issue, administrative activity stalled. Although policy experts viewed all immigration laws as needing review, politicians primarily

88 The Reagan Revolution focused on undocumented migrants. Senator Alan Simpson, a Republican moderate from Wyoming, had worked on immigration reform since 1979 and he his was the principal Congressional model. In 1982 and 1983, the bill passed the Senate by large margins but then languished. In the sec‑ ond 1984 presidential debate with Mondale, Reagan promised to support future Congressional efforts to pass legislation. In Reagan’s second term, immigration reform faced major obstacles. A Texas Republican led a sustained attack on amnesty provisions, while the Chamber of Commerce viewed requirements for employers as unwork‑ able. Leading Democrats, including Senator Ted Kennedy, along with major civil rights groups, supported amnesty but believed the bill would trigger discrimination against all Latinos. The sweeping final bill contained three central elements: it made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented immigrants, it solidified temporary ‘guestworker’ visas for agricultural and non‑agricultural industries, and it offered amnesty for undocumented immigrants who had entered the US before 1982. It also significantly increased funding allocated for enforcement and Border Patrol agents. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 passed the House 238‑173 and the Senate 63‑24. Significant numbers of Republicans voted against it; 105 in the House and 15 in the Senate, including prominent conservatives such as Senators Barry Goldwater and Helms. When Reagan signed the bill on 6 November, he reflected that it was a ‘truly bipartisan effort’ achieved only by the administration, Democrats, and Republicans ‘working together.’ He spoke passionately about the amnesty provisions, arguing: The legalization provisions in this act will go far to improve the lives of a class of individuals who now must hide in the shadows, without access to many of the benefits of a free and open society. Very soon many of these men and women will be able to step into the sunlight and, ultimately, if they choose, they may become Americans. (Reagan, 1986d) 2.7  million people, mostly of Latino background, received amnesty and gained status as legal residents of the US. Iran‑Contra Affair By the end of 1986, the Reagan Revolution seemed to have stalled. In the lead up to November, Reagan traveled to 16 states on behalf of embat‑ tled Republicans, waging what Time magazine characterized as ‘the most vigorous midterm campaign by a President ever’ (Lamar, 1986). Despite

The Teflon President 89 Reagan’s efforts, and a positive public reaction after the Reykjavík summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, discussed in Chapter 6, the mid‑ terms were a significant setback for Republicans. Democrats gained con‑ trol of the Senate after winning eight seats, giving them a majority in both Congressional bodies. Simultaneously, a major national security story broke. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been secretly selling arms to the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in an attempt to secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The profits from those arms sales were then funneled by National Security Council (NSC) officials to the anti‑communist Contra rebels in Nicaragua. These actions contra‑ vened multiple government policies. Since the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, there was a US embargo on selling weapons to Iran. The State Department also pressured American allies to stop selling arms to the regime. In 1984, the US designated Iran a State Sponsor of Terrorism. In the midst of the 1985 TWA Flight 847 hijacking Reagan bluntly told the media, ‘America will never make concessions to terrorists. To do so would only invite more terrorism’ (Rossinow, 2015: 187). Furthermore, the diversion of profits to the Contras violated the will of Congress. The first Boland Amendment, passed in 1982, barred the use of US funds to try and overthrow the San‑ dinista regime in Nicaragua. The second Boland Amendment, passed in 1984 after the US illegally mined Nicaraguan harbors, prohibited the use of US government funds to support the Contras. The entire scandal offered alarming insights into Reagan’s shadow foreign policy. It briefly seemed like Reagan might be impeached. The Middle Eastern portion of the scandal stemmed from Reagan’s intense preoccupation with seven American hostages captured in Leba‑ non by pro‑Iranian radical groups. In 1985, a Saudi Arabian arms dealer proposed to National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane that, if the US sold missiles and other weapons to Iranian moderates, he would be able to negotiate the release of the hostages. McFarlane pitched the idea to Reagan, proposing Israel act as a middleman. Arms shipments from Israel to Iran began in August. On 5 December, Reagan signed a finding which retroac‑ tively authorized the sales, a document that was subsequently destroyed. In a meeting two days later, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Sec‑ retary of State George Shultz had a rare moment of agreement when they both condemned the plan as breaking the law. Reagan responded that ‘he could answer charges of illegality, but he couldn’t answer charge [sic] that “big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages”’ (Byrne, 2014: 106). Weinberger eventually authorized the Defense sale of missiles to the CIA to be sent to Iran, even as he warned the administration that direct transfer of weapons was breaking the law. More than 2,000 missiles were shipped and multiple secret arms deals with Iran occurred. However,

90 The Reagan Revolution the scheme had mixed results. Three American hostages were eventually released but three more were taken. Reagan was also deeply aggrieved by the second Boland Amendment. He told McFarlane, McFarlane’s deputy John Poindexter, as well as NSC staffer Oliver North, ‘do whatever you have to do to help these people [the Contras] keep body and soul together.’ Scholar Michael Schaller (2007: 27) notes that ‘for a president who seldom issued clear instructions to subordinates, this was a definitive order.’ McFarlane, North, and Wil‑ liam Casey, the Director of the CIA, solicited private financial support for the Contras from individuals, lobbyists, non‑governmental groups, and foreign governments, including Saudi Arabia. These activities were covert even within the administration. When Shultz was asked about a ‘hypothetical’ situation where the administration sought aid from foreign governments for the Contras he described it as ‘an impeachable offence’ (Rossinow, 2015: 181). Reagan allegedly warned his advisors to keep their Contra activities secret, or ‘we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House’ (Schaller, 2007: 28). North was the glue that connected the Middle Eastern and Central American operations. He overcharged the Iranians for weapons and funneled the profits to the Contras, joking that the Iranians were making a ‘contra‑bution.’ The Iranians reportedly paid $30 million but only $12 million returned to the US. North’s self‑described ‘neat idea’ further violated federal law, as profits from the sale of weapons belonged to the Treasury (Pach, 2003: 106). On 5 October 1986, an American cargo plane flying in Nicaraguan airspace was shot done by the Sandinistas. The plane was stocked with rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, grenade launchers, and a wealth of incriminating documents. The only survivor confessed he was transporting American military supplies to the Contras as part of a CIA operation. The story quickly broke in the US. A few weeks later, on 3 November 1986, a Lebanese magazine published an exposé revealing the weapons‑for‑ hostages deal. Far from going to Iranian moderates, American arms had gone to pro‑Khomeini loyalists. Reagan initially made a televised address denying the exposé but retracted the statement a week later while still insisting it was not an arms‑for‑hostages deal. Only 14 per cent of Ameri‑ cans believed him. In a 25 November press conference, Meese outlined the link between the two covert policies. That same day, Reagan forced Poindexter to resign and fired North. On 26 November, Reagan created a Special Review Board, which became known as the Tower Commission, to review the NSC and the illegal arms sales. Reagan’s job approval rating plunged over the following months. A December poll showed almost four in five Americans disapproved of selling weapons to Iran to support the Contras. Schaller (2007: 30) characterizes Reagan’s assertions about events as ‘misleading and confused,’ oscillating

The Teflon President 91 between admitting, denying, and claiming to be unable to recall. [Doc. 15] The Tower Commission Report, released on 26 February 1987, did not press the question of whether Reagan should be impeached. However, it offered a damning depiction of a president asleep at the wheel, concluding that he delegated most decisions to subordinates. In mid‑1987, the televised hearings of a joint House‑Senate Committee revealed illegal actions, violations of Congressional will, and abuses of executive power. However, the committee struggled to work out a narra‑ tive of what had transpired. This was partly because North and his sec‑ retary Fawn Hall began destroying and altering government documents in the weeks after the plane was downed in Nicaragua. After North was fired, Hall smuggled sensitive records out of the office, hiding papers in her clothes and boots. Congress could not find a document that was a clear smoking gun directly linking Reagan to the entirety of the scandal, but the so‑called Diversion Memorandum of April 1986 clearly outlined the connection between the US, Iran, and Nicaragua. Although Poindexter insisted that he had not told Reagan about the funneling of profits to the Contras, after his testimony almost half of those polled believed he was lying. Conservatives were divided in their response. The New Right supported a decisive Contra victory and had criticized Reagan’s attempts to achieve a negotiated peace settlement in Nicaragua. As the Iran‑Contra story broke, conservatives condemned the White House for making North the fall guy. However, when Reagan seemed under threat most quickly rallied behind him. As Reverend Jerry Falwell explained, ‘Whenever my president is in trouble, I think I have an obligation to defend him’ (Williams, 2010: 210). During the televised hearings, North cut a striking profile to the estimated 55 million Americans tuning in at home. A Marine Corps Lieutenant Colo‑ nel, North testified in uniform and emphasized his patriotism and loyalty to Reagan. Conservatives treated North as a hero who was justified in breaking the law because he was fighting communism. Even after the hear‑ ings, the Contras remained a point of tension between conservatives and the President. Publicly, Reagan continued emphasizing the geopolitical and strategic significance of Nicaragua for the US. Yet, Reagan significantly cut his aid requests and when Congressional conservatives attempted to bypass the administration to get more funding, Reagan complained ‘Those sonsofbitches won’t be happy until we have 25,000 troops in Managua, and I’m not going to do it!’ (Witcher, 2019: 142). Fourteen people, including Poindexter, North, McFarlane, and Wein‑ berger, were charged with criminal offenses. In May 1989, a Washington, DC, jury found North guilty on three counts. He was fined and given a sus‑ pended three‑year prison term, although his conviction was later vacated on a technicality. During Poindexter’s 1990 trial, his defense strategy

92 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 5.1 Oliver North testifying before Congress, 1987 Source: Courtesy dpa picture alliance/Alamy Stock Photo

presented the President as an active part of the Iran‑Contra Affair and Reagan was subpoenaed to testify about his knowledge of NSC activi‑ ties. The Chicago Tribune summarized Reagan’s eight hours in the witness stand by noting there were ‘startling gaps in the memory of the 79‑year‑old former president’ (Cawley and Campbell, 1990). In December 1992, out‑ going President George H.W. Bush granted unconditional pardons to six key defendants. Fashioning a Comeback In the last years of Reagan’s presidency, there were growing murmurs about Reagan’s approach to leadership, including critical appraisal of his mental and intellectual capacity. A lengthy Washington Post op‑ed con‑ sidered whether Reagan exhibited dementia symptoms but concluded that ‘laziness’ and a disinterest in ‘minutiae’ were more likely to be the problem (Restak, 1987). The Tower Commission Report presented Reagan as hav‑ ing little oversight or control over White House staff or the implementation of policy. Senator William Cohen, a Republican moderate from Maine, told the press there was no point trying to pin Reagan down on Iran‑ Contra because ‘with Ronald Reagan, no one is there. The sad fact is we don’t have a president’ (Pemberton, 1988: 111). Chief of Staff Regan was pushed out of the White House over Iran‑Contra and responding retaliated

The Teflon President 93 by publishing a scandalous tell‑all memoir in 1988 which revealed that Nancy Reagan relied on an astrologer to control the President’s schedule and identify good and bad days for public events. Howard Baker, who had been Senate Majority leader during Reagan’s first term, was appointed Reagan’s new Chief of Staff on 27 February 1987. Senior White House figures told him that Reagan refused to read even ‘short position papers and documents’ and that ‘he wouldn’t come over to work – all he wanted to do was to watch movies and television at the residence.’ Baker was cautioned that the administration lacked order, that the ‘staff system had just broken down.’ Some were so concerned by Reagan’s mental competence that they called for the Twenty‑Fifth Amend‑ ment to be invoked so that he could be removed from office. Baker and his aides spent a day closely observing Reagan. They concluded he was ‘atten‑ tive and alert, charming and glib,’ in short, his usual self (Nelson, 1988). Shortly before the Tower Commission Report was released, Reagan noted in his diary that senior Republicans believed it was urgent that he ‘stage a comeback’ (Brinkley, 2007: 479). Resurrecting Reagan’s reputa‑ tion was vitally important for Republican electoral strategy as the party confronted the disappointing 1986 midterms and looked to the next presi‑ dential election. In discussions with Baker, Reagan outlined two core goals for the remainder of his presidency: a US‑Soviet arms control agreement and deficit reduction. Baker made these central priorities but was con‑ scious of the extremely short period left to realize such ambitious objec‑ tives. He thus developed a secondary strategy focused upon traditional values. This approach deftly sidelined Congress, where Republicans were at a disadvantage, and instead would allow Reagan to showcase his rhe‑ torical strengths. In the aftermath of the midterms, commentators assumed that Reagan would be careful in his approach to Congress. However, once the White House viewed cooperation as a relatively low priority, Reagan adopted a confrontational and polarizing approach. The emphasis on social issues was intended to reenergize and secure multiple elements of the base that Reagan had brought into the Republican Party. The goal was ‘framing the debate for 1988’ and beyond (Flowers, 2019: 117). Reagan was creating a legacy based not on substantive policy achievement but on spectacle. Dur‑ ing Reagan’s last years in office, culture war clashes dominated his domes‑ tic agenda, first in his handling of a Supreme Court vacancy and then his vetoing of a major civil rights bill. Supreme Court Vacancy On 26 June 1987, Justice Lewis Powell made the shock announcement that he was retiring from the Supreme Court. Powell, nominated by President Richard Nixon, was a crucial swing vote on affirmative action, reproductive

94 The Reagan Revolution rights, and separation of church and state. The Washington Post described him as ‘the justice who almost single‑handedly stymied the Reagan judi‑ cial revolution’ (Kamen, 1987). During Reagan’s time as president he had filled several Supreme Court vacancies, appointing Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981, and in 1986 elevating William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and appointing Antonin Scalia. The opportunity to replace Powell offered the possibility of a majority on the bench that would favor conservative argu‑ ments on racial, religious, and social issues. Reagan ensured it would be a particularly bitter nomination fight when he announced his pick was District of Columbia Appellate Court Judge Robert Bork. Bork had been passed over repeatedly for the Supreme Court, once by Ford and twice by Reagan. Bork was controversial for two reasons: his con‑ servative jurisprudence and belief in originalism, and his role in the Saturday Night Massacre during Watergate. Meese was a driving force in trying to fill the vacancy with an originalist and ardently defended Bork. When rumors first circulated that Bork was the pick, key conservative interest groups expressed qualms about whether this was strategically sound. The White House reassured them by arguing that Bork’s elevation to the federal appeals court had been unanimously confirmed by the Senate in 1982. On 1 July, hours after the nomination was announced, Kennedy rose on the Senate floor and offered a dystopian vision of ‘Robert Bork’s America.’ [Doc. 17] Kennedy’s opening salvo was electrifying but it was Senator Joe Biden, new Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who coordinated the anti‑Bork campaign. The controversy centered upon both Bork’s original‑ ist legal philosophy and his past statements and writing. Bork had divisive views on a range of issues, including affirmative action, busing, abortion, and contraception. Bork, like Reagan, had also been publicly critical of key civil rights legislation in the 1960s. He was seen as a biased rather than neutral interpreter of the law. Mobilization against Bork was unprec‑ edented in terms of scale and coordination. More than 80 public interest groups condemned him, including the major African American and femi‑ nist organizations. Social and religious conservatives rejoiced at the Bork nomination and heaped praise upon Reagan. They were particularly delighted because of Bork’s long record of criticizing the right to privacy, abortion, and Roe v. Wade, a decision he viewed as unconstitutional. Bork seemed to represent a clear anti‑abortion vote that would give conservatives on the bench a slim but significant majority. Religious Right and anti‑abortion groups rallied the grassroots on behalf of Bork. The Southern Baptist Convention came out in support of Bork – the first time in its 140‑year history it had endorsed a Supreme Court nominee. Religious Right and single‑issue groups coor‑ dinated a letter‑writing campaign that particularly targeted Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate Republican from Pennsylvania who was on the Senate

The Teflon President 95 Judiciary Committee. Two weeks before the hearing, the committee had received more than 33,000 letters, most of which supported Bork. Yet, the flurry of pro‑Bork grassroots activism ran counter to the White House’s strategy. The administration reinterpreted decades of Bork’s legal thought to present him as a mainstream thinker and jurist, even rewriting the Justice Department’s briefing book entries on affirmative action and abortion. Bork actively participated in White House efforts to refashion his juris‑ prudence. During the two‑week Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in September, Bork distanced himself from past statements, emphasized his respect for legal precedent, and offered concessions on several divisive issues. Specter, who supported abortion rights, questioned Bork closely on the issue and made a negative assessment about the truthfulness of his answers. Specter concluded that there was a ‘considerable difference between what Judge Bork has written and what he has testified he will do if confirmed’ (Flowers, 2019: 128). The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 9‑5 against Bork. In the full Senate vote on 23 October, the vote against was 58‑42, the largest margin by which the Senate had ever rejected a Supreme Court nomination. Six moderate Republicans joined Democrats in voting against the nominee. Senator Strom Thurmond, a conservative Republican from South Caro‑ lina, suggested that the administration pick a less controversial nominee, but Reagan and Meese were defiant. Reagan’s next choice was District of Columbia Appellate Court Judge Douglas Ginsburg, another original‑ ist. However, in an embarrassing turn of events for all parties, Ginsburg quickly withdrew his name from consideration after the media reported his past marijuana use. On 11 November, Reagan nominated the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy was widely perceived to be a traditional, rather than ideological, conservative, and he was greeted with bipartisan praise. On 3 February 1988, after only three days of hearings, the Senate confirmed Kennedy 97‑0. Like Powell, Ken‑ nedy proved to be another significant swing vote on the Supreme Court. Scholar Donald Critchlow (2007: 212) suggests that, throughout 1987, the Reagan White House was highly preoccupied by the Iran‑Contra Affair and he frames Bork as a ‘major casualty’ of the scandal. However, social and religious conservatives did not blame the President or the White House, nor did they dwell on the moderate Republicans who voted against the nominee. They also did not query why Bork was not put forward for the 1981 or 1986 vacancies when Republicans had a majority in the Senate and chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee. Instead, they directed all their ire toward the Democrats. Bork’s defeat helped solidify the commitment of social and religious conservatives to Reagan and the Republicans. It dem‑ onstrated to the base the importance of ensuring conservative Republican dominance in the White House and the Senate.

96 The Reagan Revolution Civil Rights Legislation In Grove City College v. Bell (1984), the Supreme Court found that Title IX, a federal civil rights law relating to sexual discrimination in education, applied only to the specific university program or activity that received federal funds. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), rep‑ resenting over 165 groups including the major African American, Latino, feminist, and disability organizations, responded to the verdict with alarm. The LCCR believed the ruling would make it impossible to prevent discrimination in education. These concerns had merit because the Depart‑ ment of Education almost immediately began closing or narrowing dozens of civil rights investigations at universities and colleges. In response, Con‑ gress introduced legislation, informally known as the Grove City Bill, that specified that any educational institution that received any form of federal assistance or aid was legally required to comply with anti‑discrimination regulations in all programs. The bill easily passed the House of Repre‑ sentatives in June 1984 and had broad bipartisan support, including from dozens of Congressional Republicans. Reagan had spent much of the late 1970s criticizing federal regulation of education and condemning affirmative action, but once in office he did not deliver in these areas. Scholar Hugh Davis Graham (1998: 416) argues that the 1984 Supreme Court verdict was thus effectively a ‘symbolic vic‑ tory ... to redeem campaign pledges to [his] conservative constituencies.’ The White House vigorously opposed the Grove City Bill, framing it as an immense power grab. One White House aide claimed it impacted ‘farm‑ ers and ranchers receiving agricultural subsidies, churches and synagogues running day care centers, “mom and pop” grocers participating in the food stamp program, [for] all would fall under the boot heel of Washington’s civil rights bureaucrats’ (Graham, 1998: 422). Socially and religiously con‑ servative groups insisted the legislation would have dire consequences for the separation of church and state and would lead to the ‘destruction of traditional morality.’ A central argument from figures such as Falwell and anti‑feminist Phyllis Schlafly was that federal anti‑discrimination protec‑ tions would be extended to sexual minorities. They warned of horrors such as ‘homosexuals in schools,’ ‘AIDS in school cafeterias,’ and ‘transvestite affirmative action’ (Memo from Senate Steering Committee…, no date). The abortion issue stalled passage of the legislation. The Catholic hier‑ archy, a key player within the civil rights coalition, initially supported the Grove City Bill. The White House worked carefully to separate Catholics from the rest of the LCCR by suggesting that the legislation would require institutions that received federal aid, such as Catholic universities and col‑ leges, to provide or pay for abortion care. The bill then languished until Democrats regained control of the Senate in the 1986  midterms. To the

The Teflon President 97 displeasure of feminist and pro‑choice groups, the solution accepted by Congress was an abortion‑neutral amendment. With the abortion issue resolved, the legislation progressed quickly through Congress, despite Reagan’s continued opposition. Shortly before the Senate vote, Reagan vowed to veto the bill if it passed. The threat had no impact. In January 1988, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 passed the Senate 75‑14, with 27 Republicans voting in favor. In March, the House also decisively passed it. The last president to veto a piece of civil rights legislation was Andrew Johnson during the Recon‑ struction era of the late 1860s. Even dependable allies looked askance at Reagan’s vow to veto the bill. The Chair of the National Republican Sena‑ torial Committee wrote to Reagan ‘imploring’ him to sign the bill: ‘I’ve taken many, many tough votes on behalf of this administration … [but] I will vote to override a presidential veto of this important civil rights legis‑ lation’ (Curry, 1988). However, when Reagan vetoed the bill on 16 March he was praised by New Right and Religious Right groups. Reagan (1988b) insisted he would not ‘cave to the demagoguery of those who cloak a big government power grab in the mantle of civil rights.’ The President called key members of Congress seeking support to uphold the veto while the White House held briefings for Republican leaders, warning them that the Grove City Bill would ‘change our way of life more drasti‑ cally than Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs ever did.’ However, Republican members of Congress were in a political bind. Graham (1998: 425–6) points out that, in an election year, Republicans did not want to be ‘attacked as enemies of women, African Americans, Latinos, and the disa‑ bled.’ On 22 March 1988, both Congressional bodies decisively overrode Reagan’s veto. As the media put it, 52 House and 21 Senate Republicans ‘abandoned their president’ (Molotsky, 1988). Conclusion Reagan’s landslide 1984 electoral result signified little about what his second term would look like. Instead, his achievements were profoundly shaped by his advisors and his attitude toward Congress. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Reagan’s principal second‑term domestic goal, was a bipar‑ tisan initiative and achievement. So too was the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Both laws were strongly opposed by conservative Republicans. The Iran‑Contra Affair, which erupted into the national con‑ sciousness in late 1986, dominated Reagan’s agenda as the White House scrambled to limit the impact of the scandal. Although Reagan avoided impeachment, his approach to the presidency and mental ability were harshly appraised. Simultaneously, Reagan and key advisors fought against the perception that the midterm elections had rendered the President a

98 The Reagan Revolution lame duck. With the guidance of a new Chief of Staff, Reagan’s approach to wielding power changed dramatically. From 1987, Reagan made ideologically driven domestic decisions such as nominating Bork and vetoing the Civil Rights Restoration Act. Faced with Democratic control of Congress, Reagan did not have the political capital for such controversial actions to be successful. Indeed, given the divisions between moderate and conservative Republicans, he likely would not have had the votes for these moves even in his first years in office. This was a form of political theater with Reagan performing the role of culture warrior. His actions served to unify and draw together the socially and religiously conservative elements of the Reagan Revolution who were otherwise frustrated by Reagan’s lack of substantive action on a range of issues. Conservatives wanted to secure their influence in American politics. Central to this was embedding the social issues in the Republican agenda. With Reagan’s time in office drawing to a close, they were deeply con‑ cerned that moderate Republicans might reassert themselves. Thus, when Reagan chose to act the part of the socially conservative champion in the last moments of his presidency, they were strongly supportive, strategically ignoring the specifics of Reagan’s policies as they approached the 1988 election. Even for conservatives, Reagan’s Teflon coating seemingly made it impossible for meaningful critique to stick.

6

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control

On 29 May 1988, Nancy and Ronald Reagan arrived in Moscow for the President’s first visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This was the fourth and final summit between Reagan and Mikhail Gor‑ bachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since 1985. In a few short years, Reagan and Gorbachev had devel‑ oped a dynamic that was unprecedented in the history of United States (US)‑Soviet relations, a striking illustration of which came in an informal exchange with journalists. Gorbachev gave Reagan a tour of the Kremlin grounds and Red Square, famous during the Cold War as the site of the annual May Day celebrations of Soviet military strength. The two leaders smiled and chatted casually with Soviet citizens and at one point Reagan put his arm around Gorbachev, commenting ‘I’m glad we are standing here together like this.’ A reporter asked Reagan if he still viewed the USSR as an ‘Evil Empire,’ referencing his infamous 1983 speech. To the surprise of the press, Reagan answered ‘No,’ explaining, ‘I was talking about another time, another era’ (Meisler, 1988). In the mid‑1980s, the tenor of the Cold War underwent a fundamen‑ tal shift. This was principally because of Gorbachev, who was pursuing dramatic domestic reforms while also embarking on new and meaningful dialogue with the West. For his part, Reagan took these overtures seriously and responded in kind, in the process transforming US‑USSR relations and the arms race. As scholar Melvyn Leffler (2021: 35, 29) notes, ‘Reagan engaged Gorbachev in a way no American leader had ever engaged a Soviet leader in the history of the Cold War.’ Yet this relationship, which history has looked upon so favorably, was domestically very contentious for Rea‑ gan. Conservatives were appalled by his willingness to negotiate with the communist enemy. Even within the White House, there were strong objec‑ tions about the pace and tenor of Reagan’s discussions with Gorbachev. The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recalled thinking Reagan was ‘in fairyland’ when he and Gorbachev talked about nuclear abolition. Nevertheless, before Reagan left office, these leaders DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-8

100 The Reagan Revolution had signed a bilateral arms control treaty that required both powers to eliminate a category of weapons and were engaged in ambitious discus‑ sions to drastically reduce the global nuclear stockpile. Reagan and Nuclear Weapons Throughout Reagan’s presidency, critics and even supporters worried that he had a casual approach to atomic warfare. On 11 August 1984, Reagan jokingly announced during the sound check for his weekly radio broadcast, ‘My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes’ (Hunt, 2021: 1). Although the audio did not air and the White House tried to keep it under wraps, the quote was published within days, prompting global controversy and condemnation. The USSR perceived the incident as a threat and Soviet troops were placed on high alert. Reagan refused to apologize. The glibness of Reagan’s quip overshadowed his complex, at times con‑ tradictory, beliefs. On the one hand, Reagan strongly opposed the détente era arms control treaties, particularly Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II. In his first year in office, he announced that the US would modernize its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems and add thousands of additional war‑ heads to its nuclear stockpile. Reagan called for the development of new submarine and sea‑based missile systems and effectively took the arms race to space via the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Yet simultaneously, Rea‑ gan was alarmed by the macabre logic of mutually assured destruction (known as MAD), the deterrence strategy that underpinned US military and national security policy. When Congress considered a major nuclear freeze amendment, Reagan (1982) uttered what would become his com‑ mon refrain: ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’ He added, ‘to those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say “I’m with you.”’ In announcing SDI, Reagan framed it as breaking with the para‑ digm that global peace could only be preserved by the threat of nuclear warfare. [Doc. 6] However, despite adopting the rhetorical framing of the nuclear freeze movement, Reagan remained staunchly opposed to its goals. In the short term, SDI required an even greater arms buildup and testing of technology that potentially put the US in breach of its treaty obligations. US‑Soviet Relations The US had almost no diplomatic relationship with the USSR in the early 1980s. In Reagan’s first term, he did not meet with the leader of the Soviet Union, the first president in 40 years not to have done so. Although Secre‑ tary of State Alexander Haig commenced negotiations with the Soviets for

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 101 a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in May 1982, talks quickly stalled. In late 1983, after the US began deploying Pershing II and Toma‑ hawk missiles in Western Europe (the climax of the so‑called Euromis‑ sile Crisis), the USSR suspended arms control talks. The Soviets were also highly opposed to SDI. Yuri Andropov, Soviet leader from 1982 to 1984, called Reagan’s space shield ‘irresponsible’ and ‘insane,’ an attempt ‘to dis‑ arm the Soviet Union in the face of the US nuclear threat’ (Head, 2008: 87). On 25 June 1982, George Shultz became Secretary of State. He struggled with Reagan’s leadership style, later describing ‘trying to forge policy… [as] like walking through a swamp’ (Leuchtenburg, 2015: 588). Shultz made re‑establishing relations with the USSR a priority, commencing weekly meetings with the Soviet ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin. Shultz emphasized to Reagan that the administration needed a meaningful form of diplomatic dialogue. On 15 February 1983, Dobrynin visited the White House for a two‑hour meeting with Shultz and Reagan that was not initially disclosed to others in the administration. This was the Presi‑ dent’s first interaction with Dobrynin since he took office and they had at times heated discussion about a broad agenda, including human rights and arms control. After this meeting, Reagan authorized Shultz to work on establishing areas of potential consensus between the US and the USSR, initially focused on reviving détente era policies such as cultural exchanges, new consulates, and grain agreements. These overtures occurred despite considerable opposition from administration hawks, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and members of the National Security Council (NSC). For decades, the Soviets had publicly claimed to support the elimination of nuclear weapons. American commentators and experts gave this little credence. Yet gradually, Reagan began to view this as an area for serious discussion, first in private communications and then through public rheto‑ ric. In July 1983, Reagan responded to a letter from Andropov which had pledged the USSR’s commitment to the ‘elimination of the nuclear threat,’ reassuring him that Americans were also dedicated to ‘the course of peace’ (Rossinow, 2015: 110). After Andropov’s death in February 1984, Rea‑ gan sent an almost identically worded message to his successor Konstantin Chernenko and called for the resumption of arms control negotiations. Reagan used two speeches to more broadly signify his shift in attitude toward the USSR. On 16 January, the day before a significant European nuclear disarmament conference, Reagan (1984a) delivered an address for a global audience centered on US‑Soviet relations. He focused on their mutual interest in preventing nuclear war and insisted that America had no desire for conflict: ‘we do not threaten the Soviet Union … Our coun‑ tries have never fought each other. There’s no reason why we ever should.’ Two weeks later, Reagan repeated this message in his State of the Union

102 The Reagan Revolution address. Scholar Beth Fischer (2003: 116–7) suggests that these speeches marked the beginning of Reagan’s rapprochement with the USSR, a sig‑ nificant departure from the ‘threats ‑ both explicit and implicit ‑ [that] had been the very foundation of the earlier strategy.’ However, Reagan’s rhetoric would not have been sufficient on its own. He needed an equally willing and authoritative counterpart. Turmoil in the Soviet Union In the first half of the 1980s, the leadership of the Soviet Union was in constant flux. In 1982, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU since 1964, died. Andropov was leader for less than 18 months, followed by Chernenko, who was leader for 13  months. On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new leader of the USSR. At Chernenko’s funeral, Vice President George H.W. Bush delivered a personal letter from Reagan to Gorbachev inviting him to attend a summit in Washington, DC. Aged 54, Gorbachev was the youngest member of the Politburo and the youngest Soviet leader since Joseph Stalin took power in 1924. Initially, American commentators and politicians put little stock in the generational change. Former President Richard Nixon bluntly told Reagan that Gor‑ bachev represented a continuation of the status quo. However, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had formed a favorable impression of Gorbachev after a private lunch in London. In December 1984, Thatcher told a television interviewer, ‘I like Mr.  Gorbachev. We can do business together’ (Brown, 2020: 125). At a Camp David meeting shortly thereafter Thatcher provided a detailed, positive account of Gor‑ bachev to Shultz and Bush. Gorbachev was deeply alarmed by domestic matters in the Soviet Union. The consensus within the Politburo was that the USSR’s economy was not just stagnant but in decline and had been since the 1960s. For sev‑ eral decades, almost 80 per cent of Soviet gross national product went to defense spending, which had starved areas such as education, social services, and health care. The USSR had also fallen behind technologically. Even before Reagan took office, both CPSU reformists and conservatives had concluded that this was not sustainable. Thus, the Soviets did not try to keep pace with Reagan’s massive increase in defense spending. While the US military budget grew by approximately 8 per cent per year under Reagan, from approximately 1975–1984 Soviet military spending grew by 1.5 per cent annually. Furthermore, despite heated Soviet criticism of SDI, the USSR did not embark upon an equivalent program. Almost as soon as Gorbachev became leader he began to publicly discuss the USSR’s economic problems and the inadequate living con‑ ditions of many Soviet citizens. In early 1986, Gorbachev outlined his

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 103 ‘new thinking’ at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party, discussing what became the core concepts of perestroika and glasnost. Gorbachev wanted to reform, rather than overthrow, the Soviet system, to make the USSR economically competitive with the West and improve life for its people. As part of perestroika, he called for rapid technological moderni‑ zation and increased worker productivity and an overhaul of the Soviet bureaucracy to ensure greater efficiency. Starting in 1985, Gorbachev also pursued an anti‑alcohol campaign, a deeply unpopular attempt to improve worker productivity and address the low‑life expectancy among Soviet citizens. By 1987, Gorbachev concluded that the situation in the USSR required more than cosmetic solutions and pursued initiatives that created a semi‑mixed economy with some elements of a free‑market system and foreign investment. These changes caused significant eco‑ nomic turmoil. Among other things, glasnost meant working to involve more people in the political and bureaucratic processes and greater free‑ dom of expression, including in the media. This in turn meant growing criticism of government actions. Gorbachev and Reagan Simultaneously, Gorbachev engaged in significant international outreach, seeking to persuade the world that he was genuine in his desire to reform the Soviet Union. To the surprise of both liberal and conservative com‑ mentators, Reagan and Gorbachev rapidly began to engage in meaning‑ ful dialogue. Whilst Reagan never ceded his belief in the ideological and political supremacy of the US and its systems of democracy, freedom, and capitalism, he came to view Gorbachev with respect and, eventually, trust. Their evolving dynamic was not without obstacles, some of which were the product of geopolitical and domestic factors. However, because of their mutual concern about nuclear war, Reagan and Gorbachev were able to overcome significant setbacks to find areas where cooperation was possible. Gorbachev prioritized resuming the arms control talks with the US that had stopped in 1983. Two weeks after becoming General Secretary, he wrote to Reagan to convey that he shared Reagan’s belief that there must never be a nuclear war and that there was a pressing need to improve US‑USSR relations. He swiftly halted the Soviet deployment of intermediate‑ range missiles in Europe and suggested that Reagan temporarily pause his own deployment of missiles to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers. The administration rejected this proposal, viewing it as a ruse for Soviet propaganda purposes that would leave the USSR with a sig‑ nificant advantage. However, the two countries continued to work toward the resumption of formal arms control negotiations.

104 The Reagan Revolution On 19–20 November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time in Geneva to conduct wide‑ranging talks on international diplomacy, exchange initiatives, environmental protection, and the arms race. In an hour‑long private meeting, they also discussed the importance of building a mutually cooperative relationship. Reagan told Gorbachev he thought ‘the primary aim between them should be to eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the other,’ while Gorbachev expressed his belief that, together, the two men ‘could change relations for the better’ (Witcher, 2019: 124). However, SDI was a sticking point in both one‑on‑one discussions and plenary meetings of the larger delegation. Although arms control discussions faltered, the overall summit was a success. Gorbachev and Reagan agreed for negotiations to proceed on a continuing basis and both leaders accepted invitations to visit their respec‑ tive countries. They signed a Joint Statement (1985) outlining areas of significant consensus. Particularly notable was its treatment of ‘Security,’ in which both powers pledged that they would ‘not seek to achieve military superiority.’ Scholar Doug Rossinow (2015: 227) argues that this signified an important shift for Reagan, who had long publicly presented ‘strategic superiority as his central military goal.’ Shortly afterward, Reagan sent a handwritten, informal letter to Gorbachev, emphasizing the personal value he had derived from their meeting and attempting to address some of the concerns the Soviets had expressed in Geneva. [Doc. 12] In January 1986, Gorbachev wrote a letter to Reagan outlining a dra‑ matic proposal. He put forward a three‑stage plan to ensure that ‘by the end of 1999 no more nuclear weapons remain on Earth.’ [Doc.  13] According to Shultz, Reagan’s response was to ask ‘Why wait?,’ horrifying administration hawks such as Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Casey (Head, 2008: 90). Privately, Reagan was more circumspect, musing in his diary about the possibility Gorbachev was attempting to manipulate world opinion. But Gorbachev’s public state‑ ments became more urgent in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in Ukraine, linking the accident to the horrors of nuclear war. Reagan intuited that Chernobyl would heighten the domestic diffi‑ culties that Gorbachev faced. He insisted to advisors that any agreement between the two superpowers should not make Gorbachev ‘eat crow’ or ‘look like he gave up everything’ (Leffler, 2021: 34). After much internal debate within the administration, Reagan sent a proposal to Gorbachev suggesting the elimination of all ballistic missiles and reiterating a prior offer that the US share SDI technology with the Soviets. During a visit to Washington, DC, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze hand delivered a letter to Reagan from Gor‑ bachev. The General Secretary suggested a quick meeting of the two lead‑ ers before the elaborate events planned for his 1987 visit to Washington,

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 105 DC. This became the Reykjavík summit held on 11–12 October 1986. The assumption was that if talks stalled, arms negotiations would be over for the rest of Reagan’s term and the next occupant of the White House would have to start again from square one. The US’s negotiating package included eliminating all ballistic missiles, a proposal developed with lim‑ ited consultation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which alarmed key NATO allies such as Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Gor‑ bachev countered with a suggestion referencing his January letter, namely the destruction of all strategic nuclear weapons within ten years. The scope of conversation expanded, with Reagan suggesting that they might commit to eliminating ‘all nuclear explosive devices … including bombs, battlefield systems, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate‑range systems.’ Both leaders briefly but earnestly discussed nuclear abolition. Scholar Simon Head (2008: 92, 91) suggests that the ‘scope and pace of the nego‑ tiations during the session was breathtaking.’ However, SDI was a major source of conflict. Shultz had long tried to persuade Reagan that SDI needed to be a bargaining chip during negotia‑ tions, but his efforts were unsuccessful. Gorbachev and Reagan clashed over whether research and testing should be confined to the laboratory and Reagan refused to make concessions. At a news conference, Gorbachev claimed that while he had come to Reykjavík with a range of ‘major con‑ cessions and compromises,’ the US had come ‘empty‑handed, with a whole set of mothballed proposals’ (Taubman, 1986). He condemned Reagan for prioritizing SDI over important areas of mutual agreement. Most commen‑ tators assumed that Reykjavík marked the end of Reagan and Gorbachev’s arms control efforts. However, their relationship was bruised but not bro‑ ken, primarily because Gorbachev was willing to keep negotiating despite Reagan’s intransigence on SDI. Domestically, some defense experts questioned Reagan’s prioritizing of SDI, which remained extremely hypothetical, over historic bilateral arms control agreements. However, there was significant public support for Reagan’s hawkish behavior, with 72 per cent of Americans agreeing with the way Reagan was handling the Soviet Union. After Reykjavík, Reagan campaigned vigorously in the 1986  midterm elections, insisting that his foreign policy agenda hinged on Republicans retaining the Senate. Reagan (1986c) told voters that Democrats were ‘promising to take a meat ax and chop up’ SDI, warning that that was ‘exactly what Mr. Gorbachev is hoping Congress will do.’ Conservatives, who had spent months accusing Reagan of preparing to abandon SDI, rejoiced that their dire predictions were not realized. Scholar Sean Wilentz (2009: 257) argues that Gorbachev’s opposi‑ tion to SDI was ‘on political, rather than military, grounds.’ The USSR’s internal studies concluded that even if the US could develop space shield

106 The Reagan Revolution technology, simple countermeasures would likely render it useless. Some Soviet scientists viewed SDI as a ploy to trick the USSR into increasing its defense budget. Several months after the Reykjavík meeting, Andrei Sakharov, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, publicly urged Gorbachev to drop SDI from arms control negotiations. Gorbachev began to shift his position on what had been a major sticking point. In February 1987, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze put forward a proposal with major concessions, including removing the demand that the US restrict SDI research and testing. The Soviets also indicated they would accept the so‑called ‘Zero Option,’ removing all intermediate‑range nuclear missiles from Europe and Asia, whilst dropping their past requirement that Britain and France do the same. However, when Shultz visited Moscow to finalize details for the Washington summit, Gorbachev suddenly announced he would not sign the treaty unless SDI restrictions were included. Gorbachev was facing increasingly sharp criticism within the Politburo. Although Gorbachev’s domestic reforms were the primary grievance, conservatives attacked his negotiations with Reagan as part of a broader effort to under‑ mine his leadership. Shultz refused to countenance Gorbachev’s demands, warning that the treaty needed to be signed soon if it were to come before the Senate for ratification while Reagan was still in office. The final treaty did not reference SDI, a victory for the US that came at the expense of a domestically weakened Gorbachev. Although arms control negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly for the rest of the year, during Reagan’s 1987 visit to West Berlin he reaffirmed his opposition to communism. Shultz and others in the State Department and NSC advised against using the visit for polemics, expressing particular concern about a speech to be delivered before the Brandenburg Gate. They were overruled by Reagan. On 12 June, with the Berlin Wall as a back‑ drop, Reagan issued a provocative challenge: General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosper‑ ity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall. [Doc. 16] The speech, with its revival of Reagan’s antagonistic first‑term rhetoric, seemed aimed at multiple audiences. There were 20,000 West Berliners in attendance, as well as those tuning in illegally on radios in East Germany and throughout the Eastern Bloc. Rossinow (2015: 235) argues that the speech was also tailored to US listeners, a rebuttal to ‘conservative criti‑ cism of [Reagan’s] alleged coziness with Gorbachev.’ The combative optics of Reagan’s speech did not impact US‑USSR rela‑ tions. In December 1987, Gorbachev traveled to Washington, DC, for

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 107 the long‑planned summit. He was the first Soviet leader to visit America since  1973. Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Treaty on Intermediate‑ Range Nuclear Forces (INF), agreeing that the US and the USSR would destroy their intermediate‑range ballistic and cruise missiles and never pos‑ sess them again. For the first time since the start of the Cold War, the global superpowers committed to reducing their nuclear stockpile and abolish‑ ing a category of weapons, while agreeing to on‑site inspections to verify compliance. Scholar Eric Hobsbawm (1994: 250) argues that ‘for practical purposes the Cold War ended at the two summits of Reykjavík (1986) and Washington (1987).’ Opposition at Home Conservatives were extremely critical of Reagan’s second‑term approach toward the USSR, opposing the increased diplomacy between the two superpowers and US participation in arms control negotiations. Repub‑ licans and New Right leaders condemned Reagan publicly and privately, accusing him of abandoning his pledge to restore American strength and prestige. Reagan addressed these concerns directly in the weeks before the Reykjavík summit. In a speech at the White House to supporters, he joked that the ‘suggestions that I’m getting soft on communism’ were novel and

Figure 6.1 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty, 1987 Source: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

108 The Reagan Revolution ‘titillating’ but assured his audience that he was approaching the meeting with an awareness of the ‘moral implications of [Soviet] ideology [and] the grave danger of its geopolitical intentions’ (Cannon, 1986). Conserva‑ tives were delighted when talks broke down at the summit and applauded Reagan’s full‑throated defense of SDI. However, right‑wing equanimity was shattered after the White House continued pursuing arms control discussions. As negotiations over the INF Treaty progressed in 1987, conservatives accused Reagan of betraying movement principles and America’s interests. The May 1987 issue of National Review was bluntly titled ‘Reagan’s Sui‑ cide Pact’ (Witcher, 2019: 128). Conservatives were the primary domes‑ tic force trying to stop Senate ratification of the treaty. The rhetoric of appeasement, along with comparisons to Neville Chamberlain, the UK Prime Minister who signed an accord with German dictator Adolf Hitler in 1938, were common right‑wing tropes. New Right leader Richard Viguerie helped establish the Anti‑Appeasement Alliance to oppose the treaty. Con‑ servative Caucus, led by another New Right figure Howard Phillips, ran a one‑page anti‑INF advertisement in major newspapers across the country with a visual motif linking Reagan with Chamberlain, Gorbachev with Hitler. However, there were schisms among conservatives about how to frame their opposition. Several key figures in the New Right viewed the INF Treaty as inexcusable and wanted the conservative movement to condemn Reagan directly. In the Washington Post, Paul Weyrich described him as ‘a weakened president, weakened in spirt as well as in clout.’ He asked, ‘who is more foolish: Ronald Reagan or those conservatives who still look to him for leadership?’ (Taylor, 2013: 463). However, others were wary about this approach. Experience had revealed that Reagan’s broad popu‑ larity meant that directly attacking him negatively impacted their fund‑ raising prospects. Furthermore, many conservatives believed Reagan’s approach to Gorbachev was so completely at odds with his ideological views that there must be an alternative explanation for his actions. Thus, although Reagan insisted that reducing nuclear weapons was his policy goal, conservatives frequently attributed arms control to other people. In a New York Times editorial, Phillips dismissed Reagan as nothing more than the ‘speech reader‑in‑chief for the pro‑appeasement triumvirate’ of Chief of Staff Howard Baker, Shultz, and Frank Carlucci (who succeeded Wein‑ berger as Secretary of Defense and whom conservatives had long viewed as a moderate). Viguerie echoed this claim in interviews. Several 1987 issues of Conservative Digest accused Shultz and the State Department of being responsible for ‘the repeated undercutting of the Reagan Doctrine’ (Witcher, 2019: 135, 131).

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 109 Within the administration, there was also opposition from conservatives. By mid‑1987, Weinberger believed that Reagan’s personal relationship with Gorbachev had clouded his judgment and caused him to abandon his commitment to anti‑communism. Weinberger strongly opposed those who proposed trying to also reach bilateral consensus on START before Reagan left office, arguing that engaging in complex negotiations with such tight time constraints would undermine any agreements achieved. In November, after seven years as Secretary of Defense, Weinberger resigned. Anony‑ mous White House staff told the press that Weinberger’s departure would ‘reduce the tensions between the Pentagon and the State Department, espe‑ cially over arms control’ and make the treaty ratification process much easier (Cushman, 1987). Once the INF Treaty was signed, conservative Congressional Republi‑ cans pledged to ensure it was not ratified. At a White House meeting one senator challenged the basic premise of negotiations; ‘the Soviets have bro‑ ken most every treaty they have ever signed. How do we assure compliance with the new treaty?’ Representative Jack Kemp, who was jockeying to be the conservative heir apparent for the 1988 Republican presidential nomi‑ nation, condemned the treaty as a ‘nuclear Munich.’ Senator Jesse Helms, normally one of Reagan’s most reliable Congressional allies, was a vocifer‑ ous critic. He claimed the INF Treaty would render NATO meaningless and insisted that the ‘survival of Europe’ was at stake (Witcher, 2019: 133, 137). Helms introduced multiple amendments to try and derail the treaty and led a small group of conservatives in filibustering Senate debate. Reagan and the administration lobbied relentlessly to offset conservative criticism of the INF Treaty. Reagan also sprang to Gorbachev’s defense, insisting that he was the first Soviet leader to ‘agree to destroy weapons they already have’ and the first who did not espouse ‘the Marxian concept of a one‑world Communist State’ (Witcher, 2019: 139). In pursuing arms control talks with the USSR, Reagan had broad, bipartisan public support. Indeed, Republican voters supported the treaty more than Democrats. On 27 May 1988, the Senate approved the INF Treaty 93–5. Four Republicans voted nay. Collectively, both powers destroyed 2,692 weapons, with the Soviets dismantling more than twice as many as the US. Fall of the Berlin Wall The 1988 Moscow Summit was marked by pomp and ceremony. Wilentz (2009: 262) argues that, for Gorbachev, it was an opportunity to ‘demon‑ strate, as a further means of advancing perestroika, that the Soviet Union had nothing to fear from the American president.’ Human rights emerged as a point of conflict, and in private meetings Reagan handed Gorbachev

110 The Reagan Revolution a list of cases he thought needed to be resolved. The Soviets bristled at the implication that America did not have its own human rights issues. Despite these clashes, the tone was convivial, with both men emphasizing the importance of engaging in dialogue. As Reagan noted to the press, ‘What we have decided to do is talk to each other and not about each other, and that’s working just fine’ (Meisler, 1988). On 31 May, in a moment filled with symbolism, Reagan stood in front of a large white bust of Lenin to deliver a speech to Moscow University students. He conveyed his optimism for the future while taking particu‑ lar care to praise Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and the changes that had already occurred in the USSR. He ended his speech: We do not know what the conclusion of this journey will be, but we’re hopeful that the promise of reform will be fulfilled … We may be allowed to hope that the marvelous sound of a new openness will keep rising through, ringing through, leading to a new world of reconcilia‑ tion, friendship, and peace. (Reagan, 1988c) The New York Times described this as Reagan’s ‘finest oratorical hour,’ a likely ‘milestone of the Cold War’ (‘With Lenin Watching,’ 1988). This powerful moment as a statesman on the world stage stood in dramatic con‑ trast to the domestic controversies and humiliations, discussed in Chapter 5, that had marked Reagan’s presidency since the 1986 midterms. In December, Gorbachev announced to the United Nations General Assembly that the USSR would implement unilateral cuts of more than 500,000 military personnel, including withdrawing tens of thousands of troops from Eastern Europe. Just as significantly, Gorbachev proclaimed that ‘freedom of choice is a universal principle’ that ‘knows no exceptions’ (Engel, 2014: 107). In a July 1989 address, Gorbachev seemingly ruled out the use of force to maintain Soviet authority, thus disavowing the Brezh‑ nev Doctrine that had shaped USSR actions in the Eastern Bloc for over 20 years. Soviet authority behind the Iron Curtain rapidly unraveled. In May 1989, Hungary began to publicize that it was easing restrictions on travel outside the Eastern Bloc, inviting Western media to film the removal of sections of the barbed wire fence that divided it from Austria. After years of organizing by Polish workers led by Lech Wałęsa and the independ‑ ent trade union Solidarity, Poland’s government commenced negotiations with reform groups. On 4 June, the first round of elections delivered a shock landslide victory for Solidarity, demonstrating that Polish citizens decisively rejected the status quo. In August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Soli‑ darity became Polish Prime Minister, the first non‑communist leader in

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 111 Eastern Europe since the start of the Cold War. These events marked the start of the Revolutions of 1989, the wave of social and political upheaval that brought communist power in Central and Eastern Europe to an end. By the close of the year, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslova‑ kia, and Romania had also thrown off one‑party communist rule. Most of these political transformations were the product of mass non‑violent campaigns of civil disobedience. However, the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu authorized state violence and repression, leading to significant civil upheaval. After a military coup, Nicolae and his wife Elena were cap‑ tured and found guilty of an array of charges, including genocide resulting in the death of 60,000 citizens. The Ceauşescus’ execution by firing squad was televised live on Christmas Day 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which Reagan had called for, was in the end brought about by the East Germans themselves. It was perhaps the ultimate symbol of the end of Soviet authority. Built in 1961 to isolate West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany, the 13‑foot tall cement wall was a physical manifestation of the political and ideological divi‑ sions between communist and capitalist powers. In 1989, the East German government had initially resisted the democratizing processes occurring among its neighbors, even as East German refugees poured into Hungary to flee the Eastern Bloc. When Gorbachev visited East Germany in October, crowds begged ‘Save us, Gorby’ (Engel, 2014: 115). Mass protests rocked the country, but Soviet troops stationed there were ordered not to inter‑ vene. To calm civil unrest, the East German government decided to relax border restrictions to the West, envisaging a bureaucratic scheme involving applications, passports, and 30‑day visas. However, when the policy was announced on the evening of 9 November and a journalist asked about implementation, an East German government official answered that it went into immediate effect. East Berliners rushed toward the Berlin Wall and guards, absent of orders and apprehensive about the potential for dis‑ order, opened the gate near Bornholm Street. That night, approximately 70,000 East Berliners flooded into West Berlin. People danced atop the Berlin Wall and drank from champagne bottles, while fireworks exploded overhead. Some used hammers and chisels to chip away at the structure that had divided the city for almost 30 years. Bush, Reagan’s former vice president, was the leader in the White House during these momentous events. Bush was less optimistic than Reagan about Gorbachev’s policies and was suspicious about the USSR’s commit‑ ment to meaningful reform. As a former head of the CIA and with a strong sense of himself as an authority on foreign policy, he was also keen to establish a distinct agenda rather than simply continue Reagan’s approach. In December 1988, Bush implemented a temporary halt in US‑Soviet rela‑ tions to allow the new administration to undertake a foreign policy review.

112 The Reagan Revolution Several senior figures in the new Bush White House were skeptical about so‑called Gorbymania. Thus, as democratic movements swept through Eastern Europe, Bush generally stood at a remove from events. His para‑ mount goal was that the democratization process remained peaceful, which took on heightened urgency after the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in June 1989. It was after this event that the Bush White House reached out to organize an in‑person meeting with Gorbachev. The Bush adminis‑ tration prioritized strategic arms reductions, continuing negotiations that the US and the Soviets had intermittently pursued since 1982. Signed by Bush and Gorbachev on 31 July 1991, START I was an agreement to dras‑ tically reduce the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads that either superpower could have. Within a decade, 80 per cent of the global strategic nuclear weapon stockpile would be destroyed. By mid‑1990, democratically elected governments were in place in all the former communist regimes of the Eastern Bloc. In September, East Ger‑ many withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s most significant defense alliance, followed in short order by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. While Gorbachev accepted the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc he attempted to prevent the internal fragmentation of the USSR. He pro‑ posed the New Union Treaty, which would have significantly increased local autonomy in the 15 Republics. In January 1991, Soviet troops were also deployed in Lithuania and Latvia to quell independence move‑ ments, resulting in violent clashes. In August, an attempted coup against Gorbachev revealed the turmoil within the Soviet Union to the world. Hard‑line communists arrested Gorbachev and ordered tanks into Mos‑ cow. In dramatic scenes, Boris Yeltsin, the pro‑democratization president of the Russian Republic, stood atop the tanks and rallied Muscovites to defy the coup. The coup failed and its leaders were arrested. On 25 Decem‑ ber 1991, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary and the USSR was dis‑ solved, replaced by a federation of independent states. Gorbachev, the man who had overseen the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, had no power at all. As the Soviet Union collapsed, American commentators rushed to make sense of the rapid implosion of their communist enemy. Some emphasized Reagan’s role in the events that had transpired. For his part, Reagan down‑ played his contribution. One year after the Berlin Wall fell, in a speech at the Missouri dedication of a sculpture crafted out of sections of the struc‑ ture, Reagan (1990) credited Germans ‘in the churches and the schools, in the factories and on the farms, [for] a once silent people found their voice and with it a battering ram to knock down walls, real and imag‑ ined.’ He commended allies in Western Europe such as Thatcher and Kohl and reserved special praise for Gorbachev, a leader ‘untainted by the past, unwilling to be shackled by crumbling orthodoxies.’ For the remainder of

Reagan, the Soviets, and Arms Control 113 Reagan’s time in public life, this framing dominated his accounts of the end of the Cold War. In the decades that followed, assessments of Reagan and the end of the USSR often split along ideological lines. The ‘triumphalists’ (among whom number conservative commentators and former members of the adminis‑ tration) lauded Reagan for the end of the Cold War, framing him as the causal agent. Fischer (2020) argues that by the early 2000s this mythic narrative had become the dominant popular view in the US, despite having little basis in fact. While early work by Reagan’s critics sometimes denied him any role in the collapse of the USSR, contemporary scholarship charts a middle‑ground, offering nuanced interpretations of Reagan’s evolving Soviet strategies, treating seriously Reagan’s commitment to arms control talks, while emphasizing that he was but one of several involved in the end of the Soviet Union. In Leffler’s (2021: 37) analysis, Reagan ‘was Gor‑ bachev’s minor, yet indispensable partner, setting the framework for the dramatic changes that neither anticipated happening anytime soon.’ Conclusion In Reagan’s second term, he and Gorbachev found common cause in their determination to reduce the massive nuclear arsenal held by each super‑ power, one of the most potent issues of the 1980s. Together, they worked through suspicion, disagreement, and mutually incompatible ideologies to achieve an arms control treaty, while laying the groundwork for even more sweeping discussions to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile. In pursuing this goal, Reagan and Gorbachev forged a partnership that allowed them to imagine new futures and ways of relating. This level of engagement and cooperation between the US and the USSR helped Gorbachev maintain enough domestic and international support to ensure that the sudden and shocking end of the Cold War largely involved the peaceful transfer of power. Although the Revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred during Bush’s presidency, they are perceived as intimately con‑ nected to Reagan’s approach to Gorbachev. These events have profoundly shaped Reagan’s legacy and standing in both historical and popular mem‑ ory. Reagan’s foreign policies did not end the Cold War. Rather, his impor‑ tance to the historical moment flowed from the lessons he had gradually learned in his first term and his willingness to be flexible rather than ideo‑ logically pure. Despite the demands of conservatives inside and outside the White House, Reagan was able to move beyond the rigid Cold War logic that demanded an unyielding posture toward America’s communist foe.

7

Assessment

Reagan’s tenure in the White House was not a period of sweeping conservative triumph. He presided over a harsh economic downturn, experienced very low public approval ratings, and, in his second term, was implicated in a significant foreign policy scandal. Furthermore, although Reagan’s rheto‑ ric was polarizing, he was often pragmatic in his approach to governing. Reagan’s eight years in office reveal a policy record marked by ideological victories but also compromises, an increasing willingness to cooperate with unlikely allies at home and abroad, and a complex interplay between sym‑ bolism and substance. Throughout the 1980s, conservatives bemoaned what they saw as Reagan’s failure to pursue ideologically doctrinaire positions while the Republican Party was plagued by internal fighting between moder‑ ates and conservatives over a range of domestic and foreign policy matters, particularly the social issues. Meanwhile, in Reagan’s first years post‑ presidency, controversies dogged him and prominent Republicans ques‑ tioned the relevance of his political and rhetorical agenda. Yet in the decades after 1989, the idea of Reagan has dominated the political culture of the United States (US) and his legacy and influence can be found across the partisan landscape. From the 1990s onward, largely because of Reagan’s electoral successes, the Democrats retreated from liberalism and moved to the center, while Republicans embraced an ever more rigid understanding of conservative purity. For several decades, a fictionalized Reagan served as the standard bearer against whom Repub‑ lican politicians were assessed. He functioned as a shorthand by which they could convey their conservative credentials and appeal to the public. Reagan’s enduring personal popularity and the narratives surrounding his presidency reflect a complex interplay between myth, memory, media, and politics, all of which obscure the nuances of his time in office. 1988 Election Even before Reagan left the White House, the meaning of his presidency was being shaped by the election that would choose his successor. 1988 DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-9

Assessment 115 was a litmus test about the viability of ‘Reaganism’ as a political world view and electoral strategy in the absence of Reagan as a candidate. The primaries saw intra‑party competition which reflected fault lines on both sides of politics. Liberal and centrist Democrats vied to be the nominee. Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis, the eventual candidate, was notable because although he identified as a liberal, he simultaneously rep‑ resented the Democrat’s post‑1984 pivot toward fiscal conservatism and an emphasis on economic growth and balanced budgets. As Republicans competed for the presidential nomination, the challenger that attracted the most attention was Pat Robertson, a founding member of the Reli‑ gious Right. Robertson’s bid prompted acerbic commentary from promi‑ nent Republicans who compared his religiously conservative supporters to ‘cockroaches issuing out from underneath the baseboards’ (Williams, 2010: 213). Vice President George H.W. Bush was seen as the likely front runner heading into the campaign, which prompted significant complaint from conservatives who were not persuaded that Bush had truly converted to Reagan’s views. A poll of Christian Action Committee readers placed Bush last among the Republican candidates. Privately, moderate Republicans implored Bush not to abandon his roots. However, in Bush’s opinion, he was the logical ‘inheritor’ of the immense popular support Reagan had attracted in 1980 and 1984. The Bush campaign capitalized on his rela‑ tionship with Reagan. As Bush told one Texas audience, ‘If people ask you about George Bush, tell them that he spent eight years in the most successful White House of the modern era – befriending a great and kind man, learning with him, helping him’ (Hoffman, 1988). Bush continu‑ ously linked himself to Reagan’s policy victories. Implicit was the promise that Bush represented continuity rather than disruption, a third term for Reaganism. Bush amplified electoral tactics that had been successful for Reagan. He covered himself in the glory of economic recovery, proclaimed himself a loyal convert to supply‑side economics, and vowed that he would not raise taxes (a promise he broke in 1990). To court the Religious Right, Bush appointed the founder of the Religious Roundtable to liaise with Christian conservatives and sought an early endorsement from Reverend Jerry Falwell of Moral Majority. His choice of running mate was Senator Dan Quayle, a religious conservative from Indiana with a strong ‘family values’ voting record in Congress. Bush also relied heavily on law and order politics. Although prison furloughs (weekend passes) were in place throughout the country, Bush hammered Dukakis over the Massachusetts program and the case of William ‘Willie’ Horton. Horton was an Afri‑ can American man, imprisoned for murder in Massachusetts, who did not return to prison after a furlough. In April 1987, Horton broke into a White

116 The Reagan Revolution couple’s home, raping the woman and stabbing her partner. Lee Atwater, Bush’s campaign advisor, quipped to the media that Dukakis might pick Horton as his running mate, a claim echoed in a provocative Republican fund‑raising letter that depicted Horton and Dukakis alongside the head‑ line, ‘Is This Your Pro‑Family Team for 1988?’ (‘George Bush and …,’ 1988). Horton and furloughs were also the focus of several controversial television advertising campaigns. This 1988 emphasis on Horton was an evolution of the racialized appeals that had marked Reagan’s politicking before he entered the White House. On 8 November, Bush received 426 Electoral College votes and 53.4 per cent of the popular vote. However, there were no realignments in Congress and Democrats remained the majority in both legislative bodies. Several electoral trends were notable. 81 per cent of White evangelical voters cast their ballots for Bush, matching the level of support Reagan received from this group in 1984. There was a notable gender gap, while only 11 per cent of African Americans voted for Bush, both a continuation of trends that emerged in 1980. Bush also demonstrated Republican dominance of the South, winning every state. Even as pundits discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the campaigns, they were quick to conclude that Reagan’s ‘popularity was perhaps the single most important force behind the Bush victory’ (Dionne, 1988). Life after the White House After leaving the White House in January 1989, Nancy and Ronald retired to a multi‑million‑dollar home in the ritzy suburb of Bel Air in Los Ange‑ les, California. He oversaw the establishment of his presidential library, which was initially slated for Stanford University but relocated to Simi Val‑ ley after sustained opposition from Stanford faculty and students. Reagan also helped with the publication of Speaking My Mind, a collection of his presidential speeches, while working with a ghostwriter on his memoir. An American Life, published in 1990, reached number eight on the New York Times Best Seller list. Scholar Marcus Witcher (2019: 183) argues that Reagan used his post‑presidency activities to ‘define his legacy’ on the ter‑ rain that he was most comfortable with, namely the economy, the military, and national pride. He presented himself as ‘a nonpartisan visionary leader who rehabilitated the United States.’ Reagan received accolades that affirmed his status as a global leader. Queen Elizabeth II conferred an honorary knighthood on him in June 1989. Raisa and Mikhail Gorbachev visited America in 1992 and one of their first stops was Rancho del Cielo, the Reagan ranch in the moun‑ tains near Santa Barbara, California. Mikhail also delivered a speech at Reagan’s newly opened presidential library, where he accepted the first

Assessment 117 Ronald Reagan Freedom Award and told Reagan, ‘We were able to make a difference’ (Cannon, 2000: 763). Bush awarded Reagan the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the first time a living former president had received the honor. Bush (1993) paid tribute to Reagan’s economic and foreign policies, declaring ‘Ronald Reagan didn’t just make the world believe in America; he made Americans believe in themselves.’ However, the Reagans also faced accusations of greediness and unethi‑ cal behavior. Reagan made the then controversial decision to join the paid lecture circuit. When he received $2 million for a tour in Japan, commen‑ tators complained about his unseemly ‘cashing in’ on the prestige of the presidency. As one Los Angeles Times journalist opined, ‘Reagan made it not only acceptable but almost a moral imperative for Americans to go out and get their piece of the rock in the ‘80s. Now he is going out and getting his’ (Kasindorf, 1990). Nancy’s 1989 memoir, My Turn, was a best seller but reviewers negatively commented on its argumentative and petty account of White House relations, while the Reagan’s personal astrolo‑ ger published her own tell‑all book in 1991. Nancy was also subject to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation about her habit of bor‑ rowing and not returning designer clothing while First Lady. The long tendrils of the Iran‑Contra scandal continued to entangle Reagan. During the criminal trial of former National Security Advisor John Poindexter, he insisted that the President had authorized his actions. Reagan’s lawyers fought to excuse Reagan from the proceedings and, when he finally testi‑ fied, newspapers commented on his ‘hazy’ memory, noting that he said ‘I don’t recall’ or ‘I can’t remember’ 88 times over the course of eight hours (Cawley and Campbell, 1990). In one poll, only 16 per cent of respondents viewed Reagan as ‘highly believable’ (Kasindorf, 1990). The controversies and growing public criticism disappeared after Rea‑ gan was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, a progressive and irreversible brain disorder. Reagan made his diagnosis public on 5 November 1994 in a handwritten letter addressed to the nation. In eschewing privacy, he and Nancy hoped to increase awareness of the tragic nature of the disease and ‘encourage a clearer understanding of the individuals and families who are affected by it.’ Reagan closed his brief note by thanking Americans for the privilege of being president. The final passage powerfully encapsulated the hopeful and patriotic mood he had brought to the White House: ‘I now begin the journey that will lead me into the sunset of my life. I know that for America there will always be a bright dawn ahead’ (Reagan, 1994). By the end of the decade, Reagan had withdrawn completely from public life, in his final years unable to recall the names of even his wife and children. On 5 June 2004, Reagan died at the age of 93. His passing brought a flood of tributes. Republican President George W. Bush proclaimed that, with Reagan as leader, ‘America laid to rest an era of division and

118 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 7.1 A child awaits Reagan’s funeral motorcade, 2004 Source: Courtesy US Navy Photo/Alamy Stock Photo

self‑doubt, and because of his leadership the world laid to rest an era of fear and tyranny’ (Berger, 2004). Reagan’s legacy was lauded by prominent Democrats such as former President Bill Clinton and Senator John Kerry, the Democratic front runner in the 2004 election. Over 200,000 people paid their respects to Reagan as he lay in state in the US Capitol. All four former presidents attended Reagan’s state funeral, as did Gorbachev and leaders past and present from 165 nations, including former United King‑ dom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. It was the largest state funeral since President John F. Kennedy’s service in November 1963. Reagan’s death was a major media event. All American TV networks interrupted programming to announce his passing. There was saturation coverage of Reagan’s life and legacy across media formats. Broadcast and cable news networks showed hours of live coverage from the state funeral. The vast majority of the press commentary was glowing, sketching out Reagan’s legacy in bold and sweeping terms, emphasizing his presidency as a period of transformation for the US and the world. Time magazine called him the ‘Dreamer in Chief’ and like many publications, credited

Assessment 119 him with reshaping politics, restoring American confidence and self‑belief, and reviving the executive branch by ‘remind[ing] us what a confident and sure President looked like’ (Gibbs, 2004). These near universally glowing obituaries tended to touch lightly if at all on the controversies and scandals that marked Reagan’s presidency. Republicans and the ‘Reagan Test’ Reagan looms large in the history of the modern Republican Party, mark‑ ing the re‑emergence of the party as a political force. Between 1933 and 1980, only three Republicans were president – Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford  –  and only the first two actually won a general election. Democrats dominated Congress for decades, holding a major‑ ity in the Senate from 1955 to 1981 and in the House of Representatives from 1955 to 1995. For much of the post‑World War II period, Republi‑ cans were effectively a minority party at the federal level. However, between 1980 and 2025, four Republicans– Reagan, Bush Snr, Bush Jnr, and Donald Trump  –  have won seven presidential elections. Since  1980, Republicans have also had multiple stretches where they were the majority in the Senate or the House. In the twenty‑first century under Bush Jnr and Trump, there were periods where the executive and legislative branches of government were under unified Republican control. Reagan also transformed views once seen as politically radical and extreme into something electorally palatable, mainstreaming conservatism within American politics. He inspired generations of conservatives to seek out roles in government, whether through elections or the bureaucracy. When Representative Newt Gingrich and the Republicans won control of the House in the 1994 midterms, they did so by promising a ‘Contract with America’ that borrowed heavily from Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union Address. Simultaneously, conservatives commenced a significant push to embed Reagan in the commemorative landscape. The Ronald Reagan Leg‑ acy Project, founded in 1997, sought to create physical sites of memory by naming roads, buildings, and landmarks in his honor. Its first major vic‑ tory occurred in 1998, when the Republican‑dominated Congress renamed Washington, DC’s airport the Ronald Reagan Washington National Air‑ port. That same year, conservative group Young Americans for Freedom purchased the Reagans’ Santa Barbara ranch, branding the property the ‘Western White House’ and turning it into an educational retreat to teach politics and values to young people. Scholar Sarah Thompson (2019) argues that this push to shape how the past was remembered and inter‑ preted was to ensure ‘future power’ for conservatism. Simultaneously, as Witcher (2019: 2–3) notes, there was the creation of ‘of a mythical Rea‑ gan … [who] came to represent the purest form of conservative principles.’

120 The Reagan Revolution This emphasis on Reagan masked profound tensions about the future direction of the Republican Party. In 1993, the outgoing chair of the RNC blamed opponents of abortion for Bush’s defeat the year prior. He described the right‑to‑life plank, first introduced in 1976 by Reagan back‑ ers, as ‘zealotry masquerading as principle’ (Berke, 1993). In the 1996 election, the Republican presidential nominee Senator Bob Dole argued that the party should be a big enough ‘tent’ to offer a home to people who disagreed on issues of morality such as abortion. Dole’s stance outraged the Religious Right and triggered a sustained effort from conservatives to cement their authority. While some Republicans spent the 1990s question‑ ing the influence of social and religious conservatives within their party, the 2000 candidacy of Governor of Texas George W. Bush ultimately reaf‑ firmed the centrality of Reaganism as an electoral strategy. Bush Jnr, a born‑again evangelical Christian, was much ideologically closer to Rea‑ gan than his father had been. He was endorsed by Nancy and benefited immensely from Religious Right support in the early primaries, which all but assured he became the Republican nominee. Reagan’s importance to conservatives and the broader Republican Party intensified after 2000. In the first decades of the twenty‑first century, with the conservative takeover near complete, ambitious Republicans quoted Reagan endlessly, competing about who best reflected his legacy and meaning. In 2007, Richard Viguerie, a New Right leader who had been a vociferous critic of Reagan in the 1980s, announced the ‘“Reagan test” of true conservatism that all presidential candidates of the GOP [Grand Old Party] had to pass’ (Bjerre‑Poulsen, 2008: 221). As 17 candidates vied for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination, media commentators described ‘Reagan fever’ as being at an all‑time high (Ralph, 2015). Even after the upheaval of Trump’s right‑wing populist campaigns in 2016 and 2020, pundits still initially defaulted to Reagan as an explanatory device for the 2024 election, weighing up which candidate sounded sufficiently ‘Reagan‑esque’ or might be able to lead a ‘modern “Reagan coalition”’ (Adams, 2022). The Bipartisan Hero Reagan’s popularity and status grew as his time in office receded into mem‑ ory. During Reagan’s eight years as president, his average job approval rating was 52.8 per cent. However, by February 1999, 71 per cent of Americans approved of Reagan’s performance as president. By November 2010, his retrospective standing had increased to 74 per cent. Some of this upswing reflected the intense public sympathy and goodwill after Reagan’s Alzheimer’s diagnosis, but it has endured well into the twenty‑first century.

Assessment 121 In Gallup’s public polling, Reagan routinely featured in lists of the ‘top ten’ presidents, chosen as number one in 2001, 2005, and 2011. A 2021 C‑SPAN survey of presidential historians and scholars placed him at nine, between Kennedy and Barack Obama. Reagan’s reputation post‑presidency was dramatically strengthened by broader historical events as well as the benefit of hindsight. The fall of the Berlin Wall, accompanied by the collapse of the Soviet Union, greatly boosted Reagan’s reputation as a global statesman. These events were often credited to the idea, not born out by the historical record, that Reagan had doggedly pursued a secret strategy to defeat the communist enemy, while also eclipsing much of the global fear and anxiety that had surrounded his first term. Furthermore, despite the Cold War struggle, US interven‑ tions and fatalities in Lebanon and Grenada, and terrorist hijackings and attacks, the 1980s were framed as a period of relative peace for America, in contrast to 9/11 and the ‘Forever Wars’ that followed. Similarly, despite the economic turmoil of Reagan’s first years in office, he was culturally associated with the prosperity and glitz of the 1980s go‑go economy, which stood in contrast to downturns in the early 1990s, early 2000s, and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–8. The tenure of subsequent presi‑ dents also worked to bolster Reagan’s standing. The controversies that occurred under Reagan’s watch, including the Iran‑Contra Affair, were rapidly overshadowed by Clinton’s sexual improprieties and impeachment trial, or the human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib that occurred under Bush Jnr. Lastly, Reagan’s Alzheimer’s diagnosis shortly after leaving the White House meant he was removed from politics and public life, in contrast to most former presidents. After Reagan’s historic landslide victory in 1984, prominent Democrats concluded that the New Deal Democrats were dead. In their place emerged the centrist Democrats who embraced many of the principles of neoliber‑ alism. Both Clinton and Obama reflected this approach to governance. During Clinton’s two terms in office, he accepted rather than resisted con‑ servative critiques of big government. Clinton pledged to establish fiscal discipline and bring the national debt, which had spiraled under Reagan and Bush Snr, under control. He oversaw a dramatic reduction in spend‑ ing on social and entitlement programs and engaged in sweeping welfare reform. Even the long held Democratic goal of a universal national health insurance program, first proposed in 1945 as part of Harry Truman’s Fair Deal, was curtailed by the neoliberal turn. Obama rejected a single‑payer or public option system and pursued a free‑market approach that allowed for increased competition among private insurance providers. Reagan was pivotal in the broad reorientation of American politics away from expan‑ sive visions of the liberal state.

122 The Reagan Revolution Over time, Reagan became a bipartisan rather than exclusively Republican hero. Although Reagan clashed frequently with Democrats throughout the 1980s, subsequent Democratic politicians, particularly those with presidential ambitions, increasingly praised him. In the 1992 election, as Clinton strove to unseat Reagan’s former Vice President, he used Reagan’s 1980 pledge to ‘Make America Great Again’ in campaign speeches. In the 2000 election, Vice President Al Gore’s advertising team approvingly referenced Reagan’s defense policies, to the surprise of Republicans. After Reagan’s death in 2004, Kerry suspended campaigning for a week and extolled Reagan’s bipartisan legacy and his optimism. Obama was particularly notable in his affinity for Reagan, approvingly referencing him when campaigning for the White House and during his eight years in office. In 2016, Hillary Clinton’s campaign created posters contrasting statements from Republican presidential hopefuls with Reagan’s words and actions. Reagan in the Age of Trump Trump’s political ascendance from the mid‑2010s is frequently interpreted as a seismic break in the history of the modern Republican Party. Trump is a populist rather than a conservative with views that are primarily anti‑establishment and contrarian. Trump is staunchly isolationist, touting

Figure 7.2 Donald Trump campaign advertisement, 2015 Source: Courtesy ZUMA Press/Alamy Stock Photo

Assessment 123 ‘America First’ foreign policies that reject Reagan’s belief that the US had a moral responsibility to assert itself as a global superpower. He is also highly anti‑immigrant and in 2024 called for mass deportations, the dia‑ metrical opposite of the reforms championed by Reagan which empha‑ sized amnesty for undocumented Americans. With Trump’s defeat in the 2020 election, he has become ever more autocratic, demanding loyalty to himself over party or nation. Since winning the 2016 election, Trump has positioned himself as the future of the Republican Party, routinely attacking political rivals by dis‑ missing them as Reagan Republicans. Reagan, once the outsider, is now shorthand for the establishment. However, Trump still reflexively relied on Reagan, using the fortieth president as a shorthand just like so many Republicans before him. Trump’s call to ‘Make America Great Again’ (frequently shortened to MAGA) was a direct lifting of Reagan’s 1980 campaign slogan, although Trump attempted to take personal credit for it (Dangremond, 2018). Trump used Reagan’s name and likeness in adver‑ tising and fundraising in both his 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns. During Joe Biden’s presidency, Trump (2023) paraphrased Reagan’s 1980 challenge to voters, posting on social media, ‘Ask yourself: WERE YOU BETTER OFF TODAY, OR FOUR YEARS AGO?’ Trump also relied on Reagan‑era electoral strategies, particularly in his focus on courting the religiously and socially conservative voting bloc that Reagan first ener‑ gized in 1980. Trump’s Vice President from 2017 to 2021 was Mike Pence, chosen for his anti‑abortion and family values credentials as Governor of Indiana. Pence functioned as an assurance to the Religious Right that they could trust Trump’s promises. Once in office, Trump undertook more con‑ servative outreach and action in areas relating to gender, sexuality, and reproduction than any prior Republican president, far exceeding Reagan’s support. As a pragmatic conservatism, Reagan pursued bipartisan initiatives such as immigration and tax reform and engaged in meaningful arms control talks with his ideological foe. It is almost impossible to imagine a home for this type of politician in the twenty‑first‑century Republican Party. Nevertheless, there are important points of continuity between Trump and Reagan which offer insights into the complex and enduring legacies of the Reagan years. Many of Reagan’s policies remain foundational for Trump and Congressional Republicans. Like Reagan, in Trump’s first term, he implemented significant tax cuts, particularly for the wealthy, aggressively pursued a deregulatory agenda, and attempted to significantly cut funding for social welfare programs. Although Trump favors protectionist trade policies, the remainder of Reagan’s neoliberal doctrine is part and parcel of Trump’s approach. On the social issues, Trump has foregrounded abor‑ tion, implementing many of the anti‑abortion domestic and foreign policies

124 The Reagan Revolution first advanced by Reagan, including the emphasis on filling Supreme Court vacancies with constitutional originalists. With the overturning of Roe, Trump claims to have achieved a goal that Republicans had spent decades trying and failing to achieve, even as he distances himself from any respon‑ sibility for the state abortion bans that ensued. Trump’s rise is an extension of the political model that Reagan perfected. On domestic matters, these two leaders are points on a spectrum, an amplification and deepening of trends rather than a historical rupture. However, there are potent differences between them, with one of the most symbolically powerful being the mood that they project and their vision of the nation. As the Great Communicator, Reagan was a gifted orator, and his speeches inspired ordinary Americans, transforming how they felt about their country and their future. Reagan attacked the sta‑ tus quo and amplified social division, but these themes were packaged within an overarching narrative that was optimistic and patriotic. From the beginning to the end of his presidency, Reagan described America as a beacon for the world, a ‘shining city.’ [Doc. 20] Trump’s speaking style is far less polished but inspires more fervent devotion among his support‑ ers. Trump has consistently offered a dark vision of the US and its people. His first Inaugural Address offered criticisms that would have been famil‑ iar to Reagan audiences, with talk of big government and cities racked by crime and drugs, but the mood was dystopian, describing an ‘Ameri‑ can carnage’ (Trump, 2017). This negative framing intensified after the 2020 election, becoming more conspiratorial and rhetorically violent in the 2024 campaign. Yet over three election cycles, and despite initial criti‑ cism from within the party, Trump has established himself as the domi‑ nant Republican politician. His influence has endured in the face of two sets of impeachment proceedings, electoral defeat, the 6 January US Capi‑ tol Attack, and significant criminal charges post‑presidency. Trump’s rise reflects the triumph of a politics fueled principally by anger, resentment, and distrust, the impact of which will shape the American political scene into the foreseeable future.

Part 2

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Document 1: Ronald Reagan, ‘A Time for Choosing’ Speech, 27 October 1964. … I have spent most of my life as a Democrat. I recently have seen fit to follow another course. I believe that the issues confronting us cross party lines. Now, one side in this campaign has been telling us that the issues of this election are the maintenance of peace and prosperity. The line has been used, ‘We’ve never had it so good.’ But I have an uncomfortable feeling that this prosperity isn’t something on which we can base our hopes for the future … Today, 37 cents out of every dollar earned in this country is the tax collector’s share, and yet our government continues to spend 17  million dollars a day more than the government takes in. We haven’t balanced our budget 28 out of the last 34 years … and now our national debt is one and a half times bigger than all the combined debts of all the nations of the world. … We’re at war with the most dangerous enemy that has ever faced mankind in his long climb from the swamp to the stars, and it’s been said if we lose that war, and in so doing lose this way of freedom of ours, history will record with the greatest astonishment that those who had the most to lose did the least to prevent its happening. Well I think it’s time we ask ourselves if we still know the freedoms that were intended for us by the Founding Fathers. … This is the issue of this election: Whether we believe in our capacity for self‑government or whether we abandon the American revolution and confess that a little intellectual elite in a far‑distant capitol can plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves. You and I are told increasingly we have to choose between a left or right. Well I’d like to suggest there is no such thing as a left or right. There’s only an up or down ‑ [up] man’s old‑aged dream, the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with law and order, or down to the ant heap of totali‑ tarianism. And regardless of their sincerity, their humanitarian motives, DOI: 10.4324/9781003097839-11

128 The Reagan Revolution those who would trade our freedom for security have embarked on this downward course. In this vote‑harvesting time, they use terms like the ‘Great Society,’ or as we were told a few days ago by the President, we must accept a greater government activity in the affairs of the people. … Senator Clark of Pennsylvania, another articulate spokesman, defines liberalism as ‘meeting the material needs of the masses through the full power of centralized government.’ Well, I, for one, resent it when a representative of the people refers to you and me, the free men and women of this country, as ‘the masses.’ This is a term we haven’t applied to ourselves in America. But beyond that, ‘the full power of centralized government’ this was the very thing the Founding Fathers sought to minimize. They knew that governments don’t control things. A government can’t control the economy without controlling peo‑ ple. And they know when a government sets out to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. They also knew, those Founding Fathers, that outside of its legitimate functions, government does nothing as well or as economically as the private sector of the economy. … We have so many people who can’t see a fat man standing beside a thin one without coming to the conclusion the fat man got that way by taking advantage of the thin one. So they’re going to solve all the problems of human misery through government and government planning. Well, now, if government planning and welfare had the answer ‑ and they’ve had almost 30 years of it – shouldn’t we expect government to read the score to us once in a while? Shouldn’t they be telling us about the decline each year in the number of people needing help? The reduction in the need for public housing? But the reverse is true. Each year the need grows greater; the program grows greater. … Yet anytime you and I question the schemes of the do‑gooders, we’re denounced as being against their humanitarian goals. They say we’re always ‘against’ things – we’re never ‘for’ anything. … I think we’re for an international organization, where the nations of the world can seek peace. But I think we’re against subordinating American interests to an organization that has become so structurally unsound that today you can muster a two‑thirds vote on the floor of the General Assem‑ bly among nations that represent less than 10 percent of the world’s popu‑ lation. I think we’re against the hypocrisy of assailing our allies because here and there they cling to a colony, while we engage in a conspiracy of silence and never open our mouths about the millions of people enslaved in the Soviet colonies in the satellite nations. I think we’re for aiding our allies by sharing of our material blessings with those nations which share in our fundamental beliefs, but we’re

Document 129 against doling out money government to government, creating bureau‑ cracy, if not socialism, all over the world. We set out to help 19 countries. We’re helping 107. We’ve spent 146 billion dollars. … No government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. So governments’ programs, once launched, never disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we’ll ever see on this earth. … Now it doesn’t require expropriation or confiscation of private property or business to impose socialism on a people. What does it mean whether you hold the … title to your business or property if the govern‑ ment holds the power of life and death over that business or property? And such machinery already exists … Somewhere a perversion has taken place. Our natural, unalienable rights are now considered to be a dispensation of government, and freedom has never been so fragile, so close to slipping from our grasp as it is at this moment. Our Democratic opponents seem unwilling to debate these issues. They want to make you and I believe that this is a contest between two men ‑ that we’re to choose just between two personalities. … Those who would trade our freedom for the soup kitchen of the welfare state have told us they have a utopian solution of peace without victory. They call their policy ‘accommodation.’ And they say if we’ll only avoid any direct confrontation with the enemy, he’ll forget his evil ways and learn to love us. All who oppose them are indicted as warmongers. They say we offer simple answers to complex problems. Well, perhaps there is a simple answer ‑ not an easy answer but simple: If you and I have the courage to tell our elected officials that we want our national policy based on what we know in our hearts is morally right. We cannot buy our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality so great as saying to a billion human beings now enslaved behind the Iron Curtain, ‘Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skins, we’re willing to make a deal with your slave masters.’ … You and I know and do not believe that life is so dear and peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery. If nothing in life is worth dying for, when did this begin ‑ just in the face of this enemy? Or should Moses have told the children of Israel to live in slavery under the pharaohs? Should Christ have refused the cross? Should the patriots at Con‑ cord Bridge have thrown down their guns and refused to fire the shot heard ‘round the world? The martyrs of history were not fools, and our honored dead who gave their lives to stop the advance of the Nazis didn’t die in vain. Where, then, is the road to peace? Well it’s a simple answer after all. You and I have the courage to say to our enemies, ‘There is a price we will not pay.’ ‘There is a point beyond which they must not advance.’ And

130 The Reagan Revolution this ‑ this is the meaning in the phrase of Barry Goldwater’s ‘peace through strength.’ … You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We’ll preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we’ll sentence them to take the last step into a thousand years of darkness. We will keep in mind and remember that Barry Goldwater has faith in us. He has faith that you and I have the ability and the dignity and the right to make our own decisions and determine our own destiny … Reprinted with the permission of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library [hereafter RRPL]. Document 2: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Program for Economic Recovery,’ 28 April 1981. … First, however, and due to events of the past few weeks, will you permit me to digress for a moment from the all‑important subject of why we must bring government spending under control and reduce tax rates. I’d like to say a few words directly to all of you and to those who are watching and listening tonight, because this is the only way I know to express to all of you on behalf of Nancy and myself our appreciation for you [sic] messages and flowers and, most of all, your prayers, not only for me but for those others who fell beside me. The warmth of your words, the expression of friendship and, yes, love, meant more to us than you can ever know. You have given us a memory that we’ll treasure forever. And you’ve provided an answer to those few voices that were raised saying that what happened was evidence that ours is a sick society. … Thanks to some very fine people, my health is much improved. I’d like to be able to say that with regard to the health of the economy. It’s been half a year since the election that charged all of us in this Government with the task of restoring our economy. … Six months is long enough. The American people now want us to act and not in half‑measures. They demand and they’ve earned a full and comprehensive effort to clean up our economic mess. Because of the extent of our economy’s sickness, we know that the cure will not come quickly and that even with our package, progress will come in inches and feet, not in miles. But to fail to act will delay even longer and more painfully the cure which must come … And the budgetary actions taken by the Congress over the next few days will determine how we respond to the message of last November 4th. That message was very simple. Our government is too big, and it spends too much.

Document 131 … High taxes and excess spending growth created our present economic mess; more of the same will not cure the hardship, anxiety, and discour‑ agement it has imposed on the American people. Let us cut through the fog for a moment. The answer to a government that’s too big is to stop feeding its growth. Government spending has been growing faster than the economy itself. The massive national debt which we accumulated is the result of the government’s high spending diet. Well, it’s time to change the diet and to change it in the right way. … Tonight, I renew my call for us to work as a team, to join in coopera‑ tion so that we find answers which will begin to solve all our economic problems and not just some of them. … Reducing the growth of spending, cutting marginal tax rates, pro‑ viding relief from overregulation, and following a noninflationary and predictable monetary policy are interwoven measures which will ensure that we have addressed each of the severe dislocations which threaten our economic future. These policies will make our economy stronger, and the stronger economy will balance the budget which we’re committed to do by 1984. … The old and comfortable way is to shave a little here and add a little there. Well, that’s not acceptable anymore. I think this great and historic Congress knows that way is no longer acceptable. [Applause] … Just 2 weeks ago, you and I joined millions of our fellow Americans in marveling at the magic historical moment that John Young and Bob Crippen created in their space shuttle, Columbia. The last manned effort was almost 6 years ago. … With the space shuttle we tested our ingenuity once again, moving beyond the accomplishments of the past into the promise and uncertainty of the future … The space shuttle did more than prove our technological abilities. It raised our expectations once more. It started us dreaming again. The poet Carl Sandburg wrote, ‘The republic is a dream. Nothing hap‑ pens unless first a dream.’ And that’s what makes us, as Americans, dif‑ ferent. We’ve always reached for a new spirit and aimed at a higher goal. We’ve been courageous and determined, unafraid and bold. Who among us wants to be first to say we no longer have those qualities, that we must limp along, doing the same things that have brought us our present misery? I believe that the people you and I represent are ready to chart a new course. They look to us to meet the great challenge, to reach beyond the commonplace and not fall short for lack of creativity or courage. … All we need to have is faith, and that dream will come true. All we need to do is act, and the time for action is now …

132 The Reagan Revolution Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 3: Memorandum from Elizabeth Dole to James Baker III, ‘Black Strategy,’ 24 February 1982. … Background: Black Unrest and Concerns

Ronald Reagan won the 1980 election with strong support from virtually every segment of America. One of the few exceptions was the Black com‑ munity which supported Jimmy Carter with 90% of their vote. … Today, after one year, the original uneasiness among Blacks has hardened into outright opposition, even among some former supporters. This opposition threatens to grow stronger and more activist. The poli‑ cies and programs of the Reagan administration are consistently criticized and attacked by prominent Black leaders, Black organizations, and Black press. Many of the more recent attacks have been aimed personally at the President … A NEW YORK TIMES/CBS poll released January 19, 1982, put Black approval of the President at a ‘rock bottom’ 8%. The increase in Black opposition is obviously not the result of a single statement, policy, or action on the part of the President or his Adminis‑ tration. Rather, as we all know, it is the result of a series of events over a period of time. Some of the major examples follow: a A series of ‘stops and starts’ in the policy area have communicated the impression that the President lacks a sincere commitment to the advancement of civil rights. Notable examples are: • The delay in advocating an extension of the Voting Rights Act. • Confusion and inconsistency over the Administration’s affirmative action policies. • The racial overtones of the issue of tax exemptions for segregated schools, which was highlighted by the press. b The combined impact of the budget cuts, growing unemployment and government RIFs [reduction in forces] has had a demoralizing effect on Blacks. Continual accusations are made that these actions impact disproportionately on minorities, and especially Blacks. The Adminis‑ tration’s efforts to reverse this negative perception have been both insuf‑ ficient and inefficient to date. c The relatively low number of Black appointments compared with the previous administration. … We are confronted by the erroneous and dangerous stereotype of a President who is unsympathetic to the plight of the poor and needy, and a threat to the gains in civil rights over the past twenty years.

Document 133 These perceptual issues impact most negatively on Black Americans, but have serious ramifications for other groups as well. In particular, the ‘lack of compassion’ label is one which has harmful long‑term implications for women, the elderly, and moderates of all parties. … Policy Actions

The Administration has not communicated the President’s policies regard‑ ing Black concerns in a clear, concise and definitive manner. On several issues of specific concern to Blacks, there is no policy in place. In other areas, the Administration’s positions are confusing, conflicting or viewed as ‘waffling.’ In many cases, the time and clarity of a policy needs to be given the same level of professional attention as the substance … Papers of Elizabeth Dole, Box 5. Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 4: Patti Eslinger, ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ poster, 1982. Offset lithograph paper, 25 x 18.5 in. See Figure 8.1 Document 5: Morton Blackwell, ‘Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives’ memorandum, 17 January 1983. Executive Summary

… During the 97th Congress, the only major Reagan Administration efforts on issues of paramount importance to elements of our 1980 winning coali‑ tion were in the economic area. The President did not himself retreat from those views on essentially non‑economic issues, views which attracted to his coalition millions of Americans who have not normally voted for Republicans. But his sincere words were not backed up by enough actions by the Reagan Administration. … The Roosevelt coalition split in 1980 because, for a change, the dema‑ gogy of ‘have‑not’ vs. ‘have’ did not work. One or more of a wide variety of high intensity, non‑economic issues brought many normally Democratic vot‑ ers to the Republicans. These voters found they could not stomach the actions and aims of the liberal Democratic leadership. The Reagan campaign and the actions of newly dynamic conservative organizations opened their eyes. Many surely didn’t want to elect liberal Democrats who would take their children away from home and neighborhood by forced busing on Soviet tanks into the clutches of counter‑culture teachers who would fill

134 The Reagan Revolution

Figure 8.1 Patti Eslinger, ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ poster, 1982. Offset litho‑ graph paper, 25 x 18.5 in Source: Courtesy Collection of the Oakland Museum of California, All Of Us Or None Archive. Gift of the Rossman Family

Document 135 their heads with pornography, abortion, and gun control, and prevent them from praying. In 1981 and 1982 these high intensity ‘social’ issues were not fought over in the Congress as in recent years. They were largely ignored in actions of both parties, by fearful Democrats and by disdainful Republicans … A fundamental change is required. The Administration must change its attitude. … The good old Republican issues of fiscal responsibility, capital forma‑ tion, and the work ethic are necessary, even central to our coalition, but not sufficient for us to win national elections in the 1980s. If we take the actions necessary to reactivate all the elements of the Rea‑ gan winning coalition, it can become the new, normal governing majority in American politics. Overview

… Much of the 1980 Reagan winning coalition was largely dormant in the 1982 elections. Conservative activists did have someplace else to go. Home. The tragic defeats of many GOP candidates at every level were in large measure due to this decline in activism. Many conservative organization leaders place the entire blame for the 1982 defeats on failures of the Reagan Administration to make good on the 1980 Reagan promises. Many in the Administration blame conserva‑ tives for carping and say that the election results prove that the conserva‑ tive movement was overrated. There is plenty of blame to go around. … [M]ost of the conservative issues on which millions of people had been identified and activated were virtually absent from the headlines and absent from the TV news programs … How could groups organized around these issues fire up their grassroots supporters to hold Democrats accountable last November for their liberal stands? They couldn’t. … Without legislative battles, there remained the possibility that admin‑ istrative steps on the high intensity conservative issue agenda would moti‑ vate these groups and keep their grassroots members active. In practice, virtually every administrative decision which these groups would applaud has been taken with a view to minimizing public attention. For example, right to life activist Dr. Everett Koop was named Surgeon General of the U.S., but he is instructed to make no public statements regarding abortion. … Conservative groups made their full share of mistakes in the past two years. After the 1980 election victories, many naively expected the Reagan Administration instantly to roll back all the damage done by liberals since the start of the New Deal. That was impossible. … And, of course, a slowly growing portion of conservative organization effort has been spent on public criticism of what they see as failures of the

136 The Reagan Revolution Administration to keep the faith with the 1980 mandate. Some conserva‑ tive journals and journalists for two years have taken more shots at the Administration than at all liberal Democrats combined. … This situation need not, must not, be repeated in 1984. The Reagan winning coalition can be revived. From this analysis, the steps needed are obvious, but none the less difficult. Most important, the Administration must decide to confront squarely those conservative, largely non‑economic issues which divide millions of normally Democratic voters from the liberal Democratic leadership. Yes, there are people well placed in the Reagan Administration who turn faintly green at mention of these issues. Yes, a typical staffer at the major, national Republican organizations considers it a day well spent if he has done nothing to offend either Senator Helms or Senator Weicker. Yes, on all of these issues there are well organized groups in opposition to the conservative position. Yes, the Washington Post and others will heap ridicule on any vigorous Reagan Administration actions in these areas. … Congressional GOP Leadership

Whether or not confrontations in the Congress on these issues would help the President and do significant damage to liberal Democratic candidates in 1984, it is a safe bet that the GOP leaders in both Houses will prefer not to have fights on most of the high intensity conservative issues. They stand ready, typically, to do battle on any issue which hurts the Democrats, pro‑ vided no Republican colleague is offended. … Actions can prove the determination of the President. Grassroots groups can be focused carefully. After some months of ‘heat’ … GOP lead‑ ers may ‘see the light’ and resign themselves to record votes on these issues. … Policy Initiatives

The key to reviving fully the Reagan winning coalition in time for the 1984 election is Administration action on neglected elements of the President’s 1980 issue agenda. Not access, not State Dinner invitations, not advisory commission appointments, not personal friendship, not stirring written or spoken reaf‑ firmations of principles, but action. … We can emulate the Franklin Roosevelt Administration or the Eisen‑ hower Administration. FDR was, politically, the most successful presi‑ dent of the 20th century. He built a new governing majority which lasted through his lifetime and beyond. President Eisenhower quickly lost his

Document 137 early strength in Congress. He remained personally popular, but he strug‑ gled with hostile Democratic majorities for his last six years in the White House. And his vice president lost the ensuing attempt to succeed him. … This Administration is at a crossroads. By shouldering the whole bur‑ den of the issues on which he ran and won and by taking unmistakable actions to confront his opponents on these issues, President Reagan could revive his winning coalition in three months. If we fail to take decided actions on these issues early in this new Con‑ gress, the President’s opportunity to systematically build a new, normal governing majority will be lost. … We have indulged in unilateral moral disarmament. In rhetoric and, more importantly, in action the Reagan Administration behaves as if these [social] issues were skunks at our garden party. … The coalition which coalesced in the 1970’s and won in 1980 is avail‑ able for 1984 if the Reagan Administration chooses to revive it. If not, the conservative organizations will more and more separate their fortunes from those of the President. And their leaders will continue to recruit and build, intending to revive the winning coalition in some future year under someone else’s banner … Papers of Morton Blackwell, Box 23. Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 6: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,’ 23 March 1983. … The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression – to preserve freedom and peace. Since the dawn of the atomic age, we’ve sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. ‘Deterrence’ means simply this: making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, con‑ cludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he under‑ stands that, he won’t attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression. This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. … For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous mili‑ tary might. They didn’t stop when their forces exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability. And they haven’t stopped now. … Another example of what’s happened: In 1978 the Soviets had 600 intermediate‑range nuclear missiles based on land and were beginning to

138 The Reagan Revolution add the SS‑20– a new, highly accurate, mobile missile with 3 warheads. We had none. … So, together with our NATO allies, we decided in 1979 to deploy new weapons, beginning this year, as a deterrent to their SS–20’s and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet us in serious arms control nego‑ tiations. We will begin that deployment late this year. At the same time, however, we’re willing to cancel our program if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we’ve called a zero‑zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating table – and I think it’s fair to say that without our planned deployments, they wouldn’t be there. … As the Soviets have increased their military power, they’ve been emboldened to extend that power. They’re spreading their military influ‑ ence in ways that can directly challenge our vital interests and those of our allies. … The final fact is that the Soviet Union is acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military force. They have continued to build far more intercontinental ballistic missiles than they could possibly need sim‑ ply to deter an attack. Their conventional forces are trained and equipped not so much to defend against an attack as they are to permit sudden, surprise offensives of their own. … Every item in our defense program – our ships, our tanks, our planes, our funds for training and spare parts – is intended for one all‑important purpose: to keep the peace. Unfortunately, a decade of neglecting our mili‑ tary forces had called into question our ability to do that. … We had to move immediately to improve the basic readiness and stay‑ ing power of our conventional forces, so they could meet – and therefore help deter – a crisis. We had to make up for lost years of investment by moving forward with a long‑term plan to prepare our forces to counter the military capabilities our adversaries were developing for the future. I know that all of you want peace, and so do I. I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our negotiations on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces. … Believe me, it wasn’t pleasant for someone who had come to Wash‑ ington determined to reduce government spending, but we had to move forward with the task of repairing our defenses or we would lose our abil‑ ity to deter conflict now and in the future. … This adds up to a major effort, and it isn’t cheap. It comes at a time when there are many other pressures on our budget and when the American

Document 139 people have already had to make major sacrifices during the recession. But we must not be misled by those who would make defense once again the scapegoat of the Federal budget. The fact is that in the past few decades we have seen a dramatic shift in how we spend the taxpayer’s dollar. Back in 1955, payments to individu‑ als took up only about 20 percent of the Federal budget. For nearly three decades, these payments steadily increased and, this year, will account for 49 percent of the budget. … The calls for cutting back the defense budget come in nice, simple arithmetic. They’re the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930’s and invited the tragedy of World War II. We must not let that grim chapter of history repeat itself through apathy or neglect. … Now, thus far tonight I’ve shared with you my thoughts on the prob‑ lems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. … This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisers, including in par‑ ticular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course of these discussions, I’ve become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Feel‑ ing this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides. … If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that’s a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? … What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic mis‑ siles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accom‑ plished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be

140 The Reagan Revolution failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is. … I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scien‑ tific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 7: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,’ 27 October 1983. … Some 2 months ago we were shocked by the brutal massacre of 269 men, women, and children, more than 60 of them Americans, in the shooting down of a Korean airliner. Now, in these past several days, violence has erupted again, in Lebanon and Grenada. … This past Sunday, at 22 minutes after 6 Beirut time, with dawn just breaking, a truck, looking like a lot of other vehicles in the city, approached the airport on a busy, main road. There was nothing in its appearance to suggest it was any different than the trucks or cars that were normally seen on and around the airport. But this one was different. At the wheel was a young man on a suicide mission. The truck carried some 2,000 pounds of explosives, but there was no way our marine guards could know this. Their first warning that some‑ thing was wrong came when the truck crashed through a series of barriers, including a chain‑link fence and barbed wire entanglements. The guards opened fire, but it was too late. The truck smashed through the doors of the headquarters building in which our marines were sleeping and instantly exploded. The four‑story concrete building collapsed in a pile of rubble. More than 200 of the sleeping men were killed in that one hideous, insane attack. Many others suffered injury and are hospitalized here or in Europe. This was not the end of the horror. At almost the same instant, another vehicle on a suicide and murder mission crashed into the headquarters of the French peacekeeping force, an eight‑story building, destroying it and killing more than 50 French soldiers.

Document 141 … Lebanon is a small country, more than five‑and‑a‑half thousand miles from our shores on the edge of what we call the Middle East. But every President who has occupied this office in recent years has recognized that peace in the Middle East is of vital concern to our nation and, indeed, to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. … The area is key to the economic and political life of the West. Its stra‑ tegic importance, its energy resources, the Suez Canal, and the well‑being of the nearly 200  million people living there – all are vital to us and to world peace. If that key should fall into the hands of a power or powers hostile to the free world, there would be a direct threat to the United States and to our allies. We have another reason to be involved. Since 1948 our Nation has rec‑ ognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. … So, why are we there? Well, the answer is straightforward: to help bring peace to Lebanon and stability to the vital Middle East. … The physical presence of the marines lends support to both the Leb‑ anese Government and its army. It allows the hard work of diplomacy to go forward. Indeed, without the peacekeepers from the U.S., France, Italy, and Britain, the efforts to find a peaceful solution in Lebanon would collapse. As to that narrower question – what exactly is the operational mission of the marines – the answer is, to secure a piece of Beirut, to keep order in their sector, and to prevent the area from becoming a battlefield. … Let me ask those who say we should get out of Lebanon: If we were to leave Lebanon now, what message would that send to those who foment instability and terrorism? If America were to walk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement, producing a uni‑ fied democratic Lebanon? … If terrorism and intimidation succeed, it’ll be a devastating blow to the peace process and to Israel’s search for genuine security. It won’t just be Lebanon sentenced to a future of chaos. Can the United States, or the free world, for that matter, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet bloc? … We’re a nation with global responsibilities. We’re not somewhere else in the world protecting someone else’s interests; we’re there protecting our own. … Now, I know another part of the world is very much on our minds, a place much closer to our shores: Grenada. The island is only twice the size of the District of Columbia, with a total population of about 110,000 people.

142 The Reagan Revolution Grenada and a half dozen other Caribbean islands here were, until recently, British colonies. They’re now independent states and members of the British Commonwealth. … In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. Maurice Bishop, a protege of Fidel Castro, staged a military coup and overthrew the government which had been elected under the constitution left to the people by the British. He sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet‑built long‑range bombers. … On October 12th, a small group in his militia seized him and put him under arrest. They were, if anything, more radical and more devoted to Castro’s Cuba than he had been … Grenada was without a government, its only authority exercised by a self‑proclaimed band of military men. There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. George’s University Medical School. … Last weekend, I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the Organization [sic]of Eastern Caribbean States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada. … These small, peaceful nations needed our help … The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated. We knew we had little time and that complete secrecy was vital to ensure both the safety of the young men who would undertake this mission and the Americans they were about to rescue. … Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn’t. It was a Soviet‑Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time. … The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of sur‑ rogates and terrorists. … You know, there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artil‑ lery along our coasts, and, of course, a navy … The world has changed. Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway places. It’s up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.

Document 143 Sam Rayburn [Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1949–53] once said that freedom is not something a nation can work for once and win forever. He said it’s like an insurance policy; its premiums must be kept up to date. In order to keep it, we have to keep working for it and sacrificing for it just as long as we live … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 8: Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention,’ 30 January 1984. … This is a moment I’ve been looking forward to. I remember with such pleasure the time we spent together last year. Today I feel like I’m doing more than returning for a speech; I feel like I’m coming home. … Let me set the record straight on your account: The spectacular growth of … organizations that produce religious programs for radio and television, not to mention the booming industry in Christian books, under‑ lines a far‑reaching change in our country. Americans yearn to explore life’s deepest truths. And to say their entertainment – their idea of entertainment is sex and violence and crime is an insult to their goodness and intelligence. We are people who believe love can triumph over hate, creativity over destruction, and hope over despair. And that’s why so many millions hunger for your product – God’s good news. … I was pleased last year to proclaim 1983 the Year of the Bible. But, you know, a group called the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] severely criticized me for doing that. Well, I wear their indict‑ ment like a badge of honor. I believe I stand in pretty good company. [Laughter] … My experience in this office I hold has only deepened a belief I’ve held for many years: Within the covers of that single Book [the Bible] are all the answers to all the problems that face us today if we’d only read and believe. I know what I’m about to say now is controversial, but I have to say it. … We cannot pretend that America is preserving her first and highest ideal, the belief that each life is sacred, when we’ve permitted the deaths of 15 million helpless innocents since the Roe versus Wade decision –15 mil‑ lion children who will never laugh, never sing, never know the joy of human love, will never strive to heal the sick, feed the poor, or make peace among nations. Abortion has denied them the first and most basic of human rights. We are all infinitely poorer for their loss.

144 The Reagan Revolution There’s another grim truth we should face up to: Medical science doc‑ tors confirm that when the lives of the unborn are snuffed out, they often feel pain, pain that is long and agonizing. This nation fought a terrible war so that black Americans would be guaranteed their God‑given rights. Abraham Lincoln recognized that we could not survive as a free land when some could decide whether others should be free or slaves. Well, today another question begs to be asked: How can we survive as a free nation when some decide that others are not fit to live and should be done away with? … Let me assure you of something else: We want parents to know their children will not be victims of child pornography. I look forward to sign‑ ing a new bill now awaiting final action in a conference committee that will tighten our laws against child pornography. And we’re concerned about enforcement of all the Federal antiobscenity [sic] laws. Over the past year, the United States Customs Service has increased by 200 percent its confiscation of obscene materials coming in across our bor‑ ders. We’re also intensifying our drive against crimes of family violence and sexual abuse. I happen to believe that protecting victims is just as important as safeguarding the rights of defendants. Restoring the right to life and protecting people from violence and exploitation are important responsibilities. But as members of God’s fam‑ ily we share another, and that is helping to build a foundation of faith and knowledge to prepare our children for the challenges of life … I know one thing I’m sure most of us agree on: God, source of all knowledge, should never have been expelled from our children’s class‑ rooms. The great majority of our people support voluntary prayer in schools. … I think Americans are getting angry. I think they have a message, and Congress better listen. We are a government of, by, and for the peo‑ ple. And people want a constitutional amendment making it unequivocally clear our children can hold voluntary prayer in every school across this land. And if we could get God and discipline back in our schools, maybe we could get drugs and violence out. … I made a point last year which some of our critics jumped on, but I believe it has merit. Government bureaucracies spend billions for prob‑ lems related to drugs, alcoholism, and disease. How much of that money could we save, how much better off might Americans be if all of us tried a little harder to live by the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule? I’ve been told that since the beginning of civilization millions and mil‑ lions of laws have been written. I’ve even heard someone suggest it was as many as several billion. And yet, taken all together, all those millions

Document 145 and millions of laws have not improved on the Ten Commandments one bit. … Our mission stretches far beyond our borders; God’s family knows no borders. In your life you face daily trials, but millions of believers in other lands face far worse. They are mocked and persecuted for the crime of loving God. To every religious dissident trapped in that cold, cruel exist‑ ence, we send our love and support. Our message? You are not alone; you are not forgotten; do not lose your faith and hope because someday you, too, will be free. … Helping each other, believing in Him, we need never be afraid. We will be part of something far more powerful, enduring, and good than all the forces here on Earth. We will be a part of paradise … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 9: Patrick Oliphant, ‘There he goes again’ cartoon,’ Universal Press Syndicate, 8 February 1984.

Figure 8.2 ‘There he goes again’ cartoon, Universal Press Syndicate, 9 February 1984 Source: Courtesy © Patrick Oliphant. ARS/Copyright Agency, 2024

146 The Reagan Revolution Document 10: Etta Hulme, ‘GOP Platform’ cartoon, Fort‑Worth Star Telegram, 20 August 1984.

Figure 8.3 ‘GOP Platform’ cartoon, Fort‑Worth Star Telegram, 20 August 1984 Source: Courtesy, Etta Hulme Papers, Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arling‑ ton Libraries

Document 11: Ronald Reagan, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,’ 6 February 1985. … Four years ago we began to change, forever I hope, our assumptions about government and its place in our lives. Out of that change has come great and robust growth – in our confidence, our economy, and our role in the world. … We honor the giants of our history not by going back but forward to the dreams their vision foresaw. My fellow citizens, this nation is poised for greatness. The time has come to proceed toward a great new challenge – a second American Revolution of hope and opportunity; a rev‑ olution carrying us to new heights of progress by pushing back frontiers of knowledge and space; a revolution of spirit that taps the soul of America, enabling us to summon greater strength than we’ve ever known; and a revolution that carries beyond our shores the golden promise of human freedom in a world of peace.

Document 147 … We stand on the threshold of a great ability to produce more, do more, be more. Our economy is not getting older and weaker; it’s getting younger and stronger. It doesn’t need rest and supervision; it needs new challenge, greater freedom. And that word ‘freedom’ is the key to the sec‑ ond American revolution that we need to bring about. … Together, we can pass, this year, a tax bill for fairness, simplicity, and growth, making this economy the engine of our dreams and America the investment capital of the world. So let us begin. Tax simplification will be a giant step toward unleashing the tremendous pent‑up power of our economy. But a second American revolution must carry the promise of opportunity for all. It is time to liberate the spirit of enterprise in the most distressed areas of our country. This government will meet its responsibility to help those in need. But policies that increase dependency, break up families, and destroy self‑respect are not progressive; they’re reactionary. Despite our strides in civil rights, blacks, Hispanics, and all minorities will not have full and equal power until they have full economic power. … Let us resolve that we will stop spreading dependency and start spreading opportunity; that we will stop spreading bondage and start spreading freedom. … First, the social safety net for the elderly, the needy, the disabled, and unemployed will be left intact. Growth of our major health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid, will be slowed, but protections for the elderly and needy will be preserved. Second, we must not relax our efforts to restore military strength just as we near our goal of a fully equipped, trained, and ready professional corps. … You know, we only have a military‑industrial complex until a time of danger, and then it becomes the arsenal of democracy. Spending for defense is investing in things that are priceless – peace and freedom. … Third, we must reduce or eliminate costly government subsidies. … Every dollar the Federal Government does not take from us, every decision it does not make for us will make our economy stronger, our lives more abundant, our future more free. … Now, there’s another great heritage to speak of this evening. Of all the changes that have swept America the past 4 years, none brings greater promise than our rediscovery of the values of faith, freedom, family, work, and neighborhood. We see signs of renewal in increased attendance in places of worship; renewed optimism and faith in our future; love of country rediscovered by our young, who are leading the way. We’ve rediscovered that work is good in and of itself, that it ennobles us to create and contribute no matter how seemingly humble our jobs.

148 The Reagan Revolution … Just as we’re positioned as never before to secure justice in our econ‑ omy, we’re poised as never before to create a safer, freer, more peaceful world. Our alliances are stronger than ever. Our economy is stronger than ever. We have resumed our historic role as a leader of the free world. And all of these together are a great force for peace. Since  1981 we’ve been committed to seeking fair and verifiable arms agreements that would lower the risk of war and reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. Now our determination to maintain a strong defense has influ‑ enced the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table … All of us have no greater dream than to see the day when nuclear weapons are banned from this Earth forever. … Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy, and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can. America’s economic success is freedom’s success; it can be repeated a hundred times in a hundred differ‑ ent nations. Many countries in east Asia and the Pacific have few resources other than the enterprise of their own people. But through low tax rates and free markets they’ve soared ahead of centralized economies. And now China is opening up its economy to meet its needs. … We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not innocent; nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege. … We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives – on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua – to defy Soviet‑supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. … [T]onight, I’ve spoken of great plans and great dreams. They’re dreams we can make come true. Two hundred years of American history should have taught us that nothing is impossible. History is asking us once again to be a force for good in the world. Let us begin in unity, with justice, and love … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 12: Ronald Reagan Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 November 1985. … Now that we are both home & facing the task of leading our coun‑ tries into a more constructive relationship with each other, I wanted to waste no time in giving you some of my initial thoughts on our meetings. Though I will be sending shortly, in a more formal & official manner, a more detailed commentary on our discussions, there are some things I would like to convey very personally & privately. First, I want you to know that I found our meetings of great value. We had agreed to speak frankly, and we did. As a result, I came away from

Document 149 the meeting with a better understanding of your attitudes. I hope you also understand mine a little better. Obviously there are many things on which we disagree, and disagree very fundamentally. But if I understand you cor‑ rectly, you too are determined to take steps to see that our nations manage their relations in a peaceful fashion. If this is the case, then this is one point on which we are in total agreement – and it is after all the most fundamen‑ tal one of all. As for our substantive differences, let me offer some thoughts on two of the key ones. Regarding strategic defense and it’s [sic] relation to the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, I was struck by your conviction that the Ameri‑ can program is somehow designed to secure a strategic advantage – even to permit a first strike capability. I also noted your concern that research & testing in this area could be a cover for developing & placing offensive weapons in space. As I told you, neither of these concerns is warranted. But I can under‑ stand, as you explained so eloquently, that these are matters which cannot be taken on faith. Both of us must cope with what the other side is doing, & judge the implications for the security of his own country. I do not ask you to take my assurances on faith. However the truth is that the United States has no intention of using it’s [sic] strategic defense program to gain any advantage, & there is no devel‑ opment underway to create space‑based offensive weapons. Our goal is to eliminate any possibility of a first strike from either side. … [C]ant [sic] our negotiators deal more frankly & openly with the ques‑ tion of how to eliminate a first‑strike potential on both sides? Your military now has an advantage in this area — a three to one advantage in warheads that can destroy hardened targets with little warning. That is obviously alarm‑ ing to us, & explains many of the efforts we are making in our modernization program. You may feel perhaps that the U.S. has some advantages in other categories. If so, let’s insist that our negotiators face up to these issues & find a way to improve the security of both countries by agreeing on appropriately balanced reductions. If you are as sincere as I am in not seeking to secure or preserve one‑sided advantages, we will find a solution to these problems. Regarding another key issue we discussed, that of regional conflicts, I can assure you that the United States does not believe that the Soviet Union is the cause of all the world’s ills. We do believe, however, that your country has exploited and worsened local tensions & conflict by militariz‑ ing them and, indeed, intervening directly & indirectly in struggles arising out of local causes. While we both will doubtless continue to support our friends, we must find a way to do so without use of armed force. This is the crux of the point I tried to make.

150 The Reagan Revolution One of the most significant steps in lowering tension in the world — & tension in U.S.‑Soviet relations  —  would be a decision on your part to withdraw your forces from Afghanistan. I gave careful attention to your comments on this issue at Geneva, and am encouraged by your statement that you feel political reconciliation is possible. I want you to know that I am prepared to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate such a with‑ drawal, & that I understand that it must be done in a manner which does not damage Soviet security interests. … These are only two of the key issues on our current agenda. I will soon send some thoughts on others. I believe that we should act promptly to build the momentum our meetings initiated. In Geneva I found our private sessions particularly useful. Both of us have advisors & assistants, but, you know, in the final analysis, the respon‑ sibility to preserve peace & increase cooperation is ours. Our people look to us for leadership, and nobody can provide it if we dont [sic]. But we wont [sic] be very effective leaders unless we can rise above the specific but secondary concerns that preoccupy our respective bureaucracies & give our governments a strong push in the right direction … Originally handwritten. Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239). Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 13: Mikhail Gorbachev Letter to Ronald Reagan, 14 January 1986. … I am convinced that we should work for packing the period till the next planned Soviet‑American summit with constructive efforts of both sides aimed at achieving concrete agreements, first of all, on the urgent problems of arms limitation and reduction. I am, certainly far from being forgetful about the major differences which remain between our approaches to the resolution of these problems. But all these things notwithstanding, it is also impossible to deny that there exist now serious prerequisites to overcome the difficulties we face and, without wasting time, to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements in the interests of enhancing the security of all the peoples. … We are for casting aside the stereotypes and outdated modes of think‑ ing, hindering the advance movement, and for tackling in a bold and new manner the resolution of issues which you and I simply do not have the right to postpone. In your New Year address to the people of the Soviet Union you said that it was your dream to one day free mankind from the threat of nuclear destruction. But why make the realization of this dream conditional on the

Document 151 development of new types of weapons – space weapons in this case? Why take this extremely dangerous path – which does not hold a promise for disarmament, when it is possible already now to get down to freeing the world from the existing arsenals? We propose a different path, which will really enable us to enter the third millenium without nuclear weapons. Instead of spending the next 10–15 years developing new sophisticated weapons in space, which are allegedly intended to make nuclear weapons ‘obsolete’ and ‘impotent,’ wouldn’t it be better to address those weapons themselves and take that time to reduce them to zero? Let us agree on a stage‑by‑stage program which would lead to complete nuclear disarmament everywhere already by the turn of the century. … The first stage. It would last approximately 5–8 years. During this period the USSR and US would reduce by half their nuclear weapons reaching the territories of each other. … It goes without saying that such reductions take place on the basis of the mutual renunciation by the USSR and US of the development testing and deployment of attack space weapons. … We are in favor of reaching and implementing already at the first stage a decision to eliminate completely the medium range missiles of the USSR and US in the European zone  –  both ballistic and cruise missiles – as the first step towards freeing the European continent from nuclear weapons. … From the outset, in our view, it is necessary for the USSR and US to agree to cease all nuclear explosions and to call upon other states to join such moratorium as soon as possible. … The second stage. It has to start no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years. Britain, France and China start to join nuclear disarmament. To begin with they could assume the obligation to freeze all their nuclear armaments and not to have them on the territories of other countries. The USSR and US continue the reduction on which they agreed at the first stage and carry out further measures to liquidate their medium range nuclear weapons, and freeze their tactical nuclear systems. … At this stage the Soviet‑American agreement to ban attack space weapons must become multilateral, necessarily involving all leading indus‑ trial powers. … No later than 1995 the third stage will start. During this stage the liquidation of all still remaining nuclear weapons is completed. By the end of 1999 no more nuclear weapons remain on Earth. A universal agreement is worked out that these weapons shall never be resurrected again. … The verification of the weapons destroyed or limited would be car‑ ried out both by national technical means and by on‑site inspection. The

152 The Reagan Revolution USSR is prepared to come to terms on any other additional verification measures. All this’ll become possible if we close the way for the arms race in outer space. I would like to hope, that you, Mr. President, will consider this ques‑ tion with all the attention it deserves. … Guided by the objective of facilitating the termination of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has taken the decision to prolong its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions for three more months … Moreo‑ ver, this is a practical demonstration of the restraint on the need to exercise which we agreed with you in Geneva. I will be frank, we made this step intending to give to the American side additional time for taking a deci‑ sion, which is expected from Washington by [the] world public, a decision that the American side, too, will stop its nuclear tests. … I hope that the new major initiatives I outlined will be considered by you, Mr. President, with all the seriousness and favorably and that a posi‑ tive response to them will follow … Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, USSR: General Secre‑ tary Gorbachev (8690024, 8690124). Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 14: Ronald and Nancy Reagan, ‘Joint Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse,’ 14 September 1986. The President. Good evening. Usually, I talk with you from my office in the West Wing of the White House. But tonight there’s something special to talk about, and I’ve asked someone very special to join me. Nancy and I are here in the West Hall of the White House, and around us are the rooms in which we live. … Nancy’s joining me because the message this evening is not my mes‑ sage but ours. And we speak to you not simply as fellow citizens but as fellow parents and grandparents and as concerned neighbors … So tonight, from our family to yours, from our home to yours, thank you for joining us. … From the early days of our administration, Nancy has been intensely involved in the effort to fight drug abuse … Her personal observations and efforts have given her such dramatic insights that I wanted her to share them with you this evening. Mrs.  Reagan. Thank you. As a mother, I’ve always thought of Sep‑ tember as a special month, a time when we bundled our children off to school, to the warmth of an environment in which they could fulfill the promise and hope in those restless minds. But so much has happened over these last years, so much to shake the foundations of all that we

Document 153 know and all that we believe in. Today there’s a drug and alcohol abuse epidemic in this country, and no one is safe from it – not you, not me, and certainly not our children, because this epidemic has their names written on it. Many of you may be thinking: ‘Well, drugs don’t concern me.’ But it does concern you. … Drugs steal away so much. They take and take, until finally every time a drug goes into a child, something else is forced out – like love and hope and trust and confidence. Drugs take away the dream from every child’s heart and replace it with a nightmare, and it’s time we in America stand up and replace those dreams. Each of us has to put our principles and consciences on the line, whether in social settings or in the workplace, to set forth solid standards and stick to them. There’s no moral middle ground. Indifference is not an option. … Our young people are helping us lead the way. Not long ago, in Oakland, California, I was asked by a group of children what to do if they were offered drugs, and I answered, ‘Just say no.’ Soon after that, those children in Oakland formed a Just Say No club, and now there are over 10,000 such clubs all over the country. Well, their participation and their courage in saying no needs our encouragement. … Our job is never easy because drug criminals are ingenious. They work everyday to plot a new and better way to steal our children’s lives, just as they’ve done by developing this new drug, crack. For every door that we close, they open a new door to death … It’s up to us to change attitudes and just simply dry up their markets. … [T]o my young friends out there: Life can be great, but not when you can’t see it. So, open your eyes to life: to see it in the vivid colors that God gave us as a precious gift to His children, to enjoy life to the fullest, and to make it count. Say yes to your life. And when it comes to drugs and alcohol just say no. The President. I think you can see why Nancy has been such a positive influence on all that we’re trying to do … Nancy’s personal crusade, like that of so many other wonderful individuals, should become our national crusade. It must include a combination of government and private efforts which complement one another. … I will announce tomorrow a series of new proposals for a drug‑free America. Taken as a whole, these proposals will toughen our laws against drug criminals, encourage more research and treatment, and ensure that illegal drugs will not be tolerated in our schools or in our workplaces. … Your government will continue to act aggressively, but nothing would be more effective than for Americans simply to quit using illegal drugs. We seek to create a massive change in national attitudes which ultimately

154 The Reagan Revolution will separate the drugs from the customer, to take the user away from the supply. … Drug abuse is a repudiation of everything America is. The destruc‑ tiveness and human wreckage mock our heritage. Think for a moment how special it is to be an American. Can we doubt that only a divine provi‑ dence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people on the world who yearn to breathe free? The revolution out of which our liberty was conceived signaled an his‑ torical call to an entire world seeking hope. Each new arrival of immigrants rode the crest of that hope. They came, millions seeking a safe harbor from the oppression of cruel regimes … They all came to taste the air redolent and rich with the freedom that is ours. What an insult it will be to what we are and whence we came if we do not rise up together in defiance against this cancer of drugs. And there’s one more thing. The freedom that so many seek in our land has not been preserved without a price. Nancy and I shared that remem‑ brance 2 years ago at the Normandy American Cemetery in France. In the still of that June afternoon, we walked together among the soldiers of freedom, past the hundreds of white markers which are monuments to courage and memorials to sacrifice. Too many of these and other such graves are the final resting places of teenagers who became men in the roar of battle. Look what they gave to us who live. Never would they see another sunlit day glistening off a lake or river back home or miles of corn push‑ ing up against the open sky of our plains. The pristine air of our moun‑ tains and the driving energy of our cities are theirs no more. Nor would they ever again be a son to their parents or a father to their own children. They did this for you, for me, for a new generation to carry our demo‑ cratic experiment proudly forward. Well, that’s something I think we’re obliged to honor, because what they did for us means that we owe as a simple act of civic stewardship to use our freedom wisely for the com‑ mon good. As we mobilize for this national crusade, I’m mindful that drugs are a constant temptation for millions. Please remember this when your courage is tested: You are Americans. You’re the product of the freest society man‑ kind has ever known. No one, ever, has the right to destroy your dreams and shatter your life … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL.

Document 155 Document 15: Herblock, ‘It Didn’t Happen’ cartoon, Washington Post, 21 May 1987.

Figure 8.4 ‘It Didn’t Happen’ cartoon, Washington Post, 21 May 1987 Source: Courtesy A 1987 Herblock Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation

Document 16: Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks on East‑West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, West Germany,’ 12 June 1987. … We come to Berlin, we American Presidents, because it’s our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. … Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guardtowers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same – still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state … Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar.

156 The Reagan Revolution … In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State … George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall plan. … In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder … The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the stand‑ ard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled. … In the 1950’s, Khrushchev predicted: ‘We will bury you.’ But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well‑being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind ‑ too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Free‑ dom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness … Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that free‑ dom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Sec‑ retary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! … [W]e in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS‑20 nuclear missiles, capable of‑striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counterdeploy‑ ment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Sovi‑ ets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counterdeployment, there were difficult days–days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city–and the Soviets later walked away from the table.

Document 157 But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who pro‑ tested then – I invite those who protest today – to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. … While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative‑research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. … [T]he Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that separate people, to create a safer, freer world. … As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray‑painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner, ‘This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality.’ Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it can‑ not withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL. Document 17: Senator Edward Kennedy, ‘Robert Bork’s America,’ 1 July 1987. … I oppose the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, and I urge the Senate to reject it. … Mr. Bork … stands for an extremist view of the Constitution and the role of the Supreme Court that would have placed him outside the main‑ stream of American constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960’s, let  alone the 1980’s. He opposed the Public Accommodations Civil Rights Act of 1964. He opposed the one‑man one‑vote decision of the Supreme Court the same year. He has said that the first amendment applies only to politi‑ cal speech, not literature or works of art or scientific expression. Under the twin pressures of academic rejection and the prospect of Sen‑ ate rejection, Mr.  Bork subsequently retracted the most neanderthal of these views on civil rights and the first amendment. But his mindset is no less ominous today.

158 The Reagan Revolution Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced into back‑alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers and artists would be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individual rights that are the heart of our democracy. America is a better and freer Nation than Robert Bork thinks. … The damage that President Reagan will do through this nomination, if it is not rejected by the Senate, could live on far beyond the end of his Presidential term. President Reagan is still our President. But he should not be able to reach out from the muck of Irangate, reach into the muck of Watergate, and impose his reactionary vision of the Constitution on the Supreme Court and on the next generation of Americans. No justice would be better than this injustice … Congressional Record – Senate, 1 July 1987, pp 18518‑19. Document 18: Nellie Gray Letter to Ronald Reagan, 18 September 1987. … Once again, on you alone rests the fate of some 10,000 preborn broth‑ ers and sisters; you shall soon sign a bill to either save them or kill them with tax dollars. I urge you to save them, as you have often promised to do. … Last year, I implored you repeatedly to veto D.C. Appropriations, but you signed the bill, anyway, and again gave about $2,000,000 to the D.C. Government to slaughter another 10,000 preborn babies. On January 22, 1987, during our phone conversation between the White House and the Ellipse in the midst of the snowstorm, I again asked you to veto this FY‑88 D.C. Bill. Later that afternoon, at the meeting in the White House, I asked your Budget Director, James C. Miller, to assure that no tax moneys be used for abortions in the District of Columbia. … You say that you need a ‘line‑item veto.’ No, Mr.  President, you do not, because if a bill pays one cent of blood money, the whole bill is so bad that you have a duty to veto it. This applies even if your veto delays funds for the whole government, because you cannot agree to kill a preborn child, even under heavy political pressure. Your veto will be sustained, but your duty to veto is the same even if Congress were to override your veto. … [Y]ou continue to promote stultifying cross‑purposes, as grassroots prolife volunteers work to protect all preborn children, and members of

Document 159 the Executive and Legislative Branches work for their own loopholes to give some preborn children to abortionists. Note, also, that the House has already voted to stop all funds for abortions in D.C., and it is unten‑ able for any prolifer, including you, Mr. President, to now insist on giving some preborn children back to abortionists to kill with impunity and tax dollars. Mr. President, I have heard your words many times, and I am sure you want to protect the preborn children in our country. However, it seems from my work and observation, and from the agenda and dialogue at the January 22 meetings in the White House, that your staff do not keep you properly informed about prolife matters and the work your Administra‑ tion should do to support the efforts of grassroots prolife volunteers. Thus, for years, you and your staff have put the life‑and‑death of preborn human beings so far on the back burner … Time after time your Administration has told preborn children to wait, while you focus on some favorite politi‑ cal agenda items. And, then, some of your staff have tried unsuccessfully to characterize your work on economic matters as good for preborn children and their parents … You and your staff would not even acknowledge pro‑ lifers pleading to you from across this nation. One new reason seemed to be that staff was busy with your trip to Reykjavik. … Mr. Reagan, you want to be known as a ‘Peace’ President, and are pleased with Soviet Union agreements, which you announced today. You will remove weapons, which have not killed anyone. I understand; I am pleased. You denounce foreign nations for not having a democracy and freedom, for denying civil rights, for violence against innocent people, and for aggression in distant lands. I understand; I am pleased … You talk about peace, freedom, civil rights, prolife, but your actions ignore your personal, campaign and official promises to work against the gory violence of abortion. Mr. Reagan, it is frustrating that your wrong actions for abortion con‑ tinue to provoke to the point where I, a grassroots prolife volunteer, must remind you once more of your duty to stop contributing to killing preborn children in America … So, now, Mr. President, turn your prolife talk into right prolife action. Stand strong … Do not weaken and succumb to politi‑ cal pressure to approve just ‘a little bit of abortion’ … The task is easy, because you know that you are saving babies from [the] pain of abortion … Papers of Mariam Bell, Box 1, OA 17955. Reprinted with the permis‑ sion of the RRPL.

160 The Reagan Revolution Document 19: Gran Fury, ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ poster, 1988.

Figure 8.5 Gran Fury, ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ poster, 1988 Source: Courtesy Gran Fury https://www.granfury.org/

Document 161 Document 20: Ronald Reagan, ‘Farewell Address to the Nation,’ 11 January 1989. … I’ve been reflecting on what the past 8 years have meant and mean. And the image that comes to mind like a refrain is a nautical one – a small story about a big ship, and a refugee, and a sailor. It was back in the early eighties, at the height of the boat people. And the sailor was hard at work on the carrier Midway, which was patrolling the South China Sea. The sailor, like most American servicemen, was young, smart, and fiercely observant. The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat. And crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping to get to America. The Midway sent a small launch to bring them to the ship and safety. As the refugees made their way through the choppy seas, one spied the sailor on deck, and stood up, and called out to him. He yelled, ‘Hello, American sailor. Hello, freedom man.’ … [T]hat’s what it was to be an American in the 1980’s. We stood, again, for freedom. I know we always have, but in the past few years the world again – and in a way, we ourselves – rediscovered it. … The way I see it, there were two great triumphs, two things that I’m proudest of. One is the economic recovery … The other is the recovery of our morale. America is respected again in the world and looked to for leadership. … Well, back in 1980, when I was running for President, it was all so different. Some pundits said our programs would result in catastrophe. Our views on foreign affairs would cause war. Our plans for the economy would cause inflation to soar and bring about economic collapse … The fact is, what they called ‘radical’ was really ‘right.’ What they called ‘dan‑ gerous’ was just ‘desperately needed.’ And in all of that time I won a nickname, ‘The Great Communicator.’ But I never thought it was my style or the words I used that made a differ‑ ence: it was the content … They called it the Reagan revolution. Well, I’ll accept that, but for me it always seemed more like the great rediscovery, a rediscovery of our values and our common sense. … Common sense also told us that to preserve the peace, we’d have to become strong again after years of weakness and confusion. So, we rebuilt our defenses, and this New Year we toasted the new peacefulness around the globe. Not only have the superpowers actually begun to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons – and hope for even more progress is bright – but the regional conflicts that rack the globe are also beginning to cease. The Persian Gulf is no longer a war zone. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan. … The lesson of all this was, of course, that because we’re a great nation, our challenges seem complex. It will always be this way. But as long as we remember our first principles and believe in ourselves, the future will always be ours.

162 The Reagan Revolution … Ours was the first revolution in the history of mankind that truly reversed the course of government, and with three little words: ‘We the People’ … Our Constitution is a document in which ‘We the People’ tell the government what it is allowed to do. ‘We the People’ are free. This belief has been the underlying basis for everything I’ve tried to do these past 8 years. … Nothing is less free than pure communism – and yet we have, the past few years, forged a satisfying new closeness with the Soviet Union. I’ve been asked if this isn’t a gamble, and my answer is no because we’re basing our actions not on words but deeds. … My view is that President Gorbachev is different from previous Soviet leaders. I think he knows some of the things wrong with his society and is trying to fix them. We wish him well. And we’ll continue to work to make sure that the Soviet Union that eventually emerges from this process is a less threatening one. What it all boils down to is this: I want the new closeness to continue. And it will, as long as we make it clear that we will continue to act in a certain way as long as they continue to act in a helpful manner … It’s still trust but verify. … I’ve been asked if I have any regrets. Well, I do. The deficit is one. I’ve been talking a great deal about that lately, but tonight isn’t for arguments, and I’m going to hold my tongue. I’ve had my share of victories in the Congress, but what few people noticed is that I never won anything you didn’t win for me … You won every battle with every call you made and letter you wrote demanding action. Well, action is still needed. If we’re to finish the job, Reagan’s regiments will have to become the Bush brigades. … Finally, there is a great tradition of warnings in Presidential farewells, and I’ve got one that’s been on my mind for some time. But oddly enough it starts with one of the things I’m proudest of in the past 8 years: the resurgence of national pride that I called the new patriotism. This national feeling is good, but it won’t count for much, and it won’t last unless it’s grounded in thoughtfulness and knowledge. An informed patriotism is what we want. … I’ve spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don’t know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind‑swept, God‑blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That’s how I saw it, and see it still. And how stands the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more secure, and happier than it was 8 years ago. But more than that: After 200

Document 163 years, two centuries, she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow has held steady no matter what storm. And she’s still a bea‑ con, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home. We’ve done our part. And as I walk off into the city streets, a final word to the men and women of the Reagan revolution, the men and women across America who for 8 years did the work that brought America back. My friends: We did it. We weren’t just marking time. We made a difference. We made the city stronger, we made the city freer, and we left her in good hands. All in all, not bad, not bad at all … Reprinted with the permission of the RRPL.

Glossary

Brezhnev Doctrine: A USSR foreign policy which decreed that a threat to communist rule in any Eastern Bloc country in Central and Eastern Europe would prompt a response, including militarily, from the Soviet Union. Outlined in 1968 by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU. Renounced in 1989 by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU. Busing: The practice of transporting students inside and outside their school district to address racial imbalances in schools. In 1971, the Supreme Court found busing for desegregation purposes to be con‑ stitutional. Busing was extremely controversial, triggering at least 40 riots in Boston, Massachusetts between 1974 and 1976. Centrist Democrats: Also known as New Democrats or Clinton Demo‑ crats. A faction which dominated the Democratic Party from the late 1980s to the late 2010s and remained powerful thereafter. Emerged in response to Republican presidential victories in 1984 and 1988. Characterized as liberal on social issues but conservative on economic issues, sometimes referred to as supply‑side liberalism. Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and Barack Obama are associated with this faction. Culture wars: Conflict over cultural values, with people usually divid‑ ing along religious and ideological lines over issues including but not limited to abortion, sexuality, gun control, and prayer in school. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and conservative Republicans brought these conflicts into the political mainstream and culture war clashes have been a mainstay of electoral contests ever since. Détente: The easing of tensions between countries through dialogue, diplomacy, policy cooperation, and the acceptance of peaceful coex‑ istence. The foreign policy approach toward the USSR adopted by US Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. Led to the signing in 1972 of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti‑Ballistic Missile Treaty. This was the first time in the Cold War the superpowers agreed to limit nuclear weapons. Détente began in

166 Glossary approximately 1969 and ended in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Eastern Bloc: Central and Eastern European communist countries that were forcibly aligned with the Soviet Union from approximately 1945 to 1990. Included East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and others. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 formalized the mili‑ tary and strategic nature of this relationship. Eastern Establishment: See Rockefeller Republican. Equal Rights Amendment (ERA): An amendment to the US Constitu‑ tion first introduced to Congress in 1923 which guaranteed equality of rights under the law for all citizens regardless of sex. Ratification was a key goal for second‑wave feminists in the long 1960s. The ERA passed Congress and was sent to the states in 1972 but was defeated because of the organized opposition of Phyllis Schlafly and other moral tradi‑ tionalists. Reagan opposed the ERA. Gender gap: The difference in the number of men and women who voted for a candidate. Since the 1980 election, women have usually voted for Democratic presidential candidates at higher rates than men. Glasnost: Transparency. As part of the reforms pursued by Gorbachev in the mid‑to‑late 1980s, the USSR moved toward open discussion of social problems. This began to be interpreted as freedom of speech and a freer press. It played a part in the erosion of the CPSU’s power and authority. See also perestroika. Great Society: A set of liberal domestic policies and laws pursued by President Lyndon Johnson between 1964 and 1968. These aimed to eliminate poverty and racial injustice and improve the broader stand‑ ard of living. Almost 200 pieces of legislation passed, many of which were landmark bills. New federal programs were created to address issues including but not limited to civil rights, education, healthcare, poverty, urban decay, the environment, and the arts. The War on Pov‑ erty was part of the Great Society. Hawk: With reference to foreign policy, a hawk was an individual who supported a strong and assertive military and national security policy. This did not always equal support for military engagements and war. Keynesian economics: Theory associated with British economist John Maynard Keynes and influenced by the Great Depression of the 1930s. Keynesian economics focused on total spending in the economy and its impact on issues such as employment and inflation. In the post‑WWII period, Keynesians believed that careful government interventions could ensure consistent economic growth and prevent downturns. This set of theories shaped the economies of the US, UK, Canada, and Australia.

Glossary 167 Law and order politics: Political rhetoric that emphasized the need to be ‘tough on crime’ because of perceived social disorder, referencing the crime rate and/or civil unrest and social protest. Legislative solu‑ tions included increased policing, tougher sentencing, and high rates of incarceration, which disproportionately impacted minority commu‑ nities. These tropes, also described as a politics of fear, were deployed by George Wallace and Nixon in the 1968 election and by numerous subsequent politicians. Closely associated with the war on drugs. Laissez‑faire capitalism: Leave alone or hands off. An economic policy where there are either no government interventions, or extremely lim‑ ited government interventions, in the economy or market. Long 1960s: In the US, the period from approximately 1954 to the early 1970s, often periodized as beginning with Brown v. Board of Educa‑ tion and ending with the Paris Peace Accords or Watergate. A turbu‑ lent period of profound social, cultural, and political change, marked by movements for equality and rights, protests and riots, the Vietnam War, and the start of party realignment. Modern Republicanism: An approach developed by President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s that charted a ‘middle way’ between liberals and conservatives. Eisenhower championed individual initiative and the market economy but also believed government must play a role in preserving liberty and rights. He rejected conservative calls to roll back the New Deal. Neoconservatives: Hawkish anti‑communist Democrats who rejected their party’s criticism of the Vietnam War and began to move into the Republican Party, although they also rejected détente. Famously claimed to be liberals who had been ‘mugged by reality.’ Neoliberalism: An ideology that advocated laissez‑faire capitalism, decreased size and role for the government, reduced government budg‑ ets and social welfare systems, broad deregulation of industry, and freedom of trade and capital. A set of economic theories that emerged in the mid‑twentieth century in Europe. In the US context, a reaction to the big government liberalism of the New Deal and the Great Soci‑ ety. Neoliberal views were embraced and implemented by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s, and aspects were eventually adopted by both sides of politics. Closely related to supply‑side economics. New Deal: A set of liberal domestic policies introduced by Democratic President Franklin Delano Roosevelt between 1933 and 1938 that were a response to the economic turmoil and high unemployment of the Great Depression. A combination of short‑term forms of economic relief, public works projects, and broader structural reforms across the

168 Glossary economy, including in banking, agriculture, industry, and labor. Also saw the establishment of entitlement programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance. New Deal Democrats: Also known as the New Deal coalition. This coa‑ lition included Southern Whites, African Americans, religious and ethnic minorities, union and blue‑collar workers, farmers, and intel‑ lectuals. In effect from 1932 into the 1970s. New Right: The conservative movement that emerged in the 1960s around the Republican presidential campaign of Senator Barry Gold‑ water. In the late 1970s, the label was claimed by a group including Richard Viguerie, Howard Phillips, Paul Weyrich, and Terry Dolan, who established think tanks, publications, direct mail companies, and lobbying and political action organizations. The New Right embraced neoliberal economic and governmental policies, internationalist and anti‑communist foreign policies, and socially conservative stances on an array of domestic matters. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): An alliance established in 1949 between the US, Canada, and Western European countries which was intended to contain the Soviet Union. Central to the agreement was ‘collective defense,’ wherein an armed attack against one NATO country was understood as an attack against all member nations, each of which would take whatever action they deemed necessary to assist the attacked nation. Nuclear freeze: A global and domestic social movement seeking to end the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR. Called for an end to the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. The movement grew rapidly in the early 1980s in response to Reagan’s rhetoric, his insistence on modernizing and increasing the existing US nuclear arsenal, and the deployment of US weapons in NATO coun‑ tries in late 1983. Originalism: A theory of how legal texts, particularly the US Constitu‑ tion, should be interpreted. Argued that judges must assess texts as they would have been understood at the time they were written. This conservative legal jurisprudence emerged in response to the alleged liberalism of the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. Associated with scholar and jurist Robert Bork. Perestroika: Restructuring. The economic, political, and social reforms pursued by Gorbachev in the mid‑to‑late 1980s. Intended to revital‑ ize the USSR’s dire economic situation by increasing investment and decreasing military expenditures. The overarching goal was to improve the lives of Soviet citizens. Reagan Democrats: Name given to White working‑class voters, particu‑ larly in the North, who supported some elements of the Democratic

Glossary 169 agenda but questioned the social liberalism of the party. The phrase referenced Reagan’s broad popularity across party lines. Reagan Doctrine: The Reagan administration’s foreign policy commit‑ ment to supporting anti‑communist forces around the globe with the goal of containing and eventually reversing the influence of the USSR. Underpinned US interventions in countries such as Grenada, Nicara‑ gua, and Afghanistan. Religious Right: Also known as the Christian Right. An informal coali‑ tion of conservative religious people organized around social issues rather than doctrinal beliefs. In the 1980s, this was chiefly an alli‑ ance between conservative Christians, particularly fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons. The Religious Right was supported practically and symbolically by members of the New Right, who saw the energization of social and religious conservatives as central to their political efforts. Rockefeller Republicans: Also known as the Eastern Establishment. Repub‑ lican liberals and moderates who endorsed Eisenhower’s Modern Republicanism, were liberal on social issues, supported big business and balanced budgets, and rejected laissez‑faire economic policies. The phrase references Nelson Rockefeller. In the 1980s, moderate Senate Republicans included but were not limited to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, Bob Packwood, Lowell Weicker, and Arlen Specter. Secular humanism: A philosophy that elevated human reason, logic, and rationality over religious doctrines. The Religious Right condemned this philosophy for placing humanity rather than God at the center of all things. Conservative religious people blamed secular humanism for many of the social and spiritual changes that emerged out of the long 1960s, particularly the legalization of abortion. Sino‑Soviet split: The deteriorating relationship and increasing competi‑ tion between the two major Cold War communist powers, the People’s Republic of China and the USSR. In the early 1960s, Chinese leaders publicly denounced the Soviets as social imperialists and revisionists. This schism was exploited by Nixon in the early 1970s and under‑ pinned Reagan’s stance toward China in the 1980s. Social conservatives: Also known as moral traditionalists. Conservatives with an ideological focus on spiritual and socio‑cultural concerns. In the 1970s and 1980s, social conservatives opposed abortion, femi‑ nism, gay rights, pornography, and busing. They supported prayer in school, abstinence‑only sex education, tax‑exempt status for private religious schools, and ‘traditional family values.’ Moral Majority and other Religious Right groups were socially conservative, as were many single‑issue organizations.

170 Glossary Social issues: A catch‑all term popular in the 1970s and 1980s to describe non‑economic and non‑foreign policy concerns. Frequently a short‑ hand to reference the issues that mobilized social conservatives. Southern strategy: An electoral approach whereby some Republicans stoked racial resentment toward African Americans. The initial goal was to court the votes of Southern White Democrats who were hostile to the civil rights movement. Closely associated with Nixon. States’ rights: The political powers reserved for state governments in a federal system. The phrase in the US has a fraught history, used in the Southern states to justify first slavery, then the disenfranchisement and segregation of African Americans, and then the often‑violent White resistance to desegregation and Black voting rights. Statism: The centralization of power and authority in the national gov‑ ernment, typically associated with communist countries. Conserva‑ tives claimed that New Deal and Great Society policies were statist. Supply‑side economics: Also known as Reaganomics. Economic theory which argues that growth is best supported by increasing the produc‑ tion and supply of goods via reducing taxes and government regula‑ tion and supporting free trade. Closely related to neoliberalism. Vietnam syndrome: After the Vietnam War ended in 1973, most politi‑ cians believed that Americans would not support US military interven‑ tions and engagements overseas and that the public were essentially anti‑interventionist. War on drugs: A government campaign aimed at reducing the trade in illegal drugs in the US. The term was popularized in 1971 by Nixon and the war on drugs was reinvigorated in the 1980s by Reagan. First Lady Nancy Reagan began the ‘Just Say No’ campaign. In the late twentieth century, the domestic war on drugs relied primarily on puni‑ tive policing and carceral approaches, including mandatory sentencing laws. It disproportionately impacted minority communities. War on poverty: See Great Society. Watergate: A major series of political scandals from 1972 to 1974 that dominated Nixon’s abbreviated second term. Triggered after five bur‑ glars who were associated with the Nixon re‑election campaign were arrested for breaking into the Democratic National Committee head‑ quarters in the Watergate hotel complex in Washington, DC. Nixon was not directly implicated in the crimes committed prior to the bur‑ glary but participated in the internal cover‑up. He resigned rather than be impeached by Congress.

Guide to Further Reading

Memoirs, Personal Writing, and Speeches Reagan authored two memoirs with ghost writers: Ronald Reagan and Richard Hubler, Where’s the Rest of Me? The Ronald Reagan Story (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965); and Ronald Reagan and Robert Lindsey, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). Col‑ lections of Reagan’s personal writing include: Douglas Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2007); and Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (eds), Reagan: A Life in Let‑ ters (New York: Free Press, 2003). Reagan also shaped a collection of his public oratory: Ronald Reagan, Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). Administration Insiders Many members of the Reagan Cabinet or White House wrote mem‑ oirs. Significant accounts published in the 1980s include: Martin Ander‑ son, Revolution (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Jonavich, 1988); Michael Deaver, Behind the Scenes (New York: William Morrow, 1987); Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmil‑ lan, 1984); Donald Regan, For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Jonavich, 1988); and David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (New York: Harper and Row, 1986). Key perspectives published post‑presidency include: Edwin Meese, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington: Reg‑ nery Gateway, 1992); Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era (New York: Random House, 1990); and George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993).

172 Guide to Further Reading Biographies There are hundreds of Reagan biographies. A definitive and still highly influential work was published shortly after he left office: Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). Other important accounts include: Max Boot, Reagan: His Life and Legend (New York: W.W. Norton, 2024); H.W. Brands, Reagan: The Life (New York: Doubleday, 2015); Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005); and Bob Spitz, Reagan: An American Journey (New York: Penguin, 2018). The most controversial, experimental, and poorly received biography is the one Reagan personally commissioned: Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1999). Reagan’s Political Journey Before the White House Reagan’s embrace of conservatism is explored in: Thomas Evans, The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years and the Untold Story of His Conversion to Conservatism (New York: Columbia Univer‑ sity Press, 2006). Reagan’s time as California governor is chronicled in: Lou Cannon, Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2003); and Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics (New York: Free Press, 2000). The 1980 Election Books which analyze the 1980 election as a historical turning point include: Andrew Busch, Reagan’s Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); and Jeffrey Howison, The 1980 Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement (New York: Routledge, 2014). Edited Collections on Reagan Edited collections on Reagan’s presidency are an excellent resource, offer‑ ing an array of policy perspectives and case studies that nuance under‑ standing of Reagan’s conservatism and leadership. Particularly influential ones include: W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham (eds), The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Cheryl Hudson and Gareth Davies (eds), Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Andrew Johns (ed.), A Companion to

Guide to Further Reading 173 Ronald Reagan (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2015); Paul Kengor and Peter Schweizer (eds), The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and His Legacy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Kyle Longley, Jeremy Mayer, Michael Schaller, and John Sloan (eds), Deconstructing Reagan: Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007); and Gil Troy and Vincent Cannato (eds), Living in the Eighties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). An important inter‑ vention into the historiography of US foreign policy and national security is found in: Jonathan Hunt and Simon Miles (eds), The Reagan Moment: America and the World in the 1980s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021). The 1980s Books that offer broader, non‑White House accounts of the history of the 1980s include: John Ehrman, The Eighties: America in the Age of Reagan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Andrew Hunt, We Begin Bomb‑ ing in Five Minutes: Late Cold War Culture in the Age of Reagan (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2021); Hayes Johnson, Sleepwalking Through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: Anchor Books, 1992); and Bradford Martin, The Other Eighties: A Secret History of Amer‑ ica in the Age of Reagan (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011). Reagan’s Presidency Compelling explorations of Reagan’s presidency include: Andrew Busch, Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Freedom (Lanham: Rowman and Little‑ field, 2001); Robert Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture in the Reagan Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Doug Rossinow, The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan‑Bush Era, 1980‑1992 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Gil Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 1974‑2008 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009). A lively sum‑ mary of the debates surrounding whether a ‘Reagan Revolution’ occurred can be found in: Gil Troy, The Reagan Revolution: A Very Short Introduc‑ tion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). African Americans and Conservatism An important history of African Americans in the Republican Party is con‑ tained in: Leah Rigueur, The Loneliness of the Black Republican: Pragmatic

174 Guide to Further Reading Politics and the Pursuit of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). A nuanced account of African American conservative ideology and politics is found in: Louis Prisock, African Americans in Conserva‑ tive Movements: The Inescapability of Race (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Scholarship on colorblind conservatism and racism is explored in: Amy Ansell, New Right, New Racism: Race and Reaction in the United States and Britain (New York: New York University Press, 1997); and Daniel Lucks, Reconsidering Reagan: Racism, Republicans, and the Road to Trump (Boston: Beacon Press, 2020). The New Right and the Republican Party An insider account from a key figure in the New Right is offered in: Richard Viguerie, The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead (Falls Church: Viguerie Co., 1980). An influential account of California conservatives in post‑WWII America is contained in: Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). A comprehensive history of the twentieth‑century Republican Party is found in: Donald Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). The conservative resurgence in the mid‑1970s is explored in: Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974‑1980 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010); and Rick Perlstein, Reaganland: America’s Right Turn 1976‑1980 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020). Overviews of conservatism before and after Reagan are found in: David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Prince‑ ton: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Kenneth Heineman, The Rise of Contemporary Conservatism in the United States (New York: Rout‑ ledge, 2019). Democrats in the 1980s Reflections from the most senior Democrat in the 1980s are found in: Tip O’Neill, Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O’Neill (New York: Random House, 1987). Histories of Congressional Democrats are explored in: Patrick Andelic, Donkey Work: Congressional Democrats in Conservative America, 1974‑1994 (La Vergne: University Press of Kansas, 2019); and Karl Brandt, Ronald Reagan and the House Democrats: Gridlock, Partisanship, and the Fiscal Crisis (Columbia: Uni‑ versity of Missouri Press, 2009). An exploration of centrist Democrats is offered in: Michael Meeropol, Surrender: How the Clinton Administration Completed the Reagan Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

Guide to Further Reading 175 Social Conservatism Research exploring the uses of ‘family values’ rhetoric includes: Melinda Cooper, Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Con‑ servatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Seth Dowland, Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right (Philadelphia: Univer‑ sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); and Robert Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012). Scholarship on the anti‑abortion movement in the 1980s is found in: Pru‑ dence Flowers, The Right‑to‑Life Movement, the Reagan Administration, and the Politics of Abortion (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Key histories of gender, sexuality, and conservatism are explored in: Catherine Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage Through the Rise of the New Right (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Donald Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Neil Young, Coming Out Republican: A History of the Gay Right (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2024). The Religious Right Explorations of the Religious Right’s goals and worldview are found in: Sara Diamond, Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right (Lon‑ don: Pluto, 1989); and Michael Lienesch, Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right (Chapel Hill: University of North Car‑ olina Press, 1993). Political histories of religious conservatism are explored in: Daniel Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Neil Young, We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Reaganomics A useful overview of Reagan’s fiscal policies is offered in: John Sloan, The Reagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). Analysis of deregulation and tax cuts is contained in: Barry Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan‑Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential Influence (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); and Monica Prasad, Starving the Beast: Ronald Reagan and the Tax Cut Revolution (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2018). A detailed account of the 1981 PATCO strike is offered in: Joseph McCa‑ rtin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

176 Guide to Further Reading The anti‑welfare policies that were central to Reaganomics are explored in: Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). The War on Drugs Several recent works of history explore the policies and consequences of the war on drugs, including: David Farber, Crack: Rock Cocaine, Street Capitalism, and the Decade of Greed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); David Farber (ed.), The War on Drugs: A History (New York: New York University Press, 2022); and Matthew Lassiter, The Sub‑ urban Crisis: White America and the War on Drugs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023). HIV/AIDS An influential perspective written at the highpoint of the crisis is: Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). Important interventions into the his‑ tory of AIDS include: Emma Day, In Her Hands: Women’s Fight against AIDS in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2023); Deborah Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight against AIDS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Paul Renfro, The Life and Death of Ryan White: AIDS and Inequality in America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2024). Political and policy responses to AIDS are explored in: Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: US Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Nuclear Freeze Research into the political and social movement opposed to the arms race is contained in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, and the Cold War of the 1980s (Cam‑ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Henry Maar, Freeze!: The Grassroots Movement to Halt the Arms Race and End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021). Reagan and the Cold War Insider accounts that offer rich insights into US‑Soviet relations include: Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995); and Jack

Guide to Further Reading 177 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004). Explorations of the end of détente and Reagan’s first term are found in: Aaron Donaghy, The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni‑ versity Press, 2021); and Taylor Downing, 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink (London: Little Brown, 2018). Accounts focusing on Reagan’s later Cold War policies include: Archie Brown, The Human Fac‑ tor: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Beth Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997); Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Simon Miles, Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021). A deconstruction of the hagiographic tendency in American Cold War historiography is offered in: Beth Fischer, The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan’s Cold War Legacy (Lexing‑ ton: University Press of Kentucky, 2020). Latin America Accounts which explore the complexity of US relations with its Western Hemisphere neighbors include: Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Theresa Keeley, Reagan’s Gun‑Toting Nuns: The Catholic Conflict over Cold War Human Rights Policy in Central America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020); William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977‑1992, ebook (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Eline van Ommen, Nicaragua Must Survive: Sandinista Revolutionary Diplomacy in the Global Cold War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2023); and Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). Foreign Policy and National Security An insightful text that complicates historical understandings about the Thatcher‑Reagan dynamic is found in: James Cooper, A Diplomatic Meeting: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Art of Summitry (Lexington: Uni‑ versity Press of Kentucky, 2021). Explorations of the US‑NATO relation‑ ship include: Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022); and Ralph Dietl, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO

178 Guide to Further Reading Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks, 1981‑1988 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018). Useful overviews of Reagan’s foreign policy, national secu‑ rity, and defense concerns are outlined in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds), Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981‑1989 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017); Rasmus Søn‑ dergaard, Reagan, Congress, and Human Rights: Contesting Morality in US Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Jesús Velasco, Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); and Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). US actions in the Middle East are historicized in: Nicholas Laham, Crossing the Rubicon: Ronald Reagan and US Policy in the Middle East (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); and Patrick Sloyan, When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2019). America’s involvement in Afghani‑ stan is historicized in: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). Iran‑Contra Affair Influential early accounts of the scandal include: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984‑1988 (New York: Collins, 1988); and Lawrence Walsh, Firewall: The Iran‑Contra Conspiracy and Cover‑Up (New York: Norton, 1997). An important scholarly intervention drawing on declassified materials is: Malcolm Byrne, Iran‑Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014). Conservative Mythologization of Reagan Insightful explorations of Reagan’s status among conservatives are found in: Will Bunch, Tear Down This Myth: The Right‑Wing Distortion of the Reagan Legacy (New York: Free Press, 2009); and Marcus Witcher, Get‑ ting Right with Reagan: The Struggle for True Conservatism, 1980‑2016 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2019).

References

Books and Book Chapters Adamson, Michael (2015) ‘Reagan and the Economy: Business and Labor, De‑ regulation and Regulation’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.), A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 149–66. Alexander, Michelle (2012) The New Jim Crow: Incarceration in the Age of Color‑ blindness. New York: New Press. Bailey, Christopher (1988) The Republican Party in the US Senate, 1974‑84: Party Change and Institutional Development. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Bjerre‑Poulsen, Niels (2008) ‘The Road to Mount Rushmore: The Conservative Commemoration Crusade for Ronald Reagan’ in Hudson, Cheryl and Davies, Gareth (eds) Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 209–27. Brands, H.W. (2015) Reagan: A Life. New York: Doubleday. Brennan, Mary (1995) Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Brinkley, Douglas (ed.) (2007) The Reagan Diaries. New York: Harper Collins. Brown, Archie (2020) The Human Factor: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Thatcher, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Brownlee, W. Elliot (2015) ‘“Reaganomics”: The Fiscal and Monetary Policies’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.) A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 131–48. Brownlee, W. Elliot and Graham, Hugh Davis (eds) (2003) The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Bunch, Clea (2015) ‘Reagan and the Middle East’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.) A Com‑ panion to Ronald Reagan. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 453–68. Byrne, Malcolm (2014) Iran‑Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Cannon, Lou (2000) President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Public Affairs. Critchlow, Donald (2003) ‘Mobilizing Women: The “Social Issues”’ in Brownlee, W. Elliot and Graham, Hugh Davis (eds) The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Con‑ servatism and Its Legacies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp. 293–326.

180 References Critchlow, Donald (2007) The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Critchlow, Donald (2008) Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade. Princeton: Princeton University Press. deLeon, Philip (1993) Thinking about Political Corruption. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Engel, Jeffrey (2014) ‘When George Bush Believed the Cold War Ended and Why That Mattered’ in Nelson, Michael and Perry, Barbara (eds) 41: Inside the Presi‑ dency of George W. Bush. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 100–21. Falwell, Jerry (1980) Listen America! New York: Double Day and Company. Farber, David (2019) Crack: Rock Cocaine, Street Capitalism, and the Decade of Greed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fischer, Beth (1997) The Reagan Reversal. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Fischer, Beth (2003) ‘Reagan and the Soviets: Winning the Cold War?’ in Brownlee, W. Elliot and Graham, Hugh Davis (eds) The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Con‑ servatism and Its Legacies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp. 113–32. Fischer, Beth (2020) The Myth of Triumphalism: Rethinking President Reagan’s Cold War Legacy. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Fleming, Daniel (2022) Living the Dream: The Contested History of Martin Luther King Jr. Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Flowers, Prudence (2019) The Right‑to‑Life Movement, the Reagan Administra‑ tion, and the Politics of Abortion. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Greenberg, David (2009) ‘The Reorientation of Liberalism in the 1980s’ in Troy, Gil and Cannato, Vincent (eds) Living in the Eighties. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 51–69. Hartman, Andrew (2015) A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayward, Steven (2001) The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964‑1980. Roseville: Forum. Hayward, Steven (2009) The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980‑1989. New York: Crown Forum. Head, Simon (2008) ‘Reagan, Nuclear Weapons, and the End of the Cold War’ in Hudson, Cheryl and Davies, Gareth (eds) Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Percep‑ tions, Policies, Legacies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 81–99. Heineman, Kenneth (2018) The Rise of Contemporary Conservatism in the United States. New York: Routledge. Hobsbawm, Eric (1994) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914‑1991. London: Abacus. Howison, Jeffrey (2014) The 1980 Presidential Election: Ronald Reagan and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement. New York: Routledge. Hunt, Andrew (2021) We Begin Bombing in Five Minutes: Late Cold War Culture in the Age of Reagan. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Hunter, James Davison (1991) Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books. Johns, Andrew (2015) ‘“To Grasp and Hold a Vision”: Ronald Reagan in Historical Perspective’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.) A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 1–6.

References 181 Keys, Barbara (2014) Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Klarman, Michael (2012) From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same‑Sex Marriage. New York: Oxford University Press. Lassiter, Matthew (2023) The Suburban Crisis: White America and the War on Drugs. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Leffler, Melvyn (2021) ‘Ronald Reagan and the Cold War’ in Hunt, Jonathan and Miles, Simon (eds), The Reagan Moment: America and the World in the 1980s. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 25–42. LeoGrande, William (2009) Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977‑1992, eBook. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Leuchtenburg, William (2015) The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton. New York: Oxford University Press. López, Ian (2014) Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Rein‑ vented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class. New York: Oxford University Press. Lowy, Joan (2003) Pat Schroeder: A Woman of the House. Alburquerque: Univer‑ sity of New Mexico Press. Lucks, Daniel (2020) Reconsidering Reagan: Racism, Republicans, and the Road to Trump. Boston: Beacon Press. Martin, Bradford (2011) The Other Eighties: A Secret History of America in the Age of Reagan. New York: Hill and Wang. Martin, William (1996) With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America. New York: Broadway Books. Massey, Douglas (2013) ‘Immigration Enforcement as a Race‑Making Institution’ in Card, David and Raphael, Steven (eds) Immigration, Poverty, and Socioeco‑ nomic Inequality. London: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 257–81. Maynard, Christopher (2015) ‘The Troika: James Baker III, Edwin Meese III and Michael Deaver’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.) A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Mal‑ den: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 529–45. Mieczkowski, Yanek (2015) ‘Reagan Runs: His Campaigns for the Presidency’ in Johns, Andrew (ed.) A Companion to Ronald Reagan. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 54–69. Pach, Chester (2003) ‘Sticking to His Guns: Reagan and National Security,’ in Brownlee, W. Elliot and Graham, Hugh Davis (eds) The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp. 85–112. Pemberton, William (1998) Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. Petro, Anthony (2015) After the Wrath of God: AIDS, Sexuality, and American Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. Phillips, Kevin (1990) The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath. New York: Random House. Phillips‑Fein, Kim (2009) ‘Reaganomics: The Rebirth of the Free Market’ in Troy, Gil and Cannato, Vincent (eds) Living in the Eighties. New York: Oxford University Press.

182 References Prisock, Louis (2018) African Americans in Conservative Movements: The Inescapability of Race. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Rossinow, Doug (2015) The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s. New York: Columbia University Press. Schaller, Michael (2007) ‘Reagan and the Cold War’ in Longley, Kyle, Mayer, Jer‑ emy, Schaller, Michael and Sloan, John (eds), Deconstructing Reagan: Conserva‑ tive Mythology and America’s Fortieth President. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 3–40. Schaller, Michael (2011) Ronald Reagan. New York: Oxford University Press. Schmidli, William (2021) ‘Reframing Human Rights: Reagan’s “Project Democ‑ racy” and the US Intervention in Nicaragua’ in Hunt, Jonathan and Miles, Simon (eds) The Reagan Moment: America and the World in the 1980s. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 237–59. Strub, Whitney (2010) Perversion for Profit: The Politics of Pornography and the Rise of the New Right. New York: Columbia University Press. Taylor, Jeff (2013) Politics on a Human Scale: The American Tradition of Decen‑ tralism. Lanham: Lexington Books. Thompson, Graham (2007) American Culture in the 1980s. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Troy, Gil (2005) Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Weisberg, Jacob (2016) Ronald Reagan. New York: Times Books. Wilentz, Sean (2009) The Age of Reagan, 1974‑2008. New York: Harper Perennial. Williams, Daniel (2010) God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right. New York: Oxford University Press. Witcher, Marcus (2019) Getting Right with Reagan: The Struggle for True Con‑ servatism, 1980‑2016. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Wittner, Lawrence (2017) ‘Peace Through Strength?: The Impact of the Antinu‑ clear Uprising on the Carter and Reagan Administrations’ in Conze, Eckart, Varon, Jeremy and Klimke, Martin (eds) Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Young, Lisa (2000) Feminists and Party Politics. Vancouver: UBC Press. Young, Neil (2015) We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Young, Neil (2024) Coming Out Republican: A History of the Gay Right. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Journal Articles Bagley, Bruce (1988) ‘US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure.’ Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (2/3): pp. 189– 212, doi:10.2307/165986 Brands, Hal and Palkki, David (2012) ‘“Conspiring Bastards”: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic View of the United States.’ Diplomatic History 36 (3): pp. 625–59, doi. org/10.1111/j.1467‑7709.2012.01045.x Graham, Hugh Davis (1998) ‘The Storm over Grove City College: Civil Rights Regulation, Higher Education, and the Reagan Administration.’ History of Edu‑ cation Quarterly 38 (4): pp. 407–29, doi:10.2307/369849

References 183 LeoGrande, William (1996) ‘Making the Economy Scream: US Economic Sanctions against Sandinista Nicaragua.’ Third World Quarterly 17 (2): pp.  329–48, doi. org/10.1080/01436599650035716 Pee, Robert and Lucas, Scott (2022) ‘Reevaluating Democracy Promotion: The Reagan Administration, Allied Authoritarian States, and Regime Change.’ Jour‑ nal of Cold War Studies 24 (3): pp. 151–99, doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01090 Robb, Thomas and Cooper, James (2023) ‘In Search of a Winning Strategy: Ronald Reagan’s First Term, 1981‑5.’ International History Review 45 (6): pp. 957–79, doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2023.2245848 Tal, David (2023) ‘An Arms Deal as a Bargaining Chip: Israel and the AWACS Deal.’ Diplomatic History 47 (4): pp. 674–95, doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhad028 Williams, Daniel (2011) ‘The GOP’s Abortion Strategy: Why Pro‑Choice Republi‑ cans Became Pro‑Life in the 1970s.’ Journal of Policy History 23 (4): pp. 513– 39, doi:10.1017/S0898030611000285 Zanoni, Amy (2023) ‘Remembering Welfare as We Knew It: Understanding Neo‑ liberalism Through Histories of Welfare.’ Journal of Policy History 31 (1): pp. 118–58, doi:10.1017/S0898030622000318 Newspaper and Magazine Articles Adams, Myra (2022) ‘Why Ron DeSantis can lead a modern “Reagan coalition” in 2024.’ The Hill, 18 November. Anderson, David (1987) ‘Anti‑abortion group withdraws award for Koop.’ UPI Archives, 27 March. Berger, Marilyn (2004) ‘Ronald Reagan dies at 93; Fostered Cold‑War might and curbs on government.’ New York Times, 6 June. Berke, Richard (1993) ‘Departing chairman scolds Republicans over “zealotry.”’ New York Times, 30 January. Bernstein, Richard (1983) ‘U.S. vetoes U.N. resolution “deploring” Grenada inva‑ sion.’ New York Times, 29 October. Beschloss, Michael (2016) ‘The ad that helped Reagan sell good times to an uncer‑ tain nation.’ New York Times, 7 May. Buckley, William (1982) ‘New tax bill means the collapse of Reaganomics.’ Boston Herald American, 27 July. Bunch, William (2009) ‘Obama, be like Reagan.’ Los Angeles Times, 22 January. Cannon, Lou (1986) ‘Reagan vows to pursue human rights, regional issues with Gorbachev.’ Washington Post, 7 October. Cannon, Lou and Getler, Michael (1983) ‘Reagan calls for “calm but firm” response.’ Washington Post, 4 September. Cawley, Janet and Campbell, Linda (1990) ‘Reagan hazy on Iran‑Contra: Knowl‑ edge of diversion is denied.’ Chicago Tribune, 23 February. Chavez, Lydia (1983) ‘U.S. advisers in Salvador: A delicate mission.’ New York Times, 26 May. Clines, Francis (1983) ‘Military of U.S. “standing tall,” Reagan asserts.’ New York Times, 13 December. Conservative Digest (1981). 7 (2), February. Curry, George (1988) ‘Reagan vetoes civil rights bill.’ Chicago Tribune, 17 March.

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Index

Note: Italic page numbers refer to figures. Able Archer 83 exercise 553948 abortion: ‘Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation’ (1983 article) 67; abortion‑neutral amendment and Civil Rights Restoration Act 96–7; anti‑abortion activity 16, 18, 24, 65–8, 66, 71, 73, 78, 79, 83, 94, 123; California’s Therapeutic Abortion Act (1967) 13, 16; Human Life Federalism Amendment 67; Nellie Gray Letter 158–9; Reagan administration 64–9, 78, 80–1, 83, 84; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5; Republican divisions over 15–16, 18, 64–7, 80, 81, 95, 120; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135– 7; The Silent Scream (1984 film) 67; Supreme Court 15, 18, 65, 67, 68, 93–5, 124; see also March for Life; Roe v. Wade (1973); social issues Adult Film Association of America 71; see also pornography affirmative action 14, 15, 19, 20, 93–6; Black Strategy memorandum 132–3 Afghanistan 22, 49, 50, 61–2; Farewell Address to the Nation 161–3; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148–50; see also Reagan Doctrine African Americans 11, 15, 19–21, 24, 26, 34, 40–2, 48, 71, 80, 82, 93–8, 115–16; Black Panther Party 13; Black Strategy memorandum

132–3; Martin Luther King Jr. Day 39–40; Robert Bork’s America speech 157–8; State of the Union (1985) 146–8; war on drugs 74–6; see also affirmative action; civil rights Agnew, Spiro 14 American Civil Liberties Union: Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5 An American Life (1990 autobiography) 116 Amin, Hafizullah 61 Anderson, John 23 Andropov, Yuri 101, 102 Anti‑Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) 52; see also détente Anti‑Drug Abuse Act (1986) 75; see also War on Drugs Atwater, Lee 20, 66, 116 Auchter, Thorne 35 AWACS aircraft 59–60; see also Saudia Arabia Baker, Howard 23, 31, 40, 93, 98, 108 Baker, James III: Black Strategy memorandum 132–3; Secretary of the Treasury 84–7; White House Chief of Staff 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 56, 71, 84 Bauer, Gary 79 Begin, Menachem 59; see also Israel Bennett, William 79 Biden, Joe 75, 94, 123

190 Index Blackwell, Morton 17, 37, 67, 69; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Boesky, Ivan 41 Boland Amendment 58, 89, 90; see also Iran‑Contra Affair Bork, Robert 68, 94–5, 98 Bradley, Bill 85 Brady, James 32 Brezhnev Doctrine 110 Brezhnev, Leonid 102 Buchanan, Pat 64, 76–7 Buckley, William, Jr. 38, 77; National Review 10 Bush, George H. W. 18, 23, 31, 33, 40, 55, 60, 64, 65, 92, 102; Farewell Address to the Nation 161–3; presidency 111, 112, 115, 117, 119–21 Bush, George W. 117–21 Canada 53, 87 Carlucci, Frank 47, 108 Carter, Jimmy 18, 29, 32, 73, 83; 1976 election 16; 1980 campaign 22–7; Black Strategy memorandum 132–3; foreign policy 21, 22, 26, 46, 47, 50, 55, 57, 58; human rights 21, 46; presidency, crises of 21–2 Casey, William 5, 26, 49, 90, 104 Catholics: 18, 57, 77, 83; church hierarchy 51, 67, 69, 83, 96–7; ‘consistent ethic of life’ 51; voters 18, 24, 65–6 Ceauşescu, Nicolae 111 Centers for Disease Control 76, 79, 80 Central Intelligence Agency 26, 49, 58, 60–62, 89, 90, 104 centrist Democrats 43, 44, 71, 115, 121–2 Challenger disaster 85 Chamberlain, Neville 108 Chernenko, Konstantin 101, 102 Chernobyl 104 China 49–50 Christian Action Committee 115 Churchill, Winston 50 Civil Liberties Act (1988) 85 civil rights 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 24, 34, 83, 88; Black Caucus 48; Black

Strategy memorandum 132–3; Civil Rights Act (1964) 11, 19, 94; Civil Rights Restoration Act (1987) 93, 96–8; Robert Bork’s America speech 157–8; Voting Rights Act 19, 40, 94; see also colorblind conservatism; Martin Luther King Jr. Clinton, Bill 4, 43, 52, 71, 118, 121, 122 Clinton, Hillary 122 Cohen, William 92 Cold War 9, 11, 13–15, 17, 22, 45–64, 68, 99–113, 121; Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3; Defense and National Security Address 137–40; Farewell Address to the Nation 161–3; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148–50; Letter to Ronald Reagan 150–2; Remarks on East‑West Relations 155–7; second Cold War 45, 52–6; State of the Union (1985) 146–8; triumphalists and end of the Cold War 112–13; see also Reagan Doctrine colorblind conservatism 19–21, 34, 40, 96 Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 17 The Conscience of a Conservative (1960) 11 conservatism 10–11, 13, 15–21, 25, 26, 29–31, 122; colorblind conservatism 19–21; neoconservatism 46; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7; social and religious conservatism 5, 6, 8, 17–18, 24, 27, 64–81; see also neoliberalism; New Right; Religious Right; social issues Conservative Digest 23, 31, 108 constitutional originalism 68, 94, 124; see also Bork Contras see Nicaragua Crisp, Mary 25 Crüe, Mötley 71 Cuba 53, 56, 58; Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 11 culture wars 6, 64, 65, 72, 81, 93, 98

Index 191 The Day After (1983 film) 56 Deaver, Michael 30, 56, 84 Debayle, Anastasio Somoza 57; see also Nicaragua defense budget 34, 47, 48, 52, 53, 102; Defense and National Security address 137–40 Democratic Party 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 21, 24, 25, 29, 32, 37–9, 43, 44, 51–2, 75, 82–5, 88, 89, 95, 96, 98, 114, 115, 119, 122; 1980 Democratic National Convention 23; platform 12, 51–2; Reagan Democrats 24–6; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7; Southern Democrats 19, 26, 32, 34, 69; see also centrist Democrats; New Deal Democratic coalition détente 14–16, 21, 22, 46, 47, 61, 63, 100, 101; Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I and II 14, 21, 22, 100 Dobrynin, Anatoly 101 Dolan, Terry 16, 26, 31, 59, 64, 77, 78 Dole, Bob 16, 40, 120 Dole, Elizabeth: Black Strategy memorandum 132–3 Drug Enforcement Administration 73 Dukakis, Michael 115, 116 Dworkin, Andrea 71, 72 Eastern Bloc 106, 110–12 Eisenhower, Dwight 9, 11, 18, 119; Modern Republicanism 11; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Elizabeth II (Queen) 116 El Salvador 48, 57, 58; Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 57, 58; see also Salvadoran Civil War Engel v. Vitale (1962) 68, 69 Equal Rights Amendment 15–18, 21, 24, 25, 67; see also Phyllis Schlafly Eslinger, Patti: ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ (1982) poster 133, 134 ‘Euromissile Crisis’ 54, 101 ‘Evil Empire’ speech 45, 50, 52, 99 Falklands War 53 Falwell, Jerry 17, 18, 24, 27, 31, 64, 69, 73, 77, 91, 96, 115; see also Moral Majority; Religious Right

Family Protection Act 77 Federal Aviation Administration 36 Federal Bureau of Investigation 9, 39, 40 feminism 15, 18, 21, 25, 67, 71, 72, 82, 94, 96, 97 Ferraro, Geraldine 83 Food and Drug Administration 79, 80 Ford, Betty 15 Ford, Gerald 18, 29, 31, 47, 94, 119; 1976 presidential campaign 16, 20; presidency 14–16 Foster, Jodie 31, 32 free trade 86–7; Canada 87; Israel 87; North American Free Trade Agreement 87 Fried, Charles 68 Fury, Gran 80; ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ (1988) poster 159, 160 Gaddafi, Muammar 85 Gekko, Gordon 41 gender gap and voting 25, 26, 116; Geneva summit 103–4; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148–50 Gingrich, Newt 38, 86; Contract with America 119 Ginsburg, Douglas 95 glasnost 103 Global Financial Crisis (2007–8) 121 global gag rule see Mexico City Policy Goldwater, Barry 11–13, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 25, 58, 69, 88; 1964 defeat 12–13, 15, 19; ‘Stop Goldwater’ movement 11; A Time for Choosing speech 127–30 Gorbachev, Mikhail 63, 89, 99, 102–10, 107, 112, 113, 116, 118; Farewell Address to the Nation 161–3; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148–50; Letter to Ronald Reagan 150–2; policies 103, 106, 109–12; Remarks on East‑West Relations 155–7 Gore, Al 71, 122 Gore, Tipper 70, 71 Gray, Nellie 67, 68, 79; Letter to Ronald Reagan 158–9 Great Depression 37, 41

192 Index Great Society (1960s) 12, 13, 33–4, 42, 43, 97, 128; see also Lyndon B. Johnson ‘greed is good’ (motto) 40–3 Grenada invasion 53, 54, 63, 121; Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3; ‘Americans at War’ magazine cover 54; Maurice Bishop 53 Grove City College v. Bell (1984) 96; see also Civil Rights Restoration Act Haig, Alexander 30, 47, 56, 57, 59, 100, 101 Hall, Fawn 91 Hatch, Orrin 69, 77 Hatfield, Mark 51 Heckler, Margaret 76 Helms, Jesse 16, 40, 47, 70, 79, 86, 88, 109; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Herblock: ‘It Didn’t Happen’ (1987) cartoon 155, 155; see also Iran‑Contra Affair Heritage Foundation 17, 29; ‘Mandate for Leadership 1981’ 30 Hinckley, John, Jr. 31, 32 Hispanic see Latino Hitler, Adolf 108 HIV/AIDS 65, 76–81; AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 80; Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 80; ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ (1988) poster 159, 160 Horton, William ‘Willie’ 115 Hudson, Rock 18, 78 Hulme, Etta: ‘GOP Platform’ (1984) cartoon 146, 146 Humphrey, Gordon 77 Hussein, Saddam 60; see also Iraq immigration policy 82, 87–8, 97, 123 Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiations 103–7, 107; conservative opposition 107–9; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148– 50; Letter to Ronald Reagan 150–2 Iran 22, 59, 60; hostage crisis 22, 26, 47, 89; see also Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; Iran‑Contra Affair Iran‑Contra Affair 58, 60, 82, 88–92, 95, 97, 117, 121; ‘It Didn’t Happen’

(1987) cartoon 155, 155; Robert Bork’s America speech 157–8 Iraq 60 Israel 15, 59–61, 87, 89; Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3 January 6 US Capitol Attack 124 Jefferson, Mildred 71 Johnson, Lyndon B.: Civil Rights Act (1964) 19; domestic policies 12, 13, 42, 97; presidential campaign (1964) 12; Vietnam War 14, 15; see also Great Society ‘Just Say No’ 73, 74; Joint Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse 152–4 KAL 007 flight 52, 53 Kassebaum, Nancy 48–9 Kemp, Jack 38, 40, 109; tax cuts 29, 32, 35 Kennedy, Anthony 68, 95 Kennedy, Edward ‘Ted’ 22–3, 51, 88, 94; Robert Bork’s America speech 157–8 Kennedy, John F. 12, 31, 118, 121 Kerry, John 118, 122 Keynes, John Maynard: Keynesian economics 10–11, 29 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 22, 47, 89, 90; see also Iran Khrushchev, Nikita: Remarks on East‑West Relations 155–7 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 19, 39–40 Kirkpatrick, Jeane 46, 56, 57 Kissinger, Henry 14 Kohl, Helmut 55, 105, 112 Koop, C. Everett 66, 78, 79; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Ku Klux Klan 12 labor see unions Laden, Osama bin 62 laissez‑faire capitalism 10 Latinos 42, 74, 80, 88, 96, 97; State of the Union (1985) 146–8 Lauper, Cyndi 71 law and order politics 13, 115; see also War on Drugs Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 96

Index 193 Lebanon: Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3; Beirut barracks bombing 61; hostages 89; Lebanese Civil War 53, 60–1, 63, 121; Multi‑National Force 61 Leppard, Def 71 LGBTQI+ community 18, 21, 76–8; Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 77; Briggs Initiative 18; ‘When a Government Turns Its Back On Its People, Is It Civil War?’ (1988) poster 159, 160; see also HIV/AIDS Libya 85 Lugar, Richard 48, 49 MacKinnon, Catharine 71 Madonna 71 Make America Great Again slogan 4, 25, 122, 123 Mapplethorpe, Robert 70 March for Life 66, 67, 68, 79 Marshall Islands 85 McCarthy, Joseph 9 McDonald, Larry 52 McFarlane, Bud 53, 55, 61, 89, 90; see also Iran‑Contra Affair McMahon, John 62 Meese Commission 72; see also pornography Meese, Edwin III 30, 68, 84, 87, 95 Mexico City Policy (1984) 67 Mondale, Walter 83, 84, 88 Moral Majority see Jerry Falwell; Religious Right Moscow summit 99, 109–10 Mulford Act 13 mutually assured destruction 100; Defense and National Security address 137–40 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 34 National Conservative Political Action Committee 17, 26, 77, 83 National Endowment for the Arts 70 National Rifle Association 13 National Security Council 56, 89, 90, 92, 101, 106 National Security Decision Directive 75 (1983) 49 neoliberalism 6, 28, 30, 43, 121, 123; see also supply‑side economics

New Deal 9–11, 33, 43; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 New Deal Democratic coalition 6, 9, 19, 27, 121 New Right 16–21, 26–7, 29–1, 40, 47, 53, 62, 64, 65, 68, 79, 80, 83, 91, 97, 107–8 Nicaragua: Contras 58, 62, 90, 91; Sandinistas 57, 58, 89, 90; see also Boland Amendment; Iran‑Contra Affair Niskanen, William 6 Nixon, Richard 4, 13–16, 19, 22, 36, 47, 49, 50, 59, 73, 77, 93, 102, 119; ‘Silent Majority’ 27; see also détente; Southern strategy; Watergate Noonan, Peggy 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 50, 54–5, 103, 105, 109; Defense and National Security address 137–40; see also Able Archer 83 exercise; ‘Euromissile Crisis’ North, Oliver 90, 91, 92 nuclear freeze 45, 50–2, 63, 67, 100; ‘Arms Race? or Human Race?’ (1982) poster 133, 134; Defense and National Security address 137– 40; ‘Peace Sunday’ 51; see also The Day After (1983 film) nuclear weapons 11, 12, 52, 55, 99– 113; Defense and National Security address 137–40; see also nuclear freeze Obama, Barack 4, 121 O’Connor, Sandra Day 25, 67, 68, 94 Oliphant, Patrick: ‘There he goes again’ (1984) cartoon 145, 145 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1981) 32–5 O’Neill, Tip, Jr. 4, 32, 33, 34, 37, 47, 85, 86 Operation RYaN 50, 55 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 53 Packwood, Bob 59, 86 Palestinian Liberation Organization 60 Parents Music Resource Center 70–1 Pence, Mike 123 perestroika 103, 109

194 Index Phillips, Howard 5, 16, 24, 40, 83, 108 Phillips, Kevin 19, 42; see also Southern strategy Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 68; see also Roe v. Wade (1973) Poindexter, John 90–2, 117 pornography 5, 18, 64, 71; anti‑obscenity campaigns 71, 72, 81; child pornography 71, 72; feminist critiques 71, 72; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7; see also Meese Commission Powell, Lewis 93–5 Prince 70 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization 36; see also unions Quayle, Dan 115 Reagan Doctrine 49, 56, 63, 108; Central America 56–8; human rights 45, 48–9, 57, 58, 63; Middle East and Central Asia 59–62; State of the Union (1985) 146–8 Reagan, Nancy 73, 74, 79, 93, 99, 116, 117, 120; Internal Revenue Service investigation of 117; Joint Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse 152–4; nee Davis 9; see also Just Say No Reagan Recession 28, 34, 36–9, 82 Reagan, Ronald Wilson: ‘Age of Reagan’ 3, 7; in age of Trump 122, 122–4; assassination attempt 31–2; biography 8–10; campaign speech for Barry Goldwater 12, 13; Governor of California 13, 15, 19, 25; illness and death 3, 117–18, 118; life after the White House 116–19; pragmatic conservatism of 6–7, 13, 15, 36, 43, 114, 123; presidential election campaigns (1968) 13–14, (1976) 16, 20, (1980) 22–7, 23, (1984) 83–4, (1988) 114–16; Reagan Revolution 6–7; reputation post‑presidency 3, 114, 116, 119–22; White House

dynamics 30–1, 47, 53, 59, 61, 69, 84–5, 92–3, 97; see also Reagan Doctrine; supply‑side economics Regan, Don 5, 62, 84, 92–3 Rehnquist, William 68, 94 Religious Right 8, 17–18, 23, 24, 27, 31, 59, 64, 65, 69, 70, 73, 77–80, 94, 96, 97, 115, 120, 123; Moral Majority 17, 24, 64, 115; National Association of Evangelicals convention 45; Religious Roundtable 17, 24, 115; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5; see also Jerry Falwell; Pat Robertson; social issues Republican Party 8, 10–11, 15–17, 27, 31, 38, 64, 65, 75, 80–1, 84, 93, 98, 119–24; divisions 11, 15–19, 38, 64–82; ‘GOP Platform’ (1984) cartoon 146, 146; moderate Republicans 11, 14, 15, 25–7, 31, 44, 46, 47, 51, 59, 64, 67, 69, 70, 72, 81, 88, 92, 94, 95, 98, 115; national convention (1964) 11, (1976) 16, (1980) 24, (1984) 64; platform 6, 16, 18, 23–5, 64, 65; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Revolutions of 1989 111, 113 Reykjavík summit 89, 105–8 Robertson, Pat 17, 69, 115 Rockefeller, Nelson 11, 15, 18 Roe v. Wade (1973) 15, 16, 18, 65, 67, 68, 81, 94, 124; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5 Ronald Reagan Legacy Project 119 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 116 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 3, 9, 10, 12, 84; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7; see also New Deal; New Deal Democratic coalition Roth, William 29 Sakharov, Andrei 106 Saudi Arabia 59–60, 62, 89, 90; see also AWACS Scalia, Antonin 68, 94 Schaeffer, Francis 18

Index 195 Schlafly, Phyllis 18, 24, 31, 64, 79, 96; see also Equal Rights Amendment; social issues Schmidt, Helmut 55 school busing 16, 20, 94 school prayer 5, 17, 64, 68–70, 80, 81, 83; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Schroeder, Pat 82 Second Red Scare 9, 50; House Un‑American Activities Committee 9 secular humanism 18, 69, 74; see also Francis Schaeffer Senate Judiciary Committee 94, 95 Serrano, Andres 70 Shevardnadze, Eduard 104, 106 Shultz, George 47, 48, 52, 54, 61, 89, 90, 101, 102, 104–6, 108 Simpson, Alan 88 Sinatra, Frank 28 social issues 5, 15, 18, 27, 31, 69, 72, 83, 86, 93, 94, 98, 114, 123; Remarks at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention 143–5; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Social Security 11, 16, 20, 25, 34, 38, 39, 84 South Africa 21, 48; Comprehensive Anti‑Apartheid Act of 1986 48 Southern Baptist Convention 21, 69, 94 Southern strategy 19, 24, 26, 114–16 Soviet Union 14, 21, 22, 45–50, 53, 56, 58, 60, 63, 99; arms control negotiations 99–109, 107; collapse 110–13, 121; Defense and National Security Address 137–40; as an ‘Evil Empire’ 45; Farewell Address to the Nation 161–3; internal turmoil 102–3; Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev 148–50; Letter to Ronald Reagan 150–2; Remarks on East‑West Relations 155–7; Sino‑Soviet split 49–50; SS‑20 and ‘Euromissile Crisis’ 54–5; ‘Year of Fear’ 52–6; see also Afghanistan; détente; nuclear weapons; Operation RYaN; Reagan Doctrine Speakes, Larry 78 Specter, Arlen 72, 94, 95

Stalin, Joseph 102 Stockman, David 6, 31, 34, 35, 37, 39, 48 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 101, 109, 112 Strategic Defense Initiative 52, 55, 63, 100–2, 104–6, 108; Defense and National Security Address 137–40; Remarks on East‑West Relations 155–7 supply‑side economics 28–30, 34–6, 38, 85, 115, 121; deregulation 35–7, 42, 43, 123; Program for Economic Recovery address 130–1; State of the Union (1985) 146–8; see also free trade; neoliberalism; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1981); taxes; unions Taft, Robert 11 tax: Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981) 32–5, 43; Program for Economic Recovery address 130–1; State of the Union (1985) 146–8; tax cuts 32–3, 35, 43, 86; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982) 37–8; tax increases 38, 43, 86, 115; Tax Reform Act (1986) 85–6, 97; tax revolts of the 1970s 29 Taxi Driver (1976 film) 31, 32 Teflon president 82, 98; ‘There he goes again’ (1984) cartoon 145, 145 Thatcher, Margaret 29–30, 50, 53, 55, 102, 105, 112, 118 Thurmond, Strom 95 Tiananmen Square massacre 112 Tower Commission 90–3; see also Iran Contra Truman, Harry 4, 9, 121 Trump, Donald 4, 41, 86, 119, 120, 122–4, 122 TWA Flight 847 85, 89 Twenty‑Fifth Amendment 93 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see Soviet Union unions 8–11, 16, 24, 29, 35, 36; see also Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization; supply‑side economics United Nations 19, 38, 46, 51, 57, 58, 85, 110

196 Index Vietnam War 14, 15, 46, 48, 53; domestic opposition 39; Paris Peace Accords 14; Pentagon Papers 14; Vietnam syndrome 46, 47, 54; War Powers Resolution (1973) 46 Viguerie, Richard 5, 6, 16, 17, 26, 47, 53, 83, 108, 120 Volcker, Paul 21, 22, 36 Wallace, George 19, 24 War on Drugs 19, 72–6, 81; see also ‘Just Say No’ wars: Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada 140–3; Falklands War 53; Iran‑Iraq War 60; Lebanese Civil War 53, 60–1, 63, 121; Salvadoran Civil War 57; Soviet‑Afghan War 22, 49, 50, 61– 2; War Powers Resolution (1973) 46; Yom Kippur War 15; see also Afghanistan; Cold War; El Salvador; Grenada; Vietnam War Warsaw Pact 55, 112 Washington summit 104, 106–7 Watergate scandal 14, 16, 94; Robert Bork’s America speech 157–8

Waxman, Henry 76 Weicker, Lowell 64, 69; Reviving the Winning Coalition memorandum 133, 135–7 Weinberger, Caspar 47, 48, 50, 52, 55, 61, 89, 91, 101, 104, 108, 109 welfare 10, 11, 16, 20, 21, 28, 33, 34, 37, 39, 42–4, 75, 87, 121, 123; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (1996) 43; A Time for Choosing Speech 127–30; welfare queen 20–1 Weyrich, Paul 16, 24, 31, 79, 108 White House Conference on the Family (1980) 21 White supremacy 11, 19, 24 Wilson, Charlie 62 Wyman, Jane 9 Xiannian, Li 49 Yeltsin, Boris 112 ‘Zero Option’ 55, 106; Defense and National Security Address 137–40 Ziyang, Zhao 49