The Railways in Colonial South Asia: Economy, Ecology and Culture 9781032057378, 9781003198970

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction: The Railways in Colonial South Asia
1. Imperial Railway in Nineteenth Century South Asia
2. Pakistan’s Railway: A Painful History?
3. The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests
4. Railways and Forests: History of Railways and their Impact on Forest Policies of South India, 1850-1900
5. The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railway, 1849-2013
6. An Overview of the Development of the Sri Lanka Railway
7. The Covenanted Workforce: A Study of the European Employees of BB&CI Railway in Colonial India, 1852-1870
8. Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat: A Dream Come True
9. Problems of Indian Railways upto c. 1900
10. Socio-Cultural History: Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions
11. Mapping the Gaikward’s Baroda State Railway on the Colonial Rail-Network
12. Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab: A Story of Railway Development
13. Railways in Bihar: Peasant Protest, Response of Raj and Compensation
14. Railway Development in India: A Study of Extension to Colonial Orissa
Bibliography
List of Contributors

Citation preview

THE RAILWAYS IN COLONIAL SOUTH ASIA Tis book is an interesting collection of essays on the Railways in Colonial South Asia. An attempt has been made to introduce the key concepts which have now entered the study of railway history, e.g. economy, ecology, culture, health and crime through the various essays. Te well researched essays include those on the Imperial Railways in nineteenth century South Asia, Pakistan Railway, Impact of railway expansion on the Himalayan forests, development of the Sri Lankan Railways, a study of the European employees of the BB & CI Railways, problems of Indian Railway up to c. ad 1900, railways in Gujarati literature and tradition, mapping the Gaikwad Baroda State Railway on the colonial rail network, coming of railways in Bihar, expansion of railway to colonial Orissa, etc. Tis book will be of immense value to those researching on various dimensions of railway transport in colonial South Asia. It can also be read by the more perceptive general reader exploring books on railways. Ganeswar Nayak, is working as Assistant Professor and Head, Department of History, F.M. Autonomous College, Balasore, Orissa.

The Railways in Colonial South Asia Economy, Ecology and Culture

Edited by G A N E S WA R NAYA K

MANOHAR 2021

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Ganeswar Nayak; individual chapters, the contributors; and Manohar Publishers & Distributors The right of Ganeswar Nayak to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-032-05737-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-19897-0 (ebk) Typeset in ITC New Baskerville Std 11/13 by Ravi Shanker, Delhi 110095

Contents

Preface

7

Acknowledgements

11

Introduction: The Railways in Colonial South Asia Ganeswar Nayak

13

1. Imperial Railway in Nineteenth Century South Asia Laxman D. Satya

85

2. Pakistan’s Railway: A Painful History? Muhammed Imran and Waheed Ahmed

115

3. The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

141

4. Railways and Forests: History of Railways and their Impact on Forest Policies of South India, 1850-1900 V.M. Ravi Kumar

165

5. The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railway, 1849-2013 Nadia Tahir

191

6. An Overview of the Development of the Sri Lanka Railway David Hyatt

249

7. The Covenanted Workforce: A Study of the European Employees of BB&CI Railway in Colonial India, 1852-1870 Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

261

6

Contents 8. Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat: A Dream Come True Rita P. Bhambi

285

9. Problems of Indian Railways upto c. 1900 N. Benjamin

307

10. Socio-Cultural History: Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

333

11. Mapping the Gaikward’s Baroda State Railway on the Colonial Rail-Network Aruna Awasthi

361

12. Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab: A Story of Railway Development Bhupinder Singh

397

13. Railways in Bihar: Peasant Protest, Response of Raj and Compensation Puspa Kumari

413

14. Railway Development in India: A Study of Extension to Colonial Orissa Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

431

Bibliography

453

List of Contributors

469

Preface

The collection of articles in this volume is intended to draw the attention of students and research scholars to some of the latest research on various dimensions of railway transport in colonial South Asia. It can also be read by the more perceptive general readers interested in exploring railways in colonial India. The idea originated in the course of a discussion with different research scholars presenting their papers on railway history in different sessions of Indian History Congress. That idea got further momentum when I completed an ICHR funded project on railway transport in colonial India. The volume was visualized as a collective effort of those who are in teaching and conducting their research on various aspects of the railway history of South Asia both in India and abroad. The purpose was to put together articles which grew out of annotated bibliographies and which one thought might be useful to those who are either unaware of recent advances in the subject or those who have little access to them. The focus of each article is on the new trend in research in a particular field. An attempt has been made to introduce the key concepts which have now entered the study of the railway history as, for example, ecology, culture, health, crime and economy. Problems associated with the colonial railway have received more attention since the nature of change has often been neglected in the past studies. Source material from the archives and the library is now being incorporated in new ways into historical analyses. Clearly, in such a vast coverage

8

Preface

of time and space, it is not possible to refer to all publications, even those of importance. A selection of necessity had to be made and those works which have encouraged new trends in historical interpretation have been preferred. Each article includes a bibliography. This is not intended to be exhaustive and refers to those publications which contain new data, or point towards changing existing interpretations. Many of the ideas were fleshed out at different seminars and conferences, collected from wide circle of friends, activists, peers and equally voluminous number of voices which supported the project emphatically. None the less, I acknowledge, value and gratefully express my deepest gratitude to Prof L.K. Mohapatra, former Vice-Chancellor of Utkal University, Odisha. He inculcated in me the ethics of historical research during the formative period of my research career. I owe a deep gratitude to him. I am also greatly indebted to Prof. K.S. Behera, who always encouraged me to persue research. I am richly indebted to Prof. Laxman D. Satya, Professor of History, Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania, who provided several timely input in the critical period of pursuing this project. His inspiring words and superb plans went a long way to complete this work. Priyal de Silva, former President of the Institution of Engineers, former Chairman of Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, Sri Lanka, provided several historical sources which shaped my concept on railway transport. From the beginning he supported this project strongly. I am deeply indebted to him. I am also indebted to Lisa Mitchell, Associate Professor, Department of South Asia Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (USA). Prof. Madhumita Bandyopadhyay, Associate Professor of History, Smt. P.N. Doshi Women’s College, Mumbai, arranged several sessions of academic consultation with research scholars at several conferences and seminar. This project became successful due to her sincere and patient advice at several phases. Prof. Nadia Tahir, head of Business and Economics, UCP

Preface

9

Business School, Lahore, provided many important sources on railway transport of Pakistan. Prof. Imran Muhammed, Messy University, Palmerstone North, New Zealand, also supported this project and encouraged me for an early completion. Other noted persons who helped this project are, Prof. A.K Mohapatra, Prof. of West Asia and African Studies, JNU, New Delhi, Dr L. Hoakip, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi, Dr D.C. Dash, Asst. Director, History Division, Ministry of External affairs, New Delhi, Dr Keshab Jena, Asst Director, National Archives of India, Dr S.D. Adhikari, Principal, F.M. Autonomous College, Balasore, Dr Gitasri Roy, Associate Professor of English, F.M. Autonomous College, Balasore and P. K. Tarai, Office Superitendent, F.M. Autonomous College, Balasore. At New Delhi, I consulted the Indian Council of Historical Research Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, National Archives of India, Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, Ratan Tata Library of Delhi School of Economics and Railway Transport Museum and Library. At Bhubaneswar, I consulted Orissa Assembly Library, Orissa Secretariat Library, Orissa State Archives, Orissa State Library and Orissa State Museum Library. At Cuttack, the Board of Revenue Library, Utkal Sahitya Samaj Library and Ravenshaw University Library provided me with enough material. At Kolkata, the staff of the National Library, West Bengal Secretariat Library and West Bengal Secretariat Library and West Bengal State Archives were very helpful in providing me with required sources used in the project. At Parlakhemundi, I consulted SKCG Autonomous College, Library. At Balasore, I consulted, F.M. Autonomous College, Library. I express my sincere thanks to all these institutions. I cannot forget the inspiration of my teachers, friends, and colleagues who constantly encouraged me to complete the project. I benefitted enormously through their long-term interaction and cooperation. I am also grateful to Ramesh Jain for evincing keen interest

10

Preface

in my work and for providing excellent institutional facilities. To my editor at Manohar, I owe special thanks for help and care in publication. Ajodhya, Balasore Orissa

Ganeswar Nayak

Acknowledgements

The editor acknowledges the permission to include the following articles/extracts in this volume. Economic and Political Weekly for Laxman D. Satya, British Imperial Railway in Nineteenth Century South Asia, vol. 43, no. 47 (22-8 November 2008), pp. 69-77. Special acknowledgements to David Hyatt for permitting to publish his article – ‘An Overview of the Development of the Sri Lankan Railways’, in the present volume. Ganeswar Nayak

Introduction: The Railways in Colonial South Asia Ganeswar Nayak

The article explores the origin, expansion and implication of the railway system in colonial South Asia. The railways had a revolutionary impact on the life, culture and economy of the Indian people. It is argued that it was a major instrument by which the British entered Indian life truly, linked India with the growing world market and set out on the path of capitalist development. As a matter of fact, railways began, in course of time, to be looked upon by the foreign rulers of the country as a panacea for its economic ills and its expansion was pressed on with considerable vigour getting priority over anything else. The earliest proposal to build railways in India was submitted by Macdonald Stephenson in 1844 for a railway connection from Calcutta to the North West frontier.1 He seems to have been an early advocate of railway consciousness into Bengal. During this period railway mania came to India and in Bombay and Calcutta the questions were deeply studied and discussed.2 Jenks described him as the first person to plan the railways in India.3 Stephenson adopted a plan to write about railways in various journals, to publish reports of the European railway companies and to write personal letters to influential persons (mostly Europeans), so that they could be made aware of the benefits of the railway.4 The second plan was given by John Chapman.5 It was

14

Ganeswar Nayak

intended to tap the cotton producing districts of western India. A railway line to connect Western Ghat was also submitted by Bombay businessmen. A provisional committee for the East Indian Railway and the Great Indian Peninsular Railway were formed and the proposal submitted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company in 1845.6 They showed interest in favour of proposals. However, the discussion about the terms of the contract to be entered into with the railway companies and the anxiety about the natural difficulties of constructing railways in India, led to further delay. The Court of Directors sent out Frederick Walker Simms to make inquiries. He reported that Railroads are not inapplicable to the peculiarities and circumstances of India, but on the contrary are not only a great desideratum, but with proper attention can be constructed and maintained as perfectly as in any part of Europe. The great stretch of its vast plains, which may in some directions, be traversed for hundreds of miles without encountering any serious undulations, the small outlay required for parliamentary and legislative purposes, the low value of land, cheapness of labor, and the general facilities for procuring building materials, may all be quoted as reasons why the introduction of a system of railroads is applicable to India.7

So Simm’s report confirmed that railways are possible in India but being understandably circumspect about its ultimate prospects, he suggested that an experimental line be built first. One running from Allahabad to Kanpur or from Calcutta to Barrackpore. This was in keeping with the current views, still largely sceptical about the railways in India. But Stephenson was confident of all round success.8 The court of Directors of the East India Company (EIC) was, however, apathetic in its response to this proposal, as they anticipated the failure of the railway project because of poverty and famine in India. But they found it difficult to oppose for long as the strong political and economic pressure at home given by railway promoters, financiers, mercantile houses trading with India, and the textile manufacturers of

Introduction

15

Lancashire.9 Their own Governor-General in India, Lord Hardinge reported that the ‘plains of Hindosthan offered remarkable facility for building railway which would be of immense value to the commerce, government and military control of the country’.10 After the proposal for the construction of railways in India had been accepted, a short struggle ensued between the court of directors and railway promoters on the question of a government guarantee of a minimum interest or a dividend on private capital invested in Indian Railways.11 This discussion too ended in favour of promoters. The first agreements between the EIC and East India Railways (EIR) and Great India Peninsular Railway (GIPR) companies were signed only in August 1849. According to the agreement, EIR was to build its line from Calcutta to Raniganj. It would soon stretch on towards Delhi via Mirzapur. All the equipment and building materials including fishplates, pins, bolts, chairs and even iron for building bridges were shipped from England to Calcutta via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa because the Suez Canal was opened only in 1869.12 Similarly, following the EIC’s readiness to negotiate, John Chapman and a few others set up the GIPR, as a Joint Stock Company. The GIPR as a company and as a vision of railways for western India was largely the work of a gifted, tireless, and prickly promoter named John Chapman, who was held to be essential to raise the needed capital.13 The GIPR constructed a line from Bombay to Kalyan (33 miles) and with the Madras Railway Company for a line from Madras to Arkonam (39 miles). The work of construction began in 1850. On 16 April 1853, a train with 14 railway carriages and 400 guests left Bombay’s Bori Bunder for Thane, with a 21 gun salute. It was hauled by three locomotives: Sindh, Sultan and Sahib. The first experimental line from Bombay to Thane opened in 1853. On 15 August 1854, the first passenger train in the eastern region was operated, from Howrah to Hoogly (24 miles).14 The section was soon extended to Pundooah. Howrah Station at that time was simply a tin shed with a small booking office,

16

Ganeswar Nayak

and a single narrow platform. In 1856 Royapuram-Wallajah Road line was constructed by the Madras Railway Company, the first train service in the southern region. The question of railway was reviewed by Lord Dalhousie in a far-reaching minute written in 1853.15 He pointed out the importance of a speedy and wide introduction of railway communications all over India. He also urged that the great social, political and commercial advantages of constructing railways between great cities and specially recommended the construction of trunk lines connecting the interior of each presidency with its principal ports and the several presidencies with each other. The proposed trunk lines were from Calcutta to Lahore, Bombay to Madras and Madras to Malabar Coast.16 The Court of Directors approved of the plan. By the end of 1859 eight companies were formed for construction of 5,000 miles of railways with capital under guarantee of £52,500,000 sterling. Thus, foundation for robust foundation of railways in India was laid and by 1905, 28,054 miles of railways were constructed connecting the ports of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Karachi, Chittagong and Rangoon literally extending throughout the length and breadth of India.17

Pakistan The proposal of railway transport in Pakistan was first thought of in 1847, with the possibility of Karachi becoming a major seaport. Sir Henry Edward Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh, sought permission from Lord Dalhousie to start survey for a Karachi Seaport in 1858.18 The proposed railway connection would be laid from Karachi to Kotri. On 13 May 1861, the first railway line between Karachi and Kotri was opened to the public, with a total distance of 105 miles (169 km). In 1886, there were four railway companies operating in Pakistan. Another railway line between Karachi and Keamari was opened on 16 June 1889. In 1897, the line from Keamari to Kotri was doubled.19 In 1857, it was suggested by William Andrew (Chairman

Introduction

17

of Scinde, Punjab and Delhi Railway) that the railways to the Bolan pass would have a strategic role in responding to any threat by Russia.20 During the Second Afghan War (1878-80) between Britain and Afghanistan, a new urgency came to light and the need to construct railway lines up to Quetta in order to get easier access to the frontier. On 18 September 1879, work began on laying the railway tracks, which became operational in January 1880. But the line from Sibi was difficult. So in March 1887 it reached Quetta. In 1898 the line from Peshawar to Karachi started. In the twentieth century, railway lines were also constructed between Peshawar and Rawalpindi and Rawalpindi to Lahore.21 In 1947, at the time of Independence, 3,133 route km (1,947 mi) of North West Railway were transferred to India, leaving 8,122 route km (5,048 mi) to Pakistan. Of this 6,880 route km (4,280 mi) were broad gauge, 506 km (314 mi) were Metre gauge and 736 km (457 mi) were narrow gauge.

Bangladesh Railway development in Bangladesh began on 15 November 1862, when 53.11 km of 5 ft. 6 in. (1,676 mm) broad gauge line was opened for traffic between Dorshona of Chauadanga district and Jogotee of Kushtia district. The second phase of 14.98 km 1,000 mm (3 ft 33⁄8 in.) metre gauge line was opened for traffic on 4 January 1885.22 In 1891, the construction of Bengal Assam Railway was taken up with British government assistance and was later taken over by the Bengal Assam Railway Company. On 1 July 1895 two sections of metre gauge were opened between Chittagong and Comilla, a length of 149.89 km and between Laksam Upazilla and Chandpur district, a length of 50.89 km. Railway companies formed in London managed the construction and operation of these sections in the middle and late nineteenth centuries.23 With the Partition of India in 1947, the Bengal Assam Railway was divided. The portion of the system located within the then East Pakistan, 2,603.92 km of track, came under the con-

18

Ganeswar Nayak

trol of the central government of Pakistan. From 1 February 1961, the East Bengal Railway was renamed as the Pakistan Eastern Railway. Then in 1962, the control of Pakistan Eastern Railway was transferred from the central government to the Government of East Pakistan and the presidential order of 9 June 1962, placed under the management of a Railway Board beginning in the financial year 1962-3.24

Sri Lanka Railway transport in Sri Lanka was introduced by the British colonial government in 1864. The main cause of introducing railway system in Ceylon was to transport tea and coffee from the hill country to Colombo. At first the service began with the main line of 54 km connecting Colombo and Ambepussa. Sir Guilford Lindsey Molesworth was the chief engineer and later Director General of the government railway.25 During this time, many Ceylonese people referred to the trains as the Anguru Kaka Wathura Bibi Duwana Yakada Yaka (the coal eating, water-drinking, sprinting, metal devils). Further extension in the railway construction was made in 1867, 1874, 1885, 1894 and 1924, extending railway connection to Kandy, Nawalapitiya, Nanu, Oya, Bandarawala and Badulla, respectively.26 The longest railway was constructed from Polgahawela to Kurunegala. A further extension was made in 1892 and opened for traffic in 1894. The construction of the northern line from Kurunegela to Jaffna was started was completed in 1905.27 The main objective of constructing this section of railway was to encourage the excess population in the congested district of Jaffna and the western province, to migrate to the north central province. It was thought that a railway construction through the north central province, in addition to extension of irrigation would lead to a consequent increase in population in the area.28 Many other railway connections were made in Ceylon Railway System within the first hundred years. These were Matale Line in 1880, Coast Railway Line in 1895, Northern Line

Introduction

19

in 1905, Manner Line in 1914, Kelani Valley Line in 1919, Puttalam Line in 1926 and railway line from Batticaloa to Trincomalee in 1928.29 For more than 80 years after that, no major extensions were added to the Ceylon railway network as the British left the country on its independence. The golden era of railway system began during 1955-70.30 The most esteemed Chief General Manager G.R. Rampala worked hard to maintain punctuality and improved the standard of Sri Lankan Railway. He also upgraded major railway stations outside Colombo like the rebuilding of the track in the Eastern Province to start heavier and faster trains. He launched express trains. He also ensured that Sri Lanka’s railway system was up to date in technology and offered greater comfort to its passengers. A pertinent question that arises here is why did colonial government give high priority to railway development over anything else? This can be known from the following discussion. In 1860, there were 1,349 km of track, but by 1870 there were 7,678 km, by 1890, 25,945 km, by 1920-1, 56,980 km, and by 1946-7, 65,247 km.31 By 1867, of India’s twenty largest cities (according to census of 1872), nineteen were on the railway lines and by 1947 all but a few districts in remote regions were connected by the railways. The density of railway lines grew from 35 route km per 10,000 sq. km in 1880 to 159 in 1946-7.32 In 1947, when India achieved independence, it had 33,985 railway miles in India. About 6,950 miles went to Pakistan after the Partition.33 What was the main objective of the British government behind the construction of the railways?33 Here one can describe the main colonial agenda behind the construction of the railways in India. Historians point out the military justifications for the introduction of the railways in India. They further argue that the railways were developed in India not to foster industrial development. The intention in the minds of the authority both in England and India were chiefly political and commercial.34 The military objective of the development of

20

Ganeswar Nayak

railways was very much apparent in the writings of British administration. Throughout the 1840s, the railway promoters also voiced a military justification for a railroad in India. William P. Andrews described how a railway system would have prevented the supply and ammunition shortages that occurred during the British-Sikh conflicts and how a railroad would serve to ‘rapidly concentrate troops on a sudden emergency’. He also noted that along with reducing the ‘expenses, delay and annoyance’ of troop movements, railway transportation would ‘spare the health and save the lives of Europeans troops’ who would otherwise be compelled to march through perilous weather and terrain.35 The Indian government began to view railway development as vital to maintain a military policy of expansion, annexation and defence. Henry Hardinge, the GovernorGeneral during Anglo-Sikh conflict, was in favour of railway development. He had written in 1845, ‘in a country where no man can tell in one week what the next may produce, the facility of a rapid concentration of infantry, artillery, and stores may be the chief prevention of an insurrection, the speedy termination of war, or the safety of the empire’.36 Confronted by a strong demand for an Indian railway at home and abroad, the Court of Directors eventually agreed. The most important demand was to construct the northwestern line. It was proposed by Major John P. Kennedy, a consulting engineer for the Indian government.37 He argued that this line would enable the concentration of troops on any required point in a way that would increase the military power of the government dramatically. Whereas it took three to four months in the previous system to assemble a field force of 60,000 men with sufficient artillery and provision at a site of combat, the great north-western line would hypothetically reduce the mobilization time to a matter of days.38 After the British conquest of Punjab, the security of India came to the forefront of the colonial agenda. Lord Dalhousie considered the railways as an effective means to strengthen

Introduction

21

the security of India. That is why he agreed to the proposal made by Stephenson in 1844. This railway line would prove advantageous in enhancing the internal security of India. It would enable the government to bring immediately the bulk of its military strength to bear upon at a given point to an extent that was physically impossible at times. Further he supported Kennedy’s plan that the company prioritises the construction of a railway line from Calcutta to north-western territories. Apart from connecting Calcutta and the northwest, this line would ensure the defence of British India from external invasion. As Dalhousie explained: The railways I referred to would be of incalculable value. . . . Touching every military station from Calcutta to the Sutlej, connecting every depot, Allahabad, Agra, Ferozepur, with the arsenal of Fort William; it would enable the Government of India to assemble (both) frontiers – an amount of men and materials of war adequately sufficient to deal with any such emergency within a period which would be measured by days; whereas months must elapse, with our present means.39

When the first war of Independence broke out in 1857, only 300 miles of railway were in operation. Had more railway lines been operational, the government would have a much less difficult time in reasserting its authority.40 So the British parliament ordered an inquiry into the progress of railway construction in India. The inquiry committees painted a grim picture of the government irritation to which they had allegedly been subjected. The Parliamentary Committee hearkened to the companies and rebuked the Government of India. The result was that after 1858 the cost incurred in the process of railway construction was checked only by a post-audit system. The way was opened for much more rapid and expensive, if not extravagant, progress.41 The year 1858, was also important because it took another monumental resolution for speedy expansion of railways in India. In the aftermath of the Great

22

Ganeswar Nayak

Rebellion of 1857, parliament abolished the East India Company and transferred control over India to a new member of the British Cabinet, the Secretary of State for India.42 Again during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the role of the railway came to the limelight. Following the rebellion, the views that the railways would ensure internal security of colonial India received support in Westminster.43 A committee was formed to remove technical and organizational obstacles which disallowed quick construction of railway in India. In 1855 colonial India had 325 km of railway, it increased to 8,000 km in 1870. Further, a line connecting Bombay, Allahabad, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras was completed by 1871.44 So construction of the railways and enhancement of security of colonial India remained the main agenda of colonial government after the disaster of 1857. The defence of the north-west posed another trouble to the colonial government. During the Anglo-Afghan War in 1878 the limitation of the colonial security system was exposed. The second Anglo-Afghan war awakened the British to strengthen the north-west by railroads. The Russian penetration on the north-east and completion of the TransCaspian Railway further alarmed the British; the so-called Great Game enhanced tension in the north-east. In 1883 the Russian advance to Merv was a challenge to the British. So by 1891 the British enhanced the railway line to Chaman, 60 miles from Kandahar. It enhanced the military capability of British India radically. After its completion the British troops could reach Afghanistan safely from the port city of Karachi. So the intention of the British behind the railroad construction was to strengthen the British military position and to move British troops without delay. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, supervised the continuation of railroad construction in the north-west.45 Economic historians argue that profit making and commercial interest lay behind the construction of railways in India. The nationalist historians argue that railway development was intended to provide an outlet to the steel industry

Introduction

23

of England through the export of railway stores, viz., steel rails, engines, wagons, and other machinery and plants. Railways also provided lucrative employment to Englishmen from directors to tax collector.46 Some of the nationalists were also able to understand correctly and this reveals that their deep insight into contemporary economic phenomenon – that the railway, both the state and company owned, were designed to serve and were serving as a channel for safe and profitable investment of surplus British capital. In the writing of some of them we also find a glimmering of realization that the Indian railway also intended to strengthen the alien political control over India.47 The nationalist view of the motivation of the official policy was succinctly summarized in 1898 by G.S. Ayer as follows: There are investors, company promoters, bankers, iron masters, coal owners, railway engineers and directors, above all, retired Anglo-Indian officials, looking out for a decent addition to their pension, who are all interested in pushing forward the construction of Railway in India. The European merchants, who command the whole of India’s foreign trade and whose business is no longer confined to the principal town on the coast but penetrates the villages also, are similarly interested in extending the network of Railways, covering the surface of the country.48

Railway promoters also tried to make railway construction a money making enterprise and profitable investment for Western companies. So Stephenson campaigned for state guarantee.49 The railway promoters knew that they could not raise the amount of capital required to initiate railway construction without providing state guarantee. A state guarantee means Indian government compensating a percentage of interest to investors in case the annual surplus of railway revenue was insufficient.50 The business interest groups behind the railway campaign, mostly the cotton manufacturers, influenced the construction of railway in India significantly. During 1840s, 80 per cent of British cotton was imported from the US.

24

Ganeswar Nayak

This tendency was perceived by the manufacturers as most dangerous because availability of cotton in Britain depended upon the domestic situation in the US.51 During the cotton famine of 1846, the cotton manufacturers represented to the government to reduce UK dependence on US cotton. They argued that construction of railroads in British India would eliminate Britain’s need for cotton. So they pressed for early construction of railways in India for import of enough Indian cotton to supply hundreds of thousands of people in England with the means of subsistence and stimulate Indian agriculture and industry. Moreover, the manufacturers had powerful political allies such as Charles Wood, the President of the Board of Control. In an official letter, the Governor-General Wood asserted that the railroad could serve as a ‘great national project if it travelled through the cotton country on the subcontinent since it would eliminate Britain’s need for US cotton’.52 The colonial authorities were primarily interested in how the railroad would increase the country’s military efficiency and decrease its expenditure. However, the Governor-General also endorsed the commercial interests behind large-scale railroad development in his popular minute of 1853. In agreement with Wood’s proposal, Dalhousie drew positive attention to the cotton motive. He proclaimed, The commercial and social advantages which India would derive from their establishment are, I truly believe, beyond present calculation. Great tracts are teeming with products which they can dispose. . . . England is calling out loud for the cotton (which India) would produce sufficient in quality and plentiful in quantity . . . (and there is) an increased demand for articles of Europeans produce in the most distant market of India.53

The influence of British cotton manufacturers was apparent in the government sanction and guarantees of GIPR in 1849. Promoters, chambers of commerce, MPs and select committees all pressed for this line which was to go through the Bombay cotton growing areas.54

Introduction

25

Similar pressure was also exerted in the case of the Bombay-Surat-Ahmedabad (BBCRI) line in 1850s. The Indian government was first willing to approve only the SuratAhmedabad line. But due to pressure from the Manchester Commercial Association and Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of Oriental Bank and other bodies, it agreed to sanction the whole line from Bombay.55 The cotton motive was also reflected in the Great Southern Railway, but played little part in the Bengal and Punjab line. The 1,500 miles of Indian Railway opened in 1861. Income from railway passengers was another source of profit to railway investors. The Court of Directors was apprehensive of getting adequate profit from railway passengers because of the prevalence of poverty and famine in the country. However, during the first year of opening of railway, 450,000 people travelled by train.56 In July 1854, Dalhousie reported that though many doubted whether the natives would travel on railway, ‘the recently opened Bombay line had been crowded for the first three days by Calcutta Baboos’. By 1863, Indian railways was carrying more than million passengers per year and made considerable contribution to the railway income.57 This was another factor which influenced the railway construction in British India. The British realized the importance of cheap means of transport for the progress of the country materially and for the efficiency of its administration. The administration, both of the East India Company and the Crown was subjected to a continuous pressure to extend and multiply railway lines in India. The central element of Dalhousie’s planned railway lines in India were the trunk lines connecting the major administrative centres of the presidencies and provinces. At a later stage the government was compelled to seek financial assistance of the Indian princes in the construction of the railways in their territories. The moving cause in the development of the the Indian Railways was the restless activities of the railway agents and managers. The railway promoters in India wanted rapid expansion of railways because it would

26

Ganeswar Nayak

provide political stability in India. After the Mutiny, the railway development of India continued to be associated with the fulfilment of Britain’s civilizing mission.58 In 1868, Robert Cecil, the Marques of Salisbury and a member of the House of Lords at the time, looked upon railway construction as enabling Britain to fulfil its duty of propagating civilization in the most peaceful and most harmless way. Moreover, at the turn of the century, Lord Curzon insisted that railroad development had always been a ‘blessing’ and being the ‘most unifying’ agency in South Asia, served to elevate the material and social condition of all Indians.59 The railway development was used by the British colonial administration to facilitate the formation of the modern Indian colonial state. In compressing time and space between far-flung regions as well as establishing links where none before had existed, the railways allowed the British Raj to establish its hegemony over the entire Indian subcontinent. Another objective of the British was to transform the Indian society. Railways was regarded as a potent instrument of improving Indian social condition, the diffusion of Western civilization and elevation of backward people. ‘It will lead’, wrote Dalhousie in the Minute which formulated Indian Railway Policy, ‘to some similar progress in social improvement that has marked the introduction of improved communication in various kingdoms of the Western world.’ The Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury said, ‘They will enable us to propagate our civilization in most peaceful and most harmless ways’.60 Similarly, the development of railways was expected to convey a powerful ideological message that claimed that railway would improve India and bring the fruit of progress and modernity to its inhabitants. So Michel Mann has argued that this was certainly a way in which the British justified their rule.61 Undersecretary of State, Grant Duff stated in 1873, ‘If we are not in India to civilize and raise India, we had better leave it as soon as we can wind up our affairs.’62 Many politicians and administrators reflected upon this opinion. Indian

Introduction

27

progress seemed assured if it adopted the British method and way of life and in the wake of railways would certainly follow ‘English arts, English men and English opinions. Education would spread, the caste system would collapse in the intimacy of third class carriages and most important, railways would achieve the prevention of local famine and uniform dispersion of food.’ It was also further claimed that the introduction of this ‘mighty engine of improvement, would cause the slumbering spirit of India to awake from sleep of ages, the sleep of apathy, superstition and prejudice, to the knowledge of the value of time and to assume among the nations, an aspect of renovated power’.63 Some scholars argue that Indian businessmen played a dominant role in railway construction in India. Both in Calcutta and Bombay there were Indian businessmen and traders who took a leading part in founding the railways. The most remarkable was a Bengali merchant and landowner, Dwarkanath Tagore, grandfather of the poet, Rabindranath Tagore. His firm Carr, Tagore and Co. is reported to have offered in 1844 to raise one-third of the capital required for a railway line from Calcutta north-west to the coalfields above Burdwan. After his demise, other businessmen of Calcutta also influenced the construction of railways in Bengal. They walked in the shadow of the British merchants and railway promoters.64

The Old Guarantee System (1853-69) In the 1840s, when the first suggestion for railways in India was being debated in Great Britain, there was strong lobbying in support of these proposals by bankers, traders, shipping companies, and others who had a strong interest in developing railways in India.65 These supporters prevailed upon the British Parliament to create the Guarantee System, whereby any company that constructed railways in India was guaranteed a certain rate of interest on its capital investment. This guarantee was honoured by the East India Company which

28

Ganeswar Nayak

then controlled large parts of India. The railways that were formed with such agreements governing them were called private guaranteed railways. Typically, the guarantee was for an annual return of 5 per cent, and the right for the railway company to pull out from the venture and get compensation from the government at any time.66 The government of India reluctantly agreed in 1849, to guarantee after efforts to attract unaided private capital had failed.67 However, a guarantee assignment was quite commonplace in the mid- and later nineteenth century, also seen, for example, in Argentina, Austria, Brazil, France, and Russia.68 When Dalhousie came to India, he recommended the replacement of the policy on experimental lines, by a policy of connecting the interior of each of the three presidencies with each other and with principal ports. These trunk lines were appropriate for the political and commercial objectives that underlay railway development.69 Second, Dalhousie suggested that the construction of the railways should be turned over to private companies working under government supervision and control, and to guarantee them a rate of return on capital. The acceptance of Dalhousie’s recommendation by the Court of Directors led to the sanction of 5,000 miles of railways by eight companies under terms that are known as Old Guarantee System. The main characteristic of the contracts entered between the government and railway companies were as follows: (a) Construction and operation of railways in India was entrusted to private companies.70 The capital for this Indian Railways was to be raised by the private companies incorporated with the United Kingdom. The private companies undertook to build railways and operate them for a period of 99 years. So these companies were usually known as private guaranteed companies which built the railways and could operate them for a period up to ninety-nine years.71 But the Government of India retained the prospect of purchasing the railways from the private companies after twenty-five years.72

Introduction

29

(b) Another significant feature of this system was that the state guaranteed for the company against the possible loss. The single objective of introducing guaranteeing was to encourage private British capitalists to invest their money in Indian Railways. So the Government of India agreed to certain financial obligations which was imposed upon the taxpayers of India and not on United Kingdom.73 The main obligation came into effect upon the opening of traffic of each railway. The Government of India would make contribution every year to each railway that failed to earn 5 per cent of the capital invested. But the contribution was in no case to be larger than 5 per cent. Should the company operate at a net loss (in which case the government’s 5 per cent contribution would not be enough to assure them an annual 5 per cent profit), they were conceded the unconditional right to turn back their enterprises at any time to the Government of India. All they had to do was to give the government one year’s notice, at the end of which time they would receive back their capital.74 (c) The government was to provide land free of cost for construction of railways. (d) The Government of India played a dominant role in this construction. It exercised utmost power over the railway companies. These were direction of the line, type of construction, mode of operation and rates and fare policies. Similarly, in order to give justice to the railway company, they could appeal to the British Government at Whitehall against objectionable decision of the Government of India. (e) Surplus profits, above the guaranteed minimum, were to be equally shared by the companies and the government till the past advances by way of guarantee was repaid in full. Thereafter, all profits were to go to the railway companies. (f) The route gauge, construction, gradient, etc., were all to be sanctioned by the government which also had the right to order alterations.

30

Ganeswar Nayak

(g) The government reserved to itself the power of supervision and control on the working of the railways, including rates and fares. Because of the enormously encouraging terms there was no difficulty in securing capital in London and by 1869, 4,255 miles of line had been constructed with a capital outlay of Rs. 89 crore.75 With the government guaranteeing the returns, British investors liberally funded India’s railway project during 1850. India’s guaranteed railway absorbed between 13 and 17 per cent of British portfolio foreign investment between 1850 and 1870 and less than 1 per cent of their capital came from indigenous sources. Shareholding register indicate that the principal investors were what Davis and Huttenback have termed as the imperial-oriented elite: the upper middle class of southern England, bankers, barristers, spinsters, retired army officers and London-based gentlemen. They were attracted by the prospect of a secure return from an investment which, though virtually gilt-edged, provided yields significantly above those from consolidated stock and Indian bonds.76 In the case of East Indian Railway, the register informs a medium of holding fewer than 50 of its £ 50 share. For many of its investors, the holding formed part of a relatively restricted portfolio. The two largest shareholding, with 8.5 per cent of the total equity, were held by the Glasgow grain trading firm McPhails. The 1849 guarantee contracts hampered Indian railway development for several decades. It encouraged overstated construction costs, and later the Finances Minister William M. Massey asserted that it mattered little whether the capital was thrown into Hooghly or converted into bricks and mortar. However, for the Government of India and the Indian taxpayers, three pioneer lines proved financial millstones. William Thornton described it as ‘Heads you win, tail, I lose’.77 The promoters of the pioneer EIR and GIPR had envisaged their lines being laid at between £5,000 and £8,000 per

Introduction

31

mile. But the actual out turn exceeded £20,000.78 This was double the cost of construction compared to Australia and Canada in 1850. It has been argued that the guarantee system was too costly and unnecessary. It was unnecessary because without any guarantee, money would have flown to India for railway construction. As Macpherson has pointed out, after the climax of the Industrial Revolution, safe and profitable outlets for investment in England had greatly narrowed down. Investment in overseas territories outside Britain’s control had become risky, especially after several South American countries had defaulted on repayment. England, therefore, had a surfeit capital which sought investment desperately and would have been available to India even without guarantee. The typical attitude was ‘I care nothing about what is done with money, as long as it is spent to secure 5 % to the share holders.’79 A fact worthy of note in this regard is that among the potential investors, many were friends and relatives of the directors of East India Company. The directors, therefore, wanted to do all they could to help them. This led Lord Mayo to complain that ‘the Secretary of the State guaranteed railway development not needed by India under pressure from Board of Directors in England. . .’.80 Even if it was accepted that a guaranteed interest was indispensable, it need not have been fixed so high. That abundant capital was available at much lower rate of interest is borne out by the fact that in 1845, the mere prospect of 3 per cent guarantee drew the EIR more capital than could be accommodated. This is further confirmed by the later experiences of the government, when they were able, without much difficulty, to enter into contracts on terms much less favourable to the companies. It was wasteful because interest on capital invested being guaranteed, there was neither a fear of loss nor an incentive for economy. Money was carelessly wasted. The standard of construction was far higher than required for the condition

32

Ganeswar Nayak

of the country or for the actual work which the railway were desired to perform. Conveniences were provided which were unnecessary for the safe and efficient operation of railways. Even experimental lines were double tracks. In certain cases, plans were modified after work actually started. The consequence of this wastefulness was that the earnings which might have been sufficient to pay interest charges on a reasonable expenditure, proved inadequate to meet the guarantee on the outlay actually incurred and the government had to make good the loss. The deficit went on escalating in amount, until it reached the charge sum of Rs. 166.5 lakh in 1868-9.81 In actual practice the government failed to check the tendency to extravagance and waste. The system of audit was imperfect while the government’s consulting engineers were not competent enough for railway construction. In addition, the fear of causing delay to the progress of work often led them to overlook the negligence by the companies. For example, it was reported to the select committees of 1872 that on (GIPR) Railway, 2,000 stonework works, including bridges and viaducts had to be repaired almost immediately after their construction. Actually Dalhousie had hoped to ensure a close and watchful eye on the working of the railway companies.82 But in reality, the railways landed in huge loss. However, as in other matters of general policy, the commercial interest of the United Kingdom dominated the psychology of the company than the real need of India. So utmost priority was given to the construction of trunk and commercial lines but feeder and branch lines were overlooked. Local needs and famine protective lines were sacrificed for the sake of foreign trade which tended to develop the English rather than the Indian industry.83 Dr Sanyal has rightly concluded that ‘the Indian guarantee killed effort for economy, promoted recklessness, and involved the country in liabilities much beyond what the people could bear or the needs of the time could justify’.84 According to the original contracts, if the working expenses

Introduction

33

were more than receipts, the companies were responsible for the differences. But this policy was not rigorously enforced. In the case of Calcutta and South Eastern Railway, the government had showed the astonishing extravagance of paying not only the guaranteed interest, but also the excess of working expenses over receipts which ultimately brought a losing concern returning the whole capital at par.85 There were also other defects which afflicted the guarantee system. Many of the contracts were contradictory. For example, while one clause stipulated payment of guaranteed interest only on sums spent properly, the latter clause provided payment by state of a 5 per cent dividend on all capital raised by the companies Second, the contract provided that at the expiry of the term of 99 years, the railways would become the property of the government. But the subsequent provision provided that, if a company decided to surrender their railway before the expiry of the lease, the government must pay them the full amount of the capital which they had expended upon it. This, in effect, meant that in the ninetyninth year, the government could get the railway for nothing but in the ninety-eighth year, if the company so desired, it could get the full value of the railway. That is why Thornton has rightly remarked ‘the contracts were perfectly disgraceful to whosever drew them up’.86 So the old guarantee system had created crises in the railway system. But Dalhousie had expected the average cost of the railways to be Rs. 80,000, per mile, it actually exceeded Rs. 1.80 lakh per mile, without counting the cost of land which was given free. In contrast, some of the railways in USA, were built for as little as Rs. 20,000 per mile. Similarly, progress of construction of railway was not satisfactory. By the year 1870, only 4,255 miles of railways were built. While the capital costs of Indian railways were so heavy that the net earning brought only 0.22 per cent, 1.3 per cent, 1.98 per cent and 2 per cent on the total outlay during the year 1854, 1859, 1864 and 1869 respectively. So the total loss to the state up to the end of financial year 1869, amounted to Rs. 19.5

34

Ganeswar Nayak

crore. This was an enormous financial burden on the government, which further worsened due to war and famine.

The State Construction (1869-82) The most disagreeable feature of the old guarantee system was that it encouraged carelessness, extravagance and wasteful expenditure by companies. There was no incentive for them to economize since the government was always there to pay the guaranteed interest and there was little prospect of earning more than that. The Indian view against the guaranteed railway was put forth most lucidly and briefly by justice Ranade which was published in the Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha in July 1881: The fixed guaranteed rate of interest being high (much higher than the average return on capital in England), it was found that the companies were not sufficiently economical in the construction of their works or in their management when constructed. It was their interest to keep their expenditure as high a figure as practicable, in order to secure the guaranteed interest on the maximum amount that could be laid out.87

There were several complaints against the guarantee system. Attempts were made to form companies to construct railway without a guarantee. In 1862-3 and 1863-4, the Indian Branch Railway Company and East Indian Tramway Company were formed for the purpose of constructing short and feeder lines. The only help they required was free land and other secondary help.88 The government decided to offer subsidy in place of guarantee. The subsidy took the form of an annual payment for 20 years at the rate not exceeding Rs. 1,000 per mile of a line, with an additional amount for bridges costing more than Rs. 1 lakh. Even subsidies failed to attract capital so that the two unguaranteed companies had to be later given guarantee of interest. It was now recognized that the unguaranteed companies could not be expected to

Introduction

35

play any role in the development of the Indian Railways. The idea of state construction and management of railways was suggested by Lord Lawrence in 1867 and again in 1869.89 The new viceroy Lord Mayo’s government repeated the proposal in the same year and it was accepted by the Secretary of State. Thus in the history of Indian Railways a new era started. The state took upon itself the task of construction of another 10,000 miles of track at a rate of £12,000 per mile. The choice was outstanding for an era of laissez faire. At the same time the agreement with some of the more important railway companies were modified by the Secretary of State for India without consulting the Government of India.90 The state surrendered its right of purchasing the railway on the expiry of the first 25 years of the contract with the companies in return for an equal division of the profits. Initially, during the first decade of 1869, a sum of £ 2 million per annum was appropriated for the purpose but in 1875, the sum was increased to £4 million. During the same period, the government borrowed money in London at rates of 4 per cent or less. The total mileage of railway was increased from 4,771 in 1870 to 8,996 in 1880.91 This was partly due to greater efficiency and economy in construction, the cost per mile of broad gauge line averaged about £10,000 for state lines as against £13,000 for guaranteed lines. The lower cost of expansion during this period, however, was due to the unfortunate adoption of narrow gauge in the interest of economy.92 The recently constructed trunk railways were of a gauge of 5 ft 6 in.The greater part of the new extension was made on the metre gauge. A comparison of earnings in 1880 shows that while the average return on capital was 6.2 per cent on company managed lines, it was 2.15 per cent on state managed lines.93 This was partly due to the fact that the state lines were yet in the initial years of development, and also the fact that company lines were located in the more productive and prosperous parts of the country. When, the railways were first proposed for India, it was considered that a gauge wider than English 4 ft. 8½ in. was

36

Ganeswar Nayak

desirable.94 A gauge of 5 ft. 6 in. was suggested; because of cyclonic storms at certain season and after much discussion was decided upon and became the standard for India. In 1870 state railway system was adopted because the financial position of the country demanded cheaper forms of construction. For lines which were considered as of secondary importance, narrow gauge was adopted. A committee of four engineers was appointed in 1870 to recommend the width of which would be most suited to the wants of India. But the committees were not unanimous in their recommendations.95

The New Guarantee System (1881-1900) It was due to disappointment of state construction, that the new guarantee system was started. The system of state construction faced severe criticism due to several reasons. The British merchants and industrialists, unhappy with the existing volume of India’s foreign trade, clamoured for better transport facility so that the large Indian market in the interior could be fully exploited and raw materials from the remotest fields be speedily carried to Britain.96 Second, there was also the renewed pressure of investors who looked upon the guaranteed system as a field for safe investment of their surplus fund. Further, the Famine Commission of 1880 also recommended for the immediate construction of 8,000 miles of railways to save the country from famines. The defence of north-western frontier also posed another problem. The threat of Russian expansion on north-west frontier also necessitated the transfer of large capital resources to the construction of military and strategic lines.97 Third, from 1874-9, the country was faced with a number of famines which necessitated famine relief. The limit fixed in regard to the total burden of railway, whether due to direct expenditure from revenue or on account of the servicing of the railway debt, created problems. So due to this problem, the government again took the help of private companies in the

Introduction

37

task of railway construction. The wave of public opinion had already bent in favour of private companies and government purchased the East Indian Railway in 1880. According to the recommendations of the parliamentary select committees of 1884, it was decided to employ both state and private companies in the future development of Indian Railways. So fresh contracts were signed with a number of companies such as Bengal-Nagpur Railway (BNR), the Southern Maratha Railway, and the Indian Midland Railway.98 Important features of the new guarantee system were: (a) The lines constructed by the companies were declared to be the property of the state which also had the right to terminate the contract after the expiry of 25 years from the date of signing of the contract or at subsequent intervals of 10 years, or simply by repaying the capital provided by the companies for the construction of line.99 (b) The guaranteed rate of interest was much lower than before; the usual rate was 3½ per cent. (c) The government received a much larger share, usually 2⁄5 per cent of the surplus profit. Thus started the third stage of railway development, in which the state and quasi-state agencies and private companies took part side by side. The Indian government took up unproductive lines required mainly for strategic purposes, to fulfil the needs of the army and to serve areas where famine was widespread. The princely states, district boards and other local authorities were actively encouraged to finance, construct and operate railway lines to serve their areas either directly or through some other agencies. Efforts were made to get private companies to build railways without any guarantees, otherwise on modified or limited guarantees. It was more favourable than the old guarantee system.100 From then on, railway development was pushed on hurriedly even at breakneck speed. By 30 June 1905, nearly 28,054 miles of railways (built at a cost of Rs. 359 crore) was opened to

38

Ganeswar Nayak

traffic. While 17,308 miles of railway were constructed from 1850 to 1891, nearly 10,746 miles were built during the short period of 1892 to 1905.101 As Jenks has pointed out, not even in Great Britain had railway development been carried on so rapidly, and the railways in France was built at a much slower rate.102 One of the most momentous developments of the period was the sea change in the working of the railways. After periods of losses, in 1900, the yield of profits to the state began. The net gains of the state were not merely confined to the net amount contributed by the railway to the treasury. Between 1881 and 1901, the gross revenues of the Government of India increased from Rs. 75.7 to 110.8 crore.103 Thus, every rupee spent on railways came back many times over.

Problem of Land Acquisition The problem of acquisition of land for railways during the formative phase of their construction in India was very complicated. With agreements between the government and the railway companies, the former undertook to provide land free of cost to the latter. Therefore, the government enacted Act XLII of 1850 under which it could immediately acquire any land which was required for a public work and the railways built with its sanction was classified as such.104 Once this was done, the government acquired land rapidly. But transferring land to the railway involved complexities. Smritikumar Sarkar in his article ‘Land Acquisition in Bengal, 1850-62: Probing a Contemporary Problem’, argues that during the formative phase of railway construction, there was no easy transfer of land to the railway company. Here he examines the legal and social issues involved in acquiring land for public works.105 The feudal social structure reinforced the sentiments of attributing cultural value to one’s home and land inherited from ancestors. There was the tribal notion that clearing of forest for the railways would infuriate the ancestors buried

Introduction

39

under forest land. The tribal people feared that instead of rains, fireballs would drop from heaven. In the prevailing cultural tradition of Bengal, living in the west bank of River Ganga was considered akin to residing in the holy city of Benares. Hence the Bengal folk saying: Gangar Pascimkul, Benares Samtul.106 As the Howrah Pundooa railway line was to travel closely along the western bank of the river Hoogly, the severest opposition to the process of land acquisition for the first railway project in Bengal came from the area. Other problems came from sacred sites, temples, mosques, places of religious congregation, abodes of hermits, mendicants, and cremation and burial grounds. Railways engineers always insisted on keeping the line as straight as far as possible to get the best of running out stock and economies often failing to distinguish between sacred sites and other land earmarked for the attachment. N. Benjamin in his paper ‘Problems of Indian Railways’ has outlined the case of EIR. Its line stretched over 1,000 miles, covering not only land, but also trees, huts, bamboos, etc.107 Often for single trees or a hut there was more than one claimant. Without regard to rights, it was difficult to resolve conflicting claims. In the first section of the line from Howrah to Pandua of over 40 miles, the number of claims was 4,475. Personnnel handling them were often ignorant of social and religious prejudices of the local people. They mishandled the situation which caused widespread discontent. In 1856, there was a commotion in Patna when railway engineers destroyed houses and desecrated sacred places. The Government of India had to intervene and warned the railway company. Hena Mukherjee’s book on the East Indian Railway has analysed the provision of land for the construction of the line.108 She has examined mainly the policy, legal and fiscal aspects of the problem. The question of people’s response to land acquisition for railways has not been alluded to. She argues that land was extremely cheap everywhere. Hence, the question of opposition from the people losing their land to the railway did not arise.109

40

Ganeswar Nayak

On the other hand, attitude of the people towards the railways was analysed by Dipesh Chakrabarty. He has discussed two groups of people.The commercial elite of Calcutta in the 1840 and the disbanded railway labourers shifting to wrecking trains as a means of survival. The attitude of the two groups to the railway was sharply in contrast to each other. The former readily accepted the proposal of railways as an adjunct of British rule. On the other hand, the latter group expressed their anger against the railways which destabilized their rule. There is also a third group which surrendered their land for the construction of railways.

Early Difficulties The early period of Indian railways was troubled by important movements in the political history of modern India.110 The first was the Santhal Rebellion of 1855. It was caused partly by the oppression of European railway builders in the Rajmahal district. They exploited the Santhal labourers and disgraced the Santhal women.111 The agitated Santhals damaged the railway line between Rajmahal and Bhagalpur. This resulted in the damage of the railway property and suspension of work for some time. The second was the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in which construction work was suspended for more than a year in northern India. In some places, a large number of European staff were murdered and railway stations turned into fortified posts. Construction schedules were set back by at least twelve months and incurred additional cost. The losses incurred by the uprising of 1857 is estimated around £3,000,000. But Hena Mukherjee puts a higher figure of £4,000,000.112

Geography, Rivers, Mountains, Lakes The geography of India posed another great problem to the construction of railways in India. Rivers, mountains, lakes, uncongenial climate, and poor human resources worked as barriers against the construction of the railway lines.113 The rivers like the Brahmaputra, Padma, Ganga, Mahanadi, and

Introduction

41

Narmada, were great obstacles to the construction.114 The rivers swelled and brought immense volume of water during the rains. The railway line from Mettupolayam to Vdagamandalam in Tamil Nadu was expensive because it had 16 tunnels under Bhavani river.115 Skilled engineers, costly materials and trained labourers were required to construct them. Important railway equipment were imported from England. Every mile of railway constructed in 1860 required a separate ship carrying about 600 tons of material from England. The Thal and Bhore Ghat section of the railways had a deep chain of massive impregnable rocks and lofty peaks, rising abruptly to heights ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 ft.116 There were impenetrable forests infested with wild animals and the climate was unfit for human habitation.117 Apart from geography, several diseases like pneumonia, typhoid, smallpox, kala azar (black water fever) and other diseases also weakened the pace of construction. Malaria and cholera were mass killers and killed many construction workers.118 The railways were undoubtedly the single most important innovation introduced in the subcontinent from the industrializing west. Between 1853 and 1947 more than 40,000 miles were constructed. By 1920, India possessed the world’s fifth largest rail network and almost 5 per cent share of global route mileage.119 With a combined workforce of 727,000, India’s state and private railways were by far the single largest employers in the modern sector, dwarfing coal, cotton and jute industries.120 The British civil and military engineers were entrusted with the task of planning and overseeing the execution of the construction of railways in India. During India’s pre-1870 pioneering era, consulting engineers were appointed by the London based private railway company. Railway contractors were entrusted with the task of constructing railways in India. Early railway contractors were recruited by competitive tenders from Britain.. 121 After 1870 there was sustained inflow of new engineering personnel from Britain. The number of superior grade railway engineers of the rank of assistant engineers quadrupled

42

Ganeswar Nayak

from 250 in 1870 to more than 100 in 1920.122 From 1870, the new superior grade engineers of the state lines began to enjoy preliminary training at Copper’s Hill and in India at Roorkee, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay and Poona.123 Throughout the construction of the railways, British engineers dominated the construction works. Colonial bigotry against the decision-making ability of Indians, their consistency in a crisis, and their ability to direct European and Anglo-Indian subordinates, was to prevent those other-wise well qualified officers from advancing further until the interwar years, when Indianization finally passed beyond subaltern to the superior-grades.124 The construction of the railways was one of the toughest tasks faced by the British railway engineers. Railway construction was divided into four parts: plate laying, tunnelling, cutting works and building bridges across rivers. In India labour was available in plenty. So wages were low. There was little mechanization of this basic earth-moving and stone shattering process.125 So construction of railways in India was a labour-absorptive process. Earth workers were the largest group in the railway project. Carpenters, masons, brickmakers, blacksmiths, riveters, mechanics, divers and many other skilled workmen were needed. Gradually the railway construction expanded the labour market in India.126 It has been estimated that before 1880 an average of 150 workers were engaged on each mile under construction. Over a period of time, when more powerful locomotives were introduced, labour requirements for construction of railway showed a declining trend from 1850-1920. By 1920, per mile construction of labour requirements probably declined to 100 persons. Colonial India depended on Britain for its railway technology. India was a captive market for British-made engines.127 Machinery for railway construction, steam locomotives, metal work and wheel units, for carriages and wagons and signalling equipment were imported from Britain. 128 According to Hugh and Hughes, throughout the colonial period, 91 per cent of the broad gauge and 77 per cent of

Introduction

43

the metre gauge locomotion came from Britain.129 At the end of 1869, 1,045 British steam locomotion were in main line operation in India. Between 1850 and 1940, more than 14,000 locomotives were sold to India. British engineering firms profited at the expense of India’s productive capacities.130

Railway and Crime With the expansion of railways, crimes became a matter of concern to the railway authority. The platforms, stations, and warehouses of the burgeoning Indian railway system became the main arena in which the police and their criminal adversaries faced each other. They maximized their advantages, and exploited each other’s weakness.131 Due to poverty and unemployment in the country, many criminal groups emerged to explore and expand their criminal activity. M. Pauparao Naidu identified eight classes of professional railway thieves. He identified the Bhamptas of the Deccan, the Kepmaries and Ina Koravars of south India, Bharwars of Gonda and Lallatpur as the most notorious.132 These criminal groups committed their crimes on platforms, stations, godowns, and pilgrim centres. The police report informs that they adopted several crimes like drugging and pick-pocketing the railway travellers. Sometimes they offered prashad to travellers and committed the crime after the passengers lost consciousness. These criminals sometimes disgraced women and children and looted valuable goods from them. Gradually, the government took some positive steps to curb this criminal activity. The first step in this direction was taken by Bengal province in 1862, when it created its own railway police as a joint venture financed by the railway and under the charge of an experienced superintendent from the provincial police.133 In 1867 the same policy was implemented in UP and Delhi. Since the railway police was under the private railway company, it did not carry out the orders of provincial government. However, the committee stated that railway police should identify with

44

Ganeswar Nayak

the interest of the railway as much as possible but that they should be mindful that they were servant of the public who use the railways and not the railways themselves. Thus within a forty-year period, the administration of railway police had passed almost entirely from the railway companies to the provincial police.134 This had resulted largely at the behest of the provincial police desiring to expand their search as well as the successful lobbying of the railway companies eager to unburden themselves of the increasing cost of their own police.135

Railway Accidents Accidents in the colonial railways were another problem for railway passengers. Human error, mechanical failure, climatic condition and administrative laxity were potentially responsible for railway accidents. O. Lloyd describes in a small pamphlet in 1911 entitled Secret Doings on Indian Railway, where he argued that rapid expansion of railroads had led to the hiring of many incompetent, cheap and overworked staff. Safety had been severely compromised and railroad authority downplayed the accident figure and engaged in secret mass burials of victims to reduce the claim of compensation. He further states that Ghaziabad collision of 6 May 1908 resulted in some 400 deaths instead of 72 as officially reported.136 The climatic factor sometimes caused flood in the river and washed away a railway bridge which caused death of the railway passengers. In 1870-1, a bridge over the Cheyair River washed away. A train of Madras Railway on its way to Cuddapah plunged into the water and eight persons were killed.137 The Mullor Bridge of Southern Maharatta Railway in the princely state of Mysore collapsed on 23 September 1897 dropping a passenger train in the flooded river. At least twenty people died although the exact figure was hard to establish.138 Mechanical failure also caused railway accidents sometimes. In Oudh-Rohilakhand State railway, the mail train while

Introduction

45

passing a level crossing, ran into a bullock cart with a man and a boy on it. In the accident the boy was killed, the man was seriously injured and the cart smashed. The gatekeeper was sentenced to 15 months of rigorous imprisonment.139 The Frontier Mail of North Western Railway derailed shortly after leaving Lahore station. Because of brake failure, it ran into the signals at Shahdara junction.140 Animals were also responsible for railway accidents. Camels, buffaloes, sheep, goats, wild pigs, bears and other animals were killed by the running trains. In 1871 as many as 314 cases of trains running over the cattle and other animals were reported.141 On the Madras Railway, a buffalo was run over and a wagon was thrown off the rails and dragged for a couple of miles.142 In 1869 on an EIR line, an elephant was killed.143 Human error was also responsible for accidents. Train drivers did not obey the traffic instruction and ran the train beyond the recommended speed.

The Railway Rates Policy The exploitative character of Indian Railways was also reflected in the Indian rates policy. The rates structure was tilted against the Indian industries. This short-sighted policy and commercial orientation of the railway development in India is clearly shown in the history of railway rates.144 The development of railways reduced the cost of freight movement to nearly one-twentieth of the estimated cost by bullock carts. But rates were handled in such a way that maximum benefit did not go to the Indian people and enrich the Indian economy.145 First, the rates were too high, the objective being to obtain a large income with a small amount of work. The railway companies were fixated by the idea that lines should pay from the very beginning. They did not realize that traffic should be nurtured in the initial stages by low charges. Observers commented on the high rates from the examples of reduction in rates on early years. Throughout the nineteenth century, there are examples of reduction in rates being accompanied by rapid growth of traffic. Mr. Rob-

46

Ganeswar Nayak

ertson, in his report to the Government of India in 1902, said that, though in monetary terms rates in India were lower than in England, considering the actual circumstances in two countries, Indian rates should have been 30-60 per cent lower than they were.146 Second, the rate structure was so designed as to favour the import of manufactured goods and the export of raw materials. The Indian industries had to face the twin problems of paying to the railway for the transport of raw materials and for distribution of their manufactured goods to foreign manufacturers using Indian materials and selling in Indian market. The defence of the companies was that long distance traffic was cheaper than short hauls, and that their rates merely reflected differences in costs. It was not realized that railways should serve and not dominate the country’s economic interest. For example, for Delhi low rates were quoted on imported matches from Bombay and higher rates for Ahmedabad, where there was a match factory, even though Ahmedabad was 300 miles nearer to Delhi. As for leather industry, the Indian Industrial Commission agreed that ‘grant of port rates nearly 50 per cent less than the internal rates . . . discouraged Indian tanning’. Similarly, the imported sugar could be conveyed 840 miles from Bombay to Kanpur at 13½ annas per maund, while Indian-made sugar sent 640 miles from Kanpur to Akola paid 18½ annas per maund.147 The United Province government stated before the Industrial Commission that the railway had often not fixed rates in the interest of Indian industries. An incidental effect of the railway rates policy was concentration in the port towns of the large-scale industries, taking advantage of favourable rate to the interiors. These defects in the Indian Railways rates policy ceased significantly since the 1920.

Railway and Irrigation By the closing decades of nineteenth century British government gave priority to railway expansion. But it did not try to

Introduction

47

extend irrigation facility in the country. India is an agricultural country and for expansion of agriculture, irrigation was most vital. But the British government neglected irrigation and gave priority to railways in its investment policy.148 This can be known from the total capital expenditure incurred by the government on minor and major irrigation up to the end of 1902-3 which amounted to nearly Rs. 43 crore. But the total outlay on the state and guaranteed railway had amounted by 30 June 1905 to Rs. 359 crore. The railways were said to have fostered the neglect of irrigation because they were a better implement of exploitation and the parliament, with 156 railway directors in both houses in 1860, was biased in their favour. It is true that expenditure on canals and dams by 1867 was scarcely £18 million, compared to £95 million on railway, and that more investment on irrigation schemes, with their relatively low capital-intensity, would have been advantageous. But it is clear that apart from vested interests in Britain, the government looked for far greater general benefits of the railways than irrigation.149 The neglect of irrigation was criticized by the Indian leaders. In 1898, R.M. Savani raised the matter in the viceroy’s legislative council and complained, ‘While railway absorbed so large a measure of Government attention, irrigation canals, which are far more protective against famine, are allowed only three quarter of a crore of rupees, or about one thirteenth of the amount spent on railway each year.’150 Indian leaders felt that the existing facilities for irrigation were totally inadequate when viewed in the light of the needs of the Indian agriculture.151 The Indian leaders demanded irrigation to railways due to several reasons. They argued that irrigation was a potential remedy against famine. Railways were only a palliative that could at the most mitigate the worst effects of a famine, while irrigation went to the root of the trouble and therefore, prevented a famine. The railways could do no more than lead to a more equitable distribution of the existing quantity of food grain in various parts of

48

Ganeswar Nayak

the country; irrigation on the other hand, could increase the production of food grain itself.152 Second, money spent on irrigation created employment opportunity for the Indian people, such as digging wells, etc. On the contrary, most of the expenditure incurred on the railways benefitted the foreign countries which supplied railway equipment. So railways played an important role in imparting the colonial character to Indian economy. In spite of all benefits of irrigation, the British government gave utmost importance to railway expansion in the country. The imperial motive was clearly articulated by R.C. Dutt in 1901, ‘preference was given to railways which facilitated British trade with India, and not to canals which would have benefitted Indian agriculture’.153

Indian Railways in Twentieth Century With the coming of the twentieth century, the railways entered a new era. Following growth of traffic, the railways earned a surplus and ceased to be a burden on the government exchequer. They were now a ‘running concern’. However, they continued to face problems. The speed of the movement of freights and passengers was slow and accident rate was very high. The rolling stock was not adapted to the requirements. Thomas Robertson was appointed to enquire into the administration and the working of the railways in 1902.154 Apart from the recommendations on technical questions, he reported in favour of the extension of railway mileage and public management of all railway lines in the country. Public opinion in India and the government was, however, opposed to the lease of all lines to the companies and thus the policy of having a dual system of state and company managed lines continued.155 Robertson also recommended the establishment of a board of three commissioners as the controlling authority of the Indian Railways. So Railway Board was established in 1905. It was given the power of supervision and control vested in the Government of India Railway Act 1890. Again in 1908, the power of the board was increased and the

Introduction

49

railway department became independent of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Again, the Mackay Committee was appointed to investigate the Indian Railways finance and administration in 1907.156 Though the committee stated that the equipment and improvement of the existing lines should take precedence over new lines, it also recommended that since the country could profit having 100,000 miles of railway, £12½ million annually should be allotted to railway construction and development. This led to a marked increase in the capital expenditure on railways. So Rs. 110 crore were spent between 1908 and 1914 and railway mileage increased to 34,656 in 1913-14.

First World War The Indian Railways faced other overwhelming challenges with the First World War. Even before the war, the weakness of the railways to cope with the growing volume of traffic was noticeable. As an imperial dependent, India was automatically committed to the war efforts of the British Empire. Indian resources and productive capacities were placed at the British war efforts.157 The war caused severe financial strain on the development which could hardly spare any money for railways. This is evident from the fact that capital expenditure was reduced from Rs. 18.4 crore in 1913-14 to Rs. 2.97 crore in 1916-17. Under the stress of the war, 150 miles of track were dismantled and transported to the Middle East.158 A number of river crafts were also sent away resulting in the closing or curtailing of several ferry services and a considerable diversion of their traffic to railways.159 The inconvenience of railway travel on the one side, and higher rates on the other, created great discontent among the public. According to Sanyal, ‘the railway authority preferred to sacrifice passenger traffic in favor of freight’ during the war.160

50

Ganeswar Nayak

By December 1916, the railroad could no longer handle all the traffic requiring railed transportation, so passenger traffic was curtailed, fares increased, pilgrim traffic was prohibited and a central priority committee was set up to control goods traffic.161 Mahatma Gandhi stirred up the whole country with strong indignation at the hardship of the passengers. The criticism gathered momentum with the uncovering of a number of cases where the companies had entered into secret agreements and acted against the national interest. Consequently, the Indian Railway Committee was appointed in 1920 under the chairmanship of Sir William Acworth.162 But the war taught many lessons regarding the administration and working of Indian railways. It hastened the policy of appointing Indians to superior services. Further, it emphasized the urgent need for extending traffic facilities in many directions.

The Acworth Committee The growing public criticism on every aspect of the Indian railway system led to appointment, in 1920, of the Indian Railway Committee under chairmanship of Sir William Acworth, a railway expert.163 The committee was asked to specially consider the relative advantages of different methods of managing the state-owned railways. In these connection, the committee was asked to render advice as to the policy to be adopted when the existing contract with several railway companies ended. Second, it would advise the organization of the Railway Board and the method of financing of railways in India. The most far-reaching recommendations of the committee were regarding railway finances. The committee, therefore, recommended complete separation of the railway budget from the general budget of the country and upgradation of the railway management from the finance management. The committee further recommended the establishment of a new department called Communication Department, respon-

Introduction

51

sible for management of railways, roads, and telegraph. It also recommended the setting up of a Railway Commission with a chief commissioner of the railways and four other commissioners. The period, in general was one of progress and prosperity.164 The total railway mileage increased to just 40,000 miles in 1931. India had the largest railway system in the world, only the USSR and the USA exceeded India. In the period of 5 years ending 1928-9, the average annual contribution of the railway to the general revenues was about Rs. 6 crore and the net revenue of the railway exceeded, on an average, the interest charges each year by Rs. 9.75 crore.

The Great Depression During 1930, two problems confronted the Indian Railways. The Great Depression had devastating effects on the economy of India. With the decline in exports and imports, the railway traffic plummeted. The passenger traffic declined from 634 million in 1929-30 to 480 million in 1932, and the freight carried from 91 million tons in 1928-9 to 71 million tons. The decline in traffic was aggravated by the emergence of road competition. In 1931 the government appointed a Retrenchment Committee to suggest measures for economies. Its recommendations were related only to economics in administration.165 In 1932 the Pope Committee was appointed to suggest economies in the working of railways. The committee recommended cuts in organization and staff. It laid stress on regrouping of railways into larger units. In fact, most economizing was done at the expense of maintenance and renewal of expenditure. With the end of the depression, the corner was turned about 1936-7 and over 1937-40, the surplus totalled Rs. 8.4 crore.166 In 1936, the Wedgewood Committee was appointed to examine the financial position of state-owned railways and suggest measures for improvement in net earnings and to place railway finance on a sound footing.167 The committee also recommended participation by railways in road transport. However, no significant progress was

52

Ganeswar Nayak

made in these directions before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Second World War The Second World War imposed additional burden on the railways. In addition to movement of troops and supplies, civilian passenger traffic also rose rapidly, with the growth of Indian industrial production.168 Difficulties increased after 1941, with the entry of Japan into the war and conversion of India into the base for Southeast Asia. This led to the diversion of road traffic to railways, and the use of railway workforce for munition production. As a result of these difficulties the standard of service deteriorated and there was acute overcrowding of passenger trains and long delays in goods transport. It was also a period of financial prosperity. The railway contributed Rs. 158 crore to the general revenues over 1939-46, and the railway reserved fund increased to Rs. 76 crore in the same period.169 During the war period, part of the separation convention was suspended and it was decided that the surplus would be allotted on the basis of the needs of the railways and the general revenue.170

Problem of Indian Railways after the Partition of India The Partition of India in 1947 created another problem for Indian Railways. About 6,950 miles or 19 per cent of the track went to Pakistan, leaving 34,083 miles in India.171 The rolling stock was shared on mileage-cum-traffic basis while the workshops were divided on the basis of their location. Communal riots also led to large-scale transfer of staff. About 1,26,200 railway workers, living in territories constituting Pakistan, opted for India but only 1,08,000 arrived, while 83,000 migrated from India to Pakistan. An important feature of transfer of the staff was that most of the Muslim staff that left India was skilled in trades like coppersmith, blacksmith or were drivers and firemen.172 The migration affected the EIR

Introduction

53

and GIPR. The absorption of clerical staff created problems for the railways. The Partition of India also created problems for the port of Bombay. With the loss of Karachi to Pakistan, Bombay emerged as the main port of supply for the western region of the country. The result was a heavy rush on the Delhi-Bombay line.173 The partition of Bengal raised a new problem inasmuch as India was left with no rail route to Assam, without going into Pakistani territory. The problem was however solved by the construction of the 49 miles long Assam link in 1949. Another important development during the period was the railway regrouping scheme under different railway units that were amalgamated and regrouped into six zones. Earlier, the issue of regrouping had been examined by the Acworth as well as the Wedgewood committees which had recommended regrouping of railway into three and eight zones respectively. The partition had broken up the northwestern and Bengal-Assam railway. Moreover, the integration of princely states with the Indian Union brought the state railways of various sizes under the control and management of the government of India. So, in 1950, the entire railways was divided into six zones. The southern, central and western zones came into existence in 1951 and the northern, northeastern and eastern zones in 1952.

Impact of Railways The development of railways had widespread effect on the life and economy of the Indian people. In official view the ‘benefits conferred by railways were at all time great’ and they were all powerful agents in the promotion of material and social advancement of the people. The railways converted India from a geographical expression to a well knit and consolidated political unit. Very long distances and absence of transportation facilities had been major impediments in the growth of cultural and political cohesion of the country. By

54

Ganeswar Nayak

removing these obstacles, the railways led to the establishment of a modern central administration. Travel being cheap, became frequent. This in turn prompted a sense of national unity.174 But Gandhi in his Hind Swaraj and other writings criticized the railways vehemently as the spreader of bubonic plague, famine and general roguery. When the reader in Hind Swaraj suggests that the disadvantages of the railway are outbalanced by the fact that they have produced a new spirit of nationalism, Gandhi disagreed and pointed out that it was the British who instilled this idea in the Indian people that they were not one nation prior to colonization. He further argued, ‘We were one nation before they came to India. One thought inspired us. Our mode of life was same. It was because we were one nation that they were able to establish one kingdom. Subsequently they divided us.’175 In the light of this statement, Gandhi rejected the notion that the railways somehow produced the Indian nation or a national identity, but rather believed that a sense of national identity predates the introduction of the railways.176

Railways and Famine The importance of railways was best appreciated during the famine. The major causes of famine in the past were the absence of an easy and quick means of transporting food from the surplus to scarcity areas. The coming of the railways changed the entire picture. Being quick, food could now be transported from one part to another and relief operations conducted with greater efficiency. That is why the Famine Commission of 1880 found that the highest famine mortality areas were those where transport facilities were most scanty. It is therefore pleaded for the immediate construction of new lines including 3,000 miles for protective purposes.177 But the effectiveness of the largest investment programme in the history of the British Empire, in combating appalling famines, was questionable. But Indian nationalists argued that the Indian Railways

Introduction

55

was commercially oriented and failed to protect people from famine. Tirthankar Roy estimated total famine related mortality during regional crises of 1876-8, 1896-7 and 1899-1900 at between thirteen to sixteen million people.178 While railway had a role to play in facilitating food distribution, the exclusive British focus on railway was much criticized. The British imperialists believed that railway investment tackled famines successfully. This created complacence among the policy makers. R.C. Dutt, a prominent critic, saw building railways as crowding out other investments. He drew a distinction between the early trunk lines put in place with trade and economic development in mind and those constructed after 1878, pushed through by ‘capitalist and speculations’. By 1897, Dutt called for no more railways but increased crop irrigation production. In his opinion, the railways justified increased land tax payments, which increased wheat and rice prices. This had steadily added to the Indian land revenue, while leaving the rice and wheat growers still impoverished. High crop prices left even poor farmers paying higher taxes, and the unfortunate non-agricultural workers suffering crippling deterioration in their terms of trade. Scholars like Michelle McAlpine and John Hurd, carried out regression analysis of Famine Commission data. They came to the conclusion that the British interest encouraged the extension of railways in India rather than famine relief.179 The Grand Old Man of Indian nationalism, Dadabhai Naoroji, took such complacency to task. Juland Danvers, public works member at India Office, had written to Naoroji, boasting of ‘railway wealth’ engendered by grain prices, which rose through the establishment of new markets.180 According to Danvers, rising prices added to the national income of India. Dadabhai criticized the view of Danvers saying, ‘if the mere movement of produce can add to the existing wealth, India can become rich in no time. All it would have to do is to go on moving its produce continually . . . the magic wheels of the train wealth will go on springing till the land will not suffice to hold it. . . .’181 These ‘magic wheels’ were intended to push India

56

Ganeswar Nayak

towards greater specialization of agriculture. While Danvers was technically correct that short-term grain and rice price increases would increase national income, Michelle McAlpine pointed to moves in the terms of trade in the nineteenth century favouring agriculture whereas the longer term and lack of diversification and volatility of production, probably worsened Indian poverty. In his assessment, Danvers failed to consider the impact of a limited supply of food caused by GOI spending finite resources on railway rather than irrigation.182 By 1943, Nehru was able to point to the failings of British railway policy as an aspect of Indian famine. The Bengal Famine of 1943 showed that India’s dependence on railway-transported Burma rice and grain had left the food supplies in other parts of the subcontinent vulnerable to drought.183 By 1890, with the completion of the Bengal Nagpur Railways, famine protection in Central Provinces should have improved. While the railways had increased living standards through trade growth, this had been accompanied by rising ‘rates and taxes payable’, according to the testimony given to the 1898 Famine Commission. The railways had decimated grain stores, and food was exported from Central Provinces, so undermining self-insurance. Grain price rises in the Central Provinces had been 50 to 100 per cent in recent years. The ‘famine protective’ Bengal Nagpur Railways, had accelerated price increase in areas like Sambalpur to the extent that locals could not cope, yet that same district showed net exports of food during famine. The export trade brought new demands and pushed grain prices higher while a depreciating rupee made Indian grain relatively cheap for English buyers.184 So, Nagpur suffered grain unrest in the middle of the 1896-7 famine due to increased food prices. Officials in nearby Dongargarh, who threatened severe punishment if problems arose, narrowly averted similar problems. In the Sagar district of the same ‘famine protected railway region’, the population was said to have increased by 18 per cent, cultivable area by 48 per cent over 1865-95, while wheat export

Introduction

57

by rail increased from 40,000 to 7,58,000 maunds over 188797.

Railway and Modern Indian Industry The development of railways affected modern Indian industry seriously. According to G.S. Iyer, ‘every additional mile of railway constructed in this country drove a fresh nail into the coffin of one industry or another’.185 The railways hastened the final eclipse of certain industries and directly killed the iron smelting, glass and paper industries by opening up the countryside to foreign manufacturers. While the railways enabled the cheap machine-made goods of England to undersell and thus destroyed the indigenous handicraft industries, they did not usher industrial revolution as experienced in Japan, the USA and western Europe. These countries developed their iron and steel and other basic industries because railway construction generated the demand for other products.186 In India, however, the railways failed to bring about such take-off, despite the fact that their construction, involving enormous investment in a relatively short period of time, was in the nature of a ‘big push’.187 Building the railways in India failed to give birth to a flood of satellite innovations and destroyed more occupational opportunities than it opened up. The most important reason was that complementary investment in coal, iron, and steel, machinery manufactures, were extremely slow or were not allowed to proceed at all. The development of railways combined with the growth of the jute industry did promote a slow development of a coal mining industry. Similarly, no effort was made to develop the steel industry. 188 Further, no effort was made towards the manufacturing of locomotives and other basic railway equipment except the partial fabrication of wagons and coaches for nearly a century after the establishment of the railway system. The colonial authority preferred to import all these requirements from England to boost their industries. Most of the firms which

58

Ganeswar Nayak

supplied railway equipment were European. In the words of Beumont, ‘Next to Australia, India was (the) largest customer we (England) had for locomotives. We supplied all the material and all the equipment and built railways.’ Therefore multiplier effect of railway investment in terms of income, employment, technical knowledge and growth of external economies were largely exported back to England.189 A complex system of rates and fares were introduced by the colonial government in order to discourage the growth of Indian industries. It encouraged goods traffic from seaports into the interior but hampered internal trade and industry.190 Rates were lower on goods to and from the ports and high on goods traffic inside the country. The Indian Industrial Commission quoted the case of hides: the port rate was 50 per cent less than the internal rates which discouraged the Indian Tanning Industry. The trunk lines ran from big seaports to regions rich in raw materials which also became a market for British manufactured goods. Built to exploit the country’s natural resources, such railway construction aided Europe in becoming manufacturer for India rather than India becoming the manufacturer for herself. The decline of Indian industries rendered a large mass of people unemployed to shift to agriculture, thereby leading to increased ruralization of the country. Famine, therefore, brought hunger and suffering to ever increasing numbers, which necessitated larger expenditure on famine relief. Thus, railways, though helpful in preventing the occurrence of famine, were also responsible for increasing the volume and expense of famine relief work.191

Railway and Trade The railways brought about the growth of trade of India – internal as well as external. Before the coming of railways bullock carts, pack bullocks, elephants, camels, boats and human carriers, were the chief medium of transport. Roads were not suitable for cart traffic. Trade depended upon

Introduction

59

muddy roads and rocky rivers. Most of the internal transport was slow, rates of spoilage were high. These conditions limited the scope of market and volume of trade severely. Introduction of the railways changed the entire picture. The railways provided readily available, faster, and more reliable modes of transport. Comparing freight charges per ton kilometre by pack bullock and bullock cart in early nineteenth century with railway charges a century later, we find a massive decline. By 1930-1 freight prices by rail per ton kilometre were 94 per cent less than prices per ton kilometre for pack bullocks in 1800-40. By reducing transport cost the railways brought significant economic benefit to India. Rice and wheat, especially wheat, began to be exported in large quantities, while export of tea, coffee, hides and skin, oil seeds, raw jute and raw cotton grew rapidly.192 At the same time, the railways helped foreign machine-made goods to enter into the interior of the country. As a result, the total value of Indian foreign trade, which amounted to a bare Rs. 32 crore in 1851-2, rose to Rs. 180.43 crore in 1900-1. It is an increase of more than 5.5 times. The railways gave a large impetus to internal trade as well.193 A network of markets developed all over the country and minor food grain like millets and pulses began to emerge as important commodities in the internal trade of the country. The most significant effect of railway expansion was seen upon the provincial and regional price level for medium and low value goods. I.D. Derbyshire in his article ‘Economic Change and the Railway in Northern India, 1860-1914’, argues that ‘Spatial differences in regional price levels narrowed as UP economy was integrated and all India markets in grain, oilseeds, sugar and cotton became established.’194 He further argues: the price of grain and oil seeds rose by over 60 per cent in the United Provinces between 1860 and 1900, those of raw sugar (gur) by 24 per cent, poppy by 20 per cent, and cotton, which had enjoyed pre-rail market outlet to Calcutta via the Ganga River, by only 10 per cent. Price rises were even higher within isolated sub-

60

Ganeswar Nayak

regions, such as north Oudh, where the price of grain increased by 90 per cent compared with only a 45 per cent rise in the already market connected eastern UP.195

The cotton and sugar cane cultivation in UP was also affected by the coming of railways to this area. The United Province became a ‘sugar province’ of the subcontinent with a 30-50 per cent increase in its sugar acreage being recorded between 1860 and 1895 in response to market expansion and rising prices of sugar. The cultivation of cotton in UP was effected by superior supply sources in the central provinces to furnish the newly built country spinning mills as well as sharp the contraction in local hand spinning demand. Cotton cultivation was switched over from the damp eastern UP and central, northern and eastern Oudh to middle Doab canal belt, where yields were highest and where the plant could be sown early as part of a double cropping mix.196 With the expansion of the railways, grain was transported, for example from Punjab to Bengal during famine and scarcity period. The Burmese rice was also transported to northern India during the famine period.198 During the 1860 UP famine 175,000 tons of grain was transported to the province. Also, 725,000 tons of grain transported during the scarcity of 1907.198

Migration The development of railways led to the migration of people from rural areas to the cities of Calcutta and northern India. The deep and widespread miseries of the rural people and lack of industrial progress in Orissa compelled many to emigrate to different parts of Bengal, where facilities for employment existed.199 The opening of Bengal Nagpur Railway during the closing years of the nineteenth century facilitated emigration. With regard to the emigration of Oriyas, S.L. Maddox observes:

Introduction

61

To sow year after year without knowing by whom the fruits would be gathered, to be continually harried and plundered must necessarily discourage thrift and promote improvidence. For this reason, it seems to be that in his own country at any rate the Oriya is not disposed to be a hard worker. Outside Orissa as a domestic servant, chaprasi and coolies, the Oriya have reputation for good work, which may in part be accounted for by the natural selection of the best young men as emigrants and their natural fitness to the duties in which they are commonly engaged and in part also to the unfitness of the Bengalis.200

The emigrants belonging to the higher castes worked as personal servants in the Bengali families. But those belonging to the low castes worked as labourers in the mills. A considerable number of people went to Sunderbans to cut crops, leaving in November and returning in March. The chief emigration was by rail, especially from Puri, Khurda, Cuttack, Jajpur, Balasore and Bhadrak. A comparison of the figures for the period of 1915-20 and 1925-30 shows an advance in the yearly average value of remittance from Rs. 95 lakh to 144 lakh. Orissa was lacking in industries of its own and it was natural that the surplus men who were not required for cultivation of land, turned their attention to fields of employment outside Calcutta, Jamshedpur and Rangoon, which were the main centres that received emigration. The inhabitants of Khurda sub-division generally went to Rangoon, while Killa Aul in Cuttack district supplied many servants to Calcutta households.201 Railway transport also facilitated emigration from UP to the Howrah jute mills, East Bengal, Bombay, Assam, Burma, and Kanpur. By 1900, almost half a million had migrated from eastern UP, working seasonally during December to May, the slack period for agriculture.202

Railway and Forest The construction of the railways affected the ecology of India profoundly. Railway extension affected the forest resources

62

Ganeswar Nayak

in three ways.203 These were fuel, sleepers and bricks. The scale of railway expansion from 1,349 km of tracks in 1860 increased to 51,658 in 1910 and the trail of destruction left in its wake brought home the fact forcefully that India’s forests were not inexhaustible. Railway requirements were the first and by far the most formidable forces thinning Indian forest.204 Criticizing the forest administration up to the 1857 rebellion a miserable failure, the Governor-General had called in 1862 for the establishment of a department that could ensure the sustained availability of the enormous requirements of the different railway companies for sleepers, which had now made the subject of forest conservation an important administrative question.205 The railway expansion and ecological degradation was initiated after 1853. Each mile of the railway construction required 860 sleepers, each sleeper lasting between 12 and 14 years. In 1870, it was calculated that well over a million sleepers were required annually.206 While European sleepers were imported in some qualities, the emphasis was always on substituting them by Indian timber. The problems had assumed major proportions as three Indian timber – sal, teak, and deodar – were strong enough in their natural state to be utilized as railway sleepers. Sal and teak, being available near railway lines in peninsular India, were very heavily worked in early years. The deodar of the Sutlej and Yamuna Valley was rapidly exhausted.207 The expansion of the railways in Malabar coast exhausted the teak forest of the Malabar coast. By 1870 the teak of Malabar coast was severely depleted and the great teak forest of upper Burma was used for export to India. Similarly, extension of the railways to Indo-Gangetic plains exhausted the forest reserves of the Himalayan region. The annual harvest of trees for railways in western Uttar Pradesh alone fluctuated between 78,000 and 1,47,000 in 1870.208 Bricks were used enormously in the railway expansion agenda. Platforms, station buildings, culverts, bridges were part of the construction and were tightly controlled by the railway companies. In 17 miles of Hullohar division of the

Introduction

63

Indian railways, in the second half of the 1858, two million bricks were burnt and 4.5 million kilns were ready for firing, while another 7 million were moulded.209 The idea of protecting forests was not so much for conserving the ecological balance or protecting the environment, but for constant supply of firewood to the Madras railways. Protection of the forest by the Forest Department meant protecting the commercial interest of English Railway Company and Government of India.

Railway and Health The railways also affected sanitary conditions and generated several diseases like malaria, smallpox, typhoid, pneumonia, dysentery, diarrhoea and ulcers. The railways were constructed in India with a profit motive.210 This was evident in the letter of Lord Lawrence to Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, at Whitehall, with reference to the railway project. In his words, ‘Our main object should be to complete the railway . . . which are great arteries . . . but I doubt if most of them will pay our present financial difficulties. . . . We are at our wits end for revenue; any increase of taxation is sure to produce discontent.’211 So the railways became a new conduit for the coming of several diseases. In 1888 during the construction of BengalNagpur railway, 2,000-3,000 workers died in a single stretch and their bodies were strewn all along the line and rotted with no claims. The stretch became so unbearable that the bodies were dragged into a pile and lit in a mass funeral pyre.212 The construction of the railways created miserable living condition at work sites. There was lack of proper housing, sanitation, drinking water, cooking provision, and no protection for extreme heat and cold.213 The construction of the railways also facilitated the spread of malaria in the country. The earth for railway embankments was often dug from burrow-pits along the line of works. These deserted pits filled

64

Ganeswar Nayak

up with water and vegetation during the rains and became mosquito hatcheries.214 Cutting down of trees for every mile of railway ties for every mile of trackage laid, left poorly rooted trees nearby open to buffeting by winds which soon toppled them over.215 These collapses greatly increased the area of thin soil exposed. Blasted during the dry season by the rays of the sun and by torrential downpours during the rains, these laterite based soils were soon leached out, forming water filled cracks and potholes which female mosquitoes intent on laying eggs found particularly irresistible. Malaria was by far the biggest killer.216 It was said, ‘a death a sleeper’ and some 1,700 sleepers were needed for each mile of track in the Ghat section of Great Indian Peninsular Railways. The construction site of the railways created conditions for the repeated outbreak of malaria and cholera. Life was grim and hard for poverty-stricken, malnourished, weakened, disease-ridden men, women and children. The construction labourers lived in crowded, unsanitary and unhealthy conditions. In fact, the heaviest construction years coincided with famines, 1897 (2,723 miles) and 1898 (2,962 miles) and railway companies and colonial state exploited cheap famine gang labourers.217 The main purpose behind the construction of railways, embankments and roads was to enhance the revenue of the state, not the well-being of the people. The widespread prevalence of malaria or other vector-borne diseases was due to serious environmental disturbances caused by the government’s greedy policy of exploitation. The epidemic malaria fever of Burdwan was attributed to the obstruction of the natural drainage system because of railway embankments. It was rightly remarked by K.C. Ghosh, that ‘Railways are a prolific source of Anophelics breeding places and malaria of virulent type’.218 Similarly, an outbreak of malaria in Malda district was blamed on the extension of the railways. An outbreak of malaria took place in Murshidabad district coinciding with the construction of a new railway line there.219 The sanitary report alluded to an epidemic of malaria which broke

Introduction

65

out when the railways was constructed between Dhaka and Mymensingh.220 In the later days, Bentley thought that the areas of greatest railway construction in Bengal in the 1920s were the most intensely malaria-prone ones. ‘More railway, more malaria’, became a common saying in Bengal.221 The railways also played a potential role in the multiplication of cholera in colonial India. David Arnold has given valuable scholarly insights to the problem.222 Punjab and Bengal were the important places for spreading these diseases. The great German microbiologist Robert Koch recognized the intensification of cholera after the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in Punjab.223 He argues that railway traffic played a most important role in the long distance spread of cholera. He substantiates that with the coming of railways in 1861, the behaviour of cholera had changed. From then a comparatively large number of epidemics followed regularly: 1861, 1862, 1867, 1869, 1872, 1875, and 1881.224 Modern railway transport provided incursion course for disease, and cholera epidemics flared up in the central provinces along these arteries for development and death. Construction crews brought cholera microbes or were infected from polluted water sources, and railway multiplied traffic on dusty access roads whose few miles contaminated wells and tanks rapidly. Similarly, the opening of the East Indian Railways to Jubbulpore in 1867, exposed central India to the import of cholera to the Ganga Valley.225 Cholera in 1869 spread westwards along the Great Indian Peninsular line to the new railway construction, where crowding and insanitation in work camp, and exhausted labour gang explained to the health officials why cholera was lethal. One band of 6,500 transport workers had a cholera death rate of 45 per mile and 400 others had a rate of 100 per mile.226 In 1897, plague in Bombay shook the colonial health establishment. It was feared that the disease was spreading through the pilgrims visiting Puri from Bombay. The Bengal government suggested the idea of stopping railway booking between Bombay Presidency and Khurda Road stations and all

66

Ganeswar Nayak

stations of the East Coast Railway to avert any danger to Calcutta. It was felt that this would also prevent the disease from spreading to other pilgrim centres like Benares and Haridwar since it was a common practice to visit several holy places in a single tour. However, the idea of restricting pilgrim movement – with which the railway business was obviously linked – was not considered. Interestingly, the strategy incorporated the idea that if pilgrims in the Bombay Presidency wanted to go to Puri they would go via Calcutta. The journey would be so long that the normal period of incubation would expire before they reached Calcutta. However, since it was felt that this plan would not be effective, the alternative was to screen train routes during the rathyatra by commissioning a medical officer at Bezwada. By June, the Orissa commissioner had directed the setting up of observation camps to examine pilgrims who came from Bombay. This was the formal position that was adopted. Despite the extension of railway throughout India, nothing was done to improve water supplies, not even a proper kaccha well was dug.228 Railway authorities overlooked intermittent pleas from the health officer for sanitation improvements. It proves that British government single mindedly worked for the opening out of railways but did not take any step to protect the hygienic condition of colonial people.229

Railway and Working Class Movements In the nineteenth century, construction of railways attracted a large number of labourers. Commercialization of agriculture, decline of handicraft industries and stunted growth of modern industries generated a large number of labour force in the country. So the railways became a major source of employment to the Indian labourers. On average 180,601 to 221,253 persons per annum were employed between 1859 and 1900 with 126 to 155 persons per mile.230 The British Government invited several private companies to construct railways in India. The colonial government did not bother

Introduction

67

because it protected the interest of the railway company and European contractors rather than poor Indian labourers. Abundant labour availability became an excuse to keep the level of technology low. So cheap labourers could be exploited profitably. A majority of the workers remained unskilled as manual labourers, diggers and movers. Indian railways remained a heavily labour intensive operation in which men, women, and children sold their labour force until the end of the Raj.231 Most of the labourers came from rural areas and from landless agricultural labouring and marginal peasant classes. It was primarily labour intensive capitalism whereby abundant labour-served the needs of capital in a situation of low technological initiatives.232 Sometimes entire families were employed with children as old as 10 years. Neither the railway companies nor European contractors took any responsibility for taking care of workers and their families. They were working in dangerous and accident-prone areas. Death of Europeans was reported in great details and mourned greatly. But when Indian labourers died, it was ignored or merely mentioned as a cold statistical figure. They hardly got justice from the colonial legal system.233 The British reserved mental work for themselves and gave manual labour to Indians. They underestimated the competence of Indians who were hired as lower level personnel in such jobs as engine drivers and guards. This was due to the prevalence of racial discrimination.234

Railway and Tourism Introduction and expansion of the railway increased pilgrim traffic to different historical and cultural centres substantially. That means the railways enhanced the social foundation of tourists. Most of the tourist centres were Puri, Prayag, Haridwar, Tirupati, and Rameshwaram. A British observer states that 2.5 million attended Kumbh Mela at Haridwar in 1796.235 Two million people were said to have been at Allahabad during one day in 1906 that was held to be particularly auspi-

68

Ganeswar Nayak

cious for bathing at the junction of the Ganga, the Jamuna, and the Saraswati river. Puri, the place of Lord Jagannath was connected by Bengal-Nagpur Railway.236 Piligrim traffic to Puri increased vastly after the connection with the railways.237 An average of 20,000 pilgrims were going daily to Tirupati. Rameshwaram was visited by 2,50,000 people annually. In the year 1901, 43,00,000 railway tickets were booked between Howrah Station and Puri, when a direct train was available.238 The Bihar and Orissa pilgrim committees were flooded with complaints about the ways in which pilgrim were carried and treated during their train journey.239

This Volume The collection incorporates 14 articles which weave several themes related to the railways in colonial South Asia. The choice of the articles is based primarily with the idea of integrating some of the current research associated with the railways in colonial South Asia. The first article ‘Imperial Railway in South Asia’ is a wide-ranging analysis of the British Imperial Railway during the second half of the nineteenth century. It critically examines the role of colonial economy in India, the role of the finance capital, British monopoly and colonization of Indian economy, colonization of Indian forestry, famine and disease. The article argues that the colonial railways in fact had a regressive impact on the land, environment and people of South Asia. Post-colonial scholarship in South Asia had established that the impact of British Imperial Railway was quite contrary to the official policy of the Raj. The second article on the Pakistan railways by Imran Muhammed and Waheed Ahmed explores the history and role of railways in Pakistan. It explores the challenges of construction of railways in north-western part of Pakistan. Further, the article argues about short-sighted and myopic railway policy of Pakistan government which eventually led to the decline of the railways in Pakistan. The next interesting article of Dhirendra Dangwal, ‘Im-

Introduction

69

pact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forest’, analyses the destructive effects of railway construction on Himalayan forests. The article argues that from mid-nineteenthcentury railway expansion was taking place very rapidly. For the expansion of railway, teak and sal were cut on a large scale. With the depletion of forest cover, attention was shifted to the Himalayan forest, which was considered inexhaustible and inaccessible. The reckless destruction of forest in the Himalayan region produced enormous damage to the ecology. It further argues that destruction of forests had long-term environmental consequences which the British at that time did not realize. The paper analyses all these issues. The fourth article, ‘History of Railway Deforestation in India’ by Ravi Kumar, discusses the ecological dimension of Indian Railways and argues that the railways was responsible for massive deforestation by the way of consuming valuable wood for sleepers and fuel. By focusing on south India, the article argues that the railways were the one of the important forces responsible for new forest policy. He further argues that the deforestation induced by the railways was important to understand the ecological cost of the British colonial rule in India. The fifth article entitled ‘Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railway’ by Nadia Tahir discusses growth of railways in Pakistan after the Partition of India. First, it discusses how railways were built in a strategically important and landlocked area which was the source of cheap raw materials to the British industries. Second, she discusses how guaranteed railway in the strategic area were not commercially feasible. Third, she talks about several factors which contributed to the crisis in Pakistan railways. The author argues that after 1985 railways in Pakistan declined considerably. By the year 2013, several lines closed due to financial discipline and managerial autonomy. The most significant point is that the railways declined in Pakistan in the post-Independence era. The next article is ‘Railway Development in Sri Lanka’ by David Hyatt. Here the author has highlighted the overall

70

Ganeswar Nayak

railway development in Sri Lanka. He says that construction of railway lines close to the coast was simple but the line in the hill country achieved an impressive feat of engineering. Further he argues that Sri Lanka Railway was handicapped by financial instability as it sustained on loan, gift and other financial facilities. So, railway development in Sri Lanka was not satisfactory. Madhumita Bandyopadhyay in her article has discussed the ‘Working employees of Bombay-Baroda and Central India Railway Company’, which built railway in western part of India. She has pointed out that every European employee was bound by an agreement before coming to India. She argues the various features of employment like leave rules, pay and incentives, criteria of promotion, bonus and premium offered to the employees. She further argues that geographical condition, climate and health were the main problems of coming to India. However the Europeans were the main support of railway construction in India. So the European companies were attracted with higher pay, overtime, supply of housing and healthcare facilities. Rita Bhamta in her article discusses the challenges of railway construction in India. She has described how construction of Thull and Bhore Ghat railway was a herculean task for the railway company. The geographical peculiarities, rugged precipitous ground and sudden dangerous landslides made the situation complex. The problem of pure drinking water became a potential factor for the outbreak of several infectious diseases in this mountainous region. Similarly, due to negligence of the railway company several strikes and demonstrations were conducted by employees. This was another example of exploitation by the railway company. The next article is ‘Problems of Indian Railway’ by N. Benjamin. He has nicely outlined major tribulations confronted by the Indian railways. He argues that survey of extension to Asri-Hasan line to Manjarabad was deferred for two years owing to difficult and unhealthy nature of the country. The line between Cutwa and Hoogly passed over swampy land.

Introduction

71

The flooded region of the Ganga Valley and coast of Orissa made the situation tougher for the survey team. In Bengal and western India, the railway workers had to face several diseases like cholera, malaria, smallpox, typhoid, dysentery and ulcers. Benjamin in his article has proved that all these problems handicapped the growth of the Indian railways. He further proves that colonial railway officers and engineers remained on the safe side and Indian labourers were most affected by this hazard. Maitree Vaidya in her article has discussed how the railway influenced Gujarati literature and culture. The article outlines various changes in Gujarati society with the introduction of railway. The article also tries to analyse the adoption of railway to the everyday life of Gujarati society. Aruna Awasthi has outlined the new dimension of Indian Railways by delineating the spread of railway network in the country. The article discusses Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway and its impact on the princely states. The author argues that this railway line became a new vehicle for exploiting the hinterland and also a device for tightening political grip over the Indian states. The author has discussed the profitable opium trade of this railway line for the British. Bhupinder Singh in his article ‘Colonialism and Transformation in Colonial Punjab: A Study of Railway Development’, has outlined the railway development in colonial Punjab. Due to strategic importance, Punjab was a colonial priority in the railway extension programme. The scholar argues that, though railway served the colonial interest, it also played a dominant role in the socio-economic transformation of Punjab. The author substantiates his argument by citing the example of army recruitment in Punjab. Puspa Kumari, in her article ‘Railway in Bihar: Peasant Protest, and Response of Raj and Compensation’, has outlined a new dimension of Indian Railways. In this background, the author discusses the railway problem from peasant perspectives and consequent peasant protest due to construction of railway bridge built in 1885 in northern Bihar. She has also

72

Ganeswar Nayak

discussed the environmental impact of the railway project in Bihar. The next article ‘Railway Development in India: A Study of Extension to Colonial Odisha’, by Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Jena, has outlined how a backward region like Odisha was not in the agenda of railway extension programme. The scholars argue that in spite of prevalence of famine, poverty and high mortality, the colonial government did not want to extend railways to Orissa. The authors further argue that British claim of promoting railways as a famine protecting line was not applied here. The British government desired to extend railways to Orissa only to fulfil the imperial agenda of connecting their two headquarters of Calcutta and Madras.

NOTES 1. R.M. Stephenson, ‘Report Upon the Practicability and Advantages of the Introduction of Railways into British India with the Official Correspondence with the Bengal Govt. and Full Statistical Data Respecting the Existing Trade Upon the Line Connecting Calcutta with Mirzapur, Benares, Allahabad and North-West Frontier, 1844, London, L/PWD/ 2/43, OICC. 2. Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Colonial Context of the Bengal Renaissance: A Note on Early Railway Thinking in Bengal’, in Our Indian Railway, ed. Roopa Srinivasan, Delhi: Foundation Books, 2006, p. 3. 3. L.H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital to 1875, London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, p. 210. 4. Daniel Thornier, Investment in Empire, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 47. 5. J. Chapman, The Cotton and Commerce of India Considered in Relation to the Interest of Great Britain with Remarks on Railway Communication in Bombay Presidency, London, 1851, OIOC. 6. V.B. Sing, Economic History of India, Bombay, 1965, p. 327. 7. M.N. Das, Studies in the Economic and Social Development of Modern India, Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1959, p. 336. 8. Anu Kumar, The Hindu, 8 September 2012. 9. Daniel Thornier, Investment in Empire, Philadelphia; Horace Bell, Railway Policy in India, p. 63, The Imperial Gazetteer of India,

Introduction

10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

73

vol. III, p. 365, N. Sanyal, Railway Development in India, Calcutta, p. 86. Thornier, op. cit., p. 63. Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Mationalism in India, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1869, p. 172; Imperial Gazetteer of India, p. 365. Anu Kumar, ‘Getting a Nation on Track’, The Hindu, op. cit., 8 September, 2012. I.J. Kerr, John Chapman and the Promotion of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway,1842-1850, Canada: University of Manitoba, 2008. Sanyal, op. cit., p 86. Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. III, p. 366. Ibid. Ibid. M.B.K. Mallick, Hundred Years of Pakistan Railway, Islamabad: Ministry of Railway and Communication, Railway Board Government of Pakistan, 1962, p. 56. Ibid., p. 57. R.E. Looney, ‘On the Decline of Pakistan Railway System’, International Journal of Transport Economics, vol. 25, no. 3, (October 1998), pp. 353-78. Syed Abdul Quddus, Rail Transport in Pakistan, Lahore, Directorate of Research and Training, Pakistan, p. 42. Railway Gazette International, May 2009, p. 16. Ibid. Ibid. J.M.F.G. Fernando, ‘The Economics of Tea Industry in Ceylon’, unpublished MSc thesis, University of London, 1996, p. 32. Despatch 222 of Chamberlain to Lieut. Governor on 21 July 1899, Printed in Sectional Paper, XXX of 1899. Indrani Munasinghe, ‘The Great Northern Railway of Sri Lanka’, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka, New Series, vol. 33, 1988/9, p. 85. A memorial from the planters enclosed in the Despatch 58 of West Ridgeway to Chamberlain on 18 February 1898. Colonial Office Records 54. 644. Hereafter records will be referred to as CO 54, Colonial Official records 54 series at the Public Record Office, London, contains the despatches. With enclosures from the Governor of Sri Lanka to the Secretary of State for Colonies. The copies of the replies from the colonial office

74

29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

37. 38.

39.

Ganeswar Nayak with minutes of the Secretary of State and officials were also available in their series, C.O. 54. Third Report of the Committee on Railway Extension Northwards, Sessional Paper VI of 1893. Ibid. The Railway Statistics in this chapter are taken from: Moris and Clyde B. Dudley, ‘Selected Railway Statistics for the Indian Subcontinent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) 18531946/47’, Artha Vyjnana, 17(3), pp. 185-298 (September 1975) Parliamentary Papers, Administrative Report on Railway in India (selected years). Moris and Dudley, op. cit. V.B. Singh, Economic History of India, op. cit., p. 343. Ibid., p. 328. William Patrick Andrew, Politics and Military Importance of Railway in India, Indian Railway as Connected with the Power and Stability of the British Empire in the East, London, 1846, pp. 125-7; Rowland MacDonald Stephenson, Report Upon the Practicability and Advantages of the Introduction of Railways in to British India, London, 1845, p. 7, George Huddleston, History of East Indian Railway, Calcutta, 1906-39, p. 2; Daniel Thornier, Investment in Empire, Philadelphia, 1950, pp. 47-58. Copy of the memorandum by Major Kennedy, on the question of a system of railways for India, Parliamentary papers 1854(131)4; M.J. MacPherson, ‘Investment in Indian Railways, 1854-1875’, Economic History Reviews, (1955), 8(2): 179; Edward Davidson, The Railway of India: With an Account of Their Rise, Progress, and Construction. Written with the Records of the India Office, London, 1868, pp. 56-7. Ibid., p. 58. Daniel Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress, pp. 60-1; Davidson, The Railways of India, pp. 72-3; Copy of the memorandum by Major Kennedy, Parliamentary Papers 1854(131): 3-5. William Wilson Hunter, Rulers of India: The Marquess of Dalhousie and the Final Development of the Company’s Rule, Oxford, 1895, pp. 191-3; James Andrew Broun Ramsay Dalhousie, Private Letters of the Marquis of Dalhousie, London, 1910, p. 279; ‘Copies of extract of correspondence received by the last mail from the Governor-General in Council in India, relative to railway

Introduction

40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

75

undertaking in that country’, Parliamentary papers, 18521853, (787): 114-15 (first and second quotations); 118 (third quotations), Davidson, Railway of India, pp. 80-9; Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress, p. 64. William Howard Russell, My Diary in India: In the Year 1858-1859, 2 vols., London, 1860, 1: 154-5; Ira Klein, ‘Materialism, Mutiny and Modernization in British India’, Modern Asian Studies, (2000), 34(3): 545-80; John Brunton, Being the Memories of Johan Brunton, Engineer, from a Manuscript in His Own Handwritten for his Grand Children, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 105. Thornier, Pattern of Railway Development of India, op. cit., p. 85. Ibid. Amit K. Sharma, ‘Fire Carriage of the Raj’, Annual Journal, Department of History, University of Virginia, p. 4. T. Robert Kubicek, ‘British Expansion, Empire and Technological Change’, The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter, New York, 1999, p. 251; Macpherson, Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875, p. 179. Sewaright, Steaming East, 213, 220, 222; Frontier Policy: ‘Durbar at Peshawar, April 26 1902’, in Lord Curzon in India, pp. 422, 425 (quotation). Navavibhakar, 21 April (RNP Beng, 26 April 1884); Bangladeshi, 5 May (ibid., 12 May 1894): Swadessamitran, 30 October (RNPM); G.S. Iyer, EA, p. 263; Quoted in Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism, New Delhi, 1977, p. 192. Samava, 12 May (RNP Beng, 17 May 1884); Bangabasi, 9 April, Ibid.,16 April 1887), G.S. Iyer, Indian Politics, Madras, 1898, p. 181. G.S. Iyer in ‘Indian Politics’, p. 181; Kesari, 9 September 1890; Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism, p.192; Dutt, Speeches 1, p. 98. Stephenson, Report on the Practicability and Advantages of the Introduction of Railway into British India, 7 (quotations); Thornier, Investment in Empire, 47; Ira Klein, ‘Materialism Mutiny and Modernization in British India’, Modern Asian Studies (2000), 34(3): 553; Macpherson, Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875, pp. 177-8: Davidson, Railway of India; pp. 38-9.

76

Ganeswar Nayak

50. Ibid., p.183. 51. W.J. Macpherson, Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875, p. 182. 52. Ibid., p. 182. 53. East India Company, ‘Contact Between the Honorable East India Company and the East India Railway Company (1849), pp. 12, 182, 184 (first quotation), Copies of extracts of Correspondence received by the last mail from the GovernorGeneral in Council in India, relative to railway undertaking in that country, Parliamentary Papers 1852-53 (787: pp. 114-17) (third quotation): ‘Copy of Memorandum by Major Kennedy, on the Question of a General System of Railway for India’, Parliamentary Papers, 1854 (131), pp. 3-4. 54. The Times, 2 December 1848. 55. ‘Copy of Railway Dispatches to Bombay’ (1854-8), p. 317, Financial (Railway Dispatch) No. 42 of 30 September 1857. 56. Satpal Sangwan, ‘Indian Responses to European Sciences and Technologies, 1757-1857’ The British Journal of History of Sciences, (1998), 21(2): 221; J.A.B.R. Dalhousie, Private Letters of Marquis of Dalhousie, p. 314. 57. Ibid. p. 314. 58. MacPherson, Investment in Indian Railway,1845-1875, op. cit., p. 177; Curzon, Administrative and Financial Progress: Third Budget Speech (Legislative Council at Calcutta), 27 March 1901, in Lord Curzon in India. 59. Sharma, op. cit., p. 7. 60. Robert Cecil quoted in Macpherson, Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875, p. 177; Curzon, Administrative and Financial Progress: Third Budget Speech (Legislative Council at Calcutta), March 1901, in Lord Curzon in India, pp. 81-5. 61. M. Mann, Torchbearers’ upon the path of progress: Britain’s ideology of a Moral and Material Progress in India, in H. Fisher-Tine and M. Mann (eds.), Colonialism in a Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India, London, 2004. 62. Hansard, 3rd ser. ccxvii (31 July 1873), col. 1396; quoted in W.J. MacPherson, Investment in Indian Railway, p. 177. 63. W.P. Andrews, Indian Railways, and Their Probable Results, with maps and appendix, containing statistics of external and internal commerce of India, by an old Indian Post Master, London, 1840, OIOC.

Introduction

77

64. Daniel Thornier, ‘The Pattern of Railway Development in India’, Far Eastern Quarterly, 1995, XIV. 65. A Short Enquiry into the Profitable Nature of our Investment, (1881), p. 20. 66. Ian J. Kerr, Engines of Change: The Railroads that Made India, Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2012, p. 26. 67. Ian Derbyshire, Private and State Enterprise: Financing and Managing the Railway of Colonial North India, ed. I.J. Kerr, New Departure in their Indian Railway, p. 279. 68. Ibid. 69. V.B. Singh, Economic History of India, 1857-1956, p. 330. 70. Kerr, ‘Engine of Change’, op. cit., p. 25. 71. Daniel Thornier, ‘Capital Movement and Transportation: Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railways’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1951, 390 mn). 72. Ibid., no. 5. 73. Ibid., p. 391. 74. Ibid., p. 4. 75. Singh, op. cit., p. 330. 76. A Short Inquiry into the Profitable Nature of our Investment, London, 1881, p. 20. 77. William Thomas Thornton, Indian Public Works and Cognate Topics, London: Macmillian, 1875, p. 34. 78. Report on the Indian Railway Administration, Parliamentary Papers, pp. 1867, L 658. 79. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 181. 80. Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. III, p. 367. 81. Ibid. 82. Lord Dalhousie, Minute to the Council of Directors of the East India Company, 20 April 1853, 2: 23-57. 83. D.H. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India, New York, 1934, p. 185. 84. Sanyal, op. cit., p. 17. 85. Imperial Gazetteer of India, op. cit., p. 366. 86. R.C. Dutt, India in the Victorian Age, London, 1908, p. 265. 87. Journal of East India Association, vol. III, 1869, no. 1, p. 13. 88. Kausal, op. cit., p. 369. 89. Singh, op. cit., p. 331. 90. Government of India, Despatch No. 24, 11 March 1869. 91. Singh, op. cit., p. 332.

78 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

105.

106. 107.

108. 109.

110. 111. 112. 113.

114. 115.

Ganeswar Nayak Idid. Ibid. Imperial Gazetteer of India, op. cit., p. 381. Ibid. Dutt, p. 410. Vera Anstey, op. cit., p. 133. Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, p. 170. Sanyal, op. cit., p. 68. R.D. Tiwari, Railway in Modern India, Bombay: New Book Co., 1941, p. 68. Imperial Gazetteer of India, op. cit., p. 373. Jenk, op. cit., p. 225. Thomas Robertson Report, Appendix, p. 66. Act XLIII of 1850, pp. 92-3, George Turnbull’s Letter to the Chairman and Director of the East Indian Railway, Shrirampur, 3 January 1851, from the papers on the Proposed Railway in Bengal (Home, 1853, in Selection from the Records of the Government of India, Serial 1, p. 65). Smritikumar Sarkar, Land Acquisition for the Railways in Bengal, 1850-62: Probing a Contemporary Problem, Studies in History, 2010, p. 103. Ibid. N. Benjamin, ‘Problems of Indian Railway up to 1900’, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Occasional Papers, p. 3. Hena Mukherjee, Early History of East Indian Railway, 18541879, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1994, pp. 95-6 and 98. Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Early Railwaymen in India, Dacoity and Train Wrecking, 1860-1900’, Essay in Honour of S.C. Sarkar, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, p. 90. Kerr, Engines of Change, op. cit., p. 23. Benjamin, p. 04. Hena Mukherjee, p. 35. J.N. Sahani, Indian Railway One Hundred Years, 1853-1953, New Delhi, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 1953, pp. 10-11, 43. Ibid. S. Saritha, ‘Colonialism and Modernization, History and Development of Southern Railway: A Case Study’, unpublished PhD thesis, submitted to University of Kerala, 2012, p. 69.

Introduction

79

116. G.W. Macgeorge, Ways and Work in India, Being an Accountant of the Public Works in that Country from Earliest Times up to the Present Days, Westminster, 1894, p. 358. 117. Benjamin, p. 2. 118. OICC, PWD, Railway Construction Proceedings, July 1882, No. 115. 119. Ian Derbyshire, Pattern of Railway Development in India, p. 268. 120. Ibid. 121. Jack Simon, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, London: Licestra University Press, 1978, vol. 1, p. 176. 122. Derbyshire, op. cit., p. 273. 123. G.T. Anthony, Professional Engineering Training at Thomson College, Roorkee (NF), 1919, p. 274. 124. Deepak Kumar, ‘Racial Discrimination and Science in Nineteenth Century’, Economic and Social Historical Reviews (IECHR), vol. XIX, 1982, pp. 63-82. 125. T.R. Gourvish, Railway and British Economy, 1830-1914, London: Macmillan, 1980, p. 20. 126. Kerr, ‘Engine of Change’, op. cit., p. 40. 127. Ibid., p. 28. 128. Ibid. 129. Hugh and Hughes, Indian Locomotives, pt. 1, Broad Gauges, p. 7. 130. Fritz Lehman, ‘Great Britain and the Supply of Railway Locomotives in India: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism’, IECHR II, 4 October 1977, pp. 297-306. 131. David A. Campion, ‘Railway Policing and Security in Colonial India, 1860-1930’, in Roopa Srinivasan, Manish Tiwari and Sandeep Silas (eds.), Our Indian Railways, Themes in Indian History, New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2006, p. 122. 132. M. Pauparao Naidu, The History of Railway Thieves with Illustration and Hints on Detections, 4th edn, Madras: Higginbotham 1915, p. 62. 133. ‘History of Indian Police’, Indian Police Collections (Mss Eur, F161), OICC. 134. Campion, ‘Railway Policing and Securities in Colonial India, 1860- 1930’, op. cit., p. 122. 135. Report of the Railway Police Commission, Simla, 1921, pp. 20-1. 136. O. Lloyd, Secret Doings of Indian Railway, Agra: Author, 1911. 137. ARR, 1870-71, p. 9. 138. Times of India, 25 December 1897, p. 6.

80

Ganeswar Nayak

139. AAR, 1896-97, pp. 211-15. 140. Couplings Berridge, ‘Couplings to the Khyber’, The Story of North Western Railway, New York: David and Charles, 1969, p. 295. 141. ARR, 1870-71, p. 31. 142. Ibid., p. 32. 143. J.N. Westwood, Railway of India, Newton Abbot: David and Charls, 1974, pp. 139. 144. Singh, p. 336. 145. Ibid. 146. Ibid., p. 337. 147. Ibid., p. 335. 148. Chandra, op. cit., p. 208. 149. D.E. Wacha, Indian Railway Finance, Madras: G.A. Natesan and Company, 1912, p. v; W.J. Macpherson, Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875, Economic History Reviews, second series, VIII, p. 185. 150. LCP, 1898, vol. XXX, p. 534. 151. Native Opinion, 9 September RNPBom (Report of the Native Press for Bombay) (Weekly), Joshi, op. cit., pp. 336, 856, 857; Dutt, EHI, p. 171. 152. G.S. Iyer, Indian Politics 1898, p. 182, 153. Dutt, Economic History of India, op. cit., p. 312. 154. Report of Mr. Thomas Robert Robertson, CVO, 1903, pp. 4 and 5. 155. G.V. Joshi, Writings and Speeches, p. 693. 156. Mackay Committee Report on Indian Railway Finance and Administration, 1908, pp. 11-12. 157. Kerr, Engines of Change, op. cit., p. 130. 158. RAR, 1920-21, p. 18. 159. RAR, 1921-22, p. 68. 160. Sanyal, p. 276. 161. Kerr, op. cit., p. 131. 162. Acworth Committee Report, 1920-21, pp. 3 and 4. 163. Kausal, p. 404. 164. Report of the Indian Railway Enquiry Committee, 1937, p. 88. 165. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 166. Ibid., pp. 9-167. 167. Ibid., pp. 9-10

Introduction

81

168. B.N. Asthana, ‘Railway Finance in India, 1853-1954’ (unpublished D Phil thesis), University of Allahabad, p. 142. 169. Ibid. 170. Banerjee, Indian Economics, p. 325. 171. Ibid. 172. Ibid. 173. Asthana, op. cit., p. 254. 174. Kausal, op. cit., p. 415. 175. M.K Gandhi, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, ed. Anthony J. Parel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 47. 176. Ibid., p. 166. 177. Famine Commission Report, 1880, p. 192 178. Tirthanker Roy, The Economic History of India 1857-1957, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 294; William Digby, Prosperous British India, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1901, p. 134, a prominent English critic of British India, observed an enormous increase in famine deaths over nineteenth century, even as railways were being built, from one million in the first quarter to twenty-six million in the final quarter. 179. Michelle McAlpine, Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western India, 1860-1920, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 216; John Hurd, ‘Railway and Expansion of Market in India 1861-1921’, Exploration on Economic History, vol. 12 (1975), p. 263. 180. Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, London: Swan, 1901, p. 160 181. Hans Singer, ‘The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing’, American Economic Reviews, vol. 40, no. 2 (May 1950) provides a theoretical underpinning to worsening of agriculture’s terms of trade over time against manufacturers. 182. Stuart Sweeney, Indian Railway and Famine 1875-1914, Magic Wheels and Empty Stomachs (Essay in Economic and Business History), vol. XXVI, Michigan: Central Michigan University, 2008, p. 149. 183. J.L. Nehru, The Discovery of India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 495; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 51 argued that no comparable famine had occurred in Independent India after the colonial disaster of 1943, posting a link between independent democracies

82

184.

185. 186.

187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193.

194. 195. 196. 197. 198.

199. 200. 201.

Ganeswar Nayak and robust famine prevention; Ian Derbyshire, Opening of the Interior: The Impact of the Railway on the North India Economy and Society, 1860-1914, 1985, understands that the 1943 famine proved the importance of railways, since it was the Japanese blocking rail routes which caused famines. Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1898, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, vol. IV, Central Provinces and Berar, p. 261, Testimony of Rai Bahadur Rajaran Sitaram Dizit. Address to Madras Provincial Conference at Madurai, 22 May 1901. As forests were reserved for railway construction, the price of charcoal used in smelting went very high, Gadgil, op. cit., pp. 43-4. W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 55-7. Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 284-5. Singh, op. cit., p. 512. Industrial Commission Report, 1918, p. 205. Buchanan, op. cit., p. 179. Cambridge Economic History of India, Dharma Kumar, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2008, p. 740. J. Hurd, ‘Railway and Expansion of Markets in India, 18611921’, Exploration in Economic History (1975), 12: 263-88; M. Mukherjee, ‘Railway and their Impact on Bengal Economy: 1870-1920’, IESHR (April-June 1980). Agricultural Statistics of British India, 1883/4-1914-15. I. Derbyshire, ‘Economic Change and Railway in Northern India’, Modern Asian Studies, 21: 3 (1987). Report of the Indian Cotton Committee, Calcutta, 1919, p. 186. R. Baird Smith, Report on the Famine of 1860-1 in NWP, pp. 1862, 40, and UP RBTs 1907/8 and 1908/9. S.H. Freemantle, Report on Labour Supply in the United Province and Bihar (UP Revenue Department, F 167/1906 UP State Archives). G. Nayak, Development of Transport and Communication: A Case Study, New Delhi: Anmol, 2000, p. 300. S.L. Maddox, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of Orissa, 1890-1900, vol. 1, Calcutta, 1900, p. 125. Utkal Deepika, 29 August 1906.

Introduction

83

202. In the 1911 Census, E.A.H. Blunt noted that there was not a family in the entire Banaras division without at least one member in Calcutta, Howrah, Assam, Burma, Bihar of Orissa earning supplementary income. 203. Madhab Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 107. 204. H. Cleghorn, Forest and Gardens of South India, London: W.H. Allen, 1860, pp. 3, 33, 63, 77-8, 253-4. 205. C.G. Trevor and C.A. Smythies, Practical Forest Management, Allahabad: Government Press, 1923, p. 5. 206. Indian Forestor, V, 1879. 207. D. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Railway Sleepers of Himalayan Pines Impregnated in India’, Indian Forestor, V, 1879. 208. Richard Tucker, ‘The British Colonial System and Forest of the Western Himalayas, 1815-1914’, in Richard Tucker and John Richards (eds), Global Deforestation and Nineteenth Century World Economy, Durham: Duke University Press, 1983, pp. 158-9. 209. Laxman D. Satya, ‘British Imperial Railway in Nineteenth Century South Asia’, EPW, 22 November 2008, p. 75. 210. Ibid. 211. Deepak Kumar, Disease and Medicine in India, New Delhi: Tulika, 2012, p. 129. 212. I.J. Kerr, Building Railway of the Raj, 1850-1900, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 98. 213. D. Satya, op. cit., p. 75. 214. Arabinda Samanta, ‘Malaria Fever in Colonial India, 18201939’, Social History of Epidemics, Kolkata: Firma KLM, 2002, p. 160. 215. Sheldon J. Watts, Epidemic and History, Disease Power and Imperialism, London: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 267. 216. D. Satya, op. cit., p. 75. 217. Kerr, Building Railway of the Raj, op. cit., p. 162. 218. C.A. Beantly, ‘Some Economic Aspect of Bengal Malaria’, The Indian Medical Gazette Advertiser, Calcutta, September 1922, pp. 324-6. 219. Report of the Sanitary Commissioner of Bengal for the Year 1873, Calcutta, 1874, p. 94.

84

Ganeswar Nayak

220. Stewart and Proctor, Final Report on the District of Jessore, Nadia, and Murshidabad, Calcutta, 1970, pp. xii-xiv. 221. A Review of Legislation in Bengal Relating to the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Embankments, Calcutta: Government of Bengal, 1911, p. 6. 222. Kumar, op. cit., p. 129. 223. Dharma Kumar, Cambridge Economic History of India, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005, p. 750. 224. Ira Klein, ‘Imperialism, Ecology and Disease: Cholera in India 1850- 1950’, IESHR (1994), 31(4): 15. 225. Ibid., p. 15. 226. Indian Sanitary Proceeding (ISP), 1870, VI, Cholera Epidemic, p. 2. 227. Home Dept, Sanitary Branch, 83-95, July 1897, NAI. 228. ISP, 6 May 1871, no. 9, IOL. 229. Ibid. 230. Kerr, Building Railway of the Raj, p. 189. 231. Ian Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railway: The Application of Western Technologies in the Colonial Peripheri, 1850-1920’, in Ian Kerr, Railways in Modern India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 185. 232. Kerr, Building Railway of the Raj, ch. 4. 233. Ibid., pp. 166-6. 234. Kumar, Cambridge Economic History of India, op. cit., 2005, p. 750. 235. D.P. Dube, ‘Kumbha Mela, Origin and Historicity of India’s Greatest Pilgrim Fair’, in R.L. Singh and Rana B.P. Singh (eds.), Trends in the Geography of Piligrimage, Homage to David E. Sopher, Banaras: The National Geopgraphic Society of India, Benaras Hindu University, 1987, pp. 117-40 236. Dharitri Mohanty, ‘Pilgrimage to Sri Kshetra(Puri)’, in Lallanji Gopal and D.P. Dubey (eds.), Pilgrimage Studies: Text and Content, Allahabad: The Society of Piligrimage Studies, 1990, p. 125. 237. Report of the Pilgrim Committee Madras, 1915, Simla, 1916, p. 39. 238. Mohanty, op. cit., p. 124. 239. Report of the Pilgrim Committees Bihar and Orissa, Patna, 1913, p. 31.

CHAPTER 1

British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth Century South Asia Laxman D. Satya

In 1846 the Revenue Commissioner of Bombay, Thomas Williamson wrote to the Chairman of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company in London stating The great trunk-line, running by the Malseje Ghaut in the direction of Nagpur, would be most direct which could possibly be selected to connect Bombay to Calcutta. Commercially, it would be best for the cotton of Berar, while for the first 120 miles from Bombay we would proceed in the immediate direction of the military stations of Ahmednuggur, Jaulna and Aurangabad.1

Nothing could be more obvious then the twin purpose of colonial railways stated so early and so clearly above, i.e. commercial and military. These two objectives set the tone for the imperial railway project until the end of the British Raj. Four years later the same company undertook the construction of the very first 20-4 miles railway line from Bombay to Thane completed and opened in April 1853.2 By 1900 over 24,000 miles of tracks had been laid.3 This enormous project was financed entirely by British private investment capital.

Imperial Finance and the Colonial Railway Project Private British companies with the strong backing of the Government of India not only built but also owned these railways. There were on an average 1,405 miles under con-

86

Laxman D. Satya

struction every year until the end of the century.4 Some hundred and fifty million pounds-sterling was invested in Indian railways by the end of the nineteenth century. This became the single largest investment in the British Empire. The Government of India became the guarantor to the railway shareholders who were mostly British. Private companies would build and operate their respective lines in different regions of the subcontinent with a guaranteed 5 per cent return on their stockholders’ investment assured by the Indian revenues of the empire. And between 1869 and early 1880s, the Government of India itself built railroads for private British companies. Fifty-million pounds-sterling from Indian revenues were set aside by the colonial state to meet the guarantee irrespective of the company losses.5 The ‘guarantee system’ promised its shareholders that if the companies performed poorly, the taxpayers of India would pay for the loss. Thus the entire profit went to the railway companies and their English shareholders while the loss was borne by the Indian people. Simply put, this was a ‘heads-I-win, tails you-lose proposition’.6 The deployment of British capital in such a manner was an example of ‘private investment at public risk’, or the privatization of profits and socialization of losses. By the 1870s the outflow of interest actually exceeded the inflow of fresh capital into India.7 And by the end of the nineteenth century the total cost of Indian railways amounted to 350 million pounds sterling, the largest outlet for the export of British capital.8 Under the guarantee system, all contracts were given only to British companies.9 The Government of India provided free land and other facilities including recruitment of cheap labour.10 Almost all private capital spent on Indian railroads was raised in Britain. The railway shares for Indian investments could be traded only in London stock markets. Apparently, ‘It was the policy of the railroad companies, the East India Company, and the British Government to hire contractors and discourage Indian enterprise.’11 The absolutely risk-free nature of the British investment meant that,

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

87

‘The railway profits, which could have financed India’s own development, went instead into the pockets of investors in Britain’.12 The annual tribute of India to Britain amounted to about 35 million pounds sterling and Britain’s empire in India became a great asset to the crown.13 With a reliable debt service, the railway capital market in London thrived although investment in irrigation would have been far more productive than this kind of railway expansion.14 The guarantee system contributed substantially to the ‘drain’ of funds from the subcontinent. It naturally prompted more spending on construction per track kilometre than local conditions warranted. It also created profitable conditions for even wasteful construction that increased the subsidy and the drain further. The unprofitable lines depended for their very existence upon the guarantee, which increased the drain. Had the drain not existed, it is unlikely that private capital on such a large scale would have ever been invested in the Indian railway project. The money paid out of Indian tax revenues to British investors in subsidies was substantial. It is estimated that between 1849 and 1900, a total of Rs. 568 million was paid out.15 Recurring trade surplus for which the people of India received no return, marked the steady increase in the drain throughout the nineteenth century. For example, just for the year 1882-3, the balance of payment based on railways alone amounted to 4.14 per cent of the Indian national income. What happens to a country which year in and year out loses such a sizeable part of its GNP to another, as India did during the entire period 1858-98 (and, in fact, right from 1757)? The fact that India had to have a rate of saving of 4 per cent of its national income just to pay the tribute. . . . Such continuous loss of savings had a crippling effect on the economy. Where would investments come from to stimulate any expansion of the economy, when the bulk of the possible savings was annually lost.16

India was a captive economy made to serve Britain’s economic needs.

88

Laxman D. Satya

British Indian Railways and the Development of a Classic Colonial Economy The foundations of this colonial economy were laid well before the introduction of railways. The railways only strengthened this foundation. ‘If we can cheapen carriage, we may greatly increase the imports of foreign articles into the interior; and in a corresponding degree, export cotton and other agricultural produce.’17 This observation made by an East India Company agent in mid-1840s aptly sums up the fundamental characteristic of the colonial economy of India in the nineteenth century. It is not surprising that the cotton barons of Lancashire were the most vehement supporters of the Indian railway project.18 They had a double objective: first, to sell their cheap machine-made cloth to the millions of Indian masses and second, to secure a more reliable source of raw cotton than the United States. Karl Marx in 1853 prophesied, ‘. . . the English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures’.19 The railways pushed India into an era of classical colonialism. This was characterized by Indian exports of agricultural raw materials and imports of British manufactured products. India’s economy was twisted to fit this classical colonial pattern. Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain enjoyed a trade surplus with India. But it had a growing deficit in its overall international trade with other nations, which were offset by substantial Indian export surplus. These exports primarily constituted agricultural raw materials such as cotton, jute, tea, coffee, wheat, oil seeds, opium, sugar cane, tobacco, etc., while imports were made up of mostly cloth from English mills,20 railway and military hardware. Thus Indian economy exclusively serviced British economic interest. The British devised a rather clever way to transfer huge sums of money from India to England. Each year funds were transferred to pay off debts on secure and profitable capital

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

89

investments on the railways.21 But this was just the tip of the iceberg. The colonial system required the annual transfer of funds from the colony to the metropolis to meet an array of ‘home charges’.22 These were funnelled through India’s rising export surplus. Home charges included the cost of the secretary of state’s India office in London, costs of wars at home and abroad, purchase of military stores, pensions for British military and civilian officials and for servicing the guarantee system. By the end of the nineteenth century, the visible home charges annually amounted to between 17 and 18 million pounds sterling. The chief items on the bill in order of magnitude were guaranteed railway interest, military expenses, interest on India debt, purchases of government stores, and pensions. In addition to this, there were private remittances made by British officials serving in India and transfers of profit by British merchants and ‘invisible’ charges for services, including shipping, banking and insurance.23 All of this was extracted from the Indian peasants through heavy taxation in the form of land revenue, taking away resources that otherwise would have been used for investment in the economic development within India.24 During the same period by contrast, Meiji Japan registered tremendous economic growth and its railroads were all indigenously financed and served the economic interest by helping to build a modern nation.25 Consequently, the Indian nationalist writers of the nineteenth century like Dadabhai Naoroji, R.C. Dutt, G.V. Joshi and others refused to believe that India could not be industrialized without foreign capital.26

Comparative Spread Effect of Railways: Britain and India By the end of the nineteenth century, India had become the chief export market for British goods including textiles, iron and steel and other products reflecting Britain’s industrial strength. India in return supplied Britain with raw materials

90

Laxman D. Satya

in the form of unprocessed agricultural goods. The economy primarily became agrarian as the proportion of those dependent on agriculture grew to over 70 per cent. The Government of India ensured that the British business interests benefited from favourable arrangements for land and capital in India. Commercial agriculture was made possible by the transportation infrastructure provided above all by the railway. By the end of the century India possessed the fifth longest railway system in the world. The pre-eminence of British export interests was clear in layout that focused on routes to the ports and a rate structure that disadvantaged inland transportation.27

The railroads also became a captive and publicly subsidized market for English steelmakers and locomotive builders. British obsession and priority for railroads neglected all other public works projects. The railroad system consumed thirteen times as much investment as all hydraulic works up to 1880. During the 1877-8 famine, the pro-irrigation lobbyists Sir Arthur Cotton and Florence Nightingale raised their voices against the utter worthlessness of railways in relieving distress while it cost the poor of India 160 million rupees. In the twentieth century Gandhi also denounced the railroads as the main killer of traditional Indian handicrafts and depleting food stocks from the countryside. Imperial investment in irrigation complemented the railways in promoting commercial crops for exports rather than grain crops.28 The Government of India did little to aid or stimulate the development of heavy industry or management skills within India. The colonial state and the railway companies followed policies from which British industry and financial institutions were the primary beneficiaries. Indeed, the Government of India urged the railway companies to ‘buy British’. India also ‘failed to reap the benefits of the spread effects to industry which would have occurred. Instead, the spread effects stimulated the British economy’.29 For example, after the railways had depleted the reserves of wood to make charcoal, coal

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

91

became the major source of energy used to run the railways. The needs of railways stimulated coal production but did not lead to the development of the coal industry like it did in England and other countries. Expensive transport costs kept the delivered price of coal very high. Consequently, the spread effects from the increased production of coal remained limited.30 This hindered the industrialization of the economy. Any local industry using coal as a major source of energy found itself immediately handicapped. Indian coal became very expensive, not because of the costs of coal production but because of the East Indian Railway company’s monopoly over access to major coalfields. The company made it so expensive to transport coal by rail that imports from Britain could compete with Indian coal in the Indian market. The high price of coal had a dampening effect on the expansion of industries since so many of them required it as a source of energy.31 This was more particularly so in the case of iron and steel industries. In Britain, the railways triggered the development of heavy industries such as iron and steel. But in India, this did not happen because the railways became an instrument of extracting raw material rather than triggering industrialization.32 So the major project like the railways instead of becoming the leading sector failed to generate the ‘multiplier effect’ needed for India’s industrialization. The layout of the track supported the extractive and market focus of British economic interests, linking the hinterland to the colonial port cities and those cities to each other. The classic shape of a colonial economy was only possible by the way the British built railways in India.33 India’s loss from the purchasing policies of the railways blocked its progress in developing heavy industries. The spread effect of the railways stimulated the British economy instead. The British official policy also did not support the development of industry in India and the railways failed to act as a stimulant for heavy and machinebuilding industries as they did elsewhere in the world.34 Unlike in Europe and United States, the colonial railways

92

Laxman D. Satya

in India did not lead to the growth of urban centres. The railways just redistributed the urban population leading to the decline of old cities and commercial centres. For example, the major Mughal trading city of Mirzapur on the Ganges declined and the population simply moved to colonial port cities putting all the traditional industries located in such inland centres at a disadvantage.35 The railways in particular brought about this new process of de-urbanization in the nineteenth century.36 The British industrial economy dominated every facet of the Indian colonial economy putting the latter in a disadvantaged position. Planned and constructed to serve the strategic and economic needs of the metropolis, the railways facilitated the movement of troops, dispersal of British manufactured goods, and the extraction of raw materials from hinterlands to port cities. The railways failed to stimulate the growth of other ancillary industries because most of the equipment and hardware was imported from Britain.37 Solid rails, bridge girders and work engines were all bought and brought from Britain.38 Locomotives, rolling stock, and other iron goods were also imported from Britain.39 ‘India . . . became pre-eminently the land of large iron railway-bridges whose ironworks [were] largely pre-fabricated in Britain and then assembled and erected at the Indian bridge sites. This, of course, limited the technology and economic benefits India received from railway construction.’40 Not just bridges, more then 20 per cent of all British-made locomotive engines were exported to India.41 In addition to railway machinery, plate layers, fish plates, points, rails, and sleepers, the colonial state also invited British skilled labour, management, equipment and financial capital.42 ‘Two-fifths of the capital raised for the railroads were spent in Britain. Skilled workers, foremen and engineers were brought from Britain and paid twice the home rate, plus free passage, medical care, and allowances.’43 The planning and overseeing of the execution of railway construction in India was entrusted almost exclusively to British civil and military engineers. This gave the

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

93

Indian railways a colonial character.44 Thus, Indian railways generated employment and industry for Britain rather than for India. Indian people paid for these colonial railways with their taxes while the profits benefited the English.

British Monopoly over Indian Railways The Indian railways did not experience any serious competition from alternative modes of transport. Neither the Government of India nor private companies showed much interest in building canals, roads, river channels for steamers, boats or carts. So the railways had a virtual monopoly on pricing and rates. There was no government regulation of the railway companies. Each company operated as a profitmaximizing entity.45 The total rail business was controlled by just five companies, which were all British. There was virtually no competition among them. The companies held territorial monopoly on lines. Customers had to do business with the company that dominated their region. This allowed customers few options as their demand for services were severely curtailed. The needs of potential customers were disregarded as priority was accorded to military and commerce. Cotton growing districts were the first to be connected by the railway network. The Government of India in fact encouraged cooperation rather then competition among these British companies. The companies divided traffic among themselves and established spheres of influence.46 ‘The railways of the Raj, it must not be forgotten, were built with and through the close involvement of the colonial Government of India which was not a neutral, uninterested party standing above the construction process.’47 The railway companies also charged differential rates to maximize profit. Lower rates were charged for shipments from the ports to the interior than for shipments of similar distance between two inland points. Similarly, costs were reduced for the transport of raw materials and finished products.48 Railways clearly encouraged classic colonialism

94

Laxman D. Satya

in India. The layout of the lines favoured shipment to the ports rather than encourage internal trade. Similarly, it favoured raw material export and finished goods imports. It also favoured agriculture to industry. Its colonial status deprived Indian economy of any protective tariffs but gave the advantage of low transportation costs to foreign producers in addition to low sea-rates to and from India.49 The British imperial structure tried to keep India agrarian for the most part and the manner in which the railways were constructed and operated increased India’s dependence on agriculture.50 And agriculture failed to prove to be a growth sector. It failed to stimulate other sectors of the economy. It failed to create a large enough demand for inputs from other sectors. Increases in output came not so much from increases in productivity but largely from the extension of acreage. The colonial government showed no interest in any kind of land reforms. Large-scale absentee landlordism continued to flourish until the end of the British rule in India. ‘Insufficient linkages were at the root of agriculture’s failure to encourage the growth of industries that could service it.’51 Subjugated by the first industrial nation in the world, the Indian economy offered a classic case of the colonial remoulding of a pre-modern economy.52 In fact, India’s economy was twisted to fit a classical colonial pattern.53 The British Empire was built and maintained as a collaborative project between the state and private capitalism.54 This was slightly different from capitalism in Britain where the parliament provided protection to British commerce and industry. In India however, the imperial state did not provide any such protection. Instead it worked towards the advancement of British economy. ‘Development itself was intended solely as a means of providing London with an uninterrupted flow of dividend returns on capital investment.’55 Steamboats and railways were largely initiated and financed by private merchants for the expansion of trade. And during Dalhousie’s reign (1850s) the British military and economic hold was

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

95

strengthened, the colonial state gained advantage as huge troop movement could be accomplished in a very short time. This was shown clearly in quelling the 1857 rebellion whereby the sepoys lacked the advantage of railways.56

Railways and the Colonization of Indian Economy In one sense, the railway construction in the second half of the nineteenth century completed the colonization of the Indian economy, pulling all its erstwhile isolated segments inside the net of British free trade imperialism.57 This new phase of British imperialism actually began with the triumph of railways in England in 1840s. But in the Indian context, this free trade stage of colonization began immediately as the physical conquest was completed in 1850s. The railways was the linchpin of this new free trade regime.58 Far from industrializing the Indian economy, it led to a dependence on British industry. In the process, many of India’s traditional handicrafts withered away. The craftsmen thus deprived of their employment began to flood the cities, where few industries were growing to give work to the unemployed.59 But more importantly the railways were used for the progressive subjugation of the Indian market for English industry. First, the British destroyed India’s worldwide exports in handloom textiles and then invaded the country’s home market and destroyed the domestic industry. ‘This dual economic assault upon India marks the second stage of British colonialism in India, set by the progress of industrialization in England.’60 In 1882 the Lancashire lobby in Britain succeeded in abolishing customs duties on British goods entering India completely while London slapped countervailing excise duty on Indian manufactured textiles entering Britain. This deprived protective tariffs to the marginal infant textile industry centered in Bombay and Ahmedabad. This also stunted the industrialization process in India and prevented the rise of a factory-based textile industry at a time when the artisanal

96

Laxman D. Satya

industry had already suffered serious setbacks.61 Thus in a colonial setting, the railways functioned as an imperial technology serving the Raj as a symbol and . . . as an essential strategic, defensive, subjugators and administrative ‘tool’. . . . It can well be argued that the formal imperial nexus, with its associated location in London of the controlling Boards of Directors of the private railway companies and their influential Consulting Engineers, as well as the India Office’s Stores Department, stifled the emergence of a truly ‘national’ technology.62

Indian Labour on Colonial Railway Projects Rapid commercialization of agriculture brought about by colonial railways converted a large numbers of peasants into landless agricultural labourers.63 India remained predominantly an agricultural country. The percentage of the total workforce employed in the railway industry remained small and did not increase. Since the railways caused a decline in handloom industry by making imported factory cloth available at prices lower than local weavers could offer, the proportion of workers in agriculture and non-agriculture did not alter significantly because India was reduced to an agricultural country. Loss of jobs as a result of decline in alternative mode of transportation64 added further to the landless agricultural labouring population. However, this capital-intensive technology did not change the basic structure of labour process. The Indian railways project was a good example of colonial capitalism whereby productivity was raised without mechanization and a capitalist labour market developed in a pre-capitalist labour relations of organization involving Indian gangers (mistris), sirdars, muccumdums, etc.65 Little mechanization was employed except basic earth moving and stone shattering processes like the pick and head-basket with rail dumping truck.66 Abundant availability of labour became an excuse to keep the level of technology so cheap labour could be profitably exploited. The majority of the workers remained unskilled as manual

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

97

labourers, diggers and movers. The Indian railways until the end of the Raj remained a heavily labour intensive operation in which men, women, and children sold their labour power. The organization of large bodies of workers into gangs was a central feature of the imperial railway construction project. The gang-labour system was in fact recruited and controlled by Indian labour contractors in a classic colonial policy of divide and control.67 Often entire families were employed with children as old as ten years. Work was divided along gender lines with women carrying earth, bricks, rocks and men doing heavy work of laying rails, hauling timber, etc. Neither the railway companies nor European contractors took any responsibility for taking care of workers and their families. The Government of India also did not bother because it protected the interest of railway companies and European contractors rather than that of labourers.68 Most labourers came from rural areas and from landless agricultural labouring and marginal peasant classes. There were also many navvies or families who specialized in construction labour. Chief among them were the waddars who specialized in digging earth (mannu waddar) and moving stones (kallu waddar). Waddars became an important source of railway construction labour and the railway companies used them heavily, often moving their entire families over long distances. It was primarily a labour driven capitalism whereby abundant labour served the needs of capital in a situation of low technological initiative.69 Often the railway work was extremely dangerous and accident-prone. Construction accidents were common and led to many deaths. Working on cliffs to drill and blast into rocks often sent workers down with suspension that dashed into rocks or snapped taking life. Blasting with powder resulted in considerable loss of life from flying rocks, slips, cave-ins, etc. Deaths of Europeans was reported in great detail and greatly mourned. But when Indian labourers died, it was either ignored or merely mentioned as a cold statistical figure.70 Sometimes European supervisory staff physically assaulted

98

Laxman D. Satya

Indian workers driven by their position of power and racial hatred. In such a situation the labourers hardly got justice from the colonial legal system and all white juries who freely acquitted the English.71 In the absence of redress from the imperial legal system, the labourers struck work when Europeans perpetrated violence on them. However, most of the labour resistance was directed against oppressive working conditions and low wages. Conditions in railway work sites were brutal and exploitative. On an average 1,80,601 to 2,21,253 persons per annum were employed between 1859 and 1900 with 126 to 155 persons per mile.72 The labour demand often revolved around better working conditions and wages. Strikes occurred on this issue. Demand for higher wages was coupled with demand for freedom to leave and resume work at convenience. Withholding of wages often triggered riots. ‘Wage issue brought the workers to collective action; brutality pushed them into making that action violent.’73 The British in India distinguished between mental and manual work. Driven by the same racial prejudice, they reserved mental work for themselves and delegated manual labour to Indians. Railways did not become the training ground for skilled personnel for other sectors of the economy. Indians came to be hired as lower-level personnel in such jobs as engine drivers and guards. All management posts continued to be held totally by Britons. This was a reflection of racial discrimination.74 Indian labourers were organized into small gangs of 12-13 men under the immediate charge of an Indian ganger (mistri) who in turn were subjected to close superintendence by British inspectors and sub-inspectors. Most labour was unskilled with 40 per cent of the workforce female and put under the strict supervision of imported British engineers.75 Britons also held the best jobs as station masters of large stations, drivers of express trains and administrators. The first class passengers were also all British while Indians could travel only third class.76 ‘The era of the new imperialism was also the age in which racism

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia

99

reached its zenith. Europeans, . . . began to confuse levels of technology with levels of culture in general, and finally with biological capacity. Easy conquest had warped the judgment of even the scientific elites.’77 Racial prejudice guided European thinking also. They believed that Indians were incapable of making decisions on their own, were unreliable and did not possess the ability to direct Europeans. This intense racial prejudice prevented Indians from advancing78 and only increased after 1857 rebellion when the railways were streamlined to defend the strategically important parts of the Indian empire.79 The rail line was also seen as the main strategic defence for the European population.80 The railways did not offer very many social benefits to the people either. The government of India did not seriously consider encouraging or undertaking alternative investments. The capital expended on much of the railway system would have yielded higher social rates of return had it been spent on other projects81 such as health, education, housing, sanitation, food, local industry, skills, etc. But this was not the government’s priority. Its priority lay instead in how best to make the natural resources of India available to British railway companies. One such important resource was the forest.

South Asian Forests and British Imperial Railways One of the main reasons for the depletion of forests in the nineteenth century was the railways and British engineers were the prime movers of this project.82 Wood was used not only for sleepers but also as fuel for powering engines. The railways also used enormous quantities of bricks. Bridges, culverts, station buildings and workshops consumed bricks in astronomical numbers. For example, in the 17 miles of Hullohar division of the East Indian Railways in the second half of 1858, some 2 million bricks were burnt and 4.5 million were in kilns ready for firing while another 7 million were moulded. In this division alone there were 50 brick

100

Laxman D. Satya

kilns and 16 lime kilns. These kilns were kept burning continuously with firewood supplied from forests. Brick-making was a major part of Indian railway construction and was tightly controlled by the railway companies and supplied by the government of India.83 Wood from Indian forests was also used for railway sleepers. The forests of India were searched and ravaged for supplies of sleeper wood. . . . Indian wood would be felled in a forest, possibly quite distant, by foresters in the employ of timber contractors, . . . it is clear that the demands for the railways for wood – prime wood for sleepers, buildings and carriages, and lesser wood for firewood for kilns and for fuel for early locomotives – increased the exploitation of India’s forests and the pressure on forest-dwelling people.84

In fact, when the forests were declared as ‘reserved’ for government and commercial use only, the forest dwellers were forced to move out. This triggered serious clashes between people and colonial foresters as the former resisted state encroachment on their age-old customary rights to the use of forest resources for sustenance.85 Indian forests were well known for their hardwood. There were many different varieties of it found in different parts of the subcontinent, i.e. teak, sal, deodar, cedar and even chir/ pine timber was used. Since railroads sprawled throughout the subcontinent, none of the forests were spared. It all began with the teak forests of Malabar coast and the Western Ghats. Long before the beginning of railways the Malabar teak was severely reduced to meet the needs of British royal navy.86 The railways only further decimated the forest. By 1870s the teak of Malabar Coast was already depleted and the great teak forests of upper Burma began to be harvested for export to India. When the railways were extended into the Indo-Gangetic region, its impact was felt on the Himalayan forests. Similarly, the rich sal forests of the submontane areas stretching for thousands of miles from western tarai down into Bengal became the target for the railway project

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 101 because of its tough fibres that were particularly resistant to white ants. These rich sal forests got rapidly depleted for the production of sleepers and no one took any responsibility to regenerate sal trees. Consequently, sal production dipped in the late nineteenth century.87 In the 1860s, faced with the depleted stocks and rising costs of both sal and teak, the colonial railway builders of northern India set their gaze farther into the mountains on deodar stands. ‘Exploitation of the deodar forests soon became the central focus of the first half century of Forest Department’s work in the Himalayas, first for the continuing depletion of the deodar stands and later for the gradual stabilization of commercially valuable timber lands in the system of Reserved Forests.’88 When the construction of major lines was undertaken in north-western India in the decades of 1870s and 1880s, the commercial exploitation of deodar reached its climax. In the early 1870s for example, the single largest project that stretched from Delhi into Rajasthan required 800,000 sleepers. For this enormous undertaking, the deodar forests of the Punjab hills, Kashmir, upper Ganges and Indus basin were requisitioned. Similarly, the longest line from Lahore to Karachi was designed primarily to export Punjab wheat to Europe. The annual harvest of trees for railways in western UP alone fluctuated between 78,000 and 147,000 in the 1870s. And by early 1880s it rose to double that figure.89 A one mile track required 1,700 sleepers and 1.5 tons of wooden keys with a single sleeper standard size of 10 × 12 × 6 in.90 This meant that each sleeper required one fully grown hardwood tree to be brought down. Dietrich Brandis, a German forest agent was appointed Inspector-General of Indian Forests by the colonial state. He made extensive surveys and wrote many reports recommending commercial use of Indian forests. In his 1878 report Brandis observed that tree stands in the Himalayas were a good source for maintaining a steady supply of sleepers to the railways. He estimated an annual railway demand of over 500,000 sleepers. By 1880s as many second generation

102

Laxman D. Satya

sleepers as new ones were required for replacing those that had deteriorated on original lines.91 However, the railways in fact used nearly double the number of sleepers estimated by Brandis. But even before Brandis, the colonial forest department was created (1864) to ensure a steady supply of timber for railway construction. The formation of the forest department was no coincidence,92 as the railway project was central to the imperial agenda of early colonial forestry in India.93 So the creation of the colonial forest department and the expansion of imperial railways were intimately connected.94 The story of forest depletion was repeated all across India. The establishment of Madras Railways for example triggered the large-scale depletion of forests in Madras Presidency. Madras Railways primarily used fuel-wood more than coal. The simple reason being that wood was cheaper than coal. However, more wood was required to run the railway engine than coal. The average consumption of wood per engine mile in 1870s was 89.53 lbs, while that of coal was only 26.75 lbs.95 After depleting ‘reserve’ forests, the colonial government purchased large quantities of fuel-wood from private forests. The idea of protecting forests was not so much for conserving the ecological balance or protecting the environment but for the constant supply of fuel-wood to the Madras Railways. Protection of the forests by the Forest Department primarily meant protecting the commercial interest of English railway companies and the Government of India. For forests were protected and reserved only to be cut down for railway use.96 The pressure on forests to service the railway demand was generally quite heavy. For example, in the revenue year of 1859-60 some 245,763 berths were supplied to Madras Railways and all were made of wood.97 No forest could possibly stand a drain of that nature, especially in a situation where the colonial government did not take any serious measure towards conservation. In fact, the forest conservator Brandis himself recommended that in Madras Presidency the railways should be encouraged to first extract fully from private

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 103 forests before working the government forest reserves.98 Thus the legacy of colonial forestry in Madras Presidency was that in the nineteenth century the colonial state extracted large quantities of timber from both private and government forests.

Colonial Railways and Disease In 1859 a local East India Railway engineer relayed to his boss that the cholera epidemic that decimated thousands of labourers working on the railroads as they arrived from far off places in Bengal. ‘Large masses continued to arrive almost daily, the utmost exertions of the Engineers failed to get together materials for at once hutting them, and a large proportion had no shelter for many days after their arrival and when cholera was raging among them.’99 Apparently in that epidemic some 4,000 coolies died on site. However, cholera was not the only killer of labourers building the colonial railroads. Malaria, smallpox, typhoid, pneumonia, dysentery, diarrhoea, ulcers also attacked coolies. In some longer sections sometimes as much as 30 per cent or more of the workers would succumb to disease. For example, in 1888 on the Bengal-Nagpur line across the subcontinent some 2,000-3,000 workers died in a single stretch and their bodies were strewn all along the line and rotted with no claimants. Apparently the stench became so unbearable that the bodies were dragged into a pile and lit in a mass funeral pyre.100 The deaths of large bodies of labourers were not very surprising considering the living conditions at work sites. There was lack of proper housing, sanitation, cooking facilities, drinking water, and protection from extreme weather conditions like rain, heat and cold. Generally large bodies of workers were mobilized on construction sites, hence epidemics on outbreak spread rapidly. Once begun, it would spread quickly among the assembled workers and then move into near and far villages. The construction techniques provided favourable conditions for the breeding of malaria-carrying

104

Laxman D. Satya

mosquitoes. Earth for railway embankments often was dug from borrow-pits along the line of works. These abandoned pits filled up with water and vegetation during the rains and became mosquito hatcheries.101 The railway lines were laid on raised beds that often interfered with the natural lines of drainage and created unwanted ponds and waterholes that became breeding grounds for malaria vectors.102 A British medical agent who studied malaria in India in 1927 came to the conclusion that railways were one of the major causes of malaria in India.103 However, yet another factor of malaria proliferation was the colonial irrigation projects that led to serious environmental consequences like waterlogging, salinity, and most of all malaria deaths.104 Cutting down hundreds of trees for every mile of railway ties for every mile of trackage laid, left poorly rooted trees nearby open to buffeting by winds which soon toppled them over. These collapses greatly increased the area of thin soil exposed. Blasted during the dry season by the rays of the sun and by torrential downpours during the rains, these laterite-based soils were soon leeched out, forming water-filled cracks and potholes which female mosquitoes intent on laying eggs found irresistible.105

The highly mobile nature of construction work brought diseases to the work sites from distant parts and in turn carried newly acquired diseases onwards to other sites. The labourers often shuttled between colonial plantations and railway work sites travelling by trains and steamers. The migrant labourers often went to work for months and years through disease infested region where railways had spread its tentacles. Many of them perished from neglect and diseases either on journey or upon arrival.106 Malaria was by far the biggest killer. It was said, ‘a death a sleeper’ and some 1,700 sleepers were needed for each mile of track in the Ghat section of the Great Indian Peninsular Railways.107 The environment at the work sites created conditions for the repeated outbreaks of malaria and cholera. Life was grim and hard for the poverty-stricken, malnourished, weakened,

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 105 disease-ridden men, women, and children. The labourers lived in crowded, unsanitary and unhealthy conditions.108 And there was no effort made to improve their lot. In fact, the heaviest construction years coincided with famines, 1897 (2,732 miles) and 1898 (2,962 miles)109 and the railway companies and the colonial state exploited cheap famine gang labourers. Proliferation of so many diseases leading to deaths clearly indicated that the colonial development of railways and canals was fundamentally flawed and environmentally unsound. Ecological transformation was the principal reason for the scourge of killer diseases such as malaria and cholera. Railroads were one of the biggest factors in that transformation. Although cholera had existed in India from the time of the Indus Valley civilization, it had never been as widespread as it had become during the nineteenth century. It had always been endemic to small geographical locales. The movement of conquering imperial armies and the colonial railways transformed these endemic diseases to epidemic outbreaks spreading throughout South Asia and even beyond. Wherever the railways went, cholera bacillus went with it.110 Vibrio cholerae lives for several days in tanks of water such as those carried aboard railway carriages.111 Thus the modern transportation network provided invasion routes for diseases such as cholera and malaria. ‘Modernizing works created serious “obstacles” to water flows, caused river systems to become “silted up” and “moribund”, deprived soils of enriching nutrients and damaged crop yields, drainage and sanitation.’112 While cholera slaughtered millions thus, the British government continued to invest heavily in railways and not much in public health.113

Imperial Railways and Famines Commercialization of agriculture and railroads went hand in glove. Commercial crops absorbed pasture and grazing lands putting cattle at risk. Inflation in the price of grass led to

106

Laxman D. Satya

the use of cattle dropping for fuel. Scarcity of cattle manure led to declining productivity of land and increased the pace of soil exhaustion. Dams and canals might have safeguarded the rural population in the event of drought. But the colonial state had all the investments in railroads and very little on social projects.114 The natural result of this artificial phenomenon was famine. And the railroads were directly and indirectly responsible for it. Driven by the official doctrine of free trade and non-interference, the government refused to bring food to feed the starving. It did nothing to prevent grain speculators from using railways to transfer food reserves held in places stricken with dearth to another part of the country where they would fetch a higher price.115 The colonial telegraph built alongside railways ensured that price hikes were coordinated in hundreds of towns at once. Modern markets accelerated rather than relieved famine. Railroads hiked the price of grains everywhere during famines and made it beyond the reach of the common people. The peasantry that was already groaning under the crushing weight of taxes to finance the railroads was now hit with high grain prices that brought starvation and death.116 And not just the railroads, Indian agriculture also paid for the British military machine and civil bureaucracy that kept India under its heels until the end of the British Raj.117 The colonial railroads not only created conditions for grain speculation and profit making but further aggravated famine in India by facilitating the export of grains abroad. Substantial amounts of both food and non-food crops began to be shipped overseas. It is estimated that as much as 13 per cent of the wheat produced in India went to Britain. By 1886, India was supplying 23 per cent of Britain’s wheat imports.118 Throughout the cotton-exporting districts of the Deccan including the puppet princely state of Hyderabad, forest enclosures and displacement of gram by cotton greatly reduced local food security and put in place a classic colonial economy.119 Much of the wheat and rice surplus was exported

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 107 to England. Londoners were in effect eating India’s bread. And on the eve of 1896 famine, the wheat belt of northern India had been depleted by massive exports to make up for the previous year’s terrible harvest in England. Millions of famine stricken in India died along the railroad tracks starving and exposing the hollow imperial claims of the life-saving benefits of steam transportation.120 But the British continued to believe that some regions of South Asia they construed to be endowed with rich soil were immune from famine. However, this colonial construction turned out to be false because massive famines marched across the land almost every decade since the introduction of railroads, with 1890s being the worst decade of all. At the turn of the century a colonial administration report for the cotton rich province of Berar Deccan vividly captured this falsity stating, ‘The idea that Berar enjoyed immunity from famine was dispelled by the experiences of 1896-97 and 1899-1900. The former year was one of scarcity, amounting to famine in parts of the province, in the latter year the famine was severe, and affected the whole of Berar.’121 And Berar was only a microscopic reflection of British India.

Conclusion So despite the British claims of railways as the ‘light of civilization’ to India, or Britain’s benevolence to a backward people for their ‘moral and material progress’, it is argued here that the colonial railways in fact had a regressive impact on the land, environment and the people of South Asia. The Indian nationalists in the nineteenth century decried not so much the railways per se, but its colonial and exploitative character.122 Nevertheless, the British imperialists till the end had the ‘illusion of permanence’ and continued to believe that they were in India for the welfare and security of its people and to maintain law and order.123 They continued to believe in the beneficial effects of railways and canals. But the post-

108

Laxman D. Satya

colonial scholarship on South Asia has established that the impact of British imperial railways was quite contrary to the official ideology of the Raj.

NOTES 1. Two letters on the advantages of Railway Communication in Western India by Thomas Williamson, Revenue Commissioner, Bombay – addressed to Chairman of the GIPR Company ‘Two Letters on the Advantages of Railway Communication in Western India’, London: Richard and John Taylor, 1846, p. 10. 2. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1981, p. 184. 3. Ian Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj: 1850-1900, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 38-9. 4. Ibid., p. 187. 5. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 6. Headrick, The Tools of Empire, pp. 184-6. 7. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 103. 8. Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1992, p. 205. 9. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 47. 10. Headrick, The Tools of Empire, p. 184. 11. Ibid., p. 188. 12. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 96. 13. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India, New Delhi, 1986, p. 254. 14. Ibid., pp. 268-9. 15. Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, ed. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 741 and 743. 16. Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, Madras: Tulika, 1995, pp. 279 and 360. 17. Thomas Williamson, Two Letters on the Advantages of Railway Communication in Western India, 1846, p. 24. 18. See Arthur W. Silver, Manchester Men and Indian Cotton 18471872, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966. 19. Headrick, The Tools of Empire, pp. 188.

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 109 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 99. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, p. 125. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885-1947, ch. II. Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 99. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, p. 125. Zaheer Baber, The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 214. Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, pp. 10810. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, p. 128. Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World, London: Verso, 2001, p. 332. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 749. Ibid., p. 750. Ibid., p. 758. Laxman D. Satya, ‘Colonial Modernization and Popular Resistance’, Scholars 8, 1, Winter 2001, p. 27. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, p. 96. Habib, Essays in Indian History, pp. 364-5. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 757. Habib, Essays in Indian History, p. 278. Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 103. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 2. Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 188. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 135. Kulke and Rothermund, A History of India, p. 270. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 749. Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 188. Ian Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways: The Application of Western Technology in the Colonial Periphery, 1850-1920’, in Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar, eds., Technology of the Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700-1947, New Delhi: Sage, 1995, p. 185. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 751. Ibid., pp. 742, 752 and 755. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, pp. 164-85. Cambridge Economic History of India, pp. 756-7 and 752. Ibid., p. 758. Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, p. 75.

110 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Laxman D. Satya Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 759. Habib, Essays in Indian History, p. 336. Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 97. Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 187. Sheldon Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, New Haven, 1997, p. 168. Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj: 1857-1905, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 46-7. See Peter Harnetty, Imperialism and Free Trade: Lancashire and India in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. Habib, Essays in Indian History, p. 360. Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 189. Habib, Essays in Indian History, p. 307. Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 102. Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways’, p. 203. Surendra J. Patel, Agricultural Labourers in India and Pakistan, Bombay, 1952, pp. 9-20, 63-4. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 748. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, pp. 152 and 193-4. Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways’, p. 185. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, pp. 2-12. Ibid., pp. 87. Ibid., ch. 4. Ibid., pp. 157-67. Ibid., pp. 166-7. Ibid., p. 189. Ibid., p. 178. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 750. Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways’, p. 187. Headrick, Tools of Empire, p. 190. Ibid., p. 209. Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways’, p. 184. Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, p. 96. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of India, p. 108. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 743. Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, p. 204. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 145. Ibid., p. 148.

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 111 85. See Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas, Berkeley, 1990. 86. See Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, ‘State Forestry and Social Conflict in British India’, Past and Present, no. 123 (May 1989), pp. 141-77. 87. Richard Tucker, ‘The British Colonial System and the Forests of the Western Himalayas, 1815-1914’, in Richard Tucker and John Richards, eds., Global Deforestation and the 19 th Century World Economy, Durham: Duke University Press, 1983, pp. 1589. 88. Ibid., p. 160. 89. Ibid. 90. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, pp. 148-9. 91. Tucker, ‘The British Colonial System and the Forests of the Western Himalayas, 1815-1914’, pp. 164-5. 92. Guha and Gadgil, ‘State Forestry and Social Conflict in British India’, pp. 141-77. 93. Mahesh Rangarajan, ‘Imperial Agendas and India’s Forests: The Early History of Indian Forestry, 1800-1978’, Indian Economic and Social History Reivew (1994), 31(2): 147-67. 94. Ramachandra Guha, ‘An Early Environmental Debate: The Making of the 1878 Forest Act’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, (1990), 27(1): 65-84. 95. Velayutham Saravanan, ‘Commercialisation of Forests, Environmental Negligence and Alienation of Tribal Rights in Madras Presidency: 1792-1882’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, (1998), 35(3): 139-40. 96. Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, ch. 5. 97. Saravanan, ‘Commercialisation of Forests, Environmental Negligence and Alienation of Tribal Rights in Madras Presidency: 1792-1882’, pp. 139-40. 98. Ibid., p. 140. 99. As quoted in Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 98. 100. Ibid., pp. 159-60. 101. Arabinda Samanta, Malarial Fever in Colonial Bengal, 18201939: Social History of an Epidemic, Kolkata: Firma KLM, 2002, ch. Two. 102. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 160

112

Laxman D. Satya

103. See Sir Patrick-Hehir, Malaria in India, London, 1927. 104. See Elizabeth Whitcombe, ‘The Environmental Costs of Irrigation in British India: Waterlogging, Salinity, Malaria’, in David Arnold and Ramchandra Guha, eds., Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. 105. Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, p. 267. 106. Ralph Shlomowitz and Lance Brennan, ‘Mortality and Migrant Labour en route to Assam, 1863-1924’, Indian Economic and Social History Review (1990), 27(3): 313-30. 107. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj, p. 162. [Based on this figure, even a crude conservative estimate of the construction labour mortality would work out to 11.5 million deaths at the rate of 500 deaths per track mile for the whole of South Asia between 1853 and 1900.] 108. Ibid., p. 161. 109. Ibid., pp. 42-3. 110. Ira Klein, ‘Imperialism, Ecology and Disease: Cholera in India, 1850-1950’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, (1994), 31(4): 494-7. 111. Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, p. 171. 112. Klein, ‘Imperialism, Ecology and Disease: Cholera in India, 1850-1950’, p. 512. 113. Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, p. 168. 114. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, p. 319. 115. Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, p. 204. 116. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, pp. 25-7. 117. Bipin Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, p. 33. 118. Cambridge Economic History of India, p. 745. 119. R.M. Paulomi Bharat, ‘Railways and Their Impact of the Economy of Hyderabad State’, Procedings of the Andhra Pradesh History Congress, vol. XIV, pp. 125-30. 120. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, pp. 9, 26 and 142. 121. Report on the Administration of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts

British Imperial Railways in 19th Century South Asia 113 for the Year 1901-02, Hyderabad: Residency Government Press, 1902, para 13. 122. Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1966, p. 189. 123. See Sir Francis Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

CHAPTER 2

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History? Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

The purpose of this article is to explore the history and role of railways in Pakistan. The historical overview is separated into two periods: British India, and from 1947 onwards. Each of these periods provides a time frame in which to understand the role of railways in Pakistan. The first section unfolds railways history of Pakistan when it was part of British India, viewed through publically available literature. After exploring the challenges of rail construction in north-western part of India (today Pakistan), this section examines positive and negative consequences of railway in this region. The characteristics of railways in Pakistan after Independence from British India in 1947 are important to document because they represent and symbolize the aspiration of the newly independent country. This section explores the types of policies adopted and their consequences on railways during this period. Both sections present differences and similarities of the railway system in Pakistan before and after Independence to guide future policies.

Railways Development in Pakistan: British India Historical Glimpse The railway construction in British India began in 1850 after 15 years of long and heated debate (Headrick, 1988). This

116

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

debate was won by arguing the security and commercial benefits as mentioned in an article published in Calcutta Englishman in 1844: The first consideration is as a military measure for the better security with less outlay, of the entire territory, the second is a commercial point of view, in which the chief object is to provide the means of conveyance from the interior to the nearest shipping ports of the rich and varied productions of the country, and to transmit back manufactured goods of Great Britain, salt, etc., in exchange. (quoted in Thorner 1950: 47-8)

Macpherson (1955) argued that a third motive was to uplift the status of Indians through technology transfer. However, it was not until the push from the cotton industry manufacturers of Lancashire and Glasgow and their members of parliament, and proactive lobbies of London East India houses, the city bankers, the Times, the Economist, and the midlands hardware manufacturers, and the keen interest of technocratic Governor-General Marquis Dalhousie that railways construction started in India (Kerr, 2007). In 1853 the first goods train travelled from Bombay to Thane, followed by a passenger train from Howrah to Hooghly in 1854. Railways were introduced to the region that would later become Pakistan in 1861, when a railway line was built between Karachi and Kotri. The Lahore-Amritsar and Lahore-Multan railway lines were opened in 1862. The Scinde Railway Company which built these routes was renamed as Scinde, Punjab and Delhi Railway (SP&DR) in 1863 (Malik 1962). The 1857 Indian uprising had convinced the Indian government to link Karachi with Delhi and Calcutta – 2,200 miles continuous line forming a steam arch connecting the Arabian Sea with the Bay of Bengal, on security ground (Kerr 2007). However, various government officials questioned the logic of railway extensions in Scinde (Sind) and Punjab on profitability arguments. The Lahore Chronicle reported that railway extension passed through deserts and villages in Scinde, similarly the Lahore to Multan line passed through jungles

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

117

inhibited by ‘goats and their attendants’, which made these routes unprofitable (‘India and Her Railways’, 1862, para 3). These debates lead to the state ownership of the SP&DR and the formation of state-owned and state operated North Western Railway in 1886. The North Western Railway included the SP&DR, the northern Punjab and frontier lines (Kandhar State Railway)(Kerr 2007). Lahore was selected as the headquarter of the North Western Railway in 1886. This opened up new opportunities for the expansion of railways and Lahore being the centre of the extensive network of Indian railway workshops (Khan et al. 2013). The arrival of the first locomotive in Lahore provided a glimpse of the level of difficulty in transporting things at that time. From Karachi port this locomotive was carried to Kotri through train and from Kotri to Lahore through the river transport system (Indus Steam Flotilla Company operated there). The railway line was built from Lahore to Multan but it was not functional at that time and through the river transport system it took around 2 months for the locomotive to arrive in Lahore from Karachi (Malik 1962). From the bank of river Ravi in Lahore, transporting locomotive to the Lahore station was an unusual event, which was narrated by the Lahore Chronicle in its March 1862 edition: Wednesday last was a great day in Lahore, and one that will be long remembered as the commencement of a new era in the Punjab. On the afternoon of that day, the bulk of the European residents and a large portion of the native inhabitants of the city assembled near the beautiful, but partially ruined gateway, known as the ‘Char Burj’ [chauburji] of the Multan Road. . . . After the lapse of about half an hour, a roar of many voices proclaimed the approach of some strange creature that was to astonish the natives,a steam locomotive. . . . It was being ignominiously dragged at a foot pace by one hundred and two bullocks, and stowed by two elephants. . . . The excitement exhibited by the crowds of Seikhs, Hindoos, Mussalmans, Afghans and other races, was great while their expressions of wonder on beholding the machine, the curiosity they displayed regarding its use, and the observations they made to each other

118

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

on the subject, were as interesting as they were singular (quoted in Malik 1962: 29).

Frontier Railways The north-western part of Pakistan was strategically important for the British empire due to the Anglo-Afghan wars and the danger of Russian imperialism on the Indian border. Therefore, the railway construction had become a priority in this hilly region to ensure quick movement of troops. At first, the focus was in building the Kandahar State Railway, a railway line from Sukkurto Quetta through Sibi (134 miles), which was completed in 1880 (Kerr 2007: 55). Sibi to Quetta line passed through large mountains and ravines, nearly 6,000 ft above the sea level, completed in 1887, with ‘little regard to the lives of engineers and workers’ (ibid.: 56). Later the Chaman extension was carried out on through the Khwaja Amran Mountains at 1 in 40 steep gradients (ibid.: 58). This section included a famous 3.9 km Khojak Tunnel, the longest tunnel in India at the time of its completion in 1891 (see Fig. 2.1). Due to its difficult terrain, 65 experienced Welsh miners from England were brought, along

Fig. 2.1: Khojak Tunnel in Baluchistan (Source: Google image)

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

119

with workers from throughout India, Afghanistan, Arab and Persian Gulf countries. There were 800 workers who died during the construction of this railway line (Berridge 1969). The Lansdowne Bridge at Sukkur, on the Indus River (see Fig. 2.2), completed in 1889, spanned the water is ‘one of several feats of engineering by the British colonialists who hacked through mountains, traversed ravines and cut across deserts to make a railroad in what has become Pakistan’ (Walsh 2013). The railway network in Pakistan was extended to the international border with Afghanistan in three phases. The first section of the Khyber railway, as it was called, was from Rawalpindi to Peshawar, which was built in 1883. In the second phase, the line was extended up to Jamrud in 1901. Due to the Afghan war the third phase was delayed; but finally the Jamrud-Landikotal section was opened in 1925. Landikotal is the last station on the Khyber railway line in Pakistan (see Fig. 2.2), while ‘thirty-four tunnels, and ninetytwo bridges and culverts’ (Kerr 2007: 58) were built is this line.This railway line was regarded as a strategic line and a newspaper article reported that ‘we shall now, at practically a

Fig. 2.2: Lansdowne Bridge over the Indus River at Sukkur (Source: Indian Railways Fans Club [https://www.irfca.org/articles/ lansdone-bridge.html] accessed on 2 February 2020).

120

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

minute’s notice, be able to pour troops into the Khyber and so in Afghanistan, and this alone can be the purpose of the new line’ (‘The Indian Frontier Railway: A Strategic Line’, 1900, para 2). Apart from battling with the toughest of the terrains and unpredictability of weather, the British had to contend with the tribal people (especially the Afridis) (Kerr 2007: 59). The tribal people thought ‘the building of railways as the outward and visible sign of iron grip of the country by a foreign race’ (‘The Indian Frontier Railway: A Strategic Line’, 1900, para 5) in spite of employment opportunities (Sabir 1966). Therefore, the British rulers offered monetary compensation to different tribes in return to their goodwill and assistance (Iqbal 2008). Another rail line, namely Nushki Extension Railway, linked Quetta with Zahidan in Iran in 1918. Its official report The Story of the N.E. Railway lamented the inhospitable and treacherous terrain and environment in which this railway was built. The report mentioned ‘dreary and dismal-looking surroundings . . . far removed from the blaze of modern civilization with its various amenities . . . [where] a fierce north wind roaring and sweeping over the country five days out of seven at a maximum velocity of 60 miles per hour’ (Martin 1923: 3).

Consequences of the Railways The railway system in British India provided the strategic, commercial and economic benefits to the British empire in the colonial context. This meant that railways served the British interests first and foremost, even sometimes at the expense of locals (Das 2010, Headrick 1988, Kerr, 2003). The construction of such a magnitude required an ample supply of workers and engineers. Small towns near the construction sites, especially at bridges and tunnel, had to be built as temporary housing sites for employees and engineers who needed to stay for longer years at certain points. For

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

121

instance, the Alexandra bridge (built 1870-6) over the river Chenab near Wazirabad, Punjab required 15 miles of tramways ‘which were in constant use by night and day during each working season’ (Lambert 1878: 81). Due to the concentration of large number of workforce at construction sites, thousands of workers died within days as epidemic diseases hit them. In June 1885, 2,000 of the total 10,000 workers died due to the outbreak of cholera in the upper heads of Sind-Peshin line (Kerr 2007: 55). Similarly, some 800 workers died of typhus only at the Khojak Tunnel during 1890 (Berridge 1969). The workers also died due to little safety measures available at that time. For instance on many cliff faces and hilly areas, as was the case in northern and western parts, workers needed to be suspended by ropes in order to drill or blast some portions of the rocks. Many agents reported events that workers lost their hold and ‘dashed to pieces in the nullahs [ravines] below’, which had the effect of halting work by other fellow workers (Kerr 2007: 42). The colonial railway operation saw many fatal accidents in the subcontinent due to floods and poor coordination mechanism. Flood caused many damages to the railway lines and bridges resulting in fatal accidents and loss of lives. While the bridges in Punjab, Sind and Delhi over Jumna, Sutlej and Beas rivers were completed in 1869, they were severely damaged by the floods in 1871. The collapse of the Beas Bridge caused a terrible accident when a passenger train dropped into the water (ibid. 2007). Another train was derailed on a bridge on the north-west railway resulting in 7 deaths and 11 injured. Besides significant damage to the bridge, twentynine loaded vehicles on the train were badly smashed and destroyed (‘Indian Railway Smash’, 1924). In a similar event, a newspaper from Lahore reported that while a train was passing over the bridge, the structure collapsed and the train precipitated into the river, which was flooded due to the monsoon rains. At least 50 people drowned (‘Indian Railway Accident’, 1921).

122

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

The institutional arrangements were crucial to the smooth operation of railways. Trains met with fatal disasters due to lack of integration, timely information, coordination and precise execution of the train operations. A head-on collision between a goods train and mail train happened due to inability of the driver of the mail train to understand a ‘danger’ signal, which was telegraphed to him (‘Accident on an Indian Railway’, 1884). Similarly, a serious collision occurred between two passenger trains on north-west railway near Montgomery (present day Sahiwal), resulting in death of 95 persons and 104 injured. The cause of the collision was reported to be ‘a wrong signal that the line was clear’ (‘Indian Trains in Collision’, 1924). In another event, a special train in which the Maharaja of Scinde (Sind) was travelling with a stationary passenger train at a station owing to the mistake in ‘signalling’, and resulted in injuries of passengers. The same news reported that there was another accident two days before at Kot Lakhpat station, which resulted in 11 deaths and 30 injured, due to the mistake of the station master giving ‘line clear’ ticket to a goods train. It was unusual that the ‘North-Western railways was the scene of a second serious collision within a week’ (‘Indian Railways Accidents: The Maharaja’, 1907). Another unwanted consequence of the railways was the aggravation in the number of deaths due to famines. After the construction of railways, famines happened on an yearly basis, and people regarded it as the direct result of railways. Before the railways, the surplus grain was stored, because it was not only hard to transport beyond the districts, it was also a reserve for people to fall back upon during famine. In the times of railways ‘all grain beyond the quantity necessary for local use is at once sold at a lower price consequently upon the increased sources of supply, and this grain is sent out of the districts altogether’ (‘The Indian Frontier Railway: A Strategic Line’, 1900). After all what purpose did the network of railways in Punjab served but ‘to convert it into the bread basket of the empire’ (Weil 2006: 335). Furthermore, the

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

123

railway construction did a great damage to the local natural environment by cutting and damaging forests, ravines and mountains (Das 2010). The railways also eroded the divisions of caste in the Indian subcontinent by replacing it with simpler and distinct divisions in the eyes of millions of railway passengers: Hindus and Muslims in the third class and in lowest jobs, Europeans in the first class and high paid executive jobs, and Anglo-Indians in the middle (Headrick 1988). The locals were racialized and discriminated against and the railway was very much a distinct space. The plight of Indian travellers, especially the ones who travelled in the third class (predominantly occupied by the Indians), was very miserable. Even a guide book primarily meant for the Western visitors to India observed that third class passengers were ‘unfairly neglected, and even badly treated, by the railway staff’ (A Handbook for Travellers in India, Burma and Ceylon 1908: xxiii). Irrespective of the strategic, commercial and economic benefits gained by the British from the railway development, the extensive network provided many social and economic advantages to local people. In terms of the railway’s relationship with the economy, Macpherson (1955: 177) found that L95 million were invested by British companies in Indian guaranteed railways between 1845 and 1875. According to Thorner (1951: 399-400), large investment in the railway network played an active role in regional development in both agricultural and industrial sectors. In the agricultural sector, railways brought more land under cultivation, while heavy machinery in railway, precision techniques and advanced communication brought revolution in industrial production. In contrast, Shelvankar (1940) and Mitchell (1942) believed that the railways provided an access to productive natural resources and raw material in India to Great Britain. Headrick (1981) argued that the impact of railways on the Indian economy was very different from that found in Western countries, because of the colonial context in which they were built.

124

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

In terms of industrial development, Thorner (1955: 213) identified that the development of railways brought new consumer goods to the countryside, including matches, kerosene, lanterns and utensils. Due to the large export of agricultural products, people were in a position to purchase new consumable items. The railways developed mining and related industry in India. Modern cotton and jute, spinning and weaving mills were established. An engineering industry based on iron and steel was set up in the early twentieth century. Food industries such as vegetable oil and sugar refineries were set up. All these industrial activities were a result of the development of railways in large areas of the country. Thorner (1955: 201) compared the impact of rail network on industrial development in several countries. He found that for the leading powers – particularly the USA, Russia, Germany, UK, France and even Canada and Australia, railways were the veritable dynamo for the industrial revolution. However, the situation was different in the case of India, which experienced relatively little industrialization as compared to the above countries. In a similar vein, Headrick (1981: 188-9) argued that the ‘tremendous decline in inland transport costs . . . and sharp increase of revenue from passengers did not contribute . . . to the industrialisation of the sub-continent, but to its dependence on British industry and their engineers’. Vakil (1944: 187) found that the development of railways had brought acceleration in internal trade among cities in India, which was fifteen times larger than external trade. The development of railways supported the movement of crops within the country and to the ports for exports. However, Vakil’s (ibid.: 189) analysis shows that the commercial nature of railway policy was the primary reason for fast implementation of industrial and trade policy for the country. Vakil (ibid.: 189-90) found that the railway was one of the largest employment sectors in British India. According to the Acworth Committee report, the railways employed 7,17,000 persons in 1921; among them 7,10,000 were Indians and only

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

125

7,000 were Europeans, a proportion of just 1 per cent (cited by Thorner 1951: 398). However, Thorner (1955) stated that the operating companies of railways in India were not interested in technical training for Indians that might lead to higher staff positions. The development of railways influenced the social system of British India. Thorner (1951: 399) argued that while the British had developed laws, administration, irrigation and public health and educational systems in India, the railway had the sharpest and the most far-reaching impact. Describing an analysis of village communities, Thorner (1951) found that the railways had become a more destructive than constructive innovation in Indian society. Before the railways, village communities were bound together socially and economically. But this cohesion was replaced by aggressive moneylenders, crop merchants and rent-receiving landlords. The railway was not merely a way of transport from one place to the other, rather it became a solution to the complex demands of society: ‘birth, death, marriage, illness, and religious festivals all require witnesses and rituals that imply a journey home’ (Theroux 1984: 704). The most significant and aggressive use of railway was for pilgrimage. The trains were filled to their maximum capacity during the times of pilgrimage (Kerr 2007). Railways also became ‘naturalized’ (Kerr 2003) in the subcontinent, which implied that it became part of the everyday life and even entered into literature and folklore. As early as 1880s a song from Muzzafarnagar district titled ‘Song to the British’ (Git Phirangyon Ka) in which a stanza being translated as ‘Thou has made the railway so! / Train can come in a moment!’ (quoted in Kerr 2003: 316). Another piece of literature in the form of novel talked about the association of Indians with the trains and railway stations for different reasons. One reason was to see an ‘Englishman indulge in kisses at leave-taking. It gives the Indian, Hindu or Mahomedan, something to gossip about for the next fortnight’ (Mitra 1909: 63). The train became so part of the everyday life that

126

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

people even related it with their core religious and mystic experiences. The railways was also a source of technology and skills transfer. The construction of railways started labour on the move and transferred new tools, skills and machines to India. The Indian workers used basic tools, which were not sufficient to construct structures of gigantic sizes and proportions. Many chief engineers reported that Indian artisans and skilled labourers worked in their own way but they learned many things to change their practices for good. So it might be said that ‘technology transfer was as much a part of railroad construction as it was of railroad operation’ (Kerr 2007: 38). The technology transfer in terms of skills and tools synchronized well with the traditional Indian knowledge of skills and the Indian workers adapted well to the changing needs. One historian described it to ‘a new, syncretic “Indian approach” to railroad building’ (Derbyshire 1995: 102). Irrespective of the above debate about the positive and negative aspects of railway development on British India, Thorner (1955) believed that independence in 1947 provided an opportunity to formulate a new railway policy which might have brought India and Pakistan much further along the path of industrialization. The new railway policy could be designed according to the newly independent countries’ needs, which were different from colonial obligations. The following section documents the railways policy and development of Pakistan since 1947 as it represents and symbolizes the aspiration of the newly independent country.

Railway Policy and Development Since 1947 In 1947, Pakistan inherited a large proportion of the overall railway network in the country. Since then the Federal government in Pakistan has prepared five year development plans. These development plans show the Federal government’s priorities for development in different sectors, including the railways. Therefore, rail development has to

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

127

be inferred from the Five Year Development Plan during the period from 1947 to 2013. In Pakistan, the history of development planning started before the Partition of British India, when the Department of Planning and Development was created to prepare development projects after the Second World War. When Pakistan came into being in August 1947, its states (provinces) had a stock of development projects already prepared before Independence (Waterston 1963: 13). Soon after Independence, a Department of Development was set up under the federal ministry of finance (Hasan 1999: 142). Planning in Pakistan received an added thrust in 1950, when Pakistan, over a six-year period, joined the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. Under the Colombo Plan, transport infrastructure such as road transport, civil aviation, shipping and port facilities received the highest attention (ibid.: 151). However, in real terms, Pakistan’s development planning had started with the preparation of the First Five Year Plan in 1955. This exercise is still continuing through the development of ten five year plans and three ten year perspective development plans. In 1947, Pakistan comprised an under-developed area, primarily agricultural in nature. The great port cities and centres of trade and industries during British India were included in India. However, Pakistan inherited the comprehensive network of the well-developed railway system and road network, irrespective of the low level of historical investment in areas comprising Pakistan (Hasan 1998: 97). The railways constituted the most valuable capital asset of the country and were the largest single national commercial undertaking. At that time, Pakistan railway (north western railway) carried the most significant amount of goods and passengers in Pakistan (Govt. of Pakistan, National Planning Board, 1957: 487). A six-year development plan was prepared and incorporated into the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia in mid-1951. A review of the transport section of the plan shows that civil

128

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

aviation, shipping, port facilities and road transport were developed from negligible beginnings (Govt. of Pakistan, National Planning Board 1957: 10). However the railways remained the backbone of passenger and freight transport through a ‘Railway Rehabilitation’ programme and construction of 100 miles of new railway lines. Under a grant from the Ford Foundation, foreign consultants were hired in 1955, supervised by Harvard University to help the Planning Board to prepare the First Five Year Development Plan; organise on job training for Pakistani staff in a central planning body which would enable them to carry out research and planning activities without outside assistance; and was to provide advice to the government on current economic, financial and fiscal policy. (Waterston 1963: 34)

The First Five Year Plan (1955-60) was prepared in 1956 with the help of the Harvard Group. The plan’s primary objective was to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people, provide adequate living standards and social services, secure social justice and equality of opportunity and aim at the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property. (Govt. of Pakistan, National Planning Board, 1957: 1)

According to the stated objective, the transport plan was formulated by allocating 17.8 per cent (ibid.: 15) of the resources of the total plan. The plan provided sizeable expenditures for the railways and for expansion of the road network. The First Five Year Plan accepted that ‘the backbone of [West] Pakistan’s transport system is a broad-gauge railway network. It is a system of main lines, one in each of five parallel river valleys, interlinked and stretching from the coast to Afghanistan and India’s frontiers’ (ibid.: 485). However, the plan proposed that ‘in [West] Pakistan a powerful railway system and growing road transport system operate side by side and should complement each other’

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

129

(ibid.: 485). Keeping this policy in mind, 70 per cent of total land transport expenditure was allocated to Pakistan Railway (North Western Railway) and 30 per cent of total land transport expenditure was allocated to road transport during the plan period of 1955-60 (ibid. figure extracted from Table 7, p. 510). The Road Transport Board was set up to achieve rail-road coordination financed by Federal and Provincial governments to achieve a ratio of 25 to 75 per cent in favour of the railway (ibid.: 506). It is important to note here that although resources were allocated in favour of the railway, the plan proposed that the ratio of road to railway would increase to 25 : 75 as compared to 10 : 90 in 1947. Moreover this plan did not recommend any extension of rail network. On the other hand, 1,800 miles of new roads were proposed to be constructed along with the improvement of 2,000 miles of existing roads (ibid.: 46). In short, the First Five Year Plan was a balanced plan for both railways and roads. The Harvard Group played a key role in establishing the foundation of development in Pakistan, including transport that was to be funded at the Federal and Provincial levels of government. However, this first plan opened the doors to reliance on foreign technical and financial assistance to formulate development policies in Pakistan. The Second Five Year Plan (1960-5) was prepared for implementation from 1960 to 1965. The primary objective of the plan (1960-5) was restated in the light of the first plan’s objectives: The nation aspires to a standard of living for all its people as high as can be achieved with the resources available to it; equitable distribution of wealth; education of all in accordance with their talents; victory over disease; adequate facilities for transport and communications so that the nation may be effectively unified economically and socially; and evolution of the national culture in literature, art and science. (Govt. of Pakistan, Planning Commission, 1960: 1)

To fulfil the stated objective, the Second Five Year Plan

130

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

(1960: 278) developed a long-term transport development plan to postulate a sound pattern for the country’s transport system. In the light of this ambition, the plan allocated 17.6 per cent of total plan development expenditure to transport, almost the same proportion allocation during the First Five Year Plan (1955-60). In the allocated resources for landbased transport, the railways accounted for 44.7 per cent as compared to 55.3 per cent allocated to roads. The plan became the first planning document in Pakistan in which the road sector had priority over the railways by being allocated more financial resources. The perception behind this act was stated in the plan as Road transport is particularly suited to the conditions and requirements of Pakistan . . . the motor vehicle is more adaptable than the railways to varying degrees of traffic intensity and permits a greater degree of speed and efficiency in haulage over short distance . . . there is close relationship between the volume of transport and the level of economic activity because each depends upon the other. (Govt. of Pakistan Planning, Commission, 1960: 277)

Under these beliefs, the Second Five Year Plan (1960-5) had initiated a new era in favour of road construction in Pakistan. The Second Five Year Plan (1960-5) supported the inclusion of the ‘Karachi Circular Railway (KCR)’ as the first (and last to date) rail-based urban public transport project in Pakistan. KCR was planned to serve the whole of Karachi, including the periphery of the city. It was projected as a regular, cheap and efficient means of transport for the residents of Karachi. Later this project was constructed; the urban railway was operated but then shut down in the mid-1990s. Waterston (1963: 98) argued that the character of the Second Five Year Plan (1960-5) was materially influenced through the Harvard Group by means of advice, background papers, the comments of staff and by actual drafting or redrafting of sections of the Plan. Therefore, the Second Five Year Plan (1960-5) initiated a new direction of transport

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

131

Percentage

development in favour of roads as per the preference of donor countries and international lending institutions that supported comprehensive development plans. In the last sixty years, the transport sector has received 15 to 24 per cent of the total development budget in Pakistan (Imran 2010). However, the railways were given priority only in the First Five Year Plan (1955-60), when 65.3 per cent was allocated as compared to the 34.7 per cent for road infrastructure (see Fig. 2.3). It can be seen clearly that the percentage of money allocated to railways from the total allocation for land transport has decreased gradually from 65.3 per cent during the First Five Year Plan (1955-60) to 41.7 per cent during the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83). It continued to decrease, but more sharply, down to 12.5 per cent by the Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-93). Thereafter the situation for railway development gradually improved over the last two development plans. In contrast, the percentage of money allocated to road development increased from 34.7 per cent in the First Five Year Plan (1955-60), peaking in the Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-93) when it reached 87.6 per cent. After that plan, the figure began to decline and had dropped to 60.7 per cent in the Ten Year Perspective Plan for 2001-11. In summary, the First Five Year Plan (1955-60) was an exceptional case, when the comprehensive network of the railway system inherited from the British was declared the backbone

Development Plans

Fig. 2.3: Percentage of total money allocated for land transport (Source: Data extracted from all five year plans).

132

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

of transport (Govt. of Pakistan, National Planning Board, 1955: 485) and received a greater percentage of investment than did roads. As a result of much more generous allocations of funds to road section in the Second and following five year plans, road length in the country increased more than four times over what it was in 1947, in contrast to the railways which is approximately the same length in kilometres as in 1947 (and has even decreased recently).

Current Status of Pakistan’s Railways Pakistan Railways (PR) is the sole government agency responsible for rail transport in the country. It has a network of 7,791 route km, but two-thirds of this is of non-commercial value and consists of branch and strategic lines which are mainly closed (Walsh 2013). The remaining one-third of the network carries most trains and handles the bulk of rail-based passenger and freight traffic. Until the 1970s, railways were the primary mode of transportation in Pakistan. However, transport policies and investment favours roads over railways and therefore Pakistan Railways’ market share declined from 41 to 10 per cent for passenger and from 73 to 4 per cent for freight traffic. In 2014, Pakistan Railways comprised ‘7,791 route kilometers, 423 locomotives, 1,700 passengers coaches and 16,179 freight wagons’ (Ministry of Finance 2014). In contrast, Pakistan Railway comprised ‘8775 route kilometers, 753 locomotives, and 34,851 freight wagons’ in 1990 (Ministry of Finance 2004). In 2014, the rail network carried 42 million passengers and one million tonnes of freight. On the other hand, in 1990 the rail network carried 84.9 million passengers and 7.7 million tonnes of freight. ‘Passenger traffic, which was 230 trains per day [in 2007] has been reduced to 92 trains a day [in 2014], while the number of freight trains has dropped from 96 to merely one per day’ (Ministry of Finance 2013: 171). These statistics clearly show that Pakistan Railways is

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

133

declining continuously in terms of its network and its passenger and freight capacity. The lack of investment in the last 65 years in over-aged infrastructure and rolling stock are the main reasons for the railway crisis in Pakistan. At present more than 300 locomotives (out of 423) are out of service in contrast to over 1000 working locomotives in 1965. The locomotives carrying trains are also in very poor condition. For example, The 45-year-old diesel locomotive [of the Awami Express] groaned as it belched pillowy black fumes. Fine clouds of dust entered through the open windows. The carriages jerked violently on the corners. (Walsh 2013) Early last year, dozens of protesting passengers laid their children across the tracks in Multan in southern Punjab Province. They were angry because a journey that should have taken 18 hours had lasted three days – and they were still only halfway to their destination. (ibid.) It is hard to get good news about Pakistan railway. There is lack of carriages to carry commuters between Lahore and Norwel Baou train’ (commuter train). Train is very crowded, no fan and toilets and safety is the most important issue. Commuter accepts safety issue while sitting on roof top b/c they mention that there is no other alternative for them to reach their destination on daily basis.1

In recent years, the government has encouraged a publicprivate partnership (PPP) in launching three trains between Lahore and Karachi, while it is planned to hand over 18 more trains to the private sector. Pakistan Railways has also involved the private sector in managing land based facilities such as railway stations, dry ports, real estate development and marketing. Pakistani media always compare the rail service and infrastructure of Pakistan with that of India. Recently, Pakistan Railways started a business express train between Lahore and Karachi. It was promised that it would provide facilities like those on the Indian Maharajas’ Express (Indian Luxury tour train). However, after a few weeks, TV and internet services stopped working, while food quality was not good.

134

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

Therefore, people do not trust the quality and services of Pakistan Railways and its new initiative with the private sector.2 Pakistan Railways owns a large amount of land in big and small cities of Pakistan. It is trying to establish a land bank and commercialize the surplus land to overcome its financial difficulties. However, this process is limited to one or two projects so far and mainly serves the elite class. As Walsh (2013) noted, The misfortune of the railways has, however, benefited Lahore’s [new] elite . . . that has found a home in a gilded country club built on railway land . . . the Royal Palm Golf and Country Club, a lavish facility with an 18-hole golf course, gyms, 3-D cinemas and cigar rooms, opened in 2002. The club, which costs $8,000 to join, has become a showcase for new money: families that made their fortunes from property and industry, contacts and corruption . . . the Royal Palm was also built on the bones of the railways. . . . The National Accountability Bureau, which investigates official corruption, concluded last year that the Royal Palm deal had cost the government millions of dollars in lost revenue.

Pakistan Vision 2025 and 2030 proposed to improve infrastructure to international standards to cut down the costs of doing business in Pakistan. It was proposed ‘to increase the share of railways in national freight from 4 per cent to 22 per cent by 2030’ by doubling the track and increasing the average train speeds from 70 kmph (passenger) and 42 kmph (freight) to 100-40 kmph (passenger) and 90100 kmph. The revival of railways was also suggested under the National Trade Corridor Improvement Programme, which aims to ‘bring delivery of rail services to international standards and privatize commercial operations of the Pakistan Railways’ (extracted from Five Year Plan 2010-15). Therefore, Pakistan Railways has started working on doubling two sections of the main track to provide much needed logistic support to business organizations in order to reduce their cost and fuel energy usage.

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

135

The latest Five Year Plan (2010-15) aims to ‘restore the historic role of Pakistan Railways as an economical and quality service provider both for passenger and freight traffic in the country’. To achieve this aim, it is proposed to privatize railways’ operations on strategic routes by preparing a business plan, track access policy, and link private freight forwarders and truckers for door-to-door services. Many authors (Tahir 2013; Walsh 2013) believe that government documents and the prime minister’s announcement about building a bullet train between Karachi and Peshawar are ambitious and fail to understand realities on the ground. Pakistan Railways suffers mainly from a weak governance structure, decades of misplaced priorities, lack of quality human resources and increasing corruption. Unless these factors are overcome, new projects cannot deliver any benefit to Pakistan railways.

Conclusion This article explores the history of railway development in Pakistan. It reviews railway development during the period of British rule in India, detailing the characteristics of the railways in the area of modern Pakistan, which linked to Afghanistan and Iran. The details show the rail infrastructure, such as bridges and tracks, were built on the rough terrain of north-western India. The extensive network of railways in Pakistan brought mobility of people and crops. However, the vast network has not contributed to the development of part of the Indian subcontinent that forms Pakistan, as happened in other countries of the British empire. Independence in 1947 provided a unique opportunity to formulate new railway policy that could lead to industrialization in Pakistan. However, the review of transport priorities shows that a new paradigm of road development emerged after Independence, despite the existence of an inherited railway network as an alternative for inter-city passenger and freight transport. As a result, a large proportion of finance

136

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

was allocated for road development rather than developing the existing railways. Perhaps, a large amount of international funding was available for road development instead of rail development. The initial bias of the experts pushed transport mobility in an entirely different path than that of a railway-based transport service in the country. Mahoney (2001) argued that once a particular option is selected, it becomes progressively harder to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were available. This argument fits the situation of the railways in Pakistan. The policies of the First and Second Five Year Plan were key factors in replacing a railway-based with a road-based transport paradigm during the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, this paradigm evolved and developed throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and even 2000s despite the emergence of an environmental agenda at international and national levels. Funds allocated for railway development decreased during this time, and eventually services and patronage dropped sharply. Pakistan has picked up road-based Western development ideas in the early 1960s that was mismatched to local needs and circumstances. In a famous article of ‘Seven Sins of Economic Planners’ [during the 1950s and 1960s], Haq (1973: 10) argued that Pakistan needs aid to utilize the existing capacity of its transport infrastructure. However, he observed that the planning process was isolated from society as a whole and current resources of physical infrastructure, e.g. railway were not utilized properly (ibid.: 18). Whether or not one agrees with Haq’s analysis, the deterioration of Pakistan’s railways seems to confirm it. In the same direction, Szyliowicz (2004: 23-44) described the history of transportation in Turkey, explaining how highway development became dominant over the railway network. He referred to the Turkish president’s famous saying that, ‘railways are for communists, highways for capitalists’ (ibid.: 27). This statement can be matched with financial assistance from the World Bank, which increased steadily in favour of road development

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

137

during the mid-1950s to mid-1960s. This is the time when Pakistan started getting technical and financial assistance from the international development institutions. What Pakistan’s railways needs are governance and management improvements and a reasonable share of funding devoted to existing and new infrastructure and services. Moreover, the railways should be integrated with the welldeveloped road transport system in the country to promote a multi-modal approach to transport. It is therefore concluded that institutions in Pakistan need to develop transport policies that take into consideration railways’ unique needs and priorities in order to make the railways the backbone of the transport system in Pakistan again.

NOTES 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyQi8pr0Lg8 2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QSwxkOqUJLI

REFERENCES Bayley, V., Adventure through Khyber, Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1988. Berridge, A., Couplings to the Khyber: The Story of North Western Railway, Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1969. Brunton, J., Description of the Line and Works of the Scinde Railway, London: William Clowes and Sons, 1863. Das, P., ‘Colonialism and the Environment in India: Railways and Deforestation in 19th Century Punjab’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2010, 46(1): 38-53. Derbyshire, I., The Building of India’s Railways: The Application of Western Technology in the Colonial Periphery 1850-1920’, in R. MacLeod and D. Kumar (eds.), Technology and the Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers in India 1700-1947, New Delhi: Sage, 1995. Fatima, M., A Challenge: Pakistan’s External Dependence Peaks at Golden Jubilee, available on http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/ database1/macro-economy/macro-economy-77.htm, 2003. Ghias-ud-Din, M., My Years with Pakistan Railways: What Went Wrong

138

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

with Railways in Pakistan, Lahore: Ibrahim Publishers, 2007. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 20122013, Islamabad. , National Planning Board,The First Five Year Plan (1955-60), Islamabad, 1957. , Planning and Development Division, Manual for Development Projects: Preparation, Appraisal, Approval, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Islamabad, 1997. , Planning Commission,The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), Islamabad, 1960. Haq, M., ‘Seven Sins of Economic Planners’, in M. Baqai and I. Brecher (eds.), Development Planning and Policy in Pakistan 1950-70, Karachi: NISER, 1973, pp. 9-20. Hasan, P., Pakistan’s Economy at the Crossroads: Past Policies and Present Imperatives. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Hasan, S., Pakistan: The Story Behinds its Economic Development. Rawalpindi: Offset Printers, 1999. Headrick, D., ‘The Railroads of India’, in D. Headrick (eds.), The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 180-91. , The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Huda, M., ‘Planning Experiences in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, 1968, 8: 329-53. Imran, M., Institutional Barriers to Sustainable Transport in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010. ‘India and her Railways’ (15 March 1862), Lahore Chronicle. ‘Indian Railway Accident’ (29 June 1921), Maryborough Chronicle. ‘Indian Railway Smash’ (1 March 1924), The Northern Miner. ‘Indian Railways Accidents: The Maharaja’ (20 November 1907), The Times. ‘Indian Trains in Collision’ (1 September 1924), The Advertiser. Iqbal, J., ‘Construction of Roads and Railways in the Khyber Pass during the British Period: A Positive Side-effect of British Colonial Rule’, Central Asia, 2008 (61): 40-6. Kerr, Ian J., ‘Representation and Representations of the Railways of Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 2003, 37(2): 287-326. , Engines of Change: The Railroads that Made India, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.

Pakistan’s Railways: A Painful History?

139

Khan, A., S. Arif, O. Nadeem and A. Anwer, ‘British Railway Architectural Legacy in Lahore: History, Importance and Buildings’ Priorities for Conservation’, Pakistan Journal of Science, 2013, 65(3): 392-8. Lambert, H., ‘The Alexandra Bridge, Punjab, Northern State Highway’, MPICE, 1878, 54: 71-93. Looney, E., ‘The Growth and Decline of Pakistan’s Rail System’, International Journal of Transport Economics, 1998, 25(3): 299312. Macpherson, J., ‘Investment in Indian Railways, 1845-72’, Economic History Review, 1955, 8(2): 177-86. Macpherson, W., ‘Investment in Indian Railways, 1845-1875’, The Economic History Review, 1955, 8(2): 177-86. Mahoney, J., ‘Path-Dependent Explanation of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 2001, 36(1): 111-41. Malik, K., Hundred Years of Pakistan Railways: Pakistan Western Railway, 1861-1961; Pakistan Eastern Railway, 1862-1962, Karachi: Ministry of Railways and Communication, Govt. of Pakistan, 1962. Martin, B., The Story of the N.E. Railway, 1923, Lahore: North Western Railway Press. Mitchell, K., ‘India’s Economic Potential’, Pacific Affairs, 1942, 15(1): 5-24. Mitra, M., Hindupore: A Peep Behind the Indian Unrest: An Anglo-Indian Romance, London: Luzac and Co., 1909. Morning Bulletin (19 December 1884), ‘Accident on an Indian Railway’. Murray, J., A Handbook for Travellers in India, Burma and Ceylon. London: Thacker Spink and Co., 1908. Quddus, A., Rail Transport in Pakistan, Lahore: Directorate of Research and Training, Pakistan Railways, 2010. Sabir, S., Story of Khyber. Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1966. Shelvankar, K., The Problem of India, London: Penguin, 1940. Szyliowicz, J., ‘Turkey’s Surface Transportation Policy and Sustainable Development’, Middle Eastern Studies, 2004, 40(1): 23-44. Tahir, N., ‘Efficiency Analysis of Pakistan Railway in Comparison with China and India’, International Journal of Transport Economics, 2013, 40(1): 71-98. The Inquirer and Commercial News (7 September 1900), ‘The Indian Frontier Railway: A Strategic Line’.

140

Muhammad Imran and Waheed Ahmed

Theroux, P., ‘By Rail Across the Indian Subcontinent’, National Geographic, 1984, 165(6): 696-743. Thorner, D., Investment in Empire: Bristish Railway and Steam Shipping Enterprise in India, 1825-1849, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950. , ‘Capital Movement and Transportation: Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railway’, The Journal of Economic History, 1951, 11(4): 389-402. , ‘The Pattern of Railway Development in India’, The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1955, 14(2): 201-16. Vakil, C., ‘Railways and Roads in India’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1944, 233: 187-92. Walsh, D., ‘Pakistan, Rusts in its Tracks’, The New York Times, 19 May. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/world/ asia/pakistans-railroads-sum-up-nations-woes.html? page wanted=4&_r=0&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all#comment sContainer Waterston, A., Planning in Pakistan: Organization and Implementation, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.

CHAPTER 3

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

The railways was very crucial for the British imperial power in India. Expansion of the railways was accorded great significance in the second half of the nineteenth century. India saw one of the most rapid expansions of the railways anywhere in the world. The government even introduced the guarantee system (assured return to foreign private investment) to ensure private investment in railway in India. By the early twentieth-century India had fourth largest network of railway tracks in the world. A large number of works have been produced by scholars on various aspects of the railways. Two broad frameworks with which historians initially worked on the railways were imperialist and nationalist. Imperialist scholars believed that the railways was a great gift of the British Empire to India as it led to economic growth and modernization of Indian society. Nationalist historians, on the other hand, see railways as most powerful instrument of colonial exploitation of India. Its growth was lopsided and could not bring any structural changes in Indian economy. It was argued that the railways could not become a vehicle of growth for other aspects of the economy because almost everything related to the railways was imported from Britain.1 The abundant historiography on railway was poor only in one sense that it overlooked environmental impact of the expansion of the railways till recently. Ramachandra Guha

142

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

was amongst the first scholars to suggest that the railway expansion was closely linked to deforestation in India.2 The expansion of the railways required laying down of tracks. Tracks were kept together by ties. Different kinds of material were used for sleepers. At that time these could be metallic or wooden. Initially, like other railway materials, sleepers were also imported, but later it was realized that at least some of them could be produced in India itself. Slowly as availability of wooden sleepers improved in India, import came down. Various timber species were used for preparing sleepers. Some of the species of trees of the Himalayan region were found suitable for preparing sleepers in the beginning and search for more species continued in late the nineteenth century. It was in this context that Himalayan forests acquired significance for the government. Himalayan forests were very rich in term of density and diversity until the early nineteenth century. These forests were, it seems, not opened up for a large scale trade until the mid-nineteenth century. These forests were primarily used by the local people for their dayto-day needs, and occasionally also provided products for trade both within and outside the region. Lower Himalayan forests might have been used for export of timber and firewood outside the region to some extent until the eighteenth century.3 But the early nineteenth-century records suggest that the scale of this trade was very small. The trade grew slowly after the British takeover of some of the Himalayan region. Until the mid-nineteenth century this trade was carried out on a very limited scale. Inaccessibility of forests, according to British officials, was a major hindrance in the growth of this trade.4 In this article the focus is on the Himalayan forests of the present-day Uttarakhand.5 Hill forests of Uttarakhand, which came under the British in 1815, began to be opened up for more intense trade in the 1840s and 1850s.6 This may be a result of the depleting timberlands in the adjoining plains. The pressure began to increase on the hill forests

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 143 when timber traders were forced to move up to submontane forests. Traders were looking for timber, bamboo and firewood. The demand for timber also picked up because of the growing requirements of the public works under the British: it was required in construction work of the Ganges canal, for construction in government buildings, and barracks for the army. This prompted state takeover, first of collection of transit duty on export of forest products, and later the control over extraction of forest resources of the submontain forests. By the early 1850s, accessible lower Himalayan forests of Uttarakhand were brought under the state control. This resulted in growth of trade of forest products.7 The forests of the interior then begun to be opened up systematically after the mid-nineteenth century. Frederick Wilson, who was a timber contractor, had taken the forests of the Tehri kingdom (in Uttarakhand) on lease. He was already floating down timber from the Bhagirathi Valley to railway depots as well as to markets in the plains around the mid-nineteenth century. By the middle of the nineteenth century the forests of submontane tracks were fully drawn into wider trade network, leading to increased extraction of timber. Revenue from forests, indicator of increased trade, began to grow rapidly. Slowly the forests of the inner Himalayas, in the Bhagirathi, Yamuna and Alaknanda valleys, began to be tapped. However, before forests could be drawn directly into wider trade network to supply regularly to railways, a proper survey of forest resources was deemed essential by colonial officials.

Knowing and Surveying of Forest Resources Collection of information about forests had begun in the early nineteenth century. This was a part of the exercise to constitute geographical knowledge as well as exploring resources of the region. ‘By the mid-nineteenth century’, argues Sivaramakrishnan, ‘categories like valuable lands, jungly waste, wild forests, timber yielding species, and the

144

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

productive areas of empire had undergone significant redefinition.’8 Exhaustive lists of plants were prepared and many of them, writes Sivaramakrishnan, were declared endangered deliberately to create ground for adoption of conservation policy. Similarly, as soon as ceded districts were conquered Calcutta immediately sent experts to the forests of newly won territories to explore the economic potential. ‘The spruce forests of Kumaon and Almora provided a new cheap source of mast for Calcutta’s shipbuilders’.9 The surveys carried out in the Himalayan region from the mid-nineteenth century had clear-cut agenda of locating timber producing areas. The search for timber species began in the 1850s. Many officials were reporting about forest wealth from the 1840s, but it was Henry Ramsay who produced a detailed report in 1861 on the forests of submontane tracks of Uttarakhand. As was the purpose of these exploratory surveys, Ramsay located areas of rich sal forests and recommended that they be made accessible. He estimated that 1 to 1.5 lakh railway sleepers might be supplied annually from these forests.10 The government, not satisfied with reports of non-professionals, deputed Dietrich Brandis, who was then the Conservator of Forests British Burma, to tour these forests with clear instructions that the object of his journey was to be ‘not to furnish a scientific detailed report on the forests, but to frame practical proposals of a general character for their improved management.’11 The government of the north western provinces in order to get further detailed reports on all Himalayan forests deputed T.W. Webber, an engineer and in charge of construction of road to Naini Tal, to survey these forests. The object of the survey writes Webber was to locate forests and suggest means to make them accessible. Webber found rich and dense forests, spread over ‘miles and miles’ though many of them appeared ‘valueless’, being ‘impenetrable’ and inaccessible. He estimated that these forests were spread over an area of approximately 15,000 sq. miles.12 The most detailed investigations of the hill forests was carried out by G.F. Pearson, the Conservator of Forests,

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 145 North-Western Provinces, in 1868-9 to ascertain the potential of these forests to supply timber for railway sleepers. He located deodar and chir forests in particular and wrote about their conditions.13 These surveys underlined the fact that there were extensive forests that needed to be made accessible.

Making Forests Accessible Once forests were identified it was essential to improve their accessibility. This required exploring all options of road transport, water transport and any other means. Different efforts were made in this direction. Initially sal and then deodar forests were made accessible. The Bhagirathi Valley had rich deodar forests so a large project of constructing a road of about 134 miles linking Gangotri to the plains was taken up in the 1860s. In 1869-70 and 1870-1 one lakh rupees (a huge amount at that time) were spent on this road. This road was of great significance as this made Gaumukh, a sacred spot for Hindus, easily accessible to pilgrims, while also opening up a link from the Gangetic plains to the trade routes to Tibet – a fact that made the Lt. Governor of the North-Western Province particularly happy. Some roads were constructed purely for extraction of timber as was the case with a 34 miles road from Deoban to the River Tons, below the rich Mundhol forests. This process of road construction for forest control continued through the late nineteenth century to the twentieth century.14 Roads alone were not enough. Many officials including Webber and Pearson recommended construction of slides to speed up timber operations, to save time, to avoid labour, which was difficult to procure in these areas particularly in the winter. Many slides were constructed in the Jaunsar forests mainly to carry railway sleepers. In the absence of slides, labourers were to carry sleepers on their back for miles before they were plunged into a river. A slide in Jaunsar consisted of 4 miles of sleeper canal, 1.25 miles of tramway

146

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

and ended with a shoot of 848 ft through which sleepers were launched into the river Tons. According to an estimate, Rs. 24,524 was to be saved in carrying 155,000 sleepers through this system from Mundhol forests to the Tons.15 Rivers were also surveyed to examine their suitability for floating down of timber. Pearson found the Bhagirathi good for floating except in the winter when there was little water in the river; the Yamuna good except at a place near Chakrata, while the Tons was not considered that good. The obstructions in the smooth flow of rivers were to be removed by blasts.16 By the end of the nineteenth century large parts of the forests in Uttarakhand were made accessible opening them up for timber extraction. Construction of roads in itself, as Mahesh Rangarajan has argued, results in destruction of forests.17 But more than that roads opened up forests for further destruction.

Early Timber Operations Imported sleepers helped in laying railway tracks in the coastal region of the country, but in the interiors where transportation was a problem these sleepers were not cost effective. Initially metal sleepers were tried in some areas, but they were found to be expensive as iron was not easily available. Wooden sleepers were preferred to metal ones: for they were light and easy to work and were cheaper although less durable than metal.18 There was search for suitable timber species to be used as railway sleepers. Species were to be durable. Non-durable species meant frequently changing sleepers and renewing tracks frequently which was again not cost effective. After experiments with various timber species teak, sal and deodar were found suitable for sleepers due to their durability.19 Other species required creosoting for durability, which was initially not seen as cost effective. High price of teak confined its use only to some of the places where it was found. In the provinces along the coast cheap imported

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 147 creosoted pine sleepers from Europe were available. The use of indigenous sleepers was also encouraged as a defence against contingencies like war in Europe which might interrupt supply of sleepers as was feared in 1877. Thus the railways mainly relied on sal and deodar for expansion in the north Indian plains.20 Sal was found extensively along the foot of the Himalaya and in the central Indian plateau. However tremendous pressure was put on them. Deodar, another important durable species, was confined to a few locations in the Himalaya but as a whole only a small area was under deodar. Experiments on the cheap creosoting of various species continued21 but could not succeed before the early twentieth century. With the introduction of railways in India in 1853 a large number of traders came to the forests of the submontane tracts of Garhwal and Kumaun in search of timber, felling trees far in excess of what they could have transported out.22 Many times felling trees and supplying timber was not suitable for sleepers. Railways too frequently rejected such timber. From 1858 timber operations were carried out by the state. Henry Ramsay, the Commissioner of Kumaon, had estimated that 1 to 1.5 lakh sleepers could be supplied annually from the submontane forests of Garhwal and Kumaon.23 Similarly G.F. Pearson who was in-charge of forests of North-Western Provinces hoped that a good number of sleepers could be supplied from Himalayan forests. Initially there was a shortage of sal sleepers in the NorthWestern Provinces, which was affecting the expansion of railway tracks and compelling the authorities to rely on metal and imported sleepers.24 Brandis surveyed all sal forests and found that most of the forests in central India and in the tarai belt were not mature sal trees and hence were not suitable for supplying sleepers. Nepal was one place where mature sal forests were located but only limited supply was available. Brandis also believed that Punjab hill states and Kashmir were capable of supplying in a large number. Local officials were asked to ensure sufficient supply of sleepers.25

148

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

Hence emphasis was on securing regular supply of sleepers from the hills. Initially supply was not reliable but later various timber operations were started. With these timber operations starting from the late 1860s the supply of sleepers improved. For the Delhi-Rewaree line timber operations were in progress in the Tons Valley under Captain Murrey and in the Bhagirathi Valley under O’Callaghan and Frederick Wilson. In the Tons Valley about 40,000 sleepers were prepared in 1869-70. In the Bhagirathi Valley 50,000 to 60,000 sleepers were to be prepared in 1869-70. A private contractor Scott was working on the chir forests in Agustmuni in the Alaknanda Valley for East Indian Railway and supplied 37,000 sleepers in 1868-9 and 44,000 in 1869-70.26 Timber operations to supply sleepers intensified further in the 1870s when the work on the Rajputana railways gained momentum. In July 1869 the Government of India asked to the forest department of the North-Western Provinces to provide sleepers to the state railways.27 For the Agra and Delhi lines the requirement was 7.25 lakh sleepers,28 but about 9 lakh sleepers were prepared. The forest department was thus left with a large number of spare sleepers. The railway department was requested to purchase these sleepers at reduced rates as these could not have been put to any other use.29 Sleepers were often cut for broad gauge only to discover that the railway requirement was for narrow gauge. Such operations often resulted in huge wastage of timber.30 Himalayan forests of Uttarakhand emerged as one of the most important supplier of sleepers to railways. The forest departments of various provinces supplied to the state railways 18,34,927 sleepers between 1870-1 and 1877-8. Out of this the North-Western Provinces alone supplied 13,64,251 (about 73 per cent).31 These were mainly deodar sleepers from the hills. To carry out these large-scale timber operations considerable funds was required as railways made payment only after delivery of sleepers. Budgetary allocations were made to the forest department for these operations. However, the

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 149 forest department frequently accepted indents to supply sleepers and started work even when it had no sanctioned funds. The Government of India raised objections to such practices as in such situations it was compelled to allocate funds fearing that a stoppage of work would cause heavy losses. It was also felt that ‘the Conservator in his eagerness for revenue might be apt to overlook the future of forests’.32 The Government of India issued guidelines for the acceptance of indents. This made clear that indents be accepted only within the annual yield set by the working plans; and indents were to be accepted in such a way that it allowed sufficient time to carry out the operations economically; and that only when funds to carry out operations was available.33 Dietrich Brandis, the Inspector General of Forests of India, was one of the main critics of these large-scale timber operations in the mountains of North-Western Provinces to supply sleepers. Criticizing excessive fellings he wrote, ‘A Conservator, who has no special professional interest in the maintenance and improvement of forests in his charge, cannot be expected to resist demands made upon him to supply timber for works of such paramount importance as Railways.’34 He further argued, ‘Moreover it must be remembered that the question whether a forest is overworked or not is a most delicate and difficult one, requiring great professional experience, and that unaided, His Honour the Lieutenant Governor cannot be expected to grapple with such questions’.35 Brandis questioned the professional abilities of the Conservator of the North-Western Provinces and thereby opened all operations for criticism. He argued that the fellings were excessive and harmful for forests in the long run.36 Timber felled, he wrote, was mainly ‘sal and deodar, and of both kinds the growing stock of mature trees left standing in the forests under the control of the Conservator is very small’.37 In the sal forests damage was most serious in the areas where there was no fire protection. While in the sal felling areas sal was the predominant species, deodar

150

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

was always found mixed with other species. In such a situation, he wrote, excessive felling could result in Pinusexcelsa, spruce and silver fir replacing deodar. He suggested, ‘where fires are not kept out from such a forests after cutting, it is ruined altogether’. There was, he contended, very little natural regeneration of deodar in the Bhagirathi Valley, which along with Jaunsar division mainly furnished deodar sleepers. According to Brandis, these extensive operations carried out in a short time were leading to lot of wastage and were ‘uneconomical’. He suggested that cutting ought be done only to improve forests and should be kept well below the ‘annual maximum yield’.38 He accepted that these operations could be occasionally carried out in times of exigencies. But cutting was not to be dictated by expectations of revenue returns. He wrote: ‘. . . timber operations are often undertaken under the erroneous belief that it is necessary to cut and sell timber in order to produce revenue, whereas in reality the result is a large increase of both receipt and charges, resulting either in actual loss or in an insignificant surplus.’39 The Conservator refuted these charges and argued that fellings were not excessive, they were ‘selection fellings’ done carefully and only mature trees were felled. The lack of good return was due to the pricing policy of the Government of India under which sleeper prices were continuously slashed. The operations were not uneconomical: it was only that the railways gained at the cost of the forest department.40 The Government of India refused to accept the views of the Conservator and argued that private contractors were supplying sleepers cheaper than the forest department.41 Brandis rejected all the arguments of the Conservator.42 However, A.O. Hume, Secretary, Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce, Government of India, disagreed with the observations of Brandis arguing that timber operations were not ‘excessive’ and the expenditure was ‘heavy’ but ‘unavoidable’. Without these operations Rajputana Railway would not have been possible and the problem of the scarcity of timber

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 151 in the markets of the North-Western Provinces would not have been solved.43 Nevertheless there was skepticism about the way the timber operations were carried out and the GOI felt: ‘. . . the Conservator bases his views on the assumption that the best plan to regenerate sal and deodar forests is to cut out all mature timber. Under certain favourable conditions this may be correct, but it seems to be a subject worthy of close and careful study by the local forest officers, whether this principle holds good in all cases.’44 In spite of criticism there was no let-up in the supply of sleepers. Timber operations continued to facilitate railway expansion, although the forest department suffered losses.45 These operations led to an expansion of the forest department and strengthened its control over forests. In fact, over the years demand increased as the railway network expanded. Chir forests were surveyed in the hope that cheap impregnation would become possible shortly.46 A. Smythies after the survey of chir forests on the left bank of the Tons River in Tehri kingdom and Jaunsar estimated that 100,000 broad gauge sleepers could be supplied annually from these forests on a long term basis.47 The expanding railway tracks meant increased demand for sleepers, not only to lay new tracks but also to relay old ones. In the country there were 1,349 km tracks in 1860 which increased to 7,678 in 1870, 25,495 in 1890, 56,980 in 1920-1 and 65,217 in 1946-7.48 The total length of tracks in 1910 was 32,099 miles for which the annual demand was 4 million sleepers. Only 1.5 million sleepers were for new lines, the rest were for renewal of the existing tracks.49 Thus renewal of the tracks posed most of the additional demands.50 The demand for renewal of the sleepers of Rajputana and Malwa Railway, if they were to use only deodar sleepers which usually lasted 12 years, was estimated by Hearl to be 0.25 million per annum in the last decades of the nineteenth century.51 In 1870 East Indian Railways’ requirement of sleepers for renewal was 0.2 million annually.52

152

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

Wastage of Wood in Supplying Sleepers Supplying sleepers was the main priority of the forest department. Demand of railways was met at all conditions. In doing this principles of so-called scientific forestry, where claims were made that forest management was sustainable, were thrown to winds. The eagerness to supply to railway was due to many reasons. One simple reason was that railway was too important for imperial interests to be overlooked. Further there was tremendous pressure on the provincial forest departments to generate surplus revenue. Departments struggled and made all efforts to market their produces. They wanted no opportunity to be missed as performance of forest officers was judge in term of his ability to identify and market new forest produce. Hence foresters were over enthusiastic in sending wood to the market as it was a way of judging their efficiency. In their eagerness to score on these points foresters tended to send as much timber as possible to the railways. And this often resulted in wastage of wood. The railways which was sure of getting cheap timber was least careful of using these resources. Low price of natural resources which often have invisible subsidy, argue Gadgil and Guha, result in profligacy rather than prudence in resource use.53 Precisely because of this, the railways was supplied larger number of sleepers than were required to be used on tracts. Hence the rate of rejection of sleepers by the railways was very high. Sleepers were rejected on flimsy grounds. Further, wastage of wood in preparing sleepers was common. The entire process of sawing and preparing sleepers caused a lot of timber wastage. From the hewn timber only 33 to 66 per cent of wood, it was argued, was utilized for conversion into sleeper or planks.54 Over and above this the railways frequently rejected sleepers on minor issues. The officiating Conservator of Forests, NWP, held the railways responsible for a high rate of rejection as even a small crack on sleeper invited rejection.55 Since a small damage was possible in transportation, the sleepers were usually cut to a size

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 153 larger than specified.56 Hence effectively much larger size sleepers than the need of railway were supplied. The excess wood was simply removed. Thus there was lot of wastage of timber.

Pricing of Sleepers The issue of prices of sleepers was very contentious. The Forest Department had to constantly compete with importers who provided cheap imported sleepers. Private traders also supplied sleepers at low prices. The government saw forests as its own resource to be used to serve the imperial interest. Hence the forest department was often forced to sell sleepers as cheaply as possible to the railways. Effectively the forest department found selling sleepers at very low rate uneconomical, the cost of timber operations was very high. The railways wanted the forest department of the NorthWestern Provinces to supply deodar sleepers of 6 ft × 4 in. × 4 in. at Agra at the price not exceeding Rs. 2 and 8 annas which was the cost of imported creosoted pine sleepers from Europe. The railways also argued that price of sal sleeper, Rs. 2-14 at Agra, was non-competitive. The railways pressurized the GOI to reduce prices. Consequently the GOI reduced the price of deodar sleepers in 1873 to Rs. 2-5 at Delhi and Rs. 2-8 at Agra, which was further reduced in 1874 to Rs. 2-3 at Delhi and Rs. 2-7 at Agra.57 This bringing down of prices of sleepers was resented by the forest department, but to no avail. The price of narrow gauge sal sleeper was Rs. 1-2, which was much below the market price for planks, but sleepers were still supplied due to the impression that it was essential to utilize the timber of mature trees and other profitable purchasers for large amount of timber were not easily available.58 Sleepers were not only supplied at cheap rates to railways but sometimes free of cost. The GOI arrived on an agreement with the Rohilkhand and Kumaun Railways on 12 October 1882 for providing sleepers free of cost from the tarai for-

154

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

ests.59 This shows how Himalayan forests were seen by the GOI as an important source of cheap supply of sleepers.

Supply of Firewood as Fuel for Railways Railways required not only sleepers but also fuel and timber for carriage and wagons. In areas, which were distant from the source of coal, railways used wood mainly as a fuel. So there was a search for sources of wood for fuel. G.F. Pearson, after surveying forests of Dehradun suggested that these could supply fuel to Delhi Railways. However, the forest department was unwilling as it was not cost effective.60 To supply cheap firewood there was a suggestion to lay a tramway connecting the Ganges and the Yamuna to Dehradun but it was found uneconomical.61 In many instances the railways were allowed to cut wood for fuel from forests along the tracks. Such an agreement was signed by the forest department with BareillyRanibagh Light Railway.62 Keeping in view the high demand for firewood by railways there was a proposal to plant trees for this purpose along the railway lines.63 Disagreements and disputes between the railway department and the forest department over the question of supplying sleepers became common. The forest department had a contract with the Rohilkhand and Kumaun Railways for the supply of fuel which ran into difficulty when the company accused the forest department of providing insufficient and poor quality fuel which could not be burnt to produce locomotive power.64 The government of the NorthWestern Provinces rejected these charges and argued that the agreement was never meant to supply all fuel wants of the company, particularly when it was expanding its branches after the main line was completed. The forest department accused the company of inflating its demand to cover up losses and of shifting the responsibility of losses to the forest department.65 The firewood consumption of the company jumped from 117,124 cft during 1888-90 to 1,007,522 cft in 1908 a 759 per cent increase in 28 years. In 1908 the for-

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 155 est department could supply only 117,547 cft. The company claimed that there was a shortage of 889,975 cft due to which it suffered a loss of Rs. 12,585.66 So the company demanded compensation. After considering the matter, the Railway Conference asked the Government of the United Provinces (the North-Western Provinces and Oudh became the United Provinces in 1901-2) to pay compensation and fixed a supply to the company.67 The forest department was usually at the receiving end in such cases of disputes. To supply requirements of railways became an important duty of the forest department irrespective of consequences.68 Railways was not only responsible for denudation of the hills, forest areas were also cut in the plains to supply wood to railways.69 Elizabeth Whitcombe writes, ‘Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the railways – most disturbing because least capable of remedy – was the widespread use of local timber as fuel for the locomotives.’70 Private forests were being cut on a large scale to supply fuel to railways:71 the firewood supplied by villagers being cheaper than that supplied by the forest department. This was leading to a disappearance of village groves, which caused serious concern even among officials.72 This led to increased pressure on the forest department to supply firewood to railways at cheaper rates.73 However the forest department often found it difficult to meet all the firewood requirements of the railways.74

Wood Consumption of Railways This long discussion on railways is to emphasize the point that timber and firewood supply to railways was crucial in opening up of Uttarakhand forests and constituted significant portion of the total outturn. Sources indicate that the railway department was the main purchaser of timber from the hill forests of Uttarakhand.75 However, we lack figures to systematically work out the exact share of railways in the total outturn. But some rough estimates can be made. From the discussion above it follows that on an average the num-

156

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

ber of sleepers annually supplied from Uttarakhand varied approximately between 2 and 3 lakh. Two lakh sleepers would constitute about 14 lakh cft of wood.76 Since the timber outturn in the Uttarakhand in the 1890s was around 27 to 29 lakh cft, the railways seemed to have claimed around 50 per cent of the supply. In the first decade of the twentieth century the outturn was around 40 to 45 lakh cft, the share of railway was around one-third.77 Some other estimates indicate similar patterns: according to one estimate railways used one-third of the total timber outturn of the country.78 According to another estimate, railway annually took about 2 million cft of sal and the same quantity of deodar, which was about half of the total outturn of these species in the country.79 Thus as railways was the main purchaser of timber any move by railways to use non-wooden sleepers always caused serious concern in the forestry circles though the relationship with the railway department was never free of tensions and conflicts.80 The Himalayan forests were hence commercialized to supply sleepers to railway. The increasing supply of sleepers resulted in opening up of these forests. This supply was so crucial that the forest department had to meet all railway demands at all costs. The result was that the Himalayan forests were relentlessly exploited. And this led to deforestation of the Himalayas on a large scale.

NOTES 1. For exhaustive coverage of literature on railways see Ian J. Kerr, (eds.), 27 Down: New Departures in Indian Railways Studies, Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2007. 2. Ramachnadra Guha, ‘Forestry in British and Post-British India: A Historical Analysis’, Economic and Political Weekly, two parts on 29 October and 5 November 1983, pp. 1882-96, pp. 1940-7. Elizabeth Whitcome was one of the first scholars to argue that firewood supply to railways caused deforestation in the United Provinces. See her book Agrarian Conditions in North India: The

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 157

3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

United Provinces under British Rule, 1869-1900, vol. I, Berkley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. Chetan Singh, ‘Humans and Forests: The Himalaya and Terai during the Medieval Period’, in Ajay Rawat (ed.), History of Forestry in India, Delhi: Indus Publishing House, 1991, pp. 16378. For revenue generated by these forests for government see D.D. Dangwal, Himalayan Degradation: Colonial Forestry and Environmental Change in India, Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2008, chap. 4. These forests were earlier known as the hill forests of Uttar Pradesh, and before independence of United Provinces. The United Provinces before 1901 was known as the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and in the earlier part of the nineteenth century simply as the North-Western Provinces. Himalayan forests of Uttarakhand were the first to come under the British control. Other Himalayan forests became part of British Empire slowly later. In the Punjab hills (now Himachal Pradesh) most of the forests were under princely states, though sometimes leased to the British. The same applied to the forests of Jammu & Kashmir. Nepal and Bhutan Himalayas were outside the ambit of British rule. Ibid. K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 124. Michael Mann, British Rule on Indian Soil: North India in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, Delhi: Manohar, 1999, p. 136. Henry Ramsay, ‘Report on Forests of Kumaon and Gurhwal’ in 21 February 1861 prog. 23, PWD (Agriculture) national Archives of India (hereafter NAI) (the report is hereafter referred as Ramsay, ‘Report on Forests of Kumaon and Gurhwal’). Lt. Col. R. Strachey, Secretary (hereafter Secy), Government of India (hereafter GOI), public Works Department (hereafter PWD to Cons. of Forests, British Burma, 547, 4-2-1863, February 1862, A proceedings (hereafter progs). 1, PWD (Agriculture) NAI. T.W. Webber, The Forests of Upper India and Their Inhabitants,

158

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18

19. 20. 21

22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal London: Edward Arnold, 1902, pp. 42-3. He surveyed forests in the 1860s. G.F. Pearson, ‘Sub-Himalayan Forests of Kumaon and Gurhwal 31-8-1869’, in Selection from the Government Records of the Northwestern Provinces, 2nd series, vol. 2, Allahabad: Government Press, 1871, pp. 125-50. Cons. North-Western Provinces (hereafter NWP), to Secy. Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 105 A, 15-12-1870, in May 1871, A progs. 21-4, PWD (Revenue Forests), NAI. Secy, Govt. NWP. PWD to Secy GOI, no. 121F/c 8-8-1873 in December 1873 B progs 53-9, Revenue Agriculture and Forests (hereafter RAF), NAI. G.F. Pearson, ‘Deodar Forests at the Head of the Jamuna and the Tons Rivers Dated 5-12-1869’, in Selection from the Records of the Government of the Northwestern Provinces, 2nd series, vol. II, Allahabad: Governemt Press, 1871, pp. 129-37. Mahesh Rangarajan, Fencing the Forests: Conservation and Ecological Change in India’s Central Provinces, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Railway Sleepers of the Himalayan Pines Impregnated in India’, Indian Forester (hereafter IF), vol. 4, no. 4 (1878-9), pp. 365-85. Ibid. Brandis has discussed various species and their suitability and unsuitability for sleepers. Sal from the Nepal Tarai was also supplied for railway expansion in India. See Ghimir, Forest or Farm. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on Supply of Railway Sleepers’. Brandis gives detail of how experiments were carried out on various species. One species which became durable after creosoting was chir. Extensive chir forests of the Himalaya hence saw onslaught from the early twentieth century. Ramsay, ‘Report on the Kumaun and Garhwal Forests’, p. 152. Atkinson, Himalayan Districts of Northwestern Provinces, 3 vols., 1884-5, rpt., Delhi: Cosmos Publications, 1982. See vol. I, pt. II, p. 852. Ramsay, ‘Report on the Kumaun and Gurhwal Forests’, p. 157. See Report of the Chief Engineer on the Operation of the East Indian Railway, for Half Year Ending 31 December 1861, June 1862: A prog 1, PWD (Railway), NAI. July 1862 A progs 6-7, PWD (Railway), NAI. ‘Annual Progress Report of Forest Department, North-Western

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 159

27.

28. 29.

30.

31

32.

33. 34. 35.

Provinces and Oudh (hereafter NWP & O), 1869-70, January 1871 A progs 17-19, PWD (For.), NAI, pp. 10-11. See Report attached to letter of Under Secretary GOI to Secy. Govt., NWP, no 446, 5-4-1872, April 1872 A prog 11-13, RAC (For.) NAI; Brandis, Memorandum on cost of timber operations, 4-12-1877, January 1877 A progs 7-11, RAC (For.), NAI. Report attached, Under Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 446, 5-4-1872, April 1872: A progs 11-13, RAF, NAI. Officiating (hereafter Offg) Cons. NWP to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 332, 13-12-1873, February 1872 B progs 69-78, RAF, NAI. According to another estimate 9.4 lakh sleepers prepared which were in 2.8 lakhs excess of demand. See offg Cons. NWP to Secy Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 278, 16-12-1871, February 1872 B progs 77-81, RAF, NAI. Report attached, Under Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 446, 5-4-1872, April 1872, A progs 11-13, RAF, NAI. Due to this large number of butt ends were left over. Later on the request of the Forest Department Rajputana Railway purchased 25,000 butt ends. See Secy GOI, PWD (State Railways) to Secy GOI, RAF, no. 187, 3-1-1872, February 1872, B progs 77-81, RAF, NAI. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Railway Sleepers’, pp. 384-5. According to another estimate between 1871-2 and 1875-6, 11.5 to 12 lakh sleepers were supplied to the state railways from the hills by the Forest Department of the North-Western Provinces. See Cons. NWP to Secy Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 218, 17-2-1876, January 1877, A progs 7-11 and Cons. Oudh to Personal Assistant to Lieutenant Governor (hereafter Lt. Govr.) and Chief Commissioner, Oudh, no. 116, 2-3-1877, November 1877, A progs 16-17, RAF, NAI. Brandis says in another place that 12 lakh sleepers were supplied to the state railways from the timber operations in the hills in the early 1870s. See Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Cost of Sleeper Operations’, January 1877, A progs 7-11, RAF, NAI, para 10. Cons., NWP to Secy Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 118, 14-8-1877, November 1877, A progs 24-31, RAF, NAI. The objections of the GOI are quoted in the letter. Offg Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 1500F, 6-11-1877, ibid. Comments by Brandis dated 18-6-1877, July 1877, A progs 14950, RAF, NAI. Ibid.

160

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal

36. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Cost of Timber Operation’, 4-12-1876, January 1877, A progs 7-11, RAF, NAI. 37. Ibid., para 7. 38. Ibid., paras 8-11. 39. Ibid., para 12. 40. Cons. NWP to Secy Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 15, 13-5-1877, August 1877, A progs 16-17, and Cons. Oudh to Personal Assistant, Lt. Govr. and Chief Commr., Oudh, no. 116, 2-3-1877, November 1877, A prog 16-17, RAF, NAI. 41. Offg Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP&O, PWD (For.), no. 1474F, 30-10-1877 and other letters, November 1877, A progs 16-17 and Offg Secy Govt. to Secy Govt. NWP&O, no. 1029 F, 22-81877, August 1877, A progs 44-7, RAF, NAI. 42. See comments of Brandis, 7-7-1877, August 1877, A progs 44-7, RAF, NAI. 43. Comments by Hume, 5-4-1876, January 1877, A progs 7-11, RAF, NAI. 44. Offg Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP&O, no. 1029 F, 22-8-1877, August 1877, A progs 44-7, RAC (For.). 45. See file 1/1882, box 20, COR, RA Nainital. See also Forest Settlement Report of the Tarai-Bhabar Civil Forests, in file 32/1899-1900, box 67,COR, RA Nainital, pp. 2-3. 46. To decrease pressure on sal and deodar forests and to develop alternative source of sleeper supply, efforts were made to evolve cheap methods of impregnation. Creosoting was costly and made prices of sleepers non-competitive. However, much success was not achieved in developing cheap methods of creosoting till the early twentieth century. See the following proceedings in NAI: June 1872 B, progs 154-5 (Comments by Brandis, 11-5-1872); November 1873 B, progs 36-8; November 1875, B progs, 111-12, all in RAC (For.). Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Impregnation of Pine’, 22-8-1879, September 1879, A progs 21-4 and November 1879 B, progs 19-28, Home, Reve. and Agri.(For.); September 1887 B, progs 12-17 and October 1912, B prog 80, Reve. & Agri.(For.), NAI. There is a vast literature on impregnation. For an important discussion see Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Railway Sleepers’, and J.E.C. Turner, ‘Anti-septic Treatment of Chir Pinus Sleepers in the Kumaun Circle, UP’, IF, 40 (1914), pp. 427-9. 47. A. Smythies, Assistant Cons., A report on chir forests on the left

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 161

48.

49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

57. 58.

bank of the Tons river, situated in Tehri Garhwal and Jaunsar Bawar, in July 1888, B prog 4, Reve. & Agri. (For.), NAI. J.M. Hurd, ‘Railways’, in Dharma Kumar, The Cambridge Economic History, pp. 737-61, esp. p. 739. For broad gauge railways nearly 1,800 sleepers are required per mile (Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Sleepers’, p. 368), however, the general requirements vary and in all 2,200 sleepers were required per mile, including sidings. (Brandis quoted by Stebbing, Forests of India, vol. II, pp. 311-13.) R.S. Troup, Indian Forest Utilisation (2nd revd. edn., Calcutta, 1913), p. 77. The demand included a small number of metal sleepers. The average life of the heart wood sal sleeper was 12 years (initially when good timber was available it was 14 years) (see Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Railway Sleepers’, pp. 374-5) and deodar sleeper was 12 years. Most of the other species initially used had very short life and required frequent renewal thus increasing the maintenance charges of railways. See A Note by Major H. Drumond, Offg Consultant Engineer to Govt. of Bengal, Railway Deptt., no. 655, 18-3-1862, June 1862, A prog 12, PWD (Railway), NAI. N. Hearle, WP for the Tehri Leased Garhwal Leased Forests, Jaunsar Forest Division, Allahabad: Government Press, 1888, p. 24. Brandis, ‘Memorandum on the Supply of Sleepers’, p. 368. M. Gadgil and R. Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. See Cons. Oudh to Personal Assistant of Lt. Govr. and Chief Commr. Oudh, no. 116, 2-3-1877, November 1877, A progs, 16-17, RAF, NAI. See letter to Secy Govt. NWP, PWD, no. 16, 12-4-1871, September 1871, B progs 18-19, PWD (Revenue Forest), NAI. Spdt. Engineer, Agra District, Rajputana State Railways to Secy GOI, PWD (Railway), no. 72, 25-4-1872, June 1872, B prog 107, RAC (For.). Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 1208, 11-10-1872, October, A progs 7-9, RAF, NAI. Offg Secy NWP, PWD to Offg Cons. NWP, no. 31, 27-1-1872, April 1872 B progs 50-3, RAF, NAI. On prices of sleepers see the following proceedings at NAI: September 1871, B progs 18-19, PWD (Revenue Forest); and following RAF, Proceedings:

162

59.

60.

61. 62. 63.

64.

65.

66. 67. 68.

69.

70. 71. 72.

Dhirendra Datt Dangwal February 1872, B progs 37-42; October 1872, B progs 7-9; March 1873, A progs 4-6; April 1872, B progs 52-3. See file 1/1882, box 20, COR, RA Nainital. See also Forest Settlement Report of the Tarai-Bhabar Civil Forests, in file 32/1899-1900, box 67, COR, RA Nainital, pp. 2-3. Pearson’s report attached to letter of Under Secy GOI to Secy Govt. NWP, no. 446, 5-4-1872, April 1872, A progs 11-13, RAF, NAI. June 1872, A progs 25-8, RAF, NAI. Secy Govt. NWP to Secy GOI, RAF, no. 1793, 28-8-1880, September 1880, B progs 57-8, RAF, NAI. See GOI Circular no 22F, 11-10-1888, October 1888, A progs 30-1, Revenue and Agriculture (hereafter Reve. & Agri.) (For.), NAI. For various proposals on fuel supply to the railways in Oudh see June 1874 B progs 20-1, RAF, NAI. See the following files in the Regional Archives (hereafter RA) Nainital: File 1/1882, box 20; ‘Forest Settlement Report of the Tarai-Bhabar Civil Forests’ in file 32/1899-1900, box 67, both Commissioner Office Records; See also letter to Commr., 14-6-1890, file 38/1909-11, box 153, Collectorate (hereafter Coll.) Nainital records. Chief Secy, Govt. NWP to Secy GOI, no. 96, 14-3-1912, Forest Department (hereafter FD) file 39/1907, box 43, Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow. File 38/1901-11, box 153, Coll. Nainital Records, RA Nainital. FD file 39/1907, box 43, UPSA, Lucknow. Offg Secy PWD, Chief Commr., Oudh to Secy GOI, no. 1966, 21-10-1872, January 1873 A progs 41-3, RAF, NAI. Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway was supplied 1,215,000 maunds (5 cft in stack was equal to one maund) of firewood annually from Oudh forests. The file contains details of fuel supply to railway. E.P. Flint, ‘Deforestation and Land Use Change in North India with a Focus on Sal (Shorea robusta) Forests 1880-1980’ in Richard Grove et al., eds., Nature and the Orient: Essays on the Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 421-58 Whitcombe, Agrarian Condition, pp. 94, 95-6. June 1874, B progs 32-5, RAF, NAI. January 1872, A progs 17-18, RAF, NAI. See also Whitcombe, Agrarian Condition, pp. 94-6.

The Impact of Railway Expansion on Himalayan Forests 163 73. Offg Secy GOI to Chief Commr. of Oudh, no. 49, 9-1-1872, January 1872, A progs 17-18, RAF, NAI. 74. See Note by L. Conway-Gordon, Manager of North-Western Railway, 7-7-1886, July 1887, A progs 15-24, RAF, NAI. The railways in Punjab required about 275,000 tons of fuel per annum – a volume larger than the Forest Department of Punjab could have supplied. Ibid. 75. J.C. Tullock, WP for the Leased Forests of Tehri Garhwal, Allahabad: Government Press, 1907, p. 11; P.D. Raturi, WP for the Uttarkashi Forest Division, Calcutta: Government Press, 1938, p. 23; P.D. Raturi, WP for Jamuna Forest Division, 1932, Meerut: Government Press, p. 31. 76. The volume of an average sleeper of 10 ft × 10 in. × 5 in. is about 3.5 cft. According to Brandis, about 7 cft of rough wood was required for preparing a sleeper of the volume of 3.5 cft. Brandis is quoted by Stebbing, Forests of India, vol. II, pp. 31113. 77. Dangwal, Himalayan Degradation. 78. See editorial ‘Wooden Versus Iron Sleepers’, IF, 54, no. 8 (1928), pp. 429-30. The term used is one-third of the output; I suppose it is timber outturn. 79. K. Kamesam, ‘ ‘‘Half Round” Sleepers of Chir (Pinus longifolia)’, IF, 54, no. 11 (1928), pp. 582-7. See also ‘Wood Versus Metal Sleepers’, a report in Capital, 18-5-1839, reproduced in IF, 65, no. 9 (1939), pp. 601-3. One-third of the sal outturn of the British India was, writes Flint, converted to sleepers. See Flint, ‘Deforestation and Land Use’, pp. 421-58. 80. Anonymous, ‘Wooden Versus Iron Sleepers’, IF, 53, no. 8 (1928), pp. 429-30; W.A. Baily, ‘Half Round Sleepers’, ibid., pp. 443-7; Kamesam, ‘ “Half Round” Sleepers of Chir’.

CHAPTER 4

Railways and Forests: History of Railways and their Impact on Forest Policies of South India, 1850-1900 V.M. Ravi Kumar

The history of railways, has been one of the important strands of modern Indian history. Undoubtedly, railways in India generated far-reaching impact on various domains of India. This article looks at ecological dimension of the Indian railways and proposes that railways were responsible for massive deforestation by the way of consuming valuable timber for sleepers and fuel. By focusing on south India this article argues that the railways were one of the important forces responsible for evolution of forest policies. The history of deforestation induced by railways is important to understand the ecological costs of the British colonial rule in India. The nature of colonial rule and the transformation of socio-economic and political structures brought about by it in India has been the centrality of modern Indian history. The historical versions of modern India are largely conditioned by ideological affinity of historians. In spite of rigorous debate, there has been a broad agreement among historians that colonial rule indeed initiated a transition which integrated India with the modern world system. In the process, the changes brought about by the railways have been an important narrative in the fields of economic, social, political and environmental histories of modern India. In the recent past, historical writings on the impact of the

166

V.M. Ravi Kumar

British rule on the environmental conditions of South Asia acquired significant prominence. In the historical narratives of environmental history, colonial forest histories constituted an important theme. The impact of railways on depletion of forests has been a focal theme of colonial forest history in South Asia. It has been proposed by colonial forest historians that the introduction of railways exercised significant impact upon the forest landscape and forest management policies in India. This article attempts to document the history of deforestation induced by the railways and its impact upon forests policies of south India with particular reference to the Andhra region. This article has been organized into three sections: the first section proposes approaches to study the impact of railways on Indian forests: the second section narrates the process of impact of railways on forest landscape of India, in general and south India with particular reference to Andhra region in particular and the third presents a brief note on the evolution of forest policies on account of railway in India in general and south India in particular. The main objective is to construct a historical trajectory of changes brought about by the railways on forests in India and their impact upon the evolutionary pattern of forest management policies at different levels, i.e. all India, provincial and district levels.

Railways and Environmental History The impact of railways on Indian society has been a contested issue in Indian historiography. The nationalist historians in colonial India highlighted the logic of introducing the railways at the cost of important sectors like irrigation and welfare policies.1 It has been argued that the railways were introduced to benefit the interests of capitalist class of Britain rather than Indians.2 Echoing in a similar tone, the left historians of modern India argued that the railways are mechanisms used by the colonial state for speedy exploita-

Railways and Forests

167

tion of resources from hinterlands to ports. The railways were perceived as one of the features of global expansion of capitalist exploitative system which has the main aim of profit maximization.3 It has also been proposed that railways undermined the supply of food availability on account of the ability to transport raw material from India to international markets. On this point Irfan Habib proposed, ‘the railways seriously reduced food supply available within the country in times of famine by moving large amounts of food grains to the ports for export’.4 In contrast to nationalist and Marxist approaches, neo-colonial historians argue that the railways provided socio-economic mobility thereby integrating India as a vibrant economic space in the international market. It has also been proposed that socio-cultural mobility of Indian society was greatly facilitated by the railways. In fact, the emergence of Indian nationalism was attributed to the railways which was believed to have facilitated the process of exchange of ideas among the various provinces of India.5 These studies focused mainly on the economic, social and political impact of the railways on Indian society. These studies however did not focus on the ecological costs inflicted by the railways as it was out of their reach on account of the absence of ecological consideration at the time they framed their argument. The ecological dimension of the Indian railways during the colonial period has been explored by colonial forest historians. An attempt has been made to document the factors that contributed to the ecological degradation in general and forests in particular. Among several factors, it has been proposed that the railway network was the main culprit in changing the morphology of Indian forest landscape by way of unleashing speedy exploitation of timber trees. The main argument put forward is that the railways in India were constructed and operated at an enormous cost to the forest resources. It was this process according to Ramachandra Guha which was mainly responsible for depletion of vast

168

V.M. Ravi Kumar

forest landscape of India.6 Initially the railways consumed massive quantum of forest resources and subsequently this process resulted in timber famine which threatened the existence and efficient functioning of the railways. The process of evolution of forest policies and management introduced by the colonial state according to Ramachandra Guha was actually in response to the timber requirements of railways in India. Destruction of forests on account of construction of railways – documented by Guha – mainly concentrated on the macro level (all India level) process. The process of deforestation induced by the railways in different regions has been documented by some studies. It has been proposed that forests of several regions of India were brought under an exploitative process to meet the timber demands of railways. The following regional level studies demonstrated the impact of railways on the exploitation of forests: Uttrakhand region by Arun Agarwal,7 the region of Maharashtra by Neena Ambre,8 in Central India by Mahesh Rangarajan9 and Sumit Guha,10 Bengal region by K. Shivaramakrisnan,11 in Himalayan region by Chetan Singh,12 and Vasant Sabarwal,13 in Hyderabad by Abdul Taha14 and in Sarvananan15 and Ravi Kumar in south India.16 These studies bring out empirical evidences on the patterns of exploitation of forests and evolution of forest policies in their study regions. Railways were thus perceived as a significant contributor to the destruction of forests and in turn an inspirer for the evolution of forest policies in India. This article proposes that the trajectory of deforestation induced by the railways could be broadened by a comparative analysis at different levels. An attempt has been made in this article to document the impact of the railways on forests at different levels such as the all India level, provincial level and district level to track the process of deforestation by the railways from top to bottom. This exercise would certainly expand the ecological dimension of the railways which has not adequately explored by the existing literature in a more concrete way.

Railways and Forests

169

Colonizing Indian Forest The introduction of the railways in India was indeed a landmark of the British on Indian soil. While commenting upon the importance of the railways the Governor-General of India at that time pointed out, ‘Railways will constitute a very noble work, replete with the highest advantages to the government and to the public’.17 During the period of 1855-1900, the railways in India expanded in an unprecedented manner. The good and bad effect of the Indian Railways is a debated issue, the article focuses on how railway impacted upon the forests and forest policy of India. The pioneers of environmental history proposed that deforestation and degradation of the Indian environment is a product of British colonial rule.18 The colonial economic process was believed to have unleashed the process of commodification of natural resource which resulted in unprecedented exploitation of resources. Forest resources were used initially for shipbuilding carried on at the Bombay Dockyard. Besides this, a massive quantum of timber was used in construction of imperial houses, bridges, construction works of public work department, military works, etc.19 Colonial rule thus undoubtedly unleashed the unprecedented use of forest resources, particularly timber trees acquired massive demand. As a part of this process, introduction of the railways in 1854 created a massive demand for timber and compelled the colonial state to formulate strategies for sustained exploitation of forest resources. Forests were used mainly for timber purposed by railways. Generally the following durable timbers were used in making sleepers which are essential for construction of railway track: teak (Tectona grandis) was mainly available in Burma, central Indian forests and Malabar region of south India: deodar (Cedress deodara) mainly found in slopes of Himalayan region: black or rose wood (Dalbargia latifolia) mainly available in south Indian forests and sissoo (Dalbargia

170

V.M. Ravi Kumar

sisso) mainly available in the forests of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in northern India. As these woods were scattered over the entire Indian subcontinent, the search and exploitation gradually spread to the entire Indian territories. Besides this, inferior wood was also used as engine fuel to run the railways. In fact, existing literature on colonial forest policy explicitly demonstrate the impact of railways on forest policies. Expansion of the railway network in various regions of the Indian subcontinent resulted in two simultaneous processes: first wanton destruction of forests and second, institutionalized attempts by the colonial state to secure continuous supply of wood for the railway network in the form of fuel reserves and plantations. Ramachandra Guha argues that the Indian Forest Department was established mainly to provide the wood requirements of the railways.20 Introduction of the railways, deforestation and institutionalization of forest conservation in the form of establishment of forest departments had explicit linkages in British India. Regarding the changes brought by the introduction of the railways in the forest landscape of India, Colonel Pearson wrote: As soon as mutiny was suppressed, the railways were taken in hand and the timber merchants and sleeper contractors raided the forests for timber felling trees wherever they liked. It was only necessary for contractors, whether European or Indian, to obtain Parwana orders from authorities to cut timber for him to set work, in that context formation of the Forest department was happened.21

The railways in fact instituted a paradigm of timber exploitation in India. This point can be captured from the following quote of Dr. Lyons who gave testimony to the Select Committee on Forestry: When the railways were first made there was an immense demand for sleepers, and contracts were given to go, without any proper control, into the government forests and cut timber. The contractor went in and cut everything straight done leaving nothing by

Railways and Forests

171

which forests could reproduce itself. They destroyed a great deal more than they wanted, as they did in America? Very likely they did; but wherever they went they cut straight down, not leaving enough for reproduction. Does not the indiscriminate cutting of timber by unskilled hands cause an enormous destruction to the standing timber?22

The history of forest policy in the Madras Presidency shows the process of deforestation induced by the railways at provincial level. After 1860s the district collectors regularly reported the indiscriminative destruction of trees for sleepers in the Madras Presidency.23 They reported to the higher authorities about the exploitation of forests and pressed for measures to regulate the cutting of trees.

Railways in Madras Presidency The construction of the railway tract was undertaken by the Madras Railway Company. The first railway line from Madras to Arcot, 65 miles was opened to the public in July 1856. The railway network system in the Madras Presidency belong to two systems, i.e. the Madras Railway Company and the South Indian Railway Company. The total length of the Madras Railway Company was 889 miles. This company railway was guaranteed 5 per cent by the state. The South Indian railway was owned by the company. The total length of the line owned by the company was 909 miles by 1891. Therefore, the total length of the railway in the Madras Presidency by 1891 was 1798 miles.24 The noticeable fact is that the railway network in south India was mainly dependent upon forest resources in two ways: sleepers for construction of the track and inferior wood as engine fuel. It is this process that unleashed unpre-cedented exploitation of trees for the needs of the railways. Thus, introduction of railway created a new paradigm in utilization of forest resources and accelerated the process of deforestation. The magnitude of deforestation induced by railway construction in India can be estimated at three levels, i.e. all

172

V.M. Ravi Kumar

India level, provincial level and district level. For doing so the estimates made by H. Cleghorn, first conservator of forests in Madras Presidency and E.P. Stebbing, forest historian of British India are used. The magnitude of deforestation are expressed by Cleghorn, in 1859.25 He estimated that each mile of the railway track constructions required 1760 sleepers, measuring 3 cubic ft of wood, which would last effectively for 8 years. In addition to this, maintenance of railway track as per his estimation requires at least 220 sleepers for each mile or 22,000 sleepers for every hundred miles annually.26 He suggested that to meet this demand, the government should initiate extensive plantations in the Madras Presidency as well as other parts of India. E.P. Stebbing, one of the prominent historians of forest history in British India, documents the nature of demand for wood generated by railways. As per his estimation the construction of railway track requires 20,000 tons of durable wood for every 50 miles.27 If we apply these estimates to the expanding railway track at the all India level and provincial level we can tentatively quantify the magnitude of deforestation in colonial India.

Deforestation at All India Level Forest historians of colonial India project the introduction of railways as one of the important reasons for deforestation and establishment of the forest department. Some of the provincial level studies amply demonstrate the process of destruction of forests on account of introduction of railways. The statistics pertaining to the expansion of railways provided by Ramachandra Guha mentioned that in 1854 the total length of the railways was 20 miles and by 1900 the total length of railway tract increased to 24,860 miles.28 Subsequently the extent of railways by 1915 including Burma reached 56,786 miles.29 If the estimates given by Cleghorn are to be believed, by 1915 railways have consumed 9,99,43,360 sleepers. It means that as many foresters proposed only

Railways and Forests

173

three good sleepers can be made from a timber tree, about 3,00,00,000 timber tree were used in construction of railway tracks. Besides, this annual maintenance of railway tracks consumed about 12,60,64,92 sleepers. If the estimates of E.P. Stibbing are to be believed, by 1915 railways have consumed 2,42,00,000 tons of durable timber. These estimates suggests that massive quantum of Indian woods were exploited for construction and maintenance of the railways. In fact, this estimation does not include the clearance of forests for construction of railway tracks. This was obviously the reason why Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India who was instrumental for the introduction of railways in India, was also a key figure in introduction of a separate establishment for conservation of forests in India. The introduction of railways thus created a paradigm in the utilization pattern of forest resources. Policy interventions such as the issue of a charter for management of forests in the 1856, creation of a separate department for management of forests in the same year, introduction of the 1865 Forest Act and promulgation of 1878 Indian Forest Act shows the linkages between changes brought about by the railways in evolution of forest governance in India. The pattern of the use of timber by railways shows the nature of colonial rule in India. The resources of India were used for the expansion of colonial capital accumulation. At the same time, the railways unleashed the unprecedented exploitation of valuable timber trees such as teak and sal which are identified as durable timber for construction of railway tracks. The railways were thus the epicentre from which forest management emanated as a category and subsequently transformed into policy frameworks.

Deforestation at Provincial Level Construction of the railway tract in Madras Presidency was initiated in the beginning of the 1860s. The provincial governments including Madras were forced to respond to the

174

V.M. Ravi Kumar

demand created by the railway companies for sleepers. In the absence of iron sleepers, railway track construction process in Madras Presidency was exclusively dependent upon timber. The process of deforestation in the Madras Presidency shows the nature of exploitation of forests by the timber hungry railways (Table 5.1). Table 5.1: Railway Track Expansion in Madras Presidency by 1879 Madras Railways Route Name

Distance in Miles 409 85 26 308 32

South-west line Bangalore railway line Nilgiri Branch North-west railway line Bellary Branch

857 Total running mils 644 South India Railway 1,521 Total number of miles Source: Board of Revenue Proceedings, Madras, 8 April 1879, no. 919, p. 3172.

By 1879 the total length of the railway track in Madras Presidency was 1,521 (Table 5.2). If the statistics pertaining to the sleepers utilization pattern mentioned by Cleghorn, Table 5.2: Fuel Wood Consumption Pattern by the Railway Companies in Madras Presidency in tons Items

Madras Rail- Great Southern ways of India Railway 1867

1868

1,488 1,909 Coke 5,191 3,584 Coal 364 3,259 Patent Fuel wood 49,235 48,068

Conjeveram Railways

1867

1868

1867

23 3,513 ----

32 2,791 462

--167 ---

1,923

5,923

14

1868 --43 1

Total 1867

1868

1,511 8,871 364

1,941 6,418 3,722

367 51,172 54,358

Source: E.P. Stebbing, The Forests of India, vol. II, p. 103.

175

Railways and Forests

are to be believed, by 1879, the railways network consumed 26,00,000 sleepers and for maintenance of the railway track consumed about 3,30,000 sleepers annually. If the estimates suggested by E.P Stebbing are to be believed that by 1879, the railway companies consumed about 6,000,000 tons of wood for the railway track construction alone. Besides the use of timber for the construction of railway track, a large quantity of inferior wood was consumed as fuel for trains. In the absence of coal, wood was used to run steam engines. Even though coal and other sources were used as engine fuel, but substantially the railway companies depended upon wood as a main source of fuel. The quantity of wood used in railways in Madras Presidency mentioned by E.P. Stebbing in Table 5.2. From inception to the 1880s, railways in India have depended mainly upon wood as a main source of fuel (Table 5.3). At one level, the railways consumed durable wood for sleepers, at another level inferior wood was used as fuel. It is this pattern of wood consumption that had devastated forest landscape in India after the introduction of railways which was mainly an enterprise of British capitalists for maximization of profits. Railway companies preferred wood to coal. It Table 5.3: Fuel wood Supply from Different Sources (in tons) by 1880 Dominions Nizam Bellary Cuddapah North Arcot Mysore Salem Coimbatore

Government

Private

Total

650 400

2,500 1,120 1,800 23,410 850 10,750 15,250

2,500 1,120 10,660 26,190 850 11,400 400

12,600

55,760

15,250 68,420

... ... 8860 2,750

Total

Source: D. Brandies, Suggestions Regarding the Forest Administration in Madras Presidency, 1883, Madras, p. 40.

176

V.M. Ravi Kumar

is because, according to Campbell Walker, the deputy conservator of forests, while each ton of wood fuel cost Rs. 5 per ton and the price of coal was Rs. 20 with a co-efficient of 3.25. And an engineer of the Madras Railways estimated that by using wood fuel railway companies could save Rs. 1,00,000 per annum. This was the reason why railway companies mostly used wood as fuel for profit maximization. In fact, the requirement of the railways was one of the imperatives for which the colonial policy discourse legitimized the institutionalization of forest conservation in south India. Table 5.3 shows the source of fuel wood supply from different sources. Out of total supply of fuel wood to railways, government supply constituted only 22.60. Hence little below 80 per cent of total supply comes from private supply. There was a systematic attempt made by forest offices to increase the share of government in fuel wood supply. In fact, the forest department as a professional department of colonial bureaucracy sought its legitimacy in the supply of cheap wood to various government departments. Campbell Walker estimated in 1883 that railway companies may require 90,000 tons annually. Brandis who was the main architect of the Madras Forest Act of 1882, proposed that railway may require 81.000 tons annually. And both argued that the forest department needed to be strengthened to supply the wood for railways.30 As Brandis inherited German tradition of forest management, wherein forests were strictly managed by the state control, he advocated for the government to take over forests for systematic management.31 By using the requirements of railways as the justification factor, the forest department bidded for the institution of a centralized forest management system to meet the requirements of timber required for various government departments including railways.

Deforestation at District Level The wood requirements of railways were met from different sources and levels. Exploitation of forests and institution

177

Railways and Forests

of local establishment of forest management took place simultaneously. This trend could particularly be seen in the district through which railway tract ran. The quantity of the firewood supplied to the railways from the forests in Cuddapa district shows the quantum of deforestation inflicted by railway companies (Table 5.4). The wood supply to railway companies was provided mainly by private agencies in Cuddapah. These agencies indiscriminately destroyed forests for quick profits. No mechanism was placed to regulate their fallings. Contractors were given free hand to exploit forests to meet the demand of railway companies.32 Due to the greed for quick profits, timber contractors resorted to destructive methods of exploiting forests. The North Arcot District Collector reported that most of the valuable trees were indiscriminately felled by the railway fuel contractors and all the forests near the railway lines were destroyed.33 As the Cuddapah district has valuable timber and vast Table 5.4: The Fuel Wood Supply from the Cuddapah District Forests to Railway Companies Year

Quantity in Tons

Value in Rs.

1870-1

7,816

17,509

1871-2

10,214

22,881

1872-3

16,491

36,940

1873-4

17,430

3,943

1874-5

12,838

28,758

1875-6

12,683

28,441

1876-7

16,000

33,330

1877-8

22,000

50,117

1878-9

12,000

27,906

1879-80

5,000

12,000

1880-1

7,000

16,000

1881-2

11,000

26,000

Source: V.S. Krishnaswamy, Working Plan for the Cuddapah South Forest Division, Madras: Government Press, 1937, p. 28.

178

V.M. Ravi Kumar

extent of waste lands, foresters tried to implement their forest management strategies. In 1856, the Conservator of Forests Dr. Cleghorn toured in the forests of Cuddapah district and recommended for their protection from illegal cuttings.34 He was of the opinion that efficient forest management could be achieved by imposing the control of forest department over the forests of Cuddapah district. Subsequently most of the forests in the district were brought under the control of the forest department.

Evolution of Forest Policies in South India Richard Grove suggested that the colonial scientific community played a significant role in evolving forest conservation strategies in various colonies. Particularly in India, Grove claims that the colonial scientific community, botanists and forests played a crucial role in evolving conservation strategies and policies.35 But the history of forest policy in India clearly shows that it was the resource requirement of the colonial economy which was the main guiding force of forest policies. The linkages between evolution of forest policies and introduction of railways in India establish this fact convincingly. In 1849 the Government of India had signed a memorandum of understanding with some companies in England for construction of railways in India. Soon after this, survey of land and mapping of resources required for the railways are being carefully done. In this context, forest conservation as a policy aspect of the state took shape during the time of Governor-General Lord Dalhousie. He declared a systematic policy for management of forests in 1855.36 This attempt was followed by various provinces with establishment of forest departments as follows: Punjab in 1855; North West Provinces in 1860; Central Provinces in 1861; Oudh in 1861; Coorg in 1864; Bengal in 1864 and Berar in 1865.37 These developments culminated into promulgation of Indian Forests Acts in 1865 and 1878 to give systematic direction to forest man-

179

Railways and Forests

agement. Forest management in India opted for strong role for the state in management of forests. Accordingly forests were divided into reserved, protected and village forests. In both reserved and protected forests the state enjoyed a regulatory role in controlling the access of people to forests. In the course of time, most of the valuable forests were brought under the monopolistic control of the state by excluding the customary access of forest dependent communities. Table 5.5 shows the pattern of forest reservation process in which most of forests were brought under the control of forest department. Table 5.5: Extent of Forests brought under the Control of Forest Department in India Province

Total area in sq. miles

Area of forests on 30 June 1893, in sq. miles

Bengal

150,727

12,808

North-Western Provinces and Oudh

107,441

3,886

The Punjab

106,613

6,052

The Central Provinces

86,501

20,014

Burma (Lower)

87,220

5,790

Burma (Upper)

77,296

27,009

Assam

45,350

10,776

Coorg

1,583

893

Ajmer

2,711

147

…

06

Baluchistan The Andamans

1.989

1,956

Berar

17,711

4,236

Madras

86,380

17,187

Bombay

121,352

14,510

Source: Collection of Papers Relating to the Administration in the Madras Presidency, Madras: Government Press, 1915, p. 92.

180

V.M. Ravi Kumar

By 1890s substantial portion forests in different parts of India were brought under the control of the state after settling forests as state reserves. As Mahesh Rangarajan suggests, the forest department emerged as the biggest landlord in South Asia by the way of monopolizing control over about 25 per cent of total landscape of India. The lands brought under the control of forests were managed rigidly by the way of excluding the customary access of people. One of the main driving forces for this process was explicitly the timber requirements of railways. In case of Madras Presidency, from 1800-56 forest conservation measures are undertaken mainly by district collectors. The forest department was established in 1856, with H. Cleghorn as conservator of forests. The necessity of systematic forest conservation measures was felt in the context of the shortage encountered by the wood supply agencies for railways. In 1860 a dispatch was sent by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India. This dispatch insisted upon the need for ensuring sustained supply of wood for railways. After this dispatch provinces expedited attempts for creation of forest policies. The demand created by the railways for wood stimulated forest conservation measures in the Madras Presidency. The exploitation of forests for the railways was so aggressive that the collector of Salem district reported to the Board of Revenue on the alarming situation of wood scarcity. He reported that hitherto the demand for wood by the railways was 1,300 tons per annum and the railway companies after 1865 increased the demand to 3,000 tons per annum.38 Similar concerns were expressed by the collector of North Arcot district. He suggested to the Board of Revenue to initiate a systematic policy for conservation of forests.39 After 1860 forest conservation establishments were instituted in various districts of the Madras Presidency. In Salem district, small establishment was created in 1860 to monitor the supply of wood for the railways. It was reported in 1860 that the number of sleepers supplied from this district was

Railways and Forests

181

2,45,743.40 In the South Arcot district, a forest establishment was established in 1861-2, with the main object of providing a continuous supply of fuel wood for the railways. Five blocks in the Gingee hills and the slopes of the Kalarayans were selected and strict regulations were placed on peoples’ access to those forests.41 In Tinnevelly district, the forest tracts were brought under the conservancy rules. A small forest establishment was started and kept under the charge of a duftdar and two peons. In 1860, the District Collector, Puckle advised that the only remedy for the destruction of forests was to place them under the charge of a special administrative establishment.42 After 1870, the colonial state took note on the need for conservation of forests as supply of wood for railways became difficult. It is in this context that the officials of forest department advocated for conservation as a remedy for shortage of wood. R.H. Beddome, the Conservator of Forests commented on the impact of railways and need for conservation that Railroads are utterly altering the features of the country and privileges hitherto in existence must disappear before them. The demand for timber and fuel in all districts transverse by the railways is already so far beyond what can be looked upon as the permanent supply that is becoming an imperative duty on the part of government clearly define all rights and introduce strict conservancy for the future prosperity of the country demand.43

It is in this context that the concept of state centric conservation gained prominence. In order to ensure continuous supply of wood for the railways, the Madras government initiated the policy of reservation of forests suitable for valuable timber growth and creation of plantations. These are referred to as fuel reserves. These reserves are declared as government property and access to people was strictly prohibited. The reservation of forests for wood requirements of railways was initiated after 1865. In 1869-70, 41,479 acres or 64.8 sq. miles were declared

182

V.M. Ravi Kumar

as reserved forests and these areas increased by 1877-8 to 127,059 acres or 196 sq. miles.44 The forest area brought under reserved forest category increased steadily. Table 5.6 shows the extent of forest reservation in different districts of the Madras Presidency. From 1860 to 1880, the railway network expanded rapidly and consumed enormous amount of wood in the Madras Presidency. Though substantial wood supply was drawn from private sources, the forest department continued to be the Table 5.6: Status of Forest Reserves prior to the Passing Madras Forest Act of 1882 Reservation of forests before passing the forests act. Districts (South Circle) Chinglepat North Arcot South Arcot Salem Trichinopoly Coimbatore North South Madura Tinnevelly Malabar South Canara Districts (North Circle) Godavary Kistna Nellore Cuddapah Bellary Anantapur Neilgheries

Area under reservation by 31 March 1883, in sq. miles 84 271 399 44 6 25 163 306 315 352 1 68 156 218 301 14 51.5 59

Total 2,833 Source: C.D. McLean, Manual of Administration of the Madras Presidency, vol. II, rpt. edn., Asian Educational Service, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 320-4.

Railways and Forests

183

major supplier of fuel wood to the railways. In order to provide the wood for the railway companies, the government began to reserve forest and waste lands as fuel reserves. The total area of fuel reserves in 1869-70 was 41,479 acres or 64.8 sq. miles and these areas increased by 1877-8 to 127,059 acres or 196 sq. miles.45 Within the span of ten years, there was an increase of 200 per cent area under the control of the forest department. The above statistics shows that by 1878, considerable extent of the land neighbouring the railway tracks was brought under the fuel reserves managed by the forest department. Despite the revenue department’s resistance, the government sanctioned the land as fuel reserves to the forest department. In the district through which the railway tract ran, forests were created as fuel reserves. Besides indigenous trees, tree belonging to the Acacia family and eucalyptus varieties imported from Australia were planted in reserved forests wherein the monopolistic control of the state existed for plantation purposes. These exotic plantations were initially promoted in Nilgiri district and gradually planted in most of the districts of Madras Presidency. The main purpose was to promote the fast growing tree species to meet the demands of railways. However, despite the government effort to increase the fuel wood from the government forests, the overall supply continued to be inadequate. This created alarming situation in which railway companies expressed apprehension over the certainty of wood supplies. It was in this context that Dr. Brandis, was deputed to prepare the forest act for the Madras Presidency. It was due to the fact that the Madras government expressed unwillingness to adopt both 1865 and 1878 Indian Forest Acts with the argument of safeguarding customary rights of forest dependent communities. After an extensive tour to understand the physical and administrative aspects of forests of Madras Presidency, Brandis submitted a detailed report stressing upon the necessary steps to adopt the Forest Act for systematic conservation of forests. His report which

184

V.M. Ravi Kumar

was substantially incorporated into the Madras Forest Act of 1882 justified the imposition of strict forest conservation so as to meet the wood requirements of the railways. He proposed that private resources that supplied woods to railways may not be sustained in the long run as conservation of timber was not their priority. He also warned the government if the exploitation of forests went on unabated it would lead to timber famine which would hamper the progress and efficiency of railways in India. The history of forest policy in the Madras Presidency represents the broad trends in the policy paradigm in the colonial governance. While the majority of the officials of the revenue department wanted to leave the supply of wood to railways by private agencies or communities, forest officials opted for strict conservation of forests by the state to supply wood to railway companies. While the discourse of the revenue department represents philosophy of laissez faire and forest bureaucracy which inherited the authoritarian notion of German forest conservancy ideals. Ultimately the German policy paradigm prevailed as the colonial state wanted to translate its symbolic power as a big landlord by imposing its monopoly over vast extent of forests and waste lands. This move catered to the needs of British capital invested in the form of railways and other industries such as plantation, iron manufacturing, gun manufacturing, etc. In 1883 the Madras government promulgated the Madras Forest Act of 1882. And within five years of passing this act, about 20,000 sq. miles of forests in the Madras Presidency were declared as state property and customary access of peasants and tribes was declared as illegal. Table 5.7 shows the expansion of the state control over forests in Madras Presidency. By 1910, most of the forests and waste lands of Madras Presidency were brought under the control of the forest department. These forests were designated as reserved forests to be strictly controlled by the forest department by way of excluding customary access of people to forests and waste lands. Introduction of the railways thus was a major stimulat-

185

Railways and Forests Table 5.7: Pattern of Reserved Forest Expansion in Madras Presidency in square miles by 1910 Year

1892-3 1993-4 1894-5 1895-6 1896-7 1897-8 1898-9 1899-1900 1901-2 1902-3 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10

Reserve forest notified under the madras forest act, in sq. miles

Reserve lands in sq. miles

Total forest cover under the control of the forest department, in sq. miles

7,174 9,435 11,466 12,388 13,138 13,775 14,888 15,862 16,589 17,154 17,923 18,107 18,228 18541 18,549 18,694 18,769

9,403 7,250 7,324 6,690 5,796 5,428 4,706 3,787 2,952 2,412 1,798 1,798 1,297 1,079 1,058 8,76 8,76

16,577 17,185 18,790 19,078 18,907 19,225 19,594 19,649 19,541 19,566 19,555 19,626 19,585 19,620 19,607 19,570 19,570

Source: Compiled from the Annual Administrative Reports of the Forest Department, Madras Presidency.

ing factor for introduction of forest management policies in India in general and Madras Presidency in particular.

Conclusion The history of colonial forest policies during the period 1800-1900 in India in general and Madras Presidency in particular shows the strong linkages between introduction

186

V.M. Ravi Kumar

of the railways and evolution of forest management policies. Besides this the viable trend is that colonial economic interests were mainly responsible for exploitation of forests and eventual degradation of environmental conditions. This period also shows the ability of the colonial state to forge alliance between an indigenous enterprenual class which collaborated with colonial exploitation such as wood contractors and merchants. It is this collaboration that perpetuated the devastating effect on the forest landscape in the Indian subcontinent. Most of the wood stock was wiped out due to the timber hungry railways created for maximization of the British capital. The history of forest policies in the Madras Presidency shows the way Indian resources were used for maximization of British capitalists’ interests at the cost of fragile environment and livelihood requirement of the poor in India. At the same time, this article proposes that the crisis generated by over exploitation of timber forests also resulted in a situation in which conservation of forests was taken seriously by the colonial state. Due to this institutionalized attempts were created for scientific management of forests in order to obtain sustained supply of timber supplies to railways. Introduction of the railways thus resulted in exploitation of Indian forests at one level and initiation of scientific conservation measures at another.

NOTES 1. R.C. Dutt, The Economic History of India, vol. II: In the Victorian Age, 1937-1900, New Delhi: Publication Division, 2006. 2. Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1981. He shows the expenditure pattern of the British Raj. In 1885 the expenditure on railway was 4.7 crores and sector like irrigation (0.5), education (1.00), and medical and science department (1.00). Thus, railways were given highest priority by the British government in terms of expenditure. 3. Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, New Delhi: Tulika, 1995. For studies on south India see, A.V.

Railways and Forests

4. 5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

187

Raman Rao, Economic Development of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1958. Irfan Habib, Indian Economy, 1858-1914, 2006, Delhi: Tulika, p. 45 B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, New Delhi, South Asian Paperback Edition, 2005; C.J. Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 1880-1955: The Tamilnad Countryside, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984; David Ludden, Peasant History in South India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986. Ramachandra Guha, ‘State Forestry in British and Post-British India: A Historical Analysis’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 18, nos. 44-6, October-November 1995, pp. 1882-96 and 1940-6; Madhav Gadgil, ‘Towards an Ecological History of India’, in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XX, nos. 45-6 and 47, 1985, pp. 1909-13. Arun Agarwal, Environmentality: Technologies of Government and Making Subject, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. Neena Ambre, Forest Ecology in India: Colonial Maharastra, 18501950, Delhi: Foundation Books, 2008. Mahesh Rangarajan, Fencing the Forests: Conservation and Ecological Change in India’s Central Provinces, 1860-1914, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996. Sumit Guha, Ecology and Ethnicity in India, c.1200-1991, Delhi: Cambridge University Press, Indian Prints, 1999. K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests: State Making Environmental Change in South West Bengal, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Chetan Singh, Natural Premise: Ecology and Peasant Life in the Western Himalaya, 1800-1950, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Vasant Sabrwal, Pastoral Politics Shepherds Bureaucrats and Conservation in the Western Himalaya, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Abdul Taha, Forest Policy and Ecological Change: Hyderabad State in Colonial India, New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2008. V. Sarvanan, ‘Colonialism and Coffee Plantations: Decline of Environment and Tribals in Madras Presidency during the Nineteenth Century’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 41, no. 4, 2004, pp. 465-88.

188

V.M. Ravi Kumar

16. V.M. Ravi Kumar, ‘Community Forest Management in Colonial and Postcolonial South India: Policy and Practice’, South Asia Research, November 2012, 32 (3): 257-77. 17. Edward Davidson, The Railways of India, with Account of their Rise, Progress and Construction, London: ECFN Spon, 1868, p. 119. 18. Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. 19. V.M. Ravi Kumar, ‘Colonialism and Green Science: History of Colonial Scientific Forestry in South India, 1820-1920’, Indian Journal of History of Science, vol. 47, June 2012, pp. 241-60. 20. Ramachandra Guha, Forestry in British and Post-British India, p. 1882. 21. G.F. Pearson, ‘Recollection of the Early Days of the India Forest Department, 1858-1864’, Indian Forester, vol. XXIX, no. 8, August 1903, p. 312. 22. Report from the Select Committee on Forestry: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, London: Henry Hansard and Son, 1885, p. 5. 23. Letter from the Collector of Salem District to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue (hereafter BOR), in Board of Revenue Proceedings (hereafter BORP), 14 August 1866, No. 5667, pp. 5215-7; Letter from the Collector of Coimbatore District to the Secretary to BOR, in BORP, 15 August 1866, No. 5709, pp. 5245-7; Letter from the Collector of Bellary District to the Secretary to BOR, in BORP, 21 August 1866, No. 5949, pp. 5245-7: Letter from the Collector of Trichinopoly to the Secretary to BOR, in BORP, 20 August 1866, No. 5895, pp. 5369-70 (Madras State Archives, hereafter MSA). 24. W. Francis, F. Nicholson, C.S. Middlemiss, and C.A. Barber, Gazetteer of South India, vol. 1, Delhi: Mittel, 1988, pp. 75-6. 25. Edward Balfour, The Influence Exercised by Trees on the Climate and Productiveness of the Peninsula of India, Madras: Government Press, 1878, p. 9; H. Cleghorn, Report of the Committee Appointed by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, published in 21st Proceedings of the British Association for the Advance of Science, held in Ipswich, 1851, p. 79. 26. H. Cleghorn, Forests and Gardens of South India, London: H. Allan, 1861, p. 31. 27. Stebbing, The Forests of India, vol. I, p. 314.

Railways and Forests

189

28. Guha, op. cit., p. 1882. 29. Habib, Indian Economy, p. 40. 30. Correspondence by Campbell Walker to the collector of North Arcot District, in BRP, dated 12 November 1883, no. 3411. 31. D. Brandis, Suggestions Regarding the Forest Administration in the Madras Presidency, Madras: Government Press, 1883, p. 41. 32. A. Satyanarayana, ‘Caste and Entrepreneurship in Coastal Andhra, South India, 1900-1947’, in George Berkemer, Tilman Frasch, Hermann Kulke and Jurgen Lutt, Explorations in the History of South Asia: Essays in Honour of Dietmar Rothermund, Delhi: Manohar, 2001, pp. 243-56. 33. BORP, 13 July 1871, no. 2912. 34. V.S. Krishnaswamy, Working Plan for the North Cuddapah Forest Division (1936-46), Madras: Government Press, 1937, p. 21; Andhra Pradesh District Gazetteers: A Manual of the Cuddapah District, Hyderabad: Government Press, 1992 (originally published in 1875), p. 93. 35. Richrd Grove, Ecology, Climate and Empire: Indian Legacy in Global Environmental History, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. 36. Government of India, Hundred Years of Forestry in India, 18611961, Forest Research Institute, Dehradun, 1961, p. 77. 37. D. Brandis, Memorandum on the Forest Legislation Proposed for British India, other than the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, Simla: Government Press, 1875; Brethold Ribbentrop, Forestry in British India, 1st pub. 1900, Calcutta: Government Press, rpt. Delhi: Indus Publishing House, 1989, p. 77. 38. Letter from the Collector of Salem District to the Secretary to the BOR, in BORP, 14 August 1866, no. 5667, pp. 5215-47. 39. BORP, 13 July 1871, no. 2912. 40. F.J. Richard, Madras District Gazetteers, Salem District, vol. I, Madras: Govt. of Madras, 1918, p. 248. 41. W. Francis, Madras District Gazetteers, South Arcot, 1906, Madras, pp. 147-8. 42. Madras District Gazetteers: Tinnevelly District, pt. II, pp. 196-7. 43. BORP, 4 June 1870, no. 3805, p. 4566. 44. Letter from the Conservator of Forests to the Secretary to BOR, in BORP, 8 April 1879, no. 919, p. 3171. 45. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways, 1849-2013 Nadia Tahir

Introduction The story of Pakistan Railways (PR) can be described as rising expectations of users and declining service and safety. It was never on the forefront of the transportation policy in Pakistan. The government failed to invest in railway infrastructure. The amount of resources allocated to railway has been far less than the amount spent on the road sector (Imran 2009, Quddus 2010). The faulty policy of emphasizing the road sector as a substitute of the railways proved disastrous. The railways failed to compete and lost their pre-eminence in traffic, in particular the profitable freight traffic (GOP, 1999-2013, 2013-14). The net result appeared as a crisis in public transportation network and a burden on public exchequer in the form of losses and subsidies. It is also taken as an indicator of government failure, which shifts the responsibility towards more generalized issues of corruption and over-employment, a burden in times of contracting business. This contraction of railway business made it even more difficult to overcome losses and corruption. The purpose of this study is to present a picture of PR in the colonial and post-colonial times. It is not an historical study. The motivation is to highlight some of the important issues which were encountered in the growth of railways in

192

Nadia Tahir

difficult economic and geographical conditions during the colonial period and the causes of declining performance in the post-colonial period. The misery of PR started right after the Independence of the country in 1947 (Malik 1962). It had to face extremely unfavourable conditions at the time of Partition. Like the military, railway had evolved a culture of its own, self-reliant in education, health, housing, and police, accounting system and lifetime employment. The railways was thus not merely a means of transportation; it was a way of life that had to change suddenly. There were heavy arrears, operating units were in Calcutta (now Kolkata, India) and railway personnel was transferred en masse to India (Malik 1962). Pakistan inherited a long railway line of 8,863 km, but with deteriorating conditions of railway tracks and equipment. Yet the revival of railways was considered as a measure of the firm determination of the new nation to survive (GOP 1957). It did perform reasonably well in the first three decades. Today, the PR can be described as a system which has collapsed and a huge population has no alternative but to commute on its untidy and unsafe trains which are never on time. It is not only the service delivery which is declining but it is also contracting its operations and revenue (Tahir 2013). We can see contraction in every indicator from route kilometre to passenger services, from passenger services to freight, number of locomotives to revenue. Its track has reduced from 12,000 in 1950-5 to 11,755 km in 2012-13. In the same period, the number of locomotives decreased from 862 to 493, coaching vehicles from 2,585 to 1,540 and freight wagons from 24,251 to 16,335. Operating expenses in 1950-5 were 67 per cent of revenues and the PR was making profits. In 2012-13, operation expenses were 194 per cent of the revenues (GOP 1999-2013). The net result appeared as a crisis in public transportation network and a burden on public exchequer in form of losses and subsidies. The PR is struggling to survive in a country where population growth is almost 2 per cent and income per capita was

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

193

$1,254 in 2013-14. Transport and communication sector’s share in GDP is 13 per cent and its growth rate was 4 per cent during 2005-6 to 2013-14. In this growing sector, railways registered a negative growth rate of 47.54 per cent in 2012-13 (GOP 2013-14). Social return makes the case for government intervention and investment. It is an important issue for a conflict ridden society that has lost direction because of rising inequalities. It can promote regional harmony and inter-regional disparities by creating employment opportunities and income. This policy neglect became obvious when the government tailored a policy which was urban centric and tilted towards motorways, private cars and buses. In this background, this study discusses three key issues in the rise and fall of railways in Pakistan. First, it explains how railways were built in a strategically important and landlocked area which was the source of cheap raw material to British industry. Second, it describes how investment was guaranteed by the promise of high returns on the strategic lines which were commercially not feasible. Though not built for commercial reasons in the beginning, these lines were financed out of ordinary railway programme and the state had to bear the cost of maintenance and working expenditure in addition to the interest charge on capital. Heavy losses were borne by the state on account of strategic lines. Third, the article focuses on the situation in which railway was re-born after Partition. It remained profitable till the 1970s. Since then it became a loss making organization. Financial inefficiencies have been substantial and significant since 1985. By 2013, the railways has shrunk considerably. It has closed down many branch lines; road freight has severely damaged the railway capacity to move freight. Investment remains drastically low and working expenditure has risen sharply. Lack of financial and managerial autonomy, provincial ownership of federally controlled railway land, economical accounting system which ignores sufficiency and failure to separate core business from peripheral activities have damaged the railway system in Pakistan.

194

Nadia Tahir

In addition to the Introduction, this article has six sections. The second section gives the historical background, first the colonial development and then the state of the railway affairs immediately after Independence in 1947. It then discusses the issues of governance, privatization and transport policy that characterized the discourse in the next six decades. The third section deals with input conditions which includes the track, rolling stock, the workforce, passenger, freight traffic and investment. Financial sustainability is the subject of the fourth section. The state of equipment and manufacturing and safety and environmental considerations are analysed in the fifth and the sixth sections. A summing up of the findings is presented in the last section.

Historical Evolution Railways in Pakistan was developed in the British colonial period. After Independence in 1947, no significant development took place. The railways lost to the road sector in freight as well as passenger traffic, not because the road sector was more efficient, but because the government policies favoured it. While the colonial period witnessed the rise of railways, albeit for the imperial strategic and economic interests, the post-Independence period is associated with the decline of the railways as a result of a policy shift towards roads.

Railway Development in the Colonial Period In development literature of colonial days, the railway was considered as an evocative example of technology and breaking speed barrier on land which brings industrial revolution and generates high growth rate (Kerr 2003, 2007; Satya 2008 Thorner 1950). There was no denying that it was a useful medium of connecting diverse regions and people. It was a symbol of modernity and civilization. It conquered time and connected cities. The railways was used as an engine of

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

195

growth and linked with industrial revolution. First World War proved its effectiveness as a powerful medium of moving heavy army and artillery (Malik 1962). The railways did see fierce opposition soon after the first passenger train between Liverpool and Manchester completed its journey in 1823. After this a railway mania started and it spawned huge domestic investment in Britain (Sanyal, 1930). During 183050, Britain spent almost 7 per cent of gross national income and 60 per cent of gross domestic investment in building the rail network. Due to the French Revolution and financial crises in England in 1850-60, this investment fell sharply. The investors started looking abroad for high returns (Marshman 1863, Satya 2008). This was the time when the railways were built in the areas that now form Pakistan. The state provided free land and guaranteed interest rate on capital fixed at 5 per cent. The railway companies were exempted from any duties and taxes and they exercised complete control over their servants. The government control was legislative and contractual in nature (Andrew 2010, Derbyshire 1987). However, building the railways was always considered hazardous in nature. Floods, violent weather, spontaneous vegetation, unclosed and unprotected tracts and ravages of insects and vermin were challenges for those who wished to develop the railways in early days (Andrew 2010, Satya 2008, Thorner 1955). Initially, they thought of building the railways on a high platform but due to geographical conditions and cost considerations, East India Company abandoned this idea in 1845. To avoid fatal accidents, it was decided that railway stations would be 3-4 miles away from the main cities (Danvers 1889, Day 1907, Derbyshire 1987). After the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1840 and with the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the north-west became the focal point of the British foreign policy in India (Malik 1962). The railways were built in the north-western part under the state construction system during 1869-80. These were strategic lines built for military might or military hold as a part of the Great Game in the region. With these strategic consid-

196

Nadia Tahir

erations, the railways in the region which is now Pakistan, essentially served the logistics of warfare (Marshman 1863, Sanyal 1930). No private company was willing to invest in this risky venture. After the failure to attract private capital in 1862, Lord Lawrence proposed the abolition of the old guaranteed system. He was against the private undertaking for building railways and criticized the government for not taking appropriate measure for the development of railways. He was of the view that the railways was a symbol of power and the government should regard it as a national undertaking. In 1869, state construction lines were introduced and the government directly borrowed; no guaranteed contracts were given for these lines (Acworth 1917, Andrabi and Kuehlwein 2010, Danvers 1889). The third Afghan war (1878-9), exchange rate fluctuations, and financial crises in England had produced unfavourable conditions and opinion in England was against the principle of state management. Four companies were involved in railway operations in this region. These companies were named Scinde (Sindh) Railways, Indian Flotilla Company, Punjab Railways and Delhi Railways. In 1886, Secretary of State for India purchased these companies and formed the North Western State Railways, which was later renamed as North Western Railway (NWR). From 1880, the modified guaranteed interest rate system were introduced which continued till 1920. In this system, private companies had the right to manage and run the state owned railways. After the Great Famine of Bengal, the thinking was that at least 5,000 miles more of the railways was necessary for protection against famines (Day 1907, Jeyaraj 2009, Kurosaki 1999). The government should not involve itself in massive financial and other liabilities. The railways were declared to be the property of the state, but capital was supplied by the companies. The government could terminate the contract at the end of 20-5 years in which case it had to repay the capital at par (Kerr 2007, Koshal 1972). Different systems were tried by the end of 1902. The old nomencla-

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

197

ture of provincial state and central state was given up and the classification was based on ownership and management (Andrew 2010, Malik 1962). The Bolan Pass leading to Quetta and Kandahar and Khyber Pass leading to Kabul were two important gates of India. William Andrew, Chairman of Scinde, Punjab and Delhi Railway, proposed to build railways to Bolan Pass. This would enable the government to counteract the threat posed by Russia. The threat was taken so seriously that the 31 km long Bolan Pass rail link was completed in 101 days in 1880 (Andrew 2010, Buchanan 1934). During the second Afghan War (1878-80), a new urgency required the construction of a railway line up to Quetta in order to get easier access to the frontier. In March 1887, the railway line reached Quetta. During First World War, the link with Iran was also considered important and the branch line between Quetta and Nushki was open in 1905. Another strategic line, the Nushki Extension, was started in 1916 and completed in 1922 (GOP 1998) (see Appendix Table 5.3). The first railway line between Karachi and Kotri was opened for passengers on 13 May 1861. The line between Karachi City and Kiamari was opened on 16 June 1889. The railway line from Peshawar to Karachi closely followed Alexander’s trail from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Arabian Sea. Different sections on the existing main line from Peshawar to Lahore and Multan and branch lines were constructed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century. These were all commercial lines (Danvers 1889, GOP 1998, Malik, 1962). Lord Dalhousie was motivated by the desire of exporting Indian cotton to English textile mills. In addition to the strategic considerations; an important strategic-cum-economic consideration was to develop an alternative to the American cotton. If the supply of cotton from America diminished, Manchester manufacturers would access the Indian cotton.1 Even if the American cotton supply continued, the threat of the Indian alternative would keep the prices in control.

198

Nadia Tahir

The railways would also enable the British manufactures to take their goods into the interior of India (Chaudhuri 1971, Danvers 1889, Day 1907). From the very beginning, the railways required huge and speedy investment funds and public patronage which could generate high returns and economic activity. Indus Valley, Northern Punjab and Northern Bengal lines were new lines constructed by the state. The state had to incur heavy expenditure on productive, protective and provincial work and a minimum return of 4 per cent on the capital outlay, including interest in arrears that must be paid. This rigid restriction slowed down the progress of state construction. However, the state constructed lines were cheaper than company built railways. The average construction cost on broad gauge lines was £10,000 per mile against the company lines cost of £13,000 per mile (Chaudhuri 1971, Danvers 1889, Day 1907, Kerr 2007, Koshal 1972, Marshman, 1863, Sanyal 1930). Most of the state lines were strategic and un-remunerative. The return on capital was 6.2 per cent for company lines, while the state lines yielded 2.15 per cent. These lines were not built for commercial reasons, yet they were financed out of ordinary railway programme in the beginning, and capital was included in NWR, which had to bear the cost of maintenance and working in addition to the interest charge on capital. Heavy losses were borne by the state railways on account of strategic lines (see Appendix Table 5.1). State support became their major source of sustenance. Railways in Pakistan were built during the second phase (1869-80). The state constructed these railway lines with contractual control and full autonomy. The gauge of the railway lines was determined by motivation behind the construction. Thus, broad gauge was meant for military and overseas trade purposes and narrow gauge (light line) for passenger traffic. Railways in the Pakistan areas were broad gauge in general, and narrow and metre gauge at places. In December 1870, Lord Mayo decided that Indus Valley and Peshawar should be in the narrow gauge

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

199

of 3 ft 3 in. (light line), the military experts advocated the broad gauge line for strategic purposes and others proposed metre gauge. Lord Salisbury decided that the Indus Valley and the Punjab northern lines should be constructed on the broad gauge of 5 ft 6 in. with rails of 60 lbs. to the yards (Malik 1962, Sanyal 1930). In earlier days, it was proposed that railways in British India should follow consistent and uniform mode of construction. In later years, however, the proposal was not followed, leading to multiplicity of gauges (Sanyal 1930, Satya 2008). Besides multiplicity of gauges, the railways were criticized as a system which was developed by the colonial rulers as a projection of economic stability and strategic depth. It was declared as a menace, an unnatural impetus to society destroying relationships and overthrowing local markets, and draining provinces of all their resources to the benefit of the centralized state of British India and, through it, imperial Britain. It was a source of volatility in food prices (Andrabi and Kuehlwein 2010, Kurosaki 1999). It required huge investment and high risk. They were built at a time when not many people could afford to travel by trains. It must, however, be noted that Britain built the railways against all the arguments of low demand for railway transportation, impassable terrain and harsh geographical conditions (Acworth 1917; Bogart and Chaudhary 2012, Danvers 1889, Jon 2007). The British railway policy, in the region that is Pakistan today, could be summed up as increasing military efficiency, expanding imperial trade, ensuring monopoly of the manufacture of railway equipment, employment opportunities for British engineers and exploitation of cheap local labour.

Post-Independence Decline of the Railways At the time of Independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited 8,122 route kilometres of the North Western Railways, while India inherited 3,133 route kilometres. Of this 6,880 route

200

Nadia Tahir

kilometres were broad gauge, 506 km were metre gauge and 736 km were narrow gauge (GOP 1960-2011, 1998). These different gauges posed a real challenge for the availability of railway equipment and continuity of railway operations. In the early years of Independence, the railways were considered as a symbol of national unity. Its role in facilitating migration was highly appreciated. A policy of building railways as a line of national defence and a symbol of national connectivity and integration was conceived. In 1954, the railway line was extended to Mardan and Charsada, and in 1956 the Jacobabad-Kashmore narrow gauge line was converted into broad gauge. In 1961, the Pakistani portion of North Western Railways was renamed Pakistan Railways (PR). The Kot Adu-Kashmore line was constructed between 1969 and 1973, providing an alternative route from Karachi to northern Pakistan (GOP 1960-2011, 1998). In 2007, the feasibility plan to provide a link between Pakistan and China via the border crossing near Kashgar started. The project has been included in the Public Sector Development Programme of 2014-15 (GOP 2013-14). Also included is a scheme for setting up a dry port at Havelian as part of Pakistan-China economic corridor. Up-gradation of ML-1 railway track which currently accommodates trains with the speed of 100-20 km per hour speed from Karachi to Peshawar is another major project. This upgradation will increase the speed up to 150 km per hour. Dualization of track from Khanewal to Peshawar is also planned. This will curtail the travel duration between Karachi and Peshawar. A line to the deep water port of Gwadar is also proposed(GOP 2013-14). ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE

How should the railways be managed is an unresolved riddle in Pakistan? Should it be a department of the government run by generalist civil servants or an autonomous board with professional managers? Should it be the federal government

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

201

or the provincial governments? What about privatization or public private partnership? Historically, the railways in Pakistan were subject to the complete control of the British. The control was exercised through the terms of contract. British origin, British order, British model financed by British shareholders, British engines and railway lines. The railway born in private sector but acute shortage of funds and risky investment on strategic routes increased the role and influence of the British Indian state. The strategic role of the railways strengthened the argument that government should run the railways and bear social and strategic risk. In the colonial period, there were various ownership structures and varied degrees of state control (Danvers 1889, Kerr 2007, Sanyal 1930). However, the state control was regulatory in nature. The board of directors of railway companies were in Britain. Most of these directors were ex-Indian service men with wide experience. Hurd (2007) and Sweeney (2011) explained varied ownership structures as a revolving door policy and performance of railway companies as complacent in nature. Many public sector employers joined private sector railway companies’ boards after retiring from the public sector. The British control was legislative, contractual and executive. The Indian Railway Act IX of 1890 was passed. However, the secretary of state for India had ultimate control until 1921, when the Government of India Act came into effect. Although the Government of India was responsible, the secretary of state appointed an official director who could veto all the proceedings. The Indian Railways Act, 1890 restricted the government’s role to coordination, regulation and claims settlement between railway administrations. In 1905, the first Railway Board was constituted. It consisted of a government railway official, who was the chairman of the Board, a railway manager from England and an Agent of a Railway Company. The Board was placed under the Department of Commerce and Industry of the British Indian government. In 1922, a chief

202

Nadia Tahir

commissioner of Railways was appointed, who advised the government on technical and policy matters. In 1924, the Railway Board was reconstituted. The new board consisted of a chief commissioner, a financial commissioner and two members, one responsible for way and works, projects and stores and the other for general administration, staff and traffic subjects. In the same year, the Legislative Assembly of British India separated railway finances from the general finances of the country. It was agreed that in determining the contribution of the railways to general revenues, the interest charges as well as losses on working of the strategic lines should be borne by the general revenues and deducted from the contribution calculated in accordance with convention. In 1929, an additional post of a member in charge of traffic was also created to look after the commercial and transportation affairs (Malik 1962, Sanyal 1930, Thorner 1955). After Independence, Pakistan continued with the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (GOP 1997). The issues of autonomy and organization of railway became even more important for the new state. The railway was viewed as a defence line and a symbol of national unity and integration. Upholding this symbolism, the central government assumed the control of the NWR and the Pakistan Eastern Railway (PER) and formed a unified railway board. However, for quite some time the board was not constituted, with the railways working as a division of the Ministry of Communications. Railway finances were merged in general finances and interest charges and losses on working of strategic lines and the interest rate charges were borne by the railway budget (GOP 1998, Malik 1962). The railway budget was a part of the general budget. Net receipts of the railways accrued to the general revenues of the country and money for development was annually allocated to the prevailing position of the government. This system prevented the railways from any orderly scheme of expansion (GOP 1960, 1957). Funds lapsed at the end of the financial year. The separation convention was the Magna-carta of the railways (Malik 1962). The management

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

203

of railways became an issue. All the powers required to take necessary actions did not rest with the PR authorities. They had to look to various ministries for appointments, expenditure and funds. People were appointed without requisite knowledge and skills. These restrictions in the execution of responsibilities affected the services badly. This governance structure made the railways vulnerable to political and bureaucratic interference. In time, this contributed to the transition of the railways from a profitable organization to a loss making organization. In 1956, a World Bank team studied this mode of governance and found it to be unsatisfactory for the efficient running of the railways. It proposed its replacement with a body that would exercise a modicum of autonomy. In 1959, an ordinance was passed for the creation of a Railway Board. It consisted of three members drawn from Traffic and Commercial Department (T&C), Engineering (E) and Finance (F). The seniormost was T&C who could overrule the other members. The finance member was the Financial Commissioner. The Board functioned as a ministry and its member/ secretary was ex-officio secretary to the Government of Pakistan. The financial commissioner exercises all powers of the Government of Pakistan in matters of expenditure subject to the general control of ministry of finance. Financial Commissioner was the direct representative of the Ministry of Finance. His inclusion ensured the linkage between the railway budgetary and the overall budget of the government. General managers were appointed for both railways. They were tasked with the day-to-day operations of the railways including procurement, personnel and fares. This board had only a supervisory role over the railway operations. The composition of the board ruled out autonomous decision making. The railway financial administration continued to be like that of a government department. The Board had no control over railway finance (Din 2007, GOP 1998, Malik 1962). The constitution of the Railway Board made the role of

204

Nadia Tahir

central government in the running of the affairs of railways less direct, but the delays associated with these arrangements affected the decision making process adversely. Financial powers, transfer of property and policy making remained with the central government. This disconnect between long term planning and day-to-day affairs affected the engineering capacity, acquisition of technical know-how and managerial development. In 1982, again a presidential order merged the Railway Board with the Federal Ministry of Railways. It remains the status till today. Pakistan Railways is a department under the Federal Ministry of Railways and the Secretary of the Ministry is the ex-officio Chairman of the Railway Board. According to Malik (1992), the country won freedom in 1947, but the railways lost it. The management of railways reverted to the position of Railways Act IX of 1890 (GOP 1997). Expert opinion did not dispute the role of the state. But making it just another department of the government was seen to compromise the professional management of the railways. ‘As state railway, undoubtedly government must control the expenditure on major development projects, but the management must be left in the hands of those who have requisite knowledge and experience of railway working are eventually responsible for running the railways’2 (Malik 1992). In 2014, revival of the Railway Board was again on the overall reform agenda. PROVINCIALIZATION

In addition to the governance issues, important political issues were raised about the ownership of railways. The provinces started demanding its transfer to them. As a result of this demand the railways were included as a provincial subject in the fifth schedule and provision for their transfer to province was made in Chapter V of the Constitution Bill 1956. In 1958, a committee was appointed to make recommendations on provincialization of railways. It recommended

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

205

that railway should remain with the centre, but the administration should be entrusted to a board. In June 1962, a presidential order was issued to transfer the control of PWR and PER to the provincial governments of West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively. The Railway Board Ordinance of 1959 was repealed. Concurrent Railway Boards were established in West Pakistan and East Pakistan. It also reinstated the formerly discarded Separation Convention, separating railway finance from the general finances with effect from the financial year 1961-2. Financial autonomy was given to the provinces. However, a Central Railway Division retained powers of dealing with international organizations and foreign countries, implementing the relevant agreements, coordinating rail movements to and from ports; and coordinating development programmes of each railway as part of the national development programmes. Provincial governments were restrained from altering the priority movement of defence traffic, close or dismantle any railway line, or modify any ministry of defence lines, without the prior approval of the Central Railway Division. After the separation of East Pakistan, Pakistan Western Railways was renamed as Pakistan Railways, and its management and control reverted to the central government. The ministry of railways now looks after the planning and policy-making, technical advisory service and management. Many still suggest that the railways should move to provinces (Din 2007, GOP 1998, Malik 1962, Quddus 1992). This will enable a better usage of its resources, especially land available in urban areas, which can be sold for expansion and investment. In the statutes, the railway land belongs to the provinces. After the eighteenth amendment to the 1973 Constitution in 2010, there have been demands to transfer railways to the provinces. The railway was a central subject under the 1956 Constitution, a provincial subject under the 1962 Constitution and a subject under the Part II of the Federal Legislative List under the 1973 Constitution. The Council of Common Interests (CCI), not the federal government, had the power

206

Nadia Tahir

to formulate and regulate policies in relation to matters in Part II of the Federal Legislative List. The eighteenth amendment did not change this status. It did, however, strengthen the provisions regarding the CCI. According to functions and rules of procedure given in Article 154, the CCI is to formulate and regulate policies in relation to matters in Part II of the Federal Legislative List and exercise supervision and control over related institutions. It shall have a permanent secretariat, meet at least once in ninety days and the decisions shall be made by majority rule. In effect, the Federal Ministry of Railways continues to be the in charge. RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION

Various hastily drawn plans and reforms failed to replace redundant rolling stock with modern equipment and facilities to move passengers and freight quickly (GOP 2005, 2010, 2011). Locomotives waiting for repair, decreasing train routes and dirty railway stations signified railway performance. The federal government which was not willing to transfer railways to the provinces in early 1960s, has later been willing to consider privatization of the strategic asset since 1990s. In this period, the growth argument subdued the strategic asset and national unity arguments about railways. The performance of Pakistan Railways was closely linked with the growth conditions in the country. It was thought that the government should not interfere in the administrative matters of Pakistan Railways. The case for privatization was based on increased efficiency and market orientation. In 1999, with the assistance of the World Bank, a proposal was prepared for the privatization of Pakistan Railways with the key objective to improve performance and competitiveness (World Bank 1998). There have been failures as well as successes with privatization, concessioning and franchizing of railways all around the world. Restructuring is generally a precondition for privatiza-

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

207

tion. The process of restructuring Pakistan Railways began in 1997, based on a report prepared by the civil servant and former international cricketer Javed Burki.3 To convert it to a viable and profitable organization, this report contained short, medium and long-term measures. It suggested to split PR into core and non-core activities and closing down of non-profitable lines. Ancillary services like hospitals, schools, sports centres, hostels, and clubs were proposed to be sold or leased out. A workshop on restructuring and reform was arranged to deliberate on various issues. There was, however, no discussion of the labour issues which would arise in the process of restructuring. Followed by the restructuring plan, the railways was divided into three public limited companies – passenger business unit, freight business unit, and infrastructure business unit. Under these reforms, a cost cutting strategy was used and the workforce was reduced from 1,13,000 in 1997 to 95,000 in 2001. Travelling facilities and allowances as well as paid overtime were halved. Most hospitals and schools were sold or leased and medical and education facilities minimized. Ticketing and parcel operations were partly privatized. Operations of several trains were contracted out. The washing and cleaning of trains, stations and railway workers colonies was outsourced. These efforts are still fruitless in terms of financial and operational performance. As a result of the restructuring, there was reduction in the size of permanent workforce and an increase in contractual labour. Workers’ benefits, such as education and health facilities, housing allowances, etc., have been cut. Production decreased and goods have been purchased from the international market instead of acquisition from the domestic market. Railway real estate was used for generating revenue. Highly paid consultants and private managers were hired to be responsible for eliminating wastage and increasing efficiency. The restructuring of PR has not produced any significant reduction in the deficit, nor has it necessarily improved the services provided. Instead, work-

208

Nadia Tahir

ers suffered dramatic consequences in terms of job security, whereas salaries and benefits of officers and hired consultants increased several times. Private financial institutions have not played a major role in this restructuring, as they have not invested in railways. International financial institutions imposed the constraint to change corporate culture and privatize first; only then would they consider making any investment. To convert railways into a profitable organization and enhance revenue, the recipe suggested, as noted earlier, was based on cost cutting by slashing down employees and closing down operations on unprofitable railway sections. This, the international financial institutions argued, would make railways profitable. But the restructuring of Pakistan Railway has not produced its desired effects. Hiring highly paid consultants to strengthen it, while claiming that major costs are due to excess employees, cannot hide the fact that the railways have always suffered because enormous resources have been wasted on salaries and in-kind benefits for the management. There is a view that railways’ financial crisis can be addressed by reducing expenditures on bureaucracy and consultants, whilst assigning workers a greater role in managing the companies. Railway workers do not see privatization as a viable option because it provides commuting services to the lower tier of the society. The workers of PR themselves belong to this semi-skilled and educated lower middle class. A second effort at restructuring of Pakistan Railways was undertaken during the PPP government, 2008-13. Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani directed the Ministry of Railways to restructure railways on modern and commercial lines to make it a viable financial entity. Operational inefficiencies were identified as the main reason for losses and the solution was seen in dualization of railway tracks, improvement of existing railway tracks, besides improvement in passenger and freight services. In February 2009, the Cabinet Committee on Privatization (CCOP) approved a new privatization policy based on the concept of Public Private Partnership

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

209

(PPP). A committee headed by Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission and comprising the Minister for Railways, Minister for Privatisation as well as Secretaries of Privatization and Railways was constituted to carry out expeditious unbundling of Pakistan Railways. The Ministry of Railways published an ‘Expression of Interest’ in the national dailies on 3 April 2009 for consultancy services required for the preparation of Public Private Partnership Policy for Pakistan Railways. The terms of reference included a policy on private participation focusing on freight and passenger trains and railway infrastructure (railways real estate joint ventures, dry ports and allied activities), designing of appropriate mechanisms for accelerating development of the railway system through increased private sector financing in Pakistan and elaborate procedures, based on international best practices and the experience of Pakistani agencies for interaction with private investors and building institutional capacity. The work also included review and analysis of the financial structure of PR, existing legal, regulatory and institutional framework, review of previous studies, initiatives and programme loans, and legal aspects of PPP and/or private sector financing in the rail sector. The study would also identify key legal components of the previous studies that were still relevant to PPP in rail. Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided funding for this consultancy under Loan No. 2178-Pak (SF). Terms of Reference were prepared by Ministry of Railways and shared with the Privatization Commission and subsequently approved by ADB. Both agreed to work closely to follow up, with technical assistance from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. They would also examine the scope of PPP in manufacturing units of PR such as the sleeper factories, carriage and locomotive factories, and Mughalpura workshop. In addition, a study for designing organizational and financial restructuring of Pakistan Railways was underway to update the fixed assets values of Pakistan Railways as on 30 June 2009, prepare assets register and balance sheet as on 30 June 2009 and certify its correctness, prepare format for

210

Nadia Tahir

the income and expenditure statement and define the initial chart of accounts. The purpose was to suggest key reforms for successful operation of PR on commercial lines of business. A beginning was made in mid-1992 when the most profitable route between Lahore and Faisalabad was privatized (GOP 1998, 1999-2013). While the government was considering to extend role of the private sector to other rail routes, the Lahore-Faisalabad route had to be de-privatized in September 1993 when the private operator failed to manage it profitably. Nothing concrete happened in terms of a policy shift, but the impact of mixed, often confused signals, was reflected in the slowdown of in investment on essential operations, closure of manufacturing units and increasing workers’ resentment. In 1992, there were 753 locomotives, 34,851 freight wagons and 2,622 passenger coaches. By 2008, there were 590 engines, out of which 290 were out of service being obsolete, and the remaining were extremely unreliable for haulage of rolling stock over long distances. There were a total of 1,667 passenger coaches and 220 passenger trains. The PR decided to shut down 102 trains due to financial constraints. It had accumulated liabilities of Rs. 334 billion and losses incurred due to the running expenses (GOP 1998, 1999-2013, Quddus 1992). The question of restoring the railway tracks and allied facilities was a remote possibility in this noise about privatization. The narrow gauge of Zhob Valley Railway (ZVR) between Bostan and Zhob was suspended in 1986 and a plan was made to upgrade it to broad gauge railway. Later it was also abandoned and the railway wagons, oil smelting furnace, the chrome ore hoppers and the coal crane of ZVR were all plundered. This is not an isolated case. Falling investment, rising depreciation cost and closing down of lines resulted in redundant railway equipment on a large scale. A considerable length of track has been plundered or washed away in floods. What remained of tracks and steel fittings were uprooted by the PR and sold as scrap in 2008.

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

211

In the background of failed privatization, the minister of railways announced in 2014 that the railways is not any more on the privatization list. This is not the case, as the approved list has not changed. All it means is that the minister is not actively pursuing outright privatization. Under Public Private Partnership (PPP), the PR has started Business Express Train, Shalimar Train and Night Coach Train between Lahore and Karachi. A Real Estate Development & Marketing Company (REDMCO) has also been established to exploit the potential of railway land, an area where the provinces are also the stakeholders (GOP 2013-14). TRANSPORT POLICY

The transport policy reflects how a political regime views the interaction between people and infrastructure, and the direction it should take. The government provides infrastructure and facilitates mobility. Pro-road transport policy leaves a regulatory role of controlling congestion and settling disputes (Headicar 2008). Pro-rail transport policy is considered environment friendly and a facilitator of social mobility. A railroad policy requires a balance of load sharing through modal split. The governments in Pakistan have been is pro-road and cars instead of railways. The private sector is hesitant to participate because the amount of money they receive from passenger fares is not enough to repay the costs of building and maintaining the lines. The willingness to pay taxes has eroded over time and the governments have been reluctant to expand the tax net. This has resulted in the failure to maintain infrastructure, especially the railways. Before the railway age, there were 32,500 km of turnpike roads in England (Day 1907, Headicar 2008, Satya 2008). These roads were built by private trusts for deriving income from tolls on roads they built and maintained. The roads like railways were also built and maintained by the private sector. In the early twentieth century, the over-provision of rail lines, competition between carriers and economic depression of

212

Nadia Tahir

the 1930s led to a crisis in many parts of the transport industry. After 1920, the government had to give massive subsidies to offset market failures and to ensure public service in transport sector. This was the first involvement of government in transportation affairs. The government had to introduce regulatory control in the transport sector and the private bus companies were taken over by municipally controlled transit commissions and railways were nationalized in most parts of Europe. It was also the time when the modified guaranteed system was introduced in the railway system in India. The first transport strategy emerged after the Second World War. It was developed to promote the use of cars through motorways and trunk roads. Its objective was to predict traffic level and congestion. In colonial times, apart from building railways, two important initiatives were taken in the transport sector. The first was the Karachi Tramways Act passed in 1884, with the first steam tramway opened for operation in 1885 along with the horse-drawn tram. Second, new and wider roads were constructed in Lahore (Goulding 1924). The transportation policy in colonial times was pro-railways, which revolved around strategic considerations, political economy, people and infrastructure. Pakistan inherited a very large network. Soon after Independence, the domestic transportation system was in a bad condition and underdeveloped. Railroads were the main means of transportation. It carried 90 per cent of the passenger traffic, leaving a mere 10 per cent for road transport. In the early 1950s, roads actually carried only 8 per cent of the passenger traffic. In the First Five Year Plan 195560, the modal split was 70 per cent for Pakistan Railway as compared to 30 per cent for road transport. The allocation of development funds was in the 75:25 ratio. By the Second Five Year Plan 1960-5, road transportation threw a real challenge and the railway lost as it failed to compete. The large rail network was not used extensively used. A military-controlled trucking organization, National Logistics Cell, has offered direct competition to railways. In 1955-6, there were 62,000

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

213

km of roads which have now reached 264,000 km, an expansion of around 4 times. In contrast, railway routes contracted from 8,561 to 7,791 km, or by about 10 per cent. In 1955-6, there were just 75,000 vehicles on the road. Now there are 9413 thousand vehicles on the road, a staggering 125 times growth. Planners developed a new transport policy on the assumption that Pakistan is more suitable for roads. Roads give greater convenience, safety and revenue. Building roads required less investment as compared to building railway tracks. On this basis, planners proposed 2,897 km of new roads. In 1951, the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 was amended. In 1957, the Pakistan Road Transport Board was established. Karachi Road Transport Corporation (KRTC) was created in 1959. In the 1970s and 1980s, road and air networks grew considerably faster than the railways. Between 1978 and 1992, the volume of freight and the number of passengers carried by rail increased only slightly, whereas road-borne freight and the number of air passengers more than doubled. In the late 1980s, the government shifted its infrastructure spending significantly towards roads, neglecting the railway sector. The discrimination was not only in the allocation of development funds, but also in allocating the government controlled freight. This was not necessarily due to the railway capacity to deliver, but the result of a road bias. In all development plans, roads received more allocation than the railways. There has not been much funding available for operations and maintenance of Pakistan Railways. The government gives subsidies for the working expenses but no major rehabilitation investment in tracks and rolling stock has been made. In 1991, a draft National Transport Policy was published by the National Transport Research Centre (NTRC). This policy suggested the adoption of a bus-based public transport system, as compared to a rail-based mass transit system (GOP 1991). In 1994, transportation policy was aimed at shifting more of the traffic back to the rail system, with a long-term goal of a rail to road freight traffic ratio of 33:67 by 2000.

214

Nadia Tahir

The facts reveal the opposite. In 2013, total road network in Pakistan was around 2,63,775 km, carrying over 96 per cent of inland freight and 92 per cent of passenger traffic. National highways, constituting only 3.53 per cent of the total road network, carried 80 per cent of commercial traffic. The motorways carried 0.87 per cent of the total freight. Strategic roads and expressways contribute 0.1 per cent. Road density in Pakistan is 0.32 km per square km (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013-14). During 1990-2010, the capacity of the railways to carry passenger and freight diminished significantly. The number of locomotives declined by almost 30 per cent and freight wagons by 53 per cent. The latest transportation policy claims to ‘provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, affordable, accessible, sustainable and fully integrated transport system’. However, the development allocation for railways is Rs. 39.4 billion. The main thrust is on the improvement of existing infrastructure, signalling system and procurement of essential material for rolling stock like locomotives, coaches, bogie wagons, track rehabilitation and manufacturing. The allocation for the National Highway Authority (NHA) is, however, Rs. 111.5 billion, making it clear where the priority lies (Annual Plan 2014-15). Vision 2025, prepared by the Planning Commission, also sees roads as the main instrument for regional connectivity.

Input Conditions Track and Rolling Stock The PR is among the few railways system which have contracted in route length. From 8,561 km in 1950, it reduced to 7,791 km in 2010. The track is largely broad gauge, measuring 7,346 km. Contraction has been accompanied by redundancy. Only 3.7 per cent of the track is electrified. This is the 274 km section between Lahore and Khanewal. Environment friendly rail network needs electrification, which

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

215

can be powered by any fuel. But after the initiation of doubling of track from Khanewal to Lahore, the electrification of this piece of track has been virtually suspended. The second track line is not electrified and it is not possible to run electric locomotives on single line. This anomaly was overlooked by planners. For all practical purposes now, Pakistan Railways does not have any electrified section. In 1950, PR owned 862 locomotives with no capacity to repair and construct. The number reached 1071 in 196570. Ever since, it has been declining. The PR ownership of locomotives now stands at 528. It is this redundancy which is hampering growth. The railway is still suffering from a mixture of gauges – broad gauge (5 ft 6 in.), metre gauge (3 ft 33⁄8 in.) and narrow gauge (2 ft and 6 in.). Since Independence, the PR has been struggling to convert the narrow gauge lines to broad gauge. As much as 311 km of metre gauge railway still remains to be converted. These different gauges throw a challenge to use different rolling stock at different lines. In 1950, PR had 1,429 broad gauge, 81 meter gauge and 164 narrow gauge passenger coaches. In 2011, it has 1,540 broad gauge passenger coaches. In 1950, the PR owned 22,835 freight wagons for broad gauge, 803 freight wagon for metre gauge and 613 freight wagons for narrow gauge. In 2011, the PR owned 18,402 freight wagon for broad gauge and 66 for metre gauge. In 1955 PR owned 751, 28 and 46 steam engines for broad, meter and narrow gauges respectively and 37 diesel engines for broad gauge. After 67 years of Independence, PR has 500 diesel engines in a total 528 locomotives. (GOP 1998, 1999-2013).

Passenger and Freight Traffic The PR plays a vital role in passenger and freight transportation for a country with a population of more than 180 million. In 2011, PR carried 64,903,000 passengers and 2,616,000 tons of freight. During the financial year 1950-1, PR reported an

216

Nadia Tahir

operating revenue of Rs. 315 million of which 37.3 per cent was from passenger earnings and 53.8 per cent from freight. In 1996-7, passenger earnings comprised 45 per cent of the railway’s total revenue and in 2010 54 per cent, reaching 64.3 per cent in 2011. In absolute terms, passenger earnings during 1996-7 were Rs. 4.5 billion and in 2011 11.97 billion (GOP, 1999-2013). This works out at a compound average growth rate of 7.2 per cent. This increase in passenger earning was without much increase in passengers carried. PR earned Rs.1.69 billion from freight and Rs. 33.37 billion from passengers, but the share of freight in total revenue was recorded at 17.93 per cent. On average during 1965-2010, Pakistan Railways had the capacity to carry 99.26 million passengers and 9.94 million tons of freight annually. It operated with 809 locomotives and 31,092 freight wagons on average during the same period. However, its capacity deteriorated over the years. In the last 45 years, the passenger traffic declined at a steady rate of 1.6 per cent annually. The same is the story of the freight services. In 1965-6, PR had the capacity to move 7,631 million ton freight. In 1996-7, it was 4,607 million ton and in 2010 it dropped further to 3,925 million ton. The average freight was 6,722.5 million ton. Almost 1.5 per cent decline was experienced annually in the freight carrying capacity. The number of locomotives and freight wagons also contracted at a steady rate of 1.5 and 1.7 per cent respectively annually (see Appendix Table 5.2). Freight traffic declined from 45 to 34 per cent. Total freight earnings were Rs. 4.4 billion in 1996-7 and Rs. 7.1 billion in 2009-10. There was a growth of 3.5 per cent in the freight revenue. Average revenue per passenger in 1950-5 was Rs. 1.5 and in 2005-10 it had reached Rs. 159 per passenger. Despite the deterioration in rolling stock, the increase in passenger and freight traffic earning seemed like an achievement. But it was possible due to increase in fares and freight charges. In 1950, ordinary operating expenses were 66.6 per cent of which 22.5 per cent were on repair and maintenance. PR

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

217

reported that in 2011 ordinary operating expenses were 169 per cent of total earning, of which 64 per cent on repair and maintenance (GOP 1999-2013). Traditionally speaking, PR generates its freight revenue from the movement of agricultural, industrial and imported products, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), wheat, coal, fertilizer, rock phosphate, cement, sugar and container traffic. About 39 per cent of the revenue is generated from the transportation of POL products, 19 per cent from imported wheat, fertilizer and rock phosphate. The remaining 42 per cent is earned from domestic traffic. In 2011, 18 per cent of cement, 35 per cent of departmental commodities of which 9.7 per cent coal and coke and patent fuels for railways, and 25.45 per cent of railway material and stores were transported. Petroleum and hydrocarbons explains 14.83 per cent, of which 1.7 per cent is diesel and 13.11 per cent furnace oil. Container traffic is only 5 per cent. The freight rates are flexible and depend on lead, peak/off peak season, and on quantum (GOP 1999-2013). As stated above, the PR has to deal with increasingly intense competition for the passenger and freight traffic with the road sector. Road transport became popular due to its speed and convenience. The unregulated and rapidly growing road transport is the source of revenue. Public transport and army freight companies were set up to benefit from this revenue. In its development programme, the government spends more money on the road sector than railways. In 1978, the National Logistics Cell (NLC) was established and offered a direct competition to the railway freight services. PR was not prepared for it. It was outcompeted by the NLC (GOP 1991, 2005, 2010).

Investment In the First Five Year Plan 1955-60, Pakistan opted for a strategy to rehabilitate track first and rolling stocks later, postponing expansion. A sum of Rs. 248 million was allo-

218

Nadia Tahir

cated for rehabilitation in Annual Plan 2014-15 out of a total allocation railway of Rs. 39.4 billion. The policy thus remains the same, of rehabilitation of tracks and improvements in existing infrastructure first and rolling stocks later (GOP 1957). Neither has the track been fully rehabilitated, nor has any expansion worth the name taken place. As a matter of fact, the government failed to invest in railways infrastructure. In the 1980s, investment in Pakistan railways declined, as it did in many countries of the world. It was the time when road building replaced railway transport in the investment choice. Some countries recognized the need for developing integration between rail and the road (Affuso et al. 2003, Headicar 2008). There is a common saying that if one can’t compete, join them. In Pakistan, there has been no coordination between the road and the rail sectors, although a modal split policy existed in all transport policies. It is the time to introduce financial economies and competition in railways. In the era of technological innovation, diesel locomotives have been replaced by electric ones. The use of electric trains enhanced the speed and safety of the rail and attracted the traffic back to the rail tracks. Pakistan allocated meagre ressources to the development of the railways. In 1962-3, capital outlay in PR was 1.24 per cent of the GDP and then it started to decline and reached the lowest level of 0.16 per cent. In 1974-5 it started rising and increased to 0.99 per cent but it was not persistent. After 1980-1, it was continuously declining. This was the time when road investment and road transport gained momentum. After 1978-9, the share of railway investment as a share of total investment was also declining. The PR lost its charm as a public sector investment in Pakistan. After 1980-5, Pakistan invested less and less in PR at a time when various costs started to rise sharply. Expenditure on fuel, administration, staff, repair and maintenance almost doubled in this era. After 1980-5, it did not decline. However, even the increase was not enough to turn the railways around. Insufficient

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

219

investment in tracks and rolling stocks keeps the overhead costs high (see Appendix Table 5.2). Various expansion plans have been announced but not implemented. In 2006, the ministry of railways announced the building of railway tracks between Gwadar and Quetta. It was planned that the Bostan-Zhob narrow-gauge railway line would be converted into broad gauge within one year. These two projects would have cost US $1.25 billion. In addition, there are plans of expansion into West Asia and electrification (worth about $2 billion) over the five-year period from 200510. A high-speed railway (about 300 km/h) between Punjab and Sindh is planned at a cost of $1 billion. In late 2006, plans to increase train speeds, install more lengths of double track and convert the country’s railways to standard gauge and establish direct rail connections with China were announced by the President Zardari. The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sees the Pak-China rail traffic corridor as of immense strategic importance (GOP 1999-2013). According to the Minister of Railways, PR is to establish a rail link with China under the Early Harvest Programme, upgrade the existing main line from Peshawar to Karachi and set up a dry port at Havelian. The shift from oil to coal in power generation will require PR to investment Rs. 123 billion in developing its infrastructure to move imported coal to the proposed sites of Jamshoro, Rahimyar Khan, Muzaffargarh and Sahiwal. In a three-year period, apart from improving track and signalling, 63 locomotives and 3,065 wagons will be needed. A separate freight company is also being proposed.

Employment and Labour It is usually assumed that per unit cost of PR is very high because it is labour intensive (ADB 2011). Over-employment, resulting from politicized recruitment, is often cited as a cause of its decline. In 1985, the railway minister is said to have recruited 20,000 people. His successor in 1988, 1993

220

Nadia Tahir

and 2008 continued with political job creation. At one stage, as many as 39,000 employees reportedly received salaries and overtime allowances without doing any work. There are reports that Rs. 21 billion is spent on wages and pensions every month, leaving nothing for maintenance of power and rolling stocks. This has led to financial bankruptcy, despite bailouts arranged by the government. A total of 115 railway services have been cancelled. In 2011, all goods haulage trains had to be stopped due the shortage of locomotives and fuel (GOP 1999-2013). After Independence the gazetted cadres were entirely centralized, except for the few European officers who opted for service in Pakistan. The PR continued the policy of providing housing for the employees, free medicare, educational facilities, cooperative stores, canteens, clubs, cinema shows, etc. The railways was considered as an important source for employment creation in the early years after Independence. It was the largest organization in 1959 with a total number of 165,892 employees. Every tenth family had a member working in the railways (Malik 1992). The wage bill was 45.8 per cent of the total cost of running the railways. Many observers laid the burden of bad performance of PR on the employment conditions. It was, however, PR’s failure to attract business that led to a policy of reducing cost. This did not work. Railway Workers’ Union (Open Lines), the oldest union in the country recognized under the Trade Union Act of 1926 founded by Mirza Ibrahim, a famous leader of the Left, holds that publicly owned enterprises providing services such as railways cannot be motivated by profit alone, though they should not be white elephants either. According to the union, the restructuring of railways has been designed to impede these social objectives and is focusing on cutting costs by cutting productive labour. Restructuring efforts have also emphasized the need to prepare the unions for privatization. The unions maintain that top heavy and non-professional management rather

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

221

than excess labour is responsible for the financial woes of PR. Railway Workers’ Union has two sub-divisions. The first is open lines, covering national rail network with transport operations. The number of employees here is 95,000. The second sub-division workshops, which relates to production and manufacturing units. The number of employees is 16,000. Their collective bargaining agreement is for workshops only. The last referendum to elect the collective bargaining agent was held in 1982. It was won by the Open Lines Union, but the martial law regime did not recognize it. In 1993, with railways placed on the privatization list, 90 per cent of railway lines were declared of military interest, banning workers from joining unions. During General Musharraf’s regime, 2,000 union activists were dismissed and about 5,000 transferred to remote places or threatened to refrain from activism. The democratic government lifted the ban on trade union activity in 2008. However, the membership of Open Lines union is now limited to 40,000 and its efforts to unite all railway workers have not met with much success. With a weak trade union, the restructuring efforts have achieved at least one objective-reduction of employees (railways reports). It may be noted that an employment squeeze had started in 1970, i.e. well before the restructuring began, which of course accelerated it. During 1955-60, the total number of employees on average was 1,10,972. By 2005-10, the average came down to 85,655, a contraction of almost 13 per cent. But this contraction is not the same in all departments. During 1955-2010, employment in stores, police and headquarter departments increased, while employment in civil and mechanical engineering, commercial and medical departments declined. The composition of employment has also changed during 2000-10. Employment in stores department was 2 per cent in 2000-1 and 3 per cent in 2009-10. The share in employment of railway police increased from 6 per cent in 2000-1 to 8 per cent in 2009-10. The employment share of engineering, commercial, accounts and transportation

222

Nadia Tahir

departments has declined from 90 to 84 per cent. The number of the people required to keep the railways running and be profitable is declining whereas those living off railways has been increasing. If an organization is run by the people who lack relevant knowledge and skills, it cannot achieve financial solvency and safeguard commercial interest (GOP 1960-2011, 1999-2013). From the first day the PR had its own audit and accounting system that not only ensured traditional authorization but also economical railway management. Audit and account departments were separated, with the Auditor General’s Department posting officers in the railways without understanding and experience of the norms of the railway culture. The separation of the departments created an additional burden on expenditure. From 1995 to 2010 employment in Pakistan Railways declined by 1 per cent, inflation increased by almost 8 per cent and nominal wages also increased 8 per cent. Increase in wages was thus equal to inflation rate but total cost did not decline even though there was a downward trend in employment. It was more alarming with shrinking employment. If the salaries are indexed on the basis of 1996 price level, total salaries of employees were well below the indexed salaries of employees. The situation is worse when the total number of employees handling freight and passengers are compared. In 1995-6, freight was 4,607 ton km and in 2009-10 it decreased to 3,925 ton km. There was a decline of 14 per cent in freight handling which is the major source of revenue. Against this, there was an increase of 23 per cent in the passenger services (see Figure 5.5) (GOP 1999-2013). Inability to attract business due to unfair competition from private as well as public sector road transport, inadequate investment, changing composition of employment in favour of non-productive departments and failure to invest in workers’ skills have contributed to the decline of railway.

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

223

Financial Sustainability PR suffered from declining allocations to roads not only get more allocations in development programme, but also an edge in the freight preferences of the public sector. This makes railways less attractive. It has lost its competitive edge over time (GOP, 1999-2013) (see Appendix Figure 5.6). PR has failed to meet its operational cost. Expenditure composition has changed since 2009-10. Interest on debt was 4 per cent of total expenditure in 1965-6. It rose to 10 per cent in 2009-10. Expenditure on general administration was 16 per cent in 1965-6. It is now 8 per cent. The crucial repair and maintenance expenditure has declined from 28 per cent in 1965-6 to 19 per cent of the total revenue expenditures in 2009-10. Operating expenses were 36 per cent of total revenue expenditure. In 2009-10 it was 28 per cent. Miscellaneous expenditures increased from 6 to 35 per cent of the total expenditures (see Appendix Figure 5.7). Under the old guaranteed system, railway companies maintained depreciation reserve fund. By the time the useful life of an asset or building expired, its full original cost should have been written off to revenue. This allowed timely renewal of assets without undesirable fluctuation in revenue charges. Established in April 1924, the fund provided for the cost of renewal and replacement of assets. The contribution to the fund was calculated on an ad-hoc basis of 1/60th of the capital cost of the wasting units to be replaced. After Independence it was increased to 1/45 in 1955-6 and 1/30 in 1957-8 (Malik 1962). The government is entitled to a reasonable return on investment in the railways, as it is responsible for providing finance for capital addition. Foreign loans are repaid from general revenues. In case the railways themselves finance their replacement and rehabilitation programme and they repay the foreign loans obtained for rehabilitation, the convention stipulates that the railways will pay to general revenue a fixed return of 4 per cent on capital at charge, including

224

Nadia Tahir

investment on strategic lines and will retain a balance of its surplus for credit to railway funds and reserves. However, the railways is now unable to meet even its operating expenses. Passengers were never the major source of earning. But the PR has now to depend more and more on passenger revenue. The genesis of the problem was neatly summed up by a former chairman of the Railway Board, S.A. Suharwardy, Railway management is blamed for all the faults that are detected in railway working but few realize the unenviable position in which the railway managements have been placed in discharge of their responsibilities. While we are expected to render efficient service, we are not given powers to take various actions that are essential to the performance of that service. For example we have to look to finance for any expenditure that we have to incur, we have to look to the supply ministry for the bulk purchases of railway material and stores that we need. We have to depend upon Federal Public Service Commission for the appointment of the gazetted officers. We have to go to Establishment Division of the Cabinet Secretariat for the selection of men to fill highest posts. In no country in the world have the railways been so fettered in the execution of their responsibilities. As state railway, undoubtedly government must control the expenditure on major development projects, but the management must be left in the hands of those who have requisite knowledge and experience of railway working and are eventually responsible for running the railways. It is an anomaly that an undertaking, in which the government have invested almost rupees 200 crores, should be managed as small part of government secretariat, with corporations like the PIDC and others where the government stake of funds is far less should be left to run their affairs independently. (Malik 1962)

Equipment and Manufacturing The railways was born under unfavourable conditions in Pakistan. In undivided India, the British had a monopoly in railway equipment. After Independence, the broad gauge loco, wagon and carriage workshop, besides loco running

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

225

sheds were in India. This made rehabilitation of rolling stock and other assets a daunting task. There was no supply line to replace the deteriorating tracks and equipment. The capacity to produce or repair railways equipment was almost non-existent. It requires a huge sum of investment for building the capacity of producing railway equipment and new over-haulage capacity. Pakistan had to start from scratch. The planners emphasized the policy of building railway track first and rolling stocks later. After 67 years of Independence, Pakistan is still struggling with the rehabilitation of tracks (GOP 2005, 2010, 2011; Looney 1998; Malik 1962). The failure of building new railway lines also badly affected the conditions of rolling stock. Pakistan Railways has fewer passenger trains, freight trains and locomotives than before. Declining revenue and mounting cost burden made it inefficient and loss making organization. The country entered the field of manufacturing quite late. In 1993, the Pakistan Locomotive Factory was set up at Risalpur in collaboration with the Government of Japan. It had the capacity to produce two diesel-electric locomotives per month on a single-shift basis, which could be doubled by introducing a second shift. With some adjustments, it could also make electric locomotives. The manufacturing technology was acquired from Hitachi, Japan, General Electric, United States, Dtranz, Germany and Dalian Locomotive & Rolling Stock Works, China. Up to 2007, 77 new locomotives were manufactured in the range of 2,000-3,000 hp. In addition, 26 overage locomotives of 2,000-2,400 hp were rehabilitated. A range of spare parts are also manufactured. Successful railways require congenial business environment with the priority to invest in generating a demand of industrial inputs. Efficient supply line of railway equipment which can compete on the basis of cost cutting and increased demand of transportation are prerequisites for properly running. However, Pakistan Railways has not been able to build proper traction and auxiliary systems for the maintenance of the rolling stock. The surge of investment in

226

Nadia Tahir

railway infrastructure in China and its leadership role in railway technology has revived some interest in Pakistan as well. In the Pak-China Economic Corridor project, an important component is the 1,800-km rail link between Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xingiang and the Gwadar deep sea port.

Safety and Environment Until the late 1970s the railways were the quickest mode of transport. They were also the safest. Since then there has been a huge shift towards road transport while public sector rail transport has been allowed to decline. A number of rail tracks have been dismantled and even sold to cronies. Investment in road transport is smaller and returns are quicker. While the government invests in roads at the expense of railways, the friends and relatives invest in transport vehicles. Even here, cars are preferred over buses. Contractors in road building are invariably connected to the ruling elite, whereas railways lack a political constituency. While the railway lines are declared as of military interest, military organizations are themselves involved in road construction and trucking. It seems that the projects are formulated and implemented for profit, not the people. Facilitating the lives of the people is not on the agenda. Travelling by rail is safer than travelling by road. The number of deaths attributable to road accidents is enormously larger than deaths resulting from train accidents. The Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013, published by the World Health Organisation (WHO), declared road accidents in Pakistan as a leading cause of death for young people aged 15 to 29. In 2010, the National Highway and Motorway Police (NHMP) and Rescue put the annual death toll due to road accidents at around 12,000. In the last ten years, the number of deaths due to road accidents exceeded 130,000. The fatalities reported from road accidents indicated that 41 per cent were pedestrians, 39 per cent were passengers and 4 per cent were drivers.

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

227

On the other hand, the fatalities in train accidents since 1990 are far less than the deaths caused by road accidents in a single year (see Appendix Table 5.4). The worst rail accident happened on 3 January 1990 at Sang, 15 km from Sukkur. The death toll was 350. While Pakistan Bureau of Statistics publishes data on road accidents, the data related to rail accidents is not collected. It seems the Bureau collects data that has some regularity, which is true only in the case of road accidents. We were able to collect the available information for 2005. On 13 July 2005 the worst accident in recent years occurred at Sarhad Railway Station close to Ghotki. Three trains collided, leaving 150 dead. On 21 August 2005, the upcountry Super Parcels Express derailed while crossing the Malir Bridge near Landhi in the Karachi. No deaths were reported. On 19 December 2007 the Karachi Express derailed near Mehrabpur in Sindh. The death toll was 40. On 7 July 2013 fourteen members of a family were killed when a train hit a motorcycle rickshaw at an unmanned level-crossing near Khanpur village in Sheikhupura. On 26 July 2013 a Rawalpindi-bound train derailed near Gujranwala. Two persons died (various newspapers). An affordable, comfortable, safe and fast rail system would disincentivize the use of private vehicles on the roads. As a result, hydrocarbon consumption would be reduced. There will be less congestion and fewer deaths from accidents. Reduced pollution and smog will have an overall favourable impact on the health of the people, making life less stressful. These are the indirect benefits of rail transport for the environment. The direct benefits include the economical use of fuel and lower emissions. But to make massive investments in railways requires profound changes in national priorities. Vision 2025, a recent document of the Planning Commission, proposes major upgradation of the railway system by increasing speed from 95 km/h to 120/140 km/h; doubling tracks of the main line sections; increasing line capacity with a modern signalling system; establishing north-south and east-west corridors and developing linkages to Central Asian

228

Nadia Tahir

States, China, and other neighbouring countries and development of a separate freight corridor on railway tracks. It calls for making Pakistan Railways more profitable and quality service provider for passengers and freight. However, the investment planning is yet to reflect these ideas.

Conclusion In the pre-Independence era, railways were built to achieve colonial objectives of military hold, preferential trade facilities and a way of development suited to job creation for the British. Towards these ends, the state facilitated the private ownership and introduced the guaranteed system (guarantee of 5 per cent capital at charge). Along with this guarantee, the state provided free land, flexible labour policy (no questions asked for hiring and firing of lower end services provided by the natives) and rights to withdraw operations and ownership at any time to allow companies to thrive and earn profit. With these incentives, the companies tried to raise sufficient funds in England for building railways in India but failed. Initial losses and unfavourable conditions in England made it more difficult for private companies to survive. The state rescued all the private companies and introduced varied types of contracts for protecting the private investors’ interests. Thus it was the failure of the private sector in acquiring funds that introduced state owned railways in what is now Pakistan. Under the state ownership, mostly the strategic lines of North Western Railways were built which comprised of almost 43 per cent of total railway lines in the undivided India. The state provided speedy and uninterrupted funds to facilitate rapid construction. During 1848-1902, the state bore almost Rs. 7,595 lakh of losses in general revenue for establishing railway for a mere supervisory role. It is easy to say that individuals responded to incentives but the railways in undivided India leaves no doubt that state patronage is the crucial element for this type of risky ventures. It should be clear that the railways was born in the pri-

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

229

vate sector and the state promoted its business. The varied ownership and management structures resulted into an independent railway culture, a manifestation of a compromise between development policy and short term interest of private companies. Naturally, it resulted in many problems including railway management and ownership structure, railway law, railway board formation, land usage policy, unmanned gates, multiplicity of gauges, separation of financial accounts and maintaining the accounts of strategic lines. In its initial days, the railway compromised on all these issues and ignored the technical and professional advice. Today Pakistan Railways is struggling to resolve these difficult issues, but without much success. With this chequered history of railways, the newly carved state of Pakistan, itself in the process of establishing the institutions of the state, inherited a badly divided, even dismantled railway system. The state had little resources to run it efficiently; indeed, the state needed the railway revenue for its own survival. Hence the hasty end of the separate railway budget and the autonomy of the railways. A declining interest in managing railways effectively was accompanied by the increasing public investment in roads. Roads seemed to offer convenience and revenue for the policy makers. The railways lost because there was no industrial interest lobbying for exploiting internal markets with the help of railways. Pakistan Railways’ only trade link was with India, which was soon to be suspended. The military use was the most important reason for the survival of the railways. In the beginning, there were enthusiastic declarations about the railways being the lifeline of the newly independent country that had to run a mega transportation network, without of course realizing its capabilities had been seriously undermined by en masse repatriation of the skilled railway staff, deficient technical facilities and external dependence for railway equipment. These handicaps made rail development a more difficult and expensive choice for the state. Still, the state accepted the challenge and after Independence, the railways was the only

230

Nadia Tahir

profit making department for the Government of Pakistan. The state had a multi-pronged task of building a new railway system which provides not only a cheap and safe transportation facility to the masses but also could be used as an effective warfare medium. Along with these problems, the state had to resolve the issues of development policy compromise of the colonial era. Planners devised a strategy of building tracks first and rolling stock later. Under this policy, the government tried to resolve the issue of uniform gauge tracks and compromised on getting passenger coaches, locomotives and freight trains. The state allocated meagre funds and ignored the necessity and sufficiency principle for building networks. Funds were allocated for building workshops, rolling stock, and rehabilitation of tracks simultaneously, resulted into little expansion. As a point of fact, the state shied away from providing funds and introduced pro-road funds in the name of tax collection and convenience but ignored the importance of a well-connected railway network for exploiting the potential of industrial development and internal markets. The faulty intermodal policy and declaration of the railways as a strategic asset also affected the expansion plans. Moreover, buses and trucking business and a pro-road policy caused irreparable damage to the development of railways in Pakistan. As if these problems were not enough, the state had also to resolve the soft issues of railway management, culture, autonomy, railway law, railway board and provincial land. The state took half way measures and failed miserably to resolve these issues to create a working, stable framework. Even after 67 years of Independence, the government is still struggling with these issues. Provincialization was stopped by writing railways into the Constitution first as a federal subject and then as a joint responsibility under the 1973 Constitution. The Railway Board and its formation posed another problem. Land which was provided free to build the railways and the companies accepted the state right to reclaim its land, is a source of the biggest rent seeking motive nowadays. After

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

231

Independence, as a federal state owned railway system, the federal government cannot sell the provincial land; it can only use it for rail development. In a declining business, which the railway has become for the past three decades or so, it seems more profitable to sell the land than to expand business. Now the problem is that the federal government has to bear all the losses but cannot sell the land. Unmanned gates on provincial land is also a related issue, which was the concern of engineers who carried out surveys in colonial times and raised objection to building railway tracks in the middle of cities. Later on, the advice was ignored and safety compromised because of cost considerations. Unmanned gates are the major reason for railway accidents and deaths now, as the lines that once passed through rural areas are now in the middle of the cities. Separation of the financial accounts of railways from the general budget which was necessary to overcome the evils of corruption in state railways, was ignored after Independence. The state now has to bear 70 per cent of losses of strategic lines. These lines were never profitable and were always financed from the ordinary railway programme of the North Western Railway. In 1922, the council of state proposed to separate the expenditure and revenue account of these strategic lines and losses to be debited to the military department. The government separated the accounts but rejected the losses to be debited to the military department. In 1924 when railway finances were separated from general finance it was agreed that losses on working lines and interest charges should be borne by general revenues. This convention is still practised in Pakistan. Another issue which Pakistan Railways is still facing is the overemployment in railways. It is again an historical issue. In 1913-14 to 1922-3, the Retrenchment Committee noted overemployment in railways in higher cadres and unrest in lower ranks which led to many strikes and dislocation of railways. In 1906, workers of East Indian and Eastern Bengal Railways were the first to strike, followed by a strike in 1908 in locomotive and carriage and wagons departments of the

232

Nadia Tahir

Great Indian Peninsula Railway. However, no major strike was reported in the North Western Railways until 1920, in which almost all railway workers on all lines took part. The period of dislocation extended to over three months. The government granted the demand for increased wages and certain privileges to certain employees. After 1924, Bengal and North-Western, Great Indian Peninsula, Bengal, Nagpore, East Indian and South Indian Railways witnessed strikes every year. The Lee Commission on Indian Public Services 1924 recommended improvement in the railway services and Indianizing the upper railway services up to 75 per cent in a few years. In July 1926, the rules for recruitment and training of officers were revised and a system of competitive examination, with provincial and local quota committees selecting the candidates for examination, was. In 1929, the Government of India proposed a systematic investigation of the conditions of lower paid railway servants. After 1970, Pakistan Railways was inundated with political employment and now it is suffering from overemployment. In 1928-9, the total number of Indian railway employees was 8,07,866. Pakistan inherited one-third of the railway system. Today the number of employees is almost 50,000 which is far less than the proportionate employment in colonial times. Pakistan Railways is a story of weak policy stance and neglected rail development policy after Independence. It is true that the department was not successful in overcoming most of the challenges and issues arising from time to time with any sense of direction. There was, however, no serious attempt to explore the opportunities for better transportation, industrial growth, environment friendly mode of transportation and linkages with the huge rural population in a cost effective manner. All this required a coordinated policy action and railway autonomy. The question policy makers’ face is that for how long the nation has to bear the losses? The answer is certainly not to sell the family silver and deprive the nation from a future possibility of success. The lessons learnt from the colonial history are that state

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

233

patronage for reviving the business is necessary, effective policy measures are needed for converting strategic lines into efficient commercial lines and to correlate railway lines with major industrial and employment centres, developing internal markets and providing safe, secure, timely and tidy service. Reviving the freight services on commercial basis will be the game changer. This requires the building of an efficient intermodal split, gigantic investment and professionalism. The railways began in the colonial period with a passenger/freight ratio of 96:4 in earning revenues. Today it is even worse. After Independence, planners never assigned railways an active role in promoting industrial linkages, innovation and trade within the country. Even at present, when regional economic corridors are being negotiated with neighbouring countries, roads rather than rail are the focus of policy makers. Development of the railways is considered as an important driver of promoting technical knowledge and organizing engineering capacity. Technical improvements have slashed freight costs by at least 50 per cent, mainly due to better energy intensity and containerisation. Further economies are achievable through quality enhancing information systems. Businesses want speedy and competitive freight charges with timely delivery and passengers aspire to have better service and information system. It is possible to improve the performance of the railways in these respects. There are at least four reasons why the railways should be revived. First, even in their present crumbling state, the railways have a better safety record than road transport. Second, any edge to roads in terms of economic costs loses significance as the railways do not impose the enormous environmental costs resulting from investment in roads. Third, investment in railways would contribute to innovation and supply chain and thus help revive the sluggish industrial sector. Fourth, instead of closing down the railway lines for overcoming the losses, investment should focus on promoting harmony, inclusion and social connectivity in a country

234

Nadia Tahir

that needs this social capital badly for a better tomorrow. As this article shows, the rise of railways was associated with an activist state. After Independence, a lukewarm state caused its decline. Only a state with pro-rail policy can make it rise again.

NOTES 1. Minute of Lord Dalhousie on the East Indian Railway Company and the Introduction of Railways in India, Home Department, Railway Branch, 1850, National Archives, New Delhi. 2. S.A. Suharwardy, Cahirman Railway Board. 3. Report of Railway Board, 1998.

REFERENCES Acworth, Sir William Mitchell, Historical Sketch of Government Ownership of Railroads in Foreign Countries. Washington: Hardpress Publishing, 1917. ADB (Asian Development Bank), Pakistan: Railway Development Programme: Initial Environmental Examination, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Affuso, Luisa, Julien Masson and David Newbery, ‘Comparing Investments in New Transport Infrastructure: Roads Versus Railways?’, Fiscal Studies, 2003, 24(2): 275-315. Andrabi, Tahir and Michael Kuehlwein, ‘Railways and Price Convergence in British India’, The Journal of Economic History, 2010, 70(2): 351-77. Andrew, Sir W.P., Indian Railways, London: T.C. Newby, 1848. Bogart, Dan and Latika Chaudhary, ‘Engines of Growth: The Productivity Advance of Indian Railways, 1874-1912’, The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Buchanan, D.H., The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1934. Chaudhuri, K.N., The Economic Development of India under the East India Company, 1814-1958, London: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Danvers, J. Progress of Railways and Trade in India, London: Effingham Wilson, 1889.

The Rise and Fall of Pakistan Railways

235

Day, Clive., A History of Commerce, London: Green and Company, 1907. Derbyshire, I.D., ‘Economic Change and the Railways in North India, 1860-1914’, Modern Asian Studies, 1987, 21(3): 521-45. GOP, 50 Years of Pakistan, ed. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1998. ———, ‘Annual Plan, 2011-12’, Islamabad: Planning Commission, 2011. ———, ‘Business Plan of Pakistan Railways 2010-18’, Lahore: Railway Board, 2010. ———, ‘Economic Survey of Pakistan’, ed. Ministry of Finance. Islamababd: Government of Pakistan, 2013-14. ———, ‘Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10’, Islamabad: Planning Commission, 2005. ———, ‘National Transport Policy (Draft)’, Islamabad: National Transport Research Centre, 1991. ———, ‘Pakistan Railways Year Book’, Lahore: Railway Board, 1999-2013. ———, ‘Pakistan Statistical Year Book’, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1960-2011. ———, ‘The Railways Act 1890: Corrected up to December 1996’, ed. Ministry of Railways, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1997. ———, ‘The Second Five Year Plan 1960-65’, Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1960. ———, ‘The First Five Year Plan 1955-60’, Islamabad: National Planning Board, 1957. Headicar, Peter, Trends in Car Ownership, Use and Dependence: Their Implications for a Sustainable Transport Agenda, ed. M. Higgitt, Transport Policy in Transition, Cambridge: CICC, 2008. Imran, Muhammad, ’Public Transport in Pakistan: A Critical Overview’, Journal of Public Transportation, 12(2), 2009: 30. Jeyaraj, Joseph, ’Modernity and Empire: A Modest Analysis of Early Colonial Writing Practices’, College Composition and Communication, 2009, 60(3): 68-92. Jon, E. Wilson, ’Early Colonial India Beyond Empire’, The Historical Journal, 2007, 50(4): 951-70. Kerr, Ian J., Engines of Change: The Railroads that Made India, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007. ———, ‘Representation and Representations of the Railways of

236

Nadia Tahir

Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies 2003, 37(2): 287-326. Koshal, R.K., ’Marginal Cost and Resource Allocations in Transport Industry in India’, Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series B (1960-2002), 1972, 34(4): 421-32. Kurosaki, Takashi, ’Agriculture in India and Pakistan, 1900-95: Productivity and Crop Mix’, Economic and Political Weekly, 1999, 34(52): A160-A168. Looney, R.E., ’The Growth and Decline of Pakistan’s Rail System’, International Journal of Transport Economics, 1998, 25(3): 299. Malik, M.B.K., Hundred Years of Pakistan Railways, Islamabad: Ministry of Railways and Communication, Railway Board, Government of Pakistan, 1962. Marshman, J.C., ’On the Cost and Construction of the Railways in India’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1863, 20: 397-405. Mian Ghias-ud-din, My Years with Pakistan Railways: What Went Wrong with Railways in Pakistan, Lahore: Ibrahim Publishers, 2007. Quddus, Syed Abdul, Rail Transport in Pakistan, Lahore: Directorate of Research and Training, Pakistan Railways, 2010. ———, What Ails the Railways, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1992. Sanyal, Nalinkasha, Development of Indian Railways, Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1930. Satya, Laxman D., ‘British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth Century South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, 2008, 47(43): 69-77. Tahir, Nadia, ’Efficiency Analysis of Pakistan Railway in Comparison with China and India’, International Journal of Transport Economics, 2013, XL(1): 71-98. Thorner, Daniel, ‘Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railways’, Journal of Economic History, XI(4), Fall 1951, 389-402. ———, ‘The Pattern of Railway Development in India’, The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1955, 2(14), 201-16. World Bank, ‘Pakistan Railways Privatization Project’, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998.

26.8

30.6

31.5

34.6

36.6

37.6

38.3

39.7

40.95

1903

1908

1909

1913-14

1918-19

1922-3

1924-5

1927-8

1928-9

86.29

63.58

47.06

44.83

36.01

5.955

831.39 118.87

822.86 118.26

733.37 114.75

697.46 105.65

549.74

495.09

429.83

411.92

341.11

265

74.62

72.6

69.37

72.99

41.8

32.93

26.38

27

17.11

44.25

45.66

45.39

32.66

44.48

30.65

20.68

17.82

18.9

3.039

62.8

61.4

60.4

69.1

48.4

51.8

56.1

60.2

47.5

54.96

7.13

-1.86

2.35

24

-642

5.322412

5.548939

6.189236

4.682706

5.23

6.28

6.77

1.22

8.091098 15.84

6.190794

4.811204

4.326083

5.540735

1.146792

28.84

30.59

33.8

33

33.7

33.2

33.3

34.2

35

95.8

71.16

69.41

57.8

57

57.1

59.4

59.8

58.5

62.3

4.2

80,7866

80,2209

74,5216

74,9680

6,85,965

6,33,694

5,02,489

4,15,355

4,02,249

54,965

Total Gross Working Net Operating % of net Loss/ Percentage Percentage Total Number capital Earnings Expenses Earnings Ratios earnings to gain of Coaching of Good to Total of emploto Total total capioutlay yees income Income tal outlay

Source: Compiled from Railway Administrative Report from 1848-1928.

696

Miles open

1848-61

Years

Table 5.1: Historical Data on Pakistan Railways

APPENDIX

136

132

126

8,585.53

8,585.53

8,663.51

8,794.96

8,811.21

8,811.21

8,811.45

8,811.45

8,815.03

8,815.03

1967-8

1968-9

1969-70 8,564.38

8,566.36

1966-7

1970-1

1971-2

1972-3

1973-4

1974-5

1975-6

1976-7

1977-8

149

143

147

143

141

136

124

133

128

123

8,585.53

1965-6

13

14

15

14

12

13

13

13

13

15

15

15

16

Number Freight of pas- Carried sengers million ton (million)

Route km.

Year

8,557

8,767

8,977

8,403

7,344

8,359

7,756

7,458

7,644

7,785

8,563

8,251

7,631

Freight Ton km.

978

978

1,024

992

992

993

1,015

1,141

1,076

1,045

1,047

1,045

1,026

2,213

1,748

1,632.8

1,345

1,026.1

943.4

785.4

716.3

731.2

665.2

624

615.6

592.1

1,459.4

1,416.5

1,294

1,113

860

637.8

591.3

546.4

556.7

495.1

455.7

442.4

418.8

205.4

180.3

171.5

150.8

145.9

115.6

102.1

100.5

94

91.7

85

82.8

83

624.6

613.4

536.1

429

308.1

234.1

218.5

195.1

218.5

177.6

150

148.6

146.4

629.4

622.8

586.4

533.2

406

288.1

270.7

250.8

244.2

225.8

220.7

211

188.5

188.4

143.3

121

73.5

69.1

68.2

45.2

33.1

30.4

30.1

24.2

22.4

21.9

1,109.5

1,118.3

1,152

1,111.4

145.9

111

96.9

253.3

230.1

207.3

285.2

295.5

265.4

Gross Ordinary General Repair Operat- Interests ExpenTotal to debts diture on ing no. of earnings Working Adminis- and Account locomo- millions Expenses tration Mainte- Expenses of Capital nance tives Outlay

Table 5.2: Railways After Independence

144

123

1979-80 8,817.33

8,817.33

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

8,774.87

1980-1

1981-2

1982-3

1983-4

1984-5

1985-6

1986-7

1987-8

1988-9

84.9

8,775

8,775

8,775

8,775

8,775

8,775

8,775

1990-1

1991-2

1992-3

1993-4

1994-5

1995-6

1996-7

68.8

73.65

67.7

61.72

59

73.3

84.6

1989-90 8,775

84.7

80

78

83

95

107

123

120

146

8,815.03

1978-9

6.36

6.85

8.11

8.04

7.77

7.56

7.72

9.3

10.43

12

12

12

11

11

12

11

11

12

12

4,607

5,077

6,711

5,938

6,180

5,962

5,709

7,226

8,364

8,113

7,820

8,270

7,203

7,385

7,323

7,067

7,918

8,598

9,375

633

622

678

676

703

752

753

768

773

806

837

879

916

943

979

963

960

1003

979

9394.3

8,365

9,224

9,134

9,031

8,235.9

6,696

5,654

5,318

5,279

4,884

4,368

3,681

3,679.9

3,395

3,044.2

2,492.4

2,709.4

2,274

997.7

870

772

710

686

590

561.3

479.5

492.5

421.9

339.7

305.8

273.6

225.8

8,926.7 1,302

8,864.7 1,483.3

8,746.1 1,443.5

7,774.9 1,225.8

6,899.4 1,152.1

6,708.1

5,813

5,128

4,797

4,585

4,080

4,205.5

3,740

3,634.5

3,335.7

2,854.2

2,645.2

2,196.1

1,558.8

4,195.1

4,301.5

4,186.8

3,544.3

3,118.6

3,051.8

2,553

2,345

2,177

2,114

1,850

1,803.8

1,505.7

1,420.2

1,300.8

1,161.3

1,030.9

860.4

604

680.5

992

624.7

574.6

625.1

546

917

453.5

495.2

256.3

239.5

283.8

186.5

143.2

136.7

136

306

175.7

3,429.6 1,107

3,079.9

3,115.8

3,004.8

2,628.7

2,658.6

2,390

2,009

1,910

1,785

1,640

1,840.4

1,754.8

1,721.8

1,613

1,353.2

1,308.5

1,062.1

727

3,582.5

3,378.5

3,234

2,236.6

2,188.1

2,191.8

1,625.6

1,097

820

1,409

1,699

1,827.6

1,368

1,070.8

1,207

1,700.9

1,799

1,816.5

1,762.3

68.8

82.54

58.97

7,791

7,791

7,791

7,791

7,791

7,791

7,791

7,791

2001-2

2002-3

2003-4

2004-5

2005-6

2006-7

2007-8

2008-9

2009-10 7,791

4.63

6.94

7.23

6.42

6.03

6.41

6.14

6.18

5.9

5.89

4.77

5.45

5.98

3,925

5,896

6,178

5,454

4,971

5,014

4,796

4,820

4,573

4,520

3,612

3,967

4,447

Freight Ton km.

520

551

555

544

544

557

592

577

577

610

597

596

611

13,813.9 1,973.6

10,685.2 1,883.2

10,760.7 1,645.7

9,658.5 1,372

9,052.8 1,329.8

9,169.2 1,345

22,269

23,160

19,973

19,194

911.3

2,021.1 -

6,546.3

6,959.4

9,825.5

3,436.9

6,672.6

6,508.7

5,329

3,180

3,781.2

3,714.3

3,648.6

11,280

9,949.5 14,544.2 5,769.6 11,280

3,795.1

9,811.8 3,364.8

8,944.1 3,726.6

6,827.5 2,146

5,920.5 2,094.7

6,651.9

4,443.6 2,446.8

4,700

3,894.5 2,050.7

3,701.1 1,466.8

3,659.6

7,664.7 11,003

7,396.5

6,242.8

5,261.1

5,348

5,188.4

4,358.4

4,415

4,392

4,021.9

4,163.7

29,877.9 4,322.9 10,086.4 15,468.6 5,446

28,159.5 3,665.8

22,238.3 3,570.5

20,332.2 3,123.9

18,043.6 18,016.5 2,829.6

17,827.5 14,446.4 2,357.8

14,477.8 13,380.8 2,112.3

14,810

13,346

11,938

9,889

9,245

9,805

Gross Ordinary General Repair Operat- Interests ExpenTotal to debts diture on ing no. of earnings Working Adminis- and Account locomo- millions Expenses tration Mainte- Expenses of Capital nance tives Outlay

Source: Compiled from Pakistan Statistical Year Book, Islamabad, Govt. of Pakistan, 1960-2011.

79.99

83.78

81.43

78.18

75.7

72.4

69

68

7,791

64.9

2000-1

8,774

1998-9

64.9

Number Freight of pas- Carried sengers million ton (million)

1999-00 7,791

8,775

Route km.

1997-8

Year

Table 5.3: Railways Development at Chronological Order Year 1861 1862 1947 1952 1954 1956 1961 1963 1964 1967 1967 1967 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1980 1980 1981 1986 1993

Developments

Km

Karachi-Kotri Section 169 Lahore-Amritsar 58 North Western Railways 8,557 Repair and Diesel Electric Workshop Rawalpindi Extension in Mardan-Charsadda section Extension Jacobabad-Kashmore North Western Railways renamed as Pakistan Western Railways Karachi Circular Railway Opened for goods traffic Karachi Circular Railway Opened for passenger traffic Railway Hospital at Rawalpindi (100 beds) Hyderabad-Mir Pur Khas converted from meter Gauge broad gauge Kot Adu DG Khan Kashmore Rail link 306 Goods Traffic opened between Kot Adu and DG Khan (Ist Phase) Lahore-Khanewal electric traction 286 Carriage Factory at Islamabad capacity to produce 150 Passenger Coaches DG Khan-Kashmore Phase II for goods traffic DG Khan-Kashmore Phase III for goods traffic Lahore Dry Port , Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Larkana, Multan, Faisalabad and Quetta Kotri Bridge between Guddu and Kotri and between 843 Karachi-Lodhran Marshalling Yard Pipri 2,500 wagon per day Sleeper Factories at Khanewal, Kohat, Kotri and Shaheenabad Micro Wave Telecommunication system between 2,200 Karachi and Rawalpindi First locomotive rolled out from Risalpur 23 locolocomotive factory motives

Source: Compiled from History of Indian Railways, Constructed and in Progress, 1854-1935, 1936, Govt. Press, Simla and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1998.

Table 5.4: Traffic Accidents Year

Total number of accidents

Killed

Injured

Total number of vehicles involved

1996-7

9,610

5,027

11,149

10,849

1997-8

9,663

4,858

11,597

10,892

1998-9

10,080

5,240

11,413

12,061

1999-2000

10,651

5,130

11,469

11,083

2001-2

10,033

5,248

11,922

10,765

2002-3

9,377

4,813

10,643

10,100

2003-4

10,308

5,199

12,927

10,852

2004-5

9,896

5,112

12,401

10,912

2005-6

9,492

4,868

11,415

10,565

2006-7

10,466

5,465

12,875

11,481

2007-8

10,466

5,615

12,096

11,456

2008-9

9,496

4,907

11,037

10,322

2009-10

9,747

5,280

11,173

10,496

2010-1

9,723

5,271

11,383

10,822

Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Railways Year Book, Lahore: Railway Board, 1999-2013.

543 1,845 18,559

582 1,565 22,888

610 1,755 24,834

707 2,315 30,492

809 2,622 35,740

952 2,370 35,915

992 2,137 36,515

Locomotivekilometers 99

98

97

94

91

87

84

79

73

62

42

47

Freight-ton-kilometers (millions) 9,534

8,064

6,779

574

346

277

222

169

Freight traffic revenue

Passenger traffic revenue 712

289

173

133

90

71

783

457

187

141

58

75

61

182 2,049

996 1,229

972

441

199

126

80

65

59

Fuel

9,446

8,584

5,095

3,343

2,115

960

646

515

420

315

7,457 4,878 3,268 3,144 14,451

4,425 4,278 1,646 2,533

4,067 3,076

1,743 2,076

1,258 1,301

653

322

242

196

159

119

Staff + admin

5,285 25,204 6,160 11,191 8,262 8,345 5,608 15,868

4,744 21,992 4,886

4,371 18,854 4,163

5,890 17,829 3,880

7,943 18,483 3,005

7,379 17,403 1,866

8,598 15,112 1,353

7,907 10,792

7,900 10,025

7,213

5,480

4,378

Repairs and maintance

Source: Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Railways Year Book, Lahore, Railway Board, 1999-2013.

85,655 7,791

1,20,948 8,775

1990-5

2005-10

1,31,228 8,775

1985-90

87,988 7,791

1,27,683 8,792

1980-5

2000-5

1,37,730 8,815

1975-80

97,917 7,823

1,33,748 8,759 1,026 2,083 37,395

1970-5

1995-2000

1,34,747 8,597 1,071 2,139 36,646

1965-70

961 1,891 31,681

840 1,780 25,886

862 1,674 24,251

1,25,487 8,574

Number of employees

1960-5

Length of railway in operation (km) units

1,10,972 8,582

Number of locomotives

1,00,734 8,561

Number of passenger coaches (No)

1955-60

Number of freight coaches (No)

1950-5

Years/Average Passenger-kilometers (million)

Table 5.5: Railway Efficiency

Total revenue (Rs. in million)

Figure 5.1: Decline of Pakistan Railways (Source: Compiled from Pakistan Railway Year Book, 1950-2010, Islamabad: Railway Board, Govt. of Pakistan, 2010).

Figure 5.2: Trend of Freight Wagons and Locomotive (Source: Compiled from Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1950-2010, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan, 2011).

Figure 5.3: Trend Analysis of Passenger and Freight Traffic (Source: Compiled from Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1950-2010, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan, 2011).

Figure 5.4: Output and Operating Expenses (Source: Compiled from Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1950-2010, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan, 2011).

Figure 5.5: Growth Rate of Employees (Source: Compiled from Planning Report from 1950-2010, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Govt. of Pakistan, 2011).

Figure 5.6: Plan Allocations for Transport Sector (Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan, Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Govt. of Pakistan, 1955-2005).

Figure 5.7: Expenditure Composition (Source: The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, Islamabad: Planning Commission, Govt. of Pakistan, 1970).

CHAPTER 6

An Overview of the Development of the Sri Lanka Railway1 David Hyatt

The Network The length of the current railway system in Sri Lanka is 1,453 km most of it built to the broad gauge of 5 ft 6 in. (1.676 m). This includes 272 km of main running line and spurs on the Northern and Talaimannar Lines which were closed during the Civil War but have since been largely rebuilt. The development of the various lines is outlined below.2

Lines to the Hill Country By the 1840s, it was obvious that the road system of Sri Lanka was incapable of handling the amount of traffic generated by the expanding plantation industry in the Hill Country. This led to the formation in London in 1845 of the Ceylon Railway Company to build a line from Colombo to Kandy and construction of the line was started in 1858. It became evident rapidly that, although the track through the low country was quite feasible, the route that had been selected for ascent into the Hill Country was impracticable at any reasonable cost. The project floundered, the government taking over the assets of the company and finally dissolving it in 1862. Meanwhile G.L. Molesworth, the acting agent for the com-

250

David Hyatt

pany, had discovered a new route (the so-called Dekanda route) which had been overlooked in all previous surveys. The contract to build this route was awarded to W.F. Faviell in 1863 and by 27 December 1864 a special train for the Duke of Brabant was able to run from Colombo to Ambepussa and back. This train is always referred to as the ‘First Train’ but public services to Ambepussa did not start until 2 October 1865 and this is the date officially recorded in the Way and Works Book as that on which the line was ‘opened for traffic’. At the Colombo end the line started from a station known as Colombo Terminus, opposite the present Maradana College of Technology where the National Railway Museum is now situated. The line was completed upto Kandy and officially opened for traffic on 1 August 1867. The ascent into the Hill Country from Rambukkana to Kadugannawa, involving a climb of 1,400 ft in 13 miles, is a major piece of railway construction especially considering the broad gauge nature of the line3 [12 miles are at a gradient of 1/45 with curves of 10 chains (201 m) radius]. A branch was built from a junction at Peradeniya along the Mahaweli Valley to Nawalapitiya, opening to Nawalapitiya on 21 December 1874. After much discussion, this line was extended via Hatton (1884) to reach Nanu Oya on 20 May 1885 and the Colombo-Peradeniya-Nanu Oya route became the ‘main line’. Kandy was left as a station on the Matale Line (a branch from Kandy to Matale had been opened in 1880); however trains to/from Kandy have always remained an important part of the main line service. The main line was extended to Haputale (1893), Bandarawela (1894) and, after the First World War, to Ella (1918), Demodera (1921) and finally Badulla on 5 February 1924. Nanu Oya was the nearest station to Nuwara Eliya and the planting districts between it and Uda Pussellawa. A 2 ft 6 in. (0.762 m) narrow gauge line known as the Uda Pussellawa Railway (UPR) was constructed from Nanu Oya to serve these areas. It opened to Nuwara Eliya and Kandapola in 1903

An Overview of the Development of Sri Lanka Railway 251 and to Ragala in 1904. The ruling gradient was 1/24 and Kandapola was the highest railway station in Sri Lanka (6,316 ft). The Uda Pussellawa Railway was dismantled in 1948 after having run as freight-only since 1940. The section of the main line from Nawalapitiya to Badulla is a masterpiece of surveying and construction and has breathtaking views. The 6,226 ft summit of the line at Pattipola is arguably the highest fully functioning broad gauge main line in the world.4 The engineering achievements of the Demodera Spiral and curved Gotuwela Viaduct are particularly worthy of note. The gradient is essentially 1/44 for 88 of the 95 miles between Nawalapitiya and Badulla and curves of as little as 5 chains (101 m) radius follow one another in rapid succession.

Breakwater and Coast Lines While the main line was gradually being extended, other lines were also being constructed. A line, known as the Breakwater Line, from the main line by-passing the terminus station and running alongside Norris Road (now Olcott Mawatha) and Lotus Road to the north end of Galle Face and then to the future site of the Breakwater was opened on 16 July 1874. On the same day a line into the quarries at Mahara (Ragama) was opened and the two lines allowed the transport of the large amounts of stone used in building the Colombo Harbour Breakwater from the Harbour Works Quarry at Ragama. The remaining portion of the Breakwater Line (by that time known as the Wharf Branch) was removed in 1924 after the old parliament building had been constructed immediately alongside it on land reclaimed from the Beira Lake and a new link (the Mutwal Line) had been built between the Harbour and the Main Line at Urugodawatte in 1923. The Coast Line started as a commuter line serving desirable residential towns and villages along the coast south of Colombo. Initially the line opened between Colombo and Moratuwa on 1 March 1877. The Coast Line was linked with

252

David Hyatt

the Breakwater Line just north of a new station called Fort, which was almost exactly on the site of the present Secretariat Halt. (This station was relocated to a position at the end of Chatham Street when this was extended to join Norris Road in 1883. The present Colombo Fort is a station later opened in 1917.) Trains ran through to Maradana close to the Terminus station with an intermediate station at Pettah. The Coast Line was rapidly extended to Panadura (1877) and Kalutara South (1879). Further extension to Galle offered the possibility of tapping goods traffic from the ships which called at Galle. Alutgama was reached in 1890, Galle in 1894 and Matara in 1895. The Coast Line is scenically very attractive as it runs within sight of the sea for most of its course. This causes much corrosion of track and equipment but, apart from several substantial bridges, there were few construction difficulties. Large stone ‘plumbs’ were needed to stabilize the line where it ran on the edge of the beach. These were obtained from a second quarry at Ragama known as the Railway Metal Quarry. Construction was started on an extension of the Coast Line from Matara to Kataragama in 1991 but this was abandoned in 1995. An extension of the Coast Line is now again under construction – it will be an important link to the new deep-water port at Hambantota. The tsunami of 26 December 2004 destroyed much of the Coast Line but in a truly amazing feat it was rebuilt entirely by the SLR without outside help and opened for traffic 57 days after the tsunami struck.

Lines to the North and East A railway line to Jaffna in the far north was considered in 1891 and this led to immediate construction of a section from Polgahawela on the main line to Kurunegala (1894) using a somewhat lighter 72 lb rail than the (by then) CGR stan-

An Overview of the Development of Sri Lanka Railway 253 dard of 80 lb. Extension northwards was as a light (46¼ lb) broad gauge railway reaching Maho in 1899 and Anuradhapura in 1904. Meanwhile construction also commenced from the northern end of the line and KKS and Pallai were joined in 1902. Pallai was reached from the south in 1905 and the Northern Line was then complete. In 1914, the Talaimannar Line was opened from the Northern Line at Medawachchiya to Talaimannar Pier. The light rail was replaced from Polgahawela up to Medawachchiya between 1908 and 1914 in preparation for the heavier trains needed for the Talaimannar service. The light rail north of Medawachchiya was only finally replaced in 1942/3 with American 75 lb rail. This in its turn was replaced by 80 lb rail between 1954 and 1960. In 1993, a branch was built from the Northern Line at Mihintale Junction near Anuradhapura to Mihintale. The Eastern Lines to Batticaloa and Trincomalee, which branch off from the Northern Line at Maho, were not built until the 1920s, to provide important strategic links to the east coast. Again, they were built ‘light’ and opened to Trincomalee in 1927 and Batticaloa in 1928. These lines were rebuilt to more normal standards between 1949 and 1968. Lines in the north and east suffered badly during the Civil War but since its conclusion in 2009 large portions have been reconstructed including most of the Northern Line.

Puttalam Line The final broad gauge long-distance line to be started was the Puttalam Line, opened initially to Ja Ela (1908) and Negombo (1909) and later extended to Chilaw (1916) and Puttalam (1926). The track north of Bangadeniya was lifted from 1942 to provide material for urgent repairs elsewhere but reinstated and extended between 1959 and 1970 in connection with the establishment of a cement factory at Palavi. At about the same time a spur was built into the newly developed international airport at Katunayake.

254

David Hyatt

Doubling Broad Gauge Lines Various parts of the broad gauge system were double- or even multiple-tracked over the course of time and by 1933 the Main Line to Rambukkana and the Coast Line to Panadura were fully doubled.5 Between 1986 and 1997 the section of line from Colombo Fort to Ragama was triple tracked and more recently (2003) double track has been extended on both Coast and Puttalam Lines and a fourth track laid between Colombo Fort and Maradana (not in operation at the time of writing the original draft of this article).

Kelani Valley (KV) Line The Kelani Valley Line originally ran from Maradana to Avissawella (1902) and Yatiyantota (1903) and was built to a narrow gauge of 2 ft 6 in. (0.762 m). Subsequent extension from Avissawella to Ratnapura (1912) and Dela (1916) led to the line finally reaching Opanayake (Opanake in CGR transliteration) in 1919. The narrow gauge connection between Maradana and Colombo Fort was part of the Colombo Stations Extension scheme (below). The Kelani Valley line beyond Avissawella is dismantled. The Avissawela to Yatiyantota section closed at the end of 1941 and the last train to Ratnapura – a special service kept running by the Food Commissioner after the line had officially had its service removed – ran on 31 December 1976. By 1990 it was evident that the old narrow gauge format was inadequate and between 1991 and 1997 the line was converted to dual gauge. After narrow gauge trains ceased to run regularly in 1997, use of the narrow gauge track was minimal and virtually all the third rail has now been removed.

Other Topics The Colombo Stations Extension Scheme which started in 1906 involved major reconstruction of lines in central

An Overview of the Development of Sri Lanka Railway 255 Colombo, much of the new work being on land reclaimed from the Beira Lake. Terminus was closed and a large new Maradana station opened in 1908, Colombo Yard was gradually extended and the present Colombo Fort opened in 1917 as the new central station for Colombo using a new alignment of tracks on reclaimed land. Some aspects of the scheme were not complete until 1926. Mention should be made of the existence of broad gauge railway systems in the ports and narrow gauge systems in the salterns.

Motive Power The present method of classification of locomotives dates from a reclassification in 1937 in which locomotives were given a designation specified by a letter followed by a number. For steam locomotives, the letter indicates the wheel arrangement. For diesel locomotives, letters were introduced as the diesel locomotive fleet developed. These letters indicate the type of locomotive (diesel-electric, diesel hydraulic, shunter, etc.). It is not possible here to give a comprehensive view of all the locomotives used and so just a few highlights will be mentioned.

Steam Motive Power The CGR started running with inside-cylinder 4-4-0 locomotives with 0-6-0s for the Kadugannawa Incline. A few inside-cylinder 440s still existed in 1937 and these became Class F3. The 060s were replaced in the early part of the twentieth century by large powerful 4-8-0s (which became Classes A1 and A2) and a 2-6-2+2-6-2T Beyer Garratt which became Class C1. With the opening of the Nanu Oya extension in 1885, 4-6-0 and 4-6-0TT (tender-tank) locomotives were introduced and the last batch of these was delivered in 1948. These locomotives were known as the NOA Class and formed Classes B1 to B7 after 1937. Many of the B1s

256

David Hyatt

were named after Governors of Ceylon. More Beyer-Garratts (Class C1A) for the Up Country Line were obtained in 1946. The Coast Line was initially opened with 4-4-0T tank engines but these were replaced by larger 2-6-4T tank locomotives in the years 1907-14 (later Classes D2 and D3) and 1928-31 (later Class D1). The last batch carried names of prominent schools. For trains on the Talaimannar Line a new type of 4-4-0 (later Classes F1 and F2) with outside cylinders was introduced from 1911 onwards. The light broad gauge lines had their own special light locomotives of 4-6-0 type (later Classes B8 to B10) and these were joined by very successful light 4-8-0s (later Class A3). The Uda Pussellawa Railway had 0-4-2T tanks with very small 26" driving wheels and a narrow gauge Beyer-Garratt 2-4-0+0-4-2T (later Classes L1 and H1 respectively). The KV Line initially used 4-4-0T tank locomotives (later Class K1) but when the line was extended to Ratnapura and Opanayake more powerful 4-6-4T tank locomotives were introduced (later Classes J1 and J2). After 1927 the CGR introduced both broad and narrow gauge steam railcars. Two still exist (although one is now diesel operated) and the unique V2 narrow-gauge steam railcar (number 331) should be specifically mentioned. In total the CGR had 377 steam locomotives and 33 steam railcars.

Diesel Motive Power The CGR was an early user of diesel motive power with a diesel shunter and two experimental main line locomotives in operation in the mid-1930s. Three diesel-electric 4-coach mainline sets (Class S1) and 15 single coach diesel-electric units (Class T1) were ordered in 1936. The S1s operated fast services on the Coast Line from 1938. The T1s were not delivered until 1947/8 – one (no. 515) is still running. Diesel-electric locomotives were introduced in the 1950s and these included the Brush M1s and the Canadian M2s.

An Overview of the Development of Sri Lanka Railway 257 The latter are still giving sterling service. A batch of dieselhydraulic locomotives (Classes W1, W2 and Y) were used in a project to dieselized all main line services in the late 1960s and since then various diesel-electric locomotives (Classes M4 to M10) have been introduced according to lines of credit or aid available from various sources, Canadian, Japanese, British, German, Indian and French. Suburban services were dieselised in the 1960s using diesel-hydraulic power sets (at various times Classes S2-4 and S6-8) and two Class S5, air-conditioned tourist train sets were also obtained in 1970. More recently Chinese-built diesel-electric power sets have been introduced (Classes S9, S10 and S12). The new S12s come in two formats, suburban and long-distance, the long distance format having an a/c first class restaurant and one set being entirely air-conditioned. Since 1995, SLR has produced a number of rail buses for service in more remote areas, by conversion of conventional buses to run on rails.

Signalling Older signalling in Sri Lanka follows the British tradition with semaphore signals and security of single line operation ensured by the Tyer Tablet system or, in some less busy locations, by train staff and ticket. Coloured light signals were first tried as replacements for some semaphores on the Coast Line in the 1930s but the first major colour-light scheme was installed in the 1960s from Panadura on the Coast Line to Veyangoda on the Main Line and Negombo on the Puttalam Line. This included all the main lines in the Colombo area. All lines are operated bi-directionally with centralized traffic control, removing the need for tablets on single-line sections. The system has been slightly extended – to Wadduwa on the Coast Line, Pallewela on the Main Line and Kochchikade on the Puttalam Line and, although obsolescent, is still functioning today. Between 1999 and 2004, a new colour light signalling system was installed on the rest of the Coast Line between

258

David Hyatt

Wadduwa and Matara. Between Wadduwa and Galle CTC has been introduced (though for a long time signals remained locally controlled) and from Galle to Matara a tokenlessblock system is used. This new system was severely damaged by the tsunami at the end of 2004 but has been substantially restored. The CTC centre for all CTC systems, old and new, is at Maradana. Locally operated colour light signals are used on the Main Line between Pallewela and Rambukkana and at locations on the KV Line. Colour light signals have recently (2009) been installed between Kandy and Peradeniya Junction and it is intended to increase capacity on this section by doubletracking it.

Rail Services Sri Lanka Railways operates a comprehensive service of suburban and long-distance trains and it is difficult to imagine how Colombo could function without the heavy daily influx of commuters from as far away even as Galle and Matara. In the latter part of the twentieth century services deteriorated, only partly due to lack of investment and confidence arising from the Civil War. However, as in many parts of the world, it has been realized that such a potentially valuable part of the infrastructure of the country, now deserves real investment in an attempt to offer services which will attract passengers. In addition to the captive commuter sector – a considerable number of new diesel power sets/dmus, coaching stock and locomotives has been introduced together with premium services, sometimes involving private investment in ‘Intercity’ trains and AC coaches. Some trains carry improved observation saloons and some sleeping services are still provided. The track and signalling infrastructure suffers from many years of under-investment but some sections of track have recently been doubled and/or upgraded to allow running at 100  kph and, as a result of the Civil War, much of the

An Overview of the Development of Sri Lanka Railway 259 Northern and Talaimannar Lines are benefiting from reconstruction. Presentation to the public of the service actually on offer has improved by publishing time-tables, allowing certain reservations to be made on-line. Some attempts have also been made to stimulate freight traffic.

NOTES 1. Originally written in 2009 with minor updates to 2014. 2. A schematic map of the Sri Lanka Railway System (omitting a few small local lines) can be found in Part I of the 2007 Supplement to my book Railways of Sri Lanka on the Internet at www.toccata.talktalk.net 3. Broad gauge seems to have been chosen because Lord Dalhousie had decreed this for India and it was expected that it would become the South Asian norm. Dalhousie chose 5 ft 6 in. for military reasons as it allowed two cavalry horses to travel side by side. 4. The Chaman line in Pakistan is often said to be slightly higher at the Khojak Tunnel but various figures have been quoted for this and, although impressively double track, at present it carries a single mixed train each day. 5. The section of the main line from Polgahawela to Rambukkana was singled in 1940 (not 1947 as often reported) after a bridge was washed away and only re-instated as double track in 1998.

CHAPTER 7

The Covenanted Workforce: A Study of European Employees of BB&CI Railway in Colonial India, 1852-1870 Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

Railway work in the nineteenth century was hard: wage and working conditions were poor, disciplinary procedures were severe and oppressive. British drivers, guards and mechanics were exploited. . . . It was the ambivalent position of the British railwaymen to be on the one hand exploited by capital and on the other hand to be appealed to, within a colonial context, on ‘racial’ grounds to show loyalty to the regime that exploited them.1

This is a grim picture of the working condition of the European employees of railways in India that Ian Kerr portrays in the article entitled ‘Working Class Protest in Nineteenth Century India: Example of Railway Workers’. While a more contemporary record, highlighting the privileged position of the European employees, Edward Davidson writes in his work, ‘Engineers and managers of departments whether engaged in construction or in maintenance, receive about double the pay given in England, and in most instances considerable additional allowances besides.’2 Indeed, the Europeans employed in the railway companies of India in the nineteenth century enjoyed high status as compared to their Indian counterparts, but at the same time, they faced many hardships. It is this aspect that is discussed in detail in

262

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

this article through a detailed study of the European employees of the Bombay Baroda Central India Railway Company in the years 1852-70. There is ample archival material available on this aspect, which has not received adequate attention of the historians. India experienced the beginning of railways in the middle of the nineteenth century. European railway companies undertook the task of laying lines in India with a guarantee of 5 per cent returns on their investment from the government of India. One such company was the Bombay Baroda Central India Railway Company (henceforth referred as BB&CIRC) which constructed a railway line between Bombay and Ahmedabad in the years 1852-70. The Company insisted on the departmental system, wherein, the railways were built under the supervision of the railway engineers, instead of the employment of contractors. Therefore its construction was heavily labour intensive and depended on adequate, sustained supply and its effective use. Both Europeans and Indians were employed. The Europeans occupied certain key positions: at the top of the ladder were engineers and managers, who were skilled supervisors and administrators of the various departments and then there were skilled and trained artisans, consisting of drivers, guards and mechanics.3 This article attempts to make an analysis of the actual living conditions of the Europeans employed by the BB&CIRC in the formative period of their settlement in India. It thus makes an in-depth analysis of various features of employment of the European workforce of railways in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Covenanted Workforce The railways provided employment to several Europeans who occupied most of the managerial and operative grades. Juland Danvers, Secretary, Railway Department, in his report on Indian Railways of 1867-8, spells out how they were

The Covenanted Workforce

263

employed in large number, ‘A civil Engineer was seldom seen in India before the railways were introduced. And the usual staff of a railway from the Traffic Manager to the Locomotive Superintendent, the engine driver and stoker, was of course unknown. But in 1868, they were counted by thousands.’4 The staff of the BB&CIR was divided into different departments based on the nature of work assigned. The Managing Agent,5 who headed Agency Department was responsible for conduct of the affairs of the BB&CIR. Being the principal officer of the Board of Directors of the railway company, he liaisoned between the directors and their officers in India on one hand, and on the other with the government. He had governing and controlling power of the railway, along with responsibility of its smooth functioning and cost-effective operation.6 He controlled the following departments: Audit and Accounts, Traffic, Engineering, Locomotive and Carriage and Store. The Chief Auditor and Accountant7 controlled and systematized all the accounts of the Audit and Accounts Department. The Traffic Department was managed by the Traffic Manager8 whose functions included all matters connected with the working of traffic – both passengers and goods, and also the working of Electric Telegraph. The Chief Resident Engineer9 headed the Engineering Department, whose duties included control over all matters connected with engineering, surveying, constructing and maintaining railway workshops. The Locomotive and Carriage Superintendent10 looked after all affairs connected with locomotive engines, carriages, wagons, and other rolling stock of the company, besides locomotive workshops and plant. The store keeper11 dealt with receipt and delivery of articles and stores of every description required whether in the construction of the railway, or in upholding and working it.12 A majority of the European employees were selected in England and sent out under a mutual agreement to India for work.13 Therefore every employee was covenanted, as he

264

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

was bound by the agreement that he entered into with the railway company before he arrived to India. The agreement specified terms and conditions on both sides, the employee and the BB&CIRC. The company provided them travelling expenses to and fro from England. However, if an employee was dismissed, he was not entitled for return. But if his service were terminated by the company without any reason of fault or incapacity, he was either given six months advance notice or was given lumpsum pay and return passage. Similarly, either on expiry of the term of agreement or due to illness, the employee was allowed to return to England, with passage fare and with a certificate of good conduct. Normally, salary was paid partly at Bombay and partly in England, as desired by the employee while embarking for India. Under Absentee Rules, salary was deducted in proportion to the days he remained on leave. Even a half day’s absence was calculated as leave for the entire day. However, the employee was also entitled to a certain number of paid leaves.14 The employees were allowed leave under furlough regulations, which were one year’s leave on half pay, or six months leave between the months of May and October on full pay, only after serving the company for seven continuous years in India. They could also annually avail a leave of one month with full pay. However, the Managing Agent could grant sick leave for a period recommended by the doctor, but not exceeding one year. Under sick leave rules, an employee was entitled to half pay for the first six months and one-third pay during a further period of six months, only to be paid after his return to duty within a stipulated time.15 Leave was granted to Europeans for their private visit to Europe. For instance, S. Brown, the Acting Locomotive Foreman, was granted four months leave to proceed to Europe on half pay on urgent private affairs in March 1864. But he had to bear all passage expenses to and fro.16 In April 1867, the furlough rules were modified whereby leave of six months to Europe on half salary could be granted after only three years and not seven years as was earlier done. This modification was

The Covenanted Workforce

265

effected in view of better communication facilities between England and India provided by weekly mails and extra lines of steamers.17 Usually the Europeans came here in the prime of their life, between 25 and 30 years of age. They often lived singly, could not enjoy family life as they could not afford travelling expenses of their spouse. To overcome this problem, the company bore half the amount of passage money of their wife and children, while the other half was advanced to him, which could be repaid in monthly installments.18

Pays and Incentives The salary of the Europeans in India far exceeded those paid in England. Perhaps this hindered economical working of Indian railways.19 This is amply recorded by Edward Davidson in Railways of India: The expense of European superintendence, whether by engineers or traffic and locomotive managers was great; and the cost of procuring the higher classes of mechanical or artisan labour such as engine drivers, inspectors of brickwork, foremen, carpenters, smiths, fitters etc. were excessive when compared with English scales of payment for men of that class . . . this pay though high is not the only expense connected with European agency in India, for to it has to be added the cost of transporting men to India, of medical care of them there, and the frequent need of filling vacancies.20

The company could increase pay only with the prior sanction of Bombay government who had to be convinced of the need.21 The company management complained that at times delay in obtaining official sanction for salary raise caused loss of services and hindered smooth working.22 Compared to the other railway lines, the employees of the BB&CIR received lower salaries, while the departmental system brought heavier work responsibilities.23 This invariably put impediments in procuring efficient employees.

266

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

For example, difficulties were experienced in getting efficient guards, in 1862, on lower salaries than what the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (henceforth referred to as GIPR) offered, while workload on BB&CIR covered both goods and passenger trains. J.B. Hayes, the Traffic Manager revised the scales, yet it was lower than that of the GIPR and soon he did complain paucity of securing services of good steady men as guards. Eventually, their pay was put at par with that of the GIPR.24 Records are replete with many instances in which employees stayed back only after the salary raise. In 1865, F. Mathew, the Chief Resident Engineer proposed an increase in pay of engineers as other railway companies lured them with higher pay packet.25 Wood, who was known to be a good platelayer besides being a reliable man, was given a hike to retain him in service. He was especially more valuable as A.C. Hall, the Resident Engineer observed, ‘European subordinates have to be dismissed after a short trial either as a bad workman or as a man of irregular habits.’26 The Government Deputy Consulting Engineer, A. Delisle objected to the practice of regularly increasing salaries of those who threatened to resign. Promotion was a better way of rewarding for services and salary scale once sanctioned, ought not to be altered every time, he felt.27 Largely, merit was the only criteria for promotions. One can understand promotion policies by taking the instance of the engineering department. Six monthly confidential reports were dispatched regularly to the Board of Directors of every officer under their charge by the Deputy Engineer, the Chief Engineer and the Managing Agent. Recommendations for promotion from Resident to the rank of Deputy, First Class Assistant Engineer to the rank of Resident and Second Class Assistant to the rank of First Assistant, as and when the vacancy would arise were made in these reports. However, the Directors with the consent of the Bombay Government (BG) exercised their own discretion with regard to promotion.28 It would be interesting to cite an exclusive example of a

The Covenanted Workforce

267

promotion case during the outbreak of the Revolt in 1857. As Chief Engineer, A.W. Forde, sent the first proposal for promotions of engineers on the basis of performance in June 1857, in which he included the names of A.A. Jacob, T. Andrews and R. Warren.29 The promotions although sanctioned by the BG required approval of the Board of Directors. On 7 July 1857, rumours of rebellion and the fear of losing life compelled Jacob, Andrews and R. Warren, to leave Surat, where they were stationed for work and go to Vadodara. This was condemned by the Governor of Bombay, who termed their act as ‘misconduct and desertion of their duty under discreditable circumstances’. Consequently, he revoked consent to their promotion, though judging the circumstances the Board of Directors later gave their approval.30 Their consideration was on political grounds, but feared that such hasty retreat could excite panic among others. However, they urged BG to reconsider their case in view of their past records, hard work and zeal. The request was complied with. The files show that while a few were promoted too soon, others were totally sidelined to the annoyance of many. The principle of promotion as proposed by the Directors of the BB&CIRC was that vacancies would be filled out of the existing staff, except in the event of there being no officer in a lower grade competent to undertake the duties of the superior rank.31 But this was not followed scrupulously. For instance for the post of Chief Engineer, C. Sanderson was appointed from England instead of a promotion given to the engineers who were already engaged in India. Commenting on the diversion of policy regarding promotions, the Surya Prakash, an Indian newspaper of 8 March 1873 complained against the BB&CIR, as the posts created by the promotion of signalers to station mastership was filled up by appointing new persons instead of promoting the older servants of the company.32 The BB&CIR offered incentives in salary when the engineers possessed knowledge of local language. The reasons for that are explained by Forde:

268

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

It was of the utmost importance that the Engineer, with a view to the establishment of confidence, between himself, his contractors and labourers, should become conversant with the habits, and prejudices of the people, and that the villagers should be able to hold free communication with him without the intervention of interpreters. The people will then refer their complaints and grievances to him, confidence will be established, and by their readiness to take petty contracts, they will relieve the Engineer of much of the drudgery . . . and he will thereby be enabled to give his undivided attention to his engineering duties.33

Examinations, testing local language skills were conducted regularly for European officials.34 J.P. Kennedy proposed a ‘bonus system’ as an incentive for those employees whose performance helped the company.35 This system came into operation from 1862 for engineers and mechanics. However, since building bridges constituted one of the most difficult task of the railway, the names of those engineers were recommended who, with two exceptions were connected with the successful execution of the viaducts.36 In another instance, in 1869, with the approval of BG, the Board of Directors sanctioned a bonus of 250 guineas to F. Mathew, the Chief Resident Engineer, for extra services rendered in connection with the Rajputana survey.37 Similarly, with a view to reduce the working cost of the railways and increasing the work efficiency of the workers, the Locomotive and Carriage Superintendent, E.B. Carroll initiated the system of premiums. It was observed that the expenses of the railway rose due to higher consumption of coal and oil by the drivers and firemen. Therefore Carroll initiated the concept of coal premium in March 1867, whereby an extra payment was made to the drivers and the firemen who saved on the consumption of coal. The premium was calculated on the basis of use of coal per mile.38 The system promoted economy as the consumption of coal per train reduced from 50.98 tons in the first six months of 1866 to 46.45 in the corresponding six months of June 1867. Likewise, oil premium that was introduced in February

The Covenanted Workforce

269

1867 was paid to the men in charge of oiling, at a fixed rate per gallon of oil saved out of a monthly quantity allotted. The saving effected by the premium was most marked as the total consumption of oil in January was 34,274 lbs, while the average consumption between February and May 1867 got reduced to 22,061 lbs, the premium system thereby induced concern in the use of oil as well as prevented small pilfering which was earlier a normal practice.39 Free passage money and season tickets were given to the employees while travelling on duty. However, such benefits were not usually extended to the members of the employees’ family. The normal practice in the BB&CIR was to allow each departmental head to regulate overtime, so that maintenance of a large establishment could be avoided. Any period of work beyond seven hours was considered as overtime.40 It was calculated at the rate of 1/7 or 1/10 of the daily wages. Although engaging work beyond officer hours and paying overtimes was avoided as far as possible, yet at times it was practised in urgency during busy seasons or special circumstances.41 However, in the Locomotive Department, the practice of overtime was almost mandatorily in vogue for drivers as it was followed as a rule by other railway companies. E.B. Carroll, the Superintendent of that department advanced reasons for the continuance of over-time practice: ‘if there was no extra time and extra pay allowed, Railway Companies would find it most difficult to induce men to come out from England, they would not get one man for every ten they do now’.42 On the other hand, objections were raised as this practice caused over-work – sixteen hours of continuous work schedule – for drivers, putting the lives of passengers on-board into jeopardy. Despite such concerns raised, C. Currey, the Managing Agent, denied that drivers were overworked.43 Housing was a major problem for European and Indian workforce alike. Lack of proper accommodation deterred Europeans from working in the railway as they feared that it could be a health hazard. Initially the government insisted on

270

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

the company to use station buildings as temporary housing.44 However, poor lodging facilities – specially catering to their continental palate – put many Europeans and their families to discomfort and as a result quite a few resigned.45 Hence, the company made efforts to provide housing by levying a rent of 7½ per cent of the cost of building. Extensive housing facilities were created at Parel Workshop for all employees, both European as well as Indian. Besides, along the rail-line, quarters were provided for employees of different grades. Bungalows were built for engine drivers and mechanics at Bharuch, Valsad and Vadodara.46

Medical Concerns An unusual number of vacancies arose due to sickness, death, resignation and dismissals for the European employees. Return of casualties amongst Europeans and East Indians employed by BB&CI Railway in India for the half year ending 31 December 1867 illustrates this point.47 Return of Causalities amongst Europeans and East Indians Employed by BB&CI Railway in India for the Half Year ending 31 December 1867

Died Resigned Discharged Total

Total Number Europeans East Indians 2 1 21 9 16 16 39 26

In Percentage Europeans East Indians 0.8 0.6 8.9 5.7 6.8 10.2 16.5 16.5

Source: MAS/1868/PWD/Railway/31/168. C.H. Dickens, Secretary, GOI, to Secretary, B.G., Circular No. 14, 5 August 1868.

A cursory look at the factors contributing to casualties would explain problems of Europeans in hostile Indian conditions. Indian climate took a heavy toll on the European employees of the company as they suffered from high intensity of morbidity and many succumbed to death. Their

The Covenanted Workforce

271

problems are described graphically by the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone: I fear that whichever way the Railroad is made we must be prepared for very numerous casualties, every possible means must be taken to lessen the risk and to reduce the number of victims, but it would be as idle to expect that we shall carry on a victorious campaign on the Danube without loss, as that we should successfully overcome the physical difficulties with which we have to contend in making railroads through such a country as India without a certain and heavy sacrifice of human life.48

Severity of heat and heavy rains during the monsoon had disastrous effect on recruits from Europe.49 In fact, not a single officer who had joined the services of the company in 1856 continued to work till 1860, except J.B. Lane. Most of them left either due to sickness or had died. Davidson describes climatic hazards in his work, Railways of India, ‘Exposures, excesses and carelessness, which in a temperate climate might be harmless, become under a tropical sun either fatal, or induce such serious illness as to render a return to Europe on sick leave imperative.’50 A high ratio of absentees due to illnesses obstructed the speed of work.51 This necessitated maintenance of a large staff to meet exigencies that involved additional expenses. Moreover, the company was always short of hands since many resigned and returned to Britain due to ill-health.52 Obviously this put excessive strain on the remaining staff, which itself was the cause of more illness and consequently further resignations.53 James Landon, the Director of BB&CIR found out that nearly one-fifth of employees who arrived in India until 1859, could not perform duties either due to habits of intoxication or ill health. In order to overcome their loss of service due to health reasons, each man was examined thoroughly before being appointed and declared fit by the company’s physician, William Brinton.54 The BB&CIR was kind enough to provide return fare to the widows of British labourers who died while on duty.55 No wonder, the BB&CIR provided health care for its

272

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

employees.56 Initially, A.A. Jacob, an engineer who had knowledge of medicines as well as local languages, provided primary medical assistance to the workmen. Soon this proved inadequate and three qualified Indian doctors were appointed in January 1857 in the three districts that lay between Surat and Ahmedabad, who attended to patients along the line carrying three well stocked medicine chests. In course of time, Dr. Brown was appointed as Chief Medical Officer stationed at Surat and pharmacists were appointed and stationed at Vadodara, Bharuch, Amrolee (Utran), Valsad and Tarapur.57 Besides, Dr. R. Dent, the Civil Surgeon at Surat and Dr. J. Pinkerton, the Acting Civil Surgeon at Bharuch provided medical aid to a large number of employees, both Indians and Europeans, especially in serious cases. They also issued medical certificates.58 There were also Indian medical attendants at various places, who however did not possess necessary medical equipments. When Junnadas Hargovindas, one of the Medical Assistants at Vadodara requested for necessary instruments to meet the emergencies, the company denied as his skill to perform surgical operations could not be trusted.59 Incidentally, Indian labourers too did not have confidence in Indian apothecaries and preferred to be treated by the Europeans doctors.60 Medical facilities were also provided to patients of BB&CIR in the Civil Hospital at Surat. But the Assistant Surgeon refused to continue the practice in 1862, as the number of employees increased when work got prolonged. As a result, the consulting surgeon of the railways had to hire another house at Surat and convert it as hospital.61

Resignations and Dismissals Frequent resignations in BB&CIR created many vacancies. In a period of six months between June 1857 and February 1858, six resignations were tendered. This left only eight engineers between Surat and Ahmedabad although government had a sanctioned for a strength of eighteen. To check them from resigning after short stint of service, the company

The Covenanted Workforce

273

directors inserted a clause in future agreements that an employee would be entitled for return passage money only if he resides for a fairly long period in India.62 Issues such as health problems, rigid furlough regulations, dissatisfaction due to delayed promotions, differences of opinion between seniors and the subordinates were some of the major causes for early resignations.63 Under the terms of agreement, every employee wanting to resign mandatorily had to give a prior notice of six months. This rule was relaxed only if the employee was incapacitated due to ill-health.64 The company insisted that dismissal from service should be a rare phenomenon, only to be resorted under exceptional exigencies.65 Yet there were many instances of dismissals due to overindulgence and prolonged absence from duty. Some were dismissed for misconduct with Indian labour, while others were discharged for dereliction of duties and some for insubordination. At times ego clashes led to dismissals. For instance when T. Deakin, the Assistant Storekeeper questioned J.B. Lane, the Managing Agent, regarding the dismissal of a timekeeper, it was treated as insubordination and hence, Deakin was dismissed.66 Cases of engine drivers being punished for accidents with dismissals are also found. Although dismissal required a six months prior notice, the rule was disregarded in cases requiring immediate dispensing with duties. When J.T. Green, as in-charge of Narmada Bridge construction over-spent much beyond the permissible limit, he was instantly dismissed in September 1859, by being paid six months’ salary in advance.67 The dismissed employees forfeited their return passage money as per the agreement. The BG, however, believed in giving dismissed employees return passage since they invariably found it difficult to get alternative employment as other railway companies would not trust them. This often made them destitute. Not out of empathy but out of causing embarrassment to the government and thereby lowering the ‘prestige’ of the white ruling community, such return passage was provided to destitutes.68 The BB&CIR enforced strict discipline among its employ-

274

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

ees by resorting to a system of rewards and punishment. Rewards were given in the form of bonus or cash incentives, while punishment was meted out with fines.69 In some cases punishments meant either dismissals or demotion. But if it was a case of good conduct, punishment was relaxed. When driver William Pegg was responsible for an accident at Mehemdavad in October 1862, which resulted in the death of a fireman, his promotion was withheld for a while by the Acting Agent H.F. Whyte. But later on recommendations of the Locomotive Superintendent G.N. Anderson, and the Managing Agents, J.B. Lane and C. Currey, his salary dues for fourteen months were paid.70 Some European railway employees often misbehaved and created nuisance. Even Indian newspapers such as Arunodaya, reported the way they misbehaved with native populace, namely, that they repeatedly bullied and mistreated native passengers.71 The Dandio narrates an incident of high-handedness that occurred on 17 July 1869. The driver of a local train running from Ahmedabad to Vadodara happened to see a peacock near a village between Anand and Valsad and fired a gun at it, but missed his aim. He however brought the train back about two miles, stopped it, and after he had shot the bird, again continued his journey. Although such incidents were regular, what was condemned was that the railway authorities took no steps to put them down.72 The officers of BB&CIR gave frequent occasions for complaints for infringing the law. To cite a few examples, the Assistant Engineers committed acts of criminal trespass such as cutting off private crops and trees in the vicinity of the railways without owner’s permission, closed crossings on the railway line without any authority, arbitrarily acted as judges and collected fines from owners of stray cattle, and at times, even seized cattle to the dismay of owners.73 Nevertheless, instances are found when some European officials were highly respected by Indian labourers too. H.J. Fry, the Acting Carriage Foreman who served the BB&CIR for five years, was popular among workers. On the occasion

The Covenanted Workforce

275

of his farewell on 14 August 1863, the Indian workmen presented him with an address which is worth quoting here, We the native clerks, overseers, Interpreters, Time Keepers, Body makers, Carpenters, Painters, Carriage Trimmers, Tarpauling makers etc. employed in the Carriage Department of the BB&CI Railway at Amrolee, . . . are very thankful to you for the just and kind treatment we have received from you for the last five years. . . . You have instructed us in every branch of our business of building carriages, with energy, skill and patience, and also many other things that were new to us, and in a higher degree of knowledge than we formerly possessed. We also have to return you thanks for your trouble and kind attention which you have paid us in sickness. . . .

A report in the Bombay Gazette also shows how cordial relations did exist between European officers and Indian workmen.74

Living Conditions Europeans were generally out of place in Indian conditions and encountered innumerable problems, especially while working for laying rail-lines in remote places. Some of those are highlighted through a white man’s lens in a report in the Bombay Gazette, The class of men, from which the latter (European) are taken are comparatively helpless in India, and all employers of such men, who possess a spark of common feeling, consider it their duty to look after the comforts of those in their service. The BB&CI railway however rise superior to such considerations. The wretched Europeans in their employ are badly housed, and if they are stationed at a place miles away from any town where meat and other necessaries cannot be procured, no assistance is given to them, but they are left to the mercy of disreputable native servants who fleece them and supply them with unwholesome provisions. This is bad enough, but this is not the worst. The men are so irregularly paid that they are almost in starving condition.75

276

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

However, efforts were made by Currey to minimize their problems. H.F. Hancock, the Deputy Consulting Engineer, on the contrary, felt that Currey was over-anxious in defending their interests. He introduced schemes whereby necessities of all kinds were procured from England at a lower price than those available in India.76 The Amrolee Cooperative Society was established in February 1868, with the object of purchasing liquors and European stores for the use of the men in the employment of the BB&CIRC there.77 The spiritual needs of the Europeans were also taken care of by the company. J.H. Hughes, Minister and Chaplain of Surat, attended to the European railway staff along the line since inception, and offered services such as of baptisms, marriages and burials.78 The British workforce time and again went on strike when they did not see eye to eye with the management of the company. European engine drivers protested on 16 June 1865 against extra duty. The matter was later resolved more amicably, but one of the drivers, J. Dame was dismissed. But soon forty-five of them sent a petition listing their demands regarding overtime and duty hours, on 23 June 1866, to C. Currey, and threatened to go on strike if their demands were not met favourably within a fortnight. They complained against E.B. Caroll for being untrustworthy and ‘tyrannical’. On previous occasions he had refused to entertain either their deputations or petitions. Eventually, the matter was resolved when engine drivers’ deputation sorted out issues in a joint meeting with Currey, Carroll, the Traffic Manager J.B. Hayes and an engineer L.P. Banks.79 In 1868, it was the turn of the fitters to express dissatisfaction against wages. Their petition for higher wages was not granted. However the situation changed since many of them worked in the government dockyard during the Abyssinian expedition (1868), where they received almost double pay of what they got from the company. Moreover Bombay being a more expensive city, their expenses also increased by their removal from Amrolee (Utran) to Parel.80 Moreover their

The Covenanted Workforce

277

wages were lower than what the other fitters received in the Bombay Presidency. In fact, the wages of the men engaged by the BB&CIRC in other posts was also comparatively higher. Carroll and Currey resolved the matter by having a discussion with a delegation of fitters. The fitters were satisfied as the company met their demands by increasing their pay. In fact Currey was obliged to increase the rates as they were not easily available.81 The railway companies found it difficult to procure European employees at all levels from Europe. Very few were efficient enough, while many left the work after few years. Therefore the company always attempted to fill their vacancies with Europeans living in India. However it was equally difficult in India. An instance could be cited here to understand the trouble involved in procuring qualified employees. When Lane attempted to fill the post of ‘Correspondence Clerk and Assistant Accountant’, from India he failed to find one, even after a year, although a high pay was offered.82 Finally, he temporarily employed Rowley Miller as a ‘Clerk and General Office Assistant’ from 14 August 1857. To avoid such dilemma in the future, the company kept in reserve some clerks who were employed on probation, and engaged when there were vacancies.83 Incidentally, since engineers were much in demand, shifting of jobs from one railway company to another for higher salary was very common. At times the other railway companies offered salary to junior engineers which exceeded beyond what was paid to even the Resident Engineer of BB&CIR. In June 1857 it was so difficult to procure engineers that the Board of Directors of BB&CIR hired services of four gangers instead, from England. In fact, after Assistant Storekeeper T. Deakin’s dismissal in 1859, the government insisted that Lane should not seek recruitment from England until such time as all attempts to procure a person in India failed.84 The railway company faced acute shortage of drivers. Therefore they were given overtimes as more work could be

278

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

done with fewer hands and a bigger pay package could attract them to come to India.85 Similarly, the company also found it difficult to fill the post of boilers.86 Very often the scarcity of labour was met by the railway companies by employing soldiers who were employed generally as civil guards, trustworthy clerks, etc. Incidentally they were in high demand as they were found to be disciplined and also of better quality.87 In spite of difficulty in getting European personnel, BB&CIRC retrenched many employees, when work came to near completion. This was due to persistent demand for economy by the BG, who instructed the companies not to fill up the vacancies arising from casualties or resignations.88 In fact, when G.F. Hill, an Assistant Engineer, requested leave for six months in 1865, due to ill health, he was dismissed with a view to reducing engineering staff.89 However, the Company, as a policy, retained as much as possible experienced European employees since reorienting them with the conditions and work would take longer time. The following figures regarding employment shows that the strength of workers decreased with the passage of time. The number of employees in the BB&CIR in 1861 was 7,382, with Europeans and East Indians 257 and Indians 7,125; in 1862, it was 5166, with 5,027 Indians and 139 Europeans & East Indians; in 1863, 2,411 with 2,304 Indians and 107 Europeans and East Indians; while in 1868 it was 1885 with 1,542 Indians and 343 Europeans and East Indians.90 In fact, the Surya Prakash of 20 August 1870, has expressed satisfaction over reduction of company’s expenses by dispensing with surplus staff. However it was insisted that economy in expenditure should not be effected by discharging low paid servants but by reducing highly paid officers.91

Conclusion The railway companies relied on European employees for the conception and coordination of railway construction and operation. The transfer of the Europeans to an alien

The Covenanted Workforce

279

landscape was fraught with many difficulties. While their basic needs like food and housing were uncertain, they were also frequently ravaged by diseases and epidemics. They faced other problems like strict leave rules, uncertainty of promotion and long hours of work. They had to acquire the skills of the local language and acclimatize themselves completely to Indian conditions to perform their supervisory role effectively. These difficulties created impediments in their procurement, making the supply of European labour limited and fluctuating. Therefore the European employees were cajoled with higher pay, overtime, supply of housing and healthcare facilities. This was a period of ‘constructing transitional arrangements’ wherein the railway companies made all attempts to offer inducements for the settlement of the Europeans while the latter attempted to make adaptations to Indian circumstances.

NOTES 1. Ian J. Kerr, ‘Working Class Protest in Nineteenth Century India: Example of Railway Workers’, Economic and Political Weekly, 26 January 1985, 20(4): PE-35. 2. Edward Davidson, The Railways of India: With an Account of Their Rise, Progress and Construction, London: E. and F. Spon, 1868, p. 99. 3. Ibid. 4. Maharashtra State Archives (henceforth referred to as MSA)/ Year-1868/Public Works Department (PWD)/Railway/Volume-30/ Compilation-278/Juland Danvers, Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India for the year 1867-8, London, 1868, p. 9. 5. J.B. Lane was the Managing Agent between September 1855 and April 1865 and was succeeded by Charles Currey. 6 MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/32/3, pp. 53-6; MSA/1855/PWD/ Railway/16/3; J.P. Kennedy, Instruction in Continuation of Those Issued 10th September 1855, pp. 625-30. 7. Greig Waters was the Company’s Chief Accountant till 24 May 1862 succeeded by R.C. Stovin, who resigned in September 1864 and T.W. Wood then became the Chief Auditor and Accountant.

280

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

8. J.B. Hayes was the Traffic Manager from August 1858 to December 1866 and was succeeded by J.R. Duxbury. 9. During the period under review, A.W. Forde, C. Sanderson, J.P. Kennedy and F. Mathew held the office of Chief Resident Engineer respectively. 10. As Locomotive and Carriage Superintendent G.N. Anderson died on 8 January 1865, succeeded by his assistant E.B. Carroll. 11. In 1857, Joshua Stephens was appointed as storekeeper, followed by J.E. Watton who was dismissed in 1861. F. Potter was the Storekeeper in 1869. 12. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/32/3, Appendix to Letter of Instructions to the Agent, no.1, pp. 57-62. 13. MSA/1867/PWD/Railway/11/305. 14. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/16/133, for example, Agreement entered into, on 23 September 1856, between John William Henry and the BBCIR, pp. 455-9. 15. MSA/1860/PWD/Railway/42/175, C.H. Kennedy, Secretary, BB&CIR, Extracts from Minutes, 6 August 1857, pp. 117-19; MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/19/464, C.H. Kennedy, Furlough Regulations, 27 April 1860, p. 63. 16. MSA/1864/PWD/Railway/30/132, Lane, Memo no. 772, 9 March 1864, n.p. 17. MSA/1867/PWD/Railway/25/219. 18. MSA/1868/PWD/Railway/30/278, Juland Danvers, Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India for the Year 1867-68, London, 1868, p. 9. 19. MSA/1856/PWD/Railway/4/14, p.78; Juland Danvers ‘Report to the Secretary of State on Railways for the Years 1863-64 & 1867-68’. 20. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 21. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/16/124, pp. 359 and 365. For instance, when Lane proposed salary increase of Rs. 5 per month for two clerks, F. D’Costa and J.D. Mello, because they were ‘very useful and attentive clerks’, the BG refused it as ‘unjustified’. 22. MSA/1864/PWD/Railway/23/68. 23. MSA/1855/PWD/Railway/19/53, pp. 153-60; MSA/1862PWD/ Railway/17/48, p.100. 24. MSA/1862/PWD/Railway/17/48, p. 307; MSA/1864/PWD/ Railway/23/67.

The Covenanted Workforce 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47.

48.

281

MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/22/52, p. 327. MSA/1864/PWD/Railway/23/68. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/22/52, p. 364. MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/20/102, p. 147. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/6/207, pp. 78-83. Ibid.,Lane to Sir R.C. Shakespeare, Resident at Baroda, no. 225, 16 July 1857, p. 107; Jacob to Forde, 11 July 1857, pp. 104-5; Governor to the Acting Superintending Engineer, Resolution no.1202, 30 July 1857, pp. 111-12. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/36/109, p. 605. RNP for the Week Ending 15 March 1873. Memoranda Prepared for the Information and Guidance of the Engineering Staff of the BB&CI Railway Engaged on Construction, A.W. Forde, Chief Engineer, BB&CI Railway, 1 October 1858, The Bombay Builder, August-November 1869, p. 393. MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/14/161, 6 August 1861, p. 496. MSA/1858/PWD/Railway/14/20, p. 175 MSA/1862/PWD/Railway/17/48, pp. 81-3. MSA/1869/PWD/Railway/19/137. MSA/1867/PWD/Railway/29/175. Ibid. The working hours for Indian fireman was 10 hours. MSA/1869/PWD/Railway/29/275, W. Minet, Acting Locomotive and Carriage Superintendent, Statement of Overtime and all other Allowances Allowed during Each Month from Jan. to Dec. 1868; F. Potter, Storekeeper to Currey, no. 5484, 29 June 1869. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/6/365, pp. 281-2. Ibid., pp. 149-51 & 283-9. MSA/1856/PWD/Railway/21/99, pp. 281-2. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/11/135, p. 65 MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/6/421, p. 325; MSA/1862/PWD/ Railway/40/318, p.139. This information is culled from many files. MSA/1868/PWD/Railway/31/168, C.H. Dickens, Secretary, GOI, to Secretary, BG, Circular no. 14, 5 August 1868, Numerical Return of Casualties, Whether by Death, Resignation or Discharge, Amongst the European and East Indian Employees of the Guaranteed Railway Companies in India for the Half Year Ending 31 Dec. 1867. MSA/1854/PWD/Railway/1/1A, Lord Elphinstone, Minute no. 35, 18 July 1854, p. 281.

282

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

49. Thomas Williamson, Two Letters on the Advantages of Railway Communication in Western India, Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Wharncliffe, Chairman of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, London, 1846, pp. 11-14. 50. Davidson, op. cit., p.100. 51. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/6/207, p. 83. 52. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/16/124, pp. 473-4. 53. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/24/387, pp. 72-3; MSA/1859/PWD/ Railway/32/359, pp. 581&583. 54. MSA/1868/PWD/Railway/30/278, Juland Danvers, Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India for the Year 1867-68, London, 1868, p. 9. 55. MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/9/353, p. 173; MSA/1865/PWD/ Railway/36/438, pp. 149. 56. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/27/135. 57. MSA/1860/PWD/Railway/51/532, pp. 145-6. 58. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/44/309, pp. 31-2 and 45-51. 59. MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/1/4, Junnadas Hargovindas, Medical Assistant, to John Duigan, Asstt. Engineer, 19 September 1861, pp. 239-40. 60. MSA/1861/PWD/Railway/24/428, Alexander Black, Resident Engineer to F. Mathew, Deputy Engineer, no. 636, 9 August 1861, p. 194. 61. MSA/1862/PWD/Railway/23/292, p. 57. 62. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/13/127, pp. 415-16. 63. MSA/1858/PWD/Railway/14/20, p. 175; MSA/1857/PWD/ Railway/17/154, p.151. 64. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/17/154, Governor to Acting Superintending Engineer, Resolution no. 438, 19 May 1857, p. 141. 65. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/6/365, p. 204. 66. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/32/245, pp. 355-7. 67. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/32/281, p. 492. 68. Aravind Ganachari, ‘White Man’s Embarrassment: The European Vagrancy in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century Bombay’, in Nationalism and Social Reform in Colonial Situation, Kalpaz Publications, Delhi, 2004, p. 117. 69. MSA/1864/PWD/Railway/3/7. MSA/1869/PWD/Railway/9/ 309. A number of instances are found in files. 70. MSA/1866/PWD/Railway/16/89, pp. 503-5 and 521.

The Covenanted Workforce

283

71. Arunodaya, Report on Native Papers (RNP) for the Week Ending 7 August 1869. 72. RNP for the Week Ending 31 July 1869. 73. MSA/1862/PWD/Railway/9/325, pp. 245-6 and 267-9. 74. The Bombay Gazette, 3 September 1863. 75. The Bombay Gazette, 28 September 1864. 76. MSA/1866/PWD/Railway/34/384, p. 616. 77. MSA/1868/PWD/Railway/24/123. 78. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/24/563, pp. 412-14. 79. MSA/1866/PWD/Railway/34/384, Memorandum of Meeting with Deputation of Engine Drivers at Bulsar, 4 July 1866, pp. 585-92. 80. The workshop of the BB&CI Railway was shifted from Amrolee to Parel. 81. MSA/1868/PWD/Railway/25/67. 82. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/6/169, p. 7. 83. MSA/1857/PWD/Railway/16/124, pp. 331 and 349. 84. MSA/1859/PWD/Railway/32/245, p. 334. 85. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/6/365, pp. 145, 203 and 281-2. 86. MSA/1866/PWD/Railway/16/89, p. 523. 87. The Bombay Gazette, 23 December 1864. 88. MSA/1864/PWD/Railway/23/68. 89. MSA/1865/PWD/Railway/36/437, p. 139. 90. MSA/1862/PWD/Railway/37/128, pp. 292 & 326; MSA/1869/ PWD/Railway/35/189. 91. RNP for the Week Ending 27 August 1870.

CHAPTER 8

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat: A Dream Come True Rita P. Bhambi

The world’s first train ran between Darlington and Stockton in England in 1825 and in less than thirty years of that great event the train services were introduced in India. India’s first train was run by the Great Indian Peninsula Railway from Bombay to Thana on 16 April 1853. By 1871 a traveller could depart from Bombay and transported to distant cities like Calcutta and Madras. To reach these cities the train crossed many landscapes, dense jungles, steep inclines, flat plains, and wide rivers.1 The train steamed onwards night and day, but the traveller, whether ensconced in the comfort of a first class carriage or in the hard discomfort of a third class carriage, probably gave no thought to the workers whose efforts in the deep cutting, the high embankments, the tunnels and bridges, had made steam locomotion possible. As G.W. Macgeorge put it There are probably few travllers now daily passing up and down the magnificent Thal and Bhore Ghat inclines, quietly seated in comfortable railway carriage, who can at all adequately realize the extraordinary nature of the obstacles which have been so successfully overcome, and the great skill and daring of all those engaged-especially during the first years-in shaping and carving out of the rocky mountainsides those wide luxurious roads on which they now so easily and securely travel.2

286

Rita P. Bhambi

Early efforts of railways construction in India may be traced to 1831-2 in the Presidency of Madras. Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, Part Two, deals with an abortive project of railroad construction in the Presidency of Madras. A notable feature of the project is that it was not a steam railway, since the hauling power was to be supplied only by animals (horses).3 Although Madras was the first of the three presidencies to put forward railroad proposals in India, railways were established here much later than Bombay and Calcutta, and nearly a quarter of a century elapsed between 1831 and 1856 when the first section of line was opened in Madras.4 The geographical situation of Bombay with its natural harbours5 made it an obvious point of entry to India, though the activities of the East India Company and the British interests were centred in Calcutta. Moreover Bombay was the nodal point on the west coast of the peninsula and hence, the key possessions for the British.6 Ideally, Bombay was nearer to Europe as compared to other harbours. It was shorter, more convenient and direct than Calcutta and Madras.7 Before the advent of the railways in Bombay, the fortyeight miles journey on the Agra road from Bombay could be completed in two days by travellers, and three days by the goods transporters. Epidemics were frequent and roads tended to be muddy and intractable in the monsoon season.8 The lamentable state of the economic scenario of India was analysed by British businessmen, publicists and officials. The central conclusion which they reached was that the low level of Britain’s trade with India was connected directly with the lack of efficient and safe internal transport. It was the general dissatisfaction with existing inland transport facilities that led to the first proposal for railways in India and which began in Bombay in the year 1843.9 In 1843, at the invitation of the Governor, George Arthur, George T. Clark, a railway engineer, who had been employed on the Great Western Railway in England, arrived in Bombay for making a spot study of the possibilities of constructing a

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

287

railway line from the port to the hinterland. He had first conceived the scheme that a railway line could be laid to connect Bombay to Thane, Kalyan and the Thull and Bhore Ghat10 inclines.11 But nothing definite, seems to have been decided at this time.12 But later on the scheme was investigated by a special Committee headed by the Chief Secretary of Bombay, Henry Conybeare and approved by the citizens of Bombay.

Bombay Great Eastern Railway The enthusiasm for railways from all quarters within a short period of time led to the formation of the Bombay Great Eastern Railway. A meeting was held in Bombay on 13 July 1844 to consider the expediency of constructing a railway line from Bombay to Thal and Bhore Ghat roads. Taking into consideration the advantages of rail communication in India, the enterprising merchants and government officials of Bombay formed themselves into a Provisional Committee of the Bombay Great Eastern Railway. The members were: Sir Bartle Frere, Private Secretary to the Governor, J.P. Willoughby, Chief Secretary of the Government and acting member of the Governor’s Council, Erskine Perry, Judge of Supreme Court, Lt. Col. P.M. Melville, Secretary of the Military and Naval Departments of the Government, Sir R. Oliver, Superintendent of the Indian Navy, H.H. Glass, Collector of Custom and Presidency Opium agent. Soon afterwards the Bombay Great Eastern Railway, prepared plans for constructing a railway line from Bombay to the Deccan. Just three days after its formation, a government committee was appointed on 19 July 1844. The Committee was instructed to submit the amount and value of the traffic, the expenses of making, working and maintaining the way, and the net receipts to be derived from the undertaking.13 But the report of the government committee was unfavourable on the ground that no part of the proposed railway had been surveyed. It was apprehended that any such estimate for a

288

Rita P. Bhambi

railway would be liable to contain extensive errors.14 The prospectus was returned to G.T. Clark with severe criticism and large-scale modifications.

Formation of Inland Railway Association Ignoring the criticism and determined to prove their point, the promoters of the Bombay Great Eastern Railway announced in a letter dated 9 May 1845 that the original railway company was being dissolved to create a more substantial enterprise called the ‘Inland Railway Association of Bombay’, the primary object of which would be to collect information on the applicability of railway to western India, to determine the most eligible line for a railway line from Bombay with cooperation of the government. The members of this new association were government officials from the old Provisional Committee, headed by J.P. Willoughby, Col. P.M. Melvil, Col. Jervis and H.H. Glass. The new members were Bomanjee Hormusji and Dadabhoy Pestoji.15 The Inland Railway Association, to cover all grounds now insisted on extensive and accurate surveys. The Association asked for the services of military engineers to participate in the survey and help estimate costs of the railways. The expenses of the surveys were to be divided between the Government and the Association. The response was rapid, because the Governor General had received from London the Court of Director’s letter of 7 May 1845 in which the policy was laid down in detail regarding the construction of railways in India.

Foundation of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway While the railway enthusiasts were trying to stand strong in India, fresh initiatives were being taken by John Chapman in England to promote investment in the Indian Railways with adequate government support. He prepared a detailed document which dealt with all aspects of the railways.

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

289

The GIPR viewed the East India Company’s Railway Dispatch of 7 May 1845, as a signal to go ahead, the private companies formed themselves into joint-stock companies. The Great India Peninsula Railway had the first recorded meeting of the Provisional Committee with John Stuart Wortley as the Chairman and eight other founding members, on 10 May 1845 at 35, Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London. This meeting heralded the ‘Dawn of Railway Era’ in India and laid the foundation of the one of the largest railway companies in India. After taking preliminary steps for the formation of GIP Railway Company in England, John Chapman arrived in Bombay. He found that the Inland Railway Association’s project and objectives were in no way different from those of GIPR. So his next step was to transform the Inland Association into the local Bombay group of the GIPR. Chapman with great skill and diplomacy effected its merger with the GIPR and Bombay Provisional Committee. The merger was simultaneously announced in Bombay and London in the first week of November 1845.16 The Management Committee was headed by the following members: Chairman – J.P. Willoughby, Chief Secretary to the Government and a provisional member of the Governor’s Council. Deputy Chairman – Robert Wigram Crawford,17 a wellknown merchant and ship owner. Other important members of the Committee were Col. G.R. Jervis, H.H. Glass, and Col. P.M. Melvill, Cursetji Jamsetji, Bomanji Hormusji, Viccaji Mirji, Sankersett Jagannathji, and Dadabhoy Pestonji. A.S. Aryton was the provisional secretary, Messrs. Aryton and Walker was their solicitors and the Bank of Bombay their bankers.18 Chapman himself continued as manager. The capital of the Company was set at £6,000,000 in shares of £50 each, with one third reserved for distribution in India. The deposit on each share was to be Rs. 25 in India. It was assured that the interests of the shareholders will be fully protected and represented in England. The formal deed of

290

Rita P. Bhambi

agreement between the various members and promoters was signed on 26 November 1845 which bores their signatures and seals.19 The power structure related to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company was as follows:

Thus the scheme took a concrete shape when a company was formed in under the name of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company (to give the legal status) incorporated by an Act of Parliament in August 1849.20 The GIP Railway Company entered into a contract with the East India Company on 17 August 1849,21 when it was decided to raise a capital of £500,000 for the project, and things began to move. The construction of the line was started on 31 October 1850. The first passenger train that ever ran in India on this section was on 16 April 1853. The railway line was extended up to Kalyan and opened on 1 May 1854. From Kalyan the line diverged, one proceeding north-east over the Thull Ghat to Bhusawal, from whence again two lines diverted, one extending to Jabalpur, where it joined a branch of the East India Railway from Allahabad and one to Nagpur, the capital of the Central Provinces. The second line, diverging from

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

291

Kalyan, passed over the Bhore Ghat, connecting Poona, Sholapur, and Raichur, where it joined the Madras Railway.22 The objects of this undertaking were to assist in establishing a permanent and speedy means of communication, for political and commercial purposes, between the three Presidency towns, and to connect the great cotton growing districts of central India with the seaport of Bombay.

Debate Over the Routes A fierce controversy raged for some years over the choice of the direction that the line should take beyond Kalyan. Survey of various routes for the Bombay-Calcutta Grand Trunk line was under way. This led to a debate over the adoption of a route. Three main routes suggested were: 1. Over the Malsej Ghat, suggested by John Chapman, and his engineer’s G.T. Clark and Conybeare.23 2. Bombay-Surat-Baroda via Tapti Valley to Agra and from thereon to Calcutta, suggested by Major J.P. Kennedy, in his memorandum on the Indian Railways.24 3. From Kalyan over the Thal Ghat and a connection with the East Indian Railways at Jabalpur, suggested by James Berkley, Resident Engineer of GIPR and J.H. Crawford, the Consulting Engineer for Railways to the Bombay government.25 James Berkley was appointed as Chief Resident Engineer. He himself conducted the survey of the line and errors were discovered amounting in the aggregate to 164 ft of vertical height, which seriously affected the gradient of the incline. The cost of construction proved to be much higher than the estimates made by John Chapman and tunneling presented the greatest difficulties. Ultimately Lord Dalhousie said in his minutes that the Malsej Ghat line should be wholly and fully abandoned.26 Thus Malsej Ghat route was finally discarded.

292

Rita P. Bhambi

James Berkley’s survey report was ready on 14 September 1852 and was submitted to the government, who forwarded to the GIPR Board and the Government of India, with the remark made by the Committee of Directors of GIPR that, ‘. . . these officers agree in recommending the adoption of the routes by the Thal and Bhore Ghats…in preference to that by the Malsej Ghat, also suggested that two lines should be simultaneously constructed in North Easterly and South Easterly directions.’27 In 1852, survey work was in full swing. The following monthly pay list shows the staff employed for the surveys beyond Kalyan for Ghat extensions: 28 Salaries of the Officers and Assistants Name

Occupation

Amount (Rs. A.)

James J. Berkley

Chief Engineer

1500 0

Charles B. Ker

Second Engineer

1100 0

William Inglis

Surveyor and Draftsman

400 0

W. Sanderson

Surveyor and Inspector

300 0

Atinaram Ragoba

Native Clerk

40 0

Camillo Pires

Native Assistant Draftsman

22 8

4 Chainbearers @Rs.10 each month

40 0

2 Peons @ 6 each month

12 0

Source: PWD Railways 1852, vol. 10, compilation no. 30, Monthly Salary Statement, dated 5 March 1852, MSA, p. 32.

Works on the Ghats For Thull Ghat Contract no. 11 and 12 had been let to Messrs Wythes and Jackson. The Deed of Contract for the Thal Ghat Incline and Igatpuri to Bhusawal was signed between George Wythes and Joseph Jackson and the GIPR on 26 August 1857.29 The work began on Thull Ghat Incline from November 1857.30

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

293

To build the Bhore Ghat Incline Contract No. 7 was given to William Fredrick Faviell. This was not regularly put for tenders, but Faviell’s tender for Contract No. 8 having been accepted, he was offered Contract No. 7, if he would undertake it on the Contract No. 8 rates, so that two should be considered one now. Laying a track on these inclines can be ranked among the greatest engineering feasts of its time. The subjoined table shows the magnitude of the work accomplished on the two inclines:31 Thall Ghat

Bhor Ghat

Total Length of Incline

9 miles, 26 chains

15 miles, 69 chains

Total Rise

972 ft

1831 ft

Number of Tunnels

13

25

Longest Tunnel

490 yd

437 yd

Number of Viaducts

6

8

Largest Viaduct

250 yd long 200 ft high

168 yd long, 139 ft high

Total Cost

Rs. 55,12,217

Rs. 1,05,00,297

Details of Tunnels and Viaducts at the Thall Ghat The work consists of thirteen tunnels, of an aggregate length of 2,652 yd, and of the following respective lengths: Tunnel no. 1

130 yd

Tunnel no. 8

412 yd

Tunnel no. 2

490 yd

Tunnel no. 9

70 yd

Tunnel no. 3

80 yd

Tunnel no. 10

50 yd

Tunnel no. 4

235 yd

Tunnel no. 11

261 yd

Tunnel no. 5

113 yd

Tunnel no. 12

140 yd

Tunnel no. 6

123 yd

Tunnel no. 13

58 yd

Tunnel no. 7

490 yd

294

Rita P. Bhambi

There were six viaducts, of the following dimensions: Length in yards

Length in ft

Viaduct no. 1

66

90

Viaduct no. 2

143

84

Viaduct no. 3

66

87

Viaduct no. 4

66

90

Viaduct no. 5

250

200

Viaduct no. 6

150

60

Details of Viaducts and Tunnels at the Bhore Ghat Viaduct No.

Length in yards

Length in ft

1. eight 50 ft arches

168

127

2. six 50 ft arches

128

95

85

74

3. four 50 ft arches 4. four 50 ft arches

85

94

5. eight 50 ft arches

168

139

6. eight 40 ft arches

101

85

7. four 30 ft arches

52

45

8. four 30 ft arches

101

56

The works consist of twelve tunnels of the following length: Tunnel No.

Lineal yards

Tunnel No.

Lineal yards

1

286

7

33

2

291

8

53

3

282

9

280

4

140

10

121

5

437

11

346

6

204

12

62

Examination of Inclines in Europe For working this Ghat line the Company’s Consulting Engineer-George Berkley, Cortazzi, the Locomotive Superin-

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

295

tendent and R.W. Graham, the Chief Resident Engineer, with the permission of the Board visited the Simmering Incline on the Vienna and Trieste Railway, the Giovi Incline on the Railway between Stuttgart and Ulm, the Lackeys Incline on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway to examine their working at the Company’s expenses.32 A report was, thereafter, submitted to the Board for its consideration. After the careful examination of all the inclines and their working it was found that, The Giovi Incline is sufficiently long and the radius of the curves and other circumstances approximate so nearly to those on the Bhore and Thull Ghats as to render it a most useful practical guide in determining the manner of working most safely and economically the Inclines on The Great Indian Peninsula Railway. . . .33

Work began on the Bhore Ghat Incline in January 1856.34 More than 30,000 men were employed upon the Bhore Ghat Incline, extending over 14 miles of Railway. Berkley stated in his article, ‘this enormous body is collected from all quarters of the country, from Bombay, Hyderabad, Gwalior, Goa, Ahmadabad, Kolhapur, Broach, Dharwar, Thana, Sholapur, Ratnagiri, Satara, Belgaum, Poona, Sawantwadi and the Konkan; and that it comprises 32 different classes of artisans and labourers, of whom there are 10,822 drillers and 2,659 masons.’35

Constructional Difficulties Tunnelling was the hardest work as nearly all the tunnels comprised of trap rock of varied hardness. The mining of tunnels was executed with this mode that they preceded at both the ends with headings about 12 ft wide and 9 ft high, and this operation was followed up by the excavation of the tunnel to its full size. In the headings, one of the worst situation was ineffective ventilation, which crowded as the work was with miners and had to wait till the headings become free from smoke after the blasting had exploded. James Berkley

296

Rita P. Bhambi

mentioned that, ‘In the headings, which were the principal portion of our tunnel operations, we usually employ three gangs or shifts of men during the twenty four hours at the work.’36 In the earth work, trouble was faced while cutting. There was one cutting along the top of Battery Hill, which overhangs the mail road on the left side. This cutting consists largely of rock, and where it breaks into the hill there was a basaltic crest crowning it. This led the contractor to make use of exceptionally large drills. Each of these drills was required to be worked by four natives, and make a hole 7 ft deep and 3 in. in diameter. These shots were most effective, were generally driven back in the hill, and produced a powerful explosion, throwing large masses of rock down to the cress below. About this work James Berkley said, I know of no similar circumstances, nor of such work upon any other railway. The geological peculiarity of this hill will, no doubt, attract the notice of many visitors; and I am happy to say that, when the railway is finished, a section of the trap will still be left cresting the mountain, and screening the railway from the public road.37

In the embankments, the most unfavourable points were the scouring of the slopes by the heavy rains in the monsoons. The ground along the flanks of the Ghat Mountains was precipitous, a character that engineers met with frequent cases where, on the upper side, they had only a low embankment, while on the other side, the bottom of the slope would be of an impracticable depth, unless it were retained by a strong wall. In other places, the mountain sides were very steep as to encounter the difficulty of embanking the line. Under such conditions, engineers were determined to place the line upon arches or vaults. In the words of James Berkley, These various works will constitute some of the most striking peculiarities in the construction of the Bhore Ghat Incline. They are so contingent and accidental natures as to render it sometimes impractical for an engineer to prepare his designs for dealing with

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

297

them, until the ground has been opened out and the works have advanced.38

Some of the viaducts were extensive works, and of great height. The one which crosses the Mhow-ke-Khind consisted of eight semicircular arches of 50 ft span, and it was 139 ft above the surface of the ground. Regarding these works Chief Resident Engineer said, ‘It will undoubtedly present works of so unique a character as to invest them with especial interest both in the eyes of casual and professional observers.’39 A Reversing Station was introduced so that engines could be turned. Then it increased in the length at the base so as to flatten the gradients of the incline. James Berkley mentioned in his article that, ‘The Reversing Station has an indisputable claim to that designation for the following reasons: the engine will be turned there; the tail of each train will become the head, and, as it leaves the Station, it will appear to retrograde.’40 Besides these constructional difficulties, other hurdles had to be crossed.

Cholera at the Ghats The monsoon brought dreadful diseases; cholera was one of them resulting in the death of many. In May 1860 cholera had broken out which brought the work to a virtual standstill. GIPR reported to the Bombay government that, ‘Cholera had again broken out in the Bhore Ghat Incline. Since the third instant it has increased . . . three European attacked, two are dead, one was Mr. Lockran an Agent . . . many natives have died chiefly between Wonee and MhowKe-Mulbe, and near the Reversing Station. . . . ’41 S. Adamson and G.L. Clowser Engineers immediately had taken remedial steps such as burning the infected huts and dispersing the labourers from those areas. They had also called Dr. Larkins to provide medical aid in this calamity.42 The cholera subsided, and the effects of the visitation were being overcome,

298

Rita P. Bhambi

when it returned with redoubled violence in March. This time it prevailed throughout the whole length of incline, and the progress of the works was almost stopped for the remainder of the season.43 In fact, providing hygienic drinking water was a problem in the rainy as well as in the hot season. The illness on this Ghat was traced to the problem of drinking water by the Assistant Collector of Khandala. He suggested that water should be stored at convenient points along the line in the rainy season.44 Nearly a thousand pack bullocks were engaged at the Bhore Ghat to provide a constant supply of water45 and later this problem was solved by damming one of the tunnels before the rains which acted as a reservoir for the next season.

Disturbances amongst Workmen Employed on the Ghat Exploitation of the labour force is an inherent trail of industrialization. Many a time riots broke out amongst the labour hands over the Bhore Ghat and the attention of the Secretary of State for India was drawn to this.46 A serious outbreak occurred on 20 January 1859 at the Bhore Ghat which resulted in the death of one European named Curran and several others injured.47 The reason was ill-treatment and want of payment by sub-contractors. They cut half of their pay; this annoyed the labourers who attacked the Europeans. They were beaten by sticks and pelted with stones. The mob eventually went to their line of huts. In the evening the Europeans assembled in the tent and resolved to go with all the arms at the line of huts and tried to apprehend the leaders of the outbreak. They were again attacked and beaten up and retired to their tents after several skirmishes. Later on Police and troops came on the spot and took several prisoners.48 To prevent future riots the government had appointed Mr. Praed an Assistant to the Magistrate of Thana and Poona

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

299

with Magisterial authority along the whole range of the Ghat works. The Superintendent Police of Thana was requested to place a strong party of the Thana Police at the disposal of Mr. Praed for preserving the peace on the line of the Ghat works. The company was instructed to reject all sub contractors who had been guilty of injustice to the labourers.49

Construction of Roads Haulage of railway material over the Ghat was another major problem. Permanent and temporary roads were constructed for a continuous flow of building material. Nearly 24.74 km of cart road and double the length of bullock’s paths were constructed to give access to the work.50 Three agencies worked over Bhore Ghat and took nearly 7½ years for completion. 1. W.F. Faviell ( January 1856 to March 1859) The works on the Bhore Ghat Incline were commenced in January 1856, but the Deed of Contract was signed between W.F. Faviell and GIPR in 4 February 1857. After two years Faviell surrendered the Bhore Ghat Contract to the GIPR who commented that Faviell had not carried on the works with energy or satisfactorily on the pretext of heavy rains in the monsoon, of draught in hot weather, of sickness, of the want of huts or of the storms of wind. The government approved the termination. 2. GIPR (1 April to 15 November 1859) After the termination of the contract, arrangements had to be made for prosecuting the works on the Bhore Ghat. The Railway Company itself made arrangement for carrying on certain important works through the agency of their own officers. GIPR took the charge of the construction of the Bhore Ghat Incline for 7½ months till this was re-letting to another contractor Treadwell.

300

Rita P. Bhambi

3. Treadwell (15 November 1859 to 1863) The Deed of Contract for completing the remaining part of the Bhore Ghat Incline (Contract No. 7) was signed between GIPR and Solomon Treadwell on 15 November 1859. Unfortunately he was attacked by an alarming illness and died at Khandala on 30 November 1859. Since the death of Solomon Treadwell the works on the Bhore Ghat were under the management of Mrs. Alice Treadwell. She engaged GIPR’s two engineers G.L. Clowser and S. Adamson who had worked under Faviell. They applied for the extension of time for completing the Bhore Ghat Contract. The date was extended to 31 March 1863 and promised to try and complete the contract earlier if possible.

Opening of the Bhore Ghat Incline The Committee of Directors had invited the governor, who had throughout manifested the utmost interest in that important work, for the opening ceremony proposed on Tuesday, 21 March 1863. A special train was proposed to carry His Excellency over the Ghat. The opening ceremony was attended by the President and Civil Members of the government with the principal inhabitants of Bombay and Pune, European and native. A tablet was erected in the memory of James J. Berkley at the Bhore Ghat Incline. Bickersmith, the Chairman of the Committee read, After a period of more than eleven years, during which the Engineering staff of the GIPR have been constantly engaged in surveying and supertending the construction of the Bhore Ghat Incline, the Directors at last have the satisfaction of being able to report its completion, and have demonstrated by actual experiments its full capabilities for the purpose for which it was designed, and they, therefore, confidently invite your Excellency to declare it open for public traffic.51

A Code of Regulations had been drawn up for the instructions and guidance of the special guards and drivers, who

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

301

were to be retained for service on the Incline, and every provision had been made for the security of passengers and the prevention of accident. The opening of the Bhore Ghat line was very useful for both goods train for the exchange of stock between the Konkan and Deccan. J.H. White, Acting Deputy Consulting Engineer, informed the government that the Thal Ghat was handed over by the Contractor to the Company on 26 December. He inspected the line with Mr. Rushton and said, ‘The road is in the most beautiful order and is such as to reflect the highest credit on the contractors, Messrs Whythes and Jackson.’52 The Incline was opened for goods on 27 December and for passengers on 1 February 1865. The traffic continued over it without a break. There was now complete communication between Bombay and Shegoan in Nagpur, a distance of 339 miles.53

NOTES 1. John Hurd, ‘Railways’, in Railways in Modern India, ed. Ian J. Kerr, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 147-72. 2. G.W. Macgeorge, Ways and Works in India, Being an Account of the Public Works in that Country from the Earliest Times up to Present Day, Westminster: Archibald Constable and Company, 1894, p. 358. 3. Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company III, Part II, National Archives of India (henceforth as NAI), New Delhi, pp. 671-5. This is the first available published report in 1831-2 about railway construction in India. During this period, railway construction in England entered the second phase on a large scale. A Select Committee was appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the state of affairs of the East India Company and trade between Great Britain, The East Indies and China, and to report to both the Houses of Parliament by 27 January 1932. The Select Committee submitted the report on 16 August 1832 in the House of Commons. Daniel Thorner, Investment in Empire-British Railway and Steam Shipping Enterprise in India 1825-1849, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950, p. 64.

302

Rita P. Bhambi

4. N.L. Bhatnagar, Transport in India and Abroad, Meerut: Jai Parkash Nath & Co., 1956, p. 128. 5. If Egypt is the gift of the Nile, Bombay is the gift of its harbour. Bombay harbour is situated between the long arm of the east of the island and the mainland. It is about 6 miles across at its widest part, and is 7 fathoms deep at the entrance, and 9 fathoms at anchor. The English were the first to recognize its importance. H.J. Carter, Geological Papers on Western India, Bombay, 1857, p. 122. 6. Thomas Williamson, Revenue Commissioner, Bombay, wrote Two Letters on the Advantages of Railway Communication in Western India, addressed to the Lord Warncliffe, Chairman of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, London, 1846, p. 6. 7. Edward Davidson, The Railways of India: With an Account of their Rise, Progress and Construction, London: F.N. Spon, 1868, p. 22. 8. A.K. Arora, History of Bombay Suburban Railways (1853-1985), Bombay: Author, 1985, p v. 9. O.S. Nock, Railways of Asia and Far East, Bangalore: Allied Pub, 1980, p. 8. 10. In many cases, old spellings of names and places are being used. 11. The Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, vol. 1, Pune: The Government Photozinco Press, 1977, p. 342. 12. PWD Railways 1844, vol. 1, compilation no. 728, Letter dated 27 February 1844, p. 27 and Letter no. 3260 of 1844, MSA, p. 47. 13. PWD Railway 1844, vol.1, Compilation no. 728, Letter no. 2257 of 1844, dated 19 July 1844, MSA, pp. 19-21. 14. Ibid., Report of the Government Committee, 9 November 1844, MSA, p. 55. 15. PWD Railway 1845, vol. 1, Compilation no. 12, Letter from Inland Association, dated 9 May 1845, MSA, pp. 282-7. 16. PWD Railways 1845, vol. 1, Compilation no.12, Letter to the Government, dated 5 November 1845, MSA, pp. 416-20. 17. Robert Wigram Crawford returned two years later to England for a long career in Parliament, railways, banking, as Member of Parliament for the City of London, Chairman of the East India Railway, and Governor of the Bank of England. 18. PWD Railways 1845, vol. 1, Compilation no.12, GIPR Company, 19 November 1845, MSA, p. 433.

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

303

19. Ibid., The GIPR’s Deed of Agreement, dated 26 November 1845, MSA, para 1 and 8, pp. 432-6. 20. Public Works Department (henceforth cited as PWD) Railways 1850, vol. 2, Compilation no. 26, An Act to incorporate the Great India Peninsula Railway Company, 1 August 1849, Maharashtra State Archives (henceforth cited as MSA), pp. 101-10. 21. PWD Railways 1848, vol. 1, Compilation no. 711, A Copy of the Deed of the Contract signed between East India Company and GIPR Company, MSA, pp. 179-80. 22. Juland Danvers, Report to Secretary of State for India in Council on Railways in India for the Year 1859, MSA, p. 12. 23. PWD Railways, 1846, vol. 1, Compilation no. H-139, MSA, pp. 402. 24. PWD Railways, 1853, vol. 8, Compilation no. 7, Memorandum on the Indian Railways, dated 14 September 1853, para 30, MSA, pp. 126-7. Crawford comments on Kennedy’s suggestions, Letter no. 17 of 1853, dated 31 January 1853, para 23, MSA, p. 145. 25. PWD Railways, 1853, vol. 8, Compilation no. 7, Board’s Dispatch, no. 3 of 1853, dated 2 February 1853, para 2, MSA, pp. 86-7. 26. Ibid., para 99, p. 40. 27. PWD Railways, 1853, vol. 8, Compilation no. 7, Letter no. 3 of 1853, dated 2 February 1853, para 2, MSA, p. 86. 28. PWD Railways, 1852, vol. 10, Compilation no. 30, Monthly Salary Statement, dated 5 March 1852, MSA, p. 32. 29. PWD Railways, 1857, vol. 29, Compilation no. 255, Deed of Contract no.11, MSA, pp 7-23; Deed of Contract no. 12, MSA, pp. 131-46. 30. PWD Railways, 1857, vol. 28, Compilation no. 202, Contractor Reporting to GIPR, Letter dated 17 November 1857, MSA, pp. 229-30. 31. PWD Railways, 1857, vol. 28, Compilation no. 202, Thal Ghat Incline, paras 16, 17 and 18, MSA, p. 152. 32. PWD Railways, 1864, vol. 41, Compilation no. 502, London Board to the Governor in Council, Bombay, Letter no. 33, dated 16 November 1864, MSA, p. 185. 33. PWD Railways, 1864, vol. 41, Compilation no. 502, Railway Correspondence, letter dated 11 October 1864, MSA, p. 211. 34. PWD Railways, 1857, vol. 12, Compilation no. 113, Deed of

304

35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46.

47.

48.

49 50.

51.

Rita P. Bhambi Contract Bhore Ghat Incline, Letter no. 490 of 1857, dated 24 February 1857, MSA, p. 9 (Deed of Contract pp. 15-21). Extract of a Paper on Bhore Ghat Incline by J. Berkley, Chief Engineer, published in Juland Danvers Report on Railways in India for the Year 1860-61, MSA, p. 33. Ibid. Extract of a Paper by J. Berkley, p. 32. Paper on the Thull Ghat Incline, p. 32. James J. Berkley, Paper on the Bhore Ghaut Railway Incline, Read at the Bombay Mechanics Institution, on Monday, 21 December 1857, Bombay 1858, p. 20. Bombay Pamphlets, vol. 15, Asiatic Society Library, Bombay. Extract of a Paper by J. Berkley, p. 33. PWD Railways 1860, vol. 26, Compilation no. 332, GIPR to Consulting Engineer, Letter no. 1569 of 1860, dated 9 May 1860, MSA, pp. 101-2. Ibid., Abstract no. 1137, para 2, MSA, p. 105. Narratives of the Operations on the Bhore Ghat Incline from their Commencement to their Completion in March 1863, p. 18. PWD Railways 1860, vol. 26, Compilation no. 332, Assistant Collector’s Report, dated 28 May 1860, para 3, MSA, p. 116. Ibid. GIPR to Consulting Engineer, Letter no. 2702 of 1860, dated 13 August 1860, MSA, pp. 153-5. PWD Railways 1860, vol. 26, Compilation no. 309, Despatch from Secretary of State for India, dated 20 February 1860, para 3, MSA, p. 143. PWD Railways 1859, vol. 25, Compilation no. 215, Letter no. 111 of 1859, dated 7 February 1859, MSA, p. 270. Memorandum no. 189 of 1859 dated 4 February 1859, MSA, p. 247. PWD Railways 1859, vol. 25, Compilation no. 215, Hepworth’s statement to the Chief Engineer, dated 26 January 1859, MSA, pp. 252-9. PWD Railways 1859, vol. 25, Compilation no. 215, resolution by the Hon’able Board, dated 4 March 1859, MSA, pp. 283-4. PWD Railways 1858, vol. 14, Compilation no. 380, Acting Collector of Thana to Bombay Government, Letter no. 1886 of 1858, dated 12 October 1858, MSA, pp. 147-9. Proceedings at the official opening of the Bhore Ghat Incline, on the GIPR, Bombay, 21 April 1863, Report of J.N. Danver for the year 1862-3, p. 23.

Construction of Railway Line over Thall and Bhore Ghat

305

52. PWD Railways 1866, vol. 6, Compilation no. 21, Deputy Consulting Engineer, Letter dated 29 December 1864, MSA, p. 305. 53. PWD Railways 1866, vol. 6, Compilation no. 21, Administration Report of GIPR for 1864/5, MSA, pp. 35-6.

CHAPTER 9

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900 N. Benjamin

Introduction The construction of railways started in India in the middle of the nineteenth century and has continued unabated since then. Pioneer civil and railway engineers faced many problems even before they decided to commence with the construction work. The first step towards the construction of railways was undertaking a reconnaissance survey usually conducted by a senior engineer who established one or more routes which a line could take. It was followed by a detailed survey when the building of the line was sanctioned. This work was done usually by junior engineers under the supervision of a senior engineer. It provided the blue print for the actual construction to get an idea of technical problems expected to be faced, their possible solutions and the estimates of expenditure likely to be involved. Many times making these estimates presented problems. For instance, when a survey was made for Hardwar-Dehra Dun Railway covering about 34 miles, the progress was slow owing to dense forest.1 Likewise, the survey of the extension of the ArsikereHassan line to Manjarabad and from there to the western coast was delayed by about two years owing to the difficult and unhealthy nature on the Western Ghats.2 They had also to be revised in the light of experience gained. Under agreements between the government and the rail-

308

N. Benjamin

way companies, the former undertook to provide land free of charge to the latter. Therefore, the government enacted Act XLII of 1850 under which it could immediately acquire any land which was required for public work and a railway built with its sanction was classified as such. Once this was done, the government acquired land rapidly. But transferring land to the railways involved complexities. The East India Railway (EIR) is a good example. Its line stretched over 1,000 miles, covering not only land, but also trees, huts, bamboos, etc. Often for a single tree or hut there were more than one claimant. Without a record of rights, it was difficult to resolve conflicting claims. In the first section of the line from Howrah to Pandua over 40 miles, the number of claims was 4,475! Persons handling them were often ignorant of the social and religious prejudices of the local people. They mishandled the situation causing widespread discontentment. In 1856 there was a commotion in Patna when railway engineers destroyed houses and violated sacred places. The Government of India had to intervene and warn the railway company.3 Laying down railway lines presented hurdles. Before much of construction began, houses had to be built for the engineers and foremen, and huts for the labourers. Physical obstacles came in the way of laying down the railway lines. Beyond Kalyan on the western route were the Thall and Bhore Ghats which were a continuous deep chain of massive impregnable rocks and lofty peaks, rising abruptly to heights from 2,000 to 4,000 ft. They had an impenetrable jungle infested with wild animals. The climate was unfit for human habitation. Beyond the Ghats were the Vindhyachal mountains which blocked the routes to the north and east on the one side and to the south on the other. Nilgiri Railway Company established in 1885 showed peculiar problems of railway construction in mountainous areas. The railway line from Mettupalayam to Udagamandalam (Tamil Nadu) is 346.61 km long. Its expenses of construction were heavy because apart from 16 tunnels there was a big bridge over the Bhavani River.4 Physical obstacles on the eastern route

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

309

were different. The Indo-Gangetic plain between Calcutta and Delhi had marshy and jungle lands which had to be cleared before laying the tracks. But principal hurdles were the Hooghly, Brahmaputra, Padma, Ganga, Jamuna, Mahanadi, Narmada and Godavari rivers and their tributaries, apart from seasonal torrents. These rivers were large and brought immense volumes of water during the rains, had tremendous velocity of water flow, enormous inundations and erratic channels.5 Skilled engineers, costly materials and trained labourers were required to overcome them. Crucial railway equipment was imported from England. Every mile of railway constructed in 1860s required a separate ship carrying about 600 tons of material from England on an average.6 There were unavoidable delays in the completion of the construction work. The Select Committee on East India (Railways) reported, . . . transport across the sea of the vast mass of dead weight necessary for the construction of thousands of miles of iron way, besides locomotives, iron work for bridges, and other materials, forms a cause of delay second only in importance to the difficulties which impede the conveyance of these materials up the country, where the means of internal communication are in many places very imperfect, where river navigation during the dry season is liable to constant interruption, where boats are scarce, and native boatmen untrustworthy. To these difficulties may be added the want severely felt in many districts, and especially in Bengal, of fuel for lime and brick burning, and of timber suitable for sleepers, large quantities of which are now being supplied from England; the effects of Indian climate upon European constitutions; the frequent failures of contractors, unaccustomed or incompetent to undertake such extensive works; and lastly, the circuitous and lengthy correspondence carried on between the Railway Boards and their agents, on the one hand, and with the various government departments, both here and in India, on the other; all these appear to Your Committee to form sources of delay more or less serious, and must be classed among the main impediments to the rapid progress of railway enterprise in India.7

310

N. Benjamin

In the event of a railway company in India requiring a locomotive, the engineer had to first communicate to the agent of the railway company, who had to make his wants known to the consulting engineer, and the latter had to communicate with the Secretary to the Government of the Department of the Public Works. Thereafter a letter was written by the Governor-General to the Court of Directors of East India Company (till the Company’s rule ended).8 All this was naturally time consuming. But the GIP Railway did not have much of a problem with its contractors. As per the agreements with the railway companies, the government reserved the right to supervise the working of the companies. But the government’s supervision became all-pervasive. D.I. Noad pointed out, I think it is carried to too minute a point in India; I think our engineers are unnecessarily interfered with. I thank they are called upon from morning till night for papers, returns, explanations and documents, which materially retard the progress of their operations, and moreover it creates a kind of depression, and a certain want of energy which is unsatisfactory. I think that is the great evil of the supervision as exercised.9

Even the government officials admitted that the government’s interference was too much. Occasionally the government referred the issues to the Secretary of State in London which meant additional delays. Railway companies engaged contractors to quicken and simplify completion of laying down the railway lines. Macdonald Stephenson of the EIR mentioned that the contract system vis-à-vis construction by the Company itself was adopted because completion of a railway from 1,000 to 1,500 miles for which time was an important element, the contract system was preferable as it . . . secured the advantages of a division of labour, of enlisting the co-operation of qualified men, whose interests were identified with those of the company; . . . the railway company had the power of

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

311

pushing on the works with the utmost rapidity possible, while they were secured against contingencies arising from difficulty in transport of material.10

European contractors were engaged in Bengal and the contracts broke down. The contract system was introduced hastily and the railway company had to undertake the work for which additional staff was required.11 One reason for the failure of the contractors was that they were not competent to carry on the work which they undertook.12 Madras Railway Company too had problems with its contractors. It tried to give a fair trial to the native contractors and when they failed in building bridges, the company had to do that itself. It faced shortage of engineers which resulted in delays.13 In western India native contractors were engaged and their performance was by and large satisfactory.14 Thus, the contract system led to delays in the completion of work in several instances. Railway construction needed building materials. Indigenous materials like bricks and stones could not be acquired easily on a large scale because organized trading activities in them were not undertaken. Brick making was a manual process and large-scale production was possible only during dry and hot months. Many bricks were rejected because of the unsuitability of clay, inefficiency of labour employed and inability of the makers to adjust to the heat. Consequently, they were of bad shape, brittle and over or under burnt. Bricks and other materials together with equipment had to be transported on bullock and camel carts and at times on mules and donkeys. Work had to be carried out in many areas which were inaccessible by wheeled vehicles. At other times materials were carried over rivers by boats. In the case of the EIR, materials had to be despatched from Calcutta by river and by road at a very high charge to the North-Western Provinces. So great was the difficulty and so many native boats with large quantities of materials on board were lost on their way up, that it was considered advisable to build a fleet

312

N. Benjamin

of steamers and barges at a cost of £750,000 to convey them to their destination. Sleepers were required for laying railway lines and forests were searched for it. Wood was procured from the jungles of Cuttack, Cuddapah, Malabar, etc. It was good but not always. Sometimes the natives cheated the railways and supplied wrong kinds of wood.15 Sal wood was considered suitable in northern India but in view of the sudden demand for it by the railways, its prices went up. Hence, sleepers had to be imported from England. Teak was imported from Burma. The first political disturbance that had an effect on the railways was the Santhal Rebellion of 1855. It was caused partly by oppression of the European railway builders in Rajmahal district. They bullied Santhal labourers and disgraced Santhal women. It resulted in the suspension of works and consequent compensation to the contractors. Damage was done to the railway line. It was followed by the revolt of 1857 during which the works on a large part of the line, which had been advancing towards completion, were totally suspended and greatly damaged.16 In some places large numbers of railway staff were murdered and elsewhere railway stations were turned into fortified posts and gallantly defended. The direct and indirect losses incurred by these calamities were estimated around £3,000,000. Stephenson remarked, The enhanced cost for transport of material was one of the results of the mutiny, enormously increased by the wholesale destruction of riverboats, not only by insurgent troops, but by the orders of Government, which enjoined on the civil authorities the duty of destroying all such means of communication for crossing the main rivers between the bodies, after which the company found itself face to face with the necessity for transporting three or four hundred thousand tons of material from the port of Calcutta to their place on the works, and that, too, at a time when the Government itself was also in the market for all the available tonnage on the river.17

Hena Mukherjee puts the loss higher at about £4,000,000 ‘. . . directly through the destruction of valuable railway mate-

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

313

rials in workshops or in transit, and indirectly, in the shape of the prolonged establishment costs due to the stoppage of work during the troubles and also in the form of rising prices of labour and materials.’18

Bridge-building Laying the railway lines necessitated the construction of bridges and viaducts. The Great Southern of India Railway Company had a line from Thiruchirappalli to Nagapatnam which ran through rice fields and for 38 miles over waste land. There were as many as 89 bridges of various sizes and a large viaduct over the Moothalay River.19 Indo-Gangetic plains had several rivers which were flooded during the monsoon and had strong current of water. Building bridges over rivers was a herculean work. Work on this scale had never been undertaken before in India. Juland Danvers wrote, The importance of obtaining good foundations below where the scour can possibly reach them has been demonstrated by dearly bought experience. Hardly a season passes without bridges breaking down and embankments being cut through by the streams they were respectively constructed to cross over and to check.20

Many bridges were damaged by floods year after year. Some bridges of GIPR were a disastrous failure because of a combination of errors. The foremost was the imperfect designs and specifications which were followed by the use of inferior materials and lax supervision when the construction was done.21 The technology for building bridges underwent changes over time. Bridges made originally with arches of brick and stone failed and they had to be reconstructed with iron girders. When engines were updated, the original girders were considered weak and they had to be strengthened/ renewed. Likewise culverts had to strengthened. At other times replacement of the metre gauge girders with standard gauge girders was done. Last but not the least was the shift-

314

N. Benjamin

ing of streams. A good example of this occurred in the case of the Sutlej River. It ran through a valley 5 miles wide for almost a century but it changed its course to the southern side making it necessary to extend the bridge which involved a cost of over £60,000.22

Fuels Yet another problem was of fuels.23 Coal had to be imported from England and other countries. Different English coals used were Nixon’s Navigation, Ferndale, Powell Duffryn, Welsh and Davison’s West Hartley, etc. The average price per ton of English coal was Rs. 20-5-0 and the average price of Bengal sea-borne coal was Rs. 14-12-0 delivered into boats at Bombay. Singareni coal was delivered by a contractor. It was generally of a fair quality. But when received in Madras via the Buckingham Canal it was very frequently found to be seriously damaged owing to the numerous handlings and rough treatment it had undergone.24 However, the Indian coal was of an inferior quality. It had high ash content and its heating capacity was lower than of the English coal. Active operations to open the Singareni coalfields were first commenced in August 1886 when the machinery was taken to the site. Fever and scurvy set in among the workpeople and towards the end of the year very few labourers remained. These collieries were situated in the midst of a very dense forest and at first it was impossible to clear the land. In 1887-8 the works of the railway leading up to the coalfields were in progress, and it was difficult and occasionally impossible to obtain sufficient men. The colliery suffered in consequence because it was easier to obtain men for above-ground working than to get them to descend the shafts and work below ground.25 Many steam locomotives used wood as fuel which caused deforestation. Wood was obtained from both government and private sources. Wood was inefficient as a source of fuel. The average consumption of wood per locomotive in 1870s

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

315

was 89.53 lbs, while it was of 26.75 lbs in the case of coal. The use of coal as fuel in locomotives led to operational problems. Water had to be pumped continually into boilers because they expelled steam after every use and did not recycle it. Periodic stops of locomotives were needed to fill water. Here a reference may also be made to the shortage of water which many railways faced from time to time. Water was exceedingly bad all over Hissar-Sirsa section in Rajputana-Malwa Railway. It decided to run water tanks with each train.26 Moreover, preliminary heating was required for hours before sufficient steam was available for a large locomotive to move. Smoke caused air pollution. Fire cleaning and ash removal were needed.

Floods and Natural Calamities Juland Danvers observed that when railways were first proposed for India, The great difficulty of crossing the rivers and of withstanding the force of the floods was not apparently sufficiently considered or estimated. The rivers of India . . . cut their way through soils of so soft and shifting a character, that in many places a new channel sometimes miles away from its original course is frequently formed, and the old bed is left dry. . . . In many cases river beds which may be easily forded and even waded at one season become channels for wide and impetuous streams in another. It was, of course, a part of the engineer’s duty to study this characteristic and to provide against the danger. His investigations were, however, thwarted by imperfect data, and what . . . was considered to be the maximum volume of water that ever passed through a certain channel in the height of the floods has been frequently exceeded.27

Floods and related natural calamities created problems. The annual report of the railways, 1874-5 put it, It has unfortunately become almost a regular task each year to describe the disastrous effects of the rains on the railways. The floods of the last season were unusually severe, but the only line

316

N. Benjamin

which suffered serious damage was the Madras line. On a section of the North-west line, extending 110 miles, between Gooty and Rajampett, the inundations and torrents swept every thing before them. The four large bridges which spanned the Paupugnee, the Cheyair, the Chittravutty, and the Pennair rivers, most of them constructed of girders supported on iron screw piles, were either wholly or partially destroyed. These rivers and their feeders are dry for many months in the year, but in the monsoon they swell to the width of from a quarter to three quarters of a mile, and when the rainfall is like that of October last, they rush with irresistible force and scour the beds to a great depth when any obstruction occurs in their course.28

Traffic was interrupted for several weeks. The chief causes of the failure were insufficiently deep foundations in the bed of the rivers and inadequate waterway. In 1895 some bridges of the south-east line of GIPR were washed away in the monsoon and their restoration was completed in 1896-7.29 At other times there was shortage of water. Work on Bellary-Kistna line was impeded by the shortage of water. At Guntakal the supply had to be brought from some wells five miles off. Water was pumped up to a high reservoir one mile from the wells and about 50 ft above them and from which it flowed down in pipes to Guntakal where the rail level was 90 feet below the reservoir. Water shortage was a perennial problem in the desert regions.

Labour Railways were extensive employers of native manual labour. This presented some problems the chief of which was that labourers returned to their villages, especially during the harvest season. In 1858 near Berhampur in Bengal (now in Odisha) most labourers left the railway work for harvesting even though their wages were raised.30 Caste feeling was strong among the labourers, so much so that those of the same caste preferred to work together. Once when an Englishman touched a water pot, it was immediately broken

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

317

into pieces for his touch had polluted it. The shortage of labour was a serious handicap in the first 15 years of railway construction and it gradually eased. People who had been mobilized for one project were available for the subsequent project. Labourers being poor, malnourished and living in crowded and insanitary conditions were susceptible to diseases. Malaria was a major killer since its cause and prevention were not known. Its incidence could partly be attributed to railways. During the monsoon when flooding took place, embankments were raised. They frequently interfered with natural drainage. Sometimes embankments and bridges acted as dams, creating new lakes which bred mosquitoes. In the 1860s when fierce malaria ravaged Hooghly and Burdwan, it was caused, inter alia, by railway embankments.31 Cholera and pneumonia were other killers. Epidemics and their fears disrupted the labour supply. For instance, in October-November 1859 cholera ravaged Rajmahal district. Over 4,000 labourers of the EIR succumbed to it. In 1898 when plague broke out in Calcutta, people fled the city making it difficult to get boatmen, carters and coolies. Over 1,000 wagons of merchandise remained at Howrah because of the impossibility of procuring labour to discharge them.32 Railways required various categories of staff. Apart from engineers, they employed lower categories of skilled labourers like plate-layers, brick-layers, carpenters, draftsmen, etc. Running and administrative staffs like engine drivers, guards, station masters, ticket collectors, accountants, etc., were mostly Europeans to begin with. Natives almost exclusively provided manual labour, a small proportion of them being Chinese, etc. European staff was costly, while the natives were cheaper to employ. The annual report of railway administration for 1869-70 said, One of the chief expenses connected with the working of railways in India is the high cost of European agency . . . in England the maximum pay of a driver is 150 l. a year, in India it has, by means of

318

N. Benjamin

overtime earnings, reached 480 l. a year. In England the average is from 110 l. to 120 l.; in India from 260 l. to 280 l. The actual charge in India of mechanical and skilled labour is 5¾ d. per train mile run as against 1¾ d. in England. Taking into account the passages of the Europeans, their furlough pay and failures from sickness and intemperance, the charge will be in the proportion of three to one in England.

The Report noted that the system of apprenticing Indiaborn youths as firemen, engine drivers and mechanical workmen in the locomotive shops was successful and gradually they should replace the highly paid European labour.33 But there were problems in the employment of Indians. The Government of Bengal conceded that the employment of native drivers resulted in a large saving of wages. But they were more wasteful of fuel than Europeans and had yet to show the requisite presence of mind in difficult situations.34 The saving in wages by employing Indian drivers was reduced by greater consumption of fuel by them.35 However, Parsi drivers were as good as European drivers in the GIPR.36

Thefts and Robberies Thieves and robbers became active because of the railways. There was a marked increase in serious offences where a railway was under construction. GIPR complained that base coins passed from hand to hand among its labourers. There were self-styled fakirs who minted and circulated spurious rupees in and around Satara district. Some were caught and imprisoned.37 Professional thieves and pick-pockets infested the railways. There was a serious crime in Satara. A mail-runner was carrying mails from Karad to the railway station. He was stopped and looted. Notes, parcels, etc., valuing Rs. 1,509 were stolen. Three accused were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.38 Some railways posted plain clothes policemen at the railway stations and elsewhere to control anti-social elements. Tribes declared criminal by the government indulged in

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

319

crimes on railways. Bhamptas were concentrated in western Bombay Presidency. M. Kennedy says, In fact, his (Bhampta’s) chief occupation is thieving on railways and anywhere in crowds and he succeeds, under almost impossible circumstances . . . railways afford the Bhampta the most lucrative fields for his activities and he will commit crime at all hours of the day, or night, as opportunity offers.

An instance of a particularly bold case occurred in 1898 when a Bhampta one night lifted the governor’s travelling bag from the brilliantly lighted gubernatorial salon of the Southern Mahratta Railway in spite of the strong police escort. The Bhamptas kept railway maps with the names of stations. Sansis robbed railway passengers in railway sheds. They lifted bags from open wagons of goods trains either by boarding the trains when going slow and throwing off the bags, or dragging the bags by means of grappling irons or long sticks tipped with iron hooks or catches. They also committed thefts in passenger trains. They threw the stolen property out of the window to be picked up afterwards. An ornament was snatched from a woman sitting near the window, or a bundle placed within easy reach from outside was lifted as the train started. Bowris administered stupefying drugs to the travellers and robbed them. When passengers were busy buying their tickets, and put any bundle down, the Chandrawedis made away with it. They mixed with third class passengers in a station and substituted their bundles with the bundles of the passengers. They travelled in train and, if they saw a passenger fast asleep, passed his bundle over to another Chandrawedi in the next compartment. Sometimes they disguised themselves as women, entered the female compartment and when the women were asleep, made away with their bundles or removed valuables from their persons while the train was in motion between two stations. When a passenger with a lot of luggage was getting down from the train, take down some items and boarded the train to take down the remaining items, they disappeared with some of the

320

N. Benjamin

items taken down earlier. The Pathans were railway thieves and pick-pockets in the up-country. They robbed passengers sleeping on the platforms, passenger sheds and trains. Gujarat Kolis showed unusual daring in jumping on and off the moving trains. The experience they gained as railway servants in shunting and loading yards enabled them to commission crimes in the railways. Goods were also stolen from goods trains. They climbed on open wagons and threw off bags of grain, etc.39 In Khandesh the Badaks, Menes, Babres and Jats from north India broke into houses and escaped with the loot from the nearest railway station, leaving behind no trace. The district magistrate remarked that the police could not cope with the thieves and robbers because they had learnt the value of the railways. It was impossible to catch them once they crossed the boundaries of British territories. Several robberies were committed in south India. Din Mahommad alias Sheik Abdulla was a noted railway thief living in Madras. When he was brought before the first class magistrate, his finger prints revealed that he was convicted thrice before and was awarded eighteen months’ rigorous imprisonment. Another person went by thirteen different names and had six other convictions against him. He was awarded two years’ rigorous imprisonment. Many thefts were committed by criminal tribes and they developed their secret languages. The Koravars evolved the ingenious method of defecating on the stolen property. They confined their operations largely to railway platforms, using their tools to cut open bags and break open boxes which they filled with their own rags and rubbish. The Mallas threw valuable goods out of the train at pre-arranged spots where camels, donkeys and ponies were kept to carry the stolen property. Some pick pockets had shoes with specially designed receptacles. Yet another class of professional thieves concealed the items, particularly jewellery, in an artificial cavity developed in the throat. The Sanauriyas claimed brahminical origin and when arrested they suggested to their victims that in getting robbed by Brahmins, they had gained spiritually while incurring a

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

321

material loss. Many gangs of thieves were women. They used their private parts to conceal jewels or other stolen property. They were as dangerous as their male counterparts. Many swindlers and railway thieves disguised themselves in European clothes. Moreover, railway employees were implicated in criminal activities. In short, these railway thieves committed thefts at railway stations, platforms, on trains, and at railway junctions. A police officer named M. Pauparao Naidu was badly beaten up while in the pursuit of one such gang and left for dead. The medical officer found forty contusions and abrasions on his person and his life was in danger for some time.40 Railways took protective measures to prevent all this. As early as 1854 EIR employed staff designated as ‘police’. On the recommendation of the Railway Police Committee, 1872 the railway police was organized. By 1882 the railway companies directly assumed the responsibility of protection and security of their property as well as the goods entrusted to them by public for carriage.41

Accidents Both railway employees and passengers faced the risk of accidental injury and death. Accidents involving Europeans were reported more fully than those of Indians. One surgeon treated hundreds of BB&CIR workers with ‘terribly severe injuries’ which they received while employed on the Narmada bridge and adjoining works. The superstructures of bridges took workers to great heights and an accidental fall meant a certain death. Labourers fell into rivers and were drowned. Careless or faulty blasting in tunnels or deep cutting injured or killed others. Even without blasting, tunnel work entailed cave-ins which could be fatal or trap labourers inside. When embankments collapsed, labourers engaged in earthwork were buried alive. Unguarded machinery could kill or maim them.42 Besides, accidents occurred when trains were moving or

322

N. Benjamin

stationary. Accidents happened because of human errors and mechanical faults. One of the worst years was 1869-70 when 31 passengers were killed. Two accidents alone occasioned the death of 30 passengers, one on the GIPR in January 1869 when 19 passengers were killed and 42 injured, and another on the BB&CIR in June 1879 leaving 11 passengers dead and seven hurt.43 In 1874-5 of the 68 cases of collision, 34 were attributed to the faults of drivers, 12 to the station staff, 9 each to pointsmen and workmen employed on the line. Serious collision occurred in GIPR when a special troops train and a goods train collided. With few exceptions, all cases from fire were caused by sparks from the engine and were most frequent on lines where wood fuel was burnt.44 An accident occurred in 1875 which received wide publicity. A village near the line of the Oude and Rohilkund Railway was set on fire by sparks allegedly from the engine. The company was sued for compensation by one of the sufferers resulting in damages decreed against it.45 When a bridge over the Cheyair River was washed away, a train of Madras Railway on way to Cuddapah was precipitated into water and eight persons were killed. The foundations of the bridge, which rested on treacherous ground, were undermined by the scour.46 In 1875-6, the engine of a mail train ran off the rails near Jabalpur because the cow-catcher attached to it dropped off and got under it. Nine passengers died and 13 were injured.47 Sikandrabad and Dadri stations witnessed flames caused by the explosion of native bombs used during marriage festivals. Eleven persons died and others were injured. Again, a goods train entered Hooghly station, collided with an engine which, owing to the points being incorrectly set, ran on the wrong line. Many wagons were derailed and damaged. These occurred in the EIR. In Oudh and Rohilkund State Railway, the mail train when passing a level-crossing near Roorkee station ran into a bullock cart with a man and a boy on it. The boy was killed, the man seriously injured and the cart smashed. The gate-man at fault was sentenced to 15 months’ rigorous imprisonment. When two trains of the East Coast

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

323

State Railways collided at the Kadiam station, the station master at fault was dismissed from service. A collision took place between a mail train and a shunting engine at the RajputanaMalwa Railway goods yard at Delhi station. Thirteen people died and 21 were wounded. Besides, three vehicles of the mail train were completely wrecked, two damaged, and two others derailed.48 Many more examples of this kind can be cited. Accidents occurred because of the mistakes of passengers too. In 1872-3, for instance, 23 deaths and 35 injuries arose from attempts to get on or off, or falls from carriages in motion.49 A report for 1875-6 mentions, ‘The most fertile cause of accidents is the attempt on the part of passengers to get out of the trains while they are in motion.’50 The Government of India sought to keep an eye on the accidents. The Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act IX of 1890) made it obligatory for every railway administration to send to the government a report of accidents occurring in its railways whether attended with personal injury or not and in such form and manner and at such intervals of time as the government directed. Accidents involved loss of animal life also. Buffaloes, camels, sheep, goats, wild pigs, bears, wolves and other animals were often killed by the moving trains. They were tempted by the richer pasturage in the railway precincts. Cattle with the cognizance, if not the encouragement of the herdsmen, often passed over to the railway land to graze there. Having entered, it was not so easy to return, especially when terrified by a train and the consequence was that the beast was run over unless the cow-catcher worked properly. Apart from killing the animals, such accidents damaged railway property. In 1871 as many as 314 cases of running over the cattle and other animals occurred. On two occasions the EIR carriages derailed. On the Jabalpur line a mail train ran over a buffalo and a second class carriage left the rails and on the main line another mail train ran over a wild buffalo and the rear brake van derailed. No person was hurt on these occasions. On the Madras Railway a buffalo was run over, and a wagon

324

N. Benjamin

was thrown off the rails and dragged for a couple of miles.51 The problem of collision of trains and animals had been foreseen from the very outset. By the Act XVIII of 1854, railways were required to erect and maintain good and sufficient fences on each side of the line, otherwise liable to a fine of Rs. 50 for every offence. Subsequently other Acts were passed. The question of cattle trespass was dealt with in under the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871 (Act XXV of 1871). The Indian Railway Act, 1890 (Act IX of 1890) laid down that if any cattle were driven except for crossing the railway or any other lawful purpose, its owner could be punished with a fine of Rs. 10 for each head of cattle, in addition to the amount recovered under the Act of 1871.

Miscellaneous Issues Indian capital was not forthcoming for investment in the railways. Prior to 1863-4 two attempts had been made to raise capital for railway extension without a guarantee but in vain. For many years only a small amount of railway capital was held by the native investors. For instance, in the case of the Southern Mahratta Railway £3,000,000 pounds were reserved for distribution in India but only £7,900 were applied for.52 Hena Mukherjee adds, ‘The striking point here is that the amount of contribution from India was negligible and even of that contributed there a very small fraction came from Indians.’53 The total capital invested in railways was £236 million by 1902 which was largely British raised in the UK.54 Railways were used for smuggling opium. A glaring case came to light in 1883-4. In one case opium was detected rolled up in the ball of string usually carried by Indians for drawing water with their lotas from wells. In another case opium was consigned in the centre of oil-cakes and it was found that a previous consignment had been smuggled in bags of Multani clay.55 Railways were used for smuggling liquor too. At times the railways were burdened with surplus stock which locked their capital. The stores also became obsolete,

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

325

unserviceable and damaged and had to be sold at a heavy loss. In this context two examples may be given. In 1883-4, BB&CIRC sold by auction a large quantity of miscellaneous iron and steel ware, tyres, fish-plates and sleepers originally valued at Rs. 1,22,758 for Rs. 68,600 or a loss of about 44 per cent.56 Several railways were amalgamated to form the Rajputana-Malwa Railway as a result of which there was a large accumulation of stores on the new railway because each railway had its own stock of stores. It was not easy to dispose of the large balances.57 There was insufficient loading of trains and consequently unnecessary mileage run. This was the principal cause of the high cost of their working. Taking the maximum freight of a train at 200 tons, the average freight in one direction would be 100 tons. But the average freight was somewhere between 100 and 200 tons, nearer the lower than the higher limit. On the EIR it was only 109 tons, a little above the lower limit. On most lines, it was from 130 to 140 tons on an average. Besides, the Indian traffic of goods was of low value and covered great distances.58 In terms of goods transportation, sometimes railways lost vis-à-vis road and river transportation. Boats competed with the railways between Mirzapur and Calcutta. When markets were dull and saving in time not necessary, merchants preferred slower and circuitous but less expensive routes of the river and for short distances the road. High rates were frequently charged although a reasonable profit could be earned per ton or passenger, and a better aggregate result obtained by lower charges. Overcrowding in the Class III carriages in trains was a serious problem for the passengers. This was criticized in many quarters. Thomas Robertson wrote, In fact, it would almost seem that the railways in India were insufficiently appreciative of the value of their third class passenger traffic. The less paying first and second class traffic appears to receive all the attention, whereas the traffic which really needs to be fostered is that represented by third class passengers, who are the backbone of the passenger business of every railway in India,

326

N. Benjamin

their numbers in 1901, excluding season ticket-holders, amounting to nearly 170½ millions, against 9½ millions of all the classes put together.

Moreover, the subordinate railway staff obtained illegal gratification from these passengers when they purchased tickets and travelled.59 Another related problem was the speed of a train or the time taken for reaching the destination from the point of origin of the journey. Robertson reported that the average speed did not exceed 31.25 miles an hour for the fastest train but fell to as low as 13.99 miles an hour for an ordinary one and even to 7.55 miles an hour for a branch train. As against this, in America the fast passenger trains ran at an average speed of 50 to 55 miles an hour and the ordinary trains from 30 to 35 miles an hour. The slowness of the average speed in India was due to the longish stoppages at stations for meals, watering the engines or work of the station staff in connection with the train. Another reason was that the trains were timed to run at a speed which outside India would be regarded as low.60 Allied with this was the high fares charged by the railways. Even a colonial writer like Horace Bell conceded that the fares were levied on the basis of a wrong principal, ‘The obstacles in the way of reduction of fares were to be found in two leading principles, which appear to have been then considered the foundation of all policy. The first was that the lines must be made promptly profitable; and, second, that ‘the cost of conveyance’ was merely a ‘fixed figure’. Railways failed to understand that it is not the high profit upon the unit, but the small profits upon large numbers or quantity which should be sought.61 Subsequently, Daniel Thorner expressed a similar opinion, Why should the companies exert themselves to secure the maximum passenger or freight traffic when, even if their earnings were low, the guaranteed interest would raise their dividends to 4 or 5 per cent? Instead of trying to call forth the largest possible volume of freight and passenger traffic, the railways contented themselves with a relatively high rates and high fares policy.62

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

327

Passengers faced some problems like absence of facilities to answer the call of nature for many years. For example, in Bengal and North-Western including Tirhoot State Railway all intermediate class carriages for native females were provided latrine accommodation as late as 1890-1.63 Another problem was of unsatisfactory lighting arrangements in the carriages. Installation of gas lamps on Pintsch’s system in 1890s was a step towards the solution of this problem. But Robertson still wrote in 1902-3 that the lighting arrangement was ‘on the whole unsatisfactory’. Through trains on the through routes were well-lighted with gas, but others used oil lamps. Even old established railways like the East Indian and Madras Railways used vegetable oils. Rajputana-Malwa Railway (worked by the BB&CIR) had only one train lighted by electricity.64 Many passengers from infants to aged died while travelling, or at stations when starting for their journey, or at the end of it for no fault of the railways. They were almost invariably Indians. As many as 132 passengers were found dead or dying in the six months of 1869. The most common cause was cholera. Other reasons were heat apoplexy, chronic dysentery, fever, asthma, etc. Many deaths were attributed to ‘natural causes’. Perhaps the fatigue of travelling and heat accelerated death in some cases. Most sufferers commenced their journey in a feeble state, and others possibly in the hope of reaching their homes or a sacred river or shrine and dying there.65

Conclusion After the construction of railways, many problems were faced. Qualified staff had to be brought from England. Indians were gradually trained to work in the railway because their employment was economical. Railway equipment was brought from abroad and taking it into the interior presented serious problems because of the absence of the suitable means of transportation. India is not a flat country

328

N. Benjamin

and both hilly regions and rivers presented difficulties. Railway construction entailed mortalities. Other problems were railway fuels, fatal and serious accidents, burglaries, etc.

NOTES 1. Administration Report on the Railways in India for 1896-97, by T. Gracey. Parliamentary paper c.8518 of 1897, p. 36. Annual reports on the railways in India were prepared and presented to the parliament. They have been extensively used in this article. Their exact titles changed over time. They have been uniformly abbreviated as ARR here. 2. Ibid., p. 37. 3. Hena Mukherjee, The Early History of the East Indian Railway 1845-1879, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1994, pp. 95-6 and 98. 4. S.R. Saritha, ‘Colonialism and Modernization: History and Development of Southern Railway, A Case Study’, unpublished thesis submitted to Kerala University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, 2012, p. 69. 5. J.N. Sahni, Indian Railways: One Hundred Years 1853 to 1953, New Delhi: Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 1953, pp. 10-11 and 43. 6. A.K. Banerji, Aspects of Indo-British Economic Relations 1858-98, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 66-7. 7. Report from the Select Committee on East India (Railway); Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix, House of Commons, paper no. 416 of 1858, pp. v-vi. 8. Evidence of Juland Danvers. Ibid., Question (Q.) 200. 9. Ibid., Q. 632. 10. Evidence of M. Stephenson. Ibid., Q. 3553. 11. Ibid., Q. 3710, p. 261. 12. Evidence of D.I. Noad, ibid., Q. 673. 13. Evidence of J. Walker, ibid. Qs. 2698-9. 14. Evidence of James Melvill, ibid., p. 259. 15. Evidence of G.B. Bruce, ibid., Qs. 1599-1601. 16. Ian J. Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj 1850-1900, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 35. 17. ARR, 1872-73, p. 24.

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40.

329

Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 35. Also see pp. 138-40. Saritha, op. cit., p. 61. ARR, 1872-73, p. 4. ARR, 1868-69, p. 4. ARR, 1868-69, pp. 26-7. Unless otherwise stated, this section relies on my article entitled ‘Fuels for Railway Locomotives in Colonial India’ presented in the Indian History Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi on 28-30 December 2014. ARR, 1896-97, p. 178. ARR, 1887-88, p. 43. ARR, 1883-84, p. 164. ARR, 1872-73, pp. 4-5. ARR, 1874-75, p. 5. ARR, 1896-97, p. 4. See Kerr, op. cit., pp. 94-5. Ira Klein, ‘Death in India, 1871-1921’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 4, August 1973, pp. 645-6. Also see R.S. White, Studies in Malaria as it Affects Indian Railways, Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publications Branch, 1928. G. Huddleston, History of East Indian Railway, Calcutta: Thacker Spink and Co., 1906, unpaginated soft copy. ARR, 1869-70, p. 9. ARR, 1882-83, p. 26. ARR, 1883-84, p. 128. ARR, 1872-73, p. 8. Police Reports of the Bombay Presidency including the Province of Sind for the Year 1886, Bombay: Government Central Press, 1887, pp. 31-2. Ibid., 1897, Bombay: Government Central Press, 1898, Southern Division, p. 4. M. Kennedy, Notes on Criminal Classes in the Bombay Presidency with Appendices Regarding Some Foreign Criminals who Occasionally Visit the Presidency Including Hints on the Detection of Counterfeit Coin, Bombay: Government Central Press, 1908, pp. 19-32, 1045, 183, 238, 253-5 and 302-8. For details see M. Pauparao Naidu, The History of Railway Thieves with Illustrations & Hints on Detention, Gurgaon: Vintage Books, 1995 rpt.

330

N. Benjamin

41. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railway_Protection_Force Last modified on 7 March 2015. 42. Kerr, op. cit., p. 157. 43. ARR, 1869-70, p. 37. 44. ARR,1870-71, p. 13. 45. Horace Bell, Railway Policy in India, London: Rivington, Percival and Co., 1894, pp. 230-1. 46. ARR, 1870-71, p. 9. 47. ARR, 1875-76, p. 46. 48. ARR, 1896-97, pp. 211-15. 49. ARR, 1872-73, p. 12. 50. ARR, 1875-76, p. 17. 51. ARR, 1870-71, p. 13. 52. ARR, 1882-83, p. 38. 53. Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 43. 54. Daniel Thorner, ‘Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railway’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 11, no. 4, Fall, 1951, p. 391. 55. ARR, 1883-84, p. 67. 56. Ibid., p. 71. 57. ARR, 1895-96, pp. 2-5. 58. A.M. Rendel, ‘Comparative statement of average rates charged, work done, and cost of doing it on the principal Indian railways, for the half year ending 31st December 1871, based on the halfyearly Reports of the Companies and the Government returns, rupees being converted into sterling at 1s. 10d. per rupee.’ Report 1871-2, p. 41. 59. East India (Railways), Report on the Administration and Working of Indian Railways, by Thomas Robertson. Parliamentary paper Cd. 1713 of 1903, pp. 60-1. 60. Ibid., p. 59. Horace Bell wrote, ‘To the vast majority of native travellers, a distance of 200 miles in the 24 hours is fully as much as they expect, and they prefer (for many reasons (among others the absence, owing to sundry objections, of the provision of conveniences in the carriages), to find long halts every few hours, where they can “spread themselves out”, buy and eat such food as they allow themselves on such journeys . . ., discuss the incidents of travel, the prospects of crops, or the chances of some everlasting law-suit’, op. cit., p. 201. 61. Ibid., p. 191.

Problems of Indian Railways up to c.1900

331

62. Daniel Thorner, ‘The Pattern of Railway Development in India’, reprint from Far Eastern Quarterly, p. 207. 63. ARR, 1890-91, p. 16. 64. Report . . . by Thomas Robertson, p. 64. 65. ARR, 1869-70, p. 10.

CHAPTER 10

Socio-Cultural History: Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

In place of our bullocks and carriages He brought his iron vehicle And took over our king’s fort1

Fig. 11.1: Bullock Rail Cart (Source: T. Mark, Dabhoi Lines, Railways of the Yore, Beginning of the Narrow Guage, Guiford: Genesis Publications, 1912).

Historians concerned with transport history have been conscientiously recovering physical features of the railway age that is mainly its economic impact. However, recent discourses in

334

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

the social sciences and the humanities have began to focus upon the influence of human agency3 – we must therefore try to recognize the varied ways in which the railways were viewed by a colonized people and at times the colonizers. Railways brought a motorized force into, the rather unchanging life in India. The countryside was exposed to increased social and class mobility throughout the country. Freeman asserted that ‘despite the vast array of writing on railway history and on transport history at large, the subject is too often examined in a way that disconnects it from the wider cultural milieu’.4 This article is an attempt to study the interaction of society with the phenomenon called railways in India through its representations in Gujarati literature, which includes poems, prose and folklore. The premise on which the theme of the article is based is to argue that introduction of railways in India not only ushered changes in the economy but the social milieu too was deeply affected by it. There were various reactions of Gujarat society to the introduction of railways which went into phases. It began with the arrival of railways in India; the subsequent romantic acceptance of the changes that it brought in the ghat in the society; followed by adaptation of railways into the everyday life; in the end mild questioning of the railways or being critical of it. The understanding of such aspects enables one to become cognizant of the way in which the railways had affected the entire structure of society. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s The Railway Journey – suggests, one must take into account the wider social and cultural transformations caused by the introduction of railways signifying a ‘fully rounded assessment of railway’.5 The article has been divided into three sections. The first section focuses on Gujarati poems. Gujarati poems include ukhanas, children’s songs, and other wide ranging poems. The central theme is the railways and the life woven around it. The second section focuses on Gujarati prose and literature which is fictional as well as non-fictional. The third section focuses on other cultural forms like painting and dance. Before taking a glance at the social and cultural aspects,

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

335

Source: I.J. Kerr, ‘Representation and Representatives of the Railway of Colonial and Post-colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 2003, 37(2): 295.

Fig. 11.2: The logo of Gaekwad Baroda State Railway

a brief preview of beginning of railways in Gujarat is given. The first ever train in India was run between Bombay and Thane in 1853 and the second train to run was between Howrah and Hubli in next year. Thereafter Indian railway started its journey towards one of the busiest and longest railway networks in the world. In 1855, the Bombay, Baroda and Central India (BB&CI) Railway was formed, with broad gauge from Ankleshwar to Utran on west coast and in 1864 it was extended to Bombay. Before the Independence of India, several princely states owned their own railways like Bhavnagar, Kathiawad, Dwarka, Gondal, Morbi and Jamnagar which merged into BB&CI in 1948 and in 1949 Gaekwad’s Baroda State Railway (GBSR) merged in BB&CI. And before Gujarat and Maharashtra separated from a union state to become an individual state, there were separate state owned railways but in November 1951, BB&CI were merged to create a Western Railway for Independent India. In 1865, Bombay-Ahmedabad rail link was completed in BB&CI. After successful completion of Bombay-Ahmedabad rail link, BB&CI ran direct trains

336

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

between Bombay to Ahmedabad in 1870 and in 1879 the Palanpur to Ahmedabad metre gauge (MG) was inaugurated. In 1881 Rajputana State Railway joined hands with BB&CI by opening MG line for Ajmer to Ahmedabad. In 1926 narrow gauge (NG) lines were put between Bhavnagar and Talaja of Bhavnagar Tramway and it was extended to Mahuva in 1938. While in 1948, Bhavnagar State Railway, Kathiawar State Railway, Morbi Railway and Gondal Railway were all merged and integrated to Saurashtra State Railway. So far as Rajkot railway is concerned, in 1890 NG lines constructed between Wadhwan and Rajkot via Morbi opened and later on these lines were converted to BG in 1904. The Jamnagar princely state established the Rajkot to Jamnagar MG line in year 1897. In 1904 the Surendranagar to Rajkot MG line was opened. The Morbi Railway converted MG line of Rajkot to Morbi to BG in 1924. The Baroda railway was established as early as 1865. The beginnings were of course made in 1855. BB&CI Railway was established and initially worked on a Surat to Baroda corridor. The subsequent two sections focus on the poetic representation and representation of prose railway in Gujarat, followed by a brief glance at the railway in pictures in Gujarat.

I The poetic depiction of railways show the way Indians viewed and responded to the change. This economic, political and social impact of the mechanized transport system connected the nation as one and brought the society together to interact. Their responses gradually transformed from an initial overawe to acceptance and eventual assimilation or naturalization or normalization of railways in popular culture. Various aspects of railways provided a setting, an unassuming plot, and a base for societal commentary or an unconstrained metaphor.6 Railway setting, tracks, trains, bridges and tunnels became the themes of love, mystery and romance. A railway station, its yards and footbridges, its lev-

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

337

els of railway workers and officials provided the context and a good many metaphors/similes for a mysterious and tragic story. Many a times railway settings provided the theme to portray the tensions between culture and science. Railways also began to transform Indian conceptions of space, time and structural social relations. Examining these poetic representations of the modern steam railway in India is indicative of radical transformation that India was undergoing – not just economically, politically and socially but intellectually and psychologically as well. As Kerr has rightly put it that one needs to ‘explore how railways are conjured in fiction and intermittently in visual arts and cinema’.7 The use of railways in poems as simile and metaphor signify the acceptance of the new scientific achievements as a part of their imaginative world. Rudyard Kipling was generally acclaimed as the imperial poet and prophet of technology and particularly of transport technology.8 His exposure to steam ships and trains had been implanted in an early age which grew more intense in his later life. He took deep interest in the lives of engineers and technocrats by understanding their ‘shop’.9 According to Charles Carrington, ‘Kipling was the celebrant of the modern age of railways and the ocean liners at their zenith – between about 1890 and 1914’.10 He considered railways as a source of authority, discipline and used it as a tool for the civilizing mission. His poem ‘the king’ elicits the newly founded romance of the train/travelling by train.11 Romance the season-tickets mourn, He never ran to catch his train, But passed with coach and guard and horn And left the local . . . late again! Confound Romance! . . . And all unseen Romance brought up the nine-fifteen.

Some of the first few railway poems were penned down by the Europeans who viewed imperialism with a great sense of pride in the scientific progress of Britain and faith in the civi-

338

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

lizing mission in India. The following poem written on the opening of the first railway train in 1853 was a dedication to the maxim ‘the sun never sets in the British Empire’.12 The sun walks in his glory on his way,/And earth and ocean drinks his living ray. Our happy isle reposes ‘neath the light,/The wheels of toil suspended in their might. Like sleeping nature, when the day draws nigh,/Awakening into the light and life and joy. A sun is rising on the darken’d land,/Shaped by civilization’s godlike hand, This spectacle of wonders manifold. . . .

When the railways were introduced in India, they were an object of awe. As is the case with human civilization, any unusual phenomenon is either associated with unfathomable nature or an attempt is made to strike association with ordinary day-to-day events to normalize it. For example, describing a train in natural – animalistic terms. The age for the process of absorption and assimilation of railways into poetry and imaginative comprehension began by the early twentieth century. Poets begin to relate, conciliate and categorize the impact of railways on their lives and use them as a metaphor or simile. The modes of comparison could be implicit or explicit or even complex.13 Here the poet Krishna Dave has compared coming of the rain with the trains. The clouds become the train that is driven by the wind himself. The lightning bolt is compared with the whistle of the engine and the birds Vadal ni railgadi ave re lol, (the train of the clouds have come o’) Pawanbhai pote chalave re lol, (Mr. wind is riding on it himself o’) Garjine whistle wagade re lol, (its thunder is its whistle o’) Tahukao signal dekhade re lol, (the birds are showing the signal o’) Dabba ma chalkata chanta re lol, (the raindrops are pouring from the clouds (bogie) o’) Meghdhanush che ena pata re lol, (the rainbow is its tracks o’) Station ave to jara thobhe re lol, (as the station arrives it stops a bit, o’)

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

339

bheenjta gaam keva shobhe re lol, (the wet villages are looking beautiful o’) Khad-khad jharan dode re lol, (the water bodies are running, o’) uncha je parvatne tode re lol, (they are breaking big mountains o’) Khetar kahe khedoot ji avo re lol, (the farm is calling the farmer o’) mangamta sapna vavo re lol, (sow your favorite dreams o’) Kunpadbai darwaja khole re lol, (Kunpadbai, open the doors o’) lilu chum lilu chum bole re lol, (and say its green o green o’)14

Railways and the life around it also found simple expressions in the poems which meant a general acceptance without awe or oblivion. This could be seen in the nursery rhymes that were created which indicate an assumption of existence of railways as a part of their ordinary lives.15 Railgadi avi juo/(see! The train has come) Chuk-chuk karti/(it goes chuk-chuk) Bhage dode jaldi toye/(even if it runs fast) Statione aaram karati/(takes rest at the station) Koi chade ne koi utare/(where some get on and some get down) Aavanbhav chale/(coming-going carries on) Dhanik garib sau sathe baise/(the rich and the poor sit together) Saman sau jan lage/(the whole world seems equal) Milan karave koi swajan nu/(some meet up their dear ones) Virah pan koino thato/(some part from them) Madavu ne juda padavu/(to meet and to part) E kram, station upar samjhatu/(this cycle is known at the station)

This is evident from the two poems included in Gujarati textbooks for children:16 Meri Gaadi/My train – ‘My train runs in all seasons: summer, win-

ter, monsoons/She eats not rice, or dal, vegetables or rotis, but eats lots of coal/and throws out lot of smoke./She does not speak Marathi, or gujarati, or Bangla . . .’; and Chuk Chuk Gaadi – ‘buy a ticket, sit in the train/the bell rings, she runs fast/signals come showing the way, Clears the line, she does not tire of running/learn this and keep moving forward, You will reach the station . . .’. Railways in a social milieu get enmeshed to the extent that all these cultural forms and expressions assume integrative

340

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

processes that unite people. With this view, the complicit structures, institutions and practices generate shared experiences, moral codes and collective values.17 One should not assume that use of railways as metaphors is sufficient to convince that the process of absorption was complete.18 Far more than the use of this material in metaphor rather than in simile, it is its use as the vehicle of poetic comparisons which indicates its absorption; but it was not, in fact, until the twentieth century that such images were used with either frequency or, for that matter, assurance. The poet can be viewed as an intermediary or actor of ideas. The twentieth-century poet is seen to be more ‘witty’ or ‘fanciful’ than his predecessor; tending, to combine novelty with familiarity, or to discover resemblances in things actually dissimilar. Nevertheless, it can be perceived as a sign of maturity. One reason could be the resistance or awe of railways. Railways brought massive intrusion of mechanical force into the timeless and passive world of rural India. It led to great increase in social and class mobility throughout the empire. Railways tracks and the jarring train becomes a symbol of dislocation of life, as an embodiment of new forces ruthlessly. In the poem by Krishanlal Sridharni19 titled as Relgaadi no pul/The Railway Bridge these very feelings find expression. In this poem, the poet reflects the feeling of a farmer who is on awe of the railways bridge and calls it relgaadi no pul abhama tare (the bridge of train is floating in the sky). However as much as he is in awe, he is assured of the fact that this is not going to bring any change in his routine life, and therefore he is not afraid of it, which is reflected in the last line of the poem, kamnana chila ne patana na tras!! (The desires will not be hindered by the rail tracks). Railways symbolize contradictions in life due to its intrusion. This intrusion can be a positive force and even a negative force as reflected in the Yiddish literature of the 1870s-1930s which challenged the widespread notion that the rail-road was a positive development. The trains for the Jews were signs of the oppressive rhythms of modern life as they had experienced pogroms, exile, loss of culture, alien-

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

341

ation.20 Railways thus became instruments of transformed structural social relations sometime- strained transformation. And many a times the social divisions also find expression in the way railways function. There is a similarity of sentiments in the poems of Shirish Panchal and Yiddish poet Elyokum Zunser. In the poem, Ter saat ne local/Local (train) of 13:0721 the poet compares the importance of trains of the morning/ afternoon/night according to the various types of passengers they carry. The local train of 13:07 is meant only for the aimless, unemployed, small time vendors, pheriwalas/poor village folks, mendicants, devotees, elderly, and the disorderly. They all travel in third class compartments, even the staff on the train seems to belong to the same category, and the station master also does not pay much attention to this train. Unlike the trains which run in the morning and evening – which cater to purposeful people, young, employed, and the rich. In fact, the train can be seen as a force that creates unfair and discriminatory class divisions (– varied classes: AC-I, AC-II, AC-III, and Sleeper). Just as the Yiddish poet Elyokum Zunser, expresses these sentiments in his poem Lid fun ayznban (Railroad Poem): The conductors examine the tickets,/ And seat every passenger in their class,/Those in first-with comfy recliners,/And those in third-so crowded and damp.22 Nicholas Faith very aptly has written: ‘The class structure of the trains’ themselves showed the railways as social reflectors, rather than innovators.’23 Pata upar gadi/the train is on the track Dode doto kaadhi/running fiercely, Vaanki chuki ubhi aadi/zig-zag, standing-lying, Chuk Chuk Chuk Chuk Jangal aave, jhaadi aave/come forest, come trees Nadi jharana neer kudave/jumps over river, waterfall or streams, Kadi-kadi cheeso paadi/emanates dark shouts, Mota dungar fadi/tearing big mountains Vaanki chuki ubhi aadi/zig-zag, standing-lying, Chuk Chuk Chuk Chuk Mumbai avem, vadodaru/Come Mumbai, Vadodara, Surat ave, godharu/Come Surat and Godhara,

342

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

Mummaji mumbai ave/Mother comes to Mumbai Pappaji tapal lave/Father get the post, Pata upar Gadi . . ./The train’s on the track . . .

The train here is seen from the eyes of a child and a very pictographic description is given in this poem written by Avinash Vyas.24 The children have a great fascination for anything that moves and a train became a metaphor through which the children in various languages were taught many things. Another poem which can be seen again as children poems speaks about various connotations that the train represented. There is another one called as ‘Chuk-Chuk Gadi’ which equates its walk with graceful bride. The poet is very proud of the train which is used in a dainty sense. The train here has lost its awe and has been accepted and something very beautiful. Chuk chuk karti railgadi/the train calls chuk chuk Chale jaane parani ladi/walks like a new bride Bheed ema na hoye bhaari/it is not all that crowded Gamdani e nani gadi/it is a small train of a village Engine dabba nana ena/the engine and the bogie are smaller, Dheeme adange nadi khadi/slowly they cross river or valleys Kolsa khai ne varal kadhe/eats coal and emits vapour Aajubaju khetar vadi/surrounded by fields and forest Najik-najik station ave/the station comes nearer Utaru nirate chade jaave/get down at leisure Nani toye lage pyari/it is lovely even if it’s smaller Chukchuk mara gam ni gadi/Chuk-chuk my village train25

The railways also signifies the transition in the way the country was defined. In the following two poems the poet ponders over the manner in which the railway network connected the various states and the economic development of the whole nation as a result. The poems are simple in nature with profound implications of growing economy.26 The poem: Aagaadi Aavi/Train has come speculates how the railway network has connected the entire country. The railways is seen as a powerful symbol of national unification

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

343

Aaggaadi aavi, engine gaadi aavi/Train has come, engine train has come chuk, chuk, chuk chuk relgaadi aavi/chuk, chuk, chuk, chuk rail train has come Kyan kyathi aavi, kiya mulakthi aavi/From where has it come, from which region has it come Mumbaithi aavi, Maharashtrathi aavi?/from Mumbai, from Maharashtra? Aagagaadi . . . /Rail train. . . .

The following poetic creation Maalgaadi Aavi27/Goods Train has Arrived is the description of all the kinds of goods the train has brought along with it – food, building material, etc.: Maalgaadi Aavi, Aa relgaadi aavi/Goods train has come/this rail train has come Shoon shoon laavi? saaman shoon laavi?/What has she brought? What goods has she brought? Phathar, cement/loha, laakda, laavi maalgaadi/Stone, cement/Iron, wood, the train has brought

A process of naturalization that could be nudged along by, through nursery rhymes, among other techniques, to instill the worth of the railways into the minds of the young children. The young reader is told that railway trains run in all seasons, never tire, move very fast, and provide all kinds of essential materials besides ensuring an enjoyable travel experience. Assimilation by the common consciousness means that the scientific achievements have been completly absorbed – naturalized. The poet’s account of railways becomes ‘droll, scornful, ordinary, and they are seen as antiquated and relegated to the background’. Such as Sitanshu Yashaschandra Mehta, a well-known Gujarati poet in his poem, Yardma/ In the Yard, sketches the dismal picture of a railway yard – aimless, jumbled and confused tracks; abandoned, rusted broken wagons, but the sporadic and spasmodic movement of wheels of a passing train disturb the eerie calm of the yard, wake up the sleepy pigeon, and suddenly the tracks come to

344

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

life and point the horizon to the pigeon.28 Rebzeb, muttiwadi, aandhadi, dot muki Nathela paataao, Sweating, blind tangled tracks, running with tight fist Jaraakma tho gotha khaai, athadai, techai, guchawai, jaii Tumble, collide, get hammered and confused in a moment Bhangela, nadaae, kannsata, kannsata chaupaas padeche. It is scattered all over groaning with broken shin-bone.

O.F. Jung, then as Assistant Mechanical Engineer of Western Railway composed a poem on dieselization. Published in August it brings out the frustration of time honoured steam locomotives:29 ‘A YG met a YDM-1/And asked for where did you come. Don’t you know, said YDM-1,/That I am potent of things to come, As a diesel passed a steam, He blew his horn and screamed, Your days are gone,/For old things can’t go on and on.

Gieve Patel’s heady poem30 ‘From Bombay Central’ has a visual, aural impact. The raconteur settles into a half-empty compartment -‘Cool; the odour of human manure Vague and sharp drifts in From adjoining platforms. The station’s population of porters, Stall-keepers, toughs and vagabonds relieve themselves Ticketless, into the bowels of these waiting pets: Gujarat Mail, Delhi Janata, Bulsar Express, Quiet linear beasts . . . .

The advent of high‐speed passenger railway travel in the mid‐nineteenth century radically altered the traveller’s perception of self, other people, and the landscape. The manifestation of these features is reflected in the Gujarati poems discussed above. From a child’s eye to the eye of a woman and so much more, railways in Gujarat reflected fear, hope, fascination, happiness, speed and sometimes even one’s life. The following section discusses how railways were seen in fictional and non-fictional writing.

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

345

II The above representations were from the Gujarati poems. As far as Gujarati prose is concerned, the railways and the other related institutions find manifestations mostly from the early twentieth century. However, the most prolific writing is of an eye-witness account of the first railway line that started in Gujarat. The first railway line was established in Gujarat in 1864 and the network expanded in the following years in both the British territories and the princely states.31 The first train ran between Ahmedabad and Surat on 20 January 1863 starting at six in the morning from Ahmedabad. The following is an account from the newspaper which covered the event. For a better understanding the whole account has been taken and is translated from Gujarati. The train in this account was known as Aag Gadi. According to it, before the beginning of the travel through train people had to use Aag boat from Ghogha Bandar to reach from Mumbai. Kavi Dalpatram although was a critic of the policies of Lord Dalhousie, but he praised the Governor-General for the initiation of networks of Aag Gadi, telegram and postal service. The actual reason behind the establishment of railways in the colonial mindset is pretty well known. On 16 April 1853, the first train took off from Mumbai to Thana. The railway stations were decorated and thousands of people witnessed the historical event. It took fifty-seven minutes to travel the distance of 21 miles. The train had three engines and fourteen bogies and almost four hundred passengers who were largely guests. The same situation was with the train that started between Ahmedabad and Surat a hundred and fifty years ago. People had gathered to witness the railway engine crossing the railway-bridge on the Narmada River. There were varied reactions to such a novel event in their lives. Some laid a wager that the goddess Narmada would soon engulf the dark engine others thought that the engine would fall off the bridge. Many of them thought the engine to be a dark ogre. These reactions were discussed in the newsletter

346

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

called Gujarat Shalapatra in 1863. The description is an eye witness account of the journey. According to it, ‘Aag ni Gadi’ or fire vehicle has started from Ahmedabad on 20th January 1868. Those who want to travel or send goods to Ahmedabad, Memdavad, Nadiad, Vadodara, Bharauch, Surat etc can travel in comfort and quickly. The train leaves from Ahmedabad at six in the morning and leaves from Surat at six in the evening.

The writer gives a brief account of the history of the beginning of railways in England. He himself is awed by the speed of the travel and believes that ‘in some time, when the train would start from Calcutta to here, it will be nothing less than a moment of happiness when we would take not more than three-four days to reach Calcutta’. He urges the readers to understand the revolution that the railway spells. ‘The readers know that a very good bullock cart which if travels continually with its maximum capacity can cover twenty five gau in a day. If that is compared with this vehicle which runs without a bullock then the result shouldn’t come as a surprise.’ He advocates the railway and hopes that the people find ‘nothing wrong with it’. He furthers the cause of railways by enumerating various benefits accruing out of it. He says: These readers should know that the railway gadi is the result of research, intelligence and brevity of the British. The train journey saves on time. The bullock cart takes ten days to reach Surat, whereas with railway we can reach in a day. The remaining nine days actually increase our life by nine days. The reason being that those nine days can be utilized in doing some other work. You don’t have to look for company. In favour of the train travel he says that one faces during the travel are also less. One cannot change travel plans. While travelling through the bullock charts, one has to spend the night at unknown villages, which usually is spent in great discomfort. In the train, the journey itself spells out huge comforts. There are great differences between the two. There are many advantages of the Aag-gadi. The train does a lot of work of bullock. This means that the bullock can be utilized for other purposes. Also, if the railway is spread across the country then the cost

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

347

of keeping large armies can be reduced as one battalion could be easily transferred from one place to the other.”32

He also reproaches them for not accepting the railway as it is but to some extent insists on the innocence of his fellow country-men. However, it is important to spell the mistake which the innocent country people have made in perceiving the railways. Since the work that the railway have undertaken comes as a surprise to many. The ignorant countrymen call it ‘Dev Ni Gadi’ or the vehicle of Gods. Some think the train to be a ‘mother’. Quite a few of the people worshipped the engine. This is naturally mocked by the British.

However, instead of elaborating, the point that made here is that is the cast that the human beings have carved (the inventions by human being is referred here) should not be worshipped like gods. This only proves the ignorance of those who misunderstand human inventions as divine. The writer appeals to his countrymen to teach and to learn. Those who have the benefit of secular education should teach the less fortunate ones, so that they too can see clearly the boon of modern technology. He insists that it is important to turn them towards education. Apart from this eye-witness account there were many nonfictional writing on railways. However, they were technical and not people’s perceptions. In the twentieth century there were many authors like Chandulal Mehta who wrote various volumes entitled as ‘Gathariyas’ or Bundles (Baggage) which were basically travelogues. However, his most important work is Aag Gadi,33 a popular drama. The play depicts a phase of the Indian life which existed for a pretty long time all over India. It is a realistic picture of those days without any exaggeration. For example, the incident of the shooting down of the running torch-bearer happened practically before his eyes in the province of Saurashtra in the early 1920s. The loading of an engine with coal was done by the women folk

348

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

irrespective of the night and day shifts. Christmas was an important holiday, as it is today, all throughout the country. This play has three acts. In it the dark side of the railways is portrayed. There is also a depiction of railways as a colonial power where a poor Gujarati family suffers at the hands of its colonial masters. Since Indians did not get higher positions in the railways and were given only lower class jobs as they were less educated or uneducated. All the Indians whether Hindus, Muslims or Parsis lived together. This play depicts easy friendship between the bhaiyas of United Provinces, the Marwaris and Gujaratis. All of them are workers filling coals into the engine. They worked for almost eighteen hours out of twenty-four and earned only fifty paisa or one rupee. The main character Vaghar lived with his wife Rukhi and son Naranio. Besides regular trains, special trains carrying English officers also come and disrupt the life of the workers. Through the drama the author peeps into the life of the workers filling coals in the engine for the whole night, along with the watchman and lightman. In the story, Vaghar returns home after a tiring day, however he was called to serve on another train which was a special train carrying European officers. Hungry and thirsty Vaghar goes to his duty, however the course of events take such a step that he dies. This dispossesses Rukhi with the only constant source of income and she knows her fate, which is to die hungry. Instead of mourning, she goes about begging for the job for her son. After much negotiation which included humiliation, Rukhi is able to manage to get a job for Naraniyo as the torch-man. However, he too dies on the railway track because of snake bite. The only source of income left for Rukhi is Vaghar’s cow which too dies under an incoming fast train. The play ends with a question mark which says why and how this happened. In Bhadrambhadra, a Gujarati novel/satire from 1900, written by Ramanlal Nilkantha, Bhadrambhadra, the protagonist, embarks on the ‘noble’ mission of opposing the reformists in their endeavour to bring changes in society. He begins his journey at Ahmedabad station by abusing the Parsi

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

349

ticket collector, addressing him as a yavan or a foreigner and performing a ritual purification on being touched by him. Once in the train he is anxious to know the caste of his fellow passengers. The joke however is upon him, as most people don’t understand his Sanskritized Gujarati and think him to be a madman. A reference is also made here to a short story by celebrated Gujarati poet Jhaverchand Meghani entitled as Railgadi Na Dabba Ma.34 Meghani was a noted poet, litterateur, social reformer and freedom fighter from Gujarat. He was born in Chotila. Mahatma Gandhi spontaneously gave him the title of Raashtreeya Shaayar (National Poet). Besides this he received many awards like Ranjitram Suvarna Chandrak and Mahida Paaritoshik in literature. He authored more than 100 books. His first book was a translation of Rabindranath Tagore’s Kathaa-u-Kaahinee titled Kurbani Ni Katha (Stories of martyrdom) which was first published in 1922. He contributed widely to Gujarati folk literature. He went from village to village in search of folklore and published them in various volumes of Saurashtra Ni Rasdhar. He was also the editor of Phoolchhab, a newspaper of Janmabhoomi group (which is being published till date from Rajkot). In this story the great Gujarati poet and writer Meghani gives a vivid description of a scene in a railway compartment. The characters of this story are passengers from different class, caste and gender. There is an active world that is portrayed here. The passengers get interested in each other with one common curiosity, i.e. illness of a woman. The woman suffers from stomach ache and travels across Gujarat to find an effective cure. However, they (she and her toothless husband) have little faith in the medicine prescribed by the gora babus (white men). She is advised by women, one fakir35 and many others who travelled with her in the compartment. Her plight is able to generate reluctant interest of a vidvan or an intellectual. He eventually is able to see them off to a good hospital in Rajkot. Jhaverchand Meghani unwittingly depicts the railways as a unifying mode. People belonging to different sections of the society

350

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

come together and it almost assumes the shape of the reinforcement of humanity. The socialization which had been so unbending in the country in the last century amongst the castes seemed to have lost its rigidity. The railway journey is also used by the Gujarati story tellers to explain life or various facets of life. In the next short story which is relatively new, the railways emerge as the ‘hero’. This short story is titled as ‘Return Ticket’36 and is written by Suresh Dalal. It is about a woman who is a failure in life in every sense. However, she finds some meaning when she falls in love with a man called Madan, after only one month of meeting. They soon decide to elope to Mumbai from Ahmedabad, but at a hotel in Mumbai, the fact is disclosed that he has no plans to marry her, as in his wallet there was only one return ticket to Ahmedabad. This meant he was leaving her to her fate and returning. The ‘return-ticket’ becomes the point at which the woman is able to understand the true intentions of her lover. She flees from the hotel. In the non-fictional genre, there are many who had worked on and around railways. However, the use of railways in the socio-cultural milieu has been done beautifully by two authors, i.e. Mahatma Gandhi and Himanshi Shelat. One of the few who contested the very presence of the railways was the man who became the focal figure of the Indian National movement, Mahatma Gandhi. Aspects of Gandhi’s views on railways specifically and modern technology more generally were presaged in the positions espoused by men like Vivekanand and Aurobindo or shared by some contemporaries like Tagore. Gandhi’s views on railways were expressed strongly in Hind Swaraj, first published in 1910. Gandhi inverted every positive representation of the railways; he turned every benefit the railways were typically assumed to offer into a negative conditions; indeed, he went further: railways he said, ‘propagate evil’. ‘Good travels at snail’s pace – it can, therefore, have little to do with the railways’ he memorably wrote.37 Many Indians sought to appropriate the railways for

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

351

the projects of Indian national modernity. Gandhi castigated the railways. He recognized the railways’ importance as an instrument of colonial rule. Railways along with doctors and lawyers had impoverished India; without railways, he said, ‘the English could not have such a hold on India as they have’. Gandhi did not deny the many ways in which the railways had shaped in making of colonial India but he read those transformations as reprehensible and productive of a strengthened British presence. Gandhi’s solution was however, not clear. He did not advocate ripping up the tracks and returning to bullock cart; he did use the railways himself – often in the national cause although he denied the standard view that railways had facilitated the emergence of the Indian nation. Gandhi’s voice was ignored on railway issues, as it was on much else. The Indian nation did appropriate the railways. The railways become part and parcel of Indian life. Another path-breaking but fairly unrecognized work is that of Himanshi Shelat titled as Platform No. 4. In this work, which is, a narration of the author’s experiences, platform number four of Surat junction is used as a school, an institution, playground, etc., to teach the street urchins the lessons of life. In the end they wind up teaching each other the lessons of life. The platform which was relatively empty (as usually is the case with the farther platforms) becomes the premises where the background of the narration lays. The authorities (police and railway station) allow the author (who is essentially a social worker and who abhors the term ‘social work’) to start an activity for the urchins who loiter aimlessly on the platform. The author has given a vivid description of the platform of the Surat Railway Station, which was dirty, manned by people who were sometimes travellers, but most of the time permanent residents of the platform. The lead characters of the narration are the children who instead of being taught, teach their teacher the lessons of life. As the narration progresses, the authors involve almost everyone

352

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

whose life in normal times is associated with railways. There are the police-wallahs, the station authorities, the shopkeepers, the girls who worked as domestic help and come to take some rest on the station and last but not the least the daily commuters. The daily commuters usually form a community, which is true of this station too. The author recounts the drama that enfolds when she is rebuked for teaching these urchins by women who commute daily. They repeatedly call them thieves. However, the whole incident proves advantageous to the author as her defence for the kids proves to be an ice-breaker. Since then, a bond develops between the children and the author. As the narration progresses, the author involuntarily delves in the life that revolves around railways, trains and the platforms. Through Bholi, a girl in the group (who sings and begs on the train), she discusses the society that interacts in a crowd. She is totally ignored by most of the people. At times she is considered a thief and at times is pushed around. Through Chotu, she is able to convey that trains are more than a mode of travel, they are the training grounds. Chotu, at a young age had been able to travel to-and-fro from one station to the other and was enamoured by Mumbai, as the railway station of Mumbai was much larger and had more crowds. He had plans to run off to Mumbai and even managed to do so. He felt that school was fine but they would bind him. Whereas railways and the travel gave him a free-scape to learn all that even the finest schools could not teach him. The above account has portrayed the depiction of railways in various genres of prose literature. These were individual experiences, community experiences or both. The fact remains that these were the responses of railways in people’s lives. Railway had been able to integrate a sense of uniformity in the society. This uniformity was not contested most of the times but was accepted after initial reluctance. However, there are other cultural forms too which did not remain untouched by the effects of railways. An account of some of them is presented below.

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

353

III Sighting a steam train for the first time is an unforgettable experience, which often leaves a lasting impression on the imagination. Depictions of steam engines and trains can be found in different forms of folk and tribal art in India. One such art form is the Pithora painting, the other genre of culture, i.e. the tradition of art and craft. In Gujarat the most widely known art form is the Pithora painting. Pithora is a highly ritualistic painting done on the walls by several tribes like Rathwas, Bhilals, and Naykas, who live in central Gujarat, 90 km from Vadodara, in a village called Tejgadh. In several other villages around Tejgadh and Chhota Udepur taluka of Vadodara district, a large number of these tribes live, where we find Pithora paintings on three inner walls of the house. These paintings have a significance in their lives and they believe making the Pithora paintings in their homes brings peace, prosperity and happiness. What is even more interesting is that there is never an attempt to imitate nature. A horse or a bull, which might be a vision of a God, impresses them with only one central quality. This central quality is worked upon and given a form.38 The presence of the painting of a train in Pithora painting might have impressed the artists, and therefore one sees the depictions of a train in the painting.39 The painting in Fig. 11.3 describes a mythical story with the train as one of its essential components. A ritual painting, the Pithora is made by the Rathwa community living in the Chhota Udepur region of eastern Gujarat. The painting is made in the honour of Baba Pithoradev, a prominent deity of the Rathwa. He is worshipped for the welfare of family and cattle. The painting normally occupies three walls of the main living space inside a Rathwa house. The main feature of the Pithora painting is the chowk, a rectangular space with a decorated border inside which the marriage procession of Baba Pithoradev is painted. The chowk is divided into several zones. Above the wavy horizontal line of flags is the world

354

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

Source: Amaresh Datta, Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature: Devraj to Jyoti, vol. 2, Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1998, p. 1286.

Fig. 11.3: Pithora painting in the Railway museum at Baroda

of gods. The Goddess Valan, depicted as a green rider-less horse can be seen here. She is worshipped as the protector of the earth. Lakari-Jokhari, the deities who record and weigh all activities on earth and note the destiny of each person are also depicted as sitting on chairs with notebooks in hand. The marriage procession is made up from left to right by Rani Kajal, Gam Dev, Pithori, Pithora and Ganeh riding on horses. Rani Kajal is Pithora’s foster mother. According to Rathwa folklore Pithora was abandoned by his unwed mother Kali Koyal and was adopted by Rani Kajal. Kali Koyal is depicted in the painting as a black cuckoo. Ganeh, is always depicted as a blue rider on horse, smoking a hookah. He is believed to protect people from attack by wild animals and is different from the Hindu deity Ganesh. Below the procession of horses is Raja Bhoj. Seated on an elephant and smoking a hookah. Raja Bhoj the Rathwa king, is said to have surveyed the land and divided the people into villages at the time of creation. On the extreme left is Raja Ravan shown with multiple heads

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

355

and swords hanging from his arms and shoulders. Though similar in appearance to the demon king Ravan of the Ramayana there is no connection between them. Just below Raja Ravan are the first farmer and his wife; Aab Kanvi ploughing the land. According to Rathwa folklore, the divine bull at the bottom right of the painting was born with the seeds of trees and grasses in his horns. As the bull pierced the earth with his horns, the earth became fertile. The other cultural form of Gujarat which is famous is its dance form called garba. There are many garbas40 which have been constructed around railways and trains. The garba about the first train was, Pehli gadi aagni dekhari/first vehicle of fire is seen Tao dale jova loko jaore/people go and see it Aau rakmande chithi mangavi ne/rakmande has asked for that letter Aath dahade jova jaure/I will go to see it for all the eight days Aao gadi jovani ticket/this is the ticket to watch the train Kai pawan chakkio/and many wind mills Leva jau re, gadi ni jaher/will go o’to take a peek at the train Chithi chorai/the letter has been stolen Tahare dotiyo dotiyo vechai/then will go buy another one Aao gadi aagni dekharine/come we’ll go to see the fire vehicle Bhoukhade loko jova jau re . . . all people go to see it. . . .

There are other common garbas like Mumbai thi gadi avi re. . . . This garba is also known as ramjhaniyu where the lyrics is not fixed but changed according to the wishes of the singer. The essence of this is that the train is coming from Mumbai full of goodies. The goodies could be actions which the singer sings, for instance, aa gaadi ne dhakko maro re . . . push this train and the people who are standing in one line, start pushing each other. There are many other folk songs which use railway in a metaphoric sense. In one particular form of marriage song, the fatanas, the brides and the bridegrooms parties indulge in ridiculing each other with crude and sometimes even obscene humour. They are usually sung in fast rhythmic styles.41

356

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

Conclusion When people think of trains and their functions, they simply view them as modes of transportation. In literature, this is not solely the case. While it is true that trains are included in the setting because the characters of the story are departing, arriving, or currently riding the train, the trains may be present for underlying reasons. What they symbolize can be indicative of the themes of the story. Using trains as a symbol is present in literary history. It has been used as a place where people meet accidentally, go their separate ways, take time to think, work on something and even as a place of rest and relaxation. There are plenty of examples of this concept in literature given above. The people had experienced the coming of the railway age as a watershed in the history of Gujarat. Some greeted and others mourned the changes that came with the new technology. As one might expect, references to railways and the phenomena surrounding them become one of the important part of Gujarati fiction. The railway not only changed both the landscapes and cityscapes of Gujarat, but it also changed conceptions of time and distance. According to Ian Kerr, ‘Representation and representations are an “important way in”; they are not the “destination”’.42 The cultural magnitude of India’s railway history has to be studied hitherto on a supplementary and elaborate plane. The aforesaid poetic depiction of railways is an attestation of the cultural acceptance of railways by the Indians. Travelling by train has become an integral part of their lives, which also to some extent altered the way the society changed. There is a logical acceptance – characterized by modern and open-minded attitude, with the hope to bring about essential changes in the society. An epitome of both the acceptances can be seen in Rudyard Kipling’s distinctive Kim, which depicts the train of the Empire as an Indian train, populated by Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus speaking their languages and making it their train through dialogue and repartee.

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

357

NOTES 1. These lines are a part of Saurashtra folklore, where the coming of the railways was seen with scepticism. A. Yajñika and S. Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat: Plurality, Hindutva, and Beyond, Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2005, p. 97. 2. T. Mark, Dabhoi Lines: Railways of the Yore: Beginning of Narrow Guage, Guiford: Genesis Publication, 1912 (An Excerpt). 3. I. Carter, Railways and Culture in Britain: The Epitome of Modernity, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 1-29; it is an important contribution to the cultural studies of railways; R. Chartier, Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations, 1988, p. 47. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, tr. Lydia G. Cochrane; P. Burke, What is Cultural History: Polity, Trace the Development of Cultural History, Cambridge: Polity Publications, 2008, pp. 9-20. 4. M. Freeman, ‘The Railway as Cultural Metaphor: What Kind of Railway History?’revisited The Journal of Transport History, 1999, 20(2): 160; M.J. Freeman, Railways and the Victorian Imagination, California: Yale University Press, provides details for Victorian England, 1999, p. 29. He writes of England of the 1840s and 1850s: ‘The idea that the railways coincided with and marked out the defeat of the old order is echoed in much contemporary commentary’. 5. W. Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century, California: University of California Press, 2014. He sees many social and cultural threads of the contemporary world coming out of this technological advent. In its day the railroad was seen as an agent in the annihilation of space and time. 6. I.J. Kerr, ‘Representation and Representations of the Railways of Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 2003, 37(2): 295. 7. Kerr, ibid. 8. J. Warburg, ‘Poetry and Industrialism: Some Refractory Material in Nineteenth-Century and Later English Verse’, The Modern Language Review, 1958, p. 164. 9. C. Harvie, ‘The Sons of Martha: Technology, Transport, and Rudyard Kipling’, Victorian Studies, pp. 269-70.

358

Maitree Vaidya Sabnis

10. C. Carrington and C. Carrington, Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work, London: Macmillan, 1978, p. 121. 11. S. Legg, ed., The Railway Book: An Anthology. ‘The King’ in The Seven Seas, 1952, p. 1896. 12. Extracts from the Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce, The Times of India, Bombay Daily Edition, 18 April 1857. 13. The Modern Language Review, vol. 53, no. 2, April 1958, p. 165. 14. Vadal ni Railgadi by Krishna Dave, http://tahuko.com. 15. www.sumit4all.com/life/a-poem-on-indian-railways-chukchuk-gaadi, Sumit Gupta, July 2010 16. ‘Baal Geeto’/Nursery Rhymes, Vadodara: Mahadev Publications, 2006, p. 3. 17. L. Taksa, ‘Pumping the Life-Blood into Politics and Place: Labour Culture and the Eveleigh Railway Workshops’, Labour History, 2000, p. 14. 18. The Modern Language Review, vol. 53, no. 2, April 1958, p. 164. 19. K. Sridharni, Punarpi, Collection of Poems, Bombay: Vohra & Co, 1st edn., 1961, p. 70. 20. L. Garrett, ‘Trains and Train Travel in Modern Yiddish Literature’, Jewish Social Studies, 2001, 7(2): 68-9. 21. H. Trivedi (ed.), Shirish Panchal, ‘13-7 ni local’, in Kavya Swad, Gandhinagar, 2006, pp. 6-11. 22. Jewish Social Studies, New Series, vol. 7, no. 2, Winter 2001, pp. 68-6. 23. N. Faith, The World the Railways Made, Bodley Head, 1990, p. 235. 24. http://www.forsv.com/guju/2006/ 25. Rav Chandrakant, Chuk-Chuk Gadi (Bal Kavyo), Anand: M.M. Sahitya Prakashan, 2011, p. 47. 26. Modha Jayant, Kalgaan/Chirping of Birds, Bombay, 2009, p. 22. 27. Ibid., p. 23. 28. Sitanshu Yashaschandra Mehta, Odysseus nu Halesu, Mumbai and Ahmedabad: R.R. Sheth & Co., 1974, pp. 15-17. 29. R.R. Bhandari, Western Railway, Bombay: Western Railway Publication, 1987, p. 153 . 30. ‘Gieve Patel, ‘From Bombay Central’, reprinted in Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner (eds.), Bombay. Metaphor for Modern India, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 139-40; The Modern Language Review, vol. 53, no. 2, April 1958, p. 189.

Railways in Gujarati Literature and Traditions

359

31. Yagnik and Sheth, p. 119. 32. http://www.divyabhaskar.co.in/article/MGUJ-AHM-first-trainstart-between-ahmedabad-and-surat-before-150-year-2771477. html 33. C.C. Mehta, Iron road (Aag-gadi), Bombay: Thackers Publications, 1970. 34. Meghani Jhaverchand, ‘Rail Gadi Na Dabba Ma’, Meghanini Navalkathao, vol. 2/1, 1942. 35. Mendicant. 36. http://rdgujarati.wordpress.com/2006/03/31/return-ticket/ 37. See Chapter 2, M. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, Delhi: Rajpal & Sons, 2010. 38. S. Ratnagar, Being Tribal, Delhi: Primus Books, 2010, p. 13. 39. http://dabhoilines.blogspot.in/ 40. Garba is a popular folk dance from the State of Gujarat, which depicts the rich tradition of song, dance and drama. 41. Amaresh Datta, Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature: Devraj to Jyoti, vol. 2, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1988, p. 1286. 42. Kerr, ‘Representation and Representations of the Railways of Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 2003, 37(2): 326.

CHAPTER 11

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway on the Colonial Rail-Network Aruna Awasthi

This article is an endeavour to determine the challenges faced by the princely state of Baroda by means of its location on the railway network of British India and assess the economic impact of the extension of railways into its territories. Once the Indian princes accepted the paramountcy of the British Crown which guaranteed them against external attack and internal disturbances, they were expected to conform to imperial policy in matters connected directly or indirectly with defence, e.g. admiralty, communications (railways, posts, and communication) military establishments, and the manufacture of munitions.1 The first railway line in India was formally opened to the public on 16 April 1853 from Boribunder to Thane, a distance of 21 miles on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway (GIPR).2 The period between 1854 and 1899 witnessed the formulation of a railway policy to connect far-flung British territories in India by effecting junctions of the various railway lines. Lord Dalhousie in his famous Minutes on Railways [in India] of 4 July 1850 and of 20 April 1853 sketched a blueprint for a well balanced railway network in order to avoid a mushrooming of unorganized railways constructed by private companies. He emphatically suggested that besides the connection of the three seats of British power, viz., Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, the Grand Trunk Lines (GT) should be selected on

362

Aruna Awasthi

the basis of the three priorities:3 The extent of political and commercial advantages; engineering feasibilities; and the adaptation of the route to serve as a main channel of such subordinate lines (feeder lines) as may be found necessary for a specific purpose. The Grand Trunk lines connecting the three presidency towns had to pass through certain princely states, such as: . GIPR and MR (Madras Railway) route passed through the Nizam’s Hyderabad territories. . BB&CI (Bombay-Baroda and Central India) and RMR (Rajputana-Malwa Railway) passed through the Gaikwad’s Baroda, and other princely states in Gujarat and Kathiawad towards Agra and Delhi. . GIPR and IMR (Indian Midland Railway) through the Scindia’s Gwalior towards Agra and Delhi. The British made use of these railway lines as tentacles of imperialism, to exploit the hinterlands of the princely states of their natural resources; strengthening political control; making enormous monetary gains through increased passenger and freight traffic, and create an enlarged market for British manufactured goods. On the one hand, the railway companies benefitted by over charging the princely states for working their lines and controlling the rates and fares for their own benefit, while on the other hand, the princely states faced revenue losses in transit duties and in profits from rail traffic which they passed on to the main lines. However, they did receive some advantages in the form of increased connectivity within their own territories as well as with others areas in addition to greater mobility and economic benefits. Gaikwad’s of Baroda consisted of four disconnected and scattered divisions: Baroda, Navsari, Kadi, Amreli and the port of Okhamandal which are shown in yellow on the following map. The State was interlaced with the British divisions of Ahmedabad, Bharuch, Kheda, Surat and Panchmahal and 307 other small and large princely states.

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

363

Fig. 12.1: Map of Baroda (Source: The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. VII, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908).

The importance of Baroda had been recognized by most of the British officials including Dalhousie (access to cotton areas, timber from Dangs, and opium from Kadi and Malwa and a direct route for speedy conveyance of troops from Bombay to upper India at Agra).4 The BB&CI conducted surveys in Gujarat from 1853 onwards for laying the railway lines.5 The Baroda state after lengthy negotiations agreed to surrender land in its territory for the railway tracks provided that the private owners were compensated for the loss of their lands6 and second, adequate guarantees were given against any losses to the state revenues on account of transit duties. This was a very difficult matter. In 1859 Maharaja Khanderao agreed to receive an annual amount from the British govern-

364

Aruna Awasthi

ment equivalent to any proved loss in transit duties. Since it was difficult to prove losses the Baroda government gave up the annual compensatory rights in 1876.7 The Grand Trunk line was made operational by BB&CI to Baroda in January 1860.8 During Mayo’s viceroyalty the railway expansion was undertaken. The various native states were asked to provide land free for strategic lines passing through their territories. Such grants were made willingly and some of the states also provided the companies with free timber and other building material, even compensated the local landowners, themselves for the land granted to the railways.9 The BB&CI Railway, with its auxiliary the RMR, passed from south to north, almost in a straight line, through Navsari, Baroda and Kadi districts and had major stations, such as Billimora, Navsari, Mehsana and Sidhpur in Baroda territory. In addition to these main lines, there were a number of branch railways connecting important places in the interior of the state with the main lines and serving as its feeders. Taking into consideration the incentives provided by the BB&CI lines, Maharaja Khanderao decided to construct a railway on the narrow gauge of two ft and six inches, between Miyagam (Karjan) a station on the BB&CI Railway and Dabhoi, an important centre of trade in the Baroda district10 and thereby beginning the process of connecting villages with the towns of the Baroda on the GT route. The Baroda railways were a subject of much debate in the public – newspapers. The Bombay Times published a letter (1851) in the editorial section which was a rebuttal to a particular committee’s report which stated that the Baroda railways would not be able to meet its operational costs , leave alone making profits.11 On the other hand, the Diwan of the Baroda state, T. Madhav Rao12 looked forward to the creation of a unity propelled by the railways:13 What a glorious change the railway has made in old and long neglected India! . . . Tamil, Telegu, Canarese, Marathi, Guzerati, Hindustani, Bengali, – populations which had been isolated for unmeasured ages, now easily mingle in civilized confusion. In my

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

365

various long journeys it has repeatedly struck me that if India is to become a homogeneous nation, and is ever to achieve solidarity, it must be by means of the Railways as a means of transport, and by means of the English language as a medium of communication.

The Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway (GBSR) began as a bullock driven light tramway in 1863 on the above route from Miyagam to Dabhoi, a distance of 20 miles (32.18 km).14 It was reported in The Illustrated London News15 and The Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle,16 All those who are acquainted with India and its affairs must recognise a new ‘sign of the times’ in the fact that a native Prince has atlast constructed a railway at his own cost, and has thus, we may hope, inaugurated the investment of native capital in great public works.

The Times of India Summary of 28 February notices the event as follows: It is not very creditable to European enterprise that the Baroda Prince has been allowed to take the start of us in this matter. On the small 2ft. 6in. Tramway between Meagaum and Dauboi, now being constructed by the Guicowar, whose intelligence in thus initiating this enterprise is truly admirable, loads of six tons, exclusive

Fig. 12.2: Indian Tramway Constructed by His Highness the Gaikwad of Baroda (Source: The Illustrated London News, 23 May 1863, p. 561).

366

Aruna Awasthi

of the wagons, are to be seen drawn by single pairs of bullocks with greater ease and speed than we can now convey half a ton over any Government road in the district. So much is this tramway appreciated, we are told, by the people along the line, that during the monsoon of last year, when a small part of it only had been completed, no less than three rupees per bale were offered and given for the conveyance of cotton for a distance of eight miles. The transport was otherwise impossible from the state of the roads.17

Madhav Rao explained that the GBSR decided to adopt the narrow gauge because a broader gauge would not be paying and second they were simply intended as a substitute for metalled roads which the circumstances of Gujarat rendered inordinately costly.18 The above connection was upgraded to a proper railway in 1872. The time table for the first stretch of rail link in the Baroda state was as follows: Table 12.1: Time Table Between Meagam (Kurjan) and Dubhoi 7 February 1873 Down Trains Weekdays and Sundays Station Miles from Meagam Meagam Arr. 10.32 North a.m. Meagam Arr. 1 p.m. North Meagam Arr. 11.42 South a.m. Meagam Arr. 6.48 South p.m.

5¼

Meagam Dep. 1.30 p.m. Gundara Arr. 2.2 Dep. 2.4

Up Trains Weekdays and Sundays Station Miles from Dubhoe Dubhoe Dep. 7.30 a.m. 3 Nada (water) 6¾ Mundala Arr. 8.17 Dep. 8.27 11¼ Karvan Arr. 8.55 Dep. 9.5 14¾ Gundara Arr. 9.26 Dep. 9.29 20 Meagam Arr. 10.00 Meagam Dep. South

10.32 a.m.

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway 8-¾

Karwan

Arr. 2.25 Meagam Dep. Dep. 2.35 South 13-¼ Mundala Arr. 3.3 Meagam Dep. Dep. 3.13 North 17 Nada Meagam Dep. North (water) Dubhoe Arr. 4.0 20 [Notification/Letter No. 372 of 1873, 7 Feb. 1873, GSA]

367 1.00 p.m. 11.42 a.m. 6.4

Passenger and Freight Fares Class

Fares

Passenger Fares Upper class

8 pies per mile

Lower class

4 pies per mile

Goods Rates First and special

10 pies per ton per mile

Second

13 pies per ton per mile

Third

20 pies per ton per mile

Fourth

28 pies per ton per mile

Fifth

40 pies per ton per mile

Note: Grains and salt to be charged 8 pies per ton per mile Source: Signed by Seewajirao Khanvelkar and H.F. Hancock, Lt. Col. R.E. Acting Consulting Eng. for Railway; and C. Currey, Agent, BB&CI Rly Co., 2 April 1873.

BB&CI did not invest any capital in the construction of GBSR lines; but it was able to accrue most of the financial benefits through operating costs which went as high as 12.5 per cent of the gross income.19 The Baroda state, tried unsuccessfully to negotiate this unfair siphoning of the profits by the BB&CI. The state argued that the feeder lines were responsible for getting a sizeable traffic to the mainline, thus increasing the profits. The British officials were unhappy with the Baroda state for imposing too many taxes/fees over the goods entering into the railway stations and claimed that the farmers were forced to use the circular roads. This is evi-

368

Aruna Awasthi

dent from the correspondence between the BB&CI officials, the Railway Department officials of the Bombay Presidency and Madhav Rao,20 . . . I visited the Dabhoi Branch and ascertained fully and carefully from most reliable sources that a very heavy transit duty is imposed on Mowra21 brought to the line for dispatch and proves a great obstacle to the free development of traffic: Transit duties charged (1) ‘duties of sunkheda’ at Rs 1-10-3 per cart; (2) ‘Bahadorpoor due’ at Rs 1-2-3 per cart; (3) ‘due for admission into Dabhoi’ Rs 0-10-0 per cart; (4) ‘fee for going out of Dabhoi’ of Rs 1-9-0 per cart; (5) Kahad or Baroda district fee’ of Rs 5-0-0 is charged at the entrance gate into the Dabhoi station. Thus a total of Rs 9-15-6 (babashahi) equal to Rs 8-12-0 (Indian Government) is charged for every cart load that comes into the station. The fee for entry into the station is not charged at any other station.’ Similarly castor and teel oil seeds were subject to equally heavy transit duties in Dabhoi. In the same manner the goods brought by rail over the Dabhoi branch are subjected to ‘objectionable’ transit duties – such as jagree, grocery, cotton – thus increasing their price two fold. This forces the people to transport their goods by carts rather than by rail.22

Another example was given in a letter written a month later, to the consulting engineer for railways, Bombay, . . . Traffic is good inspite of vexatious transit duties, which drive off much traffic off to the road. For example a mowra merchant preferred to take 300 tons to Broach directly by road in order to avoid the heavy tax of Rs. 7-8 per cart. The loss of this consignment alone to the railway was about Rs. 500.23

A competition was being fashioned between the roads and railways by the Railway department, Bombay and the BB&CI officials, where it did not exist. The two means of transport could have been made complementary to each other. But the Gaikwad government was pressurized time and again to reduce the lower class fares to ward off road competition and allow through booking to Dabhoi from stations in north Gujarat, so that they would be less likely to leave the railway for road at Baroda.24 There was incessant correspondence back

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

369

and forth regarding the same subject – The Dewan opined that the state would rather wait and watch and maintain status quo (no reduction in the fare – freight and passenger) till the railways extensions were completed and become profitably for the state.25 Meanwhile the Dabhoi-Meagaum line expanded into a substantial network, which is evident from Fig. 12.3.

Map 12.3: Map of Dabhoi Narrow Gauge Railways and Others (Source: Railway Heritage Park and Museum, Pratapnagar, Vadodara. Photograph was taken from a wall of the Museum).

370

Aruna Awasthi

The newspapers were regularly reporting on the extension of railways to and through Gujarat. In 1894 The Bombay Times reported on the formation of a Gujarat Railway Company. The plan was to facilitate the access into the richest province in western India and lay a single line railway from Tankaria Bunder to Baroda, a distance nearly 40 miles. This was necessitated as the large section of the road between the two was under water during the monsoons. This was particularly the case between the cotton depot of Jambusar and the Bunder (13 miles), thus the commercial operations of the Bunder was limited to six months. The Gaikwad and the people of Gujarat had bought 7,425 of the 14,000 shares of the company. In anticipation of the adoption of the project, the roads leading from Baroda into the interior were being cleared and levelled. Police stations were established towards Malwa, as far as Rutlam, and the transit duties on opium and general merchandise considerably reduced. All this was being done in anticipation of a sure and speedy communication between the coast and the capital of a province.26 Probably the reference is to the proposal of a rail line from Baroda to Tankaria by the BB&CI, for which was the company was already in discussion with the Gaikwads.27 In 1908 Maharaja Sayajirao III established a railway department28 which took over the construction of the lines from the BB&CI and laid down its own railway policy. The foundation stone for the Railway workshops at Goya Gate was laid by the Viceroy on the 25 March 1919. Notice was served on the BB&CI Railway on the 21 September 1920, and with the appointment of the first chief engineer for railways, the railway department of the Baroda state took over the management of the narrow gauge lines on 1 October 1921. An entire railway establishment29 – a huge and voluminous building for railway offices; buildings for workshops; and residential quarters for the railway staff, was built near the Goya Gate station. The station itself was remodelled, and later connected by a broad gauge line with the Vishvamitri station on the main line. Goya Gate was transformed into one of the busi-

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

371

est centres of Baroda.30 This control had also been obtained keeping in mind other benefits, for example, an increased connectivity of the villages to the towns – to provide building material from the neighbouring areas to the city of Baroda.31 There was a sizeable rail borne trade in raw cotton, cotton goods, sugar and molasses, cereals, oilseeds, mahuda flowers, tobacco, timber and stones as building material between the districts of Baroda, Kadi, and Navsari.32 The railways also facilitated greater socio-cultural interactions between the subjects of the Gaikwad. By 1923 the GBSR was a considerably vast network consisting of the following lines on different gauges:33 Table 12.2: GSBR State Railway System 1923

Sections

Date of opening

Length in miles

Total mileage

BARODA DISTRICT DABHOI RAILWAY (2'-6" GAUGE) 20.00

Miyagam Branch . Miyagam to Dabhoi

8-4-1873

20.00 58.95

Chandod-Dabhoi-Jambusar Railway . Chandod to Dabhoi . Dabhoi to Goya Gate . Goya Gate to Vishvamitri . Vishvamitri to Padra

15-4-1879

10.62

1-7-1880

17.00

24-1-1881

1.63

1-7-1897

7.14

. Padra to Mobha

10-7-1903

9.20

. Mobha to Masar Road

1-11-1917

6.88

. Dabhoi to GojapurBahadarpur

17-9-1879

9.64

. Gojapur-Bahadarpur to Bodeli

16-6-1890

12.44

22.08

Dabhoi-Bodeli Extension

62.62

Dabhoi Extension . Dabhoi to Jarod

15-11-1913

23.83

372

Aruna Awasthi

. Jarod to Samlaya . Samlaya to Timba

13-12-1915

5.41

1-2-1919

13.38

15-1-1912

23.67

23.67

Miyagam-Malsar Extension . Miyagam to Malsar

11.68

Choranda-Koral Section . Choranda-Koral

18-11-1921

11.68 19.25

Petlad-Vaso Railway Petlad to Vaso

10-12-1914

15.75

17-4-1915

3.50

. Anand to Petlad

5-5-1890

13.17

. Petlad to Tarapur

20-6-1901

8.25

. Motipura Tankhala Railway

1-4-1922

26.29

. Petlad Bhadran Railway

1-4-1922

13.41

Vaso to Pihij PETLAD-CAMBAY RAILWAYS: 5'-6" GAUGE

21.42

Anand-Tarapur Section

2'-6" GAUGE

Lines under construction 5’-6’ gauge Broad Gauge Siding from Vishvamitri to Goya Gate

2.00

NAVSARI DISTRICT: 2'-6" GAUGE Kosamba-Zankhvav Railway

1-5-1912

26.33

34.93

Billimora-Kala-Amba Railway . Billimora to Rankuwa . Unai to Kala-Amba

26.33

23-7-1914

13.42

1-5-1917

8.09

AMRELI DISTRICT 3'-3¾" GAUGE 37.22

Khijadia-Dhari Railway . Khijadia to Gavadka

1-3-1913

. Gavadka to Chalala

10-3-1914

9.14

. Chalala to Dhari

27-5-1916

11.69

13-11-1922

37.02

16.39

37.02

Okhamandal Railway . Kuranga-Dwarka-Adatra

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway KADI DISTRICT MEHSANA RAILWAYS 3'-3¾" GAUGE Viramgaum-Mehsana-Taranga Hill . Viramgaum to Mehsana . Mehsana to Vadnagar . Vadnagar to Kheralu . Kheralu to Taranga Hill Mehsana-Patan-Kakoshi Extension . Mehsana to Patan . Patan to Wagrod . Wagrod to Kakoshi Manund Road-Harij Branch . Manund Road to Harij Chanasma-Bechraji Branch . Chanasma to Bechraji Vijapur-Kalol-Kadi-Bechraji Railway . Vijapur to Kalol . Kalolto Kadi . Kadi to Bhoyani Road . Katosan Road to Bechraji . Bhoyani Road to Katosan Road

373

75.73 1-2-1891 21-3-1887 12-12-1888 20-8-1909

40.21 20.73 7.00 7.79 49.32

20-7-1891 15-1-1915 28-5-1916

24.69 14.72 9.91

23-10-1908

20.95

23-10-1908

16.63

20.95 16.63 68.32 10-6-1902 13-7-1903 1-4-1912 1-5-1920 1-3-1921

29.44 11.93 4.74 15.65 6.46

Source: Compiled from Baroda Administrative Report 1870-1925, Baroda: Baroda State Press (published between 1870 and 1925).

Besides Narrow gauge Dabhoi lines, the other major network of GBSR was the metre gauge Mehsana Railway.34 In 1880, the Government of Bombay communicated to Gaikwad’s government, to arrange the construction of feeder lines (on 2 ft 6 in. gauge) in the Kadi district, connecting either Unjha or Bhandoo, stations on the RMR in the Kadi district, with Patan and Kheralu. The Baroda government

374

Aruna Awasthi

replied that it would prefer to connect Mehsana (42 miles north of Ahmedabad), which is the centre of the district, through the feeder lines (but on metre gauge) going eastward to Vadnagar and Kheralu, and westward to Patan. Thus it was decided that Mehsana would form the nodal point of a railway network in the Kadi district.35 In May 1884 a survey had been conducted on the 21 mile – Mehsana-Vadnagar section. The funds for the line were supplied by the Baroda state. BB&CI was entrusted with survey, construction and management of the metre gauge lines. A railway connecting Rajputana and Kathiawad from Mehsana to Wadhwan via Patri was recommended in 1882 by Major W.S.S. Bisset, Manager of RMR. However, Gaikwad Durbar did not approve of the proposal, preferring the construction of a line from Mehsana to Viramgam. In 1886, the issue was raised again, this time a compromise was suggested – that, if the Government of India undertook to construct a metre gauge line from Viramgam to a appropriate point on the frontier, the Baroda government would construct the further portion from that point on the Mehsana side (8 miles) as a part of the Mehsana-Vadnagar line. Ultimately after extensive correspondence, the Government of India sanctioned the Mehsana-Viramgam line in 1889, the cost to be borne wholly by the Baroda state.36 The opening of the Mehsana Railway sections is given the above table. Besides the Mehsana railways, the Gaikwads constructed metre gauge lines in its isolated areas of Kadi district for the prosperity of its people, such as37 – the Vijapur-Kalol-Kadi Railway, mainly to connect Vijapur with Kalol, a station on the Rajputana-Malwa Railway, by a branch line, and to extend this line to Kadi – the earth work on this line was started as a famine relief work in 1899;38 Mannund-Rnuj-Harij branch; and the Chanasma-Becharaji-Katosan Road-Bhoyani Road branch. The question of a line from Khijadia to Amreli and then to Chalala was raised by Baroda government in 1889. The Resident made a conditional offer – he would recommend

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

375

the project to the Government of India only if the Durbar abandoned its jurisdiction over the said line. In 1904 Baroda government proposed to construct the Khijadia-Amreli-Chalala railway on the metre gauge, and consented reluctantly to the proposal of the Government of India to cede criminal and civil jurisdiction thereon, as a special and exceptional case not to be cited as a precedent, and on the understanding that the Durbar would be allowed the benefit of any future change in policy.39 The Khijadia-Amreli-Chalala Railway was sanctioned for construction in December 1908. The following map (Fig. 12.4) shows railways in Saurashtra including the metre gauge lines of the Gaikwad State. By establishing the meter gauge lines, the Maharaja was

Fig. 12.4: Railways in Saurashtra (1928) (Source: R.R. Bhandari, Western Railway: Meter Gauge System, Bombay: Western Railway, 1997).

376

Aruna Awasthi

able to connect the scattered areas of Baroda with each other at one level and their connection with the Saurashtra railway system on the other level. His concern for the subjects in the scattered areas of his state is evident from the statement which he made while presiding at a meeting held in Bombay on 30 November 1910, You will be pleased to hear the news that the project of joining Kathiawar with Dwarka by railway has now been finally settled. I have had the pleasure of talking with H H The Jam Saheb on the subject and this happy result has been arrived at. It has given me great pleasure to undertake the construction of this line, not only because Dwarka forms part of my territory, but also because it will be the means of removing hardships which pilgrims to that holy shrine have now to suffer. Ere long this line will connect Dwarka with the rest of India, and it may be hoped that it will also be the means of stimulating trade and commerce.40

Railway connections through the princely states were used by the British to monopolize the transit, production, sale and revenues of opium such as, in the Baroda state.41 Opium had acquired importance, as it was used by the British as an alternative means to finance its China trade. By 1800 the East India Company had begun to monopolize the production and trade first in the British territories and then in the native states.42 Opium from and through the Baroda state was to be transported either through rail, road or river routes approved by the Bombay government with preference being given to the railways. It was imported into the Bombay Presidency only by rail.43 The Palanpur-Ahmedabad state railway was the route by which alone, opium from the Baroda territories could be imported into the Bombay Presidency.44 Opium from the Kadi division could be imported only through the village of Pundrasan in the Kalol Mahal directly to the Government Opium Agency at Ahmedabad.45 The railways had special rules regarding the booking charges, insurance rates, inspection, and rewards to informers, for opium traffic.46 In the absence of the rail route, the most direct road route had to be used to the nearest railway station. Direct routes on

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

377

the above pattern were fixed for transporting opium from depots to the detached village shops.47 Even when the Durbar purchased 58 chests of Malwa opium from Indore, it was transported by rail from Chittor (Scindia-Neemuch Railway) to Sidhpur (RMR).48 The Baroda state exercised full sovereign rights in its territories. Yet, in respect of railways, it had ceded full jurisdiction on the trunk lines passing through its territories, but retained complete jurisdiction on isolated local lines lying wholly within the limits of the state. In Kathiawad, Gaikwad government was not allowed to exercise jurisdiction on lines within the state limits, because the British urged that the other states in Kathiawad would make similar claims as regards their lines.49 The railway companies were fearful of excessively interference of the native states in the operations of the lines are in Gujarat as there was too much interlacing of British and native states.50 Sir William Lee-Warner held that ‘in dealing with the subject of railways, telegraphs, and postal communications’, it was evident that ‘Imperial control was justified by considerations of common welfare as well as of common defence.’51 To gain jurisdiction over the railways and to institute one railway law, new treaties or agreements with the native States became necessary, as assumption of ‘jurisdiction would have been an infringement of internal sovereignty’.52 Likewise the jurisdiction over the railway was always a matter of perpetual concern for the Bombay Political Department 53 as the Baroda territory overlapped and intercepted the British districts of Gujarat in every direction. Sayajirao, being a strong ruler, was sensitive to interference in the affairs of the Durbar, thus, he objected to infringements of railway jurisdiction.54 An interesting incident in the Kadi district exhibits how the local people took advantage of the interlacing jurisdictions of the British and the Gaikwad state. In Shidpur, the mahajan had forbidden slaughtering of animals during the month of shravan (July-August). If an animal was being taken through the streets to the butcher, the mahajan would confiscate it.

378

Aruna Awasthi

But after the opening of the Rajputana Malwa Railway, the butcher simply had to go beyond the railway fencing and the prohibition ceased to have effect as British jurisdiction prevailed.55 It was evident ‘that the ideal of the Political Department was to make the railway lands running through the States’ British territory, where British Indian Law should run, and British authority should be absolute’.56 But as political practice of the British became more ambitious, and the need for revenue increased, the original agreements were ignored, and the railway lands were gradually used for purposes detrimental to the interests of the states. The large railway colonies sprang up within the princely states (but outside their control) with ‘co-operative stores which excluded the local trader, and excisable articles were sold without payment of local duties. It was not part of any bargain that State police should have no right to arrest offenders escaping on to the railway from native territory; or that the elaborate procedure of extradition should be necessary’.57 These colonies became British territories within the so-called independent princely states. Once the Baroda state became a part of the colonial railway system there were bound to be changes in old lines of trade and traffic. The expectation was that some of the ports like Beyt and Velan would witness improved commerce as the adjoining states were going to build railways. However, on the other hand, Billimora, in Navsari district, the only river port of any importance was the centre of a large amount of traffic before the construction of the railway. But the discriminating rates imposed by the railway against its competition reduced its utility to a vanishing point.58 Colonel Wallace in a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 41, dated 16 September 1859 gives a precise description of the old major lines of traffic in and around the Baroda territory,59 The Baroda Railway runs not along, but at right angles to, the great lines of existing traffic. One of these lines, parting from Surat, runs

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

379

up the valley of the Tapti and cannot in any way be disturbed by the railway. The second starting from Broach, runs directly through the Gaikwad’s territory via Dabhoi and Sankheda, towards Indore. The third line, parting from Broach, passes through Baroda, whence it passes via Halol and Dohad, into Malwa. The fourth, parting from Tankaria Bandar, passes through Baroda and so joins the Malwa road. The fifth line departing from Nadiad as the principal entrepot but gathering all the trade of Gujarat between the Mahi and the Sabarmati rivers, together with the goods imported to the ports by sea principally that of Dholera, passes through Godhra and Dohad into Malwa. This, the most important route of the five, but, it is beyond the limits of the state.60

Within the Baroda district there existed some additional lines of traffic61 to and from the city of Baroda such as the two roads from Baroda to Halol. The first (about 40 miles) though still in use and fair condition had fallen into disrepair, with most of its bridges, except at Paldi, having disappeared. The second road to Halol passed eastwards from Baroda had a very bad surface, and crossed many un-bridged streams. Another line of traffic passed along un-metalled, and unbridged track (90 miles) connecting Baroda with Bahadarpur. It ran side by side with the state railway and was also in the process of losing traffic to the railways. The chief exports of the Baroda district, especially to Bombay were cotton, tobacco and the mowra flower. Wheat, mowra and timber were imported by carts to Sankheda and Bahadarpur, thence shipped by rail. Earlier, these products passed through three roads: Dabhoi to Baroda; Padra to Jambusar, a third was through Petlad to Khambhat. These ceased to be of much importance once the new railway lines were opened to traffic. Nevertheless they still exported their own production into the state. In the earlier times considerable traffic in cattle, horses and other live stock, along with mowra laden carts, sugar cane and other field or garden produce passed and re-passed along the road through Savli and other important places to Halol, but later all this trade was diverted to the rail route. From Broach, Surat, and other ports, boats laden

380

Aruna Awasthi

with timber, bamboo, corn, and other articles, sailed up the Narbada to Chandod whence the goods are carried inland by train.62 The Kadi district had as many as eleven major principal lines of traffic in the pre-railway days. In fact, the province was open on all sides. Each taluka was connected with its neighbourhood by broad country cart tracks for conveyance of traffic. Owing to the opening of the RMR, and the Gaikwad branch railways, the old routes from the north fell into more or less complete disuse.63 All the talukas of the Kadi district through which the RMR passed, were connected with it by branches rail lines. The traffic intended for the railway which formerly came from Patan to Unjha and Bhandu, and to Mehsana from Visnagar, Vadnagar, Kheralu, Vijapur, and Vadavli, then went directly from each place. The Gaikwad’s Mehsana railway lines (metre-gauge)64 and the Vijapur-KalolKadi Railway (metre-gauge)65 had effected a great change in the traffic along the roads of this district—wool, cotton, clarified butter and flocks of sheep from Marwad which used to pass through Sidhpur and other talukas were transported by rail thereafter. Routes to Kathiawad, Marwad, and Prantij, to Agra, Ajmer, and Delhi, ran through Kadi division. The stature of the imperial capital is indicated by the fact that every town of any importance still possessed its Delhi Gate.66 Unusual stimulation in trade sprang up in the Kadi district during the years when speculation in opium was widespread. This reached a climax in the year 1878 when the manufacture and sale of opium was made a state monopoly.67 In Kadi there was a considerable traffic in grain, oilseed, and especially rapeseed, of which 3,000 tons was annually exported by rail to Bombay. The opening of the RMR and the feeder lines opened by the state stimulated the traffic of the district markedly. Other important exports were copper vessels from Visnagar to Ahmedabad and Kathiawad, and the silk cloth patola or chir, the cotton mashru, and the pottery for all of which Patan was and is still famous. The chief imports were molasses, sugar, timber, iron, copper, piece-goods, yarn and

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

381

metal. These used to be obtained from Ahmedabad earlier, thereafter received directly from Bombay by rail.68 In the former times the chief trade route in the province of Kathiawad followed the coast from Gogha south-east to Somnath and thence north-west to Dwarka. The chief land routes were those joining the peninsula with the main land. Of these the most frequented passed by Jhinjhuvada and Patdi to Wadhwan and by Viramgam to Wadhwan. The routes by Dholka and Dhandhuka to Wadhwan and Valabhi were also in common use. There seems also to have been a road joining Valabhi with Junagadh and Vanathli. Before the extension of the railway to Wadhwan, there was a road from Badhwan to Ahmedabad. There was another old trade route from Navanagar to Gujarat and Malwa. However, the opening of the railway from Wadhwan to Ahmedabad, and of the Kathiawad State Railways, had changed the old lines of communications completely.69 In 1901 the Secretary of State sanctioned the construction of a metre gauge line from Ahmedabad to Dholka (after being under discussion for ten years), and the contract for the same was signed on 25 March, between the Secretary of State and the AhmedabadDholka Railway Company.70 The construction, management, maintenance and working of the railway were to be done by the BB&CI. The urgency was greater as the powerful bullocks’ characteristic of the province, which alone had the strength to drag the heavy country carts over the sandy roads, had been almost annihilated by the drought.71 The line was opened to traffic in 1903.72 The imports by rail into Navsari district73 consisted of sugar, almonds, raisins, dates, coconuts, groceries, mahuda, salt, cloth, building-timber, grain, metals and live-stock. The exports by rail were molasses, castor-oil and grain. The trade by land was formerly carried on chiefly by caravans bringing various kinds of grain from Khandesh. Several journeys were made every year. Since the opening of the Tapti Valley Railway export and import was carried on mainly by rail.74 The quantity of cotton exported or grain imported

382

Aruna Awasthi

depended to a great degree on the monsoons in Gujarat. Owing to the great intermixture of British and Baroda territories, it had not been easy for the Baroda state to record exactly what proportion of goods were transported from the railway stations in the Gaikwad territory to British or Baroda subjects. This can also be applied to inward or outward bound goods traffic at several British stations along the lines. Rail-borne figures compiled in the office of the Director of Commerce show that on the average of the period from 1907 to 1918, the yearly export and import of some of the principal articles from the three districts of Baroda, Kadi and Navsari was as under in Bengal maunds (Table 12.3).75 By 1900 various native states had constructed over 10 per cent of the colonial railway network – that is 2,857 miles out of a total 24,752 miles. These princely states contributed in many ways to the development of the railways. They gave loans to cash hungry companies on very easy terms and gave land free of cost for railway construction. They also became important links in the colonial network – such as Bhopal, Itarsi, and others. They provided important linkages into the hinterlands from where the British were able to exploit raw materials such as minerals, cotton, etc. The state has to depend upon imports from outside for nearly half its food supply, even in normal years. The necessity for outside imports became accentuated in 1918-19, due to insufficient rains; the usual grain crops could not be harvested. The most important complexity in the way of importing foodstuff was the shortage of wagons; this was further enhanced when embargoes were placed on the export of certain grains by the Directors of Civil Supplies of many of the British provinces as they thought necessary, due to the shortage of those grains in their own provinces due to the demands of the First World War and the conditions in its aftermath.76 In February 1919 restrictions on the export of all grains from British provinces had been lifted (except on that of rice, wheat, and gram) and grains continued to move on railways under priority certificates. In case of rice, wheat

106,544

131,733

246,984

Cereals

Oilseeds

Timber

100,718

533,712

133,885

1,765

47,723

644,643

Export

260,923

146,373

56,413

276,944

33,940

39,986

Import

61,174

765,805

28,561

3,118

57,662

59,818

Export

Kadi District

103,967

112,133

68,908

72,989

20,381

12,714

Import

356,277

182,885

30,041

37,990

1,715

192,792

Export

Navsari District

Source: Compiled from Baroda Administrative Reports and Gazetteer of the Baroda State, vols. I & II, 1919.

187,690

77,607

110,888

Import

Baroda District

Sugar & Molasses

Cotton Goods

Raw Cotton

Commodity

Table 12.3: Railway Borne Export and Import of Principal Commodities, 1907-18

384

Aruna Awasthi

and gram, the allotment and the province of export were determined by the Foodstuffs Commissioner of India, every month.77 The failure of rains in 1918 led to scarcity of fodder in all the districts except Navsari. The Government of Bombay put an embargo on the export of grass from British territory and no grass was thus available from the neighbouring British districts. A corresponding embargo had therefore to be placed on the grass available within the state. The only source from which grass could be supplied to the famine stricken districts of Baroda and Kadi was the Navsari district. The selling price of grass in the Navsari district rose abnormally from four to eight rupees per thousand pounds in the past years to about forty rupees. The Durbar intervened to curb profiteering. The available stock of grass was therefore placed under government control78 and arrangement was made with the concerned Railway administration to prevent the booking of grass by rail without a permit from the State Director of Civil Supplies.79 The most bothersome problem for the Durbar was obtaining sufficient number of railway wagons for the transport of grass for cattle and food-stuffs. A meeting was held at the Surat station on 28 December 1918 with the BB&CI Railway officials and the Controller of Fodder, Bombay, and after lengthy deliberations it was decided by all concerned parties that priority certificates would be issued for the transport of grass.80 The railway authorities agreed to supply 42 wagons daily on the BB&CI main line, the Tapti-Valley and KosambaZankhvav lines for the transport of State grass to places in the other districts where it might be required. This number of wagons was found to be insufficient to meet the demand; it was therefore increased to 87 wagons by the railway authorities. Similar meetings were held whereby cooperation was rendered by respective Foodstuffs Commissioners, the various directors of civil supplies, the Assistant Controller of Petrol and the Bombay Salt Department and BB&CI officials for the

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

385

supply and transport of food supplies, petrol and salt into the Baroda state.81 The total mileage of railways owned by the state in 1927-8 was 694.42 miles of which 21.42 miles was broad gauge, 304.68 miles metre-gauge and 368.90 narrow gauge. Of these 368.90 miles are worked by the state, 251.67 by BB&CI, 37.21 by Jamnagar Dwarka Railway, and 37.22 by the Gondal State Railway.82 Total gross earnings of the State railways amounted to Rs. 23.24 lakh against 22.35 lakh in 1926-7.83 GBSR had stabilized its operations, within a decade of taking over the management of its lines from the BB&CI expanded its network, improved its operational ratio, increased its assets, created well-organized departments, and provided the people of the state with greater mobility and sound and assured trade services. Table 12.4 containing data of rail-borne traffic is an evidence of it.

Rail-borne Traffic of GBSR 1926-45 Once the GBSR became a part of overseas trade through its connections via the BB&CI, it was impossible for it to escape the impact of the Great Depression of 1929-30. In the early 1930s GBSR witnessed decreased earnings, both in freight as well as coaching.84 But it adopted certain measures swiftly to counter the impact and even in the worst of times showed some net earnings – significantly cut down its working expenses by: (a) running diesel coaches with trailers on nonremunerative sections; (b) increasing the passenger fares in 1932; and (c) extensive and intensive checking of ticketless travel.85 The rail-road completion once again attracted the attention of the state in the post-depression period. Introduction of mechanized road vehicles, with a promised, greater flexibility, faster short haulage over more direct routes, and door to door delivery led to an irreversible, and sizeable shift in passenger and freight traffic to the roads once again – which has continued to the present day.86 GBSR could not remain

1,65,730

4,57,812 18,63,903

7,89,868

7,83,584 12,37,968

1,83,631

19,896 10,39,322

8,41,773 12,78,978

8,93,800 20,54,752

3,59,808

Export

1,86,745

2,25,765

3,74,638

Import

1,82,516

22,328 13,24,884

8,73,836 10,85,449

4,93,366 17,35,242

5,09,122

7,39,397

Export

1944-5

9,70,737 10,81,390 13,25,551

50,493 14,25,713

7,06,551 16,98,299

4,15,162 28,42,626

5,76,515

5,25,040

Import

1940-1

3,86,404 10,02,580

Import

9,66,733 12,77,938 16,14,370

8,99,774

7,56,518 11,36,970 12,97,521

3,92,602 24,56,085

1,41,686

Export

3,14,868 15,67,137

Import

1935-6

Source: Compiled from Baroda Administrative Reports and Gazetteer of the Baroda State, vols. I & II, 1946.

Timber

26,362

9,18,322

Oil seeds

Sugar

3,03,817 23,58,893

Cereals/grains

1,47,853

1,15,084

Cotton goods

Export

1930-1

4,68,954 16,48,645

Import

18,57,603

Export

1926-7

Raw Cotton

Commodity

Table 12.4: Rail Borne Traffic of Gaekwar’s Baroda State Railway, 1926-45

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

387

insulated from this shift – that is, rail to road and in 1930 it had to deal with the situation, ‘The earnings of railways are affected due to the motor buses running parallel to railway lines, and the Government has appointment a Road traffic board to look into the question’. 87 GBSR continued to face the same competition in the forthcoming year – Motor bus competition is causing anxiety to the administration, as it short circuits the traffic in many cases. Efforts are being made to safeguard railway interests without causing undue interference to public.’88 In spite of this completion, the state continued the policy of constructing feeder roads to facilitate greater access to its railway lines. The state sanctioned and authorized the local panchayats to construct 152 feeder roads with a length of 469 miles, to connect as many villages as possible with its railway system. Of these, 112 covering a length of 283 miles had been completed. The expenditure incurred up to 1938 came to Rs. 8,75,758 of which the government grants provided nearly half of that amount.89 However, in the same year the earnings of the narrow gauge railways declined as a result of unfavourable monsoon conditions and motor competition.90 To try and contain the competition which was developing between the two modes of transportation, the Durbar authorized the State Economic Board to take charge of the matter. A decision was taken – henceforth all road authorities had to get their proposals for new roads accepted by the State Economic Board, on which the railway department was represented. The Board also decided on what roads the plying of buses for hire would be permitted and on what roads this would not be permitted. Further, the Board also decided to refuse licences for the roads which ran parallel to railways or short circuited the railway lines.91 These measures minimized competition for the time being. This was supported further by following an integrated transport policy – the railways organized additional fast train services where needed, and opened a few flag stations for public convenience and issued road-cum-rail tickets in important areas.92

388

Aruna Awasthi

By 1938 the Baroda state was served well by railways – relatively to its size and population. It had a total mileage of 723 miles. Revenue division sheets (earning by GBSR) were exchanged with twenty-seven foreign lines (for example, BB&CI, RMR, Guzerat Railway, and others). The amount due to GBSR from these railways was Rs. 1,17,127 and the amount due to them by GBSR on account of their share of freight, etc., amounted to Rs. 25,96,516.93 The railway administration of the Baroda State ventured into publicity for two reasons – popularize rail travel and to earn extra revenues – a scheme for taking advertisements for the pocket time tables and also print advertisements on the backs of the printed tickets were undertaken. The publicity section published schedules of rates for different forms of advertisements. In connection with publicity of the travel on the GBSR, posters showing holy places and attractions available were exhibited and propagandist work was done at the time of fairs at different places. A management department was established for publicity campaign, which was essentially done through commission agents.94 The environmental impact of the railways can be deduced from the accelerating process of deforestation which, nevertheless had started earlier. The expanding railways created an insatiable demand for wood – fuel, sleepers and carriagebuilding. Railways also promoted enlarged consumption with easy communication. This led to indiscriminate felling of trees, sometimes to desolation. In Gujarat, teak wood was supplied by the Surat Dangs and the Panch Mahals, which the government had acquired on lease. Here small transportable saw mills helped in felling the best timber.95 The main product from the transportable mills was the railway sleepers for which there was a constant demand. A saw mill came up near the Subir road, which had opened timber traffic from the Surat Dangs. It cut teak pillars for railway wagons, metre-gauge sleepers and scantling boards and battens for the Gujarat markets. Wherever roads were opened and with the extension of Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway to Jharia in

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

389

1925-6, the Dangs teak began to be sold for over Rs. 100 a ton standing in the forest, for which, at one time, contractors would not pay more than a rupee a tree. As a result the forest revenues of the Surat district went up from Rs. 4,82,487 (1923-4) to Rs. 6,00,435 (1928-9).96 The Gaekwar’s Baroda State Railways, especially the Dabhoi Railways switched from the use of coal to the use of wood (babool) fuel, as it cost them only Rs. 15 a ton compared to Rs. 27 a ton of coal, with an annual saving of rupees 2,250.97 Using wood fuel was dangerous as the train would be carrying cotton in open wagons placed next to the locomotive and it could easily catch fire.98 Later the villagers along the line were willing to fell and cut up fire wood into suitable lengths for value of the bark alone, an additional saving of Rs. 4,000 per annum for the state.99 By the end of 1945 the Baroda state had for its area the largest mileage in a princely state – 795 miles, of which 21.42 miles were broad-gauge, 345.64 miles metre-gauge and 428.11 narrow-gauge. The total capital invested was Rs. 5.92 crore.100 The railways mainly consisted of three systems: (i) The network of narrow gauge railways in the Baroda district: 278 miles, (ii) the network of metre gauge lines in the Mehsana district: 255 miles, and (iii) isolated sections serving different areas of the state. Of these railways the Anand-Tarapur Railway was managed by the Government of India and the Okha Railway by the Jamnagar Dwarka Railway. The remaining 737 miles were worked by the state itself.101 The gross earnings amounted to Rs. 116.7 lakh as against Rs. 101.5 lakh in the preceding year, an improvement of 14.9 per cent.102 The vision and dream of Maharaja Sayajirao to modernize his state by the introduction of industrialization was brought into effect with the help of railways. His speech delivered on the occasion of the opening of the Prachi Road-Kodinar Railway at Kodinar, on 15 February 1938, is a clear indication of the intent and farsighted policy of the Gaikwads to ensure the economic prosperity of their territories by introducing railways,

390

Aruna Awasthi

. . . railways were one of my earliest enthusiasms and have remained so . . . for while railways are primarily commercial concerns, their value cannot be measured solely by profits. They are for the convenience of trade and commerce and the benefit of the travelling public, but by facilitating intercourse, stimulating fresh ideas and broadening outlooks, they have a cultural value which cannot be shown in a financial balance sheet. . . . It is perhaps not always realised how well Baroda is served nowadays in respect of railways, but it is a statistical fact that for the area covered by Baroda State, the railway mileage is five times greater than the average for the rest of India.103

In conclusion I would like to draw attention to the following points: First, the British railway companies benefitted by siphoning away the huge profits through exorbitant operational charges. They also manipulated the rates and fares to that effect; second, colonialists exploited the natural resources to the maximum which had adverse environmental impact as a consequence such as deforestation of Sheopur, Sabalgarh area, Surat Dangs and the Panchmahals;104 third, the railway lands taken from native states for construction of railway lines were misused and created into islands of British power within so-called autonomous princely states; and lastly inspite of all the above isolated and disconnected regions of the Baroda state were linked with each other and rest of India with the help of GBSR; ensured greater economic interaction with the all India market and the overseas market was facilitated; the villages benefitted temporarily from the construction of railway lines by providing employment and also helped in migration of labour. India gained Independence on 15 August 1947. Native states were merged either with India or Pakistan. The Gaikwad State of Baroda merged with the State of Bombay. GBSR was merged with the BB&CI system in 1949. After the reorganization of railways in 1950-1, BB&CI system was renamed Western Railway. In post-Independence era the narrow gauge feeder lines have fallen into disuse, due to the competition from roads and

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

391

mass migrations to towns and an inadequate developmental policy for the backward areas and a continued importance given to the already saturated townships. Although, there have been some initiatives to develop the narrow gauge systems into tourist attractions in order to revive its profitability and develop these areas. Railways have always been instrumental and are still responsible for the transportation of men, material and ideas.

NOTES 1. Sir William Barton, ‘The Indian Princes and Politics’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, June 1944, pp. 181-9. 2. F.J. Clark, Great Indian Peninsula Railway Under the Original Company’s Administration: A Retrospect, Bombay (private circulation), 1900, p. 12 (General Manager’s Office, Bombay); Aruna Awasthi, History and Development of Railways in India, New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1994. The book traces the development of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway from Early 1850s to 1992. 3. Railway Proceedings, 1853, no. 103, Dalhousie’s Minute of 20 April 1853, para. 15, National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi. 4. Ibid., paras. 29, 33, 36 and 37, NAI. 5. Ibid., para 3; and PP.Mf, no. 60, Correspondence regarding Railway Communication in India, pp. 21-5, NAI, Delhi, letter dated 21 December, paras. 2, 3 & 4; and Huzur Political Office (HPO), Dafter no. 157, letter no. 4567 of 1853, dated 29 October 1853, Gujarat State Archives (GSA), Vadodara. 6. Sir William Wilson Hunter, Bombay 1885 to 1890: A Study in Indian Administration, London, Oxford, Horace Hart, Printer to the University, 1892, pp. 85 & 290 and Railways in Baroda Territory, Baroda: Baroda State Press, 1893, pp. 2-4. 7. G.H. Desai and A.B. Clarke (compilers), Gazetteer of the Baroda State, vol. I, Bombay: The Times Press, 1923, p. 364. 8. Ibid. 9. A.P. Nicholson, Scraps of Paper: India’s Broken Treaties, her Princes, and the Problem, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1930, p. 148. 10. Ibid. 11. Editorial Article, The Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce

392

12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19. 20

21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

Aruna Awasthi (1839-1859); 17 May 1857, Pro-Quest Historical Newspapers; The Times of India (1838-2003), p. 328. T. Madhav Rao (1828-91) was successively the Dewan of the princely states: Travancore 1858-72, Indore 1873-5 and Baroda 1875-82. S.R. Mehrotra, The Emergence of the Indian National Congress, Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971, p. 113. For photographic details see Michael Satow and Ray Desmond, Railways of the Raj, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980; and Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 365. The Illustrated London News, 23 May 1863, Indian Tramway, made by a Native Prince, p. 561, cols. I, II & III, www.beck.library. emory.edu/iln/browse.php The Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, vol. 93, Issue XXII, 24 September 1863, p. 3, http://paperspast.natlib.govt. nz/cgi-bin/paperspast? The Illustrated London News, 23 May 1863, p. 561, cols. I & II. HPO, Selections from Baroda State Railway (Selections), pt. II, Section C, p. 181, no. 880, Dewan’s Cutcherry, Baroda, Letter dated 8 October 1877 to P.S. Melvill Agent Gov.-Gen., Baroda, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 50, Letter dated Bombay, 9 March 1876, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 53, no. 13 of 1876, letter dated Ahmedabad, 29 January 1876 to J.R. Duxburffic Manager, Bombay, GSA, BRC (one cart load = 5 kulsees = 40 Bengal maunds), GSA (BRC). Mowra/mahuda is a flower from which an intoxicating drink is obtained. HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 53, no. 13 of 1876, letter dated Ahmedabad, 29 January 1876, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 53, letter dated 9 March 1876, to the Consulting Engineer for Railways, Bombay – Inspection Report of the 4 and 5 March, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, pp. 76-8, letter dated 4 November 1878, no. 7212 of 1878 from H.F. Hancock, Consulting Engineer, for Railways, Bombay to the Agent BB&CI, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 80, letters dated 21 November 1879; 30 November; 10 January 1879 and 14 May 1879

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41

42.

43.

393

between Bombay Government Railway Dept, BB&CI and T. Madava Rao, Dewan, Baroda State, GSA (BRC). ‘Prospectus of the Goozerat Railway Company’, The Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce (1839-1859); 12 December 1849; Pro-Quest Historical Newspapers, The Times of India (18382003), p. 862. PP Mf. Reel no. 60, Correspondence Regarding Railway Communication in India, pp. 25-6, letter from BB&CI Directors, dated 25 January 1853, paras 4, 7 and 8, NAI. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, vol. I, p. 377. Ibid. Ibid., p. 378. HPO, Selection, pt. II, Section C, p. 181, Dewan’s Cutcherry, Baroda, 8 October, 1877, para 6, GSA (BRC). HPO, Selections, pt. II, Section C, p. 167, no. 314, Diwan’s Cutcherry, letter dated 21 August 1877, GSA (BRC). Compiled from Baroda Administrative Reports; and Gazetteer of the Baroda State, vol. I. For details see Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway System, Calcutta: Government Press, 1918, p. 24, http://oudl.osmania. ac.in/search?query=bombay+baroda&submit=Go Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 366. Ibid., p. 367. Compiled from Baroda Administrative Reports; and R.R. Bhandari, Western Railway Metre Gauge System, Bombay: Western Railway Press, 1987, pp. 107-8. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 367. Ibid., p. 368 and Western Railway Metre Gauge System, pp. 107-8. Alban G. Widgery, Speeches & Addresses of His Highness Sayajirao III, Maharaja of Baroda, vol. I, 1877-1910, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927, pp. 265 and 266. Aruna Awasthi and Maitree Vaidya, ‘Colonization of Trade in The Gaikwad State [1800-1900]’, Indian History Congress Proceedings, 60th Session, Santineketan, 2000, pp. 572-81. Dharma Kumar (ed.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. II, 1984, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31213 and 846-7. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 368, File 5, Notification of Revenue Department, Bombay Castle, dated 9 February 1878, para. 10-A, GSA (BRC).

394

Aruna Awasthi

44. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 368, File 5, Notification no. 3340 of 29 June 1880, Bombay Gazette, pt. 1, p. 396, dated 1 July 1880 GSA (BRC). 45. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 368, File 11, Notification no. 3064 of 1878, Residency Office, Baroda, GSA (BRC). 46. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 370, File 38, Circular 9, Opium Traffic, RMR, Ajmer, 7 April 1884, GSA (BRC). 47. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 368, File 11, Notification no. 1351 of 1891, dated 29 December 1891, GSA (BRC). 48. HPO, Section 249, Daftar 369, File 15, Notification no. 8181, Dewan’s Cutcherry, dated 27 June 1889, GSA,(BRC). 49. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 376. 50. PP Mf. Reel no. 60, Correspondence Regarding Railway Communication in India, pp. 25-6, letter from BB&CI Directors, dated 25 January 1853, para, 5, NAI. 51. Sir William Lee-Warner, The Native States of India (originally published as The Protected Princes of India, 1894), London: Macmillan and Co., 1910, para 95, p. 249. 52. Scraps of Paper, p. 148. 53. Bombay 1885 to 1890, A study in Indian Administration, p. 85. 54. Ibid., p. 96. 55. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, pp. 399-400, The Mahajan has the authority to prohibit certain castes, from carrying out their work during certain months: Ghanchis – Vaishakh vad Amavasya /May-June; and Chhipas – Jeth sud 5 June. 56. Scraps of Paper, pp. 150-9. 57. Ibid., p. 149. 58. Ibid., pp. 49 and 383 59. Ibid., see pp. 383-4 for details. 60. Ibid., p. 384. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., p. 387. 63. Ibid., p. 385. 64. Administrative Report of the Railways in India, vol. II, BB&CI System, p. 27. 65. Ibid., pp. 32 and 34. 66. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 386. 67. ‘Colonization of Trade in The Gaikwad State [1800-1900]’, Indian History Congress Proceedings, 60th Session, Santineketan, 2000, pp. 572-81.

Mapping the Gaikwad’s Baroda State Railway

395

68 Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 388. 69. Ibid., p. 387. 70. Administrative Report on the Railways in India, vol. II, 1919, pp. 24 and 25 71. ‘A Guzerat Feeder Railway’, The Times of India (1861-current); 16 July 1901, Pro-Quest Historical Newspapers; The Times of India (1838-2003), p. 4. 72. Administrative Report on the Railways in India, vol. II, 1919, pp. 24 and 25. 73. Gazetteer of the Baroda State, p. 388. 74. Ibid., p. 389. 75. Ibid,. p. 390. 76. Baroda Administrative Report, 1918-19, Bombay: The Presidency Printing Press, 1920, p. 90, para. 175. 77. Ibid., p. 89, para. 174. 78. Ibid., p. 92, para. 179. 79. Ibid., p. 93. 80. Ibid., para. 181. 81. Ibid., p. 97, para. 193. 82. Baroda Administrative Report, 1927-28, The Baroda State Press, 1928, p. 222, para. 541. 83. Ibid., para. 252. 84. For details see Baroda Administrative Reports, 1929-30 to 1935-36. 85. Baroda Administrative Report, 1931-32, para. 640. 86. History and Development of Railways in India, pp. 254-61. 87. Baroda Administrative Report, 1930-31, para. 614 b. 88. Baroda Administrative Report, 1931-32, para. 633. 89. Baroda Administrative Report, 1937-38, Baroda State Press, 1938, para (i), p. viii. 90. Ibid., para. 721, p. 239. 91. Ibid., para. 734 a, p. 244. 92. Ibid., para. 734 b, p. 244. 93. Ibid., para. 748, p. 248. 94. Ibid., para. 747. 95. R.A. Choksey, Economic Life in the Bombay Gujarat (1800-1939), Bombay, 1968, p. 122 96. Ibid., pp. 123-4. 97. HPO, Section C, Correspondence related to railway extensions, Dabhoi to Bahadarpur, Chanode and Baroda, 1877, letter no. 1/5017, GSA (BRC).

396

Aruna Awasthi

98. Ibid., letter no. 4795/12600. 99. Ibid., letter no. 538 of 1877. 100. Baroda Administrative Report (1 August 1944 to 30 July 1945), Baroda State Press, 1946, p. 17, para. 29. 101. Ibid., para. 327, p. 169. 102. Ibid., para. 328, p. 170. 103. Baroda Administrative Report, 1937-38, Baroda State Press, 1938, Appendix I, pp. 307-8. 104. For details see Aruna Awasthi, ‘Environmental Degradation: A Case Study of Railways and Deforestation in India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, Indian History Congress Proceedings, 60th Session, Calicut, 2000, pp. 572-81.

CHAPTER 12

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab: A Story of Railway Development Bhupinder Singh

South Asia which includes present-day India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka has been a region that attracted explorers, traders and invaders from ancient times onwards. It is recorded in the history that the invaders included the Aryans, Mongols, Mughals and Turks who used the land route to reach the rich South Asian subcontinent through the great passes of north-western areas. The same way, the richness of the Indian subcontinent attracted the Europeans from the fifteenth century onwards which changed the course of its subsequent history and brought multifaceted and multi-layered consequences to the region. From sixteenth century onwards, European companies started to enter in the region for trading purposes. Out of these, East India Company was the biggest one which came to exploit the chances of trading in the wealthy subcontinent, subsequently became the masters of the land and brought drastic changes in the various fields like education, military, economy, society, judiciary, civil administration, communication, law and order in South Asia. Thus colonial period left very deep imprints on the geography, society and economy of Punjab. The uprising of 1857 was a watershed event in the history of India and brought far-reaching changes in the defence policy of the British. Moreover, the 1857 Revolt compelled

398

Bhupinder Singh

the British to re-frame and restructure it at the larger level. It became a turning point as it led to the reconstruction of the British Indian army on a very large scale and it converted Punjab into a fertile ground of the British Indian Army for the British. In this, the geo-strategic location of Punjab played a very crucial role and became a necessity to militarize Punjab more. Moreover, Punjab had obsessed with the Great Game (Russian expansion) and the Martial Race theory which contributed a lot to the whole process. In the defence of this threat the British started to develop a well connected communication system in which railways, road and telegraph came into existence in the Punjab and further these infrastructural developments created employment on a large scale. These institutions kicked the process of urbanization and migration in Punjab which led to the social and cultural assimilation and unification in colonial Punjab. The word ‘punjab’ is derived from a Persian word ‘panj – ab’, the literal meaning of which is ‘five rivers’; thus Punjab means ‘land of five rivers’, The Punjab: Moving Journeys (pt. I, 2004). Due to its geographical location Punjab has been the gateway of India since ancient times. The people of Punjab faced numerous invasions and confronted many attackers, which apparently made them fighters and survivors by temperament. The British conquered Punjab in 1849 and it was the last provinces of India to come under the British colonialism. Soon the British found fine qualities of bravery, militancy and loyalty in the Punjabis and explored ways of enlisting them for the service of the empire (Talbot 2007). Punjab received special attention of the colonial administration as a frontier province and due to its strategic location near Central Asia – an area where both the British and the Russian empires were trying to establish their sway (ibid.). The present article endeavours to map the multiple and complex changes and transformations Punjab has undergone during the colonial rule. The article is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the condition of Punjab during the pre-colonial

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

399

time with special reference to politics, economy and society. The second section deals with geo-strategic and geo-political importance of Punjab: appraisal of railway development. In this section the story of railway development in Punjab is especially brought into discussion. The section is written, along with some crucial transformations which Punjab has undergone during the colonial regime like construction of modern canal system, technological advancement in agriculture and a process often referred to as the Punjabization of the Indian army (Singh 1982). The canals also facilitated transportation and communication which provided a smooth atmosphere to links the trade at various levels (Chand 1930). Moreover, they also facilitated commerce by assisting the transport of British manufactured goods to reach as far as Kashmir, Central Asia and Afghanistan and bring the products from these areas to the port cities (Singh 1982). It is estimated that during the colonial era, almost 6 million acres of desert got transformed into one of the richest agricultural regions in Asia with the water supplied through these new canals which produced surplus food in the Punjab region (Khilnani 1972). The construction of modern canal irrigation system in the Punjab was thus not only a great feat of administration and engineering of the British, but also a crucial enterprise that transformed the economic and social lives of the people. Additionally, these canals promoted the trade and brought handsome incomes to the peasants and transformed their lives. In the third section, the focus is on how communication links especially the railway played crucial role to integrate the people and promote social and cultural assimilation in the region. It is argued that after the annexation of Punjab, the British exchanged the sword of disbanded Sikh Soldier with the plough (Soherwordi 2010). This was accompanied by various scientific and technological innovations for the development and modernization of agriculture. Apart from the modern irrigation system and the consequent reclaiming of barren land for agriculture, a variety of new crops,

400

Bhupinder Singh

fertilizers and techniques of cultivation were introduced. However, it should not be forgotten that the introduction of the new varieties of crops was also largely in accordance with the economic interests of the British Empire (Chand 1930). They gave more importance to those cash crops which were needed for the industries in England (Talbot 2007). Now Punjab started to produce on the indications of British and was ready to feed the British industries. To transfer the raw material from Punjab to Britain, the railways played significant role (ibid.). Finally, I have explored the story of railway development in Punjab under the British rule and purposes to build up, without missing the railway connectivity between the military cantonments in the respective region. Further how railway connects the people to each other and social and cultural amalgamation takes place will be discussed at large and further multifaceted transformations bestowed by colonial railway to the economy, society and culture and various other aspects. More important, the article focuses fundamentally on cantonments and their transformations and legacy to the respective region, which remained un-explored as yet among the scholars and academicians. To finalize this work, I used research papers, primary reports, gazetteers, books, scholarly articles and web sources. Before turning to the changes and transformation under the British, the condition of pre-colonial Punjab, especially under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, needs to receive some consideration.

Pre-British Punjab: Politics, Economy and Society The annexation of the Punjab by the British was an eventful tale compelled by the necessity to have an efficient control over the Afghan with a view to keep the French and Russian away from the Punjab. The British decision to annex Punjab after defeating the Sikhs in the Second Anglo-Sikh War has been thus influenced by the political instability within the Sikh state of Punjab and the impending threats across the borders.

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

401

Punjab remained under Maharaja Ranjit Singh almost for 40 years. The economy was strong because Ranjit Singh gave importance to extensive agriculture and more facilities and incentives were given to the farmers. Significant efforts were made to increase the productivity of land and bring more land under the plough. Importantly, cash crops such as indigo, sugar cane, jute, etc., were introduced in different parts of the state and such crops slowly began to figure in the cropping map of the state. During this time cultivators had no special knowledge of the rotation of crops. The state was also unable to meet the requirement of labour that was needed for clearing vast un-reclaimed land and lifting water from the wells. He established bandhs, kuhs, chashmas and even canals. The period of Ranjit Singh also witnessed considerable development in trade and industry. Alongside, the period witnessed the beginning of a process of urbanization and at that time Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Amritsar, Ludhiana, Multan and Sialkot, etc., were the prominent places of caravan transit from the west and Central Asia and China. But the means of transport and channels of transport minimized the speed of trade and commerce. But the greatest limitation was that the rivers were not used for the purpose of trade and commerce at any extent during the time of Ranjit Singh. Politically Maharaja Ranjit Singh remained loyal to the British during his regime, but after his death none of his successors proved to be as able and realistic as him. All his successors Khadak Singh, Nau Nihal Singh, Sher Singh and Dulip Singh were weak and inferior and they lacked true leadership qualities. Thus the political uncertainty and internal feud also gave an ideal situation for the British to annex Punjab to the British Indian Empire. The First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-6), ended with the Treaty of Lahore, and resulted in the partial subjugation of the Sikh kingdom and the Second Anglo-Sikh war led to the annexation of Punjab on 29 March 1849.

402

Bhupinder Singh

Geo-strategic and Geo-political Importance of Punjab: Appraisal of Railway Development Transport is an important infrastructure for the developmental process of every country. A country’s development depends basically upon the availability of a viable system of transport facilities. Transport is considered as a pillar of development and progress in every country. Without proper means of transport and communications it may not be possible for any government to administer a vast country like India. The story of Indian railways is also very interesting. Fundamentally it is the legacy of the British to the Indian subcontinent. Indian railways played a crucial role in the economic development and national integration of our country. It has brought about remarkable changes in the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country and especially in the colonial province. The Indian railway system today is the largest state owned enterprise in Asia and the second largest state owned railway system in the world. With the introduction of railways, quick communication became possible in the Indian subcontinent. These communication links played a very crucial role to fulfil the commercial as well as strategic interests of the British. Moreover, it brought profound changes in the habits and outlook of the people. In this discourse, some regions got special importance due to some geographical and strategic obligations. In this reference Punjab became a peculiar region for the British Empire (Talbot 2007: 4). Punjab remained the entry gate for the attackers and invaders from the ancient times. Due to that a line of foreigners had entered into the Indian-subcontinent. First, the East India Company came here as traders, but slowly and steadily became the political power in the region and started to subjugate the various region. Consequently due to the strategic position, Punjab got a very singular place in the British’s eyes. The British occupied Punjab in 1849 and immediately the Board of Administration was constituted in the region, under

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

403

whom a lot of structural changes in the administration were added. In the revolt of 1857, Punjab remained loyal towards the colonial people and played a crucial role in sustaining and maintaining the British Empire in the region. So in revert of this loyalty British introduced a lot of new inventions like the construction of canal colonies, railway, roads and workshops and introduction of fertilizers and seeds (ibid.). Due to these Punjab became the food grain market for the Indian subcontinent because the British transformed the barren areas of Punjab into a very fertile region. From all these, initialization of railway was the most important from defence as well as commercial point of view. As stated above, due to the strategic position of Punjab, because it was the home of martial races and obsessed with the Great Game (expansion of Russia towards the India), these factors had contributed a lot to compel the British to invest here. Consequently, the British invested handsomely in various institutions like railways, canals, hospitals, education, communications, etc. Out of these the British spent enormously on connectivity and railways because at that time, the army was the main instrument to dominate on the colonies. In this the British military had played a very crucial role to maintain and expand the colonial influence. So far, to make mobility of the troops faster and satisfy the strategic as well as commercial interests, the British established networks of railways and roads in Punjab region. The military cantonments were joined to each other through railways and roads, though these links were developed and operated essentially to satisfy the administrative, commercial and military needs to serve the colonial interests (Kerr 2012). For instance, in the Lahore cantonment two railway stations were established; one at Meean Meer east, on the line from Lahore to Delhi and the second at Meean Meer west, on the line from Lahore to Multan (Lahore District Gazetteer, 1883-4: 164). These military stations were linked with other strategic stations of the north and other corners of the British territory. Consequently, the development of transport and communication links brought

404

Bhupinder Singh

immense changes to Lahore region, which according to the British ‘was utterly waste and desolate for a long time after the annexation in 1849’. Moreover Lahore became the cultural centre under the British rule (ibid.: 164-6). The colonial masters had invested immensely for smooth communication in the Punjab and integrated the region with national and internal market. Further, this connectivity brought handsome economic and social consequence to the region (Talbot 2007). The historic Grand Trunk Road is an ancient and important trade route that runs from Kolkata (Calcutta) in the east, up to Delhi and on to the west (present-day Pakistan). It is one of the longest roads in the world and the British started improvements on this route in 1839 (The Punjab: Moving Journeys, pt. 1, 2004: 8). Further, from the 1840s large-scale road construction projects to link the main cities of India were also initiated (ibid.). The Grand Trunk Road from Kalka to Shimla was opened for carts and traffic of every kind and along the roads dak bungalows were constructed which provided comfort to the European servants in particular (Shimla District Gazetteer, 1888-9: 80). Beside this there were eleven D.P.W. bungalows on the Kalka Road, situated at distances varying from 8 to 16 miles (ibid.). However, the investments were much more on the railways but it was coloured with imperialistic designs and interests. But until the outbreak of the Afghan War, at the end of 1878, no comprehensive views had been taken of the interconnection of our frontier communications, nor any programme laid down for railway construction for purely or mainly military objects (Bogart and Chaudhary 2012: 3-4). After 1860, the British started to invest in strategic-cum-commercial railway and road communication on a wider scale and links were laid down to integrate various cantonments like Multan, Peshawar and Lahore in the early second half of the nineteenth century (General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, 1856: 50). The Lahore railway station was opened in 1862, which integrated the Punjab with provinces of the Indian subcontinent

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

405

(Montgomery District Gazetteer, 1933: 290). The Lahore station was built as a defensible structure at a time when the British in India were just recovering from the greatest threat to their rule in India, the widespread troop mutinies and civil uprisings of 1857-8 and during this time emergence of the railway network was seen as a vital security role in the maintenance and strengthening of British colonial rule (ibid.). Amritsar was the junction for Pathankot at the foot of the hills during this time and the British constructed originally the main railway lines with the help of Scinde Railway Company and the first portion from Amritsar to Lahore was laid down in 1862 and this was the first section of railway opened in the Punjab during the colonial epoch (ibid.). And the extension of railway lines from Amritsar to Delhi was begun in 1864 (ibid.: 291). In 1873 a new railway line opened between Lahore cantonment and Karachi Port which also connected the Montgomery and Multan cantonments to these important trade centres (ibid.). Thus the railways played a very crucial role to integrate the various military cantonments and fulfilled the commercial and military motives of the colonialists (ibid.). Sindh, Punjab and Delhi railway was a very significant railway link and it was opened to Multan in 1865 and the Indus Valley State Railway from Multan to Kotri was opened in 1878. Additionally, the railway workshops were constructed at various railway stations.1 Since, Kotri was the busiest river port city well connected with Karachi Port, the new railways joined Multan to Kotri and established a connection with the seaboard, which increased the commercial importance of Multan and also linked it with other military cantonments by sea routes (Multan District Gazetteer, 1883-4: 154). With the introduction of Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway Company, railway lines linking Lahore to Amritsar (formally opened in 1862) and Lahore to Multan (operational in late 1864) and Amritsar to Delhi (in 1870), connection from Lahore to Karachi was constructed as a result of the completion of the Indus Valley State Railway (Kerr 2012: 12). On

406

Bhupinder Singh

the other hand, the Punjab Northern State Railway linked Lahore and Peshawar cantonments in 1883 (ibid.). Thus, by 1886 the government owned and operated North Western State Railway (later North Western Railway) created by amalgamating most of the railways in Punjab and Sind and afterwards a huge number workshops were joined with these railways stations and railway lines, and drastically changed the history of transportation and connectivity of the region (ibid.). Some barren areas with strategic position were also brought into the communication fold. An example is Ambala, which was connected with the railway network due to the cantonment and defence compulsions of the area. The opening of the North-Western Railway connected Ambala with Rajpura (which was 9 miles far away from the Ambala district), Simbhu (6 miles), Ambala City (7 miles), Ambala Cantonment (6 miles), Mustafabad (8 miles), and from Jagadhri (3 miles). From Rajpura there was a branch line to Patiala and Bathinda, where a junction was joined with the Delhi line. Due to such a wide railway connectivity, the importance of Ambala increased rapidly, moreover the integration of Ambala with other parts of the country fetched economic and social significances to the city. It also facilitated the linking up of various cantonments at different places, which speeded up the mobility of the troops and arms and ammunitions from one military cantonment to the other. This kicked up migration and urbanization further within the state and on an inter-state level as well (Bagart and Chaudhary 2012, 9). Ambala district was connected to the rest of the country through roads as well, in which the Grand Trunk Road (GTR) played a very significant role. The GTR arrived at Ambala Cantonment from Karnal. The British also constructed the Ambala-Kalka Road (for Shimla) and it was connected to GTR 4 miles above the Ambala Cantonment (Ambala District Gazetteer, 1923-4: 99). These road links connected Ambala with Shimla made it convenient for the mobilization of people from one place to another. Moreover it laid out smooth

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

407

mobilization of the troops to the summer capital of Shimla for the British. These lines connected Ambala, Shimla, Multan, Lahore and Delhi to one other (ibid.: 104-5). British constructed railway stations joining them with railway workshops and the network of railway workshops generated employment opportunities which transformed the lives of the people. Table 13.1 shows the case of Lahore workshops alone. Railways generated labour works with many more opportunities of employment like clerical work, engineering, etc. (Kerr 2012, 12-13). Such employment kicked up the migration and mobilization of the rural people to the urban cities especially to the cantonment cities which further changed their social composition. These works thus played a significant role (ibid.: 15). This was the case of most of the cantonment cities and towns, which were connected by railways and roads for military purposes, creating huge impact on the social and economic life of such places. In places like Sialkot which was connected with railway and good metalled roads, its local business, like paper manufacturing in Sialkot, flourished (Sialkot District Gazetteer, 1883-4: 91-2). The Delhi Station Table 13.1: Employment in the Railway Workshops of Lahore, 1870-1929 Approximate Date

Approximate Nos. Employed Daily

1870

1,000

1880

2,000

1890

2,500

1906

4,500

1911

7,000

1916

10,000

1925

10,600

1929

12,200

Source: Kerr 2012: 14, Table 1.

408

Bhupinder Singh

emerged as the largest junction in northern India during the British rule and the East Indian Railway crosses by the Yamuna Bridge from Ghaziabad (Delhi District Gazetteer, 1912: 164). and East Indian Railway connected (since 1891) the Delhi-Ambala-Kalka to each other and when the Southern Punjab Railway was opened in 1897 and this improved connectivity among the Rohtak, Jind, Bathinda, Bahawalpur, Firozpur and Lahore (ibid.: 165). The new network of transport also resulted in the emergence of a few other cities into greater significance. An example is Karachi, which was a much smaller colonial port than others in the beginning of colonialism but with the uninterrupted railway connection to Punjab and Sindh and onwards to Delhi by 1889, converted Karachi into one of the biggest ports for the export of raw material from India and import of manufactured goods from Britain (Kerr 2012: 12). It is stated that the British government was keen to exploit the railways’ inherent potential to consolidate its grip over India because railways played a very crucial role to transport the raw material from Punjab to Britain. Lord Dalhousie constructed railway links to keep in mind the commercial and strategic importance of the links (Maitra 1997: 25-6). But as already pointed out, this tranformed the social and economic life of Punjab greatly. The British also placed sarais (rest houses specially built on the roads for travellers) for the comfortable mobilization of the people in every district, which was located on the various roads of Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Amritsar, Firozpur, Peshawar, Delhi, etc., and due to these sarais, communications were upgraded vastly and from the commercial point of view, apart from helping the British in the exploitation of the rich geography of the Punjab (Rawalpindi District Gazetteer, 1893-4: 152-5).

Social and Cultural Integration: Profound Impact on the Lives of People The increasing presence of the Europeans due to cantonments and institutions of modern education exposed the

Colonialism and Transformation in Punjab

409

local population to the modern Western culture and provided chances of learning. The missionaries played an important role in this, though their primary aim was to spread the Christian religion, as they spread Western education alongside. It built a solid path for the exchange of culture and values (Aujla 2012). As the British built connectivity across the province and beyond, connecting people and facilitating movement of goods, along with trade human interaction among these cities of the Punjab also increased substantially. It is said, for instance, Firozpur, Lahore and Amritsar started developing into one composite cultural triangle due to the easy connectivity across them. The barriers of spoken dialects started breaking over a period of time, and cultural affinities developed like never before (ibid.). The opportunity colonialism provided to the people of Punjab to emigrate and see the wider world also opened up spaces for cultural assimilation. As many youngsters from peasant backgrounds were enlisted in the British Indian Army and fought two world wars, many of them had the chance to visit a number of countries as part of their military assignment (Soherwordi 2010: 20). When they returned to Punjab, these soldiers were impressed by the magnificent civic life in the West, as they had seen in London and Paris (ibid.). Their interaction with the educated class, especially women, led them to reflect on the status of women in Europe and in their respective villages in Punjab (ibid.). High levels of cleanliness and sanitation and the engineering maze in the form of their underground train network all left a gigantic impression on the Indian soldiers, as collections of their letters reveal (ibid.: 21). Back home they were dipped with new thoughts and concepts, leading to efforts to make changes in their lives and surroundings (ibid.: 20-2). Thus, exposure to the outside world brought not only prosperity but also positive mentalities in the soldiers’ lives (Chatta 2012: 201). Their status as part of the British Indian Army helped them to rise to a new social status and acquire a new influence in society (ibid.: 202-4). The folk songs of the time captured the growing influence and social clout of soldiers in society

410

Bhupinder Singh

(Soherwordi 2010, 20-2). The new life and structures brought by the cantonments and allied development also resulted in change of mentalities in India, giving way to modernity. Western education played a dominant role in this transformation, alongside other development like modern health and communication infrastructures, whereas unification of India through new transport infrastructures and through English language, facilitated interaction and exchanges across India, leading to greater cultural assimilation and to rouse a nationalist imagination within the country.

Conclusion In the concluding remarks, one can say that the British established the world’s largest railway system in India and in this whole discourse, frontier areas and locations remained most important. In this case Punjab got remarkable changes and modifications under the British rule due to its strategic position and some allied compulsions (Russian expansionist policy, martial race, etc.) which inspired the colonial masters to build the world’s largest railways in Punjab. Further, due to the construction of railway lines, Punjab connected internally and externally with other places which kicked the trade, urbanization and migration aspects. On the one hand, it provided an opportunity to move upward in the society and on the other it generated employment to the people.

NOTE 1. Kotri was a large town and busiest river port during the British rule, situated on the right bank of the Indus in Sindh. It was well connected with Karachi and Sindh, Multan and Lahore for the commercial and strategic purposes. Available at: http://www. railnews.co.in/?p=275/ (accessed on 22 November 2013).

REFERENCES Aujla, H.S., A Tale of Three Cities: Lahore, Amritsar & Ferozepur, Sikhchic, 2012, (accessed 10 January 2014). Bogart, D. and L. Chaudhary, ‘Railways in Colonial India: An Economic Achievement?’ SSRN, (accessed on 13 January 2014). Chattha, I., ‘Economic Change and Community Relations in Lahore before Partition’, Journal of Punjab Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, 2012, pp. 193-215. Govt. of Punjab, Montgomery District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1933, pp. 1-9, 97-108, 289-309. , Multan District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1883-4, pp. 1-39, 151-60. , Ambala District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1923-4, pp. 1-7, 97-138. , Sialkot District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1883-4, pp. 1-4, 98-111. , Delhi District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1912, pp. 162-6, 197-219. , Lahore District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1883-4, pp. 140-70. , Shimla District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1888-9, pp. 2-11, 39-64. , Rawalpindi District Gazetteer, Lahore, 1893-4, pp. 1-5, 60-5, 205, 213, 248-66. Kerr, L., ‘Bombay and Lahore: Colonial Railways and Colonial Cities: Some Urban Consequence of the Development and Operation of Railways in India, c. 1850-c.1947’. (accessed on 12 December 2013). Khilnani, N.M., British Power in Punjab 1839-1858, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1972. Maitra, S., ‘Railways in Colonial India: An Economic Achievement?’, Executive Intelligence Review, vol. 24, no. 31, 1997, pp. 20-9. Royal Geographical Society, ‘The Punjab: Moving Journeys’ (Part One). (accessed on 4 January 2014. Singh, S., ‘Agricultural Science and Technology in the Punjab in the Nineteenth Century’, Indian Journal of History of Science, vol. 17, no. 2, 1982, pp. 191-204. Singh, Fauja and A.C. Arora, Maharaja Ranjit Singh: Politics, Society and Economy, Publication Bureau Punjabi University, Patiala, 2003, pp. 215-22. Soherwordi, S., ‘Punjabisation of the British Indian Army 18571947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan’, South Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 2010, pp. 1-34.

412

Bhupinder Singh

Talbot, L., ‘The Punjab under Colonialism: Order and Transformations in British India’, Journal of Punjab Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, pp. 2-8. Thos, Jones, General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, Calcutta: Calcutta Gazetteer Office, 1856, pp. 41-66.

CHAPTER 13

Railways in Bihar: Peasant Protest, Response of the Raj and Compensation Pushpa Kumari

The studies on the railways in India have witnessed paradigm shifts in the past. Initially it started as the description of the beginning and development; subsequently scholars started searching for the causes and impact of the same. In recent years newer dimensions of the studies of the railways have emerged in the historical discourses of India. It is in this background that the article aims to study the dimensions of railways from the perspective of the peasant problem and consequent protest due to the filling of a railway bridge built at village Banwar Chak in Saran district of north Bihar in 1885. It also tries to study the environmental impact of the same. The result of the protest and the response of the government had significant impact on the peasants and all these form the part of the article. Though the problem of flooding and prolonged waterlogging owing to railways was not unique to the conditions of north Bihar, the peasant protest and the final outcome of the same have certainly a significant impact unique in the case of north Bihar. The way the railway lines were built, obstructing the drainage of the country, created a lot of problem for the peasants and the planters due to the recurrent grave flood situation in north Bihar. The demands of raiyats and planters for more waterways in the railway lines of north Bihar were stonewalled by Bengal and North Western Railways (B&NWR)

414

Pushpa Kumari

engineers. The B&NWR Company argued from a purely engineering point of view that for the safety of the line that it was best to concentrate the discharge of the whole area into as few channels as practicable.1 The waterlogging in the entire area created miseries to the people of the area and to overcome the same an amount of Rs. 60,000 was estimated as the compensation to the people for the protest of the people and response of the government. Finally a compromise was reached at Rs. 10,000 for distribution to the raiyats concerned. The situation turned from bad to worse due to filling in the bridge, where already there were very few bridges constructed while laying down the track.

I This problem has caught the attention of Dr. Rajendera Prasad. He wrote: The ferocity of floods in Bihar increased because of the railway lines. I have witnessed all the major floods that have hit this reason during the last 30 years. I firmly believe that railway lines and high roads are the main reason behind the floods. If they had wide bridges at regular distances, the condition would have been different. But here, the profit of the railways companies comes first. They are not ordered to construct bridges, leave aside breaking the line. The B&NW Railways has shown a greater deal of miserliness in this. Though bridges have not been built, there are places still where bridges were needed. The bridges they have built are in line with their own selfish needs. As long as it was creating trouble for the people, they paid no heed.2

In historical researches Praveen Singh points out how railways and roads with inadequate waterways could be considered as bandhs.3 Ritika Prasad focuses on how the railway companies built high embankments without providing adequate drainage outlets for the rain and flood water that these structures trapped. The height of the embankment blocked old drainage patterns without providing new ones and converted seasonable flooding that used to be beneficial

Railways in Bihar

415

for cultivation into calamitous events that destroyed lives, crops and property. Facing repeated losses, many sought redress, more often than not, however, they found themselves marginalized by the needs of railway construction, with arguments about ‘public improvement, effacing human cost of such undertakings’.4 Radha Kamal Mukherjee wrote, the railroad, which was built with an inadequate number of culverts, obstructed even the passage of monsoon water.5 However, Parveen Singh and Ritika Prasad have given a passing reference to this problem the regional details of the problem and their outcome have remained outside the scope of these studies. This problem has been discussed elsewhere too.6

II Tirhoot State Railway and B&NWR were the two large railway networks spread across north Bihar, as the first being constructed in 1875 and the second in 1882. Both remained the property of the state, though they were administered by the B&NWR Company, which took over the running of the Tirhoot State Railway in 1890. Primarily they were instrumental in providing relief to famine affected regions, later on they emerged as the engines of economic change. However, their adverse impact on the natural drainage system led to increased intensity of flood as many natural courses of drainage of rainwater were choked could not be overlooked. In north Bihar, the alignment of most of the railways and roads (in an east-west direction) was across the drainage line of the region, the latter being in the north-south direction.7 The obstruction to the free flow of floods and spill the natural drainage line, ‘even if provided with adequate waterways, aggravated the floods’.8 The Railways and district boards both tried to skirt the responsibility of constructing bridges and culverts, first, because of the huge expenses involved, and second, due to safety factors. In fact, there were cases where existing bridges on roads and railways, were filled up to safeguard them against breaching and scouring, leading

416

Pushpa Kumari

to the miseries of the people. As the railway lines spread over north Bihar the population became vigilant about inadequate waterways provided in embanked railway lines. The region was neither the first nor the only area where railway embankments were linked with severe and prolonged flooding. This was not because railway embankments here did not have this effect. Describing its ‘flood problem’ in his report of 1948. P.C. Ghose, previously an executive engineer in Bihar PWD described north Bihar as ‘a huge inland delta’.9 Rather, it was because railways came to north Bihar comparatively late. While the section from Dalsingsarai to Darbhanga via Samastipur was opened in 1875, yet – with exception of Darbhanga State Railway – north Bihar’s railway network developed in the mid- to late 1880s. Thus, reports from many parts of the country describing the damage caused by railway embankments preceded accounts from north Bihar. A correlation between the building of extension of railway embankments and increasing episodes of unseasonable, prolonged or excessively damaging flooding was recorded in the different parts of northern India. A brief discussion of the latter given below is not going to be out of context for this article. An early account came from Burdwan, where a railway embankment with ‘insufficient waterway’ was held responsible for impeding the drainage of the area thoroughly after its completion in 1860.10 In 1877, villages south of Burdwan suffered ‘great loss’ from inundations of the River Damodar, the problem attributed to the ‘construction by the East Indian Railway of an embankment to protect their property.11 The same year after the monsoons, inhabitants of Dhubail village in Kushtea subdivision witnessed the damage caused by the construction of the North Bengal State Railway (NBSR). The line blocked the natural watercourses through which water drained into Gorai River and the ensuing inundations destroyed crops on about 1,500 bighas of land. People complained that the ‘evil’ could have been rectified by constructing culverts across the railway line, but this had not been done.12

Railways in Bihar

417

Some such cases elicited compensation. The Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway (O&RR) was held responsible for the damage caused by severe floods between 1870 and 1873 in the Ramganga Valley of Bareilly, resulting from the fact that its embankment obstructed natural drainage.13 The railway was asked to pay a government assessed compensation of Rs. 5,242 and to rectify the situation.14 A similar link was proved in a case of disastrous flooding in 1892 in Dinajpur, a town usually ‘free from natural visitations’. The town lay on the Behar section of the Eastern Bengal State Railway (EBSR), portions of it had been completed gradually between 1887 and 1891, with the ‘disastrous flood’ of 1892 following almost immediately after. A subsequent enquiry contended that the railway line, which bisected the district from east to west, was in large measure ‘responsible’ for the damage. Lacking waterway, it had held up floodwater coming from the north.15 In several other cases, however, it was more difficult to prove a direct causal link. When Jounpore and Azimgarh were inundated in 1871 following a steep rise in the Gomati and Tonse rivers, railway engineers denied that the railway embankment had in any way affected the severity of the flood. The Commissioner of Allahabad Division insisted that the railway embankment pushed floodwater to rise higher than it would have risen ordinarily.16 Thus, the growing belief in north Bihar that since railway embankments had been built in the area floods ‘invariably’ caused damage, no matter how seasonal they were, was not an isolated one.17 Those affected by railway construction did not posit a naïve relationship between railway embankments and flooding. As in many deltaic areas across the country, cultivators in north Bihar welcomed seasonal floods, relying on them for rich deposit of silt for a winter crop.18 Consequently, they stressed how railway embankments that were built without adequate waterways generated a ‘ponding effect’, either preventing floodwater from draining off as it had before these were built or else confining floodwater to a smaller area. By flooding

418

Pushpa Kumari

the area to a greater depth than usual, this process transformed normal, seasonal flooding into calamitous events.19

III In the year 1885 B&NWR Company constructed a line of embankment from Bunwarchak in Saran district, a station of their main line to Pahleza on the north bank of the Ganges without sufficient waterways. It was opened for traffic on 15 January 1885. After the opening of the line a bridge of 20 spans of 20 ft was added by the company to carry off the flood water. During the rainy season of 1885 the bridge was damaged by the scour of the floods.20 Before the next rainy season Colonel Pemberton, Railway Engineer and Mr. MacGeorge, Deputy Consulting Engineer recommended in their report that for the safety of line, the bridge should be closed. In consequence of these reports by the order of the Director General of Railways the bridge was closed accordingly on 8 March 188621 and as a result there was no sufficient means for the flood waters to reach into the Ganges. Resultantly, the water which used to pass through the bridge was accumulated; thus causing a rise in the level of the water during floods. The lands remained saturated till a late period, and thus the sowing of the winter crop was deferred. In the years 1886 and 1887 the damage caused by the closing of this outlet was loudly complained of by the inhabitants of this area.22 In 1888 the same thing occurred again but the complaints were louder. Earlier in September 1887 certain raiyats and landlords presented a petition to the then collector of the district, stating that, owing to the flood of the Ganges and there being no outlet in the railway embankment from Banwarchak to Pahleza Ghat, their lands, houses and cattle were submerged causing the great loss to them.23 The collector deputed Kasturi Lal, Deputy Collector, to the spot to enquire and report on the subject. The collector wrote to the agent of the B&NWR, suggesting certain ways by which an exit for the spill water might be made, pointing out that though the

Railways in Bihar

419

villagers had heavy loss, yet they would not press this point if proper arrangements be made before the next rains. At the same time, the collector wrote to the commissioner, asking that the question should be taken up by the government.24 The agent, Alexander Izat replied that the company was not inclined to do anything in this matter and according to the contract with the Secretary of the State, the company was entitled to receive the land for the construction of railways free of cost. In these circumstances any compensation that might be required to be paid for this land partially inundated near Banwar Chak should be defrayed by the government.25 The collector wrote a letter to the agent and asked him to reconsider the matter, and repudiated the validity of the argument that government should pay the compensation. The agent replied to the collector that the railway could not take on itself to provide bridges or other openings, and reasserted his opinion that the government should pay any compensation found necessary. The matter was then referred to the government. The government asked whether an opening at the part referred to was absolutely necessary. The collector replied that the railway authorities should re-open by suitable bridges the three drainage channels which their embankment had closed and in obedience to an order from the commissioner and deputed an officer, Babu Raghoonath Sahai, Deputy Collector, to visit the affected places and report on the subject.26 After holding a local enquiry, the Deputy Collector submitted his report on 22 January 1889. The collector wrote to the agent suggesting certain ways by which an exit for the spill water could be made. The government then directed to the railway company to put up a sluice gate of such waterway as they considered would serve to drain off the flood water at Bunwar Chak banked up by the railway bund and this was forwarded to the assistant engineer. The assistant engineer replied that the sluice gate could not be opened with any safety till the water in the Ganges would fall about the 20 September. It appeared from the correspondence of the agent

420

Pushpa Kumari

that this sluice was not put for draining off the flood water but to let off the accumulated water after the floods were over.27 On 5 August 1889 two petitions were received from the villagers of Garib Patti (one of the villages the people of which had already complained in 1887) complaining of the damage done to their crops every year by the embankment, and praying that they might be rescued. On 8 August 1889 after a few days of presentation of the petition two large bodies of the villagers armed with lathies (long bamboo sticks) and koodalies (spades) attacked the railway embankment near Banwar Chak in two places and at one place succeeded in cutting a passage through the bund for the exit of water which had accumulated behind it on the south.28 In 1890 on the persistent complaints by the raiyats, the collector of Saran with the support of commissioner of Patna Division informed many times about the incidence to the Local and Supreme governments. It caused peremptory orders to be issued for the removal of the grievance. In 1890 the Government of India, upon the reiterated complaints of local officers, appointed a committee to report on the best means of relieving the distress of the villages concerned. This committee met on 27 June 1890 and submitted a report recommending the re-opening of the bridge after it had been improved and strengthened.29 After passing of the Railway Act IX of 1890 the powers of railway authorities were very much strengthened. The Agent of B&NWR said the company would accept the recommendations of the committee and re-open the bridge if the government would accept it as a final settlement of the case. The Government of India suggested that matters should be compensated for the damage done by the floods. The agent asked how much the compensation would be. The collector of Saran pointed out that it would be an extremely costly, difficult and tedious operation assessing the compensation and suggested to re-open the bridge as recommended by the committee. After considerable correspondence the deputy collector specially deputed to make the calculation of dam-

Railways in Bihar

421

age caused to the land south of Banwar Chak station by the embankment which carried loop-line to Panapur Pahleza Ghat.30 Babu Raghunath Sahai, the deputy collector was deputed to report in this matter. He proceeded to the spot on 30 December 1891, accompanied by a staff of eight amins and with their attendants remained their till 26 February 1892. He visited one village after another and in the absence of any regular survey or any statistics of elevation, he ascertained by enquiry and by actual inspection what lands were submerged, to what extent and for how long in successive years of great, medium and small floods. Careful notes were made and these lands were measured. Working on these lines the Deputy Collector Babu Raghunath Sahai submitted his report, on showing for each village year by year the damage done to both crops (rabi and kharif the latter also known as bhadai) in the year 1886 to 1890 and 1891 had amounted to Rs. 62,627.31 The following is the deputy collector’s estimates: Year

Value of bhadoi destroyed (in Rs.)

Value of rabi Total amount destroyed (in Rs.) (in Rs.)

1885

Nil

1886

(16 annas) 23,736 100% destroyed

1887

(4 annas) 5,935 25% destroyed

1888

Nil

1889

Nil

1890

Nil

1891

20,826

1,654

Total

52,497

10,130

Grand Total

1886 to 8,476 1890

8,476

62,627

Source: J.A. Bourdilion, Esq. to the Commissioner of Patna Division, No. 477, 17 April 1894.32

422

Pushpa Kumari

It would be seen that in the years 1888, 1889, 1890, when the floods were abnormally high, none of the damage was laid to the account of the embankment, as in 1885 the bridge in the embankment was open and surplus water escaped. In 1886 and 1891, on the other hand, there was a very fine bhadoi crop elsewhere which would certainly be found on this deara also but for the inundation caused by the embankment. When the damage caused in different years varied so much, it was impossible to arrive at any general average. It would appear that the land carrying a bhadoi crop, which in 1891 was totally destroyed, and the value of the damage was assessed at Rs. 20,826. This gave an average loss last year, when the loss was total of Rs. 6-4-9 a bigha, a very low estimate indeed of the value of a bigha of good bhadoi.33 Upon learning the magnitude of the sum (Rs. 62,627), the railway authorities decided to carry out the orders of supreme government and to reopen and strengthen the bridge. For the future, therefore, the raiyats would not be exposed to loss on this account, but the local officers urged upon the lieutenant-governor the propriety of demanding from the railway closed in 1886. Sir Antony Macdonnell was disposed to support and press the claim.34 J. Johnson, ESQ, Secretary to Government of Bengal, PWD wrote to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, ‘His Honour is advised that, previous to the passing of the Railway Act IX of 1890, claims for compensation for damage caused by a Railway Company had to be enforced in a civil court.’35 No suits of this character were filed by the proprietors or inhabitants of the village affected, because in the first place, they were for the most part poor and helpless villagers and secondly, the raiyats at a very early stage of the dispute sought the assistance of the local officers, and in accordance with the instructions they received, they had throughout abstained from filing suits, trusting loyalty to the efforts which were being made on their behalf by their constituted guardians and protectors. They buoyed up continually with the expectation that the efforts of the local officers to obtain redressal for them

Railways in Bihar

423

would not be without result. It was presumed that suits for compensation for damage caused before 1890 could not be successfully instituted, since the defendant company would certainly plead limitation. Since 1890, however, a different procedure was obtained, and under Section 10, a suit no longer lied to obtain compensation for damage, but in case of dispute the collector, upon an application being made in that behalf, had to determine and realize the compensation in accordance, with the provision of the Land Acquisition Act.36 It was not to be supposed that all the raiyats in villages which had been injured by the action of the railway would come forward and make claims for compensation. The Secretary to the Government of Bengal, PWD wrote to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of the Legal Affairs The Lieutenant Government should move in the matter and call upon the Railway authorities to make good to the raiyats the estimated amount of damage done from 1890 to date, and that, in case of dispute, it should then direct the Collector to take action under Section 10(2) of the Act.37

It was understood that the company would resist by every means in its power the payment of compensation. Under Section 10 of the Railways Act a railway administration was distinctly stated to be liable to pay compensation for damage done in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the three preceding sections, which include the building of an embankment, and second, it was noticeable that the agent himself in his letters marginally noted had admitted that compensation was payable. In this matter the opinion of the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs was also that the raiyats injured by the railway embankment were entitled to compensation.38 There had been a long dispute between the Bengal government, who intervened on behalf of the raiyats and the Railway Company, as to the amount of compensation the Company should pay. A claim of over Rs. 60,000 was originally preferred against the Company and proceedings were insti-

424

Pushpa Kumari

tuted against them in a test case under the Indian Railway Act of 1890. The Advocate General advised that the Railway Act did not apply, and the proceedings be withdrawn. The Lieutenant-Governor admitted subsequently that the original estimate of damage was an exaggerated estimate, and he would exclude from calculation as remote and indefinite all damage said to have been caused by inability to sow rabi lands, confining the compensation to damage for the loss of growing crops drowned by blocked inundation in the rainy season.39 The statistics furnished by the collector of Saran showed that some 3,850 bighas of land were usually under rain crops in the area affected by the floods, and if the company would agree to give a sum of Rs. 30,000, or something less than Rs. 10 a bigha for the damage and since the Banwar Chak bridge was closed in 1886, Sir Charles Elliott would be prepared to accept this as a fair offer, and believed that it would be accepted by the raiyats in full satisfaction of all demands.40 Colonel Gracey, who dealt with the matter as consulting engineer, was of the opinion that even this estimate of damage was enormously exaggerated. As regards the season of 1894, it was probable that no damage was incurred, the bridge was opened in that year, which had carried off the floods and relieved the villages above the Banwar Chak embankment. The Government of India enquired whether the Agent was willing to submit the case for arbitration on the understanding that on no consideration should the award exceeds Rs. 30,000. The Railway Company declined to accept this proposal and preferred to fight the matter in the Civil Courts. They were, however, willing to settle the matter by paying Rs.10,000, conditionally on the amount being debited to the working expenses of the Joint Undertaking, and to a guarantee being given by the claimants that no further claims would be forwarded. As far as raiyats were concerned, this was probably considerably more than the net benefit they would receive by instituting proceedings against the company in the civil courts.41 The point especially for consideration in

Railways in Bihar

425

the Finance and Commerce Department was the proposal to debit the sum of Rs. 10,000 to the Joint Undertaking. The practical effect of this would be to approximately halve the charge between the company and the government. The damage was caused by the action of the B&NWR Company before they took over the management of the Tirhoot State Railway (in 1890), and had nothing to do with this railway. The charge was not one which under the rule should be debited to the working expenses of the Joint Undertaking. It should either have been met from the net profits of the B&NWR or should have been debited to their capital account. The latter course was proposed which would be more favourable to the company.42 The Agent of B&NWR was willing to settle the matter by paying Rs.10,000, conditionally on the amount being debited to a guarantee being given by the claimants that no further claim should be put forward. The B&NWR Company, required a guarantee to get this from the Bengal government on behalf of the raiyats.43 J.A. Bourdillion wrote: considering the uncertainties of the Civil Courts, and the unavoidable expense, delay, and harassment to which the Banwar Chak raiyats would be exposed, if they went into Court, In this circumstances Government should compromise for a sum of Rs. 10,000 down. This sum was far less than the damage done, but in the first place it was hopeless to expect to get anything like the proper sum out of the Agent Mr. Alexander Izat and secondly, probability was that many of the original victims had disappeared – died or migrated or had become incapable of suing –. Therefore, if the full original estimate had been accepted, a good deal would have remained un-awarded.44

The Lieutenant-Governor accepted, on behalf of raiyats the Rs. 10,000 offered by the Board of Directors, B&NWR Company, requested that the amount be paid to the collector of Saran for distribution to the raiyats concerned, which was paid. To conclude, the cycle of events consequent to the filling

426

Pushpa Kumari

up of a bridge had a deeper significance for the right of peasantry vis-à-vis the railway companies and also the colonial state apparatus. The demand and acceptance of compensation opened a new window into the structured relationship of the peasantry and the colonial state which always acted in a mode of patronage. Although a small compensation of Rs. 10,000 did not fully compensate their losses, it marked a new departure from the established practice of a ‘relief’ which could not be claimed as a matter of right unlike the compensation, which had a legal basis and became a crucial precedence for the future. It can be presumed that this simple victory would have definitely impacted the track-laying operation and more rain water outlets would have been provided by the railway companies.

NOTES 1. Superintending Engineer, Northern circle, to Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division, 6 April 1897 ‘Extract from the proceedings of District Board meeting held on 6 April 1896’, from the Records of Bengal Government, Railway Department, Praveen Singh, ‘The Colonial State, Zamindars and the Politics of Flood Control in North Bihar (1850-1945)’, Indian Economic& Social History Review (IESHR), 2008 45(2): 253. 2. Quoted by Anupam Mishra, in Tehalka, vol. 12 (6), 18 April 2015. 3. P.C. Ghose, A Comprehensive Treatise on North Bihar Flood Problems, vol. 1, Patna, 1948, also in Praveen Singh, ‘The Colonial State, Zamindars and the Politics of Flood Control in North Bihar (1850-1945), IESHR, 2008, 45(2): 253. 4. Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change: Railways and Everyday Life in Colonial India, Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 7. 5. Radhakamal Mukherjee, The Changing Face of Bengal: A Study in Riverine Economy, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 2008, p. 53. 6. Pushpa Kumari, ‘The Gandhian Movement and Railway Workers in Bihar: A Case Study of the Workers of Jamalpur Railway Workshop (1919-1930)’, The NEHU Journal, vol. XIII, no. 2, July-December 2015, pp. 75-86.

Railways in Bihar

427

7. ‘Extract from the Proceedings of District Board Meeting held on 6 April 1896’, from the Records of Bengal Government, Railway Department, quoted in Praveen Singh, ‘The Colonial State, Zamindars and the Politics of Flood Control in North Bihar (1850-1945), IESHR , 2008, 45(2): 253. 8. Report by District Engineer of Purnea on the Garhara Katihar Railway Project, ibid., p. 13. 9. P.C. Ghose, A Comprehensive Treatise on North Bihar Flood Problems: Being a Description of the River System and their Behaviours and tendencies with Suggestions for flood Mitigation, Patna: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1948, iii, quote in Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change, p. 109. 10. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, ‘The Bihar Flood Story’, Economic and Political Weekly, 1997, 32(35): 2207. 11. Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change, p. 109. 12. Ibid. 13. Elizabeth Whitcombe, Agrarian Condition in North India: The United Provinces under British Rule, 1860-1900, California: University of California Press, 1972, p. 93 and Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change, p. 110. 14. F.W. Strong, Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers: Dinajpur, Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1912, p. 64. Meghanad Saha, ‘The Great Flood in Northern Bengal’, in Ramchandra Chatterjee, ed., The Modern Review and Miscellany, XXXII, 5 November 1922, pp. 605-11 and Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change, p. 110. 15. Strong, Dinajpur, 64; Saha, ‘Great Flood in Northern Bengal’, pp. 605-11. 16. F.O. Mayne, Commissioner, Allahabad Division to C.A. Elliot, Secretary, Govt. of NWP, Allahabad, 7 October 1871, in ‘Flooding of Towns of Jounpore and Azimgarh,’ Article VI, Selections of the records of the North-Western Provinces (second series), Allahabad: Government Press, 1872, pp. 183-4 in Ritika Prasad, Tracks of Change, pp. 110-11. 17. L.S.S. O’Malley, Monghyr: Bengal District Gazetteers, Calcutta: Secretariat Book Depot, 1909, p. 111. 18. Saha, ‘Great Flood in Northern Bengal’, pp. 605-11. 19. O’Malley, Monghyr, 1909, p. 111. 20. F.J. Johnstone, Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, P.W. Dept. to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, 586R., 28 August 1893, No. 481, Part B, PWD Railway Construction

428

21.

22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40. 41.

Pushpa Kumari (hereafter RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI). Stephen G. Read, Pleader, High Court, NWP, Law Officer of the B&NWR Company, 29 October 1894, no. 485, PWD(RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Collector of Saran to the Commissioner of Patna Division No. 468, 133 G.L.A. 24 February 1893, Patna, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Ibid. F.A. Slack, Collector of Saran, no. 487, 16 September 1894, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Collector of Saran to the Commissioner of Patna Division No. 468, 133, G.L.A. 24 February 1893, Patna, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. J.A. Bourdilion, Esq. to the Commissioner of Patna Division no. 477, 14, G.L.A., 17 April 1894, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. F.J. Johnson, Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal PWD to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs’, no. 487, 28 August 1893, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. F.J. Johnstone, Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, P.W. Dept. to the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, 586R., 28 August 1893, no. 481, Part B, PWD Railway Construction (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. F.J. Johnstone, Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal, P.W.D to the Secretary of the Govt. of India, PWD., Ry. Branch, No. 464, 69R, 2 February 1895, PWD (RC), April 1895, nos. 464-94, NAI. Ibid. R. Nathan, Under Secretary to Secretary, 30 November 1895. PWD (RC), January 1896, nos. 29-36, NAI.

Railways in Bihar

429

42. Ibid. 43. Consulting Engineer for Railways, Luknow, 17 December 1895, PWD Pros (RC), January 1896, nos. 29-36. 44. J.A. Bourdillion to Sir Charles Elliott, KCSI, 3 December 1895.

CHAPTER 14

Railway Development in India: A Study of Extension to Colonial Orissa Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

In this article, the growth and expansion of railways in colonial Orissa has been discussed. The article seeks to argue that Orissa which was one of the backward regions of India, did not receive colonial priority for extension of railway. In 1803, Orissa was occupied by the British. The Bengal-Orissa Famine of 1866 visited Orissa in 1866 in which one third of its population perished. Backwardness of communication was one of the potential factors for aggravation of the famine. In the nineteenth century, 12 famines visited Orissa and there was high mortality rate. For the entire nineteenth century, the area remained prone to famine and disease. In spite of high mortality and spread of different diseases in Orissa, the British did not extend railways to Orissa. It would be further argued that the British claim of promoting railway as a famine protecting line was not applied here because this backward region did not receive colonial priority. The railways was extended to Orissa only to fulfil the imperial agenda of connecting two imperial headquarters between Calcutta and Madras. The first reference to the railway development in colonial Orissa was submitted by Stephenson’s 1845 draft. It prepared a grand plan of the Indian railway system that included the Calcutta-Madras railroad along the east coast of India and thus across the coastal district of Orissa. But when Dalhousie

432

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

prepared his famous minutes of 1853, it considered the Orissa coastal line as superfluous. So Orissa had to wait till 1890 for extension of railways.1 Ganeswar Nayak in his book Development Transport and Communication in Orissa: A Case Study, has made a comprehensive analysis of the railway development in colonial Orissa. 2 But the author has not discussed the imperial railway policy which was applicable to Orissa. Another significant work was done by Ravi Ahuja titled Pathways of the Empire: Circulation, Public Works and Social Space in Colonial Orissa.3 It is another monumental work on the railway history of Orissa. R.R. Bhandari4 in his book Blue Chip of Indian Railway has described construction of different branches of railway in Orissa. But he did not delineate objectives of construction of railways in Orissa and its social implication. Ramesh Roy in his article has also discussed railway extension to Orissa.5 But has not discussed the colonial railway policy and its implication in Orissa. As suggested earlier, this article marks a radical departure in the historiography of railway transport in India because it links railway construction in colonial Orissa with the broad colonial railway policy of the world. Second, the article strongly argues the significant causes of delay in the railway construction in Orissa in spite popular demands from all section of society. In this background, it also discusses the implication of railway transport in colonial Orissa.

Origin The idea of constructing railway was first put forward in 1831 within few years of the start of the early railway age in Great Britain. MacDonald Stephenson made a proposal to the Bengal government in 1844 for line from Calcutta to North-West Frontier. About the same time Bombay businessmen suggested a line across the Western Ghats.6 As a result provincial committees for East Indian Railway and the Great Indian Peninsular Railway were formed and proposals submitted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company in 1845.

Railway Development in India

433

The court was in favour of the proposal. However, discussion about the terms of the contract to be entered into with the railway companies and anxiety about natural difficulty of constructing railroads in India led to further delay.7 An engineer, F.W. Simms was sent out by the Court of Directors to make enquiries. He reported that Railroads are not inapplicable to the peculiarities and circumstances of India, but on the contrary are not only a great desideratum, but with proper attention can be constructed and maintained as perfectly as in any part of Europe. The great extent of its vast plains, which may in some directions, be traversed for hundred miles without encountering any serious undulations, the small outlay required for parliamentary or legislative purposes, the low value of lands, cheapness of labor, and the general facilities for procuring building materials, may all be quoted as reasons why the introduction of a system of railroads is applicable to India.8

The deliberation on the terms and the conditions of the contract between the companies, the Court of Director and the Board of Control continued for three years after Simms Report. The first agreement between the East India Company and the East India Railway (EIR) and the Great Indian Peninsular Railway(GIPR) company were signed only in August 1849.9 Construction began in 1850. The first lines were built inland from major ports of Bombay (1853) Calcutta (1854) and Madras (1856).10 By 1867, twenty of India’s largest cities (according to the Census of 1872) nineteen were on the railway line. In 1860, there were 1,349 km of track, but by 1870 there were 7,678 km, by 1890, 24,495 km, by 1920-1, 56,980 km, and by 1946-7, 65,217 km.11 The density of rail lines grew from 35 routes km per 10,000 sq. km in 1880 to 159 in 1946-7.12

Objectives The railways were not developed in India to encourage industrial development. The objectives in the minds of authority, both England and India were mainly political and commer-

434

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

cial.13 The railways would strengthen the control of British over the country by enabling the swift movement of troops and supplies over large distances. The Governor-General Lord Hardinge, writing in support of railway development in 1846 said that: ‘In this country . . . the rapid concentration of infantry artillery and stores may be the chief prevention of insurrection, the speedy termination of war, or the safety of the empire.’14 This became doubly evident after the war of Independence. In addition, the railways were expected to promote export of raw materials from India and open up a market for British manufactured products.15 ‘Great tracts’ wrote Dalhousie in 1853 ‘are teeming with produce they cannot dispose of’. He pointed to past experience to argue that imports into the country would also increase. ‘Every increase of facility for trade has been attended . . . an increased demand for articles of European produce in most distant market of India.’16 Sir Chars Wood, President of India Board, writing to Dalhousie expressed the view that ‘if we could draw a large supply of cotton from India it would be a great national objects. . . . It is not a comfortable thing to be so dependent on the United States. . . . If we had the Bombay railway carried in to cotton country it would be a great work which the Government is capable of performing with a view to this end.’ The benefits that would accrue to the people of India from the railroad were expected to flow from the attainment of the political and commercial objectives mentioned. This was entirely in accord with the contemporary practice of viewing the colonies as satellites geared to the economy of the mother country and depriving consequential benefits. The fact that railways were developed without any consideration for the Indian people emerge, when we consider the relative neglect by the Government of India the development of irrigation projects. In an agricultural country plagued by flood and drought, irrigation instead of transport should have been naturally considered more important. The development of railways fulfilled the objectives set for them. The control of the British over India was strengthened.

Railway Development in India

435

The export and import of the country began to grow swiftly. Raw cotton export increased from £1.8 million in 1849 to £4.3 million in 1858, that of food grains from £859,000 to £5.0 million over the same year. Over the same period, the import of cotton and woollen manufactures amplified from £2.3 million to £5 million and of machinery from £18,000 to £465,000.17 Lord Dalhousie’s famous railway minute dated 20 April 1853 was the template for the future railway project in India. It laid down broad objectives in which the construction, management and finance of railways was to be undertaken. Dalhousie recommended the replacement of the policy of experimental lines by a policy of constructing trunk lines connecting the interior of each of the three presidencies with principal ports, and the presidencies with each other. These trunk lines were appropriate to the political and commercial objectives that underlay railway development.18 Second, Dalhousie suggested that that construction of railways should be turned over to private companies working under government supervision and control and guaranteed a rate of return on capital. The British government adopted several policies for railway extension in India. The policy of guarantee system was adopted between 1853 and 1869.19 The policy of state construction followed from 1869 to 1882. Again the policy of new guarantee system was followed from 1881-1900.20

Popular Demands and Colonial Apathy The railway development in Orissa dates back to Stephenson’s 1845 proposal of an Indian railway system, which had integrated a Calcutta-Madras railroad along the subcontinent’s east coast and thus connected the coastal district of Orissa.21 However, Lord Dalhousie considered the line superfluous in his famous minute of 1853, and its construction did not receive approval of the government.22 However, the scheme for development of railways in Orissa continued to be framed.23 So the Calcutta-Madras railway along the

436

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

shores of the Bay of Bengal did not received the priority of the Government. A few years later in 1865, Messers Doyle & Co. applied to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal for the permission to develop a line of traction locomotive engine, with carriages or springs, for the passenger traffic on the Midnapur Government Road between Ooloobariah (near Calcutta) and Balasore. They planned to extend this line to Cuttack gradually.24 After the famine of 1866 there was vociferous demand in Orissa to extend the railways to Orissa. In 1866 Orissa was visited by a monstrous famine in which onethird of her population perished. It was a moment of deep distress and social crises. A famine commission was constituted which recommended development roads, canals and ports. But it did not recommend railway extension to Orissa. Even at that time India had 400 km of railways. The people of Orissa hoped that with the extension of railway to Orissa, the problem of famine and communication would be solved. So we see colonial apathy in Orissa. Even the famine commission of 1866 did not do justice to Orissa. So the people of Orissa used every platform for extension of railways to Orissa. There was also a petition from the inhabitants of Cuttack in 1866 for the construction of a railway line between Howrah (Calcutta) and Puri.25 This demand repeated by Abdul Ghani, a zamindar in Bhadrak and Balasore, before the Bengal-Orissa Famine Commissioner of 1867.26 But the Collector and the Commissioner of Cuttack held the opinion in 1868, that no railway was required in Orissa for the time being.27 However, the Collector of Balasore was in favour of a railway line to Balasore.28 Railway transport reached Orissa towards the end of the nineteenth century, when other regions of eastern India had been connected with the railway system for up to four decades. The Indian railway network had, however, a direct impact on the regional communications system, ever since the mainline of the Bengal-Nagpur Railway (BNR) was opened in 1891. This railways constituted a second and shorter rail link between Calcutta and Bombay, which passed the coal field of

Railway Development in India

437

Chota Nagpur, skirted and partly traversed the north-western of Orissa on its way to Raipur and Nagpur.29 This resulted in a shift in the organization of interregional transport costs implying that the Mahanadi route’s attraction as channel of central transregional India’s trade was further diminished.30 The structure of relative distance and spatial scales was transformed, which is also evident in the development of pilgrim traffic from central India, the road along the southern bank of the Mahanadi had been the most important route for pilgrims to the Puri from this region and their number increased after it was opened out for carts. More than then 30,000, passengers were reported to have reached Cuttack via Mahanadi route in early 1880.31 However, when the BengalNagpur main line was complemented by east coast railway in 1899-1900, the enormous diversion over Calcutta turned into a shortcut in terms of travel time, while the much more direct Mahanadi route lost its attraction for many pilgrims. Effects of dislocation also pertained to the pattern of circulation within the region of the present state of Orissa. The B.N.R connected the north-eastern Garjat to Calcutta and contributed their spatial reorientation towards the imperial capital. Sambalpur always regarded as the sub-regional centre between central India and Orissa was linked by BNR in 1893. It induced rapid commercialization of agriculture and benefitted the local dominant landowners and immigrant traders by further accentuating its ties with the central province as well as Calcutta.32 In clear difference to colonial transport policy concerning other region of the subcontinent, the protagonist of navigable canals prevailed over those railways during the crucial transitional period of the 1850s and 1860. However, there were always voices not only colonial oligarchy, but also from dominant Indian classes calling for the construction of railway link to Orissa. Appeals to this effect by Orissa notables thus continued to be written and turned down in the 1870s.33 It was only in the following decades that demands intensified. A Balasore Railway Committee was founded in 1881. It

438

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

consisted of the Maharaja Krushna Chandra of Mayurbhanja with Baikuntha Nath Dey, an influential zamindar, as its honorary secretary. The committee sent carefully prepared memorials to government of Bengal calling for the construction of a direct rail link between Calcutta and Madras through Orissa’s coastal plains and a branch line to Puri. This railway, they argued, would not only provide a faster and safer means of transport to Jagannath pilgrims, but would also reduce the incidence of cholera epidemics by improving the pilgrims’ lot and could, furthermore, serve as famine protection line. The large number of pilgrims travelling to Puri, which they believed to be between 5,00,000 and 6,00,000 annually, would guarantee handsome profits to the investors.34 From early 1880, these demands were repeated time and again by the people in Oriya newspapers. The colonial government was urged to introduce a railway line to Cuttack and Puri either from Varanasi via Chota Nagpur and the Garjat states of Orissa or from Calcutta across the coastal plains. The point was not that Orissa’s colonial administration was totally averse to the construction of a railway line at that time. In fact, they argued on similar lines as Indian notables did. Yet, the Commissioner of Cuttack clearly refused to cooperate with the Balasore Railway Committee.35 One of the potential factors contributed for the development of railway was the recommendation of Indian Famine Commission of 1880. The commission recommended construction of 8,000 km of railway to protect the country from famines.36 Besides, the parliamentary select committees of 1881 recommended for rapid extension of railways. It pointed out that it would give protection against famine, stimulate internal trade, open up fertile tracts and coal fields and in general improve the economic condition of the people.37 Another significant factor which contributed to the development of railway in Orissa was that by the dawn of twentieth century, the neglect of irrigation was the product of British selfishness and deep rooted proclivity of the foreign powers to sacrifice the interest of Indian people in order to placate

Railway Development in India

439

the interest of British traders, manufacturers and investors.38 In 1887, the demand for railways in Orissa gained momentum, when the Sir John Lawrence, a sea going steamer had left Calcutta for Puri with over 8,000 passenger. It sank on 25 May due to careless navigation. Hundreds of predominately female pilgrims were drowned, many of whom were from well-to-do Calcutta Hindu families.39 The incident was widely published in both Bengali and Oriya newspapers. The papers criticized that ‘Railway lines were constructed in all directions for the benefit of Europeans and of their trade. The interest of native India has been sacrificed to the interest of Europeans. Further it presented the demand of Orissa railway as demand of entire Hindu community. A railway line to Puri will be held with delight by 16 crore of Hindus, for it will lessen the danger and difficulties, and put an end to their sorrow and fears.40

Railway Construction in Orissa Under growing pressures from various quarters, the government approved the plan for railway development and entrusted the Bengal-Nagpur Railway Company to construct railway line in Orissa. It was formed in 1887 for the purpose of constructing railroads from Nagpur to Raj Nandgoan.41 On 9 March 1887 the indenture was made between the Secretary of State in the Council of India and Bengal-Nagpur Company Limited to carry out the contract to that effect.42 A broad analysis of the railway plan of 1890 brought to light the fact that BNR had been pondering over two alternative proposals of connecting Orissa to Indian Railways. The proposals were the coastal line from Midnapur to Cuttack and Mahanadi line from Sambalpur to Khurda. The two lines were almost equal with regard to length (193/190 miles respectively) and the estimated cost was (Rs. 22 and 23 million respectively).43 Both the proposals were to be carried out by BNR which had secured a 4 per cent guarantee for their share holders. But the company followed the first proposal.

440

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

In 1880 the collector of Cuttack reported that one of the main objectives was to convert Orissa (especially Balasore) from a remote and inaccessible region into a rural appendage of the metropolis. Summing up somewhat unusually the material results of this policy, the provincial government of Bihar and Orissa stated in 1928 that all the railways of the province were primarily designed to connect the great port of Calcutta.44 In November 1892 orders were issued for a comprehensive survey of the line from Calcutta to Cuttack.45 The total length of the proposed railway was 300 miles. By the end of 1895, the Government of India sanctioned the construction of railway lines from Sini to Cuttack, including the construction of a bridge over Mahanadi near Cuttack. The amount of capital expenditure was estimated as follows:46 Table 15.1: Estimated Expenditure of Different Projects Railway Lines

Miles

Expenditure (Rs.)

Sini to Howrah via Midnapur

175

2.03 crore

Cuttack to Midnapur

194

2.19 crore

Cuttack to Godavari

454

5.12 crore

Total

823

9.24 crore

Source: Railway Administrative Report, 1893-94, Calcutta: Superintendent of Printing, 1895, p. 164.

The year 1898-9 was one of the most significant time for realizing the dreams of Orissa. The most vital section of railway via Sini to Kharagpur and then Kolaghat to Kharagpur-Cuttack was opened for goods as well as passenger traffic.47 Survey from Cuttack to Puri was made during 18923. The construction of the line called East Coast Railway was approved in the year 1890. While East Railway was under construction from Vijaywada to Cuttack, BNR company was authorized to construct railways from Kharagpur to Cuttack. Cuttack to Bhubaneswar section was opened on 10 February 1897.48 A railway line from Sambalpur to Khurda was first sur-

441

Railway Development in India

veyed in 1891. It was estimated that the whole line of about 190 miles of length would cost about Rs. 2.77 crore. 49 But in 1894 the project was abandoned for want of funds.

Mayurbhanja State Railway The opening of the narrow gauge between Ripsaw and Talbandh was the contribution of Maharaja Bhanja Deo.50 The total capital expenditure on this line was Rs. 17.144 lakh and the line was opened for traffic in 1905. The line was extended from Baripada to Talbandh in order to explore iron ore deposit of Gurumahisani. It was sanctioned in 1915 and opened for traffic on July 1920.51 Table 15.2: Date of Opening of Different Railway Sections in Orissa Lines

Date of Opening

Mileage

Cuttack to Bhubaneswar

01.02.1897

10.32

Bhubaneswar to Khurda Road

20.07.1896

11.76

Khurda Road to Rambha

01.03.1896

61.54

Rambha to Berhampur Ganjam

01.09.1895

29.56

Berhampur Ganjam to Palasa

01.04.1895

45.76

Palasa to Parlakhemindi

17.12.1894

33.11

Parlakhemundi to Vijaynagaram

15.07.1893

37.50

Kharagpur to Balasore

17.12..1898

71.75

Balasore to Cuttack

10.01.1899

116.76

Source: Compiled from History of Railway Constructed and Progress from 1885-1915.

Railway Extension to Talcher Coal Field After the First World War the government decided to explore the coal field of Talcher. The BNR acquired the mining rights over 1,000 acres of Talcher coalfield areas and commenced the construction of the railway line connecting Talcher with

442

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

the Cuttack-Kharagpur railway line at Nirundi.52 The line was opened for traffic on 20 January 1927.

Parlakhemundi Light Railway Parlakhemundi was the largest permanently settled estate in modern Gajapati district. It came under British occupation in 1768. East Coast Railway brought its rail line to Naupada on 20 July 1884. The Raja of Parlakhemundi decided to construct a light railway consisting of 2 ft and 6 in. gauge taking off from Naupada to connect his capital Parlakhemundi and approached the British government for sanction.53 The sanction was granted on 1 April 1900.The rail line was built with utmost economy; 60 miles of rail line had cost about Rs. 7,000. In 1929-31, the Raja decided on the further extension of the railway. The total capital outlay shot up from Rs. 7 lakh to 25 lakh.

Nilgiri Light Railway A wealthy Bengali firm of Calcutta was the proprietor of extensive granite quarries at Nilgiri. The firm decided to construct a short 2 ft 6 in. gauge railway from the mines to Balasore station on BNR, a distance of 13 miles. First it was decided to transport only granite. It was further decided to extend the line to the heart of the Orissa and convert the line for passenger and goods traffic.54 But the decision of the government did not materialize and one of the beautiful projects faced premature death. Till now the project did not receive the attention of the government.

Impact of Railway in Orissa The construction of railways had a far-reaching impact on the life, culture and economy of Indian people.55 In the official view the benefits conferred by the railways were at all time high and that they were an all powerful agent in the

Railway Development in India

443

promotion of the material and social advancement of the people. Indian leaders on the other hand, holding that the railways had proved detrimental to India’s industrial activity, condemned it as a many sided evil, which prevented a healthy material advance along the normal lines.56 The value of railways was best appreciated in the times of famines. Tirthanker Roy estimated that total famine related mortality during the crises of 1876-8, 1896-7, and 1899-1900 at between thirteen to sixteen million people.57 In the first quarter of the nineteenth century Orissa was visited by 12 famines.58 The subsequent famines which broke out in 1866 were of still greater magnitude. Though it extended along the whole east coast from Madras to Bengal, yet its privation fell chiefly on three district of Orissa. The area most affected by this famine was about 12,000 sq. miles with a population of about 4,00,000. Of this, only the three districts of Orissa comprised an area of 8,000 sq. miles containing a population of about 3,00,000. The famine of 1866 was aggravated by a lack of good communication. With the coming of railways to Orissa, food could be easily transported from surplus area and relief operation could be conducted with greater efficiency. That is why the Famine Commission of 1800 found the highest famine-mortality in areas where transport facility was most scanty. It therefore, pleaded for the immediate construction of new lines including 3,000 miles for protective purposes. The development of railways facilitated the pilgrim traffic to Puri. The Indian railway was immediately used by a large number of pilgrims. In 1881 the road journey from Raniganj in West Bengal to Puri took twenty-six days.59 A Jagannath pilgrim committee of Balasore calculated in 1887 that approximately 6,000 pilgrim died annually on their journey to Puri on both overland routes and waterways. But with the introduction of railway, Puri could be reached within 12 hours. This was also immediately appropriated by a large number of pilgrims to Hindu shrines. In 1880, it was believed that pilgrimage to Gaya had more than doubled after the

444

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

construction of railway.60 There was hence little doubt that in Orissa the railways would readily be embraced as an alternative by a large number of pilgrims. The Government of Bihar and Orissa in 1913 reported an average of more than half a million pilgrim visit to Puri. So the railway communication to Puri further broadened the social base of pilgrimage.61 The development of railways provided enough facilities for material and intellectual development of the people.62 It enabled people of Orissa to go for higher studies and business outside the province. Besides, it offered great advantage for the achievement of political unity. The general improvement, both economic and intellectual, caused by growth of education and transport was reported as follows by the commissioner of Orissa. ‘There is more knowledge, and education among the masses, more trade and money in circulation, more employment in high wages for laborers, more moving to and fro in the country, less stagnation and a divided tendency to enlightment and progress.’63 The growth of railway transport united Orissa and provided formidable economic ground for unification of Orissa.64 Within a few years, the BNR, brought together the isolated and disintegrated areas of Ganjam, Midnapur, Singbhum, Sambalpur and central provinces. The railway communication to Sambalpur facilitated the communication further and strengthened the the bond of union among the Oriyas. The formation of a separate province with all advantages would help to further the internal trade relation between Sambalpur and coastal areas. So the development of railways provided economic and geographical base for unification of Orissa. The opening of BNR helped the growth of trade and commerce. But seaborne trade also decreased because the business community and traders preferred the railways because of safe and steady travel. So the ports of Orissa declined. Taking the weight of rice at two-thirds of the paddy the following figure of rice export were quoted.65 The introduction of railways affected the wages of labour-

445

Railway Development in India Table 15.3: Decline of Maritime Trade with the Introduction of Railway Year

Railway borne trade (Rs.)

Maritime trade (Rs.)

Total (Mds)

1926-7

1,837,453

146,061

1,983,514

1927-8

2,155,048

148,228

2,303,336

1928-96

2,830,799

142,757

2,982,534

Source: W.W. Dalzeil, Final Report on the Revision Settlement of Orissa, 1922-23, Govt. of Bihar & Orissa, Patna, 1923, p. 82.

ers. The wages of labourers had risen along with the price level. Table 15.4 shows the figures of three censuses of rural wages which were in the year 1911, 1916 and 1924. The figures were for unskilled laborers in the agricultural areas.66 S.L. Maddox remarked that the money wages had risen in the same proportion as the price of the staple food crops between 1814 and 1898. James noticed the same phenomena holding well up to 1910. There seems have been little rise between 1911 and 1916, and a sharp rise between 1916 and 1924. The wage level remained constant since 1924.The rise since the provincial settlement was roughly in the same proportion as the rise in price.67 The above applies to agriculture labourers put on wages, paid in cash from Rs. 0-8-0 to 0-12-0 a day, a considerable advance on the figure of Rs. 0-2-6 given Table 15.4: Price Rise with the Coming of Railways to Orissa District

Year of Census 1911 Rs A P

1916 Rs A P

1924 Rs A P

Increase in the Percentage of 1942 over 1916

Balasore

020

026

043

+70

Cuttack

020

020

040

+100

Puri

020

026

040

+60

Source: W.W. Dalzeil, Final Report on the Revision Settlement of Orissa, 1922-23, Govt. of Bihar & Orissa, Patna, 1923, p. 28.

446

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

by James at a revision settlement. Blacksmiths generally did piecework when they were daily wagers which were generally Rs. 0-8-0 per day as compared to Rs. 0-2-6 in 1875.68 There was another far-reaching result of this demand for foodgrains. This demand led to the extension of cultivation. Owing to rising price and increase in export of rice, land from other crops were diverted to food grains. For instance in Cuttack districts alone within a period of 19 years from 1877-8 to 1896-7, the area under cotton cultivation was reduced from 79,350 to 5,300 acres.69 But Orissa was under temporary settlements, and extension of cultivation led to increase in land revenue, while lands last taken up were inferior in productive powers. There had been no greater rise in the rents of the province. The Pahi rents in Orissa had during the period before the settlements in 1897 had raised by 44 per cent or 119 per cent less than the rise in price. Again, because of strict limit of assessment in 1897 no great enhancement could be made in land revenue and consequently the rents of the raiyats. The rise in prices also benefitted the cultivating class who paid their rent in cash directly.70 The development of railway transport provided easy access for foreign finished products to rural areas, as a result of which the decline of indigenous industries in Orissa as elsewhere in India was an established fact by the first quarter of twentieth century.71 Once upon a time cloth making was the principal industry. Even female members of high yielding cultivators were engaged in making thread. But with the increase of foreign import it was foresaken and relegated to lower classes. According to the census return of 1892 there were only 59,363 weavers in Cuttack, 56,767 in Balasore and about 1,900 in Puri.72 The weavers were still famous for superior quality manufacturers. But cloth making provinces did not pay any compensation to weavers. Those who were engaged in it lived on the verge of starvation. The imported goods almost silenced country looms and most of the weav-

Railway Development in India

447

ers turned to agriculture for their livelihood. In 1899 only four weavers possessed valid licenses. In early nineteenth century Andrew Sterling, a British civilian, reported that the finest quality of salt was produced in Orissa. Even before the occupation of province of Marathas in 1830, the East India Company had made several attempts to capture the lucrative salt manufacture and trade in the coastal districts of Orissa. With the coming of railways import of foreign salt increased rapidly.73 The local salt industry could not compete with superior quality of cheap foreign salt. Even salt imported from Madras was cheaper than the indigenous product. Ultimately, after several experiments, the production of salt in Orissa was stopped. It was decided to close the factory at Tua and Gurkai in Chilka Lake area in 1898. The opening of East Coast Railway for traffic hastened the closure of the salt industry in Orissa because of easy transport of Madras salt to the markets of Orissa. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the salt manufacture in Orissa had finally ceased. The net result of the decline of salt industry was that it only hit the common people who depended on it for their livelihood hard.74 The development of railways led to the migration of the people from rural to the cities of Calcutta and northern India. The deep and widespread miseries of the rural people and lack of industrial progress in Orissa compelled many people to migrate to different parts of Bengal, where facilities of employment existed. The opening of BNR during the closing years of nineteenth century facilitated the emigration.75 The migrants belonging to higher castes worked as personal servants in the Bengali families. But those belonging to low castes worked as labourers in the mills. The chief emigration was by train from Puri, Khurda, Cuttack, Jajpur, Balasore and Bhadrak. The inhabitants of Khurda subdivision generally went to Rangoon, while Killa Aul in Cuttack district supplied many servants to households in Calcutta.76 The introduction of railways brought far-reaching changes

448

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena

in Orissa. On the one hand, the coming of railways led to a decline in maritime trade and on the other hand, it provided security against another famine and natural calamity.77 In the limited economic development that Orissa experienced before independence, railways definitely played a significant role. Railways increased agricultural production, growth of modern industry and mining, new jobs redistribution of urban population and numerous other economic changes. Yet in the long run, these changes did not alter the basic structure of economy. Not until independence, when economic development became conscious and perused a policy, did the railway begin to realize their potential for assisting in the transformation of the economy of Orissa.

NOTES 1. The Earl of Dalhousie, Minute to the Court of Directorss, 20 April 1853. 2. G. Nayak, Development of Transport and Communication: A Case Study, Delhi: Anmol, 2000. 3. Ravi Ahuja, Pathways of the Empire, Circulation, Public Works and Social Space in Colonial Orissa, c. 1780-1914, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2009. 4. R.R. Bhandari, Blue Chip of Indian Railway, 1887-1987, Calcutta: SE Railway, 1987. 5. Ramesh Roy, ‘Railway in Orissa’, Comprehensive History and Culture of Orissa, ed. P.K. Mishra and J.K. Samal, Delhi: Kaveri Books, 1997, pp. 978-80. 6. V.B. Sing, Economic History of India, 1857-1956, Hyderabad: Allied Publisher, 1975, p. 327. 7. Bipin Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of Indian of Indian of National Leadership, 18801905, Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1966, p. 172. 8. M.N. Dash, Economic and Social Development of Modern India, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1959, p. 35. 9. Sing, op. cit., p. 338. 10. Ibid., p. 39. 11. Dharma Kumar, Cambridge Economic History of India, Delhi: Orient Longman, 1983, p. 739.

Railway Development in India 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29. 30.

449

Ibid., p. 739. Sing, op. cit., p. 339. Dash, op. cit., p. 36. Ibid., p. 7. N.B. Meheta, Indian Railways, Rates and Regulations, London: P.S. King and Son, 1927, p. 11. Sing, op. cit., p. 328. Ibid., p. 329. Ibid. Ibid. Dalhousie, Minute to the Court of Director, op. cit., pp. 242-5. Ibid. OSA, BoRLR 26,568 (H. Dixon, Offg, EE Cuttack Division, to H. Goodwyn, CE Lower Province, 14 June 1855). Also see OSA, BoRLR 27,532 (V.H. Shalch, Offg, Magistrate of Balasore to GF. Cockburn, CoCD, 8 June 1857. The proposal was not supported by the CoCD T.E. Ravenshaw and consequently turned down, OICC, BPWP, October 1865, P/16/72, nos. 24-7, 14-16, Ahuja, Pathways of Empire, op. cit., 2009, p. 219. OICC, BPWP, March 1866, P/432/32, no. 16, 10 (Petition of the Inhabitants of Cuttack to C. Beadon, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, 13 February 1866. The petition emphasized the importance of the line for pilgrim traffic to Puri). Report of Commission appointed during famine in Bengal and Orissa in 1866, 1:xcix, ibid., clxxxviii (statement by Abdul Ghunee, 22 January 1867). OSA, BoRLR 14 454 (W. Macpherson, Collector of Cuttack, to T.E. Ravenshaw, CoCD, 30 Marh 1868); OSA BoRLR 8 (T.E. Ravenshaw, CoCD, to Secretary to GoB, Judicial Dept., 27 April 1868. OSA, Bo RLR 15 522 (T.J. Bingold, Offg, Collector of Balasore, to CoCD, 28 Marh 1868); Further Paper Relating to the Extension of Railway Communication in India reprint 14 of PWD records (Calcutta: PWD Press, 1868), 3: 221-3 (T.E. Ravenshaw, CoCD, to Offg, Joint Secretary to GoB, PWD, Railways Branch, 27 April 1868). Bhandari, Blue Chip of Indian Railway, 1887-1987, op. cit., p. 23; Ahuja, op. cit., p. 248. W.A. Inglis, Canals and Flood Banks of Bengal, 13. Also see

450

31.

32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Ganeswar Nayak and Keshab Chandra Jena The Orissa Ports, The Indian Engineer 22/396, 10 November 1894. OICC, BPWP, December 1884 (P/2235), Railway, no. 30, app. B21 (Cuttack-Pooree Railway, Preliminary Reports and Estimates: A Smith, Co CD to Secy to GoB, PWD, 14 August 1883. Baboo G. Bal, ‘Economic History of Sambalpur District, 18491947’ (MS 21 pp.). The line was further reinforced between 1862 and 1905. G. Nayak, Development of Transport and Communication, Delhi: Anmol, 2000. A Case Study, pp. 74-5 quoted in Ahuja, p. 249. OICC, BPWP August 1882 (p/1831), Railway, no. 3, 3(CoCD to Secretary GoB, PWD, 15 October 1881, quoted in Ahuja, p. 250. OICC, BPWP Aug 1882(P/1831) Railway, no. 232 (COCD to Secy to GoB, PWD, 15 October 1881. Indian Famine Commission Report, 1880, p. 251. S.N. Sanyal, Development of Railway in India, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930, p. 146. Dutta, p. 312. Ahuja, op. cit. RNNB, 18 June 1887(Bangabasi, 11 June 1887) 621-2 quoted in Ahuja, p. 251. History of Railway Projects, Simla, 1898, p. 192. Ibid., p. 164. The Indian Engineer, 20/367, 21 April 1894, ‘Sambalpur to Khurda Connection’, in Bhandari, South Eastern Railway. Govt. of Bihar and Orissa, Bihar and Orissa in 1927-28, p. 108. BNR Engineering Committees Report, 1893, p. 145. Ibid. Railway Administration Report, 1899, p. 144. Ibid. History of Railway Projects, 1893, p. 13. L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers, Mayurbhanja: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, 1910, p. 146. Ibid., p. 147. Railway Administrative Report, 1927-28, p. 20. Bhandari, Blue Chip of Indian Railway, op. cit., p. 87. History of Railway Projects, Simla, 1900, p. 146, Nayak, op. cit., p. 124, RAR, 1915, p. 1916. Nayak, op. cit., 2001, p. 120.

Railway Development in India

451

56. Bipan Chandra, op. cit. 57. Tirthanker Roy, The Economic History of India 1857-1957, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 294; William Digby, Prosperous British India, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1901, p. 134. 58. Compiled from various Bengal Administrative Reports, quoted in B. Bhatta, Natural Calamity in Nineteenth Century Orissa. 59. Ahuja, Pathways of the Empire, op. cit., p. 258. 60. OICC, BPWP August 1882(P/1831) Railway, no. 4, 4. 61. Report of the Pilgrim Committees of Bihar and Orissa, Patna, 1913, pp. 4-5. 62. Nayak, op. cit., p. 288. 63. Orissa General Administration Report, 1876-77, p. 177. 64. Nayak, op. cit., p. 288. 65. W.W. Dalzeil, Final Report on the Revision Settlement of Orissa, 1922-23, Patna: Govt. of Bihar and Orissa, 1923, p. 82. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Monograph of Cotton Fabrics, Bengal Revenue Proceedings, April 1898, nos. 74-5. 70. S.L. Maddox, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement in Orissa, vol. I, Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1910, p. 138. 71. Revenue and Agriculture Department/Revenue Branch, Prog, no. 52, from the Secretary to Govt. of Bengal in PWD, to Secretary Govt. of India in PWD, 1 September 1877. 72. OGAR, 1897-8, pp. 11-12. 73. Nayak, op. cit., p. 298. 74. OGAR, 1897-8, pp. 11-12. 75. Nayak, op. cit., p. 303. 76. Utkal Deepika, 29 August 1906. 77. Dalzeil, Final Report on the Revision Settlement of Orissa, 1922-23, op. cit., p. 82.

Bibliography

Government Records: Unpublished Proceedings of the Judicial Department, Government of Bengal. Proceedings of the Judicial Department, Government of NorthWestern Provinces. Proceedings of the Judicial Department, Government of India. Proceedings of the Railway Department, Government of Bengal. Proceedings of the Railway Department, Government of NorthWestern Provinces. Proceedings of the Railway Department, Government of India. Railway Letters and Correspondence of the East India Railway Company. Railway Letters and Correspondence of the East Bengal State Railway. Railway Letters and Correspondence of the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway Company. Railway Letters and Correspondences Miscellaneous. Railway Letters and Enclosures from Bengal and India. Railway Records, Public Works Department, Government of India.

Government Records: Published Abstract of Evidence Recorded by the Railway Police Committee, 1921, Calcutta: Superintendents of Government Printing, 1921. Acworth Committee Report, 1920-21. Administrative Report on the Railway in India for the Calendar Year 1910, by the Railway Board, Dated 17 May 1911, Simla: Government Central Press, 1911.

454

Bibliography

Administrative Report on the Railway in India for the Year 1907, Railway Board, 22 May 1908, Simla, 1909. Annual Report on Railway and the Indian Finance Year Book, 1932, Government of India, Ministry of Railway, 1932. Annual Administrative Reports, Government of India, 1853-1900. Annual Administrative Reports, Government of Bengal, 1853-1900. Annual Administrative Reports, Government of North-Western Provinces, 1853-1900. Annual Police Reports, Railway Police Department, 1853-1900. Annual Reports of the Railway Borne Trade, Government of NorthWestern Provinces, 1866-1900. Annual Report to the Secretary of State for India on Progress of Railways, 1872-1900. Despath(Railway), 23 July 1879. Despath (Railway), 23 October 1879. Despath (Railway, No. 80, 12 August 1870). Despath (Railway), No. 89, 14 August 1884. East India Report of Famine Commission (Appendix) Misc. Paper Bearing Upon the Condition of the Country and People of India, London, 1881. Govt. of Bengal (GoB), Public Works Department (PWD), Annual Administrative Report for Roads, Buildings and Railways, 18991900, 1900-1901, Calcutta, 1900-1 , Railway Branch: Benaras-Cuttack-Puri Railway, Reports, Estimates, and Correspondence from the Commencement up to the End of 1883-84, Calcutta, 1886. Census North-Western Province, Allahabad, 1872. Census North-Western Province and Awadh, Allahabad, 1881. History of Indian Railway, Constructed and Progress, Corrected up to 31 March 1981, Railway Board, 1919. History of Indian Railway Constructed and Progress, Corrected up to 31 March 1955. Illustrated Guide to South Indian Railway, including the MayavaramMuttupet and Peralam-Karaikal, Railway, 1900, Madras, HRH, The Prince of Weles, 1900-25. Indian Railway, History and Development, Ministry of Development, Railway Board, New Delhi, 1853-1944. Indian Railway Enquiry Committee Report, 1936-37, Railway Board, New Delhi, 1938. Indian Railway Centenary Celebrations, 1853-1953, Railway Department, New Delhi, 1954.

Bibliography

455

Indian Enquiry Committee Report, 1936-37, Railway Board, New Delhi, 1938.Mackay Committee Report, 1908. Mackay Committee Report: Indian Railway Finance and Administration, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908, p. 11. ‘Mahatma Gandhi’s Letter to the Railway Board and the Board’s Letter No. 552T’, 22 January 1918. ‘Minute of Lord Dalhousie’, 21 April 1853, para 6 ‘Minute of Lord Lawrence’, 9 January 1869. Parliamentary Papers, 1877, no. 539. Proceedings of the Railway Conference, 1899. Railway Communication India, Copy of Financial Letter to India No. 9 dated 25 April 1849. Noad, D.J. Esq from J.C. Melvill Esq 28 March 1849. Railway Board Report 1923-24, New Delhi, 1924. Railway Memorandum for the Royal Commission of Labour, the Madras and SM Railway Company, Madras, 1929. Report of the Railway Board on Indian Railway, 1923-24, Delhi, 1924. Report of the Railway Board on Indian Railway, 1926-27, Calcutta, 1928. Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1879, Appendix V. Report on Inter-Provisional Crime, United Provinces, Bengal and Assam, Calcutta, 1899. Report on River Crime and River Police Reorganization Scheme, Calcutta, 1907. Report of the Railway Police Committee, Simla, 1921. Report of the Select Committee on East India Railway Communication, Proceedings of the Committee Minutes, London, 1884. Report of the Select Committee on East India, Minutes of Evidences and Appendix, 18 July 1884, London, 1885. Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on Railway in India, to the End of the Year 1859, Juland Danvers Esq, Secretary, Railway Dept. India Office, 1859. Report of the Finance Committee, 1921. Report of the Real Commission on Labour in India, 1929-30. Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Railway in India, 1884, para 17(I). Research Design and Standard Organization, Ministry of Railways, Lucknow, 226011, Documentation Notes, July 1989, XXXV, No. 4. Robertson Committee Report, 1903. South Asia Research, vol. 7, no. 2, 1987. Supplement of the History of Indian Railway, Dept of Railway, 1968.

456

Bibliography

Transport Cost Studies_ Railway and Road Transport, Joint Technical Group for Transport Planning, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1967.

Encyclopedia Compton’s Encyclopedia, vol. 21FE, Chicago: Crompton Company, 1980. Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 23, International Edition, Dambury, Connecticut, 1984 Encyclopedia Britanica, vol. 16, 2017. Jagdish Charan Sharma, Encyclopedia Indica, vol. 2, 1981. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. V and X, Chicago, 1977. William D. Halsey Benard Johnston, Collier’s Encyclopedia, vol. 12, 1994 (new edn.).

Secondary Works Adams, J., Economic Change: Exports and Imports, The Case of India, 1870-1960, Texas: University of Texas, 1966. Aguiar, Marian, ‘Making Modernity: Inside the Technological Space of Railways’, Cultural Critique, 68, 2008. , Tracking Modernity: India’s Railway and the Culture of Mobility, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. Ahuja, Ravi, Pathways of Empire: Circulation, ‘Public Works’ and Social Space in Colonial Orissa (1780-1914), Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2009. , ‘The Bidge Builders, Some Notes on Railway, Pilgrimage and the British Civilizing Mission in Colonial India’, in Harald Fischer-Tine and Michel Mann (eds.), Colonialism in Civilizing Mission. The Case of British India, London: Anthem Press, 2003. Aitken, Bill, Exploring Indian Railway, Delhi: Penguin Books, 1994. Ali, Daud (ed.), Invoking the Past: The Uses of History in South Asia, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 2006 . Andrew, Sir William P., Indian Railways as connected with British Empires in the East, 4th edn., London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1884. Anita, F.P., Inland Transport Costs, Bombay: D.B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 1932. Anstay, V., Economic Transport Costs, Bombay, 1936.

Bibliography

457

Arnold, David, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth Century India, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993. , Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, The New Cambridge History of India, III.5, 2000. , ‘White Colonization and Labour in the Nineteenth Century India’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XI: 2 (January 1983). , Famine Social Crises and Historical Change, Oxford: New York, Basil Blackwell, 1988 Awasthi, Aruna, History and Development of Railway Development in India, New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1994. Astha, Mahesh Chandra, ‘Passenger Fares on the Indian Railway (1849-1869)’, Indian Economic and Social Historical Reviews IV: 1 March 1967. Baker, D.E.U., Colonialism in an Indian Hinterland: The Central Provinces, 1820-1920, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993. Bayly, C.A., Rulers, Townsmen and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1780-1870, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. Bayley, Victor, Nine Fifteen From Victoria, London: Robert Hale, 1937. , ‘The Khyber Railway’, MPICE, 222(1927). , Adventure Through Khyber, Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1988. Bear, Laura, ‘Miscegenations of Modernity: Constructing European Respectability and Race in the Indian Railway Colony, 18571931’, Women History Reviews, 3: 4, 1994, pp. 531-48. , Lines of the Nation: Indian Railway Workers, Bureaucracy, and the Intimate Historical Self, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Laura, Bear Charlotte, ‘Travelling Modernity: Capitalism, Community and Nation in the Colonial Governance of Indan Railway’, PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1998. Bell, H., Railway Policy in India, London: Rivington Percival and Co., 1894. , ‘Indian Railway’, Asiatic Quarterly Reviews, III (January-April 1875), pp. 331-5. Bell, James Richard, ‘The Impress Bridge over Sutlet’, MPICE, LXV, 1881.

458

Bibliography

Berkley, James John, ‘On Indian Railway: With a Description of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway’, MPICE, XIX, 1860, pp. 586624. Berridge, P.S.A., ‘The Story of Kojak: The Longest Railway Tunnel in India’, Indian State Railway Magazine, VII: 8, May 1934. , Couplings to Khyber: The Story of North Western Railway, New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1969. Bhatia, B.M., Famines in India, A Study of some aspect of the Economic History of India, 1860-1965, London: Asia Publsihing House, 1967. Bhatanagar, K.P., Transport in Modern India, Kanpur: Kishore Publishing House, 1960. Bhandari, R.R., Indian Railways Glorious 150 Years, New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 2005. , Western Railways Meter Gauge System, Bombay: Western Railway, 1987. , Jodhpur Railways, New Delhi: Northern Railways, 1982. Buchanan, D.H., Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India, New York: Routledge T.&F. Group, 1934. Buchanan, R.A., ‘Gentleman Engineer: The Making of a Profession’, Victorian Studies 26: 4, September 1983, pp. 407-29. Burton, John, John Bruton’s Book, edited with an introduction by J.H. Clapham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939. Chapman, John, Cotton and Commerce in India, London: OIOC, 1851. Chatterjee, Partha, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. , Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, London: Zed Books, 1986. Chowdhury, Indira, The Frail Hero and Virile History: Gender and Politics of Culture in Colonial Bengal, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001. Christensen, R.O., ‘The State and Indian Railway Performance, 1870-1920, Part I, Financial Performance and Standard of Service’, Journal of Transport History, 3rd series, 2: 2, September 1982. , ‘The State and Indian Railway Performance, 1870-1920

Bibliography

459

Part II, The Government Rating Policy and Capital Funding’, Journal of Transport History, 3rd series, 3:1, September 1981. Cohn, Bernard, An Anthropologist among Historians and Other Essay, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1990. Cooper, Martin, Brazilian Railway Culture, New Castle: Cambridge Scholars, 2011. Chundur, Bhoolanuth, The Travels of Hindoo to Various Parts of Bengal and Upper India, vol. I, London: N Trubner and Co., 1869. Dalhousie, Lord, ‘Minute to the Court of Directors of East India Company, 20 April 1853’, in Railway Construction in India: Select Documents, vol. 2, ed. S. Setter and Bhubanes Mishra, 1999. Das, Pallavi, ‘Railway Expansion and its Impact on Forest in Colonial India, 1853-84’, PhD thesis, Ohio State Unversity, 2002. Danvers, Juland, Indian Railway: Their Past History, Present Condition, and Future Prospect, London: Effingham Wilson, 1877. Davidson, Edward, The Railways of India, With an Account of their Rise, Progress and Construction, Written with an Aid of the Records of the India Office, London: E and FN. Spon, 1868. Davis, Kingsley, The Population of India and Pakisthan, 1951; rpt., New York; Russel and Russel, 1968. Deloche, Jean, Transport and Communication in India Prior to Steam Locomotion, 2 vols., Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993-4. Derbyshire, I.D., ‘Economic Change and the Railways in North India, 1860-1914’, Modern Asian Studies, 21:3, 1987. Dewey, Clive, Steamboats on the Indus: The Limits of Western Technological Superiority in South Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1914. Dewey, Clive and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India, London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1978. Digby, Williams, Prosperous British India: A Revelation from Official Records, New Delhi: T. Fisher Unwin, 1901. Dirks, Nicholas, Caste of Mind: Colonialism and the making of modern India, Princeton: NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001. Dube, Kamal Kant, ‘Tourism and Pilgrimage in Varanasi’, National Geographical Journal of India, XIV, pt. 2-3, June to September 1969. Dutt, R.C., The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age, vols. 1 and 2, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1903.

460

Bibliography

Dutta, Anup Kumar, Indian Railways: The Final Frontiers. Genesis and Growth of the North-East Frontier Railways, Maligaon: Northeast Railways, 2002. Edney, Matthew H., Mapping on Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1997.. Edward, Davidson, Railway of India with an Account of the Rise, Progress and Construction, London: E. and F.N. Spon, 1868. Erwin, Berghaus, The History of Railways London: Columbia University Press, 1983. Fawcatt, R.H., ‘Railways in India from a Military Point of Views’, Calcutta Reviews, vol. 67, no. 133, 1867. Freeman, Michael, Railways and the Victorian Imagination, New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1999. Fischer-Tine, H. and M. Mann (eds), Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India, London: Anthem, 2004. Foster, W., The English Factories in India, 1624-1629: A Calendar of Documents in the India Office etc., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909. Gandhi, M.K., An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments With Truth, Boston: Beacon Press, rpt., 1962. , Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, rpt., 1984. Gales, Robert Richards, ‘The Curzon Bridges at Allahabad’. MPICE, CLXXIV, 1908. Gales, Sir Robert Richard, ‘The Hardinge Bridge over Lower Garages at Sara’, MPICE, CCV, 1920. Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. Ghose, S.C., A Monograph on Indian Railway Rates, Calcutta: Superintendent of Govt. Printing, 1918. , Indian Railway Problems, Gwalior: Alija Darbar Press, 1924. Godley, Arthur, East India Railway, London: Darling and Sons, 1900 Gopalan, L.V., Railway Statistics Manual, Gwalior (NP), 1924. Goswami, Manu, Producing India: from Colonial Economy to National Space, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004. Gupta, Anik and Vidya Bhatt, Indian Railway. Growth, Sustenance and the Leap Forward, Delhi: Indian Institute of Technology, 2007. Hardless, John H., The Indian Railway Servent’s Manual, Containing the Rules for Working and Duties, Privileges, Responsibilities and

Bibliography

461

Mentalities Pertaining to the Railway Administration and Railway Servants in India, Calcutta: The Law Publishing Press, 1898. Hari Rao, P., The Indian Railway Act (IX of 1890), with all Amendments and Case Laws up to date, Full Commentaries, Four Appendices and Introduction, 2nd edn., Madras: Madras Law Journal Office, 1949. Headrick, Daniel, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). Hari Roa, P., Indian Railway Act (Act XI of 1890), 3rd edn., Madras: Madras Law Journal Office, 1949. Hoskins, H.L., British Routes to India, London: Longman Green Co., 1966. Huddleston, George, History of the East Indian Railway, Calcutta: Thacker Spink & Co., 1906. Hughes, Hugh, Indian Locomotives: Broad Gauge 1851-1940, pt. I, Kenton, Harrow, Middlesex: The Continental Railway Circle, 1990. , Indian Locomotives: Meter Gauges 1872-1940, pt. 2, Kenton, Harrow, Middlesex: The Continental Railway Circle, 1992. , Indian Locomotives, Narrow Gauges 1863-1940, pt. 3, Kenton, Harrow, Middlesex: The Continental Railway Circle, 1994. , Indian Locomotives, 1941-1990, pt. 4, Kenton, Harrow, Middlesex: The Continental Railway Circle, 1996. Hurd, John, ‘Railway and Expansion of Market in India, 18611921’. Exploration of Economic History 12: 3, July 1975. Hutton-Taylor, G., Illustrated Guide to India and Indian Hotels, Calcutta, Thacker Spink, 1892. Illustrated Guide to the Madras Railway, Compiled and Illustrated by F. Dunsterville, Madras: Higginbothnam and Co., 1898. Jagga, Lajpat, ‘Colonial Railwaymen and British Rule: A Probe into Railway Agitation in India, 1919-1922’, Studies in History VIII, 1&2, 1981. James, C. Melvill, Rules for the Preparation of Railway Company, London: East India House, 19 May 1853. , Railway in India (A copy of the report of the communication appointed by the Government to inquire into the question of the practicability of the establishing railway communication through India, 4 August 1846).

462

Bibliography

Jain, S.P.S., Railways’ Journey Through Postal Stamps, Mumbai: Central Railway, 2003. Jenks, L., Migration of British Capital, 1845-1875, London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975. Johnson, J., The Economics of Railway Transport, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1963. Joyce, H.W., Indian Railway Construction and Management and Control, Calcutta: Bengal Secretarial Book Depot, 1905. Kaviraj, Sudipta, Unhappy Consciousness: Bankichandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. Kerr, Ian J., Engines of Change: The Railroads that Made India, Westport CT, Praegar, 2007; rpt. Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2012. , Building the Railways of the Raj, 1850-1900, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. (ed.), Railways in Modern India, Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 2001. (ed.), 27 Down: New Departures in Indian Railway Studies, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2007. Kerr, Ian and John Hurd (eds.), India’s Railway History: A Research Handbook, Leiden Boston: Brill, 2012. Khosala, G.S., A History of Indian Railways, New Delhi: Ministry of Railway, 1988. Klein, Ira, ‘Plague, Policy and Popular Unrest in British India’, Modern Asian Studies, 22: 4, 1988. Kling, Blair, Blue Mutiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 18591862, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966. Kumar, Sunil, The Present in Delhi’s Pasts, Delhi: Three Essays Press, 2002. Kumar, Sudhir and Shagun Mehrotra, Bankruptcy to Billions: How Indian Railway Transformed, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009. Kumar, Dharma (ed.), The Cambridge Economic History of India:17501970, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1883. Lehmann, F., ‘Great Britain and Supply of Railway Locomotives of India: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism’, Indian Economic and Social Historical Reviews, II: 4, October 1965, pp. 297-306. , ‘Railway Workshop, Technology Transfer, and Skilled Labour Recruitment in Colonial India’, Journal of Historical Research, XX: I, August 1977, pp. 49-61.

Bibliography

463

Lefebvre, Henri, The Production of Space, translated into English by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. Maclean, Kama, Pilgrimage and Power: The Kumbh Mela in Allahbad, 1765-1954, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. MacLeod, Roy and Deepak Kumar (ed.), Technology and Raj, Western Technology and Technical Transfer to India, 1700-1947, New Delhi: Sage, 1995. Macpherson, W.J., ‘Investment in Indian Railway, 1845-1875’, Economic History Reviews, second series, VIII: 2, 1995. Malik, M.B.K., Hundred Years of Pakisthan Railway, Karachi: Ministry of Railways and Communication, Govt. of Pakistan, 1962. McAlpin, Michelle B., ‘Railroads, Prices, and Peasant Rationality: India, 1860-1900’, Journal of Economic History, XXXIV, 3 September 1974, pp. 662-84. , Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western India, 1860-1920, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. , ‘The Effect of Expansion of Market on Rural Income Distribution in Nineteenth Century India’, Exploration of Economic History, 12 July 1975, pp. 289-302. Mainee, B.S., Railway Establishment Rules and Labour Law, Saharanpur: A.J.B.A. Publication, 1985. Martin, B.F., The Story of North Eastern Railway, Lahore: North Western Railway Press, 1923. Mehata, N.B., Indian Railway, Rates and Regulations, Bombay: Railway Board, 1927. Menon, Dillip, ‘Religion and Colonial Modernity: Rethinking Belief and Identity’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37: 17, 2002. Metcalf, Thomas, An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj, London: Farber, 1989. Mishra, Bhubanes (ed.), Railway Construction in India: Select Documents, vols. I and II, 1853-1900, New Delhi: Northern Book Centre for ICHR, 1999. Mitchell, Lisha, ‘To Stop Train Pull Chain, Writing History of Contemporary Political Practices’, Indian Economics and Social Historical Reviews, 48(4) (December 2011). Morris, David Moris, and Clyde B. Dudley, ‘Selected Railway Statistics for the Indian Sub Continent (India, Pakisthan, Bangladesh), 1853-1946-47’, Artha Vijnana: Journal of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, XIII: 3, September 1975, pp. 187-298. Mukherjee, Hena, The Early History of East Indian Railway, 18451879, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1994.

464

Bibliography

Mukherjee, Mukul, ‘Railway and their Impact on Bengal’s Economy, 1870-1920’, Indian Economic and Social Historical Reviews,, XVII: 2, April-June 1980, pp. 191-210. Naidu, P., The History of Railway Thieves with Illustration and Hints on Detection, Madras: Higginbotham, 1915. Natesan, L.A., State Management and Control of Railway in India, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1946. Nayak, G., Development of Transport and Communication: A Case Study, New Delhi: Anmol, 2000. Nock, O.S., Railways of Asia and Far East, New Delhi: A and C Black Publisher, 1978. Oldenburg, Veena Talwar, The Making of Colonial Lucknow: 18561877, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. Parasher Sen, A. (ed.), Subordinate and Marginal Groups in Early India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Panikar, I.A., Indian Railway, Bombay (NF), 1947. Peaboy, Nobert, ‘Tod’s Rajasthan and the Boundaries of Imperial Rule in 19th Century India’, Modern Asian Studies, 30, 1, 1996. Pouchepadass, Jacques, Land, Power and Market: A Bihar District under Colonial Rule, 1860-1947, London: Sage, 2000. , Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Prakash, Gyan, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999. Prasad, Amba, Indian Railway, Study in the Public Utility Administration, New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1960. , ‘Indianisation of Superior Railway Service’, The Modern Review, LXXI, 1 January 1942, pp. 161-4. , Indian Railway, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961. Prasad, Ritika, ‘Time Sense: Railways and Temporality in Colonial India’, Modern Asian Studies, November 2012. Prasada, Rai Saheb Chandrika, ‘The Condition of Indian Railway Men’, The Modern Reviews, XXXIX: 4 April 1962, pp. 429-37. Pratt, Mary-Louise, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, London, New York: Routledge, 2008. Raj, Kapil, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650-1900, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Ramachandran, C., East India Company and South Indian Economy, Madras: New Era Publication, 1980.

Bibliography

465

Ramachrandan, V.V., Indian Railway Finance, Delhi, 1963. Rao, M.A., Indian Railways, New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1975. Rao, Y. Saraswati, The Railway Board: A Study of Administration, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1979. Ray, Rajat Kanta, The Felt Community: Commodity and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. , Exploring Emotional History: Gender, Mentality and Literature in the Indian Awakening, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003 (Pb). Raza, Moonis and Yash Agrawal, Transport Geography of India: Commodity Geography and Regional Structure of the Indian Economy, New Delhi: Concept, 1986. Royal Dawson, Frederick George, The Indian Railway Gauge Problem, London: MPICE, 1922 Roy, Tirthankar, Traditional Industry in Economy of Colonial India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Roychoudhary, Samit, The Great Indian Railway Atlas, Calcutta: Samit Roychoudhary, 2005. Sahni, J.N., Indian Railway One Hundred Years, 1853-1953, New Delhi: Ministry of Railways, 1953. Robertson, Murray, ‘The Railways of India: Their Policy and Finance’, The Nineteenth Century and After, LXX, July 1911, pp. 84-103. Rousselet, Louis, India and Its Native Princes: Travels in Central Indian and in the Presidencies of Bombay and Bengal, new edn. revised and enlarged by Lieut.Col. Buckle, London: Bickers & Son, 1882. Sanyal, Nalinaksha, The Development of Indian Railway, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930. Sarkar, Sumir, Writing Social History, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Satow, Michel and Ray Desmond, Railways of the Raj, New York and London: New York University Press, 1980. Saxena, R.N., Four Decades of Indian Railways, Delhi: Academic Foundation, 1991.

466

Bibliography

Sen, Sudipta, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace, Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Settar, S. (ed.), Railway Construction in India: Secret Documents, 3 vols, Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1999. Seal, A., Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competitions and Collaborations in the Later Nineteenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Sharma, Hemant (ed.), Bharatendu Granthavali, 3 vols., Varanasi: Pracharak Granthavali Pariyojana, 2000. Sharma, S.M., History of Great Indian Peninsular Railways, vol. I (1853-1869), vol. II (1870-1900), Bombay: Chief Public Relation Officer, Central Railways, 1990. Sleeman, William Henry, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, Karachi: Oxford University Press, rpt., 1973. Simmons, Jack and Gordon Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History: From 1603 to 1990s, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Simmons, Jack, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914: The System and its Working, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978. Singha, Radhika, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Sinha, Mrinalini, Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Many Englishman’ and ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. Sinha, Nitin, Communication and Colonialism in Eastern India: Bihar, 1760s-1880s, New York: Anthem Press, 2012. Srinivasan, Roopa, Manish Tiwari and Sandeep Silas (eds.), Our Indian Railway: Themes in India’s Railway History, Delhi: Foundation Books, 2007. Srivastava, S.K., Railway Transport in Theory and Practice, Delhi: S. Chand, 1964) Thompson, Edward P., The Making of the English Working Class, London: Penguin, 1980. Thorner, Daniel, Investment in Empire: British Railway and Steam Shipping Enterprise in India, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950. , ‘Great Britain and the Development of India’s Railways’, Journal of Economic History, XI: Fall 1951, pp. 389-402.

Bibliography

467

, ‘The Pattern of Railway Development in India’, Far Eastern Quarterly, XIV, 1955, Thothathri, V.R., Notes on Railway Engineering, Madras: Allied Publisher, 1965. Trautmann, Thomas R., Aryans and British India, Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1997. Tiwari, R.D., Railway in Modern India, Bombay: New Book Company, 1941. Yang, Anand, Bazaar India: Markets, Society and the Colonial State in Gangetic Bihar, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. (ed.), Crime and Criminally in British India, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1985. Verghese, K.E., The Development and Significance of Transport in India (1834-1882), New Delhi: V.N. Publication, 1976. Westwood, J.N., Railways in India, London, 1974. Weitering, Dennis and Gerbe Nooteboomn, ‘Railway Porters of Mumbai Social Capital in Practise’, Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX, no. 22, 29 May 2004. Whitecombe, Elizabeth, Agrarian Conditions in Northern India: United Province Under British Rule, 1860-1900, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

Contributors

Waheed Ahmed is a co-author alongwith Muhamed Imran. He is a senior Transport Planner at Tauranga City Council, New Zealand. Also worked as a Lecturer at Massey University, New Zealand. Aruna Awasthi, Professor and Head, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, The Maharaja Sayajirao University, University of Baroda, Vadodara. Madhumita Bandyopadhyay, Associate Professor of History, Smt P.N. Doshi College, Ghatkopar(W), Mumbai. N. Benjamin, Research Scholar, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune. Rita P. Bhambi, Associate Professor and Head, Department of History, G.N. Khalsa College, Mumbai. Dhirendra Datt Dangwal, Associate Professor of History, School of Liberal Studies, Ambedkar University, New Delhi. David Hyatt, Research Fellow at University of Leige (Berlin) and Cambridge, Ph.D. (Leeds). Keshab Chandra Jena, Assistant Director, National Archives of India, New Delhi. V.M. Ravi Kumar, Associate Professor of History, B.B. Ambedkar University, Lucknow. Pushpa Kumari, Associate Professor of History, B.R. Ambedkar Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, Bihar.

470

List of Contributors

Muhammed Imran, MRPTI, Senior Lecturer in Resource and Environmental Planning, School of People, Environment and Planning. Massey University, New Zealand. Ganeswar Nayak, Associate Professor of History, F.M Autonomous College, Balasore, Orissa. Laxman D. Satya, Professor, Department of History, Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania, Lock Haven, USA. Bhupinder Singh, Research Scholar, Central University, Punjab. Nadia Tahir, Head of Finance and Business Economics, UCP Business School, Lahore, Pakistan. Maitree Vaidya Sabnis, Assistant Professor, Department of History, MS University, Vadodara, Gujarat.