The "Puerto Rican Problem" in Postwar New York City: Migrant Incorporation from the U.S. Colonial Periphery 9781978831506

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
1 The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the United States
2 The “Puerto Rican Problem” Campaign in New York City
3 Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Problem” in New York City
4 The “Puerto Rican Problem” in New York City and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy
5 Marcantonio, the “Puerto Rican Problem,” and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City
6 The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs
7 The Demise of MCPRA and the Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Problem”
8 In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Problem” in New York City
Epilogue
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in Postwar New York City

Latinidad Transnational Cultures in the United States This series publishes books that deepen and expand our understanding of Latina/o populations, especially in the context of their transnational relationships within the Amer­i­cas. Focusing on borders and boundary-­crossings, broadly conceived, the series is committed to publishing scholarship in history, film and media, literary and cultural studies, public policy, economics, sociology, and anthropology. Inspired by interdisciplinary approaches, methods, and theories developed out of the study of transborder lives, cultures, and experiences, titles enrich our understanding of transnational dynamics.

Matt Garcia, Series Editor, Professor of Latin American, Latino and Ca­rib­bean Studies, and History, Dartmouth College For a list of titles in the series, see the last page of the book.

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in Postwar New York City

EDGARDO MELÉNDEZ

Rutgers University Press New Brunswick, Camden, and Newark, New Jersey, and London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Meléndez, Edgardo, author. Title: The “Puerto Rican problem” in postwar New York City / Edgardo Meléndez. Description: New Brunswick, New Jersey : Rutgers University Press, [2023] | Series: Latinidad : transnational cultures in the United States | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2022010599 | ISBN 9781978831476 (hardback) | ISBN 9781978831469 (paperback) | ISBN 9781978831483 (epub) | ISBN 9781978831506 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Puerto Ricans—New York (State)—New York—Social conditions—20th century. | Puerto Ricans—New York (State)—New York—Public opinion. | Puerto Ricans—Government relations. | New York (N.Y.)—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. | Puerto Rico—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. | New York (N.Y.)—Ethnic relations. | New York (N.Y.)—Politics and government— 1898–1951. | New York (N.Y.)—Politics and government—1951- | BISAC: HISTORY / United States / 20th Century | SOCIAL SCIENCE / Emigration & Immigration Classification: LCC F128.9.P85 M453 2023 | DDC 305.868/7295074741—dc23​ /­eng/20220707 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022010599 A British Cataloging-­in-­Publication rec­ord for this book is available from the British Library. Copyright © 2023 by Edgardo Meléndez All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. Please contact Rutgers University Press, 106 Somerset Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. The only exception to this prohibition is “fair use” as defined by U.S. copyright law. Parts of chapter 3 w ­ ere previously published in “The Puerto Rican Journey Revisited: Politics and the Study of Puerto Rican Migration,” CENTRO Journal vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 192–221, 2005. Reprinted by permission from CENTRO Journal. Chapter 5 is a revised version of an article previously published as “Vito Marcantonio, Puerto Rican Migration, and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City,” CENTRO Journal vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 199–233, 2010. Reprinted by permission from CENTRO Journal. References to internet websites (URLs) w ­ ere accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Rutgers University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared. The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—­Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. www​.­r utgersuniversitypress​.­org Manufactured in the United States of Amer­i­ca

Contents Introduction

1

1

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the United States

12

2

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City

33

3

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City

56

4

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy

79

5

Marcantonio, the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem,” and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City

99

6

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs

117

7

The Demise of MCPRA and the Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”

142

8

In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City

171

Epilogue

191

Acknowl­edgments 197 Notes 199 Bibliography 231 Index 239

v

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in Postwar New York City

Introduction In July 2019, President Donald Trump told a group of four congresswomen of color to “go back” to their countries. Three of t­ hese w ­ omen w ­ ere born in the United States, and all of them ­were citizens. One of them happened to be Alexandria Ocasio-­Cortez, born in the Bronx to Puerto Rican parents.1 This was not the first time Puerto Ricans born on the U.S. mainland w ­ ere treated to this racist insult. Puerto Ricans born on the island have been subjected to this invective for more than a ­century, a­ fter the United States took the island in 1898 in the aftermath of the so-­called Spanish-­American War. What makes this tirade somewhat confusing is that Puerto Rico is legally—­though not constitutionally—­a part of the United States, and Puerto Ricans have been U.S. citizens since 1917. Still, a majority of Americans t­oday do not know t­hese ­people are American citizens.2 Ideas like ­these have impacted U.S. sentiment and policies ­toward the ­people of Puerto Rico. A ­ fter Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017—­causing damages estimated upward of $100 billion, the death of close to 5,000 ­people, and a general power blackout that left some areas of the island without electricity for close to a year—­a former se­nior aide to President Trump claimed that he used a “derogatory” term when referring to Puerto Ricans while discussing the extension of immediate aid to the island.3 Trump ­later suggested that Puerto Rico was not a part of the United States when he tried to justify his administration’s efforts to deny hurricane relief aid to the island.4 The U.S. president’s visit to Puerto Rico ­a fter the hurricane is best remembered by his degrading act of throwing paper towels at ­those pre­sent in an event orchestrated by the pro-­statehood administration of then governor Ricardo Rosselló (who in July 2019 became the first governor to be removed by extensive and extended popu­lar protests never seen on the island before).5 1

2  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Adding injury to insult, the Trump administration l­ater s­ topped the hurricane reconstruction aid to Puerto Rico that had been approved by Congress. Many in Puerto Rico and the United States—­including in Congress—­ questioned the Trump administration’s extremely slow emergency response in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane and its repeated attempts to block aid to devastated Puerto Rico. Months a­ fter the hurricane, Trump continued to insist that his initial claim of a very low number of deaths caused by Maria was correct, although even governor Rosselló had acknowledged that the number was above 3,000 and other in­de­pen­dent accounts put it closer to 5,000.6 No doubt racism is at play ­here, and this is nothing new. ­There is a vast lit­er­a­ ture on how the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico in 1898 and the colonial policies that followed—­implemented by Congress and legitimized by the Supreme Court—­were based on views of ­these ­people as alien and inferior subjects. The idea that the p­ eople in Puerto Rico are not ­really U.S. citizens or of Puerto Ricans in general as second-­class or nondeserving citizens has permeated Puerto Ricans’ relationship with American society and government. One of the immediate consequences of Hurricane Maria was the unpre­ce­ dented migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States, particularly to more recent areas of settlement like central Florida. Migration has been part and parcel of Puerto Rico’s history u­ nder U.S. rule since 1898. But the extremely high number of ­people who left the island in a ­matter of several months—­estimated at upward of 200,000—­was unparalleled in Puerto Rican history, even considering that high levels of migration are not a new phenomenon in the twenty-­ first ­century. A large number of Puerto Ricans have left the island since the mid-1990s, and this recent migratory flow already exceeds that of the so-­called ­Great Migration of the early postwar years. Most scholars agree that the main reason for this new surge in migration is the economic crisis that afflicts the island, particularly since 2007. One f­ actor that has aggravated this situation is the public debt crisis that forced the Puerto Rican government to declare bankruptcy in 2016. That same year, the U.S. government approved the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which halted all debtor’s claims against the island but imposed a federal fiscal control board that not only has fiscal powers but has also participated in the formulation of public policies of the local government. It effectively erased what ­limited autonomy the colonial state in Puerto Rico enjoyed. Trump and his administration, Republicans in Congress, and the U.S. economic and financial elite in general put the blame for Puerto Rico’s crisis on Puerto Ricans themselves, ignoring the role of the U.S. Congress in creating the crisis by eliminating the tax incentives on which Puerto Rico’s manufacturing economy was based. Corruption and an inherent incapacity to govern itself is the avowed reason why the Trump administration is trying to eliminate or limit congressionally approved aid to Puerto Rico.7 In an article titled “Donald Trump: A

Introduction  •  3

Nefarious Legacy in Puerto Rico,” the correspondent for El Nuevo Día in Washington, DC, alleged that Trump’s legacy on the island “is marked by the slow and inefficient response to the catastrophe caused by Hurricane Maria, prejudiced statements and a public policy that was based mainly on seeing the island as a prob­lem.”8 In May 2016, even before the Puerto Rican government had declared bankruptcy, the conservative Wall Street Journal published a piece on Puerto Rico titled “Puerto Rico’s Debt Portent: The Refugee Exodus Builds and ­Will Add to the U.S. Dole.” A ­ fter predicting Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy declaration, the paper described the dilemma that Republicans faced—­allowing the island government to write down its debt, which the Wall Street Journal called “tantamount to a bailout,” or ­doing nothing, which “­will result in anarchy and a back-­door bailout as tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans flee to the mainland where they ­will land on the U.S. public dole.” The article then elaborates on how this scenario ­w ill lead to an even greater number of ­people leaving the island, with dire consequences for the United States: “While many ­will eventually find jobs in the U.S., their incomes ­will at least initially be low enough to qualify for Medicaid, food stamps, and public housing. Their kids ­will attend public schools. The Puerto Rican refugees ­will also be able to vote.”9 Although the context might be dif­fer­ent, this kind of diatribe against Puerto Ricans, particularly against mi­grants, is nothing new. It has been a constant tirade ever since Puerto Ricans began migrating to the United States in the early twentieth c­ entury. It became stronger and more extended ­after 1945, when they moved in unpre­ce­dented numbers to New York City. They ­were seen as wretched and destitute, uneducated and unhealthy, alien to American culture and values, inclined to leftists ideologies and politics, and moving to the mainland to exploit its welfare system. An intense campaign, with racist and nativist overtones, mobilized in reaction to their entry in New York City. The campaign and the narrative that ­later emerged from it became known, first in New York and l­ ater in Puerto Rico, as the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” The ideas that came out of this campaign and narrative ­were reproduced by the U.S. media and ­later by American academia and ­shaped the way in which Puerto Ricans ­were perceived by Americans, not only in New York but in other parts of the United States as well. Its echoes still reverberate in the views that many in the United States still have about Puerto Ricans, as described in the previous pages. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York influenced the way this group was incorporated in New York City and in other parts of the United States. It also impacted the public policies of the governments of Puerto Rico and New York City regarding the entry of t­ hese mi­grants to the city. This book examines in detail the emergence, evolution, and consequences of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative in New York City from 1945 to 1960.

4  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Chapter 1 provides a historical, analytical, and more theoretical background to the arguments and research that form the main framework for this book. The initial sections discuss in general terms what the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” is and its significance for the study and understanding of Puerto Rican postwar migration and incorporation in the United States. The chapter then places the study of Puerto Rican migration within the larger framework of U.S. im/ migration studies. Puerto Ricans have been compared to the two major waves and models of migration and incorporation in the United States: the so-­called traditional migration coming from Eu­rope from the late nineteenth c­ entury to the 1920s, and the more recent “transnational” migration coming mostly from Latin Amer­i­ca in the past five de­cades. I find t­ hese two models ­limited and frequently faulty in terms of offering a good understanding of the Puerto Rican migration and incorporation experience. The traditional model is analyzed more closely, since for several de­cades this was the dominant view in the study of Puerto Rican postwar migration and incorporation within American academia. Many of the ideas presented by scholars within this perspective with re­spect to Puerto Ricans had already been disseminated during the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City and ­were notions that ­later became part of the “prob­lem” narrative that lasted for several more years. Although the transnational perspective—­also examined h ­ ere—­has provided some insights into the study of Puerto Rican migration to the United States, I argue that it is easier to understand the Puerto Rican experience within the framework of a colonial migration—­that is, a migration of colonial subjects/citizens moving to the U.S. mainland from one of its unincorporated territories. Fi­nally, the chapter discusses the concept and theory of mode of incorporation and some of the limitations of this framework in understanding Puerto Rican postwar incorporation in the United States. Chapter 2 explores in detail the late 1940s “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City: its origins, background, and evolution in the years thereafter, as well as the narrative that emerged from it. The chapter studies how the New York City and Puerto Rican media and governments exacerbated, on the one hand, or tried to contain and manage, on the other, the campaign against the entry of island mi­g rants to the city. It also looks at how Puerto Ricans reacted to the campaign and how they or­ga­nized to fight it. Many of the prevailing notions during the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign ­later became major ele­ments of the “prob­lem” narrative and discourse that ­were used to characterize this group for several de­cades. Chapter 3 analyzes how the Puerto Rican government and the Welfare Council of NYC—­a respected city institution—­reacted to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in 1947. The study financed by Puerto Rico’s government—­ the so-­called Puerto Rican Study—­and the report produced by the Welfare Council presented a more positive framework for the incorporation of island

Introduction  •  5

mi­grants into the city. Th ­ ese two studies—­the first to analyze Puerto Rican migration to New York in the postwar period—­were in reaction to the 1947 anti–­Puerto Rican campaign. The Puerto Rican Study was commissioned by the government of Puerto Rico to Columbia University in August 1947, months before it approved its migration law ­later that year. Puerto Rico’s government used the Columbia University study to counteract the negative assertions that ­were presented about Puerto Ricans in the New York City media and to appease the city and U.S. public opinion regarding the entry of island mi­grants to the U.S. mainland. Years l­ ater, the study became The Puerto Rican Journey, a very influential text on Puerto Rican postwar migration. The report by the Welfare Council represents the first study of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” by one of the city’s elite institutions. It presented a liberal view on the incorporation of Puerto Ricans to NYC and laid out a series of recommendations on how to manage their migration to the city and the United States, many of which w ­ ere ­later implemented by the Puerto Rican and NYC governments. Chapter 4 studies how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City led to and influenced the formulation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy. It was only a­ fter the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign erupted in New York that the Puerto Rican government addressed the situation of island mi­grants seriously. The official policy—­neither to encourage nor discourage migration—­ concealed a more active participation of the government in the management of migration. The new law approved in December 1947 created the Bureau of Employment and Migration in San Juan and the Migration Division in New York, both ­under the Puerto Rican ­Labor Department. The former dealt with prospective mi­g rants on the island, the latter with mi­g rants already in the United States. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York influenced the implementation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy for many years. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” resurfaced again when Congressman Vito Marcantonio ran for mayor in New York City’s 1949 mayoral election. Two issues dominated the campaign against him: his characterization as a communist and his relationship to Puerto Ricans. Chapter 5 reviews Marcantonio’s association with Puerto Ricans, both in New York and in Puerto Rico, as well as the basis of Puerto Rican support for Marcantonio and his defense of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans living in the United States. The close relationship that Marcantonio and the island’s charismatic leader Luis Muñoz Marín had in the early 1940s became antagonistic a­ fter the end of the war, primarily due to the role played by Marcantonio in the Puerto Rican community in New York. Using Marcantonio as a scapegoat, the island government blamed him for the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” and aggressively campaigned against him in 1949. ­Because of their support for Marcantonio, one impor­tant notion of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative was disseminated again during the 1949 mayoral election campaign: that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere prone to communist and un-­A merican ideals.

6  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Chapter 6 examines the most impor­tant postwar institution created by the NYC government to deal with and facilitate the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the city: the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs (MCPRA). The creation and workings of this committee are indicative of how the NYC establishment sought to incorporate Puerto Ricans: through a bureaucratic structure linked to the city government. MCPRA needs to be understood within the context of the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Its major goals ­were to diffuse the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative that continued to exist during that period, so that Puerto Ricans could provide a necessary source of ­labor to the city; to find the means to stop or drastically reduce their continuing migration to the city; and to further the incorporation of this group of ­people who, although they ­were U.S. citizens, ­were nonetheless seen as alien to American society in culture, language, and values. Unable or unwilling to create its own constituency from Puerto Ricans living in the city, MCPRA and the city government relied on the Puerto Rican government to achieve many of its objectives. The committee legitimized the role of Puerto Rico’s government as an intermediary between the city establishment and the Puerto Rican community. However, many of MCPRA’s actions and much of its discourse regarding Puerto Ricans reinforced some of the ideas of the “prob­lem” narrative that it was supposed to diffuse. The chapter discusses the relevance of examining MCPRA within the study of Puerto Rican migration and incorporation in NYC, what several scholars have said about this committee so far, its creation and programs, and its activities ­under the administrations of mayors William O’Dwyer and Vincent Impellitteri. Par­tic­u­lar attention is given to the so-­called migration conferences, or­ga­nized to coordinate the efforts of the NYC and Puerto Rico governments on ­matters related to the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Chapter 7 explores the abolition of MCPRA by Mayor Robert Wagner, a move supported by Puerto Rico’s government and sectors of the Puerto Rican community in the city. This action was an attempt to move beyond the “prob­ lem” narrative still attached to this group. Many argued that the existence of MCPRA helped to sustain the idea of Puerto Ricans as a prob­lem for the city. But many issues related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative did not go away, and the institutions created to deal with ­matters concerning all minority groups in the city—­including island mi­grants—­were not able to deal with them effectively. Many Puerto Rican po­liti­cal and community leaders in the city complained that ­these institutions did not address impor­tant concerns of their community no represent them. The NYC government kept relying on the Puerto Rican government for advice and support during the 1950s as it faced ­matters related to the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” The relationship between the city and the island governments was sustained through the migration conferences held u­ nder the Wagner administration in 1954, 1958, and

Introduction  •  7

1960. But by the early 1960s, the growing and more vocal po­liti­cal and community leaders of Puerto Ricans living in the city demanded greater participation in the solution of the most pressing prob­lems that affected them. They questioned the prominent role that the island government played in the affairs of their community and confronted the NYC government for keeping them marginal to the decision-­making pro­cess and for relying on Puerto Rico’s government for advice on m ­ atters concerning Puerto Ricans in the city. By the end of the 1960s, Puerto Rico’s government ceased to be an impor­tant actor in NYC politics as the local Puerto Rican leadership gained more access and participation in the structures of the city’s government. The fact that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was not a major issue of debate in NYC a­ fter the mid-1960s does not mean that the “prob­lem” narrative went away completely. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative extended to other Puerto Rican postwar settlements in the United States and also influenced the way that U.S. academia and American popu­lar culture perceived and understood Puerto Ricans in the United States. The first section of chapter 8 studies how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” also emerged in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Hartford, and how the “prob­lem” narrative that initially emerged in New York City impacted the incorporation of island mi­grants in ­these new postwar settlements. Certain notions that ­were disseminated during the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC, and that ­later became central to the “prob­lem” narrative, w ­ ere accepted by U.S. academia and framed how island mi­grants w ­ ere studied in the United States for several de­cades. The second section of this chapter examines what is perhaps the most influential theory in the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States: the “culture of poverty.” Puerto Ricans became a common subject of study ­under this perspective ­after the publication of Oscar Lewis’s La Vida. It argued that Puerto Rican poverty was caused by their own be­hav­iors and that its roots lie in Puerto Rico, an idea common in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative that emerged in NYC in the 1950s. The “culture of poverty” became extremely influential in the study of the myriad of “prob­lems” affecting Puerto Ricans in the United States in the postwar period. Perhaps no other cultural construct has had such an impact on the way generations of Americans have perceived Puerto Ricans than West Side Story, both the play and the film. The last section of chapter 8 reviews how this impor­tant piece of Americana reproduced some of the basic ele­ments of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative that predominated in 1950s NYC. I argue that the reason Puerto Ricans ­were chosen as one of the two warring gangs in this modern repre­sen­ta­tion of Romeo and Juliet needs to be directly related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative that still lingered in NYC during the 1950s. This book pre­sents the first comprehensive examination of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC. It looks at the public campaign that unfolded against this

8  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

group’s entry into the city in the late 1940s and the campaign’s consequences, including the institutionalization of the “prob­lem” narrative that for many years was used to characterize t­ hese mi­grants. The notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” became an impor­tant ele­ment in how this group was perceived when they migrated to the U.S. mainland in the postwar era, and influenced their incorporation in NYC and other parts of the United States where they settled. It also led to the formulation of public policies by the governments of Puerto Rico and NYC to manage the incorporation of Puerto Rican mi­grants in the city. Notions intrinsic to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative entered American academia and cultural constructs like West Side Story in the 1960s, which reproduced many of the ste­reo­types associated with Puerto Ricans prevalent at that time. Puerto Ricans remained a source of public debate in NYC throughout the 1950s, usually in relation to ­matters associated to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative. For example, news related to their alleged welfare de­pen­ dency or criminal tendencies kept Puerto Ricans in the headlines of the city’s mainstream media during this period. Another trope of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative that kept Puerto Ricans in the NYC newspapers and generated public debate about this group was their alleged tendency ­toward nationalist rebellion and communist subversion. Puerto Ricans ­were inserted back into the city’s po­liti­cal debate when Congressman Marcantonio ran as a candidate in the 1949 mayoral election. Throughout the 1950s, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere also accused of being anti-­American nationalists. Members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party living in NYC participated in the two attacks carried out by the party in Washington, DC: the Blair House in 1950 (one of the attackers had worked in Marcantonio’s office) and the halls of Congress in 1954. In 1959, the House Un-­ American Activities Committee (HUAC) held hearings in NYC and San Juan on the alleged Communist subversion of Puerto Rican in­de­pen­dence supporters. This committee implicated members of the Puerto Rican Communist and Nationalist parties in the so-­called global communist conspiracy.10 This book takes a par­tic­u­lar look at the insertion of Puerto Ricans in NYC during the 1950s. This de­cade can be characterized as a period of transition for the Puerto Rican community in the city.11 The massive entry of mi­grants in the aftermath of World War II transformed the Puerto Rican community that was established before 1945, not only in terms of the social background of its mi­grants, but also regarding the nature and structure of its community organ­ izations and even the neighborhoods that they inhabited. The large-­scale exodus from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland in the postwar period is known in the lit­er­a­ture as the ­Great Migration, and the 1950s ­were the years of its greatest intensity. Close to half a million p­ eople migrated from Puerto Rico to the United States from 1945 to 1960, and NYC was their main destination. Their growing numbers and ease of entry became main topics of the “Puerto Rican

Introduction  •  9

prob­lem” in that city. From around 65,000 ­people in 1945, the Puerto Rican population in the city grew to close to 244,000 in 1950 and over 600,000 by 1960. This was the first massive entry of “foreign” p­ eople to the city since the 1920s quota l­ imited Eu­ro­pean immigration to the United States. Puerto Ricans made their presence felt in the city’s social, cultural, economic, and po­liti­cal fabric. The organ­izations and structures of the pre-1945 community changed as new community and po­liti­cal leaders and organ­izations emerged during the de­cade. The geo­g raph­i­cal composition of the Puerto Rican community also changed ­after 1945 in reaction to the massive entry of island mi­grants and the city’s policies of urban renewal. Manhattan’s pre-1945 communities in East Harlem (El Barrio) and the Lower East Side and the one in Brooklyn ­were transformed with the arrival of new mi­grants. The Bronx emerged as the new destination for Puerto Ricans during the 1950s and by the 1960s it had become the center of Puerto Rican social and po­liti­cal power in the city. By the end of that de­cade Herman Badillo became the first Puerto Rican elected as Bronx borough president; he ­later became the first Puerto Rican elected to Congress in repre­sen­ta­tion of a Bronx district. Multiple po­liti­cal and community organ­izations ­were formed during the 1950s. The Puerto Rican Day Parade, created in the late 1950s, became the symbol of the Puerto Rican presence in the city. By the 1960s, Puerto Ricans participated and created their own institutions in areas of education and public schools, community development, health and welfare, and law enforcement, among o­ thers. The lit­er­a­ture on Puerto Ricans in NYC has focused for the most part on the emergence of the community before 1945 and its growth and consolidation ­after the 1960s.12 The 1950s has not been so extensively examined in this lit­er­ a­ture, particularly with regards to Puerto Ricans’ po­liti­cal activities and organ­ izations.13 Sherrie Baver characterized Puerto Rican politics in NYC during the 1950s as a “tiempo muerto” (the dead season a­ fter the sugar harvest). Like other scholars, she pointed to the 1960s as the era of awakening of po­liti­cal and community activism of the community.14 Similarly, community activist Louis Nuñez characterized the 1960s as the “coming of age of the stateside Puerto Rican community.”15 José Cruz begins his extensive two-­volume examination of Puerto Rican postwar politics in NYC in the 1960s, arguing that it was at this time that New York Puerto Ricans came “out of the margins.”16 Although this book w ­ ill pre­sent new insights into the history of Puerto Ricans in NYC during the 1950s, it does not pretend to offer a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the city’s island community during this period. The book examines aspects related to their incorporation in the city of New York during the 1950s from the perspective of how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative influenced their insertion in the affairs of the city. It ­will focus on subjects that have remained unexamined or ones that have not received an adequate attention u­ ntil now. For example, even though scholars

10  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

like José Ramón Sánchez and Lorrin Thomas have looked at MCPRA before, I carry out a more comprehensive study of this institution and its significance for the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in NYC. And while scholars like Michael Lapp have examined the intervention of Puerto Rico’s government in NYC politics before, I look at subjects that have not been studied yet, such as the migration conferences and other areas of interaction between city and island governments.17 This book ­will look closely at an aspect of Puerto Rican migration and incorporation in NYC that has not been properly addressed: how the governments of Puerto Rico—­representing the p­ eople where the mi­g rants ­were coming from—­and NYC—­representing the host society—­reacted to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” and how both governments acted to manage the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the city. The two governments had their own reasons for ­doing so. Migration was an essential part of the Puerto Rican government’s postwar modernization program, and its continuation and success depended on the favorable incorporation of its mi­g rants into the communities in which they ­were settling on the U.S. mainland, including NYC. The NYC government was aware that Puerto Ricans provided a necessary source of ­labor for the city’s growing postwar economy, and also recognized that it could not legally prevent their entry b­ ecause they w ­ ere U.S. citizens. This book w ­ ill not provide a comprehensive look at the formation and evolution of the Puerto Rican community in NYC during the 1950s, particularly as it relates to community activism and orga­nizational development. By d­ oing this, I do not seek to deny social and po­liti­cal agency to the Puerto Rican community in the city. On the contrary, my focus departs from the notion that it was mi­grants who created the social, economic, po­liti­cal, and cultural institutions that made pos­si­ble the consolidation of the Puerto Rican community in NYC during the 1950s and 1960s. Historically, ­there have been two waves of Puerto Rican migration to the United States: “individual migration,” that is, mi­grants moving on their own; and “or­ga­nized migration,” mi­grants who go to work in U.S. farms ­under ­labor contracts in expeditions or­ga­nized by private contractors or, a­ fter 1947, by the Puerto Rican government. Puerto Rican migration to NYC has been mostly one of individuals. The “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign of the late 1940s was a reaction to their massive entry to the city. And although Puerto Ricans w ­ ere not welcome by many in NYC, they persisted and fought the negative ste­reo­types that spread in this period and created the institutions that allowed them to make NYC their new home. This book ­will pre­sent the negative reaction to the entry of Puerto Ricans to the city, the many ste­reo­types that originated from this experience, and the obstacles Puerto Ricans had to face to become New Yorkers. One of the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative was that Puerto Ricans ­were not like previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants—­essentially arguing that

Introduction  •  11

they w ­ ere dif­f er­ent (non-­White) and would not assimilate ­because they did not share the values and culture of the United States. Puerto Ricans w ­ ere indeed not like Eu­ro­pe­ans; they ­were racially mixed U.S. citizens coming from a U.S. colonial territory in the Ca­rib­bean, with a Spanish culture and language. Although they w ­ ere citizens, initially they did not enjoy the support of some impor­tant institutions that facilitated the incorporation of Eu­ro­pe­ans like po­liti­cal parties, ­unions, and the Church. Nevertheless, even facing t­ hese obstacles, they created their own institutions and w ­ ere able to open spaces in areas of education, culture, health, public policy, and politics that allowed them to gain recognition as members of the NYC community. This is not to say that some of the negative ideas and ste­reo­types linked to the “prob­lem” narrative of the 1950s dis­appeared completely, as discussed throughout this book.

1

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the United States

Tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States ­every year ­after the end of World War II, particularly to New York City. The critical social and economic situation in Puerto Rico pushed many to leave in search of jobs and better living conditions in the United States. A March 1946 report by the U.S. Tariff Commission indicated that one million Puerto Ricans ­were required to leave in order to make Puerto Rico’s economy feasible for sustained growth.1 Some estimates suggested that in 1946 alone, around 35,000 Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States, mainly to New York City. This was made pos­si­ble by the end of the island’s war blockade, cheaper air transportation, and the need for cheap ­labor in mainland industries. The expanding American postwar economy provided jobs for Puerto Ricans in ser­vices, manufacturing, and agriculture. The immediate postwar period was characterized by the biggest migration wave of Puerto Ricans to the United States in the twentieth ­century, one of the defining events in Puerto Rico’s modern history. An adverse public campaign against the entry of Puerto Ricans gained intensity in the city’s media in 1947, from conservative tabloids to the liberal New York Times. This campaign focused on a number of “prob­lems” posed by the arrival of the new mi­grants—­from housing overcrowding to unemployment, education, crime, and diseases—­ and pointed particularly to the group’s 12

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  13

inability to assimilate to the host society. This public campaign became known in New York and in Puerto Rico as “the Puerto Rican prob­lem” and became a major subject of public debate in the city and the island. News articles emphasized the “tropical” character of the new arrivals, their inclination to go into welfare, and their ignorance of the En­glish language. One issue of concern was the rapid and growing number of Puerto Ricans coming to the city; the New York Times announced that t­ here ­were some 600,000 Puerto Ricans already living ­there, an exaggerated number by any standard. Another topic raised constantly in t­ hese news reports—­one that worried both the city and the Puerto Rican governments—­was the support given by Puerto Ricans to radical congressman Vito Marcantonio, by then a persona non grata in New York and national politics. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City was the first widespread reaction to the entry of Puerto Ricans to the United States and needs to be related to the big wave of postwar migration. Th ­ ere was an established Puerto Rican community in New York City prior to 1945, estimated to be around 60,000. Close to half a million Puerto Ricans left the island from 1945 to 1960, the period that used to be called the ­Great Migration. Most mi­grants settled in New York City, and by 1970 close to a million Puerto Ricans lived ­there. Already by the 1960s Puerto Ricans had become the largest of the “Hispanic” communities in NYC, becoming synonymous with Latino New York and helping to change the city’s cultural background. The NYC settlement became the social, economic, po­liti­cal, and cultural center of the Puerto Rican community in the United States. As a consequence of the increase of Puerto Rican population in the city—an impor­tant ele­ment of the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign and the narrative that followed it—­the governments of Puerto Rico and NYC began to encourage the migration of islanders to other parts of the United States. In many cases this policy was the basis for the formation of island communities in places like Chicago, Philadelphia, Hartford, Connecticut, and other areas in the Northeast. Puerto Rican migration was not only the largest migration to New York City in a generation but was the first “foreign” migration since the 1920s racial quotas ­limited immigration to the United States. The media, policy makers, and scholars at the time liked to compare Puerto Ricans with previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants, almost always in a negative way. Puerto Ricans w ­ ere seen as non-­ White, non-­English speakers coming from a U.S. colonial territory with a Spanish and Ca­rib­bean cultural background, and they w ­ ere considered to be racially and culturally inferior to the Anglo-­Saxons who dominated Amer­i­ca. Nevertheless, they ­were U.S. citizens. It was citizenship that made this situation most confusing for many in the city. The status of Puerto Ricans as citizens and the need for their l­ abor forced the government and impor­tant social institutions of New York to deal with their incorporation into the city. This

14  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

situation led the NYC government—­like the Puerto Rican government—to create its own institution to deal with the issues affecting Puerto Rican incorporation in the city: the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs (MCPRA). Thus the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” moved the governments of the sending country—­Puerto Rico—­and the receiving area—­New York City—to create institutions and policies to manage the migration and incorporation of ­these U.S. colonial subjects. As many analysts, scholars, and policy makers acknowledged at the time, this was something unique in American immigration history. This chapter examines how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in postwar New York City has been studied so far and how it influenced the way U.S. academia viewed Puerto Rican postwar migration and incorporation for many years. American academia reproduced notions of the narrative that emerged from the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City, thus advancing misleading and negative views of this group. The chapter also discusses how the Puerto Rican case has been compared to models of older “traditional” (Eu­ro­pean) migration and incorporation and to more recent “transnational” mi­grants, particularly from Latin Amer­i­ca. I contend that t­ hese two paradigmatic models of migration and incorporation in the United States do not provide a full understanding of the Puerto Rican experience. The final section looks at the “mode of incorporation” concept as it has been applied to the Puerto Rican case and pre­sents my own perspective on this topic.

Study of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Comprehensive examination of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City has been ­limited so far. The first mention of the issue in a book was in the last complete chapter of Bernardo Vega’s now classic text on the formation of the Puerto Rican community in New York City, Memorias de Bernardo Vega. Vega recounts how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” came to be: following the massive and rapid entry of Puerto Ricans to New York, this group became the latest scapegoat for the city’s and the nation’s economic prob­lems. He points to the series of articles published by the World Tele­gram and the actions of the Puerto Rican community and Congressman Marcantonio to fight the accusations and slanderous attacks launched by this newspaper against the group.2 In one of the first studies of Puerto Ricans in the United States in the postwar period, sociologist Clara Rodríguez discussed the impact that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” had in the reception of t­ hese mi­grants in the city. She argued that “public concern over the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem’ surfaced with the arrival of large numbers of Puerto Ricans to concentrated areas in New York City.” This was a new situation, since prior to World War II the Puerto Rican community “was a struggling community, but it was an intact, highly or­ga­nized

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  15

community that was making pro­gress.” For Rodríguez, the historical, social, and economic context of the city was a determining ­factor in the emergence of this situation, since it was “the arrival of many Puerto Ricans at the time of disappearing opportunities in the port of entry that contributed to the ‘prob­lem.’ The density of the migration did not by itself create the perception of a ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem.’ ” She added that “the historical moment of a group’s insertion into the host country significantly affects the experience of that group.”3 Rodríguez analyzed the social and economic f­ actors that influenced the incorporation of ­these mi­g rants in postwar New York, but did not elaborate on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign, its narrative and major ideas, its evolution in the 1950s, or how it influenced government policies (of both the Puerto Rican and New York City governments). The most extensive examination to date of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” is presented by Lorrin Thomas in chapter 4 of her excellent Puerto Rican Citizen. Coinciding with Rodríguez, she argues that the rapid entry of Puerto Ricans to the city ­a fter the end of World War II and the emergence of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign placed them in the m ­ iddle of New York City debates. Ideas about a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” before 1945 ­were relegated to issues of U.S. colonial governance in Puerto Rico, particularly ­those dealing with the assimilation of a dif­fer­ent race, poverty, and social prob­lems and, most importantly, colonialism and the rise of nationalism on the island. But a­ fter 1945, “the growing wave of migration from the island to New York City had produced an abrupt shift in the discourse about Puerto Rico.” The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” had moved to New York and it was no longer related to the island’s po­liti­cal status. “Now, the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem’ was confined to conflicts surrounding migration—­a social prob­lem that could readily be blamed on the mi­grants themselves.”4 The crux of Thomas’s chapter is on the reaction of the Puerto Rican community and its allies to the negative campaign. In trying to defend Puerto Ricans from the racist and prejudiced attacks, liberal supporters began to compare the experience of island mi­g rants with that of previous immigrants (i.e., Eu­ro­pe­ans) and the similar way in which they ­were initially received in the city but ­were l­ater able to assimilate. The Puerto Rican and NYC governments ­adopted this discourse in framing their respective policies to promote the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the city. Thomas correctly points out that this “just like other immigrants” discourse “failed to point to the sources of the postwar Puerto Rican migration that ­were rooted in US colonialism on the island” and the economic policies that promoted migration. This liberal discourse now focused on the real or purported characteristics of ­these mi­grants and not on the economic and po­liti­cal structural sources of migration. In this way, “liberals help clinch the definition of the Puerto Rican prob­lem as a prob­lem of mi­grants themselves rather than a po­liti­cal prob­lem

16  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

resulting from U.S. imperial policy.”5 Thomas explains how a co­ali­tion of Puerto Ricans and New York liberals (particularly ­those in the two governments) led the response to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” a­ fter the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. This was made pos­si­ble by the fragmentation of the Puerto Rican left-­wing organ­izations that in previous years had dominated the community’s activism, a demise due in part to the increased po­liti­cal persecution of the Cold War era and the po­liti­cal fall of Marcantonio. Fi­nally, she examines MCPRA and how the New York City and the Puerto Rican governments used the liberal discourse to respond to the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem.” I ­will discuss MCPRA in l­ater chapters and ­will elaborate on Thomas’s analy­sis of this institution t­ here.

Puerto Ricans and U.S. Im/migration Histories Since Puerto Ricans w ­ ere not regarded as immigrants from a foreign country by some and w ­ ere not considered as internal mi­grants by o­ thers, the study of Puerto Rican migration has remained neglected in the field of U.S. im/migrations studies. Even a standard text on “multicultural” Amer­i­ca such as Ronald Takaki’s—­which focuses on ethnicity, race, immigration, and “subject ­peoples”—­pays no attention to Puerto Rican migration or to Puerto Ricans in the United States.6 Another text on “immigrant” Amer­i­ca by Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, two scholars knowledgeable about Hispanic history in the United States, also fails to mention Puerto Rican migration, perhaps ­because Puerto Ricans are seen as internal mi­grants.7 But the question then is how to explain the presence of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland. Although Puerto Rican migration tends to be dismissed in studies of immigration to the United States, it is also absent from studies of internal migration. It is not even mentioned, for example, in one of the standard texts on this subject.8 The prob­ lem in t­ hese types of studies is how to understand a colonial migration to the United States.9 The Puerto Rican migration experience raises impor­tant questions regarding the lit­er­a­ture of im/migrant incorporation in the United States: Are they immigrants or are they internal mi­g rants? Can they be compared to “traditional” (Eu­ro­pean) immigrants or are they “transnational” immigrants? This apparently contradictory status is due to the character of Puerto Ricans’ and Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States: Puerto Rico is an “unincorporated” (colonial) territory of the United States, and Puerto Ricans enjoy an American “territorially defined” citizenship that has nevertheless allowed them unrestricted entry to the metropolitan territory. Thus, Puerto Rican migration is one of colonial citizens moving to the metropolitan territory. But once ­there, they w ­ ere treated as “aliens,” as racially and culturally foreign to the United

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  17

States. This is one reason why the Puerto Rican experience is so confusing to both traditional and more recent transnational perspectives on immigrant incorporation in the United States.

Puerto Rican Migration and U.S. Immigrant Incorporation Studies In a widely reviewed text on the po­liti­cal incorporation of immigrants in the United States, Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf compare the two most significant waves of immigration to the United States: the “old” migration coming from Eu­rope (c. 1880–1930) and the “new” wave of migration (post-1965) coming mostly from Latin Amer­i­ca and Asia. They note that ­these two migration waves have impor­tant similar characteristics: both had urban destinations; both conformed to an established ethnic division of ­labor; both happened during a period of rapid economic transformation and wealth in­equality; and both groups of immigrants experienced discrimination. But the authors also point out impor­tant differences between the two waves of mi­grants in terms of the contexts of origin and reception. The “old migration” arrived to growing urban areas and expanding industrial economies, and benefitted from the ban on immigration in the 1920s. The “new migration” entered decaying urban areas, and while its professional groups w ­ ere integrated into the formal economy, its nonskilled populations remained eco­nom­ically and socially marginal. The “new migration” is largely non-­European and has not enjoyed the traditional institutions that eased the po­liti­cal incorporation of the “old migration”: the po­liti­cal parties, the Church, and ­labor u­ nions. Th ­ ese ele­ments make the po­liti­cal incorporation of ­these two waves of immigrants very dif­fer­ent.10 While the “old migration” is usually viewed as a “traditional” migration, the “new migration” is now understood and studied as a “transnational migration.” Puerto Rican migration to the United States does not fit into ­either of ­these two models of U.S. immigration and incorporation presented by Gerstle and Mollenkopf. The first big wave of Puerto Rican migration happened precisely in the period between t­ hese two paradigmatic migrations: from the 1920s on, particularly ­a fter 1945 (the first big postwar migration wave). Furthermore, Puerto Ricans exhibit an impor­tant difference from ­those immigrants coming from Eu­rope and Latin Amer­i­ca in t­hese two migration waves: they are technically U.S. citizens coming to the mainland from a U.S. “unincorporated” (i.e., colonial) territory. Puerto Rican migration has nevertheless been compared to ­these two major perspectives of U.S. immigration. In both cases it has led to an inadequate understanding of the Puerto Rican migration experience. American academia began to study Puerto Rican migration to the United States a­ fter the “Puerto

18  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Rican prob­lem” in New York City in 1947. It viewed this experience within the par­ameters of “traditional” immigration to the United States—­that is, within the constructed notion of how Eu­ro­pean mi­grants became incorporated and ­were “assimilated” to American society. Time and time again, t­ hese studies concluded that Puerto Ricans did not follow the “traditional” (Eu­ro­pean) path of incorporation and that they had failed and would continue to fail in their pro­ cess of “assimilation” to American society. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City reflected ­these ideas from a popu­lar perspective. What is significant, though, is that American academia reproduced ­these notions without questioning them. Notable scholars in American academia took an interest in Puerto Rican migration and incorporation in the United States, particularly in New York City. Their influence in shaping how academia, the media, and the public in general viewed Puerto Ricans was extensive and long-­term.

The Unexpected Puerto Rican Journey The Puerto Rican Journey, by C. Wright Mills, Clarence Se­nior, and Rose Goldsen, published in 1950, became the first academic survey of Puerto Rican postwar migration to New York City and the United States. The research for this book came from the Puerto Rican Study carried out by Columbia University, financed by the Puerto Rican government to counteract the campaign and the narrative of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. The book’s conclusions established impor­tant ste­reo­t ypical and misguided views on Puerto Rican mi­grants, ideas that influenced American academia for de­cades to come. This text reproduced many notions that w ­ ere pre­sent in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC. The book gave an intellectual legitimacy to perceptions born from a racist and nativist public debate, beliefs that ­were l­ ater reproduced by other notable American scholars. Like studies before and many afterward, the book compares the Puerto Rican experience to that of “traditional” immigrants. It concluded that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere destined to fail in postwar Amer­i­ca, unlike previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants. According to Mills et al., Puerto Ricans would not follow the “classic pattern” of American immigrant incorporation since they did not have the ele­ments necessary to “adapt” and “assimilate” to American society. The authors reached this conclusion based on the findings of their survey: the majority of island mi­grants w ­ ere w ­ omen coming to a sexist society; many ­were Black entering a racist society; most did not have the skills necessary for an expanding cap­i­tal­ist postindustrial society; and most w ­ ere poor arriving in a society that disdained poor ­people and afforded them scant opportunities for economic and social advancement. Mills et al. argued that New York City did not provide a favorable environment to the new mi­grants, essentially b­ ecause

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  19

the mi­grants themselves w ­ ere not prepared for it: they had “no or­ga­nized community” in New York ­because Puerto Ricans had “no orga­nizational tradition” and, unlike Eu­ro­pean immigrants, they had been unable to create their own organ­izations to provide the necessary support in the new environment. Culturally, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere seen as incapable of “adaptation” (assimilation) to the United States: they w ­ ere characterized as foreign to the traditional venues of American “assimilation” like mass culture; island mi­grants in the city ­were “isolated,” living in the “cultural margins of two worlds.” The authors concluded that Puerto Ricans ­were foreign to the “industrial Protestant culture” prevalent in the United States that promoted development and civilization; thus, unlike previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants coming from such a culture, Puerto Ricans ­were incapable of full assimilation to the United States.11 The Puerto Rican Journey presented a distorted and ahistorical view of Puerto Ricans in New York; the notions it put forward lacked historical substance, as research on this community in the last four de­cades has shown. Furthermore, the authors’ own research contradicted most of their assertions.12 Clarence Se­nior, one of the coauthors, who was an advisor to the Puerto Rican government on migration issues and was ­later appointed director of the Migration Division in the United States, tried to dispel the ideas presented in this book in his writings on Puerto Ricans published in the 1950s and 1960s.13 Nevertheless, the conclusions laid out by Mills et al. had a significant influence in terms of how American academia would perceive Puerto Ricans coming to the United States. Similar notions w ­ ere reproduced years l­ ater by two of the most influential American scholars dealing with issues of race, ethnicity, and immigration: Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan.

Not in the Melting Pot In their prologue to the 1970 edition of Beyond the Melting Pot, Glazer and Moynihan stated that of the “Catholic groups of the city, none ended the 1960’s [sic] in less promising circumstances than did the Puerto Ricans . . . ​Puerto Ricans emerged from the de­cade as the group with the highest incidence of poverty and the lowest number of men of public position who bargain and broker the arrangements of the city. They had no elected officials, no prominent religious leaders, no writers, no power­ful organ­izations.”14 Their chapter on Puerto Ricans begins by pointing out that anyone who had studied the group two de­cades ­earlier would have concluded that they “would have a very hard time adapting to New York City and indeed might well be considered the mi­grants least likely to succeed.”15 Like Mills et al. before them and many ­others afterward, for Glazer and Moynihan the explanations for Puerto Ricans’ situation lies entirely with the group: Puerto Ricans are to blame for failing to “adapt” to New York City. The authors contend that although the conditions in Puerto

20  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Rico w ­ ere improving u­ nder the Commonwealth status and the reforms implemented by the Popu­lar Demo­cratic Party (PPD) government, Puerto Ricans ­were still not well qualified for adaptation to New York City. This topic is discussed in a section titled “The Island-­Centered Community.” Although Glazer and Moynihan follow the same argument as Mills et al. regarding the ­factors that make Puerto Ricans unable to adapt to New York (“color” or race, culture and language, religion, lack of orga­nizational skills and community formation, and no leadership), they added a new ­factor to this reasoning, one that became a staple on the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States for de­cades thereafter: the continued ties of the U.S. community with the island. “Puerto Rico is brought relatively close by air, and air passage is not too expensive. The island government takes a strong interest in its p­ eople. Indeed, many would be hard put to say w ­ hether they belonged to the city or the island,” Glazer and Moynihan wrote. For them, Puerto Ricans’ ties to their homeland make them dif­f er­ent from ­earlier Eu­ro­pean immigrants. Th ­ ese ties are a major obstacle to their full assimilation to American life: “Something new perhaps has been added to the New York scene—an ethnic group that w ­ ill not assimilate to the same degree as o­ thers do.” The authors argued that Puerto Ricans did not register to vote b­ ecause, among other t­ hings, they refused to learn En­glish to comply with language proficiency laws: “This is one influence of the closeness of the island, physically, po­liti­cally, and culturally.” For Glazer and Moynihan, this situation “is unquestionably a ­factor in another in­ter­est­ing characteristic of the Puerto Ricans in New York, the relative weakness of community organ­ization and community leadership among them.”16 This is the same notion that was presented de­cades e­ arlier in The Puerto Rican Journey. Glazer and Moynihan indicate that this “closeness to the island” affects Puerto Ricans’ lives in New York in multiple ways, mostly hindering their “adaptation” to the new environment: “[­There] are prob­ably many and subtle ways in which the relation to the island affects orga­nizational life of Puerto Ricans in New York: but one clear impact is seen in the role of the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in New York City.” The authors are referring to the Migration Division of Puerto Rico’s Department of L ­ abor, with offices in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Hartford, and several other U.S. cities. They praised the actions and policies of the island government in promoting the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the United States, but contend that this comes with dire consequences, since “it may very well be that it is b­ ecause the Puerto Rican group has been so well supplied with paternalistic guidance from their own government, as well as with social ser­vices by city and private agencies, that it has not developed power­ful grass-­roots organ­izations.”17 This notion also became a staple in the study of U.S. Puerto Ricans for de­cades to come. Beyond the Melting Pot also presented another idea about Puerto Ricans that has been constantly reproduced since then, one that was central to the “Puerto

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  21

Rican prob­lem” narrative in the late 1940s and afterward: the significant relationship of Puerto Ricans to welfare. Academic publications like this one—­ with its social scientific discourse by well-­established scholars—­a llowed this idea of Puerto Ricans’ extreme de­pen­dency on welfare—­and its negative consequences on the social, economic, and po­ liti­ cal development of the community—­not only to survive but to grow in importance in l­ater de­cades. Glazer and Moynihan argued that Puerto Ricans “entered the city in the age of the welfare state” and claimed that the “culture of public welfare . . . ​is as relevant for the ­future of Puerto Ricans in the city as the culture of Puerto Rico.”18 An idea quite similar to that of the “culture of poverty” that was introduced during the same period by Oscar Lewis in La Vida, a book that had Puerto Ricans as its subject of study. Like Glazer and Moynihan, Oscar Handlin, another influential scholar in U.S. postwar academia, presented similar ideas to t­ hose first proclaimed by Mills, Se­nior, and Goldsen in The Puerto Rican Journey.

Dif­fer­ent Newcomers to the City: African Americans and Puerto Ricans Handlin, one of the central figures in the study of U.S. immigration history, followed some of the ideas advanced by Mills et al. and by Glazer and Moynihan. Nevertheless, he presented a new perspective by comparing African American and Puerto Rican migrations to New York City. Handlin’s comparative focus was based on the issue of “color” or race and the fact that ­these two groups ­were also mi­grants coming from within the jurisdiction of the United States, that is, they ­were U.S. citizens. But like Mills et al. before and many ­others afterward, Handlin began his analy­sis by comparing African Americans and Puerto Ricans to Eu­ro­pean immigrants, asking “­whether and how the Negroes and Puerto Ricans of the first three de­cades are significantly dif­f er­ent from the immigrants of the first three hundred years of New York’s history” and how this explains their incorporation into this city.19 He argued that ­there w ­ ere “two significant differences between ­these and ­earlier immigrants. The Negroes and Puerto Ricans found their adjustment complicated by their dark skins in a period when a ­great deal of social tension focused on the issue of color difference.”20 The newcomers also found a dif­fer­ent social, economic, and po­liti­cal context in the city. African Americans and Puerto Ricans encountered dif­fer­ ent circumstances regarding jobs and housing and they faced racism, prejudice, and discrimination in a dif­f er­ent and more extreme form than Eu­ro­pe­ans did. The New York City school system functioned differently for them too, limiting the educational advancement of their ­children. But like Mills et al. and Glazer and Moynihan, Handlin maintained that it was not only the context of the city but their own characteristics that made

22  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

African Americans and Puerto Ricans fail in their pro­cess of “adaptation” to the new environment. Their “failures of adjustment” “­were also derived from weaknesses peculiar to the situation of Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Enjoying more l­ imited opportunities for advancement and mobility than did their pre­ de­ces­sors and without communal institutions or leadership adequate to their needs, ­these ­people w ­ ere especially vulnerable to the dangers of the city.”21 For Handlin, postwar social and economic changes in New York City negatively influenced Puerto Rican incorporation, particularly ­because they ­were unable to construct their own social or po­liti­cal organ­izations and manifested social and po­liti­cal apathy. He claimed that African Americans and Puerto Ricans “have not matched the richness and breadth of the communal life of ­earlier immigrants . . . ​Complex reasons generated among them a sense of apathy ­toward communal organ­ization that has played an impor­tant part in shaping the character of their adjustment.” Among the reasons for this situation is that for neither group “was the break of migration to New York as sharp as it had been for Eu­ro­ pe­ans.” The fact that African Americans and Puerto Ricans ­were citizens “diminished the distance between Harlem on the one hand and Mississippi or the island on the other.” Both groups kept in contact with their old homes, “so that communications ­were close and the sense of connectedness was never broken. . . . ​ Such newcomers did not feel the complete and total sense of foreignness that overwhelmed the Eu­ro­pean immigrants and, therefore, did not feel called upon to create the institutions which ­were the response to the shock of separation.”22 According to Handlin, one major reason why African Americans and Puerto Ricans did not develop the necessary institutions to promote their incorporation like Eu­ro­pean immigrants was ­because—to use the words of Glazer and Moynihan—­they came to the city in the “era of the welfare state.” To Handlin, “the welfare state assumed many social obligations ­earlier immigrants had borne themselves; it seemed pointless then to duplicate its activities.” He argued that Puerto Ricans and African Americans “yielded readily to that tendency. Neither brought with them a tradition of philanthropy or communal solidarity.” Handlin alleged that some African Americans “indeed had become accustomed to a role as recipients of aid” and added that “in the absence of voluntary associations on the island, many Puerto Ricans had learned to look for help to the efficient agencies of the commonwealth government which retained a long-­term interest in their f­ uture.” As a consequence, neither group was “inclined, in order to create their own institutions, to strug­gle against the trend, since the depression, t­ oward the reliance upon the state.”23 Like Mills at al. and Glazer and Moynihan, Handlin pointed to the lack of leadership and organ­izations and community development among Puerto Ricans and how it prevented their “adaptation” to New York City, contrary to previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants. Like Glazer and Moynihan, Handlin sees the links of the Puerto Rican community to the Puerto Rican government as an

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  23

impediment to their incorporation and assimilation in the United States. Mills et al., whose study was financed by the Puerto Rican government, saw a more positive role for the island government in the incorporation of its mi­grants in New York City. The Puerto Rican Journey was a direct result of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. Scholars like Glazer and Moynihan and Handlin argued that the Puerto Rican government retarded the pro­cess of incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the United States, an argument that has been reproduced by other scholars.24 But they did not address the idea that one of the reasons why the Puerto Rican government had to intervene in the pro­cess of incorporation of its mi­grants was precisely b­ ecause many of the traditional institutions that had eased the incorporation of Eu­ro­pean immigrants (po­liti­cal parties, ­labor ­unions, the church) failed to do so for Puerto Ricans. Or that, despite the fact that Puerto Ricans ­were U.S. citizens, they ­were perceived as foreigners, as alien to the United States in race and culture, and that for this reason they ­were rejected when entering New York and other places in the United States. This was the under­ lying ­factor for the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York and elsewhere in the United States in the postwar period. This was an impor­tant reason why the Puerto Rican government was in a sense pushed—­literally asked by NYC government and social institutions—to intervene in the pro­cess of incorporation of its mi­grants in the city.25 The Puerto Rican government did so in reaction to the way that island mi­g rants w ­ ere initially received in the city and to the obstacles they faced in their incorporation ­there and elsewhere on the U.S. mainland. Furthermore, scholars like Mills et al., Glazer and Moynihan, and Handlin failed to familiarize themselves with the history of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico or the United States and could not recognize that Puerto Ricans in New York had constructed their own community and po­liti­cal organ­izations before and ­after 1945. Puerto Rican postwar migration and incorporation in the United States has not only been compared to the so-­called traditional (Eu­ro­pean) migrations but also, most recently, to con­temporary transnational migrations from Latin Amer­i­ca. One impor­tant ele­ment used to characterize ­these migrations as transnational has been the mi­grants’ “ties to their homeland.”

Puerto Rican Migration and Transnationalism Some salient ele­ments used in the lit­er­a­ture to define transnational migrations can be observed in the Puerto Rican experience. Th ­ ere are several aspects that have been embraced in this lit­er­a­ture to depict transnational mi­grants that ­were employed by U.S. scholars de­cades ago to describe Puerto Ricans and to differentiate them from the so-­called traditional immigrants. ­These scholars noted the existence of what ­today is called “transnational linkages” between the

24  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

mainland community and the island. The recognition of ­these linkages came to be known u­ nder the rubric of “ties to the homeland.” Authors like Glazer and Moynihan, as well as Handlin, argued that continued ties to the homeland made Puerto Ricans dif­fer­ent from “traditional” Eu­ro­pean immigrants. They contended that the significant presence of the Puerto Rican government in the U.S. community was crucial in maintaining t­hese ties to Puerto Ricans’ homeland. Po­liti­cal scientist James Jennings made a similar argument in order to explain the lack of po­liti­cal incorporation of Puerto Ricans on the mainland. He claimed that Puerto Ricans during the 1950s and 1960s ­were divorced from the U.S. electoral pro­cess due, among other reasons, to what he called their “umbilicalism” to Puerto Rico. Puerto Ricans, according to Jennings, ­were dif­fer­ent from previous immigrant groups that or­ga­nized their communities po­liti­cally and sought to integrate into urban po­liti­cal machines. Since they ­were seeking to go back home, Puerto Ricans felt no need to create community organ­izations or to mobilize po­liti­cally, the argument goes. He asserted that since Puerto Ricans ­were U.S. citizens, they ­were not compelled to mobilize or or­ga­nize po­liti­cally in order to obtain citizenship—­like ­earlier immigrants had. Citizenship also facilitated coming to the mainland and g­ oing back to the island, which provoked in them apathy for U.S. politics. For Jennings, Puerto Ricans in the United States did not perceive themselves as citizens but as strangers.26 Many U.S. scholars looking at Puerto Rican postwar migration—­like Glazer and Moynihan, Mills et al., and Jennings—­saw Puerto Ricans as immigrants and not as internal mi­grants moving from one location in the United States to another. This notion was also sustained by the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy, which was premised on the idea that island mi­grants had to be considered like any other group of immigrants g­ oing through a pro­cess of incorporation into a dif­f er­ent society. According to the framer of Puerto Rico’s migration policy, Commissioner of ­Labor Fernando Sierra Berdecía, the “prob­ lems that Puerto Ricans residing ­there [in the United States] confront are the typical prob­lems of the groups that migrate to socie­ties that are ethnologically dif­f er­ent.”27 The role of the government was to help Puerto Rican mi­g rants “adapt” to their new society, one that was culturally, linguistically, and racially dif­fer­ent. In terms of their incorporation and adaption, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere no dif­fer­ent than previous immigrant groups coming to the United States.28 Some of the ele­ments that many scholars include in their depiction of con­ temporary transnationalism, particularly t­ hose interested in Latin Amer­i­ca and the Ca­rib­be­an,29 are similar to ­those that characterized Puerto Rican postwar migration: the continued links of mi­grants to Puerto Rico, including back-­and-­ forth migration; the maintenance of Puerto Rican identity as a means of providing group cohesion in the host society; and the intervention of the Puerto Rican government in the affairs of the island community in the United States,

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  25

which included sustaining its own migration policy and providing ser­vices and protection to its mi­grants in the host society. The notion of “ties to the homeland” has emerged as an impor­tant subject in the study of con­temporary transnational migration and politics.30 The experience of Puerto Rican migration and incorporation in the United States has some ele­ments in common with the experience of transnational immigrants from Latin Amer­i­ca. This can be observed in a list of the nine major ele­ments of po­liti­cal transnationalism that has been drawn up from the arguments that prominent authors in that field have proposed: 1) state-­sponsored transnationalism; 2) promotion of hometown organ­izations in the host society; 3) creation of immigrant and homeland po­liti­cal organ­izations in the host society; 4) homeland-­state organ­izations and agencies in the host society; 5) immigrant remittances and investments in homeland; 6) context of reception/impact of receiving-­state policies on immigrant incorporation; 7) support for/lobbying of homeland government policies in host society; 8) homeland-­ state protection of its citizens in the host society; and 9) granting of dual citizenship/nationality by the homeland state.31 All of t­ hese ele­ments except for the last one—­Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens—­are pre­sent in the Puerto Rican migration and incorporation experience in the United States.32 Does this mean that the Puerto Rican experience is a transnational one? Several scholars have argued so. The most prominent scholar to apply the transnational framework to the Puerto Rican migration experience is anthropologist Jorge Duany. In his first writing on this topic, he argued that the Puerto Rican case presented an “anomalous” form of transnationalism given that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens moving to the U.S. mainland from a U.S. territory. Duany claimed that, although Puerto Ricans did not cross po­liti­cal borders like other transnational immigrants, they did cross cultural ones and ­were treated as immigrants in the United States given their racial, linguistic, and cultural characteristics.33 In l­ ater writings, he proposed the term “colonial transnationalism” to differentiate the Puerto Rican case from the other forms of nation-­state transnationalism. Duany insists that although Puerto Ricans are colonial citizens, they still cross racial, linguistic, cultural, and even po­liti­cal bound­aries when they move to the United States, making their experience similar to other transnational immigrants.34 Other scholars have also applied the transnational approach to the study of Puerto Rican migration and community formation in the United States.35 One key ele­ment emphasized in the lit­er­a­ture on transnational migrations is the prominent role played by the homeland state in the promotion of migration and in the incorporation of its citizens in the host society. Eva Ostergaard-­ Nielsen, for example, argues that the formulation of migration policies by sending states is an impor­tant ele­ment in the con­temporary transnational immigration experience, a clear sign of a transnational issue by a nation-­state.36

26  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Duany has emphasized the actions by the Puerto Rican government to or­ga­ nize and promote migration as an indicator of transnationalism.37 Does this mean that the Puerto Rican migration and incorporation experience in the United States is a transnational one? Is the transnational approach the best way to understand this experience? As I have argued e­ arlier in this book and in previous writings,38 it is best to understand the Puerto Rican experience as a colonial migration, as one of colonial citizens moving from the colonial territory—­with all its cultural, racial, and po­liti­cal distinctiveness—to the metropolitan homeland. Although the Puerto Rican experience shares many common ele­ments with transnational migrations to the United States, its distinctive ele­ments—­U.S. citizenship and colonialism—­make it dif­fer­ent from Latin American migrations to the United States. Puerto Rican migration to the United States looks like a transnational migration due to the par­tic­u­lar construction of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico and of Puerto Ricans as U.S. subjects and citizens. By the time the United States conquered the island in 1898, Puerto Ricans ­were already a distinct national entity u­ nder Spanish colonialism. Puerto Ricans w ­ ere already racially, culturally, and linguistically dif­fer­ent from the idealized American mainstream. American policy makers used their alleged racial inferiority and alien character to justify U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico. This belief was used to sustain the colonial regime implemented in 1900 u­ nder the Foraker Act and ­later to legitimize the Supreme Court’s rationalization of colonialism in the so-­called insular cases. Puerto Rico was declared an “unincorporated territory” in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), the foundational basis of the insular cases. The two dominant opinions in this case declared Puerto Rico to be “foreign in a domestic sense” and “belonging to but not a part of” the United States. Th ­ ese l­egal constructs ­were based on the idea that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere “alien” to the character and values of the United States. In both the Foraker Act and Downes, Puerto Ricans ­were denied U.S. citizenship based on their supposed inferiority and alien character.39 The congressional grant of citizenship in 1917 with the Jones Act did not change this notion. In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court declared in Balzac v. the P ­ eople of Porto Rico (1922) that although Puerto Ricans w ­ ere now citizens, the status of the island remained unchanged—it was still an unincorporated territory. This implied that, even as citizens, Puerto Ricans on the island would not have all the rights of citizenship, particularly voting and po­liti­cal repre­sen­ta­ tion at the federal level. It also meant that the grant of citizenship to its inhabitants did not imply the right of the territory to become a state, as was the norm for other annexed territories ­until 1898. The Supreme Court declared that it was “locality”—­that is, the unincorporated territory—­that determined the rights of citizenship in Puerto Rico. Balzac sustained that the continued colonial status of the island and the colonial nature of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico ­were justified on the character of Puerto Ricans as an “alien” and inferior p­ eople.40

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  27

Puerto Ricans on the island w ­ ere constructed as colonial subjects by the U.S. po­liti­cal and constitutional system. The fact that Puerto Rico was not considered po­liti­cally and constitutionally part of the United States made them look like foreigners. Their racial, linguistic, and cultural characteristics made them look like foreigners when moving to the U.S. mainland. The way they ­were received and treated in the United States makes their experience resemble in many ways that of transnational immigrants from Latin Amer­i­ca and the Ca­rib­bean. The fact that their government, although a colonial one, intervened in their pro­cess of migration and incorporation in the United States also has led some scholars to conclude that the Puerto Rican experience is akin to con­ temporary transnational immigration, as Duany and ­others have observed. But t­ here are some impor­tant characteristics in their pro­cess of migration and incorporation that make Puerto Ricans dif­fer­ent from transnational immigrants in the United States and indicate that the transnational framework is not completely appropriate to fully understand their experience. First of all, Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, and, notwithstanding the territorial character of their citizenship in Puerto Rico, it allows them unrestricted entry to the U.S. mainland. Although Puerto Rico is a U.S. colonial territory and many of its cultural, social, and po­liti­cal norms are dif­fer­ent from ­those on the U.S. mainland, legally Puerto Ricans do not have to cross national borders. They do not need to go through the pro­cess of acquiring citizenship—so impor­tant in the transnational immigrant experience—­and cannot be deported. ­There are no obstacles for them to go back home, which allows for their much-­noted back-­ and-­forth or circular migration. And although certain citizenship rights can be denied to them or restricted while they live in Puerto Rico, in theory Puerto Ricans have access to ­these rights once they move to any state. And what about the role of the Puerto Rican government in the pro­cess of migration and incorporation of its citizens in the United States, which several authors have used to define the Puerto Rican experience as a transnational one? While it is true that the Puerto Rican government implemented policies and created institutions that resembled ­those of transnational homeland states regarding their mi­grants in the United States, the context where ­these actions occur is quite dif­f er­ent. In the Puerto Rican case, colonialism and U.S. citizenship make the actions and policies implemented by the Puerto Rican government dif­fer­ent from ­those of transnational states. In New York City, as this book ­will examine, the city establishment de­cided to intervene in the pro­cess of incorporation of Puerto Ricans b­ ecause they w ­ ere citizens and could not be deported, in addition to their l­abor being needed. In order to stop or reduce the numbers entering New York, the city government joined forces with the Puerto Rican government to direct mi­grants to other places in the United States. The Puerto Rican government encouraged ­those migrating on their own to move to areas away from New York. The island

28  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

government also moved thousands of farm workers e­ very year to rural areas in the Northeast. The governments of New York City and Puerto Rico used the status of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens to legitimize their presence in the city. To reduce the outcry against their entry, the city establishment argued that as citizens ­these mi­grants had a right to move anywhere in the United States. In an attempt to limit the mi­grant flow to the city, the New York establishment urged the federal government to implement policies and programs in Puerto Rico in order to reduce or eliminate the c­ auses of migration. This claim was based on the fact that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere U.S. citizens. The Puerto Rican government also alluded to the status of Puerto Ricans as citizens to justify their right to move to the United States and seek work anywhere in the nation. At the same time that it was dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York, Puerto Rico’s government was also confronting federal agencies and agricultural employers that discriminated against island farm workers in f­ avor of foreign l­abor. Puerto Rico’s government argued that as citizens Puerto Ricans w ­ ere part of the American domestic ­labor force and therefore had priority for work over foreign workers.41 Furthermore, it was Puerto Ricans’ status as citizens and that of Puerto Rico as a U.S. territory that allowed for the close collaboration between the Puerto Rican and NYC governments with re­spect to the management of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city, as this book w ­ ill examine at length. The city and the island governments coordinated policies and programs to further the incorporation of Puerto Ricans in New York through the so-­called migration conferences from 1953 to 1960. NYC’s government and social institutions became strong supporters of Puerto Rico’s migration policy and its programs to advance the “adaptation” of island mi­grants in the city. The mayor invited Puerto Rican functionaries to become members of MCPRA, the institution created to advance Puerto Rican incorporation in the city. For over a de­cade, successive mayoral administrations in New York City legitimized and sustained the role of the Puerto Rican government as the representative of the island community in the city. This kind of close collaboration and links between the city and the island governments are hard to replicate t­ oday between the NYC government and any Latin American country. If the transnational perspective is not completely adequate to fully understand the Puerto Rican migration and incorporation experience in New York and elsewhere in the United States, neither is considering it as another example of U.S. internal migrations. The Puerto Rican and the New York City governments began using this notion a­ fter the mid-1950s when the initial “like previous immigrants” notion failed to win the hearts and minds of many New Yorkers in welcoming this group to the city. But Puerto Rican migration should not be considered as another internal migration within the United States. The negative reception of Puerto Ricans’ entering New York was not in reaction to

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  29

job competition or due to lack of jobs for the city population, as was the case with the “Okies” in the Southwest. Nor is their experience comparable to the negative reaction created by the entry of African Americans to the Northeast and Southwest during the G ­ reat Migration, where issues of job competition and White-­on-­ Black racism played a significant role in their rejection. Not only did the general public in New York and elsewhere in the United States treat Puerto Ricans as immigrants and foreigners—an impor­tant ele­ment of the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign and narrative—­but so did American academia. Puerto Ricans ­were seen as alien to American values and civilization, coming from a dif­fer­ent and inferior country and culture and incapable of assimilation, bringing with them diseases from a distant poverty-­stricken island outside the United States. Their citizenship was usually not acknowledged, and, when it was, Puerto Ricans ­were regarded as an inferior class of citizens. This is precisely why the Puerto Rican government intervened in the pro­cess of migration and incorporation of its mi­grants on the U.S. mainland, not only trying to find them jobs but also to secure their rights as citizens. Be it in New York or in rural areas of the Northeast, the Puerto Rican government had to confront governmental and social institutions when they failed to recognize ­these mi­grants as U.S. citizens. The fact that the Puerto Rican government intervened in the pro­cess of migration and incorporation of its p­ eople on the U.S. mainland makes this migration dif­ fer­ent from any known internal migration in the United States.42

Mode of Incorporation The negative ste­reo­types and prejudice that Puerto Ricans ­were subjected to when they arrived in New York City ­after 1945 marked the group for de­cades and influenced their incorporation in the United States. The narrative of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” extended to other Puerto Rican communities in the United States like Chicago, Hartford, and Philadelphia. This book examines how the circumstances ­under which Puerto Ricans ­were received upon entering New York City in the immediate postwar years, or their “context of reception,” influenced the way they w ­ ere incorporated into city life; that is, the book looks at their “mode of incorporation.” Th ­ ese two concepts have been widely used in the lit­er­a­ture on immigrant incorporation in the United States.43 They have also been applied previously to the Puerto Rican migration experience. Sociologist Alejandro Portes has been credited for expanding the meaning and use of the concepts of “context of reception” and “mode of incorporation” in the study of immigrant incorporation in the United States.44 Portes has argued that the history of U.S. immigration shows that the way in which immigrants are received sets the context for the direction that their activities w ­ ill take. The extent of discrimination and hostility faced by the immigrant group in the host society ­will interact with other f­ actors to give direction to their

30  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

adaptive strategies; when the group is rejected and confined to an inferior status, t­ here is an incentive to reaffirm the group’s collective worth and seek economic security.45 Portes has also emphasized how the way immigrants are incorporated affects the propensity for transnational activities; ­these “flourish in highly concentrated communities, especially ­those that have been subjected to a hostile reception by the host society’s authorities and citizenry.”46 Portes claims that the “context of reception” w ­ ill influence how immigrants are incorporated into the host society. He refers to the mode of incorporation as “the pro­cess of insertion of an immigrant group at dif­fer­ent levels of the host society. ­These levels encompass government policies, mainstream attitudes ­toward the newcomers, and the size and characteristics of the preexisting ethnic community.” It includes the class origins of the group and their incorporation into the ­labor market in the new society.47 Several scholars have applied the “mode of incorporation” perspective to the Puerto Rican experience in the United States.48 In the mid-1990s, Portes and Ramón Grosfoguel applied this concept to the study of the migration of five Ca­rib­bean countries to the United States: three Spanish-­speaking countries (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico), the English-­speaking Jamaica, and the French-­speaking Haiti.49 Although they all have dif­f er­ent historical and cultural backgrounds, they share a common history of po­liti­cal, economic, and (except Jamaica) military subordination to the United States. They all have immigrant communities in the United States as well. Puerto Rico pre­sents a dif­fer­ent experience from the other four countries, since it remains a U.S. colonial territory and its ­people are U.S. citizens. Portes and Grosfoguel argue that it makes a difference ­whether immigrants come from a nation-­state or from a colonial territory. They contend that closer ties to the United States lowered the barriers to entry and facilitated the recruitment of cheap ­labor by U.S. companies, with Puerto Rico as the clearest example of this category. With no ­legal obstacle to their entry, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere exclusively engaged in a ­labor migration to satisfy the need for cheap l­ abor in agriculture and urban manufacturing and ser­vice industries. But although they w ­ ere citizens, Puerto Ricans ­were not welcomed upon entry to the United States (as this book clearly demonstrates). Portes and Grosfoguel maintain that the discrimination Puerto Ricans ­were subjected to in jobs, housing, and education l­ imited their economic and social improvement. The racial background and rural origins of most mi­grants led to the impoverishment of early communities and constrained the social and economic opportunities of newcomers. According to the authors, the mode of incorporation of first-­wave Puerto Rican mi­grants influenced the economic opportunities of their descendants and of l­ ater arrivals. Grosfoguel ­later expanded on the ideas he had presented with Portes. To him, the Puerto Rican colonial and migration experience is not unique outside the United States. Grosfoguel compared Puerto Ricans to the experience of

The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the U.S.  •  31

other Ca­rib­bean “colonial mi­grants” ­under Eu­ro­pean sovereignty.50 Like Puerto Ricans, mi­grants from the French and Dutch territories in the Ca­rib­bean enjoy metropolitan citizenship, have unrestricted access to the metropolis, and have migrated in large numbers to major cities t­ here—­and their migration has been espoused by the government (metropolitan or colonial). This makes the experience of colonial mi­grants dif­f er­ent from that of ­those from nation-­states who have to cross legal-­political borders. The position of t­ hese colonial mi­grants in their respective metropolitan socie­ties is dif­fer­ent depending on the mode of reception and incorporation of each par­tic­u­lar group within the specific receiving country. For Grosfoguel and other scholars, t­ hese colonial mi­grants engage in transnational relations like t­ hose mi­grants coming from nation-­states.51 As proposed by Grosfoguel and ­others, the mode-­of-­incorporation perspective examines not only how mi­grants are received in the host society but also links this pro­cess to the way they are perceived based on the mi­grants’ characteristics and their place of origin. As this book elaborates in detail, authors like Felix Padilla and Grosfoguel are correct in arguing that the way Puerto Ricans ­were constructed as colonial subjects in Puerto Rico influenced their entry into the United States. For U.S. policy makers, including t­ hose in New York, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city and elsewhere was an extension of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in Puerto Rico. Authors like Grosfoguel, Padilla, and Carmen Whalen, among ­others, have focused mostly on the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into the ­labor market. Although this is a very impor­tant aspect of Puerto Rican incorporation in the United States, it is not the only one. One central argument of this book is that we need to look at the way Puerto Ricans w ­ ere po­liti­cally incorporated; specifically, we need to pay attention to the role played by the governments of Puerto Rico and the City of New York in the incorporation of Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York. The two governments formulated policies and created institutions to further the incorporation of ­these mi­grants into city life. Puerto Rico’s government created the Bureau of Employment and Migration to manage migration from the island, including the policy to divert island mi­grants away from New York City, as well as the Migration Division in the United States to advance their incorporation on the U.S. mainland. The city government, on the other hand, established MCPRA to deal with the incorporation of t­hese mi­grants into city life. The two governments developed and shared common policies and strategies through the so-­called migration conferences in the 1950s. The NYC government saw the government of Puerto Rico as an ally and intermediary in dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. The two governments sought to advance the incorporation of island mi­grants in areas like education, housing, health, and welfare ser­vices, as well as in the l­ abor market. The study of Puerto Rican postwar migration to the United States by American scholars—­particularly by ­those who liked to compare island mi­grants to

32  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

previous “traditional” Eu­ro­pean mi­g rants—­was l­imited by their lack of understanding of Puerto Rico’s colonial history with the United States. The works by Padilla, Grosfoguel, Whalen, Thomas, and many ­others are a necessary correction to this very l­imited perspective. But with the exception of Thomas and a few other scholars, most academics dealing with the Puerto Rican migration and incorporation in the United States tend to dismiss or obviate the role that citizenship has played in this pro­cess.52 This is true of older works of traditional American academia, as well as of the more recent perspectives that place their analy­sis within the framework of transnationalism. The po­liti­cal context of Puerto Rican migration is dif­fer­ent from that of transnational mi­grants from Latin Amer­i­ca. This context includes the colonial status of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship. Citizenship is fundamental to understanding the particularities of Puerto Rican migration to the United States, including their incorporation to American society. U.S. citizenship was central to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. It allowed the Puerto Rican government to mediate in the pro­cess of incorporation of its mi­grants in the United States and played a crucial role in Puerto Rico’s migration policy as well. Puerto Ricans’ status as U.S. citizens forced the NYC establishment to deal with their entry to the city, thus influencing their incorporation t­ here. Fi­nally, one aspect in the study of Puerto Rican incorporation in the United States that has remained largely unexamined is how the Cold War context influenced this pro­cess. Puerto Rican postwar migration to the United States came precisely at the dawn of the Cold War era. One impor­tant notion in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign was the association of Puerto Ricans to communism, in large part based on their support of Congressman Marcantonio, who was characterized as a communist as Cold War politics extended throughout the United States. The idea of Puerto Ricans as sympathizers or easy prey for the communists emerged once again during the 1949 mayoral election campaign when Marcantonio ran for mayor. The Puerto Rican government intervened in this pro­cess directly by attacking Marcantonio—­its former ally in Washington—as a communist, an attempt to diffuse the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. This issue continued throughout the 1950s as exemplified by the 1959 House Un-­A merican Activities Committee (HUAC) hearings on Puerto Rican communist subversion. The HUAC hearings, the FBI’s COINTELPRO program a­ fter 1960, and many U.S. policy makers and national security officials conflated the rebellious attacks by Puerto Rican nationalists on the island and the U.S. mainland as part of the global Communist conspiracy.53 This notion propagated the idea of Puerto Ricans not only as Un-­A merican but of being anti-­A merican as well.

2

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City Negative reactions to the entry of immigrants to the nation have been an impor­ tant ele­ment of American history since the creation of the republic. New York City, guarding “the golden door” to the nation, was frequently at the center of ­these conflicts. By the m ­ iddle of the nineteenth c­ entury, American nativist organ­izations opposed the entry of Irish Catholics, and a strong anti-­immigrant movement emerged in opposition to the entry of Southern and Eastern Eu­ro­ pe­ans in ­later de­cades. The 1880s experienced the enactment of exclusionary and restrictive immigration legislation. The Chinese w ­ ere excluded from coming to the United States on the basis that they w ­ ere an “alien,” inferior race incapable of assimilation to the American nation. Southern and Eastern Eu­ro­pe­ans, although White, ­were also deemed “inferior races” polluting the American White stock. Restrictive legislation imposing limitations to their entry was enacted in the 1880s and continued u­ ntil the most impor­tant restructuring of the American immigration system of the time, the Immigration Act of 1924, which imposed the quota system.1 During the 1920s and 1930s, Filipinos—­ immigrants from the American colonial periphery, like Puerto Ricans—­ became the target of nativist and anti-­immigrant forces in the American West, due to fear of the “third Asiatic invasion.” Supported by anti-­Filipino legislation in several Western states, the anti-­Filipino forces turned violent on many occasions and ­were effective in promoting repatriation laws in ­these areas.2 Like African Americans moving out of the South ­after World War I in 33

34  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

“the ­great migration,” Puerto Ricans migrating to the Northeast ­after the 1920s and, l­ ater, a­ fter World War II, benefitted from restrictions on Eu­ro­pean immigration. Both groups experienced racism and rejection as they moved to regions populated by Whites (­whether old stock or recent Eu­ro­pe­ans).3 But rejection of Puerto Ricans in New York City was fueled by another ele­ment similar to that experienced by Eu­ro­pean and Asian immigrants: the notion that they w ­ ere “alien” to the American nation and incapable of assimilation. A vicious campaign in New York City’s media against the arrival of Puerto Ricans in the city erupted in 1947. Puerto Ricans had experienced t­ hese attacks before, although never to this extent. They began to s­ ettle in New York City in greater numbers starting in the 1920s, and by the end of the 1930s, their settlement had created a well-­defined community. Racism and discrimination ­were part of their experience. Bernardo Vega, this community’s premier chronicler, recounts the prejudice and discrimination, particularly in jobs and housing. Signs professing “No dogs, No Spics” ­were commonly seen. A huge riot erupted in Harlem in 1926 ­after a Jewish mob attacked Puerto Rican shops and individuals. In the 1930s, discrimination against Puerto Ricans escalated a­ fter statements by Eleanor Roo­se­velt regarding the spread of tuberculosis on the island ­were taken out of context and aimed at islanders in the city. Discrimination by government and private social agencies was rampant. As Vega recounts, only Congressman Vito Marcantonio came to the defense and support of Puerto Ricans during this period.4 This chapter ­will elaborate on the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York in the years prior to 1947. It ­will then examine the development of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative through the lens of both the New York City and the Puerto Rican media, as well as the reaction of the Puerto Rican government and of mi­g rants to this campaign. Furthermore, the chapter explores how the notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” defined the Puerto Rican community in New York for several more de­cades and became a stigmatizing notion for Puerto Rican migration to the United States.

Migration and Prejudice: Perspectives on Puerto Ricans before 1947 Puerto Ricans w ­ ere the subject of attacks against in the NYC media before 1947. For example, an article by Charles Hewitt published in Scribner’s Commentator in 1940 titled “Welcome: Paupers and Crime: Porto Rico’s Shocking Gift to the United States” included a list of all the degradations that ­were to be assigned to Puerto Ricans a­ fter 1947: poverty, ignorance, crime, diseases, prostitution, drug trafficking, and addiction, among o­ thers. The article contended that t­ here w ­ ere already some 150,000 Puerto Ricans in the city, an incredibly exaggerated figure. It argued that half the city’s relief load belonged

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  35

to Puerto Ricans and that ­those working w ­ ere mostly w ­ omen in the sweatshops of the garment industry. Overcrowding and lack of sanitation characterized their living quarters: the “crowded and filthy conditions which they huddle together in Harlem and Brooklyn slums do not belong to this c­ entury.” In addition: “The dope habit is one of the few easements of life in undernourished, underprivileged Porto Rico. The Porto Ricans have brought it to Amer­ i­ca with them as naturally as their fine needlework.” They introduced the habit to Blacks in the city, the account argued, and Puerto Ricans dominated city statistics in delinquency and sex crimes. Hewitt argued that the “real origin of the Puerto Rican prob­lem is in Porto Rico itself.” So desperate was the situation on the island that “they could not be depended on to aid Amer­i­ca in case of war.” The author recommended that Puerto Ricans be subjected to the “minimum requirements exacted now from all aliens who enter ­under quota”: to satisfy minimum health requirement, that they ­will not become “a public charge,” and that they be subjected to deportation. “With our back door open wide to the ­whole poor­house and pest­house of the western hemi­sphere,” Hewitt reasoned, “it is unavailing to bar the gates of Amer­i­ca to Eu­rope’s clamoring refugees.”5 What is peculiar to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” ­after 1947 is that statements like ­these ­were made openly in the city’s major news media, not only in tabloids but also in respectable newspapers like the New York Times. Hewitt’s article also presented a notion that would be common to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” l­ater: by comparing Puerto Ricans to war refugees and displaced persons, it advanced the idea that they ­were aliens, not U.S. citizens, and thus that their entry could be restricted. ­Th ings seemed to look somewhat dif­fer­ent a year before 1947. In mid-­ August 1946, the city—­represented by the mayor, other top government functionaries, and major social and economic celebrities—­gave a huge welcome to the recently appointed governor of Puerto Rico, Jesús T. Piñero. In one of his speeches, Mayor William O’Dwyer extended cordial greetings to “our fellow citizens” from Puerto Rico. The mayor l­ater stated that although the city had received many foreign and national mi­grants in the past, no native or foreign citizen had been more loyal, patriotic, or hardworking than t­ hose coming from the beautiful tropical island.6 Media pronouncements would not be so cordial in the coming year. What happened in that period that changed the public image of Puerto Ricans in the city so drastically? One indication was given by Piñero himself when he stated that among the big pending prob­lems for the Puerto Rican government was “the situation of approximately 350,000 Puerto Ricans that live in New York.” He reiterated his intention to cooperate with the city government “in the solution of this prob­ lem,” promising that together both governments could “do something to improve the situation of our fellow citizens living in New York.”7 Antonio Fernós-­Isern, the island’s resident commissioner in Congress, believed that the

36  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

situation of the Puerto Rican colony in New York City required the Puerto Rican government’s immediate attention and cooperation with the city administration.8 Piñero himself may have added fuel to the fire, since his estimate of 350,000 was exorbitant. The number of Puerto Ricans in New York City was to be one of the major ele­ments of the debate surrounding the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the coming years. An editorial by El Mundo—­the island’s leading newspaper and representative of the insular elite—­applauded New York’s reception of Piñero but was quick to criticize the government’s lack of attention to the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York. It argued that the prob­lems created by islanders in New York “are not the prob­lems of that city nor are they essentially the prob­lems of the New York community.” Any solution to the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York City is one of the “enormous responsibilities that our government has with ­those compatriots that migrate.” Puerto Ricans in the United States are a repre­sen­ta­tion of Puerto Rico, and the government of the island is responsible for the success of that repre­sen­ta­tion on the mainland, the editorial argued. It concluded that “the island has never carried out a decisive effort to maintain the necessary relations with t­ hose that migrate; the island, on the contrary, has unfortunately abandoned them and the protective hand of the Government of Puerto Rico has very few times given aid to t­ hose compatriots.”9 (The New York media and government representatives would say the very same ­thing in the coming year.) El Mundo l­ater complained that a bill to create an information and orientation center for mi­grants in New York, “even though its funding was modest and its objectives edifying,” was killed in the last legislative assembly.10 An editorial days l­ ater criticized the legislature for its lack of action on this urgent ­matter. It reiterated that the responsibility for the welfare of Puerto Ricans in New York City belonged not exclusively to the city, that “the greatest responsibility is ours.”11 One issue that intensified in importance that year was the hiring of contract laborers in Puerto Rico. In May 1946, Samuel Friedman, a controversial figure who became a major l­abor contractor for U.S. farms in the coming years, requested permission from the island government to recruit about 1,000 Puerto Ricans to work on Pennsylvania and New Jersey farms. No knowledge of En­glish was required, and transportation costs w ­ ere to be paid by the workers.12 ­Later that year, Friedman solicited the Puerto Rican government to promote a large-­scale migration of workers to the agricultural regions of the U.S. mainland; he saw this program as providing up to 50,000 jobs for Puerto Ricans in the coming years. He claimed that farm ­labor was urgently needed in the United States, and that the government of Puerto Rico should take a more active role in the migration of workers. Worker transportation to the mainland was a prob­lem, as was the high rate of job desertion among Puerto Ricans.13

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  37

By the end of October, the Department of L ­ abor was flooded with requests from American employers petitioning for the hiring of workers from the island, from domestic to farm and industrial workers to auto mechanics. This upsurge in requests from the mainland was attributed to the success of previous migration programs during the year. In order to manage the increased load of requests, Department of L ­ abor functionaries suggested the creation of a subdivision in the department to deal with migration only.14 But other concerns began to emerge during this time. El Mundo editorialized on the need to be cautious with a large-­scale migration program, particularly ­because of the pos­si­ble consequences it could have on the island’s agriculture (mostly on the coffee and sugar industries). The newspaper stated that, although it felt pleased for the success enjoyed by Puerto Rican workers on the mainland, “from ­here to promote a large scale migration t­ here is a long road. The issue needs to be thought, and be thought carefully.”15 In late August, Congressman Vito Marcantonio requested that the U.S. Department of ­Labor investigate the working conditions endured by Puerto Ricans in farms in Glassboro, New Jersey. According to the Harlem representative, workers hired by Friedman w ­ ere complaining of abusive working conditions and living in camps similar to concentration camps in Nazi Germany. New Jersey Department of L ­ abor functionaries denied any mistreatment of Puerto Ricans, although they acknowledged that the camp had been used as a concentration camp during World War II. Piñero stated publicly that he had no knowledge of Marcantonio’s accusations.16 ­These events would foreshadow t­ hose that would dominate headlines in New York City during the coming year. By 1947, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”— as U.S. and Puerto Rican functionaries liked to call the island’s supposed overpopulation situation and all of its social and economic ramifications—­had reached New York. Puerto Ricans became a “prob­lem” t­ here too.

1947: The Year Puerto Ricans Became a Prob­lem in New York City ­ ere w Th ­ ere two major waves of Puerto Rican migration to New York City in the twentieth c­ entury: the first was between 1917 and the 1930s, and the second was right ­after the end of World War II. Although Puerto Ricans could enter the United States freely before they became citizens in 1917, t­ here was a greater movement of ­people to the U.S. mainland ­after the grant of citizenship. Most of the Puerto Ricans engaging in this migration, characterized as an “individual” migration promoted neither by the government nor based on contract ­labor, settled in New York City. According to the U.S. Census, ­there ­were only 1,513 Puerto Ricans living in the United States in 1910, and 554

38  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

(36.6 ­percent) of them in New York City. By 1920, some 7,364 Puerto Ricans lived in the city (already 62.3 ­percent of all islanders living in the United States). By 1930, t­ hose living in New York City (44,908) represented 85.1 ­percent of Puerto Ricans in the United States. In 1940, t­ here w ­ ere 61,463 Puerto Ricans living in New York City, already 87.8 ­percent of the U.S. total. In 1950, 246,306 Puerto Ricans lived in the city (83 ­percent of t­ hose residing in the United States); on ­those in NYC, 138,507 (56 ­percent) lived in Manhattan, 45,599 (25.14 ­percent) in the Bronx, and 40,299 (16.36 ­percent) in Brooklyn. In 1960, Puerto Ricans represented only 3.1 ­percent of the New York City population.17 Although the number of Puerto Ricans living in New York City was not as high as publicly announced, by 1950, the fast entrance of the group and their extreme concentration in specific areas of the city provided one of the bases for the emergence of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” Several ­factors explain the migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City immediately a­ fter the war: the growing fa­cil­ i­ty of air transportation and the decrease in airfares during this period (both facilitated by the Puerto Rican government);18 the existence of an established Puerto Rican community in the city, which eased the incorporation and settlement of the newly arrived mi­grants; and the availability of jobs in the expanding economy of New York City.19 The two waves of Puerto Rican migration before 1950 must be linked to a broader ele­ment of U.S. immigration policy: the drop in Eu­ro­pean immigrants produced by both a major war and immigration quotas. The increase in migration from Puerto Rico in the 1920s must be related to the increased need for cheap ­labor in U.S. metropolitan areas as the war and, l­ater, the immigration quotas imposed by Congress, greatly l­imited Eu­rope as a source for ­labor. African Americans and, to a lesser extent in the 1920s, Puerto Ricans would provide cheap ­labor to manufacturing industries and ser­vices in the Northeast, particularly in New York City. A ­ fter World War II, with immigration quotas still in place and the U.S. economy expanding rapidly, Puerto Rican ­labor would satisfy ­labor needs in textile manufacturing, ser­vices, and agriculture in the Northeast.20 As Oscar Handlin recognized in his analy­sis of African American and Puerto Rican migration to New York City, the experience of ­these two groups had many ele­ments in common: both w ­ ere “domestic” (i.e., U.S. citizens) sources of cheap l­abor leaving poverty backgrounds, and both faced racism, discrimination, and prob­lems in cultural adaptation in their new settlement areas.21 ­There w ­ ere two impor­tant issues in postwar New York City that need to be related to the emergence of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” The first one had to do with postwar immigration from refugees and displaced persons and the rising prob­lem of housing for ­those p­ eople. Over two and a half million ­people characterized as refugees and displaced persons from World War II and its aftermath came to the United States from Eu­rope, with a quarter of t­hose

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  39

settling in New York City. Even with an increase in White, middle-­class flight to the suburbs right ­after the war, the pressure on housing in the city increased with the entrance of new mi­grants. This situation was compounded by the policy of slum clearance implemented by the federal and city governments ­after the war, which l­ imited the number of housing units in the city.22 Real or imaginary, the overcrowding of existing neighborhoods and the creation of slums became an impor­tant issue in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. The second significant issue that surfaced in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was of a po­liti­cal nature: the relationship between Puerto Ricans and Congressman Marcantonio (to be discussed l­ ater in this chapter and in chapter 5). The barrage of news reports on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City during 1947 began with articles in the Miami Herald (many Puerto Ricans flew or sailed to Miami before g­ oing to New York) and the New York Times. Both newspapers reported that ­there w ­ ere 350,000 to 400,000 Puerto Ricans in the city and that they reached New York at a rate of 1,500 to 2,000 a month. The articles claimed that the Puerto Rican government had no objection to this migration since the island suffered chronic unemployment. Puerto Ricans in New York ­were not discouraged by the dismal conditions they faced in the city since ­those they left ­behind in Puerto Rico w ­ ere far worse.23 In early February, the New York newspaper PM started a series on the Puerto Rican situation in the city, which would continue for the rest of the year. PM became one of the main instigators of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” media campaign in New York City. It argued that from July to November 1946, some 50,000 Puerto Ricans reached the United States—­mostly New York—in what was “the first airborne migration of history” (still a notion of most academic studies on this topic). The article compared Puerto Ricans to the depression “Okies” that roamed the Southwest during the 1930s.24 The newspaper also reported that the Puerto Rican government was planning to delineate a “rational plan for migration” and cited Muñoz Marín and Piñero as promising immediate legislative action. The article indicated that the government would try to “control the exodus” of mi­g rants to New York by creating a National Office of Colonization and Recolonization. This office would inform mi­grants in Puerto Rico about the conditions they would face on the mainland and advise t­ hose in New York about jobs and housing in the city; it would also coordinate efforts with private and government agencies in New York.25 The newspaper also pointed out that in late January, the New York Welfare Council had created a working group to study the miserable conditions facing Puerto Ricans in the city. City agencies reiterated that the prob­lem lay in Puerto Rico and urged immediate efforts to solve the island’s social and economic prob­lems.26 It reported l­ ater that month that Puerto Ricans had become a “big headache” for the city’s Department of Welfare, that they ­were coming to the city at a rate of 6,000 a month, and that already more than 300,000 Puerto Ricans lived in

40  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

the city—­a population larger than the states of Delaware, Nevada, Vermont, or Wyoming—­and that their numbers would reach one million by the next de­cade. The prob­lem for the city was how to assimilate ­these ­people, mostly unskilled laborers moving to overcrowded areas, with no tradition in education and health. Furthermore, Puerto Ricans brought with them a dif­fer­ent language and culture, becoming an island within New York. Although Mayor O’Dwyer promised to remedy their situation, no action had yet been taken.27 Once again, El Mundo editorialized on the several articles describing the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York. It decried that Puerto Rico “was destined to be the victim of unfavorable propaganda.” It made a call to “acknowledge the under­lying truth in t­hose reports” and claimed that, although the conditions facing mi­grants ­were no worse than t­ hose they faced on the island, they w ­ ere magnified by their isolation and lack of protection in the metropolis. “What is sought is not to control this migration but to channel it, to orient it, so that mi­grants suffer less and adapt more rapidly to their new environment.” The government should try to mitigate the miserable conditions mi­grants face in New York “by providing t­ hose social ser­vices that are necessary in cooperation with the public welfare authorities in that city.” The editorial called for the creation of an organ­ization to help the mi­g rants and to elaborate a policy that would: 1) study the conditions encountered by mi­grants in the United States and the conditions faced by t­ hose on the island interested in migrating to the mainland; 2) highlight the need to orient pos­si­ble mi­grants regarding the situation they would confront on the mainland; 3) emphasize the need to facilitate En­glish instruction on the island and to aid mi­grants on issues like jobs and housing in New York; and 4) coordinate efforts with welfare agencies in the city to ameliorate the living conditions of Puerto Ricans ­there.28 ­These guidelines articulated by El Mundo would l­ater become, in a nutshell, the policy that the Puerto Rican government implemented by the end of that year. By the end of the month, the New York Times entered the fray on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” when it estimated the Puerto Rican population in New York at 350,000 and quoted officials from the Bureau of Naturalization and Immigration specifying that some 80,000 Puerto Ricans had arrived in New York in 1946. One housing official cited in the article reported a case of twenty-­three Puerto Ricans living in a four-­room apartment in Harlem. The article stated that ­because “many of the Puerto Ricans knew nothing but poverty in their country, they w ­ ere not morally upset by the living conditions in their new homes.” The report specified, though, that the city’s Department of Welfare did not consider Puerto Ricans a “relief prob­lem” for the city, since only 8 ­percent ­were on relief rolls; it characterized Puerto Ricans as hard workers and industrious. But Antoinette Cannon, secretary of the department’s recently created Committee on Puerto Ricans, described their plight as “fleeing from

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  41

one evil into the jaws of another evil.” The article closed by summarizing the Tariff Commission’s 1946 report on Puerto Rico’s need to have an emigration of one million ­people in order to have a chance of economic development. It also reported that the Puerto Rican government was planning to “curb migration” to New York.29 In late March 1947, Newsweek joined t­ hose reporting on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City, bringing national attention to the issue. It reiterated the notion that Puerto Ricans’ was the first “airborne migration,” a characterization that became very popu­lar in the news media. The article quoted the number of mi­grants reaching the city at 8,000 a month and reported that one in twenty-­t wo New Yorkers was now a Puerto Rican. Like other news reports before—­and many more l­ater—it focused on the social, economic, housing, and health conditions experienced by island mi­g rants. It described accounts of some families living thirteen to fifteen ­people per apartment (another favorite issue reported in t­ hese stories). Newsweek’s description of conditions in Harlem was no dif­fer­ent from t­ hose in e­ arlier stories. It mentioned that Puerto Ricans voted for Marcantonio. The article again quoted unnamed government officials from Puerto Rico stating that they ­were devising a program to deflect mi­grants from g­ oing to New York and that the government was dealing with the emigration situation by seeking to develop the island eco­nom­ ically through industrialization.30 Outraged by the negative propaganda that the island and its ­people w ­ ere enduring in the United States, El Mundo sent its own reporter to investigate the situation faced by mi­grants on the mainland. The newspaper wanted Puerto Ricans to form their own opinions regarding “the issue of migration and recolonization.” The series began with a summary of the reports by American newspapers on the conditions faced by Puerto Rican mi­g rants in New York City. The first article reported that the creation of the Committee on Puerto Ricans by the New York Welfare Council “­under pressure from newspaper publicity is just one example of the lack of understanding between Puerto Ricans and the rest of the community.” It recounted a debate within public circles on ­whether the care of islanders in New York was the responsibility of the city government or that of Puerto Rico.31 The series examined Puerto Rican life in Harlem. It argued that Puerto Ricans must be compared to mi­grants from other states and should not be considered foreigners. The focus of the New York media on the conditions in Harlem had just one goal: to unfairly single out Puerto Ricans. They paid no attention to other areas of the city in worse conditions than Harlem.32 El Mundo’s description of life in Puerto Rican Harlem was quite dif­fer­ent from that reported in previous months by the city’s media. It described a hardworking ­people trying to create a f­ uture in a distant and distinct environment. Harlem re-­created island life. Overcrowding was the result of insufficient housing due

42  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

to the halting of construction during the war and the increase in migration to the city from several regions, not only Puerto Rico.33 Resentment against Puerto Ricans was fueled by groups interested in the resettlement of Eu­ro­pean mi­grants, which had been halted by immigration laws. Furthermore, the massive entrance of Puerto Ricans to the city and their pressure on housing and jobs prevented the possibility that Eu­ro­pean refugees could be admitted to the United States. The massive migration of Puerto Ricans was fueled by irresponsible airline companies and job contractors interested in moving thousands for their own economic interests. Contrary to the sensationalist media coverage, the report added that most Puerto Ricans coming to New York did not support Marcantonio nor got involved in city politics.34 The El Mundo series focused on the Puerto Rican community that settled in Harlem before the end of the war, which the New York media ignored. According to the newspaper’s reports, it was a well-­established community, with well-­defined m ­ iddle and working classes. The community contained numerous shop­keep­ers and professionals catering to the needs of the group. The situation was nevertheless changing due to the arrival of thousands of mi­grants, who ­were putting pressure on a chaotic housing shortage. Many of them came with no skills, no jobs, and no knowledge of En­glish; jobs in the city w ­ ere scarce for ­people like this.35 For ­those with skills and En­g lish proficiency, jobs ­were available in ser­vices; the h ­ otel and restaurant sectors depended on Puerto Rican ­labor, where more than 10,000 ­were employed and most belonged to ­unions. The report indicated that Puerto Ricans adjusted better to the American way of life than most foreigners, presumably b­ ecause of the influence of American ideas and customs on the island. This contradicted the notion spread in the city media that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere alien and unassimilable to the American culture and society. ­There ­were countless examples of social and economic success among Puerto Ricans in New York. Furthermore, Puerto Ricans showed a sense of group solidarity and ­family u­ nion that was incomprehensible for many Americans, thus setting some prejudices regarding their be­hav­ior.36 While the ­battle between the New York and Puerto Rican media continued, the government of Puerto Rico began to show some interest and presented some initiatives on the issue of migration to the U.S. mainland. During the very first days of January, Senate president Muñoz Marín recruited Senator Vicente Géigel Polanco to study and report on the working conditions of mi­grants in Chicago, particularly ­those ­under contract with ­Castle, Barton and Associates. ­There had already been numerous complaints of abuse and contract violations against the com­pany. Géigel Polanco, president of the Senate’s ­Labor Committee, insisted on the need to reform the law regulating ­labor migration to correct its misapplication and abuses by employers. Commissioner of ­Labor Manuel A. Pérez agreed with the senator and suggested the creation of an office within his department to deal exclusively with migration. Although the

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  43

government was not promoting any migration plan, he insisted on the need to help ­those interested in migrating to the United States in search for jobs, ­whether on their own or by contract.37 Meanwhile, during a stopover on a trip to Washington, DC, to discuss the island’s po­liti­cal status with members of Congress, Muñoz Marín commented on “a long-­range plan aimed to improve the conditions of the Puerto Rican colony in New York.”38 In mid-­February, Resident Commissioner Fernós-­Isern announced the government’s intention to open a “recolonization” office to supervise Puerto Rican migration to the United States. One office would be opened in San Juan to advise prospective mi­grants on the job and living conditions in the United States, while a second in New York would help with the adaptation of mi­grants to the city. The New York office would maintain contact with city agencies and would keep information on the job market in the United States. Fernós-­Isern emphasized the need for mi­grants to relocate in places besides New York City. The news report indicated that “Dr. Fernós elaborated his plan ­after consulting with welfare agencies in New York, which he did last autumn.”39 Meanwhile, El Mundo acknowledged the need to channel Puerto Rican migration away from New York City but cautioned against any attempt to limit the ­free movement of Puerto Ricans throughout the United States. A migration policy should not be implemented to solve prob­lems of the city of New York, but to help Puerto Ricans in their search for jobs and a better ­future.40 During the first few months of 1947, several institutions in New York began to focus on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” In late February, the Puerto Rican Committee created by the New York Welfare Council assigned a subcommittee of six members to deal with the most pressing prob­lems facing the community. The committee emphasized the need for Puerto Ricans to take En­glish classes and increase their l­ abor skills and concluded that Puerto Ricans did not pre­sent a “relief prob­lem.” According to the statistics provided by the Welfare Department, only 700 islanders ­were on city relief rolls. The committee also found that the figures presented by the media regarding the number of Puerto Ricans in the city had been greatly exaggerated.41 In late March, the assistant superintendent in charge of the Harlem district complained about the prob­ lem created by the massive entrance of Puerto Rican students into the school system, which was not considered to be ready to assist so many ­children in need of special education. He argued that Puerto Rican students showed all the prob­ lems facing foreign mi­grants whose language and customs are dif­fer­ent from ­those in the United States.42 In late May, the city’s Department of Welfare impressed upon the Puerto Rican government the need to channel the mi­grant flow away from New York. The city was feeling the burden of the increase in welfare and unemployment that came with the end of the war. The department argued that the notable increase in caseloads was due to the massive entrance of Puerto Ricans into the city.43

44  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

In early May, one actor that would be very impor­tant in the New York media campaign on Puerto Ricans entered the field: the New York World Tele­g ram. It published several series on the Puerto Rican situation throughout the year, creating tension between the island community and the city. The first series, circulated in May, was quite sympathetic to Puerto Ricans. It elaborated on the standard account of why Puerto Ricans emigrated from the island and the conditions they faced in New York. It recounted the mayor’s effort to deal with the situation, particularly his creation of the Committee on Puerto Ricans, whose members included the major departments affected by the island migration. The article reported that all department heads had confirmed that Puerto Ricans “­were not a prob­lem” for the city. Contrary to previous accounts, the report argued that ­there w ­ ere no “po­liti­cal motivations” in their migration, that is, that ­there was no evidence that the Puerto Ricans’ influx into the city was encouraged by Marcantonio for his own po­liti­cal objectives, as argued by many of his opponents. It recognized that the Puerto Rican government had been dealing with the issue of migration, trying to channel it away from the city. The series reviewed one recurring topic of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”: the lack of housing for such a massive influx of ­people. Although Puerto Ricans did not cause the housing shortage in the city, the sheer volume of their migration made an already critical situation even worse. The report also recounted the situation caused by ­these mi­g rants in the city’s education system, where their lack of En­glish knowledge and massive numbers ­were straining the city’s ­limited resources.44

The Long, Hot Summer of 1947 By the end of the summer of 1947, the New York media campaign on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” had severely escalated. The strident character of the news reports and the harsh stance taken by the city government prompted the Puerto Rican government to react with concrete mea­sures. Ironically, the new drive was started by the liberal New York Times in a series of articles during early August. Like previous reports, the series began with an estimate of mi­grants coming to the city—­said to be more than 2,000 a month—­and the supposed total number of them living then in New York, cited at 600,000. ­A fter detailing how easy it was to fly from San Juan to New York—at rates as low as $40 in cheap airlines called “bucket seaters” whose flights took some fourteen hours—­the articles proceeded to describe the prob­lems caused by this massive influx into the city: “The situation is causing the New York City authorities increasing concern b­ ecause of the housing, health and other prob­lems involved.” Most of the mi­grants, “many of them destitute and ill,” move to Harlem, where the existing overcrowding complicated other areas like health and crime. Police officials reported that “­there is a serious moral breakdown” in

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  45

Harlem. The article declared: “The authorities from the Mayor down are troubled b­ ecause of the relief, unemployment and other ­factors involved . . . ​Not a few arrivals become hospital cases. Within a day or two ­after arrival, many mi­grants seek assistance from the City Welfare Department.” The newspaper account then depicted how relief rolls in Harlem had grown dramatically since the arrival of Puerto Ricans to the city. Th ­ ere ­were charges that “many of the mi­grants continue on relief while they return to Puerto Rico.” Furthermore, Puerto Ricans had no difficulty in registering to vote, which meant that Congressman Marcantonio “has been able to benefit by the extra registration.” The report cited Puerto Rican government representatives attempting to manage the situation of their mi­grants. The government displayed statistics from a survey on mi­grants done in 1946 that disclosed that most ­were moving for jobs, and that the majority ­were of working age and had some education and ­labor skills. Island officials announced their plans to open a ­labor office in New York to deal with t­hose seeking jobs. Resident Commissioner Fernós-­ Isern indicated that the Puerto Rican situation in New York was too complex for ­either the city or island governments to deal with and requested federal intervention.45 Other articles in the New York Times series reported a rise in the rate and types of crimes in Puerto Rican Harlem. Not only w ­ ere property crimes increasing, but so ­were prostitution and drugs. Puerto Ricans also represented a health prob­lem for the city; their rate of tuberculosis was far higher than that of the city, and anemia, malnutrition, and venereal diseases w ­ ere also cited as very common within the community. The newspaper quoted island government representatives contending that they ­were trying to manage the prob­lem in Puerto Rico by developing a general plan for social and economic development that would reduce the need to migrate.46 The Times published two consecutive editorials on the Puerto Rican situation. The first, published August 3, was titled “The Tragedy of Puerto Rico.” It called Puerto Rican migration to New York City “one of the saddest of the world’s prob­lems.” Island mi­grants “are fugitives from an appallingly” social and economic situation in Puerto Rico. The attempt to solve this situation with a program of industrialization and planned migration “is an easy remedy to suggest. It is not an easy one to carry out.” Puerto Ricans must be helped to subsist in Puerto Rico, and if that proved impossible, then “some of them must be helped, in an or­ga­nized way, to find homes elsewhere. We have a responsibility, voluntarily assumed and close at hand, which we cannot evade.”47 A few days ­later, the newspaper published another editorial, this time on the po­liti­ cal situation of the island. It welcomed the po­liti­cal reforms implemented in Puerto Rico by the United States and proposed a plebiscite where Puerto Ricans would freely decide their po­liti­cal status. But it cautioned that “the economic condition of the Puerto Ricans poses a prob­lem for the United States that

46  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

should be solved.” Puerto Ricans should participate in designing a long-­range economic plan, but it was the responsibility of the United States to improve the island’s economic condition and prevent the situation from becoming more chaotic.48 ­These editorials foreshadowed what the American po­liti­cal elite would come to believe ­later: that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City and elsewhere would not be solved if the “prob­lem” in Puerto Rico was not addressed beforehand. Although t­ here was no official response to the New York Times series from Puerto Rican officials, the newspaper published a letter from Resident Commissioner Fernós-­Isern in response to the first editorial. He agreed that the economic and po­liti­cal situation of Puerto Rico was a “national responsibility.” His text detailed the island’s social and economic situation and the ways in which U.S. policies had prevented economic growth. He contended that if ­there was to be economic development, “legislation adjusting the economic relationships of Puerto Rico would be necessary.” The situation was so critical, Fernós-­ Isern wrote, that “emergency mea­sures” ­were required. “Demographically speaking, [Puerto Rico] needs a good emergency ‘bloodletting,’ scientifically carried out. If it is not done so, ‘a spontaneous hemorrhage’ ­will take place, as it is taking place in form of the migratory movement.” The resident commissioner argued that neither New York City nor Puerto Rico should be called upon to take responsibility for the situation: “It should be the nation’s concern.” Puerto Rican emigration could not be forced, “it only may be stimulated and regulated.” He indicated that the island’s migration, voluntary and spontaneous, reduced the population pressure and brought an infusion of money from remittances. Fernós-­Isern concluded that by aiding Puerto Rico, the federal government would be helping to solve the situation in New York too.49 It is apparent that Fernós-­Isern, and possibly other island leaders, realized that the issue of economic and po­liti­cal reforms for Puerto Rico should be linked to that of Puerto Rican migration to the mainland. And that is precisely what happened in the coming years. The economic and po­liti­cal reforms implemented in Puerto Rico from 1947 to 1952 had as their background the specter of Puerto Rican migration. That is how the American elite understood it, and Puerto Rican decision makers too. The only public figure to react to the New York Times articles was Congressman Marcantonio. The American L ­ abor Party (ALP) approved a resolution condemning the “smear campaign” against Puerto Ricans by the Hearst Press and now by the Times, adding that the ALP “fails to understand why The New York Times is involved in the same smear.”50 During a meeting with Puerto Rican organ­izations concerned with the nefarious campaign, Marcantonio argued that Puerto Ricans ­were attacked to force them into a condition of “second class citizens” that would make them “ready victims of a cheap l­abor

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  47

market.” Marcantonio and several Puerto Rican groups or­ga­nized a campaign to counteract the smear attacks on the island community.51 The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” got further national exposure with an article published by Time in mid-­August, provocatively titled “Sugar-­Bowl Mi­grants.” It stated that Puerto Ricans “­were the 1947 version of the Okies who had fled from the Southwest’s Dust Bowl. Instead of riding the highways, the Puerto Ricans rode the skies.” Their migration to the United States “was at flood tide.” The article claimed that the “Okies ­were mainly California’s prob­lem. The prob­ lem of Puerto Ricans is chiefly New York’s.” A ­ fter detailing the standard list of prob­lems caused by Puerto Ricans in New York City, the piece concluded that “Puerto Rico’s home government, which knows that migration is the best and easiest solution to the island’s unemployment, hopes that somebody ­will work out a plan to channel the mi­grants to U.S. farm and industrial areas.”52 Worried by the negative propaganda in the New York and U.S. media, the Puerto Rican government reacted by downplaying the situation and announcing several mea­sures to deal with the mi­grant influx.53 During a trip to Washington, DC, to discuss “migration and other ­matters,” Governor Piñero announced plans to commission a Columbia University study of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. He called newspaper accounts on the situation “a l­ ittle exaggerated” and questioned their motives. The governor argued that the aim of the study was to reach “an intelligent solution” to the situation encountered by Puerto Ricans in the city. The conditions they faced, he asserted, ­were like ­those faced by any other group coming to the mainland. This study would also recommend mea­sures to facilitate the adjustment and incorporation of Puerto Ricans into American society. Piñero stated that his government was already taking steps to guide mi­grants to other parts of the country, mentioning Chicago and Utah. The governor reiterated Fernós-­Isern’s statements that the migration question required solving the island’s economic and social prob­lems, prob­ably a readjustment of the entire economy, which would entail federal aid.54 Several days ­later, Piñero and Paul Lazarsfeld, director of Columbia University’s Department of Applied Sociology, announced an agreement to conduct a survey of Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York. The governor reiterated that the news stories on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” ­were exaggerated, “nothing in a nutshell,” and predicted that the prob­lem would go away when many Puerto Ricans returned to the island to escape winter on the mainland.55 While in New York, Commissioner of ­Labor Fernando Sierra Berdecía kept denying that the Puerto Rican government instigated or stimulated migration to the mainland. He reiterated plans to open a l­ abor office in New York to channel mi­grants to other areas and bypass the city.56 The commissioner ­later announced that from April to late August of that year, about 1,000 workers had migrated to farms in New Jersey and Pennsylvania ­under contracts

48  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

approved by his Department of L ­ abor.57 ­A fter a visit to Puerto Rican settlements in Hawaii and Utah in mid-­August, Governor Piñero disclosed the government’s intention of promoting a “planned migration” to spread out the island’s mi­grants ­going to the mainland. He cited the success of ­those settlements as a counterpoint to the notion that Puerto Ricans w ­ ere a “prob­lem.” He found ­those in Hawaii “to be a prosperous and happy ­people. The same is true for t­ hose in Utah.” ­These examples showed, he argued, that when given an opportunity, Puerto Ricans “­will take it and they w ­ ill become good American citizens.”58 The World Tele­g ram again launched a malicious series on the Puerto Rican situation ­toward the end of October. The series, based on a reporter’s observation in Puerto Rico and New York City, recounted once again the migration of thousands of unskilled workers to the city and the dismal housing conditions and health prob­lems they confronted in Harlem. The leading article characterized it as a “tragic migration . . . ​the most pathetic ­human prob­lem of its kind to plague this country since the Okies fled from the dust bowl.” Although the article absolved Marcantonio from the common accusation that he was bringing Puerto Ricans to the city to vote for him, it did say that he had “been the richest beneficiary of the migration.” It argued that Marcantonio “has grown abnormally strong, po­liti­cally, on the wretchedness growing out of a ­g reat mass movement of eco­nom­ically displaced persons—­leaderless, ill-­ equipped and disillusioned.”59 The newspaper blamed Puerto Ricans for a serious rise in contagious diseases in the city, particularly tuberculosis. In an alarmist stance, it warned of the potential prob­lems that tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans working in restaurants and ­hotels could cause through spreading diseases. The island’s overpopulation was imputed for the migration, but Puerto Rican officials ­were blamed for not ­doing enough to control it. Muñoz Marín was cited on the need for half a million ­people to migrate in order to relieve overpopulation and allow for economic and social reforms.60 Another article blamed Puerto Ricans for the rise of crime in the city and accused them of having “low moral standards,” including ­women with too many ­children, “many of them outside the bonds of matrimony.” Although church attendance in Puerto Rico was high, the article claimed that, once in New York, Puerto Ricans “have ceased attending church and have evinced signs of free-­thinking or Communist ideology.” It quoted unnamed city officials requesting the implementation of “government barriers to the entry of t­ hese unwanted immigrants.”61 Perhaps the article with the most impact was the one blaming Puerto Ricans for the drastic rise in the city’s relief rolls. One relief official stated that Puerto Ricans go directly from the airport to the relief centers to request welfare aid. A Welfare Department official referred to the pressure that Congressman Marcantonio’s office placed on them to assist Puerto Ricans, while also noting

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  49

how he was the only one helping the group. The official, nevertheless, rejected the idea that Marcantonio was promoting their migration for his po­liti­cal gain: “This migration is larger than any one man. It is a ­great movement of ­people on the march t­ oward dreams that have no foundation. He is the one they turn to and it gives him strength at the polls.”62 During the publication of this series on Puerto Ricans, the World Tele­gram published an editorial on the communist influence in the city’s Welfare Department titled “Welfare, Reds, Puerto Ricans.” It requested immediate action to stop communist infiltration in the Welfare Department, an issue that “also reminds us of both the grave welfare ­angle and the sinister Communist ­angle in the prob­lem of . . . ​Puerto Ricans coming to East Harlem.” ­These immigrants, “so poor, jobless, ignorant and even diseased as to make their impact upon welfare and health” w ­ ere also citizens that can vote. This was the real danger—­ that “­these Puerto Ricans ­will become extra easy prey for Communist scouts and organizers ­unless sound counteracting American influences are speedily brought to bear on them.”63 The idea that Puerto Ricans ­were not only a welfare burden but also likely communist recruits became part and parcel of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. This issue would arise again in Marcantonio’s mayoral campaign of 1949. But the relationship between Puerto Ricans and Marcantonio also presented Puerto Ricans as “alien” in one more way: as supporters of the most reviled politician in the city, as supporters of a communist. Coming into the United States at the beginning of the Cold War era, Puerto Ricans thus became “alien” to American ideals and values in an increasingly anti-­communist Amer­i­ca. The only public reaction to this series came from Congressman Marcantonio and a group of Puerto Rican organ­izations.64 Thirty-­six of them banded together around the Joint Committee for the Defense of the Puerto Rican ­People and, along with Marcantonio and the National Maritime Union, picketed the offices of the World Tele­g ram. Their leaflets condemned the “viciously unfair and slanderous statements of the World Tele­gram against American citizens born in Puerto Rico.” In its declaration, the Joint Committee asked what “un-­American forces” ­were b­ ehind the newspaper’s campaign “to sow prejudice, hate and discrimination among American citizens.”65 El Mundo reported that over 2,000 ­people marched and formed picket lines and that since the World Tele­g ram’s series had begun, the number of Puerto Rican organ­izations interested in fighting the smear campaign had increased dramatically, with new organ­izations forming daily in Puerto Rican settlements in Brooklyn, Washington Heights, and Harlem.66 In New York City, an assembly of twenty-­one organ­izations created the Convención Pro Puerto Rico (the Pro–­Puerto Rico Convention) to defend Puerto Ricans through education in the United States and Eu­ro­pean media regarding the values that defined their culture and society.67 In the Bronx, an

50  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

assembly of over 2,000 created the Sociedad Pro Unificación Puertorriqueña (the Society for Puerto Rican Unification). Its goal was to unify all Puerto Rican sectors aiming to counteract ­those forces that could prejudice the pro­ gress of Puerto Ricans in New York.68 In San Juan, the Congreso Pro Defensa de los Puertorriqueños (Congress to Defend Puerto Ricans) was created to discuss the situation faced by Puerto Ricans in the United States a­ fter the vicious attacks they suffered from the U.S. media. The congress met in Puerto Rico in December.69 A group of Puerto Rican l­ awyers was or­ga­nized to defend mi­grants in all m ­ atters concerning their welfare and the best interests of the community.70 The response by the Puerto Rican government was hesitant, precisely what the news media in New York had repeatedly admonished. Sierra Berdecía suggested that Puerto Ricans may carry letters of recommendation and “cards from the police” to facilitate their identification in New York. He acknowledged the lack of planning caused by the spontaneous movement of p­ eople from the island and the need for guidance about jobs and living conditions on the mainland. The ­labor commissioner conceded the need for federal help in directing this exodus and proposed new areas for migration in states that required ­labor like New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California. Sierra Berdecía also requested help from the New York ­Labor Department to translate and disseminate the state’s l­ abor laws among Puerto Ricans.71 Fernós-­Isern and Sierra Berdecía met with Mayor O’Dwyer on October 29 to discuss plans to deal with the issues created by the Puerto Rican presence in the city. ­These plans, to originate in Puerto Rico, ­were to be made in collaboration with the city government and would in no way interfere with the right of Puerto Ricans to migrate to the mainland. Fernós-­Isern indicated that “Puerto Rico can contribute to the readjustment and adaptation of ­these fellow citizens coming to the mainland.” The resident commissioner again suggested the creation of an office in Puerto Rico to guide and counsel Puerto Ricans migrating to the U.S. mainland regarding living conditions and the availability of jobs. Another office would open in New York to help mi­grants in their adaptation to the city environment and to collaborate with city agencies.72 Back in Puerto Rico, Fernós-­Isern reported that he had been working in the creation of an office “to control the emigration of ­people whose [academic] preparation or economic conditions can become an obstacle” in their adaptation to the new environment they would encounter on the U.S. mainland. Asked about the news media campaign on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” he responded that he just knew what the newspapers printed.73 In retrospect, the way the Puerto Rican government responded to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City seems startling. It took island policy makers more than a year to respond consistently to the issue; they usually appeared surprised by the news reports in the American and Puerto Rican

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  51

media and many times did not know how to react to events. The idea for a migration office in San Juan and New York had already been mentioned by the end of 1946, for example.74 But it took the summer offensive in the New York media for the Puerto Rican government to seriously consider passing legislation to this effect. Another striking ­matter is the relative distance of Muñoz Marín from this issue during this period. Aside from some short declarations, he did not intervene in this controversy, neither in Puerto Rico nor in New York, where Piñero and Fernós-­Isern took a more prominent position in the public debate.75 This is not an insignificant ­matter, since Muñoz Marín carried a lot of weight in Puerto Rican politics and in Puerto Rico’s presence in the United States. Even El Mundo took a more concrete and somewhat positive stance on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” making the issue public in Puerto Rico and presenting many proposals that would be implemented l­ ater ­under Puerto Rico’s migration policy. The Puerto Rican government repeatedly asked for federal intervention on the issue of migration, but it never came the way they wanted originally. Federal intervention came in the form of reforms to the island’s po­liti­cal status, something that Puerto Rican and New York City policymakers w ­ ere clamoring for. Meanwhile, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” kept its presence in the American media. A review by El Mundo of the debate on Puerto Rico in the U.S. media concluded that although the island’s economic prob­lems and po­liti­cal status ­were still prominent in newspaper reports, the issue of Puerto Rican migration to the mainland was attracting even more attention.76 The Christian Science Monitor expressed doubts about Puerto Ricans’ ability to assimilate in American society and issued a warning about the po­liti­cal consequences of their migration, particularly the support given by mi­grants to Marcantonio and the left.77 El Mundo’s po­liti­cal correspondent in Washington, DC, William Dorvillier, warned about the repercussions of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the American capital. He argued that even if the in­de­pen­dentistas had spent a million dollars on publicity for their cause, “they would have not created a more favorable environment for the promotion of in­de­pen­dence” than with the current media exposure on Puerto Ricans in the mainland. Dorvillier contended that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” and events like the protests against the World Tele­gram by Puerto Ricans w ­ ere creating an atmosphere of anti–­Puerto Rican resentment that could very well increase support for in­de­pen­dence among American decision makers. The relationship between Puerto Ricans and Marcantonio was an issue that promoted this resentment. Dorvillier indicated that Puerto Ricans should not support Marcantonio—­whom he acknowledged was the only politician paying attention to their demands and needs—­not only b­ ecause of his lack of popularity with the American public at large but also ­because he had no power in Congress to promote their best interests. If Puerto Ricans ­were ­going to stay in New York, they had to become a po­liti­cal force, and for this to

52  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

happen they would need support in organ­izing and in furthering their incorporation into the po­liti­cal system.78

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” ­after 1947 The malicious and prejudiced commentaries against Puerto Ricans continued in New York ­a fter 1947. Perhaps no newspaper reflects the prejudice against Puerto Ricans like the Daily Mirror, which maintained its campaign against Puerto Ricans for many years. Jack Lait, gossip columnist for the newspaper, was one of the most ferocious bigots in the city. The following is an example of his prejudiced venom: “the plane loads of Puerto Ricans packed in to come ­here and go right on relief; the unspeakable conditions in which they live; their unwillingness to work and their unfitness for any but menial employment; their prostitution, rape, incest and domestic immoralities; their congenial maladjustments for assimilation into the normal pro­cesses of the American melting-­pot.”79 Lait was a major source of the malicious rumor that Marcantonio was paying thousands of Puerto Ricans to come to New York to vote for him in exchange for welfare relief. For him, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere not only despicable but also a po­liti­cal menace: “At the Communist National Convention h ­ ere Monday night, among the loudest shouters and most active chest-­thumpers ­were local Puerto Ricans. ­There is a Red taint over the entire colony.”80 (Muñoz Marín would refer to the “Red taint” over the Puerto Rican community in his famous open letter against Marcantonio during the last week of the 1949 mayor electoral campaign.) The relationship between Puerto Ricans and Vito Marcantonio never ceased to arouse the sentiments of conservatives and racists. In 1955, another Daily Mirror columnist used the death of Marcantonio to stir resentment against Puerto Ricans once again. He argued that New York City “has been plagued recently by the biggest social prob­lem in its long history,” meaning, of course, the presence of Puerto Ricans “clogging the city’s streets. And their presence is causing a kind of tension that New York never knew before.” The man responsible for this situation was Marcantonio, whose death a year ­earlier “was kind of final justice for a man whose callous misuse of power had brought terror to the city.” A ­ fter accusing Marcantonio of po­liti­cal opportunism, racketeering, and illegal activities, the columnist argued that the congressman kept his power by bringing Puerto Ricans to New York to vote for him: “With promises that they could immediately get on New York City welfare rolls, his agents herded thousands of underfed Puerto Ricans into c­ attle planes, flew them to the city, registered them at the polls, and told them how to vote.” ­A fter they ­were used by this “ruthless politician,” Puerto Ricans w ­ ere abandoned to their new misery and became a “prob­lem” to the city: “Their kids roamed the streets at night

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  53

in gangs. Their w ­ omen walked the streets. And their men quickly learned the fine art of mugging, dope hustling and armed robbery. They ­were forgotten by the politicians who used them, and hated by the p­ eople who share the city with them.”81 In short, the conservative columnist could forgive Marcantonio for being a communist, but not for bringing Puerto Ricans to the city. In his anti-­communist tirade against Puerto Ricans prior to the 1949 NYC mayoral election, when the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign reemerged again, Clarence Woodbury claimed that, while walking in Harlem, “I always have a feeling I am not in New York at all but in some unkempt foreign city.”82 Also around the same time, Barbara Bates argued: “United States citizens yet psychologically foreigners, handicapped by the lack of En­g lish, of training, of funds, and too often, by discrimination, they do not always fare well.”83 Years ­later, on March 17, 1952, on the eve of the approval of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status by Congress, the Tulsa Tribune published an editorial titled “­Couldn’t We Get a Divorce?,” where it supported in­de­pen­dence instead. The main reason? Puerto Rican migration to the United States. Puerto Rico, the Tulsa Tribune contended, “has proven to be a gigantic incubator of p­ eople who often do not understand American traditions or ideals but who are glad to qualify for American residence or American charity.”84 Not ­every account of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City followed t­ hese racist overtones, although stigmatization of the group continued. For example, an article by the New York Times in October 1949 characterized Puerto Ricans as a “complex prob­lem.” Two years ­after the 1947 crusade, the newspaper still contended that the numbers of t­ hese “displaced persons of the Western hemi­sphere” in New York was still unknown (citing figures between 160,000 to 600,000). It argued that “­these refugees from an overpopulated tropical island . . . ​have more trou­ble adjusting to this city’s life than do survivors of Eu­rope’s concentration camps.” A ­ fter citing the proverbial prob­lems facing the group in the city and mentioning in passing the Migration Office, almost half the article was devoted to the relationship between Puerto Ricans with Marcantonio. It quoted city officials claiming impotence in dealing with the “prob­lem” Puerto Ricans still presented to the city.85 ­There w ­ ere more sympathetic and liberal views, of course, but all referred to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” in itself a way of maintaining the stigmatization of the group. In February 1948, Commonweal called for a channeling of Puerto Rican migration away from New York City, describing the conditions they faced ­there as “appalling and steadily deteriorating.” But what “makes the prob­lem so delicate” was the fact that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, so openly discriminatory policies could not be implemented. The journal suggested a U.S.-­r un “resettlement agency” to redirect mi­g rants to areas of l­ abor needs, advise and counsel them in Puerto Rico, train them in needed skills, and

54  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

“prepare certain areas” staffed by a select group of Puerto Ricans to receive new arrivals (this is precisely what Puerto Rico’s Migration Office began ­doing at this time).86 Another liberal view on “the rising Puerto Rican prob­lem” was presented by the Bar Bulletin of March 1952. The article analyzed the consequences that the approval of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status would have on migration to New York City. It argued, citing the conclusions of The Puerto Rican Journey, that as conditions improved on the island, migration would decrease proportionally, since the main reason for migration was economic betterment. It tried to dispel some unfounded notions regarding the Puerto Rican situation in terms of crime, relief, diseases, and housing. It maintained, nevertheless, that although Puerto Ricans are citizens, “the pattern [the Puerto Rican] pre­sents is that of a foreigner. This at times results in discriminatory practices which arouse his resentment.” That is, Puerto Ricans ­were still seen as “alien” subjects that faced a prob­lem of adaptation to their new environment.87 The not so liberal Reader’s Digest published an article appropriately titled “The Puerto Rican Prob­lem in New York” in February 1953. Although the piece tried to pre­sent a sympathetic view of their situation (noting, for example, that Puerto Ricans ­were exploited by employers and landlords alike), it cited once again the panoply of social ills that supposedly characterized the group’s existence in New York. It proposed that Puerto Ricans be channeled away from New York to other parts of the country: “If more [Puerto Ricans] would push on westward, most of their prob­lems—­and some of New York’s—­would dis­appear.”88 Another liberal take titled “New York’s Puerto Rican Dilemma” (“dilemma,” of course, could be used as synonymous with “prob­lem”) from 1955 reflects the continuity of this perspective and its many facets. It discussed the pervasive notion among West Side residents that Puerto Ricans had created slums in the area. It concluded that even if the hope for assimilation of the group ­were to eventually be realized, “a psychological groundwork for prejudice ­will have been laid that ­will be difficult to destroy.” The Puerto Rican situation reflected “the birth of a prejudice . . . ​born of the usual mixture of half-­truths and irrationality,” one that would continue to plague Puerto Ricans even a­ fter the slums ­were cleared.89 A more scholarly and sympathetic perspective on the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” was presented by Charles Abrams in the February 1955 issue of Commentary.90 He acknowledged that ­there was a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” just as ­there ­were other immigrant prob­lems de­cades ­earlier, that nothing “fundamental is being done.” The volume of Puerto Ricans’ migration was not the main reason for the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” but other ­causes like their “overwhelming concentration” in New York City and “the sordid conditions u­ nder which they are forced to live ­there”; the circumstances “preventing them from becoming an organic part of the community”; and “Puerto Rico’s own difficulties as an

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City  •  55

overcrowded area suffering from low living standards, l­ imited economic opportunities, and mass unemployment” (121). Abrams concluded that federal and city housing policies created a crisis in housing that disproportionately affected Puerto Ricans. U ­ nder the name of “slum clearance,” the government created a shortage of housing that coincided with the insertion of this group to the city. Contrary to the Migration Office’s efforts to minimize the situation faced by Puerto Ricans in New York by pointing to the similarities encountered by previous immigrant groups entering the city, the author argued that “conditions for the Puerto Rican mi­grants are far worse than they ­were for the immigrant in New York or Chicago in the 19th and early 20th ­century” (123). Puerto Ricans provided a needed source of cheap ­labor to the city, and the figures on their relief numbers ­were unfounded, he wrote. Abrams also criticized the federal government for giving priority to aliens over Puerto Ricans in agricultural jobs, a policy that favored the interests of farmers and politicians who preferred deportation a­ fter the farming season. For Abrams, the Puerto Rican government, fearing a negative reaction in Washington, was an accomplice in this situation by “regulating the flow of mi­grants” so as not to disrupt the l­ abor markets in areas where their mi­grants went. By ­doing this, the Puerto Rican government not only diminished the flow of mi­grants but also prevented them from g­ oing where the best jobs w ­ ere. Contrary to common opinion, he argued against limiting population growth in Puerto Rico, stating that “Puerto Ricans constitute only a fraction of what American industry can absorb” (126) and that the United States desperately needed this source of l­ abor. The solution to the “Puerto Ricans prob­lem” then lied “in our treating the Puerto Ricans as fellow citizens, enabling them to ­settle, once they come ­here, in the places that need them outside New York City.” In addition, “we need to recognize them as members of the community,” and extend them the same rights and “the same help and understanding we extend to o­ thers” (126). Abrams nevertheless criticized Puerto Ricans in the city for their lack of leadership and for not demanding their rights. He concluded that the “ ‘prob­lem’ of the Puerto Rican should be acknowledged as a prob­lem, an American prob­lem” (126) that demanded a solution through protection and understanding of Puerto Ricans.

3

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City American scholars like Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Oscar Handlin, and C. Wright Mills, Clarence Se­nior, and Rose Goldsen liked to compare Puerto Ricans g­ oing to New York City to other “traditional immigrants” (i.e., Eu­ro­pe­ans) as a way to underscore their “deficiencies” and inability to assimilate to postwar Amer­i­ca.1 The Puerto Rican government—­including Clarence Se­nior’s books—­also employed the “traditional immigrant” meta­phor to argue that Puerto Ricans, “like previous immigrants,” ­were initially rejected but would l­ ater become assimilated and be accepted as members of the American polity.2 The real­ity, however, was that t­ hese new immigrants w ­ ere not like the Eu­ro­ pe­ans who came before them. For one, they w ­ ere citizens of the United States—­colonial citizens, to be more specific. And although ­these new arrivals ­were deemed culturally, linguistically, and racially “foreign,” as Eu­ro­pe­ans had been characterized previously, they arrived during a period when racial and po­liti­cal ­factors had dramatically changed. When large numbers of Puerto Ricans began to enter New York City in the immediate postwar period, the immigrant restrictions of the early twentieth c­ entury had already closed the door to Eu­ro­pean immigrants. The latter w ­ ere now “White ethnics” that supposedly had assimilated into U.S. society in a “melting pot” that excluded ­peoples of color. The institutions that facilitated the incorporation of Eu­ro­pean immigrants ­were ­either not t­ here or ­were not interested in integrating this new 56

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  57

group of ­people. In New York, the old po­liti­cal machines had dis­appeared and the po­liti­cal parties (including the Demo­cratic, Republican, and Liberal parties), the l­ abor u­ nions, and even the church ­were not interested in supporting the incorporation of t­ hese “foreign” ­people coming from a colonial territory in the Ca­rib­be­an.3 Puerto Ricans would eventually enter t­ hese institutions in the coming de­cades; ­after all, they ­were citizens with the right to vote. But their initial incorporation in the immediate postwar period took a dif­fer­ent path from previous immigrant groups coming to the United States: a pro­cess supported and or­ga­nized in many ways by the government of the colonial territory they ­were coming from precisely ­because ­these citizen immigrants ­were rejected when entering the borders of the American polity. Furthermore, the government of New York City also participated in the incorporation of ­these new immigrants, but in a way very dif­fer­ent from that of previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants. The postwar incorporation of Puerto Ricans into the United States, particularly New York City, was influenced by the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative. As citizens, Puerto Ricans could not only move unimpeded to the mainland, but also vote and receive welfare benefits, two issues that became impor­tant ­factors in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. As the public debate shows, in spite of their citizenship, Puerto Ricans w ­ ere considered foreigners—­a group alien to the United States—by large segments of the host community, not only in racial, ethnic, and cultural terms but po­liti­cally as well. In a sense, the lack of jurisdiction of the federal government to control the entry of Puerto Ricans to New York City prompted the Puerto Rican and the city governments and notable private institutions to assume the responsibility of dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” t­ here. This chapter examines two early and significant instances of how ­these institutions reacted to this issue: the so-­called Puerto Rican Study commissioned by the Puerto Rican government and carried out by Columbia University and the report by the New York Welfare Council’s Committee on Puerto Ricans. ­These reports w ­ ere crucial in legitimizing the presence of Puerto Ricans in the city. Furthermore, both encouraged the proposition that the Puerto Rican government should actively participate in the incorporation of its citizens in New York and likewise supported its intervention and presence in city affairs. What is peculiar to the Puerto Rican postwar migration experience is not only that the island government promoted the migration of islanders to the United States but also that it interceded in the host society to influence their incorporation. The Puerto Rican government was actively engaged po­liti­cally in the United States, particularly in New York City, to facilitate the incorporation of its “citizens” t­ here. It also aimed to dissipate the c­ auses and effects of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city in an attempt to facilitate the continued flow of mi­grants to the United States.

58  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

An impor­tant course of action implemented by Puerto Rico’s government in facing the mi­grant situation in New York was its attempt to influence American public opinion in order to create a more positive view of Puerto Ricans that could facilitate their integration to the mainland. One of the first effective actions by the Puerto Rican government in its effort to counteract the anti–­ Puerto Rican campaign in New York City during 1947 was to commission Columbia University—­specifically its Bureau of Applied Social Research—to conduct a “survey” of Puerto Rican mi­grants in the city. This study l­ ater became The Puerto Rican Journey, one of the most influential works on island mi­grants in the United States and the first impor­tant empirical research study of postwar Puerto Rican migration to the mainland. This book influenced for many years how the American academia understood Puerto Rican mi­grants in the United States. The study’s head researcher and ­later first author of the book was none other than C. Wright Mills, a paradigmatic figure of American social science in the 1960s. The Welfare Council of New York City’s report on Puerto Ricans, the first study of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” by one of the city’s elite institutions, elaborated the par­ameters for the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into the city and the United States and also influenced the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy. Furthermore, the Welfare Council’s report on Puerto Ricans, like the actions and programs of MCPRA and of other NYC officials, institutions, and intellectuals ­later, tried to redefine and diminish the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse by emphasizing Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship in a narrative aptly named “Our Fellow Citizens from the Ca­rib­bean.” But the way in which ­these institutions dealt with the issue kept reinforcing the main ideas of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse: the way in which Puerto Ricans related to issues of welfare, crime, lack of assimilation, a dif­fer­ent language and culture, e­ tc., which also reinforced the notion of their foreignness to the city and the nation. The following sections analyze how the Puerto Rican government and the Welfare Council of NYC reacted to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in 1947. The study financed by Puerto Rico’s government—­the Puerto Rican Study—­and the report produced by the Welfare Council w ­ ere the first to analyze Puerto Rican migration to New York City in the postwar period. Both studies had a lasting impact on the policies implemented by the governments of Puerto Rico and the City of New York to address the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” and w ­ ere influential in how they approached the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into the United States.

The Puerto Rican Study The Puerto Rican Study—as Columbia’s proj­ect became known—­was commissioned by the Puerto Rican government to counteract the “Puerto Rican

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  59

prob­lem” in New York City. It was requested in August 1947, months before the Puerto Rican government officially launched its migration policy. Since its inception, the Columbia study followed closely the interests and concerns of the Puerto Rican government regarding the migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States. By launching the study, Puerto Rico’s government sought to appease the New York City public opinion in the midst of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in 1947. The proj­ect was also conceived as an instrument that could be used to influence the American public in their views of Puerto Rican mi­grants in order to justify their presence in the city and the mainland. The Puerto Rican Study also exemplified another practice ­adopted by the Puerto Rican government in dealing with the issue of migration to the United States: it would be very attentive to the concerns, proposals, and recommendations of public and private institutions in New York City on ­matters pertaining to Puerto Ricans in the city. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican government considered that the positive conclusions of the Puerto Rican Study—­that Puerto Ricans came to New York City in search for jobs and provided a needed ser­vice to the city’s economy—­ could be used to facilitate the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into American society, a task that would be continued in de­cades to come by the Migration Division. The Puerto Rican government countered the 1947 anti–­Puerto Rican campaign in New York City in order to keep open the flow of mi­grants to the United States. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York also harmed the image of Puerto Rico at a juncture when the governing Popu­lar Demo­cratic Party (PPD) was seeking economic and po­liti­cal reforms from Washington.

Concocting the Puerto Rican Study The announcement in New York City by Puerto Rico’s Governor, Jesús T. Piñero, on August 7, 1947, that the government of Puerto Rico had commissioned Columbia University to conduct a “survey” of Puerto Rican mi­grants came during the worst period of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. Piñero stated that the aim of the study was to reach “an intelligent solution” to the situation created by the massive influx of Puerto Ricans to the city. The governor, apparently unrehearsed and spontaneous, explained his idea to send a group of scientists to do a survey first in Puerto Rico and l­ater in the Puerto Rican community in New York, and then they would report “what we can do about it.” He added that in “the course of, say, a few weeks we can have in black and white what we r­ eally need to tackle the prob­lem intelligently.”4 On August 9, the director of Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research, Dr. Paul Lazarsfeld, and Governor Piñero announced in a press conference their agreement to carry out the survey. The study was estimated to cost between $30,000 and $35,000. No more specific details about the study

60  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

­ ere given at the press conference. Piñero, nevertheless, disclosed that Columw bia University would have the cooperation of the University of Puerto Rico, the federal government and New York’s Department of Social Welfare. He also mentioned a meeting with Mayor O’Dwyer the next day to discuss the proposed study and the Puerto Rican situation in the city.5 In an August 29 letter, Lazarsfeld advanced to Piñero the details of the proj­ ect, particularly the elaboration of the research design for the study. He also indicated his designation of Columbia professor C. Wright Mills to take charge of the proj­ect and stated that Mills “plans, of course, to contact officials of your government as well as the Committee on Puerto Rican migration, in San Juan, sometime within the next three weeks. His conferences ­there w ­ ill ensure that the Columbia proj­ect is fully informed by, and integrated with, all the work underway on the prob­lems your government confronts on the movement of its ­people and related issues.”6 Lazarsfeld added that they w ­ ere having prob­lems collecting data and information on Puerto Ricans in New York, since the existing lit­er­a­ture was l­imited, and that no one in New York r­eally knew how many Puerto Ricans lived in the city. He stated that he was creating “an Advisory Committee from the New York end, consisting of representatives from such fields as Public Health, Social Welfare, Vocational adjustment, and the like.” Lazarsfeld notified Piñero that a­ fter completion of the study’s design, “in conference with all the p­ eople in New York representing agencies which are concerned with ­these prob­lems, we ­shall go over this design in detail. It ­will then be submitted to you for your criticism. A ­ fter you have considered it, and we have modified it according to your suggestions, we ­shall be ready to launch the full-­scale study.”7 The evidence suggests that Columbia University paid close attention to the interests and concerns of the Puerto Rican government regarding the issue of migration to New York City. The proj­ect was intended to provide the Puerto Rican government with information that could be used to “guide” and “select” the flow of mi­grants to the United States. In early September, Clarence Se­nior, then director of the Social Science Research Center at the University of Puerto Rico, wrote to Piñero on ­matters concerning the situation with research on migration. He included a preliminary copy of his report Puerto Rican Emigration, which had been reproduced “at the request of the [governor’s] Emigration Committee.” Se­nior informed the governor that the Social Science Research Center was working on three joint proj­ects that “could throw added light upon the question of emigration.” The first was with the Office of Population Research of Prince­ton University, headed by Dr. Kingsley Davis; another with the Department of Anthropology of Columbia University, directed by Dr. Julian Steward; and the third with the American Museum of Natu­ral History, headed by Dr. Harry Shapiro. He had discussed with them the possibility of cooperation between the proj­ects and a suggestion “to include an analy­sis of such items as the

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  61

differences between ­those who emigrate and ­those who stay at home. This should help us determine, for instance, what the effects of migration ­will be over a period of time on the physical and psychological makeup of the population.” Se­nior asked the directors of the three studies to work with Lazarsfeld “in order to avoid duplication which would result in both confusion and waste of money.”8

Was the Study Necessary? The need to carry out the Puerto Rican Study was questioned in New York immediately ­after Columbia University made its announcement. Among the first to manifest their opposition w ­ ere Ruperto Ortiz and Harris L. Pre­sent, from the New York’s Bureau of Hispanic American Youth. Since 1946, they had been vocal in combating the New York media campaign against Puerto Ricans; they had met with representatives of the Puerto Rican government, including Governor Piñero and Muñoz Marín, to discuss this situation. Ortiz and Pre­sent argued that the study represented “an unjustifiable expenditure of funds” by the Puerto Rican government and that it was not needed b­ ecause the New York Welfare Council was making a similar study of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Furthermore, they insisted that the situation for Puerto Ricans in the city was “becoming more acute e­ very day” and that waiting for the results of such a study could only postpone needed actions. Ortiz and Pre­ sent also contended that the money spent on the study could be used to deal with the situation facing islanders in the city.9 In his response to this criticism, the governor called previous studies “amateurish” and dismissed their objection by proclaiming that “you should not get ticklish at the survey idea by a competent institution with trained personnel who dedicate full time to their chores.”10 Piñero ­later asserted that the “bad publicity that has appeared in all the continental press seems to warrant an unbiased and carefully-­made study in order that the facts and the truth be known. The majority of the ­people of the Island desire such a study made so as to be ready to thwart vicious propaganda which is harmful both to the residents in the continent, and to the island.”11 Was the Puerto Rican Study r­ eally necessary? Critics like Ortiz and Pre­sent may have had a point: the Puerto Rican government had data and information already available which pinpointed the characteristics and the situation of island mi­grants in New York. But as the last quote from Piñero points out, the study was intended to “thwart vicious propaganda” launched in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. It was meant to pre­sent facts and figures on the situation of Puerto Ricans from an outstanding American academic institution like Columbia University, located in New York City and a symbol of the city’s intellectual establishment.

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­There w ­ ere two studies that provided the government with information on the character and situation of Puerto Rican mi­grants moving to New York. In May 1947, the Bureau of the Bud­get released the findings of a mi­grant survey it had conducted in November 1946. The report noted that t­ here was a net migration of 36,116 persons in 1946, an extraordinary number given the corresponding figure for the period from 1911 to 1946—108,634. The survey was commissioned due the “considerable discussion on the ever-­increasing number of persons leaving Puerto Rico to the United States,” and b­ ecause the Puerto Rican government “is interested in the cause and extent of such a mass exodus of its population.”12 The study revealed that almost all—98.3 ­percent—of t­ hose sampled left for the United States. Some of the survey’s findings anticipated the conclusions of the Puerto Rican Study. A surprisingly high percentage—87 ­percent—of the mi­grants resided in urban areas; 47.7 ­percent lived in the metropolitan area; and 35.3 ­percent of ­those surveyed came from San Juan. Other municipalities with significant urban areas also provided a large share of mi­grants (8). Like the Puerto Rican Study, the 1946 Bureau of the Bud­get survey concluded that the main reason for migration was economic: half the sample emigrated seeking a job, while 10 ­percent claimed they already had a job, and 20.4 ­percent cited ­family reunion as the reason for their relocation. Most mi­g rants—68 ­percent—­were young adults, 54  ­percent w ­ ere males, while 41.6  ­percent ­were White. Mi­grants showed a higher rate of literacy than the island average: 71  ­percent had a fifth-­g rade level, 22.3 ­percent had high school, and 5.9 ­percent had college education. This also corresponded with l­ater findings in the Columbia study. Most mi­grants ­were in poor financial condition: two-­thirds took less than $40 with them at the time of departure. As the Columbia University study found ­later, the 1946 survey concluded that a higher number of skilled workers left the island—16 ­percent of the total—­ while only 14.3 ­percent of t­ hose who migrated w ­ ere unskilled workers. Nonlaborers (professionals and semiprofessionals, farmers, man­ag­ers, and clerical and sales workers) comprised 28  ­percent of ­those leaving. Less than 10  ­percent of ­those who left had a job waiting for them upon arrival; of this group, domestic ser­vice workers comprised 24.5  ­percent. The vast majority of mi­grants—91.3 percent—had New York City as their final destination (10–11). A second study of interest is that presented by Paquita Ruiz on the vocational needs of Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York. Based on her 1946 doctoral dissertation at Fordham University, Ruiz’s study intended to determine the vocational, social, and educational needs of Puerto Ricans in New York.13 She conducted a survey among 3,024 White males who had migrated to the city between 1940 and 1944. As in the previously cited study (and in the Puerto Rican Study ­later), Ruiz’s research found that the main reason for migration among Puerto Ricans—72 ­percent of the sample—­was “economic distress” and

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  63

the “search for a higher or steadier income.” Transportation facilities was an impor­tant reason why most migrated to New York (5–6). Contrary to the Columbia University study and to the Bureau of the Bud­ get 1946 survey, Ruiz’s study concluded that the majority of mi­g rants ­were unskilled or semiskilled workers—28 ­percent for each category. Skilled workers w ­ ere only 11  ­percent, while ser­vice occupations represented 21  ­percent. Also, in contrast to the findings of the other two studies, Ruiz found that the majority of mi­grants came from a rural background, not an urban one. The major handicap for Puerto Ricans in obtaining a job in New York was their lack of industrial training and low educational achievement, in addition to their lack of En­g lish proficiency (30–35). Contrary to what The Puerto Rican Journey would argue ­later, Ruiz concluded that the “fact that the Puerto Rican mi­grants have settled in a par­tic­u­lar neighborhood and are able to continue the customs and social activities of the island lessens their prob­lem of social adjustment in the new community” (35).

The Puerto Rican Study’s Purpose The Puerto Rican Study’s purpose became clearer by October 13, 1947, when Mills announced in a press conference in New York that Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research had submitted to the government of Puerto Rico “a detailed plan for a study of Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York.” Mills presented a statement by Emilio Colón, executive director of the Office of Puerto Rico in Washington, DC, where the latter declared that the study “reveals a concrete need by public and private agencies for accurate and detailed information on the movements of Puerto Ricans to the United States, principally to New York City.” Mills stated that the study sought to “draw up a balance sheet” of the needs and contributions of the Puerto Rican community in New York. He added that the investigation had two main purposes: “1) to serve city, state and private welfare agencies by answering their questions concerning Puerto Rican mi­grants and 2) to help the Puerto Rican Government in guiding and directing migration, and possibly to suggest other cities in the United States to which the mi­grants could successfully adjust themselves.” Mills emphasized that the study hoped to save Puerto Ricans from “the cycle of hell which so many mi­grant groups have passed through” in their integration to the United States. The study would be conducted at three levels: demographic, welfare, and psychological. The psychological aspect involved determining Puerto Ricans’ motivations and their “vision of migration.” According to Mills, the study would produce a “mathematical index of adjustment” that could be used to determine how many and in what ways Puerto Ricans adjust to life in New York.14 If we accept the public pronouncements by the government of Puerto Rico and the Columbia research team, the question then is, how urgent was the need

64  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

to conduct a survey of Puerto Ricans in New York in order to accomplish the objectives they publicly proclaimed? Based on the professed aims of the study, it could be argued that ­there was no pressing necessity for such a proj­ect. As discussed previously, the government already had conducted a survey of mi­grants that explic­itly proclaimed the economic foundations for their migration. So did the Ruiz study. As to the conditions of Puerto Ricans in New York, the Ruiz report also described their social and economic situation, and so would the impor­tant the study already commissioned by the New York Welfare Council. And what about an “index of adjustment”? Several institutions had presented ideas to this regard, including the New York Welfare Council (to be discussed l­ ater). The idea to channel Puerto Rican migration away from New York had also been discussed since 1946 in Puerto Rico and New York. Why then the idea to carry out such a wide-­scale study in times of economic need? As argued ­earlier, the Puerto Rican Study sought to pre­sent the Puerto Rican government as actively engaged in the solution of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York; the proj­ect was a tangible product—­manufactured by a distinguished American academic institution itself located in New York City—to display to the American public in the campaign for influencing public opinion. Several documents testify to this purpose. Perhaps none is more telling than the research proposal submitted by the Columbia University team to the government of Puerto Rico. The confidential “Report of a Pi­lot Study of Puerto Rican Migration to New York,” delivered to the Puerto Rican government on October 6, advanced a detailed pre­sen­ta­tion of the study’s research design and an itemized bud­get and discussed the purported aims of the study.15 The first line of the first paragraph of the introduction reads as follows: “Between January 1 and August 31, 1947, some forty news stories appeared in the New York press concerning Puerto Ricans.” It then pre­sents numerous headlines of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” media campaign we have already reviewed. It continued by stating that ­these stories “led automatically into editorial comment on the general prob­lems of Puerto Ricans in New York and the po­liti­cal status of the island. Certain papers launched into biting comments about the po­liti­cal significance of the ‘mass influx,’ asserting that it introduced ‘Radicalism and Communism into Harlem and ­Little Spain.’ One series dealt with the alleged efforts of Representative Marcantonio to subsidize Puerto Rican migration in order to increase his vote, and tied that back to ‘radicalism’ of the pre­sent insular administration” (1). The proposal set the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York as the basis for the study. Regarding the interest generated among newspapers by Columbia’s announcement that it was conducting the study, the proposal reported that “our office was besieged by calls from reporters who declared that they would be glad to print what­ever information we had to tell them about the migration.

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  65

This seems to indicate that the character of newspaper publicity on Puerto Ricans in New York can be modified through more active public relations activities backed by research” (3, emphasis added). Among the main questions and goals of the proposed study, the proposal alludes to the “balance sheet of unmet needs and cultural contribution” by Puerto Ricans that Mills had mentioned at his press conference. The welfare levels and needs of Puerto Ricans ­were a major concern of the study, particularly in regard to data and conclusions of interest to New York agencies. This issue was prominent in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. The proposal explained that, a­ fter conferring with some agencies concerned with this m ­ atter, “we concluded that any large-­scale study that was undertaken should contribute to their administrative needs” in several ways. One was to provide them with “basic census-­type information” about Puerto Ricans in New York. Another was to “provide objective data with reference to the health and welfare needs” of Puerto Ricans by area of settlement, type of mi­grant, and length of residence in the city. This analy­sis would be helpful in constructing “an index which could be used to predict the types of action which may be necessary, ­under dif­fer­ent volumes of migration and u­ nder varying compositions of migrating groups” (10). A third way would be to determine the extent to which Puerto Ricans make use of private and public agencies. This information would help the agencies to develop programs and techniques to assist the Puerto Rican community. The proposal then asserted that, in their “continued effort to insure that the research ­will serve such needs of the New York agencies,” the research team had established a working arrangement with the Welfare Council of New York. The Welfare Council would provide questions to be included in the Columbia survey and, given the council’s position as coordinating organ­ization for the city’s agencies, “we feel that their close advice on the m ­ atter provides a guarantee, so to speak, that our research is being designed for maximum usefulness” (11). The proposal also argued that it was not enough to develop a census of mi­grants, but what was needed for “maximum usefulness” to any administrator was information regarding what kinds of pos­si­ble mi­grants “are most likely to adjust themselves quickly, u­ nder certain conditions, and how many w ­ ill experience greater difficulties in adjusting themselves. The need of the administrator who would intelligently plan a relocation of p­ eople is to be able to predict” what ­will happen to mi­grants and to the community they are moving to. The administrator must also predict the strains placed upon the welfare and social agencies in ­those communities receiving mi­grants. The research team proposed “a typology of mi­grants, based upon the known success and failure to adjust, of a group of recent arrivals in New York. The most meaningful and useful information that the administrator who would plan migration can possibly have” was a count of how many of the mi­grants fall in each set of mi­grant types (16).

66  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

The administrative aim of the study, according to the Puerto Rican Study proposal, was “to furnish the Puerto Rican government with an easily administered set of tools for predicting the impact of any given migration wave, planned or unplanned, upon the welfare level of the mi­grants and the welfare facilities of the city.” Considering the Puerto Rican government’s interests, the proposal indicated that the study should provide the information necessary to identify which mi­grants would be more successful in adjusting to the new environment and also how to divert migration into “cities other than New York which have a maximum potential for satisfactory adjustment and assimilation of Puerto Rican mi­grants.” The proposal concluded that the Columbia team “of course ­will be in contact with [­Labor] Commissioner Sierra [Berdecía], and the final design of our work ­will be reviewed in detail by him or by one of his designated assistants, with the aim of insuring that it is of the greatest pos­si­ ble assistance to his planning” (17–18). Fi­nally, a detailed bud­get for the study was presented, totaling $35,732.00. On November 6, Emilio Colón announced the government’s authorization to launch Columbia University’s study on Puerto Rican mi­grants. He reiterated that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was the reason for the study. He declared that the more than forty newspaper articles printed from January to August 1947 in New York newspapers about Puerto Ricans in the city gave a “sensationalist character” to their situation and “discredited” all Puerto Ricans. It was this situation that “furthered the interests of Insular leaders [on this issue] and the decision that a scientific study be made to stop this propaganda and decide what should be done for the welfare of t­ hose Puerto Ricans that now reside in New York and for t­ hose that could emigrate to the United States in the f­ uture.”16 The beginning of the study’s fieldwork was announced at a press conference in New York City by Mills and Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía on February 7, 1948. A total of 1,500 interviews would be conducted in approximately six to eight weeks. Sierra Berdecía expressed his “satisfaction” with the study and confirmed that he was receiving reports e­ very two weeks. He was in New York to open the new government offices of the recently created Migration Office and also to meet with Benjamin Fielding, New York’s welfare commissioner. Also pre­sent at the news conference was Clarence Se­nior, who had been recently appointed as associate director for Columbia’s Puerto Rican Study.17 Se­nior’s appointment to the Columbia University study may have fulfilled two purposes. First, it certainly provided some needed expertise on Puerto Rican migration to the study. The Columbia group had no known expert on Puerto Ricans, and its director, Mills, had no previous background—­and perhaps no interest—in this ­matter.18 Se­nior had been ­until then the director of the Social Science Research Center at the University of Puerto Rico, where he

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  67

had elaborated one of the few but highly influential studies on the migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland. Se­nior also provided the government of Puerto Rico with an insider’s view into the Columbia study and could watch out for the island’s concerns and interests. He had been a member of the Emigration Advisory Committee created in the summer of 1947 and was considered by government leaders a trusted and experienced part of the emigration team. Se­nior would ­later become director of the Migration Division in New York.

The Preliminary Report The preliminary report of Columbia University’s Puerto Rican migration study was delivered at a press conference in New York on June 6, 1948. The urgency to publicize the study’s findings before the final report was completed signals the Puerto Rican government’s interest in using it to impact U.S. public opinion. Pre­sent at the event w ­ ere Sierra Berdecía; Dr. Robert K. Merton, acting director of Columbia’s Bureau of Applied Social Research; Se­nior; and the director of Puerto Rico’s Migration Office, Manuel Cabranes. Mills did not attend the event. If we take the New York Times headline for the event as a sign—­ “Puerto Ricans Seek Better Jobs H ­ ere”—it was a success for the Puerto Rican government publicity-­wise. The report also emphasized that the survey calculated the number of Puerto Ricans in New York at only 160,000. Merton stated that Columbia University “was delighted with the possibility that the Puerto Rican Government may be able to use the study. So many surveys die ­after the day they are completed.” Sierra Berdecía praised the investigation “as an objective study which goes beyond my personal expectations about the facts in connection with the so-­called Puerto Rican situation.”19 The preliminary report to Governor Piñero of the Puerto Rican Study—­ signed by Mills and Se­nior as director and associate director, respectively—­ stated that 1,113 interviews w ­ ere conducted in Harlem and the Lower East Bronx, selected due to their high concentration of Puerto Ricans; the h ­ ouse­hold data gave information on some 5,000 persons, making the sample “representative of the Puerto Ricans residing in t­ hese areas.” The report confirmed that ­there ­were three well defined, but of course overlapping, areas which our study can serve. I. ­ There are data which can be used to inform the New York public

about the Puerto Rican colony in New York City.

II. ­There are facts which can be used in defining f­ uture policy for your

government departments. III. ­There is information of value to the welfare agencies in New York City, particularly the data on relief.

68  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

No recommendations w ­ ere included in the report b­ ecause the bureau sensed that “recommendations are of considerably more value when they are worked out jointly by researcher and policy maker.”20 Se­n ior would be the liaison between the Puerto Rican government and the bureau for this and other m ­ atters. The most impor­tant findings of the study w ­ ere presented to Piñero, including the estimated number of Puerto Ricans—­found to be in the range between 160,000 to 200,000, with the weight of the evidence in ­favor of the lowest figure. Twenty-­five ­percent of the total number of persons interviewed had been born on the mainland; of the remaining 75 ­percent, 43 ­percent had migrated to New York before the war, 22 ­percent during the war, and 35 ­percent ­after the war. The median age for the Puerto Rican population in New York was 24.2, clearly reflective of a young population, while the majority (54 ­percent) ­were female. The g­ reat majority of respondents w ­ ere considered to be White (63 ­percent), 15 ­percent “mulatto,” only 5 ­percent Black, and 17 ­percent “mixed” (­either “indio” or “grifo”). While 77 ­percent of all respondents in the Bronx ­were described as White, 57 ­percent ­were designated as such in Harlem (3–4). The report concluded that the main reason why Puerto Ricans migrated to New York was “their search for economic betterment.” Other reasons w ­ ere ­family reunification, to attend schools, and to utilize health care and other city facilities. Of ­those mi­grants in the ­labor force, 85 ­percent quit jobs to move to New York, while only 15 ­percent ­were previously unemployed; 71 ­percent had worked for two years prior to the trip. “In other words, they ­were not in search of jobs as such, but of better jobs.” The ­great majority—91 ­percent—­moved to the city without prior arrangements for a job, 6 ­percent had a job arranged before the trip, and only 3 ­percent came on a l­abor contract. Mi­grants consistently received a higher salary on their first job in New York than what they earned in Puerto Rico. Of the 5,000 surveyed, 43 ­percent w ­ ere in the ­labor force in the city (5–7). One of the most impor­tant conclusions of the study—­and perhaps the one most highlighted by the Puerto Rican government—­was that “Puerto Ricans who migrate to New York are a selected group. They are not typical of the total island population in literacy, rural or urban origin, occupation and skills, among other aspects.” Only 7  ­percent of the sample ­were illiterate, contrasted to 32 ­percent on the island. The ­great majority (79 ­percent) ­were of urban origin; 70 ­percent came from the major urban areas of San Juan and Ponce. According to the report, the mi­grants’ occupational background showed a high level of skilled workers: some 47 ­percent had been employed in manufacturing (compared to 24  ­percent of the island’s l­abor force), while only 5  ­percent in agriculture—­compared to 39 ­percent on the island (8–10). A major section of the report was devoted to the issue of “relief.” Of t­ hose interviewed, 98  ­percent had heard about New York City’s relief program,

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  69

although 90 ­percent did so only a­ fter they moved to the city; only five persons had been on relief in Puerto Rico. The majority—54 ­percent—­were ­under the impression that a specific length of residence was required, while 35 ­percent had no information on the subject. Of ­those surveyed, only 161 or 6 ­percent ­were on relief at the time: 27 ­percent of ­these had arrived ­after the war, 15 ­percent during the war, and 58 ­percent before the war; t­ hese figures w ­ ere in proportion to the number of p­ eople who had migrated in t­ hose periods. Most of t­ hose on relief—77 ­percent—­were ­women, 55 ­percent of whom ­were widowed, divorced or separated; of ­these, 80 ­percent had dependent ­children. The report noted that ­women on relief ­were eligible to participate in the Social Security program. In other words, ­those on relief ­were a minute part of the community and they ­were no burden to the city—­which contradicted one of the most salient issues in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative. The report added that only 4 of the 161 p­ eople on relief ever made a trip back to the island and did not do so while receiving the benefits (compared with 7 ­percent of ­those not on relief who traveled back to Puerto Rico). An impor­tant finding of the study, not usually emphasized, is that 28 ­percent of the total sample used to send remittances to Puerto Rico; t­ hose on relief amounted only to 6 ­percent of this group (11–15). Mills delivered a copy of the report to Governor Piñero on September 8. In his letter to Piñero, Mills explained that “we shall not release anything on it ­until you and members of your government have reacted to it. A ­ fter we have taken account of your criticisms, I suggest some plan of reproduction and then the simultaneous releases from San Juan and Washington be arranged . . . ​In the meantime, we are still at work on the manuscript and are looking forward to receiving your criticisms.”21 In a letter to high-­level functionaries, Daisy D. Reck, special assistant to the governor, stated that she and Sierra Berdecía “believe that each and ­every section should be read thoroughly, other­wise the Puerto Rican government w ­ ill have no recourse in case ­there are errors.” She said both ­were “specially anxious” for other members of the governor’s Emigration Advisory Committee, to read the report and provide comments to it. She added that if any member found “any major sections which you believe should be changed or reconstructed, then perhaps the group which is reading the report should get together to discuss it.”22 Sierra Berdecía presented very detailed comments on the report, as revealed in a memo to Governor Piñero dated November 9. He holds that the report “is first rate and explodes many of the erroneous theories held in the United States about Puerto Rican migration to the Continent.” The background of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” comes out immediately in his assessment of the study: The unfavorable publicity which this country was receiving in the United States has been counteracted by the findings contained in the preliminary reports published sometime in June. The data contained therein has been of

70  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

considerable help to the government of Puerto Rico itself and the Bureau of Employment and Migration in counteracting some of this unfavorable propaganda. Individuals entrusted with the authority of the Insular Government felt that the majority, if not all the unfavorable publicity, was false. But it is one ­thing to have a feeling about a subject and another to have the facts to combat it. It is gratifying indeed to find that the beliefs which the Puerto Rican authorities had about Puerto Rican migration are in accord with the facts as contained in the Columbia report.23

Although he felt that the report “is so excellent that ­there is no room for improvement,” the commissioner raised some issues that required further clarification. One question that Sierra Berdecía devoted some attention to was the alleged number of skilled workers and illiterates in Puerto Rico stated in the report. He argued that the rates of literacy and skilled workers among the population in Puerto Rico had increased in the last de­cade, mostly due to several programs implemented by the PPD government. He warned about giving the impression “that Puerto Rico is being drained of the best ele­ments in our population.” For the commissioner, although the report enhanced the image of Puerto Ricans migrating to the mainland, it should not be used to downgrade the reputation of Puerto Rico at a time when the government was also seeking to reinforce the island’s prestige to attract American investments and obtain po­liti­cal reforms from Washington. Sierra Berdecía also expressed some concerns with the percentage of respondents citing “­family reasons” for their migration. He contended that the 31 ­percent stated by the report was too high b­ ecause many industrial workers took their families with them, and that the insertion of w ­ omen into the l­ abor force in New York should also be seen as a form of economic migration. Fi­nally, the commissioner of ­labor wanted the report to clarify why the number of Puerto Ricans on relief was higher in New York than in Puerto Rico: essentially, ­because ­there was no relief program on the island.24 ­A fter receiving Sierra Berdecía’s clarifications from the governor, Mills replied that “we are now carefully examining” each of Sierra Berdecía’s comments. He also informed the governor that the final details of the publication would be presented to him before it was made public.25 The Puerto Rican government began to use the Puerto Rican Study in its public relations campaign as soon as the preliminary report was issued, both in the United States and Puerto Rico. When addressing New York City officials, the government used the report as an example of mea­sures implemented to h ­ andle the migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland. When responding to complaints from Puerto Ricans on the mainland, the government presented the study as part of its efforts to counteract the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  71

in New York City and elsewhere in the United States. Sierra Berdecía noted in a 1949 memo how the study had been very useful in improving the “public relations of Puerto Ricans in New York,” which became more “favorable” to them since the study.26 In Puerto Rico, the preliminary study was immediately made public and given wide dissemination in the press. It was used to show how the government was dealing with the pressing issue of the mi­grants’ situation in New York.27 El Mundo argued that the study should stop all the false accusations against Puerto Ricans in New York City and elsewhere, and that Columbia’s “prestige” should provide its conclusions “the favorable publicity they deserve.”28 Columbia University’s Puerto Rican Study was published in 1950 as The Puerto Rican Journey and became an impor­tant text in the study of Puerto Rican migration and community in New York and the United States. It advanced a set of findings and conclusions that became widely accepted by the scholarly and nonscholarly community in their understanding of the Puerto Rican experience on the mainland. The Puerto Rican Journey presented a critique of the idea of a per­sis­tent upward mobility of immigrant groups in the United States. It asserted that the chances of Puerto Ricans following the pattern of social and economic incorporation experienced be previous groups in American society w ­ ere l­ imited. This was due not only to the changing nature of American society at the time, but also to some characteristics of Puerto Ricans as a group: their culture and lack of aspirations, the race and gender of mi­g rants, and their lack of adaptation and integration into the new society, among ­others. Some of the book’s findings and conclusions would l­ater be echoed to argue that the Puerto Ricans’ lack of incorporation and advancement in American society was their own ­doing, a notion that I call the “Puerto Rican exception.” The long-­term consequences of ­these ideas are discussed in other chapters of this book.

The New York Welfare Council Report One of the first actions taken by a major New York City establishment institution to deal with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was the appointment of a committee to study this situation by the Welfare Council of New York in early 1947. The Welfare Council was created in 1926 to coordinate and advise on the workings of more than 2,000 public and private agencies in New York City. It also sought “to supply the lacking ele­ment of community planning in social welfare work,” as well as to attract more public support for social ser­vices. It concentrated its efforts in four main areas: ­family ser­vice, child welfare, health, and community organ­izing. The council stood for the interests of three sectors: the government, social agencies, and the public, each represented on its board of directors. Its research bureau was to gather the facts needed to guide action and

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the means to carry out its goals. From its inception, the Welfare Council was supported by the city government and influenced its policies.29 The Welfare Council was redefining its objectives and leadership by the time the postwar wave of Puerto Rican migration began to arrive in New York City a­ fter 1945. Its 1944–1945 annual report stated that “veterans and minority groups, for many months and perhaps for years to come, ­will be sources of concern to New York’s social agencies” and thus to the council.30 The creation of the Puerto Rican Committee by the Welfare Council in January 1947 reflected the importance given by one of the city’s elite institutions—­ and one with influence on the city’s welfare policies—to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” The thirty-­three-­member committee was to “map direct action for social agencies cooperating with the council.”31 By the spring of 1947, the committee had subdivided in six subcommittees studying two major areas: five subcommittees related to the “prob­lems particularly pertinent to Puerto Rican Americans,” and one subcommittee related to t­ hose prob­lems that affected this group “as well as the ­whole community.”32 The subcommittees on the first area ­were: 1) education—to study the need for En­glish classes and teachers and to study “the development of classes in adaptation to U.S. urban life for Puerto Rican adults and ­children”; 2) health—­concerned with health facilities and programs as well as with issue of sanitation; 3) employment—to examine employment ser­vices in areas related to vocational guidance, educational counseling, vocational training, and placement, as well as to study “the practices of public and private employment agencies in terms of protection from exploitation” of Puerto Ricans and ­u nion employment practices; 4) migration and resettlement—to explore “the possibilities of resettlement with Federal officials and Puerto Rican government officials. In its relationship with Federal authorities it would determine w ­ hether or not the Federal and Puerto Rican Government [sic] could assume any financial responsibility” for Puerto Rican mi­grants, particularly in regards to t­ hose states “where residence requirements prohibit public assistance upon arrival”; it would also study the best means to offer “informational ser­vices on living conditions to Puerto Ricans contemplating coming to the United States”; and 5) the use of Spanish-­speaking personnel in public and private social agencies. The subcommittee on the second area was to be concerned with issues such as housing, intercultural prob­ lems, delinquency, day care, unattached youths, ­etc., that particularly affected other communities. In early 1948, the Puerto Rican Committee published its report on Puerto Ricans in New York City, one of the most impor­tant texts on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in this city. Relevant to our discussion is not only how this report reflected the attention given by city institutions to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” but also its recommendations. Th ­ ere are significant overlaps in the recommendations presented by the committee and the policies implemented by the Puerto

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  73

Rican government ­under its migration policy formulated in December 1947. The council’s report also acknowledged the cooperation given by the Puerto Rican government to solve the situation of Puerto Ricans in the city. The context and consequences of the report are stated in the foreword by the council’s director, Dorothy C. Kahn. She stated that “the greatest influx of Puerto Ricans which New York has ever known” prompted the city’s social agencies to request that the council study ­these mi­grants.33 Kahn mentioned several mea­sures implemented by the New York City and Puerto Rican governments to deal with the mi­grant situation, and the extent to which they ­were influenced by the perspective of the council committee and its members. She acknowledged that when Puerto Rico’s Department of ­Labor opened its office in New York, its commissioner “chose as its director a man who had been a very active member of the Welfare Council’s Committee and who regards his new position as an opportunity to help carry some of the recommendations of the Committee . . . ​It is gratifying that many of the hopes and recommendations of the Committee are already on the way to realization” (5). Kahn was referring to Manuel Cabranes, Puerto Rico’s Migration Office first director. One of the key contributions of the council’s report was its goal to deflate the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in the city. It sought to remove the racist and discriminatory ele­ments of the 1947 campaign by presenting a socially liberal perspective on the issue. An impor­tant conclusion presented by the report was that it considered “the prob­lem of Puerto Ricans in New York City as fundamentally the local manifestation of a nationwide prob­lem in which are involved on the one hand the overcrowding of cities, and in par­tic­u­lar this City, and on the other hand the unsolved economy of an island possession of the United States. In this dilemma t­ here is no s­ imple way out. Local action, however necessary, is not sufficient” (9). This perspective would become one of the man­tras of the New York City establishment and the Puerto Rican government in presenting their position in the United States with regards the island’s migration to the mainland. The report also clearly stated the position that would be maintained by both the New York and Puerto Rican governments and elite establishments: “Migration u­ nder favorable circumstances is beneficial both for the mi­grants and for the ­people among whom they ­settle.” It added that it was evident that “Puerto Ricans become assimilated easily and make excellent citizens, bringing to the community their l­abor, sometimes talent and skill, and adding to the richness of our culture.” The report acknowledged that although migration may not in itself solve Puerto Rico’s poverty, it “may play a constructive part in its solution. To be successful, migration must be or­ga­nized” (10; emphasis added). Also, in agreement with the position of the Puerto Rican government at the time, the Welfare Council’s report stated that the island’s standard of living must be improved: “This is the responsibility of the Federal

74  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

government. The p­ eople of Puerto Rico must not be allowed to remain in hopeless poverty, while they are given the supposed privilege of citizenship in the nation with the highest standard of living in the world.” It forcefully recommended that the federal government be more active in helping Puerto Rico in its industrialization and economic development for the best interests of the island and the United States (10). This would also be the position taken by the MCPRA and successive New York mayors for many years. Some of the report’s findings w ­ ere intended to counteract some of the contentions of the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign of the previous year. It reported that the Puerto Rican population in the city reached 231,302 in 1947 (a figure based on the Puerto Rican government’s data), an assessment substantially lower than the 600,000 reported by the New York Times—­which the report called “a gross over-­statement” (12–13). The report found that Puerto Ricans ­were scattered throughout the city and that some had integrated into the general community (­these “have become assimilated”). It argued that the Times and other New York newspapers did not publicize ­those findings, but rather focused on the most congested neighborhoods of the city, in East Harlem and the South Bronx. The mi­grants in t­ hese communities ­were the unassimilated and they “are New York’s Puerto Rican prob­lem” (14–15).34 One of the most impor­tant statements by the Welfare Council’s report on Puerto Ricans was its conclusion that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was ­really a prob­lem of lack of housing and overcrowding of poor neighborhoods in New York City. Since it conceded that the city government would be unable to solve the prob­lem in the immediate ­future, it recommended the channeling of Puerto Ricans to other parts of the country. It also recommended that “congestion be reduced in existing Spanish-­speaking neighborhoods, particularly in Harlem, by relocating substantial numbers of the families who now live t­ here. Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States and have a right to live wherever they wish in the United States provided they can find a home and work. In this they ­will need help. The primary responsibility for the solution of the Puerto Rican prob­lem lies in the Federal Government” (31). This resolution would be impor­tant for the f­ uture of Puerto Rican migration. First, it was central to the migration policy of the Puerto Rican government, whose Employment and Migration Bureau (BEM) in Puerto Rico and its Migration Division in New York had as a goal the redirection of migration away from New York City. The report clearly indicated that this was to be a major responsibility of the Puerto Rican government. Secondly, the relocation of Puerto Ricans away from Harlem would be a major aspect of the city’s urban and housing policy regarding Puerto Ricans. This had a tremendous impact on the social, cultural, and po­l iti­cal construction of the Puerto Rican community in New York in de­cades to come. The recommendation could also be understood as a means of dismembering what was considered a po­liti­cal base of support for Vito

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  75

Marcantonio. Thirdly, by stating this as a federal prob­lem, the report reiterated the position of the Puerto Rican and New York City governments that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was a “national prob­lem” whose solution required federal intervention and aid. The council’s report presented several recommendations to improve the welfare and integration of Puerto Ricans to the community in areas of education, employment, and housing. It recommended more En­glish classes in schools, the hiring of Spanish-­speaking teachers, and mea­sures to improve the assimilation of Puerto Rican students. In terms of employment, it also advocated the teaching of En­glish as an impor­tant requirement for getting jobs, more training in vocational skills, and employment counseling. It emphasized the “importance of fa­cil­i­ty with the En­glish language for ­those planning to come to the States should be stressed on the island.” Arguing that migration from the island to the mainland “can be successful and constructive if properly guided, the Subcommittee recommends that full information be made available in Puerto Rico as to the ­labor market situation, housing and living conditions in all parts of the continent.” The committee also suggested that information regarding the background and skills of Puerto Rican workers be distributed among prospective employers on the city. All ­these ­were mea­sures implemented by the Puerto Rican government u­ nder its migration policy. The report welcomed the cooperation given by the Puerto Rican government to foster the integration and assimilation of its mi­grants on the mainland. It stated that the “Government of Puerto Rico is aware of the importance of better preparation of its working p­ eople if they are to succeed as mi­grants in any other country.” The council’s report mentioned the collaboration of the island’s Department of ­Labor with its counter­parts in the United States “in regard to the outlook and demands of the l­ abor market.” It also alluded to the studies then conducted by island and mainland universities “which it is hoped ­will lay the foundation for effective action on the part of insular authorities to prepare the p­ eople for successful assimilation as self-­supporting citizens. By cooperative action of this kind on the part of the insular and federal authorities the utmost pos­si­ble may be done to promote the meeting of ­labor supply and demand” (46–47). Perhaps the most controversial recommendation presented by the Welfare Council’s report on Puerto Ricans pertained to the creation of a federal agency to help in the resettlement of Puerto Rican mi­g rants on the mainland. It acknowledged that the Puerto Rican government was taking steps to orient mi­grants to move to areas where their l­ abor was needed and where they could successfully integrate with the community. Nevertheless, it pronounced that “the Federal government should assume the responsibility for assisting Puerto Ricans who migrate of their own accord to s­ ettle u­ nder reasonably satisfactory conditions.” The report stated that this policy should “involve the creation of

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a federal office with funds and personnel adequate to the prob­lem” (53). This office would have three major functions. First, to make a survey “of employment opportunities suited to Puerto Rican skills and the absorptive capacities of the areas within which such opportunities exist.” Second, to notify the Puerto Rican government “of the existence of a special number of positions, of the skills required and of the fact that the area within which the employment exists promises reasonable prospects for successful integration of the mi­grants.” And third, to prepare the areas receiving the mi­grants, including “providing trained personnel to guide the mi­g rants through the period of adjustment, including the protection of them in their employment and assistance in obtaining, if necessary, other employment” (53–54). This federal office never came to fruition, but it is impor­tant to notice h ­ ere that the three functions recommended in the report for the federal resettlement agency would indeed be performed by the Puerto Rican government through its Bureau of Employment and Migration in San Juan and its Migration Division in New York. As was to be expected, the public announcement of the report in mid-­ February 1948 became part of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” public debate. A New York Times story highlighted the council’s recommendations for a federal resettlement office and the redirection of mi­grants away from New York City. It quoted G. Rowland Shaw, president of the Welfare Council, and Adrian P. Burke, chairman of the Puerto Rican Committee, claiming that “the prob­lems now affecting Puerto Ricans h ­ ere w ­ ere substantially similar to t­ hose that have beset ­every previous group of immigrants,” and that ­these prob­lems ­were not created by the mi­grants themselves but rather by “the congested and unwholesome surrounding in which they find themselves.” When asked where Puerto Ricans could go if not New York, Burke responded that they could migrate to “sparsely settled states” like North and South Dakota, or they could go to work in the beet sugar industry in Utah. The news story presented some of the council report’s findings, including that most Puerto Ricans w ­ ere not on welfare.35 The Puerto Rican government welcomed the announcement of the council’s report. In a letter to Muñoz Marín, Leonard Sussman, director of the government’s information office in New York, expressed the feeling that “the Times has somewhat repaired what­ever harm previous stories have caused. I was especially pleased to read the unabashed retraction of their estimate of the size of the local population”—­a figure he had produced and submitted to the council committee. He declared that most papers in New York and elsewhere carried similar stories.36 In his public statement on the announcement of the council’s report, Governor Piñero indicated that the report “should dispel most of the falsities that have sprung up, and result in the smoother assimilation into the New York scheme of citizens from Puerto Rico.” He then mentioned the mea­sures

Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  77

implemented by the island government to deal with the mi­grant situation, particularly the “special session of our Legislature [that] was recently called to ­settle our policy on migration. Now we can say clearly: ‘We neither encourage nor discourage migration to the mainland, but we do stand ready to help ­those who migrate in e­ very way pos­si­ble.’ ” The governor was referring to the migration law recently approved by his government in December 1947. He stated that the government was providing orientation to would-be mi­g rants on the skills needed and the places where they could successfully migrate. He also referred to the opening of “a guidance office in New York City to direct new arrivals through the first days of their assimilation.” The governor added that the government had created a program to train Puerto Rican workers in new skills that can be used in Puerto Rico or, “if the citizen chooses, on the mainland.” Fi­nally, Piñero specified that the government was sponsoring an industrialization program that would provide jobs to many and raise the island’s standard of living. The public release concluded that the island government sought “to speed the normal assimilation of newcomers into their new environment throughout the United States.”37 In late May, the Welfare Council’s president delivered a copy of the report to Governor Piñero, confiding that council members “are now working on implementing the recommendations of the report and s­ hall be in consultation with Dr. Fernós-­Isern from time to time.”38 In the official response, acting governor Luis Negrón Fernández offered the cooperation of his government on all m ­ atters related to Puerto Rican mi­grants and expressed his interest in the report’s recommendation for a federal government office to help in “assisting Puerto Ricans who migrate to find satisfactory conditions.”39 The Welfare Council’s report on Puerto Ricans in New York City was an impor­tant source of legitimation for the presence of islanders in the city by one of its prominent institutions. The report—as with Columbia University’s Puerto Rican Study l­ater—­would be used by the city and Puerto Rican governments as weapons to fight the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign in New York. MCPRA’s 1949 “Interim Report” pointed to the importance of the council’s report, arguing that it “summarized the Council’s effort to learn the size, the extent and the significance of what had by then come to be looked on as ‘the Puerto Rican Prob­lem’. That paper was a vital, a valuable and a significant piece of work.”40 The most impor­tant recommendations presented in the council’s report to deal with the city’s “Puerto Rican prob­lem” w ­ ere ­later implemented by the Puerto Rican government. This was acknowledged by Manuel Cabranes, then director of the New York Office of the Migration Division, in a review of efforts by city institutions to benefit Puerto Rican mi­grants. Cabranes expressed gratitude to the Welfare Council for “helping the Puerto Ricans integrate themselves” into New York City life. In addition to health, educational, and other

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community-­oriented mea­sures that w ­ ere implemented following the council report’s recommendations, Cabranes added “the establishment h ­ ere of a branch of the Employment and Migration Bureau of the government of Puerto Rico.”41 The creation of the Migration Division in New York was one of t­ hose instances where the Puerto Rican government followed the recommendations of U.S. institutions regarding the management of island migration to the mainland. The Welfare Council, with its activities and reports on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York, would not be the only institution interested in this issue and in the affairs of this group. One year a­ fter the Welfare Council’s report on Puerto Ricans, in late 1949, Mayor O’Dwyer created MCPRA. It would represent the most impor­tant action taken by the city’s po­liti­cal establishment to deal with the massive arrival of this group to the city. In many ways, MCPRA came as a reaction to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign that began in 1947. The Welfare Council’s report also had an impact on the policies of the Puerto Rican government. The most impor­tant recommendations of the report ­were l­ ater implemented by the island government and formed part of its migration policy. This is the subject of the next chapter.

4

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy

The Puerto Rican government’s migration policy, enacted into law in December 1947, was a reaction to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. Many of the most impor­tant aspects of this policy came as a response to the public debate generated by this event: its attempt to control and regulate the l­ abor flow to the United States; the channeling of mi­grants outside New York City; the opening of the Migration Division in New York City; the pro­cess of screening and selecting potential mi­grants in Puerto Rico; and the increased emphasis on En­glish education in the island’s public school system, among other policies. The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” also led to a closer relationship between the governments of New York City and Puerto Rico regarding how to diminish the number of mi­grants g­ oing to the city and their incorporation t­ here. One impor­tant feature of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York was the call by several institutions, including the report by the New York Welfare Council’s Committee on Puerto Ricans and by representatives of the Puerto Rican government, for the U.S. federal government to get involved in the regulation of the mass movement of islanders to the U.S. mainland. The federal government did not attend to this call for obvious reasons: Puerto Ricans are, technically, U.S. citizens, and the federal government could not intervene in the movement of citizens from one area of the United States to another. Given 79

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the inability of any government entity in the United States—­federal, state, or city—to stop or regulate Puerto Rican migration, the Puerto Rican government took on the organ­ization of migration from Puerto Rico to the United States. The Puerto Rican government, with the consent and support of social and po­liti­cal institutions in New York City (the predominant receiving destination for island immigrants then), also assumed the task of advancing the incorporation of Puerto Ricans ­there and elsewhere on the U.S. mainland. Several ele­ ments w ­ ere needed for the more encompassing management of migration that was implemented by the island government in late 1947: a revised policy, a new philosophy, and new bureaucratic institutions. Furthermore, this pro­cess coincided with the pro­cess of expanding autonomy over local affairs by the colonial state as the United States revised colonialism in Puerto Rico during the 1940s.1 This chapter begins by examining how the Puerto Rican government dealt with the issue of migration to the United States before 1947. It then explores how Puerto Ricans in New York City reacted to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and how many of them demanded the intervention of the Puerto Rican government on their behalf. The chapter continues with a discussion of how island government officials and advisors debated alternatives for managing migration to the United States and elsewhere. The subsequent section addresses the Puerto Rican government’s decision to tackle migration with the creation of the governor’s Advisory Committee on Migration at the height of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City. This action signaled the beginning of a pro­cess that led to the formulation of a migration policy by the end of 1947. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City influenced the formulation and ­later the implementation of Puerto Rico’s postwar migration policy.

The Puerto Rican Government’s Role in Migration before 1947 The government in Puerto Rico has been interested in migration since the very first days of U.S. colonial rule on the island. The very first colonial governor, Charles Allen, thought that migration was the best way of dealing with what he perceived as the island’s biggest social and economic prob­lem: overpopulation. This way of thinking remained a constant in colonial functionaries, be they from the U.S. mainland—or island born. Or­ga­nized contract ­labor migrations ­were the norm during the first two de­cades of the twentieth ­century. But the negative consequences of ­these migrations and the complaints by mi­grants of exploitation, discrimination, and abuse—­including ­those migrating to places like Hawaii, Mexico, and the tens of thousands who went to work in U.S. war-­related industries and agriculture during World War I—­led to the Puerto Rican government’s first attempt to regulate and control ­these ­labor

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy  •  81

expeditions. In 1919, the island’s government approved its first migration-­ related law allowing it to regulate l­ abor contracts by foreign l­ abor contractors, a pre­ce­dent for the 1947 law. The number of Puerto Ricans living in the United States before 1920 was not very significant (fewer than 12,000 ­people). This changed as Puerto Ricans began to migrate to New York City at the beginning of that de­cade. By the 1940s, ­there w ­ ere some 60,000 Puerto Ricans living in NYC. Since the early 1920s, government functionaries in Puerto Rico began to define Puerto Rican migration to the United States in terms of two distinct flows: 1) or­ga­nized migration, mostly of contract workers from the island’s rural areas ­going to work in U.S. agriculture; and 2) individual migration, mostly ­people from urban areas moving on their own to U.S. urban centers like New York City. In 1935, Puerto Rico’s L ­ abor Department opened an office in New York City, the first of its kind, mostly to provide islanders with documents identifying them as U.S. citizens; mi­grants had complained that they ­were denied jobs that required citizenship ­because the employers refused to acknowledge them as U.S. citizens. During World War II, tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans went to work on U.S. mainland industries and agriculture as the war effort created dramatic shortages of ­labor; war-­related limitations on transportation placed obstacles on moving higher numbers of island mi­grants to work on the mainland during the war. During the 1940s, the Puerto Rican government also considered plans for or­ga­nized expeditions of island workers to countries in Latin Amer­i­ca, but none of them was ever implemented.2 Although ­there ­were pre­ce­dents for the intervention of the government in migration before 1947, the extent and nature of the role the government played in the postwar period w ­ ere much larger and more impactful than ever. Puerto Rico’s government became seriously involved with the management of migration for the first time ­after World War II in late 1946. This involvement began with ­labor issues arising in Chicago—­a situation that preceded the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. It revolved around the treatment given to Puerto Rican mi­grant workers’ when their assertions of contract violations ­were met with indifference by the Puerto Rican Department of ­Labor. The Chicago situation confronted the Puerto Rican government with the question of migration to the United States and led to its first examination of this prob­lem in the postwar period. Several investigations by government officials, including one by the Senate’s ­Labor Committee, led to the approval of Law 89 in May 1947 granting powers to the Department of ­Labor to oversee the hiring of workers ­under contract to the United States. The department would regulate and approve all contracts, including all working conditions promised, and would assure they w ­ ere upheld. It also proclaimed that no worker would be protected by the government of Puerto Rico u­ nless the contract had been approved by the Department of L ­ abor. All foreign employers

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would be forced to inform the department of their intention to hire workers in Puerto Rico.3 The provisions of Law 89 ­were ­later incorporated into the government’s migration law approved in December 1947. The impetus for this law came from issues raised by mi­grants in New York.

The “Prob­lem” for Puerto Ricans in New York The Puerto Rican community in New York City actively reacted to the 1947 “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign t­ here—­they did not remain passive or unconcerned. Their reaction likewise influenced the decision of the island government to take action in order to remedy the community’s disturbing situation in New York. The government may have reacted out of compassion for the plight of Puerto Ricans on the mainland, but t­ here are other reasons for their actions. One reason of relevance is po­liti­cal: as the committed Puerto Rican social worker Carmen Isales indicated, mi­grant discontent could jeopardize the PPD’s po­liti­cal hegemony on the island.4 The “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” could also tarnish the government’s image in the United States during a period when the island government was seeking reforms in Washington to the island’s colonial regime. Furthermore, it could also endanger ­future migration plans at a time when migration was increasingly seen as a vital solution to Puerto Rico’s socioeconomic development. The archives of the Puerto Rican government’s documents—in the archives of Muñoz Marín first as Senate president and ­later as governor, as well as the Department of ­Labor—­are full of letters of Puerto Rican mi­grants from 1945 to the late 1950s concerned with their situation in the United States. Besides the reports published in the local newspapers, ­these letters of grievances and protest ­were impor­tant in directing the island government’s attention to the plight of Puerto Ricans in New York City during the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. ­These letters also made government leaders aware that they needed to respond to the mi­grants’ hardships not only to maintain the PPD’s po­liti­cal leadership but also to promote the continued migration to the United States. The attention given to the plight of mi­g rants on the mainland was also impor­tant in helping the PPD government to l­ ater position itself as the representative of Puerto Ricans in New York City and elsewhere in the United States. The letters of complaints from Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York City to Muñoz Marín began by 1946, even before the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” erupted in full force t­ here. For example, in October 1946, Juan Calderón Parrilla, a self-­proclaimed “ jíbaro [peasant] from the Río Grande countryside,” demanded from the then Senate president, “as main leader of the popu­lar masses in Puerto Rico,” to denounce the “vain words” appearing on news report about Puerto Rico.5 The number of t­ hese letters increased as the news reports

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy  •  83

of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in 1947 became more prominent. Petra González, “an ardent admirer of your po­liti­cal party,” demanded from Muñoz Marín to “do something beneficial and dignified to defeat the sick and denigrating campaign that is been published in the New York city newspapers against Puerto Ricans.” She felt “greatly disillusioned and disoriented with the leaders of my land” who allowed such a prejudiced campaign to go unchallenged. ­A fter enumerating several instances of discrimination against Puerto Ricans in jobs and housing, she concluded that “it is up to you . . . ​to fight for our trampled land since you represent us in Washington and since the Puerto Rican p­ eople has deposited its trust in you.”6 Also in October, Olivia Cruz and dozens of other “legitimate Puerto Ricans that work in New York with the sole purpose of saving some money to go back soon to our beautiful island,” insisted that Muñoz Marín should challenge the attacks against Puerto Ricans in the New York press. The letter concluded: “The harassment that our race is being subjected to ­really hurts.”7 One of the consequences of the heightened hostility t­ oward Puerto Ricans in New York City at this time was the spontaneous creation of organ­izations to counteract the defamation campaign. In a tele­g ram to Muñoz Marín, an organ­ization calling itself Acción Puertorriqueña (Puerto Rican Action) declared: “We denounce the slanderous, insidious and offensive campaign of the New York press against Puerto Ricans and request your support to counteract it for which we have or­ga­nized our committee stop We cannot remain impassible in this unusual and unjust attack stop The Puerto Rican colony is mobilizing.”8 Another organ­ization, the Puerto Rican Public Relations Committee, was or­ga­nized in late 1947 with the “par­tic­u­lar aim to counteract the effects of slanderous and unjust publicity about Puerto Ricans in the mainland by raising their prestige in the eyes of the English-­speaking public.”9 The Puerto Rican government was well aware of the impact that the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign had on the island community in New York City. For example, in his response to J. Ramos López, president of the Convención Pro Puerto Rico, Muñoz Marín insisted: “The Government of Puerto Rico ­will take ­every step in its reach to protect the rights of Puerto Ricans in New York and destroy this picture based on false and incomplete facts that has been published in the city newspapers and that has caused such a just indignation.”10 In his response to José A. Quintero, then director and owner of the El Crisol newspaper (Quintero ­later became the editor of New York City’s premier Spanish newspaper, La Prensa), Muñoz Marín acknowledged the critical situation facing Puerto Ricans in New York City and stated that his government was taking steps to challenge the negative campaign against island mi­grants. He specifically mentioned one of the government’s mea­sures to deal with the situation, a study on Puerto Rican mi­grants to be carried out by Columbia University, arguing that “the prob­lem of Puerto Ricans in New York . . . ​requires

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the most careful study and the most efficient action. I hope that the initiative by Governor Piñero to entrust the fast study of the prob­lem to Columbia University could guide us in terms of what must and could be done.”11 During this period, many mi­grants felt that a crucial source of protection available to them in this situation came from the island government and not from any government or private institution in New York. When the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” surfaced again in New York City during the mayoral election campaign in 1949, the number of complaints by Puerto Ricans in New York to the island government, particularly to Muñoz Marín, increased once again.12 For example, the Spanish Grocers Association, a Puerto Rican organ­ization, wrote to the governor: “Stunned with consternation and overtaken with fear we saw with rare won­der that in the current moment a campaign of racial discrimination is developing by the New York police against Puerto Ricans” residing in the city. They requested from Muñoz Marín “your intervention as Governor of Puerto Rico with the Mayor of this city O’Dwyer who a short time ago promised a good treatment to Puerto Ricans.”13 One of the consequences of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” media frenzies of 1947, and then ­later in 1949, was that the Puerto Rican government realized the importance of ­these mi­g rants’ complaints. Government functionaries, including the governor, began to use their replies to disseminate the government’s migration policy and goals. For example, by 1949, some of their responses featured a request for Puerto Ricans in New York to be more patient with racism and the rejection of newcomers by city residents; they w ­ ere asked to become more tolerant and to cooperate fully and be active participants in their integration to American society.14 Replying to a constituent in New York, Muñoz Marín asserted that “we can help ourselves much in acclimatizing properly to the environment in New York so that we can take advantage up to the limit of the many opportunities that the city offers to our p­ eople.”15 The notion that Puerto Ricans should cooperate more in their adaptation and integration to their new environment was an impor­tant part of the government’s migration policy. By 1949, the Puerto Rican government was also receiving an increasing number of letters of complaint from mi­grant farm workers. The number of farm workers ­going to the United States u­ nder a government-­approved contract had increased dramatically since the government’s migration law was enacted in 1947. Most of t­ hese letters complained about the working and living conditions ­these mi­grants ­were facing. Many clearly spelled out their po­liti­cal allegiances in Puerto Rico. In a letter to Muñoz Marín, Francisco Rivera declared that he represented “124 Puerto Ricans affiliated to the glorious Popu­lar Demo­cratic Party” and raised charges regarding violations of contract and wage discrimination.16 Juan Molina Alvarez, “one of your constituents and loyal workers in your last two elections,” wrote to Muñoz Marín to make him aware of the “deplorable conditions of camp life which the farm workers” endure in Florida.17

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Puerto Rican government officials, particularly Muñoz Marín, w ­ ere aware of the po­liti­cal and social consequences of mi­grant discontent. One of the ramifications of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaigns of 1947 and 1949 was the creation of a mechanism to respond to mi­grants’ grievances. The usual procedure was as follows: ­after receiving a letter with complaints, the governor’s office would send the letter to the commissioner of ­labor asking immediate action on the situation; the commissioner would then act from his office in San Juan or send the grievance to the Migration Office in New York for immediate action ­there. In the case of Molina Alvarez’s accusations, for example, Luis Laboy, assistant to the governor, sent the letter to Commissioner Sierra Berdecía, who, in turn, wrote to the U.S. Department of L ­ abor and then, l­ ater, to Molina and the governor on the results of the investigation.18 Only occasionally did Muñoz Marín intervene directly in addressing mi­g rants’ complaints, mostly when mediation with federal agencies was required; he usually requested subordinates working on the case to keep him informed on the m ­ atter.19 Other times the governor would send his trusted ­people to h ­ andle a critical situation, for example, when the commissioner of ­labor traveled to New Jersey on his request to intervene directly in a critical confrontation between Puerto Rican workers and local authorities. Muñoz Marín asked Sierra Berdecía to deal with this situation “so that t­ hose Puerto Ricans working ­there feel protected and that they be so if pos­si­ble.”20 The same procedure was evident in the government’s response to a farm workers’ strike in Michigan in 1950, although in this case Muñoz Marín’s intervention was more prominent given the po­liti­cal implications of this situation; representing the Michigan sugar beet interests was Representative Fred Crawford, a critical ally in the Puerto Rican government’s push for a commonwealth status during that period.21

Looking at Migration in Reaction to the “Prob­lem” in New York As the issue of migration became more pressing for Puerto Rican policymakers in 1947, in response to the situation of island mi­grants in New York City, several policy recommendations began to be presented by government bureaucrats in Puerto Rico. Julio Machuca, from the Department of L ­ abor, argued for an analy­sis of “emigration ­under a scientific basis.” He supported migration as a solution to Puerto Rico’s biggest prob­lem, overpopulation, but insisted that it had to be well planned. Machuca proposed that workers should be given an adequate preparation before leaving the island and that receiving destinations had to be carefully studied, while contending that migration to Latin Amer­ i­ca was the best alternative.22 A more influential voice regarding migration was Don O’Connor, an economic advisor at Puerto Rico’s office in Washington. He believed that a “guided

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and encouraged removal and relocation” program was the only rational alternative to the island’s population pressure, and that, “what­ever the unpleasant connotations and implications are, the advocacy of seeking jobs elsewhere than in Puerto Rico is a counsel of necessity.” O’Connor argued that a “net removal” of 1.12 million p­ eople was necessary to provide economic sustainability to the island. Further, mi­g rants’ remittances would provide “an economic support which has the potentialities of very g­ reat significance for the Island’s p­ eople.” He concluded that “voluntary removal and relocation guided and initially underwritten by government should serve to ameliorate the prospective conditions of life in Puerto Rico.”23 In another paper, written during the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York, O’Connor acknowledged that the “fear of po­liti­cal repercussions is proper” if “relocation” centers in one area, like New York City. He suggested that migration had to diverted to other areas of the United States and argued that “repercussions, local and national . . . ​might be lessened if emphasis is given to the long history of internal migration” in the United States and common ele­ments between Puerto Ricans and Americans, like citizenship, are emphasized by the Puerto Rican government. Among O’Connor’s recommendations ­were that prospective mi­grants should be screened and selected, and that migration of ­women should be encouraged as a means of reducing population growth.24 He proposed several plans for the relocation of Puerto Ricans to the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, proposals that ­were discussed ­later by the governor’s Emigration Advisory Committee. His recommendations found re­sis­tance in Puerto Rico and the United States.25 During this period, another perspective on migration was presented to policy makers in Puerto Rico: the report Puerto Rican Emigration by Clarence Se­nior, then director of the Social Science Research Center at the University of Puerto Rico (years l­ ater he became director of the Migration Division in New York). This work is often quoted and is regarded by many as highly significant in delineating Puerto Rico’s migration policy during this time—­a misguided view I have clarified elsewhere.26 In this text, Se­nior conceived migration within a broader program of economic and social development and not as a comprehensive solution by itself to Puerto Rico’s overpopulation prob­lem.27 He argued that “emigration must be or­ga­nized” (119). Like other government functionaries before him, he proposed that mi­grants had to be selected, and the conditions of migration—­including the places of reception—­had to be carefully considered. He also acknowledged that although “migration to the continental United States seems to offer the best immediate opportunities,” migration plans to Latin Amer­i­ca “should not be neglected” (119–122). Se­nior’s recommendation to create an emigration office is seen by some as the precursor idea to the Migration Office in New York.28 He presented the idea for an emigration office while reviewing “colonization” plans for Puerto Ricans in Latin

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Amer­i­ca, although in the conclusions he proposed that the office could also deal with migration to the United States. ­There was opposition to the migration proj­ects to Latin Amer­i­ca from the U.S. government, based on economic and po­liti­cal considerations. The Puerto Rican government considered for many years emigration plans to Latin Amer­ i­ca as a means to reduce the adverse reaction of island migration to the United States. None of t­ hese plans ever came to fruition.29 In the end, migration to the United States remained, for both the Puerto Rican government and sectors of the U.S. government, the best alternative.30 Dispersion to other areas away from New York City and integration into their community became part of the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy.

The Governor’s Migration Advisory Committee Governor Piñero created the Migration Advisory Committee in mid-­July 1947, at the height of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City. It signaled the importance of the migration issue for the Puerto Rican government and the need to develop a course of action regarding this issue. In the letter creating the committee, acting governor Juan A. Pons asserted that “I think the moment has come to begin to make decisions that serve as guide to a program of migration,” and stressed the need to develop a “positive but flexible” program oriented t­ oward “taking advantage of job opportunities” outside Puerto Rico. Several top government officials w ­ ere appointed to the committee, including the directors of the Planning Board, the Economic Development Administration, and the secretary of education. The committee was presided over by Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía and met for the first time on July 21, 1947.31 The debates held in this committee point to how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City was at the center of the formulation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy. Some of the issues discussed in the first meeting included the migration of female domestic workers to the United States and plans for migration to Brazil and Venezuela.32 The committee’s third meeting, held on August 18, extensively discussed the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York: “Copies of reprints from New York newspapers, concerning Puerto Rican immigrants, ­were distributed to the members.” Several proposals regarding migration plans to Brazil and Venezuela ­were discussed at this meeting. A subcommittee headed by Sierra Berdecía and Se­nior was created to discuss with Resident Commissioner Fernós-­Isern the feasibility of talks with U.S. government officials regarding Puerto Rican migration to Venezuela.33 In the committee’s fourth meeting, held in late August, two members reported on their meeting with Resident Commissioner Fernós-­Isern, “who has been spending a considerable amount of time and energy in Washington on

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prob­lems arising from Puerto Rican emigration to the United States and has been discussing pos­si­ble emigration to other places with government officials.” According to the meeting minutes, the “most impor­tant proj­ects ­under discussion in Washington” included sending Puerto Ricans to South Amer­i­ca along with some 400,000 displaced persons from the war in Eu­rope, and colonization plans in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.34 The fifth committee meeting was held on September 11 and included Piñero, Muñoz Marín, Sierra Berdecía, and other top government and party officials, pointing to the significance of this meeting. Th ­ ere was a discussion regarding the proposals in Washington, DC, to send Puerto Ricans to South Amer­i­ca along with displaced persons from Eu­rope, an idea that was questioned and discarded. A proposal for a colonization program in the Dominican Republic was also discussed, but many questions w ­ ere raised about this proj­ect. In the meeting, Muñoz Marín “raised the question of the need for the immediate organ­ization of an Emigration office” as recommended in Se­nior’s Puerto Rican Emigration report. Fi­nally, the committee agreed to have Sierra Berdecía draft a plan that, “­after consultation with Senators Géigel Polanco, Muñoz Marín and Governor Piñero would be presented to the Executive Council” at its next meeting.35 The participation of Muñoz Marín and Piñero in the committee’s last meeting shows the need felt by top government officials to develop a course of action regarding the issue of Puerto Rican migration to the United States ­after the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” emerged in New York. It is impor­tant to note that most committee discussions centered on migration plans to Latin Amer­i­ca and not to the United States. Puerto Rican policymakers considered that one way to defuse the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York could be by directing migration away from the U.S. mainland. The very existence of the governor’s Migration Advisory Committee, as well as the debates that ensued within it, signaled a shift in the direction of the government’s attention on the topic. The discussions held by this committee forced the top decision makers to take a more active stance on migration, which led to the making of Puerto Rico’s migration law in December 1947.

The Making of Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy At the end of September 1947—­after the last meeting of the governor’s Advisory Committee on Migration—­Commissioner of ­Labor Sierra Berdecía began a journey of nearly two months in the United States devoted to the investigation of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” on the mainland. He visited t­ hose states in which Puerto Ricans w ­ ere settling and working in agriculture, ser­vices, and industry. Having the island’s commissioner of ­labor away for nearly two months reflected the top priority given to this issue by the government. Puerto Rico’s

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new migration law emerged from the report submitted by Sierra Berdecía at the end of his U.S. journey. ­A fter taking part in a conference for state and federal ­labor officials in North Carolina on September 23, Sierra Berdecía visited farms employing Puerto Rican farmworkers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, investigated the situation of female domestic workers in Chicago and Philadelphia, and met with city officials in New York City.36 On October 28, he joined a conference devoted to the situation of island c­ hildren in New York City schools with teachers and officials from the city’s Education Department and Puerto Rican representatives. Social integration and lack of En­glish proficiency w ­ ere the main issues discussed at this meeting. The commissioner of ­labor described the conflictive history of En­glish as the language of instruction in Puerto Rico and insisted that the island’s school system “has not been created with a perspective to prepare Puerto Ricans to emigrate in search of better opportunities.” He asserted that as long as this mi­grant flow could not be prevented, “a plan w ­ ill be created to help them with an aim to eliminate in all we can the inevitable conflicts of adaptation and readjustment to the new environment.”37 ­A fter stating that the articles in the New York City press regarding Puerto Rican mi­grants in the city had induced him to take an interest in their situation, the commissioner insisted that “we believe that we should get into this migratory movement . . . ​It is our obligation to try to give [mi­grants] some guide for them to adjust.” He also claimed that Mayor O’Dwyer had offered his cooperation to improve the mi­grants’ conditions in the city and that he would recommend the creation of an identification office in New York to deal with the readjustment prob­lems of Puerto Ricans ­there.38 Sierra Berdecía subsequently traveled to Washington, DC, to discuss with government, ­labor, and employment officials, as well as representatives of private institutions, the possibilities of finding jobs for Puerto Ricans in the United States.39 Sierra Berdecía submitted his report to Governor Piñero—­“Migration of Puerto Rican Workers to the United States”—on November 17, 1947.40 It is the most impor­tant document on the definition of Puerto Rico’s migration policy; its recommendations ­were transferred—­almost word by word—to the new migration law that was approved in December. The longest section of Sierra Berdecía’s report was devoted to the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York City. He observed that the widespread campaign in the city press regarding Puerto Ricans was “clearly aimed at achieving one way or the other that this migration be restricted.” The commissioner stated that during his visit to New York City, he had conferred with representatives of government and private institutions dealing with the prob­lems facing Puerto Ricans ­there, including Mayor O’Dwyer and the commissioner of welfare, Franklyn Fielding. He argued that the “prob­lems that Puerto Ricans residing t­ here confront are the typical prob­ lems of the groups that migrate to socie­ties ethnologically dif­fer­ent” (13) and

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contended that their greatest prob­lem was their lack of En­g lish proficiency, which “makes it impossible for them to get quickly in contact with the city agencies, private or public, that exist to solve the social prob­lems” of city residents (14). Their prob­lems “have been presented in an exaggerated way to the public opinion, with an improper dramatics” by the city press. The commissioner proclaimed that O’Dwyer and Fielding welcomed Puerto Ricans and considered the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” as one of education and not of “relief” (17). The report stated what became the government’s migration policy central aspect: A more active participation of the Government of Puerto Rico is necessary in this spontaneous migration of Puerto Ricans. We think that the government’s policy should be that of neither encouraging nor discouraging the migration of Puerto Rican workers; but once it is spontaneously and freely initiated, it is the government’s duty and it must be its policy to provide the best help and orientation so that mi­grants know beforehand the prob­lems of adjustment that they w ­ ill confront and that they can confront and solve them with the greatest success, reducing to a minimum the natu­ral difficulties that e­ very migratory movement f­ aces. (18; emphasis added)

In Puerto Rico, the government should provide prospective mi­grants with the necessary information regarding U.S. working conditions, social and climatic environment, living and housing conditions, and so on. In mi­grants’ settlement sites in the United States, the Puerto Rican government should cooperate with state and local governments and private agencies for the “fastest and most efficient adjustment to the life of the community in which they w ­ ill work or live” (19). Sierra Berdecía’s report recommended the creation of the Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM) within the Department of L ­ abor to regulate private employment agencies and the hiring of workers migrating to the United States or any other country. Some of its functions included the coordination with federal and state employment agencies to gather information regarding the demand for ­labor in the United States; obtaining information of prospective mi­grants to New York City and elsewhere; and providing mi­grants with information on the conditions they would face on the U.S. mainland. The BEM would offer the necessary information to Puerto Ricans interested in working in the United States, no ­matter ­whether they ­were hired by private employment agencies or by federal or state employment agencies, or if they moved to the U.S. mainland on their own. The bureau would also cooperate with all employers interested in hiring Puerto Rican workers: it would maintain contact between employment specialists and Puerto Ricans workers in the sectors of agriculture,

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industry, and domestic ser­vice, for cooperation in the solution of any grievances (18–22). The other impor­tant recommendation of Sierra Berdecía’s report was to open an office in New York that would function “as a contact agency between Puerto Ricans that go to reside in that city and government agencies from the city, the state, and the Nation, and private institutions of social welfare; with jurisdiction in the prob­lems of adjustment that recently arrived Puerto Ricans confront ­there, giving t­ hese all kinds of cooperation in their effort to adapt to the new environment” (20–21). This office would focus on the areas of education, welfare, and employment, and would provide a contact agency between mi­grants and government and private agencies in New York City. The commissioner concluded by stating that t­ hese recommendations ­were presented and approved by NYC’s mayor and the Department of Welfare, among other institutions and personalities (22).41

Puerto Rico’s Migration Law Law 25, better known as Puerto Rico’s migration law, was approved on December  5, 1947.42 Its “Statement of Motives” reiterates the notions presented in Sierra Berdecia’s report to the governor, emphasizing that it was the government’s duty “to provide the proper guidance with re­spect to opportunities for employment and the prob­lems of adjustment usually encountered in environments which are ethnologically alien; and it is likewise its duty, through such guidance . . . ​to endeavor to reduce to a minimum the natu­ral prob­lems of adjustment arising out of any migratory movement of this nature” (386). The text underscores that “Puerto Ricans have heretofore been migrating freely to the city of New York and from that city to Puerto Rico, as they have the right to do as citizens of the United States.” A ­ fter stating the contributions made by Puerto Rican mi­grants to New York City, the preamble continued: However, due to the continuous increase in the migration of Puerto Rican workmen to the aforesaid city, t­ here arise prob­lems of adjustment which have already had a pre­ce­dent in the case of other groups ethnologically dif­fer­ent from the native population of New York, which in the past immigrated by the hundreds of thousands to the said city and to all other areas of the United States. B ­ ecause it recognizes the existence of the prob­lems of adjustment, the government of Puerto Rico deems its duty to cooperate with Puerto Ricans who freely select the city of New York as their place of work or residence; to cooperate with the governmental agencies of the city, the state and the United States, and its private institutions ­there which show an interest in and make sincere efforts to solve and minimize the said prob­lems of adjustment. (392, emphasis added)

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It went on to say that the Puerto Rican government’s actions would constitute a “liaison at all times and u­ nder all circumstances” between the Puerto Rican mi­grants and the government and agencies of the cities and states where they reside. Besides institutionalizing the recommendations of Sierra Berdecía’s report, the law revised previous legislation regarding the Department of L ­ abor’s creation of the Bureau of Employment and Migration and the opening of an office by this agency in New York City to “give guidance, adjustment, and direction to Puerto Ricans in said city” (392). A review of the law raises some impor­tant questions: Why so much emphasis on the issue of “prob­lems of adjustment”? Why bring up the situation in New York City directly if the government was creating a general policy of migration to the United States? Why mention repeatedly the government’s cooperation with government and private institutions in New York City with regards to the “adjustment” of Puerto Rican mi­grants t­ here? Why reiterate the well-­known position that the Puerto Rican government did not encourage nor discourage migration? The answers to t­ hese questions should be obvious by now: the Puerto Rican government was responding to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. The law not only gave the government the authority to engage directly in the migration pro­cess but was also aimed at t­ hose in New York City and elsewhere who ­were demanding a more active role by the Puerto Rican government. By stating that it was in response to the situation in New York, the law also legitimized the opening of a Puerto Rican government office in New York City to deal with the affairs of its mi­grants, as unusual a move then as it is t­ oday by a state (or in this case, a nonstate) government in the United States. The law acknowledged that it would not intrude in the workings or jurisdiction of government and private institutions in New York City dealing with the “adjustment” of Puerto Ricans ­there, while at the same time recognizing their contribution to the mi­grants’ incorporation in the city.43 The law also codified what would be the Puerto Rican government’s main discourse regarding its migration policy: not only did it not encourage or discourage migration to the United States, it also asserted that the prob­lems faced by Puerto Ricans t­ here ­were simply “prob­lems of adjustment.” ­There would be a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” no more, at least publicly, for the Puerto Rican government. From now on, that negative public reaction to the entry of Puerto Ricans that had emerged in New York City in 1946–1947 (and elsewhere a­ fter that) would simply be defined as “prob­lems of adjustment” for Puerto Ricans. No need for the island government to fight against the racism and nativism experienced by Puerto Ricans in the United States. The structural inequalities with which mi­grants’ social and economic lives w ­ ere circumscribed w ­ ere de-­ emphasized, while the responsibility for integration now fell squarely on the shoulders of Puerto Rican mi­g rants themselves—­who would presumably

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy  •  93

be following the path of ­every immigrant group before them in learning to “adjust” to an “ethnologically dif­fer­ent” environment in the United States. At the center of Puerto Rico’s migration policy was the position that the government would neither “encourage nor discourage” migration. This policy statement ran contrary to all the actions that w ­ ere taken by the government in the following de­cades, a period during which it not only encouraged the migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States but also facilitated and or­ga­nized it as well. As Sierra Berdecía acknowledged years l­ater, the government’s policy of “not encouraging” migration to the United States was part of its “public relations” campaign to prevent opposition to Puerto Rican migration in the United States. He once argued that changing the government’s policy “for another of openly encouraging it could create very serious opposition and obstacles from the American communities where Puerto Ricans ­settle. This opposition and ­these obstacles could seriously delay if not permanently obstruct the employment program of Puerto Rican workers in the United States, which we are developing ­under the most desirable public relations in the Mainland.”44 Even staunch supporters of the PPD government recognized that this policy of “neutrality” on the issue of migration was contradicted by the government’s actions.45

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy a­ fter 1947 The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” remained an issue of concern for Puerto Rican decision makers a­ fter the formulation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in 1947. Top functionaries ­were always concerned with news reports dealing with Puerto Ricans in the United States. ­A fter 1947, they had understood the importance of this issue and the relevance of public relations campaigns to fight the several “Puerto Rican prob­lems” that kept emerging in New York City and elsewhere on the U.S. mainland. This was a constant issue in the communications between the Migration Division in New York and top government officials in Puerto Rico. A ­couple of examples are representative of this concern. In September 1949, Gustavo Agrait, executive assistant to Governor Muñoz Marín, wrote to Manuel Cabranes, head of the Migration Office in New York regarding his concern about recent news reports on Puerto Ricans in the New York media. This was during that year’s mayoral election campaign, in which Marcantonio was a candidate, and city newspapers had begun to debate the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” again. Agrait wrote: “I am worried by the campaign against the Puerto Rican colony that is taking place si­mul­ta­neously in several New York newspapers. I know this is an old ­thing, but I suspect that it has increased recently.” He asked if that campaign was actually against someone

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e­ lse (referring to Marcantonio) and ­whether Puerto Ricans ­were being used as a vehicle for ­these the attacks. Agrait told Cabranes that “I would appreciate if you keep us informed on the course of the situation to see if it is pos­si­ble to do something to prevent it or weaken it.”46 Another example was the concern by island officials regarding the announcement of population growth estimates in New York that showed a dramatic increase in the number of Puerto Ricans in the city by 1970. Se­nior wrote a confidential letter in early 1952 to Sierra Berdecía and BEM director Petroamérica Pagán informing them of the impact that such information would have in the city. Se­nior told them he had been able to lower the estimates for 1970 and had met with representatives of the Urban League and city agencies in order to “prepare a ‘cushion’ of informed citizens and civic leaders” ready to combat the report when it was published. He then voiced the reason for his concern: “I do not have to tell you what kind of hysteria w ­ ill, in all probability, be whipped up by the Mirror, the News, or the World Tele­gram. We would be right back to the days of 1946, 1947, and early 1948 in New York City.” Se­nior emphasized that this hysteria could also spread to other “Puerto Rican colonies [that] are being formed with increasing speed” in other regions of the United States. He reminded them of the “highly confidential nature of this material,” and that any leak to the press “before we have succeeded in building up our defenses would be a terrible catastrophe.”47 Several days ­later, Sierra Berdecía sent the letter to Agrait and commented on its relevance, stating that the ­matter could pre­sent “an issue of public relations that could have serious repercussions to the Puerto Rican community living in New York and also in Puerto Rico’s relations with the mainland,” particularly on its farm l­ abor program and U.S. investments on the island. He requested Agrait to take the issue to Muñoz Marín “as soon as pos­si­ble.”48 ­A fter replying that the governor was busy with other ­matters—­Puerto Rico’s f­ uture status as a commonwealth was u­ nder debate in Congress—­Agrait requested more details on the issue and asked: “Is t­ here a way to prevent the publication of ­these facts?”49 Days l­ater, Se­nior responded to Agrait’s letter, expressing his deep uneasiness with the issue, apparently not obvious to the governor’s office: “Yes, I’m still convinced that we have a terrible catastrophe hanging over our heads. If and when it breaks, u­ nless we have spent at the very least several months of intensive work, it would do tremendous damage not only to the Puerto Ricans who now live in New York, but, and this is even more impor­tant, it ­will cut down drastically on the number of Puerto Ricans we can ­settle outside New York.” Se­nior stated that he and Joseph Monserrat, director of New York’s Migration Office, ­were working with groups in the city to mitigate the consequences of the report, but that the issue required the aid of the ­whole Puerto Rican government. Se­nior told Agrait that it “is pos­si­ble, but not highly

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy  •  95

probable, that this specific study can be kept ‘­under wraps.’ ” Se­nior declared that all ­those in New York involved with the Migration Division “feel the same as I do about the terrific damage that this w ­ ill be done [sic] when t­ hese or similar figures from another source are made public.”50 Months l­ater, Se­nior still reiterated his worry about this issue and its implications in a letter to Teodoro Moscoso, head of the Economic Development Administration: “You can imagine what another wave of anti-­Puerto Rican articles in the New York press would do not only to the population in New York City and to its possibilities for getting jobs but the reaction that would be felt throughout the country, just as it was in 1947 and 1948. We are still ­running into re­sis­tances on the part of ­people throughout the country which ­were built up by newspaper accounts of this period.”51

Redefining the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” One of the few persons able to speak about Puerto Rico’s migration policy was Joseph (or José) Monserrat. He was director of New York’s Migration Office and ­later headed the Migration Division for many years. Monserrat was emblematic for many Puerto Ricans of la oficina en Nueva York. So it was a significant event when he sent governor Muñoz Marín a confidential memo in February 1961, suggesting the need to develop a ­whole new thinking about migration. Monserrat began his memo to Muñoz Marín by stating that his goal was to pre­sent “a unified view of the total real­ity of migration” that could lead to a more realistic migration policy based on the impact migration has on the economic and po­liti­cal development of Puerto Rico. He then argued: Although certain ­factors in the “real­ity of migration” have been recognized, and in fact led to the development of what is now the Migration Division, t­ hese ­factors w ­ ere primarily the “pathological results” of migration in the field of public relations in the States and the adverse effects of this “bad publicity” on Puerto Rico . . . I wish to recall the fact that this law [the migration law of 1947] and the ­limited programs developed therefrom w ­ ere motivated primarily by the negative effects of migration in the United States and consequently w ­ ere generally aimed at minimizing t­ hese effects.52

Montserrat clearly recognized how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City had influenced the formulation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in 1947 and its implementation afterward. Montserrat’s memo provides a background on the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York before 1947 and begins by discussing the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” He stated that Puerto Ricans had migrated to New York for many de­cades and

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that before 1946, ­there ­were some 100,000 of them living in the city. He then asked: “Why this sudden highlighting of the Puerto Ricans? Th ­ ere w ­ ere undoubtedly many reasons but only one is of real significance to us ­here. That reason was Vito Marcantonio” (7). Monserrat goes on to discuss Marcantonio’s po­liti­cal ­career and the attempts ­after the war by the city’s po­liti­cal establishment to defeat him. He then affirms the link between this situation and the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”: “It became obvious that in order to defeat Marcantonio his grip on his constituents had to be broken. ­Here, in my opinion, is where the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem’ was created. In order to break Marcantonio’s stronghold on his community, the ­people had to be divided and to do this required an issue, a scapegoat. The Puerto Ricans became the scapegoat: the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem,’ the issue. Marcantonio, as the ‘creator’ of the issue and the ‘protector’ of the scapegoat, could thus be defeated and in fact was” (8). According to Montserrat, fear was created through the news media when they exaggerated the impact of Puerto Rican migration on the city. It was no coincidence, he argued, that t­ hese stories spread whenever Marcantonio ran for office. He contended that none of the allegations against Marcantonio based on his relationship to Puerto Ricans ­were ever authenticated. The Puerto Rican vote was never big enough to make him win the elections in his district, and the accusations that he brought islanders to New York to vote for him ­were unfounded. But the image of Puerto Ricans as a “prob­lem” had remained long ­a fter that period. Montserrat concluded by stating the consequences of that campaign: “In New York City t­oday Puerto Ricans are a symbol. They symbolize—­indeed personify—­the basic prob­lems of the city” (12). This became the official version of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” ­adopted by Puerto Rican functionaries. The “prob­lem” had nothing to do with the massive migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City, or their subsequent rejection by many sectors ­there based on nativist, racist, and prejudiced notions. It was due to Marcantonio and his infamous politics. This notion, of course, legitimized the attacks against Marcantonio by the Puerto Rican government, particularly in the 1949 mayoral election campaign (to be discussed in chapter 5). One way to combat the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was to fight Marcantonio.53 Monserrat’s thesis that Marcantonio was to blame for the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” might be one of the explanations for this event in New York in the late 1940s but it does not explain why the idea of the “prob­lem” lingered for such a long time a­ fter Marcantonio was out of the public arena, or why it extended beyond New York City to several other areas where Puerto Ricans settled ­after the 1950s. Puerto Rican government officials continued to blame Marcantonio for the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York and kept using this fallacy in po­liti­cal campaigns for many years. None other than Sierra Berdecía used this rhe­toric during the 1951 campaign for the approval of a constitution for Puerto Rico.

The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy  •  97

He called Marcantonio a communist and blamed the negative image of Puerto Ricans in New York on their relationship with him. ­A fter Marcantonio urged Puerto Ricans on the island to oppose the proposed constitution, Sierra Berdecía stated that “the best ser­vice and greatest benefit” that islanders could bestow on their fellow Puerto Ricans in New York was to vote for the constitution and “show the public opinion in New York that Puerto Ricans w ­ ill not be misled” by the statements of Marcantonio.54

Implementing Puerto Rico’s Postwar Migration Policy By 1947, the leadership of the PPD government had reached the same conclusion as previous colonial administrations and defined migration as the best solution to the prob­lem of overpopulation. Migration became a crucial ele­ment in the PPD’s social and economic program for postwar Puerto Rico. Migration was as impor­tant for the PPD at this time as economic development and the island’s po­liti­cal status. In fact, all three w ­ ere deeply interrelated for the PPD leadership. Migration officials—­like Sierra Berdecía, Se­nior, Montserrat—­used to say that the government’s migration policy was the other face of Operation Bootstrap. That is, that economic growth and development would have not occurred without the massive exodus of ­people from Puerto Rico. ­There are two areas of Puerto Rico’s migration policy that merit par­tic­u­lar attention, and both are directly related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City: 1) the role played by the government in building an air transportation infrastructure that would sustain the massive postwar migration; and 2) the use of the island’s education department to encourage migration, particularly through the expansion of En­glish classes to potential mi­grants and to regular students as well.55 Immediately ­after it approved its migration law, the island government prioritized advancing the expansion of a modern and efficient air transportation infrastructure. If migration was seen as a crucial part of Puerto Rico’s postwar economic and po­liti­cal proj­ect, then making it easier for p­ eople to migrate was a priority. To paraphrase a statement attributed to Governor Muñoz Marín, ­there ­ain’t no buses from San Juan to the Bronx. The government of Puerto Rico fiercely lobbied the federal government to allow more flights to the island and encourage more competition among airlines to produce cheaper airfares that would enable more mi­grants to fly to the United States for work. Puerto Rico’s government was ­behind the construction of the modern international airport in Isla Verde (now appropriately named the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport). The main reason for this proj­ect—­based on the government’s own statements and documents—­was to move mi­grants from the island. This modern airport was needed to allow more flights and the larger and more efficient jet planes to land on the island, making it easier for more p­ eople to leave.

98  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Facilitating migration was the central reason for constructing this modern airport, although by the late 1950s the government began to argue that it was tourism, to dispel any criticism in the United States that it was encouraging migration to the U.S. mainland. The expansion in air transportation infrastructure contributed to the increase in the number of Puerto Rican mi­grants heading to New York and elsewhere in the United States during the 1950s. During this period, the growing number of island mi­grants moving to the city continued to be a central ele­ment of the recurring “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York. Another impor­tant area related to Puerto Rico’s migration policy is how the government used the island’s education department to encourage and instill the idea of migration in the minds of potential mi­grants and regular students as well. The government used the Department of Education (DE)—­its largest and farthest-­reaching bureaucracy—to prepare Puerto Ricans to move to the United States and to promote the idea of migration as one worth considering. Since the days of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City, Puerto Rican migration officials—­particularly Sierra Berdecía—­argued that the most impor­ tant prob­lem facing mi­grants in the United States was one of adaptation to the host society, and that lack of En­glish language knowledge and proficiency was the main obstacle to achieving this goal. Officials in New York city and elsewhere in the United States reinforced ­these ideas. One of the first laws enacted by the administration of the newly elected governor Muñoz Marín in 1949 was to make Spanish the main language of public education in Puerto Rico. But that same legislation also made the expansion of En­glish language education a priority for the DE. En­glish classes expanded throughout the regular curriculum, particularly in the rural areas that provided most of the mi­grants for the government’s Farm Placement Program. The DE turned its adult literacy program into its English-­for-­migrants program, which increased rapidly and spread throughout the island during the 1950s. By the mid-1950s, the government began to distribute through the DE tens of thousands of copies of the newspaper Semana, which students w ­ ere asked to take home to their parents. The main objective of this newspaper was to promote En­glish classes for adults, and it focused mostly on the benefits of migrating to the United States. En­glish lessons in Semana w ­ ere ­later linked to the government’s public radio and TV stations. By the end of the 1950s, the main institutions of socialization in the hands of the Puerto Rican government—­education, radio, TV—­were promoting En­glish language education and encouraging migration. By this time, the policy of the government was to make “­every Puerto Rican a potential mi­grant.”56

5

Marcantonio, the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem,” and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City

The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” surfaced again in NYC in 1949, when Congressman Marcantonio became a candidate for city mayor ­under the American ­Labor Party. For Marcantonio’s opposition, his being a communist and a friend and supporter of Puerto Ricans w ­ ere the strongest points of attack against his candidacy. Marcantonio’s defense of the Puerto Rican presence in New York and the intervention of the Puerto Rican government in the 1949 election also reflects the “politics of empire” by connecting po­liti­cal institutions and events in the metropolis and colonial politics in Puerto Rico and Puerto Rican politics on the U.S. mainland. Puerto Rico’s colonial debate moved to the U.S. mainland along with its mi­g rants. The 1949 election is an example of the interconnections of imperial politics at home and abroad. It was imperial cir­cuits, ­a fter all, that connected New York City to Puerto Rico, and U.S. mainland politics to island politics. The construction of U.S. empire and the evolution of imperial politics made the links between Marcantonio and Puerto Ricans (on the island and the mainland) almost inevitable. By the mid 1940s, Marcantonio was perhaps the most vocal anti-­imperialist in the United States and represents the best example of anti-­imperialist politics in the period from the 1930s to 1950.1 As a progressive anti-­imperialist, Marcantonio was drawn to the issue of Puerto Rico and of 99

100  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Puerto Ricans in New York. By the time he was elected to Congress, Puerto Rico was the most impor­tant U.S. colony in the Ca­rib­bean and became the most pressing colonial issue ­after Congress approved the Tydings-­McDuffie Act in 1934, “promising” in­de­pen­dence to the Philippines. Marcantonio was involved directly in Puerto Rico’s politics a­ fter his election and quickly became “Puerto Rico’s representative in Congress” for the rising in­de­pen­dentista and liberal-­ reformist forces taking more impor­tant roles in island politics and government management. But his link to Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans was even more po­liti­cally direct and personal: his congressional district included El Barrio (East Harlem), a significant and active Puerto Rican settlement before 1945. Marcantonio was an impor­tant actor in Puerto Rican politics—­both on the island and the mainland—­from his election in 1934 u­ ntil his electoral defeat in 1950. No other U.S. politician reflected more the dilemma of empire and imperial politics at this time than Marcantonio. Lacking not only participation but also effective repre­sen­ta­tion in the metropolitan po­liti­cal structure, Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico and New York City during the 1930s and 1940s turned to Marcantonio as their representative ­there. But his defense of Puerto Rico and of Puerto Ricans in the United States became an impor­tant issue in his po­liti­cal demise. Marcantonio was also at the center of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City for both the Puerto Rican and the city po­liti­cal establishments a­ fter 1947. However, Marcantonio’s relationship with Puerto Ricans reinforced the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York city from another ­angle. The relationship of Puerto Ricans with Marcantonio—­who was considered a communist for his progressive politics and refusal to support the rising anti-­communist discourse at the beginning of the Cold War era—­also “tinted” their po­liti­cal characterization as radicals and communist sympathizers. The colonial subjects that in Puerto Rico w ­ ere deemed racially and culturally “alien” to the United States became “alien” to the United States po­liti­cally as well once they moved to New York City. This chapter looks at the 1949 mayoral election in New York City, a crucial event in the po­liti­cal incorporation of Puerto Ricans in the postwar period. It explores the role played by Marcantonio in Puerto Rican politics—on the island and on the mainland—­particularly his popularity among the Puerto Rican community in New York City. The relationship between the Harlem congressman, the Puerto Rican community in New York, and Puerto Rico’s government influenced the incorporation of this group into the city’s politics. The Puerto Rican government intervened in this electoral campaign to deal with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the United States. Its participation in the 1949 election also legitimized its intervention in New York politics as an intermediary and representative of the Puerto Rican community on the mainland.

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  101

Marcantonio and Puerto Rican Politics Marcantonio’s relationship with Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans began with his election as congressman for New York’s Seventeenth Congressional District in 1934 (to be renamed the ­Fourteenth District a­ fter the 1944 redistricting), which included Puerto Rican Harlem. In this election, he received only 28 ­percent of the Puerto Rican vote. One of Marcantonio’s first manifestations regarding Puerto Rico was to support statehood for the island, a position not well regarded in El Barrio at that time. Gerald Meyer, Marcantonio’s biographer, argues that his support among Puerto Ricans increased when he began to support in­de­pen­dence and the Nationalist Party leader Pedro Albizu Campos. Marcantonio achieved 40 ­percent of the Puerto Rican vote in 1936, the same year he submitted the first of his bills supporting in­de­pen­dence for Puerto Rico and also became a defense ­lawyer for Albizu Campos, who had been accused of conspiracy against the U.S. government.2 Support from his Puerto Rican constituency never wavered ­after that, not even during the critical years when Marcantonio was confronted by the w ­ hole New York po­liti­cal establishment and the Puerto Rican government. Puerto Rican support for Marcantonio is explained by his consistent solidarity with and advocacy for the community since the 1930s. He provided aid and support at a time when the New York City po­liti­cal establishment ignored Puerto Ricans. His office in East Harlem provided t­ hese mi­grants ser­vices in the areas of welfare, housing, education, and health care—­services that the city government had denied them. He defended them from racism and prejudices when no one e­ lse did. He became, in the words of Bernardo Vega, the community’s premier chronicler, “el campeón de los puertorriqueños” (the champion of Puerto Ricans).3 But the relationship between Marcantonio and the Puerto Rican community was a two-­way street. Contrary to the predominant notion among the Puerto Rican and city establishments (and l­ ater of American scholars) of Puerto Ricans as lacking orga­nizational and leadership capabilities, this was not an apathetic, disor­ga­nized, and marginal community in need of leadership. As Vega and ­others have elaborated, this was a vibrant, well or­ga­ nized, and po­liti­cally active community. The community was represented by radical and militant workers, artisans, merchants, intellectuals, and professionals. Th ­ ere ­were many community and po­liti­cal organ­izations, many of them espousing radical ideas and in­de­pen­dence.4 They supported Marcantonio not ­because they ­were in need of a leader but ­because they shared his ideals and actions. As Meyer has argued, the community’s po­liti­cal ideas and marginal socioeconomic status correlated well with Marcantonio’s progressive positions.5 Marcantonio’s defense of Puerto Ricans in New York and Puerto Rico was based mainly on his ideals; as he used to say, it “was due not only to the fact that I represent the largest Puerto Rican constituency . . . ​but also to my desire

102  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

as a progressive to defend the most exploited victims of a most devastating imperialism.”6 Puerto Rican endorsement for Marcantonio was based not only on his unfailing support of Puerto Ricans in New York but also on his actions in f­ avor of Puerto Rico in and outside Congress. As Meyer has argued, Marcantonio “served two constituencies in the House: his Congressional District and Puerto Rico itself.”7 From the late 1930s to the late 1940s, Marcantonio was the major defender of Puerto Rico’s interests in Congress. He presented numerous bills and mea­sures favoring the island. Among t­ hese ­were bills to apply the Fair ­Labor Standards Act and the minimum wage to Puerto Rico; protection of the island’s coffee industry against the buying practices of the U.S. armed forces (1941); and the extension to Puerto Rico of the amendments to the Social Security Act (1939). He also authored a bill approved by Congress in 1942 to make Puerto Ricans born on the island ­after the Jones Act U.S.-­born citizens. Since 1940, he fought for Puerto Rican “expedicionarios”—­contract workers in the United Stated during the First World War—to be certified as military personnel and have veterans’ benefits extended to them or their families. Other war­time mea­sures included his submission of a bill in 1942 to provide financial aid to Puerto Rico to compensate for the dire economic conditions imposed by the war and his defense of Puerto Ricans’ claims against unjust land appropriations by the U.S. armed forces during the war. In addition, he halted the Cole Amendment that sought to eliminate the Foraker Act provision returning rum taxes to the island. He proposed numerous bills to increase congressional appropriations for the island in areas of education, employment, and relief. He was a staunch defender of the use of Spanish as the language of instruction in Puerto Rico.8 Questioned by right-­wing forces in Puerto Rico about his “meddling” in Puerto Rico’s affairs, Marcantonio answered that it was not only his duty as a member of Congress but also as a representative of Puerto Ricans in New York.9 Many Puerto Ricans recently arrived to New York voted for Marcantonio ­because they knew his name well from the island (the claim by the opposition that he paid for their trips to New York was, of course, spurious).10 In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Marcantonio’s name was well recognized in Puerto Rico. On his 1936 visit to Puerto Rico—­the only trip he made outside the continental United States—he was received by thousands and given a reception resembling that of a head of state. He had just submitted his first in­de­pen­dence bill in reaction to the punitive Tydings in­de­pen­dence bill of that same year. The latter forced in­de­pen­dence upon the island with no economic compensation or continued relationship with the United States. He also arrived to take Nationalist Party leader Pedro Albizu Campos’s defense in a case that the American Civil Liberties Union would l­ ater declare a mockery of justice.11 Thus during this period in the 1930s and early 1940s, as the most avid defender of the extension of New Deal mea­sures to Puerto Rico, Marcantonio

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  103

received the acclaim of most of the island’s ­labor movement and sectors of its po­liti­cal establishment. Among the latter was the reformist sector of the Liberal Party, discontent with conservative party leadership; this sector would ­later leave the Liberal Party and form the Popu­lar Demo­cratic Party. Among the supporters and allies of Marcantonio in this group was its leader, Luis Muñoz Marín. At this time, Marcantonio assumed the defense of Puerto Rico’s interests in Congress by default. The island’s representatives in Congress, the elected resident commissioners, became defenders of sugar and manufacturing interests and opposed New Deal reforms on the island. Ironically, they ­were the presidents of the Socialist Party in Puerto Rico: first Santiago Iglesias Pantín, and ­later Bolívar Pagán. During the 1930s, the Socialists formed a po­liti­cal pact with the right-­wing Republicans, together called the Co­ali­tion, which won the elections in 1932 and 1936. The Socialist leadership a­ dopted conservative postures to maintain the po­liti­cal pact and its government patronage.12 Marcantonio was in the uncomfortable position of defending New Deal reforms and other policies for Puerto Rico over the opposition of the island’s resident commissioner. For example, Marcantonio’s strug­g le to extend the Fair ­Labor Standards Act and minimum wage laws to the island was opposed by Iglesias Pantín and Pagán. No won­der workers from all around the island proclaimed Marcantonio as the “true representative of Puerto Rico in the American Congress.”13 Not only workers appreciated his positions in Congress. Muñoz Marín, then struggling to gain the support of the masses for his party, also acknowledged Marcantonio’s defense of Puerto Rican workers’ interests. During this period, Muñoz Marín and Marcantonio exchanged letters regarding the Works Pro­gress Administration’s attempt to reduce wages in Puerto Rico. ­A fter complaining that ­labor organ­izations had abandoned the interests of workers and had become entangled with business interests, Muñoz Marín wrote to Marcantonio: “Both the men [workers] and myself place our hope in you that you may tackle this prob­lem in Washington as successfully as you have tackled ­others in defense of Puerto Rico heretofore.”14 Correspondence between the two leaders shows they had a working relationship on many issues relevant to Puerto Rico.15 ­There are other indications of Muñoz Marín’s affinity for the Harlem congressman. Angelita Santaella, a relative of Muñoz Marín, wrote to Marcantonio: “I do know of the g­ reat affect [sic] that Luis Muñoz Marín have [sic] for you for the valuable assistance that you have given him in all prob­lems concerning the very life of Puerto Rico.”16 Another ele­ment contributing to Marcantonio’s popularity in Puerto Rico was his campaign to remove perhaps the most brutal and despised of all the U.S.-­appointed governors: Blanton Winship. Winship’s repressive regime reached its lowest point with the Ponce Massacre in March 1936, when unarmed

104  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Nationalist Party demonstrators ­were shot by police on his ­orders, resulting in 17 deaths and 235 wounded. The governor was supported in Puerto Rico only by the conservative Co­a li­tion.17 Marcantonio became the major advocate in Washington for reformist and progressive forces in Puerto Rico seeking to depose Winship. His tireless lobbying of President Roo­se­velt and Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes succeeded in removing the governor.18 The ousting of Winship was seen in Puerto Rico as a victory for island reformist forces—­ and for Marcantonio in par­tic­u­lar. Many close to the PPD recognized this.19 In view of the warm ongoing po­liti­cal and personal relationship between the leader of Puerto Rico’s dominant party and government and the Italian American congressman, how can we explain the acrimonious relationship that had developed by the late 1940s, when Muñoz Marín publicly proclaimed Marcantonio a “communist” and Marcantonio characterized his former friend as “the Nero of Fortaleza” (the same epithet he had used ­earlier to depict Winship)? Most observers of this period agree that the conflict between Muñoz Marín and Marcantonio reflects differing notions about the island’s po­liti­cal status. Such an argument is presented by Gerald Meyer, the only biographer of Marcantonio who has devoted considerable attention to Marcantonio’s relationship to Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans.20 This observation has merit. By 1945, Muñoz Marín had declared his opposition to in­de­pen­dence and his support for a po­liti­cal and economic relationship with the United States. Marcantonio maintained his support for in­de­pen­dence ­until his death. He submitted bills for Puerto Rican in­de­pen­dence in 1943 and 1945. But what may have also been distressing to Muñoz Marín was Marcantonio’s support for in­de­pen­dence forces in Puerto Rico, which presented a direct challenge to Muñoz Marín’s leadership in the party and government. In 1943, in­de­pen­dence supporters in and outside the PPD created the Congreso Pro Independencia (CPI; Pro-­ MelendezIndependence Congress) to pressure the PPD to promote this option in Puerto Rico and the United States. CPI members in the PPD ­were expelled by Muñoz Marín in 1946; l­ater that year, this group and other in­de­pen­dence supporters created the Partido In­de­pen­dentista Puertorriqueño (PIP; Puerto Rican In­de­pen­dence Party). Marcantonio gave his support first to the CPI and ­later to the PIP. By 1947, Marcantonio had become the PPD’s and the Puerto Rican government’s most ardent foe in Washington. He became a critical opponent of the economic and po­liti­cal reforms sought by the PPD and the U.S. government officials in Puerto Rico. When in 1947 Congress approved the election of the island’s governor for the first time, Marcantonio questioned its value, calling it a reform of the colonial status that denied the ­people of Puerto Rico their right to self-­determination.21 L ­ ater, Marcantonio furiously attacked the bill to approve the commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1950, calling it “a colonial mea­ sure; it means nothing to the Puerto Rican ­people; it leaves unresolved the

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  105

Puerto Rican po­liti­cal prob­lem.”22 He argued that Muñoz Marín and the PPD had proposed a pro­cess for the self-­determination of Puerto Ricans and had no mandate to advocate for a commonwealth. Marcantonio claimed that the governing party never presented the commonwealth alternative as an option to the p­ eople of Puerto Rico in the 1948 elections.23 He also contended that approval of the commonwealth was an attempt by the U.S. government to “obtain formal consent of Puerto Ricans to their pre­sent [colonial] relationship with the United States.”24 Marcantonio submitted several amendments to the bill, which, of course, ­were rejected by the House of Representatives.25 Marcantonio asked Puerto Ricans to defeat the new constitution—­which he called a “new slavery contract”—in the 1951 referendum supported by the PPD and the U.S. government.26 Marcantonio also became a staunch opponent of Operation Bootstrap, the PPD’s economic reform policy, which he sarcastically called “Operation Booby-­ Trap.” In this industrialization program—­approved in 1947, the same year the migration law was ratified—­the PPD government sought to promote economic development through the attraction of U.S. capital in manufacturing industries by providing several incentives, mostly tax exemption, cheap ­labor, and infrastructure provisions. Marcantonio argued that the most impor­tant limitation to the island’s economic development lay in its po­liti­cal and economic subordination to the United States. He insisted that in­de­pen­dence was necessary for Puerto Rico’s economic growth. He characterized Operation Bootstrap as a program to benefit U.S. interests and capital and dubbed Muñoz Marín a “Wall Street stooge.”27 Marcantonio’s role in this period as the most fervent adversary of the Puerto Rican government’s economic and po­liti­cal proposals in Washington does not on its own explain the furious attack against him by the PPD in 1949. ­A fter all, Marcantonio’s criticism of the PPD’s reforms found no substantial echo in Washington, where by this time he was isolated and marginalized in the midst of postwar Cold War politics. In Puerto Rico, the PPD had achieved its po­liti­ cal and electoral hegemony by 1948, and the PIP presented no real danger to it or an alternative to the government’s economic and po­liti­cal reforms. What explains the PPD’s attack on Marcantonio in 1949 is the congressman’s role in New York City politics and his relationship to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. By this time, the Puerto Rican government had publicly defined the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” as a situation caused by the community’s relationship to Marcantonio. Reaction to Puerto Rican migration was due to Marcantonio’s reputation in New York City and not to prejudice and racism against the mi­grant group, argued the PPD leaders. If Marcantonio dis­appeared from the scene, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” would dissipate, the logic went. In its campaign against Marcantonio, the Puerto Rican government made a pact with New York’s

106  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

po­liti­cal establishment in order to reduce the adverse reaction to the entry of Puerto Rican mi­grants in New York. Moreover, the campaign allowed Puerto Rico’s government to become an intermediary for Puerto Ricans in city politics. But Marcantonio was linked to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” and to government policies in other ways. As Bernardo Vega recognized at the time, the Puerto Rican government resented “the influence of Vito Marcantonio and his role in the Puerto Rican strug­gles.” Vega argued that the Puerto Rican government pretended to “impose its direction” on the community through the recently opened Migration Office in New York City.28 Ser­vices and support to the community provided by Marcantonio w ­ ere sometimes similar and very often on a larger scale than ­those that the Migration Office would offer beginning in the late 1940s. In addition, Marcantonio was an obstacle to the “leadership and organ­ization” that the government of Puerto Rico sought to render the community in order to deal with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” The congressman was also critical of the role played by the Puerto Rican government in sponsoring migration from the island. He understood that Puerto Ricans ­were treated as cheap l­abor in the United States and had no protection from their government. As long as Puerto Ricans in New York considered Marcantonio as their “defender” against abuses, discrimination, and exploitation, the Puerto Rican government could not play this role ­under the Migration Office.

The 1949 Elections in New York City The 1949 mayoral election occupies a significant place in New York City po­liti­ cal history. This election and its campaign must be understood as an attempt by the city power structure to defeat Marcantonio, by then the only progressive in Congress. The opposition to the congressman can also be seen as a tactic to undermine the American ­Labor Party (ALP), of which he was the leader. ­There w ­ ere other reasons why the city po­liti­cal establishment wanted Marcantonio defeated. Since the 1930s, he had been elected ­under both the Republican and Demo­cratic parties’ slates; beginning in 1938, he also ran as the ALP candidate. E ­ arlier attempts to defeat the Harlem representative included the 1944 redemarcation of his Twentieth Congressional district, which included most of East Harlem, and the creation of the Eigh­teenth Congressional district, which incorporated other East Side areas not sympathetic to him. This ploy did not work, as Marcantonio was reelected in 1944 and 1946. But in 1947, the New York State legislature passed the Wilson-­Pakula Act, which prevented any candidate from entering the primary of a party of which they ­were not a member; this law had every­thing but Marcantonio’s name on it. Nevertheless, it was not sufficient to defeat him in the 1948 elections, when he ran ­under the ALP banner and won again. Marcantonio de­cided to run in the 1949 mayoral

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  107

contest to push his progressive agenda and make the ALP a po­liti­cal force in city politics. By 1949, Marcantonio was a rare bird in the American po­liti­cal scene: a progressive r­unning for office and winning with popu­lar backing. The 1948 national elections signified a reversal for progressive politics in the United States. This was the first national campaign fought ­under the clouds of the emerging Cold War climate. Marcantonio was one of the few survivors of the conservative tide that swept the country. The anti-­communist campaign against him in the 1949 mayoral election was a consequence of ­these events; it was also a prelude to the 1950 congressional election, in which anti-­communist smears ­were an impor­tant f­ actor in his defeat.29 Other ­factors created a context for the role played by Puerto Ricans in this election. Facing Marcantonio ­were Mayor O’Dwyer, seeking his reelection ­under the Demo­cratic Party banner, and Newbold Morris, ­r unning for the Republican and Liberal parties. Although most predictions saw the incumbent mayor as winning, O’Dwyer’s lead over Morris was uncertain, so any vote g­ oing to Marcantonio would hurt Demo­crats the most. The mayoral election would also bear on the race for U.S. senator of New York, where Herbert Lehman faced John Foster Dulles, an impor­tant ­battle with significance for the Senate’s balance. Marcantonio had called for the mayoral candidates to abstain from endorsing candidates for the Senate race, which hurt Demo­crats and Lehman the most.30 By mid-­October, Marcantonio’s campaign experienced an upsurge in popularity, a cause for concern in O’Dwyer’s headquarters. Of par­tic­u­lar interest was his popularity among the city’s “ethnic vote.” As LaGumina has argued, “­There ­were indications that he was making considerable impact on three impor­tant New York City ethnic and racial groups—­the Italians, Puerto Ricans and Negroes. . . . ​Even more telling was O’Dwyer’s efforts to cut into Marcantonio’s strength among Puerto Ricans. This was a genuine concern ­because Marcantonio’s name and Puerto Rican influx had become nearly synonymous.”31 In October, the PPD’s intensified its anti-­Marcantonio campaign in the city, with the aim of weakening Marcantonio’s grip on the Puerto Rican community and facilitating the reelection of O’Dwyer. A crucial reason for the Puerto Rican government’s intervention in the 1949 mayoral election was to address the recurrent “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. By then, the PPD had blamed the “prob­lem” on the continued association between the Harlem congressman and the Puerto Rican community: in its view, Marcantonio’s negative reputation in the city and in the country adversely affected the smooth integration of islanders into life in New York City. The PPD’s goal was to dissociate Puerto Ricans from Marcantonio, electorally and in the arena of public opinion. The party’s discourse had already become evident by the 1948 elections, with support from the island’s leading

108  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

newspaper, El Mundo, whose line closely resembled the government’s on migration issues. In an editorial about Marcantonio, the 1948 New York elections, and Puerto Ricans, El Mundo declared By supporting Marcantonio, Puerto Rican voters have shared in the national prejudice that exists against him. Prob­ably for the same reason, some newspapers have developed a campaign against Puerto Ricans in Harlem and, by the way, against all Puerto Rican interests. Prob­ably for the same reason, ­there is the prejudice against Puerto Ricans in the city of New York (and possibly in other parts of the United States) that we represent a group of radicals without much affection for American traditions. . . . The truth is that, for many of our forsaken fellow citizens, Marcantonio has been a g­ reat comfort [paño de lagrimas]. When nobody wanted to take care of our poorest ­people in that city, Marcantonio made the effort to find them employment, he fought for their right to aid from the public welfare system, and extended to ­others l­ ittle ­favors that, in moments of need, represent salvation for an individual. The electoral support for Marcantonio on the part of many Puerto Ricans could come from self-­interest and gratitude, and not precisely from shared po­liti­cal ideas. . . . That is why it would be a m ­ istake to generalize that all Puerto Ricans share his po­liti­cal ideals. And it would be another ­mistake that such a generalization be extended, which is an injustice to Puerto Rico. In this regard, Demo­crats as well as Republicans in the city of New York could learn something by examining this loyalty to Marcantonio. That loyalty could be obtained if they took the same good care of Puerto Ricans [as he has].32

New York City’s po­liti­cal establishment and its major newspapers ­were not as delicate as El Mundo; they launched a malicious campaign against Marcantonio in the 1948 congressional elections, mostly depicting him as a communist. However, he won handily, and once again he received most of the Puerto Rican vote in Harlem.33 A year ­later, Luis Muñoz Marín, in his well-­known letter to Mayor O’Dwyer, made the same argument as El Mundo. In his view, Puerto Rican support for Marcantonio came from gratitude for his ser­vice to the community; however, this relationship was the fundamental reason b­ ehind the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City. The governor wished to clarify the “significant misconception” regarding Puerto Ricans in the city:

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  109

The relations of a sector of the Puerto Rican community to Mr. Marcantonio plus Mr. Marcantonio’s par­tic­u­lar kind of ideology have resulted in a false identification of the w ­ hole Puerto Rican community with Mr. Marcantonio’s po­liti­cal ideology. . . . Many Puerto Ricans are grateful to Mr. Marcantonio b­ ecause he and his organ­ization looked a­ fter them upon their first arrival in New York and have kept in close contact thereafter. Th ­ ere is nothing wrong with a feeling of personal appreciation for past ser­vices. But, it is well known that ­there is an additional f­ actor which many grateful Puerto Ricans frequently overlook while their continental fellow-­citizens keep constantly in mind: Mr. Marcantonio is ­either a Communist Party member or a close adherent of the Communist Party procedures and purposes. . . . ​It is this association that, I believe, is chiefly responsible for the virulent prejudices against Puerto Ricans that frequently break out.34

According to the Puerto Rican government leaders, attacking Marcantonio and breaking his hold upon the Puerto Rican electorate in Harlem (and in this election, in the city as a w ­ hole) was one way of dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. In 1949, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was resurrected once again as a campaign issue during the mayoral election. As before, Marcantonio was attacked for his close relationship to Puerto Ricans.35 The number of media attacks on Puerto Ricans increased from the previous year; moreover, they acquired a more vicious tone. Puerto Ricans became entangled in Cold War politics in the United States. A new argument emerged, insisting that Puerto Ricans ­were not only an aggravation to New York City but, even worse, a threat to the safety of the United States and the Western world. The most blatant example of this argument was published in an article in the right-­wing journal the American Way, printed in the midst of the electoral campaign. The article—­entitled “Our Worst Slum: Can We Save It from ­Going Red?”—­presented a laundry list of social and economic ills plaguing Spanish Harlem similar to ­those of the 1947 “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign, ranging from unemployment, prostitution, gambling, drugs, social dysfunction, rampant crime, and unsanitary be­hav­iors to an unassimilable culture. In addition, according to the article, Puerto Ricans’ presumed sympathies for communism posed a grave threat to national security; the piece claimed that “we have permitted a g­ reat Communist-­breeding slum to grow up in the heart of our largest city.” If federal policies failed to improve their economic conditions and Americanize them, if the Puerto Rican government failed to improve conditions on the island to halt their migration, or if Puerto Ricans w ­ ere not distributed more evenly throughout the United States, “the slum ­will spread like a festering sore ­until it endangers the social

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health not only of New York, but of the nation.” It further argued that if “they vote as overwhelmingly for extreme left-­wing leaders as they do now, they could prove a power­f ul and, in certain circumstances, a sinister po­liti­cal force . . . ​ [T]he Puerto Ricans of New York could swing an election which might place the world’s largest city, with all its shipping docks, and other vital facilities, in the hands of revolutionary conspirators, and thus pave the way for national paralysis.” Why this identification of Puerto Ricans with communism? Puerto Ricans ­were supporters of Vito Marcantonio, who was described as a communist stalwart: “this follower of Moscow’s Red line has taken them ­under his wing, and he w ­ ill keep them ­there if he can.”36 One impor­tant event during this time was the creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs (MCPRA) in September 1949. This committee was openly used to campaign against Marcantonio in the mayoral election campaign, with the support of the Puerto Rican government. Its most impor­ tant activities before November 1949 ­were held in El Barrio, in Marcantonio’s district, in order to gain Puerto Rican votes for Mayor O’Dwyer.37 The committee’s activities and program attempted to separate Puerto Ricans from Marcantonio. Furthermore, MCPRA represented an attempt by the New York City po­liti­cal establishment to “officially” incorporate Puerto Ricans into the city’s po­liti­cal pro­cess: “officially,” in the sense that the city government and parties did not recognize their po­liti­cal presence in support of Marcantonio. The city government recognized the Puerto Rican government as representative of the Puerto Rican community in New York City, allowing it to become an actor in city politics. The creation of the MCPRA reflected an agreement of cooperation between the government of Puerto Rico and the City of New York to deal with the issue of Puerto Ricans in the city that would last for many years. Officially, the NYC government created MCPRA to address the issue of Puerto Ricans and welfare. The foundation of an “Advisory Committee on Puerto Ricans” was one recommendation of a report on Puerto Ricans and welfare submitted in early September by the commissioner of welfare, Raymond M. Hilliard, to Mayor O’Dwyer. One conclusion of this report was that the Puerto Rican community in New York City needed “guidance and leadership.”38 The implication, of course, was that this “guidance and leadership” would be provided by the city and the Puerto Rican governments. Criticism of the creation of the committee came from Marcantonio, who characterized it as a “triquiñuela” (a po­liti­cal campaign trick) to cover up the administration’s “crass negligence” of Puerto Ricans in the city. Marcantonio questioned the supposed need to develop Puerto Rican leadership in the city, arguing that Puerto Ricans “do not need advice on their leadership. Their traditions of demo­cratic strug­gle are as old as ­those of the American ­people . . . ​They have as good a leadership as any other group.” Marcantonio argued that the defamatory campaign against Puerto Ricans in New York City increased the discrimination

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against this group, “imposing upon them a condition of second-­class citizenship and forcing them into a cheap ­labor market.”39 The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” surfaced once again in New York City and became an issue in the 1949 electoral campaign. Two widely discussed topics in this campaign w ­ ere welfare and Puerto Ricans. ­These issues, in turn, ­were linked by his opponents to Marcantonio and his supposed ties to communism. Besides accusing Puerto Ricans of inflating the city’s welfare rolls and of being welfare cheaters, ­there was the question of welfare itself. Marcantonio censured O’Dwyer and Welfare Commissioner Hilliard for trimming welfare assistance to some 300,000 recipients, and for trying to construct a “false economy at the expense of ­those who can least afford it.”40 The mayor reacted by stating that Marcantonio wanted candidate Newbold Morris elected so he (Marcantonio) could “keep his Commy friends in the Welfare Department.” He argued that communists exploited welfare recipients for their own po­liti­cal and economic interests. O’Dwyer claimed he had appointed Hilliard—­a Republican—­ precisely to clean out the Welfare Department of any communists. Marcantonio responded, saying that the mayor’s statements w ­ ere red herrings to cover up his administration’s inadequacies and that its policies had been detrimental to the poorest of the poor.41 In a meeting with Puerto Ricans during the last days of the campaign, O’Dwyer accused Marcantonio of trying to convert the Welfare Department into “a Communist club­house.” ­A fter enumerating his administration’s policies in f­ avor of Puerto Ricans, the mayor accused Marcantonio and his “Communist stooges” of leading Puerto Ricans away from “the channels of patriotism” to that “dread ­enemy of our nation, the Communist Party.” He added that Marcantonio and “his Communist stooges” tricked Puerto Ricans into believing they could get city ser­vices from them and that no one in the city “need be led down the blind alley of Communism to get fair treatment in this city.” Speaking directly to Puerto Ricans, O’Dwyer declared that when “the hour of need comes, ­there is an agency known as the Welfare Department. We have receptionists so that we can have at least a common channel of communication.” He concluded by pronouncing that Puerto Ricans “­don’t have to go to any club­house to get relief.”42 By linking Puerto Ricans to welfare and communism, O’Dwyer was enflaming the same prejudices that had fueled the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. Marcantonio recognized this, arguing that the mayor “uses my friendship for the Puerto Rican ­people against me” and in so d­ oing “incited racial hatred against the Puerto Ricans.”43 The Puerto Rican campaign in support of Mayor O’Dwyer began in earnest by mid-­October. In a meeting or­ga­nized by the Puerto Rican Committee to Reelect O’Dwyer, headed by Laura Santiago (a well-­known PPD supporter and also president of the United Puerto Rican Committee), City Council president Vincent Impellitteri declared that the Puerto Rican vote was impor­tant for reelecting O’Dwyer and enumerated the administration’s policies in ­favor of

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the island community in New York.44 On October 14, Josefina (Fini) Rincón, then acting mayor of San Juan during her ­sister’s absence, was received by Mayor O’Dwyer at city hall. Rincón publicly backed the mayor, citing his administration’s support to Puerto Ricans in the city, and promised to actively campaign for his reelection. She stated that she would also solicit the Puerto Rican vote for the election of Lehman for the Senate and Robert F. Wagner for borough president of Manhattan—­that is, the Demo­cratic slate.45 As her ­sister did ­later, Rincón not only lobbied for O’Dwyer within the Puerto Rican community, but she also took the opportunity to denounce the PIP. In response to the PIP president’s comments on her campaigning in New York, she responded that the PIP did not represent the p­ eople of Puerto Rico, since they had not elected a single public official in the past elections. Rincón replied that Puerto Ricans in New York believed in “demo­cratic ideals” and would “vote for democracy by voting for the reelection of Mayor William O’Dwyer.”46 On November 1, the mayor of San Juan, Felisa Rincón de Gautier, was received at the airport by O’Dwyer, where she announced she would campaign for him during the next ten days; her ­sister, acting mayor of San Juan, would also remain in the city.47 Rincón de Gautier was honored at a gala at the H ­ otel Empire, where guests of honor included New York City administration officials such as Impellitteri and other well-­known Puerto Ricans; the event was or­ga­nized by her ­sister, Josefina, and Laura Santiago. Rincón de Gautier declared the Puerto Ricans “should not allow themselves to be fooled like puppets, but instead should vote in f­ avor of Puerto Rico, and not against Puerto Rico.” Marcantonio responded by insisting that she should have stayed in San Juan, where she was needed more by the city’s poor.48 On November 3, Rincón de Gautier was officially received by O’Dwyer at city hall. Th ­ ere she once again proclaimed her support for him and thanked him for proj­ects benefitting Puerto Ricans in the city.49 Like her s­ ister before, Rincón de Gautier used her podium to attack the PIP. She declared that Marcantonio was linked to a party that did not represent the vast majority of Puerto Ricans and that was “opposed to every­thing that is good in Puerto Rico.”50 She fiercely attacked Marcantonio, arguing that “my constituents w ­ ere being misled by individuals of an ideology foreign to us and contrary to our princi­ples of democracy.” She saw her role in the mayoral campaign as helping to “dissuade my countrymen of this ideology and to assist ­those who, I feel, are friends and champions of our demo­cratic form of government, among whom I count the Hon. William O’Dwyer.”51 Perhaps the most significant PPD tactic during the 1949 campaign was Muñoz Marín’s letter of October 6 to O’Dwyer, in which he accused Marcantonio of being a communist and indirectly asking all Puerto Ricans in New York to vote for the incumbent mayor. Puerto Rico’s governor began his letter by recognizing O’Dwyer for his administration’s attention to Puerto Ricans, including

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  113

MCPRA, and his “defense” of islanders in the city. He also acknowledged him for “clarifying in the minds of all that the overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans in New York City are neither on relief nor seeking relief.” Muñoz Marín then clarified the other “significant misconception concerning Puerto Ricans” in New York: that they ­were all followers of Marcantonio. He asserted that the vast majority ­were not, and that the actions of the minority of Puerto Ricans who supported Marcantonio “resulted in a false identification of the w ­ hole Puerto Rican community with Mr. Marcantonio’s po­liti­cal ideology.” The prob­ lem, he argued, was that most Puerto Ricans in New York had not registered to vote in city elections. He then contended: “I believe that if most Puerto Ricans would vote, the unfair red tinge placed upon New York Puerto Ricans by Marcantonio would be incontrovertibly and definitely shown to be false. That red tinge is what creates such harmful hostility against the w ­ hole group.” A ­ fter explaining that Puerto Rican support for Marcantonio came from gratitude for ser­vices provided to the community and that ­there ­were extremely few communists in Puerto Rico, Muñoz Marín indicated that it would be best for Puerto Ricans to get “rid of this deplorable identification” with communism. He asked Puerto Ricans “to come out and register in mass and go to the polls on November 8 and vote in a clear and overwhelming manner to show t­ here is no more communist tinge in the New York Puerto Ricans than ­there is ­here in the Island.”52 Muñoz Marín never asked Puerto Ricans point-­blank to vote for O’Dwyer in this letter—he would avoid taking sides in New York politics for many years—­but the PPD’s campaign in New York for O’Dwyer left no doubt whom the governor supported. While he abstained from any direct intervention in the campaign for fear of inflaming tensions over the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York, he allowed O’Dwyer to make the letter public and use it in the campaign.53 Muñoz Marín’s letter was made public on October 16 in New York City and Puerto Rico. Marcantonio reacted by accusing the governor of d­ oing nothing for his p­ eople, that he had “double-­crossed the Puerto Ricans,” and that his “administration [was] filled with graft and corruption.” He predicted that, with the publication of this letter, “the Puerto Rican vote ­will be the most impor­tant contributing ­factor” to O’Dwyer’s defeat.54 Among Marcantonio’s supporters was PIP president Gilberto Concepción de Gracia, who campaigned in New York for Marcantonio since the end of October. He said the letter was “a pretty unfair statement” by Muñoz Marín and accused the governor of using Puerto Rico’s government machinery to defend O’Dwyer, particularly its New York office and its sending of Rincón de Gautier to campaign for the New York mayor. “It is a po­liti­cal patronage office,” Concepción de Gracia said, referring to the Migration Office in New York, “and they have been working for O’Dwyer.” He accused Muñoz Marín of sending 25,000 letters to Puerto Ricans in New York asking them to vote for the incumbent.55

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Largely due to outrage over this letter, Concepción de Gracia de­cided to campaign for Marcantonio. On October 26, he arrived in New York, where he was received at the airport by the congressman. Calling Marcantonio “the best friend Puerto Rico ever had in this country,” Concepción de Gracia announced that he would campaign for him throughout the Puerto Rican community in New York. He proclaimed Marcantonio’s defense of Puerto Rican in­de­pen­ dence and of Puerto Ricans’ rights in the United States, as well as his success in ousting Winship, as reasons for his support.56 He accused the San Juan mayor of campaigning in New York at the expense of the ­people of Puerto Rico and of having no support within the community in the city. Concepción de Gracia argued that the recent media campaign against Puerto Ricans in city tabloids like the Daily Mirror and the World Tele­g ram ­were part of a “defamation campaign” against islanders by the reactionary forces opposing Marcantonio with “the purpose of confusing the non–­Puerto Rican electorate in the city.”57 He labeled Muñoz Marín and Rincón de Gautier—­whom he accused of trying to “indoctrinate” Puerto Ricans in the city—as “birds of passage” (aves de paso) that did not know the prob­lems and real­ity of the New York community. Concepción de Gracia called O’Dwyer’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs “a pre-­elections electoral trick to fool the incautious and satisfy the ingenuous.” He condemned the mayor for d­ oing nothing to improve the living conditions of the community in New York City and for not hiring a single Puerto Rican to serve in his administration. Neither the O’Dwyer administration nor the Puerto Rican government had defended the Puerto Rican community against the brutal and racist attacks they had suffered at the hands of the city’s media. According to the PIP president, only the election of Marcantonio could guarantee the two fundamental issues of interest to Puerto Ricans in the United States: (1) the end of the colonial system in Puerto Rico, which lay at the root of the migration; and (2) the provision of needed ser­vices for and the protection of rights of Puerto Ricans on the mainland.58 The last days of campaigning before election day ­were very active for the Puerto Rican community. Both Concepción de Gracia and Rincón de Gautier kept to a busy schedule of meetings and electoral activities.59 El Mundo described tremendous enthusiasm among Puerto Ricans, conscious of their new po­liti­ cal strength and hopeful that their interests and needs would be taken into consideration from then on. The newspaper argued that the revived “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign during the year had convinced many that “with their votes they could put an end to the offenses, scurrilous criticism and negation of rights they have experienced in dif­f er­ent occasions.” It estimated that between 50,000 and 75,000 Puerto Ricans would go to the polls.60 In the end, Marcantonio lost the 1949 mayoral contest by a wide margin, coming in a distant third. O’Dwyer won the mayoralty with over 1.2 million

Marcantonio and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City  •  115

votes, while Morris received 956,170, and Marcantonio 356,423. O’Dwyer was reelected without a majority, and the American L ­ abor Party increased its vote from the previous mayoral race in 1945. This critical election of 1949 in New York left its imprint on f­ uture city politics. The anti-­communist campaign against him contributed to Marcantonio’s defeat in the 1950 congressional election. O’Dwyer was accused during the 1949 campaign of having links to the mob; he was forced to step down as mayor in 1950 amidst a controversial corruption scandal. In contrast, Marcantonio proclaimed that his progressive program received more votes than ever before. According to news reports, Puerto Ricans voted in large numbers in this election.61 Indeed, the 1949 election results w ­ ere not all negative for Marcantonio. He publicly thanked Puerto Ricans for their support during the campaign and declared that the election results represented “the repudiation of Muñoz Marín by the Puerto Rican p­ eople.” In his words, “although I lost the elections, Muñoz Marín was completely defeated. An analy­sis of the elections shows that in each of the electoral districts where Puerto Ricans predominate, I defeated O’Dwyer on an average of 3½ to one; so Puerto Ricans rejected Muñoz Marín on a proportion of 3½ to one.”62 Muñoz Marín was, of course, not a candidate in the 1949 mayoral election. Even so, for many supporters as well as opponents he was part of the race. Although Marcantonio may have exaggerated his margin of victory over Muñoz Marín in the last quotation, he was correct regarding his support among Puerto Ricans. He won over O’Dwyer in his congressional district 35,900 to 34,600; he increased the percentage of votes in his district from 36 to 39 ­percent. In the predominantly Puerto Rican area of Harlem, he won 26,154 to 22,574.63 In Puerto Rico, Marcantonio’s defeat more than O’Dwyer’s victory was celebrated by his opponents, as an El Mundo editorial attests: “Luckily, the candidate who had the greatest support in our island’s environment was elected.” It argued that the Puerto Rican vote was an impor­tant f­ actor accounting for the reelection of New York City’s mayor and concluded that Puerto Ricans expected O’Dwyer’s program in the city to “continue . . . ​without interruption and in an increasing manner.”64 But contrary to the wishes of Puerto Rico’s leading po­liti­cal forces, Marcantonio’s relationship with Puerto Ricans would last ­until the end of his ­career. Marcantonio ran again for reelection to the House of Representatives in his congressional district in 1950. This time only an unpre­ce­dented alliance of the city’s po­liti­cal forces made pos­si­ble his defeat. The Demo­cratic, Republican, and Liberal parties joined forces to support a common candidate against Marcantonio. The PPD campaigned again against Marcantonio and again for the incumbent, Demo­cratic mayor Vincent Impellitteri, who had replaced O’Dwyer a­ fter the latter stepped down.65 Marcantonio’s opponents launched

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the anti-­communist campaign once again, and the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was resurrected as well. This time, Marcantonio’s ties to the Puerto Rican issue w ­ ere too hot. A few days before the election, two Puerto Rican Nationalists attempted to murder President Truman, and Nationalist Party leader Albizu Campos was charged with conspiracy. Marcantonio had been defense counsel for Albizu Campos in his 1936 trial and had supported him over the years. More damaging to Marcantonio’s campaign was the fact that one of the Nationalists accused in the attempt against Truman’s life was Oscar Collazo, who had worked in Marcantonio’s Harlem office years e­ arlier. But even though Marcantonio lost the 1950 congressional election overall, El Barrio delivered 60 ­percent of its vote to him.66

6

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs

This chapter and the next examine the founding of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs (MCPRA), its evolution throughout the 1950s, its relevance for the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into New York City, and its demise and abolition by Mayor Wagner. MCPRA reflects how the New York City establishment—­particularly the municipal government—­dealt with the presence of Puerto Ricans in the city. The creation and history of MCPRA needs to be understood in the context of how the NYC establishment and government tried to manage the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” Perhaps nothing is more telling on this than the fact that the files on Puerto Ricans in the NYC Municipal Archives during the 1950s are titled, well, “The Puerto Rican prob­lem.” Through MCPRA, the NYC government and po­liti­cal establishment sought to redefine the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” to a more liberal perspective in order to allow a more effective and less conflictive incorporation of Puerto Ricans to NYC life. But contradictorily, in the way that MCPRA and the city establishment tried to achieve this goal, the committee ended up sustaining some of the basic ideas of the “prob­lem” discourse that it tried to confront. By emphasizing issues of welfare, crime, housing overcrowding, and the need for t­ heses mi­grants to assimilate and adapt to American life, MCPRA’s actions and discourse made Puerto Ricans look foreign and not capable of assimilation, which was one of the main notions of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative. Po­liti­cally, MCPRA represents the attempt to incorporate Puerto Ricans into “establishment” politics and move them away from supporting the radical 117

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politics of Congressman Marcantonio. In order to further this goal, the committee and successive city government administrations acknowledged the participation of the Puerto Rican government in NYC politics as representing the Puerto Rican community in the city. The committee was used by Mayor O’Dwyer and the Puerto Rican government in the 1949 mayoral election campaign to support the incumbent’s candidacy and attack Marcantonio. MCPRA signaled the alliance between the NYC and the Puerto Rican governments in the pro­cess of incorporating island mi­grants into the city. It legitimized the intervention of the Puerto Rican government in the affairs of the city’s Puerto Rican community. Furthermore, the very existence and the workings of MCPRA and the city government’s relationship with Puerto Rico’s government illustrate the impor­tant role that the island government played in dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. The most salient goals of MCPRA—­diverting Puerto Rican mi­grants away from New York City but helping t­ hose who did migrate integrate into city life—­were largely implemented by the Puerto Rican government and t­ hose institutions in charge of its migration policy. The chapter ­will first discuss the relevance of MCPRA for the study of Puerto Rican incorporation and politics in New York City, particularly by examining how several scholars have understood the intent and workings of MCPRA. A l­ater section ­will examine the origins of MCPRA and its activities ­under the O’Dwyer and the Impellitteri administrations. In this chapter, I begin to analyze one aspect of the close relationship between the governments of NYC and Puerto Rico, the so-­called migration conferences between officials of the two governments. ­These conferences sought to establish a close cooperation between the two governments regarding issues related to the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City.

The Significance and Study of MCPRA Despite the importance of MCPRA for the postwar incorporation of Puerto Ricans into New York City, very few scholars have paid attention to this organ­ ization. The most extensive analy­sis so far of MCPRA is presented by José Ramón Sánchez in Boricua Power. According to Sánchez, “Puerto Ricans ­were brought into government, where they gained some influence in exchange for facilitating city management over the migration of Puerto Ricans in the city.”1 Although true, this statement can be somewhat misleading without the context ­under which this pro­cess occurred: the attempt to manage the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” Sánchez also fails to take into account that most of the Puerto Rican members in MCPRA ­were linked to or ­were functionaries of Puerto Rico’s government. Sánchez exaggerates the number and influence

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of Puerto Rican community activists and organizers participating in MCPRA. This is one reason why when MCPRA was abolished, reaction in the New York Puerto Rican community against this move was very ­limited. For Sánchez, the committee’s creation sought to weaken Marcantonio’s po­liti­cal relationship with the Puerto Rican community and to support the Puerto Rican government’s reforms in Puerto Rico.2 Furthermore, he argues that the “creation of MCPRA was very closely tied to the creation of the Migration Division of the Puerto Rican Department of ­Labor.”3 But Sánchez is wrong in terms of the connection between t­ hese two organ­izations. The Migration Division emerged from the Migration Office opened in New York City in 1948 as a result of Puerto Rico’s migration law approved in 1947. The main impetus for the creation of this agency was the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City in 1947. That is, the Migration Division preceded MCPRA by almost two years. More impor­tant yet, Sánchez confuses the functions of both agencies. He states that MCPRA fulfilled a role in the management of Puerto Rican migration “by informing the Puerto Rican mi­g rant about the conditions in New York City and by marshaling city ser­vices to provide necessary assistance, though at very minimal levels, in housing, education, welfare, and recreation.”4 But t­ hese functions in fact ­were fulfilled by the Puerto Rican government through its Bureau of Employment and Migration in San Juan and the Migration Division in the United States. Although Sánchez correctly identifies the role that defeating Marcantonio in El Barrio played in the creation of MCPRA,5 he fails to note the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York as the context for the creation and actions of MCPRA. This committee was indeed created in response to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” of which Marcantonio’s role was an impor­tant ele­ment but not the only one. Sánchez is also right to point out the connection of MCPRA with the Puerto Rican government, but he misrepresents the relationship. The New York elite was interested in having the Puerto Rican government involved in the management and organ­ization of migration from the island, particularly in implementing one of the most impor­tant objectives of MCPRA: channeling Puerto Ricans away from New York City to other U.S. locations. Sánchez pays no attention to the role that the Puerto Rican government played in MCPRA and in the po­liti­cal incorporation of Puerto Rican mi­grants into New York City during this period. Another scholar who included an analy­sis of MCPRA in her examination of Puerto Rican incorporation into New York City but also failed to note this role of the Puerto Rican government is Lorrin Thomas. She argues that the establishment of MCPRA was an attempt by New York City and Puerto Rican liberals to redefine the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city and to take it away from the Puerto Rican left, thus correctly recognizing the relationship between

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the creation of MCPRA and the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” She also contends that one of the committee’s most impor­tant accomplishments was in the area of welfare, arguing that the attention to welfare in the city was part of a growing national concern about welfare costs and welfare cheaters.6 Like Sánchez, Thomas argues that MCPRA was interested mostly in the status of the island since a more beneficial view of its affairs enhanced the image of Puerto Ricans in New York.7 For her, MCPRA played an impor­tant role in changing attitudes ­toward Puerto Ricans in New York City in the 1950s, which became less hostile and more accepting.8 MCPRA and other NYC establishment institutions and intellectuals did pre­sent a more positive perspective of Puerto Rico and the PPD governmental reforms, which paralleled the positions of U.S. foreign policy at the time. It is also true that an improved image of the island and its government, one showing Puerto Rico in a positive light, was seen as a step to solve the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. But MCPRA’s emphasis on the situation in Puerto Rico and its support for the island government are more directly related to the issues raised by the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. An impor­tant idea at the time was the notion that the prob­lems that Puerto Ricans ­were causing in the city had their roots in Puerto Rico. Solving the island’s social and economic prob­lems would be a means of managing the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Both Sánchez and Thomas point to how MCPRA was trying to improve Puerto Rico’s image in the United States and to increase federal funding for the island. This has to be understood in relation to MCPRA’s attempt to deal with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. In asking the federal government to provide greater social and economic assistance to Puerto Rico, MCPRA and other city functionaries ­were trying to deal with what they perceived to be the root of the “prob­lem” in New York: Puerto Rico’s poverty, unemployment, overpopulation, lack of health care and social welfare programs, and so forth. Simply put, they w ­ ere looking for the means of stopping migration from Puerto Rico to New York, one of the main goals of MCPRA. Both Sánchez and Thomas fail to take into account the critical role that the government of Puerto Rico played in MCPRA’s attempt to deal with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. By praising the changes ­going on in Puerto Rico, the New York City establishment was directly extolling the island government. This was a means of legitimizing the intervention of the Puerto Rican government in city affairs as the representative of and intermediary for New York Puerto Ricans. It also justified the participation of Puerto Rico’s government in MCPRA. The Puerto Rican government became a significant actor in the plans of the New York City establishment to manage issues raised by increased Puerto Rican migration to the city. Moreover, the Puerto Rican government implemented one crucial goal defined in the city’s Welfare Council’s

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs  •  121

report on Puerto Ricans and in MCPRA’s plans regarding the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”: to move Puerto Ricans away from the city. The perspective offered by Sánchez and Thomas reflects not only an analytical limitation but a methodological one as well. Both authors looked only at documents from New York sources and failed to examine documents and media coverage from Puerto Rico that depict a somewhat dif­fer­ent picture, particularly regarding the role played by the Puerto Rican government in dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC and its relationship with MCPRA. By focusing only on NYC sources and the resulting historical narrative, the authors pre­sent a l­ imited view of the committee and its objectives, failing to establish the relationship of MCPRA and the city government with the Puerto Rican government. The goals and policies of the committee w ­ ere closely linked and aligned with the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy. Both the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York and the committee ­were of significant interest to the Puerto Rican government and the island media. Another perspective on the creation of MCPRA and its relationship with Puerto Ricans is presented by Michael Lapp in his influential study of the Migration Division in New York. His analy­sis is closer to my perspective on this committee than that of Sánchez and Thomas. Lapp argues that MCPRA’s goals “outlined in a plan drawn up in consultation with the Puerto Rican migration office” ­were similar to the goals of established by Puerto Rican migration functionaries. City and Puerto Rican officials shared the view that Puerto Ricans in New York had no established community group to provide leadership and that mi­grants w ­ ere not coming to the city to get welfare. For Lapp, “the formation of the committee thus marked the beginning of an association between the city and the Commonwealth that would grow stronger in the 1950s.”9 Lapp points to how José Cabranes—­the first director of Puerto Rico’s Migration Office in New York and a member of MCPRA—­attached importance to the committee mostly for “its success in bringing together officials of New York City’s governmental bureaucracy with Puerto Rican government officials and members of the New York Puerto Rican professional elite.” Lapp adds that the active participation of Puerto Rican government officials “helped to establish a pattern of direct involvement by the Puerto Rican government in the po­liti­cal affairs of New York City mi­grants.”10 Although for Lapp the 1953 MCPRA report “cited only a few modest achievements,” this was not the impor­tant issue. For Puerto Rican functionaries, what mattered was “the establishment of a pre­ce­dent for a formal relationship between the government of New York City, the government of Puerto Rico, and a sanctioned body of members of the evolving local elite of New York Puerto Ricans.”11 My findings coincide with t­ hose of Lapp in this regard.

122  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

The Creation of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Ricans William O’Dwyer was elected as the Demo­cratic mayor of New York in 1945, replacing the very popu­lar and progressive mayor Fiorello La Guardia in a critical period in the city’s history. O’Dwyer had to face the challenges posed by the end of the war and the rapid economic, social, and po­liti­cal transformations of postwar New York, including the entry of new immigrants coming not just from Puerto Rico but also from the war in Eu­rope. He was elected by a broad ethnic co­ali­tion that included the Irish, Italian, and Jewish vote and presented himself as a reformer and inclusive politician. On the top of his to-do list was welfare reform.12 ­A fter his election, he was faced with the emergence of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. He was certainly placed in a sensitive situation, since, notwithstanding the strong negative public reaction to the massive entry of t­ hese immigrants, they w ­ ere nonetheless U.S. citizens and their ­labor was necessary in areas like ser­vices and labor-­intensive manufacturing. The creation of MCPRA allowed him to be viewed by New Yorkers as dealing with two po­liti­cally sensitive issues at the time: the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” and welfare reform. O’Dwyer announced the creation of the MCPRA in September  1949. An official document of the committee years l­ ater defined the importance of this organ­ization for the management of relations with new mi­grants in the city, arguing that “for the first time in the history of the many migrations onto New York City, an official, government-­sponsored body was set up to learn the needs and discover the prob­lems of a large group of new arrivals and to give guidance and help furnish leadership in efforts to meet t­ hose needs and solve t­ hose prob­lems.”13 Like the Welfare Council’s report had stated years ­earlier, MCPRA was created on the notion that Puerto Ricans ­were not like the “traditional” immigrants that came to the city in years past, and that they needed the government’s assistance for their incorporation. MCPRA is very impor­tant in the history of Puerto Ricans in New York City. Its very existence implied the “official” recognition by the city po­liti­cal establishment of the presence of Puerto Ricans in the city and their attempt to incorporate this group to the city’s po­liti­cal system. As Lorrin Thomas has argued, ­because of their culture and language and their colonial status and citizenship, Puerto Ricans remained “invisible” to New York City politics and society since they began coming to the city in the 1920s.14 Thus MCPRA represented an “official” incorporation, since Puerto Ricans had been participating in New York City politics for de­cades by creating their own po­liti­cal and community organ­izations and through their support for Marcantonio.15 The committee was one more instrument brandished by the city po­liti­cal establishment to defeat Marcantonio and to weaken what was perceived then as the radical politics of the Puerto Rican community, particularly in East Harlem.

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs  •  123

The creation of MCPRA signaled the official cooperation between the governments of New York City and Puerto Rico in managing the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Once again, it is an official committee document that acknowledged that the creation of MCPRA came “as a result of official discussions between the Mayor and officials of the City of New York and the Governor and officials of what is now the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Both groups sought to establish machinery which could benefit the City of New York, the island of Puerto Rico and, most particularly, the p­ eople of New York, ­whether t­ hese w ­ ere long-­time residents or newly-­arrived citizens.”16 A specific date for such an agreement is unknown, but beginning in late 1946, officials of the government of Puerto Rico frequently visited New York City and held talks with city officials regarding the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” They also exchanged ideas during Mayor O’Dwyer’s historic visit to Puerto Rico in late June 1948, almost a year before the creation of the committee. In San Juan, the mayor declared that Puerto Ricans “did not constitute a prob­lem” for New York City, that they ­were “welcomed” and their presence represented “a gift for the city.” O’Dwyer’s declarations in San Juan repeated many of the conclusions of the Welfare Council’s report, including that the “prob­lems” facing Puerto Ricans ­were not peculiar to them but w ­ ere prob­lems facing the ­whole city. The official reception was hosted by San Juan mayor Felisa Rincón de Gautier, who would play an impor­tant role l­ ater that year and afterward in the relations of the island government with that of New York City.17 A ­ fter O’Dwyer’s visit to Puerto Rico, the San Juan mayor mentioned to her New York City counterpart the need to discuss further the “prob­lems of the Puerto Rican colony in New York” and proposed a committee to discuss such situation.18 The context for the creation of MCPRA was the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. This was acknowledged in another series by the New York Times on this issue. It argued that the persisting prob­lems facing Puerto Ricans in the city prompted the mayor to create the committee. The issue of welfare was particularly sensitive at this time, and the group’s relationship to Marcantonio was still a source of concern for many. The New York Times quoted Adrian P. Burke, who had chaired the Welfare Council’s Committee on Puerto Ricans, saying that, ­after almost a year, “­there has been some pro­ gress, but not the pro­gress we had hoped for.” Burke complained about the lack of responsibility taken by the federal government on dealing with Puerto Rican migration.19 The creation of MCPRA was linked officially to the city’s welfare program. Mayor O’Dwyer acknowledged that the committee was one of the recommendations in a report submitted by Welfare Commissioner Raymond M. Hilliard, who became chairman of MCPRA. O’Dwyer argued that with the committee’s creation, “it is certain that the constructive steps proposed ­will not only improve greatly the ­whole situation affecting our Puerto Rican fellow-­citizen,

124  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

but ­will also result in a substantial reduction in relief costs.”20 This was a strange way of dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” since by linking it with the city’s welfare concerns, it reinforced the negative and prejudiced notions then prevalent about Puerto Ricans and one of the impor­tant issues on the “prob­lem” narrative. One of the major recommendations presented to the mayor in a report by the commissioner of welfare on the department’s “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in early September 1949 was to create an advisory committee on Puerto Ricans. Hilliard acknowledged that such a committee would be a ­great help to him, to the department, and to the Puerto Rican community “in promoting understanding of the Puerto Rican prob­lem, greater efficiency in dealing with it, and better methods of alleviating existing disadvantageous conditions.” The commissioner argued that “real pro­gress could be made with re­spect to the major concerns of this Department: namely, the prevention of dependency”—­ that is, the elimination of t­ hose conditions that promote welfare de­pen­dency and the rehabilitation of recipients into self-­support.21 The commissioner of welfare’s report was submitted on September 6, and the mayor announced the creation of the committee on September 12. The haste in the creation of the MCPRA suggests t­ here w ­ ere other concerns besides the issue of welfare, mainly the 1949 mayoral election. The major conclusion by the commissioner of welfare’s report on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was that the “overwhelming majority of the Puerto Ricans are self supporting, hard working citizens of New York City, contributing to the essential industries and well-­being of the City.” Additionally, the report found that, contrary to public statements and opinions, only a small minority of Puerto Ricans received public assistance in the city, and that “­there are easily understandable reasons for their need of help.”22 One central finding of the report indicated that ­there w ­ ere some 15,000 cases of Puerto Ricans receiving public assistance, involving some 35,000 persons. ­These represented 10 ­percent of the city’s public assistance caseloads and 11 ­percent of all persons receiving assistance from the department. If the Puerto Rican population was estimated at 350,000, it meant that around 10 ­percent of the group was on the city’s welfare rolls, as compared to 4.2 ­percent of the total city population (2). The Puerto Rican case reflected a new perspective for the Welfare Department: “Dif­fer­ ent only in degree from the many other welfare prob­lems, the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem,’ from the point of view of the Department of Welfare, is an outstanding example of the need to attack de­pen­dency at its source.” A comprehensive program attacking the sources of de­pen­dency would “reduce the number of Puerto Ricans requiring public assistance” and thus reduce the welfare costs for the city. The recommendations proposed in the report, including the advisory committee, “surely make for the comprehensive permanent solution which is necessary” (1). The “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was thus defined as a “welfare

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs  •  125

prob­lem,” one of the main ele­ments of the anti–­Puerto Rican discourse and a notion that would remain for de­cades to come in the minds of many New Yorkers regarding Puerto Ricans. The two major recommendations presented by the commissioner of welfare’s report on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” w ­ ere the creation of an advisory committee on Puerto Ricans, as mentioned ­earlier, and a ten-­item list of “Immediate Objectives for Improvement of the Puerto Rican Situation.” ­These two would become the body and heart of MCPRA. Why an advisory committee on Puerto Ricans? “­There are many reasons why an Advisory Committee on Puerto Ricans would be most valuable. As is noted ­earlier in this report, ­there is no established group to provide leadership and guidance for New York’s large Puerto Rican community” (3). The committee would provide “leadership and guidance” in “improving conditions affecting Puerto Ricans” and assist the commissioner of welfare “in dealing with Puerto Ricans applying and receiving assistance.” How was this to be done was not specified, and the history of MCPRA does not reflect any advances ­toward its implementation. In addition to the commissioner of welfare, the report suggested as committee ex officio members representatives from the Board of Education, the Department of Health, the Department of Hospitals, the Police Department, the Department of Housing and Buildings, the NYC Housing Authority, the NYS Employment Ser­vice, and the office of Puerto Rico’s Employment and Migration Bureau in New York. The ten objectives listed by the report to improve the Puerto Rican situation w ­ ere: 1) improving public relations regarding the group; 2) the creation or extension of En­glish classes programs; 3) the establishment of vocational training institutes; 4) the dissemination of information among Puerto Ricans regarding the apprenticeship program of the Department of ­Labor; 5) special training in areas of abundant employment; 6) development of better employment ser­vices and opportunities; 7) development of better informational ser­vices “concerning opportunities available in New York and elsewhere for Puerto Ricans”; 8) development of better informational ser­vices for Puerto Ricans in New York “concerning conditions elsewhere in the country which may offer better opportunities for Puerto Ricans”; 9) dissemination of information for prospective mi­grants in Puerto Rico “concerning the best opportunities throughout the country rather than exclusive concentration of emigration to New York”; and 10) “development of leadership, particularly for mutual self-­help and advancement, among the Puerto Ricans themselves” (4). The question is: How would the composition of the committee and its stated objectives help in the reduction of “welfare de­pen­dency,” which was the stated reason for the creation of this committee? The inclusion of t­ hose ex officio members may have helped improve “public relations” for Puerto Ricans in the city, but only the Department of Welfare and the Department of Employment could have helped in the betterment of welfare for the group.

126  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

Although the Department of Housing was included in the committee, better housing was not one of its stated goals. It is to be noted that three out of the ten recommendations (numbers 7, 8, and 9) dealt with the relocation of Puerto Ricans away from New York. Exactly how preventing the entrance of Puerto Ricans into the city would reduce the de­pen­dency of ­those already on welfare was not explained. It should be noted also that all ten objectives ­were already implemented or promoted by Puerto Rico’s BEM in San Juan and the Migration Division in the United States—or would be in the ­future. ­Whether this was expected at the time was not stated. A report reviewing the mayor’s committee’s work years ­later conceded that perhaps its biggest accomplishment was the reduction in the concentration of Puerto Ricans in New York City, from 98 ­percent of the total island migration to the mainland to 75–80 ­percent in 1953. The report added that the committee “soon realized that one of its major objectives had to be a program through which the ­future Puerto Rican migration might be spread more evenly over all the United States, instead of being concentrated exclusively in New York.” This objective “had the complete, active and effective support” of the Puerto Rican government, the NYS ­Labor Department, and the U.S. Employment Ser­vice. It confirmed that principally “through the work of the Office of the Government of Puerto Rico in New York City, new mi­grants ­were placed in jobs in parts of the United States elsewhere than New York.”23 Thus, a major ele­ment of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in the late 1940s—­directing the flow of mi­grants out of New York City—­was also a major goal of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs and was, in fact, achieved mostly through the actions of the Puerto Rican government. One of the consequences of MCPRA was precisely the legitimation of the Migration Division and thus of the direct involvement of Puerto Rico’s government in NYC politics. This is also related to the last recommendation on the list, the development of leadership, which legitimized the intrusion of both governments into the life of the Puerto Rican community in the city.24 This notion of lack of leadership and organ­izations was one of the major conclusions reached by Columbia University’s Puerto Rican Study (­later reiterated in The Puerto Rican Journey). One major reason for the creation of MCPRA was, of course, po­liti­cal, as the Mayor’s critics liked to point out. The committee helped Mayor O’Dwyer in the 1949 elections by implying to the general public that he was actively trying to solve not only the city’s welfare prob­lem but the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” as well. The committee would also be helpful in his attempt to get the city’s Puerto Rican vote by suggesting that he was not only a friend of the community but was also trying to improve their social and economic situation. MCPRA was a means of attacking Marcantonio citywide and in the Puerto Rican community in par­tic­u­lar. In all of this, O’Dwyer got a boost from the Puerto Rican government.

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs  •  127

MCPRA and the 1949 Mayoral Election MCPRA became enmeshed in the city’s po­liti­cal debate immediately ­after its creation. New York’s Daily Mirror, a loud voice in the anti–­Puerto Rican campaign, congratulated Mayor O’Dwyer on facing one of the “most unfortunate situations” the city had faced in its history. The paper referred to the po­liti­cal “exploitation” of Puerto Ricans by Marcantonio, who, it claimed, brought them to the city and then abandoned them to face poverty and to swell the city’s welfare rolls; it also complained about the continuing flow of mi­grants to the city.25 An editorial by the New York Herald Tribune followed the same line of thought: “De­pen­dency and rising relief rolls are, however, but part of the Puerto Rican prob­lem. The rapidly accelerating postwar migration, largely concentrated in New York City, has re­created slums as bad as any the city has known, increased the incidence of tuberculosis, added to racial frictions and the frustrations and factional discontents that play into the hands of Left-­wing politicians. A concerted city drive to improve the lot of its Puerto Rican community is overdue.”26 On the Puerto Rican side, Migration Office director José Cabranes thanked Mayor O’Dwyer and expressed his “appreciation and willingness to give the fullest cooperation” to the new mayoral committee and indicated that his membership on it was “additional evidence of his already well-­known friendly attitude ­toward the Puerto Ricans.” He stated that Puerto Ricans in New York ­were not asking “for any special ­favors. Our needs should be met, as should ­those of all other citizens,” reiterating that t­ hese “have been exaggerated and given undue emphasis in the press.” Cabranes added that MCPRA “­will afford representatives of the Puerto Ricans” not only an opportunity to help in the solution of their community’s prob­lems “but also to contribute to the solution of some prob­lems which deeply affect the life of the city as a w ­ hole.”27 In Puerto Rico, El Mundo, always concerned with the affairs of Puerto Ricans in the United States, congratulated the New York mayor on forming the committee, calling it the beginning of “New York’s New Deal” for Puerto Ricans in the city.28 The composition of the committee’s membership was announced by Mayor O’Dwyer on September 17, 1949. He embraced their continued migration into the city and their contribution to the city’s pro­gress. The mayor announced that the committee was only the first of several mea­sures to benefit the group and that it would provide a solution to their situation in the city. Out of forty-­ six members announced, twenty ­were Puerto Ricans. Some ­were well-­known in the community. Many had links to or ­were supporters of the Puerto Rican government. Aside from Cabranes, members Alan Perl and Manuel Gómez had direct links to Puerto Rico’s office in New York; also sympathetic to the Puerto Rican government w ­ ere Benjamín Arnaldo Meyners (an El Mundo

128  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

reporter), José Negrón Cesteros, Frank Ledesma, Luisa Frías de Hempel, and newspaper editor Babby Quintero. Another member was Adrian Burke, who had chaired the Welfare Council’s Committee on Puerto Ricans.29 Some Puerto Rican community organ­izations and activists in New York welcomed the formation of the organ­ization but warned about O’Dwyer’s pos­ si­ble po­liti­cal motives and the committee’s composition. Ruperto Ruiz, president of the Spanish-­A merican Youth Bureau, called it “a step ­toward building better relations between this new minority group and the other groups which have previously come to our city.” He argued that the committee could be helpful in “eliminating unwarranted criticism of t­hese American citizens and expediting their pro­cess of assimilation and Americanization.” Ruiz offered his organ­ization’s support to the goals of the committee but warned that “politics of any sort be kept entirely out of the picture and that neither the Mayor nor his administration claim any po­liti­cal benefit for necessary ser­vice to our Puerto Rican neighbors.”30 Furthermore, Ruiz attached what he called “a pi­lot survey of community leaders” on the creation of MCPRA. The document provides an initial criticism of the organ­ization and its purported goals. It questions why most committee members w ­ ere Demo­crats and a significant number w ­ ere representatives of newspapers; it suggested that the mayor was looking for favorable media coverage for the committee, his administration, and the Puerto Rican government. It also stated that it was widely believed that the “Spanish-­ speaking members” ­were selected ­because “they sided with the administration po­liti­cally and would further the administration’s goals in an election year.” Among the conclusions presented in the document ­were that most committee members w ­ ere not competent in t­ hose areas the committee wanted to establish policy in and that it lacked repre­sen­ta­tion from other po­liti­cal parties. It also questioned the complete absence of “Puerto Rican Negroes” in the committee: “A goodly portion of New York Puerto Ricans are Negroes. Negro Puerto Rican leaders should be represented on the Committee.” Perhaps the most scathing criticism was regarding the capacity, skills, and expertise of the “Puerto Rican and Spanish-­speaking” members of the committee, contrary to the “Continentals,” most of whom w ­ ere “professional workers and leaders of Community and Social agencies who directly or indirectly have been concerned” with the community’s needs. The document warned of the negative consequences this composition of the committee’s membership could have on the community and the way it would be perceived in the city: “The educated and trained Puerto Ricans who have been left out of the committee believe that such an unfair repre­sen­ta­tion ­will continue to build a negative opinion in the eyes of the Continental insofar as Puerto Rican leadership and capabilities are concerned.” The authors wondered about the motives for this se­lection, pointing to Cabranes from the Migration Office as the person who provided the list of Puerto Ricans to be included in the committee, most of

The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs  •  129

whom w ­ ere supportive of the po­liti­cal goals of the mayor. The document concluded by declaring that MCPRA was “by no means an impartial se­lection of the true representatives of Puerto Rican talent capable of serving pre­sent and ­future City administrations.” The document also presented its own list of Puerto Rican and “Continental” professionals, community activists, and representatives who many in the community felt ­were qualified to be members of the committee.31 As discussed in chapter 5, MCPRA became an ele­ment of debate in the 1949 city mayoral election campaign. It is no coincidence that proj­ects and activities by the committee w ­ ere increasingly made public in the weeks prior to the November election. In early October, the provision of public ser­vices to Puerto Ricans and the opening of two welfare centers in the Puerto Rican communities of Harlem and Brooklyn ­were announced by MCPRA. In late October, the New York Board of Estimate approved a proposal backed by Mayor O’Dwyer to allow the commissioner of welfare to hire Spanish-­speaking translators regardless of w ­ hether they ­were city residents or not—­a ­legal requirement ­until then. The World Tele­g ram welcomed the law as a means to break the “Commie ‘stranglehold’ on the Welfare Department,” signaling the obvious purpose of the mea­sure to weaken support for Marcantonio among Puerto Ricans.32 Other mea­sures disclosed leading up to the election included the hiring of more Spanish-­speaking social workers and teachers by the Department of Welfare and the Department of Education, respectively. Steps to improve the housing of Puerto Ricans ­were also mentioned. Commissioner of Welfare Raymond Hilliard, MCPRA chairman, announced the ­future creation of subcommittees to deal with specific areas of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” including one to follow and support Puerto Rico’s social and economic development that might reduce the flow of migration to the mainland. This subcommittee would also propose helpful federal legislation for Puerto Rico, like an increase in social security and welfare aid to the island.33 Hilliard and O’Dwyer repeatedly urged the federal government to increase entitlements to Puerto Rico as a means to reduce migration to New York City and thus reduce “prob­lems” in the city.34 The idea of subcommittees had been proposed ­earlier by Cabranes, as well as the suggestion to recognize and support the island’s social and economic development efforts.35 ­Later activities of MCPRA in 1949 ­were linked to the election campaign. In mid-­October, O’Dwyer inaugurated the building of a welfare center in Harlem, where he rejected Marcantonio’s accusations that he had done nothing for Puerto Ricans in New York. Appearing alongside him w ­ ere Josefina Rincón—­acting mayor of San Juan and ­sister of that city’s mayor—­and Laura Santiago, a member of O’Dwyer’s reelection committee and president of the Committee of United Puerto Ricans. Rincón spent a month in New York

130  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

campaigning for the mayor.36 Days before the election, MCPRA held its second meeting in a Harlem community center that had been acquired by the committee to provide ser­vices to Puerto Ricans in the area. Along with Hilliard, other speakers included Cabranes (MCPRA vice-­chairman) and Rincón, who took the opportunity to praise O’Dwyer and MCPRA for their work on the behalf of Puerto Ricans in the city.37 ­A fter the election, Commissioner of ­Labor Sierra Berdecía praised MCPRA’s continued work in the community, thus rejecting opponents’ claims that the committee was an electoral ploy to get the Puerto Rican vote.38 Marcantonio had accused O’Dwyer of ­doing nothing for the Puerto Rican community in New York prior to the appointment of the committee. It was not a baseless claim. It was acknowledged by none other than Cabranes in a confidential letter to Gustavo Agrait, executive assistant to Puerto Rico’s governor. I think that u­ ntil the recent visit by our governor to New York, Mayor O’Dwyer did nothing to help our fellow citizens in par­tic­u­lar. He visited Puerto Rico, came back and, if he made any statements on his experience ­t here, it was only to acknowledge Puerto Ricans on the island. I did not see a single line in American newspapers about this par­tic­u ­lar trip, except that the mayor had gone and returned. Furthermore, I have no knowledge that ­later he had “lifted a fin­ger” to help us. . . . ​Our governor came to New York and then the mayor honored his Puerto Rican fellow citizens. . . . ​­Later he appointed the Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs and at the inauguration of this committee he made notable and moving statements that we appreciate. The appointment of this committee in itself has g­ reat significance. . . . ​ We still need to see if the municipal administration (and maybe the state government as well) implements the recommendations made by the committee.39

As Cabranes stated, MCPRA represented a distinct change of attitude ­toward Puerto Ricans by O’Dwyer. What­ever was agreed between Muñoz Marín and O’Dwyer, it definitely involved MCPRA and the 1949 mayoral election. A coordinated effort between the government of Puerto Rico and the mayor of New York took place during the campaign.40

MCPRA u­ nder Mayor O’Dwyer The O’Dwyer administration began to publicize the achievements of MCPRA soon a­ fter its creation. A front-­page article in the October 1949 edition of The Welfarer, the newsletter published by the city’s Department of Welfare, discussed the first meeting of MCPRA and stated that one hundred new social

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investigators had been appointed the month before; forty-­three ­were Spanish speakers, of which twenty-­three ­were born in Puerto Rico. It also announced the opening of two new welfare centers in Harlem to help Puerto Ricans. Marck McClosky, director of the Division of Community Education, declared that the city was making ­every effort “to help not only the ­children who come ­here from Puerto Rico, but their parents in the pro­cess of assimilation into the education and social life of our city.” He reported on the increase in the number of remedial En­glish classes for students and parents, the opening of new recreational centers, and additional help in m ­ atters related to housing and urban renewal. The article quoted O’Dwyer stating that “the pre­sent situation affecting the Puerto Ricans parallels that of all the newest comers of the City in the past.” A MCPRA member is quoted as saying how unfortunate that “the stress should be on ‘relief ’ when the fact is that 90% of our Puerto Rican population ­were [sic] entirely self-­supporting.”41 In August 1950, Commissioner Hilliard officiated at the graduation of the Welfare Department’s first class of Puerto Ricans enrolled in its En­glish classes program. He reminded the public how Puerto Ricans ­were handicapped in looking for employment “due to the fact that they had no knowledge of the En­glish language.”42 Although the NYC establishment promoted a positive image of the island in the United States, as argued by Sánchez and Thomas, MCPRA’s relationship with Puerto Rico was more complex. One major ele­ment in the discourse on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York was that its roots lay in Puerto Rico: its poverty, unemployment, lack of welfare and health ser­vices, and so forth. One strategy developed by the New York establishment to deal with its “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was to address the alleged “root” of the prob­lem by lobbying the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to increase or extend federal social and economic programs that could improve the social and economic conditions of Puerto Ricans on the island. This in turn would diminish the f­ actors that led them to migrate to New York. The focus of MCPRA and other city institutions was not primarily to align themselves with the goals of U.S. foreign policy in the Ca­rib­bean but to manage the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” on the ground in New York. This perspective is evident in how Mayor O’Dwyer dealt with members of Congress on m ­ atters related to Puerto Rico. For example, in a letter to Albert Thomas, chairman of the Senate Committee on L ­ abor and Public Affairs, the mayor informed the senator of the reasons for his creation of MCPRA: “The responsibility of the Committee not only embraces local prob­lems but also ­those in Puerto Rico itself which directly affect the migration to New York City or the preparation of Puerto Ricans for successful adjustment upon arrival ­here.” O’Dwyer told Thomas about an April 20, 1950, committee discussion on educational issues in Puerto Rico “insofar as it influences Puerto Rican migration, employability on arrival ­here, and adjustment to New York City

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life.” He reiterated MCPRA’s hope that Congress “­will pass legislation granting substantial assistance to the Puerto Rican educational system.”43 The same perspective is evident in O’Dwyer’s letter to Walter F. George, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. The mayor informed George that MCPRA supported the extension to Puerto Rico of any legislation dealing with Social Security, adding, “This step w ­ ill benefit greatly the Puerto Rican residents of New York City as well as on the island itself.”44 Similarly, O’Dwyer requested from members of Congress the restoration of a provision for public assistance aid to Puerto Rico as was initially included in the Social Security Act approved in a House of Representatives bill (HR 6000) but ­later excluded by the Senate. According to O’Dwyer, the provision “would reduce the unfair burden on Puerto Ricans h ­ ere to support relatives at home who o­ ught to benefit from Social Security. In turn, Social Security in Puerto Rico would reduce relief burdens in New York City and lift some of the pressures which force such large migration from the island, most of which comes to New York City.”45 In another communication to members of Congress on the same issue, O’Dwyer used Puerto Ricans’ status as U.S. citizens to claim equal treatment in the apportionment of federal funds to “our fellow Americans in Puerto Rico”: “Social Security protection is vital to their economic welfare. Exclusion of American citizens from benefits of American laws is discrimination.”46 In late April 1950, the Federal Security administrator, Oscar R. Ewing, met with Cabranes and other Puerto Ricans and MCPRA members in New York before departing for Puerto Rico. Ewing was ­going t­ here to lay out the orga­ nizational work for administering Social Security on the island, included in a bill expected to be approved by Congress. That bill, signed into law by President Truman in August 1950, extended federal funds to Puerto Rico to aid the el­derly, dependent ­children, and the blind. MCPRA members pressed the federal administrator with committee recommendations on how federal assistance to the island would help in “easing the economic pressure on migration from Puerto Rico.” Apparently, their message was well received: “Mr. Ewing said the extension of Federal Security provisions to Puerto Rico would improve conditions on the island and also in New York, which receives 90 ­percent of the migration from Puerto Rico.”47

MCPRA u­ nder Mayor Impellitteri Several months a­ fter his reelection in 1949, William O’Dwyer resigned as mayor of New York City among accusations of corruption. Vincent Impellitteri, then City Council president, replaced him as mayor in early November  1950. Although he did not have the support of Tammany Hall—­the po­liti­cal machine that controlled the city’s government and politics since the late nineteenth ­century—or a clear po­liti­cal program, Impellitteri was able to win a special

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election by a slim margin of votes. Known mostly as a loyal subaltern of O’Dwyer, Impellitteri continued many of his pre­de­ces­sor’s policies.48 He did so too with regard to issues facing Puerto Ricans in the city. Impellitteri also sought close relations with the Puerto Rican government.49 In a swearing-in ceremony for new members of MCPRA on April 9, 1951, Impellitteri announced the creation of MCPRA’s new committees focused on homeless men, the aged, and foster care. In this ceremony, Impellitteri commented on his recent trip to San Juan. He stated that “I am proud as an American citizen to see such pro­gress in that part of our country” and that Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans “are an integral part of our nation.” He repeated the discourse on Puerto Ricans espoused by MCPRA that Puerto Ricans “constitute the newest minority group. As such, they face the same handicaps, the same prejudices and the same prob­lems which e­ very other minority group had to overcome. I speak from first-­hand experience, having myself been a member of such a minority group.” Impellitteri added that he was aware “of the unsympathetic and false accusations which are leveled against the newcomers in our midst,” but stated that the overwhelming majority of “our Puerto Rican citizens are self-­respecting, hard-­working and self-­sufficient members of our community.”50 In 1951, MCPRA published a report on “Puerto Rican Pupils in NYC Public Schools.” It stated that since immigration of “non-­citizens” had s­ topped during the 1920s, recent migrations to the city ­were comprised of citizens and that the “real reason for Puerto Ricans coming ­here is our need for more workers in the essential economic business life of our city.” From social and educational standpoints, the report argued that “our newly arrived duplicate the experience of previous groups.” It repeated other ele­ments of the “prob­lem” discourse, such as Puerto Ricans obtaining mostly low-­paying jobs, having l­ ittle access to housing, experiencing overcrowded conditions, and facing “foreign language handicaps.” The report reiterated one of MCPRA’s basic ideas by sustaining that the better-­educated “achieve rapid cultural assimilation” but their incapacity “to identify themselves with the less fortunate fellow Puerto Ricans has left the community bereft of the valuable strength and leadership which this group can and should give.”51 A November 1951 report by MCPRA recommended a substantial increase in the hiring of city employees with an understanding of Spanish, particularly in the Department of Police, Department of Education, and the Department of Housing and Buildings. According to this report, “the language handicap was a prime f­actor in making more difficult a proper relationship between new arrivals from Puerto Rico and the rest of the New York community.” It contended that better language communication would have been particularly impor­tant in preventing past “tragic misunderstandings” between the police and Puerto Ricans. The committee’s recommendation was based on its

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findings that bilingual workers had been very effective in the Welfare Department when serving Puerto Ricans.52 MCPRA and Mayor Impellitteri continued to maintain a close relationship with the Puerto Rican government in their efforts to deal with issues raised by island migration to the city. In a letter to Impellitteri in October  1952, Hilliard related his meeting with Muñoz Marín during his visit to the island in July, stating that the governor’s “continued interest in the work of the Committee has been most encouraging and helpful.” According to Hilliard, the governor “had suggested that, in order to establish a still closer working relationship between the Committee and the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it might be a good idea for high officials of his government to participate in its meetings.” Both Hilliard and Impellitteri accepted the idea and requested recommendations from the governor, who suggested the following names: Mariano Villaronga, secretary of education; Commissioner of ­Labor Sierra Berdecía, architect of Puerto Rico’s migration policy; Jaime Benítez, president of the University of Puerto Rico campus at Río Piedras; and Teodoro Moscoso, head of the Economic Development Administration and architect of the island’s industrialization program. All w ­ ere appointed by the mayor to MCPRA. The appointments ­were made public on November 19, 1952, when the mayor declared that date as Discovery of Puerto Rico Day.53 In the letter inviting the Puerto Rican officials to participate in MCPRA, Impellitteri credited the idea to Governor Muñoz Marín and stated that the committee had won prestige in the city and in Puerto Rico for its achievements in “bringing into closer harmony the Puerto Rican residents of New York and our public agencies.” He added that the participation of the four island functionaries in MCPRA would “bring about a still closer working relationship between it and the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”54 In January 1952, Raymond Hilliard, then director of the city’s Welfare Council, Henry  L. McCarthy, commissioner of welfare, and MCPRA announced the creation of the New York Puerto Rican Scholarship Fund, an organ­ization linked to MCPRA, with the objective of providing aid to needy Puerto Rican students seeking higher education. On April 15, the scholarship fund was the beneficiary of a concert given at Hunter College. In August, MCPRA announced that the fund would provide ten scholarships from 1952 to 1957 to Puerto Rican students to attend college; the annual grant ranged from to $300 to $600.55 In February 1953, MCPRA created a thirteen-­member subcommittee on neighborhood relations. Its goal was to promote goodwill between Puerto Ricans and their neighbors and the better integration of islanders into the city’s social, civic, and economic life. The subcommittee’s work included meeting with representatives of community welfare, health, and civic organ­izations to gather information on group relations, particularly about

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Puerto Ricans. Their activities ­were to be centered on the Upper West Side, the Lower East Side, and Chelsea.56 Many of Mayor Impellitteri’s and MCPRA’s actions ­were symbolic and intended to improve the image of Puerto Ricans and perhaps to make them feel more at home in the city. An example of this is the previously mentioned action by the mayor declaring a Discovery of Puerto Rico Day. In June 1952, Hilliard invited Impellitteri to participate in a special In­de­pen­dence Day observance as tribute to the U.S. armed forces in ­Korea, “with par­tic­u­lar reference to the participation of Puerto Ricans in this effort.” He added that in the previous year “more than 10,000 of our fellow-­A merican Puerto Rican citizens attended this affair.”57 On July 25, 1952, the day that Puerto Rico formally proclaimed its commonwealth status, Impellitteri publicly declared it “Puerto Rican Commonwealth Day.”58 In February 1953, the mayor supported the decision by MCPRA to invite Muñoz Marín to speak at the annual luncheon of the Welfare and Health Council in a special session on “Our Puerto Rican Citizens.” Impellitteri declared that the governor was always welcome in New York City.59 In its efforts to integrate Puerto Ricans more fully into the city, MCPRA challenged some basic beliefs of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse. One per­sis­tent notion was that Puerto Ricans ­were coming to the city to exploit the welfare system. MCPRA consistently fought this view in the media. For example, in February 1952, Welfare Commissioner McCarthy declared that Puerto Ricans “have made faster pro­gress than any other immigrant group.” He noted that the figure of 9 ­percent of Puerto Ricans on relief (as compared to 3.8 ­percent of all New Yorkers) was not r­ eally that high considering their language barrier and lack of education, and the fact that they w ­ ere the most recent group to migrate to New York. Former MCPRA chairman Hilliard reiterated the committee’s original declarations that the majority of Puerto Ricans ­ were employed, with only a minority on welfare, while also pointing to their economic and cultural contributions to the city.60 MCPRA and Puerto Rico’s Migration Office agreed that they would regularly provide New Yorkers with information on the number of Puerto Ricans moving to the city, specifically their dwindling migration numbers and their settlement in other parts of the country. This, as argued e­ arlier, was a major objective of both agencies. This information would apparently show their success in dealing with the Puerto Rican prob­lem in the city. For example, in June 1953, MCPRA and the Migration Office announced the conclusions of a study revealing that island migration to the city had decreased from 95 ­percent to 75 ­percent of the total migration to the United States in the previous four years. Hilliard, once again MCPRA chairman, announced that other growing Puerto Rican settlements w ­ ere drawing islanders away from the city. He expected fewer Puerto Ricans moving to the city due to ­factors like the rapid

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economic development of Puerto Rico, the critical situation of housing in the city, and better jobs elsewhere on the mainland.61 It was u­ nder Impellitteri’s last days as mayor that the first report by MCPRA—­the 1953 “Interim Report”—­was made public. In the introduction to the report, Hilliard argued that “the recent Puerto Rican influx must be seen in proper perspective—­a half million against thirty-­five million,” referring to the estimated number of islanders in the United States versus the number of Eu­ro­pean immigrants that had reached the U.S. mainland in previous de­cades (some 400,000 Puerto Ricans w ­ ere said to be living in the city then). Hilliard credited MCPRA for “a noticeable improvement in the attitude of the public ­toward Puerto Ricans in New York,” adding that the city press helped in “presenting facts about Puerto Ricans to dispel the many myths and misconceptions which prevail.” He concluded by thanking Governor Muñoz Marín for the social, economic, health, and educational achievements that helped to improve conditions in Puerto Rico (that of, course, would result in fewer mi­grants to New York City).62 MCPRA’s “Interim Report” listed several “continuing objectives” among the committee’s priorities. ­A fter describing the critical housing situation in the city, the report concluded that “the housing situation is a prime reason” why Puerto Rican mi­g rants should “seek relocation where ­family living conditions are better than in New York City.” Another prime goal of MCPRA activities was to promote “the maximum integration of our citizens of Puerto Rican background into the general New York citizenry in the shortest pos­si­ble time,” with par­tic­u­lar emphasis on public schools for ­children and En­glish education for adults. A third major goal of the committee was to “further widespread understanding and appreciation” by the city’s “old residents” of their “Puerto Rican neighbors” and the contributions the latter “are making and can make” to the economic, social, and cultural life of the city. One example of this publicity effort was to highlight the patriotism of Puerto Ricans who had served in the U.S. armed forces. A fourth objective of the committee was to help Puerto Ricans in “overcoming the language difficulty,” and improve their En­glish language skills as soon as pos­si­ble. A fifth objective was to “inform prospective mi­grants” of opportunities outside the city. This “original objective of the Committee” had been “furthered with considerable success” through the efforts of the Puerto Rican government and the New York State Industrial Commission. Other objectives ­were to increase the number of scholarships available to Puerto Rican students and to increase information available to islanders regarding ser­ vices provided by the city and state governments. A major objective of the committee—­the “encouragement of Puerto Rican leadership in New York City”—­sought “full participation on the basis of culture and ‘sharing’ ” for both Puerto Ricans and New Yorkers in vari­ous organ­izations. The report asserted that MCPRA itself “pre­sents such a pattern by its integration of responsible lay

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and official membership of all groups.” An impor­tant objective was the improvement of relations between the Puerto Rican and New York City governments. Specifically, it urged the island government to “learn the situation confronting mi­grants” in the city and “the urgent need for more adequate preparation” before they left the island, and to advise mi­grants on “the need for seeking employment and living outside the overcrowded metropolitan area.” A tenth and final objective was related to the employment of Puerto Ricans in the city. The report stated that Puerto Ricans came to the city with higher skills than the jobs given to them in the city: “Employers should be encouraged to recognize ­these skills and not limit workers to manual or menial occupations.” The committee urged New Yorkers to recognize the contributions made by Puerto Ricans to the city in terms of employment: “They now fill tens of thousands of obscure but essential jobs, without which the commercial life of the city would be para­lyzed.” The findings of this report ­were hastily announced several months ­earlier by some MCPRA members on their way to San Juan to participate in a conference or­ga­nized by the governor of Puerto Rico to discuss the major issues raised by migration from the island to the city and to search for ways to deal with ­these m ­ atters.63 One major goal of the conference was to have city and island functionaries meet face-­to-­face, many for the first time, and also to have New York officials experience for themselves the situation in Puerto Rico and relate to Puerto Ricans in their homeland as a way of better understanding the c­ auses of their migration to city.64 MCPRA’s 1953 “Interim Report,” published several months a­ fter the San Juan conference, described a major goal of the event: “The Conference enabled folks from New York to see ‘the other end of the prob­lem’—­ that is, the island from which the mi­grants come, conditions ­under which they live before migrating, and what the island government is ­doing to improve social and economic conditions t­ here.”65 This was the first of the four so-­called migration conferences held between 1953 and 1960.

The First Migration Conference The migration conferences between Puerto Rico and New York City functionaries w ­ ere or­ga­nized to deal with the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. Although the first of ­these conferences started ­under Impellitteri, they would continue u­ nder the administration of Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr. even ­after the latter had disbanded MCPRA. Although many of the discussions in ­these meetings dealt with the social and economic conditions in Puerto Rico and federal policies ­toward the island, the major issue discussed was always the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York City. While New York functionaries wanted to discuss what Puerto Rico’s government was d­ oing to restrict and regulate island migration to the city and how it was dealing with the integration of mi­g rants into the United States, Puerto Rican officials wanted to discuss

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what the city government was d­ oing with regards to ser­vices for mi­grants and the way they ­were being characterized in the media.66 The first migration conference was or­ga­nized and financed by the Puerto Rican government, as w ­ ere the next two. This event reflects the interest, the effort, and the leadership of Puerto Rico’s government in addressing the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York. The conference needs to be understood within the framework of Puerto Rico’s migration policy.67 Days before the beginning of the event, Muñoz Marín met with all high-­ranking officials from the government, including his top migration functionaries: Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía, architect of Puerto Rico’s migration policy; Clarence Se­nior, director of the Migration Division; and Joseph Montserrat, director of NYC’s Migration Office. The goal of the conference was to allow New York officials to know firsthand the conditions on the island, what the Puerto Rican government was ­doing to advance economic development in order to stem migration, and what policies it was implementing to address the issue of ­people moving to New York specifically. The conference also sought to develop a plan, working with the New York del­e­ga­tion, for h ­ andling the situation of island mi­grants in the city. Mayor Impellitteri was to be one of the most impor­tant participants in this conference, but he never made it to San Juan.68 This conference was an impor­tant attempt to frame and redefine the Puerto Rican presence in New York for both island and city functionaries.69 Top officials from both governments attended the event in San Juan. It was or­ga­nized and led by Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía. The other twenty-­six island functionaries included MCPRA members Moscoso, Villaronga, and Benítez. The thirteen New York delegates included MCPRA chairman Hilliard; Manhattan borough president Robert F. Wagner; Henry McCarthy, commissioner of welfare; and the commissioners of the Housing, Health and Hospitals Departments, among o­ thers.70 Governor Muñoz Marin declared before the conference began that its purpose was to delineate plans to ameliorate difficulties faced by Puerto Ricans moving to New York. He announced that his government would begin intensifying the teaching of En­glish classes in public schools and would create a program to teach En­glish to prospective mi­grants. The governor stated that, besides the language barrier, housing was a major prob­lem affecting island mi­grants in the city, and that his government was implementing programs that advised mi­grants on the American way of life and encouraged them to look for other places besides New York to ­settle. To the American press, Muñoz Marín complained that the island was not receiving a proportional amount of federal funds as t­ hose awarded to the states and added that this was a major obstacle to the economic development of the island, which would allow Puerto Ricans to stay at home.71 The front-­page headline of El Mundo reviewing the first day of the conference read: “New York Officials Advise Puerto Ricans to Migrate to Other

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Cities.” E ­ very city agency head made a pre­sen­ta­tion on the situation of Puerto Ricans in New York. The major theme was that Puerto Ricans ­were not a prob­ lem for the city. They reiterated that lack of En­glish knowledge was the main obstacle to their social and economic incorporation. They disputed the basic notions of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse, arguing that Puerto Ricans ­were not a welfare prob­lem since only very few ­were on the welfare rolls and deservedly so; that while housing was a major prob­lem facing Puerto Ricans in the city, they ­were not the cause of the housing prob­lem; that island mi­grants ­were not spreading tropical diseases in the city, but, on the contrary, w ­ ere themselves afflicted by tuberculosis once they arrived in New York; that although gangs had emerged in the community, this was no dif­fer­ent from other ethnic groups, and Puerto Ricans ­were not the cause of delinquency, as some argued; and that although mi­grant ­children ­were facing adaptation prob­lems ­because of the language barrier, they w ­ ere not wrecking the city’s public school system. Wagner stated that since the city did not have the resources to deal with all the issues affecting island mi­grants, ­there was an urgent need for more federal aid to Puerto Rico and New York.72 Fi­nally, a joint committee headed by Sierra Berdecía was created to follow up on the discussion and make proposals on how to deal with the issues affecting Puerto Ricans in the city. The committee put out a series of recommendations and a work plan that was agreed to by both del­e­ga­tions during the last day of the conference.73 The agreed-­upon document produced by the conference—­“Conclusions of the Conference on Migration”—­was a major victory for the Puerto Rican government since it upheld its migration policy and programs. The very first line of the document stated that “both in law and in practice the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico neither encourages nor discourages migration.”74 Even at the time, this was a gross distortion of real­ity, since Puerto Rico’s government was in fact not only organ­izing but encouraging migration by dif­f er­ent means. And although the island government was encouraging mi­grants to move away from New York and helping the emerging communities elsewhere with its Migration Division, by no means was it preventing mi­grants from ­going to New York. The document also sustained MCPRA’s and Puerto Rico’s government discourse that Puerto Ricans ­were an example of internal migration of citizens exercising their right to move within the nation and that they w ­ ere not creating extraordinary prob­lems in the city. In addition, the document recognized the relevance of MCPRA in New York’s history: “For the first time in the history of the many migrations into New York—­which is a city built by migration—an official, government-­sponsored body was set up to work on the situation resulting from a migration and to help the new arrivals.” But it also recognized the role played by the Puerto Rican government in the migration pro­cess of its ­people, stating that it was “significant that this is the first migration in which the government of the areas from which the mi­grants have come,

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namely Puerto Rico, has manifested official concern by establishing an office to help the existing agencies and the mi­grants facilitate the adjustment pro­cess” (3). The “Conclusions” argued that housing was the most pressing issue facing mi­g rants in the city. The New York del­e­ga­tion contended in the section on housing that extensive “preparation of prospective mi­grants” was required and that the Puerto Rican government, “­because it did not and does not now wish to promote or even to give the impression it was promoting migration,” had been reluctant to fulfill this function, which they suggest it should do (4–5). The document called for more federal aid for Puerto Rico’s economic development. A plan of action was proposed for both the island and New York City governments. It is impor­tant to note that most of the mea­sures w ­ ere to be implemented by the Puerto Rican government, most of which ­were already in place: intensifying En­g lish language education, expanding its orientation to mi­g rants and prospective mi­g rants, encouraging migration to places outside New York, providing mi­grants with information on employment opportunities on the mainland, and extending health ser­vices to mi­grants. On the New York side, most of the recommended actions ­were already part of MCPRA’s agenda. ­These included more training for city personnel in dealing with Puerto Ricans, adding more qualified Spanish-­speaking personnel throughout city agencies, preventing violations of l­abor standards in mi­grant employment, and improving relations with other ethnic groups. The two del­e­ ga­tions agreed to seek more collaboration between the city and the island governments. But again, most of the actions in this regard ­were also to be taken by the Puerto Rican government, such as the exchanges and programs or­ga­ nized by the island’s Department of Education and the University of Puerto Rico. In New York, most of the programs w ­ ere to be implemented by the Migration Division, including establishing closer cooperation between the community and city agencies, the orientation of mi­grants regarding city ser­vices and their adaptation to the city environment, the creation of self-­help and community organ­izations, and providing En­glish language education.75 The document encouraged Puerto Ricans in New York to engage in more “civic participation,” noting, for example, their high rate of electoral participation on the island but their very low rate in the city (without explaining why this was so). Strangely, the document concluded by stating that the Puerto Rican government would not get involved “in the po­liti­cal strug­gles of the parties and groups in any community on the continent” (13). Although the island government had openly supported and campaigned for O’Dwyer in the 1949 mayoral election, it was an open secret that Robert F. Wagner was ­going to run for mayor in November against Impellitteri.76 The first migration conference was declared a success by both the New York and Puerto Rican del­e­ga­tions. But a purportedly more honest discussion between the two del­e­ga­tions showed signs of internal conflicts within MCPRA’s

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New York and Puerto Rican del­e­ga­tions. According to the New York Times, MCPRA chairman Hilliard “asked t­ oday for a frank talk h ­ ere and got it.” Commissioner of ­Labor Sierra Berdecía bluntly said that although the Puerto Rican government and the mi­grant community in New York w ­ ere d­ oing every­thing pos­si­ble to ease the mi­grant situation ­there, as a member of MCPRA, he had not seen “a single action, a single movement” from some city agencies. He stated that the city government and MCPRA had done nothing for Puerto Ricans in the city and that any improvement was due to the actions of the Puerto Rican government, a statement supported by Wagner. Sierra Berdecía went even further, declaring that MCPRA was “just a front committee for po­liti­cal purposes.” Furthermore, he questioned not only how such a large committee—­then composed of fifty-­one members—­could function effectively but also the mayor’s practice of naming department heads as subcommittee chairs. Hilliard characterized Sierra Berdecía’s statement as indicative of an “unfortunate gulf” of communication between island and city functionaries. Wagner urged city officials to have the same passion for tackling the mi­grants’ situation in New York as the Puerto Ricans had.77 Unnamed members of the committee told the New York Post that they wondered if the committee was intended to do anything but make the incumbent mayor “look good for what­ ever it was worth at the polls.” They also voiced the prob­lems they faced in trying to implement the committee’s avowed goals: “When we began confronting some of the prob­lems of the mi­grants, we ran into a stone wall from some of the very commissioners who w ­ ere our fellow members.” Th ­ ese members also argued that MCPRA chairman Hilliard had no authority to implement concrete actions without the intervention of the mayor, pointing to police brutality and housing as examples where the committee had been in­effec­tive.78 The first migration conference established some guidelines for ­future cooperation between the Puerto Rican and the New York City governments; it also delineated basic issues of importance and a work agenda for both governments with regards to Puerto Rican mi­g rants in the city. But this conference also showed some major differences between the two del­e­ga­tions, particularly reflected in Sierra Berdecía’s critique of MCPRA ­after the event. The conference revealed the increasing irrelevance of MCPRA in dealing with Puerto Rican affairs in New York and the growing role of the Puerto Rican government in managing the affairs of island mi­grants in the city.79 Th ­ ere w ­ ere three additional migration conferences or­ga­nized during Robert F. Wagner’s tenure as city mayor, even a­ fter he disbanded MCPRA in 1956. Th ­ ese conferences showed the impor­tant links between the city and Puerto Rican governments as they pursued their common interest of dealing with the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York.

7

The Demise of MCPRA and the Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”

By the mid-1950s, a new discourse on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” had emerged, one that questioned the very existence of MCPRA. Proponents of the abolition of the committee argued that it singled out this group of mi­grants as constituting the only “prob­lem” for New York. The city government’s creation of the Committee on Intergroup Relations (COIR) was intended to ­counter this characterization of the island mi­grants. COIR was to address issues related to the Puerto Rican community u­ nder the wider umbrella of all minority groups in the city. COIR was supposed to make the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” go away. But that did not happen. F ­ actors contributing to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”—­continued migration from the island and difficulties concerning incorporation—­remained on the city’s agenda for many years, even ­a fter MCPRA was officially dissolved. MCPRA was abolished b­ ecause it lacked strong support not only from the Puerto Rican community in the city but also from Puerto Rico’s government, its most impor­tant source of institutional support among Puerto Ricans. MCPRA also lost the confidence of the new Wagner administration, which saw it as incapable of managing the continuing “prob­lem.” By the time MCPRA was abolished, the NYC establishment had realized that the best way to deal with the situation of incorporation was to support the Puerto Rican 142

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government’s migration policy. Programs to meet MCPRA’s original goal of curbing Puerto Rican migration to the city or diverting mi­grants away from New York could only be implemented—as they had been already—by the island government. Puerto Rico’s officials took the lead in discussing and defining strategies to deal with the “prob­lem” in New York through the migration conferences that they or­ga­nized and funded from 1953 to 1960. Th ­ ese four conferences defined the relationship between the Puerto Rican and the New York City governments regarding the continuing issues related to island mi­grants in the city. The failure of MCPRA to accomplish its goals was the major reason the Wagner administration abolished the committee, but COIR was also unable to cope with the per­sis­tent issues related to the Puerto Rican presence in the city. The new administration came to rely on the island government once again. But the 1960s brought about a redefinition of this relationship. The election in 1965 of Mayor John Lindsay, the broader civil rights movement, and growing concerns within the Puerto Rican community in the city about housing, education, and health care led to a shift in how New York City officials related to the Puerto Rican community. An impor­tant ­factor was the rise in the city of Puerto Rican community organ­izations and po­liti­cal leadership that questioned the role and influence of the island government in their affairs. By the end of the de­cade, the Puerto Rican government had lost its previous access to and influence with the New York City government.

Dissolution of MCPRA José Ramón Sánchez argues that the abolition of MCPRA was related to the po­liti­cal exit and death of Marcantonio in 1954, which “eliminated the biggest po­liti­cal threat to Muñoz-­Marín [sic] and to local New York politicians.” He posits other f­ actors as well, like the shooting attack in Congress by Puerto Rican Nationalists in 1954 and the opposition of New York Puerto Rican leaders and activists who “began to resent the efforts of the government in Puerto Rico to influence ­things in the city.”1 Furthermore, Sánchez sees the abolition of MCPRA and the creation of COIR as a symbol of the decline in power of Puerto Ricans in New York. He argues that “the rise of reform and professionalism in COIR deflated the minimal power Puerto Ricans had amassed through MCPRA corporatism,” adding that “COIR generalized the government’s relation to Puerto Ricans. COIR was mostly a black institution. It could only investigate. It c­ ouldn’t make policy or take any punitive action. More importantly, COIR had a social work approach to reform that was ultimately depoliticizing.” Sánchez cites Lorrin Thomas’s argument that Mayor Wagner ended MCPRA b­ ecause the “Puerto Rican migration became politicized at the level of social life in New York City.” He contends that the

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committee’s “relative success at providing Puerto Ricans with po­liti­cal influence made the MCPRA undesirable and untenable. It was too po­liti­cal and too Puerto Rican.” Sánchez maintains that with the creation of COIR, Puerto Ricans, especially its community activists, lost “con­ve­nient access to centers of power in the city.”2 He believes that through MCPRA, “Puerto Ricans found themselves in the position to engage and move within the cir­cuits of New York City’s ruling elites. The biggest loss, however, was prob­ably conceptual.” He adds that “COIR came into existence with the very dif­fer­ent goal of reducing tensions” between ethnic groups vying for power and ser­vices in the city.3 Although Sánchez pre­sents some insight into the demise of MCPRA, his analy­sis is ­limited. The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs was not a faithful representative of the Puerto Rican community. It was not linked to Puerto Rican grassroots community activism, and it never had widespread support within the community. This explains why when Wagner eliminated MCPRA, ­there was no significant opposition within the community. Puerto Rican repre­sen­ta­tion in MCPRA was mostly linked to Puerto Rico’s government, which itself endorsed the abolition of the committee. MCPRA did not represent any real sphere of power for Puerto Ricans in New York, nor did it do anything concrete to advance Puerto Rican interests or to improve their socioeconomic conditions. It did allow for some repre­sen­ta­tion of Puerto Rican interests in city government, but it mostly legitimized the role of the island government in the affairs of the Puerto Rican community in New York. MCPRA was born within the context of the 1949 NYC mayoral election to counteract the influence of Marcantonio within the Puerto Rican community. Its goal was not to give Puerto Ricans in New York any power but the opposite: to counteract any rise in their influence. The committee eventually failed in this attempt as the Puerto Rican community and its po­liti­cal leadership gained power during the 1960s, in­de­pen­dently from MCPRA, COIR, or the city and Puerto Rican governments. Sánchez is correct in arguing that most New York City Puerto Rican po­liti­cal leaders never strongly supported MCPRA. But his analy­sis is ­limited in several ways. Sánchez seems to imply that MCPRA was a Puerto Rican institution, but the committee was created by O’Dwyer in 1949 for po­liti­cal reasons, in an attempt to delegitimize Marcantonio. But Marcantonio was essentially out of the picture ­a fter the 1950 elections, and MCPRA was supported by the city’s new mayor, Vincent Impellitteri, and at least initially by his successor, Robert Wagner. MCPRA never represented the Puerto Rican community in New York; most Puerto Rican members ­were linked with or belonged to Puerto Rico’s government and thus reflected its priority and policies. Not only did members and organ­izations of the Puerto Rican community began to question and attack MCPRA but representatives of Puerto Rico’s government did so as well, for dif­fer­ent reasons. However, COIR was not representative of the Puerto Rican community ­either.

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And although COIR was an attempt to replace MCPRA, a Puerto Rican subcommittee was created within COIR right ­after its creation. ­Because of MCPRA’s in­effec­tive­ness in dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City, Mayor Wagner was able to eliminate the organ­ ization without any significant opposition. The committee never built a strong, widespread constituency within the Puerto Rican community in the city. Furthermore, Puerto Rico’s government, which had the most impor­tant Puerto Rican repre­sen­ta­tion in MCPRA and was its most impor­tant source of support among Puerto Ricans, began to question MCPRA long before it was dismantled by Wagner. Thomas and Sánchez downplay or ignore the significant role played by Puerto Rico’s government not only in the workings of MCPRA but in its demise as well, and in how the NYC establishment dealt with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. The migration conferences from 1953 to 1960 show how influential the Puerto Rican government was not only in defining city policy t­ oward the mi­grants but also in how dependent the NYC establishment became on Puerto Rico’s government in the absence of any real connection to the Puerto Rican community in New York. The first two migration conferences in San Juan also demonstrated the irrelevance of MCPRA in dealing with a significant issue of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York: that a central goal since its creation—to deter Puerto Rican migration to the city and steer mi­grants to other locations on the mainland—­could only be carried out by the Puerto Rican government. In real­ity, MCPRA was not replaced by COIR but by the Puerto Rican government. Another perspective on the demise of MCPRA is presented by Michael Lapp in his study of the Migration Division in New York. He argues that the “Migration Division’s apparent lack of support for the Committee indicates its increasing desire to play the role of quasi-­official representative of Puerto Rican New Yorkers, a role that MCPRA had originally staked out for itself.”4 He contends, furthermore, that MCPRA was associated “with the discredited mayoral administrations of O’Dwyer and Impellitteri. With a mayoral election approaching in the fall of 1953, it appears likely that the Migration Division saw a chance to gain a larger voice in the making of city policies regarding Puerto Ricans.” Lapp also holds that the election of Wagner “would in fact enable the Migration Division to perform a larger role in with the encouragement of the mayoral administration.”5 Lapp’s perspective is close to mine on this issue. However, I disagree with his view that Puerto Rico’s policies in New York City ­were implemented by the Migration Division. He views the division as the Puerto Rican state institution interacting with the New York government. But as I have shown in chapter 4, Puerto Rico’s migration policy was made by government leaders in San Juan, in par­ tic­ u­ lar, Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía. The Migration

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Division was an agency of and subordinated to Puerto Rico’s ­Labor Department.6 Lapp, like Sánchez and Thomas, downplays the role of the Puerto Rico’s central government and leadership on issues of migration policy and its relationship with the city government. Furthermore, like Sánchez and Thomas, Lapp falls short in examining the interactions between the Wagner administration and the Puerto Rican government during the 1950s; for example, he pays almost no attention to the migration conferences, where such interactions became public.

The Continuing “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”: MCPRA u­ nder the Wagner Administration Robert Wagner was elected mayor with strong support from Tammany Hall leader Carmine De Sapio; he was not a power­ful politician on his own. Although not terribly charismatic, he was seen as a corrective leader a­ fter the dubious mayoralties of O’Dwyer, who had been accused of corruption, and Impellitteri, who had been widely viewed as incompetent. The son of a famous U.S. senator from New York, Wagner received the support of the city Demo­ cratic machine as well as from l­abor. He was also supported by dif­fer­ent ethnic constituencies in the city, including Catholics, Jews, African Americans, and Puerto Ricans.7 Richard M. Flanagan argues that Wagner’s major contribution to New York City politics was to extend New Deal policies and programs to the city and to tame Tammany Hall’s influence on local politics. He implemented major reforms in the areas of housing, health, and education, and he ­unionized and reformed the city’s workforce. Wagner was also interested in reducing racial and ethnic tensions in the city.8 Very ­little has been written regarding Wagner and his relationship to Puerto Ricans in New York City, and even less about his administration’s relationship with the Puerto Rican government. A ­ fter his inauguration as mayor, Wagner continued the relations with the Puerto Rican government that had begun ­earlier with MCPRA and the first migration conference in San Juan. It was early in his administration that COIR was created to, among other t­ hings, replace MCPRA in an attempt to move beyond the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. But initially Wagner worked with MCPRA, and even introduced new leadership to the committee in an effort to revitalize it. Criticism of MCPRA from functionaries of the Puerto Rican government continued a­ fter the first San Juan migration conference. Of par­tic­u­lar interest are the comments of Joseph Montserrat, then interim director of the Migration Division, in an October 1953 memo to Sierra Berdecía on the activities carried out by NYC agencies with regards to Puerto Ricans in the city a­ fter the San Juan conference. A ­ fter making a somewhat positive assessment of what the dif­fer­ent city departments ­were ­doing with regards to the agreements made

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in San Juan, Montserrat contended that although MCPRA met several times ­after the conference, specific actions regarding plans to integrate more Puerto Ricans into city agencies had not been implemented, and he urged the island government to keep pushing for concrete actions. Montserrat wrote that many members ­were not sure of the committee’s f­ uture given that it could be terminated ­after the upcoming mayoral elections in November. He concluded by saying that while nothing concrete had resulted from the conference, the general feeling among New York functionaries t­ oward Puerto Rico was favorable.9 A more scathing analy­sis of MCPRA came from a 1953 memo from Laura Santiago to Wagner just ­after he was elected mayor. Santiago was well known among MCPRA and city circles; she had been a strong supporter of MCPRA as a member of O’Dwyer’s reelection committee as well as a strong ally of the Puerto Rican government. She called for a reor­ga­ni­za­tion of MCPRA and for city agencies to have a better understanding of the needs of the Puerto Rican community. Santiago asserted that “since the end of 1950, very few meetings have been held, virtually nothing new has been accomplished” and “virtually none of the ­earlier recommendations have been followed up or implemented.” She contended that the Puerto Rican community was “as badly served as it was before the founding of the Committee. What improvements have been made are excellent but negligible in scope with the growth” of the community. She remarked that ­there was still a need for more Spanish-­speaking police and other city officials; more interpreters throughout the city government; and investigators of unfair l­ abor and housing practices, as well as of price gouging by taxi ­drivers at airports. She presented a number of recommendations, many of which had already been proposed within the committee. Lastly, she pointed out the voting exclusion of Puerto Ricans due to literacy tests and language requirements, an issue that attracted increasing attention in ­later years.10 MCPRA members sensed that changes to the committee or its elimination ­were strong possibilities with the advent of the new mayor. At the time of Santiago’s memo to Wagner, MCPRA chairman Hilliard declared during a committee-­sponsored cele­bration of Puerto Rico’s Discovery Day that the committee should be comprised of a combination of government officials and private citizens. He argued that although the committee had helped improve conditions of Puerto Ricans in the city, more action was needed as migration from the island continued and many issues such as the provision of language education and adequate housing remained unresolved.11 On May 18, 1954, Mayor Wagner announced the appointment of a “reconstituted” MCPRA with a new chairman, Edward G. Miller, a Puerto Rico native and former assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs. The mayor announced that in addition to representatives of the city’s public and private agencies, members of l­ abor, civic, and religious groups, officials from Puerto Rico’s government, and leaders of the Puerto Rican community would

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be incorporated into the committee. Wagner acknowledged that although “the ­great majority of the 450,00 fellow-­citizens of Puerto Rican birth or ancestry now living in New York have successfully adjusted themselves to our way of life,” nevertheless the “heavy influx” of mi­grants still coming from the island had caused “undue hardships” to the newly arrived. He reiterated MCPRA’s discourse on Puerto Ricans: “Largely ­because of language difficulties and cultural differences, they face the same handicaps, the same prejudices and the same prob­lems which newly arrived groups before them had to overcome.” Wagner stated that the committee’s main goals ­were to promote the integration of Puerto Ricans into the city and to investigate the specific aspects of island migration to New York.12 From Puerto Rico, Governor Muñoz Marín gave his full support to MCPRA u­ nder Wagner, with Miller as chairman. Although he noted some limitations of MCPRA’s work ­until then, the governor argued that it was impor­tant for the integration of Puerto Ricans into the city and promised his government’s full support.13 In his statement upon being sworn in as MCPRA chairman, Miller stated that Puerto Ricans in New York had been blamed for many social prob­lems not of their d­ oing, serving “as con­ve­nient scapegoats for community frustrations.” He argued that although previous immigrants resolved their integration prob­lems in the long run, MCPRA was ­there to accelerate the integration of Puerto Ricans in a shorter period of time, for the benefit of both islanders and New Yorkers. One recommendation was for New Yorkers “to get to know [their] Puerto Rican neighbor at first hand” and begin to “appreciate fully the contributions” they made to city life. For Miller, an impor­tant goal of the newly constituted committee was to create “an atmosphere of harmony and understanding” between city residents and the newer mi­grants.14 An event that foreshadowed MCPRA’s ­future was the debate surrounding the appointment of its executive secretary during the summer of 1955. The committee had from its inception been disconnected from certain sectors of the growing and increasingly or­ga­nized Puerto Rican community in the city. A significant number of community and po­liti­cal activists w ­ ere in support of Antonia Pantoja for this appointment. A Puerto Rico–­born social worker and community activist, Pantoja would become an icon in the U.S. Puerto Rican community in years to come. (She helped found numerous organ­izations that served New York Puerto Ricans and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1996.) A Citizens’ Committee for the Appointment of Antonia Pantoja was formed to promote her candidacy for the position. Community activist Marta Valle, from the committee, warned in a letter that what was at stake was ­whether the position would be filled “by a po­liti­cal appointee, or by a non-­ political and extraordinarily well qualified and competent person on the basis of objective merits.” She contended that MCPRA had already investigated and approved Pantoja’s appointment, but that it had “not been confirmed by the

The Demise of MCPRA and Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”  •  149

Mayor due to po­liti­cal pressures desiring that the appointment be made as a po­liti­cal reward for po­liti­cal activity.” ­A fter listing Pantoja’s professional merits and work background, Valle urged the support of her appointment “for the sake of a better government and for the community at large.” Weeks ­later, apparently based on news that Pantoja would be appointed, Josephine Nieves, who would become another impor­tant Puerto Rican community leader for many de­cades, wrote to Wagner that she was “so well satisfied at this sign of interest and sincerity on the part of our Mayor to help the Puerto Rican prob­lem by appointing someone who is familiar with and had worked hard at combating it.”15 While Pantoja did not get this job, she was appointed months l­ ater to the professional staff of COIR. Another controversy engulfed MCPRA during the summer of 1955, this time involving its chairman. In a July 11 letter to the New York Times, Miller opposed a U.S. Senate bill raising the minimum wage in Puerto Rico on the basis that it would hurt its less developed economy. Lower wages w ­ ere an impor­ tant part of the island’s Operation Bootstrap, and Puerto Rico officials—­ including ­those in the Migration Division—­had also opposed the mea­sure. The eleven MCPRA members representing l­ abor, supported by major city u­ nions, demanded that Wagner repudiate Miller’s statement. They complained that they w ­ ere not consulted on this statement and that Miller had misused his position as chairman. Th ­ ese members called the statement “detrimental to the best interests of the p­ eople of New York and of Puerto Rico.” Union leaders declared that they ­were shocked that MCPRA’s chairman could make such a “reactionary” and anti–­working-­class statement. A protest in New York was or­ga­nized by Puerto Rican ­labor leaders, including representatives from the island. Wagner was forced to make a statement supporting the bill while sidestepping the MCPRA controversy.16 Concerns about MCPRA continued even ­after Wagner’s attempt to revitalize the committee. At the same time, the Puerto Rican government continued to take actions and implement policies to maintain a prominent role in ­matters related to the Puerto Rican community in New York, particularly in cementing its relationship with the city government. This goal became very clear with its organ­ization of the second migration conference in San Juan.

The Second Migration Conference In June 1954, a second migration conference was held in San Juan. Like the first one a year ­earlier, it was or­ga­nized and financed by the Puerto Rican government. Why another migration conference a­ fter just one year? The apparent goal of the Puerto Rican government was to meet with members of the newly elected Wagner administration and to continue discussions on how to h ­ andle the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York, for the benefit of both the

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island and the city governments. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican government kept pushing for legitimacy of its migration policy and recognition of its role in NYC affairs as the representative of the Puerto Rican community ­there. For Wagner and the New York del­e­ga­tion, the main goal of the conference was to send a message to New Yorkers that his administration was dealing with the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. One impor­tant result of this conference was the cementing of the relationship between the Puerto Rican government and the Wagner administration in New York.17 But in the end, the conference laid bare the notion that even if the city government implemented certain mea­sures to facilitate the smooth incorporation of island mi­grants into New York, it was not able by itself to curb the continued migration from Puerto Rico; realizing this objective lay in the hands of the Puerto Rican government. The call for a second migration conference came in the aftermath of the shooting in Congress by Puerto Rican Nationalists. On March 1, 1954, four members of the Nationalist Party had opened fire, wounding five congressmen. A troubling aspect of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in Puerto Rico—­this time, nationalism and radicalism—­had manifested itself in the U.S. capital, and in New York City as well. (In November 1950, two Nationalists attempted but failed to assassinate President Truman.) In Puerto Rico, Governor Muñoz Marín used Law 53 (commonly known as the “gag law,” a copy of the Smith Act) to go ­after and imprison not only Nationalist Party members but Communist Party members as well. Puerto Rican officials called the Nationalist attack in Congress part of a “communist plot.” Muñoz Marín immediately flew to Washington to confer with U.S. officials and to extend his sympathy to the wounded and other members of Congress for the act by “madmen.” In Washington, DC, the House Committee on Un-­A merican Activities showed an interest in Puerto Rican subversives and requested that the Puerto Rican government provide the committee with relevant information and documents. In New York City, a police force was sent to the governor’s home at Gracie Mansion and to the offices of the Migration Division ­after supposed threats ­were received against t­ hese functionaries. Federal and local police in New York ­were put on high alert.18 Thus, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” resurfaced again in New York City. For several weeks following the Nationalist attack, the Puerto Rican community in New York was terrorized by city police and the FBI. This law enforcement campaign was justified on the basis that the four Nationalists who had attacked Congress w ­ ere longtime residents of the city. According to the New York Times, “Heavy reinforcements of detectives ­were sent into all Puerto Rican sections of the city . . . ​[a]cting on the theory that the assassination plot had been hatched ­here.”19 In addition to raiding the homes of the four Nationalists, the police arrested ninety-­one supposed Nationalists (forty-­three w ­ ere also arrested in Puerto Rico).20

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Wagner responded immediately to the event and tried to prevent retaliation against the Puerto Rican community. On March 2, in a speech at Hunter College, he declared, “Our Puerto Ricans are good citizens. They are hard-­working God-­fearing citizens.” He added that it would be tragic if New Yorkers “­were to be prejudiced by the acts of a few madmen.” Wagner stated that as long as he was mayor, “­there w ­ ill be no persecution of the rest of our Porto [sic] Rican ­people for crimes in which they played no part.” He concluded that “as in the case of e­ very other racial group, with the evil-­doers as individuals, and not as representatives of the group.”21 That after­noon, Wagner met with Dr. José N. Cesteros—­a well-­known member of the island community in New York, an ally of the Puerto Rican government, and a member of MCPRA—­along with the Manhattan borough president and twenty other Puerto Rican leaders. ­After the meeting, Wagner announced the appointment of Edward G. Miller Jr. as chairman of MCPRA.22 ­Later that week, Puerto Rico’s commissioner of ­labor Sierra Berdecía, along with Montserrat and Miller, spoke publicly in New York against the Nationalist attack in Congress. During his speech, Sierra Berdecía gave his full support to Miller’s appointment as MCPRA chairman.23 This was the context in which the Puerto Rican government invited Wagner and other New York functionaries to visit San Juan again, for a second migration conference. Wagner was advised not to attend for security reasons, but a­ fter several months of deliberations, he de­cided to go. NYC police commissioner Francis Adams went to the island days ­earlier to or­ga­nize and coordinate security details for Wagner’s visit. Wagner told the press before leaving for Puerto Rico that his administration was not trying to curb Puerto Rican migration to the city but rather trying to promote policies to raise the standard of living in Puerto Rico so that Puerto Ricans “­will want to stay t­ here.”24 The second migration conference was chaired, once again, by Commissioner of ­Labor Sierra Berdecía. In mid-­March 1954, he announced plans for the conference, including the invitation to Mayor Wagner. He declared that, as with the previous conference, the goal was to discuss the facilitation of successful adjustment of island mi­grants to New York, and he explained mea­sures taken by his department so far to achieve this goal. He reported that Joseph Monserrat, director of the Migration Division, was meeting with Commissioner of Welfare Henry McCarthy to discuss preparations for the conference and to review the recommendations proposed at the 1953 migration conference.25 Days before the event, Sierra Berdecía stated that the second conference was a continuation of the first one and that it sought to pre­sent a balance sheet of the situation of island mi­grants in New York and to develop a plan of action to deal with the issues they faced t­ here.26 Besides Wagner, the New York del­e­ga­tion included nearly all the city commissioners, including ­those from the Department of Welfare, the Department of Health, the Department of Housing and Buildings, the Department of

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Hospitals, and the Sanitation Department, as well as the Manhattan borough president and the executive director of the NYC Youth Board, along with four members of the city press. In announcing his decision to attend the conference, which he called a m ­ atter of “serious business,” Wagner stated that his administration’s goal was to have the New York del­e­ga­tion get “better acquainted” with the strides made by the island government “in bettering economic conditions to curb migration to the United States.” He added that he was prepared to ask the city’s congressional representatives to request more federal aid for Puerto Rico.27 On the first day of the conference, Governor Muñoz Marín reiterated the main discourse of his government’s migration policy: that it neither encouraged nor discouraged migration to the mainland but that it would advise potential mi­grants on conditions they could face in the United States. He also announced his government’s new policy of intensifying En­glish education in the island’s public schools to prepare potential mi­grants for incorporation into U.S. society. Sierra Berdecía emphasized Puerto Rico’s integration to the American economy, particularly regarding the island’s ­labor market; he mentioned how Puerto Rican ­labor benefited the United States and that Puerto Ricans alone ­were not enough to satisfy the increasing l­abor needs of New York City. He argued that the island’s economic development would not only benefit the mainland economy and investments but would also help to stop migration to the mainland. Sierra Berdecía also highlighted the impor­tant role of Puerto Rico in strengthening the links and in improving relations with the Spanish-­ speaking countries of Latin Amer­i­ca. Of par­tic­u­lar interest to the New York press was his announcement that island migration to the United States, and to New York in par­tic­u­lar, had decreased by 50 ­percent and that most mi­grants to the city in the previous year had been the wives and ­children of ­earlier mi­g rants. The New York newspapers also highlighted Muñoz Marín’s statement that Puerto Rican migration would stop by 1960. The Puerto Rican press emphasized Wagner’s statement that Puerto Ricans ­were not a prob­lem for New York and his praise for the work of Puerto Rico’s government offices in the city.28 The second day of the conference was devoted to pre­sen­ta­tions by New York officials. Housing Commissioner Bernard Gilroy and Chief Magistrate John Murtaugh made clear that city housing policies to “clean slums” would limit the number of housing units available, an issue of concern to both city and island officials. Youth Board director Ralph Whale declared that the estimated 450,000 Puerto Ricans in the city w ­ ere scattered throughout Manhattan, the lower Bronx, Brooklyn, and Long Island, as opposed to their concentration in East Harlem in previous years. He declared that this population shift had led to the rise of Puerto Ricans gangs as they moved to areas inhabited by other groups that resented their entrance. Welfare Commissioner McCarthy stated

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that the number of Puerto Ricans on city relief had grown due to the economic recession but that total relief rolls had decreased dramatically. “This,” he asserted, “refuted any implication that Puerto Ricans migrated to seek relief.”29 As with the first migration conference, the second one concluded with a joint statement from the Puerto Rican and New York del­e­ga­tions. The most significant ideas from the first conference’s joint statement w ­ ere again affirmed, including the position that the federal government should “re-­evaluate the social, welfare, housing and other Federal benefits programs” that could be extended to Puerto Rico. The statement emphasized that the United States was a nation of immigrants and that new mi­grants contributed to the well-­being of the nation. It also stressed that the influx of islanders represented just half of p­ eople from other states moving to New York City. The report also underscored the importance of Puerto Rican l­abor for New York City’s manufacturing, tourism, and ser­vices industries. It asserted that the “city’s prob­lems” around housing, employment, and education w ­ ere not ethnicity specific but paralleled ­those of any other big metropolitan area. The joint statement hailed the “advances” made by Puerto Ricans in New York and called for programs to reduce “misunderstandings” between islanders and other groups. As in the previous conference statement, it called on the city to hire more Spanish-­ speaking employees to advance the “orientation and integration of Puerto Rican residents.” The report also pointed out the improvements made in recent years in Puerto Rico by the current government and “urged continuation and expansion” of Migration Division ser­v ices in New York City “to orient and advise” mi­g rants. MCPRA chairman Miller declared that his committee “would continue as a focal point for contacts” between the governments of the city of New York and Puerto Rico.30 The second migration conference was covered extensively by the Puerto Rican press, reflecting its importance for the local government and elite. The local press covered the statements of the New York del­e­ga­tion and closely followed the remarks and actions of Mayor Wagner, who was welcomed on the island as an impor­tant dignitary. Of par­tic­u­lar interest to the papers was his relationship with San Juan’s mayor, Felisa Rincón de Gautier. She had been the Puerto Rican government’s main contact with the mayor of New York since O’Dwyer. Rincón de Gautier established a close relationship with Wagner, visiting the city frequently and endorsing his policies concerning Puerto Ricans.31 El Mundo covered the migration conference extensively and published three editorials on the event. The paper extolled the positive benefits that would accrue to Puerto Ricans in New York and to t­ hose on the island. It highlighted the importance of Wagner’s presence at the conference and his contacts with Puerto Ricans on the island. An El Mundo editorial a­ fter the conclusion of the event noted the conference report supporting the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy discourse that it neither encouraged nor discouraged

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migration to the United States but was quick to point out that this did not mean that the local government “is indifferent to the fate of the mi­grants,” and that it would be “as con­ve­nient for the island as for mi­grants that ­there are as few prob­lems as pos­si­ble in this migration.” It concluded that the Puerto Rican government “must have an interest in the migration being a success and it should look for ways to make it a success.”32 During the last days of the conference, the Puerto Rican press quoted Monserrat stating that the city should not implement programs affecting the Puerto Rican community separately from ­those that would benefit the community at large. That is, city Puerto Ricans should not be treated differently from other groups in New York.33 This was precisely the position taken for many years by critics of MCPRA and it became the main justification of the Wagner administration for abolishing MCPRA and creating the Committee on Intergroup Relations (COIR).

COIR and the Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” COIR, formed in 1954, was the orga­nizational and bureaucratic successor to the Unity Committee created in 1944 by Mayor La Guardia. The Unity Committee followed the model of similar agencies in other cities created to manage race relations during this period. By 1950, it had already come ­under increasing criticism by community and civil rights organ­izations for its in­effec­tive­ness in dealing with major issues affecting minority communities in New York. Minority organ­izations in the city began to demand changes to the Unity Committee. As a mayoral candidate, Wagner was sympathetic to calls for change,34 but as mayor, he became concerned about empowering such an institution. According to Gerald Benjamin, COIR, like the Unity Committee, “approached race relations with methods of conciliation and compromise, convinced that the basic prob­lem was simply to educate the population of the city in tolerance.” COIR also functioned “largely as a protective device” for the mayoral administration, “helping it to deal with racial issues without major expenditures of time or resources.” He argues that the creation of COIR was an indication “that concern about racial inequalities had reached a new level of po­liti­cal importance” in the city. Benjamin asserts that Wagner “recognized the need for such an agency . . . ​but he was equally convinced that its functioning should be closely controlled.”35 With the creation of COIR, Wagner saw an opportunity to abolish MCPRA. Harris L. Pre­sent, ­legal counsel to the Spanish-­A merican Youth Bureau, had made an early call to dissolve the committee. In a November 1953 letter to the New York Times, Pre­sent contended that MCPRA “should be abolished and [­there should] be established a statutory Committee on Intergroup Relations . . . ​concerned with all minority prob­lems facing New York.” He

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argued that ­there was “no Mayor’s Committee on Negro Affairs, or Italian Affairs or Jewish Affairs” and that it was “unfair to single out” Puerto Ricans and “create the impression that their group represents the only prob­ lem” for New York. Pre­sent argued that the existence of MCPRA fueled continued resentment against Puerto Ricans and that since its creation the committee “was looked upon with suspicion by many civic organ­izations” dealing with Puerto Ricans. He called for COIR to replace both MCPRA and the Unity Committee.36 The Puerto Rican government’s support for abolishing MCPRA was impor­ tant for ­those who wanted to replace it with COIR. In an April 1954 letter to Muñoz Marín, Pre­sent argued that COIR “could very well do every­thing” that MCPRA “is supposed to do without pinpointing the Puerto Ricans as the only group representing a prob­lem for the City of New York.” He pointed out the situation then was not conducive “to improve inter-­group relations in the City of New York especially where housing and education are particularly sore spots ­because of the recent influx.” He told the governor that although he was sure that “the sentiments I have expressed with regard” to MCPRA “are echoed by the officials of your Government” in New York, the widespread impression was that “your government is in sympathy with such committee by the participation of its representatives in its work.” Pre­sent asked Muñoz Marín to “use your good offices to indicate your support” for COIR.37 The bill to create COIR was approved in May 1955. It formed a fifteen-­ member committee appointed by the mayor that would investigate complaints and survey bigotry, discrimination, and group tensions. COIR sought to improve relations among the city’s diverse racial, religious and ethnic groups. COIR would replace the Unity Committee.38 On December 16, 1955, Wagner announced the members of COIR and the appointment of Herbert Bayard Swope as chairman. Si­mul­ta­neously Wagner announced the abolition of MCPRA on the basis “that the functions of this Committee would be taken over” by COIR. According to the press release, “any prob­lems which now exists with re­spect to any group in the city of New York w ­ ill be u­ nder the jurisdiction of the new commission and that t­ here was no need for a special committee to be concerned with any one or more of the groups which make up our City.” But, the mayor added, consideration would be given to the creation of a COIR subcommittee on Puerto Rican Affairs. Of the fifteen members of COIR, only one, Juan Aviles (a critic of MCPRA), was Puerto Rican.39 On January 9, 1956, Governor Muñoz Marín told Wagner that he had “followed with a g­ reat deal of interest” the creation of COIR and that it was “gratifying to note” that the mayor also “included within its functions the activities of your former committee on Puerto Rican affairs.” He added that MCPRA had “played an impor­tant and needed role helping to integrate the Puerto Rican community in New York City at a time when ­there was no existing agency to

156  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

perform this task.” With COIR, “it is fitting and proper that New York citizens from Puerto Rico should be treated in the same manner as all other citizens of your ­g reat city.” Muñoz Marín assured Wagner “of the complete cooperation of my government.”40 According to Benjamin, the only Puerto Rican–­related institution included in the list of twenty-­six organ­izations making up COIR’s “constituency” was Puerto Rico’s Migration Division. And of the four areas of influence within COIR listed by Benjamin—­supported commission idea (in 1953), consulted by mayor on appointments (in 1955), provided commissioner (in 1955), and consulted by commission on programs (in 1956)—­ the Division was included only in the second one.41 Wagner thanked Muñoz Marín for supporting COIR and the abolition of MCPRA and told him that he had recommended to Swope that “an advisory sub-­committee on Puerto Rican Affairs be established” within COIR.42 The Mayor’s Office made public a letter from Wagner to members of MCPRA thanking them for their work on behalf of the city; the press release included Muñoz Marin’s letter endorsing COIR and supporting the abolition of MCRPA. In his letter, Wagner argued that MCPRA was formed to advise the mayor “on certain ­matters of an especially urgent character presented by the extraordinary war­time and post-­war migration of our fellow citizens” from Puerto Rico and that MCPRA had successfully provided “a central forum in which officials of the City Government could meet with representatives the Puerto Rican community” to discuss their issues. Wagner declared that to continue with MCPRA a­ fter COIR was created “might lead to confusion and duplication of functions.” He concluded by saying that MCPRA “has to a large extent carried out most effectively its basic purpose of indoctrinating the City Departments on Puerto Rican affairs and of providing for coordination between official and private efforts in this field.”43 In Puerto Rico, El Mundo made the announcement of MCPRA’s dissolution on its front page.44 MCPRA, nevertheless, had its supporters, and they did not go silently. Dr. José Cesteros, a member of MCPRA and a high-­ranking Puerto Rican in the Demo­cratic Party, called Wagner’s announcement a “disappointing surprise” and argued that the wider commission would overlook the prob­lems of Puerto Ricans.45 El Mundo published strong negative reactions from members of the community in New York. Julio Garzón, editor of La Prensa in New York, was quoted arguing that MCPRA had to be understood as a “Committee for Grievances and the Defense of Puerto Ricans” and that COIR could not fulfill the original goals of MCPRA. He maintained that the prominent access that Puerto Ricans now had to city government would be curtailed with COIR. For Garzón, “­there are no such racial prob­lems in New York as they have tried to pre­sent, since Eu­ro­pean emigrations have now been reduced to a minimum with very ­limited quotas. It is the mass migration of Puerto Ricans that is the major and fundamental prob­lem that must be addressed.” Ángel Arroyo, from

The Demise of MCPRA and Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”  •  157

El Diario de Nueva York, was quoted calling for COIR member Aviles to quit his position and characterized the commission as “inadequate and suspicious.” He contended that the half a million Puerto Ricans living in the city “required a more adequate repre­sen­ta­tion” in the city government.46 Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, chairman of MCPRA’s Sub-­Committee on Neighborhood Relations, wrote to Wagner in support of the creation of COIR, but warned that it was necessary to continue the work begun by MCPRA on behalf of the Puerto Rican community in New York. He called for the inclusion of more Puerto Rican leaders in COIR and on the need for the commission “to give attention to some of the prob­lems which pertain only to our Puerto Rican citizens such as ­those arising out of the language f­actor.” He added that “some prob­lems which all minority groups face may be intensified among Puerto Ricans and ­will need special attention.”47 ­A fter meeting with a group that included former members of MCPRA in January 1956, Wagner de­cided to revive the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs as an advisory committee. The group was led by Dr. Cesteros and included, among o­ thers, Dan Carpenter, director of the Hudson Guild Settlement, and Garzón from La Prensa. ­These leaders insisted on the need for MCPRA and argued that they would continue with the committee as an in­de­ pen­dent institution if Wagner refused to reestablish it. Wagner demanded that it should be a smaller group and that it be part of COIR. Carpenter argued that the formation of COIR fixed one prob­lem but created another: COIR was to deal only with racial tensions but not with the numerous prob­lems caused by the mass migration of Puerto Ricans to the city and issues not directly linked to discrimination.48 The influence of the Puerto Rican government with the NYC government could have been diminished with the creation of COIR, but even COIR in its early days had to rely on Puerto Rico’s government to advance programs regarding Puerto Ricans. One example is the request for support by COIR chairman Swope to Muñoz Marín regarding “an approach to assist in the identification and development of leadership among young adults of New York City’s Puerto Rican and Spanish-­speaking citizenry.” The purpose of this proj­ect was to “hasten the realization of the full potential of the Puerto Ricans as an integral ele­ment of our community and . . . ​bring about a fuller appreciation of his contribution to the city at large.” Swope asked the governor to meet with COIR functionary Antonia Pantoja, who “has evolved this proposal out of specific experience and consultation with the ­people in this City and in other communities.” Swope acknowledged that he wanted “to have your viewpoint and help since its success would depend on large mea­sure upon the cooperation of the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”49 The 1958 and 1960 migration conferences showed that the Puerto Rican government still played a key role in the city’s policies t­ oward Puerto Ricans.

158  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

The Third Migration Conference The third migration conference was held in San Juan in January 1958 and, like the previous two, it was or­ga­nized and financed by the Puerto Rican government and was convened for the same purpose: to provide an opportunity for Puerto Rican and NYC officials to discuss the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” in the city. It revealed that even two years ­after the creation of COIR, the NYC government still depended on the Puerto Rican government to deal with significant issues of the Puerto Rican community in the city, specifically with the continuing migration from the island. Like the previous two, this conference served to further legitimize the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy and its role as intermediary between the city establishment and the Puerto Rican community in New York. Days before the conference began, Joseph Montserrat announced in Puerto Rico that this third conference, like the first two, was “aimed at developing a means of better appreciation of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans on behalf of the officials who directly supervise the programs” intended for Puerto Rican mi­g rants both on the island and in New York. Montserrat claimed that the NYC del­e­ga­tion would discuss the “difficulties and strange situations with which the dif­fer­ent departments of the city are confronted in their eagerness to better understand the recently arrived Puerto Ricans.” In turn, Puerto Rican officials would pre­sent recommendations as how “to solve said situations or at least understand them and try to find solutions for them.” As in the previous two conferences, a large number of NYC government officials attended, along with Frank Horne and Sid Brigand, executive director and public relations director of COIR, respectively.50 Wagner’s presence at this conference—­his fourth visit to the island—­was impor­tant to the Puerto Rican government. This time, Puerto Rican officials wanted to showcase the supposed social and economic advances of their industrialization and modernization programs. Wagner was taken to the University of Puerto Rico, factories, vocational schools, new public housing complexes, and other places that showed the island’s pro­g ress.51 Wagner’s arrival in San Juan was preceded by a very forceful editorial by La Prensa in New York acknowledging the mayor’s strong words of support for the right of Puerto Ricans to migrate anywhere in the United States, including to New York. The mayor again emphasized the economic contributions made by Puerto Ricans to the city and refuted the old notion that they ­were moving ­there to get welfare. La Prensa applauded Wagner for confronting the “denigrating myths” regarding Puerto Ricans in the city.52 Once in San Juan, Wagner declared that the conference’s purpose of furthering the exchange between island and city officials was needed in order to confront the issues facing Puerto Ricans in New York.53 According to an El Mundo editorial, Wagner’s presence in Puerto Rico

The Demise of MCPRA and Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”  •  159

denoted the importance of the Puerto Rican issue in New York for his administration and how crucial it was to coordinate with Puerto Rican officials on the island in seeking solutions to the prob­lems facing the mi­grants.54 In his address to the conference, Wagner emphasized once again the need for mi­grants to have better En­glish skills and to receive proper orientation and advice before leaving the island. He acknowledged that his administration had to do a better job of making Puerto Ricans aware of the city’s programs and ser­vices available to them as New Yorkers and had to improve the coordination between the city’s dif­fer­ent agencies in this regard.55 As in the previous conferences, functionaries of dif­fer­ent city agencies presented reports on several issues affecting the Puerto Rican community in New York, particularly regarding juvenile delinquency and gangs, police arrests and incarceration, education, and infant mortality. COIR chairman Horne announced a proposal to develop a leadership program in New York for Spanish-­speaking youth. The program was to be implemented with the support of the Council of Spanish-­ American Organ­izations or­ga­nized by Puerto Rico’s Migration Division.56 Like the previous two migration conferences, the third one concluded with a joint statement from both del­e­ga­tions. It claimed that the New York del­e­ga­ tion gained “a valuable understanding of the many social, economic and po­liti­ cal developments” in Puerto Rico, while Puerto Rican officials “learned in detail the varied efforts” made by government agencies in New York “to deal with the prob­lems facing newcomers to the city.” Both sides agreed that, similar to previous mi­grants, Puerto Ricans faced a series of “adjustment prob­lems” to life in the city, many of them typical of large metropolitan areas that had existed long before their arrival in New York. The adjustment of mi­grants to their new social environment could be accelerated by means of “a better understanding” and “intense programs of education and improved ser­vices” for ­these citizens. The governments of New York City and Puerto Rico recognized their duty to accelerate the pro­cess of adjustment of ­these mi­g rants. To achieve this purpose, the conference made several recommendations, including a request to better coordinate ser­vices and programs for mi­grants in the city and for the improvement of relations between Puerto Rican and NYC agencies; the creation of a continuation committee to implement the agreements of the conference; the expansion in Puerto Rico and the United States of En­glish instruction for both c­ hildren and adults; the development of new orientation programs and technical training for potential mi­grants by the government of Puerto Rico; the development of leadership and community organ­izations in New York; an increase in exchange programs between professionals on the island and in the city; and an increase in Spanish language training for teachers and other city employees who interacted with the Puerto Rican community.57 Among the main topics of the third migration conference ­were the need for Puerto Rican mi­grants to have a better understanding of En­glish and the need

160  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

for them to receive proper orientation and advice before leaving the island. As before, related programs would have to be implemented by the Puerto Rican government (­these ­were in fact already being implemented). One of the joint statement’s recommendations was to extend Puerto Rico’s mi­grant orientation program in New York, not only by the Migration Division but also by NYC agencies.58 As in the previous two conferences, the common position of the two del­e­ga­tions regarding issues of migration and incorporation of Puerto Ricans in New York w ­ ere thus heavi­ly influenced by the programs already being implemented by the Puerto Rican government u­ nder its migration policy.59 The Puerto Rican government moved quickly to carry out several of the recommendations of the third migration conference. Days ­after it ended, Sierra Berdecía announced a program whereby mayors would create local committees to provide orientation to prospective mi­grants in their municipalities. Th ­ ese would be in addition to the orientation programs managed by the Department of ­Labor’s BEM. Mayors ­were asked to create subcommittees at the level of barrios (the local orga­nizational divisions of municipalities). ­These committees would link government officials with private citizens in an attempt to expand the implementation of the government’s migration policy.60 Shortly ­after the conclusion of the conference, Muñoz Marín announced that he had requested the Department of Education to intensify the teaching of En­glish in public schools, for adults as well as c­ hildren, and to expand and further develop programs aimed at prospective mi­grants. He asked the DE to use all its resources—­from classroom teachers to public radio and TV stations— to reach the largest number of ­people pos­si­ble, particularly in rural areas, since many mi­grants ­were farm workers. The governor emphasized that this program was following recommendations from the migration conference. He also asked government agencies throughout the island to fully cooperate and coordinate with the Department of ­Labor in implementing its migration policies.61 Two days ­later, Muñoz Marín made public his letter to Wagner and to Averell Harriman, governor of New York State, informing them of his government’s implementation of the recommendations made by the latest migration conference in San Juan. He asked them to request from Congress a study on internal migrations in the United States, one of the recommendations of the conference.62 Another recommendation of the third migration conference was the creation of the Continuations Committee, which was set up to provide follow-up on the agreements of the conferences and to coordinate efforts of the Puerto Rican and NYC governments in managing Puerto Rican migration to the city. The committee was co-­chaired by Robert A. Low, assistant to the mayor of New York, and Joseph Montserrat, director of the Migration Office in New York. The New York side also included COIR executive director Horne, Henry Cohen of the Office of the City Administrator, and Winifred Lally of the NYC

The Demise of MCPRA and Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem”  •  161

Department of Welfare. The Puerto Rican side represented the top leadership of the island’s migration program: besides Montserrat, it included Sierra Berdecía; BEM director Petroamérica Pagán; and Clarence Se­nior, director of the Migration Division. In early March 1959, during a radio interview with Fini Rincón, Wagner contended that it would be a m ­ istake to revive MCPRA to work on behalf of a specific ethnic group in the city while COIR was working “to ensure equal opportunities for all groups.” Rincón responded that COIR had not fulfilled the goals that led to the creation of MCPRA and that issues of interest to the Puerto Rican community w ­ ere not taken into consideration by the broader agency. Wagner replied that the Continuations Committee was working to deal with t­ hese issues and added that he would depend on the committee to advise him on ­matters of par­tic­u­lar interest to the Puerto Rican community in New York.63 Thus, Wagner acknowledged that the Continuations Committee, consisting of functionaries from the city and Puerto Rican governments, was ­doing the work and fulfilling the goals of MCPRA. On June 12, 1959, the Continuations Committee made public in New York its first report. It provided an account of what each government was ­doing to deal with the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city. It can be concluded from the report that most of the work was being done by the Puerto Rican government; for example, the number of pages devoted to actions of the island government is almost double that of the New York City government.64 In addition to mentioning the work of COIR in improving intergroup relations in New York, the report describes the programs implemented u­ ntil then by the city’s Department of Education, the Department of Health, the Department of Housing, the ­Labor Department, the Police Department, and the Department of Welfare. Most of the work reported by t­ hese agencies had to do with ser­vices that ­were provided to the community and the efforts to expand the number of Spanish-­speaking employees, in addition to the offering of En­glish courses to ­children and adults to “speed and ease the adjustment of Puerto Ricans living in the city” (1). Essentially, the report shows how the city government was trying to limit prejudice and discrimination against Puerto Ricans in the ser­vices they offered to the community in general. The report’s section on the efforts of the Puerto Rican government is more extensive and detailed. It states the resources that the island government was devoting to address the issue of migration from the island and the incorporation of its mi­grants into the United States: the Migration Division began with a staff of 20 employees and a bud­get of $88,000 when it opened its first office in New York in 1948 and grew to a staff of over 130 and a bud­get of nearly a million to maintain 12 offices throughout the United States and an orientation unit in Puerto Rico.65 In Puerto Rico, the main goal was to orient mi­grants and prospective mi­g rants to life in the United States, and to encourage them to

162  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

move to places other than New York. The report details the vast structure that the government had already developed for this purpose: from the Department of Education (expanding En­glish classes for ­children, adults, and prospective mi­g rants; the use of public radio and TV; the publication of pamphlets and textbooks discussing migration and providing orientation to prospective mi­grants); to the Department of L ­ abor’s BEM’s high visibility throughout the island (including in municipal governments); to numerous orientation programs throughout the island and even at the airport. In the United States, the main objective of the Migration Division was to deal with “temporary prob­ lems of adjustment which occur when any group migrates to a new environment with a dif­f er­ent customs [sic]” (38). The report lists the dif­f er­ent programs established by the agency on the mainland, particularly ­those of its largest office in New York City, to provide guidance to mi­grants in seeking employment; encouraging assimilation (En­glish classes); establishing relations with the local communities; encouraging the “responsibilities of good citizenship,” like voting; and providing mi­grants help to identify themselves as American citizens, since such identification was required for certain types of employment and government ser­vices.66 This report of the Continuations Committee clearly reflects that significant programs to manage the continued “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York—­ reducing the number of mi­grants coming to the city and easing their incorporation into city life—­were primarily the responsibility of the Puerto Rican government. The issues created by Puerto Rican migration to the city ­were not ­going to be addressed by COIR, which had replaced MCPRA. Dealing with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was now in the hands of the Continuations Committee, which, in contrast to MCPRA, was composed only of city and Puerto Rican government officials. And although Wagner kept arguing publicly that COIR was ­going to take care of issues of concern to the Puerto Rican community within the umbrella of racial and ethnic relations in the city, the fact was that ­there was still a committee linked to the mayor’s office dealing with Puerto Rican affairs. It was during a November 1959 meeting of the Continuations Committee in New York that Mayor Wagner announced that a fourth migration conference would be held in the city in the spring of 1960 and that a fifth would be held in San Juan in the near ­future. The mayor declared that he wanted Puerto Rican functionaries to see firsthand “how Puerto Ricans lived, worked, and played in this city” so they could understand “the tremendous strides that have been made in bettering the conditions of Puerto Ricans in the city.”67 But as was the case in past migration conferences, the main issue to be dealt with in this one was again the continuing Puerto Rican migration to the city and the related issues of incorporation.

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The Fourth Migration Conference The fourth migration conference, held at the ­Hotel Manhattan in New York, included thirty-­five functionaries from Puerto Rico, while the New York del­ e­ga­tion numbered sixty-­five officials, as well as other members of the city’s community and religious organ­izations. Although the conference was called by the mayor of New York, the Puerto Rican press reported that the city government only provided $4,000 and that the majority of the cost was borne by the island government. Governor Muñoz Marín did not attend the conference but was represented by Commissioner of L ­ abor Sierra Berdecía. The conference was led by the co-­chairs of the Continuations Committee: Low from New York and Sierra Berdecía from Puerto Rico. While announcing the conference, Low emphasized that one impor­tant issue to be discussed was the need for island mi­grants to come to the city with adequate skills, so they would not be trapped in the low-­wage economy. He considered that an impor­tant outcome of the migration conferences was the discussion of “ideas and techniques to help us speed adjustment of Puerto Ricans in New York.” He added that city functionaries hoped that Puerto Rican officials would become “better equipped to carry on their orientation programs for ­people coming to New York.” Likewise, Sierra Berdecía argued that ­these conferences, with the cooperation of NYC government, had advanced the self-­help actions of the Puerto Rican community.68 In his announcement of the conference, Mayor Wagner stressed that ­these meetings had been “of enormous help in developing programs to speed the adjustment” of Puerto Ricans coming to the city “in response to job opportunities h ­ ere.” He added that a “primary objective” of the conference was to develop “approaches to give prospective mi­grants the skills that are in short supply” in the city’s l­ abor market and to “up-­grade workers who are earning below minimal standards.” An additional goal was to “continue our efforts in breaking down language barriers and in strengthening understanding and cooperation between our two governments.” Conference participants would be grouped into four sections to discuss the major issues of interest: health and welfare, education, housing, and law enforcement and delinquency.69 Wagner devoted most of his attention in his opening remarks to the issue of housing, calling it the most pressing prob­lem facing the city. He defended his administration’s “urban renewal” and “slum clearance” programs, specifically the West Side Urban Renewal Proj­ect—­a program that would eventually displace an entire Puerto Rican community. Wagner also cited good public school education as impor­tant for the city, and particularly for Puerto Ricans. The Puerto Rican press emphasized Wagner’s declared goal to end discrimination against Puerto Ricans and members of other minority groups.70 Like previous meetings, the fourth migration conference concluded with a final report.71 It claimed that this meeting had “occurred at a time of profound

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changes . . . ​in the migration pattern of Puerto Ricans leaving the island.” The report pointed specifically to the decreasing number of island mi­grants moving to the city, from an estimated 95 ­percent in 1948 to about 60 ­percent in 1959. It reiterated the view that Puerto Rican migration constituted “only a few slender strands in the major complex web of internal migration throughout the United States” and noted that, for the first time since World War II, the increase in the number of Puerto Ricans in the city was due to a “natu­ral increase” (births) and not from migration. The report also pointed to a new trend in Puerto Rican migration, that is, “two-­way migration”: p­ eople moving from Puerto Rico to the United States and from the mainland back to the island (1–2). This emerging migration pattern was in response to changes in “employment conditions and personal considerations.” It then stated: “Increasingly, the absorption of the Puerto Rican population into the life of the City ­will depend more on the basic ser­vices of the city government and the voluntary agencies than of special programs designed for a mi­grant population” (3). The final report of the fourth migration conference enumerated the programs implemented by both the city and the Puerto Rican governments that ­were designed to ease the incorporation of island mi­grants into New York and concluded with a set of recommendations for further action. At the top of the list was the request made in previous reports for Congress to “give immediate attention to the impact of heavy migrations on dif­f er­ent sections of the nation and to developing appropriate forms of federal assistance to communities affected by such migration” (7).72 The recommendations also included a call for an increase in the minimum wage and for the creation of a joint committee between the New York City Board of Education and the Puerto Rican Department of Education to coordinate activities dealing with areas of mutual concern, such as teaching En­glish as a second language in Puerto Rico and other mea­sures aimed at improving the educational skills of island students in the city schools. The report also recommended improvements in the housing situation in the city in general (7–9). One of the issues more fully discussed and debated during the conference was of the number of Puerto Ricans coming to the United States, and particularly to New York City. The press had reported that the numbers of mi­grants from Puerto Rico w ­ ere provided, as before, by the Puerto Rican government. The latter had estimated that t­ here ­were close to 700,000 Puerto Ricans living in the city at the time. In his opening pre­sen­ta­tion, conference co-­chair Low argued that ­there was a need to study the “two-­way migration” between the city and the island, arguing that the “number of ‘new’ persons migrating to New York from Puerto Rico each year is larger than the net migration figures previously relied upon.” Low argued that using this number obscured the real extent of migration to New York. In addition, when discussing the issue of Puerto Ricans in the city’s public school system, Low examined their very high rate of

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mobility, particularly on the West Side, and how this affected student achievement. It was left to the Puerto Rican press to notice that much of this mobility was the consequence of the city’s urban renewal policy.73

The Failure of COIR and Puerto Rican Racial Incorporation COIR was an institution fragmented by internal frictions of its core groups and incapable of fulfilling its mission of eradicating racial tensions and discrimination in the city. The agency experienced significant and divisive internal strife, mostly between its Jewish and African American leaders and organ­ izations. Like its pre­de­ces­sor, the Unity Committee, COIR was questioned both internally and externally regarding its effectiveness in battling racial discrimination in the city and its failure to provide equal access to housing, health care, and education for minority groups. Furthermore, the organ­ ization was seen as too subservient to Wagner.74 COIR failed to deal with issues of importance to the Puerto Rican community in New York, especially regarding En­glish language instruction in the public schools. As several Puerto Rican critics had argued when the organ­ization was formed, COIR was not structured to address issues of relevance to the island community. And, like the African American community, the Puerto Rican community in New York was growing fast and faced similar challenges in areas like education, housing, health care, and welfare. COIR, like MCPRA before it, did not manage to generate ­great support among the Puerto Rican community. Internal conflicts as well as the changing po­liti­cal and social context of the rising civil rights movement led to the abolition of COIR and the creation of the City Commission on H ­ uman Rights (CCHR). As an institution, CCHR was closer to civil rights groups and organ­izations than COIR ever was. In his study of CCHR, Benjamin cites the organ­izations that ­were consulted for the conferences or­ga­nized by the commission in 1961, 1964, and 1965. The Puerto Rican organ­izations that participated in t­hese conferences included Puerto Rico’s Migration Division, the Congress of Puerto Rican Hometowns, and the Puerto Rican Forum; by 1965, CCHR was also consulting with the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights.75 CCHR followed COIR’s program of leadership development among the Puerto Rican community, but it never developed a close relationship with that community. Benjamin argues that although CCHR “sought support from the Puerto Rican community and attempted to serve it, ­there is ­little indication that the community e­ ither responded to ­these initiatives or benefitted from them. Few Puerto Ricans brought complaints to the commission. Of ­those who knew of it, many saw no reason to distinguish the CCHR from other agencies in the city’s bureaucracy.” Critics believed that CCHR was too abstract in its approach, interested “too much in the ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem’ and too ­little in

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the ‘prob­lems of Puerto Ricans.’ ”76 Benjamin adds that even ­those Puerto Rican leaders working with CCHR “believed that for it as for other city agencies, Puerto Rican–­oriented programs ­were afterthoughts, undertaken with the resources left over a­ fter the needs of the black minority w ­ ere met.”77 He argues that CCHR, like COIR before it, was unable to build a strong constituency among Puerto Ricans, and that the latter “focused their efforts upon organ­ izing the Puerto Rican community and upon getting more po­liti­cal attention (and patronage) from the mayor.” Benjamin quotes Montserrat from the Migration Division stating that the commission’s leadership was not interested in the issues and affairs of the community.78 Moreover, Benjamin argues that CCHR, like COIR, was ­limited in its effectiveness by internal strife among its ethnic and racial leadership and constituencies and by a weak commitment from the city’s mayors. He maintains that “it is not the agency’s substantive achievements that have kept it alive” but the belief by several mayoral administrations that terminating it would be seen “as an ‘illiberal act’ and carry with it high po­liti­cal costs.” CCHR had survived ­because “it is believed to be a symbol of the city’s commitment to equal rights for all its citizens.”79 By the early 1960s, institutions like MCPRA, COIR, and CCHR w ­ ere becoming less and less relevant for Puerto Ricans in New York. A new generation of Puerto Ricans—­both island and city born—­was making its presence felt in the city, creating new organ­izations to deal with the challenges it faced in areas like education, housing, health care, and welfare, among ­others. Issues of civil rights, of course, also became central for this new leadership.80 The influence, relevance, and presence of the Puerto Rican government in city politics, particularly as a representative of the community, also diminished dramatically. Although the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” never ­really went away completely, it metamorphosed during this de­cade. To paraphrase Wakefield, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” became the “prob­lems of Puerto Ricans.”

The Rise of Local Leadership and the Demise of Puerto Rico’s Influence in New York Politics The 1950s was a transition period in the structure and organ­ization of the Puerto Rican community in NYC. The number of Puerto Ricans in the city increased dramatically from 1945 to 1960, and new settlements emerged in the Bronx and Manhattan’s West Side, while the old settlement areas of the pre-1945 community in Manhattan’s East Side (El Barrio) and Lower East Side and the one in Brooklyn ­were transformed with the influx of new mi­grants. The organ­izations and institutions of the prewar community w ­ ere transformed by t­ hese changes.81 This changing context allowed the Puerto Rican government to play an impor­ tant role in the affairs of the Puerto Rican community in New York City during the 1950s.

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During this period, Puerto Rico’s government became an intermediary between the Puerto Rican community in the city and the government and establishment of NYC. Th ­ ere ­were several reasons for this. First, as Lorrin Thomas has argued, in previous de­cades the NYC government had treated Puerto Ricans as if they w ­ ere “invisible” in the city’s affairs. It regarded them as a marginal group, constantly dismissed their interests and concerns, and kept them out of the decision-­making pro­cess before the 1950s.82 Their only source of support within the city establishment came from Congressman Marcantonio. The dramatic increase in their migration to the city immediately a­ fter the war ended and the ascent of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign changed that approach. Puerto Rican migration and incorporation to the United States in the immediate postwar period was strongly influenced by the context of the Cold War. The group’s close relationship and its support for Marcantonio, already considered a pariah during this increasingly anti-­communist era, allowed some conservatives to disseminate the idea that ­there was a “red tinge” in the Puerto Rican community in the city. With the electoral defeat of Marcantonio in 1950, and his subsequent death in 1954, Puerto Ricans lost their most impor­tant advocate and defender in the city and nationally. The Puerto Rican government filled this void. It is not a coincidence that it entered NYC politics and developed closer ties to the NYC government during the 1949 mayoral election campaign, when the island government joined the anti-­ communist offensive against Marcantonio. But the Puerto Rican government filled another void, the one created by the inability of the NYC government to manage the city’s “Puerto Rican prob­lem” on its own. The NYC establishment entrusted Puerto Rico’s government with the management of issues that it believed most pressing regarding the growing Puerto Rican presence in the city: the efforts to stop their migration to the city and to advance their assimilation, as well as their social and po­liti­cal incorporation. For José Cruz, the Puerto Rican community in NYC came “out of the margins” by the early to mid-1960s. His examination of post-1960s Puerto Rican politics in NYC shows that the number of elected officials at all levels of the city and state structure increased dramatically by the end of the de­cade, and so did the number of professional and community organ­izations. By this time, po­liti­cal and community leaders demanded a greater participation in the affairs that most affected their community, like education and schooling, voting rights, health care, and law enforcement and policing.83 Community leaders and organ­izations that played a prominent role ­after the 1960s began to emerge during the 1950s. A younger leadership—­what community activist Antonia Pantoja called “Young Turks”—­created new organ­ izations and demanded a greater role in the affairs of the community.84 Pantoja herself was instrumental in the foundation of institutions like the Puerto Rican Forum, Aspira, and the Puerto Rican Development Proj­ect in the late 1950s

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and early 1960s, organ­izations that became bulwarks of the community in the following de­cades. Also during the 1950s, po­liti­cal and community activist Gilberto Gerena Valentín was instrumental in the creation of the Congreso de los Pueblos and, most importantly, the Parada Puertorriqueña, which has come to epitomize the presence of Puerto Ricans in the city and became a symbol of Puerto Ricanness in the United States.85 By the early 1960s, the Puerto Rican community and po­liti­cal leadership in NYC already resented and questioned the intervention of Puerto Rico’s government in the affairs of the community.86 They also criticized the NYC government for seeking advice and support from Puerto Rico’s government in ­matters related to Puerto Ricans in the city and for keeping the community’s leaders and organ­izations outside the decision-­making pro­cess on issues that affected them. The War on Poverty provided the resources for community economic development and encouraged the creation of in­de­pen­dent community and po­liti­cal organ­izations that allowed Puerto Ricans in the city to gain influence and po­liti­cal power. Issues like community control over education, law enforcement, and racism, and the emerging civil rights movement created a greater distance between the new generation of leaders and community organ­ izations and Puerto Rico’s Migration Division in the United States.87 The redefinition of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the city and the emergence of new community and po­liti­cal leadership and organ­izations led to the diminished influence and presence of the Puerto Rican government in city politics. ­There is no event more telling in this regard than the end of the migration conferences and of the coordination between the NYC and the Puerto Rican governments in dealing with issues that affected the island community in the city. In March 1966, Mayor Lindsay announced a proposed visit to San Juan to discuss with island officials ­matters pertaining to the Puerto Rican community in the city. Th ­ ere he planned to meet with Governor Roberto Sánchez Vilella and other high-­ranking island officials. The governor stated that among the issues to be discussed w ­ ere housing, jobs, and public school education for Puerto Ricans in New York. Lindsay announced the appointment of Teodoro Moscoso as his advisor for Puerto Rican affairs.88 Moscoso was the architect of Puerto Rico’s industrialization program known as Operation Bootstrap and had also been appointed by President John F. Kennedy to the Alliance for Pro­ gress, as an American intermediary with Latin Amer­i­ca. Lindsay’s announcements ­were immediately questioned by Puerto Ricans in New York. Regarding the mayor’s proposed visit to Puerto Rico, Herman Badillo stated that the “prob­lems of Puerto Ricans in New York are urgent and San Juan is too far away.” Badillo -­one of the most prominent post-­war Puerto Rican politicians in NYC, and the first Puerto Rican to be president of the Bronx borough and l­ ater to be elected to Congress as a representative-­also questioned Moscoso’s appointment, particularly given the latter’s statement that

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he would only visit New York once a month. Badillo argued that “the job requires more than one person. Puerto Rican prob­lems in New York must be addressed by Puerto Ricans from New York. Moscoso is not knowledgeable about the Puerto Rican condition in New York.” Badillo’s statements w ­ ere supported by Robert A. Low, Lindsay’s point person for Puerto Rican affairs.89 Mayor Lindsay went ahead and kept Moscoso in the post, paying no attention to his critics. But Moscoso’s activities ­were indeed problematic. One of his first acts was trying to convince Lindsay to oppose an amendment to the Fair ­Labor Standards Act increasing the minimum wage in Puerto Rico. As architect of Operation Bootstrap, Moscoso had always supported keeping wages in Puerto Rico below the federal minimum wage as one of the so-­called incentives to attract U.S. corporations to the island. Moscoso argued that an increase in the minimum wage in Puerto Rico would lead to a loss of jobs t­ here and an increase in migration to New York. Lindsay, aware of the opposition to this idea in New York among Puerto Rican leaders and ­labor u­ nions, refused to support Moscoso on this issue.90 Also problematic for Lindsay was Moscoso’s role in the proposed visit to San Juan in December 1966 for another migration conference. Moscoso became the liaison between the island and the city for the event. When Lindsay announced his intention to participate in the conference, the plan was for him to spend three days in San Juan in high-­level talks with island officials on prob­lems of mutual concern to the city and Puerto Rico. He would be accompanied by twelve commissioners and their top aides.91 The reaction to this plan by the Puerto Rican community was immediate. According to an advisor of the mayor, Puerto Ricans felt that “the city administration is dealing with San Juan over the heads of the New York Puerto Rican community and that this signifies a lack of consideration and re­spect for that community’s ability to analyze its own prob­lems and propose solutions.” To assuage the critics, Lindsay announced that he would include city Puerto Ricans in the del­e­ga­tion and would consult with them on the city’s agenda for the event.92 The Puerto Rico conference was called off ­after Lindsay canceled his participation in reaction to what the New York Times characterized as “an angry meeting” with Puerto Rican leaders from New York. City hall officials “acknowledged that relations with the Puerto Rican community ­were not marked by ‘warmth and cordiality’ b­ ecause of the belief that for the last de­cade the city had turned to the Puerto Rican government rather than to local leaders for solutions.” The meeting represents a turning point in Lindsay’s—­and, for that ­matter, previous city administrations’—­relationship with the Puerto Rican community in New York. In January 1967, Lindsay announced a proposed conference on Puerto Rican issues in the city, rather than on the island, to be attended by 500 representatives of the community. He also announced the appointment of the thirty-­t wo-­year-­old social worker Marta Valle as his

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advisor on Puerto Rican affairs. Valle would head the forty-­member committee organ­izing the conference. The list of members announced publicly did not include anyone from Puerto Rico’s government or the Migration Division, and definitely not Moscoso. According to the New York Times, Lindsay was “seeking greater guidance from the Puerto Rican community ­here on prob­lems of urban development, education and housing rather than relying on po­liti­cal leaders in Puerto Rico for advice.” Herman Badillo stated that the prob­lems facing Puerto Ricans in the city required “local solutions.” He added: “I suppose t­ here was a time when most of the civic leadership for Puerto Ricans in New York had to come from the island,” but he was pleased to see that Lindsay and o­ thers had come to realize “that the local community has come of age and is quite prepared to h ­ andle its own affairs.”93

8

In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City Although most of the offensive ideas related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” ­were no longer openly displayed in the public arena by the mid-­to late 1960s, partly due to the policies and programs of the Puerto Rican and New York City governments and the growing mobilization and increasing participation of the Puerto Rican community in city affairs, some of the basic notions under­lying the narrative persisted for many years thereafter. Frequently, some in the media and the NYC establishment would refer to the “prob­lems of Puerto Ricans” or of Puerto Ricans facing this or that prob­lem instead of alluding directly to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” For example, in 1967, in reaction to the protests of Puerto Rican po­liti­cal leaders and community activists, mayor John Lindsay or­ga­nized a conference on the issues facing the community in NYC titled “Puerto Ricans Confront the Prob­lems of Urban Society.”1 This chapter w ­ ill discuss the threat of a new “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign re-­emerging in the late 1950s, this time fueled by news headlines on gangs and juvenile delinquency. This was a continuation of one trope of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative, that of Puerto Ricans being inclined to criminal activity and vio­lence. De­cades l­ ater, the perception of Puerto Ricans as propagators prostitution and of a drug culture in NYC as addicts and dealers, as shown in the film Fort Apache: The Bronx, became common.2 By the 1970s, urban renewal programs in NYC had destroyed minority communities and White flight, and the fiscal crisis of the state and city governments ­limited 171

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their investments in public housing. Nevertheless, during this de­cade Puerto Rican communities in NYC became the symbol of urban decay. The “Bronx is burning” came to represent the image of urban dwellers destroying their own communities; at the time the Bronx was the center of the Puerto Rican community in NYC.3 This chapter examines some of the ramifications of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC and the narrative and discourse that developed thereafter, and how they have impacted the way Puerto Ricans ­were incorporated, perceived, and studied in the United States. The first section discusses how the narrative of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” that emerged in NYC also surfaced in other areas where Puerto Ricans ­were settling in the postwar period. It focuses on how it influenced Puerto Rican incorporation in the par­tic­u ­lar cases of Philadelphia, Chicago, and Hartford, Connecticut, which became major settlements of this group in the United States. The notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” influenced the way American scholars studied Puerto Ricans in the postwar period. The second section examines a prominent perspective in the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States that needs to be linked to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative: the “culture of poverty.” It is perhaps the academic theory with the greatest impact on the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States. No book has been more influential in reproducing the “culture of poverty” theory than Oscar Lewis’s La Vida. It proposes that the root of Puerto Ricans’ poverty in NYC lies in Puerto Rico and that their economic marginalization is caused by their own be­hav­ior, a notion also propagated by the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative in NYC. The “culture of poverty” is another example of how certain ideas moved from the public debates regarding the entry of Puerto Ricans in NYC to U.S. academia. Perhaps no single American cultural construct has ­shaped the way Puerto Ricans have been perceived in the United States and elsewhere as has West Side Story, the play and particularly the film. Lauded by critics and the general public alike, West Side Story has been criticized by scholars for reproducing many ste­reo­types regarding Puerto Ricans. The third section of this chapter examines how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative prevalent in NYC during the 1950s framed how Puerto Ricans ­were portrayed in this iconic piece of Americana. I argue that the reason why Puerto Ricans ­were selected as one of the clashing gangs in West Side Story needs to be directly linked to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC. West Side Story reproduced many of the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” that still lingered in NYC in that period.

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The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” . . . ​Outside New York One consequence of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC was the decision by the Puerto Rican government to encourage mi­grants to move to other areas of the United States. It became a central aspect of its migration policy a­ fter 1947. During the 1950s, the need to move Puerto Ricans away from NYC was a constant demand by the city establishment. The reduction in the number of Puerto Ricans moving to NYC in the late 1950s was one of the major accomplishments claimed by both the Puerto Rican and the city governments. But what came to be known as NYC’s “Puerto Rican prob­lem” also influenced the incorporation of Puerto Rican mi­grants in other regions of the United States. Communities in Philadelphia, Chicago, and Hartford, among o­ thers, also experienced their own “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” This notion was an impor­tant f­ actor in shaping how emerging Puerto Rican postwar communities ­were perceived in the United States for several de­cades. Carmen Whalen has examined how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” arose in Philadelphia. In July 1953, a bar brawl between Puerto Ricans and Whites led to street riots in the Puerto Rican community that lasted several days. The growing Puerto Rican migration to the city became a focus of public attention. It also became a “prob­lem” to be dealt with by the city authorities. A ­ fter the riots, the City’s Commission on ­Human Relations (CHR) appointed a committee to study the situation of the new mi­grants. The commission found that Whites had initiated the riot and that Puerto Ricans felt unwelcome in the city and complained of persecution by police. According to Whalen, as they responded to the street fighting, policymakers and social ser­vice workers transformed the vio­lence from a racially motivated reaction against Puerto Ricans into a manifestation of Puerto Ricans’ “prob­lems of adjustment.” The Commission of ­Human Relations Study was a first step in this transformation. Sharing some of Puerto Ricans’ neighbors’ concerns about racial change, policy makers and social ser­vice workers dismissed whites’ prejudice and defined the “prob­lem” as Puerto Ricans’ culture, their lack of assimilation, and their failure to make use of social ser­vices. They responded to the “prob­lem” by forming committees of public and private agencies to explore Puerto Ricans’ prob­lems and to foster a solution, which they defined as Puerto Ricans’ increased use of existing social ser­vice agencies and “assimilation.”4

This was a pro­cess very similar to the one that had occurred in NYC years ­earlier. While the commission downplayed the neighbors’ prejudice against Puerto Ricans, it defined Puerto Ricans as strangers lacking adjustment to the new milieu.

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As in New York City, the Philadelphia media began a series of highly prejudiced reports against Puerto Ricans. Whalen states that “Puerto Rican ‘prob­lems’ no longer included or referred to the prob­lems Puerto Ricans encountered, but rather to the ‘prob­lems’ Puerto Ricans caused the city.”5 A 1958 study asked, “Does Philadelphia have a ‘Puerto Rican Prob­lem’?” and answered ambivalently that it had not arisen yet. It concluded that Puerto Ricans did not show a disproportionate participation in crime, delinquency, or other forms of antisocial be­hav­ior, and they ­were not overrepresented in the city’s relief rolls. A report by Philadelphia’s CHR the next year stated that “concern was expressed for the prob­lems which might arise from the rapid in-­migration of a low income group with a language handicap and culture unfamiliar with urban life in the United States. The difficulties involving New York City’s mushrooming population was uppermost in the minds of social agency administrators, school authorities and the City departments.”6 Not only did a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” emerge in Philadelphia, but such a notion was linked to the one in New York. The experience in Philadelphia shows, as in Chicago and Hartford, how the stigmatization of Puerto Ricans that began in New York extended l­ ater to other communities on the mainland. In Chicago, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” took a l­ ittle longer to surface than in Philadelphia. As Gina Pérez argues, Puerto Rico’s government actively tried to prevent in Chicago what had happened in New York and—­along with Chicago authorities—to pre­sent Puerto Rican mi­grants as a “model minority.” She contends that Puerto Rico’s Migration Office in Chicago also had “the desire to avoid a ‘racial powder keg’ that characterized New York Puerto Ricans’ experience.”7 Puerto Ricans in Chicago ­were presented in direct contrast to ­those in New York: hardworking, well adjusted, and lacking signs of antisocial be­hav­ior. All this changed with the Division Street riots of June 1966, when the community erupted in several days of rioting ­after acts of police brutality. The June riots, like ­those that would occur in Hartford, signaled the beginning of a new ethnic consciousness among Puerto Ricans and, with it, the creation of autonomous and activist organ­izations.8 ­These riots also changed the perception of Puerto Ricans in Chicago. As Pérez points out, “the Division Street Riots ­were key in transforming the popu­lar perception of Puerto Ricans as hard-­working, peaceable, and furiously industrious ­people. News articles, for example, began to focus on the prob­lems of gangs, drugs, welfare de­pen­dency, and vio­lence that now, according to media accounts, characterized the community.”9 As in Philadelphia, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” emerged in Hartford quite rapidly, although not as promptly as in New York. As José Cruz’s study of Puerto Ricans in Hartford demonstrates, although Puerto Rican migration ­there consisted mostly of workers and few w ­ ere on welfare rolls or had been accused of major crimes, the views about Puerto Ricans in Hartford ­were mostly

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negative. As in Chicago, officials from the Puerto Rican government tried to differentiate Puerto Ricans in Hartford from ­those in New York as a means to ease their incorporation into the city. By 1954, city officials had declared Puerto Ricans a “prob­lem” for the city, stating: “They are not moral or immoral—­just unmoral.” As had happened in other cities, they ­were accused of having no work ethic, having dif­f er­ent customs and culture, and being unassimilable to American society. ­Because of their U.S. citizenship, they “­were considered to lack the incentive to become assimilated—an impor­tant f­ actor in the incorporation of Germans, Poles, Italians, and other immigrant groups.”10 As in Philadelphia and Chicago, Puerto Ricans in Hartford tried to advance their integration to the city by creating social, cultural, and po­liti­cal organ­izations. Nevertheless, they encountered prejudice and racism, exploitation, and marginality. As in Philadelphia and Chicago, the August 1969 riots in the Puerto Rican neighborhood in Hartford signaled the beginning of a period of po­liti­cal organ­ ization and mobilization by the community, but they also illustrate Puerto Ricans’ peculiar form of incorporation into the po­liti­cal structure of the city.11 As in the other two cases mentioned, t­ hese riots cemented the notion of Puerto Ricans as a “prob­lem” to the city that needed to be dealt with.

The Pathology of American Social Science: From the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” to the “Culture of Poverty” Puerto Ricans, particularly ­those living in the United States, became a trendy subject of study by U.S. academia in the postwar period. The purpose was usually to try to understand the myriad of prob­lems presented by this ­people to American society in m ­ atters such as poverty, schools, m ­ ental health, diseases, juvenile delinquency, and their inability to assimilate into U.S. society and culture, among ­others. Recent generations of scholars, particularly Puerto Ricans, have examined how t­ hese ideas influenced the way U.S. scholars, policy makers, and the public in general understood Puerto Ricans in the postwar era, and, most importantly, how they have s­ haped many public policies implemented to deal with the “prob­lems” that Puerto Ricans posed for American society. Perhaps no other theory has impacted the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States as has the “culture of poverty.”12 Several scholars have traced the origins of this concept to the narrative and discourse on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem.” But they have failed to perceive the historical origins of the “prob­lem” narrative. ­These scholars have assumed that the notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” emerged from U.S. academics and policy makers looking at Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico and that it was l­ater transferred to the study of Puerto Rican mi­grants in the United States. As discussed throughout the book, the idea that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC was simply a reflection

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of their “prob­lems” in Puerto Rico was integral to the narrative that emerged in NYC in the late 1940s and afterward—­that is, that the prob­lem with Puerto Ricans was Puerto Ricans themselves: that the way they are and behave is rooted in their “prob­lems” in Puerto Rico, ­later transferred to the United States.13 But we need to separate this idea—­central to the narrative of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the United States—­from the way that it became dominant on the U.S. mainland. Scholars who have questioned the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative and discourse in U.S. academia have not paid attention to the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign in NYC in the 1940s and 1950s, which I argue is the basis for the narrative and the discourse associated with this notion in the United States. Although ­these scholars are critical of the academic trend objectivizing Puerto Ricans as a subject of study, they have in a sense reproduced the view that this is a merely academic enterprise. The notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC and the U.S. emerged out of a real historical and social pro­cess of migration and incorporation, and the narrative and discourse associated with this event l­ater moved to academia. In order to understand the nature of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative and discourse in the United States, it is necessary to comprehend its historical origins. Concepts and perspectives that emanate from colonial subordination, nativism, and racism w ­ ere integrated into American academia as means of studying and understanding the experience of Puerto Ricans in the United States. Several scholars have argued that the idea of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in the United States emerged first in Puerto Rico, as U.S. scholars and policy makers confronted the myriad of “prob­lems” presented by Puerto Ricans on the island (overpopulation, poverty, racial inferiority, e­ tc.). According to this view, this narrative l­ater moved to the United States as Puerto Ricans began to migrate to the U.S. mainland in larger numbers in the postwar period. That is, it moved from a scholarly/policy-­making enterprise focusing on Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico to a scholarly/policy-­making exercise concentrating on Puerto Ricans in the United States. The prob­lem with this argument is that it misses a major intervening step in this pro­cess: the real “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign in New York City in the late 1940s and afterward. A good example of this perspective is presented by Laura Briggs in her excellent study of reproductive policies in Puerto Rico. She traces the “culture of poverty” to the narrative of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” that emerged first in Puerto Rico and l­ ater transferred to the United States as island mi­grants moved ­there. She claims that it was in reaction to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC that “politicians turned to social scientists to explain, and thus solve, the ‘prob­lem’ of working class Puerto Ricans.”14 But as we have discussed in this book, American scholars followed the narratives that emerged in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC in the immediate postwar period.

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Another scholar who directly links the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” to the “culture of poverty” is Laura Ortiz in her outstanding examination of U.S. postwar academic discourses on Puerto Ricans. She argues that U.S. academia developed three major discourses to study postwar Puerto Ricans in the United States: “the Puerto Rican Prob­lem,” “the assimilation prob­lem,” and “the culture of poverty.” Th ­ ese discourses are interrelated and linked chronologically: the first discourse is the “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” followed by the “assimilation discourse,” and then the “culture of poverty.” The last two are directly linked to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse, although they have their own basis and characteristics. Unfortunately, Ortiz does not elaborate at all on how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse originated in the United States, that is, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in New York City. As in other scholarship, the assumption seems to be that it was a purely academic exercise. But besides this point, her study provides an excellent analy­sis of how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse influenced American academic perspectives on postwar Puerto Ricans in the United States. The contours of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse as she views it correspond to what has been described in this book. Her study overlaps with my argument that the postwar narrative that emerged from the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in NYC was absorbed by U.S. academia and converted into a scholarly discourse on how to understand Puerto Ricans in the United States. Ortiz claims that the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” was the first discoursive formation on Puerto Ricans in the United States.15 It served as the discoursive basis for a myriad of institutions in charge of “solving” the “prob­lems” presented by Puerto Ricans in multiple areas of society, like education, health and m ­ ental care, jobs, drug and alcohol addiction, juvenile delinquency, and imprisonment, among ­others. Ortiz describes how the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” discourse moved from the front pages of NYC newspapers to the halls of academia in its new discursive formation: “While North American citizens, journalists, social workers, teachers, priests, community leaders, and government officials are the leading authorities that speak on ‘The Puerto Rican Prob­lem,’ in this new discourse social scientists, researchers, and gradu­ate students are the main authorities that address ‘The Assimilation Prob­lem.’ ”16 To Ortiz, although the basic notions about Puerto Ricans under­lying the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”—­like backwardness, alienness, inferiority, etc.—­are not completely gone, the new discourse of assimilation assumes a more liberal perspective t­ oward this group, which was more consonant with U.S. academia in the postwar period; this last point has also been emphasized by authors like Briggs and Thomas. Ortiz argues that “cultural prob­lems and deficits of Puerto Ricans are the point of departure from which they can evolve u­ ntil fi­nally integrating into North American culture.”17 Cultural difference and otherness w ­ ere at the center of the “Puerto Rican Prob­ lem” campaign and narrative in NYC. For many scholars and policy makers, a

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way out of Puerto Ricans’ situation was through assimilation and integration into American society and culture. Their Puerto Ricanness had to be left ­behind. This is precisely what Puerto Rico and New York City policy makers ­were promoting during the 1950s as the solution to the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” in NYC. But for many in the United States, culture remained a prob­lem for the complete integration and assimilation of Puerto Ricans to American society. A new view of Puerto Rican pathology emerged in U.S. academia during the 1960s to explain their socioeconomic marginalization and alleged lack of incorporation to American society: the “culture of poverty.” Although Oscar Lewis initially developed his theory of a “culture of poverty” with the study of Mexicans, it was not ­until he published La Vida—­ focusing on a dysfunctional Puerto Rican f­amily—­that the concept became academically popu­lar and accepted by policy makers.18 Lewis follows the life patterns of a f­ amily from the slums in San Juan to New York City. He described ­these p­ eople as trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, marginalization, and despair caused by their own be­hav­iors, passed from one generation to the next.19 For Lewis, following the basic contours of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative and discourse, the poverty experienced by Puerto Ricans in the United States is the product of the slums of Puerto Rico. According to Ortiz, Puerto Ricans became the source for Lewis’s new conceptual model, the point of departure for the theorization of the “culture of poverty.”20 Whalen characterizes the “culture of poverty” “as a historically specific racial ideology . . . ​still embedded in the mainstream lit­er­a­ture on Puerto Ricans.”21 In a ­matter of years, the “culture of poverty” became the dominant theoretical perspective in the study of Puerto Ricans in the United States, particularly as it was related to issues of poverty, joblessness, welfare de­pen­dency, female-­headed h ­ ouse­holds, juvenile delinquency, school dropouts, and drug addiction, among o­ thers.22 Although the theory was criticized when first published, even many on the left, like Michael Harrington and David Harvey, made use of it to explain poverty in the United States. For many scholars, the “culture of poverty” was the intellectual basis for the War on Poverty programs of the 1960s. The intellectual under­pinnings of the work that is usually said to have provided the guidelines and justification for the War on Poverty, Moynihan’s The Negro ­Family, is similar to Lewis’s “culture of poverty” thesis.23 The way Glazer and Moyhiham viewed Puerto Ricans in Beyond the Melting Pot corresponds with Lewis’s characterization of this group. But even Glazer—in his review of La Vida—­found that Lewis had gone too far in his depiction of Puerto Ricans. He correctly predicted—­although not for the right reasons—­ that the book “­will form an impor­tant part of the lit­er­a­ture building up on the Puerto Rican community in New York City and its background in Puerto Rico.” Quite perceptively, Glazer questioned if Lewis was “describing Puerto Ricans, in San Juan and New York, or is he describing exceptional

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p­ eople, leading exceptional lives, who resemble their fellow Puerto Ricans only in l­imited ways.” A ­ fter describing the criticisms and massive protests in Mexico in reaction to Lewis’s book on Mexicans, Glazer concluded that “­those who are bound to protest against La Vida as a misleading picture of the Puerto Rican community ­will, one feels, be somewhat more justified than ­those who protested against The C ­ hildren of Sanchez.”24 Many, including myself, have questioned Beyond the Melting Pot in a similar way.

The “Puerto Rican ­Thing”: West Side Story and the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Apparently, no discussion of Puerto Ricans in NYC in the 1950s can end without discussing West Side Story. This book ­will not be the exception. Most Puerto Ricans, young and old, born in Puerto Rico or in the United States, at some point in their lives, one way or another, had to face the allusions to this famous and iconic film that premiered in 1961 but was staged as a Broadway play in 1957.25 While the American public in general, and critics in par­tic­u­lar, praised West Side Story for its aesthetic qualities as a cultural product, many critics consider that it is full of ste­reo­types and see it as a cultural construct that serves to reproduce them. According to Lorrin Thomas, West Side Story created “an enduring image of the Puerto Rican in New York [that] was e­ tched into the national imagination.”26 Frances Negrón-­Muntaner argues that t­ here is “no single American cultural product that haunts Puerto Rican identity discourses in the United States more intensely than the 1961 film West Side Story.”27 For Arturo Sandoval Sánchez, the film “has propagated the image of Puerto Ricans in the U.S.A. and internationally up to the point of becoming a referent a priori, the ‘model of/for’ immigrant Puerto Rican ethnicity and identity.”28 Carina del Valle Schorske stated that “the show remains one of the most enduring repre­sen­ta­tions of Puerto Rican life in American pop culture, and the entertainment industry w ­ on’t leave it alone.”29 She was referring to the latest production of the play on Broadway in 2019; the play was also staged ­there in 2009 ­after several de­cades of absence. Furthermore, a new film version by none other than Steven Spielberg—in his first ever musical—­came out in December 2021. New and old critics have complained that the way Puerto Ricans ­were portrayed in West Side Story—­both in the play and in the movie— is not an accurate image of their history and culture, that it is full of old ste­ reo­t ypes, and, for many, is racist. The reason why I am discussing West Side Story in this chapter is ­because the play and the film reproduced the way Puerto Ricans ­were looked at in New York during the 1950s. Furthermore, I argue that this view of Puerto Ricans is directly related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative in vogue at that time.30

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West Side Story has become a piece of Americana. The play was a huge success even before it opened on Broadway to rave reviews. It was staged in other parts of the United States before finishing its initial Broadway run. It is one of the most popu­lar American musicals of all times and it is performed over and over in regional theaters, local productions, and high schools throughout the United States. West Side Story was also very successful internationally; it was staged in many countries ­after it opened in New York. The film was a big box office hit in the United States and worldwide. It was well received by critics and the public alike and won ten Acad­emy Awards, one of the highest numbers ever.31 According to several scholars, this was the first time Puerto Ricans became central characters in a major Hollywood movie.32 For millions of ­people in the United States and the world, this might have been the first time they came to know anything about Puerto Ricans. So, how w ­ ere Puerto Ricans represented in West Side Story? For Thomas, who discusses West Side Story in the same chapter where she examines the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC, the film “traded on the image of the dark and foreign Puerto Rican mi­grant who, despite striving for the dreams of Amer­ i­ca, brought intractable social prob­lems to the city.” She adds that although West Side Story tried to pre­sent a more liberal view of Puerto Rican mi­grants, “the more dominant symbols w ­ ere t­ hose of the knife-­wielding Puerto Rican youth who was inescapably drawn to delinquency and vio­lence.”33 And according to Briggs, “When Puerto Ricans who grew up in the 1950s and ’60s complain that everywhere they went, West Side Story provided the lens through which mainland Americans saw them, this is part of the complaint—­all the boys are criminals, all the girls are sexualized, and the island is ‘overpopulated.’ ”34 Sandoval Sánchez characterizes West Side Story as “an iconic ideological articulation of the ste­reo­type and identity of Puerto Rican immigrants in the U.S.A. as well as for all other Latino immigrants.”35 Negrón-­Muntaner claims that in West Side Story “it was not only a single Puerto Rican who was hailed as a criminal, it was a generalized ‘Puerto Rican youth.’. . . . ​West Side Story locates Puerto Rican identity at the crossroads of colonialism, racialization and shame by addressing just not one Puerto Rican but a w ­ hole community as abject.”36 In her extensive examination of West Side Story as a social and cultural phenomenon, Julia Foulkes argues that what began “as a random assignment of difference in an updated Romeo and Juliet became the primary channel for defining Puerto Ricans and what it means to belong. The story portrayed their marginalization, but it also served to perpetuate ste­ reo­types.” The success of the play and the film nationwide and globally “made it particularly hard to see Puerto Ricans beyond the characters of Bernardo, Anita, and the Sharks.” She adds that, for the creators of West Side Story, Puerto Ricans “­were stand-­ins (with a colorful heritage in ­music and dance) for ­those

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who did not belong.”37 For cultural studies scholar Carol Oja, although both the play and the film “aimed to feature Puerto Ricans as p­ eople, rather than as exotic flavouring, they still traded on troubling essentialisms, and the lyr­ics of some numbers—­especially ‘Amer­i­ca’—­have grown in their capacity to offend as time has passed.”38 West Side Story has been linked to another construct that emerged from the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC in the 1950s: the “culture of poverty.” Briggs, for example, discusses the film in the same chapter and context where she examines the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC and the “culture of poverty.” If “the culture of poverty” provided a perspective that framed the academic study of Puerto Ricans for de­cades, West Side Story advanced a repre­sen­ta­tion of Puerto Ricans that remains in the imaginary of American popu­lar culture. For historian V ­ irginia Sánchez Korrol, West Side Story and Oscar Lewis’s La Vida are “two examples that contributed overwhelmingly to ste­reo­t yped perspectives ­because of their broad impact on American culture and international circulation . . . ​[B]oth works have contributed ­toward perpetuating a conformist image of the Puerto Rican in Amer­i­ca devoid of positive values, historical legacy or culture.”39 The ideas and ste­reo­types about Puerto Ricans presented in West Side Story need to be linked to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative in NYC during this period. As a m ­ atter of fact, the reason why Puerto Ricans w ­ ere inserted into West Side Story as main protagonists is directly related to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative in NYC during the late 1940s and 1950s. Leonard Bern­stein, the show’s composer, Jerome Robbins (choreographer), and Arthur Laurents (writer) had been toying with the idea of staging a play titled East Side Story about an impossible love between a Jewish girl and a Catholic boy in this neighborhood of New York City. This play, like West Side Story, was to be a modern production of Shakespeare’s classic Romeo and Juliet. But according to Bern­stein, “we have abandoned the Jewish-­Catholic premise as not very fresh, and have come up with what I think is ­going to be it: two teenage gangs, one the warring Puerto Ricans, the other ‘self-­styled’ Americans.” In Bern­stein’s account, he came up with the idea a­ fter reading a story about Chicano gangs in a Los Angeles newspaper while working ­there on a film score: “We stared at it and then at each other and realized that this—in New York—­ was it. The Puerto Rican t­hing had just began to explode, and we called Jerry, and that’s the way West Side Story—as opposed to East Side Story—­was born.”40 Laurents ­later stated: “In New York we had the Puerto Ricans, and at that time the papers w ­ ere full of stories about juvenile delinquents and gangs.”41 What was this “Puerto Rican t­ hing” that inspired Bern­stein and Laurents to make Puerto Ricans the main protagonists of their new play? According to Negrón-­Muntaner, “the Puerto Rican ‘­thing’ was nothing but the emerging

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public subjectivity for a community that had lived in New York for de­cades.”42 For del Valle Schorske, “that ‘­thing’ . . . ​was an enormous postwar migration from the island that had ‘nearly doubled’ New York City’s Puerto Rican population.”43 Both observations are true, but in terms of explaining “the Puerto Rican ­thing” Bern­stein was referring to, ­these are very s­ imple generalizations. If you have been reading this book so far, you already know what the “­thing” Bern­stein was taking about is: the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative that extended throughout New York City from the late 1940s and was still alive during the late 1950s. Views of Puerto Ricans that dominate West Side Story emerged directly from this narrative: criminals, juvenile delinquents, sexualized ­women, alien foreigners incapable of assimilation leaving an island ravaged by overpopulation, poverty, crime, and diseases. The notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC never ­really went away. Traces of the late 1940s and early 1950s’ campaign remained, and the narrative of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” still dominated the public debate on this group.44 One issue that gained in relevance a­ fter the mid-1950s was that of juvenile delinquency and gangs. It had become one of interest nationwide in the United States.45 The concern with Puerto Rican gangs and juvenile delinquency during the 1950s—­what the creators of West Side Story ­were reading in the city newspapers—­was nothing but a continuation of one of the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and the narrative that emerged from it: Puerto Ricans as criminals and prone to delinquency. News about Puerto Rican gangs and juvenile delinquents kept reproducing the notion of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC a­fter the mid-1950s. Sensationalistic headlines from the mainstream media sustained the idea of young Puerto Rican criminals rampaging throughout the city. As Elizabeth Wells points out, “newspaper accounts tended to emphasize the whiteness and good breeding of the victims and the seemingly unprovoked and cold-­blooded be­hav­ior of their clearly Hispanic assailants.”46 The issue was discussed by Puerto Rican and NYC officials meeting in the migration conferences held from 1953 to 1960;47 ­these conferences ­were supposed to help t­ hese government officials deal with the continuing “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC. By the late 1950s, Puerto Rican and NYC officials w ­ ere concerned about the emergence of a new “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign in the city like the one that emerged a­ fter 1947. Th ­ ere w ­ ere two issues that again became a source of front-­page news and widespread public debate in the city: Puerto Ricans as welfare cheaters48 and the rise of crime among Puerto Ricans fueled by gangs and juvenile delinquents. Both had echoes of the 1947 campaign. As in the previous episode, the Puerto Rican and city governments began a public campaign to counteract the most damaging aspects of the Puerto Rican crime narrative. Puerto Rican community activists and government officials worked to create a co­ali­tion of 149 Puerto Rican and other citywide organ­izations to ­counter

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this narrative. They claimed that the crime rate in Puerto Rico was lower than in the United States and that ­there was almost no juvenile delinquency or gangs on the island. They also argued that Puerto Ricans in the city ­were no more prone to crime than other groups and that, in fact, their crime rate was lower than other groups. Puerto Rico’s government insisted that the rise of Puerto Rican youth gangs in NYC was the consequence of their experience in the city. They warned New Yorkers of g­ oing back to the 1947 campaign that was full of hurtful and untruthful ste­reo­types that led to widespread discrimination and prejudice against Puerto Ricans.49 The New York establishment also reacted to c­ ounter the emerging new “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign. In a September 1959 editorial titled precisely “The ‘Puerto Rican’ Prob­lem,” the New York Times questioned ­those who kept distorting the statistics regarding the crime rate among Puerto Ricans, claiming that it was not higher than that of any other group. The editorial applauded the contributions made by Puerto Ricans to NYC, but still asserted they ­were ill prepared to face the harsh conditions they confronted in the city. It praised the programs of the Puerto Rican and NYC governments to help ­these mi­grants better adapt to city life but urged islanders to move to other areas of the United States.50 That same month, New York state governor Nelson Rocke­fel­ler and NYC mayor Robert Wagner declared in a joint conference that the crisis of juvenile delinquency in NYC was not caused by Puerto Rican mi­grants. Like the position taken by the Puerto Rican government on this topic, they argued that ­there was no juvenile delinquency or gang prob­lem in Puerto Rico, that this was a situation caused by their living conditions in the city.51 Another issue that became impor­tant in the late 1950s and affected the lives of thousands of Puerto Ricans and their communities—­and one that many officials linked to the rise of Puerto Rican gangs in the city—­was their forced removal from established neighborhoods. The city and state planners called it “urban renewal,” although African American and Puerto Rican activists called it “Negro removal” or “Spic removal.” During the 1950s, the NYC establishment raised concerns about the growth of slums, which w ­ ere considered a main aspect of the city’s apparent decline. The main purpose of urban renewal was to get rid of slums. It was supported by the federal, state, and city governments and was considered to be one impor­tant ele­ment in the postwar restructuring of NYC.52 Although this policy was being implemented at the time of the growing gang vio­lence in the city, it did not get the same newspaper publicity as the latter did. And even though Puerto Ricans w ­ ere one of the groups most affected by urban renewal, their plight did not get the headlines in the mainstream media that gang vio­lence did. Opposing urban renewal proj­ects was one of the few issues that brought together the dif­fer­ent groups and organ­izations of the Puerto Rican community in the city.53 Housing and urban renewal ­were among the major topics of discussion between Puerto Rican and NYC

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officials in the migration conferences held since 1954.54 Ironically, at the same time that both the West Side Story play and film ­were receiving praise and popu­lar ovation, one of the most dramatic forced relocations of Puerto Ricans was happening precisely in the West Side of NYC.55 But you would not get any glimpse of this strug­gle from watching West Side Story. Police brutality was another prob­lem that the Puerto Rican community faced during the 1950s. Although it is not explored in West Side Story, it is hinted at in the very first scene, the prologue, a­ fter both gangs are introduced and the conflict between them becomes a central aspect of the play. Detective Shrank appears to separate the gangs and asks a bloodied Jets member which Puerto Rican had hit him; the Jets gang leader responds, “We suspicion [sic] the job was done by a cop,” with the cheering of the other Jets and the Sharks. Shrank, a White cop, then becomes openly hostile against Puerto Ricans ­after he asked the Sharks to leave the park. Throughout West Side Story the police are more hostile and racist against Puerto Ricans and more favorable t­ oward the Jets. When the Jets and the Sharks are in the m ­ iddle of a war council at Doc’s store, Shrank appears suddenly to find out where the “rumble” was g­ oing to be. He immediately addresses the Sharks: “Clear out, Spics. Sure, it’s a ­free country and I ­ain’t got the right. But it’s a country with laws: and I can find the right. I got the badge, you got the skin. It’s tough all over. Beat it.” ­A fter the Sharks leave, he tells the Jets: “I’m for you. I want this beat cleaned up and you can do it for me. I’ll even lend you a hand if it gets rough.” The only issue the Sharks and the Jets seem to agree on is their hostility t­ oward the police, but this is never explored in West Side Story. Why is this of any relevance at all? A ­ fter all, West Side Story is not a so­cio­ log­i­cal treatise on juvenile delinquency but an artistic construct. However, the producers and many who lauded the play and the film did believe it was providing some insight into juvenile delinquency and gangs.56 Foulkes narrates how the producers of the play—as a kind of community ser­vice in the midst of a publicity blitzkrieg—­de­cided to give f­ ree tickets to real gang members and ­later asked for their opinion on the play. Although many gang members agreed with some of the ways the play had portrayed them, they also had disagreements with several aspects. For them, the two most impor­tant ones ­were that “­there was no way that Maria would have continued to love Tony a­ fter he killed her ­brother. Perhaps the largest divergence from real­ity was that the cops had far less power and presence onstage than did ­those in their own lives.”57 Police brutality was an impor­tant concern for Puerto Ricans at that time. For example, iconic po­liti­cal and community activist Jesús Colón kept a file in his rec­ords on acts of police brutality against Puerto Ricans during this period.58 Officials from the Puerto Rican government kept bringing the issue in their meetings with NYC officials, including in the migration conferences

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of the late 1950s.59 Police brutality against Puerto Ricans, like other ­matters that affected the community, was not getting any headlines in the same mainstream media that highlighted Puerto Rican gangs and juvenile delinquency. By not exploring police brutality as one reason for the Sharks to be hostile and mistrusting of police, West Side Story suggests that this be­hav­ior by Puerto Ricans is simply one more ele­ment of their innate tendency t­oward crime and delinquency (a topic to be discussed l­ ater in this section). According to many scholars, West Side Story presented a racist view of Puerto Ricans, in itself an impor­tant aspect of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative in NYC. As stated ­earlier, Bern­stein conceived the two clashing gangs as “the warring Puerto Ricans” versus the “ ‘self-­styled’ Americans.’ ” In the play’s book, the gangs are described as “the Sharks are Puerto Ricans, the Jets an anthology of what is called ‘American.’ ”60 The “American” gang confronting the Puerto Ricans consisted largely of descendants of White Eu­ ro­ pean immigrants. According to Sandoval Sánchez, the producers of West Side Story “­were just searching for a confrontation between ­peoples of color and Caucasian Anglo-­ Americans.” For this critic, this approach reveals the a priori prejudices of t­ hose who created this cultural construct, which constitutes “a discourse of racism by framing the racial Other in ste­reo­types of delinquency, poverty, and crime. That is, indeed, how Puerto Ricans w ­ ere conceived of in” West Side Story.61 Even actress Rita Moreno, who played Anita in the film, complained that Puerto Ricans ­were presented as “one ‘homogenous’ brown.” For Foulkes, “the close-­ups made the darker hair and skin more obvious. And the consistency of the darkness heightened the contrast between white and dark skin.” She adds that this “difference posited outside status.”62 Foulkes argues that, in their conception, the liberal creators of West Side Story tried to depict the consequences of racism against Puerto Ricans, a portrayal that occurs mostly in the character of Bernardo. But she contends that “in their made-up world Puerto Ricans remain bound by ste­reo­type. Men brandish switchblades, ever ready to fight; ­women are spitfires, tempestuous and sexy . . . ​Ultimately, the creators found it easier to rely on ste­reo­types than to dispel them. They used Puerto Ricans to evoke more general tensions of difference and prejudice in the city, a choice that reinforced the racism of the era even as it purported to point out this injustice.”63 Although West Side Story pre­sents the Jets and the Sharks as juvenile delinquent gangs, the groups are portrayed differently. The reasons why the “American” boys engaged in delinquency is explained in perhaps the funniest song and scene in West Side Story, “Gee, Officer Krupke.” According to Briggs, “the song points up the need for explanation and individualizes the boys’ situations” and pre­sents “the boys as the products of broken homes, alcoholism, or prostitution.” For the Puerto Rican boys, the explanation is dif­fer­ent: “they are forced

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to fight for their right to be t­ here, propelled from home by poverty and overpopulation.” For her, this explanation is “a homogenizing one: they are delinquents ­because they are Puerto Ricans.”64 Foulkes comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that while for the Sharks “vio­lence was prompted by their experience of prejudice—or perhaps an assumed innate predilection to vio­lence,” for the Jets the source of their be­hav­ior “was far more difficult to nail down.”65 When the Jets ­were preparing for the “rumble” with the Sharks, the gang leader proclaimed, “They might ask for blades, zip guns . . . ​But if they say blades, I say blades,” a statement that clearly reflects the then common ste­reo­type of Puerto Ricans as knife-­wielding criminals. Negrón-­Muntaner claims that critics praising West Side Story’s technical mastery overlook “the film’s use of racist discourse to construct its narrative.” She argues that the film uses several racial markers to point to the differences between the Puerto Rican Sharks and the “American” Jets; the “three most obvious signs of racialization efforts are the use of ‘brownface’ for Bernardo, the always shifting, asinine accent deployed by most Puerto Rican characters, and the unnaturally blond hair of the Jets.”66 Only “Hispanic”-­looking actors ­were cast as members of the Sharks, while, in typical Hollywood fashion (then and even ­today), two of the three main Puerto Rican characters ­were played by White American actors: Maria (Natalie Wood) and Bernardo (George Chakiris); the role of Anita was played by Puerto Rican actress Rita Moreno.67 Chakiris was “brownfaced” for the role of Bernardo, the leader of the Puerto Rican gang, and he and Wood spoke with the “asinine” accent that was supposed to represent Puerto Ricans when they spoke. Similarly to the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” narrative dominant at the time West Side Story was conceived, Puerto Ricans ­were portrayed as a group of ­people with no history or culture of their own, as racially and culturally inferior to White Americans, as foreigners and alien to U.S. culture and society, and, ultimately, as unable to assimilate and become “true” Americans. Puerto Ricans are presented as “foreigners” in contrast to the White “American” Jets. In one instance, Anita—­initially the symbol of the “assimilated” Puerto Rican—is heard saying, “Tony was born in Amer­i­ca, so that makes him an American. But us? Foreigners!” This notion was sustained by the film industry as well; its Production Code, which held a category on the “portrayal of ‘races’ and Nationals,” defined “the Puerto Rican characters in the film as ­either not citizens or of ‘unclear’ status.”68 West Side Story also depicts Puerto Ricans as a backward and inferior ­people. The very names of the two gangs reinforces this view, according to Sandoval Sánchez: “The opposition of Jets vs. Sharks reproduces an ideological configuration that opposed cultural technology to nature, aerial military techniques to primitive and savage instincts, civilization to barbarity.”69 Throughout West Side Story, Puerto Ricans are

In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  187

referred to as “Spics,” “trash,” and “cockroaches.” And although they are portrayed as foreigners in West Side Story, the reasons for their presence in NYC are never specified. The fact that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens is not mentioned in West Side Story. As Thomas has argued, “the show’s version of the postwar Puerto Rican experience silenced any suggestion of the po­liti­cal under­ pinnings of the migration.”70 Puerto Rican culture is completely absent in West Side Story. It is obvious that ­there was no input from Puerto Ricans in the making of West Side Story (in neither the play nor the film)—­this in a city where their numbers ­were growing dramatically at that time. As del Valle Schorske contends, “The show’s creators d­ idn’t know, or d­ idn’t seem to care to know, much about their own material. The lyricist Stephen Sondheim at first expressed doubts about his fitness for the proj­ect: ‘I’ve never been that poor and I’ve never even met a Puerto Rican.’ ”71 Foulkes recounts how Robbins tried to get acquainted with the life and culture of Puerto Ricans in New York, but a­ fter a visit to El Barrio he exclaimed that it was “absolutely like ­going into a foreign country.”72 This lack of interest by the creators of West Side Story in getting to know Puerto Ricans led to the misrepre­sen­ta­tion of the mi­grants’ as a ­people and of their culture. This is most obvious in the ­music of West Side Story; ­music, of course, is central to a musical. ­There is no Puerto Rican ­music in West Side Story. Negrón-­Muntaner argues that “the ‘Puerto Rican m ­ usic’ found in West Side Story is an American-­made fusion of a wide range of rhythms with no discernible or specific national origin.”73 For del Valle Schorske, “the musical’s creators squandered the opportunity to engage the genius of Afro-­Caribbean polyrhythms. The gym scene ‘mambo’ is not, rhythmically, a mambo, and the famous rooftop number ‘Amer­i­ca’ has the Sharks dancing a Spanish-­from-­Spain paso doble mishmashed with a whitewashed showbiz jazz.”74 Th ­ ese two scenes referenced by del Valle Schorske are crucial in presenting Puerto Ricans to the audience. “Amer­i­ca” ends with an “Olé,” which is associated with Spanish—as in Spain—­culture, not Puerto Rican. Wells argues that the main influences on Bern­stein for the “Hispanic” ­music in West Side Story came from Spain and vari­ous Latin American countries, mainly Mexico; ­there is no documentation that he was knowledgeable of Puerto Rican m ­ usic.75 Puerto Ricans are presented in West Side Story as a p­ eople without culture, and by extension without their own history. Th ­ ese are tropes reproduced constantly by the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” narrative. In Beyond the Melting Pot, Glazer and Moynihan claimed that Puerto Ricans did not have their own defined culture and that they could not even sustain the best aspects of Spanish or American culture.76 Perhaps no other scene and song lyr­ics in West Side Story have been as popu­ lar and controversial as “Amer­i­ca.” It is an impor­tant scene and the only one where Puerto Ricans interact with each other as a group. Wells claims that it

188  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

is in “Amer­i­ca” that Puerto Ricans have their own “voice” within West Side Story.77 They are also “seen h ­ ere in more detail than in any other blockbuster movie to date.”78 The scene and song lyr­ics are supposed to pre­sent Puerto Ricans to the audience, but they are shown confronting each other and divided between what Sandoval Sánchez calls the “assimilationists” versus the “nationalists.”79 For this critic, the song not only pre­sents Puerto Ricans divided po­liti­cally, but also debating among themselves the merits of living in the United States or “Amer­i­ca.” For Negrón-­Muntaner, what “is perhaps jarring for some spectators is the notion that it is the leading ‘au­then­tic’ Puerto Rican actress [Moreno playing Anita] who is singing the praises to Amer­i­ca, and the ‘brownface’ Bernardo who critiques the United States.”80 In the original play the scene is acted only by Puerto Rican girls (boys versus girls in the film), with Anita leading the chorus praising the virtues of living “in Amer­i­ca” and putting down her homeland, Puerto Rico. The original text read as follows: Puerto Rico . . . ​You ugly island . . . Island of tropical diseases. Always the hurricanes blowing. Always the population growing . . . And the money owing. And the babies crying. And the bullets flying.

In a single stanza, West Side Story reproduced some of the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem”: Puerto Ricans bringing diseases to NYC, the island’s overpopulation and poverty causing migration, and its vio­lence being transplanted to the city. The play was received with protests by Puerto Ricans in the city and Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican activists and the Spanish-­language media in New York complained about the negative way island mi­grants ­were represented and threatened to boycott the play in New York. A specific line from that verse caused controversy: Puerto Rico as full of diseases. The Puerto Rican government complained that Puerto Rico was not ravaged by diseases. The play’s producers could not understand what the commotion was about, although that verse was modified for the film.81 What infuriated Puerto Rican government officials about that line was that it resonated with the idea of island mi­grants bringing diseases to the city, a common notion in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign and narrative in NYC. During the 1950s, the Puerto Rican government tried to dispel ste­reo­t ypical beliefs like this one, arguing that “Puerto Ricans did not import tuberculosis and other diseases but simply suffered from the diseases spread in the unhealthy conditions of crowded slums.”82

In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City  •  189

In the film this specific verse was changed to the following: Puerto Rico . . . ​My heart’s devotion . . . Let it sink back in the ocean. Always the hurricanes blowing. Always the population growing. And money wowing. And the sunlight steaming. And the natives steaming.

Somewhat dif­fer­ent, but not so much. H ­ ere Anita still denigrates her homeland, ravaged by overpopulation and poverty, inhabited by oversexualized “natives.” Although in the film the boy’s chorus (led by Bernardo) pre­sents a more critical view of living in the United States (racism and discrimination, substandard housing, crime and gangs, low-­paying jobs), anyone who has seen the play or the film remembers Anita as the leading voice in this scene, singing I like to be in Amer­i­ca, O.K. by me in Amer­i­ca, Every­thing ­free in Amer­ic­ a.

When Bernardo talks about g­ oing back to Puerto Rico, Anita responds, “I know a boat you can get on.” But by the late 1940s almost every­one moving to the U.S. mainland from Puerto Rico did it by air. The creators of West Side Story should have known that: Puerto Ricans as the “first airborne” migration to the United States was one of the main tropes of the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC. One of the most impor­tant ideas that emerged from the “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” campaign, and one that became central to its narrative afterward, was that Puerto Ricans ­were foreigners, alien to American society and culture, and incapable of assimilation, contrary to previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants. This notion played a fundamental role in the way that American scholars understood the Puerto Rican experience in postwar United States. This view was not absent from West Side Story. “Amer­i­ca” reproduces the image of Puerto Ricans as foreigners. Nobody in Puerto Rico—­then and now—­calls the United States “Amer­i­ca,” they refer to it as the United States, no ­matter how they feel t­ oward this country. P ­ eople in Latin Amer­i­ca, as well as in Puerto Rico, feel that they also live in the Amer­i­cas, the continent, and that therefore they too must be considered Americans in the continental sense.83 “Amer­i­ca” is a term used by other immigrants to refer to the United States, particularly ­those coming from Eu­rope, but not by Puerto Ricans. So when the creators of West Side Story call “Amer­i­ca” the song that is supposed to pre­sent Puerto Ricans to the audience,

190  •  The “Puerto Rican Problem” in Postwar New York City

they are in fact pointing to that group as immigrants, as foreigners to the United States. And it does not m ­ atter to this portrait how many claims of “Americanness” the character of Anita makes, at least initially. In West Side Story, Anita is the symbol of the “assimilated” Puerto Rican mi­grant who wants to “live in Amer­i­ca” with all the comforts of U.S. capitalism and wishes to be accepted as an “American” and not be seen as a “foreigner.” She represents the contrast to the “nationalist” Bernardo. At one point, she tells him, “I am an American girl now.” She always reminds Bernardo that he is not a “real” American, telling him, “Once an immigrant, always an immigrant,” or “Sometimes I d­ on’t know which is thicker, your skull or your accent.” But by the end of West Side Story, the character of Anita suffers the most dramatic transformation. Her boyfriend, Bernardo, is killed by Tony, Maria’s “American” lover. She is almost raped by the Jets at Doc’s store when she goes to deliver a message from Maria to Tony. Full of rage, she exclaims: “Bernardo was right . . . ​ If one of you was bleeding in the street, I’d walk by and spit on you.” She then deliberately delivers the wrong message to Tony that Chino has murdered Maria, which eventually leads to Tony’s death at Chino’s hands. Anita l­ater tells Maria to forget Tony and be with “One of your own kind / Stick to your own kind!” The “assimilated” Anita becomes an ethnic “nationalist” by the end of West Side Story, representing the difficulties or perhaps the impossibility of Puerto Rican “assimilation” to the United States. The film ends with Maria walking ­behind members of the two gangs carry­ ing Tony’s dead body, which could imply a reconciliation between the two groups and perhaps the dissolution of hatred between them. But West Side Story also ends with Maria singing a version of “Somewhere,” that mythical place where she and Tony dreamed of escaping to fulfill their love. Tony’s death, however, makes that love impossible to realize. Ending with “Somewhere” also suggests that the u­ nion between “the Puerto Ricans” and “the Americans” might not be realized, that impossible love or reconciliation between the two hating gangs ­will not happen at that moment, that it is still a dream to be fulfilled. The final shot of the movie, when Maria and the gang members are already out of the screen, pre­sents the cops taking away Chino, who has killed Tony. The very last ­thing the movie shows just before the credits begin to roll is a Puerto Rican being arrested as a criminal, which in fact he was. But h ­ ere West Side Story contradicts the liberal lesson it had suggested a few minutes ­earlier, when Maria accused both gangs of being equally guilty in her lover’s death. This may be so, but only the Puerto Rican is arrested for the crime. As Foulkes concludes, the “criminalization of the story’s actions only impacts a Puerto Rican.”84

 Epilogue On September 20, 2017, Puerto Rico was hit by Hurricane Maria. Its strong winds and extreme rainfall caused critical damage to the island’s population and infrastructure. It is estimated that between 3,000 and almost 5,000 ­people died as a consequence of the category-­four storm. It caused the total collapse of the electric power system, in frank decline for de­cades due to the lack of maintenance and investment precipitated by the fiscal crisis of Puerto Rico’s government, which declared bankruptcy in May 2017. In some parts of the island, power did not return for six months. Economic activity was affected for many months, tens of thousands of families lost their homes, and many businesses closed their doors a­ fter the hurricane. The country’s economic rebuilding pro­cess was torpedoed by President Trump’s administration, which halted most of the tens of billions of dollars in proj­ects approved by Congress to aid the island’s recovery. By the fall of 2021, most of the housing and infrastructure reconstruction proj­ects had not yet begun, including that of the power system. A massive number of ­people left Puerto Rico in the weeks and months a­ fter Hurricane Maria. It is estimated that in 2017 and 2018, some 84,000 and 133,000 thousand p­ eople, respectively, migrated to the United States. This monumental outflow in such a short period of time has no parallel in the history of Puerto Rico. According to official estimates, close to half a million persons migrated from Puerto Rico to the United States between 1945 and 1960, the period that used to be called the G ­ reat Migration. In only three of t­ hose years did more than 60,000 ­people leave the country. Between 1960 and the mid1990s, migration to the United States decreased considerably, being negative for many years. The departure of ­people increased again near the twenty-­first ­century and took an upward turn ­toward the end of the first de­cade of the 191

192  • Epilogue

2000s, continuing to this day. Between 2010 and 2020, Puerto Rico lost nearly 440,000 ­people, a loss of 11.8 ­percent of its population. The post-­Maria migration was therefore not a new phenomenon, although the exorbitant number of ­people leaving the island in such a short period of time was. The migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States in the last de­cade, particularly the post-­Maria exodus, lends itself to comparisons with the migration period that led to the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City, the subject of this book. Perhaps the most significant ­factor in this comparison is that the migration of the last de­cade, including the post-­Maria exodus, has not provoked the widespread antipathy and rejection that the 1940s migration generated in NYC and elsewhere in the United States. Th ­ ere is no evidence of anything comparable to the massive rejection that produced the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York in the late 1940s and 1950s. The circumstances and context of recent migrations have changed significantly compared to the 1940s and 1950s. One salient f­ actor of Puerto Rican postwar migration was not only the massive outflow of mi­grants during that period but also its extremely high concentration in NYC. The NYC and Puerto Rico governments encouraged the migration of islanders to other areas outside of NYC. By 1960, this had been largely implemented due to the migration policy of Puerto Rico’s government. Puerto Rican communities developed in the Northeast in cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Hartford, among many ­others. By 2000, the U.S. Puerto Rican community began to grow and diversify in areas of the American South and Southwest in states such as Florida, Texas, and California, among ­others. ­These new Puerto Rican settlements have seen the highest population growth in recent de­cades, at the same time that old postwar communities in the Northeast have seen their populations decline (NYC being the main example). It is not surprising then that the largest number of mi­g rants from Puerto Rico in recent de­cades, including post-­Maria migration, have moved to t­ hese new settlements. The Puerto Rican community in Florida, for example, had been growing for years and was able to absorb the large number of post-­Maria mi­grants. The issues that generated the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in postwar NYC w ­ ere not pre­sent at this time in the new settlements, and neither w ­ ere the notion that Puerto Ricans represented a massive influx of “foreign immigrants” and the scarce availability of housing. Another subject that predominated in NYC—­the alleged relationship between Puerto Ricans and communism due to their close relationship to Congressman Marcantonio—no longer exists ­either, as the Cold War ended de­cades ago. Now both Demo­crats and Republicans are fighting for the Puerto Rican vote in Florida. Former Republican Governor Rick Scott implemented special programs to assist in the relocation of post-­Maria mi­grants in Florida.

Epilogue  •  193

Another f­ actor that has changed from the 1940s to the pre­sent is the characteristics of island mi­grants in recent de­cades. In the 1940s and 1950s, both in NYC and other areas of the United States, Puerto Ricans ­were seen as ignorant and unskilled mi­g rants, as culturally alien b­ ecause of their inability to speak and understand En­glish. This was another impor­tant issue in the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC. The characteristics of most island mi­g rants have changed since then. The pro­cess of postwar modernization and cap­i­tal­ist development in Puerto Rico brought about a notable expansion in K-12 and university education, mainly in the public area. The island experienced a growth in the educated ­middle classes. Many mi­grants in recent de­cades are highly educated young professionals fluent in En­g lish and highly cognizant of American popu­lar culture, given its widespread influence in Puerto Rico. The capacity of ­these social sectors to incorporate themselves socially, eco­nom­ ically, and culturally in the United States is vastly greater than that of postwar mi­grants. One f­ actor that may have prevented a greater negative reaction to the entry of new mi­grants from Puerto Rico to the United States in recent years is the larger presence and visibility of Puerto Ricans in the American public space. Lorrin Thomas talks about the “invisibility” of Puerto Ricans in NYC before 1945, a phenomenon that changed for the worse with the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” of the 1940s and 1950s. But the dif­fer­ent “Puerto Rican prob­ lems” that developed in NYC and other cities in the Northeast began to dissipate with the growth and strengthening of the island communities starting in the 1960s. Since then, the po­liti­cal, social, and cultural presence of Puerto Ricans in vari­ous regions of the United States has prevented extreme campaigns of racism and nativism against this group. Th ­ ere are thousands of Puerto Rican public officials in the United States, from the Supreme Court to local city councils and school boards. Th ­ ere is also a Puerto Rican presence in American popu­lar culture, from ­music to film and tele­vi­sion. Another ele­ment that has changed since the 1940s is the role that Puerto Rico’s government played in the promotion of migration and incorporation of island mi­grants in the United States. It has not fulfilled this role at least since the 1980s. Beginning in the 1960s, the NYC Puerto Rican community began to demand greater participation in the issues that affected it the most. Puerto Rico’s Migration Division lost po­liti­cal presence in the United States as the U.S. Puerto Rican communities became more empowered. The Puerto Rican government ended its migration efforts for all practical purposes in the 1970s, when its farmworker program was challenged in federal court. In the 1980s, the administration of Rafael Hernández Colón converted the Migration Division into the Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, trying to maintain some relevance in the affairs of that community. But that

194  • Epilogue

office was ­later invalidated by Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court in a lawsuit presented by the annexationist government of Pedro Rosselló. For de­cades, the Puerto Rican community in the United States has dealt with its own affairs without the interference of the Puerto Rican government. They have their own po­liti­cal representatives from Congress to the local city councils, in addition to numerous po­liti­cal, cultural, and community organ­ izations throughout the United States. The U.S. Puerto Rican community has also played an impor­tant role in issues related to Puerto Rico, such as the campaign against the U.S. Navy in Vieques, the campaign in ­favor of the release of Puerto Rican po­liti­cal prisoners (imprisoned mostly for their fight in f­ avor of the island’s in­de­pen­dence), in advocating for public programs to solve the island’s economic crisis, and, since 2017, in promoting the restructuring and recovery of the island ­after Hurricane Maria. The day ­after Maria devastated the island, the Puerto Rican community in the United States began to or­ga­nize humanitarian aid and recovery programs in Puerto Rico. This was long before the Trump administration showed any interest in easing the plight of the island’s population. Puerto Rican politicians and community organ­izations in the United States not only advocated for economic aid to the island but also facilitated the incorporation of post-­Maria mi­grants into their communities. Although many ­things have changed, ­today, as in the 1940s, migration is still perceived to be related to what many consider to be a “Puerto Rican prob­ lem.” In the 1940s, migration was regarded by both U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers as the solution to what they viewed as the island’s biggest social prob­lem: overpopulation. Many in the United States believed that the “prob­ lem” in Puerto Rico was transferred to NYC when Puerto Ricans migrated ­there in large numbers. ­Today the situation is very dif­fer­ent. Puerto Rico has experienced a dramatic loss of population in the last two de­cades, to a ­g reat extent due to the high number of mi­grants leaving in this period. This massive movement has occurred at a time of extreme deterioration of the island’s economy that has happened along with the fiscal crisis of Puerto Rico’s government. For many, Puerto Ricans migration is still seen as an exit strategy in the face of the island’s economic, po­liti­cal, and social crisis. As throughout the twentieth ­century, Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. colony and Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship allow for Puerto Ricans’ unrestricted entry to the U.S. mainland in search for jobs and a better standard of living. More p­ eople of Puerto Rican descent now live in the United States than in Puerto Rico and it is estimated that Puerto Rico w ­ ill continue to lose population in the near ­future. Sectors of the Puerto Rican elite and policy makers still see migration as a prob­lem, but this time as the cause and not as the solution; they now advocate for reducing migration as a means of maintaining the country’s viability socially and eco­nom­ically. This book’s introduction discussed the Trump’s administration policy ­toward Puerto Rico, his personal

Epilogue  •  195

view of Puerto Ricans, and how by the end of his administration a Puerto Rican analyst concluded that the president saw Puerto Rico mostly as a prob­ lem. ­Today, both in Puerto Rico and in the United States, the debate over the island’s colonial status continues to create ­great controversies and differences as in previous de­cades, and no final solution to this crucial issue is expected in the immediate ­future. For many in Puerto Rico and the United States, the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” has not dis­appeared. It has simply changed shape.

Acknowl­edgments I want to thank all ­those who facilitated the research that made this book pos­ si­ble. I would like to acknowledge the staff of the following institutions: the Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR—­Puerto Rico’s General Archives) in San Juan (particularly archivist Pedro Roig); the Colección Puertorriqueña (the Puerto Rican Collection) in the General Library of the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras (specially its former director María Ordoñez); the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín in San Juan (notably Julio Quirós); the Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies (Centro) (in par­tic­u­lar se­nior archivist Pedro Juan Hernández, librarian Félix Rivera, and director Aníbal Arocho); and the New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA). I would also like to thank the Hunter College President’s Fund for Faculty Advancement and the Center for Puerto Rican Studies for providing support for editorial assistance with the manuscript, and to Ryan Morgan, Elizabeth Allen, and Jonathan Goodman for their copyediting work. I want to extend my sincere gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for Rutgers University Press. Their thoughtful comments and recommendations have contributed to this becoming a more discerning and rigorous book. I would also like to express my gratitude to Michelle Scott, production editor at Westchester Publishing Ser­vices; and to Adriana Cloud, who did an excellent job copyediting the manuscript. Fi­nally, I would like to thank the staff of  Rutgers University Press;  Matt ­Garcia, editor of the Latinidad series;  a nd particularly executive editor Nicole Solano for believing in this book and for supporting it throughout its publication pro­cess.

197

Notes Introduction 1 “Trump Tells Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to the Countries They Came From,” New York Times, July 14, 2019. 2 “Yes, Puerto Rico Is a Part of the United States,” USA T ­ oday, September 26, 2017. 3 “Omarosa: Trump Used ‘Derogatory’ Term for Puerto Ricans; Kelly Fought Hurricane Aid,” NBC News, August 14, 2018. 4 “Trump Suggests Puerto Rico I­ sn’t Part of the United States ­a fter Senate Blocks Disaster Aid Bill,” Miami New Times, April 2, 2019. 5 “Trump Lobs Praise, and Paper Towels, to Puerto Rico Storm Victims,” New York Times, October 3, 2017. According to Miles Taylor, former chief of staff for the Department of Homeland Security ­under Trump, the president remarked—­while flying to visit the island a­ fter Hurricane Maria—­that “Puerto Rico was dirty and the ­people ­were poor.” Taylor also added that on several occasions Trump expressed “a profound animosity t­ owards the ­people of Puerto Rico.” “Ex-­Staffer: Trump Wanted to Trade ‘Dirty’ Puerto Rico for Greenland,” Vanity Fair, August 19, 2020. 6 “Donald Trump Denies That 3,000 ­People Died in Puerto Rico a­ fter Hurricane Maria,” HuffPost, September 13, 2018; “Disaster Aid Bill Hits Snag a­ fter Trump Tells GOP Puerto Rico Gets Too Much Storm Assistance,” Politico, March 27, 2019; “Donald Trump: Apunta otra vez hacia la isla,” El Nuevo Día, March 28, 2019, 20; and “Asistencia federal: Datos oficiales refutan a Trump,” El Nuevo Día, May 14, 2019, 8. Trump also proposed trading Greenland for Puerto Rico. Furthermore, according to then acting secretary of homeland security Elaine C. Duke, Trump suggested the possibility of “divesting” or “selling” Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. See “He Wanted to Buy Greenland. She Said No. Then Th ­ ings Got Ugly,” New York Times, August 22, 2019; “Leading Homeland Security u­ nder a President Who Embraces ‘Hate-­Filled’ Talk,” New York Times, July 12, 2020. 7 “Donald Trump: No Cesan sus críticas a la isla y sus políticos,” El Nuevo Día, April 3, 2019, 12; and “Trump Blasts ‘Corrupt’ Puerto Rico’s Leaders amid Po­liti­cal Crisis,” The Hill, July 7, 2019. 199

200  •  Notes to Pages 3–10

8 “Donald Trump: Un legado nefasto en Puerto Rico,” El Nuevo Día, January 17, 2021, 4; emphasis added. 9 “Puerto Rico’s Debt Portent: The Refugee Exodus Builds and W ­ ill Add to the U.S. Dole,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2016; emphasis added. 10 House Committee on Un-­A merican Activities, Communist Activities among Puerto Ricans in New York City and Puerto Rico. 11 Lorrin Thomas looks at the 1950s as one period—­mostly of transition—in her extensive examination of the Puerto Rican community in NYC from the 1930s to the 1970s. Despite their growing numbers and their salience in the city’s public debate, she refers to the “paradox of Puerto Rican invisibility in the fifties.” Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 198. She suggests that Puerto Ricans gained greater “visibility” in NYC affairs in the 1960s. On the 1950s as a period of transition for the Puerto Rican community in NYC, see also Sánchez, “Puerto Ricans and the Door of Participation,” and “Puerto Rican Politics in New York.” 12 See, e.g., Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen. The history of the community from its early days in the late nineteenth ­century to the 1950s is examined in Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community. Another overview of Puerto Ricans in the city, mostly focusing on events ­a fter the 1960s, is presented in Haslip Viera, Falcón, and Matos Rodríguez, Boricuas in Gotham. 13 Several authors have examined the 1950s within the framework of postwar community developments, although focusing mostly on the 1960s. See, e.g., Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement. The 1950s has also been discussed in memoirs by prominent po­liti­cal and community activists. See, e.g., Antonia Pantoja, Memoir of a Visionary; Gerena Valentín, Gilberto Gerena Valentín; and Colón, A Puerto Rican in New York. An anthropological perspective of El Barrio in the 1950s is presented in E. Padilla, Up from Puerto Rico. Several books have examined the community in the 1950s from a so­cio­log­i­cal perspective. Covering the postwar period, with a sympathetic view ­toward Puerto Ricans, is Fitzpatrick, Puerto Rican Americans. Originally published in 1959 is Handlin’s The Newcomers. The book Spanish Harlem by New York University sociologist Cayo Sexton pre­sents a simplistic overview of life in El Barrio during 1950s. Both Cayo Sexton and Handlin reproduce the “prob­lem” narrative prevalent at that time. Two books by journalists published by the end of the de­cade that had a sympathetic view ­toward Puerto Ricans but nevertheless reproduced the “prob­ lem” narrative are Wakefield, Island in the City and Rand, The Puerto Ricans. Focusing on community formation and politics from the 1930s to the 1970s is Sánchez, Boricua Power. An analy­sis of Puerto Rican postwar politics appears in Jennings, Puerto Rican Politics in New York City. Two prominent reports on the use and impact of Puerto Ricans on public ser­vices in NYC are Morrison, The Puerto Rican Study, 1953–1957; and Gradu­ate School of Public Administration and Social Ser­vice, New York University, The Impact of Puerto Rican Migration on Governmental Ser­vices in New York City. 14 Baver, “Puerto Rican Politics.” 15 Nuñez, “Memories.” 16 Cruz, Puerto Rican Identity, chapter 2; and Cruz, Liberalism and Identity Politics. 17 Sánchez, Boricua Power; Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen; Lapp, “Managing Migration.”

Notes to Pages 12–24  •  201

Chapter 1  The Study of Puerto Rican Migration and Incorporation in the United States 1 U.S. Tariff Commission, The Economy of Puerto Rico. 2 Vega, Memorias de Bernardo Vega, 275–280. 3 Rodríguez, Puerto Ricans, 85. 4 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 141. 5 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 146. 6 Takaki, A Dif­fer­ent Mirror. 7 Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant Amer­ic­ a. 8 Greenwood, “Research on Internal Migration,” 397–433. 9 For Monique Milia-­Marie-­Luce, the study of Puerto Rican migration to the United States pre­sents similar issues to the migration from the French territories of Martinique and Guadalupe to France. Both cases are excluded from “general works on immigration to the United States and France.” She argues that even though both mi­grant groups are citizens of their respective countries, they are perceived t­ here as “foreigners”: “The possession of citizenship does not constitute a guarantee of ac­cep­tance or inclusion for mi­g rants. The migration of the Puerto Ricans and French West Indians has challenged the usual frontier between nationals and foreigners.” Milia-­Marie-­Luce, “Puerto Ricans in the United States,” 98. 10 Gerstle and Mollenkopf, E Pluribus Unum?, 1–13. 11 Mills, Se­nior, and Goldsen, The Puerto Rican Journey, 38–39, 73, 90–92, 105–124, 152–160, 168–170. 12 See Meléndez, “The Puerto Rican Journey Revisited,” 212–214. 13 Se­nior, The Puerto Ricans; and Se­nior, Our Citizens from the Ca­rib­be­an. 14 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, lxviii–­l xix. 15 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 86. 16 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 99–101. 17 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 109–110. 18 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 121–122. On the twentieth anniversary of their book’s publication, Glazer and Moynihan noted that one of the main challenges facing New York City was “the disproportionate presence of Negroes and Puerto Ricans on welfare.” Glazer l­ ater added: “We have a black and Puerto Rican underclass in the city.” “Beyond ‘Beyond the Melting Pot,’ Moynihan and Glazer Feel Vindicated,” New York Times, December 3, 1983. 19 Handlin, The Newcomers, 45. 20 Handlin, The Newcomers, 61–62. 21 Handlin, The Newcomers, 103. 22 Handlin, The Newcomers, 108–109. 23 Handlin, The Newcomers, 110. 24 See Baver, “Puerto Rican Politics in New York City,” 45; Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 145; Jennings, “Puerto Rican Politics in Two Cities,” 83–86. 25 See Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chaps. 1–2. 26 Jennings, “The Puerto Rican Community,” 74–75; and Jennings, “The Emergence of Puerto Rican Electoral Activism in Urban Amer­i­ca,” 3–12. 27 Sierra Berdecía, “Migración de Trabajadores Puertorriqueños a Estados Unidos,” 13. Report by the Commissioner of ­Labor to Governor Jesus T. Piñero, November 17, 1947, 13; in Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR), Fondo Oficina del Gobernador, Tarea 96-20, box 454.

202  •  Notes to Pages 24–31

28 See, for example, Se­nior, The Puerto Ricans, and Se­nior, Our Citizens from the Ca­rib­be­an. 29 The lit­er­a­ture on transnationalism is extensive. Some relevant reviews are: Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, “The Study of Transnationalism”; Portes, “Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism”; Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, “International Perspectives on Transnational Migration”; Levitt and Jaworsky, “Transnational Migration Studies.” 3 0 See, e.g., DeSipio and Pantoja, “Puerto Rican Exceptionalism?”; Adrian Pantoja, “Transnational Ties and Immigrant Po­liti­cal Incorporation”; Barreto and Muñoz, “Reexamining the ‘Politics of In-­Between.’ ” 31 Meléndez, “Puerto Rican Migration,” 163–173. 32 See Meléndez, “Puerto Rican Migration,” for a comparison between Latin American transnationalism and the Puerto Rican experience. 3 3 Duany, The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move. 3 4 Duany, Blurred Borders. 3 5 See Grosfoguel, Colonial Subjects; Pérez, The Near Northwest Side Story; and Aranda, Emotional Bridges to Puerto Rico. 36 Ostergaard-­Nielsen, International Migration, 11. The reference appears in her introduction. 37 Duany, “A Transnational Colonial Migration,” 247–248. 3 8 Meléndez, Sponsored Migration; Meléndez, “Puerto Rican Migration.” 39 Meléndez, “Citizenship and the Alien Exclusion.” 4 0 Meléndez, “Citizenship and the Alien Exclusion.” 41 Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 3. See also García-­Colón, Colonial Mi­g rants at the Heart of Empire. 42 See Meléndez, Sponsored Migration; García-­Colón, Colonial Mi­g rants; Lapp, “Managing Migration.” 4 3 Some reviews of this lit­er­a­ture include Portes and Böröcz, “Con­temporary Immigration”; DeWind and Kasinitz, “Every­thing Old Is New Again”; Freeman, “Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies.” 4 4 For a review of Portes’s writings on this subject and a critique of the theory of mode of incorporation, see Waldinger and Catron, “Modes of Incorporation.” 45 Portes, “Conclusion: T ­ owards a New World.” 4 6 Portes, “Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies,” 880. 47 Portes and Grosfoguel, “Ca­rib­bean Diasporas,” 62. 48 Félix Padilla made use of this concept in his analy­sis of the Puerto Rican community in Chicago. He argued that before Puerto Ricans in Chicago became an “internal colony” t­ here, they had been constructed as colonial subjects in Puerto Rico by way of their social, economic, and po­liti­cal subordination to the United States. Their status as inferior subjects was then transferred to the United States as they ­were integrated into the host society. The Puerto Ricans’ mode of incorporation—­what Padilla called their “mode of entry”—­determined their social and economic position in the United States. See Padilla, Puerto Rican Chicago, 55. 49 Portes and Grosfoguel, “Ca­rib­bean Diasporas.” 50 Grosfoguel, “Ca­rib­bean Colonial Immigrants,” 82–95. An updated version appears in Grosfoguel, Colonial Subjects, chap. 6. 51 See Grosfoguel, Colonial Subjects, chap. 6; Grosfoguel, “Ca­rib­bean Colonial Immigrants”; and Portes and Grosfoguel, “Ca­rib­bean Diasporas.” See also Grosfoguel, Cervantes-­Rodríguez, and Mielants, “Introduction.”

Notes to Pages 32–38  •  203

52 On citizenship and migration, see Meléndez, Sponsored Migration; García-­Colón, Colonial Mi­g rants; McGreevey, Borderline Citizens; and Whalen, “Colonialism, Citizenship.” 53 On the HUAC 1959 hearings on Puerto Ricans, see House Committee on Un-­A merican Activities, Communist Activities Among Puerto Ricans in New York City and Puerto Rico. An example of U.S. policy makers identifying nationalist rebellion in Puerto Rico with the global communist conspiracy, see House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, “The Nationalist Party.” On COINTELPRO activities in Puerto Rico, see Merrill Ramírez, “The Other Side of Colonialism.”

Chapter 2  The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” Campaign in New York City 1 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door; Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues. 2 Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion, chaps. 4 and 5; Ngai, Impossible Subjects, chap. 3. 3 On the ­Great Migration, see Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns; on African American and Puerto Rican incorporation in New York City, see Handlin, The Newcomers. 4 Vega, Memoirs of Bernardo Vega; Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community; and Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, chaps. 2, 3, and 4. 5 Charles Hewitt Jr., “Welcome: Paupers and Crime: Porto Rico’s Shocking Gift to the United States,” Scribner’s Commentator 7, no. 5 (March 1940), emphasis added. 6 “Muchedumbre puertorriqueña aclamó ayer a Piñero en el homenaje de Nueva York,” El Mundo, August 16, 1946, 1, 5; and “El gobernador Piñero recibe el homenaje de Nueva York,” El Mundo, August 19, 1946, 7. 7 “Muchedumbre puertorriqueña,” 5. 8 “Dr. Fernós halla dificultad para ir ahora a los Estados Unidos,” El Mundo, August 17, 1946, 7. 9 “El homenaje a Piñero,” editorial, El Mundo, August 17, 1946, 6. 10 “Estudio revela es precaria vida de boricuas en N.Y.,” El Mundo, August 25, 1946, 1. 11 “El mismo problema,” editorial, El Mundo, August 27, 1946, 6. 12 “Esta semana saldrán los primeros trabajadores,” El Mundo, May 14, 1946, 5. 13 “Pide gobierno auspicie una emigración,” El Mundo, August 21, 1946, 1, 15. 14 “Planes migratorios aumentan solicitudes de empleo en E.U.,” El Mundo, October 27, 1946, 1, 18. 15 “Para meditarlo,” editorial, El Mundo, August 25, 1946, 6. 16 “Sorprendió a Piñero queja de Marcantonio,” El Mundo, August 28, 1946, 1. 17 Ira Rosenwaike, Population History, 120–121, 138–139. Although the increase of Puerto Ricans living in NYC from 1940 to 1950 was not as dramatic as that from 1950 to 1960, it was nevertheless noticeable for the time. Th ­ ere was a l­ imited movement of ­people from Puerto Rico during the war, but it began to increase in 1944. That year, 8,088 Puerto Ricans moved to the city; 11,003 in 1945; 24,621 in 1946; 35,144 in 1947; 28,031 in 1948; 33,086 in 1949, and 34,155 in 1950. Figures from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Puerto Ricans, 26. 18 Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 4. 19 On the role that the costs of air transportation and the existence of a Puerto Rican settlement in New York City played as f­ actors in explaining the movement of islanders to the city, see Fleisher, “Some Economic Aspects of Puerto Rican

204  •  Notes to Pages 38–42

Migration,” 245–253. In addition, Gallaway and Vedder argue that the income differential between Puerto Rico and the United States was also a major f­ actor explaining this migration. See Gallaway and Vedder, “Location Decisions of Puerto Rican Immigrants.” 20 Torres, Between Melting Pot and Mosaic, chap. 2. For the quota system and U.S. immigration policy a­ fter the 1920s, see Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, chaps. 2, 3, and 4; and Ngai, Impossible Subjects, chap. 1. Regarding the effects of the immigration quotas on NYC’s l­ abor needs and its relationship to Puerto Rican migration t­ here, see Fleisher, “Some Economic Aspects of Puerto Rican Migration,” 248n18. 21 Handlin, The Newcomers, 50–53, 61–62, 72–73, 93, 95. 2 2 Handlin, The Newcomers, 43–45; Lankevich and Furer, A Brief History of New York City, 259–260; Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, chap. 5; Zolberg, A Nation by Design, chap. 9. Lankevich and Furer indicate that by the early 1950s, nearly 56 ­percent of t­ hose living in New York City w ­ ere foreign-­born or first-­ generation Americans, and that some two million ­people settled in the city during the de­cade. 23 “La migración portorriqueña a los E.U.,” El Mundo, January 14, 1947, 1; and “Aid Planned ­Here for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, January 12, 1947. 24 Reproduced in “PM relata las vicisitudes de portorriqueños,” El Mundo, February 8, 1947, 1. 25 Reproduced in “PM informa se controlará el éxodo boricua,” El Mundo, February 11, 1947, 1. 26 Reproduced in “Miseria y abandono esperan a emigrantes boricuas en N.Y.,” El Mundo, February 16, 1947, 5. 27 Reproduced in “Problema de boricuas en Nueva York sin resolver,” El Mundo, February 20, 1947, 2. 28 “Evitemos la mala propaganda,” editorial, El Mundo, February 16, 1947, 6. 29 “Puerto Rico Seeks to Curb Migration,” New York Times, February 20, 1947, 20. Published in Spanish as “El Times citó las condiciones en Puerto Rico,” El Mundo, February 25, 1; and “El ‘Times’ hace historia de caso de los boricuas,” El Mundo, March 3, 1947, 1. 30 Reported in “ ‘Newsweek’ comenta la emigración de boricuas,” El Mundo, March 21, 1947, 2; and “Uno de cada 22 neoyorquinos es boricua,” El Mundo, March 23, 1947, 1. 31 “Cómo viven los puertorriqueños en Nueva York,” El Mundo, March 26, 1947, 7. 32 “Harlem centro de actividad de la mayoría de portorriqueños en Manhattan,” El Mundo, March 27, 1947, 7; and “Se señalan pocos casos de extrema penuria por falta de hogares en el Harlem hispano,” El Mundo, March 28, 1947, 7. 3 3 “Los puertorriqueños conservan en Nueva York el mismo ritmo lento de las calles insulares,” El Mundo, March 29, 1947, 7; and “Tienen oportunidades de mejorar, pero las viviendas son escasas,” El Mundo, March 31, 1947, 7. 3 4 “Es errónea la propaganda de que los boricuas pueden encontrar seguro puerto en Nueva York,” El Mundo, April 1, 1947, 7. 3 5 “A partir del 1930 dió comienzo en grande la ola migratoria,” El Mundo, April 2, 1947, 7; and “Segundo escollo para los boricuas que desean permanecer en Harlem es hallar un empleo,” El Mundo, April 15, 1947, 7. 36 “Boricua dice cómo se abren paso en restaurantes neoyorkinos compatriotas que buscan trabajo,” El Mundo, April 18, 1947, 7; “Período de aprendizaje para

Notes to Pages 43–48  •  205

37 3 8 39 4 0 41

42 4 3 4 4

45 46 47 4 8 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 5 8 59

boricuas en Harlem,” El Mundo, April 20, 1947, 13; and “Los boricuas han llevado una tradición hispana a New York,” El Mundo, April 21, 1947, 12. “Géigel partió en una misión especial ayer,” El Mundo, January 3, 1947, 1. “Viaje de congresistas a Puerto Rico fijado tentativamente para el día 17,” El Mundo, February 7, 1947, 1. “Fernós pide supervisión para emigración boricua,” El Mundo, February 15, 1947, 3; “Alégase Muñoz ofreció ayuda para boricuas,” El Mundo, February 24, 1947, 5. “La emigración a otros puntos,” editorial, El Mundo, March 10, 1947, 6. “Problema de boricuas en Nueva York lo constituye el inglés,” El Mundo, February 22, 1947, 1. “Boricuas han creado problema en las escuelas neoyorkinas,” El Mundo, March 20, 1947, 1. “Tratan de inducir a los boricuas a no ir a N.Y.,” El Mundo, May 27, 1947, 4. Reproduced in “Los boricuas no son un problema en New York,” El Mundo, May 3, 1947, 4; “Problema de boricuas en Nueva York: faltan casas,” El Mundo, May 5, 1947, 5; and “Problemas de escolares boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, May 6, 1947, 12. “Officials Worried by Influx of Mi­g rant Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, August 2, 1947, 1; “Puerto Rican Drift to Mainland Gains,” New York Times, July 31, 1947, 18; “Why Puerto Ricans Flock to the U.S.,” New York Times, June 1, 1947, E5. “Crime Increasing in ‘­Little Spain,’ ” New York Times, August 3, 1947, 12; and “Solution Is Sought to Mi­grant Influx,” New York Times, August 4, 1947, 19. “The Tragedy of Puerto Rico,” editorial, New York Times, August 3, 1947, IV, 6. “Puerto Rican Pro­gress,” editorial, New York Times, August 7, 1947. A. Fernós-­Isern, “Economy of Puerto Rico,” Letters to The Times, New York Times, August 7, 1947, 20. “Fielding Is Ousted as ALP Executive,” New York Times, August 5, 1947, 3. “Defends Puerto Ricans; Marcantonio Sees Them Forced into Second-­class Citizenship,” New York Times, September 23, 1947, 18; “Marcantonio urge proteger a los boricuas,” El Mundo, September 18, 1947, 10. “Sugar-­Bowl Mi­grants,” Time, August 11, 1947. Top Puerto Rican officials, particularly Muñoz Marín and Governor Piñero, w ­ ere well aware of the media campaign in the United States. Numerous news clippings on the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York are found in government archives of that period. See, e.g., Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR), Fondo Oficina del Gobernador (FOG) 96-20, box 2283; and Archivo de la Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín (AFLMM), section IV, subsection 1, series 2, folder 19; and section IV, series 16, subseries “Emigración puertorriqueña a E.U.,” folder 58. “Governor of Puerto Rico Planning Study by Columbia of Migration,” New York Times, August 8, 1947, 1. Also, “Puerto Rican Governor Calls Influx a Trifle,” New York Herald Tribune, August 10, 1947. “Columbia Accepts Puerto Rico Study,” New York Times, August 10, 1947. “Migration Spontaneous,” New York Times, August 1, 1947, 3. “Han ido al Norte desde abril más de mil obreros,” El Mundo, August 27, 1947, 21. “Piñero Pushes ‘Planned Migration’ of Puerto Ricans,” Washington Daily News, August 14, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 1369. “The Miserables Find Grim Promised Land,” New York World Tele­gram, October 20, 1947, 1; reproduced by El Mundo, October 21, 1947, 3. News clips of the series are found in Muñoz Marín’s files in AFLMM, section IV, series 15, subseries 196.

206  •  Notes to Pages 48–50

60 The New York World Tele­g ram series includes: “City’s Disease Rate Raised by Mi­grant Tide,” New York World Tele­g ram, October 21, 1947, 1; “Tide of Mi­grants Swell Relief Load,” New York World Tele­g ram, October 22, 1947, 1; “Migration to Go on Island Officials Warn,” New York World Tele­g ram, October 24, 1947, 1. The series was reproduced by El Mundo: “Declaran boricuas hacen subir enfermedades en Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 23, 1947, 11; “Señala sobrepoblación como la causa de la emigración insular,” El Mundo, October 25, 1947, 2; “Keller alega los boricuas crean otro problema,” El Mundo, October 27, 1947, 1; and “Agencias urgen haya oficinas de información,” El Mundo, October 31, 1947, 1. 61 “Crime Festers in Bulging Tenements,” New York World Tele­g ram, October 23, 1947, 1. 62 “Tide of Mi­grants Swell Relief Load,” 1. 6 3 “Welfare, Reds, Puerto Ricans,” editorial, New York World Tele­g ram, October 22, 1947; emphasis added. 6 4 The only response by a Puerto Rican official to the World Tele­g ram series came from Sierra Berdecía, published in a New York City Spanish newspaper not widely read; “Sierra B. contesta a los ataques de ‘World Tele­gram,’ ” El Crisol, November 15, 1947. The newspaper had published a harsh editorial condemning the World Tele­g ram of a “malicious conspiracy.” See “Cowardly Action against Natives of Puerto Rico,” editorial, El Crisol, October 25, 1947, 1. Both articles are found in AFLMM, section IV, series 15, subseries 196, docs. 8 and 9, respectively. 65 “500 Pickets Blast Newspaper Series on Puerto Ricans,” New York World Tele­g ram, October 31, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 66 “Dos mil personas piquetearon el edificio del World Tele­gram,” El Mundo, November 1, 1947, 1. 67 “Boricuas de Nueva York fundan organización para su defensa,” El Mundo, November 6, 1947, 21. 6 8 “Boricuas constituyen sociedad para su defensa en Nueva York,” El Mundo, November 13, 1947, 5. 69 “La reunión pro boricuas será en la Baldorioty,” El Mundo, December 22, 1947, 24. El Imparcial, the island’s leading opposition newspaper, paid a closer attention to the Congreso Pro Boricuas. See, e.g., “No han invitado entidades al Congress Pro Boricuas,” El Imparcial, December 10, 1947, 7; “Comité Pro Boricuas N.Y. verá al Gobernador y al Comisionado del Trabajo,” El Imparcial, December 20, 1947, 4; “ ‘Venceremos pesimismo sobre unificación boricuas N.Y.,’ ” El Imparcial, December 22, 1947, 5. El Imparcial criticized the island government for not responding to the defamation campaign in New York; see “El Congreso de hoy,” editorial, El Imparcial, December 7, 1947, 19. 70 “Forman grupo de abogados en Nueva York,” El Mundo, November 3, 1947, 12. 71 “Guidance Is Asked for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, October 28, 1947, 17; and “Island Official ­Here,” New York Times, October 31, 1947, 11. 72 “Sugirieron creación en la Isla de oficina que ayude a migrantes,” El Mundo, October 31, 1947, 1. Also, “Immigrant Aid Urged for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, October 30, 1947. 73 “Estudian forma de canalizar la emigración,” El Mundo, November 4, 1947, 1. The health and educational prob­lems of Puerto Ricans in the city are again underscored in “Better Care Urged for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, November 12, 1947, 29; “Puerto Ricans Bring Schooling Prob­lem,” New York Times, November 6, 1947.

Notes to Pages 51–54  •  207

74 In January 1947, Muñoz Marín told a New York official that the island government “­will take interest in practical action with regard to Puerto Ricans that go to New York and elsewhere in continental United States.” Letter from Muñoz Marín to Harris L. Pre­sent, January 15, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, folder 8, doc. 22. 75 On his response to Petra González, who had complained on the attacks against Puerto Ricans in the New York media, Muñoz Marín instructed her to communicate with Fernós-­Isern, “who is the person most directly involved due to the position he occupies.” Letter from Muñoz Marín to González, October 21, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries “Ultramar,” folder 3, doc. 9. 76 Paul Harrison, “El caso de Puerto Rico en la prensa norteamericana,” El Mundo, August 5, 1947, 6. 77 Reproduced in “La política y la emigración de los boricuas a Nueva York,” El Mundo, November 16, 1947, 1. 78 William Dorvillier, “De Wáshington a Puerto Rico,” El Mundo, November 3, 7, and 18, 1947, 6, respectively. Dorvillier was a regular columnist for El Mundo. His column was always titled as cited and always published on page 6 (one of the newspaper’s two editorial/opinion pages). 79 Jack Lait, “Broadway and Elsewhere,” New York Daily Mirror, September 5, 1950, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 8 0 Jack Lait, “Broadway and Elsewhere,” New York Daily Mirror, August 4, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454; emphasis added. 81 Paul V. Coates, “Confidential File,” New York Daily Mirror, September 28, 1955, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2282. 82 Clarence Woodbury, “Our Worst Slum: Can We Save It from ­Going Red?” American Way, September 1949, 30–31. 83 Barbara Bates, “New York and Its Puerto Ricans,” The Survey, September 1949, 487. 8 4 “­Couldn’t We Get a Divorce?,” Tulsa Tribune, March 17, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2276. 8 5 “City Puerto Ricans: Complex Prob­lem,” New York Times, October 3, 1949, 11, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 86 “Channel Puerto Rican Migration,” Commonweal, February 27, 1948, 484–485. Bates reached the same conclusions, arguing that “­these ­people are Americans, but they need the same kind of resettlement ser­vice afforded displaced persons from abroad.” Bates, “New York and Its Puerto Ricans,” 488. 87 Probst and Olmsted, “The Rising Puerto Rican Prob­lem.” 8 8 Blake Clark, “The Puerto Rican Prob­lem in New York,” Reader’s Digest, February 1953, 61–65. 89 Gerald Weales, “New York’s Puerto Rican Dilemma,” New Leader, March 7, 1955, 8–9. 90 Abrams, “How to Remedy Our ‘Puerto Rican Prob­lem.’ ” In 1955, the New York Daily News presented a series of articles titled “The Puerto Rican Prob­lem” that examined the situation of Puerto Ricans in the city. The articles w ­ ere reproduced in El Mundo: “Daily News de NY: Ve problema boricua solucionado en 1955,” El Mundo, January 5, 1955, 11; “Puertorriqueños en N.Y.: Censuran conducta de Boricuas,” El Mundo, January 6, 1955, 1; “Boricuas en N.Y.: Creen dentro de 20 años podrían ser líderes,” El Mundo, January 7, 1955, 2; and “Daily News: Dice boricuas empiezan a desarrollar iniciativa,” El Mundo, January 8, 1955, 2.

208  •  Notes to Pages 56–66

Chapter 3  Dealing with the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City 1 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot; Handlin, The Newcomers; and Mills, Se­nior, and Goldsen, The Puerto Rican Journey. 2 See, e.g., Se­nior, The Puerto Ricans; and Se­nior, Our Citizens from the Ca­rib­be­an. 3 For an examination of Puerto Rican postwar incorporation in New York City, see Sánchez, “Puerto Ricans and the Door of Participation in U.S. Politics”; Sánchez, “Puerto Rican Politics in New York”; Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community; Baver, “Puerto Rican Politics in New York City”; and Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen. 4 “Governor of Puerto Rico Planning Study by Columbia of Migration,” New York Times, August 8, 1947, 1. See also “Se pedirá a la Universidad de Columbia que investigue y recomiende sobre la situación de boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, August 8, 1947, 1. 5 “Columbia Accepts Puerto Rico Study,” New York Times, August 10, 1947, 54. 6 Letter from Lazarsfeld to Piñero, August 29, 1947, Archivo General de Puerto Rico (hereafter AGPR), FOG 96-20, box 422, 1. 7 Letter from Lazarsfeld to Piñero, August 29, 1947, 2. 8 Letter from Se­nior to Piñero, September 3, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. Se­nior’s report on emigration refers to Se­nior, Puerto Rican Emigration. Mills’s visit to Puerto Rico was recorded in “Salió hacia la Isla el doctor C. Wright Mills,” El Mundo, September 18, 1947, 15. 9 “Afirman el estudio de Columbia es un estipendio injustificable,” El Mundo, October 5, 1947, 12. 10 “Columbia Study of Puerto Ricans in City Defended by Piñero in Response to Critics,” New York Times, August 16, 1947, 2. 11 Letter from Piñero to Augusto Quintana, December 1, 1947; letter from Augusto Quintana to Piñero, October 8, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. 12 Bureau of the Bud­get, Division of Statistics, “Survey of Persons Who Left Puerto Rico in November 1946,” San Juan, May 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454, 7. 13 Ruiz, “Vocational Needs of Puerto Rican Mi­grants,” ii, Archivo Fundación Luis Munoz Marin (hereafter AFLMM), section V, series 17, folder 38, box 13, doc. 1. The study was reviewed in “Estudio revela es precaria vida de boricuas en N.Y.,” El Mundo, August 25, 1946, 1. 14 “Columbia Is Ready for Mi­grant Study,” New York Times, October 14, 1947. 15 “Report of a Pi­lot Study of Puerto Rican Migration to New York. Confidential,” New York, October 6, 1947, AFLMM, section V, series 17, folder 12d, box 8b, doc. 2. 16 “Columbia inició el estudio sobre puertorriqueños,” El Mundo, November 7, 1947, 1. See also “Wright anuncia Piñero ordena inicie estudio,” El Mundo, November 10, 1947, 12; and “El estudio de Columbia,” editorial, El Mundo, November 8, 1947, 6. 17 “Hoy empieza en la urbe estudio de migración,” El Mundo, February 9, 1948, 1; and “Puerto Rico Inquiry to Question 1,500,” New York Times, February 8, 1948, 54. 18 According to Lapp, Mills was not interested in the Puerto Rican proj­ect but was “obliged, according to the terms of his contract, to engage in empirical research for the Bureau.” Mills recruited Se­nior for the proj­ect during his trip to Puerto Rico in October 1947. Se­nior would manage the day-­to-­day operations while Mills supervised the research and edited the final draft of the written study. Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 93–94.

Notes to Pages 67–72  •  209

19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

In his study of Mills, A. Javier Treviño contends that “his involvement was motivated not by intellectual curiosity, but by expedience and indemnity” and that he showed an “estranged, if not disinterested, attitude ­toward Puerto Ricans during this time.” Treviño concludes that “Mills’s posture vis-­a-­vis Puerto Ricans, both islanders and mi­grants, was elitist at best and racist at the worst.” In an interview with journalist Dan Wakefield, Mills confessed his negative attitude ­toward Puerto Ricans in general: “My own experience with them [the Puerto Ricans] was disappointing, especially in PR itself. Th ­ ey’ve ­little Spanish stuff and ­they’ve only the most blatant U.S. stuff. A sort of culture-­less ­people. Hollow and ­really hysterical. But I ­don’t r­ eally know them. My stuff was at g­ reat distance and necessarily statistical in nature.” All quotes from Treviño, The Social Thought of C. Wright Mills, 111. The Puerto Rican Journey did not even mention the consequences of U.S. colonialism on Puerto Ricans on the island and New York. For a more extensive critique of the book’s methodology and conclusions, see Meléndez, “The Puerto Rican Journey Revisited.” “Puerto Ricans Seek Better Jobs H ­ ere,” New York Times, June 16, 1948, 31. That same day, Se­nior forwarded a copy of the report to Governor Piñero and added this handwritten comment: “Please let me know how the P.R. papers carry the story!” Letter from Se­nior to Daisy Reck, special assistant to the governor, June 15, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. Letter from Mills and Se­nior to Governor Piñero, June 15, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454, 1–2. Letter from Mills to Governor Piñero, September 8, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. Letter from Daisy D. Reck to Sol L. Descartes, September 28, 1948; letter from Reck to Jaime Benítez, September 30, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. “The Puerto Rican Journey: A Report to the Puerto Rican Government,” memo from Sierra Berdecía to Governor Piñero, November 9, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454, 1. “The Puerto Rican Journey,” 4–5. Letter from Piñero to Mills, November 22, 1948; letter from Mills to Piñero, November 30, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. “Puertorriqueños en New York,” memo from Sierra Berdecía to Gustavo Agrait, executive assistant to the governor, November 22, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. “Estudio destruye falsedades sobre puertorriqueños,” El Mundo; June 16, 1948, 1; “Columbia cooperará en fijar normas, a tono con su informe,” El Mundo, June 19, 1948, 7; “Emigrantes de isla a NY son un grupo selecto,” El Mundo, June 20, 1948, 1; “De 3,000 boricuas entrevistados por Columbia 161 recibían ayuda,” El Mundo, June 21, 1948, 1. “El informe de Columbia,” editorial, El Mundo, June 17, 1948, 6; “Lucha contra el discrimen,” editorial, El Mundo, June 19, 1948, 6. “Welfare Council Aims to Coordinate Charity,” New York Times, June 6, 1926; “Welfare Council Gets More Powers,” New York Times, May 3, 1927. “Social Agencies Expand Ser­vices,” New York Times, October 3, 1945; “Plan Is Outlined for Welfare Unit,” New York Times, September 28, 1946. “Aid Planned ­Here for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, January 12, 1947. Memo from the Program Committee to the Committee on Prob­lems of Puerto Rican Americans and Con­sul­tants, Welfare Council of New York City, not dated

210  •  Notes to Pages 73–82

33

34

35 36 37 3 8 39 40

41

(stamp-­dated May 2, 1947), in Jesús Colón Papers, series VI—­New York Organ­ izations, box 1F1-8 (micro reel 17), Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies. Welfare Council of New York City, Puerto Ricans in New York City, 4. According to Antoinette Cannon, secretary of the Welfare Council’s Puerto Rican Committee, the first committee on Puerto Ricans by the agency was created in 1929 and the second in 1939; they w ­ ere aborted due to the economic crisis of 1930 and the beginning of World War II, respectively. See “Problema de boricuas en Nueva York lo constituye el inglés,” El Mundo, February 22, 1947, 1. The number of Puerto Ricans living in the city was calculated by Donald J. O’Connor, economist for Puerto Rico’s office in Washington, DC. See letter from O’Connor to Leonard Sussman, office director, August 14, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 2, folder 27, doc. 9. “Mi­grant Aid Asked for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, February 13, 1948, 23. See also “Dan informe de migración de boricuas,” El Mundo, February 14, 1948, 1. Letter from Sussman to Muñoz Marín, Senate president, February 13, 1948, AFLMM, section IV, series 16, subseries “Emigración Puertorriqueña a E.U.,” folder 58, doc. 2. “Statement by Hon. Jesús T. Piñero, Governor of Puerto Rico, on Report of the Welfare Council’s Study of Puerto Ricans in New York City,” AFLMM, section IV, series 16, subseries “Emigración Puertorriqueña a E.U.,” folder 58, doc. 3. Letter from G. Howland Shaw to Piñero, May 27, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. Letter from Negrón Fernández to G. Howland Shaw, June 16, 1948, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs, “Interim Report,” 12, Rec­ords of Vincent R. Impellitteri (Impellitteri Papers), New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA), folder “Puerto Rican Affairs in NYC—­Mayor’s Committee Interim Report (1953),” subject files series, box 85, folder 989, roll 43. See also “Welfare Group Airs Aid to Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, November 18, 1949. Manuel Cabranes, “Pro­gress Report on the Puerto Rican Mi­grants,” Migration Division, New York, no date [1950?], Office of the Government of Puerto Rico in the United States (OGPRUS), Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, box 3037, folder 15.

Chapter 4  The “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City and Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy 1 See Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 1. 2 For a discussion of the Puerto Rican government’s role in migration before 1947, see Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 1. 3 “Caucus de la mayoría aprobó medida de emigración obrera,” El Mundo, April 2, 1947, 1, 21. The text of the law appears in Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Legislatura, Leyes de la Tercera Legislatura Ordinaria, 210–215. 4 In her letter to Muñoz Marín, social worker Carmen Isales argued that migration required a conscious effort from the government “since the m ­ istakes that are made affect fundamentally the hegemony of the party. The frustrated worker that returns to the country without having achieved his ambitions is a seed of discontent and

Notes to Pages 82–84  •  211

5 6

7

8 9 10 11

12

13 14

15

16

17

distrust for the party.” Letter from Isales to Muñoz Marín, April 3, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 2, subseries 9—­Department of L ­ abor, folder 277, doc. 14. Letter from Juan Calderón Parrilla, New York City, to Muñoz Marín, October 7, 1946, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, folder 9, doc. 35. Letter from Petra González, New York City, to Luis Muñoz Marín, October 15, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 3, doc. 11. See also letter from Ramón Ruíz de Hoyos to Muñoz Marín, August 15, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 5, doc. 6. Letter from Cruz and other Puerto Ricans to Muñoz Marín, October 13, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 3, doc. 13. See the reply to this letter by Muñoz Marín’s secretary: Letter from M. A. Bigles to Oliva Cruz, October 20, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 3, doc. 12. West India Tele­grama October 2, 1947, in AFLMM, section IV, series 2, folder 27, doc. 7. Frank Ledesma, president of the Puerto Rican Public Relations Committee, committee’s April–­May 1950 newsletter, AGPR, 96-20, box 2276. RCA Radiograma, October 28, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 2, folder 27, doc. 5. Letter from Muñoz Marín to Quintero, September 5, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 4, doc. 11. In another instance, Muñoz Marín replied to a constituent that the commissioner of l­ abor had traveled to New York “to study the dif­fer­ent a­ ngles of the prob­lem of Puerto Ricans ­there, with the goal of making the necessary recommendations” for legislation. Letter from Muñoz Marín to Antulio Charneco, September 30, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, series 8, subseries Ultramar, folder 4, doc. 1. See, e.g., letters from Vidalina Ramírez to Muñoz Marín, July 23, 1949; Gilda C. R. Díaz to Muñoz Marín, November 18, 1949; Ramón Matos to Muñoz Marín, November 22, 1949; Carmen Rolón to Muñoz Marín, May 18, 1950; all in AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. Letter from Antonio Zapata and Ramón Rodríguez, president and secretary, respectively, of the Spanish Grocers Association, to Muñoz Marín, May 18, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. See the letter from Gustavo Agrait to Gilda C. R. Díaz, where the executive secretary to the governor told Díaz that, although racial intolerance ­toward Puerto Ricans was unjustified, that this was to be expected “while minority groups are incorporated to the foreign environment.” Gustavo Agrait to Gilda C. R. Díaz, New York, December 5, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. This position was reiterated in another of Agrait’s replies to an island mi­grant: Gustavo Agrait to Casimiro Pérez, Youngstown, OH, March 18, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2276. Letter from Muñoz Marín to Ramón Matos, New York City, November 28, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2276. See the letters from Gustavo Agrait to Vidalina Ramírez, August 8, 1949, and from Gustavo Agrait to Carmen Rolón, May 25, 1950, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. Letter from Francisco Rivera, Vernon, WA, to Muñoz Marín, September 7, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20. The same complaint is made in a letter from Pablo Sánchez, Dixon Camp, NY, to Muñoz Marín, September 5, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2279. Letter from Molina Alvarez to Muñoz Marín, February 7, 1950, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2279.

212  •  Notes to Pages 85–88

18 See letter from Sierra Berdecía to William L. Conolly, director of the Division of ­Labor Standards, U.S. Department of ­Labor, February 17, 1950; memo from Luis Laboy to Sierra Berdecía, February 13, 1950; letter from Sierra Berdecía to Juan Molina Alvarez, February 17, 1950; and memo from Sierra Berdecía to Luis Laboy, February 20, 1950; all in AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2279. 19 See, for example, his tele­gram requesting an investigation into allegations of wage discrimination against Puerto Rican farm workers in New Jersey: Muñoz Marín to Maurice J. Tobin, U.S. secretary of ­labor, August 15, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2279. 20 Letter from Muñoz Marín to Sierra Berdecía, July 31, 1950, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2275. 21 See Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 6. 22 Letter from Julio Machuca, Conciliation Ser­vice, Department of ­Labor, to D. E. López Ramírez, secretary to the governor, February 3, 1947; and attached memo from Machuca to Muñoz Marín, “Sugestiones [sic] en torno al momento ­actual,” no date, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 468. 23 D. J. O’Connor, “No Panaceas for Puerto Rico,” no date; accompanied by letter from D. J. O’Connor to Governor Piñero, March 4, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 236. 24 D. J. O’Connor, “Addendum on an Internal Migration of Puerto Ricans,” no date (stamp-­marked April 2, 1947), AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 236. 25 D. J. O’Connor, “Notes for the Hon. Andrew L. Sommers on a Proj­ect to Locate Puerto Ricans in the Dominican Republic,” no date; attached to memo from O’Connor to Resident Commissioner Antonio Fernós-­Isern, March 14, 1947, along with a draft letter to the U.S. president on the Dominican Republic plan, March 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 236. Also, Donald J. O’Connor, “A Basis for Preliminary Conversation on a Resettlement Proj­ect for Puerto Ricans in Venezuela,” June 11, 1947, AFLMM, section IV, subsection 1, series 1, folder 13, doc. 4. See also “Estado se opone a plan emigración de boricuas a República Dominicana,” El Imparcial, July 3, 1947, 17. 26 Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 2. 27 Se­nior, “Puerto Rican Emigration,” 122. 28 See Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 67–74; Duany, The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move, 170–171; and Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 35–36. 29 Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, 37–48. 3 0 See, e.g., letter from H. Rex Lee to Governer Piñero arguing that the island government should focus on migration to the U.S. mainland: H. Rex Lee, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Jesús T. Piñero, July 24, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 31 Letter from Juan A. Pons, acting governor, to Rafael Picó, July 14,1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 32 See letter from Russell C. Derrickson, acting chief of the Ca­rib­bean branch of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Daisy D. Reck, July 29, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 3 3 Minutes of the third meeting of the Emigration Advisory Committee, August 18, 1947, and attached memo to members from Daisy Reck, August 28, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 3 4 Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Emigration Advisory Committee, August 23, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422.

Notes to Pages 88–96  •  213

35 Minutes of the Emigration Advisory Committee, September 11, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 422. 36 Fernando Sierra Berdecía, “Migración de Trabajadores Puertorriqueños a Estados Unidos,” report by the commissioner of ­labor to Governor Jesus T. Piñero, November 17, 1947, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 454. 37 “Caso boricua discutido en Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 29, 1947, 1. 3 8 “Sierra dictará cambio radical en emigración,” El Mundo, October 31, 1947, 5. 39 “Esperan que Sierra Berdecía regrese en la próxima semana,” El Mundo, November 1, 1947, 5; “Sierra discute un plan para dar empleo a los puertorriqueños,” El Mundo, November 5, 1947, 7; and “Sierra afirma hará cambios en emigración,” El Mundo, November 11, 1947, 1. 4 0 Sierra Berdecía, “Migración de Trabajadores Puertorriqueños a Estados Unidos.” 41 Sierra Berdecía and other Puerto Rican government officials claimed repeatedly that the island’s migration policy was the result of consultation with functionaries and institutions in New York City. See “Sierra expone l­ abor oficina de New York,” El Mundo, December 19, 1947, 1. 42 Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Asamblea Legislativa, Leyes de la Cuarta y Quinta Legislaturas Extraordinarias, 386–394. 4 3 As stated in a ­later document: “The first mainland office of this Bureau [BEM] was opened in New York City in 1948. Consultations w ­ ere held with the then Mayor of New York City and the Governor of the State of New York both of whom agreed that the creation of such an office by the Government of Puerto Rico would be beneficial to both the mi­grant and the agencies that worked with him.” City of New York, First Report of Continuations Committee, 28. 44 Memo from Sierra Berdecía to Governor Muñoz Marín, “ ‘Financing Migration from Puerto Rico’ by D. J. O’Connor,” March 23, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2275. 45 See Maldonado, Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap, 144–146. 4 6 Letter from Agrait to Cabranes, September 12, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 47 Leter from Se­nior to Sierra Berdecía and Pagán, February 19, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2253. 4 8 Letter from Sierra Berdecía to Agrait, February 29, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2253. 49 Letter from Agrait to Sierra Berdecía, March 5, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2253. 50 Letter from Se­nior to Agrait, March 11, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2253. On the follow-up, see memo from Agrait to Governor Muñoz Marín, March 13, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2253. 51 Letter from Se­nior to Moscoso, May 28, 1952, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2276. 52 “Suggestions for a New Approach to Migration,” confidential report from Joseph Monserrat to Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, February 9, 1961, AFLMM, section V, series 1, folder 137, doc. 1, p. iii. 53 This notion was presented by Monserrat in a New York TV program discussing precisely the “Facts and Figures on the Origin of the so-­called Puerto Rican Prob­lem in New York.” See “Monserrat en N.Y.: Señala cómo surgió el problema boricua,” El Mundo, September 26, 1957, 4. See also Migration Division, press release no. 34, “Monserrat aclara mitos sobre Marcantonio y boricuas,” September 23, 1957, in OGPRUS, Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, box 3448, folder Press Releases/Tele­vi­sion Programs, September/ December 1957.

214  •  Notes to Pages 97–102

5 4 “Sierra Berdecía pide al pueblo vote ley 600,” El Mundo, June 4, 1951, 22. 55 On ­these two areas, see Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chaps. 4 and 5. 56 In May 1958, Speaker of the House Ernesto Ramos Antonini submitted a bill to fund an En­g lish education program for mi­grant farm workers. The preamble concluded: “Common citizenship and the increase in mass transportation and communication between Puerto Rico and the United States make ­every Puerto Rican a potential mi­g rant.” “Bill Cámara: Lleva enseñanza inglés a obreros boricuas EU,” El Mundo, May 3, 1958, 40; emphasis added.

Chapter 5  Marcantonio, the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem,” and the 1949 Mayoral Election in New York City 1 On Marcantonio as an anti-­imperialist, see Meyer, Vito Marcantonio; LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio; Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio; and Kaner, “­Towards a Minority of One.” 2 Meyer, “Marcantonio and El Barrio,” 72. Marcantonio’s first statement in support for Puerto Rico’s statehood was not well received by the majority of Puerto Rican organ­izations in El Barrio, who strongly supported in­de­pen­dence. See related correspondence in Marcantonio Papers, box 54, General Correspondence, New York Public Library (NYPL). 3 Vega, Memorias de Bernardo Vega, 230. 4 See Vega Memorias de Bernardo Vega; Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community, chaps. 5 and 6; and Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 7. Support for in­de­pen­ dence was strong in El Barrio according to a February 1948 Cleveland Plain Dealer article on New York Puerto Ricans. “Cleveland Plain Dealer trata de la vida de boricuas en New York,” El Mundo, February 28, 1948, 12. Marcantonio was well aware of the support for in­de­pen­dence among Puerto Ricans in his district; see “Santiago Iglesias hará campaña en Puerto Rico en f­ avor de que la Isla se una a los EE.UU.,” La Democracia, May 9, 1936, 1. 5 Gerald Meyer, “Marcantonio and El Barrio,” 72. See also Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio, 195–198. 6 Quoted in Jackson, “Vito Marcantonio and Ethnic Politics in New York,” 59. 7 Meyer, “Marcantonio and El Barrio,” 72. 8 Meyer, “Vito Marcantonio, Congressman for Puerto Rico.” Th ­ ere is an abundant documentation in the Vito Marcantonio Papers at the NYPL that shows his deep involvement with Puerto Rico’s affairs. See, e.g., the following folders in the Puerto Rico file: “Education, Federal Aid to 1949”; “Citizenship”; “Coffee Industry”; “Expedicionarios”; “Wage and Hour Administration”; “Works Pro­gress Administration.” 9 See Marcantonio, press release, August 23, 1939, Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rican Papers, folder “Wage and Hour Administration,” Centro de Investigaciones Históricas (CIH), University of Puerto Rico, roll 3. 10 On Marcantonio’s popularity in Puerto Rico, see letters in Marcantonio Papers, box 54, General Correspondence, CIH, roll 4; see also Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, 99. 11 On Marcantonio’s 1936 in­de­pen­dence bill, see “La independencia dentro de 90 días,” El Imparcial, May 7, 1936, 1; and “Proyecto Tydings pretendía desacreditar el ideal de independencia: Marcantonio,” El Imparcial, August 5, 1936, 6. See also “Bill Would ­Free Puerto Rico Now,” New York Times, May 7, 1936, 13. On

Notes to Pages 103–108  •  215

Marcantonio’s visit to Puerto Rico and his public reception t­ here, see Meléndez, “Marcantonio y Muñoz Marín.” 12 On the Socialist Party, see Silvestrini, Los trabajadores puertorriqueños. On the Co­a li­tion, see Meléndez, Puerto Rico’s Statehood Movement, chap. 4. 13 See letters from island workers in Vito Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rican Papers, folder “Wage and Hour Administration,” CIH, roll 4. See also the file “Puerto Rico: Wage and Hour a­ fter Recommittment ” in the Marcantonio Papers, box 55. 14 Letter from Muñoz Marín to Marcantonio, September 5, 1939, Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rican Papers, folder “Works Pro­gress Administration,” CIH, roll 4. On the relationship between Muñoz Marín and Marcantonio, see Meléndez, “Marcantonio y Muñoz Marín.” 15 ­There is abundant correspondence between Muñoz Marín and Marcantonio in the former’s archives, AFLMM, mostly from 1939 to 1944, dealing with constituents’ issues. See AFLMM, section IV, series 1, “General Correspondence,” folders 8, 119, and 123; and section IV, series 3, “Individuals,” folders 360 and 361. 16 Letter from Santaella to Marcantonio, November 5, 1941, Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rican Papers, General Correspondence, CIH, roll 3. This letter was translated into En­g lish by Marcantonio’s office. 17 On Puerto Rican politics in the 1930s, see Mathews, La política puertorriqueña. 18 Documents on Marcantonio’s efforts to oust Winship are found in Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rico file, folder “Investigation,” CIH, roll 5. 19 See, e.g., letter from Vicente Geigel Polanco to Marcantonio, May 13, 1939, Marcantonio Papers, NYPL, General Correspondence, box 54, microfilm copy at the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños in New York; and letter from Walter McJones to David Noble, November 18, 1939, Marcantonio Papers, box 55, Puerto Rican Papers, folder “W. McJones,” CIH, roll 3. 20 Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, 263–264n50. 21 “Marcantonio denuncia la posposición del status,” El Mundo, June 19, 1947, 2. 22 “V. Marcantonio sigue atacando el proyecto como insuficiente,” El Mundo, July 28, 1950, 15. 23 “V. Marcantonio alega liderato Popu­lar viola promesa status,” El Mundo, July 26, 1950, 13. 24 “V. Marcantonio niega a Muñoz mandato en reforma política,” El Mundo, June 20, 1950, 10. 25 “Marcantonio somete enmiendas tras exponer sus objeciones,” El Mundo, July 31, 1950, 11. 26 “Marcantonio pide derroten Constitución,” El Mundo, May 31, 1951, 2. 27 “Según Marcantonio, el azúcar es el mayor problema insular,” El Mundo, August 1, 1950, 16; and “Marcantonio cita consecuencias leyes de cabotaje y cuota azúcar,” El Mundo, August 5, 1950, 12. 28 Vega, Memorias de Bernardo Vega, 28. A similar assessment is made by Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 53–54. 29 See Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 3; LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 9; and Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio, 204–207. 3 0 On Marcantonio and the 1949 elections, see LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 10; Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 3. 31 LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, 127. 32 “El triunfo de Marcantonio,” editorial, El Mundo, November 8, 1948, 6.

216  •  Notes to Pages 108–111

3 3 LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, 127. 3 4 Letter from Muñoz Marín to O’Dwyer, October 6, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 3 5 As El Mundo reported, “the so-­called ‘Puerto Rican prob­lem’ in New York has come to occupy an impor­tant role in this election not only b­ ecause of the participation of Vito Marcantonio, in whose district lives a power­f ul nucleus of Puerto Ricans, but also ­because of the number of the articles recently published in newspapers and magazines of the country, giving prominence in some occasions in a sensationalist and openly anti–­Puerto Rican form, and in other occasions in a more impartial way, to the situation of Puerto Ricans that live in the so-­called Hispanic Harlem, stronghold of the Marcantonio forces.” “Crece interés pro campaña en New York,” El Mundo, November 2, 1949, 1. In early October 1949, the New York Times published a report on the situation of New York’s Puerto Ricans. It repeated some of the themes of the 1947 “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign, including the elevated number of Puerto Ricans on welfare and, of course, their support of Marcantonio. “City Puerto Ricans: Complex Prob­lem,” New York Times, October 3, 1949, 11. 36 Woodbury, “Our Worst Slum,” 30, 32. 37 “Ser­vices Extended for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, October 5, 1949, 43. See also “Alcalde niega que su gobierno desatendiera barrio de Harlem,” El Mundo, October 13, 1949, 1; and “Nuevo centro comunal para boricuas en NY,” El Mundo, November 1, 1949, 1. The allegations that the creation of MCPRA had electoral motives ­were made in a series of reports by the New York Post in 1953; see “Alegan comité sobre asuntos boricuas surgió en campaña política,” El Mundo, June 29, 1953, 12; and “Juez Murtagh opina el comité del alcalde no ha realizado l­ abor,” El Mundo, June 30, 1953, 14. 3 8 Raymond M. Hilliard, “The ‘Puerto Rican Prob­lem’ of the City of New York Department of Welfare,” report submitted to Mayor William O’Dwyer, September 6, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 485. 39 “Marcantonio habla confidencialmente a O’Dwyer sobre los puertorriqueños,” po­liti­cal flyer by the American ­Labor Party in New York, October 1949, Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies. See also “Marcantonio ataca comité sobre boricuas,” El Mundo, September 25, 1949, 1; “Marcantonio Cites Puerto Rican Woe,” New York Times, September 22, 1949, 37; “Defends Puerto Ricans: Marcantonio Sees Them Forced into Second-­Class Citizenship,” New York Times, September 23, 1947, 18; and “Marcantonio Chides Mayor for Seeking Puerto Rican’s Support,” New York Times, October 23, 1949, 88. 4 0 “Aid Cuts Planned, Macantonio Says,” New York Times, October 30, 1949, 59. 41 “Rivals Teamed Up, O’Dwyer Charges,” New York Times, November 2, 1949, 24; “Marcantonio Sees the Needy Ill-­Used,” New York Times, November 2, 1949, 24; “Marcantonio Assails Morris and O’Dwyer,” New York Times, October 8, 1949, 30. Marcantonio repeatedly ridiculed O’Dwyer’s concern for Puerto Ricans, calling him “an October advocate of civil rights” whose knowledge on the subject was “the length of a policeman’s nightstick.” “Marcantonio Urges Bomb Race Be Ended,” New York Times, October 17, 1949, 10. 42 “Marcantonio Plot Charged by Mayor,” New York Times, November 7, 1949, 5; see also “Espérase acudan en Nueva York a las urnas 2,500,000 personas,” El Mundo, November 8, 1949, 1. Commissioner of Welfare Hilliard, also the chairman of MCPRA, joined the attack on Marcantonio by declaring that the congressman “is

Notes to Pages 111–115  •  217

4 3 4 4

45 4 6 47 4 8

49 50 51 52 53

54 55

56 57 58 59

60 61

seeking to frighten the good p­ eople of Harlem into voting like Communists.” “Hilliard Declares Marcantonio ‘Liar,’ ” New York Times, November 1, 1949, 12. “Marcantonio Gets Puerto Rican Aid,” New York Times, October 27, 1949, 20. “Impellitteri cita ejemplo de boricuas,” El Mundo, October 12, 1949, 1; and also, “Celebra acto Comité boricua de Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 14, 1949, 5. “­Woman Mayor a Visitor,” New York Times, October 14, 1949, 29; and “O’Dwyer Defends Subway Fare Rise,” New York Times, October 15, 1949, 30. See also “El Alcalde O’Dwyer ofreció un agasajo a Fini Rincón,” El Mundo, October 15, 1949, 7. “La Srta. Rincón lanza ataque a líder del PIP,” El Mundo, October 29, 1949, 4. “Felisa Rincón hará campaña f­ avor O’Dwyer,” El Mundo, November 1, 1949, 1. “Grupo de boricuas dió agasajo a Señora Rincón en Nueva York,” El Mundo, November 4, 1949, 5. “La Alcaldesa en recibida por O’Dwyer,” El Mundo, November 4, 1949, 1. “Llegó a New York la señora Rincón,” El Mundo, November 2, 1949, 1. “Puerto Ricans to Back O’Dwyer, ­Woman Mayor of San Juan Says,” New York Times, November 7, 1949, 5. Letter from Muñoz Marín to Mayor O’Dwyer, October 6, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280; emphasis added. Muñoz Marín rejected Cabranes’s idea for a recorded message b­ ecause he thought it would be “counterproductive” given “the climate that has been created regarding Puerto Ricans” in NYC, according to his executive assistant, Gustavo Agrait. Letter from Agrait to Cabranes, October 10, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. “Puerto Ricans Get Campaign Warning,” New York Times, October 17, 1949, 29. See also “Muñoz insta boricuas a votar en Nueva York en contra Marcantonio,” El Mundo, October 17, 1949, 1. “Marcantonio Gets Puerto Rican Aid”; “Dr. Concepción ataca táctica de Gobernador,” El Mundo, October 27, 1949, 1. An El Mundo columnist reported that the 25,000 letters to Puerto Ricans, which included Muñoz Marín’s letter to O’Dwyer, ­were mailed by New York’s Demo­crats. E. Combas Guerra, “Desde La Fortaleza,” El Mundo, November 8, 1949, 6. See “Muñoz Marín’s Foe Comes to Steer Puerto Rican Vote for Marcantonio,” New York Times, October 27, 1949, 1; and “Líder del PIP hace campaña a Marcantonio,” El Mundo, October 25, 1949, 1. “Dr. Concepción de Gracia dice boricuas elegirán Marcantonio,” El Mundo, November 2, 1949, 3; and “Dr. Concepción ataca táctica de Gobernador,” El Mundo, October 27, 1949, 1. “Concepción dice boricuas votarán Marcantonio,” El Mundo, November 8, 1949, 4; and “Dr. Concepción hace campaña intensa en N.Y.,” El Mundo, November 6, 1949, 1. See “Arrecia brega eleccionaria en Nueva York,” El Mundo, November 3, 1949, 1; “La colonia puertorriqueña vivió ayer intensa actividad,” El Mundo, November 8, 1949, 16; and “Espérase acudan en Nueva York a las urnas 2,500,000 personas,” El Mundo, November 8, 1949, 1. “Espérase acudan en Nueva York”; “Los 4 partidos están activos en Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 10, 1949, 3. On the last days of campaigning, see LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, 127–132. On the reception of the elections results in Puerto Rico, see “O’Dwyer y Lehman triunfan por una abrumadora mayoría; boricuas invaden los colegios,” El Mundo, November 9, 1949, 1.

218  •  Notes to Pages 115–123

62 “V. Marcantonio agradece voto de los boricuas,” El Mundo, November 11, 1949, 5. 6 3 Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, 39. 6 4 “La elección de O’Dwyer,” editorial, El Mundo, November 10, 1949, 6. 65 “Una coalición trata de vencer Marcantonio,” El Mundo, June 12, 1950, 1; “Marcantonio Race High in Invective,” New York Times, November 1, 1950, 28. On Marcantonio’s last campaign, see LaGumina, Vito Marcantonio, chap. 11. 66 Meyer, Vito Marcantonio, 169–170. Marcantonio’s opponent, James Donovan used Marcantonio’s relationship to Puerto Rican Nationalists in his campaign against the Harlem congressman; see “Marcantonio Foes Guarded in Parade,” New York Times, November 4, 1950, 6. El Mundo editorialized that with Marcantonio’s defeat, islanders would realize “that the po­liti­cal ­f uture of Puerto Ricans in New York lies in a dif­fer­ent path.” “La lección de las elecciones,” editorial, El Mundo, November 9, 1950, 6. See also “Puerto Ricans Glad for Donovan,” New York Times, November 12, 1950, 24. When Marcantonio died on August 9, 1954, Concepción de Gracia called him “the best friend Puerto Ricans living in New York ever had.” “Dice Marcantonio fue mejor amigo Isla en NY,” El Mundo, August 11, 1954, 11. Reflecting on the impact that Marcantonio’s death had on Puerto Ricans and the American left in general, activist Gilberto Gerena Valentín concluded: “It was hard to fill Marc’s shoes. Po­liti­cally, we ­were orphans.” Gerena Valentín, Gilberto Gerena Valentín, 100.

Chapter 6  The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs 1 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 104. 2 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 110 and 117. 3 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 111. 4 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 111. 5 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 120. 6 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 152 and 154. 7 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 155. 8 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 158–160. 9 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 111. 10 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 112 and 114. 11 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 111 and 115. 12 See McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York, chaps. 3–4; and Lankevich and Furer, A Brief History of New York City, 249–257. 13 The Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City, “Interim Report,” September 1949 to September 1953, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2281, 12. A copy of this report is also found in Rec­ords of Mayor Impellitteri (Impellitteri Papers), New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA), folder “Puerto Rican Prob­lems in NYC–1953,” series subject files, box 85, folder 991, roll 43. 14 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, “Introduction.” 15 See Vega, Memorias de Bernardo Vega, passim; Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community, passim; Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, passim. 16 MCPRA, “Interim Report,” 5. 17 “O’Dwyer afirma que los boricuas no constituyen problema en Nueva York,” El Mundo, June 23, 1948, 1; also “La visita de O’Dwyer,” editorial, El Mundo, June 22, 1948, 6.

Notes to Pages 123–130  •  219

18 “O’Dwyer ofrece a Felisa Rincón ayuda para los puertorriqueños,” El Mundo, August 15, 1948, 1. 19 “City Puerto Ricans: Complex Prob­lem,” New York Times, October 3, 1949, 11. The New York Times series was reproduced in El Mundo: “El Times sigue su defensa de boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 5, 1949, 6. 20 Press and Public Relations of the Department of Welfare, press release, September 12, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 21 Letter from Hilliard to O’Dwyer, September 6, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 485. 22 Hilliard, “The ‘Puerto Rican Prob­lem,’ ” in AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 485, 1. 23 MCPRA, “Interim Report,” 16. 24 Before the creation of MCPRA, O’Dwyer had informed Muñoz Marín about its formation, had asked for his suggestions on the ­matter, and had announced to him the appointment of Manuel Cabranes, director of the Migration Office, as vice-­chairman. Letter from O’Dwyer to Muñoz Marín, September 8, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 25 “Preparará un programa para mejorar la situación de los puertorriqueños un comité nombrado por el Alcalde,” La Prensa, September 12, 1953, 1; and “Mirror aplaude plan O’Dwyer para boricuas,” El Mundo, September 16, 1949, 1. 26 “Our Puerto Rican Community,” New York Herald Tribune, September 18, 1949, OGPRUS, Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, box 2993, folder 18, Mayor’s Committee, 1949–1954. See also “City Puerto Ricans Found Ill-­Housed,” New York Times, October 4, 1949, 30. 27 Manuel Cabranes, press release, September 16, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2278. See also “Aid Plan Outlined for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, September 15, 1949; and “Cabranes hace nueva defensa de boricuas,” El Mundo, September 19, 1949, 5. 28 “Cumpliendo la promesa,” editorial, El Mundo, September 20, 1949, 6. 29 “46 Named to Help City Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, September 17, 1949; also, “Alcalde O’Dwyer de Nueva York toma juramento a grupo asesor,” El Mundo, September 24, 1949, 1. 3 0 Letter from Ruperto Ruiz to Hilliard, October 3, 1949, Jesús Colón Papers, series X: Clippings (1923–1972), box 1-2F4, micro reel 26, Library and Archives of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies. 31 “Analy­sis of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Ricans Prob­lems,” no date, Jesús Colón Papers, box 1-2F4, micro reel 26. 32 “Good-by, Suggar D ­ addy [sic],” editorial, World Tele­g ram, November 11, 1949; and “Puerto Rican Job OK, A Jab at Marcantonio,” Daily News, October 28, 1949, OGPRUS, box 2993, folder 18, Mayor’s Committee, 1949–1954. 3 3 “Ser­vices Extended for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, October 5, 1949, 43. 3 4 See, e.g., “City Seeks U.S. Aid for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, April 21, 1950; and “Puerto Rican Help Urged by O’Dwyer,” New York Times, July 12, 1950. 3 5 See letter from Cabranes to Hilliard, September 29, 1949; and “Minutes of Meeting of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City,” November 28, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. 36 “Alcalde niega que su gobierno desatendiera barrio de Harlem,” El Mundo, October 13, 1949, 1; also, “La Srta. Rincón rinde informe de su l­ abor,” El Mundo, November 12, 1949, 5. 37 “Nuevo centro comunal para boricuas en NY,” El Mundo, November 1, 1949, 1. By early 1947 a “grass roots experiment in democracy” was already in place in East

220  •  Notes to Pages 130–134

38 39

40 41 42 4 3 4 4 45

46 47 4 8 49 50 51 52 53

54

Harlem whose goal was to fight “communist infiltration” t­ here. See “Block Plan in Beginning to Yield Results in East Harlem’s Slums,” New York Times, March 12, 1947. “Sierra hace elogio de la l­ abor a f­ avor boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, December 22, 1949, 29. Confidential letter from Cabranes to Agrait, September 28, 1949, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2280. Cabranes seems to refer to Muñoz Marín’s visit to New York City on July 21, when he was given an official reception by O’Dwyer. Muñoz Marín also made a stop in New York on his way to Washington, DC, in early July. See “Gobernador agasajado en alcaldía New York,” El Mundo, July 22, 1949, 1; and “Muñoz recibido por centenares en Nueva York,” El Mundo, July 5, 1949, 1. Sánchez points to the meeting in NYC between Muñoz Marín and O’Dwyer on July 21, 1949, as the probable date where the allegiance to defeat Marcantonio and to create MCPRA came to be. See Sánchez, Boricua Power, 114. “Puerto Rican Committee Meets,” The Welfarer 1, no. 11 (October 1949): 1, Rec­ords of William O’Dwyer (O’Dwyer Papers), NYCMA, folder “Puerto Rican Prob­lems in NYC,” subject files 1946–1950, box 13, folder 1427, roll 68. Department of Welfare, press release, August 29, 1950, O’Dwyer Papers, folder 1427, roll 68. Letter from O’Dwyer to Thomas, no date, O’Dwyer Papers, folder 1427, roll 68. Letter from O’Dwyer to George, no date, O’Dwyer Papers, folder 1427, roll 68. Tele­gram from O’Dwyer to members of Congress, July 11, 1950, O’Dwyer Papers, folder 1427, roll 68. Tele­gram from O’Dwyer to members of Congress, no date, O’Dwyer Papers, folder 1427, roll 68. “Ewing Off to Map Puerto Rican Aid,” New York Times, April 25, 1950, 19. See McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York, 84–93. On O’Dwyer’s demise and the rise of Impellitteri to the mayoralty, see also LaGumina, New York at Mid-­Century. La Gumina devotes just three pages in his study of Impellitteri to his relationship with Puerto Ricans. But the same ­thing can be said of other studies of NYC mayors O’Dwyer, Wagner, and Lindsay. LaGumina, New York at Mid-­Century, 200–202. Mayor Impellitteri, press release and speech on the swearing of members of MCPRA, Department of Welfare, April, 9, 1951, Impellitteri Papers, NCYMA, folder “Puerto Rican Affairs in NYC,” series subject files, box 85, folder 987, roll 43. MCPRA, “Puerto Rican Pupils in New York City Public Schools,” report of the Subcommittee on Education, Recreation and Parks, 1951, 6, Impellitteri Papers, folder 990, roll 43. “City Aides Sought Who Know Spanish,” New York Times, November 9, 1951, 10. Letter from Hilliard to Impellitteri, October 28, 1952; and press release, November 19, 1952, Impellitteri Papers, folder 991, roll 43. On ­these appointments, a New York Times editorial stated: “They understand their own p­ eople and their own ­people’s prob­lems, and can give us good advice as to how to improve the lot of the Puerto Rican who is temporarily or permanently a New Yorker.” “The Puerto Rican Committee,” New York Times, November 3, 1952, 26. See, e.g., letter from Hilliard to Sierra Berdecía, October 30, 1952, Impellitteri Papers, folder 991, roll 43. See also “Mayor Invites Aid of 4 Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, November 2, 1952, 30.

Notes to Pages 134–140  •  221

55 See “To Aid Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, January 16, 1952, 6; “Concert on April 15 to Aid Scholarships,” New York Times, April 6, 1952, 86; and “Ten Puerto Ricans Win,” New York Times, August 11, 1952, 6. See also MCPRA, press release, August 11, 1952, Impellitteri Papers, folder 991, roll 43. 56 “Puerto Rican Neighbors,” New York Times, February 16, 1953, 15. 57 Letter from Hilliard to Impellitteri, June 10, 1952, Impellitteri Papers, folder 991, roll 43. 5 8 Mayor’s Office, press release, July 24, 1952, Impellitteri Papers, folder 991, roll 43. 59 Letter from Impellitteri to Hilliard, February 20, 1953, Impellitteri Papers, folder 987, roll 43. 6 0 “Puerto Ricans Win Praise as Citizens,” New York Times, February 17, 1952, 56. 61 “Puerto Ricans Shift to Other U.S. Areas,” New York Times, June 5, 1953, 29. 62 MCPRA, “Interim Report,” introduction by Hilliard, no page numbers. 6 3 “New York Puerto Ricans: Official Sweet-­Talk Ignores Official Inaction,” New ­ oday,” New York York Post, July 22, 1953, 4; and “Puerto Rico Talks ­Will Start T Times, March 2, 1953, 8. 64 “City Leaders Invited to Puerto Rico Talks,” New York Times, February 23, 1953, 14. 65 MCPRA, “Interim Report,” 26. 66 Lapp claims that the main objective of the first conference was to showcase the economic and social advances made by the PPD government in recent years. Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 129–132. 67 See chapter 4 for a discussion of Puerto Rico’s migration policy. See also Meléndez, Sponsored Migration. 6 8 See “Tratan caso de boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, February 25, 1953, 1; “Afirman que boricuas no son un problema difícil para N.Y.,” El Mundo, February 26, 1953, 1; and “Una visita oportuna,” editorial, El Mundo, February 26, 1953, 6. 69 Before the San Juan conference, a statement by MCPRA members reported that the committee was created during “a peak of vilification, exaggeration and misconceptions” of Puerto Ricans in the city. “Listening to t­ hese critics, one would have believed that ­every Puerto Rican was a Communist, a criminal and on relief.” “Puerto Rico Talks W ­ ill Start ­Today.” 70 The first migration conference was front-­page news in Puerto Rico. See “Señalan logros de los boricuas en Nueva York,” El Mundo, March 2, 1953, 1. 71 “Aumentarán la enseñanza del inglés,” El Mundo, March 2, 1953, 1; and “Puerto Rican Help to Mi­grants Urged,” New York Times, March 3, 1953, 29. 72 “Oficiales de Nueva York aconsejarían a boricuas emigar a otras ciudades,” El Mundo, March 3, 1953, 1. 73 “Puerto Rican Help to Mi­grants Urged”; “Sugerirán intercambio maestros entre Puerto Rico y Nueva York,” El Mundo, March 6, 1953, 25. 74 Department of L ­ abor, Migration Division, “Conclusions of the Conference on Migration Held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 1–7, 1953,” 1, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 1207. This document is also found in Impellitteri Papers, folder 992, roll 43. 75 According to the New York Times, the recommendations approved by the conference members “laid much of the burden of easing the mainland adjustment on the Puerto Rican Government. This was specifically at the request of the New York members.” “New Yorkers Urge Aid to Puerto Rico,” New York Times, March 8, 1953, 70. See also “Conferencia pide gobierno federal siga ayuda a isla,” El Mundo, March 9, 1953, 1.

222  •  Notes to Pages 140–149

76 The New York Times de­cided to emphasize on the Puerto Rican government’s decision not to intervene in New York politics while covering the return of MCPRA members to New York. “Puerto Rico Avoids New York Politics,” New York Times, March 9, 1953, 31. El Mundo announced that Impellitteri appointed Puerto Rico’s Speaker of the House, Ernesto Ramos Antonini, as a member of MCPRA, reinforcing the presence of island PPD officials in the committee. “Speaker de la Cámara recibió la invitación del alcalde Impellitteri,” El Mundo, March 9, 1953, 12. 77 “City Called Lax on Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, March 6, 1953, 25. 78 “New York Puerto Ricans: Official Sweet-­Talk Ignores Official Inaction,” 56. 79 An El Mundo editorial ­a fter the conclusion of the conference questioned the workings of MCPRA and urged the city government to do more to help island mi­grants integrate into New York. “Después de las conferencias,” El Mundo, March 10, 1953, 6.

Chapter 7  The Demise of MCPRA and the Redefinition of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” 1 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 120. Thomas also suggests a connection between the abolition of MCPRA by Wagner and the Nationalist attack in Congress in 1954 in Puerto Rican Citizen, 161. 2 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 107. 3 Sánchez, Boricua Power, 107 and 108. 4 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 141–142. 5 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 142. 6 For a comprehensive view on the formulation and implementation of Puerto Rico’s postwar migration policy, see Meléndez, Sponsored Migration. 7 McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York, chap. 5; also, LaGumina, New York at Mid-­Century, chap. 8. 8 Flanagan, Robert Wagner and the Rise of New York City’s Plebiscitary Mayoralty. See also McNickel, To Be Mayor of New York, chap. 5. 9 “Actividades de las agencias de la ciudad en relación con los puertorriqueños en la ciudad de Nueva York desde la conferencia de migración,” memo from Monserrat to Sierra Berdecía, October 9, 1953, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2272. 10 “Reconstructing the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs,” memo from Santiago to Wagner, November 27, 1953, Rec­ords of Robert Wagner (Wagner Papers), New York City Municipal Archives (NYCMA), file “Puerto Rican Prob­lems in NYC,” subject files series, roll 148, box 276, folder 3211. 11 “Puerto Rico Group Urges It Be Kept,” New York Times, November 20, 1953, 25. 12 Mayor’s Office, press release, May 18, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 2388. See also, “Miller jura cargo grupo pro boricua,” El Mundo, May 19, 1954, 2; and “Mayor Names Group to Aid Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, May 18, 1954, 8. 13 “Muñoz se niega a apoyar movimiento para abolirlo,” El Mundo, June 10, 1954, 15. 14 “Statement by Edward G. Miller, Jr., Upon Being Sworn in as Chairman of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City,” May 18, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 2388. 15 Letter from Marta Valles, Citizens’ Committee for the Appointment of Antonia Pantoja, June 12, 1955; letter from Nieves to Wagner, July 3, 1955, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box, 276, folder 3213. Hundreds of letters in files 3212, 3213, and 3214 in

Notes to Pages 149–155  •  223

the Wagner Papers supported the appointment of Pantoja for MCPRA’s executive secretary. In Memoir of a Visionary, Pantoja makes absolutely no mention of MCPRA, but devotes several pages to her work with COIR and how it influenced her ­later community work. 16 Edward G. Miller, Jr., “Fixing Puerto Rican Wages,” Letter to The Times, New York Times, July 11, 1955, 22; “Puerto Rico Pay Issue for Mayor,” New York Times, July 14, 1955, 21; “Bilingual Rally Backs Wage Bill,” New York Times, July 15, 1955, 32; and “Mayor ­Favors Pay Rise,” New York Times, July 20, 1955, 30. 17 For this argument, see Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 139–140. 18 “Communist Plot Charged,” New York Times, March 2, 1954, 19; “Puerto Rico Tightens Security ­a fter Report of Terrorist Plots,” New York Times, March 5, 1954, 8; and “6 Top Reds Seized in San Juan Raids,” New York Times, March 8, 1954, 1. 19 “Police Alerted to Local Clues,” New York Times, March 2, 1954, 19. 20 “F.B.I. and Police Dig for Plot Roots H ­ ere,” New York Times, March 3, 1954, 1; “91 Puerto Ricans Rounded Up ­Here,” New York Times, March 9, 1954, 1; and “Puerto Rican Plot Alerts Police ­Here,” New York Times, March 18, 1954, 1. 21 Mayor’s Office, press release, March 2, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3211. 22 “F.B.I. and Police Dig for Plot Roots H ­ ere.” 23 “Exhortan boricuas en New York no abochornarse por atentado,” El Mundo, March 6, 1954, 1. 24 “Mayor and Party Land in San Juan,” New York Times, June 21, 1955, 12; also “Mayor, Defying Risk, to Fly to Puerto Rico,” New York Times, June 15, 1954, 1. 25 “Sierra invita alcalde de NY venir a Isla,” El Mundo, March 16, 1954, 1. Documents related to this conference are found in Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3211. 26 “Celebrarán en privado conferencia de migración,” El Mundo, June 18, 1954, 7. 27 “Mayor Off ­Today on San Juan Trip,” New York Times, June 20, 1954, 46. 28 “Wagner afirma boricuas no son problema en N.Y.,” El Mundo, June 22, 1954, 1; “Puerto Rican Tide to U.S. Falls 50%,” New York Times, June 22, 1954, 29. 29 “Puerto Rico Gets Caution by City,” New York Times, June 23, 1954, 18; also, “Se reducirán las viviendas en New York,” El Mundo, June 23, 1954, 1. 30 “More Help Urged for Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, June 27, 1954, 52. 31 “Homenajean a Wagner en el ayuntamiento,” El Mundo, June 24, 1954, 5; and “Sábado cesó conferencia de migración,” El Mundo, June 28, 1954, 1. See also “Puerto Rican W ­ oman Mayor Has a Busy Day ­Here,” New York Times, November 3, 1955, 33. 32 “La conferencia de migración,” El Mundo, June 29, 1954, 6. 33 “Instan crear liderato boricua NY,” El Mundo, June 24, 1954, 1. 34 See Benjamin, Race Relations, chap. 3, and 71–75. 35 Benjamin, Race Relations, 81. 36 Harris L. Pre­sent, “New Committee Suggested to Deal with Minority Group Prob­lems,” Letter to The Times, New York Times, November 20, 1953, 22. 37 Letter from Pre­sent to Muñoz Marín, April 26, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 102, box 174, file 2388. 3 8 “Youth Body Backs Intergroup Proj­ect,” New York Times, February 18, 1954, 34; and “Anti-­Bias Agency Voted by Council,” New York Times, May 18, 1955, 25. 39 Mayor’s Office, press release, December 16, 1955, Wagner Papers, roll 107, box 174, file 2388. See also “Swope Appointed Rights Unit Head,” New York Times, December 16, 1955, 30.

224  •  Notes to Pages 156–161

40 Letter from Muñoz Marín to Wagner, January 9, 1956, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 2282. 41 Benjamin, Race Relations, 90. 42 Letter from Wagner to Muñoz Marín, January 17, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3217. 4 3 Mayor’s Office, press release, January 17, 1954, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3217. See also, “Puerto Rican Unit Ends,” New York Times, January 18, 1956, 18. 4 4 “Alcalde NY elimina comité de boricuas,” El Mundo, December 17, 1955, 1; “Wagner revela carta de Muñoz,” El Mundo, January 20, 1956, 21; “Wagner elogia comité boricua,” El Mundo, January 19, 1956, 1; “Wagner prohibe que se señale a boricuas como grupo aparte,” El Mundo, January 23, 1956, 14. 45 “Ending of Committee Decried,” New York Times, December 19, 1955, 10. 4 6 “Protestan aquí por la acción alcalde de N.Y.,” El Mundo, December 20, 1955, 1. 47 Letter from Fosdick to Wagner, January 19, 1956, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder file 3215. 4 8 “Revive Comité sobre boricuas,” El Mundo, January 20, 1956, 1. 49 Swope to Muñoz Marín, August 8, 1956, AGPR, FOG 96-20, box 2282. This proposal for a youth leadership program was also supported by the third migration conference held in 1958. 50 “Conferencia persigue fin comprender mejor boricuas,” El Mundo, January 17, 1958, 26. 51 “Wagner irá hoy a acto católico,” El Mundo, January 22, 1958, 1; and “Visitan caseríos, la UPR, fábrica cigarros Caguas,” El Mundo, January 24, 1958, 2. 52 “Señala Wagner desvirtuó especies sobre boricuas,” El Mundo, January 24, 1958, 30. 53 “Wagner afirma estar orgulloso de boricuas,” El Mundo, January 23, 1958, 1. 5 4 “La Conferencia de Migración,” El Mundo, January 23, 1958, 6. 55 “Alcalde Wagner pide a boricuas aprender inglés,” El Mundo, January 25, 1958, 1. 56 “Leadership Plan for Mi­grants Due,” New York Times, January 22, 1958, 30. 57 Migration Division, Department of ­Labor of Puerto Rico, “Report of the Third Migration Conference between New York City and Puerto Rican Officials (San Juan, P.R., January 19–26, 1958),” AGPR, FOG 96-20, file 2280. See also “Conferencia de Migración rinde su informe final,” El Mundo, February 15, 1958, 30. 5 8 “Conferencia Migración respalda programas orientación, inglés,” El Mundo, January 27, 1958, 1; and “Wagner recalca valor de idea enseñar inglés,” El Mundo, January 29, 1958, 1. 59 See Meléndez, Sponsored Migration, chap. 5. 6 0 “Insta alcaldes a orientación de migrantes,” El Mundo, February 7, 1958, 1. 61 “Muñoz urge intensificar la enseñanza del inglés,” El Mundo, February 12, 1958, 2. 62 “A Harriman y Wagner; Gobernador dice seguirá consejos sobre migración,” El Mundo, February 14, 1958, 30. 6 3 “Alcalde ciudad de Nueva York: Cita comité para abordar problemas de los boricuas,” El Mundo, March 2, 1959, 39. 6 4 “First Report of Continuations Committee of the Third Migration Conference Held in San Juan, Puerto Rico on January 19–26, 1958 (New York City, June 12, 1959),” 28, Colección Puertorriqueña, University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras. See also “Pro­gress Noted by Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, June 14, 1959, 77; and “Comité a Alcalde: Informará resultado ­labor pro ajuste de boricuas NY,” El Mundo, June 12, 1959, 36.

Notes to Pages 161–167  •  225

65 The programs described in this report did not include the Puerto Rican government’s Farm L ­ abor Program designed to move thousands of farm workers to U.S. agriculture, regarded as or­ga­nized migration. The programs described in this report, and t­ hose discussed in the migration conferences, ­were related to individual migration from Puerto Rico, which was the basis for the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in New York City. 66 “Pro­gress Noted by Puerto Ricans.” 67 “Migration Talks Invited to City,” New York Times, November 21, 1959, 6. 6 8 Quotes from “Job Parley Set by Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, May 29, 1960, 48; and “Celebra 4ta conferencia sobre migración boricua,” El Mundo, June 1, 1960, 14. 69 Mayor’s Office, “Fourth Migration Conference between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the City of New York,” press release, May 29, 1960, Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3220. 70 Mayor’s Office, “Remarks by Mayor Wagner, Opening Session of the ‘Fourth Migration Conference,’ June 1, 1960,” Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3220. See also “Wagner ataca discriminación a boricuas N.Y.,” El Mundo, June 2, 1960, 1; and “New Skills Urged on Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, June 2, 1960, 22. 71 “Draft of Final Report, Fourth Migration Conference, New York City, May 31–­ June 4, 1960,” Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3221. See also “A Mi­grant Drift from City Noted,” New York Times, June 5, 1960, 20; “Pide aumento de enseñanza inglés en isla,” El Mundo, June 6, 1960, 1; and “Conferencia ve necesidad coordinar ayuda boricua,” El Mundo, June 6, 1960, 26. 72 “Mayor Asks U.S. to Aid Mi­grants,” New York Times, June 4, 1960, 48. 73 “West Side Notes Big Pupil Shift,” New York Times, June 1, 1960, 80; and “Señala número boricuas de NY se ha triplicado,” El Mundo, June 2, 1960, 1. 74 See Benjamin, Race Relations, chap. 4. 75 Benjamin, Race Relations, 142–143. 76 Benjamin, Race Relations, 149–150. Benjamin is quoting Wakefield, Island in the City, 231 77 Benjamin, Race Relations, 150; the comments Benjamin relates are from an interview with Montserrat and Ralph Rosas from Puerto Rico’s Migration Division. 78 Benjamin, Race Relations, 205. 79 Benjamin, Race Relations, 239. 8 0 The National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights (NAPRCR) was created in 1965 to represent the specific issues of concern to Puerto Ricans in their civil rights strug­g les. That year, a­ fter meeting with the leadership of the CCHR, NAPRCR president Gilberto Gerena Valentín called for the abolition of this organ­ization ­a fter concluding that “the commission has no power to help us.” “City’s Right Unit u­ nder Sharp Fire,” New York Times, May 6, 1965. NAPRCR representatives had complained that CCHR was “prejudiced against Puerto Ricans.” “City Rights Agency to Hear Protests of Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, May 5, 1965. 81 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, chaps. 3–4; Sánchez Korrol, From Colonia to Community, chaps. 6–7; and Sánchez, “Puerto Ricans and the Door of Participation in U.S. Politics.” 82 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, “Introduction.”

226  •  Notes to Pages 167–175

83 Cruz, Puerto Rican Identity, chap. 2; and Cruz, Liberalism and Identity Politics, chaps. 2 and 3. See also Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement, chaps. 2 and 3. 8 4 Antonia Pantoja, “Puerto Ricans in New York.” See also, Rodríguez-­Fraticelli and Tirado, “Notes ­Towards a History.” 8 5 See Gerena Valentín, Gilberto Gerena Valentín. 86 According to Antonia Pantoja, the emerging “new leadership” in the Puerto Rican community by the late 1950s and early 1960s believed “that the fate of Puerto Rican New Yorkers belonged in the hand of Puerto Rican New Yorkers.” Antonia Pantoja, “Puerto Ricans in New York,” 26. 87 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” chap. 5; Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement, chaps. 2 and 3. 8 8 “Puerto Rico Head W ­ ill Aid Lindsay,” New York Times, March 22, 1966, 50. 8 9 Quoted in Cruz, Puerto Rican Identity, 93. 90 Cruz, Puerto Rican Identity, 95. 91 “Mayor to Head City Group at Parley in Puerto Rico,” New York Times, October 5, 1966, 35. 92 Cruz, Puerto Rican Identity, 97–98. 93 “Mayor ­Will Seek More Advice H ­ ere on Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, January 23, 1967, 1.

Chapter 8  In the Aftermath of the “Puerto Rican Prob­lem” in New York City 1 Cruz, Liberalism and Identity Politics, 69–70. 2 Cruz, Liberalism and Identity Politics, 130–132, 167–168. 3 See the PBS documentary De­cade of Fire, directed by Gretchen Hildebran and Vivian Vázquez Irrizary. See also, Diaz, “Historical Images of Puerto Ricans.” The image of a devastated Bronx became widely disseminated when a photo of President Jimmy Car­ter standing in ravaged empty lots in the South Bronx made the front pages of American and world newspapers. See “Car­ter Takes ‘Sobering’ Trip to South Bronx,” New York Times, October 6, 1977, 1. 4 Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 194. 5 Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 196. 6 Quoted in Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 198; emphasis added. 7 Pérez, “An Upbeat West Side Story,” 50; emphasis added. 8 See F. Padilla, Puerto Rican Chicago, chap. 4. 9 Pérez, “An Upbeat West Side Story,” 57. See also Pérez, The Near Northwest Side Story, chap. 3. 10 Cruz, Identity and Power, 47–49. 11 The 1969 riots in Hartford are discussed in Cruz, Identity and Power, chaps. 3 and 4. On the emergence of a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in Florida, see “Sur de Florida ‘tiene problema puertorriqueño,’ ” El Mundo, February 12, 1953, 5. Th ­ ere was a “Puerto Rican prob­lem” even in Lorain, Ohio, presented as a model mi­grant community by the Puerto Rican government in the early 1950s. See Rivera, “La colonia de Lorain, Ohio.” 12 Whalen argues that the critique of the “culture of poverty” as the basis for the understanding of U.S. mainland Puerto Ricans in the postwar period was an impor­tant ele­ment in the evolution of the field of Puerto Rican studies. See Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 6–9. See also Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze”; Rodríguez, “Puerto Ricans in Historical and Social Science

Notes to Pages 176–179  •  227

Research”; Cabán, “Puerto Rican Studies”; Briggs, Reproducing Empire, chap. 6; and Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, chap. 5. 13 As Hewitt concluded in his anti–­Puerto Rican diatribe regarding the ills affecting Puerto Ricans in New York: “Real origin of the Porto Rican prob­lem is in Porto Rico itself.” Hewitt, “Welcome: Paupers and Crime,” 15. Even a more liberal take like Probst and Olmsted’s argued that “the population prob­lem of Puerto Rico has impor­tant bearing on the Puerto Rican prob­lem in New York.” Probst and Olmsted, “The Rising Puerto Rican Prob­lem,” 9. 14 Briggs, Reproducing Empire, 163–165; quote from 165. 15 Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” 45. 16 Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” 231. 17 Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” 234–235. On assimilation policies to counteract the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC and elsewhere, see Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, chap. 5; and Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 194–198. 18 In an article published in the October 1966 Scientific American on the “culture of poverty,” just before the publication of La Vida, Lewis mentioned Puerto Ricans along with other groups in the United States, Latin Amer­i­ca, Asia, and Africa. Nevertheless, the tag­line for the article read: “Does membership in a group that has been poor for generations constitute belonging to a separate culture? A study of Puerto Ricans in both Puerto Rico and New York indicates that it does.” All the photos in the article ­were of slums in Puerto Rico and El Barrio in New York. Lewis, “The Culture of Poverty.” 19 Lewis, La Vida. 20 Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” 275. 21 Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 9. On a similar perspective, see Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement, 43. 22 See Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” chap. 7; Whalen, From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, 198–206, 238–241; Pérez, The Near Northwest Side Story, 86–91. The New York Times reviewed a surge in academic interest in this theory in “ ‘Culture of Poverty’ Makes a Comeback,” New York Times, October 17, 2010. 23 Briggs, Reproducing Empire, 177–192; Ortiz, “Disrupting the Colonial Gaze,” chap. 7. 24 Nathan Glazer, “One Kind of Life,” review of La Vida: A Puerto Rican F ­ amily in the Culture of Poverty-­San Juan and New York by Oscar Lewis, Commentary, February 1967, 83–84. 25 Renowned Puerto Rican writer Judith Ortiz-­Cofer recounted the story of how she was serenaded with “Maria” while traveling in London; quoted in Foulkes, A Place for Us, 198. Arturo Sandoval Sánchez also recalls how, upon arriving to the United States to attend college, “the musical West Side Story frequently was imposed upon me as a ‘model of/for’ my Puerto Rican ethnic identity.” Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story” (I was able to find only an online version of this article, with no page numbers included). 26 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 163. 27 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 83. 28 Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” 29 Carina del Valle Schorske, “Let ‘West Side Story’ and Its Ste­reo­t ypes Die,” New York Times, February 24, 2020. 3 0 Foulkes mentions the “Puerto Rican prob­lem” as context in her book, particularly as it related to gangs, but does not explain or examine in detail the campaign of the late 1940s and the narrative that emerged thereafter. Foulkes, A Place for Us, 43.

228  •  Notes to Pages 180–183

31 See Foulkes, A Place for Us, chaps. 4 and 6. 32 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 82–84; Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 85–86. 3 3 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 163–164. 3 4 Briggs, Reproducing Empire, 174. 3 5 Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” On West Side Story and the racialization of Latinos on Broadway, see Sebesta, “Just ‘Another Puerto Rican with a Knife’?” 36 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 86. 37 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 195–196. Foulkes adds that in “its valorized stereotyping, widespread distribution, and easy embrace, West Side Story marked the ac­cep­tance and endorsement of prejudice—­not its unraveling” (198–199). 3 8 Oja, “West Side Story and The M ­ usic Man,” 25. 39 Sánchez Korrol, “Building the New York–­Puerto Rican Community,” 9. According to linguist Ana Celia Zentella, both works negatively influenced how the community was perceived while she was growing up in El Barrio. See Zentella, “A Nuyorican’s View of Our History,” 27. 4 0 Quoted in Kasha and Hirschorn, Notes on Broadway, 15 emphasis added. 41 Quoted in Guernsey, Broadway Song and Story, 42; emphasis added. 42 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 90. 4 3 del Valle Schorske, “Let ‘West Side Story’ and Its Ste­reo­t ypes Die.” 4 4 In October 1959, the journal Sign, the official organ of the Passionists Priests in New Jersey, published an editorial asking the public to stop reproducing harmful and untruthful ste­reo­t ypes about Puerto Ricans. Th ­ ese included the main tropes of the “prob­lem” narrative regarding crime, welfare, diseases, slum creation, e­ tc. “Organo Católico en N.J.; Pide actitud de justicia para emigrantes boricuas,” El Mundo, October 31, 1959, 2. 45 “Preocupación mayor en EU es la delincuencia juvenil,” El Mundo, October 26, 1959, 4; and “Alcalde Wagner; Inaugura proyecto pi­loto contra la delincuencia,” El Mundo, October 7, 1959, 15. For a general overview of youth gangs in postwar New York City, see Schneider, Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings. On Puerto Rican gangs, see also Foulkes, A Place for Us, chap. 3; and Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 191–196. 4 6 Wells, “West Side Story” (online journal). 47 Among the sections or­ga­nized by the New York del­e­ga­tion during the fourth migration conference held in NYC in 1960 was one on law enforcement and delinquency prevention. See “Draft of Final Report, Fourth Migration Conference, New York City, May 31–­June 4, 1960,” Wagner Papers, NYCMA, roll 148, box 276, folder 3221. El Mundo described the discussion in the panel or­ga­nized by this section as “very agitated.” “Conferencia ve necesidad coordinar ayuda boricua,” El Mundo, June 6, 1960, 26. 4 8 On the issue of Puerto Ricans and welfare at this time see, “City Relief Rolls Held Down Despite Job-­Hunter Influx,” New York Times, June 2, 1957. See also “Informe dice los boricuas no son carga,” El Mundo, October 18, 1958, 5; and “Negdo. Bienestar NY: Niega ayuda a migrantes para devolverlos a isla,” El Mundo, April 16, 1960, 2. 49 “Monserrat señala los boricuas se unen ante la campaña adversa en Nueva York,” El Mundo, October 9, 1959, 1; “Gob. Rocke­fel­ler; Elogia actitud Boricuas frente a la delincuencia,” El Mundo, October 20, 1959, 4; “Sierra Berdecía afirma, Ha bajado tensión causada por actos violencia en NY,” El Mundo, November 3, 1959, 1. See also “Munoz [sic] Says City Caused Own Ills,” New York Times, October 14,

Notes to Pages 183–185  •  229

1959, 24. During this controversy, Puerto Rican government officials admitted that gang-­related crime was growing slowly on the island, but attributed it “to teenage mi­grants who return, having picked up anti-­social habits in New York.” “Puerto Rico Finds Gang Crime Rising,” New York Times, October 21, 1959, 39. 50 “The ‘Puerto Rican’ Prob­lem,” New York Times, September 28, 1959, 30. 51 “Niegan crisis NY sea debida migración PR,” El Mundo, September 7, 1959, 16. 52 “Fight on City’s Slums So Far Losing ­Battle,” New York Times, August 30, 1953, 130; “Increase in Slums Found by Survey,” New York Times, January 11, 1954, 22; “Our Changing City: Harlem Now on the Upswing,” New York Times, July 8, 1955, 25; “Slums Engulfing Columbia Section,” New York Times, June 9, 1958, 25. See also, “Destacan boricuas no son culpables del crecimiento de arrabales,” El Mundo, August 5, 1953, 11. On the effects of urban renewal policies on Puerto Ricans in NYC, see Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement, 45–51. 53 “Tenants Deplore Renewal Plans,” New York Times, June 21, 1961; “Housing Assailed by Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, May 16, 1962; and “Renewal Fought by Puerto Ricans,” New York Times, June 23, 1962. 54 Mayor Wagner’s opening speech to the fourth migration conference held in New York in 1960 was devoted almost exclusively to the issue of urban renewal, including in the West Side. See Mayor’s Office, “Remarks by Mayor Wagner, Opening Session of the ‘Fourth Migration Conference,’ June 1, 1960,” Wagner Papers, roll 148, box 276, folder 3220. See also “First Report of Continuations Committee of the Third Migration Conference Held in San Juan, Puerto Rico on January 19–26, 1958 (New York City, June 12, 1959),” 28, Colección Puertorri­ queña, University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras. 55 Some of the opening scenes of West Wide Story ­were filmed in the real West Side of New York, on Sixty-­Eighth Street and Amsterdam, where “urban renewal” was evident with block a­ fter block of empty spaces full of debris from knocked-­down buildings. See Foulkes, A Place for Us, 150–151. 56 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 79–82, 87–99, 175–186. 57 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 91. 5 8 Jesús Colón Papers, Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and Archives, series X-­Clippings (1923–1972), box 1-2F4, micro reel 26. 59 “Instan que N.Y. tenga 300 policías boricuas,” El Mundo, October 2, 1954, 3; and “Conferencia persigue fin comprender mejor boricuas,” El Mundo, January 17, 1958, 26. See also, “Leadership Plan for Mi­grants Due,” New York Times, January 22, 1958, 30. On police brutality against Puerto Ricans in the 1960s, see Cruz, Liberalism and Identity Politics, 58–62. 6 0 As quoted in Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” 61 Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” 62 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 147. In an interview on the occasion of the San Juan premiere of a documentary about her life, Rita Moreno commented on the interest of the creators of West Side Story in intensifying the racial difference between Puerto Ricans and Whites in the film. Comparing it to the new Steven Spielberg version, she claimed that “in the original movie we had to wear dark makeup. That was Jerome Robbins’ fault (choreographer) b­ ecause he wanted a g­ reat contrast in skin colors . . . ​­Because they ­didn’t know anything about Puerto Ricans and our diversity.” “Rita Moreno: ‘No todo es éxito, no todo es Oscar,’ ” El Nuevo Día, June 3, 2021, 24–25. 6 3 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 54.

230  •  Notes to Pages 186–190

6 4 Briggs, Reproducing Empire, 173. 65 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 86. 66 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 88 and 91. 67 Foulkes claims that the producers of West Side Story only considered the possibility of a Puerto Rican or Latina actress for the role of Anita, a supporting character played in the film by Rita Moreno and in the 1957 Broadway play by Puerto Rican Chita Rivera. Talking about the role of Maria, Foulkes contends that the “creators ­were not especially interested in ethnic authenticity in this role (onstage or, ­later, in the movie),” adding that for the film “an affected accent and dark hair would suffice.” Foulkes, A Place for Us, 69 and 137, respectively. 6 8 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 148. 69 Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” 70 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 165. 71 del Valle Schorske, “Let ‘West Side Story’ and Its Ste­reo­t ypes Die.” 72 Quoted in Foulkes, A Place for Us, 67. 73 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 85. 74 del Valle Schorske, “Let ‘West Side Story’ and Its Ste­reo­t ypes Die.” 75 Wells, “West Side Story.” Bronx-­born Puerto Rican musician and conductor Bobby Sanabria pre­sents a very positive view of the film and its ­music by Bern­ stein. Although he acknowledges that ­there was no truly Puerto Rican m ­ usic in the film, Sanabria claims that Bern­stein incorporated m ­ usic (such as the mambo) that Puerto Ricans heard and danced at that time in NYC. Bobby Sanabria, “West Side Story Re­imagined,” NILP Report, March 4, 2018. 76 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, 129–130. 77 Wells, “West Side Story.” 78 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 146. 79 Sandoval Sánchez, “West Side Story.” 8 0 Negrón-­Muntaner, “Feeling Pretty,” 93. 81 Briggs, Reproducing Empire, 174; Foulkes, A Place for Us, 82–83. Foulkes points out how activists and the Spanish-­language media in New York took more offense to the play than officials and the media in Puerto Rico. 82 Lapp, “Managing Migration,” 216. 8 3 Discussing the film’s m ­ usic, Jack Delano, the well-­k nown photographer who lived for many years in Puerto Rico, contends that “no one in Puerto Rico ever refers to the United States as ‘Amer­i­ca’ and no Puerto Rican ever did.” He adds that “the melodies of Bern­stein, for all their beauty, could only have been composed by someone for whom Mexican and Puerto Rican ­music are essentially the same—­ that is, ‘Latin.’ The rich and distinctive musical tradition of Puerto Rico is almost entirely absent from WEST SIDE STORY.” Delano, Puerto Rico Mío, 4. 8 4 Foulkes, A Place for Us, 147.

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Index Agrait, Gustavo, 93–94, 130, 211n14 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 101, 102, 116 Badillo, Herman, 9, 168, 170 Balzac v. the ­People of Porto Rico, 26 Baver, Sherrie, 9 Benítez, Jaime, 134, 138 Benjamin, Gerald, 154, 156, 165, 166 Beyond the Melting Pot, 19–21, 178–179, 187 Briggs, Laura, 176, 177, 180, 181, 185 Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM), 3, 5, 90, 92, 125, 126 Bureau of the Bud­get (Puerto Rico), mi­grant survey, 62 Cabranes, José, 67, 73, 77, 93, 121, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 219n24 Cesteros, José (Negrón), 128, 151, 156, 157 City Commission on ­Human Rights (CCHR), 165–166 Colón, Emilio, 63, 66 Colón, Jesús, 184 Columbia University, 5, 47, 59; Bureau of Applied Social Research, 59, 63, 67. See also Puerto Rican Study Committee on Intergroup Relations (COIR), 143, 146, 154, 155, 165–166; criticism by NYC Puerto Ricans, 156–157; and NYC Puerto Ricans, 142, 165; and

“Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 142, 154–157; to replace MCPRA, 154–155 Concepción de Gracia, Gilberto, 113, 114, 218n66 Congreso pro Independencia (CPI), 104 Congress of Puerto Rican Hometowns (Congreso de los Pueblos), 165, 168 Cruz, José, 9 culture of poverty theory, 7, 172, 175; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 172, 175–178; and Puerto Ricans, 7 Davis, Kingsley, 52 del Valle Schorske, Carina, 179, 182, 187 Department of Education (Puerto Rico), 98; En­g lish for adults program, 98; En­g lish for prospective mi­g rants program, 98 Department of ­Labor (Puerto Rico). See Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM); Puerto Rican mi­g rants in the U.S.; Sierra Berdecía, Fernando Department of Welfare of NYC, 124, 129; report of Puerto Ricans and welfare, 123–125 Dorfman Report, 46–47 Duany, Jorge, 25 East Harlem (El Barrio), 9, 45, 106, 109, 115, 116, 122, 129, 130, 131, 152, 166

239

240  • Index

El Mundo, 138; and Puerto Rican migration to/migrants in the U.S., 37, 43; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 51, 71, 100, 114, 127, 216n35; and Puerto Ricans in NYC, 36, 40, 41–42, 153–154; and Puerto Rico’s migration policy, 36, 40 Farm Placement Program (FPP), 98 Fernós-­Isern, Antonio, 35–36, 43, 45–47, 50, 87, 88 Fielding, Franklyn, 89–90 Foulkes, Julia, 180, 184–187, 190 Friedman, Samuel, 36, 37 Garzón, Julio, 156, 157 Géigel Polanco, Vicente, 42 Gerena Valentín, Gilberto, 168, 218n66, 225n80 Gerstle, Gary, 17–18 Glazer, Nathan, 19–21, 178–179, 187 Governor’s Migration Advisory Committee (Puerto Rico), 87–88 Grosfoguel, Ramón, 30–31 Handlin, Oscar, 21–23, 38 Hilliard, Raymond, M., 110, 111, 123–124, 141, 147; and Marcantonio, 108; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem, 124, 129, 130, 131, 135, 138. See also Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA) Horne, Frank, 158, 159, 160 House Un-­A merican Activities Committee (HUAC): hearings on Puerto Ricans, 8, 32, 150 Hurricane Maria, 1–3, 191, 194 Impelliteri, Vincent, 6, 111, 112, 115, 132–133, 146; and MCPRA, 6, 132–135. See also New York City government Jennings, James, 24 Lapp, Michael, 10, 121, 145–146 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 59–60 Lewis, Oscar, 7, 21, 178–179, 181, 227n18 Lindsay, John, 143, 168–169 Low, Robert, 160, 163, 164, 169

Marcantonio, Vito, 5, 32, 41, 44, 45, 48–49, 64, 143; as communist, 100, 108, 112–113; and Luis Muñoz Marín, 5, 103, 104–105, 113; and NYC 1949 mayoral election, 5, 8, 99–100, 106–107, 114–115; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 5, 52, 96–97, 105–106, 192; and Puerto Ricans, 13, 34, 37, 46–47, 99–100, 101, 102, 115, 167; and Puerto Rico, 101–106, 114; and Puerto Rico in­de­pen­ dence bills/support for in­de­pen­dence, 102, 104; and Puerto Rico’s government, 100. See also Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA) Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA), 6, 14, 31, 139; and channeling of Puerto Ricans away from NYC, 119, 121, 125, 126, 129, 135, 136, 137, 145; creation of, 119, 120, 121, 122–124, 125, 126, 128; criticism of, 128–129, 141, 146–147; demise/ abolition of, 142–143, 144–146, 154–155, 156–157; discourse on Puerto Ricans, 133, 142, 148; and En­g lish classes/vocational training for mi­g rants, 125, 131, 135; and federal aid to Puerto Rico, 129, 131–132; goals, 6, 117–118, 119, 125–126, 136–137, 145; and lack of Puerto Rican leadership in NYC, 121, 125, 126, 136; and Marcantonio, 119, 122, 126, 127, 129; members, 127–128, 133, 134, 222n76; and NYC 1949 mayoral election, 126, 127–130; 1953 Interim Report, 136–137; and number of Puerto Ricans in NYC, 135, 147, 148; and programs for Puerto Ricans, 133–134, 135; and Puerto Rican community, 119, 143, 147, 148–149; and Puerto Rican government, 6, 118, 119, 120–121, 123, 126, 127, 134, 137, 145; and Puerto Rican incorporation, 122, 148; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 6, 110, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 145; and Puerto Ricans on welfare, 123–125, 131; study of, 118–121; ­under mayor Impelliteri, 132–135; ­under mayor O’Dwyer, 130–132; u­ nder mayor Wagner, 146–149. See also Hilliard, Raymond, M.; New York City government; O’Dwyer, William; Wagner, Robert

Index  •  241

McCarthy, Henry L., 134, 138, 151, 152 Meyer, Gerald, 101, 102, 104 Migration Conference(s), 6, 145, 146, 168–169, 182, 184–185; First, 137–141; Second, 149–154; Third, 158–163; Fourth, 163–165; and channeling mi­grants away from NYC, 138, 139, 140, 161–162; Continuations Committee, 160–162; and En­g lish classes/skills for mi­grants, 138, 140, 159–160, 163, 164; and federal aid to Puerto Rico, 139, 140, 153, 164; goals, 138, 151, 158; and mi­g rant adjustment/assimilation, 159, 163; and Migration Division, 140, 153, 160, 161; and number of Puerto Ricans in NYC, 152, 158, 164; and NYC government, 138, 140, 161; and police brutality, 141; and Puerto Rican gangs/juvenile delinquency, 152; and Puerto Rican government, 138, 139, 145, 158, 160, 161–162; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 137, 139, 141, 149, 150, 158, 161, 162; and Puerto Ricans and diseases, 139; and Puerto Ricans and welfare, 139, 153; and Puerto Rico’s migration policy, 139, 150; recommendations/programs for Puerto Ricans, 140, 153, 159, 160, 163–164; and relationship between Puerto Rican and NYC governments, 141, 143, 150, 159; and urban renewal/slum clearance/housing, 140, 152, 163, 165 Migration Division (Puerto Rico government), 5, 78, 119, 126, 145, 156, 165, 193. See also Migration Conference(s) Migration Office (Puerto Rico government), 106, 113, 135, 174 migration to the United States: traditional model of, 4; transnational model of, 4 Mills, C. Wright, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 208–209n18 mode of incorporation, 29–31 Mollenkopf, John, 17–18 Monserrat, José (Joseph), 94, 95–96, 138, 146–147, 151, 154, 158, 160 Moreno, Rita, 185, 186, 188, 229n62 Moscoso, Teodoro, 94, 134, 138, 168–170 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 19–21, 178, 187 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 42, 88, 150, 157; and MCPRA, 130, 134, 135, 148, 155–156,

219n24; and migration conferences, 135, 152, 160; and migration/migration policy, 43, 97; and Puerto Ricans in NYC, 82–85, 95, 207n74; and Vito Marcantonio, 5, 103, 108–109, 112–113. See also Puerto Rico government National Association of Puerto Rican Civil Rights, 165, 225n80 Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, 8, 150 Negrón-­Muntaner, Frances, 179, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188 Newsweek, 41 New York City government, 6; and Puerto Rican government, 6, 7; and Puerto Ricans in NYC, 7, 168–170. See also Impelliteri, Vincent; Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA); Migration Conference(s); O’Dwyer, William; Wagner, Robert New York Times, 45, 46, 76; and number of Puerto Ricans in NYC, 13, 40, 44, 54, 74; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 40, 44–45, 53, 123, 183, 216n35 New York World Tele­g ram, 14, 44, 48–49, 94, 129 Nuñez, Louis, 9 Ocasio-­Cortez, Alexandria, 1 O’Connor, Don, 85–86 O’Dwyer, William, 6, 35, 89, 90, 122, 123, 132, 146; and MCPRA, 6, 110, 118, 122, 129; and NYC 1949 mayoral elections, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113. See also New York City government; Puerto Rico government Oja, Carol, 181 Operation Bootstrap, 105, 149, 168, 169 Ortiz, Laura, 177–178 Ortiz, Ruperto, 61 Ostergaard-­Nielsen, Eva, 25 Pagán de Colón, Petroamérica, 94, 161 Pantoja, Antonia, 148–149, 157, 167–168, 226n88 Pérez, Gina, 174 Piñero, Jesús T., 35, 59 Pons, Juan A., 87

242  • Index

Portes, Alejandro, 16, 29–30 Pre­sent, Harry L., 154–155 Puerto Rican community in NYC, 6, 8, 9, 10, 193–194 Puerto Rican Day Parade, 9 Puerto Rican Emigration (Se­nior), 60, 88 Puerto Rican Forum, 165 Puerto Rican Journey, The, 5, 18–19, 54, 58, 71, 126 Puerto Rican mi­g rants in the U.S.: as alien/ foreign to the U.S., 2, 6, 16, 27, 29, 186, 189; and assimilation, 15, 18, 19, 20, 173, 177–178; and crime/delinquency, 173, 174; and En­g lish education, 174; as “ethnologically dif­fer­ent,” 24; as immigrants, 24; and ties to the homeland, 20, 24–25; as transnational mi­g rants, 16, 24–26; and welfare de­pen­dency, 21, 22, 174, 178. See also Puerto Rican migration to the United States; “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC; Puerto Ricans in NYC Puerto Rican migration: to Chicago, 81, 174; to Florida, 2, 192; to Hartford, 173–175; to New York City, 3, 8, 13, 56–57, 192; to Philadelphia, 173–174 Puerto Rican migration to the United States, 2, 4, 194–195; and air transportation, 97–98; and American academia, 19; as colonial migration, 4, 26–27, 31; during World War II, 81; as first airbone migration, 39, 41, 189; as individual migration, 10, 225n65; and mi­grant incorporation, 4; and migration/immigration studies in the U.S., 10, 16, 17; and mode of incorporation, 4, 30–31; as or­ga­nized migration, 10, 73, 75, 225n65; and Operation Bootstrap, 97; and overpopulation, 85–86; pre-1945, 2, 8; postwar, 2, 8, 37, 38, 191, 192; post hurricane Maria, 191, 192; and race/racism, 2; as transnational migration, 24–26; in twenty-­first ­century, 192–193; and U.S. colonialism and citizenship, 2; as U.S. internal migration, 28–29, 139, 164 Puerto Rican poverty: in Puerto Rico, 7; in the United States, 7. See also Puerto Rican mi­g rants in the U.S.; Puerto Rico government

“Puerto Rican prob­lem”: in Chicago, 7, 172, 174; in Hartford, 7, 172, 174–175; in Philadelphia, 7, 172, 173–174 “Puerto Rican prob­lem” in NYC, 12–13, 34, 38, 47, 49, 57, 150, 165, 166, 167, 168, 192–193; ­a fter 1947/postwar, 52–55, 171–172; and American academia, 3, 7, 14, 175–178; campaign, 3, 4, 5, 7, 15, 48–49, 176–177; and channeling mi­g rants away from NYC, 74, 87; and “culture of poverty,” 7, 172–176; and growing number of Puerto Rican mi­g rants, 8, 13, 38, 53, 74, 94, 98; and juvenile gangs and delinquency, 171, 182–183; and housing/overcrowding, 38, 73, 74; narrative, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 69, 131, 171, 176–177; and NYC 1949 mayoral elections, 84, 99–100, 107, 109–110, 111; and NYC public policies, 3, 8, 10; and Puerto Rican incorporation in New York City and the United States, 3, 4, 8; and Puerto Rico’s migration policy, 3, 5, 8, 10, 87; roots in Puerto Rico, 37, 46, 73, 120, 131, 176; and slums, 39, 183–184; study of, 14–16; and welfare, 52, 182. See also Committee on Intergroup Relations (COIR); culture of poverty theory; El Mundo; Hilliard, Raymond, M.; Marcantonio, Vito; Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA); Migration Conference(s); New York Times; Puerto Rican Study; Puerto Rico government; Sierra Berdecía, Fernando; Welfare Council of NYC; West Side Story Puerto Ricans in NYC, 8, 28, 34–35, 37–38, 81; and alleged lack of community/ community organ­izations and leadership, 19, 20, 22; assimilation/adjustment/ adaptation, 42, 53, 54, 159, 186; and communism/alleged communist tendencies, 32, 49, 52, 53, 64, 109–110, 111, 113, 192; compared to previous Eu­ro­pean immigrants, 13, 15, 18–19, 20, 21; and crime/alleged criminal tendencies, 8, 139; criticism of Puerto Rico government/ Migration Division, 168–170; and development of community organ­izations and leadership, 143; and diseases, 139;

Index  •  243

growing numbers, 38, 40, 41, 68, 203n17; history of, 9; housing/overcrowding, 41–42, 44, 54–55, 139, 183; incorporation, 11, 42, 57; jobs/employment, 42; lack of En­g lish language skills, 139; lit­er­a­ture on, 9; mi­g rant characteristics, 62–63, 67–68, 70, 71; need to move away from NYC, 44, 53; and police brutality, 184–185; and reaction to/or­ga­ni­za­tion against anti-­Puerto Rican campaign, 49–50, 82–85; reasons for migration, 62–63, 67–68, 70; rise of leadership 1960s, 166–167; and schools/education, 43, 139; seeking support from Puerto Rico government, 82–85; and ste­reo­ types, 10, 35; support for Marcantonio, 102; and welfare, 8, 21, 22, 43, 44, 48, 65, 68–69, 70, 110, 111, 123–125; as welfare prob­lem, 40, 48. See also El Mundo; Marcantonio, Vito; Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA); Migration Conference(s); New York City government; Puerto Rican Study; Puerto Rico government; Welfare Council of New York City Puerto Rican Study, 4–5, 18, 57, 62–63; need for, 61–63; preliminary report, 67–71; proposal, 64–66; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 58–59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 69–70; purpose, 63–67 Puerto Rico: fiscal and economic crisis, 2, 3, 191–192; as unincorporated territory, 26; and U.S. policies, 2 Puerto Rico government: and air transportation, 97–98; and En­g lish language education, 138, 162; and mi­g rant adjustment, 91, 92, 162; and mi­g rant incorporation, 23, 31, 80; and mi­g rant ­labor contracts, 80–81; and mi­g rant orientation/advice, 75, 79, 86, 160; and migration away from New York City, 63, 66, 79, 126, 138, 139, 161–162; migration law, 77, 79, 91–93; and migration office, 39; migration policy, 5, 27, 88–91, 92, 97–98, 139, 145; neither encouraging nor discouraging migration, 77, 90, 92, 93, 139; and NYC 1949 mayoral election, 107; plans for migration to Latin Amer­i­ca, 81, 86–87, 88; and prospective mi­g rants, 90,

138, 160, 162; and “Puerto Rican prob­ lem” in NYC, 50–51, 59, 79, 82, 92, 95–96, 100, 121, 138; relationship to NYC government, 7, 28, 79, 92, 138; as representative/intermediary for NYC Puerto Ricans, 145, 150, 167, 168–169; role in migration, 23, 31, 47, 57–58, 59, 76, 80, 85–86, 92, 106, 146, 193–194; role in migration before 1947, 80–82; and screening and se­lection of mi­g rant workers, 60, 63, 86. See also Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM); Marcantonio, Vito; Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City (MCPRA); Migration Conference(s); Migration Division; Muñoz Marín, Luis; Sierra Berdecía, Fernando Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 2 Reck, Daisy, 69 Rincón, Josefina (Fini), 112, 129, 130, 161 Rincón de Gautier, Felisa, 112, 113, 114, 123 Rodríguez, Clara, 14–15 Rosselló, Ricardo, 1–2 Ruiz, Paquita, 62–63 Ruiz, Ruperto, 128 Sánchez, José Ramón, 10, 118–119, 120–121, 131, 143–144, 145, 146 Sánchez-­Korrol, ­Virginia, 181 Sandoval Sánchez, Arturo, 179, 180, 185, 227n25 Santiago, Laura, 111, 129, 147 Se­nior, Clarence, 60, 66–67, 86, 88, 94–95, 138, 161, 208n18 Sierra Berdecía, Fernando, 24, 66, 67, 69–70, 71, 85, 86, 87–88, 94; and MCPRA, 130, 134; and mi­g rant adaptation/adjustment, 89, 90; and migration conferences, 138, 141, 151, 161, 163; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 50, 89, 96–97; and Puerto Rico’s migration law, 91–93; and Puerto Rico’s migration policy, 47, 88–91, 145; report on migration, 89–91. See also Puerto Rico government Swope, Herbert Bayard, 155, 156, 157

244  • Index

Thomas, Lorin, 10, 15–16, 119–121, 122, 131, 143, 145, 146, 167, 177, 179, 180, 187, 193 transnationalism, 24–25; and study of Puerto Rican migration, 25–26 Trump, Donald, 1–3, 194–195; and hurricane reconstruction aid to Puerto Rico, 1–2, 191 U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico, 26–27; and migration, 32 U.S. government in Puerto Rico, 26–27; colonial policies, 26; and Puerto Rican migration, 46, 73–74, 75, 76 U.S. Tariff Commission: report on Puerto Rico, 12, 41 Valle, Marta, 148–149, 169 Vega, Bernardo, 14, 34, 101, 106 Vida, La, 7, 21, 172, 178–179, 181 Villaronga, Mariano, 134, 138 Wagner, Robert, 6, 112, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 146; and COIR, 154–155; and MCPRA, 6, 142–143, 144, 145, 146, 147–148, 151, 155–156, 157; and migration conferences, 137, 138, 139, 141, 152, 158–159, 160, 163; and NYC Puerto Ricans, 146, 149, 151, 161,

183; and Puerto Rico government, 146. See also New York City government Wakefield, Dan, 209n18 Wall Street Journal, 3 Welfare Council of New York City, 4–5, 65, 71, 77, 78; Puerto Rican Committee of, 39, 40, 41, 43, 72, 210n33; Puerto Rican Committee Report on Puerto Ricans, 57, 58, 72–78, 120–121, 122, 123; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 72–73, 77; and Puerto Rico’s migration policy, 73, 78 Wells, Elizabeth, 182, 187 West Side Story, 7, 172, 179–180; “Amer­i­ca,” 181, 187–189; and “culture of poverty,” 181; and police brutality, 184–185; and Puerto Rican identity/culture, 179, 187; and Puerto Rican juvenile delinquency and gangs, 181, 182, 184, 185–186; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem,” 172, 179, 180, 181; and “Puerto Rican prob­lem” campaign/narrative, 7, 8, 182, 188–189; and Puerto Rican ste­reo­t ypes, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186; and Puerto Ricans in NYC, 179, 181–182; and racist/racism against Puerto Ricans, 179, 184, 185, 186; and repre­sen­ta­tion of Puerto Ricans, 179, 180, 186–187, 189 Whalen, Carmen, 173–174, 178, 226n12

About the Author is a retired professor from the Department of Po­liti­cal Science at the University of Puerto Rico–­R ío Piedras and the Department of Africana and Puerto Rican/Latino Studies at Hunter College. His writings include Patria: Puerto Rican Exiles in Late Nineteenth-­Century New York City; Sponsored Migration: The State and Postwar Puerto Rican Migration to the United States; Puerto Rican Government and Politics: A Comprehensive Bibliography; and Puerto Rico’s Statehood Movement. EDGARDO MELÉNDEZ

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