The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord 9780773586109

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism
PART ONE: SETTING THE CONTEXT
1 Radical Right Populism as a Party Family: Contextualizing the “Third Wave”
2 Opportunity Structures, Political Mobilization, and Radical Right Populism: The Origins and the Radicalization of the Lega Nord
PART TWO: LA LOTTA: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE LEGA NORD: FROM REGIONALISM TO RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM
3 Populism, Political Mobilization, and the People
4 Padania, Nationalism, and an Autochthonous Civil Society
5 Nativist Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion
6 The Lega Nord: Between Neo-Liberalism and Opposition to Globalization
PART THREE: AL GOVERNO: BETWEEN POPULISM AND PRAGMATISM: THE LEGA NORD IN GOVERNMENT
7 Populism, the Lega Nord, and the Negotiation of Political Power
8 Is Their Bark Worse Than Their Bite? Public Policy and the Lega Nord in Government
Conclusion: The Lega Nord, Radical Right Populist Parties, and Europe: Reinventing Radical Right Politics
Appendix: The Phases of the Lega Nord: Ideology, Support, and the Economic and Political Context
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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the re-invention of the european radical right

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The Re-invention of the European Radical Right Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord andrej zaslove

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2011 isbn 978-0-7735-3851-1 Legal deposit third quarter 2011 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Zaslove, Andrej, 1963– The re-invention of the European radical right: populism, regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord / Andrej Zaslove. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7735-3851-1 (bound) 1. Lega per l’indipendenza della Padania – History. 2. Conservatism – Italy – History. 3. Populism – Italy – History. 4. Regionalism – Italy, Northern. 5. Italy – Politics and government – 1994-. I. Title. jn5657.l45z38 2011

324.245'03

c2011-901632-x

This book was typeset by Interscript in 10.5/13 Sabon.

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

part one

3

setting the context

1

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family: Contextualizing the “Third Wave” 19

2

Opportunity Structures, Political Mobilization, and Radical Right Populism: The Origins and the Radicalization of the Lega Nord 46

Part two La Lotta: Political Mobilization and the Ideology of the Lega Nord: From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism 3

Populism, Political Mobilization, and the People 73

4

Padania, Nationalism, and an Autochthonous Civil Society

5

Nativist Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion 108

6

The Lega Nord: Between Neo-Liberalism and Opposition to Globalization 131

90

Part three Al Governo: Between Populism and PragmatiSM: The Lega Nord in Government 7

Populism, the Lega Nord, and the Negotiation of Political Power 157

vi

8

Contents

Is Their Bark Worse Than Their Bite? Public Policy and the Lega Nord in Government 166 Conclusion The Lega Nord, Radical Right Populist Parties, and Europe: Reinventing Radical Right Politics 193 Appendix The Phases of the Lega Nord: Ideology, Support, and the Economic and Political Context 207 Notes

209

Bibliography Index 279

257

Acknowledgments

First and foremost I would like to thank my family Liz, Max, and Luca for their love, patience, and continuous support through the years. I would also like to thank my mother and father, Jerry and Sibylle, for their love and for their continuous belief in me. Special thanks to Steve Hellman for his academic mentorship, depth of knowledge, and friendship, and to Harvey Simmons, and Jack Veugelers for their insights and support. Throughout the research and writing process I am grateful to a number of people, including Phil Triadafilopoulos, Rodney  Loeppky, Deepika Grover, John Cameron, Dennis Pilon, Glenn Goshulak, and Shane Gunster, for their friendship and intellectual support. I also owe my gratitude to Eve Hepburn, Duncan McDonnell, Daniele Albertazzi, Matthew Goodwin, Sarah De Lange, Anna Cento Bull, Tamir Bar-on, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Kristof Jacobs for their knowledge and stimulating debate on populism, the radical right, and European politics. Finally, I am indebted to Oliver Schmidtke and Steve Wolinetz for their continued support. And also to Sheila Das and Daniela Turrin who were excellent Italian teachers and great friends. I owe you much for enabling me to conduct original research. I would like to thank Linn Clark for her excellent advice and editorial assistance along with the editors at McGill-Queen’s University Press for their patience and assistance throughout the project. A special thanks to Jessica Howarth at McGillQueen’s for her editorial support, comments, and suggestions and to Silvia Benvenuto for her assistance with the index. Financial assistance was made possible by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Scholarship. A large portion

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Acknowledgments

of this manuscript was written while I was a post-doctoral fellow at McGill University in the Political Science Department and the European Union Center of Excellence at McGill University and Université de Montréal. In that regard, I would like to thank Professor Mark Brawley for providing me with the opportunity and the much needed time which allowed me to focus and complete the project in a timely manner. The manuscript was completed at Radboud University, Nijmegen. I would like to thank my colleagues at the Faculty of Management and in the Political Science Department. Over the last year they have welcomed me, made me feel at home, and have provided a great intellectual atmosphere. Passages from “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” European Review vol. 16, no. 3 appear in chapter one and two and are printed here with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Some passages from “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an anti-globalization movement,” Comparative European Politics vol. 6, no. 2 appear in chapters one and two and in the conclusion and are printed with the permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Paragraphs from “Alpine populism, Padania and beyond: A response to Duncan McDonnell,” Politics vol. 27, no.  1 appear in chapter one, and are printed with permission of John Wiley and Sons. Several passages from “The dark side of European politics: Unmasking the radical right,” Journal of European Integration vol. 26, no. 1 appear in the introduction and chapter one and are printed with the permission of Taylor and Francis. Some passages from “The populist radical right: Ideology, party families and core principles,” Political Studies Review vol. 7, no. 3 (2009) appear in the introduction, in chapter one, and in the conclusion and are printed with the permission of John Wiley and Sons.

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introduction

The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

On 10 February 1991, after what was often a contentious first party Congress, Umberto Bossi emerged as the leader of a new political party in northern Italy, the Lega Nord (the Northern League).1 The Lega was a formal alliance of several “leagues” under Bossi’s charismatic leadership.2 During the three day Congress, Bossi attacked the centralized state and the dominance of the post-war political parties, claiming that they were corrupt and must be opposed. He demanded a federal state and regional autonomy, and addressed a broad range of issues in the economy, the environment, agriculture, immigration, and the media.3 Over the next several years, Bossi would lead the Lega Nord to unanticipated success through political manoeuvring and a persona that shocked many observers. In contrast to the leaders of the political parties that had dominated post–Second World War Italian politics, Bossi presented himself as a “man of the people” in his appearance and speech. Unlike the well-dressed, well-schooled Italian political class, he would stand before his audiences with rolled-up sleeves and dishevelled hair, appearing agitated and emotional. He addressed his supporters in a new political language and his ideas were adversarial. Often speaking in dialect or the language of the street, Bossi denounced other politicians as corrupt, self-serving, and out of touch with the average person. His anti-politics and the radical ideas of the Lega Nord’s political platform were accompanied by new forms of political mobilization, including the liberal use of graffiti along highways and streets in northern Italy. The Lega Nord’s provocative style and politics proved highly successful: in Italy’s 1992 national elections it received 8.6% of the national vote and 17.3% of the northern vote. In the 1994 general

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The Lega Nord

elections, despite a marginal decline in the party’s political support (it received 17.0% in the north and 8.4% nationally), the Lega Nord formed the national government in alliance with Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale.4 Although the Lega Nord’s first foray into national governance was short (it was in power only from May until December)5, under Bossi its sustainability has proven to be lasting. The electoral success of the Lega Nord has inspired many theories about its emergence and rise, and debates continue about how to categorize the party. Does the Lega represent an Italian anomaly, far removed from developments in other parts of Europe? Should it be considered a new regionalist political party, a local resurgence of populism, a new form of extremism, or something fundamentally different? At first glance, the Lega Nord appears somewhat enigmatic as it does not fit clearly into a single party category. Researchers have referred to it as a protest party, a regionalist party, a populist party, or a radical right (or right-wing) populist party. However, objections have been raised to all of these labels: when it is classified with minority nationalist or regionalist parties, some argue that there is no distinct northern or Padanian identity and thus it does not fit into this classification; when it is classified with radical right parties, sceptics argue that its origins differ too much from parties such as the French National Front or the Austrian Freedom Party, which are often held up as typical cases of parties from the radical right family. This study argues that the Lega Nord is a radical right populist party. Previous studies have situated the party exclusively as a regionalist, a populist, or a radical right populist party. I argue that the Lega combines regionalism with radical right populism. Although I argue that the Lega is currently a radical right populist party, I also contend that it moved towards a radical right populism only in the mid-1990s. In the process I show that the Lega shares characteristics with other European radical right populist parties. While parties within this family share characteristics, they do not necessarily share origins or trajectories. My argument is not intended to be deterministic. Even though the Lega became a radical right populist party, this process was not inevitable. To be sure, elements of populism and exclusion were prevalent from the beginning, but the increasing popularity of Silvio Berlusconi’s newly formed party, Forza Italia (FI), on the eve of the 1994 elections, the Lega’s failed attempt to govern in coalition with FI in 1994, as well as pressures emanating from globalization, European integration, and Italy’s transition to

The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

5

an immigrant-receiving nation, propelled the party towards a radicalization and redefinition of its political message. To understand the rise and continued success of the Lega Nord, I contextualize the party within Italian and European politics through the 1990s and into the new millennium. Although this is a case study of the Lega, the broader aim is to contribute to our understanding of radical right populism. I look at debates over how to understand and classify the Lega within a larger framework of the rise and classification of other new regionalist, populist, extreme, and right-wing political parties in Europe. Drawing from the theoretical literature and case studies on radical right populist parties, I contend that radical right populist parties share a common ideology and political organization, and are supported by voters with a similar profile. Placing the Lega within the radical right populist family enhances our understanding of this enigmatic party. In addition, locating the Lega in the European context furthers our understanding of how many diverse parties came to be under the umbrella of the radical right populist family. As this book demonstrates, the rise of the Lega was part of a phenomenon that was unfolding not just in Italy, but across Western Europe as part of a dramatic change to post–Second World War politics.

new political parties and the rise of the radical right In 1973 politics in Western Europe began to change radically. The Danish Progress Party burst onto the political scene, obtaining 15.9% of the national vote after campaigning for lower taxes; in the same year the Norwegian Progress Party also campaigned against high taxation levels, winning 5.0% of the national vote.6 As isolated examples, these political developments might not seem important: the Progress parties could simply be considered two tax-revolt parties. However, given the ideological convergence of both parties, and considering the rise of similar political parties in other Western European countries, it is now recognized that the rise of the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway represented the beginning of a new, right-wing European political movement. This movement continued in the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of the National Front in France, the Freedom Party in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Republikaner Party in Germany, the Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) in Belgium,

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The Lega Nord

the People’s Party (especially the Zurich wing under the leadership of Christoph Blocher) in Switzerland, and the People’s Party in Denmark. The rise of these parties coincided with an increase in neoNazi activity and neo-fascist political parties. In Germany and in the UK, where the new wave of radical populist right parties has not been very successful, there was an increase in other extreme political movements. Here skinhead activity, and neo-Nazi parties such as the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands and the Deutsche Volksunion enjoyed increased popularity. In Great Britain the British National Party also experienced higher levels of success.7 Although extremism and radicalism are not new to European politics – extreme and radical right-wing political parties were active throughout Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – most of these parties disbanded, went underground, or had only limited success in the immediate post–World War Two period. Right-wing extremism did not disappear completely: in the 1950s and 1960s, several small nationalist and extreme right political parties were active in Germany;8 while the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) remained on the fringe of the Italian political system, obtaining between 2% and 8.7% of the national vote between 1948 and 1992.9 Other small radical parties experienced short-lived success, including the French Poujadist and the Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque movement in Italy. However, it was not until the emergence of the “third wave” of radical right parties in the 1970s that the radical right regained its political strength.10 The sudden surge of right-wing politics shocked observers, but even more surprising is that this new wave has become a permanent fixture within European politics. Since 2000, the majority of western European democracies now have a right-wing, extreme, or radical right political party: in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland, a radical right party has obtained at least 10% of the national vote in at least one election. In Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, a right-wing party has participated in government, while in Denmark, the People’s Party has supported the centre-right minority government since 2001.

classifying the third wave The third wave of right-wing political parties is a heterogeneous collection: it includes neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, extremist, and radical political parties.11 Conceptually, this necessitates a distinction between

The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

7

the two types of right-wing parties within this third wave. First, there are neo-fascists and neo-Nazis, who reject the legitimacy of liberal democracies and electoral politics.12 These parties include Forza Nuova and Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore in Italy, the NationalDemocratic German Party (NPD, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) the German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion, or DVU), and the British National Party.13 Because the political message of these neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties has not kept pace with the current economic, cultural, and political climate, they have had minimal electoral success. These neo-fascist and neo-Nazi forces are still relevant, however, because political mobilization takes place within civil society, outside the realm of party politics where there are fewer limitations on their actions.14 The second group consists of political parties that are critical of how liberal democracies currently function, but do not oppose liberal democracy and electoral politics.15 This latter group has been the most successful in electoral politics,16 mobilizing support and influencing public policy. These parties, which I refer to as radical right populist parties, include the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People’s Party, the Danish People’s Party, the Lega Nord (especially since the mid-1990s), the Danish and the Norwegian Progress parties, and the Belgian Vlaams Blok/ Belang. These parties have diverse origins – many began as reformed extremists (French National Front), others as anti-tax parties (Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway), and in some cases they evolved from regionalist or minority nationalist movements (Vlaams Blok/Belang and Lega Nord) – but they have all converged toward radical right populism.17 A common ideological platform is the criterion used to decide which radical right populist parties are part of this party family. Peter Mair and Cas Mudde argue that the study of the party family “remains one of the most under-theorized and least-specified approaches to the general classification of parties.”18 The authors identify several methodologies for the study of party families. The sociological study of party classification, dating back to Stein Rokkan, is praised for its ability to explain the origin of parties and party families, but is criticized for not sufficiently explaining shifts in organization, ideology, and electorates; nor does it sufficiently address the rise of new parties.19 The transnational federations approach is deemed problematic since not all parties belong to international federations;

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The Lega Nord

some belong to several international federations at one time, and there seems to be a lack of membership consistency within specific federations.20 In a similar manner, relying on party names does not suffice since not all parties adhere to a common family party name.21 And finally, the policy/ideology approach, although it exhibits potential, is criticized for either too much focus on policy as opposed to party ideology or for its over-reliance on data sets (derived from the party manifesto approach). This tends to makes the analysis overly rigid and static, while the focus tends to be on election platforms and less on a broader conception of party ideology.22 Mair and Mudde contend that the study of party families should focus on both origins and “ideological profile,” arguing that ideally both approaches should be used together. However, as the authors point out, the ideological approach is the most appropriate for comparing parties between countries within a particular time period.23 Moreover, the advantage of the ideological approach is that it allows the analysis to focus on parties that have become increasingly similar but may have had diverse origins. However, focusing on ideology means “that families be characterized on the basis of their ideological (as opposed to simply policy) profile – that is … on the basis of what they are rather than what they do.”24 This “requires a more comprehensive and in-depth approach than is normally applied to the analysis of policy position, and it requires the assessment of a wider variety of documentary sources (including, for example, programs of principle and party papers).”25 This study utilizes the approach as outlined by Mair and Mudde. I argue that this is the most appropriate method for assessing a new political phenomenon such as radical right populist parties since this approach allows the researcher to focus on political parties that may have moved “from one category to another over time and also allows the researcher to group together parties that may have developed out of very different sets of circumstances.”26 It most readily accounts for the diverse origins of these parties and the extent to which the identity of parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Lega Nord has evolved. Focusing on the common ideologies of radical right parties allows us to identify the core shared characteristics of the parties in question. It is important to emphasize that radical right populist parties respond to the national history and the political culture of their individual

The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

9

countries and, similar to mainstream political parties, they draw on this ideological tool kit depending on specific political conjunctures; thus, particular policies are often emphasized or de-emphasized according to the context. Yet, at the same time, radical right populist parties demonstrate enough ideological commonality to place them within a common family. Although ideology is the foremost criterion used to classify the parties in question, radical right populist parties also have common organizational structures. In fact, their organizational capabilities often determine their success or failure.27 The classical literature on political parties pays close attention to organization;28 more recently, however, less attention has been given to organizational capability and institutional structure. The degree to which similar parties demonstrate similar organizational structures, and the extent to which these structures contribute to their electoral success and their ability to govern, are often overlooked.29 Despite subtle national variations, radical right populist parties are supported by a common electorate in terms of class, age, gender, and education. Mudde correctly cautioned against identifying the “one homogenous electorate,”30 and it is also important not to be overly deterministic when evaluating support for radical right populist parties. Ignazi notes that the recent trend to create overly rigid models of support for right wing parties can lead to a tendency to attribute an ideological identity to a party based on its supporters.31 Despite these warnings, it is still possible to identify the “ideal” radical right populist voter, who is generally young and male, with a low level of education and a higher level of distrust of economic and political elites and immigrants. Radical right populist parties are no longer new and currently have some of the most loyal and stable voting constituencies when compared with other new political parties and even mainstream political parties.32

tangentopoli, the second republic, and the lega nord In the postwar era, Europe underwent dramatic socio-economic and political changes. Between 1945 and 1970, European societies experienced dramatic levels of industrialization, the welfare state was consolidated, and liberal democracy and stable party systems

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were institutionalized. The 1970s were the symbolic end of the postwar era; beginning with the oil crisis and stagflation, European welfare states began to restructure, economies moved from large-scale factory production (Fordism) to knowledge-based economies built on flexible modes of production (post-Fordism), class politics waned, and political party systems experienced a series of dealignments and realignments. Italy was not immune to these broader socio-economic and political transformations. Civil society secularized, gender and family relations gradually changed, and the Fordist production concentrated in the northern “Industrial Triangle” of Turin, Milan, and Genoa no longer dominated the economy. High levels of debt and government spending, the demise of international Keynesianism, and European integration placed new pressures on the Italian state. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and the transformation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) – Western Europe’s largest communist party – into a centreleft social democratic party changed the Italian political system after 1989. In addition to these dramatic socio-economic and political changes in the early 1990s, Italy’s stable post-war political system crumbled as its leading political figures were implicated in corruption and political scandal. What the Italians refer to as Tangentopoli (“bribesville”) and mani pulite (“clean hands”) – the operation that uncovered and prosecuted those who were involved in the circles of corruption and bribery – was instrumental in the fall of the so-called First Republic.33 In the process, Europe’s longest-governing political party, the Christian Democratic Party (DC), along with its main coalition partner of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), disintegrated. In the aftermath, the Italian party system was transformed from a polarized party system based on Christian Democratic dominance and Communist opposition into a fragile bipolar system build around centre-right and centre-left coalitions.34 An important consequence of this political turmoil was the emergence and success of the Lega Nord. After the failed alliance with Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale in 1994, the Lega ran in the 1996 elections without a coalition partner. On its own, the Lega was still able to win 20.5% of the vote in the north and 10.1% of the national vote.35 In 2001, Lega support dropped to just below 4% (3.9%) nationally. The Lega, however, emerged as an important coalition member in the Berlusconi government, remaining in government until the

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11

coalition was defeated in 2006 by the centre-left. Even though the centre-right government lost the elections in 2006, the Lega’s support increased, albeit by a slight margin, to 4.6%. In April 2008, when the centre-right was returned to power, the Lega almost doubled its support, obtaining 8.1% of the vote.36 Throughout the 1990s, the Lega Nord radicalized its ideology, evolving from a populist regionalist party into a radical right populist party without renouncing its demands for increased regional sovereignty. In the process, the Lega has introduced or exploited the most controversial and pressing issues to have dominated recent Italian politics. They have influenced and shaped the debate surrounding federalism, neo-liberalism, immigration, crime, drugs, law and order, the “northern question,”37 the sustainability of the welfare state, European integration, globalization, and political corruption. The Lega’s influence was evident through the 1990s and the early years of the Second Republic. However, between 2001 and 2006, and again since 2008, it has had a direct influence on public policy; the party has successfully made the transition from a party of opposition to a party of government.

explaining the rise of new political parties The third wave of radical right populist parties (and as a consequence the Lega Nord) must be placed within the debate concerning the rise of new political parties. Political parties such as the German Greens, the Danish Progress Party, and the French National Front spurred political scientists and sociologists to question the causes behind the apparent destabilization of European post-war political systems. Whereas the dominant political discourse of the early 1960s focused on the origins of political stability, by the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the causes of fragmentation, dealignment, and realignment began to preoccupy social scientists. In the 1970s, stable party systems were transformed as new political parties (on the left and right) appeared and as more established political parties (Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties) changed, both ideologically and organizationally. Herbert Kitschelt distinguishes between three types of party system changes: (1) parties adapt their message in order to attract new voters, thus adjusting to changing socio-economic, cultural, and political

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pressures; (2) new political parties appear, but the ideological blocs remain the same. Although old party organizations are replaced by new ones, the issues and constituencies remain similar; (3) new political parties emerge when new political, economic and social issues can no longer be subsumed by the existing ideological configurations. Kitschelt argues that types one and three are the most common examples of party change.38 If political parties change and new parties arise, how do we account for these often dramatic political developments? Recent scholarship emphasizes the need to focus on opportunity structures and political mobilization. Building on the theoretical framework set out by Kitschelt in his investigations of green, social democratic, and radical right parties, I argue that it is necessary to focus on socio-economic structures and party systems (opportunity structures), and on ideology, political platforms, and party organization (political mobilization).39 Although opportunity structures contextualize agency, as Kitschelt notes, parties do not react passively to political and social events within civil society; because they are active, mobilizing forces, it is theoretically important to avoid “sociological determinism and political voluntarism.” As Kitschelt notes: “People make history, but not under freely chosen conditions, and political parties are more than the passive reflection of collective demands and preferences originating in the prepolitical sphere of social relations. Politicians actively participate in shaping people’s political views (‘issue leadership’). Nevertheless, it is misleading to attribute the power to create political consciousness and action exclusively to the realm of politics. Both sociological determinism and political voluntarism shun a more complex reconstruction of the relationship between social structure and politics.”40 Political parties are not one-dimensional reactions to economic developments. Parties act strategically within a political system, competing for voters and political power. Kitschelt correctly characterizes leaders as “rational, informed, calculating beings” who sometimes “face hard choices with trade-offs forcing them to sacrifice voters to new competitors.”41 Political parties and party leaders must contend with internal organizational structures, the power of its own leadership, grass roots organizations, and party members.42 Ideology and political platforms are also crucial. By examining ideas and policy proposals, it is possible to elucidate why certain party actions appeal to voters. New political parties on the right

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and the left are often better able to introduce new and even controversial platforms because they do not have to combat an institutional history.43

methodology of the book The analysis focuses on opportunity structures and political mobilization to explain and assess the rise, fall, and continued success of radical right populist political parties. This book focuses on both demand- and supply-side concerns.44 Demand-side theories address transformations of post-war economies, such as the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, the crisis of the welfare state, and globalization. Supply-side considerations address the transformation of political parties from catchall45 to cartel parties, the convergence of political ideologies, and the transformation of party systems.46 The process of political mobilization (internal supplyside) is of equal importance.47 Internal supply-side considerations examine political ideology, strategic decisions, party organization, and mobilization.48 I employ a combination of primary and secondary data in analyzing the Lega Nord and radical right populist parties. The theoretical and comparative discussion of radical right populist parties relies on the vast literature since the 1990s on right-wing political parties. The analysis of the Lega Nord relies on primary and secondary data. I conducted archival research at the party headquarters in Milan. I collected relevant newspaper articles from the party newspaper (which has alternately been known as Lombardia Autonomista, Repubblica del Nord, Lega Nord, and La Padania) as well as speeches, party platforms, and policy papers. This archival research was complemented with online archival research on the party’s website, where I collected articles from La Padania, policy papers, speeches from party officials, and proceedings from party congresses. The primary research from the party archives and website was complemented with archival research from the main Italian daily newspapers La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera. And finally, this primary research was further complemented with biographical writings, Italian case studies, and secondary literature. The combination of articles from the party’s official newspapers, policy papers, political platforms, and speeches are the basis of the qualitative analysis of the “core features” of the party ideology. As

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Mudde argues, a qualitative analysis “provides the proximity to the data and flexibility in operationalization necessary for studying highly complex concepts.”49 The data analysis here follows the guidelines set out by Mudde: 1) the focus is on official party documents (including official party newspapers); 2) national party publications and not publications of local or regional sections of the party are the primary focus; 3) the literature is “externally and internally oriented” in order to “minimize the chance of catching only the “front-stage” of the party.”50 The qualitative research is used to uncover the ideology of the Lega Nord. Secondary research and case studies of other radical right populist parties are employed to compare and contrast them with the Lega Nord. And finally, case studies, political economy, institutional analysis, and public opinion surveys are employed to contextualize the Lega, and radical right populist parties, within existing opportunity structures (demand and supply-side).

structure of the book Chapter one outlines the dominant approaches to the study of rightwing political parties and it contextualizes and substantiates the use of the concept of radical right populism. It defines the core characteristics of radical right populist parties, focusing on ideology, party organization, and the class, gender, age, and educational levels of its supporters. The chapter provides a brief comparative history of the changing nature of these parties and it concludes with a discussion of the various approaches to the study of the Lega, substantiating why this book focuses on the transformation of the Lega Nord into a radical right populist party. Chapter two examines the Italian socio-economic and political context that gave rise to the Lega. It contextualizes the Lega Nord’s electoral success within the Third Italy,51 the decline of Christian Democratic hegemony, and the emergence of the new party system with the transition to the so-called Second Republic. The subsequent chapters unravel the Lega’s organizational structure, political ideology, and the nature of its political support. Chapter three focuses on Bossi’s use of populism, his ability to mobilize voters with his charisma, and the organizational structures of the party. Chapter four traces the Lega’s evolving concept of the “nation,” federalism, separation, and devolution. I argue that the Lega’s

The Lega Nord and Radical Right Populism

15

nationalism is coupled with an affirmation of what I refer to as the authenticity of civil society. This emphasis on the moral and ethnic authenticity of civil society has allowed the party to focus its attention on traditional values and issues such as family, gender, and religion. Chapter five then turns to the Lega’s use of nativist nationalism to articulate a discourse that targets outsiders (first southerners and subsequently immigrants) as threats to the community. Chapter six moves to an analysis of the party’s economic platform, arguing that the party espouses a populist political economy, i.e. it supports a market economy, while also opposing globalization and the destruction of the local, autochthonous communities. The discussion then moves to the question of political power, the move from la lotta (the struggle) to participation in government (al governo). Chapters seven and eight examine how the Lega Nord has been able to maintain power in coalition with the centre-right political parties, clarifying the extent to which it has been able to influence policy. Since the Lega Nord has succeeded in maintaining power where other populist and radical right parties have been less successful, we are presented with an opportunity to analyze the conditions under which such parties are able to govern, and the extent to which they are able to influence public policy. Chapter seven examines how the Lega successfully retained power between 2001 and 2006 while holding on to its populist and radical party identity. Chapter eight examines the Lega’s influence on public policy during its term in government, specifically analyzing federalism, immigration, fiscal policy, taxation, labour market policy, and European integration. In 2006, the centre-right government lost a highly contested election to the Romano Prodi-led centre-left coalition. After the 2008 elections, the centre-right government was restored to power. The Lega’s electoral support almost doubled in the 2008 elections, and the party continues to have an important influence on issues such as immigration, security, and federalism. The current analysis, however, focuses on the period between 2001 and 2006. I use this period as a case study of a radical right populist party in government, examining the conditions under which the party in question is able to make the transition to a party of government, while also focusing on the extent to which it has been able to influence public policy.

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part one

Setting the Context

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1 Radical Right Populism as a Party Family: Contextualizing the “Third Wave”

If the third wave of right-wing radical parties has converged into a party family, its political trajectory and its origins have not always been clear. Unlike traditional political parties, (such as communist, socialist, or Christian democratic parties), radical, extreme, and populist parties do not adhere to a single foundational doctrine, origin, political philosophy, or intellectual tradition. They often shun international associations, links with other political parties, and reject the use of similar or common party names. Such diversity poses a particular challenge for researchers aiming to explain their emergence and success. As a consequence, there is notable disagreement among social scientists on the causes for the rise of the third wave and continued debate about how to classify or label the parties in question. It could be argued that debates over terminology have not clarified matters; Mudde identifies some twenty-three different labels for this new political wave.1 This chapter addresses the debates over the radical right by focusing on the dominant approaches that have come to characterize the study of radical and extreme right parties since the early 1990s. It begins with Ignazi’s distinction between fascism and post-industrial extremism, and then moves to Betz and Taggart’s introduction of populism and to Kitschelt’s Weberian-inspired classification of the three forms of right-wing parties. Building upon these seminal works, I categorize the current literature into four broad “schools”: populism, extremism, the radical right, and radical right populism. Despite important insights from each approach, I argue that radical right populism most appropriately identifies the organizational and ideological characteristics of the dominant parties within the third

20

Setting the Context

wave, while it best explains the unexpected rise and continued success of right-wing political parties. Radical right populism is, subsequently, contextualized and a brief history of the evolution of radical right populist parties is presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the various approaches employed to explain the rise and the continued success of the Lega Nord. I conclude that the Lega is a regionalist and a radical right populist party.

the roots of the debate and schools of thought In the early 1990s, Piero Ignazi made an important distinction between neo-fascist parties and the new wave of extreme or radical right parties. He argues that there are two forms of extremist parties: those with direct links to inter-war fascism, and a new postindustrial extreme right. While the latter differs ideologically from earlier versions of fascism and neo-fascism, it remains an anti-system political party and can be placed on the extreme right of the political spectrum. Ideologically, the new post-industrial extreme right represents a counter response to post-material values 2, fusing neoconservatism with support for authoritarian values (in opposition to post-material values) such as law, order, and traditional family values, while opposing excessive levels of immigration.3 Ignazi focuses the debate on a new post-industrial extreme right. There is no question that fascist and neo-fascist parties are still present in European politics. However, Ignazi points out that the majority of third wave right-wing parties should not be misconceived as a return to fascist or neo-Nazi politics. Hans-Georg Betz and Paul Taggart built on Ignazi’s work, distinguishing between “new” right-wing parties and fascist or neo-fascist parties.4 However, Betz and Taggart introduce the important concept of populism, each maintaining that the most successful rightwing parties are populist, mobilizing voters who resent the political elite. Taggart claims that these parties are successful precisely because of their populism, and that populism represents the core ideology of this third wave of right-wing parties.5 Betz took a slightly different approach, arguing that these new parties exhibited a specific ideology in addition to their populism. Betz highlights core ideological features such as opposition to immigration and support of a market economy. In other words, Betz argued that right-wing

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

21

populist parties have been successful because of their populism and their right-wing ideology.6 Herbert Kitschelt introduced a Weberian typology to the debate, using three ideal types: anti-establishment populism (Austrian Freedom Party and the Lega Nord); the prototype of the new radical right, which combines neo-liberalism, authoritarianism, and opposition to immigration (French National Front); and welfare chauvinism (represented by neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties).7 According to Kitschelt, the radical right can be characterized by its ideology and its support; ideologically it combines authoritarianism and opposition to immigration with support for a market economy. This ideology tends to attract working-class and petit-bourgeois voters who fear that their socio-economic position will decline within the context of an internationalizing economy.8

“schools of thought” and the study of the third wave Despite ongoing controversies about how to define the current wave of right-wing parties, I argue that most theories fall within one of the four dominant schools of thought established by these seminal texts.9 The populist school of thought builds on Taggart’s study. The more recent work of Mény and Surel, and Albertazzi and McDonnell emphasizes the populist discourse of third wave parties, focusing on their ability to present themselves as the voice of the people against corrupt elites and dangerous outsiders.10 Proponents of populism also point to the importance of a charismatic leader and centralized structures within the party.11 The populist school is less concerned, however, with left/right political ideologies and radical and extreme labels; instead, populism represents a wider framework that encompasses a wide range of parties; parties as diverse as Forza Italia, the French National Front, and the Danish People’s Party. Proponents of the extremist thesis argue that the new right-wing parties are extremist when they have direct ideological links with neo-fascist organizations, or when they reject the fundamental values of liberal democracy and are positioned at the extreme right of the political spectrum.12 Proponents of the extremist school reject the use of populism to describe radical right parties: Ignazi argues that populism is multifaceted and should not be equated with

22

Setting the Context

extremism,13 while Elisabeth Carter argues that populism represents a style of politics and cannot be used to identify a specific type of political party.14 In contrast to the extremist approach, the radical right school argues that these parties are not anti-system parties. Kitschelt prefers the term “radical right,” since the political parties in question do not reject democracy per se.15 Norris similarly prefers to label these parties as radical and not extreme. She argues that the term “extremism” prejudices the analyses since it places the parties beyond the boundaries of liberal democracy.16 Kitschelt and Norris both, however, reject the use of populism to explain the rise of the radical right; according to Kitschelt, populist parties should be separated from radical right parties since their success emanates not from their radical right ideology but from their ability to capitalize on resentment of elite corruption, party convergence, consociational democracies, and neo-corporatist welfare states.17 The radical right populist school originated with Betz.18 This perspective focuses on two important aspects of the new parties, arguing that they are both populist and radical right. Scholars from this school of thought are in general agreement with proponents of populism; they highlight the importance of the charismatic and populist leader and the discourse that pits “the people” against the elite and the dangerous “other.” However, they also claim that these parties possess a specific ideology. In addition to populism, Betz identifies a new right-wing identity politics based on exclusion, nativism, and “differentialist racism” (or what is often referred to as “the right to difference”);19 Mudde refers to nativist nationalism and authoritarianism; and Rydgren points to ethnopluralism and authoritarianism.20

defining radical right populism This study argues that radical right populism best conceptualizes the core characteristics of the most successful right-wing political parties; success is measured by electoral politics, the ability to mobilize support, and influence on public policy. Table one presents a list of the most important radical right populist parties in Western Europe. Closer examination of the political platforms of radical right populist parties reveals that the parties are radical and not extreme; although these parties often express hostility towards the fundamental

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

23

Table 1 Country

Party

In Existence

Austria

Freedom Party Alliance for the Future of Austria

Since 1986 Since 2005

Belgium

Vlaams Blok Vlaams Belang

1979-2004 Since 2004

Denmark

Progress Party (borderline case) People’s Party

Since: mid-1980s Since 1995

France

National Front

Since 1972

Germany

Republikaner

Since 1983

Italy

Lega Nord

Since mid-1990s

Norway

Progress Party

Since 1980s

Switzerland

People’s Party

Since mid-1990s

Source: Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 305-8. (Note: the table covers only the most important radical right populist parties in Western Europe).

values of liberal democracies (pluralism, for example), they do not go so far as to oppose parliamentary democracy.21 They undisputedly contain authoritarian and extremist elements, but their platforms are not based on anti-liberal democratic and anti-constitutional policies, nor are these policies the central reason why the majority of voters support them. They respect representative democracy and the constitutional order, if somewhat reluctantly. Unlike extremist parties or movements, who choose not to participate in electoral politics, radical right populist parties participate in electoral politics with the intention of achieving public office.22 In fact, the success of these parties emanates, in part, from their recognition that the majority of voters in Western Europe support democracy and that Western Europeans generally perceive anti-democratic parties as illegitimate.23 In addition, radical right populist parties often claim that they cannot be placed squarely either on the left or the right. Indeed, policies such as opposition to globalization and protection of the welfare state have much in common with left-wing parties. However, the philosophical principles underlying these claims distinguish them from left-wing ideology. Employing Bobbio’s distinction between the political left and right, we can conclude that the right assumes inequalities to be “natural” and should, therefore, not be addressed by the state through redistributive or transformative policies, as is

24

Setting the Context

frequently promoted by parties on the left.24 Mudde similarly notes, “the left considers the key inequalities between people artificial and wants to overcome them by active state involvement, whereas the right believes the main inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state.”25 The radical right is therefore a radicalized version of parties on the political right. The parties examined here are considered to be both right-wing and radical. I do not downplay the existence of right-wing extremist movements and parties in Western Europe. Nor do I deny that many extremists vote for radical right populist parties; however, this constitutes neither the core of their support nor their overarching ideology.

populism defined Radical right populist parties are both radical and populist; this new right-wing party family, therefore, has much in common with other populist political movements. Although populism is notoriously difficult to define, it is possible to identify its core characteristics. Any analysis of populism must begin with “the people” – the basis of all populist movements is the claim that political sovereignty rests upon an unmediated link between the leader and the people. Defining who “the people” are is difficult since populists are vague about the boundaries between “insiders” and “outsiders.” Mény and Surel argue that for populists, “the people” are the foundation of the political community;26 Taggart employs the term “heartland” to convey the idealized notion of a people who romanticize the past.27 Drawing on metaphors and images such as Middle America, Padania, rural French life, or traditional Austrian mountain culture (through events such as the Bierzelt and the Frühschoppen), populists proclaim to speak on behalf of the virtuous, silent majority, the backbone of society. Despite subtle, but important, distinctions, enough common ground exists to define who and what constitutes “the people”: they are the non-plural, virtuous, and homogenous groups that are part of the “everyday” and the “normal” core of the country or the region in question. Thus, they are not defined by class or by political ideology (left or right). Populists juxtapose “the people” against political elites. Mudde emphasizes that populists consider “society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

25

versus ‘the corrupt elite.’” He notes that populists proclaim that “politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (emphasis in original).28 In other words, the people are juxtaposed against the elites, who have usurped power and have contravened the basic contract of democracy: the idea that the people remain sovereign. In addition to the threat posed by the elites, populists target “dangerous others,” who are represented by outsiders who threaten the homogeneity and virtue of the heartland. A triangulation then occurs: the authentic people are juxtaposed against the corrupt elites and dangerous others. Populists on the left tend to point to the danger of large economic corporations and financial interests, while those on the right tend to scapegoat minority groups including immigrants, the unemployed, feminists, and environmentalists.29 These broad distinctions do not always hold, however, since populism is usually fused with a political ideology.30 For example, the current radical and populist right also opposes international corporate interests and globalization, even though this discourse is more common to the left.31 Populism also possesses a common form of organization and mobilization, combining centralized organizational structures with charismatic populist leadership.32 Although other party types may have centralized political institutions and charismatic leaders without being populist (i.e. Alleanza Nazionale), centralized leadership is essential to populist parties since it provides the unmediated link between the leader and the people.33 Direct and unmediated claims of popular representation are also a feature in their style of politics. Populist leaders present themselves as political outsiders, driven into politics out of a sense of duty for their people. They commonly express a concrete political message rooted in everyday issues, employ a language of “common sense” and a non-political mode of communication, conveying the sense that they are speaking as one of the “ordinary people.”34

populism and the radical right: defining the new party family Radical right populist parties conform to the populist ideal type described above, claiming to represent the common, hardworking, everyday citizen. The actual discourse in which this common person

26

Setting the Context

is embedded can vary; the French National Front claims to protect France for the ordinary French, the Freedom Party for the ordinary hard working Austrian, and the Lega Nord for the hard working Northern Italian.35 But all radical right populist parties portray lower middle and working class voters (the people) as the backbone of the nation and as victims of the political elite and special interests groups. The populist leader is essential to the success of radical right populist parties. In fact, their leader often becomes an embodiment of the party. For example, Jörg Haider was identified with the Austrian Freedom Party, 36 Jean-Marie Le Pen is automatically associated with the National Front, and Umberto Bossi with the Lega Nord. It is common for the leader to claim that he (or in the rare case she) is both of the people and speaks for the people. Supporters of radical right populist parties feel that when, for example, Bossi, Le Pen, and Haider speak they see their own opinions reflected in their leaders.37 Radical right populist parties capitalize on voter resentment towards, and alienation from traditional political parties, their leaders, and the party system. To do this, leaders of radical right populist parties cultivate an “everyday person” image with casual dress and a simple oratory and presentation style. They frequently use vulgar language to attack established politicians, and employ common vernacular or dialect. In the process, they oversimplify complex issues, calling for seemingly common-sense solutions to difficult and often contradictory problems. The charismatic populist leader claims to practise politics differently; he claims to break the rules that, he contends, have been created by professional politicians and bureaucrats, excluding the ordinary citizen from political power. The leader’s populist persona is often reinforced insofar as they emanate from “outside of the political mainstream during a time of declining public confidence in political institutions.”38 For example, Mogens Glistrup, the leader of the Danish Progress Party, was a tax lawyer, while Anders Lange, the founder of the Norwegian Progress Party, was a kennel owner; Bossi was a former medical student, and Haider was a sports model. Although radical right populist parties contend that they are more democratic and participatory than traditional and mainstream political parties, they are highly centralized. The charismatic leader and a few close allies formulate party policy and strategy.

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

27

Studies demonstrate that, in fact, centralized leadership, along with well-organized political parties, contribute to the continued success of radical right populist parties.39 Although these parties lack internal democracy, successful radical right parties are able to penetrate civil society and mobilize voters. Grassroots efforts, along with an army of volunteers, can mobilize voters and create loyal constituencies. Mudde points out that continued success depends on the organizational capabilities of the party and on local implementation. Thus, the “most successful populist radical right parties have both skillful external and internal leaders, working in unity towards the same goal.”40 Populism, however, only constitutes one of the defining characteristics of this new right-wing party family. Radical right populist parties are also united by common ideological platforms. The parties in question articulate an ideology that is nationalist and supports the authenticity of civil society; it is exclusionary (based upon nativist nationalism); and it supports a market economy, while opposing globalization.

nationalism, populism and an authentic civil society Nationalism is identified as a core characteristic of radical right populist parties. Mudde argues that according to “the primary literature on the various political parties generally associated with this party family, as well as the various studies of their ideologies, the core concept is undoubtedly the ‘nation.’”41 This is corroborated in statements by the parties in question: Haider argued that Austria should be for the Austrians;42 the Vlaams Blok proclaimed Our people first!;43 Le Pen claims that “we are above all nationalists”;44 the Swiss People’s Party defends the Swiss Sonderfall (Switzerland’s unique history, based upon neutrality, independence, prosperity, federalism, and direct democracy);45 the Lega Nord swears allegiance to Padania.46 However, the nationalism of radical right populist parties is also fused with its anti-state populism. Thus, even though it is correct to argue that radical right populist parties are nationalist, and they do support policies that protect the nation (in cultural or economic terms), they do not call for the return of a highly centralized state with a highly regulated economy or culture, as is common with fascist parties.47 Nationalism is combined with apprehension

28

Setting the Context

and fear of the state.48 The nationalism of radical right populist parties is fused with attacks on economic elites, politicians, and intellectuals, thereby attracting supporters who feel that politicians no longer address pressing economic and political issues. These feelings of resentment and apprehension towards political elites have more recently been directed at the European Union. The combination of nationalism and a high level of scepticism towards elites, has led to an emphasis on cultural politics and what I refer to as support for the moral and cultural authenticity of civil society. Radical right populists argue that civil society must be economically and culturally decolonized from political and economic elites, and that the political process needs to be de-bureaucratized. The preservation of morally authentic civil society is linked to the protection of truly productive individuals: those who work or are self-employed in the private sector and not those who are unemployed or on social assistance, considered to be “social parasites.” Moreover, it is within this autochthonous civil society that the authentic values, morality, and culture are claimed to be found. These developments have led radical right populist parties to support conservative and traditional stances on issues such as abortion, family, religion, and law and order. This was not always the case. In fact, initial supporters of the radical right included individuals who were productivist, but also liberal on post-material issues (i.e. they demonstrated concern for the environment and did not appear to be hostile to feminist issues and the expansion of gay rights.) In the early years, Bossi openly opposed the Church, and early supporters of both Haider and Le Pen did not necessarily support anti-abortion, pro-family, and Catholic policies.49 However, as the policies of radical right populist parties have shifted, becoming increasingly complex and well-articulated, the parties have come to support socially conservative platforms on issues of family, religion, and sexual orientation, generally centred on Christian values.50 The literature on radical right populism points to an emphasis on authoritarian themes such as law and order and support for family values.51

exclusion and nativist nationalism It comes as no surprise that populist leaders exploit immigration. Immigrants are scapegoated as the source of crime and violence, the scarcity of local jobs, and the overburdening of the welfare state.52

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

29

Populist leaders use the high numbers of foreigners in most Western European countries and growing fears of immigration to their political advantage.53 Opposition to immigration is based on what Mudde terms “nativist national” sentiments.54 Nativist nationalists claim that states “should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (emphasis in original).55 Thus, even though exclusion is usually aimed at immigrants, internal enemies such as Jews and the Roma – or internal others such as southern Italians in the case of Italy – are also targeted. Nativism is the link that unites exclusion directed towards internal and external enemies.56 Political movements that practice one form of exclusion (i.e. towards an internal enemy, for example) have demonstrated a tendency to incorporate other forms of exclusion in a subsequent political context.57 The Lega Nord, which originally scapegoated southern Italians, has increased its anti-immigrant political discourse since the mid-1990s.58 Although nativist nationalism is associated, often exclusively, with opposition to immigration, radical right populist parties should not be labelled as merely anti-immigrant parties.59 Nevertheless, there is no question that opposition to immigration has become central to their political platforms and to their continued electoral success. However, there has been an epistemological transition from biological to cultural justifications of exclusion. Radical right populist parties have been influenced by the Nouvelle Droite (New Right). Shaped by Gramscian notions of cultural hegemony, the New Right was formed in France in the 1960s and the 1970s to counter what its founders perceived as left-wing hegemony. The New Right sought to re-legitimate the extreme and radical right in a post-Holocaust context by abandoning biological notions of racism and focusing instead on culture. The European radical right no longer argues that specific cultures are superior to others, instead they maintain that all cultures, European and non-European, have the right to protect their cultural identity.60 As Rydgren notes, the New Right departs “from the left’s notion of difference” and multiculturalism, arguing that this doctrine is misplaced and that cultures must remain separate and distinct if they are to protect their identities. By “adopting the doctrine of ethnopluralism … [extreme right] parties were able to mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists.”61 Cultural notions of exclusion (the new

30

Setting the Context

racism) serve as justification for nation-states to control immigration, limiting new arrivals to not only those who are willing and able to work, but also to those who are willing and able to assimilate into local culture.62

populist political economy: between neo-liberalism and anti-globalization For the continued success of radical right populist parties, the general consensus within the literature is that economic policy is not as important as cultural politics (i.e. immigration and national identity), questions of security, and dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties.63 In contrast to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when scholars more readily recognized that economic liberalism was an important component of radical right populist party platforms, and an important reason for voter support,64 more recently the critical focus has shifted, perhaps too strongly, towards an exclusive focus on immigration, thus minimizing the importance of economic policies. Immigration and cultural politics are central to the ideology and the continued success of radical right parties, especially since the mid-1990s. However, economic issues still constitute an essential component of their political platforms, ideologies and voter support. Radical right populist parties, much like mainstream parties, choose and attempt to exploit the salient issues of the day, depending on the particular political context. Close examination of radical right populist platforms reveals a continued focus on economic issues. These parties generally promote a free-market economy, although this support of liberal economic policy is tempered by anti-globalization platforms. Early on, Le Pen, Bossi, and Haider were influenced by Thatcherite neoliberalism, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. Liberal economic policies were integral to the platforms of the Lega Nord, the Freedom Party, and the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties. Free-market liberal economic policy was used to attack the welfare state, as well as taxation, spending, and interventionist policies.65 In addition the radical right populist parties linked economic liberalism with autonomy, freedom, economic prosperity, and a productivist culture.66 These policies attracted small business owners, shopkeepers, and blue-collar workers disillusioned by

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

31

deindustrialization and the inability of the welfare state to tackle economic problems. If most radical right populist parties initially had neo-liberal policies, or at least supported a market economy, more recently they have begun to oppose uncontrolled and unbridled capitalism. The French National Front, the Lega Nord, the Freedom Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Danish People’s Party are some of the strongest voices against globalization, corporate elites, and the Americanization of European capitalism. It is now common for radical right populist leaders to support the European model of capitalism and the European welfare state.67 Opposition to economic globalization among radical right populist parties is based on three elements: globalization is elite driven, serving economic and political elite interests; globalization limits state sovereignty; and globalization is linked to the growing power of the European Union. Radical right populist parties are highly critical of the financial power of international capital, the state, banks, and large corporations. It is claimed that this wide range of economic and political elites support a similar political and economic agenda that threatens national sovereignty.68 Although the radical right initially argued that neo-liberal economic policies were needed to tackle corrupt elites, it now proclaims that neo-liberalism transfers economic power – through privatizations of state monopolies – to global, corporate monopolies. Radical right populist parties argue that in order to limit economic globalization, the state needs to better regulate international trade and finance.69 Opposition to the European Union is also common to radical right populism. Since the mid-1990s, traditional populist antagonism toward political elites has been redirected toward the bureaucratic and elite nature of the European Union. European integration is linked with globalization and the unwanted encroachment of international institutions into the sovereignty of the nation-state. Radical right populist parties have not always opposed the European Union, however. For example, until the early 1990s, the Austrian Freedom Party supported European integration.70 The same is true of the Lega Nord, which, until the mid-1990s, was pro-EU; it perceived the European Union as a means by which to reduce the reach of the nation-state.71 In the 1980s the French National Front claimed that France should not isolate itself, but work with other European

32

Setting the Context

countries through the European Union in order to solve the problems of the modern world.72 However, as the scope (and direction) of the European Union expanded (especially post-Maastricht), and as the radical right populist opposition to globalization intensified, they began to frame European integration in terms of the economic, political, and bureaucratic colonization of civil society, as an infringement on national sovereignty, as a facilitator of globalization, and as a means of letting Turkey into the EU. As a result, euroscepticism is now common among radical right populists.73

classes and coalitions: towards a “typical” radical right populist voter Radical right populist parties possess both a specific ideology and a mode of political mobilization and organization. However, the parties also draw support from identifiable segments of the population. The literature unanimously concludes that supporters include the petite-bourgeoisie (consisting of the self-employed and small business owners) and the working class.74 Self-employed workers and small business owners were attracted to radical right populist parties from the outset, but in the 1990s support from the working class steadily increased.75 Public sector employees and educated professionals (private and public) are less likely to vote for the radical right.76 In the 1980s and 1990s, self-employed and working class voters were already gravitating towards radical right populist parties. However, these parties also received support from other voters during this time.77 For example, in the late 1980s and especially the early 1990s (before the party evolved into a radical right populist party), the Lega was supported by a wide cross-section of Italian society. This was particularly evident from 1992-94, when the party hoped to fill the void created by the demise of the Christian Democratic Party.78 In the 1980s, the French National Front was supported by liberal professionals and the well-educated middle class, and did not receive significant levels of support from the working class;79 support for the party was also fluid, often moving across the left-right divide.80 In the 1980s in Austria, the Freedom Party was supported by the self-employed and professionals – white collar employees and skilled workers. In fact, “voters with higher levels of education were overrepresented.”81 In the 1990 elections support from skilled workers increased and remained strong among professionals and the self-employed.82

Radical Right Populism as a Party Family

33

By the mid-1990s, three clear trends had emerged. First, higher numbers of working class voters began to support radical right populist parties.83 This increase in working class support was, in part, facilitated by defections from social democratic parties;84 while working class voters who are also non-unionized are more vulnerable to the appeals of radical right populist parties.85 Second, the parties began to lose support from the well-educated middle class and from professionals.86 Third, support for radical right populist parties had stabilized, and these supporters had become some of the most loyal voters; this was a dramatic change from the 1980s.87 Radical right populist voters can be classified in terms of gender, education, and age. Their supporters are more likely to be male,88 even in countries where they have been relatively successful with women voters.89 This is not to imply that women do not support radical right populist parties; in fact, the parties have attempted to balance their support for traditional (gendered) communities and traditional family values with the recognition that women are also workers.90 Radical right populist parties court the female vote by supporting increased childcare funding and tax reductions for stayat-home mothers. More recently they have even become outspoken supporters of women’s rights, particularly in the context of debates concerning the role of women in Western (i.e. Christian) versus nonWestern (i.e. Islamic) societies.91 On occasion, women have even led radical right populist parties: Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter (Marine Le Pen) is rumoured to be next in line to lead the French National Front; Pia Kjærsgaard currently leads the Danish People’s Party, and Susanne Riess-Passer was the interim leader of the Austrian Freedom Party in 2000.92 Radical right parties also tend to be supported by voters from specific age groups, particularly young voters93 who were previously non-aligned and not politically integrated. Several researchers have also argued that radical right populist parties have been particularly successful with older voters, especially pensioners.94 Generally, lesseducated voters are more likely to support radical right populist parties. However, supporters are not necessarily uneducated; voters who have completed high school and/or who have a technical degree are the most likely to vote for radical right populist parties. University graduates are less likely to support these parties.95 Support also depends on specific trends in the fears, anxieties, and attitudes of supporters. Research indicates that greater dissatisfaction

34

Setting the Context

with national democracy increases the salience of radical right populist parties, while radical right populist supporters demonstrate high levels of mistrust towards political elites and political institutions.96 They are also most fearful of immigration, crime, and present a general picture of apprehension and insecurity towards their surroundings and their future.97 It is important not to search for the single homogenous radical right populist voter, while it is also important not to allow our analysis of voters to deterministically define a party. However, despite these cautions, it has become evident that specific segments of society vote for radical right populist parties.

the rise of radical right populism in western europe With the exception of the early success of the Progress parties, the third wave of radical right political parties did not emerge in Western European countries until the 1980s. As we see below, radical right populist parties have disparate origins and are bound by the histories of their respective nations, by their national party systems, electoral systems, and political economies. As a result, depending on the specific election and/or the particular political juncture, each of the parties in question, not unlike mainstream political parties, has emphasized or minimized particular issues at different times. Still, all of the parties in question share enough similarities to place them into a common party family. They have converged most notably in terms of political ideology, political organization, and electoral constituency.

the french national front: from the margins to electoral success Even though the French National Front (FN) was formed in 1972, it was not until it received 11.08% of the vote in the 1984 European elections that the party experienced significant electoral success.98 The delayed success of the party was in spite of the fact that the original purpose of forming the FN was to move from the political fringe and compete in electoral politics.99 Initially, the French National Front was a heterogeneous collection of extremist and radical right-wing parties and movements. The choice of Jean-Marie Le Pen as leader was indicative of the early

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electoral intentions of the party. Le Pen was a compromise; he had been active in the radical and extreme right, but was far enough removed from right-wing activity to allow him to compete in electoral politics.100 From the outset, familiar themes such as anti-communism, immigration, nationalism, and traditional values dominated the party platforms; however, these political issues did not resonate with the voting public until the 1980s.101 In the 1980s, larger numbers of voters began to lose confidence in the mainstream political parties. As a consequence, Le Pen began to add typical populist techniques to his repertoire, arguing that the political class and the mainstream parties no longer represented the true interests of the people, and that only he uniquely represented the will of the common person.102 In the early 1980s, the National Front politicized immigration and by the late 1980s and early 1990s, it espoused neo-liberal policies.103 Throughout the 1990s, however, support for a market economy was complemented by scepticism towards excessive neo-liberalism and opposition to globalization. The party’s increasing deployment of populist strategies and these abovementioned themes was mirrored by its rising electoral success: in the 1986 parliamentary elections the party received 9.80% of the national vote, 9.73% (first ballot) in 1988, and 12.68% (first ballot) in 1993, and 15.23% (first ballot) in the 1997 elections.104 The success of the National Front continued into the 21st century, and Le Pen even made it to the second round of the 2002 presidential elections. Although the party’s political support did not dramatically increase, Le Pen defeated the Socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of the presidential elections, allowing him to face off against Jacques Chirac in the second round of the French runoff electoral system.105 Since the 2002 elections, support for the party has wavered; nevertheless the National Front remains important and influential within the French party system.106 Not only has the National Front become a permanent member of the party system, it also boasts some of the most loyal supporters when compared with other French political parties.107

austria’s freedom party: from liberalism to radical right populism In Austria, the new radical right surfaced after the election of Jörg Haider to the leadership of the Freedom Party in 1986.108 Over time,

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Haider fused his populist, charismatic leadership with anti-immigrant, free-market rhetoric, transforming the Freedom Party from a loose collection of liberals, neo-fascists, and nationalists into a radical right populist party.109 In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, opposition to the Austrian party system and the highly politicized consociational/ consensus democracy and neo-corporatist welfare state accounted for Haider’s early electoral success.110 As was common among parties within this emerging party family, neo-liberalism was employed to attack the highly bureaucratic state.111 Between 1983 (before Haider took over the party) and 1990, support for the party increased from 5.0% to 16.6% of the vote.112 Despite this early success, it was not until the early 1990s that the party began to vocally oppose immigration. In 1993, it organized an anti-immigrant referendum. The referendum was not successful given the low level of participation.113 By the mid-1990s the Freedom Party had largely consolidated its political identity. The 1997 party Congress was an important turning point as it formally adopted a new platform. The party no longer officially supported pan-Germanic nationalism (a carryover from its post-war period). Instead, its aim was to vocally defend Austria for the Austrians.114 The platform also focused on family values, Christianity, and balanced support for the welfare state (what it referred to as a fair market economy) with support for a market economy. 115 The electoral success of the party increased throughout the 1990s, reaching 22.5% of the national vote in 1994 and 22.0% in 1995. In 1999 it received 26.9% of the national vote and formed a coalition government with the center-right People’s Party in 2000.116 Ironically, holding political office marked the beginning of the decline of the Freedom Party, suffering internal divisions and electoral setbacks. Divisions occurred between the leadership and grassroots, and between factions within the party who supported neo-liberal fiscal policies and those who feared that an excessive focus on neo-liberalism would alienate the “popular” classes.117 These internal divisions, and the uncertainty that accompanied political power, led to a series of electoral defeats. These internal divisions caused the party to split in 2005 when Haider formed the Alliance for the Future of Austria.118 The Freedom Party went into opposition, while the newly formed Alliance for the Future of Austria remained in government until 2006. The difficulty that the Freedom Party had in maintaining its support while in power highlights the difficulty that radical right populist parties have in

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moving from oppositional parties to parties in government.119 Not all radical right populist parties have suffered this fate; the Lega Nord, for example, has been able to balance its populist and radical right political identity while in government.120 In the years following these events, it appeared that radical right populism was in decline in Austria; but surprisingly, in the 2008 elections, the Freedom Party and the Alliance for the Future of Austria obtained a combined total of 28.2% of the national vote. Although the radical right fragmented, it had its best showing since the 1999 elections. With the death of Haider in October 2008, the future of the Austrian radical right seems uncertain; although the evidence suggests that Heinz-Christian Strache, the leader of the Freedom Party, has thus far managed to fill the void.121

germany: the republikaner party – a borderline radical right populist party In Germany, dissenting members of the Christian Social Union (the Bavarian sister party of the Christian Democratic Union) founded the Republikaner Party in 1983. In its initial stages, the party represented nothing more than a national-conservative party, placing special emphasis on German unification; it even took care to explicitly differentiate itself from other German extreme right-wing parties. However, when Franz Schönhuber took over the leadership in 1985, the party began to radicalize. Schönhuber intended to transform the party into a “modern” radical right party.122 The party’s 1987 political platform resembled the platforms of other European radical right populist parties; it increased its anti-immigrant rhetoric and began to denounce the state and the established political parties as corrupt. Its electoral breakthrough came in the West Berlin state elections in 1989, when it won 7.5% of the vote. In the European elections of the same year, it received 7.1% of the vote. However, the party’s success was short-lived and ended in 1990 with German reunification.123 The inability of the Republikaner Party to break into the German party system stems, in part, from the higher level of intolerance for right-wing parties in Germany, and from the inability of the party to exploit populism.124 The Republikaner Party in Germany, therefore, represents a borderline case in terms of success and party type. The party did not make the full transition to a radical right populist party since it was not able to fully shed its image as a neo-fascist party.

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The success and failure of radical right populism in Germany highlights the importance of agency, while it also points to the extent to which national context must be taken into account. Given the lower level of tolerance for right-wing parties in Germany, it is even more important than elsewhere in Europe for radical right populist parties to separate themselves from the legacy of Nazism.

switzerland’s people’s party: radical right populism in the alps In Switzerland, radical right populism emerged with the transformation of the People’s Party in the 1990s. Founded in 1971, it was a well-established party and a member of the governing Federal Council. The party began to radicalize under the leadership of the Zurich wing, and more specifically, under the tutelage of Christoph Blocher. In the early 1990s, it began to challenge Swiss consociational democracy, stressing a clear dichotomy between the elite and the people.125 The party campaigned to protect Swiss identity, opposed entry into the European Union, and voiced opposition to immigration, claiming that immigrants threatened the Swiss way of life and the security and the well-being of Swiss citizens.126 The party, much like other radical right populist parties, supports a market economy, less taxation, and less state interference; however, this emphasis on a market economy is complemented with demands for protections against globalization. In the Swiss case, globalization is framed less as an economic and more as a cultural threat.127 These ideological transformations were complemented with the institutionalization of the party around Blocher, a centralized, charismatic leader.128 The radicalization of the party paid off: in 1995 it won 14.9% of the national vote; in 1999 it won 22.5%. In 2003 it received 26.7% of the vote, becoming the largest Swiss party. Due to the continued success of the party, Blocher was accepted into the governing Federal Council; however, due to his confrontational style of politics, Blocher was not re-elected in 2007, in spite of the fact that the party’s support had increased once again in the 2007 elections. The party, protesting the exclusion of their leader from the Federal Council, went into opposition. This strategy proved unsuccessful, and it returned to its role in government in 2009.129

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belgium: from vlaams blok to the vlaams belang – minority nationalism and radical right populism In Belgium, radical right populism emerged from Flemish minority nationalism. In 1977 the nationalist movement divided over disagreements regarding the federalization of Belgium. Splinter factions from the nationalist Volksunie (VU), a Flemish ethnic nationalist party, objected to the agreement that the VU had signed with other Belgian parties concerning the federalization of the state. The more radical factions argued that the proposal was too moderate.130 These divisions eventually led to the creation of the Vlaams Blok in 1979, when two splinter parties, the Flemish National Party and the Flemish Popular Party, joined forces.131 Initially, the Vlaams Blok’s political platform emphasized themes that were consistent with Flemish nationalist parties; although it must be emphasized that its brand of nationalism already focused heavily on ethnic nationalist themes and must be considered extremist.132 Three themes dominated the party’s early years: independence for Flanders, VU betrayal, and amnesty for Nazi collaborators.133 By the mid-1980s the party began to reorient its political platform. A new generation of leadership began to focus on immigration, while opposition to multiculturalism became important.134 In the 1987 elections, the Vlaams Blok ran on the platform of “Our People First!”, while immigration continued to be an important issue for the party. However, as with other radical right populist parties, the Vlaams Blok is not a single-issue party. In the 1980s, it began to campaign for traditional values by supporting law and order legislation, opposing abortion, emphasizing support for the family, and objecting to European integration.135 As the party radicalized, its support increased throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and into the new millennium.136 The Vlaams Blok has, however, always walked a thin line within the Belgian political system. After a court decision in 2004, the party was forced to change its name and moderate its political platform when the constitutional court ruled that three of its political associations espoused racist propaganda. The plaintiffs argued that “the propaganda material put out by these three associations advocated systematic discrimination.”137

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Setting the Context

the progress parties and beyond: denmark and norway – from protest to radical right populism In Denmark and Norway, the radical right’s success continued after its initial surge in the early 1970s. The Norwegian Progress Party’s success was spotty until the 1990s. After the death of its founder, Anders Lange, the party leadership was taken over by Carl I. Hagen, who proved able to consolidate the party organizationally, while expanding its political platform.138 In the 1980s its political platform evolved from an anti-tax protest party to include anti-immigrant, authoritarian themes with demands to protect the welfare state for nationals, while maintaining its support for a market economy.139 Since the 1997 elections, the Progress Party has emerged as one of the three most electorally successful Norwegian political parties.140 In Denmark, due in part to the loss of its charismatic leader Mogens Glistrup (who served jail time for tax fraud) and internal divisions and factions, the success of the Progress Party waned.141 The People’s Party (formed in 1995) replaced the Danish Progress Party. After the 1998 elections, the People’s Party became the strongest Danish radical right populist party. Pia Kjærsgaard, one of the few women to lead a populist party, also exhibits typical populist characteristics, while the party, as with other radical right populist parties, is highly centralized around its leader.142 The party objects to immigration and the creation of a multicultural society, it opposes European integration, and it balances support for a market economy with support for the welfare state for Danish citizens.143 The party has not articulated a clear stance on globalization; however, its position can be summarized as fearful toward the perceived threat of globalization.144 Its support has steadily increased, from 7.4% in the 1998 national elections, to 12.4% in the 2001 elections; in 2005 it received 13.3% of the vote, and 13.9% in 2007. However, perhaps more significantly, since 2001, the party has supported the center-right minority government and has had a significant influence on public policy.145

the lega nord and the emergence of radical right populism in italy Italy represents a particularly interesting case for studying populism and the radical right. On the surface it could be argued that it has had

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several right-wing or populist parties: Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, and the Lega Nord. However, this is an oversimplification, and in fact, it is wrong to group all these parties together. Forza Italia was a center right populist party,146 Alleanza Nazionale was a party in transition towards a conservative or perhaps a neo-Gaullist party,147 and the Lega Nord represents a radical right populist party.148

perspectives on the lega nord: protest, regionalism, populism and radical right populism When the Lega Nord first came onto the scene in the 1980s it was considered a protest party, due to its support from voters who were disenchanted with the governing Christian Democratic Party and the Italian state. Studies of the initial rise of the leagues in northern Italy (and subsequently the Lega) noted that voters used this new political phenomenon as a vehicle to express their frustration with corruption, as well as with economic and social policies that no longer represented their interests, especially in electoral constituencies that had been dominated by the Christian Democratic Party.149 The emphasis on the Lega as a protest party led to a certain level of scepticism about its political longevity. Moreover, scholars were apprehensive about categorizing the party. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Lega was not as “radical” as other radical right populist parties; scholars were also reluctant to classify it squarely within the context of regionalist political movements. When the party was in its infancy attachment to the party and its nationalist claims were often perceived as fleeting. Protest was clearly an important element in the initial rise of the Lega, but does not explain the party’s continued success; the party remains a permanent and influential member of the Italian party system even now, twenty years after its founding. Although the Lega obtained early success as a protest party, its original demands were for regional self-determination. Comprehensive studies of minority nationalism have included the Lega Nord for good reason.150 Since the initial formation of the leagues in the 1980s and the Lega Nord in 1991, the movement has advocated federalism, separation, or devolution. Even in the early 1990s, after the fall of the First Republic, the party did not abandon its demands to restructure the state. After 1996 it called for the north to separate from Italy, and since achieving power in 2001 it has advocated devolution.

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Despite its inclusion with other regionalist parties, scholars still argue over the Lega’s nationalism and the extent to which support for the party is predicated upon its nationalist aspirations. Diamanti, and Cento Bull and Gilbert focus on how the socio-economic context of the Third Italy, combined with Christian Democratic strongholds, has facilitated the rise of the Lega.151 They have built on research that highlights the specific socio-economic constellation of the region, focusing on the extent to which industrialization and associational life have created a specific form of localism that is endemic to the northeast. 152 The Lega is thus situated within a context of declining support for the Christian Democratic Party and competing visions of economic policies between the Third Italy and the declining Industrial Triangle. These researchers analyze how the Lega has mobilized voters who are apprehensive of the state, critical of existing fiscal pressures and a lack of social services, and who fear the demise of their local cultures and communities.153 They emphasize that the Lega has successfully reversed what had historically been framed as the “southern question” into the “northern question.”154 Within this framework less attention is paid to the Lega’s ability to construct a nationalist movement; the focus is instead on how the party fuses localism with an us against them discourse (“them” being represented by the south, Rome, and immigrants).155 These scholars tend to be sceptical of the legitimacy of the Lega’s nationalist claims, focusing instead on the specific socio-economic and associational life within the north, and especially the north-east.156 Other political scientists have focused on how the Lega has constructed a nationalist or regionalist belonging. This group argues that nationalist identities do not have an a priori existence and that the Lega does not differ, therefore, from other nationalist movements; it too has constructed a nationalist movement by creating an “imagined community.” For example, Tambini is less concerned with the authenticity of Lega nationalism. Instead, he focuses on the process whereby the party has successfully fused collective action and identity to construct a nationalist movement.157 Likewise, Schmidtke argues that the Lega is emblematic of a new form of regionalism that politicizes the local. He claims that localism should not be viewed as an essentialist identity, or as a pre-modern condition, but as a modern response to political and economic grievances.158 In a similar vein, Huysseune argues that the discourse and political success of the Lega is rooted within the tendency to view Italian unification as an

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incomplete project; a view that is propagated by social scientists with a specific vision and understanding of modernity.159 These studies are not insensitive to the socio-economic and political context of the Third Italy, but they focus less on these contexts and more on the construction of a regionalist and nationalist identity. In reality, the success of the Lega Nord and its ability to construct a “nationalist” political party lies somewhere between these two perspectives. There is no question that the socio-economic dynamics of the Third Italy, the demise of Christian Democratic hegemony, and the restructuring of the Italian economy were important to the party’s initial success. However, over time the party has also created a political movement of believers: loyal supporters of the party feel that they are defending a northern cultural identity. Critics of the nationalist argument claim that the Lega has more in common with other populist movements across Europe. Proponents of the populist school argue that populism is the defining characteristic of parties such as the Lega Nord, Forza Italia, the French National Front, and the Austrian Freedom Party.160 As mentioned earlier, in the early 1990s Taggart argued that these kinds of parties were successful because of their populism.161 Similarly, Mény and Surel and Albertazzi and McDonnell argue that populism has become a Europe-wide phenomenon.162 Classification of the Lega as a populist party appears appropriate, particularly through the mid to late 1990s, when Umberto Bossi carved out a position as an oppositional political force, challenging taboos and pushing controversial issues such as federalism, devolution, and opposition to immigration, globalization, and the European Union. Those who consider the Lega to be a populist party are engaged within a larger debate concerning populism’s link with the radical right. As noted above, one school of thought is that the current wave of radical right parties should be classified as populist parties, because populism represents their defining ideology, political organization, and political mobilization.163 Others distinguish between the radical right and populism.164 Still others argue that parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Danish People’s Party combine populism with a radical right ideology.165 Those who place the Lega within the context of radical right populism argue that Bossi, like other populist leaders, employs the language of common sense, juxtaposing the common people with elites and corrupt politicians. An emphasis is also

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placed on the party’s anti-immigrant message, its exclusionary nationalism, its affirmation of authoritarian values, and its opposition to globalization and the European Union, claiming that these common ideological features unite the party with other radical right populist parties.166 In this study, I argue that the Lega is a radical right populist party. In reality, I argue that it is not possible, and not necessary, to distinguish between the Lega as a regionalist and a radical right populist party; in other words, it is a regionalist party with a radical right populist ideology. Regional sovereignty, federalism, and devolution have been a constant theme throughout the party’s evolution. However, in addition to the party’s regionalism, it has evolved into a radical right populist party, in terms of ideology, organization, and political support. Placing the Lega within the radical right populist family is contingent on a clear understanding of what is meant by radical right populism and the ideology, political organization, and the electorate of the Lega.167

the lega as a radical right populist party This book will demonstrate that by the mid-1990s the Lega Nord had become a radical right populist party. The party’s initial success was partially due to its ability to attract the protest vote. As the Italian political system crumbled in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party was able to mobilize voters who had lost confidence in their political leaders. However, the protest thesis does not explain the party’s ability to maintain an important political role throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. The continued success of the Lega can be explained in part by voter support for the party’s nationalism. The socio-economic conditions of the Third Italy were crucial to the rise of the Lega. Moreover, the party’s continued success rests on the social construction of a national belonging and the construction of a regionalist nationalism. However, placing the party within the context of other regionalist parties does not explain the complexity and the full extent of the party’s political ideology; nor does it take sufficient account of the importance of populism in its political success.168 The Lega Nord (and possibly the Vlaams Belang) is particularly interesting because, unlike other regionalist parties such as the Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union), the Esquerra

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Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia), the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party), and the Scottish National Party, it is one of the few regionalist political parties that has an anti-immigrant platform (influenced by the Nouvelle Droite), opposes the European Union, supports a populist political economy that explicitly opposes globalization, and is structured around a charismatic and populist leader. Thus, the Lega is a regionalist party, but also a radical right populist party. Placing regionalist political parties such as the Lega Nord within the radical right populist camp highlights the diverse ideological strains of regionalist political parties.169 As Keating notes, “Political regionalism becomes associated with an array of ideologies, and is not inherently linked to any one of them.”170

2 Opportunity Structures, Political Mobilization, and Radical Right Populism: The Origins and the Radicalization of the Lega Nord A focus on opportunity structures and political mobilization helps to clarify why the Lega and other radical right populist parties emerged when they did, and why they have continued to achieve success since the 1990s and well into the new millennium. At the end of the 20th century, similar socio-economic and political changes were taking place across Western Europe (summarized briefly below); yet within Italy, these changes manifest themselves in ways specific to the country, such as the emergence of small and mediumsized businesses in the Third Italy and the complete transformation of the party system. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the leagues, and, subsequently the Lega Nord, emerged as the political response to the growing economic power of the Third Italy and the decline of the Christian Democratic hegemony. The Lega successfully mobilized feelings of mistrust and political alienation among ex-DC voters within the small and medium-sized towns located within the small-scale industrial districts of the Third Italy (within the northeast) to create a new territorially-based politic. The success of the Lega in the 1990s, and afterward, along with its radicalization and transition to radical right populism were the result of a series of evolving opportunity structures. This chapter focuses on the evolution of the Second Republic: the new party system, globalization (and the threat it posed to the Third Italy), accelerated EU integration, and higher rates of immigration. In the midst of these socio-economic and political transformations, the Lega established a permanent niche within the party system of the Second Republic. In

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the process, it distinguished itself from new parties such as Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale (as it transformed into a post fascist party), and the smaller centre-right Christian democratic parties.1 The ideological evolution of the party and its radicalization were calculated responses to growing fear of economic insecurity, the perceived cultural and economic decline of local communities, and apprehensions concerning European integration.2

changing opportunity structures: western europe and italy Scholars generally agree that the political and economic context of the immediate post-war era (roughly 1945-1973) limited opportunities for populist and radical right mobilization.3 The post-war party system, the welfare state, and the economic organization of society (built on unions and employer associations) acted as both a legitimating force and as an institutionalized means through which to channel political conflict. High levels of economic growth, based on large-scale factory production, and an expanding welfare state created what is often referred to as the era of Fordism.4 This socio-economic organization of society dovetailed with postwar political organization and party systems. The “mass” and subsequently the “catchall party”5 filtered “identical interests” and demands (more often than not class demands) through the bureaucracy and the internal representative channels of political parties.6 In other words, political parties maintained close links with unions, employer associations, and other forms of collective representation such as farm and business organizations, and the denominational and nondenominational social service and non-profit sector. During the height of post-war democracy, political parties were the glue that linked popular sovereignty and civil society with the state and constitutional democracy. The mandate of the party was to mobilize citizens within civil society and to act as their partisan representatives in parliament; the political party was the mediating force that guaranteed representative democracy.7 Mastropaolo refers to this as an era of “organized democracy.” It was an epoch during which political parties “took on the responsibility of governing.” Parties were intent upon “bringing citizens into (and guiding them through) the labyrinth of universal suffrage and representative democracy.”8 “Organized democracy” minimized opportunities for

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populist and anti-establishment parties since the existing political parties were perceived as vehicles of legitimate political representation and as the custodians of economic growth and expanding levels of material well-being. In the 1970s, however, across Western Europe, the post-war economic and political model began to crumble, opening a space for new political parties. The economic crisis of the post-war economy and the changing structures of work in the context of post-Fordism spawned grievances and frustrations that facilitated the emergence of radical right populist parties. The ineffectiveness of fiscal policies (especially via state spending) in the face of stagflation in the 1970s created an ideological void.9 For the first time since the end of the Second World War, economic growth stagnated, unemployment spiked, and the post-war economic and social model built roughly on the Keynesian welfare state appeared unable to solve the ensuing economic and social crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.10 With declining trust in the welfare state and the ability of political elites to manage the crisis, voters began to look for alternative political voices. Post-Fordist restructuring continued well into the 21st century, as the effects of internationalized trade, finance, and production created new socio-economic insecurities. Faced with globalization, trust in political elites declines, as more and more citizens feel that the government cannot effectively confront this new reality. This has led to a gap in political legitimacy and, in some cases, has created opportunities for a populist response.11 Eurobarometer polls published in 2003 corroborate these findings: 77% of respondents were aware of globalization, 20% felt that their country’s economy was too open, 54% felt that their country should exert more influence in controlling globalization, and 56% proclaimed that more regulation was required. Perhaps most interestingly, 79% of Europeans felt that anti-globalization movements raise points that should be debated, however, 53% expressed scepticism about the solutions that these movements proposed.12 Although it is not possible to draw a direct correlation between these expressed apprehensions and the rise of radical right populist parties, public opinion surveys such as these highlight the extent to which a significant portion of Europeans are fearful of economic liberalization. Even though European governments ended their active recruitment of immigrant labour in the early 1970s, European states, since the 1980s, have experienced high levels of immigration (and increases

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in asylum seekers and family reunifications), and the transition to de facto multicultural and multiethnic societies.13 Unlike in the immediate post-war era, when immigration was perceived as primarily a concern for labour market policies (for example, the German guest worker model), in the 1980s, 1990s, and well into the 21st century, immigration has been transformed into a highly politicized issue, with far-ranging implications for citizenship, integration, and security.14 An analysis of the 2000 Eurobarometer, conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, demonstrated that Europeans are apprehensive about immigration. Of the EU-15 countries (i.e. the states from the pre-2004 expansion), 21% of the total populace were actively tolerant, 39% were passively tolerant, 25% were ambivalent, and 14% were intolerant. Although only a minority were outright intolerant, the majority fell somewhere between ambivalent to passively tolerant.15 At the same time, the pace of European integration, especially since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, monetary integration, the euro, the eastward expansion of the EU, and attempts to create a European constitution, have dramatically increased the breadth and scope of the European Union. Eurobarometer polls demonstrate that a significant percentage of Europeans are concerned about European integration. For example, in 2007, although the majority of Europeans were supportive of the EU (57%), some 25% concluded that EU membership is neither good nor bad, while 15% viewed membership as bad.16 The transformation of political parties and party systems accompany these socio-economic changes. If, in the post-war period, the political party was the mediating force that guaranteed representative democracy, more recently, the rise of the “cartel party”17 has produced closer links between political parties and the state, blurring political ideologies. This party type is part and parcel of the declining presence of the party within civil society18 – a decline that coincides with lower voter turnout, increased voter volatility, and declining party membership.19 As a result, these opportunity structures set the stage for the rise of new parties, among them radical right populist parties. 20 As trust in governing elites dissipates, new solutions, and especially populist “common sense” solutions, become more attractive to voters. However, despite the implications of socio-economic and political transformations, as Mudde notes, opportunity structures themselves

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Setting the Context

simply present political parties “with a series of possibilities.” Success and failure depends on the ability of the parties to exploit these opportunities. He correctly highlights that “In line with scholarship on political parties in general, populist radical right parties should no longer be seen simply as ‘hapless victims of their economic or democratic environments, but as … active shapers of their fates …’ In other words, the party itself should be included as a major factor in explaining its electoral success and failure.”21

italian opportunity structures: the end of the post-war era These broad European socio-economic and political developments had specific characteristics within the Italian context. In the immediate post-war era, the Italian economy grew at a faster pace than any other European country, with the exception of Germany.22 During the era of the “economic miracle” (roughly from the1950s to the mid-1960s), large-scale Fordist production and mass consumption industrialized Italian society.23 Tensions began to appear in the 1960s, as productivity declined, growth slowed, and the number of strikes and demonstrations increased.24 The latter were in response to attempts by the government and businesses to restore profit margins through austerity measures and wage controls, and by increasing the rate of production, culminating in the “Hot Autumn” of 1969. After 1969 Italy began to lose its competitive advantage, labour costs increased (especially in relation to productivity) and energy costs (especially after the 1973 oil crisis) skyrocketed. Italy experienced some of the highest rates of inflation in the industrialized world.25 In the international context, the 1970s were characterized by national and international restructuring spurred on by stagflation, the energy crisis, declining rates of growth and productivity, and the deregulation of capital and financial markets.26 The Italian response was, in part, to decentralize production by creating small and medium sized firms. Beginning in the 1970s, factories in the Industrial Triangle implemented layoffs, cutbacks, and new forms of technology. As a result, the motor of the economy gravitated from the Industrial Triangle to the “Third Italy”: the small and medium-sized businesses, factories, and industrial districts in the Veneto, in parts of eastern Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia,

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and in central Italy where the Third Italy includes Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, and Umbria.27 By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Third Italy had become an economic powerhouse, resulting in what is often referred to as the “second economic miracle.” Despite high levels of unemployment and inflation, in the mid-1980s the Italian economy became the fifth largest economy in the world, overtaking the United Kingdom. Until the economic stagnation of the mid-1990s, it appeared for a brief while that the Third Italy had saved the economy.28 The growth of the Third Italy was important from a cultural and political perspective. Non-unionized, small-scale production centres were based on a model of industrialization that differed from postwar Fordism in Turin, Milan, and Genoa. Unlike the Industrial Triangle, which often experienced tensions between employers and employees, the smaller enterprises of the Third Italy emphasized cooperation.29 At this critical juncture, a new model emerged that did not affect internal migration or uproot traditional communities, as Fordist industrialization did. A new post-Fordist economy and civil society were created, and although this civil society was measurably more secular and wealthier than in the immediate post-war era, it remained rooted in the local community.30 This socio-economic, cultural, and political context would prove to be important in toppling the post-war party system in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and in aiding the rise of the Lega Nord.

christian democratic soft hegemony The Christian Democratic Party was the most important party of the post-war period. The DC maintained its political power through interclass mobilization, by integrating diverse interests into the party, distributing power and resources among these internal factions, and through its opposition to communism.31 Using these tactics, the DC obtained between 38% and 42% of the vote throughout the height of the post-war period.32 The electoral strongholds of the party were located in the north-east and in the south.33 The core of DC support came from Catholic voters, from the anticommunist vote, and from the urban and the rural middle classes. The DC also received support from workers, especially Catholic workers affiliated with the DC union (the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions, CISL). In general, the DC had more success with

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women than with men, with older rather than with younger voters, and in the countryside versus the city.34 The party attracted voters from across the occupational spectrum. The only class that was overrepresented was the rural peasant-farmer, while the working class was underrepresented.35 The glue that held this inter-class alliance together was the strong sense of local belonging that voters demonstrated. This was facilitated by cohesive community structures and through party and church organizations within civil society.36 The DC also relied on the politics of mediation and exchange in order to secure what Sidney Tarrow calls “soft hegemony”. The politics of exchange were the tangible outcome of an inter-class strategy that brought diverse interests together under a common umbrella through the redistribution of power and resources, thus mediating between various interests. In its most extreme form, it led to patronage and clientelism. Tarrow writes, “Soft hegemony is a pattern of political relationships based on a flexible centrist governing formula, an interclass social base, friendship to business but solicitousness to marginal groups, and a governing style that is based heavily on distributive policy. Previous interpretations of the DC have stressed the corrupt and clientelistic nature in its governing practice; but these interpreters often miss the point that corruption and clientelism are only the extreme expression of a system of governance based on political exchange.”37 Ironically, soft hegemony emanated from the DC’s inability to achieve a full and undisputed majority; the party needed to include forces within parliament and from civil society, from both the right and the left. Tarrow writes, “Because it lacked an overall majority and depended on distributive deals to stay in power, the DC’s hegemony was ‘soft’; but because it provided the necessary glue to fuel the country’s extraordinary economic growth, the softness was hegemonic, although to journalists and to the untrained foreign eye, it looked like chaos.”38 DC soft hegemony was the political custodian and overseer of the dramatic economic growth, and of industrialization and Fordism in Italy during the post-war era. Mediation, bargaining, and exchange permitted the DC to forge alliances with a wide array of social and political actors. The DC was able to create an alliance with northern industrialists, forging a model of development favouring northern industry, yet it also maintained its alliance with the Catholic Church,

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assuring Catholic control of education, marriage, and some aspects of social services and health care. Christian Democrats also worked with the middle class to pass laws and to create policy that favoured small businesses. And finally, it was able to receive support from Catholic working-class voters through affiliated unions.39 Continued DC hegemony was assured by the persistence of the Italian Communist Party as the largest party in opposition, creating what Sartori referred to as a system of polarized pluralism.40

the decline of the christian democratic party, the birth of the leagues, and the rise of the lega nord Frustrations with the Italian post-war party system were on the rise in the 1970s and the 1980s. Disenchantment grew particularly high among employees and employers in the Third Italy’s small and medium-sized businesses in the north-east. These were voters who were increasingly alienated from the Christian Democratic Party.41 Despite declining legitimacy, the DC was determined to maintain its hold on political power; in order to accomplish this, the party turned to its support in the south. Southern support, often referred to as “southernization” (meridionalizzazione), was consistent with the politics of mediation, exchange, and clientelism. Southernization increased clientelistic politics; on the one hand, politics in the south has always been more clientelistic than in the north, while, on the other, declining ideological support increased the party’s reliance on patronage and clientelism. Southernization further fragmented a party that was already fraught with ideological and regional tensions. During the height of DC power, factionalization worked to the party’s advantage. It permitted the DC to straddle the centre, shifting power between factions. After the 1970s, this only further reinforced internal tensions, especially between the north and the south.42 DC decline and the southernization of the party were a direct response to modernization and the secularization of civil society. Religion no longer defined individual and community values and identity as much as it had in the past. Church attendance declined dramatically between the late-1950s and the mid-1970s, so much so that “by 1976, the level of weekly church attendance had fallen by a half from roughly two-thirds in the mid-1950s to about 30 percent.”43 This decline was generational: the young were less likely to attend

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mass and to participate in Church activities than the old.44 The 1974 referendum on divorce was a major signal of this change: 59% supported the right to divorce (41% voted against it), in spite of an allout effort by the Church to oppose the legalization of divorce.45 Southernization of the DC and clientelistic politics antagonized voters, especially those located in the former Christian Democratic strongholds within the Third Italy. This fuelled widespread political mistrust and apathy. Fewer and fewer Italians voted, and when they did vote, higher numbers spoiled their ballots. Between 1979 and 1987, “the number of blank and invalid votes increased from roughly 1.5 to over 2.6 million votes.”46 The Veneto and eastern Lombardy, regions that would become Lega strongholds, felt particularly alienated from the party. These regions had always felt excluded from the policies of the post-war era, geared towards the Industrial Triangle, while more recently they objected to what it perceived as endless state assistance for the south. Antonio Bisaglia, a Veneto leader from within the DC, summed up these sentiments as early as 1982: “The state often considered my region as an isolated area, external to the strategic choices of the country. It concentrated its attention on the large metropolitan areas, which we luckily do not have, or on the South. Thus, an intermediate area, which includes neither Naples, nor Turin, nor Milan was sacrificed. I believe that if the state would have done more for this area it would have been advantageous for everyone.”47 The soft hegemony of Christian democracy obscured what was actually taking place in the shadow of ostensible DC dominance beginning in the 1970s. Fear of communism and the lack of a viable political alternative to Christian democracy meant that the DC was able to maintain political control despite its eroding legitimacy. Journalist Indro Montanelli once advised voters, on the eve of a general election, that he felt that there was no choice but to hold one’s nose and vote DC. This summed up the attitude of an ever increasing number of voters over time. Predictably, this deterioration of legitimacy reflected a growing separation of the governing party from civil society and was perceived as the DC’s indifference towards its traditional political base and the electorate in general. No longer able to mobilize voters around a common social and political vision, the DC became increasingly irrelevant to a secular, educated, and affluent civil society. Voters demanded greater political accountability and transparency, increased efficiency in social services, and a more effective and substantive infrastructure, in return for relatively high levels of taxation.48

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the leagues, the third italy, and the birth of the lega nord The rise of the league phenomenon, from which the Lega Nord was later born, was a direct response to the socio-economic and political developments described above. Although the league phenomenon made its appearance in northern Italy in 1979, when Franco Rocchetta founded what Diamanti refers to as “the mother of all leagues,” the Liga Veneta, the leagues did not gain electoral success until the 1983 general elections, when the Liga Veneta obtained 4.2% of the vote in the Veneto. The success of the Liga was important symbolically, demonstrating that there were latent forces within civil society that could be mobilized with the correct political message, charismatic leadership, and adequate organization. The early success of the Liga Veneta, as well as other leagues in Piedmont and Lombardy in the 1980s, can be attributed to changing economic dynamics and class structures, and to voter frustration with established political parties. Resentment towards the state resulted in demands for regional autonomy, articulated through an affirmation of local dialects and culture.49 The most important league to appear in the 1980s was the Lega Lombarda, under the leadership of Umberto Bossi.50 The Lega Lombarda was founded in 1984, but it had minimal success until the 1987 general elections, when it established itself as the forerunner among the leagues.51 It was during these elections that Bossi was elected to the Senate, and Giuseppe Leoni to the Chamber of Deputies. The Lega Lombarda’s success in Lombardy was complemented by good results for the Piedmontese leagues.52 As a result, the leagues decided to compete in the 1989 European elections under a single alliance, referred to as the Alleanza Nord. Support continued to increase in Lombardy (where it received 8.1% of the vote), home of the Lega Lombarda, while the other regions in the north did not improve on their previous electoral results. This confirmed the growing hegemony of Bossi and the Lega Lombarda over the other leagues.53 The success of the 1989 European elections convinced the leaders of the smaller, less successful leagues scattered across the north, that further alliance with the Lega Lombarda was necessary. The sudden surge in electoral support was evident in the 1990 regional elections, under the leadership of Bossi and the Lega Lombarda the alliance (now referred to as the Lega Nord) tripled the number of votes that

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it received in the 1989 elections.54 As a communal councillor in Belluno proclaimed, “All of the people from Belluno went to vote when the Lega Nord arrived. With the Liga Veneta, I believe that it would never have exceeded 5%.”55 In the 1980s, support for the Liga Veneta, for the Lega Lombarda, and for other leagues came primarily from the lower middle class, from self-employed workers, and from those who were employed within the industrial districts of the Third Italy located in the northeast. Supporters of the leagues of northern Italy had a lower than average level of education, were mostly male, and were mostly represented by voters in their twenties.56 In the 1980s, the leagues of northern Italy were most successful in industrialized and productive communities with high levels of growth. These communities also had the lowest levels of unemployment. Based on a survey conducted in the late 1980s, Diamanti concludes that the locations where the Lega is successful demonstrate “a very limited level of employment in the private service sector [servizi privati]. Furthermore, in this zone … fiscal transfers from the state are much lower in comparison with the centre-north, that is, those areas where the leagues have had a much reduced presence.”57 The Lega phenomenon was less successful in metropolitan areas characterized by a strong tertiary sector and an economy based on large concentrated centres of production. Instead, the Lega represented “the areas of small business in the north where development has been the most rapid in the last 20 years, especially most recently.”58 The Third Italy also extends into the red zones of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and into Marche, regions in which the Lega has received only minimal support. Unlike its strongholds in the centre of the country, the Lega’s northern strongholds were previously dominated by the DC. The success of the leagues, and the Lega, in the former DC zones must be attributed to various political and institutional factors. First, the anti-regime message was successful because of the DC’s close link to the post-war First Republic. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, until the eventual demise of the DC and the gradual birth of the Second Republic, the leagues relentlessly employed an anti-regime message to attack the DC, accusing the party of corruption and of the southernization of the Italian state.59 Second, it adopted DC themes such as localism, subsidiarity, family,

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and religion. It avoided focusing on questions of class, and it demonstrated clear support for a free-market economy based on small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs, thus speaking to the political culture of the region.60 Third, the Lega in particular created a new political discourse, speaking to the fears and apprehensions of the north. They were able to reverse the message from an almost exclusive emphasis on the “southern question” to refocus on the “northern question.” In other words, the Lega proclaimed that the question should not be how the south could catch up to the north; instead, since the south was an economic burden on the north, the emphasis should be on policies that would benefit the north.61 This became important in the former DC regions because of the close link between the party and the state. Politicians in Rome and the south became the scapegoats. The Lega Nord argued that taxes were too high, that the quality of services was too low, and that the hard-working small and medium-sized businesses financed the state, while the unproductive classes in the south, and politicians in particular, were parasitic, feeding off of the state and the north. Public sector workers were among the Lega’s favourite targets. This strategy was particularly effective given the high number of southerners employed in the civil service and in the state bureaucracy.62 Anti-south sentiments were not a completely new phenomenon,63 however. The Lega, unlike previous political parties, exploited these latent sentiments for political gain, while it also further inflamed negative stereotypes of the south.64

the fall of the first republic The 1992 elections were the last to be held under the post-war party system. Cracks in the system were already evident; inner circle party members began to oppose DC clientelism, while investigations into political corruption were already underway. In addition, international political developments significantly limited DC manoeuvring: the end of the Cold War freed anti-communist voters to support new political parties, and accelerated EU integration increasingly tied the government’s hands. In the 1992 elections, the DC and its coalition partner, the Socialist Party, lost considerable support. Despite declining confidence, the dominant political parties managed to hold onto political power. In addition, none of the established opposition parties benefited from the emerging crisis.65

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The one exception was the Lega Nord. In the midst of the turmoil, the Lega continued to expand its electoral support, especially in the regions of Lombardy, the Veneto, and Piedmont; the party received 8.6% of the national vote and 17.3% of the northern vote. The Lega also expanded into other regions of northern and central Italy, receiving over 10% of the vote in Liguria, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and 8.9% in Trentino-Alto Adige. It even received some support (though very little, with the exception of Emilia-Romagna where it received 9.6%) in central Italy, which was seen as a communist stronghold.66 From the outset, Bossi proved to have an uncanny ability to mobilize voters. He employed a combination of populism and regionalism by tapping into growing feelings of resentment towards the political class and the Italian state. As Cento Bull notes: “in the early 1990s ethnonationalism had as its main goal that of breaking down the prevailing political and social consensus and destroying partyocracy, consociationalism and state welfarism.”67 The Lega’s archetypal centres of support were the small and medium-sized ex-DC towns in the Third Italy regions of Lombardy68 and Veneto.69 To this day, these remain the party’s strongholds. However, for a brief period in the early 1990s, the Lega’s support extended beyond these regions. During the fall of the First Republic, the party was able to garner support in larger cities such as Milan, and in pockets outside the Third Italy. Between 1990 and 1993, the Lega experienced its highest levels of electoral gain, expanding the scope of its voter profile. Although the Lega received more votes from men than women, women’s support increased during this phase. Whereas its supporters had once been predominantly less educated, selfemployed, and from the working class, in the early 1990s, the Lega Nord received votes from shopkeepers, medium-sized and small business owners, and even from the professional middle class. The Lega Nord was also able to expand out of the foothills of the north, gradually extending its support to incorporate the provinces in southern Veneto and Lombardy, and provinces in central Italy, such as Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche. The Lega candidate, Marco Formentini, won the mayoral election of Milan in 1993. The Lega was the single largest political party in the mayoral elections in Trieste, Venice, and Genoa (although it was not able to win these elections).70 The expanding support for the Lega between 1990 and 1993 is important for our understanding of the evolution of the Lega Nord,

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but it is also illustrative from the perspective of radical right and populist politics in Europe more generally. First, the sudden growth of the Lega in the early 1990s needs to be placed within the context of the fall of the First Republic. In the early 1990s, Forza Italia had not yet appeared on the political scene, the Movimento Sociale Italiano had not yet been transformed into Alleanza Nazionale, and the DC was in the process of fragmenting. Attempting to capitalize on the political crisis, Bossi toned down the party’s political message, hoping to attract mainstream voters. As Cento Bull notes, in the early 1990s it was not apparent that “a party such as Forza Italia would inevitably emerge out of the collapse of the old Christian Democracy, and that the neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano would be able to recast itself in a new, post-fascist guise.”71 Second, the correlation between the regime crisis and the rise of the Lega is consistent with the emergence of other populist parties; electoral breakthroughs often come during times of political crisis. The years between 1990 and 1993 represented an extension of the Lega’s constituency. The “normalization” of its electorate, as well as what several political commentators in the early 1990s perceived to be an evolution toward a catchall party, represented an important period in the history and development of the Lega Nord.72 However, after 1994 the party retrenched its political support once again in its original geographical strongholds, solidifying support among autonomous workers, small businesses entrepreneurs, and the working class, all within the north-eastern Third Italy.73

party politics, the second republic, and external threats The end of the DC and the post-war Italian party system came in the months following the 1992 elections, as hundreds of politicians were implicated in “extortion, illegally financing political activity, corruption or, worst of all, collusion with organized crime.”74 DC and Socialist Party politicians in particular were implicated and prosecuted in the “clean hands” investigations. The discrediting of an already unpopular political class brought an end to the First Republic. Now that disgruntled Christian Democratic voters were less fearful of the threat of communism in a post 1989 context (i.e. they no longer had to worry that not supporting the DC would lead to a Communist Party in government), many voters fled to the Lega

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Nord. In the ensuing years, the post-war party system was completely transformed. The Christian Democratic Party splintered into a number of smaller political parties, on the left and the right. The Socialist Party, coalition partner of the DC in the 1980s, all but disappeared, and the Italian Communist Party began its evolution towards a social democratic party. The Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) was transformed into a post-fascist party and Forza Italia was created ex novo by Silvio Berlusconi in the months before the 1994 elections. These dramatic developments appeared to herald a total change in the Italian political system–hence the notion of a “Second Republic”– even though there was no formal constitutional change. Despite the end of the post-war party system, and the demise of polarized pluralism, many characteristics of the old party system remain. The system is still based on a many political parties and coalition governments, and on unstable coalitions between political parties on the left and on the right. For example, in the 2001 elections, the centre-left coalition (the Olive Tree) was made up of five parties However, several of the parties within the alliance were also built upon a series of smaller alliances between smaller parties. Thus, this coalition could be further broken down into nine parties. The centre-right coalition (the House of Freedoms) also consisted of five parties; although it could also be further broken down.75 The centre-right and the centre-left coalitions have been dominated by the two largest parties, the Left Democrats or ds (now simply the Democratic Party) and Forza Italia.76 However, as mentioned above, in order to govern, both political parties have been dependent on smaller political parties to form what are often volatile and heterogeneous coalitions.77 In order to understand the rise, the continued success, and the changing fortunes of the Lega after the end of the First Republic, it is important to present a brief description of Forza Italia (FI), Alleanza Nazionale (AN), and the centre-right Christian democratic parties. These are the political parties on the right that have been the Lega’s prime competitors, and with which it formed coalitions in 1994, and again in 2000 (this coalition held through the 2001, 2006, and 200878 national elections). The focus is on FI and the transformation of MSI into AN, and in the reconstitution of Christian democracy. In 2009, the Italian centre-right experienced another important transformation: FI and AN merged into a single party, the People of Freedom. The focus remains, however, on the pre-2009 period for two reasons. First, the analysis of

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the rise of the Lega, its continued success, and its transition to a party of government focuses on the pre-2009 period. And second, the extent to which the newly created People of Freedom will survive, given the internal infighting, remains an open question.

forza italia: a new centre-right populism The largest and most important player on the right, until the party was transformed into the People of Freedom, was Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia. Shortly before the 1994 elections, Berlusconi used his media, communications, and advertising company to hand-pick candidates to create local political clubs, build his campaign, and create his new political party from scratch. Berlusconi’s quick success is often attributed to his ownership of the largest private media outlet in Italy. There is no doubt that this played an important role; however, his party’s success was also due to Berlusconi’s personality and populist approach. He presented himself as the saviour of Italy, appealing especially to the middle and working classes. Although he made his fortune in the shadow of the First Republic in the 1980s, Berlusconi successfully portrayed himself as a political and economic outsider. Politically, he was not a member of the establishment, and claimed that he did not belong to the old industrial bourgeoisie. Like Bossi, but less crudely, Berlusconi presented himself as a man of the people. FI was able to defeat the left, in alliance with the Lega Nord and the AN, in 1994.79 Despite this initial success, Berlusconi was unable to hold political power; his party was organizationally too weak, and the coalition too diverse, heterogeneous, and fractious.80 Forza Italia’s electoral troubles continued in the 1996 elections, when the centre-right was defeated by the centre-left coalition. With the defeat in 1996, Berlusconi began to forge a more organized and institutionalized political party. He established a party infrastructure, rooted in the local community. The party sought to create closer links with its electorate and its party members, it increased its internal organizational structures, and it attempted to mitigate the party’s over-reliance on the personality of Berlusconi.81 In the international context, Forza Italia sought, and was successful in achieving, membership in the European People’s Party.82 Forza Italia, it must be said, did not possess a strong ideology; the party kept its political platform short, simple, and to the point.

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Nevertheless, specific policy trajectories did persist. These were represented by the party’s liberal-conservative, Catholic-traditionalist, and former Christian Democratic wings.83 From its conception there was an emphasis on neo-liberalism, tax reductions, and the need to reduce the size of the state. FI emphasized law and order issues, and was a defender of the nation, as represented by civil society and not the state.84 Although the party also pursued a populist defence of Italian identity and civil society, it should not be classified as either a predominantly nationalistic or as an anti-immigrant party.85 Despite the fact that Forza Italia became increasingly rooted in civil society, Berlusconi still dominated the party. His control over party policy, strategic decisions, the populist approach, and the explicit attempt to link himself to the common person have accounted in part for FI’s success. He emphasized that he was not a “real politician,” preferring to present himself as a self-made businessman who earned his wealth through hard work. Thus, he may be “luckier” than the everyday working Italian, but he is one of them, and understands their trials and tribulations. Berlusconi therefore becomes both “defender and interpreter of the popular will.”86 However, despite Berlusconi’s provocative statements, Forza Italia’s ideology and its voting constituency were more moderate than those of radical right populist parties.87 As noted above, FI was transformed into the People of Freedom in 2009. Nevertheless, the extent to which it is substantially different than FI and the extent to which it will survive remain uncertain.

from neo-fascists to post-fascists: the movimento sociale italiano and alleanza nazionale The neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), which was transformed into Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in 1995, also exploited the changing political context, emerging from the political ghetto of the 1990s. In the post-war republic, the MSI struggled on the margins of the political system. Its political marginalization was due to the low levels of support for a neo-fascist party in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as to internal contradictions between those who supported the idea that fascism should be an extraparliamentary movement, and those who were convinced that it should evolve into a political party. This compounded the party’s inability to secure its political identity.88

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In the 1980s, the party attempted to de-radicalize and insert itself into the First Republic, hoping to become a party of protest by opposing the Italian party system. Support for the party did increase to 6.8% in the 1983 elections.89 However, the MSI’s electoral success did not substantially increase thereafter, preventing a stabilization of the party’s identity. After the death of its long-time leader Giorgio Almirante, the party oscillated between a left-wing anti-capitalist neo-fascism and a radical right ideology – the latter represented an attempt by the party to capitalize on the recent resurgence of the radical right in countries like France. Although Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the party between 1987 and 1990 and since 1991, established contacts with Le Pen, the MSI did not adopt National Front themes, such as its anti-immigrant platform. Instead, well aware of the difficult legacy of fascism, Fini focused on corruption, law and order, and institutional reform.90 However, it was not until Berlusconi publicly declared his support for Fini in Rome’s 1993 mayoral election that the new leader managed to bring the party out of isolation. Although he did not receive enough votes to win the election, he was able to gain enough votes to run against the centre-left candidate Francesco Rutelli in a second round runoff. Fini’s success continued when the party allied itself with Forza Italia in the 1994 general elections, gaining 13.5% of the vote.91 After these promising results, Fini was determined to bring the party into the political mainstream. At the 1995 Fiuggi Congress, the MSI was officially transformed into Alleanza Nazionale. Not all supporters were convinced of the new and more moderate path, thus the more extreme elements split to form the Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement-Tricoloured Flame). The Fiuggi Congress was an important venue for AN to affirm its adherence to liberal democracy while opposing racism. However, at this early stage of the party’s transformation it failed to fully abandon its fascist roots, and no real discussion on the legacy of fascism was undertaken.92 Since Fiuggi, Fini firmly held the reins of the party, though he is not a populist leader in the mould of either Berlusconi or Bossi. Unlike Fini’s populist coalition partners, he has attempted to present himself as calm, cool, and rational.93 Fini has attempted to push and pull the party in a mainstream conservative direction. A resistant element remains within the party, but significant progress has been made. In 2003, while in Israel, Fini declared that fascism had been

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an absolute evil. In October of the same year, he announced that immigrants should be given the right to vote in local elections after six years of residence. In 2004 Fini was appointed Foreign Minister. The fact that very little opposition was logged by Italy’s allies is testament to how far Fini moved the party into the political mainstream.94 In 2009, AN joined forces with FI to form the People of Freedom. However, at the time of writing, the merger has not been very successful. Even though the parties governed under a similar party umbrella, considerable differences exist between them; tensions have been especially high between Fini and Berlusconi. In 2010, disagreements between Fini and Berlusconi led to further splits: Fini subsequently formed a new political party called Future and Freedom for Italy.

the christian democrats: from hegemony to fragmentation If the formation of FI in 1994, and the slow transformation of AN, represented new political forces, the origins of the other main centreright coalition partner, the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, are more straightforward. As noted, the Christian Democratic Party dominated the post-war era by bringing various factions and interests under a single roof; these factions often straddled the left/right political spectrum.95 Not surprisingly, with the demise of the First Republic, Italian Christian democracy fragmented into several political parties. In 1994 the Popular Party (PPI) became the self-appointed heir to the DC. However, disagreements arose over the extent to which Christian democracy should ally itself with the centre-right or the centre-left. In the ensuing years, the Christian democrats split into centre-left and centre- right Christian democrats. The centre-left joined the Margherita coalition, and the centre-right was divided between the Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and the United Democratic Christians (CDU). The CCD was a member of the 1994 centre-right coalition, while both the CCD and CDU joined the 1996 and the 2001 coalitions. 96 In 2002 the CCD and the CDU merged into the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC) and remained a member of Berlusconi’s governing coalition,97 although they did not rejoin the coalition in 2008. The UDC has represented a moderate voice in the coalition, opposing the Lega’s strong anti-immigrant sentiments and its scepticism

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towards European integration.98 The party supports classic Christian democratic themes (such as support for the family and opposition to abortion and euthanasia), while it is supportive of an active role for the state in preserving national unity, social programs, and investment in infrastructure.99 It draws its support primarily from areas where unemployment is higher, such as the south and the centre of Italy.100 Although the Christian democrats hover around 6% of the vote,101 they are an important coalition partner of the centre-right, acting as a vocal representative of Italy’s long-standing Christian democratic tradition, an important ally of AN, and an opponent of the Lega Nord.102 More than fifteen years after the fall of the First Republic, the Italian party system has been reconstructed. The centre-right consists of a heterogeneous collection of political parties. Forza Italia, a populist centre-right party, dominated the coalition until the formation of the People of Freedom. It was joined by the post-fascist AN; pushed and pulled by Fini in the direction of a mainstream conservative political party, and by the UDC, a party that has its roots in Christian democracy. And finally, the picture is completed with the addition of the Lega Nord, a populist, regionalist party with a radical right populist ideology.103 The new system created a new set of opportunity structures for Italian political parties, in turn affecting their strategic decisions, coalition partners, and political ideology.

party system and alliances on the right Given the diverse nature of the main centre-right political parties, alliances and coalitions are often volatile. In 1994, the Lega Nord joined the centre-right coalition with Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale. Silvio Berlusconi created two separate alliances, one with the Lega in the north of Italy (the Freedom Pole), and one with MSI (the Pole of Good Government) in the south. With the transition from the First to the Second Republic, the Italian electoral system abandoned its pure proportional system for a Mixed Member Majoritarian system. Under this new electoral system, three-quarters of the seats were allocated according to direct voting for a constituent member, while the remaining seats were distributed according to the percentage of the popular vote.104 The implementation of a partial first-pastthe-post voting system meant that it was strategically advantageous for the Lega to join forces with Forza Italia. This minimized

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competition in electoral strongholds. Even more important, the Lega was now forced to contend with political competition from Forza Italia and MSI. The Lega Nord could no longer portray itself as the only “new” political party, or as the sole opposition to the corruption of the First Republic. In 1994, the centre-right government fell after less than eight months (from 10 May to 22 December).105 The immediate disagreement was over pension reform. However, the Lega’s larger concern was that a close association with Forza Italia, and with the Italian state, would harm it electorally. An identification with FI would lead to defections to Berlusconi, while an association with the state would threaten its regionalist and its populist identity.106 The volatile relationship between Bossi and Berlusconi was highlighted in the months leading up to the 1994 elections. Just after the electoral pact between Forza Italia and the Lega was signed, public opinion polls showed that support for Forza Italia had increased from 8% to 30%, while the Lega’s support dropped from 16% to 8%.107 Bossi altered his tactics as soon as he realized that he was losing support. He feared that his alliance with Forza Italia would link him too closely with established political elites and he realized that forming a coalition would limit his ability to attack Berlusconi and Fini. First, he reinvigorated his attacks on Fini and MSI. In the weeks leading up to the elections, Bossi began once again to attack Berlusconi. He linked the leader of Forza Italia with the old regime and with the old political class, claiming that Berlusconi was merely recycling politicians from the First Republic. As Bossi increased these attacks on Berlusconi, he was able to regain some of the votes that he lost after signing the electoral agreement with Forza Italia.108 After the 1994 elections, the Lega broke with the centre-right and ran in the 1996 elections without a coalition partner. The “go it alone” strategy meant that the Lega would not have to limit its populist attacks on the regime, the political and economic elites, or other political parties. The Lega surprised most political commentators (and other political parties) when it increased its support in the north by 3.5%, obtaining 20.5% of the vote. It also increased its vote in Italy by 1.7%, receiving 10.1% of the national vote.109 In addition, the Lega began to radicalized its discourse; it advocated for northern separation, reemphasizing the Padanian roots of the north, and it began to vocally oppose immigration and globalization while supporting conservative values.

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This “go it alone” strategy and the radicalization of the Lega coincided with a changing electorate. The Lega continued to receive the bulk of its support in the wealthy provinces of the north-east – incomes of supporters remained above the national average.110 However, this should not give an incorrect image of the nature of the Lega’s support. The Lega is often characterized as a movement of the well-off. This is only partly true. The Lega also attracts dispossessed voters who feel as if their economic situation is economically precarious and under threat. The success of the Lega also stems from its ability to mobilize voters who are scared, anxious, and politically alienated. During the crisis of the First Republic, the Lega began to attract more middle-class voters. But since 1996, the working class has been its core constituency. Beirich and Woods demonstrate that support for the Lega Nord, especially in the mid 1990s, stemmed from worker insecurities in the face of globalization. They point out that a survey conducted in 1997 demonstrated that 60% of northern workers felt that their region was strongly affected by European and global developments, and 55% recognized that external political developments have a profound influence on their region. The perceived impact of globalization translated into support for the Lega Nord.111 With the Lega Nord’s consolidation within its strongholds in the mid-1990s, the “modern” and internationally oriented entrepreneurs predominantly shifted their support to Forza Italia, while the selfemployed and workers employed in local- and domestic-dependent industries that were least competitive internationally, became the bulk of the Lega’s support. Diamanti concludes, The more solid and “modern” component of small entrepreneurs and artisans, in fact, tended to privilege Forza Italia, while the self-employed workers and the owners of smaller businesses whose markets remain in the local context looked to Bossi. Moreover, among the leghista electorate the weight of the employee [worker; lavoratori dipendenti] is relatively high and even tends to grow. This confirms that the return to the original territory of the Lega is associated with the protection of the social sectors most exposed to change. They also represent voters who feel frustrated and fear that they will lose their acquired wellbeing without seeing their level of political legitimization increase on the national level.112

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Setting the Context

The Lega’s “go it alone” strategy was short-lived, and its electoral support began to decline in the late 1990s. For example, in the 1999 European elections it won only 4.5% percent of the vote.113 Given its electoral decline, the Lega was enticed to return to the coalition, rejoining the House of Freedoms (as the coalition was called) first for the 2000 regional elections, and subsequently for the 2001, 2006, and 2008 elections. The House of Freedoms won the 2001 elections. However, just as the alliance with Forza Italia was bittersweet in 1994, so too was the Lega’s ascent to power. In the process of becoming a coalition partner in the national government, its electoral support dropped just below 4%. In comparison with the 1996 results, the 2001 elections were a setback for the Lega Nord; yet the party continued to receive higher levels of support in its traditional strongholds of Lombardy and the Veneto. Overall, support for the Lega marginally increased while it was in government between 2001 and 2006. In the 2006 national elections, despite the defeat of the centre-right government, support for the Lega increased to 4.6% of the vote, and in the 2008 elections its vote almost doubled, reaching 8.3%.114 Well into the 21st century, the Lega’s support remains the strongest among the working class and the employees of small and mediumsized businesses in the north-east. Its electoral strongholds remain within the smaller communities of the north-eastern Third Italy. Support is highest among those who fear globalization, excessive levels of immigration, and are sceptical of European integration.115 The establishment of the Lega in these constituencies is accompanied by the radicalization of its political discourse. Even though the Lega has renounced secession, replacing it with devolution, it continues to oppose globalization, European integration, and immigration, affirming its support for conservative social values. While in government between 2001 and 2006, and since April 2008, these ideological positions have influenced government policy. The Lega’s growing emphasis on economic and cultural protectionism is in response to the new party system, as well as to the consolidation of its support among the working class and among voters fearful of economic, social, and cultural decline. In addition, international dynamics such as EU integration, economic and cultural globalization, and immigration have structured the strategic and ideological decisions of the party. The accelerated pace of European integration since 1992, eastward expansion, the introduction of the euro, and attempts to create a European Constitution have altered

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the Lega’s view of the EU. The EU is no longer perceived as a means for the north to achieve political autonomy vis-à-vis the Italian state and the south (as it argued until the mid 1990s), but as yet another form of bureaucratic control over the sovereignty of the region.116 Bossi has used increasingly vitriolic language when speaking of the EU, linking it with powerful international forces (such as lobbies) that oppose the values of the Lega, and even referring to it as a superstate, as Stalinist, or as a new form of fascism.117 Globalization is linked to the internationalization of production, trade, and finance and competition from low wage countries such as China. Beginning in 2003, Bossi began to demand tariff barriers against countries such as China in order to protect production in the north, and in particular in the Third Italy.118 In other words, the Lega is caught in a double bind: on one hand, it perceives the south to be a burden on its economic competitiveness, while on the other, it now views the state as a necessary evil to protect the north from the excesses of globalization.119 Italy’s transition to an immigration-receiving state in the 1990s has presented new challenges and opportunities for political mobilization. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of legal immigrants increased from 625,034 to 1,334,889.120 Before 1986, Italy did not have an immigration law; however, since 1986 subsequent laws have addressed this lacuna and have attempted to regulate immigration, to grant social and legal rights to immigrants, and to address issues of family reunification and asylum.121 Despite Italy’s emerging status as an immigration-receiving state, immigration was not politicized until the 1990s, with the arrival of the Lega.122 The Lega’s opposition to immigration became progressively more vocal throughout the 1990s, during a period when the other centre-right parties (Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale) avoided politicizing immigration. It was not until the Lega rejoined the coalition in the regional elections of 2000 that immigration became a campaign and policy concern of the centre-right coalition. The restructuring of the Italian party system and the effects of globalization, European integration, and immigration are particularly acute examples of larger European trends. The evolution of the Lega Nord emanates from its strategic actions within these economic and political transformations. However, the success and the failure of the Lega is contingent on its strategic decisions and its framing of political issues (internal supply-side).

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part two

La Lotta Political Mobilization and the Ideology of the Lega Nord: From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

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3 Populism, Political Mobilization, and the People

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, support for the Lega Nord dramatically increased, a testament to the power of its anti-regime, anti-Rome, and anti-elite populist message. The Lega’s message emerged in response to the crisis of the Italian First Republic and to the self-destruction of the Christian Democrats. The rapid and dramatic success of the Lega tapped in to the anxieties and frustrations that a growing number of northern Italians felt towards the changing national and international economic and political climate. In favour of a populist discourse, the Lega de-emphasized the folkloric, regional, and ethnic nationalism that had characterized the leagues of the early 1980s. Although themes such as regionalism and federalism, and an anti-south/anti-Rome discourse remained, an emphasis on regional dialects and the unification of the north based on ethnic identity were supplemented with a populist discourse.1 The Lega Lombarda and the other leagues in northern Italy had always relied on populist mobilization. But the use of populist slogans, street graffiti, and attacks on the political elites increased when the leagues joined under the unified banner of the Lega Nord, and therefore under Bossi. Since the populist turn in the late 1980s, populism has remained a permanent part of the Lega’s mobilization strategy. Even in the early 1990s, when the Lega moderated its political message, populism was central. And since the 1996 radicalization of the party, it has fused populism with a radical right ideology. Populist movements such as the Lega Nord possess a specific discourse and common mode of organization and mobilization. As noted in chapter one, the discourse of populism pits the common, virtuous, and homogenous people against both elites (politicians, intellectuals,

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the media) and perceived outside threats, such as immigrants, large financial interests, or other perceived outsiders. This dichotomy is based on an understanding of democracy in which representation is viewed as unmediated popular sovereignty. However, populist movements also demonstrate specific organizational features. They are driven by a charismatic leader who claims to have a direct and unmediated relationship with the people; he (or she) is characterized as both “of the people and for the people.”2 This chapter examines the Lega’s populism, arguing that the Lega adheres to typical populist organizational structures and discourse. Umberto Bossi (with a few close allies) controls internal decisionmaking, limiting internal democracy, and preventing the formation of divisions and factions within the party. Party bureaucracy is minimal. Despite their top-down organizational structures, the current European radical right populist parties are successful because they are able to mobilize voters within civil society by employing grassroots politics. The Lega is no exception. The Lega also engages in populist discourse: Bossi presents himself as an anti-political figure, a man of the people. He articulates his points in colloquial language, often speaking in dialect. His colloquial style is fused with common-sense propositions, while the party presents itself as post-ideological, arguing that its platform cannot be classified on the typical right/left spectrum.

populism, political mobilization, and the party The Lega Nord adheres to a federalist structure. Federalism is usually associated with decentralization and local participation and decision-making, not with populism. But the Lega Nord’s brand of federalism retains a great deal of centralization. The federal structure of the party is based on the organization of the various leagues that began to appear in the early 1980s in northern Italy. The local structure and recruitment practices of these leagues were adopted by the Lega Nord in 1991. Biorcio writes, “The new party thus assumed the character of a heavily centralized organization, despite its statute that preserves the federal structure of the regional leagues. Centralization is increased by Bossi’s charismatic leadership. Access to all the positions of power in the organization has become

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increasingly and more exclusively dependent upon the support and the trust of the leader.”3 The Lega Nord has the typical organizational structure of a centralized, populist party with a charismatic leader: (1) the leader has a small group of advisers who pledge almost complete loyalty to him, preventing, or attempting to prevent, internal divisions; (2) there is a lack of internal bureaucratization, with decisions and promotions generally made by the leader; (3) the institutionalization of the party is also avoided so as to avoid the usurpation of the leader’s charisma; and (4) there is the tendency to present itself as an anti-party.4 The party is organized hierarchically into five tiers: federal, national, provincial, district, and communal. At the federal level the party is organized around the Federal Congress, the Federal Council, the Federal Secretary, the Federal President, and the Federal Board of Arbitrators. The Federal Congress elects the Federal Secretary and the President. Bossi is the Federal Secretary, a position that he has held since the beginning. On paper, the Federal Council is responsible for strategic, ideological, and policy decisions. In reality, however, the Federal Secretary, Bossi, is the sole decision-maker. Bossi represents the “unity of the movement.” He (as the Federal Secretary) “coordinates the directives of the Federal Congress, summons and chairs the Federal Council and the Political Secretariat (art. 16).”5 The organization of the party at the Federal level is replicated at the national level since the party constitutes a federation of its national sections.6 Each of these national sections has a National Secretary and National President. These national sections are further divided into provincial and communal sections; in addition there is a provincial congress, an executive council, a provincial secretary, and an administrative secretary. The communal sections are in turn entrusted with expanding the movement on the ground and diffusing its program.7 Lega headquarters are located in Milan. It is there that Bossi spends much of his time when he is not in Rome or on the road. Each of the Lega’s regional and provincial sections also has headquarters, but these lower-level organizations are controlled and organized by the head office in Milan, where Bossi and his small inner-circle dictate ideology and strategy. Milan is also the home of the party’s television and radio stations, and its daily newspaper, La Padania. Policy papers, pamphlets, position papers, and news

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releases are also produced at the Milan party headquarters.8 La Padania is a source of domestic and international news, as well as a vehicle for many of the party’s political positions and policies.9 The party’s centralized structures have served it well, allowing Bossi to effectively guide the Lega through a variety of circumstances. Despite Bossi’s indispensable role in the success and survival of the Lega, party members also play a vital role. At first there were three types of membership: ordinary, militant, and supporter. More recently, there are only two types of membership: ordinary-militant and supporter. Ordinary-militant members are supposed to actively participate in the life of party by voting on important party and policy matters. Supporters do not have these rights: although they may, and often do, play an important role in organizing events, participating in demonstrations, and in spreading the party’s political message, they are not permitted to actively influence policy decisions.10 Much like other European populist parties, the Lega has mobilized its voters by creating numerous organizations for workers, farmers, businesses, Catholics, families, environmental activism, youth, culture, women, and education.11 These micro-organizations were created in order to mobilize support, give the party a local presence, and involve previously disillusioned voters in the political process. Grassroots political mobilization has engendered a strong sense of party belonging. Public opinion polls conducted by Itanes in 2006 demonstrated that Lega voters closely identified with the party (the Lega scored higher in this regard than other Italian parties – see tables two and three below). The most important factors in voter support for the Lega were the leadership of Umberto Bossi and the Lega’s platform, while support for the center-right coalition itself is low.12 A true accomplishment of the Lega’s micro-organizational structure is that it has mobilized voters who were previously disillusioned with politics, penetrating and politicizing elements of civil society such as bars, discos, cafes, and football clubs, which were once thought to be outside of the political realm.13 This structure, in combination with the party’s dependence on volunteers and the loyalty it demands from its supporters, has produced Lega militants who often dedicate a significant part of their life to the party. As a result of this strong sense of belonging, the social circles of militants revolve around party membership and political involvement. Outside attacks only bolster the feeling of solidarity among such members.14

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Table 2 Factors determining voter support by party (%) (2006) Factors Determining Choice Party Leader

Coalition Leader

Party Platform

Preferred Party Coalition

Olive Tree

5.9

8.0

18.0

25.4

42.7

(461)

Communist Refoundation Italian Communist Party-Greens

9.2

7.2

13.7

45.1

24.8

(153)

Other center-left parties

5.8

8.7

35.0

22.3

28.2

(103)

Union of Christian and Centre Democrats

16.3

13.3

17.3

33.7

19.4

(98)

Forza Italia

17.0

28.2

11.1

18.5

25.2

(341)

Alleanza Nazionale

15.9

9.9

12.1

43.4

18.7

(182)

Lega Nord

25.4

7.5

20.9

41.8

4.5

(67)

(N)

Maraffi, “Nella selva della politica: Partiti, coalizioni e altri animali,” 200.

Table 3 Voters who feel close to the party they voted for (in the Senate) (2006) Party

% Who Felt Close to Party

(N)

Lega Nord

84.7

(59)

Alleanza Nazionale

79.2

(159)

Union of Christian and Centre Democrats

75.0

(100)

Left Democrats

73.2

(295)

Communist Refoundation

71.6

(95)

Forza Italia

68.4

(294)

Margherita

54.5

(110)

Other center-left parties

50.8

(132)

Maraffi, “Nella selva della politica: Partiti, coalizioni e altri animali,” 203.

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This local level of politics distinguishes the Lega Nord from what the traditional parties (i.e. FI and Left Democrats/Democratic Party) have become: organizations run by elites with fewer links to civil society. The Lega’s use of grassroots organizations harks back to the heyday of the Christian Democrats (in the 1950s and 1960s) and the Communist Party (until the 1970s). As Gómez-Reino notes, Bossi’s goal was to create a “powerful mass organization, to recruit a new political class and to develop party policy and programmatic goals.” Replicating the mass party, the intention was to “replace [emphasis in original] the presence of traditional parties in the north.”15 The party thus attempts to ensure loyalty and the consistency of its message with a strong presence within civil society and a strong sense of political participation. The combined effect of local organization and populism becomes a powerful tool to attack the elite, centralized, (and often patronageplagued) nature of mainstream political parties. Notions of participation and democracy are not “merely instrumental but pose an issue critical to the Lega’s political identity.”16 As Schmidtke points out, from its earliest days the Lega stood for a form of politics that was dramatically different from that of the traditional and more established political parties. This was accomplished, in part, by creating opportunities for ordinary and locally rooted party members to engage in politics.17 The Lega continues to emphasize the extent to which it is different from the other parties in this regard, pointing to the convictions and idealism of the party and its leaders.18 In the process, Bossi has been particularly successful in presenting himself as an anti-politician, someone not interested in politics for the sake of power, money, or fame. The extent to which this has motivated his followers is well documented. There is a religious quality to the Lega’s mission; Zúquete, in fact, refers to the Lega’s strategy as “missionary politics,” illustrating the “sacred” and “holy” sense of “mission” that the followers feel towards the movement and its “charismatic leader.”19

populism and the populist discourse The charismatic personality of Umberto Bossi, the founder and leader of the Lega Nord, has been an essential component in the success first of the Lega Lombarda and then the Lega Nord. Bossi’s

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beginnings were humble. He was born into a working-class peasant family in 1941 in Cassano Magnago, a small town in the province of Varese. In his biography, he describes a modest yet happy upbringing. His father came from a Christian Democratic family, while his mother came from a socialist family. As a young man, Bossi was a member of a music band, was a tutor at university, and had a series of other odd jobs. In his early twenties he completed his scientific high school degree, specializing in applied medical electronics. After passing his exams, he attended classes at the faculty of medicine at the University of Pavia. However, he never finished medical school, turning instead to politics. Bossi is married and has four children. His wife, Manuela, is a schoolteacher from southern Italy.20 Bossi was not active in politics until a chance meeting at the University of Pavia in 1979 with Bruno Salvadori, the leading intellectual figure of the Union Valdôtaine. Salvadori convinced Bossi to found the North-West Lombardy Union for Autonomy with him. However, in June 1980, Salvadori was killed in a car accident, leaving Bossi liable for the new political organization’s large debt. Although he had to work to pay off the debt, he did not abandon politics: instead he founded the Lega Autonomista Lombarda in March 1984.21 The Lega owes its existence to Bossi’s ability to convert, motivate, and lead his followers. Bossi may appear crude and crass to many Italians and detractors of the Lega Nord, but to the party faithful, his ability to emotionally engage his audience is at the heart of the party’s rapid success. From the inception of the leagues and the creation of the Lega Nord, it has been Bossi’s personality and manner which have attracted fervent loyalty from supporters, often more so than his message has. As Roberto Maroni, one of Bossi’s closest confidants and member of the Lega inner-circle puts it: In the beginning the Lega consisted practically only of Umberto Bossi and his ideas. Without him the Lega would not have existed. We were all enchanted by this great person more than by the project. He was a kind of a holy man who charmed us not so much with what he said but what he did. Bossi always knew how to be on the front line, the general who led the bayonet charge … I personally was in the Lega for many years because of this strange relationship that linked everything to Bossi. It was almost

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

a psychological contact that forced one to place one’s time at the disposition of this crazy, unrealizable project.22 Throughout the years, Bossi has remained the undisputed leader of the party, with few rivals.23 Following the unification of the leagues under the Lega Nord (and Bossi’s leadership), party dissidents attempting to forge alliances with other parties or steer the Lega away from Bossi’s message were forced out or isolated. Numerous important figures have either been expelled from the party or have chosen to leave, often finding themselves subject to strong verbal attacks at party congresses, in the party newspaper, and in the public news media.24 A 1996 poll of party militants demonstrated the overwhelming power that Bossi exerts; no other political figure within the party came close to challenging his leadership. Eight prominent figures emerged from the poll results. However, 80.1% said that they felt closest to Bossi. Giancarlo Pagliarini, the Lega deputy from Lombardy at the time, came in second, Roberto Maroni a distant third, with others obtaining less than 5%.25 More than any other Italian party, people vote for the Lega because of its leader. Party leadership is of paramount concern to Lega voters. As is the case with other radical right populist parties, strong leadership has fostered significant party loyalty.26 Even though support for the Lega since the height of its success in the early mid-1990s hovers between 4% and 8% (although it does perform better at regional and European elections), those who do support the party demonstrate an almost unwavering loyalty to the leader and a strong identification with the party’s identity.27 In 2004, Bossi suffered a stroke and was incapacitated for almost a year. During this period the party survived without significant setbacks, leading some to question the extent to which Bossi has remained integral to the party’s survival.28 Despite the ability of the party to survive Bossi’s illness, long term survival is a different matter. Since returning to politics, he remains the central figure in the party, negotiating party strategy and its evolving ideology. In addition, based the experience of other European populist parties, it seems unlikely that the party would outlive its charismatic leader. The List Pim Fortuyn disintegrated when party leader Pim Fortuyn was murdered, the Freedom Party splintered when Haider stepped down, and the Danish Progress Party suffered electoral defeats when its leader was imprisoned.29

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of the people, for the people: the anti-politician as political leader An essential component of Bossi’s power and charisma comes from his ability to portray himself as an anti-politician. Bossi has been an important political player since the early 1990s, and an elected member of the Senate since 1987,30 but he has always been able to portray himself as a political outsider. This image has endured since the creation of the party in the 1980s through its meteoric rise in the early 1990s and even during the party’s foray into political power in the 2000s. In contrast with the career politicians of whom Bossi is so critical, the Lega’s leader has worked hard to eschew association with the political, economic, or intellectual class, carefully crafting his persona as an ordinary, hard-working Italian citizen who has been forced to fight the state in the name of his people. In Bossi’s retelling of his own life story, Vento dal Nord, the reader is given the impression that Bossi was always a reluctant politician. Unlike other politicians who enter politics for power, fame, money, or even strong ideological convictions, Bossi presents his voters with the sense that he entered the public realm because of a duty to and a calling on behalf of his people.31 Bossi’s outsider status was important to the party’s initial attempts to situate its leadership outside the intellectual, political, or economic class that dominated post-war Italian politics. It allowed Bossi to claim that he represented the moral voice of civil society in the face of a corrupt and amoral political class, and contributed to the seemingly unmediated link between Bossi and his supporters. Unlike the “lazy southerner,” the “parasitic intellectual,” or the “unmotivated bureaucrat,” Bossi represents the self-employed, hard-working northerner and, most importantly, a man of action. The continued success of the party in the 1990s and into the 21st century is due, in part, to Bossi’s populism; Bossi remains a leader who is of the people and speaks for the people. If media, public relations, and spin doctors are crucial for a successful modern political image, “anti-image” and non-traditional mobilization tactics are crucial to the populist leader. The anti-politician image is prevalent in Bossi’s public presence and his manner of dress and appearance. Unlike other Italian politicians, who wear welldesigned suits, Bossi appears in public, in parliament, and on television

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

with unbuttoned jackets, loosened ties, and tacky suits displaying the Padanian symbol and party colours. Bossi himself writes, “Manuela and I never had much money. But we have never felt deprived. Some say that I should dress better, that I should be more stylish. But I am convinced that what is important is what one is and what one succeeds in accomplishing.”32 Bossi, in other words, looks like every other hard-working small businessman, artisan, or working-class person who has put in an honest and hard day’s work. Unlike those whom Lega supporters see as merely paper-pushing bureaucrats, stock politicians, or members of the talking, thinking, or managerial class, Bossi presents himself as pragmatic, frugal, and even provincial. This last characteristic is linked to honesty and authenticity, in juxtaposition to the corrupt and sophisticated elites.33 Bossi’s hard-working image is reinforced by his relentless campaigning; he frequently gives political speeches, holds rallies and demonstrations, and meets with party officials and militants across northern Italy. This dedication to and sacrifice for the cause, his people, and the party has taken its toll. In the final speech at the Lega’s congress in 1989, Bossi declared, “Keep in mind that the Lega functionaries are the same as everyone else. I think of my children who never see me, even if we love each other. We have to wait until Christmas and the summer to go to Livigno to play and to sleep under the same roof.”34 Since his stroke in 2004, Bossi’s public appearances have been less frequent. However, despite his weakened health he remains an important element in the party’s electoral strategy. Lega supporters are quick to note Bossi’s dedication and sacrifice as two of his most enduring qualities, as well as important factors in the Lega’s success. Bossi’s commitment underlies his honesty and dedication and differentiates him from most other politicians.35 The construction of Bossi’s image as a hard-working anti-politician is essential in creating the crucial (albeit almost mythical) link between the leader and the party supporters, enhancing the illusion of democracy and direct representation. According to Biorcio, Bossi is perceived by his supporters as an ordinary and “simple person who does not succumb to the flattery of power and does not accept privileges. The leader has demonstrated to the militants how the sharing of the common cause must translate into sharing a common lifestyle: to be a leghista means to be part of the common ‘people.’ This implies situating oneself against the excesses of politics and against the privileged caste and the deference that usually comes with public

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office.”36 Reference to the “common people” here assumes a homogenous bloc with a unified “will” that is embodied in the leader, who must swear allegiance to those he represents.37 Bossi is seen as someone who protects ordinary citizens from opportunistic politicians. The image of a common man is crucial for the success of populist parties, while at the same time the leader has to distinguish himself from the average person; this is what gives him his special leadership qualities. Bossi has been very successful at balancing these tensions. His position as a common man is complemented with a sense that he is a leader among equals. Despite the simplistic and often crude nature of Bossi’s public language, his discourses are peppered with important political concepts, such as globalization, elitism, partitocrazia (the dominance and rule of political parties), and federalism, giving authority to the party and especially to Bossi himself. His autobiography reinforces his intellectual powers by highlighting his intellectual curiosity. For example, he notes that in the early days of his political career, he prepared by reading the works of Marcuse, De Felice, Pareto, Adorno, and Weber.38 Combining intellectual ideas and straight-forward speech gives the impression of Bossi as both a man of the people and a political visionary.

populism and the discourse of common-sense The “common-sense” political discourse presented by Bossi, and used in party material, is an essential component of the Lega Nord’s populism and its continued electoral success. Bossi employs typical populist tactics in his use of so-called common sense, as well as with direct inflammatory statements intended to break established boundaries of acceptability. As I describe in detail below, Bossi attacks the state, its politicians and its established political parties through the use of everyday language and argot from bars, cafes, and football clubs. As noted, the construction of a political discourse that entrenches the juxtaposition of the authentic people with the state is central to the Lega’s ability to mobilize voters. The creation of an “us against them” dichotomy is nowhere more evident than in the language of common sense. Common sense, “telling it like it is,” and simple solutions to complex problems, allow the party to contrast its message with what it refers to as the doublespeak, rationalizations, and

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complexity of the public discourse of politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and financial and economic elites.39 The politics of common sense conveys the notion that the silent majority and the common person present uncorrupted, concrete solutions to problems. The Lega presents itself in its party material and through Bossi’s speeches as the only political force to confront the political class with the sentiments that everyday people have purportedly been feeling and saying amongst themselves for years. The Lega argues that the issues that it stresses are “plain for all to see,” and that its simple presentation style does not confuse or attempt to fool voters with rationalizations and highly complex solutions to economic and political problems. The Lega claims that it is able to “cut to the chase,” that it is not afraid to simply “tell it like it is.” As Biorcio points out, its themes are simple and well-understood: “‘They are right before our eyes’ and, one could say, ‘they speak for themselves’ in a language that ends up, in general, being much clearer than that of the other political actors.”40 Given the populist and anti-intellectual nature of its discourse, it is not surprising that intellectuals have not played an important leadership role within the party. The few exceptions include the journalist Daniele Vimercati, and Gianfranco Miglio, the political philosopher, party member, and party consultant in the early 1990s. Other exceptions are Professors Giulio Tremonti and Giuliano Urbani, both important advisers and elected officials within Forza Italia, and Gianni Baget Bozzo, the priest, publicist, and Berlusconi adviser; all three, over the years, developed close ties to Bossi and the Lega. But as Bossi emphasizes, it is due to reasons of the heart that one supports the Lega. Leghismo is not something that can be intellectualized, instead, it is simply felt by the common person.41 The Lega argues that notions of common sense, moral superiority, and honesty allow the party freedom from ideology and political labels, in other words, that it is post-ideological. Bossi claims that in a post-communist world order, the old left-right cleavages no longer make sense: communist, socialist, and fascist ideologies, political strategies like corporatism, and political parties such as the Christian Democrats no longer speak to the current economic and political situation. Common sense, the Lega argues, means that on some issues the party can be on the right (i.e. immigration and law and order) and on other issues it can be on the left (i.e. opposition to globalization, the protection of local community, and more recently, the protection of the European welfare state).

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This attempt to bridge the gap between the right and the left is common among radical right populist parties. Successful attempts to re-frame controversial issues concerning community, cultural identity, globalization, the welfare state, and immigration have allowed parties such as the Lega Nord to draw supporters from diverse political allegiances.

the politics of language: argot, speaking for the people, and language as political action If the message of common sense is both direct and simple, the style, syntax, and mode of expression and the concepts chosen are also intended to represent the common person. Through his use of common, crude, and straightforward language, Bossi transposes the language of the streets, bars, cafes, and football stadiums into the political realm. It is common to hear Lega supporters declare: “When Bossi speaks, it is as if I were speaking”; “The political speeches of the Lega resemble how one speaks in the bar, on the commuter trains and at the work place”; “Bossi says directly to the politicians what we say to each other”; “The Lega talks and thinks how Lombards talk and think.”42 This language, the Lega claims, represents the silent majority, the heartland. In the early years, several leaders of the various leagues attempted to politicize language through campaigns to protect local dialects. They argued that dialects should be considered authentic languages and that the colonization of the central state and its bureaucracy was destroying this essential link to local and traditional culture. However, as Schmidtke notes, “the emphasis on dialect appeared too parochial and lent itself to ridicule. For instance, in city hall meetings a working-class mayor teased a young Lega city councilor about an imperfect understanding of the dialect.”43 With only a small number of Italians in these regions still speaking in dialect, and no unifying ethnic identity linking the regions of Lombardy, Piedmont, and the Veneto to a common northern identity, Bossi discovered that instead of campaigning for their protection, using local dialects where they existed along with everyday street language and argot could serve as a powerful tool to break the codes of the dominant political discourse. These local forms of communication are now employed less as a means to create an ethnic political movement, but rather as

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a tool to mobilize the common person against the state, the bureaucracy, and the official political language of the political class.44 The means of communication is often more important than the actual policies and proposals of the Lega. Paraphrasing Marshall McLuhan, Biorcio argues that in the case of the Lega, “the language is the message.”45 Using crude, popular street language, Bossi and the Lega Nord attack the political class, intellectuals, and journalists.46 Biorcio writes, “To the political jargon of the politicians, Bossi counters with the language of the people, immediately clear and concrete, evoking the everyday life of the common person. This language avoids any syntactical complication: the construction searches for maximal simplicity.”47 The use of expressions such as “La Lega ce l’ha duro” (“The Lega has a hard-on,” in the sense that the Lega can keep it up) or the use of cazzo (Italian equivalent of “dick,” “prick,” or “cock”) become important symbols. Bossi understands that the official “solipsistic language of the ruling parties was vulnerable to a crude, transgressive discourse.”48 Equally as important and transgressive have been the Lega’s overt attacks on the character, manliness, and even virility of other politicians. Bossi made crude attacks on Fini’s last name (“to be finished”) by juxtaposing it with the virility of the Lega. Berlusconi, before the Lega’s alliance with Forza Italia in 2000 , became “Berluscosa” or “Berluskaiser.”49 Claudio Martelli, the minister in charge of passing the 1990 immigration law, which the Lega criticized, was attacked for his “gay look or appearance,” and Giulio Andreotti, the influential post-war Christian Democrat, was accused of “having no balls.”50 More recently, the Lega circulated a post with a picture of Giuliano Amato with large ears. The captions read: “Robbery of the Rat.”51 The language and discourse used by the Lega Nord in its attacks are not only crude and vulgar, but often violent. Marco Tarchi points out that Bossi walks a fine line between claiming that the Lega is a mainstream party, even claiming to be the saviour of democracy, and using inflammatory rhetoric to attract radical voters.52 The Lega has not been directly involved in any acts of violence other than small skirmishes and some acts of civil disobedience, such as when supporters took over the bell tower in the Piazza San Marco in Venice.53 In general, the official party line shuns political violence and supports civil disobedience; leghisti often refer to their political resistance as Gandhian.54 There is, however, an attempt to portray the Lega as a party of action and revolt against the status quo. La

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Padania frequently depicts Bossi screaming or yelling, accompanied by articles with provocative headlines. In a similarly confrontational vein, it is common for the Lega Nord to refer to immigration as an “invasion,” to proclaim the need to put an end to multicultural society, or to push legal boundaries by calling for direct action such as a tax revolt in order to challenge taxation policy. Although there is no question that these acts are not in themselves violent, the message is intended to appeal to law-abiding citizens while sounding revolutionary, and pushing the boundaries of acceptable public discourse in a liberal democracy. Bossi declares, “This, of course, does not mean that the Lega is comparable to the Red Brigades. But our movement is a bomb triggered for the Mafioso government – a bomb that does not kill but that can politically destroy the parliament, representing the healthy forces of the country.”55 On other occasions, in order to evoke a feeling of revolution, the Lega Nord has organized marches on Rome, and political gatherings on the banks of the Po River or in historically resonant Pontida.56 From the beginning, the visual nature of the Lega’s language and message has been essential. By using graffiti, posters, and town hall meetings, the Lega Nord has cultivated its grassroots and its place in the fabric of civil society. It was common to see slogans painted on walls and roads that read “Mount Etna do your work”57 or “Roma Ladrona, la Lega non perdona (Rome steals and the Lega will not pardon, or look the other way).”58 Posters like these have persisted, with slogans such as “No to unnatural adoptions” (protesting the rights of gays to adopt); “No Amnesty: Expel Illegal Immigrants”; “Approve the Federal Reforms of the State: Thanks Bossi”; “Vote for the Lega: Less Rome, Less Taxes.”59 Bossi writes, “From the beginning I used the piazzas and the walls – in other words, the most rudimentary forms of communication. Through leaflets and graffiti, I expressed the popular spirit of the Lega; in my political speeches I explained directly to the citizens, looking them in the eye, what was happening, the crimes of the regime, and the strategy for the counterattack.”60 This created a “type of immediate, coloured and brutal language that belongs to the vocabulary and the rhetoric of the man on the street.”61 The visual, emotional, and revolutionary power of the Lega Nord is captured in the party’s ability to create a strong sense of belonging through festivals, marches, and demonstrations. Beginning in 1990, Bossi used demonstrations at Pontida to celebrate electoral results, to

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call for the foundation of a Northern Republic, and to celebrate other important events in the history of the Lega Nord.62 Biorcio writes, “Since 1990, Pontida has become for the militants the place of the Lega’s soul.” These well-organized events are important for creating a sense of belonging, victory, and destination; the “ritual and collective swearing of allegiances have not only had the capacity to discipline the actions and the behaviour of the most passionate in the movement, but they have also aroused strong feelings and elevated emotional involvement by participants. This creates both a group solidarity and group symbols.”63 In addition to these ritualistic gatherings, the importance of symbolism for the Lega’s political mobilization is evident in its wide array of flags, scarves, and green shirts with the party emblem, not to mention in events such as Miss Padania, youth organizations such as the Movimento Giovani Padani, cultural groups, and sports teams, which are used to represent the Padanian nation competing on, for example, the football pitch.64 A group of citizen patrols, called the Green Shirts, was also formed; they are comprised of leghisti who patrol certain dangerous locations and areas, such as train stations, after dark.

radical right populism As we have seen, populism claims to reconstitute democracy on the notion of the sovereignty of the people. However, if populism is to be successful, it must be driven by a charismatic leader who speaks more to the hearts than to the minds of citizens who feel they have been cheated by politicians. It must forge a seemingly unmediated link between the leader and the people. Success is also predicated on the ability to mobilize support at the local level. Everyday language, common sense solutions, and “telling it like it is” are used to carefully construct an image of a party of the people for the people. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Lega fused populism with an anti-regime discourse to defend the region against the political class of the south. However, in the mid-1990s, as the party radicalized and adopted a radical right ideology, its populism as such did not wane. Populism was combined with nativist nationalism, an emphasis on social conservatism, and a populist political economy. In this regard, the Lega is no different from other radical right populist parties in Western Europe. In the late 1980s and 1990s, radical right populist parties began to adopt populism; Haider used populism to

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attack Austrian consociational democracy; Le Pen fused populism with opposition to immigration to attack the French political class; and in Switzerland and Denmark the People’s Parties employed populist tactics to attack political elites within their respective states. Radical right populists are, however, not the only populist parties currently active within European politics. Berlusconi represents an example of centre-right populism, while the German Party of Democratic Socialism, and its successor Die Linke (the Left Party), represent examples of left-wing populism.65 In other words, populism must be contingent on other ideologies.66 In the case of the Lega Nord, its regionalist populism of the late 1980s and early 1990s has been supplemented with a radical right ideology.

4 Padania, Nationalism, and an Autochthonous Civil Society

The Lega Nord’s populist political message and rhetoric contributed to its rapid growth and its continued success. However, its electoral success is also a result of its pointed critique of the Italian state. This critique has taken two forms. First, the Lega has argued that the Italian state failed to create a national identity after the unification process in the late 19th century (i.e. after 1870) from the highly localized and differentiated identities that populated the peninsula. To counter this failure, the Lega has proposed radical decentralization of the state. Second, the Lega was highly critical of the post– Second World War state and party system, arguing that it produced an inefficient, corrupt, and overly centralized political regime. In chapter 1, I argued that radical right populist parties are nationalist. To a certain extent, the Lega’s nationalism differs from that of other European radical right populist parties: the Lega is highly critical of the Italian state and is a defender of local and regional cultures. The Lega’s regionalism has passed through four phases: in the 1980s, the emphasis was on local, folkloric cultures and dialects; in the early 1990s the focus was on federalism and the Republic of the North; after 1996 it argued that Padania should separate from Italy; and since the late 1990s, it has renounced separation and turned its attention to devolution. On the one hand, the Lega’s nationalism differs from the nationalism of, for example, the French National Front or the Austrian Freedom Party, since it does not defend Italian national identity. That said, the Lega’s nationalism retains much in common with that of other radical right populist parties. First, as noted in chapter one, these parties combine nationalism with populism. In the process, radical right populist parties, such as the

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Freedom Party, harbour considerable suspicion toward the state. The state regulates the economy and culture; however, civil society is where authentic local cultures flourish.1 The Lega, much like other radical right populist parties, especially since the mid 1990s, affirms the importance of not only local cultures and identities, but also of traditional values and morality within the community, the village, and the family. Second, the nationalism of the Lega should be understood as a nativist nationalism. The party argues that preference (regarding, for example, housing and employment) should be given to locals, while only those who are willing to culturally integrate into civil society should be permitted entry. Nativist nationalism is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. This chapter begins with a discussion of the Lega as a regionalist political party, focusing on its policies for achieving regional autonomy, ranging from requests for special regional status, federalism, separatism, to devolution. I argue that the Lega’s minority nationalism has succeeded in part because of its ability to fuse ethnic nationalism with its populist critique of the state. The fusing of populism and nationalism was particularly important during its early critique of the DC and the First Republic. However, since its radicalization in the mid-1990s, the party has increased its emphasis on conservative social values and what I refer to as “authentic civil society.” This focus on family values, social conservatism, and Christianity are part and parcel of its evolution into a radical right populist party.

ethno-regionalism, federalism, padania, and beyond The critique of the Italian state was an important component of the Lega’s political platform and has contributed to its political success. The electoral evolution of the Lega has demonstrated the degree to which the movement, since its beginnings in the 1980s, was rooted in the small and medium-sized towns in north-eastern Lombardy and the Veneto, in the small and medium-sized business districts, and within the Christian Democratic subculture. Despite continuities in this regionalist project, its demands for institutional change have progressed through several phases. In the early years (19791989), its ethno-regional project advocated for the extension of the same special status as enjoyed by the five special regions of Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/ Südtirol, Aosta Valley, and Friuli-Venezia

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Giulia, to the Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont. For example, the special regions have special status over taxation, i.e. they are permitted to retain more of their taxes, and in turn they have to finance specific services themselves such as education and healthcare. Between 1989 and 1994, it supported federal reforms to the state, calling for the division of Italy into three macro regions (the north, centre, and south). From 1995 to roughly 1998, it argued that the north (Padania) should separate from Italy. Finally, more recently, especially since joining the centre-right coalition in 2000, it has advocated a broad devolution of powers to all regions.

ethno-regionalism: the early years The early leagues, especially in the Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont, modeled themselves after the minority nationalist movements in Sardinia, the South Tyrol, and the Valle d’Aosta. They emulated the political activities of the Valdotanian Union, the South Tyrolean People’s Party, and the Sardinian Action Party. However, an essential difference between the newly-formed leagues and the existing regionalist parties in the special regions of Italy was that nationalist sentiments were considerably weaker in the Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont when compared to the Aosta Valley and South Tyrol, which have large French- and German-speaking populations.2 The leagues focused on regionalism with the goal of decentralization, targeting the Italian nation-state as a colonizing force. The northern leagues demanded protection for their local cultures and dialects, claiming that the regional dialects should have status equal to languages.3 Claims of internal colonization were levelled at the state and the Italian post-unification project. The northern leagues claimed that this project had largely failed: northern regions such as the Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont had not lost their unique cultural and political identities and should therefore be given special status within the confines of the Italian state in order to better address cultural, administrative, fiscal, and law and order issues.4

federalism: the three regions of italy The move towards a unified movement and party after 1989 led to changes in the Lega’s vision for restructuring the state. After 1989, because it united many diverse regional formations, the movement

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mitigated its emphasis on ethno-regionalism and focused on unifying the north into a single region. The newly-formed Lega Nord pushed for the autonomy of a Northern Republic within the confines of a federal state, arguing that Italy should be divided into three regions (the north, centre, and south).5 The Lega claimed that these regions were sufficiently distinct in terms of culture, language, and economy to warrant radical reconstruction of the state. At this stage, the emphasis on dialects and cultural differences, especially between the north and the south, persisted. However, ethnocultural elements were minimized for electoral purposes; due to political pragmatism it had been difficult for the leagues to argue that the rather diverse regions within the north had sufficiently preserved a unique identity. To address this issue, and to consolidate support, the Lega used its populism to target external enemies such as the central state, the south, and to a lesser extent immigrants.6 In 1990, Bossi launched the idea of the Northern Republic. The pilgrimage to Pontida, which was to become an annual event, was thus inaugurated. The Lega began to construct the “imagined” republic of the north through the use of symbolic images represented on flags, coins, passports, and licence plates.7 Nevertheless, the party remained vague about what institutional form federalism should take. At this time the Lega was influenced by the Italian political philosopher Gianfranco Miglio, who was critical of the process of European state formation, claiming that states do not conform to pre-existing national identities: the modern state is an administrative construction and attempts to eradicate local identity through its authoritarian project of nation-building. Miglio argued that despite the goals of this centralizing project, local European identities had remained remarkably resistant. To protect these local identities, Miglio advocated federalism and a Europe of regions.8 Despite Miglio’s direct influence on the Lega – Miglio was elected to the Senate under the banner of the Lega in 1992 and 1994 – Bossi remained vague about how he foresaw the institutionalization of federalism. This was further confounded by the eventual split between Bossi and Miglio in 1994; Miglio complained of Bossi’s “opportunism” and of the extent to which he had given in to the demands of Berlusconi, especially regarding his decision not to appoint Miglio as minister of constitutional reforms.9 Nevertheless, certain continuities can be identified. The Lega consistently demanded regional autonomy, allowing northerners to retain regional financial resources

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for their own benefit. It emphasized the need for the regional governments to prioritize the local population, especially regarding employment and obtaining resources from the state. And finally, it demanded that education, justice, and public administration be carried out by persons from the region.10

secession: the north as nation After 1992 and the fall of the First Republic, the Lega moderated its political message, attempting to evolve into a centre-right catchall party. However, this proved to be electorally dangerous. The party lost a significant portion of its moderate support to Forza Italia. Fearing the repercussions of moderation, after 1994 it radicalized its political platform, intensifying demands for northern independence and taking the necessary steps to “manufacture” a Padanian nation. In part, this strategy was indicative of external political developments. In the move toward European monetary union Italy’s eligibility was called in to doubt. Thus, campaigning for an independent north seemed viable: Bossi calculated that if Italy did not meet the qualifications for European monetary integration, support from the entrepreneurial class for the political independence of the north would be likely to follow. The north could thus join the European monetary union without the south.11 Padanian independence was not a radical break with the party’s critique of the Italian state. However, the renewed emphasis on independence did intensify the focus on ethnic belonging. The party exploited its structures to galvanize support for Padania. For example, promotion of the annual pilgrimage to Pontida intensified. The party newspaper and other party print and media outlets were used to emphasize the cultural, linguistic, economic, and historical nature of northern Italy.12 At this point, Gianfranco Miglio was replaced by Gilberto Oneto as the chief intellectual figure within the movement. Oneto was instrumental in constructing a Padanian identity. Oneto argued that Padanian claims to national identity were legitimate because the region has its own ethnic identity, language, culture, and economic organization.13 These arguments were often drawn indirectly from literature about the Third Italy (i.e. from research arguing that the region had unique social, political, and economic qualities), and, even though direct reference is rare, the argument is analogous to

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Robert Putnam’s work on the differences between civil society in northern and southern Italy.14 Oneto and others also pointed to the historical reality of Padania. They argued that this distinct northern identity has Celtic roots, and that the Celts were instrumental in fending off Roman invaders and the Longobards from central Europe. Despite the fact that no single language unifies the region, they argued that the north has a common bond born of a long history of open and democratic communities, a commitment to autonomy, and deeply rooted democratic traditions. This unified struggle against outside invaders was exemplified in the Lombard League and Alberto da Giussano’s resistance to the invasion of Frederick I Barbarossa in Legnano in 1176.15 As Daniele Albertazzi points out, the “historic Lombard League was an alliance of free northern communes which, once again, was never meant to turn itself into a stable federation or a political union. The alliance was rather aimed at defending some prerogatives of the communes against the centralising power of the emperor.”16 A second battle took place some fifty years later when Frederick II, the grandson of Frederick I, tried to invade once again. This time the Lombard League was defeated in Cortenuova in 1237. However, his ability to “subjugate” this region came to an end in 1250.17 After 1994, the Lega took rapid steps toward the institutionalization and the construction of the Padanian nation. In 1995, Bossi announced the opening of the Parliament of the north in Mantua.18 In 1996, the parliament changed its name to the Parliament of Padania and the party was renamed the Lega Nord for the Independence of Padania.19 In September 1996, the symbolic declaration of allegiance to the provisional constitution of Padania was declared.20 In May 1997, a referendum was held on the question of Padanian independence. According to the Lega 4.8 million voted. The party claims that an overwhelming majority of the voters supported sovereignty. The validity of the referendum is questionable since it is highly likely that multiple voting took place.21 In October 1997, the first elections were held for the Padanian parliament.22 On the surface, this process appeared to be a symbolic political tactic, but it had a specific purpose: the creation of parallel state institutions was intended to garner support for Padania.23 Overall, the project failed for three reasons. First, the electoral fortunes of the Lega declined to such a degree that it had to join the centre-right coalition in order to survive.24 To accomplish this, and to mitigate fears among potential allies, especially Alleanza Nazionale

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and the Christian Democratic parties, the Lega was forced to drop its separatist demands. Second, support for Padanian independence was extremely limited. A poll conducted in 1998 for the magazine LiMes indicated that 68.9% of northerners considered separation to be “unacceptable or disastrous,” while 17.4% thought it would be “advantageous but unacceptable.” Only 13.7% perceived separation as “advantageous and desirable.” Not surprisingly, support for separation was higher among Lega voters, 45.5% of whom favoured it.25 The low level of support for separation among the northern voting public forced the party to rethink its political project. Third, once Italy was accepted into the monetary union in 1999, the party realized that it would be more difficult to convince the business community that separation was viable.26

devolution: asymmetrical federalism Before the 2000 regional elections, the Lega again changed tactics, forming an alliance with Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition. In the process, the Lega proclaimed that its goal was devolution, rather than secession. In 2001, when the centre-right government took power, the Lega again emphasized that its primary goal was devolution. This route was pursued for two reasons: first, the Scottish autonomist movement had recently been granted a parliament and powers over taxation and education through devolution; and second, the demand for devolution distinguished it from other Italian political parties, which (except for Communist Refoundation) supported some degree of federalism.27 Devolution refers to the Lega’s new goal of decentralizing healthcare, education, and policing to the regions. It could be argued that these entities correspond to key policy areas: healthcare and education are at the heart of state spending, and policing is related to the Lega’s focus on law and order. The ultimate goal was to take the power of the state away from the south, especially with regard to spending. Despite considerable opposition within the coalition, by the conclusion of the centre-right’s term in office in 2006, a new law addressing the devolution to the regions passed through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Although the law was eventually defeated in a referendum shortly after the centre-right government left power, devolution has become the party’s new mantra. Chapter eight discusses the full implications of these developments.

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assessing the lega’s nationalist project To what degree was the Lega’s attempt to construct the Republic of the North a success? Scholars (and voters) have been sceptical about the distinctiveness of a Padanian identity.28 Compared with other minority nationalist movements, the Lega had a lower level of identification with the region. Yet, the Lega has been remarkably successful in creating a sense of regional belonging in a relatively short period of time. Even though its project for separation was not successful, the Lega has significantly influenced the discourse with regards to federalism. In the early 1990s, there was a high degree of scepticism towards federal reforms. However, by the late 1990s, most Italian political parties accepted that some form of decentralization was acceptable. In March 2001, the centre-left government passed a new law that significantly decentralized the state. In November 2005, the centre-right passed its own set of constitutional reforms, but these were rejected in a referendum. However, if we examine the referendum results, we find that in the north, and in the regions of Lombardy and the Veneto in particular, more voters were sympathetic to the Lega’s devolution package than in the centre or in the south, demonstrating the extent to which the party’s federalism project remains more popular in this region that in the rest of Italy.29 The Lega has succeeded in highlighting the “northern question.” Unlike the immediate post-war period, when the division between north and the south was framed as the “southern question,” the northern question has progressively made its way into public debate. It has now become part of the common political discourse.30 The party’s ability to create a regional, ethnic sense of belonging is more doubtful. Italian regional belonging has always relied on anti-state and anti-south populism. At first this was formulated by creating an “us against them” dichotomy: “them” represented by the state, the political parties, and the south, “us” as the hardworking citizens of the north. More recently, the “us versus them” dichotomy has been posed in relation to immigrants, the EU, and globalization. Finally, the Lega has never abandoned its focus on the local. From the initial days of the movement to its current opposition to immigration, globalization, and the European Union, the local plays an integral part in its political ideology. Since the mid-1990s, this emphasis on the local has stressed family, work, Christianity, and opposition to immigration and globalization.

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the local as ideology: an autochthonous civil society The Lega embraces the local as good and morally pure, claiming that this purity had been corrupted and colonized by the state and its allies. The importance of localism is not new to Italian politics and was only reinforced by late unification and a limited sense of national identity. Localism was strengthened in the Lega’s Third Italy stronghold, supported by what Cento Bull and Corner termed the “urbanized countryside” and small-scale industrialization, which tends to create less social upheaval, dislocation, and destruction of local life than has been experienced in the Industrial Triangle.31 The Lega’s emphasis on the local addresses the tension and the contradiction in a region that has experienced high levels of economic growth in a very short time with fears that this economic growth may have reached its limits, i.e. especially regarding the necessary institutional infrastructure to address issues such as the environment and transportation. At the same time, there was much preoccupation, especially among Lega supporters, with perceived threats to the social and cultural fabric of society; the fear was that the very context that helped give rise to the Third Italy would be destroyed by the pressures of globalization.32 An element of the Lega’s success, therefore, has been its ability to create a political movement that addresses the local in a political climate within which other Italian political parties, both right and left, have distanced themselves from associational life in civil society and citizen participation in politics. The Lega Nord not only creates an ideology out of the local; it also nationalizes this localistic discourse. Diamanti argues that localism “has become a specific means of looking at reality, of evaluating and reinterpreting the facts.”33 This constant reference to the local, ideologically and organizationally, allows the Lega Nord to rejuvenate sentiments for the patria.34 This process works on economic, social, and institutional levels. Economically, it claims to protect the local economy; socially, it calls for the priority and protection of “their own”; and institutionally, it calls for a decentralization of political decision-making power. In addition to influencing the national dialogue on federalism and institutional reform, the Lega’s emphasis on the local radicalized its militants and supporters on issues of family, religion, abortion, gay rights, drugs, and crime. This has been particularly apparent since

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the radicalization of the party and its political platform in the mid 1990s. Subsequently, Bossi and the Lega have attempted to articulate a more coherent political philosophy in the areas of morality, family, and religion, claiming that in order for an individual to act ethically and to have a moral code, he or she must be embedded within his or her own ethnic community; if this bedrock of society is destroyed, the danger is that society will become overly individualistic. This position – in opposition to the left but also to laissez-faire liberals – emphasizes that local rights of particularistic belonging should take precedence over universal rights.35

localism as conservatism: family, religion, anti-liberalism, and the productive civil society The politics of the local are part of an attempt to embed politics in a larger theory of society and culture.36 Bossi theorizes that an individual can only evolve into a well-adjusted person within the confines of a healthy family, and that this family must be embedded within a civil society that protects and maintains its history, culture, and values. This view has led the party to present a conservative stance on issues such as family, homosexuality, abortion, and drugs. These themes of society, culture, and the individual were present from the outset, especially since its populist turn in the late 1980s; but after the split with Forza Italia in 1994, and especially since 1996, when the Lega’s political platform became radicalized, these themes evolved into its central platform, policy, and ideology. Bossi claims that in a post-ideological era, when there is a tendency toward post-modern relativism, it is more important than ever to contextualize the individual within a community, culture, history, and local society, arguing that it is necessary to place persons within the context of “their traditions, belonging and thus countering the single and oppressive power that tries to subject the world to its ascetic and abstract rationality.”37 Since the Lega’s strongest support came from former DC strongholds and former DC voters, the party has supported policies that favour the family. However, in early years, it attempted to differentiate itself from the DC. Bossi overtly attacked the Catholic Church, and the party avoided explicitly expressing support for family issues. Its goal was to attract younger, secular voters as well as those who

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no longer supported the DC. During the early period, the Lega presented itself as a secular political force that reacted to both a secularized society and to voter demands for clearer separation between the Church, politics, and civil society.38 The Lega quickly learned that its attacks on Christian democratic themes had to be separated from its attacks on the DC. Although Lega supporters were critical of the DC, many felt that it had ventured too far in its condemnation of the Church. The change in ideology was reflected in the Lega’s policy on the family; the Lega came to support the “natural,” nuclear family, arguing that no society has been able to survive without the family because the family socializes and grounds the individual. The Lega states, “The identity of a people is that much stronger where there is the institution of the family; the survival of the people has been historically linked with the family.” It argues that “the crisis of the family involves the more radical questions of the contemporary person, the loss of the values of the person and the process for their realization.”39 The decline of the family is linked with the desacrilization of European societies, an overemphasis on material concerns, all which leads to an increase in the use of birth control and abortion.40 Thus, the logical conclusion of this argument is that only through political and cultural support for the nuclear family can society fight declining birth rates and increasing immigration, and promote the institution of the family. In other words, it is necessary to focus on community and local belonging and the protection of the family. The Lega Nord does not argue that it intends to return to the patriarchal, hierarchical traditional family. But it does claim that without the important social structure of the family, children will not be properly equipped to live in modern society. When identities are not formed in a strong family unit embedded within the community, individuals are atomized and forced to fend for themselves. The family unit for the Lega Nord must consist of the nuclear family of a man and a woman joined in marriage. The party opposes the notion of post-traditional and same-sex families and it is especially vocal in its opposition to homosexual adoption rights. The Lega espouses the importance of heterosexual marriage, while it argues that children should be raised by a heterosexual family.41 The Lega blames the destruction of the family on liberals, socialists, the state, the European Union, and at times the welfare state. It places the destruction of the family within an anti-globalization

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discourse. It argues that the European Union and multinational corporations, through the implementation of “turbo-capitalism,” seek to destroy the family with the propagation of deviant sex, liberal drugs, prostitution, and pornography laws, policies, and legislation, all in the name of capitalism and profit.42 It believes that the Italian parliament should object to artificial insemination. In an article subtitled “Children Should be Born in the Family: No Sperm Supermarkets and Ovary Refrigerators,” the Lega strongly objects to the use of technology and the “artificial” creation of the family.43 In an article in La Padania, the party claims that “it is necessary to point to the compatibility between globalization, which is a phenomenon to which one cannot completely object, and saving territorial belonging, something that is a fighting banner of the Lega. It is here that many things for which we struggle arise: the defence of the natural family, the protection of the small community, the only ‘force’ able to cultivate specific values. But we cannot stop here: closely related also is biotechnology, decisive for making it possible to put our identity under the protection of the dominant powers, the financial lobby and businesses that would like to replace politics with technocrats.”44 This conservative philosophy grew stronger in the mid 1990s, for several reasons. First, as noted above, the Lega’s early success with secular voters fuelled its attacks on the Church. However, Bossi realized that even though Lega supporters were not practicing Catholics, they were still socially conservative; therefore, the Lega linked Catholicism with a “European” identity, as well as promoting it as a moral cornerstone. Second, social conservatism was another way to link the Lega with the local. This coincided with Bossi’s attempt to ground the Lega within the context of a larger philosophical outlook. Third, the working class and less-educated voters supported conservative values during period. Fourth, the Lega’s emphasis on the inherent dangers of immigration (especially from Muslim countries) and globalization led it to place more emphasis on family.45

between religion and politics: anti-church but pro-catholic? Just as the Lega Nord attempted to support the family unit while distancing itself from the DC, the party also consciously distanced itself from Catholicism and the Catholic Church in the early years.

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In the 1980s and the early 1990s, it was common for Bossi to attack the Church and the Pope. Bossi and the Lega were responding to what many DC voters saw as a need for clearer demarcations between the Church and civil society.46 Lega voters tended to be more secular and less likely to be practicing Catholics. In the early days, Bossi claimed that he had a general understanding of religion and of God: “I believe in God. But it is not a God whom one is told about in catechism class. It is a God who is everywhere, in the water, in the fire, in the air that we breathe. As Heraclites said, God is day and night, summer and winter, war and peace, abundance and hunger.”47 While he did not attend mass, he understood the importance of the Church to Italian society. Although the Lega was a lay political movement, it therefore remained sensitive to Catholic issues. In its early years, the Lega created its own Catholic organization, Consulta Cattolica, led by Giuseppe Leoni and Irene Pivetti; the goal of this organization was to maintain contact with the Catholic world.48 In the 1980s and the early 1990s, when the Lega attacked the Church more vocally, Bossi claimed that his fight was not with Catholicism or with the priests, but with the Church hierarchy and the way the Church interfered in politics. Bossi sensed that while his supporters were non-practicing Catholics, they maintained their Catholic identity and Catholic values. He claimed that he was polemical, “but not with the Catholic world, rather with the priests. More precisely, with those Bishops and those high prelates who make political decisions contrary to the interests of the people.” For example, high priests and bishops applied their own agenda to immigration, trying to ensure they had enough priests by inserting “African blood” into the Church’s ranks.49 Bossi claimed that this was against the wishes of the average person. On occasion, the party argued that due to the strong work ethic in the north, northern Catholicism had more affinities with Protestantism. This position was untenable, and finally the combination of support for religion and attacks on the Catholic Church gave way to explicit support of Catholicism, the Catholic Church, and especially Catholic morality and values.50 This change must be understood as both an ideological and a political strategy. On one hand, increasing numbers of Lega supporters were critical of the Lega’s stance on religion. While they did not attend mass on a regular basis and objected to too much

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Church involvement in their private lives, they were still socially conservative and had not completely abandoned their Catholic identity. Catholicism was less about church, priest, or Rome, but more about local identity, local morality, and a larger Padanian or Italian identity. On the other hand, support for religious values dovetailed with the attempt to ground the Lega within a specific ideology. The growing number of radical statements made by some Catholic bishops and priests on issues of immigration and homosexuality made it easier for the Lega to support elements and factions within the Church. In fact, this gave the Lega much-needed legitimacy, especially for its more radical political positions. The Lega exploited statements made by bishops such as Alessandro Maggiolini and Giacomo Biffi regarding the dangers of immigration and especially the increased presence of Islam, making the party’s own views appear less extreme. For example, in an article in La Padania in the fall of 1998, the Lega reported on the meeting between the Bishop of Como, Maggiolini, and Bossi, underscoring that the meeting aimed to repair the relationship between the Lega and the Church, and to find common ground in opposition to globalization. The article highlighted that the meeting “signals something like a truce between the two parties” not only because of the presence of the bishop but also because of “the Catholic wing within the Lega.” It suggested that this was just the first step in a new working relationship between the party and those in the Church most responsive to Lega themes, such as the protection of the family.51 The Lega’s emphasis on Christianity, and Europe’s Christian roots, increased with its opposition to immigration, and more importantly, with its growing opposition to Muslim immigrants and the growing presence of Islam within Europe.52 This battle was fought on several fronts: 1) the Lega argued that Islam is incompatible with European society and culture and is therefore incompatible with Christianity;53 2) Islam threatens the cultural makeup of northern Italy and the communities of Padania in particular; 3) it is necessary to bolster the Padanian and European identity, with its Christian heritage, in order to avoid Muslim influence. Islam is perceived as a threat, in part, since the Lega claims that Muslims have a stronger attachment to their religious and cultural identity than do Italians.54 Opposition to Islam has been part and parcel of the party’s affirmation of Europe’s Christian roots.

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These views have been reinforced by the more radical elements in the Church. In the process, the Lega has identified what it sees as good and the bad factions within the Church. Church-affiliated organizations such as Caritas and Migrantes, which have been instrumental in helping immigrants and lobbying for more inclusive immigration laws, are perceived as detrimental to the wellbeing of the north; the party thus distinguished between those within the Church who defend Europe and those who do not.55 The Lega, not surprisingly, has supported the positions of the more radical religious leaders, and those who are the most sceptical of inter-religious dialogue, such as Maggiolini and Biffi.56 For example, Archbishop Maggiolini wrote of the “passive colonization” by Islam, caused by the uncontrollable migration process, and stated almost as fact that it would someday be necessary to teach the Muslim religion in school.57 Other important church leaders such as Bishop Ennio Antonelli and Cardinal Camillo Ruini, pointed with alarm to the number of marriages between Muslims and Italians. Cardinal Ruini feared the introduction of polygamy and voiced concern about the number of conversions to Islam as the Catholic Church continues to lose public support. These bishops and cardinals also publicly contest the lack of opposition by the Church to public prayer locations for Muslims, arguing that this inaction demonstrates the weakness of the Catholic Church.58

politics as conservative values Siding with Church factions on moral issues of family, religion, and homosexuality also led the Lega to take a conservative stance on social issues such as drugs, crime, pedophilia, pornography, prostitution, and abortion. La Padania preaches the dangers of homosexuality, pornography, and, in particular, the dangers that they pose to the family and the very survival of the community. Pedophilia, prostitution, and pornography are linked to the destruction of the family.59 In typical populist fashion, the Lega’s emphasis on these conservative themes was manifested through provocative statements and actions. On several occasions, the Lega has publicly objected to gay pride marches: in Milan it asked the mayor not to issue the necessary permits for the gay pride festivities, while in Verona, during the celebrations, the party hung a sign that read: “We are for Romeo and Juliet: no to Gay Pride.”60 As was reported in La Repubblica, Bossi

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was particularly provocative when he declared, “the time of the family is returning, of the heterosexual family, absolutely different than homosexual adoption, if the people have children again it will be the end of the freemasons and their ideology.” He concluded by emphasizing that “the family is an important theme: I will soon collect signatures against the European project that wants to recognize adoption for homosexual families.” He finished the interview by stating that he wanted to fight the upcoming elections with the slogan: “Heterosexual family, Children, the People, and Devolution.”61 Non-heterosexual families are portrayed as an assault on Christianity.62 In 2002, Bossi introduced a popular initiative in parliament that would address prostitution, pornography, and pedophilia; he proclaimed that the Lega would collect the 50,000 necessary signatures to introduce the law.63 In 2002, Calderoli (a dentist by training) demanded castration for rapists, arguing that “a pair of scissors is enough and the problem is solved.”64 These actions are typical populist responses; however, they are also part of a larger philosophical project. The Lega’s emphasis on the authenticity of civil society is part of its larger political project, which addresses questions of morality, religion, and ethnicity. As Guolo points out, “from the Lega’s ideology reemerges, therefore, the idea of the völkische Gemeinschaft, a community based upon ethnicity.”65 Christianity and family are linked to healthy and functional communities.66 And the fear of pornography, pedophilia, and prostitution are associated with an excessively liberal political order.67 Or as Luverà points out, “the emphasis on community in contrast to the individual, group rights instead of individual rights, the centrality assigned to the völkisch nation (modernized in economic protectionism), are all elements that represent a return to an antiuniversalistic, anti-enlightenment politics.”68 Chapter six links these fears of excessive liberalism with globalization, the European Union and the encroachment of cosmopolitan liberals.

the local as work and ethic The basis of the Lega’s vision of authentic civil society, as opposed to the corrupt and morally backward state, is also constructed around the notion of hard work. The Lega claims that, unlike the “lazy bureaucrat” and the “corrupt politician,” civil society, especially in the north and in the Third Italy, is based on hard work, linking

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community identity to the virtue and the purity of the local and to the idea of a productivist culture. The Lega validates the dominant sentiment among its supporters that northern Italians work like “animals” but are underappreciated. Rumiz writes, “They all work like animals, bosses and workers alike. Conflict does not exist; unions die before they are born. There is no boss who was not also a worker and there is no worker who does not want to become boss.”69 Collective values of work, self-sacrifice, and prosperity are linked to an authentic civil society, and northern identity, in what is often referred to as the “Japanese Italy,” is contrasted to the welfarism of southern Italy.70 The physical space and the urban geography of the city are integral to the creation of the northern identity. It is common for employer and employee in the Third Italy to live and work within the same urban or physical environment. Family life, socialization, and working within close proximity to the home mean that the division between the public and the private is blurred. Yet, as much as hard work and long hours are valued, a civilized existence is identified with going home for lunch, spending time with the family, and eating home-cooked meals. The least desirable employment in the Veneto, for example, are those employees who are forced to work through lunch hour in the service industry. Rumiz recalls, “In Treviso, the bank clerk who has only a 35-minute break and is forced to eat fast food is seen with a condescending air, like a truck driver who must make his living by making hellish hauls. ‘Going to eat’ is synonymous with going home since food bought outside of the home is not considered eating.”71 It is for this reason that there were loud objections when the local section of Confindustria in Schio proposed changing the work schedule to six days a week, six hours a day. The residents of the Veneto pride themselves on hard work and long hours, but they are concerned about losing their lunch break and the sanctity of private life and family time; those who do not understand this, Rumiz argues, do not understand the north-east.72 The Lega exploits these connections, walking the line between exploiting support for a market economy and opposing the invasion of supermarket chains, international banks, and other global economic institutions. It argues that not only are these outside forces a danger to the moral fabric of the local community, but that they also jeopardize the competitive nature of the Third Italy. The local and the importance of hard work are juxtaposed with the power of large

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corporations and multinationals in the new global economy. This is discussed in more detail in chapter six.

lega nord, authentic civil society, conservative values and radical right populism The Lega’s emphasis on the local and on the idea of authentic civil society has led the party to articulate a conservative political ideology, especially as it relates to family, religion, opposition to liberalcosmopolitan values, opposition to equal rights for minorities, and social issues such as drugs and prostitution. The Lega did not begin as a party that defended conservative values; in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Lega supporters did not express radically different views from the general population regarding, for example, issues such as homosexuality.73 However, as the party radicalized in the mid 1990s, conservative values in the areas of family, sexuality, and law and order have become prime concerns of the party. As stated in chapter one, this is consistent with the Lega’s evolution into a radical right populist party. Radical right populist parties have evolved into firm defenders of conservative social values, defending the traditional Christian family, local morality, community, and traditions. As radical right populist parties fear that their communities are under threat because of globalization, immigration, and the growing hegemony of the EU, they have more forcefully defended the authenticity and distinctness of their communities. The Lega’s Padanian populist nationalism combines regional belonging with its suspicion of the state. In the process, the Lega has influenced the Italian discourse on federalism. As chapter eight will more directly demonstrate, federalism and decentralization are no longer viewed pejoratively by the mainstream political parties. The Lega’s emphasis on regional sovereignty has remained a constant theme throughout its political development, and in this regard, its nationalism differs from that of most other radical right populist parties. However, the Lega’s nationalism has much in common with other radical right populist parties in another important aspect: it is a nativist nationalism. It is to the Lega’s nativist nationalism that the discussion now turns.

5 Nativist Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion

Nativist nationalism is a defining feature of the Lega Nord. The Lega identifies two threats to “members of the native group.” In the early years, especially until the mid-1990s, the Lega targeted the Italian south as a threat to the northern identity; according to the Lega, southerners do not have the same work ethic as northerners, and as a consequence the south is a burden on the state, and in particular on the resources of the north. Since the party’s radicalization in the mid1990s, the Lega has targeted immigrants as a threat to the community, proclaiming that non-European immigrants (extracomunitari) present a threat to the security, identity, and economic wellbeing of the north. This chapter closely examines the party’s two phases of exclusion, arguing that nativist nationalism links its anti-south and its antiimmigrant discourse. In both instances, nativist claims that outsiders threaten the homogenous community are juxtaposed with an authentic, northern, Padanian identity. Nativist nationalism provides the link between the party’s radicalization and its convergence with other radical right populist parties. We begin with an examination of the Lega’s early anti-south discourse, explaining why the Lega was able to exploit these sentiments in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The analysis then turns to the Lega’s anti-immigrant discourse by focusing on the politics of exclusion and the party’s use of “the right to difference” as the justification for its opposition to immigration and the resulting threat to culture, security, and employment.

the southerner as other As noted in chapter two, the Lega Nord’s attacks on the state, Rome, and southernization were employed to mobilize voter resentment.

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However, this anti-state discourse also creates us against them politics, targeting the south and the southerner as a threat to the homogenous northern community. Three factors are used to identify southerners as outsiders: (1) they are not locals, that is, they do not come from northern communities; (2) they are often employed in the public sector and thus are seen as part of the southernization of the state and the incursion of the state into the northern civil society; and (3) coming from the less industrialized south, they do not have the same productive ethos as northerners.1 Anti-southern sentiments were common in northern Italy as early as the 1960s, especially in cities that experienced high levels of migration from the south. In Turin, for example, it was not uncommon to see signs advertising rooms for rent only to the Piedmontese. 2 In 1984, a poll revealed that 35.2% of those interviewed agreed that Lombardy would be better off if there were fewer southerners, 25.2% claimed that it was hard to get along with southerners, and 19.6% agreed with both of these opinions.3 The Lega Nord was able to exploit these sentiments for its political purposes. In order to understand why these latent anti-south feelings were mobilized only by the late 1980s, we have to focus on a combination of opportunity structures and political mobilization. During the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth was high and southern migrants were needed in the factories in order to provide manpower for Italy’s expanding post-war economy. Migration took place during the height of economic growth, a period when the dominant political paradigm was that the role of the nation-state was to alleviate internal socio-economic cleavages through a combination of economic and social policies (in Italy as well as in Europe).4 Potential political mobilization of anti-southern sentiments was held in check, in part, since economic growth continued into the 1970s within the Third Italy. Thus, even though the Italian economy in general was in a recession, the Third Italy was experiencing a growth spurt. This was due in part to its ability to take advantage of outsourcing and the decentralization of production that marked Italy’s transition to post-Fordism. Given that growth continued, anti-southern sentiments remained latent. Cento Bull writes, “Even the 1970s did not disrupt expansion, since the Italian response to the recession of that decade was to decentralize production from the large to the small plants: industrial districts benefited as a result. Immigration from the South thus took place at a time of growth for the manufacturing sector, when many Lombard

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people would not consider employment in the poorly paid public sector.” 5 As the economic climate began to change in the 1980s, northerners’ frustrations with the Italian state increased. Many in the Third Italy felt as if their region no longer benefited from government policies. These feelings of frustration were directed toward what was perceived as privileged access by southerners to public-sector employment; toward the state-centered model of economic development; and toward the Christian Democratic Party.6 The growing anti-south sentiment had to be mobilized. The Lega Lombarda, and then the Lega Nord, exploited this resentment by employing a typical populist strategy; it defined the movement’s identity in relation to the outsider. Since there was little regional sense of belonging, attachment to local dialect, or sense of local culture, it would have been difficult to mobilize support without identifying an external enemy.7 There is no question that dialects were still in use, and that Lombards or Venetians felt a strong attachment to their communities; however, these factors were insufficient for generating the necessary political mobilization.8 The Lega was able to link the south to the state by arguing that it had colonized the north with its political parties, and with state institutions such as schools and the justice system. Since southerners were mostly employed in the civil service, the Lega argued that the northern identity would eventually be subjugated by the south and its identity.9 A prime example of this creeping southern hegemony was the distinction between the southern and the northern work ethic. As noted in chapter four, the belief in hard work was integral to the selfidentity of small and medium-sized communities in the Third Italy; there was a strong sense of pride in business and community, and in the notion that these communities were built on hard work and a productivist ethos. Productivity was associated with self reliance. The Lega linked the ethic of hard work with public stereotypes that government employees did not work; thus it could be inferred that southerners were lazy. As one leghista noted, “in general, southerners in the Veneto are reprimanded for not wanting to work very hard; this is often correct. We, for example, have a janitor at our school and he does as little as possible, even going to sleep in the school gym during work hours. They come here to take the jobs from the locals.”10

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Table 4 Trust of southerners by northern voters (%) (1992) Party allegiance

Little or Enough or a No Trust Lot of Trust (N)

Lega Nord

61.2

38.8

164

DC

39.1

60.9

107

PDS-Communist Refoundation

34.5

65.5

117

Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 141.

Changing economic and political opportunity structures permitted Bossi to construct this new political discourse, allowing him to reframe the north/south question. Portraying the north as hardworking and the south as lazy, unproductive, intellectual, and bureaucratic provided ammunition for Bossi to claim reverse discrimination; he maintained that the south was racist since it colonizes and exploits the north and treats the hard-working northerner as crude, crass, and uneducated.11 It was during this period that the Lega used posters and pamphlets with images such as a Lombard hen laying a golden egg into a basket held by a “caricatured Roman matron.” The caption underneath reads: “Southern hegemony means the power to loot the North.”12 In the late 1980s, opposition to the south became an important part of voter support for the Lega. A DOXA poll in 1992 demonstrated that Lega supporters were less likely to trust southerners (table four). During the early 1990s, when the Lega was attempting to fill the void left by the crumbling DC, it attempted to mitigate its anti-southern discourse, even hoping to gain votes in the south.13 However, by 1996, during its separatism phase, anti-southern sentiments were on the increase again. A 1996 ABACUS poll revealed that the division between the north and the south was more important for Lega supporters.14 Feelings of animosity towards the south persisted well into the 1990s and the 21st century, even if they have been mitigated and supplanted with other themes. By the mid-1990s, the prevalence of anti-southern sentiment was gradually replaced with anti-immigrant sentiment. This was reflective of Italy’s transition to an immigrantreceiving society, and due to the Lega’s ability to galvanize feelings of fear and anxiety towards migrants.

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shifting horizons: italy’s transition to an immigration nation In the late 1970s and the 1980s, Italy began its transition from a nation of emigration to a nation of immigration.15 A number of domestic and international developments facilitated this transition. The first was the end of immigrant labour recruitment in northern Europe in the early 1970s, which increased labour migration to southern Europe. Second was the opening of southern Europe’s borders, coupled with its strong maritime tradition and extensive coastline, which meant that for both logistical and economic reasons, it was difficult to control immigration. In addition, the demographic decline in Italy was easily supplemented by large families from developing countries, especially in North Africa. Fourth, the demand for new migrants was fueled by social change: increasing levels of education meant that the young were less willing to take low-paying jobs, while higher numbers of women in the work force created a need for domestic workers. And finally, economic growth and economic restructuring created demand for immigrant labour.16 As table five demonstrates, since the 1980s Italy has experienced a notable increase in immigration, spiking in the late 1990s.

changing immigration legislation, changing attitudes Until 1986, Italy had no immigration law. There were no policies to govern the entry and residency of aliens, and social and civil rights were insufficiently guaranteed to immigrants. As a consequence, immigration was treated as a law and order issue; policy did not address immigrant flow, employment, housing, education, training, health, or family reunification.17 In 1986, Italy drafted its first immigration law (Law 943). Law 943 gave non-European workers the same rights as Italian workers, linked immigration to labour market needs, and attempted to regularize illegal workers.18 Law 943 was passed with minimal opposition, since in the 1980s anti-immigrant sentiments were still low and the dominant political parties, on the left and the right, avoided politicizing the issue.19 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the general attitude toward immigrants remained relatively positive. In 1989, the murder of Jerry Esslan Masslo, a political refugee from South Africa and an

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Table 5 Foreign Population in Italy, 1985-2006 Total

% of Population

1985

423,004

NA

1990

781,138

NA

1995

677,791

1.2

1998

1,090,800

1.9

2000

1,379,700

2.4

2002

1,503,300

2.6

2004

2,402,200

4.2

2006

2,938,900

5.0

Source: 1985-1995, Migration Policy Institute. 1998-2006: OECD International Migration Data 2009.

agricultural worker in a small southern Italian town, served as a catalyst to improve the immigration law. Although the motive for the murder was ostensibly robbery, the tragic event galvanized support for the improvement of social and civil rights for immigrants. A march in response to Masslo’s killing was organized in Rome by unions, and voluntary and religious organizations, drawing about 200,000 people.20 The Socialist minister Claudio Martelli exploited public outrage to garner support for further immigration legislation. Initially, there was general support for Martelli’s initiatives, especially among the Christian Democratic and the Socialist representatives in government, and among the opposition Communist members of parliament. Few feared that immigrants would take jobs from locals and it was also acknowledged that Italy’s exposed borders meant that immigration was inevitable. Moreover, the Italian government did not seem particularly concerned with growing external demands made by the European Union regarding the need to better control its borders.21 Although early drafts of what would be passed as the “Martelli Law” in 1990 received cross-party support, political and civil opposition began to take shape before the proposed legislation became law. The Republican Party, a small member of the governing coalition, objected to early drafts of the law, claiming that, especially in

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relation to a planned amnesty, the proposed legislation was too lenient. It was argued that the leniency of the law would encourage further Third World immigration to Italy, and as a result, Italy would be excluded from the Schengen Agreement.22 The other party opposing the immigration law was the Lega Nord. Umberto Bossi, the only Lega senator, introduced 108 amendments to the Martelli Law in order to obstruct the legislation.23 The Lega and the Republican Party’s attempt to politicize immigration was not successful. With only minor revisions, the Martelli Law was passed in 1990.24 Although the Martelli Law was more comprehensive than Law 943, it still did not adequately address work quotas and civil and social rights for immigrants. In 1996, the newly elected center-left government realized that it needed to improve the Martelli Law. However, the government had to compete with opposing political and social forces. Left wing and Catholic immigrant advocacy groups and unions demanded that the immigration law address issues of employment, citizenship, multiculturalism, and asylum. The European Union demanded that Italy, in order to comply with the requirements of Schengen, control illegal immigration. Center-right and more radical elements put pressure on the government to maintain a hard line on illegal immigrants and to ensure that Italian immigration policy remained vigilant as it related to asylum, family reunification, and the need to directly link immigration with work.25 Finally, in 1998, the Turco-Napolitano immigration law was passed. The law targeted better planning of entry flows, increased measures against illegal immigrants and the criminal exploitation of immigrants by human traffickers, and increased integration measures. The law also had “a range of social measures, with better administrative coordination and more financial resources, covering health, education, assistance to minors, and to women.”26 The law reflected the evolving tensions within Italy concerning immigration. It was influenced by progressive elements in the government and within civil society, seeking to make it easier for immigrants to come to Italy, to find work, access social rights, and integrate (by way of multicultural policies). At the same time, however, the government was forced to increase border controls and penalties for illegal immigration due to EU demands and pressures from center-right political parties.27 The Lega strongly and vocally opposed the Turco-Napolitano law. After leaving government in 1994, the Lega’s anti-immigration

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rhetoric increased. During the drafting of the center-left immigration law, and then following its passage, the Lega began to vigorously target immigration.28 As Andall points out, the Lega’s protests ranged from street-level demonstrations to a series of institutional responses. For example, when the law passed in 1998, Lega senators walked out of the Senate in protest. In 1999, a demonstration was organized in Milan, attended by several thousand, to protest against immigration and crime. It was also during this period that the Lega was responsible for a series of protests against the building of mosques in Italian cities. And finally, the Lega collected signatures for a referendum to abrogate the Turco-Napolitano law. The Lega submitted a long list of objections, emphasizing that the law favored immigrants over Padanians. It objected to provisions that protected immigrants’ native language and culture, arguing that it gave priority to foreign languages and cultures over local dialects and cultures. It was critical of the bill’s recognition of international education qualifications and it denounced the introduction of “cultural mediators” to assist new immigrant children. The underlying premise of its objections was that immigrants were given preferential treatment and as a consequence the law discriminated against Padanians and Italians.29 The Lega’s proposed referendum was struck down by the constitutional court on the grounds that a referendum cannot be held on issues that influence internationally signed treaties. Since the TurcoNapolitano law had responded to demands by the EU to better control its borders by setting up refugee camps to accommodate the large numbers of immigrants arriving on Italian shores, abrogation of the law was not permitted.30 In 2000, after the referendum was disallowed, the Lega began to collect signatures for a people’s initiative. This initiative was highly symbolic on two accounts: it was carried out in alliance with FI, and thus reflected the new partnership along with the centre-right’s new emphasis on immigration. In addition, the tone of the initiative was highly provocative, serving as a precursor to the 2001 election campaign, in which immigration became a central campaign issue for the centre-right.31 The politicization of immigration in the 1990s corresponded with an increase in hostility toward immigrants. Between 1987 and 1991, it was becoming clear that fewer Italian citizens thought that immigration should be encouraged, while an increasing number wanted

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Table 6 Attitudes toward immigrants (% responding “in agreement” and “very much in agreement”) Italy France

Spain

Great Britain

Immigrants are a threat to our culture and identity

25.2

25.3

18.5

35.6

22.2

25.6

Immigrants are a threat to employment

32.3

27.4

26.3

49.9

29.4

33.2

Immigrants are a threat to public order and personal safety

42.8

35.8

25.8

32.0

24.4

31.9

eu

Germany Average

Ilvo Diamanti, “Immigrazione e Cittadinanza in Europa,” 6.

Table 7 Attitudes towards immigrants (% responding “Strongly Agree” or “agree”) Italy France “Immigrants pose a threat to our culture, our identity and our religion”

Germany

Czech Poland Republic Hungary

26.6

22.4

29.2

32.5

46.6

46.3

“Immigrants pose a threat to employment” 35.1

26.7

39.9

60.5

65.1

72.3

“Immigrants pose a threat to public order and personal Safety”

39.2

22.8

34.1

40.0

61.1

61.8

“Immigrants are a resource for our economy”

46.9

59.7

57.1

12.2

35.5

61.1

“The presence of immigrants enhances our cultural Openness” 51.4

71.7

64.2

52.2

28.8

49.7

Fondazione Nord Est/LaPolis-Univ. di Urbino, conducted by Pragma Srl, GMS for Germany, July-Sept. 2005 (N=5927) Ilvo Diamanti and Fabio Bordignon, “Immigrazione e cittadinanza in Europa Migration and citizenship rights in Europe,” Fondazione Nord Est, November 2005, 12.

to prohibit or more strictly control immigration.32 Consistent with the growing fears and opposition to immigration, polls conducted by Fondazione Nord Est in 2001 demonstrated that immigration

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had become a salient and volatile political issue. The most worrisome concern for Italians was public order, or the fear that immigration would increase crime, after which Italians were preoccupied with the loss of jobs. Finally, there was a concern that immigration threatened local and Italian identity.33 Fondazione Nord Est polls conducted in 2005 revealed similar patterns. Although there was a slight decline in the number who felt that immigrants threatened public order and security, there was a slight increase in those who thought that immigrants presented a threat to employment, culture, and identity.34 (See table 7)

exploiting the “right to difference”: the lega nord, the msi, and alleanza nazionale The Lega was instrumental in exploiting growing fear and apprehension toward immigrants. There was a link between the Lega’s early concerns over immigration and its Miglio-inspired nationalism. Although immigration was not a crucial component of Miglio’s political philosophy (he placed more emphasis on liberal and economic freedoms), his emphasis on local and ethnic belonging led him to conclude that ethnic communities were better able to “withstand the ‘invasion’ of foreigners, thanks both to their greater cultural uniformity and attachment to local institutions and to a more efficient implementation of measures of control and repression.”35 After Milgio broke with the Lega, the influence of the French New Right (Nouvelle Droite, founded by Alain de Benoist) increased. Influenced by cultural notions of exclusion put forward in the 1960s and 1970s by Benoist, the Lega focused on cultural justifications of exclusion, cleverly framing the immigration issue to avoid biological arguments. The influence of the Nouvelle Droite was evident in the Lega’s adoption of what is often referred to as “differentialist racism,” support for ethnic federalism, and opposition to multiculturalism; the latter is based on opposition to universalism and support for the right of communities to defend themselves against the state and immigrants.36 Over the years, La Padania has printed reviews of books written by individuals associated with the Nouvelle Droite, references to ideas and individuals from within the movement, editorials by Benoist, and descriptions of conferences in Italy and elsewhere in which Nouvelle Droite members make appearances.37

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Although both Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale supporters have historically demonstrated the most mistrust and animosity toward immigrants, it was the Lega that first exploited this ideological paradigm shift for political purposes (see tables 8 and 9). Soon Lega supporters surpassed AN voters in terms of xenophobia.38 Due in part to its fascist past and its quest to become accepted into mainstream politics, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) avoided politicizing immigration issues in the 1980s. Even though much of the MSI membership demonstrated prejudice towards immigrants, the leadership decided not to exploit the issue. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the MSI tied immigration to its critique of capitalism, to the exploitation of the Third World, and to the shortcomings of multiculturalism. 39 With the ascendancy of Fini to the leadership of the party, Alleanza Nazionale chose not to politicize immigration, either. While AN does not always speak in a unified voice and its immigration policies are often contradictory, unlike the Lega, which began to voice strong opposition to immigration in the 1990s, AN (especially under the leadership of Fini) has reluctantly accepted the inevitability of immigration.40 The weight of MSI’s fascist past meant that as Fini transformed the party into AN, he moved away from overtly discriminatory policy. The ideological change in the politics of exclusion was, therefore, led by the Lega Nord and not by either the neo-fascist MSI or the postfascist AN. From these differing stances on immigration, we see since the 1990s how the new radical right has emerged, not out of fascism or neo-fascism, but from a newly constituted and evolving combination of populism and radical right ideology.

the politics of immigration and exclusion In the early 1990s, the Lega began to publicize its anti-immigration platform with posters declaring, “The enemy is Rome! The parties in Rome favour immigration from the Third World knowing that they are not able to integrate and that they will bring tensions and racial conflict”; and “Bringing blacks here is slavery.”41 But almost as quickly as it had launched this campaign, it deemphasized its antiimmigration message in light of the crisis of the First Republic and the demise of the party system. The party’s 1992 electoral platform made only a single mention of immigration.42 The softening of its

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Table 8 Hostility towards immigrants in Italy by party support (% responding in agreement) (1994) Lega Nord

an

fi

ppi

pds

Italy

Immigrants exploit the welfare state

62.0

58.8

36.0

40.6

30.3

40.4

Immigrants increase unemployment

78.0

73.8

66.9

72.5

49.6

64.1

Roberto Biorcio, La Panadia Promessa, 161.

anti-immigrant platform coincided with the Lega’s aspiration to move toward the political centre, and the hope of emerging as the new Italian catchall party. At the time, many viewed the Lega as the political force that would challenge the post-war consensus. The Lega was given more space to manoeuvre since Forza Italia was not formed until 1994, and the MSI had not yet shed its fascist past. 43 The formation of Forza Italia, and the transformation of MSI into what would become AN in 1995, set the stage for the 1994 centerright coalition government. However, the fall of the center-right government only months after it was formed permitted the Lega to increasingly focus its attention on immigration. In 1995, Prime Minister Lamberto Dini, who headed the technical government that was formed after the failed 1994 government, proposed a decree (the Dini Decree) to regularize illegal immigrants. The Lega’s position was that unemployed and undocumented immigrants should be expelled. Although the government initially issued a decree reflecting these sentiments (for example, those convicted of drug trafficking and other criminal offences were to be expelled), Bossi was critical of the regularization and the lack of criminalization of illegal immigration.44 In the latter half of the 1990s, the Lega continued to intensify its anti-immigrant rhetoric. Three factors pushed the Lega forward. First, the party began to consolidate support among its core constituents. Constructing a distinct party identity, especially with new competition from Forza Italia, involved constructing a Padanian identity. In the process, a distinction between Padanians and nonPadanians emphasized the inherent dangers of uncontrolled immigration as it related to identity, security, employment, and social welfare. Second, the radicalization of the anti-immigrant discourse

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

Table 9 Attitudes towards immigration and foreigners (%) (2001) an

Lega

Population Mean

Immigrants should be fired first Don’t know

14

4

6

Strongly disagree

21

27

24

Disagree

26

20

30

Agree

23

37

19

Strongly agree

15

11

11

6

1

11

Immigrants cause crime Don’t know Strongly disagree

6

4

13

Disagree

33

28

34

Agree

32

43

29

Strongly agree

23

24

14

Immigrants should be expelled even if they have not committed any crime Don’t know

12

3

13

3

–

10

Disagree

17

19

21

Agree

26

24

29

Strongly agree

42

54

27

Strongly disagree

Immigrants weaken the national identity Don’t know

11

3

14

Strongly disagree

11

11

16

Disagree

30

27

31

Agree Strongly agree

32 17

25 34

26 13

Piero Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 343.

corresponded to the Lega’s declining middle-class support and its increased support among the working class and less-educated voters.45 And finally, the Lega’s anti-immigration stance corresponds to

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both the heightened concern over immigration in Italy and across Europe, and to the growing number of immigrants arriving in Italy.

framing immigration: identity, security, welfare, and employment The Lega’s anti-immigration message is based on three principles. First, it argues that immigration is a threat to Padanian identity in particular and more generally to Italian identity. The Lega promotes fears that immigration will lead to multiculturalism and to the destruction of local identities. Second, as noted earlier, immigration is presented as a security threat, with immigration linked to an increase in crime. Third, the party argues that immigrants are a burden on the welfare state and that they represent an economic threat to locals.

the battle for identity: opposing multiculturalism, americanization, and islam In order to present immigration as a threat to Padania and Italian identity, the Lega merges its anti-multiculturalism message with the notion that immigration is linked to the Americanization of society and to the hegemony of consumer culture and globalization. In addition, it proclaims that the values and culture of immigrants, especially those of Muslims, cannot be integrated with European, Italian, and Padanian culture and norms. Beginning with its early attempts to politicize immigration, the Lega has opposed multiculturalism (or what it often calls a multiracial society). This opposition is based on the implication that multiculturalism destroys local identities. In fact, in a party document it is argued that American multiculturalism implies de-localization.46 In the same document, in a chapter entitled “The Multiracial Society and Globalization: A system for killing the people!”, multiculturalism, linked with globalization and a multiracial society, is depicted as a threat to self-determination and local identity. This opposition to multiculturalism is at the heart of the Lega’s philosophy, and emerges from its contention that local identity and community are based on shared history, values, and worldview.47 The same document states, “The multiracial society, which removes the common cultural and identity reference points, is another step forward along the road of alienation and the solitude of the individual who feels alone and

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crushed between a super-state apparatus … and a global market always more ruthless.”48 The Lega’s opposition to immigration and multiculturalism is linked to its larger philosophical outlook and to its larger political project, which claims that the demographic decline should not be addressed by increasing immigration and encouraging multiculturalism, but by supporting traditional structures of civil society such as families and local communities (in part by institutionalizing a system of national preference) and by using foreign aid to prevent immigration to Europe.49 The party links multiculturalism with a larger political project jointly supported by center-left political parties, large capital, and international finance, claiming that the desire to globalize capitalism and create an individualistic and cosmopolitan world order are detrimental to local communities. The Lega claims that such forces are intent on creating a highly individualized society based on liberalism, a market economy, and a cosmopolitan society. This is perceived by the party as a means by which to destroy traditional communities.50 An article in La Padania, entitled “First the Martelli Law, Now Turco-Napolitano: The Immigrants Celebrate on the Backs of the People; This is How the Political Regime in Rome Indiscriminately Throws Opens the Doors” declares that at the beginning of the decade, the Lega Nord was the only party that asserted its opposition to the Martelli Law: “The Lega, since its first appearance, has underlined how the capitalist system and globalization must necessarily demolish borders and favour mass immigration from underdeveloped countries.” The article also proclaims its systematic opposition to the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law on the grounds that it reads much like a “charter of rights for immigrants.” The Lega objects to the ease with which immigrants are able to bring their families and obtain housing and employment, arguing that it is too easy to enter the country illegally and then remain, often by way of amnesties.51

opposing the americanization of padania, italy, and europe Linking multiculturalism to the Americanization of society has also been a successful strategy. The Lega argues that the implementation of an American and a multiracial society is foreign to the culture and history of Europe. European culture and politics are firmly rooted in

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123

national belonging, and Europe is more apprehensive about the total marketization of society than is America. The Lega writes, “The multiracial model is the essence of American society. On the contrary, Europe has never been multiracial. Even if its millennial history is comprised of internal migration and the acceptance of different races, European ethnic groups have still maintained a substantial historical homogeneity and a reciprocal affinity derived from common Indo-European origins.”52 The Lega argues that if this process is allowed to continue, European and Italian culture and history will be colonized and annihilated by American consumer culture. Moreover, the creation of a multicultural and a multiracial society, in the mirror image of the United States, will lead to internal conflict, violence, and divisions between races, cultures, and social groups akin to Los Angeles, and other large major urban metropolises in the United States.53 The Lega’s conclusion is that American notions of multiculturalism and the melting pot do not and cannot work; instead, they merely create violent societies without their own specific and unique identities. The Lega concludes that multiculturalism is not workable, especially if the goal is to mix incompatible cultures. If, however, European states are forced to accept immigrants, it has to be done in a controlled manner that is sensitive to compatibility between cultures. Overall, the Lega argues that Catholic immigrants, other Europeans, and second and third-generation Italian emigrants should be given priority, since a failure to give priority to those who are able to integrate will result in the loss of identity for Italians, especially for those in the north. Local politicians propose encouraging the return of second- and third-generation Italian emigrants, in order to avoid the need to accept non-Italians or non-Europeans. La Padania reports that “The president of the province of Treviso, Luca Zaia, has already prepared a plan for return migration. This plan targets third-generation emigrants by linking them with a desired professional job and housing; the mayor of Vittorio Veneto, Giancarlo Scottà, has also already planned for housing in the former hospital of Serravalle; and the mayor of S. Vendemiano, Guido Dussin, has proposed internships and temporary work to link the demand of the Veneto entrepreneurs with the interests of the returning émigrés themselves.”54 Loss of identity, up-rooting, and multiculturalism are associated with large industrial cities. This loss of identity is a major reason why

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

the Lega Nord does not fare as well in large urban centres such as Milan, Turin, and Genoa. It argues that its message speaks to the smaller, less homogenized, and more culturally intact towns.55 Or, as, Domenico Comino proclaimed: “The capital of Piedmont has become, unfortunately, the symbol of the loss of identity of our people … invaded by non-EU immigrants. In a few years Turin has experienced a level of degradation that has already reached a very high level of squalor … The citizens seem to be chloroformed and dazed. Mayor Castellani is one of the principal persons responsible for this foolish immigration policy, transforming entire zones into dangerous areas reminiscent of the Bronx. But if someone hazards to ask for strict control and the restoration of legality, they are quickly silenced with calls of racism. This someone, in Turin as in the north, is the Lega.”56

the war on islam Increasingly, the cornerstone of the Lega Nord’s objection to immigration and multiculturalism has become its war on Islam. Although the Lega was apprehensive about Islam before 11 September 2001, its fears of Muslim immigration have increased since the terrorist attacks.57 Highlighting the tensions between Christian Europe and Islam leads the party to paint a one-dimensional picture of the latter. The Lega Nord emphasizes the Islamic fusion of private and public spheres, religion and politics, and Muslim identity, faith, and the conception of politics and citizenship. The Lega Nord contends that the integralist nature of Islam does not allow for a secular state, and implies that this constitutes a threat to European democracy, Catholic values, and European culture and society. An article in La Padania in 2001 cites an article in Civiltà Cattolica to substantiate its opposition to the construction of mosques. It reads, “in the authorization of the construction of mosques it must be remembered that this is not only a place of worship, but a political, social and cultural reality … It is important to remember the function of the Mosque: it is a place of worship, where political decisions also originate.” The article also cites that in Islamic history this is where “revolutions and popular uprisings” have been born. The article emphasizes that, for this reason, the construction of a mosque is not only a question of the freedom of religion but of politics.58 This position is not merely political rhetoric, but also manifests itself in the Lega’s political mobilization. For example, in the fall of

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125

2000, Lega Nord supporters and militants opposed the construction of a mosque in the northern town of Lodi. The demonstration’s theme was that Islam was an invasion. Protestors declared that they were there to protect Italian/Padanian identity against an intolerant Islam, irreconcilable with local laws and traditions and therefore unable to integrate into Italian society.59 The intensification of the party’s anti-immigration discourse has been consistent with the views of party members and party supporters.60 A 2001 IspO poll demonstrated that Lega supporters, more than any other group, feared that immigrants threatened their cultural identity (see table nine above).

immigration, crime, and insecurity Polls conducted by the Fondazione Nord Est indicate that Italians are most afraid that immigration increases crime (i.e. above taking jobs from locals and representing a threat to culture); these sentiments are particularly strong among Lega voters (see table nine). Populist parties such as the Lega feed off this fear, simplifying the link between immigration and crime. The Lega is particularly adept at linking immigration to criminal behaviour and to the presence of immigrants in cities.61 As Mario Borghezio, one of the more vocal leghisti, pointed out, “The people are afraid to leave their homes. They find it unacceptable that there are five thousand armed policemen on the street in Italy who are supposed to defend them, who are no longer in a position to carry out their duties. They are not trained and they cannot use their weapons because of absurd regulations. And meanwhile it is the same state that leaves its citizens unprotected, opening the borders indiscriminately and continuing to concede every kind of privilege to illegals.”62 The governing parties and the existing immigration legislation are blamed for creating refugee and immigrant ghettos in the large urban centers. The Lega Nord claims that these immigrant “cities” are known to be centres of crime, prostitution, drug use, and drug traffic. Governing elites, who do not have to contend with the problem since they live in wealthy and secure neighbourhoods, are criticized for integrating the immigrant population in with the working class and the less well off, creating undesirable living conditions for locals who have no right or power to object.63 The Lega, especially in La Padania, consistently links immigration with crime. For example, the Lega Nord in Mantua protested what

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

it called the government’s excessively liberal and lenient immigration legislation after an Albanian immigrant beat a native Italian to death. Pointing to the reluctance of the government to deport immigrants, the article noted that even though the Albanian was a legal immigrant, he was, nevertheless, a danger to society since he was involved in criminal activity and did not have employment.64 The Lega also points to the many illegal immigrants in Italy. Exact figures are hard to determine, but Italy has one of the highest numbers of illegal immigrants in Europe.65 The Lega has opposed illegal immigration since the early 1990s. As noted, it objected to the 1995 Dini Decree. The party literature (its newspaper, policy documents, and election posters) presents the situation as if Italy was under siege from illegal immigrants. As early as 1991, such discourse appeared in the party newspaper. For example, one headline depicted the arrival of Albanians as an invasion.66 Faced with this so-called invasion, the state is depicted as unresponsive, incompetent, and lax. Bossi has even declared that the Italian navy should be used to discourage the arrival of illegal immigrants.67 The Lega proposes several solutions to the immigrant problem: stricter immigration laws and better border control; lower immigration quotas; and the contingency of immigration on employment or the adoption of guest or seasonal worker models.68 In addition, it demands that priority for social services be given to Padanians and European69 and calls for the creation of citizen patrols to protect the territory.70 The link between immigration, security, and employment is consistent with the message of other radical right populist parties. Moreover, concerns over immigration and security influenced immigration legislation once the center-right came to power in 2001. Chapter eight discusses the Lega’s calls for tighter border controls, stricter laws for deporting illegal aliens, and restricting immigration to only those with jobs.

immigrants and the welfare state: protecting “our own” According to the Lega, immigrants also pose a threat to the welfare state, burdening an already over-extended state and taking resources such as housing and social benefits from local citizens. Lega supporters have contradictory sentiments toward the welfare state. In its early stages of formation the party used neo-liberalism to attack

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Table 10 Opinion of political economy by party allegiance (% responding in agreement) (1996) Lega

fi

an

pds

ppi

Northern Italy

Too much fiscal pressure penalizes the economic system

86.3

85.2

88.5

67.2

70.2

76.7

There should be more freedom for private initiatives and businesses

82.7

92.5

90.1

68.5

71.1

78.3

Social services should be free for everyone

61.0

55.2

57.0

58.1

53.5

58.4

Roberto Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 173.

what it perceived to be an overly bureaucratized state. As table ten highlights, Lega supporters were in favour of lower taxes and more economic liberalization. However, Lega voters are also supportive of extensive social services and do not perceive a contradiction in also supporting a market economy. The conclusion, however, is that priority should be given to the indigenous population (i.e. those who pay taxes and whose families have made a long-term contribution to society). In the process, immigrants are targeted as a threat to the viability of the welfare state. Bossi originally declared that he did not oppose granting social services to non-Italians, but cleverly contextualized this within civic obligations: “For me all human beings are equal, in the sense that they have the same dignity. The most black of the blacks has the same rights as my neighbour. However, they also have the same duties. Thus, they have to contribute to the national wealth before asserting the right to a house and to unemployment and to health insurance. These rights do not grow on trees, they are not guaranteed to all human beings as those ’68 fools wanted with their all human beings are equal”71 Similar sentiments are echoed in the party newspaper. The Lega Nord argues that reverse discrimination by political parties, and especially those on the left, has treated immigrants better than locals. It is common to find articles in the Lega newspaper, as well as statements by party officials, declaring that immigrants are given services while pensioners and other recipients of social assistance are forced to live in poverty. Bossi noted that it is necessary to avoid the situation in which after a lifetime of work the Italian citizen receives a

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

pittance, “while Roma gypsies receive a million lire a month, that is to say, twice as much as a minimum pension.”72 To combat this predicament the party endorses the notion of national preference; Italians, and northerners in particular, should be given priority access to social assistance. The Venetian regional councilor Fabrizio Fracassi proclaimed in an article in La Padania, entitled “Enough of Anti-Padanian Racism,” that “it is absolutely embarrassing what is currently taking place with regard to public housing.” Attacking decisions to give homes to immigrants while, he claimed, local citizens remained without, he proclaimed that “at the beginning of next week … I intend to prepare a motion to present in council … An intervention is urgently needed: citizenship must once again be an indispensable requisite for social housing.”73 Further linking abuse of the welfare state to immigration, an article in the Lega’s newspaper declared that, “because of the essentially socialist nature of our country, in fact, Muslims have an easy time acquiring funds, support, or subsidy, or whatever other name you want to call our money. They understand that if they kill us sooner or later we’ll get mad, but if they rob us little by little they will be able to throw us out in the street in the blink of an eye.” Evoking the right to self-defense against this invasion, the Lega claimed that locals “have the right to defend themselves, first cutting the funds, without the agreement of the politicians, from that pot that they call the welfare state. This is nothing but defending ourselves from this sweetened version of Jihad.”74 The effect of the party’s stance on immigration and unemployment is demonstrated in public opinion polls. Early Eurobarometer polls (table 8) demonstrated that supporters linked unemployment with immigration. Recent Itanes (2006) polls are less forthcoming (table  11). Although Lega supporters were more fearful of immigrants as a threat to employment, this level was not dramatically higher than that of other centre-right parties’ supporters. These contradictory findings may in part be due to the realization among even Lega supporters that new arrivals are employed in jobs that locals are not willing to fill. Moreover, local entrepreneurs have openly opposed the Lega’s immigration policy, lobbying the government for more open immigration policies. For example, influential Venetian entrepreneurs, many of whom are Lega supporters, publicly voiced their objections to its proposed attempts to limit immigration, claiming that cuts to immigration would severely hamper their ability to conduct business. Rossi Luciani, the leader of the

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129

Table 11 Opinions on immigration (2006) (% responding “agree”)

Left

Left Democrats

Union of Christian and Centre Democrats

Immigrants are a threat to our culture

33

37

57

66

68

80

Immigrants are a threat to employment

37

35

51

64

64

66

Immigrants who pay taxes should be allowed to vote

74

75

54

49

58

48

Forza Italia

an

Lega

Salvatore Vassallo, “Le questioni che dividono gli italiani,” 170.

Venetian wing of Confindustria (the national employers association) proclaimed that “the lack of a serious open immigration policy that is not based on demagogy puts at risk the very survival of the northeastern system.” In particular, he was critical of the rigidity of the new 2002 immigration law, especially provisions that required workers to leave the country after losing their jobs. Instead, he demanded an immigration policy that was more flexible and more suited to the economic reality.75 Nevertheless, the Lega argues that northerners, Italians, and Europeans should be given job priority. Roberto Maroni, Bossi’s right-hand man, and the Minister of Labour and Social Policies between 2001 and 2006 (and current Interior Minister, since 2008), declared that “foreigners … must only be given work that citizens of each region clearly do not want. The number of immigrants allowed to enter will be based on the choice of the citizens. The fundamental concept is to prevent manpower from outside the EU from being used just because it costs less.”76 The party argues that foreign labour power benefits big business while it is detrimental to Italians and aggravates the situation of Italian workers.77 The Lega argues that the social and economic drawbacks of immigration necessitate a rethinking of current immigration policy. If this does not occur, an article in La Padania claims, “perhaps they do not realize that soon a conflict could explode between workers: between those Italians who have been laid off for long periods of time, who are forced to accept lower pay and more flexible working conditions, and the new competition from immigrants, by illegals who are ready to enter and compete on an already over-burdened labour

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From Regionalism to Radical Right Populism

market.”78 Bossi and the Lega Nord argue that immigration needs to be linked to productivity and labour demand, while social services need to be attached to social and economic contributions. In addition, those who come to Italy must have adequate lodging and employment.79 In a similar vein an article in La Padania declared, “Italian citizens who reside in Padania for at least five years will be favoured in the application process for employment in the municipality. The decision of the Federal Council of the Carroccio [Lega Nord] will ignore those fools who instead prefer to ‘help’ the immigrants and the non-residents, in the name of charity.”80

nativist nationalism and european radical right populism Nativist nationalism provides the link between the Lega’s anti-south and its anti-immigrant political platform. Lega supporters, especially early in its development, tended to distrust southerners, supporting the party’s attempt to construct a political identity based on its opposition to the southernization of the Italian state. The south was portrayed as culturally incompatible with the north, lacking an entrepreneurial culture and thus more dependent on the state, draining the resources of the north. After 1996, the party’s radicalization of its anti-immigrant message corresponded with a heightened fear of immigrants. With changing opportunity structures the Lega altered its target. When it became evident that Italy was a country of immigration the Lega began to increase its opposition to immigration. Immigration is linked to issues of identity, security, welfare and employment, as well as the Lega’s larger philosophy of the community within the global order.81 In addition, in a post-September 11th environment, the party pointed to the incompatibility of Islam with a Christian Europe and liberal democracy. Targeting Muslims as a cultural threat is framed in terms of protecting Padania, Europe, the Christian family, liberal democracy, and even women.82 Affinities with Europe’s other radical right populist parties show that an emphasis on immigration is common. The French National Front employed an anti-immigrant discourse in the early 1980s. However, Le Pen was rather precocious in this regard; the Austrian Freedom Party, the Progress Parties in Norway and Denmark, the Swiss and the Danish People’s Parties, and the Lega Nord only began to fully articulate an anti-immigrant ideology in the 1990s.

6 The Lega Nord: Between Neo-Liberalism and Opposition to Globalization

The discussion so far has focused on populism, nationalism, and on the Lega’s support for what I have referred to as an authentic civil society. Chapter one argued that these are traits common to all parties in the radical right populist family. The Lega applies these radical right populist themes to the Italian context, addressing the Italian socio-economic and political opportunity structures. For example, given the historical divide between the north and the south, a Padanian nationalism has emerged. The Lega’s populism placed considerable emphasis on anti-state discourse, especially as the First Republic began to collapse. And as chapter five argued, nativist nationalism provides the link between its early anti-south rhetoric and its current anti-immigrant rhetoric. The discussion now turns to the Lega’s economic platform. As noted in chapter one, the scholarship on radical right populist parties tends to underemphasize the importance of economic policies, either as a central component of their political platforms or as a reason for voter support. However, in the case of the Lega economic concerns have always been a central policy concern. In the early 1990s, the Lega’s anti-Rome, anti-state populist discourse extolled the virtues of the market economy. The party claimed that lower taxes, increased competition and productivity, and less state involvement benefited both employers and employees, creating more jobs and take-home pay for workers. Thus, especially in the early 1990s, the party employed a typical free-market discourse. However, support for free-market, anti-trust, anti-monopoly capitalism has also been accompanied by the Lega Nord’s opposition to unbridled capitalism. The Lega defends the local economy

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against the perceived threat of multinational capitalism, the power of domestic and international lobbies, and the colonization of European capitalism by American economic interests and the American model of capitalism. The Lega contends that this delicate line between supporting a free-market economy and opposing globalization can and should be achieved through the decentralization of the Italian state and through federalism, if not through outright northern separation. The objection to government favouritism for large industrial interests, along with criticisms of the growing power of international capital, were present in the Lega Nord’s political platform even in its earliest phases. The degree to which the Lega emphasizes the virtues of a free-market economy, low taxes, and privatization, or the extent to which it focuses on the need to protect local economies depends, in part, on voter support and the actions of the other political parties. The Lega placed more emphasis on free-market discourse during its early development in the late 1980s and the early 1990s when it received more middle-class and even some liberal-professional support. During that first phase, vocal support for free-market economic policies, such as anti-trust legislation, privatization, and the organization of tax revolts, occurred before Silvio Berlusconi appeared with his neo-liberal political platform.1 After 1994, the Lega needed to contend with competition from FI, which, calling for less taxation and less government, managed to attract Lega voters, especially larger manufacturers located within the fabric of the Third Italy. As a result, the Lega began to concentrate on consolidating its voter base among lower-middle-class entrepreneurs, the non-unionized working-class, and the self-employed within the Third Italy. The party placed more emphasis on its critique of the economic and political power of multinational companies and globalization. Bossi even began to question the notion of “unlimited” growth and stressed the need to protect the European model of capitalism. Support for a free-market economy speaks to the productivist forces within civil society, to the Lega’s attacks on the state, and to the desire for lower taxes. The anti-globalization discourse appeals to those who oppose the power of economic elites and big business and the internationalization of the economy. In the face of increasing economic and political instability and insecurity, it also represents a desire to protect “one’s own.”

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populist neo-liberalism In the early 1990s, the Lega Nord argued that it represented an economic revolution in post-war Italian politics.2 Presenting itself as supporting a neo-liberal revolution, the Lega successfully exploited anti-state and anti-party sentiments. These policies addressed growing resentment of what was perceived by a growing percentage of the population, especially located in the Third Italy, as excessive fiscal pressure (taxation, payroll deductions, etc.). These anti-tax sentiments were magnified by the belief that taxation was not accompanied by efficient social services. A dissatisfaction with taxes and services was not new to Italian political discourse. Already by 1986, 43.4% of those surveyed thought it was important to lower taxes, while 55.8% wanted more efficient public and social services.3 In successive years, these sentiments grew: by 1992, over 50% of the respondents thought that it was important to lower taxes, while 65.8% called for more efficient social services.4 Yet no party was able to distance itself sufficiently from its relationship with the state to exploit these latent frustrations. A Thatcherite revolution, as had occurred in Great Britain, did not take place in Italy. The appearance of an outsider party such as the Lega Nord was able to mobilize these sentiments. Like the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway and the Freedom Party in Austria in the early 1990s, the Lega Nord combined its populism with neo-liberal political economic ideas to attack the monopoly of the state, high taxes, and the high level of public debt.5 Bossi argued that the Lega’s economic revolution would enact legislation that supported anti-trust provisions, privatization, lower taxes, and fewer unions. This economic revolution was needed to build a true free-market economy and a competitive economic system. However, this could only materialize if all forms of monopolies, public and private, were prevented. The party argued that the state’s monopoly over the economy and the monopoly of large industry should be dismantled with appropriate legislation. It claimed that “blind-trust and anti-trust policies are therefore close relatives for the Lega: it is not possible to operate in a liberal environment without declaring a strong ‘no’ to the fusion and the concentration of the economic and the political, something that is currently unique” to Italy. Ironically, given its more recent attacks on American capitalism, the Lega had earlier claimed that this

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anti-trust legislation should not follow the European model, which is predicated too much on state intervention and regulation. Rather the party aspired to the American model which “avoids monopolies, concentrations, and illicit overlapping controls.”6 Anti-trust legislation, for the Lega Nord, was also linked to the need to reduce the size of the state. The Lega Nord argued – in this case accurately – that the Italian state’s role in the economy, and the size of its public debt, was larger than in any other Western industrialized country. Bossi pointed out that the Italian state had a direct hand in the ownerships of banks, and of food production, insurance, electricity, oil, chemical, and transportation industries. More often than not these monopolies functioned to prevent competition. They constituted a dumping ground for failed private ventures, curtailing competition, productivity, and the creation of jobs.7 Linking deficit spending to support for the south, to corrupt political parties, and to large industry, the Lega’s newspapers and its party literature pointed to the disproportionate fiscal pressure placed on northern entrepreneurs and employees, and on the competitive ability of the northern economy.8 Bossi declared his support for privatization but warned of a double effect: “in the short term it produces cash, and in the long term it reduces financial needs and improves productivity. But be careful; the selling off of the dying master state’s family jewels means that one places absolute trust in an ‘executor’... Privatizations signify business and large geo-political choices; it is unthinkable that a question this delicate should be placed in the trust of a political class that has demonstrated itself to be untrustworthy and dishonest. The selling of large Italian public businesses attracts large appetites, national and especially international.”9 In order to overcome the danger of creating a new private monopoly, the Lega Nord claimed it was necessary to permit ordinary citizens and small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs to own shares in these newly privatized companies. Appealing to the so-called ordinary people, it argued that such measures would prevent large capital from falling under the influence of politicians.10

tax revolt as political mobilization In the early 1990s, the Lega shaped its populist discourse around dissatisfaction with high taxes. It was the patriotic duty of northern taxpayers to withhold taxes from the state in order to protest the

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corrupt political parties and the funneling of revenue to the south. Citizens should either simply not pay their taxes or else pay them to the local municipal government. Bossi proclaimed that “The choice of paying taxes to the municipality instead of to the Treasury does not put the mayor in difficulty – he receives the money from the citizen – it is just an error with respect to the entity to which the taxes are addressed. The fine is very low, 5%... Another type of fiscal protest – more complicated – consists of opening an account at the bank, and creating a bank book addressed to the Treasury... But in this case, the fine would be much more elevated since this behaviour, according to the Internal Revenue, would be equivalent to not paying taxes.”11 The tax revolt was based on the assumption that fiscal resistance is revolutionary, democratic, just, and reflects the work of the “honest.” It was common to see headlines such as “Fiscal Resistance: Courage of the Honest.” The article with this title reported how Lega parliamentarians called on citizens to exercise collective courage: citizens must participate in a fiscal revolt, “a civic defense by honest citizens, sick of paying for the state’s theft.”12 Or, as Paolo Rumiz writes, “illegality transforms itself into a call for a more equitable legality; tax evasion transforms itself into a patriotic act. When I listen to LIFE [Free Federalist Entrepreneurs of Europe] I wonder if I am a fool. Since I pay my taxes, if they are patriots, I am a deserter.”13 This tax revolt was not successful: only a tiny proportion of Lega supporters participated.14 Where the fiscal protest was successful, however, was at the level of electoral mobilization – the Lega was able to attract voters by claiming that it was the party that stood up for the average citizen, demanding lower taxes and fiscal reform.15

populism against unions The Lega Nord’s objections to the state’s fiscal policies, high levels of taxation, and high costs of labour are also brought to bear on what it claims is the excessive power of the unions. The Lega links union politics with the left, with large industry, and with the protection of elite, well-protected union members. Bossi claims that unions and left-wing parties are to blame for the problems of the Italian economy since they “defend the privileged workers and industries with justifications of solidarity. The protection of the alleged weak allows the heirs of the PCI, and their allied unions, the right to carry out destructive and damaging policies against the poor.”16

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Reminiscent of its populist attacks on the state, the Lega points to the elite nature of Italian unions and links the unions to the political economy of the Industrial Triangle. It declares that the unions themselves sell out the interests of their members, forming alliances with the new globalizing left. The head of the Lega’s own union, Rosi Mauro, claims that workers were forced to make sacrifices under the centre-left government (1996-2001) in order for the government to meet its fiscal goals. The alliance between the government, unions, and Confindustria materialized because all of these political forces “found themselves in perfect agreement over the abolition of the scala mobile [the adjustment of wages to the rate of inflation] and they started the current program that heavily penalizes take-home pay.” She concludes that the agreement was not beneficial to the average worker, who was not protected against inflation, rising prices, rent control, and who was not presented with adequate pension reform.17 These anti-union sentiments carry over into the 21st century. While in power, especially between 2001 and 2006, when Maroni was Minister of Labour and Social Policies, the unions were a target of the government. Excessive union power was blamed for labour market rigidities and for Italy’s economic troubles. These anti-union sentiments work on two levels. First, they appeal to a less unionized workforce, located particularly in the Third Italy. Second, they exploit the general mistrust of political institutions among Lega supporters. Despite this anti-union discourse, the Lega Nord created its own union. It argues that its union protects employees and self-employed workers, that is, those workers who are often treated as if they were second-class citizens by the state: “Juridical injustice, we have said, is why employees are treated as if they were a category of minus habens, a minority; employees in Italy are treated as if they were a minority, i.e. by the constitution, and in respect to their lack of direct fiscal representation.”18 The Lega formed the Sindacato Autonomista Lombardo in 1990. The objective of this organization was “to pursue the national interests of the national Lombard people through the transformation of the economic system. Actions by the unions are intended to create a more equitable allocation of the fruits of production between the different competing forces, in the interest of the entire Lombard people.” The union called for an agreement between business and labour (those who produce), creating cooperation within the community.19 It emphasized the different contexts of the small and medium-sized

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businesses and the large Fordist production centres, and the need for alternative contracts (bargaining) to represent these differences, i.e. the differentiation between salaries and geographic areas (that is, the need to implement salary cages), the fiscalization of social contributions, the de-fiscalization of overtime work, and the creation of regional pension funds.20 The goal of the Lega’s unions was to represent the workers employed in small and medium-sized businesses, but unlike the larger Italian unions, this was to be accomplished by protecting entrepreneurship. The union leadership argued that it would “restore the relationship between the entrepreneur and the dependent worker to its authentic value – not the negative antagonism and conflict so dear to Marxist ideology, but a relationship that is dialectical and contractual.”21 When asked how the tensions between the north and the south should be resolved, the Lega repeats its argument in favour of “salary cages,” so that labour costs, wages, paycheque deductions and pensions reflect the cost of living in the region in which the worker is employed and where the employer sets up his business. The Lega asks, “What should be done? The Lega Nord and Confedersal [the Lega Union] for years, despite charges of racism, has pointed to the necessity of returning union contracts to the regional level. This would strengthen the legitimacy of unions such as Confedersal by allowing regional representation (unlike the centralist logic of the triple alliance) for workers.”22 The Lega’s attempt to bridge the gap between a market economy and support for workers in the Third Italy is indicative of its ideology and its popularity in the Third Italy. The Lega has always claimed that its economic platform is above class conflict; thus, it has attempted to address the specific socio-economic organization of work within the small and medium-sized business in the region. However, these developments are also indicative of the party’s attempt to balance support for a market economy, while claiming to protect the local economy. These sentiments have carried over into its opposition to globalization.

protecting “our own”: the lega as critic of globalization The Lega Nord’s economic model, as presented thus far, is based on a critique of the fiscal and taxation policies of the central state. The

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insufficiency of public services despite high taxation is linked to the alliance between the state and large industry. However, the promarket, anti-tax, and neo-liberal policies of radical right populist parties such as the Lega Nord differ from the neo-conservative revolution of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan on several counts. Radical right populist parties propose neo-liberal economic policies, but their political platform is also used as a “lever for a general challenge to the political class and the traditional parties.” The fusion of populism with a neo-liberal discourse is based on the idea of combating the political community and protecting “one’s own.”23 This is the essential link between the Lega’s support for a free-market economy, its opposition to globalization, and its criticism of multinational domination and the European Union. What may appear to be a contradiction to external observers makes sense to Lega supporters since the party’s neo-liberal, anti-state discourse is about protecting small and the medium-sized businesses from the state, from unions, and from large, international corporations. This overlaps with an anti-globalization discourse which scapegoats large finance, the EU, and American capitalism. However, if protecting “our own” is also about supporting those who produce, the Lega’s free-market discourse does not completely condemn the viability of the welfare state. Rather, the welfare state is important as long it supports those who contribute to society, and not “social parasites” like bureaucrats, southerners, and immigrants. The critique of the fiscal policies of the state should, therefore, not be mistaken as a demand for the complete elimination of government and the state; rather, the streamlining of the state and the curtailing of spending, mixed with the politics of exclusion, aims to maintain and, if possible, increase the level of “social services for inhabitants of the respective national communities.”24 This balancing act appeals to the international and yet local nature of communities in the Third Italy. In other words, even though production is very locally based, it is dependent on the international market. As a result, Lega voters live within communities that depend on the domestic and international competitiveness of local industrial districts. Support for a market economy, but opposition to globalization, speaks to a fear that the material limits of this model of economic development may already have been reached. In short, the very success of the Third Italy model now threatens the cultural and social makeup of the communities themselves. For example, labour

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shortages, and the need to import lower-cost labour from outside Western Europe, stems from international competition and from the international success of these small- and medium-scale industrial districts, while the notion of a free-market economy addresses support for a productivist ethic, especially in opposition to the state, the south, and the Industrial Triangle. This fear of globalization continues to grow and is reflected in the platform of the Lega Nord as support for the party becomes increasingly rooted in working-class and the lower-middle-class entrepreneurs. In addition, the rise of Forza Italia produced an important political shift. As noted in chapter two, the more “modern” and internationally competitive enterprises favour Forza Italia, while the self-employed and the workers (i.e. those who work for wages), and the more localized and less internationally competitive businesses and manufacturers, those most threatened by globalization, became the bulwark of the Lega Nord’s support.25

anti-globalization and opposition to the european union Fella and Ruzza, in a quantitative content analysis of the election platform of the Lega (during the 1994, 1996, and 2001 elections), discovered that references to protectionist policies significantly increased between 1996 and 2001. Between the 1996 and the 2001 elections, pro-welfare statements increased almost four-fold, while there was also a notable increase in welfare chauvinist statements leading into the 2001 elections. This protectionism is representative of the party’s growing opposition to globalization and its scepticism towards the European Union and European integration.26 The Lega’s anti-globalization stance has two dimensions: the party articulates clear opposition to both cultural and economic globalization. It is not always possible to clearly differentiate between the two, since the underlying causes often overlap and since the party’s pronouncements against globalization are often analogous; it claims that globalization is detrimental to the well-being of everyday citizens and Padanians, especially those employed within small and medium-sized business. Cultural globalization is linked to global consumer culture and the emerging multiracial society. The construction of both a consumer society and a multiracial society are the result of similar

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globalization processes: an economic system built on pure profit, and people, cultures, and traditions turned into commodities with no regard for local communities, with the final goal of constructing a global village.27 The Lega points out that “the global economy irrespective of the people, the nation, and states conceives the world as a single market through which persons and capital are moved, following the exclusive logic of profit. In order to accelerate the process of globalization they want to, therefore, create the ‘global consumer.’”28 This process is epitomized by multinational companies such as McDonald’s and Benetton.29 As Bossi states: “Today the capitalist system brings immigrants here to favor the birth of a multiracial society, of identical men with the same ambitions and without traditions. In sum, the big consumer, fat from hamburgers and drowned in a sea of Coca-Cola. Economic internationalism and Catholic universalism, in a way, speak the same language and aim at the same result: a world society in which all consume the same things and worship the same God … It is not only an economic problem, [The Lega] wants to stop globalization and to prevent that everything is made into a commodity.30” According to Bossi, the creation of the global consumer destroys the local; in order for globalization to function it must de-localize and uproot local traditions by bringing non-local culture and international labour (people) to historically rooted communities.31 Cultural globalization, and the creation of a global consumer culture, is, for the most part, associated with the American model of capitalism, fast food, and consumption. However, more recently, China has emerged as a key target of the Lega; China epitomizes the ubiquity of a low wage economy that produces cheap goods. Bossi lamented in a speech that China “already exports oranges and asparagus to Europe,” to the detriment of the Spanish economy. “Soon it will attack the canned tomato market. In the last five years Chinese exports in the United States have doubled; they reached 125 billion dollars in 2002.”32 The emphasis on local products enforces the loss of tradition and the link between global consumer culture and the eradication of local production and local culture; for the Lega the two are inseparable. The Lega associates global capitalism with capital and big business, as well as with the left. These disparate entities are lumped together since they are both seen as universalist or cosmopolitan. In other words, they de-localize the individual and production; each

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may do so in a slightly different manner, capital and business through markets, and the left through philosophical principles such as individual and abstract universal human rights.33 But in the end, these two entities are united by their disregard for the local; according to the Lega, both capitalists and the left understand people to be interchangeable – either before the law or before the laws of the market. In order to counter globalization, Bossi argues that the solution is to re-localize production and to increase tariffs, in particular against low-cost production states such as China.34 The Lega also links cultural globalization with the creation of a multiracial and eventually a multicultural society. The ultimate goal of this project, akin to what the Lega sees as an American-style hegemony, is to create a melting pot.35 The Lega opposes multiculturalism as untenable; it not only dilutes local culture but also increases crime rates. The culprits, again, are the universalist left and the capitalists who believe in individual and universal rights, with human beings seen as interchangeable.36 Cheap labour, the destruction of tradition, and the creation of a multiracial society go hand in hand; cheap labour is required to increase profits, while a multiracial society de-localizes consumption since tastes are no longer based on history, tradition, or localized notions of belonging. This socio-economic climate does not favour local workers but rewards international powers, since the opening up of markets to immigrant labour necessarily leads to a reduction in salaries; if these salaries are not lowered, then there is the threat of re-localizing of economic activity to the Third World.37 If globalization and the creation of a consumer society destroy local production and local customs, economic globalization commodifies people and labour. Bossi proclaims, “The Ulivo’s [centre-left coalition] attempt to curtail the crisis of our businesses with low cost labour has failed. The only result has been to contravene the rights of our workers by creating more precarious work.”38 The undesirable result has been the creation of a multiracial society.

economic globalization The underlying causes, and the ultimate effects of economic globalization are similar to those of cultural globalization; in fact, the two work hand in hand. However, the Lega’s focus on economic globalization highlights the elite nature of globalization, expanding

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American capitalist hegemony (and to a lesser extent the AngloSaxon model), the desire to create an individualistic and fluid society, and the undue emphasis on material growth over spiritual well-being. Globalization is seen as elite-driven, at the expense of common people, especially small producers.39 However, elites here are the same strange bedfellows that we encountered earlier: capitalists, big business, and the left. In the Italian context, the Lega has connected figures such as Gianni Agnelli (the former head of Fiat), Romano Prodi and Massimo D’Alema (the two prime ministers in the centreleft government between 1996 and 2001), and Fausto Bertinotti (former leader of Communist Refoundation).40 These diverse political representatives are lumped together since they are all understood to be supporters of large-scale production, labour unions (often associated with internationalism), and the European Union. This emphasis on the elite nature of globalization manifests as attacks on multinational corporations and international financial institutions, just as it attacked large-scale Fordist production in the Industrial Triangle in the post-war era. For example, in an interview with Bossi in a party publication, he and the interviewer, in typical populist fashion, criticized the deal between Fiat and General Motors in 2000; this business venture was placed within the context of the growing power of the Federal Reserve in the United States, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, and American global capitalism.41 Or, as Bossi declared on an earlier occasion, “We do not agree with globalization … because it is an agreement between twenty crazy bankers, who, thanks to the majoritarian and the presidential electoral systems, have taken the world economy in their hands.”42 This elite model of global capitalism is further tied to American and Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Bossi proclaimed that the goal of all of this is “to create a fluid society where, as in America, not family but only money counts.”43 Globalization, according to Bossi, implies American/Anglo-Saxon colonization of the European continent. This new American-inspired capitalism poses a danger to Europe; if Europeans are not careful then the continent will become the “Europe of the Bankers,” signifying the destruction of small Padanian businesses. And from the socio-cultural point of view, this means a society that prioritizes money over values.44 Even though Bossi earlier emphasized the need to implement the American anti-trust model, he argues that there is a qualitative

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difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental models of capitalism: “Europe’s is a social capitalism, which guarantees pensions, education, health, and society. It is based on the right of the people to exist and to have an identity. I repeat: here we are Padanian or Italian and European; we are not American, globalists, or multiracial.”45 Bossi contends that the individualistic, elite-driven, American model of capitalism is overly materialistic. Unlike in the early 1990s, when the focus was on how the south limited the growth of the Third Italy, Bossi has recently argued that growth may not be sustainable without exacerbating social, cultural, and even environmental tensions. Criticizing the model of social and economic organization that commodifies all aspects of life in search of profit, Bossi asserts that it is essential to focus less on material growth and to instead emphasize the spiritual concerns of the individual. After a meeting with Jörg Haider in Vicenza in the fall of 1999, Bossi declared that the two leaders spoke of “the risk of materialism, such as the evil that eliminates the spiritual part of the human being. This clash is affecting Christianity, for example, the good is being attacked by the evil that attempts to annihilate all of the places of privacy and affection such as love and family.” When asked about the evil forces that threaten the identity of the people, Bossi responded, “It coincides with Large Finance that, through globalization, concentrates economic power in its hands. It is necessary to fight against this evil force. It is this Europe of Large Finance and globalization that will make the person and his values disappear. We [Bossi and Haider] agreed on these issues. And it is in Middle Europe, the cradle of culture, tradition and spiritual values that the hope of constructing a different Europe, more humane and closer to the real needs of the people, can recommence.”46

opposing globalization and the european union In the early 1990s, the Lega supported European integration. It viewed integration as a means to furthering its federalist project and achieving regional sovereignty. The party placed its political development within the context of European minority nationalist movements. Given the high level of the Italian debt, and the inability of the government to meet the eu monetary convergence requirements,

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especially in relation to the GDP debt ratio, the Lega argued that northern industrialists would recognize that Italy could not qualify for monetary union, and eventually for the common currency. As a consequence, the northern industrialists and business classes would blame the politicians in Rome and the south, and in the process support Padanian separation. In 1996, Bossi even approached the European Union to inquire about how Padania could qualify for monetary union, the assumption being that Italy would not be able to qualify and therefore the north would make an application on its own.47 However, once the centre-left government, led by Prodi, ensured that Italy would in fact meet the requirements for monetary union (agreed to in 1998 and adopted in 1999) and eventually the single currency (2002), it became more difficult for the Lega to argue for northern separation. Subsequently, the Lega began to view the European Union as a negative and intrusive force.48 In the mid- to late-1990s the Lega’s anti-EU rhetoric increased. Instead of being perceived as a means for preserving its local identity, the EU was viewed as a “homogenizing force threatening to destroy cherished local identities.”49 This anti-EU rhetoric emerged from the failure of separatism, a growing anti-globalization stance, and the radicalization of the party. 50 Conti points out that in the mid 1990s “the party started to strongly criticize the results of European integration. The EU institutions were accused of statebuilding and replacing nation-states with a new ‘super-state’ which would hinder the development of local identities.”51 Bossi proclaimed in a speech at Pontida in 2001 that “subsidiarity is a concept coming from European law matching each interest with a different level of government. In reality, it is only a trap to keep one level of sovereignty: yesterday it was the state, today it is the state and Europe, while tomorrow it will be Europe only.”52 Once the EU did not seem to serve the interests of “the self-determination” of the north, its influence was seen to negatively affect the region, and in particular “farmers, milk producers, and small firms.”53 As the Lega’s opposition to the EU increased, it began to employ the same kind of populist language used in its attacks on Italian politicians. Bossi refers to the EU as Masonic, as a super-state, as Stalinist inspired, as neo-Jacobin, and even as a new form of fascism.54 In one of his more colorful references to the European Union, Bossi refers to it as “the land of gallows” (forcolandia).55 This “us against them”

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distinction is reminiscent of its populist strategy to juxtapose the people against the political elites. This strategy became particularly useful after 2001, when the Lega was in government, allowing Bossi to create a new external enemy while the party shared power. In addition, the Lega opposes the European Union’s growing bureaucracy and what it perceives as the abstract and unjust application of European laws. For example, Bossi claims that the EU poses a threat to the local food production, culture, and identity. He argues that soon “the super- and the hypermarkets will arrive from central Europe, with their competitive prices and their global business networks. They will bring honey from Paris, prosciutto from Hamburg, French and Bavarian cheese, and Belgian and Dutch milk.”56 On another occasion, Bossi commented that it is possible to look with amusement at the European Union and its regulation of the “length of peas or carrots” but that ultimately, the ramifications are serious. He comments that “behind these things lays a lethal design for the future and the freedom of peoples: the birth of a European Superstate, according to a Stalinist idea.”57 In the 21st century, as European integration has deepened and widened, so have the Lega’s objections increased. From the outset, the Lega objected to the European Union’s adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Bossi, on several occasions, threatened to descend on the EU summit in Nice in December 2000. He proclaimed that he would bring 250, 000 irate leghisti to Nice to protest the inclusion of the Charter and to protest the “creation of the European confederation without the voice of the people.”58 As was the case with the argument against globalization, the Charter was seen as a liberal project based on universalism. Bossi also vigorously objected to what he perceived as intentions to sanctify adoption by gay couples, homosexual marriage, and artificial insemination.59 In the Italian parliament on 10 October 2000, the Lega (along with the centre-right coalition) voted against the future adoption of this Charter.60 The Lega’s opposition to European integration intensified after it formed the government in 2001. Its earlier objections to the Charter carried over into its objection to the European Convention and eventually into the European Constitution. While in government, the Lega served as a representative of the Italian delegation during the Constitutional Convention, between 2002 and 2003. Throughout the convention, the party maintained its objections to the European

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Constitution, arguing that it was a top-down elite project which failed to emphasize Europe’s Christian roots. Chapter eight discusses in greater detail how the Lega influenced government policy towards the European Union. In 2002 the Lega expressed scepticism towards the introduction of the euro. In 2005, the Lega even proclaimed that it was time to discuss pulling out of the euro and returning to the lira. Maroni called for a referendum,61 while Calderoli, the Minister of Institutional Reforms and Devolution, proclaimed, “The time to escape has arrived, before the palace crumbles; to escape as soon as possible given the risk that the euro will become waste paper. I invite everyone to come to Pontida tomorrow to vote and let the work begin: The Euro, No Thanks!”62 The party argued that the euro created inflation, difficulties for consumers, and socio-economic problems; countries that have not adopted the euro, such as the UK, Sweden, and Denmark, have fared better during the economic downturn. For this reason, it declares that a referendum is necessary.63 And finally, the Lega criticized the expansion of the European Union. It objected to the inclusion of new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Bossi declared that “for the countries of the East it would be much better to design a type of European common market, an economic union, rather than integrating into the European Union.” EU expansion would only increase immigration. This, Bossi declared, was “social engineering and I am not convinced that it is right, furthermore I am convinced that one has to say so clearly.”64 However, the Lega has voiced its strongest objections towards possible Turkish membership in the European Union. The Lega views Turkey as non-European, non-Christian, and it argues that it would become a Trojan horse for Islamic terrorism.65 In typical populist fashion the Lega organized rallies opposing Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. In the process, it even attacked its coalition allies (especially Berlusconi and Fini) for what was perceived as support for Turkey’s bid to join the Union; the Lega argued that the question should be left to a popular referendum.66 During the European elections of 2004, the Lega sought to capitalize on the issue of Turkish membership; it distributed a pamphlet that declared “NO to the Islamic Invasion.”67 In 2005, members of the party presented signs in parliament, during discussions on a motion concerning Turkish entry into the EU, that declared “Turkey? No Thanks!”68

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The Lega’s objections to European integration and the European Union have the same basis as its objections to globalization. They believe that the EU uproots local society; it supports universal rights and individual over group rights, that it is socially liberal and cosmopolitan and that it will force Italy to adopt unwanted policies, such as allowing homosexuals to adopt children – all of which are considered a threat to Europe’s Christian roots.

anti-globalization, the welfare state, and the christian model As noted above, Fella and Ruzza have quantitatively documented the dramatic increase in statements supportive of the welfare state (classified as welfare chauvinistic proclamations) and statements regarding immigrants and the “competition for resources.”69 These quantitative findings complement the qualitative analysis of this study nicely; as we have seen from the analysis presented thus far, the Lega actively and aggressively portrays immigrants as a threat to jobs and welfare, while more recently it has presented the welfare state as a necessary complement to a market economy. In fact, Bossi claims that the welfare state is integral to the European identity. The question becomes: what kind of a welfare state does the Lega support? It could be argued that there are similarities between the Lega’s objections to globalization, especially in its analysis of global capitalism, and left-wing anti-globalization movements. The Lega’s antiglobalization message warns against the dangers of large financial interests, a market society, the commodification of everyday life, and a consumer society that is predicated upon profit for profit’s sake. Even though the Lega believes in the complicity of the left and big business, in 1999 it published a discussion in the party newspaper between Massimo Fini, a well-known journalist and writer, and Matteo Mauri (a journalist for La Padania) that highlighted the similarities between some of the policies of the Italian Communist Refoundation and the Lega. The article noted that the Lega Nord is the only force within Italy currently fighting for local interests and against globalization and the hegemony of American capitalism. It emphasized the commonalities between the Lega and the Italian communist left, and it suggested the Lega’s leadership perhaps strike an alliance with Bertinotti (the leader of the Italian Communist

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Refoundation party).70 This was not far-fetched, since Bertinotti had made an earlier appearance on TelePadania during the Kosovo war. During this appearance he and Bossi were both highly critical of globalization, the Americanization of European society, and American intervention in Kosovo.71 It is interesting that the Lega would choose to present itself in this light. The obvious intention was to be seen as an anti-globalization force, and not to be outdone by the anti-globalization message of the Communists. We have already emphasized that working-class support for the Lega has grown remarkably. This is analogous with other radical right populist parties; the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front had become large working class parties by the 1990s. Although no serious talks between the Lega and the Communist Refoundation ensued, these developments indicate the nature of the Lega’s anti-globalization message. Radical right populist parties such as the Lega often claim that they challenge the traditional right/left classifications. Even though it has adopted a seemingly left-wing ethos and critique of capitalism and globalization, the Lega’s political solutions are very different from those of the left. This is explained by the Lega’s populist critique of globalization and the welfare state, and its populist political economy; however, it also speaks to the specific nature of class politics in the Third Italy. The working class of the Third Italy is not the same working class of the large-scale, highly-unionized Industrial Triangle; instead, it is employed in small and medium-sized companies, it has a lower level of unionization, while labour relations attempt to diminish the importance of class. The specificity of labour relations contributes to the Lega’s seemingly left-oriented critic of globalization, while it explains why it distances itself from too explicit an association with the left. This brings us back to the question: What would the Lega’s welfare state look like? In a September 2003 speech in Venice, Bossi argued that the nation state has been destroyed by globalization. He proclaimed that “the old world order based on national borders, on popular sovereignty, in other words, democracy that was the child of the nation-state, and on the notion that it was not possible to interfere in the lives of other peoples [i.e. states], has been reduced and replaced by globalization.”72 According to the Lega, turbo-capitalism is an economic model in which “profit does not serve the well-being of all but is only an

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expression of a power that pursues the objective of global domination.” Its implementation is blamed on the left, the European Union, and multinational companies.73 According to Bossi, this is followed by a neo-Jacobin ideology that supports a multicultural, multiracial society in which the state functions as a transmission belt between the market economy and extra-state superstructures such as the EU. In opposition to this model, Bossi presents what he calls a Christian model: a state that mediates between the past, the present, and the future, and between the local and the global, while at the same time rejecting a multicultural society.74 Both models, it is argued, evolve from the crisis of the nation-state. The first imposes the state over the nation and thus sees no problem with immigration and with the creation of a market society; it does not view culture as an essential link between the individual and society. The Lega Nord’s model gives priority to culture, the local, and the nation over the state. It argues that moral values, religion, language, and traditions are important for the healthy functioning of society, family, and the individual. Immigration, globalization, and the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism threaten the very existence of society and the person. Consequently, protecting the local from the power of globalization implies that it is necessary to allow entry only to those immigrants who are willing and able to assimilate, and only those who will seek employment that does not take work from local inhabitants.75 This Christian model is based on the protection of local cultures, local production, and popular democracy. As Bossi noted in a speech in Venice, the people already recognized the need to conserve the local economy, preferring local foods to McDonald’s, Chinese food, and couscous. Bossi proclaims that it is necessary to “democratize globalization, reconstituting customs and duties to save our jobs and factories, before it is too late; development, in short, has to be based on territory.”76 The Lega’s vision of society and the state is based on local and group rights taking precedence over individual rights. But it is also important to draw a clear distinction between the Lega’s notion of a welfare state and left-wing conceptions of the welfare state. The Lega’s welfare state has a market economy, so long as this is based on the small-scale industries of the region. Protectionism is directed at external threats (China, EU, large capital), but does not interfere with the free functioning of the market. The Lega is in favour of

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redistribution of wealth and aid for citizens in need – but it emphasizes that the welfare state should prioritize its own citizens. As a Lega publication points out, “It is necessary to concretely apply the principle of national and EU preference.”77 It stipulates that national preference must be applied to welfare and to employment. The Lega’s view of globalization has broader implications for its political ideology. It is impossible to isolate the party’s ideology in this regard from its philosophical understanding of community and immigration. As noted in this chapter, the Lega condemns economic globalization, the growing power of finance, a loss of state sovereignty, and the growing importance of the American model of capitalism. However, globalization is also related to immigration. As Bossi himself says: “Today the capitalist system brings the immigrants here to favor the birth of a multiracial society, of identical men.”78 Immigration is seen as a threat to local identity, community security, and indigenous employment. Moreover, this ideology is aligned with the Lega’s growing conservatism, and its emphasis on the Christian roots of Padania and Europe. Finally, the populist element of the Lega’s anti-globalization stance should not be overlooked. In the early days of the movement, external enemies (the south, the state, the Christian Democrats) were juxtaposed against the northern identity. This clear demarcation of the outsider (i.e. external enemies) is typical of populist movements. As such, economic and cultural globalization, especially with the growing power of the European Union, has served as an external foil for the Lega’s territorial populism.

a populist political economy and radical right populism The Lega’s economic political platform falls between support for a free-market economy and opposition to globalization. Liberalism, less state intervention, and lower taxes, according to the Lega Nord, imply the creation of a society dominated by the market system, that is, a society based on the total commodification of everyday life, the uprooting of the local and the individual, and the ultimate destruction of the family. This American, multicultural model of capitalism must be juxtaposed with the Christian/European model of economic and social relations. The ability of the populist party’s political project to withstand scrutiny depends on its leader’s creation of a

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political discourse that transforms the inherent contradictions of this model into common-sense propositions. The extent to which the Lega attempts to balance the two sides of its political economy can be seen in its policies while in government between 2001 and 2006, and since 2008. The party supported Berlusconi’s demand for tax cuts and was an active participant in the attempt to create a more flexible economy, while simultaneously demanding tariffs on products from China and defending pensions for workers of the Third Italy. These issues are discussed more fully in chapter 8. The Lega’s move towards a populist political economy is in step with the Europe-wide radical right phenomenon. The French National Front, early in its political development, was more of a statist party, however, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, its support of a market economy was evident; Kitschelt identified this as a distinguishing feature of radical right populist parties.79 Since the early 1990s, the National Front has shied away from its support of neo-liberalism, opposing the excesses of globalization.80 Similar developments have taken place in Austria, Denmark, Norway, and to a lesser extent in Switzerland. However, in these latter cases, the parties’ economic platforms evolved from support for market principles to anti-globalization. Unlike the French National Front, the Freedom Party, the Progress Parties, and the People’s Parties were never strongly statist; the Progress Parties began as anti-tax parties, and along with Haider in Austria, used neo-liberalism to attack the state. Early support for market economies has been replaced with opposition to globalization. Moreover, opposition to European integration is common among radical right populist parties. Initially the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front supported, or at least did not actively oppose, the European Union; however, in the 1990s, especially after the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the euro, the European Constitution, and discussions over possible Turkish European Union membership, radical right populist parties have become clear opponents of the European Union.

towards a radical right populist party: contextualizing the lega nord within europe We have traced the evolution of the Lega Nord from the appearance of the leagues in northern Italy in the 1980s, to the party’s first

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congress in 1991, to the Lega’s radicalization in the mid-1990s. Diamanti, a leading Italian scholar, has recently noted that the Lega of the 21st century is far removed from its origins in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when it was instrumental in bringing down the First Republic, and represented the grievances of the dynamic small and medium-sized businesses in the Third Italy.81 Diamanti claims that the Lega currently represents those who are fearful of globalization, immigration, and the European Union. The party now resembles populist parties in Austria and Switzerland, while it is also part of the larger surge of populism in Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands.82 Diamanti’s insights lead to an important question: if the Lega is now a radical right populist party, has it departed from its origins? The evidence presented here demonstrates that in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Lega was a borderline example of a radical right populist party. It displayed radical right tendencies and it was an exclusionist populist party. However, its discourse became considerably more radical in the late 1990s. The early success of the Lega was due, in large part, to its opposition to the post-war Italian political system. So, why did the Lega evolve into a radical right populist party? Moreover, does this represent a clear break with its past? The Lega’s evolution can be explained through the combination of opportunity structures and political mobilization. The Lega’s history, its legacy, and its changing positions and alliances have been influenced by the dynamics of the Italian political system and actions of other political parties. The Lega’s support of a market economy differentiated it from other parties in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, since there was no real neo-liberal force within Italy. However, the Lega was forced to temper its position towards neo-liberalism as centre-right politicians such as Berlusconi began to extol the virtues of a free market – a development that followed the 1994 elections, but became especially prominent after the 1996 elections. The Lega needed to solidify its identity and distinguish itself from other Italian parties. In addition, this growing scepticism towards a market economy corresponded to its supporters’ objections to unbridled capitalism, the European Union, and transnational corporations, even if its electorate supported, and continued to support, less state intervention. The economic context of the formerly Christian Democratic Third Italy, and the class dynamics created by this post-Fordist configuration, structured the actions of the Lega. As soon as Bossi realized that

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it was not desirable to evolve into a more moderate catchall party, the Lega attempted to deepen its support among its key constituencies: the working class, small business owners, men, the less educated, the socially conservative, and those who were most fearful of immigrants. The fall of the 1994 government, and the Lega’s surprising success in 1996, were important landmarks in the party’s decision to radicalize. A governing alliance in 1994 with Forza Italia seemed too precarious, while the 1996 elections results seemed to prove that the party’s “go it alone” strategy was successful. However, the story continues with the Lega’s support declining dramatically in the late 1990s. Unable to survive without a coalition partner, it rejoined the centre-right coalition. With a strengthened identity, the Lega has been able to carve out a niche within the centre-right coalition. In order to understand the fluctuations in the Lega’s identity it is also necessary to examine the foundations of the Lega’s original political positions, in particular its understanding of free-market, neoliberal principles. Unlike Thatcherism or Reaganite neo-liberalism the Lega’s support for a free-market economy was always based on the notion of protecting “our own,” on familial notions of capitalism, and on local, or regional (national or cross-national, but not multinational) production. Neo-liberalism was about eliminating the ubiquitous state, but not about getting rid of the state in its totality. Neither was it about opening up the Italian economy to multinationals. Support for a free-market economy was about making the state more efficient for those who contribute and for those who produce (especially employers and employees of the small and mediumsized businesses in the Third Italy), but not for the “lazy southerner,” bureaucrat, or immigrant. Similarly, opposition to globalization should not be conflated with a desire for a social democratic, protectionist, or a corporatist state. Rather, opposition to globalization means supporting the principles of small-scale capitalism. This form of capitalism is often regional, inter-regional, and even international, but it is not multinational. Similarly, by examining the discourse of exclusion, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s we see that the Lega promoted antisouthern sentiments. Despite Bossi’s racist comments about foreigners, the core of the Lega’s politics of exclusion was its anti-southern position. Along with its anti-Rome and anti-bureaucracy stance, this position represented an attempt to defend the local community from outside corrupting forces, perceived as both “alien” and “other.”

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The story evolves further as fears of immigration grew in the mid 1990s, and the Lega increased its emphasis on protecting the local through demonization of foreigners, specifically non-European and Muslim. Fear and exclusion of an “other” is easily transferred from one group to another. The Lega, therefore, began to adopt the Nouvelle Droite’s notion of the “right to difference” in order to legitimize and to expand the exclusion of foreigners, immigrants, and non-Europeans. Exclusion is the constant that runs through the Lega’s evolution. It is clear that the ideology and the actions of the Lega have evolved, but this evolution has been built on core principles. The definition and articulation of these principles has been in itself an evolutionary project. Importantly, at its core, this ideology has always defended the local, the producer, and the community. The Lega never abandoned its emphasis on some form of regional autonomy: demands for regional autonomy are articulated through federalism, separation, and now devolution. Thus, the regionalist nature of the party remains constant despite a shifting ideology. If the Lega Nord was a borderline radical right populist party in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and if it has evolved into a radical right populist party in the 1990s, this is not to imply that the Lega was destined to become a radical right populist party. Just as the party radicalized and lost some of its more moderate supporters,83 it could have become more moderate and lost some of its more radical supporters. However, at the same time, it is also incorrect to argue that there has been a clean break with the past; certain underlying themes remain. In 2001, the Lega became a party of government, succeeding where other radical right populist parties have been less successful. How has it managed to remain in power without renouncing its populist and its radical right identity? And has it had a tangible and long lasting influence on public policy? The analysis now turns to the party’s transition from la lotta (the struggle) al governo (to government).

part three

Al Governo Between Populism and Pragmatism: The Lega Nord in Government

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7 Populism, the Lega Nord and the Negotiation of Political Power Radical right populist parties have become permanent fixtures within the party systems of Western Europe since the 1990s. With electoral success, these parties have obtained political power, participating in government at the municipal, regional, and national levels. A radical right populist party was in national office in Austria from 20002006, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) radicalized under the leadership of Christoph Blocher in the 1990s while in government. In 2003, due to the growing influence of the party, Blocher was given an extra seat in the Swiss governing body, the Federal Council. However, by 2007, due to his confrontational style, Blocher was not re-elected to the Council. As a result, and in protest to his exclusion, the SVP proclaimed that it would go into “opposition.” This proved to be a short-lived experiment, as the SVP returned to government in 2009.1 In Denmark, the People’s Party has supported the centreright minority government since 2001, allowing the centre-right government to remain in office. And most importantly for this analysis, the Lega Nord was a member of the centre-right coalition government in Italy between 2001 and 2006 and again from 2008. The existing literature questions the extent to which it is possible for radical right populist parties to maintain their radical and populist political identity while participating in government. For example, Reinhard Heinisch points out that populist parties are confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, their low level of institutionalization and reliance on charismatic leaders makes them “a poor match for the specific constraints of public office.” On the other hand, if they renounce populism and adhere too closely to the parameters of liberal democracies, they may “mutate into ordinary right-of-centre

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parties,” losing the elements that differentiate them from mainstream political parties.2 Similarly, Mény and Surel have concluded that the fate of populist parties “is to be integrated into the mainstream, to disappear, or to remain permanently in opposition.”3 In contrast, Albertazzi and McDonnell argue that the Lega Nord has been successful where others have failed by balancing political power with its populist identity. This has proven nonetheless to be a difficult balancing act for the Lega, especially in its first attempt at governance in 1994. Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2006 (and once again since 2008) the Lega was able to walk the thin line between maintaining its populist identity and securing its role as a government party, keeping one foot in government while still having the other firmly planted outside government.4 This chapter, focusing on the period between 2001 and 2006, discusses why the Lega succeeded, and how other populist parties have failed. I argue that the party has been able to exploit a series of opportunity structures, while its success emanates from political mobilization. First, the structure of the coalition created a set of conditions that allowed the party to keep its combative identity while in power. Berlusconi’s control over the coalition, his special relationship with Bossi, and the high degree of autonomy given to the members of the coalition, allowed Bossi and the Lega to attack the coalition without fearing repercussions. Second, the heterogeneous nature of the coalition permitted the Lega to differentiate itself from others in the government, especially Alleanza Nazionale and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats. AN and the UDC were often characterized as enemies despite their joint participation in the governing coalition. Third, the Lega was thus able to maintain its fighting identity without minimizing its populism or radicalism, keeping itself firmly planted within its own heartland. Fourth, Bossi’s control over the party, its policy decisions, strategic choices, and internal divisions also facilitated the balancing act. The centralized leadership of the party and supporters’ strong identification with the leader and the party allowed Bossi to keep one foot in the piazza, even as he had to compromise on policies that were essential to his party’s ideology. Fifth and finally, compromise was justified by appealing to supporters’ desires for real and effective policy change; despite its populist identity, it presented itself as a party of pragmatic change, especially in relation to devolution and immigration.

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This combination of structure and agency allowed the Lega to succeed where others had failed. Heinisch and Mény and Surel are correct to highlight the difficulty that parties such as the Lega Nord have in avoiding the alienation of either their coalition partners or their supporters. This chapter demonstrates that governing as a populist and radical right party is not an easy task, but given the correct set of conditions, strategic decisions, and organizational capabilities, it is possible for these parties to hold political power.

radical right populism in power: the lega nord as internal opposition The structure of the centre-right coalition, its heterogeneous composition, and its reliance on the charismatic leadership of Silvio Berlusconi all helped the Lega to become a governmental party while keeping its image as an opposition party. The structure of the centreright coalition permitted the Lega to exploit its inside-outside position by choosing enemies from within the government.5 This was facilitated by the heterogeneous nature of the centre-right coalition and by the deep regional and ideological differences and divisions. The Lega’s two prime targets were Alleanza Nazionale and the UDC. As outlined in chapter two, the Italian centre-right since the fall of the First Republic has been beset by fragile alliances between political parties with diverse histories, political ideologies, and constituencies. The centre-right coalition owed much of its success to Silvio Berlusconi, who was responsible for bringing such diverse parties together. The House of Freedoms was composed of Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats. These parties have dramatically different regional support. AN and the UDC receive support from central and southern Italy, the Lega Nord is rooted in north-eastern Italy, and FI is a party with a national electoral base.6 The regionalization of political support was mirrored in party ideologies. AN and the UDC call for a more active role for the state, and are therefore supported by unemployed voters and members of the civil service; support is higher for the Italian state and for a strong national identity. The electoral base of FI is divided between the north and the south; northern middle-class voters respond to the party’s focus on personal security and state efficiency, older voters

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and lower-middle-class voters in the south also agree with the party’s demands for a strong state and more extensive involvement in the economy.7 The analysis of the Lega’s political ideology and support presented in chapters three through six demonstrates how its support and political platform differ from its coalition partners. Still, some security and immigration issues overlapped among the Lega, AN, and FI, and FI and the Lega have agreed on the need for reduced state involvement in the economy. At times, diverse ideological positions have created considerable disagreement, even threatening the coalition’s survival. However, the Lega has also been able to exploit these differences. AN was attacked for its support of a centralized state, and for its desire to preserve an Italian identity. It was also seen as a political force that acted on behalf of the interests of the south. The Lega portrayed AN as anti-northern, claiming that its economic policies (spending and state reform) and cultural policies (language) propagated a centralized state that worked in favour of the south and to the detriment of the north.8 Although AN and the Lega agreed on important policy issues, such as immigration and security, Bossi provocatively and vocally demarcated the differences between the two, with these differences increasing over time. During the 2001 election campaign and in the early months of the coalition, Bossi and Fini often cooperated, joining forces, for example, to pass a new immigration law. Early in the coalition the two leaders attempted to convey an impression of unity; for example, in 2001 Bossi was invited to the Naples AN congress.9 However, differences and tensions between the two increased as Bossi’s attacks became more vocal and as Fini made a concerted effort to distance himself from the Lega by moderating his own positions and objecting to the Lega’s special relationship with Berlusconi. Fini was harshly criticized by the Lega when he argued that immigrants with residence permits, who had been in the country for at least six years, should be permitted to vote in municipal elections, and when he supported Turkish membership in the European Union.10 Policy and ideological disagreements were only the tip of the iceberg. Bossi and Fini also differ in political style. Fini consciously tries to project the image of a calm, collected, and trusted statesman, while Bossi has always exploited his image as a populist leader and an outsider.11 Bossi exploited these tensions in order to assure his

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supporters that he had not become a mainstream politician, and in order to enhance his persona as a coalition outsider. The other prime target of the Lega has been the UDC (before 2002 they were the CCD-CDU). UDC members who are former Christian Democrats are particularly disliked and mistrusted, perhaps even more than AN members. Lega leaders and supporters never overcame their mistrust and resentment of the Christian Democrats, and have thus viewed the UDC as a party of recycled Christian Democrats. The political platforms of the Lega and the UDC differ greatly. The UDC supports a more centralized state, more state intervention regarding social policy and economic development, especially for the south, and is considered by the Lega to be soft on immigration. For example, the Lega attacked the UDC for supporting an amnesty for illegal immigrants, and for opposing devolution. In opposition to the Christian democratic parties and the Catholic organizations (often in close association with the parties), the Lega argues that it is the true and authentic representative of the family, moral order, and the region. Moreover, it argues that the people should not be defended with compromise or tolerance (as propagated by the Catholic associations and the Christian democratic politicians) but with a firm and tough stand against enemies and against threats to the community. Thus, Bossi has saved some of his harshest criticisms for prominent Christian democratic leaders.12

strong but flexible: berlusconi and the structure of the coalition Berlusconi has held this diverse coalition together using three main tactics: (1) forming personal relationships and brokering deals with each of the parties; (2) allowing for flexible political platforms and policies in the coalition, enabling specific demands from members of the coalition to be met; and (3) uniting the parties with a common message that appeals to the interests of all partners – anti-communism, opposition to the old political system, and support for the traditional values of family and community.13 The Lega has been able to attack its coalition partners by establishing a special alliance with Forza Italia, often referred to as the axis of the north. Bossi, Berlusconi, and Tremonti (former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance) held weekly dinner meetings at Berlusconi’s villa in Arcore.14 Bossi and Berlusconi

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have a mutual understanding: as populist leaders, they both have a high degree of distaste for traditional politics, and claim to be direct representatives of the people against the corrupt and the powerful.15 Their alliance is important: it gives Bossi room to attack his enemies, while Berlusconi often mitigates the attacks by claiming that Bossi is only being Bossi. The special relationship between FI and the Lega means that political power has also skewed in favour of the Lega. Despite the Lega’s rather low electoral results (3.9% of the vote in 2001), it was overrepresented with several high-profile ministerial positions: Roberto Maroni (Labour and Social Policies), Roberto Castelli (Justice), and Umberto Bossi (Minister of Institutional Reforms and Devolution).16

the piazza, the heartland, and the house of freedoms: pugno nel governo e piedi fuori 17 Bossi appears to have been well aware of the dangers in becoming a governing party, especially in coalition with FI, AN, and the UDC. He maintained from the outset that the Lega was different from the other coalition partners – it was a party of the people. Thus, at party celebrations in Pontida, only days after forming the government, Bossi declared to his supporters that the Lega ministers were faithful representatives of Padania – that they had, in fact, taken their oaths as Padanians and not as Italians. In his speech, he insisted that just because the Lega had become a government party, this did not mean that it had become a traditional party; it was still a revolutionary force. He explained that the decision to join the government was made for purely instrumental reasons, because it had become painfully obvious that the party would not be able to influence government from its position as an opposition party. The time had come for a revolution, but the revolution would occur through the instruments of parliamentary politics. He stressed that governing did not mean abandoning the northern identity or the northern heartland, symbolized by celebrations at Pontida, Venice and the Po River. 18 He went on to justify the Lega’s choice to govern by pointing out that the party could not stand aside while the Left took power and “opened the country to uncontrolled immigration, to the liberalization of drugs, to the destruction of the traditional family by proposing support for homosexual families, while, on the one hand,

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imposing the destruction of national sovereignty, and on the other, creating a heavily centralized state, fiscally and institutionally.”19 During the Lega’s tenure in government, Bossi never abandoned grassroots politics: he relied on dedicated supporters, public rallies, and party festivals, especially during periods of government and policy crises. At these times, he would gather his supporters in the streets, demonstrating that the street was the origin, heart, and soul of the political movement. For example, in June of 2003 he called on the support of his people when he declared that “the Lega has a fist in government and its feet outside.”20 When the coalition partners were reluctant to implement institutional changes to devolve power to the regions, despite their preelectoral agreement, Bossi declared his mistrust for his coalition partners and pledged allegiance to his supporters. In 2002 at Pontida he declared that “Devolution, the parliament of the regions, the famous parliament of the north will become a reality and a new regionalized and territorialized constitutional court” will materialize. “Finally, the year of reforms has arrived; there will not be space for those with weak stomachs, we are going to battle, either we get federalism or we die, a river of people will pour into the piazza, we will mobilize the masses.” Roberto Maroni added, “by September the reforms will begin or it is futile to stay in the government. We are in government to pass reforms and not out of convenience.”21 By September of the same year the Lega made similar threats during its gathering in Venice. Bossi proclaimed, “We leghisti are not soldiers of fortune, or mercenaries, we are idealists ready to defend our cause at any moment.”22 Bossi eventually resigned in July 2004 because of poor health.23 On 17 March 2005, the newly appointed Minister of Institutional Reforms and Devolution, Roberto Calderoli, also resigned in protest over the lack of movement towards devolution.24 During the Lega’s tenure in government, appealing to the piazza has been a common tactic. This does not always involve threatening to step down, but it often involves staging rallies and criticizing coalition partners. In December 2004, the Lega staged a rally in Milan against Turkish entry into the European Union and also attacked coalition members. Alessandro Cè proclaimed, “Dear Berlusconi, we are not in agreement with the majority of your foreign policy, we don’t want a Europe that is subservient to the United States. Dear Fini, you have sacrificed the best part of your past politics, defending the identity of your people.”25

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While the Lega attempts to maintain ties with its supporters by keeping one foot outside of parliament, the party also brings the piazza and populist politics into the parliament through political mobilization and populist political discourse. As discussed in chapter three, language (i.e. use of dialects and anti-political discourse) has been crucial to the party’s continued success and its ability to maintain an image as anti-political. It has continued to use dialects and street language while in government, and avoids the language of the political class. The continued use of a populist discourse helps the Lega in several ways: it separates them from other politicians and coalition partners; it maintains its image as an oppositional party while in government;26 it brings the people into parliament, using this language to express what party supporters would say in the halls of government given the chance; and it gives the impression that the Lega is more revolutionary, more radical, and has a further-reaching influence and platform than is the case.27 In the process of bringing populist politics into parliament, the Lega often behaves less like a traditional political party and more like a protest movement, or even a street mob. Recent examples have included the occupation of parliament, abandoning parliament in protest, and using non-traditional forms of agitation. For example, as judges were being elected to the constitutional court in December 2004, the Lega carried out a public protest against Guido Papalia, the public prosecutor from Verona.28 The Lega particularly disliked Papalia because he was responsible for prosecuting several leghisti for inciting racism.29 Moreover, the Lega dislikes the constitutional court because of its support for the preservation of a centralized state.30 On this particular occasion, Lega members of parliament exited the voting booths carrying signs that read “Papalia is a racist.”31 These actions are highly unusual for a political party that sits in parliament, let alone one that is a member of government.

populists as pragmatists Despite presenting itself as an oppositional party within the coalition, the Lega has also highlighted its pragmatism and its intention to make a positive contribution to government policies.32 It does this by emphasizing its legislative accomplishments in party literature, on its website, and in the party newspaper, clarifying which policies

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the party supports, how it was involved in the legislative process, and the degree to which these policies serve the interests of its supporters.33 It has also ensured that its elected representatives are familiar with the party’s positive contributions to government legislation. Power is justified by the need to enact changes, and Bossi has justified joining the coalition by claiming that the Lega could no longer carry out a revolution on its own. As a member of the coalition, the Lega is quick to take responsibility for successes, often embellishing its influence and the radicalness of its policies. The party has also justified its governing power by claiming that if it had not been in power, policy decisions would have been shaped by other political parties within the coalition, most importantly AN and the UDC. The Lega’s experience in government has demonstrated that radical right populist parties are not destined to languish in opposition. However, as this analysis has also demonstrated, for parties such as the Lega Nord governing is not an easy task; it is dependent on the right set of conditions and party tactics. If the centre-right coalition had not been so heterogeneous, and had Berlusconi not tolerated the antics of Bossi, in all likelihood the Lega would have been forced to tone down its rhetoric, or it would not have survived in government. However, power was also dependent on a leadership that was determined to convince its followers that the Lega had not become a conventional party – it remained a populist party rooted in civil society. When it has had to compromise on public policy it portrayed this as a necessary evil, which was accepted because of the loyalty of the leghisti towards their leader and their party.34 This combination of structure and agency was key to the Lega’s success. By comparison, in Austria, for example, internal divisions, policy contradictions, and tensions between the leadership and the grassroots plagued the Freedom Party after it obtained political power in 2000. In addition, the Austrian coalition consisted of only two parties: the Freedom Party and the People’s Party (a Christian democratic party). Thus, it was difficult for the party to distance itself from the government and from the People’s Party, giving the impression that it has become a mainstream party.35 In the ensuing years, it suffered electoral decline and eventually the party split when Haider formed a new party in 2005.36

8 Is Their Bark Worse Than Their Bite? Public Policy and the Lega Nord in Government From 2001 to 2006, the Lega Nord successfully maintained its populist and radical right image while in government. In doing so, it convinced its coalition partners that it was capable of governance while placating its supporters by demonstrating that its government participation did not require the abandonment of its radical or its populist identity. This chapter examines the extent to which the Lega influenced and radicalized public policy during this time. Comparatively few studies have been conducted on the influence of radical right populist parties on public policy. Instead, research has focused on party support, ideology, and the causes of success and failure. The dearth of research stems, in part, from the difficulty in assessing the impact of these parties on public policy. Radical right populist parties influence politics in a number of ways: they introduce controversial and volatile issues into the public sphere, they alter and re-frame the articulation of, and response to, emerging issues, and they can directly influence public policy when in government. Three general conclusions have emerged from the available literature: first, when radical right populist parties are in government, policies have been implemented that would not otherwise have been addressed;1 second, the act of governance does not guarantee the implementation of policies as radical as radical right populist platforms, since the power and influence of these parties are mediated through the actions of its coalition partners;2 and third, these parties have had the most effective influence on immigration policies.3 I will also examine how much the Lega’s influence on public policy mirrors its political platform. The focus is on four policy areas: federalism, immigration, political economy, and foreign policy, more

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specifically Italy-EU relations. I focus on these policy areas since they represent the heart and the soul of the Lega’s political ideology, while they are also the areas in which the party has exerted the most influence. The analysis focuses on the highly politicized nature of the policy process and the tensions between the parties within the coalition throughout the 2001-2006 legislative period. In order for the Lega to make its mark, given its minority status in the coalition, it needed to carefully choose its friends and its enemies. Whom it sided with, and in what context, often depended on the issue in question. For example, in order to secure federal reforms, the party sought the tacit support of Berlusconi, while it needed to battle the centrist aspirations of AN and the UDC. In terms of immigration, initially, Bossi and Fini cooperated, much to the chagrin of the UDC, the more progressive factions within FI, and Catholic and business organizations within civil society. In relation to issues of political economy, especially fiscal policies and taxation, the Lega sided with FI and Tremonti, the Finance Minister. And finally, with respect to the Lega’s scepticism towards the EU and European integration, it sought support from EU detractors within Forza Italia, again much to the chagrin of the Christian democrats and Fini. These internal dynamics have often determined and structured public policy. The Lega’s influence on policy has been more extensive when it has forged an alliance, because the Lega’s influence has always been mediated rather than direct. In this sense, its influence is often difficult to assess since it has not been able to directly implement its political platform.

federalism, devolution and institutional reform In March 2001, the centre-left Italian government (in power from 1996 to 2001) passed a constitutional reform package that modified the structure of the Italian state, moving it significantly in the direction of federalism. This reform clearly listed the laws under central state jurisdiction and those that the regions and the central state ruled in common. However, unlike previous legislation, all remaining laws were delegated to the regions. There was also explicit reference to the principle of subsidiarity, while provisions were provided for fiscal federalism. An important omission, however, was Senate reform, and

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no provisions were made for regional representation.4 However, when the reforms are placed within a historical context, they are more extensive and more radical than is often acknowledged. It is important to emphasize the extent to which the Italian state since unification has been centralized, modeled on the French state. The ultimate goal in constructing a centralized state was to forge a national identity from strong regional and local notions of belonging. Although the post–Second World War state remained highly centralized, this was not the original intention of the new constitution. Due in part to the rise of fascism and fears concerning excessive centralization, the drafters of the post-war constitution included provisions to enhance regional representation. As a result, and in order to prevent history from repeating itself, the 1948 constitution balanced support for a unitary state with apprehensions over excessive state centralization. Four levels of government were created (national, regional, provincial, and municipal) and five regions with special status were formed to compensate for linguistic and cultural claims.5 In reality, however, the state remained highly centralized partially due to the Christian Democratic Party’s hegemony and the influential role of the state in guiding the post-war economy. Most importantly, this was due to the Christian Democratic Party’s resistance to devolving power to the Communist strongholds, especially in central Italy. As a result the provisions of the 1948 Constitution were not fully implemented until the 1970s. The de facto centralization of the state limited political power at the municipal and provincial levels, especially in terms of fiscal responsibilities.6 Despite the reforms of the 1970s, significant steps towards decentralization were not taken until the 1990s. A newly empowered regional political class pushed to further devolve powers to the regions. Support for these demands increased as voters became more and more frustrated with the central state and as economic disparities between the north and the south became more pronounced. Most importantly, the leagues and then the Lega Nord politicized federalism, de-centralization, and the north/south disparities. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s federalism was still viewed as a radical challenge to the integrity of the Italian nation-state.7 However, by the mid- and late-1990s, support for federalism became more pronounced, moving beyond the confines of party politics and the left-right divide, leading to the centre-left constitutional reforms previously discussed. Thus, despite Bossi’s criticism of the centre-left

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package, these institutional reforms represented a victory in the fight for federalism. The Lega had actually altered the political agenda and public support for federalism while in opposition The influence of the Lega on debates over institutional reforms, and more specifically its influence on the constitutional package, created a political dilemma for the party. Once in power in 2001 it needed to regain ownership of the federalism issue. Its strategy was to attack the centre-left’s constitutional reform package, claiming that the legislation did not represent true federal reform since it left too much power in the hands of the central state.8 First, the Lega’s official position was for voters not to participate in the referendum on the centre-left’s constitutional reform package, though its position in reality could be interpreted as an objection to this new legislation.9 Since outright opposition to the referendum would put the Lega in an awkward position, it emphasized that abstention did not represent a vote against federalism, but rather a vote for more change than the inadequate constitutional reforms proposed by the left. Second, the Lega formulated its own proposal, replacing federalism with devolution. The use of the term devolution permitted the Lega to separate itself from what had become an almost ubiquitous use of the term “federalism.” Moreover, it allowed the party to compare the Italian federalism debate with successful institutional reforms in Great Britain and Spain.10 According to the proposal, education, health, and policing should be devolved to the regions, and the regions should be given voting representation in the selection of the constitutional court. In addition, it argued that citizens should be immune from prosecution related to freedom of expression. The latter referred to the Lega’s belief in the right to question the unity of the Italian state. Finally, according to the proposal, devolution should be introduced at different speeds. It would be incumbent upon the regions to petition the government to devolve powers, and regions that objected to devolution would therefore not be required to participate in the exercise.11 Despite the pre-electoral agreement among members of the centreright coalition, the Christian democrats and AN were critical of the Lega’s initiative, especially the Lega’s demands to regionalize the constitutional court and its proposed asymmetrical devolution.12 These objections were fuelled by fears that devolution would be detrimental to the south and that devolution would increase and not alleviate economic and social disparities between north and south.13

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Notwithstanding disagreements and open hostilities within the coalition, the coalition partners approved in principle Bossi’s devolution proposal on 13 December 2001. The proposed legislation would devolve health, education, and policing to the regions, while no longer demanding the regionalization of the constitutional court.14 Although the Lega’s devolution proposal was accepted by the governing coalition, passing the legislation through the parliament proved to be more difficult. On the one hand, the Lega had not fully renounced its more radical demands, while on the other hand, AN and the UDC were reluctant to act on the accepted proposal. Disagreement and open hostility continued to plague the coalition.15 On several occasions the Lega threatened to pull out of the coalition if its demands were not met. Reforms stalled until 2003 when the coalition agreed to a new strategy. Instead of tinkering with the constitution and inserting provisions addressing devolution, the coalition decided to facilitate wider reforms, confronting issues such as the need for institutional changes (electoral and parliamentary), which had been on the table since the early 1990s. It was argued that by including wider concerns, this new strategy would make it easier to broaden support within the government coalition, which was required for a law to be passed by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. In the long run, broad coalition support would prove crucial in providing a united front, since in all likelihood the centre-left would challenge the constitutional changes with a referendum.16 The government formed a committee with representatives from each of the governing coalition parties, and the ensuing discussions resulted in legislation that satisfied the demands for institutional change from the governing parties. The centre-right coalition stuck to demands for devolution and the resulting legislation granted increased powers to the regions in the areas of health, education, and policing. The proposed legislation also met FI demands for provisions to enhance the power of the office of the prime minister; AN agreed to these provisions despite the desire for a presidential system. Finally, the UDC was promised a proportional electoral system.17 Despite the government’s new strategy, it took more than two years for the reform package to pass (from the committee stage in October 2003 to November 2005).18 This delay was partially due to the hurdles of constitutional reform; the bill had to pass through both Chambers with two successive deliberations not within a threemonth period, and the law had to be adopted with an absolute majority on the second vote.19 However, delays were also caused by

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ongoing internal disagreements; on several occasions the government did not have enough members in parliament to pass the legislation. The Lega became so frustrated with its coalition partners and the lack of support for the reform package that on 17 March 2005 Calderoli, who had recently replaced Bossi as Minister of Institutional Reforms, resigned in protest.20 In November 2005 the government finally passed the constitutional reforms. As anticipated, the opposition called for a referendum to be held on 25-26 June 2006.21 The referendum was held after a long and bitter election in which the centre-right lost a close-fought battle to the centre-left. The Italian electorate was exhausted and unenthusiastic about the reform package. In addition, some elements within the centre-right, especially the UDC and AN, were reluctant to campaign in support of the newly-passed constitutional changes, particularly after losing the elections.22 Berlusconi did campaign in support of devolution, but more out of loyalty to the Lega than conviction.23 In the end, 53.7% of voters turned out; of these, 61.7% voted against the legislation and 38.3% voted in favour. Devolution was clearly defeated. Of the electorate in the south, 74.8% voted against devolution; in the centre 67.7% voted against devolution, and in the north 52.6% voted against devolution.24 In Lombardy and Veneto, Lega strongholds, 54.6% and 55.3% respectively voted yes.25 Devolution continued to be a highly politicized process throughout the center-right’s tenure in power. The Lega had a mixed influence on the federalization of the Italian state. The party clearly influenced public discussions of institutional change, most notably decentralization. Both left and right parties now accept some form of federalism or decentralization. However, the Lega was less successful in terms of direct policy influence. It took considerable effort for the party to convince its partners to support its demands for devolution, and in addition the centre-right’s legislation was defeated in a referendum. As a result, the centre-left’s constitutional reforms, passed in 2001, had not been modified when the Lega was returned to office in 2008.

immigration and the bossi-fini law: real or symbolic reform? In Italy, immigration became a politically contentious issue in the 1990s. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Italians were largely indifferent to immigrants, demonstrating minimal opposition to immigration.26

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Immigrant advocacy associations, unions, and Catholic organizations were instrumental in organizing immigrants and lobbying the government for more progressive immigration laws.27 By the mid1990s, however, anti-immigrant sentiments had increased and were being mobilized. Della Porta has detailed how many citizen committees were formed in the large cities, especially in the north, consisting of non-aligned voters who feared that immigration led to higher crime rates.28 The Lega exploited and politicized the growing fear of immigration. It was one of only a few political parties able and willing to galvanize support through an anti-immigrant message. Unlike AN, it did not need to worry about its association with fascism or extreme politics. The centre-right coalition avoided politicizing immigration until the Lega Nord rejoined the House of Freedoms in 2000. The notable exception was AN, which did attempt to link immigration with security issues and criminal behaviour, calling for the criminalization of illegal immigration in 1999 when it sponsored the Fini-Landi bill.29 However, Fini and the AN did not use the same populist overtones to exploit immigration as did the Lega Nord. 30 Moreover, the broader coalition feared that too much emphasis on immigration would only benefit the Lega.31 Once the Lega had joined the coalition the centre-right began to exploit immigration. As noted above, in 2000 Bossi and Berlusconi presented a people’s initiative that called for more stringent immigration laws. Borrowing from the Lega’s political platform, the initiative demanded a stop to illegal immigration, it opposed integration and multiculturalism (or the creation of a multiracial society), it linked immigration to decaying social order, and it associated immigration with the decline of Christian Europe.32 The politicization of immigration continued during the months leading up to the 2001 elections and during the election campaign. The House of Freedoms linked new arrivals with illegal migration and criminal behaviour, arguing for better border controls. It called for a decrease in the demand for immigrants by encouraging internal migration (from the south to the north) and by making the return of emigrants a priority.33 Immediately after winning the 2001 elections, the centre-right government sought to revise the centre-left’s 1998 Turco-Napolitano immigration law. Bossi and Fini took responsibility for creating a new immigration law.34 Divisions quickly materialized within the coalition: the Lega was intent on instituting a neo–guest worker model,

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linking immigration directly with employment, while AN demanded the criminalization of illegal immigration. The other parties within the coalition had strong responses: especially the Christian democrats, and Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero were critical of both the Lega’s and AN’s proposals.35 Before any consensus could be reached on a new immigration law, Roberto Maroni called for the abolishment of the work-seekers permit and the sponsorship program which were part of the TurcoNapolitano law.36 Immigrants would only be permitted entry into Italy if they had guaranteed employment. To the chagrin of employers in business and industry, Maroni proclaimed that Italy did not require immigrant labour and that immigrants could only obtain a work permit after they had found employment prior to arrival. Moreover, if immigrants lost their jobs, they were required to return home. Maroni contended that if businesses needed immigrants, they should shoulder more of the burden, ensuring employment and housing so that the state should not be forced to foot the bill.37 These comments, and the emerging immigration legislation caused tension between government and business.38 On 14 September 2001, after a summer of political conflict over immigration, the cabinet approved a draft bill to be introduced into parliament. The bill was inconsistent, representing segments of each party’s strong ideological positions.39 The “patchwork” nature of the proposed legislation was not only due to the strong ideological position of the main stakeholders, but to the limited role played by other parties within the coalition, such as the UDC, as well as from the limited influence of the civil service, business, religious associations, and unions.40 However, despite being excluded from the policy process, the UDC, Catholic associations, and business did manage to tone down elements of the earlier proposals through vocal and public objections to the more radical demands of both the Lega and AN. Eventually, for example, it was agreed that illegal immigration would not be criminalized, immigrants would be given six months to find a new job before their work permits expired, and the social and family rights of immigrants (including illegals) were retained.41 The bill was given first reading in the Senate in early 2002. Opposition was high: some 1,035 amendments were tabled at the Committee stage. This opposition was matched by the government’s intransigence; it refused to concede even minimal changes. However, since the government had a substantial parliamentary majority, it

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did not need to obtain opposition support; debate and opposition continued, but the major objections and disagreements came from within the government coalition.42 The first reading of the bill was approved by the Senate on 28 February 2002. It was introduced into the Chamber of Deputies and was passed on 4 June 2002 and given final approval in the Senate 11 July becoming law on 30 July 2002.43 In the end, the Bossi-Fini Law was more moderate than the BossiBerlusconi and Fini-Landi initiatives or any of the campaign rhetoric, and did not fully implement the Lega’s political platform. However, it did contain specific Lega and AN demands. For example, the link between work and immigration was not removed. Thus, the sponsorship program and the work-seekers permit, as outlined in the Turco-Napolitano law, were eliminated. Employers were allowed to recruit immigrant labour only when it was demonstrated that the job in question could not be filled by an Italian or an EU citizen.44 The employer had to ensure that the worker had a job, housing, adequate funds to live on, and funds to return to his or her home country once employment ended. The work permit was only valid as long as the individual was employed; if the new arrival lost his or her job, the immigrant had six months to find another position.45 The process for renewing work visas was also made more stringent, while the duration of renewed residence permits was reduced.46 These provisions were not as severe as earlier proposals, but they were more stringent than previous legislation. The rhetorical and symbolic implications were loud and clear: immigrants would not be a drain on the welfare state, they would not steal jobs from locals, and they would be discouraged from integrating into Italian society. Illegal immigration was not criminalized, in other words illegal residence in Italy was not deemed a criminal offence. However, the rules governing expulsions were more severe; expulsion was to take place immediately, irrespective of whether the case was under appeal or not. If the offender returned, he or she could be charged with a criminal offence, jailed for six months to a year and then expelled. On the second offence he or she could be imprisoned for up to four years.47 Family reunification was restricted, however less so than had been demanded in earlier proposals. Under the new law third generation family members (i.e. grandparents) were no longer included, while parents of immigrants who were already supported by their other children in their home country were also not permitted migrate to Italy.48 Despite the less restrictive nature of these provisions, they

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were highly symbolic, giving the impression that the government was discouraging multi-generational integration. The most controversial provision, however, was the amnesty for illegal immigrants. Despite the government’s demands to control immigration, and despite calls for better border controls, the centreright government passed the largest amnesty legislation in European history.49 Pressure for an amnesty began with the Christian democrats immediately after the centre-right took power in 2001.50 The Lega objected and, in typical populist style Bossi declared that the amnesty and the legalization of previously illegal immigrants would only regularize a million illegal prostitutes.51 Despite these objections, the Lega was gradually forced to agree to an amnesty. Initially, it only supported an amnesty for homecare workers.52 However, the UDC, industrialists, and religious associations continued to exert pressure on the government. Against the objections of the Lega, the amnesty was eventually passed. The amnesty did not come into effect until the fall of 2002 in order to avoid the perception that it was part of the Bossi-Fini law.53 In return for allowing the amnesty to pass, the Lega was compensated with language that reassured its constituency that the government had not softened its opposition to immigration. It was agreed that new arrivals would be fingerprinted and that the military would be given permission to fire on boats carrying illegal migrants to Italy, supposedly only if it was felt that that national security was at risk. It was also declared that those countries that did not assist in fighting illegal emigration would be subject to a reduction in aid.54 The consensus is that these provisions were highly impractical and that they were largely symbolic.55

assessing the bossi-fini law During the months leading up to the passage of the Bossi-Fini immigration law, the Lega maintained its tough anti-immigrant rhetoric. It argued that only immigrants with jobs should be given work permits, that Italy’s borders should be better controlled, and that integration should be discouraged. However, as discussed above, the centre-right immigration bill was highly contested within the coalition. The question remains: was the Lega able to influence immigration policy? And if so, did the influence reflect its demands as presented in the party platform and election campaign?

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The Lega successfully linked immigration with work. It eliminated the ability of immigrants to obtain a work-seekers permit. Although the Lega was forced to soften its demand that immigrants be forced to return home as soon as they lost their job, it did establish a direct link between employment and work. Immigration was not criminalized, but the government was given more power to expel illegal immigrants. However, despite these changes, more immigrants came to Italy during the centre-right’s tenure in power than under the previous center-left government. Between 2001-2005 the number of immigrants increased from 1.33 million to 2.4 million. There was a steep reduction in government quotas for regular and stable migrant workers between 2001 and 2003, from 50,000 to 11,000 per year. The purpose of this was to substitute these workers with seasonal and temporary employment. However, this only resulted in an increase in illegal immigration. This became clear with the growing demand for regularization by illegal immigrants; in 2002 there were 700,000 requests and in 2005 there were a further 600,000. Despite attempts to control immigration, by 2005, the government had increased the number of authorized workers who entered into Italy from 83,000 in 2001 (as originally set by the centre-left government) to 179,000.56 Thus, despite the government’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, it soon became clear that restrictive immigration policies were not sustainable. In addition, no attempts were made to increase inspections and controls on employers in order to ferret out illegal immigration.57 Nor was the Bossi-Fini law successful in expelling illegal immigrants. While the law, and the rhetoric surrounding the creation of the law, conveyed the sense that the government would be more efficient in catching and removing illegal immigrants, the reality was different: fewer immigrants were expelled in 2004 than in 2001.58 In addition, the constitutional court ruled that the more repressive measures of the Bossi-Fini law were unconstitutional on two counts: it was deemed unconstitutional to imprison an individual for not complying with an order to leave the country since this is only an administrative offence; it was also deemed unconstitutional to expel an individual from the country without legal proceedings. The government eventually addressed the court’s ruling, empowering Justices of the Peace to make arrests and authorize deportations. However, this applied only to illegal immigrants and not to

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overstayers. As Zincone points out, the rulings by the constitutional court mean that the repressive nature of the government’s demands has not dramatically increased,59 especially compared with the government’s initial demands. The Lega’s most tangible influence was on integration. Maroni, the Minister of Labour and Social Policies, dissolved the commission for the integration of immigrants: funding for integration was reduced from 56.8 million euro in 2001 to 7 million in 2003. Moreover, even though the number of immigrant children attending school increased from 181,000 in 2000-01 to 420,000 by 2005-06, the number of support teachers and cultural mediators was reduced.60 Thus, the Lega’s goals of discouraging immigration, integration, and multiculturalism were in fact realized outside the confines of the BossiFini law. The Lega also continued its cultural attack on multiculturalism while in power, especially on Islam and the creation of a multicultural society. The attacks often took place at municipal and regional levels. Although these attacks did not directly translate into policy changes, cultural concerns remained highly charged. For example, the Lega requested that ritual killing of animals for religious purposes be abolished, it vocally opposed the opening of an Islamic school in Milan, and it opposed the construction of mosques.61 The Lega claimed that due to their sensitive nature, issues such as these should be subject to popular referendums.62 Finally, the Lega argued against obvious Islamic practices in public spaces, on one occasion objecting to a woman wearing a hijab while working with children and on another objecting to prayer breaks for workers.63 The initial intent of the anti-immigrant forces within the coalition, especially the Lega, was to make a clear and decisive break with the Turco-Napolitano law.64 However, the extent to which the Bossi-Fini law was successful is less clear. There is no question that immigration policy did become more regressive. However, legal and economic realities, the difficulty in controlling illegal immigration, and the amnesty made the law less restrictive than its original intent. Colombo and Sciortino summed up the influence of the BossiFini law: What is perhaps destined to become the major innovation introduced by the Bossi-Fini law comes into play at this point. Both the wording of the law and, more importantly, the communicative

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aura surrounding its aims and intentions are in fact considerably different from previous Italian immigration policies. Prior to this law, even the introduction of highly restrictive measures was always accompanied by rhetoric acknowledging the noble intentions of those foreigners already living in Italy and the majority of potential immigrants. The Bossi-Fini law, both in its formulation and in its transmission, on the contrary, presents immigration as either a danger or a “necessary evil.”65 The Lega’s efforts to radically influence immigration policy are instructive for they demonstrate the extent to which even radical proposals are limited by constitutional principles66 and the degree to which it is difficult to control immigration in the face of direct demands from the business community. There is no question that radical right populist parties can, and do, exert a lasting influence on immigration by addressing anxiety within civil society towards a growing immigrant population. The Lega’s influence was felt in terms of its three main areas of concern: work, security, and culture. However, its influence was mediated through the need to cooperate with its coalition partners. Thus, the BossiFini law did not directly reflect the Lega’s political platform; however, its influence is apparent, especially as it relates to the connection between work and immigration and regarding integration and multiculturalism.

populist political economy meets economic policy Chapter six illustrated the Lega’s articulation of a specific economic platform, coupling support for neo-liberal economic policies with opposition to excessive globalization. The party combines demands for reductions in fiscal pressure and state regulation with calls for national protection against international trade and objections to declining state sovereignty. More specifically, it supports lower taxes, labour market de-regulation, and pension reform, while targeting competition from low-wage export economies and excessive encroachment of the European Union. This section first examines the influence of the Lega on taxation, market liberalization, and pension reforms. Subsequently, demands for market liberalization are juxtaposed with the party’s objection to globalization.

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taxation and fiscal policies During the 2001 election campaign, Berlusconi presented a “Contract with the Italian People.” This included tax cuts for high- and lowincome earners alike, increased minimal pensions, the creation of jobs, and much-needed improvements to infrastructure. His election manifesto also promised to cut bureaucracy and to privatize publiclyowned utilities.67 A neo-liberal political agenda characterized the pre-electoral promises of FI in the House of Freedoms; the Lega generally supported this platform. Once elected, Minister of Economy and Finance Giulio Tremonti implemented tax cuts. Although Tremonti was a member of FI, he had strong ties to Bossi and the Lega. He was an important mediator between the two parties, and had been instrumental in bringing the Lega back into the centre-right coalition in 2000. He was a strong supporter of Bossi’s when the Lega came under attack from coalition members and other political forces in Europe. Bossi was also a supporter of Tremonti’s.68 During its tenure the government introduced several bills reducing inheritance and donation taxes, increasing tax deductions for children, and increasing areas of tax exemption.69 Journalists and academics have debated the extent to which Berlusconi kept his promises to voters. Ricolfi concludes that the centre-right government only marginally reduced taxes and maintained its fiscal and tax policy promises. He writes, “direct taxes were reduced by 1.4 points, while total fiscal pressure fell by just 0.5 points.” Only if you interpret tax reductions in relative terms, i.e. in relation to the GDP, did Italians pay less in direct taxes (10% less) than they had in 2001.70 Nevertheless, the Lega deemed the government reforms a success; an official party document proclaimed that tax reforms and deductions have benefited working families. The Lega contrasted the government’s courage with left-wing policies, praising its ability to reduce fiscal pressures despite the economic downturn.71 Thus, even though the tax cuts were implemented by Forza Italia and its Minister of Finance, both FI and the Lega agreed on the need for tax and fiscal reform. It was argued that less fiscal pressure benefited small and medium-sized businesses and lower taxes would benefit both employers and employees. The government tax policies were not popular with all coalition members. Both the UDC and AN felt that Tremonti’s fiscal policies

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harmed the south, and they encouraged the government to increase investment in southern economic development and infrastructure. By 2004 disagreement over what they felt was excessive Lega influence on fiscal policies favouring the north over the south led the UDC and AN to demand Tremonti’s resignation. The declining electoral fortunes of FI, improved results for AN and UDC, and the Lega’s declining influence in the coalition, due to Bossi’s health problems, did eventually lead to the Minister of Economy and Finance’s resignation on 2 July 2004.72 Arguably, with the resignation of Tremonti, the Lega’s influence over fiscal policies diminished. In this regard, the Lega’s influence was, therefore, more clearly evident in the early years of the coalition, when it helped to shore up support for tax reductions, pitting the axis of the north against AN and the UDC.

creating a more flexible labour market: il libro bianco and article 18 In addition, the Berlusconi government promised to deregulate Italian capitalism and increase labour market flexibility. The White Book (Il Libro Bianco sul mercato del lavoro in Italia), the government’s official document on labour market reform, focused on creating a more flexible labour market and decentralizing bargaining. Its view was that unions had excessive power and that labour bargaining was too centralized. The government’s message was clear: unions and para-state organizations needed to exert less pressure over the bargaining process, and business needed to have better control over hiring and firing.73 The Lega had a clear and direct influence on this issue through Roberto Maroni, who was Minister of Labour and Social Policies. The government’s critique of the unions dovetailed with the Lega’s critique of post-war Italian economic policies in general, which it claimed were based on large-scale factory production and a highly unionized workforce. Article 18 epitomized the government’s intentions to reform the labour market. It was a controversial piece of legislation from its introduction in the 1970s, after fierce agitation and mobilization by the unions. According to the law, companies with more than 15 employees are not able to dismiss workers without just cause. For the left, and especially the communist parties and the most militant union (CGIL), Article 18 symbolizes job security, while for business it represents an overly-regulated labour market.

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After much bargaining, Maroni and the centre-right coalition proposed that Article 18 be suspended for four years in certain situations. The government proposed that companies in the south that previously had paid their employees on the black market and which subsequently legalized this practice would not be subject to the law. It also proposed exempting those companies from Article 18 that exceed 15 employees by either creating new positions or converting existing positions into permanent contracts. For the left, these provisions were highly symbolic of the government’s intentions to deregulate the labour market.74 The response of the unions was swift and strong: a general strike was called. Initially, the government response was one of intransigence. Maroni and the government contended that the legislation would proceed despite pressure from unions and other para-state organizations. The government viewed the unions as special interest groups, and not as defenders of the general interests of society. Conflict over Article 18 increased when the Red Brigades75 assassinated Professor Marco Biagi, a principal author of the White Book. Although the unions condemned the assassination, they did not cancel the general strike, further infuriating the government. Conflict between the government and the opposition led the Communist Refoundation, the CGIL, and other grass-roots organizations on the left to submit a demand for a referendum on Article 18 to the Constitutional Court. They demanded that all limits of the article be removed and that the law should also apply to companies with fewer than 15 employees.76 Eventually tensions between the government and the unions forced Maroni to soften the government’s stance. Divisions between the more moderate unions (UIL and CISL) and the more radical CGIL led to a compromise between the UIL, CISL, Confindustria, and the government, referred to as the “Pact for Italy – An Employment Contract.” This compromise allowed a three-year amnesty for companies that had recently expanded to employ more than 15 permanent employees. It also allocated more funds for unemployment benefits and social security in the south.77 Italy remains one of the most regulated economies in Western Europe. Labour market reform is notoriously difficult. From the outset, FI and the Lega were intent on curtailing the power of the unions and deregulating economic activity. Despite the limited success of these reforms, the general mood was one of confrontation.

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pension reforms: an aging population and the territorial cleavage The pension system also represented a natural area of reform for the centre-right government. The Lega was once again integral to this process given Maroni’s strategic position in the government. It had been clear since the early 1990s that the Italian pension system was in need of reform. Italy spent more than any other European country, except Austria, on pensions.78 The centre-right coalition promised to increase minimum pensions, to promote alternative means to finance supplementary pension funds, and it supported the possibility of receiving additional income while collecting a pension. The goal was to increase the role of private pension funds and to increase employment rates among those over 50.79 Once in power the government implemented a contentious reform process. Initially, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Policies, Alberto Brambilla, was put in charge of a parliamentary commission to reform the pension system. The proposed changes were minor and included allowing workers to retire later, and a reduction in employer contributions; it avoided major cuts and avoided the question of seniority benefits, i.e. pensions linked to the number of insurable years payable before retirement. However, as with the labour market reforms, conflict arose between unions and government. Subsequent reforms stalled. The unions objected to being shut out of the initial negotiation process and disagreed with the reduction of employer contributions for new workers. They viewed the reforms as an attack on public pension plans and they objected to the distinction between public and private plans. In light of these developments and the other proposed market reforms, the unions called for a general strike.80 In addition, there were disagreements within the coalition: the Lega and FI wanted to reduce public sector and disability pensions, while AN and the UDC wanted to cut seniority pensions.81 These diverse policy positions were closely related to ideological positions: Lega opposition to bloated public sector pensions was based on its claims that the overly bureaucratized state gave too much support to the south, especially through public pensions, while the UDC and AN focused on preserving these public pensions in order to protect their constituents in the south. Moreover, flexible retirement plans and pension supplements appealed to the small and medium-sized businesses in the

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north, especially the north-east. These internal divisions, coupled with pressures from the unions, led to a “stop and go” process.82 It was not until October 2004 that a consensus was reached over pension reform. A compromise agreement was intended to placate the unions and to diminish disagreements between coalition partners. Cuts to old-age and seniority pensions were to be delayed until 2008, while the government also introduced a bonus program which increased the age of retirement: workers on seniority pensions were permitted to increase eventual benefit levels by working longer, or they could continue to work while receiving benefits. The proposed legislation also guaranteed that self-employed workers would not be required to increase their contributions. In addition, increased resources were made available to finance public schemes, while an increase in contributions for new workers and for those in flexible and short-term contracts was implemented.83 These provisions benefited Lega supporters in the north in particular. The issue of seniority pensions was most pertinent to Lega supporters since the ability to put off retirement and/or to continue to work while collecting a pension did not apply to public sector pensions. UDC and AN supporters were forced to settle for the protection of disability and public sector pensions.84 Natali and Rhodes conclude that the Lega was the crucial actor and winner in the battle over pension reform. The territorial cleavage profoundly influenced pension reforms, given that the Lega “had the upper hand in this struggle.” On several accounts Bossi and Calderoli “threatened to withdraw from the coalition unless Parliament gave full approval to its devolution proposals. The link between devolution and pension reform became explicit at the end of July 2004 when, after Tremonti’s resignation, the League threatened to scupper the pension vote before the parliamentary summer recess. The League lent its support only when the other parties agreed to back the new devolution laws. These developments signalled the emergence of a new ‘territorial cleavage’ in pension politics.”85 There is no doubt that the Lega played an important role in the centre-right government’s economic policy. The party was an important supporter of tax cuts, and Maroni was an important impetus behind attempts to reform what FI and the Lega viewed as an excessively rigid labour market. Moreover, the Lega was instrumental in forcing the government to adhere to its demands for pension reforms. The territorial cleavage and the special demands of small and

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medium-sized businesses in the Third Italy influenced the discussion concerning pension reform. However, despite the Lega’s influence, the government was less effective in confronting the unions, and the pension and market reforms were by no means extensive.

anti-globalization and opposition to european integration While in government the Lega reiterated demands for less taxation and for labour market and pension reforms. Support for the government’s policy initiatives grew out of the party’s desire for less state intervention in the economy and for policies that represented the interests of the north. The Lega also remained sceptical of globalization, which it understood as the internationalization of trade, production, and finance. Therefore, it called for tariffs to protect Italian commodities, demanded protection for national capital, and opposed the introduction of the euro. The Lega also linked globalization to a loss of state sovereignty and to European integration, opposing the involvement of the European Union in domestic politics (issues such as the European Constitution and the European arrest warrant) and objecting to the expansion of the EU to include central and Eastern Europe and possibly Turkey. China became the main target of the party’s anti-globalization message. According to the Lega, China symbolizes low-wage competition, especially for manufactured items such as clothing, shoes, and other items produced in the Third Italy. Bossi claimed that production must be part of the local economy, otherwise it would be impossible to compete with low-wage economies such as China.86 He supported protection of Italian (especially northern Italian) industry, since labour costs could no longer be offset by currency devaluations. Bossi proclaimed that it was necessary “to save the industries with a neo-protectionism and with new tariffs against the invasion of Chinese low-cost products.”87 The leghista Giancarlo Giorgetti agreed, declaring that, “the Lega was born to challenge political taboos. The claim that you cannot impose tariffs is one of these taboos.” To reinforce this point he added that economic liberalism should not been seen as dogma by the party.88 In spite of the party’s radical and provocative claims, it had a limited ability to influence government policy in this regard. On several occasions the Lega proclaimed that it was necessary for Italy, or the

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EU through pressure from Italy, to invoke tariffs against China. In the spring of 2005 the Lega (unsuccessfully) threatened to block legislation in parliament dealing with the competitiveness of Italian industry unless anti-dumping measures were enacted against non-EU countries and special tariffs were levied against China.89 Despite considerable support from FI members such as Tremonti the government never intended to give in to the Lega’s demands;90 the antiChina proclamations and the calls for tariffs against international competition were unpopular with political and economic elites. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the President of the Republic, and Luca di Montezemolo, the President of Confindustria between 2004 and 2008, were busy organizing trade missions to China and India to gather support for Italian products. Gianfranco Fini (who had become foreign minister in November 2004) accompanied the Italian delegation to China.91 In the end, the Lega was not able to influence the government in passing legislation to combat economic competition from abroad.

the lega nord and the deepening and widening of eu integration The Lega’s anti-globalization message also targeted European integration. As discussed in chapter six, the Lega Nord supported the EU in the early 1990s. However, by the end of the 1990s, the party became fiercely eurosceptical: reminiscent of its attacks on the Italian state, the Lega attacked the bureaucratic nature of the EU, referring to it as totalitarian, Stalinist, and fascist.92 It even sat with the Eurosceptical Independence and Democracy Group in the European Parliament for a brief period until it was removed for being too extreme in February 2006 after Calderoli showed support for the Danish newspaper that had published the controversial Muhammad cartoons. Calderoli exposed a picture of the published cartoon on a t-shirt that he was wearing under his dress shirt while appearing on live television.93 The party currently sits with the Eurosceptical Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group in the European Parliament. Since Italy was a founding member of the European Economic Community, Italian political elites and the Italian public in general have been highly supportive of the EU.94 Not until the end of the First Republic, and more particularly with the emergence of Silvio Berlusconi and Forza Italia, did the centre-right became increasingly

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sceptical of European integration. However, the direction of Berlusconi’s “new” foreign policy has not always been evident. Social scientists have debated the degree to which Berlusconi changed the direction of Italian foreign policy, and the extent to which government policies could be labelled eurosceptical.95 The Lega was the most eurosceptical of all coalition parties, though other individuals in the governing coalition were also sceptical of European integration, including members of FI such as Defence Minister Antonio Martino and Economy and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti.96 Nevertheless, Berlusconi had to act cautiously given the pro-EU factions within the coalition and even his own party. Of these, the Christian democrats were the most pro-EU, toeing the old Christian Democratic line.97 The position of the AN was somewhere in the middle; it was sceptical of losing national sovereignty and thus supported an intergovernmental integration process, but Fini was not openly anti-EU. Berlusconi was forced to mediate between those who were wary of the EU and those who supported integration. Berlusconi himself stated that his government did not oppose European integration, but it was more a question of “how to be in Europe.” In order to mediate between these forces, he argued, “We believe in Europe, but we have to differentiate between our faith and a dogmatic, a-critical, maximalist and fideistic Europeanism.”98 Given the populist nature of Berlusconi and the anti-EU forces within the coalition, Italian elites were concerned about international reactions to the government, and especially the reaction within the EU. After urging from Gianni Agnelli,99 the government appointed an unelected official, Renato Ruggiero, as Foreign Minister. Ruggiero had a good international reputation; he was the former directorgeneral of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a long-time advocate of European integration.100 Tensions ran high between Ruggiero and coalition members from the outset. The Lega was the most vocal critic of the Foreign Minister, objecting to Ruggiero’s appointment for several reasons: the technical nature of his appointment offended the party’s populist instincts; he was a member of the old Christian Democratic political elite; and he was pro-EU and intent on ensuring the government’s pro-EU position.101 Conflict between Ruggiero and EU sceptics within the government intensified with the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2002. Public statements by coalition members highlighted the split within the government: Bossi and Tremonti expressed outright concern over

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the euro, while Berlusconi remained evasive and lukewarm. Ruggiero and Ciampi, especially, expressed concerns over the less-thanenthusiastic reception of the euro.102 Tensions between Ruggiero and Bossi were particularly high, to the degree that Berlusconi proposed mediation. Bossi refused to relent, and eventually Ruggiero resigned as Foreign Minister, blaming Eurosceptics in the government, pointing especially to Bossi.103 During its tenure in power, and especially after Ruggiero’s resignation, the Lega’s opposition to the euro intensified. The official line of the Lega was that the common people had been forced to pay for the introduction of the euro. In fact, in June 2004 Giorgetti proclaimed that he was doubtful that the north-east has benefited from the joining the euro-zone.104 By 2005, the Lega was calling for Italy to pull out of the euro and return to the lira. It even proposed the notion of a referendum and/or popular initiative to consult with voters (especially Lega supporters) on their support for these drastic measures.105 As noted earlier, the party argued that the euro caused inflation, and was detrimental to the Italian economy.106 However, despite these provocative demands, there was no real threat that Italy would abandon the euro. Debates also ensued over what became two controversial EU proposals: financing for the European Airbus and the European arrest warrant. Berlusconi objected to both, and was supported by eurosceptical forces within the coalition, especially the Lega Nord. The government refused to continue its contribution to the construction of the Airbus 400M military transport plane, a pan-European project. Berlusconi stated that his objections were based solely on business.107 Internal divisions persisted within the coalition: Ruggiero (before his resignation) and Fini supported the Airbus, while opposition came from Bossi, Tremonti, and Defence Minister Martino.108 The European arrest warrant was to replace extradition procedures within the EU, especially in a post-9/11 environment. The Italian government was isolated in its opposition. The government (and Berlusconi in particular) was concerned about the inclusion of crimes such as fraud and corruption, while the Lega was concerned that it would include provisions to fight racism and xenophobia.109 The Justice Minister (and leghista) Roberto Castelli argued that the proposed law lacked transparency and legitimacy: “He argued that an important juridical instrument such as a European arrest warrant should be approved by representative assemblies and not by a few

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people acting over the heads of European citizens.”110 Bossi went so far as to proclaim that the European arrest warrant was not constitutional, warning against extraditing citizens. Bossi declared that the law invoked images of the Jacobins and the Freemasons. He proclaimed that he would “vote against it since it would be the end of the rights of the state… it is completely unconstitutional and therefore the parliament cannot do anything but defeat it, but from the political point of view we are confronted with a monstrosity, a regime of terror and as a consequence judges who act according to political mandates.”111 Despite the opposition by the Lega and by Berlusconi, the European arrest warrant did eventually become law in 2004 and was eventually passed by the Italian government in April 2005.112 The Lega supported the anti-EU faction of the government, contributing to the resignation of Ruggiero and opposition to the Airbus and to the European arrest warrant. However, the question remains: did the Lega exert a broader influence on the government’s foreign policy? Post-9/11, Berlusconi emphasized Italian atlanticism and Italy’s strong ties to the United States, emerging from strong ties forged in the post-war period. Berlusconi wanted to ensure that he represented the Americans’ most loyal European ally. To this end, he strongly supported NATO, the invasion of Iraq, and the war on terror.113 On these issues, the Lega was a reluctant ally; it had long attacked the American model of society, opposing its dominant role in the world, its model of economic and social development, and the American melting-pot society. Bossi even supported Milosevic during the war with Kosovo. Despite these disagreements, Bossi did not attempt to interfere in this aspect of Italian foreign policy; the Lega’s main interests lay elsewhere.114 The Lega also opposed EU expansion, especially the inclusion of Turkey in the EU. Even though Fini (in his new position as Foreign Minister) and Berlusconi both supported Turkey’s bid to enter the EU, the Lega demanded that a referendum be called on the matter. The Lega attacked both Fini and Berlusconi, framing the issue as the need to protect the European identity against the Islamic invasion.115 In addition, the Lega opposed eastward expansion and the inclusion of new member states into the EU. Bossi claimed that the new countries should have their own European common market; he worried about the flood of new arrivals should these countries join. He states: “We raise our voices because we want to make it

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understood that the Lega, and the Lega is the voice of the people, wants to give space also to those in Europe who are not convinced of this science fiction experiment.”116 As with the euro, despite vocal protest from the Lega, the government’s position towards EU expansion was unchanged. Berlusconi’s own position on European expansion was not always transparent. He had been sceptical of EU enlargement and at the Athens Summit in 2003, he complained of a lack of real consultation on the process, but his position appeared to soften during his term in office, and he did not actively attempt to prevent the eastward expansion of the European Union. In fact, he publicly supported the entry of Russia, Turkey, and even Israel into the EU.117

the european convention and the european constitution Studies demonstrate that despite its vocal opposition to European integration the Lega Nord’s tangible influence was minimal. A prime example was the Lega’s influence during the proceedings of the European Convention (which met between in Brussels from 28 February 2002 to 10 July 2003) which led to the drafting of the 2004 European Constitution.118 An examination of the diplomatic process demonstrates that the Italian negotiating team gradually isolated the Lega.119 For good reason there was concern about the role that the Italian delegation would play given Berlusconi’s attempt to distance his government from the traditional pro-Europe stance of previous Italian governments. Moreover, the Italian delegation was led by Gianfranco Fini, whose position could be characterized as neo-Gaullist, in other words he did not oppose European integration, but he was more supportive of an intergovernmental approach as opposed to a federal Europe. Other important members of the negotiating team were the leghista Francesco Speroni as Fini’s alternate, other prominent Italian politicians such as Marco Follini (from the UDC) and Senator Lamberto Dini, as national parliamentary representatives, and Giuliano Amato (although he was Vice-President of the Convention and thus not a representative of Italy).120 In the initial stages of the negotiating process the government expressed positions that could be classified as eurosceptical.121 However, by the end of the negotiating process, “Fini gradually became the spokesperson for the most ‘European’ component of the

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governing majority,” not introducing any amendments.122 If in the early stages the Italian contingent was divided, towards the end of the process the positions of the team began to converge, and as a result the Lega was isolated.123 Emerging from the Convention, Speroni voiced his objections. With respect to the free movement of people, I would have preferred the free movement of citizens of the Union rather than of persons. I believe that the movement of non-EU citizens should be governed by nation states. I do not believe in a European public prosecutor. The Italian government was among those which wanted the removal of the word federal. I had written my draft, and then with Fini, we wrote another. Our view is that the EU must be a union of sovereign states. There was a difference between the Italian representatives on the questions of unanimity on fiscal and foreign policies. The government’s position was the one that carried the day; that is, that there remain for many issues unanimity to protect the national interest. The Northern League is more prone to maintaining unanimity. Others, especially on the left, favour a system based on majority voting. Fini, that is the government, has assumed a position that is more attenuated than ours.124 The Lega objected to the Constitution right to the end, declaring that it would not be present in the parliament when the treaty was to be passed and that it would boycott the ceremonial signing in Rome. Speroni, the Lega’s delegate, concluded that his assessment of the constitution was “absolutely negative.” He proclaimed that the constitution did not respect the principles of democracy since the people had been removed from the decision-making process.125 The Lega objected to the final draft of the constitution for three reasons: it was not ratified by a referendum; it did not protect the Christian roots of Europe; and the constitution was linked with the concept of a superstate and thus did not protect cultural diversity and regional and local belonging and identities.126 However, despite these proclamations, the eurosceptical position of the Lega did not seem to dramatically influence the delegation’s position towards the constitution, nor did it prevent the government from supporting the document. Unlike in France and the Netherlands, where the constitution was defeated in a referendum, it was ratified by the parliament.

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While in government the Lega Nord did not mitigate its opposition to European integration. It employed populist language to attack the bureaucratic nature of the EU; it opposed EU expansion, the euro, and the European Constitution. Although Berlusconi and the Lega shared a certain amount of scepticism towards Europe, it would be incorrect to imply that the Lega significantly and tangibly influenced Italian foreign policy. Italy did not contemplate reverting to the lira, it did not actively prevent EU expansion, and it did not oppose the European Constitution.

the mediated influence of radical right populism on national policy How should the Lega’s influence on public policy be assessed? First, there is no question that the Lega exerted a lasting influence on the policies of the centre-right government. However, this influence was neither direct nor automatic. In fact, when the Lega was able to obtain support from at least one other coalition member, it was more successful. For example, Berlusconi’s tacit support for federal reform was instrumental to the ability of the Lega to prod and poke its coalition partners, especially AN and the UDC, to accept the party’s proposals for decentralization. However, despite Berlusconi’s support for the federalism law that passed in 2005, the scope of the law was more restricted than the Lega would have liked. Similar dynamics played out with regard to immigration; in this case, without support from AN, the influence of the Lega would likely not have been as great as it was. As it stood, the Bossi-Fini law did not represent a direct application of the Lega’s political ideology. Again, in terms of political economy, where the Lega found an ally it was more successful; since FI was in favour of tax cuts, the Lega was able to support Tremonti in opposition to AN and the UDC. The Lega also tackled the unions in alliance with FI. But the strength of the Italian union movement meant that the influence of the Lega was much less than its influence on federalism and immigration. In terms of its anti-globalization message the Lega was far less able to influence government policies; it did not find a suitable ally to support higher tariffs, while its influence was minimal in relation to Italian-EU relations. As Croci points out, despite Berlusconi’s posturing, his anti-EU remarks, and his ability to alienate his European counter-parts, no drastic measures were taken to alter Italy’s relation

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to the EU;127 moreover, Italy did not pull out of the euro, nor did it oppose the European Constitution, and the government’s official policy accepted continued dialogue between Turkey and the EU. In the end, the Lega did influence public policy, but its influence was mediated by, and contingent on, alliances within the coalition. This confirms claims that policies were enacted that, in all likelihood, would not have been addressed had the radical right populist party not been in the coalition. However, it also confirms the thesis that radical right populist parties are tamed while in political power. In addition, we can conclude that the Lega’s influence extended past a single focus on immigration. Immigration was important, but the Lega also exerted its influence over federalism and policies pertaining to economic policy, taxation, and pension reform.

conclusion

The Lega Nord, Radical Right Populist Parties, and Europe: Reinventing Radical Right Politics The Lega Nord combines regionalism with radical right populism. There is no question that the Lega’s position on regional autonomy has shifted from federalism to separation to devolution (especially since its tenure in government); however the party has never relinquished a demand for some form of regional autonomy. In addition to the Lega’s continued support for higher levels of regional sovereignty, the Lega’s political ideology has extended beyond its territorial claims. Looking at the broader ideology of the Lega Nord, the development of the party and its strategic actions reflect the evolution of other radical right populist parties in Western Europe. In the late 1980s, the radical right populist landscape was very different indeed. The Lega Nord was not yet a political party, while the various populist, regionalist, and protest leagues were still in their infancy. The Danish People’s Party had not been formed. The Swiss People’s Party was still a mainstream centre-right party. Haider had only recently taken over as leader of the Freedom Party in Austria; the source of its initial success was its populist attacks on the Austrian model of consociational democracy and its neo-corporatist welfare state, marked by highly politicized institutions, bureaucracy, and labour associations.1 In other words, its political platform could not be classified as radical right populist at that point in time. The Vlaams Blok/Belang in Belgium was a regionalist nationalist party, though its opposition to immigration was already evident. The French National Front was the most successful of the radical right populist parties; it had already begun to influence the French party system and public policy.2 Arguably, however, its ideology, and its party support, was still fluid.3

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Only ten years later, the landscape had completely changed. By the late 1990s, radical right populist parties sufficiently resembled one another to place them within a common party family. The Austrian Freedom Party had consolidated its identity under Haider’s leadership. The Lega Nord had evolved into a radical right populist party. Pia Kjærsgaard had split from the fledgling Progress Party to form the Danish People’s Party. And the Norwegian Progress Party had evolved from an anti-tax party into a radical right populist party. The French National Front and the Vlaams Blok/Belang were wellestablished parties with loyal voters. The emergence of a common radical right populist family was not a straightforward process; there was no road map, no foundational text or doctrine, and no seminal political thinker. Convergence came about, in part, because of structural changes across Europe, although they manifested differently in each country.4 Economic restructuring, globalization, European integration, mass migration, the transformation of welfare states, declining party membership, the crisis of European social democracy, and the sclerosis of Christian democracy afflicted all Western European polities. Eurobarometer reports demonstrate that a significant number of Europeans fear globalization and European integration, while, in general, mistrust directed toward politicians and political elites has been on the increase.5 Evidence also demonstrates that a significant number of radical right populist voters are fearful of European integration.6 In addition, studies demonstrate that Europeans in general demonstrate potential fear of immigrants.7 Despite varying manifestations it is now clearly possible to speak of a general European trend. Numerous studies that focus on the structural base of the radical right highlight the importance of economic restructuring. Betz and Kitschelt have both pointed to the transition to a post-industrial economy and the ensuing tensions between those who benefitted from modernization and those who suffered. In a comprehensive comparative ethnographic study of the economic attitudes of radical right populist supporters, Flecker et al. point to three trends: 1) supporters demonstrate “intensive feelings of injustice stemming from frustrations of legitimate expectations relating to various aspects of work, employment, social status or standard of living”; 2) fear and anxiety emerge from a sense of powerlessness due to “industrial decline, precarious employment, or the devaluation of skills and qualifications”; 3) finally, there was a clear trend among those who had

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experienced “occupational advancement” with a strong sense of attachment to the “company and its goals.”8 In others words, not only modernization losers support the radical right, but also modernization winners, particularly those who feel dazed and bewildered by existing socio-economic transformations and the seeming inability of political parties to adequately respond to absolute and relative levels of economic decline. Despite these Europe-wide structural considerations, and the indisputable link between these issues and the profile of radical right populist voters, common opportunity structures alone cannot explain the rise, the continued success, and the convergence of these parties toward a common party family. It is not possible to isolate a single structural explanation that directly, and uniquely, accounts for success (or failure) or for the convergence of radical right populist parties. Mudde emphasizes that demand-side explanations serve as “a fertile breeding ground” for the rise of radical right populist parties, but structures alone are not enough to explain the success and failure of these new right-wing political parties.9 Focusing on party family formation, Rydgren points out that “The fact that ERP [extreme right] parties look alike in different political systems – that is, they constitute a party family – has less to do with macrostructures forming the demand sides of these political systems in similar ways (as the prevalent demand-centered approach would have it) than with the fact that ideas and practices diffuse from successful ERP parties to embryonic ones in other countries.”10 Structural explanations must be complemented with an analysis of political mobilization. In part, the trajectory towards a radical right populist party was facilitated by strong, charismatic leaders who have presented themselves as political outsiders and as representatives of the common people. By mobilizing voters who feel high levels of mistrust for government radical right populist parties have created loyal constituencies over time. Moreover, continued success is dependent on well-organized and well-led parties.11 Where radical right populist parties have failed to achieve the “correct” type of leadership, organization, or political message they have been less successful. Parties in Germany and Sweden are two examples of where a lack of political organization has been one of the causes of failure.12 As Decker points out, in Germany radical right populist parties have suffered from organizational fragmentation, while no single charismatic leader has been able to convince the

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German voting public that their parties are not extremist, neofascist, or neo-Nazi.13 Commenting on Sweden, Rydgren argues that despite apprehension surrounding immigration (although it has not been politicized as of yet), mistrust of and dissatisfaction with political parties, periods of higher unemployment and economic downturns, and some anti-EU sentiments, radical right populist parties have largely failed; the only exception was New Democracy’s limited success in Sweden in the early 1990s.14 However, even in the case of New Democracy, questions of leadership, party organization, internal divisions, and the inability of the party to overcome differences among supporters contributed to its eventual demise.15 As Rydgren notes, even where the “‘right’ mixture of politicized xenophobia, ethnonationalism, and political discontent exists,” a lack of success might be due to “supply-side ‘failures’.”16 Success emanates from an emphasis on similar themes, precipitating a move to a common party family. In part, as Rydgren points out, convergence is a product of cross-national diffusion. Crossnational diffusion does not imply that parties automatically and directly adopt ideas and policies from one another; instead, the parties assess, interpret, and adopt ideas and policies to their particular context.17 He notes that when studying radical right populist parties (as with other social and political movements) “it should be emphasized that diffused ideas and practices are always being actively modified or even ‘translated’ to a greater or lesser extent by adopters in order to fit the unique political and cultural context in which they are embedded.”18 Radical right populist parties learn from one another either directly or indirectly; direct contact take place through meetings and personal acquaintances, and indirect contact may take place through websites and news media.19 Although direct contact does account for a certain degree of cross fertilization, more often than not, leaders and party members fear that close association with parties with dubious international reputations might affect electoral fortunes in their own country. For example, Bossi, by the turn of the millennium, was reluctant to associate with Jörg Haider, the leader of the Freedom Party, and began to distance himself from the party once Haider was designated as a European pariah; this was despite earlier contacts between the two leaders.20 As a result, cooperation among radical right populist parties in the European Parliament is limited, sporadic, and problematic at best.21 More often than not, indirect

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contacts through party websites and mass media are the predominant form of diffusion.22 Radical right populist ideology focuses on a matrix of three themes: nativist nationalism, which leads to fear of the encroachment of the other (usually the immigrant); support for an authentic civil society based on the affirmation of local culture, values, and morality (authoritarian themes); and support for a populist political economy. These three areas lead to a focus on exclusion, protection of local, regional, or national cultures, an anti-bureaucratic discourse (directed at both the state and EU), and opposition to established political parties. These core ideological traits characterize the radical right as a whole. Political parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, the Swiss People’s Party, the Vlaams Blok/ Belang, and the Danish People’s Party object to “excessive” immigration. Radical right parties have gravitated towards policies that support a Christian Europe, a traditional family, and policies that emphasize law and order. They demonstrate scepticism towards European integration. And similar to the Lega Nord, the French National Front, and the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party have fluctuated between support for a free-market economy and opposition to globalization.

the future of the lega nord and radical right populism The Lega’s electoral support has diminished considerably since its initial breakthrough in the early 1990s. In the 2001 general elections its support dropped to less than 4% of the vote, although it maintains numbers in the teens and twenties in its regional strongholds. Since 2001, its support has increased, albeit not to the levels of the early 1990s: in general elections, it received 4.6% of the vote in 2006 and 8.3% in 2008; in the 2009 European elections it received 10.2%, and in the 2010 regional elections it received 16.5% in Piedmont, 26.2% in Lombardy, and 35.2% in the Veneto. What does this mean for the party’s fortunes in the future? Several conclusions are possible. One view is that the Lega was a fleeting phenomenon. Its early and dramatic success had as much to do with the fall of the First Republic as with its own actions. Another possible conclusion is that that the rise of other political parties such as Forza

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The Lega Nord

Italia effectively eliminated the political space in which the Lega could manoeuvre or expand. A third view is that the Lega has made poor strategic choices by emphasizing more extreme ideas and alienating more moderate voters, thus marginalizing itself. There is some truth to all of these arguments. First, there is no question that the Lega’s initial rise and its initial success were due to the decline of the First Republic and its ability to exploit the new political reality. During the early 1990s, the Lega toned down its political discourse in order to attract more middle class and mainstream voters. This strategy soon alienated its core constituency. There is also no question that the Lega was unable to compete with new political forces such as Forza Italia: there was insufficient political space for the Lega to differentiate itself from Forza Italia as Bossi lost support to Berlusconi’s more moderate populism. The battle between Bossi and Berlusconi is often contested on the terrain of populism. However, and this points to an important emphasis in this study, all populisms are not the same. Berlusconi’s populism must be distinguished from that of the radical right.23 As a result, the Lega was forced to rethink its strategy and in the process further radicalized its political discourse. Reading the evolving political situation, the Lega realized that its core values of localism, exclusion, and opposition to bureaucracy enabled it to exploit anti-EU, anti-immigrant, and anti-globalization sentiments. One might conclude that the Lega marginalized itself by returning to its core voters and to a radicalized political identity. Instead, I have found that the Lega had no choice but to radicalize its political platform once again if it wanted to carve out a niche within the crowded Italian party system. Its attempt to tone down its message in the early 1990s, during the fall of the First Republic, took place within the context of a specific time period – once Bossi realized that he could not keep his core supporters and compete with Forza Italia for more moderate voters he moved to deepen his support among his core constituency. Initially, between 1994 and 1998, Bossi decided that it was easier for the party to achieve its goals as the perennial political outsider. However, gradually since the late 1990s, and especially since 2000, Bossi was forced by institutional constraints (the electoral system and the emerging bipolar party system) to form an alliance with Forza Italia. He determined that the identity of the party was strong enough to form an alliance with Forza Italia, while at the same time he concluded that the alliance would allow the Lega to push through

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some of its demands. Similarities between the Lega and Forza Italia, and Berlusconi’s desire to secure the support of Bossi in order to assure electoral victory in the north, meant that Bossi could influence policy through his alliance with Berlusconi. This is illustrated by the pact between the Lega and Forza Italia before the 2000 regional elections, by the 2001 pre-electoral pact, and by the legislation on immigration, security, and discussions of decentralization that have taken place between 2001 and 2006, and again since 2008. Will the Lega Nord, therefore, remain an important party in Italian politics? Several scenarios are possible. First, it is conceivable that the Lega Nord will disappear once Bossi leaves politics. When he is no longer the leader, the Lega could disintegrate into many smaller factions, or even evaporate. While the Lega survived during Bossi’s illness in 2004, the role of a charismatic leader remains critically important, ideologically and hierarchically, for the organization of a party of this type. Secondly, it is possible that a new leader will emerge who will be able to control internal tensions and factions. Although there is ample evidence of the importance of the charismatic leader for the survival of radical right populist parties, more recent studies demonstrate that the parties in question have become institutionalized to such a degree that they are able to sustain leadership succession.24 It is highly unlikely that the Lega will return to its electoral results of the early 1990s. The only way that the Lega might dramatically increase its support is to take advantage of a political crisis comparable to the fall of the First Republic. Even then, however, it is unlikely that the Lega would be able to garner the support it had between 1992 and 1996. The fall of the First Republic represented a specific and contingent reality, signifying, simultaneously, the end of the post-war compromise, Christian democracy, and Fordism. Although one might be sceptical of the emergence of a Second Italian Republic, there is no question that the current political environment is contextually and qualitatively different than either the post-war First Republic or the transitional period following its collapse. However, the Lega has established itself as a permanent party within the Italian system, and as a party of government.

radical right populism in power Radical right populist parties have achieved political power in Italy, Austria, and Switzerland. Peter Mair, in an article on the influence of

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Green parties on party systems, argued that the influence of these parties extends beyond their electoral success. Green party support very rarely exceeds 7.0% of the vote.25 However, despite these rather dismal electoral results, Green parties often play a decisive role in restructuring party systems. In several countries in Europe, they have provided the “extra weight to the left to allow for the possible emergence of a sustained bipolar pattern of competition.”26 Green parties have succeeded where, previously, communist parties failed, since Green parties are not perceived by the voting public, unlike was often the case with communist parties – especially during the Cold War – as anti-system parties.27 Tim Bale expands Mair’s thesis to include radical right populist parties. He argues that since radical right populist parties have been accepted into the party systems (unlike anti-system parties), often serving as coalition partners, they have helped centre-right parties, and centre-right coalitions, to achieve political power. Radical right populist parties mobilize new voters and they attract working-class supporters, often stealing voters from Social Democratic parties. And as a consequence, the inclusion of radical right populist parties into centre-right coalitions has extended the reach of the coalition. Bale writes, “Translated into an empirical argument, this outcome means that the center-right, by including the far right either as a coalition partner or as a support party, has removed what was essentially an artificial constraint on the size of any right bloc in parliament, thus putting an end to a situation in which far right votes – whether they were garnered from conservatives or (possibly and still better) from social democrats – were effectively wasted.”28 In Italy the Lega often determined the success and the failure of the centre-right in obtaining power: when it did not join the centreright in the 1996 elections, Berlusconi’s coalition was defeated. However, with the Lega in the coalition, the centre-right won in 2001 and 2008. We should not assume that a centre-right victory is assured because of the Lega’s participation; the centre-right lost the 2006 elections. However, these elections were only lost by a very thin margin.29 Likewise, in Austria the Freedom Party remained an important ally of the centre-right between 2000 and 2005, while the Alliance for the Future of Austria supported the government until 2006. In Denmark, although the People’s Party has not officially joined the government, the centre-right government has remained in office since 2001 because of the direct support of the party.

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Most importantly, this study has demonstrated that it is possible for radical right populist parties to govern, given the correct set of opportunity structures, political organization, and political tactics. Success depends on the structure of the coalition and the potential agency of the party. Too much power associates the party too closely with traditional political forces. Between 2000 and 2002, this is exactly what happened to Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party in Austria. On the heels of the Freedom Party’s strong electoral results in 1999, and immediately after taking office, its support steadily declined. This decline in support was due to a combination of organizational difficulties and policy concerns. A divided leadership and membership and the inability of the party to present itself as a viable political alternative in the eyes of its supporters contributed to its rapid decline.30 In Switzerland Blocher and the People’s Party (SVP) have moved in the opposite direction of other radical right populist parties. The party was able to radicalize while in power, demonstrating that populist and radical politics does not preclude political power. As the organizational capacity and the ideological identity of the SVP consolidated in the 1990s, the party began to challenge the consociational nature of the Swiss party system, and in the process it increased its political power. The SVP exploited the highly decentralized political system, referendums, and initiatives to attack Swiss consensus democracy. The success of the party meant that after 2003 it was given an extra seat on the Federal Council. As a member of the Federal Council in 2003, Blocher sought to actively challenge the consensual nature of decision making. He consistently blocked policies, and counter to Swiss consociational politics and to the workings of the Federal Council, he publicly voiced his objections to policy decisions.31 This strategy proved successful and was reflected in the gradual and consistent growth of the party. However, at the same time Blocher’s confrontational style meant that he was not reappointed to the Federal Council in 2007, despite the fact that the SVP was the largest Swiss party.32 The exclusion of the SVP from the Federal Council highlights once again the tension between populism, radical politics and political power. In 2009, however, the SVP returned to power. The Swiss People’s Party has been able to negotiate the tension between being in government and its identity as a populist party throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century. Whether the party will be able to retain its populism and secure political power remains an open question.

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Unlike in Italy (and in Switzerland), the Danish People’s Party negotiated the populist dilemma somewhat differently, since it has been on the outside of the government looking in. By situating itself within the government, but at arm’s length, the party gave the impression that its policies influenced the government, while at the same time it did not become tainted and compromised by being inside the government. Unlike the Freedom Party, the Lega Nord and the Swiss People’s Party, which were awarded high profile portfolios in the government, the People’s Party has only served on parliamentary committees, on several occasions receiving committee chairmanships.33 This strategy has allowed the party to influence government policy, while not diminishing its position on controversial policy issues, especially relating to immigration.

radical right populism and public policy: radical changes and mediated influence Better party mobilization translates into more influence by radical right populist parties on public policy. Again as Schain points out, “This continuing process of party construction is likely to have an impact not only on other parties within the party system, but also on the ability of the party to participate directly and indirectly in the policymaking process.”34 The political influence is notable in Denmark. Here the Danish People’s Party has been able to push for much more radical immigration legislation. Since 2001, the Liberal-Conservative coalition, supported and encouraged by the People’s Party, has dramatically changed Danish immigration policy. In 2001 and 2002 new asylum and immigration policy increased restrictions on asylum seekers, stipulated that public assistance would not be provided to arrivals for the first seven years, while legislation was also passed that restricted family reunification and the entry of Danish foreign-born spouses.35 In addition, family reunification was the most adversely affected policy area. Foreign spouses cannot gain entry to the country if their Danish spouse has collected social benefits in the months leading up to their arrival.36 In sum, since 2001, Denmark has gained the notorious distinction of having some of the most exclusionary immigration policies in Europe – an achievement made possible by the People’s Party’s successful mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment. The influence of the People’s Party, especially in terms of immigration policy, is also notable in Switzerland. Mazzoleni and Skenderovic

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demonstrate that as the number of elected People’s Party officials increased, the influence of the party, regarding immigration in particular, also increased. This has especially been the case since the late 1990s. The People’s Party has not only had a direct influence on public policies, it has also influenced the mainstream centre-right to adopt similar ideological positions towards immigration.37 The People’s Party has been particularly adept at politicizing immigration by launching its own referendums and by vocally opposing the initiatives of other parties.38 There is also evidence that the Austrian Freedom Party, especially when it took power in 2000, was able to influence immigration policies. Although the party did not dramatically or unduly change immigration policies, its direct influence and its influence over coalition members led to more restrictive immigration policies. Tougher immigration policies were implemented as much on behalf of the People’s Party’s Interior Minister Ernst Strasser as by the Freedom Party.39 However, the influence of radical right populist parties is not only reflected in public policy. The presence of these parties also influences the agenda of mainstream parties (even before election campaigns or the presence of the radical right in government) and in turn this can afford respectability and legitimacy to the radical right populist party.40 For example, although the French National Front has not reached power at the national level, as its support increases at the subnational level it has influenced mainstream political parties on the left and right, especially regarding immigration. There has been a notable attempt by mainstream political parties to co-opt and to assert their influence over immigration.41 Even in Germany, where the radical right has been much less influential, radical right populist parties, such as the Republikaner, have had a direct and tangible influence on public policy. In the 1980s, German immigration policy was in transition. As a significant postwar recruiter of immigrant labour, Germany had a large immigrant population; however, restrictive citizenship laws prevented many guest workers from naturalizing. In addition, significant numbers of new arrivals came to Germany in the 1980s by way of family reunification, and by way of Germany’s liberal and generous asylum laws.42 In the late 1980s and 1990s, in the midst of intense and highly politicized debates concerning immigration, the Republikaner Party was able to influence the actions of the governing Christian

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Democratic coalition, especially at the local level. A fear of growing support for the Republikaner Party, in part, pushed the Kohl government to make it more difficult to seek asylum.43 The influence of radical right populist parties goes beyond immigration policy. In Denmark, for example, the People’s Party backed the centre-right government’s support of the war in Iraq; the People’s Party, along with the government, was the only party to support the war. Their support was therefore crucial, given that the government’s margin of victory was very narrow.44 There is also evidence that radical right populist parties have been able to shore up the Eurosceptical agenda. Thus, where referendums on EU related issues have been held, radical right populist parties have, in general, actively opposed further integration. For example, the Danish Progress Party opposed two referendums in 1992 and 1993 on Maastricht. In 1992, the Swiss People’s Party opposed increasing economic ties (through the European Economic Area) with Europe and in 2005 it opposed signing the Schengen/Dublin Agreement. And the French National Front opposed the 2005 referendum on the European Constitution.45 There is a growing body of research in this area; however, this remains fertile ground for further analysis. In sum, this study has argued that we can effectively and predictably chart the trajectory of the radical right. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the third wave of radical right parties moved toward a new populist politics of exclusion, if not always in a straightforward manner. This involved generating a new style of politics and a new political ideology. The radical right is unlikely to sweep through European parliaments in the next decade, but it is also far from being irrelevant; such parties have already and will continue to influence Western European politics. Given the expansion of the European Union into Central and Eastern Europe, the proposed inclusion of Muslim Turkey in the EU, and the high levels of migration into Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe, Africa (especially Muslim Northern Africa), Asia, and Latin America, the core issues of the radical right will continue to remain on the political agenda. As Central and Eastern European countries consolidate into liberal democracies and capitalist economies, while simultaneously dealing with the challenges inherent to EU integration, radical right populist parties will continue to enjoy success in the new Central and Eastern European democracies as well.46

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The literature demonstrates that radical right populist parties have converged toward a common party family and that with this electoral success, these new right-wing parties now influence party systems, public policy, the public discourse – most notably on immigration, though not exclusively. Their influence extends to policies (and the public discourse) on European integration, the welfare state, law and order, security, a market economy, family, globalization, and questions regarding local, national, and European identity (in particular Christianity vs. Islam). To be sure, one should not overestimate the influence of radical right populist parties. Nevertheless, since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the degree to which European politics has been radically altered by changing partisan affiliations and ideologies is remarkable. In the new millennium, political parties – on the right as well as the left – are scrambling to include issues of security and immigration on their political agenda. Even if it is likely that the Lega Nord and the third wave of radical right populist parties have reached the height of their electoral success, they have had a marked influence on West European politics. They will remain an important, if minor, coalitional force. Despite its new style of organization and politics, and its unique ideology, radical right populism will not overrun Western Europe, while it will not completely disappear either. Its effect on the European political stage in the last decade has been permanently written into political discourse and public policy. And there is no doubt that this effect will continue to be felt in the future.

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Appendix

The phases of the Lega Nord: ideology, support, and the economic and political context

Ideology

1984-1989

1989-1996

1996-2000

2001-2006 and since 2008 (Lega in power)

Phase 1: Origins and foundations of the leagues

Phase 2: Consolidation under the Lega Nord

Phase 3: Radicalization and transition to a radical right populist party

Phase 4: The Lega in power

regionalism, localism, dialect, anti-Rome, anti-south, free-market

populist, free-market, federalist, less anti-south but strongly anti-Rome and anti-established parties,

anti-immigration, anti-EU, pro-free-market, increasingly anti-globalization, emphasis on “conservative values,” support for secession since 1996, supported for devolution since 2000

core supporters, also some middle class professionals, mostly secular voters, anti-left

core supporters, same more working class, those who fear globalization and immigration, those with strong sense of local, community, and Padanian belonging

Sociological core supportbase ers: men, less educated, workers, small business, non-aligned, secular, locally oriented

same, with a focus on key issues: immigration, devolution, political economy, opposition to European integration

The phases of the Lega Nord: ideology, support, and the economic and political context (cont.)

1984-1989

1989-1996

1996-2000

2001-2006 and since 2008 (Lega in power)

Phase 1: Origins and foundations of the leagues

Phase 2: Consolidation under the Lega Nord

Phase 3: Radicalization and transition to a radical right populist party

Phase 4: The Lega in power

end of Fordism, Tangentopoli, Economic end of First and political fiscal crisis of the state, crisis Republic, context of the welfare state, decline of established parties (corruption in the DC and PSI and the end of communism)

demise of the DC, PSI and transformation of the PCI into a social democratic party, debt crisis, cutbacks (signs of neo-liberalism)

rise of radical right populist parties across Western Europe, globalization, neo-liberalism, European integration

same

Common themes: localism, protection of the people, opposition to economic and political elites, exclusion, support of small-scale free-market capitalism, and opposition to cultural, economic, and political globalization, “federalism.”

Notes

introduction 1 “Bossi esce indenne dalla rivolta,” La Repubblica, 10 February 1991. “La scommessa di Bossi,” La Repubblica, 8 February 1991. “Lega Nord: Cronistoria della Lega Nord: Dalle origini ad oggi seconda parte 198895,” 9. 2 League refers to the various parties/movements that began to appear in Northern Italy in the 1980s. The leagues capitalized on a combination of frustration with the governing political parties, protest against the post– wwii political system (the so-called First Republic), and demands for regional autonomy. 3 Bossi, “Conclusione dei lavori congressuali e ringraziamenti del Segretario,” Congresso Federale Ordinario, Pieve Emanuele, 8/9/10 February 1991. Bossi, “Discorso di apertura del Congresso della Lega Lombarda,” Congresso Federale Ordinario, Pieve Emanuele, 8/9/10 February 1991. Bossi, “Intervento Segretario uscente,” Congresso Federale Ordinario, Pieve Emanuele, 8/9/10 February, 1991. 4 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 80-1. 5 It did support the subsequent Dini technical government. Bull and Newell, Italian Politics, Appendix chapter 3, “Political parties and the party system.” 6 Svåsand, “Scandinavian right-wing radicalism,” 85. 7 The distinction here is between radical and extreme parties and movements. Even though there has been an increase in both extremist and radical parties, it is the radical right populist parties that have enjoyed the most success. Backes and Mudde, “Germany: Extremism without successful parties,” 457-68. Eatwell and Goodwin point out that there are signs

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8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16

17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Notes to pages 6–8

that more recently the bnp has attempted to “modernize” its message. Eatwell, “The extreme right in Britain: The long road to ‘modernization’,” 62-79. Goodwin, “The extreme right in Britain: Still an ‘ugly duckling’ but for how long?” 241-50. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 62-6. Ibid., 40. Mudde, “The war of words: Defining the extreme right party family,” 225-48. Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 50-1. Elisabeth Carter makes this distinction in her informative study The Extreme Right in Western Europe; she notes that extremist and neo-fascist political parties reject the basic principles of liberal democracies (23, 42, and 50-1). She identifies five types of parties: neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal xenophobic, and neo-liberal populist parties. Although I agree with the distinction between parties that threaten a regime and those that do not, I question her subsequent classifications, and I have doubts about her use of “extreme” over “radical.” See chapter one for a more complete discussion. This represents only a sample of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties. For a more complete list see Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 50-1. Minkenberg, “The West European radical right as a collective actor,” 153. Rydgren, “The sociology of the radical right,” 243. Although Carter employees the term “extreme” and not “radical,” she concludes that parties considered to be extreme (i.e. neo-fascist and neoNazi) are electorally less successful. Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 54-62. For a discussion of the radical right and party families see Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 11-59. Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 413-37. Mair and Mudde, “The party family and its study,” 214. Ibid., 215-16. Ibid., 217. Ibid., 220-1. Ibid., 217-20. Ibid., 223-5. Ibid., 224. Ibid., 224. Ibid., 225.

Notes to pages 9–12

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27 Paul Taggart, Yves Mény, and Yves Surel, and Elisabeth Carter also point to the importance of party organization. I discuss their work more fully in chapter one. 28 Here I am referring to sociologists such as Max Weber, and Robert Michels. 29 Some notable exceptions are Katz and Mair, “Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party,” 5-28, and Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power. Also see the studies by Herbert Kitschelt of Social Democratic and Green political parties. See note 39 below. 30 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 225. McGann and Kitschelt claim that in order for radical right parties to be successful a cross-class alliance is required. McGann and Kitschelt, “The radical right in the Alps: Evolution of support for the Swiss svp and Austrian fpö,” 149-50. 31 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 247-53. 32 Ibid., 249-50. 33 The First Republic refers to the post–Second World War Italian political system. Because of the dramatic political transformations in the early 1990s, the literature on Italian politics often refers to this period as a transition from the First to the Second Republic, even though there was no official regime change. 34 Sartori referred to the Italian post war party system as polarized pluralism. See Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 131-45. 35 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 90. 36 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php. 37 The “northern question” refers to the economic and social disparities between the north and the south. Historically, these divisions were referred to as the “southern question,” i.e. the question was what should be done so that the south could catch up to the north. However, the Lega began to reverse the question, arguing that the constant emphasis on the south was unfair to the north. 38 Kitschelt, “European party systems: Continuity and change,” 135-6. 39 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe. Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Kitschelt and Hellemans, Beyond the European Left: Ideology and Political Action in the Belgian Ecology Parties. Kitschelt, The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany. 40 Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, 8.

212

Notes to pages 12–13

41 Kitschelt, “European party systems: Continuity and change,” 136. 42 See Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, especially chapter 5. For questions of leadership and party strategy see Veugelers, “A challenge for political sociology: The rise of far-right parties in contemporary Western Europe,” 78-100. 43 See Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy. 44 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 201-76. Eatwell, “Ten theories of the extreme right,” 47-73. Rydgren, “The sociology of the radical right,” 241-62. 45 After the Second World War, Christian democratic and social democratic mass parties and liberal and conservative parties of “individual representation” evolved into what Otto Kirchheimer refers to as catchall parties (Kirchheimer, “The transformation of the Western European party systems,” 177-200). The new post-war political party became an important legitimizing force of the liberal democratic welfare state. This occurred as parties shifted to the political centre, as they attempted to incorporate and appeal to moderate, centre, and unattached voters, and as they increasingly depended on the mass media and the personality of the leader. An often missed but central point in Kirchheimer’s argument is his claim that before the First World War the mass party had a conflictual relation with the state. The mass party was responsible first and foremost to its supporters, to political organizations, unions, and churches within civil society (Smith, “Core persistence: System change and the ‘people’s party’,” 157-68). However, after the Second World War, this changed as political parties professionalized and bureaucratized. There was a general agreement between parties of the left and the right over the role of the state, social welfare, and industrial policy. 46 Katz and Mair argue that with the emergence of the cartel party that political parties are increasingly intertwined with the state. As political parties become dependent on the state for financing and expertise they depend less on party members and they begin to loosen ties with civil society. (Katz and Mair, “Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party,” 5-28. Mair, “Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western Democracy,” 25-51). For discussions on ideology and party convergence see Herbert Kitschelt, “The authoritarian right against the libertarian left: Variations in West European right-wing extremism.” Norris, “Location, location, location: Party competition.” Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 237-43. 47 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 256-76. 48 Ibid., 256-76.

Notes to pages 13–21

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49 Ibid., 39. 50 Ibid., 38. By avoiding “front-staging” we avoid confusing the party’s message with a political message that may be constructed primarily for nonparty members. This may entail de-radicalizing its ideology. The centralized nature of radical right populist parties, and the control that the leader has over the party, means that it is possible to more confidently conclude that the party literature distributed through the party headquarters (ranging from speeches, policy papers, and party newspapers) represents the ideas and the platform of the parties in question. 51 The Third Italy refers to the area in which small and medium-sized businesses began to appear in northeast and central Italy. The term is used to contrast the political economy of the region with the simple distinction between the north and the south. It must also be contrasted with the socalled Industrial Triangle, i.e. the area consisting of Turin, Milan, and Genoa, where production in the post–Second World War era was based on large-scale factory production. This type of production is often referred to as Fordist production. See chapter two for a more detailed discussion.

chapter 1 1 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 11-12. 2 The term was coined by Ronald Inglehart. It refers to voters who are primarily concerned with the environment, gender equality, gay rights, and cultural recognition, as opposed to what he refers to as material issues. Material issue refer to concerns over economic growth, employment, while they also include a desire for policies that support traditional gender roles and law and order concerns. 3 Ignazi, “The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe,” 3-34. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 20-34. 4 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe,” 34-51. Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics. 5 Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe,” 44-8. 6 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. 7 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe. 8 Kitschelt and McGann have modified this position more recently. See McGann and Kitschelt, “The radical right in the Alps: Evolution of support for the Swiss svp and Austrian fpö,” 149-50.

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9 I do not deny the use of other terms. As noted, Mudde identifies some twenty-three different terms. However, the argument is that populism, extremism, the radical right, and radical right populism represent the dominant approaches and that the other terms can be placed within one of these four categories. 10 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre,” 1-11. Mény and Surel, “The constitutive ambiguity of populism,” 12-13. 11 Taggart, “Populism and the pathology of representative politics,” 67. 12 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 26-34. For Carter, “extreme” is based on the “rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional order, and according to its acceptance or rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality, rather than in terms of its spatial location” (23). Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe. 13 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 29-30. 14 Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 23. 15 Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1178. 16 Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 45-6. 17 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, 159-201. Herbert Kitschelt, “Popular dissatisfaction with democracy: Populism and party systems,” 179-96. 18 Some within this school prefer to use the term radical right-wing populism (Betz and Rydgren), while Mudde prefers the populist radical right. Despite these slight differences in terminology, I place them within the radical right populist school since the underlying contention is that the parties in question are radical and not extreme, they are located on the right of the political spectrum, and populism is an essential component of their political identity. See Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 26 and 30. See the numerous articles and books by Betz (see bibliography). For Rydgren see Rydgren, From Tax Populism to Ethnic Nationalism: Radical Right-Wing Populism in Sweden. Rydgren (ed.), Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World. 19 Betz, “Against the ‘green totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic nativism in contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe,” 35-46. Betz and Johnson, “Against the current–stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right,” 316-23. Betz, “Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und politische Bedeutung,” 251-64.

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20 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 11-59. Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 413-37. 21 Rydgren, The sociology of the radical right, 243. Betz, “Introduction,” The New Politics of the Right, 3. 22 Betz, “Introduction,” The New Politics of the Right, 3. Rydgren, “The Sociology of the Radical Right,” 243. 23 Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 213. The failure of European Union sanctions against the inclusion of the Freedom Party into the Austrian coalition government in 2000 further highlights the difficulty in labeling a radical right party as extremist. The eu sent a commission to investigate whether the Freedom Party and its coalition partner, the People’s Party, threatened democracy. The commission concluded that despite worrisome comments by Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party, there was no immediate justification for imposing sanctions against Austria. Neither the actions nor the words of the party had contravened European or international treaties or norms. (“Report clears way for Europe to drop Austrian sanctions,” New York Times, 9 September 2000. Zaslove, “The dark side of European politics: Unmasking the radical right,” 65.) 24 Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, 60-72. For a good discussion of how the radical right populist support of the welfare state differs from left-wing support of the welfare state see Derks, “Populism and the ambivalence of egalitarianism,” 175-200. 25 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 26. 26 Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple, 181. 27 Taggart, Populism, 95-8. 28 Mudde, “The populist Zeitgeist,” 543. 29 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre,” 3. Taggart, Populism, 93. 30 Taguieff, “Political science confronts populism,” 9. 31 Zaslove, “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an anti-globalization movement,” 169-89. 32 Taggart, “Populism and the pathology of representative politics,” 67. Mény and Surel, “The constitutive ambiguity of populism,” 13. Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple, 102-17. 33 Taggart, “Populism and the pathology of representative politics,” 67. 34 Betz, “Conditions favouring the success and failure of radical right-wing populist parties in contemporary democracies,” 198-9. 35 Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 207-8. Knapp, Parties and the Party Systems in France, 300-303. In the case of the Austrian Freedom Party and

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38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46

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Notes to pages 26–7

the Lega Nord this is often framed as protecting those who “produce.” See Betz, “Mobilizing resentment in the Alps: The Swiss SVP, the Italian Lega Nord, and the Austrian fp ,” 147-66. Zaslove, “The dark side of European politics: Unmasking the radical right,” 61-81. This was before the party split in 2005 and before Haider’s death in the fall of 2008. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 196. Gingrich, “A man for all seasons: An anthropological perspective on public representation and cultural politics of the Austrian Freedom Party,” 67-8. Knapp, Parties and Party Systems in France, 300-303. For a good discussion of the link between populism and the French National Front see Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 201-8. Svåsand, “Scandinavian right-wing radicalism,” 77. Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 91-100. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 275-6. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 276. Ibid., 16. Heinisch, “Austria: The structure and agency of Austrian populism,” 80-1. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 132. Knapp, Parties and the Party System in France, 298. Mazzoleni, Nationalisme et Populisme en Suisse: La Radicalisation de la ‘Nouvelle’ udc , 70 and 72. Albertazzi, “Switzerland: Yet another populist paradise,” 105-6. Before the emergence of the Lega, Padania was not a common term - when used it referred to the Po Valley. However, because of the Lega Nord, it is now used to refer to Northern Italy. The Lega has used the term as a means by which to construct a northern identity, an identity that in reality, has not previously existed, and consists of a number of locally rooted identities and dialects. For a more complete discussion see chapters three, four and eight. Betz, and Betz and Johnson use identity politics instead of nationalism to describe the nationalism of radical right populist parties. Identity politics is an interesting concept in this regard since it connotes a strong sense of cultural identification without a strong notion of state sponsored nationalism (Betz, “Against the ‘green totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic nativism in contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe,” and Betz and Johnson, “Against the current - stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right.”). There is also an interesting trend in Western Europe towards post-nationalism, focusing on Europe and a pan-European identity (Zúquete, “The European extremeright and Islam: New directions?” 329-32). Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 158-83. For a good discussion on the Danish People’s

Notes to pages 28–9

48 49

50

51

52

53 54

55 56 57 58 59

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Party and its relation to nationalism, see Andersen, “Nationalism, new right, and new cleavages in Danish politics: Foreign and security policy of the Danish People’s Party,” 105-9. In addition, for a very interesting discussion of nationalism and local cultures, see Gingrich, “A man for all seasons: An anthropological perspective on public representation and cultural politics of the Austrian Freedom Party,” 70-89. This is what Betz refers to as the politics of resentment: Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 37-67. For a good discussion of the nature of the support for the National Front, see Veugelers, “Social cleavage and the revival of far-right parties: The case of France’s National Front,” 31-49. Veugelers provides data that support the claim that many new voters, and those who had not voted in previous elections, initially supported the National Front. He also demonstrates that many of these voters were subsequently socialized and politicized in the National Front subculture as they become party supporters. In the case of Austria, the tension between those who supported traditional religious and familial values and those who support more libertarian values became increasingly problematic as the Freedom Party attempted to bring more disenchanted Catholics into the party (see Riedlsperger, “The Freedom Party of Austria: From protest to radical right populism,” 33-4). As opposition to Islam has increased, so has the emphasis on Christianity. For a good discussion see Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 324-7. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Populist Parties in Europe, 23. Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 433 (fn. 1). Zaslove, “Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy,” 101-9. Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 175-83. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 102-6. Mudde, Radical Right Populist Parties in Europe, 18-20. Betz also uses nativism in a similar manner, “Against the ‘green totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic nativism in contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe,” 35-46. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 19. Ibid., 63-89. Sniderman et al., The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy. See chapter 5. Mudde, “The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue,” 182-97.

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60 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 426-7. 61 Ibid., 427. 62 Betz, “Against the ‘green totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic nativism in contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe,” 35-46. Zaslove, “Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy,” 99-118. 63 Mudde, “It’s not the economy, stupid!” in Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 119. Daniel Oesch, “Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe,” 349373. Ivarsflaten, “The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success,” 465-92. There are a few dissenting voices: see Jörg Flecker (ed.), Changing Working Life and the Appeal of the Extreme Right. Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right,” 1181-4. Derks, “Populism and the ambivalence of egalitarianism,” 175-200. 64 Kitschelt, Radical Right Parties in Western Europe. Betz, Radical RightWing Populism in Western Europe, 107-19. 65 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 107-19. 66 The term “productivist” refers to an ethos that combines a work ethic, a belief in private enterprise, and certain degree of self-sufficiency. The argument is that that those who produce contribute to the well-being and the prosperity of the community; they may consist of entrepreneurs, business people, or even employees. 67 Zaslove, “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an anti-globalization movement,” 169-89. 68 Ibid., 169-89. 69 Ibid., 169-89. 70 Pelinka, “Right-wing populism plus ‘X’: The Austrian Freedom Party (fp ),” 133. 71 See chapters six and eight. 72 Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 149. 73 Zaslove, “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an anti-globalization movement,” 169-89. 74 Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1199. McGann and Kitschelt, “The radical right in the Alps: Evolution of support for the Swiss svp and Austrian fpö,” 154-5. Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 139 and 147.

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75 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 122, 149, 251. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 150-66. 76 Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1199. 77 Evans, “The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party support,” 76-7 and 81. See Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 150-66. 78 See chapter 2. 79 Evans, “The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party support,” 81. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 153. 80 Mayer and Perrineau, “Why do they vote for Le Pen?” 128. 81 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 153. 82 Ibid., 153. 83 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 155. In the case of several radical right populist parties, there was evidence of a growing working class vote in the 1980s. For example, by the late 1980s the fn already received significant working class support (Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 155). For a good discussion, see Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 150-66. 84 For example, this is what occurred in Austria and the increase of the fpö’s working class vote. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 122. 85 Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1200-1. 86 For a good discussion of the decline in middle class voters, see Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 150-66. 87 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 249. 88 Evans, “The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party support,” 86. Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 144-7. Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, 58-60. 89 Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, 59. 90 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 93. 91 Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?,” 321-44. 92 For a good discussion on the women and the radical right populist parties, see Mudde, Radical Right Populist Parties in Europe, “Männerparteien,” 90-118. 93 Evans, “The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party support,” 86. 94 McGann and Kitschelt, “The radical right in the Alps: Evolution of support for the Swiss svp and Austrian fpö,”154-5.

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95 Evans, “The dynamics of social change in radical right-wing populist party support,” 86. 96 Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1200. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 105, 119, 147, 155. 97 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 105, 119, 147, 155. 98 Ibid., 90 and 94. 99 Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, 62-3. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 90-2. 100 Simmons, The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge to Democracy, 62-3 and 187-91. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 90-2. 101 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties Western Europe, 90-2. 102 Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 203-8. Knapp, Parties and the Party System in France, 300-3. 103 Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 162-83. 104 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 94. 105 http://www.electionresources.org/fr/. 106 Evans and Ivaldi, “An extremist autarky: The systemic separation of the French extreme right,” 351-66. Mayer, “How Nicolas Sarkozy shrank Le Pen’s electorate,” 429-45. For a good discussion of the continuing significance of Le Pen on French politics, see Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe. 107 Schain, “The extreme-right and immigration policy-making: Measuring direct and indirect effects,” 274 and 276. 108 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 112. 109 Ibid., 111-23. 110 For a good discussion on consociational democracy, see Andeweg, “Consociational democracy,” 509-36. 111 Luther, “Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006,” 12-14. 112 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 113. 113 Gärtner, “The fpö, foreigners, and racism in the Haider era,” 23-4. 114 Heinisch, “Austria: The structure and agency of Austrian populism,” 80-1. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 119-20. Although this was the party’s official declaration, the party had already moved beyond pan-Germanic nationalism in the early 1990s. 115 Luther, “Austria: A democracy under threat from the Freedom Party?” 437. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 119-20. 116 Heinisch, “Austria: The structure and agency of Austrian populism,” 68.

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117 Luther, “Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006,” 8-20. Fallend, “Austria,” (2003): 894. Luther, “The fpö: From populist protest to incumbency,” 200. Heinisch, “Success in opposition - failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office,” 104-12. Luther, “The self-destruction of a right-wing populist party? The Austrian parliamentary election of 2002,” 136-52. 118 Luther, “Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006,” 11. 119 Heinisch, “Success in opposition— failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office,” 91-130. 120 I discuss how the Lega was able to avoid the fate of the Freedom Party in chapters seven and eight. 121 Luther, “The revival of the radical right: The Austrian parliamentary elections of 2008,” 1057 and 1058. “Wer wählt noch bzö?” Die Zeit- Online, 13 October, 2008. 122 Backes and Mudde, “Germany: Extremism without successful parties,” 459. 123 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 71-3. 124 Decker, “Germany: Right-wing populist failures and left-wing successes,” 119-34. Frank Decker points out that perhaps, in part, due to the failure of radical right populism in Germany, that it is on the left that populism has been the most successful (see Decker, “Germany: Right-wing populist failures,” 131-3. Decker, Der neue Rechtspopulismus 148-51). Art and Minkenberg note that in Germany, the threshold for radical right parties to enter the political sphere is higher; a strong consensus exists among the political parties, the media, and mainstream voters that no form of radicalism or extremism should be tolerated (Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria. Minkenberg, “Repression and reaction: Militant democracy and the radical Right in Germany and France,” 25-44). 125 Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, “The rise and impact of the Swiss People’s Party: Challenging the rules of governance in Switzerland,” 93-8. 126 Ibid., 93-4. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid., 94-6. 129 Albertazzi, “Switzerland: Yet another populist paradise,” 106. Church, “The Swiss elections of 21 October 2007: Consensus fights back,” 608-23. Church and Vatter, “Opposition in consensual Switzerland: A short but significant experiment,” 412-37. 130 Mudde, “One against all, all against one!: A portrait of the Vlaams Blok,” 9. 131 Ibid., 9-10. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 131.

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140 141 142 143

144 145

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Notes to pages 39–41

Ibid., 16-17. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 18-19. Ibid., 21. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 131-4. For example, in the 1995 elections the Vlaams Blok received 7.8% of the vote, in 1999 it obtain 9.9%, in 2003 it reached 11.6%, and in 2007 it won 12.0% (Deschouwer, The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society, 125). Erk, “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian far-right renames itself,” 493-4. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 151-2. Ibid., 154-5. Akkerman and Hagelund, “‘Women and children first!’ Antiimmigration parties and gender in Norway and the Netherlands,” 201-4. Sitter, “Norway’s storting election of September 2005: Back to the left?” 578. http://electionresources.org/no/. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 143-8. Rydgren, “Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: The case of Denmark,” 486-8. Rydgren, “Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: The case of Denmark,” 484-8. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 144. Andersen, “Nationalism, new right, and new cleavages in Danish politics: Foreign and security policy of the Danish People’s Party,” 103-23. Ibid., 109-10. Bille, “Denmark,” (1999): 371. Bille, “Denmark,” (2002): 942. Bille, “Denmark,” (2006): 1085. Bille, “Denmark,” (2008): 953. For policy considerations see the discussion in the conclusion. Zaslove, “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” 327-8. Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many populisms,” 84-99. In a more recent article, Tarchi argues that Berlusconi is more extreme than the party. See Tarchi, “Recalcitrant allies: The conflicting foreign policy agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord,” 187. In 2009, an and fi merged to form a new party, Il Popolo della Libertà. The current analysis, however, deals with the period before this merger. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 347. Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 191. Ignazi, “Epilogue to the paperback edition,” in Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. The extent to which a complete transition to a conservative or mainstream party occurred is still a matter of discussion.

Notes to pages 41–3

148 149

150 151 152

153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

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Tarchi provides a very good discussion of the party’s political platform and the evolution of an into a mainstream party. See Tarchi, “The political culture of the Alleanza Nazionale: An analysis of the party’s programmatic documents (1995-2002),” 176-8. However, Anna Cento Bull argues that Alleanza Nazionale’s full recognition of its participation in terrorism impeded its full transition to a mainstream political party. See Cento Bull, Italian Neofascism: The Strategy of Tension and the Politics of Nonreconciliation. See chapter two. For example, Gallagher placed the rise of the Lega within the demise of the post-war party system and the decline of post-war politics (Gallagher, “The regional dimension in Italy’s political upheaval: Role of the Northern League 1984-1993,” 456-68). Cento Bull and Gilbert point out that several interpretations in the early 1990s came to similar conclusions. They point to studies by Martin Bull and James Newell, Patrick McCarthy, Carlo Galli, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Renato Mannheimer (Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord, 43-4). Mannheimer et al. examined how early support for the Lega consisted of young, non-aligned, and disenchanted voters (Mannheimer (ed.), La Lega Lombarda). And Torpey focused on the Lega Nord as a protest of the wealthy, equating it with California anti-tax protests (Torpey, “Affluent Secessionists: Italy’s Northern League,” 311-15). De Winter and Türsan (ed.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. Diamanti, La Lega. Diamanti, Il Male del Nord. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord, 67-105. Bagnasco, Tre Italie: La Problematica Territoriale dello Sviluppo Italiano. Trigilia, Grandi Partiti e Piccole Imprese: Comunisti e Democristiani nelle Regioni a Economia Diffusa. Diamanti, La lega, especially “Il Localismo,” 29-55. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord, 67-104. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, especially “Part II: I Temi,” 105-85. See Biorcio, La Padania Promessa. Diamanti, La Lega. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord. Tambini, Nationalism in Italian politics, 6-15. Schmidtke, Politics of Identity, 19-24. Huysseune, Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy. Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe,” 34-51. Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple. Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many

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163

164

165

166

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Notes to pages 43–4

populisms,” 84-99. Albertazzi and McDonnell, “Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre,” 1-11. Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe,” 34-51. Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple, 255-70. Albertazzi and McDonnell make a similar argument (Albertazzi and McDonnell, “Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre,” 1-11). Taggart, “New populist parties in Western Europe,” 34-51. Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple. Albertazzi and McDonnell, “Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre,” 1-11. Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. See especially Rydgren, The Populist Challenge. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Betz and Johnson, “Against the current - stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right,” 311-27. Betz, “Exclusionary populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland,” 393-420. Betz and Johnson, “Against the current - stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right,” 317-21. Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 64-5. Zaslove, “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an antiglobalization movement,” 169-89. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Considerable debate has taken place over whether the Lega should be classified with other radical right and/or radical right populist parties. For example, in the early to mid- 1990s, Kitschelt claimed that the Lega was an anti-establishment populist party (Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, 159-201.) Although more recently Kitschelt has tempered this position, claiming that since the mid-1990s the Lega has evolved towards a radical right populist party (Kitschelt, “Growth and persistence of the radical right in postindustrial democracies,” 1179). Early on, Ignazi also argued that the Lega was less extreme than other extreme right parties. However, more recently he has also argued that the Lega has become more extreme and thus should be classified with other radical right populist parties (For an evolution of Ignazi’s opinion, see Ignazi, Extreme right parties in Western Europe, 61, 236, 244, 250 and Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 348). Some, including Mudde and Norris, see the party as a borderline case, even though in the end they do include the Lega with radical right populist parties and the radical right. Mudde concludes that the Lega is too similar to exclude, while Norris also

Notes to pages 44–8

225

includes the Lega with other radical right parties, based upon the Lubbers scale measuring opposition to immigration (Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 55-8. Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 64-5). In addition, Betz and Rydgren group the Lega with other radical right populist parties. See Rydgren, The Populist Challenge, 13-17. Betz, “Against the ‘green totalitarianism’: Anti-Islamic nativism in contemporary radical right-wing populism in Western Europe,” 33-54. Betz and Johnson, “Against the current - stemming the tide: The nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right,” 317-21. Betz, Radical RightWing Populism in Western Europe. 168 As Biorcio notes, the Lega has its feet in both camps; the regionalist and the neo-populist (Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 19). For a good discussion of the problems that the Lega Nord had in joining other regionalist parties in the European parliament, see Hanley, Beyond the Nation State: Parties in the Era of European Integration, 157-67. 169 Zaslove, “Alpine populism, Padania and beyond,” 67. 170 Keating, “Regionalism in the Alps: Subnational, supranational, and transnational,” 54.

chapter 2 1 Fella, “From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini’s remarkable journey,” 11-23. Diamanti and Ceccarini, “Catholics and politics after the Christian Democrats: The influential minority,” 37-59. 2 See appendix for table on the evolution of the Lega Nord. 3 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 413. 4 For a good discussion of Fordism see Allen, “Fordism and modern industry,” 280-306. 5 See the Introduction note 45. 6 Kitschelt, “European social democracy between political economy and electoral competition,” 330-1. 7 Mair, “Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western democracy,” 25-51. Mair, “Populist democracy vs. party democracy,” 84-5. 8 Mastropaolo, “Politics against democracy: Party withdrawal and populist breakthrough,” 38. 9 For a good study of how economic restructuring has influenced support for the radical right see Flecker (ed.), Changing Working Life and the Appeal of the Extreme Right.

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Notes to pages 48–51

10 Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare. 11 Mény and Surel, Par le Peuple, Pour le Peuple, 129-75. 12 Flash Eurobarometer, 151b. “Globalization,” 4, 8, 33, 41, 53, 58. 13 Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-wwii Migration to Western Europe, 19-53. 14 Ibid., 170-93. 15 Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenhofer, Salfinger, and Orgis, Attitudes Towards Minority Groups in the European Union, 25. 16 Standard Eurobarometer 67: Public Opinion in the European Union, 97. 17 See note 46 in the Introduction. Katz and Mair, “Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party,” 5-28. Mair, “Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western democracy,” 25-51. 18 Katz and Mair, “Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party,” 5-28. Mair, “Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western democracy,” 25-51. 19 Mair, “Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western democracy,” 25-51. Mair, “Populist democracy vs. party democracy,” 84-5. Mair and van Biezen, “Party membership in twenty European democracies: 1980-2000,” 5-21. 20 Müller-Rommel, “The new challengers: Greens and right-wing populist parties in Western Europe,” 198. 21 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 256. 22 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 15-41. 23 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 25-41. Allum, “Italian society transformed,” 10-20. 24 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 44-5. 25 Ibid., 58-73. 26 Allum, “Italian society transformed,” 20-6. 27 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 65-70. Locke, Remaking the Italian Economy. Allum, “Italian society transformed,” 21. Boccella, “Squilibri territoriali,” 427-8. Sforzi, “Localizzazione e distretti industriali,” 439-42. Brusco, “Small firms and industrial districts: The experience of Italy,” 184202. The classic study of politics and the Third Italy is Trigilia, Grandi Partiti e Piccole Imprese: Comunisti e Democristiani nelle Regioni a Economia Diffusa. 28 Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 75-88. 29 Cento Bull, “Collective identities: From the politics of inclusion to the politics of ethnicity and difference,” 44-7. For a good discussion of

Notes to pages 51–5

30 31

32

33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

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socio-economic development and the Third Italy, see Cento Bull and Corner, From Peasant to Entrepreneur, 158-60. Cento Bull and Corner, From Peasant to Entrepreneur, 158-64. Ginsborg, L’Italia del Tempo Presente, 109-13. Tarrow, “Maintaining hegemony in Italy: ‘The softer they rise, the slower they fall!’”, 306-32. Leonardi and Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy, especially chapters three and four, “Christian Democracy in power, 194588,” and “The dc factions and leadership groups.” Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 442. The best result was in 1948 when it received 48.5% but after that it wavered between 38 and 42%. Ibid., 181-5. Leonardi and Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy, 164-86. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 181-5. Leonardi and Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy, 164-86. Parisi and Pasquino, “Relazioni partiti-elettori e tipi di voto,” 81-2. Hellman, “Italy,” 423. In central Italy, a similar dynamic occurred, however, in this region the hegemonic party was the Italian Communist Party. Tarrow, “Maintaining hegemony in Italy: ‘The softer they rise, the slower they fall!’”, 309. Ibid., 319. Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 237-40. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 131-45. Trigilia, Grandi Partiti e Piccoli Imprese, 296-309. Diamanti, La Lega, 45-69. Also see Caciagli, “Il resistible declino della Democrazia Cristiana,” 104–10. Leonardi and Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy, 177. Ibid., 178. Ibid. Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 39. Quoted in Diamanti, La Lega, 49. Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 29-53. Diamanti, La Lega, 45-69. Diamanti, La Lega, 45-69. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 39-53 and 133-41. Diamanti, La Lega, 57. Its initial name was Lega Autonomista Lombarda, but it became the Lega Lombarda soon afterward. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 47-8. Ibid., 50.

228

Notes to pages 55–60

54 Ibid., 54. The alliances that were forged in the European and the Regional elections were the precurors to the official formation of the Lega Nord in 1991. However, much of the ground work had already been laid before hand: Biorcio notes that the Lega Nord was already officially concieved in 1989 before a notary in Bergamo (Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 54). Also, see Lega Nord, “Cronistoria della Lega Nord: Dalle origini ad oggi, seconda parte 1988-1995,” 6. 55 Ibid., 53. 56 Diamanti, La Lega, 46-7 and 65-7. 57 Ibid., 40 and 42. 58 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 21. 59 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 14. 60 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, “Il localismo,” 29-53. 61 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 133-4. 62 Nanetti, Growth and Territorial Policies: The Italian Model of Social Capitalism, 25. 63 Sabel, Work and Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry, 149. Sabel notes that it was common in the region of Piedmont to see signs for renting apartments that read “for Piedmontese only.” 64 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 133-44. 65 McCarthy, The Crisis of the Italian State, 134-48. 66 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 64. 67 Cento Bull, “Breaking up the post-war consensus: The ideology of the Lega Nord in the early years.” 68 Especially in provinces such as Brescia, Bergamo, Varese, Como, and Sondrio. 69 Especially in provinces such as Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, and Belluno. 70 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 66-7. 71 Cento Bull, “Breaking up the post-war consensus: The ideology of the Lega Nord in the early years.” 72 Mannheimer, “Chi vota Lega e perché,” 132. 73 Diamanti, La Lega, 139-44. 74 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 26. 75 Newell and Bull, “Italian Politics after the 2001 General Election: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?” 629. 76 In 1991, the Italian Communist Party began its evolution towards a social democratic party. It first became the Democratic Party of the Left. In 1998, the Party became the Left Democrats (ds). Between 1995 and 2007, it contested elections as part of the center-left coalition, the Olive Tree Alliance. In 2007, the ds, along with several other center-left parties (the

Notes to pages 60–5

77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

229

most important being the Margherita) became the Democratic Party. This party ran in the 2008 elections. For a good discussion of the center-right, see Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards?” 9-35. The Union of Christian and Centre Democrats did not join the House of Freedoms in the 2008 elections. McCarthy, “Il ‘carisma’ nell’Italia del dopo-1992,” 67-72. Biorcio, “Bossi-Berlusconi, la nuova alleanza,” 253-64. Poli, Forza Italia, 283-90. Hopkin and Paolucci, “The business firm model of party organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy,” 328-32. It appears that the process of party building that took place in the late 1990s is less relevant more recently, especially with the formation of the People of Freedom. Biorcio, “Bossi-Berlusconi, la nuova alleanza,” 257. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 335. McCarthy, “Forza Italia: The new politics and old values of a changing Italy,” 135-6. Zaslove, “Here to Stay? Populism as a new party type,” 319-36. Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many populisms,” 84-99. Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many populisms,” 84-99. Zaslove, “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” 319-36. Ruzza and Schmidtke, “Towards a modern right: Alleanza Nazionale and the ‘Italian revolution’,” 148. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 40-1. Tassani, “Il movimento sociale italiano da Almirante a Fini,” 167. On immigration, see Veugelers, “Recent immigration politics in Italy,” 33-49. Veugelers and Chiarini, “The far-right in France and Italy: Nativist politics and anti-fascism,” 83-103. Chiarini, “La destra italiana e la protesta antiimmigrati,” 95-118. Carioti, “Dal ghetto al palazzo: L’ascesa di Alleanza Nazionale,” 73-95. Ignazi, Postfascisti? 99-105. Fella, “From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini’s remarkable journey,” 13. Ibid., 14. Ibid., 16 and 19. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 339. Diamanti and Ceccarini, “Catholics and politics after the Christian Democrats: The influential minority,” 38. Ibid., 44-5. Ibid., 44. See chapters 7 and 8.

230

Notes to pages 65–9

99 Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards,” 16 and 22. 100 Diamanti, “The Italian centre-right and centre-left: Between parties and ‘the party’,” 740. 101 Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards,” 15. 102 Ibid., 18-29. 103 I only refer to the four most important parties in the center-right coalition. 104 David Farrell notes that the Italian system was also often classified as a Mixed Member Proportional system. However, he argues that is more correct to refer to it as a Mixed Member Majoritarian system, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, 119. 105 Bull and Newell, Italian Politics, Appendix to chapter 3, “Political Parties and the Party System.” 106 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 83-89. Diamanti, La Lega, 137-8 and 150-7. 107 Diamanti, La Lega, 137-8. 108 Ibid., 138-9. 109 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 90. 110 Beirich and Woods, “Globalization, workers, and the Northern League,” 137. 111 Ibid., 140-2. 112 Diamanti, La Lega, 143–4. 113 http://elezioni.interno.it/. 114 http://elezionistorico.interno.it/. 115 Diamanti, “La Lega di governo ha perso le radici,” La Repubblica, 3 March 2002. Guolo, “Geopolitica della Padania,” La Repubblica, 17 April 2008. Diamanti, Bianco, Rosso, Verdi... e Azzurro: Mappe e Colori dell’Italia Politica, 71-3. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 345-7. 116 Conti, “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: A new dimension of party competition?” 224-5. Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 964-6. 117 “Nazisti rossi e omosessuali: A Venezia l’invettiva di Bossi,” La Repubblica, 18 September, 2000. “Bossi: la nuova Unione mi fa pensare a Stalin,” La Repubblica, 28 August 2002. “E il popolo del Carroccio tributa il trionfo ai ministrieroi,” La Repubblica, 14 January 2002. “Europa nuovo fascismo,” La Repubblica, 3 March 2002. 118 “Bossi attacca gli eurocrati,” La Repubblica, 17 September 2001. “Bossi invoca dazi contro la Cina,” La Repubblica, 17 August 2003. 119 For a good discussion of the Lega and tensions surround globalization, see Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 139-72. 120 National Census from Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, appendix. For a good discussion of immigration and

Notes to pages 69–79

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the Third Italy, see Reyneri, “Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market,” 75. 121 For the most comprehensive analysis of immigration and immigration policy, see Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi. 122 Zaslove, “The politics of immigration: A new electoral dilemma for the right and the left?” 10-36.

chapter 3 1 On the difficulties of creating a regionalist movement based on elements such as language in the case of the Lega, see Bossi, Il Mio Progetto, 20-1. 2 Zaslove, “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” 319-36. 3 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 211. 4 Ibid., 237. 5 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 143-4. 6 These National Sections correspond to the Italian Regions. They are referred to as National Sections since this corresponds to the party’s claims for national self-determination for the regions. 7 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 144-5. 8 Before the party newspaper became La Padania it had several names: Lombardia Autonomista, Repubblica del Nord, Lega Nord. 9 www.leganord.org. 10 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 145. 11 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 145. Ruzza, “The Northern League: Winning arguments, losing influence,” 76. See http://www.associazionipadane.org/. 12 Maraffi, “Nella selva politica: Partiti, coalizioni e altri animali,” 203. 13 Schmidtke, Politics of Identity, 161. 14 Diamanti, La Lega, 83. 15 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 143. 16 Schmidtke, Politics of Identity, 221. 17 Ibid., 221. 18 “Bossi, resa dei conti con i centristi sul federalismo voglio un vertice,” La Repubblica, 16 September 2002. 19 See Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe for an excellent discussion on this topic. 20 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 3-35. 21 Gilbert, The Italian Revolution: The End of Politics, Italian Style? 46-7. Vimercati, I Lombardi alla Nuova Crociata, 3-35. 1984 was its official introduction, although the movement had been active since 1982. See “Lega

232

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Notes to pages 80–6

Nord: Cronistoria della Lega Nord: Dalle origini ad oggi, prima parte 1979-1987,” 33-7. Sarubbi, La Lega Qualunque, 61-2. For a good study of the role of Bossi and leadership, see Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 146-63. Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 151-2. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 246. See also Diamanti, Bianco, Rosso, Verde … e Azzurro, 75-7. Maraffi, “Nella selva della politica: Partiti, coalizioni e altri animali,” 200 and 203. Maraffi, “Nella selva della politica: Partiti, coalizioni e altri animali,” 200 and 203. Diamanti, “Ma La Lega ha bisogno di Bossi?” La Repubblica, 9 January 2005. See chapter 7 and the conclusion for a more in-depth discussion. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 48. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 38-49. Ibid., 54. Confalonieri, “Identità, interessi e carisma nei movimenti populisti: La Lega Nord e il Poujadismo,” 79. Bossi, “Discorso finale del Segretario Nazionale,” 1st National Congress, Lega Lombarda, Milan, 7, 8, 9 December 1989. Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 146-63. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 241. Biorcio, “La Lega come attore politico,” 71-2. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 34. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 193-6. Biorcio, “La Lega come attore politico,” 34. Bossi, Processo alla Lega, 27. Quoted in Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 195. Schmidtke, Politics of Identity, 183–4. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 193. Ibid., 189. Ibid., 194. Ibid. McCarthy, “Italy: A new language for a new politics?” 343. Ibid., 343. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 194. See: www.leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti2000.asp. Tarchi, “L’ascesa del neopopulismo in Europa,” 9. Rumiz, La Secessione Leggera, 12-15. Bossi, Processo alla Lega, 136.

Notes to pages 86–94

233

55 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 155. 56 Pontida is a small village near Milan where the Lega gathers. In the Middle Ages, this is where a northern alliance, referred to as the Lega Lombarda, defended itself from Barbarossa and the invaders from the north. According to the Lega Nord, this site is now representative not of the battle against the invaders from the north, but from the south, i.e. Rome. 57 This refers to the active volcano in Sicily and more specifically to the eruptions between 1991 and 1993. 58 www.leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti. 59 For a full list visit: www.leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti. 60 Cited in Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 197. 61 Sarubbi, La Lega Qualunque, 28. 62 For a good list of important dates and party events of the Lega between 1990 and 1996, see Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 160. 63 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 199. 64 Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 56. 65 Zaslove, “Here to stay? Populism as a new party type,” 319-36. 66 Taguieff, “Political science confronts populism,” 9.

chapter 4 1 Gingrich, “A man for all seasons: An anthropological perspective on public representation and cultural politics of the Austrian Freedom Party,” 85-9. 2 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 41. 3 Ibid., 43. 4 Ibid., 44. 5 Ibid., 55-9. 6 Ibid., 59-62. 7 Ibid., 57. 8 Spektorowski, “Ethnoregionalism: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord,” 66-7. 9 Ibid., 66. 10 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 59. 11 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 106-9. 12 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 105-21. Ruzza, “The Northern League: Winning arguments, losing influence,” 75-6. With the growing emphasis on Padania as a nation, the influence of the New Right increased. See Spektorowski, “‘Ethnoregionalism’: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord,” 55-70. Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 73-118.

234

Notes to pages 94–100

13 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 112-21. 14 Huysseune, Modernity and Secession: The Social Sciences and the Political Discourse of the Lega Nord in Italy, 176-8. 15 Albertazzi, “‘Back to our roots’ or self-confessed manipulation?” 24-8. 16 Ibid., 27. 17 Ibid., 28. 18 Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 106. 19 Ibid., 110. 20 Ibid., 111. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 112. 23 Ibid. 24 The first electoral test for this new strategy also proved to be a failure; in the European elections of 1999, the Lega’s support dropped from 10.1% to 4.5%. Roberto Maroni acknowledged that between 1996 and 1998, the Lega’s separatism contributed to its loss of public support (Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 53). 25 Cited in Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 117. 26 Conti, “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: A new dimension of party competition?” 225. 27 See chapter 8. 28 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 81-108. Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 10538. Albertazzi, “‘Back to Our Roots’ or Self-Confessed Manipulation?” 2139. Diamanti, Bianco, Rosso, Verde … e Azzurro, 56-60. 29 Bull, “La ‘grande riforma’ del centro-destra alla prova del referendum,” 137. 30 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 133-4. 31 Cento Bull and Corner, From Peasant to Entrepreneur, 108-29. 32 Beirich and Woods, “Globalization, workers, and the Northern League,” 130-43. Diamanti, La Lega, 143-4. 33 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 49. 34 Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 73-6. 35 Ibid., 83-4. 36 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-8. Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 83-4. 37 Bossi, Il Processo alla Lega, 173. 38 Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 325. Bossi, “La questione cattolica,” Vento dal Nord. Bossi, “La Lega è atea e anticlericale,” Processo alla Lega. 39 “Famiglia, cardine dell’identità,” La Padania, 2 January 2001. 40 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità è società multirazziali,” 10. 41 “Super-Stato europeo. Il regalo dell’Ulivo,” La Padania, 8 May 2001.

Notes to pages 100–4

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42 “La coppia multinazionale,” La Padania, 26 April 2001. 43 “Il bambino deve nascere in famiglia,” La Padania, 19-20 July 1998. 44 “Famiglie e comunità locale, un argine alla globalizzazione,” La Padania, 29 March 2001. 45 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-8. 46 Diamanti, Il Male del Nord, 41-2. Diamanti, La Lega,” 47-8. 47 Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 186. 48 Ibid., 188. 49 Ibid., 191. 50 This change was also linked to the growing opposition to Islam. See Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 325. 51 “Lega-chiesa riprene il dialogo,” La Padania, 12-13 July 1998. 52 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 64-80. Mauro, “Chi tace davanti a Bossi il crociato,” La Repubblica, 17 October 2000. 53 Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 324-7. 54 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-80. 55 Ibid., 63. 56 Ibid. 57 Guolo, “La chiesa e l’islam,” 93-4. Also see Guolo, “I nuovi crociati: La Lega e l’islam,” 893-4. 58 Guolo, “La chiesa e l’islam,” 94. Giacomo Biffi, cardinal of Bologna, also made controversial comments claiming that Muslim immigrants do not want to integrate into Italian society because they are not interested in learning about the Catholic religion. He claims, for this reason, that immigrants of the Catholic faith should be favoured - they are more likely to integrate into Italian society, and especially Catholic society. Restating his controversial comments from the previous year, in the fall of 2001 Biffi proclaimed that if his suggestions were not followed, there would be a future of “tears and blood for our country.” He did not see the possibility of interfaith dialogue or the weakening of either side’s principles. “Biffi: Immigrazione, prima i cattolici,” La Padania, 14 September 2000. “Ma per la Chiesa ogni uomo è fratello,” La Repubblica, 14 September 2000. “Islam, Biffi sgrida due papi,” La Repubblica, 21 September 2001. “Il diavolo e gli stranieri,” La Repubblica, 14 September 2000. “Non temo l’Islam,” La Repubblica, 1 October 2000. 59 “Pornografia, un danno per la sessualità,” La Padania, 2 January 2001. “Lotta alla pornografia, famiglie in prima linea,” La Padania, 11 January 2001. “Pedofilia, la penso come la Lega,” La Padania, 21-22 January 2001. Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 132.

236

Notes to pages 104–10

60 “Gay pride, ultima sfida,” La Repubblica, 3 March 2001, “Verona, la Lega attacca il gay pride,” La Repubblica, 25 February 2005. 61 “Bossi: Noi con la Chiesa contro gay e massoni,” La Repubblica, 11 September 2000. 62 Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 134. 63 “Legge popolare sugli eros center,” La Repubblica, 23 May 2002. 64 “Cappio, pallottole, castrazione l’album tribale della Lega,” La repubblica, 6 July 2005. 65 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofilil, 59. 66 Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-8. Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 132-5. 67 Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 132. 68 Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 82. 69 Rumiz, La Secessione Leggera, 66. 70 Ibid., 58-9. 71 Ibid., 59. 72 Ibid. 73 Mannheimer, “L’elettorato della Lega Nord,” 269.

chapter 5 1 2 3 4

5 6

7 8

Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 133-44. Sabel, Work and Politics: The Division of Labour in Industry, 149. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 138-9. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 210-53. Keating points to a new regionalism that began to emerge in the 1980s. He notes, “Once again, it was impelled by a functional pressure combined with new forms of political mobilization and a redefinition of the social and economic meaning of territory, but this time the context was provided not just by the state as in the past, but also by the changing international market and the emerging continental regime” (Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, 72). Cento Bull, “Ethnicity, racism and the Northern League,” 183. Cento Bull, “Breaking up the post-war consensus: The ideology of the Lega Nord in the early years.” Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 39-53 and 133-44. Woods, “The centre no longer holds: The rise of the regional leagues in Italian politics,” 56-76. Cento Bull and Gilbert, The Lega Nord, 9-22. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 134-5. Diamanti, La Lega, 45-56, 57-69, 72-5. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 133-44.

Notes to pages 110–14

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21

22

23 24

25 26 27

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Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 135-8. Quoted in Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 138. Bossi, Processo alla Lega, 15. Cento Bull and Gilbert, La Lega, 14. Also see examples of posters at: www.leganord.org/ilmovimento/manifesti. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 140. Ibid., 143. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 407. King “The troubled passage: Migration and cultural encounters in southern Europe,” 4-5. Veugelers, “Recent immigration politics in Italy,” 35. Ibid., 38-9. Ibid., 37-9. Perlmutter, “Immigration politics Italian style: The paradoxical behaviour of mainstream and populist parties,” 233-4. Veugelers, “Recent immigration politics in Italy,” 41. Perlmutter, “Immigration politics Italian style: The paradoxical behaviour of mainstream and populist parties,” 234-9. Perlmutter, “Bringing parties back in: Comments on ‘modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic societies’,” 381. In this context I use European union, even though the eu only officially came into existence in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union. Perlmutter, “Immigration politics Italian style: The paradoxical behaviour of mainstream and populist parties,” 235-6. The Agreement refers to the elimination of border control between states that have signed the accord. Although the Schengen Agreement originally took place outside of the eu structures, originally signed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium in 1985, in 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated it into eu law. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 152. Veugelers, “Recent immigration politics in Italy,” 42-4. Veugelers notes that the efforts of the Republican Party were successful in that it focused the attention of the law on public order. However, the law did pass with 90 percent approval (43). Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 352-8. Hine, “Drafting the 1998 legislation on immigration: A test of government cohesion,” 187-8. Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 347-75. Andall, “Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in government (1996-2001),” 131-53.

238

Notes to pages 115–19

28 The influence of the Lega’s anti-immigration message was felt early on at the local level; however, during the discussions leading up to the TurcoNapolitano law, and in its aftermath, the influence of the Lega on the national immigration discussions increased. Zincone, “Illegality, enlightenment and ambiguity: A hot Italian recipe,” 74-5. Andall, “Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in government (19962001),” 146-51. 29 Andall, “Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in government (1996-2001),” 148-9. 30 Ibid., 148-9. 31 In Italy, if parties collect 50,000 signatures they are able to present a law to parliament. Andall, “Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in government (1996-2001),” 149-51. 32 Woods, “The immigration question in Italy,” 189-90. 33 Diamanti,“Immigrazione e cittadinanza in Europa,”3. 34 Diamanti and Bordignon, “Immigrazione e cittadinanza in Europa,” 12-13. 35 Cento Bull, “Breaking up the post-war consensus: The ideology of the Lega Nord in the early years.” 36 Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 83-7. See Spektorowski, “Ethnoregionalism: The intellectual new right and the Lega Nord,” 55-70. 37 As Bruno Luverà points out in I Confini dell’Odio, many of the Lega’s ideas and references come from the Nouvelle Droite. 38 Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 343. 39 For a good discussion of immigration, Alleanza Nazionale, and the radical right, see Veugelers and Chiarini, “The Far-Right in France and Italy: Nativist politics and anti-fascism,” 83-103. Veugelers “A challenge for political sociology: The rise of far-right parties in contemporary Western Europe,” 78-100. 40 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 967-9. See also Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 333-49. 41 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 151-2. 42 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 128. 43 Diamanti, “The Northern League: From regional party to party of government,” 119-21. Cento Bull, “Breaking up the post-war consensus: The ideology of the Lega Nord in the early years.” 44 Gómez-Reino, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics, 128-9. Eventually the decree was further amended by parliament; a quota for seasonal workers was added and powers to detain and deport illegal migrants

Notes to pages 120–6

45

46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63

64 65 66 67 68

239

were dropped (Watts, Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization, 38). In the early 1990s, especially during the fall of the First Republic, the Lega received more middle-class support. However, since 1996, the Lega’s support has come increasingly from workers and the working class. This has corresponded to a radicalization of its political message. See Beirich and Woods, “Globalization, workers, and the Northern League,” 130-43. Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 14. Ibid., 13-16. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 3-16 and 27-30. Ibid., 3 and 13-16. “Prima la Martelli, ora la Turco-Napolitano: Gli immigrati esultano sulla pelle dei popoli, Così il regime romano apre indiscriminatamente le porte,” La Padania, 29 October 1999. Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 22. Ibid., 3, 13, 22. “Prima gli oriundi veneti,” La Padania, 1 August 2000. Bossi, Il Processo alla Lega, 101. “Comino: Torino svegliati!” La Padania, 2 October 1998. Guolo, “I nuovi crociati: La Lega e l’islam,” 892. Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 325. “La moschea non e` solo un luogo di culto’,” La Padania, 16 March 2001. “Basta all’invasione islamica,” La Padania, 15-16 October 2000. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 346-7. “Via i delinquenti dall’Italia,” Lega Nord, 26 September 1995. “Comino: Torino svegliati!” La Padania, 2 October 1998. Luverà, I Confini dell’Odio, 11. “Cittadini da proteggere,” La Padania, 2-3 April 2000. “Via i delinquenti dall’Italia,” Lega Nord, 26 September 1995. “Il Referendum è indispensabile: Per abrogare la legge Martelli sull’immigrazione,” Lombardia Autonomista, 15 November 1990. “Emergenza immigrati: Servono più controlli anche per chi è in regola,” La Padania, 1 August 2000. For a good discussion of illegal immigration in Italy, see Reyneri, “Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market,” 71-93. “Albanesi: Invasione voluta,” Lombardia Autonomista, 16 August 1991. Geddes, “Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the center-right in Italy,” 349. These concerns influenced the Bossi-Fini law. See chapter 8.

240

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

Notes to pages 126–36

Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 28-9. Ibid., 25-7. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 143-4. Bossi, Il Processo alla Lega, 15. “Basta col razzismo antipadano,” La Padania, 16 February 1999. “Assistenzialismo o invasione, il risultato è lo stesso,” La Padania, 31 January, 1 February 1999. Guolo, “Immigrazione, etnicismo, crescita zero. La Lega e il nord est,” 891. “Bossi: Vogliamo seguire il modello cristiano,” La Padania, 30 March 2000. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 144-6. “Verso una guerra tra poveri,” La Padania, 14-15 February 1999. Bossi, Vento dal Nord, 143-6. “Concorsi pubblici: Favorire i residenti,” La Padania, 29 July 1998. Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-8. Guolo, Xenofobi e Xenofili, 62-8. Zúquete, “The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?” 329-33.

chapter 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

See chapter 2. Bossi, La Rivoluzione, 179. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 170. Ibid., 170. Ibid., 169-70. “Antitrust per abbattere i monopoli,” Lega Nord, 13 December 1994. Bossi, La Rivoluzione, 182. “Antitrust per abbattere i monopoli,” Lega Nord, 13 December 1994. Savelli, Che Cosa Vuole La Lega, 27-8. Bossi, La Rivoluzione, 187. “Basta con le false privatizzazioni,” Lega Nord, 27 April 1994. Bossi, Il Mio Progetto, 45. “Resistenza fiscale, il coraggio degli onesti,” Lega Nord, 21 October 1996. Rumiz, La Secessione Leggera, 54. Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 171. Ibid., 172. Bossi, Il Processo alla Lega, 67. “Contro i patti scellerati tra governo romano e sindacati di regime,” La Padania, 30 July 1999.

Notes to pages 136–43

241

18 “Rivolta contro il fisco e la Rai,” Lombardia Autonomista, 14 October 1991. 19 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 178. 20 Ibid., 178-9. In 1993 the various unions that were formed at the regional level were merged into an organization called Confedersal. 21 Ibid., 179. 22 “Meno oneri sociali, più lavoro,” Lega Nord, 28 March 1994. 23 Biorcio, La Padania Promessa, 169. 24 Ibid. 25 Diamanti, La Lega, 143-4. 26 Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 186-7 and 190-4. 27 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 3 and 14. 28 Ibid., 3. 29 Ibid. 30 Quoted in Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe, 130-1. 31 Ibid., 130-1. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 15-21. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Pontida, 4 May 2003, 25. 32 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 17. 33 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 3. 34 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 15-20. 35 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 15. 36 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 3-5. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 15-16. 37 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 3. 38 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venezia, 21 September 2003, 16. 39 Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 192. 40 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 3. 41 “Un’Europa a misura di popoli,” Padania: Lega Nord, April 2000. 42 “Nessuna legge prima del referendum: La proposta Amato non bloccherà la consultazione,” La Padania, 15 February 1999. 43 “Nessuna legge prima del referendum: La proposta Amato non bloccherà la consultazione,” La Padania, 15 February 1999. 44 “Bossi-sfida il filo-americano: Il referendum contro il proporzionale farà chiarezza,” La Padania, 26 January 1999. 45 “ Bossi-sfida il filo-americano: Il referendum contro il proporzionale farà chiarezza,” La Padania, 26 January 1999.

242

Notes to pages 143–6

46 “Mitteleuropa, nostra casa comune, Bossi ad Haider: Battiamoci contro la globalizzazione dell’Ue,” La Padania, 19 October 1999. 47 “Solo La Padania deve entrare in Europa,” La Repubblica, 1 September 1996. 48 Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 190-4. 49 Ibid., 190. 50 Ibid., 190-4. 51 Conti, “Party conflict over European integration in Italy,” 224. 52 Ibid., 224. 53 Ibid. 54 “Europa nuovo fascismo,” La Repubblica, 3 March 2002. Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 133 and 137. 55 “Bossi in piazza: No all’Europa-Forcolandia,” Corriere della Sera, 10 December 2001. 56 Bossi, Il Processo alla Lega, 143-4. 57 Quoted in Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 133. 58 “Marceremo su Nizza,” La Repubblica, 26 October 2000. 59 “Nazisti rossi e omosessuali: A Venezia l’invettiva di Bossi,” La Repubblica, 18 September 2000. “Marceremo su Nizza,” La Repubblica, 26 October 2000. 60 Rumiz, “Eu, Bossi spara ai fantasmi,” La Repubblica, 7 March 2002.   61 “Il governo si smarca dalla Lega,” La Repubblica, 4 June 2005. “È l’ora di tornare alla lira chiediamo un voto agli Italiani,” La Repubblica, 3 June 2005. “Vivere senza l’euro - con la vecchia lira un conto più salato,” La Repubblica, 3 June 2005. 62 “Lega, da Pontida assalto all’Europa,” La Repubblica, 19 June 2005. 63 Marraccini, “Unione Europea: La costituzione europea, l’Euro, l’allargamento, la protezione delle nostre imprese,” 2. 64 “Ma Bossi gela al premier: Aprire all’est è una follia, La Repubblica, 26 October 2002. 65 Guolo, “Islam, il nemico utile ai padani,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. 66 “Lega in piazza, no alla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. “La Lega scende in piazza: No ai turchi in Europa,” La Repubblica, 19 December 2004. Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 129. “Referendum sulla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. 67 Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 128. 68 “Turchia nella Ue la Cdl si spacca,” La Repubblica, 2 March 2005. The quotation was written on the back of the interventions by the leghisti during the discussion and others were placed on the House’s benches.

Notes to pages 147–60

243

69 Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 186-7. 70 “Fini: “Le piccole patrie a difesa dalla globalizzazione planetaria,” La Padania, 24-25 January 1999. 71 “Europa disunita dagli USA,” La Padania, 11 June 1999. 72 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venezia, 21 September 2003, 13. 73 “La coppia multinazionale,” La Padania, 26 April 2001. 74 “Un’Europa a misura di popoli,” Padania: Lega Nord, April 2000. 75 Ibid. 76 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venezia, 21 September 2003, 15-16. 77 Mussa et al., “Padania, identità e società multirazziale,” 5. 78 Zúquete, Missionary Politics in Contemporary Europe,” 130. 79 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe. 80 For a good discussion, see Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe, 99-195. 81 Diamanti, “La Lega di governo ha perso le radici,” La Repubblica, 3 March 2002. 82 Diamanti, Bianco, Rosso, Verde … e Azzurro, 73. 83 Ruzza, “The Northern League: Winning arguments, losing influence,” 76.

chapter 7 1 Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, “The rise and impact of the Swiss People’s Party: Challenging the rules of governance in Switzerland,” 94-110. Church, “The Swiss elections of October 2003: Two steps to system change?” 518-34. Church, “The Swiss elections of 21 October 2007: Consensus fights back,” 619-22. For a good discussion on the svp’s opposition period, see Church and Vatter, “Opposition in consensual Switzerland: A short but significant experiment,” 412-37. 2 Heinisch, “Success in opposition – failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office,” 91-2. 3 Mény and Surel, “The constitutive ambiguity of populism,” 18. 4 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 952-72. 5 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 25-43. 6 See Diamanti, Bianco, Rosso, Verde … e Azzurro. 7 Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards?” 9-35. 8 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 952-72.

244

Notes to pages 160–63

9 Bellucci and Bull (eds.), “Gli avvenimenti del 2001,” 11. 10 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 952-72. Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards?” 22-3. Albertazzi and McDonnell, “La botte piena e il militante ubriaco: La Lega Nord al governo,” 32. Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 196-8. Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 333-49. Fella, “From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini’s remarkable journey,” 15-21. “Bossi spara su AN e immigrati: Con Fini leader, elezioni perse,” La Repubblica, 5 December 2003. “Referendum sulla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. 11 Fella, “From Fiuggi to the Farnesina: Gianfranco Fini’s remarkable journey,” 14. 12 Diamanti, “Il fantasma DC che insegue Bossi,” La Repubblica, 15 September 2002. 13 Diamanti, “The Italian centre-right and centre-left: Between parties and ‘the party’,” 733-62. Diamanti and Lello, “The casa delle libertà: A house of cards?” 9-35. Anti-communism and the fight against the old regime play less of a role in the late 1990s, nevertheless, these are often implicit themes. 14 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 956. 15 Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many populisms,” 84-99. 16 Donovan, “Il governo della coalizione di centro-destra,” 103-4. 17 This is translated as: “A fist in government, feet outside.” “Bossi rilancia la Lega di lotta: Pugno nel governo, piedi fuori,” La Repubblica, 29 June 2003. 18 “Bossi giura su Pontida da Ciampi: Ero un padano,” La Repubblica, 18 June 2001. 19 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale On. Umberto Bossi,” Pontida, 17 June 2001, 2. 20 “Bossi rilancia la Lega di Lotta: Pugno nel governo, piedi fuori,” La Repubblica, 29 June 2003. 21 “Lega, la minaccia di Pontida riforme o via del governo,” La Repubblica, 24 June 2002. 22 “Bossi: Resa dei conti con i centristi sul federalismo: Voglio un vertice,” La Repubblica, 16 September 2002. 23 “L’addio di Bossi: Traditori,” La Repubblica, 20 July 2004. “Bossi lascia e va a Strasburgo La Lega: Le riforme sono fallite,” La Repubblica, 20 July 2004.

Notes to pages 163–67

245

24 Amyot and Verzichelli (eds.), “Gli avvenimenti del 2005,” 15. 25 “Referendum sulla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. 26 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “La botte piena e il militante ubriaco: La Lega Nord al governo,” 27-9. 27 Diamanti, “Quando le parole sono usate come pietre,” La Repubblica, 29 June 2003. 28 “La Lega attacca Papalia in aula,” La Repubblica, 15 December 2004. 29 “Indagati per razzismo sei leghisti,” La Repubblica, 29 October 2001. “Razzismo, Castelli critica la sentenza contro i leghisti, La Repubblica, 5 December 2004 (online version). “Cassazione: Se sono ladri legittimo discriminare i nomadi,” La Repubblica, 30 June 2008. 30 Cento Bull, “Verso uno stato federale?” 213. 31 “La Lega attacca Papalia in aula,” La Repubblica, 15 December 2004. 32 Fella and Ruzza, “Changing political opportunities and the re-invention of the Italian right,” 192. For a good discussion of the tensions between radicalism and pragmatics, see Ruzza, “The Northern League: Winning arguments, losing influence,” 77-81. 33 The Lega tracks its influence on legislation while in government. See: http://www.padaniaoffice.org/. 34 See chapter 3. 35 Heinisch, “Success in opposition - failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office,” 91-130. 36 Luther, “Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006,” 8-13.

chapter 8 1 Bale, “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party systems,” 81-4. 2 Minkenberg, “The radical right in public office: Agenda-setting and policy effects,” 1-21. 3 Bale, “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party systems,” 81-4. Hale Williams, The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in Western European Democracies. Schain notes the influence of the radical right on immigration policy. However, he emphasizes that this is due to the influence that radical right populist parties have had on the realignment of party systems (Schain, “The extremeright and immigration policy-making: Measuring direct and indirect effects,” 270-89). 4 Cento Bull, “Verso uno stato federale?” 206-12.

246

Notes to pages 167–71

5 Cotta and Verzichelli, Political Institutions in Italy, 177-81. 6 Ibid., 182-3. In the 1970s, these provisions were finally implemented due to economic and social changes, frustrations with state administration, and a leftward drift of the government (Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 17-62). 7 Cotta and Verzichelli, Political Institutions in Italy, 186. For a good discussion of the Lega and federalism, see Gold, The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. 8 Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale On. Umberto Bossi,” Pontida, 17 June 2001, 2. “Bossi attacca gli eurocrati,” La Repubblica, 17 September 2001. “Referendum, Bossi denuncia la Rai stanno ingannando i cittadini,” La Repubblica, 2 October 2001. “L’incognita referendum alle urne in tre milioni,” La Repubblica, 7 October 2001. 9 Bellucci and Bull, “Gli avvenimenti del 2001,” 13. Cento Bull, “Verso uno stato federale?” 218-20. 10 Cento Bull, “Verso uno stato federale?” 213-14. 11 “Devolution solo per chi la chiede,” Corriere della Sera, 5 July 2001. “Braccio di ferro sulla devolution salta il consiglio dei ministri,” La Repubblica, 5 July 2001. “Scuola, sanità e sicurezza ecco la devolution di Bossi,” La Repubblica, 7 July 2001. “Il federalismo solidale e il ‘fai da te’,” La Repubblica, 13 July 2001. Cento Bull, “Verso uno stato federale?” 212-18. 12 “Devolution, maggioranza spaccata,” La Repubblica, 8 July 2001. 13 “Il federalismo solidale e il ‘fai da te’,” La Repubblica, 13 July 2001. 14 Bull, “La ‘grande riforma’ del centro-destra alla prova del referendum,” 127. “Scuola e sanità alle regioni,” La Repubblica, 14 December 2001. Bellucci and Bull, “Gli avvenimenti del 2001,” 33. 15 Vassallo, “The constitutional reforms of the center-right,” 125-8. 16 Vassallo, “The constitutional reforms of the center-right,” 126-9. Bull, “La ‘grande reforma’ del centro-destra alla prova referendum,” 125. 17 Vassallo, “The constitutional reforms of the center-right,” 127-9. Bull, “La ‘grande reforma’ del centro-destra alla prova referendum,” 126-9. 18 Vassallo, “The constitutional reforms of the center-right,” 128. Bull, “La ‘grande reforma’ del centro-destra alla prova referendum,” 123. 19 Bull, “La ‘grande reforma’ del centro-destra alla prova referendum,” 125. 20 Amyot and Verzichelli, “Gli avvenimenti del 2005,” 15. 21 Bull, “La ‘grande riforma’ del centro-destra alla prova del referendum,” 123 and 125. 22 Ibid., 132. 23 Ibid.

Notes to pages 171–73

247

24 Ibid., 134-5. 25 Ibid., 137. 26 Veugelers, “Recent immigration politics in Italy,” 36. Perlmutter, “Immigration politics Italian style: The paradoxical behaviour of mainstream and populist parties,” 234. 27 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 111-36. Della Porta, “Immigration and protest: New challenges for Italian democracy,” 113-18. Watts, “Italian and Spanish Labour Leaders’ unconventional immigration policy preferences,” 129-48. 28 Della Porta, “Immigration and protest: New challenges for Italian democracy,” 118-24. 29 Zincone, “Immigrazione,” 62. Geddes, “Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the centre-right in Italy,” 358. 30 Ignazi, “Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing,” 348. 31 Zincone, “Immigrazione,” 57-60. 32 Colombo and Sciortino, “La legge Bossi-Fini: Estremismi gridati, moderazioni implicite e frutti avvelenati,” 202-3. Andall, “Immigration and the Italian Left Democrats in government (1996-2001),” 149-50. 33 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 307-8. 34 Geddes, “Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the centre-right in Italy,” 359-60. 35 “Immigrati, tensioni tra AN e Lega,” La Repubblica, 11 July 2001. “Non firmiamo il piano leghista così si paralizzano i tribunali,” La Repubblica, 10 July 2001. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 309. 36 Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 361. The permits and sponsorship program were some of the most progressive elements of the Turco-Napolitano Law. These provisions were borrowed from immigration policies of countries such as Canada (357). 37 “Maroni concertare gli ingressi,” La Repubblica, 11 July 2001. 38 As noted earlier, influential Venetian entrepreneurs publicly voiced their objections to the Lega’s proposed attempts to limit immigration, claiming that cuts to immigration would severely hamper their ability to conduct business (Guolo, “Immigrazione, etnicismo, crescita zero. La Lega e il nord est,” 891). 39 Geddes, “Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the centre-right in Italy,” 360-1. Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 363. 40 Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 361-4. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 311.

248

Notes to pages 173–75

41 Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 365-6. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 312-3. 42 Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 364. 43 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 317. Colombo and Sciortino, “La legge Bossi-Fini: Estremismi gridati, moderazioni implicite e frutti avvelenati,” 210. 44 Einaudi argues that in reality this did not prevent hiring non-eu workers. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 315. 45 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 31415. Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 365. 46 Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 365. 47 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 313. Colombo and Sciortino, “The Bossi-Fini law: Explicit fanaticism, implicit moderation, and poisoned fruits,”171-2. Once expelled it was not possible to return to Italy for ten years (an increase of five years). And finally, the length of time that off-shore arrivals could be held in immigration centres (Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza) was increased from thirty to sixty days. 48 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 316. 49 Ariemma, La Resa dei Conti, 160. 50 Beginning in September 2001, the Christian democrats, with support from religious associations and business, began to push for an amnesty. Initially, they proclaimed that the amnesty would only be for homecare workers. 51 “Sanatoria per le colf il governo dà via libera,” La Repubblica, 8 February 2002. 52 “Immigrazione, La Lega cede minisanatoria per le colf,” La Repubblica, 25 January 2002. 53 Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 318 (see footnote 17). Colombo and Sciortino, “La legge Bossi-Fini: Estremismi gridati, moderazioni implicite e frutti avvelenati,” 207-10. “Immigrati, sì al maxicondono e ora la maggioranza si divide,” La Repubblica, 15 May 2002. “Sommerso, sanatoria anche per gli immigrati,” La Repubblica, 16 June 2002. “Lavoro, arriva la sanatoria per gli immigrati irregolari,” La Repubblica, 5 September 2002. “Immigrati, sul posto fisso resa dei conti nel governo,” La Repubblica, 6 September 2002. 54 Colombo and Sciortino, “La legge Bossi-Fini: Estremismi gridati, moderazioni implicite e frutti avvelenati,” 208-9. “Navi militari contro gli sbarchi

Notes to pages 175–81

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62

63

64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74 75

249

degli immigrati,” La Repubblica, 23 January 2002. “Marina contro i clandestini, primo sì,” La Repubblica, 22 February 2002. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 316 and 319-20. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 319-20. Ariemma, La Resa dei Conti, 160. Ibid., 161. Ibid., 162-3. Zincone, “The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy,” 367. Ariemma, La Resa dei Conti, 165. “La Lega: Vietare la macellazione ebraica e islamica,” La Repubblica, 19 June 2002. “I musulmani avranno la loro scuola,” La Repubblica, 18 July 2004. “La Lega dice no a Simini sulla scuola islamica,” La Repubblica, 29 June 2005. “La Lega in comune ‘chiudete la moschea’,” La Repubblica, 3 April 2003. “La Lega: Moschee covi dell’odio referendum prima di costruirle,” La Repubblica, 25 March 2004. “Leghisti contro la moschea minacce a un militante,” La Repubblica, 25 April 2004. “Islam, Lega contro la pausa preghiera,” La Repubblica, 31 March 2004. “Pisanu: Lasciate il velo a Fatima,” La Repubblica, 24 March 2004. “Primo giorno di scuola l’emozione di Fatima,” La Repubblica, 29 March 2004. Einaudi, Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a Oggi, 306. Colombo and Sciortino, “The Bossi-Fini law: Explicit fanaticism, implicit moderation, and poisoned fruits,” 178. See Joppke, “Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration,” 266-93. Edwards, “The Berlusconi anomaly: Populism and patrimony in Italy’s long transition,” 229-30. “Ma Tremonti si schiera con Bossi: Tiene il nord nella democrazia,” La Repubblica, 7 July 2005. Bossi, Interview with Bruno Vespa, “Bossi: i buonisti stiano attenti,” Panorama, 27 June 2003. Ricolfi, Tempo Scaduto: Il ‘Contratto con gli Italiani’ alla Prova dei Fatti, 12. Ibid., 21. “Scuola politica federale 2005,” 6 and 12. Guarnieri and Newell, (eds.) “Gli avvenimenti del 2004,” 25. Accornero and Como, “La (mancata) riforma dell’articolo 18,” 242-6. Ibid., 245. The Red Brigades was a left wing terrorist group formed in the 1970s. It was involved in a number of political assassinations, especially in the

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87

88 89

90

91 92 93

Notes to pages 181–85

1970s. Although their activity greatly diminished in the 1980s and since 1989, a new generation has recently taken responsibility for several political assassinations. Ibid., 248-56. Ibid., 256-9. Natali and Rhodes, “The Berlusconi pension reform and the emerging ‘double cleavage in distributive politics’,” 172-3. Ibid., 174. Ibid., 175. Ibid., 177. Ibid., 174-9. Ibid., 182-6. Ibid., 184-5. Ibid., 182. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 13-20. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Pontida, 4 May 2003, 24-6. “Bossi invoca dazi contro la Cina,” La Repubblica, 17 August 2003. Also see Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Venice, 21 September 2003, 13-20. Bossi, “Intervento del Segretario Federale,” Pontida, 4 May 2003, 24-6. Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 952-72. “Bossi invoca dazi contro Cina,” La Repubblica, 17 August 2003. “Senza i dazi contro la Cina votiamo no al piano-sviluppo,” La Repubblica, 9 March 2005. Coralluzzo, “Italy’s foreign policy towards China: Missed opportunities and new chances,” 14. “La ricetta anti-Cina di Tremonti dazi per salvare il made in Italy,” La Repubblica, 18 October 2003. “Cina, Tremonti contro la commissione Ue,” La Repubblica, 16 June 2005. “Sfida a Ciampi nel nome dei dazi il premier guida la rivolta anti-Cina,” La Repubblica, 2 March 2005. See chapter 6. “Calderoli ha insultato l’Islam Berlusconi deve licenziarlo,” La Repubblica, 9 February 2006. “Calderoli invoca la Crociata il governo lo sconfessa,” La Repubblica, 11 February 2006. “Porto una maglia antiIslam Silvio vuole che mi dimetta,” La Repubblica, 16 February 2006. “Berlusconi: Ora Calderoli deve lasciare il governo,” La Repubblica, 18 February 2006. “Libia, Calderoli si dimette anche Ciampi lo censura,” La Repubblica, 19 February 2006.

Notes to pages 185–88

251

94 Quaglia, “The role of Italy in the European Union: Between continuity and change,” 136-7. Morisi, “The second Berlusconi government, the parties and the president: A new European policy?” 332. 95 Croci, “Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government,” 59-74. Croci, “Italian foreign policy after the end of the cold war: The issue of continuity and change in Italian-US relations,” 117-31. Ignazi, “Al di là dell’Atlantico, al di qua dell’Europa,” 267-77. Brighi, “One man alone?” 278-97. 96 Brighi, “One man alone?” 289. 97 Andreatta and Brighi, “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” 264. “E il biancofiore insiste: Serve un voto su Bruxelles,” La Repubblica, 6 March 2002. 98 Brighi, “One man alone?” 290. 99 Gianni Agnelli was the former head of Fiat. However, by this time he was the honorary head of Fiat with a lifetime senatorial appointment. 100 Croci, “Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government,” 62. Bellucci and Bull, “Gli avvenimenti del 2001,” 17. 101 Bongiovanni, “Esteri,” 42-3. 102 Blondel and Segatti, “Gli avvenimenti del 2002,” 7. Andreatta and Brighi, “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” 272. “Altolà di Ruggiero a Bossi e Tremonti Ue di tecnocrati? Parole in libertà,” La Repubblica, 3 January 2002. “Ciampi: Sull’Europa basta polemiche,” La Repubblica, 5 January 2002. 103 “Ruggiero rompe il silenzio con la Lega non potevo stare,” La Repubblica, 5 March 2002. 104 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 965. 105 “É l’ora di tornare alla lira, chiediamo un voto agli Italiani,” La Repubblica, 3 June 2005. “Siniscalco e la voglia di lira nostalgia di anni dissennati,” La Repubblica, 5 June 2005. “Lega, da Pontida assalto all’Europa,” La Repubblica, 19 June 2005. 106 Marraccini, “Unione Europea: La costituzione europea, l’Euro, l’allargamento, la protezione delle nostre imprese,” 2. 107 Croci, “Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government,” 63. 108 Morisi, “The second Berlusconi government, the parties and the president,” 333. 109 Croci, “Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government,” 63. 110 Ibid., 63.

252

Notes to pages 188–94

111 “Bossi rispolvera forcolandia legge incostituzionale, voto no,” La Repubblica, 23 October 2003. 112 Marin, “The European arrest warrant in the Italian Republic,” 255. 113 Brighi, “One man alone?” 278-97. 114 Ignazi, “Al di là dell’Atlantico, al di qua dell’Europa,” 269. 115 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own,” 966. “Ma Bossi gela al premier: Aprire all’est è una follia,” La Repubblica, 26 October 2002. “La Lega scende in piazza. No ai turchi in Europa,” La Repubblica, 19 December 2004. “Referendum sulla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. “Lega in piazza, no alla Turchia,” La Repubblica, 20 December 2004. Marraccini “L’Unione Europea: La costituzione Europea, l’Euro, l’allargamento, la protezione delle nostre imprese,” 2. 116 “Ma Bossi gela al premier: Aprire all’est e una follia, La Repubblica, 26 October 2002. 117 Brighi, “One man alone?” 290. 118 Fabbrini, “When a pigmy acts as a giant: The role of the Italian representatives in the Brussels constitutional convention,” 233. 119 Ibid., 241-3. 120 Ibid., 234-5. 121 Ibid., 241. 122 Ibid., 242. 123 Ibid. 124 Quoted in Fabbrini, “When a pigmy acts as a giant: The role of the Italian representatives in the Brussels constitutional convention,” 242. 125 “E la Lega prepara l’assalto al nuovo trattato delle Ue,” La Repubblica, 21 October 2004. 126 Marraccini, “Unione Europea: La costituzione europea, l’Euro, l’allargamento, la protezione delle nostre imprese,” 1. 127 Croci, “Much ado about little: The foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government,” 59-74.

conclusion 1 Heinisch, “Austria: The structure and agency of Austrian populism,” 68. 2 Schain, “Immigration and changes in the French party system,” 597-621. 3 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 90-6. Mayer, “The Front National vote in the plural,” 3-24. 4 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 417-26. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 201-31.

Notes to pages 194–96

253

5 Flash Eurobarometer, 151b. “Globalization.” 6 For a more complete discussion, see Zaslove, “Exclusion, community, and a populist political economy: The radical right as an anti-globalization movement,” 169-89. 7 Thalhammer et al., Attitudes Towards Minority Groups in the European Union, 25. 8 Flecker, Hentges and Balazs, “Potentials of political subjectivity and the various approaches to the extreme right: Findings of the qualitative research,” 60-1. 9 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Populist Parties in Europe, 230. 10 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 415. 11 Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe, 64-101. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 275-6. Art, “The organizational origins of the contemporary radical right: The case of Belgium,” 421-40. 12 Decker, “Germany: Right-wing populist failures and left-wing successes,” 128-31. Rydgren, From Tax Populism to Ethnic Nationalism: Radical Right-Wing Populism in Sweden. Rydgren, “Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?” 27-56. 13 Decker, “Germany: Right-wing populist failures and left-wing successes,” 128-31. 14 Rydgren, “Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?” 33-44. 15 Rydgren, From Tax Populism to Ethnic Nationalism: Radical Right-Wing Populism in Sweden, 69-86. 16 Rydgren, “Radical right populism in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long?” 50. The two most important supply-side concerns for Rydgren, in the Swedish case, are party convergence and the inability of a radical right populist party to present itself as a credible (or attractive) alternative (48-9). 17 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 416-7. 18 Ibid., 431. 19 Ibid., 429-30. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 172-4. 20 “Per la Lega di Bossi un esempio da imitare,” La Repubblica, 1 February 2000. “Polo-Lega, Haider gradisce,” La Repubblica, 4 May 2000. “Bossi assolve l’amico carinziano. È nazionalista, alla De Gaulle,” La Repubblica, 13 July 2000. “Bossi-austriaci incontro segreto,” La Repubblica, 21 March 1999. “Mitteleuropa, nostra casa comune, Bossi ad Haider: Battiamoci contro la globalizzazione dell’Ue,” La Padania, 19 October 1999. 21 Minkenberg and Perrineau, “The radical right in the European elections 2004,” 29-55. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” 177-81.

254

Notes to pages 197–202

22 Rydgren, “Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family,” 430. A limited amount of research has been conducted on the contact between radical right populist parties. 23 Zaslove, “Here to stay?” 319-36. Although Tarchi does not agree that the Lega Nord is a radical right populist party, he does agree that Berlusconi’s populism differs from that of Bossi and the Lega. See Tarchi, “Italy: A country of many populisms,” 84-99. 24 Albertazzi and McDonnell, “‘It ain’t what you do, it’s the way that you say it.’ The Lega Nord back in government.” The Norwegian Progress Party and the Austrian Freedom Party have survived leadership changes, while the French National Front is on the verge of possible leadership change. 25 Mair, “The green challenge and political competition: How typical is the German experience?” 102. 26 Ibid., 111. 27 Mair notes that although support remains low for Green parties, they are not met with “outright hostility.” Ibid., 104-5. 28 Bale, “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party systems,” 69. 29 Pasquino, “The Italian political system after the 9-10 April 2006 elections,” 465-7. 30 Luther, “The self-destruction of a right-wing populist party? The Austrian parliamentary election, of 2002,” 136-52. Luther, “Electoral strategies and performance of Austrian right-wing populism 1986-2006,” 8-13. Luther, “The fpö: From populist protest to incumbency,” 191-219. 31 Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, “The rise and impact of the Swiss people’s party: Challenging the rules of governance in Switzerland,” 105-6. 32 Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, “The rise and impact of the Swiss people’s party: Challenging the rules of governance in Switzerland,” 94-108. Church, “The Swiss elections of October 2003: Two steps to system change?” 518-34. Church, “The Swiss elections of 21 October 2007: Consensus fights back,” 608-23. Church and Vatter, “Opposition in consensual Switzerland: A short but significant experiment,” 412-37. 33 Rydgren, “Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: The case of Denmark,” 496. 34 Schain, “The extreme-right and immigration policy-making: Measuring direct and indirect effects,” 272. 35 Rubin, “Love’s refugees: The effects of stringent Danish immigration policies on Danes and their non-Danish spouses,” 329-30. 36 Persons under 24 are not able to bring a spouse to Denmark. Residence requirements to obtain permanent status have been increased from three

Notes to pages 203–4

37 38

39 40

41 42 43 44 45

46

255

to seven years. And a fifty thousand dollar income and a ten thousand dollar deposit are required until the spouse becomes a citizen. Finally, couples are required to reside in their own apartments. In other words, they are not able to live with extended families (Rubin, “Love’s refugees: The effects of stringent Danish immigration policies on Danes and their nonDanish spouses,” 330). Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, “The rise and impact of the Swiss people’s party: Challenging the rules of governance in Switzerland,” 105-8. Mazzoleni, Nationalisme et Populisme en Suisse: La Radicalisation de la «Nouvelle» udc , 34-6. Milic (2006), “Switzerland,” 1275-7. Hardmeier, “Switzerland,” 1106. Luther, “The self-destruction of a right-wing populist party? The Austrian parliamentary elections of 2002,” 138. For a good discussion of the role of centre-right parties, see Bale, “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party systems,” 74-81. Schain, “The extreme-right and immigration policy-making: Measuring direct and indirect effects,” 270-89. Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-wwii Migration to Western Europe, 33-53. Karapin, “Protest and reform in asylum policy: Citizen initiatives versus asylum seekers in German municipalities, 1989-1994,” 1-45. Andersen, “Nationalism, new right, and new cleavages in Danish politics: Foreign and security policy of the Danish People’s Party,” 110. Hervik, “The emergence of neo-nationalism in Denmark, 1992/2001,” 95-6. Ladner, “Switzerland,” 552. Mazzoleni, Nationalisme et Populisme en Suisse: La Radicalisation de la «Nouvelle» udc , 35 and 93. Milic (2006), “Switzerland,” 1275-7. Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe, 167-95. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. This is the best comparative analysis of radical right and populist parties in West, Central, and Eastern Europe.

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Index

Agnelli, Gianni, 142, 186 Airbus 400M, 187–8 Albertazzi, Daniele, 21, 43, 95, 158 Alberto da Giussano, 95 Alleanza Nazionale (an): Berlusconi and, 65; devolution and, 169–70, 171; European Union and, 186; Fini as leader of, 63–4; Forza Italia and, 64; immigration and, 118, 172–4; Lega Nord and, 159–60, 191; pension reforms and, 182–3; supporters and voters, 159; tax policies and, 179– 80; udc and, 158. See also Fini, Gianfranco Alleanza Nord, 55 Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria), 36–7, 165, 200 Amato, Giuliano, 86, 189 Americanization of society, 121–4, 142–3, 147–8, 188. See also globalization; multiculturalism and anti-multiculturalism Andall, Jacqueline, 115 Andreotti, Giulio, 86 anti-south sentiments, 108–10, 111t; Lega Nord and, 57, 97, 110–11, 130, 153

anti-trust legislation, 133–4 Antonelli, Ennio, 104 Art, David, 221n124 Baget Bozzo, Gianni, 84 Bale, Tim, 192, 200 Beirich, Heidi, 67 Benoist, Alain de, 117. See also Nouvelle Droite (New Right) Berlusconi, Silvio: Alleanza Nazionale and, 65; Bossi and, 66, 86, 158, 161–2, 165; “Contract with the Italian People,” 179; creation of FI, 60; on economic policy, 151, 152; European Union and, 185–9, 191–2; federalism and, 191; Fini and, 63, 64; on immigration, 172; Lega Nord and, 65, 160, 167; populism and, 198. See also Forza Italia (fi); House of Freedoms Bertinotti, Fausto, 142, 147–8 Betz, Hans-Georg, 20–1, 22, 194, 214n18, 216n47 Biagi, Marco, 181 Biffi, Giacomo, 103, 104, 235n58 Biorcio, Roberto: on Bossi as leader, 74–5, 82; on Lega Nord,

280

Index

74–5, 225n168, 228n54; on Pontida, 88; on use of language, 84, 86 Bisaglia, Antonio, 54 Blocher, Christoph, 6, 38, 157, 201. See also People’s Party (Switzerland) Bobbio, Norberto, 23–4 Borghezio, Mario, 125 Bossi, Manuela, 79, 82 Bossi, Umberto: as anti-politician, 3, 74, 78, 81–3; background, 26, 79; Berlusconi and, 66, 86, 158, 161–2, 165; on capitalism, 132; Catholic Church and, 28, 99– 100, 101–2; common sense and, 83–5; on economic policy, 30, 133–4; on EU and euro, 69, 144– 5, 146, 186–8; Fini and, 66, 86, 160–1; foreign policy and, 188; on globalization and China, 69, 140–1, 142–3, 148; grassroots political mobilization and, 163– 4; Haider and, 143, 196; on homosexuality, 104–5, 145; on immigration, 126, 130, 150, 175; as leader of Lega Nord, 3, 26, 58, 74–5, 78–80, 158, 199; on Lega Nord as governing party, 165; Miglio and, 93; pension reforms and, 183; on taxes, 135; Tremonti and, 161–2, 179; on unions, 135; use of language, 3, 74, 83–4, 85–6; on welfare state, 127–8. See also Lega Lombarda (political party) Bossi-Fini Law, 172–8, 191 Brambilla, Alberto, 182 “bribesville” (Tangentopoli), 10 British National Party (uk), 6, 7

Calderoli, Roberto, 105, 146, 163, 171, 183, 185 capitalism: Lega Nord on, 101, 122, 131–2, 140–3, 147–50, 153; msi and, 118; radical right populism and, 31. See also globalization cartel parties, 49, 212n46 Carter, Elisabeth, 22, 210n12, 210n16, 214n12 Castellani, Valentino, 124 Castelli, Roberto, 162, 187–8 catchall parties: defined, 47–8, 212n45; Lega Nord as, 59, 94, 119, 152–3 Catholic Church: attendance, 53–4; Bossi and, 28, 99–100, 101–2; DC and, 52–3; on immigration, 103–4; Lega Nord and, 99–100, 101–4 Cè, Alessandro, 163 Cento Bull, Anna: on an, 223n147; on anti-south sentiments, 109– 10; on rise and success of Lega Nord, 42, 58, 59, 223n149; on Third Italy, 98 Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD, Christian Democratic Centre), 64 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 145 China: as target of Lega and Bossi, 69, 140–1, 184–5 Chirac, Jacques, 35 Christian Democratic Party. See Democrazia Cristiana (dc, Christian Democratic Party) Christianity and Christian values: Lega Nord and, 99–105, 107, 149; radical right populist

Index

parties and, 28, 33, 107, 197. See also Catholic Church; Islam and Muslims Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio, 185, 187 CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori, Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions), 51, 181 civil disobedience, 86 “clean hands” (mani pulite), 10, 59 Colombo, Asher, 177–8 Comino, Domenico, 124 Communist Refoundation Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, PRC), 96, 147–8, 181 Confedersal, 137 Consulta Cattolica, 102 Conti, Nicolò, 144 Corner, Paul, 98 Cristiani Democratici Uniti (cdu, United Democratic Christians), 64 Croci, Osvaldo, 191–2 D’Alema, Massimo, 142 dangerous others, 25 Decker, Frank, 195–6, 221n124 Della Porta, Donatella, 172 Democratici di Sinistra (ds, Left Democrats), 60 Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, pd), 60 Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, pds), 228n76 Democrazia Cristiana (dc, Christian Democratic Party): centralized state and, 168; decline of, 10, 53–4, 56, 59–60, 64; rise of Lega Nord and, 41, 42, 46,

281

56–7, 99–100; soft hegemony, 52–3; southernization of, 53–4; supporters and voters, 51–2, 54 Denmark: immigration policy, 202. See also People’s Party (Denmark); Progress Party (Denmark) devolution, 41–2, 96, 169–71. See also federalism; separation dialects: Bossi and, 3, 74, 85–6; leagues and, 55, 73, 85, 92, 110; Lega Nord and, 73, 85–6, 93, 110, 164; radical right populist parties use of, 26 Diamanti, Ilvo: on Lega Nord, 42, 56, 67, 98, 152; on Liga Veneta, 55 Dini, Lamberto, 119, 189 Dini Decree, 119, 126 Dussin, Guido, 123 Eatwell, Roger, 209–10n7 economic miracle, 50 electoral system, 65 ethno-regionalism, 91–3 euro, 146, 186–7 European arrest warrant, 187–8 European Convention (2002-03), 145–6, 189–91 European Union (eu): Freedom Party and, 31, 151, 215n23; House of Freedoms and, 185–9; immigration and, 114, 115; Lega Nord and, 31, 68–9, 143–7, 167, 185–91; National Front and, 31–2, 151, 204; opposition to, 49; People’s Party (Switzerland) and, 204; Progress Party (Denmark) and, 204; radical right populism and, 31–2

282

Index

exclusion: Lega Nord and, 117–21; radical right populism and, 29– 30, 204. See also nativist nationalism; right to difference extremism, 6, 21–3 family values: Lega Nord and, 99– 105, 107, 149; radical right populism and, 28, 33, 107, 197 Farrell, David, 230n104 federalism: 2001 reform and, 97, 167–9; Berlusconi and, 191; Lega Nord and, 41, 92–4, 167. See also devolution; separation Fella, Stefano, 139, 147 Fini, Gianfranco: Berlusconi and, 63, 64; Bossi and, 66, 86, 160–1; China and, 185; on European Union, 186, 187, 188, 189–90; as leader of msi and an, 63–4. See also Alleanza Nazionale (an) Fini, Massimo, 147–8 Fini-Landi bill, 172 First Republic: defined, 211n33; fall of, 10, 58–9, 67, 73, 152, 198–9. See also Democrazia Cristiana (dc, Christian Democratic Party) Flecker, Jörg, 194–5 Follini, Marco, 189 Fordism, 10, 47, 51, 52 Formentini, Marco, 58 Fortuyn, Pim, 80 Forza Italia: Alleanza Nazionale and, 64, 65 Forza Italia (fi): as center right populist party, 41, 61–2, 89; creation of, 60; devolution and, 170–1; European Union and, 185–9; Lega Nord and, 4, 65–6,

115, 198–9; pension reforms and, 182–3; supporters and voters, 132, 139, 159–60 Forza Nuova (fn), 7 Fracassi, Fabrizio, 128 Frederick I Barbarossa, 95, 233n56 Frederick II, 95 Freedom Party (Austria): decline of, 36, 80, 201; economic policy, 30, 36, 133, 151, 197; European Union and, 31, 151, 215n23; globalization and, 31; as governing party, 165, 200; immigration and, 36, 130, 197, 203; populism and, 26, 91; rise and success of, 5–6, 35–7, 193, 194; supporters and voters, 32, 148, 219n84; Susanne Riess-Passer and, 33 Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque (uq), 6 Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (fli, Future and Freedom for Italy), 64 Gallagher, Tom, 223n149 German Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, pds), 89 German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion, or dvu, Germany), 6, 7 Germany: radical right populism and extremism in, 6, 195–6, 203–4. See also specific parties Gilbert, Mark, 42, 223n149 Giorgetti, Giancarlo, 184, 187 Glistrup, Mogens, 26, 40. See also Progress Party (Denmark) globalization: Bossi on, 140–1, 142–3, 148; Lega Nord and, 31,

Index

67, 69, 121–4, 132, 138–43, 153, 184–5, 191; People’s Party (Switzerland) and, 38; populism and, 48; radical right populism and, 31. See also Americanization of society go it alone strategy, 66–8 Gómez-Reino, Margarita Cachafeiro, 78 Goodwin, Matthew J., 209–10n7 Green parties, 200 Green Shirts, 88 Guolo, Renzo, 105 Hagen, Carl I., 40. See also Progress Party (Norway) Haider, Jörg: Alliance for the Future of Austria and, 36–7, 165; Bossi and, 143, 196; as leader of Freedom Party, 26, 35–6, 193–4; nationalism and, 27; neo-liberalism and, 30, 151; populism and, 88–9. See also Alliance for the Future of Austria; Freedom Party (Austria) Heinisch, Reinhard, 157–8, 159 homosexuality: Bossi on, 104–5, 145; Lega Nord and, 100, 104–5 House of Freedoms: European Union and, 185–9; immigration and, 172–3; Lega Nord and, 68, 179; parties in, 60, 159, 161–2 Huysseune, Michel, 43 identity politics, 22, 216n47 Ignazi, Piero, 9, 20, 21–2, 224n167 immigration: Catholic Church and, 103–4; crime and, 125–6; to Europe, 48–9; Fini on, 64; Italians on, 129t; to Italy, 69,

283

112, 113t, 115–17, 116t, 119t, 120t, 126, 171–2, 176; Law 943/86 and, 112; Lega Nord and, 69, 108, 119–21, 126–30, 149–50, 154, 167, 172–8; Martelli Law and, 113–14, 122; La Padania on, 122, 123, 125–8, 129–30; radical right populist parties and, 28–30; TurcoNapolitano law and, 114–15, 122, 172–4, 177. See also Islam and Muslims Industrial Triangle, 10, 50–1, 98, 136, 148, 213n51 Inglehart, Ronald, 213n2 Islam and Muslims: Lega Nord and, 103–4, 121, 124–5, 128, 130, 177, 217n50 Johnson, Carol, 216n47 Jospin, Lionel, 35 Katz, Richard S., 212n46 Keating, Michael, 45, 236n4 Kirchheimer, Otto, 212n45 Kitschelt, Herbert: on Lega Nord, 224n167; on party system changes, 11–12; on radical right parties, 21, 22, 151, 194, 211n30 Kjærsgaard, Pia, 33, 40, 194 Lange, Anders, 26. See also Progress Party (Norway) language: Bossi and, 3, 74, 83–4, 85–6; Lega Nord and, 85–6, 164; radical right populist parties and, 26. See also dialects Law 943/86, 112 leaders and leadership: populism and, 25–7, 83, 162; radical right

284

Index

populism and, 26–7, 80, 195, 199 leagues: dialects and, 85; Lega Nord and, 3, 73, 74; regionalism and, 92, 93; rise of, 41, 46, 55–6 Lega Autonomista Lombarda, 79. See also Lega Lombarda (political party) Lega Lombarda (1167-1250), 95, 233n56 Lega Lombarda (political party), 55–6, 73, 110. See also Lega Nord (Northern League) Lega Nord (Northern League): common sense and, 83–5; economic policy, 126–7, 152, 153; electoral results, 3–4, 10–11, 68, 162, 197–8, 199; as governing party, 158–9, 162–5, 167, 183–4, 191–2; grassroots political mobilization and, 76–8, 163–4; organizational structure, 74–6; populism and, 26, 44–5, 73–4; as protest party, 41, 44; as radical right populist party, 44–5, 88–9, 107, 152–4; supporters and voters, 32, 56, 58, 67, 120, 127, 128, 132, 135; work and ethic, 105–7, 110–11. See also Bossi, Umberto; specific topics Leoni, Giuseppe, 55, 102 Le Pen, Jean-Marie: Fini and, 63; on immigration, 130; as leader of National Front, 26, 34–5; nationalism and, 27; neo-liberalism and, 30; populism and, 35, 89. See also National Front (France) Le Pen, Marine, 33 liberalism and neo-liberalism: Lega Nord and, 30, 126–7, 152;

radical right populist parties and, 30–1, 133 Libro Bianco (White Book), 180–1 Liga Veneta, 55, 56 Die Linke (Left Party, Germany), 89 List Pim Fortuyn, 80 Lombard League (1167-1250), 95, 233n56. See also Lega Lombarda (political party) Luverà, Bruno, 105, 238n37 Maggiolini, Alessandro, 103, 104 Mair, Peter, 7–8, 199–200, 212n46 mani pulite (“clean hands”), 10, 59 Mannheimer, Renato, 223n149 Maroni, Roberto: on Bossi, 79–80; on euro, 146; on government, 163; on immigration, 129, 173, 177; as minister, 162; on separatism, 234n24; unions and, 136; White Book and, 180–1 Martelli, Claudio, 86, 113 Martelli Law, 113–14; Lega Nord and, 114, 122 Martino, Antonio, 186, 187 Masslo, Jerry Esslan, 112–13 mass parties, 47–8, 212n45 Mastropaolo, Alfio, 47–8 Mauri, Matteo, 147–8 Mauro, Rosi, 136 Mazzoleni, Oscar, 202–3 McDonnell, Duncan, 21, 43, 158 McGann, Anthony J., 211n30 Mény, Yves, 21, 24, 43, 158, 159 Miglio, Gianfranco, 84, 93, 117 Minkenberg, Michael, 192, 221n124 Montanelli, Indro, 54 Montezemolo, Luca Cordero di, 185

Index

Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Social MovementTricoloured Flame), 7, 63 Movimento Sociale Italiano (msi), 6, 59, 60, 118; transformation into an, 62–3 Mudde, Cas: on Lega Nord, 224– 5n167; on nationalism, 22, 27, 29; on populism, 24–5; on radical right parties, 19; on radical right populism, 7–9, 27, 49–50, 195, 214n18; on right vs. left, 24 multiculturalism and anti-multiculturalism, 121–4, 141, 177 Natali, David, 183 National-Democratic German Party (npd, Germany), 6, 7 National Front (FN, France): economic policy, 35, 151, 197; European Union and, 31–2, 151, 204; globalization and, 31; immigration and, 35, 130, 197, 203; origins, rise and success of, 5–6, 7, 34–5, 193, 194; populism and, 26, 35; supporters and voters, 32, 148. See also Le Pen, Jean-Marie nationalism: Lega Nord and, 97, 98–9; radical right populism and, 27–30. See also regionalism nativist nationalism, 28–9; Lega Nord and, 29, 91, 108. See also immigration neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties, 7, 20, 27, 37–8 New Democracy (Sweden), 196 New Right (Nouvelle Droite), 29, 117; Lega Nord and, 117, 154, 233n12

285

Norris, Pippa, 22, 224–5n167 northern question, 42, 57, 97, 211n37 Nouvelle Droite (New Right), 29, 117; Lega Nord and, 117, 154, 233n12 Olive Tree Alliance, 60 Oneto, Gilberto, 94–5 organized democracy, 47–8 Padania, 27, 94–6, 119, 144, 162, 216n46. See also regionalism La Padania (newspaper), 75–6, 94; on Bossi, 86–7; on Catholic Church, 103; conservative philosophy and, 101; on globalization, 147–8; on homosexuality, 104; on immigration, 122, 123, 125–8, 129–30; on Islam, 124; Nouvelle Droite and, 117 Pagliarini, Giancarlo, 80 Papalia, Guido, 164 Partito Comunista Italiano (pci), 10, 53, 59–60, 227n36, 228n76 Partito Democratico (pd, Democratic Party), 60 Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS, Democratic Party of the Left), 228n76 Partito Popolare Italiano (ppi, Popular Party), 64 Partito Repubblicano (pri, Republican Party), 113–14 Partito Socialista Italiano (psi, Socialist Party), 10, 57, 59–60 pension system and reforms, 182–4 People’s Party (Austria), 165 People’s Party (Denmark): economic policy, 40, 151, 197;

286

Index

globalization and, 31, 40; immigration and, 40, 130, 197; populism and, 89; rise of, 5–6, 40; support of government, 6, 40, 157, 200, 202, 204 People’s Party (Switzerland): economic policy, 38, 151; on European Union, 204; globalization and, 38; as governing party, 157, 201; immigration and, 38, 130, 197, 202–3; nationalism and, 27; populism and, 89; rise of, 5–6, 38, 193 Pivetti, Irene, 102 Pontida, 87–8, 93, 94, 162–3 Popolo della Libertà (pdl, People of Freedom), 60–1, 64, 222n146 populism: defined, 24–5; globalization and, 48; leadership and, 25–7, 83, 162; left-wing parties and, 25, 89; organizational features, 73–4; right-wing radical parties (third wave), 20–2 Poujadist (France), 6 Prodi, Romano, 142, 144. See also Olive Tree Alliance Progress Party (Denmark): decline of, 40, 80; economic policy, 133, 151; on European Union, 204; immigration, 130; liberalism and, 30; origins and rise of, 5, 7 Progress Party (Norway): economic policy, 133, 151, 197; globalization and, 31; immigration, 130; liberalism and, 30; origins and rise of, 5, 7, 40, 194 Putnam, Robert, 95 radical right populism: characteristics, 7–9; defined, 22–4;

economic policy and, 30–2, 138, 151; European parties, 23t; vs. fascist and neo-fascist parties, 27; globalization and, 31; governing parties, 157–8, 192, 200– 1; grassroots politics and, 74; immigration and, 130, 202–4; influence on public policy, 166; leaders and leadership, 26–7, 80, 195, 199; nationalism and, 27– 30, 90–1; populism and, 25–7, 90–1; right/left classifications and, 85, 148; rise and success of, 11–13, 34, 49–50, 193–7; supporters and voters, 32–4. See also specific parties Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse, br), 181 regionalism: leagues and, 92, 93; Lega Nord and, 41–3, 90–1, 154, 193. See also devolution; federalism; separation Republikaner Party (Germany), 5–6, 37–8, 203–4 Rhodes, Martin, 183 Ricolfi, Luca, 179 Riess-Passer, Susanne, 33 right to difference, 22, 154 right-wing radical parties (third wave), 5–9, 19–22. See also radical right populism Rocchetta, Franco, 55 Rokkan, Stein, 7 Rossi Luciani, Luigi, 128–9 Ruggiero, Renato, 173, 186–7, 188 Ruini, Camillo, 104 Rumiz, Paolo, 106, 135 Rutelli, Francesco, 63 Ruzza, Carlo, 139, 147 Rydgren, Jens, 22, 29, 195, 196, 214n18, 225n67

Index

Salvadori, Bruno, 79 Sartori, Giovanni, 53, 211n34 Schain, Martin A., 202, 245n3 Schengen Agreement, 114, 204 Schmidtke, Oliver, 42, 78, 85 Schönhuber, Franz, 37. See also Republikaner Party (Germany) Sciortino, Giuseppe, 177–8 Scottà, Giancarlo, 123 secession, 94–6 separation, 41–2. See also devolution; federalism Sindacato Autonomista Lombardo, 136–7 Skenderovic, Damir, 202–3 soft hegemony, 52–3 southernization (meridionalizzazione), 53–4 Speroni, Francesco, 189, 190 Strache, Heinz-Christian, 37. See also Freedom Party (Austria) Strasser, Ernst, 203 Surel, Yves, 21, 24, 43, 158, 159 Taggart, Paul, 20, 24, 43 Tambini, Damian, 42 Tangentopoli (“bribesville”), 10 Tarchi, Marco, 86, 222–3n147, 222n146, 254n23 Tarrow, Sidney, 52–3 taxes and taxation, 133; Alleanza Nazionale and, 179–80; Lega Nord and, 134–5, 167, 179–80; udc and, 179–80 Third Italy: anti-south sentiments in, 109–11; dc and, 53–4; defined, 213n51; growth of, 50–1; Lega Nord and, 42–3, 44, 46, 56–8, 68, 98, 132, 137, 138–9, 152–3; work and family values, 105–6; working class, 148

287

Tremonti, Giulio: Berlusconi and, 161–2; Bossi and, 161–2, 179; on eu and euro, 186–7; Lega Nord and, 84, 167, 191; taxes and, 179–80 turbo-capitalism, 101, 148–9 Turco-Napolitano law, 114; Lega Nord and, 114–15, 122, 172–4, 177 Turkey: inclusion in eu, 146, 160, 163, 188 Unione di Centro (udc, Union of Christian and Centre Democrats), 64–5; 2008 elections and, 229n78; Alleanza Nazionale and, 158; devolution and, 169–70, 171; immigration and, 173, 175; Lega Nord and, 64–5, 158, 161, 167, 170; pension reforms and, 182–3; supporters and voters, 159; tax policies and, 179–80 unions: dc and, 51; Lega Nord and, 135–7; pension reforms and, 182; White Book and, 180–1 Union Valdôtaine (uv), 79 Urbani, Giuliano, 84 Vento dal Nord (Bossi with Vimercati), 79, 81, 83 Veugelers, John W.P., 217n49, 237n24 Vimercati, Daniele, 84. See also Vento dal Nord (Bossi with Vimercati) Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang, Belgium): immigration and, 193, 197; nationalism and, 27, 39; origins and rise of, 5–6, 7, 39, 193–4

288

Index

Volksunie (VU, Belgium), 39 voters: party support and, 77t; on political economy, 127t; women as, 33, 51–2, 58. See also specific parties welfare state: left-wing conceptions of, 149–50; Lega Nord and, 126–8, 138, 147–50; radical right populist parties and, 30–1

White Book (Libro Bianco), 180–1 women: radical right populist parties and, 33; as voters, 33, 51–2, 58 Woods, Dwayne, 67 Zaia, Luca, 123 Zincone, Giovanna, 177 Zúquete, José Pedro, 78