The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia [1 ed.] 9781443803861, 9781443803601

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The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia

The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia

By

Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani

The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia, by Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani This book first published 2009 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2009 by Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-0360-X, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-0360-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ............................................................................................. vi List of Charts ............................................................................................. vii Acknowledgements .................................................................................. viii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One................................................................................................. 5 Freedom of The Press in The Public Sphere Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 31 The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 52 Media Legislation Chapter Four.............................................................................................. 68 Reasons for Restrictions Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 92 Newspapers in the 2008 General Election Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 138 The New Public Sphere and Defeudalisation of Malaysian Media: The Internet and Mobile Phone Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 166 Toward A Free and Responsible Media Notes........................................................................................................ 197 Bibliography............................................................................................ 207 Abbreviations .......................................................................................... 227 Index........................................................................................................ 229

LIST OF TABLES

5-1 Parliamentary Seats Won By The Political Parties ............................. 95 5-2 State Assembly Seats Won By The Political Parties ........................... 96 5-3 Newspapers’ Circulation (1 July 2006-31 June 2007) ....................... 98 5-4 Mainstream Newspapers and The 2008 General Election: Total and Percentage of Coverage and Tendency Toward Political Parties ...................................................................................................... 100 5-5 The Star: MCA Advertisements ........................................................ 111 5-6 Alternative Newspapers: Tendency Towards Political Parties.......... 118 5-7 Political Tabloids and The 2008 General Election: Total and Percentage of Coverage and Tendency Toward Political Parties...... 128

LIST OF CHARTS

5-1 New Straits Times Daily Coverage ................................................... 102 5-2 The Star Daily Coverage ................................................................... 104 5-3 Total Percentages: Buletin Rakyat .................................................... 128 5-4 Total Percentages: Mingguan Wasilah.............................................. 129 5-5 Total Percentages: Siasah.................................................................. 129

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book began as a new attempt after completing my doctoral thesis entitled Social Responsibility and the Theory and Practice of Freedom of Political Speech in Malaysia. My doctoral thesis discussed the issue of free speech. In this book, I try to narrow down the issue in analysing the debates on press freedom. I believe that the issue of media politics in Malaysia can be explained by using Habermas’ theory of the public sphere even though I am a little bit sceptical in some of the Habermas’ arguments on media. I want to express my gratitude to Cambridge Scholars Publishing especially to Carol Koulikourdi and Amanda Millar who assisted me during the editing and editorial process in publishing this book. I am indebt to two special persons, Prof. John Horton of Keele University and Associate Prof. Saliha Hassan of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia who introduced me and gave me understanding about the ideas of free press and free speech. I am glad to receive encouragement and advice from the Vice Chancellor of Universiti Utara Malaysia, Tan Sri Dr. Nordin Kardi who urged me to become an excellent writer and research for the university. This book would also not have been possible without the assistance from my colleagues and administrative staffs in College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS), Universiti Utara Malaysia. Special thanks to Associate Prof. Dr. Ariffin Omar, Dr. Abu Bakar Eby Hara, Dr. Norhafezah of Universiti Utara Malaysia for their comments and advices in improving the book. Thanks also to my coresearchers, Noorulhafidzah Zawawi and Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, and research assistance, Noor Aida Mohd Adham, for participating in COLGIS Research Project entitled Media and Election in Malaysia: Coverage and Tendency of Printed Presses toward Political Parties and Issues in the 2008 General Election. I am indebt to Noorulhafidzah who has done a brilliant job in undertaking a content analysis research for the Star newspaper, one of the newspapers selected in the writing of this book. This research has inspired me to further understand the reality of the Malaysian media in which part of the report is included in this book in Chapter 5.

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I want also to thank the Faculty of Communication, University Utara Malaysia and Malaysian Social Science Association (MASSA) for allowing me to present the findings and main arguments of this book in the international conferences, International Conference on Communication and Media 2008 (I-COME 08) and The 6th International Malaysian Studies Conference (MSC6) organised by them. I am grateful of getting many excellent comments for this book in both conferences. Finally, thanks especially to my loving family–my wife Fida, my two beautiful daughters Nusra and Amni, my mum and dad, my in laws, and my siblings–for their consistent support and inspiration. For their efforts and sacrifices as I completed the preparation of this book, I dedicate it to them.

INTRODUCTION

This book can be divided into three main arguments. First, this book explores about the theory of free press and the role of the media in a society. Second, it also explains about the development and progress of media system in the Western countries as well as in Malaysia. Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is used in order to understand the media system. I believe that the theory of public sphere is the best theory in explaining the reality of media politics in Malaysia. Third, this book argues that Malaysia should apply the theory of social responsibility in order to implement a free and responsible media and to ensure media is used for the common good without jeopardising racial harmony in Malaysia’s multiracial society. Chapter 1 sets up in discussing about the theory, role and problem of free press. This chapter also elucidates that the media is so essential when people utilise the media in deliberating and debating views and issues critically without government’s intervention, unless the views and issues could harm the society. Therefore, Habermas has come out with his idea of the public sphere. This chapter elaborates Habermas’ views on the public sphere especially in Western experiences. Chapter 2 further discusses the Habermas’ argument of public sphere and applies the argument in the context of Malaysian media. It traces the argument in Malaysia where the period of bourgeois public sphere is referred to the period of nationalist movements that used the printing media to challenge the British colonial and implanted consciousness within the community especially the Malay community about the lack of education and the evil of British colonialisation. The period of mass press or commercialisation of the media began soon after Malaya getting its independence and it continuously practised widely during the Mahathir Mohamad’s period as prime minister through the privatisation policy. However, this chapter highlights the process of refeudalisation in Malaysia where Malaysian media portrayed and focused too much on Malaysian leaders especially from the ruling BN such as Mahathir and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi like a feudal king. This helps by Malaysia’s political culture which is still feudalistic in nature. This process and political

2

Introduction

culture curb the media and close the public sphere for the benefit of the government. Chapter 3 continues the analysis about the Malaysian media, but the focus is on the Malaysian legislation. This chapter analyses the impact of Malaysian laws toward the overall media practices. It looks deeply on the federal constitution and several restrictive laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), Sedition Act (SA), Official Secret Act (OSA), Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) and several other laws. These legislation are among the main factors that contribute to the limitation of press freedom and engineer the refeudalisation process in Malaysia. Chapter 4 looks into the reasons or justifications in restricting press freedom and strengthening the refeudalisation process. It explores four issues that have been used as justifications in curbing the media; the national stability, developmental journalism, pornography and hate speech. While pornography is accepted as a right justification to be restricted based on the cultural and religious grounds, but the arguments of national stability, developmental journalism and hate speech are rather controversial due to the claim that the ruling BN manipulates them in curbing the press. The government argues that those arguments are essential in ensuring that Malaysia is stable politically, prosper economically and in harmony, racially and socially. However, many especially the opposition parties and political non-governmental organisations (NGOs) criticise the government’s view and argue that the real reasons to restrict the press freedom is for the purpose to weaken the opposition and dissent and limit political freedom. Therefore, the media have been controlled by the government in order for the ruling BN to prolong its domination onto the political power, public sphere and public opinion. Chapter 5 analyses the newspapers reporting or coverage and tendency toward political parties contested in the 2008 general election. It explores the result of the general election and how the press influence the result. It examines in detail three types of newspapers; mainstream newspapers, alternative newspapers, and political tabloids. Mainstream newspapers used for this analysis are the New Straits Times and The Star. Both are bias toward the ruling BN party in their coverage in the 2008 general election. Alternative newspapers selected for this analysis are Harakah owned by Islamic Party (PAS) and Suara Keadilan owned by People Justice Party (PKR), and both are definitely bias toward their respective

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owners against the ruling BN. Moreover, political tabloids such as Buletin Rakyat, Mingguan Wasilah and Siasah gave more attention to the debate between the government and opposition. Siasah seemed bias toward the opposition party, but Buletin Rakyat and Mingguan Wasilah were slightly balance in their coverage on political party. Unlike the mainstream media, political tabloids were able to provide channels for the opposition parties to distribute and spread their views and party agendas. Therefore, Chapter 5 is essential in order to understand the real intention or situation of those newspapers participating in the public sphere. Chapter 6 centres on the counter-argument of Habermas’ refeudalisation called “defeudalisation”. This process of defeudalisation exists and develops as a response to the process of refeudalisation through the introduction of new media such as the Internet and mobile phone. This process is so strong where it could counter the refeudalisation process by challenging and weakening the state as actor for refeudalisation and giving the people new space and medium in expressing their critical views. This defeudalisation process emerged in Malaysia in 1998, soon after former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim being sacked from the government and detained and imprisoned under the charges of corruption and sexual misconduct, where the Internet have been used by the people to criticise the government of harsh treatment to Anwar. Since that event, the process was gaining strength and in the 2008 general election, defeudalistion through the Internet and mobile phone was able to be utilised by the opposition parties in gaining supports from the people. The opposition managed to attract the voters to vote them in the election which later saw the opposition denied the two third majority seat previously won by the BN and took control five states. Not only the opposition surprised of the outcome of the election and how the Internet and mobile phone managed to assist them in their campaigns, the ruling BN also admitted that the new media dominated by the opposition is one of the major factors contributing to its bad result in the election. Chapter 7 looks into the demands and pressures, by especially the civil society movements, to the government in strengthening the practice of free press in the pre- and post-2008 general elections. It concurs with the theory of social responsibility that although press freedom is important for any democracy, it must be guided by the practices of responsible media through such as responsible reporting particularly in multiracial, multireligious and multicultural country like Malaysia. This is in line with the concept of public journalism where the media should report and

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Introduction

deliberate ideas and views in the interests of the people, not bias for the government, the media owners or any particularly groups. Public journalism is a counter argument of Malaysia’s developmental journalism. By implementing free and responsible media, and public journalism, Malaysia could permit not only public deliberation and free press with responsibility, but also maintain racial harmony, political stability and economic prosperity. Hence, certain international laws on free speech and free press should be ratified and restrictive domestic laws should be either repealed or amended. This chapter also suggests several recommendations in improving the practices of press freedom in Malaysia. Therefore, the struggle to establish a free and responsible media system in Malaysia is a continuous agenda where the Malaysian people deserve to have as one desirable common good.

CHAPTER ONE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The media are essential in the modern world of democracy because it can inform the people and influence their decisions in private and public life. It may also seek to lay down an agenda for the nation to pursue. A free press helps to preserve and promote democracy by safeguarding the independence of its institutions, including itself, and ensuring their accountability. It is on this account that it comes to earn the status of the fourth estate of the State (because of its “watchdog” function) and has today become one of the most powerful institutions of society. No democratic society can exist or can be conceived of without a free media, which is its life-line, and at the same time democratic values alone are likely to nurture a free media. The media are also essential to a democratic society. Alexander Meiklejohn (1965) stresses on two functions of freedom of the press in a democracy: one is the formative function, where a free press permits the flow of information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions and for leaders (public servants) to stay abreast of the interests of their constituents (the electorate); and the second is the critical function, where the press in particular serves as the people’s watchdog, ensuring independent criticism and evaluation of the government and other institutions that may usurp democratic power. Furthermore, freedom of the press is important to the public in order to attain truth. The belief that anyone might make a valuable contribution to the search for truth or for better ways to do things does not mean that we think “anyone” is likely to. It means: (1) There is no way of telling in advance where a good idea will come from. (2) Valuable contributions to arriving at truth come in many forms, speaking the truth being only one of them. We arrive at truth or the best policy largely by indirection. (3) Thus, much of the value of a person’s contribution to the “marketplace of ideas” is its role in stimulating others to defend, reformulate or refute ideas, and that value

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Chapter One

may be quite independent of the merits of the original view. Even fallacy has its place in the search for truth (Lichtenberg 1987, 338). Beside free press, this book will also explore a theory called the public sphere pioneered by Jurgen Habermas in order to understand the role of the media in today’s world and national politics. Habermas emphasises the critical role of the media in the public sphere, distinguishing between the early press who highlighted political controversy and the more recent development of media that commodities the news (Thornton 2002, 9). He outlines the development of Western newspapers in the early seventeenth century, commenting that the press “was for the first time established as a genuinely critical organ of a public engaged in critical political debate: as the fourth estate” (Habermas 1962/1989, 60). Identified as “the most prominent latter-day descendant” of the Frankfurt School, Habermas holds similar views about Marxism as a flexible, critical approach. He agrees that the working class was no longer revolutionary and that the Soviet Union version of Marxism was highly distorted. He also agrees that many of Marx’s concepts need to be revised as capitalism had changed markedly (Giddens 1985, 123). Habermas transcends the work of the early Frankfurt School in creating his own system of thought (Giddens 1985, 124), although his media analysis has been seen as heavily influenced by Horkheimer and Adorno’s model of the culture industry in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Outhwaite 1994, 12). Therefore in this chapter, it will explore the concept of press freedom and together with the argument of Habermas’ public sphere in explaining the essential roles played by the media in the society.

The Role of the Press The mass media includes radio, television, magazines, newspapers, and the Internet.1 The concept of freedom of the press developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the US and Europe. The mass media, however, began to come into being only in the 1830s with the penny press (Lichtenberg 1987, 350). Prior to this, political newspapers circulated only among elites, made no pretence of objectivity or neutrality, and were marked by a degree of vitriol and bias unmatched today. They were financed by political parties, candidates for office, or political factions, who were directly responsible for editorial policy (Schudson 1978, 14-15). Freedom of the press has been given a wide and confusing array of interpretations, evident in a study conducted by the Indian Press

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Commission which indicated that people variously understood freedom of press to mean (Holland 1956; Jeffery 1986, 198-199): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Freedom from legal restraint–liberty, that is to say, to publish any matter without legal restraint or prohibition; Freedom from prejudices and preconceived notions; Freedom from the executive control of government; Freedom from the influence of advertisers, or proprietors and pressure groups; and Freedom from want–freedom from dependence on others for financial assistance.

In fact, all these factors are important facets of press freedom and all five should no doubt be satisfied before press freedom can be said to enjoy a real significance. The intellectual heritage of the idea of free speech and free press is long and impressive. In 1644, John Milton (1644/1971) defended the freedom of the press and demanded the freedom to express his opinions above all other freedoms. Two centuries later, John Stuart Mill (1859/1974, 76), one of the most renowned philosophical advocates of the concept of liberty, stressed the importance of free flow of ideas and opinions. He emphasised the importance of freedom of opinion and expression to the free functioning of modern, democratic societies where the truth is upheld. The press undeniably plays a pivotal role in enabling the right of the individual to free speech to be exercised, as the press functions as conduit for disseminating information, which in turn contributes to the development of societies as a whole. Without the open communication of ideas and information, societies would remain in the darkness of ignorance. Moreover, a free press and democracy are complementary to each other. The media helps to preserve and promote democracy by safeguarding the independence of its institutions and ensuring their accountability as well as by facilitating the communication of ideas and policies. A free press performs three essential features for a democracy: a “watchdog” role, the provision of knowledge and information, and the facilitation of public discussion (Baker 2003; Sawant 2001, 44-51; Ward and Cook 1992, 21-27). First, the role of a free press is to serve as a “watchdog” on government and its officials (as well as a watchdog of private centres of power). Vincent Blasi (1977) asserts that one of the most

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Chapter One

important values attributed to a free press by eighteenth-century political thinkers, such as Cato (the pen name of co-authors John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon), John Wilkes, Father of Candor, Junius, and Thomas Jefferson, was that of checking the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them. The following statement, made by a South African court in the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Sunday Times Newspaper, captured the inter-connection between freedom of expression and press freedom through this function: “The role of the press in a democratic society cannot be understated. The press is in the frontline of the battle to maintain democracy. It is the function of the press to ferret out corruption, dishonesty and graft wherever it may occur and to expose the perpetrators. The press must reveal dishonest mal and inept administration. It must also contribute to the exchange of ideas. It must advance communication between the governed and those who govern. The press must act as the watchdog of the governed.” (Nadirsyah 2002, 24)

The news media should serve as the watchdog of democracy and can perform the task of protecting of the people’s interests. This has led several scholars to consider the role of the press as that of “the Fourth Estate”.2 The press must be able to expose failures of, and abuses by government and government officials–with this capacity providing probably the greatest democratic safeguard against both malfeasance and misfeasance by government (Stewart 1975, Blasi 1977). Democratic development absolutely depends on the press being permitted to perform this “checking” function effectively; the aim of preventing the press playing this role may be the single biggest reason for governments’ censoring the press or abridging its freedom. The acts of omission and commission, of corruption, waste, inefficiency and negligence on the part of the authorities, can be exposed by it. Through investigative journalism, scams and scandals can be unearthed, anti-social activities exposed and implementation of the policies and programmes monitored and pursued. It is the accountability of those in power that distinguishes democracy from other political systems, and to the extent that the press acts as an instrument to ensure day-to-day accountability, it helps to make democracy real and effective. Of course, as stated, this condition sounds so ideal that in reality even the most democratic country will not fully live up to it. Further, advocates of a free press always feel that government has a tendency to manipulate the media and cannot be trusted because of the power it holds. However, a free press does not mean free only from the

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overt restrictions of the government, which is a narrow conception of the freedom of the press, but also from other overt and covert influences; externally (i.e. from foreign powers and ownerships) and internally (i.e. the ownership of individuals who are close to the government and editorial censorship). The legitimate influence to the press is when the press is openly allowed diverse opinions from diverse sources to be debated and discuss as long as the opinions are not to be used to trigger disharmony situation. The illegitimate influence to the press is surely when all or almost all the media companies are dominated by individuals, subversive organisations–such as racist organisations like Ku Klux Klan and NeoNazi in the US–or the government, where strict restriction is normally imposed to only one particular idea and the circulation of diverse ideas are limited. Second, people need information relevant to their political concerns. The press has a helpful role to play which flows from its role as an informer and educator of the people. Although the press is not the only forum and people can still use other methods of expression such as public gathering and demonstration and the press can effectively exercise this right of the people on their behalf through its space, which is absolutely necessary in a democracy. When the press represents and speaks on behalf of all the sections of the society, particularly the voiceless, it makes democracy a truly representative regime. Various conceptions of the right to know can be found in media ethics literature. According to H. Goodwin (1983, 9), this doctrine means that “the public has a legal right to know what its government is doing and the press is the representative of the public in finding that out”. R. Barney (1986, 65) argued that the right to know is a basic component of a “participatory society”. As he points out, “in order for consistently intelligent social decisions to be made, adequate information to the individual produces greater awareness of alternatives in any decision-making opportunity”. C. Fink (1988, 11) describes the people’s right to know in terms of a duty, so that “while the freedom of expression gives the press the right to freely print the news, the people’s right to know gives the press the duty to print it”. What developed from this concept is “the idea of a press serving as surrogate of the people and demanding access to news, as well as freedom to print it, on behalf of the people”. It appears that the moral right to know, belonging to the public, and the legal concept of freedom of the press are inextricably bound together. The public’s right to know what is going on in its government and to have relevant information about

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government officials underlies press freedom. This may explain why the public’s right, expressed in shorthand as “the right to know”, is often interpreted in terms of the media’s right of access and publication. Some of these commentators suggest, as well, that the public’s right to know includes more than just information needed to make knowledgeable political decisions. C. Gauthier (1999), however believes that the right to know guarantees citizens access to any available information relevant to political, professional, and personal decisions essential for the exercise of constitutional rights in a democratic society. For example, exercise of the rights of free speech, religion, and assembly, as well as the rights to liberty and property requires access to information, making possible rational choices and responsible actions in these areas. The danger comes in the too easy slide from the public’s right to know to the right of the media to access and to publication. The seemingly unlimited nature of the first leads to an understanding of press freedom as similarly unlimited. Moreover, the elliptical right to know, justifying ethically controversial media claims and activities, obscures the more complicated relation between the rights of the public and press rights and gives media the illusion of unlimited freedom. Only the mass media is equipped to provide the information and make it publicly accessible. In doing so, the press will inevitably make errors. There will be factual inaccuracies and the press will make questionable, sometimes clearly misguided, decisions concerning what information is relevant to the public. However, if a robust free press is to be maintained, it must not be punished for these errors, at least if honestly made. This is the lesson of New York Times v. Sullivan, where the US Court held that the press could not be held civilly (or criminally) libel for defaming a public official unless the plaintiff could prove the falsity of what was said and prove that the false statement was made “with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or (not)”. In other words, unless the paper was demonstrably not contributing any real information or viewpoint to the public sphere and was not showing any real interest in doing so, unless its legal critics could show that the press’ assertions were false and knowingly (or recklessly) false, freedom of the press should protect the media from legal liability. After observing, in appropriately understated language, the nation’s “profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”, the Court explained “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and (it) must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need (to) survive” (Baker 2003).

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Third, the press can also act as a day-to-day parliament of the people by discussing the public matters in a way that may be more effective than the parliament itself. The press can provide an important forum for the people to debate and discuss the pros and cons of the issues and problems confronting them. Through news reports, articles, letters to the editor, interviews, panel discussion etc, the forum created by the press may supplement, and sometimes act more effectively, than parliament. The press can therefore act as an impartial, objective and constructive critic of official policies and programmes, and protect the interests of the nation from the politicians’ vote-centred actions or inaction. Democratic processes do not always lead to the best decisions being made. But at least they allow for the general participation in decision-making that is characteristic of a society free form the domination of elites. Equally, while free speech and a free press are no guarantee that the truth or the best policy will be arrived at, it seems that the most likely outcome of unfettered debate will be some approximation of the truth or the best policy. A healthy democracy is one in which people are exposed to a variety of ideas and are given the chance to examine and reject those which they find unacceptable. They might not be right, but the level of debate and the demands this places on people’s judgement will result in a populace with the ability to think critically and to make informed choices.

The Press Regulation There is an argument that freedom of the press, even if worthless or harmful, must be tolerated and unregulated because of the risks created by suppression. According to Justice John Harlan, an attempt to purge public discourse of everything offensive and obnoxious would drastically impair “robust and uninhibited” public debate. There is also force in Harlan’s argument that it is risky to make any exceptions on this point, lest there be no principled stopping place. But is he justified in his faith that society is strong enough to shrug off the side effects of allowing even the most debased messages their place in the marketplace of ideas (Harlan and Shapiro 1969; Farber 1980, 283)? Harlan’s view is similar to the view of several writers such as William O. Douglas and Hugo Black who advocate the idea of “strong liberalism”. They reject any regulation of free press by the government (Sunstein 1993, 5-8). They believe that the government is the enemy of freedom of the press and any effort to regulate the press by the government threatens the principle of free press. Government may not draw any lines between the coverage it likes and the coverage that it hates: all press coverage stands on the same footing. The protection given the

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right to free press also equally to the well-known extremists and racists like the Communists, Nazis, and Ku Klux Klan in the US. The government, in this view, should ensure that broadcasters, newspapers, and others may say what they wish, constrained only by the imperatives of the marketplace of ideas. “Strong liberals” also accept the “slippery slope” argument, where any restrictions on the press, once permitted, have a sinister and nearly inevitable tendency to expand. To allow one kind of restriction is in practice to allow many other acts of censorship as well. The risk of censorship is so serious and omnipresent because seemingly small and innocuous acts of repression can turn quickly into a regime of repression that is anything but innocuous. Judges should not uphold restrictions on the press simply because government seems to have good reasons for the restriction in a particular case. Neither should they examine “the value” of the press at issue, compare it against the “harm” of that press, and announce a judgement based on weighing value against harm. In any such judgements, there is far too large a risk of bias and discrimination. “Strong liberals” argue that if judges were to balance harm against value, they would be likely to uphold a wide range of laws censoring political dissent, literature, and other forms of speech. However, the “strong liberals” are not only advocating complete freedom of the press, but also the constitutional protection of all speech in the press including commercial speech, sexually explicit speech, libel, publication of the names of rape victims, and advocacies of crime, the violent overthrow of the government and flag-burning (Sunstein 1993, 5-8). However, many are critical to the argument of “strong liberals”. Most of the criticisms come from the advocates of “reasonable regulation”, who call for a form of balancing between the interest in free press and the likely harms in some particular cases in the US. The opponents were led most vigorously by Felix Frankfurter, who waged a challenge for balancing and against “strong liberals”, especially in the area of constitutional law (Sunstein 1993, 7). Frankfurter, in Bridges v. California 1951 and Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952, and, later, others, such as Robert Bork (1971) and Alexander Bickel (1976) argue that balancing is a healthy and even an inevitable part of a sensible system of free speech and free press. Judges should take into account the various conflicting interests that are inevitably at stake. Speech, coverage and report that threaten real harm may legitimately be prohibited. This category includes the press calling for violent overthrow of the government, libel of racial groups, and publishing a threatening message to a judge with reprisal if he rules against one of the parties. These thinkers argue that “reasonable regulation” should not

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protect the advocacy of crime, commercial speech, hate speech, obscenity, and the libel of individuals and groups. The government is not an enemy of free press, in fact, it should be allowed to maintain a civilised society. This principle means that the government must not restrict any legitimate speech in the press, especially for public policies and interests, expressed by, for instance, the opposition, pressure groups and civil society. At the same time, the government may also guard against the degradation produced by, for example, obscenity, the risk to social order posed by speech advocating violently overthrow of the government, and the threats to equality and civility produced by racial hate speech. This is parallel with John Stuart Mill’s (1859/1974) view that states censorship is “only a prima facie wrong”, recognising as well that censorship can be justified on the basis of protecting others from harm. Edmund Lambeth (1986), after reviewing Mill’s arguments for free press, pointed out that all aspects of liberty can be limited to prevent harm to the interests of others. Judith Lichtenberg (1987, 329-355) explains that the commitment to freedom of press has two different strands: The first is an opposition to censorship, based on a belief that “one should not be prevented from thinking, speaking, reading, writing, or listening as one sees fit”; the second, equally fundamental, is our conviction that the purposes of freedom of press are realised when expression and diversity of expression flourish. While government intervention seems to intrude upon the first principle, it may advance the second. Based on this argument, the state has a duty and responsibility to protect the right to press freedom. However, restrictions or regulations in these areas are only permitted if they are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in order to maintain public good. The restrictions must also pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the public interests pursued such as restricting hate speech for racial harmony. The state that restricts press freedom more than acceptable or agreeable, according to the argument of “reasonable regulation”, could be considered as non-democratic, less-democratic or autocratic state.

The Problems of the Media The argument for freedom of the press is an argument for a more general freedom of expression. But it does not follow that whatever supports freedom of speech also supports freedom of the press, for at least two related reasons (Lichtenberg 1987, 333). First, considerations internal to the theory of free speech itself may provide reasons for limiting

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freedom of the press. That is what is at issue in the claim that the contemporary mass media may suppress information and stifle ideas instead of promoting them. Second, the modern press consists largely of vast and complex institutions that differ in essential respects both from individuals and from the early press, around which the concept of freedom of the press grew. Arguments that support freedom of expression for individuals or for small publications do not necessarily support similar freedoms for the mass media. But contemporary defenders of freedom of the press commonly assimilate the new forms to the old. There are several problems with the arguments for unlimited press freedom which come from the issues of: (1) control, (2) surveillance, (3) the truth (or marketplace of ideas), and (4) public opinion (Graber 2003, 139-160; Sawant 2001, 44-51; Gauthier 1999, 197-213).

Control According to Doris Graber (2003, 142), there are no media that are free from government controls. Many of the regulations regarding the size and reach of media business combinations, protection of national security, protection of the rights of individuals, and cultural safeguards strongly influence what may and may not be published. Violations are kept in check by the fear of regulatory legislation. In times of war or similar threats to national security, controls have often become quite severe, including laws that prohibit criticism of the government (Hemmer 2000, Tillinghast 2000). Finally, most of the information about government that the media present is supplied by government sources, giving government officials control over what to disclose or conceal and allowing them to present information from the government’s perspective. Whether government’s role as the main supplier of news about its activities impairs democracy, and if so how much, remains an unsettled argument. So does the question of whether government control of the media is more likely to be accepted or rejected. P. Sawant (2001, 44-51) argues that the media, besides the influences of the government, has also been influenced from the other overt and covert influences externally and internally. The external pressures flow from social, racial and religious groups; politicians, political parties and their supporters; bureaucrats, police, local idiots and mafias of all kind; and militants and terrorists wherever they exist. Internally, pressures are exerted by proprietors, advertisers and financers. Besides, the political, ideological, class, caste, racial, social, religious and even personal biases and even corrupt motives of the editorial staff from the editor down to the reporter, play their own role in

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interfering with the honesty of the media. Many media businesses try to serve the public’s interests, but the extent of their public-service orientation varies greatly. Currently, for instance, most major media in the US are owned by large business enterprises whose primary goal must be to produce revenue for the shareholders of their parent companies. That may mean that the public-service orientation yields to profit concerns occasionally or regularly. To serve huge, heterogeneous audiences, media enterprises feature sensationalised news of crime, sex, and violence and oversimplify serious news. Many media critics call that a disservice to democracy because “soft” news replaces “hard” political information; others hail it as praiseworthy populism (Franklin 1997, Brants 1998, Hermes 1997). According to Gillian Doyle (2002, 19), whatever regulatory measures are in place, the opportunities for media owners to assert an indirect influence over the content and the agenda of products they own seem so comprehensive as to defy any absolute guarantees of separation. An owner’s influence may manifest itself in the choice of key personnel, or in strategic decisions about which resources to reduce or invest in, or in arrangements for sourcing and distributing content. Not all owners wish to exert an influence over the content of their media and, for those that do, the primary motivation may sometimes be political rather than commercial. Nonetheless, the reason why diversity of ownership is important for pluralism is because media ownership can translate into media power (Meier and Trappel 1998, 39). Since it is difficult to monitor the intentions of media owners, or to fully regulate their conduct in respect of editorial matters, the single most effective way of ensuring a healthy diversity of voices in the media is to prevent media power from being monopolised by the government, politicians, particular commercial interests or one or two individuals. An especially blatant example of the damage which concentrated media ownership may inflict on political pluralism and on democracy more generally is provided by the case of Silvio Berlusconi “using his three TV stations reaching 40 percent of the Italian audience to give unremitting support to his own political party” in Italy during the March 1994 elections (Graham and Davies 1997, 32).

Surveillance Within democratic theory and practice, the media is expected to serve as the eyes and ears for citizens, who need to monitor the soundness of policies and the performance of politicians. The unstated assumption is

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that the media have the ability, resources, inclination, and mandate to perform this oversight function. In reality, in many countries, their powers are very limited and no match for the power of politicians to hide what they are doing. The media lack subpoena powers to trace hidden information. They must depend on what is voluntarily supplied or what emerges when insiders leak information to the press. They also lack sufficient money and manpower for systematic oversight. Besides, they do not consider surveillance a compelling mandate. This is why the media usually wait for leaks and tips, although some still manage to implement investigative journalism. Even then journalists rarely act unless the activities involved seem clear and easily investigated and unless the investigation seems likely to produce a newsworthy, appealing story. Impending institutional failures and the public’s need to know about them have been insufficient to stimulate major investigations (Graber 2003, Lang and Lang 1983, Jamieson and Waldman 2003). T. Patterson (1993) has highlighted numerous specific complaints about news quality. He accuses the media of failing to discuss the likely consequences of various types of political decisions. They may speculate about future events but they rarely tell their audiences what the political impact is likely to be. Talk about the horse-race aspects of elections is plentiful during campaigns, whereas analyses of the capabilities of various candidates are neglected. The media rarely point out patterns in political developments; they approach political happenings as if they were a series of discrete events. They emphasize novel twists that may be insignificant while ignoring long-term continuities. Lengthy analytical pieces are rare. The media favour stereotypes and perpetuate them because they are dramatic and easy to understand, rather than to offer nuanced comments. The situation is the same with regard to monitoring misbehaviour, corruption, and abuses of power by the government. Investigative journalism has enjoyed a few spectacular successes–for instance in US cases, unearthing the Watergate scandal in the Nixon administration, disclosing the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, reporting on excesses by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents, and detailing the activities of corrupt individual politicians. But such investigations have been exceptional, not routine (Protess et al. 1991, Sabato et al. 2000), which only allocate a small part of their content to public affairs and a tiny amount to disclosure of official wrong-doing (Curran 2000, 122). However, the monitoring function has a deterrent effect that may be more significant than the actual

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investigation of wrong-doing. Like all non-happenings, the extent of deterrence is hard to measure.

The Truth One contention is the public dialogue generated by media coverage will help to bring out the truth in political controversies so that the best policies can emerge. In the words of the US Supreme Court Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 1969, in “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas…(the) truth will ultimately prevail” because many viewpoints will be heard (Graber 2003, 142). In reality, however, the cacophony of voices in today’s marketplace of ideas often confuses non-experts more than it enlightens them. The problem is made worse by the “neutrality” norm, which precludes telling their audiences where the “truth” might lie, because it does not apply to all media in all countries, for instance, newspapers in the West are often explicitly partisan. Instead, the news is flooded with comments by “expert” sources with diametrically opposed opinions. That makes it difficult for lay people to judge the merits of complex policies (Neuman 1986, Zaller 1994). Of course, what is true and untrue in the policy realm, and the criteria by which policy alternatives should be judged, are matters of political and personal choice, but the marketplace of ideas, stocked with diverse news stories, gives little reliable guidance even about factual matters. A second claim about the marketplace of ideas is that genuine news diversity requires that a large number of independent journalistic enterprises, representing many different perspectives on politics, must select and present the news. Many critics believe that the increasing concentration of news enterprises precludes such diversity (Bagdikian 1996, Alger 1998). News media have multiplied steadily, but many are controlled by the same large business enterprises or by the government and companies that have a close relation with the government. The number of media outlets competing for audiences does not necessarily determine the diversity of viewpoints that are publicly aired. Media tycoons who control numerous media enterprises, such as Rupert Murdoch, often sponsor vastly different news outlets. Murdoch, for example, simultaneously controls a popular British tabloid, The Sun, News of the World, and Times (Gunther & Mughan 2000), Sky TV, and in Asia, Star TV. The American media are often rivals in conformity, framing the news in line with mainstream political orientations. That happens because they share notions about what is newsworthy and what appeals to their

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particular publics, they tap the same sources of information, and they seek to appeal to the same audiences. In the eyes of critics, the media do not offer the electorate multiple, diverse frames of reference on political issues that citizens need. This is especially true in the foreign policy realm. Most discussions of US foreign policies are presented from a particular interpretation of the perspective of the US. It was argued that, from the late 1960s onward, American aid programmes to developing countries, and the “free flow of information” policies promoted by the US government, assist the American media industry in its drive to achieve international domination (Schiller 1998). Far from promoting selfsufficiency, the “modernisation” of developing countries merely fosters dependency within an exploitative system of global economic relations. It promotes American capitalist values and interests, and erodes local culture in a process of global homogenisation. “Today”, writes Herbert Schiller (1998, 17), “the US exercises mastery of global communications and culture”.

Public Opinion The mass media in democracy are expected to give voice to public opinion so that the government will know where majorities and minorities stand. The view that the media frame the news to reflect the opinion of various publics or the opinions of the majority is another myth that has little relation to political realities. Nonetheless, it has major consequences because political observers often equate the thrust of media coverage with a single, unanimous public opinion when there is no such unanimity. There seems to be agreement that the role of the media in society is to inform the public of what it needs to know and to serve the public interest. The press has tremendous power to determine the focus and tone of public discourse. Whatever is widely reported becomes news and sets the agenda for public discussion and further investigation and reporting. To the extent that issues are truly important to people’s lives and relevant to their personal and political decisions, the quality of public discourse is elevated and the goal of an informed public is well served. The danger arises when members of the press abuse the power to set agendas for public debate and discussion in ways that threaten the quality of public discourse and, as a result manipulate individual and collective decision-making. Lee Bollinger (1991, 27) recognises this danger, writing that the press may “exert an adverse influence over the tone and character

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of public debate in subtle ways”. Bollinger (1991, 26 & 39) argues that press freedom poses a threat to the quality of public discussion, and ultimately to democracy, through the potentially harmful effect of such freedom on the quality of “democratic decision-making”. Gauthier (1999, 197-213) agrees in his concern for the detrimental effects of unlimited press freedom on the quality of public debate and on the democratic system. In addition, when issues of little or no significance become the focus of public debate, particularly with intrusions into people’s private lives, the quality of public discourse is debased and the goal of an informed public is subverted. Furthermore, the press cannot function as a megaphone for public opinions because it does not keep in regular touch with various factions among the public. For instance, Howard Zinn (1991) argues that the problem with free speech in US is not with the fact of access, but with the degree of it. There is some departure in the mainstream press from government policy, but it is limited and cautious. Some topics are given prominence, others put in the back pages or ignored altogether. Subtle use of language, emphasis, and tone make a difference to how the reading public will perceive an event. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) point out how the American press paid much attention to genocide in Cambodia, but ignored the mass killings in East Timor, carried on by Indonesia with US military equipment. The media note the very large attention given to Arab terrorism and the small attention given to Israeli terrorism. They comment on the sensational coverage of the break-in of Democratic party headquarters (Watergate) and the very tiny coverage of the much more extensive series of break-ins by the FBI of the headquarters of the Socialist Workers party (Zinn 1991). Journalists gather most of their information for news stories from media beats representing selected public and private institutions, but not the mass public. The opinions of elites are featured while the views of the mainstream public are marginalised; and the views of ideological dissenters are largely ignored. Overall, the opinions of the mass public are treated as quaintly interesting but as inconsequential, except in connection with electoral politics and situations in which public support and compliance are essential. The mass media has also come to depend excessively on public opinion polls taken by their own or other organisations. Leaving aside the many questions that have been raised about how accurately public opinion polls reflect public views, and their tendency to simplify everything, the number of issues about which its

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opinion is reported is minuscule compared with the number of important public policy issues facing the nation at any particular time (Traugott & Lavrakas 2000, Asher 2001). Still, the press supplies the raw material from which public opinion is formed, so there is indeed a connection between the press and public opinion. If the press fails to alert people to information that they need to judge major aspects of the political scene, citizens’ capacity to influence public officials suffers.

Media and the Public Sphere The media has been historically polarised between the liberal and Marxist debates of it. Recently, there is a movement propagating a “radical democratic” approach of the media which evolves the projection of this by major Western governments as the triumph of capitalism in the wake of the popular rejection of communist regimes globally. Proponents of this movement try to reapply the fundamental principles of democracy in realisation of current complex modern societies. Therefore, they believe that the concept of the public sphere is an accessible and independent realm in which each voice is equal to one. The public sphere is the means by which democratic decisions are reached. Re-examinations of theories of the public sphere have inspired new and innovative ways of examining current developments in the media and have been used to overcome the theoretical deadlocks of the past. For many the degree to which the mass media function as a public sphere, representative of the citizenry and accessible to all, serves as a key barometer of democracy within a polity. This arises from a lengthy tradition which places the media at the interface between the governors and the governed. From this perspective democracy is a relative concept. The character of a democracy is dependent on the flow of public information. This will determine to what degree the citizenry can take actions based on informed decisions and make government accountable (Gillwald 1993, 65-77). From a traditional liberal position the public sphere is an arena between the distinct areas of state and civil society that guarantees the protection of the individual. Liberal theory equates the public sphere with the political domain and the public role of the media is defined in relation to government. The liberal belief in the virtue of civil society’s domination over the state, however, has led to a view of the market as the mechanism best suited to meeting the information needs of society. However, the further the market commands information flows through conglomeration, privatisation and deregulation–the further it fails to fulfil democratic ideals

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of equal accessibility and independence. The liberal view fails to take account of the way in which power is exercised through capitalist and patriarchal structures (Curran 1991, 29). It ignores the ways in which interests have become organised and collectivised (Gillwald 1993, 65-77). Despite such criticism, the liberal media model remains intact. The Left, in all its diversity, has remained trapped in a free press model inherited from the nineteenth century. Nicholas Garnham (1986, 39) argues that “The hold that liberal theory exercised can be judged by the inadequacy of proposals for press reform generated by the Left and the weakness with which such proposals have been pursued”. This is not to suggest that liberal press theories have gone unchallenged. From an orthodox Marxist position, the public sphere in capitalist formations disguises the dominance of bourgeois media but they do not challenge the liberal basis of the public sphere itself. Unable to break out of the liberal state-civil society dichotomy, reform of the public sphere was rejected and socialist transformation regarded as the only solution. Marxist approaches, Curran (1991, 37) contends, are based on the conception of dominant ideology as “a monolithic rationalisation of dominant material interests. It generally overstates the unity between ideas and economic interests, the internal consistency of dominant discourses, the homogeneity of dominant interests and the extent of ideological domination of subordinate classes”. This foreclosed on certain reformist strategies as the weak links in the system were not perceived (Gillwald 1993, 65-77). In contrast, and under very different international conditions, the radical democratic approach is highly pragmatic. Curran suggests an innovative solution to overcome the deficiencies of both the orthodox liberal and Marxist approaches and exploits their strengths. He meshes the general market approach with a collectivist approach to democratise the public sphere by making it more representative and accessible. Rethinking the media as a public sphere, as Curran and others, Dahlgren (1991) and Garnham (1986), have done, is a useful way of breaking out of the statecivil society polarisation that has dominated media debate (Garnham 1986, 39). Radical democratic theorists reject the way the distinction is made between private and public realms, which underpins the liberal definition of the public sphere. The mediation role of the press and broadcasting is said to extend to all areas where power is exercised over others, the workplace and home (Gillwald 1993, 65-77).

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Peter Dahlgren contends that the public sphere should not simply be understood as the processes of public opinion nor as a synonym for the mass media. He draws on Jurgen Habermas, as do Curran and Garnham, to develop the public sphere as “an analytic category, a conceptual device that, while pointing to a specific social phenomenon can also aid us in analysing and researching the phenomenon....As an analytic category, the bourgeois public sphere consists of a dynamic nexus which links a variety of actors, factors and contexts together in a cohesive theoretic framework” (Dahlgren 1991, 2). Therefore, in the next chapter, Habermas’ idea of the public sphere will be thoroughly discussed in order to understand the role played by the media in encouraging public debate and deliberation.

Habermas and the Public Sphere Habermas (1962/1989) advanced a Marxist critique of Western capitalism and its discontents and wrote The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere to explore the status of public opinion in the practice of representative government, especially in Western Europe. Habermas defined the public sphere as a virtual or imaginary community which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space. The public sphere, in its ideal form, is “made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state” (Habermas 1962/1989, 176). Habermas illustrated his work from a historical moment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when coffee houses, salons and voluntary societies became the centre of debate. He extends this to an ideal of participation in the public sphere for today. Then, a public sphere began to emerge through the growth of the press. In engaging and disciplining the state, parliament and other agencies of representative government sought to manage this public sphere. Through acts of assembly and dialogue, the public sphere generates opinions and attitudes which serve to affirm or challenge and, then, to guide the affairs of state. In ideal terms, the public sphere is the source of public opinion needed to legitimate authority in any functioning democracy (Rutherford 2000, 18). In his later work, Further Reflections, Habermas (1992) made a distinction between “lifeworld” and “system”. The public sphere is part of the lifeworld; “system” refers to the market economy and the state apparatus. The lifeworld is the immediate milieu of the individual social actor, and Habermas opposed any analysis which uncoupled the interdependence of the lifeworld and the system in the negotiation of political power–it is thus a mistake to see that the system dominates the

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whole of society. The goal of democratic societies is to erect a democratic dam against the colonising encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld (Soules 2007). The success of the public sphere depends upon: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The extent of access (as close to universal as possible), The degree of autonomy (the citizens must be free of coercion), The rejection of hierarchy (so that each might participate on an equal footing), The rule of law (particularly the subordination of the state), and The quality of participation (the common commitment to the ways of logic). (Rutherford 2000, 18)

For Habermas, the success of the public sphere was founded on rationalcritical discourse. Everyone is an equal participant and the supreme communication skill is the power of argument. This ideal of the public sphere has never been fully achieved by most accounts. As ethnic, gender, and class exclusions were removed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the public sphere approached its ideal more closely, Habermas identifies a concurrent deformation of the public sphere through the advance of social welfare, the growth of culture industries, and the evolution of large private interests. Large newspapers devoted to profit, for example, turned the press into an agent of manipulation: “It became the gate through which privileged private interests invaded the public sphere” (Habermas 1992, 185). Habermas writes of a “refeudalisation” of power whereby the illusions of the public sphere are maintained only to give sanction to the decisions of leaders. Habermas (1992) believes the public sphere can be most effectively constituted and maintained through dialogue, acts of speech, through debate and discussion. In Further Reflections, he claims that public debate can be animated by “opinion-forming associations”–voluntary associations, social organisations, churches, sports clubs, groups of concerned citizens, grassroots movements, trade unions–to counter or refashion the messages of authority. For Habermas (1992), the misuse of publicity undermines the public sphere. “Manipulative publicity” has become common: “Even arguments are translated into symbols to which again one cannot respond by arguing but only by identifying with them” (Habermas 1992, 206). Such propaganda manages views, fosters political theatre, and conveys authorised opinions. Visual display, “showy pomp”

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and “staged display”, are used by those in authority to assert dominance or entitlement. Although communication clearly was a significant element with the notion of rational-critical debate, Habermas followed an important new direction in the 1970s with work on communication theory (Outhwaite 1994, 38). The “ray of hope” that allowed Habermas to move beyond the pernicious writings of the Frankfurt School became “the sunbeam shining on communicative action” in Habermas’s later theory. Rational discourse is free of domination, oriented toward consensus and understanding, which is seen as the most appropriate type of activity for the public sphere (Holub 1991, 8). Communicative rationality is the basis for critical social theory and has an analytical as well as utopian aspect. It is able to criticise distorted communication by basing the theory on the validity claims of normal speech. At the same time, it provides as an end the “neverrealizable…state in which unconstrained, perfectly free communication occurs. With the theory of communicative action, Habermas has come full circle and arrived back at his starting point in the public sphere” (Holub 1991, 15). But, instead of a historical structure that has collapsed, Habermas projects a state of affairs whose realisation lies in the future. Simply put, communicative action “is the (verbal or non-verbal) interaction between two or more actors who seek to reach an understanding about their action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement” (Outhwaite 1994, 71). His system offers two types of action. Rational-purposive action involves technical knowledge that includes manipulation in order to achieve social goals, while communicative action is related to praxis and the realisation of human potential (Hallin 1986, 122-123). Underlying Habermas’s communication theory is the concept of dialogue, in that all forms of communication, regardless of how unequal, derive from dialogue between human subjects and must be evaluated on that basis (Hallin 1986, 142). Habermas moved from a bleak critique of modernity in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, to communication theories based on emancipatory potential. Habermas offered a utopian model of rationalcritical debate through communicative action with a model of oral communication culture. Even as he criticises the “refeudalisation” of the media, Habermas returns to an oral mode of communication for his ideal speech situation, an oral mode that last existed in the feudal era (Soules 2007, Grosswiler 2001).

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Habermas and the “Refeudalisation” of the Media The shape of the public sphere or media environment has brought the Habermas’s notion of the bourgeois and manipulated public sphere. Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere provides evidence for equating the bourgeois public sphere. Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere is primarily “private people come together as a public” who claimed they “regulated from above against the public authorities themselves” (Habermas 1962/1989, 27). Connecting the private realm to public authority, the three parts of the public sphere in the eighteenth century included the public sphere in the “world of letters,” composed of clubs and the press, “through which the vehicle of public opinion it (the public sphere) put the state in touch with the needs of society” (Habermas 1962/1989, 30-31). The institutions of the public sphere, after coffee houses and salons, included art and cultural criticism journals and “moral weeklies,” which expanded the circle of the coffee houses. Their dialogue form attested to their closeness to the spoken word and thereby the “public held a mirror up to itself” (Habermas 1962/1989, 41-43). In England, the end of licensing in 1695 was one of three events that marked the emergence of the public sphere–along with the founding of the Bank of England and the first cabinet government. The end of censorship allowed the influx of rational-critical arguments into the press and made the press into an instrument to bring political decisions before the public. Throughout the 1700s, the public sphere’s development was measured by the degree of confrontation between the government and the press, as the latter was raised to the status of an institution. The press uncovered accusations against public authorities in the 1760s-1770s that were brought forth in a manner that ever since has been exemplary of a critical press (Habermas 1962/1989, 58-61). In France, the critical public arose more slowly in the mid-1700s, foremost because “not a line could be published without the consent of the censor; a political journalism could not be developed; the periodical press as a whole remained scanty” (Habermas 1962/1989, 67). It was the French Revolution that created, overnight, what had evolved in England for a century: a political daily press. In Germany, the rational-critical debate took place in private gatherings revolving around the blossoming journals, including political ones, in the late 1700s–although the most popular political journalists faced death and imprisonment for their efforts (Habermas 1962/1989, 6973).

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In Habermas’ analysis, it seems that even as the bourgeois literary public sphere was forming, it was also beginning to collapse, owing in part to the type of privacy that evolved in the 1700s to create the literary public sphere. The world of letters’ public sphere and its rational-critical debate gave way to the “pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption” (Habermas 1962/1989, 160). Habermas centres this collapse on the broadening of the reading public to include almost everyone as readers, thereby creating the mass public of culture consumers. Reflecting this change in the early 1800s was the rise of the penny press throughout Europe and America, beginning in 1816 in Germany. The penny press depoliticised content to maximise sales. This trend intensified in the latter 1800s through the yellow press and the human interest story, the weekend press, and illustrated magazines, all part of what he calls the “American form of mass press” (Habermas 1962/1989, 167-169). As the mass press, which was based on commercialisation of the public sphere, offered the masses access to the public sphere, this expanded public sphere lost its political character. This “consumption of culture” was fostered as picture-based and sound-based media, still visible in the daily press, eventually replaced the literary press and encouraged the disappearance of critical debate. This change progressed further in the “new media”: “Radio, film, and television by degrees reduce to a minimum the distance that a reader is forced to maintain toward the printed letter–a distance that required the privacy of appropriation as much as it made possible the publicity of a rational–critical exchange about what had been read. With the arrival of the new media the form of communication as such has changed; they have had an impact … more penetrating … than was ever possible for the press. … In comparison with printed communications the programs sent by the new media curtail the reactions of their recipients in a peculiar way. They draw the eyes and ears of the public under their spell but at the same time, by taking away its distance…deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to disagree.” (Habermas 1962/1989, 170-171)

Thus, according to Habermas, the mass-mediated world is a public sphere only in appearance, as is the private sphere that the media promise to consumers. Habermas called the product of mass media culture one of integration of information with critical debate, journalistic formats with novel forms, and advice shaped by human interest. The culture of integration also assimilates advertising as a “kind of super slogan” and is a

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means of political and economic propaganda while becoming unpolitical and “pseudo-privatised” (Habermas 1962/1989, 175). Habermas (1962/1989, 181) documented the shift in the function of the public sphere in the “transformation of the public sphere’s pre-eminent institution, the press”. Habermas traces the early press’ emergence as a “small handicraft business” that followed the tenets of early capitalism. Evolving from “pure news reporting” to include literary journalism, the press became political as well as economic. With scholarly journals, moral weeklies, and political journals, this literary journalism put commercial needs in the background in pursuit of critical-rational reflections. Publisher-printers dominated, yielding in the 1800s to independent editorships. With the formation of a constitutional state and a legal political public sphere, the press was released to focus on profits, and in the 1830s in Europe and America the press began the transition from an ideological press to a press that was primarily a business. Throughout the 1800s, editor-publisher relations changed, major newspaper chains emerged, and technological advancements made economic growth possible. The degree of concentration of ownership was modest by comparison to that of film, radio, and television, which in Europe were initiated by government and turned from “private institutions of a public formed of private people into public corporations” (Habermas 1962/1989, 187). The rise of public media corporations has reversed the original basis of the press as institutions protected from government by being privately owned. With commercialisation and economic concentration, the private media have become “complexes of societal power” that threaten their critical role. This also marks the beginning of electronic culture with the penny press in the 1830s and the introduction of the telegraph in 1844. This electronic media culture only intensifies with the sound and images of film, radio, and television. The effect of electronic media culture is a reversal of the cultural effects of print culture: the loss of rationality, detachment, linearity, nationalism, and individualism. The new values are involvement, simultaneity, globalism, and the collective (Grosswiler 2001). Habermas describes in detail the process by which the manipulated public sphere of consumption resembles the process found in a medieval feudal system more than it resembles rational-critical debate. Habermas (1962/1989) called this “refeudalisation.” The flooding of the public sphere with advertising arose as economic concentration increased in order

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to assure market stability and share (Habermas 1962/1989, 189-194). Economic advertising became political with the development of public relations, and public opinion management invaded public opinion by creating and exploiting events. The result is the engineering of consent with features of a staged public opinion. A consensus created by sophisticated opinion-molding lacks the criterion of rationality of a consensus reached by the time-consuming process of mutual enlightenment. Shaped by public relations, the public sphere takes on feudal features as the public is presented a “showy pomp” that it is ready to follow. It is feudal in that it imitates the aura of personal prestige and supernatural authority given to the publicity of feudal courts. In short, this is called refeudalisation. Within the decayed form of the bourgeois public sphere, and the manipulated public sphere and manufactured public sphere, the media both represent political ideology and are ineffectual in political communication except as advertising (Habermas 1962/1989, 214217). In debating Habermas’ argument of refeudalisation of media, John B. Thompson (1995, 7) feels that the strength of Habermas’ early work in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is that it treats the development of the media as an integral part in the formation of modern societies. With the rise of the bourgeois public sphere, Thompson argues that Habermas puts particular importance on the rise of the press–critical journals and moral weeklies that appeared in the late 1600s and 1700s– along with coffee houses and salons. Habermas argued that the critical discussion stimulated by the press transformed the institutions of the state (Thompson 1995, 70). Although Thompson (1995, 73-74) finds Habermas’ account of the decline of the bourgeois public sphere to be his weakest argument, a central component of its decline was the radical change of its key institutions, including the commercialisation of the media in the 1800s and 1900s. This process turned rational-critical debate into cultural consumption, as the media became part of a “quasi-feudal” kind of public life in which politics becomes a managed show of leaders who exclude most people from discussion and decision-making in the refeudalisation of the public sphere. In this manipulated or managed public sphere, the media bestow aura and prestige upon authorities similar to that bestowed on royal figures under feudalism. Thompson (1995, 260) notes that Habermas moved away from addressing the normative issues of his early work with an immanent critique of a historical set of ideas because it did not explain why the

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principles of the bourgeois public sphere should hold sway today. He moved toward his theory of communicative action and discourse ethics to show that a conception of rationality that is binding and unavoidable can handle the problems confronting a critical theory of society. Under this theory of rational consensus, a norm would be valid only if it was openly discussed and consented to by everyone affected by it under conditions without constraint (Grosswiler 2001). Moreover, Nicholas Stevenson’s (1995, 47-50) account of Habermas’ work notes that despite the impact of his thinking on a variety of disciplines, his work on mass communication has not received the attention it should. The transformation of the newspaper industry is offered as an illustration of the tragedy that the bourgeois public sphere was eventually destroyed by the social forces that created it, and eventually led to the refeudalisation of the public sphere. More recently, Habermas deals less with refeudalisation than with the “pulverisation” of the cultural sphere and the “colonisation of the life-world,” as well as “cultural impoverishment” (Stevenson 1995, 51-52). But Habermas ultimately breaks with the early Frankfurt School’s pessimism by developing a means of emancipatory politics. Against the philosophy of consciousness represented by the early Frankfurt School, Habermas builds his theory of communicative rationality, which provides the basis for an ideal speech situation. In this situation, a statement is true only if it gains the free consent of everyone affected by it–a type of radical democracy far removed from present practices (Stevenson 1995, 51-53). Through the theory of communicative action, Habermas provides a basis for rebuilding the ideal public sphere (Grosswiler 2001).

Conclusion In sum, Habermas has devoted considerable attention to the importance of public discourse. He maintains that an institutional arena of public discourse and civic participation is essential to counterbalance the dual pressures of state and market. He conceives of the public sphere as both a process by which people can deliberate about their common affairs, and as an arena, or space, in which this can happen naturally. His work is aimed at establishing a normative framework for a robust public sphere as well as preserving it from the erosive influences of modern society (London 1995, 33-55). He believes the public sphere can be most effectively constituted and maintained through dialogue, acts of speech, debate and discussion (Soules 2007).

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Chapter One

However, the reality of public sphere is that the mass press and the commercialisation of the media have diminished of its ideal in encouraging public deliberation for common good. Worst, Habermas wrote, is when a refeudalisation of power whereby the illusions of the public sphere are maintained only to give sanction to the decisions of leaders. Refeudalisation has diverted the attention of the media from discussing public issues to reporting the state and political elite’s affairs. This process, which happens in Western democracies, also affects the role of the media in Malaysia.

CHAPTER TWO THE PUBLIC SPHERE OF MALAYSIAN MEDIA

This chapter will discuss Habermas’ prominent idea of the public sphere especially with regards to the process of refeudalisation. These concepts will be tested in analysing the Malaysian media since the British colonisation era. Through the analysis, this chapter will be able to show that both of Habermas’ concepts could explain the reality of Malaysian media vis-à-vis the government’s superiority in power. Despite controlling the media, Malaysian government also manages to dominate the public sphere and carries on the process of refeudalisation in order to ensure that Malaysian people will always loyal to the government.

Historical Background of the Press in Malaysia During the period of the nineteenth century, more than forty English language newspapers appeared in the Malay peninsular. What was obvious about the early English newspapers, which were published by the British colonial administrators, was that the newspapers were to serve British interests in Malaya and particularly to cater to the business community. News items of foreign countries especially Europe, were given prominence as these events affected business in Malaya. A large part of the contents of the newspapers were commercial news and advertisements. Local news which made up a small portion of the news column, often focused on crimes and schedules of ship arrival and departures (Dhari 1992). The first newspaper in Malaya (or known as Malaysia since 1963), The Prince of Wales Island Gazette was published in Penang in 1805. This was followed suit by a host of newspapers like The Malacca Observer, The Perak Pinoor and The Malay Mail. One of the most popular newspapers in Malaysia and Singapore today, The New Straits Times (New Straits Times, Malaysia) had their origin in July 1845 under the name of The Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce (Dhari 1992).

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By the end of nineteenth century, there was a revelation of people movement in instigating the public sphere in the media. However, this movement was influenced by ethnocentrism and ethnic-oriented media which was only existed to provide news for certain respective communities only. For instance, though early Chinese newspapers were produced by British individuals, most Chinese newspapers published between 1822 and 1832 were partisan and sympathetic to the Chinese Revolution in China in 1911. They, then, also began to produce their own newspapers, such as Lat Pao (1881-1932). The contents indicated their attachment to their homeland (China), with reprints of news and articles from China and Hong Kong (Dhari 1992). When the Chinese Revolution ended in China in 1911, the local Chinese newspapers changed their focus to commerce. Sin Chew, for instance, founded by the Aw Boon Haw family, famously for its Tiger balm skin ointment, was used as a vehicle to promote its company’s product (Halimahton 2006, 3). The seeds of ethnocentrism were further sown when the Malays published the Malay newspapers in the 1870s and 1900s. Early Malay journalism in Malaya was pioneered by non-Malays in particular the Indian Muslims, the Arabs and Baba Chinese. The first Malay weekly, The Jawi Peranakan was published in 1876 in Singapore. This was followed by other publications in Singapore, such as Sekolah Melayu (1888), Peranakan (1891) and Bintang Timor (1894), and in Perak, Sri Perak (1893). By the end of nineteenth century, at least 17 Malay language newspapers and magazines appeared in Malaya (Dhari 1992). The Indian press highlighted Indian interests too. Newspapers like Tamil Nesan and Tamil Murasu carried the plight of the Indians in the estates and other economic sections, championed Indian education, helped spread literary works and became the vehicle for political demands (Arabi 1989). This early Tamil Nesan (1923), for instance, carried information about local and national affairs, and about India. The local news focused on social problems and oppressions experienced by Indian labourers in the rubber estates in the country (Halimahton 2006, 4). Malay, Chinese and Indian communities published their own newspaper for their distinctly and separately own agenda. This is clearly not a genuine public sphere that what Habermas has imagined, but it is just the beginning of that. In fact, this ethnocentrism in content and organisation has progressed through the 21st century where the press system in Malaysia today is actually a legacy of the colonial past (Dhari

The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media

33

1992). However, the emergence of public sphere or in Habermas’ term, bourgeois public sphere, happened at the same time with the emergence of nationalist movement in Malaya. The spirit of nationalism among local people exploited the democratic approach of self-determination and freedom of speech introduced by the British, and used them to confront the British with demands for independence. In the early decades of twentieth century, public sphere flourished when Malay nationalists utilised newspapers as channel for expressing Malay interests and opposing to the colonial policies of British administration. Kaum Muda (Youth Group)1 was the first nationalist group that used a newspaper to spread its views especially about the Malay’s struggle against colonisation, for education and for Islamic teachings (Abdullah 1985, 85-87). In the publication of the newspaper Al-Imam2 in 1906, Kaum Muda highlighted the evil of Western (British) colonisation, the value of political freedom, and the role of national sentiment among Muslim local peoples (Khoo et al 1982, 8). National sentiment was used for strengthening the local movement for independence. In the 1920s, the Malays press became increasingly critical to the British colonial policies that repressed Malays. From 1910 until the 1930s, there was a rapid expansion in the number of newspapers, reflecting the leniency of British policy on the printed press and also the rapid development of printing technology. The Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Melaka teachers associations published the Majalah Guru in 1924. The Majalah Guru discussed Malay socio-economic issues, education, and language (Latif 1985, 130, Mek and Aminah 1985, 250). The most significant role played by Malay newspapers was to boost political consciousness amongst Malays and force the British to change certain policies. For example, the Malay newspapers had pushed for the British administration to restructure the Federation Council. The British conceded, and the Federation Council was restructured in 1927. The Malay Sultans gave up their posts in the Federation Council, and one Malay representative Abdullah Dahlan was appointed to replace the Sultans. Thereafter, Malay newspapers have continued to report discussions and debates in the Federation Council (Khoo et al 1982, 10). The use of the press as a medium for people to express their views burgeoned in the 1930s. Not only the newspapers opposed the British but some of them played a pivotal role in changing the mentality of much of the Malay community, extending knowledge of the benefits of social transformation and self-determination. The newspaper Majlis,3 formed in

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Chapter Two

1931, attempted to spread ideas about democracy and how Malays could improve their conditions of life for the better. A good example is in an article on 8 December 1945 edition: “The Malay (umat Melayu) throughout the Malay Peninsula in general and in Selangor in particular should be aware (sedar) and we believe are already aware that according to the requirements of the era (zaman) after (sudah tamat) the Second World War, the pattern of the world has changed to a democratic hue…So also our Malay Peninsula which before was based on bureaucracy will become democratic…which can lead to the conclusion that in the past (di masa lalu) our Malay people usually looked to their raja (and his chiefs) as the sole patron or leader to protect and defend the fate (nasib) and rights (hak) of the Malay people, but in the end according to the trend in this democratic era (zaman), all thoughts and beliefs like these among Malays must be discarded (buang) and wiped clean away (dihapuskan licin).” (Ariffin 1993, 171-172)

The Majlis strived to change Malay’s attitude and political culture that previously had always depended on the Sultans as the political power. The passage above reflects the move towards democratisation in Malay society and away from feudalism. It encouraged Malays to decide their own fate; promoting rights, including a right to freedom of speech, as essential to the struggle to free the country from British colonisation. However, the Majlis also made a brave move in arguing that the right of “sovereignty” (kedaulatan), a prerogative of the royal family, was possessed by the people. In order to apply democratic concepts to the society, the “Majlis” proposed the idea of “the sovereign people” instead of “sovereignty of the King”, although “the sovereign people” was limited to the Malay community and excluded other groups.4 In its 17 September 1947 edition, the Majlis advocated that: “the meaning of democracy is that of a government (kerajaan) based on the opinion of the people (rakyat) who possess the right of citizenship. The representatives who become members (ahli-ahli) of the (kerajaan) council (mesyuarat) are people who are chosen or voted according to the voice of the people. Here it can be seen that whatever is decided on the voice of the people. Here it can be seen that whatever is decided on in the council is according to the will of the people.” (Ariffin 1993, 177)

Thus, the ideas of democracy and the need for freedom of speech slowly flourished in the community at that time, especially among educated persons, political elites and community leaders. The role of the media became particularly important as a vehicle for independence.

The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media

35

Although the British had introduced and enforced the Printing Presses Ordinances in 1920, the prevention of use and storage printing machines was only applied to Chinese newspapers in the Straits Settlements (Penang, Melaka and Singapore). British Colonial government allowed the practice of freedom of the press, at the same time, set up a double standard rule of the practices and banned presses which the British felt would weaken its power and prestige. In the 1930s, newspapers of the Kuomintang party, such as Kwong Wah Yit Poh, Yit Khuan Poh, San Yik Khuan Poh, Malayan Chinese Daily News, Min Kuo Jih Poh, and Sin Kuo Min Press, had been either censored or banned by the British Colonial government for publishing propaganda news supporting banned party of Kuomintang. British government even implemented different regulation between English presses and Chinese presses. The whole system was so repugnant to ideas of freedom of the press that it should be permitted to continue only if absolutely necessary (Safar 1996a, 155). The 1939 amendment of the Ordinance that required permit application before publication was intended to stop Japanese propaganda from entering Malaya (Safar 1996b, 5). Malay newspapers were routinely permitted to publish, despite being regulated by the Ordinance, because the British felt that the Malay newspapers were not effectively undermining their position or their policies. Although many Malay newspapers wrote articles encouraging the people to fight the British, they had little influence due to the lack of a large educated, or even literate, public. Tamil newspaper published in the period after the 1930s witnessed a dramatic change in the attitudes of the Indians in Malaya (Dhari 1992). Newspapers campaigned to the Indian readers to remain and become citizens of Malaya, and no longer to consider Malaya as place of work and then to return to live in India. The Tamilan (1931), Samudaya Olin and Bharata Mithun, for example, urged the Indians to consider Malaya as their country of residence (Halimahton 2006, 4). The end of Second World War saw the heightening of Malay nationalism and Malay journalism. Given the political and social developments at that time during the British administration (the threat of the Malayan Union and the influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants from China and India), there were publications of anti-Chinese and anti-Indian sentiments by the Malay newspapers. The non-Malays, through the English and other vernacular language newspapers, followed suit and became critical of the pro-Malay attitude of the British administration.

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Chapter Two

Communalism and the flight for factional interests were prominent in the newspapers in that era (Dhari 1992). In my view, the press obviously managed to instil the public sphere through encouraging the nationalist movements against the British. However, it was not a bourgeois public sphere, instead it was a pseudo public sphere. The public sphere was dominated and controlled by the British through repressive laws and the level of literacy among the people was also very low even though the robust debates against the colonial power and for public welfare and awareness were practised. The British finally granted Malaya independence in 1957. For the first time, freedom of speech and the press was practised in the 1951, 1952 and 1955 elections and later institutionalised in the Federal Constitution in 1957. However, like Habermas said, the press in Malaysia, even though made the public sphere possible to be implemented, it was also the reason of its downfall. The development of the Malay political parties was made possible by the Malay press (Arabi 1989). The new government of Perikatan party realised of the powerful influences of the press and decided to control it. This caused of the collapse of public sphere and started the beginning of refeudalisation of Malaysian media. Government and opposition parties permitted freedom of the press through print and electronic media as tools for campaigning in the general election in 1964, although, in fact, most were biased towards the governing Perikatan party. Freedom of the press was increasingly restricted under the Internal Security Act (ISA), Sedition Act (SA), and the Printing Presses and Publications Ordinance. For instance, the Socialist Front5 newspapers, the Berita Buroh and Nyala, were banned under the Printing Presses and Publications Ordinance (amendment) 1957, due to the party’s pro-communist stand (Ratnam and Milne 1967, 200), and some of the party’s leaders were also arrested under the ISA in the 1960s. The Perikatan government recognised the enormous impact of the media on the community and its capacity to change people’s perceptions of the government. Therefore, the Perikatan government leaders, in securing its political power, had made the decision to take over the press. First attempt was when the United Malays National Organisations (UMNO) tried to take over Utusan Melayu newspaper after the 1959 General Election, which eventually succeeded in 1961. An UMNO political leader from the state of Terengganu, Ibrahim Fikri Mohamad, the Chairman of the newspaper’s publication company, took over the newspaper and it

The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media

37

triggered off a major strike against the government intervention in the Utusan Melayu (Hussain 1999, 26). These events in early Malaysia’s independence period were significant in showing that the government realised the problems it faced in relation to racial politics and political power. The opposition had command of a few publications and became stronger in challenging the government for political power. The government also worried about the Malay superiority in political power which was extensively threatened by the Chinese minority who already controlled the national economy. By restricting freedom of the press, the government hoped that it could control public opinion and get political support from the people. Although the government began the initiative to curb the press in the 1960s, the racial rioting on the 13 May 1969 gave a huge opportunity and justification for the ruling party to control the public sphere of the media in Malaysia. In promoting the national unity and urging people to support the government and refeudalisation process, the “Rukunegara” (national charter or ideology) was introduced as a foundation of national ideology in Malaysia on 31 August 19706 and the media role as a “watchdog” of the government’s activities has been non-existent in post 13 May 1969. Besides, two newspaper editors, A. Samad Ismail from the New Straits Times (NST) and Samani Mohd Amin from the Berita Harian, were arrested under ISA and accused of supporting communism through the mass media. One Malay newspaper editor said on 24 August 1972 that “It is not the newspaper’s role to check on government. The papers here are not pro- or anti-government, but supporters of government” (Lent 1977, 39). UMNO also managed to take over The Straits Times in 1972 through Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS), and had its name changed to the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) (Halimahton 2006, 5). Mahathir was the Fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia since 16 July 1981. After two years in power, Mahathir became more autocratic, increasingly control of the media, by for instance stopping the circulation of the newspaper, Nadi Insan, because the newspaper was critical towards the government’s policy on relations between Malaysia and neighbouring countries. Nadi Insan regularly published articles on social problems in Malaysia, especially the poverty in the peasant communities (Tan 1985, 76-78). Mahathir contended that Malaysia’s multicultural, multiracial, multireligious and multilingual society, made it inappropriate for open debate via press and other channels on some issues. As Mahathir said in the Far Eastern Economic Review of 28 October 1996: “The threat is from

38

Chapter Two

inside…So we have to be armed, so to speak. Not with guns, but with the necessary laws to make sure the country remains stable” (Mendes 1994, 3). He implied that racial conflict and political instability are inevitable in a multiracial society unless protected by laws like the ISA, the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) and the SA. Racial conflict is like a time bomb and the misuse of public sphere for political ends and to exploit racial sentiments could spark racial conflict. The amendment of laws by Mahathir was presented as a preventative action starting from an operation named “Operasi Lalang” (weed operation) on 27 October 1987. Three major newspapers, the English-medium The Star, the Chinese Sin Chew Jit Poh and the Malay weekly Watan had their licenses revoked. They resumed publication in 1988 but the ban, and resulting changes in editorial staff, engendered a climate of self-censorship among journalists which continued through the 1990s. Mahathir saw the operation as an initiative to prevent another racial conflict similar to that of 13 May 1969 (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 107-110). By the end of the 1980s, Mahathir had a firm hold over all levers of power. During the 1980s, Malaysian media was also flourished and had entered into what Habermas’ called as mass press, thanked to the privatisation policy introduced by Mahathir. By the end of 31 December 1995, he, also a Home Minister, approved 3206 licences for publications where 149 licences were for newspapers and 1875 licences were for magazines (Safar 1996b, 9). However, the commercialisation of the press in Malaysia had not sustained the original basis of the press. In fact, the press had become institutions protected for the government, not from the government. The press were privately owned via proxy companies which have good relationship with political elites in the government. This means that the critical role of the media in public sphere as advocated by Habermas was never existed. The implication of media policy in Malaysia under Mahathir’s leadership, and also his successor Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, was that many local newspapers, especially daily newspapers, were either controlled or owned by the Barisan Nasional7 (BN or National Front-previously known as the Perikatan party until 1 June 1974) party in order to dominate the public sphere of the media. Fleet Company, controlled by ruling party UMNO,8 owned the NST, Berita Harian, Business Times, Malay Mail, and Shin Min Daily News. In addition, Utusan Melayu and Utusan Malaysia newspapers have been published by Utusan Melayu (M) Berhad, which has a special relationship with UMNO.

The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media

39

Vincent Tan owns the Berjaya Group, and a close friend of Mahathir, published The Star, The Sun and Watan newspapers.9 However, the daily newspapers, The Star, Nanyang Siang Pau, and China Press had been taken over by Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) party’s investment company of Huaren Holdings.10 Tamil newspapers, like Tamil Nesan, Tamil Osai and Thinamani, have links with a few personalities and leaders in the Malaysian Indians Congress (MIC) party (Arabi and Safar 1993, 1011).11 Monopoly of the electronic media were clearly inevitable when all of RTM 1, RTM 2, TV3, Metro Vision, and NTV7 were under BN party ownership and government control. Radio and Television of Malaysia (RTM) is a public channel under direct control of the Information Minister. RTM has been used by the ruling BN to spread the party’s messages and propagandas. The opposition consistently gets bad publicity and negative coverage from the media. Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad (commercially known as TV3), was launched on 1 June 1984, and has a close link to the ruling party especially UMNO. In January 1993, a newspaper company of NST Group and TV3 were bought by a group of UMNO leaders for RM870 million (Rais 1995, 176). Then, Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB) controlled TV3 and owned the total shares of 49.7 percent (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 92; MRCB 2001). However, majority shares, 75 percent, of Metro Vision television station were owned by Tunku Abdullah’s, a close friend of Mahathir, Melewar Corporation and Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd. On the other hand, share holding in Metro Vision was also owned by Vincent Tan through the Berjaya Group and Quek Leng Chan12 from the Nanyang Press Bhd (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 96). Meanwhile, Natseven TV Sdn Bhd (NTV7), launched on 7 April 1998, which was a company owned by Mohd Effendi Norwawi, a former Agricultural Minister. Furthermore, in 1995, Malaysia had been introduced for the first time a subscription television station called Mega TV. This cable television owned by a BN aligned consortium called Cableview Services Sdn. Bhd. consisted of several shares owners which Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad was one of them with 40 percent shares, Ministry of Finance with 30 percent shares, Ibex TV Sdn Bhd. 12.5 percent, Eurocast 12.5 percent and Sri Utara Sdn. Bhd. (a subsidiary of MIC investment arm, Maika Holdings Bhd) 5 percent (Wang 1998, 44). According to Information Minister, Mohamed Rahmat, Mega TV was created for the purposes for circulating latest news reports from the US, Europe and Malaysia, and

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Chapter Two

broadcasting entertainment programmes from abroad. In addition, Mega TV was also provided services for tourism market and business consumers (Zaharom 1996, 176). Mega TV offered 24 hours programmes through nine channels, among them were CNN, Discovery Channel, ESPN and Cartoon Network. Unfortunately, Mega TV stopped its operation in 2001 (Juliana 2006, 178). In 1996, Malaysia also launched two satellites Malaysia-East Asia Satellite (MEASAT) I and II on 13 January 1996 and 14 November 1996. Through these two satellites, Malaysia introduced it first satellite television under the brand name, Astro All Asia Networks (ASTRO). ASTRO is a subscription television station which provides a 24 hours a day services via its 51 television 17 radio channels. T. Ananda Krishnan owns the ASTRO Station Broadcasting, which is a sub company of MEASAT Broadcast Network Systems Sdn. Bhd. Ananda has been politely referred to by The Star newspaper as a businessman who enjoys the confidence of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (The Star 1996). Besides television, radio stations are also monopolised by parties that have an interest in and close relationships with the government. The government, through the Information Ministry, controls fully all radio channels run by RTM. In fact, privately owned radio stations are also controlled by individuals who have good relationship with the national leaders. For example, ASTRO produces several digital radio networks such as ERA, Hitz, Mix, MY, Lite FM, Classic Rock, and Opus (ASTRO 2000).13 As mentioned before, T. Ananda Krishnan has a close relationship with Mahathir. The first Malaysian private radio station, Rediffusion, was established in 1970s and was owned by Arab Malaysian Group which is led by Azman Hashim. Time Highway Radio was owned by the Renong Group, headed by Halim Saad, who had a close relationship with the former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, while Best 104 was managed by Voice of Johor Sdn. Bhd., a subsidiary of MADOS, owned by the Johor royalty (MASSA 1997). The government routinely threatens the use of oppressive laws against dissenting voices. In June 1999, five months before the general elections, the Information Minister, who was also the UMNO’s secretary general, Khalil Yaacob, explained that RTM’s airwaves were reserved for the government, and this was why the broadcaster would not be featuring any opposition voices in its news or other programmes (SUARAM 2003a, 2526). Opposition media like Harakah owned by Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS, Malaysia’s Islamic party),14 The Rocket by Democratic Action Party (DAP), and Suara Keadilan by the People Justice Party and

The Public Sphere of Malaysian Media

41

independent media such as Wasilah and Aliran Monthly are allowed to operate in Malaysia. However, opposition newspapers and magazines are not published on a daily basis; Harakah, The Rocket and Suara Keadilan are bimonthly, while Aliran Monthly is published once a month. The regulation of the bimonthly publication of the party’s newspaper was first introduced and applied to stop political criticism and dissent from entering the public sphere when Malaysia was experiencing a currency and political crisis in 1998 and 1999. The policy to control the media has become difficult with the emergence of the Internet in 1990s. Malaysia has at least 900,000 Internet subscribers in 2000, with an estimated 4 million users (MASSA 2000).15 When Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister, was sacked from government and during the Reformasi movement period, the government had difficulties controlling the criticism from Internet sources sent by pro-Reformasi (reform) movement websites such as Laman Reformasi (http://members.tripod.com/~mahazalimtwo), Anwar dot com (http://www.anwar.com), freeMalaysia (http://www.freemalaysia.com), and Reformasi Dot Com (http://www.reformasi.com). Opposition parties have also established their own websites to disseminate information to the public about their daily activities. Independent media or news portal on the Internet like Malaysiakini (http://www.malaysiakini.com) and Malaysia Today (http://www.malaysia-today.net) manage to be functioned as alternative media for the public. However, these alternative media also faced pressures from the government and threats under the Sedition Act (SA) for their reporting. For instance in July 2005, editor of Malaysia Today, Raja Petra Kamarudin, was under police probe over alleged seditious reports carried by the website, had his two computers confiscated. The action was taken following a police report lodged by the Negeri Sembilan royal family claiming the website reported corruption and misconduct of the royal family (SUARAM 2006, 76). It is argued that Malaysia is a newly independent and developing country, and during this initial period of growth, stability and unity must be sought; criticism must be minimised and the public faith in governmental institutions, especially the executive, and policies must be encouraged. Thus, press freedom should be limited so that the Malaysian people can enjoy political stability and racial harmony. To justify the restriction on the media, Mahathir, in an interview with Cable News Network (CNN) on 2 September 1997, argued that:

42

Chapter Two “We have a problem in Malaysia, in that racial problem is very serious. If we allow the media to go and provoke and instigate people to fight against each other…that will disrupt or destabilise our country and our policies. We all need to pay a price and we have a need to control the news. But otherwise we are quite free and if you care to read the vernacular papers in Malaysia…you will find that their criticisms of the government come by the tonnes almost everyday. They have not missed taking pot shots at the government and we have not done anything to withdraw their licence or whatever.” (Mahathir 1997, 15)

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the media, but also stipulates that this freedom may be restricted by legislation in the interests of security and public order. The principal instrument used is the SA, which prohibits public comment on issues defined as sensitive. Zainuddin Maidin (2003, 4-5), former Deputy Minister for Information Ministry, argues that press laws are necessary to protect national security and the public interest. Steps should be taken to strengthen regulation on the press to cover the Internet media as well. Current Prime Minister, Abdullah maintains Mahathir’s policy in relations with the press. In October 2006, a business deal between the MCA and media tycoon Tiong Hiew King in October solidified the monopolisation of the Chinese press, with all top four Chinese dailies now concentrated in the hands of a firm political-business alliance. Despite a call for media law reform launched by 47 civil society organisations in response to the October merger, newspaper reports in late November 2006 indicated plans for a subsequent merger in the Malay print industry that would grant UMNO, the ruling party, direct ownership of most local media through a new partnership with the Media Prima company. In 2007, Media Prima Berhad, with close link to UMNO, acquired all the private television stations including TV3, NTV7, 8TV and TV9. It also has a 43 percent equity interest in The NST Press (Malaysia) Berhad (NSTP), one of Malaysia’s largest publishing groups that publish leading newspaper titles such as the NST, Berita Harian and Harian Metro. The Group also owns two radio networks, Fly FM and Hot FM (Media Prima 2007, 1). Malaysia also launched two more subscription television stations. First, MiTV is owned by Vincent Tan from Berjaya Group on 5 September 2005. And second, Fine TV is owned by Eurofine (M) Sdn. Bhd., which is a subsidiary company to Network Guidance Sdn. Bhd, a company with close relation to Perbadanan Nasional Berhad which operated under the control of Ministry of Finance (Juliana 2006, 187-188). Both the print and broadcast media’s news coverage and editorials already in general support the government line (Freedom House 2007).

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However, during Abdullah’s leadership, there are wave of bloggers who are critical to the government entering the public sphere on the Internet such as Jeff Ooi Blog and Anwar Ibrahim Blog and being critical to the government. The government is unable to control the blogs16 but has threatened to take action against them, webmasters and authors for purportedly spreading “false news” and “defamatory material” or for bringing up “sensitive issues” and hate speech about, as argued by the government, race relations on the Internet. For example, blogger Jeff Ooi was summoned to give a statement to the police on an alleged blasphemous remark posted by a reader on his weblog “Screenshots” (SUARAM 2006, 76). Freedom of the press and open public sphere are almost non-existent in Malaysia, where the government has a full power to control the media and restrict the alternative or opposition media. Clearly, the policy to control the media in Malaysia is a way to deter dissent and criticism to the government, which can be considered as undemocratic. Although the issue of racial harmony is a determine factor of the policy, the government manages to manipulate this issue, by controlling the media, to strengthen its power (Azizuddin 2004, 12-22).

Television and the Public Sphere Television was first introduced in December 1963 with the help of technical consultants from Canada. Unlike the newspapers which have gone through the process of the pseudo public sphere and then refeudalisation, the television, the initial set-up comprised a single channel national network, was from the beginning under the control of the RTM or the Department of Broadcasting of the Ministry of Information. In October 1969 a second channel was launched. It was also under the direct control of the Ministry of Information, and guided by the same directives as those which governed the operations of the first channel (Karthigesu 1991). These directives by Ministry of Information, which have remained virtually unchanged and which have informed broadcasting policy, are (Zaharom 2002, 118-119): 1. 2. 3.

to explain in depth and with the widest possible coverage the policies and the programmes of the government in order to ensure maximum understanding by the public; to stimulate public interest and opinion in order to achieve changes in line with the requirement of the government; to assist in promoting civic consciousness and fostering the development of Malaysian arts and culture;

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4. 5.

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to provide suitable elements of popular education, general information and entertainment; to aid national integration efforts in a multi-ethnic society through the use of the national language.

What is certainly apparent is that television–and, more generally, broadcasting–in Malaysia was from its inception closely aligned to the government. Both the RTM channels, now called TV1 and TV2, were established not through an Act of Parliament or by a Royal Charter, but via decisions made by the then Perikatan (Alliance) coalition government which, in turn, formulated the policies that would determine the role television would play (Zaharom 2002, 118-119). The latter practice continues to the present day even through the era of commercialisation of the press or mass press with the introduction of several private television stations such as TV3, NTV7 and ASTRO. In other words, the purpose of broadcasting agenda in Malaysia since inception has been to propagate state ideology and ensure the ruling Perikatan, then BN, continuously in power. Every Prime Minister in every election campaign has been known to extensively utilise the Ministry of Information which houses RTM to reach and win the electorate. If at all space was accorded to opposition parties, such as the PAS, PKR and DAP, it has mostly been in detrimental light. While Malaysians have hardly had the privilege to neither view the flipside to any issue nor witness national televised debates, Prime Minster Abdullah Badawi, in his desire to unite the Malaysian people, has recently allowed such a debate amongst opposing political parties over national television. While the face of national television may change under different leaderships and may seem fairer in Malaysia’s modern times, it will tend to continue to serve the ambitions and aspirations of the state. In other words, public broadcasting service (PBS) really means development broadcasting service (DBS) in the context of most modernising nations such as Malaysia (Khattab 2004, 2-3). Debating from the aspect of public sphere on Malaysian television, the national broadcast industry as a whole is a Malay business corporation. Therefore, the public sphere of the television is built on Malay values for a Malay national family in multi-ethnic Malaysia. Minorities by accident of birth, shall remain a peripheralised national mediated symbol until independent and fair-minded programme producers are born (Morley 2004, Khattab 2004). Fundamentally, television’s potential to serve as a national public sphere, to create a national family, to brand national

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culture and to build the imagery of good government and good people is nowhere to be denied as we see it being harnessed and exploited in myriad ways by ruling elites whether in Japan, United States, Australia, Singapore or People’s Republic of China. Nations regardless of political ideology, including Malaysia during the Mahathir’s era, are branding and positioning themselves by creating a hyper reality of national culture, and this process seems enabled by commercialised public television which now has a two-pronged purpose–perpetuating state ideology while profiteering (Khattab 2004, 4). According to Umi Khattab (2004, 5), in modern Malaysia public sphere of broadcasting is served the interest of the BN government and favours the Malay Muslim more than the non-Malay. It deviates from traditional western democratic ideals and as such: 1. privileges one group over several others, one language over many others and one set of religious values over others. 2. promotes the vested interest of the main component ruling political party i.e. UMNO. 3. represents a polarised Malaysian society i.e. Malays and nonMalays or Bumiputera (prince of the soil) and non-Bumiputera (ethnic minorities or colonial immigrants) and Muslim and nonMuslims. 4. mediates two public spheres–one sacred and the other non-sacred and within each enables several circuits of discourses and practices. Further argued Khattab, a privileged Muslim public sphere is evident in TV1 and a non-Muslim public sphere in TV2. It seems, in other words, the sacred and the non-sacred are being nationally mediated. The former is filled with purity; it is non-penetrable by foreign cultural elements and beyond “the non(s)” (colloquial reference to minorities). The primary language is Malay and the values are Islamic. The latter, however, is typically diverse and free for all, with a potpouri of Chinese, Tamil and English news and entertainment programmes from local and abroad. TV2 airs programmes for the Chinese largely imported from Hong Kong, for the Indians imported from India and for the English-speaking viewers imported from Singapore and the United States in the main. While on the one hand, RTM may point out that it is providing fair content for all minority groups via TV2, on the other, knowingly or not, it is guilty of perpetuating a deeply wedged pure and impure public sphere. It is in effect

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stumbling Mahathir’s vision of creating a single Malaysian race (bangsa Malaysia) come 2020 (Khattab 2004, 5). Within the Malay-Muslim public sphere itself, there prevails a form of subtle dualism–one for the Bandar (urban) Muslims and one for the Kampong (rural) Muslims.17 The Kampong Muslim masses who are constantly bombarded with Islamic genre, seen as an important constituent of the opposition Islamic party (PAS) and therefore must be won over. The Bandar Muslim tends to denote the Malay-bumiputera privileged middle class who are an important constituent of the ruling Malay party UMNO whose undivided loyalty must be preserved and nurtured. Thus, while the Kampong and the Bandar are the chosen audiences for TV1 – the prime channel and the first channel, all the rest of the audiences, albeit the nonMalays, are fed with all local and foreign programmes by a second channel. Indeed, public broadcasting in Malaysia reflects how one ethnic group is privileged over several other ethnic groups. To be inclusive in a divisive manner is nothing but a reflection of the Malaysian ethnic-based political party system where the ruling Barisan Nasional is made up of the UMNO (a Malay party) representing the Bandar Malay Muslims, while MIC (Indian component party) and MCA (Chinese component party) represent the non-Malays. Having said that, now there are many private television stations such as TV3, NTV7, and ASTRO are catered for all Malaysians through the programmes. Even news, all the stations broadcast multilingual news segments in Malays, Mandarin, Tamil and English which are for the purpose to cater the need of all races in Malaysia including the foreigners. Sensitive political fora and debates are not allowed to be broadcasted in local television. From the current entertainment programmes point of view, there are many foreign programmes not only from the US but also from Latin America, East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China), and other Southeast Asian countries (particularly Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippine, and Singapore) flooded the broadcasting industry in Malaysia and broadcasted by the local stations including TV1 and TV2. Thus, the unofficial government policy of broadcasting 80 percent of local programmes and 20 percent of imported or foreign programmes by Malaysian television stations is seemed unrealistic and difficult to achieve (Juliana 2006, 183). The reality is that the public sphere of the television is limited especially for the opposition. The BN government is the only party that

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can access the broadcasting media freely to propagate and voicing its agenda and propaganda. The space for political speech and political freedom is obviously limited, regulated and restricted by the government. Although the public sphere is provided to all races and foreigners in Malaysia, the open public deliberation and discourse, as suggested by Habermas in the bourgeois public sphere, are missing from the context on Malaysian broadcasting media. Hence, the refeudalisation and commercialisation of the media are denying the public to have a free media.

Malaysia’s Refeudalised Media The role of the media depends crucially upon the configuration of power to which the media are linked. In the Malaysian case, the refeudalisation of public sphere has managed to put the power of the media concentrated within the political elite. The main circuit of influence passes from this elite through the media system to other groups and power centres in society. The political elites generally use state power to develop a clientelist system of patronage and influence. In Malaysia, the media primarily follows the policy of “Asian values”, and the goal of the media under such a system is to support and advance the policies of the government. The major function in such a system is establishing and exercising effective control over the media, mostly privately owned. Control mechanisms include but are not limited to a licensing system, government censorship, special taxes, and restrictive laws, such as treason and sedition, and implicit and explicit threats. Control is also exercised through the award of television franchises to allies, generous state loans, subsidies and government advertising to lubricate media goodwill, the waiving of monopoly controls to boost the growth of friendly media groups, state posts for top media people, and highly restrictive laws enabling the imprisonment of dissident journalists who stray outside this system of control (Curran 2000, 133). One theorist of the press system, Frederick S. Siebert, has analysed the system of the authoritarian press (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956, 18-26). This authoritarian system, according to Siebert, does not object to discussion of the political system in broad philosophical terms, but will not allow direct criticism of current political leaders or their projects, or overt attempts to unseat the existing authorities. Furthermore, Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard (2001, 310) argue that Siebert’s concept of authoritarian press is roughly based on the sixteenth and seventeenth

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century English history and philosophy of the absolute power of the monarch, and this authoritarian system has been the most pervasive both historically and geographically. The press in Malaysia which is under refeudalisation process is often regarded as the prototype of the authoritarian press in Asia (Yin 2003, 1-13). However in Malaysia, the means used to control the press bear only some similarities to those used in sixteenth or seventeenth century England, including government censorship, suspension of licenses, legal actions against the press and even shutting down the offending publications. But, according to Jiafei Yin (2003, 1-13), that is where the similarities stop. The authoritarian press was based on the history of Western society and Christianity of the sixteenth and seventeenth century England, while the press in Malaysia is shaped more by Malaysian cultural tradition or Asian values, and the practical needs of geo-political realities. Yin argues that the Malaysian restrictions are defended in terms of “Asian values”, which sets them far apart from the kind of authoritarianism that originated in England. Although “Asian values”, with the strong influences of Islam and Confucianism, and “Western values”, of Christianity, in sixteenth and seventeenth century England are dissimilar in practices, but in terms of the role they play in both societies and how the state has used and manipulated them are rather similar. Ideologically, the elites and their intellectual supporters in both perspectives express a preference for systems of government that is underpinned by moral values, social norms and cultural attitudes which are said to be derived from religious and philosophical traditions, and historical experiences. It is clear in Malaysia that, from the perspective of elites seeking to exert domestic control, “Asian values” is part of their dominant discourse, and laden with hegemonic intent (Khoo B.T. 1999). The principal dissimilarity between the authoritarian press in Malaysian and the sixteenth and seventeenth English experience is the geo-political context. Malaysia has to face the issue of race relations and national and regional sensitivities. The government keeps a watchful eye on the press for any stories that address race relations or problems in foreign countries. Controversial stories in these areas are banned because of the mixed racial and religious makeup of Malaysian population and often-sensitive relations with its neighbours. Through the refeudalisation process, the media manage to instil the neo-feudal psychology among the Malaysian people in order for the government to control and manipulate the public sphere for its own interest which is to grasp the political power. Syed Hussein Alatas (1968,

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584-585) observes that although the institutional and judicial system of feudalism had gradually disappeared in the peninsular Malay states with the development of modernisation during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the psychological traits of feudalism have remained. He calls this “psychological feudalism”, meaning an attitude or relationship characterised by personal attachment to the leader, in which the subordinate is expected to be loyal and faithful under all circumstances. Chandra Muzaffar supports Hussein’s view and accepts Rushton Coulborn and Joseph R. Strayer’s (1956, 1-13) definition of feudalism as “a method of government, a certain relationship between the protector (the feudal lord) and the protected (his vassal)”. In his book Protector?, Chandra (1979, vii & 1) is concerned with the “Malay protector-protected relationship”, whose origins he traced to the Melaka Sultanate and which now exists in practices of the ruling party, UMNO. He describes the relationship as one of “neo-feudal psychology”: “The protector is averse to any attempt by anyone especially among the protected to question, criticise or challenge his policies and position while the protected is reluctant to evaluate, scrutinise or admonish the protector even when he has erred or is in the wrong.” (Chandra 1998, 1)

This relationship between the ruler and the ruled, which has been particularly strong within the majority Malay community, has been reinforced by the deep psychological need for a “protector” to look after the community’s interests in the face of the competition from the economically better-off Chinese minority. Invariably, it was the UMNO President and Prime Minister, who donned the mantle of “protector”. Loyalty to the protector was, however, not just a product of feudal psychology. As in other political systems, what assured the protector of the loyalty of his followers were the perks and positions he could provide. This “neo-feudal” political culture that has generated the “herd” mentality or “follow the leader” syndrome, is another feature that is very widespread (Pathmanathan 1995, 11). Musa Hitam (2001), the former Chairman of the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM), is critical of the neo-feudal argument. He argued that the post of the UMNO President and Prime Minister cannot be seen as parallel to the role of the king, which justifies the feudalistic practices. In his view, neo-feudalism only exists in the mind and attitude of leaders, hoping for the people’s loyalty. This feudalistic attitude has weakened democracy and freedom of speech because no one was permitted to question the leader although the leader’s decision is

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sometimes wrong from people’s point of view. Musa claims that freedom of the press is so limited in Malaysia that citizens could be judged as antinational and disloyal to the country if they criticise the decisions and policies, especially on economic development, of the leaders in power because there is no distinction between the state and the ruler. While the Malaysian government sometimes has good reasons for restricting press freedom on the basis of civil order and racial harmony, it is still the case that it has manipulated these issues to reinforce its position in power. Public political speech in the mainstream media is allowed only to the ruling leaders and government officials. Zainuddin Maidin reportedly told Parliament in October 2002 that opposition parties will not be given air and radio time on state owned television and radio stations because Malaysia is “undeveloped”. He said, “We are still a developing country. We will only be developed when orang kampong (villagers) do not buy the issues of race and religion raised by the opposition.” He added that opposition parties could disseminate their views through the commercial media and the Internet (SUARAM 2003b, 78-79). However, this argument is unconvincing because opposition parties as well as the public are entitled to participate in the public sphere and political process of decision-making as long as they are not provoking racial and religious conflict. The opposition should have the right to criticise the government and should be allowed to publish their criticism in the mainstream media. So far, the opposition is only allowed to publish political criticism in its own party’s bimonthly newspaper or on the Internet. The manipulation of the media by the government and the refeudalisation process are clearly seen through the government monopoly over the definition of what was in the interest of nation and what was antinational in which made it difficult for people to let an idea for a reform reach the public sphere for consideration. Only the government is allowed to define what is in the national interest and what is not. If certain demands for change and ideas to reform the political system or media system are considered by them to be detrimental to the nation, they have to be suppressed. An example to corroborate this point was the case of SUHAKAM’s criticism of the high-handed behaviour of the police during a mass demonstration, by supporters of the Reformasi movement, on a public highway. The government, rather than responding to the criticism of unwarranted police aggression, reprimanded the human rights commission. When reporting the reaction of the government to SUHAKAM’s criticism, the headline of the leading English daily, NST,

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read: “Suhakam taken to task. Dr. Mahathir: Commission not acting in the interest of nation”. The NST article on this topic quoted the prime minister as saying: “They (Suhakam) are very much influenced by Western thinking”. He advised members of the commission to think as Malaysians (NST 2001, 1). The only interpretation of this public discourse one could make was that the beating of Malaysians by police officers was in the interest of nation, whereas criticising such an act reflected anti-Malaysian behaviour and thinking (Derichs 2004, 119-120). This approach had also been applied during the campaign period in the 2008 general election. Malaysian media showed a mutual support to the BN government. For instance, the NST carries the headlines such as “Malay voters still with Pak Lah (nick name for prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi)”, “BN sure of surpassing two-thirds majority”, and “Opposition caught offguard” (NST 2008a) (See further discussion Chapter 5). The government is clearly undermined the public sphere of the media and freedom of the press. The refeudalisation process in Malaysian media manages to silence dissent and critical views to the political elites in order to prolong the current government, the BN or UMNO, to stay in power.

Conclusion In sum, Malaysian government is able to dominate public sphere through controlling the media. Strengthening media law, self-censorship and media ownership by companies that have close relation with political elite in the ruling government are some of the practices that restrict freedom of the press. One of the methods used by the government in sustaining the domination of the media is by implementing refeudalisation process. The ruling government instils neo-feudal psychology in order to maintain loyalty among the people. Malaysian government also monopolises over the definition of what is in the national interests. The government argues that it has effectively controlled the media to promote national stability over the last fifty years. Freedom of the press has been limited on this ground because racial and ethnic politics still dominates Malaysia’s politics. However, the opposition has criticised the government policy towards the media arguing that, in reality, it has a political agenda to keep the ruling BN party in power and control people’s views accordingly. Hence, the idea of refeudalisation should be rejected and the public sphere should be opened for the people to have debates, dialogues and deliberations for the common good. For the next chapter, this book will assess the legislation aspect of the media and how the laws control the media in order to understand the level of freedom of the press in Malaysia.

CHAPTER THREE MEDIA LEGISLATION

Freedom of the press is valuable if people have full and true information on all matters of public interest. Democracy requires that the people should be able to know everything that is in their interest to know, and that it is the duty of the media to collect such information and communicate it to the masses. Patrick Birkinshaw (1996, 14) argues that while information itself is important, our ability to discern the degree of the reliability of the information provided is essential in the exploitation of resources or relationships, or in the exposure of sham. Information acquired through scientific enquiry establishes that it is irrational to believe that consulting the auspices, the stars or the tea leaves is a reliable indication of future events. Information is necessary to make sensible choice or wise judgement. Moral and ethical evaluation depends upon information acquired through our own and our predecessors’ experience. Information in the form of facts institutes the basis of order in our lives, of community, regularity and knowledge. In practice, it is the media that can most effectively search for such information, and disseminate it. The access to all necessary information is a pre-requisite for the media to discharge its functions of informing and educating the people and for acting as the watchdog of their interests. Every democratic regime should, as an essential attribute of it, give access to its citizens to all the requisite information and media can perform its proper role. In Malaysia, the government uses legal measures to contain the media from being critical and perform as civil society that encourages public deliberation. Many accuse the government of manipulating the media as tool for propaganda in ensuring the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) government maintains its status quo as the power holder. However, the government argues that it has to restrict and control the press because Malaysia as a multicultural, multiracial and multireligious country has many sensitive considerations before press freedom could be implemented. Despite Malaysia should be cautious about the issues of pornography and hate speech, the government also argues that it favours or

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prioritises the economic and development issue than the issue of free press. Therefore, this chapter will analyse thoroughly the media laws and issues surrounding them.

Federal Constitution and Laws Regulating the Media The Malaysian constitution guides and legislatures restrict media freedom through a number of Acts. Among them are the Internal Security Act (ISA), Sedition Act (SA), and Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) plus several specific media Acts such as the Broadcasting Act, the Control of Imported Publication Act, the BERNAMA Act, and the FINAS Act. The government uses these restrictive laws to limit in the function and role of media industry in the country.

The Federal Constitution Freedom of expression and press is formally assured by Part II of the Federal Constitution under Article 10(1) entitled “Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association”. Article 10(1) allows a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression; b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; and c) all citizens have the right to form associations. However, although citizens have a right to freedom of expression and press, Section 2 of the Article limits the right where Parliament may by law impose: “(a) On the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence;” (Federal Constitution 1999, 11)

Based on the provision above, the BN government has sought to protect institutions i.e. the Parliament, Courts and federal and states government from a loss of credibility and confidence arising from criticism facilitated by the practice of freedom of expression and press. The BN government has tried to avoid any misuse and exploitation of the freedoms by the citizens or foreigners that could embarrass the nation and in particular the government. For instance, the Malaysian government supported the 12 weeks’ imprisonment (reduced on appeal to six weeks) of Murray Hiebert, a Far Eastern Economic Review journalist, on 4 September 1997 for his

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article entitled “See You in Court” which scandalised the court and threatened the credibility of judicial institutions.1 Article 10(4) explains the reason for restricting freedom of expression and the press: “In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part of thereof or public order under Clause (2) (a), Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part II, Article 152, 153 and 182 otherwise in relation to the implementation thereof as may specified in such law.” (Federal Constitution 1999, 12)

The provision of Article 10(4) was part of the amendment of the Federal Constitution in 1971 and was enforced on 10 March 1971 as a reaction to the racial conflict of 13 May 1969. During five weeks of the 1969 General Election campaign and before the racial tension erupted on 13 May 1969, the Perikatan party (now BN) faced a stiff challenge from the opposition parties, especially the Democratic Actions Party (DAP) and the Gerakan party (in the 1974 General Election, Gerakan had joined BN and currently still coincides with the BN). The opposition was accused by the Perikatan of using freedom of expression and the press to exploit racial sentiments and dissatisfaction among non-Malays, particularly Chinese and Indians, over the special rights of Malays with respect to particular occupations and higher posts in the public sectors and bringing to an end Chinese hegemony in the business industries (Comber 1983, 63). A State of Emergency was declared after the racial clash. The Federal Constitution was also amended to prohibit anyone including members of Parliament during Parliamentary sessions from questioning Part III of the Federal Constitution on Citizenship, Article 152 on National Language, Article 153 on Malay special rights to a quota of public service posts, permits and university enrolments, and Article 181 on saving for Rulers’ sovereignty2 (Rais 1995, 168).

The Internal Security Act 1960 In 1960, the government made a decision to end the state of emergency caused by communist insurgency, despite the fact that the threat was still extant. As a result, the government took an initiative to create a new law, similar to Emergency Ordinance 1948 in the insurgency period called the

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Internal Security Act (ISA), with its main objective to eliminate the subversive threat and extinguish terrorism (Wu Min Aun 1999, 268). There are a few provisions under the ISA restricting people’s freedom in Malaysia mainly in term of freedom of expression and the press. Section 8(1) of the ISA provides: “If the Minister (Home Minister) is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a detention order) directing that person be detained for any period not exceeding two years.” (ISA 1998, 187)

Clearly this shows that Home Minister has the power to determine whether an individual should be arrested under ISA because his or her acts may be judged by the police and Home Ministry as a threat to the country or even to the government. Section 8(5) further allows for “restriction orders”, i.e. imposing restrictions on a person’s freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of expression if the Minister is satisfied that such restrictions are necessary for the above-mentioned purposes (SUARAM 2003a). Section 8(5) mentions that if the Minister is satisfied that any purposes mentioned in subsection (1) it is necessary that control and supervision should be exercised over any person or that restriction and conditions should be imposed upon that person in respect of his activities, freedom of movement or places of residence or employment, but that for that purpose it is unnecessary to detain him he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as “a restriction order” imposing upon that person all or any of the following restrictions and conditions: (a) for imposing upon that person such as may be specified in the order in respect of his activities and the places of his residence and employment; (b) for prohibiting him from being out of doors between such hours as may be specified in the order, except under the authority of written permit granted by such authority or person as may be so specified; (c) for requiring him to notify his movement in such manner at such times and to such authority or person as may be specified in the order; (d) for prohibiting him from addressing public meetings or from holding office in, or taking part in the activities as adviser to, any

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organisation or association, or from taking part in any political activities; and (e) for prohibiting him from traveling beyond the limits of Malaysia or any part thereof specified in the order except in accordance with permission given to him by such authority or person as may be specified in such order. In addition Section 22(1) empowers the Minister to ban the printing and circulation of publications that are deemed prejudicial to security and public order. He may do so if he finds that the publication (ISA 1998, 19899): (a) contains any incitement to violence; (b) counsels disobedience to the law or any lawful order; (c) is calculated or likely to lead to the breach of the peace, or to promote feelings of hostility between different races or classes of the population; or (d) is prejudicial to the national interest, public order, or security of Malaysia. Detention under the ISA could not be challenged in any courts with no role for judicial review. In 1989, the Parliament passed amendments to the ISA where Section 8B(1) prevents any acts of the Minister taken under the ISA from being brought into question by the courts. Section 8B(1) as amended reads: “There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.” (ISA 1998, 180)

Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, argued that the government alone was able to determine, from information it received, what action was necessary to preserve the country’s stability and security and that: “It is not appropriate for us to follow the practice in other countries where courts play an interventionist role in substituting the decisions of the Executive as this is against the concept of ‘separation of powers’ between the Executive and the Judiciary.” (Amnesty International 1999, 13)

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Printing and electronic media are restricted–both printing and broadcasting media are limited to voicing good news about the government leaders and race relations in Malaysia. Besides, there is strict policy for the media practitioners especially the journalists in reporting the news if it is against the government policy and inflicts political instability in the country. The person responsible for drafting of ISA in 1960, R.H.Hickling, agreed that the act had become tougher and was open to mishandling by the government for political reasons: “Since I drafted the original act, the ISA has been tightened up and tightened up until now there’s no provision for judicial review. Unfortunately over the years the powers have been abused. Instead of locking up people suspected of organizing violence, which is the phrase used in the preamble to the ISA, it’s been used to lock up political opponents, quite harmless people.” (Wu Min Aun 1999, 269)

In November 2002, Sarawak police chief Mohd Yusoff Jaafar threatened to use the ISA against those who posted “seditious” messages on a popular website, “Sarawak Talk” that could stir up racial and religious hatred or threaten the peace in the state. He added that the police could trace them even if they had pseudonyms and that his men were very close to apprehending them. In December 2002, a total of 10 persons were arrested under Section 28 of the ISA for allegedly disseminating false reports in emails warning of pre-planned bombings in Kuala Lumpur. Police also seized personal computers allegedly used to forward the e-mail. All of them have since been released on bail. The offence carries a fine not exceeding RM5,000, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both. Following the incident, Deputy Education Minister Abdul Aziz Shamsuddin said that the UMNO supreme council meeting had discussed the viability of imposing harsher sentences, including whipping, on those who spread rumours or sent poison pen letters, as their actions could threaten national stability (SUARAM 2003b, 36).

The Official Secret Act 1972 The Official Secret Act (OSA) 1972 (Act 88) replaced the Malay States Official Secret Ordinance 1950 and was based on the British OSA 1911 and 1920. It was intended to curb and protect government secrets from falling into the hands of foreign agents or countries where this might be detrimental to national security. However the OSA was also seen to impose wide, largely unjustified restrictions on the rights to freedom of

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expression and press, and on the examination and discussion of issues of public interest by the political opposition. By curbing access to public information and information relating to the public interest, the electorate’s right to know was curtailed and the means to uphold public accountability weakened (Amnesty International 1999). The OSA defines an official secret as any documents of the Cabinet, State Executive Council and documents concerning national security, defence and international relations. However, under Section 2 of OSA defines official secret as any official letters, information, and other material which is classified by the Minister, the Chief Minister of state or appointed public officers as “Top Secret”, “Secret”, “Confidential” or “Restricted” (OSA 1998, 277). Section 2B allows the Minister and the Chief Minister of State appoint public officers through a letter of approval signing by the Minister and the Chief Minister of State to classify any official letters, information or material as “Top Secret”, “Secret”, “Confidential”, or “Restricted” (OSA 1998, 280). The Minister and the Chief Minister of State have a total control of the government documents and can hold it as secret as long as they want. It can therefore, cover any government document, and because of the unclear meaning of the word “secret”, any ministers and public officers could effectively classify any documents, materials and information as secret whenever they wish. As a result of the broad powers they have, many government documents are unjustly classified as “official secret”, which seriously undermines the right to information. Moreover, under Article 16A, the decision of ministers and appointed public officer in classifying official secret is final and cannot be challenged in court. It looks like a denial of the right to judicial review and an abrogation of the power of the judiciary (Yap S.S. 2002). When the government amended the Act in 1983 and again in 1986, there were many criticisms from the opposition as well as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) who were worried that the act could be misused (Aziz B. 1999, 17). The 1983 amendment increased the fine as a response to the Bumiputera Malaysian Finance Ltd. (BMF) scandal. The BMF scandal had jeopardised government credibility when foreign media published articles from government sources and information from public officers, involving some of Malaysia’s political leaders. BMF scandal had caused BMF a major loss with a total of RM2.5 billion through Hong Kong branch. It happened when three Hong Kong land brokers turned bankrupt caused by the downturn of land market in Hong Kong. Although the loss came from the ambiguity issue in loan and the flaw of documentation, the close relations between BMF officers and few leaders

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might be the cause of the loss (Crouch 1996, 202). Implication from the BMF case, amendment of the OSA was done once again in 1986 to change from fine penalty to mandatory punishment for one year (Chandra 1989, 141). On 13 January 2000, the conviction under Section 8(1)(i) OSA was of Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor,3 Youth Chief of the National Justice Party, for disclosing two classified Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) reports. These concerned an investigation into corruption by two political leaders, Minister of International Trade and Industry Rafidah Aziz and former Chief Minister of Melaka Rahim Tamby Chik (MASSA 2000, 30).4 No criminal proceeding was ever initiated against the named parties. Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Rais Yatim, who is also the de facto law minister, has since said that the cases against the two ministers have been closed, as the evidence against them was unsubstantiated. However, in Ezam’s speech to the court after his conviction, he said that the ACA, as supported by the attorney general’s chamber, had recommended criminal prosecution against Rafidah on five counts of corruption and against Rahim on four counts of corruption (SUARAM 2003b, 85). Sections 16(1) and (2) of the OSA contain broad provisions allowing for arrest and detention without warrant, and substantially reverses the burden of proof. It states that “until the contrary is proven”, any of the activities proscribed under the Act will be presumed to have been undertaken “for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of Malaysia” (SUARAM 2003a, 11). This makes it difficult for opposition leaders who are always critical towards government policies (Chandra 1989, 137-39).5 For example in early case of 1976, DAP Secretary General Lim Kit Siang was found guilty of receiving and revealing information about the purchase of Swedish warships for the Malaysian Navy, a controversy which prompted allegations within and outside parliament of excessive expenditure and possible misuse of public funds. The judgment in his case established that once official documents came into possession of an unauthorised party it was ipso facto a violation of Section 8, if it could not be proved that the transmission of the documents was with lawful authorisation. Lim Kit Siang was fined RM15,000. However, on appeal, the Federal Court reduced the fine to less than RM2,000, and Lim Kit Siang was therefore not automatically disqualified from the Parliament (Amnesty International 1999, 28).6

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In 1992, civil servants and journalists allegedly involved in the leak of official documents concerning the controversial purchase of cars for Kuala Lumpur City Hall were threatened with prosecution. Then in 1995, two Harian Metro journalists in Johor were arrested under the OSA and remanded in custody for reporting a local kidnapping case using information, which the police regarded as “classified”. Charges were not pursued. In April 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (now Prime Minister of Malaysia) stated that he would issue guidelines to government media officers to clarify that the OSA should not be used by officials to suppress information from the public (Amnesty International 1999). Although the secrecy of government documents is important for the national security, the use of the Act to shield corruption, if it is happened, is clearly an abuse of power. The OSA provides that anything classified by the Executive as secret is to be treated as such, no matter what its content and clearly, the OSA can be used as a tool to restrict public freedom and to prevent people’s freedom of the press.

The Sedition Act 1948 The Sedition Act (SA) 1948 (Act 15) was implemented by the British colonial government in Malaya in 1948. It was known as Sedition Ordinance 1948, designed to contain any risk to the colonial administration triggered by local people’s dissatisfaction and initiated by communist party insurgency. Chandra Muzaffar (2000, 1) believes the reason behind the creation of this law by the British was not only to contain communist militancy but also to restrain rising nationalist movements, especially from UMNO, seeking to free Malaya from British colonisation. After the events of 13 May 1969, the SA was tightened for the purposes of national stability. Since the amendment of the Act in February 1971, the government strictly enforced the law and prosecuted anyone who questioned about the citizenship status of the non-Malays; national language and other communities language; Malay special rights or other races interests; and Malay Rulers sovereignty (Malaysia 1971, 3).7 Section 2 SA defines the word “seditious” as anyone who does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do, or conspires with any person to do any act which has or would have a seditious tendency, who utters any seditious words, or who prints, publishes or imports any seditious publication.

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Furthermore, it is a crime to have in one’s possession, without lawful excuse, any seditious publication (Sedition Act 1998, 391). Seditious acts also include organising a public hearing or publishing an article which could create public disorder or instability, i.e. picketing, strikes, demonstrations, riots and undermining the credibility of government bodies such as the judiciary and the police. As a result of racial rioting on 13 May 1969, SA has been used to prevent the media from publishing news that could create anger or disharmonious relations between races in Malaysia (Aziz Z. 1988, 147). The SA was used in 1971 to prosecute DAP parliamentarian Fan Yew Teng and party member Dr. Ooi Kee Saik. Fan Yew Teng had published an article entitled “Alliance Policy of Segregation: Evidence Galore” in the DAP newsletter The Rocket. This was the text of a speech by Dr. Ooi, alleging that the ruling coalition policies in a number of sectors were racially discriminatory. In 1975 Fan Yew Teng was found guilty and fined RM 2,000 or a six months’ prison sentence. He then automatically lost his parliamentary seat (Amnesty International 1999). Shad Faruqi (1989, 3) reviewed the SA in his paper entitled “Laws Relating to Press Freedom in Malaysia”. He observed that the concept of sedition in Malaysia was much broader than in the United Kingdom, Ireland, India and Australia. A Malaysian lawyer was, therefore, unable to give a clear definition of what constitutes free speech and free press and what constitutes sedition, with the consequent effect that “this legal uncertainty is very much in favour of the prosecutor”. Under the SA of Malaysia, sedition could be committed in any of the following ways: inciting disaffection against any Malay Ruler or government; inciting unlawful changes to any lawful matter; inciting contempt for the administration of justice; raising discontent among the people; promoting ill-will between races or classes, or questioning “sensitive issues” such as citizenship, the national language, special privileges of Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the status of the Malay Rulers (Mohammad H.K. 1998, 278). Sections 3(1) and 4(1)8 tightly control the political opposition and Section 9(1) regulates the press. Section 9(1) states that anyone can be prosecuted for publishing in any presses material considered by the Court as seditious (SA 1998, 394-95). On 25 August 1998, opposition parliamentarian Lim Guan Eng was imprisoned for sedition after Court in the judgement agreed that Lim had made maliciously false statements and

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published them in 1995. Lim in the statements accused the Attorney General of mishandling allegations that the Chief Minister of Melaka was guilty of statutory rape of a schoolgirl. Because of his conviction, Lim Guan Eng was disqualified from being a Member of Parliament or holding elective office. He was prohibited from holding any position in a political party for five years and barred from pursuing his profession as an accountant. The most serious defect of sedition laws in Malaysia is that they represent a disproportionately serious interference with democratic debate. Any benefits they may be deemed to bring in terms of protecting public order, which as the analysis above makes clear, are slight, are far outweighed by the harm done to freedom of expression in its most important guise, namely as an underpinning of democracy. Lee Min Choon (1989, 5) comments that some of the restrictions imposed under the SA “may be unreasonable”. The writer further points out that judicial construction and elaboration by the judges have not helped matters. One particular judicial remark on the meaning of “disaffection” was analysed, and the assessment it invoked from the writer was that “this restriction tends to stifle the legitimate activities and aims of political opposition” (Mohammad H.K. 1998, 279).

The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 The Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) 1984 (Act 301) was based on Printing Presses Ordinance 1948 used during Emergency period caused by communist insurgency. This Ordinance was revised in 1971 because of the rioting on 13 May 1969 to provide the power to revoke the licenses of newspapers that aggravated national sensitivities or were detrimental to national development goals. The Ordinance became the PPPA in 1984. PPPA has also been used to strengthen and tighten the law regarding the monitoring of ownership of printing presses and the production of materials such as books, papers and magazines. Section 3 requires each publication to apply for a license or permit from Home Minister annually. This can be withdrawn without judicial review. It is systematically used to force the media to conform to government-approved views (SUARAM 2003a). Section 3 states: “The Minister may in his absolute discretion grant to any person a license to keep for use or use a printing press for such a period as may be specified in the license and he may in his absolute discretion refuse any application

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for such license or may at any time revoke or suspend such license for any period he considers desirable” (PPPA 1997, 319-327). Under Section 7 of the PPPA, the government may at its discretion ban the publication, import and circulation of any manuscripts deemed prejudicial to “public order, morality, security, the relationship with any foreign country or government, or which is likely to alarm public opinion, or which is otherwise prejudicial to public interest or national interest”. The PPPA further provides in Section 8A(1) for a jail term and/or heavy fine of RM 20,000 for editors, journalists, publishers, and printers if found guilty of “maliciously publishing false news”, defined as “not taking reasonable measures to verify the news”. Former Judge and Vice Chairman of the Malaysian Human Rights Commission, Harun Hashim (1999, 13) commented that: “The Act (PPPA) is clearly unconstitutional if the constitutional rights tand alone ... It imposes restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression, but as such restrictions are permitted by the Constitution, the law is valid.”

Chandra Muzaffar (1986, 2) reviewing the PPPA wrote: “…the 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Bill removes whatever minor safeguards that now exist in checking the exercise of executive authority. It confers absolute power upon the minister concerned. Whatever his virtues as an individual, there is no doubt that he will be in a position to control the most fundamental of all freedoms–the freedom of expression. It may well give him the sort of dictatorial image that he may not desire or deserve.”

The government has often threatened to terminate or not renew the license of some presses particularly newspapers from the opposition parties such as Harakah owned by Pan-Islamic Malaysia Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia, PAS), Suara owned by Peoples Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia, PRM) and The Rocket owned by DAP. The wider effects of the PPPA upon freedom of expression and press, the media and the development of civil society in Malaysia have been far reaching. During the Operasi Lalang (Weed Operation) in 1987 three newspapers, the English-medium The Star, the Chinese Sin Chew Jit Poh and the Malay weekly Watan had their licenses revoked. They resumed publication in 1988 but the ban, and resulting changes in editorial staff, engendered a climate of self-censorship among journalists which continued through the 1990s. This provoked serious domestic criticism of allegedly one-sided coverage by the mainstream

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press. This also remained in practice with regards to the Anwar Ibrahim case and the Reformasi movement in 1998 and 1999 (Amnesty International 1999). In 2000, the government party of BN did not renew the permits of magazines like Detik, Tamadun, Wasilah and a newspaper Eksklusif for criticising the government on the issues of Anwar and political rights.9 Harakah had been forced to limit its circulation from twice a week to twice a month and must sell the paper to the PAS party members only, not to the public. Executive Director for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Ann Cooper, protested against government actions censoring the press, naming Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as one of the enemies of the press because the government: “… severely restricts the Malaysian public’s ability to evaluate important issues facing the country … In the absence of such alternative voices, Malaysia cannot be called a democratic state.” (freeMalaysia 2000a, 1)

There are two reasons why the government wants to restrict freedom of the press and introduced PPPA in Malaysia; firstly, to ensure racial order and, secondly, to limit the ability of foreign presses in influencing people’s attitudes and minds against the government and country as a whole. A statement former Information Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Zainuddin Maidin made in May 2002 at a seminar held in conjunction with World Press Freedom Day is typical: “The big problem faced by Asian countries now after the end of the Cold War is the infiltration by subversive elements from the developed countries through their media and use of local journalists to carry out the agenda of Western media imperialism.” (SUARAM 2003b, 77)

Mahathir (1999, 71) expresses the same view with a strong criticism to the foreign imperialist agendas: “Make no mistake. The people who control the media control our minds, and probably control the world….Not the national Governments of tiny developing nations…or the Government of powerful nations. A very few people in the west control all the international media.”

For these reasons, the government uses its power to strengthen the media laws particularly the PPPA and control almost all local media companies either directly or indirectly. However, it looks like the government seeking to control people’s mind, not the western media. By controlling the media the ruling party could also contain political opposition. Raja Aziz Adruse, a widely respected lawyer has written:

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“the time has come to consider seriously the validity and constitutionality of the … Act, bearing in mind that its effect is to provide a prior restraint on the exercise of the right of free speech and expression. Instances of initially good Government becoming arrogant and corrupt through failure to check them are many.” (Wu Min Aun and Hickling 2003, 134)

Such is the proposal of a wise, experienced Malaysian counsel but, alas, likely to be ignored in official circle given his constant criticism of various governmental actions.

Other Laws Beside the laws mentioned in the previous sections, there are also several laws that responsibly and specifically restrict the media such as the Broadcasting Act, the Control of Imported Publication Act, the BERNAMA Act, and the FINAS Act. The Broadcasting Act allows Information Ministry to control and monitor all radio and television channels and stop the permit of any private companies which broadcasting information that contradict with government policies or against “Malaysian values” (Asian values from Malaysian perspective). The 1988 Act, notes Zaharom Nain (1996), was introduced: “in anticipation of the further commercialisation of broadcasting, especially television. Indeed, in the midst of the supposed ‘deregulation’ of broadcasting (it) now gives the Minister of Information virtually total powers to determine who will, and who will not broadcast, and to determine the nature of the broadcast material…On paper, this means one individual has the power to decide.”

Under the Act, any potential broadcaster needs to apply for a licence from the minister. Further, Part III, Section 10(1) of the Act states that “It shall be the duty of the licensee to ensure that the broadcasting matter by him complies with the direction given, from time to time, by the minister.” The October 1996 amendments made to the already stringent legislation were aimed at taking into account the introduction of new services, such as cable and satellite television, satellite radio, pay-TV, and video-ondemand (Zaharom 2002, 129). The Control of Imported Publication Act 1959 tries to control and regulate the circulation and transmission of all foreign media publications within Malaysia, and bestows on the government the full power to ban foreign publications if the government believes that they constitute a risk to public order, morality or the security of Malaysia. A special office in

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the Home Ministry censors all foreign publications and has repeatedly delayed licenses for publications deemed too critical of the government. Several foreign publications have been forced to retract stories or publish public apologies after publishing articles deemed too critical of the government (SUARAM 2003a, 25). For instance, the Malaysian government stopped The Economist edition entitled The World in 2004 from circulating in Malaysia because the edition included an article by the imprisoned Anwar Ibrahim criticising the Malaysian government. The BERNAMA Act (Berita Nasional Act) was established in 1967 as the government official news agency named BERNAMA, amended in June 1990 in order to give BERNAMA exclusive rights to distribute news photographs, economic and financial data and other material. The amendment also allowed BERNAMA to ignore the international conventions protecting freedom of information (Commission on Human Rights 1998, 3). The National Film Development Corporation Act (FINAS) 1981 was amended in 1984 in response to technological changes that had taken place in the film industry. The amended Act, among other things, widens the definition of film to incorporate video tapes, video discs, laser disc, and video compact discs. By so doing, officials of FINAS can exercise control over and act against people who are found to be contravening certain provisions of the Act. Under the Act, anyone who possesses three or more copies of the same film is deemed to be involved in film distribution, and therefore is required to apply for a distribution permit (Zaharom 2002, 129-130). As argued by the opposition, the government uses these restrictive laws to strengthen its power in controlling the media industry in the country. These restrictive laws are typically justified by one or more of four principal arguments: the national stability, developmental journalism, pornography and hate speech which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Conclusion Malaysian laws mentioned in this chapter are definitely curbed the practice of press freedom. Although the laws should be functioned to ensure the media responsibility being practised in Malaysia, limitations on open public debate and political speech especially expressed by the opposition in the media are contradictory to the understanding about the ideal role for the media in any democracy. Malaysian government who designs and implements the legislation has given many justifications in legitimising the practice of controlling and monitoring the media.

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Therefore, in the next chapter, this book will analyse those justifications or reasons in limiting the media. This will give us a clear picture the real purpose of the government to control the media.

CHAPTER FOUR REASONS FOR RESTRICTIONS

As discussed in preceding chapters, the right to press freedom in Malaysia is practiced with many considerations due to the make up of society which is multiracial and multicultural. There are many considerations that the people have to adopt in order to ensure that racial harmony exist in Malaysia. Malaysia has never applied the concept of freedom of the press as like in the West because sensitivities surrounding the race relations have denied the concept to be fully realised. However, there are also arguments that the restrictions on the media are not for the purpose of maintaining the racial harmony or economic prosperity in Malaysia, rather they are for the reason of ensuring the ruling BN will always in power. It is clear that all of the mainstream media are controlled by the ruling government directly and indirectly through the close-link companies. So far, the ruling BN and its supporters have argued on four factors why Malaysia has to restrict the media; national stability, developmental journalism, pornography and hate speech. Therefore, this chapter will look deeply into these four factors and will reconcile the issue whether these arguments are strong enough to justify the restrictions on the media.

National Stability Abdullah argued in a speech at the Asian Media Summit 2008 on 27 May 2008 that there is no such thing as absolute freedom and the media should not be ashamed of “self-censorship” to respect cultural norms. Abdullah is consistent in his view on “self-censorship”, as he mentioned similar view in 2006, by saying that “…different societies held different values….In a globalised world where news travels in the ‘blink of an idea’ and becomes accessible to all, cultural insensitivities and arrogance can lead cultures to clash and nations to collide” (The Star 2008a, 4). His government claims to continuously support “ethical journalism” where its fundamental consideration was to have a media that was not only free but

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also responsible. Thus, the government wants the media not to undermine racial and religious harmony to the extent that it could threaten national stability. Abdullah clearly accepts the argument of permitting the practices of self-censorship by the media. In an interview with the CNN on 16 October 2006, he admitted that the Malaysian press practises self-censorship. He argued that “…there is no such thing as absolute freedom. The degree of freedom that one exercises varies from one country to another. This is the truth” (Borneo Buletin 2006, 1). Abdullah said that if Malaysia allows total freedom of the media and rejects self-censorship, this practice could lead to mistrust and tension in society. The statement made by Abdullah for media organisations to stop raising sensitive issues on religion and race is seen by many people as a gag order. Information Minister, Zainuddin Maidin however, denied Abdullah has ever imposed a gag order. In fact, he argued that Abdullah made the statement was to ensure continuity in government policy which had been neglected by certain media. Zainuddin clarified that: “The government has identified one or two mainstream newspapers which have been abusing the freedom (of the press) to the extent that other newspaper editors have the impression that these newspapers are given special privileges…. If there are newspapers which claim they get special privileges from any quarters and want to challenge the government on this, then they should be prepared to face the consequences.” (Bernama 2006, 1)

Zainuddin notified that the Cabinet had been informed of the tendency by some newspapers to exploit religious and racial issues by blowing them out of proportion and giving rise to “unnecessary contentions”. He also argued that the government had gathered much evidence which showed the publication of articles in some newspapers (without giving the names of those newspapers), be they in the form of news, features, interviews as well as articles which had been published abroad, which aimed to deny the credibility of Islam as the official religion in Malaysia and the rights of all races in the country as contained in the Federal Constitution. The newspaper organisations should learn from the country’s journalism and media history which showed that they were also responsible for creating instability which resulted in the 13 May 1969 tragedy, following which the government was forced to act against the media by launching the “Operasi Lalang” on 27 October 1987. The newspapers should also not be used as tools for “street press freedom demonstrators” that stir racial and religious sentiments in which the government will not compromise. Zainuddin

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strongly stressed that the government will act according to the Malaysian way, he meant probably convicting the newspapers including their editors and writers under the SA and PPPA, in addressing problems that crop up to further strengthen the Malaysian press ethics (Bernama 2006). One issue that needs to be addressed which is about whether restrictive laws essential for political stability, racial harmony and economic prosperity or are they just for the purposes of autocratically maintaining the BN government in power and restricting political opposition and people’s fundamental liberties. So far, many have mix responses on this issue. The government argues that it needs the restrictive laws to ensure racial harmony in this multiracial country. It explains that the government has managed to curb any subversive elements in the country that intentionally want to disturb the national security. As evidence, there is no nationwide clash between races in Malaysia since racial tension on 13 May 1969, except for minor and near clashes such as in the cases of Kampung Medan in 2001 and HINDRAF demonstration in 2007. Communist insurgency had also renounced violence and stopped its struggle and revolution against the Malaysian government in 1989. The government however still believe that the laws are important in ensuring Malaysia to progress as developing country in sustaining economic prosperity. Tan Teng Leng, in supporting the policy of curbing the press, argues that: “For developing countries wrestling with the problem of Independence, the concept of an omnipotent Press holds no appeal. The hungry, the unemployed, the uneducated, and the homeless exact immediate attention and action. At the same time, the disparate demands of competing races, languages, and religions dictate adroit responses. Such exigencies of development and nation-building tend to engender strong pragmatic policies which might compromise freedoms and rights deemed fundamental in the West. Whether the ends justify the means is, however an issue not permitted for debate in the media because of the potentially divisive impact of divergent views…” (Tan T.L. 1989, 1)

Hasny Md Salleh (2004) concurs with Tan and argues that Malaysia exercises “controlled democracy” which simply means that as much as Malaysia is a democratic nation, the government rigidly stipulates what can be done and said. The media community is not spared this restriction. The government provides the guidelines to the media community of what can and cannot be reported through the media. The media is used by the government as its informational tool to reach out to the population, reporting successes for the country and reports of the failures and

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defamation of the opposition party. He admits that all these can be seen as the downside of the Malaysian government. Malaysia views the media as a “double-edged weapon” and thus, must be controlled and exploited to the advantage of the government of the day. However, argued Hasny (2004), political instability means lost of foreign direct investment and could give rise to internal security problems such as racial clashes or religious confrontations. Therefore, Malaysia must understand that the fragility and diversity of the religious and social structures are potentialities for instability. Efforts must be maintained to ensure that a strong government and racial integration remain intact to facilitate and accommodate further development for the nation. However, these are sensitive issues that if not handled accordingly, could give rise to terrorism. Malaysia also realised that it needs to have a strong system of government. Most terrorist organisations are found in countries that have weak and unstable government or failed states. These states become easier targets, easily influenced and enable the terrorists to promote terrorism. Terrorism will have little or no support at all from a country that has a strong and stabilised form of government. The government remained sensitive over issues such as race, culture, religion and ethnicity and every opportunity was taken to deny the terrorists from exploiting theses issues. The government also ensured that the general social system was viewed as stable with the equitable distribution of power and rights, both politically and socially. According to Hasny (2004), if all the issues such as the fragile social structure (social integration), extremist religious groups, national security and the role of the media are not handled diplomatically, there will be dire prospects for political instability. Therefore, Hasny advocates that Malaysia needs all its legislative tools such as the restrictive laws of the ISA, OSA, SA and PPPA to remain politically and economically stable. Many reject the argument made by the government that repressive laws are important for political stability and racial harmony. The opposition party for many years argue that laws are definitely important for national stability and social order against crime, but repressive laws in Malaysia are existed for the political purposes. The only intention of the government to maintain and enforce the repressive laws is to prolong BN government in power. In the perspective of media, although licenses have since been freely issued to the opposition publications since 1988 and articles highly critical of the government are regularly published, the fact remains that 581 journalists have felt inhibited by the existing statutory controls to the point that on World Press Freedom Day on 3 May 1999, they presented a

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Memorandum to the Home Minister calling for repealing the restrictive laws especially on media. The “compelling arguments” they made in favour of abolishing the Acts, especially the PPPA, are as follows (Shankar 1999): 1. 2. 3.

4.

Existing libel laws more than adequately safeguard against irresponsible journalism as well as provide legal recourse for parties who feel they have been wronged. The local media have over the years shown themselves to be mindful of the fact that we live in a multiethnic society. So long as the Acts exist, with all its attendant controls on the media the power to shut down a newspaper, withdraw a publisher’s license indefinitely and “arrest without warrant any person found committing any offence under this act”–the local press will continue to be viewed with a certain amount of distrust by ordinary Malaysians. The arbitrary and absolute powers of the Home Ministry over the local press, only serves to reinforce the impression the Malaysia is undemocratic, with an opaque and authoritarian system of administration.

In my view, both national stability and freedom of the press are important in Malaysia. Malaysia needs a thorough public deliberation in this issue whether Malaysians prefer the restrictive laws to be either preserved, reviewed or abolished. However, I concur with the argument made by the SUHAKAM on this issue. It does not deny that laws are useful in accomplishing national stability. SUHAKAM (2003a, ix-x) describes that it is clear that human rights principles have built-in flexibility that allows for limitation of some individual rights and freedoms in the preservation of national security and public order. However, there are caveats. When resorting to powers or measures that lead to the limitation of rights, certain stringent conditions, which are as follows, must apply: First, the limitation of rights of an individual must be imposed solely for the purpose of protecting a legitimate aim that is prescribed by international human rights principles. Second, the limitation of rights must be absolutely necessary for the protection of the legitimate aim. Third, the limitation of rights must be proportional to the protection of the legitimate aim. It must be remembered, however, that, there are some rights and freedoms that cannot be limited and they include the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Fourth, there must be adequate safeguards so as to avoid any

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abuse of powers. These conditions must be adhered to at all times as they greatly assist in the very difficult but not impossible task of striking a fair balance between two very important but, at times, competing public interests–legitimate national security concerns, on the one hand, and fundamental freedoms of an individual, on the other. SUHAKAM (2003a, x) also argues that the government, being the ultimate entity entrusted with the solemn duty of ensuring national security, is given wide latitude to make judgements when interpreting the “legitimate aim” and when applying the principles of “necessity” and “proportionality” in the determination of the scope of the limitation of the rights of an individual. The aim of this wide latitude is to enable the government to adapt international human rights standards in accordance with the local environment. Such judgements, however, must not be made arbitrarily. Further, it is reasonable to say that in a democracy, the government cannot possibly have the sole right of interpretation in the application of these principles. Instead, the right of interpretation of these principles by the Judiciary and other responsible institutions or citizens of the nation must also be respected. By considering the law and practice in relation to the ISA, and other laws as well, to date in light of the four human rights principles on the limitation of the rights of a person, declared by SUHAKAM (2003a), it is clear that the balance between national security and human rights or freedom under the ISA is disproportionately weighted in favour of national security. Therefore, the time has come for all Malaysians to evaluate this issue constructively and rationally with the view to redressing this imbalance. Laws are obviously essential to protect national stability, but laws should also protect human rights and people’s right to free press because they are vital for the common good in ensuring Malaysia has a responsible democratic government that serves for the people’s interests.

Developmental Journalism It is claimed that economic rights can be more important than political rights, and that it is necessary to focus on economic development. At the current level of development in Malaysia, it is maintained that people’s economic well-being must assume primary importance and this justifies the argument of “economics first”. Malaysian leaders claim that political stability is of primary importance to economic development, and a strong government is best able to assure the required stability. One argument is that economic progress can best be achieved by a government that need

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not deal with a political opposition. To be sure, multinational corporations are more likely to invest in Malaysia, if it is viewed as being able to provide a stable and secure environment. Mahathir disputes the notion that freedom and human rights are pre-requisite for economic success. He argues that: “The West tells us that democratic freedom and human rights are fundamental for the achievement of economic and social development. We in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) never disputed that democracy for the people and opportunity for the individual to develop his or her own greatest potentials are indeed important principles. We disagree, however, that democracy has only one definition or that political systems qualify as democratic only when they measure up to certain particular yard-stick. Similarly, the norms and precepts for the observance of human rights vary from society to society and from one period to another within the same society. Therefore, when the issue of human rights (including press freedom) are linked to trade, investment and finance we cannot but view them as added conditionalities and protectionism by other means.” (World Youth Foundation 1999, 35)

In spite of the claims of Malaysian leaders, especially Mahathir, attempting to justify the restriction of political liberties in the name of furthering economic growth, it has never been demonstrated that depriving citizens of their civil rights leads to an increase in the rate of economic growth of a country. The problem with the “economics first” argument is that, as government elites are the actors who declare when the threshold of sufficient economic development has been achieved, there is no one to hold accountable in two respects. First, no one will actually compel them to declare when the threshold has been reached. Secondly, if no clear criteria are put forward to define the threshold, it remains a matter of state prerogative. The fear then is that civil and political rights will be perpetually suppressed in the name of the nebulous and indeterminate goal of economic development (Nadirsyah 2002, 35). Malaysian leaders also argue that the press should not engage in continuous, caustic attacks on the institutions of state, because Malaysia has a fragile political structure and cannot withstand this endless scrutiny of their faults. Mahathir (1999) describes the news media as the government’s partner in the process of nation building and urges journalists to be vigilant and attentive, in an effort to discourage the growing elements of narrow individualism, and to protect the spirit of unity. He calls for the press to be free but responsible in guarding a dynamic national stability and maintaining national unity and promoting development. The government has used those two arguments to justify restriction on free press as Malaysians are moving

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towards economic prosperity and maintaining the distinctiveness their identity and way of life. Further, Malaysia also uses the concept of developmental journalism in justifying certain restrictions on the media. Developmental journalism1 is a controversial concept and involves “an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas, rhetoric, influences, and grievances” (Hachten 1999, 31). Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (1978) argued for the role of communication in the achievement of national integration and economic development. And the idea of developmental journalism is most popular in developing countries, where higher living standards and an end to poverty, disease and illiteracy are considered the most urgent goal. The concept of developmental journalism maintains that the media should be primarily used for the purpose of nation building and it allows the government control of the media in the name of nation building (Yin 2003, 3). In supporting the concept of developmental journalism, Samad Ismail, the former managing editor of NST, rejects the Western notion of “unrestricted press freedom”, which theoretically allows for “a free marketplace of ideas”. For him, this notion is based on the false assumption that all groups and individuals have equal access to the media. Additionally, a plural society like Malaysia cannot for long withstand the rigours of an unrestricted press as irresponsible reporting on sensitive matters can easily pit one community against another, even if what is reported is true. In an interview with Utusan Malaysia on 17 April 1992, he advocates instead “development journalism” and defines it as a medium which “is controlled by the government and mobilised to serve national goals in development, political integration, and the elimination of poverty, diseases and illiteracy” (Loh and Mustafa 1996, 105).2 This kind of view has come to dominate the thinking of most of the managers of the Malaysian media. While the criticisms of the Western media are often valid and the goals of development journalism as stated by Samad Ismail valuable, the practice does not square up to the theory. Some of these press managers in their regular columns–for example Kadir Jasin of the NST on Other Thots and V.K. Chin of The Star in Comments–readily reveal that they rarely ever take on the government even when development goals are thwarted. Of late, as a result of increasing criticism in the Western media of the environmental consequences of Malaysia’s timber industry and its effects on the indigenous peoples in Sarawak, some press managers, especially Samad Ismail in his article Western Media Bad-mouthing the Third World in The Star on 21 April 1992, have argued that the local

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media need to counter these “half truths”. They rejected the criticism in the Western media as interference by Westerners to impede Malaysian government from developing the area and giving the better life to the indigenous peoples. As Angela Romano (2003, 40) points out, “development journalism evolved along synchronous although not identical lines to general development theories”. It is very common for journalists from Western countries to highlight the negative aspects, such as the coups, corruption crises, and chaos, of developing nations. Developmental journalism, by contrast, should involve advancing the positive aspects, such as economic, social, and cultural development. It can involve reporting of negative aspects as long as it “avoids scare headlines and sensationalism that may lead to or exacerbate existing social turmoil” (Romano 2003, 41). Jakob Oetama emphasises that “developmental journalism” refers to a balanced reporting of the successes of government projects as well as failures (Mustafa 2000, 183-192). According to developmental journalism, there is no authoritative basis for the rights and freedom of the press, and no one legitimate account of the ties between government and media. However, while one scholar describes it as “the pursuit of cultural and informational autonomy” and “support for democracy” among other goals (Downing 2002, 22), another scholar criticises it as “a rationale for autocratic press control” and a “guided press” (Hachten 1999, 32). Over the years in Malaysia, the conception of “developmental journalism” has been somewhat corrupted to serve the interests of the government, thereby giving rise to news reports that provide only a glowing picture of the state. Worse still, the press has not been encouraged to entertain any criticisms of government projects and leaders for fear that they would divert the attention of the people and the government away from so-called vital development issues and concerns. Thus, in the context of Malaysia, people normally read numerous reports of the officiating of government’s development projects such as land settlement schemes and construction of low-cost flats. The reports always portray the positive side of the government but seldom the negatives. This journalistic practice has the effect of portraying political leaders as always benevolent, compassionate and responsive to the needs of the ordinary citizens. I believe that strong liberals and proponents of reasonable regulation will reject this argument of developmental journalism. The press is needed in protecting the public from become victims of development such as workers exploitation, discrimination to the indigenous people due to the

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development of their land, environmental issue of pollution and the government mismanagement in public project. To limit the role of the press to only supporting whatever government policy in economic development is totally wrong and undemocratic. People should be allowed to utilise the press in protecting their rights from aggressive government’s ambition of economic development. All countries need development but it must be followed by responsible government to ensure that the development is for the need of the people, not for the profit of big corporations or leaders’ individual interest.

Pornography There are several cases with regard to combating pornography in Malaysia. For instance, Fahmi Kassim, chief enforcement officer at Johor’s domestic trade ministry, mentioned that Malaysia’s movie bootleggers are selling more pornography to offset financial losses following a government crackdown using two sniffer dogs, Lucky and Flo owned by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), that have found huge stashes of pirated Digital Versatile/Video Discs (DVDs) (Inquirer 2007). Pornographic discs, including some featuring underaged girls, comprised nearly a quarter of some 180,000 illegal DVDs found in raids over the past four days in southern Johor state. A pirated DVD sells for about RM10 (USD2.80), but pornographic movies–which are not all pirated–can fetch at least RM3 (USD0.85). The pornographic discs found in Johor–which attracts many pirated DVD buyers from neighbouring Singapore–mostly originated in the US and Europe, but some included Chinese and other Asian-looking actresses. Neil Gane, senior operations executive of the MPAA, said that “What is disturbing is this growing proof that the piracy syndicates are working with the pornographic industry, especially when the seized items now include child pornography,” (Inquirer 2007). According to the Malaysian government, five million discs were seized in more than 2,000 raids nationwide last year, and 780 people were arrested. Besides, in combating pornography, Malaysia is moving to block access to Internet pornography in government departments and schools. Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Najib Razak, as saying in the NST, argued action was being taken after news reports that Malaysians could access 1.5 million sex sites. He said that “We are worried by the presence of these websites on the Internet. While we accept the use and application of modern technology, the downside of technology needs to be considered

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too” (Channel News Asia 2005, 1). While the Internet will not be censored in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a centre for local high-tech firms, Najib said that the restrictions will be extended outside government offices to other sectors. Malaysia’s Education Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said, in an Agence France-Presse (AFP) report, that school computers will soon be fitted with software to block access to pornography. In 2004, the government committed RM800 million to expand access to broadband facilities in rural areas and schools, government offices, universities and research institutions (Channel News Asia 2005). Although Malaysian government has taken some initiatives to control the circulation of pornographic materials, the issue of pornography has shocked the country when two DVDs were distributed anonymously in several towns such as Muar and Batu Pahat in Johor showing Dr. Chua Soi Lek, Malaysian Health Minister, having sex with a young woman. On 1 January 2008, Chua admitted that he was the person featured in the sex DVDs. He claimed of no involvement in the filming and producing of the DVDs. However, on 2 January 2008, Chua announced of his resignation from the government including as the Health Minister, Member of Parliament for Labis, and Vice President of Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (The Star Online 2008a). Although this was a political scandal, distributing the DVDs to the public and the pornographic content of it were totally against Malaysian laws such as the PPPA, Penal Code and Broadcasting Act, and taboo to most of Malaysian society who are strong culturally and religiously against this type of misbehave or immoral practice. This issue of pornography has given a significant impact to the argument of free press in Malaysia. The debate now is not only covered a legal matter in term of controlling the circulation of pornographic materials particularly on the Internet, but also philosophical justification of such restrictions, regulations or censorships. Regarding the issues of pornography vis-à-vis free press and human rights, Li-ann Thio (1999, 1-86) argues that a distinction should be drawn between contested human rights norms and those norms upon which all agree, such as the right to free press. The controversy surrounding the latter category is one with respect to the scope of application, not the substance of the value. The right of free press, which underpins a democratic society, is, for example, formally guaranteed in the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The controversy concerns the degree of liberty that should be permitted and the permissible grounds for derogation. This can

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have extensive ramifications in the practical realm, as illustrated by the following quote from a scholar, Shad Faruqi: “Admittedly, the rugged individualism, un-inhibitedness and licentiousness of what is still ‘the wild, wild West’ is contrary to Asian tradition. Our attitudes to nation, religion and culture, race, family and community are reverential. We draw a line between liberty and license. We do not deem it a matter of constitutional principle that there should be a right to desecrate our national flag, to blaspheme our religions and to walk freely into shops to buy murderous weapons. We view a freewheeling sexual lifestyle, drug taking and alcohol addiction with revulsion. With the bulk of us, pornography is not part of free speech, abortion on demand is not part of personal liberty and homosexuality is not part of freedom of choice. We acknowledge that rights and responsibilities must go hand-in-hand and that freedom is not an end in itself.” (Shad 1996, 17)

Joseph Chan (2000, 59-74) has identified approaches–which he calls “thin” accounts of human rights–as a cause of the disjunction between Western liberalism and the social conservatism of the “Asian values” discourse. He regards such declaratory accounts of human rights as nothing more than “shorthand” for the results of bundles of sophisticated and contingent arguments. The right to freedom of speech, for instance, is a shorthand that describes several different rights, each with its own rationale; the rights to commercial speech, political speech, artistic expression, religious expression and including freedom of the press. Shorthand can be useful for facilitating discussion and for coining a slogan, but the slogan should never be mistaken for the argument. Hence Chan argues that: “…the general right to freedom of speech as such is a generalisation from these independently justified specific rights. Thus to decide whether cigarette advertising should be regulated, it requires substantive reasoning from square one – we need to discuss what sorts of interests and what parties are relevant and how those interests should be balanced.” (Chan 2000, 65)

The same caveats apply to the application of the “freedom of the press” mantra to pornography and sexist language. It is because we have mistaken imprecise shorthand generalisations for the real thing that so many supposedly fundamental and universal human rights commonly conflict with other fundamental and universal human rights (Barr 2002, 188-189). Pornography has been more heavily censored in some Asian countries, e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, than in most Western

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ones. Does the prohibition of pornography unjustifiably violate freedom of the press? Adopting the three-party analysis of interests mentioned above, some may judge that what is required is a balancing of the interests of the publishers (commercial and ideological interests), the audience/consumers’ interests (in erotic excitement) and third-party, or community, interests. Important disagreements may centre on the third-party interests, some may take the view that the community as a whole has an interest in maintaining its moral standards, and that society’s morals should, therefore, enter into our judgements. However, this view offends many liberals who uphold a particular mid-level principle, namely, that it is not the business of the state to enforce a society’s particular moral ethos. On this view, the maintenance of morals is never a legitimate interest to enter into the balancing calculus. According to Chan (2000, 70-72), those accepting the legitimacy of, for example, the principle of legal moralism would allow society’s morals to be put on the scale; those liberals who are against legal moralism would not. In Malaysia, moralism is parallel with the cultural and religious (Islamic) practices and normally, principles of political morality guide Malaysian society to make this kind of fundamental decision, such as banning pornography. The government has an essential role to represent society’s moralism and act on cultural value and religious belief. There is strong consensus amongst Malaysians, Malays (or other indigenous people), Chinese, and Indians, in declaring materials of a pornographic or sexual nature as immoral and obscene. Pornography is seen as a kind of exploitation as it degrades, endangers, and harms the lives of women. Although many in the business argue that the women’s involvement in pornography is voluntary, most Malaysians believe that there is an element of exploitation by the pornographic industry. Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, argues in this context: “…there are limits to freedom, and I believe it is important for every member of a society to know these limits. One good example is pornography. You can have computer animation, which may be ever so creative–and thus should be freely available–but if this ‘freedom’ is used to produce pornographic films that are purveyed to the impressionable young, then the fruits of the freedom should not be accepted and allowed by society. In Malaysia, it is not my impression that business ingenuity or creativity have been stifled by our Malaysian value system which sets clear limits to individual freedom and generally emphasises the community over the individual. To the contrary, I believe that our value system has been the foundation for our society’s stability and prosperity, at least until the economic crisis struck.” (Mahathir 1999, 73-74)

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On this matter, the government takes the initiative to protect public morality and the traditional way of life from pornography and sexual exploitation. For instance, in February 2002, the government banned a rerun of the controversial feminist play The Vagina Monologues. The play, presented by local performers, and according to the producer of the show, the play contained adult material but was neither vulgar nor obscene. The play was banned because of alleged complaints by members of the public on the vulgar content and title of the play. Also in 2002, the government banned a music video Are You In? by the group Incubus, which was banned because it portrays interaction between the sexes in an unruly and erotic manner, vulgarity and scenes of women wearing bikinis which may incite lust among men (SUARAM 2003a, 89). Although, pornography is one of the most “flourishing” industries on the Internet and the number of sites posting this type of content is increasing with each passing year. Malaysian government is definitely limiting the access to such materials, due to their alleged bad influence on their citizen’s moral values. However, there is argument that the government is taking these anti-porn measures too far. For instance, the use of filters in the case of Internet Cafés or educational and government networks, as reported by the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ), has caused a negative effect which included blocking the access to health sites. These sites offer very useful information related to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Sexual Transmitted Diseases (STDs) prevention and are very important for the poorly informed Malaysian society. Sonia Randhawa, the CIJ director, told AFP that up to ten percent of the results obtained from searching the expression “safe sex” are blocked, and that by using the most nonrestrictive filters. The CIJ says that the anti-porn measures adopted by the Malaysian government represent the country’s first formal attempt to impose a level of censorship over the Internet. Randhawa concluded that “The Internet is the only place in Malaysia where there are guarantees of freedom of expression...We’re concerned that using the filter approach could easily be a temptation to filter out other sites as well” (Softpedia 2005, 1). Ronald Dworkin (1985), as a strong liberal defending of the right to pornography, appeals to a right to autonomy which he terms as a “right to moral independence”. He writes: “People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and opportunities, including disadvantage in the liberties permitted to them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their

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Dworkin holds the view that to restrict people’s speech or to restrict their access to other’s speech out of contempt for their way of life or their view of the good is a violation of their right to moral independence or autonomy. In agreement with Dworkin, David Richards asserts, in an article defending the right to pornography, that freedom of the press “supports a mature individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others…In so doing, it nurtures and sustains the selfrespect of the mature person. Further, freedom of expression protects the interest of the mature individual, with developed capacities of rational choice, in deciding whether to be an audience to a communication and in weighing the communication according to his own rational vision of life…The value of free speech, in this view, rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of the spirit is meagre and slavish” (Richards 1974, 45-91). Hence, both Dworkin and Richards justify people’s right to access pornography in the press and on the Internet through the arguments of personal autonomy and moral independence. The decision of Malaysian government to restrict pornography from being accessed by the public is definitely aligned with the argument of “reasonable regulation”, but definitely against the “strong liberalism”. The advocates of “reasonable regulation” believe that the policy of banning pornography is for the purpose of protecting the public good. Michael Sandel (1984, 15-17), for instance, argues that he would permit banning pornographic bookstores in the name of community protection. Like Sandel, George Will (1983) points to laws that do not ignore the social consequences of individual behaviour, but would focus on those social consequences rather than the behaviour itself. The law should not, for example, treat the pornography trade as a purely private transaction–a question of rights–when the public consequences include “a multibilliondollar pornography industry”, the “laceration of sensibilities”, and “dubiety about the very idea of shamefulness” (Will 1983, 84-85). By juxtaposing the act of moral education inherent in civil rights legislation with more controversial claims about pornography, Will effectively undermines the characteristic liberal assertion that the government either

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should not or cannot deal with morality by effecting moral change through law. In general, Will’s standard for legislative proscriptions seems to be that they are appropriate where the conduct being proscribed cannot, by a reasonable person, be hoped to produce a better or more responsible citizen or a better polity. Pornography, therefore, ought not to enjoy the same protection as other speech or expression. This is not to say that there will invariably be broad and comprehensive bans on such forms of speech and expression. Rather, Will argues only that the political community, acting in its own interest and on its sense of responsibility, and in the interest of the moral betterment of its citizens, ought presumptively to have the right to impose prudential restrictions that would violate the liberal principle of free press supported by the “strong liberals”. However, both “strong liberalism” and “reasonable regulation” are in agreement with Malaysia’s decision to strongly deplore the practice of the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and the exploitation of children. Malaysia has criminalised these activities via legislation which include the Child Act 2001 and the Penal Code. The Child Act 2001 incorporates the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Malaysia became a party to the CRC on 17 February 1995. The entry into force of the Child Act 2001 on 1 August 2002 repealed three other laws–the Women and Young Girls Protection Act 1973, the Juvenile Courts Act 1947 and the Child Protection Act 1991. The Child Act 2001 in effect stipulates heavier punishment for offences relating to the illtreatment, neglect, abandonment or exposure of children as compared to the Child Protection Act 1991. Malaysia also feels that the rise and unabated misuse of new information technologies, including the Internet, for purposes of child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism must be arrested immediately. Section 211 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) provides that “no content applications service provider, or other person using applications service, shall provide content which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse or threaten or harass any person”. To this end, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, the regulator for the converging communications and multimedia industry in Malaysia, designated a Content Forum on 29 March 2001 pursuant to section 212 of the CMA. The role of the Content Forum is to govern content and address content related issues disseminated by electronic medium by industry self-regulation in line with a Content Code. The Code is a set of industry guidelines on the usage and/or dissemination of content for public consumption. It is currently being finalised. As of 15 January

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2004, there is explicit provision in the Code that prohibits child pornography. SUHAKAM in its Annual Report 2001 (and reiterated in its Annual Report 2002) recommended that Malaysia be a party to the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. In her address at the Roundtable Discussion on the CRC organised by SUHAKAM on 19-20 January 2004, the Malaysian Minister of National Unity and Social Development, whose ministry is responsible for children, said that the recommendation by SUHAKAM will be reviewed to ascertain the viability and suitability of the signing of both the optional protocols to the CRC by Malaysia (SUHAKAM 2004).

Hate Speech A similar concern about the impact that public utterances may have upon the social status of disadvantaged groups has recently led to a revival of interest in regulation of hate speech, though the psychological dynamic by which that speech inflicts its harm differs from that of pornography and the group allegedly victimised is not primarily women but racial and religious minorities. As with pornography, the question posed is whether the regulation of hate speech is consistent with, or even required by, an acceptable liberal principle of freedom of the press. Hate speech can be defined as insults and characterisations that are directed against an individual’s or a group’s race, religion, ethnic origin, or gender, which may incite violence, hatred or discrimination (Rud and Sexton 1999, 1). In the US, hate speech is a broad term that may include a great variety of expression, but according to Nelson v. Streeter 1994, it generally refers to words or symbols that are “offensive, hurtful, and wounding” and are directed at racial or ethnic characteristics, gender, religious affiliation, or sexual preference (Trager and Dickerson 1999, 124). The US courts usually consider hate speech part of the “rough and tumble” of discourse that is part of a democratic and open society. On the contrary, some contend that hate speech is deliberately hurtful, morally no better than physical aggression, and should not be permitted in civilised societies. Hate speech is a form of speech that goes to the core issues in society, for example, racism, homophobia, and women’s rights. In many countries including Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, as well as Malaysia, it is not protected. In the past ten years, too, there has been a movement in the US to have hate speech removed from its place at the core of protected speech, arguing that it is dangerous and damages individuals and society. Many support the view that hate speech may be

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legitimately restricted because it is not essential to democracy and indeed, it often undermines the equal respect that is essential to democracy as well as causing other social harms. For instance, it encourages feelings of inferiority, destroys self-esteem as well as personal security and emotion (Matsuda et al. 1993). Thus, a number of minority and female writers argue that the US approach to hate speech is inadequate and that it should be subject to criminal or civil penalties3. On 30 September 2005, hate speech had become a global issue when the daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten (The Jutland Post) published a piece entitled “Muhammeds ansigt” (The face of Muhammad). The article consisted of twelve cartoons (of which only some depicted Muhammad) and three of these twelve cartoons were illustrated by Jyllands-Posten’s own staff, including the “bomb” and “niqaab” cartoons. Supporters of the cartoons argued that they illustrated an important issue in a period of Islamic terrorism and that their publication is a legitimate exercise of the right of free press, and self-conscious refusal to exercise self-censorship in the face of violent threats. In response, Danish Muslim organisations publicly protested about the cartoons and intentionally promulgated knowledge of Jyllands-Posten’s publication thereby igniting a near worldwide controversy. As it grew, examples of the cartoons were reprinted in newspapers in more than fifty other countries, which led to numerous death threats, attempted murder, bounties placed upon the heads of the cartoonists by Islamic leaders and numerous protests both peaceful and violent, and some riots, particularly in the Muslim world. Critics of the cartoons described them as Islamophobic or racist, arguing that they were gratuitously offensive to people of the Muslim faith, intended to humiliate a Danish minority, and another insensitive manifestation of ignorance about the history of western imperialism. In Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Security, shut indefinitely a Borneo-based paper, the Sarawak Tribune, for reprinting the cartoons. Lester Melanyi, an editor of the newspaper, resigned from his post for allowing the reprinting of a cartoon. Abdullah described their publication as insensitive and irresponsible and had also declared possession of the cartoons illegal. The paper had apologised for what it called an editorial oversight. Malaysia’s third-largest Chinese-language daily, Guang Ming, was also suspended from publication for two weeks of its evening edition for carrying one of the cartoons in its edition on 3 February 2006 (BBC News 2006, Media Guardian 2006).

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One of the latest cases of hate speech in Malaysia is when HINDRAF, a coalition of 30 Hindu NGOs committed to the preservation of Hindu community rights and heritage, had organised a rally turned riot on 25 November 2007 to submit the petition at the British High Commission. The group had led agitations against what they see as an “unofficial policy of temple demolition” and concerns about the steady encroachment of shariah-based law. They also accused of the UMNO-led government of maginalised the ethnic Indian and run a policy of ethnic cleansing (Chandra 2007, 53). According to Chandra Muzaffar (2007, 53), the statement about ethnic cleansing is dangerous and utterly a reckless and a scurrilous allegation. It is a clear example of reporting hate speech in the press which could hurt and anger many Malaysians especially the Malays.3 It is obvious that there is no ethnic cleansing in Malaysia like what had happened in Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda. However, the provocative racial hatred statement by Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) could be easily used by bigots and troublemakers to justify a retaliation attack on the Indian community. This makes hate speech so dangerous to be permitted in the press and especially in a multiethnic country like Malaysia. Mahathir attacked Western liberal democracy which often tolerates offensive hate speech: “Malaysian democracy is not a liberal democracy and not bound to accept every new interpretation of democracy in the West where democratic fanatics have pushed devotion to a pedantic notion of democracy to include the protection of neo-fascists or the empowering of a vocal minority of political activists over the silent majority of ordinary citizens.” (Leigh and Lip 2004, 320)

Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in his first speech to the Parliament on assuming his appointment as the Prime Minister in November 2003, expressed his conviction that democracy is the best system of governance, but: “Democracy does not mean absolute freedom. Issues that inflame religious, racial (ethnic), and cultural sentiments should not be sensationalised, while attempts to undermine national security must be dealt with firmly.” (SUARAM 2004, 21)

Abdullah will pledge to ensure ethnic harmony and stability, and continue restricting hate speech in the press that is deemed to be a threat to national security and public order.

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Furthermore, K.J. Ratnam (2003, 34-35) rejects the liberal argument that every time a regime embarks on actions that curtail political freedoms it does so without legitimate cause and only for self-interested reasons, or that opponents of governments are themselves always believers in democracy and civil rights. He argues that the importance of social and political stability, especially in multiracial society, is strong enough to justify substantial restrictions on hate speech. With regard to the media, Ratnam (2003, 54-55) urges that editors should disallow the publication of views that inflame ethnic feelings or in other ways undermine the fabric of society, even though the reasons for publishing those views are to honour their commitment to freedom of speech and their opposition to censorship. He concurs with the decision by the editor of a major Malaysian newspaper not to published letters, reports or articles that incite people to racial hatred. Ratnam’s view is clearly in line with the argument that justifies the practice of self-censorship in the Malaysian media. However, many argue that people should beware of the government’s leaders, members and supporters who use hate speech in strengthening their grip in power and exploiting ethnic issues for political purposes. Therefore, the criticism on this issue is not about the illegality of hate speech, but rather the projection of racial politics by the government. Sumit K. Mandal (2004, 57), for instance, criticises the Malaysian government’s policy on racial hatred, arguing that racialised, and even racist, instruments of state and politics find their place in the public spaces of Malaysia without much sustained and rigorous criticism. Notable examples of racialised language are the primordialist terms “Malay supremacy” (ketuanan Melayu) and “newcomer” or “immigrant” (pendatang) used by chauvinist elements in the Malay leadership to assert an inherent difference between their “own” and “migrant” others. In recent decades, according to Mandal, these chauvinist terms have come to the fore during elite political crises in order to galvanise groups along racial lines. Hence, when oppositional groups, including NGOs, accuse the state of racist politics, their arguments often run aground and do not find widespread support. The racialisation of state initiatives like the New Economic Policy (NEP) soon after the watershed of 13 May 1969, have institutionalised race and made it part of an effective political system, thus furthering its unproblematised existence. As a result, according to Mandal, the state may be credited with making colonial era racialisation, with a policy of divide and rule, a post-colonial success.

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Anwar Ibrahim also made a same argument and accused the ruling party leaders of stoking racial tensions over plans to dismantle discrimination policies favouring ethnic Muslim Malays. Anwar’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat, Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Islamic Party (PAS, Parti Islam Semalaysia) made major gains in the 2008 general election. All three opposition parties have endorsed the NEP reform plan, saying it fosters cronyism and corruption and has neglected impoverished Malays in rural areas. The policy, which gives advantages in education, housing and business, has been criticised as outdated, and benefiting mostly an elite group of Malay entrepreneurs who enjoy preferences in government contracts. The alliance’s plans to transform the NEP, introduced in 1971 to boost majority Malays, has drawn criticism from the ruling UMNO which led a protest in northern Penang state. At least 1,000 people led by UMNO figures defied a police ban to gather outside the office of the newly appointed chief minister of Penang on 14 March 2008. Anwar argues that the opposition wanted to reform the NEP so that it uplifted all poor Malaysians, no matter what their race, and accused elements in UMNO of inciting fear among Malays over the plan. He said, in the aftermath of the elections, that “I am... deeply concerned with the attempt being made by certain elements to stoke the flames of racial hatred…This vicious campaign is being orchestrated by a small number of very wealthy Malays and UMNO leaders who are themselves guilty of squandering and abusing the NEP” (AFP 2008a, 1). This is clear in the case of Bukit Bendera UMNO division chief, Ahmad Ismail, who has been suspended by UMNO supreme council for three years after pressures, of leaving the BN, from other BN component parties such as Gerakan and MCA. The decision was made under Clause 20.9 of the party constitution, which bars a member from contesting or holding any position in the party, because Ahmad Ismail referred to Malaysian Chinese as “squatters” in a public gathering during the Permatang Pauh by-election in August 2008 (Vasudevan, Ng and Sajahan 2008, 2). Clearly, hate speech is not only spoken by bigots and racists, but also sometimes by some people in power who try to achieve their objective of achieving or retaining the political power or anxiety of losing the power. Germany’s Nazi in the Holocaust during World War II and Rwanda’s Hutu/Tutsi in Genocide in 1990s proved that hate speech could be used to achieve certain racist policy of the government. In Malaysian history, the 13th May 1969 racial incident was the obvious example that hate speech had been exploited by the government and the opposition during the election campaigning period and celebration parade just after the election result being announced.

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Several “strong liberals” criticise the proposal to restrict hate speech, primarily for two reasons. First, there is an idea that speech should be allowed and tested by the people without restriction. One leading supporter of this idea is Henry Louis Gates (1993, 37-38), who decries the effort of critical ethnic theorists who support the punishment of those who engage in hate speech. He claims that the theory behind hate speech codes–if you banish the speech, you banish the hate–is not only simplistic but also unrealistic. Equality, justice, and human dignity, if allowed to remain unchallenged and untested by racists and bigots of every stripe, will not prosper but become “dead dogma”. Gates says that American hate speech codes, which target vulgar language and epithets, do nothing to halt carefully worded bigotry. Gerald Gunter (1994, 76) concurs with Gates, arguing that opinion expressed in debates and arguments about a wide rage of political and social issues should not be suppressed simply because of disagreement with the content or form of the expression. He stresses that speech should not and cannot be banned simply because it is “offensive” to substantial parts of, or a majority of, a community. The proper answer to bad speech is usually more and better speech–not new laws, litigation and repression. Second, there is also an argument that the restriction of hate speech will harm the democratic system and public discourse. Robert Post (1991, 267-328) argues that the banning of hate speech would sacrifice other important values served by the freedom of the press such as exchange of ideas and open debate. Democracy serves the value of self-determination by establishing a communicative structure within which the varying perspectives of individuals can be reconciled through reason. If the state were to forbid the expression of particular ideas, the government would become, with respect to individuals holding those ideas, suppressive and non-democratic. Although Post argues that all opinions should be tolerated so long as their protagonists urge their acceptance by legal methods, the notion that racist ideas ought to be forbidden within public discourse because of the offensiveness is thus fundamentally irreconcilable with the rationale for freedom of the press. He thinks that the case has not yet been made for circumscribing public discourse to prevent the kind of preemptive silencing that occurs when members of victim groups experience “fear, rage, (and) shock”. If the empirical claim of systematic pre-emptive silencing is accepted, in his view, it is directly the result of the social and structural conditions of racism, rather than of specifically racist speech. This is the logic of the argument from pre-emptive silencing does not impeach the necessity of preserving the free speech of ideas, public

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discourse could at most be regulated in a largely symbolic manner so as to purge it of outrageous racist epithets and names. Post concludes that it is highly implausible to claim that such symbolic regulation will eliminate the pre-emptive silencing that is said to justify restraints on public discourse, and deliberative self-government is not compatible with such restriction on free speech (Arthur 1997, 231-232). However, the arguments of Gates, Gunter and Post for allowing the expression of hate speech, argued by the supporters of “reasonable regulation”, are rather dangerous. Joel Feinberg (1984), for instance, argues that when fighting words are used to provoke people who are legally prevented from using a fighting response, the offence is profound enough to allow for prohibition. Feinberg also suggests that a variety of factors need to be taken into account when deciding whether speech can be limited by the offence principle. These include the extent, duration and social value of the speech, the ease with which it can be avoided, the motives of the speaker, the number of people offended, the intensity of the offence, and the general interest of the community at large. In a multicultural and multiracial society where the risk of violence and disorder is real and can undermine the nation’s political stability, the restriction of hate speech should be allowed. Speech influences action and hate speech can spark aggression and violent behaviour. A society that wants to encourage tolerance between races and ethnic groups must choose a policy that creates political stability and not one that promotes enmity, and hostility even in the name of marketplace of ideas. The idea of associating hate speech with democracy and self-government is also unconvincing, as a democratic political system can still flourish in the absence of hate speech. This is clear from the numerous democracies where hate speech is restricted. Democratic self-government is impossible in the absence of a minimal degree of civility and mutual respect among citizens. Although that minimum standard will differ depending on the nature, size, customs, and values of each society, its members must observe some standard or they cease to constitute a democratic community. Thus, however minimal our society’s version of that standard is taken to be, it will be violated by the press that denies recognition to others on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion (Heyman 1999, 1380-1383). Therefore any practices of hate speech should be stopped in order to ensure the real racial harmony and political stability exists in Malaysia. Any disagreements or dissatisfactions should be resolved in civil as

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manner possible. Proper peaceful dialogues and discussions could be the way in resolving any problems especially concerning racial issues. In general, Malaysians can accept that the restrictions on hate speech are for the common good. No such campaign, either by the government, opposition and NGOs, in legalising hate speech in the press is a comprehensible proof that Malaysians are disinterested with it.

Conclusion All reasons discussed in this chapter are controversial but reasonable restrictions on national stability, pornography and hate speech are justifiable in the context of protecting the society. In protecting racial harmony in Malaysia’s multiracial society and cultural values, the government uses those reasons or arguments to limit the media. However, in practice, the government imposes the restriction too far. It seems that the ruling BN government wants to prolong in power by limiting the media where the opposition is denied the opportunity to equally participate in the public sphere. I agree with the government to curb pornography because it is obviously detrimental to the society and discriminates the dignity especially of the women. Hate speech should also be restricted, but to include legitimate criticism and dissent against the government in the category of hate speech are totally absurd in any democratic states. The media should be the medium for the people to deliberate views for and against the government and opposition in civil manner. Denying the right to oppositional speech is totally against the spirit of democracy and free press. Malaysia should balance the needs for national stability and freedom of the press because both are important. Although it is not easy to balance these two, the best way to balance them, in my view, is to implement responsible media or freedom of the press with social responsibility. However, developmental journalism is the weakest argument among all of the justifications. The media should have the right to monitor the process of any developmental projects approved by the government and must condemn any wrongdoings in the project for the public interests. Therefore, developmental journalism should be rejected and Malaysia should accept an approach called public journalism that propagates robust public deliberation (see the discussion about freedom of the press with social responsibility and public journalism in Chapter 7). Malaysia should definitely rethink about the justifications to restrict the media in order to expand the public sphere. In the next chapter, the public sphere of printed press during the 2008 general election will be analysed in order to explain the reality and system of printed press in Malaysia.

CHAPTER FIVE NEWSPAPERS IN THE 2008 GENERAL ELECTION

In the 12th General Election in 2008, a research has been done in studying the coverage and tendency of Malaysian newspapers–the mainstream newspapers, alternative newspapers and political tabloids– toward the political parties. This analysis is important in determining who dominates the public sphere. The analysis covers from the day of Parliament dissolve on 13th February 2008, until the polling day on 8th March 2008.1 Results obtained are based on the frequency and percentages of the reports’ coverage on the Barisan Nasional (BN) party and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) party concerning whether they are positive, negative or neutral coverage on either sides. This research applies the research method of content analysis where the researchers choose and analyse each one of the elections columns and determine them into five categories, BN+, BN-, PR+, PR-, and N. Not all the columns in the newspapers are selected for the analysis. Only columns covering election issues are selected.

The Election Result The country’s voters had delivered an unprecedented blow to the ruling BN in the 12th general election on 8 March 2008. The severe losses of the incumbent coalition–five (out of thirteen) state governments (states of Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, Penang and Selangor), eighty-two seats in the 222-seat national Parliament, with 50.6 percent popular votes compared to 49.4 percent received by the opposition, and a major swing against the non-Malay component parties within the multi-ethnic coalition–mean that the election marks a new political chapter in Malaysian history. The loose alliance of PAS, DAP and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR or People Justice Party, Keadilan party changed its name to PKR after merged with PRM) then formed a coalition called the Pakatan Rakyat (PR, People’s Alliance), used to be known as Barisan Alternatif (BA), soon after the election in order to coordinate policy through the decision-making from the top

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leadership especially for all states won by the PR. The reasons for the BN setback, according to Bridget Welsh (2008), have more to do with the coalition’s lacklustre performance under Abdullah than the strength of the opposition. She argues that in his four years in office, Abdullah has managed to maintain the economic growth (forecast of 6 percent in 2008) but he was ineffective in channelling the benefits to ordinary citizens. The record levels of inflation (forecast of 8 percent after the increase of fuel prices in June 2008), comparatively lower wages, increased lack of confidence in Abdullah’s management and persistent corruption translated into massive disgruntlement among Malaysians of all races. Malaysians were squeezed, as economic gains were seen to be disproportionately directed toward increasingly arrogant political elite, notably leaders of UMNO (Welsh 2008). Moreover, Malaysians also felt insecure and anxiety about the increase of fuel and essential goods prices.2 For instance, since took over as prime minister, Abdullah has increase the price of petrol five times from RM1.35 per litre in 2003 to RM2.70 per litre in 2008, an exactly 100 percent increase or RM1.35 per litre for just less than five years (Harakah 2008a, 2). These bread and butter issues influenced the voters to vote the opposition in the election.3 This declining economic legitimacy was compounded by a shocking record of managing ethnic relations, particularly of the concerns of the non-Malays. Chinese, Indian and East Malaysian voices were ignored and often insultingly dismissed as rising Malay chauvinism went unchecked within Abdullah’s party.4 In fact, he harnessed racial identity to buttress his position within the party, rejuvenating the racially implemented affirmative action policy of the NEP and lost the confidence of the non-Malay community in the handling of the sensitive expansion Islamic governance through Islam Hadhari propagated by Abdullah.5 On the other hand, former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, in an interview with a magazine Dewan Masyarakat revealed that there are two reasons why the BN lost in the election. First, UMNO leaders, instead of concentrating in winning the election, were over confidence due to a big win in the 2004 election and concentrated their efforts for the UMNO party election scheduled in December 2008. Second, the 12th general election was held at the wrong time. This is because the government still did not resolve many sensitive issues such as the HINDRAF riot case,6 BERSIH demands and rallies,7 V.K. Lingam tape,8 and increase of essential goods price. According to Daim, it would be better if the government resolves these cases before dissolving the Parliament and facing the election (Dewan Masyarakat 2008, 22). Abdullah, in addition,

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acknowledged that one of the reasons the BN lost in the election was the factor of new media, the Internet and mobile phone, which the government has never utilised after depending too much on mainstream printing and broadcasting media for election campaigns. After fifty years of rule by UMNO–the dominant party in the BN coalition–the signs of a shift are unmistakable: towards a new system of checks and balances, away from the racial politics that have characterised the country’s history since independence in 1957, and wider democracy (Welsh 2008). There is argument that free press situation will become better in post-election Malaysia because the government will soften it policy, listen to the people’s demands and give more space and greater voice particularly to the opposition and civil society movement to express their views in the Parliament and media. The election results will bring greater democracy to Malaysia. A stronger opposition will bring more checks and balances at the national level and in state governments the push for transparency, against corruption. In the next section, this book examines the coverage and tendency of Malaysian newspapers toward political parties competed in the 2008 general election. All newspapers included in the analysis are published or date of publications in the range starting on the day Parliament dissolved, 13 February 2008, until the polling day, 8 March 2008. In exception, Harakah publication dated on 16-31 March 2008 is included in this analysis because it published earlier, not as the stated date, which is before polling day. Besides, Buletin Rakyat edition dated on 15 March 2008 and Mingguan Wasilah publication on 9-15 March 2008 are also included in this analysis because most of the coverage in these two editions covers activities and election issues during the campaign period. This analysis will give some indications about the reality of public sphere in the Malaysian printed press.

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TABLE 5-1: PARLIAMENTARY SEATS WON BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES

STATES

PERLIS KEDAH KELANTAN TERENGGANU PENANG PERAK PAHANG SELANGOR F.T. KUALA LUMPUR F.T. PUTRAJAYA NEGERI SEMBILAN MELAKA JOHOR F.T. LABUAN SABAH SARAWAK TOTAL

BN

TOTAL SEATS

3 15 14 8 13 24 14 22

PAS

DAP

PKR TOTAL

WC WWC WC WWC WC WWC WC WWC 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 6 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 9 0 0 0 3 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 4 0 13 0 2 0 6 0 3 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 4 0 4 0 9 0

3 15 14 8 13 24 14 22

11

1

0

1

0

5

0

4

0

11

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

8

5

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

8

6 26 1 25 31 222

5 24 1 22 25 132

0 1 0 2 5 8

0 0 0 0 0 23

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 1 1 28

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 31

0 0 0 0 0 0

6 26 1 25 31 222

WC - Winning Candidates WWC - Win Without Contest F.T. - Federal Territory Source: (Election Commission 2008)

96

TOTAL SEATS

15 36 45 32 40 59 42 56 0 0 36 28 56 0

STATES

PERLIS KEDAH KELANTAN TERENGGANU PENANG PERAK PAHANG SELANGOR F.T. KUALA LUMPUR F.T. PUTRAJAYA NEGERI SEMBILAN MELAKA JOHOR F.T. LABUAN

PAS

DAP

PKR

WWC WC WWC 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

INDEPENDENT

WC WWC WC WWC WC WWC WC 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 0 16 0 1 0 1 6 0 37 1 0 0 0 24 0 8 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 19 0 0 28 0 6 0 18 0 0 37 0 2 0 2 0 1 19 1 8 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 1 0 10 0 0 23 0 0 0 5 0 0 50 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

BN

TABLE 5-2: STATE ASSEMBLY SEATS WON BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Chapter Five

15 36 45 32 40 59 42 56 0 0 36 28 56 0

TOTAL

WC - Winning Candidates WWC - Win Without Contest F.T. - Federal Territory Source: (Election Commission 2008)

SABAH SARAWAK TOTAL

60 0 505

57 0 304

2 0 3

0 0 82

0 0 1

1 0 73

0 0 0

Newspapers in the 2008 General Election

0 0 2

0 0 0

0 0 40

0 0 0

60 0 505

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98

Mainstream Newspapers during the 2008 General Election Daily circulation of the mainstream newspapers such as in Table 5-3, ranging from 135,000 to 310,000 and on Sunday’s publications from 150,000 to 460,000, makes that the companies that control the newspapers, in this case the companies with close link to the ruling BN in Malaysia, control the public sphere of the media as well. Even some of the newspapers published twice a day in boosting their selling. Therefore, BN has not got any problem in spreading its messages and even propaganda to the people. This definitely ensures the public opinion dominated and determined by the ruling government. TABLE 5-3: NEWSPAPERS’ CIRCULATION (1 JULY 2006-31 JUNE 2007) No. Newspapers Languages

Daily Daily No. Newspapers Languages Circulation Circulation

1

Utusan Malaysia

Malay

197,033

7

The NST

English

139,763

2

Mingguan Malaysia

Malay

459,793

8

New Sunday Times

English

153,409

3

Harian Metro

Malay

289,315

9

The Star

English

309,181

4

Metro Ahad

Malay

314,321

10 Sunday Star

English

322,741

5

Berita Harian

Malay

192,917

11

6

Berita Minggu

Malay

305,256

12 China Press

Source: (Audit Bureau Circulation 2007)

Sin Chew Jit Mandarin Poh

Mandarin

357,163

231,539

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In analysing the mainstream media, this book looks into the coverage of two English newspapers, the NST and The Star during the 2008 general election. First, the overall assessment of the NST’s coverage and tendency toward political parties contested in the 2008 general election is that NST favoured the ruling BN government in its reporting with 50 percent or 625 columns, out of 1,258 of overall election columns, of positive coverage and only 3 percent or 43 columns negatively reporting toward the BN. Although the positive coverage of the PR was more than the negative one where the differences was just about 1 percent, 10 percent or 129 columns of positive PR coverage and 9 percent or 112 columns of negative PR coverage, the overall coverage was definitely less than the overall coverage of the BN. This clearly shows that the NST was biased in term of its coverage toward the BN compared to the PR. Neutral coverage, which is 28 percent or 349 columns, was the second highest covered by the NST (see Table 4).

Chapter Five

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

43 14

50 60

625 759

1

3 122

129 10

10 107

112 9

9 245

349

20

28

1247

1258

100

100

TABLE 5-4: MAINSTREAM NEWSPAPERS AND THE 2008 GENERAL ELECTION: TOTAL AND PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE AND TENDENCY TOWARD POLITICAL PARTIES T % NEWSPAPERS BN + % BN - % PR + % PR - % N %

NST & NEW SUNDAY TIMES THE STAR & SUNDAY STAR

100

Newspapers in the 2008 General Election

101

Looking to the daily coverage in Chart 5-1, the pattern of coverage is clearly shown that most of the daily published columns, except on 25 February 2008 and 27 February 2008, were positive coverage toward the BN. However, the highest coverage for a single day was on a neutral coverage on 25 February 2008, total volume of 43 columns. This was because the NST covered most of the issues about what had happened on nomination day, a day before on 24 February 2008. The lowest neutral coverage was on 13 February 2008 with 3 columns. The highest frequency of positive coverage for the BN was on 24 February 2008 with 40 columns. The lowest positive coverage for the BN was on 19 February 2008 with 14 columns. The highest negative coverage for the BN was on 18 February 2008 with 7 columns. The PR also received positive and negative coverage from the NST. The highest positive coverage was on 24 February 2008 with 11 columns, the lowest was 1 column on polling day. The highest negative coverage for the PR was on 5 and 7 March 2008 with 11 columns each. This was probably because the polling day is near and the NST gave negative coverage for PR in order to give a winning mood for the BN.

102

NEW STRAITS TIMES DAILY COVERAGE

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 13- 14- 15- 16- 17- 18- 19- 20- 21- 22- 23- 24- 25- 26- 27- 28- 29- 01- 02- 03- 04- 05- 06- 07- 08Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08

Frequency

CHART 5-1:

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N

BN + BN PR + PR -

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Second, the coverage and tendency of The Star was more towards the ruling government’s party, BN. Based on the Chart 5-2, BN positive coverage was the highest percentage in The Star with 60 percent and the columns involved were 759 out of 1247 columns. While positive coverage towards BN was at the highest position, negative coverage consisted of 14 columns or 1 percent of the overall coverage. The Star’s coverage for PR was quite balance between positive and negative tendency, which the former was 10 percent with the total of 122 columns outnumbering negative tendency towards PR with the total of 107 columns equivalent to 9 percent. Neutral columns hang in the middle with the total amount of 245 columns or 20 percent of the coverage (see Table 5-4). Based on the result in Chart 5-2, the positive coverage towards BN outnumbered the other four coverage tendencies on every each day of data collection. The lines show an explicit ascending pattern with its highest peak on 3 March 2008 by 52 columns and lowest by 8 columns on 13 February 2008. On the other hand, the highest negative is covered by only 4 columns on both dates 18 February and 3 March 2008, and almost none negative coverage for BN on the other days. Coverage for PR started with a frayed pattern until 24 February 2008 wherein negative coverage for PR beat positive coverage for PR along the way to the polling day. The highest positive coverage for PR was on 20 February 2008 with 12 columns. The same number of columns, 12 columns, was also the highest negative coverage for PR on 3 March 2008 and 6 March 2008. Besides coverage for BN and PR, there are also neutral coverage (N), which the column involve either explains on both parties simultaneously or accounts on events outside the parties involve. At this juncture, neutral coverage hit an average pattern except for several days such as 25 February 2008, 5 March 2008 and 8 March 2008 where the coverage reached a quite high peak compared to same neutral coverage on other days.

THE STAR DAILY COVERAGE

CHART 5-2:

Chapter Five

13- 14- 15- 16- 17- 18- 19- 20- 21- 22- 23- 24- 25- 26- 27- 28- 29- 01- 02- 03- 04- 05- 06- 07- 08Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Feb- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Frequency

104

N

PR-

BNPR+

BN+

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Front Page Most of the front page columns in the NST and The Star gave priority for the statements made by the BN leaders especially the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister by supporting the BN party. The NST carried the positive reports on the BN party through headlines like Barisan Nasional opts for renewal and the list is… (21 February 2008), PM gives report card on Progress made from 2004-2007 (22 February 2008), Expansive: BN promises prudence and accountability (26 February 2008), 10-1: The score so far (27 February 2008), and Blue tide rising? (4 March 2008). Headlines favouring BN in The Star are such as Enter the new faces (21 February 2008), 9 ahead (25 February 2008), Kelantan siege (29 February 2008), and One more for BN (27 February 2008). There is also coverage in The Star which slightly disfavoured the internal bickering and power struggle in Perlis between BN or UMNO leaders on headline, Little state, big drama (23 February 2008). The NST and The Star carried the negative coverage mostly for the opposition party. The NST allowed the criticism made by BN leaders on opposition such as DAP, PAS and HINDRAF available on Front Page. Headlines are like Rocket Trouble (13 February 2008) referring to DAP, Don’t spoil the mood: PM condemns street protests; warns action will be taken against those who disrupt the polls (17 February 2008) referring to Hindraf’s street protest, Po Kuan Cries off: Batu Gajah MP declines nomination (18 February 2008) referring to DAP’s internal bickering, Mercury Rising: Scuffles reported in Terengganu (20 February 2008) referring to PAS’s aggressive campaigning, and Expensive: DAP promises big spending (26 February 2008) referring to DAP’s election manifesto. The Star also highlighted the issue of DAP’s Batu Gajah MP, Fong Po Kuan, who announced of her intention for not contesting again in the 2008 general election after a rift in DAP’s leadership in Perak through headlines Fong drops a bomb (18 February 2008). In addition, the BN utilised the Front Page to inform the voters about its achievement to bring development and economic prosperity in Malaysia on NST’s headlines: Do the Math: Barisan Nasional has never lied about the subsidies, says Abdullah (28 February 2008) and Economic growth beats forecasts (28 February 2008), and The Star’s headlines Secure future (26 February 2008) and Good growth (28 February 2008). The BN realised that it was unsuccessfully explained or countered the opposition campaigns over the increase of essential goods and fuel prices

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after the election and of the cost of living in big cities. The BN parties also noticed that the Chinese and Indian were distancing from supporting them in the election and both communities set to vote opposition parties. Therefore, the NST gave the BN opportunities to warn people about the consequences of not voting the BN in the election especially racial disharmony and it had the best recipes of maintaining racial harmony in Malaysia via headlines: Don’t Risk It: Abdullah: This is not the time to gamble on your future (29 February 2008), Dark horse in the running? (2 March 2008), Battle for Chinese votes hotting up (2 March 2008), Abdullah: Unity and co-operation in BN help us solve difficult issues (2 March 2008), Waves of expectations running high: Hot, hot, in Penang (3 March 2008), Chinese voters have a simple choice (5 March 2008), No representation, No Voice (7 March 2008), Dancing with wolves: Flaws and all, BN’s no bad wolf (7 March 2008), and Whither Malaysia? It’s Your Call (8 March 2008). There was also a headline entitled Lingam Tape Inquiry: Secretary Tells All (13 February 2008) which destroyed the image and credibility of the judiciary and this happened under BN’s rule. In The Star, BN leaders reminded the Chinese and Indians to vote the BN party in ensuring the representation of both races in decision making process. The headline, Vote for a voice in the Govt, says Abdullah (7 March 2008), caught the government’s anxiety of the Chinese and Indians distancing from voting it. The Star also focused its coverage on Penang issue in headlines such as; Koh: MNCs are not leaving Penang (28 February 2008, N1), Teng for CM? (2 March 2008, N1), and Penang needs a dynamic CM (3 March 2008, N3). The NST also run on issue of the EC plan to scrap using indelible ink in the election on headlines: Plot foils ink plan (5 March 2008) and Flap over ink stain (6 March 2008). The Star also covered the same issue in headline Ink washout (5 March 2008). This issue had raised a concern and criticism on the lack of transparency and independence in the EC. Moreover, others coverage in the NST and The Star on Front Page were related to the election processes and activities.

Advertisements Political advertisements had been used extensively in the 2008 general election especially by the ruling BN party. According to Nielsen Advertising Information Services, BN had spent on advertisement at RM9.8 million in February 2008 which is the month of election period begun. Meanwhile, Transparency International Malaysia (TI-M) estimated

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BN spent 7.68 percent (RM7.3 million) of its budget of RM94.8 million on print ads (RM7.3 million). Transparency International president Tan Sri Raymond Navaratnam pointed out that according to the supervision of the council, BN had used some RM1.5 million for its election advertisements in 18 domestic newspapers within three days, which were from 25 February 2008 to 27 February 2008. TI-M also estimated opposition party PKR spent 0.07 percent (RM0.03 million) of its budget of RM36.8 million, while DAP spent 0.57 percent (RM0.12 million) of RM19.5 million, and PAS did not spend anything on print (Marketing 2008, MySinchew 2008). The NST and The Star were being utilised for that purpose of campaigning for the BN party. During the 2008 general election, the political advertisement started to appear in the NST on 25 February 2008 and it continued to appear until the polling day on 8 March 2008. In The Star, the advertisement started to appear on the same day with the NST but finished one day earlier on 7 March 2008. In overall, there were 22 advertisements in the NST and 35 in The Star in which all of them were pro-BN except one in each newspaper which is neutral, and none from the opposition party. The advertisement in the NST can be split into three types: the BN, the MIC and others pro-BN advertisements. However, The Star advertised one extra type than the NST which included the advertisements by the MCA as owner of the newspaper. The BN advertisements were first to appear in the NST and The Star on 25 February 2008. Furthermore, all the BN advertisements, which 13 in the NST and 14 in The Star, were focused on four election issues; economy and development, social, civil services, and BN as people’s choice. There were six advertisements on the issue of economy and development as it was the main issue of the BN in gaining vote. On 25 February 2008, with the title of Proven: Stretching The Ringgit (NST 25 February 2008, 3; The Star 25 February 2008, N11), the BN tried to show that the prices of selected essential items such as flour, sugar, cooking oil and petrol were among the cheapest in Southeast Asian countries compared to like Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. The BN also said that it spent RM43.4 billion to subsidise essential items in ensuring the lower prices of the items. On 29 February 2008, through the advertisement of Progress: A Solid and Stable Economy (NST 29 February 2008, 3; The Star 29 February 2008, N13), the BN showed to the people that since 2004 until 2007, Malaysia economy progressed solidly and stably through the increasing growth in Growth Domestic Product (GDP), Total Trade, Foreign Exchange Reserves, and Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI).

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BN also aimed continuously to combat poverty through advertisement entitled No More Poverty (NST 1 March 2008, 3; The Star 1 March 2008, N11) on 1 March 2008. BN, through advertisement’s No One Left Behind (NST 3 March 2008, 3; The Star 3 March 2008, N11) on 3 March 2008, will implement all its planned developmental projects such as East Coast Economic Region, North Corridor, Sarawak Corridor, Sabah Corridor, and Iskandar Development Region. The projected amount of RM1.1 Trillion of investment is to ensure all Malaysians share the economic and development prosperity. On 5 March 2008, Promise: Develop Human Capital (NST 5 March 2008, 3; The Star 5 March 2008, N9) was the title of advertisement in showing that the BN has an ambition to develop human capital in order for Malaysia to become a developed country. One day before polling day, on 7 March 2008, the BN came out with advertisement which appeared in the NST, not in The Star, entitled Vote for Stability, Vote Barisan Nasional (NST 7 March 2008, 25) showing that Malaysia has improved in World Competitiveness Ranking reported by Swiss-based Institute of Management Development. The report showed that Malaysia improved in overall ranking, economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure. There was also a statement by Second Finance Minister, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop of Malaysia strong economy and management of economy. Second, there were three advertisements with regard to social issues. On 26 February 2008, the BN, via advertisement’s Free Education For All (NST 26 February 2008, 3; The Star 26 February 2008, N5), allocated RM30 Billion to build more schools and universities, and to subsidise school fees and text books in order for the people to have free and quality education. On 27 February 2008, a title of A Healthy Nation (NST 27 February 2008, 3; The Star 27 February 2008, N7) was for the people to realise that they have to pay a very cheap cost, at only RM5, for consultation, investigation, treatment and medicine at government hospitals and clinics. The BN also wanted to develop a nation with stable society in terms of race relations. This message is clear through the advertisement entitled A Place For All (NST 4 March 2008, 3; The Star 4 March 2008, N5) on 4 March 2008. Third, the NST had published three BN’s advertisements which covered the issue of productive and efficient civil services. An advertisement on 28 February 2008 entitled Efficient Public Delivery System (NST 28 February 2008, 3; The Star 28 February 2008, N5), BN tried to show that under its leadership, civil service became efficient and it

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managed to cut red tape. For instance, 3 hours is the only time that consumers need to wait for getting passports. Meanwhile, there were two advertisements regarding the police services to the people. Through advertisements’ A Strong Police Presence (NST 2 March 2008, 3; The Star 2 March 2008, N9) on 2 March 2008 and Making Malaysia Safer (NST 6 March 2008, 3; The Star 6 March 2008, N13) on 6 March 2008, the BN under Prime Minister Abdullah will recruit 60,000 additional police personnel and allocate RM 8 Billion to build police station, buy patrol cars, and equipments for Malaysians to have a safer living environment. Finally on 7 March 2008, the BN advertised an advertisement entitled Only One Choice (NST 7 March 2008, 3; The Star 7 March 2008, N37) which the BN appealed for Malaysians to vote it in the general election. The Star, on 7 March 2008 as well, published two more advertisements endorsing the BN entitled Vote for effective result, not for show (The Star 7 March 2008, N25) and Among the achievements of Barisan Nasional Government (The Star 7 March 2008, N38-39). During the election as well, one of the BN component parties, the MIC, sponsored seven advertisements which focused on the issue of Indian community. The MIC realised that the Indian community dissatisfied with the government and MIC of not doing enough in protecting Indian rights, place of worship from being demolished, and combating poverty in Indian community. In the advertisements, the MIC was actually tried to deny and counter the criticism toward the party and showed that throughout the years, it has struggled to protect the interest of Indian community in Malaysia. The NST had published MIC’s advertisements entitled MIC Care: The Power of the truth… and MIC: The Community’s Custodian. Started on 27 February 2008, these advertisements denied that MIC has not done enough for the Indian community, instead MIC has never said no to resolve Indians’ problems such as children’s education and financial difficulties, and has always said yes to, such as, world class university and preserving Tamil schools and language (NST 27 February 2008, 7; The Star 27 February 2008, N15). Advertisement on 28 February 2008 was in the intention to show that the MIC leadership cares about Indians’ problem and is willing to listen and solve the problem. However, MIC threatened the Indian community that if they do not vote the MIC or BN, they will pay the price of lacking of opportunity, and difficulty in education and in practising their language as what has happened to the Malays in PAS ruling Kelantan state (NST 28 February 2008, 7; The Star 28 February 2008, N11). On 29 February

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2008, the MIC advertisement explained the track record of the party arguing that it is the true “community champions” for the Indians (NST 29 February 2008, 7; The Star 29 February 2008, N23). In same tone, the MIC advertisement on 1 March 2008 mentioned about the MIC track record of championing the Indian issues especially in providing the worldclass Tamil schools, funding Indian businesses, and working with other BN components to provide financial aids and self-supported programmes for the Indian community (NST 1 March 2008, 7; The Star 1 March 2008, N13). After no advertisement in three days, on 5 March 2008, the MIC came out with the advertisement entitled Managing Indians’ Concern: Uplifting Every Aspect of Our Lives in trying to influence Indian community that the MIC will ensure excellent education for the Indians, safeguard temples and places of worships, and provide enough houses for decent living (NST 5 March 2008, 7; The Star 5 March 2008, N15). On 6 March 2008, the advertisement entitled The Scale of Success: Balancing Malaysian Indians’ National Aspirations and Socio-Economic Needs confirmed that the MIC has championed national agenda through the BN partnership and socio-economic needs (NST 6 March 2008, 7; The Star 6 March 2008, N15). Finally on 7 March 2008, the MIC via the advertisement entitled An Appeal To All Malaysian Indians: Its Time To Vote and Secure Your Future definitely begged to Indian community for their votes in ensuring the MIC, and also BN, candidates will win in the election. This was also to ensure the brighter future for Indian community under BN’s rule (NST 7 March 2008, 13; The Star 7 March 2008, N13). Beside the BN and MIC advertisements, The Star also advertised its owner, the MCA. The advertisements, ten in total, started to come out in The Star on 26 February 2008 until 6 March 2008 which covered the achievements of MCA in education, establishing new villages, promoting good relations and investments between Malaysia and China, increasing Chinese programmes on television, and humanitarian activities. These advertisements can be examined in further details in Table 5-5.

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TABLE 5-5: THE STAR: MCA ADVERTISEMENTS DATE 26 February 2008 27 February 2008

PAGE N23

28 February 2008

N13

29 February 2008 1 March 2008

N35

2 March 2008

N21

3 March 2008 4 March 2008

N19

N18

N27

CONTENTS To date, more than 140,000 students have graduated from KTAR and UTAR, and many more will. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. The MCA’s Lifelong Learning campaign improved the working skills and increased the earning power of over 101,613 people. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. 2,300 non-Bumiputera students obtained full JPA scholarships to study overseas between 2000 and 2007. A marked increase compared to only 100 students before the year 2000. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. To date, more than 140,000 students have graduated from KTAR and UTAR, and many more will. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. 2,300 non-Bumiputera students obtained full JPA scholarships to study overseas between 2000 and 2007. A marked increase compared to only 100 students before the year 2000. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. More than RM550 million secured for 450 New Villages in 8 years. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked.

More than RM550 million secured for 450 New Villages in 8 years. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. N23 The MCA and BN leaders have always emphasized on strengthening Malaysia-China ties, resulting in more than RM372.42 billion in trade with China. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. 5 March N17 Chinese programming hours on TV have increased by 121 2008 percent over the last 5 years. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. 6 March N25 To date, MCA’s Crisis Relief Squad Malaysia (CRSM) have 2008 trained and mobilized over 1,000 members and volunteers to provide crisis relief and assistance to a great number of Malaysians in need. While the opposition put on a show, MCA worked. Source: (The Star 2008)

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There were also other advertisements which endorsed the BN party. For instance, there was an advertisement in the NST sponsored by Kejuruteraan Asas Jaya Sdn. Bhd. (KAJ) which praised on Chief Minister of Melaka, Mohd Ali Rustam, for putting Melaka on track towards achieving a fully developed status by 2010. Moreover, Emerald Capital Group, an established group of companies which core business is in real estate development had also advertised a medium size advertisement endorsing the BN by saying Undilah Barisan Nasional (Vote for Barisan Nasional) twice on 28 February 2008 and 6 March 2008 which both on the first page of StarMetro North section. StarMetro is a regional section focusing on community-based stories happening in the respective region. There are three regions involve; StarMetro Central covers Selangor, KL and Seremban; StarMetro North covers Ipoh, Penang, Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan; and StarMetro South & East covers the rest of the country (The Star 28 February 2008, M1; 6 March 2008, M1). The only neutral advertisement was published and sponsored by the NST and The Star themselves, probably sponsored also by political party, entitled Their Future Is In Your Hands (NST 7 March 2008, 3; The Star 7 March 2008, N35) showing Malaysian teenagers wearing Malaysian flag tshirt as a symbol and reminder for Malaysians to decide and vote wisely the candidates and parties that deserve to win the election. This is because Malaysians votes will determine the future of these teenagers.

Election Issues: Coverage and Tendency toward Political Parties by the Mainstream Newspapers Look deeply into the coverage and tendency of NST and The Star toward political parties contested in the 2008 general election, both newspapers were clearly highlighted and focused on the ruling BN. The coverage can be looked into four essential aspects; the strength of BN, the issues of economy and development, the race relations, and the weakening and distrusting opposition.

The Strength of BN The BN was portrayed as a strong coalition party. It was seen as the choice for the people in order for the society to progress successfully in the future. For instance, the NST came out with the headlines such as Crystal clear vision of success (13 February 2008, 18), Simple choice: The best or warlords (19 February 2008, 2), and Voters have a clear choice,

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says Abdullah (24 February 2008, 2). Meanwhile, The Star published headlines like Pak Lah: BN will bring progress (1 March 2008, N6), I will continue to fulfill promises, says Abdullah (17 February 2008, N4), Bright future ahead for township (26 February 2008, M7), PM: Barisan finds long-term solutions (1 March 2008, N10), and Promise to create more businesses (4 March 2008, M9). The BN, according to the both newspapers, had proven that it has a strength and good track record in serving the people and confidently can win the election. The NST printed headlines BN sure of ‘surpassing twothirds majority’ (14 February 2008, 2), 50 years of legacy to uphold (6 March 2008, 22), BN likely to sweep all seats (7 March 2008, 15), and Possible repeat of BN success (7 March 2008, 16). The Star obviously argued through its headlines that BN has a good record (14 February 2008, N4), Barisan to rely on track record (2 March 2008, N14), Four years of success (4 March 2008, N4), and Spirit of Barisan behind 50 years of success (6 March 2008, N4), Vote BN and get a new market, says candidate (27 February 2008, M2), and Idris: Growing support for Barisan (6 March 2008, N26). The NST and The Star also argued that the success of Malaysia was because it has a strong, good and effective leader or prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Both newspapers explained that the Abdullah factor will contribute to the success of BN in the election through headlines in the NST like Malay voters still with Pak Lah (14 February 2008, 8), and They all ‘ad’ up to inform the electorate: BN campaign in line with PM’s personality (2 March 2008, 20 & 21), and The Star like ‘I am PM of all races’ (18 February 2008, N4), Pak Lah’s special rapport with other races (8 March 2008, M2), and We love Pak Lah fan club members show their support (24 February 2008, N3). BN reported by both newspapers as receiving strong support from all communities and profesion that ensured the BN winning the election. The NST listed headlines such as Teachers back BN (26 February 2008, 17), Businessmen rally for BN (26 February 2008, 16), Negri businessmen back BN (1 March 2008, 21), Cabbies support BN (3 March 2008, 20), Sikh groups back BN (4 March 2008, 20), Punjabi back BN (5 March 2008, 10), Old age no barrier for loyal voters (5 March 2008, 23), and Chamber backs BN (8 March 2008, 25). At the same time, The Star cited headlines, Shahrizat: Indians support BN (20 February 2008, N16), Pandithan: Only Barisan can help Indian community (5 March 2008, N31), Indian groups back BN (28 February 2008, N28), Sothi predicts handsome win (15

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February 2008, N20), PBB all set for perfect record (17 February 2008, N18), and PM: People back Barisan (28 February 2008, N3).

The Issues of Economy and Development In every election, BN always described itself as an agent for development. It argued that it has brought development and economic success to Malaysia and improves and prospers the life of the people through many opportunities for instance by providing employments and property ownerships. BN used the issue of development as its main issue in the 12th general election and promised that it will further the agenda for development in the future. Therefore, the NST had listed several projects that the BN wants to realise if it wins the election, even though many in the opposition argued that those projects and promises are actually a way of the government to buy vote from voters. Among the promises were RM50m fund to help the needy in Iskandar (13 February 2008, 19), PM to launch road project (14 February 2008, 2), 40,000 houses for the poor (17 February 2008, 4), Free insurance for Felda settlers (17 February 2008, 4), and 45,000 to be hired as civil servants (17 February 2008, 28). The Star also mentioned the government’s promises such as Govt to spend RM158mil to upgrade roads (17 February 2008, N4), Many keen to invest in Perlis (20 February 2008, M4), Pedestrian bridges to be built in front of schools (26 February 2008, M3), BN reps needed to ensure execution of major projects (4 March 2008, M7), RM550mil for new villages (6 March 2008, N23), and RM26m district hospital (6 March 2008, M16). The government also argued that those promises could be realised because Malaysia has a strong economy. NST agreed with the government through headlines, Exports seen posting 7pc growth this year (13 February 2008, 39), Total trade in 2007 hit record RM1.1tril (13 February 2008, 40), Shifting Outlook: On the road to a new economic horizon (15 February 2008, 12), and Strong enough to weather US recession (15 February 2008, 13). The Star also showed that Malaysian economy is strong through headlines, Trade surplus passes RM1tril mark again (13 February 2008, N12), Five sen dividend per share for unit holders (22 February 2008, M5), Makeover plans for the SMEs (23 February 2008, N6), Abdullah credits GDP growth to political stability (28 February 2008, N4), Govt to be proactive over rising prices (26 February 2008, N4), and Billions spent on subsidies (26 February 2008, N6). The rising global price of petroleum was not affected the Malaysian economy in general.

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The Race Relations The NST and The Star also gave an assurance that political stability and race harmony will be maintained under the BN’s rule. The BN realised that there are sentiments of disapprove and disappointment to its government in handling the race issues especially from the Chinese and Indian communities. Therefore, both papers had been utilised by the BN to propagate that it actually promoted tolerance. The concept of consensus politics through a coalition of political parties under the BN was argued as the best way in serving the interests of all communities. NST endorsed those headlines, BN ‘never sidelined any community’ (24 February 2008, 17), Non-Malays may swing it for Barisan (27 February 2008, 18), Abdullah: Unity and co-operation in BN help us solve difficult issues (2 March 2008, 1), PM: Friendship helps BN parties solve tough issues (2 March 2008, 2), and Optimistic about race relations (3 March 2008, 19). The Star in the same tone argued that All races prosper under BN, says Ch’ng (4 March 2008, N26), Barisan takes care of all races, Sikhs told (7 March 2008, N2), Lee: M’sians must work together (27 February 2008, M3), Ong: Highlight the good, too (1 March 2008, N12), and Non-Malays to enjoy benefits, too (2 March 2008, N10). BN admitted that it had to deal with the Chinese and Indian communities. Regarding the Chinese community, the NST printed the statements made by the government leaders that the Chinese interests are protected by the BN party and also the Chinese must beware of the opposition party through the NST headlines such as Chinese voters have a simple choice (5 March 2008, 1), Chinese votes crucial in determining results (7 March 2008, 18), and Ong: A Vote for DAP means a vote for PAS (8 March 2008, 5). The Star also explained through headlines such as President ‘fighting for Chinese’ (18 February 2008, N6), Support Barisan, Dr Teng urges Chinese voters (23 February 2008, M8), Don’t let opposition split the Chinese (28 February 2008, N6), Support BN, Chinese voters urged (4 March 2008, M3), Minister: Vote for BN to preserve voice in Govt (7 March 2008, M6), ‘Don’t erode Chinese voice’ (8 March 2008, N8), and Tee Keat: A vote for DAP is a vote for PAS and PKR (8 March 2008, N10). The Star also mentioned that the government promised to allocate some money or funds to Chinese schools and associations such as RM10mil more for Chinese schools (13 February 2008, N6), MCA to ensure school is completed (18 February 2008, M4), RM15mil for Chinese schools (23 February 2008, N28), and RM400,000 for associations, NGOs (2 March 2008, N19).

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The Indian community gave a hard time to the ruling party since the HINDRAF protest in November 2007. MIC was seen unable to protect Indians’ rights and interests. The Indians looked set to vote the opposition in the 2008 election. In previous election, Indians were the strong supporters of the ruling government. In order to ensure the continuity of the support to the government, the BN used both newspapers to woo the Indian community by reminding the benefit that they got under the BN administration. BN will also protect the place of worship for the Indians. Their rights and interests will always in the government agenda and policy. The NST for instance came out with the headlines such as Racing against time to woo Indian voters (5 March 2008, 10), Foundation chief on how Indians have benefited (6 March 2008, 8), ‘Place of worship will be protected’ (7 March 2008, 2), and Don’t cut off your nose to spite your face (8 March 2008, 26). Besides, The Star promoted MIC as a sole protector for Indian community through headlines such as Samy: Indians can count on MIC (27 February 2008, N26), Don’t vote with emotions, Indians urged (29 February 2008, N8), Rep: Indians backing BN despite Hindraf’s actions (20 February 2008, M2), Policy that allows Indians to be represented (1 March 2008, M2), and Samy: Govt has and will provide for Indians (3 March 2008, N16).

The Opposition The opposition parties, the PAS, DAP and PKR, were perceived by both newspapers as weak and unable to challenge the superiority and strength of the ruling BN party. For instance, the NST highlighted that the opposition had no issue against the BN, misled the people and was incapable to bring development to the people. The headlines are PKR loses 500 members (26 February 2008, 16), Three DAP members expelled (26 February 2008, 19), ‘Hadi’s fatwa against Islamic teachings’ (29 February 2008, 2), No common goals, so how can they rule, asks Najib (29 February 2008, 4), Lacking strong issues, Malay opposition can’t touch BN (1 March 2008, 13), and Opposition suffering ‘development envy’ (2 March 2008, 4). The Star also argued that the opposition was just happy to take part in the election without any intention to gain anything. The opposition also manipulated people’s sentiments such as utilising racial sentiments in getting people’s votes in the election. In downgrading the opposition, The Star published headlines such as Hisham: Opposition not taking polls seriously (28 February 2008, N23), Hon: Opposition has same bed but different dreams (29 February 2008, N10), Deadlock over Johor opposition seats (17 February 2008, N12), Opposition long shot just

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thrilled to be contesting (26 February 2008, N24), Reject opposition dirty tricks, Ong tells Lobak voters (29 February 2008, N8), and Opposition out to mislead (5 March 2008, M10). The BN also noticed that Anwar Ibrahim is a determinant factor that unites the opposition parties. Therefore, BN leaders utilised mainstream newspapers to attack the credibility of Anwar as a leader of opposition. The NST focused on headlines like Permatang Pauh ready for change, says Hishammuddin (1 March 2008, 8), ‘Anwar cannot do anything for Permatang Pauh’ (3 March 2008, 6), Chandra breaks silence on Anwar (4 March 2008, 8), and Abdullah slams Anwar for misleading people (5 March 2008, 2). Similarly, The Star also covered the statements expressed by the BN leaders in attacking Anwar through headlines such as Abdullah slams Anwar (5 March 2008, N4), Nalla: Anwar only cares for himself (5 March 2008, N6), BN: Don’t be taken in by Anwar (5 March 2008, N10), Chandra stands by his remarks (6 March 2008, N35), Anwar wanted to bar non-bumis (7 March 2008, N8).

Alternative Newspapers during the 2008 General Election Alternative newspapers are referred to the parties’ newspapers, Harakah and Suara Keadilan. Both newspapers are important in contributing alternative views and ideas and debating the political issues especially during the general election. Although the impact of these newspapers is less than the mainstream daily press, they can offer significant information especially from the opposition party which has been denied campaigning in the mainstream newspapers. In comparison with mainstream newspapers, the alternative newspapers which are belong to the opposition PR–the BN does not have party’s newspaper–do play a significant role as alternatives to the mainstream newspapers which are bias toward the ruling BN. However, this type of newspaper is unable to challenge the strength of the mainstream media because this is due to its bimonthly publication and saleable to only party’s members. Alternative newspapers such as Harakah owned by the PAS and Suara Keadilan owned by the PKR try to contribute political debates and discussion in a limited public sphere in Malaysian media. Circulation of this newspaper is in the range of 150,000 to 200,000 of each publication. With limited circulations, alternative newspapers gives a space for limited press freedom in Malaysia and makes sure that the public sphere of printing press still opens for the people to access.

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During the 2008 general election, both Harakah and Suara Keadilan were critical toward the BN and supportive to the PR. In total of coverage between the day Parliament dissolve on 13 February 2008 and polling day on 8 March 2008, there were 433 columns reported by Harakah and 221 columns covered by Suara Keadilan for election issues. Most of the coverage are negative toward the BN by both newspapers, 58 percent by Harakah and 61 percent by Suara Keadilan which make them less relevant in analysing their tendency toward political parties contested in the 2008 general election. The highest negative coverage in the Harakah and Suara Keadilan was about the BN as a weak party with internal bickering and bad performances in leadership and administration. Besides, only 35 percent columns in both Harakah and Suara Keadilan focused on the positive coverage of the PR. Harakah gave more coverage on the PR, especially PAS, activities and strategies in the election. Meanwhile, Suara Keadilan gave priority to the coverage on the PR, or the PKR, strength in challenging the mighty BN (see Table 5-6). TABLE 5-6: ALTERNATIVE NEWSPAPERS: TENDENCY TOWARDS POLITICAL PARTIES TENDENCY HARAKAH SUARA KEADILAN BN249 58 % 135 61 % PR+

152

35 %

77

35 %

N

32

7%

9

4%

TOTAL

433

100 %

221

100 %

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

Front Page Harakah in the front page tried to propagate a new approach or policy of the PAS party called “welfare state”. PAS seemed to silent its previous agenda of “Islamic state” after realising that many non-Muslims disfavoured the policy. The policy of welfare state appeared to soften and moderate the PAS party in order to appeal and get vote from Muslims, conservatives and moderates, and non-Muslims alike through headline entitled UMNO cemas: Tawaran Negara berkebajikan pikat hari rakyat (UMNO nervous: Welfare State attracted the people, 1-15 February 2008).

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Harakah also argued that Prime Minister Abdullah is a weak leader and BN has failed to serve the people in headline, PM lemah BN gagal (PM is weak BN fails, 16-29 February 2008). Therefore, Harakah urged Malaysians to prepare for the change of government with the aim of saving Malaysia from any abuse of power and wrongdoings done by the BN government in headlines, Sedia berubah (Ready to Change, 1-15 March 2008) and Selamatkan Malaysia (Save Malaysia, 16-30 March 2008). Since the Parliament dissolved, Suara Keadilan centred its coverage on the judicial issue where the case of Lingam’s tapes caused the crisis of credibility and integrity in the Malaysian judiciary system. Suara Keadilan highlighted the Royal Commission’s proceedings in the case through front page headlines, Dzaiddin hukum Anwar kerana mahu anugerah Tun (Dzaiddin punished Anwar because wanting the Tun-ship, 30 January-14 February 2008), Enggan panggil Anwar sebagai saksi; Suruhanjaya sandiwara (Does not want to call Anwar as witness: The Commission is theatrical, 30 January-14 February 2008), Eksklusif: saksi misteri Anwar (Exclusive: Anwar’s mystery witness, 30 January-14 February 2008) and Tangan ghaib: 5 peguam keluar mahkamah (Invisible Hands: 5 lawyers leaving Court, 14-27 February 2008). Suara Keadilan has also been used to print statements made by PKR de facto leader and advisor, Anwar Ibrahim, who claimed that Abdullah scared of him by dissolving the Parliament in March and denying him to contest in the election. Anwar can only be allowed to contest in the election in April 2008 after being convicted of corruption and imprisoned for six years. According to Malaysian law, Anwar was barred for three years after released from prison in 2005. PKR argued that BN worried of Anwar’s ability to attract voters from all races to vote the oppositions. Anwar’s also advocates transformation and reformation in the political system. These headlines clearly caught the argument and mood of the election, Sah Abdullah takut lawan Anwar! (Confirm Abdullah scared to challenge Anwar!, 14-27 February 2008), Faktor Anwar tarik sokongan berbilang kaum sokong BA; kebangkitan seluruh Negara (Anwar factor attracted supports from all races toward BA; elevating nationwide, 27 February- 7 March 2008), and Masa paling baik untuk perubahan (The best time to change, 7-12 March 2008). Suara Keadilan also informed the voters that BN government will increase the petrol and essential goods prices after winning the election in headline, Jika BN menang harga barang, petrol naik lepas p’raya (If BN wins goods, petrol prices increase after the election, 7-12 March 2008). It exposed the BERSIH’s discovery of postal vote manipulation in winning

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the BN candidate in headline Bersih dedah penyelewengan undi pos (BERSIH exposed the manipulation of portal vote, 7-12 March 2008).

Election Coverage and Issues Most of the columns covered the election issues discrediting the ruling BN as a weakening coalition party. UMNO was seen as a party in crisis of leadership with internal bickering. The BN was forecasted by the Harakah and Suara Keadilan of losing several seats in the 2008 general election. There was also strong sentiment of anti-BN among the people in the election and UMNO has also not served for the interests of the Malays anymore except for certain rich Malays. Some public policies implemented by the BN were not for the public good. Harakah had come out with headlines in showing the BN is weak such as Masa depan rakyat lebih buruk jika BN kekal memerintah (People’s future were getting worse if BN is continue in power, 1-15 February 2008, 36), BN gagal satukan rakyat-Ahmad Awang (BN failed to unite people-Ahmad Awang, 16-29 February 2008, 21), Umno khianati mandate besar orang Melayu (UMNO violated the Malays’ big mandate, 16-29 February 2008, 23), Memusnahkan dongengan hanya BN mampu perintah (Vanishing the myth that BN can only rule, 1-15 March 2008, 27), Namakan individu bankrap bukti BN ketandusan calon (Named a bankrupt individual proved that BN did not have enough candidate, 1-15 March 2008, 38), Najib tidak layak jadi PM-Mohamad Sabu (Najib unqualified as PM-Mohamad Sabu, 16-31 March 2008, 8), and Kaji semula penggunaan BI, bukti BN semakin tertekan (Reconsider the use of English proved BN is desperate, 16-31 March 2008, 41). Suara Keadilan also made the same argument as the Harakah through headlines such as BN kucar-kacir, Abdullah tidak yakin ulangi 2004! (BN in chaos, Abdullah pessimistic of repeating 2004!, 30 January-14 February 2008, 19), Kelantan; UMNO diingat jangan ghairah tawan Kelantan banyak negeri akan jatuh ke tangan BA (Kelantan; UMNO was reminded for not too excited in taking over Kelantan because many states will fall under the BA hands, 14-27 February 2008, 18), BN akan hilang banyak kerusi (BN will lose many seats, 27 February-7 March, 29), Dua calon BN Kelantan tarik diri petanda BN tidak diyakini – Husam (The withdrawal of two Kelantan BN candidates is a sign of no confidence to BN, 27 February-7 March, 30), and Sentiment anti-BN seluruh negara (Anti-BN Sentiment Nationwide, 7-12 March 2008, 4). Both newspapers, Harakah and Suara Keadilan, also attacked the personality and credibility of Prime Minister, Abdullah, in managing and

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ruling the country. Abdullah was considered as a weak leader with a lot of unfulfilled promises since taking over from his predecessor, Mahathir. In fact, Mahathir himself urged Abdullah to resign as prime minister. Abdullah was portrayed as corrupt and arrogant and had wasted public fund for projects that will not benefit the public. Harakah cited headlines like Hapus miskin tegar hanya janji palsu Abdullah Badawi (Put an end to hardcore poverty was a false promise by Abdullah Badawi, 1-15 February 2008, 38), Teka-teki pilihan raya, taktik tidak demokratik PM (Snap election, undemocratic tactic by PM, 1-15 February 2008, 38), PM tidak layak bercakap mengenai kebebasan media (PM unqualified to talk about press freedom, 1-15 February 2008, 38), PM lemah BN gagal (PM is weak BN fails, 16-29 February 2008, 1), Pengaruh Abdullah terhakis, sokongan rakyat merosot (Abdullah’s influence diminished, people’s support reduced, 16-29 February 2008, 2), Anwar dakwa Abdullah berbohong (Anwar claimed Abdullah lied, 16-29 February 2008, 36), Mahathir nasihatkan PM ‘cukup sepenggal’ (Mahathir advised PM ‘enough for one term’, 16-29 February 2008, 34), Manifesto BN, percayakah anda kepada janji Abdullah? (BN manifesto, do you trust Abdullah’s promises?, 1-15 March 2008, 16), Why did Abdullah lie? (1-15 March 2008, 20), Rekod Abdullah Buruk-Dr M (Abdullah’s record was bad-Dr M, 16-31 March 2008, 48), and Berhenti berbohong PM (PM stop lying, 16-31 March 2008, 6). Suara Keadilan also cited in its headlines, BN kucar-kacir, Abdullah tidak yakin ulangi 2004! (BN in chaos, Abdullah is not confident of repeating 2004!, 3 January-14 February 2008, 19), Pembaziran Mega Dollah Badawi/Najib (Mega Waste by Dollah Badawi/Najib, 14-27 February 2008, 7), Mahu wajahnya di mana-mana; Imam Hadhari gila glamour (Want his face everywhere; Hadhari Imam was glamour freak, 14-27 February 2008, 9), Jangan malu jadi PM sepenggal (Do not shy as one term PM, 14-27 February 2008, 9), Dinasti Badawi-Pemerintahan keluarga ayahanda dan anakanda2nya (Badawi Dynasty- Family Rule by the father and sons, 14-27 February 2008, 10), Abdullah kawal media macam komunis (Abdullah controlled the media like communist, 14-27 February 2008, 29), Abdullah Badawi lebih biadap-Bersih (Abdullah Badawi was more rude-BERSIH, 14-27 February 2008, 29), Abdullah terlalu lemah untuk buat perubahan-Syed Husin (Abdullah was too weak to make change-Syed Husin, 27 February-7 March 2008, 4), and Inikah amalan Islam Hadhari? (Is this the practice of Islam Hadhari?, 27 February-7 March 2008, 23). PAS and PKR through Harakah and Suara Keadilan highlighted the concerns among people about the increase of the cost of living, essential

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goods prices, oil prices, and inflation rate, and the lack of economic growth and foreign direct investment in Malaysia. Both political parties criticised the government of mismanaged the Malaysian economy and run the developmental projects against people’s needs. Harakah focused on its coverage on the issue of poverty in Malaysia, while Suara Keadilan was more on the intention of the government to increase the price of fuel. Harakah for instance published columns such as Protest anjurkan himpunan aman 6 Jan, bantah kenaikan harga barang (Protest organised peaceful assembly on 6 Jan, opposing the increase of goods price, 1-15 February 2008, 12), Warga emas kecewa tidak dapat rumah PPRT (Elder people disappointed of not receiving PPRT house, 1-15 February 2008, 19), Revert oil to pre-hike price to combat inflation (1-15 February 2008, 25), Projek ekonomi BN Terengganu didakwa bertujuan politik (Terengganu BN economic project was politically motivated, 1-15 February 2008, 32), Hapus miskin tegar hanya janji palsu Abdullah Badawi (Wipe out hardcore poverty was a false promise by Abdullah Badawi, 1-15 February 2008, 38), Penswastaan hospital tetap dibantah (Privatisation of hospital continued to be opposed, 16-19 February 2008, 34), Jurang pendapatan miskin-kaya kita paling teruk (Gap between rich and poor is worst, 1-15 March 2008, 6), Umno gagal urus ekonomi Negara (UMNO failed to manage the country’s economy, 1-15 March 2008, 11), Najib wajib rawat kemelaratan rakyat Pekan (Najib must take care of people’s poverty in Pekan, 1-15 March 2008, 39), Fomca hantar memo kepada calon pilihan raya minta gaji minimum (Fomca delivered memorandum to the election candidate for minimum wage, 1-15 March 2008, 46), and Nasib Melayu Pulau Pinang tidak secerah Kelantan (Penang Malays were less fortunate than Kelantan Malays, 16-31 March 2008, 24). Suara Keadilan came out with columns such as KeADILan perkenal konsep ‘merakyatkan ekonomi’ (KeADILan introduced the concept of ‘people’s economy’, 30 January-14 February 2008, 3), Bantah harga minyak: polis tangkap 58 orang (Protest on oil price: Police caught 58 people, 30 January-14 February 2008, 8), Petrol pasti naik selepas pilihan raya (Petrol price will increase after the election, 30 January-14 February 2008, 27), Dasar kewangan bobrok bebankan rakyat (Flawed financial policy has burdened the people, 14-27 February 2008, 6), Turunkan harga minyak; saya tahu & mampu lakukan- Anwar (Reduced oil price; I know and am able to do it- Anwar, 14-27 February 2008, 11), and Negara bankrupt jika terus di bawah BN–Angkatan Muda (State bankrupts if still under BN–Angkatan Muda, 14-27 February 2008, 31).

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One of the main issues covered extensively by Harakah and Suara Keadilan was the issue of abuse of power and corruption practised by the government. There are so many columns focusing on this issue in showing that the BN leaders were out of touch with the people, were too wealthy, misused of public fund, and practised cronyism and nepotism. Harakah listed many headlines on this issue such as Tolak calon rasuah walaupun dari BN (Reject corrupt candidate even though from BN, 16-29 February 2008, 3), Penyalahgunaan harta kerajaan bermula (Misusing of the government property is begun, 16-29 February 2008, 8), Tanah kerajaan dibina bangunan Umno (UMNO building had been built in government land, 16-29 February 2008, 10), Jika BPR terlibat rasuah, bagaimana nak tapis calon? (If BPR involves in corruption, how could they screen the candidate?, 16-29 February 2008, 24), BPR perlu berhenti jadi tukang cuci calon BN (BPR was reminded to stop as BN cleaner, 16-29 February 2008, 35), BN diingatkan jangan salah guna kuasa ‘kerajaan sementara’ (BN was reminded of not misusing power as ‘caretaker government’, 1629 February 2008, 38), Calon Keadilan ditawar RM1 juta untuk tarik diri (Keadilan candidate was offered RM1 million to withdraw, 1-15 March 2008, 15), BN Kedah hanguskan RM113 juta wang rakyat (Kedah BN vanished RM113 million of people’s money, 1-15 March 2008, 28), Negara bankrap kerana dirompak menteri (State bankrupts because robed by the minister, 16-31 March 2008, 2), Rasuah RM1 bilion supaya Motorola kekal di Pulau Pinang? (RM1 billion bribery to keep Motorola in Penang?, 16-31 March 2008, 21), and Siapa biayai penerbangan mewah MB Kedah? (Who sponsor luxury flight of Kedah MB?, 16-31 March 2008, 27). PKR through Suara Keadilan came with headlines, Kita ada bukti komisen kapal selam, pesawat Sukhoi dan skandal PKFZ (We have proofs of commissions of submarine, Sukhoi jet and PKFZ scandal, 14-27 February 2008, 2), Exco Pahang rasuah, bina mahligai haram (Pahang Exco is corrupt, builds illegal mansion, 14-27 February 2008, 22), Pilihanraya ke-12; pemimpin korup masih dicalonkan (The 12th general election; corrupt leader was selected as candidate, 27 February-7 March 2008, 8), Korupsi mega sebelum PRU (Mega Corruption before general election, 27 February-7 March 2008, 23), SELANGOR: BN kaya, rakyat miskin (Selangor: BN is rich, People are poor, 27 February-7 March 2008, 24), and Antara rasuah Khir Toyo (Among Khir Toyo’s Corruption, 27 February-7 March 2008, 24) Suara Keadilan also gave special attention to the issue of Lingam’s tapes which is related to the crisis of judiciary system in Malaysia. This issue shows that Malaysian court is controlled by the government or

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Executive. Therefore, Malaysia is not a democratic state because there is no separation of power being implemented. The prime minister can choose judges that he favours, including the Chief Justice (CJ), to be appointed by the King. In its coverage, Suara Keadilan printed many columns on this issue such as Anwar dedah pita Lingam siri 3 (Anwar exposed Lingam’s tape series 3, 30 January-14 February 2008, 2), ‘Thirunama tidak gila’ – Rajendram (‘Thirunama is not crazy’ – Rajendram, 30 January-14 February 2008, 10&11), Ini mahu disembunyi Suruhanjaya (The Commission tried to hide this, 30 January-14 February 2008, 10), Inilah pelakon-pelakonnya (These are the actors, 30 January-14 February 2008, 11-13), Fitnah dirancang di rumah Tengku Adnan (defamation was planned in Tengku Adnan’s house, 30 January-14 February 2008, 11), Menetapkan keputusan kes adalah objektif skandal Lingam (Fixing the case’s decision was the objective of Lingam scandal, 30 January-14 February 2008, 12), Langkah keluar kerana prinsip- William Leong (Step out due to principle- William Leong, 14-27 February 2008, 4), …Kami akan cabar suruhanjaya di mahkamah (…We will challenge the commission in court, 14-27 February 2008, 4), JANJI ANWAR kepada rakyat (Anwar’s promises to the people, 14-27 February 2008, 5), and Suruhanjaya tolak video ketiga VK Lingam (The Commission rejected the third video of VK Lingam, 14-27 February 2008, 5). Harakah also covered this issue in headlines like Anwar ada bukti baru pakatan Tengku Adnan, Vincent dan Lingam (Anwar has new evidences of the pact between Tengku Adnan, Vincent and Lingam, 1-15 February 2008, 2), Suruhanjaya takut jejaskan individu tertentu (The Commission was afraid to tarnish certain individual, 16-29 February 2008, 33), and TIM bantah Suruhanjaya teruskan prosiding secara tertutup (TIM protested to the close door proceeding by the Commission, 16-29 February 2008, 36). Both political parties, PAS and PKR, utilised their respective newspapers to question the role of EC which seemed to bias for the ruling BN and against the opposition. Both political parties criticised the election processes such as postal voting, phantom voters, cancelling the use of indelible ink a few days before election, and registered voters in wrong constituencies. Harakah and Suara Keadilan supported and even participated in the move by BERSIH, NGO to ensure a free and fair election in Malaysia, campaigning against any intervention by the government to manipulate any election processes. Harakah listed many headlines such as Bersih’s Feb 23 carnival-Will permit be given? (1-15 February 2008, 14), Guna dakwat perlu digazet dalam Peraturan Pilihan Raya (Indelible Ink should be gazetted in the election rule, 1-15 February

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2008, 36), Pemuda PAS Johor bantah kenyataan Pengerusi SPR (Johor PAS Youth protested of the statement made by the Chairman of EC, 1-15 February 2008, 36), Undi pos senjata terakhir (Postal vote is the last weapon, 16-29 February 2008, 17), Najib pernah diselamatkan undi pos (Najib used to be safed by postal vote, 16-29 February 2008, 17), Bersih lapor kewujudan pengundi hantu (BERSIH reported on the existence of phantom voter, 16-29 February 2008, 18), BPR perlu siasat salah guna kuasa SPR (ACA should investigate an abuse of power by EC, 16-29 February 2008, 23), Undi pos tinggi di kawasan panas (Postal votes are high in hot constituencies, 16-29 February 2008, 23), Konspirasi Umno, SPR rebut kerusi PAS (UMNO conspiracy, EC grasps PAS seat, 16-29 February 2008, 33), Umno-BN akan peralat SPR untuk kekal memerintah (UMNO-BN will manipulate EC to regain power, 16-29 February 2008, 34), Isu duti setem: Calon PAS dan Keadilan buat laporan polis (Stamp duty issue: PAS and Keadilan candidates made a police report, 1-15 March 2008, 33), Awasi penipuan BN dan SPR pada hari mengundi 8 Mac ini (Beware of BN and EC manipulation on polling day this 8 March, 1-15 March 2008, 7), Pengundi pos turut didaftar sebagai pengundi biasa (Postal voters had also been registred as regular voters, 1-15 March 2008, 8), and Nama bertindih dalam daftar pemilih (Names overlapped in voters’ list, 1-15 March 2008, 42). Suara Keadilan also cited several more headlines, Skandal ‘Beras untuk Undi’ di Pulau Pinang: SPR perlu siasat (‘Rice for vote’ scandal in Penang: EC should investigate, 30 January- 14 February 2008, 26), Dakwaan SPR ‘Pengundi Hantu Tidak Wujud’ disanggah pemantau (EC’s claim of ‘non-existence of phantom voters’ rebuffed by observers, 14-27 February 2008, 2), Jangan kira siapa mengundi, kira siapa mengira undi (Don’t count who is voting, count who is counting the votes, 14-27 February 2008, 23), SPR masih menjadi alat penipuan BN (EC is still a tool for BN’s manipulation, 27 February- 7 March 2008, 23), SPR perkenal duti setem, kemudian mansuh pula! (EC introduced stamp duty, then abolished it!, 27 February- 7 March 2008, 31), SPR sengaja biarkan 8,666 pengundi hantu berumur 100 tahun (EC just simply lets 8,666 phantom voters aged 100 years old, 27 February- 7 March 2008, 3), Rakyat Malaysia di Filipina dedah penyelewengan undi pos (Malaysian in the Philippine exposed the manipulation of postal vote, 7-12 March 2008, 6), and Kes duti setem bukti SPR kuda tunggangan Umno-BN (Duty stamp case proved EC controlled by UMNO-BN, 7-12 March 2008, 10). PAS as usual stressed on its agenda of Islam and Harakah has always been operated to serve the interest and agenda of Islam as wanted by the

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Islamic party. During the general election, Harakah criticised UMNO as unIslamic. The agenda of Islam Hadhari propagated by Abdullah is fail and is confusing people. What interesting in this 2008 general election, PAS nominated a non-Muslim candidate for the first time in Johor in order to attract votes from the non-Muslims. These headlines grab the PAS agenda, Umno pinggir Islam, golongan ulama (UMNO marginalised Islam, Muslim scholars, 16-29 February 2008, 21), An ignoramus’ voyage on an unchartered sea of Islam (16-29 February 2008, 26), Islam Hadhari gagal kerana Umno menolak Islam (Islam Hadhari failed because UMNO rejected Islam, 16-29 February 2008, 38), NGO Islam gesa kerajaan beri kerusi Senator (Islamic NGOs urged government to give them a Senator seat, 16-29 February 2008, 10), PAS Johor pecah tradisi calon bukan Islam (Johor PAS broke tradition on non-Muslim candidate, 16-29 February 2008, 33), Tolak Islam Hadhari, kembali kepada Islam sebenar (Reject Islam Hadhari, back to the true Islam, 16-29 February 2008, 44), Manifesto BN Kelantan-Manhaj Islam Hadhari kelirukan rakyat (Kelantan BN Manifesto-The idea of Islam Hadhari is confusing people, 16-31 March 2008, 8), and Najib dakwa ada Islam yang tidak realistik (Najib argued there is an unrealistic Islam, 16-31 March 2008, 10). Harakah also paid more attention to the issue of morality. It was critical to the morality of government leaders especially in the case of Chua Soi Lek sex DVD. In its argument, Harakah attempted to advocate and educate morality among the Malaysians. These are the headlines on morality, Selepas Chua Soi Lek, VVIP Pahang, kini menteri homoseksual? (After Chua Soi Lek, Pahang VVIP, now homosexual minister, 1-15 February 2008, 3), Didik rakyat bermoral (Educate people’s morality, 1-15 February 2008, 8), Lantik Chua Soi Lek, bukti BN terima pelaku seks bebas (Appointed Chua Soi Lek, proof BN accepted free sexist, 1-15 February 2008, 38), BN bankrap calon bermoral (BN lacked of moral candidates, 16-29 February 2008, 4), and Ustaz Ghani bimbang banyak rumah kampong ada premis karaoke (Ustaz Ghani was afraid many kampong houses had karaoke premises, 16-31 March 2008, 33). Suara Keadilan on the other hand gave many coverage on Anwar Ibrahim’s, the PKR advisor, statements and activities. Anwar was still popular and important in uniting the three opposition parties, PAS, PKR and DAP, in challenging the BN government. Suara Keadilan came out with headlines on Anwar such as, 3000 rakyat sambut Anwar di Bandar Tun Razak (3000 people welcomed Anwar in Bandar Tun Razak, 30 January-14 February 2008, 4), Pada malam itu sahaja lebih 700 org India mengisi borang menyertai KeADILan; gagasan Anwar disambut rakyat

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Pahang (This evening 700 Indians filled the forms to join KeADILan; Anwar’s agenda accepted by people in Pahang, 30 January-14 February 2008, 6), Sekat Anwar tanding PRU12: Bukti BN takut (Prevented Anwar from contesting in the 12th general election: Proof BN was scare, 30 January-14 February 2008, 26), Hormati hak asasi: benarkan Anwar bertanding (Respect Human Rights: Let Anwar to contest, 14-27 February 2008, 3), Polis sekat Anwar di Kelana Jaya (Police stopped Anwar in Kelana Jaya, 14-27 February 2008, 15), Jelajah Anwar ke seluruh negara (Anwar touring the country, 14-27 February 2008, 17), and Menteri Besar Negeri Sembilan cuba gagalkan lawatan Anwar Ibrahim (Negeri Sembilan Menteri Besar tried to stop Anwar’s visit, 14-27 February 2008, 26).

Political Tabloids In addition, political tabloids gave significant impact to the voters in the 2008 general election even though the impact was not as strong as the mainstream media. Political tabloids managed to give Malaysian people alternative news and views especially from the opposition PR when all the mainstreams media clearly supported the ruling BN. In this research, there are three tabloids which constantly reported the political issues during the election; bimonthly Buletin Rakyat, weekly Mingguan Wasilah and weekly Siasah. During the election, the coverage by the Buletin Rakyat and Mingguan Wasilah were slightly balanced to the both BN and PR compared to the Siasah which totally biased toward the PR. Although the BN received more coverage than the PR in the Buletin Rakyat, Mingguan Wasilah and Siasah, the BN definitely received more negative coverage than the positive. In three publications of the Buletin Rakyat (including one edition published just after the election) during from the day Parliament dissolve until the polling day, the BN got 47 columns (or 40 percent of overall coverage) of negative coverage and 21 columns (or 18 percent) of positive coverage. Through five of its editions (including as well one edition published after the election), the Mingguan Wasilah covered 110 columns (37 percent) of negative coverage and 68 (23 percent) columns of positive coverage. Both tabloids also gave a slightly higher positive coverage for the PR than the positive coverage for the BN with 28 columns (24 percent) in the Buletin Rakyat and 70 columns (23 percent) in the Mingguan Wasilah. Both also included a very low negative coverage on the PR, 5 columns (4 percent) in the Buletin Rakyat and 7 columns (2 percent) in the Mingguan Wasilah. In contrast, the Siasah favoured the PR in all of its coverage. It only provided 1 column with

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positive coverage to the BN. On the other hand, in it five editions during the election, the Siasah came out with 151 columns (49 percent) of negative coverage to the BN and 139 columns (45 percent) of positive coverage to the PR. This proved that the Siasah has been used as campaign tool for the opposition PR in its struggle against the ruling BN. Although the political tabloids were trying to balance the strength of the mainstream newspapers, with the circulations around 100,000 to 150,000 per-edition and publication of two and four times a month, these political tabloids only managed to give small impact particularly the opposition PR in gaining supports from voters in the election. TABLE 5-7: POLITICAL TABLOIDS AND THE 2008 GENERAL ELECTION: TOTAL AND PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE AND TENDENCY TOWARD POLITICAL PARTIES BN + BN PR + PR N TABLOIDS\TENDENCY Buletin Rakyat Mingguan Wasilah Siasah

21 68 1

47 110 151

28 70 139

5 7 0

16 45 17

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

CHART 5-3:

TotalPercentages: BuletinRakyat 14%

18%

4% BN+ BNͲ PR+ PRͲ 24%

N

40%

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

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CHART 5-4:

TotalPercentages: MingguanWasilah 15% 23% 2% BN+ BNͲ PR+ PRͲ

23%

N

37%

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

CHART 5-5:

TotalPercentages: Siasah 6% 0%

0%

BN+ BNͲ 49% 45%

PR+ PRͲ N

Source: (Azizuddin M.S., M. et al 2008)

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Buletin Rakyat gave a lot of coverage to the issue within the UMNO party especially the internal bickering among its leaders. In the front page on 15 February 2008, it argued that BN can and will win the election but not UMNO in headline, BN menang UMNO kalah? (BN wins UMNO loses, 15 February 2008). However, many of UMNO leaders believed that UMNO was still strong in winning the election through headlines, Mohamad Aziz berjaya wujudkan keharmonian kaum di Parlimen Sri Gading (Mohamad Aziz was able to inspire racial harmony in Sri Gading Parliamentary constituency, 15 February 2008, 3, 5 & 14), Peluang Pak Lah ‘cerah’ (Pak Lah has a good chance, 1 March 2008, 2), and Jangan cabar Syed Hamid (Don’t challenge Syed Hamid, 1 March 2008, 10, 24 & 25). However, Buletin Rakyat realised that the opposition was getting stronger and it admitted BN and UMNO worried about the ‘Welfare State’ agenda by PAS and the ruling party was going to lose in Kelantan. UMNO was also portrayed as party that opposed to the institution of ulama or Muslim scholars. These are clear in columns such as Annuar, Idris Jusoh tertekan Negara kebajikan PAS (Annuar, Idris Jusoh were pressured by PAS’ welfare state, 15 February 2008, 17), Negara kebajikan PAS untuk tebus hak rakyat digadai-Salahuddin Ayob (PAS’ welfare state was for bringing back people’s rights- Salahuddin Ayob, 1 March 2008, 31), PAS menang di Kelantan (PAS won in Kelantan, 15 March 2008, 2), BN Kelantan sukar nak menang… (Kelantan BN was difficult to win, 15 March 2008, 11), Nik Aziz tetap jadi pilihan… (Nik Aziz was always the choice, 15 March 2008, 11), and UMNO tolak ulama, kabinet Khairy dan politik ilmu hitam (UMNO opposed ulama, Khairy’s cabinet and black magic politics, 15 March 2008, 8 & 9). Buletin Rakyat also provided coverage about Anwar Ibrahim in front page of its two editions during the election. It showed that although Anwar was denied to contest, he can still be an essential factor in threatening BN’s status quo in this election through columns, Tetap jadi wakil rakyat-Anwar (Always be a people representative-Anwar, 15 February 2008, 1), Siapa PM bayangan BA? (Who is BA’s shadow PM, 1 March 2008, 1), Anwar hadapi risiko seperti Bhutto? (Anwar faced risks like Bhutto?, 1 March 2008, 1), BN tak perlu takut bayang-bayang Anwar (BN should not be scared of Anwar’s shadow, 15 February 2008, 11), Agenda pembangkang mahu Anwar bertanding p/raya (Opposition’s agenda wanted Anwar contesting in election, 15 February 2008, 21), Menyerang Anwar itu tanda kelemahanDr Syed Husin Ali (Attacking Anwar was a sign of weakness-Dr Syed Husin Ali, 1 March 2008, 7,14 & 15), and ‘…kecewa ayah tidak bertanding’-Nurul Nuha Anwar Ibrahim (‘…disappointed daddy is not going to contest’-Nurul Nuha Anwar Ibrahim, 15 March 2008, 21).

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Buletin Rakyat also saw that Bloggers dominated the Internet in influencing the voters in the election in headline, Bloggers pengaruhi corak pengundian pilihan raya umum 12 di luar Bandar (Bloggers influenced the pattern of rural area voting in the 12 general election, 15 February 2008, 18 &19). Mingguan Wasilah gave more positive coverage to the opposition and was critical to the government. It argued that the government liked to manipulate certain issues for its interests. The ruling party also served the country badly because the price of oil will increase after the election, the crime rate is increase, the rich become richer and poor become poorer, many development projects are in difficulty, and the economic condition becomes worst. Here are some of the related headlines, Najib putar belit! (Najib deceiving!, 17-23 February 2008, 1), Harga minyak pasti naik! (Oil price will surely increase!, 10-16 February 2008, 42), Ini masanya ‘bersihkan’ BN-Tun Mahathir (This is the time to ‘clean’ BN-Tun Mahathir, 10-16 February 2008, 3), Jenayah berleluasa-apa kesudahannya? (Crime is increasing- what is the end?, 10-16 February 2008, 15), Masalah kaya dan miskin dalam satu kaum (Problem of rich and poor in one ethnic, 10-16 February 2008, 15), Strategi politik atau temberang rakyat (Political strategy or deceiving people, 17-23 February 2008, 8), 3 projek bermasalah di Pulau Pinang ‘Maafkan saya’- PM (3 problematic projects in Penang ‘I am sorry’-PM, 17-23 February 2008, 10), Profesional agama terus jadi alat Umno (Religious professionals are continue to be used as tool for UMNO, 9-15 March 2008, 4), and Henti menipu rakyat dalam persoalan ekonomi nasional (Stop lying to the people on national economy, 9-15 March 2008, 23). The BN government, as accused by the opposition, ruled the country by ignoring democratic practices such as in this column, Mengajar BN erti demokrasi (Teaching the meaning of democracy to BN, 17-23 February 2008, 41). Besides, Abdullah’s idea of Islam Hadhari becomes useless because BN has many immoral leaders through headlines such as Model Islam Hadhari tidak laku (Islam Hadhari Model is unaccepted, 2-8 March 2008, 46) and Jangan biar negara diperintah ‘pemimpin tiada moral’ (Do not let the country ruled by the ‘immoral leaders’, 9-15 March 2008, 15). Therefore, Mingguan Wasilah argued that many people distrusted the BN party, in headline Rakyat sudah tidak percaya pada BN (People distrust the BN, 9-15 March 2008, 41), and urged all Malaysians to think deeply before voting the BN party in the election in front page headline entitled ‘Fikir’ sebelum pangkah BN (‘Think’ before voting BN, 10-16 February 2008, 1).

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Mingguan Wasilah also showed that the opposition especially the PAS party is strong and very confident to win many seats in the election. They were certain to deny two third majority of BN in the Parliament because the young generation or youth in Malaysia were keen to vote the opposition after seeing the government unfulfilled many promises such as good governance and combating corruption. People life is also getting worst with the increase of essential goods prices and cost of living particularly in big cities such as Kuala Lumpur. Thus, the opposition believed that they could take over the government from the BN in the 2008 general election. These are the example of headlines printed by Mingguan Wasilah on this issue, Anak muda pilih BA (Youth chose BA, 915 March 2008, 1), Pas yakin menang 40 kerusi-Hadi (Pas was confident of winning 40 seats-Hadi, 17-23 February 2008, 3), Pas tekad roboh kerusi Umno (Pas aimed on conquering UMNO seats, 24 February-1 March 2008, 3), Misi kurangkan majority 2/3 BN (Mission to reduce the two third of BN majority, 24 February-1 March 2008, 7), Peluang lakar sejarah baru Negara (Chances to write a new chapter of country’s history, 24 February-1 March 2008, 9), Peluang pembangkang memerintah Malaysia (Chances for the opposition to rule Malaysia, 24 February-1 March 2008, 28), Pembangkang optimis nafi majority 2/3 BN (Opposition optimistic of denying BN’s two third majority, 2-8 March 2008, 5), and Umno lepasi zaman gemilang: Pembangkang mesti sedia ambil alih (UMNO surpassing its glorious period: Opposition must ready to take over, 2-8 March 2008, 24 & 25). BN was however still confident of winning the election, but it realised the supports from the people were decreasing. BN was portrayed by the Mingguan Wasilah as desperate in begging the voters to vote it in the election such as in the headlines, Jangan lupa jasa BN-Rafidah (Do not forget BN’s past services, 10-16 February 2008, 4), Terima dan sokong calon BN, rayu Abdullah (Accept and support BN’s candidates, Abdullah’s appeal, 10-16 February 2008, 10), BN perlu mandat baru–PM (BN needs new mandate, 24 February-1 March 2008, 4), Johor milik BN-Syed Hamid (BN owns Johor-Syed Hamid, 17-23 February 2008, 46), and Iklan BN: Tiga hari RM1 juta (BN advertisements: RM1 million for three days, 9-15 March 2008, 10). In term of media reporting, Siasah, edited by its chief Mohd Sayuti Omar, is rather similar to Harakah in its coverage and tendency which is bias toward the opposition especially PAS and against the ruling BN. During the 2008 general election, Siasah gave more attention to the PAS party and highlighted its policies, manifesto and promises. When PAS introduced the concept of “Welfare State”, Siasah explained that the

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“Welfare State” proposed by PAS is better than BN’s manifesto propagating safety, peace and prosperity. PAS was portrayed as party that can rectify problems made by BN such as reducing the price of oil. These are among the headlines, Negara berkebajikan lwn selamat, aman dan makmur (Welfare state versus safety, peace and prosperity, 10-16 February 2008, 1), PAS dan PKR kemuka ‘Tawaran Bersama’ (PAS and PKR proposed a ‘joint proposition’, 10-16 February 2008, 1), Matlamat PAS dalam pilihan raya umum ke-12; perbetul kerosakan BN (PAS aims in the 12th general election; rectifies BN’s mistakes, 17-23 February 2008, 1), Keuntungan Petronas boleh realisasikan Negara berkebajikan (Petronas profits could realise Welfare State, 24 February-1 March 2008, 13), PAS yakin boleh turunkan harga minyak (PAS is confident of reducing fuel prices, 2-6 March 2008, 3), Manifesto pembangkang lebih realistik (Opposition manifesto is more realistic, 7-15 March 2008, 8), and Bertanding untuk perjuang nasib rakyat (Contesting for the people, 7-15 March 2008, 11). PAS as a multiracial party was also seen as party that can protect the rights for non-Muslims and non-Malays. There were so many dissatisfactions by non-Malays of UMNO racist agenda. Thus, nonMuslims and non-Malays especially Chinese and Indians have begun to accept PAS with non-racist agenda, albeit stressing on Islam. These are the headlines, Bukan Melayu lebih baik dengan PAS (Non-Malays are better with PAS, 17-23 February 2008, 8), PAS jamin masyarakat bukan Islam dapat hak (PAS ensured non-Muslim communities getting their rights, 1723 February 2008, 17), Prejudis kaum untungkan siapa? (Racial prejudice profiting whom?, 24 February-1 March 2008, 44), Masyarakat cina terpinggir ketika pemerintahan BN (Chinese community was marginalised under BN, 10-16 February 2008, 6), Kaum cina berani dekati PAS (Chinese were getting to know PAS, 17-23 February 2008, 5), Masyarakat Cina luahkan sokongan terbuka kepada PAS (Chinese community openly expressed supporting PAS, 2-6 March 2008, 6), Pemimpin kaum India akui minority di Kelantan terbela (Indian leaders admitted that minorities are protected in Kelantan, 17-23 February 2008, 6), Tsunami politik masyarakat India dalam PRU 12; protes kaum terpinggir (Political tsunami of Indian community in the 12th general election; protest of marginalised group, 17-23 February 2008, 19), Membela kaum India bukan hak mutlak MIC (Struggle for Indians not the absolute right for MIC, 17-23 February 2008, 9), and Tsunami politik India dalam pilihan raya umum ke-12;politik perkauman lawan politik nombor (Political tsunami of Indian community in the 12th general election; racial politics versus number politics, 24 February-1 March 2008, 19).

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Siasah focused most of its coverage on two states, Terengganu and Kelantan. PAS used to win and control Terengganu in the 1999 general election, but lost in the 2004 general election. Therefore, with the intention in getting back the state, PAS was portrayed as a strong party that can rectify any wrongdoings done by the BN government in Terengganu. Siasah extensively attacked the government and its leaders and policies. PAS proposed a special manifesto for Terengganu and with PKR nominated many new candidates for the election. These are clear in headlines, PAS kemukakan tokoh baru Terengganu (PAS listed new candidates in Terengganu, 10-16 February 2008, 1), Tokoh-tokoh baru bakal perkuatkan Pas Terengganu (New candidates will strengthen PAS in Terengganu, 10-16 February 2008, 2), Pilihan raya- rakyat Terengganu mudah berubah angin dan beralih rasa (Election- people in Terengganu can change their mind and taste easily, 10-16 February 2008, 33), Rakyat Terengganu masih ingat pencerobohan Masjid Bujal (People in Terengganu are still remember the Bujal Mosque raid, 10-16 February 2008, 34), Mustafa sahkan PKR bertanding 7 kerusi di Terengganu (Mustafa confirmed PKR will contesting 7 seats in Terengganu, 17-23 February 2008, 56), Khairy de facto MB Terengganu-Lim Kit Siang (Khairy is the de facto Chief Minister of Terengganu- Lim Kit Siang, 1723 February 2008, 56), PAS, PKR Terengganu berada di tahap terbaik (Terengganu PAS, PKR in good form, 17-23 February 2008, 16), Masuk UMNO: Idris tipu atau ditipu (Join UMNO: Idris lied or was lied, 17-23 February 2008, 16), BN Terengganu gagal berlaku adil kepada rakyat (Terengganu BN failed to be just to the people, 17-23 February 2008, 33), STP: MB Terengganu ditipu lagi (STP: Terenganu MP was lied again, 1723 February 2008, 33), Masjid Kristal tanpa imam, ahli qaryah (Cristal Mosque without imam and the followers, 17-23 February 2008, 34), Manifesto PAS Terengganu: Islam berdaulat rakyat sejahtera (Terengganu PAS manifesto: Islam is sovereign people are prosper, 24 February- 1 March 2008, 52), PAS mampu tawan Terengganu (PAS can capture Terengganu, 24 February-1 March 2008, 11), PAS kemuka 17 muka baru di Terengganu (PAS nominated 17 new faces in Terengganu, 24 February-1 March 2008, 38), Idris belum yakin BN kekal memerintah Terengganu (Idris was not yet certain BN will continue to rule Terengganu, 2-6 March 2008, 33), Pertembungan generasi kedua politik Terengganu (The political clash of second generation in Terengganu, 2-6 March 2008, 34), Sasaran 17 DUN, 4 Parlimen sudah dicapai; Terengganu jatuh ke tangan PAS (Target of 17 seats in state assembly, 4 Parliamentary seats were achieved; Terengganu fell in PAS hands, 7-15

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March 48), and PAS yakin dapat ambil Terengganu semula (PAS was confident of getting back Terengganu, 7-15 March 2008, 2). Kelantan had also been given a special attention by Siasah. Kelantan is a fortress for PAS since 1990. Even Mahathir agreed on that argument and admitted that UMNO was difficult to capture Kelantan because PAS was too strong. In one rhetorical reporting, even tourists were reported of wanting PAS to win in the election. PAS condemned the BN party, and its choice for chief minister named Awang Adek, of giving false promises to the Kelantanese. These are some of the headlines for Kelantan; Awang Adek bukan calon MB? (Awang Adek was not a candidate for MB?, 2-6 March 2008, 1), Umno sukar tawan Kelantan-Tun Mahathir (Umno is difficult to take over Kelantan-Tun Mahathir, 7-15 March 2008, 1), Anak Kelantan di perantauan sokong PAS (Kelantanese abroad support PAS, 715 March 2008, 1), PAS sukar digugat di Kelantan (PAS was not intimidated in Kelantan, 10-16 February 2008, 6), Ketenangan Tok Guru menghadapi pilihan raya (Tok Guru is calm facing the election, 10-16 February 2008, 37), PAS Kelantan tampil ramai calon muda, berwibawa (Kelantan PAS nominated many credible youth candidates, 17-23 February 2008, 5), Pelancong mahu Kelantan kekal di bawah kerajaan Pas (Tourists wanted Kelantan under PAS, 24 February-1 March 2008, 4), Parlimen Bachok semakin kelam buat Awang Adek (Bachok Parlimentary seat is getting bleak for Awang Adek, 24 February-1 March 2008, 5), 2,000 rumah untuk penduduk miskin di Kelantan (2,000 homes for the poor in Kelantan, 24 February-1 March 2008, 5), Tiga pukulan untuk Umno Kelantan (Three hits against Kelantan UMNO, 2-6 March 2008, 2), Najib akui Umno Kelantan bermasalah (Najib admitted Kelantan Umno in difficulty, 2-6 March 2008, 6), Abdullah buat Umno Kelantan makin kalut (Abdullah made Kelantan Umno in disarray, 7-15 March 2008, 6), Penanam tembakau hilang keyakinan terhadap Awang Adek (Tobacco farmers lost of confidence in Awang Adek, 7-15 March 2008, 7), Gelombang kebangkitan rakyat Kelantan (Wave of Kelantanese power, 715 March 2008, 14), and Umno umpan janji retorik untuk rakyat Kelantan (UMNO lured rhetorical promises for Kelantanese, 7-15 March 2008, 14). Lastly, Election Commission (EC) was claimed to be bias for the ruling BN. Siasah, like other alternative newspapers and political tabloids, criticised the EC for not doing enough in practising free and fare election. EC did not seriously to prevent phantom voters and apply the use of indelible ink. There are also arguments that voter’s registration was flawed where names of voter were missing and foreigners were also registered as

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voters. The oppositions were sceptical of the EC, which they accused, trying to help BN candidates to win the election. Many headlines or columns were for the issue of EC performance and biasness such as Awas pengundi hantu (Beware of phantom voters, 17-23 February 2008, 56), Bersih dakwa rakyat ditipu hidup-hidup; dakwat: SPR main wayang (BERSIH claimed people had been duped, 24 February- 1 March 2008, 1), Dakwat kekal:SPR tipu hidup-hidup (Indelible ink: EC utterly cheating 24 February-1 March 2008, 3), Kajian sahkan Pulau Pinang pusat pertempuran PRU-12 (Research confirmed Penang is the centre for battle in the 12th general election, 24 February-1 March 2008, 3), Penipuan SPR bercanggah dengan demokrasi (EC cheating against democracy, 2-6 March 2008, 16), SPR selamatkan Rafidah dan calon BN Cempaka (EC saved Rafidah and BN candidate for Cempaka, 2-6 March 2008, 38), PAS Baling kesan 1000 nama pengundi hilang (Baling PAS identified 1000 names missing, 7-15 March 2008, 4), SPR dipersoal lagi (EC is questioned again, 7-15 March 2008, 4), PKR dakwa pendatang Burma di daftar di Pekan (PKR claimed Burmese immigrants were registered in Pekan, 7-15 March 2008, 4), Batal dakwat kuku: bertenang dan tingkat usaha untuk menang (Cancellation of nail ink: calm and strengthen the capacity to win, 7-15 March 2008, 4), Pembatalan dakwat kuku untuk jamin mandate selesa kepada BN (Chancellation of nail ink was in ensuring BN to get comfortable mandate, 7-15 March 2008, 7), SPR tidak konsisten (EC was inconsistence, 7-15 March 2008, 8), Perubahan di tangan pengundi: ‘tolak calon yang tidak layak’ (Change in voters’ hands: ‘reject the unqualified candidates’, 7-15 March 2008, 10), Pembatalan dakwat kekal: adakah polis lemah (Cancellation of permanent ink: Is the police weak, 7-15 March 2008, 14), Pengundi hantu beraya di Kelantan (Phantom voters rejoice in Kelantan, 7-15 March 2008, 27), Keanehan SPR di mata orang ramai (The odd about EC in public eyes, 7-15 March 2008, 27), and PAS Terengganu sapu bersih jika bantahan diterima (Terengganu PAS gets clean sweep if the protests are accepted, 7-15 March 2008, 33).

Conclusion In conclusion, this analysis found out that the mainstream daily newspapers dominated the public sphere of the printed press. The alternative newspapers and political tabloids were lack of circulations which proved about the influence of mainstream newspapers in controlling people views especially to the government and as tools in gaining political supports and votes in the election. Therefore, the BN government can

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continue utilise the mainstream press in order to maintain the refeudalisation process toward favouring the ruling party and elites. However, election result saw the government lost five states–Kelantan, Kedah, Penang, Perak and Selangor–where two of them are the richest states in Malaysia to the opposition PR and denied two third seats–the BN won 140 seats and the PR won 82 seats–in the Parliament which have never happened before in Malaysian history. This also proved that there is other factor that contributes to the election result. Many argue that one of the major factors contributing the significant lost of states and seats in the Parliament and State Assembly by the BN was the factor of new media, the Internet and mobile phone which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Therefore, the new media is seen as the medium that could challenge the refeudalisation process and bring about and strengthen the defeudalisation process in Malaysia.

CHAPTER SIX THE NEW PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEFEUDALISATION OF MALAYSIAN MEDIA: THE INTERNET AND MOBILE PHONE

This chapter analyses further the Malaysian media from the Habermas’ perspectives of the public sphere and refeudalisation. In the previous chapter, Harbermas argued that the public sphere existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when meeting in the coffee houses, salons and voluntary societies brought about the public debate and deliberation. However, the success of public sphere was also its downfall. The public sphere had turned the press into mass press through the commercialisation of the media and generated the refeudalisation process. Refeudalisation was also the implication of the media manipulation when the media bestow aura and prestige upon authorities similar to that bestowed on royal figures under feudalism. Malaysia is also facing the same situation when nationalist movement utilised the newspaper to generate an active public sphere. But the British colonial and later Malaysian government under Perikatan (or Barisan Nasional) Party controlled the media, and dominated and manipulated the public sphere. There were signs of mass press or commercialisation of the media especially during Mahathir’s leadership, but again Malaysian media are still being controlled by the government. Through refeudalisation process, Malaysia’s BN government instils neo-feudal psychology to attract loyalty among Malaysian and sets up the media approaches in defining the national interests. However, this chapter takes an effort, not to expand the Habermas’ argument of refeudalisation, but to introduce a new idea based on the reversed Habermas’ argument of refeudalisation which is called “defeudalisation”. The 2008 General Election has shown that a new public sphere of cyberspace via the Internet and mobile phone or Short Message Service (SMS) are opened and given significant effect to the public deliberation. It, dominated by the opposition, is strong enough in influence

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the public and becomes one of the major factors in determining the result of the election which is for the first time the opposition denying the ruling government a two third majority in the parliament and taking control of five states. This new and influential public sphere in Malaysia has reversed the media from refeudalisation process to “defeudalisation”.

The New Bougeois Public Sphere and Defeudalisation In his writing, Habermas has never mentioned about the process called “defeudalisation”. In fact, Habermas’s argument about the public sphere stops at the description of the refeudalisation process of media and he has never extended his argument beyond that process. The reason is that Habermas’ notion of the public sphere was grounded historically in the era of print media through modes of argumentation characterised by linear rationality, objectivity, and consensus. Habermas could not see the existing process of defeudalisation. As a critique and challenge to the refeudalisation process, argued Douglas Kellner (1999), Habermas downplays broadcasting and other communication media, the Internet and new spheres of public debate, and various alternative public spheres in part because he does not participate in these media and arenas himself and partly because the categorical distinctions in his theory denigrate these domains in contrast to the realms of communicative action and the lifeworld. But these blindspots and conceptual limitations, argued Kellner, truncate Habermas’s discussions of democracy and undermine his obvious intention of fostering democratisation himself. In Habermas’ conception, the media and public sphere function outside of the actual political-institutional system. Precisely, it is a site of discussion, not a locus of political organisation, struggle, and transformation. The media in the Western democracies, which is now the dominant model in a globalised world, are intricately intertwined within the state and economy, in ways that Habermas does not acknowledge, nonetheless oppositional broadcast media and new media technologies such as the Internet are serving as a new basis for a participatory democratic communication politics. Habermas, by contrast, fails to perceive how new social movements and oppositional groups and individuals use media communication to both educate and organise oppositional groups and thus expand the field of democratic politics even though Habermas sees the media and public sphere as a sphere of civil society (Habermas 1998, 359). Nonetheless, public broadcasting continues to offer an ideal of public interest communication geared toward the common good. Ironically, the proliferation of new media, including the Internet, has

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multiplied information and discussion, of an admittedly varied sort, and thus provide potential for a more informed citizenry and more extensive democratic participation. In fact, the Internet can allow the public sphere, not only serves to form public opinion but also designates an ideal of how public opinion ought to be formed. It sets its goal as a sphere that is opened to all citizens, where information is unrestricted and where free, critical and selfcritical discussion goes on (Poole 1989, 13). According to Kellner (1999), the rise of the Internet expands the realm for democratic participation and debate and creates new public spaces for political intervention. He argues that first broadcast media like radio and television, and now computers, have produced new public spheres and spaces for information, debate, and participation that contain both the potential to invigorate democracy and to increase the dissemination of critical and progressive ideas–as well as new possibilities for manipulation, social control, the promotion of conservative positions, and intensifying of differences between haves and have nots. But participation in these new public spheres, computer bulletin boards and discussion groups, talk radio and television, and the emerging sphere of what Kellner’s call cyberspace democracy require critical intellectuals to gain new technical skills and to master new technologies (Kellner 1995, 1997). To be sure, the Internet is a contested terrain, used by Left, Right, and Centre to promote their own agendas and interests. The political battles of the future may well be fought in the streets, factories, parliaments, and other sites of past conflict, but politics today is already mediated by media, computer, and information technologies and will increasingly be so in the future. Those interested in the politics and culture of the future should therefore be clear on the important role of the new public spheres and intervene accordingly. A new democratic politics will thus be concerned with new media and computer technologies are being used to serve the interests of the people and not corporate elites which could turn the defeudalisation process back to refeudalisation. A democratic politics will strive to see that broadcast media and computers are used to inform and enlighten individuals rather than to manipulate them. A democratic politics will teach individuals how to use the new technologies, to articulate their own experiences and interests, and to promote democratic debate and diversity, allowing a full range of voices and ideas to become part of the cyberdemocracy of the future (Kellner 1999). Now more than ever, public debate over the use of new technologies is of utmost importance to the future of democracy. Who will control the

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media and technologies of the future, and debates over the public’s access to media, media accountability and responsibility, media funding and regulation? What kinds of culture are best for cultivating individual freedom, democracy, and human happiness and well-being will become increasingly important in the future? The proliferation of media culture and computer technologies focuses attention on the importance of new technologies and the need for public intervention in debates over the future of media culture and communications in the information highways and entertainment by-ways of the future (Kellner 1999). The technological revolution of our time thus involves the creation of new public spheres and the need for democratic strategies to promote the project of democratisation and to provide access to more people to get involved in more political issues and struggles so that democracy might have a chance in the new millennium (Kellner 1999). The disinformation and misinformation that circulates on Internet undermines democratic information and discussion, pointing to sharp contradictions within the current media system. Biased reporting, combined with factors like manipulative publicity and mass advertising have been described as “the colonization of the public sphere by systems of authority” (Soules 2001, 1). Critics feel it is unfair to suggest this is a modern day problem using the example of the manipulated bias found in reportage of such events as the French Revolution (Crossley 2004, 11). If critics believe that bias has always existed then at least we can argue that the amount of bias has increased, if only for the fact we have more media than ever before, with a medley of corporate, public, independent and Internet sources to choose from. As the smorgasbord increases, so too does our awareness of different angles of truth, and our ability to make comparisons between one kind of media and another. We can clearly see, where before it was not so obvious, that the media are being used as active participants in political processes rather than reporting and questioning them. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch has been widely “accused of running partisan media coverage for political parties that promote policies and decisions which favour his commercial interests” (Howell 2005, 26). During the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War, all 175 Murdoch-owned newspapers editorialised in support of the war, and his Fox television network has been accused of political conservatism (Mrkich 2006). Today of course we can conclude that the Internet is perhaps the best example of a modern day bourgeois public sphere. It is a global space that gives ordinary people the opportunity to express and share opinions, news

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and information. Never before people have had the opportunity to gain previously unavailable information, share opinions and news so rapidly, and challenge authority so openly. However only around 10 percent of the world’s population have home access to the Internet (BBC 2003, 11) thus excluding 90 percent of the world’s population from having a voice in this so called global conversation. So far it does not measure up to Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” which requires freedom and equality not always in existence in every society. It is however a step toward the direction of the ideal. Access is steadily increasing and it remains to be seen how much of humanity will eventually be included under this “public sphere” umbrella. Habermas’ theory makes clear that “the public sphere is not a given for every type of society; nor does it possess a fixed status” (Holub 1997, 3). Habermas believes that “communicative action” is a primary part of the public sphere, and this, unnoticed by Habermas, also brings the idea of defeudalisation. Defeudalisation exists to counter and reverse the process of refeudalisation where mass press or commercialisation of the press has hindered the people to express and access ideas freely in the public sphere. People are the centre stage of discussion, not the elites, political leaders and celebrities. Defeudalisation involves people coming together in discussion, responding to a particular crisis when society is not meeting their needs, or when institutions are manipulating individuals, and rejects mass press especially when media coverage ignore the public interests, instead prefer coverage on the issues of the government or media companies interests or likings. In the US, this process of defeudalisation is currently happening on the Internet with entire sites, message boards, chat rooms and blogs without controlled from the government or media companies devoted to issues like public criticism over the invasion of Iraq and subsequent public suspicion over the US’s motives, debate concerning the legitimacy of the recent US elections and online activism dedicated to political, social and environmental change. Millions of people marched on the world’s streets in protest about military action in Iraq, primarily as a result of the power of the Internet to inspire action, with sites like MoveOn.Org taking the lead. This call for action is also used for personal causes. In April 2006, it took only a few days before millions of people around the world had received an email urging them to write to the Australian Foreign Minister to increase his assistance in the Schapelle Corby case, a young Australian at risk of being put to death in a Balinese jail allegedly falsely accused of importing drugs into the country. It has the ability to unite the global community like never before with the recent tsunami effort being a prime example. It also has an affect on the unity of

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local community. The creator of PlanetWaves.Net writes that he heard about a fire a few streets away from his Paris home by scanning the Internet news that morning. The Internet allows for connection that is immediate, providing a tremendous potential for the empowerment of society, taking back control over their own voice and movement forward (Mrkich 2006). It is problematic that the minority with access to global media, particularly the Internet, are in the power position of making statements and decisions on behalf of those without access. On one hand this approach can be seen as a rather condescending and elite one. It does not match up to the “late-modern” school of public sphere thought which stresses the Habermasian pre-requisites of general accessibility to information and the eradication of privilege, although the other prerequisite of a common quest for truth does seem to be being met (Crossley 2004, 13). In fact, Habermas is so negative on the prospect of Internet as a new public sphere. In his acceptance speech of the Bruno Kreisky Prize for the advancement of human rights on 9 March 2006, Habermas (2006, 1) said: “the use of the Internet has both broadened and fragmented the contexts of communication. This is why the Internet can have a subversive effect on intellectual life in authoritarian regimes. But at the same time, the less formal, horizontal cross-linking of communication channels weakens the achievements of traditional media. This focuses the attention of an anonymous and dispersed public on select topics and information, allowing citizens to concentrate on the same critically filtered issues and journalistic pieces at any given time. The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the Internet is the decentralised access to unedited stories. In this medium, contributions by intellectuals lose their power to create a focus.”

It seems Habermas is lamenting the control of the expert, the voice which in many ways has silenced the voice of the public in a mass media driven pseudo public sphere. Instead of praising the new public sphere, Habermas’ worst anxiety is that the Internet will weaken the traditional media such as the printed press. While Habermas’ analysis of the Internet continues to be ambiguous, numerous scholars subscribing to the theory of multiple public spheres have outlined fundamental criteria that need to be fulfilled if the Internet is to function as a public sphere in its traditional definition, which is based on the need for rational and critical thought, as opposed to forum of inane chatter (Ubayasiri 2006).

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On the other hand, “social movements can positively construct voluntary associations” (Crossley 2004, 14) and responsible social movements can ensure that whilst the majority do not have a voice then at least the problems and issues of the majority can be heard, acknowledged and discussed. This is admittedly a very Habermasian idealistic view, one that has understandably been criticised for taking the position that participants will have shared assumptions about communicative practice (Gaynor 1996, 3). It is also not a realistic, productive approach with different cultures having different beliefs, traditions, values and needs. How can someone outside one’s culture possibly understand the issues inherent within it? Ideally there would be “a single public sphere…made up of a series of subsidiary public spheres, each organized around its own political structure, media system and set of norms and interests” (Garnham 1993, 371). Whilst the current situation is far from ideal, the Internet do have a powerful potential for creating the ideal, however for it to do so we need to have a dramatic increase in global access (Mrkich 2006). In Malaysia, the new bourgeois public sphere emerges through the utilisation of the Internet by the Malaysian people. In agreement with Habermas’ speech, the Internet is definitely capable to challenge the authoritarian regime and the traditional media such as printed and broadcasting media in Malaysia which are controlled by the regime or companies with close ties with the regime. The Internet have become a new public sphere in giving the Malaysian people new hope to express and deliberate critical views after all the mainstream media forbid such criticisms. The true impact or power of this new media is when views in the Internet are strong enough to influence the people to vote the opposition in the 2008 general election. The result is the opposition parties–alliance of PR, PKR, DAP and PAS–are able to control five states and deny the ruling BN party a two third majority seats in the parliament which has never happened before in Malaysian history. In my view, this is a clear indication that defeudalisation process, caused by the Internet revolution, has made its impact in Malaysia. It also undermines the role of traditional media in Malaysia. However, we have to beware about the commercialisation of the Internet. R.W. McChesney (1999, xiii) argues that rather than the Internet setting us free “it is largely being incorporated into the dominant commercial media and communication system” run by the media giants who are in the process of colonising the Internet (McChesney 1999, xxii). In an interview in 1998, Habermas recognised that we should not “harbour

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any illusions about the condition of a public sphere in which commercialised mass media set the tone” (McChesney 1999, 245). Therefore, Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) set six fundamental criteria need to be fulfilled for the Internet to be considered a public sphere free from commercialisation; autonomy from state and economic power, exchange and critique of criticisable moral-practical validity claims, reflexivity, ideal role-taking, sincerity, and discursive inclusion and equality.

The New Public Sphere and Defeudalisation: The 2008 Malaysia’s General Election Since the British colonisation era, the media in Malaysia have transformed, as suggested by Habermas, from the pseudo public sphere during the nationalist movement in pre-independence period to the refeudalisation during the Mahathir’s leadership. Mahathir’s successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, enjoys the refeudalisation of the press at the beginning of his administration. However, unpredictably, even Habermas has never proposed the progress of the media after refeudalistion, the new public sphere has emerged through the emergence of new media such as the Internet, including mobile phone, and has managed as well to give a significant impact in influencing public opinion in challenging the power holder, the BN government. Habermas has never predicted that this situation would happen even though he realised that the power of the media is strong enough to overthrow the government. This new media has not only transformed the public sphere and political culture of the society, but has also reversed the process of refeudalisation into a process called “defeudalisation”. Defeudalisation is a process that rejects the media manipulation in bestowing aura and prestige upon authorities. This process tries to project the media as a proper channel for expressing public concerns and interests. Furthermore, the media should be functioned as a medium, like in the marketplace of ideas, where ideas could be critically deliberated, debated and discussed in civil and peaceful manners for the common good. In Malaysia, this process of defeudalisation has changed people’s view on the ruling government. As shown in recent election, people were brave enough to give theirs vote to the opposition in denying the ruling government a stronger mandate. With the new public sphere through the Internet and also mobile phone, people have demoted the function of mainstream media which is controlled by the companies with close relationship with the government. The strength of online media in Malaysia is clearly shown

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through a research done by Zentrum Future Studies Malaysia involving 1,500 respondents aged between 21 and 50 from 20 February to 5 March 2008, before the general election. In the study, 64.5 percent of those aged from 21 to 30 years trusted blogs and online media for reliable information compared with 23.1 percent who relied on the television and only 12.4 percent on newspapers. Of those between 31 and 40 years, 61.7 percent believed that the information in the blogs and online media was true while 23.5 percent trusted the television and 14.8 percent the newspapers. However, the older generation, those who are from 41 to 50 years old, seemed to trust the traditional media more than the new media. According to Abu Hassan Hasbullah, research leader, young people are relying more on these new alternative media rather than the conventional ones like newspapers and television. Therefore, realising about the attraction of the new media towards young people or voters, the opposition parties have used the opportunity since 1998, when the Internet started to penetrate the country, to utilise the Internet for its campaign and propaganda. In fact, in 2004, the opposition had more than 7,500 blogs and websites compared to only 45 bloggers in 1998 while the government had only two websites and one blog in 2004. Abu Hassan also argues that in the recent election, BN lost in the “information war” due to its misjudgement on the importance of the online media (NST 2008b, 13). Now, many have realised about the strength of the new public sphere and defeudalisation process. In fact, the ruling government also admits that, besides the issues of economy, higher prices, co-operation among opposition parties, ethnic frustrations and dissatisfaction with the administration, one of the important factors that determine the 2008 general election result was the new media of the Internet and mobile phone (Koh 2008, 25). On 25 March 2008, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi acknowledged, at the opening of Invest Malaysia 2008, that the BN government lost the online war in the general election. He said that: “We didn’t think it was important. It was a serious misjudgement. We thought that the newspapers, the print media, the television were important but young people were looking at text messages and blogs. (The influence of alternative media) was painful. But it came at the right time, not too late.” (NST 2008c, 2)

Moreover, the statement, made by the newly appointed Information Minister, is actually proved that the defeudalisation process was strong enough to determine the 2008 general election result. In order to win back the votes for the coming election, Information Minister, Ahmad Shabery

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Cheek realises about the impact of defeudalisation process in Malaysia and argues that he will adopt new rule for RTM by focusing on the news in its media coverage, not personalities as previously such as the prime minister, deputy prime minister and information minister, in order to ensure Malaysians are kept well informed. Shabery, however, still believes that the mainstream media will continue to play a major role even though the current worldwide trend is to turn to alternative sources of information. Although he disagrees with the notion that Malaysians turned to the new media as the mainstream media was biased, he notices the strength of the new media in providing a new public sphere for Malaysian society. Therefore, he suggests that the Malaysian government will reach out to bloggers, dropping threats of arrest and listen to dissenting voices. Shabery states that “I am trying to build a bridge between the government and the people so that we can have a two-way dialogue–and bloggers are a key part of this. I am planning on meeting them soon” (NST 2008d, 8). Besides, the Youth and Sports Ministry also plans to have its own blogsite in an effort to be close to and interact with the nation’s youths. Ismail Sabri Yaacob, Youth and Sports Minister, admits that the move was made in view of the popularity of blogs among youths as a channel of information (Bernama 2008a). However, many bloggers are suspicious of the government move and intention to engage them because they are accused of spreading lies and threatened severe punishment including detentions without trial under the ISA. Ahiruddin Attan, President National Alliance of Bloggers, welcomes the government’s move but the offer of talks with bloggers needed to reflect the political will of the government (AFP 2008b). The reality is that the government realises that the bloggers have successfully changed the face of Malaysian politics. Bloggers have become a vocal group and civil society to challenge and counter-balance the government. They even participated and won the seats they contested in the election as opposition candidates. The Web and SMS allowed parties like DAP, PKR and PAS, which have long complained of bias in the traditional media, to reach voters directly. In thoroughly looking this situation, there are several questions that need to be addressed such as how much the influence of new media in the 2008 general election and how does the defeudalisation process work during the election. In the next section, this chapter will examine the roles of the Internet and mobile phone (or SMS) in the 2008 general elections.

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The Internet The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) is the regulator for the converging communications and multimedia industry, including the Internet. At the time it was created its key role was the regulation of the communications and multimedia industry based on the powers provided for in the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act (1998) and the Communications and Multimedia Act (1998). Pursuant to the Acts the role of the MCMC is to implement and promote the government’s national policy objectives for the communications and multimedia sector and is also charged with overseeing the new regulatory framework for the converging industries of telecommunications, broadcasting and on-line activities. Its social regulation roles include the area of content development as well as content regulation. The latter includes the prohibition of offensive content as well as public education on contentrelated issues (Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 2004). The Section 211 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 in Malaysia provides: “No content applications service provider, or other person using a content applications service, shall provide content which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person” (Communications and Multimedia Act 1998). Consensus is necessary both at the rule-generating stage and at the enforcement stage (Klein 2002; Biegel 2001, 53). However most people believe that one of the reasons the Internet worked so well and vigorous is that it has been free of government regulation (Biegel 2001, 355). The rules and regulations are believed will reduce the passion of Internet using, but ironically, the utility of websites has flourished and contributed to the defeudalisation process. In 1996, when former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad launched the ambitious MSC project to attract the world’s leading Information Technology (IT) companies, the government came up with the MSC Bill of Guarantees, which included a commitment that the Malaysian government would never censor the Internet. This policy is continue until today and the oppositions and civil society movements have obviously benefited from this policy by creating a new public sphere of the Internet after mainstream broadcasting and printed media are hostile to them (George 2006, 60-70). Malaysian government, however, has curbed or limited the Internet, not through cyber censorship, but through prosecuting web operators under existing media and libel laws. The Reporters Without Borders

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(RWB) (2008) has published a report entitled Press Freedom Index 2007. Among 169 countries surveyed, Malaysia strikingly dropped 32 notches from at 92nd place in 2006 to 124th in 2007. According to RWB (2008), they are concerned about the increase in cases of online censorship in Malaysia, for example, bloggers were arrested and news websites were closed or made inaccessible. RWB (2008, 1) said, “More and more governments (including Malaysian government) have realised that the Internet can play a key role in the fight for democracy and they are establishing new methods of censoring it. The governments of repressive countries are now targeting bloggers and online journalists as forcefully as journalists in the traditional media.” It is Malaysia’s worst ranking since the annual Press Freedom Index was institutionalised in 2002. Realising the impact of online advocacy in the general election, the youth wing of UMNO, the dominant party in the BN coalition, has set up a team of volunteers at the party headquarters in Kuala Lumpur scouring the Internet to counter what it sees as rumours and misinformation. In addition to these so-called cyber-troopers, some of the other BN parties have despatched their own teams to keep track of popular sentiment in cyberspace. Abdul Rahman Dahlan, secretary-general of UMNO Youth, argued that it is important to fight rumours after seeing increasing levels of accusations and half-truths being spread on the Internet and via SMS. Gerakan, the fourth biggest component in the BN, has a team to track blogs and gauge the sentiments of young Internet users especially those living in urban and semi-urban areas (Theophilus 2008). However, the result of 2008 general election clearly shows that the government attempts to counter anti-government information on the Internet and SMS have failed because the Internet was dominated and the SMS was extensively used by the opposition parties’ leaders, members, supporters and sympathisers. Malaysia’s weak oppositions were up against a hostile mainstream media and restrictive campaign rules, but they went online and turned effectively to Blogs, SMS and YouTube to dodge a virtual blackout on mainstream media (Stewart 2008, Tarrant 2008). The worldwide web has allowed parties like the DAP, PKR and PAS to reach voters, especially young voters, in their offices and homes. As of December 2006, most of 10.3 million registered Malaysian voters are aged between 21 and 35 years. This statistic compiled by the Election Commission as published in The Sun on 28 February 2008 demonstrate that this youth voters would determine the result of the general election and political parties must target

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this group in winning the election (See 2008). It is clear in the election, the opposition parties managed to win heart and mind of youth voters. Besides, many young voters were keen and interested to support the young candidates representing the opposition parties. For instance, from the youths support, it enabled young and first-time candidates, such as DAP’s Hannah Yeoh and PKR’s Loh Gwo-Burne to draw record crowds of more than 10,000 to their hastily organised ceramah (public gathering) in USJ, Selangor, in the first week of campaigning. Later, Yeoh won the Subang Jaya state seat, and Loh, who had also filmed the infamous V.K. Lingam clip that triggered a judiciary crisis, the Kelana Jaya parliamentary seat. Compared with the opposition’s regularly updated web-logs, BN component parties had hardly any web presence except for Malaysia’s mainstream media via their online newspapers. Google searches on the DAP, PKR and PAS far outstripped those on BN, UMNO and other component parties. Google searches on PAS and PKR in Malay far outnumbered those in English, and were highest in the smaller cities and towns such as Kuantan in Pahang and Kajang in Selangor (Lee 2008, 25). The Internet is now a player and channel in Malaysian politics, and those who refuse to believe that may have to rethink their views. Many may think the Internet influence may not reach outside the urban masses but this is rather simplistic. The Internet played a relatively small role in the 2004 election, but Internet penetration has surged since then with the continued roll-out of high-speed broadband facilities. According to international statistics gathered by the NST, Malaysia is now at a 60 percent Internet penetration rate. In the population of around 24.8 million, Malaysia had 3.7 million Internet users in 2000. In 2007, this figure was nearly 14 million. This means that in eight years, Malaysia had a user growth of 302.8 percent. These are figures about Internet usage and not computer ownership or Internet subscribers, which are related but different things (Koh 2008, 25; Lee 2008, 25). The reality is that the people in kampong (villages) and rural areas can access information from the Internet, not only via the flourish opening of cyber cafes in the areas, but also through some initiatives by young people who access and print the information on the Internet and, then, photocopy and distribute them to the rural community. This effort has made the rural community become more informed about the current political situations and issues in Malaysia. Whether the news is fact or fiction is another story. The truth is that civil society organisations, activists and the nation’s youth have a powerful tool at their disposal and use it like a weapon against the

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government. The fact is also that now Malaysia has members of parliament who are bloggers with no significant grassroots “bases” supporters or previous political experience is something that has pricked the attention of international observers. Various alternative news sites sprung up in the run-up to the election where youth organisations used multiple methods such as mass emails, Facebook, blogs and networking groups to spread awareness about voting. The arts community, political bloggers, and civil society at large combined forces in supporting the opposition in challenging the government. Opposition candidates also used the Internet to solicit funds for their election campaigns. DAP’s Tony Pua, in his campaign for the Petaling Jaya Utara parliamentary seat, argued that e-donation was a new way for the party to raise funds, by saying that “Previously, we obtained funds through conventional means such as ceramah and dinners…The Internet is now another important channel which has helped us tremendously to get more funds”. Through the website, Pua managed to collect more than RM10,000 via credit card and online transfers, while another RM20,000 was banked into the Maybank2U account. The target was to raise 50 percent of the amount that election candidates are legally permitted to spend. The law stipulates that parliamentary and state candidates may spend up to RM200,000 and RM100,000 respectively. He added that conventional fund-raising methods were still yielding better results. He also managed to collect some RM45,000 from over five nights of ceramah. Beside Pua, Badrul Hisham Shaharin, a candidate from PKR, used the same method as well. He confessed that online fund-raising will enable those from outstation and overseas to show their support for him. His challenger for the Rembau parliamentary seat was UMNO Youth deputy chief Khairy Jamaluddin. He collected more than RM21,000 through his blog. Even conservative PAS like the PAS treasurer Mohd Hatta Ramli jumped on the online fund-raising bandwagon too (Ng 2008, 17). This method however has never been utilised by the ruling government party candidates in raising funds for election because the BN party has always had sufficient funds through its savings and contribution from its members and supporters especially from conglomerates and big corporations benefited from the government’s economic and development policies which the opposition did not have. The lesson that can be learned is that the Malaysian citizenry is far more sophisticated than the government figured. The effects of development, globalisation and information through the Internet have

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changed the political landscape. Malaysians clearly reject the idea that the masses are generally simple-minded and easily influenced by “mob mentality” or fear, particularly of racial tension, propagated by the ruling government if it loses in the election. Even as the surprising results were still being calculated, many sites were already launching a pre-emptive strike as it were, calling for calm, asking for no public celebrations. Many Malaysians were already putting out caveats to new winners from PKR, DAP and PAS by saying that they must make sure to fulfil all of their promises. If not, they will vote out of office in the next election (Koh 2008, 25). It is a simple but effective message that goes for all winners and losers of the election that when the electorate speaks, it expects to be listened to. Indeed, retired BN and Gerakan leader Lim Keng Yaik acknowledged that BN’s opponents had skilfully exploited the Internet. He argues that the opposition used the blogs to reach the voters. He asks the BN, and the Gerakan party in particular, to master and utilise the Internet in order to win back the electorates (Lee 2008, 25). In further understanding the impact of the Internet in the 2008 general election, this article will analyse in detail two topics of virtual presses and blogs in the next sections which have become the alternative media or public sphere for the opposition to campaign in the election and for the people to access alternative information about the election after all mainstream media are control by the government.

Malaysia’s Online Press The use of information technology and communication in mass media was started in 1980s. In that period, press companies began to use computer in writing and editing the news. Now, information technology and communication are essential in searching sources and spreading news to the readers. Press companies have developed websites and have introduced online news portal. In Malaysia, mainstream press has pioneered this approach. For instance, The Star Publications, the company that publishes the newspaper called The Star, was the first to introduced online newspaper called “Star Online” (http://www.thestar.com.my) in 1995. Others followed such as the Utusan Malaysia (http://www.utusan.com.my), Berita Harian (http://www.bharian.com.my), and NST (http://www.nst.com.my). Not only the mainstream media, but alternatives media were also developed their own websites such as the Harakah (http://www.harakahdaily.net) and Suara Keadilan (http://www.suarakeadilan.com). This phenomenon of mainstream and alternative media developing their own websites and combining Internet technology with broadcasting is called “netcasting”. This combination is then

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produced “video-streaming” which broadcasts video through computer screen (Badaruddin 2002, 94). However, during the 2008 Malaysia’s general election, there is one online news portal, the Malaysiakini, which is so dominant, even some argue it as one of the determining factor of people’s decision in voting the opposition. Malaysiakini (http://www.malaysiakini.com) is the best example of the Internet news portal that has “gained increasing importance both as an arena for battling out political confrontations and as a locus for pushing government accountability” (Tumber 2001, 21) since its coming online on 20 November 1999, prior to the 1999 general election. Malaysiakini was initially funded largely from a grant that it received from the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA). The way the Anwar Ibrahim saga–the sacked from the UMNO in 1998, detained under the ISA in the same year and imprisoned for corruption and sexual misconduct for six years in 1999–was offended many, plus the way it was reported in the mainstream media which were bias to the power holder. These factors, coupled with the fact that UMNO’s hegemony over the Malay community was broken during this period, help to explain the temporary shift towards alternative forms of explanation, alternative media such as Malaysiakini (Nain and Wang 2004, 263). In countries like Malaysia where civil society is weak, virtual civil society becomes important “as a space where in a wide range of views may be articulated, to improve journalism for the benefit of society, to broaden the spectrum of public sphere” and “the fostering and reproduction of democratic culture” (Tumber 2001, 27 & 29). However, for the alternative media like Malaysiakini, the initial heady days were somehow not translated to hard cash to keep them providing a free Internet newspaper. In 2001, it had to start a subscription service to increase revenue. Despite the fact that it is still operating, it is suffering financially and politically. Its journalists have been refused press accreditation by the administration, disqualifying them from covering official government meetings. In 2002, after having earlier been heavily criticised by the government television station, TV1, the offices of Malaysiakini were raided by the police and its computer equipment confiscated by the police. This happened because of a police report lodged by UMNO Youth about a letter published on Malaysiakini’s website which was purportedly seditious in nature. Following this, their landlord threatened to evict the journalists from their rented premises. In the end, most of the equipments were returned, no one at Malaysiakini was charged, and their landlord backed down. But threats of further harassment continue (Nain and Wang 2004, 265).

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However, Malaysiakini is progressing significantly throughout the years as the alternative online media for Malaysians. Besides the website’s 100,000 readers each day, Steven Gan Editor-in-chief of Malaysiakini became the first Malaysian journalist to be awarded the International Press Freedom Award and also the first online journalist to win the award in 10 years by Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a New York-based journalist organisation dedicated to the defence of press freedom internationally. Since its inception, readers view Malaysiakini as “a dotcom with a mission other than just making money” (MSCTimes.com 2000). CPJ also gave the statement, mentioning that the “revolutionary” role of Malaysiakini provides an insightful into the future of Internet journalism which uses the relatively unfettered space on the Internet to publish a newspaper that challenges the existing order, and has become the pioneer in the use of Internet to evade government restrictions on the press, and is providing a new model for press freedom under authoritarian regimes (Malaysiakini 2003). Prior to the 2008 general election, Malaysiakini has been denied yet again a media passes for its reporters to cover government events. Besides, Steven Gan argued that the use of the Internet as a campaign tool was hampered by penetration rates which remain low in rural areas where the government enjoys strong support. He said that “…in urban areas, it is significant. They now have this alternative access to news and other views” (AFP 2008a). The Malaysiakini website receives about 100,000 daily hits and has struggled to cope with the volume since an unprecedented series of public protests against the government broke out in months prior to the general election. He argued that “During this election period, I expect it to increase by tenfold and we are preparing for that kind of explosion in the coming weeks. We have upgraded the bandwidth for better access” (AFP 2008a, 1). During the 2008 general election, Malaysiakini was so overwhelmed by visitors on polling day that the site broke down. According to the company’s CEO Premesh Chandran, at its peak, the site was getting some 500,000 visitors an hour, a sharp jump from between 100,000 and 200,000 hits it gets a day (Yong 2008). In comparison, the NST website received 970,000 visits only for one day, from midnight on election day to midnight the following day (New Sunday Times 2008, 30). Premesh said that the alternative media has broken the monopoly of the government on the media and provided a platform for information distribution. It gave a

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platform for people not in power. He also stated that no one was caught more off-guard than the government, by arguing that “They (the government) thought it wouldn’t reach beyond the segment of the community that had Internet access. They didn’t consider the spill over effect. If you had gone to a rally, you would have seen that the people are well aware of the issues, issues that were only broadcast on alternative media. The Internet fed the information into a certain part of the community, and it spread from there.” He referred to stories like the alleged links between murdered Mongolian model Altantunya Shaariibuu and Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak, as well as the judiciary scandal involving V.K. Lingam (Yong 2008, 1). On the other hand, Malaysia’s Islamic opposition party PAS also run its own online journal Harakah Daily (http://www.harakahdaily.net) which features six different online television channels and original reporting on the election (AFP 2008a). PAS candidates also have their own websites, complete with their biodata, live streaming of press conferences and PAS Internet TV. A PAS source told The Straits Times: “We have editing suites for online content, the works. UMNO is so complacent because they rely on mainstream media and are so woefully behind in technology” (Yong 2008, 1). But it is one thing for politicians to make a fuss online, and something else to get the public to turn to them there. That is where the experts say the poor reputation of the traditional media played into their hands (Yong 2008). Clearly Malaysiakini and Harakah Daily have proved to Malaysian generally and the media community particularly that their roles have given the significant impact in creating a new public sphere, a new civil society agenda and, essentially, influencing the election result. Furthermore, beside local online press, foreign online press also contribute to the emergence of a new public sphere and defeudalisation process in Malaysia. For instance before and during the election, Malaysia.msn.com (http://www.msn.com.my) brought an AFP report concerning human rights in Malaysia to the attention of the public. Previously, Malaysia.msn.com featured an AFP story citing Malaysia’s dismal performance on Reporter’s Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. Later, the AFP article–subsequently posted on Malaysiakini, Malaysiatoday, and Jeff Ooi’s Screenshots–featured statements from New Yorkbased human rights group, Human Rights Watch (HRW), on the Election Commission’s decision to retract the use of indelible ink. In the “Breaking News” story box, the article’s headline, “Activists warn Malaysian elections will be dirtiest ever,“ loomed over a picture of a hazy Kuala

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Lumpur skyline. On the scrapping of the ink process, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has declared the decision unfortunate but unavoidable, and lamented that the opposition “is happy because now they have an excuse to tell the whole world why they cannot succeed in the election”. But HRW is not buying it. According to the AFP report covered by Malaysian.msn.com, HRW has said that “Malaysians will be denied a fair vote in Saturday’s general election” and is “accusing the government of muzzling the opposition and manipulating the electoral process.” This is a significant claim, as HRW is an organisation known to deal with severe violations of human rights. Yet, the mainstream publications reflected Abdullah Badawi’s “no-big-deal” attitude (Media Monitors 2008, 1). But only citizens with Internet access would be exposed to this international criticism avoided by the mainstream newspapers. At least its placement on Malaysia.msn.com could potentially catch the attention of even the least politically inclined. Other international media such as Al-Jazeera (http://www.aljazeera.com/English) and British Broadcasting Corporation (http://www.bbc.co.ul/news) and Reuters (http://www.reuters.com) also cover the Malaysian pre- and post-election and are consistently critical to the political process in Malaysia

Bloggers In the 2008 general election, bloggers have surprised many analysts of their involvement in determining the result of election and in opening the new space of public sphere. Many Malaysians, especially young voters who have accessed the Internet, turn to bloggers in getting the alternative news about the election particularly news and campaigns from the opposition parties. In fact, many believe the information that they receive from bloggers. Previously, the media agency, Universal McCann, published the striking results of a survey of 9,460 online users worldwide. There are 170 million blog creators and 340 million blog readers worldwide in May 2007, mainly in emerging Internet markets in Asia. Globally, almost 60 percent of respondents agree that blogging is a positive form of expression, 34 percent agree that they can trust bloggers’ opinions, and 33 percent believe that corporate blogs have a positive impact on their perception of the company. Asia was found to be driving the adoption of social media, with China, South Korea and Malaysia taking the lead in online content creation and socialising (Ooi 2007). No wonder, the bloggers have become significant forces in struggling against the power holder in Malaysia.

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Opposition leaders such as Lim Kit Siang runs three blogs (http://www.limkitsiang.com, http://blog.limkitsiang.com, and http://limkitsiang.blogspot.com) which are meticulously updated with multiple posts every day, and many of the party’s other leaders follow suit. Lim argued that blogging is one way to get word out and an opportunity to circumvent media control, which aims to dent the governments thumping majority votes in the 2008 election. He said that “We cannot neutralise the state-controlled media…But Internet pick-up rates will keep getting higher. We will not be blacked out forever” (AFP 2008a). In addition, political dissident and ex-deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim also writes his own blogs (http://www.anwaribrahim.com and http://anwaribrahimblog.com) which have news links and videos of his Keadilan party’s campaign activities. In 2007, Anwar used the site to release a video clip which allegedly showed a high-profile lawyer, V.K. Lingam, brokering top judicial appointments–a scandal which triggered a full royal commission of inquiry. Besides the opposition leaders, opposition supporters turned opposition candidates for election also utilised the blogs in gaining their personal ambition as politician and spreading alternative views about political issues. For instance, Jeff Ooi, a 52-year-old former advertising copywriter who made his name writing a political blog, “Screenshots” (http://www.jeffooi.com) won a seat in northern Penang state for the opposition DAP (Tarrant 2008). He said that news and views on blogs appealed to a cross-section of people and was not limited to urban youth alone. He said that “It is not really restricted by age. We are attracting many concerned citizens who are above 45 years old and these are the people who are more interested in politics and the oppositions’ viewpoint…Our campaign videos will be transmitted through YouTube because it is unlikely for television stations to broadcast them, of course” (AFP 2008a, 1). The Chinese-backed DAP was even appointed blogger Ooi to head the party’s “e-campaign”. The impact brought by the bloggers is clearly shown in the volume of people accessing the blogs. For example, this scenario was playing out during the election through a prominent political blog, Malaysia-Today (http://www.malaysia-today.net). The blog had some 15 million hits the day after results were announced, a more than three-fold increase. That works out to about 625,000 visitors an hour. The site’s owner Raja Petra Kamarudin said that “Traffic went up so high that I could not get on to update the site”. The massive visitor numbers put up by the website, gave

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one of the clearest indications of just how much the Malaysian public have been turning to alternative media for its political news. With opposition parties feeling shut out of traditional news media, they turned to the Internet to air their views and it seems many Malaysians follow them there (Yong 2008). Raja Petra felt that the Internet’s biggest contribution was in getting the middle class to the ballot booths, by saying that “Alternative media cured the apathy the middle class has. They were no longer saying: Let’s not bother. Suddenly, it was let’s go and give the opposition a chance” (Yong 2008, 1). He is convinced that the government now regrets its own apathy towards new media. He said that “I hear from my sources in UMNO that during the post-mortem of the polls, they admitted they underestimated the power of the Internet. They admitted they had lost the media war” (Yong 2008, 1). Indeed, it was clear throughout the campaign that there was a great disparity between the number of opposition candidates and government ones online where the opposition was infested with bloggers (Yong 2008, 1). Cyberspace is also the new frontier for BN. Representing BN and UMNO as Johor Bahru Member of Parliament, Shahrir Samad has perhaps the most committed online presence. He has faithfully, if irregularly, posted entries and news on his weblogs (http://shahrirsamad.blogspot.com) and kept an online itinerary of events since 2006. Claiming the honour in 2005 of being the only BN leader to maintain a blog, Shahrir has even updated his online journal with pictures taken at the counting centre during the election counting process (Lee 2008, 25). The lack of BN component parties utilising the Internet as alternative medium for people has caused them a defeat result in the election. Some bloggers even argue that cyberspace was where the recent election was lost for the BN party. Tony Pua, a Democratic Action Party candidate who made his name as a blogger, said the Internet played a pivotal role in informing people about the issues. Although he admitted that he was surprised at how effective it turned out to be. He believes that the Internet may be more instrumental than people thought it would be which was not expected by anyone (Yong 2008). In comparison during the campaign process, Pua’s opponent, MCA’s Chew Mei Fun had two event items on her English website, the launch of the site in late February and a meet-the-people session on 5 March. In contrast, Pua had months before garnered a loyal following through his web-log where he posted campaign updates and video clips of ceramah. Government backers doubt whether bloggers turned opposition politicians like Pua could make their presence felt. Mohamad Norza Zakaria, an UMNO youth leader, was confident that

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beyond the major cities like Kuala Lumpur and Penang, there is not much that the bloggers can really hope to accomplish. No one could imagine before the election that bloggers turned politician contesting in the election could win. The argument is proven wrong when Pua, with no mass grassroots, won the Petaling Jaya Utara parliamentary seat, beating Chew by almost 20,000 votes. This is obviously an evidence that Malaysians have come to rely on cyberspace for information and deciding their votes (Lee 2008, 25). Bloggers also utilised YouTube as a tool or channel for their campaigns. YouTube, the phenomenally popular video Web site, did as much damage as any opposition figure could hope to inflict. Despite showing their activities such as ceramah and interviews, YouTube has also been used as a propaganda tool to attack the government with the intention to create awareness among the people of government’s wrongdoings and to reduce votes for BN in the election. One YouTube video in January 2008 showed ruling party MP Badruddin Amiruldin caused a ruckus in parliament over whether Malaysia is an Islamic state. Badruddin declared that Malaysia is an Islamic state and urged other MPs from the opposition who do not like the concept to move out from the country. Muslim Malays form the majority in multi-racial Malaysia, but ethnic Chinese and Indians account for a third of the population and they deserted the ruling BN in droves, partly in outrage over the religious debate (Tarrant 2008). Sex, sleaze and corruption were election issues and they all had video soap operas on websites. Malaysia’s health minister, Chua Soi Lek, resigned in January 2008 after admitting he and a female friend were the couple in a secretly filmed sex video uploaded on YouTube. That cost some votes for those who are concerned about the morality of Malaysian leaders from the ruling party. Malaysians also could access a secretly videotaped phone conversation allegedly showing a highprofile lawyer trying to fix judicial appointments with Malaysia’s former chief judge, via YouTube. This issue has stirred Malaysian judiciary and has definitely caused the ruling government of losing some votes (Tarrant 2008). The reality is that Malaysia’s blogging community offers alternative views in a country as the government keeps a tight control on mainstream media. The government is unable to stop, counter, or even control the cyberspace or the Internet. Malaysian government, however, has implemented several efforts to curb the bloggers activities. Last year, the government said that it might compel bloggers to register with the

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authorities to curb the spread of malicious content on the Internet. Malaysian bloggers have been heavily criticised by the government which accuses them of spreading lies, and threatened severe punishment and tighter controls on Internet use. In January 2007, the government-linked NST Press (NSTP) filed suits against Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi over items published on their websites a year before, which criticised the low journalistic standards of the newspaper. This was the first time bloggers had been taken to court for publishing comments on the Internet. Malaysian bloggers and media watchdogs have condemned the lawsuits against the two, saying that they stifle free expression in the country where the media is already tightly controlled. When the lawsuits were filed against the two bloggers, many feared that it was the beginning of a clampdown on freedom of expression on the Internet. Over the course of the year, several more bloggers were subject to threats of prosecution. On 25 July 2007, following the police report of UMNO Information Chief Muhammad Mohd Taib against Raja Petra Kamarudin, the webmaster of the popular political blog Malaysia-Today, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Nazri Abdul Aziz said that the government would not hesitate to use the ISA against the bloggers. The police report lodged by Muhammad reportedly cited a blog entry in Malaysia-Today that had allegedly insulted the King, degraded Islam and incited ethnic hatred and violence. On the same day, UMNO Youth Public Complaints Bureau chief Subahan Kamal stated that people who write sensitive issues insulting the King and Islam should be severely punished under the ISA. Two days later, blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin was summoned to the Dang Wangi police station in Kuala Lumpur and interrogated for eight hours (SUARAM 2007, 9).1 All these pressures from the government have not been able to deter the role of bloggers in circulating alternative views against the government. As mentioned earlier, Malaysian government admitted that one of the reasons of BN defeat in the election was because they were lost in the battle on cyberspace with the bloggers. The existence of blogs should not be taken lightly as they had been effective in influencing voters to vote for the opposition in the recent general election (Bernama 2008a). Therefore, the government encourages bloggers to have direct interaction with the government especially in policy making process. For instance, Information Minister, Ahmad Shabery Cheek announces that bloggers will get on television in a 20-minute segment on Sunday between 8.40pm and 9.30pm beginning on 20 April 2008 to discuss current affairs. He argues that the purpose of the programme is to understand the alternative media better and

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to acknowledge the bloggers’ views. He also promises that there will be no censorship because the most important thing is the analysis of the issues, not the personality of the bloggers (NST 2008e, 12).

Mobile Phone and Short Message Service (SMS) Many have argued that the SMS was widely used as a cheap and effective means of getting the message to the masses. The opposition claimed that they successfully used the SMS which contributed to the unexpected outcome of the last general election. Baharuddin Aziz, academician from Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) for instance, argued that those between the ages of 20 and 35 were the most frequent users of the SMS. The SMS is important to mobilise people to attend public political speeches and to raise funds (Ramachandran and Vijaindren 2008). Moreover, Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, academician and political analyst from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), said that the government was totally unprepared for the impact of the alternative media of the SMS during the general election. He argued that some of the SMSes are misleading and false, but people still believe them (Ramachandran and Vijaindren 2008). These days, mobile phones have become so indispensable that many Malaysians just cannot leave home without it. They are also using mobile phone to send quick messages via SMS. In fact, SMS or text messaging has become so popular it has spawned a “thumb generation” of phone users who view it as the most efficient means of communication. Statistically, SMS usage in Malaysia showed significant growth between 2004 and 2005, according to a recent study conducted by Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). The industry regulator, in a study entitled The Handphone Users Survey 2005, reported that 84.9 percent of mobile phone users sent at least one SMS a day and 49.6 percent sent out at least five daily. This is an increase from the previous year where only 74.9 percent sent at least one SMS a day, and 31.7 percent sent at least five a day, the report noted (Yap and Khalid 2006). During the 2008 general election, mobile phone operators too saw an increase in SMS traffic on 8 March 2008, polling day. A spokesman for Maxis said the increase in voice and SMS traffic on 8 March came close to matching traditional high-traffic seasonal events such as New Year’s eve – the busiest day for voice and SMS traffic. Maxis SMS traffic increased by 31 percent and voice calls by 27 percent on polling day, compared to a normal day. SMS-based news alert services were also popular, with a large

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number of customers signing up for election updates and results. Maxis, which has a subscriber base of over 9 million, serviced 600,000 customers who accessed the EC link from their mobile phones. This data service enabled customers to check on the contesting parties in their voting area and polling centre locations, through a link which connected clients to the online EC website. The Maxis spokesman added that although this service was also available during the 2004 general election, only 500,000 subscribers took advantage of it then. Meanwhile, Celcom saw an increase of 0.5 percent for average daily SMS usage during the election period from 24 Feb to 8 March 2008. On nomination day, about 70 million SMS were sent, which is the average number sent on a regular day. But on polling day, Celcom subscribers sent about 80 million messages. Though Celcom was not sure how many messages were election-related, it spokesman said that the visible hike in SMS traffic showed Malaysians utilised this as a means of communication (Sunday Star 2008, 24). In addition, a spokesman for Digi said that it noticed an average increment of five percent for SMS traffic leading up to voting day and a 15 percent increase on polling day, compared to with normal day (New Sunday Times 2008). This clearly shows that the SMS has become a new sphere as well as the Internet for the people to discuss and debate the political issues even though the deliberation would not as thorough as in the public fora. In the 2008 general election, SMS was effectively used by politicians, especially among those in the opposition, as a mean of disseminating information. Actually, they may have not been the pioneers in utilising this method to mobilise people. The first time mobile phones played a significant role in a political context was in January 2001 in Manila, when mass demonstrations organised after the televised impeachment trial via text messages (SMS) which led to the downfall of President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines (Paragas 2003). Since then, there were similar patterns of political mobilisation occurred such as after the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, just a few days before general elections, people used mobile phones to organise and invite mass protests against the Spanish government in which resulted in the defeat of prime minister Jose Maria Aznar (Dányi 2005). Moreover, young people from the outskirts of Paris used SMS to co-ordinate their actions against the police during the 2005 riots in France (Rajarethnam 2006). These clearly show that mobile phone or SMS has been used effectively as a new medium in gathering people, with the same views, to challenge the government and to struggle for or against certain issues such as racism and police brutality in France and terrorism in Spain.

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In the recent Malaysia’s general election, media-savvy politicians discovered that SMS was a very economical and effective medium to reach out to the masses compared to conventional methods like putting up posters and banners or television advertisements (Foong, Lee and Ng 2007). The opposition parties have managed to use the SMS effectively in generating the vote for them in the election. Tian Chua, PKR information chief, mentioned that it is all about hard work and perseverance and PKR took three years to collect the phone numbers and data. The PKR has a subscriber network to send information via SMS to members and supporters. It provides direct delivery to individual voters and is cheaper than billboards and advertisements. Chua said that “for 5 cent for one message, I spend RM100 to send 2,000 messages to the people. For the same amount, I can only buy three banners measuring 2 metre by 0.75 metre” (Foong, Lee and Ng 2007). The PKR resorting to the SMS in its campaign was because it did not have enough polls workers. Penang PKR Deputy Chief, Jason Ong said that they had been sending SMSes to voters to garner support since parliament was dissolved on 13 February 2008 (NST 2008f, 20). PAS, according to Kamaruddin Jaafar, PAS secretarygeneral, did not officially use SMS but there were PAS supporters who used it. He said that Malays are very fond of disseminating information via SMS. For instance, SMS was used to check whether Nurul Izzah had won. SMS has also helped to deliver messages from the city to rural areas. However, he argued that in Kelantan, there was not much effort to use SMS (Foong, Lee and Ng 2007). PAS newspaper, Harakah, was obviously used the SMS and disseminated latest news to its subscribers. It charged RM5 per-months for 3 to 5 news per-days or 100 to 150 news per-months. For DAP, argued Liew Chin Tong, Bukit Bendera MP, the SMS has allowed people from all walks of life to participate directly in the elections. With SMS, people can use creative ideas to vent their frustrations on current issues. The information is being circulated when people receive messages and they forward them to friends, colleagues and relatives (Foong, Lee and Ng 2007). Many government’s leaders also agree that the SMS played an essential factor in determining the election result. Wee Ka Siong, MCA Youth secretary-general and newly-appointed Deputy Education Minister, argued that BN overlooked the effectiveness and impact of SMS in this general election. The opposition optimised the usage of SMS, which partly contributed to the political tsunami in the recently-concluded general election. Esther Tan, former NTV7 managing editor and journalist, stated

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that the SMS is extremely popular among the younger generation. Its influence is such that those who were previously apolitical are suddenly talking about politics and the state the country is in. She believes that it is grossly unfair to dismiss SMS that is not to one’s favour as nonsense. In fact, observers have put the accuracy of information via SMS to as high as 80 percent. Some of them have their contacts to provide them with information on a wide range of issues, from policies, corruption to up-todate happenings around the country. And the fact that they could not get access to the mainstream media also drove them to disseminate information via SMS, for instance. Zainuddin Maidin, UMNO leader and former information minister, however, rejects the argument of strong effect of the SMS in the election, by arguing that “I do not believe SMS and blogs had a huge impact on the recently-concluded general election. It (outcome of the general election) could be more of a protest the people had in mind–to vent their anger on the government. It is a fact that there are more people owning a mobile phone than a computer. It is common for the village folk to receive SMS nowadays but again some may not know how to retrieve them” (Foong, Lee and Ng 2007). Nobody knows the true impact brought by the SMS in the 2008 general election, but it has clearly been used and will be used as new medium for people in circulating political ideas and news which will definitely transform Malaysia’s political culture and democratisation practices. Although Habermas might not agree the notion that the SMS is a new public sphere, the role and function of the SMS could generate a new space of deliberation in strengthening the defeudalisation process in the public sphere.

Conclusion Habermas seemed sceptical of the role of new media such as the Internet and mobile phone through the SMS. He was so protective of traditional media particularly the printed press. That is why he never extended his argument beyond the process of refeudalisation. This book believed that due to the introduction of powerful new media, not only the new bourgeois public sphere has been established, there is a rejection of the refeudalisation which is called defeudalisation. In Malaysia, new media allows responsible people to generate defeudalisation process in order to counter one-sided mainstream media coverage and views which are controlled by the government. This new media becomes so strong thus it manages to change public opinion and affect people’s voting behaviour and decision in the 2008 general election. What is true from Habermas’ prediction of the new media is that it can weaken the traditional media. In

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Malaysian case, the mainstream printed and broadcasting media are unable to challenge the Internet in a battle to win heart and mind of the voters especially youth voters. Therefore, new media is clearly as one of the reasons that the government lost significantly parliamentary and state seats in the general election. In Malaysia, the Internet is dominated by the opposition after broadcasting and printed media are dominated by the ruling government. The positive aspect of the new media is it helps to strengthen the democratisation process and public deliberation. Malaysia now is become more democratic than before the general election. It also opens the space for the people to participate in the marketplace of ideas brought by the new media. People are not only listened but are also responded to the government’s policy via commenting on the Internet. SMS also encourages the people to express views easily and in fact, could be the best tool to invite people to join or participate in the public gathering or protest. However, there are the dark side of the new media. The Internet and mobile phone could be used by irresponsible people such as bigots and racists to inflict instability to the society especially Malaysia’s multiracial and multicultural society. They could spread rumours and invite people to fight each other. We also need to beware the intention of government and big corporations in controlling the new media. If this happened, the new bourgeois public sphere and the defeudalisation process of media in Malaysia will demolish and transform the new media to the processes, as what Habermas’ call, of mass press or commercialisation of the press and refeudalisation. There is possibility that these processes could happen. Hence, Malaysians must ensure that Malaysian media and the public sphere will remain open and free for responsible public deliberation and guarantee defeudalisation will be upheld. A free and responsible media should be the key element in maintaining the bourgeois public sphere and defeudalisation in Malaysia. I believe in order to achieve those and protect the civility of the press, we have to adopt the social responsibility theory which will be discussed in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER SEVEN TOWARD A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE MEDIA

As argued in the preceding chapters, Malaysia should ensure that the bourgeois public sphere and defeudalisation are maintained and the civility of the media is protected. The best way in my view to attain these is to encourage the media to accept the social responsibility theory and the concept of public journalism. Before entering into the discussion of freedom of the press with social responsibility, this chapter explores the civil society movement in lobbying for a greater freedom of the press in Malaysia. Since the end of the 2008 general election, the ruling BN government promises to improve the practice of press freedom in Malaysia through reviewing some of the restrictive laws. This chapter also argues that the government now becomes more open to the criticisms and dissent in the press, but it still wants to maintain all the restrictive laws, denying any possibility of the abolishment of the laws, for the reasons of protecting national stability and racial harmony. Because this chapter propagates freedom of the press with social responsibility, it looks in details the arguments of social responsibility theory and public journalism. Chapter 7 also analyses suitability of these arguments or approaches in Malaysian context and proposes several recommendations in order for Malaysia to adopt these arguments and improving the practice of press freedom without jeopardising the racial harmony and cultural values in Malaysia. .

Lobbying for Media Freedom Media freedom is actually a demand of rights to free expression of opinions. It is stated in a joint declaration with non-governmental bodies in Asia that produced “Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights”, held on 24-28 March, 1993. According to this declaration, rights to freely express the opinion is a big challenge to developing nations including Malaysia especially towards the spirit of democracy that guarantees the press freedom, and civil and political rights (Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, 1993).

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Although the government feels that media freedom should be restricted, the opposition parties and the NGOs think that media freedom could bring more balance in terms of political rights and people’s involvement in the decision-making processes for the better Malaysia. The opposition parties always suffer from the negative treatment of imbalance coverage by the media controlled by the government or close associate company owners to the ruling party. Besides, the journalists are also inconvenienced to report events, which edited by the editor, unpublished, prosecuted of being seditious, applying self-censorship or sacked by media company. As has been mentioned, World Press Freedom Day on 3 May 1999 saw 581 Malaysian journalists signed a memorandum calling for the repeal of the PPPA and handed it over to Home Minister, also Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. “I shall read it. I will let you know,” Abdullah told the group. It was the last the journalists heard from him on the matter (SUARAM 2003, Syed Ahmad Idid 2001). A boycott of mainstream media (New Straits Times, TV3, Utusan Malaysia, and Berita Harian) was also organised in 2000 by the opposition parties. Meanwhile, Kumpulan Aktivis Media Independen (KAMI) was set up at about the same time as the crackdown in 2000 against the Malaylanguage press. KAMI, basically groups journalist from independent Malay-language media, have been the target of official crackdowns. One of its key activists is publisher Ahmad Lutfi, who has borne the brunt of recent crackdowns through the banning and restriction of sales of his publications. KAMI was lobbying the government to show leniency to the publications that critical to government policies and permission for selling the materials. When two Chinese language newspapers–Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press–were taken over by the investment arm of the MCA party in 2001, there was a backlash, especially from the Chinese community and from journalists themselves. The fractional split in the MCA widened. Galvanised by public outcry, four press freedom committees (Press Freedom Action Committee [Nanyang], China Press Freedom Action Committee, Committee against Takeover, and The Writers Alliance for Media Independence [WAMI]), comprising mainly journalists and writers from the two papers as well as media activists, sprouted (Netto 2002). Similarly, some journalists, with the support of Aliran Monthly magazine, launched a “citizen initiative”, named Charter 2000, calling for freedom of expression to be respected and higher standards of professionalism in media reporting (SUARAM 2003). Charter 2000 is

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guided by the following basic principles in its quest to realise media freedom within the context of civil society in Malaysia (Netto 2002): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The media must be plural, democratic, and accessible. The media must be committed to upholding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The media must uphold ethical responsibility and professionalism. The media must consciously promote justice, freedom and solidarity. The media must empower the disenfranchised, downtrodden and dispossessed.

The Malaysian Charter On Human Rights, which have been endorsed by 49 Malaysian NGOs is more explicit in championing media freedom. Article 14 of the Charter entitles “Freedom of Expression and Access to Information” states the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinions and responsible exercise of the freedom of expression without interference and persecution. Everyone is entitled to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through an independent and responsible mass media free of political censorship and monopoly. The media of mass communications shall not be subjected to licensing at the discretion of government. Mass communication media owned by the state must be governed and run by an autonomous impartial board made up of representatives appointed by the state, the non-governmental sector and opposition political parties.

However, the government responses negatively to the Charter, because it is just recommendations from the opposition and civil society thus make it ineffective for Malaysian to implement without government consent. The NGOs are continually campaigning to the government for more open and less restriction towards the media for a better Malaysia. But from government’s point of view, the better Malaysia is media with responsibility to national security and government’s credibility, and then the media should be controlled from being manipulated by subversive element in the country.

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In addition, SUHAKAM has also produced a report entitled A Case for Media Freedom: Report of SUHAKAM’s Workshop on Freedom of the Media that based on a workshop organised by SUHAKAM on 1 August 2002, at the 30th floor of the SUHAKAM office. SUHAKAM has invited speakers, Chor Chee Heung, Zainuddin Maidin, Mohd Safar Hashim, Steven Gan, Ahmad Lutfi Othman, and Mohd Hamdan Adnan, to present papers and discuss deeply regarding the issue of media freedom.1 From the workshop’s feedback, a few recommendations have been proposed by SUHAKAM to the government including the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act; review of the PPPA 1984, OSA 1972, ISA 1960, SA 1948, and Defamation Act 1957; proposals to improve the quality of media reporting; and press accreditation tags for better accessing to report the events (SUHAKAM 2003b). However, the government has yet to respond to these recommendations by the SUHAKAM or any proposals by the NGOs, and uninterested to comment on any issues that related to media freedom.

Media in Post-Election Period Since the end of 2008 general election, there are voices from not only the opposition and NGOs, but also from the government leaders and media activists and practitioners demanding the government to allow greater press freedom in Malaysia by amending or repealing the restrictive laws. Some of Malaysia’s government controlled newspapers are also calling for greater press freedom. For instance, on International Press Freedom Day, which was celebrated on 3 May 2008, several media editors and practitioners were of the view that the time has come for the PPPA to be reviewed. Berita Publishing editor-in-chief, A. Kadir Jasin stressed that now, in post-election period, was appropriate for the Act to be reviewed in allowing critical views to be published in the newspapers (Mahmood 2008). Newspaper editors reportedly asked for the eventual abolishment of the PPPA. Wong Chun Wai, Group Chief Editor of The Star, which is owned by the pro-government MCA, has asked for the annual renewal of press permit to be waived. Wong argued that “its relevance should be questioned when one does not need a permit to start a blog or website. We must change with the times. There are enough laws to deal with the media” (Yoong 2008, 1). Moreover, “The Sun” Newspaper Group Executive Editor Zainon Ahmad explained that although the media enjoyed more freedom under Prime Minister Abdullah’s current tenure as compared to his predecessor,

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the laws were still there such as the PPPA, SA, and ISA. The government should demonstrate its willingness for more transparency and giving the media more freedom by removing at least one of these laws. Even without one of these laws, the media can still be regulated. At the World Press Freedom Day 2008 forum organised by the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ), Zainon added that in lieu of the 8 March general election, a legislation should be passed whereby, newspapers and other form of mass media should not be owned by any political party or those (media companies) closely linked to political parties. He urged that the editors and editorial board have limits when publishing political articles because of the ownership of the media companies which belong to political parties. Thus, there is no balance and less and negative reporting on the opposition parties in comparison to the government. It has come to a point whereby the people have rejected the messages of the mainstream media, thinking it is just BN propaganda. The people have lost trust in the mainstream media. Unfortunately, in his opinion, BN leaders and supporters believe in their own propaganda which helped contributed to the results of the 2008 general election. Thus, Malaysia should have antimonopoly laws which some other countries are practising (Bernama 2008b). Opposition leader Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar’s wife and President of PKR, in calling for a review of the Acts, said a lack of press freedom in the country had caused blogsites to flourish because people are no longer willing to accept one-sided reporting by the mainstream media (Mahmood 2008). Furthermore, UMNO Youth deputy chief, Khairy Jamaluddin, in his speech at the National Union of Journalists Press Freedom Forum 2008 on 10 April 2008, advocated reforms in the mainstream media in order to stem the crisis of credibility that it is facing in post-election period. He elucidated that to reform the media, the PPPA should be repealed. This reform would benefit Malaysians in getting credible news everywhere from the mainstream and other-stream media. However, Khairy insisted that before the Act could be abolished, the media should have in place a self-regulatory mechanism like a Press Complaints Commission to address complaints and ethical issues. This is important because there are sensitivities in this country and there must be a place for people to complain when they are not comfortable with the way things are being covered such as the media incite some racial or religious sentiment in them (The Star Online 2008b). Malaysia’s press is still in a state of heavy handed control by the ruling regime but with pressure mounting for

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changes in the legislations regulating the presses, it is expected to see more freedom being given to journalists to do their job. Probably listen to the demand of more press freedom in Malaysia, the government shows the signs of allowing a freer media through reviewing of annual renewal of press permit required under the PPPA and granting a printing permit to an opposition newspaper that was previously restricted only to members. Agreeing with the demands for press freedom, Malaysia’s Home Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, has pledged to review the country’s media laws especially on the legislation that require newspapers and other publications to apply and renew the licence annually. Syed Hamid wanted to change the perception, saying that “We need press freedom in order for us to have a check and balance in government. We are not trying to control you (the press) but we want everyone to contribute to the nation-building process. Why should we let ourselves (government) become unpopular by having such regulations?” (Channel News Asia 2008, 1). In realising his intention, PKR’s tabloid Suara Keadilan has been approved of the publishing permit on 20 April 2008. Therefore, the newspaper would be published weekly and distributed widely, not only circulates among party members like for the last three years since 2008 (NST Online 2008a). On 24 June 2008, the government has also reverted Harakah, the organ of Islamic party PAS, from a twicemonthly to a twice-weekly publication (Malaysiakini 2008). Syed Hamid has also reversed his decision on 16 April 2008 to reject the Tamillanguage newspaper’s, Makkal Osai, request for a renewal of publishing license for 2008. Before, vernacular newspaper’s, Makkal Osai, publication permit was not renewed as it had breached media guidelines governing the publication of newspapers in the country. Syed Hamid however did not specify which guidelines were breached, but he stressed that it was not over its pro-opposition stand (Ram and Yong 2008). Information Minister, Ahmad Shabery Cheek reportedly said that freedom of the press should not be feared by anyone, including the ruling party, as it could also be a source of strength for the government and the country. He said media freedom had not brought about major effects on the BN’s position in the state. This proved, argued Shabery, that freedom of the press could be useful to the current government (Mahmood 2008). In an interview with “Sunday Star” newspaper on 25 May 2008, he explained his ambition in projecting the idea of free flow of information. The principle of free debate should be encouraged where the government and opposition will engage in an open debate especially through the live

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telecast of Parliament. However, even if the government abolishes the PPPA, argued Shabery, it still has to protect society on issues that can create unrest among the society. Freedom of expression does not mean that you can do whatever you want (Habib 2008b, 25). In regard with the issue of new media, Information Minister, Shabery was argued in a statement that the Malaysian government has to reach out to bloggers in building a bridge of understanding between the government and bloggers (NST 2008g, 8). However his superior, Deputy Prime Minister, Najib, at the Asian Media Summit 2008 on 27 May 2008, in a hostile mood confessed that the government committed to take on bloggers in cyberspace and responded to wild and baseless allegations raised in blogs. He acknowledged that the government had overlooked the need to engage the new media, which was a new dimension in shaping public opinion, in the recent general election. The government had not been savvy in engaging the new media and lost out in cyberspace. Now, instead of just criticising or running the bloggers down, Najib believed that the best thing to do is to engage them (Habib 2008a, 1 & 4). After so many post-election demands made by the opposition, media practitioners and concerned citizens, and promises from his ministers who wanted to review the laws, especially the ISA, PPPA, and SA, Abdullah announced at the Asian Media Summit 2008 as well, confirming that his government and the country is still needing the laws that protect people from criminal defamation and core institutions from seditious attacks. He argued that there is no reason to abolish those laws by saying that “I do not see these laws as curbs on freedom. Rather, they are essential for the healthy functioning of our society. It may cost us a few decimal points on the World Press Freedom Index, which is based on specific assumptions and premises. But our security and the well-being of our society take precedence” (The Star 2008a, 4). In the case of the new media, Abdullah argued that this new technology has expanded the meaning of freedom of speech where unfettered speech is flourished without government’s restriction. With this remark by Abdullah and his argument in keeping the existing laws, it seems that, from the legal aspect, there will be no reform in improving the status of free speech in Malaysia. In fact, there are several events that proved the government will not change its position in continuously limiting and intimidating the free speech with punishment under the existing laws. For instance, Malaysia Today blogger, Raja Petra

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Kamarudin, and former banker Syed Akbar Ali on 6 May 2008 became the first and second Internet citizens to be charged with sedition, under the SA. Raja Petra was charged with posting a seditious article on his website, “Malaysia Today”, (http://www.malaysia-today.net) entitled “Let’s send the Altantuya murderers to hell” which implicated Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak and his wife Rosmah Mansor in the murder of Altantunya Shaariibuu, a Mongolian woman in October 2006.2 Syed Akbar, however, a Jalan Masjid India-based jeweller, was charged with posting a seditious comment also on the “Malaysia Today” website. The comment was in response to an article entitled “Malaysia’s organised crime syndicate: All roads lead to Putrajaya”. He allegedly posted seditious comments about Malays and Islam (Veera and Lourdes 2008). With these cases, it is not a surprise that many bloggers are suspicious of the government move and intention in engaging them. In reality, the government realises that the bloggers have successfully changed the face of Malaysian politics. Bloggers have become a vocal group to challenge the government, and even contested and won seats as opposition candidates for the Parliament and state legislative assembly. In May 2008, the MCMC announced that they have investigated twenty-two websites and blogs for airing false, pornographic and baseless allegations. Deputy Energy, Water and Communications Minister, Joseph Salang Gandum told the Dewan Negara (Senate) that out of those blogs investigated, the commission had also forwarded three investigation papers to the AttorneyGeneral’s Chambers for reviewing the investigation and taking legal action. However, most of the blogs and websites are being operated using platforms from abroad and efforts to obtain evidence necessary for action often come to a dead end. Therefore, it is very hard to take legal action against these blogs. Gandum also mentioned that the commission did not license blogging activities, making it hard for both the ministry and commission to have a comprehensive list of those behind these websites and blogs. The government, on the other hand, did not intend to set up a special body to counter “irresponsible blogging” as there were adequate laws such as the SA and the Penal Code in place (The Star 2008b, 12). However, in July 2008, the MCMC blocked the access to many websites and blogs including the Malaysia Today website (Farrah 2008, 6). In September 2008, the government came down hard on owners of blogs and news portals. All 21 Internet service providers (ISPs) in the country blocked the controversial Malaysia Today website. The ISPs were acted under a directive of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia

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Commission (MCMC). The notices were sent out on 26 September 2008 in accordance with Section 263 of the Communications and Multimedia Act. This means that MCMC is allowed to block any particular website which has committed acts that contravene the local laws of the country, for example, sedition (The Malaysian Insider 2008a). Access to the Malaysian Today website via its domain name system (DNS) (http://www.malaysia-today.net) has been barred since 6pm on 26 September 2008. The Malaysia Today website was targeted because it has been accused of publishing libel, racial and religious hatred materials and giving the running battle between its owner, Raja Petra Kamarudin, and several prominent personalities, including Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak and his wife. Supporters of Najib have been pushing for tougher action to be taken against Raja Petra and his ilk, arguing that the same rules which bind the mainstream media should be applied on the online media (The Malaysian Insider 2008a). The need to rein in bloggers was discussed at a high-level meeting involving ministers and senior government officials. Deputy Energy, Water and Communications Minister Joseph Salang Gandum fired against the Malaysia Today website, saying that “You should ask Malaysia Today what is wrong with them? I don’t think the MCMC will just block any media. Even if something is remotely sensitive, people may misinterpret what we think is proper. Issues of race and religion are normal basis for action” (Chong and Teoh 2008, 1). Meanwhile, Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar said that the MCMC was just “exercising their power under the Act”, arguing that “I think the most important thing is everyone is subject to the law, even people operating on websites or blogs. We do not intend to curtail people’s freedom and right to give information or debate. But when you publish content that is libellous, defamatory, slanderous to other people, I think it is only natural, looking at their powers, in order to bring law and order within the country, to take action which they deem necessary” (Chong and Teoh 2008, 1). He noted that the authorities had given many fair opportunities and warnings to bloggers, which have gone unheeded. Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz said that it was the government’s responsibility to take preemptive action against anything that could jeopardise the stability of the country, saying that “We have laws to ensure that no sensitive issues are raised. If the MCMC made that decision, it was made considering the welfare of the population of this country. There must be a control, it cannot be complete freedom. You have to discuss behind closed doors,

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you know, we are multiracial. Sometimes, you bring up a matter and say you are sincere. But the perception of other groups is different” (Chong and Teoh 2008, 1). According to The Malaysian Insider (2008a), the consensus among the government officials was actually that if nothing was done to counter the gush of accusations and allegations against BN leaders, the ruling coalition will face the real prospect of losing the next general elections. According to their reasoning, some 400,000 new voters are registered every year. With next general election scheduled for 2013, BN will face two million new voters the next time it seeks a mandate from the Malaysian public. The bulk of the new voters are in their 20s and their first source of information is likely to be the Internet. Their opinions about the country and its leaders are going to be shaped by what they read on new websites and blogs. The move to block websites and blogs put the government in the defensive. Critics are going to argue that the MCMC’s action contravenes Section 3 of the Act which prohibits any censorship of the Internet. When the government launched the MSC, it promised not to allow any censorship of the Internet. Surprisingly, criticisms came not only from the opposition PR, but members of the ruling government also criticised the move by MCMC. The UMNO Youth deputy chief, Khairy Jamaluddin, was against the move to block access to Malaysia Today. He argued that such a blatant and crude employment of state power is inconsistent with the widening democratic space–an approach the current administration adopted long before the 12th General Election. Khairy posits that the MCMC’s high-handed approach also sends out the wrong message as it is at odds with the MSC Bill of Guarantees–a 10-point Bill that prescribes zero Internet censorship. Moreover, former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad also cautioned that any move to censor the Internet could further alienate the public from BN. He explained that this act of censorship betrays a lack of faith in Malaysia’s youth to intelligently decide the truth for themselves. Tabloids sell far more than broadsheets in many countries, but it would take a bold person to suggest that readers of The Sun or The Mirror in the UK, for example, take all of its content at face value. He saw every indication that bright young Malaysians, too, can apply the same self-filtering process. What they will not stand for is the state imposing its own filter on the web. The BN government needs to be savvier in responding to issues on the Internet (The Malaysian Insider 2008b).

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However, Raja Petra claimed that the government will never able to block any website including the Malaysia Today. The block of access to the Malaysia Today was only a partial shutdown limited to Streamyx users. Raja Petra clarified that readers who are overseas and those who subscribe to other ISPs such as Maxis are still able to access the Malaysia Today website normally. He also managed to set up an alternative blog site (http://mt.harapanmalaysia.com) and passed the word of the new DNS address through SMSes (Chong and Teoh 2008). Therefore, any attempt to block the website is useless because there is always other method or mechanism to activate the website. This view catches on in a government which is at a loss on how to counter the influence of blogs and websites. Probably due to the many pressures, the move which is against the Communications and Multimedia Act itself, and the unsuccessful action by government to block the Malaysia Today, Energy, Water and Communications Minister, Shaziman Abu Mansor, announced on 11 September 2008 that websites and blogs will no longer be blocked, even if they are deemed as threats to the country. He argued that freedom of cyberspace should be restored, as it was important that the people should not be discouraged from using the Internet. Further, he believed that there were enough laws such as the ISA to control irresponsible dissemination of information over the Internet and bring those behind irresponsible websites and blogs to book. The decision by the minister also means that access to the Malaysia Today has been reinstated with immediate effect (Farrah 2008, 6). Astonishingly on 12 September 2008, one day after announcing no more block to the websites and blogs, the government detained Raja Petra Kamarudin with a Sin Chew Daily reporter Tan Hong Cheng and Seputeh Member of Parliament from DAP Teresa Kok under the ISA. They were arrested under Section 73(1) of the ISA for allegedly being a threat to security, peace and public order.3 In protest for government’s decision to use the ISA, Zaid Ibrahim as Minister in Prime Minister Department, who was in charge of the law matters in the country, resigned from government on 15 September 2008. On other issue, on 16 May 2008, as the Cabinet made public the Royal Commission report on the V.K. Lingam video scandal, the government directed the attorney-general to order investigations into the six personalities named by the commission for possibly having broken the laws, including the SA, OSA, Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption Act and the Legal Profession Act.4 On the same day, police reports were lodged against the Berita Harian, NST and The Star by the Prime

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Minister’s Department for breaching the OSA and publishing excerpts of the report before the Cabinet ruled that it could be made public. It has been learnt that commission members, ministers and UMNO politicians have been upset with several newspapers for breaking the embargo on the explosive report which confirmed what Malaysians long suspected that the appointment of judges during the Mahathir era was manipulated by individuals close to the then prime minister (The Malaysian Insider 2008c). The same method had been employed on 12 September 2008 when three newspapers, Sin Chew Daily, The Sun and Suara Keadilan, had received show-cause letters under the PPPA from the Home Ministry for breaching publications guidelines by reporting racial sensitive and manipulation issues. All publications were given three warning letters if they were found to have breached guidelines before show-cause letters were issued. Failure to adhere to the guidelines further could result in the ministry revoking their permit. The National Union of Journalists (NUJ) President Norila Mohd Daud described the worrying trend as being tantamount to further restriction to press freedom, thus hindering journalists from reporting the truth without fear. If these newspapers were to be closed down or suspended, the livelihood of hundreds of journalists and non-journalists who are not involved with the issues will also be affected (The Star 2008d, 8).5 Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Nazri Abdul Aziz mentioned in the Parliament that the government has no intention of amending the OSA as the Cabinet can declassify any document at any time (Tan 2008). The government is also silent about drafting a Freedom of Information Act which could protect whistleblowers in effort to fight corruption. In combating corruption, Nazri said that the ACA would shift its emphasis from enforcement and punitive actions to a focus on internal control by encouraging government departments to work with the agency in various programmes to prevent corruption, misappropriation and the abuse of power. This will be implemented through the formation of a Joint Committee to Prevent Corruption, which is an extension of the existing efforts implemented through the Committee for Integrity in Management (CIM). Sivarasa Rasiah, an opposition PKR Vice-President and a MP, criticises the government for not having the “political will” to prevent corruption by drafting a Freedom of Information Act and protect whistleblowers. According to Sivarasa, the government had never declassified any confidential documents of public interests such as the toll concession agreements. Instead, it is the Selangor state government under the PR that started to declassify confidential documents as an early

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measure to improve transparency and governance. He had proposed a motion for a freedom of information legislation to be debated in the Parliament, however, it had been excluded from the sitting in May 2008 (Tan 2008). Although since the post-election period, mainstream newspapers such as The Sun and The Star announced of their advocating toward greater freedom of the press in Malaysia, mainstream press are remained to be bias to the BN government against the PR opposition. For instance, the PR announced on 27 May 2008 that it was boycotting “Utusan Malaysia” and “Mingguan Malaysia” for allegedly running a smear campaign against the opposition. Opposition bench chief in the Parliament and PKR president, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail said that the two publications have been criticising and painting PR members in a bad light as if “still on an election campaign”. She also charged that both newspapers were stoking narrow-minded racial sentiments to incite the anger of the Malays against PR leaders (NST Online 2008b). Chief Minister of the PR government in Selangor, Khalid Ibrahim also criticised and doubts about the willingness of Information Minister, Shabery, to implement greater freedom of the press in Malaysia after Shabery did not give consent to RTM for allowing its radio station, “Selangor fm”, to air a state government slot. Khalid asked RTM to give state government merely an hour live slot every week for him and his executive councillors to interact with the people. The unwillingness of Shabery and RTM to give more space for BN’s opponent was clearly seen as an inconsistent policy by the Abdullah’s government in implementing the policy of openness in the media. Implication from this quarrel, Khalid had to force the “Selangor fm” to be moved its operation out from Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Building, which is a state government centre of administration (Nasir 2008, 34). “Selangor fm” is a RTM radio station which operates for the state of Selangor only. It operates everyday from 6am to 12.00am on the next day with programmes such as local news and entertainment in Malay language. Its total air times are 18 hours perday or 126 hour per-week. The government of Selangor only asked for one hour per-week slot programme. This kind of problem also occurred in other PR-control states such as in Perak with “Perak fm”. This is definitely a breach of the people’s right to free press by the federal government and the right for the people to interact with state government about local issues.6 Although in the post-election period the government promised to reform some of the laws and media practices in Malaysia, freedom of the

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press remains limited if the restrictive laws remain to be practised and implemented. Freedom of the press is a fundamental right and essential in creating an accountable and a responsible government in Malaysia. However, we must also bear in mind that this freedom should not be used to promote violence or exacerbate racial tensions. Rather, it should be practised responsibly, with due regard for the common good, in accordance with the theory of social responsibility, as argued in the next section.

Freedom of the Press with Social Responsibility Social responsibility approach was developed in the US following an exercise carried out to assess the role and responsibilities of the media. The Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947, 1-12), disappointed by the failure of the press to provide adequate and equal access to voices outside the circle of a privileged and powerful minority, suggested that a responsible press should “provide a full, truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning”. The Commission (1947, 23-26) claimed that the press should “serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism” and act as “a common carrier of public expression”. The press should give a “representative picture of constituent groups in society” and clarify the “goals and values of society”. The press should also be challenged to use its considerable freedom in a socially responsible manner, by providing citizens with diverse sources of information, presenting them with a variety of opinions and attitudes and clarifying society’s goals and values (Bunton 1998, 232). According to Theodore Glasser (1986, 93), an affirmative reading of the free press clause underscores the importance of public expression by recognising its higher purpose; it thus embodies an appreciation for the role of the press, an expectation that the press will serve not just itself but the larger community whose members look to it for clearer sense of who they are, where they are going, and where they have been. Frederick S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm (1956/1973), further developed the social responsibility theory, summarising it as follows: “Freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the press, which enjoys a privileged position under our government, is obligated to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential functions of mass communication in contemporary society.” (Gauthier 1999, 197-213)

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Apart from laws of libel, press control mostly takes the form of community opinion, consumer action and professional ethics. A specific press responsibility identified by the Commission report is the “presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society”. Peterson points out that the “right of expression” is not seen as an absolute right within social responsibility theory. Instead, “one’s right to free speech must be balanced against the private rights of others and against vital social interests” (Gauthier 1999, 197-213). In this same light, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm also warned that: “...the power and near monopoly position of the media impose on them an obligation to be socially responsible, to see that all sides are fairly presented and that the public has enough information to decide; and that if the media do not take on themselves such responsibility it may be necessary for some other agency of the public to enforce it.” (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956/1973, 102)

The Canons of Journalism, adopted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, addresses these same obligations when it calls on newspapers to practise responsibility to the general welfare, sincerity, truthfulness, impartiality, fair play, decency, and respect for the individual’s privacy. The very term “social responsibility” seems to indicate a sense of moral restraint. Assumptions such as societal order and stability, personal sacrifice for the benefit of others, consistency in the reporting of possibly complicated facts and events, and a stewardship toward humanity all seem to flow from this theory (Lloyd 1991, 200). Some proponents of social responsibility theory even claim that its application is essential to preserve democracy (Mollenhof 1964). The press emphasises the rights of a free press, such as rights of access and publication. Social responsibility theory, on the other hand, recognises that constitutional rights and protections granted to the press are necessarily accompanied by responsibilities, particularly to the public interest and the well-being of a democratic community (Glasser 1986, 87-93). So it is the press, therefore, that must be the “more alert element” with a duty to keep the public informed, as an informed populace is the cornerstone of democracy. The argument for social responsibility is influenced by the political idea of communitarianism, which requires individual rights to be balanced by social responsibilities and duties, and gives due weight to the social construction of identity. The thrust of this argument is that the political idea of communitarianism requires that the rights of individuals be

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balanced with the need for social harmony and order. Thus, social responsibility theory clearly rejects the argument of unfettered freedom of the press, and instead promotes freedom of the press with responsibility. It has been argued that, as a social and political philosophy, communitarianism emphasises connection, community, responsibility, and the common good over individualism. Ethically, communitarianism may be seen as a direct contrast to classic individualist liberalism, and as a radical form of social responsibility theory (Bunton 1988, 232). Political theorists such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer, commonly labelled as communitarians, for all their differences, reject the classical liberal idea that people are free-standing individuals whose moral commitments are based on abstract universal principles. They further insist that human beings are integrated into social groups, having special obligations to their particular groups that do not extend to others (Mulhall and Swift 1996, 40164). The focus of political communitarians appears to be directed toward specific issues that arise from the need to balance individual rights with social responsibilities, and freedom with social order. Their discourse deals with practical issues that emphasise the promotion of policies that are meant to stem the erosion of communal life in what appears to be an increasingly fragmented world and emphasising the importance of social responsibility (Bell 2001, 1-18). Communitarians argue that entrenched notions of individualism are out of step with an increasingly interdependent world, and that it is misguided to view institutions as neutral organisations designed simply to make society function efficiently. Instead, institutions are embedded within a social fabric that gives them particular meanings, and they have profound effects on shaping citizens’ lives (Bellah et al. 1985, 1992). For example, the press is one of the institutions centrally involved in the making of societal meanings, and the press has a key role to play in recreating a sense of community and common good (Christians, Ferre and Fackler 1993). This leads naturally to the idea that freedom of the press must be guided by responsibility. The theory of social responsibility supports the concept of a diverse, objective, and independent press, but one that should seek to avoid causing offence or encouraging crime, violence or disorder.

Public Journalism In this book, I was critical to the argument of developmental journalism which favoured the autocratic leaders to run developmental projects without the media able to check and balance any wrongdoings done for and in those projects. Media are unable to debate public concern

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on those projects under the name of “nation-building” propagated by the state. In here, I propose the alternative concept to the developmental journalism called “Public Journalism”. Public journalism is come from the idea of deliberative democracy that encourages public deliberation in all policies and decision making made by the state. Media are the best channels or tools to realise this idea of people taking part in deliberating public issues. According to Peter Levine (2003), democracy requires public deliberation for three reasons which are to enable citizens to discuss public issues and form opinions, to give democratic leaders much better insight into public issues than elections are able to do, and to enable people to justify their views so we can sort out the better from the worse. For Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1990, 1), a deliberative democratic or public deliberation theory offers “a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life”. They argue that the promise of a deliberative democratic theory lies in a concern for “finding terms of cooperation that each citizen can accept” for the reason that contemporary societies are driven by deep conflict and moral disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson 1990, 26). James Bohman (1996, 4), another defender of deliberative democracy, posits that democracy in some form implies public deliberation, which is “the deliberation of citizens is necessary if decisions are not to be merely imposed upon them…consent, is after all, the mean feature of democracy”. In other words, political decision-making is legitimate insofar as policies are produced in “a process of public discussion and debate in which citizens and their representatives, going beyond mere self-interest and limited points of view, reflect on the general interest or on their common good”. Therefore, public deliberation is an approach to decision-making in which citizens consider relevant facts from multiple points of view, converse with one another to think critically about options before them and enlarge their perspectives, opinions and understandings. Deliberative democracy strengthens citizen voices in governance by including people of all races, classes, ages and geographies in deliberations that directly affect public decisions. As a result, citizens influence–and can see the result of their influence on–the policy and resource decisions that impact their daily lives and their future (Deliberative Democracy Consortium 2003). The argument of public journalism is borrowed from the work of Habermas on the public sphere, from John Dewey’s great book, The Public and Its Problems, and from the writings of James Carey. John

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Dewey (1927) argued that citizens were capable of participating in the public life with more than just voting and that they were obligated to do so. Rather than delegating the process of deliberation to officials and lobbyists, citizens ought to participate in the important, but often unorganised and difficult, deliberation themselves. James Carey (1997, 1999) sees public journalism as one of the many reform movements. Carey sees democracy as working best when communities, no matter how diverse, nonetheless enjoy interdependence: “We inevitably share a common life boat and therefore owe one another the terrible loyalty of passengers on a fragile craft” (Carey 1999, 62). What is distinctive about the argument is not the ideas in it, but the simple fact that journalists are helping to create the argument. So, what exactly is public journalism? According to Jay Rosen (1995, 34-39), it is at least three things. First, it is an argument about the proper task of the press. Second, it is a set of practices that are slowly spreading through American journalism. Third, it is a movement of people and institutions. What the argument says is this: journalism cannot remain valuable unless public life remains viable. If public life is in trouble, then journalism is in trouble. Therefore, journalists should do what they can to support public life. The press should help citizens participate and take them seriously when they do. It should nourish or create the sort of public talk that might get us somewhere, what some of us would call a deliberative dialogue. The press should change its focus on the public world so that citizens are not reduced to spectators in a drama dominated by professionals and technicians. Most important, perhaps, journalists must learn to see hope as an essential resource that they cannot deplete indefinitely without tremendous costs to us and them (Rosen 1995). The press, argued Levine (1999), has a crucial role to play in cultivating deliberation. When we think and talk about public affairs, we initially acquire most of our information from newspapers and television. Letters-to-the-editor pages, radio call-in programmes, and television talk shows are fora for public deliberation. At their best, the national media can prevent local conversations from becoming insular or uninformed. Nothing else can connect small-scale discussions into what Benjamin Page calls one “deliberative national public” (Levine 1999). Levine further argues that journalists often see their own job as providing information to citizens. But not all facts are equally helpful in promoting democratic deliberation. To dwell on information of the wrong kind can even be damaging. For example, when journalists mostly provide facts about the

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tactics and fortunes of political insiders, they make citizens seem insignificant. Likewise, information about who is likely to win the next election is of no use to citizens who are trying to decide who ought to win. Too often, these predictions turn into self-fulfilling prophecies that reduce the importance of actual votes. Facts about “public opinion” can be equally harmful. For instance in the US, surveys often ask a random sample of Americans to answer pre-formulated questions without first reflecting, discussing, or acquiring background information. The aggregated results are then presented as constraints within which politicians and the public must operate. We are told, for example, that a given policy is “unrealistic”, because 65 percent of the public opposes it. Public opinion thus confronts citizens as an alien force, even though it is supposed to be something that they create. Finally, many news stories “explain” officials’ behaviour by analysing the political benefits that are likely to flow from their decisions. The implication that politicians act out of naked self-interest is often plausible–but also unverifiable and largely irrelevant. Motives are always difficult to assess, and in any case the important question is not why a politician votes in a particular way, but whether this position is right. Journalists are taught to keep their values out of their writing. But to limit the explanation of politicians’ actions to selfinterest is itself a moral judgment. It denies the legitimacy or relevance of any principled reasons that actors give for their decisions, and therefore makes deliberation seem pointless. Fortunately, explained Levine (1999) during the last few years, a new movement, called public or civic journalism, has begun to transform American newspapers, at least beyond the Capital Beltway. This label has been adopted by a loose coalition of reform-minded journalists with diverse ideals and projects. But a common theme unites many of their experiments: the cultivation of public deliberation. Public journalists resist stories about the political “horse race” in favour of articles about issues. They also cover the public deliberations that occur in civil society, that is, within voluntary associations, neighbourhood and civic groups, religious denominations, and universities. In covering these discussions, public journalists do not define “news” merely as moments of sharp disagreement, charges and countercharges, resignations and lawsuits. They also count routine exchanges of ideas as newsworthy. Finally (and most controversially), public journalists instigate deliberation by convening citizens to talk about public affairs. For instance, during several recent elections in the US, the Charlotte (North Carolina) Observer and the local American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)-television affiliate recruited

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people to serve on “citizens” panels’ that collaborate with journalists to devise questions for candidates to answer. The politicians’ responses were published in the newspaper. If a candidate refused to participate, a blank space was left by his name. Reporters from the business, health, education, and religion beats covered topics that the citizens’ panel considered relevant to the election. Members of the panel met directly with candidates, and some of their deliberations were televised locally. Such experiments cross traditional boundaries between objective reporting and activism. But North Carolina’s public journalists have never forced candidates to take any particular position on issues. Instead, they have compelled politicians to engage in a dialogue with citizens. Thus public journalists have promoted a particular democratic process, and not a political outcome. Furthermore, it is worth remembering that conventional news stories about campaign tactics and polls are not truly neutral and detached, for they also affect public engagement. The effects of public journalism appear to be better: readers become demonstrably more active in community organisations and more interested in public affairs (Levine 1999). Therefore, public journalists see themselves as conveners of public talk, aids to a more active citizenry, modelers of deliberative dialogue, supporters of a healthy public life. They are willing to assume a kind of political identity, but are not willing to join the struggles at the heart of left-right-centre politics–except the very important struggle for a more vital public sphere, a better conversation, a public life that might earn our respect (Rosen 1995). In overall, public journalism is a form of journalism that seeks to (Lambeth 1998): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Listen systematically to the stories and ideas of citizens even while protecting its freedom to choose what to cover, Examine alternative ways to frame stories on important community issues, Choose frames that stand the best chance to stimulate citizen deliberation and build public understanding of issues, Take the initiative to report on major public problems in a way that advances public knowledge of possible solutions and the values served by alternative courses of action, and Pay continuing and systematic attention to how well and how credibly it is communicating with the public.

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Therefore, this is important if public journalism could be applied in Malaysia where the media serve the people interests and could be utilised in generating debate between politicians and people about any public issue. This will ensure that political leaders are accountable to the people and should respond to the people’s needs and interests. The public journalism is definitely suitable to be implemented in Malaysia.

Responsible or Irresponsible Press in Malaysia So far, the Malaysian media have played a positive role for several decades in containing racial conflict and have an impressive track record in this regard. One obvious factor in Malaysian journalism is the media’s inability to discuss issues which might provoke racial sensitivities. Since 1969, there have been several near clashes between the races, averted only though intervention by political leaders and the police, and the media have been prevented from discussing any aspects of these conflicts that might trigger nationwide crisis.7 In 2001, there was the Kampung Medan incident where a neighbourhood problem over an Indian funeral turned into a racial incident that rocked the country for days. Six people died and scores were injured in the outbreak of violence. The racial background of people involved in fights or conflicts were not mentioned in print. Neither is the race of people arrested or charged in court mentioned. This is a generally agreed upon rule which has become a convention among the Malaysian press (Moses 2002, 102-107). Mahathir Mohamad urged the need for a responsible media in covering the sensitive issue such as racial issue in Malaysia. He considered a socially responsible press to be the best model (Safar 1996b, 164-181). Mahathir felt that the Malaysian press is currently practising this approach and in his speech in the UN 48th General Assembly in 1993, he said: “Malaysia believes in press freedom. But the freedom as other freedom and rights must be with responsibility. We hope for responsible Malaysian media but we do not ignore the need of supervision of this responsibility. But for international newspaper, we can only hope and pray that they realise what they are doing.” (Mahathir 1994, 1-5)

Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in his speech at the Malaysian Press Night 2008 and MPI-Petronas Malaysian Press Award Night 2007 on 2 May 2008, also urged the media practitioners, including bloggers, to be responsible and ethical in reporting important issues,

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including those on fuel prices and the food crisis occurring in the country. This was because whatever was reported will draw much attention and would have an influence on public opinion. Commenting on journalism ethics, Abdullah argues that as journalists, it was important for them to know not only how to write reports, but also to take into consideration journalism ethics which should be the guide in their writings, saying that: “In my opinion, the media must be constructive and responsible in presenting their views. The views and role of the media should be respected...if they write irresponsibly, come up with incorrect stories, this is not the way to earn public respect….If there is misunderstanding in the report made, this could lead to misunderstanding among the people which would create a wrong reaction and lead to bigger problems.” (Bernama 2008c, 1)

Thus he proposes the creation of a group of journalists specialising on specific subjects, especially on the issue of escalating fuel prices and the food crisis to avoid inaccurate reports, speculations, assumptions and perceptions on these issues. He hopes journalists would play their role in conveying the correct report to eliminate public misconception on these issues. In addition, he asks the mass media could help the government in correcting the social lifestyle where there was an increasing tendency to indulge in wastage. Many, especially from the opposition, would argue that the motive behind Mahathir’s and Abdullah’s argument of social responsibility is to hide their strict policy on controlling the media. As discussed in previous chapters, the media have also assumed unprecedented importance as a direct form of mediation between government and the people. However in Malaysia, the BN party has effective control of the mass media, largely through legislation but also increasingly through ownership of the printed and electronic media. Historically, the Malaysian media have not been an independent force and since national independence, the priority in most sectors, including the media, has been nation-building and socio-economic development (Padmaja 2001, 98). Without doubt as well, the press has a responsibility and duty to encourage harmonious relationships between races in Malaysia; and concern for racial conflict affords the government with a reason to monitor and control the press. Over recent decades, the Malaysian media have played a positive role in helping to control ethnic conflict through carefully reporting any clash between races such as in Kampung Medan incidents, and supporting the government’s policies of national unity and

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social harmony. What necessary for journalists to show responsibility is when it comes to issues of race, religion, gender and community, while not suppressing legitimate diversity of opinion or manipulating facts. There must be a real effort to give due weight to the positive rather than focus on the negative, and the approach should be one of a third party trying to allay unfounded suspicion and fears in the community. Accordingly, this is where the issue of responsible reporting comes into the picture. The press should be guided by Code of Ethics to enable them to carry out their duties in a responsible and peaceful manner. Numerous defamation cases are inevitably the result of what may be considered to be “irresponsible reporting”. Historically, in many democratic countries including Malaysia, the Courts have made exorbitant awards in such defamation suits, even though the critics argue that exorbitant awards will only serve to stifle press freedom. The Declaration of Rights and Obligations, drawn up in Munich in 1971, which was later adopted by the International Federation of Journalists requires journalists to “respect the truth whatever be the consequences to himself, because of the right of the public to know the truth”. In particular, journalists are duty bound to “report only facts of which he knows the origin; not to suppress or manipulate essential information nor alter texts and documents” (Abu 2003, 16). The Declaration also stresses the need to refrain from using unfair methods to obtain news, and to respect the right to privacy. These duties should not be seen as unnecessary restrictions, but rather as aids for responsible reporting. There is also a code of ethics in Malaysia which the National Union of Journalist uses as a general yardstick to ensure ethical journalism. There have been calls for the creation of a Press Council or committee to arbitrate and set standards for journalists. The Malaysian government has begun the process but journalists are apprehensive about what form the council will take and whether it will in fact involve an erosion of traditional rights (Moses 2002, 107). The creation of a Press/Media Council or Commission is crucial for implementing a responsible free press and public journalism in Malaysia. The Press Council is a body formed to regulate the press by using a code of ethics. It is a check and balance mechanism for the operations of the press. This mechanism provides for the people to lodge complaints against the press found contravening the code of ethics (Safar 2006, 43). The Press Council is also where reputable and responsible journalists can deliberate on issues affecting the press, and appropriate penalties can be meted out to those who run foul of the established press codes and ethics. For example, the case of a newspapers “China Press” in 2006, and together with other

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newspapers, in relation with the “nude ear squat episode”, which reportedly involved a mistreatment of a woman of Chinese national by the police in a police lockup, had angered the Chinese government. Malaysian prime minister had to apologise to the Chinese government in resolving the case. Later, however, the truth emerged that the woman was a local Malay, not Chinese citizen. Two of the “China Press” editors resigned after receiving a letter from Internal Security Ministry threatening to suspend the paper (Zaid 2007, 189-190). Hence, the Press Council is a body that, if it establishes, will cater of such case. The people must trust journalists to regulate themselves, so that they can produce accurate, truthful and responsible reporting. This would also spare the government of the need to refute allegations that action taken was politically or racially motivated. Such as Press Council would, however, be pointless if the laws and regulations currently in place were not repealed (Zaid 2007, 193). As we have seen, countries like Malaysia, which have multiracial and multi-religious populations, are often inclined to place curbs on press freedom purportedly to suppress conflict and promote national unity. However, media observers and journalists alike must be vigilant of governments that abuse such justifications to protect their vested interests. Once again, balance is crucial, and the press should find a middle way between irresponsibility and toadying to government. Nik Abdul Rashid has eloquently summed up the conundrum of attempting to balance press freedom with other competing concerns: “How much freedom do we need in order to develop the kind of journalism fit for the country? Or how much freedom should be given to media people to develop that kind of Malaysian journalism? It is like asking how much water and fire are needed to prosper. With too little water, we go thirsty, but with too much water, we will be drowned. With too little fire, we may have to go ‘raw’, but too much fire, we perish. Press freedom is vital, but too much freedom is fatal.” (Abu 2003, 14-17)

The media should play a more responsible role to create well-balanced reports addressing public needs as well as the government policies. One helpful suggestion is made by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression of United Nations Commission on Human Rights (1998), Abid Hussain, who wrote in his 1999 report on Malaysia: “Freedom of the media in Malaysia has been hindered by exerting political and legal pressure on journalists, which has led to widespread selfcensorship in their daily work. The Special Rapporteur considers the

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He suggests that the government has to take all necessary steps to ensure the independence and responsibility of the media, including safeguards against any interference by political interests, while reporting responsibly news which touches the sensitive racial, religious, and cultural issues. Initiatives on the part of media professionals to establish independent and voluntary professional associations should also be encouraged, in particular with regard to developing methods and systems of voluntary self-regulation such as codes of ethics for the profession, and training programmes which address the rights and responsibilities of the media and the government, as well as monitoring their implementation. Abid Hussain also argues that the Malaysian government should repeal or amend the regulations governing the annual licensing of newspapers in order to ensure that any registration requirements serve an administrative purpose only and are not used to impose restrictions on the media. What need to be added to his suggestions is that political speech should be a cornerstone of the implementation of a free and responsible media and public journalism. The opposition should be given more space in the press to express its views, and be allowed to publish and broadcast its own programmes and even have its own media companies. But first, Malaysia has to transform its political culture from neo-feudalism that tends toward authoritarianism to democratic system that promotes public deliberation. This transformation is possible if Malaysia rejects the concept of developmental journalism and accepts public journalism by giving political opposition, and even NGOs equal opportunity for power or political contestations and the right to practise legitimate political speech. Moreover, there should be the freedom to allow for a diversity of publications, television channels, and radio stations that cater to the needs of not only the various ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic groups, but also to various political groups, including the opposition and NGOs, except groups that intentionally seek to destabilise the country and propagate racial disharmony.8 In this way, a free and responsible media and public journalism can take a significant step in recognising and promoting public deliberation in Malaysia.

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International and National Legislation It has been argued that in order to improve the scope of and provide better protection for free press, Malaysia should ratify the international laws on civil and political rights or free speech (Article XIX 2003, Commission on Human Rights 1998, SUHAKAM 2003b). Against this, however, some argue that those international laws might not be suitable for Malaysian society. There is also an argument that international law is weak in enforcement, and continuously dominated and violated by powerful countries like the US and UK which overrule it as they please. As a member of the UN, Malaysia has voluntarily to abide by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),9 a United Nations General Assembly resolution that guarantees the right to freedom of speech in the following terms: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (Article XIX 2003, 2). The UDHR is not directly binding on States but parts of it, including Article 19, are widely regarded as having acquired legal force as customary international law since its adoption in 1948. International bodies and courts have made it very clear that freedom of speech and information is one of the most important human rights. In its very first session on 14 December 1946 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I), which states: “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated” (Article XIX 2003, 3). As this resolution notes, freedom of speech is both fundamentally important in its own right and also key to the fulfilment of all other rights. As has been argued earlier, it is only in societies where the free flow of information and ideas is permitted that genuine democracy can flourish. In addition, freedom of speech is essential if violations of human rights are to be exposed and challenged. Freedom of speech is also guaranteed by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),10 a treaty with 149 States Parties, as well as in all three regional treaties on human rights, specifically at Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),11 at Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,12 and at Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.13

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However, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute. Both international law and most national constitutions recognise that freedom of speech may be limited within strictly defined parameters. Article 29 of the UDHR provides: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” (Article XIX 2003, 5)

Article 19(3) of the ICCPR lays down the benchmark, stating: “The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” (Article XIX 2003, 5)

It is a maxim of human rights jurisprudence that restrictions on rights must always be construed narrowly; this is especially true of the right to freedom of speech because of its importance in democratic society. Accordingly, any restriction on the right to freedom of speech must meet a strict three-part test, approved by both the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. This test requires that any restriction must a) be provided by law; b) be for the purpose of safeguarding a legitimate public interest; and c) be necessary to secure that interest. The third part of this test means that even measures which seek to protect a legitimate interest must meet the requisite standard established by the term “necessary”. Although absolute necessity is not required, a “pressing social need” must be demonstrated, the restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons given to justify the restriction must be relevant and sufficient. In other words, the government, in protecting legitimate interests, must restrict freedom of the press as little as possible. Vague or broadly defined restrictions, even if they satisfy the “provided by law” criterion, will generally be unacceptable (Article XIX 2003, 5-6). Besides, Article 12 of the UDHR sets a clear standard that members of the press should endeavour to follow. Article 12 states that “no one shall

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be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation”. Article 12 also provides for the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Under Article 19 of the ICCPR, the exercise of the right to freedom of speech carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Article 10 of the ECHR establishes the right to freedom of speech and also provides for restrictions to the right. It follows, therefore, that the right to freedom of speech must be balanced by the obligation to display respect for the rights of others, the rights of society and the rights of the nation (Abu 2003, 14-17). As we have seen, Malaysia does not fully implement the UDHR 1948 resolution (Rais 1999, 103),14 and nor has Malaysia acceded to the ICCPR, and three other major conventions, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Commission on Human Rights 1998, 13-15). As a consequence, it means that Malaysia is not bound to implement any international laws under these conventions. Section 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 permits SUHAKAM to have regard to UDHR 1948. However, according to Shad Faruqi despite this admirable provision, the enforceability in national Courts of the international law in human rights remains deeply problematic. He provides the following reasons (Hamdan 2003, 18-24): 1.

2. 3.

International law is not part of the definition of “law” in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution. In this Article, law is defined as written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation, and any custom and usage having the force of law in the Federation or any part thereof. International treaties are not law per se for national purpose, unless they have been ratified by the national government. Even if ratified by the Executive, treaties do not become part of the law of Malaysia until they are converted into an Act of Parliament by the legislature.

Clearly, Malaysian government has no intention to ratify these international laws. Without ratification by the Parliament, Malaysians could practise none of these international laws.

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From the perspective of national legislation, there is an argument that it is unrealistic to reveal all information to the public. It shows that whatever the political colour of the system, governments everywhere develop a stake in the secrecy of their operations. Malaysia is not an exception, and under the OSA Ministers and government officers have the power to restrict any government information from being accessed by the media and made public. Under this Act, the classification is completely subjective and not subject to independent scrutiny. It has been shown that the OSA has been used to prevent public access to important information on national corruption and scandals. For instance, in 1985 the NST journalist Sabry Sharif pleaded guilty to violating the Act for writing a story on alleged irregularities in military aircraft purchases, and was fined RM7,000 (Amnesty International 1999).15 In July 2003, the opposition detailed allegations of abuses in government procurement contracts involving weapons systems, school construction and computerisation, and project auditing. Although the government offered no response, these allegations were consistent with the government’s longstanding practice of granting large contracts without competitive bidding. The government has used the OSA to conceal any deal or process of granting those contracts. Indeed, Mahathir regularly defended his government’s distribution of contracts as the most efficient means by which to ensure that they were awarded to capable individuals and firms (Case 2004, 13). In 2003, the SUHAKAM recommended the government to enact a Freedom of Information Act. Mehrun Siraj (2001, 4), the Malaysian Human Rights Commissioner, urged the government to enact a Freedom of Information Act and to repeal the OSA. She admits that although the OSA was intended to protect official secrets, the indiscriminate classifying of documents as secret has prevented the public from gaining access to materials such as draft Bills to be tabled before Parliament and the granting government contracts. The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (MII) supports the SUHAKAM’s initiative because the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act would bring about sea change in the battle against corruption (Lim 2004, 1). After a certain period has elapsed, the government should reveal its secrets in line with the people’s right to know. The media has a corresponding right and duty to provide effective coverage of issues, especially regarding the public interest and human rights. However, the government always argues that secrecy concerning of military, diplomatic, police, and personal privacy should be protected for reasons of national

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security and respect for privacy. The right to freedom of information is a complex issue partly because the Malaysian government has never encouraged ordinary people to exercise this right. Sometimes, it was argued that, in the short term at least, hiding the truth may be better than telling it, particularly about highly sensitive issues. For example, the Malaysian government has never explained in detail about what was really happened in the conflicts of 13 May 1969 or the Kampung Medan incident in 2001 because of the anxiety that by explaining the crisis, it will spark hatred between races and jeopardise civil order. In terms of corruption and scandal, the government relies on the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) to contain them.16 The media are normally discouraged from finding information through investigative journalism. The media only publish government information or documents after receiving approval from the government. Regarding the enactment of Freedom of Information Act, the Malaysian government has yet to respond to the SUHAKAM’s recommendation because the government still depends on secrecy and the OSA to protect national security and credibility. However, freedom of information is so important because, without that freedom, the media is incapable of checking any government mismanagement or corruption. Conversely, the Malaysian government can legitimately limit the flow of information for reasons of racial harmony and political stability. There are several proposals that can be made to improve the situation of political speech in Malaysia. Again, the recommendations made by Abid Hussain, are very much to the point here. These recommendations include of repealing or amending the ISA, particularly the provision that legalises the detention without trial. Malaysia is encouraged to ratify international legislation on free speech fully, or with certain reservations that take account of its local culture, values, and beliefs, and the agenda of social responsibility. It should furthermore include amendments to some of the current national legislation of the OSA, PPPA, and SA especially on the power of the Home Minister to define and restrict free press. The government should also enact a new law of the Freedom of Information Act and take an initiative to establish any public inquiry or commission to resolve any sensitive cases of race relations for the purpose of protecting people’s right to know and stopping any speculation which might worsen the situation. The cases of persons who are being held for having exercised their right to freedom of speech should be reviewed with a view to releasing them. Moreover, the cases of all those who have been convicted as a result of the application of laws or regulations incompatible with the protection of the right to freedom of speech should also be reviewed,

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unless the speech has been genuinely and irresponsibly offensive, promoted violence or been a clear case of hate speech. The most important issue to be resolved is about political speech. The Malaysian constitution should protect and have a special provision for political speech. Article 10 of the constitution should be amended to insert a special provision of protecting legitimate freedom of political speech. The Malaysian constitution must make a clear distinction between political and nonpolitical speech, and legitimate and illegitimate political speech. This is to ensure that people can practise their right to political speech responsibly without undermining racial harmony. The most important thing is that the special provision for political speech could obviously encourage a more open and responsible public debate and strengthen the process of deliberative democratic process. By implementing the special provision, Malaysia’s political system would also become more transparent and accountable, and the political process should become a fairer competition between the parties. These proposals would not be detrimental to political stability or racial harmony, but would fortify both the social responsibility and public journalism approaches, and encourage the implementation of freedom of the press.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is undoubtedly true that Malaysian government effectively controls the media through legislation and ownership of the media company. The priority of Malaysian government is to control media for nation-building, socio-economic development and racial stability. However, people’s right to press freedom is limited because of the policy of curbing political opposition by the government. Therefore, I proposed some recommendations, which include repealing or amending media regulations, and rejecting neo-feudalism for democratic process of public deliberation, for the purpose of encouraging more people to practise their right to legitimate political speech. These recommendations are surely in line with the social responsibility theory and public journalism that urge people’s participation in the media and freedom of political speech to be practised responsibly.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 1. I will use the word “press” and “media” interchangeably. 2. The Fourth Estate view was eventually borrowed from the British to suit the modern system of government; whereas the three estates in England had been the clergy, nobility, and the House of Commons, the three estates in American terminology became the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Fourth Estate role has not gone uncriticised by legal scholars and commentators, especially in its pure sense as “fourth branch of government” (Lange 1975, Nadirsyah 2002). CHAPTER 2 1. Kaum Muda with its pan-Islamic agendas were against another group called Kaum Tua (Old Group) that practised Islamic orthodoxy by its members who among them were conservative ulamas, religious teachers, and community leaders. Kaum Tua strongly protected the feudal tradition of values and norms (Khazin and Nabir 1996, 329). Kaum Muda was supported by a few Islamic educated Malays, who had been educated in Egypt and in the Arab Peninsular i.e. Mecca and Madinah (Khazin and Nabir 1996, 329). Among the leaders of the group were Syed Syeikh al-Hadi, Syeikh Tahir Jalaluddin, Haji Abbas Mohd Taha, and Syeikh Mohd Salim Al-Kalali, who were inspired by the struggle for independence by Syeikh Muhammad Abduh in Middle East. 2. Al-Imam had published its first Malay-Jawi edition on 23 July 1906 in Singapore. Al-Imam means leader and it reminded the Malay to: “…remind anyone who forget, take care anyone who forget and sleep and lost and expressing voice to accentuate for the welfare to them (Malay people).” (Abdullah 1985, 87; Aziz M.T. 1972/73, 29) 3. Majlis had been published in 1931 and one of the famous journalist personality cum nationalist named Abdul Rahim Kajai was one of the editor and writer of the newspaper. After the Second World War, another popular writer named Abdul Samad Ahmad had been working hard to guide the newspaper to become a very lucrative newspaper from year 1949 to 1954. The great thing about the Majlis was it always sensationalised the political issues during a pre independence period (Mek and Aminah 1985, 250). 4. The Malays were regarded as the original inhabitants. The British believed that they should offer “protection” to the Malays, thus supplementing the protective role of the rulers. This was thought to be necessary because the Chinese and the Indians were exceptionally competitive. They were compelled to be so, for them to

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have undertaken the journey to Malaya, survived and made the necessary adjustment to local conditions. Protection took the form of protecting the Malays’ occupation of land and according them preference for some government employment and for acquiring various permits and licenses (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 10). 5. The Socialist Front consisted of two parties, Labour Party and People’s Party. 6. The Rukunegara declaration reads as follows: “Our nation, MALAYSIA, being dedicated – to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; to maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology; WE, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles–Belief in God, Loyalty to King and Country, Upholding the Constitution, Rule of Law, and Good Behaviour and Morality.” 7. The BN is a coalition party and comprises mainly (late 1999): Peninsular Malaysia, UMNO, the MCA, the MIC, the Gerakan, the People Progressive Party (PPP), and the Indian Democratic Party (IDP); in Sabah, UMNO Sabah, Parti Demokratik Sabah (PDS), the Sabah People’s Party (SAPP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); in Sarawak, the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak. The Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) left the coalition in 1990. The BN has won all general elections since 1974 (Hilley 2001, 16). 8. After Mahathir became UMNO President in 1981, he appointed Daim Zainuddin (later become Finance Ministry) as Chairman of Fleet Company, a main Malay corporate company to funding UMNO activities (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 52). 9. The Berjaya Group company is owned by Vincent Tan (51 percent of company shares) who bought 20.5 percents of Star Publication (M) Bhd company shares which publishes The Star newspaper. In September 1994, half of 20.5 percent shares owned by Vincent Tan, sold to Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor who is a member of UMNO Supreme Council, a Director of Berjaya Singer Bhd. Company (sub company of Berjaya Group), who owned Watan newspaper. Plus, Vincent Tan also owns The Sun newspaper through Fikiran Abadi Sdn. Bhd (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 155). 10. Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press had been bought by MCA from Hong Leong Group on the price of RM230 million on 24 June 2001 after a party referendum being conducted among MCA representatives where 1,176 (53 percent) votes were in favour to the taking over and 1,019 (47 percent) were opposed to the motion (Ng 2001, 1-2). This issue of taking over has worsened the MCA internal crisis between two leaders, Ling Leong Sik as MCA President and Lim Ah Lek as MCA Deputy President. 11. Indirani, wife of MIC President and work Minister Samy Vellu, possesses the Tamil Nesan newspaper. Meanwhile, Tamil Osai and Thinamani are also owned by a few MIC members (Ramanathan 1992, 11).

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12. Quek Leng Chan leads Hume Industries, a company which has a close link with the Fleet Group which is owned by UMNO. Hume Industries used to possess 84.9 percents of share in the Nanyang Press Bhd (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 67). 13. MEASAT Broadcast Network Systems Sdn. Bhd. is a broadcasting company, jointly owned by Khazanah Nasional Berhad a Malaysian government investment company and Usaha Tegas Entertainment Systems Sdn. Bhd. owned by T. Ananda Krishnan who also owns Kuala Lumpur Twin Towers (the tallest office building in the world). 14. Starting in March 2000, Harakah was only allowed to be published twice a month. On 2 March 2000, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister that time, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, explained the decision was to standardise the regulation on all political parties owned newspaper including one owned by the government party. Prime Minister Mahathir however revealed that the action against Harakah was because the newspaper, which was supposed to be sold to the PAS members only, has been sold to the public (NST 2000, 1-2). 15. From a report on the Straits Times in Singapore, Multimedia, Communication and Energy Minister Leo Moggie admitted that the government believes that the misuse of the Internet happens even though the government tries to control it. He clarifies further: “The Internet is a wide communication net, makes rules and regulations are useless because the Internet (computer) users still can misuse purposely. The government has given an assurance to not censoring the Internet and the policy is permanent.” (MASSA 2000, 15) 16. When the government launched the MSC a few years ago, it pledged to allow the Internet to be free from censorship and state meddling. 17. Umi Khattab (2004, 5) uses the word the Rakyat Muslims referred to the urban Muslim and the Ummah Muslims referred to the rural or Kampong Muslim. I disagree with the description and choose of words in differentiating Muslims in urban and rural areas because the words and meaning of the words do not reflect the true description Muslims in both areas. Therefore I change the description into Bandar Muslims and Kampong Muslims but still maintain Khattab’s argument in those aspects. CHAPTER 3 1. Murray Hiebert faced a jail sentence as he prepared to appeal a conviction for writing a “defamatory” article about the speedy processing of a lawsuit brought by the wife of a prominent Appeal Court judge. Addressing the growing level of spurious litigation in the Malaysian courts, Hiebert highlighted the RM 6 million damages being sought by the mother of Govind Sri Ram against the International School of Kuala Lumpur for “unfairly dropping” her son from the school debating team. Noting the student’s father as Court of Appeals judge Gopal Sri Ram, Hiebert commented that “many are surprised at the speed with which the case raced through Malaysia’s legal labyrinth”. Awaiting appeal, Hiebert had his Canadian passport held for two years (Hilley 2001). 2. Article 181 entitled “Saving for Rulers” sovereignty, etc. says:

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(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers and the prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Ruling Chiefs of the Negeri Sembilan within their respective territories as hitherto had and enjoyed shall remain unaffected. (2) No proceedings whatsoever shall be brought in any court against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity except in the Special Court established under Part XV. 3. Mohamad Ezam was a Political Secretary of the sacked and imprisonment former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. At the time of conviction, Ezam was already under incarceration without trial under the ISA; he had been imprisoned since April 2001 for allegedly attempting to overthrow the government through “militant” means. He also faces numerous other criminal charges of sedition, unlawful assembly and rioting (SUARAM 2003b). 4. Section 8(1)(i) says: “communicates directly or indirectly any such information or thing to any foreign country…or to any person other than a person to whom he is duly authorised to communicate it;” (OSA 1998, 285-286) 5. Section 16(1) and (2) explain (OSA 1998, 293): (1) it shall not be necessary to show the accused person was guilty of a particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of Malaysia; (2) notwithstanding that no act as stated in subsection (1) is proved against him, the accused person may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, his conduct or his known character as proved it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of Malaysia; 6. Lim Kit Siang was found guilty under Section 8(1)(b) on leaking any official secrets or codes, signals, or secret words about war equipment and other tools, equipment and vehicles which being used for security and peaceful purpose of Malaysia (OSA 1998, 285). 7. A seditious tendency is then defined in Section 3 as follows: (1) A “seditious tendency” is a tendency: (a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler or against any Government; (b) to excite the subjects of the Ruler or the inhabitants of any territory governed by any government to attempt to procure in the territory of the Ruler or governed by the Government, the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any matter as by law established; (c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the administration of justice in Malaysia or in any State; (d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the subjects of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or of the Ruler of any State or amongst the inhabitants of Malaysia or of any State; (e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia; or

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(f) to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of part III of the Federal constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the Federal Constitution. 8. Under Section 4(1) of the Sedition Act any person who: a) does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do any act which has or which would, if done, have a seditious tendency; b) utters any seditious words; c) prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes, or reproduces any seditious publication; or d) imports any seditious publications, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall on conviction be liable ... to a fine not exceeding RM 5000 or to imprisonment ... not exceeding three years or to both .... 9. Detik had been given a letter by the Home Minister asking reasons why the magazine should not be banned because of not informing the Home Ministry that the magazine had elected its new Chief Editor. Wasilah had been banned because the magazine did not put its full name Al Wasilah in the registration. Meanwhile, Tamadun had been accused and banned for writing the articles that could suspend people’s reliance to the government. However, Eksklusif newspaper had been warned for spreading rumours (freeMalaysia 2000b, 2). CHAPTER 4 1. This concept initially evolved, inter alia, through the Philippine Press Institute during the 1960s. According to Lent (1977, 17-26), “those who conceived (the idea) believed that, because national development depends so heavily upon economic, there should be better trained and informed economic specialist among journalists, to cover and report fully, impartially and simply the myriad problems of a developing nation”. During the 1970s, however, as Third World governments realized that development journalism could be used to promote particular development strategies, “the term was transformed into commitment journalism systematically applied to a nations problems”, and the notion arose the “bad” development news (including criticism of government development strategies) should not be reported at all (Jeffery 1986, 212). 2. According to Samad Ismail, this kind of journalism: “…challenges the idea that news must be sensational or exciting or gripping. While its practioners agree that the media should hold up a mirror to society, they question the tendency of the Western press to angle the looking glass in such a way as to highlight the least flattering features of Asia and exaggerate the warts…As practiced in this country (Malaysia), it does not preclude investigative reporting although our approach is a lot more cautious than that of our Western counterparts. We may point to a possible wrong but we do not endeavour to play judge, jury and executioner. Malaysian media practitioners are cautious for good reason.” (Loh and Mustafa 1996, 105)

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CHAPTER 5 1. One of Harakah’s publication dated 16-31 March 2008 is included in this research, where it had been published earlier, before polling day, than the date mentioned purposely to maximise the election campaign for the PR. It also covers election issues specifically for alternative newspaper where study about tendency or approach towards political parties is less relevant. This is because alternative newspapers definitely support their own parties and are critical to the opponent parties. For the study of alternative newspapers, the analysis splits into three categories, BN-, PR+, and N, and also includes elections issues reported by the newspapers. This research also considers the reports on Election Commission (EC) in the alternative newspapers as N (neutral) even though the reports negatively attacked the BN government as the reason behind the weaknesses of the EC. 2. Abdullah in a meeting of his ruling party BN on 11 May 2008 mentioned that Malaysian government subsidies for gasoline, food and other essential goods are expected to hit RM50 billion (USD15.6 billion) in 2008 as global prices soar. He said that “We are facing a situation we have not faced before ... it’s a new crisis related to crude oil prices. Total subsidies are up to RM50 billion” (The Irrawaddy 2008, 1). The central bank recently cut its 2008 economic growth forecast to between 5 percent and 6 percent, down from between 6 percent and 6.5 percent previously, citing global uncertainty due to the US credit crisis. The economy expanded 6.3 percent in 2007. Concerns over the rising cost of living contributed to the poor performance of Abdullah’s ruling coalition in March elections, when it lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Minister, Shahrir Samad was quoted by “Berita Minggu” as saying the government plans to charge foreigners market prices for gasoline in order to curb its subsidy bill. World oil prices breached USD126 a barrel for the first time on 9 May 2008 (The Irrawaddy 2008). Meanwhile, the world average food prices are going up by 75 percent since 2000. 3. In an opinion poll commissioned by The Star and carried out by the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIU), which involved 2,930 respondents and was conducted in 58 clusters in 12 states in the peninsula from 8-29 December 2007, the survey revealed that 96 percent of respondents were concerned with the current economic situation such as the rising cost of consumer goods, while 88 percent said they were worried about the increase of crime rate in the country (Zulkifli and Samy 2008). 4. One of the incidents is the keris-waving stunt by UMNO Youth chief Hishammuddin Hussein. Many argue that Hishamuddin fails to realise and understand that raising a weapon (even a sheathed one) creates an aggressor’s image. He is unaware that the keris is instrument of violence for the non-Malays (Malaysiakini 2005). Hishamuddin later apologised to the non-Malays for his behaviour of keris-waving soon after the 2008 general election. He realised that his action insulted many non-Malays and has been used by the opposition to scare the non-Malays about Malay chauvinistic behaviour of UMNO leaders. 5. Abdullah (2006, 3) explains that Islam Hadhari is not a new religion, a new teaching nor a new mazhab (denomination). It is an effort to bring the ummah (the

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worldwide community comprising all adherent of the Muslim faith) back to the basics of Islam, back to the fundamentals as prescribed in the Quran and the hadith which form the foundations for an Islamic civilisation. Therefore, Islam Hadhari aims to achieve 10 main principles: 1. Faith and piety in Allah; 2. A just and trustworthy government; 3. A free and independent people; 4. A vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; 5. A balanced and comprehensive economic development; 6. A good quality of life for the people; 7. The protection of the rights of minority groups and women; 8. Cultural and moral integrity; 9. The safeguarding of natural resources and the environment; and 10. Strong defence capabilities. In Parliamentary session on 27 August 2007, the prime minister reiterated that Malaysia was a Muslim country and governed according to Islamic principles. 6. A coalition of 30 Hindu NGOs committed to the preservation of Hindu community rights and heritage, had organised a rally of 10,000 people turned riot on 25 November 2007 to submit the petition at the British High Commission. The group had led agitations against what they see as an “unofficial policy of temple demolition” and concerns about the steady encroachment of shariah-based law. Abdullah first responded defensively, calling on the protestors to stay at home. The police also denied every request for protest permits, under the guise of protecting public safety. When those measures did not work, Abdullah adopted the tough tack of his predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, by intimidating his political opposition. The police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowd. Over 130 people were arrested during the incident, which saw thousands gathering at various locations along Jalan Ampang and Jalan Tun Razak (The Star Online 2007). 7. The 2007 BERSIH (the Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform) Rally held in Kuala Lumpur on 10 November 2007 where 40,000 people defied ban attending the rally. The non-violent and peaceful rally organised by the opposition parties and civil society movements to campaign for electoral reform was denied a permit by the police and was marred by the confrontation between the police and the rally participants nearby Masjid Jamek. Police used chemical-laced water bombs and tear gas in a violent crackdown. The police arrested 34 people, released a night later, and injured several more (BERSIH 2007). In separate BERSIH’s demonstration, two people suffered bullet wounds from Police actions during a BERSIH information rally held in September in Batu Burok, Terengganu. 8. The grainy eight-minute video footage was taken in 2002 at senior lawyer V.K. Lingam’s Kelana Jaya house. At that time, Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah was Chief Justice (CJ). Appointed in 2000, he was seen as a fresh break from his two previous predecessors–Mohd Eusoff Chin (1994-2000) and Abdul Hamid Omar (1988-1994). Dzaiddin was to retire in 2003, and the video showed Lingam expressing concerned that the outgoing CJ was moving his “men” into top judiciary posts. The conversation revolved around the urgent need to get Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim, then chief judge of Malaya–the judiciary’s No 3–

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appointed as Court of Appeal president (No 2) and then CJ (No 1). There was also the plan to get former attorney-general Mokhtar Abdullah, who was then a Federal Court judge, to replace Ahmad Fairuz as No 3. To do that, Lingam had roped in tycoon Vincent Tan, a close crony of then prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, and Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor, a key minister in PM’s Department. They were to talk to Mahathir on the appointment of judges. Ahmad Fairuz was appointed Court of Appeal president in December 2002–months after the telephone conversation. Dzaiddin stepped down as CJ in 2003 and he was replaced by Ahmad Fairuz. Mokhtar, however, could not take the No 3 post as he was in coma after suffering from a fall in August 2002. He died in 2003. Ahmad Fairuz’ term as CJ ended in October 2007 (Malaysiakini 2007). CHAPTER 6 1. On 7 August 2007, Raja Petra’s wife was also summoned to the police station and was interrogated by the police. On 13 July 2007, People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) staff member Nathaniel Tan was arrested at his office by the Special Branch and detained for four days under the Official Secrets Act (OSA). The reason for his arrest was apparently that he was suspected of having access to state secrets, namely documents relating to corruption allegations made on his blog, not by Tan himself but by an anonymous commentator. Commentators noted that detaining Tan was meant instead to intimidate and clampdown on other bloggers (SUARAM 2007). CHAPTER 7 1. Chor Chee Heung was Deputy Minister of the Home Ministry, Zainuddin Maidin was Parliamentary Secretary for the Information Ministry (now Deputy Minister), Mohd Safar Hashim is Professor of Communication Faculty of UKM, Steven Gan is Chief-Editor of “Malaysiakini”, Ahmad Lutfi Othman is Spokesperson for KAMI, and Mohd Hamdan Adnan was SUHAKAM commissioner. 2. The offence was alleged to have been committed at his house at No 5, Jalan BRP 5/5, Bukit Rahman Putra, Sungai Buloh, on 25 April 2008. If convicted, he is liable to be fined RM5,000 or jailed up to three years or both. This is the fourth time Raja Petra has been investigated by the police under the SA. The first was in March 2001, followed by November 2004 and July 2007 (Veera and Lourdes 2008). In other case, in March 2008, a court ordered him to pay RM4 million (USD1.25 million to the state-run Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) and its Vice Chancellor, Nordin Kardi, for publishing a defamatory article which Raja Petra has refused to pay. 3. Raja Petra was detained after he was said to have posted articles on the Malaysia Today deemed to be seditious and that also belittled Islam. The Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) and several Muslim bodies had lodged a police report against Raja Petra who already faced criminal defamation charges for allegedly insulting the Malays, Muslims and Islam. Prime Minster Abdullah explained that the arrest was made after Raja Petra had been given time to correct

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the offensive postings on his Malaysia Today website. Abdullah said that “It (invoking the ISA) is not done without a concrete reason and a belief that stability and public order could be threatened”. Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar, who was responsible for signing the detention order, argued that the authorities were forced to act against Raja Petra as he had disregarded countless advices to stop posting “racially sensitive” materials. Meanwhile, Tan Hoon Cheng was arrested over her report on alleged racist remarks by Ahmad Ismail, Bukit Bendera UMNO chief, who called the Chinese as “squatters” in Malaysia. Probably, after the demand for her release by the political parties from both the government, MCA and Gerakan, and the opposition PR, and NGOs such as the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), Tan Hoon Cheng was released a day later on 13 September 2008. On the other hand, Teresa Kok was arrested for allegedly telling mosque officials in Kota Damansara, Sri Serdang and Puchong Jaya to tone down the call to prayer. She had denied the allegations, which first came to light in a Malay language daily (The Star 2008c, 1-8; New Straits Times 2008h, 1-9). 4. Those six personalities are former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, two retired chief justices Mohd Eusoff Chin and Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim, former minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Tengku Adnan Mansor, tycoon Vincent Tan and lawyer V.K. Lingam. 5. The Ministry’s Publications and Quranic Text Control Unit secretary Che Din Yusof explained that The Sun was issued with the letter for alleged manipulation and highlighting of many sensitive issues. Sin Chew Daily was given the letter for reporting a racially sensitive controversial statement involving former Bukit Bendera UMNO Chief Ahmad Ismail. Suara Keadilan was issued the show-cause letter in connection with a report quoting sources as alleging that InspectorGeneral of Police Musa Hassan had become paralysed after undergoing coronary bypass surgery (The Star 2008e, 1). 6. On other case, the government is also seeking to revoke the publishing license of The Herald, a Catholic newspaper in Kuala Lumpur, for using the word “Allah” as a synonym for “God”. On 4 May 2008, a high court judge ruled that The Herald’s suit against the government could proceed. The Herald publishes in English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil. The government, however, insists that its use of “Allah”, an Arabic word widely used in many cultures to denote God, is an attempt by Christians to confuse ethnic Malays into converting (Yoong 2008). 7. After a rise in communal tensions in 1987, the English Daily The Star, the Chinese Sin Chew Jit Poh and the Malay weekly Watan all had their licenses revoked. The licenses of the three papers was restored after a few months but Tunku Abdul Rahman’s, Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, weekly column As I See It no longer appeared in The Star (Shankar 1999, 7). 8. For instance, the banned Malayan Communist Party (MCP). 9. UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), adopted 10 December 1948. 10. UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976. 11. Adopted 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953. 12. Adopted at Nairobi, Kenya, 26 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986.

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13. Adopted at San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978. 14. Malaysia is a party to five international instruments: the Convention on the Rights of the Child (although with several reservations, in particular to article 13 which provides the right to freedom of speech of the child), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, also with reservations. 15. The same year “Far Eastern Economic Review” correspondent James Clad was charged under the OSA after he cited an allegedly confidential cabinet document, the essence of which Prime Minister Mahathir had revealed in an earlier press conference, in a review of trade relations between Malaysia and China. He pleaded guilty and was fined RM10,000 (Amnesty International 1999). 16. However, the prosecution of corruption in Malaysia is conducted in partisan ways: No high-level politician or business person has ever been charged with corrupt practices during Mahathir’s era except Anwar (Case 2004, 12).

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ABBREVIATIONS

% ACA AFP AMCHAM ASEAN ASTRO BA Bernama BN BN + BN ch. CIA CIJ CJ CMA CNN CRC DAP DVD EC ECHR FBI FT HINDRAF ICCPR IIU IPI ISA ISPs Keadilan KLIA MCA MCMC MEC

Percent Anti-Corruption Agency Agence France-Presse American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce Association of Southeast Asian Nations Astro All Asia Networks Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front) Berita Nasional (Malaysian National News Agency) Barisan Nasional (National Front) Positive Coverage by the media for BN Negative Coverage by the media for BN Chapter Central Intelligence Agency Centre for Independent Journalism Chief Justice Communications and Multimedia Act Cable News Network Convention on the Rights of the Child Democratic Action Party Digital Versatile/Video Disc Election Commission European Convention on Human Rights Federal Bureau of Investigations Federal Territory Hindu Rights Action Force International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Islamic University International Press Institute Internal Security Act Internet service providers Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) Kuala Lumpur International Airport Malaysian/Malayan Chinese Association Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Malaysian Electric Corporation

228

MIC MP MPPA MSC N NEP NGO NST NTV7 NUJ OSA PAS PKR PPPA PR PR + PR PRM RM RTM RWB SA SEAPA SMS SUARAM SUHAKAM Suqiu TV3 UDHR UiTM UK UMNO UN UNESCO Organization US USD v.

Abbreviations

Malaysian/Malayan Indians Congress Member(s) of Parliament Motion Picture Association of America Multimedia Super Corridor Neutral New Economic Policy Non-Governmental Organisation New Straits Times Natseven TV Sdn Bhd National Union of Journalists Official Secret Act Parti Islam Semalaysia (Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party) Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People Justice Party) Printing Presses and Publications Act Pakatan Rakyat (People Alliance) Positive Coverage by the Mainstream Media for PR Negative Coverage by the Mainstream Media for PR Parti Rakyat Malaysia (People’s Party) Ringgit Malaysia (Malaysian Ringgit) Radio and Television of Malaysia Reporters Without Borders Sedition Act Southeast Asian Press Alliance Short Message Service Suara Rakyat Malaysia (People’s Voice) Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (Malaysian Human Rights Commission) Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals Committee Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad Universal Declaration of Human Rights Universiti Teknologi Mara United Kingdom United Malays National Organisation United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural United States United States Dollar Versus

INDEX

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 1, 38, 4244, 51, 60, 68, 69, 85, 86, 93, 105, 106, 113-122, 126, 131, 132, 135, 145, 146, 156, 167, 169, 172, 178, 186, 187, 199, 202-205 Abdul Najib Razak 77, 78, 116, 120-122, 125, 126, 131, 135, 155, 172-174 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 191 Ahmad Shabery Cheek 147, 160, 171, 172, 178 Anwar Ibrahim 3, 41, 43, 64, 66, 88, 117, 119, 121-127, 130, 153, 157, 170, 200, 206 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 74 Asian Countries 46, 64, 79, 107 Tradition 79 Values 47, 48, 65, 79 Asian Media Summit 68, 172 ASTRO (Astro All Asia Networks) 40, 44, 46 Authoritarian, authoritarianism 47, 48, 72, 143, 144, 154, 190 Authority 22-25, 28, 55, 56, 63, 141, 142 BA (Barisan Alternatif) 92, 119, 120, 130, 132 Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights 166 Berita Harian 37, 38, 42, 98, 152, 167, 176 Blog 43, 131, 142, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 156-161, 164, 170, 172-176, 204

BN (Barisan Nasional) 1-3, 11, 38, 39, 44-46, 51-54, 64, 68, 70, 71, 88, 91-94, 96-101, 103, 105-128, 130-138, 144-146, 149-152, 158-160, 163, 166, 170, 171, 175, 178, 187, 198, 202 Bourgeois 1, 21, 22, 25-29, 33, 36, 47, 141, 144, 164-166 British 1, 17, 31-36, 57, 60, 86, 138, 145, 156, 197, 203 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 156 British High Commission 86, 203 Colonial, colonialisation 1, 31, 33, 35, 60, 138 Government, administration 33, 35 Interests 31 Policy 33 Tabloid 17 Buletin Rakyat 3, 94, 127-131 Capitalism 6, 20, 22, 27 Censorship 9, 12, 13, 25, 38, 47, 48, 51, 63, 68, 69, 78, 81, 85, 87, 148, 149, 161, 167, 168, 175, 189, 199 Chan, Joseph 79 Chandra Muzaffar 49, 59, 60, 63, 86, 117 Christianity 48, 205 CIJ (Centre for Independent Journalism) 81, 170 Civil society 3, 13, 20, 21, 42, 52, 63, 94, 139, 147, 148, 150-155, 166, 168, 184, 203 Class 6, 14, 21, 23, 40, 46, 56, 61, 158, 182, 200

230 Middle class 46, 158 CMA (Communications and Multimedia Act) 83, 148, 174, 176 Commercialisation 1, 26-28, 30, 38, 44, 47, 65, 138, 142, 144, 145, 165 Commission on Freedom of the Press 179 Commission on Human Rights 189 Common good 1, 4, 30, 51, 73, 91, 139, 145, 179, 181, 182 Communalism 36 Communicative action 24, 29, 139, 142 Communitarians, communitarianism 180, 181 Confucianism 48 Consensus 24, 28, 29, 80, 115, 139, 148, 175 Control 2, 3, 7, 14, 17, 31, 36-43, 47, 48, 51-53, 55, 58, 61, 6368, 70-72, 75-78, 98, 121-125, 134, 140, 142-145, 152, 157, 159, 160, 164-171, 174, 176178, 180, 187, 196, 199, 205 Convention on the Rights of the Child 83, 206 Daim Zainuddin 40, 93, 198 DAP (Democratic Action Party) 40, 44, 54, 59, 61, 63, 88, 92, 95, 96, 105, 107, 15, 116, 126, 144, 147, 149-152, 157, 163, 176 Deliberative democracy 182 Democracy 3, 5, 7-9, 11, 14, 15, 1820, 22, 29, 34, 49, 52, 62, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76, 85-91, 94, 131, 136, 139-141, 149, 166, 168, 180-183 Democratic 5, 7-11, 13, 15, 19-22, 33, 34, 40, 43, 45, 52, 54, 62, 64, 70-74, 77, 78, 84, 86-91, 121, 124, 131, 139, 140, 141, 153, 165, 168, 175, 180-185, 188, 190, 192, 196, 198

Index Approach 21, 33 Community, society 5, 8, 10, 13, 78, 90, 180, 192 Culture, values 5, 153 Decision-making 19 Democratic Party 19, 198 Government, regime 52, 73 Less-democratic 13 Nation, state, country 8, 64, 70, 91, 124 Non-democratic 13, 89 Power 5 Processes 11, 185, 196 Radical 20, 21, 29 System 19, 89, 190 Theory, practice 15, 131, 182 Developmental journalism 2, 4, 66, 68, 73-77, 91, 181, 182, 190 Dewan Negara 173 Dewey, John 182, 183 Dworkin, Ronald 81, 82 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) 191, 193 Economic prosperity 4, 68, 70, 75, 105 Election 2, 3, 15, 16, 36, 40, 44, 51, 54, 88, 91-94, 97-100, 105107, 109-114, 116-124, 126128, 130-139, 142, 144-147, 149-170, 172, 175, 178, 182, 184, 185, 198, 202 Elite 6, 11, 19, 30, 34, 38, 45, 47, 48, 51, 74, 87, 88, 93, 137, 140, 142, 143 Ethnic, ethnicity 23, 32, 44-46, 52, 71, 72, 84-93, 131, 146, 159, 160, 187, 190, 205 Ethnocentrism 32 Federal Constitution 2, 36, 53, 54, 69, 78, 193, 201 Feinberg, Joel 90 Feudal, feudalism 28, 34, 49, 138, 190, 196 Defeudalisation 3, 137-148, 155, 164-166 Era 24

The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia King 1 Feudalistic 2, 49 Neo-feudal psychology 48, 49, 51, 138 Quasi-feudal 28 Refeudalisation 1-3, 23-25, 2731, 36, 37, 43, 47-51, 137-142, 145, 164, 165 System 27 Frankfurt School 6, 24, 29 Frankfurter, Felix 12 Freedom 2-14, 19, 33-43, 47-55, 57, 60-64, 66, 68-76, 79-82, 84-91, 117, 121, 141, 142, 149, 154, 155, 160, 166-181, 184, 186196, 206 Absolute, total, unfettered, unlimited 10, 68, 69, 86, 181 Freedom of assembly 10, 22, 53, 122, 200 Freedom of association 23, 53, 55 Freedom of choice 79 Freedom of expression 8, 9, 13, 14, 53-55, 62, 63, 81, 82, 160, 166-168, 172 Freedom of information 66, 169, 177, 178, 191, 194, 195 Freedom of movement 55 Freedom of opinion 7, 168, 189, 191 Freedom of speech, free speech 4, 7, 10-13, 19, 33-36, 42, 49, 53, 61, 63, 65, 79, 82, 87, 89, 90, 172, 180, 191, 195, 205 Freedom of the press, free press, press freedom 1-14, 19, 21, 3537, 41, 43, 50-53, 60, 61, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71-85, 89, 91, 94, 117, 121, 149, 154, 155, 166172, 177-181, 186, 188-191, 192, 195, 196 Freedom of Information Act 169, 177, 194, 195 Gates, Henry Louis 89, 90 Gender 23, 38, 63, 70, 84, 90, 188

231

Gerakan party 54, 88, 152 Glasser, Theodore 179 Gunter, Gerald 89, 90 Habermas, Jurgen 1, 3, 6, 22-33, 36, 38, 47, 138, 139, 142-145, 164, 165, 182 Harakah 2, 40, 41, 63, 64, 93, 94, 117-126, 132, 152, 155, 163, 171, 199, 202 Harlan, John 11 Hate speech 2, 13, 43, 52, 66, 68, 84-91, 196 HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force) 70, 86, 93, 105, 116 Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 193 Human Rights Watch 155 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 191193 Individualism 27, 74, 79, 181 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 193 Internet 3, 6, 41-43, 50, 77, 78, 8183, 94, 131, 137-165, 170, 173-176, 199 Investigative journalism 8, 16, 195 ISA (Internal Security Act) 2, 36, 38, 53-57, 71, 73, 147, 153, 160, 169-172, 176, 195, 200, 205 Islam, Islamic 33, 40, 45-48, 63, 69, 80, 85, 88, 93, 116, 118, 121, 125, 126, 131-134, 155, 159, 160, 171, 173, 197, 202-204 Islamophobic 85 Pan-Islamic 63, 197 State, governance 93, 118, 159 Teaching 33, 116 UnIslamic 126 Values 45 Islam Hadhari 93, 121, 126, 131, 202, 203 Kellner, Douglas 139-141

232 Khairy Jamaluddin 130, 134, 151, 170, 175 Levine, Peter 182-185 Liberals, Liberalism 11, 12, 20, 21, 76, 79, 80-89, 181, 198 Strong liberalism 11, 12, 76, 8183, 89 Liberal democracy 86 Lichtenberg, Judith 6, 13 Lifeworld 22, 23, 139 Lim Kit Siang 59, 134, 157, 200 Mahathir Mohamad 1, 37-42, 45, 46, 51, 56, 64, 74, 80, 86, 86, 121, 131, 135, 138, 145, 148, 175, 177, 186, 187, 194, 198, 199, 203-206 Malay Special Rights 54, 60 Malay Supremacy, Superiority 37, 87 Malaya 1, 31-36, 60, 198, 203, 205 Malaysiakini 41, 153-155, 171, 202, 204 Malaysian Charter on Human Rights 168 Malaysia Today 41, 172-176, 204, 205 Marketplace of ideas 5, 11-14, 17, 75, 90, 145, 165 Marxist, Marxism 6, 20-22 Mass press 1, 26, 30, 38, 44, 138, 142, 165 MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) 39, 42, 46, 78, 88, 107, 110, 111, 115, 122, 158, 163, 167, 169, 198, 205 MCMC (Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission) 83, 148, 161, 173-175 Media Alternative 41, 146, 152-155, 158, 161 Broadcast 12, 17, 21, 40-47, 53, 57, 65, 78, 94, 139, 140, 144, 148, 153-157, 165, 184, 190, 199

Index Community, society 1, 6, 18, 70, 155 Coverage, reporting 17, 18, 132, 141, 142, 147, 164, 167, 169 Culture 26, 27, 141 Electronic 27, 36, 39, 57, 83, 187 Ethic 9 Industries 6, 18, 23, 29, 42, 46, 53, 54, 59, 66, 75, 77, 80-83, 148, 161, 199 Law, Regulation 42, 51, 53, 64, 171, 196 Mainstream 3, 50, 68, 99, 117, 127, 144-155, 159, 164, 167, 170, 174 Mass 6, 10, 14, 18-22, 26, 37, 143, 145, 152, 168, 170, 187, 190 Model, system 1, 4, 21, 47, 50, 141, 144 New, online 2, 26, 94, 137, 139, 140, 144-147, 158, 164, 165, 172 News 8, 17, 74, 158 Organisations, businesses, groups, companies 9, 14, 15, 47, 64, 69, 142, 167, 170, 190, 196 Ownership 9, 15, 27, 39, 42, 51, 62, 114, 150, 170, 187 Print 1, 2, 9, 26, 27, 32-38, 42, 53, 56, 57, 60-63, 85, 91, 94, 107, 113, 115, 117, 119, 124, 132, 136, 139, 143-146, 148, 150, 164, 165, 171, 186, 187, 201 Responsible 1, 3, 4, 91, 165, 166, 186, 190 Traditional 143-149, 155, 164, 165 Media freedom, free media see freedom of the press Meiklejohn, Alexander 5 MIC (Malaysian Indians Congress) 39, 46, 107-110, 116, 133, 198 Mill, John Stuart 7, 13

The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia Milton, John 7 Mingguan Wasilah 3, 94, 127, 128, 131, 132 Minority group 45, 203 Mobile phone 3, 94, 137, 138, 145147, 161-165 Modernisation 18, 49 Mohammad Cartoons 85 Moral independence 81, 82 Moralism 80 MSC (Multimedia Super Corridor) 78, 148, 175, 199 Murdoch, Rupert 17, 141 Musa Hitam 49, 50 National security 14, 42, 57-60, 7073, 86, 168, 192, 195 National stability 2, 51, 57, 60, 66, 68-74, 91, 166 NEP (New Economic Policy) 87, 88, 93 New Straits Times 2, 31, 37-39, 42, 50, 51, 75, 77, 98-101, 105117, 146, 147, 150, 154, 160163, 167, 171, 172, 176, 178, 194, 205 News portal 41, 152, 153, 173 NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 2, 58, 86, 87, 91, 115, 124, 126, 166-169, 190, 203, 205 NTV7 (Natseven TV Sdn Bhd) 39, 42, 44, 46, 163 Operasi Lalang 38, 63, 69 Opposition 2, 3, 12, 36-46, 50, 51, 54, 58-66, 70, 71, 74, 87-94, 105-107, 111-119, 124-132, 136-139, 144-177, 187, 190, 194, 196, 202-207 OSA (Official Secret Act) 2, 57-60, 71, 169, 176, 177, 194, 195, 200, 204, 206 Parliament 11, 22, 44, 50, 53-56, 59, 61-64, 78, 86, 92-95, 118, 119, 127, 130, 132, 134, 137-140, 144, 150, 151, 158, 159, 163,

233

165, 172, 173, 176-178, 193, 194, 202-204 PAS (Islamic Party) 2, 40, 44, 46, 63, 64, 88, 92, 95, 96, 105, 107, 109, 115-118, 121, 124126, 130, 132-136, 144, 147152, 155, 163, 171, 199 Penal Code 78, 83, 173, 176 Personal autonomy 82 Peterson, Theodore 47, 179, 180 PKR, Keadilan (People Justice Party) 2, 44, 88, 92, 95, 96, 107, 115-126, 133-136, 144, 147, 149-152, 163, 170, 171, 177, 178, 204 Political stability 4, 41, 70-73, 87, 90, 114, 115, 195, 196 Pornography 2, 52, 66, 68, 77-84, 91 Post, Robert 89, 90 Power 2, 5, 7-9, 15-18, 21-23, 27, 30, 31, 34-38, 43, 44, 47-52, 55-73, 86-91, 105, 109, 111, 119-125, 135, 142-158, 164, 168, 174-180, 190, 191, 194, 195, 200 PPPA (Printing Presses and Publications Act) 2, 38, 53, 6264, 70-72, 78, 167, 169-172, 177, 195 PR (Pakatan Rakyat) 92, 93, 99-103, 117, 118, 127, 128, 137 Press Council 188, 189 Press freedom see freedom of press Press Freedom Committees 167 Press Freedom Index 149, 155, 172 Privatisation policy 1, 20, 38, 122 Public deliberation 4, 30, 47, 52, 72, 91, 138, 165, 182-184, 190, 196 Public good 13, 82, 120 Public journalism 3, 4, 91, 166, 181190, 196 Public opinion 2, 14, 18-22, 25, 28, 37, 63, 98, 140, 145, 164, 172, 184, 187

234 Public sphere 1-6, 10, 20-33, 36-51, 91-94, 98, 117, 136-149, 152156, 164-166, 185 Race 1, 43, 46-48, 50, 56, 57, 60, 61, 68-71, 84, 87-90, 93, 106, 108, 112-115, 119, 174, 182, 184, 186-188, 195, 199, 200 Racial harmony 1, 4, 13, 41, 43, 50, 68, 70, 71, 90, 91, 106, 130, 166, 195, 196 Racialisation 87 Racism 84, 89, 162 Raja Petra Kamarudin 41, 157, 158, 160, 170, 173-176, 204, 205 Reasonable regulation 12, 13, 76, 82, 83, 90 Reformasi, Reform movement, 41, 50, 64, 183 Religion 10, 50, 69, 70, 71, 79, 84, 90, 174, 185, 188, 202 Richards, David 82 Right 10, 14, 34, 49, 50, 53, 54, 57, 60, 63-66, 69-79, 82-87, 109, 116, 127, 130, 133, 143, 155, 156, 166-168, 180, 181, 186194, 203, 206 Civil rights 74, 82, 87 Community rights 86, 203 Constitutional rights 10, 63, 180 Economic rights 73 Human rights 50, 72-74, 78, 79, 143, 155, 156, 168, 191-194 Individual rights, Rights of individual 14, 72, 180, 181 Political rights 64, 73, 74, 166, 167, 191 Right of assembly see freedom of assembly Right of citizenship, to citizen 34 Right of expression see freedom of expression Right to form association 53 Right to information 58 Right to know 9, 10, 58, 194, 195 Rights to liberty 10 Right to privacy 188

Index Right to property 10 Right of religion 10 Right of sovereignty 34 Right of the media see media freedom Women’s rights 84 RTM (Radio and Television of Malaysia) 39, 40, 43-45, 59, 77, 147, 160, 174, 176-178, 204, 205 SA (Sedition Act) 2, 60-62, 70, 71, 169, 170, 176, 195 Samad Ismail 37, 75, 201 Sandel, Michael 82, 181 Schramm, Wilbur 47, 75, 179, 180 SEAPA (Southeast Asian Press Alliance) 153 Siasah 3, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135 Siebert, Frederick 47, 179, 180 SMS (Short Message Service) 138, 147, 149, 161-166, 176 Special Rapporteur 189 Social responsibility 1, 3, 91, 165, 166, 179-181, 187, 195, 196 Southeast Asian Countries 46, 107 State assembly 96, 134, 137 Stevenson, Nicholas 29 Suara Keadilan 2, 40, 41, 117-126, 152, 171, 177, 205 SUHAKAM (Malaysian Human Rights Commission) 49-51, 72, 73, 84, 169, 191-195, 204 Surveillance 14-16 Syed Hamid Albar 130, 132, 171, 174, 205 Taylor, Charles 181 Terrorism, terrorists 14, 19, 55, 71, 85, 162 The Child Act 2001 83 The Fourth Estate 5, 6, 8, 197 The Star 2, 38-40, 52, 63, 68, 75, 78, 98-100, 103-117, 152, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176-178, 198, 202-205 Thompson, John 28

The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia Truth 5-7, 11, 14, 17, 69, 76, 109, 141, 143, 149, 150, 175, 177, 179, 180, 188, 189, 195 TV3 (Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad) 39, 42, 44, 46, 167 UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) 36-51, 57, 60, 86, 88, 93, 94, 105, 118, 120126, 130-135, 149-155, 158, 160, 164, 170, 175, 177, 198, 199, 202, 205 UDHR (Universal Declaration on Human Rights) 191-193 Utusan Malaysia 38, 75, 98, 152, 167, 178 YouTube 149, 157, 159 Walzer, Michael 181 Wan Azizah Wan Ismail 170, 178

235

Watchdog 5, 7, 8, 37, 52, 160 West, Western 1, 6, 17, 20, 22, 30, 33, 45, 48, 51, 64, 68, 70, 7476, 79, 85, 86, 101, 103, 139, 201 Capitalism 22 Countries 1, 76 Democracies 30, 139 Government 20 Imperialism 85 Media, newspaper, press 6, 64, 75, 76, 201 Society 48 Values 48 Western Europe 22 Will, George 82, 83 Zainuddin Maidin 164, 169, 204